MT.

TOP SECRET CAB ONE

NEW FILE COVER PART 1 CONFIDENTIAL FILING.

Policy towards the Soviet Union

Call on the Prime Minister by Robert Conquest

Organisation of a Seminar on Soviet Intentions

Soviet and East European Studies

SOVIET UNION

PART 1:

August 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~31.8.87~~ 8.9.87 [X] PART ENDS						5 3002	

PREM 19/2531

PART 1 ends:-

CDP TO PM 8.9.87

PART 2 begins:-

K. CONQUEST TO PM 12.11.87

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH ROBERT CONQUEST

You are seeing Robert Conquest tomorrow afternoon. I have placed in the folder the two papers on the Soviet Union which he recently sent you.

You will want to get Robert's assessment of developments in the Soviet Union since your visit. Has his scepticism about change, very evident at your seminar, increased? Does he detect serious opposition to Gorbachev?

You will want to reassure him about your welcome and encouragement for Gorbachev's reforms. This is not starry-eyed. It is based on a belief that anything which enlarges human liberty and choice, and which however imperfectly promotes initiative and enterprise should be welcomed. You are under no illusion that Gorbachev plans to slacken Communist Party control. The interesting question is: can you contain or reverse change once it starts?

The main theme at the session of the IDU Conference which you will attend in Berlin is East/West relations. You will be expected to intervene. You might invite Robert to contribute some thoughts or alternatively comment on the first draft of your speaking notes which I have prepared (copy in the folder). I have included some of his ideas.

CDP

CDP
8 September 1987

JA1BMG

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You will want to see Robert Conquest's latest piece.

He is of course right to sound a strong note of caution. But his analytical framework is a very rigid one; he does not for instance allot any importance to the pressure

which may come
from the Russian
people for more,
once they start to
taste the benefits of
even limited liberalization.
I think the situation
in the Soviet Union is
more complex & more
fluid than Robert's
note suggests. I
remain convinced that you
are right to encourage
what Gorbachev is doing. C.D. 31/8

BF // 1730 or 2 Sep.

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Conquest informed. CDP 1/ix.

ROBERT CONQUEST

Robert Conquest will be over here between 7 - 10 September. I think you might well find it worthwhile to have a brief word with him.

Agree to find half-an-hour in the diary?

If possible

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
28 August 1987

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-2323

25 ~~September~~ August 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I am enclosing a piece on the principles and practice of Western-Soviet relations in the new period; together with a short note on Soviet social realities as compared with propaganda claims.

On another basic point: the rather neglected reason why it may be impossible radically to reform the Soviet economy under the present system is that they may in principle be able to bankrupt incompetent enterprises and secure the necessary exits from the economy, but there is no plausible way in which they can arrange the necessary entries -- of new, innovative small enterprises such as have been crucial to Western technological progress.

As I have written Charles Powell, I shall be in London for some days after September 6; and I would, of course, love to see you if you have a moment to spare.

With warmest wishes, as ever, from both of us to both of you,

Robert

Robert Conquesr

Soviet Developments & the West

It may be helpful to look at the foreign policy problems presented us by the Gorbachev regime schematically. There are, in effect, four possible conditions of the future Soviet Union:

1. A weak and friendly Soviet Union
2. A weak and hostile Soviet Union
3. A strong and friendly Soviet Union
4. A strong and hostile Soviet Union

Only the fourth variant should worry us.

If the reconstruction of the Soviet Union is successful, the outcome will be either 3 or 4. But which?

Some commentators just assume that a strengthening of the Soviet economy is bound to lead to the abandonment of that hostility in principle to other political orders which has marked the USSR from its beginning. What is there to justify this assumption?

Those who cast a cool eye on Soviet developments are charged -- by Archie Brown, for instance -- of thinking that the Soviet system "cannot change". On the contrary, most serious observers of the Soviet regime have always maintained that (in Orwell's words) the USSR must

"either democratise or perish" -- or if not democratise, at least somehow evolve from being a closed society based on force, fraud, and dogma. And if we envisage an eventual Russia which has so changed, then it is obvious that, between the present Soviet Union and that later entity, there must be some form of transition.

No one sees as probable an imminent revolution putting into power anything resembling democracy. There is no plausible political movement, no political leadership, nor any serious possibility of one readily emerging -- in Russia proper at least. (As Alex Ginzburg, has said, almost none of the dissidents is capable of ruling the country). All political experience is within the present party and governmental machine. Mere administration could not be carried out without them. For the moment, then, it is the Party, and the Party leadership, which must be the agent of change.

Democracy as such is thus not the immediate issue. But it is true that the Soviet economy cannot be seriously reformed without the withdrawal of party and state from its total monopoly of economic and political power, to a minimum of something like a limited autocracy which is yet a Rechtstaat, with a largely market economy. And, whatever decentralisation of the state machinery may take place, so long as the Party itself remains centralised there will be a disciplined plenipotentiary representative of the centre in every level and locality.

It is equally true that there is no sign of accepting any restriction of party power in even the most reformist section of the leadership. Gorbachev, in his July 15 speech, said that the West was more frightened of Soviet 'democratisation' than of Soviet nuclear weapons. But if democratisation meant the beginnings of dismantling the despotic-socialist state and the totalitarian ideology, the West would of course be delighted. The West would only be 'frightened' if the intention of the Gorbachevite 'democratisation' were to strengthen the Communist order in its doctrinally mandated struggle against our own: and this is what he appears to mean.

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Thus, if the proposed or probable changes in the USSR were inevitably to lead in the long run to an open and unaggressive society, regardless of the present intentions of Gorbachev, we should welcome them unreservedly. But there is no such inevitability.

At present the more radical of the reformers, that is to say Gorbachev and his adherents, wish to modernise the economic system while retaining Leninist socialism, and the one party state. Formally speaking, this is impossible. Various adjustments between these contradictory aims can be made, but only up to a point.

Gorbachev wishes, in effect, to square the circle.

If the reform programme goes ahead (and is not, in practice at least, effectively shelved), then a contradiction faces the leadership. If they do not introduce a market economy, then the country will be ruined; if they do introduce such an economy, then the all-pervading power of the party will have to withdraw from a major social area, and cease to have total control. The trouble with planning and thinking in contradictory terms is that sooner or later the facts blow up in one's face. It is normal for such transitional rulers to find, when the crunch comes -- but not until then -- that they are pursuing incompatibles.

At that point Gorbachev, or some successor, must in practice (if not in theory) break out of the mould of Leninist doctrine: or fail in his economic aims.

If so faced with giving up Marxism-Leninism, the one-party state and the socialist state-controlled economy, or proceeding with real radical change, which would Gorbachev and the others chose?

Everything they say, and everything we know of them suggests that they would preserve the Communist order. Gorbachev himself has laid down that reform does not include political pluralism. Of course, it may be that the pressures of the continuing issues, becoming ever greater as such a choice approaches, would work in the by then split and confused minds of the leadership and bring them, half-concealing it even from themselves, to at least

the beginnings of a true evolution forward. More likely still, their successors, emerging in a shaken and disrupted apparat, might grasp the nettle; or their successors.

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A further and highly refractory problem is that of nationalism in the peripheral republics and in Eastern Europe. Any 'opening' to hitherto heretical ideas must also open the issue of national rights, even of self-determination. Any genuine "democratisation" must liberate the powerful forces of nationality. In an important sense a 'liberal' (even a 'liberal communist') Soviet Union could not exist; for if 'liberal' it would no longer be a Soviet Union. The peripheral republics, and even their party leaders, have long tended to seek more autonomy than Moscow grants; and given the opportunity some at least of them would seek at lowest the level of independence of Mongolia or Poland.

It is an interesting slip of the tongue that in a speech last yeat Gorbachev twice referred to the USSR as 'Russia' -- and on Ukrainian soil at that.

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What then, in the international context, has the

current struggle for glasnost, 'openness', been about, and where is it leading?

There has been much frankness about present day social and economic horrors, with a view to their amendment. And we have seen the beginning of an attack on Stalinism, as economically and politicaly misconceived, and practically criminal.

Here the point at issue has been the extraordinary, demoralising falsehoods on which the regime has stood for fifty years. The traditionalists want them to be preserved, or at least only unsubstantially amended. The 'reformists' want:

(a) to repudiate the faked trials of the 1930s

(b) to condemn Stalin

(c) to restore the rest of the revolution's leaders to the status of comrades, even if mistaken ones

(d) to question the economic policies of the 1930s, including collectivisation -- not as such, but as to the Stalinist methods of its fulfilment.

By Soviet standards this is a huge clean-up; but it does not in any way question the Leninist one-party state. As Gorbachev has said, 'Glasnost should further socialism ... it is not intended to undermine socialism and our socialist values'.

Still, if they admit the awfulness of the Stalin regime, then they should admit that the West was right in defending itself against its expansion. At present, as in other spheres, they attempt to square the circle by the thesis that Stalinism was abominable, but that it was nevertheless socialism, and therefore empowered to assault and defeat 'imperialism' -- i.e. the West -- as far as it could.

This ties in with current foreign policy. Is 'Socialism', Soviet style, still essential for the world? Or is it to be admitted that other political social orders have a legitimate right to exist? And this is not to be solved by mere rhetoric about 'peaceful coexistence', which was equally spoken of by Stalin and Brezhnev and all earlier Soviet rulers. It must, if we are to have peace, be admitted in principle as well as tactically. So far, there has been no abatement of the claims of Moscow's socialism as the only legitimate model for the world.

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Of course, the reformists may simply be defeated, and the group which merely wants a sort of semi-streamlined Stalinism may succeed. And apart from that, Gorbachev himself may press change as far, and no further, than it begins to affect the Marxist state, and settle for a fully streamlined Stalinism. Indeed the USSR

may be entering a period of social and political instability, where all sorts of possibilities could emerge.

The economic reforms will cause intense social strains, both for the bureaucratic caste, and for the working class which now relies on heavy food and other subsidies. The potential for fresh developments is great. Yet politically the attraction of a Western-style evolution seems largely confined to the intelligentsia, while the forces of an archaic nationalism seem to have more profound roots, and more potential dynamism, with large sections of the Russian population. Even if a formal Communist facade is maintained, we may see a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, or a sort of Russian national fascism (the influence of the new rightwing crackpots is already astonishing: for example, they have been accused of 'taking over' Soviet institutions in Novosibirsk), or a combination of the two. A military-nationalist Russia (perhaps within the Soviet forms) would not be a comfortable associate in a world community. But it might at least have foreign policy aims which, unlike those of Marxism-Leninism, were at least not unlimited as a matter of principle.

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But if we assume that the 'reformers' triumph

completely, at what point might the social and political order be such that it does not regard Western democracy as its enemy and destined prey?

If the USSR does eventually take the steps necessary to bring it into the civilised world, then we must welcome it, and adjust our policies accordingly.

Meanwhile, we can pursue negotiations as we have in the past. And we can make the best of any Soviet retreat, even if considered in the Kremlin as a 'breathing space' and made with a view to advance later on. These were, or should have been, our policies with previous Soviet governments.

Another side of the West's role in the past continues to be important. The present revulsion of, probably, the majority of the educated class is the result of two things. First, the plain failure of the system. Second, the years of devoted work by a small number of dissidents who have placed the rest of the intelligentsia in an impossible intellectual position; but above all, the constant intrusions of real facts and knowledge over the foreign radios, including the BBC.

It has always been clear that for a genuine participation by Moscow in a cooperative world order the main condition we seek must be the abandonment of global and absolutist claims, and that this should be reflected, for a start, in the free movement of people and ideas.

Until Moscow takes such steps, we should not

prematurely accept, or encourage our public to accept, that it is no longer irremediately hostile.

This is not to be too schematic about the point at which we can assume genuine co-operation. Our attitude can change pasi passu with Soviet evolution, as and if it actually takes place; but our criteria must be based at every point on careful assessments of the reality. And we should encourage a reformist Soviet regime precisely to the degree that it fulfils those criteria.

Robert Conquest

It has been publicly stated in the Soviet press that the USSR ranks 35th in life expectancy;[1] (the average age of death of a Politburo member is 15 years higher than that of an average Soviet male). And when it comes to infant mortality, the Minister of Health himself rubbed it in that the country is, as he put it, 50th, "after Barbados and the United Arab Emirates".[2] In addition, there have been a number of Soviet articles describing incompetent, and insanitary -- even rat-ridden -- hospitals. And the proportion of Soviet national income spent for health is far lower than the British or American.

When it comes to unemployment, only local figures have been printed. But these are remarkable: a million unemployed in the Uzbek republic (population c.18.5 million);[3] 250,000 in Azerbaidzhan (population c.6.7 million);[4] one-fifth of the population in the 1.7 million inhabitant industrial city of Baku.[5] There is, of course, no unemployment pay, except in special circumstances of re-apprenticeship.

Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, still maintain to Westerners that though their economy is admittedly behind, their social services 'from cradle to

grave' are much superior to ours. (Indeed Gorbachev said this to a group of American visitors on August 6th). At the same time they often criticise our unemployment as something unheard of in the USSR.

They should not be allowed to get away with this.

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1. Les Nouvelles de Moscou 1 March 1987.

2. Literaturnaya Gazeta no 18, 1987.

3. Pravda Vostoka 20 March 1987; Sel'skaya Zhizn 24 March 1987.

4. Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya 27 March 1987.

5. ibid.

Telephone. Office 415-723-1647 . Home 415-493-5152

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-2323

25 August 1987

Dear Charles

I'm enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister , and a new, rather general,piece on Western Policy and the Soviet Future , (together with a short note on the contradiction beween the Soviet line on socialist social superiority, as put even by Gorbachev, and a few of the facts.)

I'll be over for Dahrendorf's conference at Leeds Castle, and before going there will be in London from September 6 to the night of September 11. If the Prime Minister would like to see me, could you perhaps let my sister Charmian Hartley (352-2334: 45 Shawfield St, SW3) know ?

In any case, I will ring you. - I've lately had much and strange conversation with Soviet officials* and others concerned with what's going on in Moscow , and it would be good to hear your views.

I expect to be over again in November.

Yours ever

Robert C

Robert Conquest

Charles Powell Esq.

* Stanford is a Mecca for these...

G- 11 NIT CF

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-2323

19 June 1987 CRC 236

Dear Charles

I only got your kind letter of 12 May, asking me to look in for an account of the Russian trip, after I had got back here. As it was, I thought I wouldn't bother you during that superbusy period. (I did see John O'Sullivan; and we stayed over for the splendid result - and I did indeed have to translate Hat Trick for Americans and others.)

As to the Chequers meeting, it was, of course, only one or two of the Soviet experts I thought pretty mediocre, not the rest of those assembled...

John Fretwell is a splendid appointment.

We'll be over in September, and I do hope to see the Prime Minister, and yourself, then. Will give plenty of notice. - By then things may have begun to happen in Moscow. It rather looks as though Gorbachev , to keep the political initiative, will have to make a big set-piece attack on Stalinism, comparable to the 1956 Secret Speech, and with unforeseeable consequences.

yours ever

Robert

Robert Conquest

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 May 1987

Many thanks for your letter of 8 May enclosing one for the Prime Minister, together with a note on the present position in the Soviet Union. I have passed these on to her. As you can imagine, it is unlikely that she will be able to see you in late May since the Election Campaign will be in full swing. But if I can be of any help in giving you an account of the Moscow visit, do let me know.

C D POWELL

Mr. Robert Conquest

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-6010

8 May 1987

Dear Charles

I enclose a short letter to the Prime Minister. (Also a briefish note on the present position in the USSR, perhaps of some use). I expect you will be in mid election when I'm there - I'm trying to explain to Americans the headline they will, one hopes, find in London papers: HAT TRICK. None of them know it.

The Moscow visit was terrific !

Yours ever

Robert

Robert Conquest

f-la 86
cc SH PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 December 1986

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

Thank you for your letter of 16 December about Soviet and East European Studies in our Universities. The Prime Minister was grateful to be informed of the discussions which you are having on this and would like to be kept in touch with the work which is being done. She hopes that it might be possible for her to see some recommendations by Easter next year.

You asked me to let you have copies of the representations which have been made to her. They are enclosed.

CHARLES POWELL

George Walden, Esq., C.M.G., M.P.,
Department of Education and Science.

CMA

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
ELIZABETH HOUSE YORK ROAD LONDON SE1 7PH
TELEPHONE 01-934 9000
FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

Prime Minister
This is an interim report from George Walden. I propose to say that you would like to be regularly informed; & would want to see some recommendations by Easter. Agree?
CDP 18/12

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

16 December 1986

Dear Charles,

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

Thank you for your letter of 26 November about the representations the Prime Minister has received on Soviet and East European Studies in our universities. This is a concern that I have shared for some time (see enclosed minute). It was reinforced by the Foreign Affairs Committee's report on UK-Soviet Relations last March, which recommended improved support for Soviet and East European Studies and Russian Language Teaching in the universities. In reply, the Government said that it proposed to hold discussions to consider what might be done to meet the concerns of the Committee.

After preliminary consultations with the relevant Ministers I have already had some discussions with officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade and Industry and representatives from the University Grants Committee. I have also had talks with the leaders of the two main subject associations - the British National Association of Soviet and East European Studies and the British Universities' Association of Slavists - and I am now planning to hold a seminar in the new year that will allow me to hear the views of a wider cross section of academics. My preliminary conclusion is that the problem is most marked at the post graduate level.

The Economic and Social Research Council, which is responsible for funding research in Soviet and East European Studies, is planning to review its position on area studies generally next year and has already had a useful meeting on research on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China.

There may be some initiatives that the Government can take to stimulate research and postgraduate study. I have some ideas which I shall test out in the Soviet Studies community. But the University Grants Committee will have to take the lead in

Continued/...

reviewing basic provision in the universities, and I know that they will be happy to do this. It is wholly untrue to say that "area studies are being ignored by the UGC". It was, after all, the UGC that commissioned the Parker Report on the requirements of diplomacy and commerce for Asian and African languages and area studies when the Government declined to do so and I understand that they are likely to agree to its main recommendations on funding when they consider grant allocations for 1987-88 and later years over the next few weeks.

I shall, of course, keep the Prime Minister in touch with the work that is being done and would, in turn, be glad to see the representations that have been made to her.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

GEORGE WALDEN

VRD7M11

CUK

MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

For some time I have been concerned by signs of decline in the number and calibre of Soviet and East European experts in the UK. Not only are there no obvious replacements for such figures as Leonard Shapiro, Hugh Seton-Watson or Isaiah Berlin, but people like Alec Nove, Peter Wiles, or Michael Kaser cannot be around forever. I do not believe that our international standing in this field is as good as it was, or could and should be now.

The need for an adequate cadre of experts with sufficient political and historical background and personal weight, to balance the current emphasis on the more technical arms control aspects of East-West relations is of course your territory. My own immediate, Departmental concern is evidence which is reaching me - notably from Mr Archie Brown at St Anthony's College - of a shrinkage in opportunities in the range and number of postgraduate students in Soviet and East European studies (out of 15 applications for the M Phil at Oxford next year, 12 are from the USA and only 1 from the UK). One of the dangers of not having a top flight British cadre of Soviet specialists is of course that the field could be left increasingly open to "peace studies" and various arms control pressure groups.

It would be unrealistic to think in terms of an expansion of Russian in schools. If action is necessary, it must be more focused. I know that the Atkinson Report looked into this 6 or 7 years ago, and recognised the need for some concentration of the rather scattered expertise that exists in

our universities (eg. London, Birmingham, Oxford, Glasgow and Bristol). But we still do not have anything remotely comparable in Soviet Studies to, say, IISS in defence.

I would be grateful for your views, and those of other recipients of this letter, on the general issues I have raised, and particularly on the quality and quantity of top level expertise available to them; on what help the universities provide in this area, and whether you share my impression that our overall national capacity may be declining. In the light of your comments, I would then propose to consider convening a meeting of representative figures from the universities, the UGC, the ESRC, and of course from interested Departments, simply to talk over the problems - arming myself beforehand against a simple request for more cash all round. But before proceeding to this, I would like some confirmation from others that a problem exists.

I should add that I am of course well aware of Peter Parker's report on the needs of diplomacy and commerce for Asian and African languagues and area studies; this is a separate (though related) problem, on which this Department will be consulting you and others.

I am copying this to David Trefgarne (MOD) and Alan Clark (DTI).

GEORGE WALDEN

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
16 May 1986

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-2323

Roger Hilsman
Cr.

Dear Caroline,

here is a (very short) note I said I'd send to Prime Minister.

Sorry to miss you again.

I much enjoyed be meeting you [illegible] with the PM - in splendid form for about three quarters of an hour. And saw the well-deserved polls!

We'll be over in May, (just possibly earlier as well): do hope to see you then.

Love

Bob

SRWANQ

cePC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1986

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

The Prime Minister has received a number of representatives recently about the condition of Soviet and East European studies in our universities. The general theme has been that our capability in this area is in decline; that experts are being diverted into general teaching; and that area studies are being ignored by the UGC. It has also been suggested that we are losing large numbers of our best experts to universities overseas; that eminent scholars who have retired or will shortly retire are unlikely to be replaced; that the quantity of post-graduate research has fallen significantly, because of lack of ESRC funding and with the absence of academic career prospects; and that because Soviet and East European studies departments tend to be small and to lack clout within universities they tend to get squeezed out when it comes to distributing funds. As a consequence, a risk is seen that we shall lose our national core of expertise in what is a vital area from the point of view of national security.

The Prime Minister understands that you are looking into these problems. She would like to be kept closely informed of the work which is being done and consulted before any decisions are taken. She has commented that we must retain an adequate research and teaching capability in this important area.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

George Walden, Esq., C.M.G., M.P.,
Department of Education and Science.

ECL

PRIME MINISTER

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

You will recall that Robert Conquest promised to let you have a note on the condition of Soviet and East European Studies in this country. It has now arrived (Flag A). It shows in essence that our capability in this area is in decline. Experts are being diverted into general teaching. Area studies are being ignored by the UGC.

I have had a similar approach from three Professors of Soviet and East European Studies (Branch, Amann and Kaser). Their memorandum (Flag B) argues that:

- we are losing large numbers of our best experts in this area to universities overseas;

- eminent scholars who have retired or will shortly retire are unlikely to be replaced. Our expertise is drying up;

- the quantity of postgraduate research has fallen significantly, largely because of lack of ESRC funding and absence of academic career prospects;

- Soviet and East European Studies' departments tend to be small and not to have much clout within universities. They tend to get squeezed out when it comes to distributing funds.

As a result unless the UGC gives unambiguous guidance to maintain Soviet and East European Studies at least at their present level, we risk losing our national core of expertise in what is a vital area from the point of view of national security.

George Walden is aware of these problems and is, I understand, looking into them. You might like to indicate:

(a) that you would want to see us retain an adequate research and teaching capability in this area; and

(b) that you have an interest in the exercise which George Walden is conducting, would wish to be kept informed of progress and be consulted before any decisions are taken;

Agree that I should write to George Walden in this sense?

C.D.P. Yes — very much so

MB

C D POWELL

25 November 1986

SL3ATO

School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street London WC1E 7HU
Telephone 01-637 4934/38
Extension.....

From the Director

Mr. Charles Powell,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

17 November 1986

Dear Charles (if I may),

I enclose a memorandum on Soviet and East European Studies in British Universities which summarises the main points that were discussed on 31 October when you joined Professor Amann, Professor Kaser and me for lunch. It is a very brief summary of the issue and confines itself to essential points, each of which could be substantiated further if that were required.

I have also had the opportunity to speak to Robert Conquest in Stanford who assures me that his paper on the same issue will reach you shortly.

Yours sincerely,

Michael.

M.A. Branch

Enc.

AM86

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES IN BRITISH UNIVERSITIES

(1) The Level of Provision of Key Specialisms

(a) A list of leading specialists who have left Britain for senior posts abroad during the last few years - or are about to do so - is set out in the appendix. It provides flattering confirmation of our standing in the world scholarly community but, more to the point, represents a measure of our national loss. The main consideration here is the quality of those concerned and the gap they will leave behind them; their departure will weaken the ability of the profession to advise government, respond to requests for information and to train a new generation of researchers. It should be emphasized that the movement of small numbers of key specialists does not necessarily show up in general surveys and, therefore, on the surface national provision might appear to be unimpaired. Only those individuals in the 30-50 age range, who have acquired a significant international reputation, are included in the list, on the grounds that they have reached maturity as researchers and have a peak creative period in front of them before retirement. The list is not comprehensive; it includes only specialisms of direct governmental interest (and excludes language and literature specialists, for example).

There are still a number of prominent scholars left in Britain who have in many cases already turned down good offers from the USA, but if the present decline in funding of infrastructure continues and if the non-replacement of colleagues further erodes their research time, they, too, are likely to be tempted to emigrate.

(b) We need to go further and take into account our most eminent scholars who have recently retired or died and those who will retire within the next five years or so. Such a list would include the names of Malcolm Mackintosh, Hugh Seton-Watson, Alec Nove, Peter Wiles, R.W. Davies, Francis Seton, Ronald Hingley, Wlodzimierz Brus and others: these names are simply illustrative. The loss of such outstanding talent is compounded by the fact that the specialist posts they vacate are unlikely to be refilled.

(c) At the taproots of the profession, the quantity of postgraduate research by British students is substantially less than it was a decade ago and has now fallen to an inadequate level. (This also applies more generally to research funding in the whole of Area Studies as well as to the provision of postgraduate studentships) There are three main reasons for this: (i) lack of ESRC funding, (ii) absence of academic career prospects and (iii) lack of enthusiasm on the part of departments to undertake supervision of theses demanding use of difficult foreign language sources, for which they are penalised by the inappropriate ESRC rules governing Ph.D. completion rates when they can earn substantial income by accepting large numbers of overseas students on one year taught master's programmes.

(d) From the trends described above it can readily be seen that the profession is being weakened at all three major age bands and is in serious danger of not renewing itself.

(2) Possible Courses of Action

(a) If the case outlined above has any validity, it is important that the UGC should give firm and unambiguous guidance to universities to maintain Soviet and East European Studies at least at their present level. Academic staff should be replaced and the infrastructure (major libraries, in particular) must be preserved for future generations. There is a distinction to be drawn here between the Russian language and literature departments which are still relatively numerous and might be rationalised to some extent and Centres of Soviet and East European Studies, which were already set up on a rationalised basis in the early 1960s in response to the UGC's Hayter Report. In the case of the latter departments (including, for this purpose, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies) there is much to be said for preserving the present level of healthy competition. Of the major concentrations of expertise at Birmingham, Bristol, Essex, London, Glasgow, Oxford and Swansea, four are already linked by special Consortium arrangements, initiated and financed by the UGC.

(b) It is important that several centres of excellence in Soviet studies in this country should be maintained, and if possible, strengthened rather than run down. The idea has been floated of concentration of the resources in a centre in London which is regarded by specialists in Soviet studies in Britain as a very undesirable step. First, it would jeopardise the chances of preserving much that is worthwhile in the existing university centres to the great loss of students in those universities as well as to research. Second, it would remove a healthy pluralism of academic interests and viewpoints which the present centres sustain. Third (and related to the last point), one consolidated centre in London, funded directly from the public purse, would run the risk of being far too much under the influence of the government of the day.

(c) In view of their national importance, it might be helpful for the UGC to create some special machinery for monitoring developments in Area Studies on a continuing basis. Given their interdisciplinary focus, Area Studies do not fit easily into the scope of any single subject committee.

(d) The ESRC is presently considering its internal structure and has announced that it will report the results of its deliberations by July 1987. Careful thought needs to be given within the ESRC to providing a stronger committee representation for the study of foreign countries with regard to both postgraduate studentships and to research projects. An increase in studentships in Soviet and East European Studies is essential.

(e) There have been very positive developments recently in the links between government departments and Soviet and East European specialists in universities. Our main concern in preparing this note, therefore, is to ensure that we retain a national core of expertise which is sufficient to respond to these approaches.

R. Amann (CREES, Birmingham)
M.A. Branch (SSEES, London)
M.C. Kaser (St. Anthony's, Oxford)

13/11/86

LOSS OF SPECIALISMS OF DIRECT NATIONAL IMPORTANCE

RESEARCH SPECIALISMS	BRITISH UNIVERSITIES (Losses)	FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES (Gains)
Soviet defence policy and military institutions	Edinburgh	Stanford (Full tenured chair)
Dissent and political opposition in the USSR	LSE	Secretary, Kennan Institute, Washington DC. (Presumably, fixed term contract: future intentions unknown)
Soviet diplomatic history and contemporary strategic studies (e.g. SS-20 issue)	CREES / Birmingham	Johns Hopkins and Stanford (no tenured post yet but unlikely to return)
Contemporary Soviet foreign policy	Southampton	Maryland (full tenured chair and possible US government advisory role)
Contemporary Soviet economy (specialising in trade, technology transfer and impact of strategic embargo)	CREES/Birmingham	Harvard (Professorial fellowship: likely to return - but some doubt)
Organisation of Soviet science (work on Soviet SDI/lasers and fusion research at a preparatory stage)	CREES/Birmingham	Sydney (tenured post)
Contemporary East European economics (special field - economic disequilibrium in Poland)	CREES/Birmingham	Florence, European University Institute. (7 year fixed tenure chair)
Contemporary Soviet economy and planning (including mathematical approaches to planning)	Cambridge	Amsterdam (full tenured chair)
Population and labour problems in the USSR	CREES/Birmingham	Texas (tenure-track appointment)

Cont/.....

RESEARCH SPECIALISMS	BRITISH UNIVERSITIES (Losses)	FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES (Gains)
Contemporary Soviet politics and institutional reform	York	Texas (tenure-track appointment)
Contemporary Soviet and East German politics and economic organisation	Kent	Melbourne (tenured position)
Historical evolution of Soviet system of central planning	CREES/Birmingham	Melbourne (fixed term contract: might return if post in Britain were available - but presently shortlisted for full tenured chair at Amsterdam)

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-2323

15 November 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

I said I would let you have a note on the condition of Russian and East European studies in the United Kingdom, and I now enclose it -- giving only the barest essentials and not, for example, going into the gradual withering of the scholarly body through non-replacement. I should add that George Walden is very highly regarded in Slavicist circles.

It was very good to see you in September. I came away more convinced than ever that you have another victory before you. And that's one reason why I am hoping to get back to England on a more permanent basis in the fairly near future...

with warmest wishes as always

Robert Conquest

PS The expected plenum of the Soviet Central Committee may well have happened by the time you get this. It is rumoured that a power confrontation will take place. If so, and if (say) Kunaev and/or Shcherbitsky go, it will be said that this is a victory for Gorbachev: but he has various coalitions on various issues, and they may have been helping him on foreign affairs...

A Note on the Condition of Russian and East European Studies in the United Kingdom

It is, I am sure, the government's wish to produce an adequate supply of well-equipped scholars in this field; to train those employed in government, business, science, the media and elsewhere who are concerned with these areas; and to further a general sound knowledge of the Soviet sphere among the ordinary educated population.

If so, the government's wishes are not being given effect.

On the purely language side (in spite of our committment under the Helsinki Final Act) the number of Advanced Level GCE passes in Russian dropped from 619 in 1970 to 293 in 1984; the number of first degree graduates in Russian from 185 to 109. In the secondary schools, of 280 teachers with Russian as their major qualification, only 24 per cent were teaching Russian; of 1,090 with any qualification in the subject only 14 per cent were teaching it (as against 95 and 74 per cent in French and 89 and 66 per cent in German.)

Even more important, the study of Soviet and East European politics, economics, society, history and culture at the University level has been grossly mishandled. The expansion of Russian studies in the 1970s produced a reasonable body of qualified people. They are being misused: Soviet and East European experts have been diverted - for example experts in the Soviet economy and social studies are often largely having to teach general economics or sociology instead.

While previous documents , in particular the Scarbrough Report of 1947 and that of the Hayter Committee in 1961, saw the crucial necessity of broad studies of the area, the recent (1979) University Grants Committee

2/...

" Atkinson Report" simply failed to recognize any studies beyond those of language and literature. Area studies proper are at present virtually ignored by the UGC and the ESRC.

I know that the Department of Education is well aware of all this. But it is not merely an educational problem, and I suggest that remedying the situation should be considered as a matter of high policy.

SOVIET UNION Policy towards
the Soviet Union
Aug 79



CCBKUP (1)

PRIME MINISTER

ROBERT CONQUEST

You are seeing Robert Conquest tomorrow morning. You will want to remember that he has recently sent you:

(a) a rather good paper called "Crisis in the USSR" which you have kept upstairs; and

(b) a book called "The Harvest of Sorrows". Caroline's thank-you letter said that you would read this in the Christmas recess.

CDP

C. D. POWELL
23 September 1986

SRW

File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1985

I have had a word with the Prime Minister about the possibility of you seeing her when you are over here and much as she would like to have a chat I do not think it is going to be possible this time. Her diary seems to be more over-crowded than ever and you will be in London during a particularly busy period leading up to a major speech in Wales on the 22nd. The Prime Minister is sorry to miss you.

With all best wishes and I am copying this letter c/o your sister.

CAROLINE RYDER

Mr. Robert Conquest

(1)

HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-2323

Prime Minister

This is just before the Welsh Conference. Shall I explain or would you like to see Mr. Conquest? CR

23 May 1985

Dear Caroline

I don't think there is any time until the weekend!

just to say that I will be in London for the week 15-23 June, and if the Prime Minister wants to discuss anything am of course available (as ever my sister Charmian Hartley , 45 Shawfield St-- 352-2334-- will know where to get me).

would like to see him

We are probably borrowing a flat near Victoria; hope to have a little party; and if you and Richard are free...

yours ever

Robert Conquest

29 MAY 1985

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2531 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Alexander to Richards dated 31 March 1981	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Extract details: Letter from Richards to Alexander dated 27 March 1981	
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Extract details: Letter from Walden to Alexander dated 13 October 1980	X
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2531 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Meeting record dated 11 July 1980	
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2531 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Walden to Alexander dated 26 June 1980	X
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	21 March 2017 CWayland
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2531 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Alexander to Walden dated 6 May 1980	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	21 March 2017 Wayland
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The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2531 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Walden to Alexander dated 2 May 1980, with enclosure	
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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	21 March 2017 CWayland
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

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Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SECRET

3A

Weekend Box -

(2)

Prime Minister

I also attach the academics' paper.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 April 1980

Dear Michael,

POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

Following the discussions at Chequers on 24 February, officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have prepared the attached paper and annexes on 'The Prevention of Soviet Expansion in the Developing World'. The paper itself and all of the annexes except one are classified Confidential. The exception - Annex F - which is Secret - should not, I hope, pose any problems on handling.

Government policy on East/West relations, and towards the Soviet threat, has been set out in Ministerial statements both before and after Afghanistan. The attached paper does not therefore deal with general questions (though Annex A describes our policy as it was on the eve of the invasion).

But the authors have for some time felt that we have not yet thought through all the problems of Soviet expansionism in the Third World and the various ways in which this might be countered by the West. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, this issue has been posed more dramatically. The authors have therefore attempted a broad survey of Soviet activities throughout the Third World, and possible measures for countering these. The conclusions are set out in the covering paper, which is designed to be read on its own.

There are several points to note. First, the paper and its annexes are intended as a basis for discussion; they do not constitute official policy as agreed by Ministers, though they are compatible with Government policy as it now stands.

Second, the important and highly relevant question of destabilising the USSR and its clients within the Bloc and the Third World is addressed only in passing. We are working on a separate and more highly classified paper to deal with the subject in more detail. The conclusions in the present paper on individual countries (particularly those in Annex C) could require some modification in the light of this later study.

/Thirdly,

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

2 - APR 1980

Thirdly, no attempt has been made at this stage to cost the recommendations in the paper or its annexes, or to examine the implications of some of the organisational measures that might be needed to support the recommendations. Finance will obviously be a major constraint: for example, our diminished aid programme is unlikely to be sufficient to cover all the proposals made in the paper.

In the light of the Prime Minister's eventual views and following further work inside the FCO, the intention would be to produce a single paper (preferably much shorter than the present documents) containing precise and costed proposals.

Yours ever

GGHW

(G G H Walden)

THE PREVENTION OF SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Introduction

1. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the latest in a series of communist military interventions in the Third World which began in 1975 with the Cuban-backed installation of a Marxist regime in Angola.

2. The invasion highlighted the difference between Western and Soviet expectations of "détente". That the Russians did not feel inhibited by considerations of "détente" from attempting to spread their influence in the Third World had long been clear; but the use of considerable Soviet force outside the countries of the Warsaw Pact marked a new departure. Western failure to react effectively to earlier activities by Soviet proxies, and perhaps specifically US impotence in the face of the occupation of their Embassy in Tehran, no doubt encouraged the Soviet leaders to believe that they could take such action with impunity.

3. Government policy even before Afghanistan had been to improve the UK's defence posture and its contribution to NATO, as a demonstration of our own determination to resist Soviet pressure. The Government increased defence expenditure immediately on entering office and played an active role in the NATO decision, taken in December last year, to carry through plans for the modernisation of Alliance long-range Theatre Nuclear Forces. It has also been a consistent British objective to promote political unity in the Alliance.

4. This paper does not deal with NATO matters or with East-West relations as such. Recent Ministerial speeches and other official documents(1) have set out the policy of promoting strength and cohesion in the Alliance, developing East-West contacts for many purposes, including the encouragement of diversity in the Warsaw Pact, accepting the Soviet challenge to a struggle of ideas, pursuing East-West negotiations on CSCE and arms control, and preventing Soviet expansion in the developing world. It concentrates on the last element: the need to develop a coherent Western policy towards the Third World and the containment of Soviet expansionism there. The paper and its Annexes consider the extent and nature of Western interests in the Third World, look at current and possible future Soviet targets and examine ways of countering growing Soviet attempts to increase their control over developing countries.

Western interests in the Third World

5. The general interest of Western countries in the Third World stems largely from the fact that, as trading nations, we need to secure access to raw materials, outlets for exports and stable conditions for investment. The West's own economic interests are helped by [illegible] stability and prosperity in developing countries. For the UK, a nation highly dependent on world trade, this is especially true. In addition, a number of Third World countries are in areas of strategic importance to the West. Furthermore, the colonial legacy of several European countries, particularly Britain and France, has left them with a financial burden, a political liability and residual military commitments which intrude into their relations with every continent.

Footnote (1): Eg the Prime Minister's statements of 18 October in Luxembourg and of 28 January in the House of Commons; the Secretary of State's lecture to Chatham House on 22 February; Annex A summarises FCO views in December 1979 (ie before Afghanistan).

6. The most vital area of interest to the West as a whole is the Middle East, from which the bulk of Western oil supplies come, and with which we have important economic and political ties. Next to this is the Mediterranean, an area of obvious strategic importance to the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The West's most important needs after oil are for mineral resources and, to a lesser extent, foodstuffs; these are obtained in varying quantities from Africa, Latin America and Asia. European countries have traditionally had a close political and economic interest in Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean are of strategic and political importance to the USA; Europe and the United States share an interest in Asia, in which both are or have been politically and militarily involved. Joining these areas are vital lines of communication, especially the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Suez Canal and the Atlantic, which must be kept open. Annex B describes the West's interests in more detail.

The Threat

7. The Russians will persist in their drive to shift the "correlation of forces" in their favour. Faced by NATO in the West, they are likely to concentrate their attention on the developing countries, assessing each opportunity in the light of likely Western and Third World reactions. An increase in the number of governments owing allegiance to Moscow or under its dominant influence could threaten Western security in various ways. The threat would be most acute if the Soviet Union could establish itself as the dominant power in the Middle East, controlling or influencing the production or transport of the oil supplies on which most Western countries depend. In other areas, the Russians might acquire military facilities which could directly threaten the West, or gain the ability to deny the West access to vital minerals. More generally, the greater the number of developing countries which come under Soviet tutelage, the more the West's credibility is undermined and the less may be the resistance of others to the same fate.

8. Annexes C-E look at individual Third World countries which are already, or could fall, under dominant Soviet influence. Annex C describes those countries which are firmly in the Soviet camp; Annex D examines countries which are ideologically inclined towards the Soviet Union or in which the Russians or their proxies are actively seeking to increase their influence; Annex E covers countries which could be vulnerable because of possible communist designs on their resources, their geographical position near the Soviet Union or a proxy, internal political instability or economic problems.(2) At Annex F is a table showing the number of Soviet and proxy military and civilian personnel in individual countries.

Footnote (2): The countries in this section are chosen for their importance to the West, either collectively or to individual Western countries (eg Chad to France). The assessment of risk is subject to great uncertainties: coups frequently happen without warning; communist tactics might change; the country concerned may prove more or less resistant to communist overtures. The estimates in Annex E can therefore be no more than a general guide, subject to periodic revision. A number of important countries (eg Nigeria, Kenya) have not been included here because they are, for the time being at least, relatively stable. We shall need nonetheless to keep a watchful eye on developments in these countries.

Countermeasures:

Instruments available to the West

9. Increased Western interest in the Third World will of necessity involve some additional expenditure. This will cause problems for Western countries, not least the UK, who have all been hit by recent oil price rises and the consequent world recession. The following list of instruments available to the West to counter Soviet influence is therefore set out in roughly ascending order of cost:

a. Propaganda: is necessary to counter both Soviet propaganda and inherent Third World distrust, arising out of the colonial experience, of Western motives. It can be put out in broadcasts, speeches, articles, unattributable fact sheets, press briefings and through normal diplomatic channels; it has, however, to be carefully handled.

b. Visits: and other well-timed political gestures like Ministerial contacts and political consultation can demonstrate the West's interest both to the developing country itself and to the Soviet Union.

c. Technical assistance: the provision of doctors, teachers, engineers etc. is useful in helping to demonstrate to people on the ground that the West is concerned for their welfare. The Cubans and the Chinese achieve considerable success in this field.

d. Cultural exchanges: are an indirect way of disseminating "propaganda" about the Western way of life. The two main instruments for the UK in this area are the BBC Overseas Service and British Council. They can be particularly valuable in areas where there is no other UK or Western involvement.

e. Military and police advice, training and loan service personnel: can often provide disproportionate benefits. The UK's subsidised military training assistance scheme (UKMTAS), which is often the only means by which Third World armed forces can train in this country, is a particularly cost-effective way of spreading British influence and helping developing countries to maintain their own security.

f. Trade: can be a mutually beneficial instrument; but it can also cause major short-term problems for Western countries, who may have to run down their low-technology industries as a result of import penetration by cheaper Third World products. Subsidised export credits can also be a heavy charge on Western Exchequers.

g. Aid: Despite its economic problems, the West as a whole is still able to provide more aid than the Soviet bloc (see Annex G for comparison). The UK has, however, been forced by circumstances to reduce its total aid budget, and bilateral programmes will be severely squeezed. Many of the recommendations in Annexes C-E involve continuing or increasing UK aid. This is unlikely, in the event, to prove possible. The aid weapon has most political effect when it is first given or when it is taken away: a continuing programme tends to be taken for granted; we shall therefore need to explain our case fully in those countries in which UK aid is to be reduced. Although increased German and Japanese aid may help to fill some of the gap caused by our reductions, the developing countries are likely to remain discontented with what they regard as the West's (and UK's) poor response to their economic needs. This could result in the undermining of the effectiveness of the other instruments listed here. The case for improved North/South relations generally is argued in Annex H.

h. Direct military intervention: The above measures are for the most part preventive and deterrent. Many depend for their ultimate effectiveness on the West's being ready to go further if they fail. Considerable thought is currently being given by France, the UK and particularly the US to the improvement of long-range intervention forces, which could provide a valuable deterrent. The Soviet Union seeks to avoid nuclear confrontation with the USA and will refrain from actions likely to trigger an uncontrollable process of escalation. The ability of the US to put large forces on the ground quickly would be an important factor in determining Russian actions. British and French forces would be on a much smaller scale, but they would be useful as a contribution to the US effort and could serve limited purposes when used alone (eg protection of communities). Annex I considers military countermeasures in more detail.

i. Subversion: this is placed at the end because, while not necessarily costly in financial terms, subversion can be politically disastrous if it is detected or otherwise fails. The creation by the West of instability (from which in the past the Russians have usually benefitted) needs very careful consideration.

10. To the above instruments, which are directed primarily at projecting Western influence in vulnerable developing countries, must be added another category of instruments:

j. Signals to and levers against the Soviet Union: If signals aimed at demonstrating our commitment to Third World countries fail, more direct political signals to the Russians will be needed, such as the cancellation of East/West visits, contacts etc. This is an argument for as broad a range of contacts as possible with the Russians and East Europeans during normal times, so that preliminary signals can be passed and business rapidly shut down with newsworthy effect when the occasion warrants. The question of non-military signals and levers is examined in Annex J.

Conclusions and Recommendations

11. A list of the specific recommendations for action by the UK in particular countries contained in Annexes C-E is appended to this paper. The following general conclusions may be drawn from these and the other Annexes:-

(a) The greatest threats to Western interests in the Third World remain subversion, sabotage and internal collapse. Politico/economic policies and military and para-military advice and assistance to existing governments, rather than a simply military response, should therefore be the cornerstone of Western policy. The West must, however, take care to avoid suspicions of meddling, or of foisting on developing countries its own interests and values.

(b) Soviet appeal in the developing world is as much political as ideological: the Russians and their proxies have exploited existing conflicts and gained much of their initial success, particularly in Africa, from supporting national liberation movements. We should therefore continue with our allies to work for peaceful solutions to disputes, and in particular an international solution to the Namibia question, and a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute which recognises the rights of the Palestinian people. Failure to achieve solutions to these conflicts will enhance the opportunities open to the Russians and will be counted against the West by most of Africa

and the Arab World as long as it can plausibly be maintained that Western leverage against South Africa and Israel is not being fully exerted.

(c) The policies of the white minority in South Africa itself are another major factor souring Third World, and particularly black African, relations with the West. The West must therefore be seen to bring strong influence to bear on the South African Government to adopt more acceptable political and social policies. But in view of the unlikelihood, at least in the short to medium term, of such pressure leading to the fulfilment of black African demands, the West also needs both to encourage and sustain the moderate black States and to try to convince Soviet-inclined African Governments that their interests lie in increased links with the West; to avoid being forced to choose between South Africa and the rest of Africa will be a major challenge for Western diplomacy.

(d) Soviet influence in countries of the Third World can be short-lived. The Soviet position in Iraq, Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea is for example weaker today than it was three years ago. Governments may come to power by military means, aided by the Russians and their proxies, but may soon discover that their country's economic development depends on aid from, and trade with, the West. We should not, however, be lulled by this; the Russians have yet to withdraw from a country in which they or their proxies have substantial numbers of combat troops.

(e) Although the withdrawal of aid and reduction of contacts with countries which move into the Soviet orbit may be inevitable and desirable in some cases, in others (eg Mozambique) it is wiser to maintain contacts, at however low a level, to avoid pushing them irretrievably into the Soviet camp (as did the USA with Cuba).

(f) The ability to give aid is still a strong card. Despite its own economic problems, therefore, the West should look at new ways of assisting the LDCs and should be prepared to entertain more ambitious approaches to the world's economic difficulties, including a possible understanding with the oil producers on greater predictability of production and price in return for some improvement in the treatment of their financial assets. The West should, at the very least, try to develop closer consultations with oil producers on aid policy. Because of the obvious constraints on its resources, however, the UK should not get too far out in front in this field.

(g) The provision of military assistance by the West is a useful means of improving local forces and can provide political benefits both in cases where the existing regime depends for its existence on the loyalty of the Armed Forces (eg Jordan) and, in the longer term, where there is a possibility of the armed forces becoming involved in under-pinning a future government (eg Jamaica). In the case of the UK, the support we provide through Military Training Assistance and Loan Service Personnel is a clear demonstration of our interest in the integrity of the countries concerned and can prevent them from turning to the Soviet Union for military aid. A greater willingness to provide both military training and equipment would be a sound investment.

(h) It is sensible for the Western allies to divide responsibilities between themselves, each taking the lead in the area or activity

for which they are best equipped. The USA, the Germans and the Japanese are, for example, generally best placed to provide economic assistance; the USA, France and the UK: military assistance. Australia, New Zealand and Japan should be encouraged to take a greater interest in Asia and the South Pacific, and should be brought more closely into Western consultations, perhaps within some new framework of Western coordination. Third World sensibilities about US involvement (eg in many Moslem countries and to some extent in Latin America) often make it preferable for Britain or France, or in some cases Spain or Portugal, to take the lead, particularly where they have traditional links. We should consider with our allies how best to divide our efforts. It has to be remembered, however, that some developing countries (eg Algeria) do not want to be too closely associated with any one Western country and prefer to diversify.

(i) The West's effective ability to induce governments to act against corruption and encourage democratic processes may be limited (eg Saudi Arabia). Parliamentary democracy has in any case a poor track record in the developing world and may not be practicable in the short term; but our dealings with unattractive, undemocratic regimes should as far as possible be handled so that the West does not become irrevocably identified with them or tainted with their worst excesses. We should try discreetly to maintain contacts with oppositions.

(j) The West should exercise caution in its relations with China because it is not yet clear how permanent is China's present course. We should concentrate on increasing contacts, including limited and strictly controlled military contacts, with the aim of encouraging China to maintain moderate policies; but in the long run our relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to loom larger.

(k) The West could strengthen its hand, at least with the moderate oil producers, by being less profligate with oil. This calls for intensified measures by Western Governments to conserve oil and develop alternative sources of energy (an area in which the UK's record is not outstanding). In so doing we would assist those States (eg Saudi Arabia) which are ready to increase production and moderate prices to rebut both internal criticism and the strictures of more radical Arab States. Such a policy would also be prudent in view of the difficulty - if not impossibility - of the West's preventing internal change which, as in Iran, can severely affect oil supplies and prices.

(l) The West should be prepared to "take on" the Russians in the propaganda field. The example of Afghanistan can be used to point the contrast between the Soviet way of "helping" developing countries and the West's (as shown by our efforts to bring Rhodesia and Namibia to independence by peaceful means). The Soviet Union's irrelevance to the real needs of developing countries should also be emphasised: their poor aid performance; their highly selective targetting of economic aid; their heavy concentration on the provision of military assistance; and their refusal to participate in multi-lateral aid schemes. The contrast between the theory of Marxism and Soviet (and Cuban) reality needs explaining; examples like the Berlin Wall deserve wider publicity. The danger of concluding Treaties of Friendships which might provide a "legitimising factor" for Soviet intervention should be emphasised; as should the risks of accepting communist advisers who can be used for subversive purposes when the government of the day is not to Soviet liking. The hollowness of

Soviet peace and disarmament initiatives at the UN; the political and devotional problems of Soviet Moslems; the Russian record of racial prejudice (experienced by most black visitors to the Soviet Union); the pain and inefficiency of forced collectivisation of agriculture and the problems of State-controlled industrialisation could all be brought out.

(m) The limitations of the main Soviet proxy, Cuba, could also be exploited. The speciousness of Cuba's "non-aligned" status has already become clear since she took over the Presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement last year; but the West could do more to promulgate the extent to which Cuba relies for survival on Soviet aid. We could also point out that the majority of Cuban troops sent to fight in Africa are black, while the ruling Cuban elite is almost all white; and Cuba's poor human rights record should not go unnoticed. Such propaganda would, however, need careful handling. We could over-saturate the market by being too insistent. But we should make the most of the opportunity afforded by Afghanistan.

(n) We should also do more to counter both the Marxist assertion that history is on the side of communism and the Soviet claim that it is therefore "correct" for them to subvert Western of pro-Western governments, but unacceptable for the West to behave in a similar fasion. We should expand the theme already used in Ministerial speeches that we welcome the ideological struggle; we could suggest cautiously that Russian maintenance of their "right" to subvert our friends carries an obvious corollary; but we would need to avoid giving the Russians an excuse to stay in, or to repeat, Afghanistan. We should seek to establish the term "national liberation movement" to describe the Afghan rebels.

(o) In the military field, the Americans will not be able to match conventional Soviet deployments when the latter are operating on much shorter lines of communication as in SW Asia. But they should be able to deploy sufficient forces quickly enough to signal to the Russians the risks of military adventures in the area. A US reinforcement capability should also help to steady those states which feel threatened. It is, almost by definition, difficult to predict exactly in what circumstances, other than Russian or proxy invasion, US or other troops would be used, although an invitation from a threatened Third World government would be a likely requirement. There may be occasions when it would be useful to commit UK forces to a limited intervention, possibly in conjunction with other Western forces, either to stabilise a shaky regime or to deal with small centres of subversion (eg counter-terrorist units in the Gulf). But the West should not attempt to prop up regimes which are clearly crumbling.

(p) By means of most of the measures outlined above the West would be demonstrating indirectly to the Russians its interest in the fate of the Third World. But this alone is unlikely to deter them. Direct signals could, depending on the circumstances, range from the cancellation of visits, to the denial of benefits like technology or grain, to nuclear alerts on the model of 1973. If such signals are to be heeded they must be sent at an appropriate level, including the highest; and the message will be taken more seriously if the West acts together, both in the Nine and in NATO. This entails over-hauling and strengthening existing mechanisms of consultation, while accepting that complete coherence is hardly obtainable in a voluntary

association of free nations. We should also cultivate channels for mobilising Third World, and in particular, non-aligned opinion (eg in the UN). And we should consider how best we might use the East European countries to signal to Moscow.

(q) A strong and coherent Western posture is not only important vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Third World Governments are greatly influenced by the general impression of resolution (or lack of it) displayed by Western leaders. The West must therefore work harder to avoid unpredictability, uncertainty, divisions with NATO and the Nine and economic disarray.

(r) Western attempts to foment unrest in the USSR, whether by support for dissidents or for nationalism in eg the Ukraine, would be more likely to engender greater repression than liberalisation or de-centralisation. The same would apply to attempts to sow the seeds of separatism in Central Asia. Western encouragement of unrest in Eastern Europe, if successful, would lead to Soviet invasions like those in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. If the West undertook such attempts for the tactical purpose of deterring - or retaliating against - Soviet moves in developing countries, it would be unlikely to achieve sufficient results in the USSR and/or Eastern Europe to influence Soviet policy significantly. However, the possibility of Western attempts to destabilise Soviet power in other areas - eg the PDRY, Ethiopia or even Cuba - is worth analysing in depth, given the desirability of demonstrating to other developing countries that Marxist regimes are not irreversible.

Appendix

List of recommendations in Annexes C-E

Annex C (Third World countries firmly in Soviet camp)

1. Strengthen diplomatic and commercial links with Angola; encourage Savimbi to seek a peaceful settlement, involving the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

2. In concert with our NATO partners, step up (discreetly) propaganda against Cuba; consult Spain on Cuba's internal affairs, with a view to establishing how increased pressure might be brought.

3. Maintain minimal diplomatic links and continue commercial relations with Ethiopia.

4. Maintain international pressure on Vietnam to moderate her policies in South East Asia.

5. Maintain minimal relations with PDRY.

Annex D (Developing countries already subject to Soviet/proxy interference)

6. Increase trade and cultural links (British Council) with Algeria.

7. Re-establish in due course cultural and educational links in Iran and build up commercial and political contacts.

8. Improve political consultation, educational and technical assistance and arms sales to Iraq.

9. Little to be done in Libya.

10. When the Syrian internal situation becomes clearer respond positively to requests for assistance eg English language teaching and, if political climate permits, military training.

11. Provide more arms and technical assistance to Yemen Arab Republic and encourage Saudi Arabia to give financial aid; consider encouraging Iraqi interest; support proposals for YAR/EC Agreement.

/12.

12. Continue to seek intercommunal settlement in Cyprus; strengthen EC/Cyprus relationship.

13. Continue economic aid to Turkey; respond to requests for security assistance; strengthen EC/Turkey Association Agreement; increase visits; help with export promotion; increase technical assistance and cultural exchanges; work for Greece's reintegration into NATO military structure.

14. Respect Yugoslavia's desire for non-alignment; but make clear discreetly that we are ready to help, especially in the economic field; maintain and develop relations through trade, political exchanges and cooperation in defence matters.

15. Encourage Nigerian interest in Benin and continue UK aid programme.

16. Encourage Portuguese links with Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe.

17. Encourage French interest in Congo and US and French interest in Mali.

18. Encourage Spanish interest in Equatorial Guinea.

19. Consider starting a small aid programme in Guinea.

20. Continue to advise Lesotho of dangers of too close a link with Soviet bloc; continue aid, including to Police Mobile Unit.

21. Try to improve political and trading relations with Madagascar.

22. Maintain political and commercial relations with Mauritius; allow military training team to stay.

23. Improve aid and trade links with Mozambique, including non-lethal military supplies; encourage Mozambique to accede to the Lomé Convention.

24. Continue to press for a negotiated UN settlement to the Namibian question.

25. Respond to requests for police and military training for Seychelles.

/26.

26. Keep Tanzania at arms length.

27. Maintain a dialogue with and some support for Zambia.

28. Show greater respect for Non-Aligned Movement in order to improve links with countries like India; continue aid and arms sales; hold regular consultations.

29. Increase economic assistance to Pakistan; encourage Saudis and other Arab States to fund limited arms sales.

30. Curtail aid to Grenada; expose undemocratic and repressive nature of Bishop regime.

31. Consider whether to maintain links with defence forces in Guyana.

32. Continue UKMTAS training for Jamaica; consider future aid in the light of the termination of the IMF agreement.

33. Consider increased aid to Nicaragua for carefully chosen projects; manifest Western support for a politically independent stance.

Annex E (Vulnerable countries not yet subject to significant Soviet/proxy interference)

34. Maintain aid and cooperation with armed forces in Egypt.

35. Increase military training and naval visits in the Gulf; encourage regional cooperation and cooperation with EC; increase all forms of cooperation; use influence to try to steer Rulers on to safer paths.

36. Continue aid, arms supplies and military training for Jordan.

37. Assist development of Moroccan economy and links with EC; maintain neutrality on Western Sahara.

38. Encourage US to keep a low profile in Oman (Masirah); continue to supply Loan Service Personnel; try to restrain Sultan; given technical assistance.

/39.

39. Improve defence, internal security and educational cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

40. Encourage Saudis to step up aid to the Sudan, and maintain our military training programme, financial assistance and defence sales.

41. Continue British Council activities in Tunisia; support US and French efforts politically.

42. Continue with other Western countries to adopt a "friendly but firm" approach to Maltese threats.

43. Encourage Botswana to play an interpretative role between South Africa and the Black States to the North; continue aid, military assistance, cultural links and visits.

44. Encourage French interest in Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Zaire.

45. Give substantial aid, technical cooperation and military and police training to Ghana.

46. Work discreetly for wider influence for Malawi as moderate African voice; aid, military assistance, cultural links and visits should continue.

47. Maintain aid, technical cooperation and assistance under UKMTAS to Sierra Leone.

48. Encourage Somalia to cease support for the Ogaden rebels; strengthen political and economic relations.

49. Continue aid to Swaziland; concentrate on helping Swaziland Defence Force; increase Ministerial and other high-level visits.

50. Continue to give Uganda political and financial support and consider giving military assistance.

51. Provide military training, technical assistance and substantial economic aid to Zimbabwe; encourage other Western governments to do likewise.

/52.

52. Develop trade, aid, political and cultural links with ASEAN countries; continue military training under UKMTAS.

53. Continue aid and military assistance (including Loan Service Personnel) to Bangladesh.

54. Continue UKMTAS training for Burma; maintain participation in Burma Aid Group.

55. Increase contacts with China in all fields; encourage pragmatic policies.

56. Continue aid and give limited police training to Maldives.

57. Continue political support for South Korea and encourage Americans to continue with their defence guarantees.

58. Develop commercial links with Taiwan.

59. Maintain contacts with Antigua and St Kitts in all fields; try to encourage regional cooperation in police and coastguard affairs and extend to economic and other fields.

60. Mobilise international support for viable independence for Belize, free of threats from Guatemala and interference from Cuba.

61. Pursue proposed capital aid project in Bolivia.

62. Consider giving more aid to Costa Rica.

63. Continue to provide aid and security assistance to Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent; build on Barbados as the firmest available base for initiatives in the Caribbean.

64. Move in quickly with offers of reconstruction assistance to El Salvador when situation become calmer.

65. Encourage US efforts to improve human rights in Guatemala.

66. Give Honduras more aid.

67. Continue limited aid to Panama.

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ANNEX A

BRITISH POLICY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

SUMMARY OF FCO VIEWS BEFORE AFGHANISTAN

1. On its own admission, the Soviet Union seeks to defeat the West in a struggle waged by all means short of war. The Russians hope, with their military strength, one day to become the dominant factor in Europe. 'Detente' for them is a tactic to lessen the risk of nuclear confrontation and secure technology, credits and grain. In their view it does not require them to slow down their military build-up, relax their internal dictatorship, loosen their grip on Eastern Europe or renounce their freedom to intervene in developing countries.

2. Some of our Allies have specific interests in East-West relations. The US needs to manage its relationship with the other super-power in the new situation of nuclear parity. The FRG seeks a reduction in East-West tensions in order to keep Berlin quiet, to promote the emigration of ethnic Germans from the East and to facilitate the development of its own links with the German Democratic Republic. France has had particular reasons for developing a special relationship with the Soviet Union, both to assert its independent role in international affairs and to blur the apparent contradiction between the existence of a large Communist Party and the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent and an expensive defence budget. The United Kingdom, by contrast, has no exclusively national interests in East-West relations. Our interest is the general but highly important one of trying to ensure that the West maintains the balance of power and minimises the risk of Soviet acts which could significantly upset it. We are thus better placed than some of our Allies to take a consistently objective view of Soviet intentions and to be an active influence for realism in the Alliance's policies towards the East.

ELEMENTS FOR BRITISH POLICY

I Western Defences

3. This is the key requirement. Western defences must cover the full spectrum from conventional to strategic deterrence. Indeed it is in the interest of progress in arms control that this should be so: the Soviet Union has no compelling reason to engage in negotiations in areas where the West is weak. Soviet military preponderance could undermine political self-confidence in the West, and the USSR could exploit the situation for political ends, seeking to isolate and demoralise the weaker Alliance countries and spread its influence

towards the Atlantic. To withstand this we also need political unity in the Western Alliance and it is a major British interest to promote it. The Long Term Defence Programme and the undertakings to increase expenditure by 3% a year in real terms are a demonstration of renewed resolve. The UK should play its part in implementing these decisions and encourage others to do the same. We also have a major interest in persuading our Allies to carry through the plans for modernisation of NATO's longer-range Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF), without which the continuum of capabilities which NATO needs to deter political and military aggression would be broken.

II. The Struggle of Ideas

4. The Soviet Union, as part of its duel with the West, has challenged the latter to a contest of ideas. We can win such a contest and our answer should be 'take you on'. We should not copy Soviet tactics, but should make the most of our own strengths. Our democracy, ensuring that policies rest on public consent, starts with a powerful advantage over a system which cannot tolerate dissent. Soviet fears of Western contamination are an admission of weakness. Our Alliance, based on common interests, is politically stronger than the artificial and unwelcome Warsaw Pact. We in the West must manage our own affairs successfully, particularly our economies, if our ideas and the kind of societies which derive from them are to prevail, not only in East-West terms, but in the struggle for influence in the Third World. Here too we are the stronger, for the USSR - despite its long-term economic potential - faces chronic problems of inefficient allocation and use of resources and cannot satisfy its consumers. We should work to bring home to developing countries the real nature of the Soviet system, its economic and other failures and its inability or unwillingness to provide economic aid in anything like the sums offered by the West.

III. East-West Contacts

5. The Prime Minister has called for contacts with the European communist countries at all levels. There are many purposes in this. One is simply to learn more about those countries, so that our assessments shall be as good as possible and our credentials for advocating policies to our Allies shall be strong. Another purpose is to explain our policies to the East, so that the Soviet Union may better understand the limits of what the West will tolerate. Contacts also enable us to explore interests shared with the East, such as preventing the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons.

6. Contacts are also needed to promote trade. Although economic and energy problems may depress Eastern Europe's imports from the West for a time, there are still likely to be major capital projects on offer which can be important for some of our key industries. If the East Europeans overcome their immediate economic problems, the number of such projects should increase. The decision whether to go after projects and the outcome of commercial negotiations are the responsibility of industry, but, since the Governments of these countries are directly responsible for their foreign trade, political relations play a key role. We should therefore continue to provide substantial Government support for the efforts of British firms to secure business. Ministerial contacts can play an important part and we should develop them as much as we can. Political activity will not win us contracts when we are uncompetitive, but its absence may help us to lose them. There is one important limit to the extent to which Government should support the efforts of British firms: export credit at rates more generous than the OECD's 'consensus' terms should be ended.

7. East-West contacts are also part of our armoury in the contest of ideas. A major purpose is to do what we can to undermine Soviet power by encouraging the existing tendencies towards diversity within the Warsaw Pact, tendencies exemplified by Romania's foreign policy, Hungary's new economic mechanism and Poland's particular brand of pluralism which was eloquently demonstrated by the Pope's visit. We have no interest in provoking a crisis in the area, which would again be ended by invasion if the Russians thought it necessary. But the East European countries are generally the best judges of what contacts with the West are safe for them to undertake.

8. Many types of contact have a role. We should exploit to the limit the licence provided by the Helsinki Final Act. We should develop cultural exchanges as far as we can within the financial constraints, using the GB-USSR Association and the GB-East Europe Centre to promote non-governmental exchanges. Tourism is offering increasing numbers of people a glimpse of reality on the other side, a process which in both directions is likely to be to our advantage. 'Round Table' discussions between academics, journalists and others can be enlightening and should be maintained. One of the fruits of the Helsinki process was that the Soviet Union felt constrained in 1973 to stop jamming the BBC and some other Western radio services. The more alternative opinions

are available and listened to, the greater the potential resistance to the official view. In the long run that must be an influence for evolution. That is why the BBC's services to Eastern Europe are being maintained.

IV. The prevention of Soviet expansion and the Management of Crises

9. We need to be able to deter and prevent Soviet expansion and to manage East-West crises. Provided we maintain our defences sufficiently in Europe, the major risk is likely to be in the Third World. We need an effective diplomacy and presentation of our policies to help us deal with this. Here too the BBC External Services and the British Council provide important support.

10. We cannot allow Soviet successes like that in Angola to go on happening, or the impression will gain ground that history is after all on the side of Marxism-Leninism and developing countries' resistance to intervention will be weakened. The catalogue of Soviet ruptures with Egypt and others will not prevent this. Indeed, after Ethiopia, South Yemen and Vietnam, and the rather different case of Cambodia, the need for a Western stand has become pressing. However the current threat in Afghanistan is assessed, the Soviet Union and its proxies sooner or later will contemplate intervention in an area of importance to the West. It is essential that the West, and the US in particular, should contrive to leave as little room as possible for Soviet miscalculation.

11. High level contacts are the best means for making Western views clear. The most effective signals will be those which register the danger of provoking East-West military confrontation. We should try to persuade the Americans to make the risks clear in important cases. But the Russians would not believe threats of confrontation if they were made on lesser matters. Here other actions, such as cancellation of major planned events, may have some limited impact.

12. The West should also be fully aware of the leverage at its disposal. When East-West relations are going well the Russians may be more reluctant to upset them. The growing Western relationship with China is a strong constraint on the USSR which must dislike the idea of a crisis on two fronts, although any deliberate attempt to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute would be risky and its effects unpredictable. Economic levers exist; but technology transfers (outside the COCOM field) and credits cannot be denied effectively unless a number of Western

countries act together, and some seem unlikely to agree to do so; this is a field requiring further study. Grain sales to the USSR offer the Americans a potentially powerful unilateral lever, commercial interests and other factors have opposed its use.

13. The other aspect of crisis prevention is to identify the countries where the Soviet Union might be tempted to intervene, and to do what we can to prevent a vacuum emerging. Negotiations like Camp David and our own efforts on Rhodesia are needed to settle regional problems. Western economic aid, and training facilities for the military and security forces of friendly states, have important roles. So have well-timed political gestures, like Ministerial contacts with potentially vulnerable states. The United Kingdom might propose a co-ordinated Western study of how we could try together to prevent more Soviet interventions in developing countries.

V. Negotiations

14. Balanced arms control can contribute to Britain's security. With our NATO Allies we suggested an arms control approach to long-range TNF in parallel with modernisation. SALT III is likely to be the right forum for this, provided that SALT II is ratified. The negotiation should be a strictly bilateral US/Soviet affair, but with the closest consultation among the Allies. Some result is desirable in MBFR and the Alliance should make new proposals for a simplified agreement on US-Soviet ground force reductions and a package of associated measures.

15. The Helsinki Final Act was important, principally because it established humanitarian questions on the agenda of East-West relations. We should support the CSCE process as a forum for East-West dialogue and in order to keep up the long-term pressure on the Warsaw Pact countries to improve their performance on human rights. We should therefore work for a successful but realistic outcome of the Madrid review meeting starting in November 1980. We should press for a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act. We should seek to exploit the Eastern interest in confidence building measures in order to call for their application throughout the European USSR and also to secure progress over Basket III. Thus our final agreement to a follow-up meeting on security issues, on the lines of Phase I of the European Disarmament Conference proposed by France, should depend on there also being a satisfactory package of other measures. We should explore these possibilities with

the Warsaw Pact countries and stress the need for them to improve their implementation of the Final Act before Madrid and to avoid actions, such as harassment of dissidents, which are inconsistent with the Final Act.

16. The Final Act also strengthens the UK's standing for raising individual human rights cases with the Warsaw Pact countries. We should continue to press for resolution of all cases where there is a direct family connection with Britain. We should raise selectively, and at high levels, some other cases, e.g. those of particularly prominent dissidents like members of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia or of Helsinki Monitoring Groups, on which there are especially strong feelings in Britain. When possible we should do this jointly with the Nine. It is important that we should keep public opinion with us in this way, even if responding to it may cause difficulties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, because without public support it would not be possible to maintain that thickening of contacts which is an important lever in managing East-West relations.

17. Success is desirable in the negotiations between the EEC and the CMEA. The right outcome would be an agreement which would not strengthen the position of the CMEA vis-à-vis its member states but on the contrary would open the way to direct contractual arrangements between the Community and the individual East European countries. This would accord with our objectives of fostering diversity in Eastern Europe and promoting trade: and there is evidence that some of the East Europeans would join Romania in welcoming the chance to negotiate directly with the Community.

ANNEX B

WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

A. The Middle East and Mediterranean

1. The Middle East and Mediterranean are the areas of the greatest sensitivity for the West today. The West's economic, political and strategic interests here are more important, and more at risk, than in any other area of the Third World.

2. The West's main economic interest is to preserve its access to the oil of the area at a reasonable price. The Gulf region (with Iran but not Libya or Algeria) supplied in 1979 some 90% of UK oil imports and some 60% of OECD countries' oil imports. Our forecasts for 1985 are that the Gulf countries will produce about 23 million barrels of oil per day (1978 figure is 21 million) - about 72% of the "free world's" production. In the longer term, gas reserves are equally impressive. In North Africa, Libya and Algeria also hold substantial reserves of oil and gas.

3. Commercially the Gulf is of particular importance at a time of world recession as one of the few major markets for manufactured goods which are likely to grow fast. Every moderate State in the area except the YAR falls in the top third of UK visible export markets, and invisible earnings are also substantial. In North Africa, too, Egypt, Libya and Algeria are significant markets.

4. Politically the area is also of great importance. Countries like Egypt and Algeria are influential in the non-aligned world. Qadhafi's Libya has the capacity to damage Western interests (eg in Malta). Saudi Arabia is a leading voice in the Muslim world and a major financial and OPEC power. Even the small Gulf States have disproportionate political influence through aid programmes and other financial assistance. The North African States belong to the OAU and our relations with them are therefore linked with our interests in other OAU countries.

5. Strategically the Mediterranean area is an important crossroads between three continents, and secure communications between the West and the Gulf are essential to our interests.

6. The West's political and economic relations with the countries of the Mediterranean littoral are all designed in part with strategic considerations in mind. Events in Afghanistan have pointed up the importance of Turkey's strategic role in the region and of resolving the stalemate over Greece's reintegration into the NATO military structure. Control of the Aegean and the Bosphorus, giving access to and from the Black Sea, remains a major NATO interest. The countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean are important for the threat they could pose to NATO's southern flank if the Soviet Union were to obtain military facilities there.

7. The British bases in Gibraltar and Cyprus, and the American bases in Greece and Turkey, together with the French and Italian bases, enable the West to dominate the sea, with its trade routes to the Suez Canal and the Gulf, and its access to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. The denial of comparable military facilities in the region, such as those of Malta, to the Soviet Union is thus also a major Western interest.

8. Our relations with the Arab States in the area continue to be coloured by Western, and notably American, support for Israel. A resolution to the Arab/Israel dispute involving recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people would make a major contribution to Western interests in the Arab world.

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9. Those countries where Western-style democracy is most clearly perceived as being "on trial" are all Mediterranean countries: Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. The collapse of parliamentary democracy in any of these countries would be a significant political set-back for the West. Despite the precarious political and economic position of Turkey, recent developments have not generally been unfavourable to Western interests. The process of Community enlargement, if the Portuguese and Spanish Accession negotiations go according to plan, will tie three of these countries more closely into one of the two major Western groupings; and Spanish accession to NATO would be another positive development. A possible Turkish application for Community membership would, however, cause serious problems given the impossibility of either accepting or flatly rejecting it.

B. Sub-Saharan Africa

10. Sub-Saharan Africa is important to the West as a source of essential raw materials, as a trade partner and useful field for investment, as the place of residence for significant numbers of Western nationals, as an area occupying geographical points of strategic vulnerability and as the scene of a potentially damaging and long drawn-out political struggle: the future of Southern Africa, with which the West is inescapably involved.

11. As a source of raw materials, Nigeria is an important oil supplier, and Gabon and Angola are also producing significant quantities of oil. Africa's particular importance lies in the supply of vital minerals: cobalt, copper and uranium from Zaire and Zambia; gold, uranium, diamonds and a host of other important minerals such as chrome, asbestos and manganese from South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia; diamonds, bauxite and iron ore from Sierre Leone, Angola and Ghana. For a substantial number of these minerals there is no alternative source outside the Soviet Union.

12. As a trade partner, Nigeria is the largest market in black Africa for Western imports, taking £638 million of British exports in 1979; other important customers are Kenya (£195 million), Tanzania(£112 million), Ghana (£88 million) and Zambia (£85 million). South Africa imported £667 million of British goods in 1979. Given reasonable political stability, there is considerable scope for economic expansion throughout Africa, and the West is well placed to provide the technological and managerial expertise that will be required.

13. Substantial numbers of Western nationals, originating from the European colonial period, are still resident in Africa. In Rhodesia there are some 100,000 UK passport holders, in Zambia30,000, in Kenya 10,000 (plus 17,500 Asians with British passports). In South Africa, the white English-speaking community has strong links with Britain. Elsewhere in Africa there are important French communities in the former French colonies and an important Belgian community in Zaire. As the Kolwezi massacre following the Shaba invasion of Zaire in 1978 demonstrated, these communities are vulnerable and, on occasion, their protection can require direct Western intervention.

14. Sub-Saharan Africa is an area of major strategic interest. Already, Soviet influence in the Horn means that the Soviet Union could interfere with Western shipping there; and the Soviet presence in Angola and Mozambique could threaten the shipping lanes around the Cape, the freedom of which is vital to Western oil imports.

15. Over the longer term, the hostility of black Africa to the political power of the white minority in South Africa is a threat to Western interests

in Africa as a whole. Egged on by the Soviet bloc, radical African states may threaten to make the severance of the West's economic ties with South Africa a pre-requisite for good relations with black Africa. A major challenge for Western diplomacy is to avoid being forced to choose between South Africa and the rest of Africa. To finesse this choice, the West will need to encourage and sustain moderate black African states on the one hand, while convincing the Soviet bloc's African friends on the other that their long-term interests lie in increasing their links with the West. The West also needs to be seen to be bringing its influence to bear on the South African Government to adopt more acceptable political and social policies.

C. Latin America and the Caribbean

17. Latin America is an expanding source of commodities (Brazil and Colombia for coffee, Brazil for cocoa) and of raw materials, especially minerals and foodstuffs. Latin American countries are among the top five holders of reserves of fourteen of the twenty-two strategically important minerals (copper, tin, bauxite, titanium, cobalt etc.). Venezuela is currently the largest oil producer outside the Middle East; Mexico, with potentially greater reserves, is already self-sufficient and exports oil to the USA, Japan and Europe; Argentina, Peru and Ecuador are approaching self-sufficiency. Latin America's potential for agricultural production has been only patchily realised but could be of global importance by the year 2000. Brazil and Argentina (and Mexico to a lesser extent) have ambitious civil nuclear programmes which will give them an independent fuel cycle and weapons capability: neither Brazil nor Argentina subscribes to the NPT.

18. Strategically, Latin America and the Caribbean are of major importance to the USA, the Panama Canal being of especial significance. The area also has possible wider significant in the East-West context, as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis illustrated. Cuba is the only fully-fledged Communist state to have come into existence without direct Soviet or Chinese intervention: it represents a continuing threat throughout the area but in particular in the context of precarious stability in many Caribbean and Central American countries.

19. In many countries of Central America, political activity has become increasingly polarised, and the evident vulnerability of the old order must make Central America attractive to the Russians in the medium term. While the Soviet Union has established disproportionately large embassies in Costa Rica and (lately) in Nicaragua and is beginning to play a more obviously active role, they have in general preferred to use Cuba as their stalking horse. Cuba played a discreet but probably decisive role in the Nicaraguan revolution and there is a large Cuban presence in Nicaragua. There is no evidence of active Cuban involvement in the current political confrontation in El Salvador, but some Cuban arms may be filtering in through Honduras. In Guatemala, Cuba has been giving guerrilla groups moral and material support for years, but the government is not yet seriously threatened.

20. South America is not at present a critical area. Historically, while anti-American, it has through its affinities with Europe shown pro-Western sympathies. Its growing wealth gives it shared interests with the developed world. This applies in particular to the Andean Pact (Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia), a moderate pro-democratic and fundamentally pro-Western Alliance. But Latin American countries are active

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members of the G77 and adopt Third World attitudes in the North-South dialogue. A number are members of the Non-Aligned Movement. While these susceptibilities could be played on, there is no strident anti-colonialism. A number of countries have internal problems of social and political instability, with extremes of wealth, high inflation and unemployment and often excessive suppression of opposition with human rights violations, all of which provide opportunities for terrorist or communist-backed organisations. In concert with our EC and NATO partners we have every reason to build on existing affinities and shared interests with a view to a solid political relationship which should exclude Soviet influence.

D. Asia

21. Asia is a region of major interest for the West. After Europe and the Middle East, it is perhaps the most likely scenario for a Great Power conflict. Underlying instability in South West Asia, caused by differences between India and Pakistan, has existed since 1947 and has led to three major wars. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has exacerbated the problems. Vietnam's attempts to dominate Indo-China have caused major upheavals and great loss of life. The obsessive distrust between China and the Soviet Union seems likely to persist for some time.

22. The strategic importance of South West Asia lies in the relative proximity to the oil producing areas of the Gulf. Should Pakistan, or components of a disintegrated Pakistan, fall under Soviet control the security of our supplies could be put at risk. Strategically important lines of communication also lie through South East Asia (eg Japan/Middle East, Europe/Australasia).

23. Politically, India is important as a strong military power whose voice counts with the non-aligned. In South East Asia it is in the West's interest that ASEAN be supported as a moderate political and economic grouping, and hence as a major factor for stability. The West has a common interest with China in procuring the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and a fortiori preventing the extension of Vietnamese influence and activities beyond the boundary of Indo-China (in the first instance, Thailand). China's concern to block and counteract the extension of Soviet influence in Asia is important for the West, eg in the Afghanistan context; and by effectively forming a 'second front' against the Soviet Union, China diverts and thereby reduces the Soviet military threat to the West. Japanese economic and political (but not military) support contributes to the prosperity of many Third World countries, which might otherwise be more susceptible to Soviet influence.

24. The West has an interest in the stability of the region. The USA and the UK have continuing commitments under the Manila Pact. The UK has a major responsibility for Hong Kong. In addition, the UK has obligations (shared with Australia and New Zealand) under the Five Power Defence Arrangements and an undertaking to keep a Gurkha Battalion in Brunei until at least 1983. The USA is militarily allied to Japan, which provides important naval and other bases; and has a substantial defence interest in South Korea and Taiwan.

25. The region is also important economically; it contains a number of developing economies which now offer competition as well as opportunities to the West: eg Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and India. Japan is already the second largest economy in the non-communist world. The ASEAN countries, too, continue to enjoy a high economic growth rate, expected to

be about 7 to 8 per cent per annum over the next five years, and are major producers of raw materials (tin, rubber, hardwood etc.). The West needs to expand its economic links with this market.

Annex C

THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES FIRMLY IN THE SOVIET CAMP

ANGOLA

1. Angola is a one-party state. The governing party, MPLA, received material and political support from the communist countries in its struggle for independence against the Portuguese and therefore regards the Soviet bloc as its natural ally.

2. The Soviet Union and her allies are well established. There are about 19,000 Cuban troops in Angola and 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers. In addition there are about 850 Soviet military and civilian advisers and over 1,000 East European advisers, mainly East German. The Angolan armed forces are almost entirely equipped with Soviet weapons, and Angola has Treaties of Friendship with the Soviet Union (1976) and East Germany (1979).

3. The West's interests are to retain Angolan support for a negotiated settlement in Namibia; to continue to play a major role in developing Angola's oil and mineral resources (particularly diamonds); to expand trade with a growing market and to reduce Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba.

4. Although there have been conflicting reports, it seems likely that the Cubans have not increased their strength in Angola in recent years, and may indeed be interested in reducing it. But there is unlikely to be any significant reduction as long as the threat from South Africa and UNITA (see below) continues.

5. There are two main options open to the West. The first is to continue its present policy of slowly strengthening diplomatic and commercial links with Angola. This was the policy pursued when Neto was President, and the present Angolan Government has not yet shown any desire to break off these links. It is particularly important to keep up the dialogue with Angola over Namibia in order to head off African demands for economic sanctions against South Africa. The sale of non-lethal military equipment would reduce Angola's dependence on Soviet supplies.

6. The second option would be to support Savimbi and his UNITA movement. Savimbi has strong backing from his own tribe and is active in four or five of Angola's seventeen provinces; he is also able to stop international traffic on the Benguela railway. The attraction of this option is that a military defeat for the Cubans in Angola would badly shake Castro's regime.

7. However, Savimbi has little or no appeal to the country's other tribal groups, who make up the majority of the population; he receives support from South Africa, and is indeed indentified with South Africa in the minds of many black African countries; and any attempt by him to increase the scale of his activities would almost certainly result in an increase in Cuban troops.

8. It would seem better, therefore, to encourage Savimbi to seek a peaceful settlement with the Angolan Government, with the withdrawal

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of Cuban forces forming part of the package. There is evidence that both the MPLA and Savimbi would be prepared to consider such a solution when the time is ripe.

CUBA

9. Western policy towards Cuba is determined by her rôle as stalking horse for the Soviet Union. She has proved an effective instrument for spreading Soviet influence in Africa and the Caribbean. This rôle accords with Fidel Castro's belief in the internationalisation of the Cuban revolution, which is now the centre of Cuba's foreign policy. Much of Cuba's success is derived from exploiting the image of a small Third World nation which has successfully withstood United States pressure and been able to spread its political and military influence in different parts of the world.

10. The United States has adopted the strongest line towards Cuba. The establishment of a communist state on America's doorstep has caused considerable irritation and frustration to successive US administrations. The US economic blockade continues to impose hardship on the Cuban economy and is a major irritant in US/Cuban relations. The new Carter Administration initiated moves which might have led to a lifting of the embargo, but this ceased with the increasing Cuban military involvement in Ethiopia. The attractive prospect of access to the traditional US market has been insufficient to divert Cuba from her chosen path. Since she receives from the Soviet Union economic subsidies of an estimated US $6-8 million per day, and the economic blockade has been lifted by other members of the Organisation of American States (OAS), Cuba continues to get by without US trade.

11. The UK's relations with Cuba since the revolution have generally been cool, with the emphasis on trade. Other members of the European Community have taken varying attitudes, but they have generally been less prepared than the UK to act to counter growing Cuban influence in international forums. Cuba's traditional and most natural European contact has been with Spain, which has provided large commercial credits.

12. Following the lifting of the economic blockade by the OAS, Cuba has established commercial links with Latin America. Trade has been particularly strong with Argentina. But the Latin American nations continue to be wary, as a result both of Cuban attempts at subversion in the 1960s and of more recent Cuban involvement with left-wing movements in Central America and the Caribbean. Venezuela and Colombia have expressed concern at increasing Cuban influence in the Eastern Caribbean. Mexico, while publicly adopting a stance sympathetic to Cuba, is aware of the dangers of too close a link with the Castro regime.

13. Cuba has been successful in the last 3-4 years in exercising influence through international and regional organisations. The peak of her achievement was to be elected Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Havana, September 1979. This placed her in a unique position to spread Soviet influence further in the Third World. The UK and USA have taken suitable opportunities to point out to NAM members the myth of Cuba's non-alignment and her considerable economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with

subsequent Cuban endorsement has, for the time being, at least, done more than we could to damage Cuba's credibility with the Movement.

14. The West should capitalise on this by continuing to stress Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union and undermining her claim to non-alignment. Countries may be less likely to provide Cuba with favourable commercial credits if they appreciate that by so doing they are relieving the Soviet Union of some of the economic burden which support of Cuba requires. Cuba's poor economic performance and human rights record, and the fact that the majority of her soldiers sent to fight in Africa are black while the ruling Cuban elite is almost all white, could also be played upon. Care must be taken, however, not to adopt too visible and aggressive a stance, since there is a danger of a Third World backlash against Western (and particularly US) interference.

15. There is no prospect of Cuba's breaking away from Soviet influence in the short-term. Economic problems within the Soviet Union during the next decade could, however, impose a strain on Cuban/Soviet relations if the Russians were forced to cut back aid or charge more for oil supplies. In the absence of assistance from other quarters this could also result in problems inside Cuba. The West should be ready to benefit from any strains which arise. In the meantime, we should consult with Spain with a view to learning more about internal Cuban affairs, and to establishing how increased pressure might be brought.

ETHIOPIA

16. Ethiopia is governed by a Marxist military junta, headed by Colonel Mengistu, heavily dependent upon Russian and Cuban support. With some 15,000 Cubans, over 1,000 Russians and nearly 500 East Germans in advisory and other roles, the communist bloc has considerable influence. Ever since their switch of support in 1977 from Somalia to Ethiopia, the Russians have given substantial assistance in terms of military equipment. Ethiopia has Treaties of Friendship with the Soviet Union (1978) and East Germany (1979); an inter-connecting Treaty of Friendship between Ethiopia and the PDRY was also concluded in 1979.

17. While the insurgency in the Ogaden continues, the level of Cuban presence is unlikely to go down. The number of Russians and East Germans is a function of several factors, the most important of which are the Eritrean war and the development of communist party structures.

18. The main Western interests in the Horn as a whole are strategic, since it dominates the vital trade routes through the Red Sea to the Suez canal. The commercial opportunities here are unlikely to be as significant as elsewhere in Africa.

19. The reduction of communist influence in Ethiopia will be difficult to achieve, but there is some potential leverage in the fact that the Ethiopians cannot expect to obtain from the Soviet bloc all the economic assistance or technology necessary to the country's development. Western aid, especially multilateral, is therefore important.

20. The UK has virtually wound up its bilateral aid programme, although it is still committed to providing some 18% of the large statutory aid provision under the European Development Fund. The access

of our relatively small mission to the highest Ethiopian circles is negligible and unlikely to improve, and there have been no Ministerial visits since the 1974 revolution. The future of the British Council in Ethiopia beyond 1981/82 is also in doubt. In the circumstances it will be difficult for the UK to do more than keep a foot in the door.

21. We should, however, along with our Western allies, continue to maintain diplomatic links and [redacted] commercial relations in readiness for the day when the Derg decides that dependence on the Soviet Union no longer serves its interest.

VIETNAM

22. Vietnam's historic preoccupation, interrupted by the French colonial period and the Vietnam War, is with her relationship with China. Her first concern now is to maintain her independence and freedom of action. Events marking the deterioration in the relationship since 1975 include the abrupt ending of Chinese aid, Vietnam's 'quiet' take-over of Laos, the invasion of pro-Chinese Cambodia, China's 'preemptive counter-attack' and the expulsion of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese. Vietnam has now reached an almost total breach with China and a corresponding near-total dependence on Soviet economic and military support.

23. The new Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is not easy and gives the USSR the ability, by withdrawing support (or hinting at it), to limit Vietnam's scope to act. The Soviet Union, by the November 1978 Cooperation and Friendship Treaty, undertook to underwrite the December 1978 invasion of Cambodia and its aftermath, but the decision to invade was Vietnam's.

24. Vietnam's aims include the domination of Laos and Cambodia. Laos is for all practical purposes in the bag, but in Cambodia 200,000 troops are tied down at great economic cost, with no present prospect that the puppet regime in Phnom Penh can survive without continuing large-scale military support. The dénouement of this 'proto-Afghanistan' is not easy to predict. Vietnam's attitude to Thailand in the immediate future will depend on how she fares in Cambodia; and the continuing Vietnamese failure to eliminate Khmer Rouge and other resistance is likely to lead sooner or later to border clashes or even punitive incursions. But in the longer term there is no evidence that Vietnam has territorial ambitions in Thailand or seeks the degree of control exercised in Laos. The major threat to other countries lies in the possibility of increased Vietnamese support for subversive activity in Thailand and possibly in other ASEAN states.

25. The near termination of Western aid to Vietnam since 1978 has left no effective economic levers except disruption of trade. Japan buys nearly 80% of Vietnam's hard currency exports and provides over a third of her hard currency imports. The Nine account for almost half her imports and a fifth of her exports (France 16% of imports, 8% of exports). Her ability to import already depends heavily on concessional credit facilities which are unlikely to be renewed.

26. There is no reason to suppose that the West could persuade the Soviet Union to impose terms on Vietnam, and great doubt about the Soviet ability to do so. The only other channels of pressure are:

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a) through China's capacity to inflict military damage;

b) through international opinion.

An example of the latter has been the so far largely successful attempts to stop the boat people exodus. The theoretical alternative, of seeking to improve relationships by a massive offer of Western aid, would involve very large sums which most Western Governments, including the USA, seem unlikely to contemplate in the short term, and which in any case would be unlikely to have significant effect on Vietnamese behaviour. A rapprochement with Vietnam could also seriously damage the West's developing relationship with China.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

27. This small impoverished State is reliant on Soviet and Cuban military, civil and financial assistance. It is of considerable value to the Russians as a naval and air base and played an essential role in the campaign to recapture the Ogaden and Eritrea in 1977. The PDRY has supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman's guerrillas in Dhofar and given them shelter since the war ended in 1975. It has a potential for subversion in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf where there are large Yemeni communities. PDRY troops have been used in Ethiopia and could be used as Soviet proxies elsewhere in the Middle East or the Muslim world.

28. The régime appears to be irreversibly in the Soviet camp. Saudi and Kuwaiti attempts to buy a non-aligned policy failed and the leader of a nationalist group in the government (President Rubay Ali) was defeated with Soviet help in a putsch in 1978. British (and Western) policy is to maintain minimal relations and use our small Mission as a listening post. We have a tiny scholarship programme (£40,000 per annum) and pay £1.5 million to Yemenis in lieu of Colonial pensions. There are signs of division in the ruling Popular Front between the Soviet Group and more non-aligned leaders, but open support for the latter would be counter-productive, and given the large Soviet presence and PDRY's weakness, a plot to oust the Russians is unlikely to succeed at present.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALREADY SUBJECT TO SOVIET OR PROXY INTERFERENCE

Section A: Middle East and North Africa

ALGERIA

1. Algeria is a radical socialist regime whose foreign policy objectives often conflict with our own and whose army uses a wide range of Soviet equipment. There are Soviet advisers in the country, but Algeria is far from being a Soviet proxy. She is economically dependent on trade with the West and is trying to improve relations with Europe and the USA. The Russians are kept at arms length and, although the Algerian and Soviet Governments agree on many issues, cannot take Algerian support for granted. The Algerians were, for instance, represented at the Islamabad Conference on Afghanistan.

2. Algeria is now the second largest market in the Middle East and is a significant source of energy supplies for the West. France's position as the ex-colonial power gives her the most extensive links, although the Algerians are anxious to diversify. It is in both the UK's political and commercial interests to make a major effort to increase our own trade with Algeria. We should also continue to encourage Algerian students to study in Britain (there are already some 2,000 in the UK financed by the Algerian Government), and since British aid is insignificant there is a strong case for increasing the British Council effort.

IRAN

3. The Soviet Union's aim must be to strengthen its influence in Iran, in which it has a substantial political, economic and strategic interest, and to work for the eventual installation of a pro-Soviet regime. The Russians were pleased by the overthrow of the Shah and the consequent loss of Western influence but are worried by the general instability and the new aggressively Islamic State, which provides an unwelcome example to the Soviet Union's own substantial Islamic peoples. Apart from the long-term importance of Iran's oil resources, the Soviet Union has a large economic stake in the country: it buys natural gas in large quantities (though reduced since the Revolution) and has provided technical assistance for a number of large-scale engineering projects. It maintains a large Embassy in Tehran.

4. There is a past history of Soviet intervention in support of Iranian separatist movements. Evidence by which to gauge the present level of such activity is sparse, but there is scope for support for discontented minority groups in Kurdestan, Azerbaijan and possibly elsewhere. The present weakness of the Iranian security forces must provide ample opportunity for subversion. The Soviet-backed Tudeh (Communist) party is also active, though its following is difficult to assess.

5. There are serious limits to what we can do to counter the threat. Principally because of the West's support for the Shah, the new regime is fervently anti-Western and anti-American; it is anxious to cut as many as possible of its previous ties with, and dependence on, Western countries. Approaches by the West may easily increase rather than diminish, Iranian resentment as long as this attitude persists. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has helped to increase hostility to the Soviet Union. The West should make an effort to reconstruct its

relations with Iran once the American hostages are released and to re-establish cultural and educational links. In time it should be possible to build up commercial and political contacts as the xenophobic enthusiasm of the Revolution is tempered by reality.

IRAQ

6. The Ba'ath party has ruled Iraq for ten years and fought off several serious threats, most recently from the Communist party, its former junior partner in government. Successive Soviet expansion in and around the Middle East has disillusioned Iraq but she is still very dependent on Russian arms and back-up. The fall of the Shah enabled Iraq to increase her oil production considerably (and prices very substantially) and left her the strongest military power in the region. But it also stirred up Iraq's Shi'a majority, unleashed further insurgency in Kurdistan and increased tension on the border. Although Iraq has drifted away from her former relationship with the Soviet Union she still distrusts the United States and fears a military occupation of the Gulf oil fields.

7. The USA is unable to make much impression on the Iraqi leadership and even the resumption of diplomatic relations is unlikely. But France, and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy, have reasonable relations and our own are slowly improving. There is scope for political consultation, educational and technical assistance and arms sales, although given Iraq's abrasiveness and suspicion of the West, the relationship will not be easy.

LIBYA

8. Colonel Qadhafi's eccentric socialist regime is far from being a Soviet proxy. He believes in exporting his own brand of socialism, his policies are often at variance with Western interests and the Russians no doubt attempt to use him to further their own designs. Qadhafi is, however, a devout Muslim and committed to non-alignment. He will support Soviet policies only when they coincide with his own. He claims to have protested privately to the USSR about Afghanistan, and Libya was represented at the Islamabad Conference. Internally, the Russians are kept at arms length and do not even have port facilities in Libya.

9. Qadhafi's regime is firm enough to withstand Soviet penetration. We have no evidence of serious opposition, although this could develop if Qadhafi conducted many more foreign adventures.

10. In present circumstances there is little the West can do to improve its position in Libya. Qadhafi is attempting to subvert Tunisia, the Libyans have recently burnt down both the US and French embassies, and relations with France are strained both because of opposing positions in Chad and because of alleged Libyan support for the Corsican independence movement. The UK's relations are still coloured by the outstanding claims dispute and by memories of past Libyan support for the IRA, although we continue to try to improve them. Consideration is currently being given to the negotiation of a limited arms package which could help to ease UK/Libyan relations. But the most important contribution to Libya's relations with the West would be a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute.

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SYRIA

11. Soviet influence is greater in Syria than in any other country of the Near East. The internal situation is deteriorating and Syria is feeling increasingly isolated and threatened by Israel. These factors could lead the Government to accept an increased Soviet presence in the country. There are already Soviet advisers and most of Syria's arms come from the Soviet Union. If Syria were to accept a substantial increase in the number of Soviet advisers she could risk going the way of Afghanistan. This would have serious implications and could even lead eventually to direct confrontation between Israel and the Soviet Union.

12. This is, however, a scenario which the present Syrian Government (and indeed most Syrians) would resist. They have held out against signing a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR and, although they did not attend the Islamabad Conference, have not supported the invasion of Afghanistan. They are far from being a Soviet satellite. They are economically dependent on financial support from conservative Arab regimes, and 50% of their trade is with Western Europe. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Russians would themselves willingly be drawn into the Syrian (and consequently also the Lebanese) whirlpool.

13. The Russians' strongest card is the Arab/Israel issue. The Syrians are unlikely to break with them while the Israelis remain in occupation of Arab territory, and any substantial improvement in the West's relations with Syria must await a solution to the Arab/Israel question. Of the Western countries, France still retains the closest links, both culturally and with the Syrian armed forces. The UK has a small number of technical aid projects in Syria, and we can show our goodwill by responding to Syrian requests in certain areas, eg English language teaching, and, if the political climate permits, military training.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

14. The YAR has at present no exploitable oil. If the Soviet Union could secure as dominant a position in the YAR as it now has in the PDRY, the immediate strategic consequences would not be great, but Saudi Arabia would be threatened and the likelihood of further change in the area increased.

15. The country is torn between its financial dependence on Saudi Arabia, which supports the northern feudally-organised tribes, and the threat from the PDRY in the south: some Yemenis still aspire to a union between the two countries. Soviet influence derives from its large Embassy, the military assistance given to the republican side during the civil war from 1962-70 and subsequent arms sales (even in late 1979). There is also considerable PDRY subversion. The Saudis have played their hand clumsily, and the YAR Government has recently sought more Soviet arms in order to reduce Saudi influence and increase their financial support.

16. The West should increase its presence in Sana'a and provide more arms and technical assistance to balance the Soviet effort. This should be complemented by an attempt to work out a common policy with the Saudis, who could provide finance; we should persuade them to use their influence more sensitively. We might also consider encouraging Iraqi interest in the YAR. The United Kingdom could have a particular role, since many middle class Adenis with British links have taken refuge in the YAR. An agreement between the YAR and the European Community (EC) including a sizeable economic aid element, is currently under discussion in Brussels. We should support this.

/Section B

Section B: The Mediterranean

CYPRUS

17. The Turkish part of Cyprus is likely to remain under Turkey's influence for the foreseeable future. The Soviet threat in the Greek sector lies in the influence of the Communist party, AKEL, which is the biggest and best organised party on the island and under strong Moscow influence. It is already the major prop of the current centre/left Government of President Kyprianou.

18. It would be relatively simple for AKEL to change their line on the major Western interest in the island: the British Sovereign Bases. Hitherto, they have maintained that the removal of the bases would not easily be possible before an intercommunal settlement; but they could make retention of the bases very difficult. There is some evidence of a swing back to the right among the Cypriot electorate; the 1981 elections will show. But the growing mood of frustration among Greek Cypriots at the West's failure to dislodge the Turkish Army continues to pose a risk to Western interests.

19. The obvious way for the West to counter the Soviet threat is by bringing about an intercommunal settlement. Because of the intransigence of the Cyprus parties themselves this is only likely to be possible in a favourable conjuncture of internal and external circumstances, including a strongly-based moderate Greek Cypriot Government, and strong Government in Turkey interested in disposing of the problem, American and German Governments prepared to apply the necessary economic leverage (mainly on Turkey), and a cooperative attitude in Athens. Of these, only the last exists at present.

20. Otherwise the scope for Western action is limited. We should try to tie the Cyprus Government (and to a lesser extent the Turkish Cypriots) to the West, eg by strengthening the EC/Cyprus relationship. Local sensitivities make it desirable for US involvement to be minimised and the European role stressed.

TURKEY

21. Turkey is a special case. She is a developing country, but a member of the OECD; an Asian country aspiring to membership of the European Community; a Middle Eastern country which is a member of NATO; and a Moslem country which identifies more closely with Christendom than with her Arab neighbours.

22. The Soviet subversive threat is a factor in Turkey's internal instability and Soviet economic penetration is already significant. But these will only become critical in the event of substantial internal breakdown. This eventuality cannot be excluded. Parliamentary democracy is being threatened by a marked rise in terrorism and breaches of law and order. Despite martial law in one third of the country, the death toll from political violence now averages some 6 people a day. The Turkish National Police are generally unable to cope with terrorism, and the army is deeply concerned at the slide towards anarchy.

23. Political violence and terrorism are unlikely to disappear as long as the economy is in chaos. The West's main effort to support its strategically vital NATO ally should continue to be on the economic side. The FRG and USA are best placed to provide (and have already promised)

substantial sums, but the UK and France can also make a modest contribution. We can in addition make a practical contribution to Turkish security at relatively low cost by agreeing to requests for military or police advice, training and equipment. Increased visits, help with export promotion, technical assistance and cultural exchanges have all been agreed by UK Ministers. A strengthening of Turkey's relationship with the EC through the Association Agreement is also desirable. These measures may assist us to offset the effects of problems on other fronts, eg a Turkish application for EC membership later this year. The West should also continue to work actively for the reintegration of Greece into the NATO military structure; this would help Turkey by reducing her isolation and closing her Western flank.

YUGOSLAVIA

24. The Russians retain their long-term ambition of regaining influence over Yugoslavia. Such a move would bring them important political and strategic gains. It would also forestall any possible tilt by Yugoslavia towards the West in the post-Tito era. There is, however, at present no sizeable pro-Soviet faction in the Yugoslav leadership and Tito's likely successors are united in wishing to remain non-aligned. The Russians probably realise, therefore, that any move by them would have to be gradual.

25. There is little likelihood of direct Soviet military intervention, at least in the near future. The Russians no doubt recognise that this would meet with fierce resistance and provoke a serious confrontation with the West. They are therefore more likely to adopt other means of increasing their influence. They could exploit through subversion the differences between the nationalities in Yugoslavia and, by offering economic assistance, the growing economic problems likely to face Tito's successors.

26. The corner-stone of Yugoslavia's foreign policy is likely to remain non-alignment and the maintenance of a careful balance between East and West. The West should respect this and avoid embarrassing the Yugoslavs by over-protective expressions of support. Nonetheless we should make clear discreetly that we stand ready to help particularly in the economic field. The Yugoslavs have been concerned at their growing trade deficit with the West and the danger that this could force them into greater dependence on CMEA States. They therefore welcomed the initialling on 25 February of a new Cooperation Agreement with the EC. They will continue to look to the West for assistance in this area. We should also seek to maintain and develop relations in other areas, for example through high level political exchanges and cooperation in defence matters.

Section C: Sub-Saharan Africa and Indian Ocean

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BENIN

27. Marxist-Leninism has been the official ideology of the revolutionary military government since 1974, but Benin's pro-Soviet posturing masks an increasingly pragmatic and genuinely non-aligned approach. Soviet, Cuban, Chinese and North Korean military and civilian advisers assist the regime, but their influence in most fields is outweighed by the French who still dominate commercial and cultural life.

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28. Nigeria attaches importance to Benin and her influence has increased appreciably in recent years. We should encourage this development, while continuing our own small aid programme - mainly in the English teaching field - which makes a small but effective impact.

CAPE VERDE

29. Cape Verde pursues a non-aligned foreign policy and, although she has turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc for military aid, has maintained good relations with Portugal and continues to provide staging facilities for South African aircraft (an important source of revenue). Senegal has made vigorous efforts to encourage Cape Verde to pursue a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy.

30. The Soviet Union's prime interest is in Cape Verde's potential as a naval base; but President Pereira is reported to have assured Senegal last year that he would not allow the Russians to establish a base in the islands.

31. Cape Verde's continuing relationship with Portugal should prevent any change in her carefully balanced relationship with East and West. We should encourage the Portuguese to maintain their interest.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

32. Soviet and proxy influence seems to have increased during 1979 with the seizure of power by Colonel Sassou-Nguesso, who follows a more doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist line than his predecessor and leans further towards Moscow and Havana. Some hundreds of Russian, East German and Cuban military and civilian advisers are in the country, and the French have recently expressed anxiety about the evidently increasing numbers.

33. France still maintains close ties particularly in the commercial, technical assistance, educational and cultural fields and is best placed to counter Soviet and proxy influence. The French seem currently to be making a special effort: the President was given a red-carpet visit to Paris last October and came away with new aid offers of $100m. We should encourage the French to maintain this effort.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

34. 1979 saw a turning point in Equatorial Guinea's history with the overthrow of the brutal Macias regime and the consequent realignment of the country's foreign policy. The Macias government had received considerable assistance from the Soviet Union (with whom it concluded notorious and one-sided fishing agreement), from Cuba and East Germany.

35. The new regime made clear on its installation that it did not favour maintaining these ties, and many Soviet and Cuban personnel were expelled. The country now receives considerable aid from the West, and Spain, as the former colonial power, is providing the lion's share.

36. Equatorial Guinea remains a fundamentally vulnerable country. Though a pro-Western orientation is assured in the short term, neither the continuation of this attitude nor the stability of the regime can be properly assessed at present. We should back Spanish efforts to ensure that Equatorial Guinea continues to look to the West for support.

GUINEA

37. Guinea has large unexploited mineral resources and excellent agricultural potential. She could beome one of the richest countries in Africa. The Government of President Sekou Touré professes to be Marxist and until recently maintained close links with the Soviet bloc. During the last three years, however, Sekou Touré has distanced himself from the communists, restored good relations with France and with his moderate West African neighbours, followed a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy and made clear that Western aid, trade and investment are now welcome. Privately he admits that the policies pursued since independence have failed and that the communist bloc cannot, or will not, provide on acceptable terms the economic assistance which Guinea's development requires.

38. We and our partners should take every opportunity to encourage this promising trend by developing our relations with Guinea, particularly in the commercial and economic fields. The UK is handicapped in this respect both because our proposals to open a small Embassy in Conakry have been put on ice for economy reasons and because Guinea's default on her rescheduled debt payments has obliged ECGD to come off cover. But the visit of a Guinean goodwill mission this spring for talks with ECGD may open the way to a solution of the debts problem, and we are considering the possibility of starting a small aid programme in order to improve the environment for our current commercial efforts.

GUINEA-BISSAU

39. Soviet links with Guinea-Bissau date from the colonial period when they supplanted China as the principal supplier of military training and weapons to the liberation movement. The Soviet Union and East Germany continue to have a strong grip on the army, security forces and youth movement. But the government has re-established good relations with Portugal and during the past year has seemed determined to demonstrate genuine non-alignment. It resisted Cuban attempts to gain support for the pro-Soviet line at the Non-Aligned Summit and declined to support the Soviet Union on Afghanistan at the UN.

40. The country is of minimal economic or strategic importance and an increased effort by us would not be justified. The maintenance of Portuguese influence is the best insurance against the communists and we should encourage Portugal in her efforts to re-build links.

LESOTHO

41. Lesotho is poor, over populated, lacking in natural resources and entirely surrounded by South African territory. Almost total economic dependence on South Africa colours all her policies. Power rests with Dr Jonathan, leader of the Basutoland National Party, but no proper elections have been held since before independence in 1966. Despite recent violence instigated by the opposition, Jonathan has resisted holding fresh elections because of almost certain defeat by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).

42. Lesotho has recently opened diplomatic relations with both Cuba and the Soviet Union. There has also been an increase in contacts with Mozambique, including the training of Lesotho police and army personnel. This flirtation with the Soviet Union and her allies probably represents an attempt by Jonathan to pre-empt the development of similar relations between the BCP and the communists. The Russians are no doubt interested

in the opportunities that a foothold in Lesotho offers for the furtherance of their policies against South Africa. In view of Jonathan's uncertain political future it seems likely that the flirtation will continue, although he will probably be careful not to push South Africa into taking active measures, eg closing the Lesotho/South African border, an economic blockade or direct intervention.

43. The UK's own influence over events in Lesotho is limited. We have little trade and few important aid commitments, including aid to the police mobile unit; these should continue. Jonathan and his colleagues are, however, prepared to listen to our advice and we should take suitable opportunities to warn him of the risks he runs and the need to keep his relationship with South Africa in reasonable order.

MADAGASCAR

44. The main threat to Western interests would be the grant to the Russians of a base or facilities at Diego Suarez; President Ratsiraka has so far held out against Soviet pressure for this. The President is obsessed with his own security and buys considerable amounts of military equipment from the communists, especially North Korea. Although an energetic member of the NAM, Madagascar's abstention on the UN resolution on Afghanistan was not encouraging.

45. Madagascar supports the proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Friction is therefore possible over the joint US/UK use of Diego Garcia. Short of refusing to allow the Americans to expand the Diego Garcia facility there is little we can do to counter Malagasy disapproval on this question.

46. Of the Western countries, France plays the most prominent role. The UK's influence is relatively limited. We have no military assistance to offer and our aid programme is small. Our presence is welcomed by the Malagasy as a sign to the world of their respectability and there is modest trade between us in non-strategic items. Madagascar is also an important source of graphite for the UK. We have recently reopened our Embassy in Antananarivo and this may help with relations and support our expanding trading relationship. We are also trying to develop our defence sales.

MALI

47. The Soviet Union has a tight grip on the Armed Forces, and the East Germans enjoy a similar position in the security service and gendarmerie. The Russians are engaged in the construction of two international airports, use of which will be of strategic importance to them. In other fields Soviet and proxy influence is limited, and French, American and Chinese efforts provide an effective counter-balance.

48. The present government is committed to genuine non-alignment and seems to feel that the balance has tipped too far in Moscow's favour; it is making discreet efforts to adjust. We and our partners should encourage this process and keep a close eye on developments. An increase in the UK's bilateral effort would not be justified given our other commitments. We should continue to encourage the French and the Americans to provide the main sources of Western influence.

MAURITIUS

49. The main threat is from subversion through the forceful left-wing Movement Militant Mauritien, exploiting grievances such as high unemployment, poor wages and autocratic government, and issues such as the sovereignity of Diego Garcia and the desire of some former Chagos Islanders to return there. The main Western interest is to deny Mauritius as a port of call/base to the Russians. While the ageing Prime Minister Ramgoolam retains power there is little fear of this but he could be toppled at the next election, due by March 1982.

50. The outcome of the election may well depend on how effectively the Government deals with the damage caused by the worst series of cyclones suffered in many years. The UK made an emergency aid contribution of £5,000 and our share of the EC cyclone relief allocation amounted to £135,000. Budgetary constraints limit the amount of aid the UK can provide, and Mauritius is not a high priority country. The planned closure of the British Council and the increase in overseas student fees will hit Mauritius hard and reduce our influence there. But we should attempt to maintain our political and commercial relations as far as possible. The two-man military training team with the Special Mobile Force should remain.

MOZAMBIQUE

51. Mozambique is a one-party state. As in Angola, the governing party, FRELIMO, received material and political support from the communist countries in its struggle for independence against the Portuguese, and therefore regards the Soviet bloc as its natural ally. There are in Mozambique about 500 Soviet military and civilian advisers, over 1,200 Cuban advisers and over 400 East European advisers, mainly East German. The Mozambique armed forces are almost entirely equipped with Soviet weapons. Ideologically FRELIMO is more attuned to Marxist-Leninist ideas than to Western democracy; and Mozambique has Treaties of Friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union (1977) and East Germany (1979).

52. Mozambique is not, however, a Soviet satellite or surrogate. Although the Soviet Union is reported to want to establish a naval base at Nacala, Mozambique is said to have resisted this. And in the case of Rhodesia, President Machel has shown himself ready to pursue an independent and constructive policy. In order to restore Mozambique's shattered economy, he is prepared to follow a pragmatic policy towards South Africa; he is keen to receive aid from, and trade with, Western countries; and he is looking forward to the resumption of the profitable transit trade with Rhodesia. These factors provide an opportunity to reduce Mozambique's dependence on the Soviet Union and its allies, and to encourage her to adopt a more genuinely non-aligned stance.

53. The West can counter Soviet influence through the encouragement of increased commercial and economic links, bilateral aid programmes, and non-lethal military supplies. Mozambique should be encouraged to accede to the Lomé Convention and should be associated in any moves to find peaceful settlements to residual South African problems, particularly since she would be reluctant for practical reasons to impose economic sanctions against South Africa.

NAMIBIA

54. If there is an international settlement with UN elections in

Namibia, SWAPO, already strongly influenced by the USSR and with a significant Marxist element in its leadership, could form, or be a coalition partner in, the government. They might call in communist support to bolster their position against white reaction backed by South Africa, or find Soviet intervention forced on them through subversion, as part of the communist strategy of pressure against South Africa and Southern African mineral resources. This could seriously hurt the UK, nearly half of whose uranium imports for electricity until 1984 come from Namibia.

55. In such circumstances, aid or economic support for the new government to help it towards genuine non-alignment would be important. So, too, would diplomatic pressure on South Africa to prevent it from giving the USSR an excuse to intervene, and in favour of building a relationship with the new government analogous to South Africa's relationship with Mozambique.

56. If there were to be a South African sponsored internal settlement, a war of attrition between SWAPO and South Africa could ensue. This would give increasing opportunites for communist involvement, not excluding the commitment of ground troops to invade Namibia from Angola.

57. It is therefore important for the West to continue to work for a negotiated UN settlement.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

58. Soviet and proxy influence in STP is strong and the regime has recently shifted to the left as moderates have been removed from office. Links with Angola are also close. The islands have some limited strategic value as a staging post, (extensively used at present by the Cubans), and it is undesirable that they should drift further into the Soviet orbit.

59. The most effective counter-balance to the communists is Portugal, and we should encourage the Portuguese in their present efforts to rebuild their traditional links.

SEYCHELLES

60. There is a threat to Western interests from the increasingly radical policies of the present government. Although René, an ardent member of the non-aligned movement, aims to play off the superpowers against each other, he may be in more danger than he realises of being toppled by Soviet-supported Leftists. Western interests are to prevent the establishment of a Soviet base or facilities in the Seychelles; to persuade the Seychelles Government to co-operate over the application of the Islands Agreement (which seeks both to deny Seychelles facilities to Soviet ships and aircraft and gives the 'current users' - essentially the UK and USA - certain staging rights); and to defer any closure of the American satellite tracking station until a replacement has been brought into service. Our close association with the American military build-up on Diego Garcia will make it harder for us to pursue these interests.

61. The means at the West's disposal to counter Soviet ambitions are limited. Relations with France and the USA are strained, the British aid programme is diminishing and there is only limited British trade with and investment in the Seychelles. Although we were prepared to help train the embryo army in amphibious warfare, the scheme was rejected by René, who believes that the French Government was involved in a recent plot to

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overthrow him and now intends to seek police and military training and assistance only from Third World countries. Nonetheless there is still a possibility that a request for training may be revived later this year; we should respond positively.

TANZANIA

62. The West's direct interests in Tanzania are modest, although commercially Tanzania is important to Britain (third largest market in Black Africa). Tanzania's political importance resides principally in President Nyerere's influence with the more radical Africans, especially in his capacity as chairman of the 'front-line' States.

63. The USSR and China have cultivated Nyerere since independence but with limited success so far. There has been little ideological support among Tanzanian politicians for Soviet-style socialism. Tanzania is, moreover, a member of the non-aligned movement, and Nyerere criticised the invasion of Afghanistan. But the Eastern bloc is already a source of military supplies to Tanzania; and when Nyerere goes there could be a power vacuum which might offer openings to the Russians.

64. A sharp deterioration in the already strained relations between Kenya and Tanzania, leading to the West's siding openly with Kenya, could also create an opening.

65. The West could attempt to maintain its influence by providing Tanzania with what she wants: more economic aid, better credit, and perhaps military equipment. But this might only buy temporary favour: the UK's aid programme of £20 million per annum notably counted for little in moderating Nyerere's attitude towards the Rhodesian elections. The UK has therefore decided to keep Tanzania at arm's length for the present.

ZAMBIA

66. Zambia is a one-party state with power concentrated in the hands of President Kaunda, a relatively moderate leader compared with many of his African colleagues. He has an affection for the Commonwealth and has in the past shown that he can be helpful to Western interests. He looks to the West for badly needed economic support. Zambia is an important source of copper and cobalt for Britain and a potential source of uranium. Britain has a 21% share of the Zambian imports market and there is a substantial (30,000) British community.

67. In the past Zambia has flirted with a number of communist countries including China, Yugoslavia, the GDR and the Soviet Union, securing military equipment and assistance from the Chinese. Soviet and Cuban military advisers have trained ZAPU guerrillas at camps on Zambian territory, and there are also about 180 Soviet and East European civilian aid personnel. Soviet and GDR influence has increased during the past two years. Zambia recently concluded a $100 million arms deal with the Soviet Union, in frustration at not getting the military supplies she wanted from the West. Kaunda claims however, to be conscious of the risks of substantial Soviet involvement and is probably aware that he would not get from them the vital economic support which

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he currently enjoys from the West.

68. The UK's relations with Zambia have been strained as a result of the Rhodesian conflict, for which she holds us responsible. The peaceful settlement in Rhodesia should reduce Zambia's military vulnerability and improve her economic prospects. Meanwhile our influence remains largely in abeyance following the Rhodesian elections.

69. The West should continue to demonstrate its desire to secure peaceful and equitable solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. We should continue to help the Zambian economy through our aid programme, including the provision of technical expertise. We should also maintain a dialogue with Kaunda as and when circumstances permit.

Section D: Asia

INDIA

70. The Soviet Union has worked hard to increase its influence in India. The recent change of Government will encourage Soviet efforts, which may be assisted by Mrs Gandhi's deep suspicion of the United States. She is not, however, necessarily pro-Soviet and her son, Sanjay, is even less so.

71. India maintains large military forces. It is in the Western interest to ensure that relations between India and Pakistan improve and that Indian forces are not again used against Pakistan. The Soviet Union may hope that a closer relationship with India will add to pressures on Pakistan to adopt a more favourable policy towards the Soviet Union.

72. As one of the most important non-aligned countries India can play an important part in the NAM. The strong opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan within the Movement will encourage the Indians to maintain their demands for Soviet withdrawal. It would help to keep India out of the Soviet camp if the West demonstrated that it felt the NAM had a role to play in dealing with Afghanistan and other major international problems. We should therefore aim to hold regular consultations with the Indians on these issues. Aid and arms sales should continue.

PAKISTAN

73. Pakistan is the country most directly threatened by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. We doubt whether the Russians wish to increase their influence in Pakistan to the extent of making her a satellite. That would create potential problems in their relationship with India. But as long as Pakistan pursues pro-Chinese policies the Soviet Union will have an inducement to stir up trouble. Baluchistan in particular is an area which could easily be subverted. The possibility also exists that the Russians might attempt to undermine the Government at the centre. The military regime in Pakistan lacks popular support. Political activity is banned, but sections of former political parties are sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

74. Although the West should not take any action that would discourage the restoration of democracy, it would lead to a loss of confidence in the West if we did nothing to help Pakistan. The best way of doing so is through increased economic assistance and by helping Pakistan to defend herself through military training and the sale of military equipment. Arms should not, however, be sold on a scale which would alarm the Indians. It would serve our interests best if Pakistan were able to purchase military equipment on commercial terms with money provided by the Saudis and other Arab countries, with whom, as a major Islamic country, she has close links. This seemed to be the intention behind the Pakistani announcement, made at the

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beginning of March, that they were refusing the US aid package, which included $200 million of credits for military equipment, and putting their trust in their Arab friends.

Section E: Latin America and the Caribbean

GRENADA

75. Since Mr Maurice Bishop's coup d'etat in March 1979, Cuban influence in Grenada has grown sharply and Grenada has abandoned democracy and civil liberties. Bishop's early promises to hold elections have been forgotten, the "Torchlight" newspaper has been closed, the Cuban-trained security forces have greatly expanded, and there are about 100 political prisoners. The Cubans were quick to support the coup and there are now many skilled personnel in Grenada. Among other things, they are contributing US$9 million worth of aid in the form of materials and personnel for the construction of a new airport. In return, Grenada voted with the Soviet Union at the UN on the Afghanistan resolution.

76. The West should, while maintaining correct formal relations, make clear by all suitable means including curtailment of aid its concern to see the restoration of democracy and a less pro-Soviet foreign policy. We should remain on the alert for signs that Grenada is being used as a base for subversion in the Caribbean. We should also expose the undemocratic and repressive nature of the Bishop regime.

GUYANA

77. The recent extension of the life of Parliament for a further year until October 1980 seems a further step in the erosion of democracy. Adoption of the new Constitution with its provision for a strong executive president should further strengthen the position of the Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, who has been taking an increasingly anti-Western line in foreign affairs. It remains to be seen whether Burnham will allow free elections. Even if he did and lost, the potential alternative governments, including Cheddi Jagan's PNP, are more Marxist-inclined than the present government.

78. There is little the West can do in such circumstances. The UK should consider whether to maintain its links with the defence forces, which are a stable and non-political element in the country.

JAMAICA

78. Jamaica has gradually slid into economic trouble since Mr Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP) came to power in 1972. World economic factors together with unrealistic policies have led to an annual decline in GNP of 2% per annum, 30% unemployment and inflation in 1978 of between 35% and 47%. Western aid has underpinned the economy while it has gradually weakened. During this period Cuba has developed close links with both the government and the Marxist Workers' Party. She has also provided some low-cost aid in the form of technical assistance. Cuban penetration of the government-controlled media has led to her efforts receiving uncritical praise, while the major source of Western aid, the IMF, has come in for severe criticism. Mr Manley and leading members of his government have also been lavish with praise for Cuban and

Soviet policies.

80. Jamaica's inability to comply with the terms of the [redacted] agreement with the IMF has led to its termination. The withdrawal of Western aid would force Jamaica to turn to Cuba and the Soviet Union. But Cuba alone could not help Jamaica, and the Soviet Union is believed to have refused Jamaican requests for assistance in 1977. There is no strategic reason for the Soviet Union to support Jamaica on a large scale since Cuba already provides a bridgehead in the Caribbean. There could be damage to the international financial system if the country's economic collapse were blamed on the IMF.

81. The UK should consider its future aid programme in the light of the termination of the IMF agreement. We should [redacted] continue with UKMTAS training: the Jamaican army is non-political and could come into its own in the event of a breakdown of law and order.

NICARAGUA

82. The new government is making admirable efforts to re-build the country in the wake of Somoza's overthrow, accepting help from Cuba as well as the West. Some 2,000 Cubans are now in the country operating as doctors, teachers etc. A nationwide literacy scheme in which Cuban teachers will play a major role will provide a means for indoctrination of the large illiterate peasant population. The Russians are opening a very large Embassy in Managua. The US and the Nine are watching the situation carefully.

83. The Americans are best placed to assist Nicaragua and are already providing substantial aid. The UK might also consider giving Nicaragua higher priority in its aid programme, but projects will need to be chosen carefully to allow us to cut our losses if she does move more closely into the Soviet camp. To prevent this, the West should give manifest support for a politically independent stance by Nicaragua.

VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NOT YET SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT SOVIET OR PROXY INTERFERENCE

Section A: Middle East and North Africa

EGYPT

1. Egypt's internal economic problems and the uncertain prospects for her relations with other Arab States could create the conditions which would allow the Russians to re-establish their influence. This could only come about as the result of a change in regime, since President Sadat remains implacably hostile to the Soviet Union. It would be a major set-back for the West both strategically and politically. One incentive for a successor regime to mend its fences with the Russians would be the prospect of renewed arms supplies.

2. President Sadat's strong personal dislike of the Russians is broadly shared in Egypt. The Egyptians know that only the USA is in a position to influence Israel; they will be reluctant to sacrifice the gains made from the Treaty with Israel, although not all Egyptians support it; they will also continue to look to the West, particularly the UK, for arms supplies. The re-establishment of dominant Soviet influence in the short-term is thus unlikely. A limited rapprochment between Egypt and the Soviet Union, including the return of an Egyptian Ambassador to Moscow, was cut short by the invasion of Afghanistan.

3. Western political and economic support for Sadat's Egypt and progress towards a comprehensive Arab/Israel settlement are the best safeguards. Although the dominant influence in Egypt is American, the UK has a considerable aid programme and should maintain its cooperation with the armed forces.

THE GULF STATES: BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, QATAR AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

4. All four States share a similar form of government: traditional ruling families. They all, since the fall of the Shah, are concerned by the danger from the Iranian revolution, and are worried about the possible effects of events in Mecca last November. Their Shi'a communities (55% in Bahrain, up to 30% in Kuwait, but small elsewhere) have shown restiveness in the last year; this has not been helped by inflammatory broadcasts from Iran. The Gulf States have all faced in varying degrees a threat from Iraqi subversion, but the scope for Soviet subversion still seems limited. Only in Kuwait has the Soviet bloc any diplomatic representation.

5. Threats to particular countries are:

a) Kuwait: Direct invasion by Iraq, as in 1961. Threats from the Palestinians, who make up $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total population.

b) Bahrain: The Iranian claim to Bahrain, revived in 1979 by certain Iranian clergy, who later added an ultimatum to the Bahrain Ruling Family to make way for an Islamic Republic or face incorporation into Iran.

c) UAE: Dissension among the Rulers of the seven Emirates which form the loose federation of the UAE. Very poor security against eventual subversion.

Iran and may eventually pose a strong challenge to Saudi authority. The Saudis are also beset by a range of increasingly pressing regional problems and risk damaging entenglements over the YAR and PDRY borders, the Horn of Africa, Iraq and Iran (in the Gulf). Saudi Arabia is an obvious target for Soviet regional strategy.

17. The West can make only a limited contribution to internal stability. Corruption and related deficiencies in the Ruling Family's life style and methods of rule should be condemned, but implicitly rather than explicitly, and the West should refrain from condoning or conniving in them. At the same time we can improve cooperation in the fields of defence and internal security (by the provision of equipment and training and exchange of information); and in educational matters. Accusations of a pro-Western bias from neighbours and perhaps from some quarters within Saudi Arabia would lose much of their force if the West (or at least Europe if this is impossible for the USA) took a more constructively pro-Arab stance in the Arab/Israel conflict; and if a less prodigal oil policy were implemented by all Western nations.

SUDAN

18. The Soviet Union might be able to regain a dominant influence if the Sudan's considerable economic and political problems worsen and this leads to the fall of President Nimeiri. Additionally, there remains tension between the northern and southern halves of the country since the aspirations of the latter are still insufficiently met. The Sudanese Communist party is the largest in the Arab world and retains influence in a number of key unions despite intermittent Government harrassment. Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia also presents a serious potential threat, although the Sudanese have made a number of attempts to mend their fences with Addis Ababa.

19. The Sudan is not of crucial economic or political importance to the West. There is vast agricultural potential but its realisation will take decades at best. The disappearance of President Nimeriri could, however, undermine President Sadat's position and open the way to progressive co-operation with Libya. It would also mean the loss of a moderate and influential voice in Africa and the Arab world.

20. Sudan looks to the West, and particularly to the UK, as her traditional supplier of financial assistance and military hardware with which to resist Ethiopian or Libyan aggression. We should encourage the Saudis to step up aid and maintain our military training programme. As an insurance policy, should Nimeiri fall, we should keep up our links with Sadiq el Mahdi, a possible successor who is on the whole pro-Western.

TUNISIA

21. After 20 years of stability, Tunisia is going through a period of some uncertainty as a result of Bo guiba's advanced age, the illness of the Prime Minister, Mr Nouira, and Libyan attempts at subversion. The Government successfully dealt with the Libyan-sponsored attempted up-rising in Gafsa, but there is a danger of growing instability in the area which could be exploited by the Russians. While Tunisia is not of great economic or political importance, if it were to fall into Soviet hands it would offer valuable port facilities in the Mediterranean.

22. The Americans and the French, who have already reacted to the Gafsa incident, would take the lead in ensuring the survival of Tunisian democracy, but we should give moral and political support. British aid is small and all of it is devoted to British Council activities, which can have significant influence and should therefore continue.

Section B: The Mediterranean

MALTA

23. The chief threat lies in the probable long-term aim of the Soviet Union, with its lack of bases in the central and western Mediterranean, of seeking naval facilities in Malta. The Prime Minister, Mr Mintoff, is inhibited from offering these both by his declared policy of keeping the navies of both superpowers out of Malta and because such a step would be highly unpopular domestically. But he has on a number of occasions threatened to 'sell' such facilities to the highest bidder and might succumb (particularly if other things were going badly for him) if the Russians made a large enough offer. Such a step could be accompanied by the suspension of the Constitution and the establishment of a non-democratic regime.

24. There is probably little danger of the Russians' using the small and uninfluential Maltese Communist Party to increase their influence. A more likely instrument would be the Czechs, who are the only Warsaw Pact members to have established a resident mission in Malta and who already provide quite substantial aid.

25. A major shift in the Maltese position is unlikely, at least as long as the main Western powers continue to demonstrate interest in good relations. But should it be necessary to counter a determined Soviet bid to establish a foothold, the financial cost would probably be high. Mr Mintoff has already demanded, in the context of a proposed agreement under which France, Italy, Libya and Algeria would provide financial assistance in return for a guarantee of Maltese neutrality, £38 million per annum for 5 years. Were the West prepared to pay this kind of money, the Soviet Union could almost certainly be excluded. But France, Italy and the FRG, who take the lead in dealings with Malta, evidently are not.

26. In any case, a frindly but firm approach, however unreasonable Mr Mintoff's demands and accusations, is likely to be effective. It is contrary to Maltese wishes and interests to succumb to Soviet pressure; the large majority of Maltese - and Mr Mintoff himself - are well aware of this.

Section C: Sub-Saharan Africa

BOTSWANA

27. A militarily and economically weak parliamentary democracy under the ailing President Khama, Botswana's borders to Namibia, Zambia and Rhodesia are wide open, and the country is protected from Angola only by the narrow Caprivi Strip. President Khama exerts a moderating influence on other Front Line African States, but the signs are of gradually increasing radicalism among younger educated Batswana. The Defence Force is incapable of preventing penetration by ANC guerillas, and South Africa has several times threatened to invade to deal with them.

28. Botswana is richly endowed with various mineral deposits, the most important being diamonds and copper. The prospects for development here are good: the country's newly exploited diamond mines may provide both jobs and increased revenue. Heavy dependence on South Africa makes Botswana an unwilling pawn in the struggle for Southern Africa.

29. Western multilateral and bilateral agencies have extended substantial assistance to Botswana on highly concessional terms. The main sources are the World Bank, EDF, UK, USA, FRG, Norway and Sweden. Even with some improvement in Botswana's economy there will be a continuing requirement for external assistance for the foreseeable future.

30. We should continue to encourage President Khama to perform an interpretive role between South Africa and the Black States to the North and should support Botswana as a stable, democratic and non-racial society. Aid, military assistance, cultural links (eg through the British Council) and visits all make an important contribution.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

31. The CAR's geographical position gives it some strategic importance and in the long term the country has considerable economic potential. The installation of a Soviet/proxy client regime would be deeply stabilizing for three neighbouring countries of great Western importance to Western interests: Sudan, Zaire and Cameroon.

32. The CAR is inherently vulnerable because of its size, small population, ethnic diversity and very low level of economic and social development. French influence has remained very strong in all fields since independence. The present government, which came to power last year after President Bokassa had been ousted with the help of French troops, is by no means secure; and the continued presence of French troops along with substantial aid and technical assistance is indispensable to the maintenance of stability. Soviet and proxy influence has never been strong and received a setback in January when the CAR broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and ordered all Soviet nationals to leave (the same action was taken against Libya).

33. We have no aid programme and our direct interests are negligible. Our best course is to encourage the French to maintain their present effort and to give strong support to the EDF's programme.

CHAD

34. One of the poorest countries in Africa, Chad has been plagued since independence by bitter divisions between the Moslem, Arab-oriented Northerners and the black African tribes of the south. The country's position in the middle of the continent gives it some strategic importance and there are thought to be large unexploited mineral resources including oil. For the past year the country has been teetering on the brink of total political and economic collapse, and there are no prospects of any early improvement. A precarious stability is only being maintained by the presence of 1,200 French troops together with civilian advisers and experts.

35. At present there are indications that the French are tiring of an unprofitable and open-ended commitment, which attracts criticism in

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black Africa, and are likely to bow to pressure to pull out. French withdrawal would create a vacuum which only the Libyans seem ready to fill. The establishment of a radical Libyan client régime would be disturbing for the important pro-Western countries on Chad's other borders and could pave the way for an expansion of Soviet/proxy influence. It is therefore important that the French should maintain a presence in Chad especially in terms of technical and advisory staff, and we should encourage them to do so.

DJIBOUTI

36. Djibouti's instability derives from her division between the Afars (culturally linked to Ethiopia) and the Issas (ethnic Somalis) who predominate in the Government. The continuing dismal state of the economy (80% unemployment reported in the urban areas) bears particularly hard on the Afars, who while not entirely sharing the interests of Ethiopia, tend to look to her for help. If the Afars succeed with Ethiopian help in destabilising the country, the Russians could take advantage of the resulting confusion with a view to securing the use of the strategic port of Djibouti. Recent Ethiopian efforts to improve relations with Djibouti are no doubt diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at this end.

37. Among Western powers, France is the best placed to preserve Western influence through her existing military garrison and economic support. The French have sought with some success to persuade the present Djibouti Government to take much fuller account of the needs of the Afars and thus lessen the risk of Ethiopian intervention.

GHANA

38. The new civilian government faces grave economic problems, and political and military stability is fragile following the army meeting last year. Another coup by junior officers and/or NCOs cannot be ruled out, especially if the government's efforts to restore the economy do not show early results. The Soviet Union and its proxies, whose influence at present is very limited, are known to be preparing to exploit such an eventuality. Any new military regime would be likely to be dominated by extremists who would look to the communists for support. Such a development would be deeply destabilising for West Africa as a whole.

39. We therefore need to continue our present efforts to ensure the survival of the civilian government and assist it to restore the economy; because of our close ties with Ghana our Western partners legitimately look to the UK to take the lead. We should offer further substantial programme aid later this year when the present tranche is fully utilized, and continue our technical cooperation programme and our help with military and police training.

MALAWI

40. Malawi is a country with few natural resources heavily dependent on Mozambique for import and export routes, including all oil imports. Serious balance of payments difficulties are likely to worsen as Rhodesian tobacco comes on the market. President Banda is elderly and ailing and no potential successor has been permitted to emerge. But Malawi is not an immediate target in the struggle for Southern Africa.

41. Malawi's development programme is significantly dependent on foreign aid and other forms of outside assistance, almost all of which comes from Western sources. The UK is the largest bilateral donor, followed by Canada and West Germany, and there are substantial contributions from the EDF, World Bank and IMF.

42. The UK has close ties with Malawi, deriving from a long historical association and from the time President Banda spent in Britain; the French and Germans have become increasingly involved in Malawi military matters. We should aim to work discreetly for a wider influence for Malawi in Africa as a moderate voice, and to strengthen further our bilateral relations with a view to increased UK influence at the time of succession and beyond. Aid, military assistance, cultural links (eg through the British Council) and visits can all assist in this aim.

SIERRA LEONE

43. Soviet activity in Sierra Leone has hitherto been at a relatively low level. Their technical assistance comprises a handful of doctors together with technical training given under a fisheries agreement. The doctors compare unfavourably with a much better and bigger Chinese team, and Soviet overfishing has caused widespread dissatisfaction.

44. The main source of Soviet influence is its training programme for Sierra Leoneans in the USSR. Although the number of scholarships has recently been reduced Sierra Leone professionals and trades unionists are increasingly Soviet-trained. For this reason, despite Sierra Leone's continuing strong ties with the West and particularly the UK, the possibility of Soviet efforts eventually paying greater dividends cannot be discounted.

45. The internal political situation is likely to remain reasonably stable while President Stevens remains in office, but he is in his 70s and ailing and there is no obvious successor. Instability following his departure could offer greater opportunities to the Russians. We and our Western partners should watch the situation closely in the period immediately ahead and at least maintain the present level of aid and technical cooperation, including assistance under UKMTAS, which is now virtually the only means by which members of the Sierra Leone armed forces can train in Britain.

SOMALIA

46. Although anti-Soviet feeling is generally high in Somalia, following Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden and the invasion of Afghanistan, internal disenchantment could result in moves to topple the present regime. One source of such action could be pro-Soviet Somali military officers and others now out of favour. President Siad Barre is unlikely to seek a reconciliation with Moscow, although he could be tempted to use the threat of one to secure more help from the West. Continuing tribal divisions are a further source of political instability, and despite some lip service to democratic development the President's blatant tribal bias only exacerbates the problem. Were the Ethiopians to continue or step up their aerial attacks, President Barre's position would be further weakened.

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47. The Soviet aim would be to recover and perhaps extend their military base at Berbera. The recent American decision in principle to seek military facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu in exchange for certain defence and economic assistance will make it considerably more difficult for the Russians to achieve this objective. It could also strengthen President Barre's internal position and offer the West some leverage over Somali territorial aspirations.

48. Even before the American decision the West was trying to build up political and economic relations with Somalia, particularly through economic aid. But President Barre attaches a higher priority to the acquisition of arms which the West (no less than the Soviet Union) is reluctant to provide without an end to Somali military support for the Ogaden rebels, as well as satisfactory assurances about neighbours' frontiers. This is important to the Kenyans. Such a change in policy would no doubt entail political risks for President Barre, but he should be encouraged to make it.

SWAZILAND

49. The elderly King Sobhuza feels increasingly vulnerable: as Rhodesian pressures on President Machel ease the Swazis see Mozambique's interests turning south. There is already evidence of Mozambican infiltration into South Africa and President Machel recently paid an uninvited visit to Swaziland. The Swazi Defence Force is ill-disciplined and in disarray. King Sobhuza is painfully aware of his country's dependence on South Africa and feels neglected by the West.

50. Swaziland's economy and external trade are in relatively good shape. Foreign aid continues to contribute to the country's successful economic development. The Commonwealth Development Corporation, UNDP, World Bank, EDF, UK, USA, Canada, FRG and Scandinavian countries are the principal donors.

51. Among Western countries the UK has traditionally had the closest links. We are currently considering how to assist the Swazis and reassure them of our interest. There is little scope for offering increased aid, although we should ensure that Swaziland continues to receive its share. We should concentrate efforts on bringing some order into the affairs of the Swaziland Defence Force. Advice, assistance and training are already being provided. More frequent Ministerial and other high-level visits and an increase in exchanges with the Swazis on developments in Southern Africa would also help to increase Swazi confidence.

UGANDA

52. The West's interests in Uganda are to see it restored as quickly as possible to internal political stability, international independence and economic self-sufficiency. Though it is nearly a year since Amin was overthrown, Tanzanian troops are still maintaining less than perfect domestic security for a weak government headed by Binaisa. Unless significant progress is achieved, there is a strong possibility of a return to political and tribal strife, a reversion to economic chaos and famine.

53. Nyerere might soon be tempted to extricate his troops from a potentially long and fruitless commitment; Uganda is also a thorn in Kenyan/Tanzanian relations. Binaisa would welcome the replacement of Tanzanian

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troops by a Commonwealth Force. We have said that this is a matter for the Commonwealth Secretariat, but that we would not be able to contribute.

54. The Ugandans are leaving no stone unturned in their search for international economic and military assistance. They would probably not hesitate to accept either from the Eastern bloc, although they naturally prefer the West. We should therefore continue to give Binaisa political and financial support and should consider giving military assistance.

ZAIRE

55. Zaire is the second largest country in Africa and has borders with nine other States. It is rich in mineral resources and has a government which is well disposed towards the West. President Mobutu has kept his country together for 15 years, and there is no satisfactory alternative in sight. It is important for the West to keep Zaire from falling into anarchy, since this could destabilise the whole of Central Africa.

56. Zaire is vulnerable because of her continuing economic crisis, the inefficiency and corruption of the Mobutu regime, and possible incursions by Zairean rebels or dissidents from neighbouring countries, particularly Angola, Zambia, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville. The most likely threat to Zaire's stability is a military coup which could turn to the Russians for support if the West refused recognition. The Soviet Union currently has no military or civilian advisers in Zaire, but there are some 250 East European civilian advisers there. Zairean military forces are being retrained by Belgian, French, Chinese and Egyptian advisory teams.

57. The Western countries have frequently consulted together in recent years about Zaire's economic problems and the two Shaba invasions. Massive aid, debt rescheduling and Franco/Belgian assistance for the armed forces are some of the measures which have been pursued. The West should continue to give political and financial support to Mobutu's government. The French and the Belgians should be encouraged to maintain their support for the armed forces.

RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE)

58. In the short-term, Rhodesia's independence under a government led by Mr Mugabe will increase the opportunities for the Soviet Union to extend its influence, by establishing an Embassy, an aid programme, and so on. Against this, the longer-term prospects for Soviet influence would almost inevitably have been greater had the conflict in Rhodesia been allowed to continue and the Patriotic Front come to power as the result of victory in a Soviet-supported guerrilla war. As it is, Mr Mugabe will be compelled to take account of the interests and views of other groups in Rhodesia. Moreover, although subscribing to certain basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, he is not an orthodox communist and his connections with the Soviet Union are tenuous. He is likely to pursue a strictly non-aligned foreign policy.

59. The United Kingdom should provide economic, technical and military assistance to independent Zimbabwe on a considerable scale, so that the new government is encouraged to preserve its independence; we should encourage other governments to assist in this.

/Section D

Section D: Asia and the Indian Ocean

ASEAN Countries

a. INDONESIA

60. Indonesia may be unduly complacent about the Soviet threat; the military regime nevertheless seems stable and provides a framework for government by consensus. The Indonesians still regard China as the ultimate long-term threat to the area and, possibly wrongly, see their Chinese minority as a potential Fifth Column and their own sheer size as an obstacle to external aggression.

b. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

61. Malaysia and Singapore are further removed than Thailand from the Vietnamese threat but are nonetheless wary of the Soviet Union. Malaysia has a major political problem in the relationship between Malays and Chinese, including a continuing risk of Malay Muslim extremism; Malaysia's present leaders are, however, unlikely to let matters get out of hand. Under Premier Lee, Singapore currently enjoys both political and economic stability, but her dependence on Malaysia makes her very vulnerable to any upsets there. Under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the UK, Australia and New Zealand have a consultative commitment towards the defence of Malaysia and Singapore (buttressed by two Australian Mirage Squadrons, an Australian frigate and a New Zealand battalion).

c. THE PHILIPPINES.

62. The Philippines enjoy the protection of resident US forces at the naval and air bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field. Although President Marcos' marshal law regime may not last beyond the medium term, or he may himself modify it, any change would probably be more a matter of form than of substance. The 400 year old Muslim dissidence in the south (backed by foreign Muslim organisations) and traditional piracy do not threaten stability but continue to cause security problems, to hamper economic development, and to frustrate the military caste.

d. THAILAND

63. Of the ASEAN countries Thailand is the most exposed to subversion and even aggression from Vietnam by way of Cambodia and Laos. Communist insurgency has caused problems in the border areas but has declined in the past year, because of splits between pro-Chinese and pro-Vietnamese elements. Thai leaders are aware of the dangers and of their own military weakness; they might be tempted to succumb if faced with a situation which they considered hopeless, but the Vietnamese are having difficulty in subduing Cambodia, and a serious threat to Thailand is unlikely to develop within two years. Meanwhile the Thai leaders are experimenting with a limited form of Parliamentary democracy and their self-confidence will need all the support that their ASEAN and Western friends can provide.

64. The USA is the major supplier of military material and could be asked to help under the Manila Pact (signatories: US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines) which obliges members to act in the event of aggression against Thailand or the Philippines. Thailand looks to ASEAN to provide political and moral support and counts on China to deter outright Vietnamese aggression through fear of provoking a 'second lesson' to Vietnam.

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65. For some years UK policy has been to act with others to strengthen ASEAN by developing trading links of mutual interest, by promoting

economic development, and by political dialogue encouraging moderation in external and internal policies. We have sought to use our links, the aid programme, British Council, military training under UKMTAS, and Royal, Ministerial and official visits to this end. Such activities should continue, but they will not of themselves suffice to counter the threat from Vietnam. ASEAN's main defence against Vietnamese expansionism lies in those factors which limit or restrain Vietnam's ambitions, such as economic problems, the threat from China and the problems of assimilating conquests in Indo-China.

BANGLADESH

66. The present government of President Zia is well disposed towards the West, is a moderate in the NAM, and has played a useful role in rallying support for condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan.

67. The Soviet Union may be tempted to support opponents of President Zia. It is a weakness that the Bangladesh government have taken no effective action to limit the activities of a large Soviet diplomatic mission and a number of Soviet economic advisers.

68. Bangladesh is unlikely to become an area of major economic importance to us. But its population of over 80 million provides a large domestic market, and a number of British firms have established themselves successfully in the country. The UK provides some £40 million per annum in aid. We also give training to Bangladesh officers under UKMTAS and will be providing Loan Service Personnel. Other Western countries, too, provide substantial economic aid. This should continue.

BURMA

69. Burma under Ne Win's military dictatorship has largely opted out of international relations. In an attempt to reduce Chinese support for the communist insurgents Burma has cultivated relations with China and has balanced this by relations with the Russians. The rest of the world has been kept at a distance. Having left the NAM in 1979 Burma no longer belongs to any international grouping. Her security lies in relative isolation from a Soviet threat and the fact that she threatens no-one; but she could come to look like a temptingly open target for acquisition.

70. Talk about economic development is slow to be translated into practical projects, but the UK has contributed limited economic aid, despite the inhibitions imposed by outstanding claims for compensation due to UK nationals. We also provide training under UKMTAS and maintain as much cordiality as the Burmese administration permits. We should continue with this and should keep up our participation in the Burma Aid Group (other participants: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, FRG, Japan, USA).

CHINA

71. For broad historical and geographical reasons, a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union is at present unlikely. But the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, particularly if the Chinese leadership conspicuously fail to achieve their economic objectives, and in consequence an alternative solution is sought to China's problems.

72. The West can best work against this by showing some understanding for Chinese international views and concerns; increasing contacts in all fields; and contributing to China's modernisation programme, thus increasing the political and economic inter-dependence between China and the West.

THE MALDIVES

73. The Soviet Union might be tempted to intervene in the Maldives to secure facilities for the Soviet fleet. They have expressed an interest in the use of Gan, but their approaches have been rejected by the present Maldives government, which is reliant on the goodwill of countries such as Saudi Arabia and is unlikely to take any steps which will antagonise the Islamic countries of the Gulf.

74. Direct UK interests in the Maldives are minimal. We have a small aid programme totalling £3 million and are giving thought to further small-scale assistance eg some limited police training. As long as such Western assistance continues the Maldives are unlikely to turn towards the Soviet Union.

SOUTH KOREA

75. The main threat to the Republic of Korea is an invasion from the North. North Korea is a closed communist society with a large military machine and the avowed national ambition of reunification with the South. The North Koreans manage to maintain close relations with both the Soviet Union and China (though probably leaning more towards the latter) who provide arms, oil and other aid. Of the two, China is least likely to favour military action against the South, because of the risks to stability in the area and the inevitable complications which a conflict in Korea would bring to Sino/US and (less directly) Sino/Japanese relations. Precisely for these reasons, however, the Russians might see advantage in encouraging the North to make trouble. But they would have to be prepared to pay a very high price in economic and military support for an unpredictable and ageing regime; it is unlikely that they would judge the game worth the candle.

76. Within South Korea itself, there are no significant groups known to favour the Soviet Union or the North. The political opposition shares the Government's concern for unity in the face of the communist threat. But internal instability exacerbated by economic difficulties could provide opportunities for communist intervention.

77. North Korean military action would be discouraged by a stable South Korea with a strong defence capability, and by Chinese disapproval. South Korea requires continued American defence guarantees and Western political support. Chinese support for stability in Korea is likely to be based on self-interest, but we should continue to remind them that a conflict there would harm both China and the West.

TAIWAN

78. Peking's current policy towards Taiwan and reunification is deliberately conciliatory and long term. For ideological and historical reasons, the Taiwanese would be very reluctant to align themselves with the Soviet Union. But this option could conceivably be forced on them if they felt critically threatened by a more militant policy from Peking (which might be linked with discontent among the native Taiwanese population). President Carter's abrogation of the United States Joint

Security Treaty with Taiwan as part of the conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in January 1979 did nothing to raise Taiwanese morale. But the USA still provides substantial military equipment, although not as much, or of as high a sophistication, as the Taiwanese would like.

79. There is little, if anything, the UK can do at present to influence the Taiwanese. But we can encourage China's current pragmatic policies and develop our commercial links with Taiwan to the limited extent that this is compatible with the maintenance of good relations with Peking.

Section E: Latin America and the Caribbean

ANTIGUA

80. The two major political parties are the Antigua Labour Party and the Progressive Labour Movement. A third party, the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), has no seats but has been politically active, notably in campaigning for independence. The ACLM is a Marxist organisation and has links with other such groups in the Caribbean. But there is no hard evidence that their activities have been orchestrated by Cuba or the Soviet Union.

81. The Antigua Government must call a general election before May 1981. If they wish to proceed to independence they need to demonstrate that they have a mandate. Were an election to be announced, unrest would be likely. This would be exacerbated by an inconclusive election result. In such circumstances, Antigua's vulnerability to subversive elements, both within and outside the State, would increase substantially.

82. The assumption by both Antigua and St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (see paras 101-104) of Associated Statehood in 1967 gave them full internal self government: although the British Government do not therefore have the constitutional right to interfere in their internal affairs, we continue to take a very close interest. Aid to both territories continues and will not cease when they become fully independent. Nor would many of the other British connections with the Islands. These are, at present, maintained by regular Ministerial and official visits, goodwill visits from Royal Naval ships, the occasional British military exercise and the presence of the 'British Government Representative' to the Associated States. In addition, since Britain retains full responsibility for the States' external affairs and defence, we could be called upon to provide military assistance against external aggression. Trilateral talks on Caribbean security with the US and Canadians have already addressed the question of developing regional cooperation amongst Caribbean territories in such areas as police, coastguard etc. The US are keen that, to counter increasing Cuban influence, such cooperation should be expanded into economic and other fields. Both the Antigua and the new St Kitts Governments are likely to be responsivle to such suggestions.

BELIZE

83. As long as Belize remains a colony, the threat will remain minimal. Cuban involvement with Belizian trade unions is carefully monitored and Russians from the Embassy in Mexico City are no longer being granted visas to visit Belize. Once the country becomes independent, however, there is a possibility that it could become vulnerable to communist influence, particularly from Cuba; some left-wing members of the present ruling party are already attracted by the Cuban philosophy.

84. The UK should try to retain US cooperation, both in influencing Guatemala and in providing military assistance, to secure viable independence for Belize, and work to mobilise international support therefor.

BOLIVIA

85. Bolivia's poverty and chronic instability (more coups in its history than years of independence and three in the past two years) offer obvious openings for subversion. Most of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and the economy is dependent on exports of a single product, tin ore. As the world's second largest tin producer (after Malaysia) and the source of 16% of the Western world's tin production, Bolivia is important to the West. She also exports tin to the USSR.

86. Bolivia is currently governed by an interim President pending elections in June. If held, these will be the third attempt to establish a democratic government in the past two years. The 1978 elections were declared fraudulent and void; the July 1979 elections resulted in a prolonged stalemate between the political parties which prompted a short-lived military putsch in November. The lack of firm political direction has exacerbated underlying economic problems and Bolivia has only just avoided a debt-rescheduling operation. But the economic measures required to secure IMF assistance, involving a devaluation and price rises, have been vigorously opposed by the powerful trade unions and by peasant groups.

87. In foreign policy Bolivia has a particular grievance over the loss of territories in 1879 which deprived her of an outlet to the sea: the issue has caused a break with Chile. When a member of the Security Council, and at the Non-Aligned Summit, Bolivia has shown herself willing to trade support on international issues for backing for her claims on Chile to cede territory.

88. There is a Soviet Embassy in La Paz and some Soviet economic aid but no record of Soviet interference in internal affairs. The Russians could, however, seek to profit if the West fails to respond to Bolivian requests for economic and aid assistance. The UK should proceed with a major capital aid project, currently under consideration, to assist the mining industry.

COSTA RICA

89. Costa Rica is a pro-Western country although the Russians maintain a disproportionately large Embassy there. In 1979 two Russian diplomats were expelled for involvement in fomenting labour unrest which led to two or three large strikes. There is no other significant evidence of Russian or Cuban activity. The stability of the government could be threatened if El Salvador, Honduras, and other regional countries fell under left-wing influence, and with the general instability of the whole area this remains a possibility.

90. The West can support the Costa Rican Government by aid and commercial policies designed to assist the country's economic and social development. Although the USA can offer most support, Costa Rica could become a candidate for higher priority for UK aid.

DOMINICA

91. Despite its precarious and barely constitutional government and early flirtation with the Bishop regime in Grenada, there is no immediate sign of Dominica's following the Grenadian example. Much will depend on

the outcome of elections due by July 1980. The political scene is so fragmented that predictions are difficult; but Dominica might adopt more radical policies should Mr Rosie Douglas come to power. Because of Dominica's position midway between Guadeloupe and Martinique, the French are taking a close interest in its affairs, and have helped with post-hurricane reconstruction.

92. The UK should encourage Dominica's economic development by means of its aid programme and should continue security assistance through police training.

EL SALVADOR

93. The present virtual anarchy in El Salvador is expected to continue for some time. While successive short-lived governments may hold off the final dénouement, political forces are becoming ever more polarised and the situation could degenerate into civil war. There is at present little sign of direct Cuban interference although we believe that Cuban small arms may be reaching the country through Honduras.

94. The West is reluctant to provide arms in the present confused situation, but the US has recently announced a large development aid programme, which includes some military assistance, and has issued warnings to the right wing against any attempt to mount a coup d'état. For the next few months the West can only watch sympathetically; but we should be ready to move in quickly with offers of reconstruction assistance as soon as the situation becomes calmer.

GUATEMALA

95. The right-wing military dictatorship was elected by 28% of the population (and, undoubtedly, a rigged ballot). The system of justice still exists fairly independently but ineffectively. The Press is relatively free but journalists and editors, like trade unionists, educationalists and other influential leaders of society both on the right and the left are in constant danger of assassination if they offend either side's hit-squads. The last three or four years have seen a significant resurgence among the left-wing guerrillas decimated in the sixties by the ruthless policies of President Arana. There is some evidence that they may be receiving small arms and other small-scale assistance from the Cubans. The present Guatemalan regime is paranoically afraid of communism in any form, but unless they can repeat Arana's success in putting down the guerrillas the possibility exists of a popular revolt. For the present, the Army appears to be in full control, and the guerrillas can only apply pin-pricks in the form of ambushes, assassinations and bombs.

96. The Americans are best placed to exert influence and have attempted, though with little success, to persuade the authorities to improve their human rights record. We ourselves are currently precluded from any direct attempt to influence Guatemala because of the Belize dispute. But it would be to the West's advantage to support American efforts.

HONDURAS

97. The present Honduras Government is, like Guatemala's, strongly anti-communist; but with the complicated transition from military dictatorship to a civilian government beginning with elections for a constituent assembly in April 1980, opportunities for interference may arise. For the moment there is no sign that Honduras

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will remain other than friendly to the West, to which she is linked by commercial, developmental and other ties; but we must be wary for the next year or so, in view of growing Cuban involvement in the area.

98. The West should support the moderate government by encouraging democracy and assisting in Honduras' economic and social development through aid and trade. The US is best placed to assist, but Honduras is a candidate for higher priority for UK aid.

PANAMA

99. Panama offers little of interest to the communists other than as one of the dominoes in the isthmus. The smooth operation of the Panama Canal is of paramount importance to the West and any threat, whether military or, for example, through labour unrest, to the Canal operation would be of considerable importance. The Soviet bloc, including Cuba, provide less than 5% of the total tonnage using the Canal each year and could therefore disrupt its operation with virtual impunity. If they did so, however, we could assume that the Americans would take immediate action.

100. The West should encourage democracy in Panama by assisting economic and social development through aid and trade. Although Panama is a poor country, she is not a high priority for British aid because of the royalties she receives from Canal operations.

ST KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA

101. The Labour Party, drawing its main support from the sugar cane workers, enjoyed 29 years of unbroken rule until the general election in February 1980, when a coalition was formed between the People's Action Movement (PAM), and the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP). The NRP have consistently campaigned for seccession, but if Nevis benefits from NRP involvement in the coalition and the island achieves greater devolution secession demands will probably fade.

102. The new Government intends to concentrate on development, especially of tourism, and a close relationship with North America will be an important element of this policy. It is also expected to move more cautiously towards independence, which had hitherto seemed likely by mid 1980.

103. The PAM's election campaign warned of the danger that a continuing Labour Government would eventually bring the State into the kind of unacceptable socialism which had developed elsewhere in the Caribbean. Since taking office, Premier Simmonds has privately expressed to us his concern that the Labour Party might seek to resume power by unconstitutional means. It remains to be seen whether the Defence Force (and Civil Service), so long accustomed to Labour Party masters, will remain apolitical.

104. The question of British and other Western assistance to the islands is covered in the section on Antigua (paras 80-82 above).

ST LUCIA

105. Prime Minister Allan Louisy's government, though moderate, is unstable because of a vigorous campaign by the Deputy Prime Minister, George Odlum, to replace him. Despite a reputation as a radical, Odlum is energetic

and decisive and may be more inclined towards moderation with lengthening experience and governmental responsibility. St Lucia had seemed vulnerable in the aftermath of the Grenadian coup. The present government has held on longer than expected and we may reasonably hope that, even if Odlum supplants Louisy by legal means, moderation will continue.

106. We should continue to provide aid and security assistance through police training.

ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

107. The re-election of the moderate Cato government last year was an encouraging development. Although all of the small Caribbean islands are by their nature potentially vulnerable to economic difficulty and political instability, things seem set as far as possible in St Vincent. The UK is contributing some security assistance in the form of police and coast-guard training and should continue with this.

108. Barbados is the firmest available base for initiatives (eg police training, coastguard forces) to improve security against Cuban subversion of the English-speaking Caribbean mini-States. The UK should continue to underpin Barbados' own efforts in this context.

ANNEX F

SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PRESENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AT END 1979

Country	Soviet	Cuban	E. European	Remarks
Algeria	1,000 military	Some (military and civilian)		
Angola	850 military and civilian	19,000 military* 6,000 civilian	1,000+ (mainly E. German)	*Mostly combat troops
Bangladesh	Some economic advisers			
Benin	Up to 30 military	Up to 50 military		
Burundi	Up to 5 military			
Cape Verde Islands	Up to 10 military	5-10 military 5-15 civilian		
Chad	Up to 50 military			
Congo	30 military	300 military 75 civilians	30 military	
Cuba	4-5,000 military* 4-6,000 economic advisers			*Of which 2-3,000 combat troops
Equatorial Guinea	Up to 100 military	200-300 military		
Ethiopia	1,200-1,500 military	Up to 15,000 military*	Nearly 500 military and civilian	*Mostly combat troops
Grenada		40 military 50-60 civilians		
Guinea	Up to 25 military	Up to 50 military Possibly 100 civilians		

Country	Soviet	Cuban	E. European	Remarks
Guinea-Bissau	Up to 100 military?	Up to 100 military[x] 50 civilians		[x] Possibly some military with Polisario
Guyana		Some military? 70-75 civilians		
India	300 military			
Iraq	1,250 military	200 military 400 civilians	Some military	
Jamaica		480 civilians		
Libya	1,400 military	At least 30 civilians	Some military	
Madagascar	Up to 15 military	Some military?		
Mali	100-150 military		Some	
Mozambique	500 military and civilians	200 military[ø] Possibly 600 civilians	400 military and civilian	[ø] Some probably assisting ZANU
Nicaragua		About 50 military 2,000 technical		
Panama		25-30 civilians		
PDRY	500 military	150-200 military	75 military	
Sao Tome and Principe		A few military 100 civilians		
Sierra Leone		15-30 military		
Syria	1,700 military		Some military	
Tanzania	150-200 military	Possibly some military Possibly 150 civilians	Up to 10 military	

Country	Soviet	Cuban	E. European	Remarks
Vietnam	5,000-8,000 military			Also some in Laos and Cambodia
Yemen Arab Republic	300 military			
Zaire			250 civilians	
Zambia	Up to 25 military+ About 180 civilians*	Up to 200 military++	Probably some military+++	+With ZNDF and ZAPU ++With SWAPO and ZAPU +++With ZAPU *Includes East Europeans

Note: Figures for civilians are more comprehensive for Cubans than for Soviets and East Europeans; in all cases they exclude diplomatic presence.

ANNEX G

SOVIET, EAST EUROPEAN AND WESTERN ECONOMIC AID

A. Volume (Table I)

1. In 1978 (the latest year for which comparable figures are available) the Soviet Union and East European countries committed $5.9 billion in civil aid to developing countries. Net transfers by these countries (disbursements less repayments of capital and interest) totalled $3.3 billion. The 17 major Western aid donors of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) committed $26.2 billion and made net transfers of $18.8 billion.

B. Distribution and Terms (Table II)

2. Nearly 90% of Soviet aid goes to two client states, Cuba and Viet Nam. Nearly 2/3 of East European aid goes to the same two countries.

3. The remaining aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is spread over some 40 other developing countries. But it is lent on such hard terms that, in 1978, repayments from these countries exceeded aid disbursements to them. Repayments to the Soviet Union totalled $150 million and to Eastern Europe $20 million. Soviet and East European aid, whether bilateral or multilateral, is made in unconvertible currencies and is thus tied to purchases from the Eastern bloc.

4. The distribution of DAC aid is much wider. There are 160 recipients in all. 34% is channelled through multilateral organisations. No single country receives more than 7% of bilateral aid from DAC donors. A large proportion of DAC aid is in grant form. 84% of multilateral aid and 39% of bilateral aid from DAC countries is untied.

C. Aid as a Proportion of GNP (Table III)

5. Most Western donors have accepted the UN target of 0.7% of GNP for net disbursements of aid (which includes repayments of interest but not capital) though without specifying a date. The average for the DAC is 0.33%, though some countries - Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - have already passed the target. The UK is at 0.48%, but this will decline after next year.

6. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have not accepted the target, arguing that the removal of the 'colonialist legacy' in developing countries is the responsibility of the West. If aid to Cuba and Viet Nam is included, total net Soviet aid as a proportion of GNP is around 0.3%. For East European countries the figure is about 0.1%. If aid to Cuba and Viet Nam is excluded, the proportion of GNP is negligible in either case (about 0.04% in 1978).

TABLE I: VOLUME

$ million 1978

Countries	Commitments	Net Transfers
Soviet Union	5.1	2.9
Eastern Europe	0.8+	0.4
DAC countries	26.2	18.8

TABLE II: DISTRIBUTION

Donor	% of gross aid 1978	Recipients
Soviet Union	59	Cuba
	29	Viet Nam
	12	42 other countries, mainly Iraq, Iran, Egypt, India, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Pakistan
East European countries	64	Cuba and Viet Nam
	36	30 other countries, mainly Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Iran
All DAC countries		160 recipients in all. The largest recipients of bi-lateral aid are:-
	7%	Israel
	6.5%	Egypt
	5%	India
	4%	Indonesia
	3%	Pakistan
United Kingdom		128 recipients in all. The largest being:-
	20%	India
	10%	Bangladesh
	7%	Zambia
	5%	Kenya
United States		Largest recipients of US civil aid:-
	16%	Israel
	12%	Egypt

TABLE III: AID AS A PROPORTION OF GNP

Countries		% of GNP 1978
Soviet Union)	including Cuba and Viet Nam	0.30
Eastern Europe)		0.11
DAC average		0.33
United Kingdom		0.48
United States		0.27

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NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS AFTER AFGHANISTAN

1. This paper reviews the state of the North/South Dialogue and HMG's approach to it in the light of developments over Afghanistan and the outcome of recent meetings, including UNIDO III. Conclusions are at paragraph 16.

The consequences of Afghanistan

2. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has led to a significant shift in third-world political attitudes towards the Soviet Union (and its allies, including Cuba). The vote on the General Assembly Resolution, supported by many developing countries, and the outcome of the Islamic conference are evidence of this political change. This may, however, be a temporary phenomenon; we should use whatever means are available to ensure that it is sustained.

3. There may be a disposition among developing countries to re-examine the Soviet role in the economic field. They may realise, more clearly than before, that the Soviet Union has little interest in the economic development of the poorer countries except as a by-product in furtherance of their strategic needs. The low level of Soviet civil aid, its concentration on 'Socialist' allies and the preponderance of military aid demonstrate this. We should continue to take suitable opportunities to bring this point home to developing countries. But the Soviet role in the North/South Dialogue has until now been largely discounted by the developing countries. They have realised that the Russians had little to offer and have, broadly speaking, concentrated their demands upon the West. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the Russians may at some point decide to be more forthcoming, with

a view to the political benefits. There is no sign of this so far.

4. In a broader context, third-world reaction to Afghanistan has been widespread but differentiated. Those countries which are geographically close to the Soviet Union or which have (or whose neighbours have) 'friendship treaties' with the Russians will have had particular reason to reflect. In general, however, Afghanistan provides us with an opportunity (as HM Ambassador, Moscow, suggests) 'to emphasise that it is with us, not with the Soviet Union, that the developing countries have a genuine community of interest'. We might thus be able, provided we avoid appearing unduly to be 'cashing-in' on Afghanistan, to put North/South discussions on to a more cooperative footing than at present. However, most developing countries already conduct the greater part of their trade with the West and obtain most of their external capital from Western sources. Present flows of trade and capital are insufficient to offset their mounting economic difficulties. We will need to do more to help them with their economic problems if we are to take lasting advantage of the anti-Soviet feeling provoked by the Afghanistan invasion. But the needs of the developing countries are daunting and we are constrained by our own economic difficulties.

Economic difficulties

5. The oil price increases which took place in 1979 and early 1980 will generate OPEC surpluses and LDC deficits equal in real terms (and much larger in money terms) to those produced by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74. In 1980 alone we expect OPEC surpluses of about $100 billion. The deficits of non-oil LDCs will be perhaps $60 billion, even with import growth at less than 2 per cent in volume.

In addition, they face about $33 billion of debt repayments (ie of principal) during the year. Their financing and debt problems will be even worse in 1981 and thereafter, since very high OPEC surpluses are forecast to persist for several years. The account of the economic difficulties facing developing countries in the Brandt Commission Report is not exaggerated.

6. The ability of the developed West to provide extra help is also impaired. Western countries have decided that they must counter inflationary pressures, fed by higher oil prices, through monetary discipline, holding down public spending and levels of demand. This has meant sluggish markets for the exports of developing countries, with some increase of protectionism; and only modest increases in official aid. Because of Britain's economic weakness, we have been obliged to cut back our aid programme over the next few years and current levels of unemployment make it difficult for us to envisage any substantial trade concessions.

7. Outside the economic field there may be politico-military aspects which should continue to be examined - for example, a possible disarmament initiative or support for proposals by the Non-Aligned Movement concerning Afghanistan. More generally, we should continue to make it clear that we respect genuine non-alignment, and that we do not wish to impose East/West rivalries on the third world.

Prospects for the North/South Dialogue

8. The North/South Dialogue has a certain educative value and has proved useful as a safety valve. But it is very awkward as a framework for serious negotiation. There is a basic conceptual difference: the South are seeking a new world economic system, while the North want at most to adapt

the existing one. The developing countries (G77) often advance demands of substance which go far beyond what the developed West (Group B) can accept. The West is forced on to the defensive, and in order to avoid a breakdown, may accept procedural solutions which lead to the useless proliferation of international meetings. Over the last few months we have tried to persuade our Western colleagues to adopt a less defensive posture, and to steer discussion on to subjects where both North and South have something to offer and something to gain. But this has been uphill work.

9. The failure of the UNIDO Conference in February was unusually clear cut. But it does not reflect a fundamental shift of attitude for either side, nor is it likely to cause one. The developing countries overplayed their hand and left Group B with no choice but to vote unanimously against them. There was no sign of a collective change of attitude by developing countries after the Afghanistan events, nor was one really to be expected at a specialised conference of this kind. Western countries were solid in resisting G77 demands this time. But many of them, including our EC partners, regret the failure and are working for a more conciliatory approach elsewhere in the Dialogue. We should, perhaps, combine this with a greater effort to expose the hollowness of Communist support for G77 aspirations.

10. The main focus of attention in the Dialogue is now the 'global negotiations'. These are to be launched in the UN by the Special Session of the General Assembly in August/September, and will spread over much of 1981 and perhaps 1982. Preparations for this global round have already begun in the UN Committee of the Whole (COW) and the usual EC and OECD meetings have got under way. The global round will cover raw materials, trade, energy, development, money and finance;

it may include a new body to discuss energy matters, which does not exist at present. The subject matter is similar to the abortive North/South Conference (CIEC) of 1975/77 and the first signs of the G77 approach to the agenda are not encouraging. There will be strong pressure, as the negotiations proceed, to achieve an agreed result and avoid deadlock. But the 'global negotiations' will be a very unwieldy framework for the West to use in promoting better relations between North and South.

11. Numerous other North/South negotiations continue. UNCTAD meetings are becoming increasingly perfunctory, as attention shifts to the global round in New York. The International Development Strategy (IDS) will also be on the agenda for the special session in August. While the IDS will lay down guidelines for development in the 1980s (and beyond) its immediate impact will be less than the global negotiations.

IMF and World Bank

12. There is a better chance of working out effective measures to help developing countries through the IMF and World Bank. It is widely accepted in the West that the Fund will need to provide extra help to developing countries to finance their deficits. The Fund will soon be discussing how to do this; they could, for example, take a greater role in the recycling of OPEC surpluses. The amounts available to the World Bank and to the IDA are also being increased. There has already been discussion between the FCO, Treasury and Bank of England on these subjects, so that we should be in a position to take a constructive line as new proposals surface. But new Fund and Bank measures will not be enough on their own to meet the serious problems which developing countries will face. And we may have difficulty in reconciling such measures with our own preference, flowing from the recent Aid Policy Review, for reducing the share of our aid that goes to multilateral institutions.

A deal with the oil producers?

13. A more ambitious approach to present economic difficulties would be for the West to seek a bargain with the oil producers. On their side the oil producers might give assurances of predictable supplies and, by implication, prices. But in return oil producers would demand concessions from the West, such as indexed assets for OPEC surpluses or indexed oil prices, improved access to markets and technology, and more transfers to non-oil developing countries (in which they themselves might be willing to share). We are now considering with other Departments whether such a deal is feasible; whether we have enough to offer; and whether the oil producers would have the incentive or capacity to observe a deal, once struck. But the normal channels of the North/South Dialogue could probably not handle such delicate negotiations, if we chose to pursue them.

Summits

14. Economic summits have not hitherto given much attention to North/South relations, though they have always been on the agenda. The Prime Minister recently suggested to Chancellor Schmidt (who agreed) that, at the Venice Summit due in June, one day should be devoted to political matters, particularly the consequences of Afghanistan. This could lead into a discussion of North/South issues which have already been highlighted by the Brandt Commission Report and the impending global round. The Italians are keen to put more stress on North/South relations and the Germans are writing a paper for the summit preparatory group. If the Summit participants decide to make North/South relations a major theme, they will wish to have some results to announce which will have a good impact in the Third World.

15. The Brandt Commission recommended a limited North/South Summit. This is also favoured by the UN Secretary-General. We doubt whether such a Summit could be fruitful and are trying to discourage our major Western partners from premature endorsement of the idea. But Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard may be more disposed to favour it.

Conclusions

16. The conclusions of this paper are:

a. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan offers an opportunity to achieve a closer community of interest with perhaps a considerable number of countries in the third world. But the West cannot make much durable progress unless we can respond to the very serious and growing economic difficulties of developing countries.

b. The West's economic response is constrained by their own problems, aggravated by the latest rise in oil prices. Our own position is particularly difficult.

c. Forthcoming events in the Dialogue will provide an awkward framework for promoting better North/South relations. The failure of the UNIDO conference does not mean a change of heart by either side.

d. Some extra financial help for non-oil developing countries can be provided from the IMF and World Bank, but this will not suffice on its own to remedy the new problems which they face. A more ambitious approach to world economic problems, involving a deal with the oil producers, is now under inter-Departmental discussion. If we should decide to pursue this, we would probably wish to do so outside the main North/South Dialogue.

e. North/South questions may figure more prominently than in the past at the forthcoming Venice Summit. If so, the participants will wish to show signs of progress.

Financial Relations Department

28 February 1980

ANNEX I

Counter Measures against Soviet and Proxy Military Activity

Forms of Soviet Military Activity

1. Soviet or Soviet-backed military or quasi- military activity in the developing world could involve:

a) Indirect Politico/military pressure, eg naval deployments or manoeuvres. The mere possession of a capability to intervene militarily can constitute a form of pressure even if it is not used.

b) Subversion, which is the main threat from the Soviet Union at present and can create options for more overt forms of intervention at a later stage.

c) Military assistance: eg the use of Soviet and/or proxy military advisers, the provision of military equipment and training to established pro-Soviet regimes (eg Ethiopia, PDRY) or opposition rebel groups(eg Dhofar, Shaba).

d) The use of proxy combat forces: these provide a lower profile form of assistance to a pro-Soviet regime (eg Ethiopia and Angola) than direct Soviet involvement.

e) The large-scale deployment of Soviet combat forces: the Russians are likely to seek to avoid this wherever possible, especially in circumstances where it entails direct confrontation with the West.

2. There will also continue to be many threats to the stability of Third World countries with which the Soviet Union has no connection. Libyan-backed insurgency in Tunisia is a current example. The

/Russians

Russians will stand to gain if such dangers engulf regimes sympathetic to the West or genuinely non-aligned, or drive them through desperation to accept Soviet support.

Western counter-measures

3. Western counter-measures will need to be as varied as the threat. Those which are purely political or economic are considered elsewhere. But they will certainly be all that is called for in many cases. The political climate in the Third World is generally more hostile than it was to outside military intervention of any kind. Foreign military bases are less acceptable. Recent advances in technology have made it easier to deploy Western forces rapidly without dependence on a large overseas base, but have also increased the capacity of an otherwise unsophisticated enemy to hamper even well-trained Western forces.

4. Where Western counter-measures need to have a military dimension, it will often be in both Western and Third World interests that they should fall short of actual intervention. The West can assist through the provision of:

a) paramilitary assistance (eg SAS-type training, police training, subsidised military training assistance (UKMTAS), and in certain circumstances, loan service personnel);

b) defence equipment (perhaps on easy terms);

5. Western military assistance can take the form of an over-the-horizon presence or the temporary deployment in a peaceful context of units from any of the three Services. Britain already plays a part

/here

here, with annual ship deployments to a number of areas (Indian Ocean, Caribbean, Far East) and exercises in Kenya and Oman.

6. Measures of this kind are preventive and deterrent. They depend for much of their effectiveness on the West's being seen to be ready to go further if they fail. In a Third World where the use of external force by the Russians (or their proxies or others) has become a recognised danger, much importance is bound to be attached to the West's ability to promise actual military intervention and if necessary carry it out.

Forces available to the West and the Soviet Union

7. Western conventional forces available for deployment outside the NATO area are at present quite limited. Although the USA has vast forces potentially available for this role (the US Marine Corps alone comprises a total of 180,000 men) in practice the number of troops which could be deployed rapidly would be much smaller. Britain and France could also deploy small forces at short notice. Ministers have accepted the case for this.

8. The West cannot match Soviet conventional deployments when the latter are operating on much shorter lines of communication, as in South West Asia (SWA). The Russians have, for example, seven airborne divisions ready for deployment in SWA, and 20 armoured divisions deployable within 4-6 weeks. The West could not deploy forces on such a scale or within sufficient time to contain with conventional forces alone direct Soviet aggression there, particularly in north-east Iran,

/north-

north-west Pakistan or Baluchistan. This constraint would be acute if accompanied by an alert in Europe (eg by blocking road access to Berlin). Western conventional deployments, backed where necessary by Theatre Nuclear Forces could, however, signal Western readiness to meet the Soviet challenge. Such a signal would have credibility only where the Russians believed a vital US interest (eg oil) was at stake. Outside countries bordering on the USSR, the Soviet ability to intervene in places where they would encounter resistance would be more limited, and the conventional balance would be more even.

Use of Western Military Forces

9. It is rarely possible to forecast the precise circumstances in which intervention might be needed; but there have been several cases in the fairly recent past where a threatened Third World country (Zaire, Oman, Chad) has seen direct Western military intervention as the only effective way to counter an external or externally-backed threat. Pakistan provides the clearest example of a country which is increasingly relying on the explicit possibility of Western intervention in an emergency. In the future, as in the past, the most obvious source of such intervention is the United States. But for domestic political reasons the willingness of the Americans to act as global policemen is going to depend more and more on the willingness of their allies, in particular Britain and France, to help too.

10. The UK has a tradition of military involvement in the Third World; our presence alongside the Americans may be politically useful; and because of the dangers inherent in super-power military action, there

/may

may be cases where it would be in everyone's interest for the Americans not to get involved. We could therefore play a useful role. But United Kingdom forces acting on their own would only be able to counter a relatively low threat from insurgents or infiltrators; and that only in a relatively small, isolated or little-populated country. In practice, the only countries which would be likely to look to the United Kingdom for help against an enemy with whom British forces could deal effectively would probably be Gulf countries (particularly Oman) or Commonwealth states (eg in the Caribbean). In all other circumstances, we should only be likely to intervene as a part of a wider Western effort, probably in support of the United States. Examples might be operations to secure Western oil supplies through the Straits of Hormuz; or assistance in South East Asia to a signatory of the Manila Pact.

11. Western ability to deploy forces quickly in the Third World could be valuable in two ways:

a) deterrence: the existence of Western deployment plans or over-the-horizon forces might help to discourage Soviet or proxy intervention;

b) it would also strengthen the determination of local governments to resist.

But large-scale and visible Western military activity could stimulate damaging regional counter-reactions. This could ultimately work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. In practice, therefore, it is unlikely that the West would intervene except where its vital interests were at stake or on the request of a local government. Even in the latter

/case

case, we would probably be reluctant to intervene unless it were reasonably likely that such action would be decisive.

Conclusions

12.

a. Various levels of Western response will be required in the face of instability in the Third World and the growth of the Russians' ability to intervene, or threaten intervention, alone or through proxies. Political and economic measures will in many cases be the key element of the Western response.

b. In the military sphere, preventive Western measures short of armed intervention are to be preferred where possible. But they may not be effective unless Western forces are capable of intervening as a last resort.

c. The West has the ability to respond militarily in certain scenarios, but the use of retaliatory military measures might in some cases be inhibited by political factors.

d. The conventional forces available to the West are not adequate to counter a direct Soviet thrust in South West Asia particularly in areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The West could only deter such an attack by signalling its willingness to use any means necessary (which might not exclude nuclear weapons) to protect its vital interests (eg oil supplies). The presence of US forces would act as a trip-wire in such circumstances.

ANNEX J

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SIGNALS AND LEVERS

1. Signals fall into two categories: those designed to demonstrate Western interest in a particular country or region; and those designed specifically to warn the Soviet Union of Western concern about apparently impending Soviet actions. Levers are here considered to be more concrete actions designed either to deter future moves by the Russians or to induce them to reverse an earlier move.

2. The US military signals and levers described in Annex I are the most potent ones. The non-military ones described here should be seen as complementing them.

3. There are few signals or levers which would be effective if used by the UK alone. In most cases the US would have to give a clear lead, to be followed by active and concerted West European support. While the Europeans are probably unable to generate effective leverage on their own, they are capable of nullifying US leverage by withholding their support.

SIGNALS

The demonstration of Western interest

4. The West needs to be visibly committed to the Third World. Aid programmes, trade, political visits, cultural activities etc play their part in demonstrating and developing that commitment. Part of the cause of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may have been that the Russians concluded from the lack of signals to the contrary that the West was not interested in that country. The West can more easily

/demonstrate

demonstrate a close interest in friendly or uncommitted Third World countries than in those which have Marxist or near-Marxist governments. Links can then be demonstratively increased when the Russians begin to exhibit strong interest in a particular country.

Warnings to the Russians

5. It is not much good issuing a warning only days before Soviet troops are due to move. This demands early and good intelligence and its correct interpretation.

6. Warnings will be taken more seriously if they are made at a high level and on a concerted basis by members of NATO and the Nine. Cancellation of planned events can be used as a signal to back up direct warnings. This presupposes a broad range of contacts with the Russians and their allies at times when tension is not high, so that preliminary signals can be passed on the channels thus established and business can be rapidly shut-down with dramatic effect if the situation demands. The cancellation of visits alone may not have a significant effect on Soviet policies or actions except in cases where those visits are linked with business of potential substantial benefit to the Russians. But threats to cancel major events such as East-West conferences or summit meetings could sometimes act as a restraint. The East European countries can be a useful means of re-inforcing signals sent directly to Moscow. Channels, such as the UN, for mobilising Third World opinion should also be considered on each occasion.

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Grain

7. Agriculture is a major weakness of the Soviet Union. There are recurrent moderate or poor harvests. Since 1972 the Soviet Union has become a major net importer of grain. Its domestic requirement is estimated to be 210 to 220 million tonnes in 1980, increasing to 225 to 230 million tonnes in 1985. More than half of this is feed grain for livestock. The Russians now depend in most years on imported grain to maintain the momentum of their meat production programme. They will probably need to import an average of at least 15 million tonnes of grain per year over the next five or six years, and after bad harvests this figure will be much higher. Agreement by the principal Western suppliers to withhold grain, if effectively implemented, can place the Russians in a difficult position. The experience after Afghanistan shows, however, that effective implementation is difficult: some Western countries, not to speak of Argentina, have sold grain. But an embargo operated by only some suppliers is likely to lead to depletion of Soviet strategic grain stocks and distress slaughtering of livestock. Threats of a grain embargo could thus be a useful element in a package of advance levers for use when the USSR seemed to be contemplating a move into a Third World country.

Credit

8. The Soviet Union and its allies will wish to continue to import Western goods on favourable credit terms. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the major Western countries have agreed not to grant credit to the Soviet Union at rates below OECD 'consensus' terms. But leverage is still potentially available, since these rates remain well below the commercial interest rates in most Western countries. Western

/Governments

Governments could in principle raise the rate (though probably not above the lowest commercial rates that are readily available in the OECD area) or could suspend credit altogether; or could threaten to do either. Such a decision would have to be unanimous in order to be effective, yet unanimity would be very difficult to achieve, not least because France and Italy still have intergovernmental agreements under which credit is available to the USSR.

Technology

9. The Soviet Union is likely to continue in the 1980's to seek to import Western technology to accelerate the modernisation of Soviet industry against the background of an inefficient economic system and a declining growth rate. The centralised Soviet planning system would take some time to adjust to a denial of key types of technology, which thus could be a powerful lever provided a sufficient number of Western countries applied it rigorously. COCOM provides machinery for controlling the transfer of strategic goods and technology, and in the wake of Afghanistan an attempt is being made to tighten and widen its application. But COCOM has to proceed on the basis of unanimity, which would be extremely difficult to achieve in respect of the denial of major areas of civil technology. An embargo on exports to the Soviet Union of oil production technology would have to be considered with care since it could have the effect of prolonging a future Soviet need to buy oil on world markets and thus of putting greater pressure on prices. The best hope in this area, if the attempt to reach agreement on widening the scope of COCOM in the wake of

/Afghanistan

Afghanistan should fail, may be to try to launch a serious Western discussion about the possibility of contingency agreement on stopping deliveries of certain types of equipment and technology, if the USSR seems to be preparing to invade another developing country. It would be necessary to try to identify certain key industrial areas where the USSR is dependent on imports from the West; and if possible where the Western exporters are all countries which might seriously consider an embargo. This is a very tall order but may need to be attempted if we are to establish what leverage can be extracted from Soviet purchases of technology.

Political Leverage

10. The scope for exploiting against the Russians the West's expanding relationship with China is not unlimited. Despite the Western and Chinese interest in resisting Soviet international ambitions, there are no shared basic values or objectives. The best approach is probably to develop our relations with China in normal times at the speed suggested by our purposes in those relations, so that the rate of development can be accelerated when we wish to use Sino-Western relations to demonstrate disapproval of the Russians. Care will always be needed to avoid over-playing this card, with unforeseeable effects on Soviet policies.

/11.

11. The UN Human Rights Commission and other specialised inter-governmental and non-governmental international bodies can be stimulated to condemn Soviet malpractices of various kinds. A campaign to arrange concerted action by a number of such bodies would take time to mount and might not be effective. But it could help to bring home to the Russians the disapproval of the international community and thus to persuade them to modify their policy in a particular area.

The National Archives

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If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Symposium on the USSR in the 80s

You asked for an account of the symposium organised by the Director-General of Intelligence at Ashford from 6-8 December 1979. I enclose a list of the participants and a copy of the programme.

The symposium seems to have been a great success. The interaction of officials and academics was fruitful and there was a broad measure of agreement. Officials picked up a number of useful points from the better informed academics and the latter in turn were complimentary about the official contribution.

The general conclusion of the analytical discussion was that the USSR under new leaders was likely to continue to seek to increase its influence by all means short of war, while avoiding confrontation with the USA. Infiltration was thought likely and military intervention unlikely in Iran and Yugoslavia after Tito. No one seriously doubted that the US deterrent would remain effective, despite Kissinger's 'window' theory about US ICBMs being vulnerable for a short period early in the 1980s.

On the economy, the consensus was that the Soviet leadership will face real problems with their growth rate declining and their energy surplus dwindling and perhaps disappearing by 1985 or 1990: but they are not likely to risk the wholesale reforms of the system which could bring a cure, so that muddling through is going to continue. The Soviet Union, by again depriving the consumer, may again be able to maintain an annual increase of 4-5% in defence expenditure. There were many useful contributions on the defence side, not least the observation that Soviet successes in defence technology result not so much from solving technical problems as from clarifying these problems at the outset through an intense and often surprisingly open debate about the requirements and possible solutions. Mr Mackintosh, the Cabinet Office expert on Soviet personalities, tipped Grigori Romanov, at present Leningrad Party Leader, as the man most likely to emerge from the transitional arrangements which are expected to follow Brezhnev's departure.

In spite of the broad consensus however the academics suggested that officials should look again at the influence of ideology, the effects of subversion, the challenge of dissidents and the reality of Soviet allies in Eastern Europe. They also felt that we perhaps should look carefully at the lack of

safety margin in the unpalatable economic options which are open to the Soviet leaders. We are taking account of these important suggestions.

On the last day the Head of East European and Soviet Department here, Mr Christopher Mallaby, put forward on a personal basis an outline of a policy towards the Soviet Union round which about three-quarters of the participants, including Robert Conquest, and also Philip Windsor, Peter Reddaway and Leonard Schapiro of LSE - were prepared to rally. This was based on five planks: strong Western defences as the basic requirement; a readiness to compete with the Russians in the struggle of ideas; the pursuit of ~~contracts~~ compacts and trade; ? much more effort to anticipate and deter Soviet expansion in developing countries; and the continued pursuit of East-West negotiations in fields important to the West.

The analytical thinking produced by the symposium will be reflected in the work in Whitehall on Soviet aims and capabilities in the 1980s.

I am copying this letter to Brian Norbury in the MOD, and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

// this will be coming forward next month

Yours ever

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

ASHFORD SYMPOSIUM: GUEST LIST

MOD

Sir Arthur Hockaday KCB CMG	Second Permanent Under Secretary of State
Sir John Aiken KCB	Director General of Intelligence
Vice Admiral S F Berthon	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operational Requirements)
Vice Admiral R W Halliday DSC.	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff(Intelligence)
Mr J Jones CMG	Security Service
Rear Admiral D Reffell	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy)
Rear Admiral M La T Wemyss	Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Operations)
Major General M H Sinnatt	Director of Combat Development (Army)
Air Vice-Marshal N S Howlett	Director of Management and Support Intelligence
Air Vice-Marshal H Reed-Purvis OBE	Director General of Security (RAF)
Mr John Culshaw	Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser (Studies)
Dr F A Johnson	Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Mr W Rudkin	Director of Economic Intelligence
Mr J N H Blelloch	Assistant Under Secretary of State (Defence Staff)
Mr L E Jeanes	Chief of Public Relations
Mr K W B Gooderham	Head of Defence Intelligence Staff (Central Staff)
Mr Murray Stewart	Defence Policy Staff
Commodore R J F Turner	Commodore (Intelligence)
Brigadier J N S Arthur	Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence)
Air Commodore R G Ashford	Air Commodore (Intelligence)
Air Commodore P S Collins	Director of Forward Policy
Air Commodore J B Fitzpatrick	Director of Operations (Strike)
Group Captain R A Mason	Director Defence Studies, Bracknell
Mrs J P Hamilton-Eddy	Defence Intelligence (Research Group)

FCO

Sir Curtis Keeble KCMG	HM Ambassador, Moscow
Mr J Bullard CMG	Deputy Under-Secretary of State FCO
Mr C L G Mallaby	
Mr D J Moss	
Mr I Roberts	

CABINET OFFICE

Sir Brooks Richards KCMG DSC	Co-ordinator
Mr P Maxey	Head of Assessments Staff
Miss C Pestell	Assessments Staff
Mr J M Mackintosh	Assessments Staff

GCHQ

Mr D Nicoll	Director of Requirements

ACADEMICS

Professor P Nailor	Dept of History and International Affairs, RN College, Greenwich
Professor L B Schapiro	London School of Economics and Political Science
Dr R Amann	Centre for Russian & East European Studies, University of Birmingham
Mr G R Conquest OBE	
Mr M H A Edmonds	Department of Politics, University of Lancaster
Dr P Hanson	Centre for Russian & East European Studies, University of Birmingham
Mr P Reddaway	London School of Economics
Dr Susan Richards	St Anthony's College, Oxford
Dr R J Vincent	Department of International Relations, University of Keele
Mr P Windsor	London School of Economics
Colonel J R Alford	Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies

USA

Lieutenant General E F Tighe	Director of Defence Intelligence Agency
Mr R Huffstutler	Director of Office of Strategic Research

ASHFORD

Brigadier M J D Perrett-Young	Director, Intelligence Corps
Colonel B A H Parritt CBE	Chief Instructor SSI.

DGI SYMPOSIUM: 6 - 8 DECEMBER 1979

Aim: Soviet Defence and Overseas Policy 1980 - 1990s.

DATE	ITEM			SPEAKER	CHAIRMAN
Thur. 6/12	1	1600	Assemble		
		1700	Introduction Tour d'Horizon	DGI	DGI
		1715	(a) Soviet Defence & Overseas Policy	Mr Maxey	
		1745	(b) The military component.	BGS (Int)	
		1945	Reception Drinks		
		2015	Informal Dinner		
Fri 7/13		0800	Breakfast		
	II	0900	The Soviet Leadership	Mr M Mackintosh	2nd PUS
		1030	Coffee		
	III	1100	Economic Constraints	Dr Hanson	Hd of DIS(CS)
		1230	Break		
		1300	Lunch		
	IV	1400	Advances in Soviet Science & Technology	DSTI	DCDS(I)
		1530	Tea		
	V	1600	National Constraints	Mr Reddaway	DEI
		1930	Dinner (Black Tie)		
Sat 8/12		0800	Breakfast		
	VI	0900	International Constraints	Mr Mallaby	Prof. Nailor
		1020	Coffee		
	VII	1100	Future Soviet Policy: Two views: one Hawkish, one Doveish.	Dr Windsor Mr Conquest	DGI
			Debate		
	VIII	1230	Sum up	DGI	
		1300	Lunch		
		1400	Disperse		

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
22 JAN 1960

Foreign Policy 2

Ref: A0362

Top Copy filed in Security: May 79. Briefing for PM on Intelligence + Subversion

SECRET

MR. ALEXANDER

This minute is in reply to the two points about the JIC raised in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of your minute of 18th September which otherwise dealt with Mr. Tovey's call on the Prime Minister.

2. The Prime Minister's wish to attend a meeting of the JIC is, of course, very welcome. I think it is important however that this should be arranged for a day when the chairman (Sir Antony Duff) can be sure of being in the chair himself. This may point to waiting until after the end of the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia. There is also the point that the JIC's regular weekly meeting is on Thursday morning when the Prime Minister has Cabinet. The JIC will therefore need to meet at a different time: and the Prime Minister has, of course, got Questions on Thursday afternoon if Parliament is sitting. But these are details which you could no doubt sort out direct with Sir Antony Duff.

3. The Prime Minister asked about studies on the motivation and intentions of the Soviet Government (as opposed to studies of capabilities, opportunities, etc.). The most recent JIC paper relevant to this is JIC(79) 5 of 14th May which deals with the long-term aims of the foreign policy in the Soviet leadership. If the Prime Minister has not read it before, she may like to do so. I do not however think that it fully meets her basic question about underlying motivation and intentions. Nor does a separate but related JIC report which is currently being prepared and which will aim to define the characteristics of the Soviet Union with which we will be dealing in the 1980s. This will start by identifying the constant factors in Soviet policy and analysing the likely strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and go on to assess how these and other factors may shape Soviet policies during the period. I have therefore commissioned a study by the JIC which will seek to analyse in depth the thinking and motivation of the Soviet leaders and will not, as JIC assessments tend to, emphasise the limitations, as we currently perceive them, on Soviet freedom of action.

4. The Prime Minister also asked about whether we drew sufficiently on (i) information of recent emigres and (ii) academics with a professional interest in the Soviet Union.

5. To take first the use of emigres (as distinct from defectors), I am informed that every effort is made to obtain intelligence from them. But the Soviet regime tries to prevent anyone leaving the country who possesses sensitive information. Although some emigres, particularly among those who go to Israel, yield valuable intelligence of a technical kind, the contributio of emigres is usually limited and low-grade.

6. As regards academics, the Ministry of Defence have for some time been planning a symposium early in December, in which academics will participate, on Soviet foreign and defence policies. Following your letter to Mr. Walden of 21st September about the follow-up to the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Conquest, the FCO have now suggested that the MOD seminar should be expanded so as to include Mr. Conquest and some other notable expert and this is now being arranged. The two new JIC papers referred to in paragraph 3 above will take account of the results of the seminars.

JOHN HUNT

(John Hunt)

3rd October 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 September 1979

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 19 September about the follow up to her meeting with Mr. Robert Conquest.

The Prime Minister agrees that a seminar of the kind proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be held and that a decision about whether or not to perpetuate the seminar should be taken in the light of its outcome.

You may already be aware that the Prime Minister has very recently asked the JIC to undertake a broad study of the current thinking and outlook of the Soviet leadership (assuming that there is not a currently valid study on the stocks). I enclose an extract from a minute setting out the Prime Minister's wishes. The Prime Minister would like the seminar proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the JIC exercise to be dovetailed so that the outcome is a single piece of work. This suggests that the proposed seminar should be held in the relatively near future.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), together with a copy of your letter under reference.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

Robert Conquest

Following your talk with Mr. Conquest at the end of August, I wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about Mr. Conquest's suggestion that an advisory commission on Soviet intentions should be established. I attach Mr. Walden's reply giving the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's reaction to the proposal. As you will see, Lord Carrington is much in favour of closer contact between Soviet experts in Government service and those outside. He thinks that in the first instance a seminar on Soviet intentions might be organised this winter at which the participants would include officials and academics. In the light of the outcome of the seminar, a decision might be taken on whether to formalise it.

As it happens I had minuted two days ago to Sir John Hunt, following your meeting with Mr. Tovey, saying that you would like to have a study put in hand of the current thinking of the Soviet leadership. I attach a copy of the relevant part of my minute.

If you agree, I will write to Mr. Walden saying that you agree with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's approach but that you would like the proposed seminar to be held relatively soon and for its conclusions to be taken into account in the JIC study. If the two exercises can be dovetailed, the outcome might be a paper of real value to you.

Thankyou. — Agreed MT.

20 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1979

Dear Michael,

Robert Conquest

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has read the paper by Mr Conquest enclosed with your letter of 6 September and entitled "Britain and the American Misconception of Soviet Motives".

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is strongly in favour of closer contact between experts on Soviet affairs in the Government Service, including not only the FCO but also the Cabinet Office and elsewhere, and those in the universities and in journalism engaging in the same study. There has in fact been a good deal of contact for many years, for example by the participation of FCO officials in Professor Leonard Schapiro's seminars at the London School of Economics, and through the sabbatical work on Soviet subjects done by officials at several universities. But the present time is especially suitable for the experts to put their heads together about Soviet intentions in the critical period of the early 1980s (Dr Kissinger's "window of danger") when it seems likely both that the Soviet Union will be under new leadership and that Soviet military strength in relation to the United States will be greater than ever before, possibly greater than in the second half of the decade.

Lord Carrington is therefore thinking of giving instructions that a seminar on this subject should be organised during the coming winter, at which the participants would comprise both academics such as Conquest himself and others, and also officials including our Ambassador in Moscow. Any conclusions reached by this gathering could then be discussed with the Americans in the usual way on both the official and academic channel.

We could then judge in the light of the usefulness of the seminar whether to formalise it.

Yours ever

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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20 SEP 1979

SECRET

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Extract from a minute to Sir J. Hunt recording the meeting with Mr Tovey of GCHQ

More generally, the Prime Minister voiced considerable interest in the way in which Intelligence produced by GCHQ and through other channels is collated and assessed. She is anxious that assessment should be, to the extent possible, objective and that policy (or political) considerations should not be allowed to intrude. She said that she would like to attend a meeting of the JIC. You may like to discuss with Sir Antony Duff how this might most satisfactorily be arranged.

The Prime Minister would also like to be re-assured that we are making use of, and co-ordinating effectively, Intelligence from every source on the motivation and intentions of the Soviet Government. She mentioned the need not to overlook recent émigrés and academics with a professional interest in the Soviet Union, particularly those who themselves have a Russian background. I am not sure when the JIC last carried out a broad study of the thinking of the Soviet leadership (as opposed to studies of the military capability and immediate intentions of the Soviet Union). If there is nothing on the stocks, the Prime Minister would like a study to be put in hand.

Finally, the Prime Minister has said that she intends in future to ask for more assessments on short-term issues of concern to her. I shall, of course, pass on these requests as and when they are made.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

18 September 1979

Original filed Security May '79 (Intelligence)

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

Foreign Policy

From the Private Secretary

6 September, 1979.

Dear George,

Robert Conquest

Robert Conquest called on the Prime Minister on 23 August. The enclosed paper entitled "Britain and the American Misconception of Soviet Motives" covers the main point which Mr. Conquest wished to raise.

The Prime Minister is interested in the idea advanced in paragraph 6 of Mr. Conquest's paper viz that an "advisory commission on Soviet intentions" should be set up. I think it would be useful if, in due course, you could seek the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views on the suggestion.

If the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary were to consider that an advisory commission on the lines proposed might not be a particularly fruitful innovation, especially, if so heavily weighted with academics, he might nonetheless think it worth putting forward a counter-proposal focussed on the desirability of bringing about closer links between academic experts and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. One suggestion which might be worth looking at would be the inclusion of outside specialists in the teams which regularly go from Whitehall to Washington to discuss Soviet and other Communist affairs with the Americans.

I shall be grateful if you would ensure that knowledge of the fact that I have sent you a copy of Mr. Conquest's paper is kept to a limited number of people in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

2

(Weekend Box)

PRIME MINISTER

Robert Conquest

The folder below contains the material which Robert Conquest left with you when he called on 23 August. The ~~attached~~ for paper "Britain and the American Misconception of Soviet Motives" covers the main point which he wished to raise with you.

I think that Robert Conquest takes too pessimistic a view of the expertise on the Soviet Union which is available to President Carter and Mr. Vance in Washington. Of the advisers whom he names on page 2 of his note, I cannot comment on the qualifications of Mr. Legvold or Mr. Hough. But I do know that Dr. Marshall Shulman's credentials in Soviet affairs are very respectable (he was Director of the Russian Research Centre at Harvard when I first went there in 1958 and has since held the Chair in Russian Studies at Columbia University) and his recent writings in, for example, "Foreign Affairs" are well informed and trenchant. Moreover, I think Robert Conquest pays too little regard to the second echelon of professional Soviet experts in the State Department, in the CIA and in the National Security Council, most of whom I have met and whom I consider to be of very high calibre indeed and just as alive to Soviet realities as Robert Conquest himself.

That said, I think Robert Conquest is quite right to make the point that British academic expertise on the Soviet Union and on Communism in general is deployed much less effectively, in terms of influencing official opinion, than it is in the United States; and it is also true that the views of men like Leonard Schapiro, Hugh Seton-Watson and Robert Conquest himself

/do command

do command wide respect in the US. I frankly doubt whether it would be helpful to set up a body such as the "Advisory Commission on Soviet Intentions" which Robert Conquest proposes, at any rate in the form he suggests which seems too heavily weighted towards academia. But it would be well worth devising some means of bringing about closer links and co-operation between our academic experts and the FCO: consideration could be given, for example, to including one or two such experts in the teams which quite regularly go across to Washington to discuss Soviet and other Communist affairs with the Americans.

Would you like me to send a short note to Lord Carrington's office on Robert Conquest's call on you and to ask whether consideration could be given to mobilising our own non-official Soviet experts more effectively?

28 August 1979

Britain and the American Misconception of Soviet Motives

The central problem facing the British Government is clearly the twin threat of nuclear war and Soviet domination.

But at present the most urgent aspect of this problem is the wholly unrealistic and misleading view of Soviet attitudes now prevalent in the United States Administration. The crucial question is, therefore, how can we bring influence to bear on Washington to change its course?

2. A major element in the consolidation of a false view of Soviet intentions in the American governmental mind has been the assembly of supposed experts, of academic provenance, to give it credibility. A score of these, far the highest number of such political appointments to be seen there in recent decades, have been included at high levels in the State Department, and others in the National Security Council, while yet others play a supportive role outside government in the organs of the so-called "Foreign Policy Establishment." They are all in the

/2....

strictest sense "McGovernites". Those in State were recruited through Tony Lake, who, with Leslie Gerb (in charge of armaments questions at State) is among the most awkward.

They are not in fact men of real repute. Mr. Marshall Shulman, who holds the post of Vance's Advisor on Soviet matters, with the rank of Ambassador, is a (not very good) student of French affairs, who does not speak Russian, and whose claim is based on an administratively accidental tenure at the Columbia Russian Institute. His leading extra-governmental supporter, Robert Legvold, is a student of South African affairs, recently drifted into Soviet matters. These two are in effect weak and pliable followers of fashion. Others, better informed, are most charitably to be described as half-crazed: for example, Jerry Hough (extra-governmental), who has recently asserted that Stalin hardly killed anybody at all. At the other end of the scale are men like Averill Harriman, on record as saying that he accepts assurances of goodwill from Brezhnev and Co, because it is inconceivable that they would venture to deceive <u>him</u>; and so on. I say nothing of the attitudes of the President himself, and of certain of his advisors such as Mr. Andrew Young.

/3....

3. We should note that British opinion, or the opinion of Britons, carries greatly disproportionate weight in the United States. And particularly in this sphere. Even as individuals, Britons of any repute are often asked to testify (as I have done several times myself) to Senate and House Committees. To cite another personal experience: when Dr. Helmuth Sonnenfeld was Dr. Kissinger's chief envoy, he would when spending a few hours in London, get hold of me to try to pursuade me that he was acting correctly, (usually failing). I give my own case, because, at the time, I had no current academic or other institutional status at all. If a Briton in this position can have some influence, it is easy to imagine that a body of such, with more formal credentials, would have very much more.

It is even the case that left-wing American magazines, which would not dream of printing anything by an American "reactionary", are prepared to accept a Briton: as with the New York Review of Books, which is now printing Leonard Schapiro's devastating review of a potentially influential work by Jerry Hough; just as it prints Hugh Trevor-Roper and others.

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The Americans are deeply impressed, even within their own country, by Institutions, Centers and so forth, invariably described as "prestigious". This results, already, in reasonable publicity for British views not in accord with current American thinking, if put forward by the "prestigious" Institute for Strategic Studies, and even for people who would be regarded individually as grossly, even grotesquely, reactionary, such as Mr. Brian Crozier, since incorporated into his "Institute for the Study of Conflict".

4. How, then, could British influence be maximised?

Pronouncements by the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary carry great weight. But it is inevitable that, in the first place, they cannot be made very often; and in the second that considerations of international protocol - vis-a-vis Moscow as well as Washington - are bound to some degree to blunt their emphasis.

Our Ambassador in Washington may also speak on occasion, but he is, in general, even more inhibited from giving public advice to the American administration.

Our Ambassador to the United Nations, not being accredited

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to the U.S. Government, is not under such inhibitions. At present the post is held by a career diplomat, who can hardly speak freely: but in my view it should be a political appointment, and one somewhat in the nature of those of Daniel P. Moyniham and Andrew Young, responsible in principle to the Secretary of State, but in practice to the head of the government or the government as a whole. Such a political appointee, who should in any case be conducting a vigorous defensive and counter-offensive role in the United Nations itself, and thereby making the American press and other media (as Lord Gladwyn did in his time), would also be in a position to speak strongly in American fora.

5. The Foreign Office is in any case not, one would say, organised to provide a profound, long-term view of Soviet ends. There are several excellent experts in it, but they are comparatively isolated in special departments, and kept to a lowish hierarchical level; and those concerned with high policy are inclined to be, in the natural course of such careers, Jacks of all trades. This is not to say that the current American system of the intrusion of "experts" at an executive level in the department is necessarily a good thing. Nor, of course, that any British equivalent of Marshall Shulman is conceivable

/6....

under our system. Nevertheless a gap exists.

6. I would suggest that the heaviest possible weight might be brought by the setting up of an official, (or "quasi") Advisory Commission on Soviet Intentions responsible to the Prime Minister: a small body of five or six people, perhaps chaired by Lord Home, (or Lord Caccia), and containing Hugh Seton-Watson, Leonard Schapiro and myself; with possibly a Foreign Office representative, such as Eddie Bolland. This would carry the weight of the individuals, the weight of an institution, and the weight of H.M. Government. Its initial Report, which should not take long to produce (and which should be strong, firm, lucid and comparatively brief) would have very great impact in the United States. And it could follow this up with occasional pronouncements. At the same time the appearance of any of us in the United States as individuals, which would be a perfectly natural and usual thing for all of us, would give our already fairly effective comments enormously greater power.

Of course, apart from the effect in Washington, such a Commission should anyhow be of great value in itself.

Robert Conquest
20/8/79

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

STRATEGIC REVIEW

VOL. VII Pg. 9 SUMMER 1979 (7 AUGUST) NO. 3

SALT II: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

MANFRED WÖRNER

THE AUTHOR: Manfred Wörner is the Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and Speaker on defense matters in the parliamentary delegation of the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union. He has served in the Bundestag since 1965 as a representative of a district in Baden-Württemberg. He is a Lieutenant Colonel and jet pilot in the West German Luftwaffe Reserve. His article, "NATO Defenses and Tactical Nuclear Weapons," appeared in the Fall 1977 issue of *Strategic Review*.

IN BRIEF

SALT II and the raging internal American debate confront West Europeans with a diplomatic dilemma, which governments have sought to solve with what appear as sweeping endorsements. Yet in one measure or another, all knowledgeable Europeans hold some reservations about the Treaty. There is the fear that the door will be slammed upon urgent options in theater nuclear capabilities, especially since the Soviet Union has already posited its interpretation of a durable and comprehensive ban on cruise missile deployments in Europe. A perceived trend toward a "low strategic profile" by the United States has profound implications for the "extended deterrent" over NATO Europe. Moreover, in the wake of SALT II and the absence of quick redressive measures, NATO's bargaining prospects in SALT III promise to be scant indeed.

The SALT II Treaty has been signed by President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev. With Brezhnev's signature, the Treaty has in effect been ratified by the Soviet Union. The same does not apply to the United States, where the issue of formal ratification by the U.S. Senate is still very much up in the air. At this writing, no one can predict with confidence whether there will indeed be a SALT II—and if so, what its precise contents and ramifications will look like. An element of U.S. foreign policy has become in a real sense a function of American domestic politics.

To that extent, SALT II has also become an exceptionally delicate problem of diplomacy for all of America's allies. Every articulated European opinion of SALT inevitably smacks of meddling in internal American affairs.

The way European governments have gone about solving this dilemma is both understandable and disquieting. Placed before the choice of endorsing the position of the U.S. government or that of its opposition, a European government obviously feels compelled to opt for the former. But frequently such an exercise in diplomatic niceties comes to mean a sweeping endorsement of SALT II, irrespective of any reservations that may be entertained about the Treaty.

And, in one measure or another, all knowl-

(See SALT II, Pg 2-F)

SALT II -- CONTINUED

Knowledgeable Europeans hold reservations about SALT II, even though they may voice these only in confidential tones. The following observations constitute an attempt to express such reservations. They should not be interpreted as being intrinsically "for" or "against" SALT II. A sweeping endorsement of the Treaty seems to be as inappropriate as a categorical rejection. This writer has followed SALT with sympathy. The attempt to harness, limit or reduce armaments merits every endeavor. Should it be possible to establish permanent and comprehensive strategic parity between the two superpowers, surely the world would become a more stable and thus more secure place.

But the SALT II Treaty also touches the foundations of European and German security. It thus demands that positions be taken—not categorical positions, to be sure, but careful ones, commensurate with the complexity of the technical and political issues involved. If in voicing such positions one risks being marshaled as a prime witness by one or the other side to the American debate, so be it. To remain silent would reinforce the impression that Germans and other Europeans have grown incapable of formulating their vital interests and have thus been rendered mute in the strategic dialogue.

The problems posed for Europeans by the SALT II Treaty range at four different levels:

1. The Protocol of the Treaty bears directly on possible European military options.
2. The provisions of the Treaty regarding technology transfer as well as the so-called noncircumvention clause do not necessarily discriminate against Europe, but the imprecise formulations make a battle of interpretations well nigh inevitable.
3. The strategic force relationships fixed in the Treaty, official U.S. elaborations on this score, as well as the way the United States has dealt with redressive weapons decisions thus far sharpen the impression of a U.S. policy of "low strategic profile," the perception of which would have profound implications for Western Europe.
4. The question arises whether and to what extent the negotiations toward SALT II, as well as their conclusion, impart certain real and perceived precedents for SALT III and the MBFR negotiations.

The Protocol to the SALT II Treaty

An inevitable consequence of rough parity between the superpowers at the strategic nuclear level is the growing significance of military imbalances at the regional level. In the new strategic environment, each superpower will find its global interests vulnerably exposed within those regional sub-systems wherein it fails demonstrably to muster an adequate balancing weight against the adversary's power. But this also means that such regions of military and political imbalance will be the first to feel the heat of any new conflict between the superpowers. In light of the relentless expansion of Soviet superiority in theater nuclear capabilities in Europe, it behooves the United States—in its self-interest as well as those of its allies—to use all available means to redress this imbalance.

The above makes it all the more astonishing that the United States has obligated itself, under the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty, not to construct and deploy land- or sea-based cruise missiles, either conventional or nuclear, with ranges of more than 600 kilometers—and to enter into this obligation without exacting a comparable concession from the Soviet Union. The obligation slams the door upon some potentially important and urgent security options for the European members of NATO.

To be sure, the Protocol is supposed to expire on December 31, 1981. The danger is real, however, that the restrictions will be extended beyond this date in order to be set in concrete in SALT III. Reinforcing this fear, among other things, is the unequivocal position of the Soviet Union, which was expressed already on February 11, 1978, by *Pravda:*

> These figures [U.S. SALT critics] would like to remove from the limitations sea-launched and surface-launched cruise missiles. This is in fact a blatant attempt to insure right now that after the three-year term of the protocol ends there is freedom of action to develop such missiles and increase their agreed range above 600 km, and ultimately to retain the possibility of deploying them outside the United States—that is, as close as possible to the USSR's borders. Comment, as they say, is superfluous. It is surely quite obvious that this is yet another attempt to emasculate the limitations already agreed on and to wreck the agreement as a whole.

The Soviet Union thus has given clear notice that it intends to consider any deviation from the cruise missile limitations, even after the expiration of the Protocol, as compromising the entire substantive basis of SALT II. This interpretation is ostensibly reinforced by the Statement of Principles in the Treaty, which set the guidelines for future negotiations. The last Principle calls for the "resolutions of the issues included in the Protocol. . . ." It thus envisages that those issues that are given temporary treatment in SALT II under the Protocol will be passed on to more conclusive settlement in SALT III.

The implication is clear, therefore, that following the expiration of the three-year Protocol, the issue of longer-range cruise missiles will be the subject of further negotiations, and no one can anticipate their duration. Legal as well as practical considerations militate against a one-sided exercise of the longer-range cruise missile option while the negotiations would be in progress. Moreover, the Soviet Union has recourse to a powerful lever for sustaining the Protocol provisions beyond their formal expiration date—namely, in its developed (and probably produced) SS-16 mobile ICBMs, whose deployment is also barred by the Protocol. If the Soviets were to introduce these mobile systems after December 1981, the United States could not counter with comparable capabilities until well into the late 1980s.

(See SALT II, Pg. 3-F)

SALT II -- CONTINUED

The notion is already making the rounds in Europe today that, assuming SALT II should be ratified, the only chance for NATO to grasp the cruise missile option would be a U.S. decision to forgo SALT III entirely—a prospect that is neither realistic nor inspiring. If one adds to the calculations the fact that the Soviet Union has successfully tested long-range cruise missiles of its own—as well as the fears expressed in American official circles that parts of the Soviet Navy may already be equipped with the weapons system—then the dismal prospect (from the European perspective) points at best toward continued bilateral U.S.-Soviet restrictions on cruise missiles. Such a protraction of limitations would be reinforced by Soviet threats of a return to a cold war footing, combined with the possible "carrot" of some marginal Soviet concessions in the strategic nuclear arena.

The likelihood of this kind of scenario is upheld by the record of the past decade. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger justifiably criticized the Protocol for creating "an illusionary impression of temporariness," elaborating that "I don't know of any such protocol that has expired." [1]

In light of all these factors, Americans should not be surprised that their assurances regarding a lifting of all cruise missile restrictions by 1982 are greeted with a marked skepticism on the part of Europeans.

Technology Transfer and Non-Circumvention

There has been a strange silence in Western Europe with respect to the provisions of SALT II dealing with non-circumvention of the Treaty in the broadest sense—notwithstanding the knowledge that this provision is formulated rather vaguely. Two reasons account for this. On the one hand, this Treaty provision has been interpreted largely in the context of the aforementioned Protocol restrictions on cruise missile deployments. On the other hand, Europeans have tended to rely on comforting American interpretations of the non-circumvention clause in SALT II.

Particularly in view of the doubts noted above regarding a timely elapse of the Protocol restrictions on cruise missiles, a negligent attitude toward the non-circumvention clause hardly seems justified. Indeed, the combination of the Protocol restrictions and the non-circumvention clause suggests the contingency that not only will the European members of NATO be barred from American land- and sea-based cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs), but that they may be similarly blocked from the option of fitting long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on tactical NATO aircraft like the FB-III, F-4 and Tornado. To this must be added the moot question whether the technological transfer prohibition will apply even to cruise missile components like guidance systems and computerized mapping. The apparent debate in the United States over this issue presages the wide leeway for interpretations of the no-transfer provisions.[2]

It is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union has offered the *a priori* determination that neither can cruise missiles under 600 kilometers be deployed in third countries (i.e., NATO states) nor can technology or components of such missiles be transferred to third nations. An article in *Pravda* on February 11, 1978, left no room for misinterpretation of the Soviet position:

> It is necessary to lay particular stress on the dangerous nature of attempts to leave loopholes so that cruise missiles can be deployed on the territory of other countries—the United States' NATO allies first and foremost. This question is part of the overall problem of insuring that the agreement worked out completely excludes the possibility of strategic arms being handed over to third countries, or of the agreement's being circumvented through the agency of third countries.

Those sentences make it clear that from the Soviet vantage point even the transfer of technology or of manufactured cruise missiles with a range of *less* than 600 kilometers would be deemed by Moscow violations of the Treaty.

To be sure, this Soviet position clashes with an American interpretation of the no-transfer provisions that is much more favorable to Allied interests. Yet, those Europeans who draw comfort from this overlook a central fact: given the growing Soviet military threat in Europe, the SALT II Treaty should not burden Western Europe with ambiguities that invite future disputes over interpretation and implementation. Perhaps the United States as a world power could afford such disputes with the Soviet Union, but the consequences for an exposed country like the Federal Republic of Germany might be incalculable.

If experience is a teacher, in the event of such a dispute, a loudly declaimed interpretation by the Soviet Union would be enough to convince a good part of the government in Bonn of the need to accept this interpretation. The argument, often advanced in the Federal Republic, that the Europeans would not be involved in a dispute over interpretation of SALT because they are not parties to the Treaty is as legalistic as it is politically naive. In such a contingency, the Soviet Union would not accuse the West European nations of a Treaty violation; rather, Moscow would simply apply massive political pressure and threaten the end of detente. Governments that have loudly announced that there is no alternative to detente could not, by definition, withstand such pressure. A number of developments in the past few years strongly suggest that there is indeed basis for such concern.

But the relevant provisions in SALT II about technology transfer and non-circumvention apply not only to cruise missiles, nor solely to the Federal Republic of Germany. Whether and to what extent the United States would be able to help Great Britain and France in the modernization of their national strategic forces are open questions—and surely controversial ones in light of the Soviet Union's traditionally restrictive interpretation of Treaty provisions.

(See SALT II, Pg. 4-F)

SALT II -- CONTINUED

Strategic Stability and "Extended Deterrence"

However the capabilities of the superpowers may be added up and measured, it seems certain that by the early 1980s a large part of the land-based ICBMs of the United States would not survive a Soviet nuclear strike. The Carter Administration tried to redress this vulnerability in its March 1977 SALT proposal, which sought substantial reductions in the land-based ICBMs of both superpowers. The proposal was rejected peremptorily by Moscow. To be sure, the survivability of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs, as Defense Secretary Harold Brown put it, is "not exactly the same as the survival of the United States." Nevertheless, a forfeiture of this force certainly would have a more serious meaning than "simply" the amputation of one leg of the U.S. strategic triad.

The debate over this problem in the United States turns around the development and deployment of a new generation of ICBMs. It becomes increasingly clear, however, that the technical arguments obscure more fundamental political and strategic questions. These are questions about the future capability of the United States for crisis management and willingness to risk conflict; about the relationship between military balance and political freedom of action; about the linkage between defense and deterrence; and about the criteria of strategic stability. These are questions primarily for the United States, but they necessarily cast their shadows upon Western Europe as well.

The Carter Administration has marked NATO as a priority of its foreign and security policies—a fact that has been welcomed in Europe. It has emphasized the strengthening of the conventional components of the NATO posture, and this undoubtedly is a most urgent requirement for the Alliance.

Yet NATO cannot subsist on conventional forces alone. The Alliance remains dependent upon a United States nuclear deterrent that is credible in terms of capabilities as well as doctrine. Especially since NATO will be incapable in the foreseeable future of mustering a balancing weight in conventional forces in Europe, the Alliance's strategy, forces and weapons will have to be framed in such a way as to preserve the options of first use of nuclear weapons, nuclear escalation, and flexible and selective targeting. In light of the general perception of a strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers, these options can be vouchsafed only through capabilities that can credibly and durably attest to the ability by the United States to control the process of escalation in the event of a conflict in Europe.

Against this background, the vulnerability of the U.S. arsenal of land-based ICBMs is provoking serious concern. For the foreseeable future, land-based ICBMs represent the most reliable, quickly reactive and accurate strategic weapons, especially in terms of systems applicable to a conflict in Europe. Only survivable ICBMs fill the NATO requirement of keeping open the options of first and selective use of nuclear weapons. Because of a variety of factors, even improved U.S. SLBMs could not adequately substitute for ICBMs in such missions. There is thus a "legitimate" European stake in the maintenance by the United States of a survivable force of ICBMs.

Other factors enter into this European interest. The prospect that the U.S. Administration could adopt a "launch on assessment" or "launch under attack" doctrine with respect to its vulnerable Minuteman ICBMs can only be disquieting. Such doctrines represent but marginal improvements over a "launch on warning" concept, and in any event portend a highly unstable situation susceptible to accident and error.

Against this background, West Europeans have reacted with a sense of relief to the announced decision of the U.S. Administration to proceed with the development and eventual deployment of modernized MX intercontinental missiles. However, anyone who has followed the internal debate in the United States, particularly the statements of the Administration, cannot skirt the conclusion that the MX decision reflects less the embrace of strategic necessity and more the attempt to entice some opponents of SALT II in the U.S. Senate toward support or at least tolerance of the Treaty. If this conclusion is accurate, then the MX decision is in the truest sense of the word a tactical rather than a strategic decision.

Apparently the U.S. Administration still clings to a belief in the possibility of reciprocal U.S.-Soviet restraint within a solidifying "structure for peace." But the reality is otherwise. Anyone who has objectively analyzed the progressive global engagement of the Soviet Union in the past several years, the deliberate creation of regional imbalances, and above all the massive Soviet strategic arms effort is pushed toward some inescapable conclusions: namely, that the Soviet Union does not accept the U.S.-propagated concept of mutual deterrence; that Moscow in no way sees strategic stability as synonymous with strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers; that rather the USSR defines its own security strictly in terms of military superiority; and that therefore a durable condition of parity, which is the declared aim of SALT, is illusory. The "bottom line" is that he who does not want to accept Soviet supremacy must engage in an arms race—with or without SALT.

It is always at once fascinating and frightening for Europeans to witness the efforts by Americans to interpret Soviet behavior. Apparently the current generation of Americans in policy positions, having reached maturity in a period of clear U.S. superiority, has difficulty in imagining a world in which matters would be reversed. Regrettably West Europeans know otherwise. They have lived already for years in the shadow of clear Soviet military superiority on the European continent. Although Europeans are conscious of their alliance with what is still the strongest power on earth, nevertheless the immediate proximity of a massively superior potential adversary leaves an ever deepening imprint on West European policies.

It is in this subtle context that one must grasp the meaning of military superiority in the waning decades of the twentieth century. The mili-

(See SALT II, Pg. 5-F)

SALT II -- CONTINUED

tary power of the Soviet Union is not likely to be directly invoked except under condition of massive Soviet superiority—and probably not even then. Nevertheless, the political impact of Soviet military superiority sets in on the day when U.S. policymakers can no longer look confidently toward prevailing in a possible military confrontation with the Soviet Union. To be sure, a sense of national strength is still prevalent in the United States. It is uncertain, however, how responsible Americans—and the public at large—will react to unequivocal evidence of Soviet superiority in important realms of the strategic balance.

Much more certain is the fate that would befall Western Europe in the event of America's descent into strategic inferiority. In that event, the direction for Western Europe would be predetermined. The direction would not be toward a unification of the free nations of Europe, as continues to be erroneously assumed by Americans who are unfamiliar with the political realities of Western Europe. What would ensue, rather, would be a race by the West European nations for accommodation with Moscow.

Americans should entertain no illusions on this score. The United States itself conceivably may be able to weather periods in which elements of Soviet strategic superiority will be clearly recognizable. But Western Europe could not endure such a "double inferiority." The United States, in casting its strategic decisions, therefore, must always take into account the protective requirements of the entire Alliance. An American "minimum deterrent" might protect the United States; it would not safeguard the Alliance.

The Mirage of SALT III

At least in Europe nowadays—and especially when arguments stray into difficulty—there inevitably comes a reference to "SALT III." This applies particularly to so-called Eurostrategic nuclear weapons of continental range. SALT III has somehow become a kind of strategic Nirvana, where all problems concerning such weapons will be magically solved.

Unfortunately such happy assumptions do not correspond to reality. Today there are hard notions about neither the participants in, nor the substantive agenda of, SALT III. The very fact that SALT III has already been designated the repository of issues that could not be solved in SALT I and SALT II suggests that, if anything, the third round will prove more difficult than its two predecessors with respect to procedural as well as substantive issues. Expectations for SALT III range from deep cuts in the opposing Eurostrategic arsenals down to simply a "freeze" of existing capabilities. Be that as it may, the fear already is making the rounds in Europe that certain SALT II provisions may seriously compromise the West's position in SALT III.

This holds above all for "gray area" nuclear systems. The one-sided limitations on cruise missiles in the SALT II Protocol offer the Soviet Union an obvious pretext for claiming (as Moscow has already done on more than one occasion) that these limitations already are an integral part of the SALT II accords, and that cruise missiles therefore are no longer grist for the bargaining process in SALT III. If this interpretation should prevail, then the only contending assets in long-range theater nuclear capabilities remaining to SALT III would be the forward based systems (FBS) on the NATO side and the SS-20 IRBMs and tactical aircraft (including the Backfire bombers) on the Warsaw Pact side.

Merely the relative quantitative dimensions of these contending bargaining assets render it highly unlikely that the West could emerge from the negotiations with anything resembling a favorable outcome. The rhetoric that has been devoted of late to SALT III, especially in European governmental circles, is thus revealing. It shows that no one really has come to grips in a serious way even with a possible NATO negotiating position. To the contrary: Through its so-called Option III in the Vienna negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR), NATO created yet another barrier to a redressive solution of the Eurostrategic imbalance.

If, therefore, the cruise missile limitations in the SALT II Protocol should prove prejudicial in SALT III—and if NATO does not move quickly in the meantime to deploy Eurostrategic weapons systems other than cruise missiles—then the West will find itself reduced to a SALT III negotiating position that could realistically aim at best at cementing the existing imbalance in theater nuclear capabilities.

To be sure, there are still some "sorcerer's apprentices" on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that NATO can somehow use weapons options and weapons blueprints as bargaining chips against actually deployed Warsaw Pact capabilities. Anyone with even a casual knowledge of the record of arms control negotiations thus far, however, realizes that in that business "software" has absolutely no chance against hardware.

At a Strategic Crossroads

Whoever has seriously studied the current strategic nuclear equation on the one hand, and the conspicuously contrasting dynamics behind the strategic arms policies of the two superpowers on the other hand, must reach a pregnant conclusion. That conclusion is that the evolution in the relationship between the two superpowers has reached a stage in which not only the U.S.-Soviet force equation will be determined over at least the next decade, but where in more meaningful terms the mold will be cast for the entire international system of the future.

Once again, as a number of times before in the past century, the hopes of Europeans in a critical hour are directed to the United States.

NOTES

1. *The Economist*, February 3, 1979, p. 21.
2. See *SALT II: An Interim Assessment*, Report of the Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Military Application of Nuclear Energy, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess., December 23, 1978.

Some lessons from SALT I

1. SALT I prohibited conversion of "light" ICBM launchers into "heavy" ones. The U.S. wanted to be more specific, and the two delegation heads initialed an Agreed Interpretation saying that "the dimensions [remember that word] of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased." But what is "significant"? In a separate "Common Understanding" the sides agreed that "an increase will not be greater than 10 to 15 per cent of the present dimensions of land-based launchers." The U.S. wanted a specific quantitative definition, but the USSR refused, arguing that the "Common Understanding" was sufficient. So, the U.S. issued one of several "Unilateral Statements" which set out a quantitative base approximately equal to the volume of the existing SS-11, which was later rounded off to 70 cubic meters.

In 1974, the USSR began to deploy the SS-19, with a volume of over 100 cubic meters - between 50 per cent and 60 per cent over our unilateral baseline. Was this a violation? No, because the baseline was unilateral. But was it even incompatible with a 15 per cent increase in dimensions? Not if a 15 per cent increase in dimensions (not volume) is interpreted to mean an increase in length and breadth, which would permit an increase up to 52 per cent in volume. Technically, there was no violation; but, more importantly, there was no meeting of the minds. Although the U.S. had tried to reach an understanding, the USSR had refused. Why? Clearly because it had plans which it would not share with us and which took priority over an agreed definition of size.

2. The 1972 ABM treaty prohibited testing air defense radar in an "ABM mode." Unable to get Soviet agreement on a definition, the U.S. unilaterally defined this to mean, "at an altitude inconsistent with i.e., [too high for] interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed." The object was to prevent the sly upgrading of surface-to-air anti-aircraft capability to anti-ballistic-missile capability. During 1973 and 1974 the Soviet tested SA-5s and radars in an "ABM mode" but, when queried, replied blandly it had only been practicing permitted "range safety and instrumentation on an ABM range." Who is to know, without verification of the ground? Hide-and-seek. We can't be sure the Soviet SAM anti-aircraft system is not being used as a womb for gestation of an ABM system. Vagueness has its uses.

3. One more example. "Current or additionally agreed ABM ranges" were exempted from the ABM treaty. In 1975, the USSR established a new ABM radar range at the Kamchatka impact area without "obtaining additional agreement." Violation? The background is more interesting than the question of violation. At the time of negotiation, the United States, playing its customary role of pressing for open precision, gave the USSR a list of American and known Soviet ABM ranges, not including Kamchatka. Although by acknowledging its existence the USSR could automatically have gained legal exemption for Kamchatka, Moscow, in its customary posture of hardline secrecy, refused to acknowledge or deny the validity of the list commenting only that each side's own capability for technical verification should "prevent any misunderstanding." In other words, "We accept your information on

your installations and on what you know about ours, but we will not confirm. Find it if you can, but we won't tell." Hide-and-seek.

When taxed in 1975 to comment on the new radar in Kamchatka, the USSR coolly responded that there had been a radar range in Kamchatka all along (we knew there had been an old one, which didn't count under the 1972 criteria). Now however, in 1975, when confronted directly, the USSR said it was quite content to have Kamchatka exempted under the ABM treaty. But the Soviets had been unwilling to acknowledge it in 1972 when the treaty was signed! Another deliberate refusal to cooperate in establishing a mutually recognized baseline for enforcing the treaty.

In all three cases the failure to achieve a meeting of the minds was contrived by the USSR to preserve its freedom to maneuver and conceal its intentions while accepting our unilateral statements of our intentions. Sophomoric negotiation on our part - but it also reflects the yawning gap between U.S. and Soviet views of SALT. It reveals how Soviet SALT I negotiations were animated by an aggressive strategy calculated to meet the Soviets' plans for developing new weapons to carry out their strategy.

Norman B. Hannah, U.S. Foreign Service, retired.
National Review, June 22, 1979

SALT II and Europe

In the hearings on SALT II before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month a constant theme both from those giving testimony and from various members of the Committee itself - a theme, moreover, heavily stressed in the American press - was that America's European allies were deeply concerned that the Treaty should come into force. Secretary Vance spoke in this sense, and George W. Ball, for example, asserted that "on the whole, I think a rejection would certainly increase European doubts as to our competence and reliability as a leader and could, in the longer term, weaken our whole system of cooperation and common effort".. and that rejection "... would certainly reinforce European doubts as to our steadiness on course and thus our reliability as Europe's main defense". John A. Armitage said that "..a rejection of SALT II will be regarded by Europeans as a basic change in U.S. - Soviet policy - away from an attempt to contain Soviet expansionism while offering the prospect of improved relations under appropriate conditions - and toward a policy of unrestrained confrontation with primary emphasis on the military rivalry. Europeans will not wish to join us on that path." And so forth .... General Haig, it is true, made the point that the Europeans in fact had many qualms about it, and Eugene V. Rostow was most realistic. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the fact that we and others

/2 ...

do not wish to appear to be intervening in an American political quarrel has not only let our case go by default, but has given the impression that we enthusiastically favour the Treaty.

In fact, how could this be? For even if American critics of SALT were wrong, and it did in fact provide for equality in strategic weapons between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., that would amount to their cancelling out, leaving NATO in Europe in a position of gross inferiority.

Since these American voices have now so strongly asserted our approval, I would feel that HMG should put our qualms directly to the American government; or even express them publicly, say in an interview with a prominent American correspondent. That is, unless the Foreign Office has somehow pursuaded itself that SALT does not have these consequences: in which case our political leadership should surely tell them to think again.

The very least we should demand, surely, is the reinstatement of the neutron bomb. - The fact that the Russians launched a massive propaganda campaign against it, as against no other weapon in the Allied armoury, is indication enough that their major current aim is the effective disarmament of NATO.

Beyond that, there seems a very good case for a major Prime Ministerial speech in the next month or two, on the need - especially in view of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber - to develop an independent European deterrent.

R Cayzer

A recent (and very experienced) visitor to the USSR, Professor Robert F. Byrnes, tells us that :

> "... the ignorance to be found among even educated citizens of Moscow and events within the Soviet Union and of Soviet policy elsewhere is overwhelming, and constitutes, again, a chronic handicap to the Soviet government. No Soviet citizen I met was at all well informed about the Soviet budget, the size of the Soviet armed forces, the number of Soviet troops in various Eastern European countries and the problems those countries face, or about Soviet policies with regard to SALT, the Middle East, Africa, or the other areas of critical concern throughout the world. Indeed, the misinformation poured upon the Soviet people by all the media makes one yearn for old-fashioned ignorance ..."
> (Survey, Vol 23, No 4)

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The Role of the Intellectual in International Misunderstanding

by Robert Conquest
Senior Research Fellow



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Robert Conquest

The Role of the Intellectual

in International misunderstanding

IT WILL NOT be my concern to retail particular scandals in the intellectual and academic involvement in foreign affairs. I am not compiling a *sottisier* of idiotic remarks made by particular professors, which would indeed be a cruel, but all too easy pastime, under George Orwell's dictum: "You have to be a member of the intelligentsia to believe things like that—no ordinary man could be such a fool. . . . " I seek, rather, to trace the fundamental attitudes which, on the whole, lead intellectuals, and academics in particular, to misinterpret the world scene. This is not, of course, to censure all who have ever served in universities, but merely to indicate generally disqualifying elements in the intellectual-academic approach, or rather temperament, which are responsible for much that is unreal in accepted thinking about international matters.

First, the academic is afflicted, like all of us, with the problem of making the effort of the intellect and the imagination not to project his or our ideas of common sense or natural motivation on to the products of totally different cultures. If it is worse, usually, in the case of the intellectual, that is partly because he systematises the error more strongly, partly because he has also devised means of misunderstanding his *own* culture. The citizenry as such (unless misled) often nourish fairly sound attitudes based on instinct or memory. Inadequacy in understanding the real world is most marked among educated people, including many of those who consider themselves exceptionally qualified to discuss or write of foreign politics.

The crux of the international scene today is a relationship between different political cultures, the histories, attitudes, and beliefs of each of which are radically alien to those of the other. As early as 1946, T. S. Eliot wrote in an extraordinarily perceptive essay introducing *The Dark Side of the Moon*:

> "We are, in fact, in a period of conflict between cultures—a conflict which finds the older cultures in a position of disadvantage: from lack of confidence in themselves, from divisions both internal and between each other, from the inheritance of old abuses from the past aggravated by abuses due to the hasty introduction of novelties. The Liberal . . . assumes . . . that the cultural conflict is one which can, like political conflict, be adjusted by compromise, or, like the religious conflict, be resolved by tolerance. . . . The frantic attempt, either through assembling representatives of more and more nations in public, or through discussions between leaders of fewer and fewer nations in private, to find a political solution to what is not merely a political problem, can . . . only lead to temporary and illusory benefits, unless the deeper problem is faced and pondered."

The present world is, moreover, extraordinary in containing, in the extreme and sensitive contiguity produced by modern arms and modern communication, these states and political cultures of such fundamentally divergent types.

In his Nobel Prize speech, Alexander Solzhenitsyn noted in one of his most penetrating insights, that in the old days disparate cultures were physically separated. Men were "guided by their own experiences in their circumscribed localities, in their community, in their society, and lastly, on their national territory. Then it was still possible for a single pair of eyes to perceive and accept some common scale of values." The differences between distant cultures were only known by report and to a few travellers; and they were so overt and extravagant at the most apparent level that they did not invite any insular judgment. Padishah or Peacock Throne were instantly recognisable as alien. Secretary-

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General or Trade Union Congress sound like the titles and institutions, with their associated attitudes, of the Western world. Nowadays, Solzhenitsyn points out, mankind has become "united", not in the old natural way of communities, but simply in a crude physical sense, with instant communication all over the planet of all superficial information, while at the same time "people in various places apply their own tried and tested scale of values to events, and insist self-confidently and stubbornly on judging only by their own scale."

MY CENTRAL POINT is not so much that people misunderstand other people, or that cultures misunderstand other cultures, but that they do not realise this to be the case. They assume that the light of their own parochial common sense is enough. And they frame policies based on illusions. Yet, how profound is this difference between political cultures and between the motivations of different political traditions; and how deep-set and how persistent these attitudes are!

The contrast between the Soviet despotic culture and the Western civic culture is the current crux, but it needs to be seen on a world historical perspective. Political Man in different systems is not just basically the same creature holding different theoretical opinions, but rather a life-form which has evolved into radically different phyla, each with deep-set attitudes, historically determined over long periods (and subject to natural selection as between different temperamental groups). So that, for example, the present Marxist-Leninist ruling elements in the USSR are actually unable to see the world under categories different from their own. They are the product of a political culture, and nourish a political psychology, quite different from our own. They—and their motivations and probable actions—are not to be understood by projecting on to them our own notions of natural behaviour. The centuries-old tradition of post-Mongol Russia produced a system of unlimited despotism, with a tendency to universal expansionism. This was somewhat modified by two generations of Europeanisation after 1860. But this Western tendency was destroyed by the Revolution which, moreover, grafted on to the old despotic tradition a newer messianic revolutionary despotism with explicit pretence to world rule.

CULTURES HAVE HAD, as they still have, enormous intrinsic momentum, and they cannot be rapidly turned in new directions. Just as the roots of Russian political attitudes derive from the time of the Mongol invasion, the Western civic culture is to be traced back, in spite of vast changes, to "tribal" times. In these "civic" cultures the polity is articulated and decisions are made in accord (in principle at least) with a balance of interests, through consultation with and acceptance by various sections of the community, while in the "despotic" cultures the decisions are taken by a single man or a single group and the population is merely a passive element.

This is not the only way to look at the development of society. But from the point of view of the most substantial and dangerous differences between current forms of polity, it is the crucial one.

THIS APPROACH INVOLVES treating the matter in a rather different light than has been usual. For example, the "civic" culture, though containing the possibility of democracy, is not necessarily "democratic." And though containing the potentiality of the "open society", it is not in itself or necessarily so definable.

The despotic type of culture divides naturally into two general types. First, the traditional "imperial" system in which it is assumed that the true form of the state has already been achieved; and, secondly, the messianic revolutionary type which seeks by an act of will to bring history to an eschatologically predetermined conclusion. The history of the latter tradition expressed itself at different periods in the most highly regarded terminology of the time—as Theology in the 16th Century, as Reason in the 18th, and as Science in the 19th and the 20th, each being in fact a closed and false "scientism"—but each appealing, in turn, to the intellectual of the time.

The present situation is, of course, "unique", like all previous situations; and the particular polities now existing equally have their own singular and specific characteristics. Nevertheless, there is nothing novel about the existence of a civic culture in some countries and a despotic one in others; nor, among the latter, of the temporary emergence of political orders claiming the "Messianic" power to bring history to its Final End. Present ones may seem novel to us, but only because they have not, in the immediately preceding epoch, played much of a role on the world scene; and also because the present-day language of political eschatology is couched in terms which, on the surface, seem to be assimilated to certain political dialects of the established civic cultures, and even—by a logical confusion—to constitute no more than an extreme and total case of ideas operating normally in the civic order.

It is not easy to get into another man's skin,

let alone that of another culture. The great Condé once remarked (to Cardinal de Retz), about historians, that the reason they got things wrong was,

> *"Ces coquins nous font parler et agir comme ils auroient fait eux-mêmes à notre place."*

He noted, in fact, that academics of his own culture could not, or at any rate had not, made the effort adequately. When it comes to alien cultures, the immodesty of anthropologists and social historians who believe that they have got into the essence of a society is a constant trap. The poet Louis MacNeice, who was also a Professor of Greek and deeply versed in ancient Athens, could nevertheless write:

> *And how one can imagine oneself among them*
> *I do not know.*
> *It was all so unimaginably different,*
> *And all so long ago.*

And this is Athens! Incomparably closer to us in many ways than most of the other ancient cultures, and many modern ones.

AND YET THE EFFORT must be made. And when it comes to modern alien cultures, no understanding (and so no policy) will be worth anything until academics, statesmen, and all others concerned make that effort, to the degree that unreal assumptions are driven even from their almost unconscious first thoughts on affairs. After that, they need, it may be suggested, to master the idea that these deep-set forces of motivation are not merely very strange to us, but cannot easily be changed by argument or manipulation. Macaulay writes of the French Revolution that "had six generations of Englishmen passed away without a single session of Parliament" then we too would have needed years of blood and confusion "to learn the very rudiments of political science," and been equally duped by childish theories, and have equally "sought refuge from anarchy in despotism, and been again driven from despotism into anarchy." Six generations—even though France had by no means become totally uncivic, and had started not too far from the English style—were needed to produce this measure of de-civicisation. Even Marx talks of fifty years being necessary to teach his "proletariat" to rule, while the Maoists have spoken in terms of a hundred or two hundred years as the time required to change social attitudes in a truly radical way. At any rate, we must avoid being too sanguine about the early blossoming of new cultural styles in areas where history has rooted others.

IN ALL REALISM, meanwhile, we must note that the actual state of Western academic and political attitudes on such issues is by no means satisfactory. In particular, we may find that the current tendencies, excessive by all previous civic standards, to use the power of the Western executive arm in vast fields of internal affairs previously controlled by the communities, or guided rather than controlled, has imported into the Western political thought and action attitudes which dispose its formulators to think—wrongly—that the revolutionary polities are doing the same sort of thing. It would not be the first time that a sort of bureaucratic sympathy has determined attitudes. Lord Acton's controversy with Archbishop Creighton—with the Catholic historian attacking, and the Anglican defending the atrocities of the early Popes—is convincingly attributed by Lytton Strachey to Creighton's instinctive sympathy with administrators dealing with refractory problems (with the stake and the rack rather appearing as side issues).

In a somewhat different vein, academics in the West, particularly to the extent they are cut off from "real" politics, are more than ordinarily inclined to systematising in concept, and "planning" in policy, beyond what the subject will bear. This, too, leads to a tendency to see in totalist schemes just a variety of systematic politics.

And, of course, these ideas are not confined to the intellectual world, but seep down, in even more debased form, to a larger audience. Serious-minded housewives by the millions absorb masses of horror-sociology put out by Parrot Paperbacks.

The Etatist Fallacy

ONE SORT OF POLITICAL ACADEMIC sees "problems", works out "solutions", and then turns to an agency for putting them into effect: the state. The idea that there are any limitations in principle to what the state, properly empowered, can do seems to evaporate. Yet this is to venture into action which time and again—and not necessarily through any malice—has brought the civic society into danger. Moreover, while to effect changes that go with the grain of a culture is comparatively easy, to the intellectual one abstract change is as good as another, and depends solely on its formal advantages.

In its most important aspect, the civic order is that which has created a strong state while still maintaining the principle of consensus which existed in primitive society.

There is a hierachy of types among the social animals. Lowest come the colonial invertebrates, such as the corals, in which polyp buds off from polyp, remaining connected by filaments of tissue, with each polyp serving in various specialised functions, such as tentacles or stomachs, almost as if forming a single animal, but with no individual sphere of action at all. The social insects are not physically connected, but are linked by communication—mainly odours—and have very limited individual flexibility, though the individual can survive for a time in isolation. The social animals, like baboons, have far more individuality, recognise each other as individuals, and can play a variety of roles, sometimes in rotation. Human beings go further still in the same direction, in various obvious ways.

One may similarly note the hierarchy of human societies, in which the lowest give the least scope to individual action, the least variation in attitudes, and the narrowest limits to opinion.

For let me insist that the *Civic* order is of a higher and more developed type than the *Despotic*, and that the carrying through of the older adjustments into the higher form of state organisation is a remarkable feat, a continual and fruitful dialectic of the tendencies of state power and the interests and rights of individuals and groups. It has only been achieved by the Western-type culture. And the tradition has been maintained continually, with occasional lurches and recoveries, through Anglo-Saxon times right back, presumably, to the prehistoric originals.

The Germanic nations which came to Britain had various political customs. The Angles had had kings for several centuries but the Saxons did not. All the Saxon "townships" had their own rulers, and general meetings were held once a year

> "where the leaders met with twelve nobles and as many freedmen and bondmen from each township. There they confirmed the laws, judged important legal cases, and agreed upon the plans that would guide them in peace or war during the coming year. . . ."[1]

The piece-meal movement of the Mercian occupation, the comparatively peaceful incorporation of British populations, provided much flexibility. Settlements varied from military colonies—mainly directed against the Northumberlands—to groups of individuals, groups following chieftains, individual farms; and the same is true, to a lesser degree, of other parts of England.

THE EFFECT ON THE American political culture of the special circumstances of the Frontier has, of course, been much discussed since the end of the last century. The idea of the determining effect of small Western communities owing a general allegiance to government on the East coast, but beyond its effective protection and compelled to rely on their own common initiative, clearly has much to be said for it in accounting for the special circumstances of American democracy. It is interesting to reflect that this was in a sense a re-enactment of the original spread of the English settlers in Britain. That, too, was on the whole, piece-meal. It was only after considerable areas had been settled for some time that they "sent for kings" to the Continent—which is to say, under the circumstances, organised themselves into States.

In both the English and the American cases, it was not, of course, a matter of traditionless man evolving broad new administrative forms to suit the circumstances. Both Americans and Saxons built their new communities on the basis of the traditional laws and rights as they remembered them. In England from that time on, as a historian of the period has put it,

> "From Pagan and Mercian times onward, custom has expected that men of suitable standing should be heard before decision is reached; society has frequently disagreed about which men should be heard when, but when it has reached agreement, governments that ignored agreed opinion have been denied obedience and revenue."[2]

Local tenures and local institutions "trained English society to respect governments that coordinate and to discipline governments that rule by command."

THESE ATTITUDES MAINTAINED the flexibility of our society, with an easier movement of ideas and smoother social change than was possible in most of Europe. Above all, it became possible to correct a powerful central government, which was still obliged to observe the restraints of custom. "Time and effort shaped a tradition of firm leadership and light rule."

Generally speaking, great and successful rulers in England have been those (like Edward I and Edward III) who worked within the laws and customs, sought cooperation rather than sub-

[1] "Hucbald. Vita LeGuini", in *Monumenta Germaniae Historia: Scriptores* (ed. Pertz and Mommsen, Hannover-Berlin, 1826).

[2] John Morris, *The Age of Arthur* (1973), p. 504.

mission from the representatives of the cities and counties. In turn, from the Magna Carta on, the community rarely called into question the essential powers of the executive—though particular Kings might be, and were, removed. These were those who sought to extend the power of the state at the expense of the community (as under John, Edward II, Richard III, and James II). And the balance in each case was restored by a constitutionalist counter-revolution.

For the civic tradition of Britain has fairly often in the past been faced by more dynamic, more modern, "waves of the future." In Yorkist times, the attempt was made to install in England a streamlined, Renaissance-style despotism (complete with the torture and treachery of the Sforzas and the Borgias). In Stuart times came the attempt to turn England into one of the new Divine Right monarchies on the French model, again to the accompaniment of illegality and torture.

The point is that an executive can be strong without being intrusive into areas in which the community, or a large part of it, resents its presence. This is the key distinction to be made between Elizabeth I and her successors. To say that the Tudor state was as dominant as that of the Stuarts is to miss the essential. Generally speaking it did not—and the Stuarts did—try to impose itself in areas of life (including the economic) which the community thought inappropriate. The state monopolies of James I's time may remind us strongly of similar state operations in Britain in the past generation. This is true even to the extent of the appointment to leading positions in them (accompanied by peerages) of prominent adherents of the executive power.

FOR THE CENTRALISING ELEMENT, always necessary, has lately again shown signs of escaping from popular judgment. Perhaps this is seen less when it comes to major matters than in a tendency to override interests in favour of overall economic or other efficiency. This is an old story, and certainly represents or includes one of the great social problems of the forthcoming period. What is clear, at any rate, is that it is only within the Western order that there is any prospect of the administrators and centralisers being criticised and controlled. All notion that this can be done in some other fashion—i.e. by a "revolutionary dictatorship"—is a leap from a mildly uncomfortable frying pan into a particularly hot type of fire.

Nevertheless the "sovereignty of Parliament", itself in practice tending to mean the sovereignty of the Prime Minister exerted through his "Whips", has been taken to dogmatic extremes, with Parliament being made to take action in spheres in which no doubt it is theoretically competent, but which in practice is destructive of civic society. The famous resolution of 1780 that the powers of the executive "have increased, are increasing, and ought to be diminished" is once again applicable. For, as Dr Thomas Sowell recently put it (in the *New York Times Magazine*):

> "The grand delusion of contemporary liberals [I would say of contemporary étatistes in general] is that they have both the right and the ability to move their fellow creatures around like blocks of wood—and that the end results will be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions."

It does not seem so far-fetched to suggest that this trend to excessive centralisation involves some trace of fellow-feeling with—and hence amiable illusions about—the despotic cultures proper; just as the Stuart phase of executive usurpation went with a certain rallying to Bourbon tyranny on the Continent. At least *some* feeling of Burintern solidarity seems to play a certain role in recent academic tendencies to underrate the profound and principled hostility of the Communist culture to our own.

Thus we get the "liberal" idea that there is nothing wrong with executive solutions to every sort of social and even moral problem; and hence that the revolutionary is really just a sort of rather impatient liberal—a fatal romanticising of what Richard Henry Lee defines as "the fickle and the ardent, the right instruments for despotism." It would be a very sanguine topologist who would welcome Alexander the Great as a fellow-professional on the grounds of his having solved the problem of the Gordian knot.

The Systematisation Fallacy

THE KEY WORD in modern studies of politics is "model." With its overtones of something that works in the same way as its original, e.g. a model steam-engine, it is highly inappropriate. A modest and realistic word like "sketch" would be more suitable, in not giving the impression that the model-maker has, at least in essentials, mastered the workings of his original. He never has. Polities are *sui generis*. And though they may be conveniently treated under general categories for many purposes, the description of the elements involved must not be pressed beyond what is possible and appropriate, in this or in any other field where rigour is impossible.

The contrary tradition of Aristotle, which normally proceeds from the actual state of affairs, seems preferable.

> "In studying this subject we must be content if we attain as high a degree of certainty as the matter of it admits. . . . Such being the nature of our subject and such our way of arguing in our discussions of it, we must be satisfied with a rough outline of the truth, and for the same reason we must be content with broad conclusions."

The open society is in fact the actual result of the absence of a belief in rigorous political science. As the late Nicola Chiaromonte once put it, it is the most perverse of all modern ideas—though similar notions go back a long way—that "the course of things must have a single meaning . . . or that events can be contained in a single system." Judgments in political matters may be made in simple terms and be none the worse for that. Churchill understood the Nazis better than Chamberlain did, not because he had a vast apparatus of "political science" verbosity to analyse it, but because he had some knowledge of history, and of evil. I remember after the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956 the TV interview with Professor Peter Wiles, who had chanced to be in Budapest at the time. Asked what, in his view, were the causes of that revolution, he answered simply: "They were fed up with telling lies."

Bismarck once told the Prussian Chamber: "*Die Politik ist keine exakte Wissenschaft.*" It was only at about this time in the 1860s that such a remark was evidently beginning to be necessary. German academics who had, as they thought, systematised most other fields of knowledge, were now treating history and politics as though these too could be brought within a set of formulae, developing a tradition which had only recently become dominant, though going back to such aberrations, two hundred years previously, as Leibnitz's extraordinary "mathematical proof" that the Count Palatine of Neuburg must win the Polish throne (*Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege Polonorum*, 1664).

It has been one of the marks of our time that the prestige of the physical and other genuine sciences has been so great that other studies have wished to share it. Unfortunately, it is not as easy to introduce the scientific rigours into areas from which the information is as yet greatly insufficient for such structures. As a result, in psychology, sociology, linguistics, literary criticism, etc., inflated theorisings have been treated as though they were established doctrine. The position is roughly that of phrenology in the last century. A complicated (and, on the face of it, sophisticated) methodology was used to study phenomena which appeared to be directly related to the subject, but from which in practice absolutely no useful information could really be extracted. Physiognomy was also developed as a "science" by Lavater. Norman Douglas in his *Siren Land* effectively ridicules the attempts by its practitioners to deduce many contradictory characteristics from a bust of Tiberius—which as it happened was probably not of the Emperor Tiberius at all.

YET THE ACADEMIC MIND cannot be kept from premature theory. Behaviourism, Systems Analysis—and no doubt soon Catastrophe Theory—arise elsewhere and are applied one by one to politics.

The word "system" is so general that it can be used in any field from nuclear weaponry to elementary education, and thus leads to the assumption that the ideas of design, engineering, and analysis suitable to the one can be applied to the other. As Dr Ida Hoos has commented,

> "In the real world there appears to be about as much justification for committing society's sundry malfunctioning systems to the care of a systems analyst whose sole claim to expertise is technical as to call a hydraulic engineer to cure an ailing heart because his speciality is pumping systems. Although the term 'system' can be applied to both space hardware and social problems, the inputs are vastly different, as are the controls and objectives. In the engineered system, the components are tangible, the variables controlled, and the outputs identifiable. In the social sphere, the crucial elements often defy definition and control and do not behave according to a set of rules. There is no quality control of a social system; the test of its effectiveness is to a large extent a reflection of values and it is certainly not amenable to mathematical measurement. . . ."

Resemblances of form rather than of intent or actual activity tend to mislead. A wolf has a very close resemblance, physiologically speaking, to a basset hound. Its reaction to a pat on the head, however, is different. A death camp is "structured", both physically and operationally, very much like a holiday camp. Two identically structured cars may present different dangers if one is driven by an alcoholic psychopath. The Roman Empire had the same structure under Nero and under Vespasian, under Gallienus and under Aurelian.

The same objection applies to all premature systematising. The success of conceptual and mathematical rigour in the fields in which it can be applied—for example, in the engineering triumphs which go into the Apollo spacecraft—must be distinguished severely from the failure in areas where an alleged scientific or rigorous system has been applied, but where the rigour is in fact inapplicable. The failure of scientific sociologists in putting vast sums of money into Poverty Programmes, which have not done anything to alleviate poverty (except to some degree among the bureaucracy), is matched by the failure of Robert McNamara's military academics with their computerised science of war, its escalations and responses.

AND THIS DISASTER, in 1966, was little more than a repeat of 1916, when the entire Western European culture was severely shaken, if not nearly destroyed. The major villain then was Field Marshal von Falkenhayn, the "most scientific" general who ever ruined his country, as Liddell Hart significantly remarked, who put into effect a calculated method of winning the war for Germany. The arts of strategy were forgotten, the uncertainties of the battlefield dismissed. The French Army was to be destroyed not even by attempting a breakthrough, but by attacking a position which the French must defend at all costs and where they would "bleed to death" whether the objective—Verdun—was captured or not. This was to be done simply by a scientific concentration of weaponry which could not be matched within the narrow French salient. The result was the great 10-month battle of 1916 with its 700,000 dead or missing on a 10-mile front. It is true that the French Army was never the same again, but nor was the German. The only net German gain for one-third of a million dead was "the acquisition of a piece of raddled land little larger in area than the combined Royal Parks in London. . . ."

Generally speaking, attempts by the new schools of political sciences to introduce "rigour" into the subject are comparably fallacious, and hence dangerous if taken seriously (and if not, a notable waste of money). An attempt is reported to analyse problems of international *détente* by feeding 1200 factors into a computer. Such readily numericised factors do not exist. At best, there are numbers of infinite variables and of unknowns.

THE NOTION that everything can be reduced to mathematical manipulation is in any case basically mistaken. We do not even have a general mathematical solution to the *three-body* problem, which can only be solved by progressive approximation. Again, as we all know, it has long since been proved by Gödel that some problems are in principle insoluble, mathematically speaking. But more generally, we should consider the fact that it is impossible to design a computer that could cover all the potentialities of a chess game. For it can be shown that such a computer would need more units than there can be particles in the entire universe. And chess has rules in the sense that international politics does not.

In all areas of historical and anthropological investigation genuine scholars have progressively abandoned theories of linear development and the older attempts to attain generality by the selection and inflation of often superficial similarities as "essential." On the other hand, at a certain theoretical level worthless generalisation is still rampant—nowhere more than in "political science." It is for the most part evident to serious students that (except in a very short-range sense) predictability in the political and social field is both in principle and in practice unattainable, at any rate by the weak and fallible general theories at present in existence. The urge to premature and inadequately supported generality is—far from being a higher development—a sure sign of primitivism.

In so far as they retain the element of intellectual rigour which makes them liable to refutation on empirical and evidential grounds, they are invariably so refuted. In so far as they are irrefutable, it is precisely because they are so general and flexible as to convey no real information. In that case, why do they emerge? We are plainly in the presence not of an intellectual but of a psychological phenomenon.

How did the contrary delusion which so frequently falsifies views of our politics, and those of international politics, ever arise? It is, at any rate, an astonishing tribute to the power and persistence of the desire for tidiness and certitude.

The Rationality Fallacy

CRITICAL THOUGHT on politics, beginning with the pre-Socratics, provides another contrast between our society and the despotisms, and at the same time another way for the academic to go wrong.

The Western type of society, just as it managed to create a strong state without destroying the consensual, managed to contain the critical attitude without destroying the older, less "rational" loyalties. In this it was invariably, though naturally, hampered by minds devoted to the attempt to conceptualise, rationalise, and verbalise everything—that is, generally speaking, academics and members of early-teenage debating societies, right from the time of the sophists and

their pupils. These envisaged the post-critical society as one in which every view or decision is the product of pure reason, with the old half-conscious bonds and myths uniting that society treated as null and negligible. But in fact the bonds of social order did not become a hundred per cent conscious, nor could they, any more than the development by the human animal of the consciousness or self-awareness by which he distinguishes himself from other species in any way eliminated the personal unconscious.

Political civilisation subsists both at a rational level, and at a depth beyond present—perhaps any—analysis, as with all the unsterile human attitudes: as with successful art appealing (as A. E. Housman puts it) "to something in man which is obscure and latent, something older than the present organisation of his nature, like the patches of fen which still linger here and there in the drained lands of Cambridgeshire. . . ."

For political civilisation consists of attachment to (or rather a less conscious rooting in) the tradition of generations. It is a libertarian attitude, and a modern one in that it is open to the seeking of undogmatic solutions to unforeseen problems. But it is a modern style which has not (or not yet) deprived itself of the barbarous strength of the ancient loyalties, and which cannot survive if it does. As Orwell said, in World War II (in his "Wells, Hitler and the World State"):

> "What has kept England on its feet during the past year? In part, no doubt, some vague idea about a better future, but chiefly the atavistic emotion of patriotism, the ingrained feeling of the English-speaking peoples that they are superior to foreigners. For the last twenty years the main object of English left-wing intellectuals has been to break this feeling down, and if they had succeeded, we might be watching the *S.S.* men patrolling the London streets at this moment."

The post-critical political culture, except to some degree and in certain areas and periods, has contrived since it emerged to preserve the unconscious or "myth" basis of the state while exercising the critical faculty in politics. The emergence of the mind did not lead to the disappearance of the heart. The patriotism of the West is not, moreover, solely a tribal solidarity; it is a feeling not only for the "nation", but also for the order. Men who do not deny their past are wiser than men who do or who try to. As Burke points out (in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*), in the English Petition of Right:

> "The parliament says to the king, 'Your subjects have *inherited* this freedom', claiming their franchises not on abstract principles 'as the rights of men', but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers."

Nor were Selden and the other learned men who drew up the Petition ignorant of the many general theories then already current about "the rights of men." They simply preferred to ground themselves soundly upon experience, rather than enter the vague and wild territory of speculation. Something of the sort could be said about the American Founding Fathers. Arthur Schlesinger (Sr.) remarks of them that they were "men of vision without being visionaries"; Carl Bridenbaugh that they were "men of intellect, not intellectuals."

IN THE LONG RUN, our own political culture depends less on the conscious will of our statesmen and citizens, or even on the political institutions which have been found to provide a suitable mechanism than on the whole drift, tradition and habit, unconscious as much as conscious, unformulated as much as legislated. Or as Aristotle noted (in the *Politics*):

> "There are plenty of instances of a constitution which according to its law is not democratic, but which owing to custom and way of upbringing is democratic in its workings; there are likewise others which according to law incline towards democracy, but by reason of custom and upbringing operate more like oligarchies."

And, of course, one does not transcend one's culture, one simply deserts it. Patriotism is, as Orwell remarked, for better or for worse. Stephen Decatur's famous formulation (now frequently given in a later and somewhat perverted form):

> "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country right or wrong."

does not state a general abstract principle, but only asserts that in a society of the Western democratic type involvement is inextricable. Those who go outside it are not in fact judging from a superior position. They have merely cut their roots. And the conclusions at which they arrive are not purely rational and moral: they represent, rather, the rationalisation either of active hostility to the soil that has nourished them, or, less disreputably though more sillily, of the childish hope for short cuts to perfection, the provision by magic of peace, or plenty, or justice. In any case intellectuals delude themselves

when they think that they can detach themselves from these feelings, can stand above such things and judge from the point of view of abstract principles. Orwell pointed out that they quickly became attached simply to another, and hostile, "nationalism", by which he meant allegiance to some different principle. There have been many attacks on the Loyalty oaths required in the late 1940s and early '50s in some American schools and universities; and, indeed, there is much to be said against them. All the same, one may feel that they are slightly preferable to the Disloyalty oaths in effect required in the late 1960s and early '70s, when a professor charged with serving his own government—Walt Rostow, for example—could be blacklisted for the crime.

STEPHEN DECATUR'S FORMULATION, it will be noted, is totally unlike the nationalism we are accustomed to from the States in which it is associated with ideological fanaticism. With them, the mere possibility of being "wrong" does not arise: their "right" is actually *defined* in terms of their own allegiance.

And here we should note a "contradiction" in the modern Messianic Despotisms. Their movements were, in an important sense, the product of critical rather than the pre-critical attitudes. Yet they are now in the position of having to restore the pre-critical attitude as far as their own ideas and organisation are concerned. The dust must be swept back under the carpet, the djinn restored to its bottle. But this is a staggeringly difficult task, both conceptually and administratively. Conceptually it can only be done by extravagant "doublethink", highly deleterious to the minds undergoing it; and organisationally it requires an unprecedented exercise of force, far more than was ever needed by traditionalist despotism. It seems to be partly for this reason that the new-style rule, needing every possible source of psychological support, turns to the older traditions of imperial despotism.

The Cultural Malleability Fallacy

ORWELL REMARKS on the "mental coarseness" of revolutionaries, who "imagine that everything can be put right by altering the shape of society."

In the despotisms, of whatever style, politics properly speaking can hardly be said to exist. There are the skills of intrigue among a narrow group of those closest to the instruments of power; but, though on a more impressive stage, these are exercised within limits which, in the civic society, would be appropriate to a parish council. There are skills of administration which may, indeed, be very highly developed. But these again, though necessary in any state, do not themselves constitute the substance of politics. Real politics is an immensely untidy art, and dependent more on the habits of a culture and the experience of centuries than on any political science, or concepts worked out in the abstract in studies or reading rooms.

The first true studies of politics, in particular that of Aristotle, were already historical. That is, they were (or the best of them were) not abstract speculations but based rather on several generations of experience in a score of real political units. It is surely no accident that both the greatest writers on politics (the other being Machiavelli) had experience of, or immediate access to, a large number of variously ruled states. It is perhaps not to be wondered at that a modern professor, separated by thousands of miles from any but the most indirect and misinterpreted notions of other types of polity, should come to shallow conclusions.

A delusion common even in the West, at least among academics, is that all "social" problems are in principle susceptible of being solved by political decision. It is this error which has led many backward countries further and further into the grip of incompetent terrorists. Each time a solution imposed by force has, after all, failed to improve matters it is thought that the fault is merely that insufficient power has been put behind it. If one more refractory social group is liquidated, if party discipline is tightened and all shirkers and compromisers adequately dealt with, then next time all will be well. We should have learned by now from these unfortunate "social experiments" that there are problems which cannot be dealt with even by the maximum application of political power.

But even genuine social improvements may be unacceptable if imposed by force. Frau Heydrich has told us[3] that her husband "introduced higher education and health insurance and raised the standard of living" and that the British had him killed because he was, in this way, winning over the Czechs. Not dissimilar errors are being made today.

As Burke notes in a famous passage, the great fault of every sort of arbitrary rule is the superficiality of imagining that political and similar difficulties can be disposed of by main force. This is, he points out, laziness and evasion.

> "The[a]micable conflict with difficulty obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our object, and compels us to consider it in all its relations.

[3] *Sunday Express*, 8 August 1965.

It will not suffer us to be superficial. It is the want of nerves of understanding for such a task, it is the degenerate fondness for tricking shortcuts, and little fallacious facilities, that has in so many parts of the world created governments with arbitrary powers. They have created the late arbitrary monarchy of France. They have created the arbitrary republic of Paris. With them defects in wisdom are to be supplied by the plenitude of force. They get nothing by it. Commencing their labours on a principle of sloth, they have the common fortune of slothful men. The difficulties, which they rather had eluded than escaped, meet them again in their course; they multiply and thicken on them; they are involved, through a labyrinth of confused detail, in an industry without limit, and without direction; and, in conclusion, the whole of their work becomes feeble, vicious and insecure."

REVOLUTIONARY STATES have in no cases succeeded in transforming their cultures so much that they can relax the pressures. The situation is particularly unlike that foreseen by Marx who held that the revolutionary state, though a dictatorship of the proletariat (a phrase by which he did not in any case imply the rule of a minority machine), would start to "wither away" immediately. In all the revolutionary countries, the current structure of society can only be maintained by the constant pressure of the administrative organs holding everything in a state of special strain. They are left regarding as the central moral principle the mere protection of their own rule. By definition this is the ideal system, no longer requiring objective justification—or only perfunctorily—as with the legitimists of the declining period of the European monarchies.

Sanguine attitudes to "Revolution" have existed mainly among comfortably situated intellectuals who resent their own societies, but suffer little from them. The modern Liberal, rejoicing in the scandals about the Establishment, may remind one of the shock given to the old régime in France by the affair of the Cardinal's Necklace. Fréteau de Saint-Just, quite typically, of course exulted:

> "What a triumph for Liberal ideas! A Cardinal a thief! The Queen implicated! Mud on the crosier and the sceptre! . . ."

He was himself, equally of course, to go to the guillotine before ten years were up.

For as Camus points out, "none of the evils which totalitarianism claims to remedy is . . . worse than totalitarianism itself." He might have added that, on the record, it does not even remedy those evils against which it particularly declaims—except, sometimes, in a purely superficial sense. That is, it may cure unemployment, as in Russia in the 1930s. But it is less unemployment as such than the hunger and misery it causes which is the objection to it; and the Russians substituted for the temporary mass unemployment of the West the far greater misery and hunger of the more enduring and more heavily populated labour camp system.

The academic, who is exempt from the temptation of supporting the old-fashioned and openly hierarchic despotisms, is deceived into thinking that he has something in common with the newer style despotism, for two reasons. First, of course, these use similar language. Words like "democracy . . . social change . . . revolutionary structure . . . basic problems . . ." abound in the mutual vocabulary.

But even academics who are not deceived, or not exactly deceived, by this superficial point, are often trapped by what on the face of it is a more substantial affinity. For, as I noted earlier both they and the revolutionary appear to be—in a sense, in fact, are—supporters of compulsory state action *for what appears to be the common good*. Nor is the difference between the two an absolutely clear-cut one, though, as Tocqueville remarked (about the differences between the moderate constitutional monarchies and the more left-wing republics even of his day), the revolutionary régime "promises more but gives less."

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT has noted that for some people government is "an instrument of passion: the art of politics is to inflame and direct desire. . . ." For others, which is to say in general the traditional attitude of those who have a regard for the unity and continuity of a culture, the business of government is something different: "to restrain, to deflate, to pacify, and to reconcile; not to stoke the fires of desire, but to damp them down"; on the grounds that (as he puts it) "the conjunction of dreaming and ruling generates tyranny." For it is a basic principle of true as against despotic politics that it is more important for the civic system as such to be unshaken than for particular measures to be opposed or insisted on to the limit. A democratic community enjoying political liberty is only possible when the attachment of the majority of the citizens to political liberty is stronger than their attachment to specific political doctrines. And this is to say that on many controversial issues a certain comparative apathy must prevail amongst a large part of the population. But apathy cannot appear a virtue to the man who has committed himself to an intellectually elaborated scheme or policy.

The Artistic Criterion Fallacy

IT IS NOT ALL THAT RARE to come across people in the West—particularly, perhaps, in academic circles—unable to believe that other cultures can be, in one sense, uncivilised, if they can be shown to produce architecture, opera, ballet, drama, etc. on an impressive scale. Even in relations between States, we find "cultural exchange" sponsored or handled by Westerners who seem to imagine that a political amenity is thereby achieved.

We must distinguish between the various uses of the word "civilisation." As is often pointed out, China has been "civilised" for millennia. That is to say, it long ago achieved a *civil* order. But it never rose to the higher degree of a *civic* order. Cultures may win our admiration for the high development of their administrative order, but political civilisation proper is another matter.

Something similar applies to the erection of great buildings. It used to be believed that the "Old Empire" of the Mayas, in the Peten area, died out owing to a migration to Northern Yucatan, where the "New Empire" then arose. It is true that the great temples and buildings ceased to be used and disappeared under the jungle. But we now realise that the peasant culture which had supported these cults continued as before: they just stopped going in for architecture—just as pyramids petered out in Egypt after the earlier dynasties. Quite highly organised communities may exist without towns. There was nothing that could be called a town in Ireland until the Danes founded Dublin and the other settlements in the 10th century.

Large buildings at least imply a fair-sized and mobilisable work-force. When it comes to the purer arts, no necessary connection between high achievement and an advanced social order exists at all. The paintings in the Altamira caves are as accomplished, as brilliant, as any that have been produced since. Yet there is a reasonable sense in which we may feel that the Stone Age hunters were all the same less "civilised" than at least some of their less brilliant successors on the same continent.

It is another delusion of the generally educated that politicians they approve of are more cultured, or more concerned with culture, than their alternates. But political culture does not run *pari passu* with "culture" in the aesthetic sense. Abraham Lincoln was incomparably more advanced in political civilisation than any Romanov or Habsburg, in spite of all the ballet and opera of St Petersburg and Vienna. Or, if we feel that some special exception should be made for the fans not only of Artemus Ward, but even of the far worse Petroleum V. Nasby, on the grounds that Saginaw County could hardly be expected to produce the culture of the old metropolises, we can retort first, that Lincoln was extremely well read in the political culture; and we can anyhow destroy the dubious and shaky special plea by turning to England and noting that, while the Tsars were at the Bolshoi, British prime ministers (Rosebery, for example) would be at the Derby. And it was Nero, wasn't it, rather than Vespasian, who was so keen on the arts?

MUCH OF THIS attached to the intellectuals' attitude to President John F. Kennedy. They deluded themselves with the idea that he shared their high aesthetic tastes. This does not seem to be so. Perhaps they would overlook, nowadays, his addiction to James Bond. But Arthur Schlesinger (Jr), in his official biography, makes it clear that the President's favourite poem was Alan Seeger's "I Have a Rendezvous With Death", a morally admirable, but aesthetically third-rate piece of versification. One can imagine the offended cries which would have gone up if it had been revealed as General Eisenhower's favourite verse. (We are also told that Kennedy could not stand "long hair" music.)

President Kennedy's relations with the intellectuals do him credit. They do not do nearly so much credit to the intellectuals. When it came to the actual crises of foreign policy, in Cuba or Berlin or Viet Nam, he paid no attention to their demands or views. But in a general way, he wished for their support; he obtained it as he would have obtained the support of the Iowa farmers—by having them to dinner and making a few skilful gestures. (It is true, indeed, that the Iowa farmers would have been a little more hardheaded and looked for more tangible returns.) In reality, President Kennedy's intellect operated in other spheres: those proper to a politician. And even had he in fact been a keen fan of William Burroughs' *Naked Lunch* and Abstract Expressionism (though one may doubt if such a taste is compatible with sense in any field, including the political), it is not that which would have marked him as a statesman.

A CURIOUS LITTLE VOLUME might be made of the poems of Stalin, Castro, Mao and Ho Chi Minh, with illustrations by A. Hitler. This last name should remind us that the much touted slogan, "When I hear the word 'culture', I reach for my revolver", was uttered by a fictional member of the *S.A.*, the Nazi radical, egalitarian wing crushed in the blood purge of June 1934. Quite

the contrary, Hitlerism proper (like Kaiserism) swarmed over Europe to the accompaniment of vast claptrap about *Kultur* and its preservation from Anglo-Saxon and Slavonic hordes. If it comes to that, the first truly "cultured" man in English politics was the revolting Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, translator of Cicero, patron of Humanists, the purity of whose Latin brought tears to the eyes of Aeneas Sylvius himself. But he is known to political history, under different criteria, as the "Butcher Earl", owing to his record as impaler of prisoners and slaughterer of infants—new phenomena in medieval England. We have a horrid example to moderns in the incredible eulogy of him by Caxton after his death as supreme "in science and moral virtue."

It ought, at any rate, to be possible to dismiss from our minds the idea that any necessary correlation, individual or collective, exists between artistic culture and political maturity.

The Temperamental Homogeneity Fallacy

CONDÉ'S REMARK, to the effect that academics were temperamentally unfitted to understand the world of soldiers and statesmen is enough, I hope, to make much professorial blood run cold. It is not even as if Condé himself was an intellectually muscle-bound thug of a professional soldier. Those who delighted to frequent his château when he was in disgrace make almost a roll call of the genius of the age. . . . But if intellectuals fail to understand the temperaments of the generals of their own culture and find great difficulty in mastering the principles of an alien culture, they are all the more unlikely to grasp the temperaments producing and produced by that opposite tradition.

Political opinion seems largely a matter of temperament. Strikingly enough, this is implicitly admitted by Marx himself in that passage in the *Communist Manifesto* in which, having insisted that in general people act according to their class economic interest, he makes an exception for—Marxist intellectuals!

> "A portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole."

As we know, most Marxist and Communist leaders have been of bourgeois origin. Marx is here admitting that their motivations are not those normally provided for by Marxism. What are they, then? Marx himself would have been the last to say that any of his followers were the intellectual superiors of Darwin or Clark Maxwell, nor is it likely that a Communist in this century would claim that Molotov was the intellectual superior of Ivan Pavlov or Anton Chekhov; or Louis Aragon of Louis de Broglie or Albert Camus. But if not intellect, nor interest, we are left with—temperament.

A major cause for misjudgment is the fact that the messianic totalist uses a rational-sounding political vocabulary—one not far different from that of the "liberal" academic. Not only can discussion, debate, "dialogue" take place; but the feeling is given that here, too, is a rational man with sympathetic aims.

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the mistakes due to what would appear to be so simple and easily corrigible a misconception. I know of the daughter of a prominent Eastern European Communist politician who had, at one time, been arrested, tortured and barely escaped execution during the purges which affected his country. This family, as a result, became completely disenchanted with the whole system. When he was released and regained a high position, his daughter imagined that he, too, would have been chastened by his experiences. There was absolutely no sign of this. He was delighted to be back, and full of pleasure at inflicting on his countrymen, and on his former comrades where possible, any form of terror that might prove suitable. The view he seemed to take was that the rules of the game were tough, and he was not in the least surprised that when he was on the losing side, he would suffer by it. The notion that there might be something wrong with the whole system had simply not occurred to him at all; his thinking was limited to "it's my turn now."

W. H. Auden similarly writes (in *Vespers*) of the difference between an "Arcadian" and a "Utopian" temperament.

> "When lights burn late in the Citadel, I (who have never seen the inside of a police station) am shocked and think: 'were the city as free as they say, after sundown all her bureaus would be huge black stones.'
>
> He (who has been beaten up several times) is not shocked at all but thinks: 'one fine night our boys will be working up there.'"

Bernard Shaw's attitude to Revolution was markedly a bloodless rationalism which could only see in Lenin and his subordinates people conducting a reasonable experiment, and he accused Churchill as falsely characterising them as "devils" when they were no more than rational human beings at work. Orwell comments that whether one regards them as angels or devils,

one thing certain is that they were not *reasonable* men.

A remarkable dramatisation of the results of reasonable men misunderstanding unreasonable men who used the same terminology, is given of the French Revolution. La Harpe, the only eventual survivor, tells a story of a dinner held at the beginning of 1788 at which all the guests were leading intellectuals opposed to Church and State, and longing for the reorganisation of society in the "Revolution" which would bring in "the Rule of Reason." One of those present, Cazotte, an adept of the Illuminati, claimed to have the gift of prophecy. He told them that the Revolution was indeed almost on them. They jokingly asked what would happen to them under the new régime. Condorcet (Cazotte replied) would die in prison of poison he had taken to cheat the executioner.

> "What has that to do with philosophy and the reign of reason?"
>
> "It is just what I told you, it is in the name of philosophy, of humanity, and liberty. It is under the reign of reason that you will come to such an end. . . ."

Chamfort (Cazotte went on) would cut his veins with twenty-two slashes of the razor, but fail to die for some months; Vicq-d'Azyr, on the other hand, would succeed in a similar act. De Nicolai would die on the scaffold; Bailly too; and de Malesherbes, and Roucher. . . .

> "Then we will be subjugated by the Turks and the Tartars?"
>
> "Not at all. . . I have told you: those who will treat you thus will all be philosophers, and will have at every moment on their lips all the same phrases that you have been using for an hour, and will be repeating all your maxims."

By the time six years had passed, every word had been fulfilled, and Cazotte himself had been the hero and victim of one of the most pitiful events of the Revolution.

Where—perhaps in Hampstead or in Princeton—could such a meeting take place today? But then they might be discussing a foreign country rather than their own.

EACH RÉGIME PROJECTS, in a sense, a mesh of the right reticulation which—passed through society—pulls to the surface the politico-psychological type required, and leaves the others unused. It is equally the case that on the breakdown of an order, the atmosphere and events of revolution similarly drag up, with a net of different mesh, a totally different ruling type replacing, within months, the older establishment.

One of the lessons of Nazism, and indeed of the other totalitarianisms, is that a reserve of people suited to the most abhorent and horrible types of state are in existence in potential, and usable when the time comes. However hostile the view that might have been taken of Germany, few would have thought that quite such a criminal revolutionary element as eventually formed the ruling caste existed in its recesses. The same can be said of Hungary's Rakosi regime. Again, in *The Gulag Archipelago*, the moral-psychological type which Stalinism nourished and gave power to, comes through very clearly indeed; not the iron executors of the laws of history, but the bird-brained, sniggering torturers of the *NKVD*, the corrupt and selfish toadies of the apparatus. Djilas tells us that Stalin had only one moral principle: objection to income from property. As far as the state he created is concerned, even that principle was of little account compared with the great driving force of mere self-interest, habit of mind, inability to think at all outside closed formulae. But all were melded in the psychological product, or catch. One can only recognise this phenomenon, at the moral level, in the brutal local operatives of the Jacobins. And Lenin, of course, not only made use of just such characters, but, with his usual clarity, justified the action:

> "Party members should not be measured by the narrow standard of petty bourgeois snobbery. Sometimes a scoundrel is useful to our party, precisely because he is a scoundrel."

A MESSIANIC REVOLUTION is not the product of messianic supermen without earthly contamination who have been sleeping in caves. It uses human material of the country it takes over. And, as I have said, political or general psychology is the product of generations.

In the Russia which the Bolsheviks seized, they could rely on few who could in any real sense be said to have been their followers before the seizure—or the promise of the seizure—of power. As with all other seizures of power it was a matter of the violent, the ambitious, the brutal, the criminal. But nor is this to say that the old underground party itself consisted simply of sea-green incorruptibles. When one thinks of Stalin, Kaganovich, Mekhlis, Yagoda, Shkiryatov, it is clear enough that the qualifications for underground membership did not exclude characters truly revolting by any standards whatever.

To look at it from a different angle and consider the concerns of the progressive intellectual—to determine if the package they form is a unity based on reason or a temperamental matter—let

me quote the left-wing historian Professor E. J. Hobsbawm, on the causes pursued by the typical progressive figure a hundred years ago: "natural philosophy, phrenology, free thought, spiritualism, temperance, unorthodox medicine, social reform, and the transformation of the family",[4] each supported with just as much righteousness and certainty as the partially different batch, containing a fresh lot of pseudo-sciences, now so much heard of. The point is, clearly, that what comes out of the package is not intellectual coherence, or the pursuit of interests, but a cast of mind.

The revolutionary is typical of a *milieu* with little or no civic culture and thus cut off from all political realities. In a rather different sense, one can see that this also applies to a certain type of Westerner. He is typically a student, or an academic who has never in effect ceased to be a student. His experience has not included the give-and-take of ordinary political and civic life. He has come to utopian or near-utopian attitudes at an age when whatever he may have absorbed from the social ambience is at its weakest—and his tendency to reject it at its greatest—and at a time when his own experience is virtually nil. He also, typically at least, comes from families whose way of life has provided effective cushioning against the rough edges of reality.

As has been shown by analysts of the revolutionary movements of the Middle Ages, the leaders were mainly members of the lower clergy, with a few eccentric scions of the lower nobility, together with obscure laymen who had somehow acquired a clerical education. As Norman Cohn puts it, "a recognisable social stratum—a frustrated and rather low-grade intelligentsia. . . ."[5] (And for their cannon fodder they did not recruit the poor as such, but those of the poor "who could find no assured and recognised place in society at all.") And Cohn, noting all these resemblances to the modern revolutionaries like Nazis and Communists, adds that even in the medieval context, not remarkable for tolerance or objectivity, the millenarians were "abnormal in their destructiveness and irrationality"—psychological points.

A discussion of "temperament" (a word selected for its appropriate lack of precision) as a major crux in politics is hardly popular in political-science circles, partly because it is extremely hard to produce an adequate typology of political temperament, at any rate one better than Plutarch's. Still, one advantage of such an approach is that it enables us to take note of a particular temperament—that of the "intellectual", which is particularly limited and unreal, particularly unable to credit the existence of various temperaments and various cultures, and so particularly likely to lead us into disaster, if heeded

[4] In the *New Statesman* (4 April 1970).
[5] Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (2nd and later editions).

Recluse

Smoking the hours. Fag-ends litter
the tabletop, ash on my shirt
and trousers, on the few books
I still possess, and never read.
It is their smell I've come to love:
the yellowed page I lift to my face
and breathe. Poems, stories, all

long forgotten; but brackish print,
the smoke-scent of a first edition . . .
I close my eyes, and live.
I do not know or care what time it is.
Days fly though me
like grey sea birds through mist
on their way to the sea.

Tony Flynn

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