S
3002

PREM 19/2545

TOP SECRET

1084

MT.

PART ONE

Confidential Filing.

VISIT TO THE U.K. BY President MR. GORBACHEV.

SOVIET UNION.

PT1: NOVEMBER. ~~OCTOBER~~ 1987

~~November 1987~~

PREM 19/2545 ~~2775~~

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~21.11.87~~							
~~23.11.87~~							
~~25.11.87~~							
~~26.11.87~~							
~~30.11.87~~							
~~2.12.87~~							
~~8.12.87~~							
~~9.12.87~~							
~~13.12.87~~							
~~14.12.87~~							
~~22.12.87~~							
~~7.1.88~~							
~~22/1/88~~							
~~13.10.88~~							
~~25.10.88~~							
30.10.88							

PT 1 ENDS

PART 1 ends:-

CDP to FCO 30.10.88

PART 2 begins:-

CDP to PM 10.11.88

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE KKIAHF

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 October 1988

POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 28 October suggesting some of the ideas we shall need to consider once it is confirmed that Mr. Gorbachev will visit the United Kingdom.

I think the Prime Minister would agree that it should not be a State Visit, although we should aim to provide some of the pageantry and other ingredients of such a visit. These might include lunch or dinner at Buckingham Palace, a dinner at No. 10, talks at No. 10 and at Chequers (possibly with an overnight stay at Chequers) and lunch or dinner in the Guildhall. The Prime Minister has not reacted directly to the idea of an address to both Houses of Parliament, beyond inquiring whether we did not agree to something of the sort in the 1950s (presumbly the Kruschev/Bulganin visit). You might like to check on this. When it comes to visits outside London much will depend on the time of year. An agricultural show is one possibility which might be pursued, or alternatively a visit to a large agricultural research centre (I believe Unilever have one in the Midlands). The London Docklands Development should certainly be included, as should a visit to a firm making goods for Marks and Spencers and perhaps a small firm working in the field of very high technology. A speech at a university might be rather risky given the way British students seem to behave. The Prime Minister has not commented on the question of a possible visit to Scotland or Wales.

I think it is useful to have got some of these ideas out into the open. We can now hold them in reserve until we have further news of Mr. Gorbachev's intentions.

I am copying this letter to Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SW2AMJ

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE VISIT OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

I asked for some contingency planning to be done on a programme for Mr. Gorbachev, in case we are faced with a proposal for a visit at short notice. I attach the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's suggestions.

I am sure they are right to say it should not be a State visit. But we should go for some pageantry and there would be many of the same ingredients:

lunch or dinner at Buckingham Palace
Dinner at No.10
Talks here and at Chequers (possibly overnight at Chequers)
Lunch or dinner at the Guildhall.

The Foreign Secretary recommends against an address to both Houses of Parliament. I think there would certainly be sufficient interest to warrant one. The question is whether it would be regarded as distasteful to have the Head of State of an undemocratic country addressing the Mother of Parliaments.

When it comes to engagements outside London, I think a bit more imagination is needed. Depending on the time of year, an agricultural show might be an idea. Certainly something in the retail/distribution side - Marks & Spencer or Sainsbury's. A new town perhaps. A ceremony at Oxford University. A visit to a great cathedral. A small firm using very high technology.

Are there any points on which you want to react at this stage?

(C. D. POWELL)

CONFIDENTIAL

28.10.88

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1988

Prime Minister

I asked for some contingency planning to be done on a programme for Gorbachev.

Dear Charles,

flap.

Possible Visit by Mr Gorbachev

In your letter of 13 October you suggested that some contingency planning might be done for a visit by Mr Gorbachev. We had in fact been working up ideas for some time. It is too early to shuffle them into any particular order but you may like to look at them as possible ingredients. They include replies to the specific points in your letter.

The first issue to resolve is whether, now that Mr Gorbachev is Head of State, we should raise the level to a State Visit, as some of the press have been suggesting. The Foreign Secretary's advice is that we should not. Quite apart from the practical problems and precedent of fitting such a visit in at short notice, there is no suggestion from the Soviet side that such an escalation might clinch a visit date which could otherwise remain in doubt. Mr Katushev, when he called on the Prime Minister, dropped a clear hint that we should be hearing very shortly what Mr Gorbachev wishes are. More importantly, Sir Geoffrey Howe does not believe that our relations, or Soviet internal reforms, have yet reached a stage where an exchange of State Visits would be appropriate. Until Mr Gorbachev has addressed some of the key issues of legal and human rights reform, and the central issues of the continuing East-West confrontation, it would not be right to send such a strong signal of approval. There is no protocol reason why, even as President, Mr Gorbachev should not still make much the same visit as that which we had all along envisaged.

Talks and Government Hospitality

The core of the visit would be the extensive talks which he would hold with the Prime Minister which we assume would be on the same restricted basis which worked so well in Moscow. Sessions could be held both in Downing Street and Chequers, whose atmosphere Mr Gorbachev so much appreciated in 1984. Sir Geoffrey Howe assumes that the Prime Minister would want

/to

to give a formal dinner at No 10 plus a private more informal meal, perhaps at Chequers. Some evening entertainment would also be appropriate. It might be good to get away from the usual formula of Covent Garden to something more typical of London theatre. Cats, the Phantom or Les Miserables might fit the bill or in more serious vein, if one is running, a Shakespeare play where interpretation might not be required.

The Palace

We had already envisaged the possibility of Mr Gorbachev being received by The Queen. Now that he is Head of State, it would be appropriate to recommend also that The Queen give a lunch at Buckingham Palace. This would no doubt be very well received. It would no doubt also be appreciated if The Queen could receive the Gorbachevs privately, perhaps for half a hour before lunch. If Mr Gorbachev is received by the Queen, I assume the Guard of Honour ceremony would take place at Buckingham Palace rather than in the FCO courtyard.

Parliament

The Foreign Secretary does not support the idea of an address to members of both Houses of Parliament. In recent times this singular honour has only been accorded to some of our closest friends including Presidents Reagan, Mitterrand and Weizsaecker and King Juan Carlos. In 1967 the then Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, did give such an address, but in Sir Geoffrey's view we do not need to regard this as a precedent over 20 years later. Members of Parliament should have plenty of opportunities to hear Mr Gorbachev speak if he takes up all the possibilities open to him. The Foreign Secretary sees no need for a specific occasion on which members of both Houses might meet or hear Gorbachev. It would be for consideration however whether he might not be invited to attend Prime Minister's Question Time.

The City

A Guildhall function is a normal ingredient in a State visit. However there is considerable City interest in commercial and economic relations with the Soviet Union. A strong banking delegation has recently been in London and the head of the State Bank has just been here. Many companies are interested not only in straightforward exporting but in joint ventures, cooperation, and management training. A City occasion would therefore seem highly appropriate. Perhaps a Guildhall or Mansion House lunch could be arranged.
Mr Gorbachev might also visit a City institution.

The Church

The Archbishop of Canterbury was in the Soviet Union for the millennium of christianity this summer. The Gorbachevs have considerably eased the divide between Church and State, and management of this relationship will continue to be an important question as Gorbachev's reforms advance. He could well be interested in exploring how this relationship works in Britain. We could offer him a call on the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth Palace. He would be following in the distant footsteps of Peter the Great who made such a call in 1698.

The Press/Media

It would be for Mr Gorbachev to decide what exposure he would like. But media interest would obviously be intense. We could no doubt expect the media to be ready to offer anything from interviews to panel discussions to question and answer sessions. Mr Gorbachev might be interested to visit the BBC or ITN, including a television news studio to combine an interview with first-hand experience of seeing the process of pulling together the strands of a news analysis programme. He might welcome the chance of some practical experience of freedom of information in action.

The Opposition

Mr Gorbachev will no doubt want to meet oppostion leaders, and perhaps the TUC, in the usual way.

Other Possibilities

(a) Mr Gorbachev could perhaps be offered a speech at a university - possibly one with Soviet connections and Soviet students. A visit to the London Business School which we hope will have Soviet students by next spring could also be considered.

(b) An Honorary Degree (perhaps for Mrs Gorbachev as well). These are tricky and universities are jealous of their prerogatives.

(c) A walk about, possibly in a shopping centre or city centre renewal area. This could include a hospital or school.

/(d)

(d) A look at the production/processing/ distribution/ marketing chain in a key sector for the Soviet economy such as agro-industry where he could look at production at a small agricultural unit leading to factory processing, warehousing and on to the supermarket (perhaps Sainsburys). It might be possible to include the research end of agriculture eg the National college of Agricultural Engineering. Alternatively, a small or medium level business leading through the chain to retailing eg a small manufacturer successfully marketing through Marks and Spencer.

(e) A visit to a science park (perhaps Cambridge). The application of research to industry is another key problem for Soviet reform.

? (f) A visit to an inner-city renewal area, currently a British Government priority. This would offer good media coverage and a walkabout even though such renewal programmes are not at the top of Mr Gorbachev's priorities.

(g) A visit to a British perestroika success or an imaginative large-scale project. Jaguar cars, British Telecom or British Aerospace might fit the former description, and the Channel Tunnel (common European home) the latter.

(h) A meeting with business leaders/bankers, perhaps with a speech and questions.

None of these ideas necessarily determines the destination for a substantive visit out of London. In 1984 Mr Gorbachev cut short his visit to Scotland to go back to Moscow for Marshal Ustinov's funeral. Naturally Scotland is keen to have him again. There are good links between the Soviet Union and both Glasgow and Edinburgh. The latter is in the process of being twinned with Kiev, where a major British week is planned in 1990. The Foreign Secretary however wonders whether Wales might not offer a suitable mixture of slimmed-down, revitalised old industry and new investment in advanced modern industry (perhaps a steel mill and a successful outside new investor). Mr Gorbachev would also be able there to look at urban renewal, housing and social facilities and see something of the country. He could travel one way by train and the other perhaps in another success story, the BAe 146, whether of The Queen's flight or one of the two domestic airlines now equipped with it.

/As

CONFIDENTIAL

As for Mrs Gorbachev, it would probably be best to consult her once dates are firming up. As a sociologist by training she might be interested in a meeting with British sociologists and a more detailed look at the social aspects of urban renewal including housing, a leisure centre, a job centre, facilities for old people and so on.

So that we can take our planning to the next stage I should welcome an indication of the Prime Minister's reaction to these ideas.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET UNION: Visit by
Pres Gorbachev NO[illegible]7

PRIME MINISTER

cc. Mr. Ingham

VISIT OF MR. GORBACHEV

I was telephoned this evening by Miss Hella Pick of the Guardian who said that she had just been told by the Soviet Ambassador that Mr. Gorbachev was likely to visit the United Kingdom very soon, possibly before the end of the year, and that he was discussing dates in December and January with us. She was planning to run this story in tomorrow's Guardian.

I said that I was surprised to hear this. We were expecting to hear soon from Mr. Gorbachev about dates for a possible visit but had no inkling yet when they would be and the Soviet Ambassador had not in fact put any proposals to us.

The Soviet Ambassador says that he has not spoken directly to Miss Pick. But in reply to an enquiry to the Embassy, he authorised his press counsellor to say that dates for a visit to the UK were 'on a priority list' for Gorbachev.

C. D.?

C. D. POWELL

25 October 1988

SL3BES

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1988

Org. Filed on Soviet Union: Relations Pt II

UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mrs. Gorbachev, handed to me by Mr. Kossov last night. He drew my attention to Mrs. Gorbachev's hope to meet the Prime Minister "in the near future", but could not further elaborate.

I might add that we had a brief word about Afghanistan. Mr. Kossov said that the decision to appoint Mr. Vorontsov as Ambassador reflected the domestic political difficulties which Mr. Gorbachev faced on this issue. The military continued to grumble that, if they had been given their heads, they could have finished the job off without difficulty. They did not want withdrawal to be a humiliation. Their cause was receiving support from conservative forces in the Soviet Union. The policy of withdrawal from Afghanistan was very much identified with Mr. Gorbachev personally and he was under some fire. He had appointed Vorontsov, as the Soviet Union's ablest diplomat, to try to ease the final stages of withdrawal. There was no doubt that withdrawal would go ahead but the last phase had to be managed skilfully. Vorontsov's appointment to Kabul was only a short-term one and he would retain a 'role' in Moscow, where Bessmertnykh would take over most of his functions.

I asked Kossov about Zamyatin's future. He said that as far as he knew, there were no plans for Zamyatin to leave. Although he was getting on - 66 - it appeared that Gorbachev thought quite highly of him. He was certainly very active and energetic. We should realise he performed a valuable service for UK/Soviet relations. There was no organised lobby for these in Moscow, as there was for FRG/Soviet and Franco/Soviet relations. Much therefore rested on Zamyatin's personal commitment - and self-interest - in making a success of them.

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1988

POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

We continue to get occasional hints - e.g., Mrs. Gorbachev's recent message - that we could be confronted by a proposal for a visit by Mr. Gorbachev at relatively short notice, perhaps even as early as December. I think it would be worthwhile doing some contingency planning of the programme for a visit, just in case. For instance:

- where would we envisage taking him outside London?
- would we suggest that he speaks to a joint meeting of the two Houses of Parliament?
- what contact would we envisage with the Palace?
- would we want the City to lay on an event at the Guildhall?

Even if an early visit does not materialise, the work would not be wasted: we are still likely to have to field him in the first half of next year. But equally we do not want to be caught short.

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a message to you from Mrs. Gorbachev, given to me by the Soviet Ambassador last night. He asked me to draw your attention to Mrs. Gorbachev's hope that she will be able to meet you "in the near future".

CDP

C. D. POWELL
13 October 1988

ПОСОЛ
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A

12 October 1988

Dear Prime Minister,

Mrs. R.Gorbacheva asked me to convey to you her sincere gratitude for the letter, which you sent to her with the Secretary of State Mr. K.Baker.

Mrs. R.Gorbacheva interpreted it as a sign of personal respect and she thanks you very much.

Mrs. R.Gorbacheva asked me to convey to you that she is pleased to see useful contacts between our countries in different aspects of material and spiritual culture being developed more actively. She believes it's wonderful. It inspires optimism, belief in future, promotes mutual understanding and trust between peoples of our two countries.

Mrs. R.Gorbacheva hopes to have a new meeting with you Mrs. Prime Minister, in near future.

Mr. M.Gorbachev and Mrs. R.Gorbacheva send you and Mr. Denis Thatcher their kindest and most sincere wishes.

Yours truly,

Leonid Zamyatin

L. Zamyatin
USSR Ambassador

COPIED TO

PERSONAL SOVIET UNION: Relations PM ①

Faxed 12/10

PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE VISIT OF MR. GORBACHEV

CDP 13/X

You will wish to see the attached note describing my conversation with Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy.

What I have not referred to, at his specific request, is his view that there is still a distinct possibility that Mr. Gorbachev may ask at short notice to come here in December this year. Having blurted this out, he then got frightfully nervous about it and begged me not to mention it to anyone else. He said that Gorbachev himself seemed to want to come then but others in Moscow were opposed. In the current situation it was very difficult to know exactly what would happen and when, but we should not rule out the possibility of such a visit. He would tip me off as soon as he heard anything definite. I said that you were perfectly relaxed about the timing of a visit and would do your best to fit in with Mr. Gorbachev's wishes.

I have not reported this part of the conversation to the Foreign Office or others. I am never quite sure where Kossov gets his information from, but he is a close friend of the official in the Central Committee who looks after Mrs. Gorbachev's programme, so that may be the source.

Would you be ready to see Mr. Katushev next week (see letter)?

C.D.P.

Yes - I would like to

C. D. POWELL

10 October 1988

SLHBAS

PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

I promised to let you have copies of some of the photographs of you and Mrs Gorbachev taken at Brize Norton. I enclose a selection.

Charles Powell

22 January 1988

CDP-for see. CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 January 1988?

Prime Minister (2)

MEA 7/1

Dear Mark,

at flop

I enclose, as requested in your letter of today, a translation of the message the Prime Minister has received from Mr & Mrs Gorbachev.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

M Addison Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

Dear Mrs Thatcher

We thank you for the letters, received on our return from Washington, and for the warmth and hospitality shown to us on British soil.

We take this opportunity to send sincere congratulations and very best wishes to you and to Mr Denis Thatcher on the occasion of the New Year.

With respect (signed)

M S Gorbachev

R M Gorbacheva

SOVIET UNION: VIS. 2
to Gorbachev

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 January 1987

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Gorbachev.

I should be grateful for an urgent translation please.

(Mark Addison)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

УВАЖАЕМАЯ ГОСПОЖА ТЭТЧЕР,

БЛАГОДАРИМ ВАС ЗА ПИСЬМА, ПОЛУЧЕННЫЕ ПО ВОЗВРАЩЕНИИ ИЗ ВАШИНГТОНА, ЗА ТЕПЛОТУ И ГОСТЕПРИИМСТВО, ОКАЗАННЫЕ НАМ НА ЗЕМЛЕ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ.

ПОЛЬЗУЯСЬ ЭТОЙ ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬЮ, ШЛЕМ ИСРЕННИЕ ПОЗДРАВЛЕНИЯ И НАИЛУЧШИЕ ПОЖЕЛАНИЯ ВАМ И ГОСПОДИНУ ДЭНИСУ ТЭТЧЕР ПО СЛУЧАЮ НОВОГО ГОДА.

С УВАЖЕНИЕМ

М. С. ГОРБАЧЕВ

Р. М. ГОРБАЧЕВА

VC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 December 1987

Mr. Gorbachev's Visit to Brize Norton

The Prime Minister is sending Mr and Mrs Gorbachev a volume of photographs taken during their visit to Brize Norton. As you will see it is extremely large and bulky. You will find in the box a covering letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev. I should be grateful if you could arrange to have it sent by diplomatic bag to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VC

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T239A/87

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT
cc OPS
MASTER

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 December 1987

Dear Mr. Gorbachev.

I have great pleasure in sending you an album of photographs taken during the brief visit which you and Mrs. Gorbachev paid to RAF Brize Norton on 7 December. I hope they will serve as a reminder of a happy and friendly occasion which will long be remembered in this country.

May I also thank you very much for the inscribed copy of your book, which I value greatly. It is most kind of you to send it.

My husband joins me in sending you both warm good wishes for the New Year.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev

CCPC

The Italian Ambassador

Italian Embassy
4, Grosvenor Square
London, W. 1.

11749

22nd December 1987

CD 24/12

Dear Charles,

Further to my letter no. 11520 of 14th December, I take pleasure in enclosing the original text of the letter addressed to the Prime Minister from the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Giovanni Goria. DATED 12/12/87

Yours sincerely

Boris Biancheri

Encs.

Mr. Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
for Overseas Affairs
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Cite PM

CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1987

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. AND MRS. GORBACHEV - LUNCH DISCUSSION

I have just received from Richard Pollock, the interpreter, his notes of the Prime Minister's discussion over lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev at Brize Norton on 7 December. I enclose a copy. I have excised one passage which refers to an individual case about which I have written to you separately.

In sending the notes, Richard Pollock has made a number of comments:

- as in the talks on 30 March, he was struck by Mr. Gorbachev's emphasis that the next two or three years in the Soviet Union would be difficult in terms of securing the cooperation of the Soviet people with his plans;

- it was interesting to note how often Mr. Gorbachev initiated during the talks points which the Prime Minister herself would have wished to raise. This suggested that their priorities were very similar;

- Mr. Gorbachev made more disciplined use of his speaking time than in March; and

- there was more proximity of mood - if not necessarily of views - than pauses for an interpretation from the Russian allowed to emerge. It was evident that both the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev enjoy and benefit from lively debate.

I should be grateful if the notes could be given a very restricted circulation only.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. AND MRS. GORBACHEV AT BRIZE NORTON ON 7 DECEMBER 1987

1. PM takes Mr. Gorbachev in - after Mrs. Gorbachev removes fur coat in which she had emerged from her powder room, unsure whether to keep it on for lunch [Mr. Gorbachev said to take it off when Mrs. Gorbachev consulted him] - from foyer. On the way PM and Mr. Gorbachev talk briefly about Mrs. Gorbachev's health, he said she had had an operation before the summer break, but feels alright now.

2. PM seats Mr. Gorbachev, Richard Pollock (interpreter) seats Mrs. Gorbachev. PM quietly mentions to Richard Pollock the very private subject she wishes to mention to Mr. Gorbachev - Richard Pollock suggests that be done on the way out of lunch, when best chance of being out earshot of Soviet interpreters: PM agreed [it was so done, see below, paragraph 17].

3. PM asks Mrs. Gorbachev if warm enough [Mrs. Gorbachev looked pale - possibly no time for make up in powder room: Mr. Gorbachev had lightheartedly remarked - while we waited for Mrs. Gorbachev in the foyer - that what she had to do took longer than what he had to do on such occasions of withdrawal from the proceedings!].

4. Kenneth Baker, standing, tells the PM (once she and Mrs. Gorbachev were seated) that the morning (visit to school etc) had been a great success (nativity play, carols, etc). PM registers pleasure. Kenneth Baker returns to own seat.

5. PM asks after Mrs. Gorbachev's health. Mrs. Gorbachev replies - "Our life has its ups and downs [an initially ambiguous phrase], and so I had to have an operation in the summer. But I feel alright now. PM: "You look fine, you look wonderful!" Mrs. Gorbachev: "I feel quite alright now". PM: "You'll find Nancy Reagan looking very drawn". Mrs. Gorbachev: "I was shocked to hear she had had

to have an operation." Then Mrs. Gorbachev turned subject to schooling.....

6. Mrs. Gorbachev animatedly tells PM how 8 year old boy asked her to say "Guten Tag" (sic) in Russian. Mrs. Gorbachev told him it was "zdravstvuyte!" - and expresses to PM her amazement that the small boy could articulate it correctly. Mrs. Gorbachev says she herself finds that, although she has studied English herself, she quickly loses the knack of pronunciation and forgets vocabulary. PM says that she has the same problem with French and German, especially tenses and structures.

7. PM tells Mrs. Gorbachev it is so important to tackle languages when you are young. Mrs. Gorbachev: "All our children do at least one language in school". PM: "I was impressed when I went to a school in Leningrad where all children were learning not only English, but other subjects through the medium of English." Mrs. Gorbachev: "12/13 million Soviet children learn English at school - incidentally there are 500+ special English schools (ie other subject taught as well in English)".

8. At this point, PM's attention engaged by Mr. Gorbachev - re, and with Marshal Akhromeyev, sitting opposite, slightly to right of Mr. Gorbachev. Soviet interpreter took over, being more conveniently seated. PM enquired what arm of the forces Akhromeyev was in. Akhromeyev replied: "Land forces" (thus - and correctly - rendered by Soviet interpreter). Dobryin chips in with a wrong translation of Akhromeyev's remark - ie "Infantry"!

9. Meanwhile, seeing Mrs. Gorbachev "neglected", Richard Pollock asks after her grand-daughter, Oksana. Mrs. Gorbachev gently reads Richard Pollock a lecture about why Oksana must not be called Oksana, but rather - 'Ksenya' [(since latter is a Ukranian name, and Mrs. Gorbachev's "dad" (sic) was Ukranian [Mrs. Gorbachev's maiden name ends in the typically Ukranian "-enko"]). Grand-daughter much prefers Ukranian 'Ksenya'.

Richard Pollock said he would bear that in mind in hope of meeting her!

10. Sir Geoffrey Howe engages Mrs. Gorbachev in conversation about her morning visiting local school (other UK interpreter).

11. Richard Pollock reverts back to PM as she informs Mr. Gorbachev that Britain has much experience in handing back territory to local peoples. PM emphasises this requires knowledge of respect for local people's traditions, culture, history. Mr. Gorbachev agrees on latter, affirming UK has much experience at handing back territory.

12. PM makes point that individual freedom is paramount, and that it is enshrined in British legal system. Secret of effective freedom/governmental system is legal system. Our history is the history of our judicial system. Even the humblest citizen (repeated) knows he/she will be assured just treatment under our legal system - which has been in existence for hundreds of years, longer than our Parliamentary system, long before principle of "one man, one vote".

13. Mr. Gorbachev comments it is interesting that Marx found it appropriate to develop many of his political ideas in Britain. PM immediately points out that was because he was in a free society in which he was at liberty to develop any ideas. Mr. Gorbachev laughed.

14. PM tells Mr. Gorbachev she has been reading some of his earlier speeches - in which he mentioned that after a few years Lenin changed some of his theories. PM comments that it was tragic Lenin died prematurely - history might have been different, otherwise .... Mr. Gorbachev rejoins [with a smile]: "It's not for us to indulge in speculation!"

15. [Mr. Miller, RAF Brize Norton, asks Richard Pollock to inform PM that only two minutes remain: Richard Pollock does so - PM registers immediately.] PM then says privately to

Mr. Gorbachev - and quickly - that only two minutes remain, but "you will come again, won't you?" (to which Mr. Gorbachev immediately responds, smiling, "But you have invited me!" [first reference to invitation inside Officers' Mess Building, in Richard Pollock's hearing]. In her private, rapid words to Mr. Gorbachev before the speeches, PM says several of the things she subsequently said in her post-lunch (at table) speech: ie "It has been a delight to have you with us; we are keenly interested in all that you are doing; this is a historic time; we wish you success...." Then PM taps glass with spoon to say her few post-prandial words - as above, adding thanks for the visit and saying we look forward immensely to continuing UK-USSR cooperation. PM includes specific mention of Britain's affection/welcome for Mrs. Gorbachev.

16. Mr. Gorbachev makes answering post-lunch speech. Mockingly protests at blatant discrimination: "first the PM says there are two minutes left, and then she talks for two minutes, then she says I have one minute in which to reply!". Confines himself primarily to gratitude for hospitality and proposes toast to continuing UK-USSR cooperation and strengthening of bilateral relationship.

17. PM, Richard Pollock, Mr. Gorbachev progressed to dining-room exit, Richard Pollock commented that a VIP guest-book awaited signature on the table in the foyer. Mr. Gorbachev acknowledged/indicated willingness to sign. Once in foyer, Mr. Gorbachev signed and called to Mrs. Gorbachev to do likewise. While wife signing, Mr. Gorbachev - seeing Christmas tree nearby - began reciting Russian folksong about a little fir tree: Richard Pollock continued it by a couple of lines, Mr. Gorbachev joined it for further couple of lines, saying "It's a lovely song, isn't it?". By which time, Mrs. Gorbachev had signed the book. Principals go over Christmas tree.

18. When PM entrusted two gifts to Mrs. Gorbachev (for conveyance to the aircraft), Mr. Gorbachev chafed (to wife):

"You'll never be able to carry all that." Then PM hands separate packet to Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev thanked her, said he had a present for her/her husband and (repeating what he had said in talks) that he would send PM a signed copy of his book. RAF Brize Norton Officer presents (a) Mrs. Gorbachev (b) PM with silver serving-dishes to commemorate visit. Mr. Gorbachev/Mrs. Gorbachev palpably touched by Brize Norton RAF Officer's presents (to Mrs. Gorbachev/PM) - and registered the point that the two serving-dishes together constituted a pair [perhaps Brize Norton Officers could be informed], as well as genuine gratitude.

19. PM goes to sign VIP guest book (as Mr. Gorbachev/Mrs. Gorbachev had done), then informs Mr. Gorbachev that the press await outside entrance to Officers' Mess. Mr. Gorbachev immediately says to Uspensky: "Kolya, where's my file?" Apparently he had notes prepared for this moment (though he did not have much - if any - recourse to them when standing before the press in entrance portico).

20. Thereafter, see live TV coverage of PM/Mr. Gorbachev's speeches to press outside Officers' Mess.

RICHARD POLLOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

RP→CP
11/12/87

Notes on PM's lunch with MSG/RMG at Brize Norton [7/12/87].

1. PM takes MSG in — after RMG removes fur coat in which she had emerged from her powder room, unsure whether to keep it on for lunch [MSG said to take it off when RMG committed him] — from foyer. On way PM/MSG talk briefly about RMG's health: he said she had had op. before summer break, but feels alright now.

2. PM seats MSG, RP (interpreter) seats RMG. PM quietly mentions to RP the v. private subject she wishes to mention to MSG — RP suggests that be done on way out of lunch, when best chance of being out of earshot of Sov. interpreter: PM agreed [it was so done, see below, §17].

3. PM asks RMG if warm enough [RMG looked pale — possibly no time for make-up in powder-room: MSG had lightheartedly remarked — while we waited for RMG in foyer — that what she had to do took longer than what he had to do on such occasions of withdrawal from the proceedings!].

4. Kenneth Baker, standing, tells PM (once she & RMG seated) that the morning (visit to school, etc) had been a great success (nativity play, carols, etc). PM registers pleasure. KB returns to own seat.

5. PM asks after RMG's health. RMG replies — "Our life has its ups and downs [an initially ambiguous phrase RP], and so I had to have an operation in the summer. But I feel alright now. PM:- "You look fine, you look wonderful!" RMG:- "I feel quite alright now." PM:- "You'll find Nancy Regan looking very drawn." RMG:- "I was shocked to hear she had had to have an operation." Then RMG turned subject to schooling...

6. RMG unprompted tells PM how 8-year-old boy asked her to say 'Guten Tag' (sic) in Russian. RMG told him it was 'Zdrastvuyte!' — and expresses to PM her amazement that the small boy could articulate it correctly. RMG says she herself finds that, altho' she has studied English herself, she quickly loses knack of pronunciation and forgets vocabulary. PM says she has the same problem with French and

/...

German, especially tenses and structures.

7. PM tells RMG it is so important to tackle languages when you are young. RMG: "All our children do at least one language in school". PM: "I was impressed when I was in a school in Leningrad where all children were ~~not~~ learning not only English, but other subjects thro' the medium of English." RMG: "12/13 million Sov. children learn English at school — incidentally, there are 500+ special English schools (i.e. other subjects taught as well in English)".

8. At this point, PM's attention engaged by MSG — re, and with Marshal Akhromeyev, sitting opposite, slightly to right of MSG. Soviet interpreter took over, being more conveniently seated. PM enquired what arm of the forces Akhromeyev was in. Akhromeyev replied: "Land forces" (thus — and correctly — rendered by Sov. interpreter). Dobrynin chips in with a wrong translation of Akhromeyev's remark — i.e. "Infantry"!

9. Meanwhile, seeing RMG 'neglected', RP asks ~~her~~ after her grand-daughter, Oksana. RMG gently reads RP a lecture about why Oksana must not be called Oksana, but rather — 'Ksenya' (since latter is a Ukrainian name, and RMG's "dad" (sic) was Ukrainian [RMG's maiden name ends in the typically Ukrainian "-enko"]). Grand-daughter much prefers Ukrainian 'Ksenya'. RP said he would bear that in mind in hope of meeting her!

10. Sir Geoffrey Howe engages RMG in conversation about her morning visiting local school (& the UK interpreter).

11. RP (interpreter) reverts to PM as she informs MSG that Britain has much experience in handing back territory to local peoples. PM emphasises this requires knowledge of, respect for local peoples' traditions, culture, history. MSG agrees on latter, affirming UK has much experience at handing back territory.

12. PM makes point that individual freedom is paramount,

/...

and that it is enshrined in British legal system.
Secret of ~~the~~ effective freedom/governmental system
is ~~the~~ legal system. Even the humblest citizen (repeated)
knows he/she will be assured just treatment under
our legal system – which has been in existence for hundreds
of years, longer than our Parliamentary system, long before principle of "one man, one vote".

Our history is the history of our judicial system.

13. MSG comments it is interesting that Marx found it appropriate to develop many of his political ideas in Britain. PM immediately points out that was because he was in a free society in which he was at liberty to develop any ideas. MSG laughed.

14. PM tells MSG she has been reading some of his (MSG's) earlier speeches – in which he mentioned that after a few years Lenin changed some of his theories. PM comments that it was tragic Lenin died prematurely – history might have been different, otherwise... MSG rejoins [with a smile]: "It's not for us to indulge in speculation!"

15. [Mr Miller, RAF Brize Norton, asks RP (interpreter) to inform PM that only 2 minutes remain: RP does so – PM registers immediately.] PM then says privately to MSG – and quickly – that only 2 minutes remain, but "you will come again, won't you?" (to which MSG immediately responds, smiling, "But you have invited me!" [first reference to invitation inside Officers' Mess building, in RP's hearing]. In her private, rapid words to MSG before the speeches, PM says several of the things she subsequently said in her post-lunch (at table) speech: i.e. "it has been a delight to have you with us; we are keenly interested in all that you are doing; this is a historic time; we wish you success...". Then PM taps glass with ~~fork~~ spoon to say her few post-prandial words – as above, adding thanks for the visit and saying we look forward immensely to continuing UK-USSR cooperation. PM includes specific mention of British affection/welcome for Mrs G.

/...

16. MSG makes answering post-lunch speech. Mockingly protests at blatant discrimination: "first the PM says there are 2 minutes left, then she talks for 2 minutes, then she says I have 1 minute in which to reply"! Confines himself primarily to gratitude for hospitality and proposes toast to continuing UK-USSR cooperation and strengthening of bilateral relationship.

17. [On way out of dining-room, PM says quickly/quietly (and RP murmurs in Russian) to MSG...[request that whatever could be done re a certain family should be done if possible]. MSG strides purposefully on, without reaction, exactly as he did when the similar juncture after Kremlin banquet on 30 March 1987 was used in same way. There is a possibility that the Soviet (bald) interpreter got within earshot when the matter was broached this time. MSG clearly registered the point, ~~but~~ with palpable (if unexpressed) emotion [slight tensing of cheek/neck muscles!]. After some 3 to 4 seconds of pregnant silence ds] PM, RP, MSG progressed to dining-room exit, RP commented that a VIP guest-book awaited signature on table in foyer: MSG acknowledged/indicated willingness to sign. Once in foyer, MSG signed and called RMG to do likewise. While wife signing, MSG ~ seeing Christmas tree nearby ~ began reciting Russian folksong about a little fir-tree: RP continued it by a couple of lines, MSG joined it for further couple of lines, saying "It's a lovely song, isn't it?"! By which time, RMG had signed the book. Principals go over to Christmas tree.

18. When PM entrusted 2 gifts to RMG (for conveyance to the aircraft), MSG chaffed (to wife): "You'll never be able to carry all that." Then PM gave separate packet to MSG. MSG thanked her, said he had a present for her/her husband and (repeating what he had said in talks) that he would send PM a signed copy of his book. ~~PM goes to Sigov~~ RAF Brize Norton officer presents @ RMG ⓑ PM with silver serving-dishes to

/...

commemorate visit. MSG/RMG palpably touched by BN RAF Officers' present (to RMG/PM) — and registered the point that the two serving-dishes together constituted a pair [perhaps BN officers could be informed], as well as genuine gratitude.

19. PM goes to sign VIP guest-book (as MSG/RMG had done), then informs MSG that the press await outside entrance to Officers' Mess. MSG immediately says to Uspensky: "Kolya, where's my file?" Apparently he had notes prepared for this moment (tho' he did not have much — if any — recourse to them when standing before the press in entrance portico).

20. Thereafter, see live TV coverage of PM/MSG speeches to press outside Officers' Mess.

File

PRM

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1987

Dear Richard,

Thank you very much for your letter of 11 December and for sending me your excellent notes of the discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev over lunch. These are very helpful indeed.

I have also passed on your letter to the Prime Minister and your various Christmas cards, for which thank you very much. May I take the opportunity to wish you and your family a very Happy Christmas - and advise you to keep a place yet unknown in your diary for next year in case of a further visit by your favourite couple!

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Richard Pollock, Esq.

SSE

University of BRADFORD

The Modern Languages Centre

Bradford West Yorkshire BD7 1DP
telex 51309 UNIBFD G
☎ 0274 733466

From: Richard Pollock.

Private address:

137 Framingham Road,
Brooklands,
Sale,
Cheshire, M33 3RQ.

C.D.Powell, Esq.,
Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1A 2AA.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 December 1987.

Dear Charles

Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev, RAF Brize Norton, 7 December, 1987

I enclose herewith some notes, as you requested, on the proceedings in the Officers' Mess at RAF Brize Norton - other than during the restricted talks themselves. For reasons of security, I have not had them typed up: as previously, I leave you to arrange that - if, and as, you think fit - hoping you do not mind. I am sorry that I was not able to supply the notes as promptly as I would have wished. End-of-term pressures and 'flu (not, of course, INF-luenza!) caused unavoidable delay. I do apologise for any inconvenience.

I hope it will not be out of place if I comment on one or two matters which struck me on the day of the visit and subsequently - beyond what figures in my notes:-

(i) Again during these talks, as on 30 March, MSG explicitly said he expects the next 2 or 3 years to be difficult in terms of winning internal cooperation. The similarity of phrasing struck me.

(ii) It was interesting how often MSG initiated during the talks points which the PM herself would have wished (judging by the brief) to raise. This might be deemed encouraging closeness of positions re priorities.

(iii) MSG made more disciplined use of his speaking time as cf. March, covering more topics in better balance - even granted time-constraints.

(iv) I am sure there is more proximity of moods - if not necessarily of views - than the sometimes long pauses for interpretation from Russian allowed to emerge. Both the PM and MSG enjoy, and benefit from (in their thinking), lively debate.

If it is not too much trouble, could you kindly confirm safe receipt (to my home) - and also pass the enclosed reply to the PM, thanking her for her very kind letter, please? If I may, I will leave the circulation of the Brize Norton notes to you.

With kind regards.
Yours ever,
Richard.

Richard Pollock

Enclosures

Cile

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1987

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Signor Goria thanking her for her message about her meeting with Mr. Gorbachev.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DA

SUBJECT CC OPS MASTER CFO

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T234/87

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 December 1987

Dear Ambassador

I want to let you know how very much I appreciated all that you did to help arrange the visit by General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev to Brize Norton. As you will have seen, it was very much appreciated by people in this country and your own efforts were crucial to the visit's success. I should be grateful if you could also pass on my thanks to the members of your staff who contributed to it.

Thank you also for your kind card of season's greetings and the very fine Palekh Icon painting. We were delighted to receive this and it will be a very welcome addition to our home.

My husband joins me in sending you and your wife best wishes for a happy New Year,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Leonid M. Zamyatin

CC/C

11520

Italian Embassy,
4, Grosvenor Square, W.1.

14th December, 1987

Dear Charles,

I take pleasure in enclosing herewith the text of a message addressed to the Prime Minister from the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Giovanni Goria. I also enclose a rough translation for your convenience.

Yours sincerely

Boris Biancheri
Ambassador

Encs.

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
for Overseas Affairs
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T233/87

SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

DA

CFCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 December 1987

Dear Mrs. Gorbachev.

I wanted to let you know how delighted we all were to see you in Britain again on your way to Washington, and in particular how very much we appreciated your visit to the Edith Moorhouse primary school. This gave immense pleasure to the children. Your warmth and interest were very well captured in the pictures on television and in the press and made a very favourable impression on people in this country. We all hope that you and your husband will return for a further and longer visit soon.

We also followed the visit to Washington with great interest and welcome its success, to which you clearly contributed a great deal.

May I also thank you for the handsome gifts of the coffee set and the Cossack ornaments. It was kind of you to choose them with such care. We also appreciated the caviar and vodka, which will help us celebrate the New Year.

My husband joins me in sending you both best wishes for 1988,

Warm regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

DA

c fco

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T232(87)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 December 1987

Dear General Secretary,

Your brief visit to the United Kingdom on your way to Washington was very well received by people here, and I am most grateful to you and your senior colleagues for the time you devoted to discussions with us. For my own part, I found it very useful to be able to pick up the threads of our talks in Moscow earlier in the year. It was particularly gratifying to see these brought to fruition in the INF Agreement. I congratulate you once again on your own major contribution to the conclusion of this agreement, which represents a success for us all.

I am writing separately to thank Mrs. Gorbachev for so kindly undertaking the visit to the school, which gave great pleasure to the children and teachers and also led to some really enchanting pictures which I shall be sending her.

We followed your meetings in Washington with very great interest. The media created - as they always do - some exaggerated expectations of agreements. I remember that you yourself told me that there would be no surprises and this was borne out. But my own assessment of the outcome is a positive one. It was clear that your discussions with President Reagan were very thorough and productive, and have created a good basis for future progress in East/West relations. I hope that this will be reflected in further agreements next year.

Finally, may I thank you both very much for your kind and generous gifts. They were chosen with obvious care and thoughtfulness and very much appreciated.

My husband joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Gorbachev a happy and successful New Year. We all hope that you will both return for a longer official visit in the course of 1988.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

FILE
DA
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1987

I enclose letters from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev and the Soviet Ambassador. Provided the Foreign Secretary is content with the texts, I should be grateful if they could be forwarded. I suggest that the texts for Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev should be telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow for delivery.

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

fie DTS
bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 December 1987

I enclose a cassette tape of a message from Mr Gorbachev to the Prime Minister dictated in Russian while his aircraft was overflying Scotland on the return journey.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a translation as soon as possible.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DS

file DTSAGB

bc - PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 December 1987

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you very much for your letter and for sending the cassette tape recording conveying the message from Mr Gorbachev, transmitted while his aircraft was overflying Scotland on its return journey from Washington. She was most grateful for the trouble which has been taken to make this available to her.

She has also asked me to send you and all your colleagues at Scottish and Oceanic ATCC her best wishes for Christmas.

C D POWELL

R. C. Brown, Esq.

DTS

T'

Italian Embassy,
14, Three Kings Yard,
London, W.1.

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS MARGARET THATHCER, MP, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SIGNOR GIOVANNI GORIA.

"Signora Primo Ministro e Cara Amica,

La ringrazio della sollecitudine con cui ha voluto farmi pervenire le Sue valutazioni sul Suo incontro del 7 dicembre con il Segretario Generale del PCUS Gorbaciov.

Ho particolarmente apprezzato il Suo messaggio poichè esso mi è giunto alla vigilia della mia partenza per Washington e mi sarà di grande utilità in vista dei miei colloqui con il Presidente Reagan il 16 dicembre alla Casa Bianca.

Condivido la Sua valutazione che il 1988 potrà essere un anno determinante: le intese di Washington danno una dimensione nuova e radicalmente innovativa ai rapporti Est-Ovest realizzando una distruzione di armi non con altre armi, ma grazie ad un trattato internazionale.

Il clima di maggiore fiducia instauratosi deve ora favorire progressi negoziali nel campo del disarmo nucleare, strategico e di quelli convenzionale e chimico. Ad esso potrà portare un contributo la soluzione anche della crisi afghana, da Lei opportunamente sollecitata nei suoi colloqui con Gorbaciov.

Nell'attesa di rivederLa presto e con rinnovati ringraziamenti Le invio i miei più cordiali saluti.

Signed: Giovanni Goria.

Roma, 12 dicembre 1987."

(2)

Prime Minister

CDP
14/XII

FROM: Signor Giovanni Goria
TO: Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Date: Rome, 12th December, 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T229A/87.

SUBJECT a OPS MASTER.

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Prime Minister and Dear Friend,

I wish to thank you for the promptness with which you have conveyed to me your impressions following your meeting with Secretary General Gorbachev on December 7th.

I am particularly grateful for your message since it arrives on the eve of my departure for Washington and will be most useful in view of my meeting with President Reagan at the White House on December 16th.

I share your consideration that 1988 could prove to be a determining year: the Washington accords will give a new and radically innovative dimension to East-West relations, bringing about the destruction of arms not by menas of other arms, but by means of an international treaty.

The climate of greater trust which has been brought about should now foster progress in the negotiations in the field of strategic nuclear disarmement and of conventional and chemical arms disarmement. This could be aided also by a solution to the Afghanistan crisis, so appropriately raised by you in your discussions with Mr Gorbachev.

I look forward to seeing you again soon and, in renewing my thanks, send you my warmest regards.

Giovanni Goria

UCD/792

Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 12 dicembre 1987

Signora Primo Ministro e Cara Amica,

La ringrazio della sollecitudine con cui ha voluto farmi pervenire le Sue valutazioni sul Suo incontro del 7 dicembre con il Segretario Generale del PCUS Gorbaciov.

Ho particolarmente apprezzato il Suo messaggio poichè esso mi è giunto alla vigilia della mia partenza per Washington e mi sarà di grande utilità in vista dei miei colloqui con il Presidente Reagan il 16 dicembre alla Casa Bianca.

Condivido la Sua valutazione che il 1988 potrà essere un anno determinante: le intese di Washington danno una dimensione nuova e radicalmente innovativa ai rapporti Est-Ovest realizzando una distruzione di armi non con altre armi ma grazie ad un Trattato internazionale.

./.

S.E. la Signora
Margaret THATCHER
Primo Ministro del Regno Unito
di Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord

L O N D R A

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Il clima di maggiore fiducia instauratosi deve ora favorire progressi negoziali nel campo del disarmo nucleare strategico e di quelli convenzionale e chimico. Ad esso potrà portare un contributo la soluzione anche della crisi afghana, da Lei opportunamente sollecitata nei Suoi colloqui con Gorbaciov.

Nell'attesa di rivederLa presto e con rinnovati ringraziamenti, Le invio i miei più cordiali saluti.

SOVIET UNION

USSR OF

GORBACHEV

11/87

(2)

University of BRADFORD

The Modern Languages Centre

Bradford West Yorkshire BD7 1DP
telex 51309 UNIBFD G
☎ 0274 733466

Prime Minister
CDV

From: Richard Pollock.

Private address:

137 Framingham Road,
Brooklands,
Sale,
Cheshire, M33 3RQ.

The Right Honourable
Mrs Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1A 2AA.

11 December 1987.

Dear Prime Minister —

I am deeply grateful for your generous letter of 8 December. It was a great privilege to take part again in your discussions with Mr Gorbachev - and, indeed, a great pleasure.

I have passed on my impressions of the Brize Norton occasion to your Private Secretary. I think there were various indications - obvious and less obvious - that the UK-USSR relationship is developing encouragingly, and that your dialogue, already very effective, has much further potential.

Thank you once again for your kind words. I am heartened to know my contribution is useful. I am delighted to assist your endeavours in whatever way I can.

My wife and family join me in warmly wishing you and your family a very happy Christmas - and health and fulfilment in 1988.

Yours sincerely —
Richard Pollock

Richard Pollock

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You may like
just to glance
at the note of
your talk with
Mr. Gorbachev.

CD
11/12

National Air Traffic Services
Atlantic House
Sherwood Road
Prestwick
Ayrshire KA9 2NR
Telephone Prestwick 79800

NATS

Scottish & Oceanic ATCC

The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Ref: 8AH/ATC/10/1/1

Dear Prime Minister

Please find enclosed a cassette tape recording of the Scottish Control frequency at approximately 0810 today, Friday 11 December on which is a message, in Russian, from Mr M Gorbachov for Mrs Thatcher which was dictated whilst the aircraft was overflying Scotland en-route to Berlin.

Yours faithfully

R C Brown

R C BROWN
Airways Operations
for General Manager.

(40)

036721
MDHOAN 4580

SUBJECT cc OPS
MASTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T227A/87.

Messages

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 091630Z PARIS
TELNO 722
OF 091500Z DECEMBER 87
AND TO DESKBY 091630Z BONN, ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

WRG 020/1
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
14 DEC 1987
DESK PRIME

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, TODAY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. PARIS SHOULD DELIVER IT TO BOTH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND CHRIAC, BONN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL AND ROME TO GORIA.

QUOTE WE HAVE BRIEFED YOUR OFFICIALS ON MY MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV ON 7 DECEMBER. AND EVENTS HAVE OF COURSE MOVED ON WITH THE SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON OF THE INF AGREEMENT WHICH WE HAVE ALL WELCOMED. BUT THERE ARE A FEW POINTS OF INTEREST WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW VERY BRIEFLY TO YOUR ATTENTION:

- MR GORBACHEV WAS IN VERY LIVELY AND CONFIDENT FORM AND PLAINLY DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS INTERNAL REFORMS. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, OF WHICH WE HAVE ALL READ, HAVE PLACED CONSTRAINTS ON HIM.

- HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A START AGREEEMENT TO BE SIGNED NEXT YEAR AND CLEARLY BELIEVES THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES WHICH REMAIN, FOR INSTANCE ON VERIFICATION, CAN AND WILL BE OVERCOME.

- HE MADE NO EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND SDI (ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PRESS REPORTS HAVE RESTATED THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE ON THIS). I DETECTED SOME EVIDENCE THAT HE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO MANAGE THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE RATHER THAN TREAT IT AS A ROADBLOCK IN THE WAY OF FURTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. I PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON THIS.

- NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS AND CHEMICA' WEAPONS ARE HIGH ON HIS LIST OF PRIORITIES.

- MORE GENERALLY HIS APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS STRUCK ME AS MORE PRACTICAL AND LESS PROPAGANDISTIC THAN IN THE PAST.

- I PRESSED MR GORBACHEV TO CONTINUE THE IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE OF RECENT MONTHS AND INDEED STEP IT UP: ALSO TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN IN THE COURSE OF 1988. I TOLD HIM THAT NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO ASSURE RATIFICATION OF THE INF AGREEMENT AND CREATE THE CLIMATE OF TRUST WHICH FURTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL NEED. HE SAID NOTHING NEW ON EITHER POINT.

I WOULD ONLY ADD THAT MR GORBACHEV WENT TO SOME TROUBLE TO STRESS THE SOVIET UNION'S HISTORICAL ROLE AS A EUROPEAN POWER AND HIS WISH THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SO CONSIDERED. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF WE WERE TO SEE STEPPED UP EFFORTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR TO DEVELOP THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE.
UNQUOTE

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 102

MAIN 102

LIMITED
SOVIET DEPT
WED
EED
NEWS DEPT
PUSD
SEC POL DEPT
ACDD
SAD

ECD(E)
PS
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL

NNNN

036215
MDHIAN 9691

RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1750
OF 091220Z DECEMBER 87
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, PARIS BONN

MY TELNO 1745: GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE UK: FURTHER SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE

SUMMARY

1. SUBSTANTIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA OF 9 DECEMBER.

DETAIL

2. IN THEIR FOREIGN NEWS PAGES ON 9 DECEMBER BOTH PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA CARRIED EXTENSIVE QUOTATIONS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING HER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV ON 7 DECEMBER. THESE EMPHASISE THE VERY GOOD ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER'S PLEASURE AT SEEING MR AND MRS GORBACHEV AGAIN, AND HER INTEREST IN PERESTROIKA. HER COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV'S STRONG PERSONALITY AND BOLD AND DECISIVE LEADERSHIP ARE QUOTED. PRAVDA PRINTS IN FULL THE EXTENSIVE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO ITS CORRESPONDENT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

3. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (9 DECEMBER) HAS REPORTED BRITISH NEWSPAPER COMMENT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN SUPPORTING ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT HAS GIVEN RISE TO ''A STORM OF INDIGNATION IN THE CAMP OF THE AMERICAN HAWKS,'' WHO REGARD SUCH APPEALS FROM LONDON AT THE MOMENT AS ''MORE THAN MISPLACED''. THE CORRESPONDENT COMMENTS THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE IS NOT TO THE TASTE OF SUCH PEOPLE.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

036215
MDHIAN 9691

DISTRIBUTION 442

MAIN 442

FCO(PALACE)WHITEHALL SOVIET D

NNNN

file VC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 December 1987

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you and all your men for the excellent arrangements made for the visit of the Soviet General Secretary and Mrs Gorbachev on Monday. Although it was a very short visit the Prime Minister knows how much work is involved and she is grateful to you for ensuring that the external policing arrangements, especially involving Mrs Gorbachev's visit, went so smoothly.

I should be grateful if you could pass on the Prime Minister's thanks to all concerned.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C. Smith, Esq., CVO.

DTS.

CABINET

MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

Points which you might cover are:

(i) You found Mr. Gorbachev in lively and confident form. There was nothing in his manner or in what he said to suggest that he was in any sort of difficulty at home. He was very clearly determined to press ahead with internal reforms. His enthusiasm for these seemed in no way diminshed.

(ii) Mr. Gorbachev was obviously very pleased about the INF Agreement. You warned him of the possible difficulties over ratification by the United States' Senate. The best way to overcome these difficulties would be for Mr. Gorbachev to be as forthcoming as he could on human rights and Afghanistan.

(iii) You found Mr. Gorbachev optimistic on the prospects for a START Agreement. You told him that the Soviet Union must come forward with credible proposals for verification of limits on mobile ICBM's. Mr. Gorbachev had left a clear impression that he believed the problems over this could be overcome.

(iv) Mr. Gorbachev gave high priority to negotiations for reductions in conventional forces and chemical weapons.

(v) In discussing SDI, Mr. Gorbachev made no linkage with the START negotiations. You renewed your proposal that there should be agreement on a period of several years during which neither party would withdraw from the ABM Treaty and each side would spell out the nature of the research which it intended to pursue. This would give the reassurance of predictability.

(vi) You stressed the continuing role of nuclear weapons in

defence, and made clear that the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons would not be included in any of the current negotiations. They were an irreducible minimum for effective deterrence.

(vii) You welcomed progress in the Soviet Union on human rights, but pressed Mr. Gorbachev to step up the Soviet Union's performance, citing in particular permission for greater numbers of Jewish people to emigrate, family reunification and changes in repressive laws in the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev was prickly in response but said that the Soviet Union would continue to proceed on the lines which they thought right.

(viii) You also raised Afghanistan urging the Soviet Union to withdraw in 1988. Mr. Gorbachev accused the United Kingdom and the United States of making Soviet withdrawal more difficult by supplying arms to the rebels. If that ceased, all the components of a solution would be to hand.

(ix) Mrs Gorbachev had a very good visit. The Education Secretary may like to report on the school visit.

(x) As expected Mr. Gorbachev is making a considerable impact in Washington (there is a phenomenon called "Gorby fever"). But we have little information so far on the substance.

C.D.S.

VC3AUO

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Agreed CD

Agree the attached text as a short message from you to Kohl, Mitterrand, Chirac & Gonia about the Gorbachev visit?

No need to sign: we will weigh it.

CDP

CONFIDENTIAL

File
-PC SHW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 December 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

I enclose a short message which the Prime Minister would like to send to Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Chirac and Prime Minister Goria about her meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. Subject to any comments you may have on the text, I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to posts for delivery today if possible.

BF

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

We have briefed your officials on my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev on 7 December. And events have of course moved on with the signature in Washington of the INF Agreement which we have all welcomed. But there are a few points of interest which I would like to draw very briefly to your attention:

- Mr. Gorbachev was in very lively and confident form and plainly determined to press ahead with his internal reforms. There was no evidence that recent developments in the Soviet Union, of which we have all read, have placed constraints on him;

- he is optimistic about a START Agreement to be signed next year and clearly believes the considerable difficulties which remain, for instance on verification, can and will be overcome;

- he made no explicit linkage between the START negotiations and SDI (although subsequent Soviet press reports have restated the standard Soviet line on this). I detected some evidence that he is looking for ways to manage the problem of strategic defence rather than treat it as a roadblock in the way of further arms control agreements. I put forward some ideas on this;

- negotiations on conventional force reductions and chemical weapons are high on his list of priorities;

- more generally his approach to arms control negotiations struck me as more practical and less propagandistic than in the past;

- I pressed Mr. Gorbachev to continue the improved human rights performance of recent months and indeed step it up; also to withdraw from Afghanistan in the course of 1988. I told him that nothing would do more to assure ratification of the INF Agreement and create the climate of trust which further arms control agreements will need. He said nothing new on either point.

I would only add that Mr. Gorbachev went to some trouble to stress the Soviet Union's historical role as a European power and his wish that it should continue to be so considered. I would not be surprised if we were to see stepped up efforts over the next year to develop the Soviet Union's relations with Western Europe.

PRIME MINISTER

INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET TELEVISION

You are giving a short interview to Soviet TV this morning about the INF Agreement, the way ahead on arms control and Anglo-Soviet relations.

You will want to balance words of welcome for the INF Agreement and of hope for future arms control agreements with sober reminders of some of the problems which still lie ahead. You have a reputation with a large Russian audience for plain speaking and you preserve that.

INF

On the INF Agreement and arms control the main points are:

- the INF Agreement is a success for both East and West. It reinforces the Christmas message of peace and goodwill to all men;

- it shows that with patience and persistence agreements can be negotiated which reduce nuclear weapons but do not leave either side feeling less secure;

- that lesson should now be applied by working out further agreements to reduce not only strategic nuclear weapons, but chemical weapons and conventional forces. The Soviet Union has a very considerable superiority in these weapons. Agreements will therefore require the Soviet Union the biggest reductions, so that the balance can be redressed;

- you very much welcome Mr. Gorbachev's public confirmation that the Soviet Union is doing extensive work on strategic defence. It is natural that both sides should be doing this and certainly there is no

way to stop it. It should be possible for the US and the Soviet Union to reach an understanding in this area based on three points:

(1) an agreed period of years during which neither side will withdraw from the ABM Treaty;

(2) a confirmation that deployment of strategic defence weapons in space would be a matter for negotiation;

(3) an explanation by both sides of their intended research activities over the next few years so that both can have confidence in the other's intentions;

- but despite the promising prospects, we must not be euphoric. Further arms control agreements will call for greater trust and confidence. Nothing would do more to promote that than for the Soviet Union to accelerate the changes it is introducing in improved human rights including the right of Jewish people to emigration; and secondly for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1988, leaving a non-aliged country;

- the other points in that nuclear weapons will remain vital to preserving peace, particularly while the Soviet Union continues to enjoy superiority in chemical and conventional weapons. This history of the last 40 years shows that deterrence based on nuclear weapons works. A war-free world is the most important objective. A sufficiency of nuclear weapons on each side is the best way to acheive that. That does, of course, leave scope for considerable reductions from the numbers there are now.

On Anglo-Soviet relations the main points are:

- these relations have reached a new high point;

- the very open and frank relationship which you and Mr. Gorbachev have has made a big contribution to this;

- we were delighted by their brief visit to Britain earlier this week. The warmth of the welcome which both Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev received shows how much people want better relations;

- it was a particular pleasure to see how warmly our young school children responded to Mrs. Gorbachev;

- we look forward to the General Secretary returning to pay an official visit as soon as possible, perhaps next year;

- you stlrongly support Mr. Gorbachev's policies of 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost' and hope that they will succeed. In Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet people have a bold and courageous leader.

C. D. POWELL

9 December 1987

033762
MDHIAN 9569

UNCLASSIFIED
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 924
OF 081800Z DECEMBER 87
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PARIS, UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON
AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ROME

GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. WIDESPREAD AND FAVOURABLE REPORTING OF GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. THERE IS EXTENSIVE COVERAGE THROUGHOUT THE GERMAN MEDIA TODAY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AT BRIZE NORTON. HER COMMENT THAT THE MEETING WAS EXCELLENT, AND THE INF AGREEMENT AN HISTORIC ONE, ARE WIDELY REPORTED. THE PRIME MINISTER IS DESCRIBED AS CONVEYING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S WELCOME FOR THE INF TREATY. SEVERAL PAPERS NOTE HER CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE UK SHOULD REMAIN AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR POWER.

3. THE PRESS DESCRIBES GORBACHEV'S AIM AS BEING TO USE THE MEETING AS A TRIAL RUN FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ''TANKING UP ON IDEAS, NOT JUST PETROL''. THE UK'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IS THE OBVIOUS REASON FOR THE CHOICE OF STOPOVER. DIE WELT (CONSERVATIVE) COMMENTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS EVIDENTLY ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV AS WELL: TALK OF THE UK'S ''MAJOR POWER'' ROLE IS NOT MUCH EXAGGERATED.

4. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE TAKEN A VERY UPBEAT LINE ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT IN GENERAL, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE NEXT STEPS IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD (IN FAMILIAR TERMS). KOHL WILL GIVE A FORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO THE BUNDESTAG ON 10 DECEMBER, FOLLOWED BY A FULL DEBATE. SOME GERMAN POLITICIANS (EG RUEHE, CDU) EMPHASISE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THE SENATE RATIFY THE INF TREATY, IF US CREDIBILITY IS TO BE MAINTAINED.

5. IN COMMENTING ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE INF STATIONING DEBATE, THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (CONSERVATIVE) SAYS THAT NO PRESENT WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO GO THROUGH WITH THE STATIONING DECISION, A POINT WHICH THOSE PROPOSING SNF

MODERNISATION SHOULD NOTE. IT COMMENTS THAT REMOVING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IS THE NEXT PRIORITY.

BULLARD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 198

MAIN 172

EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED
SOVIET
DEFENCE
SEC POL D
RESEARCH
PLANNERS
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD
SAD
CRD
ESSD
NEWS
INFO
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL
PS
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
CHIEF CLERK
MR BOYD
MR MUNRO
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MISS PESTELL
MR WINCHESTER
MR KERR
NO. 10 DOWNING ST

ADDITIONAL 26

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

NNNN

RESTRICTED

033570
MDHIAN 9549

The Russians gave a very full briefing. CDS.

RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 081700Z FCO
TELNO 1745
OF 081515Z DECEMBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE U.K.: SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE

SUMMARY

1. PRIME COVERAGE ON SOVIET TV DURING THE EVENING OF 7 DECEMBER AND SUBSTANTIAL FRONT-PAGE REPORTS WITH PHOTOGRAPHS IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA ON 8 DECEMBER. AS IN SOVIET REPORTING OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN MARCH THE REPORTING COVERED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND DID NOT GLOSS OVER DIFFERENCES, WHILE ASSESSING THE OUTCOME POSITIVELY.

DETAIL

TV

2. GORBACHEV'S VISIT DOMINATED BOTH THE MAIN SOVIET EVENING NEWS PROGRAMME ''VREMYA'' (PROVIDING OVER HALF ITS 40 MINUTE RUNNING TIME) AND THE LATE NIGHT FOREIGN NEWS PROGRAMME WHICH INCLUDED BRIEF FAVOURABLE INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC.

PRESS

3. BOTH TV AND NEWSPAPERS USED THE SAME TASS REPORT, IN WHICH THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

ATMOSPHERE

(A) THE MEETING WAS A CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND HELD IN THE CUSTOMARILY FRANK, FRIENDLY AND OPEN MANNER.

PERESTROIKA

(B) BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PERESTROIKA BOTH FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND MORE GENERALLY

IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. GORBACHEV DESCRIBED THE CURRENT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT IN PRESTROIKA INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER HE STRESSED THAT THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF AN INCREASING NUMBER OF SECTORS OF THE SOVIET POPULATION WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN MAKING PERESTROIKA IRREVERSIBLE.

BILATERAL TRADE

(C) A DETAILED DISCUSSION. GORBACHEV STRESSED THE NEED FOR BRITISH PROJECTS AND BIDS TO BE MORE COMPETITIVE SINCE THIS PROBLEM CONTINUED TO LOSE MAJOR CONTRACTS FOR BRITISH COMPANIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS ''EVERY CHANCE'' OF ACHIEVING THE TARGET FOR TRADE SET DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. THIS ISSUE WOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE CLOSEST ATTENTION OF BOTH SIDES.

BILATERAL GENERAL

(D) GORBACHEV NOTED THAT GENERALLY OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING RECENT YEARS HAD BECOME MORE DYNAMIC. DESPITE REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, MRS THATCHER'S CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE WAS AN IMPORTANT AND VERY VALUABLE ELEMENT IN THIS PROCESS.

ARMS CONTROL - INF AND THE EUROPEAN ROLE

(E) BOTH SIDES EMPHASISED THAT THE INF AGREEMENT WAS NOT ONLY A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA BUT ALSO DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ACTED IN AGREEMENT WITH THEIR ALLIES. HERE GORBACHEV EMPHASISED EUROPE'S ROLE, SAYING THAT WHEN THE WORLD WAS MAKING A NEW TURN IN TERMS OF REAL DISARMAMENT, MOVING FROM CONFRONTATION TO A CONSOLIDATION OF TRENDS TOWARDS COOPERATION, EUROPE'S ROLE WAS NOT ONLY INDISPENSABLE BUT INCREASING. MR GORBACHEV ASSURED MRS THATCHER THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER TAKE A STEP WHICH WOULD THREATEN EUROPE'S SECURITY, INFRINGE ITS INTERESTS OR CAUSE DESTABILIZATION.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

(F) GORBACHEV ''EMPHASISED THE NECESSITY OF LOWERING THE LEVEL OF (ALL CATEGORIES OF) ARMAMENTS AND INVITED THE PRIME MINISTER TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO DEFINE MORE QUICKLY THE

DIRECTION AND CONTENT OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TALKS'', ON THE BASIS OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID IT WAS TIME TO SWITCH TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS FROM PROPAGANDA TO POLICY. ''LET US MAKE POLICY - IT IS PRECISELY IN THIS MOOD THAT I AM GOING TO THE WASHINGTON TALKS''.

START

(G) BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT VERIFICATION WAS A KEY ISSUE

ABM

(H) BOTH SIDES DECLARED FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE TREATY ESPECIALLY ON THE NEED FOR PARTIES NOT TO USE THEIR RIGHT TO ABROGATE THE TREATY WITHIN AGREED TIME SCALES. GORBACHEV SAID THIS WAS ''AN IMPORTANT PRE-REQUISITE FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION''.

NO!11

CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

(I) THE TWO LEADERS CONTINUED THIS ''OLD DISPUTE'' AS GORBACHEV DESCRIBED IT. HE SAID ''YOU WOULD SURELY AGREE THAT IT IS BETTER TO BE SITTING IN A COZY ARM CHAIR THAN ON A POWDER KEG. WHEN NUCLEAR ARMS ARE RELIED UPON AS A MEANS OF ENSURING SECURITY THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE FROM BOTH A PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW. THERE ARE CERTAINLY REALITIES, AND WE FACE THEM. BUT NOW THAT THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION IS ABOUT TO BE STARTED I INVITE YOU, MRS PRIME MINISTER, TO RECONSIDER THIS CONCEPT OF YOURS''.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

(J) GORBACHEV SAID THAT WHILE BRITAIN HAD TAKEN AN ACTIVE STAND ''LATELY, AS WE SEE IT, THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN SLACKENING-OFF ON THESE ISSUES ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH SIDE''. HE AGREED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE DECISIVE NATURE OF VERIFICATION WHICH WAS DIFFICULT. HOWEVER THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS AND SOLVE SUCH DIFFICULTIES JOINTLY WITH ITS PARTNERS IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

US INF RATIFICATION - SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE LINKAGE

(K) MRS THATCHER NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING US CONGRESS RATIFICATION OF AN INF AGREEMENT LINKED WITH THE ISSUES OF ''HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION''. A ''LITTLE POLEMIC'' ENSUED DURING WHICH GORBACHEV REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE UNDERSTANDING THEY HAD REACHED IN DECEMBER 1984 AT CHEQUERS THAT EACH SIDE WOULD RUN ITS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN LEGISLATION AND AVOID INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

FUTURE CONTACTS

(L) AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION BOTH LEADERS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THEIR CONCENTRATED, IF BRIEF, EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS AND AGREED TO CONTINUE CONTACTS IN THE FUTURE.

4. THE TASS REPORT CONCLUDED WITH VERBATIM REPORTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE TO THE PRESS AFTER THEIR MEETING BY BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV.

MRS GORBACHEVA

5. RAISA GORBACHEVA FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN THE TV COVERAGE OF THE DEPARTURE SHAKING HANDS WITH MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO. THE OFFICIAL DEPARTURE PHOTOGRAPH SHOWS HER STANDING IN THE FRONT ROW SEPARATED FROM HER HUSBAND BY GROMYKO AND RYZHKOV. DURING THE STOP OVER SHE WAS SHOWN SHAKING HANDS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND ATTENDING THE SCHOOL NATIVITY PLAY.

COMMENT

6. AS WITH THE PM'S VISIT TO THE USSR, THE SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE MANAGES BOTH TO BE POSITIVE AND TO RETAIN A DEGREE OF BALANCE (STILL BY NO MEANS THE RULE). THE TELEVISION PICTURES IN PARTICULAR WILL HAVE REINFORCED THE EXISTING IMAGE HERE OF A SERIOUS, VIGOROUS AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY.

7. SEE MIFT (TO FCO ONLY)

MARSHALL

YYYY

034023
MDADAN 8497

UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1260
OF 081629Z DECEMBER 87
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW
INFO SAVING TO BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

GORBACHEV'S STOP-OVER IN BRITAIN

SUMMARY

1. FULL COVERAGE. THE STOP-OVER IS SEEN TO CONFIRM THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH GORBACHEV AND REAGAN AND HER ROLE AS EUROPEAN SPOKESMAN. ONLY ONE OR TWO WHIFFS OF SOUR GRAPES.

DETAIL

2. THE FRENCH MEDIA (INCLUDING TELEVISION) GAVE GORBACHEV'S STOP-OVER FULL AND GENERALLY FAIR COVERAGE, WITH MUCH COMMENT MIXED IN THE FACTUAL NEWS REPORTING.

3. LIBERATION (LEFT OF CENTRE) SAYS THAT MRS THATCHER WON TWO ADVANTAGES FROM GORBACHEV'S STOP-OVER: FIRST, SHE APPEARED AGAIN AS A PRIVILEGED INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, HER FRIENDSHIP WITH GORBACHEV ECHOING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH REAGAN, AND, SECOND, THE GORBACHEV STOP-OVER UNDERLINED THAT SINCE HER MOSCOW VISIT LAST MARCH SHE HAS GRADUALLY INSTALLED HERSELF AS THE SPOKESMAN OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

4. LE MATIN (SOCIALIST) SAYS THAT GORBACHEV WILL HAVE FOUND THE VISIT USEFUL IN INFORMING HIMSELF BOTH ABOUT REAGAN'S MOOD ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT AND ABOUT THE EUROPEANS' FEELINGS. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER IT WAS A PRESTIGE OPERATION, DESTINED TO CONFIRM HER INTERNATIONAL STATURE AND HER SPECIAL INFLUENCE WITH REAGAN. IT SAYS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERLINED THE UNITY OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE BEHIND THE US AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIVIDING THE ALLIANCE. IN THIS SHE WAS ABLE TO DRAW ON THE EAST/WEST DECLARATION AGREED AT THE COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL. AS WELL AS ACTING AS A SPOKESMAN FOR EUROPE SHE SPOKE ABOUT OTHER DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, SDI, AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, NOTABLY JEWISH EMIGRATION. IT CONCLUDES THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT HAVE HAD A GREAT IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT CONFIRMED THAT EVEN

WHEN MRS THATCHER IS ONLY THE SECOND FIDDLE, SHE PLAYS HER SCORE WITH ARDOUR.

5. FIGARO (RIGHT-WING) HINTS AT FRENCH SOUR GRAPES, ADMITTING THAT THE STOP-OVER INCREASED MRS THATCHER'S PLACE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE, BUT ALSO QUOTING THE BBC AS SAYING THAT IT HAD GONE LARGELY UNREMARKED IN WASHINGTON. IT SAYS THAT GORBACHEV STOPPED IN BRITAIN TO SEEK A SORT OF EUROPEAN SEAL OF APPROVAL FOR THE INF TREATY, AND THAT MRS THATCHER, REAGAN'S BEST ALLY, AGREED WILLINGLY, ALTHOUGH SHE REPEATED HER ATTACHMENT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

6. LE MONDE'S REPORT STRIKES AN IRONIC AND MOCKING NOTE. IT SAYS THAT THE BRIZE NORTON MEETING TOOK THE PLACE OF ANY PROPER CONSULTATION OF THE EUROPEAN LEADERS: IN THE EYES OF THE SUPER-POWERS EUROPE SEEMED ONLY TO MERIT SUCH QUOTE FAST-FOOD DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 21

ADVANCE 21

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
HD/NAD

HD/SEC POL DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT
HD/DEFENCE D.
RESIDENT CLERK
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING STREET
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC(POL)SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD

NNNN

FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 December 1987

Dear Mr. Pollock,

Thank you very much for your help during Mr. Gorbachev's visit. Your skill once again played a tremendous part in the success of my meeting with the General Secretary; and both he and Mrs. Gorbachev were obviously very pleased to see you again. We had to cram a great deal of talking into a short time, which must have made your task the more difficult, but you rose splendidly to the occasion. I am most grateful.

With warm good wishes for a happy Christmas,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Richard Pollock, Esq.
c/o Modern Languages Centre, University of Bradford,
Richmond Road, Bradford, BD7 1DP

FILE
AA

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 December 1987

Dear Mr. McCutcheon,

I am most grateful to you, and to all the staff and pupils of Edith Moorhouse Primary School for the very warm welcome which you gave Mrs. Gorbachev yesterday. She clearly enjoyed every minute of her visit, which helped make it a day to remember for her - and I hope for all of you.

With best wishes to you all for a Happy Christmas,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Brian McCutcheon, Esq.
Headmaster, Edith Moorhouse Primary School, Carterton, Oxon.

FLE
MJ

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 December 1987

Dear Group Captain Lumb.

May I say how immensely grateful I am for the magnificent way in which RAF Brize Norton rose to the challenge of Mr Gorbachev's visit. The arrangements were outstandingly good and reflect enormous credit on all those concerned. It must have been a considerable diversion from your normal duties. But I hope it was also some satisfaction to know that you have contributed to such an historic event. Few of you probably imagined that the Soviet leader and his wife would one day be your guests. But your hospitality was remarkable, and I know that they left happy at the success of their brief visit and the warmth of the welcome they received.

It was particularly generous of you to present the really beautiful pieces of silver to Mrs Gorbachev and to me. They will be a lasting record of a unique occasion.

I should be grateful if you could pass on my warm thanks to all those concerned for their excellent work, together with my best wishes for a Happy Christmas.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Group Captain C. P. Lumb, O.B.E., R.A.F.
Station Commander, RAF Brize Norton, Oxford ~~OX8 3LX~~

FILE
DA

c Bn

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 December 1987

Dear Emma,

Thank you very much for presenting the flowers so prettily to Mrs. Gorbachev yesterday. It made a lovely welcome for her. I hope that you found it exciting, and did not get too cold. I expect you have seen your picture in many of the papers. That will be something to treasure all your life.

With best wishes for a Happy Christmas,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Miss Emma Parker
c/o RAF Brize Norton, Oxford, OX8 3LX

FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Personal Minute
No. MIS/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

I am most grateful to all the members of your Department concerned with the arrangements for Mr. Gorbachev's visit for their efforts, and above all to the Royal Air Force who performed magnificently. I am writing to the Station Commander to express my thanks. But I should like you to know how very thankful I am for what can truly be described as an outstanding effort, which reflects credit not just on those concerned but on the country as a whole.

Margaret Thatcher

8 December 1987

FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

Personal Minute
No. M14/87

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

I am very grateful to all those members of your Department who worked to make a success of Mr. Gorbachev's brief visit. The arrangements were outstanding and reflect great credit on all those involved, both in the Soviet Department, Protocol Department and elsewhere. So too was the level of support for the talks, in terms both of briefing and interpretation. It was a job very well done of which all concerned can be proud: a good day for Britain. Please thank all of them on my behalf.

Margaret Thatcher

8 December 1987

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

7 December 1987

From the Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV

The Prime Minister has briefed President Reagan personally on the outcome of her talks with Mr Gorbachev and I have briefed the US Embassy here. Points on which Sir Antony Acland can draw in Washington, and Mr Alexander can use in briefing Permanent Representatives in NATO are:-

(i) the Prime Minister found Mr Gorbachev in lively and confident form. There was nothing in his manner or in what he said to suggest that he was in any sort of difficulty at home. He was very clearly determined to press ahead with internal reforms. His enthusiasm for these seemed in no way diminished.

(ii) Mr Gorbachev was obviously very pleased about the INF agreement. The Prime Minister told him of her full support for it. She also warned him of the possible difficulties over ratification by the United States' Senate. The best way to overcome these difficulties would be for Mr Gorbachev to be as forthcoming as he could on human rights and Afghanistan. She herself raised both matters with him, underlining that the impression he made in the United States would depend crucially on what he could offer on these two points. His reaction had been quite touchy.

(iii) the Prime Minister found Mr Gorbachev optimistic on the prospects for a START agreement. She spoke of the need for the Soviet Union to come forward with credible proposals for verification of limits on mobile ICBMs. Mr Gorbachev had left a clear impression that he believed the problems over this could be overcome.

(iv) Mr Gorbachev gave high priority to negotiations for reductions in conventional forces. He would also press hard in Washington for an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons. He suggested that British enthusiasm for this had been dampened by the United States. The Prime Minister made clear the very real problems of verification, but had repeated her commitment to seek agreement.

(v) it was noteworthy that, in discussing SDI, Mr Gorbachev made no linkage with the START negotiations. The Prime Minister renewed her proposal that there should be agreement on a period of several years during which neither party would withdraw from the ABM treaty and each side would spell out the nature of the research which it intended to pursue. This would give the reassurance of predictability, which should allow START negotiations to go ahead. Mr Gorbachev asked how such an arrangement could be verified. The Prime Minister replied that there was no way in which research could be verified or constrained. But a combination of a commitment not to deploy strategic defences without negotiation, a lengthy period during which both sides committed themselves not to withdraw from the ABM treaty and mutual information on research plans should provide adequate assurance against unexpected developments or a break-out.

(vi) the Prime Minister stressed the continuing role of nuclear weapons in defence, and made clear that the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons would not be included in any of the current negotiations. They were an irreducible minimum for effective deterrence.

(vii) the Prime Minister welcomed progress in the Soviet Union on human rights, but pressed Mr Gorbachev to step up the Soviet Union's performance, citing in particular permission for greater numbers of Jewish people to emigrate, family reunification and changes in repressive laws in the Soviet Union. Mr Gorbachev was prickly in response but said that the Soviet Union would continue to proceed on the lines which they thought right.

(viii) the Prime Minister also raised Afghanistan urging the Soviet Union to withdraw in 1988. Mr Gorbachev accused the United Kingdom and the United States of making Soviet withdrawal more difficult by supplying arms to the rebels. If that ceased, all the components of a solution would be to hand.

(ix) the Prime Minister's dominant impressions were

of Mr Gorbachev's commitment to continue the process of perestroika and glasnost, his optimism about the prospects for a START agreement, his acceptance of the step by step approach to arms control, and the degree to which he seemed to be looking for ways to manage the problem of strategic defence rather than making it a bar to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Mr Gorbachev seemed genuinely ready for further arms control agreements. There was no signs of diminished self-confidence or vigour on Gorbachev's part. He was clearly looking forward to his visit to Washington.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Charles Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

7 December 1987

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT cc MASTER

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV: TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

The Prime Minister telephoned President Reagan on her return to Downing Street from Brize Norton to give him an account of her meeting with Mr Gorbachev.

The Prime Minister said that she had found Mr Gorbachev in lively and confident form. There was nothing in his manner or in what he said to suggest that he was in any sort of difficulty at home. He was very clearly determined to press ahead with internal reforms. His enthusiasm for these seemed in no way diminished.

The Prime Minister continued that Mr Gorbachev was obviously very pleased about the INF agreement. She had told him of her support for it. She had also warned him of the possible difficulties over ratification by the United States' Senate. The best way to overcome these difficulties would be for Mr Gorbachev to be as forthcoming as he could on human rights and Afghanistan. She had herself raised both matters with him, underlining that the impression he made in the United States would depend crucially on what he could offer on these two points. His reaction had been quite touchy.

The Prime Minister continued that she had found Mr Gorbachev optimistic on the prospects for a START agreement. She had made the point about the need for the Soviet Union to come forward with credible proposals for verification of limits on mobile ICBMs. Mr Gorbachev had left a clear impression that he believed the problems over this could be overcome. He had clearly attached high priority to negotiations for reductions in conventional forces and was also likely to press hard for an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons. He had suggested that British enthusiasm for this had been dampened by the United States. She had made clear the very real problems of verification, but had repeated her commitment to seek agreement. It had been noteworthy that, in discussing SDI, Mr Gorbachev had not made any linkage with the START negotiations. She had

herself renewed her proposal that there should be agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty and that each side should be ready to spell out the nature of the research which it intended to pursue. This would give the reassurance of predictability, which should allow START negotiations to go ahead. Mr Gorbachev had asked how such an arrangement could be verified. She had replied that there was no way in which research could be verified or constrained. But a combination of a commitment not to deploy strategic defences without negotiation, a lengthy period during which both sides committed themselves not to withdraw from the ABM treaty and mutual information on research plans should provide adequate assurance against unexpected developments.

The Prime Minister said that her dominant impressions were of Mr Gorbachev's commitment to continue the process of perestroika and glasnost, his optimism about the prospects for a START agreement, his acceptance of the step by step approach to arms control, and the degree to which he seemed to be looking for ways to manage the problem of strategic defences rather than making it a bar to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister continued that she believed that Mr Gorbachev was genuinely ready for further arms control agreements. He both wanted and needed them. She thought he was a man with a sense of history and was genuinely prepared to work for improved East/West relations in a new spirit of co-operation. The President should tackle him on human rights matters but must be prepared for a sharp reaction. She wanted to stress again that there was no signs of diminished confidence on Gorbachev's part. He was clearly looking forward to his visit to Washington.

The President said that he was grateful for the Prime Minister's extensive report. He had been looking forward to some tough sessions with Mr Gorbachev, but the Prime Minister had clearly softened him up. She had covered a great deal of ground. He wondered whether she would like to come over and sit in on his meetings. The Prime Minister said that the President should speak very frankly to Mr Gorbachev, while at the same time showing understanding for some of the problems and difficulties which he faced. He responded well to friendship.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister had raised the incident in Moscow in which the KGB had attacked Jewish demonstrators. The Prime Minister said that she had not done so. When asked by the press about it, she had described it as a tragic incident but had said that one setback should not detract from the larger goal of seeing real progress on human rights.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister thought that he should try to get on first name terms with Mr Gorbachev. The Prime Minister advised him to go very gently on this. Her own impression was that, while frank and open in his manner of talking, Mr Gorbachev was quite

formal and of course the Soviet system encouraged this tendency.

The Prime Minister suggested that she and the President should talk further after Mr Gorbachev's visit to Washington. The President agreed.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Charles Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2545 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Powell to Gadsworthy dated 7 December 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	16 March 2017 CWayland
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SECRET

17

FILE
DA
PE

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 December 1987

SUBJECT cc MASTER

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

The Prime Minister had a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev when he stopped at Brize Norton today, on his way to the US/Soviet Summit in Washington. They talked together for just over an hour, with only Mr. Chernayev and me present. They continued their discussion over lunch. I have had a brief account of this latter talk from the Prime Minister. Mr. Pollock, who interpreted, will do a fuller note. The Prime Minister has subsequently spoken to President Reagan on the telephone and given him a full account of her meeting. I am recording their conversation separately.

General

The talk with Mr. Gorbachev was very lively and vigorous. Mr. Gorbachev was in high good humour although he bristled rather when the discussion turned to human rights and Afghanistan. Since both he and the Prime Minister were determined to say a great deal in a relatively short time, not everything they said was interpreted once the general drift became clear. Now and again both were talking at the same time. Recording their remarks was therefore rather more difficult than usual.

Developments in the Soviet Union

The Prime Minister showed Mr. Gorbachev that she had a copy of his book on perestroika. Mr. Gorbachev said he would send her another, which he would dedicate to her personally. It was not so much a book as a collection of thoughts and reflections. The Prime Minister would recognise many of the ideas in it because they had emerged from his discussions with her. The Prime Minister said she had already read much of the book and saw it as a testament to Mr. Gorbachev's hopes.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he appreciated the Prime Minister's public comments about perestroika. He knew that it reflected serious and constructive interest on her part. Although the two of them belonged to different social and political systems, he had found that they were able to have remarkably good and vivid exchanges about common problems.

The Prime Minister said that talking freely was the best way to get rid of misunderstandings. Mr. Gorbachev continued that he wanted to say to the Prime Minister personally, since there was a rather special relationship based on mutual sympathy between them, that he was ready to go a very long way indeed with the policy of perestroika. There was a clear consensus on this in the Soviet leadership. Certain things led to debate or even dispute. That was only natural. They concerned the priorities, the tempo and the methods of perestroika but not the basic objective. He was determined to bring about far-reaching change and a process of democratization. There had been attempts in the past to break away from the mould established by Stalin, of which the boldest was that of Kruschev. But his reforms, and those in Brezhnev's time, had failed because they were essentially only half measures. They had not gone far enough and had any way affected only the people at the top. This time he was trying to make changes irreversible by involving all members of society in them through the process of democratization, economic reform and decentralization. He was trying to get down to the level of the individual and involve him directly in reform. At the same time, he had to be careful not to cause havoc.

The Prime Minister said there were two sorts of politicians: those who ran up against problems and simply stopped: and those who drove through the problems to grasp the opportunities which lay beyond them. In her experience it was vital to keep going in the direction you had chosen and not to be put off because of criticism. Criticism and problems always emerged long before the benefits of bold policies. She had noticed that Mr. Gorbachev was constantly explaining his objectives to the people. She was sure this was right. Mr. Gorbachev interjected that the Prime Minister's understanding was remarkable. The Prime Minister continued that her own first two years in office had been the most trying but she had pressed on. The most difficult undertaking of all was to change people's attitudes.

Mr. Gorbachev said that, when he was asked if there was opposition to his line, he always replied that the most serious opposition was that which came from from the old psychology. He had to change attitudes. The next two or three years would undoubtedly be difficult. The Prime Minister said that she found it irritating that the exponents of the old psychology in the Soviet Union were described as conservatives. She wanted nothing to do with Mr. Gorbachev's conservatives. (Mr. Gorbachev thought this a tremendous joke.) Recent visitors to the Soviet Union had told her there was a very different feeling in the country. Mr. Gorbachev said that there was a great deal of debate and ferment within the Communist party about the application of perestroika. Some of the reports about progress with it had been judged inadequate and thrown out. A number of local party leaders had been relieved of their duties. There were interesting processes afoot which he was trying to stimulate. He genuinely believed that Soviet society was coming out of its state of social apathy. This was vital for the success of

perestroika. That said, he did not agree with everything that was happening and was having to fight against certain trends.

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Gorbachev was getting the support of sufficient enthusiasts at the local level to motivate others. Mr. Gorbachev said that they were becoming more numerous every month. There had been hesitations at first but now active people were coming forward. Next year's party conference would be a very important event. It would have to answer two questions: were the policies of perestroika working? And what further measures were needed to extend democracy? The conference would decide major steps in this latter field. At the moment the Soviet Union had the democracy of assemblies. But democracy needed a proper legal foundation to make it irreversible. The Prime Minister recalled that she had recently seen Academician Aganbegyan, Academician Marchuk and Mr. Tolstykh. Yes, said Mr. Gorbachev, they told me that you had subjected them to pretty rigorous examination. They were supposed to share with you as fully as possible our thinking on change in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that she had indeed found the discussions very useful.

Bilateral relations

Mr. Gorbachev said that mention of these visits led him on to relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. Certain things seemed to be preventing economic and commercial relations from developing at the pace on which he and the Prime Minister had agreed during her visit to Moscow. The Prime Minister said that trade was not increasing as rapidly as it should. We were particularly concerned about the lack of progress with the project for an automatic process controller at Yerevan. A letter of intent had been signed during her visit but there was still no contract.
Mr. Gorbachev said that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Kamentsev on the aircraft. He thought that he could say with confidence that the period of argument was coming to an end. In that case the period of action can start, rejoined the Prime Minister. Mr. Gorbachev continued that British companies must be competitive. They had lost several contracts because they had submitted bids which were simply not competitive enough. The Soviet Union was rapidly learning the laws of competition. The Prime Minister said that our exports elsewhere were doing very well. Mr. Gorbachev said once again that he had discussed all this with Mr. Kamentsev. When he had asked Mr. Kamentsev what he should say to the Prime Minister, Mr. Kamentsev had told him to say that the agreement reached in Moscow to increase the volume of trade by 40% was attainable and realistic. The Prime Minister said that we would persist.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he was pleased with the development of Anglo-Soviet relations on the broader front. The Prime Minister said that she was keen to keep up the momentum. She would like there to be a new spirit in these relations in the remaining years of the century.
Mr. Gorbachev said that he appreciated and estimated highly

the Prime Minister's position on many major international problems. Of course there were differences, but then there were differences even within the Politburo on some matters (and in the Cabinet said the Prime Minister). But overall he thought there was a high degree of understanding between them on international matters.

Arms control

The Prime Minister said that she and her fellow heads of government in Western Europe were fully behind the INF agreement. There appeared to be some doubters in the United States, but she had made clear her own full support for the agreement. It would be a very important step forward. Mr. Gorbachev said that he was pleased to hear the Prime Minister's statement. The agreement had been a joint endeavour. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had negotiated with the agreement and support of their allies. That was the right way to do it. He could not answer for the United States, but the Soviet Union would never do anything to damage Europe. The Soviet Union was part of Europe, and if the world was to move from confrontation to co-operation, then Europe would have a unique role. He wanted to put on record formally that the Soviet Union would not take a single step to infringe Europe's security or to destabilise it.

The Prime Minister said that she and Mr. Gorbachev were at one in believing that every country had to safeguard its defence. But if greater trust could be built up, adequate defence could be found with lower levels of forces and weapons than existed at present. The crucial point was that reductions should be balanced so that neither side felt more vulnerable or less secure because of them. Moreover reductions needed to cover the whole spectrum of weapons. Mr. Gorbachev said that he agreed entirely with the Prime Minister. That was one reason why the Soviet Union had proposed negotiations to reduce conventional forces. He could not understand why the West was - to use a Russian expression - rushing around like a cat round hot porridge in Vienna. It had proved possible to solve the problem of reducing minimum and shorter range nuclear missiles. It should be possible to do the same with conventional forces. He intended to press President Reagan hard on this issue.

The Prime Minister said that she would set out her thoughts on the way ahead in arms control. We very much welcomed the verification measures which had been included in the INF agreement. They were unprecedented and a great step forward. Mr. Gorbachev interjected that they were indeed a very important achievement, not least because they would build up experience which would be crucial for verifying an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons. Effective verification would be even more important for that. The Prime Minister continued that she had talked to Mr. Carlucci recently and had the impression that the prospects for a START agreement were promising, although there were still differences on sub-limits. A particular problem for the Americans was that of verifying mobile ICBMs. She hoped that

Mr. Gorbachev would be taking new proposals on this to Washington because otherwise the negotiations might run into serious difficulty. Mr. Gorbachev interjected that the Americans had mobile missiles, in their case in submarines. They had their concerns, the Soviet Union had its own worries. The Prime Minister continued that submarines were of course mobile. But SLBMs were second strike weapons and anyway the Soviet Union had them too. Mobile, land-based missiles were destablising weapons and it was therefore particularly important to find ways of putting limits on them and verifying those limits. Her own view was that we should be putting behind us notions such as first strike weapons and entering a new period. She very much hoped that an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic nuclear weapons could be reached. Mr. Gorbachev said that he was confident the problems the Prime Minister had described could be overcome and an agreement would be reached.

The Prime Minister went on that we would nonetheless need to keep a certain number of nuclear weapons for deterrence. They had proved themselves the most effective means of preventing war. Mr. Gorbachev said that this was a course which he and the Prime Minister had been round before. After they had discussed it last time he had thought to himself: does she prefer talking in easy chairs or sitting on a powder keg? His own preference was for an easy chair. If you were sitting on a powder keg you would constantly worry that it might blow up. It was morally wrong to rely on nuclear weapons for defence. He accepted that the reality was that nuclear weapons existed. Both East and West had embarked on the right road of reducing them. He still hoped that the Prime Minister would change her way of thinking about nuclear weapons. He wanted to emphasise that he was speaking in a very friendly and not a hostile way. The Prime Minister said that chemical and conventional weapons were no less a powder keg than nuclear weapons. If there were ever a conventional war in Europe again it would cause destruction and mayhem on a scale never before known. Mr. Gorbachev agreed. That was why he proposed tackling those weapons. He was not defending conventional war or conventional weapons. The Prime Minister said that if a town was destroyed by bombs, the people in it would not say "three cheers our town was obliterated by conventional bombs not nuclear bombs". The fact was that you could not disinvent nuclear weapons. It was better to recognise this and keep a number of such weapons to deter war of any sort. That was why the United Kingdom would keep an irreducible minimum nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Gorbachev said he wanted to put a direct question to the Prime Minister. At what point would the United Kingdom join in nuclear disarmament? The Prime Minister said that we would certainly not do so yet. We had only four submarines carrying nuclear weapons, which meant that generally there were only two on station. That was close to an irreducible minimum. Negotiations to reduce Soviet and American nuclear weapons would have to go very much further than the 50% reductions envisaged at present before we could consider including our own nuclear weapons in the negotiations.

Moreover we had to take account of the possibility that other countries would obtain nuclear weapons over the next decade. Mr. Gorbachev said that the Prime Minister had given him rather a roundabout answer. The Prime Minister said that was not her intention. The point she wanted to make was that we were determined to retain a last resort deterrent and it was hard to see how it could be significantly less than what we now had. But if the Soviet Union and the United States were eventually to reduce their nuclear weapons by much more than 50%, then obviously we would have to consider whether we should also contribute to the process.

The Prime Minister said that she and Mr. Gorbachev seemed to be agreed that the next priorities were a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations to get rid of the grave imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour in chemical and conventional forces. We would work for that. But she was concerned about the difficulties of verifying an agreement on chemical weapons. Mr. Gorbachev said that the Prime Minister was making a very important statement about chemical weapons. He agreed that these weapons were frightful. The Soviet Union wanted to get rid of theirs. There had been good co-operation with the United Kingdom in the negotiations about this and the Soviet Union had supported various British initiatives, changing its own position in the process. But he was puzzled why we suddenly seemed to have lost momentum. Was someone preventing us from following our ideas to their logical conclusion? The Prime Minister said that the problem lay with the difficulties of verification to which she had referred. But we continued to attach importance to an agreement on chemical weapons and it was vital to get down to further negotiations. Mr. Gorbachev commented that he would be pressing this matter in the United States.

The Prime Minister said she also wanted to mention strategic defence. It was a step forward that Mr. Gorbachev had admitted publicly that the Soviet Union was also doing research. It would be wrong to allow this exploration by both sides of the possibility of strategic defence to block a START agreement. She thought that a solution could be found on the lines that she had suggested when she had been in Moscow in March. Both sides needed stability and predictability. She did not believe there was any serious likelihood that the United States would deploy an SDI system by 1994 as some had suggested. The right course was to agree a period of years during which neither side would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It was up to the Americans and Russians, not to her, to put a figure on that. At the same time both sides should spell out their intentions in the field of research, so they could both see that there were no nasty surprises in store.
Mr. Gorbachev asked how it would be possible to verify that neither side was concealing anything. The Prime Minister said that you could not verify research. But each side would have the assurance of a detailed statement of the other's research intentions and of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Taken together these should create sufficient confidence.
Mr. Gorbachev said that he had two important questions to pose. Did the United Kingdom still regard the militarization

of space as impermissible? And had we changed our view on the importance of strict observance of the ABM Treaty? The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, she was stressing the continuing importance of the ABM Treaty and suggesting that the period of notice required before withdrawal from it should be extended. Moreover, it was accepted that there would have to be negotiations before deployment of a strategic defence system. Her aim was to get to a position in which it was clear that neither side would act suddenly or unilaterally. Mr. Gorbachev said that the United Kingdom should take a balanced view of this problem and not lean towards the United States' side. The Prime Minister should also help the Soviet Union preserve its interests. In any event, the period of seven years proposed by the Americans for non-withdrawal was too short. The Prime Minister said that the fact was that research would be done, to the point of establishing the feasibility of strategic defence. There was no point in trying to stop it or constrain it. The right way was to create confidence about each side's intentions and minimise the likelihood of a break-out.

Human Rights and Afghanistan

The Prime Minister said that doubts were being expressed by some members of the US Senate about the INF Treaty. In her view the Senate would ratify the agreement but it would take strenuous efforts by the Administration to achieve that. The best way in which the Soviet Union could help these efforts would be to step up the improvements in human rights which Mr. Gorbachev had already begun to implement and by setting an early date for withdrawal from Afghanistan. An improvement in human rights' performance was the way to win the hearts and minds of the American people. She recognised that greater numbers of people were being allowed to leave the Soviet Union, although the figure was still well short of that of the late 1970s. But the more Mr. Gorbachev was able to do on emigration, family reunification and relaxation of repressive laws in the Soviet Union, the better. In the case of Afghanistan, she recognised the difficulties of withdrawal and accepted that Mr. Gorbachev genuinely wanted the Soviet Union to leave. She hoped that he would have the courage to take that step in 1988.

Mr. Gorbachev, who by now was getting very restless, said that a solution in Afghanistan would be made easier if the United Kingdom would stop supplying the rebels with missiles which they used to shoot down civilian aircraft, and if the United States were similarly to stop supplying weapons. Then all the components of a solution would be in hand. As for human rights, he recalled the reply which he had given when he had been challenged about this when talking to British Members of Parliament in 1984. Each country should concern itself with its own affairs. The Soviet authorities would continue to proceed on the lines which they thought right. He was glad that the Prime Minister had noted the changes which had been made.

Further visit

The Prime Minister said that she very much hoped that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev would return for a full visit to the United Kingdom, perhaps next year. Mr. Gorbachev said that they would very much like to come and that next year might be possible, although he was not at present able to say exactly when it might be.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robert Armstrong, with the proviso that it should receive a very limited circulation. I am copying the section on trade to Alison Brimelow. Copies of the whole letter may be shown, on a personal basis, to Sir Antony Acland and Sir Bryan Cartledge.

yours ever,

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ANNEX I

DRAFT SPEAKING NOTE:

PRESS CONFERENCE

It has been a great pleasure to meet Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev again and to have a talk with Mr. Gorbachev, if only for two hours, on his way to what will be an historic summit in Washington.

We are, after all, on the eve of the first ever agreement between the major powers to reduce, and indeed eliminate, certain classes of nuclear weapons.

As one who has discussed the approach to this agreement with both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, I shall share their sense of achievement tomorrow.

My concern, therefore, in picking up my long talks with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow at the end of March was primarily to look forward to see how we can build on an INF agreement, and

to look forward in two ways:

- first, to how we can develop East/West relations to secure further reductions in armaments and forces on the basis of mutual confidence; and

- second, to hear from Mr. Gorbachev of the progress he is making with his historic and courageous undertaking in the Soviet

Union - namely Perestroika, the restructuring of Soviet society to try to make the system delivered more for the Russian people.

I must say that, as on previous occasions, I have had a thoroughly valuable and of course stimulating discussion with Mr. Gorbachev. We have ranged widely under the two broad headings also to take in:

- human rights, where I welcomed what has been done but pressed for more;

- Afghanistan, where I expressed the hope that there would be a Soviet withdrawal;

- the Middle East, where I pressed an international conference as the right way forward;

- Anglo/Soviet trade, which we both pledged to develop when I was in Moscow.

You all know my position - as indeed does Mr. Gorbachev - as a staunch and loyal ally of the United States within NATO and in no way a go-between.

That is the whole basis of our very frank but very friendly discussions.

And in looking forward to the development of the arms control process, I made broadly four points:

(i) I want Mr. Gorbachev's summit with President Reagan to be a success and I welcome very much indeed the INF agreement they intend to sign tomorrow;

(ii) I see as the next steps a START agreement cutting strategic nuclear weapons by 50%, the elimination of chemical weapons and the establishment of a conventional balance;

(iii) I see no scope for further reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe until there is a balance in conventional forces and chemical weapons have been eliminated;

(iv) as I said in Moscow on 30 March I support SDI, and I see the most promising way forward here towards a START agreement as a commitment by the USA and the USSR not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period, together with forecasts by both sides of their intended research programmes.

This, I believe, would provide the necessary mutual confidence for another

step forward in the arms control process.

Mr. Gorbachev, I am sure, appreciated what I had to say, and I found his account of Perestroika fascinating.

He is a decisive, determined and courageous leader, and I hope that he succeeds in his colossal task, for in doing so that will enlarge human freedom and happiness.

The Foreign Secretary has had similarly useful and interesting talks with Mr. Shevardnadze, and I am delighted that Mrs. Gorbachev has apparently enjoyed her visit to a nearby school, where I am sure they have had a day they will never forget.

I hope that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev will return soon for a longer visit.

We shall be delighted to see them.

RESTRICTED

VISIT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MRS. GORBACHEVA

RAF Brize Norton
7 December 1987

RESTRICTED

Page

Programme	English	1, 2
List of Participants and Programme	Russian	3, 4, 5
Guard of Honour Diagram		6
Car Plan		7, 8, 9
Press Arrangements		10
Medical Arrangements		11
Map and Route to Brize Norton ..... and Plan of Officers' Mess		12, 13
Useful Telephone Numbers		14

PROGRAMME

1135 hours	Arrive Royal Air Force Station Brize Norton by special flight IL 62M aircraft from Moscow
	Met by the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe MP, and the Station Commander RAF Brize Norton, Group Captain Chris Lumb OBE RAF
	Bouquets will be presented to Mrs Gorbacheva by a pupil from the Soviet Embassy School and Miss Emma Palmer from the Carterton Primary School
	Guard of Honour found by The Queen's Colour Squadron, Royal Air Force under the command of Squadron Leader Roger Booth RAF, supported by the Central Band of the Royal Air Force under the direction of the Director of Music Wing Commander Eric Banks MBE FLCM LRAM ARCM LGSM, Royal Air Force
1140 hours	Depart airfield for Officers' Mess
1145 hours	Arrive Officers' Mess
	Refreshments will be served
	(See following page for Mrs Gorbacheva's programme)
1150 hours	Talks between the Prime Minister, and The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1150 hours	The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will hold separate talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1250-1320 hours	Luncheon
1322 hours	Press statement
1330 hours	Depart Officers Mess
	RAF Ceremonial Carpet Guard
1335 hours	Depart Royal Air Force Brize Norton The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, accompanied by the Station Commander, Group Captain Lumb, will bid farewell

PROGRAMME FOR MRS GORBACHEVA

1135 hours	Arrive Royal Air Force Station Brize Norton
	Please see programme for the General Secretary until:
1150 hours	Depart Officers' Mess accompanied by Secretary of State for Education and Science, Mrs Zamyatina, Miss Horner, Mr Lagutin and Mr Krasnov
1200 hours	Arrive Edith Moorhouse Primary School, Carterton
	Met by Headmaster: Mr Brian McCutcheon
1205-1215 hours	View Christmas Play and meet the children and teachers
1215 hours	Visit classrooms to see various activities
1235 hours	Depart School
1245 hours	Arrive Officers' Mess
	Please see General Secretary's programme for luncheon and departure arrangements

ПРИНИМАЮЩИЕ УЧАСТИЕ С АНГЛИЙСКОЙ СТОРОНЫ

Госпожа МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР, Премьер-министр

Сэр ДЖЕФФРИ ХАУ, Министр Иностранных Дел и по делам Содружества

Господин Дж. Янгер, Министр Обороны

Господин К. Бейкер, Министр Образования и Науки

Господин А.Кларк, Министр Торговли

Господин Д. Мэллор,Заместитель министра иностранных дел

Сэр Джон Фильдхаус, Начальник комитета начальников штабов

Сэр Джон Фретуэлл, Политический Директор,МИД

Сэр Брайен Картледж, Посол Великобритании в Москве

Господин Ч.Пауэлл, Советник Премьер-министра по внешней политике

Господин Б.Фоулл, Старший советник по вопросам контроля над вооружениями,МИД

Господин Д. Рэтфорд,Старший советник по европейским делам,МИД

Господин С.Химанс,Глава Советского Отдела,МИД

Господин Х.Мейер, Глава Отдела Печати,МИД

ПРОГРАММА

11.35	Прибытие из Москвы в авиационную станцию Королевских ВВС "Брайз Нортон" советским спетцсамолетом ИЛ 62М
	Гостей встречают их Превосходительства госпожа Маргарет Тэтчер,Премьер-министр Великобритании, сэр Джеффри Хау,Министр Иностранных Дел и по делам Содружества,и Полковник авиации Лэм,Командир станции
	Гостям преподносят букеты ученик школы советского посольства и госпожа э.Палмер,ученица из начальной школы села Картертон
	Почетный караул Королевского авиационного полка во главе с Майором авиации Буф, с главным оркестром Королевских ВВС во главе с Подполковником авиации Бэнкс
11.40	Отъезд из аэродрома
11.45	Прибытие в офицерскую столовую Предлагаются освежающие напитки
	(Программа госпожи Горбачевой на следующей странице)
11.50	Беседа Премьера-министра Великобритании с Генеральным секретарем ЦК КПСС
11.50	Отдельная беседа Министра Иностранных Дел и по делам Содружества с Министром Иностранных Дел СССР
12.50-13.20	Завтрак
13.22	Сообщение для прессы
13.30	Отъезд из офицерской столовой
	Гостей к трапу самолета провожает поцетный караул Королевских ВВС
13.35	Отлет из авиационной станции "Брайз Нортон" после официальной церемонии проводов с участием Премьер-министра, Министра Иностранных Дел и по делам Содружества, и Полковника авиации Лэм

ПРОГРАММА ГОСПОЖИ ГОРБАЧЕВОЙ

11.35	Прибытие в авиационную станцию "Брайз Нортон"
	Дальше по программе Генерального секретаря вплоть до:
11.50	Отъезд из офицерской столовой в сопровождении Министра Образования и Науки Великобритании, госпожи Замятиной, госпожи Хорнер, и господина Лагутина
12.00	Прибытие в начальную школу имени Эдит Мурхауз,в селе Картертон Гостей встречает Директор школы господин Брайен МкКэтчен
12.05-12.15	Посещение рождественского спектакля,исполняемого учениками школы.Встречи с учителями
12.15	Посещение различных занятий в школе
12.35	Отъезд из школы
12.45	Прибытие в офицерскую столовую
	Организация завтрака и отлета-- по программе Генерального секретаря

DETAILED PARKING PLAN

FOR VVIP AIRCRAFT



REVISED

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER 1987
1ST CONVOY

SOURCE	VEHICLE NUMBER	PASSENGERS
RAF	1	RAF Provost 2 Soviet Protection Officers Mr Powell
Daimler (No 10 Driver)	2	PM, Mr Gorbachev, 1 MPSB Mr Uspensky (Interpreter) 1 Soviet Protection Officer
MPSB Police Back Up (Armoured RR)	3	1 MPSB 2 Soviet Protection Officers
Hired Daimler	4	Chief Soviet Security Officer 1 MPSB 2 Soviet Doctors 1 Soviet Communications Officer
Daimler (Police Driver)	5	Mrs Gorbacheva, Sir Geoffrey Howe 1 MPSB, 1 Soviet Protection Officer Interpreter (Soviet) Miss Horner
MPSB Police Back Up	6	1 MPSB 2 Soviet Protection Officers
RAF	7	RAF Provost Mr Smagin Mrs Morrison Mr Chernyaev

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER 1987 (Cont'd)
2ND CONVOY

RAF	8	RAF Provost
Hired Daimler	9	Mr Shevardnaze Soviet Ambassador 1 MPSB 1 Soviet Protection Officer
MPSB	10	PMs Car
Hired Daimler	11	Mr Boldin Mr Yakovlev 1 MPSB 1 Soviet Protection Officer
Hired Daimler	12	Mr Dobrynin 1 MPSB Mrs Zamyatina 1 Soviet Protection Officer
Hired Daimler	13	Marshal Akhromeyev 1 Soviet Protection Officer
Hired Daimler	14	1 Soviet Protection Officer Mr Kamentsev
Hired Daimler	15	1 Soviet Protection Officer Mr Kruchina Mr Gusenkov
Hired Daimler	16	Spare

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER 1987
2ND CONVOY (Cont'd)

Hired Daimler	17	Spare
RAF	18	RAF Provost 2 Soviet Protection Officers

PRESS FACILITIES

1. Admission by accreditation only.

2. Press Centre established at Airport Terminal.

3. Fixed position photocall for arrival and departure of aircraft.

4. Limited fixed position photocall (pool arrangement) inside Officer's Mess before talks begin.

5. Fixed position photocall (pool arrangements) outside Officers' Mess with stand-up microphone for end of talk statements

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS

An emergency medical facility will be established in one room of the Officers' Mess VIP suite. There will be a medical team present with comprehensive resuscitation equipment. The team will consist of a Senior Medical Officer, Consultant Anaesthetist, Nursing Officer, Operating Theatre Technician, Flight Nursing Attendant plus a doctor from the visiting party in attendance.

In the event of an emergency requiring transfer to hospital a Puma helicopter parked on the hard-standing outside the mess will be used. A back-up Puma and a Chinook will be held in reserve near the Air Terminal.

PA RAF Hospital Wroughton will be the hospital of choice but should the nature of the emergency be such that highly specialised treatment (eg neurosurgery) is required, the John Radcliffe Hospital Oxford will be used. The decision as to which hospital will be chosen will be taken at the time by the Senior Medical Officer.

The senior staff at both hospitals will be briefed by the Senior Medical Officer. Landing sites have already been reconoitred by the helicopter aircrew.

There will also be 2 ambulances on standby behind the Officers' Mess.

Additionally, SMO RAF Brize Norton will maintain the station medical services at an increased alert state during take offs and landings.

If a disaster occurs, the Station disaster plan will be activated.





USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Protocol Department	01-210 6366
Soviet Department	01-270 2420
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 13 Kensington Palace Gardens, W8	01-229 3628/9, 2666 and 6412

RAF Brize Norton

Station Telephone Exchange	0993-842551
Station Commander - Gp Capt Lumb	x 460
OC Ops Wg - Wg Cdr David Calvert (Operations Room from 0630 on Monday 7 December)	x 551/2/4
OC Admin Wg - Wg Cdr Tony Banks	x 462
Senior Medical Officer Wg Cdr Chris Abbott	x 254/256
Officers' Mess	x 6020/1/2

Hospitals

RAF Hospital Wroughton Commanding Officer Air Cdr Pallister	0973-812291 x 200
John Radcliffe Infirmary General Manager Mr Stapleton	0865 817690
Edith Moorhouse Primary School Carterton	0993 842372
Ministry of Defence Protocol Office	218-6510
Department of Trade & Industry 1 Victoria Street, SW1	215-7877
Department of Education and Science Elizabeth House, York Road, SE1	934-9000
Cabinet Office 70 Whitehall, SW1	270-3000

DISTRIBUTION

No 10 Downing Street

Private Secretary (2)
Press Office (10)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (40)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (3)
PS/PUS
PS/Mr Mellor (2)
PS/Sir John Fretwell (2)
Sir D Miers (2)
Mr Ratford
Mr Fall
Mr Hemans
Soviet Department (Mr Holmes) (10)
News Department:
  Mr Meyer (2)
  Miss Pegler (6)
Research Department (Mr Bishop) (2)
Protocol Department (10)
Colonel Durrant (6)
Resident Clerk (2)
Mrs McBride
GHF

Cabinet Office

Mr Nicholson (2)

Department of Trade and Industry

PS/Mr Clark (2)

Department of Science and Education

PS/Mr Baker (2)

Ministry of Defence

PS/Mr Younger (2)
PS/Chief of Defence Staff (2)
Gp Capt Dillon (Protocol) (4)
Wing Commander McLaughlin, P&SS, RAF (6)

RAF Brize Norton (15)

Metropolitan Police Special Branch

Det Supt Butler, No 10 (4)
Det Chief Insp Blackmore (10)

Thames Valley Police

Chief Supt Poole (4)

PRIME MINISTER

GORBACHEVS' VISIT: MEDIA

This note looks at the visit of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev tomorrow from a media point of view.

For the media there are two visits rolled into one - your talks with Mr. Gorbachev; and Mrs. Gorbachev's programme, for which Terry Perks is personally handling the media.

Objective

Our objective is for the visit to be seen that:

(i) you have extended and deepened Britain's relationship with Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union and are identified with the balanced and verifiable arms reduction process. (For who has done more to keep it on the rails?); and

(ii) Mrs. Gorbachev has an enjoyable and trouble-free time here - and nothing more, I think, can be done to stand between the media and mischief.

Current Stance

I think your stance in advance of tomorrow is OK, once we have today dealt with the tendency in some of the Sundays to see your approach to SDI as compromise-seeking rather than as managing the way forward.

Handling the Media

For tomorrow there are two aspects to your talks:

substance; and
theatre....

both of which are important to public perceptions.

The substance will be dealt with in what is said after the meeting; the theatre will come in your public contacts with Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev and the other Russian leaders.

On theatre - and leaving aside the ceremonial trimmings - the most inconsequential incident can catch the media's imagination. There are three crucial points:

- your greeting for Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev at the steps of the plane;

- the pre-talks photocall;

- your farewell appearance before the media on the steps of the Officers' Mess before Mr. Gorbachev takes his leave; this is the most important point and is one which ideally should combine a little seriousness with manifest good humour.

I should add that on each and every occasion the media will try to get a three-way - media, you and Mr. Gorbachev - conversation going, with the aim of embarrassing both of you. It will be better tomorrow not to rise to their bait at all, if only out of consideration for Mr. Gorbachev.

Press Conference

I have thought long and hard about a Press Conference and discussed it with Charles, and finally come round to Charles' view that you should give one.

My worries stemmed from how it might be seen in the USA, on the basis of my contacts with American journalists. But there really is no substitute on such an important occasion as this for your telling the world first-hand what went on rather than my retailing it second-hand.

But in conducting a Press Conference, you need to have in mind the following critical points mentioned to me by the media:

- you have engineered the meeting with Mr. Gorbachev "to upstage Reagan";

- you want to "wash Reagan's head" - or, more elegantly, to ensure that the Western position is clearly on record before Mr. Reagan stumbles over his prompt cards;

- "to ensure that Gorbachev knows what the West's real position is" - i.e. before Reagan blurts out his objective of a nuclear-free world;

- "to show the world who really runs the show";

- "to put on a show to convince American conservatives INF really is OK".

So far as Mr. Gorbachev is concerned, the media will want to know:

- whether you have detected he is going to take any new initiative in Washington;

- your assessment of his position, post Yeltsin, and his prospects;

- any light touch between you and Mrs. Gorbachev, such as what you talked about, and whether she has told you anything about her school visit;

- I attach a draft speaking note for your Press Conference at Annex I.

Radio and Television Interviews

If you wish, I can lay on the usual four BBC radio and

television, ITN and IRN interviews afterwards. These are not likely to add much to the Press Conference, but they would be worth doing if only to produce a more tailor-made radio and television product. **Agree?**

DSGreer.

p.p. Bernard Ingham

6 December 1987

DG2CLN

16

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

You will have a one hour meeting with Mr. Gorbachev at Brize Norton on Monday, followed by a working lunch.

Programme

The basic elements are as follows. You will arrive at Brize Norton at 1045 a.m. to look over the arrangements. (There have already been two full dress rehearsals.) Mr. Gorbachev's aircraft will arrive at 1135. You will meet him at the foot of the steps with the Foreign Secretary and the Station Commander. There will be a young Russian boy and English girl to present bouquets. The Guard of Honour will present arms and the Soviet national anthem will be played. You will then proceed to the cars and drive to the Mess, you travelling with Mr. Gorbachev, and the Foreign Secretary with Mrs. Gorbachev. At the Mess, Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev will be offered an opportunity to tidy. You will introduce Mrs. Gorbachev to Mr. Baker who will take her off to visit a school. You and Mr. Gorbachev will go to one room for talks, accompanied by Mr. Chernayev (his Private Secretary) and interpreters. The Foreign Secretary will hold parallel talks with Mr. Shevardnadze. At 1250 you will go to the dining-room for lunch. At 1325 you and Mr. Gorbachev will make short statements to the press from the porch of the Mess. You then drive back out to the aircraft. Mr. Gorbachev will depart at 1335.

We need to decide whether you should then go and give a press conference (there are some 400 accredited journalists). Bernard will let you have a note on this. My own view is that you should do so. It will be an excellent opportunity to underline your role in East/West relations at the highest level.

You then helicopter back to London. You will probably want to telephone the President (and possibly also send him a message on the hot-line).

-

Tactics

Gorbachev has gone out of his way to be flattering in his comments about you through the official Soviet spokesman. He clearly thinks it serves his ends to be seen to be consulting you. He will portray it as a willingness to pay attention to European not just US concerns. He will also want public support from you for the INF agreement and reassurance that the US will ratify it (no need to overdo this: Soviet worries about ratification are useful leverage for progress on human rights and other issues). He will be interested in any pointers you can give to President Reagan's likely intentions at the Summit. His interest will be in the meeting with you being friendly and successful, as a curtain raiser for the Summit.

From your point of view there is a line to be steered between underlining the degree to which Britain under your leadership is again playing a major role - alone among the European nations - in East/West relations; and allowing Gorbachev to give the appearance of neutralising you as a strong and independent voice counselling caution and scepticism in approaching these relations. You are not a bridge between the Soviet Union and the US but have your own contribution to make which both sides value and have to take into account. This is one reason why a press conference afterwards is important in getting your views on the substance once again on the record, as well as your role in the theatre of it all.

Substance

There is a full brief in the folder. I think that you should focus on arms control, Afghanistan, Middle East, human rights and progress with perestroika. The Foreign Secretary can deal with more detailed points with Shevardnadze. There is one trade point you will want to make.

I suggest that you speak generally on the following lines:

you are grateful to Mr. Gorbachev for coming. You wish him well at the Summit;

- you hope that he and Mrs. Gorbachev will pay a full dress visit soon, perhaps next year;

- you are sorry about the entirely unacceptable comments by one irresponsible British newspaper. All you can say is that you have had to put up with worse;

- you have read with interest his speech on the 70th anniversary of the Revolution and have started on his book (you might have it with you at Brize Norton);

- you have had very useful talks with Academician Marchuk, Mr. Tolstykh and Academician Aganbegyan. They increased your understanding of perestroika. You have publicly repeated your support for what Mr. Gorbachev is trying to do;

- you genuinely hope that the Summit will be a success. You have discussed it with President Reagan and have a clear idea of his intentions and priorities: progress on a START agreement, Afghanistan, and human rights;

- you very much welcome the INF Agreement including in particular the verification provisions. You have made this clear publicly as has NATO as a whole;

- Soviet spokesmen have talked of NATO circumventing the INF Agreement. We shall abide strictly by the Treaty, although obviously retain the freedom to adjust other parts of our nuclear weapons programme not covered by the Treaty, in just the same way as the Soviet Union does (and they are of course engaged in modernisation of their nuclear weapons);

you see the next steps as a START Agreement, elimination of chemical weapons and establishment of conventional balance. There is no scope for further reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe until there is conventional balance and chemical weapons have been eliminated;

- you welcome the progress which has been made towards 50 per cent reductions in US and Soviet Strategic nuclear weapons. The verification measures will need to go even further than in the case of INF. In particular it is up to the Soviet Union to come up with credible proposals for verifying a ban on mobile ICBMs. Otherwise you are sure that the Americans will continue to demand a complete ban on these weapons;

- you were glad to see that the Soviet spokesmen had reiterated the Soviet understanding that British and French nuclear weapons would not be included in the current negotiations. Trident will represent a smaller proportion of Soviet nuclear weapons than did Polaris in 1970, even after 50 per cent reductions;

- as regards SDI, Mr. Gorbachev will know the strength of President Reagan's resistance to new constraints on SDI. You can confirm that remains the President's view. In your view the most promising approach remains that which you outlined in your speech in Moscow in April: an agreed non-withdrawal period from the ABM Treaty together with forecasts by both sides of their intended research activities. This will provide assurance that no break-out is imminent. The Americans have asked you to tell Mr. Gorbachev that, even if the Soviet side are not willing to proceed with strategic arms reductions without a solution on SDI testing, they should put the linkage issue aside for now and get on with the completion of a START Treaty;

Sir Geoffrey Howe will be discussing the details of the chemical weapons negotiations with Mr. Shevardnadze;

- you hope that NATO will soon have a proposal on conventional arms control. But we shall be insisting on explicit exclusion of nuclear weapons from these negotiations;

- on Afghanistan you will want to probe him about any proposals which he may be intending to make in Washington. The President certainly intends to make this a major issue in the discussions. If the Russians are intending to withdraw, the sooner they do so the better. Apart from anything else, this could help INF ratification;

- you might throw in a brief reference to Cambodia. This helps us with the ASEAN countries;

- because President Reagan probably won't say much on Arab-Israel, you should raise it. You see an international conference as the right way forward and are pressing both the Americans and the Israelis to accept this. You could probe him on restoring relations with Israel and on Jewish emigration. You will also want to mention Iran/Iraq and the need to implement SCR 598;

- human rights progress will again be vital to helping ensure ratification of the INF Agreement. You welcome what has been done, but we need more, such as modifications to the Soviet criminal code to abolish the crime of "anti-Soviet agitation", a demonstrable liberalisation of the criteria for applications for exit permission, and a reduction in the denial of exit visas on grounds of "possession of state secrets";

- finally, you will want to recall your discussions in parallel on trade. Despite agreeing to set a target then of a 40 per cent increase by 1990, the figures so far this year are disappointing (our exports are down). The letter of intent signed during your visit for the contract for Simon Carves/GEC to build a process controller

plant in Yerevan has still not been converted into a contract. You hope Mr. Gorbachev will agree to encouraging Soviet officials to give trade relations more impetus.

You will probably want to deal with perestroika and other Soviet internal developments over lunch and try to get some feel for how far Mr. Gorbachev has had to modify his tactics and the speed with which he is moving on reform as a result of recent political setbacks.

Finally at an appropriate moment - possibly at the end of the talk and just before going into lunch - you will want to mention Gordievsky. You still hope that his family could very discreetly be released to join him or at least to pay him a visit.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

5 December 1987

PROGRAMME

1135 hours	Arrive Royal Air Force Station Brize Norton by special flight IL 62M aircraft from Moscow
	Met by the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe MP, and the Station Commander RAF Brize Norton, Group Captain Chris Lumb OBE RAF Mrs Gorbacheva will be presented with a bouquet by Miss .....
	Guard of Honour found by The Queen's Colour Squadron, Royal Air Force under the command of Squadron Leader Roger Booth RAF, supported by the Central Band of the Royal Air Force under the direction of the Director of Music Wing Commander Eric Banks MBE FLCM LRAM ARCM LGSM, Royal Air Force
1140 hours	Depart airfield for Officers' Mess
1145 hours	Arrive Officers' Mess
	Refreshments will be served
1150 hours	Talks between the Prime Minister, and The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1150 hours	The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will hold separate talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
1250-1320 hours	Luncheon
1322 hours	Press statement
1330 hours	Depart Officers Mess
	RAF Ceremonial Carpet Guard
1335 hours	Depart Royal Air Force Brize Norton The Prime Minister and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will bid farewell

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER 1987
1ST CONVOY

SOURCE	VEHICLE NUMBER	PASSENGERS
RAF	1	RAF Provost 2 Soviet Protection Officers
Hired Daimler (No 10 Driver)	2	PM, Mr Gorbachev, 1 MPSB 1 Interpreter, 1 Soviet Protection Officer
MPSB Police Back Up	3	1 MPSB 2 Soviet Protection Officers
Hired Daimler	4	Chief Soviet Security Officer 1 MPSB 2 Soviet Doctors 1 Soviet Communications Officer
Hired Daimler (Police Driver)	5	Mrs Gorbachev, Sir Geoffrey Howe 1 MPSB, 1 Soviet Protection Officer
MPSB Police Back Up (Armoured RR)	6	1 MPSB 2 Soviet Protection Officers
RAF	7	RAF Provost

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER 1987 (Cont'd)
2ND CONVOY

RAF	8	RAF Provost
Hired Daimler	9	Mr Shevardnaze Soviet Ambassador 1 MPSB
MPSB	10	PMs Car
Hired Daimler	11	Mr Yakovlev 1 MPSB
Hired Daimler	12	Mr Dobrynin 1 MPSB
Hired Daimler	13	Marshal Akhromeev 1 Soviet Protection Officer
RAF	14	RAF Provost 2 Soviet Protection Officers

CAR PLAN - 7 DECEMBER (Cont'd)
3RD CONVOY

RAF	15	RAF Provost
Hired Daimler	16	1 Soviet Protection Officer
Hired Daimler	17	1 Soviet Protection Officer
Hired Daimler	18	1 Soviet Protection Officer
RAF Bus	19	Academicians Interpreters Officials
RAF	20	RAF Provost

1. Human Rights:

It would be helpful for Mrs. Thatcher to stress to Gorbachev that further Soviet movement on human rights is essential to a sustained improvement in East-West relations, and will be vital to the INF Treaty ratification process. (FYI: The U.S. is still pressing the Soviets for the establishment of some formal institutional mechanism for resolution of individual cases. But even more significant would be modifications to the Soviet criminal code to abolish the crime of "anti-Soviet agitation," a demonstrable liberalization of the criteria for applications for exit permission, and a marked reduction in the denial of exit visas on grounds of "possession of state secrets." End FYI)

2. Afghanistan:

We would also appreciate it if the Prime Minister placed similar emphasis on the need for tangible steps toward a withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Thatcher-Gorbachev meeting will take place just after the release of the EC statement on Afghanistan. We would suggest that the Prime Minister not only reinforce the strong message in that statement, but also emphasize the importance of Afghanistan to the entire civilized world. It would be helpful for Mrs. Thatcher to make the point that, if the Soviets are going to withdraw -- as they keep saying they are -- then they should do it soon and quickly; it is not in their own interest to prolong either the occupation or the period of withdrawal.

We would also suggest one additional point: like human rights improvements, concrete moves toward withdrawal from Afghanistan could have a major impact on prospects for INF ratification.

3. Verification:

We suggest that the Prime Minister, in welcoming Soviet agreement to extensive on-site inspection measures in the INF Treaty, underscore the need to go even further in the case of START. In particular, it is essential that the Soviets present proposals for the verification of mobile ICBM deployments. In Washington's view, the ball is in the Soviets' court on mobiles; without a proposal, the U.S. will persist in demanding a complete ban on these systems.

4. START/SDI Linkage:

We would also appreciate the Prime Minister reinforcing the current U.S. position on START/SDI linkage: Even if the Soviets are not willing to proceed with strategic arms reductions without a solution on SDI testing, they should put the linkage issue aside for now and get on with the completion of a draft START Treaty.

cc Mr Ingham
Mr Powell
Mr Perks
Press Officers

PRIME MINISTER

MR GORBACHEV'S VISIT : PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

The following arrangements have been made:-

Aircraft Arrival

Platform as illustrated on Page 6 of the official programme. Restricted to photographers and television only to cover arrival, greeting, guard of honour and motorcade. No facilities for questions.

Television cameras and a few still photographers will also be positioned on the roof of the terminal buildings to cover the aircraft landing and taxi-ing and offer another angle of the arrival formalities.

Talks in the Officers' Mess

A small photographic and television pool will be positioned in the room for your talks with Mr Gorbachev, to cover your arrival and subsequent photocall. They will then be removed from the building.

After the Talks

A small platform will house a pool of television, photographers and reporters (50-60 persons) outside of the Officers' Mess to cover your oral statements. Separate microphones will be installed for you and Mr Gorbachev at the front of the porch. Microphones will also be installed for the interpreters.

Aircraft Departure

The same platform and terminal-roof facilities will be available as for the arrival. No microphones.

Mrs Gorbachev

Separate press arrangements are being made for Mrs Gorbachev's programme.

Mike Bates

MICHAEL BATES
PRESS OFFICE

4 December 1987

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN
TEL[illegible] 265
OF [illegible]41520Z DECEMBER 87

FOR PS SOFS
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF S OF S
PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW TELNO 1723 OF 4/12
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, MODUK
INFO SAVING EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS, PEKING

SIC EMA/EMC/EME

MODUK FOR DACU

MR GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 7 DECEMBER:
PREVIEW

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV IS ON THE DEFENSIVE INTERNALLY AND NEEDS A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS. HE OPENLY VALUES HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND WILL HOPE TO PERSUADE HER TO USE HER INFLUENCE HELPFULLY. HE REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE SUPER-POWER STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE WILL ALSO BE WORRIED THAT THE INF AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE RATIFIED, WHICH WOULD BE A DEFEAT FOR HIM AS WELL AS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN. RECENT INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, HANDLED WITH A VERY UNCERTAIN TOUCH, HAVE DENTED GORBACHEV'S AUTHORITY BUT IT AND HIS POLICIES REMAIN INTACT. HE HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO WATER THE WINE OF HIS IMPATIENT RADICALISM AND MAY SEEM TO HAVE LOST SOME OF HIS BOUNCE. A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT COULD HELP TO RESTORE IT.

DETAIL

2. THE TIMING OF MR GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND VISIT TO BRITAIN IS BOTH DIFFICULT AND FELICITOUS FOR HIM. GORBACHEV HAS JUST BEEN THROUGH HIS TOUGHEST MONTH AS GENERAL SECRETARY. HE FACES A DAUNTING YEAR IN 1988. HIS AUTHORITY HAS TAKEN A KNOCK. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TEMPORARY DIVERSION OF ATTENTION TO EXTERNAL ISSUES MUST BE A RELIEF: A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR VALUE NOW. HIS NEED FOR A MAJOR AGREEMENT WITH THE OTHER SUPER-POWER HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN A STRING OF CONCESSIONS TO US POSITIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR. HIS DECISION TO ACCEPT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO A MEETING EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON IN PART REFLECTS THE DOMESTIC POPULARITY OF THE UK STRAND IN THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.

3. THE RECENT NEAR-HYSTERICAL REACTION TO A PIECE OF SENSATIONALIST JOURNALISM IN THE OBSERVER VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED THE TENSION UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET LEADER IS OPERATING, DESPITE HIS CONFIDENT DEMEANOUR. THE REASONS GO DEEPER THAN THE PUTSCH AGAINST ELTSIN, THOUGH THAT EPISODE BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE DIVISONS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY SENSED RATHER THAN SEEN.

4. THE HEART OF PERESTROIKA (UNDERLINED) IS ECONOMIC REFORM. FROM GORBACHEV'S BELIEF IN THE URGENT NEED FOR AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION STEM THE OTHER

CHANGES WHICH HE IS PROMOTING IN SOVIET SOCIETY AND ALSO THE MORE PRAGMATIC, LESS CONFRONTATIONAL CAST WHICH HE HAS GIVEN TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL KNOW FROM HER RECENT MEETINGS WITH SOME OF GORBACHEV'S MOST INFLUENTIAL ADVISERS JUST HOW FAR HE HAS TO GO ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. BUT THERE ARE MOUNTING INDICATIONS THAT THE REFORM PROGRAMME IS OVER-AMBITIOUS. ECONOMIC RESULTS FOR 1986 AND 1987 ARE SO FAR POOR. PROBLEMS INCLUDE:

- THE ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON ALL FRONTS (WELL DESCRIBED BY AN AMERICAN ECONOMIST AS TRYING TO CHANGE A CAR ENGINE WHILE TRAVELLING AT FULL SPEED): HIGH GROWTH TARGETS, INCREASED QUALITY, GREATER PRODUCTIVITY, DEVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATIVE TO INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS, NEW TRADING MECHANISMS:
-

- THE NEW REGIME AIMED AT MAKING ENTERPRISES FINANCIALLY INDEPENDENT AND SELF-SUPPORTING IS DUE TO OPERATE FROM 1 JANUARY 1988 BUT NEITHER INSTITUTIONS NOR PERSONNEL ARE ADEQUATENEL PREPARED SEMICOLON

- THE DIFFICULTY OF MOTIVATING A PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO LOW REWARD AND ENFORCED EQUALITY SEMICOLON

- THE SCOPE FOR IMPROVING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS IS IN ANY CASE LIMITED BY THE VERY POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE AGRICULTURE/FOOD AND CONSUMER INDUSTRIES SEMICOLON

- ESSENTIAL PRICE REFORMS HAVE BEEN POSTPONED BECAUSE OF JUSTIFIED FEARS OF HOSTILE PUBLIC REACTION.

5. WHEN GORBACHEV SPEAKS, AS I AM SURE HE WILL TO THE PRIME MINISTER, OF THE TRANSITION TO THE SECOND STAGE OF PERESTROIKA (UNDERLINED) , HE IS TALKING ABOUT MOVING FROM FORMULATION TO IMPLEMENTATION. IN SO DOING, HE HAS LED MANY RUSSIANS TO ASK WHAT THE ENERGY GENERATED OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS HAS SO FAR ACHIEVED. WHERE'S THE BEEF (BOTH LITERALLY AND METAPHORICALLY)? WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THE SO-CALLED FIRST STAGE?

6. THE MAJOR LESSON OF THE FIRST STAGE IN FACT SEEMS TO BE THAT GORBACHEV IS NOW OBLIGED TO MOVE MORE SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY THAN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY INTENDED:

- GORBACHEV HAS JUST LOST HIS SNOWPLOUGH, ELTSIN: TO MOVE QUICKLY, HE IN FACT NEEDED MORE ELTSINS OUT AHEAD OF HIM IN THE RADICAL VANGUARD, ALLOWING GORBACHEV HIMSELF TO LEAD FROM THE CENTRE.

- THE ELTSIN AFFAIR REVEALED THE STRENGTH OF CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PARTY, THE ''INERT SWAMPY LAYER'' WHICH ELTSIN HAD HIMSELF DENOUNCED.

- GORBACHEV HAS ALWAYS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID KRUSHCHEV'S MISTAKES AND TO COVER HIMSELF THROUGH THE COLLEGIALITY OF THE LEADERSHIP. SINCE ELTSIN'S FALL, HE IS HAVING TO MAKE A TACTICAL RETREAT INSIDE THAT COLLEGIALITY USING GRADUALIST LANGUAGE AND DENOUNCING ''ADVENTURISM'' (THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE FIRE AND BRIMSTONE OF HIS SPEECH IN LENINGRAD ON 13 OCTOBER AND HIS MUCH BLANDER FORMULATIONS ON THE SAME THEME OF CADRE POLICY IN MOSCOW ON 20 NOVEMBER WAS STRIKING). IN NOT ONLY FAILING TO SAVE ELTSIN BUT BY LEADING THE HOUNDS AT THE KILL, GORBACHEV HAS DISAPPOINTED MUCH OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, THE ONLY DEDICATED REFORM CONSTITUENCY IN THE COUNTRY, WHOSE ACTIVE SUPPORT IS CRUCIAL TO HIM. ALREADY FEELING LET DOWN BY THE LACK OF RADICALISM IN GORBACHEV'S 70TH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH, SOME OF THEM ARE NOW TAKING A MORE SCEPTICAL VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS FOR PERESTROIKA, AND WILL BE MUCH LESS WILLING TO RAISE THEIR OWN HEADS ABOVE THE PARAPET.

ENDS PART 1 OF 2

HOWE

PTMIAN 0115

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Mufaxed to Chequers
8.45am, 7/12

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1987

Dear Charles

CDP
7/12

Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev : 7 December : Cambodia

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware of a further development over Cambodia before she meets Mr Gorbachev on 7 December. The Foreign Secretary has not seen these papers but will do so over the weekend.

As you will know, Prince Sihanouk of the Cambodian resistance held talks near Paris from 2-3 December with Hun Sen of the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh. These were the first direct contacts between opposing Cambodian factions since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The two leaders issued a joint communiqué after their meeting setting out their approach to a political solution to Cambodia. This laid emphasis on the need to reach agreement among the Cambodian parties, following which an international conference should be convened to guarantee that agreement and the independence of Cambodia. They also agreed to meet again in France next year and thereafter to meet in Pyongyang. Although no firm dates were given for further meetings, the meeting in France may take place as early as January. A French Government spokesman has welcomed the prospects which the meeting seemed to have opened up for the start of a process leading to a settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

We have reservations about the results of the meeting as set out in the communique. There is no reference in it to the central role of Vietnam, nor to the need for Vietnam to withdraw its troops and enter into negotiations for a settlement. It appears that Prince Sihanouk may have given away more to the PRK side than will be acceptable to other members of the resistance, to ASEAN, or to China.

/We

CONFIDENTIAL

We continue to believe that in any discussion of Cambodia with Mr Gorbachev, it would be right for the Prime Minister to remind him that we look to the Soviet Union to persuade Vietnam to withdraw its troops and to participate directly in talks about a settlement.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

Mr Powell

GORBACHEV VISIT

Ann Morisai (FCO Protocol) asked me to let you know that there is now a small change of plan on departure procedure.

The cars will now pull up at the end of the red carpet, and the PM and Gorbachev will walk along the carpet to the plane. Some of the senior Soviet delegates will take their leave at the foot of the steps.

Mike Bates

(M.C. BATES) 4/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 DEC 1987

1. ✓ with attachment
2. Foreign & State

From : D J E Ratford
Date : 4 December 1987

Copied to :
Mr Hemans, Soviet Department

Prime Minister

CDP 6/12.

Private Secretary

GORBACHEV : STOPOVER

1. I attach a copy of an account of the Australian Prime Minister's recent meetings with Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. The Australians, whom we had briefed in detail before Mr Hawke's visit, specially expedited this account so that it should be on hand before the Gorbachev stopover. It does not tell us anything about the Soviet leadership which we do not already know. But out of courtesy to the Australians you may perhaps like to pass the copy to Mr Powell before Monday.

4 December 1987

D J E Ratford

CONFIDENTIAL

From : D J E Ratford
Date : 4 December 1987

Copied to :
Private Secretary
PS/Mr Mellor
Sir J Fretwell
Soviet Section,
Research Department

Mr Hemans, Soviet Department

GORBACHEV : DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. The Australian Deputy High Commissioner called this afternoon to give an account of Mr Hawke's recent visit to Moscow. He based himself on a telegram recording a briefing given to the US Ambassador in Canberra.

2. The Soviet leadership had been very generous with their time: Mr Hawke had spent more than three hours with Gorbachev, of which two were tete-a-tete. He had also had six and a half hours with Ryzhkov. Mr Hawke characterised his reception as "friendly and cordial" and the discussions as "frank and warm". Gorbachev did not bridle when he raised human rights questions. He found Gorbachev engaging and intelligent.

3. On glasnost' and perestroika, Mr Hawke's conclusion was that there was no doubt about the strength of the leadership's commitment. They had spoken of the economy as being in "a pre-crisis condition". Ryzhkov had dropped the remark that "he and Gorbachev had been thinking about the need for reform for years before coming into power". Mr Hawke had concluded that the leadership had decided that the "system must be changed". Gorbachev clearly understood the dimensions of his problems. Ryzhkov said that "it was not a question of groups of opponents mobilising against perestroika but the general reluctance of some groups to accept new ideas". Mr Hawke felt that opposition both from the bureaucracy and from consumers might well build up before the benefits of economic reform came through. The leadership had perhaps not understood what market forces might bring about. Ryzhkov had spoken of the Soviet Union's wish "to become and organic part of the international division of labour". That prompted Mr Hawke to doubt whether the Soviet leadership fully understood the implications of what they were saying.

/ 4.

4. All in all, Mr Hawke believed that it was in the West's interest to encourage perestroika, while showing the proper degree of caution.

5. On global issues, particularly arms control, Mr Hawke believed Gorbachev to be committed to a process in which the INF agreement was only a first step. He wanted President Reagan to visit Moscow in 1988 but was also prepared, if necessary, to wait until after the Reagan Presidency. Gorbachev had expressed concern about the extreme right in the West: Mr Hawke had said that there were indeed those who wanted continued confrontation, but they were only a minority and they would not expect decisions. Part of the problem arose because the US electoral cycle gave them a constituency at which to preach. But the West was sincere and committed to the negotiating process.

Regional Issues

6. Gorbachev insisted that he wanted to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but first required an assurance of an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan which would not be a threat to the Soviet Union. It was the American responsibility not to try to create a regime hostile to the Soviet Union. If those conditions were fulfilled, the Soviet Union would be ready to withdraw its troops. In Mr Hawke's view these words were "not just rhetoric".

7. Mr Hawke was given a standard presentation on Vietnam. Nor was any new ground broken on specific questions, Middle East and Southern Africa.

Human Rights

8. Some considerable time had been spent on this topic and Gorbachev's attitude had been "quite good". He had evidently expected Mr Hawke to raise these questions but had not bridled and had expressed understanding when Mr Hawke had put the case for improved human rights behaviour on the basis both of general moral arguments and Soviet self-interest: it was most important from the Soviet point of view to be seen to be reception to such arguments. If so, the Soviet Union would enjoy better understanding in the West.

9. Mr Hawke had put forward a list of five specific cases, two of which had been solved at once. As regards Jewish emigration, Gorbachev's first line of defence had been the need to protect security sensitive information but had not pursued the argument when Mr Hawke challenged it. The other strand in his argument was that the Soviet Union could not (or would not) afford the brain-drain. In Mr Hawke's view this showed Soviet awareness that free movement of persons would, in the Soviet case, be a one-way street.

COCOM

10. Ryzhkov had made a strong pitch on COCOM, arguing that it was disruptive of Soviet economic plans and contradicted Western statements about our desire for a more open economic relationship.

4 December 1987

D J E Ratford

023523
MDHIAN 9034

CONFIDENTIAL
UK COMMS ONLY
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 041600Z FCO
TELNO 1723
OF 041015Z DECEMBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, MODUK
INFO SAVING EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS, PEKING

SIC EMA/EMC/EME

MODUK FOR DACU

PART TWO OF TWO

7. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU MET GORBACHEV IN MARCH, HE WAS RIDING HIGH: AFTER SOME ROUGH IN-FIGHTING, THE JANUARY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD ENDORSED MOST OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF PERESTROIKA AND THE WAY WAS CLEAR FOR HIS MUCH MORE COMPLETE SUCCESS AT THE JUNE PLENUM. GORBACHEV RETURNED FROM HIS LATE SUMMER HOLIDAY EXUDING A CONFIDENCE WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN HIS MAJOR SPEECHES IN MURMANSK (SEPTEMBER) AND LENINGRAD (OCTOBER). BUT THE EARLY AUTUMN MAY COME TO BE SEEN AS THE APOGEE OF GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL DOMINANCE. HIS OBJECTIVE OF TURNING THE SOVIET UNION INTO A MORE EFFICIENT, COMPETITIVE, ECONOMICALLY DYNAMIC AND CONTENTED COUNTRY, NOT LIVING IN A STATE OF TENSION WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS OR WITH THE MAJOR POWER BLOCS, REMAINS INTACT: BUT I THINK THAT HIS CHANCES OF ACHIEVING IT DURING HIS CHOSEN TIMESCALE OF FIFTEEN YEARS, IF AT ALL, NOW LOOK MUCH MORE PROBLEMATIC. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT GORBACHEV, RATHER THAN SEE PERESTROIKA SMOTHERED IS HAVING TO COMPROMISE WITH ''THE OLD THINKING'' MUCH MORE THAN HE WOULD LIKE.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

8. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV HAS NOT RECENTLY SUFFERED ANY MAJOR SETBACKS IN FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS NOT CHALKED UP ANY SIGNIFICANT SUCCESSES EITHER. HE HAS HAD TO CONCENTRATE HEAVILY ON INTERNAL MATTERS AND HAS NOT BEEN ABROAD SINCE MAY (VISITS TO ROMANIA AND THE GDR: HE VISITED CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN APRIL: HIS LAST TRIP OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT WAS IN NOVEMBER 1986, TO INDIA). HE DID WELL TO ATTRACT SUCH A WIDE SPREAD OF LEFT-OF-CENTRE FOREIGN DELEGATIONS TO THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS BUT THE OCCASION WAS MARRED BY

THE REVELATION OF DISUNITY IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. AS GORBACHEV'S NBC INTERVIEW SHOWED, HE IS ON THE DEFENSIVE OVER AFGHANISTAN AND CSCE. HE IS THE DEMANDEUR IN MOVES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA. HE DOES NOT HAVE UNITED BACKING EVEN WITHIN EASTERN EUROPE, WHERE THE ELTSIN AFFAIR HAS INDUCED NERVOUSNESS. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN ARE BAD, AND WITH FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY STILL STICKY (IN AN INTERVIEW WITH IZVESTIYA PUBLISHED HERE ON 2 DECEMBER, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND MADE A SERIES OF POINTS TRENCHANTLY CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET UNION).

9. DESPITE A DELIBERATE DISPLAY OF INSOUCIANCE OVER THE SDI AS SUCH, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO HAVE A LONG-TERM PREOCCUPATION WITH THE SUPER-POWER STRATEGIC BALANCE AND WITH RIGHT WING OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES TO ARMS LIMITATION. CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE IMPELLED INTO A NEW SPIRAL OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEFENCE EXPENDITURE REMAINS, ALTHOUGH THE TACTICAL APPROACH IS NOW CONCENTRATED ON ABMT OBSERVANCE. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR GORBACHEV TO ACCOMPLISH THE SHIFT IN TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES WHICH PERESTROIKA REQUIRES IF AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO COMPETE WITH THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPING NEW GENERATIONS OF ARMAMENTS. GORBACHEV MUST SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE US ADMINISTRATION THAT A BLOCKING THIRD IN THE SENATE MAY PREVENT RATIFICATION OF THE INF AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD BE A DEFEAT FOR HIM AS WELL AS FOR REAGAN. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF COMMENT AND SPECULATION IN THE SOVIET PRESS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR RATIFICATION, CLEARLY REVEALING NERVOUSNESS. GORBACHEV WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM THAT HE HAD REPEATED THE MISTAKE OF SALT II IN PLACING TOO MUCH FAITH IN NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITH AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH COULD NOT DELIVER. THERE MAY WELL BE ELEMENTS HERE, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY, WHO WOULD NOT BE SORRY TO SEE RATIFICATION BLOCKED.

10. I WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT INF RATIFICATION TO BE IN THE FRONT OF GORBACHEV'S MIND WHEN HE MEETS THE PRIME MINISTER, AND CONCERN ABOUT LIMITING SDI, THROUGH STRICT INTERPRETATON OF THE ABM TREATY AND NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM IT, NOT FAR BEHIND. HE MAY ALSO PROFESS CONCERN OVER OPPOSITION (OF WHICH WE ARE A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT) TO HIS PROPOSAL TO HOLD A CSCE CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS IN MOSCOW. HE IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE A MORE COOPERATIVE LINE THAN OF LATE OVER THE GULF: AND HE MAY BE RESTRAINED OVER AFGHANISTAN IF HE HAS POSITIVE NEWS UP HIS SLEEVE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN.

GORBACHEV'S OBJECTIVES

11. BY STOPPING FOR BUSINESS IN BRITAIN, GORBACHEV IS MAKING A LONG DAY (32 HOURS FOR HIM THROUGH THE TIME ZONES) EVEN LONGER. HE HAS PUT SOME NOSES OUT OF JOINT (THE ITALIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN TOLD THEY WERE NEXT ON HIS LIST), BUT HIS DECISION IS UNDERSTANDABLE.

12. FIRST, GORBACHEV GENUINELY VALUES HIS WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, SOVIET OFFICIALS HABITUALLY TRY TO PLAY DOWN THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS: IT WAS THEREFORE STRIKING THAT, IN THE FIRST PUBLIC REFERENCE HERE TO THE UK VISIT, PRAVDA (QUOTING THE MFA SPOKESMAN) REPORTED YOUR COMMENT TO THE BBC THAT THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND MRS THATCHER HAD MADE A DISTINCT CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET/BRITISH RELATIONS. THE IMPACT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL FELT: FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO BY OFFICIALS AND OTHERS WHOM I MET EARLIER THIS WEEK ON TOUR IN DISTANT VOLGOGRAD AND KHARKOV. MEMORIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TV INTERVIEW ARE STILL FRESH AFTER EIGHT MONTHS. GORBACHEV IS INTERESTED IN THE WAY BRITAIN HAS DEALT WITH ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS AND IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY: HE IS RESPONDING TO SYMPATHETIC CONCERN ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S PART ABOUT SOVIET REFORMS. ABOVE ALL, HE RECOGNISES THE PRIME MINISTER'S INFLUENCE BOTH IN WESTERN EUROPE AND IN WASHINGTON: THIS IS NOT NEWS, BUT IT IS THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK TO THE UK.

13. SECOND, THE BRITISH VISIT ENHANCES, FOR BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND THE INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE, THE OVERALL SUBSTANCE AND IMPACT OF THE JOURNEY. GORBACHEV, AND ESPECIALLY HIS KEY ADVISER YAKOVLEV, HAVE CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND WITH OTHER REGIONS IN PARALLEL WITH, AND TO SOME EXTENT INDEPENDENTLY FROM, THE SOVIET/US RELATIONSHIP. THEY ARE MAKING A DELIBERATE DISTINCTION FROM THE BREZHNEV/GROMYKO DETENTE OF THE EARLY 1970S, WHICH THEY REGARD AS HAVING BEEN TOO EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSSED ON THE AXIAL SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP AND AS HAVING FAILED IN PART AS A RESULT.

14. THIRD, GORBACHEV IS WELL AWARE THAT THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON ARMS CONTROL IS NOT THE SAME AS THE AMERICAN. LIKE THE AMERICANS, HE WILL BE KEEN TO MAXIMISE EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE INF AGREEMENT AND PRESSURE FOR RATIFICATION: BUT HE WILL ALSO HOPE TO EXPLOIT ANY TRANSATLANTIC DISAGREEMENTS WHICH MAY ARISE OVER WHAT HAPPENS THEREAFTER, AND IN PARTICULAR THEREBY TO COUNTER MOVES FOR COMPENSATORY DEFENCE MEASURES WITHIN NATO. HE WILL KNOW THAT THE INF AGREEMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER AGREEMENT TO REDUCE

STRATEGIC WEAPONS MAKES THE QUESTIONS OF THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE, OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS AND OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, MORE ACUTE. HE WILL HAVE IN MIND THE STRONG EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO REYKJAVIK, AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO CAMP DAVID (THIS PRECEDENT MAY DETER HIM FROM TRYING TO PULL ANOTHER FAST ONE IN WASHINGTON ALTHOUGH THAT CAN NEVER BE ENTIRELY EXCLUDED GIVEN HIS PROPENSITY FOR SURPRISES).

BILATERAL

15. ALTHOUGH TIME IS VERY LIMITED, THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND YOURS WITH SHEVARDNADZE ARE A NATURAL OPPORTUNITY TO AIR IMPORTANT BILATERAL QUESTIONS. I SHALL BE SURPRISED IF GORBACHEV GOES FIRM ON THE TIMING OF HIS SUBSTANTIVE RETURN VISIT TO THE UK, BUT I HOPE THAT SHEVARDNADZE WILL AGREE ON DATES FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV WILL HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON BRITISH/SOVIET TRADE AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE TARGET AGREED DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT OF A 40% INCREASE IN TURN-OVER. I HOPE HE WILL THEREFORE BE RECEPTIVE TO A FURTHER STRONG PITCH FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE #250M SIMON CARVES BID FOR THE EREVAN PROJECT (FOR WHICH THE LETTER OF INTENT WAS SIGNED DURING HER VISIT) WITHOUT WHICH THE 40% TARGET CANNOT BE ATTAINED.

16. GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY ANNOYED TO BE ASKED ABOUT RAISA BY TOM BROKAW IN THE NBC INTERVIEW: BUT I THINK THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY YOU WILL HAVE BURIED THE HATCHET SO FAR AS THE BRITISH DIMENSION IS CONCERNED. I DOUBT THAT GORBACHEV WILL SPOIL THE ATMOSPHERE BY REFERRING TO THE OBSERVER ARTICLE AT ALL, THOUGH IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SHEVARDNADZE MAY EXPRESS SOME APPRECIATION OF YOUR COMMENTS IN IT. (THE MFA HAVE SO FAR DONE NO MORE THAN TAKE NOTE OF YOUR BBC INTERVIEW, PRESUMABLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE WERE MERELY RIGHTING A WRONG THAT WE THE BRITISH HAD INFLICTED).

CONCLUSION

17. I WOULD EXPECT THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU TO FIND GORBACHEV A LITTLE LESS EBULLIENT THAN BEFORE, A LITTLE MORE GUARDED AND DEFENSIVE. BUT IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO CRY ''NEVER GLAD CONFIDENT MORNING AGAIN''. GORBACHEV'S AUTHORITY HAS BEEN DENTED BY THE EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS BUT IS NOT UNDER SERIOUS THREAT. A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT COULD BOOST HIS CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION FOR THE CRUCIAL MONTHS OF PREPARATION FOR THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE NEXT YEAR.

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 070900Z FCO
TELNO 2676
041930Z DECEMBER 87
TO DESKBY 050900Z COPENHAGEN
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

RESTRICTED
IMMEDIATE

COPENHAGEN FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PARTY

US/SOVIET RELATIONS : PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN TELEVISION NETWORKS

SUMMARY

1. AN UNEVEN PERFORMANCE BY THE PRESIDENT. ON INF HE PREVIEWED THE LINE HE WILL BE TAKING WITH CONGRESSIONAL DOUBTERS. ON THE SOVIET UNION, A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY REFERENCES TO GORBACHEV, DESPITE A BRIEF FLASHBACK TO THE EVIL EMPIRE SPEECH. ON AFGHANISTAN, A HARD LINE ON CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE DURING THE PERIOD OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A TAPED INTERVIEW IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON 3 DECEMBER TO THE ANCHORMEN OF THE FOUR AMERICAN TV NETWORKS. THE INTERVIEW WAS BROADCAST LATER ON 3 DECEMBER (TRANSCRIPT BY BAG TO SOVIET DEPARTMENT).

4. THE MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

INF

ON RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION: QUOTE I THINK THAT THE OBJECTIONS WE ARE HEARING ... ARE BASED ON A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHAT THIS TREATY CONTAINS, AND PARTICULARLY THEY ARE IGNORANT OF THE ADVANCES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN VERIFICATION UNQUOTE. QUOTE WE WILL SIGN A TREATY WHEN WE ARE SURE THAT THAT TREATY IS AS BENEFICIAL TO US AS IT IS TO THEM ... I THINK THAT SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE OBJECTING THE MOST ... BASICALLY DOWN IN THEIR DEEPEST THOUGHTS HAVE ACCEPTED THAT WAR IN INEVITABLE UNQUOTE.

NEXT STEPS IN ARMS CONTROL

QUOTE IF IT COMES TO THE POINT OF US NEGOTIATING, AS I HOPE IT DOES ONE DAY ON THOSE BATTLEFIELD TACTICAL WEAPONS, THEN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MUST BE NEGOTIATED AS WELL. ... BOTH WOULD HAVE TO BE - WELL, ONE ELIMINATED AND THE OTHER BROUGHT DOWN TO PARITY UNQUOTE. ON THE PROSPECTS OF A MOSCOW VISIT AND A START AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR QUOTE I THINK THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A MEETING IN MOSCOW, AND I THINK THERE IS A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE THAT WE WILL MAKE ANOTHER GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD IN THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE. ON THE SAME THEME HE ADDED QUOTE IN REYKJAVIK, WE HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON LITERALLY TOTAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT EXCEPT THAT, AT THE VERY LAST MINUTE, THEY SAID IT COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF WE GAVE UP SDI, AND THAT'S WHEN I CAME HOME UNQUOTE. ASKED ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM EUROPE THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED QUOTE NOT AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE ALREADY OUTWEIGHED BY THE OPPOSITION UNQOUTE.

SOVIET UNION

ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CAPABLE OF STANDING UP TO GORBACHEV QUOTE I HAVEN'T CHANGED FROM THE TIME WHEN I MADE A SPEECH ABOUT AN EVIL EMPIRE UNQUOTE. BUT THE PRESIDENT ADDED LATER THAT ALTHOUGH PREVIOUS SOVIET LEADERS HAD SOUGHT A ONE WORLD COMMUNIST STATE QUOTE WE NOW HAVE A LEADER WHO HAS NEVER MADE THAT CLAIM BUT IS WILLING TO SAY THAT HE IS PREPARED TO LIVE WITH OTHER PHILOSOPHIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

QUOTE WE HAVE MADE SOME HEADWAY ... BUT WE HAVE GOT TO GO FURTHER ... WE ARE NOT TRYING TO INTERFERE IN THEIR INTERNAL WORKINGS. BUT MAYBE WE CAN MAKE THEM SEE THAT IF THEIR PEOPLE HAD MORE OF THAT GLASNOST HE HAS BEEN TALKING ABOUT, THEY WOULDN'T WANT TO EMIGRATE UNQUOTE.

ON WHETHER THE US WOULD FACILITATE A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BY MAKING A COMMITMENT NOT TO SUPPLY THE MUJAHEDIN FOR A YEAR QUOTE I DON'T THINK WE COULD DO ANYTHING OF THAT KIND BECAUSE THE PUPPET GO VERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN LEFT THERE HAS A MILITARY ... YOU CAN'T SUDDENLY DISARM THEM AND LEAVE THEM PREY TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENT. THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE ASSURED OF THE RIGHT OF ALL OF THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN ESTABLISHING THE GOVERNMENT THEY WANT AND THAT REQUIRES MORE THAN JUST GETTING HIS FORCES OUT OF THERE UNQUOTE.

THE DOLLAR

QUOTE I DON'T THINK WE'VE DONE ANYTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS FALLING FURTHER UNQUOTE. IT MIGHT BE THAT SOME FOREIGN CURRENCIES WERE WAY BELOW VALUE AND HAD COME UP TO WHERE THEY SH OULD PROPERLY BE. QUOTE A SUDDEN SURGE OF CUTTING INTEREST RATES IN SOME OF OUR TRADING ALLIES ABROAD DID HAVE THE EFFECT, AGAIN, OF MAKING THE DOLLAR FALL UNQUOTE (THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID LATER THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MIS-SPOKEN ON THIS POINT).

COMMENT

5. THE CONFLICTING PRESSURES WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS FACING IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT WERE APPARENT AT A NUMBER OF POINTS. HE SPOKE STRONGLY OF THE NEED TO RATIFY THE INF TREATY AND MADE A NUMBER OF FAVOURABLE REFERENCES TO GORBACHEV. BUT HE BALANCED THIS WITH A REAFFIRMATION THAT HIS UNDERLYING VIEWS HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE EVIL EMPIRE SPEECH. ON AFGHANISTAN HE EXEMPTED GORBACHEV FROM RESPONSIBILITY, BUT POINTEDLY DECLINED TO SAY THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BY HALTING SUPPORT TO THE MUJAHEDIN. AT THE END OF THE INTERVIEW HE WAS LURED INTO A LONG COMMENT ON THE IRAN/CONTRAS AFFAIR, IN WHICH HE REVERTED TO HIS EARLIER LINE THAT HE HAD NOT TRADED ARMS FOR HOSTAGES.

6. ALL IN ALL, AND AS EXPECTED, A MUCH LESS FLUENT PERFORMANCE THAN GORBACHEV'S EARLIER THIS WEEK (OUR TELNO 2672). BUT THIS WAS THE FAMILIAR REAGAN RE-STATING A NUMBER OF HIS DEEPLY HELD BELIEFS. BOTH THE INTERVIEWERS LAST NIGHT AND THE PRESS TODAY TREATED HIM FAIRLY GENTLY, AND HE IS UNLIKELY TO SUFFER IN THE RATINGS ON THE BASIS OF THIS WEEK'S EXCHANGE OF INTERVIEWS ALONE. BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HIS APPROVAL RATINGS, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT OF HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE DOMESTIC ISSUES, MAY AGAIN BE FALLING SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT 50 PERCENT FIGURE. IN TWO RECENT PRE-SUMMIT POLLS THE PRESIDENT'S QUOTE FAVOURABILITY RATING UNQUOTE CAME OUT ONLY 4 AND 6 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY AHEAD OF GORBACHEV'S.

ACLAND

YYYY

DRWBAN 6519

NNNN

022743
MDLIAN 4242

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 2672
OF 031820Z DECEMBER 87
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

MOSCOW TELNO 1714 : US/SOVIET RELATIONS : GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH NBC

SUMMARY

1. MIXED REVIEWS HERE. GORBACHEV GIVEN GOOD MARKS FOR A POLISHED PERFORMANCE. BUT GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT BENEATH THE NEW PACKAGING THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF FAMILIAR SOVIET SUBSTANCE. HIS REMARK ON HUMAN RIGHTS WENT DOWN PARTICULARLY BADLY.

DETAIL

2. THE PUNDITS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS HERE HAVE BEEN DIGESTING GORBACHEV'S 30 NOVEMBER TV INTERVIEW. THE GENERAL VERDICT IS THAT IT WAS IMPRESSIVE AS A PERFORMANCE: INTELLIGENT, ARTICULATE, AT POINTS COMBATIVE, ALWAYS POISED, AND WITH A REFRESHINGLY PRACTICAL APPROACH IN MANY AREAS.

3. BUT LEADING POLITICAL COMMENTATORS HAVE URGED THE PUBLIC NOT TO TREAT HIM AS A POP HERO. THEY HAVE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS SALUTARY FOR AMERICAN VIEWERS TO SEE, AFTER ALL THE TALK OF GORBACHEV THE REFORMER, THAT HE REMAINED A DEDICATED SOVIET COMMUNIST, DEFENDING WITH CONVICTION TRADITIONAL SOVIET POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES. MOST AGREED THAT THE OLD THINKING SHOWED THROUGH MOST CLEARLY IN THE PASSAGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE BERLIN WALL AND AFGHANISTAN. AS THE WASHINGTON POST PUT IT IN AN EDITORIAL QUOTE TO TAKE WESTERN INTEREST IN EMIGRATION AS A TRICK TO STEAL SOVIET SCIENCE WOULD BE LAUGHABLE IF IT WERE NOT SO WRONG AND MEAN. TO PRESENT THE AFGHAN CRISIS AS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE RESULT OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IS, AT BEST, MISLEADING AND EVASIVE UNQUOTE.

4. GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE HAD A PARTICULARLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE EFFECT. A CONTACT IN STATE TELLS US THAT SHULTZ'S REACTION WAS THAT GORBACHEV HAD FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN FEELING ON THIS ISSUE, AND THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD THEREFORE BRGIN WITH GORBACHEV ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS AT A SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON 3 DECEMBER, ATTENDED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, SPOKE OUT STRONGLY AGAINST GORBACHEV'S REMARKS. THE PRESIDENT TOOK A FIRM LINE IN HIS OWN REMARKS THERE (QUOTE WE WILL NOT BE LULLED INTO IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE APPARATUS OF STATE

REPRESSION REMAINS INTACT IN THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE).
5. IN SHORT, GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEMED TO HAVE ACCENTUATED THE SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH HAS BEEN GAINING GROUND HERE IN RECENT WEEKS AT THE LACK OF PRACTICAL ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 198

MAIN 172

EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED
SOVIET
DEFENCE
SEC POL D
RESEARCH
PLANNERS
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD
SAD
CRD
ESSD
NEWS
INFO
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL
PS
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
CHIEF CLERK
MR BOYD
MR MUNRO
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MISS PESTELL
MR WINCHESTER
MR KERR
NO. 10 DOWNING ST

ADDITIONAL 26

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

NNNN

010

Deadline Done 4/12.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC

Please telephone FCO Protocol Dept tomorrow to say:
(1) Table plan agreed — with one change
(2) Mr. Mellor to lower second table.
(3) PM does not want Pollock behind her during lunch. CDP.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1987

Dear Charles,

Gorbachev's Stopover: Seating at Lunch

I am sending you with this letter a draft placement for the top table at lunch at Brize Norton on 7 December.

The seating has been arranged on the assumption that the Prime Minister will wish primarily to continue her talks with Mr Gorbachev; that Mrs Gorbacheva will have spent an hour with Mr Baker and should therefore be seated next to another senior British Minister, and that the object of including Mr Clark and the CDS is that they should be given the opportunity of talking to Mr Kamentsev and Marshal Akhromeyev. This leaves the other senior Politburo representative, Mr Yakovlev, seated next to two senior Ministers and Mr Gorbachev placed next to the Defence Secretary, although there will probably not be much conversation in that direction.

Mr Yakovlev, Mr Dobrynin and Mr Zamyatin all speak English. Interpreters, a mixture of British and Soviet, will be spaced for other guests. It would be useful to know whether the Prime Minister wishes Richard Pollock to sit behind her, or whether she is relaxed about the interpretation at lunch being done by the senior Soviet interpreter who will probably be Mr Uspensky, as it was in Moscow.

There is one minor potential awkwardness in that there are two Central Committee members on the delegation for whom room could only be found at the top table either by a considerable squash or by replacing two others. These are Messrs Boldin and Kruchina, who are Heads of Central Committee Departments respectively for general coordination and administration. They will not take part in the talks, but are quite senior and the Russians may press for them to be given higher priority. However, there is a defensible distinction between those already selected for top table status and these two other senior visitors and we would propose to place them in the top slots on the second table which we suggest should be hosted by Mr Mellor. The details of the seating on the second table cannot yet be finalised as the Russians have not yet clearly indicated who else will need to be accommodated there.

CONFIDENTIAL

I should welcome a very early indication of the Prime Minister's views.

Yours ever,

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street


Interpreter
Interpreter
Interpreter
Interpreter
Mr Baker
Mr Yakovlev
Mr Younger
Mr Gorbachev
The Prime Minister
Mrs Gorbacheva
Sir Geoffrey Howe
Mr Shevardnadze
Sir Bryan Cartledge Ambassador, Moscow
Zamyatin
Cartledge
Mr Chernayev
Grp Cpt Lumb Station Cdr of Brize Norton
Marshal Akhromeyev
Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr Dobrynin
Mr Clark
Mr Kamentsev
Mr Powell
Mr Zamyatin
Interpreter
Interpreter
Interpreter

U99AAN

017472
MDADAN 7793



CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 030900Z FCOLN
TELNO 2663
OF 030215Z DECEMBER 87
INFO DESKBY 030700Z MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

ADVANCE COPY

SIC
MODUK FOR DACU

MY TWO IPTS: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL: INF/CW/CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL/NUCLEAR TESTING

SUMMARY

1. INF TREATY TO BE SIGNED. MOVEMENT ON CW AND NUCLEAR TESTING POSSIBLE. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL CERTAIN TO BE DISCUSSED.

DETAIL

2. SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY ON 8 DECEMBER IS EXPECTED TO BE THE CEREMONIAL CENTREPIECE OF THE SUMMIT. THE TREATY TEXTS ARE, HOWEVER, STILL NOT COMPLETE IN SPITE OF FRENETIC LAST-MINUTE EFFORTS TO FINISH DRAFTING. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN DEEPLY FRUSTRATED IN RECENT DAYS BY THE APPARENT LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA SINCE 26 NOVEMBER. GLITMAN GAVE A CLEAN US DRAFT OF THE TREATY TO THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA ON 2 DECEMBER, WITH A VIEW TO THE IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION OF THE LAST REMAINING ISSUES. IF ALL GOES WELL, LAWYERS WILL CONFORM THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TEXTS OVER THE WEEKEND.

3. THE RUSSIANS FINALLY ON 2 DECEMBER PRODUCED THE NECESSARY OUTSTANDING DATA (ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES). THIS HAS MADE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ENTIRELY CONFIDENT THAT THE OTHER REMAINING MINOR PROBLEMS WILL NOW QUICKLY FALL AWAY, ALTHOUGH THE WEEK-LONG IMPASSE IN GENEVA HAS TESTED THEIR NERVES AND COMPLETION ON TIME WILL BE A CLOSE-RUN THING.

4. MEANWHILE, DETAILS OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME HAVE BEEN WIDELY REPORTED HERE. INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER REACTION HAS BEEN FAIRLY FAVOURABLE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE PERMANENT MONITORING OF THE SS-25 FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY AT

VOTKINSK, BUT THAT REACTION MAY OWE SOMETHING TO THE DEPRESSED EXPECTATIONS OF RECENT MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE LOOKING TO THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY, AND TO THE FAVOURABLE REACTION OF POLITICAL FRIENDS AND ALLIES, TO GIVE THE TREATY AS GOOD A LAUNCH AS POSSIBLE.

CW.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO CW AT THE SUMMIT WILL EMPHASISE THE SECURITY ASPECTS. WHILST ANY MOVE THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A DISAVOWAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S LONG-STANDING OBJECTIVE OF A GLOBAL CW BAN IS UNLIKELY (THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY REVIEW IS STILL IN TRAIN), THE US TEAM WILL TRY TO FOCUS ON THE FOUR MAJOR US CONCERNS: VERIFICATION, PROLIFERATION, NOVEL AGENTS, AND MONITORING OF THE CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.

6. GORBACHEV IS EXPECTED TO TRY FOR A COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CONVENTION IN 1988, IN LINE WITH THE (REJECTED) SOVIET DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR A JOINT STATEMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO EXPECT A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE DURING THE SUMMIT WITH EMPHASIS ON THE IMMINENCE OF A CONVENTION AND ON THE SOVIET PRODUCTION MORATORIUM. SUCH AN OFFENSIVE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE AIMED AT CONGRESS IN PARTICULAR. FOR THEIR PART, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO CONCENTRATE DETAILED WORK ON BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE SORT DISCUSSED BY SHEVARDNADZE AND SHULTZ AT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS IN THE HOPE OF SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FURTHER BILATERAL VISITS TO SHIKHANY AND TOOELE AND EARLY EXCHANGES OF DATA DECOUPLED FROM THE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION. MUTUAL INSPECTION OF A LIMITED DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS IS ALSO SOMETHING ON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE THAT AGREEMENT MIGHT JUST POSSIBLY BE REACHED.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

7. THE PROFILE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN RAISED SLIGHTLY HERE IN RECENT DAYS, WITH RENEWED CONGRESSIONAL (AND ADMINISTRATION) INTEREST IN THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE POST-INF, AND WITH PENTAGON IN-FIGHTING ON BUDGET CUTS PROPELLING PROVOCATIVE ARMY CONTINGENCY PLANS (FOR WITHDRAWING A US DIVISION FROM GERMANY) ONTO THE FRONT PAGES OF SPECIALIST JOURNALS. BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PROGRESS ON DETAILED ISSUES WILL BE MADE AT THE SUMMIT: WHILE A BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO GOALS THAT MIGHT ANTICIPATE SOME ASPECTS OF THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT NATO DELIBERATIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT, THE ADMINISTRATION FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IS A MULTILATERAL AND NOT

A BILATERAL MATTER.

8. AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY GORBACHEV DURING THE SUMMIT OF A LIMITED UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET DIVISIONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE IS REGARDED AS A POSSIBILITY ALTHOUGH MOST US OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE MORE IMPACT IF MADE AT THE OPENING OF THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS NEXT YEAR.

NUCLEAR TESTING

9. NOW THAT US/SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS HAVE OPENED IN GENEVA (LIMITED BUT WORTHWHILE PROGRESS ON BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WAS MADE DURING THE FIRST ROUND ON 9-20 NOVEMBER - CLARKE'S TELELETTER OF 2 DECEMBER), SOME OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION FOR EARLY MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN TAKEN OFF. AT THE SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO STRESS THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON A VERIFICATION REGIME THAT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO SEEK SENATE CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET. PROGRESS ON THE PROPOSED JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR STEP DOWN THAT ROAD, IS POSSIBLE. MAJOR SOVIET SURPRISES, SUCH AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF CORRTEX AS A BONA FIDE MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR ALL NUCLEAR TESTING, ARE NOT THOUGHT LIKELY, BUT CONTINUING PRESSURE FROM GORBACHEV FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TOWARDS A CTB IS EXPECTED, IN PUBLIC (WITH CONGRESS IN MIND) AS WELL AS IN PRIVATE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 22

ADVANCE 22

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/NAD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD

017472
MDADAN 7793

MR FALL
MR FEARN

CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

017464
MDADAN 7792

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 030900Z FCO
TELNO 2662
OF 030210Z DECEMBER 87
INFO DESKBY 030700Z MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA,
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

SIC
MODUK FOR DACU

MIPT: THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL: START/DEFENCE AND SPACE

SUMMARY

1. START THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR SIGNFICANT ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR HOW SERIOUS AN OBSTACLE ABMT ISSUES MAY PROVE.

DETAIL

START

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE AND EXPECT THAT START WILL BE THE MAIN FOCUS OF ARMS CONTROL DLSCUSSIONS DURING THE SUMMIT. THEY HOPE THAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE AGREEMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATORS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE IMPETUS AND DIRECTION TO WORK IN GENEVA OVER THE COMING MONTHS. IN PRACTICE, ANY SUCH DOCUMENT COULD LOOK VERY LIKE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT THOUGH THIS IS A TERM THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CAREFUL TO AVOID USING.

3. THE MAIN OUTSTANDING START ISSUES ARE WELL-KNOWN AND RELATIVELY CLEARLY DEFINED IN THE HEAVILY-BRACKETED JOINT DRAFT TREATY THAT IS NOW THE MAIN WORKING DOCUMENT IN GENEVA. THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE:

(A) SUB-LIMITS. UNDER THE AGGREGATE CEILING OF 6,000 WEAPONS (AND 1,600 SNDVS), THE US HAS PROPOSED SUB-LIMITS OF 4,800 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3,300 FOR ICBM RVS, AND 1,650 FOR RVS ON HEAVY, MOBILE AND HIGHLY MIRVED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO IMPLY A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SUB-LIMIT OF 5,100 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS (AN INFORMAL SUGGESTION MADE TO SHULTZ BY AKHROMEYEV IN GENEVA LAST MONTH), COUNTERPROPOSE A LIMIT OF 1800-2000 SLBM

RVS, AND ACCEPT A LIMIT OF 1,540 FOR RVS ON HEAVY (THOUGH NOT MOBILE OR HIGHLY MIRVED) ICBMS. CONSIDERABLE CONVERGENCE HAS THEREFORE NOW TAKEN PLACE ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN, ESPECIALLY ON MOBILE MISSILES AND SLBMS:

(B) SLCMS. THE REYKJAVIK AGREEMENT WAS THAT SLCMS COULD BE CONSTRAINED (A US CONCESSION) BUT OUTSIDE THE MAIN START AGGREGATES (A SOVIET CONCESSION). THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT SINCE THEN. THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT OF 400 LONG-RANGE SLCMS DEPLOYED ONLY ON TWO IDENTIFIED CLASSES OF SUBMARINE ON EACH SIDE. THE US HAS REJECTED THIS POSITION BOTH ON FORCE POSTURE GROUNDS (THE US NUCLEAR SLCM FORCE WILL BE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE US SURFACE AND SUBMARINE FLEETS) AND ON VERIFICATION GROUNDS (DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS IS REGARDED HERE AS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE). THEY HAVE FLOATED INSTEAD THE IDEA OF (UNVERIFIABLE) DECLARATIONS BY BOTH SIDES OF THEIR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SLCM FORCES, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SIGNALLED THAT THEY WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE SLCM ISSUE DURING THE SUMMIT:

(C) MOBILE MISSILES. THE US HAS SO FAR MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THAT ALL MOBILE MISSILES SHOULD BE BANNED AND HAVE SAID THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS CANNOT ACCEPT THIS, THEN THEY MUST OFFER IDEAS ON HOW LIMITS ABOVE ZERO MIGHT BE VERIFIED:

(D) VERIFICATION. VERY LITTLE DETAILED WORK ON START VERIFICATION HAS SO FAR BEEN DONE IN GENEVA PARTLY BECAUSE THE LIMITED NUMBER OF VERIFICATION EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN FULLY ENGAGED ON INF AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN WAITING TO SEE WHAT VERIFICATION BASELINE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN START WOULD FINALLY EMERGE FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE GENERAL VIEW HERE IS THAT VERIFICATION OF A START TREATY (WHICH WOULD LARGELY INVOLVE MONITORING LIMITS ABOVE ZERO) WILL BE A CONSIDERABLY TOUGHER PROBLEM THAN INF VERIFICATION:

(E) THROW-WEIGHT. THE US POSITION IS THAT THERE MUST BE A DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONSTRAINT ON THROW-WEIGHT LIMITING IT TO HALF OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEVEL. SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE SOVIET-PROPOSED LIMIT OF 1,540 HEAVY ICBM RVS WOULD EFFECTIVELY DO THE TRICK, BUT THE PENTAGON CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR DIRECT THROW-WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. ALL PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ANYWAY BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST BE ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT SUBSEQUENT QUOTE THROW-WEIGHT CREEP UNQUOTE IE AN INCREASE IN THROW-WEIGHT AS A RESULT OF BUILDING LARGE NON-HEAVY ICBMS THAT WOULD NOT BE LIMITED UNDER

THE 1,540 CEIALING. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF GREAT TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING WHAT THROW-WEIGHT IS:

(F) BACKFIRE. THE US HAS ARGUED THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER MUST BE CONSTRAINED BY A START TREATY, WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE REJECTED:

(G) COUNTING RULES. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE AT REYKJAVIK ON A COUNTING RULE FOR BOMBER WEAPONS. BUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR CALCULATING ALCM LOADINGS AND THE WHOLE ISSUE OF COUNTING RULES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS REMAIN LARGELY UNADDRESSED.

4. BRIEFS FOR THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE FINALISED BEFORE AN NSPG MEETING LATER THIS WEEK FOLLOWING CARLUCCI'S RETURN FROM EUROPE. IT IS THEREFORE NOT YET CLEAR WHAT US CONCESSIONS ON THESE POINTS THE PRESIDENT MAY BE ADVISED TO MAKE. WHILE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE DURING THE SUMMIT ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF START ISSUES, THE MOST LIKELY PROSPECTS ARE PERHAPS FOR AGREEMENT ON SUB-LIMITS (WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY INVOLVE A US MOVE AWAY FROM THE PROPOSED BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES AND THE DROPPING OF SEPARATE SUB-LIMITS ON ICBM AND SLBM RVS), VERIFICATION (PERHAPS AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES NOW ESTABLISHED IN THE INF CONTEXT), AND BACKFIRE (PERHAPS SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONSTRAINTS BUT OUTSIDE THE 6,000/1,600 AGGREGATES).

5. BUT THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS IN START MAY OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW GORBACHEV AND THE PRESIDENT PLAY THEIR RESPECTIVE HANDS ON LINKAGE WITH DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES. THE GENERAL INCLINATION HERE IS TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE RELAXED THEIR INSISTENCE ON START/SDI LINKAGE SOMEWHAT IN RECENT WEEKS AND THAT THEY HAVE SOFTENED THEIR OVERALL APPROACH TO SDI CONSTRAINTS. IT DOES INDEED SEEM CLEAR THAT THE TONE AND LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH HAS EVOLVED. THE EARLIER FRONTAL ATTACK ON SDI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED IN FAVOUR OF A MORE EXPLICIT CONCENTRATION ON THE ABMT, AND GORBACHEV HAS NOW ADMITTED PUBLICLY TO SOVIET SDI-TYPE ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THERE IS LESS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO AVOID THE MILITARISATION OF SPACE AND MORE ON THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY, A CONCEPT QUITE CLOSE TO THAT OF PREDICTABILITY. BUT US OFFICIALS FIND IT HARDER TO POINT TO ACTUAL CHANGES IN SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. WHILE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CONFINE ALL SDI RESEARCH TO THE LABORATORY, IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THEIR INSISTENCE ON STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABMT REFLECTS ANY REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET BOTTOM LINE REQUIREMENTS.

6. THE KEY DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES REMAIN THE SAME:

(A) THE LENGTH OF ANY PERIOD OF OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM OR COMMITMENT NOT TO DEPLOY SDI SYSTEMS (PRECISELY WHICH OF THESE THE US IS OFFERING REMAINS UNCLEAR AND CONTINUES TO BE A MATTER OF DISPUTE BETWEEN AGENCIES). THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED 10 YEARS FROM ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ANY DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY WHILE THE AMERICANS HAVE PROPOSED THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1994:

(B) WHAT ADDITIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD THERE MIGHT BE DURING THIS PERIOD. THE RUSSIANS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN EITHER (I) A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE ABMT AS IT WAS SIGNED AND RATIFIED (PRESUMABLY THE NARROW INTERPRETATION) OR (II) AGREEMENT ON A LIST OF TIGHT TECHNICAL PARAMETERS THAT WOULD LIMIT SDI DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING DURING THIS PERIOD. THE AMERICANS HAVE SO FAR DECLINED TO DISCUSS EITHER OPTION ALTHOUGH SOME OFFICIALS (NOTABLY NITZE) HAVE NOT HIDDEN THEIR BELIEF THAT (II) COULD BE A PROMISING AVENUE:

(C) WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD APPLY AT THE END OF THE ABMT OBSERVANCE/NO DEPLOYMENT PERIOD. THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT THE ABMT (WITH ITS PROVISION FOR SIX MONTHS NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL) WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE, A POSITION VERY CLOSE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE US POSITION IS. BUT THE DOD BELIEVE THAT THE US POSITION IS THAT THE ABMT WOULD THEN FALL AWAY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY THAT WOULD ESTABLISH THE NO DEPLOYMENT PERIOD.

OF THE THREE ISSUES, (A) WOULD APPEAR RELATIVELY EASY TO RESOLVE AND MIGHT INDEED BE SETTLED DURING THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. (C) WOULD APPEAR EASY TO RESOLVE IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE US POSITION IS ACCEPTED BUT A MAJOR CONTINUING DIFFICULTY IF THE DOD INTERPRETATION IS UPHELD. (B) SEEMS CLEARLY TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE.

7. ALL OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PREFERENCE AT THE SUMMIT WILL BE TO DELINK START AND SDI ISSUES COMPLETELY AND TRY FOR SOLID PROGRESS IN START WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE DISPUTE. BUT NONE OF OUR CONTACTS IS WILLING TO HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW THE PRESIDENT MAY REACT IF GORBACHEV IS UNWILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THIS AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF HE INSISTS ON PROGRESS ON (B) ABOVE. THE PRESIDENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT ((I) ABOVE) FOR A MEANINGFUL PERIOD (A SHORT, SAY TWO YEAR, PERIOD MIGHT BE EASIER) SEEMS UNLIKELY AND WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FACE AND A FIRESTORM OF CRITICISM FROM CONSERVATIVE QUARTERS. THE PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PARAMETERS CAN PERHAPS BE

ENVISAGED SOMEWHAT MORE EASILY, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH A DISCUSSION SEEMED TO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ABOUT PLANS AND PROGRAMMES THAT CREATED NO REAL NEW CONSTRAINTS (THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEAS IN THIS RESPECT ARE VERY MUCH IN PEOPLE'S MINDS HERE). BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS PLENTY OF ADVISERS WHO BELIEVE THAT, IF GORBACHEV PRESSES THE LINKAGE POINT, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD - AND WILL - QUOTE JUST SAY NO UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 22

ADVANCE 22

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/NAD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

017457
MDADAN 7791

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 030900Z FCO
TELNO 2661
OF 030155Z DECEMBER 87
INFO DESKBY 030700Z MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS,
INFO ROUTINE UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, UKDEL MBRF VIENNA

COPY COPY

MODUK FOR DACU
WASHINGTON SUMMIT PREVIEW
SUMMARY
1. A WORKING SUMMIT, BUT WITH THE CEREMONIAL OF A STATE VISIT, AND HENCE VERY DIFFERENT IN ATMOSPHERE FROM GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK. SIGNATURE OF INF AGREEMENT THE PUBLIC CENTREPIECE. NEGOTIATIONS AND POSSIBLE PROGRESS ON START: BUT DISCUSSION PROBABLY LIMITED TO SPARRING ON OTHER ISSUES, UNLESS GORBACHEV COMES WITH SOMETHING TO OFFER ON AFGHANISTAN.
DETAIL
2. GORBACHEV ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON ON 7 DECEMBER FOR THE FIRST VISIT TO THE US BY A SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY SINCE THE BREZHNEV/NIXON SUMMIT OF 1973. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A DELEGATION OF SOME 70 OFFICIALS INCLUDING SHEVARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN AND AKHROMEYEV (FULL LIST BY BAG TO SOVIET DEPARTMENT). THE WHITE HOUSE ARE TREATING IT AS A FULL STATE VISIT WITH ALL THE CUSTOMARY CEREMONIAL. IN ADDITION TO SIGNING THE INF TREATY, GORBACHEV WILL HAVE FIVE MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT: A BREAKFAST SESSION WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND A GROUP OF SCIENTISTS/ACADEMICS TO DISCUSS LONG-TERM GLOBAL TRENDS: A PRIVATE MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY: AND SESSIONS ALSO ORGANISED BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY WITH BUSINESSMEN AND THE PRESS, INCLUDING A PRESS CONFERENCE. THE IDEA OF AN ADDRESS BY GORBACHEV TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS WAS DROPPED AFTER OPPOSITION FROM THE RIGHT (MUCH TO SOVIET IRRITATION, WE ARE TOLD, WITH THE RESULT THAT HIS CONTACT WITH CONGRESS WILL BE FAIRLY LIMITED). WORKING GROUPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS AT PREVIOUS SUMMITS.
3. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE A JOINT STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE VISIT (AS AT GENEVA), ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT COMMITTED TO ONE, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR EXERCISE TO PRE-NEGOTIATE A TEXT. THE RUSSIANS HAVE HOWEVER HANDED OVER SOME LANGUAGE ON ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THERE

HAS BEEN SOME INITIAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN MS RIDGWAY AND BESSMERTNYKH.

4. THERE IS A PALPABLE AIR OF ANTICIPATION HERE IN ADVANCE OF GORBACHEV'S ARRIVAL. THE US PRESS IS FULL OF FEATURES ON GORBACHEV: HIS PERSONALITY, POLICIES AND HIS WIFE. THE RUSSIANS ARE SKILFULLY PLAYING TO THIS NATURAL AMERICAN CURIOSITY, WITH A SERIES OF MEDIA EVENTS, INCLUDING THE HOUR LONG INTERVIEW WITH GORBACHEV SCREENED BY NBC ON 30 NOVEMBER (MOSCOW TELNO 1714).

5. FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE SUMMIT IS A WELCOME CHANCE TO SCORE A FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUCCESS AFTER AN AUTUMN OF SET-BACKS ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT. THE SUMMIT SEEMS BOUND TO PLAY WELL FOR HIM IN MIDDLE AMERICA. BUT THERE ARE PITFALLS. IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF NERVOUSNESS (AS THERE WAS BEFORE GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK) THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY BE UPSTAGED BY GORBACHEV IN PUBLIC APPEARANCES OR WORSTED BY HIM AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE RIGHT ARE INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED

ABOUT THE TREND OF EVENTS IN ARMS CONTROL, AND ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR FEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY GIVE AWAY THE STORE, ESPECIALLY ON SDI. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE RESPONDED WITH A SERIES OF SPEECHES BY THE PRESIDENT (IN DENVER ON 27 NOVEMBER: OUR TELNO 2594 AND TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION ON 30 NOVEMBER) DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE RIGHT. BUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON THIS TRACK RISKS SETTING AN ADVERSARIAL TONE FOR THE SUMMIT. IN SHORT, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO STRIKE A DIFFICULT BALANCE IN HIS PUBLIC PRESENTATION BETWEEN HIS NATURAL AFFABILITY AS HOST COUPLED WITH HIS DESIRE TO MAKE THE SUMMIT A SUCCESS, AND ON THE OTHER HAND HIS NEED TO SHOW TOUGHNESS ON THE ISSUES.

6. THE CENTREPIECE OF THE DISCUSSION SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE THE NEXT PHASE OF ARMS CONTROL. MY TWO IFTS CONTAIN AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE OF PLAY AND THE PROSPECTS. THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE SOME DETAILED NEGOTIATION ON START. BUT THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF INTEREST WILL BE WHETHER A WAY CAN BE FOUND OF RECONCILING THE PRESIDENT'S INSTINCTIVE DETERMINATION TO AVOID CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WITH GORBACHEV'S REQUIREMENTS ON A GUARANTEED PERIOD OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM TREATY. THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVELY DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPALS. AND NO-ONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY HOW THE PRESIDENT WILL PLAY HIS HAND, OR INDEED WHETHER THIS KEY POINT WILL BE ADDRESSED HEAD ON AT THIS SUMMIT, OR LEFT UNTIL LATER

7. THERE IS EQUAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT MIGHT COME OUT OF

THE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES. AFGHANISTAN WILL BE TOP OF THE LIST. THE AMERICANS WILL WANT TO PROBE THE RECENT HINTS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SET A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL (WITHOUT LINKAGE TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT.) THEY REGARD THE BALL AS VERY MUCH IN GORBACHEV'S COURT, AND SEE THIS AS ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH HE COULD COME WITH SOMETHING NEW TO OFFER - WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DEFUSING THE ISSUE AT THE SUMMIT AND SECURING AN AGREED REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. TO ACHIEVE THIS HE WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT HE HAS GENUINELY TAKEN THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW: AND OUR CONTACTS FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT GORBACHEV WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A CONCESSION DIRECT TO THE AMERICANS RATHER THAN AT GENEVA OR TO THE PAKISTANIS. ON THE GULF, THE PRESIDENT WILL PRESS THE RUSSIANS ONCE AGAIN TO COOPERATE ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO RESOLUTION 598 AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, HE WILL BE PROBING TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEW FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ANGOLA WHILST SOME AMERICANS PROFESS TO DETECT. THERE ARE A SERIES OF OTHER ISSUES ON THE AGENDA WHICH MAY BE TOUCHED ON IF TIME ALLOWS (ARAB/ISRAEL, CAMBODIA, BERLIN, CENTRAL AMERICA). BUT THESE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DEFLECTED TO A WORKING GROUP.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE A MAJOR THEME THROUGHOUT GORBACHEV'S VISIT. ON THE EVE OF HIS ARRIVAL, AMERICAN JEWISH GROUPS ARE MOUNTING A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION (ESTIMATES RANGE UP TO HALF A MILLION) ON THE WASHINGTON MALL. THE THEME WILL NOT BE OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMIT ITSELF, BUT A WELCOME FOR THE IMPROVED RATE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION, COUPLED WITH AN APPEAL FOR A MUCH LARGER INCREASE, A LIFTING OF EMIGRATION CONTROLS AND GREATER CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SOVIET UNION. BETTER SOVIET EMIGRATION FIGURES HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN RECENT MONTHS, ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET PERFORMANCE REMAINS CONSIDERABLE. THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV ON ALL THE MAIN ISSUES: INDIVIDUAL CASES: EMIGRATION AND THE REGULATIONS CONTROLLING IT: AND POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS. FOR THEIR PART THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT RECENTLY AT WHAT SEEMS TO BE A LEVELLING-OFF IN THE LATEST SOVIET EMIGRATION FIGURES, AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN AMENDING SOVIET LAWS TO MAKE THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION FAIRER AND MORE OPEN. THEY ARE EXPECTING GORBACHEV TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY - AS HE DID IN HIS NBC INTERVIEW,

BUT THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY ANNOUNCE A CLEAN SWEEP OF ALL THE INDIVIDUAL CASES OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE US

(E.G. DIVIDED SPOUSES AND FAMILIES).
9. THE RUSSIANS ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST DURING WHITEHEAD'S VISIT IN JOINT COOPERATIVE PROJECTS IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD (DRUG ABUSE, ALCOHOLISM, EXCHANGES OF LAWYERS, DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES AND PSYCHIATRISTS). SOME OF THESE MAY SURFACE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.
10. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MIXED SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THERE IS NO INCLINATION HERE TO GIVE ANY GROUND ON THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. SHULTZ CONFIRMED TO EC AMBASSADORS ON 30 NOVEMBER THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED IN SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
11. BILATERAL ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO GET LITTLE IF ANY TIME IN THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THE JOINT STATEMENT MAY WELL CONTAIN A BOOST FOR PEOPLE TO PEOPLE EXCHANGES, PARTICULARLY YOUTH EXCHANGES: A SUBJECT DEAR TO THE PRESIDENT'S HEART. IT MAY ALSO RECORD AGREEMENT ON A NEW BASIC SCIENCES AGREEMENT AND AN EXPANSION OF CIVIL AVIATION SERVICES. OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NEW US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WILL BE DEALT WITH BY EXPERTS IN THE MARGINS.
COMMENT
12. THIS ADDS UP TO A SUBSTANTIAL AGENDA, MOST OF IT ON FAMILIAR LINES. APART FROM THE SIGNING OF THE INF AGREEMENT, MUCH OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VISIT WILL BE SYMBOLIC, MARKING A FURTHER STEP IN THE RETURN TO NORMAL DEALINGS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. BUT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER WE ARE TO BE TREATED TO ANOTHER SURPRISE OUTCOME. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CERTAINLY ALIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT GORBACHEV MAY COME WITH SOME STRIKING NEW INITIATIVE. BUT THEY ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT THE LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK, WITH ITS FREE-WHEELING AND LARGELY UNPREPARED DISCUSSIONS, HAVE BEEN LEARNED. THIS TIME, THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PREPARATION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL AND BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE. THE FLAVOUR SHOULD BE CLOSER TO A STATE VISIT THAN A SHIRTSLEEVES SUMMIT. AND THE PRESIDENT, EMBATTLED WITH THE RIGHT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING INF RATIFICATION, WILL NOT WANT TO COURT FURTHER TROUBLE BY SIGNING UP TO SOME UNEXPECTED SUMMIT QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE CAN BE NO PROGRESS ON ANY ISSUE AT THIS MEETING. WE MAY WELL SEE SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT ON START, ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, OR POSSIBLY ON AFGHANISTAN. BUT WHILE SUMMITS CAN OF COURSE NEVER BE ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE, THE AGENDA IS NOW MUCH MORE CLEARLY DEFINED THAN IT WAS FOURTEEN

MONTHS AGO, AND REYKJAVIK-TYPE SURPRISES ARE LESS LIKELY.
13. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT GORBACHEV WILL BE STOPPING OVER IN THE UK FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN PRIVATELY WELCOMED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE DETECTED NO SENSITIVITY HERE: ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT IT CAN DO NOTHING BUT GOOD FOR GORBACHEV TO HEAR THE SAME FIRM MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WILL SUBSEQUENTLY HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT.
14. SEE MY 2 IFTS (NOT TO ALL).

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 22

ADVANCE 22

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/NAD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

cc PC
B/UP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office 15

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

COVERING SECRET

3 December 1987

Dear Charles,

Mr Gorbachev's Stop-over in the UK

This letter and its attachments are intended to serve as the Prime Minister's brief for her talks with Mr Gorbachev.

MR GORBACHEV'S AIMS

Mr Gorbachev will probably wish to assess European attitudes to the INF treaty and European strength of purpose in resisting steps towards further denuclearisation. He may well wish to raise again the point at which the British and French deterrents should enter the strategic weapons discussion. In general he will be anxious to maintain the dialogue with Britain as the United States moves into the pre-election period but will not be averse to a little wedge-driving - indeed his last-minute acceptance of the Prime Minister's invitation might in part have been calculated to cause concern in Washington. He will also want to stress that both internally and externally his reforms are genuine and not merely tactical repackaging, and that he is firmly in control.

BRITISH OBJECTIVES

Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that arms control should be at the head of our agenda. We should make clear that there is no division between Europe and the US on INF and full alliance unity on the way ahead on arms control. We should keep up the pressure on the human rights front, as well as making one or two bilateral points. (One of these is being covered In a separate letter). We should also take the opportunity to get across the strength of our views on key regional issues, notably Afghanistan and the Gulf war. Finally the meetings will be an opportunity to gain a first-hand impression of the strength of Gorbachev's own position. Public presentation will clearly be very important. The crucial point will be to appear supportive of the Americans just before the Summit.

Given the limitations on time, Sir Geoffrey Howe recommends as far as possible a division of labour. He suggests that the Prime Minister may wish to focus on the main political aspects of arms control and alliance unity and on Mr Gorbachev's assessment of the prospects and direction of perestroika. The Prime Minister will clearly also wish to raise human rights in general terms, refer

briefly to regional issues, and make one or two bilateral points (invitation to Mr Gorbachev, trade); but Sir Geoffrey suggests that his own talks should cover these in more detail.

ARMS CONTROL

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish warmly to welcome the INF Agreement. Mr Gorbachev may well try to accuse NATO of planning to "circumvent" the Agreement by making adjustments to its residual INF forces. There will in fact be no circumvention because any adjustments will be composed of non-Treaty limited items. The Soviet Union will have as much freedom to adjust as NATO and has substantial modernisation programmes underway for nuclear capable aircraft and for sea-and air-launched cruise missiles. NATO Defence Ministers have repeatedly made clear that only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence are maintained by the Alliance. Even before the INF treaty NATO reduced its stockpile by 2400 warheads. Can the Soviet Union say the same for its stockpile?

Mr Gorbachev may press for follow-on INF negotiations and negotiations on SNF, and seek to portray the Germans as keen on the latter. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to reiterate the validity of nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future and the need to eliminate chemical weapons and the conventional imbalance before any further agreement on nuclear weapons in Europe could be considered.

This does not mean that we do not support 50% reductions in the strategic forces of the superpowers. This is likely to be the major arms control topic at the Washington Summit. Further progress on sub-limits may be possible. Verification discussions still have a long way to go (the Americans have asked us to stress that verification will have to go even further than for INF). But the main question will be linkage between START and the ABM Treaty.

Both sides have proposed a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (US seven years, after which deployment would be permissible in the absence of agreement to the contrary; Soviet Union ten years, during which activity relating to ballistic missile defence would be constrained within the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty or by a list of agreed parameters on what could and could not be done in space). Both Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Gorbachev have recently claimed that the Soviet Union is interested in strategic stability rather than in shackling the SDI programme as such; and Mr Gorbachev has confirmed for the first time publicly that the Soviet Union has a strategic defence research programme of its own. The Americans have asked that the Prime Minister should tell the Russians to set aside START/SDI linkage and get on with the completion of a draft START treaty. The Prime Minister may wish to

reiterate that she sees scope for mutually agreed US and Soviet programmes of activities involving space-based devices over a set time period. This, combined with a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, would reassure both sides that no break out was imminent.

If our own deterrent is raised, it is worth recalling Mr Gorbachev's public statement at the Reykjavik Summit; "we decide today to withdraw completely the question of British and French missiles" and "let them remain as an independent force, let them increase and be further improved". 50% cuts would still leave the US and Soviet Union with 6,000 strategic warheads each compared with a maximum of about 500 which the UK could deploy on Trident. Trident would thus represent a very small proportion of superpower arsenals even after such cuts. A START Agreement would not meet our conditions for subsequently associating the UK deterrent with the arms control process, ie very substantial reductions in the arsenals of the superpowers and no change in Soviet defensive capabilities.

It is possible that Mr Gorbachev may probe our position on nuclear testing. We have welcomed the recent opening of US/Soviet talks in Geneva which aim, as a first step, at agreeing verification procedures which will allow ratification of the bilateral Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. If Mr Gorbachev presses the Prime Minister to agree to an early resumption of CTB negotiations, the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to stress that a step-by-step approach is best. It would be premature to embark on the new CTB negotiations until progress on verification has been made.

On conventional arms control the Prime Minister may wish to commend stability as the goal in this, as in the strategic nuclear, field; and to welcome Mr Gorbachev's professed thesis that the right approach is for the side which enjoys numerical superiority in Europe to build down. She will also want to leave Mr Gorbachev in no doubt that we shall be looking for an explicit exclusion of nuclear weapons in the mandate for the forthcoming negotiations. There have been signs recently that the Soviet Union might be willing to accept such an exclusion, provided the mandate permits dual capable systems to be addressed. The Alliance's agreed position on such systems (aircraft, artillery and missiles) is that we will not make or accept proposals which might impinge upon our requirements for nuclear deterrence. At the same time we do not want to prevent ourselves trying to secure reductions in all those elements of the Warsaw Pact's military capabilities, including dual capable systems, we find threatening or destabilising. To reconcile these considerations the allies are seeking to negotiate a mandate for the talks which stipulates that the negotiations will be about

"conventional forces"; contains a specific provision that nuclear weapons will be excluded; but is silent on dual capable systems.

Mr Gorbachev may press for a commitment to "mutual" reductions. Allied representatives in Vienna have resisted "mutual", which might be taken to imply agreement to self-serving Soviet proposals for equal or equal percentage reductions. In our own planning for the negotiations we are not ruling out some modest Western reductions. But if any were eventually agreed they would not necessarily apply to all NATO countries. The key point to put to Mr Gorbachev is again that the side with superiority in Europe should build down.

On chemical weapons we recognise that the Soviet Union has moved towards us on verification and that progress has been made this year in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But the Prime Minister might underline to Mr Gorbachev that an effective agreement to eliminate CW, to which we are committed, poses exceptionally difficult problems for verification. With the world's largest and most advanced CW armoury, the Russians have a special responsibility to respond to the concerns of others on detailed data exchange and verification measures. It follows that the negotiations cannot be tied to completion within an artificial deadline (the Russians have suggested that negotiations can be completed in the next few months).

A question mark over Soviet motives stems from the claims made by Gorbachev in his speech in April in Prague (cessation of Soviet production; no deployment outside Soviet Union; and no non-Soviet Warsaw Pact possession). The Prime Minister will be aware of our intelligence assessments on these points, but we could not challenge Gorbachev directly without the risk of compromise to (mainly American) sources. The point could perhaps be met by noting that Gorbachev's speech contained the first public Soviet admission that the Soviet Union possessed CW: to that extent, we welcomed it as a step in the direction of greater openness, although there were some references - perhaps to the situation in the past - on which our experts would not necessarily agree. The Prime Minister might then say that the important thing was to look to the future, to a much more complete data exchange and other measures to build confidence between the major parties. The visit to the Soviet CW facility at Shikhany in October should be built upon (intelligence makes clear that a very considerable proportion of the site was not opened to the visitors); the exchange between Shikhany and Porton Down, which we hope will take place next spring, will be a further opportunity.

If Mr Gorbachev raises the new US binary programme (due to enter production on 17 December), the Prime Minister could say that this seems to us only prudent, given Soviet failure to respond to an effective 17 year US moratorium.

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET

Annexes with the main facts on the various arms control negotiations and on the East/West nuclear and conventional military balances are attached.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Prime Minister will wish to hear Mr Gorbachev's assessment of the current Soviet political and economic situation, and to repeat our support for the changes he is attempting to bring about. I attach short notes on the leadership, perestroika and proposed economic reforms. We are also arranging for you to receive a videotape of Mr Gorbachev's recent NBC interview.

There is no doubt that this is a difficult time at home for Mr Gorbachev. The prospects for his reforms are at best uncertain, particularly now that economic reforms are starting to bite and the removal of subsidies is in prospect. The downfall of his radical appointee, Eltsin, the strengthening of the conservatives under Ligachev and to a lesser extent sensitivities over the role of Raisa Gorbacheva, have made him more vulnerable than in the past.

In order to draw Mr Gorbachev out, the Prime Minister could ask how democratisation and economic decentralisation (both of which are given considerable emphasis in Mr Gorbachev's "Perestroika" book a copy of which was sent to the Prime Minister earlier) are compatible with the continuing "leading role" of the Party, and whether there are those in the Party who fear the loss of this role. Another possible theme is the need for, and difficulty of, changing attitudes. Mr Gorbachev asserts in his book that the Soviet people need to be educated into perestroika and out of the "psychology of dependence" which, he says has deep roots in the USSR. Motivating people to work harder requires material incentives as well as ideological exhortation, but ordinary people look to be more worried about price rises than attracted by payment by results and more responsibility. The Prime Minister might ask where positive results from reform might be seen soonest, and what the real prospects are for more and better consumer goods in the shops and a more consistent and varied food supply. ("Wishful thinking is a dangerous occupation" - Mr Gorbachev's book).

The Prime Minister could also welcome recent indications that the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence is evolving towards an acceptance that Western style capitalism/democracy is an alternative to socialism rather than a stage on the road to the inevitable triumph of socialism. She might wish to take the opportunity to stress that for our part we find Soviet style socialism alien and will not accept any Soviet subversion of our way of life. But greater tolerance and openness in the Soviet Union would increase Western confidence in the prospects for genuine cooperation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET

REGIONAL ISSUES

This is a timely moment to press Mr Gorbachev to prove Soviet good will by making a commitment at the summit to withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan next year and to accept a transitional government. The Americans have officially asked if the Prime Minister will raise this and suggested she make clear that concrete steps forward in this area could help the prospects for INF ratification . The proposed balanced statement by the European Council will add weight to the message, as did the record number of countries (123) at this year's UN General Assembly who demanded immediate Soviet withdrawal.

Discussion of Afghanistan may well lead to the question of US military aid to Pakistan and the related highly dangerous issue of nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent. We want to encourage the Russians and Americans to cooperate over this and of course stand ready to help ourselves. The Prime Minister could stress that the Iran/Iraq conflict is one regional issue where we share the same objectives: ending the conflict, and preserving freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The Summit is an opportunity for the superpowers to show a clear lead, and thus give new impetus to the implementation of SCR 598. The most urgent first step is for the Five to give the Secretary General the draft arms embargo resolution he has asked for. The Russians should resist the temptation to look for unilateral political advantage, and avoid unrealistic diversions such as their undefined proposal for a UN naval force.

The Americans will be happy to avoid discussion of Arab/Israel at the Summit. The Prime Minister might nevertheless make clear our own continuing support for an international conference, and discreetly encourage Mr Gorbachev at least to put down a marker with President Reagan that the convening of a conference remains a major Soviet objective. She might add that any new Soviet flexibility on Jewish emigration and/or restoration of relations with Israel would increase the pressure on Shamir (and the Americans) to move towards accepting a conference (and also help with INF ratification).

If time allows the Prime Minister might also remind Mr Gorbachev that the Soviet Union has an important role to play over Cambodia by using its influence to persuade Vietnam to work for an internationally acceptable solution.

HUMAN RIGHTS/CSCE

The Prime Minister will wish to recall her conversation with Mr Gorbachev in March, to note the continuing releases of prisoners and refuseniks (7,000 Jewish emigrants this year) but to press for

further major steps forward and for the necessary changes to basic attitudes, including abolition of repressive legislation. This would increase Western confidence in the Soviet Union and is essential to a sustained improvement in East-West relations. (Sir Geoffrey Howe will be pursuing a number of individual cases with Mr Shevardnadze). Again the Americans have suggested that Mrs Thatcher might make the point that Soviet performance in this area will crucially affect the INF Treaty ratification process. Mr Gorbachev may well refer to the Soviet proposal for a CSCE humanitarian conference in Moscow, to which he attaches importance. He may argue that such a meeting would actively contribute to improving Soviet performance and give assurances about the open circumstances in which it would be held. The Prime Minister will wish to stress our grave doubts about the appropriateness of such an event without a significant qualitative improvement in Soviet human rights performance, fulfilling their existing CSCE commitments as a minimum. She could also urge an end to Eastern stonewalling on these issues in the Vienna Review Conference.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

The Prime Minister will wish to renew the invitation to Mr Gorbachev to pay a substantive visit to the UK in 1988. If necessary she could repeat that she was distressed by the personal attacks on Mrs Gorbacheva in the British press, whilst reminding him that press freedom is an essential ingredient in our democracy. She could refer to her recent conversations with Academician Marchuk, Dr Tolstykh and Academician Aganbegyan, and Sir Geoffrey Howe's forthcoming visit to Moscow (dates in January or February still to be agreed) as examples of our interest in the development of a broadly-based bilateral dialogue. She could point to the usefulness of the memorandum of understanding signed during her visit in promoting exchanges and to Academician Aganbegyan's excellent launching of the lecture series. It would be very helpful if she could also make a brief mention of trade. Despite the agreement reached during her visit to Moscow to aim for a 40% increase by 1990, the figures so far this year are disappointing: UK imports up 17% at £650m and UK exports down 5% at £421m. The award to Simon Carves/GEC of the £250m contract to build a process controller plant in Yerevan, for which a letter of intent was signed during her visit, would do much to redress the balance. Negotiations are at a critical stage, and a mention by the Prime Minister could have a decisive influence. She could stress that HMG is offering its best possible credit terms. Continued delay is in no-one's interest.

/ Finally, I attach personality notes on Mr and Mrs Gorbachev.

Yours ever,

(D Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

(UNTIL TREATY SIGNED AND PUBLISHED)

INF Treaty

Main Provisions

1. The INF Treaty will provide for the global elimination of US and Soviet ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500/5500 kms. The existing missiles caught by this provision are spelled out by name. On the Soviet side, they are the SS-12/22 and the SS-23 (short range INF systems whose ranges are under 1,000 kms); and SS-4 and SS-20s (long range INF systems with ranges of 1,000 kms plus). All these Soviet systems are ballistic. On the US side the missiles concerned are the ground launched Cruise missiles (GLCM9 and the (ballistic) Pershing II. Both of these are long range INF systems. The FRG-owned Pershing ballistic IA missile, with US-owned warheads, will also be eliminated but not under the provisions of the Treaty. They will be renounced unilaterally by the FRG, such renunciation taking effect before the end of the elimination period set in the INF Treaty.

Elimination Arrangements

2. Elimination procedures will cover missiles; launchers; and supporting structures and equipment. A detailed protocol to the agreement sets out what has to be done to re-entry vehicles (including warheads), missiles, launchers, equipment and support structures. The main requirements are that:

(a) A limited number of missiles will be destroyed by launching (without warheads) within the first six months of the treaty.

(b) The remaining missiles and launchers will be destroyed at specifically designated destruction sites, not at their declared deployment sites.

(c) Support structures at the deployment sites will be destroyed, or permanently converted to other uses, in situ. For cruise missiles, the support structure is defined as the hardened shelter.

/(d) Re-entry

(d) Re-entry vehicles will be returned to the country of origin. Fissile material and guidance systems will be removed before the warhead casing is destroyed.

Ancilary Measures

3. To ensure that elimination is effective, a number of provisions restrict associated activities and establish definitions and counting rules, including:

(a) No production, flight test or launch of any missiles subject to the Treaty.

(b) Flight testing is the main criteria for establishing range category and capability to deliver weapons.

(c) All missiles of the relevat range, both ballistic and cruise are taken to be nuclear-armed. So conventional intermediate range missiles will also be banned.

(d) Warhead numbers are taken to be the maximum number determined and specified for the type of missile concerned.

(e) There are detailed provisions to cover the continued existence of R&D rocket booster systems with a 500/5000 km range.

Timetable for Elimination

4. All SRINF missiles will be eliminated within 18 months. There will be two phases for reductions of LRINF missiles within an overall period of 3 years. The first phase will cover 70% of the total period at the end of which each side will have 180 warheads on deployed missiles and 200 deployed and non-deployed launchers/missiles. Each side is free to vary its drawdown schedule within these overall limits . During the elimination period, missiles remaining are subject to geographical restrictions:

/(a) They

(a) They must be in specified deployment areas; at specified missile support facilities; or in transit.

(b) Deployment areas are spelled out in a MOU, and cannot be changed. There are no restrictions on deployment of legal missiles within a specified deployment area.

(c) There are rules governing the time allowed in transit. Missile support facilities include production, assembly, repair, training and storage.

Exchange of Data

5. There will be a detailed data exchange prior to the signature of the Treaty, which will be updated within 30 days of its entry into force. The data must be regularly updated therefter; and there will also be regular notification of significant changes, progess of reduction, elimination of sites, transits of missiles etc. All this ties in with the verification regime, (para 7 below).

Miscellaneous Provisions

6. Consultation arrangements for resolving compliance questions are established; the treaty is of unlimited duration; and there are usual clauses covering withdrawal from the Treaty for reasons of supreme national interest, proposals for amendment; and an obligation not to enter into conflicting obligations.

Verification

7. The Treaty establishes a verification regime involving data exchanges, on site inspection and unimpeded national technical means. The inspection regime has seven main elements:-

(a) Baseline inspections, in the first three months of the Treaty, to verify the data exchanges. These cover missile operating bases and support facilities. A missile operating base is defined as part of the deployment area.

/(b) Inspection

(b) Inspection of elimination and destruction at designated areas, to establish that the specified elimination procedures for missiles, launchers and support equipment and structure have been completed.

(c) Short-notice inspections of declared missile operating bases and support facilities. An annual quota of twenty such inspections will be allowed for each side in the first three years.

(d) A "Close-out" inspection of the operating bases and support facilities at the end of the three year period to confirm that elimination has been completed.

(e) Short-notice inspections of "suspect sites". Such inspections will cover formerly-declared sites for a period of ten years after elimination of missiles. In the first five years after elimination an annual quota of 15 is set; and in the next five years 10 a year will be allowed.

(f) In addition the US will have the right to establish a permanent monitoring team at a Soviet ballistic missile production facility at Votkinsk and a Soviet cruise missile production plant at Sverdlosk. As a reciprocal right the Russians can monitor a ballistic missile production facility in Utah and a cruise missile launcher production plant in San Diego.

(g) The United States can request that the sites of SS 25 ICBM sites be periodically opened to permit confirmation by satellite obersvation that they do not contain any Treaty limited systems.

CONFIDENTIAL

(UNCLASSIFIED ONCE TREATY SIGNED)

INF Verification Arrangements: How do they affect the UK

Basic Provisions

- Only RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth are involved. All missiles at these sites wil be eliminated within three years. Likely that those at Molesworth will be eliminated first.

- There will be four types of inspections at Greenham Common and Molesworth:

(a) baseline data exchange - within 30-90 days of the treaty's entry into force.
(b) short notice challenge inspections during the period when missiles still deployed
(c) close-out inspections when all the missiles have been eliminated.
(d) continuing short-notice challenge inspections for 10 years after the end of the three year elimination of missiles.

- All inspections will begin with the arrival of a team at RAF Greenham Common. A maximum of ten Soviet inspectors will be involved. There are strict timelimits. A single inspection could last for up to 90 hours from entry into the UK to departure. But most are likely to be much shorter than this.

- Inspections in the UK will be included in overall annual quota of 20 for first three years, 15 for next five and 10 for next five (up to year 2001). No more than 50% of any quota can be in one basing country).

- The British authorities will be informed immediately by the US of Soviet requests for inspections. As little as one hour's notice will be given to clear a Soviet Flight Plan. How soon after this Soviet inspectors will arrive will depend on point of departure.

/British

- British officials, along with American officials, will join in meeting the aircraft carrying the Soviet inspection team and will form part of a permanent escort of Soviet inspectors during the period of inspection.

- Neither the inspectors nor the aircrew will be allowed access beyond the two bases, where they will be accompanied by British and American escorts at all times.

Modalities

- The details of the inspection arrangements, which wil be the same in all the countries concerned, are set out in an Inspection Protocol appended to the INF Treaty. In addition a Basing Country Agreement will be signed between the United States, the UK, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy which will establish the practical procedures and provisions which are necessary in order that the United States can discharge its obligations under the Treaty in respect of facilities not on US territory. Finally there will be an Exchange of Notes between the UK and the Soviet Union. The British Government will grant to the Soviet Government the right to conduct inspections on British territory and the Soviet Government will undertake to comply with British laws and procedures

- Responsibility for monitoring and assessing compliance with the Treaty will be the exclusive responsibility of the US and the Soviet Union.

UK Sovereignty, Laws Etc

- All inspection personnel will require British visas: normal vetting procedures will apply.

- Inspectors will be drawn from a list of names approved in advance over which the UK will be consulted.

- Provisions agreed in UK/US Basing Country Agreement and UK/Soviet Exchange of Notes will guarantee to the UK direct powers to ensure observance of UK laws and sovereignty.

/Costs

- Costs of any services requested by the US and provided by Basing Country will be borne by the US.

- UK fully involved in air traffic control assistance, transportation of inspectors (if they need to go to Molesworth) and accommodation (if required).

- UK has the right to examine equipment brought in by inspection team and to ensure it is in line with agreed limits.

Customs Procedures. Privileges and Immunities

- HM Customs procedures will apply at point of entry. Privileges and immunities have been agreed for inspection personnel which do not exceed those granted under the Vienna Convention.

- US and UK will hold regular consultations on implementation of inspection regime.

- Any changes in inspection arrangements which directly effect interests of UK (and other basing countries) will not be agreed by US unless approved by UK.

START - SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS

	US	Soviet
General Approach	50% reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive nuclear warheads carried out in phases over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force. Agreement not contingent on the the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations.	50% reductions in strategic offensive warheads within five years, with subsequent negotiations for additional reductions. Agreement on 50% reductions within five years contingent on the resolution of Defence and Space issues, particularly US undertaking strictly to comply with ABM Treaty.
Delivery Vehicles	1600 ceiling on number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.	Same as US but wish to include submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
Warheads	6000 warhead ceiling to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs and with each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles counting as one warhead.	Same as US but wish to set separate limit of 400 SLCM warheads for each side above 6000 ceiling.
Warhead Sublimits	Sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads and 1650 warheads on heavy ICBMs (with over 6 warheads)	Soviet proposals: 5100 ballistic missile warheads 3000-3300 warheads on ICBMs 1800-2000 warheads on SLBMs 800-900 warheads on ALCMS

WGEAUK(1)

Heavy ICBMs	As in sublimits - down to 1650 level.	50% reduction from current level of heavy ICBM launchers which, Russians say, means 1540 warheads.
Throw-Weight	50% reduction from current Soviet throw-weight level to be codified in treaty.	Russians claim that effect of 50% cuts would be to reduce their throw-weight level by 50% and that this would not subsequently increase. They refuse to codify such reduction
Mobile ICBMs	Banned	Permitted
Heavy Bombers	Each heavy bomber counts for one nuclear delivery vehicle. Each heavy bomber equipped with gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in 6000 limit. Each long-range ALCM would count as one warhead in 6000 ceiling.	Same as US
Verification	Not tabled. But instrusive on-site monitoring and National Technical Means would be inlcuded.	Agreement in principle to such a framework. But no detailed position.

WGEAUK

USSR-US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE OCTOBER 1987

SYSTEMS	LAUNCHERS/ AIRCRAFT	WARHEADS PER MISSILE	MAXIMUM NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS
USSR	A		B
ICBM			
SS11	420	1	420
SS13	60	1	60
SS17	138	Up to 4	552
SS18	308	Up to 10	3080
SS19	360	Up to 6	2160
SS25	99	1	99
TOTAL ICBM	1385		6371
SLBM			
SS-N-23	64	Up to 10	640
SS-N-20	100	Up to 10	1000
SS-N-18	224	Up to 7	1568
SS-N-17	12	1	12
SS-N-8	292	1	292
SS-N-6	272	1	272
TOTAL SLBM	964		3784
AIRCRAFT			
BEAR	135)	Varies according	
BISON	15)	to mission.	
TOTAL AIRCRAFT	150	60 ALCM CARRIERS EACH WITH 12 ALCMs	

1. Totals in column A will be reduced to 1600 and those in column B to 6000 under START agreement providing for 50% cuts in strategic warheads.

WGEAUL(1)

WARSAW PACT: NATO LAND BASED SUB-STRATEGIC FORCES IN EUROPE OCTOBER 1987

WARSAW PACT		NATO	
SYSTEMS	NOS	SYSTEMS	NOS
LRINF (1000-550 kms range)		LRINF	
*SS20	270	*GLCM	256
*SS4	104	*Pershing II	108
Badger	120	F111	144
Blinder	120		
Backfire (1)	115		
SRINF (500-1000 kms range)		SRINF	
**SCALEBOARD (SS-12 Mod 2)	78	***Pershing 1A	72
SCUD	608		
**SS-23	12		
Aircraft	3348(2)	Aircraft	738
SNF		SNF	
FROG	644	Lance	88
SS21	158		
Artillery	6810(3)	Artillery	2720

Notes:

1. Excludes 90 BACKFIRE with Soviet Naval Airforces (SNAF).

2. Includes all Warsaw Pact aircraft with nuclear association. It is not possible to state what proportion would be used in a nuclear role.

3. It is not possible to estimate what proportion of artillery would be used in a nuclear role.

4. Systems marked * will be eliminated within three years of INF agreement entering into force, those with ** within 18 months.

5. *** FRG Pershing 1A will be eliminated within three years of INF Treaty entering into force but not as part of the agreement.

SYSTEMS	LAUNCHERS/ AIRCRAFT	WARHEADS PER MISSILE	MAXIMUM NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS
USA	A		B
ICBM			
MINUTEMAN III	528	3	1584
MINUTEMAN II	450	1	450
MX (PEACEKEEPER)	22	10	220
TOTAL ICBM	1000		2254
SLBM			
POSEIDON C3 ON POSEIDON SSBN	256	10	2560
TRIDENT C4 ON POSEIDON SSBN	192	8	1536
TRIDENT C4 ON	192	8	1536
TOTAL SLBM	640		5632
AIRCRAFT			
B52	263)	Varies according to mission.	
FB-111	56)		
B1-B	54)		
TOTAL AIRCRAFT	373	about 144 ALCM Carriers each with 12 ALCM.	

1. Totals in column A will be reduced to 1600 and those in column B to 6000 under START agreement providing for 50% cuts in strategic warheads.

WGEAUM(1)

NOTES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

(a) Conventional Stability Talks

1. Since February of this year informal NATO/WP discussions have been under way in Vienna aimed at agreeing a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations covering the Atlantic to Urals area, first called for in the Brussels Declaration of December 1986. Progress has been reasonable: the Warsaw Pact have demonstrated a willingness to talk seriously. Both sides are agreed that a primary objective of the talks should be the elimination of the capacity for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. Substantial divergences however still remain, in particular over the extent of the conventional imbalance in Europe: the Warsaw Pact have importance to specifying in the mandate that any reductions should be not only substantial but also "mutual" to avoid any suggestion of unilateral cuts by the Warsaw Pact alone. Until recently the Warsaw Pact were insisting on the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiations. But there have been signs recently that they may be prepared to modify their demands, provided their concerns over dual capable weapons are met. It is agreed that naval forces will be excluded. It is hoped that agreement on a mandate can be reached by next Easter to allow the negotiations to begin in the summer or the autumn of 1988.

(b) Confidence Building

2. In parallel with the informal "mandate" discussions the CSCE review meeting in Vienna has been discussing how to take forward work on confidence building to follow-up last year's Stockholm Conference. The Western aim will be to build upon and expand the results of Stockholm.

(c) MBFR

3. Now in its 15th year having started in 1973. There is no prospect of any substantive agreement owing to the East's refusal to accept Western proposals on verification and data. The Alliance are however agreed that MBFR will continue at least until a mandate for the new negotiations is agreed and the Warsaw Pact for their part have shown no disposition to bringing MBFR to a premature close. The Soviet Union have recently proposed a "symbolic" end to MBFR involving the (unverified) reductions of a token number of US and Soviet troops. The West has rejected this as an attempt to side-step their December '85 proposal which likewise provided for limited US/Soviet troop withdrawals but only on condition that the East accepted proper verification of these reductions and a subsequent three year no increase commitment (both of which were rejected by the East).

The Current Disposition of Conventional Forces in Europe

(a) Central Front

	NATO	Ratio	Warsaw Pact
manpower	790,000 (33 divisions)	1:1.22	960,000 (57 divisions)
tanks	7,800	1:2.14	16,700
combat aircraft	1,250	1:2.12	2,650
artillery	3,000	1:3.07	9,200

(b) Atlantic/Urals

manpower	3 million	1:1.36	4.1 million
tanks	16,800	1:3.02	50,900
combat aircraft	4,300	1:1.79	7,700
artillery	10,600	1:3.41	36,200

ANNEX

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The CW negotiations formally reconvene on 2 February 1988, although informal meetings are currently taking place in Geneva. The US and Soviet Union have recently agreed to supplement a Convention with a bilateral exchange of data, verified by on-site inspection prior to signature.

2. The Soviet Union has been making a determined effort to raise the profile of CW; and Shevardnadze has recently written to his counterparts represented in the negotiations calling for agreement in 1988. The proposal he made to the Foreign Secretary for a joint Soviet-British working group was fairly obviously to put pressure on the US whose programme of binary weapon production is due to begin on 17 December.

3. Agreement in the next few months is unrealistic given the range and complexity of the remaining problems. A UK paper entitled "Making the Chemical Weapons Ban Effective", tabled by Mr Mellor in Geneva this summer, highlighted some of these difficulties and suggested how they might be handled.

4. But negotiations aside, US doubts about verification have resurfaced in Washington. A review of US CW policy is in progress, although no decisions will be made before the Summit. The Soviet Union, who we think may be aware of US moves, will be quick to exploit any divisions in the alliance or signs that the West is stepping back from its own proposals.

5. We hold periodic bilateral meetings on CW with the Soviets. The last occasion was in August when the main subject was our proposals for challenge inspection (now broadly acceptable to the Soviets). We are prepared to hold another meeting early in the new year. Meanwhile, a US-Soviet bilateral on CW is due to take place in December.

SITUATION IN THE LEADERSHIP AND PROSPECTS FOR PERESTROIKA

1. Gorbachev has made steady progress in bringing into the leadership younger reform-minded people, but a handful of Brezhnev's associates still remain in the Politburo. The promotion to the Politburo last June of Aleksander Yakovlev, who is a strong advocate of democratisation and glasnost, strengthened Gorbachev's position, since it served to dilute the influence of the Party's more conservative number 2, Ligachev (Yakovlev is in the party for the visit). During Gorbachev's absence from Moscow in the summer, tensions in the leadership became apparent - Ligachev and Chebrikov, the KGB chief and Politburo member, publicly expressed doubts about the scope and pace of reform, especially glasnost. Gorbachev's speeches in Murmansk and Leningrad in the early autumn and his book on Perestroika nevertheless demonstrated his determination to advance as rapidly as possible.

2. Gorbachev has since then suffered a significant setback through the political disgrace of Boris Eltsin, a radical whom he himself brought in to head the key Moscow Party organisation in 1985, and whose strong views on corruption and abuse of power in the Party he clearly shared. Although Gorbachev had failed to obtain full Politburo membership for him, Eltsin represented a radical position which was helpful to Gorbachev. There is no obvious replacement for Eltsin as the cutting edge of perestroika, leaving Gorbachev himself somewhat exposed. Ligachev's reassertion of his authority and role in personnel matters over the Eltsin affair meanwhile places a question mark over Gorbachev's future freedom to promote people of his choice to key posts.

3. The affair may have serious implications for the pace of reform. Gorbachev's customary sense of urgency and reforming zeal were much less marked in his 70th anniversary speech on 2 November, when he adopted a relatively "balanced" approach. This is likely to encourage the large numbers of opponents of perestroika, particularly in the Party and government bureaucracies, to use the pretext of patience and caution to undermine the momentum behind the reforms. The Party in particular seems uncertain what its future role will be under democratisation and economic decentralisation.

At a meeting in the Central Committee on 20 November, Gorbachev attempted to reassure the Party that its leading role remained as before but explained that in the next phase of perestroika when reforms would have to be put into effect, it would have to take new forms. He did not clarify what these would be.

4. Against this background of political uncertainty the special Party Conference, set to open on 28 June 1988, looks likely to be of considerable importance. It is clear that Gorbachev would like to use the occasion to make significant changes to the composition of the Central Committee, the majority of whose current members are not his natural supporters. He evidently also wishes to extend democratisation by introducing limits to terms of office in the Party and elsewhere, a policy Ligachev has explicitly rejected. Gorbachev stressed in his 2 November speech that economic reform would fail without practical implementation of democratisation in society. But this democratisation may dilute the Party's authority, particularly at lower levels.

5. The political base in the Party for radical reform meanwhile remains narrow. Now that Eltsin has gone, only Yakovlev and perhaps Shevardnadze among the leadership fully share Gorbachev's radical determination. This explains Gorbachev's attempts to appeal over the heads of the Party to the intelligentsia and the public. But there is little sign of wide public enthusiasm for his kind of reform. Gorbachev has great power as General Secretary of the Party and a very strong personality but his difficulties are immense. Further tension in the leadership looks likely, particularly when the economic reforms start to bite bringing with them administrative difficulties and a probable reduction in subsidized prices.

SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

Soviet economists have identified three main objectives of the economic reform programme: to change the balance of the economy towards increased living standards and the resolution of social problems; the modernisation of industry to improve the efficiency of production and qualities of output; and the reform of management practice.

The main economic reform package was put forward at the June plenum of the Central Committee. It coincided with the publication of an article by an economist (Shmelev) which savagely criticised the economic system and put forward radical proposals, many of them characteristic of a market economy. It became clear at the plenum that the Soviet leadership is now persuaded that it is no longer possible simply to tinker with the existing economic system. It is therefore to be replaced by a system in which most economic decisions are made at enterprise level, with the State Planning Commission (the supreme planning organisation in the government) assuming the role of strategic planner, with the task of formulating plans for only a few vital items of production and of ensuring the provision of adequate resources to key sectors such as defence.

New methods of management are outlined in the Law on the State Enterprise. The aim of the new methods is to give enterprises as much independence as possible and to give workers a larger say in running their enterprises. Instead of detailed plans for all products, there will be state orders, by which centrally-run sectors of the economy will ensure production of essential items, and "wholesale trade in the means of production" - a decentralised, market-orientated system of contracting for supplies of raw materials etc by enterprises. The law provides for the election of managerial staff by councils of workers and a degree of accountability by managers to their workforce.

The law also contains references to reforms in specific sectors (some of which are still under discussion) and which are set out in detail in 10 additional decrees finalised after the June plenum debates. These cover:

science and technology
planning
the supply system
finance, prices, banks
statistics
the role of the ministries
republic administration
social policy and labour

The majority of these reforms are to be in place by 1991. Enterprises are to be self-financing and will be able to keep a stable proportion of their profits while receiving no more subsidies from central funds. They will be able to increase wages in relation to their profits, and will be encouraged to shed surplus labour. To some extent they will be able to negotiate prices with consumers but some prices will continue to be set by the central authorities. Persistently loss-making enterprises face the prospect of closure, and redundant workers will be able to claim benefits for up to 6 months while they find a new job. However, Gorbachev has rejected the idea of unemployment as an incentive to work harder (proposed by Shmelev).

The wholesale and retail price structure, which at present costs the Soviet government 73 billion roubles annually in subsidies, out of a total budget of 430 billion roubles, is to be overhauled within the next 2-3 years. Gorbachev has promised a public debate on price reforms, recognising the controversial nature of increases in retail prices for food (to eliminate the 50 odd billion rouble subsidies to agriculture) and the need to compensate for price increases. Pay, pensions and allowances will have to be adjusted to protect the poorer members of society from the effects of such increases.

The financial system and the banks are supposed to play an enhanced role in the economy, with emphasis on the role of repayable bank credit to enterprises. Four new sectoral banks have been set up, including a bank for Workers' Savings and Credit for the People, which will issue cheque books to savers from December 1987, initially only in the RSFSR.

Changes in the agricultural system are also in progress and a Central Committee plenum on this area has been promised by Gorbachev next year. The trend is towards family farms as highly efficient units of production, particularly on marginal land and in the

livestock sector. There are plans to lease land to families or groups of people on a long-term basis. Gorbachev himself seems personally committed to this policy.

Soviet leaders have acknowledged that things will probably get worse in the economy before they get better. The effect of tighter quality controls imposed this year in only 1500 of the best enterprises, bears this out. Gorbachev's insistence in 1985 on an annual growth target of 4% has apparently been tactily abandoned in favour of qualitative improvements rather than quantitative growth for its own sake. The greater involvement in world trade advocated by Gorbachev will be difficult to achieve without a major improvement in quality of manufactured goods and convertibility for the rouble.

GORBACHEV, Mikhail Sergeevich

General Secretary of the CC CPSU; Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Chairman of the Defence Council.

Gorbachev (56) spent his early career in the Stavropol region (a heavily agricultural area) of Southern Russia, apart from 4 years spent studying law at Moscow University. He rose through the Stavropol Komsomol and Party organisations, eventually becoming First Secretary of the regional Party Committee (1970-1978). From this post he was brought to Moscow in 1978 as Party Secretary responsible for agriculture, and in the course of the next two years progressed via candidate to full membership of the Politburo. In March 1985 Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary. Gorbachev has not so far followed the example of his predecessors and become President: he remains a member (one of 21) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This is typical of his generally less formal profile. During his visit to the UK in December 1984, a few months before he became General Secretary, he and his wife made a strong impression on the British press as a relatively young and unstuffy couple able to hold their own in most situations. At home too Gorbachev's manner is easy and confident, and his set speeches are lively, well written and well delivered.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Temporarily retained. D Wayland, 16/3/17

U98AAK

GORBACHEVA, RAISA MAXIMOVNA

Mrs Gorbachev was born in 1932 in Siberia, the daughter of a Ukrainian railway official. We cannot confirm press reports that he was an economic adviser to Lenin or Stalin, but these seem very unlikely. We have no knowledge of her childhood years. At Moscow University in the 1950s, where she was studying philosophy, she met and married Mikhail Gorbachev and returned with him to his native province of Stavropol, in southern Russia. She taught at Stavropol Agricultural Institute and wrote a sociological treatise on the local kolkhoz peasantry. (She is a D.Phil.)

On Gorbachev's transfer to Moscow in 1978 as Central Committee Secretary for agriculture, Mrs Gorbachev began teaching at Moscow University, but she says she has given this up since her husband became General Secretary.

The Gorbachevs have a 31-year old daughter Irina, a therapist, who is married to a surgeon specialising in cardiovascular diseases; their daughter Oksana is 7.

Mrs Gorbachev is the first wife of a Soviet leader to have a publicly-acknowledged official function in her own right. In November 1986 she was elected one of 11 members of the Presidium of the newly-formed Soviet Culture Foundation and she has made several public appearances in that capacity.

Mrs Gorbachev is known to be keenly interested in fashion, and she was closely involved in the much-publicised West German fashion show held in Moscow in March 1987, to launch the publication of the fashion magazine Burda in the Soviet Union. Her other interests are on a more intellectual level, and she takes a keen interest in philosophy, sociology and literature. She claims to be well read in English literature (in translation) and is said to be learning English seriously (she was taught it at school but rembered very little). She claims Thackeray as one of her favourite British authors and the Prime Minister presented her with a first edition of Vanity Fair during her visit to Moscow in March.

Mrs Gorbachev has accompanied her husband on many of his trips abroad.

U98AAK

14

SECRET

017407
MDHIAN 8790

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 030830Z FCO
TELNO 2660
OF 022020Z DECEMBER 87
INFO DESKBY 030830Z MODUK
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, ROME, BRUSSELS, BONN, THE HAGUE

MODUK FOR DACU
YOUR TELNO 2001: INF
SUMMARY
1. PROGRESS IN GENEVA AFTER FIVE DAY HIATUS. OUTSTANDING SOVIET DATA HANDED OVER. ACCEPTANCE OF REVISED DRAFT OF EXCHANGE OF NOTES. MINOR ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE OUTSTANDING, INCLUDING TIMING OF EXCHANGE OF NOTES.
2. REVISED BCA BEING TRANSMITTED ON 2 DECEMBER. PROTOCOL UNLIKELY TO BE READY BEFORE WASHINGTON SCG MEETING ON 4 DECEMBER.
DETAIL
3. THE INF TALKS IN GENEVA FINALLY GOT GOING AGAIN ON 2 DECEMBER FOLLOWING FIVE DAYS OF INACTIVITY CAUSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION BEING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. THE OUTSTANDING SOVIET DATA (ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES) WAS HANDED OVER, WITH INITIAL US REACTIONS BEING THAT IT CONFORMS SATISFACTORILY WITH US INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. TWO OR THREE OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WERE SOLVED, INCLUDING THE NEW DRAFT OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES INCORPORATING THE AMENDED SENTENCE IN PARA 1 OF TUR. THE TWO SIDES CONTINUE TO DISPUTE THE DURATION OF THE US/SOVIET PORTAL MONITORING REGIME OUTSIDE SS25/MX FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITIES, AND THE RUSSIANS ARE CONSIDERING THE US AMENDMENTS TO THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONTAINED IN PARA FOUR OF TUR. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL ACCEPT SUCH A FORMULATION, WHICH WOULD ALLOW BASING COUNTRIES TO EXCHANGE NOTES AT THEIR CONVENIENCE PRIOR TO RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY PROPER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
4. WE HAVE STRESSED TO BURNS (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POL/MIL BUREAU, STATE DEPARTMENT) THE NEED FOR US TO SEE THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. BUT GIVEN THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, AND THE UNFINISHED STATE OF THAT DOCUMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PASS THE PROTOCOL TO US IN ADVANCE OF THE WASHINGTON SCG MEETING ON 4 DECEMBER. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSMIT A FULLY UPDATED BCA TO BASING COUNTRIES CAPITALS FOR DELIVERY FIRST THING ON 3 DECEMBER. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THIS

017407
MDHIAN 8790

DOCUMENT WILL REFLECT FULLY THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY ON THE PROTOCOL (AND IS OF COURSE MORE UP TO DATE THAN THE VERSION CIRCULATED EARLIER IN THE WEEK). IT WILL ALSO, WE UNDERSTAND, TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR CONCERNS IN PARA 5 OF TUR.

5. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION WITH OTHER BASING COUNTRIES, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE BCA WILL ONLY BE SIGNED IN ENGLISH. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE MAKING THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING TEXTS FOR SIGNATURE AT THE NAC.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 163

MAIN 139

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
SEC POL D
ACDD
DEFENCE
SOVIET
EED
NEWS
INFO
NAD
WED
POD
PLANNERS
RESEARCH
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
HD/MVD
HD/SAD
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR GILLMORE
MR FALL
MR RATFORD
MR FEARN
MR SLATER
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR KERR
MISS PESTELL
ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL 24

ARMS CONTROL TALKS
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

NNNN

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2545 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Galsworthy to Powell dated 2 December 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	16 March 2017 C Wayland
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SECRET

12

FCO VHo
cc Sir PC
L04A01

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 December 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV

The United States Ambassador came to see me this morning to talk about the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He left a note of points which the Americans would find it helpful for the Prime Minister to raise with Mr. Gorbachev. I enclose a copy. I said that, on a quick reading, they seemed to fit quite easily with our own thinking. I would make sure that the Prime Minister saw them.

You may wish to take account of them in providing briefing for the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

1. Human Rights:

It would be helpful for Mrs. Thatcher to stress to Gorbachev that further Soviet movement on human rights is essential to a sustained improvement in East-West relations, and will be vital to the INF Treaty ratification process. (FYI: The U.S. is still pressing the Soviets for the establishment of some formal institutional mechanism for resolution of individual cases. But even more significant would be modifications to the Soviet criminal code to abolish the crime of "anti-Soviet agitation," a demonstrable liberalization of the criteria for applications for exit permission, and a marked reduction in the denial of exit visas on grounds of "possession of state secrets." End FYI)

2. Afghanistan:

We would also appreciate it if the Prime Minister placed similar emphasis on the need for tangible steps toward a withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Thatcher-Gorbachev meeting will take place just after the release of the EC statement on Afghanistan. We would suggest that the Prime Minister not only reinforce the strong message in that statement, but also emphasize the importance of Afghanistan to the entire civilized world. It would be helpful for Mrs. Thatcher to make the point that, if the Soviets are going to withdraw -- as they keep saying they are -- then they should do it soon and quickly; it is not in their own interest to prolong either the occupation or the period of withdrawal.

We would also suggest one additional point: like human rights improvements, concrete moves toward withdrawal from Afghanistan could have a major impact on prospects for INF ratification.

3. Verification:

We suggest that the Prime Minister, in welcoming Soviet agreement to extensive on-site inspection measures in the INF Treaty, underscore the need to go even further in the case of START. In particular, it is essential that the Soviets present proposals for the verification of mobile ICBM deployments. In Washington's view, the ball is in the Soviets' court on mobiles; without a proposal, the U.S. will persist in demanding a complete ban on these systems.

4. START/SDI Linkage:

We would also appreciate the Prime Minister reinforcing the current U.S. position on START/SDI linkage: Even if the Soviets are not willing to proceed with strategic arms reductions without a solution on SDI testing, they should put the linkage issue aside for now and get on with the completion of a draft START Treaty.

CONFIDENTIAL

SRW BCX

cePC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 December 1987

MR. GORBACHEV'S STOPOVER

Thank you for your letter of 1 December. I am replying immediately because of the shortage of time. The enclosures to your letter have not yet arrived and I may have further comments on them.

As regards the lunch, I think the size of the top table is getting out of hand and that those listed in paragraph (ii) of your letter should be on a separate table hosted perhaps by Mr. Mellor if he is to be present, or Sir John Fretwell.

I note the arrangements for the visit by Mrs. Gorbachev to the Edith Moorhouse primary school. The Russians evidently remain nervous about this and I would be grateful if the police could be encouraged to make very thorough arrangements indeed to protect Mrs. Gorbachev from too much attention by the press.

I also note what is proposed about bouquets. Surely it would be more appropriate for these to be given to Mrs. Gorbachev. The Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev will not wish to be standing holding flowers while the honour guard gives the general salute and the band plays the Soviet national anthem.

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1987

Dear Charles,

Mr Gorbachev's Stopover

You may find helpful the enclosed outline programme and car plan which show where arrangmments currently stand. Both will need to be filled out considerably in the next day or two, in particular the car plan, to include other senior Soviet officials accompanying the Gorbachevs. A full programme of administrative arrangements will also be produced as soon as possible, including details of access to Brize Norton and the various passes required. We will be reviewing all this with the Soviet Embassy on the morning of 2 December.

It may also be helpful to bring you up to date with progress on other aspects of the programme:

i) we now understand that Yakovlev and the other senior members of the Soviet delegation may take part in the talks between Mr Shevardnadze and Sir Geoffrey Howe. The need to entertain them separately would therefore fall away. We have resisted Soviet suggestions for separate sessions of talks on trade and military matters, not least on logisitic grounds; but some of them will be able to talk to their opposite members over lunch;

ii) the list of senior officials on the Soviet side for the Prime Minister's table at lunch should include, in addition to those listed in your letter of 30 November:

Mrs Zamyatin
Mr Bolin (Head of Central Committee General Department)
Mr Kruchina (Head of Central Committee Administrative Department)
Mr Gasenkov (aide to Mr Gorbachev)
(possibly)
Mr Karpov (arms control negotiator)
Mr Sukhodryev (Head of MFA American Dept and previously interpreter for Brezhnev/Gromyko)

We are arranging for a U-shaped table to be available to accommodate these extra numbers. Extra members on our side may include a Trade Minister, Mr Mellor, Sir John Fretwell, and possibly one or two more;

iii) Mrs Gorbachev will visit the Edith Moorhouse primary school in Brize Norton (just outside the base), accompanied

by Mr Baker. This has been chosen by the DES as the most suitable of the local schools. Mrs Zamyatin and Mr Shilov (Soviet Embassy) will also go with her, as well as bodyguards and an interpreter from our side (Kate Horner) who was with Mrs Gorbachev in 1984. We are working on a detailed programme at the school itself, as well as the press arrangements;

vi) the Russians have said they would like <u>two</u> Soviet children (from the Embassy) to present bouquets on arrival to the Prime Minister and Mrs Gorbachev, with the British child presenting one to Mrs Gorbachev. We have told them that this would be over egging it and that in any case we are the welcoming side. A suitable compromise which the Russians would accept would be two bouquets for Mr Gorbachev, presented together by a British girl and a Russian boy.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
<u>Private Secretary</u>

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CDP

CVM.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

Squadron Leader L Pyne RAF
MOV (OPS)
Room 5178
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall, SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 30 November 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BRIZE NORTON: MONDAY 7 DECEMBER

I am writing to confirm our requirements for a helicopter to take the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs plus 8 Officials from Brize Norton to Wellington Barracks on Monday 7 December.

It is expected that the standby time at Brize Norton will be 1300 but I will confirm exact timings as soon as possible.

You have confirmed that the flying time for the helicopter is approximately 30 to 35 minutes. Costs will be borne by the Management and Pesonnel Office.

Anne Morrison (Mrs)
Protocol Department

cc: Duty Clerk, No 10
APS/Secretary of State

 File

JA2 ANG
cc PC
Trevor
Butler

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 November 1987

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

You may find it helpful to have a quick reaction to some of the points which I understand the Soviet Ambassador raised about Mr. Gorbachev's programme when he called on the department earlier today:

- the Prime Minister accepts that Mr. Gorbachev cannot manage more than two hours (although I dare say it will not be a tragedy if he gets away a few moments late).

- the Prime Minister would be reluctant to dispense altogether with protocol on arrival. We could drop an inspection of the Guard of Honour. But she would still like a substantial guard to be mounted. Once Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev have shaken hands with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Station Commander, the Guard might present arms and the Soviet National Anthem be played. The party would then proceed straight into the cars and to the Mess.

- the Prime Minister would like a small girl to be at the aircraft steps to present Mrs. Gorbachev with a bouquet. But we can dispense with schoolchildren at the entrance to the Officers' Mess.

- despite the short time, the Prime Minister would like to preserve a lunch as well as the talks. This points to about an hour of talks, starting immediately upon arrival at the Officers' Mess, followed by a light lunch lasting some 35-40 minutes. In these circumstances, lunch would have to be "plated".

- I understand that the Soviet Ambassador remains reluctant to agree that the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev should say a few words to the press as they leave the Officers' Mess, but favours allowing a small press pool into the Mess itself. Bernard Ingham's strong advice is that this would be worse from the Russian point of view. The press pool would try to get in far more questions and the event would be much more difficult to control. The department

should therefore go back to the Ambassador with a revised proposal to the effect that a limited press pool of say 50 should be stationed opposite the entrance to the Officers' Mess at a distance of at least 30 yards. There would be microphones on the porch for the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev each to say a few words as they leave the Mess after which the cars would be called forward, with no questions taken.

- as regards Mrs. Gorbachev's programme, we must clearly go along with her wish to visit a school and I understand that there is a suitable one close to Brize Norton. The Prime Minister would like the Education Secretary to escort Mrs. Gorbachev if he is available. He should also of course be consulted about the choice of school. He would be welcome to attend the lunch. The question of press coverage for Mrs. Gorbachev's visit is going to be particularly difficult. Bernard Ingham advises that there will be enormous press interest. We shall have to ask the police to place a very effective cordon round the school and admit only a small press pool.

- for the lunch, the Prime Minister envisages a top table with separate tables for other accompanying officials. Subject to your advice those at the top table on the Soviet side would be:

Mr. Gorbachev
Mrs. Gorbachev
Mr. Yakovlev
Mr. Shevardnadze
Mr. Dobrynin
Mr. Kamentsev
Marshal Akromeyev
Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Chernayev

On the UK side, the Prime Minister would envisage, in addition to herself, Mr. Thatcher (although it is not yet certain that he will be present), the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Education Secretary (assuming that he is able to escort Mrs. Gorbachev to the school), Sir John Fieldhouse, the Station Commander and me. She would be grateful if senior Foreign Office officials could be available to look after the other Soviet guests at lunch.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

(CHARLES POWELL)

Tony Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PM seen

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Ingham

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

I wonder if I could put to you a number of points about the programme for Mr. Gorbachev which arise as a result of a call by the Soviet Ambassador at the Foreign Office this morning:

(i) Mr. Gorbachev very much regrets that he cannot extend the time of the visit beyond the two hours allotted. To get to Brize Norton by 1135 he has to leave Moscow at 5 a.m. local time; and he is similarly constrained at the other end by the need to reach Andrews Air Force Base before the prime time television news in the United States. The Ambassador thinks that, if the timings were to slip 10 or 15 minutes, it could probably be made up in flight.

(ii) The Ambassador says that Mr. Gorbachev would be content to dispense with protocol. I think there is a careful balance to be struck here, between laying on the trappings of an appropriate welcoming ceremony, which will be important visually, and saving time. If we could dispense with Mr. Gorbachev inspecting the Guard of Honour that will save time. But I think we should still have a substantial honour guard which would present arms once Mr. Gorbachev has shaken hands with you and before he climbs into the car. The question is whether we should also have a military band which plays the Soviet National Anthem at that point. It is of course quite long but my own view is that it would add to the occasion. Agree Guard of Honour salute and Soviet National Anthem but no inspection of Guard of Honour?

(iii) Mrs. Gorbachev has apparently decided against a discussion with "intellectuals" and does not want/ will not be allowed to visit Blenheim. She would however like to visit a local school. This can of course be arranged. The Soviet Ambassador has said that it is hoped that there could be no more than a small press pool for the visit. That may present problems but we shall have to do our best to comply with their wish. Content for Mrs. Gorbachev to visit a local school? (Incidentally I am told the Brize Norton school is not considered worthy of a visit, so it would probably be in a neighbouring village or small town.)

(iv) The Soviet Ambassador has asked who would accompany Mrs. Gorbachev on this visit. One possibility would, of course, be Mr. Thatcher if he were willing. Another possibility which occurs to me is Angela Rumbold. Which would you prefer?

(v) According to the Ambassador, Mr. Gorbachev does not wish to confront a large body of press shouting questions on his departure from the Officers' Mess. This is apparently because he does not want to pre-empt his arrival statement to the press in Washington. The Ambassador claims, however, that he would be prepared to join you in answering two or three questions from a small press pool inside the Mess. Subject to Bernard's views, I think that we shall have to go along with this in the interests of doing all we can to accommodate him. Agree?

(vi) There is also the question how we divide the time available between talks and lunch. The Soviet Ambassador has given his personal view that it would be nice to maintain a short lunch because that would give the Prime Minister an opportunity to meet the other senior members of Mr. Gorbachev's party. With the attenuated arrival ceremony we could probably be

inside the Officers' Mess by 1145, start talks at 1150, talk for one hour and go straight into a light lunch lasting some 40 minutes. The lunch would have to be "plated" to get through in that time. Agree to this scenario? The alternative is to dispense with the lunch and have only the talks, but this might look a bit inhospitable.

(vii) Assuming you decide to go ahead with the lunch we need to think who should be present at the "top table". I do not think we need match the Soviet visitors one for one and would suggest the following participation:

Soviet side	UK side
Mr. Gorbachev	Prime Minister
Mrs. Gorbachev	[Mr. Thatcher]
Mr. Yakovlev	Foreign Secretary
Mr. Shevardnadze	Defence Secretary
Mr. Dobrynin	Sir Percy Cradock
Mr. Kamentsev (the Deputy Prime who accompanied you down to Georgia)	(if you feel it safe to have the Chairman of JIC)
Marshal Akromeyev (Head of the Soviet Armed Forces)	Sir John Fieldhouse
Soviet Ambassador	Mr. Powell
Mr. Chernayev (Gorbachev's Private Secretary)	The Station Commander (as host)

That would leave other Foreign Office officials to host tables for accompanying Soviet officials. Agree?

(viii) Would you like us to arrange for a small girl to be at the foot of the aircraft steps to present Mrs. Gorbachev with a bouquet?

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

30 November 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

file

bc PC
Mr Ingram
Supt. Butler

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 November 1987

MR GORBACHEV'S STOP-OVER

Thank you for your letter of 27 November about the reconnaissance visit to Brize Norton by British and Soviet officials to prepare for Mr Gorbachev's visit. The Prime Minister is grateful to all those concerned for the prompt way in which they have tackled the arrangements.

The Prime Minister would want us to meet Russian wishes on close protection for Mr and Mrs Gorbachev, and on stand-by medical arrangements.

As regards Mrs Gorbachev's programme, we must clearly wait to hear what the Russians themselves want. If they opt for Blenheim, we must fall in with their wish for no press presence.

I understand that it is intended to hire Daimlers for the Soviet VIP party. The cars carrying Mr and Mrs Gorbachev (at least) should be from GCS not hire cars and must have government or police drivers. We should also have available at Brize Norton for emergency use the armoured Rolls. The Prime Minister's armoured Daimler and back-up will be there too.

The problem over where the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev should say a few words to the press before departure is evidently difficult. But it cannot be done near the aircraft (because of noise levels) and the press cannot be admitted to the Officers' Mess (on security grounds). We must therefore find a way to arrange it on departure from the Officers' Mess. Not having taken part in the reconnaissance, I am not well placed to comment on the detail. But I would have thought it possible to construct a reasonably aesthetic press stand opposite but well away from the Mess entrance, to which the press would be admitted some ten minutes before Mr Gorbachev's departure.

The major outstanding question, apart from Mrs Gorbachev's programme, is the overall length of the stop-over and whether this will leave time for lunch. We should

CONFIDENTIAL

continue to press the Russians to extend the time to three hours (settling for two-and-a-half hours if necessary), and for an early decision on this point.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(2)

Prime Minister
I understand that the atmosphere of the reconnaissance visit was good. We shall meet the Russians wishes on the points which they raised.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

27 November 1987

Dear Charles,

CAP 27/XI

Mr Gorbachev's Stop-over

You may find useful a brief account of the reconnaissance visit by Soviet officials on the Aeroflot flight which passed through Brize Norton this morning. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister and Krychkov, Deputy Head of the KGB, were accompanied by security, protocol and press advisers. John Fretwell and our team from RAF Brize Norton, FCO and the MOD were able to go through with them the proposed arrangements for the visit and show them what was proposed on the ground. Zamyatin, the Soviet Ambassador, was also there.

Overall the Russians gave every appearance of being satisfied with what they saw and heard. John Fretwell impressed upon them the Prime Minister's strong hope that the party would stay longer than two hours, to allow time for a full, relaxed discussion and hospitality of a kind the Prime minister wished to offer. They made no promises except to report, but did not rule out a longer stay or claim that there were major difficulties in the way of a change. I understand that the Soviet Embassy (Mr Kossov) may pursue this with you further. Clearly uncertainty over the length of the stop-over considerably complicates planning, particularly since the proposed lunch must be in doubt if the visit is not extended. Other arrangements, for example how to deal with the press at the end of the visit, also depend on this.

The Russians were unable to provide any guidance on Mrs Gorbachev's wishes and said that they were still awaiting word from Moscow. It was clearly a point of some sensitivity for them. The principals on the Soviet side were interested in the possibility of a helicopter visit to Blenheim (although Zamyatin stressed that this would be conditional on no press presence, referring to his conversation at No 10 yesterday). However the Soviet security experts suggested that, while they had no particular difficulty with a visit outside the base by road, a helicopter trip would be out of the question for security reasons.

CONFIDENTIAL

U97ABA

C D Powell Esq

PS/10 Downing Street

There were three other areas of Soviet concern. On the security front, they stressed that Mr and Mrs Gorbachev must never be without their personal (Soviet) close security protection. This may pose some problems for the short car journeys between the aircraft and the officers' mess, but we have some ideas which were discussed with the Soviet advisers and about which you will no doubt be briefed separately. Otherwise their security consciousness is high (they want five armed bodyguards altogether) but they seemed generally satisfied with our proposals.

On the press side, they had no particular proposals of their own to make, but took a little convincing that the proposed arrangement of the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev speaking to the pre-assembled press outside the entrance to the officers' mess, shortly before departure, would not be messy and undignified. We will need to look at this carefully.

The Soviet doctor present was concerned about the adequacy of the medical arrangements in case of emergency. We will need to provide trained medical personnel at the base, and a specially equipped ambulance and helicopter, as well as ensuring that the proper facilities are available at a readily accessible hospital of high standing.

One point which we may need to rethink is the stand-by arrangements in case of bad weather at Brize Norton. The base staff took the view that RAF Lyneham was unlikely to be open if Brize Norton were closed, and suggested that an RAF station in Scotland might be the only feasible alternative if airports in Southern england were fog-bound. This would obviously pose major, possibly insuperable problems. The experts will be looking at this again.

There is likely to be another Soviet reconnaissance visit on 4 December and further specialist visits in addition. We shall of course be staying in close touch with the Soviet Embassy meanwhile.

The Russians did not have precise details of numbers in Mr Gorbachev's party, but suggested a total of 110, excluding aircrew, of whom about 50 would be security staff. They made clear that all the VIPs and main delegation, about 25 in all would arrive on the Gorbachevs' plane at 1135, and leave with them.

I am copying this to John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever, Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

SECRET

11

Copied to: Mr Powell
Mr Ingham
Mr Perks

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF MR GORBACHEV

You may be interested to know how the programme is shaping up following the Soviet reconnaissance visit to Brize Norton this morning.

Mr Gorbachev's aeroplane will probably touch down at 11.35 am and taxi to a position immediately outside of the Brize Norton main terminal. The Soviet Ambassador will board the aircraft and bring out Mr and Mrs Gorbachev and Mr Shevardnadze to meet you at the steps. You will be accompanied by Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Station Commander, Group Captain Chris Lumb. Escort along red carpet to dais for Royal Salute and Soviet National Anthem. Mr Gorbachev then invited to inspect guard of honour provided by the Queen's Colour Squadron. Central Band of the RAF present.

There will be a press enclosure constructed in tiers to cover all of the above. No microphones. Also a photographic pool on terminal roof for alternative veiws.

Convoy of cars to take official party to Officers' Mess (about 400 yards).

After an opportunity for visitors to freshen up you begin tete-a-tete talks with Mr Gorbachev. This would be preceded by photocall - by strict rota - in the room itself. Foreign Ministers have separate bilateral talks in adjoining conference rooms.

NOTE: The Russians say they have only two hours and will depart at 13.35. Sir John Fretwell has asked that this be increased to at least three hours which would allow for lunch.

Depart Officers' Mess by car. A small photographic and television pool to cover.

Arrive beside aircraft. Two stand-up microphones on canopied dais in front of press enclosure for you and Mr Gorbachev to make a few comments and take 2-3 questions, if desired.

Then, a few steps along red carpet, flanked by airmen, to aircraft for farewells and boarding.

SECRET

Mrs Gorbachev's Programme

Various options were put to the Russians:

(a) visit Blenheim Palace and received by Duke of Marlborough. (The Russians made clear they would not use helicopter);

(b) visit kindergarten and some service wives on the base;
or
visit school just outside of the base;

(c) expert(s) - historians, authors etc - to meet Mrs Gorbachev on the base. She would be invited to choose the subject.

Option (a) likely to be impracticable if visit is limited to two hours.

The Russians have been invited to give us their news on media facilities for Mrs Gorbachev.

Afterwards

The main airport terminal will be used as a press centre. It will contain a large briefing hall where you could give a press conference if you wanted to. The separate VIP lounge is available for individual interviews.

Comment

Much detail remains to be resolved. The Russians were unclear on many things. They are planning a further reconnaissance visit on Friday 4 December. We shall be pursuing other matters through the Soviet Embassy. But, in principle, content

(a) with outline programme as it stands?

(b) with press statement arrangements?

MICHAEL BATES
PRESS OFFICE

27 November 1987

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BANGKOK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 667
OF 270310Z NOVEMBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY HANOI, PARIS, WASHINGTON, PEKING, JAKARTA

GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO BRITAIN.

SUMMARY.

1. IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF A MINUTE OR TWO COULD BE SPENT ON CAMBODIA DURING GORBACHEV'S TRANSIT AND IF I COULD SUBSEQUENTLY TELL THE THIAS THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN RAISED.

THAIS

DETAIL.

2. CAMBODIA IS NOT A MAJOR PROBLEM IN UK/SOVIET RELATIONS. NONETHELESS THE THAIS WERE VERY PLEASED THAT BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF WERE ABLE TO RAISE THE ISSUE DURING THE VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MARCH THIS YEAR.

3. THE THAIS WOULD WELCOME IT IF THE OPPORTUNITY OF GORBACHEV'S TRANSIT COULD BE USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON MOSCOW TO WORK HARDER ON THE VIETNAMESE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

4. THE EXPECTED MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, 2 DECEMBER BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND HUN SEN COULD ENCOURAGE INTEREST IN THE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT. INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR IS TODAY QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HOPES TO GET A COCKTAIL PARTY GOING IN INDONESIA IN JANUARY IF THE RESULTS OF THE SIHANOUK/HUN SEN MEETING ARE POSITIVE.

5. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO A GENEVA-STYLE CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA IS PROBABLY CLOSE TO OUR OWN: MOSCOW SUPPORTS THE 8 OCTOBER 1987 DECLARATION OF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IN FAVOUR OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO BE CONVENED ONLY AFTER THERE HAVE BEEN TALKS BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS AND PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT REACHED ON ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE MAIN PURPOSE OF A THIRD GENEVA-STYLE CONFERENCE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE TO CONFIRM AND GUARANTEE ARRANGEMENTS PROVISIONALLY AGREED BETWEEN THOSE MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED. PRESUMABLY ALSO WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO CO-CHAIRING SUCH A CONFERENCE, PROVIDED UNGA RESOLUTIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES IN THE ICK DECLARATION

ARE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

6. THERE MAY IN SHORT BE AN OPPORTUNITY SOON FOR IMAGINATIVE DIPLOMACY BY BRITAIN OVER CAMBODIA. I HOPE THAT WE DO NOT LEAVE ALL THE RUNNING TO THE FRENCH. IT MAY ALSO BE WORTH CONSIDERING INFORMAL EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH ON THE PROSPECTS FOR, AND THE MODALITIES OF A SETTLEMENT.

7. WHILE BOTH WE AND THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL FEEL THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO TALK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD BE A LITTLE MORE POSITIVE THAN MERELY NOT REJECTING THE IDEA OUT OF HAND.

TONKIN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 236

MAIN 234

CAMBODIA/VIETNAM
STANDARD
SEAD
FED
SPD
HKD
SOVIET
UND
ECD (E)
CONSULAR
MR MCLAREN
CABINET OFFICE
10 DOWNING ST

ADDITIONAL 2

MR P MCLEAN EAD/ODA
COL HINTON DI ROW 3F MOD

NNNN

SUBJECT

CC MASTER

C.D.B.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

26 November 1987

From the Private Secretary

VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister this morning to say that he had been instructed to confirm to her that Mr. Gorbachev accepted with gratitude the Prime Minister's invitation to make a short stopover in Great Britain on his way to Washington for the Soviet/American Summit. I enclose a copy of the speaking note which he handed over. The Prime Minister said that she was absolutely delighted by the news. She was very much looking forward to a chance to talk to Mr. Gorbachev.

The Ambassador said that he assumed that the Prime Minister would want to say something about this in the House this afternoon. The Prime Minister said that she would do so in answer to questions. It was agreed that No.10 and the Soviet Embassy would both confirm it to the press once Prime Minister's Questions were over. The Ambassador said that there was no mention in his instructions of the precise date. He was in no doubt that it would be 7 December. But since his instructions were not specific it might be better simply to stick to the wording "on his way to Washington".

The Prime Minister continued that she was also looking forward very much to seeing Mrs. Gorbachev. She wanted to say how deeply distressed she was that a person whom she admired, respected and liked should be subject to the sort of remarks which had appeared in the Observer newspaper. She hoped the Ambassador would inform Mrs. Gorbachev of this and urge her not to worry about it. She herself was subject to frequent attacks in that newspaper.

I have passed the gist of the two paragraphs above by telephone to Sir Bryan Cartledge in ~~Washington~~ Moscow

I subsequently had some further discussions with the Ambassador about the arrangements for the visit. Although he still does not have firm details of the length of the stopover or its timing, he seems to be working on the basis that Mr. Gorbachev will be something like three hours in the United Kingdom. His understanding is that Mr. Gorbachev would like a private talk with the Prime Minister at which he would be accompanied only by his assistant, Mr. Chernayev.

Subsequently, there might be a wider session of talks or lunch. Others who he believed should be present for that, on the Soviet side, would be Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Dobrynin, Kamentsev, Akromeyev, Chernayev and himself. If it was lunch, then of course Mrs. Gorbachev would also be present. I said that I believed the Foreign Secretary would hold a similar session of talks with Shevardnadze while the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev were talking. The Ambassador said that Mr. Gorbachev would probably want to say a few words to the press. We agreed that this would best be after the meeting/lunch and before departure. The most convenient place would be in the Officers Mess.

I asked the Ambassador whether he had any ideas on what Mrs. Gorbachev would like to do. The Prime Minister had suggested that she might visit a school or kindergarten at Brize Norton; alternatively we could arrange for experts in Russian literature or philosophy to meet Mrs. Gorbachev over coffee; or she might like to meet some of the wives serving at Brize Norton. We were open to any suggestions. The Ambassador said that he would check with Mrs Gorbachev.

The Ambassador then said that the aircraft which would be landing at Brize Norton tomorrow would have aboard Vice-Minister Bessmertnykh and Deputy-Minister of State Security Kryskhov (I am not familiar with the name and this is just my spelling). He himself would be going down to Brize Norton to meet them. He thought that what they most wanted was to see the building and the rooms where the meetings and other contacts with Mr. Gorbachev would take place. I said that I would ensure that this was done. The Ambassador added that it would be very helpful if he could be met on the A41 west of Oxford and his car guided to Brize Norton. You will wish to make arrangements for this.

I subsequently suggested to you that we should make sure the level of representation at Brize Norton tomorrow matches that of the Soviet side. I have spoken in similar terms to John Howe. The Russians particularly want somebody who is responsible for security arrangements to be present to deal with Kryskhov. May I emphasise again that the Prime Minister wants no effort spared to ensure that the arrangements are everything that the Russians would wish.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the Ministry of Defence.

C. D. Powell

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Speaking Note

Esteemed Madame Prime Minister,

I am instructed to confirm that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted with gratitude your kind invitation to make a short stop-over in Great Britain on his way to Washington for Soviet-American summit.

In principle the Soviet side agrees to the proposed variant of the meeting between the British Prime Minister and the General Secretary.

November 26, 1987

L. Zam

Charles Powell
This is the basis on which we are working

CONFIDENTIAL

MR INGHAM

PRESS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GORBACHEV VISIT

1. **Arrival**

Pen or platform scaffold on tarmac. (Limited pooling. Television: BBC/ITN/Soviet/American/FPA(?) plus stills.)

2. **Talks**

Very restricted photocall (television/stills) immediately prior to talks, inside airport building/officers' mess.

3. **Departure**

Platform scaffold or indoor hall for (?) oral statements and brief questions. Microphones and interpreters required.

4. **After Departure**

Prime Minister to give press conference/or BI to brief press in a press hall. Possible COI relay, including 3 above, to a hall in Central London (at FCO?).

5. Possible fixed camera position on airport balcony to cover 'planes arrival and departure, guard of honour etc. Restricted pool.

Other requirements

Accreditation system.

Press announcement and Q and A.

Mike

MIKE BATES
PRESS OFFICE

25 November 1987

File

SECRET

cc PC
bc: BI

SRW

10

CC CSL/LP

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1987

POSSIBLE VISIT OF MR. GORBACHEV

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy telephoned me early this morning to say that he had received a cable from Moscow saying that it was not intended to make any announcement about a stop-over by Mr. Gorbachev in the United Kingdom today. The Embassy would be kept appropriately informed. I asked Mr. Kossov whether he thought this signalled any change in plans. He said that he had no reason to think so. I reminded him that it would become increasingly more difficult to keep news of the intended visit secret. I hoped very much that we could have an early announcement. It would be helpful if he pressed this upon people in Moscow if he was in contact with them during the day.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

cc PC 9

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 6/18/4

24th November 1987

CDP 24/11

Dear Charles,

POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR GORBACHEV

Should you want an MOD representative at the meeting proposed in your letter of 21st November, may I nominate our Head of Protocol to attend. He is Group Captain John Dillon on extension 6608. It is he who is co-ordinating the arrangements from the MOD's point of view.

Yours sincerely,

John Howe.

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

SOV. UNION: visit by Governor
Nov '57

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1987

POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 23 November about the possible visit by Mr. Gorbachev.

I agree to the proposed text of the announcement in the slightly amended form enclosed. I also agree that we should try to let the Americans know about the visit before the formal announcement. But I would prefer to wait until we have had the final decision from the Russians that Mr. Gorbachev will come.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

(Charles Powell)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

At the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P., the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mr. M. S. Gorbachev will pay a short visit to the United Kingdom on Monday 7 December on his way from Moscow to the US/Soviet Summit in Washington. During his visit he will hold talks with Mrs. Thatcher [who will also give a lunch in honour of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev].

SECRET 7

CC PC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1987

Prime Minister Content with proposed arrangement? CDP 23/11

Dear Charles,

Possible visit by Mr Gorbachev

I am replying to the points in your letter of 21 November to the Resident Clerk and your two letters of 23 November to me about the arrangements for Mr Gorbachev's possible stopover at Brize Norton on his way to the Washington Summit, and the possibility of the Soviet advance party stopping at Brize Norton on 25 November.

MOD have given the green light both to the substantive stopover and the recce visit. They are going ahead with the necessary arrangements. They have taken on board the Prime Minister's wish that arrangements should be meticulous and that full honours should be accorded.

Although we have not yet been given the definite go-ahead by the Russians that the visit is on, we should be ready with an announcement to make either tomorrow, 24 November, or at the latest Wednesday 25 November. Now that the MOD and Brize Norton are involved the circle of people in the know is inevitably widening and with it the risk of a leak. (As you know the circle is wider than it need have been as a result of Aeroflot's unexpected telex to Brize Norton.) Once the text has been approved, we will clear it and the timing of any announcement with the Russians.

We also need to consider when to tell the Americans. It is quite possible that Mr Shevardnadze may already have told Mr Shultz in Geneva. Either way it would be only courteous to tell them before any announcement is made to the press. I attach a draft telegram to Washington with appropriate instructions, which should issue once the Russians have confirmed the stopover.

Liaison between the FCO and the MOD on all practical arrangements will be handled by Anne Morrison of Protocol Department. She will also act as Administrative Liaison Officer with the Soviet Embassy on the detailed protocol arrangements in very close coordination with Soviet Department where the Assistant, John Holmes, will act as Liaison Officer both with Anne Morrison and with departments concerned with substantive aspects including briefing. Mr Hemans, the head of Soviet Department, will of course be in general charge

/of

SECRET

of arrangements for the visit. You will no doubt let me know when you would like to hold the meeting proposed in your letter of 21 November.

I shall write separately with proposed arrangements for Mrs Gorbachev.

We are making arrangements to secure Richard Pollock as interpreter. He cannot be contacted until late this evening.

I shall be writing separately with proposals on the press arrangements for the visit itself in the next day or two.

I am copying this letter to John Howe.

Yours ever

Tim Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11C

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

At the invitation of the [British] Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mr M S Gorbachev will pay a short visit to the United Kingdom on Monday 7 December on his way from Moscow to Washington ~~where he is to hold a meeting with President Reagan.~~ During his visit he will hold talks with Mrs Thatcher [who will also give a lunch in honour of Mr and Mrs Gorbachev]

re US/Soviet Summit in

OUTWARD TELEGRAM YFB 4

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
SECRET		IMMEDIATE

TC SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ... SECRET

CAVEAT PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX

FM FM (post) . FM . FCO

TO TO (precedence/post) . TO . IMMEDIATE . WASHINGTON

TELNO TELNO/~~TELEGRAM~~

OF OF (Time of origin) ..... Z (Month) ..... (Year)

AND TO AND TO (precedence/post)

AND TO SAVING

INFO INFO (precedence/post)

INFO SAVING

Distribution:-

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE UK BY MR GORBACHEV.

1. Subject to ~~the~~ final confirmation which is expected either late today 24 November or early 25 November, Mr Gorbachev and the Soviet delegation will make a short stopover in the UK on their way from Moscow to Washington on 7 December. The exact details including the length of the stopover have yet to be determined but the party are expected to land at RAF Brize Norton, and the Prime Minister and Secretary of State expect to hold separate talks with Mr Gorbachev and Mr Shevardnadze. If time permits the Prime Minister will give a lunch in honour of Mr and Mrs Gorbachev and the Soviet delegation.

2. It may be that Mr Shevardnadze has already mentioned the possibility of this to Mr Shultz in Geneva. Nevertheless on receipt of a trigger ~~delegation~~ telegram please inform the Americans of this at a suitably high level. The Prime Minister will shortly be sending a reply to President Reagan's pre-summit message in which she intends to outline her thoughts on her necessarily

Catchword: short

File number	Department	Drafted by: (block capitals)	Telephone no

Printed in D.R.C. E 0015

short talks with Mr Gorbachev. She will also send him her impressions once these talks have taken place.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

SRWBCG 6

cdc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 November 1987

Dear Roger.

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

The ubiquitous Mr. Kossov got in touch with me at short notice this morning with yet another request relating to Mr. Gorbachev's possible visit on 7 December, which incidentally he now regards as absolutely firm.

Kossov said that he had very recently delivered to the Foreign Office a note saying that a Soviet aircraft carrying Mr. Gorbachev's advance party for Washington would over-fly the United Kingdom on 26 November landing at Shannon in the Republic of Ireland. He had this morning received a flash cable from Moscow saying that the aircraft would instead like to land at Brize Norton on Wednesday 25 November. The aircraft would be an IL-62M, the same one which Mr. Gorbachev would use. It would have on board the advance party including a number of protocol and security people and some journalists. It would arrive at 1105 and depart 1½ hours later. The main purpose of requesting the landing was to enable the pilots to familiarise themselves with the runway, refuelling arrangements and so on. If it were possible for members of the advance party on board to see very briefly the building where the meeting with Mr. Gorbachev would take place, that would be a bonus but it was not absolutely essential. Mr. Kossov handed over the enclosed note about the flight together with a form required by the Ministry of Defence which the Soviet Embassy had already filled in. I said that this was of course very short notice. I would consult the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence to see whether it was possible. But I knew the very great importance which the Prime Minister attached to the visit and I was confident that we would try to help if we could. However, I had to say that the flight would inevitably become known to a wider circle of people who would rapidly draw the conclusion that it was a prelude to a visit by Mr. Gorbachev. I hoped therefore that we could have a formal decision and possibly even an announcement of the visit by Wednesday. At the least I must ask the Soviet side to accept that we could not exclude the possibility of a leak. Mr. Kossov said that this was understood. The Soviet preference would be to avoid any premature publicity if possible.

SECRET

Mr. Kossov then added that if at all possible the Ambassador would wish some members of the Embassy to go to Brize Norton on Wednesday to be present for the aircraft arrival and departure and if possible to see the facilities. Those concerned would be himself, Mr. Smagin whom he described as the Embassy's chief security officer, and the Aeroflot representative Mr. Mirzoyan. They would like to travel to Brize Norton by car if that were feasible. I said that I would look into this too.

I realise the difficulties of setting all this up at short notice, not least for people at Brize Norton who are so far completely unaware I assume of the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev is likely to land among them. However, I think the Prime Minister would want us to co-operate as far as we possibly can, given in particular the very considerable lengths to which the Russians went to make acceptable arrangements for her own visit to the Soviet Union. Could I ask you and the Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate very urgently on this. The MoD will of course have to discuss with the Station Commander and no doubt others at Brize Norton. I would hope they could urge the need for preserving the need for maximum confidentiality. I think it also a good idea if the Foreign Office were to appoint someone to liaise with the Soviet Embassy on all this and preferably to accompany the members of the Soviet Embassy when they go to Brize Norton on Wednesday (assuming that can be arranged). I should be grateful if you could let me know by 6 pm today if in principle we can agree the Soviet request. I will then put Mr. Kossov in touch direct with the appropriate people in the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence to discuss further details.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 November 1987

Dear Clyn,

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR. GORBACHEV

I wrote at the weekend to report that Mr. Gorbachev had agreed in principle to stop off in the United Kingdom on his way to the US/Soviet Summit in Washington. I also recorded the Prime Minister's wish that the greatest possible care should be taken with the arrangements.

I had a talk with the Prime Minister about the possible visit, and the arrangements, yesterday. You and the Ministry of Defence may find it helpful to know her thinking, even though we are precluded from starting to make arrangements until the Russians have confirmed later this week that Mr. Gorbachev will come.

The Prime Minister would like full honours accorded to Mr. Gorbachev on arrival. This means a substantial guard of honour which he would inspect and playing of the Soviet national anthem. I do not know what the precise position is on protocol, but in the Prime Minister's view we must be prepared to stretch a point. There should be an impressive red carpet.

The arrangements for talks will depend how long Mr. Gorbachev stays, whether there is a lunch, on the compositon of his delegation and the Soviet side's own wishes. In principle the Prime Minister would like a session of talks with Mr. Gorbachev alone plus note-takers (while recognising that he might want Mr. Yakovlev and/or Mr. Dobrynin present). The Foreign Secretary might hold parallel talks with Mr. Shevardnadze. There might then be a lunch at which the Soviet side would include all those listed above, together with Mrs. Gorbachev and Marshal Akromeyev.

Particular thought will be needed for the arrangements for Mrs. Gorbachev. Clearly a suite should be set aside for her in the Officer's mess. If there is a kindergarten within the Brize Norton perimeter, she might visit that. Another idea which the Prime Minister has floated is to invite one or two (Russian-speaking) experts on Russian literature and philosophy to meet her, people of the calibre of Sir Isaiah

SECRET

Berlin. You will wish to consider this.

The Prime Minister would like Richard Pollack to interpret for her.

The press arrangements will also need care (and discussion with the Soviet side). Clearly there must be television and photographic coverage. The Prime Minister's inclination is against proposing a joint press conference but to aim instead for a joint press statement.

There are also of course a number of technical questions on which MoD will advise such as refuelling facilities, height of steps, closure of Brize Norton to other flights.

I hope that you will find this a help when you come to start work on a programme.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

yours ever,

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

EMBASSY
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT

Kensington Palace Gardens
London, W. 8
Tel.: 229-32-16

No. 358/ko

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and with reference to our note No.355/ko of November 20, 1987 has the honour to inform that the flights mentioned in the note will be carried out not on 26 and 27 November 1987, but on 25 and 26 November 1987 with landing not at Shannon but at Brize Norton.

The Embassy would be grateful to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the communication of the above information to the appropriate British authorities.

The Embassy of the USSR avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, November 23, 1987

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

London

EMBASSY
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT

Kensington Palace Gardens
London, W. 8
Tel.: 229-32-16

No. 357/ko

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Ministry of Defence and has the honour to inform that to bring from Moscow to Washington specialists to ensure the forthcoming visit of Mr.M.S.Gorbachev to the USA Aeroflot is operating special flight AFL 4I2I on IL-62M aircraft No.86466, call-sign RPNDZ (reserved aircrafts No.867I0 call-sign RPEIK and No.86536, call-sign ROWRV). Captain's name is Khomchenko.

The flight will be as follows (Time in UTC):

25.II.87.

Take off from Moscow - 07.00
Arrival at Brize Norton - II.05
Take off from Brize Norton - I2.35
Arrival at Washington - 20.40

Flight delays will be notified direct to the airfield concerned by the aircraft captain.

The Embassy would be grateful to the Ministry of Defence for getting clearance for the above-mentioned aircraft to overfly the UK territory and land at Brize Norton airport.

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Defence the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, 23 November I987

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

London

To:
...nistry of Defence
..S (Air)
Metropole Building
...rthumberland Avenue
London WC2N 5BL

Form FLS AP.1
NOTICE : 5 working days for UK airfields
10 for overseas airfields

REQUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR AIRCRAFT

Country	USSR	Date of Application	23.II.87	Date of Flight	25.II.87
Aircraft Type	IL-62M	Radio Callsigns Alternatives	RPNDZ	Capt.'s name Rank	Khomchenko
	~~MIL~~/CIV				
Crew/Ranks	I8	Passengers	20 ~~MIL~~/CIV	VIP	YES ~~NO~~

Reason for Flight/VIP details: to ensure the forthcoming visit of Mr.M.S.Gorbachev to the USA

Cargo	~~YES~~ NO	Type		Cargo Handling Agent	n/a
Amount		Dangerous	YES ~~NO~~	Tel. No.	

AIRCRAFT ROUTE

	LANDING	OVERFLIGHT = Entry/Exit Points/Time			
...rfield of Origin	Moscow USSR			ETD	07.00
Last Airfield before UK	none	ETA		ETD	
UK Airfield Requested	Brize Norton	ETA	II.05	ETD	I2.35
Acceptable Alternate					
First Airfield after UK	Washington, USA	ETA	20.40	ETD	
Destination Airfield	as above	ETA	as above		

FACILITIES REQUESTED

Customs	~~YES~~ NO						
...ccommodation*	~~YES~~ NO	Numbers		Type	MIL/CIV	No. of Nights	
...l*	YES ~~NO~~	Type		Amount			
Transport*	~~YES~~ NO	Type		Destination			
Embassy Staff Meeting?	YES ~~NO~~	Car No.	248D 3I6	Names	Mr.N.Kossov Mr.A.Smagin		
Cargo Handling Equipment*	~~YES~~ NO	Type					
Aircraft Guards*	~~YES~~ NO						

I understand the facilities marked * may incur further charges.

Originator's Name	M.Ippolitov	Tel.	2298027	Signature .....
Rank/Status	USSR Consul	Ext.		

FOR FLS ACTION

4

PRIME MINISTER

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

Some of the main questions on which it would be helpful to have your guidance before setting in hand the detailed arrangements are:

(i) Arrival/Departure

Would you want a full honour guard, which Mr. Gorbachev would inspect?

Do you think there should be a band, and national anthems played?

[Although he is not a Head of State, I think we should give him the fullest possible treatment.]

(ii) Talks

Should we propose that your talks with Mr. Gorbachev be one to one, as in Moscow? If Mr. Gorbachev wanted to include others, e.g. Yakovlev who is a full member of the Politburo, we should presumbly agree. The Foreign Secretary would have separate talks with other senior Soviet officials not involved in the talks with you.

(iii) Lunch

Assuming that lunch will be appropriate, should we propose one lunch for you, the Gorbachevs and the few most senior officials; and another for the rest? Or would you want to lunch just with the Gorbachevs?

(iv) Mrs. Gorbachev

Who should look after her during the talks? Should she have a short programme? (i.e. meet schoolchildren). We shall of course provide a suite where she can rest, tidy etc.

(v) Interpretation

Agree to ask for Richard Pollock?

(vi) Press

Obviously there will have to be photographs. Should we propose to the Russians a short joint press conference?

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

21 November 1987

JA2AVA

file 3

PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE VISIT FROM MR. GORBACHEV

The Soviet Embassy got in touch with me early this morning and read a message to the effect that Mr. Gorbachev accepted in principle your invitation to stop over in the UK on his way over to the Summit in Washington. However, a formal decision would not be taken until after the meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in Geneva on Monday 23 and Tuesday 24 November (presumably in case there are any hitches which delay a Summit). It was important that there should be no leak in advance about the proposed visit. We could discuss a joint announcement once the formal decision had been taken. The Soviet Ambassador would very much like to call on you briefly later in the week to confirm formally Mr. Gorbachev's acceptance of your invitation. I said that I was sure you do your best to fit him in.

This is good news. It will be important to take great care with the arrangements and get everything exactly right. I will consult you about the details as soon as possible.

C. D. POWELL

21 November 1987

SLHAPS

SECRET

Cile 2

cc PC

CCSKP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

21 November 1987

From the Private Secretary

**UNITED STATES/SOVIET SUMMIT:
POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY MR. GORBACHEV**

The Soviet Embassy got in touch with me early today to inform me that Mr. Gorbachev accepted in principle the Prime Minister's invitation to visit the United Kingdom briefly on his way to the United States/Soviet Summit in Washington. However, a formal decision would have to wait until after the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in Geneva on Monday 23 and Tuesday 24 November (presumably in case there should be any hitch in the arrangements from the Summit itself). The Soviet Ambassador would like to call briefly on the Prime Minister later in the week, once he received final confirmation from Moscow, to convey Mr. Gorbachev's acceptance. It was important that there should be no announcement of the proposed visit until the formal decision had been taken.

I asked Mr. Kossov whether his instructions from Moscow led him to assume agreement that the meeting would take place at Brize Norton. Mr. Kosov said that the point was not specifically covered, but he had no doubt that this would be accepted. The Embassy's contacts with Moscow had all been on the assumption that the meeting would take palce at Brize Norton. I said that I took the point about avoiding premature publicity, but once the formal decision was taken we would need to begin straightaway to make detailed arrangements. It would not be possible to hold the news for long. We should aim for a joint announcement in London and Moscow as soon as possible after the Ambassador's call. Mr. Kossov agreed that this seemed sensible.

Assuming that the formal decision is indeed taken in the next few days, we shall need to move very rapidly on the preparations for the meeting. The Prime Minister wishes these to be meticulous. Mr. Gorbachev must be accorded full honours. The Foreign Office will no doubt wish to appoint someone to co-ordinate all the arrangements in liaison with the Ministry of Defence. But, in the first instance it might be helpful if I were to convene a small meeting of those principally concerned to explain what the Prime Minister wants done.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for this letter to be seen by the Foreign Secretary before his departure to Brussels.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SUBJECT
cc MASTER.

Cito DCA
cePC
ccSKP
1.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 November 1987

Dear Lyn,

UNITED STATES/SOVIET SUMMIT: POSSIBLE STOP-OVER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BY MR. GORBACHEV

The Prime Minister took the opportunity of Mr. Aganbegyan's call this morning to have a brief word with the Soviet Ambassador.

The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for Mr. Gorbachev's message about the Kings Cross fire. People in this country had been touched by the gesture. She hoped the Ambassador would inform Mr. Gorbachev of this.

The Prime Minister went on to say that if there were any possibility of Mr. Gorbachev stopping in the United Kingdom briefly on his way to Washington, she would be very pleased to meet him. There were many important topics to be discussed. Were he to come, she envisaged a meeting at Brize Norton where there were excellent facilities. Mr. Zamyatin said that the matter was being considered in Moscow. His personal feeling was that Mr. Gorbachev would come, although there would probably not be a decision for several days yet. He had passed on to Moscow the details of Brize Norton which I had provided. He hoped that every effort will be made to keep the possibility of Mr. Gorbachev coming here secret. Premature publicity might well lead to the idea being dropped. The Prime Minister said that knowledge of the possibility was being kept to a very small circle.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

yours ever,

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Grey Scale #13
C
Y
M
A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19