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PREM 19/2571

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Visit to London by Ambassador
Nitze (US INF Negotiator)

USA

JUNE 1983

In attached folder: Briefing An Pui's meetings
① 27 March 1985 ② 25 February 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
17.83							
10.9.84							
20.11.84							
27.3.85							
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4.3.2.87							
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NB: Briefing for Nitze Meeting on
27 March 1985 is in folder at
back of this file.

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US/FRG CONSULTATIONS ON SDI/ABMT

SUMMARY

1. STRONG GERMAN PITCH TO NITZE FOR ABIDING BY NARROW INTERPRETATION OF ABMT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT BY KOHL AND GENSCHER.

DETAIL

2. NITZE AND PERLE HAVE SEEN KOHL, WOERNER AND GENSCHER IN THE LAST 24 HOURS. ALTHOUGH GENSCHER MADE IT CLEAR TO NITZE THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT WAS JURIDICALLY CORRECT, THE GERMANS TOLD NITZE THAT THEIR STRONG PLEA THAT THE AMERICANS ABIDE BY THE NARROW INTERPRETATION WAS MADE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. THE GERMANS HAD THREE REASONS FOR WANTING THIS:

A) TO AVOID THE INEVITABLE DAMAGE TO THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

B) TO AVOID DAMAGE TO ALLIANCE COHESION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUE.

C) BECAUSE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S OWN PUBLIC CREDIBILITY, HAVING SUPPORTED THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME ON THE 'CONTRACTUAL BASIS' ('GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE' - DESCRIBED AS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON) OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION.

(COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW TERM DEvised BY THE GERMANS, AND USED BY KOHL PUBLICLY, TO EMPHASISE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE GERMANS VIEW THIS POINT. THERE IS NO EXPLICIT COROLLARY THREATENED BUT THE IMPLICATION MUST BE THAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME MIGHT NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE IF THE LEGAL/CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR THEIR SUPPORT WERE CHANGED.)

3. THE QUESTION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME DID NOT COME UP.

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4. NITZE WAS APPARENTLY CAREFUL TO SAY NOTHING WHICH SUGGESTED A DECISION TO MOVE TO THE BROADER INTERPRETATION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. EQUALLY, THE GERMANS FOUND NOTHING IN HIS REMARKS WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE MATTER WAS STILL SERIOUSLY OPEN IN WASHINGTON. THE GERMANS DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WAS MUCH THE EUROPEANS COULD DO TO INFLUENCE MATTERS. NITZE SAID THAT THREE POINTS WOULD NOW BE REVIEWED - THE RATIFICATION RECORD; THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ABMT; AND THE TESTING POSSIBILITIES UNDER BOTH NARROW AND BROAD. THE END OF APRIL WAS THE DEADLINE MENTIONED FOR THE VARIOUS STUDIES TO BE COMPLETED.

5. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT PRESS LINE IS AS FOLLOWS. NITZE INFORMED GENSCHER ABOUT THE RE-STRUCTURING OF THE SDM PROGRAMME AND RELATED QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT. GENSCHER EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ON A SUBJECT WHICH DIRECTLY TOUCHED THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, AND UNDERLINED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE BOTH FOR GENEVA AND FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY. HE CALLED FOR A CAREFUL ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGE FROM NARROW TO BROAD INTERPRETATION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CALLED ON BOTH PARTIES TO STICK TO A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY. THEY NOTED THE PROPOSAL AT REYKJAVIK FOR A TEN-YEAR COMMITMENT TO THE ABMT TREATY AND STRESSED THAT THE PRIORITY NOW WAS TO USE THIS TO SECURE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (NB WE DO NOT YET HAVE A WRITTEN TEXT OF THIS).

6. BEFORE NITZE'S ARRIVAL, KOHL GAVE AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN A REGIONAL NEWSPAPER YESTERDAY. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED REAGAN HAD DEFERRED A DECISION ON A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF ABMT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT EFFECTS SUCH A DECISION WOULD HAVE ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, HE HAD AGREED THAT ALLIES WOULD BE CONSULTED (E.G. NITZE VISIT). THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF ABMT WAS THE CONTRACTUAL BASIS (GESCHAEFTSGRUNDLAGE) AS THE US GOVERNMENT HAD AGAIN REASSURED THE ALLIES. THE FRG SUPPORTED THE SDM RESEARCH PROGRAMME BUT THIS RESEARCH MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ABMT AND ANY STEP GOING BEYOND RESEARCH MUST NOT ONLY BE DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES, BUT MUST ALSO LEAD TO COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT MEANT THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION, AS TREATY PARTNERS, MUST JOINTLY CLARIFY HOW THE ABMT COULD BE INTERPRETED.

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7. SPEAKING ON WIDER ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES FOR 1987 (50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ZERO OPTION FOR LRINF AND FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR SRINF; GLOBAL CW BAN; LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR TESTING), KOHL SAID THAT SUCH RESULTS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE READY TO ACCEPT INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS, AND DROP ITS LINKAGE. ON THE OTHER SIDE IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINED FLEXIBLE IN ITS HANDLING OF THE ABMT, AND DID NOT PRESENT THE SOVIET UNION WITH A FAINT ACCOMPLISHMENT.

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Telephone 0130203032 218 2111/3

MO 26/7/4V

26th February 1987

*CDP
26/2.*

Dear Charles,

SDI

I enclose my record of Mr Younger's meeting yesterday with Ambassador Nitze and Mr Perle.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Galsworthy in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,

John Howe

(J F HOWE)

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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MO 26/7/4V

SDI: NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DEFENCE
SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR NITZE, 25TH FEBRUARY 1987 AT 1130AM

Those present:

The Rt Hon George Younger MP Secretary of State	Ambassador Nitze
The Rt Hon John Stanley MP Minister of State(AF)	Ambassador Price
Mr Nicholls DUS(P)	Mr Perle
Mr Ledlie CPR	Mr Gordon Smith
Mr Griffiths Head of DACU	Mr Clyne
Mr Pakenham FCO	And other US officials
Mr Howe Private Secretary to Secretary of State	

Mr Nitze said that he had had very useful meetings that morning with the Prime Minister and with Sir Geoffrey Howe. The President had taken a number of decisions, namely that there should not be early deployment of the SDI programme; that SDI deployment, if and when it occurred, would be phased; and that the already established criteria for SDI deployment, namely that the system should be militarily effective, survivable and cost effective at the margin, must be met at the initial phase of deployment (although the degree of military effectiveness demanded would not be so high for the first component to be deployed as for the system as a whole). The President had not, on the other hand, taken a decision on whether to move now, for the purpose of the test programme, from the narrow to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Before addressing the latter decision he had called for a further legal examination of the ABM Treaty negotiating record, and the record of statements since; and a report by the DOD on the requirements of the SDI test programme. The President had directed that, meanwhile, there should be consultation with Congress and with allies.



2. Mr Younger emphasised the extreme importance of the consultation process, particularly in the interests of Alliance cohesion. Were the US yet in a position to say what elements of necessary testing were precluded by the narrow interpretation of the Treaty? Mr Perle said that the Administration would like to be in a position to establish the feasibility of the SDI without withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. On the basis of the broader interpretation of the Treaty, this was entirely possible. Some tests did, however, require the broad interpretation. It must seem as though the US had "cooked up" the broad interpretation as a way of getting round the Treaty. This was, however, definitely not the case. The broad interpretation had come to light quite fortuitously in 1985 as the result of work set in hand following Congressional questions during a confirmation hearing. DOD and subsequently State Department lawyers had become convinced. The narrow interpretation was based on the ABM Treaty negotiators' claim that they had succeeded in their efforts to get the Russians to agree such an interpretation. On close examination of the records, it was clear that the Soviets had not agreed. Mr Nitze confirmed this from his own recollection of the negotiations, with which he had been intimately concerned. Mr Perle said that the use of the word "created" in Agreed Statement D made sense only in terms of the broader interpretation; systems based on other physical principles could not be said to be "created" unless they were developed and tested. Agreed Statement D placed restrictions on deployment only.

3. Mr Younger said that it was not for us to enter the debate about Treaty interpretation. He took it that the DOD's study was intended to provide for the President, before he took a decision, an indication of what tests were necessary. Mr Nitze confirmed that this was the case. Mr Perle said that there would be some opposition in Congress to the move to a broader interpretation and this would be reflected in attempts to restrict the funding of the test programme. The attitude of the United States' allies in that situation would be crucial. Mr Nicholls said that he took it that Allies would be consulted again after the reports had been submitted to the President, and before a final decision. Mr Perle confirmed this. Mr Smith said that it was important to test beyond the limits of research in order to establish the fidelity of calculations made. As it was, "we have waltzed around some critical issues". It was necessary to test realistically, at realistic velocities and trajectories, lest the US found themselves in a few years time having spent a great deal of money and still not knowing whether the system was feasible. Mr Perle confirmed this. The President could find himself in a position of uncertainty.

4. Mr Stanley asked how Mr Nitze envisaged the Russians would be handled. Mr Nitze said that the ABM Treaty issue was not relevant to the INF basket at Geneva. The main outstanding issues there were verification, SRINF, and geographical constraints. As regards the strategic, space and defence baskets, the Russians had



no basis for their suggestion that SDI work should be confined to laboratory research, and for holding progress hostage to this; neither the word 'research' nor the word 'laboratory' appeared in the Treaty. Mr Stanley asked whether the US were prepared to discuss Treaty interpretation with the Soviets. Mr Nitze said that the US were prepared to talk to the Soviets about Treaty interpretation, but not negotiate about it.

5. Mr Younger asked whether the Administration was going to make a real effort to follow up the arms control objectives agreed at Camp David in November. Mr Nitze said that the President would like to see progress towards an agreement. The question was how to move towards one. A meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow was one possibility, but the Administration were not willing to put forward this idea yet particularly while constructive work was continuing in Geneva. The meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Vienna had not been productive. Now, however, the Russians were prepared to compare positions in Geneva although they seemed to want to limit this process to general headings. The US concern was to get down to more details. Mr Younger asked whether, assuming the consultations with allies and Congress ended favourably so far as the Administration was concerned, a US decision to move to the broader interpretation would encourage the Soviets to reach arms control agreement; or the reverse? Mr Nitze felt that the effect would be positive. The Russians did not negotiate seriously until they saw their interlocutors were in earnest. Mr Perle said that the Soviets would bluster as they had on INF. They would have a difficult decision to make, provided that NATO remained cohesive.

6. Mr Nicholls asked whether the feasibility which the testing was intended to establish was the feasibility of the total SDI deployment, or the feasibility of individual phases of that deployment. And were the technologies in question those in which Allies were involved? Mr Smith said that judgements of feasibility would need to be based on an extrapolation of individual phases into a whole. As for the involvement of allies, full scale engineering development, if approved, would be on the basis of a balanced programme. The concentration, although not exclusively, would be on the more mature technologies.

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Ministry of Defence
25th February 1987



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10 DOWNING STREET
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SUBJECT
CCMASTER

25 February, 1987.

From the Private Secretary

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE

The Prime Minister saw Ambassador Nitze for some ninety minutes this morning, as part of the consultations being conducted by the United States Administration with its NATO allies on the Strategic Defence Initiative and the ABM Treaty. Mr. Nitze was accompanied by the United States Ambassador and by Mr. Perle. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

Mr. Nitze described the position reached in discussions in Washington on the future of the SDI programme. The President had concluded that progress to date with research was not sufficient to warrant a decision on early deployment. It was also clear that, if and when research reached the point where deployment was possible, such deployment would be phased. Even the initial phase of deployment must meet the established criteria of military effectiveness, survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margins. The issue which had not been decided was whether to change the ground rules for the SDI research and testing programme. The research programme had made faster progress than anticipated. The point for consideration was whether starting now to plan future tests based on a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty (which the US regarded as the correct interpretation) would make it possible to establish the feasibility of SDI more effectively and with a more economical use of resources. To resolve this, the President had ordered a further legal review of the ratification record of the ABM Treaty and the subsequent statements and practice of the two parties; and an analysis of future tests, to establish the costs and benefits of moving to the broader interpretation. Meanwhile, there would be consultations with Congress and the Allies.

Mr. Perle amplified one point. A distinction had to be drawn between actual tests of SDI components and planning for them. While the tests themselves were not imminent, it was necessary to reach planning decisions relatively soon. Were the restrictive interpretation to be maintained, some

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tests would need to be downgraded and rendered less effective. This in turn affected the quality of judgement which could be made about the feasibility of the SDI system.

The Prime Minister summarised the United Kingdom's approach. We strongly supported the SDI research programme. It was vital for the West to remain at the leading edge of new technology. Interpretation of the ABM Treaty was for the parties, but, as a matter of common-sense, research should be taken to the point of establishing feasibility. Deployment was a matter for negotiation, as she and the President had agreed at Camp David in 1984. It was difficult for us to judge at what point the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty would become a real and practical constraint. This would presumably emerge from the study now being undertaken by the Department of Defense. If this demonstrated clearly that feasibility could only be established by the sort of tests which the broader interpretation of the Treaty would allow, she would wish to see the programme go ahead on that basis. But she counselled against taking a decision to move to the broader interpretation for political effect and before it was absolutely necessary to do so.

The Prime Minister continued that she agreed that the Soviet Union should not be given a veto over the SDI. But the impact of a change of policy on the SDI on the arms control negotiations in Geneva had to be considered. There was a strong case for giving the Soviet Union a sense of security and predictability about the future course of the SDI programme. This could be achieved in two ways. The US offer made at Reykjavik not to deploy SDI for a fixed period (with negotiations at the end of that period) should be renewed. And the practical limitations which would in any event determine the timetable for SDI research, testing and development should be translated into a statement of limits beyond which the programme would not go within a certain time-scale. An offer to the Russians on these lines might make it feasible to combine a move to testing in accordance with the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty with the achievement of agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Gorbachev was probably better for the West than any likely alternative. Although we should not give up anything fundamental to help him, we had an interest in enabling him to claim that some constraints had been placed on SDI, even though they would in practice be self-imposed. Summing up her views, her advice to the President was that he should not reach a decision to move to a broader interpretation of the Treaty before the restraints imposed by the narrow interpretation made themselves felt in practice. And the Soviet Union should be offered reassurance about the likely shape, scope and time-table of the SDI, in terms which would not in practice add new constraints, in order to preserve the prospect of achieving arms control agreements.

Mr. Nitze and Mr. Perle made a number of comments in reply. Interpretations of the ABM Treaty were really only a side issue. They played no part in discussions of the Treaty and its implementation in the period 1972-85.

Discussions with the Russians in Geneva about SDI were continuing. Press reports to the contrary were wrong. But the United States side were not interested in negotiating amendment of the ABM Treaty, which appeared to be what the Soviet aim of "strengthening" it meant in practice. Whatever might have been said by Soviet spokesmen elsewhere, in Geneva they continued to insist on restricting research to the laboratory. Other aspects of the negotiations in Geneva, on START and INF, were going well, although there were difficulties on shorter-range systems. This might be a breaking point. There was no disagreement that deployment of SDI would be a matter for negotiation. The offer at Reykjavik not to deploy SDI for 10 years had been directly linked to the second stage of reductions in strategic nuclear weapons below 50%, though that linkage might be reconsidered. What the United States did or did not do in terms of testing and development would matter much less to the Russians than a firm commitment not to go beyond feasibility to deployment. The constraints of the narrow interpretation on the SDI testing programme were already being felt. While some of the necessary tests were themselves quite far ahead, decisions on how to configure them were needed in the next 6-12 months. The question was whether the broad interpretation would survive a long period of adherence to the narrow interpretation (this from Perle).

The Prime Minister commented that the Reykjavik meeting had been an earthquake. For the first time, she had seen no firm ground on which the West's security could rest safely. But that had been overtaken by the agreement which she had reached with the President in November on arms control priorities. It should be perfectly possible for the United States to offer the Soviet Union predictability about non-deployment of SDI without linking this to elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. She accepted that amendment to the ABM Treaty was not desirable, but her own proposal would not require this. It was intended to offer the Soviet Union sufficient reassurance about United States intentions to save Gorbachev's face and to enable arms control agreements to be concluded. As regards SRINF negotiations, she did not regard a freeze and an option to match Soviet deployments as adequate. Soviet shorter-range weapons must be greatly reduced.

Mr. Perle asked how controversial a decision to move to the broader interpretation would be. The Prime Minister said that she would understand it, but it must be combined with evidence of willingness to talk to the Russians on the lines she had indicated. The Foreign Secretary said that the fact that Administration spokesmen had so recently given assurances that the SDI programme would remain within the narrow interpretation meant that there would inevitably be concern among the allies about a change to the broader interpretation. It would be necessary to explain the reasons for this, if it happened, very clearly and to show awareness of the need to minimise the impact on the arms control negotiations. The Prime Minister repeated that if the United States did decide to adopt the broader

interpretation, the decision must be accompanied by very substantial assurances to the Russians, confirming that there would be no early deployment, and no deployment without negotiations as well as predictability about the future course of the SDI programme.

The enclosed press statement was subsequently issued.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence), and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell

C.D. Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE AND RICHARD
PERLE: WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1987

1. Very good discussion - lasted over 90 minutes (present also was Sir Geoffrey Howe).
2. Nitze described the consideration being given by the Administration to the future of work on SDI and the consultations being conducted. He emphasised that early deployment was not under consideration. He confirmed that deployment was a matter for negotiation as agreed by the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David in 1984.
3. Prime Minister confirmed Britain's support for the SDI research programme. Interpretation of the ABM Treaty was a matter for the signatories, but as a matter of commonsense research on SDI should be conducted to the point of establishing feasibility.
4. Both sides confirmed their wish to see the arms control negotiations in Geneva lead to reductions in nuclear weapons on the basis of the priorities agreed between the President and the Prime Minister at Camp David last year.

PRIME MINISTERMEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE

You are to see Nitze at 0845 tomorrow morning. He will be accompanied by Richard Perle and Charlie Price. The Foreign Secretary will be present (in a non-combatant role). We have set aside 1½ hours for the meeting. Nitze and his team will have flown in from Washington overnight, getting in at 0645, and going on to Bonn at lunch time.

The visit constitutes the consultations for which you and others have pressed. To that extent it is welcome. The effect is rather spoiled by heavy leaking from Washington that the President has already made up his mind to move from the narrow to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This suits the book of Weinberger and Perle.

The formal position in Washington is that a number of steps have to be taken before any decision on the future of the SDI programme is reached. These are:

- a further study by lawyers of the legal case for the broad interpretation of the Treaty;
- a study by the Pentagon of how and why the SDI programme needs to be reconfigured, and which interpretation of the Treaty would be required for each part;
- consultations with Congress and the Allies.

The attached telegram from Washington contains important background. You will want to read it in full. In essence it accepts the view that you have taken for some months that there is no point in arguing about interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Administration believe the broad interpretation to be valid. They have no doubt that the feasibility of SDI

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can only be determined by testing and development activities which require the broad interpretation to prevail. Foreign governments will not change the Administration's mind on this. It remains to be seen whether Congress will.

The question which we can usefully discuss is - as you have said in Parliament - what effect US decisions will have on the arms control negotiations in Geneva. The Embassy's assessment is that the motives of Weinberger and Perle in the current debate are to make the SDI irreversible and to sabotage the arms control negotiations, so that there is no START agreement in the life of the present Administration. While the President would fully endorse the former objective, it is not clear whether he fully appreciates the risk that it poses to successful arms control negotiations. Nitze appears to believe that you can both go ahead with SDI and reach arms control agreements in Geneva provided the Administration talks to the Russians about limitations (both of time and scope) on the SDI programme. It is suggested that you should endorse Nitze's approach in the hope that it will prevail in Washington. The difficulty is that the President already seems to have ruled out any negotiation in Geneva on permissible and non-permissible activities under the ABM Treaty.

The crucial calculation concerns the impact of American decisions on the Russians. On the one hand, we do not want the Russians to have a veto on the SDI. We must be careful, too, not to cry wolf: in the past, the Europeans have made more fuss about issues such as breach of the SALT limits or nuclear testing than the Russians have. SDI has been a remarkably successful lever for getting the Russians to negotiate seriously on arms control. The Russians will have learned from bitter experience over INF that walking away from arms control negotiations does not help them. This may limit any inclination to do so again.

On the other hand, they have hitherto been unyielding in their determination to restrict SDI research to the laboratory: and

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they will see the propaganda advantage to be gained from making a maximum fuss about an American decision to go to the broader interpretation. This could have political consequences for you, if the Russians could convincingly point to American conduct on SDI as a threat to the achievement of arms reductions. Presentationally the Americans would be in a stronger position if they were seen to be willing to talk to the Russians and to give them assurances about what would not be done with the SDI within a given time-scale. After all, they were ready to do this at Reykjavik.

Behind all this, one has to bear in mind that we do not want to press the Americans to be so reasonable on SDI, that we are once again confronted with the Reykjavik arms control package in its totality.

This points to an approach to these consultations on the following lines:

- we are grateful to the rapid response to our request for consultations;
- we are strong supporters of SDI. We very much agree that the Russians should not have a veto over the programme;
- we have never claimed to interpret the ABM Treaty. That is for the parties. So far as we are concerned research must be done: and as a matter of common sense should be taken to the point of demonstrating feasibility. This implies at least some testing;
- equally we remain very attached to the agreed statement issued at Camp David in December 1984 that SDI-related deployment would, in view of Treaty obligations, be a matter for negotiation. We assume that remains the President's position;
- at the same time we want to see arms control

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agreements reached with the Soviet Union, based on the priorities which you and the President agreed at Camp

David last year. We think that such agreements can be reached during the remainder of the President's term of office, without harming Western security (although we admit to some unease about zero INF). We assume that the Administration (hard look at Perle) attach no less weight to arms control than to progress with SDI;

- we think both aims - arms control and SDI - can be reconciled. The Russians must not be given reason to think that they can block SDI activities by the US which enable the feasibility of a system to be determined. Equally, if the Americans intend to step up the pace and scope of the SDI programme, it would be reasonable at the least to repeat the assurances given at Reykjavik about no deployment for ten years. This was in effect the approach which you proposed to the President just over a year ago;
- it will also be very much better presentationally if the US are seen to be offering the Soviet Union discussions (but no veto) rather than a fait accompli. If the Russians refuse, it is they who are wrong-footed. The Soviet Union not SDI will be blocking arms control;
- so your advice to the President can be summarised as follows:
 - (i) if and when the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty becomes a real and practical obstacle to establishing the feasibility of the SDI, it would clearly be wrong to halt the programme. At that point there will be a strong case for moving forward. But it would be tactically wrong to take decisions before the restraints genuinely

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start to be felt simply for political effect;

(ii) presentation and negotiating tactics will be very important. A decision to move ahead with the SDI programme beyond what is possible under the restrictive interpretation will be easier to justify publicly if it is preceded by a declaration of the Administration's:

- continuing resolve to negotiate arms reductions:

- reiteration of its commitment not to deploy SDI without prior negotiation:

- renewal of the offer not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years;

- and a statement of its readiness to discuss with the Russians forecasts of the timing of the likely development of strategic defences by both sides short of deployment.

A note by Percy Cradock and an FCO brief are in the folder, with supporting documents.

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)

24 February 1987

LO4AKZ

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

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NY TELNOS 369 AND 392: ABMT/SDI/NITZE'S VISIT SUMMARY

1. GIVEN THE TIMING, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC DISARRAY HERE, THE MESSAGE NITZE BRINGS BACK FROM LONDON WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. EARLY SDI DEPLOYMENT A NON-ISSUE, AND ABMT LEGAL INTERPRETATION NOT THE CENTRAL ISSUE; THE KEY POINT FOR US MAY BE TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS MADE AWARE OF THE RISK THAT A START AGREEMENT, A CAMP DAVID TOP PRIORITY, MAY BECOME UNATTAINABLE IN HIS TERM IF THE REPHASING OF SDI IS MISHANDLED AT GENEVA.

DETAIL

2. MY TWO TURS SPELL OUT NITZE'S DOUBTS ABOUT THIS WEEK'S MISSION (ON WHICH HE IS NOW BEING JOINED BY PEPE), AND THE OUTLINE OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT UK MESSAGE MIGHT BEST BE CONVEYED TO HIM (AND SUBSEQUENTLY PERHAPS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT).

3. THE TIMING IS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY AWKWARD, SINCE THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT ON THE NSC/IRAN/CONTRAS AFFAIR WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 26 FEBRUARY, AND THE ADMINISTRATION, ALREADY BELEAGUERED, WILL BE FURTHER DISTRACTED. REGAN'S DEPARTURE IS

WILL BE FURTHER DISTRACTED. REGAN'S DEPARTURE IS
EXPECTED SOON, AND MAY WELL BE ESSENTIAL IF THE
ADMINISTRATION IS TO REGAIN SOME MOMENTUM, AND DEVELOP A SENSIBLE
WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH DEMOCRATS ON THE HILL. THOUGH THE NSC
UNDER CARLUCCI HAS BEGUN TO GET GOING AGAIN, SHULTZ'S LOW PROFILE
(AND HE LEAVES ON 27 FEBRUARY FOR A WEEK'S VISIT TO CHINA), AND
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT PREDICAMENT, INCREASE THE DANGER OF
THE PRESIDENT HEARING ONLY EXTREME (WEINBERGER-TYPE) VIEWS ON
STRATEGIC ISSUES, AND THEREFORE ACTING ON THEM (AS OVER THE SALT
LIMITS DECISION IN LATE NOVEMBER). BUT HE WILL CERTAINLY LISTEN
TO ADVICE FROM NO 10.

4. THAT SAID, I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO WELL TO BE SELECTIVE ABOUT
THE POINTS ON WHICH WE CHOOSE TO ADVISE HIM. IN PARTICULAR, I SEE
NO FUTURE IN LEGAL ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THE
RESTRICTIVE ABMT INTERPRETATION IS RIGHT. APART FROM THE FACT
THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, SCC MINUTES ETC, THE
POLITICAL FACTS ARE THAT:

(A) THE ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING SHULTZ, HAS SINCE OCTOBER 1985
BEEN UNANIMOUS THAT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS VALID (THOUGH
THEY HAVE UNTIL NOW AGREED TO CONSTRAIN SDI WITHIN THE
NARROW INTERPRETATION).

(B) ALLIED VIEWS ON THE LEGAL ISSUE WILL NOT THEREFORE CUT MUCH
ICE. THOUGH ADELMAN'S REMARKS WERE CRASSLY PUT, THEY REFLECT
A FAIRLY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION VIEW. CONSULTATION ON THE
HILL, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH MUNN, WILL HAVE REAL IMPACT,
BECAUSE THE SENATE RATIFIED THE TREATY, AND BECAUSE SDI
FUNDING COULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED; BUT ALLIED VIEWS WILL
NOT.

(C) MOREOVER, IN FACT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT AT SOME
STAGE PURSUIT OF SDI WILL INDEED NECESSITATE A MOVE FIRST TO
THE BROAD INTERPRETATION (TO ALLOW MORE ADVANCED TESTING),
AND THEN TO A NEW TREATY OR NO TREATY (WHEN THE QUESTION OF
DEVELOPMENT IN THE END ARISES). SO ABSOLUTE ARGUMENTS ABOUT
THE VIRTUES OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION COULD REBOUND, WITH
THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDING TO FOLLOW THE SIMPLER COURSE OF
WITHDRAWING FROM THE 1972 TREATY ALTOGETHER.

5. NOR DO I SEE MUCH VIRTUE IN OUR QUIZZING NITZE AND PERLE
ABOUT THE PROGRAMMATIC CASE FOR NOW QUOTE REPHASING UNQUOTE, IE
RECONFIGURING, THE SDI PROGRAMME. THE FACT IS THAT THE CASE IS
NOT YET URGENT; ABRAHAMSON TOLD ME ON 9 FEBRUARY THAT A MOVE TO
THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR PROGRAMME REASONS,
AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND WE KNOW THAT THIS IS ALSO NITZE'S
VIEW (SECOND TUR). IT IS REMARKABLE THAT ONLY ON 10 FEBRUARY
WERE THE PENTAGON COMMISSIONED TO PREPARE A STUDY, WHICH WILL
APPARENTLY TAKE THEM SOME 2-3 MONTHS, OF WHAT PROGRAMME CHANGES
THEY WANT, AND WHY THESE REQUIRE A MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION
THIS SHOWS THAT THE TESTS WEINBERGER WISHES FREEDOM TO CONDUCT
HAVE NOT AS YET EVEN BEEN PLANNED. BUT HIS REAL MOTIVES ARE
POLITICAL, IE:

(A) TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF GREATER MOMENTUM, AND SO STIMULATE
GREATER CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING, AND HELP PRESERVE SDI
POST-1988; AND

(B) TO DISPOSE OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT - AND HE
WOULD NOT MIND IF THAT BROUGHT THE GENEVA TALKS TO AN END.

ON (A) PERLE PRIVATELY CONCEDES THAT MUNN MAY BE RIGHT TO SUGGEST
THAT A CHANGE OF SDI POLICY NOW MAY PRODUCE LOWER RATHER THAN
HIGHER FUNDING FROM THE HILL. BUT FOR PERLE THE ARMT HAS ALWAYS

THAT A CHANGE OF SDI POLICY NOW MAY PRODUCE LOWER RATHER THAN HIGHER FUNDING FROM THE BUDGET. BUT FOR PERLE THE ABMT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A BAD DEAL, AND TO SECURE ITS EROSION, AFTER SALT I AND SALT II, WOULD IN ITSELF REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PARTING ACHIEVEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS IT WOULD PROBABLY ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO START AGREEMENT IN REAGAN'S TERM.

6. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE CRUX OF THE MATTER: IT IS CERTAINLY THE HEART OF NITZE'S CONCERN - SEE PARA 6 OF FIRST TURN AND MY SUGGESTION IS THAT OUR MESSAGE TO THE ADMINISTRATION NOW SHOULD CENTRE ON IT.

7. I SUSPECT THAT, BECAUSE OF SHULTZ'S SILENCE, THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE AWARE THAT, BY PRESSING AHEAD WITH SDI REPHASING, WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE RUSSIANS, HE IS RISKING LOSING A TOP CAMP DAVID PRIORITY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. NITZE PUTS THE POINT MORE STRONGLY, AND BELIEVES THAT A DIALOGUE ON EACH SIDES' DEFENSIVE PLANS AND TIMETABLES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A START AGREEMENT. HE MAY WELL BE RIGHT.

8. COULD WE PERHAPS SAY TO NITZE AND PERLE ON 25 FEBRUARY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT:

- (A) WE REMAIN STRONG SUPPORTERS OF SDI, AND STRONG OPPONENTS OF ANY PLAN TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS A VETO OVER THE PROGRAMME;
- (B) BUT WE ALSO ATTACH CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT IN GENEVA OF A SATISFACTORY STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TEST WHETHER THE EMERGENCE OF GORBACHEV PROVIDES A REAL OPPORTUNITY DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM;
- (C) WE SEE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO OBJECTIVES OF PRESSING AHEAD WITH SDI AND AT GENEVA. INDEED WE BELIEVE BOTH COURSES NOT ONLY NECESSARY BUT COMPLEMENTARY: ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR SDI COULD BE ERODED IF US UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE RUSSIANS THEIR RESPECTIVE DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES APPEARED TO BE BLOCKING ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS, WHILE THE RUSSIANS MAY BE UNWILLING TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT WITHOUT SOME PARALLEL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS;
- (D) NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARILY THE CASE THAT THE ONLY NEGOTIABLE US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD UNACCEPTABLY IMPAIR THE SDI PROGRAMME. THE RUSSIANS TOO HAVE THEIR SDI PROGRAMME, AND PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IT STOPPED.
- (E) OF COURSE THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW HOOKED THEMSELVES ON THE NARROW ABMT INTERPRETATION, REVERSING THEIR 1972 POSITION, AND FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS MAY NOT READILY ABANDON IT. BUT ANY SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY AGREED LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WOULD IN ANY CASE PROBABLY BE A BLIND ALLEY. INSTEAD, THE RIGHT COURSE IS PERHAPS TO ACCEPT THAT THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE HAS PRODUCED NEW OPPORTUNITIES (LASERS, SENSORS, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS) OF WHICH THE TREATY-DRAFTERS IN 1972 WERE NECESSARILY UNAWARE, AND WHICH THE TREATY THEREFORE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS; AND TO BUILD ON TO THE TREATY NEW MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SUCH TECHNOLOGIES DURING AN EXTENDED (?? OR 10 YEARS) TREATY NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.
- (F) EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS WERE TO PROVE UNWILLING, AND THE CHANCE OF A START AGREEMENT THEREFORE STILL DISAPPEARED, THE WEST WOULD HAVE GAINED FROM THE EXERCISE, FOR THE BLAME WOULD THEN CLEARLY REST ON MOSCOW. SO LONG AS WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION

WOULD HAVE GAINED FROM THE EXERCISE, FOR THE BLAME WOULD THEN CLEARLY REST ON MOSCOW. SO LONG AS WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION SEES THE ISSUE AS ARMS CONTROL BEING FRUSTRATED BY SDI, THE RUSSIANS ARE HANDED A POWERFUL CARD, UNNECESSARILY AND DAMAGINGLY.

9. WE KNOW, OF COURSE, THAT NITZE'S OWN VIEWS (AND KAMPELMAN'S) ARE VERY MUCH ALONG THESE LINES (MY FIRST TUR). THIS IS HOWEVER AN ADVANTAGE, RATHER THAN AN EMBARRASSMENT, PROVIDED THAT WE AVOID ANY ATTRIBUTION TO HIM. AND OUR LINE WOULD IN FACT BE NO MORE THAN AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S 11 FEBRUARY 1986 MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT.

10. IF YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER NOW AGREE THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK FOR THE PRESENT IS TO MAKE THE PRESIDENT AWARE THAT, WHILE SDI AND THE CAMP DAVID START REDUCTIONS PRIORITY ARE NOT NECESSARILY IN CONFLICT, THEY WILL BE (WITH DAMAGING ALLIANCE AND EAST/WEST CONSEQUENCES) IF THE ADMINISTRATION PLAY THE HAND WRONGLY IN GENEVA, IT MIGHT BE BEST OF ALL IF A FURTHER MESSAGE ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, FOLLOWING UP NITZE'S REPORT, COULD REACH THE WHITE HOUSE EARLY NEXT WEEK, WHEN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS THERE ARE LIKELY.

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cc By/CP.
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PRIME MINISTER

24 February 1987

SDI: MEETING WITH NITZE

1. You are to see Paul Nitze and Richard Perle tomorrow morning. Washington telegram 399 suggests a line. Foreign Office briefing has not yet emerged.

2. I suggest the following propositions as guides to our approach:
 - a. If the Americans simply continue with the existing SDI programme, making no statement about interpretation, the chances of strategic arms reduction are slight. The Russians would need large numbers of missiles and other counter-measures if they were to have a prospect of overwhelming an SDI system; they will only consider reductions if they feel that they have tightly constrained the US programme, confining it in effect to research.

 - b. By the same token, any negotiable US/Soviet understanding would seriously impair the US SDI programme (pace paragraph 7d of telegram 399). The Russians, of course, have their own SDI programme and would not wish to see it stopped. But their ideal objective, which they may feel attainable, will be "restraints on the Americans - none on us". They are likely to continue their work in almost any event and since much of it is related to land-based systems they can claim it is within the terms of the ABM Treaty.

 - c. If the Americans formally move to a broad interpretation I seriously doubt whether it would wring further concessions from the Russians.

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rather the reverse. The Russians could well decide that the ABM Treaty was defunct and direct resources to preparing their answer to SDI.

- d. The prospect of negotiating an understanding about the development of new technologies is slight at best. The Soviet answer will be that the ABM Treaty provides clear rules and that the first step must be to obey these rules. Agreement on supplementary rules about new technologies would be frustrated by inability to agree the base from which both sides started.
- e. Nevertheless, for presentational reasons, particularly in Europe, there would be advantage in being seen to try (d.) before any announcement of a broad interpretation. We may well be moving into a colder US/Soviet climate; but we do not want to move before we actually have to; and we must try to avoid a situation in which the blame appears to rest with Washington.
- f. For a number of good reasons we support the SDI programme; we have no locus for arguing about narrow or broad interpretations of the Treaty; but we are entitled to warn about likely consequences and to advise on presentation.

3. This adds up to something like the advice in the Washington telegram under reference, subject to a divergence on its paragraph 7d.

4. There is another consideration to be borne in mind. From a domestic point of view it could be damaging if President Reagan, with whom you are so closely associated, were to appear to slam the door on arms reduction

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possibilities before or shortly after your visit to Moscow. It is in our interest that the door should left at least ajar for the rest of this year.

5. Since writing this minute I have seen Charles Powell's, with which I generally agree.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

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CONFIDENTIAL

cc: PC
BJUP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1987

Dear Charles,

mt

Prime Minister

CDP
24/2.

SDI/ABMT: US/UK Consultations

The Prime Minister will receive Ambassador Nitze and Mr Richard Perle at 0845 on 25 February (your letter of 23 February). They will be accompanied by Ambassador Price and by Mr Vershbow of the US Embassy. Subsequently they will call on the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. These meetings are designed to implement the US commitment to consult the Allies on a US move from the restrictive to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty as the basis for SDI research.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister, agreed with MOD officials. The main lines of the brief reflect the approach already set out by the Prime Minister in the House on 19 February. It also draws on the ideas in paragraph 4 of the Defence Secretary's 19 February report to the Prime Minister of his discussions last week in Washington, with which the Foreign Secretary agrees.

Detailed background is set out in Washington telegrams 369 and 392 (which you will already have seen; further copies enclosed for ease of reference). In addition, we have just received the latest advice of Sir A Acland in his telegram number 399 which I also enclose. Its overall approach is fully consistent with our own views. We strongly agree that we should avoid - as we have avoided in the past - any attempt to interpret the Treaty for the Americans; and that the main area on which to focus is the impact of a US shift on the prospects for success at Geneva.

A wrongly-judged move on SDI could have a damaging effect on the credibility of President Reagan's commitment to progress at Geneva and, indeed, to the two Camp David texts agreed between the President and the Prime Minister. The essence of our position is support for the SDI programme on the basis of Camp David I, and pursuit of arms control at Geneva on the basis of Camp David II. They are not incompatible, but it will require a careful eye to the tactics and to presentation to prevent Mr Gorbachev from persuading public opinion to the contrary. The Pentagon approach - speeding up SDI and refusing to talk to the Russians about the appropriate parameters - falls straight into the trap.

??
[They have espoused one interpretation as recently as last week].

/You

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You will wish to consider, after the meeting, whether a written message should go to the President (as suggested by Sir A Acland), in order to reinforce the thrust of tomorrow's meeting.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'L. Parker', with a horizontal line underneath the name.

(L. Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY MR PAUL NITZE, WEDNESDAY 25 FEBRUARY 1987

SDI/ABM TREATY

Your Objective

1. To underline need for US move to broad interpretation to be based on sound legal and technical grounds.
2. To emphasize potential link between such move and progress in Geneva negotiations.
3. To explore US thinking on latter.
4. To urge further round of consultations after current US legal and technical studies completed (end-April?) but before any final US decision taken.

His Objective

5. To achieve UK endorsement now of US decision to shift to broad interpretation.

UK Arguments

6. Welcome consultations, and no early US decision on deployments. Importance for latter of well-established criteria - feasibility, survivability and cost-effectiveness.
7. UK consistently supported SDI research programme. Prudent hedge against Soviet activities. Politico-military implications of strategic defences in part dependent on technical answers. Hence need for research.

8. No UK locus to pronounce on legality of various Treaty interpretations. But must be expected to take position on US policy decisions stemming from adoption of one or other interpretation. Note new study now under way of legal position. Not likely to be completed until late April?

9. Welcome more information on technical arguments for move to broad interpretation. ERIS/KKV only systems liable for deployment within 6/7 year timescale? Using advanced or 1972-era technology? If latter, how KKV legitimate even under broad interpretation? Note new DOD study now in progress, same timescale?

10. Likely Congressional attitudes if Administration shift to broad interpretation? Likely impact of Senator Nunn study on legal position? Effect on Congressional readiness to continue funding SDI at required level?

11. Believe US now considering "cost/benefit ratio" [as used in draft message from Shultz] of change from narrow interpretation. Correct to do so. But studies indicate ambiguities still to be resolved. Benefits easier to assess when they have clarified overall picture.

12. Recognise US (Weinberger) argument that distinction between research and some forms of development may be artificial. No Soviet veto on SDI, nor unilateral Soviet re-interpretation of Treaty.

13. Nonetheless, assessment of costs in US shift must take prime account of :

- (i) impact on Geneva negotiations; and
- (ii) effect on Alliance cohesion in support of US. Long-term prospects for SDI should be pursued. But need not be at expense of near-term prospects for historic US-Soviet agreements.

14. Therefore welcome US assessment of likely Soviet response, at Geneva and elsewhere (note own visit shortly to Moscow), to US shift.

15. Is it possible that US shift will produce positive Soviet response at Geneva? If creates new impasse, or even seen as deliberate effort to block progress, then damaging consequences for Alliance.

16. Arguable that 1972 Treaty no longer fully applicable to new technology? Case for both sides to reach agreement, perhaps even independent of Treaty, on permissible activity in BMD research? Potential for discussion of scope and timetable of each side's programmes? Debate not about treaty interpretation, but about future.

17. Overall aim, as I have put to President in past, to maintain stability and create predictability about pace and scale of defensive developments.

18. In summary, prefer to await outcome of US studies and further consultations before giving firm view on shift. In any case, will wish to reflect on prospects for Geneva. Also important that US intensify Geneva exchanges on permissible BMD activities.

US Arguments

19. (i) broad interpretation legally correct;
(ii) cost/benefit ratio of conducting research under narrow interpretation now changed because of technology progress;
(iii) decisions needed shortly on restructuring programme to envisage deployments in early 1990s of two-stage initial SDI system (ERIS - ground-based; and KKV - space-based).

20. Mr Nitze understood privately to favour increased exchanges with Soviet Union on permissible BMD activity. But President reluctant to endorse these, probably under pressure of DOD arguments that they would "stop the SDI". Certainly not a necessary consequence. Failure to discuss risks blocking arms control process.

Counter Arguments

21. (i) no UK attempt, as stated earlier, to interpret Treaty;
(ii) unclear why cost/benefit ratio changed, politically or strategically;
(iii) need more information on US programme.

Press Line

22. The Prime Minister had a thorough and detailed exchange of views with Ambassador Nitze on issues connected with the ABM Treaty, SDI and the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

23. [For use in answer to further questions]

First, we have no locus in interpreting the ABM treaty. Secondly, deployment is clearly a matter for negotiation, as we have agreed. Thirdly, we have received satisfactory assurances from the United States that there will be consultation about any significant change of policy in relation to SDI research. Fourthly, the Government fully support the SDI research programme which is permitted by the ABM treaty. it is vital to our defence that the West should always be at the forefront of new technology.

[Prime Minister: House of Commons, 19 February]

24. [If asked about any reference to testing]

"No-one would deny that the Treaty allows some testing. It is also clear that there is some testing that is not allowed. Controversy is about where precisely to draw the line: that is a question of Treaty interpretation. As I have repeatedly made clear, that can only be done by the two parties to the Treaty - who are the only ones with access to the full negotiating record."

GRS 1100

Secret

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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 369

OF 190105Z FEBRUARY 87

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

SIC

MODUK FOR DUS(P) AND DACU

MY TELS NOS 343 AND 190120Z (TO MOD): ABMT/SDI

SUMMARY

1. CARLUCCI CONFIRMS (A) OUR UNDERSTANDING OF POSITION REACHED FOLLOWING NSPG 10 FEBRUARY MEETING AND (B) CONTINUING STRONG ADMINISTRATION RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS THE ABMT/SDI ISSUE WITH THE RUSSIANS. NITZE WORRIED.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH WEINBERGER (SECOND TUR), THE DEFENCE SECRETARY SAW CARLUCCI LATE ON 17 FEBRUARY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO RECEIVE FROM WEINBERGER THE ASSURANCES WE NEEDED THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES BEFORE DECISIONS ON ABMT INTERPRETATION/SDI DEVELOPMENT WERE TAKEN. OUR POSITION WAS CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE 1984 AND 1986 CAMP DAVID STATEMENTS. IT WAS NOT FOR US TO TRY TO INTERPRET THE TREATY, TO WHICH WE WERE NOT A PARTY. BUT IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY ISGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS SDI, WE SHOULD WANT TO BE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE. WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED SDI RESEARCH, AND SO DID PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK. BUT MISLEADING SUGGESTIONS THAT DEPLOYMENTS WERE IMMINENT WERE UNHELPFUL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS PUBLIC SUPPORT, AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

3. CARLUCCI (WHO HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A REPORT OF THE YOUNGER/WEINBERGER TALKS) CONFIRMED (FIRST TUR) THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT YET APPROVED A DECISION DOCUMENT (NSDD) ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 3 AND 10 FEBRUARY NSPG MEETINGS. BUT HE WOULD DO SO VERY SHORTLY, AND THE DOCUMENT WOULD SET OUT THREE DECISIONS, VIZ:

(A) THAT MORE LEGAL WORK ON ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE DONE, PARTICULARLY ON THE SENATE RATIFICATION DEBATE AND SUBSEQUENT QUOTE CASE LAW UNQUOTE. THIS MIGHT TAKE 2-3 MONTHS (THOUGH THE LAWYERS HAD BEEN SAYING THAT THEY MIGHT NEED 6):

(B) THAT THE PENTAGON SHOULD PRODUCE A DETAILED REPORT ON HOW AND WHY THE SDI PROGRAMME NEEDED TO BE RECON-FIGURED AND WHICH INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR EACH PART:

(C) THAT A CONSULTATION PROCESS WITH ALLIES AND CONGRESS SHOULD BE INITIATED, PERHAPS WITHIN THE NEXT 2-3 DAYS.

(THIS CONFIRMS THE REPORT IN OUR TELNO 306.)

Secret

14.

4. CARLUCCI THOUGHT THAT THE RESULTS OF ALL THREE LINES OF ACTION WOULD BE AVAILABLE WITHIN 2-3 MONTHS (WHICH SQUARES WITH WEINBERGER'S ESTIMATE (PARA 4 OF SECOND TUR) OF THE LIKELY TIMETABLE FOR THE PENTAGON STUDY: B ABOVE). ONLY THEN WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SEE WHAT SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT NEED TO TAKE. HE WAS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE SDI PROGRAMME, BUT HE ALSO WANTED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE CHANCES OF SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD BE INCREASED IF THE RUSSIANS WERE BROUGHT FINALLY TO REALISE THAT THEY COULD NOT STOP SDI. THE PROCESS OF ALLIED CONSULTATION WOULD OF COURSE INCLUDE THE UK, BUT IF THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED ANY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BEFORE HER VISIT TO MOSCOW, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE HAPPY TO HELP.

5. CARLUCCI ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO ANY NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS ON WHAT WAS AND WAS NOT PERMITTED BY THE ABMT.

6. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION AT MY DINNER FOR MR YOUNGER, NITZE CONFIRMED TO US THAT:

- (A) DESPITE CARLUCCI'S REFERENCE TO ALLIED CONSULTATION STARTING WITHIN THE NEXT 2 TO 3 DAYS, HE HAD NOT YET BEEN ASKED TO PLAN A EUROPEAN TOUR, OR TOLD WHAT HE COULD SAY IF HE WENT: HE IMPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE US POSITION NEEDED TO EVOLVE FURTHER (SEE BELOW) BEFORE CONSULTATION COULD BE SENSIBLE AND PRODUCTIVE.
- (B) HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS, INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL (PERHAPS 50 PER CENT) REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WITHOUT ACCEPTING DAMAGING CONSTRAINTS ON SDI, BUT WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT SECURING THE START AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE SCOPE (AND TIMETABLE) OF EACH SIDE'S STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES.
- (C) AS TO THE FORM OF THIS DIALOGUE, HE DID NOT FAVOUR A LEGAL DISCUSSION OF THE PRECISE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT. HIS PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT, AS HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS MIGHT, THAT THE TREATY WAS IN SOME RESPECTS DEFECTIVE, OR OVERTAKEN, IN RESPECT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS USING QUOTE OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NO CRITICISM OF THE ABMT-DRAFTERS: TECHNOLOGY HAD MOVED ON IN THE LAST 15 YEARS. THE NEED NOW WAS TO MAINTAIN STABILITY BY ADDING TO THE ABMT NEW JOINT UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE PACE AND SCALE OF DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS.
- (D) HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE IF THE US WERE SEEN TO PLAN TO MOVE FROM THE NARROW TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WHILE REFUSING TO ENTER INTO A REAL DIALOGUE, ON THESE LINES, WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE WOULD BE SAD IF HIS HUNCH PROVED WRONG, AND THE RUSSIANS REJECTED SUCH A DIALOGUE, FOR HE DID NOT SEE HOW A START AGREEMENT COULD THEN BE ACHIEVED: BUT AT LEAST US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THE ADMINISTRATION HAD CLEARLY MADE THE OFFER.

COMMENT

7. CARLUCCI'S REMARKS PROVIDE HELPFUL CONFIRMATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE ABMT/SDI DECISIONS THIS SPRING, AND OF THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION RECOGNITION THAT ALLIANCE CONSULTATION WILL BE PART OF THE PROCESS. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT AN EMISSARY WILL BE SENT TO BRUSSELS AND OTHER NATO CAPITALS BEFORE LONG, BUT PROBABLY NOT AS SOON AS CARLUCCI IMPLIED.

8. AS IS EVIDENT, NITZE WAS SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED BACK TO OTHER AMERICANS. BUT HIS REMARKS FULLY CONFIRM WHAT WE HAD HEARD (PARA 4 OF FIRST TUR) ABOUT HIS CURRENT WORRIES.

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ORWBAN 9711

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MODUK FOR DACU
MY TELNO 369: ABMT/SDI
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS (ON FURTHER LEGAL, SDI PROGRAMME RESTRUCTURING, AND CONSULTATION) AS EXPECTED. BUT NO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT PERMISSIBLE/IMPERMISSIBLE SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY ENVISAGED. INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND ALLIES TO BE COMPLETED BY 2 MARCH. MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS IN DRAFT. EMISSARIES ABOUT TO SET OUT, BUT NITZE STILL UNHAPPY WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION DOCUMENT (NSDD) HAS NOW ISSUED. ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS, THE THREE DECISIONS IN THE DOCUMENT ARE AS DESCRIBED TO THE DEFENCE SECRETARY BY CARLUCCI (MY TUR), IE THAT MORE LEGAL WORK ON ABMT INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE DONE; THAT THE PENTAGON SHOULD PRODUCE A REPORT ON HOW AND WHY THE SDI PROGRAMME SHOULD BE RECONFIGURED; AND THAT A CONSULTATION PROCESS WITH ALLIES AND CONGRESS SHOULD BE QUICKLY INITIATED. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE ASKED THAT THE OUTCOME OF QUOTE INITIAL UNQUOTE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD REACH THE PRESIDENT BY 2 MARCH. THE TIMING OF THE LEGAL WORK AND OF THE PENTAGON STUDY ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SDI PROGRAMME APPEARS TO BE LEFT OPEN, BUT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE (AS CARLUCCI AND WEINBERGER INDICATED TO THE DEFENCE SECRETARY) THAT THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO COMPLETE BOTH IN 2-3 MONTHS. NO END DATE IS GIVEN FOR THE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES AND CONGRESS AND NOTHING SPECIFIC IS SAID ABOUT WHAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, IF ANY, WOULD FOLLOW THE QUOTE INITIAL UNQUOTE ROUND.

3. ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS, THE NSDD HAS TWO OTHER IMPORTANT FEATURES:

- (A) THE STRONG IMPLICATION (ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO FORMAL DECISIONS) IS THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES INDEED WISH TO RESTRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAMME TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY;
- (B) THE DOCUMENT COMES DOWN AGAINST ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS ABOUT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY, AND DOES SO IN SUCH BROAD TERMS AS TO RULE OUT LEGAL DISCUSSION OF ABMT INTERPRETATION ISSUES, DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRAINTS OR TIMINGS, AND DISCUSSION

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Secret

OF POSSIBLE NEW UNDERSTANDINGS ADDITIONAL TO THE
ABMT ON THE PACE AND SCALE OF DEFENSIVE ACTIVITY
(STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ARE CLEAR THAT THIS SECTION
OF THE NSDD WILL DEPRIVE KAMPELMAN OF HIS PRESENT
ALREADY LIMITED ABILITY TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF THIS SORT IN
THE GENEVA DEFENCE AND SPACE QUOTE POST-PLenary MINI
GROUP UNQUOTE).

4. GIVEN THE CALL FOR A REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON QUOTE INITIAL
UNQUOTE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES BY 2 MARCH, STATE
HAVE DRAWN UP A PLAN (MY TELNO 348) UNDER
WHICH NITZE WOULD VISIT LONDON (ON 25 FEBRUARY), BONN, THE
HAGUE, BRUSSELS (FOR A NAC, PROBABLY ON 27 FEBRUARY), ROME, PARIS
AND OTTAWA (ROWNY WOULD SIMILARLY VISIT CANBERRA,
TOKYO AND PEKING). HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT NITZE REMAINS
UNHAPPY ABOUT TWO ASPECTS OF HIS LIKELY INSTRUCTIONS: HAVING TO
MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT IS NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE THE
RUSSIANS IN A DISCUSSION OF PERMISSIBLE/IMPERMISSIBLE SDI-TYPE
ACTIVITY (NITZE BELIEVES THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION IS ESSENTIAL IF A
START AGREEMENT IS TO BE OBTAINED); AND HAVING TO ARGUE THAT THERE
HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN THE SDI PROGRAMME SINCE 1985 TO
NECESSITATE A CHANGE NOW TO CONDUCTING THE PROGRAMME WITHIN ONLY THE
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT, (WHICH NITZE REGARDS AS NOT
DEMONSTRATED).

5. A MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS, TIMED TO
ARRIVE BEFORE THE VISITS BY NITZE AND ROWNY IS IN PREPARATION.
THE PRESENT DRAFT SAYS THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES
THAT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT IS LEGALLY CORRECT AND
THAT PROGRESS IN THE SDI PROGRAMME SINCE 1985 HAS BEEN SO RAPID AS
TO CHANGE THE COST/BENEFIT RATIO OF CONDUCTING THE SDI PROGRAMME
WITHIN THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT THE DRAFT GOES ON TO SAY THAT THIS REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO
TAKE EARLY DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE SDI PROGRAMME SHOULD
BE RESTRUCTURED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
THE TREATY. THE DRAFT APPARENTLY ALSO SAYS THAT THERE IS A
PROSPECT OF A US CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY A TWO-LAYERED INITIAL SDI
SYSTEM (ERIS AND KKV) IN THE EARLY 1990S AND THAT, ALTHOUGH NO
DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS ARE NEEDED NOW, THIS REQUIRES EARLY DECISIONS
ABOUT POSSIBLE CONSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE SDI PROGRAMME
IN PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS LATER. THE PRESENT DRAFT
GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT THE SDI
PROGRAMME WITHIN THE ABMT (BROAD INTERPRETATION), IN CONTRAST WITH
THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAS ALREADY BREACHED THE TREATY. THE
DRAFT INVITES COMMENTS, BUT DOES NOT INDICATE THAT ANY OTHER OPTIONS
ARE ON THE TABLE.

ACLAND.

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MY TELNOS 369 AND 392: ABMT/SDI/NITZE'S VISIT
SUMMARY

1. GIVEN THE TIMING, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC DISARRAY HERE, THE MESSAGE NITZE BRINGS BACK FROM LONDON WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. EARLY SDI DEPLOYMENT A NON-ISSUE, AND ABMT LEGAL INTERPRETATION NOT THE CENTRAL ISSUE: THE KEY POINT FOR US MAY BE TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS MADE AWARE OF THE RISK THAT A START AGREEMENT, A CAMP DAVID TOP PRIORITY, MAY BECOME UNATTAINABLE IN HIS TERM IF THE REPHASING OF SDI IS MISHANDLED AT GENEVA.

DETAIL

2. MY TWO TURS SPELL OUT NITZE'S DOUBTS ABOUT THIS WEEK'S MISSION (ON WHICH HE IS NOW BEING JOINED BY PERLE), AND THE OUTLINE OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT UK MESSAGE MIGHT BEST BE CONVEYED TO HIM (AND SUBSEQUENTLY PERHAPS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT).

3. THE TIMING IS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY AWKWARD, SINCE THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT ON THE NSC/IRAN/CONTRAS AFFAIR WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 26 FEBRUARY, AND THE ADMINISTRATION, ALREADY BELEAGUERED, WILL BE FURTHER DISTRACTED. REGAN'S DEPARTURE IS WIDELY EXPECTED SOON, AND MAY WELL BE ESSENTIAL IF THE ADMINISTRATION IS TO REGAIN SOME MOMENTUM, AND DEVELOP A SENSIBLE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH DEMOCRATS ON THE HILL. THOUGH THE NSC UNDER CARLUCCI HAS BEGUN TO GET GOING AGAIN, SHULTZ'S LOW PROFILE (AND HE LEAVES ON 27 FEBRUARY FOR A WEEK'S VISIT TO CHINA), AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT PREDICAMENT, INCREASE THE DANGER OF THE PRESIDENT HEARING ONLY EXTREME (WEINBERGER-TYPE) VIEWS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, AND THEREFORE ACTING ON THEM (AS OVER THE SALT LIMITS DECISION IN LATE NOVEMBER). BUT HE WILL CERTAINLY LISTEN TO ADVICE FROM NO 10.

4. THAT SAID, I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO WELL TO BE SELECTIVE ABOUT THE POINTS ON WHICH WE CHOOSE TO ADVISE HIM. IN PARTICULAR, I SEE NO FUTURE IN LEGAL ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THE RESTRICTIVE ABMT INTERPRETATION IS RIGHT. APART FROM THE FACT THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, SCC MINUTES ETC, THE POLITICAL FACTS ARE THAT:

(A) THE ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING SHULTZ, HAS SINCE OCTOBER 1985 BEEN UNANIMOUS THAT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS VALID (THOUGH THEY HAVE UNTIL NOW AGREED TO CONSTRAIN SDI WITHIN THE NARROW INTERPRETATION).

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(B)

(B) ALLIED VIEWS ON THE LEGAL ISSUE WILL NOT THEREFORE CUT MUCH ICE. THOUGH ADELMAN'S REMARKS WERE CRASSLY PUT, THEY REFLECT A FAIRLY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION VIEW. CONSULTATION ON THE HILL, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH NUNN, WILL HAVE REAL IMPACT, BECAUSE THE SENATE RATIFIED THE TREATY, AND BECAUSE SDI FUNDING COULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED; BUT ALLIED VIEWS WILL NOT.

(C) MOREOVER, IN FACT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT AT SOME STAGE PURSUIT OF SDI WILL INDEED NECESSITATE A MOVE FIRST TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION (TO ALLOW MORE ADVANCED TESTING), AND THEN TO A NEW TREATY OR NO TREATY (WHEN THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE END ARISES). SO ABSOLUTE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE VIRTUES OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION COULD REBOUND, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDING TO FOLLOW THE SIMPLER COURSE OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE 1972 TREATY ALTOGETHER.

5. NOR DO I SEE MUCH VIRTUE IN OUR QUIZZING NITZE AND PERLE ABOUT THE PROGRAMMATIC CASE FOR NOW QUOTE REPHASING UNQUOTE, IE RECONFIGURING, THE SDI PROGRAMME. THE FACT IS THAT THE CASE IS NOT YET URGENT: ABRAHAMSON TOLD ME ON 9 FEBRUARY THAT A MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR PROGRAMME REASONS, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND WE KNOW THAT THIS IS ALSO NITZE'S VIEW (SECOND TUR). IT IS REMARKABLE THAT ONLY ON 10 FEBRUARY WERE THE PENTAGON COMMISSIONED TO PREPARE A STUDY, WHICH WILL APPARENTLY TAKE THEM SOME 2-3 MONTHS, OF WHAT PROGRAMME CHANGES THEY WANT, AND WHY THESE REQUIRE A MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION THIS SHOWS THAT THE TESTS WEINBERGER WISHES FREEDOM TO CONDUCT HAVE NOT AS YET EVEN BEEN PLANNED. BUT HIS REAL MOTIVES ARE POLITICAL, IE:

(A) TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF GREATER MOMENTUM, AND SO STIMULATE GREATER CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING, AND HELP PRESERVE SDI POST-1988; AND

(B) TO DISPOSE OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT - AND HE WOULD NOT MIND IF THAT BROUGHT THE GENEVA TALKS TO AN END.

ON (A) PERLE PRIVATELY CONCEDES THAT NUNN MAY BE RIGHT TO SUGGEST THAT A CHANGE OF SDI POLICY NOW MAY PRODUCE LOWER RATHER THAN HIGHER FUNDING FROM THE HILL. BUT FOR PERLE THE ABMT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A BAD DEAL, AND TO SECURE ITS EROSION, AFTER SALT I AND SALT II, WOULD IN ITSELF REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PARTING ACHIEVEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS IT WOULD PROBABLY ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO START AGREEMENT IN REAGAN'S TERM.

6. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE CRUX OF THE MATTER: IT IS CERTAINLY THE HEART OF NITZE'S CONCERN - SEE PARA 6 OF FIRST TUR; AND MY SUGGESTION IS THAT OUR MESSAGE TO THE ADMINISTRATION NOW SHOULD CENTRE ON IT.

7. I SUSPECT THAT, BECAUSE OF SHULTZ'S SILENCE, THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE AWARE THAT, BY PRESSING AHEAD WITH SDI REPHASING, WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE RUSSIANS, HE IS RISKING LOSING A TOP CAMP DAVID PRIORITY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. NITZE PUTS THE POINT MORE STRONGLY, AND BELIEVES THAT A DIALOGUE ON EACH SIDES' DEFENSIVE PLANS AND TIMETABLES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A START AGREEMENT. HE MAY WELL BE RIGHT.

8. COULD WE PERHAPS SAY TO NITZE AND PERLE ON 25 FEBRUARY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT:

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(A)

- (A) WE REMAIN STRONG SUPPORTERS OF SDI, AND STRONG OPPONENTS OF ANY PLAN TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS A VETO OVER THE PROGRAMME;
- (B) BUT WE ALSO ATTACH CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT IN GENEVA OF A SATISFACTORY STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TEST WHETHER THE EMERGENCE OF GORBACHEV PROVIDES A REAL OPPORTUNITY DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM;
- (C) WE SEE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO OBJECTIVES OF PRESSING AHEAD WITH SDI AND AT GENEVA. INDEED WE BELIEVE BOTH COURSES NOT ONLY NECESSARY BUT COMPLEMENTARY; ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR SDI COULD BE ERODED IF US UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE RUSSIANS THEIR RESPECTIVE DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES APPEARED TO BE BLOCKING ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS, WHILE THE RUSSIANS MAY BE UNWILLING TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT WITHOUT SOME PARALLEL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS;
- (D) NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARILY THE CASE THAT THE ONLY NEGOTIABLE US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD UNACCEPTABLY

IMPAIR THE SDI PROGRAMME. THE RUSSIANS TOO HAVE THEIR SDI PROGRAMME, AND PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IT STOPPED.

- (E) OF COURSE THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW HOOKED THEMSELVES ON THE NARROW ADMT INTERPRETATION, REVERSING THEIR 1972 POSITION, AND FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS MAY NOT READILY ABANDON IT. BUT ANY SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY AGREED LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WOULD IN ANY CASE PROBABLY BE A BLIND ALLEY. INSTEAD, THE RIGHT COURSE IS PERHAPS TO ACCEPT THAT THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE HAS PRODUCED NEW OPPORTUNITIES (LASERS, SENSORS, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS) OF WHICH THE TREATY-DRAFTERS IN 1972 WERE NECESSARILY UNAWARE, AND WHICH THE TREATY THEREFORE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS; AND TO BUILD ON TO THE TREATY NEW MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SUCH TECHNOLOGIES DURING AN EXTENDED (7 OR 10 YEARS) TREATY NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.
- (F) EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS WERE TO PROVE UNWILLING, AND THE CHANCE OF A START AGREEMENT THEREFORE STILL DISAPPEARED, THE WEST WOULD HAVE GAINED FROM THE EXERCISE, FOR THE BLAME WOULD THEN CLEARLY REST ON MOSCOW. SO LONG AS WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION SEES THE ISSUE AS ARMS CONTROL BEING FRUSTRATED BY SDI, THE RUSSIANS ARE HANDED A POWERFUL CARD, UNNECESSARILY AND DAMAGINGLY.

9. WE KNOW, OF COURSE, THAT NITZE'S OWN VIEWS (AND KAMPelman'S) ARE VERY MUCH ALONG THESE LINES (MY FIRST TUR). THIS IS HOWEVER AN ADVANTAGE, RATHER THAN AN EMBARRASSMENT, PROVIDED THAT WE AVOID ANY ATTRIBUTION TO HIM. AND OUR LINE WOULD IN FACT BE NO MORE THAN AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S 11 FEBRUARY 1986 MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT.

10. IF YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER NOW AGREE THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK FOR THE PRESENT IS TO MAKE THE PRESIDENT AWARE THAT, WHILE SDI AND THE CAMP DAVID START REDUCTIONS PRIORITY ARE NOT NECESSARILY IN CONFLICT, THEY WILL BE (WITH DAMAGING ALLIANCE AND EAST/WEST

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(CONSEQUENCES)

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CONSEQUENCES) IF THE ADMINISTRATION PLAY THE HAND WRONGLY IN GENEVA, IT MIGHT BE BEST OF ALL IF A FURTHER MESSAGE ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, FOLLOWING UP NITZE'S REPORT, COULD REACH THE WHITE HOUSE EARLY NEXT WEEK, WHEN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS THERE ARE LIKELY.

ACLAND

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ORWBAW 9809

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From the Private Secretary

23 February 1987

BF
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ABM TREATY: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS

You mentioned to me that Ambassador Nitze would be coming to London this week to conduct consultations about the ABM Treaty. The Prime Minister will see Mr. Nitze at 0900 on Wednesday 25 February. I should be grateful for briefing by 1600 hours on 24 February.

(Charles Powell)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

✓

0902
25 Feb

PRIME MINISTER
cc Mr. Bearpark

VISIT OF PAUL NITZE

As you will have seen from the telegram, President Reagan is sending Paul Nitze to consult with NATO governments about SDI. I think it is important that you should see him on this occasion. Although we do not yet have firm dates, he is likely to be here as early as Tuesday/Thursday next week.

Agree to see him?

Yes not

CDP

C. D. POWELL

20 February 1987

DRAFT

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
 AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE, LANCASTER HOUSE, 0800 HOURS,
 WEDNESDAY 23 APRIL 1986

Secretary of State	Ambassador Paul Nitze
Mr Tim Renton MP	Ambassador Charles Price
Mr David Goodall	Ambassador Ron Lehman
Mr A C Galsworthy	Mr Charles Thomas
Mr M A Pakenham	(State Department)
	Mr Norman Clyne
	(State Department)

1. Mr Nitze explained that the President was faced with two decisions, one of immediate relevance and the other of a longer term nature. In the immediate future, he had to decide on a proportionate response to Soviet non-compliance, in the context of the seventh Trident SSBN entering sea trials. He had had three alternatives:
 - (i) to run on the Poseidon submarines, refurbishing them for a three/seven year extension. This had not been a worthwhile option, not least in cost terms;
 - (ii) to dry-dock two Poseidons. This would not be consistent with the current modernisation programme; and
 - (iii) to dismantle two Poseidons. This was the President's tentative decision.

2. Mr Nitze continued that in the longer term there was a different decision to face. The US modernisation programme meant that, without reductions in some areas, the current equipment of heavy bombers with ACLMs would drive the US by late November over the SALT II ceiling of 1320 on mixed systems. The question was whether it was worth the US continuing its policy of unilateral

restraint at a military cost, and at a time when the US needed all the military capability it could get. It was also relevant to ask whether the Administration wished to do this at a time when the Russians showed no signs of reciprocal restraint. A decision geared to the November deadline would give the Russians time to show evidence of reciprocity. If there were no sign of this, the US would "have to look very carefully" at continuing the present restraint policy.

3. Mr Lehman added that there were thus two dimensions to consider: programmes and policy. There would in any case be a programmatic response, but the President wished to register that the policy of continuing restraint carried an increasing price. He intended to stay within the constraints for the time being.

4. The Secretary of State said that the fundamental UK position was well known. We had welcomed the consultations on the issue last year and the result of these. We were not fully alongside the US on their claims about Soviet non-compliance but had nonetheless been pressing the Russians ~~hard~~ to satisfy US concerns. He saw a ^{strong} case for the claim that the Russians were circumventing the Treaty. Consequently we ~~had pushed,~~ and would continue to push the Russians hard, as we had done last week with Karpov.

5. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State continued, we were anxious that the sort of decision the President seemed to have in mind would put the US in a very unattractive position. The decision on the Poseidons was welcome. But the other element seemed to put the US on

course towards break-out from the SALT constraints. This was of intense concern to the UK; as he had expressed in a letter ^{earlier} in ~~February~~ ^{April} to Mr Shultz, two blacks would not make a white. The West must aim to retain the current arms control framework; otherwise there was a real danger that it would unravel.

6. The Secretary of State emphasised that he was particularly worried about the presentational effect of the prospective decision by the President. The Russians had made a recent series of propaganda moves in which they had had some success in wrong-footing the US. Whereas they now professed to have clean hands (eg on nuclear testing), the US was contemplating a posture based upon a sword of Damocles.

7. Mr Renton noted that the Russians had stolen the propaganda high ground from us. The Gorbachev proposals might well be old hat to the experts, but could still register favourably with public opinion. The sort of conditional right to break out which the President's decision implied would be anticipated by Western publics as the US opening up the opportunity to withdraw from SALT. This would be particularly damaging at a time when the West would be trying to focus attention on our aims in the START negotiations and for the US/Soviet Summit.

8. Mr Lehman emphasised that the President saw deep cuts in nuclear weapons as the core element in his arms control policy; he had also exercised continual restraint in the past. However, each year we had seen a new Soviet excuse for their inability to reach agreement on cuts; in 1986 it was a CTB, and perhaps it would be ^{again} FBS in 1987.

The Russians
also refused
to set a
Summit
date.

The President therefore saw little or no progress having been made on addressing the compliance problem, while the Soviet military build-up continued. In terms of the SALT agreements, the US had to bear greater burdens than the Russians since they had more systems to dismantle. At the same time the Russians might well be better placed to continue their military build-up. The question thus was how far an unratified treaty which the Russians were violating should be allowed to constrain sound military programmes. The President had shown his willingness to go an extra mile, but this mile was now coming to an end.

9. The Secretary of State noted that the argument about sound military programmes would cut little ice with Western public opinion. Mr Nitze said that the Russians wanted to hang on to their current strategic advantages while continuing to cheat on previous agreements; their latest test of the SS18 follow-on system might well be another violation. At the same time they were conducting a magnificent propaganda campaign. Mr Nitze recognised the public desire to cling to the remnants of the SALT agreements, but the flaws in these were becoming increasingly evident especially where new systems were concerned.

10. Mr Renton repeated that the US decision could have a damaging impact on handling the Summit, and could jeopardise the East-West process. The Russians would be able to exploit it for propaganda purposes, but this should not conceal the very real disappointment in the West that would attach to the President's move. Mr Goodall added that, presentationally it had to be asked why we should commit ourselves to conditional

break-out in November. The Russians would certainly not play their hand that way. What signal did the US intend to convey to the Russians and Western public opinion? A threat to Moscow? Or evidence that the President wished to avoid break-out but wanted to negotiate an agreement in the meantime.

11. The Secretary of State said that there was a widespread perception that both sides already had too many nuclear weapons. It would be very damaging if the result of the current review were that the US emerged with a much-publicised own-goal. Gorbachev would certainly take the line, faced with similar circumstances, that he was ready to go an extra two miles. The present US approach would have the worst possible public impact. X

12. Mr Nitze recognised the problem of presentation. Hence the current round of consultations. He underlined that the President's decision should still be seen as tentative; Mr Reagan had not reached the firm view that, come what may, he would break out of the SALT constraints in November. The Secretary of State noted that, nonetheless, that would be the impression given unless the US approach were shifted in the direction we had suggested. Mr Nitze replied that there should be no illusion between the Allies that, unless the factors affecting the US decision were altered, the US would have no choice but to proceed as proposed; and that the chances of altering them were not that good.

13. Mr Renton asked whether the announcement was being made now in order to put pressure on the Russians to be

more realistic. Mr Nitze did not think this likely but in answer to Mr Renton's repeated question about the rationale for the announcement, responded that questions would be asked of the Administration which would require forthright answers.

14. Mr Pakenham noted that the President intended to proceed with a range of strategic modernisation programmes. The question that would be asked in Europe would be how far the US needed the additional military advantage to be gained from breaking out of the SALT limits. Conversely, was the price in political terms to be paid for such an action outweighed by the military gain from exceeding the ceiling on mirrored systems? Mr Nitze noted that the effect of the SALT constraints on DOD planning were not small, and would continue to have a long-term effect on US programmes. Mr Goodall noted that this would merely lead public opinion to be confirmed in the impression (however mistaken) that military programmes were in fact responsible for driving arms control policies.

15. Mr Nitze ^{asked whether} ~~replied that~~, on the other hand, ~~was~~ it was fair that the US should continue a unilateral policy of restraint. Mr Goodall noted that at present there was profound dismay in Europe about the behaviour of the US, and the decision contemplated would be seen as yet another move by the President to jeopardise the Summit. Thus it would be an own goal of the sort described by the Secretary of State.

16. Mr Lehman emphasised that the Administration had not yet decided where the balance of military advantage to

which Mr Pakenham had referred might lie. Nor had the President yet decided on conditional break-out. He hoped that ~~such a~~ ^{the President's final} decision would not be viewed as ominous, but would be seen as an opportunity to make progress on compliance, in the current arms control negotiations, and in scheduling the next Summit. He also noted that there was frustration in Washington at the previous Soviet behaviour.

17. The Secretary of State replied that this was another popular and wide-spread perception: the US was not good at suffering frustration. The perception was the product of a long-run failure of public presentation. The arrival of Gorbachev had seen the Soviet Union winning round after round in the battle for public opinion. He himself did not accept that this was justified. But even in the CW area, where we had all the good arguments, we had not yet won the public relations struggle. At this moment it was immensely important that the US should not lose another crucial round. He suggested that the approach to be taken was that the best should not be the enemy of the good; that the US would stick within the SALT constraints until at least the next Summit; and that military programmes came second to the US determination to make a break-through in arms control. The generals could wait another six months. Mr Nitze asked whether this was really true. In any case, it was not only the generals who doubted the wisdom of the SALT constraints.

18. Mr Renton said that with the approach of the Summit this was not the moment to announce, with whatever degree of conditionality, a potential break-out from SALT. It would present a major propaganda prize to Gorbachev which

he would exploit to the maximum. The US would be seen as frustrated and as anticipating the failure of the next Summit; in effect they would be perceived as already having washed their hands of the chances of success. The Secretary of State added that Gorbachev was reported that morning as saying that he would still not resume the nuclear testing programme although the US had shown no signs of cooperation. The US might have an intellectually respectable case, but the current approach simply stood it on its head.

19. Mr Lehman suggested that the US might be represented as ready to move one more mile, as looking towards the next Summit, and as hoping for a serious Soviet response. The Secretary of State said that it was much better to make the Russians an offer they could not refuse rather than a threat to which they would not respond. The US should not box themselves in with a ^{specific} ~~certain~~ deadline.

20. Mr Price asked whether in the UK view the Russians had violated SALT II. The Secretary of State replied that we were not in a position to make definitive judgements. It was clear that some of the US allegations were, at best, not proven. Equally, in the case of Krasnoyarsk the Russians ^{appeared to have} ~~had~~ demonstrated an intention to circumvent the ABM Treaty. Whether this was evasion or avoidance of their obligations (in ^{an} ~~the terms~~ of income tax) ^{analogy} was not a question on which we were in a position to make a definitive or public judgement. The West should continue to press the Russians on the issue, as both we and the Americans were doing.

Reverting to the Soviet failure to agree a Summit date

21/ Mr Renton ^{noted} ~~added~~ that ~~the Soviet failure to agree a date~~

for ~~the Summit~~^{this} would not be seen by Western public opinion, in the immediate aftermath of Libyan events, as wholly unjustified. The Secretary of State ^{said} ~~urged~~ that the US should continue to press them for a firm date and ~~should~~ demonstrate publicly an urgent desire to pursue the issue. /

22. Mr Goodall noted the range of current European/US disagreements. Mr Nitze agreed that there was worrying difference of perceptions between the Europeans and the Americans, eg on Libya and East-West relations. The Secretary of State emphasised that the maintenance of Alliance cohesion was all-important. In each Western country there were those who wished to challenge the unity of the West. Hence the importance of preserving that cohesion. He himself had recently been urging the point on all his EC colleagues in the context of Libya. It now seemed that the US intended to take an action which would make that task even harder. Were the US to act however in the way we had suggested, this might be used to demonstrate US readiness to listen and respond to European ideas, allowing us in turn to argue for similar responses from other Europeans (for example, over Libyan Peoples Bureaux). ~~As~~ He ^{himself} had said recently ^{that} we could not allow Qadafi to do to the Alliance what Moscow had failed to do. Equally, it would be wholly wrong to allow ~~an~~ ^{wrong} ~~incorrect~~ US approach to do to the Alliance what Qadafi had failed to do. Mr Nitze concluded that the President had showed extreme patience on the subject of SALT - for 6½ years he had held his hand, despite having campaigned for the Presidency in ^{firm} ~~heavy~~ opposition to the evident flaws in the agreements. Many in the US believed that he had been too patient.

23. Mr Nitze concluded, and Mr Lehman agreed, that the meeting and discussion, at which all had spoken very freely, had been extremely useful.

ACDD

23 April 1986

Mr. 23/4

Distribution:

Private Secretary

PS/Mr Renton

PS/PUS

Mr Goodall

Mr Derek Thomas

Sir W Harding

Mr Daunt

Mr Ratford

ACDD

Defence Dept

NAD

Soviet Dept

Planning Staff

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UKMis New York

DACU, MOD

DPS, MOD

Mr Jago, Cabinet Office

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



11
He Ho

10 DOWNING STREET
London SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1986

I enclose a copy of my note of this morning's meeting with Ambassador Nitze.

CHARLES POWELL

His Excellency The Honourable Charles Price II

File



SUBJECT CC MASTER

10

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1986

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE

The Prime Minister had a discussion with Ambassador Nitze this morning of President Reagan's recent message to her about Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements and the action which the United States had it in mind to take. Mr. Nitze was accompanied by Ambassador Price and Mr. Lehman.

The Prime Minister said that there were two contradictory strands running through what the President proposed in his message. On the one hand he intended to dismantle two Poseidon submarines. This was strictly in accordance with United States' obligations and very welcome. But on the other hand he was going to announce that the United States would break its obligations in the autumn. She had in the past made clear her strong view that democratic nations must be seen to observe their Treaties strictly. The President had done magnificently in setting an example in this respect. She believed that it would be tactically most unwise, indeed highly damaging, to do what was now proposed. It would hand Mr. Gorbachev an enormous propaganda weapon which he would not hesitate to use. Particularly against the background of the attack on Libya, the issues would be divisive within the Alliance at a moment when we needed to do everything possible to strengthen it. She could fully understand and accept the need for the United States to appear firm and to modernise its nuclear weapons. But a careful line had to be drawn between appearing firm and seeming bellicose. Moreover, we were not as convinced as the United States of the extent of Soviet non-compliance. In some cases at least, the evidence was ambiguous. There had to be absolute clarity if world opinion was to be carried. In any case, she did not see why it was necessary to take a decision on what the United States might or might not do in the autumn until the moment came. To sum up, she was delighted by the President's decision to scrap the two Poseidon submarines but urged him most strongly not to throw away the advantages of this by threatening future non-compliance.

Mr. Nitze suggested that it was unfair to say that the United States was reneging on its international obligations. The United States' decision to exercise restraint in the face of Soviet non-compliance had been a unilateral one. This restraint had been exercised over some six and a half years. It was by no means clear to the President that the United States should be unilaterally bound indefinitely by an unratified agreement. Moreover, dismantlement of the Poseidon submarines was not just a matter of complying with the letter of SALT, it also made sense in terms of modernisation of the United States forces. In this case, there was no conflict between what was wise politically and what was sensible militarily. The situation in the autumn would be different. No further submarines were due to reach the end of their life cycle then. The President was not prepared to tolerate continuing exploitation by the Soviet Union of American restraint. He therefore wished to leave them in no doubt in the run up to the next Summit of the United States' intentions.

The Prime Minister said that the President must establish firmly and beyond all doubt to the satisfaction of public opinion that the Soviet Union was not complying with existing agreements and that the United States had specifically and repeatedly challenged them on non-compliance in the Standing Consultative Commission. She would respectfully suggest that this point had not yet been reached. Moreover, it was important to understand the wider political context. There had been a great feeling of relief in Western public opinion after the first United States/Soviet Summit and a belief that there was now a real prospect of moving towards reductions in nuclear weapons. A public announcement now by the United States that it did not intend in future to comply with existing agreements would have an electric effect on public opinion particularly if the result was to interrupt progress towards a further Summit. It would lead to the West being in the dock rather than the Soviet Union. She could understand that compliance ought to be a theme for the Summit. She would be making these points in a message to the President.

Mr. Nitze said that the Americans had raised the matter time and time again with the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission although this had not, in accordance with its terms of reference, been made public. While he understood the need to carry public opinion, one could not make that the main consideration otherwise it would never be possible to take action. The United States was absolutely convinced of Soviet non-compliance, particularly in introducing new types of weapons.

The Prime Minister repeated that we remained to be convinced of the extent of Soviet non-compliance. In any case the United States non-compliance proposed in the President's message would actually be more obvious and clear cut than anything done by the Soviet Union. That would be hard for public opinion to understand. She could only say again that she thought that the course of action outlined by the President in his message would do the Alliance great

harm and hand the Soviet Union a major propaganda advantage. The President had been enormously successful at Geneva in demolishing the myth of an aggressive United States. It would be wrong to throw that great advantage away for some marginal military gains. It was far better for the United States in the period leading up to the next Summit to be in the position of abiding by agreements while being able to accuse the Soviet Union of failing to do so. The United Kingdom was enormously grateful to the United States for its commitment to defending freedom. It was in order to enable the United States to go on carrying out this task effectively that it was essential to handle this matter carefully. President Reagan should not put himself in the dock of world opinion when Mr. Gorbachev should be there. She had spoken very frankly and would be equally frank in her message to the President. But she had also spoken in the spirit of friendship and genuine concern.

I propose to recast the draft message to the President from the Prime Minister in the light of this conversation and anything further which emerged from Mr. Nitze's meeting with the Foreign Secretary.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely
C D Powell*

C D POWELL

AR

Tony Galsworthy, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE

The purpose of the meeting is for Nitze to hear and report to the President your reaction to his 'tentative judgements' on how the US should react to continued Soviet non-compliance (as they see it) with existing arms control agreements.

The President's intentions are set out in his lengthy message to you (in the folder). In brief, he intends to go ahead with dismantling two Poseidon submarines in May to compensate for the introduction of a new Trident (good); to continue the US strategic modernisation programme (all right); but to decide now to overstep SALT constraints on MIRVed systems next November unless the Russians mend their ways (rotten). The Embassy in Washington say this is still not a final decision and could be altered by your intervention, as in the past.

The main points for you to make are:

- our assessment of the alleged Soviet violations is much less conclusive than that of the US. (Summary of JIC views in folder).
- it is vital that the US continue to show moral leadership in observing international obligations. Indeed, recent events over Libya heighten the need for this.
- it is nutty to announce now that you are going to break your international obligations next November. It just gives the Soviet Union a massive propaganda gift which Gorbachev will be quick to exploit (particularly at a moment when European feelings about the US are a bit uneasy anyway). At the very least reserve the decision and announcement of it until November.

- anyway the military advantages of overstepping the limits are minimal and quite out of proportion to the political costs.

- it is much more sensible to set a big example internationally than to shake a little stick at the Russians.

- we have been exemplary allies to the United States on a host of issues, especially of late, but we shall not be able to support this decision and shall say so plainly.

You may also want to use the occasion for a few general remarks about US/UK relations in the wake of recent events, which have had a political cost for you.

C.D.P.

CDP

22 April, 1986

SECRET

CC B/CP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8

22 April 1986

Dear Charles,

US Compliance with Arms Control Agreements:
Call by Mr Paul Nitze, 23 April

I enclose a self-explanatory brief on which the Prime Minister may wish to draw when Mr Nitze [and Mr Lehman], accompanied by Ambassador Price, call on her at 0900 tomorrow, 23 April.

The brief covers the points raised in the President's message to her of today (enclosed). It is based on the need seen by the Foreign Secretary for Nitze to carry back to Washington a strong message from the Allies, and particularly the Prime Minister and HMG, that we would not be able to support a US decision deliberately to breach the SALT agreement constraints.

Sir Geoffrey wishes in particular to draw to the Prime Minister's attention the point in the brief that US moves beyond current limits would present Gorbachev with a propaganda gift. While the Russians have managed recently in the arms control field to paint themselves as ready to offer carrots as incentives to make progress, the Americans risk once again being tied into a posture which is simply punitive: marked by a readiness in predefined circumstances to wield an even bigger stick.

The brief does not refer to wider factors in US/UK relations, particularly in this post-Libya period. The Foreign Secretary feels sure that the Prime Minister will wish to reflect some of her own thinking on the point when she sees Mr Nitze.

In June 1985 the Prime Minister sent the President a brief message after she had seen Mr Shultz here, to discuss the US policy of "interim restraint". The Prime Minister's views on that occasion, and her message, were of undoubted importance in swaying the President's eventual decision to remain within the constraints for the time being. The Foreign Secretary believes that, on a contingency basis, it would be helpful to have prepared another such message in case this would be equally useful; I enclose a draft on which you may care to draw, should the need arise.

/1 am

SECRET



S E C R E T

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures
to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

S E C R E T

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note~~ BRIEF

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE :
0900 HOURS, WEDNESDAY 23 APRIL

.....In Confidence

US RESPONSE TO ALLEGED SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

CAVEAT.....

1. Your objective

To press for continued US adherence to existing obligations in deciding its response.

2. Your arguments

- Grateful to President for message of 22 April and consultation process. Similar exercise in 1985 great success for Alliance unity and US diplomacy.
- Should take rigorous view of Soviet compliance. We shall continue to press them.
- Crucial to demonstrate Western democracies take own obligations seriously; and intend to observe international law. Admired President's statesmanship

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/ last

last year, set international good example.

- Despite frustrations of Soviet non-response, therefore urge no action in current decision exercise which would take US now, or commit US later to going, beyond current SALT constraints. Not asking for endorsement of earlier agreements, but continuation of "interim restraint". ←

Agree on need to press ahead with Geneva negotiations.

- US must exercise leadership, not always easy. Moves beyond current limits would be worse possible signal to our people in the West. Would also present Gorbachev with propaganda gift. Do not believe marginal military advantage (at best) from overstepping limits would compensate for very grave political disadvantages.

- Also urge public presentation of US decisions to be set in that light.

- [If appropriate] Ready to reflect above thinking in another message to President.

3. His objective

- To brief the Prime Minister on discussions last week in Washington; to outline the decision-stage now reached, in the light of the President's letter of 22 April; and to seek British views on the main US option.

4. Your response

US options (as appropriate) :

Dismantling two Poseidon submarines to compensate for new Trident submarine introduction

- Welcome decision to go again for fully compliant option.

Pressing ahead with US strategic modernisation programme (MX, SICBM (Midgetman) and Cruise missiles)

- Welcome clear US resolution to ensure continued security of West. Whatever decision taken on Midgetman after DOD November study, trust in further negotiations with Russians can be incorporated in mutually acceptable arrangements.

Failing Soviet response, decision to overstep SALT constraints on MIRVED systems this November

- Cannot support, for reasons already stated.

Presentation

- Urge need for most careful consideration of public presentation, will be crucial in current international debate, and on domestic opinion in West. Must not give the impression of intention to breach deliberately current obligations.

5. Krasnoyarsk (if raised)

- Believe Foreign Secretary already explained position. Recognise US concerns, but HMG in no position to give public endorsement to allegation of clear violation. Will continue to urge Russians to satisfy US concerns.

6. Press line

- The Prime Minister received Ambassador Paul Nitze today, Special Adviser to President Reagan and Secretary Shultz on arms control. They discussed current arms control issues, including future US decisions relevant to the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister welcomed the impeccable US record in consultation with the Allies, of which this was the latest example. She emphasised the importance she attached to preserving the unity of the Alliance which continued to be essential to Western security.

BACKGROUND

7. The President's message to the Prime Minister of 22 April outlines his current thinking and his "tentative judgements" on how to respond to what is seen in Washington as a pattern of Soviet non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. The key elements are the options outlined in para 4 above. The review, and its outcome, reflects the continuing debate in Washington about the best response to this perceived pattern of non-compliance. The civilian side of the Pentagon is anxious to lock the President as soon as possible into a decision to break out of the SALT constraints; the Joint Chiefs appear a good deal less convinced of the merits of doing so, on military grounds. The State Department would prefer to remain within the constraints for the time being.

8. The President's message implies that, should the Russians fail to give satisfaction between now and November (as is likely), the current decision then to break out of the SALT limits would not be subject to further review, nor to further consultation with the

/ Allies.

Allies. It is therefore crucial to put down a marker at this stage that HMG would find the greatest political difficulty in endorsing, either now or at a later stage, such a step.

9.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am grateful to you for consulting us about your response to the Soviet record of compliance with arms control agreements. I have considered with care the very full account of your thinking in your letter of 22 April, and I welcomed the chance to go over this ground with Paul Nitze earlier this week. I know that he will have conveyed my views to you in detail, but I wanted to underline a couple of points myself.

We should certainly take a rigorous view of Soviet compliance. We need to hold the Russians to their word. We for our part shall continue to press them on that score, as we have in the past.

We also need to demonstrate, not least to our own people, that the countries of the Western democracies take their obligations with extreme seriousness. You know how much I admired your decision last June to go the extra mile and continue your adherence to the SALT Limits. I recognise your desire to send the right signal to the Russians and to others.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

But I believe strongly that the right signal now would be reflected in a renewed commitment to continue your interim policy of restraint; and to maintain your observance of current arms control obligations.

There is no risk of the Russians doubting your determination. It is surely right to press ahead with those strategic modernisation programmes which can add to the security of the United States and your Allies. But I ^{should} ~~shall~~ have grave anxiety about the situation that ^{would} ~~will~~ arise this November, on the basis of the course that you have outlined. I must say that if you did decide to pursue that approach, I would find it very difficult to offer you the support which I have always tried to do in the past.

I do believe that it would be a mistake to allow your hands to be tied in this way, particularly since at that time your relations with the Soviet Union may well be in a most sensitive stage. To commit yourself now to the sort of step you seem to envisage would in my view lock yourself into an increasingly disadvantageous situation. We both know that Gorbachev would not be slow to exploit what ~~he~~ would see as a propaganda gift, particularly at this point.

Recent events have testified eloquently to your firmness of resolve. If you can now against that background show that the United States intends to continue its scrupulous respect for existing obligations, that would highlight the essential difference in the standards

of behaviour of the Soviet Union and Western democracies. And it would remind our own people, the Russians and the rest of the international community that we continue to see the rule of law as the fundamental factor governing international relations.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1986

AMBASSADOR NITZE

Changes in the Prime Minister's diary now make it possible for her to see Ambassador Nitze briefly, at 0900 on Wednesday, 23 April. I have informed the American Embassy of this, saying that Nitze should be accompanied by Ambassador Price only.

|| I should be grateful for a brief by tomorrow evening, please.

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

slw



CF.
Besty put
on file.
CR

10 DOWNING STREET

~~CFP.~~

Paul Nitze

He will be
here next
Wednesday
morning.

What shall
we do?

CR.

17/4

I think we

~~have to say no -~~

~~just eat it & +~~

Tobacco.

CR.

~~Circle~~ CR :

I still aspire
to avoid him in
time - have had
to go to FCO
C

MR. POWELL

AMBASSADOR NITZE

He has re-instated his visit to London and the Foreign Office have asked for the original time of 1030 on Tuesday, 4 March for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Unusually, I agreed.

CR

Meeting
Cancelled

CAROLINE RYDER

~~Meeting~~
F.O.

MA
3/3

SUBJECT
cc Master

SECRET

File 5D 7
cc Mr. Gorton

Copied to
DEFENCE: Arms
Control: Part 7.



10 DOWNING STREET

5 February, 1986.

From the Private Secretary

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE

The Prime Minister saw Ambassador Nitze this evening for a discussion on arms control issues. Mr. Nitze was accompanied by the United States Ambassador and by Mr. Ron Lehman of the National Security Council.

Mr. Nitze said that the US Administration had been studying the Gorbachev proposals of 15 January very closely. They had reached the conclusion that they were heavily weighted towards propaganda effect. In particular the proposals were front-loaded: the points of interest to the Soviet Union were all included in the first stage. The only evident movement was over INF. But even here there were important flaws in the form of the no-transfer provision, the freeze on modernisation of the United Kingdom and French deterrents, and the need for declarations by the United Kingdom and France agreeing to total elimination of their nuclear forces in the second stage. Moreover, the Soviet proposal made no provision for reductions of SS20s in Asia, although Soviet officials had indicated informally the possibility of a freeze on these. As regards START, the Soviet position was entirely unchanged and retained their objectionable definition of strategic systems. While at first sight there appeared to have been some change of position on strategic defence in terms of omission of any reference to research in the English text of the Gorbachev proposals, this too disappeared on closer examination. Soviet officials had confirmed that what they termed "purposeful research" would be prohibited. A final objection was that all the other elements in the Gorbachev proposals were linked to immediate agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban.

Mr. Nitze continued that President Reagan had reached decisions on the broad lines of a reply to Gorbachev, on which he would welcome the views of the United States' allies. He then spoke broadly on the lines of the information in Washington telegram No.270. While reiterating the United States' commitment to elimination of nuclear weapons, the reply would point out the

MS

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deficiencies in the Soviet proposals for this and would in practice leave it to one side. The focus should instead be on steps to achieve a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons applied to like weapons and on an interim INF Agreement. The reply would go on to say that the elimination of nuclear weapons would not dispose of the need for non-nuclear defences and would reiterate the United States commitment to SDI research. The US saw no need for fresh initiatives on START or strategic defence at this time. But the United States was ready to contemplate interim reductions in INF coupled with 50 per cent reductions in SS20s in Asia, as a prelude to a zero-zero solution for INF coupled with elimination of all SS20s west of Novosibirsk. There would also need to be agreement on a global LRNF ceiling and constraints on SRINF. (This was all rattled off from a piece of paper and I cannot guarantee the details. You will no doubt receive the fuller account tomorrow.)

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Nitze for explaining US views. She would like to study them in detail before making definitive comments and in any event intended to let the President have a message setting out her views on arms control at the next US/Soviet Summit shortly. She welcomed the renewed commitment to SDI research. She thought that the US were right to try to set aside in practice the concept of elimination of nuclear weapons. This would have enormous risks for the West unless accompanied by measures to secure a balance in the conventional field. Indeed, she regretted that the West had bound itself to such an impracticable objective. She also had misgivings about a zero-zero INF solution although she would need to study carefully the precise conditions which the United States proposed attaching as regards Soviet SS20s in Asia. A zero-zero solution would call into question the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles as an essential part of the Alliance's spectrum of nuclear deterrents. In any case, our preferred solution was zero-zero on a global basis. A full exploration of the proposal would be necessary within the Alliance. But apart from this she found the President's general approach in replying to Gorbachev on the same wave-length as the United Kingdom.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours Sincerely,
Martin Savers (Duty Clerk)
P.P. CHARLES POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



*File 16
ah / Crank*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 January 1986

VISIT OF AMBASSADOR NITZE

U Thank you for your letter of 20 January about Ambassador Nitze's visit. The Prime Minister would be happy to see him at 1030 on 4 March. She would prefer to see him alone.

CHARLES POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq, C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

10-30-1115 24/3

RESTRICTED

CLPC
①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1986

Prime Minister
Agree to see Mr.
Nitze again in
March?
Dear Charles,

CDP 209;

Yes Mr

Visit to London by Ambassador Paul Nitze

The American Embassy has informed us that Ambassador Nitze, Special Adviser on Arms Control to the President and to the Secretary of State, will be in London on 4 March. Mr Nitze is likely to meet the Foreign Secretary. Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks it likely that the Prime Minister may wish to see Mr Nitze for a general talk about the arms control negotiations in Geneva if her diary for that day permits it. We understand that Mr Nitze is likely to be available at any time during the morning of 4 March.

Mr Nitze last called on the Prime Minister on 27 March (your letter of that date). They had a wide-ranging discussion which was evidently of interest to both her and Mr Nitze. He remains very influential in the formulation of arms control policy in Washington, having access to the White House as well as very frequent contact with Mr Shultz. On most of the main arms control issues his views are close to those which the Prime Minister put to Mr Reagan ahead of the November Summit. He is likely to continue to be supportive of the Prime Minister's line on handling the SDI in relation to the Geneva negotiations. He is, however, something of a heretic over British and French nuclear weapons, having from time to time advocated that an undertaking be given to include them in a START II negotiation.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to see Mr Nitze for thirty minutes or so if she has time and would be interested to do so. In that event, I should be grateful if you were to suggest a specific time.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

USA

VISIT OF P. NITZK

6/83





MO 14/2

NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A MEETING WITH THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON
ARMS CONTROL TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, MR PAUL NITZE
AT 1600 HOURS ON THURSDAY 28TH MARCH 1985
IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE MAIN BUILDING

Those present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Mr Nitze

Sir Clive Whitmore
PUS

Ambassador Charles H Price II

Mr R C Mottram
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State

US Embassy - Mr Harrison

Mr C H P Draper
DACU

1. Mr Nitze said that there was no real dialogue yet with the Soviet Union though he hoped there would be. As the Russians said, "the objective situation" should lead to dialogue but the signals were confusing. The Secretary of State said that Gorbachev, during his visit to the UK, had referred to the debate in the Soviet Union as to whether they should return to the negotiations. He himself had remarked that similar debates took place here in the West but the difference was they were conducted in public. Gorbachev had been unwilling to accept the implication that the policy process was similar in the two systems! Mr Nitze commented that Gorbachev had remarked to them that if the US thought they had difficulties on these issues in the States they were a thousand times worse for the Russians.

2. The Secretary of State asked how long it might take to get down to real negotiations. Mr Nitze said he had asked Semyonov (Chief Soviet SALT I negotiator) that question. He had said that a third of the work was done in the first 2 months, one third in the next 2 years and the final one third in the last 20 minutes. It didn't necessarily happen that way, sometimes it was longer or shorter. On the partial test ban treaty, once both sides' positions were sorted out, it took Harriman only 28 days to negotiate the treaty itself. In that case, however, there had been a clear situation with agreed mutual interests. In the current negotiations the two sides' basic positions were far apart. There would be a lot of feeling-out of the other side's position. The Soviets would try to divide the US from its allies and to find weaknesses in their position. Once they had made the most of their opportunities in



these areas, they might get down to real negotiations. This would not happen for a while. The Secretary of State commented that it was strange the way the Soviets put so much faith in wedge driving; it was fundamentally not possible to divide the West. He thought that they found it difficult to understand the nature of our debate. Mr Nitze commented that, once they realised that wedge driving would not work, sometimes they went too far the other way and assumed that Western countries were all the same and had the same views. The Secretary of State remarked that the Russians did not have the problem of Western Governments of having to face their electorate every four years or so. Mr Nitze commented that they had become inured to elections going the wrong way from their point of view, eg President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl. The Secretary of State said that he wondered if the Russians realised that the Labour Party and the SPD in Germany were shifting back towards the middle ground.

3. Mr Nitze said that he welcomed discussion amongst the Allies on SDI and arms control. It was inevitable that there would be a debate on these issues in Europe as in the United States. His own speech in Philadelphia had been a contribution to this. The Secretary of State commented that the approach in the Philadelphia speech had been noticeably different from the visionary view of the future in earlier statements on the SDI. Mr Nitze agreed. He pointed out that his speech had been approved by the President, Mr Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. The speech he was making that evening to the IISS had also been similarly cleared. He would continue to advocate a step-by-step transition towards an increased emphasis on defensive systems on both sides, and agreed reductions in offensive systems, particularly counter force capabilities. The Secretary of State said that the evolution he was seeking was an ambition of immense scale. It would have to take place over a long period and would require a great deal of trust from both sides. This seemed very optimistic in the light of the history of arms control, in which there had been no agreements which involved actual reductions. Mr Nitze said that the ABM Treaty had involved both sides cutting back on planned deployments of defensive systems. This had been in the interests of both sides and the Treaty had already lasted 10 years. The Secretary of State said he agreed that there had been restraint on the defensive side but offensive numbers had raced ahead. Had it been a mistake to agree to that bargain? Mr Nitze said that he had argued at the time that it was a mistake to sign the ABM and SALT I agreements but the President had disagreed. It could be argued the other way. If an agreement on defences had been delayed, numbers might have been built up further. He did not regret the signing now. The SALT II agreement however did not constrain the build-up in Soviet strength which had grown at least tenfold. SALT dealt with cosmetics, with launcher numbers rather than with re-entry vehicles or throw weight.

4. The Secretary of State said that the US approach to the SDI appeared to envisage sharing knowledge of defensive technologies with the Russians. Would the Americans really be willing to do this?



Mr Nitze said that they would. They wished to discuss how the two sides could co-operate, despite their mutual suspicions, during the transition period to maintain deterrence and to lessen risks. If the Russians were concerned about their security, this approach ought to be attractive to them. The Americans would seek agreements as to which kinds of system would be deployed and when. He had done a lot of work on this and was convinced that it could work. The Secretary of State asked about the problem of technology transfer. Mr Nitze said that there might have to be the transfer of gadgets rather than of know-how or technology. The Secretary of State wondered if this was possible. Because of the scale of the strategic defence task, the key element would be highly advanced computer technology which it might be unattractive to share. Mr Nitze said that if the two sides could agree to a transition schedule and to a reduction of hard target kill capabilities, would it not be right to transfer whatever was required to make it effective? It clearly could not be handed over in advance of an agreement.

5. The Secretary of State said he agreed that the US had a very strong card in the SDI. There would be a great deal of political pressure for the US to play it early. If they were to negotiate successfully, the Americans had to play their cards close to their chest. He accepted this. The problem for the Allies was that, because they could not be taken into the Americans' confidence on their negotiating strategy, they had no means of knowing that all opportunities for an agreement were being explored. Mr Nitze said that the US certainly would play their hand close to their chest. He was already being asked about US fall-back positions. It would be crazy to get into this since it would ruin the chances of an agreement.

5. The Secretary of State said that it had been agreed by the Prime Minister and the President at Camp David that SDI research must go ahead but deployment would have to be a matter for negotiation. Where did research come up against the constraints of the ABM Treaty? Mr Nitze said that a cut-off point had been agreed during the negotiation of the ABM Treaty. He and Harold Brown had taken the 6 categories of research that the US used in the line items for the defence budget. They had decided that half-way through the engineering development phase was the point at which the work would be prohibited. This was where it had got to the testing of major system components, and the first point at which these constraints could realistically be verified. The Treaty dealt essentially with radars, launchers and interceptors. Agreed Statement D (which he then read out) dealt with the handling of ABM systems based on other physical principles. If the US produced substitutes for any of the 3 controlled components, then under the Treaty they would need to consult with the Russians with a view to agreeing a regime to control them. The Secretary of State asked if this regime would be on the same basis as the ABM Treaty. Mr Nitze said he thought so; he could not see a way of improving it.



7. The Secretary of State asked if the US could conceive of a circumstance in which it would want to use the provision under Article XV of the Treaty to withdraw with 6-months notice. Mr Nitze said, while he could not say that the US absolutely rejected the possibility, it was not the US intention to do so. At the time of signing the Treaty they had said that a failure to achieve effective limits on offensive systems would be fundamental to US national interests and thus could be such grounds; but the US planned to abide by the Treaty. It was better to have co-operation on defences between two suspicious partners than an unagreed regime.

8. The other possibility was that the Soviets would cease to recognise the validity of the Treaty. The US had tried to abide by its spirit as well as its letter. This was the basis of their worries about the Krasnoyarsk radar. They had also been concerned about the Russian tests of the SAX12 against target RVs going at re-entry speeds in excess of Polaris RVs. The Soviets had now phased that out but it remained a concern. There were always some arguments that a shyster lawyer could make to show that the precise letter of the treaty had not been violated but this was not a satisfactory basis for treaty compliance. As an example of the Russian approach, the negotiations in the early 70s had covered the question of test ranges. The US said that they had 2 and understood the Russians to have one at Saryshagan. The Russians, having consulted Moscow, did not dispute this but said that it would be contrary to the interests of State security to mention specific ranges. They preferred the treaty to say that national technical means would be adequate for both sides to detect each others ranges. When, later on, the US found another range at Kamchatka, the Russians said that this had been there all the time and the Americans should have found it. This was an example of a shyster trick.

9. Turning to Krasnoyarsk, in the ABM negotiations they had talked for days about the problem of new radars. The US had proposed that if either side desired additional space tracking radars it would discuss it with the other, and also discuss how the other side could distinguish it from other types of radar. It was one of many items still at issue in the last hours of negotiation of the ABM Treaty. The US had held out to the last minute, though their instructions had been to give up on the issue if they had to. When the Soviets had said finally they were able to agree a compromise on the numerical limit on the potential of new phased array radars (PAR) in Agreed Statement F, the US was so glad to reach agreement that they did not raise the other issue. It had therefore not been agreed with the Soviets but the record was clear. The Soviets had agreed that a space track PAR would be indistinguishable



from other PARs. The Krasnoyarsk radar could be very useful for the Russians and he could well understand why they wanted to put it there. It certainly had an early warning capability and also therefore had a space tracking capability. They had discussed with the Soviets at the time the question of distinguishing between different radars by wave form. The US was clear that it was not possible as this could be changed relatively easily with changes in a few components or software.

10. The Secretary of State said that he was puzzled as to why the US and UK did not appear to agree about the Krasnoyarsk radar. Mr Nitze said he also found it puzzling. He understood the difference of opinion to be over the intent of the Soviets with the UK accepting that their intent may have been to set up a space track radar. The UK did not maintain that you could distinguish between the wave forms. Even if you could dig out the right pulse that could give an indication, you could not be sure that it would not be switched. The frequency requirements were about the same for early warning and space tracking; higher frequencies were required for battle management.

11. Mr Nitze said that radar limitations were fundamental to the ABM Treaty. A PAR took some 5 years to build. If either side began one in the wrong position, there would therefore be 5 years notice. Even if it took 2 years to detect, this would still allow 3 years. The US had been protesting about Krasnoyarsk for 3 years and it was now about to be turned on. Other elements of ABM systems could be prepared and deployed relatively quickly; the time taken to construct PARs was the main protection against breakout. Once that went, so too did the whole basis of the Treaty.

12. The Secretary of State said that it was suggested that all you achieved in an agreement with the Russians was the precise language of that agreement. They would not infringe against its specific terms but would exercise to the full freedom of manoeuvre within it. Mr Nitze said that the Soviets would certainly go up to the edge: the US believed they also went beyond it. But they had been prepared to deal with some problems, for example testing of SAMs in an ABM mode, in the standing consultative commission. The Secretary of State said that the very bad atmosphere between the East and West might perhaps have harmed this consultation process. Mr Nitze said that while there had been a lot of dialogue in the SCC, it had got down to exchanges of recriminations. The Secretary of State said it was always possible to have technical discussions but political will was required to get things fixed. Whether that now existed on the Soviet side remained to be seen. He thought that it was naive to assume that a younger leader meant an improvement, but it could be true. Mr Nitze agreed.



13. The Secretary of State said the need for arms control was clear. It was not possible in a democracy to rest on the uncomfortable fact that arms reductions had never been achieved. We needed to go on saying and believing that they were possible. He found Mr Nitze's presentation realistic and coherent. The idea of getting rid of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future was in his view undesirable. Unless another cataclysmic deterrent could be found, it would be destabilising. War would become thinkable again. This was the basis of his concern about the assertion that we should get rid of nuclear weapons. If we could get a more balanced form of offence/defence, then all well and good; but the longer term outcomes envisaged required a degree of trust almost beyond his comprehension.

14. Mr Nitze said that it was interesting that a large number of US and Soviet statements on these issues were the same. Shultz had asked Gromyko in the Geneva talks how he proposed to get from the present situation to a world where there were no nuclear weapons. Gromyko had thought for a while and said they had addressed the problem in the late '50s in the 10-nation committee on disarmament and perhaps the positions that they took then needed some refurbishment! The Soviets would now aim to use the leverage of a possible deal on offensive arms as a hostage to agreement on defences. The US could try to put the pressure on the other way round, aiming to achieve separate agreements on offensive systems and then to get down to an agreement on defences. The Secretary of State said he saw no coherent deal that did not involve all 3 areas. Mr Nitze said that the US thought there had been a chance for a deal in the INF and START negotiations and this had not changed with the SDI, though clearly it impinged on it. He believed a deal on offensive systems was still possible. The Secretary of State said that, if they believed the US would proceed unilaterally with the SDI, the Soviets would aim to keep all the missiles they could. Mr Nitze said that he did not think it would be attractive to the Soviets to increase offensive systems against increasingly capable defences. The Secretary of State said he thought they would have no choice as they would not be able to match the defences. Mr Nitze said they could do so if they joined the US in agreement on defensive systems. The Secretary of State repeated that he could see reductions being achieved only on the basis of an agreement covering all three areas.

15. The Secretary of State said that, if both sides were to have a BMD that was sufficiently effective to negate the threat of nuclear weapons, the West would need to tackle the conventional imbalance with the Warsaw Pact. But it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to agree a balanced approach in this area because of her concern over the threat from China, the Muslim world, and in Eastern Europe. The conventional imbalance had not mattered while the West had nuclear weapons but we would then be in a different situation. Mr Nitze said that he thought that, if the political atmosphere was right for an agreement on strategic defences and offensive capabilities, it could then be better for a conventional



agreement. He agreed that China could become much more powerful and more formidable, especially if her economic success continued. If he were a Russian, he would want to normalise relations with the West and would also like to do so with China, but this would probably be impossible. The Secretary of State said that he believed it would not be possible to cope with the conventional imbalance in a way which the Russians could accept given the Chinese threat in the East. This brought him back to the difficulties which would arise were nuclear weapons to be eliminated.

16. The meeting ended at 1720.

slm

Ministry of Defence
2nd April 1985

Distribution:

PS/Prime Minister
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet
Chancery, Washington

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10 DOWNING STREET

27 March 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Ambassador Paul Nitze
at 10 Downing Street on 27 March

The Prime Minister saw Ambassador Nitze, Special Adviser on Arms Control to the US Secretary of State, this afternoon. Mr Nitze was accompanied by Ambassador Price.

The Prime Minister expressed her repugnance at the shooting of a US Army officer by a Soviet sentry in East Germany. It showed the true nature of the political system which we were dealing with, one which was incapable of humanity.

Arms Control

The Prime Minister asked Mr Nitze to tell her about the opening stages of the arms control negotiations in Geneva. The negotiations had been difficult enough when they were limited to START and INF. With the additional element of space added they would presumably be more difficult still. Mr Nitze thought that there might actually be a better chance of getting things done than before. The Soviets, were clearly anxious and uncertain about the Strategic Defence Initiative. This opened up possibilities for progress.

The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom position on the Strategic Defence Initiative was as she had presented it in Washington. We recognised that the United States had no alternative but to pursue research into strategic defences in the light of Soviet advances in this field. Mr Nitze commented that the Soviet Union had long been investing heavily in defence. They already had a defence system round Moscow and were busy upgrading it. A continuance of the present imbalance in defensive systems in their favour would suit them nicely.

Turning to the discussions in Geneva, Mr Nitze said that formal Soviet positions were as tough as they could be. Basically they did no more than expand on what Mr Gromyko had said at the January meeting and at his subsequent televised press conference. His impression was that they were trying to capture the high ground. In private conversations there were hints of a more cooperative approach. But a good number of these were probably deliberate deceptions.

SECRET

The Prime Minister said that she attached great importance to preserving the ABM Treaty. It would be useful if both sides at Geneva could confirm it. She had been alarmed at some hints that the United States might consider withdrawing from it. She knew that US and British experts did not entirely agree on the extent of Soviet infringements of it. Mr Nitze said that, as one of the negotiators of the ABM Treaty, he had no doubt at all that the Soviets were violating it. The Krasnoyarsk radar undoubtedly had an early warning capability and was oriented to perform that function, even if it was also capable of space tracking. The question was: what to do about Soviet violations?

Turning to the rationale for the Strategic Defence Initiative, Mr Nitze said that his preference was to work out a cooperative approach with the Soviet Union. If the research resulted in cost-effective defence systems which could not be taken out by counter-measures, then it was in both the US and the Soviet interest to be able to deny the other the prospect of victory. It would be made militarily unattractive to either side to start a nuclear war. The Prime Minister said that her concerns lay in the likelihood that any system would have an Achilles heel and could be overwhelmed by counter-measures. This meant that there would continue to be a role for nuclear deterrence. It was therefore dangerous to undermine confidence in it. Mr Nitze agreed that no system would be leak-proof and that the need for the nuclear deterrent would remain. But if a viable defence system could be constructed - and here he was thinking of a time-scale well into the next century - the risks of nuclear war would be reduced by several orders of magnitude. President Reagan saw this as a psychological problem, one above all affecting young people. Did one hold out the prospect of generation after generation living under the threat of annihilation? Or could one offer them a more optimistic goal of defence? In his view President Reagan's political instinct was right. But this did not alter his view that we must go on relying on the nuclear deterrent for the next 20 years at least. It would continue to be needed during the subsequent transition to an effective defence system. Otherwise there was a risk that the West would be "nibbled" to death on the lines propounded by Marshal Ogarkov.

The Prime Minister said that we must be careful not to suggest that nuclear weapons were immoral, implying that non-nuclear weapons were moral. Otherwise it would be increasingly difficult to maintain public support for deterrence. We had to accept the fact that effective strategic defence would undermine not enhance the deterrents of the smaller nuclear powers, unless the Soviet Union were to make radical cuts in its offensive nuclear forces. She greatly admired the work being done in the United States, but remained convinced that it would be many years before it led to a viable defence system.

The Prime Minister asked how the START and INF discussions were going. Mr Nitze explained that the separate working groups had only just met for the first time and it was too early to discern the prospects for progress. But it was already noticeable that Soviet negotiators were stressing the inter-relationship between the three sets of negotiations even more strongly than had Mr Gromyko in January. The Prime Minister asked how the United States would respond if the Soviet Union made an attractive offer on INF or START, while insisting that implementation of it was dependent on agreement on space. Mr Nitze said that in his view negotiations should be taken as far as possible on INF and START with the Soviets left to carry the responsibility of refusal to implement the results. He thought it would be a mistake for the United States to prepare fall-back positions at this stage.

The Prime Minister asked about the prospects for controls on ASATS. Mr Nitze said that this was a very difficult problem. One was dealing with a very limited field of non-nuclear systems which had the capability of dealing with satellites but not with ballistic missiles or re-entry vehicles. In effect there was only the Soviet orbital system and a prototype American one. The Soviets had talked of banning all weapons with an ASAT capability; but strictly interpreted this would cover all ICBMs. They had also talked of banning "systems designed to destroy objects in space". But in his view this was a poisonous phrase. The Americans would want to include Galosh and the SS 18s and 19s but the Soviets would certainly not agree.

The Prime Minister said that we were keen to make progress towards limitations on chemical weapons. It might encourage the Soviets to make progress if the West showed signs of acquiring an updated chemical deterrent capability. Mr Nitze thought that it would not be possible politically for the United States to acquire such a capability. The Prime Minister suggested that if people realised that the only Allied response to a chemical attack was nuclear retaliation, they might prefer a chemical capability. The Prime Minister continued that there were also problems over the US proposals on challenge inspections. These caused difficulties in the Alliance. Mr Nitze acknowledged this.

The Prime Minister asked Mr Nitze's assessment of the chief Soviet arms control negotiator, Mr Karpov. Mr Nitze said that he was a good, tough extrovert who carried out his orders with vigour and no embarrassment. There was a time when he drank too much, but now he drank nothing. The Prime Minister asked whether Mr Nitze thought that the Politburo had given very detailed negotiating instructions. Mr Nitze hazarded that they had set objectives for the first round of negotiations, but had reserved to themselves the decision where to go next in the light of US reactions.

The Prime Minister commented that Lord Carrington had handled NATO discussion of the SDI very well. She expected no difficulty at the European Council. She also welcomed Congress' decision on the MX missile.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TEL: (202) 462-1340

20 December 1984

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Prime Minister

pa

*sent
3/1/85*

Dear Charles,

28/12

Paul Nitze has written asking me to convey to the Prime Minister the enclosed letter of thanks for Mrs Thatcher's message last month.

I was unable to attend the dinner. But David Hannay went in my stead.

Yours ever,

Oliver Wright

*CA file? no-
see books of Mrs.!*

OSA: Nitze June 83.

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

PAUL H. NITZE

Temporarily retained, Wayland, 2/8/16

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

December 4, 1984

ms

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
London
England

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister:

It was a great honor when the Ethics and Public Policy Center presented me with the Shelby Cullom Davis Award last month. The occasion was made even more special by the receipt of your letter; I very much appreciated your generous comments.

Sincerely,

Paul Nitze



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1984

Ethics and Public Policy Centre, Washington:
Message from the Prime Minister

You wrote to me on 7 September about the request from the Ethics and Public Policy Centre for a message from the Prime Minister to be read out at a dinner in November in honour of Ambassador Nitze.

The Prime Minister is content to send the message proposed in your letter. I enclose a signed but undated copy of this which I should be grateful if you could send to the Embassy in Washington for delivery.

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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BM



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I am glad to have this opportunity to express Britain's appreciation for the distinguished role played by Ambassador Paul Nitze over the years in the fields of arms control and Western security policy. We remember his work on the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty and in common with the other European members of NATO we have been grateful for his untiring efforts to achieve progress in the talks about intermediate range nuclear forces.

Margaret Thatcher

28/11/81



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Nitze is a distinguished figure
but not in the first rank. If you send a message this year, it
will be harder to refuse next year when another
recipient of the Shelby Cullom Davis Award will be

Dear Charles, honored.

If you know him, it makes a
difference: a message if you do, none if you
don't?

Ethics and Public Policy Centre, Washington: Message from
the Prime Minister

Our Embassy in Washington have received the attached request from Mr Ernest Lefever of the Ethics and Public Policy Centre (EPPC) in Washington which asks whether the Prime Minister could send a message to be read out at a dinner in November in honour of Ambassador Nitze.

The EPPC is a small organisation whose aim is to apply "traditional Judeo-Christian values in public policies". Its head, Mr Lefever, has close connections with the right wing of the Republican Party. He was at one time President Reagan's candidate for the post of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Affairs at the State Department but withdrew after opposition from Congress.

We have had some previous dealings with the EPPC. Last year Mr Lefever asked whether the Prime Minister would be willing to receive the Shelby Cullom Davis Award (the same as is now being offered to Ambassador Nitze) when she visited Washington for the Williamsburg Summit. I enclose copies of the relevant correspondence from which you will see that the invitation was declined.

Ambassador Nitze, who is 77, spent long periods as Secretary of the US Navy and US Deputy Secretary of Defence in the 1950s and 60s. He has since played a major role in the arms control field and will probably be best remembered for the important part he played in negotiating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, a Treaty of special interest to the small nuclear powers as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. He has been the American INF negotiator since the INF talks began in November 1981 and in this role he called on Prime Minister in 1983. We see no very strong reasons for the Prime Minister to send a message on the occasion of this Award, but a few words of appreciation from her for the effort Nitze has made to defend Western security interests over many years would be a nice gesture at the end of his career. You may therefore like to consider the idea. A message could be simple, perhaps on the following lines:



"I am glad to have this opportunity to express Britain's appreciation for the distinguished role played by Ambassador Paul Nitze over the years in the fields of arms control and Western security policy. We remember his work on the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty and in common with the other European members of NATO we have been grateful for his untiring efforts to achieve progress in the talks about intermediate range nuclear forces".

If the Prime Minister does not wish to send a message we would like to be able to say, provided it is true, that it is not the Prime Minister's normal practice to send messages of this sort. This would help to save any awkwardness particularly if, as is quite likely, Chancellor Kohl or Herr Genscher sends a message.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Ethics and Public Policy Center

1030 Fifteenth Street N.W., Suite 300 □ Washington, D.C. 20005 □ (202) 682-1200

HMA is free
to attend. NJ

Ernest W. Lefever
President

August 9, 1984

Dr. Itz
NJ
15/viii

His Excellency Sir Oliver Wright, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.C.
Ambassador of Great Britain
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It is a pleasure for me in behalf of the Honorary Sponsoring Committee of 72 distinguished Americans (see enclosed list) to invite you and Lady Wright to be guests of the Ethics and Public Policy Center at a reception and dinner for Ambassador Paul H. Nitze on November 15, 1984, at the Washington Hilton. A formal invitation will follow shortly.

Ambassador Nitze will receive the Shelby Cullom Davis Award for outstanding public service marked by integrity and courage. Previous Davis awards have gone to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Lech Walesa.


In the meantime, I would like to make a request of you. In the light of Ambassador Nitze's distinguished contribution to the defense of the free world, would it be possible for you to arrange for a brief greeting from Prime Minister Thatcher be read at the Nitze dinner?

Paul Nitze has served eight Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan. He is well known and respected in Great Britain and a message from Mrs. Thatcher would add much to this significant event.

We have requested President Reagan to speak at the dinner. Senator John Tower, Ambassador Nitze, and other notables will make brief addresses.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Ernest W. Lefever

Enclosures:

1. Brief Sketch of Ambassador Nitze
2. Honorary Sponsoring Committee List

Board of Directors Leslie M. Burgess, Chairman □ Kenneth Baker, S.J. □ Shelby Cullom Davis □ Midge Decter
Kenneth R. Giddens □ Felix B. Gorrell □ Joshua O. Haberman □ Carl F. H. Henry □ Richard John Neuhaus
Paul Ramsey □ Richard Schifter □ Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.

PAUL HENRY NITZE

Ambassador Paul Henry Nitze has a long and distinguished record of service to his country in a career marked by integrity, courage, and patriotism.

In November 1981, he was named to head the United States Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations with the Soviet Union when they convened in Geneva, Switzerland, and currently continues in that role.

During the preceding seven years, he served as a consultant on defense policy and international relations for various government agencies and private industry. In addition, he was chairman of the Advisory Council of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; a director of the Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, Schrodgers, Inc., American Security and Trust Company, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the Atlantic Council of the United States; trustee emeritus of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and the George C. Marshall Research Foundation; and chairman of policy studies for the Committee on the Present Danger.

In the spring of 1969, Mr. Nitze was appointed the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, a position he held until June 1974.

While serving as the 57th Secretary of the Navy, he was nominated by the late President Lyndon B. Johnson in June 1957 to become Deputy Secretary of Defense succeeding Cyrus R. Vance, a position he held until resigning in January 1969.

The late President John F. Kennedy nominated Mr. Nitze to be Secretary of the Navy in October 1963. At the time he was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, having assumed that position in January 1961.

Mr. Nitze left the Federal Government in 1953 to become president of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C., a position he held until January 1961. For the previous seven years, he had served in various capacities with the Department of State, including deputy director of the Office of International Trade Policy, deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and deputy director and director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

During the period 1944-46, Mr. Nitze was vice chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey for which the late President Truman awarded him the Medal of Merit. From 1942-43, he served as chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, until named as director of Foreign Procurement and Development for the Foreign Economic Administration.

In 1941, he left his position as vice president of Dillon Read and Company to become financial director of the U.S. Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

After graduating cum laude from Harvard University in 1928, he joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon Read and Company.

Born at Amherst, Massachusetts, on January 16, 1907, Mr. Nitze is married to the former Phyllis Pratt and has four children—Heidi, Peter, William, and Anina.

June 1984

Honorary Sponsoring Committee

For a Dinner Honoring Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, November 15, 1984

Washington Hilton Hotel

C. Douglas Dillon, Chairman

Dean Rusk, Thomas H. Moorer, Clare Boothe Luce, Co-chairmen

David C. Acheson	Paul W. McCracken
Richard V. Allen	Robert C. McFarlane
Anne L. Armstrong	Robert S. McNamara
Lucius D. Battle	Steve Muller
Saul Bellow	Edmund S. Muskie
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.	Richard M. Nixon
Harold Brown	Garrison Norton
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Charles Burton Marshall	Vernon A. Walters
William McChesney Martin, Jr.	Caspar W. Weinberger
John J. McCloy	Francis O. Wilcox
John McCone	Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.

Ethics and Public Policy Center
1030 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

August 3, 1984



BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 August 1984

Mr Ernest W Lefever
President
Ethics and Public Policy Center
1030 15th Street NW - Suite 300
WASHINGTON DC 20005

Dear Mr Lefever,

Thank you for your letter of 9 August to the Ambassador, on whose behalf I am replying in his absence on leave in the United Kingdom.

We shall consult No 10 Downing Street about your request for the Prime Minister to send a brief greeting to be read at the dinner for Ambassador Nitze. I shall let you have their response as soon as possible. The Ambassador returns on 30 August. His office will then let you know whether he and Lady Wright will be able to accept your kind invitation to be the guests of the Center at the dinner on 15 November.

Yours sincerely

David Hannay

D H A Hannay
Chargé d'Affaires

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British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384

Telex International 84224(WUJ)/248308(RCA)/440015(ITT)

Telephone (202) 462-1340

1 Mr. MacLennan to see
2 R & R.
hkn 24/8/84

N H Marshall Esq
NAD
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 17 August 1984

A-17 022/3	
05 SEP 1984	

Dear Noel

ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, WASHINGTON DC.
REQUEST FOR A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

attached

1. I enclose copies of the Ethics and Public Policy Center's letter of 9 August and David Hannay's interim reply.
2. The Center is a small, private, non-profit-making organisation which has been in operation for about eight years. Its aim is to apply "traditional Judeo-Christian values" to public policies. It is not in the top bracket of Washington think-tanks. Politically, it seems to occupy much the same sort of ground as the much more influential Heritage Foundation.
3. Ernest Lefever is the founder of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He was President Reagan's first choice as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. However, Lefever's highly conservative track record created broad Congressional opposition to the nomination which was subsequently withdrawn. Lefever has, for example, been a fierce critic over the years of policies relating US foreign aid to human rights abuses and has been a staunch defender of the need, in his view, for the United States to make common cause with friendly authoritarian regimes in the struggle against totalitarian expansion. His nomination was regarded at the time as a gesture to the Republican Right and as a token of the new Administration's determination to move away from the emphasis on human rights during the Carter Administration.

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4. The Ethics and Public Policy Center therefore has a distinctive political voice and Lefever himself is a controversial figure. In addition, the following factors seem to us to weigh against the Prime Minister agreeing to send a greeting to be read at the dinner:

- a) although Nitze is a distinguished public servant, it seems a little out of scale for the Prime Minister to send a message. We here are not sure whether the Prime Minister has agreed to do this sort of thing in the past or knows Nitze well enough to make a message credible.
- b) the timing is awkward, coming nine days after the Presidential election. If the Democrats were to win, the occasion would no doubt be rather flat as Nitze is most unlikely to be retained in a senior position in the arms control community. Given the uncertainties, it seems to us rather difficult to commit the Prime Minister in advance.

5. All that said, the sponsoring committee for the dinner is as bi-partisan a list of the great and good as one is likely to see, despite the conservative hue of the Center itself. Furthermore, it is possible that other heads of government will agree to send messages. For example, the FRG Embassy have recommended that the Chancellor or Herr Genscher should respond positively to a similar request for a message from Kohl. However, Nitze is personally very well known and liked in Bonn, by the Chancellor and others, so there may be special factors at play.

6. We should be grateful if you would pass the Ethics and Public Policy Center's request to No.10 Downing Street. We see no strong reason for the Prime Minister to agree to send a message unless she wishes to do so. If the Prime Minister decides not to send a message, it would be best to say - if this is true - that it is not the Prime Minister's normal practice to send messages of this kind. If the Prime Minister decides to send a brief greeting, we suggest that it need do no more than refer to Nitze's long career of public service, particularly in the defence and arms control field, and pay tribute to his efforts on behalf of the US and the whole Alliance to work sincerely for an agreement in the INF talks.

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copy to Mr Dean Arden Mr Madhavan fi ROAD



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 March, 1983

Am 026/2

7 MAR 1983

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SERIALIZED	FILED	ACTION TAKEN
		@ 7/3

Invitations to the Prime Minister from Mr F L Holihan and Mr Ernest Lefever

Caroline Stephens wrote to John Holmes on 21 February asking for advice on how to reply to a letter from Mr F L Holihan forwarding invitations to the Prime Minister to address the Private Enterprise Foundation in Oklahoma on 1 June and to receive the 'Shelby Cullom Davis Award' for statesmanship from the Ethics and Public Policy Center (EPPC) at the time of the Williamsburg Summit 'or at some other convenient date'. She wrote subsequently on 1 March about a letter from Mr Ernest Lefever of the EPPC inviting the Prime Minister to receive the award at a dinner on 20 October in Washington.

Mr Holihan is a Republican of the far-right with business interests in London. He is one of the founders of the anti-CND group 'Coalition for Peace through Security', though is no longer involved with it. As you will have gathered from the various documents enclosed with his letter, he has links with similar organisations in the United States. Mr Lefever was previously nominated by President Reagan as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Affairs in the State Department but withdrew after encountering opposition from Congress. The EPPC has the active support of some members of the present US Administration and President Reagan sent a message of congratulations to Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick when she became the first recipient of the Shelby Cullom Davis award last year.

We have already declined a number of invitations to the Prime Minister to give speeches and receive honorary degrees during her visit to the United States at the time of the Economic Summit, and you will have seen my letter of 25 February suggesting that an address to the Foreign Policy Association and presentation of the Churchill Foundation Award might be Mrs Thatcher's main public engagements in Washington. We are not aware that the Prime Minister has any plans to be in Washington later in the year, and we rather doubt whether we would in any event have advised that Mrs Thatcher should take up either of these two most recent invitations. I attach draft replies of letters for you to send to Mr Holihan and Mr Lefever, turning them both down.



You will note that we have not, in the reply to Mr Holihan, specifically addressed the question of the EPPC's seminar to be held in London in May for which Mr Holihan appears to be looking for some form of official support. We have consulted the MOD who agree that it would not be appropriate for the Prime Minister to become involved. I suggest we need only deal with this question if and when it is raised by the organisers of the seminar themselves.

A copy of this letter goes to Barry Neale at the Ministry of Defence. I am advised by officials here, following consultation with the MOD, that the references in Mr Holihan's letter to contacts with the MOD may be somewhat exaggerated. Barry Neale could doubtless comment further on this if you wish.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1983

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Dear Brian,

Call by Ambassador Nitze

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and Ambassador Nitze which took place here this morning.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

John Galsworthy

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE AT 1030 ON 8 JULY 1983 AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	Ambassador Nitze
Mr. Coles	Mr. Harrison

* * * * *

In response to a question by the Prime Minister, Ambassador Nitze said he had as yet received no reports about Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow. But before the visit had taken place the Russian negotiating team in Geneva had given him the clear impression that the Chancellor would be given rough treatment in Moscow. It had been pointed out that Pravda and Isvestia had produced very critical articles before Chancellor Kohl's arrival. However, not only the Chancellor but also the German Defence and Foreign Ministers were very firm on INF. Genscher was perhaps more sensitive than the others to the complexities of the issues.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned that the Soviet leadership was so isolated from the real world. Ambassador Nitze said that he shared this concern. It was easy enough for the Americans to win the arguments in Geneva but what difference did that make? The Soviet Union did not care who won the arguments at the negotiating table.

He had been trying to assess which was the worst of the possible outcomes to the INF talks. The Russians stated that if the West deployed Cruise and Pershing they would abandon the INF and START negotiations. This did not mean that they would not re-open these later on a different basis but meanwhile they would concentrate on applying pressure to the Germans. The latter were vulnerable to a number of pressures which were not solely related to INF. They were sensitive to relations with East Germany, the interests of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union, humanitarian exchanges between East and West and the preservation of the access routes to Berlin. The Russians also said from time to time that they did not necessarily

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have to go on buying capital equipment and other goods from Germany.

The Prime Minister interjected that she did not believe that tactics of this kind would work with Chancellor Kohl. Ambassador Nitze said he agreed but Chancellor Kohl had to keep a coalition together and had to preserve support in public opinion. If this negative scenario developed the United States and Britain would have to help him. The Prime Minister recalled that Chancellor Kohl had told her earlier that 70% of the German people were behind him on these issues. Ambassador Nitze said that, nevertheless, in response to a question as to whether they favoured US deployment, 65% of Germans replied in the negative (though 90% supported NATO).

The Prime Minister said that the West was in a very difficult negotiating position. The Russians threatened that, if we deployed Cruise and Pershing, they would deploy further weapons in retaliation. But if we did not deploy, the Russians would keep their superiority in INF weapons. The Kremlin were unlikely to make concessions unless it paid them to do so. Did Ambassador Nitze have a clear view of what transpired at the recent Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow? Ambassador Nitze said that he had merely a "smell" that the meeting had not been successful and that a number of Warsaw Pact members were scared at the prospect of deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil.

There were however some more favourable elements in the present situation. His impression from Geneva was that there were disagreements in Moscow about policy. In part this was due to uncertainty about how long Andropov would last. Those beneath him felt that their career could be determined by whether or not they were on the right side with regard to INF matters when a successor took over. A further positive feature was that it was not clear that the Russians really wanted confrontation with the West.

The Prime Minister agreed with the last point but said that in her view we were dealing with a system which did not allow people

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to develop differing views. Most of the Russian leadership had never been exposed to genuine argument or to the atmosphere of the Western democracies. There was thus a fundamental problem of how we could convey to them our real feelings and thoughts. It was because of this problem that she had seen some merit in Mrs. Gandhi's suggestion that there should be a Summit at this year's UN General Assembly. If this resulted in Andropov visiting New York and certain meetings between him and Western leaders, there could be benefits. We certainly needed to persuade more Russian leaders to visit the West.

Ambassador Nitze said that his opposite number in Geneva was a Pole by ancestry. He was fluent in a number of languages, widely read and intelligent but utterly cynical. He could slip into a number of different personalities at will. He had a macabre sense of humour but was not a happy man. He was widely travelled in the West as well as elsewhere.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister Ambassador Nitze said that during his absence from Geneva the Russians had said that when he returned they would wish to discuss changing the terminal date for the present round of talks. It was not clear why they had taken this view. It might be simply to embarrass the Americans. Or they might have something to talk about. He would discover when he lunched with Kvitsinski on 11 July. The Russians had also said that they wanted to open the autumn session on 6 September and not to fix a terminal date for that session.

The Prime Minister said that if the Russians broke off the negotiations when we deployed it would be important for the West to have a concerted position both on presentation and on tactics. She was very grateful to the United States for keeping us so well informed to date. Ambassador Nitze said that he considered it absolutely essential to keep the United Kingdom and Germany, in particular, fully informed.

Ambassador Nitze said that the Russians would probably make further cosmetic moves in the negotiations. The team handling

/ this

this subject in Moscow were good and linked propaganda and military threats with their negotiating tactics.

The Prime Minister said that if negotiations did break down it would eventually become politically imperative to propose new negotiations. For a time was bound to come when it made no sense to have more nuclear weapons. This would only be untrue if the targetting of nuclear weapons became so accurate that the assertion that nuclear war would result in holocaust became demonstrably unsound.

The discussion ended at 1115.

A. J. C.

8 July 1983

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 July 1983

Prime Minister

PA

7/5

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by Ambassador Nitze on 8 July

There were several points made by Ambassador Nitze in discussion with Sir Geoffrey Howe this afternoon of which you might like to be aware before Nitze calls on the Prime Minister tomorrow morning.

Nitze said he thought that the Russians were planning on the assumption that NATO deployments would begin according to the scheduled programme by the end of the year - though they would continue to make life as difficult as possible for the basing countries. If the first cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles were installed in December he thought that the Russians would then suspend the INF negotiations and perhaps also the START talks, for some months. During that period they would continue to play upon Western European public opinion, especially in Germany where they could use interest in eventual German reunification and the vulnerability of Berlin as well as the deployment of new Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe as part of their intimidatory tactics. As and when they started negotiating again it would probably be to try to negotiate reductions in NATO's new missiles in exchange for reductions in the newly deployed short-range Soviet missiles, rather than the SS20s.

Nitze is not able to predict in any detail how the negotiations might develop between now and the end of the year. His own preference continues to be to tackle all the issues, including the secondary ones of verification and constraints on shorter range missiles, rather than to try only to resolve the central issue. He fears that if the central issue were resolved Western European public opinion would then demand that NATO's stand on the important secondary issues could be sacrificed. He felt that the Russians were likely to come up with some move, perhaps only cosmetic but perhaps in part substantive, in the summer or at the beginning of the autumn round. NATO should then be in a position to move quickly and, in the meantime should reach agreed positions on the outstanding negotiating issues.

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A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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He was somewhat reassuring on the question of the attitude of the German Government. He was sure that Chancellor Kohl, Herr Genscher and Herr Woerner were firmly committed to beginning deployments on time. The question was whether they could succeed given the political realities in Germany. He was fairly relaxed about the Bundestag resolution on 23 June committing the Federal Government to a Bundestag debate on, or immediately after, 15 November. Such a debate would have had to take place in any case and the US Army was confident that Pershing II missiles could be delivered and fully deployed between 15 November and 31 December.

After seeing the Prime Minister and Mr Heseltine tomorrow Nitze will return to Geneva for the rest of the current round. He told us that the Russians have now changed their mind about finishing this round on 14 July. They wish to discuss continuing it, although Nitze has no idea for how long or for what purpose.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram at the Ministry of Defence.

W. Manser,
Jim

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 July 1983

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 3/2.

John Dehn.

Call on the Prime Minister by Ambassador Nitze

/ I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister on the
current state of the INF negotiations for her discussions
/ with Ambassador Nitze on 8 July, together with a background
note on him. As the latter points out we believe that
Nitze's views on how the negotiations may develop in the
run up to NATO's first INF missile deployments will be
well worth hearing.

Nitze will be calling on the Secretary of State on
Thursday afternoon, 7 July. We will let you know of
any points of significance that arise. I understand
that Mr Heseltine also plans to see him, on 8 July.

Ambassador Nitze will be accompanied by Mr Roger
Harrison of the US Embassy, in the absence of the US
Ambassador from London.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram.

John Dehn
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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BRIEF FOR THE CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY AMBASSADOR NITZE,
UNITED STATES INF NEGOTIATOR, AT 1030 ON 8 JULY 1983

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Need to keep European Allies united in support of agreed negotiating position. Reluctance of some smaller European Allies (Greeks, Danes), unhelpful, but much less important than attitudes of governments of basing countries. Basing countries must remain firm. How can we help ensure this? What is your current assessment of German attitudes?
2. Present negotiating position remains convincing to HMG and British public opinion. Retain open mind about possibilities for further changes in negotiating position in due course without preconceived ideas about timing. But must guard against being panicked into seeking a change in the negotiating position in the Autumn just for change's sake. NATO has very little negotiating leeway. British view is that we should wait for signs from the Russians that they are willing to negotiate on the basis of our essential principles before contemplating any major change in NATO's negotiating position. This means signs of Soviet readiness to negotiate about a balance in INF missile warheads for the US and Soviet Union on a global basis.
3. If NATO makes a further substantive move this autumn before any Soviet concession, Russians will simply pocket our concession and ask for delays in deployments while they 'consider' their response.
4. No question of NATO delaying deployments of first cruise missiles and Pershing II beyond the end of 1983 except in unlikely event of Russians agreeing to zero option. We must resist Soviet enticements in the autumn falling short of serious negotiating currency and aimed at postponement of first

missile deployments by a few months. But will continue to make clear that NATO's deployment programme could be halted or even reversed following success in negotiations.

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY AMBASSADOR NITZE, UNITED STATE
INF NEGOTIATOR, AT 1030 ON 8 JULY 1983

BACKGROUND

1. A summary of the issues involved in the INF negotiations is contained in an annex to this brief.
2. The 5th round of the negotiations will finish on 14 July and has produced no significant progress. Ambassador Nitze has developed NATO's offer of an interim agreement (the right to an equal number of longer-range INF missile warheads for the US and Soviet Union), by tabling a second US draft treaty. This has equal status with the draft treaty which sets out the zero option. In the second US draft treaty spaces have been left for warhead numbers under an interim agreement, (although we understand that Nitze has for illustrative purposes used a range of possible levels between zero and 450 warheads).
3. The Russians continue to pursue their proposal to preclude the deployment of any cruise missiles or Pershing II missiles by matching Soviet SS20 missiles and Backfire and other bombers against British and French strategic missile forces and a small number of US nuclear-capable aircraft. On 3 May Mr Andropov announced that the Russians would be prepared to count warheads as well as missiles, thus appearing to meet one of NATO's demands. But as long as the Russians insist on the right to equate SS20 warheads with British Polaris/Chevaline and French submarine-launched and land-based missile warheads, the Russian move to count in warheads represents no concession. According to the Soviet methods of counting British and French warhead numbers they would indeed claim the right greatly to increase their numbers of S20s in Europe in the late 1980s and 1990s.
4. On 30 June Nitze revealed to Chancellor Kohl, and will probably repeat to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, that the Russians have recently indicated that they

might reduce their SS20 missiles in Europe to a level (unspecified) below 162 - the number of British and French missiles according to Soviet calculations - if NATO would agree to forego deployment of any cruise missiles or Pershing II missiles.

5. The 6th round of the negotiations will begin on 6 September and it has been agreed that, contrary to the practice in previous rounds, no finishing date will be set. We can expect Soviet propaganda initiatives during the summer and during the autumn round of negotiations, but it is doubtful that they will shift on matters of substance. In recent weeks they have repeatedly indicated that they would take counter measures if NATO deployed cruise or Pershing II missiles and in the latter half of 1983 we may see them focus increasingly on this 'stick', rather than the carrot of promising changes in the Soviet negotiating position.

6. The German Government is concerned to placate its public opinion and members of the Bundestag in the Autumn, and for that reason drafted the Resolution passed by the Bundestag on 23 June under which the Government are committed to holding a Bundestag debate on or soon after 15 November and before any Pershing II missiles are stationed in Germany. (The date of 15 November was included in the Resolution before the German Government had been told that no date would be set for the end of the autumn round of negotiations.) As part of the effort to show that NATO has done all possible to reach a negotiated agreement before the first missile deployments, the Germans seem keen to urge on the Americans the need for a new negotiating offer early in the autumn. This should in their view offer the Russians something on regional sub-ceilings for missiles and on inclusion of aircraft. In 1979 NATO agreed that there might be

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scope for regional sub-ceilings within global limits in an INF agreement, but the idea has not been pursued subsequently. Our view has been that the offer of a regional sub-ceiling for missiles in or near Europe (and indeed the relevance of aircraft) deserves further examination within a restricted group of Allies; but that it would be wrong to offer any new move before the Russians have made a genuine concession themselves.

7. There is also a danger that some members of the German Government might be tempted by a Soviet offer to take a step favouring NATO, for example the dismantling of a small number of SS20s, in exchange for a postponement of NATO's first deployments. A Soviet offer in this sense is quite likely.

8. The Germans have been talking to Nitze in Bonn and they claim that he supports some of their ideas. If so, we should bear in mind that there is sometimes a fairly large gap between Nitze's own thinking and that of the Administration in Washington, as indeed the fate of the famous Nitze/Kvitsinski 'walk-in-the-woods' in July 1982 has already illustrated.

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INF: BACKGROUND

1. The present INF negotiations in Geneva spring from NATO's 1979 dual track decision (the Integrated Decision Document). Faced by increasing obsolescence/vulnerability in NATO's existing longer range INF systems (US F1-11s and British Vulcans) and by the growing Soviet SS20 programme, the Alliance decided to deploy 572 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing ballistic missiles in Europe; and at the same time to offer to negotiate with the Russians reductions in US and Soviet LRINF missile systems.

2. The US negotiating position, as agreed within NATO, is essentially as follows.

1. Global limitations on longer range land based missiles defined as GLCM, Pershing 2, SS20, SS4 and 5.
2. Ultimate objective zero option, meaning zero deployment of such systems on each side. Equal rights and limits for the US and Soviet Union, no compensation for or inclusion of nuclear systems belonging to third countries.

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3. All banned systems to be destroyed, according to agreed procedures. Collateral constraints on shorter range INF missiles.
 4. Verification measures going beyond national technical means to be agreed between both parties.
 5. Readiness to consider any interim solution on the way to zero, provided it respects key principles of balance, exclusion of third party systems, ~~no~~ no shifting of the problem eastwards, verification and no degradation of NATO conventional capability (eg by forcing the removal of US dual capable aircraft).
3. The Soviet negotiating position is designed exclusively to prevent any new deployments of GLCMs or Pershing 2s by NATO, while preserving as much as possible of the SS20 programme intact. It has the following elements.
1. Limitations on "medium range" (including aircraft) systems in Europe and adjacent seas and oceans (or intended for use in Europe)ie with a range or combat radius of between 1,000 kms and 5,500 kms.

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2. They claim that a balance already exists between NATO and the Soviet Union in such systems at roughly 1,000 on each side. No deployments of GLCMs or Pershings to be permitted, since they would "disturb" this balance.

3. Account be taken of British and French nuclear systems.

4. Each side to reduce to 300 systems by 1990, of which 255 on NATO side would be accounted for by UK and French systems.

5. Within the ceiling of 300, sub-ceiling of 162 for missiles, that being the Soviet count for French and British missile launchers. Readiness to reduce Soviet missiles below this figure pro rata if French and British systems are reduced towards zero; conversely, right to increase Soviet numbers, if French or British numbers increase.

6. More recently, a readiness to express these figures in terms of warhead numbers, rather than missiles, which is in effect the NATO counting unit.

7. Freeze on current deployments while negotiations in progress.


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8. Ambiguity as to whether systems reduced would be destroyed or merely withdrawn beyond a line drawn on a map (60° east for aircraft, 80° east for missiles).

4. The prospects for agreement on INF in the course of the next 12 months are not very good. It still appears that, despite recent election results, the Russians are hoping to achieve their aim of preventing new Western deployments without paying a serious price at the negotiating table. Initial deployments of Pershing 2s and GLCMs in Britain, Germany and Italy by the end of 1983 may therefore be necessary to concentrate Soviet minds. But even then they may prefer to respond in kind by new Soviet deployments rather than to settle for a negotiated agreement. The key elements preventing agreement are whether and how to include aircraft at an early stage, whether agreement should be global in application or focus primarily on regional limits, and the question of French and British nuclear systems. As has already in fact been demonstrated by the famous "walk in the woods" of Nitze and Kivitsinski in summer 1982, there may be some room for manoeuvre on the first two of these issues, provided the political will is there. Some analysis is currently underway in NATO on a very restricted basis. If, however, not even this proves enough to secure agreement over the next 12 months, thought will increasingly be given to the possibility of

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some merger (or at least cross trade off) between the
START and INF negotiations.

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AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE

Ambassador Nitze is a 76 year old American with a long career in US Government service, mostly in the State Department and the Pentagon where he rose to become, in the 1960s, Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defence. From 1969 to 1974 he took part in the SALT negotiations and was a principal architect of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, a most important nuclear arms control agreement which remains in force.

He is a key figure in the policy-making process in Washington, as well as the leader of the INF negotiating team in Geneva. The rather prosaic impression which he often conveys hides considerable subtlety and a strong political sense. His views on how the INF negotiations might develop will be well worth hearing.

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1 July 1983

Visit to London by Ambassador Nitze

Thank you for your letter of 28 June. The Prime Minister would like to see Ambassador Nitze and could do so for 45 minutes at 1030 on Friday, 8 July. I should be grateful for a brief in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree to see
Ambassador Nitze
45 minutes at 10.30
on Friday, 8 July?

28 June, 1983

Yes not

John Selwyn

A.J.C. 29/6.

Visit to London by Ambassador Nitze, 7-8 July

The US Embassy have told us informally that Ambassador Nitze, the US INF negotiator in Geneva, is offering to visit London on 7-8 July, on his way back to Geneva from discussions in Washington. He might be able to arrive in London on 6 rather than 7 July, depending on his programme in Washington.

You will remember that we were arranging a visit for him, including a talk with the Prime Minister, for early June but put him off once the Election was announced. Ambassador Nitze now wishes to reinstate this earlier visit. Sir Geoffrey Howe recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to see Mr Nitze to hear from him at first hand the prospects in the INF negotiations (Mr Nitze was seen both by Herr Kohl and by Herr Genscher in Bonn earlier this month). If the Prime Minister agrees, are there any times on these days which we might put to the Americans?


We are telling the Americans that Sir Geoffrey would be free to see Nitze at 2.45 pm on 7 July.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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