

72/2

Confidential filing

Visit of President Masire of  
Botswana to Britain.

BOTSWANA

SEPTEMBER 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<b><u>File Series closed</u></b>							
<del>20.9.80</del>							
<del>28.10.80</del>							
<del>31.10.80</del>							
<del>10.11.80</del>							
<del>19.11.80</del>							
<del>27.10.82</del>							
<del>2.11.82</del>							
<del>18.11.82</del>							
<del>07.4.84</del>							
<del>26.4.84</del>							
<del>11.5.84</del>							
<del>11.5.84</del>							
<del>8.6.84</del>							
<del>2.7.84</del>							
<del>6.2.84</del>							

PREM 19/2591



*me pm*  
*(S3)*  
*ah*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 June 1989

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE

Thank you for your letter of 5 June about the visit of President Masire. I am afraid the Prime Minister cannot see him that day as it is very short notice and her diary is quite simply full. I should be grateful if you could convey to President Masire the Prime Minister's profound regret that her programme is such that she is unable to see him at this short notice.

C. D. Powell

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  
CONFIDENTIAL

*D*





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 June 1989

Dea Charles,

Botswana: Possible Call on the Prime Minister  
by President Masire, 16 June

The President of Botswana will be passing through London on his way back from the United States, where he will have been a guest of the US Government. He will arrive on 15 June and leaves on the evening of 16 June. He has requested a call on the Prime Minister on 16 June.

The Foreign Secretary recognises the difficulty of a call on the Prime Minister by President Masire at this short notice, especially on a day when she is already receiving Mr Manley. He believes, however, that there are arguments which the Prime Minister will wish to take into account in considering such a meeting.

(i) Botswana is a moderate and helpful member of the Frontline States, who will have crucial influence over the implementation of the UN Plan for the independence of Namibia. We are again having to lobby the FLS to restrain SWAPO. It would be useful if the Prime Minister could speak to President Masire about Namibia;

(ii) The Prime Minister could explain our approach to the changing situation in South African and the region;

(iii) In the approach to CHOGM, this would be a useful opportunity to put some backbone into a Commonwealth country which tacitly opposed sanctions and has to co-habit with South Africa;

(iv) President Masire will have just met President Bush in the United States. We, with our stronger historical links with Botswana, should try to meet his request. (The Prime Minister last met President Masire at the Vancouver CHOGM, although there was no substantive bilateral meeting.);

Of less importance, but nonetheless useful:

(v) A meeting would demonstrate our support of Botswana as a successful multi-party democracy (a

/rarity



rarity in black Africa) and a prosperous and well-run economy. The Prime Minister is aware of this and considered a visit to Botswana as part of her March visit to Africa;

(vi) There are British commercial interests to be supported, including possible defence and aircraft sales;

(vii) A call would reassure the Botswana that we continue to discourage South African cross-border raids.

I would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister is able to receive President Masire. If she is not, we should be happy to draft a message for the Prime Minister to send him.

*Yours,*  
*Stephen Wall*  
*for* (R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



cc MASTER



26  
R6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1984

Dear Roger,

Call on the Prime Minister by the President of Botswana

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place when President Masire called on the Prime Minister today.

I also enclose an aide memoire which the President's Private Secretary handed to me after the meeting.

You see  
for Wla.

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MFJAAD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA AT 1500 HOURS ON MONDAY, 14 MAY AT  
10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister  
Mr. Squire  
Mr. Coles

President Masire  
Mr. Mogwe  
Botswana High Commissioner  
Mr. Mogae

\*\*\*\*\*

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, President Masire said that his visit to the United States had gone well. It was some time since he had been there.

The Prime Minister said that she believed that the Prince of Wales' visit to Botswana had been most successful. She was distressed to hear that Botswana was facing another year of drought.

There now seemed to be more hope of progress in Southern Africa. The Prime Minister of South Africa would shortly visit Germany, Switzerland and Portugal. She had thought it would be a mistake not to take this opportunity to put our views to him. The Nkomati accord and the recent progress made in Angola were cause for optimism. How did Botswana see these developments?

/President Masire

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

President Masire said that the situation in Southern Africa did inspire hope. But he was not sure whether there would now be a change for the better or for the worse - or merely a move to another period of stalemate. Botswana had welcomed the establishment of the Joint Commission between South Africa and Angola to supervise the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. But the question now was whether all the recent activity pointed to the early granting of independence to Namibia in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435. Botswana took a rather more optimistic attitude than some about the delinking of South African and Cuban withdrawal from Angola. From his conversations with the President of Angola it was clear that the latter felt that having secured the departure of the Portuguese he could not retain a Cuban presence. He said that he needed a foreign force in his territory only because of the presence of South African troops. The Prime Minister suggested that, since the South African withdrawal had not produced any Cuban movement, this might not be true. President Masire replied that he felt that Angola did not wish to appear to be pushed but wanted to move in its own time.

With regard to Mozambique, it seemed that President Machel's visit to Western Europe had persuaded him to sign a non-aggression accord with the South African Prime Minister. Machel had done so because he realised that his chances of holding the earlier situation were limited. Also, South Africa had been tightening the screws. Botswana would have very much preferred that any agreement signed should have been one between free trading partners such as that which had brought together partners in the European Community. Nevertheless, Botswana had told Mozambique and Angola that it understood the circumstances which had driven them into their arrangements with South Africa.

/The worrying

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

The worrying thing about these agreements was that South Africa seemed to regard them as a blue-print for dealing with all the other States in the area. Botswana had sent three delegations to South Africa each of which had been met with a Nkomati-type accord and asked to sign it. Apparently the same tactics had been applied to Zimbabwe and recent remarks by the Leader of SWAPO suggested that the South Africans were trying to persuade him to do the same. Botswana had declined to sign any such agreement. It had had eighteen years experience of working with South Africa and had maintained from the outset that its territory would not be used as a launching-pad for attacks on neighbouring states. This policy had been observed even during the Rhodesia crisis. Botswana had told the South Africans that if they believed that it was departing from this policy they should say so. There had been no reply. His fear was that if Botswana was seen to be openly "clubbing" with South Africa, then the goodwill of eighteen years would be destroyed and liberation movements would move in. South Africa would tell Botswana to get rid of them and threaten action if it did not. His country could become a Lebanon. The Prime Minister commented that Botswana's history was one of stability. She believed that it had a problem with refugees from Zimbabwe. President Masire confirmed this. The presence of the refugees had come close to starting a shooting war. Botswana told Zimbabwe, just as it did South Africa, that if refugees left its territory because of fear Botswana, as a member of the International Community, had to receive them. But if they came in order to fight, they would be sent back. The acrimony between Botswana and Zimbabwe had now been reduced - though the media sought to sustain it.

/He had

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

He had been disturbed by a number of recent South African statements claiming that South Africa would sign a non-aggression pact with Botswana.

The Prime Minister said that she looked forward to hearing from the South African Prime Minister an account of his strategy. She would be grateful for the President's assessment of Mr. Botha. It had seemed to her that Mr. Botha was trying to move his own party in a more liberal direction. President Masire said that this might be true but Botha was prepared to take any action to enhance his own position, even if this greatly exacerbated the political problems of others. His destabilising policy was a case in point. The Prime Minister said that that policy was totally against our principles.

Mr. Squire asked how Mr. Botha's personality compared with that of other South African Prime Ministers. Invited by the President to respond, Mr. Mogwe said that Botswana had never dealt with Mr. Botha directly. He was a dyed in the wool nationalist but he had liberal inclinations. He had played for high stakes in pursuing a referendum and constitutional reform and had provoked a split in his party. Botswana was disappointed that, since he was running these risks anyway, he had, by leaving the black community out of his constitutional reform, opted for half measures. Nevertheless, Botha appeared to be sincere and wished to achieve something. Since he had taken one major step he needed to be encouraged to do more. The Prime Minister said that her own feeling was that if people continued to attack Botha, when he had taken a step in the right direction, he would be unlikely to do more. President Masire predicted that Botha would tell the Prime Minister that in going for limited constitutional reform he had bitten off all that he could chew (whether this was true or not).

/In replying

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

In replying to a question from the Prime Minister about the economy, President Masire said that it had been badly hit by one disaster after another. The effects of the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 1979 still lingered. Botswana had had difficulty in meeting its EC beef quota (he was most grateful for the stand taken by the United Kingdom on the Botswana beef issue in the EC). The revenue from diamonds had declined and copper and nickel exploitation had also suffered from the fall in world prices. Then there had been the accumulative effect of successive droughts. Botswana had directed one-third of its development funds to drought. He was grateful for British aid in the last two or three years.

Reverting to Angola, the Prime Minister said that we had never accepted a tight linkage between South African and Cuban withdrawal but we had taken the view that as a matter of practice Cuban withdrawal should follow South African. She herself had always doubted whether this would happen, believing that the Angolan Government would need to retain Cuban troops until it had resolved its dispute with Savimbi.

Mr. Mogwe said that Savimbi was an important factor. He was sustained largely by South Africa. The recent agreement between Angola and South Africa might be the first step in reassuring Angola that South Africa would not give unlimited support to Savimbi. This would not demoralise the latter because he was well equipped already.

The Cubans were not in Angola to threaten South Africa nor Namibia. They were there because of Savimbi - if he was subdued they would leave. The need was to convince South Africa of this.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

The Prime Minister said that she would make clear to Mr. Botha that she disapproved of some of his policies but she would also encourage him to move further in the right direction. What would the President like her to say to him? President Masire said that Botswana's problem was Mr. Botha's statement that Botswana would be the next country to sign a non-aggression accord. Botswana faced an election year and such statements were particularly unhelpful at the present time.

The discussion ended at 1550.

A.J.C.

14 May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



THE STATE PRESIDENT

GABORONE

AIDE MEMOIRE

Background

1. Since the late 1970's, South Africa has pursued a policy of aggression and destabilisation against its neighbours. This has included direct military attacks such as in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, occupation such as in Angola, the use of dissident groups to create political and economic chaos in each of these countries as well as economic sabotage and blockades.

2. Last year I had to call in the Representatives of the Contact Group in Gaborone at a time of strong indications that South Africa was about to mount a Lesotho-type of invasion into Botswana. These Representatives who included the British High Commissioner in Gaborone received our appeals to their respective governments to restrain South Africa from attacking Botswana. Indeed the danger receded.

3. My Government and all Batswana are grateful for the timely intervention by the British Government.

4. But lack of strong public condemnation of South Africa's aggression may have had the effect of diluting such intervention and may have encouraged that country in the belief that it could get away with further aggression. We also fear that the latest renewal of high level contacts with the South African Government may be seen by that regime as rewarding aggression and the imposition of non-aggression pacts on its neighbours.



Non Aggression Pacts

5. Following the success made in the negotiations for a non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, South Africa has decided to put pressure on Botswana to sign a similar pact. South Africa could not point to any policy of ours encouraging the liberation movements to use Botswana as a base for attacks against it. There was therefore no ground for South Africa to seek a non-aggression pact with us.

6. South Africa therefore seized the opportunity offered by a meeting requested by Botswana to discuss a commercial project - the Sua Soda Ash Project - to table a non-aggression draft treaty. The South African delegation sought to tie agreement on the project to Botswana signing a non-aggression pact. The Botswana delegation which had no brief to discuss security issues naturally resisted. They returned to Botswana. Botswana's proposal for the sale of Soda Ash to South Africa was in the context of the existing Southern African Customs Union Agreement.

7. Next we sent another delegation led by the Foreign Minister to find out from the South Africans what problems they had with Botswana's policy and why they thought we should sign a non-aggression pact. They accused us of harbouring terrorists. The Botswana delegation reiterated our policy of not permitting the use of our territory for attack against neighbouring countries, including South Africa. In the end the two sides agreed to have their security officers meet to make recommendations to their respective governments on how to deal with any weaknesses in their present security arrangements.

8. When the two sides met at the Security Officer level, our side was again surprised to find a draft treaty which they were told to sign. Threats were made to Botswana. The South Africans threatened that if Botswana did not sign now (the Nkomati or Swazi-type of agreement), it would in two years time beg to sign. They would create conditions in Botswana which would force us to sign. After Mozambique, Lesotho and Angola, we know only too well what they mean.

Botswana's Position:

9. Botswana has neither the wish nor the capacity to attack nor to connive at aggression by third parties, on any Country, including South Africa. Botswana has always not only forbidden the liberation movements from using its territory as a launching pad for attacks on its neighbours, but has ensured that the policy is adhered to.

10. Botswana would compromise its independence, territorial integrity and, above all, its credibility, if it were to sign the treaty. The success of our foreign policy of the past 17 years has been based on our honesty, consistency and predictability thus ensuring credibility with those we deal with. We have avoided extremes. Signing the pact would undermine this characteristic of our policy as it would seem that a legal document had become necessary to underpin our policy. We do not need a treaty to give credence to our own policy.

11. Needless to say, a pact would give South Africa the pretext to enter our territory anytime to undermine our independence and territorial integrity. That we have arrested and sentenced those freedom fighters who have entered our country carrying arms should be enough to show that we mean what we say.

12. The kind of treaty South Africa wants us to sign would have the effect of legally enlisting us to participate in the enforcement of apartheid in South Africa, for example. This is against our principles. We abhor apartheid. Besides, the liberation movements do understand and respect our policy of not permitting the launching of attacks on South Africa or Namibia from Botswana. They do so because we have explained it to them and because we have the respect and sympathy of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. Signing a security treaty with South Africa would erode this appreciation of our position. It would also erode our respectability and open us to attacks by the liberation movements as well - also an undesirable prospect.



13. Botswana believes in human rights and democracy. It is signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. South Africa invariably regards refugees fleeing from apartheid oppression and Namibia as "terrorists". Its government would, if we signed a treaty with it, demand the expulsion of such refugees. It does so now, but we have no treaty obligation to comply.

14. Apartheid is the root cause of conflict in South Africa in as much as colonialism is the problem in Namibia. South Africa's conflict with the liberation movement stems not from any actions of its neighbours but from its own policies. Apartheid oppression generates resistance, repression and refugees. Even if Botswana signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa, these problems would continue for as long as apartheid existed. Apartheid cannot be made acceptable even by the imposition of non-aggression pacts. South Africa's efforts in this regard are directed at the wrong target.

15. The only way of ending conflict in South Africa is to move seriously towards the elimination of apartheid through the genuine consultation of all the country's peoples. Conflict in Namibia would be ended by the granting of independence to that country.

16. The Government and people of Botswana would appreciate, once again, strong representations to the South African authorities, at the highest level possible, of the British Government's displeasure at South African threats to and pressures on Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact against its will and interests.

17. This representation is made in the context of the excellent relations which exist between Botswana and the United Kingdom and on the basis of the understanding and sympathy which we know the British Government and people have for our position in Southern Africa and our concern to build a non-racial and economically vibrant democracy.

LONDON, 14 MAY 1984

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May 1984

*John Taylor*

Call on the Prime Minister by President Masire of Botswana  
on Monday 14 May at 3 pm

President Masire of Botswana is to pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 3 pm on 14 May. I enclose a brief.

President Masire is at present in the United States and is due to arrive in London on the morning of 14 May. He will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Mr Mogwe, his Private Secretary, Mr Mogae, the Botswana High Commissioner in London, Mr Mpuchane, and possibly the Permanent Secretary from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Garebamono.

*John Taylor*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA:  
MONDAY 14 MAY, 3PM

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Glad that the Prince of Wales' visit was so successful.
2. Distressed to learn of the continuing drought in Botswana.

Southern Africa

3. Some encouraging developments recently: South African withdrawal from Angola, and the Nkomati Accord. Important that we all work to carry the process of dialogue and negotiation forward, in a general effort to reduce tensions.

Namibia

4. South African disengagement a necessary preliminary to a Namibia settlement. Many difficulties yet to overcome: the Cuban issue cannot be ducked. The US are keen to carry the dialogue with Angola forward. Believe Angola also ready to negotiate realistically. South African good faith must be tested by carrying the present process forward.

Nkomati

5. Conscious that you and others view Nkomati with some misgiving.

/But



But this agreement can bring great benefits to Mozambique. We have pressed South Africa to negotiate not bully. We shall maintain pressure on South Africa to deal with its neighbours on basis of mutual respect.

Botswana/South Africa non-aggression pact

6. For you to determine what is in your best interests.

(If necessary) South Africa is aware of our strong disapproval of aggressive or bullying tactics towards its neighbours. I shall emphasise this to Mr Botha.

P W Botha's visit to the UK

7. Mr Botha's visit to Europe presented a natural opportunity to put our views to him. Wrong not to have taken it. We wish to influence South African policies towards their neighbours, on Namibia, and on internal change. Mr Botha's exposure to the views of a series of Western countries must be beneficial. I have written to Mugabe, Kaunda and Nyerere to this effect. Wanted to take this opportunity to see you myself.

Bilateral Relations

8. Aid: Our planned expenditure for 1984/85 is £6.3million - slightly higher than last year. (If raised) You are aware of the idea that Botswana should contribute to cost of our Technical Cooperation programme. Regrettable but indicates no lessening





of our commitment to Botswana. Hope we can come to mutually satisfactory arrangements.

9. Beef (only if raised): Welcome Fiji agreement on arrangements for Botswana's future beef exports to EC. Only very considerable efforts by the UK secured agreement within EC on maintenance of present arrangements. We hope Botswana will regard this as a reasonable outcome.

Zimbabwe Refugees

10. We remain concerned about the problems these are causing you. Understand that following establishment of a Joint Commission a better understanding has been achieved with Zimbabwe.  
(If necessary) Agree that caution and restraint are necessary.  
The Zimbabweans are aware of our views.

## BACKGROUND

Introduction

1. President Masire is passing through London on his return from a working visit to the US, where he met President Reagan and Mr Shultz. The discussions will have covered recent developments in Southern Africa. A biographical note on President Masire is attached, as is a Fact Sheet on Botswana.

PART A  
PART B

2. Botswana is moderate, stable, pro-Western. Favours peaceful solutions to Southern African problems although not influential. Voted for the 1982 and 1983 UNGA Resolutions on the Falklands. The country's economic progress has been impressive. Has exercised sound economic management and runs successful diamond and beef based free market economy. Further development dependent on world diamond market. Botswana has entered its third year of drought and President Masire has issued an appeal for international assistance.

3. Elections are to be held in Botswana this year. President Masire's Botswana National Party is expected to win.

UK/Botswana Relations

4. Relations generally close and friendly. President Masire and his wife were official guests of HMG in November 1980 and during a brief visit in November 1982 the President called on the Queen and the Prime Minister. The Queen made a State Visit

/to





to Botswana in 1979. The Prince of Wales has just paid a highly successful visit to Botswana on CDC business (March 1984). The Botswana Government also arranged for him to pay a private visit to the Okavango National Park.

#### Southern Africa

5. Botswana takes a pragmatic approach to Southern African problems, favouring peaceful solutions. Although it has no formal relations with South Africa, close working relations exist, and Botswana is a member of the South African-run Common Customs Union. Botswana accommodates refugees from South Africa and Namibia, but will not permit military activities by SWAPO or the ANC on its territory. Botswana's own opposition to apartheid is frequently if moderately affirmed.

6. Botswana has viewed the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique with misgiving. Although it has not been the object of covert or overt acts of destabilisation by South Africa, Botswana has come under pressure from South Africa to sign a non-aggression pact. The Botswana Government have told us that South African agreement necessary (under Common Customs arrangements) for a major soda-ash project in Botswana to go ahead has been made conditional upon the conclusion of such a pact. Botswana is resisting this and may seek our support.

7. Botswana's reaction to Mr Botha's visit to the UK has been, at official level, critical. While they accept that dialogue

/is

is necessary to influence South African perceptions and policies, they believe this should be done at a level below that of Prime Minister: receiving Mr Botha here gives South Africa a respectability it does not deserve. This view may not be reflected by President Masire but the Prime Minister may wish to underline her determination to take a firm line with Mr Botha on the subjects which concern Botswana.

### Namibia

8. South African withdrawal from Southern Angola is approaching completion. In spite of difficulties, both Angola and South Africa have continued to display the political will necessary to carry disengagement through successfully. The Americans are keen, once disengagement is complete, to continue the process through negotiations with Angola on the remaining problems blocking a Namibia settlement, particularly Cuban withdrawal. The Angolans seem ready to discuss these problems and the Americans believe that a package which would meet the legitimate concerns of all the parties can be put together. The South Africans continue to explore the possibilities of a settlement on some basis other than that proposed by the UN SCR 435. We do not believe that SWAPO or the FLS will be seriously tempted. We and our other Contact Group partners are taking opportunities to reaffirm publicly our commitment to SCR 435.

### Bilateral Relations

9. Aid: UK Aid to Botswana in 1983/84 was £6 million, primarily manpower assistance but also some programme aid. This is planned to

/increase





increase in 1984/85 to £6.3 million. We have indicated to the Botswana Government that, because of Botswana's relative prosperity, and constraints on our own aid programme, we wish Botswana to contribute to the costs of our Technical Cooperation (manpower) assistance. The Botswana Government have (probably reluctantly) taken note of this, and the issue remains to be negotiated. No firm proposals or figures have been put forward.

10. We have received from the Botswana Government a list of drought relief projects for which they are appealing for international assistance. These are being studied.

PART

C 11. Beef: See separate background note on this subject.

#### Zimbabwe Refugees

12. Dissident activity in the Zimbabwean province of Matabeleland South and the Zimbabwean army's brutal treatment of civilians there, have driven many refugees over the border into Botswana. Most (3-4,000) are at the Dukwe refugee camp, administered by Botswana and UNHCR. The Zimbabweans claim that dissidents are sheltering in the camp, and want them handed back. The Botswana have returned some trouble-makers but continue to insist that the majority are genuine refugees.

13. For a time last year tension rose on the border; there was some Zimbabwean hot pursuit into Botswana and we feared the possibility of a Zimbabwean strike against the camp. But following a meeting between

/President



President Masire and President Mugabe and the setting up of a Joint Commission to look at the problem, the situation improved, and although misunderstandings still arise it remains much easier than last year. We have taken opportunities to counsel caution and restraint to the Zimbabweans in a low-key way.





## CURRICULUM VITAE

HE THE HON QUETT KETUMILE JONNY MASIRE JP MP

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, ELECTED 18 JULY 1980

MP FOR NGWAKETSE/KGALAGKADI

Born: 1925

Educated at Kanye and Tigerkloof

Founded the Seepapitso Secondary School (Kanye): 1950-55

- 1967 Took up journalism, at first as a reporter then as a director of the 'African Echo'. Was a member of the Bangwaketse Tribal Council, the African Council and the Legislative Council. A foundation member of the Botswana Democratic Party and its Secretary-General since its inception; editor of the party organ 'Therisanyo'.
- 1965 Elected to Legislative Assembly. Deputy Prime Minister.
- 1966 Independence Conference, London. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.
- Vice President on the attainment of Independence (30 September 1966)
- 1967 Minister of Development Planning
- 1969 Lost his seat at Kanye in the elections to ex-Chief Bathoeru of the Bangwaketse and became one of the four specially elected members, elected by the Assembly itself. As such, was reappointed Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning.

/1974



- 1974 Elections; won his present seat, also in the Bangwaketse tribal area.
- 1979 Elections; retained present seat.
- 1984 Elections planned for later this year.

Owens cattle ranches near Kanye and Ghanzi. Given an opportunity, he loves to talk about cattle farming.

Married with several children. 2 or 3 in higher education in the USA, 2 in UK.

Visited UK as Vice President in June 1980 and as President (official visit) in October 1980. Private visit in 1982 (which included tea with The Queen).



FACT SHEET

THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

DEMOGRAPHY

- Population : 936,000 (census 1981), concentrated mainly in the east of the country.
- Majority Tribe : Bamangwato
- Religion : Christianity is official religion, but not more than one person in five is a practising Christian.
- Language : Official - English  
National language - Setswana
- Principal political parties : Ruling is Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which holds 29 of the 32 National Assembly seats.  
The Botswana National Front has two seats and the Botswana Peoples Party one.

GEOGRAPHY

- Area : 581,730 km<sup>2</sup> (or 231,804 square miles) of which 80% is Kalahari Desert.
- Neighbours : Republic of South Africa (S East and South), Namibia (West), Caprivi strip (North), Zimbabwe (N East)
- Water Resources; Rivers : Metsemotlhaba, Marico, Limpopo, Boteti, Shashe, Hanahae, Okwa, Kaua, Okavango (Delta)
- Major dams : at Lobatse, Gaborone, Shashe and Mopipi
- Administrative districts : Central, Chobe, Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, Kgatleng, Kweneng, Ngamiland, North East, Southern and South East.
- Capital : Gaborone (popn. 59,657)
- Principal Towns : Selebi-Phikwe, Francistown, Lobatse.

ECONOMY

- Basis : 84% population engaged in live-stock husbandry - 3m cattle and c. 2m goats and sheep, although



mineral exports have overtaken agricultural products as major export by value.

Currency	:	Pula. 1.6450 = £1 (4 May 1984)
GNP Per Capital 1981-82	:	P718
Balance of Payments on visible trade 1982	:	-130 million pulas
Balance of Payments on current account 1982	:	-118 million pulas
International Reserves (net per million) 1982	:	311.8
GNP Growth Rate (8 years)	:	8% (1981/82: 15%)

#### TRADE

Principal Exports	:	Diamonds, Nickel-Copper matte, Beef, Textiles
Principal Imports	:	Food, beverages, tobacco, fuel, chemicals and rubber products, wood and paper products, textiles and footwear, metal and metal products, machinery and electrical equipment, vehicles and transport equipment.

#### TRADE WITH BRITAIN

		1982 (£ million)
Total value of Exports	:	5.2
Total value of Imports	:	19.1

#### DEFENCE

In the 1984/85 Budget the percentages of development budget appropriation sought for internal security were about 2% (P4.8m) to the police and about 5% (P12.2m) to the 3,000 strong and well disciplined (largely Indian trained) Botswana Defence Force.





## Beef

### Essential Facts

1 President Masire may raise the question of Botswana's beef exports to the Community, most of which have traditionally come to the UK.

2 Under an exchange of letters appended to the Second Lome Convention between the EC and 64 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, all ACP beef enters duty free, but within fixed quotas it is charged only 10% of the normal import levy, provided the other 90% is collected in the country of origin and used to benefit local farmers. Botswana is the biggest beneficiary of these concessionary arrangements, with a quota of 18,916 tonnes out of the 30,000 tonne total. Zimbabwe has a quota of 8,100 tonnes which is not formally included in the total (although for health reasons her quota cannot yet be taken up).

3 In the negotiations on a successor to the present Convention, which are currently underway, the ACP side sought a global beef quota of 44,000 tonnes. On the Community side, all Member States except the UK were opposed even to the Commission proposal for inclusion of the Zimbabwean figure in a new global quota of 38,100 tonnes. (The Community has a surplus of beef which is significantly increased by a number of concessionary import schemes, including the ACP quota). The UK however, argued that a total of 38,100 tonnes was the very least the EC could offer.



4 At the EC/ACP Ministerial Meeting in Fiji from 3-5 May it was eventually agreed, after considerable struggle within the Community, that in the next Convention all ACP countries (including Zimbabwe) would continue to get their current quotas. There was no agreement on consolidating these individual quotas explicitly into a new global quota of 38,100 tonnes, but the ACP did not insist on this (in fact none of the ACP suppliers has ever filled its annual quota and the serious drought in Southern Africa last year has probably ensured that they will not fill them for at least the next two years).

5 President Masire may not have heard of the outcome of the Fiji meeting, at which Botswana was represented by Foreign Minister Mogwe. If he raises the matter we should take full credit for having obtained as good a deal for the ACP as was possible. We did so in the face of opposition from all other member states.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Dato*

*26/4*

26 April 1984

*Dear David,*

Thank you for your letter of 17 April. We have told the Botswana High Commissioner that the Prime Minister agrees to see President Masire at 1500 hours on 14 May and he has confirmed the arrangement. We will let you have a brief for the Prime Minister in due course.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq  
10 Downing Street

BOTSWANA: VISIT of Pres Masire

Sept 80

POSTAGE AND TELEGRAMS OFFICE

POST OFFICE





RESTRICTED



hte  
SM

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 April 1984

BOTSWANA

JK  
Thank you for your letter of 16 April to John Coles. The Prime Minister agrees to see President Masire, and could do so at 1500 hours on 14 May. I should be grateful for your confirmation of these arrangements, and for a brief for the Prime Minister in due course.

(David Barclay)

Roger Bone  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

✓

019

RESTRICTED

cc PC ①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree to see President  
of Botswana at 1500 hrs.  
on 14 May?

16 April 1984

John Thur

A.S.C. 7/4

Wes out

Botswana

President Masire of Botswana is briefly passing through London on 14 May. He has asked to pay a courtesy call on the Prime Minister. The President's visit here is a private one, and he will be having a medical check-up while here. He called on the Prime Minister in November 1982 during a similar visit. The Prime Minister will, of course, have met him at last year's CHOGM.

President Masire is Head of Government as well as Head of State. He is democratically elected, and faces elections later this year which we expect him to win. His government pursues sensible economic policies and there are no human rights problems; although non-aligned, his foreign policy is basically pro-Western. His government plays a helpful if not influential role on Southern Africa. Our bilateral relations are friendly and there are few difficulties. The President's main current preoccupation is the drought from which Botswana is suffering for the third year, with serious economic effects.

Prince Charles visited Botswana in March this year, as Head of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and the Botswana Government spared no effort, even at a time of economic hardship, to make his visit a success. If the Prime Minister were prepared to see President Masire on 14 May, it would undoubtedly be greatly appreciated. It would also provide an occasion for an exchange of views on Southern Africa, including the drought. President Masire may wish to raise bilateral issues, particularly the future level of our aid programme to Botswana, but the nature of the call should enable these to be handled without contention.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would, in the circumstances, be prepared to receive President Masire.

Yours  
R B Bone

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

da

Botswana



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 November 1982

The President of Botswana, accompanied by his High Commissioner and Private Secretary, called on the Prime Minister at 1800 hours today. The discussion lasted for nearly one hour. The main points made were as follows.

Zimbabwe

President Masire said that he had recently visited Zimbabwe. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that nobody had mentioned, while he was there, the air force officers who are currently detained. The Prime Minister said that reports that some of them had been tortured had caused great concern in London.

President Masire said that the general situation in Zimbabwe was better than he had expected from the disturbing accounts which reached Botswana.

Situation in Botswana

President Masire said that this year's drought had been terrible. Thousands of cattle had died. The fall in commodity prices due to the recession had affected Botswana severely. The Prime Minister asked whether the drought had led to a serious shortage of food. President Masire confirmed it had. Foreign aid had been needed to meet the requirements of vulnerable groups. In Botswana good crops were obtained in only one out of every three years. In Britain the Government talked of the percentage of unemployment. In Botswana one talked of the percentage of employed, meaning the percentage of the total population in formal employment.

In response to the Prime Minister's questions, President Masire commented on his recent state visits to Algeria and France. He had been greatly impressed by the extent of land under cultivation in Algeria. In France he had met President Mitterrand and some of his Ministers. He had also paid a visit to Lyons whose vaccine institute had established a vaccine institute in Botswana which had produced an extremely potent vaccine against foot and mouth disease. This disease had virtually been eradicated from Botswana and

/the

Sty

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

the institute was exporting vaccine to other countries including South Africa and Mozambique.

## Namibia

President Masire said that there was considerable disappointment in Southern Africa about the lack of progress on Namibia. In Dar es Salaam last June the Front Line states were informed of the obstacles preventing progress. They had prevailed on Namibia to accept solutions and had departed thinking that progress would be rapid. But since then nothing had changed. Instead of implementing UN Resolution 435, attempts were being made to link Namibian independence with the removal of Cuban troops. It was difficult for the Front Line states, who had put pressure on SWAPO to solve previous problems, now to argue for a link. The Namibians naturally asked what the presence of Cubans in Angola had to do with Namibian independence. The Prime Minister commented that she thought that the United States would continue to insist on some understanding about the departure of the Cubans from Angola.

## OAU Summit

President Masire said that the two main issues on the agenda would be the Western Sahara and Chad. He believed that the OAU was doing good work in "pre-empting eruptions".

## Falklands

The Prime Minister said that we had been rather disappointed that Botswana had voted for the recent UN Resolution when most of the rest of the Commonwealth had abstained. President Masire said that it was difficult to see how Botswana could have done otherwise. They had worked to tone down the original draft, in particular to delete language prejudicial to the United Kingdom. When their objections had been met, it was hard not to vote for the Resolution. The Prime Minister asked whether she was to conclude from this that if an aggressor marched into Botswana and was repelled Botswana would then expect to negotiate with that aggressor. We had received good support from most of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretary-General had been most helpful. We had not expected Botswana to vote against the Resolution. Abstention would have been enough. The Prime Minister then explained in familiar terms why it was not possible for us to negotiate with Argentina.

Following a short discussion about the world recession, the Prime Minister enquired whether the arrangements made for the President's visit to London, including the medical arrangements, were satisfactory. President Masire confirmed that they were. He had seen the doctor today and thought he would require no further medical examination unless the tests produced something unexpected.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November 1982

*Your Tshu.*

Call by President Masire on the Prime Minister: 18 November

I enclose briefs for President Masire's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

President Masire is arriving in London this evening, 17 November, following State Visits to Algeria and France. He will be leaving London for the OAU Summit in Tripoli on 22 November. The visit to the UK is a private one: the primary purpose is to enable President Masire to undergo a medical check-up.

President and Mrs Masire will be calling on The Queen at 4.30 on 18 November. No other official engagements are scheduled.

*Your m.*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA:  
18 NOVEMBER AT 6PM

BRIEFS

A Bilateral Relations

Points to Make

Essential Facts

Background Note

B Falkland Islands

Points to Make

Essential Facts

C South Africa

Points to Make

Essential Facts

D Namibia

Points to Make

Essential Facts

E Personality Notes

President Masire

Mrs Masire



CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. I hope your medical check-up went well [the check-up scheduled for morning of 18 November].
2. Glad our bilateral relations continue to be excellent.
3. How is Botswana's economy weathering the recession? Understand diamond sales still holding up reasonably well.
4. How is the drought situation? Glad we were able to provide additional aid. [£200,000 this year for drought relief].

## BILATERAL RELATIONS

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Independence in 1966 under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama who died in 1980. Succeeded by his Vice President Dr Q K T Masire. A democratic and essentially pro-western country. Economy in recession. Economically heavily dependent on South Africa, but enthusiastic member of the South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). Bilateral relations generally close and friendly but present relationship lacks the interest and sympathy of late President Khama. The Queen made a State visit to Botswana in 1979. President Masire made an official visit to UK in November 1980. Last UK Ministerial visit to Botswana was Mr Marten's in February 1982. Presidential elections in 1984; Masire and the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) may face a tougher fight.

TRADE AND AID

2. Balance of trade in Botswana's favour. UK exports to Botswana mainly machinery and manufactural goods and imports mainly beef and meat products. Unable to measure precise volume of trade because much passes through South Africa.

Aid: Decision last year to reduce UK aid from £7.6 million (1981(82)) to run at about £6million annually had a negative effect partially mitigated by prompt provision this year of £200,000 special allocation for drought relief. Our aid is mainly in the form of skilled manpower and training awards in UK for Botswana. We also provide military training courses in the UK and exported £1 million of defence equipment in 1981.

NON-ALIGNED STATUS

3. Masire's government has taken opportunities to underline non-aligned status. A member of the African Front Line States (FLS). Fell into line with other FLS members in voting for the Argentine UNGA Resolution on the Falklands (see Falklands brief). Active member of Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

/SOVIET INFLUENCE....



SOVIET INFLUENCE

4. Growing Soviet influence is a concern. Arms deal in late 1980. There have been exchanges of visits at ministerial and official levels and the presence (so far only a few) Soviet military advisers. Batswana justify these links on evidence of genuine non-alignment. We are watching developments closely.

Southern African Department  
15 November 1982

BOTSWANA: BACKGROUND NOTE

General

1. The Republic of Botswana (formerly the Bechuanaland Protectorate) is about 2 and a half times the size of the United Kingdom, (220,000 square miles) with an estimated population of 900,000. Independence in September 1966. The country, 80% of which consists of the Kalahari Desert, is landlocked and bordered by Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, and touches Zambia at the confluence of the Zambezi and Chobe Rivers. The economy is based on diamonds, agriculture, beef and cupra-nickel. Botswana has achieved an enviable growth of nearly 10% pa over the past decade, based mainly on sound financial management and the development of valuable diamond deposits. Despite the need to stockpile up to a third of the country's current production, the revenue from diamond sales is still sufficient to save Botswana from the severe economic decline so prevalent elsewhere in Africa.

Internal Political

2. President Masire elected July 1980 on the death of President Sir Seretse Khama, who had successfully led Botswana for 14 years since Independence to sound economic development. Botswana, one of the few genuine multi-party parliamentary democracies left on the African continent follows moderate, generally pro-Western policies. However, since his accession, President Masire, though emphasising continuity with his predecessor, has taken opportunities to underline Botswana's formal non-aligned status. The ruling political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) took 29 out of 32 National Assembly seats at the last 1979 elections. There are no political prisoners. Tribal



arrangements still play an important part in the country's affairs: the majority tribe is the Bamangwato, to which the late President Khama belonged and of which his son, Brigadier Ian Khama, Deputy Commander of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) is now Paramount Chief.

3. The internal political situation in Botswana is generally settled and orderly. However, despite the very small opposition representation in the House of Assembly, there are some signs that a growing body of younger, more politically conscious and radical opinion is becoming dissatisfied with the present order. President Masire, President Khama's protege for many years, lacks both his predecessor's charisma and also that solid basis of support within Botswana enjoyed by the late President (Masire does not belong to the majority tribe). Seeming to lack that firm control of the Botswana Government and of the BDF exercised by President Khama, there must be some doubt whether he will so easily achieve re-election at the next Presidency elections in 1984. In the longer term Ian Khama has political ambitions.

#### External Political

4. The most recent significant development was the conclusion in late 1980 of an arms deal with the Soviet Union. Deliveries of Soviet equipment started in 1981 as well as the stationing of (so far only a few) Soviet military advisers in Botswana. There have been exchanges of ministerial and official visits between Moscow and Gaborone and a report that a commercial agreement between the two countries may be in the offing. The

level of Soviet activity in Botswana remains limited, but there must be doubts on how far President Masire may be able or willing to resist Soviet pressure for the further development of the relationship. The Botswana Government have sought to play down their Soviet links while justifying them as evidence of their policy of genuine non-alignment. We are watching the situation closely.

5. Botswana remains economically heavily dependent upon South Africa. The Botswana provide refugee status to ANC elements from South Africa, but only on the basis that they should mount attacks or operations against South Africa from Botswana territory. Although she has no diplomatic relations with South Africa, informal contacts between the 2 countries are frequent and of a businesslike and constructive nature. Botswana is a member of the South Africa Common Customs Union but has left the Rand Monetary Area to establish its own currency, the pula, which is valued against a basket of several currencies. The Russians, Chinese and Libyans have resident diplomatic missions in Gaborone.

6. President Khama was a driving force and inspiration behind the institution and development of the SADCC. President Masire has continued Botswana's enthusiastic support; Botswana chairs the Conference and the small permanent SADCC secretariat will be established in Gaborone later this year.

/7....



7. Britain's relations with Botswana have been generally close and friendly, but the present relationship lacks the interest and sympathy of the late President Khama who had personal links with the UK. We have a small programme of military assistance and training courses in the UK for the BDF. Botswana Ministers visit the UK fairly frequently on their own business. President Masire and his wife were the official guests of HMG in November 1980. Mr Mogwe, the External Affairs Minister, was also an official guest in May 1981, as was Mr Meswele, the Botswana Minister of Agriculture, in November 1981. The last outward ministerial visit was Mr Marten's in February this year. The Queen made a State visit to Botswana in 1979.

8. Given Botswana's relative prosperity, we have reduced our aid programme to about £6 million annually (£7.6 million in 1981/82 to £6.25 million in 1982/83). Botswana are unhappy, pointing to current economic problems (depressed market for diamonds, minerals, the drought etc) and possibility of 'domino effect' on other donors. The effect on our relations somewhat mitigated by our prompt provision in April this year, following an approach by President Masire, of a special allocation of £200,000 for drought relief.

9. The UK is also Botswana's principal overseas market for her beef exports. The trade suffers from occasional interruptions because of outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and the Botswana frequently seek HMG's support to ensure that their interest are safeguarded at the EC in Brussels, ie over import quotas, conditions attached to the imposition of import bans following outbreaks of FMD, etc.

10. In 1980 British exports to Botswana (mainly machinery and manufactured goods) were valued at £2.64 million and imports (beef and meat products) at £4.04 million (a drop from £26.26m in 1979 as a result of the EC ban on meat imports from Botswana following an outbreak of FMD; the ban was lifted in June and the trade has resumed). It is difficult however to measure the precise volume of trade flowing between the United Kingdom and Botswana because so much passes through South Africa.

Southern African Department

15 November 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

FALKLAND ISLANDS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Disappointed that Botswana voted for Argentine resolution.
2. Welcome opportunity to explain our position, so that there will be no misunderstanding in future. As will be aware, UNGA Resolution (copy attached) totally unacceptable to Britain. We reject it as cynical and hypocritical coming from country which only seven months ago broke off negotiations to invade Islands. Makes no reference to right of Islanders to self determination. Argentina still refuses unambiguously to declare end to hostilities.
3. Will not be deflected from priorities of repairing damage, assuring Islands' defence and planning future economic development. Hope for Botswana's support.

CONFIDENTIAL

## FALKLAND ISLANDS

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Botswana voted for Argentine Resolution at UNGA on 4 November.
2. Until 4 November vote, gave valuable support at UN and in Non-Aligned Movement. Botswana told us on 3 November that they would abstain; on 4 November that they would support the Resolution.
3. Botswana justification somewhat disingenuous: believed that Resolution implied renunciation by Argentina of use of force, referred to the 'rights' of the Islanders, and could lead to 'open ended' negotiations. These points have been refuted.
4. Probable causes of last minute defection: Botswana's normal inclination to favour 'talks for talks sake' on international issues, a desire to keep in line with other African Front Line States (they all voted for the Resolution), the last minute changes in the text, the American decision to support the Resolution.
5. We have registered our deep disappointment in London (to their High Commissioner) and in Gaborone (to their Foreign Minister and to the Secretary to the President).
6. But Botswana have assured us they have not changed view on Islanders' right to self-determination. UNGA vote should not be overlooked, but should not have lasting effect on bilateral relations. May be useful on Falkland issues in future.

Southern African Department  
15 November 1982



Revised Argentine Draft Resolution (1/11/82) (Official UN version)

The General Assembly

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Recalling its resolutions 1515 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1986,

Recalling further Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them,

Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII),

Likewise reaffirming the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas):
2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary measures to that end:
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eight session on the progress made in the implementation of this resolution:
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled quote question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) unquote.

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 November 1982

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

SOUTH AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. We believe in maintaining and using our extensive links with South Africa to encourage peaceful change.
2. Like Botswana, we remain unconvinced that sanctions and moves to isolate South Africa would achieve our objective.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

3. How does Botswana see internal developments in South Africa? We wish to encourage reform but we note that Mr Botha's reforms do not address the crucial question of the involvement of the blacks in the central government process.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

4. How does Botswana view relations between South Africa and its neighbours? Is the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) having effect in reducing Botswana's dependence on South Africa?



## SOUTH AFRICA

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. The Batswana are well aware of our policy of contact and links with South Africa. They also have some understanding of our objections to further sanctions (in addition to present Arms Embargo, Gleneagles Agreement, no military or nuclear collaboration with South Africa). A sanctions policy would be particularly disastrous for Botswana and other small countries neighbouring South Africa whose economies are heavily dependent on the Republic. It would also be unlikely to encourage the evolution of South African internal policies in the desired direction.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

2. The South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, is pressing ahead with constitutional reforms to bring the coloured and Asian communities into a closer cooperation with the whites particularly through the creation (possibly by 1984) of separate Parliamentary Chambers for these three groups. Mr Botha's proposals as so far announced envisage no share in the central government process for South Africa's 20.5 million blacks whose political aspirations are to be satisfied only within the framework of the Government's policy of separate black 'homelands'. Reform programme also makes no provision for political involvement in central process of South Africa's 10 million urban blacks (though there have been suggestions that Government may be considering methods of doing so).

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND HER NEIGHBOURS (NOT FOR USE)

3. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) are heavily dependent economically on South Africa and participate in a common South African Customs Union. Nine black Southern African countries, including BLS, formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1979 to reduce their individual and regional economic dependence on South Africa.

4. Politically, regional tension would be much reduced by a Namibian settlement (see Namibia brief).

Southern African Department

15 November 1982



CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

FIVE'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT

1. IMG attach great importance to Namibia settlement. Essential for stability of whole region. Five have made great effort to secure implementation of UN Plan. They have now resolved nearly all issues preventing this.

OPPORTUNITY FOR WIDER REGIONAL SETTLEMENT

2. But timing of implementation of UN Plan now in practice depends on outcome of US/Angolan/South African talks on regional security. Presence of foreign troops in Angola is a significant factor in current tense regional atmosphere. For a Namibia settlement to go through there must be some movement on Cuban issue. This should be regarded in a positive light: wider regional settlement leading to long term stability could bring economic and political benefits to Central and Southern Africa.

NEED FOR PATIENCE

3. US/Angolan dialogue has come a long way since it began a year ago. Americans have stressed determination to keep it alive. Complex issues which touch on vital security interests of all concerned. We should not expect rapid progress. On the other hand, precipitate action, eg at UN, could risk undoing useful progress achieved.

## NAMIBIA

## ESSENTIAL FACTS (NOT FOR USE, EXCEPT PARA 2)

BOTSWANA ATTITUDE

1. [NOT FOR USE:] As a member of the Front Line States, Botswana holds a potentially important position on Namibia. Partly because of their closeness to and economic dependence on South Africa the Batswana have traditionally taken a moderate line. They are however outweighed by the other Front Line States. The Batswana protest about 'linkage' of a Namibia settlement with Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and have shown greater suspicion of US motives recently; but probably accept the political reality of the need for an agreement on Cuban withdrawal if the UN Plan is to be implemented.

UN PLAN

2. [FOR USE FREELY:] Following informal consultations in New York in July and August, the Five have reached agreement on nearly all issues preventing implementation of the UN Plan. Outstanding points are the electoral system to be used for the Namibian Constituent Assembly, and the composition of, and practical arrangements for, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The UN Secretariat are in touch with the parties concerned on these issues, which we do not expect to present any major difficulty. In New York on 1 October, Foreign Ministers of the Five reviewed progress and in their communiqué (copy attached) reiterated their commitment to early implementation of the UN Plan.

CUBAN/ANGOLA

3. [NOT FOR USE:] There has so far been no breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations between the Americans and Angolans on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. But, despite Angolan criticism of linkage, the dialogue remains alive; and the Angolans have made clear their willingness to consider a withdrawal once a Namibia settlement is achieved and the threats to their security ended. The Five have agreed to support American efforts, while stressing that Cuban withdrawal is not formally part of the UN Plan. We accept the need to secure arrangements which meet the deeply-felt security concerns of both South Africa and Angola.



We recognise the political reality that South Africa will not be prepared to allow a Namibia settlement without some agreement on Cuban withdrawal. Speaking to the press before his current African tour, Vice-President Bush expressed 'personal' view that there could be no settlement without a move by the Cuba.

4. 'Linkage' is generally unpopular with the Africans; they consider that Cuban withdrawal is unrelated to Namibia and that the South Africans are using it as a delaying tactic with American connivance. However, most African governments would like the Cubans to leave, to end foreign interference in South Africa and to gain the advantages of reduced tension and increased stability following such a settlement. We hope the Angolans may take this difficult decision with the confident expectation of support from other African governments.

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FIVE: NEW YORK, 1 OCTOBER 1982

The Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States and the State Secretary of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany met in New York on 1 October to take stock of the progress made in the Namibia negotiations since their previous meeting in Luxembourg on 18 May.

The Ministers reviewed the consultations which took place during July and August in New York between the Contact Group and representatives of the Front Line States and SWAPO, and the concurrent consultations with South Africa. They expressed satisfaction with the results of these discussions.

The Ministers welcomed the agreement of the parties to the negotiations to the Constitutional Principles for the Namibia Constituent Assembly. They noted that all parties had agreed that the method to be employed to elect the Constituent Assembly would be decided in accordance with the terms of UNSCR 435, and insisted that the issue should not cause delay in the implementation of UNSCR 435. They expressed appreciation of the constructive and flexible attitude of the parties, which enabled substantial progress to be made on impartiality and the size, composition and deployment of the military component of UNTAG. They noted that, on September 24, representatives of the Front Line States, Nigeria, SWAPO and the Contact Group had reported to the Secretary-General on the results of the consultations which had taken place.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to the early implementation of SCR 435 in order to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and to bring peace and security to the region. They paid tribute to the efforts already made by the Secretary-General and his staff and agreed that arrangements for the implementation of the plan were proceeding satisfactorily.

The Ministers agreed that a valuable opportunity now existed to achieve a settlement within the time frame envisaged which would strengthen peace and security and foster economic development in the region. They noted that the objective of achieving such a settlement was shared by all Contact Group governments.



MASIRE, HE The Hon Quett Ketumile Jonny JP MP

President of the Republic of Botswana

MP for Ngwaketse/Kgalagkadi. Elected President 18 July 1980.

Born 1925. Educated at Kanye and Tigerkloof. Founded the Seepapitso Secondary School (Kanye) 1950-55. In 1967 took up journalism, started as a reporter then one of the Directors of 'African Echo'. Was a member of the Bangwaketse Tribal Council, the African Council and the Legislative Council. A foundation member of the Botswana Democratic Party and its Secretary-General since the Party's inception; editor of the Party organ 'Therisanyo'.

Elected to Legislative Assembly March 1965. Deputy Prime Minister 1965. Independence Conference London February 1966. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 5 April 1966. Vice-President on the attainment of Independence 30 September 1966. Minister of Development Planning 1967. He lost his seat at Kanye to ex-Chief Bathoen of the Bangwaketse (Mr Bathoen Gaseitsiwe) (qv) in the 1969 election and became one of the four specially elected members, elected by the Assembly itself. As such he was re-appointed as Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning. In the October 1974 elections he contested and won his present seat which is also in the Bangwaketse tribal area; he retained his seat in the elections in October 1979.

Short of stature and usually extremely genial with a stentorian laugh, he is easy and approachable. He has been a driving force within the Party and within the Government and is a shrewd politician and a fluent extempore speaker. A good Parliamentarian. A loyal follower of the late Sir Seretse Khama and worked well with him. Though the late President's protege for many years, he does not have the same international stature or authority within his own country as President Khama (he has no great backing and his family, but not him, were apparently involved in some questionable land deals in early 1980). Whilst his stewardship of the Presidential office has been basically sound it has lacked lustre and Masire has failed to gain the widespread popularity enjoyed by his predecessor. This must raise doubts as to whether he will decide to offer himself as President

/after



after the next elections in 1984 or opt for retirement.

However, he is still working very hard for the party and the Government. He periodically carries out a punishing programme of tours in the rural areas addressing numerous public meetings expounding the Government's policies. His personal style favours more the small informal meeting than the set piece formal occasion. And he seems to prefer economic issues and the development of the country (his responsibility before he became President) to the ideals and principles which Seretse Khama propounded both as politician and statesman (though Masire probably subscribes to those same ideals).

He apparently carries some suspicion of British politics and motives in Southern Africa (which were particularly evident over Rhodesia) and it has been necessary to explain to him more carefully and in more detail the background to our policies. In the past he was bitter about Rhodesian attacks on the border and he has a cautious and sceptical attitude towards British policy in Southern Africa. In general he is more hawkish than the late President over the aspirations of black Africa and this has been spelt out in his public speeches. Regionally he made some impact with nearby black African states by the lead he has taken in promoting the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference.

He has not proved so adept as his predecessor at maintaining a balance between Botswana's loyalty to the OAU and their interest in maintaining discreet contacts with the Republic of South Africa, and in the process he has probably been less impressive with both.

Owns cattle ranches near Kanye and Ghanzi. Would probably prefer to run them than be President.

Married with several children. Two or three are in higher education in the USA and two in the UK. Mrs Masire (qv) is shy but supports her husband well.

President Masire as Vice-President visited London early in June 1980 and as President paid an official visit in October 1980.



MASIRE, MRS GLADYS OLEBILE

Wife of the President.

Born 1932 in Mafeking. Educated Mafeking and at Tigerloof. Obtained teacher's certificate and taught for five years before her marriage.

A shy, soft-spoken person who has a wholly unpretentious nature. She appears to play little part in politics but has taken a prominent role in the work of the Red Cross, the Camphill Community (school for handicapped children) at Otse, and the Botswana Nursing Association. She is patron of the latter. Mrs Masire always played a secondary role to Lady Khama in social activities but has now asserted her position (with the aid of the US Ambassador's wife). She is a thoroughly nice but rather negative person.

She has six children: two are being educated in the UK and two or three in the USA.

2 November 1982

PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA

Thank you for your letter of 29 October.

The Prime Minister could see  
President Masire for half an hour at 1800 hours  
on Thursday, 18 November.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 October 1982

*for [unclear]*

*JC*  
*1800 on Tuesday*  
*18:15 - 18:30*  
*Cl.*

President Masire of Botswana

Thank you for your letter of 27 October.

Unfortunately we have now been informed that the President does not arrive at Heathrow from his State Visit to France until 1830 hours on Wednesday, 17 November; an hour after the time you propose for a call on the Prime Minister.

With apologies, I should therefore be grateful if you would enquire whether the Prime Minister could see the President on 18 or 19 November, (except late afternoon when he will be calling on The Queen at 1630). If neither of these days is convenient, could something be fitted in before his departure at 2040 hours on Saturday, 20 November?

*Yours [unclear]*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

Mr A J Coles  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Botswana, Sept '80

Visit of Pres. Masisi  
of Botswana

29 OCT 1982





File

Bre

B/F

cc: C. Stepano

Botswana

27 October 1982

PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

Thank you for your letter of 25 October.

The Prime Minister could see President Masire from 1700 - 1730 hours on Wednesday, 17 November.

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SB

010  
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to see President

Reserve from 1700 to

1730 on Wednesday, 17 November?

Yes no

Dear John,

President Masire of Botswana

A. & C. 16/11

We have just learned that following State Visits to Algeria and France, President Masire of Botswana will be making a short private visit to Britain, primarily to enable him to undergo a medical check-up, from 17 to 20 November. I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be willing to receive him for a brief call at No 10 on one of those days.

The Prime Minister may remember that the President had talks and dined at No 10 during his official visit to Britain in 1980; President Masire would undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to renew contact.

Botswana is in a position to offer some help in our efforts to bring Namibia to independence, and continues to give us staunch support at the UN on Falkland issues.

We are also consulting the Palace about the possibility of the President being received by The Queen. The Botswana Foreign Minister, Mr Mogwe, who will be accompanying President Masire to London, will be calling on Mr Pym, and having a short session of talks with Mr Onslow.

Yours ever

*John Hones*  
for (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





SUBJECT  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T225A/80

State House

Gaborone

Botswana

Botswana

S.H. 14/15 I (26)

19th November, 1980

Prime Minister

(2)

MB

Dear Prime Minister,

H. Masire

It was very kind of you to have found it possible for you and your Government to agree to meet me and my Ministers to discuss the Southern African Development Co-ordination initiative during my recent visit to the United Kingdom. I am most grateful for the support you pledged in this regard.

I also wish to express my gratitude for the hospitality you extended to me, my wife and my delegation during our stay in your country.

I am confident that the mutual good relations existing between our peoples and governments will continue.

Thanks

Yours sincerely

Quett Masire

Q.K.J. Masire  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

*Botswana*

10 November 1980

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for the excellence of the ceremonial arrangements on Horseguards Parade for President Masire of Botswana and President Stevens of Sierra Leone. The performance and turnout of the Guards of Honour and the Bands were impeccable and I should be grateful if you would convey the Prime Minister's appreciation to all the officers and other ranks who took part in the parade.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

*cc ~~Sierra Leone~~ visit file*

Major General H.D.A. Langley, M.B.E.

*GB*



010



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 November 1980

*Handwritten signature in a circle*

*Dear Michael,*

Guards of Honour for Heads of State

I hope you will agree that the new form of ceremonial on Horse Guards Parade used to welcome President Masire and President Stevens worked well. You may wish to thank the Household Division. I attach a draft letter to Major General Langley.

*yours ever*  
*R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

DSP 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXXXX~~/letter/telex/telegram/XXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Private Secretary to the Prime  
Minister  
10 Downing St  
DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Major General H D A Langley MBE  
Major General Commanding the Household  
Division and General Office Commanding  
London District  
Horse Guards  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2AX

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for the excellence of the ceremonial arrangements on Horseguards Parade for President Masire of Botswana and President Stevens of Sierra Leone. The performance and turnout of the Guards of Honour and the Bands were impeccable and I should be grateful if you would convey the Prime Minister's appreciation to all the officers and other ranks who took part in the parade.

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....



CONFIDENTIAL

R H

*Botswana*

31 October, 1980

Prime Minister's Meeting with the  
President of Botswana

I enclose the record of the discussion between the Prime Minister and President Masire which took place on 28 October.

I agree that copies of the record may go on a personal basis to those listed in your letter to me of 30 October.

M. O. B. ALEXANDER

R M J Lyne, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

*9B*

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1630 HOURS  
ON TUESDAY 28 OCTOBER 1980

Present:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| The Prime Minister   | H.E. The Hon Dr. Q.K.J. Masire<br>President of the Republic of<br>Botswana |
| Mr. Richard Luce MP<br>Parliamentary Under<br>Secretary for Foreign<br>and Commonwealth<br>Affairs | The Hon A. M. Mogwe<br>Minister for Internal Affairs                       |
| Mr. D. M. Day<br>Deputy Under<br>Secretary, FCO  | The Hon. P. S. Mmusi<br>Minister for Finance and<br>Development Planning   |
| Mr. W. Turner<br>British High<br>Commissioner at Gaborone  | H.E. Mr. A. W. Kgarebe<br>Botswana High Commissioner<br>in the UK          |
| Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander<br>PS to Prime Minister   | Mr. L. M. Mpotokwana<br>Secretary for External Affairs                     |
| Mr. B. L. Barder<br>Head of Southern African<br>Department, FCO                                    | Mr. M. L. Selepeng<br>Senior Private Secretary to<br>the President         |

\* \* \* \* \*

The Prime Minister warmly welcomed the President and his colleagues: it was always good to see them in London.

Namibia

The Prime Minister recalled that the Lord Privy Seal had discussed Namibia briefly with the President earlier in the day, and invited Mr. Luce to outline the current position, which seemed reasonably cheerful. Mr. Luce said there was little information available at present about the outcome of the UN talks in Pretoria. Mr. Urquhart would be reporting during the week to the Secretary-General, who in turn would report to the Security Council. If Mr. Urquhart had succeeded in securing even provisional agreement on a date for implementing the UN

/ plan,



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

plan, this would be very encouraging. Mr. Mudge of the DTA had spoken of possible independence for Namibia in 1981. The Prime Minister commented that she hoped we were not putting excessive reliance on a few straws in the wind, but the outlook seemed reasonably optimistic.

The President recalled the general expectation that the Namibia problem would be solved before the apparently more difficult problem of Zimbabwe. It was difficult to understand South African intentions, but they seemed to be trying to shift the responsibility for taking a decision on to the internal parties, thus avoiding blame for the South African Government. Despite extensive economic links with South Africa, Botswana had little political insight into the inner councils of the South African Government. But their impression was that the problem lay largely within the National Party. The Prime Minister agreed that Mr. P. W. Botha wanted to bring his own colleagues along with him. But he should go a little faster than those he led; this was the essence of leadership. It would be a positive development if the likelihood of a breakdown over Namibia proved to have receded. How did Botswana view the prospects for Namibia as a country, given its great potential resources? Mr. Mogwe expressed suspicion about South Africa's intentions in suggesting direct talks with Angola but keeping them secret. South Africa wanted an all-party conference on Namibia, but with what objective? If it was to secure implementation of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 435, well and good. But there was much suspicion that the South Africans wanted a constitutional conference on Lancaster House lines, designed to produce special privileges for the whites. He feared that protracted discussion of the constitution might put the clock back and cause SCR 435 to unravel. Mr. Luce agreed. If the conference was to ratify agreement already reached on implementation of SCR 435, that would be acceptable and useful. But the Namibia settlement proposals differed materially from the Zimbabwe pattern in that decisions on the constitution were to be taken only after the elections.

/ The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

The Prime Minister pointed out that it would be a major task to weld the eleven main population groups in Namibia into a single nation, but if this could be achieved by communities as disparate as the Swiss, and indeed the British, it should also be possible for the Namibians. There might be a case for offering reassurances to minority groups that each would have a secure place in the country's future. Botswana, as a neighbouring country, was well placed to make a judgement on this. In the end, the South Africans would have to make an act of faith; the difficulty was to coax them over the final hurdle. There had been a similar difficulty in the final stages of the Rhodesia negotiations, when after years of fighting Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo were suddenly confronted by the uncertainties of an election. It had been fortunate that the election result had proved so decisive. The British electoral officers, soldiers and police had made a major contribution. However, there were important differences between the circumstances in Zimbabwe and those in Namibia, and the solution had to fit the nature of the problem. Britain's role in the Rhodesia negotiations was quite different from that of the Five in Namibia. The President agreed. President Machel of Mozambique had stressed the differences between the experience of the former Portuguese territories and that of other African countries. The Prime Minister said President Machel had played a most helpful role over Zimbabwe.

Mr. Luce promised to pass on to President Masire any further news of Namibia that might become available during the rest of the visit.

#### Botswana Affairs

The Prime Minister asked about the prospects for the Botswana economy including especially the beef, diamond and copper sectors. Had the increase in oil prices affected the balance of payments? The President said that they had just been getting control of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease when herds had been hit by a new infection from Zimbabwe. However, they hoped to make early progress on this with a new vaccine now available. Mineral

/ prices

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

prices were tending to fluctuate. There was a tendency among developing non-oil-producing countries to blame the industrialised countries for inflation and rising prices. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was not the industrialised countries which had raised prices by 120% in one year. Mr. Mogwe said the oil producers justified raising their prices by saying that they had been kept artificially low in the past. Botswana's oil came from South Africa which had bought it on the spot market at prices even higher than the world price. The German Government had provided oil storage tanks with enough capacity for three or four months' supply of oil for Botswana to enable them to stockpile and thus minimise the effects of price fluctuations, and also to cope with a sudden crisis: but the South Africans had refused to sell sufficient oil to enable the tanks to be filled, and Botswana still had only up to a week's requirements in stock at any one time. Botswana and the FRG had both pressed the South Africans on this, but to no avail.

Mr. Luce said he had been struck by the importance of Botswana coal resources. The President agreed, but said there was a pressing need for new heavy gauge railways to carry the coal from the south-west of Botswana to the ports (either Walvis Bay or the ports of Mozambique or Angola). Existing railway lines were not suitable. Satellite pictures had shown the existence of basins along the Kalahari Desert and right up to the Namibian border: these must contain either oil or water, and were being investigated. Mr. Turner said that Botswana coal reserves probably made the country second only to Saudi Arabia in energy resources. The problem was finding suitable markets. The Prime Minister thought that big companies like RTZ ought to be interested in exploiting these reserves and finding markets, which would expand with technological advances and with the longer term expansion of the world economy. There was a great potential for coal both for burning as coal and for the extraction of oil. One economic procedure was to build electricity generating stations at the coal fields; but all this needed capital for development.

/ Southern

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

The Prime Minister asked about Botswana's role in co-ordinating the activities of the group of nine African countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). She understood that this had been discussed with Mr Neil Marten. The President said the nine SADCC countries were all to varying degrees dependent on trade with and through South Africa. All but three were landlocked. This created problems: for example, oil producing countries were willing to supply oil to the African countries concerned, but only on condition that it did not pass through South Africa, and there was no other way of getting oil to some of the would-be importers. The nine countries were therefore trying to organise diversification of their communications and transport networks, reconstruction in areas affected by the Rhodesian war, and other measures of economic co-operation. The main objective of the present mission to Europe was to alert the countries of the European Community to their dilemma and to seek their help, especially in developing the area's transport, communications, food production and security, and disease control. At present African countries dependent on South Africa were being used as South Africa's pawns. Advocates of sanctions against South Africa were told that sanctions would damage neighbouring African countries more than South Africa, and black South Africans more than white. The South Africans well understood the importance of keeping their neighbours dependent on them. They tried to counter all moves aimed at reducing African dependence on South Africa by offers of dialogue and the creation of a 'constellation of states' in which South Africa would be the star and the other African countries its satellites.

The Prime Minister stressed the importance of keeping in mind long-term objectives, however necessary it might be to look at the short-term results of one's policies. If there was a grand design for the longer term, ordinary people would respond and would be willing to make considerable sacrifices. The President said this was indeed their intention: they wanted to develop the whole region and thereby to encourage South Africa to see itself in a different light, and its neighbours as equal partners, not satellites. He stressed the hope of Botswana and the rest of the SADCC countries that EC Governments

/would

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

would send representatives at the highest possible level to the forthcoming conference in Maputo. It would be helpful if western European delegations could be led by senior ministers. Seven of the nine SADCC countries had formerly been under British rule, so Britain's attitude was of special importance. Some European governments had decided not to send ministers to the earlier conference at Arusha because the British Government had decided to be represented only at official level. That was now water under the bridge, but it showed the importance of Britain's lead and example. They recognised that they had secured favourable terms in the EC because Britain had fought for their interests. Without British support they doubted whether they could meet their objectives in southern Africa.

The Prime Minister confirmed that Britain would continue to fight fiercely for the interests of developing countries of the Commonwealth in relation to the EC. She had been worried about the problem of Zimbabwe sugar, and had raised it forcefully with President Giscard. Mr Marten would be representing the UK at the Maputo conference. Britain much appreciated being invited to participate in activities of this kind, but as a former colonial power was anxious not to intrude on the activities of countries which were now fully independent. Mr Day added that Britain had encouraged other western countries to send ministerial representatives to the Maputo conference. The President confirmed that Mr Cheysson would represent the Community. He was delighted by the British Government's response.

/Relations with South Africa and the Prospects  
in the Republic

CONFIDENTIAL



Relations with South Africa and the Prospects in the Republic

The Prime Minister invited the President to give his assessment of events in South Africa. Col. van der Post, with his extensive knowledge of southern African languages and customs, had been very helpful in encouraging a co-operative attitude to the Zimbabwe negotiations in Pretoria, and his view was that there were elements in the South African Government anxious to end the separation of the races. These elements seemed gradually to be gaining ascendancy. However, those who favoured reform did not get enough encouragement from the outside world. Mr. Mogwe said that Botswana condemned all South Africa's actions and policies. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was impossible to condemn a whole people. Mr. Mogwe acknowledged that Mr. P. W. Botha would like to get encouragement for his policies from the more moderate African countries. But Africans regarded the changes made so far as purely cosmetic. The South African Government were concerned only with removing the outward signs of petty apartheid. There was no sign of willingness to tackle the fundamental problems. Botswana had no wish to discourage those in South African who favoured reform, but the most they could do at present was to explain that they had seen little evidence of real change and to ask for much more in future. Because of Botswana's close economic links with South Africa, she could not afford to advocate sanctions against South Africa. Their sympathies were with those who were fighting apartheid, but Botswana was vulnerable and had to be careful.

Uganda

The Prime Minister asked whether Botswana thought it would be possible to hold free and fair elections in Uganda: she herself was doubtful. Mr. Mogwe said he had not yet heard the outcome of a meeting called by the Commonwealth Secretariat earlier in the day. The parties in Uganda were still poles apart. Botswana had been invited to contribute an observer to any Commonwealth team for the elections.


/ Conclusions



Conclusions

The Prime Minister said she had much appreciated the discussion, which would be useful in many ways, not least in the context of the forthcoming Commonwealth conference in Melbourne. The Lusaka conference had played an indispensable role in laying the basis for the Rhodesia settlement. It was much more valuable to be able to meet fellow leaders from the Commonwealth and hear their views and concerns at first hand than to read about them in indigestible masses of paper. The President said he too had valued the talks and was grateful to the Prime Minister and the British Government for the warmth of their reception in Britain.

The meeting concluded at 5.30 p.m.



31 October 1980

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1980

*Type if final form.*

*Dear Michael,*

Prime Minister's meeting with  
President of Botswana

/ I enclose Brian Barder's draft record of the Prime Minister's talk on 28 October with the President of Botswana and his colleagues.

With your agreement, we should like to send copies of the record on a personal basis to HM Representatives at Gaborone, Pretoria, Maputo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and at the United Nations.

*yours ever  
Rodric Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

*a Summary*

RECORD OF TALKS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
 PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA *at* NO 10 DOWNING STREET *at*  
 4.30 PM ON TUESDAY 28 OCTOBER 1980

Present

The Prime Minister	HE The Hon Dr CKJ Masire President of the Republic of Botswana
Mr Richard Luce MP Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs	The Hon A M Mogwe Minister for Internal Affairs
Mr D M Day Deputy Under Secretary FCO	The Hon P S Mmusi Minister for Finance and Develop- ment Planning
Mr W Turner British High Commissioner at Gaborone	HE Mr A W Kgarebo Botswana High Commissioner in the UK
Mr M O'D B Alexander PS to the Prime Minister	Mr L M Mpotokwana Secretary for External Affairs
Mr B L Barder Head of Southern African Department FCO	Mr M L Selepeng Senior Private Secretary to the President

1. The Prime Minister warmly welcomed the President and his colleagues: ~~they were~~ <sup>it was</sup> always <sup>good to see them</sup> welcome in London. Namibia
2. The Prime Minister recalled that the Lord Privy Seal had discussed Namibia briefly with the President earlier in the day, and invited Mr Luce to outline the current position, which seemed reasonably cheerful. Mr Luce said there was little information available at present about the outcome of the UN talks in Pretoria. Mr Urquhart would be reporting during the week to the Secretary-General, who in turn would report to the Security Council. ~~There had been some prospects of progress~~ If Mr Urquhart had succeeded in securing even provisional agreement on a date for implementing the UN plan, this would be very encouraging. ~~Even~~ Mr Mudge of the DTA had spoken of possible independence for Namibia <sup>in</sup> 1981. The Prime Minister commented that

CONFIDENTIAL



she hoped we were not putting excessive reliance on a few straws in the wind, but the outlook seemed reasonably optimistic.

3. The President recalled the general expectation that the Namibia problem would be solved before the apparently more difficult problem of Zimbabwe. It was difficult to understand South African intentions, but they seemed to be trying to shift the responsibility for taking a decision on to the internal parties, thus avoiding blame for the South African Government. Despite extensive economic links with South Africa, Botswana had little political insight into the inner councils of the South African Government. But their impression was that the problem lay largely within the National Party. The Prime Minister agreed that Mr P W Botha wanted to bring his own colleagues along with him. But he should go a little faster than those he led; this was the essence of leadership. It would be a positive development if the likelihood of a breakdown over Namibia proved to have receded. How did Botswana view the prospects for Namibia as a country, given its great potential resources? Mr Mogwe expressed suspicion about South Africa's intentions in suggesting direct talks with Angola but keeping them secret. South Africa wanted an all-party conference on Namibia, but with what objective? If it was to secure implementation of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 435, well and good. But there was much suspicion that the South Africans wanted a constitutional conference on Lancaster House lines, designed to produce special privileges for the whites. He feared that protracted discussion of the constitution might put the



CONFIDENTIAL

clock back and cause SCR 435 to unravel. Mr Luce agreed. If the conference was to ratify agreement already reached on implementation of SCR 435, that would be acceptable and useful. But the Namibia settlement proposals differed materially from the Zimbabwe pattern in that decisions on the constitution were to be taken only after the elections.

4. The Prime Minister pointed out that it would be a major task to weld the eleven main population groups in Namibia into a single nation; but if this could be achieved by communities as disparate as the Swiss, and indeed the British, it should also be possible for the Namibians. There might be a case for offering reassurances to minority groups that each would have a secure place in the country's future. Botswana, as a neighbouring country, was well placed to make a judgement on this. In the end, the South Africans would have to make an act of faith; the difficulty was to coax them over the final hurdle. There had been a similar difficulty in the final stages of the Rhodesia negotiations, when after years of fighting Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo were suddenly confronted by the uncertainties of an election. It had been fortunate that the election result had proved so decisive. The British electoral officers, soldiers and police had made a major contribution. However, there were important differences between the <sup>Circumstances</sup> ~~considerations~~ in Zimbabwe and those in Namibia, and the solution had to fit the nature of the problem. Britain's role in the Rhodesia negotiations was quite different from that of the Five in Namibia. The President agreed. President Machel of Mozambique had stressed the differences between the experience of the former Portuguese territory <sup>ies</sup> and that of other /African

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

African countries. The Prime Minister said President Machel had played a most helpful role over Zimbabwe.

5. Mr Luce promised to pass on to President Masire any further news of Namibia that might become available during the rest of the visit.

Botswana Affairs

6. The Prime Minister asked about the prospects for the Botswana economy including especially the beef, diamond and copper sectors. Had the increase in oil prices affected the balance of payments? The President said that they had just been getting control of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease when herds had been hit by a new infection from Zimbabwe. However, they hoped to make early progress on this with a new vaccine now available. Mineral prices were tending to fluctuate. There was a tendency among developing non-oil-producing countries to blame the industrialised countries for inflation and rising prices. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was not the industrialised countries which had raised prices by 120% in one year. Mr Mogwe said the oil producers justified raising their prices by saying that they had been kept artificially low in the past. Botswana's oil came from South Africa which had bought it on the spot market at prices even higher than the world price. The German Government had provided oil storage tanks with enough capacity for three or four months' supply of oil for Botswana to enable them to stockpile and thus minimise the effects of price fluctuations, and also to cope with a sudden crisis: but the South Africans had refused to sell sufficient oil

/to enable

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -



CONFIDENTIAL

to enable the tanks to be filled, and Botswana still had only <sup>up to</sup> a week's requirements in stock at any one time. Botswana and the FRG had both pressed the South Africans on this, but to no avail.

7. Mr Luce said he had been struck by the importance of Botswana coal resources. The President agreed, but said there was a pressing need for new heavy gauge railways to carry the coal from the south-west of Botswana to the ports (either Walvis Bay or the ports of Mozambique or Angola). Existing railway lines were not suitable. Satellite pictures had shown the existence of basins along the Kalahari desert and right up to the Namibian border: these must contain either oil or water, and were being investigated. Mr Turner said that Botswana coal reserves probably made the country second only to Saudi Arabia in energy resources. The problem was finding suitable markets. The Prime Minister thought that big companies like RTZ ought to be interested in exploiting <sup>these reserves</sup> and finding markets, which would expand with technological advances and with the longer term expansion of the world economy. There was a great potential for coal both for burning as coal and for the extraction of oil. One economic procedure was to build electric <sup>ity</sup> generating stations at the coal fields; but all this needed capital for development.

Southern African Development Coordination Conference

8. The Prime Minister asked about Botswana's role in coordinating the activities of the group of nine African countries of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). She understood that this had been discussed with Mr Neil Marten. The President said the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

nine 54200(22452)DD.052154 300M 7/79 GWS LTD.GP.870

nine SADCC countries were all to varying degrees dependent on trade with and through South Africa. All but three were landlocked. This created problems: for example, oil producing countries were willing to supply oil to the African countries concerned, but only on condition that it did not pass through South Africa, and there was no other way of getting oil to some of the would-be importers. The nine countries were therefore trying to organise diversification of their communications and transport networks, reconstruction in areas affected by the Rhodesian war, and other measures of economic cooperation. The main objective of the present mission to Europe was to alert the countries of the European Community to their dilemma and to seek their help, especially in developing the area's transport, communications, food production and security, and disease control. At present African countries dependent on South Africa were being used as South Africa's pawns. Advocates of sanctions against South Africa were told that sanctions would damage neighbouring African countries more than South Africa, and black South Africans more than white. The South Africans well understood the importance ~~to them~~ of keeping their neighbours dependent on them. They tried to counter all moves aimed at reducing African dependence on South Africa by offers of dialogue and the creation of a 'constellation of states' in which South Africa would be the star and the other African countries its satellites. <sup>3</sup> The Prime Minister stressed the importance of keeping in mind long-term objectives, however necessary it might be to look at the short-term results of one's policies. If there was a grand



CONFIDENTIAL

design for the longer term, ordinary people would respond and would be willing to make considerable sacrifices. The President said this was indeed their intention: they wanted to develop the whole region and thereby to encourage South Africa to see itself in a different light, and its neighbours as equal partners, not satellites. He stressed the hope of Botswana and the rest of the SADCC countries that EC Governments would send representatives at the highest possible level to the forthcoming conference in Maputo. It would be helpful if western European delegations could be led by senior ministers. Seven of the nine SADCC countries had formerly been under British rule, so Britain's attitude was of special importance. Some European governments had decided not to send ministers to the earlier conference at Arusha because the British Government had decided to be represented only at official level. That was now water under the bridge, but it showed the importance of Britain's lead and example. They recognised that they had secured favourable terms in the EC because Britain had fought for their interests. Without British support they doubted whether they could meet their objectives in southern Africa.

<sup>10.</sup> The Prime Minister confirmed that Britain would continue to fight fiercely for the interests of developing countries of the Commonwealth in relation to the EC. She had been worried about the problem of Zimbabwe sugar, and had raised it forcefully with President Giscard. ~~She was~~ <sup>would be</sup> ~~glad that Mr Neil Marten intended to represent the~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~Government at the Maputo conference.~~ <sup>UK.</sup> Britain much appreciated being invited to participate in activities of

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

/this



CONFIDENTIAL

this kind, but as a former colonial power was anxious not to intrude on the activities of countries which were now fully independent. Mr Day added that Britain had encouraged other western countries to send ministerial representatives to the Maputo conference. The President confirmed that Mr Cheysson would represent the Community. He was delighted by the British Government's response.

Relations with South Africa and the Prospects in the Republic

// The Prime Minister invited the President to give his assessment of events in South Africa. Col van der Post, with his extensive knowledge of southern African languages and customs, had been very helpful in encouraging a cooperative attitude to the Zimbabwe negotiations in Pretoria, and his view was that there were elements in the South African Government anxious to end the separation of the races. These elements seemed gradually to be gaining ascendancy. However, those who favoured reform did not get enough encouragement from the outside world. Mr Mogwe said Botswana condemned all South Africa's actions and policies. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was impossible to condemn a whole people. Mr Mogwe acknowledged that Mr P W Botha would like to get encouragement for his policies from the more moderate African countries. But ~~unfortunately~~ <sup>Africans</sup> they regarded the changes made so far as purely cosmetic. <sup>South African Govt</sup> They <sup>L</sup>were concerned only with removing the outward signs of petty apartheid. There was no sign of willingness to tackle the fundamental problems. <sup>Botswana</sup> ~~There~~ had no wish to discourage those in South Africa who favoured reform, but the most they could do at present was to explain that they had seen little evidence of real change

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

/and to



CONFIDENTIAL

and to ask for much more in future. Because of Botswana's close economic links with South Africa, she could not afford to advocate sanctions against South Africa. Their sympathies were with those who were fighting apartheid, but Botswana was vulnerable and had to be careful.

#### Uganda

12. The Prime Minister asked whether Botswana thought it would be possible to hold free and fair elections in Uganda: she herself was doubtful. Mr Mogwe said he had not yet heard the outcome of a meeting called by the Commonwealth Secretariat earlier in the day. The parties in Uganda were still poles apart. Botswana had been invited to contribute an observer to any Commonwealth team for the elections.

#### Conclusions

13. The Prime Minister said she had much appreciated the discussion, which would be useful in many ways, not least in the context of the forthcoming Commonwealth conference in Melbourne. The Lusaka conference had played an indispensable role in laying the basis for the Rhodesia settlement. It was much more valuable to be able to meet fellow leaders from the Commonwealth and hear their views and concerns at first hand than to read about them in indigestible masses of paper. The President said he too had valued the talks and was grateful to the Prime Minister' and the British Government for the warmth of their reception in Britain.

14. The meeting concluded at 5.30 pm.

CONFIDENTIAL

# Duty List

Botswana

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA AND MRS. MASIRE ON TUESDAY, 28 OCTOBER 1980 AT 7.45 PM FOR 8.00 PM BLACK TIE

---

The Prime Minister  
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

His Excellency The Hon. Dr. Q.K.J. Masire, MP  
and Mrs. Masire

The Hon. A.M. Mogwe, MBE                      Minister for External Affairs of Botswana

The Hon. Peter S. Mmusi                      Minister of Finance and Development Planning  
of Botswana

His Excellency the High Commissioner for Botswana  
and Mrs. Kgarebe

Mr. P.L. Steenkamp, MBE                      Permanent Secretary to the President and  
Secretary to the Cabinet

Mr. L.M. Mpotokwane                      Secretary for External Affairs, Office of  
the President

Mr. O.K. Matambo                      Director of Economic Affairs of the  
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Mr. M.L. Selepeng                      Senior Private Secretary to the President

Ms. M. Motlogelwa                      Lady-in-Waiting to Mrs. Masire

## His Government

The Rt. Hon. Peter Walker, MP  
and Mrs. Walker

Mr. Neil Marten, MP  
and Mrs. Marten

## Business

The Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson                      Governor of the Bank of England  
and Mrs. Richardson

Mr. E.M. Charles                      Director, De Beers and Diamond Trading Company

## Media

Mr. Peter Robbs                      Editor, Africa Economic Digest  
and Mrs. Robbs

## Conservative MPs

Mr. Robert Maxwell-Hyslop, MP  
and Mrs. Maxwell-Hyslop



Others

The Rt. Hon. Lord Alport  
and Lady Alport

British/Botswana Parliamentary Committee,  
former Minister of State, Commonwealth  
Relations Office

Naomi Mitchison

Spent many years in Botswana; Tribal Mother  
to Bakgatla, Botswana; prolific author

Officials

Mr. W. Turner  
and Mrs. Turner

British High Commissioner, Botswana

Mr. Derek Day

Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign and  
Commonwealth Office

10 Downing Street

Mr. Michael Alexander

Mr. Tim Lankester



*Botswana*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1980 (1)

*Dear Michael,*

*Prime Minister*

*I hope that, as usual, you will speak extempore. But here notes may help to give an indication of the points to cover. The brief contains personality notes.*

Visit of President of Botswana

I am sending with this letter a draft speech for the Prime Minister for the dinner she will give on 28 October for President Masire of Botswana.

One of our main aims in President Masire's visit is to establish good personal relations with him early in his term of office. The draft speech therefore focuses on giving him a warm welcome. The two substantive points which the Prime Minister may like to include are the message that Britain has nothing inherently to fear from strengthened African nationalism in Southern Africa, but that Britain is not to be singled out either for a greater share of responsibility, or as possessing greater influence in the region.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1



SPEECH

DRAFT: ~~RESTRICTED~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Mr President: Our long-standing friendship with Botswana is a matter of pride. We are delighted that you have been able to come so soon after assuming your high office to reinforce your links with Britain and other countries in Western Europe. It cannot surprise a President of Botswana to hear me say that our diversity in Europe, like yours in Botswana, is an essential part of our democracy, and a major source of our strength.

We were deeply saddened this summer by the death of your distinguished predecessor. Sir Seretse Khama epitomised all that was positive in our relationship with Botswana. We mourn our friend and we grieve with the people of Botswana. But our relations are not static. In Southern Africa in particular, nationalism and nationhood are today's strong influences.

You and we together, in close collaboration with our western and African partners, have faced the challenge of Rhodesia and played our part at the birth of the independent nation of Zimbabwe. Together we are equally determined that, through the efforts of the

/United Nations

RESTRICTED

Enclosures—flag(s).....

RESTRICTED

United Nations, Namibia shall achieve independence on a basis that will launch her confidently into the world of independent states. Together we are involved in the search for a peaceful solution to the major problems which divide both the peoples of South Africa among themselves, and South Africans from their fellow Africans and from the wider world. I believe that through the experience of tackling together the pressing problems of Southern Africa, in which both our countries have so much at stake, our bilateral relations should be both deepened and strengthened.

As we have discovered in our discussions earlier today, there are no major problems between us. We shall of course continue our programme of development assistance to Botswana. As you know, we are facing severe financial constraints. But the latest figures show that our attack on inflation is producing results, and there are the beginnings of a new mood of realism in Britain. The potential for our partnership with Botswana will grow once our actual resources, as distinct from our borrowed resources, begin to grow again too. As we tackle our own economic problems, we watch with sympathetic appreciation the efforts of Botswana and Botswana's partners in central and southern Africa to develop regional cooperation among yourselves for the benefit of all the peoples of the area. We wish you well in <sup>the</sup> challenging task.

Because of our Commonwealth associations; our commercial and financial interests in South Africa; our historical links; and perhaps partly because of the successful

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

achievement of Zimbabwe's independence, there is a tendency in some quarters to believe that Britain has more influence in the region than she does. I am not seeking to disclaim any proper responsibilities, but we are convinced that Britain's influence on the future of Namibia can most effectively be exercised in future as in the past through the group of Five Western nations. As for South Africa, we are firmly convinced that our policy of dialogue, contact and persuasion is the right and most fruitful course both for South Africa, and for Botswana and Britain.

Mr President, We look forward to a continuation of the intimate and mutually beneficial relationship that we have enjoyed with Botswana for so many years. My colleagues and I regard your visit here as a happy augury for that continued friendship and cooperation marked in part by the welcome inauguration of the United Kingdom Botswana Society. We see your visit not only as a compliment to us, but as an earnest of your own belief in the enduring value of the relationship between our countries.

Toast

His Excellency President Masire and Mrs Masire and  
Anglo-Botswana Relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

MASIRE, HE The Hon Quett Ketumile Jonny, JP

MP for Ngwaketse/Kgalagkadi. President of Botswana.

Born 1925. Educated at Kanye and Tigerkloof. Founded the Seepapitso Secondary School (Kanye) 1950-55. In 1967 took up journalism, started as a reporter then one of the Directors of 'African Echo'. Was a member of the Bangwaketse Tribal Council, the African Council and the Legislative Council. A foundation member of the Botswana Democratic Party and its Secretary-General since the Party's inception; editor of the Party organ 'Therisanyo'.

Elected to Legislative Assembly March 1965. Deputy Prime Minister 1965. Independence Conference London February 1966. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 5 April 1966. Vice-President on the attainment of Independence 30 September 1966. Minister of Development Planning 1967. He lost his seat at Kanye to ex-Chief Bathoen of the Bangwaketse (Mr Bathoen Gaseitsiwe) in the 1969 election and became one of the four specially elected members, elected by the Assembly itself. As such he was re-appointed as Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning. In the October 1974 elections he contested and won the Ngwaketse/Kalahari district seat which he held until his election as Botswana's President in July 1980.

Short of stature and usually extremely genial with a stentorian laugh, he is easy and approachable. He is hard-working and has been a driving force within the Party and within the Government and is a shrewd politician and a fluent extempore speaker. A good Parliamentarian. He was a loyal follower of Sir Seretse Khama and worked well with him. There was some infighting within the BDP before he was elected; he is not universally liked in Botswana and has his enemies. He lacks tribal power and has indifferent health (a kidney was damaged by accidental poisoning from agricultural chemicals); this casts doubts as to his length of tenure as President but his premature removal would have serious consequences for the fortunes of the BDP who would find it difficult to put up an acceptable replacement. The testing time is likely to be the run-up to the next general

/election

CONFIDENTIAL



election in 1984 when his position may be challenged if his stewardship has been ineffectual. He has a more cautious attitude towards British policy in southern Africa, and he is likely to be more influenced by pressures within the FLS and the OAU than was his predecessor. He will probably continue the policy of maintaining unofficial contacts with the South Africans.

Owns cattle ranches near Kanye and Ghanzi.

Married with several children. Mrs Masire is shy but supports her husband well and occasionally entertains very pleasantly in their home.

President Masire as Vice-President visited London early in June 1980. Called on the Secretary of State and Mr Marten; lunch hosted by Mr Luce. Attended Trooping (of) Colour ceremony in High Commissioner's party hosted by the Prime Minister. More recently he has made a visit to China. Received Mr Luce in Gaborone in early October.

MASIRE, MRS GLADYS OLEBILE

Wife of President.

Born 1932 in Mafeking. Educated Mafeking and at Tigerloof.

Obtained teacher's certificate and taught for five years before her marriage.

A shy, soft-spoken person who has a wholly unpretentious nature. She appears to play little part in politics but has taken a prominent role in the work of the Red Cross, the Camphill Community (School for handicapped children) at Otse, and the Botswana Nurses' Association. She is a patron of the latter. Mrs Masire has always played a secondary role to Lady Khama in social activities and is showing no signs of wishing to take over the leadership. She is a thoroughly nice but rather negative person.

She has six children: two are being educated in the UK and one in the USA.



CONFIDENTIAL

MOGWE, The Hon A M, MBE

(Presidential Order of Honour)

Specially Elected MP, Minister for External Affairs.

Born 1921.

BA University of South Africa.

Education Officer 1957. Principal, Ministry of Labour and Social Services 1965. Attended one year course arranged by the Foreign Office at Oxford 1965-6. Permanent Secretary, Office of the President (Senior Permanent Secretary) and Head of the Civil Service 1972. Retired from Civil Service before October 1974 General Election. After the elections became Specially Elected Member of the National Assembly and Minister of State for External Affairs in the Office of the President (title of portfolio later changed to Minister for External Affairs).

Archie Mogwe is hard working, and unassuming. He is not universally popular and upset people because he would not stand for election. Even while handling internal and civil service matters in the Office of the President he frequently accompanied President Khama to international conferences (OAU, meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, etc) and his experience of international affairs and his international contacts are wide and longstanding. He is very friendly to us. Can be devastatingly critical of the behaviour of other African countries. He realises that Botswana cannot afford to step out of line with OAU. He has shown himself an effective and serviceable Minister for External Affairs. He is one of the ablest of Ministers but his political influence is limited by lack of power base. (He belongs to a minority tribe with its centre outside Botswana which is closely related to the President. This may enhance his position.) He is an eloquent speaker both in private conversation and on the public platform. Very good fun.

/Married

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Married; Mrs Mogwe, an ex-teacher, is from Lesotho. She is an energetic lady who is the executive head under Lady Khama of the Botswana Council of Women. One son and two daughters. Son and eldest daughter, who has recently married the son of the Rev Albert Lock, former Speaker of the National Assembly, were at school in England.

CONFIDENTIAL



MMUSI, The Hon Peter S

(Presidential Order of Meritorious Service)

MP for Kweneng (South), Minister of Finance and Development Planning.

Born 1929.

Educated St Joseph's College, Gaborone.

Teacher, St Joseph's College 1951-56; Teacher training college, Lobatse 1957-61; Assistant Clerk of Legislative Council 1961-63; Assistant Labour Officer 1963-65; Labour Commissioner 1965-74; Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning 1974-6; Minister of Commerce and Industry 1977; Minister of Home Affairs 1977-79; Minister of Works and Communications 1979-80; Minister of Finance and Development Planning 1980.

Very interested in national sport. Was General Secretary of the Botswana Football Association. One of the founders of the Botswana Lawn Tennis Association. Founder and First Chairman of Botswana Sports Council.

Trustee and Chairman of the Botswana Cooperative Trusts since 1965.

A very good Commissioner of Labour during the years when big industrial enterprise was beginning in Botswana. Under pressure from the President he resigned in 1974 to contest seat for the Botswana Democratic Party in the General Election. Intelligent, active and versatile, he is a steady, conscientious and hard working Minister. A devout Roman Catholic.

He is one of the most able Ministers and his promotion to the key job of Minister of Finance and Development Planning was deserved.

Married. Wife is primary school headmistress.

STEENKAMP, Phillippus Laurens, MBE

(Presidential Order of Meritorious Service)

Permanent Secretary of the President and Secretary to the Cabinet.

Born 1932 in Kenya of Afrikaner parents. A Botswana citizen.

Educated Eldoret Primary School, Kenya 1938-42; Nairobi Secondary School 1943-49; Natal University, South Africa 1950-54 (BA,LLB).

Joined Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration before independence. Assistant Secretary 1957; District Commissioner, Ghanzi, Lobatse and Francistown 1955-67; Permanent Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs 1968; Administrative Secretary in the Office of the President 1969-74; Permanent Secretary (and ex-officio Head of the Civil Service) to the President October 1974.

A key figure in the effective operation of the Government. An abrasive character and a fairly ruthless administrator. He tries to run the government machine in the fashion of a district commissioner. He attracts envy and controversy and on three occasions he has been the subject of severe criticism from the Opposition in the House of Assembly. He probably does not enjoy the same easy relationship with President Masire which he did with the previous President. Despite being third generation Kenyan he has an Afrikaner's suspicious attitude towards Britain and the British and can be difficult for us to deal with. He is probably equally difficult with his Batswana colleagues. There are persistent rumours however that he will be replaced in the near future and will assume control of a major state enterprise.

Divorced and remarried. Wife is South African. Children by both marriages.





CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October 1980

*Dear Michael,*

*H. P. [Signature]*

Visit of President Masire of Botswana

I am sending with this letter a set of briefs for the Prime Minister for the talks which she will be holding with President Masire of Botswana on 28 October. A note on the outcome of the United Nations Mission to South Africa for Namibia negotiations (20-25 October) will follow shortly.

The Lord Privy Seal will be calling on President Masire at his hotel on the morning of 28 October. This will be a courtesy call, but to avoid overlap with the Prime Minister's discussions, the Lord Privy Seal would propose to focus any discussion of substance on prospects for a Namibia settlement.

Since the briefs were prepared, we have received from Gaborone a copy of the speech which President Masire made on Botswana Radio on Independence Day, 30 September. I enclose a copy of the four paragraphs on international affairs which provide a useful indication of the President's thinking on important Southern African issues.

I shall send you brief notes for the Prime Minister's remarks at her lunch for Masire on Monday.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Our own independence is directly affected by the evolution of events in the southern African region. In April this year, Botswana undertook, in concert with the other eight majority-ruled countries of southern Africa, to reduce her economic dependence on South Africa. The nine countries concerned intend to establish closer links amongst themselves in a number of fields such as transport and communications, food security, the control of animal diseases, manpower development and industrialisation. The areas of cooperation are unlimited, but we have to be guided by prudence and realism - hence

our step by ...

CONFIDENTIAL



our step by step approach. This initiative marks the beginning of a long-term struggle for the economic liberation of Southern Africa as a whole.

7. The people of Southern Africa, have for the past few years contributed in different ways to the liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe. Some Batswana lost their lives and others had their property destroyed at the hands of the security forces of the illegal Rhodesia regime. No less than 25,000 men, women and children from Rhodesia found refuge in Botswana. These sacrifices were richly rewarded when the people of Zimbabwe finally triumphed and liberated their country. Zimbabwe has now taken her rightful place among independent nations and we wish our newly-independent neighbour lasting peace and prosperity.

8. The struggle for freedom, equality and justice in southern Africa, is by no means accomplished. Our friends and neighbours in Namibia and South Africa are still to enjoy the human rights which we in Botswana often take for granted. Independence has again eluded the people of Namibia when it was almost within their grasp. For our part, we fully support the United

/Nations initiative for ...

Nation's initiative for the independence of Namibia. South Africa is stalling on minor points which are not relevant to the issue. The substantial points of difference have long been resolved in an exchange of letters with the United Nations Secretary-General. We are anxious that this initiative be brought quickly to a conclusion so that the people of Namibia may be spared from further sufferings. Although we shall continue to lend our assistance and support in this effort, as a matter of duty to our friends in Namibia, we would like to call upon those who maintain normal ties with South Africa to use their influence and show her reason in this regard.

9. If the experience of the now defunct Rhodesian regime is anything to go by, South Africa should realise that time is not on her side. No amount of force or military might, can keep a people under subjugation indefinitely. The South African leaders will be acting in their own interest and the interest of their own children, if they were to take courage and bring about meaningful change, where political power, equality and social justice, would be extended to all races. The choice for peaceful change lies with the leaders but they must act with speed and determination to avert a forced solution.

There has been enough violence in southern Africa to demonstrate the need for peaceful change. Let us hope

/ that we .....



that we shall not be made to wait for too long to direct  
all our energies towards the development of our sub-  
continent for the benefit of all our peoples.

BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

STEERING BRIEF

BACKGROUND ON BOTSWANA

BOTSWANA CABINET and PERSONALITY NOTES

ANGLO-BOTSWANA RELATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA

NAMIBIA

ZIMBABWE

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATION CONFERENCE

NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE

ENERGY

IRAN/IRAQ

AFGHANISTAN



BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN  
27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Steering Brief

Aims

1. To get our top-level relationship with the new leadership in Botswana off to a good start.
2. To consolidate the traditionally good relations between Botswana and the United Kingdom.
3. To dispel doubts which the new President may harbour about our commitment to Namibian independence, and peaceful change in South Africa.
4. To acknowledge Botswana's help over Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and to encourage her continued support over Namibia.
5. To encourage and support Botswana's development as a stable, moderate pro-Western country; one of the few genuine multi-party, Parliamentary democracies in Africa.

Structure of the Talks

6. Bi-lateral relations with Botswana are good but not very substantial. There are no major problems.
7. In addition to discussing Southern Africa therefore, the Prime Minister may like to broaden the exchange to wider issues of importance to Botswana and Britain including the North-South dialogue, energy, and to current world problems with implications for Southern Africa either at

CONFIDENTIAL

the United Nations or directly, such as Afghanistan and Iran/Iraq. Briefing on these topics is included.

Southern African Department  
October 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



BOTSWANA: PRESIDENT MASIRE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

## BOTSWANA BACKGROUND

### General

1. Botswana is about two and a half times the size of the United Kingdom (220,000 square miles); the Kalahari Desert covers 80% of the country. Botswana was formerly the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Population only 800,000. A Commonwealth country, Botswana is landlocked and bordered by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. Her economy is based on agriculture, beef, diamonds and minerals.

### Political

2. A republic; granted Independence on 30 September 1966. President Masire was elected July 1980. A moderate pro-Western country; one of the few genuine multi-party, parliamentary democracies left in Africa; Botswana still retains Westminster style of Government. There are no political prisoners. The late President, Sir Seretse Khama, successfully led his country for 14 years from Independence to sound economic achievement. The ruling political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) took 29 of the 32 National Assembly seats at the 1979 elections. Despite the very small opposition representation in the House of Assembly there are some signs that a growing number of younger, more politically conscious and radically minded people are becoming dissatisfied with present order. Brigadier Ian Khama, President Khama's eldest son and Deputy Commander of the Botswana Defence Force, is a possible future candidate for the Presidency. Tribal arrangements still play role in Botswana politics. The next elections are due in 1984.

/Foreign



Foreign Policy

3. Botswana is one of the African Front Line States (FLS) but has consistently pursued moderate and pragmatic politics. Botswana supports OAU policies but by skilful diplomacy avoids criticism of her economically essential links with South Africa (but she has no diplomatic relations with the latter). The Botswana have played a leading role in the recent moves (under the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference - SADCC) to promote closer economic coordination amongst the black South African states and to seek to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa. We attach considerable importance to Botswana support for our Southern African policies - in the past over Rhodesia and at present over Namibia. Botswana has diplomatic relations with both the USSR and China.

Economic

4. The economy is largely agricultural, sound, export orientated and decreasingly depends on foreign aid contributions. The overall balance of payments is strong. The majority of the population is rural, relying principally on cattle-raising for their livelihood; Botswana's export trade in beef and meat products is periodically disrupted by outbreaks of foot and mouth disease. Mining and export of diamonds and copper nickel has recently overtaken beef exports as the principal revenue earner; mining developments have attracted substantial foreign aid and private investment. Botswana is the world's 4th largest diamond producer (and soon likely to be the 3rd). A high proportion of imports and exports pass through South Africa, including oil imports; there are current attempts to diversify trade routes through Zimbabwe and Mozambique (and for the future a rail outlet through Namibia) and plans are in hand for a

/Botswana



Botswana takeover of the section of Rhodesia Railways running through its territory.

UK/Botswana Relations

5. Bilateral relations have been close and friendly for many years, resulting particularly from late President Khama's own personal links with Britain - including his British born wife Lady Ruth Khama. We particularly valued the Botswana leadership's support for our policies in achieving a settlement in Zimbabwe and currently over Namibia.

6. Botswana Ministers make frequent visits to Britain. President Masire (as Vice-President) visited London in June 1980. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr Richard Luce, visited Botswana in October 1980. Her Majesty The Queen made a very successful State Visit to Botswana in July 1979.

7. In 1979 British exports to Botswana were £3.85m (machinery and manufactured goods) and imports £26.26m (beef and meat products) but it is difficult to measure the precise volume of UK/Botswana trade since so much passes through South Africa; there are British banking and insurance interests in Botswana. The Botswana have appreciated vigorous British support in their negotiations with the European Community over access for beef exports (much of which come to Britain); the beef trade is, however, subject to interruption because of outbreaks of foot and mouth disease.

/8.

8. The United Kingdom remains a major aid donor to Botswana (in the fields of agriculture, education, roads, water resources and irrigation).


9. Since its foundation in 1977 we have provided help to the Botswana Defence Force with military defence equipment, training programmes in Britain and visits by senior British officials to Botswana (the Deputy Commander of the Force, Brigadier Ian Khama visited British Army units and the British Army Equipment Exhibition at Aldershot in June 1980).

Southern African Department

October 1980



# Botswana



BOTSWANA: PRESIDENT MASIRE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN

27 - 31 OCTOBER 1980

1. Botswana Cabinet
2. Personality Notes on the following:-

HE The Hon Q K J Masire	President
Mrs G O Masire	Wife of President
The Hon A M Mogwe	Minister for External Affairs
The Hon P S Mmusi	Minister of Finance and Development Planning
Mr O K Matambo	Director of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance and Develop- ment Planning
Mr L M Mpotokwane	Secretary for External Affairs, Office of the President
Mr P L Steenkamp	Permanent Secretary to the President and Secretary to the Cabinet
Mr M L Selepeng	Senior Private Secretary to the President
Mr J Mogopodi	Senior Private Secretary to the President (State House)
Ms M Motlogelwa	Lady-in-Waiting to Mrs Masire
HE Mr A W Kgarebe	Botswana High Commissioner in London



## BOTSWANA CABINET - JULY 1980

President	HE The Hon Q K J Masire JP MP
Vice-President and Minister of Local Government and Lands	The Hon L M Seretse MP
Minister of External Affairs	The Hon A M Mogwe MP
Minister of the Public Service, Broadcasting and Information	The Hon D K Kwelagobe MP
Minister of Finance and Development Planning	The Hon P S Mmusi MP
Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning	The Hon W M Seboni MP
Minister of Health	The Hon L Makgekgenene MP
Minister of Home Affairs	The Hon Mrs K L Disele MP
Minister of Agriculture	The Hon W Meswele MP
Assistant Minister of Agriculture	The Hon G U Matlhaphiri MP
Assistant Minister of Local Government and Lands	The Hon D Kwele MP
Minister of Works and Communications	The Hon C W Blackbeard MP
Minister of Commerce and Industry	The Hon M P K Nwako MP
Minister of Education	The Hon K P Morake MP
Minister of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs	The Hon Dr G K T Chiepe MBE MP

MATAMBO, Mr Ontefetse Kenneth

Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

Born 1947. Educated at Moeding College, Botswana, the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland where he received a BA in Economics in 1972 and an MA in Development and Economics in 1975 from Williams College Massachusetts.

He joined the Botswana Civil Service in 1972 and his entire career has been spent in central planning. Matambo has risen swiftly in the Botswana Civil Service in recent years and probably now feels his position. Whilst he can be friendly in his dealings, because he lacks confidence he can often be offhand and dismissive. This does not endear him particularly to some aid donors.

He is married and has one son.



CONFIDENTIAL

MPOTOKWANE, LEBANG M

Secretary for External Affairs, Office of the President.

Born about 1942.

Educated Tigerkloof College (South Africa); Nairobi University;

Foreign Service Course, Oxford 1970-71.

Private Secretary to the President 1971-73; High Commissioner to UK 1974-75; Administrative Secretary, Office of the President 1976; Secretary for External Affairs 1976.

One of the abler younger generation civil servants; he has a diffident manner but warms up on acquaintance. He is always cooperative with us and we have found him to be honest and reliable. Good tennis player. Diabetic. Firm proponent of non-alignment.

Married. Wife is a teacher. 2 daughters.

CONFIDENTIAL

SELEPENG, MOLOSIWE LOUIS

Senior Private Secretary to the President.

Born 1947. Educated Botswana, Zimbabwe and at University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In 1971 at the beginning of his civil service career he worked for 3 months in local government in Francistown and then transferred to External Affairs. Sent to London in 1973 as Second Secretary, to Brussels 1976 as First Secretary and London 1978 as Counsellor. Returned to Botswana mid-1980 to take up his present post.

A quiet retiring person who is diligent and hardworking and has been particularly helpful and friendly to this mission. His style is a complete contrast to Joe Legwaila whom he replaced. It was obvious that the establishment preferred a more orthodox and controllable person in this job.

Married. His wife is from Lesotho. She is a doctor and worked for a number of years in hospitals in the Home counties and at the Royal Free Hospital in London. A sociable and pleasant person. They have one child.



CONFIDENTIAL

MOGOPODI, JULIUS

Senior Private Secretary to the President (State House).

Born 1936, educated Botswana, Holland and Finland to diploma standard. Joined the Office of the President 1978. Acts in State House as President's Secretary. Handling private matters.

A pleasant and effective person. Married with three children.

CONFIDENTIAL

MOTLOGELWA, MISS MOSADINYANA MPOELANG

Senior Personal Secretary, Office of the President.

Born 1946 in Serowe, educated at Moeng College, Botswana, to school certificate standard. Joined civil service 1967 and worked as a clerical officer and typist with the Ministry of Agriculture. After a one-year secretarial course at the Botswana Training Centre in 1972 she became Senior Personal Secretary in the Office of the President and has worked for both the late Sir Seretse Khama and President Masire. A helpful and pleasant person.



KGAREBE, A W (pronounced KAR-EEBEE)

High Commissioner in London.

Born 1923.

Graduated 1954 from the University of South Africa, and obtained a post-graduate diploma from the University of Leeds in 1965.

Kgarebe was a teacher from 1946 to 1964, both in Botswana and in South Africa. Principal of the Teacher Training College in Lobatse, 1966; Senior Education Officer in the Ministry of Education, 1968; Chief Education Officer, 1970.

High Commissioner to Zambia, December 1975 to January 1978. High Commissioner in London from March 1978.

Energetic and balanced in his judgements; a pleasant friendly personality. We had close and fruitful relations with him when he was at the Ministry of Education. Devout Catholic.

Mrs Kgarebe was a teacher whilst in Botswana. A likeable woman. They have three children.

BOTSWANA : VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN

27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Anglo-Botswana Relations

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Anglo-Botswana relations excellent. No bilateral problems. Glad welcome you so early in your term of office. Hope your programme satisfactory. Sorry your visit had to be at a time when Her Majesty The Queen away. Express again our sorrow at death in July of President Khama.

Agenda for Talks

2. Propose we focus on South Africa, broadening as required to include North South dialogue: energy and major international problems such as Iran/Iraq and Afghanistan.

Aid [If Raised]

3. Public expenditure cuts hit aid too. But aid still substantial, notably multilateral (EDF, IDA, UNDP) which also benefit Botswana. Economic recovery will allow us to do more. Commitment to aid Botswana remains firm. Detail no doubt covered in talks with Mr Marten earlier today.

/Military





Military Assistance [If Raised]

4. UK happy to continue advice and training for Botswana Defence Force.

Trade [If Raised]

5. Hope to see increase in direct British exports to Botswana.

Beef [If Raised]

6. UK continues to support Botswana beef industry. Hope trade resume soon when Foot and Mouth eliminated. This for EEC veterinary inspectors and Botswana. Detail for discussion with Mr Walker on 29 October.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

General

1. UK/Botswana relations have been close and friendly since Independence in 1966, thanks largely to the personal involvement of the late President Khama with his own background in, and ties with, the UK. HM The Queen paid a very successful State Visit to Botswana in 1979 (returning President Khama's official visit of 1978). Vice President Masire (as he then was) visited the UK briefly in June and called on the Secretary of State, and Mr Marten; Mr Luce gave a lunch for him. Mr Luce visited Gaborone on 1 and 2 October 1980.

Visit to UK of President Masire

2. President Masire addressed the Development Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels on 21 October; thereafter he has made a tour of Western European countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and UK). His programme in the UK is at Annex A. His Party is listed at Annex B.

Death of Former President Sir Seretse Khama

3. President Khama died at Gaborone on 13 July. We had arranged his return to Botswana by RAF aircraft on 30 June. The Duke of Kent representing HM The Queen; the Lord Privy Seal; Mr Peter Shore, and Mr David Steel attended the State Memorial Service in Botswana on 24 July.

/4. Aid



Aid

4. Estimated British Aid expenditure 1980/81 £7.64m, 1981/82 £7.69m, 1982/83 £6.45m and 1983/84 £6.04m. Most goes on supplementation of British staff. Capital aid is small and focussed on agriculture/livestock. Aid cuts mean progressive reductions in British staff as costs rise. But Botswana popular with aid donors (about 25 including multilateral and voluntary organisations: Britain provides 1/5 of total). Therefore, reasonable for British aid to decline gently.

Military Assistance

5. 1980/81 allocation £120,000. This used for training (including 2 at Sandhurst), official visits including Commander and Deputy of Botswana Defence Force - the latter being President Khama's son, and visits to Botswana by the Military Assistance Office (MOD) who have been advising Botswana on force levels, deployment and equipping since 1977. [Not to be revealed]. This is a useful influence for stability and British ear to the ground in a key sector.

Trade

6. British exports 1979 £3.8m, imports £26m. Many British exports are via South Africa and figure in those statistics. Direct exports mostly transport and communications equipment. British imports mainly beef and minerals. Botswana's diamonds mostly sold on London market. No detailed statistics on British investment, but estimated at £40m. Export potential hampered by limited industrial growth areas in Botswana.

/Beef

Beef

7. Botswana's major export (but diamonds soon overtake). Under Lomé, Botswana ships to EC a quota, increased last year, duty-free and with 90% reduction in levy. Current Foot and Mouth outbreak has halted EC imports. Resumption depends on EC veterinary authorities. ACP agreement allows delivery shortfall because of disease to be made up later. 1979 total UK imports both carcass and corned 16,000 tons.

Southern African Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

24 October 1980



BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN, 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

SOUTH AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

UK POLICY

1. First priority Namibia settlement. This would also help internal reform. Not our policy to dictate constitutional change. Aim is consent of all the peoples of South Africa. Contact and dialogue preferable to ostracism and threats.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

2. Reiterate UK abhorrence of apartheid including homelands policy. Reforms do not question the fundamentals of apartheid. But talk of reform is launched for first time in 30 years. Momentum may carry it beyond intentions. Stability in Botswana a useful influence for those favouring reform in South Africa.

SANCTIONS

3. Hypothetical. Would not work: would harden South African resistance; hurt black South Africans; damage Botswana and other neighbouring countries and hit West hard. Main proponents are those who would be least affected. But UK has extensive interests in black Africa. Sanctions choice very difficult for us. Civil trade should be determined by commercial considerations.

/ARMS

ARMS EMBARGO [If raised]

4. UK carries out its obligations. Alleged breaches are carefully investigated. No need to extend embargo. Risk to Namibia and internal reform if extension pressed.

SPORT [If raised]

5. Under Gleneagles Agreement we discourage sporting contact. But sporting bodies are independent.

MILITARY LINKS [If raised]

6. We have no defence collaboration at all.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

BOTSWANA POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. President Masire more stridently opposed to South Africa than Seretse Khama. Botswana however highly vulnerable to South African attack if she permitted ANC bases. She is also totally dependent on trade routes, oil imports and customs revenue. Hence her lead in SADCC for greater independence from South Africa. But a long term goal. No formal Botswana/South African relations but low key contacts.

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

2. Tendency for Africa to exaggerate extent of UK influence and not to realise extent of UK interests in black Africa (see Annex A). But confrontation reduces influence to nil. No desire to dictate constitutional future. But must be acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

3. Mr P W Botha has embarked on a programme of limited reforms in the apartheid system but the last session of Parliament ended disappointingly without major legislative reforms. He has abandoned the idea of an Advisory Council of blacks and there are no blacks - and few coloureds of note - on the new President's Council. But Mr Botha's speech to the Transvaal National Party Congress (3 September) revived hope of further change. The inclusion of several new 'verligtes' in the new Cabinet should help him circumvent opposition from the NP right-wing caucus.

4. South Africa hopes to involve the 'independent' and non-independent homelands in a 'Confederation of Southern African States' with separate sovereignties and citizenships but common nationality, to avoid the problem of an 'independent' homeland citizen losing any entitlement to South African nationality. This is also recognition that 'independent' homelands have no prospect of economic viability.

SANCTIONS/UK ECONOMIC LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

5. UK exports to South Africa in 1979 were £714m making South Africa our fifteenth largest market. UK imports from South Africa were £534m. UK investment in South Africa totals £4 to £5 billion representing about 10% of all British investment overseas, and making us the largest single foreign investor in South Africa.

6. Our exports to black Africa are worth about three times as much as to South Africa; investments there are worth almost as much. The sanctions choice is thus potentially highly damaging to the UK either way. We believe the risk of African retaliation would be far less in the event of a triple veto.

7. African countries dependent on South Africa would be particularly affected. Over 80% of Botswana's imports come via South Africa. 50% of its revenue is from the customs union. 200,000 of its people are employed in South Africa. Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Zaire and Mozambique are all affected though some to a lesser extent. It would be worth while to ask President Masire's view of the prospects for sanctions, and of the chances of those countries likely to be most affected, persuading the OAU not to push.



UK TRADE AND INVESTMENTS  
COMPARATIVE FIGURES FOR SOUTH AFRICA, NIGERIA  
AND BLACK AFRICA

£ million

1979 (1978 FIGURES IN BRACKETS)	NIGERIA	TOTAL BLACK AFRICA	SOUTH AFRICA
UK EXPORTS	638 (1133) (a)	1582 (2044)	713 (667)
UK IMPORTS	186 (286)	1208 (1244)	534 (768)
UK INVESTMENTS	2000 (no change) (estimated value)	not available	4000-5000 no change)
ECGD COMMITMENTS	763 (752)	1857 (1824)	710 (762)

(a) see para 4 above

BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Namibia

POINTS TO MAKE

[NB: Brief will require amendment in the light of progress <sup>see extra brief below</sup> during the UN mission to Pretoria 20-25 October]

Should Not Rule Out Success In The Negotiations

1. Regret delay, but gap has narrowed. Few points left in dispute. Cannot guarantee South African agreement, but no quicker or more likely route to independence exists.

UK Supports UN Mission To South Africa

2. Have pressed South Africa and UN Secretariat for a positive result. Likely to be discussion of timetable for implementation.

Equal Treatment Of Internal Parties

3. UN Secretariat will talk to internal parties; but no question of negotiating with them rather than with South Africa. Gestures are required to demonstrate UN impartiality.

Sanctions [defensive]

4. Sanctions unlikely to be effective in securing a settlement.

SWAPO-South Africa Talks And/Or Namibia Conference

5. Question for the parties. We would not object to any generally agreed means of making progress.

Will Continue to Press South Africa

6. UK acts in unison with its partners. UK has no special influence.



ESSENTIAL FACTS (may be freely used except where indicated)

Should Not Rule Out Success In The Negotiations

1. In their reply of 29 August to Waldheim South Africa accepted assurances on the main security questions at issue (subject to a few points which should not cause serious difficulty). The main points in dispute are now their insistence that impartial treatment of SWAPO and the internal parties by all UN organs should start now and that the 'leadership in the territory' should be included in all future consultations.

UK Supports UN Mission To South Africa

2. Urquhart is leading a UN Secretariat team in Pretoria 20-25 October to discuss South Africa reply of 29 August and in particular their offer to discuss the setting in motion of implementation. [A note on the outcome will be submitted as soon as possible]

Equal Treatment of Internal Parties

3. The UN team will also talk to Namibian internal parties, but negotiation will be with the South African Government. Right to acknowledge that they have a legitimate interest in the transitional arrangements. Zimbabwe showed that such small points of the negotiations leading up to a settlement are of very little significance for the final outcome.

Direct SWAPO - South Africa Talks (Not to be revealed)

4. No prospect in the short term as President Nyerere killed an Angolan/South African proposal for talks under UN chairmanship. We would like them to take place - even if they failed, they would not create more obstacles to a settlement than exist at present - but

do not advocate them in public or private as to do so would raise suspicions that we were seeking delay or speaking for South Africa, thus making them less likely. Botswana opposed (see telegram annexed).

Will Continue To Press South Africa

5. African governments complain that the Five have not put enough pressure on South Africa, and that this has allowed South Africa to prepare for an internal settlement. We can argue in response (a) that pressure from the Five has helped bring the negotiations as far as they have come; (b) that there is no alternative to obtaining South African consent and that threats and economic pressures would not have helped obtain this; and (c) that our opposition to the internal changes in Namibia has been made quite clear in public and private.

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 185

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 141118Z OCT

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 381 OF 14 OCTOBER 1988

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, SALISBURY, LUSAKA, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM  
AND MAPUTO.

NAMIBIA.

I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER (MOGWE) YESTERDAY, 13 OCTOBER, ON ONE OF HIS BRIEF VISITS TO BOTSWANA. HE MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS.

(A) HE WAS NOT UNDULY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE UN MISSION VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE THOUGHT IT JUST POSSIBLE THAT SOME PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE.

(B) HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE CONCEPT OF DIRECT TALKS AND WAS PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THE IDEA THAT THEY SHOULD BE KEPT SECRET.

(C) THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR NAMIBIA SHOULD NOT BE RAISED AT THIS JUNCTURE (A POINT WHICH PRESIDENT MASIRE MADE TO MR LUCE ON 2 OCTOBER). APART FROM GIVING THE SOUTH AFRICANS SCOPE FOR DELAYING THE ELECTIONS THE QUESTION OF RESERVED SEATS FOR THE WHITES (ON THE ZIMBABWE PATTERN) WOULD BE INTRODUCED. MOGWE THOUGHT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD ARGUE FOR 30 SEATS AND THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS STICKING POINT.

PAYNE

NAMIBIA LIMITED

S AF D

OADS

FUSD

UND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR E YOUDE

MR DAY

SIR L ALLINSON

LORD N G LENNOX

CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM

WAS NOT

ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Visit by the President of Botswana: Namibia

As promised in my letter of 24 October, I enclose a brief on Namibia for the Prime Minister's meeting with the President of Botswana at 1630 on 28 October. This takes into account the results of the UN Secretariat Mission to Pretoria last week, in so far as they have become apparent.

*Yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1



VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA

MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

We await Waldheim's Report to Security Council about  
Pretoria Talks

1. Little definite has emerged so far. We have the impression that the UN team may have made progress on the problem of UN impartiality and that agreement on date for implementation is not ruled out.

Public Signs of South African attitude Mixed

2. South African Foreign Minister has expressed doubt publicly about whether obstacles can be overcome, but Mudge (leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and Chairman of the Namibian Council of Ministers) said Namibian independence could become a feasible proposition by the end of 1981.

UN determined to persevere in Search for Agreement

3. Waldheim will consult Front Line States, the Five and SWAPO this week to explore a possible way forward, and hopes to report to the Security Council by the end of the week. The Five are ready to give maximum support to Waldheim.

Hope Front Line States will restrain advocates of sanctions  
in New York

4. Acknowledge that there is widespread impatience at lack of progress hitherto. But sanctions disastrous for Southern Africa.

## VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA

## MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LORD PRIVY SEAL

## NAMIBIA

ESSENTIAL FACTSWe await Waldheim's report to the Security Council about Pretoria Talks

1. The UN have asked us not to reveal knowledge of content or outcome of the talks but to sound a note of 'cautious optimism'.
  2. (not to be revealed). Mr Urquhart pressed hard for South African agreement for a date for implementation, arguing that for South Africa to stall on the very few remaining technical/military questions outstanding about the DMZ or to raise new problems which did not feature in the recent exchanges of correspondence about outstanding issues, would precipitate breakdown. In order to provide South Africa with some way round their domestic political problem over agreeing to UN elections, he offered a deal whereby South Africa would set a date early in 1981 on condition that there was agreement on composition of the UN force and that a pre-implementation meeting of the parties concerned (including the principal internal groups) would be held, perhaps before mid-December.
- UN Determined to Persevere in search for agreement (not to be revealed)
3. On 25 October Mr P W Botha agreed <sup>provisionally</sup> to 1 March 1981 as the date for implementation to begin. Mr Ahtisaari will consult President Nyerere on 28 October and urge him to convene a meeting of Front Line presidents in order to agree the text of a passage embodying the proposal in Mr Waldheim's report to the Security Council. In order to hold the situation in New York it will be important for Mr Waldheim to report by 31 October. Meanwhile there will be no public comment by the UN (nor should there be by the five) on the outcome of the talks.
  4. The UN team did well. They came away more hopeful than they have been for the best part of 2 years that agreement might be possible. They began the process of re-establishing trust between the UN and the DTA and appear at last to have got through to Mr P W Botha the seriousness of the present crisis in the negotiations. The proposed all-parties meeting, which we have entertained for some time, could enable the South African Government

/to



to agree to implementation by associating the internal parties with the decision. The chief danger is that a number of contentious issues, including the status of local Namibian forces and the internal ministerial council during the transition, could wreck the pre-implementation meeting, if not resolved beforehand.

Hope Front Line States will restrain advocates of sanctions in New York

5. [Not to be revealed]. Debate on sanctions postponed from 25 September as a result of front line pressure. While talks appear inconclusive, there will be strong pressure for early Security Council action.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEPARTMENT  
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

27 OCTOBER 1980

BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Zimbabwe

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Grateful for Botswana's contribution to settlement. Hope the end of the war and lifting of sanctions have had beneficial effect on Botswanan economy.

Reconstruction

2. HMG giving Zimbabwe Government all possible help in this critical reconstruction period (aid, military assistance, debt cancellation). We continue to press our friends in the West to provide generous aid for Zimbabwe. A fair start has been made, but we hope others will match our aid offer. Stability in Zimbabwe central to well-being of whole region.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

Botswanan Contribution to Settlement

1. President Khama was a moderating influence with other Front Line States; supported British policies at sensitive stages of Lancaster House negotiations and of Governor's administrations.

Refugees

2. All the 21,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana were returned before the February elections.

Aid for Zimbabwe

3. Britain has pledged £75 million for commitment over three years, to include £12 million grant for immediate reconstruction £1 million to UNHCR for refugees, £0.5 million for joint funding with voluntary agencies and a £10 million loan to provide essential equipment in support of rehabilitation work. Tentative allocation of the remainder agreed during ODA mission's visit in June. Plans being finalized for a £40 million land resettlement programme to be funded jointly by British and Zimbabwe Governments.

4. HMG cancelled £22 million of pre-UDI Rhodesian debts, rescheduled remaining £33 million on liberal terms.

5. Military assistance programme to April 1981 costs £3 million. One hundred and thirty seven instructors now in Zimbabwe. Planned that a reduced British team will remain after next April.

International Aid

6. Total initial pledges so far US\$400 million. World Bank and other multilateral agencies have yet to announce their programmes. After accession to Lomé, expected in November, Zimbabwe will qualify

for Community aid.

Internal Developments

7. Trial of Edgar Tekere (Manpower Planning Minister and ZANU-PF Secretary-General) for murdering white farmer due to begin on 3 November. His (British) Defence Counsel has applied for the white judge in the case to be withdrawn on the grounds that as a member of the judiciary during UDI, he is not fit to conduct the trial.

8. Steady progress continues with military amalgamation. By end October nine amalgamated ZANLA and ZIPRA battalions will have been formed. ZANLA and ZIPRA still in assembly places being moved to housing compounds near Salisbury and Bulawayo. Following deterioration in security situation in September, Mugabe ordered deployment of army and police units to control dissident elements outside assembly places. This has improved security.

Central African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980



BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, Maputo  
27-28 November

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Aware of President Masire's strong commitment to economic cooperation among Southern African States.
2. Very much hope that it will be possible for Mr Marten to attend Maputo Conference in November.
3. We see primary role of Conference as that of identifying sensible, economically sound projects, particularly in transport and agricultural sectors, which will bring real economic benefits to whole region.
4. This practical economic objective seems to us of greater immediate importance than economic disengagement from South Africa.
5. (If pressed on UK pledge at Conference). We are already providing significant aid funds to SADC countries on bilateral basis, particularly in transport and agricultural sectors. We will do what we can within the limits of our resources to maintain a prominent position in these fields, whether through bilateral or regional assistance.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. In July 1979, the five Front Line States held meeting in Arusha, chaired by (then) Vice-President Masire, to discuss ways in which they might increase regional economic cooperation, with particular reference to reducing dependence on South Africa, and secure increased aid from international community. Donors, including UK, attended mainly at official level. Further meeting held in Lusaka in April 1980, to which other independent countries of the region (Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zimbabwe) were invited. No donors present. Masire, who is strongly committed to Southern Africa Development Coordination (SADC) played active part at Lusaka meeting, main decision of which was to hold a further Conference with donors in Maputo in November.
2. Maputo Conference is designed to seek pledges from donors. Mr Marten has informed President Masire that, parliamentary business permitting, he will attend. [Not to be revealed] A pledge of £10 million to be announced at the meeting by Mr Marten is under consideration.
3. Main focus of Maputo Conference likely to be on possible regional projects in transport/communications and agriculture/food sectors. We would support this general thrust and indeed, if a UK pledge is agreed, would be prepared to help finance economically-sound development projects in both these areas.
4. South Africa hostile to Conference, seeing its primary aim to reduce their economic hold over region. UK objective at Conference should be to stress positive aspects: ie any projects undertaken





under SADC auspices should be directed not so much at economic disengagement from South Africa (which in any case is unrealistic for many SADC countries) but for economic and practical ends such as improving regional communications.

Central & Southern African Departments/  
Overseas Development Administration  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980

BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

North/South Dialogue

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Regret we were unable to reach consensus at UN Special Session on Global Negotiations. But discussion will continue during General Assembly. We will continue to work for successful launch of Global Negotiations on a generally acceptable basis.
2. Disagreement turns on an issue of principle. We believe integrity of Specialised Agencies should be preserved. Cannot accept that decisions of these Agencies should be overridden by a UN Conference. Significant that the countries responsible for the three major international currencies took same view.
3. North/South Summit (if raised). Mexicans have enquired whether we would accept an invitation, if offered; we replied that we would be willing to attend. Believe careful preparation essential.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Botswana is not very prominent in North/South discussions.
2. Special Session (25 August - 15 September) concentrated on procedures for Global Negotiations. Main issue was preservation of competence of Specialised Agencies, especially IMF and IBRD. After much discussion a text emerged which most developed countries were prepared to accept. However, the Americans decided to reject it as not sufficiently protecting the integrity of the International Financial Institutions. UK and Germany supported them, while rest of Community joined majority in favour. Agenda and procedures will be further discussed in General Assembly, beginning mid-November.
3. Special Session agreed on International Development Strategy for the decade. But this will only be adopted by General Assembly when outstanding issues on Global Negotiations have been settled.
4. UK has been criticised along with US and FRG (though relatively mildly at recent Commonwealth Finance Ministers and IMF/IBRD meetings). We have tried to play down failure of Session, expressing hope that quiet diplomacy will provide a solution, while remaining firm about the issue of principle.
5. Cuts in the aid programme have had a considerable effect, especially in recipient countries, on our reputation on North/South matters. UK was singled out, albeit inaccurately, by McNamara at IMF/IBRD meetings. (He claimed UK aid would fall from 0.52% of GNP in 1979 to 0.38% by 1985. Apart from his questionable assumptions about rate of GNP growth, we have taken no decision on aid spending that far ahead.)

6. North/South Summit. Date currently envisaged is March 1981. However some potential participants would like it postponed; the Mexicans have suggested that without progress on launching the Global Negotiations there will be little point in holding the Summit. Date may therefore slip. Meeting of sponsors (Mexico, Austria, Canada, Sweden, India, Nigeria, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Germany and France) will take place in Vienna on 7 November. From Africa on the Mexican invitation list for the Summit itself are Tanzania and possibly Senegal.

Economic Relations Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980



BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Energy

POINTS TO MAKE

General And Iran/Iraq

1. Oil price increases of 1979 severely damaging to world economy.
2. IEA countries determined to do what they can to prevent further price increases. Have responded to Iran/Iraq crisis rapidly and effectively. This is in interests of developing countries as well.
3. Because of lower demand for oil in OECD countries record stock levels, and willingness by some OPEC producers to increase production, short term effect on oil market of Iran/Iraq crisis should be manageable. But important that fighting should end quickly and Iran/Iraq production resume soon if more serious damage is to be avoided.

Oil Embargo

4. [Defensive] British policy is not to interfere with trade relations with South Africa. HMG do not support calls for oil embargo against South Africa. Fully understand damage this would do to Botswana.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. IEA member governments considered the implications of the Iran/Iraq crisis on 1 and 21 October and agreed that overall supply of IEA and other countries could be managed so as to meet demand over the next few months despite the loss of all Iraqi/Iranian exports (about 3.5m bpd). IEA demand for oil is low compared to recent years; IEA stocks are at record level; and OPEC producers, in particular Saudi Arabia, have partially offset the loss in Iran/Iraq production. Nevertheless situation could deteriorate. IEA countries have agreed to urge companies to refrain from abnormal purchases on the spot market and to ensure that supply and demand is balanced in the fourth quarter by drawing down on stocks. The explosion of spot prices caused by panic buying by the oil companies was main cause of 1979 price increases.
2. Botswana is concerned not just about oil prices but also about security of supply. She has no refineries of her own and depends entirely on South Africa for supplies of product. (Last year Ministers agreed that BP could swap UKCS crude for non-embargoed crude for delivery of the latter to South Africa). She has been looking for alternative supplies from Saudi Arabia but has had no success so far. In 1979 Botswana asked about the possibility of UKCS supply but accepted that the guidelines ruled out exports to destinations outside EC and IEA countries. She could in theory now receive supplies through Zimbabwe.

Energy, Science & Space Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980



BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Iran/Iraq

POINTS TO MAKE

The Fighting

1. Iraqi armed forces making slow progress in their advance on Abadan and Khorramshahr. Iranians still fiercely resisting. Little hope at present for an early ceasefire.
2. Risk of fighting spreading to include neighbouring countries has receded for present, but the supply of arms to either side by third parties could prolong the war.

UK Attitude

3. Deep concern over threat to free navigation through the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf. Discussing protection with allies.
4. UN and Islamic Conference best channels to prevent widening or extended conflict. Iranian Prime Minister seems to want Mr Waldheim to mediate. But neither side ready to negotiate and outlook gloomy.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

Situation on the Ground

1. In the last two days the Iraqi offensive aimed at capturing key ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan, has made slow but steady progress. Iraqi tanks now encircle the two towns and Ahwaz is under constant bombardment. Street fighting continues.

Attempts at Mediation

2. Prospects for a fresh Security Council Resolution are slim. The emergency session of the Security Council ended on 20 October. Both Iran and Iraq presented their cases on standard lines. However, there are recent signs that Iran would welcome an initiative by the Secretary General to bring the war to an end.
3. The Islamic Conference has renewed its efforts at mediation. The Secretary-General, Habib Chatti, has visited Iraq and Iran, and had discussions with President Bani Sadr and Khomeini. Following his meeting with Habib Chatti, President Bani Sadr announced that he had received a fresh proposal for a delegation of several Islamic Heads of State. He is to submit this proposal to the Iranian Defence Council for consideration.
4. The new Non-Aligned Movement good-will mission will shortly be under way. Six NAM foreign ministers are to visit Iran and Iraq in a fresh bid to stop the fighting.
5. In Beirut the Palestine leader, Abu Azad, has published a peace plan proposed by the PLO. The four point plan includes a ceasefire followed by Iraqi unilateral retreat back to the frontiers of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, or the Treaty of Constantinople of 1914, together with an Iranian agreement for negotiations in a



neutral country and control over the Iraqi retreat by Islamic and Non-Aligned countries.

Straits of Hormuz: Consultations with our Allies

[may be freely used]

6. With naval forces in the region, we are consulting with the Americans about how we might use our ships if it became necessary to ensure continued access to the Gulf by merchant ships. The Americans have put on record their intention to keep the Straits of Hormuz open. Objective of any action should, in our view, be to restore confidence of world shipping community. Meanwhile, vital not to provoke precisely the incident we are hoping to avoid by precipitate action. Our two warships in the area are under orders now to stay outside and patrol the Gulf of Oman. We have other war ships in the Indian Ocean which are currently taking part in a naval exercise with the US 7th Fleet.

7. We have informed the President of the UAE, Shaikh Zaid, that, in the spirit of our Friendship Treaty, we are ready to consider giving what military help we can. The Director of Military Assistance Overseas (a former commander of the Sultan of Oman's Army) Major General Perkins flew to the Gulf on 23 October.

Oil

8. As a recent IEA statement makes clear, the position on oil supplies gives no cause for immediate concern. Total loss of Iran/Iraq oil is 3.6 to 3.8 mbpd (15% OPEC and 10% of Western total imports). There has been some increase in other Gulf OPEC production (one mbpd). IEA countries still have several months surplus. But if the war drags on, anxieties will rise and psychological factors could lead countries to resort to the spot market, even though the situation does not warrant this.

BOTSWANA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE TO BRITAIN 27-31 OCTOBER 1980

Afghanistan

POINTS TO MAKE

UN

1. UNGA debate on Afghanistan an opportunity to maintain pressure on Soviet Union. Hope Botswana will speak up to condemn continued Soviet occupation.

Afghan Precedent

2. If Soviet Union is left to consolidate hold on Afghanistan they will be encouraged to meddle elsewhere.

Neutrality: EEC Proposal

3. The proposal for neutrality and non-alignment put forward by UK and the Nine continues to offer basis for a genuine political settlement.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Botswana voted in favour of January UNGA resolution condemning Soviet invasion and is member of non-aligned movement.
2. It is as yet unclear whether a satisfactory resolution will emerge from current Islamic drafting committee. We are discreetly trying to encourage firm wording.
3. Within Afghanistan the 85,000 Soviet troops and advisers have so far failed to break the will of the resistance to continue the war. Soviet helicopter gunships have played effective but not decisive role. On the ground reprisals against villages have not halted supplies to the insurgents. The training and equipment of Soviet forces for mountain warfare is now better than earlier this year. But, despite the continuing failure of exiled resistance leaders to form a United Front, the resistance groups are also better equipped and more experienced. A long campaign lies ahead. The winter will bring problems for both sides. The Russians appear resigned to this and despite continuing casualties, will take whatever action is necessary to avoid military defeat. Rivalries between the two wings of the Afghan People's Party are as bad as ever.

South Asian Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
22 October 1980

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, AND MRS MASIRE

---

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Monday 27 October

Arrival

The President and Mrs Masire and party will arrive on flight BA 645, London Heathrow Airport, Terminal 1. As soon as the aircraft doors open a representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party to the aircraft. The Botswana High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe will board the aircraft and escort the President and Mrs Masire to the tarmac. The following will be at the aircraft steps (in order):-

The Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty  
The Queen.

Sir Edwin Arrowsmith, Special Representative of the Secretary  
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr and Mrs W Turner, British High Commissioner, Botswana.

Brigadier J A C Cowan, Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund.

Mr Robert Swann, Escort Officer.

The Hon Diana Makgill, Lady Escort Officer.

The Lord Hamilton will greet the President and Mrs Masire on behalf of The Queen and will take them down the receiving line. The party

/will



will then proceed by car to the de Havilland Suite. There the Botswana High Commissioner will present members of his staff and their wives.

Transport

Cars are provided for the official suite and seating arrangements are described at Annex 1.

Tuesday 28 October

Procedure at the Guard of Honour ceremony is described at Annex 2.

All members of the official party will be present at Horseguards Parade. When the President and Mrs Masire depart with the Prime Minister for 10 Downing Street the members of the party will proceed to Downing Street where the cars will be waiting. They will depart with the President and Mrs Masire.

Call by the Lord Privy Seal

The following members of the Botswana suite will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President

Senior Private Secretary.

Call on the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:-

Botswana

Minister of External Affairs

/Minister

Botswana (cont'd)

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

Senior Private Secretary.

United Kingdom

Mr Luce, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr D M Day, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs.

Mr B L Barder, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Private Secretary.

Wednesday 29 October

The following will accompany the President to Shinfield:-

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President.

Call by Mr Walker

The following will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary

Counsellor, Botswana High Commission.

/Audience



Audience of HRH The Prince of Wales

The President and Mrs Masire only will have an Audience of The Prince of Wales. His Royal Highness will receive the President and Mrs Masire at the Grand Entrance and take them to the Belgian Suite.

Thursday 30 October

Visit to the Tower of London, Mansion House and Guildhall

The President and Mrs Masire will be accompanied by:-

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe

Permanent Secretary to the President

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary

Personal Secretary.

Visit to Diamond Trading Company

The Minister of External Affairs will join the party.

Call by Mr Callaghan

The following will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President

/Secretary

Call by Mr Callaghan (cont'd)

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary.

Friday 31 October

Departure

On departure the President and Mrs Masire will be received at the Alcock and Brown Suite by a representative of the British Airports Authority who will conduct them inside the building where they will be received by the Lord-in-Waiting.

The Lord-in-Waiting will accompany them to the aircraft where the following will bid farewell:-

The Hon Diana Makgill

Mr R Swann

Brigadier J A C Cowan

Mr and Mrs W Turner

Botswana High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe

Sir Edwin Arrowsmith, Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Finally Lord Hamilton will bid farewell on behalf of The Queen.



MOTOR CAR ARRANGEMENTSMONDAY 27 OCTOBERFrom London Heathrow Airport to Hyde Park Hotel

Car P	H.E. The President H.E. Mr A W Kgarebe Mr R Swann Det Insp Lowe
Car 1	Mrs Masire Mrs A W Kgarebe The Hon. Diana Makgill Ms M Motlogelwa
Car 2	The Hon A M Mogwe Mr & Mrs W Turner Det Sgt Muir
Car 3	The Hon P S Mmusi Mr P L Steenkamp Brig. J A C Cowan Mr L M Mpotokwane
Car 4	Mr O K Matambo Mr M L Selepeng Mr J Mogopodi

TUESDAY 28 OCTOBERFrom Hyde Park Hotel to Horseguards Parade

as for journey from airport to hotel

10 Downing Street to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to Horseguards Parade, except that Mrs Turner will travel in car 1 for Mrs Masire's programme.

Hyde Park Hotel to Admiralty House

as for journey from 10 Downing Street to Hotel.

Admiralty House to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to Admiralty House.

Hyde Park Hotel to 10 Downing Street

Car P                    HE The President  
                          HE Mr A W Kgarebe  
                          Mr R Swann  
                          Det Insp Lowe

Car 2                    The Hon A M Mogwe  
                          The Hon P S Mmusi  
                          Mr W Turner  
                          Mr M L Selepeng  
                          Det Sgt Muir

10 Downing Street to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to 10 Downing Street

Hyde Park Hotel to 10 Downing Street and return

as for journey from airport to hotel.



WEDNESDAY 29 OCTOBER

Hyde Park Hotel to Shinfield and return

Car P            H.E. The President  
                  H.E. Mr A W Kgarebe  
                  Mr R Swann  
                  Det Insp Lowe

Car 2            The Hon P S Mmusi  
                  Mr W Turner  
                  Mr P L Steenkamp  
                  Det Sgt Muir

Hyde Park Hotel to Buckingham Palace and return

Car P            HE The President and Mrs Masire  
                  Mr R Swann  
                  Det Insp Lowe

Hyde Park Hotel to High Commissioner's  
Residence and return

Car P            HE The President and Mrs Masire  
                  Mr R Swann

Car 1            The Hon A M Mogwe  
                  The Hon P S Mmusi  
                  Mr P L Steenkamp  
                  Mr L M Mpotokwane

/Thursday 30 October

Thursday 30 October

Hyde Park Hotel to Tower of London, Mansion House, Guildhall, and  
Diamond Trading Company

car P            HE The President  
                  HE A W Kgarebe  
                  Mr R Swann  
                  Det Insp Lowe

car 1            Mrs Masire  
                  Mrs A W Kgarebe  
                  The Hon Diana Makgill  
                  Ms M Motlogelwa

car 2            The Hon P S Mmusi  
                  Mr and Mrs Turner  
                  Mr P L Steenkamp  
                  Mr L M Mpotokwane

car 3            will take The Hon A W Mogwe from Hyde Park  
                  Hotel to join the party at the Diamond Trading  
                  Company.

Diamond Trading Company to Hyde Park Hotel

as on journey from Hotel to Diamond Trading Company except that  
Mr Mpotokwane will travel in car 3 with The Hon A W Mogwe

Hyde Park Hotel to Westminster Abbey

and return and

Hyde Park Hotel to Commonwealth Institute and return and

Friday 31 October

Hyde Park Hotel to London Heathrow Airport

As on journey from airport to hotel



DISTRIBUTION

PS to HRH The Prince of Wales (1)

10 Downing Street

PS to The Prime Minister (2)

Press Office (1)

Botswana High Commission (6)

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

PS to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (2)

PS/LPS (2)

PS/PUS (1)

Mr D M Day (1)

Sir L Allinson (1)

Mr B L Barder (1)

Mr M Long, South Africa Department (6)

News Department (3)

Commonwealth Co-Ordination Department (1)

Security Department (1)

Resident Clerk (1)

Protocol and Conference Department (6)

Overseas Development Administration

PS/Mr Marten (2)

Government Hospitality Fund

Brigadier J A C Cowan (1)

Mr C Taylor (1)

Mr M Snell (2)

GUARD OF HONOUR  
PROCEDURE

1. The President's car will draw up directly in front of the Guard of Honour, between and slightly behind the two Colour Points. After the formal meeting and introduction between the Prime Minister and the President, the President will turn to face the Guard, standing centrally between the two Colour Points. The Prime Minister will stand on the President's right.

Royal Salute

2. As soon as the President is in position, the Guard Commander will order the Royal Salute. The Guard of Honour will present arms, the Colour will be lowered, and the Band will play the Republic of Botswana National Anthem. The President will acknowledge the Salute as long as the Band plays.

3. At the end of the Salute the Guard Commander will prepare his Guard for inspection.

The Inspection

4. The Guard Commander will approach the President, salute with his sword, and invite the President to inspect the Guard of Honour. He will then escort the President to the right flank of the Guard of Honour, walking on his right. The Prime Minister will remain in the vicinity of the Colour Points.

5. The Band is not inspected. During the inspection, which is of the front only of the two ranks, the Guard Commander will maintain his position beside the President. The Ensign carrying the Colour is positioned three paces in front of the Centre of the front rank. The President will pass behind the Colour and should acknowledge it (to his right). The inspection will be completed at the right flank of the rear rank and here the Guard Commander will take leave of the President by again saluting with his sword.

6. Towards the conclusion of the inspection the Prime Minister will move to the right flank of the Guard of Honour. Once the Guard Commander has taken leave of the President, the Prime Minister will escort the President across the front of the Guard of Honour, (both acknowledging the Colour to the left as they pass), to the Garden Gate of No 10 Downing Street. The Guard of Honour will remain in the inspection position until the President and Prime Minister have entered No 10 Downing Street.





ANNEX B

His Excellency Dr O K J Masire, President of the Republic of Botswana and Mrs Masire will be accompanied by:

Mr A M Mogwe, MBE,  
Minister of External Affairs

Mr P S Mmusi,  
Minister of Finance and Development Planning

Mr P L Steenkamp, MBE,  
Permanent Secretary to the President and Secretary to the Cabinet

Mr L M Mpotokwane,  
Secretary for External Affairs

Mr O K Matambo,  
Director of Economic Affairs

Mr M L Selepeng,  
Senior Private Secretary to the President

Mr J Mogopodi,  
Senior Private Secretary to the President

Ms M Motlogelwa,  
Personal Secretary to Mrs Masire



VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, AND MRS MASIRE

---

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Monday 27 October

Arrival

The President and Mrs Masire and party will arrive on flight BA 645, London Heathrow Airport, Terminal 1. As soon as the aircraft doors open a representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party to the aircraft. The Botswana High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe will board the aircraft and escort the President and Mrs Masire to the tarmac. The following will be at the aircraft steps (in order):-

The Lord Hamilton of Dalzell, Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty  
The Queen.

Sir Edwin Arrowsmith, Special Representative of the Secretary  
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr and Mrs W Turner, British High Commissioner, Botswana.

Brigadier J A C Cowan, Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund.

Mr Robert Swann, Escort Officer.

The Hon Diana Makgill, Lady Escort Officer.

The Lord Hamilton will greet the President and Mrs Masire on behalf of The Queen and will take them down the receiving line. The party

/will

will then proceed by car to the de Havilland Suite. There the Botswana High Commissioner will present members of his staff and their wives.

#### Transport

Cars are provided for the official suite and seating arrangements are described at Annex 1.

#### Tuesday 28 October

Procedure at the Guard of Honour ceremony is described at Annex 2.

All members of the official party will be present at Horseguards Parade. When the President and Mrs Masire depart with the Prime Minister for 10 Downing Street the members of the party will proceed to Downing Street where the cars will be waiting. They will depart with the President and Mrs Masire.

#### Call by the Lord Privy Seal

The following members of the Botswana suite will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President

Senior Private Secretary.

#### Call on the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:-

#### Botswana

Minister of External Affairs

/Minister



Botswana (cont'd)

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

Senior Private Secretary.

United Kingdom

Mr Luce, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr D M Day, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs.

Mr B L Barder, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Private Secretary.

Wednesday 29 October

The following will accompany the President to Shinfield:-

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President.

Call by Mr Walker

The following will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary

Counsellor, Botswana High Commission.

/Audience

Audience of HRH The Prince of Wales

The President and Mrs Masire only will have an Audience of The Prince of Wales. His Royal Highness will receive the President and Mrs Masire at the Grand Entrance and take them to the Belgian Suite.

Thursday 30 October

Visit to the Tower of London, Mansion House and Guildhall

The President and Mrs Masire will be accompanied by:-

Minister of Finance and Development Planning

High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe

Permanent Secretary to the President

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary

Personal Secretary.

Visit to Diamond Trading Company

The Minister of External Affairs will join the party.

Call by Mr Callaghan

The following will also be present:-

Minister of External Affairs

High Commissioner

Permanent Secretary to the President

/Secretary



Call by Mr Callaghan (cont'd)

Secretary for External Affairs

Senior Private Secretary.

Friday 31 October

Departure

On departure the President and Mrs Masire will be received at the Alcock and Brown Suite by a representative of the British Airports Authority who will conduct them inside the building where they will be received by the Lord-in-Waiting.

The Lord-in-Waiting will accompany them to the aircraft where the following will bid farewell:-

The Hon Diana Makgill

Mr R Swann

Brigadier J A C Cowan

Mr and Mrs W Turner

Botswana High Commissioner and Mrs Kgarebe

Sir Edwin Arrowsmith, Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Finally Lord Hamilton will bid farewell on behalf of The Queen.

MOTOR CAR ARRANGEMENTSMONDAY 27 OCTOBERFrom London Heathrow Airport to Hyde Park Hotel

Car P	H.E. The President H.E. Mr A W Kgarebe Mr R Swann Det Insp Lowe
Car 1	Mrs Masire Mrs A W Kgarebe The Hon. Diana Makgill Ms M Motlogelwa
Car 2	The Hon A M Mogwe Mr & Mrs W Turner Det Sgt Muir
Car 3	The Hon P S Mmusi Mr P L Steenkamp Brig. J A C Cowan Mr L M Mpotokwane
Car 4	Mr O K Matambo Mr M L Selepeng Mr J Nogopodi

TUESDAY 28 OCTOBERFrom Hyde Park Hotel to Horseguards Parade

as for journey from airport to hotel



10 Downing Street to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to Horseguards Parade, except that Mrs Turner will travel in car 1 for Mrs Masire's programme.

Hyde Park Hotel to Admiralty House

as for journey from 10 Downing Street to Hotel.

Admiralty House to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to Admiralty House.

Hyde Park Hotel to 10 Downing Street

Car P            HE The President  
                  HE Mr A W Kgarebe  
                  Mr R Swann  
                  Det Insp Lowe

Car 2            The Hon A M Mogwe  
                  The Hon P S Mmusi  
                  Mr W Turner  
                  Mr M L Selepeng  
                  Det Sgt Muir

10 Downing Street to Hyde Park Hotel

as for journey from hotel to 10 Downing Street

Hyde Park Hotel to 10 Downing Street and return

as for journey from airport to hotel.

WEDNESDAY 29 OCTOBER

Hyde Park Hotel to Shinfield and return

Car P                    H.E. The President  
                             H.E. Mr A W Kgarebe  
                             Mr R Swann  
                             Det Insp Lowe

Car 2                    The Hon P S Mmusi  
                             Mr W Turner  
                             Mr P L Steenkamp  
                             Det Sgt Muir

Hyde Park Hotel to Buckingham Palace and return

Car P                    HE The President and Mrs Masire  
                             Mr R Swann  
                             Det Insp Lowe

Hyde Park Hotel to High Commissioner's  
Residence and return

Car P                    HE The President and Mrs Masire  
                             Mr R Swann

Car 1                    The Hon A M Mogwe  
                             The Hon P S Mmusi  
                             Mr P L Steenkamp  
                             Mr L M Mpotokwane

/Thursday 30 October



Thursday 30 October

Hyde Park Hotel to Tower of London, Mansion House, Guildhall, and  
Diamond Trading Company

car P            HE The President  
                  <sup>Mr</sup>  
                  HE A W Kgarebe  
                  <sup>Mr</sup>  
                  Mr R Swann  
                  Det Insp Lowe

car 1            Mrs Masire  
                  Mrs A W Kgarebe  
                  The Hon Diana Makgill  
                  Ms M Motlogelwa

car 2            The Hon P S Mmusi  
                  Mr and Mrs Turner  
                  Mr P L Steenkamp  
                  Mr L M Mpotokwane

car 3            will take The Hon A W Mogwe from Hyde Park  
                  Hotel to join the party at the Diamond Trading  
                  Company.

Diamond Trading Company to Hyde Park Hotel

as on journey from Hotel to Diamond Trading Company except that  
Mr Mpotokwane will travel in car 3 with The Hon A W Mogwe

Hyde Park Hotel to Westminster Abbey

and return and

Hyde Park Hotel to Commonwealth Institute and return and

Friday 31 October

Hyde Park Hotel to London Heathrow Airport

As on journey from airport to hotel

DISTRIBUTION

PS to HRH The Prince of Wales (1)

10 Downing Street

PS to The Prime Minister (2)

Press Office (1)

Botswana High Commission (6)

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

PS to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (2)

PS/LPS (2)

PS/PUS (1)

Mr D M Day (1)

Sir L Allinson (1)

Mr B L Barder (1)

Mr M Long, South Africa Department (6)

News Department (3)

Commonwealth Co-Ordination Department (1)

Security Department (1)

Resident Clerk (1)

Protocol and Conference Department (6)

Overseas Development Administration

PS/Mr Marten (2)

Government Hospitality Fund

Brigadier J A G Cowan (1)

Mr C Taylor (1)

Mr M Snell (2)



GUARD OF HONOUR  
PROCEDURE

1. The President's car will draw up directly in front of the Guard of Honour, between and slightly behind the two Colour Points. After the formal meeting and introduction between the Prime Minister and the President, the President will turn to face the Guard, standing centrally between the two Colour Points. The Prime Minister will stand on the President's right.

Royal Salute

2. As soon as the President is in position, the Guard Commander will order the Royal Salute. The Guard of Honour will present arms, the Colour will be lowered, and the Band will play the Republic of Botswana National Anthem. The President will acknowledge the Salute as long as the Band plays.

3. At the end of the Salute the Guard Commander will prepare his Guard for inspection.

The Inspection

4. The Guard Commander will approach the President, salute with his sword, and invite the President to inspect the Guard of Honour. He will then escort the President to the right flank of the Guard of Honour, walking on his right. The Prime Minister will remain in the vicinity of the Colour Points.

5. The Band is not inspected. During the inspection, which is of the front only of the two ranks, the Guard Commander will maintain his position beside the President. The Ensign carrying the Colour is positioned three paces in front of the Centre of the front rank. The President will pass behind the Colour and should acknowledge it (to his right). The inspection will be completed at the right flank of the rear rank and here the Guard Commander will take leave of the President by again saluting with his sword.

6. Towards the conclusion of the inspection the Prime Minister will move to the right flank of the Guard of Honour. Once the Guard Commander has taken leave of the President, the Prime Minister will escort the President across the front of the Guard of Honour, (both acknowledging the Colour to the left as they pass), to the Garden Gate of No 10 Downing Street. The Guard of Honour will remain in the inspection position until the President and Prime Minister have entered No 10 Downing Street.

HORSE GUARDS BUILDING

Lord  
Roberts

BAND  
and  
CORPS  
of  
DRUMS

Chinese  
mortar

Chinese  
mortar

GUARD OF HONOUR

Colour

GARDEN  
ENTRANCE

10

DOWNING  
STREET

Carriageway

Colour points - MRS HASLIE  
- ESCORTS.

ENTOURAGE + HIGH COMMISSION STAFF.

Barriers

Barriers

→ → → →  
President's walk.  
X Prime Minister joins the President.  
Y Mrs Marine joins the President + the Prime Minister.  
Horse Guards Parade - South Side

Horse Guards Approach Road



RESTRICTED

BSG

1) BF 17/10/80  
2) BF 27/10/80

cc: Miss Stephens  
✓ Sue Goodchild

13 October 1980

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA

1 The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 9 October about the visit of President Masire. She has agreed to invite the President to dinner on the evening of Tuesday 28 October. The meal will be for 32 guests, and I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft guest list as soon as possible.

2 The Prime Minister would also be prepared to have talks with President Masire from 1630-1715 on the same day. I should be grateful to receive a brief the previous day.

M. OD. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

NWM

①

RESTRICTED



Prime Minister  
Apce Dinner for 32 on 28 October  
and talks from 16:30 - 17:15 the same  
day?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1980

Paul Yes no.

Dear Michael,

Visit of President of Botswana

In your letter of 20 September you said that the Prime Minister had agreed to receive President Masire of Botswana during his forthcoming official visit to Britain, and give a small lunch in his honour if a suitable date could be set.

We have just heard that the President wishes to visit London between Monday 27 October and Thursday 30 October. These dates are not very convenient as Her Majesty The Queen will be away on her Maghreb tour; the Prime Minister will be entertaining M. Thorn on 27 October and is not free for lunch on the other days of the President's visit; and Lord Carrington will be in Hungary and Poland. However the visit comes at the end of a European tour which President Masire begins on 18 October (he will arrive here from Oslo) and it would be very difficult to persuade him to change his dates.

President Masire will naturally understand that at such short notice we could not manage the level of attention we would have wished: but we hope that the Prime Minister will nevertheless be able to entertain Dr Masire. I understand that the Prime Minister might be able to invite the President to dinner on the evening of Tuesday 28 October. We would also like to recommend that the Prime Minister should receive the President for a short session of formal talks lasting perhaps three quarters of an hour, on 28 or 29 October.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

RESTRICTED



20 September, 1980.

Visit of President of Botswana

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 18 September about a possible visit by President Masire of Botswana. She agrees that he should be invited to be an official guest of HMG. She has also agreed to receive President Masire and give a small lunch in his honour if a suitable day can be found. The Prime Minister's programme for mid-November is very heavy: the sooner we can discuss dates, the better.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SL

20  
/

1.



Prime Minister  
Agree to receive  
President Masire,  
& offer lunch if  
he is here on  
a suitable date?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

- Yes - but I hope he won't  
bother me about -  
18 September 1980

Dear Michael,

MA 19/ix

more aid  
not

Visit of President of Botswana to Britain

President Masire, the new President of Botswana, has been invited to address the European Parliament at the end of October (probably between 27 and 30 October) in Luxembourg. Thereafter he will undertake a tour of several European countries, and has indicated to our High Commission that he would like to visit Britain at the end of the tour for two to three days about mid-November 1980. He has said he wishes to discuss bilateral aid and other matters during his visit.

This will be the new President's first visit to Britain following his election in July this year after the death of President Khama. Although the timing of such a visit is not ideal - Ministers are already heavily engaged during November - it would be a useful fillip for our political relations to ensure that the new President is accorded suitable treatment on this, his first visit to Britain as President. He visited the UK briefly in June this year as Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning. He called on the Secretary of State and Mr Luce and was included in the Prime Minister's party to view the Trooping of the Colour ceremony. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore recommends to the Prime Minister that we should extend to President Masire a formal invitation to be the official guest of HMG in mid-November. If the Prime Minister agrees and if she is in London when the precise dates of the visit are agreed, the Secretary of State also recommends that the Prime Minister should receive President Masire and perhaps give a small lunch in his honour. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is also recommending that the President should be received by Her Majesty The Queen.

yours ever  
Ronnie Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



