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FILE TITLE: Deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe		SERIES DEFENCE
Modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe.		PART: 5
PART BEGINS: 5 July 1984	PART ENDS: 31. March 1989	CAB ONE: 

PREM 19/2616

SECRET

PART 5 ends:-

PM to Martens (T636/89)

31. 3. 89.

PART 6 begins:-

CDP to FCO (Wall) 3. 4. 89



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 636189

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT cc Maiter
OPS

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 March 1989

Dear Prime Minister,

I want to congratulate you on the Tenth Anniversary of your first appointment as Prime Minister. They say the first ten years are the most difficult!

Over the last ten years, we have both had to take difficult decisions, for instance on control of public expenditure and on the installation of cruise missiles. Our decisions have been thoroughly vindicated by events.

Our most testing challenge now is in East/West relations. Of course we support what Mr. Gorbachev is doing in the Soviet Union. But I am convinced that one crucial factor pushing him in the right direction is that he faces a NATO that is strong and united. One crucial element in that is to keep our defences up to date. The nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace in Europe for over forty years, and we recognised, both in the WEU platform and in last year's NATO Summit statement, that security in our continent will continue for the foreseeable future to be based on nuclear deterrence. This means that decisions on updating the means of assuring deterrence will have to be taken. The NATO Summit at the end of May provides an occasion for doing so.

Such decisions will not come as a surprise to the Soviet Union. They are themselves updating their entire range of nuclear capable forces. Land-based SNF systems held by Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have been extensively modernised over the last five years and the USSR has begun to transfer these new systems to Warsaw pact allies. This Soviet modernisation enables the Russians to fill any gap created by the elimination of systems under the INF Treaty. NATO, too, must be in a position to restructure its forces as well. This is not a wrong signal. This is the expected signal, and I shall be making the point when I see Mr. Gorbachev in London on 5 April.

These are difficult issues for our public to understand. As with the installation of cruise missiles, our countries need strong leadership and careful preparation to understand that negotiations succeed from a position of strength. I realise you face many domestic pressures. But I believe it is vital that the NATO Summit at the end of May gives a clear signal of our determination to keep all our defences up to date. It would be very damaging if anything were said or done before the NATO Summit that signalled weakness on NATO's part.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Stubbart

His Excellency Mr. Wilfried Martens.

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301030Z MAR 89
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO AIRBORNE 008 DESKBY 301630Z
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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FOLLOWING FROM FCO.

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OF 301030Z MARCH 89
INFO DESKBY 310900Z BRUSSELS
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, NEW DELHI

CABINET OFFICE TO PASS TO PS TO PRIME MINISTER ON AIRCRAFT
BETWEEN HARARE AND BLANTYRE (DESKBY 301630Z)
NEW DELHI FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

POSSIBLE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO M MARTENS ON DEFENCE

1. THE EMBASSY IN BRUSSELS HAVE REPORTED THAT THERE IS REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL, AS A RESULT OF INTERNAL PARTY POLITICAL MANOEUVRINGS, COME OUT DURING THE NEXT WEEK WITH A STATEMENT OR POSITION AGAINST SNF MODERNISATION. THIS WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THEIR RECENT ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE BELGIAN DEFENCE PROGRAMME WHICH REFLECT INADEQUATE FUNDING AND THE ABANDONMENT OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT NATO TASKS.
2. THE EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT ONLY THE ACTIVE INTERVENTION BY M MARTENS COULD PREVENT THE ISSUING OF A STATEMENT ON SNF AND THAT A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT HELP PERSUADE HIM IN THIS SENSE. A CONVENIENT PEG ON WHICH TO HANG SUCH A MESSAGE IS THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY ON 3 APRIL OF HIS FIRST APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM (HIS PERIOD IN OFFICE SINCE THEN HAS BEEN ALMOST, BUT NOT QUITE, CONTINUOUS: THERE WAS A GAP OF 3 MONTHS IN 1981). THE THEMES OF SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD BE THAT RECENT HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN THE DEFENCE FIELD DO IN THE END PAY OFF, THAT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH MR GORBACHEV IS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY FROM A POSITION OF SOUND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING IN THE TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT TO MAKE THE TAKING OF SENSIBLE DECISIONS AT THAT SUMMIT MORE DIFFICULT.
3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS BEEN CONSULTED AND ENDORSES THE IDEA OF SUCH A MESSAGE. A SUGGESTED TEXT IS IN MIFT.

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FM BRUSSELS

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 291745Z FCO FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

TELNO 111

OF 291710Z MARCH 89

AND TO DESKBY 300200Z NEW DELHI FOR THE PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MARTENS ON DEFENCE

1. FOLLOWING SETS OUT ELEMENTS FOR A POSSIBLE DRAFT MESSAGE FROM
MRS THATCHER TO PRIME MINISTER MARTENS:

BEGINS. I WISHED TO SEND A SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRATULATE YOU
ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER.
THEY SAY THE FIRST TEN YEARS ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT. I AM SURE
THAT YOU LIKE ME LOOK FORWARD TO BRINGING YOUR POLICIES TO
FRUITION IN THE NEXT DECADE.

WE HAVE BOTH HAD TO TAKE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS DURING OUR TIME
IN OFFICE NOT LEAST IN TERMS OF CONTROLLING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
AND RESTRUCTURING THE VERY SHAPE OF OUR SOCIETIES. WE HAVE BOTH
ALSO FACED UP TO PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRIES ON THE
INSTALLATION OF CRUISE MISSILES. YOUR COURAGEOUS DECISION, WHICH
I UNDERSTAND CAUSED MAJOR DIVISIONS EVEN WITHIN YOUR OWN PARTY,
WAS FULLY VINDICATED BY EVENTS.

WE NOW FACE A TIME OF REAL CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY IN EAST/WEST
RELATIONS. THERE IS INDEED A REFORMIST REGIME IN THE USSR, BUT
THAT THAW STEMS FROM MR GORBACHEV'S RECOGNITION THAT ONLY NEW
POLICIES CAN STEM THE PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC HAEMORRHAGE OF THE
SOVIET UNION. MY OWN FRANK AND LIVELY EXCHANGES WITH MR
GORBACHEV CONVINCED ME THAT WHAT HE NEEDS MOST FROM US IS TO FACE
AN ALLIANCE THAT IS STRONG, PREDICTABLE AND MODERATE. AT A
MOMENT WHEN MR GORBACHEV HIMSELF APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTING THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES ORIGINALLY SET OUT IN THE HARMEL DOCTRINE IT
WOULD BE A PITY IF WE WERE OURSELVES TO UNDERMINE IT WITH A NEW
VARIANT.

WE NEED A STRONG HAND TO PLAY IN THE VIENNA CFE TALKS SO THAT WE
CAN AIM TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN A FEW YEARS ON THE NECESSARY
ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. MR GORBACHEV HAS
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE. THIS IS WHAT HE EXPECTS. BUT NATO MUST

MAINTAIN ITS FORCE LEVELS UNTIL THEN OTHERWISE OUR NEGOTIATING STRATEGY COLLAPSES. NATO CAN HARDLY REQUIRE EVER MORE DRACONIAN CUTS BY THE OTHER SIDE TO COMPENSATE FOR ITS OWN SELF-IMFLICTED WOUNDS. SIMILARLY, THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT HAS KEPT THE PEACE IN EUROPE FOR OVER FORTY YEARS. EVEN AFTER ACCEPTING THE COMMITMENTS IN THE INF TREATY THE SOVIET UNION RETAINS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT FORCES FOR ITS NUCLEAR TARGETING REQUIREMENTS, AND IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNISING ITS ENTIRE RANGE OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES. SOME 95 PERCENT OF LAND-BASED SNF SYSTEMS HELD BY SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN MODERNISED OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS AND THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO TRANSFER THESE NEW SYSTEMS TO WARSAW PACT ALLIES. THIS SOVIET SNF MODERNISATION AND THE EXISTING OVER CAPACITY ENABLES THE USSR TO FILL ANY GAP CREATED BY THE ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS UNDER THE INF TREATY. NATO MUST BE IN A POSITION TO DO THE SAME IF NECESSARY. THIS IS NOT A WRONG SIGNAL. THIS IS THE EXPECTED SIGNAL, AND I SHALL BE MAKING THE POINT WHEN I SEE MR GORBACHEV IN LONDON ON 5 APRIL. THIS IS WHY THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT IS SO IMPORTANT IN THAT IT WILL PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE WITH THE MINIMUM ARSENAL REQUIRED.

THESE ARE DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR OUR PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND AND WE FACE A REAL CHALLENGE IN KEEPING THEM WITH US WHILE THESE COMPLEX ISSUES ARE PLAYED OUT. AS WITH THE INSTALLATION OF CRUISE MISSILES, OUR COUNTRIES NEED STRONG LEADERSHIP AND CAREFUL PREPARATION TO UNDERSTAND THAT NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND INDEED PREDICTABILITY. I REALISE YOU FACE MANY DOMESTIC PRESSURES BUT I BELIEVE THAT ONCE AGAIN THAT YOUR COURAGE AND DETERMINATION WILL HELP YOU KEEP OPEN YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION UNTIL THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT IS COMPLETE AND PRESENTED TO THE NATO SUMMIT.
ENDS.

PETRIE

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ADDITIONAL 18

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FM BRUSSELS

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 291745Z FCO FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
TELNO 110

OF 291705Z MARCH 89

AND TO DESKBY 300200Z NEW DELHI FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN

PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE ON DEFENCE TO MARTENS

SUMMARY

1. BELGIANS MAY COMPLICATE ADOPTION OF ALLIANCE POSITION ON SNF BY PREMATURE DECISION. COMPLETION BY MARTENS OF DECADE AS PRIME MINISTER PROVIDES PEG ON WHICH TO HANG A STIFFENING MESSAGE ON DEFENCE FROM MRS THATCHER PRIOR TO KEY 7 APRIL CABINET DISCUSSION.

DETAIL

2. UK MINISTERS ARE RIGHTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LAMENTABLE BELGIAN PERFORMANCE ON DEFENCE WHICH WE HAVE SEPARATELY REPORTED. THE BELGIAN CABINET HAVE RECENTLY ENDORSED PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING THEIR DEFENCE EFFORT WHICH FAIL TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY MEANS AND THEREBY GUARANTEE FURTHER BACKSLIDING. ONLY ONE LIBERAL OPPOSITION MP, IN PARLIAMENT OR OUT OF IT, HAS CRITICISED THE INADEQUACY OF THE BELGIAN DEFENCE EFFORT, TERMING DEFENCE MINISTER COEME QUOTE MINISTER FOR DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE. THE PRESS AND THE REST OF THE OPPOSITION ARE APATHETIC. OTHER MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ARE IN STORE. THE FLEMISH SOCIALISTS HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY COULD NOT QUOTE SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE IF IT WAS TO SEEK TO ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF SNF MODERNISATION.

3. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS DEFENCE AND SNF MODERNISATION ON 7 APRIL. A DEBATE ON DEFENCE IN PARLIAMENT IS PLANNED FOR 11 APRIL (DEFENCE MINISTER COEME IS IN LONDON FOR TALKS WITH MR YOUNGER ON 10 APRIL). A MAJOR ANTI SNF MODERNISATION PEACE DEMONSTRATION IS TO BE HELD ON 16 APRIL. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BEHIND SCENES MANOEUVRING IN THE RUN UP TO THE DEBATE AND DEMONSTRATION. OFFICIALS IN THE MFA AND DEFENCE MINISTRY ARE SEEKING TO COBBLE TOGETHER A FORM OF WORDS THAT LEAVES DECISIONS OPEN PENDING NATO AGREEMENT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND THE NATO SUMMIT. BUT TINDEMANS IS UNLIKELY TO STAND UP TO REAL PRESSURE ON SO ELECTORALLY UNPOPULAR AN ISSUE AND

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE MINISTER COEME IS A SOCIALIST WHOSE PARTY IS TEMPTED BY AN ANTI NUCLEAR STANCE. MEANTIME THE FLEMISH SOCIALISTS (SP) HAVE A CLEAR LINE OF POLICY AND APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO ENGINEER A SITUATION WHEREBY THE GOVERNMENT COMES DOWN AGAINST SNF MODERNISATION BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT AND BEFORE THE GERMANS HAVE TAKEN THEIR DECISION. OUR CONTACTS WITH AND LOBBYING OF A WIDE RANGE OF BELGIANS ON DEFENCE, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, PRODUCES ACCEPTANCE THAT WE MAKE A GOOD INTELLECTUAL CASE COMBINED WITH TOTAL UNWILLINGNESS TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. THERE IS THUS A REAL DANGER OF THE BELGIANS COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A FORM OF WORDS THAT PREVENTS DOMESTIC SCHISM BUT CREATES MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE GERMANS AND THE ALLIANCE (AS AT SCHEVINGEN). THE AMERICANS SHARE OUR CONCERNS.

4. THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD CONCEIVABLY MANAGE TO BUY TIME UNTIL AT LEAST THE NATO SUMMIT IS MARTENS HIMSELF AS A QUOTE EUROPEAN STATESMAN UNQUOTE AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND THAT HE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRABLY RIGHT IN HIS JUDGEMENT ONCE BEFORE (ON THE STATIONING OF CRUISE MISSILES). BUT HE WILL NEED HELP. HE IS NOW ONLY CHAIRMAN OF A BOARD WHERE SIGNIFICANT VOTES ARE HELD BY THE SP AND THE BALANCE IN THE GOVERNMENT MAJORITY BY THE EQUALLY ANTI NUCLEAR FLEMISH NATIONALISTS (VOLKSUNIE).

5. ON 3 APRIL, MARTENS CELEBRATES THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER. HE YIELDS THE PALM AS LONGEST SERVING EUROPEAN PRIME MINISTER TO MRS THATCHER SINCE HE WAS TEMPORARILY OUT OF OFFICE FOR EIGHT MONTHS IN 1981.

6. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER USE THE OCCASION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF MARTENS' APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER TO SEND A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS WHICH COULD REFER TO HIS PAST STEADFASTNESS AND GO ON TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SOME OF THE INTELLECTUAL ARGUMENTS TO FACE UP TO HIS SOCIALIST COLLEAGUES ON DEFENCE. IN AN ANNIVERSARY INTERVIEW IN TODAY'S LE SOIR (FRANCOPHONE CONSERVATIVE) MARTENS IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT QUOTE MRS THATCHER'S HUMANITY AND POLITICAL SKILLS ARE FORMIDABLE: SHE IS AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHOSE SUCCESS HAS BEEN FOUNDED ON COMMITMENT AND HARD WORK UNQUOTE. HE WOULD BE FLATTERED BY THE CONGRATULATIONS AND COULD FIND THE ARGUMENTS IN THE MESSAGE INVALUABLE.

7. MIFT CONTAINS POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A DRAFT.

PETRIE

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ADDITIONAL 18

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MODUK FOR DUS(P) AND AUS (POL)

MY TELNO. 845: SNF MODERNISATION

1. BLACKWILL HAS NOW GIVEN MINISTER A READ OUT OF BURT'S DEMARCHE TO KOHL. HE EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS BEING GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SCOWCROFT AND SIR R BUTLER. HE HOPED THAT ALL CONCERNED WOULD BE CAREFUL TO ENSURE THAT DETAILS DID NOT GET BACK TO THE GERMANS OR TO OTHER US OFFICIALS.

2. BURT HAD SEEN KOHL FOR 90 MINUTES ON FRIDAY, 24 MARCH. BURT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DOBBINS, AND KOHL BY AN AIDE WHO WAS ATTENDING HIM IN HIS AUSTRIAN RETREAT BUT SEEMED TO HAVE NO BACKGROUND IN POLITICO/MILITARY AFFAIRS. BURT REPORTED THAT KOHL HAD ALREADY LOST 10 POUNDS (ON A DIET OF TEA ALONE) AND THAT, DESPITE ACKNOWLEDGING MANY DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES, HE WAS HIS USUAL OPTIMISTIC SELF. KOHL THEN READ THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND SAID THAT HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO REACH A COMMON POSITION ON THE SNF ISSUE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT. HE UNDERTOOK TO SEND TELTSCHIK TO WASHINGTON IN THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF APRIL TO WORK ON THE ISSUE (INDICATIONS FROM A CONTACT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGEST THAT IT MAY BE TOWARDS THE END OF THIS PERIOD).

3. KOHL WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE HAD NOT CHANGED: HE REJECTED THE THIRD ZERO AND CONSIDERED THAT THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE WOULD BE A DISASTER. HE SAID THAT SNF WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN THE 1990 ELECTION, AND AN ISSUE ON WHICH HE WOULD FIGHT. HE THEREFORE WANTED A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM THE NATO SUMMIT: GERMAN VOTERS SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE SPD POSITION WOULD ISOLATE THE FRG IN THE ALLIANCE.

4. THAT, INTERJECTED BLACKWILL, WAS THE GOOD NEWS. KOHL HAD THEN GONE ON TO SAY THAT THE NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE HARMEL CONCEPT AND REFLECT BALANCE BETWEEN DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL. HE WAS NOT PRESSING FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NEITHER COULD HE AGREE THAT SNF ARMS CONTROL

PAGE 1
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SHOULD AWAIT THE COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS. A FORMULA WHICH LINKED THE BEGINNING OF TALKS ON SNF TO QUOTE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS UNQUOTE IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE VIENNA TALKS WOULD BE FAR ENOUGH ADVANCED BY 1993 TO ALLOW NATO TO CONSIDER ABANDONING GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, A POSITION WOULD QUOTE THEN UNQUOTE HAVE TO BE MADE TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY FOTL IN ORDER TO HAVE A SYSTEM READY BY 1995/96.

5. BLACKWILL'S REACTION TO ALL THIS WAS PREDICTABLY GLOOMY. HE THEN POINTED OUT THAT KOHL WAS RELATIVELY CLEAR ON WHAT HE WANTED ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT, BUT ALL AT SEA ABOUT PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. HE HAD MOREOVER NOTED IN PASSING THAT SOME OF HIS MILITARY ADVISERS WERE SAYING THAT THEY COULD LIVE NOT ONLY WITH A REDUCTION IN THE US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE, BUT WITH THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY.

6. BURT RESPONDED ON THE LINES OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND SEPARATE TALKING POINTS, COPIES OF WHICH WERE LEFT WITH KOHL AND WHICH THE AMERICANS NOW BELIEVE TO BE CIRCULATING IN THE BUREAUCRACY IN BONN. IN RESPONSE TO KOHL'S REFERENCE TO THE STOCKPILE AND NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, BURT HAD UNDERLINED THE LINK BETWEEN CUTS AND MODERNISATION.

COMMENT

7. THERE IS AS YET NO CONSIDERED US REACTION, AND ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS WILL NO DOUBT BE WORKED INTO THE PREPARATION OF AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL POSITION FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH TELTSCHIK. ALL THIS IS LIKELY TO BE CONFINED TO A VERY SMALL GROUP ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. MEANWHILE, THOSE IN THE KNOW IN STATE HAVE NOTED THAT THE GERMANS ARE PUSHING FOR EVEN MORE THAN THEY HAD EXPECTED ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT. BLACKWILL, FOR HIS PART, REMAINS OF THE VIEW THAT THE MAJOR DANGER IS TO EXCHANGE PROMISES ON ARMS CONTROL WHICH WILL IMMEDIATELY BE CASHED FOR ASSURANCES ON MODERNISATION WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO PROVE BANKABLE.

8. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/NO. 10 AND CABINET OFFICE (FOR WESTON).

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ADDITIONAL 18

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*See by pm 57
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*Good - the President
has responded to
your urgency.
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TELNO 845
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AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

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MODUK FOR DUS(P) AND AUS(POL)
SNF MODERNISATION
NOTE FOR RESIDENT CLERK/DUTY OFFICERS

1. YOU MAY WISH TO TOUCH BASE WITH THE DEPARTMENT TO SEE WHETHER ANYONE IS LIKELY TO BE HAVING CONVERSATIONS WITH AMERICANS OR GERMANS ABOUT SNF OR THE NATO SUMMIT OVER THE HOLIDAY WEEKEND. IF NOT, WHAT FOLLOWS CAN WAIT UNTIL NORMAL WORKING HOURS.

SUMMARY

2. FURTHER MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO KOHL, ON HELPFUL LINES.

DETAIL

3. BLACKWILL (WHO EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN (STRICT CONFIDENCE), INFORMED MINISTER TODAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN INCREASING CONCERN AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HERE ABOUT QUOTE EROSION UNQUOTE IN GERMAN THINKING. THE FACT THAT THE GERMANS HAD POSTPONED SENDING A TEAM FOR BILATERAL TALKS WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. AND AN ADDITIONAL WORRY, NOT LEAST NOW THAT GENSCHER WAS OUT OF HOSPITAL, WAS THAT POSITIONS WOULD BE STATED IN PUBLIC FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RETREAT. THE PRESIDENT HAD EARLIER THIS WEEK MET WITH BAKER, CHENEY AND SCOWCROFT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO SEND BURT (WHOM THE LAWYERS ADVISED WAS STILL FORMALLY AMBASSADOR TO THE FRG) TO SPEAK IN CONFIDENCE TO KOHL. BLACKWILL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE TODAY, AT A HEALTH FARM IN AUSTRIA. HE HAD NO IDEA WHO IF ANYONE ON THE GERMAN SIDE WAS THERE WITH KOHL.

4. BURT HAD GONE WITH A SHORT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND A SERIES OF TALKING POINTS. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO BRING HOME TO KOHL THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL AND CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT IN THE MATTER, AND TO RESTATE THE AMERICAN POSITION. BLACKWILL EXPLAINED THAT THE LETTER HAD STATED EXPLICITLY THAT THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD REQUIRE LAND-BASED SNF

MISSILES REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CFE. IT HAD GONE ON TO EXPRESS THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY TO DESCRIBE THE MIX OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WE REQUIRED, INCLUDING FOTL. FINALLY, THE LETTER HAD STATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF WOULD BE QUOTE A GRAVE MISTAKE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES UNQUOTE. THE TALKING POINTS HAD ADDED SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS ABOUT SNF NEGOTIATIONS, REFERRING INTER ALIA TO PROBLEMS OVER THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS, VERIFICATION, UNITS OF ACCOUNT AND THE COLLATERAL IMPACT ON DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS.

5. BLACKWILL ADDED THAT THE STRONG VIEW IN THE NSC WAS THAT KOHL WOULD HAVE TO START COUNTER PUNCHING IMMEDIATELY AFTER EASTER IF HE WAS TO REGAIN LOST GROUND. HE UNDERTOOK TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AND TO GIVE US A READ OUT AFTER BURT'S RETURN.

6. FINALLY, BLACKWILL EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE WAY THE DUTCH INITIATIVE WAS RUNNING. HE SAW A REAL DANGER THAT WE WOULD QUOTE NEGOTIATE WITH OURSELVES UNQUOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE DUTCH TEXT, AND THEN GO IN TO THE CRUCIAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GERMANS WITH A DANGEROUSLY SOFT OPENING POSITION. HE HOPED THAT A TELEGRAM WOULD ISSUE SHORTLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO CALM THE DUTCH DOWN.

7. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO PS/NO 10.

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UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

17 March 1989

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CSO
21/3

Dear Charles,

SNF MODERNISATION ETC

I can't honestly say that the situation has improved in recent weeks. Even the President's message seemed to me to leave a good deal to be desired. However we should, obviously, keep trying.

Thank you for your help with the reception for the Council in October

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Alexander



UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

16 March 1989

J D I Boyd Esq CMG
DUS
FCO

Sean John,

COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT CHAPTER IV: THE MISSING LINK

1. You may by now have seen the draft (in effect a UK draft) of Chapters I-IV of the Comprehensive Concept issued by the International Staff on 15 March. The IS text is more or less identical with that which I forwarded under cover of my letter of 10 March to John Goulden.
2. I hope (quite possibly in vain!) that this draft will now become the basic working text into which any SNF compromise will eventually have to be fitted. Against this background I have been giving some thought as to how the ideas in my letter of 12 December would look if inserted at the appropriate point in Chapter IV. I recognise that there is little enthusiasm in London at present for further action on our part. But I continue to think it does no harm to have a reasonably clear idea of what we would like to see happen. I therefore enclose some, as it seems to me, appropriate language. The draft has two alternative endings depending on whether or not we might be prepared to contemplate discussions on how the implementation of the challenge might be verified.
3. While including a more general challenge to a common ceiling for all sub-strategic systems, the specific (and possibly to be verified) challenge relates only to SNF missile numbers, in recognition of your and MOD's advice on the difficulties of verifying reductions to a common ceiling, as proposed in my letter under reference. Should wider verification not be deemed an insuperable problem, I would still see merit in the common ceiling approach.

/For



For the present, however, in view of the verification difficulties the specific challenge is confined to SNF missiles. This also has the advantage that a Soviet reduction to current NATO levels could be implemented straight away and need not await the currently envisaged very lengthy process of reductions as modernisation programmes are implemented.

4. On a purely personal basis, the numbers which I would insert in the three square brackets in paragraph 54 would be 2500, 25% and 60% respectively. A reduction of 25% in missile holdings would leave us with a little over 500. So far as I can see, the number of launchers could be more or less whatever we liked.

5. The text does, of course, go considerably further than either the FRG, on the one hand, or the US on the other, are at present prepared to contemplate. We shall need to consider what fall-back positions might be acceptable. But the draft does seek to follow the line of the PM's recent letter to President Bush and, in part at least, the Dutch initiative as originally floated (see below).

6. We are of course a good deal more likely to end up in May with a short and indeterminate formula of the kind which seems to be favoured in Bonn and Washington - and no doubt elsewhere. (I attach a copy of a draft para 52 which The Hague, on the basis of Van den Broek's contacts with Baker and Genscher, are currently tinkering with. It was given to me on a very personal basis by the Dutch Ambassador - please protect - earlier today.) If this does happen we will, obviously, have no choice but to present the outcome as a success.

7. That said, it seems to me that in the medium term the consequences of a fudge will be negative from almost every angle. Thus:

(a) the Alliance will condemn itself to further months and years of divisive argument. From this we will derive neither the military advantage of an updated weapons system nor the arms control advantage of having a credible bargaining counter. In the worst case we may end up without either a new weapons system or decisive reductions by the other side;

(b) the Alliance will deny itself one of the few obvious opportunities still available to us to seize the initiative at least temporarily from Mr Gorbachev (always assuming he does not beat us to the punch again).

/I may



I may be wrong but it still seems to me that the sort of package summarised in the enclosure to this letter could be made to look rather attractive to most of our electorates;

(c) the Alliance would give Chancellor Kohl and the CDU little help. The German government would probably be seen at home as having failed to be firm, as having failed to kill off modernisation, and as having failed to deliver anything substantive on arms control;

(d) the trans-Atlantic relationship and the confidence of the military in the Alliance's civil arm would both have been seriously weakened.

It follows that I hope that for some time yet we will stick to our guns and seek a detailed decision - even if the price is, as it clearly would have to be, giving something on the issue of negotiation.

8. I should be happy to discuss further, eg on 7 April or when David Nicholls is here next week.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Alexander

cc: D Nicholls Esq CMG
DUS(P), MOD

P J Weston Esq CMG
Cabinet Office

Sir Christopher Mallaby KCMG
Bonn

B J P Fall Esq CMG
Washington

COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, CHAPTER IV: SNF SECTION

(For para 52 et seq)

51. the Alliance retains a credible deterrence capability.
52. In order to preserve such a capability, Alliance strategy requires a mix of sub-strategic systems, comprising both ground-based and air-launched weapons, and for these to be kept up to date, as necessary.
53. As already noted, the members of the integrated military structure agree that the updating of their sub-strategic nuclear forces, with greater emphasis on relatively longer-range systems in view of their more flexible contribution to deterrence, would provide scope for further substantial reductions in addition to those already implemented. The Allies therefore support the programmes which the US has under way for the development of a surface to surface missile capability of longer-range than the existing, ageing Lance system and of a stand-off air-launched missile capability to replace obsolescent free-fall bombs, with a view to their deployment in Europe in the mid-1990s.
54. The Allies recognise that final decisions on the procurement of such systems cannot be taken until development work is further advanced. However, in keeping with their commitment to minimise NATO's holdings of nuclear weapons, the Allies concerned are agreed that the updating of existing systems, together with full implementation of the INF Treaty, would allow the overall stockpile in Europe to be reduced from 4600 to [], with reductions in all weapon categories, including a reduction of over 50% in the number of shortest range (nuclear artillery) systems and a reduction of [] in the number of surface-to-surface missiles. This would mean that the Alliance had reduced its stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe by [] since 1979, largely through unilateral steps. That figure far exceeds reductions made or announced by the WTO in the same period.

55. This fact notwithstanding, the Alliance's willingness to reduce its stockpile is not conditional on any agreement by members of the WTO to redress existing imbalances in short-range nuclear forces. It derives solely from the Alliance's own minimum requirements for deterrence. The Allies now invite the WTO to follow NATO's example and to give practical substance to the frequently expressed desire of WTO leaders to see reductions in the numbers of sub-strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. In particular, we invite the Soviet Union and her Allies to reduce straightaway their holdings of land-based missiles of shorter range to existing NATO levels and thus correct the major asymmetries which currently exist in this area. The Allies concerned also invite the WTO to join with them in reducing their overall holdings of sub-strategic weapons down to planned NATO levels.

[56. If the WTO is prepared to reduce its land-based missiles of shorter range to NATO levels, the Allies concerned would be ready to negotiate verification arrangements which would give both sides confidence that these reduced ceilings have been achieved and will not, in future, be exceeded. Once such verification arrangements are in place, the Allies concerned will be willing to consider the scope for negotiating a further reduction to agreed ceilings, at a level above zero, in the light of developments in the international situation and, in particular, in the context of major agreements in the CFE talks bringing significantly closer the establishment of a verified conventional balance in Europe.]

[56. If the WTO is prepared to reduce their land-based missiles of shorter range to NATO levels, this would be an important step forward. Its implementation, together with major agreements in the CFE talks bringing significantly closer the establishment of a verified conventional balance in Europe, would open the way for further progress in this area. In the light of such developments, the Allies concerned would, accordingly, be prepared to consider the scope for a negotiated reduction to agreed ceilings, at a level above zero.]

Confidential

16.3.89

Text under consideration by the Danish.

S2. There are (thus) sound political and military reasons for NATO to decide to restructure its SNF posture so as to allow for a shift of emphasis from shorter to longer ranges and for a substantial unilateral reduction in overall SNF numbers. In implementing this policy the Alliance expresses its political commitment to keep its SNF land-based missile capability up to date. NATO's SNF policy further includes a call upon the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF land-based missiles to the NATO level as well as an announcement of NATO's preparedness to start negotiations on these weapons in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance, when the Soviet Union has actually reduced its SNF land-based missiles to the NATO level. To this end the Allies will set up a new task force to further study specific possibilities for both unilateral and multilateral arms control.



MO 18/5A(V)

56a cc P.C.
 R. H. H. H.
 CDP
 15/3

PRIME MINISTERTHEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH

attached

During our discussion of the results of the Anglo/French Summit during Cabinet on 2nd March, I noted that the French Government clearly still believed that they could provide a missile which would meet our requirements for a delivery vehicle for the replacement of our free fall nuclear bombs. I had expressed some scepticism about this in my talks with M. Chevenement and emphasised that our need to identify a successor system was now an urgent one and that decisions would have to be made by the end of the year because of the lead time required to develop and produce the warheads. Nonetheless, I undertook to ensure that full details of the UK requirement would be provided as soon as possible.

2. I should record that arrangements are now in hand to do this. While the French are already aware in broad terms of what we are looking for, I believe it is important to make certain they are not in a position at some future date to claim that they had not been able to help us because we had not been fully open about our needs. The French will be invited to respond to us by the Autumn so that we are in a position to set what they now claim to have on offer alongside the results of our formal feasibility study which is evaluating the two American delivery systems.

3. I am sending a copy of this minute to members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

15 March 1989

G.Y.

SECRET



File
SSA-5 CCR

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

MR. WESTON
Cabinet Office

SNF MODERNISATION

I asked Herr Teltschik today whether he yet had a date for his visit to Washington to talk to the Americans about SNF modernisation. He told me that he had planned to go quite soon, but after Genscher had entered hospital, it had been decided to postpone the visit. No new date had been fixed but it was most unlikely that he would go to Washington until after Easter. (In practice it is likely to be mid-April since he is going on holiday for a week or so immediately after Easter.) In response to my question, Teltschik said that no proposals had been put to the Germans by the Americans and he was not expecting any, at least ahead of his visit to Washington. The invitation had been to go there to discuss the problem.

Teltschik added that a number of sources had told him that the review of strategic systems being conducted by the new Administration was very extensive and covered not just MX and Midgetman but also air launched and sea launched missiles. It might be necessary to delay decisions on SNF until this review was complete since it could have consequences for NATO's interests. I recall that he had made the same point to me when we had met and I had pointed out that the SNF decision was not linked to these wider issues and should not be complicated by them.

I asked if the Germans were any nearer finalising their own position. Teltschik said that they were not and he did not know when there would be another coalition meeting. He still had some hope that the way forward which we had discussed in his office, i.e. common ceilings with freedom to mix, would be part of the German position. He added that he had also heard that some people were talking of trying to find a solution by amalgamating elements of the NATO Summit Communiqué of last year and the Communiqué of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Reykjavik.

Teltschik said that he would keep me in touch with any developments, in relation to the Americans or to the German position. It might be useful if we were to meet again in April.

SECRET

8

I am copying this minute to Mr. Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Mr. Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

c.v.7

CHARLES POWELL

15 March 1989

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TO PRIORITY FCO

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OF 101245Z MARCH 89

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SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SPANISH VIEWS *Wk*

1. OUR TEL 217 (NOT TO ALL) RECORDED, INTER ALIA, THE REPORTED VIEWS OF FELIPE GONZALEZ AND THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER VISITING MADRID, THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A RUSHED DECISION ON THE MODERNISATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TODAY'S SPANISH PRESS REPORT THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALFONSO GUERRA, AT A MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL IN VIENNA, AS REJECTING THE MODERNISATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES "IT IS A TIME TO NEGOTIATE NOT TO MODERNISE". HE IS FURTHER REPORTED TO HAVE SAID: "WE MUST NEGOTIATE LINKING CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NEED TO ARRIVE AT A SECURE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND NON-CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL".

GORDON LENNOX

YYYY

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



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apc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 March 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

I enclose the text of President Bush's reply to the Prime Minister's recent message about SNF modernisation. It is highly satisfactory.

Because of the Prime Minister's absence from London, she will not see this reply until 11 March. No reference should be made to it in the meantime in contacts with American officials. It should receive a most restricted distribution.


I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2616</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Message from President Bush to Prime Minister (T48/89) dated 9 March 1989, enclosed with letter from Powell to Wall dated 9 March 1989</i>	
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FM VIENNA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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OF 061830Z MARCH 89

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FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 69.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH VAN DEN BROEK: SNF

1. VAN DEN BROEK HANDED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE A REPLY TO HIS LETTER ABOUT THE GERMAN ATTITUDE ON SNF, EMPHASISING ITS CONFIDENTIALITY. TEXT IS IN MIFT.

2. VAN DEN BROEK SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING GENSCHER THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE DUTCH POSITION REMAINED SATISFACTORY. THEY HAD HAD A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE WHICH HAD GIVEN THEM A SUFFICIENT MARGIN OF MANOEUVRE TO AGREE, NOT TO A PRODUCTION DECISION, BUT TO A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE SO THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SNF COULD TAKE PLACE. AS FAR AS GENSCHER WAS CONCERNED, MODERNISATION APPEARED TO REMAIN OUT OF BOUNDS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER A BRIDGING FORMULA COULD BE FOUND. ALL WERE AGAINST THE ZERO OPTION. BUT COULD WE ESTABLISH MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT OUR SYSTEMS HAD TO BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE? VAN DEN BROEK WENT ON TO SPEAK ON THE LINES SET OUT IN HIS LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT HANDLING THE ISSUE WAS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY GENSCHER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. BUT WE MUST CONTINUE OUR MISSIONARY TASK, RENDERED ALL THE MORE NECESSARY BY THE ABSENCE OF AN AMERICAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND OF KEY PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

3. THE CONVERSATION HAD TO BE BROKEN OFF AT THIS POINT SO THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND VAN DEN BROEK COULD HEAR BAKER'S CFE SPEECH.

4. THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN BY THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED BUT SHOULD BE GIVEN ONLY A LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE HANDLED ON A SIMILARLY RESTRICTED BASIS IN ADDRESSEE POSTS. THE EXISTENCE OF VAN DEN BROEK'S MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO NOT BE REVEALED.

O'NEILL

NNNN

cc: PS
PS/Mr Chulke
Ps/Mr Winkler
PS/PUS
ST J Frickwell
Mr Boyd
Mr Goulder
Mr Hatford
Ltd, Sec Pol Dept
Ltd, WED
Ltd, Planners
C. J. Powell
1210

A. file

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DEDIP

FROM VIENNA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 69

OF 0618, 0Z MARCH 89

INFO WASHINGTON, BONN, THE HAGUE. UKDEL NATO.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH VAN DEN BROEK: SNF

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM VAN DEN BROEK TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF TODAY.

I ALSO HAD AN INTERESTING TALK WITH HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, FEBRUARY 25TH IN TOKYO, FOCUSING ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT.

BONN HAS NOT REACHED FINAL CONCLUSIONS. GENSCHER INTENDS TO ELABORATE ON THIS MATTER WITH HIS STAFF IN THE COURSE OF THIS WEEK.

HE STILL MAINTAINS THAT ANY MODERNIZATION DECISION IS PREMATURE. HE SAYS HE REJECTS A THIRD ZERO OPTION BUT WANTS TO KEEP ANY OPTION OPEN IN RELATION TO THE OUTCOME OF CFE-NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, HE CLAIMS THAT MODERNIZATION WOULD MEAN INTRODUCING A MISSILE SYSTEM WHICH COULD REACH POLAND: AN INACCEPTABLE PROPOSITION IN THE YEAR THE GERMAN INVASION IN POLAND 50 YEARS AGO WILL BE COMMEMORATED. IN ANOTHER CONTEXT HE POINTED AT THE LARGE NUMBER OF DCA STATIONED IN EUROPE WHICH GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MAY WANT TO MARGINALIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LANDBASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT INTRODUCING THE FOTL COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED AS MODERNIZATION SINCE IT IMPLIED AN ENTIRELY NEW MISSILE SYSTEM. BESIDES, HE SAID TO BE INTERESTED IN PURSUING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH WHO SEEM TO ADVOCATE A RETHINKING ON NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY.

FINALLY, HE REITERATED THE DEMAND FOR INCLUSION OF A SNF-MANDATE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. AFTER EXPRESSING MY VIEWS I HANDED OUT TO GENSCHER THE DUTCH NON-PAPER, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH HIM EARLIER (IN VIENNA IN JANUARY). HE UNDERTOOK TO GIVE THESE THOUGHTS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND TO DISCUSS THEM IN THE EARLIER MENTIONED MEETING WITH HIS STAFF.

IN MY VIEW THE FOREGOING SHOWS THAT IT WILL PROVE DIFFICULT TO REACH BALANCED CONCRETE RESULTS, THE MORE SO SINCE I FEEL THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS SHIFTED HIS POSITION ON MODERNIZATION GRADUALLY IN GENSCHER'S DIRECTION.

UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID GIVING THE GERMANS THE UNJUSTIFIED IMPRESSION THAT ALLIES HAVE STARTED TO QUESTION THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO NATO, FOR WHICH THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY ALLERGIC FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE FRG DESERVES OUR OPTIMAL SUPPORT TO OVERCOME THESE COMPLICATED POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

IN THIS RESPECT, I BELIEVE IT REMAINS WORTHWHILE TO EXPLORE WITH BONN WHETHER WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON FORMULATING A NATO SNF-POSTURE AT A MINIMAL LEVEL TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE SYSTEMS ARE INDISPENSABLE COMPONENTS OF A CREDIBLE DEFENSIVE MIX WHICH IN TURN AUTOMATICALLY IMPLIES THAT THEY WILL BE KEPT QUOTE UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY UNQUOTE. TOGETHER WITH LESS CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS LIKE REDUCTION (EVENTUALLY ELIMINATION) OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY WARHEADS AND DCA MODERNIZATION, THIS MAY AS YET WELL PROVE TO PROVIDE FOR AN QUOTE ADEQUATE MIX UNQUOTE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE NEEDS. THIS, AS YOUR KNOW, WAS THE GIST OF THE DUTCH NON-PAPER.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENT OR INQUIRY FROM YOUR SIDE TO HELP BRIDGING THE GAP AND TO ARRIVE AT SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

I TRUST YOU WILL HANDLE THIS INFORMATION WITH UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY.

ENDS.

O'NEILL

NNNN

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH JIM BAKER: 6 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. SNF: BAKER DETERMINED TO AVOID AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION BUT HOPES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GERMANS A FORMULA ON MODERNISATION. SEES NO STRONG CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR A CLEAR DECISION THIS YEAR. MIDDLE EAST: AMERICANS HOPE TO ENGAGE RUSSIANS, PARTICULARLY IN BRINGING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SYRIA. BAKER EVEN MORE LUKEWARM THAN BEFORE ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. RUSHDIE: BAKER SUGGESTS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD CONSIDER AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF IRAN. DOHERTY: HELPFUL RESPONSE TO REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN LONDON.

DETAIL

CW

2. BAKER DESCRIBED THE PROPOSALS HE WOULD BE INCLUDING IN HIS SPEECH TO THE CFE CONFERENCE (FCO TELNO 80 TO VIENNA). THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO EXPLORE WAYS OF ACCELERATING THE REMOVAL OF CW STOCKS FROM GERMANY, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR SAFE TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND DESTRUCTION. THE US WAS AIMING FOR WITHDRAWAL BY 1990 BUT WOULD NOT PUBLICISE THE DATE. HE WOULD BE CALLING ON THE SOVIET UNION TO REMOVE THEIR CW STOCKS WHICH THREATENED EUROPE.

THE FINAL
PART OF THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE A CONFERENCE WITH INDUSTRY ON TRADE IN PRECURSORS. THE AUSTRALIANS HAD AGREED TO HOST THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT.

SNF

PAGE 1
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SNF

3. BAKER SAID THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE DEALT WITH IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY SUMMIT (FOR WHICH THE DATES OF 29/30 MAY WERE SATISFACTORY). WE MUST AVOID A MAJOR DIVISIVE DEBATE AT THE SUMMIT. BOTH KOHL AND GENSCHER HAD SPOKEN CLEARLY AND WITH APPARENT SINCERITY OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO A THIRD ZERO BUT THERE WAS NO SECRET ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY GERMANY WOULD HAVE IN TAKING A DECISION NOW TO MODERNISE, UNLESS THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE OF THE EQUATION WAS ALSO RECOGNISED. BAKER HAD IT IN MIND TO SIT DOWN QUIETLY WITH THE GERMANS TO TRY TO COME UP WITH A FORMULATION THAT WOULD BRIDGE THE GAP. HE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UK AND OTHERS. HE HAD LOOKED AT THE DUTCH FORMULATION AND COULD WORK WITH IT, THOUGH IT WOULD NEED SOME CHANGES.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE MUST WORK FOR A CONCLUSION BEFORE THE SUMMIT. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO HAMMER OUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK, THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS, THOUGH WE SHOULD NOT DISCARD THE DUTCH, WHO HAD BEEN ROBUST ON THIS ISSUE. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE SEEING KOHL AGAIN IN MID-APRIL AND KOHL AND MITTERRAND WOULD BE MEETING IN EARLY APRIL. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE DUTCH FORMULA IMPLIED A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS. BAKER SAID THE AMERICANS HAD THE SAME PROBLEM WITH THE PROPOSAL. HE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE. DURING DISCUSSIONS IN TOKYO MITTERRAND HAD NEVER REALLY GOT ENGAGED ON THE SUBJECT. HE HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE GERMANS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, FROM THE LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD WITH GENSCHER, HE HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS UNWILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH MODERNISATION AT ALL. WHAT WAS THE MINIMUM COMMITMENT NECESSARY TO GET A CONGRESSIONAL DECISION? BAKER THOUGHT THAT AN UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. THERE WAS SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND HE WOULD RATHER LOOK FOR LATITUDE IN THAT AREA RATHER THAN ON THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE. THE CRUNCH WOULD NOT COME THIS YEAR, THOUGH SINCE CONGRESS WOULD HAVE TO SPEND DOLLARS 130 MILLION NEXT YEAR (DOLLARS 1.4 BILLION OVER THE FULL TERM) THEY WOULD NEED SOME INDICATION OF ALLIANCE INTENSIONS. BAKER CONCLUDED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD NOT PROVE AN EASY RABBIT TO CATCH. HE WOULD KEEP US POSTED OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. GENSCHER HAD URGED THE NEED FOR GREAT DISCRETION, WHICH MADE HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN GENEVA ALL THE MORE SURPRISING. IF THE GERMANS STARTED TO PUBLICISE THEIR VIEWS, THEY WOULD MAKE IT HARD FOR THE AMERICANS TO AVOID GOING PUBLIC ON THE OTHER SIDE.

COCOM

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OUTLINED THE CASE FOR AN END TO THE POLICY OF NO GENERAL EXCEPTIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. BAKER SAID THAT ONLY ONE OTHER COUNTRY HAD RAISED THE ISSUE DURING HIS TOUR (THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WAS NOT SURPRISING: FRANCE DID NOT PLAY BALL ANYWAY). BAKER SAID HE HAD REPORTED OUR CONCERNS AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE TAKING A DECISION SHORTLY.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING TO IMPLY THAT THERE WAS A SOVIET RIGHT OF OVERSIGHT OVER EASTERN EUROPE. WE SHOULD AVOID SUGGESTIONS OF A NEW YALTA, BUT SHOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH THE GENERAL ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGE. BAKER AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY. HE HAD RECENTLY HAD REMARKABLE MEETINGS WITH THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS. THE POLES WERE TALKING ABOUT AN INTERNAL DEBATE ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD HAVE A US OR FRENCH STYLE PRESIDENCY (SECRETARY OF STATE: QUOTE WHAT A DREADFUL CHOICE UNQUOTE).

THEY WERE TALKING OF A LOWER HOUSE WITH A 60:40 SPLIT BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHERS, AND AN UPPER HOUSE TO BE DIRECTLY ELECTED, THOUGH THEY HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT ITS REMIT SHOULD BE. IF THE POLES CONTINUED DOWN THIS ROUTE, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO MORE TO HELP THEM ECONOMICALLY, THOUGH THE POLES MUST COME UP WITH A FIRM PLAN FOR THE IMF. THEY SEEMED INCAPABLE OF TRANSLATING INTENTIONS INTO DEEDS.

EC/US RELATIONS

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS GRATEFUL FOR US HELP OVER THE HORMONES ISSUE. WE WERE TRYING TO SECURE EC FLEXIBILITY. BAKER WAS GRATEFUL FOR OUR ROLE. IF A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND TO THIS ISSUE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL GATT ROUND.

IMPORTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

9. BAKER HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BECOME MORE OF AN ISSUE THAN IT ALREADY WAS. THE INTRODUCTION OF TARIFFS WOULD IMPOSE A VERY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN ON THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE LEGAL POSITION AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ARTICLE 28 REGULATION WITH TARIFFS SUSPENDED MIGHT BE JURIDICALLY MORE CERTAIN THAN TRYING TO PERPETUATE AN ARTICLE 223 REGIME.

MIDDLE EAST

10. BAKER SAID THE VIEW HE HAD EXPRESSED IN LONDON WAS NOW EVEN MORE FIRMLY HELD. IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROGRESS, IT MUST BE MADE BY WORKING ON THE GROUND AND AT LOWER LEVELS. GIVEN THE PRESENT

SITUATION IN ISRAEL, A PUBLIC CONFERENCE WAS A NON-STARTER. THE US WOULD CONTINUE THE PLO DIALOGUE. THEY WOULD PROBE THE SOVIET UNION AS TO HOW GENUINE THEIR INTEREST WAS. THERE WAS MUCH THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO BY BRINGING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SYRIA AND LIBYA AND GROUPS SUPPORTED BY SYRIA AND THROUGH NORMALISING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. SHAMIR WOULD BE COMING TO THE UNITED STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL. BAKER WOULD BE MEETING ARENS ON 13 MARCH. HE DID NOT INTEND TO BE INACTIVE. THERE HAD TO BE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS NOT THE BEST WAY AT THIS JUNCTURE, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE THE RIGHT COURSE SOME WAY DOWN THE LINE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INTRODUCE SOME FLEXIBILITY INTO THE ISRAELI POSITION BUT IF WE PUSHED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE NOW, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BACK OFF COMPLETELY.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO BELIEVE THAT SHEVARDNADZE WAS WELL-INTENTIONED . BUT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE THE RUNNING AT OUR EXPENSE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A COINCIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REMAINED THE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED GATEWAY FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION AND WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON IT. IF WE MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF A SUPER POWER DEAL, THERE WAS A RISK OF THE SOVIET UNION BECOMING LINED UP ON ONE SIDE WITH THE US ON THE OTHER.

HONG KONG

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE LOOKED FOR MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION FROM THE UNITED STATES NOW THAT THE US HAD ADOPTED A SIMILAR POLICY TO OUR OWN IN RESPECT OF IMMIGRANTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA. BAKER SAID THAT THE POLICY OF SCREENING OUT PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT GENUINE REFUGEES HAD ALWAYS APPLIED. WHAT WAS NEW WAS THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUCCESS IN OVERTURNING A COURT DECISION WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY PREVENTED THEM FROM CONFINING IMMIGRANTS TO CAMPS. HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CUTTING BACK ON ASIAN ADMISSIONS IN ORDER TO BRING IN MORE REFUGEES FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

CENTRAL AMERICA

13. BAKER URGED A POLICY OF CONDITIONAL AID IN ORDER TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA. THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING WITH THE FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES THIS WEEKEND WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE DIPLOMACY A CHANCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT TIM EGGAR BEEN DENOUNCED AT THE MOST RECENT MEETING WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS A CLONE OF THE UNITED STATES, SO THE US NEED HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT OUR POSITION.

RUSHDIE

14. BAKER SAID THAT, SINCE THE UNITED STATES ALREADY HAD NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND A TOTAL ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WITH IRAN, THERE WAS NO FURTHER ACTION THEY COULD TAKE. HE THOUGHT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD THINK ABOUT IMPOSING AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ITS OWN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SUCH A BOYCOTT WOULD BE AGAINST OUR GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF AVOIDING SANCTIONS. IT COULD ALSO FORCE OTHER ARAB STATES TO SUPPORT IRAN WHERE THEY HAD SO FAR REFRAINED FROM DOING SO.

DOHERTY

15. BAKER SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE US ATTORNEY GENERAL FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REPRESENTATIONS IN LONDON. DOHERTY'S CASE WAS BEING REVEIUED. BUT THE US WAS NOT CONSIDERING ALLOWING DOHERTY'S VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE TO IRELAND.

O'NEILL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTIONADVANCE21

.EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS

PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/LORD GLENARTHUR

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

PS/SIR J FRETWELL (MR RATFORD)

MR BOYD

MR RATFORD

MR GOULDEN

MR FEARN

HD/NAD

HD/SEC POL DEPT

HD/ACDD

HD/SOVIET DEPT

HD/DEFENCE D.

MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD

D.NUC(POL)SY MOD

DACU MOD

CDI MOD

NNNN



File
3
A
B
P10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA*From the Private Secretary*

5 March 1989

I enclose a copy of a short handwritten note to the Prime Minister from President Bush which was handed to her by Mr. William Reilly, the US Environmental Administrator, at the Ozone Conference this morning. As you will see, it refers to the Prime Minister's message on SNF modernisation. Although a fuller reply is promised, it is helpful that the President says "we are in general agreement here".

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office). Copies of the message itself should not leave Private Offices.

(C.D. POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

do

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Allyson 'T'd.



THE PRESIDENT

March 3, 1989


Dear Margaret,

I have asked my ^{trusted} Environmental Administrator to hand you this note.

First, I carefully read your cable on those security measures. More on that later but we are in general agreement here.

Second, I have asked Bill Ruttly to work closely with your top people on our common environmental agenda. I agree on CFC's! Environmental concerns are very high here; and international cooperation is imperative.

Third, Barbara joins me in sending you both our warm personal regards.

Sincerely,


CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 293

OF 031743Z MARCH 89

INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL VIENNA

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

SIC ECA/EME

SNF MODERNISATION: FRENCH POSITION.

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND'S LINE AT ANGLO/FRENCH SUMMIT REPRESENTS A FURTHER MOVE IN OUR DIRECTION, BUT HE HAS LEFT HIS OPTIONS OPEN AND, AS HIS TONE AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CONFIRMED, HE WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO AVOID PUBLIC DISCORD WITH KOHL. REQUEST THAT WE BE INSTRUCTED TO PASS INFORMATION ON SOVIET SNF MODERNISATION TO THE FRENCH.

DETAIL

2. MY TELNO 1257 OF 7 DECEMBER 1988 COMMENTED ON THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S POSITION ON NATO SNF MODERNISATION: STARTING FROM EARLY OPPOSITION TO ANY QUOTE AGGRESSIVE MODERNISATION UNQUOTE AND A SUGGESTION OF A TWO OR THREE YEAR DELAY AS CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS PROCEEDED, AND MOVING TO UNDERTAKINGS AT THE END OF NOVEMBER THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT (NOT) BE AN OBSTACLE TO MODERNISATION DECISIONS IN 1989 BUT COULD NOT OFFER ACTIVE SUPPORT BECAUSE OF RESERVATIONS ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

3. MITTERRAND'S COMMENTS IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE ANGLO/FRENCH SUMMIT HERE ON 27 FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 263, NOT TO ALL) APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT INTELLECTUALLY HE HAS NOW MOVED CLOSER TO OUR POSITION, ON THE GROUNDS THAT (AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ARGUED HERE) THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE, IE FOR OR AGAINST FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, BUT AN ISSUE ENGAGING THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE: THE WEST MUST NOT DISARM UNILATERALLY. MITTERRAND'S REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF FORCES IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, WHICH WOULD BE JEOPARDISED IF THE WEST FAILED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET SNF MODERNISATION, ECHO THE ARGUMENTS HE USED, EG IN THE BUNDESTAG IN JANUARY 1983, WHEN HE URGED THE WEST GERMANS TO ACCEPT CRUISE AND PERSHING DEPLOYMENT.

4. MITTERRAND'S INTELLECTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE SNF PROBLEM IS

THEREFORE NOW FAIRLY CLOSE TO HIS ANALYSIS OF THE INF ISSUE IN 1982/83. BUT THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IS DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THE FRG COALITION IS DIVIDED AND EVEN KOHL IS SHOWING COLD FEET. AS WE KNEW AND MITTERRAND AGAIN MADE CLEAR AT THE SUMMIT, HE IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO KOHL'S DIFFICULTIES. FOR BOTH TACTICAL REASONS - THE HANDLING OF THIS ALLIANCE PROBLEM - AND WIDER STRATEGIC REASONS - THE IMPERATIVE OF MAINTAINING GOOD FRANCO/GERMAN UNDERSTANDING ON SECURITY AND EAST/WEST QUESTIONS - MITTERRAND WILL NOT WANT A PUBLIC ROW WITH KOHL. NOR DOES HE BELIEVE THAT PUBLICLY LINING UP WITH BRITAIN'S FIRM STAND WOULD AT THIS STAGE BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF BRINGING KOHL ON SIDE.

5. CHARACTERISTICALLY, MITTERRAND HAS KEPT HIS OPTIONS OPEN. HE STRUCK A CAREFUL BALANCE AT THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE (SEE MIFT) BETWEEN THE NEED TO MAINTAIN AND IF NECESSARY RESTORE BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND THE QUOTE SOVEREIGN UNQUOTE NATURE OF AN SNF MODERNISATION DECISION FOR GERMANY. HIS FORMULATION HAS BEEN VERY CAREFULLY REPORTED BY THE FRG EMBASSY HERE TO BONN, ALONG WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE BY MITTERRAND TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

6. A KEY QUESTION LEFT OPEN BY MITTERRAND'S FORMULATIONS IS WHETHER SOVIET MODERNISATION IS IN FACT SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE AN ALLIANCE DECISION. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE AMERICANS HERE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE PASSED SENSITIVE INFORMATION ON SOVIET SNF MODERNISATION TO THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION. I SHOULD SEE STRONG ADVANTAGE IN OUR BEING AUTHORISED TO DO THE SAME, DRAWING ON OUR INDEPENDENT INFORMATION IF AVAILABLE. I SHOULD LIKE THIS TO BE IN WRITTEN FORM SO THAT, AS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE HAS CONFIRMED, WE CAN ENSURE THAT IT WILL PERCOLATE THROUGH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MACHINE.

7. MITTERRAND'S NEXT INFORMAL MEETING WITH KOHL WILL BE IMPORTANT. WE UNDERSTAND, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT THIS WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE FIRST DAYS OF APRIL.

FERGUSON

YYYY



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 March 1989

cm.

Sea Change.

SNF Modernisation

Thank you for your letter of 2 March. We would suggest:

- i) deleting the words "and of dividing the US from Europe" on page 3. It is a good argument to deploy with other Europeans but could lead President Bush to think that we have little faith in the US commitment to the defence of Europe;
- ii) we would amend the next sentence on page 3 to read: "It is the one point we do not go along with in the otherwise ingenious proposals which our Netherlands colleagues have put forward: it would draw us into negotiations which would drag us inexorably down to a third zero." The point here is simply not to be thought to be rubbishing the Dutch, who are our soundest European ally on this issue.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

Jas.
 Stephen Wall
 (J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

Defence - INF - PVS

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100
PH 9

SECRET



HL 46 a -

eda

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 March 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

I enclose the final text of the Prime Minister's message as it is being despatched on the direct line to the White House. You will want to send a copy to Antony Acland in Washington. But the text is clearly sensitive and should be given a very limited distribution.


I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2616</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Message from Prime Minister to President Bush dated 2 March 1989 (T.46/89) (Two final copies - one typed and one teleprinted - and one draft)</i>	
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SECRET

47A 48



shw
c/c

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 March 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

Thank you for your letter of 1 March covering a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush about SNF modernisation. The Prime Minister was not satisfied with this as drafted. I enclose an alternative version with which she is generally content. I should be grateful if you and the Ministry of Defence could let me have any comments on it in the course of the day. We would like to send it off overnight on the direct line to the White House.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

SNF MODERNISATION

I have told the Foreign Office that you want to send a message to President Bush about SNF modernisation. They have produced a draft (FCO version). I am not sure that it is quite right, and have produced an alternative version (CDP version). Could you please indicate which you prefer to work on. I think we ought if possible to get a message off before the weekend.

CDP

1.3.89

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COVERING SECRET

45ia-d

cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 March 1988

Ica Charles,

SNF Modernisation

Thank you for your letter of 24 February about the way ahead on SNF modernisation following the Prime Minister's discussion with Chancellor Kohl in Frankfurt.

The Foreign Secretary agrees that, before we enter into any further discussions with the Germans, we need to agree a position with the United States; and that the Prime Minister should therefore send a message to President Bush setting out her views on what the NATO Summit at the end of May might be expected to achieve. The sooner that such a message can be sent the better. There are indeed indications that the US position on SNF modernisation is changing. General Scowcroft, the US National Security Adviser, has told Sir Antony Acland that US goals are: one, to ensure that Chancellor Kohl wins the next elections; two, to secure a sensible decision on SNF; and in that order. Some American officials are now downplaying the degree of European commitment which Congress will require to vote funds for the development of a follow-on to LANCE. The Embassy's impression (Washington tel no 516) is that the mood among Mr Baker's advisers is now in favour of no more than a "signal" at the NATO Summit of the requirement for modernisation, to be accompanied by some kind of recognition of the possibility of an arms control perspective at some future date.

What a
start to
a new
administration

If US thinking does develop in this way there is a risk that the NATO Summit in May will represent a step backwards from the position achieved last year: the commitment to modernisation would be no more firm but the prospect of an arms control negotiation would be given greater credence. If the Germans come to believe that the Americans are prepared to settle for a weak result, then Genscher's position will be strengthened and our own ability to influence Kohl much reduced. Indeed, there is a risk that we would become marginalised in the whole

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NATO debate. None of our other allies, not even the Dutch whose inclinations are currently fairly robust, would be disposed to argue for a decision more firm than the one the Americans say is required.

We understand that Mr Baker was favourably impressed by the 'integrated approach' suggested to him by Mr Van den Broek (contained in the Hague telno 77). This approach involves firm decisions on a Tactical Air to Surface Missile and on a LANCE successor, the latter of which would be introduced in numbers no greater than the current number of LANCE missiles. NATO would challenge the Warsaw Pact to eliminate asymmetries in SNF missiles and would offer either to agree on our minimum number as a mutual ceiling; or to indicate that a lower number (but above zero) would be negotiable. If a conventional arms control agreement was reached, and if the Warsaw Pact followed suit NATO would eliminate its nuclear artillery altogether. Such an approach is attractive inasmuch as it involves clear-cut decisions on modernisation, its drawback from our perspective is that it holds open the door to negotiations at a future date.

Reaching an understanding with the Americans is therefore crucial. But to achieve it we shall need to give them a clear picture of what sort of a decision NATO might reasonably be expected to take in May, including the elements that might be helpful to the Germans.

The attached draft message, the substance of which has been agreed with the Ministry of Defence, is designed to do this. It also contains the suggestion that the issue of SNF modernisation could be discussed not only with Sir Antony Acland but also when Sir Robin Butler and Mr Weston visit Washington in mid-March.


I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen Wall
 (J S Wall)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

?? (he doesn't know about it)

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2616</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Two drafts of PM/President message T46/89 enclosed with letter from Wall to Powell dated 1 March 1988</i>	
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PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.
COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 585
OF 010112Z MARCH 89

FOLLOWING FROM MINISTER IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON TOUR
YOUR TELNO 369: SNF MODERNISATION

1. I HAVE TAKEN ACTION ON A VISIT BY PRESIDENT BUSH WITH NSC AND STATE. THE POINT IS FIRMLY LODGED, AND AT THE RIGHT TIME BECAUSE PEOPLE ARE NOW BEGINNING TO WORK ON PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL PLANS ATTENDANT ON THE NATO SUMMIT. BUSH MAY NEED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER 29/30 MAY IN ORDER TO HOST AN EXTRAVAGANZA TO CELEBRATE THE GERMAN 40TH ANNIVERSARY AT WHICH WEIZACKER WILL BE PRESENT. BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT LONDON JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT, PERHAPS AS PART OF A WIDER EUROPEAN TOUR, WILL BE ACTIVELY CONSIDERED. !!

2. AS REGARDS MANAGEMENT OF THE SNF ISSUE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER MADE TO PRICE HAVE BEEN EQUALLY OPPORTUNE. THE ISSUE HAS BEEN ON HOLD WHILE BUSH AND OTHER KEY PLAYERS HAVE BEEN OUT OF TOWN AND NO DECISIONS ARE IMMINENT. BUT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME SERIOUS THINKING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IN PREPARATION FOR A FURTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES WHEN BAKER IS IN VIENNA FOR THE CFE TALKS. THERE IS THEREFORE MUCH TO BE SAID FOR FOLLOWING UP THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRICE WITH THE MORE DETAILED APPROACH REFERRED TO IN YOUR TUR.

3. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS WE MAY NEED TO PUT ACROSS EITHER AT THIS STAGE OR ALONG THE WAY, IF THEY ARE TO BE KEPT IN THE FOREFRONT OF MINDS HERE.

THE MAIN ONES ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) THE NEED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO KEEP US FULLY INFORMED, NOT LEAST ABOUT THEIR CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS, BETWEEN NOW AND THE NEXT MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR KOHL.

(B) WHILE SHOWING THE ADMINISTRATION THAT WE, LIKE THEY, ARE SENSITIVE TO KOHL'S PROBLEMS, TO UNDERLINE THE CENTRAL SECURITY INTEREST. HOWEVER RELAXED CONGRESS MAY BE THIS YEAR WHEN THE FUNDING REQUIREMENTS ARE LOW, THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE MODERNISATION DECISION WILL GET EASIER THE LONGER IT IS DELAYED. IT MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE NECESSARY TO REMIND THE AMERICANS THAT A SHORT-TERM 'FUDGE' WHICH MANAGED TO PRESERVE FOTL DEVELOPMENT FUNDING FOR FY 90 WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT IF IT WAS JUDGED UNLIKELY TO MEET THE CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENT IN 1991/2 (WHEN THE COSTS ESCALATE RAPIDLY).

C) TO WARN OF THE RISK OF ENDING UP WITH LESS THAN WE WOULD LIKE ON MODERNISATION WHILE PAYING OUT MOST OF

ANY AVAILABLE SLACK ON ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS A DANGER OF THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS TAKING ON A LIFE OF THEIR OWN. IT WOULD MAKE IT EVEN HARDER TO TAKE PART TWO OF A MODERNISATION DECISION IN TWO YEARS TIME IF THE ACCOMPANYING SWEETENERS HAD MEANWHILE BEEN GIVEN AWAY.

(D) TO ENCOURAGE A MORE RIGOROUS ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE NETHERLANDS 'INTEGRATED' PROPOSAL (THE HAGUE TELNO 77). THIS REMAINS AT CENTRE STAGE HERE AND CONTINUES TO BE SEEN BY BAKER AS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION SO FAR. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF OUR COMMENTS WERE BOTH TO ADDRESS THE ATTRACTIVE ASPECTS OF THIS, WHILE POINTING OUT THE WEAKNESSES. IF WE WERE ABLE TO DEVELOP A MODIFIED NETHERLANDS APPROACH AS A VEHICLE FOR OUR OWN VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO PACKAGE THE SNF MODERNISATION DECISION, WE WOULD GAIN TACTICAL ADVANTAGE WITH BAKER.

4. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER ON ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDES AS THEY EMERGE DURING THE COURSE OF THIS WEEK IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR MEETING WITH BAKER IN VIENNA. MEANWHILE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE FURTHER MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN YOUR TUR WERE TO BE AVAILABLE HERE IN TIME FOR BAKER TO SEE IT BEFORE HE LEAVES.

ACLAND

YYYY		
ADVANCE	5	
HD/NAD		1
HD/SEC PDL D		1
HD/WED		1
HD/ERD		1
RESIDENT CLERK		1
MAIN	53	
LIMITED		6
NAD		4
SEC POL		5
WED		9
ERD		5
NEWS		9
PS		7
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE		1
PS/MR EGGAR		1
PS/PUS		1
MR GILLMORRE		1
MR BOYD		1
MR FEARN		1
MR GOULDEN		1
MR TEASDALE		1
[B. L]		

CONFIDENTIAL

B.054

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Mr Goulden, FCO
Mr Powell, No 10

SNF

Bob Blackwill (Director for European and Soviet Affairs NSC Staff) telephoned me this afternoon on another subject. He also made the following observations on the current state of play over SNF. We should not necessarily assume that the Americans have given up on the Germans. The Prime Minister's message had been received and understood. No authoritative decisions in Washington had yet been taken on how to handle matters. Unfortunately the people who had accompanied Secretary of State Baker on his trip round Europe had not been in full command of their briefs on the subject. Rick Burt (outgoing Ambassador in Bonn and US negotiator designate for START) was now taking an active interest which at least had the merit of bringing some real expertise to the discussion. Blackwill himself was on the point of leaving for the State Department (after our conversation) to bang the table a bit.


2. It was important that the US and the UK stay close together. This would depend on having a common view of -
 - a. our precise aims;
 - b. what steps we should take to achieve them;
and
 - c. the risks and costs of failing.

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Your own visit to Washington (with me) would be an important opportunity for establishing whether the US and UK assessments were the same. Blackwill expressed the hope that we would give General Scowcroft an authoritative British view when we saw him on 17 March. He fully took the point that at all costs we should avoid springing surprises on one another in the way we dealt with the Germans.

3. Some modest signs here that the debate is still open within the Administration and that the White House staff do not seem disposed to let the State Department view through on the nod.



P J Weston

28 February 1989

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 570
OF 280100Z FEBRUARY 89
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

SIC

BURDEN-SHARING: PROPOSAL FOR US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. REPS SCHROEDER AND IRELAND ANNOUNCE INTENTION TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ASSIGNED TO US MISSILE SITES COVERED BY INF TREATY. CLAIMS THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTIONS OF 25,000 MEN (AS AGAINST PENTAGON ESTIMATES OF AROUND 8,000). IRELAND, RATHER THAN SCHROEDER, THE DRIVING FORCE FOR THIS WELL TARGETTED ASSAULT WHICH MAY WELL PROVE DIFFICULT TO RESIST.

DETAIL

2. REPS PAT SCHROEDER (D-COLORADO) AND ANDY IRELAND (R-FLORIDA) (THE RANKING REPUBLICAN ON LAST YEAR'S BURDEN-SHARING PANEL) ANNOUNCED AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THAT THEY WOULD BE INTRODUCING LEGISLATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE REQUIRING THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE OF ALL US PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO US MISSILE SITES COVERED BY THE INF TREATY. THIS LEGISLATION, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY SURFACE AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE FY90 DEFENCE AUTHORISATIONS BILL, WILL, ACCORDING TO ITS AUTHORS, ENTAIL THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME 25,000 US TROOPS FROM EUROPE (6,000 ARMY (PII'S) AND 19,000 AIR FORCE (GLCMS)). IT WILL SWEEP UP FORCES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REASSIGNED DURING THIS ELIMINATION PHASE OF THE TREATY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SCHROEDER ALSO INTENDS TO SCRUTINISE SPENDING ON MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION AT THE SITES USING HER RECENTLY ACQUIRED RESPONSIBILITY AS CHAIRWOMAN OF THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.

3. THE DOD HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSIDER THE IMPENDING LEGISLATION. AT A MEETING IN THE PENTAGON ON 27 FEBRUARY, BOTH THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE PROPOSAL, AND THE TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH IT WERE DISCUSSED. ON THE FORMER, THERE WAS SOME PERPLEXITY AS TO THE FIGURE OF 25,000 TROOPS SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED TO INF DEPLOYMENT DUTIES: PENTAGON

ESTIMATES RANGE FROM 7,500 TO 8,000. ON THE LATTER, THERE WAS, ACCORDING TO BADER (OSD), WHO HAS BRIEFED US IN CONFIDENCE, A GRUDGING RECOGNITION THAT THE LEGISLATION WAS WELL-TARGETTED AND COULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESIST. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAKE ALL OF THE OBVIOUS ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, PARTICULARLY ONE COINCIDING WITH THE OPENING OF THE CFE TALKS. BUT MILITARILY, IT MIGHT PROVE HARD TO ARGUE AGAINST A WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST THE DEDICATED INF PERSONNEL (IE AROUND 8,000).

4. WE HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT IT WAS OUR JUDGEMENT THAT SCHROEDER HAD LEARNED A SHARP POLITICAL LESSON LAST YEAR, THAT LEGISLATION SPEAKS LOUDER THAN PANEL REPORTS. THAT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE CASE, AND SHE HAS CERTAINLY MOVED QUICKLY TO PUT THAT LESSON INTO PRACTICE. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, FROM SCHROEDER'S STAFF THAT IT IS IRELAND, AND NOT SCHROEDER, WHO HAS MADE ALL THE RUNNING IN THIS LATEST BURDEN-SHARING VENTURE OF THEIRS. NEITHER IRELAND NOR SCHROEDER ARE WELL THOUGHT OF ON THE HILL AND DO NOT NORMALLY CARRY MUCH WEIGHT WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES. NEVERTHELESS THEIR TACTICS HAVE IMPROVED, AND IT MAY WELL PROVE DIFFICULT TO DEFLECT THEM FROM THEIR OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING SOME EARLY UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE.

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MODUK FOR DUS (P)
BONN TELNO 255: SNF MODERNISATION

SUMMARY

1. CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS STILL UNFORMED. MAIN OPPORTUNITY FOR SERIOUS LOBBYING WILL NOT COME UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED ITS POLICY AND THE KEY COMMITTEES FOCUS ON THE SUBJECT, IN APRIL. MEANWHILE INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS ADD TO THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS BECOMING LESS FIRM ON NEED FOR AN EARLY MODERNISATION DECISION.

DETAIL

2. THE STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN BEREUTER REPORTED IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THE CONGRESSIONAL POSITION ON SNF MODERNISATION. BUT THIS HAS YET TO EMERGE. ONLY A FEW INDIVIDUALS HAVE SO FAR FOCUSED ON THE ISSUES AND IT WOULD BE MISLEADING TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS ANYTHING APPROACHING A COLLECTIVE VIEW. THIS REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF LEHMAN AT THE PENTAGON, HAS DONE VERY LITTLE TO LOBBY THE IMPORTANT PLAYERS IN CONGRESS AND IS ONLY NOW MOVING TOWARDS A CONCERTED STRATEGY.

3. BEREUTER'S REMARKS CAME ON 21 FEBRUARY DURING A HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WHICH WAS TAKING EVIDENCE FROM SECRETARY BAKER ON THE FY 90 FOREIGN POLICY APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION. BAKER SPOKE IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ABOUT SNF MODERNISATION, SAYING IT WAS AN ISSUE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE GERMANS AND OTHER ALLIES AND THAT IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, TO BE READY IN TIME FOR THE NATO SUMMIT IN LATE MAY. ON THE ISSUE ITSELF, BAKER CONFINED HIMSELF TO POSING THE QUESTION OF WHAT CONGRESS WILL REQUIRE FROM THE ALLIANCE IN ORDER TO FUND FOTL, RATHER THAN OFFERING ANY SPECIFIC VIEW ON THE SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT CONGRESS WOULD ASK QUOTE IF THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER IS GOING TO SPEND MONEY AT

THIS RATE OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS, CAN YOU ASSURE US THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR THIS EXPENDITURE AND THAT IT WILL BE UTILISED UNQUOTE.

4. THIS PROMPTED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM BEREUTER QUOTE I JUST WANT TO SAY TO YOU THAT I - AND I THINK A BIPARTISAN GROUP OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS - BELIEVE THAT THE INITIAL BUDGETING IN FY 90 ... IS ESSENTIAL AND THAT IT CONTRIBUTES TO KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE US THE ARMS REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY WHERE THEY HAVE SUCH ASYMMETRICALLY LARGE ADVANTAGES OVER US. SO I BELIEVE THAT THAT MESSAGE CAN BE CONVEYED TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THIS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE FOR DEPLOYMENT ON THE PART OF THE FRG IS NOT CONDITIONED NECESSARILY ON (ITS) TAKING PLACE THIS YEAR, AS FAR AS CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PRESSURE IS CONCERNED HERE, UNQUOTE.

5. BEREUTER IS NOT A MAJOR PLAYER ON DEFENCE ISSUES. HIS STAFF TELL US THAT THIS WAS AN OFF THE CUFF REMARK IN AN INTERVENTION DEVOTED MAINLY TO NUTRITION AND HEALTH MATTERS. HE DOES NOT SIT ON THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ALTHOUGH HE IS ON THE HOUSE DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY). THE MAIN FACTOR WILL BE THE POSITION TO BE TAKEN BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE UNDER SENATOR NUNN. THE COMMITTEE STAFF TELL US THAT THEY ARE DELIBERATELY DEFERRING ANY HEARINGS ON THE SUBJECT UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IS DEFINED MORE PRECISELY AND THE GENERAL BLOCKAGE ON ALL DEFENCE SUBJECTS CAUSED BY THE TOWER CONTROVERSY IS CLEARED. THEY ARE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO CONCENTRATE SERIOUSLY BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF APRIL, WHEN THERE WILL BE A VERY THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF ALL OPTIONS. THESE RANGE FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PROLONGING THE LIFE OF THE EXISTING LANCE MISSILE UNTIL AFTER 1995 (THE ARMY DEPARTMENT WILL BE MEETING NUNN'S STAFF TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THIS IN A WEEK'S TIME) TO THE OPPOSITE EXTREME OF REQUIRING A CLEAR DECISION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL AT THE NATO SUMMIT. NUNN IS ALSO STILL SEEKING ASSURANCES THAT A DECISION ON FOTL WOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL ATACMS TO WHICH HE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE. THE OTHER VARIABLE IS THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS FORMED NO OPINION AT ALL AS YET, BUT WHICH - AS IT SHOWED LAST YEAR WHEN IT HALVED FOTL FUNDING - CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE RECKONING.

6. NEVERTHELESS BEREUTER'S REMARKS REMAIN OF SOME INTEREST AS AN INDICATION OF THE CURRENT MOOD IN NOT WANTING TO FORCE THE GERMANS

INTO A CORNER ON THIS ISSUE AND THEREFORE SOFTENING THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MODERNISATION DECISION. IN ADDITION TO ASPIN, THE ONLY OTHER CONGRESSMAN WHO, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS OFFERED A VIEW RECENTLY IS LEE HAMILTON (DEMOCRAT) WHO INDICATED THAT HE HELD A SIMILAR POSITION DURING BAKER'S MEETING.

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From the Private Secretary

24 February 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

I sent you this morning a brief account of the Prime Minister's exchange with the United States Ambassador on the subject of SNF modernisation. One purpose was to be able to copy the letter to Ambassador Price and thus ensure that he passed on to Washington exactly what the Prime Minister had said.

My letter suggested that Sir Antony Acland should speak in similar terms in Washington. But I think there is probably also a case for a message from the Prime Minister to President Bush, giving her conclusions from her discussion with Chancellor Kohl. Besides repeating the points which the Prime Minister made to Ambassador Price this morning, this would urge the President to continue to press the Germans for a decision at the NATO Summit on the development of a successor to LANCE and urge caution on the arms control aspect.

It would be helpful to have a draft for such a message by the time the Prime Minister returns from Paris on Monday evening.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Defense (1974) p. 5

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MR POWELL *COO 24/2*

SNF

I note that the Prime Minister remains keen to keep the pressure on Chancellor Kohl between now and the NATO Summit; and that further preparatory discussions between No 10 and the Federal Chancellery are in prospect.

2. You will have seen from Washington telegrams 001 to UKREP Brussels and 516 to FCO that the Administration's thinking is apparently evolving in a direction providing for some arms control component on the lines favoured by the Dutch (Hague telegram 77).

3. Sir Robin Butler and I will be visiting Washington on 16/17 March for talks with General Scowcroft among others. Given the latter's personal interest in this subject we shall no doubt be questioned about British thinking. As the Prime Minister said in Cabinet the United States attitude on this subject will be critical.

4. It would be helpful to be kept fully informed of the Prime Minister's thinking on this subject and of any further contacts you may have with Teltschik in the run-up to Sir Robin Butler's visit. It does not look as though the Bush Administration are going to be particularly robust with the Germans, on the basis of present evidence.

P J Weston
P J Weston

24 February 1989
Cabinet Office

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MY 2 IPTS: SNF MODERNISATION

1. THE MAIN LEADER IN TODAY'S FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ: CONSERVATIVE) CALLS ON KOHL TO COME OUT FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF SNF RESTRUCTURING BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. IT SAYS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RECENT DECISION TO ABANDON A PROJECT TO DEVELOP A SHORT-RANGE CONVENTIONAL MISSILE, THE DAY AFTER A TELEVISION REPORT ABOUT IT (DETAILS BY BAG), SHOWED THAT ITS ONLY DEFENCE POLICY AIM WAS TO AVOID TROUBLE. WAS THIS THE SAME GOVERNMENT, WHICH PUSHED THROUGH THE NATO DUAL TRACK DECISION? THE WEAKER THE GOVERNMENT WAS DOMESTICALLY, THE STAUNCHER IT WAS IN FEUDING IN NATO, PLEADING GERMAN SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE NUCLEAR QUESTION AND DESTROYING CONFIDENCE.

2. FAZ SEES THE CAUSE, APART FROM THE LEGACY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AS A FALSE ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY MANY POLITICIANS, CONCENTRATING ON THEIR DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL RATHER THAN THE FACT THAT THIS POTENTIAL STABILISED PEACE. AS A RESULT MANY, IN ALL PARTIES, REGARDED IT AS URGENT TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND TO FOLLOW THE DOUBLE ZERO WITH SNF ARMS CONTROL. ADVOCATES OF THIS DID NOT REALISE, HOWEVER, THAT THE DYNAMIC OF SNF ARMS CONTROL AND SOVIET PROPOSALS COULD EASILY LEAD TO A THIRD ZERO, AS EXPERIENCE OVER THE SECOND ZERO SHOWED. IT WAS IN THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN INTEREST TO CONCENTRATE ON THE REMOVAL OF CONVENTIONAL INVASION CAPABILITY. ONLY THEN COULD THERE BE CLARITY OVER THE SIZE OF THE REMAINING REQUIREMENT FOR REGIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. THE SUCCESSOR TO LANCE - WHETHER LAND-BASED MISSILE, TASM, SLCM OR A COMBINATION - SHOULD BE CHOSEN ON MILITARY CRITERIA. NO NEW COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WAS NEEDED FOR THAT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD DECIDE NOW ON THE PRINCIPLE 'AS FEW AS POSSIBLE, BUT MOBILE AND AS LONG-RANGE AS POSSIBLE', AND SHOULD DO SO BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. THOUSANDS OF BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS COULD ALSO BE REMOVED. THE

ALLIES HAD RECOGNISED FROM THE OUTSET THE GERMAN DEMAND FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AS DELAYING TACTICS. IF THE GOVERNMENT PERSISTED IN ITS POLICY OF DELAY 'UNTIL 1991/92', ITS DOMESTIC OPPONENTS WOULD PRESS THE LANCE QUESTION EVERY DAY FOR THREE YEARS. THE GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY REGAIN THE INITIATIVE BY TAKING ON ITS CRITICS. IF GENSCHER AND THE FDP WANTED TO SCORE DOMESTIC POINTS BY REFUSING A DECISION NOW, KOHL'S TASK WAS TO STAND FIRM. HE WOULD NOT HAVE THE WORST CARDS, IF FDP MOTIVES WERE PUBLICISED 'THERE ARE ENOUGH FREE DEMOCRATS WHO CAN DISTINGUISH GERMAN INTERESTS FROM PARTY INTERESTS'

4. SOME OF THESE POINTS ARE ONES WHICH I PUT TO FAZ'S EDITORIAL BOARD WHEN VISITING THEM LAST WEEK.

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SNF MODERNISATION

SUMMARY

1. IMPRESSION GROWING IN BONN THAT AMERICANS WILL NOT INSIST ON MODERNISATION DECISION IN MAY. PROSPECTS OF GERMAN FIRMNESS ARE BLEAK. MIFT REPORTS NEW IDEAS FROM CDU POLITICIAN DREGGER. MY SECOND IFT SUMMARISES LEADING ARTICLE IN FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG URGING FIRMNESS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE IMPRESSION IS GROWING HERE THAT THE US MAY NOT BE ALTOGETHER FIRM ABOUT A MODERNISATION DECISION IN MAY. THE POSITION, I JUDGE, IS THAT KOHL HAS THE WISH BUT AT PRESENT NOT THE WILL TO GO FOR A MODERNISATION DECISION IN PRINCIPLE IN MAY, WHILE GENSCHER IS STRONGLY AND OPENLY AGAINST. ONE FACTOR IN KOHL'S WAVERING IS NO DOUBT THE ELECTORAL BACKGROUND. AS I HAVE REPORTED, THE SURPRISE ELECTION RESULT IN BERLIN A MONTH AGO WAS A SHOCK TO CDU AND FDP, AND THE PREVAILING ASSUMPTION THAT THE PRESENT COALITION WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE DECEMBER 1990 ELECTION NOW LOOKS LESS RELIABLE. BUT SPD WILL PLAY UP SNF IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN EVEN IF THE DECISION ON MODERNISATION IS DELAYED. SO IT IS ARGUABLE THAT A STRONG LEADER WOULD GO FOR A DECISION NOW (AS THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG URGES TODAY - SEE MY SECOND IFT) AND GET THE PROBLEM OUT OF THE WAY WELL BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. BUT I SEE NO CHANCE OF THAT UNLESS THE AMERICANS PUT MAJOR PRESSURE ON KOHL. AND EVEN IF THEY DID, I AM NOT CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD GRASP THAT NETTLE, NOW THAT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION IS THAT HE WANTS DELAY.

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MODUK FOR DUS (P)

OUR TELNO 1 TO UKREP BRUSSELS: SNF MODERNISATION/ARMS CONTROL SUMMARY

1. US THINKING, STILL COLOURED BY BAKER'S VISITS TO BONN AND THE HAGUE, MOVING IN FAVOUR OF A MODERNISATION 'SIGNAL' RATHER THAN DECISION IN MAY, WITH AN ARMS CONTROL COMPONENT SHORT OF A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATION.

DETAIL

2. FROM SOUNDINGS IN STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC WE KNOW THAT DECISIONS ON HANDLING THE SNF ISSUE IN THE LIGHT OF BAKER'S TOUR OF NATO CAPITALS HAVE YET TO BE TAKEN. ALTHOUGH THE RELEVANT RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOW WITH BAKER HE DID NOT COME TO A VIEW BEFORE LEAVING ON HIS VISIT TO ASIA AND WE DO NOT EXPECT TO HAVE ANYTHING DEFINITE UNTIL HE HAS RETURNED NEXT WEEK. NEVERTHELESS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ISSUE IS MOVING ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN TUR. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF A REVISED US APPROACH, AS OUTLINED TO US BY THE EUROPEAN BUREAU TODAY, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) TO AIM FOR A MUTED REAFFIRMATION OF THE MODERNISATION REQUIREMENT IN MAY IN VIEW OF THE GERMAN DIFFICULTIES. WHAT USED TO BE TERMED A DECISION IS NOW DESCRIBED AS A SIGNAL HERE.

(B) AN ARMS CONTROL COMPONENT ON THE BASIS OF AVOIDING A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATION BUT OF NOT CLOSING THE DOOR FIRMLY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE DUTCH PAPER (HAGUE TELNO 77) IS REGARDED AS THE MAIN SOURCE FOR THE REVISED AMERICAN APPROACH. ALTHOUGH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF IT ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE, SUCH AS THE PROSPECT OF COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, THE FIRST STEP, PROVIDING FOR AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE, BUT NO MANDATE, IS RAPIDLY TAKING ROOT HERE, AT LEAST AMONG BAKER'S IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE.

(C) WORK WITH CONGRESS TO ESTABLISH THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR A SIGNAL WHICH WILL ENABLE FOTL DEVELOPMENT FUNDING TO BE PROVIDED.

3. THIS APPROACH IS NOT AGREED UNANIMOUSLY. INDEED THERE

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IS AN INTER-AGENCY PROBLEM WITH THE PENTAGON, WHICH REGARDS THE ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION CONTEMPLATED BY STATE AS BEING BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF SAFETY. FOR THIS REASON THE ISSUE IS BEING HELD CLOSELY BY SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION (WE WERE TOLD YESTERDAY BY THE NSC THAT SCOWCROFT WAS DEALING WITH IT PERSONALLY). NEVERTHELESS STATE DEPARTMENT ARE FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT BAKER WILL WIN THE DAY.

4. MUCH DEPENDS OF COURSE ON THE PRECISE TERMS OF BOTH THE MODERNISATION SIGNAL AND ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE IN MIND. BOTH STATE AND THE NCS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED AND WE HAVE UNDERLINED OUR CONCERN TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE MADE WITH THE GERMANS. IN THIS REGARD IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THERE WAS ANYTHING FURTHER WHICH COULD BE SAID TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE ANGLO/GERMAN SUMMIT AS A MEANS OF KEEPING US FULLY IN THE GAME HERE.

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SNF MODERNISATION: THE DEBATE IN THE FRG

SUMMARY

1. NO DATE FOR FURTHER COALITION DISCUSSION. FDP HARDEN OPPOSITION TO ANY DECISION ON MODERNISATION BEFORE 1991/92. SPD AND MEDIA ATTACK GOVERNMENT FOR INCONSISTENCY AND LACK OF CLARITY. NEED TO RESTORE KOHL'S NERVE.
2. TODAY'S FRANKFURTER ALGEMEINE ZEITUNG (CONSERVATIVE) REPORTS THAT THE FDP LEADERSHIP DECIDED ON SUNDAY, UNDER GENSCHER'S INFLUENCE, TO INSIST THAT THERE BE NO MODERNISATION DECISION (EVEN IN PRINCIPLE) BEFORE 1991/92, EVEN IF THAT MEANT CONFLICT IN THE COALITION. FDP LEADER LAMBSDORFF SAID AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE REJECTION OF A THIRD ZERO WAS VALID 'UNDER TODAY'S CIRCUMSTANCES' (I.E. IT NEED NOT REMAIN SO). GENSCHER ARGUED THAT OPTIONS MUST BE KEPT OPEN OVER MODERNISATION: THE 'HISTORIC CHANCE' MUST NOT BE MISSED TO FIND A RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV'S SOVIET UNION WHICH COULD BRING RELAXATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR THE GERMANS IN THE GDR.
3. ALSO ACCORDING TO FAZ, KOHL BELIEVES THAT THE CHANCES AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE MUST FIRST BE TESTED: IF MODERNISATION IS THEN NECESSARY, IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. IN DEFENCE MINISTER SCHOLZ'S VIEW, THE LOGIC IN REJECTING A THIRD ZERO IS THAT, WHILE TIMING AND NUMBERS CAN BE LEFT OPEN, MODERNISATION ITSELF CANNOT. FAZ SAYS THE COALITION NOW HAS TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WILL LEAVE AS MUCH OPEN AS POSSIBLE BUT WILL GIVE THE US ENOUGH TO OPEN THE DOOR TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THE 'GREY AREA' IN THE COALITION CONCERNS WHAT SHOULD PRECEDE IN 1989 KOHL'S 'REAL' DECISION IN 1991/92. (AN ALLEGED US LINKAGE BETWEEN GERMAN AGREEMENT TO MODERNISATION AND US AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS IS REPORTED IN SOME NEWSPAPERS AND

DISMISSED IN OTHERS).

4. THE GERMAN MEDIA AND THE OPPOSITION ARE DEMANDING CLARITY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. THE SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (INDEPENDENT) SEES KOHL FACING A DILEMMA. HE HAS PUT OFF A DECISION AND SAID NEITHER YES NOR NO TO MODERNISATION. HE DOES NOT WANT TO RISK ANOTHER MISSILES ELECTION, IN WHICH THE FDP, UNLIKE IN 1983, WOULD BE AGAINST MODERNISATION. BUT THE FRG'S MAJOR ALLIES ARE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN GERMAN ATTITUDES TO DEFENCE. KOHL'S DOMESTIC WEAKNESS, HOWEVER, PROVIDES THE UNSPOKEN THREAT TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON THAT TOO MUCH PRESSURE BY THE ALLIES COULD RESTORE THE SPD TO POWER. DIE ZEIT (LEFT OF CENTRE) DESCRIBES COALITION POLICY AS A THREE-EYED CYCLOPS: TELLING THE GERMAN PUBLIC THERE IS NO NEED FOR ACTION BEFORE THE 1990 ELECTION, THE ALLIES THAT THE MODERNISATION OPTION IS STILL OPEN, AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT IT IS READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE SPD IS CALLING FOR AN EARLY BUNDESTAG DEBATE TO PUT THE COALITION ON THE SPOT, AND TO UNDERLINE ITS OWN OPPOSITION TO MODERNISATION. EYON BAHR HAS ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF 'CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION'. HE SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TO BLAME IF NATO COULD NOT AGREE TO A SUBSTANTIAL COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, INCLUDING SNF NEGOTIATIONS. ON BEHALF OF THE SPD HE PROPOSED BOTH A THIRD ZERO (ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY IN PARALLEL WITH THE FIRST CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES) AND A FOURTH ZERO (REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM NON-NUCLEAR STATES IN EUROPE ONCE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IS ACHIEVED). IN THE MEANTIME, THE SPD COULD ACCEPT THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF NATO SNF (BELOW THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 88 LANCE LAUNCHERS), BUT MODERNISATION MUST NOT MEAN INTRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT (IE LONGER RANGE) SYSTEMS. BAHR SAID THE INTRODUCTION OF A STAND-OFF WEAPON ON AIRCRAFT REPRESENTED THE GREATEST DANGER OF 'COMPENSATION' FOR THE INF TREATY.

COMMENT

6. KOHL'S NERVE HAS CLEARLY WAVERED IN THE PAST WEEK. THE ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT ON 20-21 FEB IS WELL TIMED FOR AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE HIS DETERMINATION TO GO FOR THE AIM HE HAS HAD IN VIEW - A MODERNISATION DECISION IN PRINCIPLE THIS YEAR.

MALLABY

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FM BRUSSELS
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 65
OF 171735Z FEBRUARY 89
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS

US SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO BELGIUM: SNF

SUMMARY

1. NO SURPRISES ON SNF MODERNISATION: BELGIANS TO FOLLOW GERMANS.

DETAIL

2. THE US MINISTER/COUNSELLOR HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF BAKER'S BILATERAL VISIT TO BELGIUM.

3. THREE-QUARTERS OF BAKER'S FIFTY MINUTE BILATERAL WITH MARTENS AND TINDEMANS (SHORTER THAN INTENDED BECAUSE OF THE KING'S WISH TO SEE BAKER AT THE LAST MINUTE) WAS DEVOTED TO SNF. BAKER EXPLAINED THE RATIONALE FOR MODERNISATION AND THE DANGERS OF INACTION. HE DISCOUNTED LES ASPIN'S REMARKS THAT CONGRESS WOULD AGREE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO START DEVELOPMENT OF FOTL WITHOUT SPECIFIC ASSURANCES BY EUROPEAN ALLIES. IN RESPONSE, MARTENS AND TINDEMANS HAD RECALLED THEIR PAST FIRM STANCE AND EXPLAINED THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. THEY MADE CLEAR THEY DID NOT SUPPORT A THIRD ZERO BUT THEY COULD DO NOTHING UNTIL THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WAS AGREED. NOR COULD THEY GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE GERMANS. THEY REGARDED KOHL'S FT INTERVIEW AS SIGNIFICANT. US AMBASSADOR GLITMAN ARGUED THAT ONCE THE CFE TALKS AGREED CUTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES THE ALLIANCE COULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT SNF AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE ELICITED ANY BELGIAN REACTION. BELGIAN BRIEFING ENSURED THE LOCAL PRESS ALL REPORT THE NUMBER OF STATES ALLEGEDLY OPPOSED TO AN EARLY DECISION ON FOTL AS INCLUDING BELGIUM, DENMARK, GREECE, SPAIN, HOLLAND, ITALY, NORWAY AND FRG.

4. THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR BAKER TO RAISE THE CHARLIER REPORT, ALTHOUGH HE DID SPEAK IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT BURDEN SHARING.

5. ON CFE, TINDEMANS SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD A GOOD POSITION BUT IT WAS TOO LATE TO CHANGE THE NUMBERS NOW. BAKER SAID THAT

THEY HAD SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE TURKS AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND SOMETHING TO BRIDGE THE GAP. BUT IT WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE EUROPEANS HAD TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR THEMSELVES.

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MIPT: TEXT OF DUTCH PAPER

1. RESTRUCTURING OF SNF: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

PURPOSE

AN EXPEDITIOUS DECISION WITH REGARD TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF FOTL AND TASM AS PART OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH OF DEFENSE PLANNING AND ARMS CONTROL.

PARAMETERS

- THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN A LARGE DEGREE OF FREEDOM TO ACT - IN ORDER TO ENABLE NATO TO DECIDE ON ITS SNF POSTURE - WHILE PROVIDING AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE.
- THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FLOWING FROM NATO STRATEGY: FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE SNF LAND-BASED MISSILES WILL BE INDISPENSABLE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS ('NO ZERO OPTION').
- A CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF A SHIFT FROM SHORT TO LONGER RANGES.

SUCH AN INTEGRATED APPROACH COULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

1. A DECISION TO INTRODUCE THE TASM, COMBINED WITH A REDUCTION OF FREE-FALL NUCLEAR BOMBS IN A GREATER NUMBER.
- 2A. A DECISION TO MODERNISE THE LANCE, TO A 'MINIMUM' NUMBER NOT HIGHER AND PREFERABLY LOWER THAN THE CURRENT NUMBER OF LANCE MISSILES, RESERVING THE RIGHT TO FOTL INCREASES IN CASE WTO REJECTS REDUCTION AND/OR MODERNISES.

2B. A PROSPECT OF ARMS CONTROL WITH REGARD TO THE FOTL BY CHALLENGING THE WP TO ELIMINATE THE CURRENT ASYMMETRIES IN THIS FIELD, AND OFFERING TO AGREE ON OUR MINIMUM ('FLOOR') AS A MUTUAL MAXIMUM ('EQUAL CEILINGS'): ALTERNATIVELY BY INDICATING THAT A SOMEWHAT LOWER NUMBER (BUT NOT ZERO) WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE.

3. A 50% REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ROUNDS, WITH THE PROSPECT OF COMPLETE ELIMINATION IN CASE OF A SATISFACTORY CFE-AGREEMENT AND PROVIDED WTO-COUNTRIES FOLLOW SUIT.

FIRST STEP

AT THE NATO SUMMIT THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLANNING AND ARMS CONTROL APPROACH WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 'COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT': A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR FUTURE SNF POSTURE (INCLUDING A MODERNISED FOTL, UNDERLINING THAT THERE WILL BE NO 'THIRD ZERO' BUT NOT GIVING EXACT NUMBERS), WHILE PROVIDING AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE (BUT NO 'MANDATE' FOR NEGOTIATIONS).

2. TEXT ENDS.

JENKINS

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A good thing,
but goes a bit
too far on
the arms control
side.
— on.

BAKER'S VISIT TO THE HAGUE, 16 FEBRUARY : SNF

SUMMARY

1. TALKS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY CENTERED ON SNF MODERNISATION. DUTCH HAND US A PAPER WITH THEIR IDEAS FOR A PACKAGE.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW VAN DEN BROEK ON ANOTHER MATTER TODAY, HE RAISED HIS PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSION WITH BAKER ABOUT SNF.

3. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE HAD HANDED BAKER A PAPER CONTAINING A PROPOSED FORMULA FOR HANDLING THE MODERNISATION ISSUE (TEXT IN MIFT). THIS WAS A WORKED UP VERSION OF IDEAS HE HAD OUTLINED TO YOU AT CHEVENING ON 11 FEBRUARY. BAKER HAD RESPONDED THAT HE FOUND THE DUTCH APPROACH HELPFUL AND HE PROMISED TO STUDY IT CAREFULLY.

4. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT 'MODERNISATION ALONE' WOULD NOT RUN. THE GERMANS WOULD NOT SWALLOW IT, NOR COULD HE GET IT THROUGH THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT. THERE HAD TO BE AN ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION, ALTHOUGH HOW THIS WAS DEFINED CLEARLY REQUIRED MUCH DISCUSSION. MEANWHILE HE HOPED TO HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO TALK FURTHER WITH GENSCHER.

5. WIJNAENDTS (POLITICAL DIRECTOR), WHO WAS PRESENT, SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT GENSCHER'S INITIAL REACTION, WHEN VAN DEN BROEK HAD TRIED HIS IDEAS OUT ON HIM GENERALLY AT VIENNA, HAD NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY FAVOURABLE. THE DUTCH HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THEIR APPROACH WITH WORNER, WHO HAD SHOWN INTEREST. HE HAD AGREED TO ASK THE MILITARY STAFF TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR MINIMUM NUCLEAR ARTILLERY REQUIREMENT.

6. WIJNAENDTS SAID THAT VAN DEN BROEK HAD STRESSED TO THE AMERICANS THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE DUTCH ATTACHED TO NOT (REPEAT NOT) USING MLRS AS THE LAUNCHER SYSTEM FOR FOTL IF PROBLEMS OF DUAL CAPABILITY AND VERIFICATION WERE TO BE AVOIDED. THEY HAD ALSO ADVISED MOVING THE DISCUSSION FROM NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS TO MISSILES WHERE THERE WAS GREATER ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE WITHIN ANY ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT.

7. THE US EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT BAKER HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY DUTCH EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY FORWARD. HE HAD NOT HOWEVER REVEALED MUCH OF HIS THINKING TO THEM AND HE HAD SAID LITTLE ABOUT HIS TALKS IN BONN. THEY NOTED THAT AT ONE POINT IN DISCUSSION WITH VAN DEN BROEK, BAKER HAD REMARKED, APPARENTLY THINKING ALOUD, THAT PERHAPS IT MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT FOR CONGRESS QUOTE TO HAVE A GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT A LAND-BASED SYSTEM WOULD BE KEPT EFFECTIVE UNQUOTE.

8. THE DUTCH PRESS, AS A RESULT OF OFFICIAL BRIEFING, IS SPECULATING THAT VAN DEN BROEK MAY BE TRYING TO MEDIATE OVER SNF BETWEEN THE US AND WEST GERMANY. I TOLD WIJNAENDTS THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I DID NOT THINK THIS LINE WOULD PROVE HELPFUL IF THE DUTCH WANTED THEIR IDEAS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

9. SEE MIFT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 189

OF 142231Z FEBRUARY 89

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, MOSCOW

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NY TWO IPTS: SNF MODERNISATION: GERMAN POSITION

1. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED NO DECISION ON SNF MODERNISATION, ANOTHER MEETING OF THE COALITION WAS NEEDED. IT WOULD NOT BE TODAY BUT MIGHT BE THIS WEEK OR NEXT. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S HOPE WAS STILL TO GET "A BASIC DECISION IN PRINCIPLE" ON MODERNISING LANCE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AT A SUMMIT IN MAY. IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE, HOWEVER, TO TALK OF "UPDATING" SNF OR KEEPING SNF EFFECTIVE. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S REMARK IN HIS FINANCIAL TIMES INTERVIEW THAT THE REAL DECISION ON PRODUCTION WOULD COME IN 1991/92 WAS COMPATIBLE WITH A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON MODERNISATION IN 1989.

2. I ASKED TELTSCHIK ABOUT REPORTS IN TODAY'S GERMAN MEDIA THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD SAID THAT THE IDEA OF A THIRD ZERO SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN FOR THE FUTURE. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT KOHL HAD MADE A REMARK OF THIS SORT TO CORRESPONDENTS YESTERDAY, BUT HAD MEANT THAT A THIRD ZERO WAS A THEORETICAL OPTION FOR THE FURTHER FUTURE. IT FORMED NO PART OF KOHL'S VIEWS CONCERNING WHAT SHOULD BE DECIDED IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. (IN OTHER INTERVIEWS YESTERDAY, KOHL SAID FIRMLY THAT HE WANTED NO THIRD ZERO AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO THIRD ZERO IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. (THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT KOHL MISHEARD THE QUESTION).)

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT SECRETARY BAKER, IN HIS TALKS YESTERDAY WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR, HAD BEEN "CAREFUL AND RESERVED" ABOUT SNF. HE HAD BEEN EXPLORING THE SUBJECT, RATHER THAN PRESSING THE GERMANS FOR A MODERNISATION DECISION THIS YEAR. (THIS, OF COURSE, CONTRASTS WITH THE US PERCEPTION REPORTED IN MIPT.)

4. KOHL SAID TO THE PRESS ON 13 FEBRUARY THAT NO DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT (STIC) OF A SUCCESSOR TO LANCE WOULD BE DUE UNTIL 1991/92. THIS IS IN LINE WITH WHAT HE SAID TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES EXCEPT THAT THERE HE SPOKE OF PRODUCTION (BONN TELNO 167). FEDERAL SPOKESMAN OST ON 10 FEBRUARY SAID THAT KOHL, IN HIS FT INTERVIEW, HAD REFERRED TO US EXPLANATIONS IN THE HLG ON 6 DECEMBER 1988 THAT CONCRETE PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT COMMITMENTS BY ALLIED COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE ON THE AGENDA BEFORE 1991/92. AUSWAERTIGES AMT OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO DRAWN OUR ATTENTION TO A STATEMENT BY CARLUCCI AT THE LAST VAB THAT ONLY THREE TO FOUR YEARS WOULD BE NEEDED TO MODIFY AND PRODUCE ATACMS AS A SUCCESSOR MISSILE.

5. FEDERAL CHANCELLERY MINISTER SCHAEUBLE (CDU) WAS QUOTED IN MONDAY'S PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IMPRESSED THAT ALL

RECENT SENIOR GERMAN VISITORS TO WASHINGTON HAD USED THE SAME ARGUMENTS: THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A DECISION UNTIL 1991. LAMBSDORFF IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HAD PRESENTED TO THE AMERICANS A POSITION COMMON TO THE COALITION PARTIES: NO THIRD ZERO: NO DENUCLEARISED EUROPE: REMOVAL OR AT LEAST SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS: AND A DECISION ON SNF MODERNISATION NOT BEFORE THE DUE TIME, IE 1991/92.

6. AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, OUR CONTACTS IN BOTH AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND FMOD NOW DOUBT WHETHER THE FORTHCOMING NATO SUMMIT WILL BE ABLE TO DO MUCH BEYOND REAFFIRMING THE FORMULAE IN THE MARCH 1988 SUMMIT DECLARATIONS, ON KEEPING FORCES "UP-TO-DATE WHERE NECESSARY" AND ON SNF ARMS CONTROL, BUT FMOD ARE LOOKING AT POSSIBLE WORDING FOR A "DECISION IN PRINCIPLE" IN FAVOUR OF MODERNISATION AT THE NEXT SUMMIT.

7. MY INTERPRETATION OF THESE CONFLICTING INDICATIONS OF GERMAN VIEWS IS IN PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 186 SETTING THE SCENE FOR NEXT WEEK'S ANGLO GERMAN SUMMIT.

MALLABY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 188

OF 142148Z FEBRUARY 89

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MIPT: BAKER'S VISIT TO BONN: 12/13 FEBRUARY: SNF MODERNISATION

1. THE MINISTER AT THE US EMBASSY HAS GIVEN MISS NEVILLE-JONES THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT. DOBBINS WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS COULD BE PROTECTED AND DEBRIEFING ON THE VISIT BE SOUGHT IN WASHINGTON WITHOUT REVEALING PRIOR KNOWLEDGE.
2. ON SUNDAY NIGHT GENSCHER TOLD BAKER THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE COALITION THAN TO GET AN SNF MODERNISATION DECISION THIS YEAR. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE NO DECISION UNTIL 1991/92. KOHL WOULD SAY THIS THE FOLLOWING DAY.
3. THE AMERICANS QUERIED THIS STORY NEXT MORNING WITH SCHAEUBLE, CABINET MINISTER IN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY. SINCE IT DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH SCHAEUBLE'S ACCOUNT OF KOHL'S POSITION DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON. HE HAD SAID THEN THAT KOHL CONSIDERED THAT A MODERNISATION DECISION WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. AFTER CONTACTING KOHL, SCHAEUBLE SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR "SAW NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN GENSCHER'S STATEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND THE POSITION AS STATED BY SCHAEUBLE IN WASHINGTON".
4. A MEETING OF 1 AND A HALF HOURS TOOK PLACE WITH KOHL ON 13 FEBRUARY. GENSCHER WAS UNUSUALLY PRESENT. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION WAS TAKEN UP WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND GERMAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS. KOHL WAS IN TRUCULENT MOOD AND WENT ON AT LENGTH ABOUT "GERMAN FAITHFULNESS TO THE ALLIANCE". SNF WAS DEALT WITH IN ABOUT 15 MINUTES.
5. BAKER WENT OVER THE GROUND NOTING THE NEED FOR A DECISION ON MODERNISATION. HE SAID THAT THE TIMING WAS BECOMING VERY TIGHT. HE HANDED KOHL A DRAFT STATEMENT THAT HAD BEEN SEEN BY SCHAEUBLE, GENSCHER, WHO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN THE TEXT. INSISTED ON THE REMOVAL OF AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO KEEP NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS UP-TO-DATE. A REFERENCE TO THE NATO COMMUNIQUE OF MARCH 1988 WAS SUBSTITUTED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A JOINT STATEMENT BUT COULD BE USED BY BAKER AS REFLECTING AN AGREED DESCRIPTION OF THE POSITION. (TRANSCRIPT OF BAKER'S PRESS CONFERENCE BY FAX TO SECPOLE DEPARTMENT.) OST'S STATEMENT (PARA 4 OF MIPT) USED THE AGREED LANGUAGE. BAKER ADDED TO THE PRESS THAT KOHL HAD SAID HIS STATEMENT TO THE FT WAS IN LINE WITH THE MARCH 1988 NATO COMMUNIQUE, AND HAD REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES "I HAVE NOT CHANGED MY POSITION." BAKER SAID THAT THERE WAS A COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE THE SNF ISSUE THROUGH FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATION.

6. IN A SEPARATE MEETING DEFENCE MINISTER SCHOLZ TOLD BAKER THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE FDP AND THAT A MODERNISATION DECISION WAS UNOBTAINABLE BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIANCE DECISION SHOULD BE SPLIT INTO TWO. THIS YEAR DEVELOPMENT COULD BE ENDORSED. THERE COULD LATER BE A SECOND DECISION ENDORSING PRODUCTION. BAKER WAS SCEPTICAL. IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO ASK CONGRESS TO AUTHORISE DOLLARS 1.2 BILLION DEVELOPMENT COSTS ON SO SLENDER A BASIS. SCHOLZ THEN TRIED ANOTHER FORMULA. PERHAPS THIS YEAR THE ALLIANCE COULD SAY THAT A TRIPLE ZERO WAS REJECTED AS AN OUTCOME IN NEGOTIATION ON ANY CATEGORY OF WEAPONS AND THAT ALL OF THEM HAD TO BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE. BAKER REACTED EVEN MORE COOLLY. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO SCHOLZ THAT THESE FORMULAE WOULD NOT SUFFICE.

7. THE AMERICANS HERE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT BAKER CONVEYED AN UNEQUIVOCAL MESSAGE ABOUT THE NEED FOR A DECISION ON SNF MODERNISATION AND THAT THE GERMANS UNDERSTOOD HIM TO BE DOING THIS. THEY FEEL THAT THE MESSAGE GOT THROUGH MORE CLEARLY TO SCHOLZ. WHO WAS HIMSELF EXPLICIT. WHILE KOHL SHOWED A TENDENCY TO SLIDE OFF THE ISSUE. THEY THINK THAT SCHOLZ'S REMARKS REFLECT WHAT KOHL WOULD HAVE SAID HAD BAKER NOT PRE-EMPTED HIM BY HIS DRAFT STATEMENT. THEY THINK THAT KOHL CHANGED POSITION LAST WEEK, IE WHEN HE GAVE THE INTERVIEW TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES. AND THAT HE HAS NOW BEEN BROUGHT "SOMEWAY BACK" TO HIS PREVIOUS POSITION. THEY ARE EVIDENTLY NOT CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL HOLD. THE AMERICANS HAVE YET TO WORK OUT HOW THE DISCUSSIONS REFERRED TO IN BAKER'S STATEMENT WILL BE PURSUED BUT THEY WILL INCLUDE BILATERAL CONTACT AS WELL AS WORK IN NATO. DOBBINS REMARKED THAT THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO HOLD THE GERMANS TO GIVING SUPPORT TO MODERNISATION "HOWEVER THIS IS FINALLY EXPRESSED".

8. SEE MIFT.

MALLABY

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TELNO 167
OF 101630Z FEBRUARY 89
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 133: SNF MODERNISATION: FT INTERVIEW WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

1. THE FT CORRESPONDENT, DAVID MARSH, HAS GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THE TRANSLATED FULL TRANSCRIPT OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH KOHL. (BY FAX TO WED). THIS INDICATES MANUSCRIPT AMENDMENTS AND DELETIONS MADE BY THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY ON TELTSCHIK'S INSTRUCTIONS.

2. THERE WAS ONE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE ON SNF. KOHL IN FACT SAID: 'THE REAL QUESTION OVER THE DEPLOYMENT AND MODERNISATION WILL BE IN 1991/92, WHEN THE QUESTION OF THE AGEING OF THE LANCE WILL COME UP FOR DISCUSSION.' THIS WAS AMENDED TO: 'THE REAL DECISION OVER THE PRODUCTION WILL BE IN 1991/92. ONLY THEN WILL THE QUESTION OF THE AGEING OF THE LANCE REALLY COME UP FOR DISCUSSION.' THE PURPOSE OF TELTSCHIK'S CHANGE WAS TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN. KOHL'S LANGUAGE WAS IMPRECISE AND CONFUSED HERE AND ELSEWHERE IN THE INTERVIEW. BUT HIS INTENTION, AS REPORTED BY THE FT, IS CLEARLY TO DELAY THE MODERNISATION DECISION.

3. THE FT INTERVIEW IS TOP ITEM ON TODAY'S GERMAN RADIO NEWS. FDP DISARMAMENT SPOKESMAN FELDMANN HAS WELCOMED KOHL'S 'CLEAR WORDS', IN WHICH HE SAW A CONFIRMATION OF THE FDP'S LONGSTANDING LINE.

COMMENT

4. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT KOHL HAS DECIDED, IN THE FACE OF A UNITED FDP STAND BY GENSCHER AND LAMBSDORFF (MY TELNO 153) NOT TO PUT THE COALITION AT RISK OVER THIS QUESTION. THE RESUMED COALITION DISCUSSION OF SNF, WHICH MAY NOW TAKE PLACE ON 14 FEBRUARY, SHOULD SHOW WHETHER THIS INFERENCE IS CORRECT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 153

OF 081837Z FEBRUARY 89

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE PARIS

WASHINGTON TELNO 388 : SNF MODERNISATION

SUMMARY

1. KOHL'S AND GENSCHER'S CONFLICTING POSITIONS UNCHANGED. LAMBSDORFF NOW SEEMS CLOSE TO GENSCHER. FDP'S REASONS FOR OPPOSING MODERNISATION COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY DISASTROUS ELECTION RESULT IN BERLIN. TELTSCHIK SHOWS FIRST SIGNS OF CONCERN THAT AMERICANS MAY NOT BE REALLY FIRM ON MODERNISATION BUT APPEARS NOT TO KNOW OF TREND IN US OFFICIAL THINKING REPORTED IN TUR.

DETAIL

2. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT KOHL STILL WANTED COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT ADOPTED THIS SPRING TO INCLUDE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON SNF MODERNISATION AND AN ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT. TELTSCHIK HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER AT LENGTH WITH GENSCHER YESTERDAY. GENSCHER HAD BEEN CAGEY BUT APPEARED TO BE STICKING TO HIS VIEW THAT AN EARLY MODERNISATION DECISION WOULD BE PREMATURE AND THAT AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE WAS NEEDED THIS YEAR. TELTSCHIK'S PRIVATE INTERPRETATION WAS THAT GENSCHER MIGHT WELL HOPE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND 1991/92 WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO AVOID MODERNISATION.

3. IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK LAMBSDORFF TOOK A POSITION CLOSE TO GENSCHER'S (BRINKLEY'S TELELETTER OF 8 FEBRUARY). I ASKED TELTSCHIK WHETHER THE FDP'S DISASTROUS RESULT IN THE BERLIN ELECTIONS MIGHT CAUSE THE PARTY TO SEEK PUBLICITY AND PROFILE BY EMPHASISING DIFFERENCES WITH THE CDU/CSU AND WHETHER THAT OVERALL POLITICAL TACTICS MAKE GENSCHER EVEN MORE INTRACTABLE ON SNF MODERNISATION. TELTSCHIK SAW THIS AS A POSSIBILITY BUT WAS NOT YET SURE.

4. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT, WHILE BUSH'S MESSAGE TO KOHL OF 25 JANUARY ON SNF HAD BEEN CLEAR AND HELPFUL, BAKER HAD SPOKEN TENTATIVELY AND UNCLEARLY TO LAMBSDORFF, FAILING TO PUT ACROSS A MESSAGE THAT THE USA WOULD INSIST ON A MODERNISATION DECISION THIS YEAR. TELTSCHIK HOPED THAT BAKER, WHEN HE SAW KOHL ON 12 FEBRUARY, WOULD BE MORE DEFINITE. IF NOT, KOHL'S POSITION IN ARGUING WITH GENSCHER WOULD BE

WEAKENED.

5. TELTSCHIK DID NOT REVEAL ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE DOUBTS AMONG US OFFICIALS CONCERNING A MODERNISATION DECISION THIS YEAR THAT WERE REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TUR. IF INDICATIONS LIKE THAT REACH BONN, GENSCHER'S HAND IN THE ARGUMENT HERE WILL BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED.

MALLABY

YYYY

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TO DESKBY 260800Z FCOLN

TELNO 206

OF 260140Z JANUARY 89

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MODUK FOR DUS(P), DACU, NUC POL/SY

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

OUR TELNO 188: MODERNISATION OF NATO'S SNF

1. THE TEXT OF A LETTER WAS AGREED AT MEETING CONVENED BY THE
NSC TODAY. OFFICIALS SAY THAT IT WILL BE SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT
THIS EVENING AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ENSURE
DELIVERY TO CHANCELLOR KOHL BEFORE HIS MEETING ON 26 JANUARY.

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SIR P. CRADDOCK

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TO DESKBY 261400Z FCO
TELNO 100
OF 261210Z JANUARY 89
INFO DESKBY 261400Z WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY PARIS

SIC

SNF MODERNISATION

SUMMARY

1. FEDERAL COALITION DISCUSSION REACHES NO RESULT. SUGGESTED LINE FOR YOUR TALKS WITH GENSCHER 27 JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. FEDERAL MINISTER SCHAEUBLE HAS GIVEN ME A FIRST READOUT OF THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF COALITION LEADERS ABOUT SNF MODERNISATION. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO RESULT. THE CDU WAS INSISTING THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD AGREE TO INCLUSION IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF A FORMULA WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD ZERO. IT SHOULD BE SUCH THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT FEAR THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD IN DUE COURSE ACCEPT A THIRD ZERO. THE FORMULA SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE THE US CONGRESS TO VOTE DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FOR A SUCCESSOR TO LANCE.

3. GENSCHER HAD ARGUED THAT THE OPTION OF MODERNISATION SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. NO DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN 1989.

4. IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONCILE THE TWO POSITIONS. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE OF THE QUESTION. THE DATE FOR RESUMED DISCUSSION HAD NOT YET BEEN SET.

COMMENT

5. SCHAEUBLE WAS SPEAKING IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. HE ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL TO OTHERS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAD THIS INFORMATION.

6. I SUGGEST THAT, WHEN YOU SEE GENSCHER TOMORROW, YOU SHOULD ASK HIM HOW TODAY'S COALITION DISCUSSION WHEN AND WHAT POSITION HE TOOK AND THEN ADVOCATE OUR VIEWS ON MODERNISATION, CONCENTRATING ON THE NEED FOR A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE THIS YEAR. THERE IS MORE CHANCE OF MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PERSUADING HIM THAT HE CANNOT RESIST

SUCH A DECISION THAN THERE IS OF PERSUADING HIM AGAINST AN SNF ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH ALSO TO SET OUT OUR VIEWS ON THE LATTER.

MALLABY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 197
OF 252314Z JANUARY 89
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MOD(UK) FOR DUS(P), DACU, DNUC POL SY
OUR TELNO 188: MODERNISATION OF NATO'S SNF

SUMMARY

1. INDICATIONS THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL FOCUS QUICKLY ON THE NEED FOR AN SNF DECISION AND SIGNS OF A MORE ACTIVE POLICY WITH THE GERMANS.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE NOT COMMENTED EARLIER ON AMERICAN THINKING BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT, IF ANY, STEER THE OUTGOING TEAM WAS PROPOSING TO GIVE TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. BUT OUR LOBBYING IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY DECISION ON A NATO SUMMIT HAS HELPED TO FOCUS THOUGHTS: IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO SKETCH IN SOME BACKGROUND TO RIDGWAY'S COMMENTS SUMMARISED IN TUR, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME EVOLUTION IN ATTITUDES HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE.

3. WE ARE NOW FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT OUTGOING OFFICIALS, AT LEAST, ARE SATISFIED THAT DECISIONS ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND ON SNF MODERNISATION, INCLUDING LANCE AND TASM, SHOULD BE TAKEN AT A NATO SUMMIT MEETING TO BE HELD IN MID-MAY. A RECOMMENDATION TO THAT EFFECT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POINTS WE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE AND THE POSITION TAKEN BY CHANCELLOR KOHL, IS NOW WITH RIDGWAY AND IS EXPECTED TO BE INCLUDED IN A SET OF PROPOSALS BEING PUT TO BAKER THIS WEEK.

4. THESE PROPOSALS (AND A FORTIORI ANY GLOSS THAT RIDGWAY MAY PLACE ON THEM) ARE LIKELY TO REFLECT A PERCEPTION THAT CONGRESS IS UNLIKELY TO BE TOO DEMANDING OVER THE DEGREE OF COMMITMENT WHICH THEY WILL REQUIRE FROM THE GERMANS AND OTHERS IN ORDER TO VOTE THE NECESSARY FUNDS TO PROCEED WITH THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME. NUNN AND ASPIN, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE IN THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE, HAVE BOTH COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF A PHASED APPROACH REQUIRING DECISIONS IN PRINCIPLE ONLY AT THIS STAGE OF SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, WITH AGREEMENT TO DETAILED DEPLOYMENT DEFERRED UNTIL THE PRODUCTION STAGE IS REACHED TWO OR THREE YEARS DOWN THE TRACK. ASPIN FOR EXAMPLE SPOKE IN THOSE TERMS TO THE CHANCELLOR AND OTHERS DURING HIS VISIT TO GERMANY LAST MONTH. SOME EMPHASIS

IS ALSO PLACED BY OFFICIALS ON THE VIEWS OF VOLKER RUHE, WHO IS SEEN HERE AS UNDERLINING THE NEED TO COUPLE A DECISION ON MODERNISATION WITH REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AND A THINNING OUT OF SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS, BUT AS NOW PLACING SOMEWHAT LESS STRESS ON WHAT WILL BE NEEDED ON THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE.

5. PERHAPS IN CONSEQUENCE, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF A SHIFT HERE ON THE QUESTION OF AN ARMS CONTROL INGREDIENT. EARLIER OPPOSITION EVEN TO TALKING ABOUT AN SNF ARMS CONTROL POSITION IS NOW SAID NOT TO HAVE BEEN QUITE AS RIGID AS IT MAY HAVE SEEMED: THERE HAD BEEN A TACTICAL DESIRE TO AVOID COMMITTING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. CRITICISM OF OUR OWN EXERCISE WITH THE GERMANS HAS NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN, BUT IS NOW RATIONALISED ON THE ARGUMENT THAT TO TALK OF QUOTE OPTIONS UNQUOTE WAS TO IMPLY THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST ONE SATISFACTORY NEGOTIATING STANCE WHICH COULD BE IDENTIFIED: THIS, RATHER THAN DISCUSSION AS SUCH, IS THE REVISED FORM OF THE INDICTMENT.

6. OFFICIALS TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN IN BOTH DOD AND STATE HAVE NOW MOVED FURTHER. THEY MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL QUOTE POSITIONS UNQUOTE (AS MIGHT BE CONTAINED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OR EVEN MADE PUBLIC EG IN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY) AND ARMS CONTROL QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE, WHICH REMAIN TABOO. WHEN THE MINISTER SPOKE TO RIDGWAY YESTERDAY SHE EMPHASISED THAT THERE COULD BE NO PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SHE SEEMED AT THE SAME TIME TO BE LOOKING ABOUT FOR SOMETHING SHORT OF THAT WHICH COULD NEVERTHELESS BE SOLD TO THE GERMANS AS A QUOTE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL UNQUOTE.

7. WHETHER THIS LAST POINT WILL TURN OUT TO BE MORE THAN CURRENT STATE DEPARTMENT THINKING REMAINS TO BE SEEN: IT IS CERTAINLY MUCH INFLUENCED BY RIDGWAY'S VIEW THAT WE MUST NOT PRESS KOHL TOO HARD, AND SHE SEEMS NOW TO BE ON HER WAY OUT. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO FOCUS COLLECTIVELY ON THE QUESTION, OR EVEN TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL BE CAUGHT UP IN THEIR REVIEW OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY.

8. ONE NEW FACTOR WHICH HAS YET TO BE WEIGHED HERE IS BURT'S RECENTLY RECEIVED ACCOUNT OF HIS FINAL MEETING WITH KOHL, IN WHICH THE CHANCELLOR IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT SNF WERE AN EVEN MORE ATTRACTIVE CANDIDATE FOR THE DUAL-TRACK APPROACH THAN INF. SOME HERE WILL BE TEMPTED TO SEE IN THIS A REFLECTION OF BURT'S OWN VIEW OF WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED, BUT THERE MAY BE MORE TO IT THAN THAT. IF SO, IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE HELPFUL IF THE AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE CHANCELLOR ON THE LINES WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY (MY TUR). BLACKWILL AND RIDGWAY ARE BOTH OPTIMISTIC.

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*the MJ
cpc
fw*

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL No. In/89.10-DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT *a* MASTER
OAS.

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 January 1989

Dear Helmut,

When we met in Rhodes, you told me how your thinking was developing over NATO's Comprehensive Concept of security and arms control including the modernisation of the Alliance's theatre nuclear forces. Charles Powell has subsequently given me an account of his discussion in Bonn on 20 January with Mr. Teltschik. I look forward to discussing the subject again with you myself in Frankfurt on 20/21 February. I thought it might be helpful to send you this personal message on how I see the problem.

My starting point is very much in line with what you said in Rhodes. I believe that NATO must in the course of 1989 - and preferably the first half - take clear decisions about modernising and restructuring its stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe; that these decisions need to be taken in the framework of a proper concept of security and arms control; that some new systems, notably a tactical air to surface missile for aircraft (TASM) and a longer range ground based missile as a successor to LANCE, will be needed; but that the effect of their introduction will be to permit a major reduction in the overall size of NATO's nuclear stockpile and a shift of emphasis away from short range battlefield systems.

Rm

A restructuring/modernisation package of this kind should achieve wide support throughout NATO. It would mean better deterrence with fewer weapons. I agree with you that we should work for the adoption of such a package at a Summit meeting in late April/early May.

I recognise the danger for Europe from the enormous superiority which the Warsaw Pact enjoys in short-range missiles. It was with this in mind that we agreed at the NATO Summit last year that the Comprehensive Concept should foresee, in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions in US and Soviet land-based missiles in Europe leading to equal ceilings. I remain committed to that goal when the conditions are met.

But I believe that we should be very cautious about how we approach it. It is one thing to make our own autonomous cuts in theatre nuclear systems and to challenge the Soviet Union to reduce to NATO levels. But an arms control negotiation in this category would be a very different matter and I foresee major difficulties. We would surely come under extreme pressure to accept a third zero. It is far from clear how we could distinguish the nuclear from the conventional aspects of this dual capable system which are involved. There is an obvious risk that the possibility of an arms control agreement might sap NATO's willingness to agree the necessary updating and restructuring of existing systems. The attention which we have with difficulty focussed on the huge Soviet conventional and CW superiority could easily be diverted back to nuclear matters. For all of these reasons, and others, I do not see how we could include in the Comprehensive Concept an arms control proposal on SNF without storing up serious risks for our security. Let us proceed instead by taking decisions which meet our own security needs and give us the up-to-date systems which we need, while reducing the overall number of nuclear warheads in our stockpile.

C

I look forward to hearing your views on all of these points when we meet next month.

Warm regards

Y
Lounsbury

Raymond

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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calk

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1989

MODERNISATION OF NATO'S SNF

Thank you for your letter of 18 January proposing that the Prime Minister should send a message to Chancellor Kohl on the issue of modernisation of NATO's SNF.

I enclose the message which the Prime Minister has now signed. There are some small amendments, so you will want to look at it carefully. But I do not think it should cause any problems. Subject to that, I should be grateful if the text could be despatched as soon as possible.

C. D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Di. Amster
COB

Jp 0714

PRIME MINISTER

SNF

As you will have heard, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told the CSCE on 19 January that the Soviet Union would withdraw from Central Europe military formations and units with all their armament including tactical nuclear systems; that the Soviet Union was not modernising its tactical nuclear missiles; and what happened on modernisation in future depended on the West.

2. The statement comes as no surprise (my minute of 22 December attached). The Soviet Union can well afford to make cuts in their tactical missile units. They have an overwhelming superiority in this field (over 1,400 launchers west of the Urals against NATO's 88 Lance). They have been rapidly modernising this force, improving the missile range and accuracy, and warheads, and adding new multiple rocket launchers to attack some targets previously only reached by missiles.

3. The statement implies that the missiles belong to the units being withdrawn under Gorbachev's statement of 7 December. This is puzzling. There are no tactical missile units subordinate to the six tank divisions or to the assault units specified in the December speech. Gorbachev did however refer to "other formations and units with their weapons and combat equipment". It seems probable therefore that these could include some missile units directly subordinate to the headquarters of the Groups of Soviet Forces and of the armies in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

4. The announcement was clearly aimed at the West Germans to complicate further the already difficult SNF modernisation issue. The Russians were probably aware of reports of a

Postponed

meeting on this subject due to be held today by Kohl, Genscher and Scholz. But it will have a wider impact, both in the Alliance, where it will be harder to hold allies to the position of no SNF arms control negotiations, and in the wider Western public. We need to get over to the public the immense Soviet preponderance in short range weapons and the fact that they have already modernised. We also need an early message from you to Kohl.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

20 January 1989



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1989

Dear Stephen,

MODERNISATION OF NATO'S SNF

At the end of a meeting on another matter this morning, the Prime Minister raised briefly our position on modernisation of NATO's SNF. Richard Gozney wrote to me about this on 18 January, but the Prime Minister has not yet seen the letter or accompanying draft message to Chancellor Kohl.

The Prime Minister said that our position must be absolutely firm that we would not get drawn into negotiations with the Soviet Union on reductions in SNF. If NATO were to be drawn in, we would rapidly find ourselves confronted with proposals for a third zero which was unacceptable. This meant that we should avoid all discussion with the Germans about possible SNF arms control options. We should make the case for early decisions on modernisation and recognise the possibility of unilateral reductions in NATO's nuclear artillery. But the best service we could do to those in the German Government who supported modernisation was to be absolutely firm against negotiations with the Russians on SNF.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C.D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



40 a-b
cepa

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

18 January 1989

Dear Charles,

Modernisation of NATO's SNF

At the meeting of MISC 7 on 6 December the Prime Minister said that before she next met Chancellor Kohl in February she would write to him about the issue of nuclear modernisation. We understand that the Chancellor is likely to hold a meeting of key Ministers on this subject later this month. The Prime Minister might wish to consider sending her message before then. This letter describes recent developments in German and US thinking, and encloses a suggested text.

When they discussed the matter in Rhodes, Kohl told the Prime Minister that he wished the Comprehensive Concept to be completed, and the way thus opened for a decision on SNF restructuring/modernisation, at a NATO Summit to be held in late April/early May, ie well before the European elections and before a planned visit to the FRG by Gorbachev in late May. The indications are that he still favours this timetable and that he has not been deflected from his purpose by Mr Gorbachev's announcement in New York of unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces in Europe. Although Genscher may be disposed to use this announcement as an excuse for delaying any NATO modernisation decision, his views seem as of now unlikely to prevail within the German Government coalition. Graf Lambsdorf, the FDP Party Chairman, appears to be taking a more robust line, similar to that of Chancellor Kohl.

It seems likely however that Kohl will want any modernisation decision to contain some kind of arms control dimension. Teltschik, the Chancellor's diplomatic adviser, has told Sir Christopher Mallaby and subsequently Mr Waldegrave that the Federal Government would be looking for a commitment in the Comprehensive Concept to East/West negotiations about SNF, to be attendant on progress in, but not the conclusion of, the Conventional Stability Talks. Such a commitment was, Teltschik explained, necessary both vis à vis German public opinion and as the price for Genscher's acquiescence in modernisation.

The key questions are what sort of modernisation decision and what sort of arms control dimension will the Germans press for, and what position will the US adopt.

/As

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As regards the nature of the decision the choice lies somewhere between endorsement of the desirability of modernisation (which Defence Ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group have already effectively established) and specific commitments to numbers and deployment sites for particular systems (which would be premature at a time when the systems concerned - the Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM) and the Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) - are still only under development.) This points to a decision in principle to deploy both systems as part of a wider theatre nuclear weapons restructuring package, the exact details of which would be worked out over time, but whose general nature - a shift of emphasis from the very short to the somewhat longer ranges involving major reductions in nuclear artillery shells - would be confirmed already.

A decision of this kind ought to be attractive politically to Kohl. Too vague a formulation would leave him vulnerable to questions from his opposition about whether new missiles would eventually be deployed on German soil. If the German Government is unable or unwilling to answer such questions, it will look weak and indecisive. If therefore Kohl is prepared to face the issue at all in 1989, it seems likely that he will do so in terms which will involve acknowledgement that the FOTL will eventually be deployed in Germany.

A decision in principle to deploy will probably also to be needed in order to maintain Congressional funding for FOTL's development. The sums involved in the US Defence Budget are not large. But Congress is likely to want to see some evidence of Allied willingness to deploy the system before voting any more money. It would also fit well with the presentation by SACEUR early this year of his updated Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study which is likely to show that full implementation of the modernisation programme, ie. the continuation of current projects together with the introduction of both TASM and FOTL, could allow the removal of a significant portion (perhaps up to 50%) of the current stockpile of some 1,500 nuclear artillery shells as well as a number of free fall bombs.

As regards arms control, all Allies except France are committed to the position, most recently reaffirmed by the NATO Summit, that the Comprehensive Concept should include, 'in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings'.

/The

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The Germans have yet to develop a clear position on how they wish to see this commitment developed. Their officials have however recently given an indication to ours of options on which they are working. Their preferred approach would involve a reduction of US and Soviet nuclear SNF missiles in Europe, including systems held on a dual key basis, to agreed equal ceilings (perhaps 72 launchers with 5-8 missiles each). The units of account would be launchers and missiles, which in future would need to be functionally differentiated from their conventional counterparts. Existing systems not so differentiated would all count as nuclear.

There are a number of technical objections to such a scheme:

- i) The launch vehicle which the Americans have selected for the FOTL is the launcher of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which a number of allies, including the UK, are committed to buying for conventional purposes; and the missile may well be a variant of the conventional US Army Tactical Missile. To insist on functional differentiation between the nuclear and conventional versions of these systems, even if technically possible, would be a classic case of basing defence planning on the possibility of arms control. It would reduce the flexibility and survivability of FOTL, and could involve delay and expense.
- ii) The negotiability of such a scheme with the Russians is, to say the least, questionable. The Soviet Union would effectively have to forego its existing short range conventional missile capability altogether (since theirs is all dual capable); would lose its nuclear missile superiority; and would be expected to legitimise, through an arms control treaty, the presence of several hundred American nuclear missiles on European territories.
- iii) Even an elaborate verification regime designed to differentiate between nuclear and conventional missiles might not necessarily ensure that any future conventional missile could not be fitted with a nuclear warhead at short notice.

An alternative approach favoured by officials in the German Ministry of Defence would be to agree equal ceilings on the total number of SNF missiles and launchers - conventional and nuclear - on either side. This would have advantages in terms of verification and flexibility/survivability. But:

- i) if the ceilings were set low they would adversely affect NATO's plans for introducing into service large numbers of conventional Multiple Launch Rocket Systems.

(ii)

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- ii) if set high, they would not affect Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Transcending these technical difficulties is a potential problem of a more political nature. If the Alliance were to embark upon a formal East/West negotiation about short-range missiles, how would we react if the Soviet Union was to propose zero as an outcome? Would we be prepared to reject such an offer and to maintain our plans to deploy a successor to LANCE? Or would we be condemned, as in the case of the second INF zero, to accept it? The Germans do not seem so far to have faced up to this issue. At official level they say simply that they do not believe that the Russians will propose a third zero, but that if they do it will be firmly resisted.

We are even less clear about the position which the new US Administration will take. Hitherto there has been a steadfast US refusal to contemplate any discussion within the Alliance of an SNF arms control position. It is not clear however whether this reflects an end-of-Administration hiatus in policy making or a belief that the Germans can in the end be ridden off the idea.

Until the German position has become clearer it is hard to offer a clear recommendation on how to handle their wish for SNF arms control. One possible solution may be to impress upon Chancellor Kohl the desirability of avoiding a negotiation and to suggest as an alternative that NATO should call upon the Soviet Union to reduce its own SNF to the same level as ours before consideration can be given to the negotiation of lower ceilings. But before adopting such an approach we need the Germans to explain how they see the solution to the problem. To propose solutions now would lead us into a position which might be interpreted by the Americans as the first step towards agreeing an arms control dimension with the Germans over American heads.

Against this background, it is important that we do not give the Germans an excuse to believe that we are receptive to the idea of early SNF arms control. But it is equally important that we should not leave the impression that we are deaf to their concerns or that we are unwilling to think about how to put into effect the commitment in the summit communique. We must convince them that we do share their concern if we are to convince them to share our reservation. The Foreign Secretary has suggested that a letter to Chancellor Kohl along the lines of the attached text, which suggests an approach to restructuring/modernisation but which merely flags the arms control aspect as a matter which the Prime Minister would wish to discuss with the Chancellor when they meet, would cover these points. The draft has been agreed with the Defence Secretary.

/I am

SECRET



SECRET

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD)
and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: CHANCELLOR KOHL

Copies to:

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

MJ2DCY

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

MODERNISATION OF NATO'S SNF

CAVEAT

Charles Powell has subsequently given me an account of his discussion in Bonn ~ 20 January with Mr. Feltschik.

1. When we met in Rhodes, you told me how your thinking was developing over NATO's Comprehensive Concept of security and arms control including the modernisation of the Alliance's theatre nuclear forces. I look forward to discussing the subject again with you ^{myself} in Frankfurt on 20/21 February. I thought it might be helpful to send you this personal message on how I ~~myself~~ see the problem. I recognise both its importance and its political difficulty; I would like to work as closely as possible with you to resolve it.

2. My starting point is very much in line with what you said in Rhodes. I believe that NATO will need in the course of 1989 to take ^{clear} certain decisions

Enclosures (tag(s))

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R. S. ...

about modernising and restructuring its stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe; that these decisions need to be taken in the framework of a ~~well thought-out~~ *proper* concept of security and arms control; that some new systems, notably a tactical air to surface missile ^(TASM) for aircraft and a longer range ground based missile as a successor to LANCE, will be needed; but that the effect of their introduction will be to permit a major reduction in the overall size of NATO's nuclear stockpile and a shift of emphasis away from short range battlefield systems.

3. A restructuring/modernisation package of this kind could, *should achieve wide support* in my view, be presented in a way which *throughout NATO - it would not* ought to be attractive to the sensible majority of our electorates: better deterrence with fewer weapons, ~~and a clear renunciation of any interest in nuclear war-fighting.~~ *agree with you* I welcome your suggestion *but we should work for* that the way might be cleared for the adoption of such a package at a Summit meeting in late April/early May. ~~I am confident that we can complete the necessary preparatory work in time.~~ I should be happy to instruct my officials to work ~~closely with your people to this end.~~

4. I recognise also ~~the concern that exists in~~

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the danger for Europe from
 Germany, and which I share, about the enormous
 superiority which the Warsaw Pact enjoys in
 short-range missiles. It was with this in mind that
 we agreed at the NATO Summit last year that the
 Comprehensive Concept should foresee, in conjunction
 with the establishment of a conventional balance and
 and the global elimination of chemical weapons,
 tangible and verifiable reductions in US and Soviet
 land-based missiles in Europe leading to equal
 ceilings. *committed to let it stand*
 That remains a desirable goal. But I
 believe that we should be very cautious about how we
 approach it. It is one thing to make our own
 autonomous cuts in theatre nuclear systems and to
 challenge the Soviet Union to reduce to NATO levels.
 But an arms control negotiation in this category
 would be a very different matter and I foresee a
major number of difficulties. We would surely come under
 extreme pressure to accept a third zero. It is far
 from clear how we could distinguish the nuclear from
 the conventional aspects of this dual capable system
 which are involved. There is an obvious risk that
 the possibility of an arms control agreement might
 sap NATO's willingness to agree the necessary
 updating and restructuring of *existing* our aging systems.
 The attention which we have with difficulty focussed
 on the huge Soviet conventional and CW superiority

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could easily be diverted back to nuclear matters.

For all of these reasons, and others, I do not see how we could include in the Comprehensive Concept an arms control proposal ^{on SNA} without storing up serious risks for our security. ~~Let us proceed~~ ^{instead of making decisions that}

~~with our own security needs and allow~~
5. I look forward to hearing your views on all of these points when we meet next month.

no the systems which we want, while reducing the overall number of nuclear warheads in a multiple.

59 a-b

MR POWELL

22 December 1988

A GORBACHEV INITIATIVE ON SNF?

Although we have no specific intelligence on Gorbachev's intentions, we should be alive to the possibility that at a suitable time next year he may make a unilateral cut in short-range nuclear weapons.

So far in the Gorbachev story SNF has been the dog that has not barked (though it is worth noting Sahevardnadze was originally reported to be going to make a speech on the subject on 8 December). The Warsaw Pact has plenty of fat - more than 1400 SNF missile launchers west of the Urals. In recent years the SCUD SSM (range 300 kms) has been improved, FROG (range 70 kms) is being replaced by SS-21 and a new conventional warhead sub-500 kms missile is believed to be under development. Additionally, a new heavy multiple-barrel rocket launcher (MRL) has been developed which can take on the saturation of targets up to 100 kms. The developments in the SRBMs have provided or will provide considerable improvements in both range and accuracy and the new MRL will remove the need for short range missiles to cover some targets. These developments taken together with the increased effectiveness of improved conventional munitions, and coupled with the large number of systems in the Soviet inventory, offer substantial scope for cuts without a serious effect on targeting requirements. An initiative could take the form of the conversion of nuclear warheads to conventional (although this would have severe verification problems), or a reduction in missile numbers, or geographical constraints on their deployment, or any combination of the three.

An announcement of a unilateral cut would of course further complicate the SNF modernisation issue, in NATO and make it harder to hold the position of no SNF negotiations at this stage. Timing about May 1989 would probably have maximum impact.

Since this is a card that may be played we should consider whether there is anything we can do beforehand to counter its effect. Not easy. But it might reduce the impact and even make a move less likely if there was widespread Western speculation and comment on such a step beforehand, so that it was to some degree discounted.

*O. by we
let it be
known
more widely
how many
might suspect
they had
been let have*

Cl.

PERCY CRADOCK

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disc

[Handwritten signature]
2

MR POWELL

22 December 1988

A GORBACHEV INITIATIVE ON SNF?

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PERCY CRADOCK

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FM BONN
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SIC CFJ

SNF MODERNISATION: FRG INTENTIONS

SUMMARY

1. EVENTS SINCE MR WALDEGRAVE'S VISIT HAVE SHOWN THAT THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT WITHIN THE COALITION ON TIMING OF MODERNISATION DECISIONS. GENSCHER STILL PLAYING FOR DELAY: HIS HAND STRENGTHENED BY GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE. BUT FEDERAL CABINET MEETING IN MID-JANUARY COULD PRODUCE UNITED GERMAN POSITION.

DETAIL

2. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1235, WE RECEIVED DURING MR WALDEGRAVE'S VISIT INDICATIONS THAT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT WERE READY TO ACQUIESCE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT INCLUDING A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON LANCE MODERNISATION. SINCE THEN IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT OST'S STATEMENT OF 5 DECEMBER (PARAGRAPH 11 OF TUR) REPRESENTS THE EXTENT OF EXPRESS AGREEMENT WITHIN THE COALITION. (TRANSLATION SENT UNDER COVER OF BRINKLEY'S LETTER OF 9 DECEMBER TO SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT.) IN PARTICULAR, OST SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CURRENT NEED TO DEAL WITH MODERNISATION EG OF LANCE, WHICH WOULD BE MODERN UNTIL 1995. HE DID NOT (NOT) STATE CLEARLY WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SHOULD INCLUDE A MODERNISATION DECISION.

3. DURING THE PUS'S TALKS AT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ON 8 DECEMBER, HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER, SUDHOFF, BASED HIMSELF ON GENSCHER'S STATEMENT IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE (MY TELNO 1241). HE ACCEPTED THAT GENSCHER HAD INDICATED THAT MODERNISATION SHOULD BE COVERED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT BUT ARGUED THAT THE TIME HAD NOT COME TO DECIDE WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE, AND IF SO IN WHAT FORM. THE ISSUE WOULD RUN INTO THE 1990'S, AND WHO KNEW WHAT RESULTS THE VIENNA TALKS WOULD HAVE PRODUCED BY THEN? SUDHOFF SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD TO FIND A FORM OF WORDS WHICH COVERED OUR DIFFERENT VIEWS AND LEFT OPTIONS OPEN.

4. THIS IMPRESSION OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT TRYING TO KEEP THE QUESTION OPEN IS OF A PIECE WITH REMARKS MADE BY GENSCHER AND GERMAN OFFICIALS IN BRUSSELS, (PARAGRAPH 9 OF UKDEL NATO TELNO 486). IN ADDITION, THE HEAD OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL DEPARTMENT IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAS DESCRIBED THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AS A BASIS FOR MAKING DECISIONS ON SNF MODERNISATION RATHER THAN THE VEHICLE FOR SUCH DECISIONS (MY TELNO 1246). EXPERT JOURNALISTS HERE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, DESPITE OST'S DENIAL, THAT KOHL HAS SIGNALLED TO THE PRIME MINISTER (AND TO THE US) A READINESS FOR MODERNISATION.

5. GORBACHEV'S CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTION INITIATIVE HAS, OF COURSE, STRENGTHENED GENSCHER'S HAND. THERE IS A FEELING AMONG GERMAN POLITICIANS, NOT CONFINED TO THE OPPOSITION, THAT THE WEST NEEDS IN SOME WAY TO ANSWER GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE. IT IS RECOGNISED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WARSAW PACT WILL STILL HAVE SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, SO THAT THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR A WESTERN "RESPONSE" IN THIS FIELD. (THE ALLIANCE'S PROPOSALS FOR CST WERE ALREADY WIDELY EXPECTED HERE, AND THEREFORE DISCOUNTED, BEFORE THEY WERE ANNOUNCED.) THE SPD ARE ALREADY SUGGESTING THAT NATO'S RESPONSE SHOULD BE TO FOREGO NUCLEAR MODERNISATION PLANS. (I WILL COMMENT FURTHER ON THE EFFECTS ON GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION OF THE UNHAPPY COINCIDENCE OF GORBACHEV'S MOVE WITH THE US AIRCRAFT CRASH AT REMSCHEID.)

6. THE SITUATION WITHIN THE COALITION IS STILL FLUID. BUT THE MAKINGS OF AN AGREED POSITION MAY BE AVAILABLE: THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SHOULD COMBINE AN ALLIANCE POSITION ON SNF ARMS CONTROL, REDUCTIONS IN NATO'S NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND SOME DECISION IN PRINCIPLE (I.E. NOT A DEPLOYMENT DECISION) ON THE NEED FOR MODERNISATION. THE LAST WOULD BE THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION TO USE WITH CONGRESS.

7. THE FEDERAL CABINET IS EXPECTED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN MID-JANUARY. THEREAFTER WE MAY FIND A MORE COHERENT GERMAN POSITION BEING DEPLOYED IN NATO. ONE MAIN ELEMENT OF DIFFICULTY FOR US (AND THE US) IS LIKELY TO BE GERMAN INSISTENCE ON AN SNF ARMS CONTROL POSITION. ALL THE MORE REASON, AS SEEN FROM HERE, FOR US TO PERSIST WITH OUR BILATERAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GERMANS TO FOCUS ON THE DIFFICULTIES THAT POSES.

MALLABY

YYYY



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Prime Minister

A week journey.
Can still with no
raise the issues
both with Brinkler
Hittend & with
Chancellor Kohl.

PM/88/061

PRIME MINISTER

The Modernisation and Restructuring of NATO's Theatre Nuclear Forces

CBP
29/mi

1. As background to the MISC 7 discussion on 6 December, this minute reviews the prospects for decisions in 1989 on the restructuring and modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons, which was last discussed in MISC 7 on 11 May.

Nuclear Planning Group

2. The step by step approach has gone reasonably well. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in October endorsed (with Belgium abstaining) a report which set out the politico-military requirement for short range nuclear forces (SNF). The report provides a clear rationale for a longer range successor to LANCE; and links its deployment to the prospect of cuts in artillery warhead numbers and thus a reduction in NATO's overall nuclear stockpile in Europe. At the NPG, SACEUR also gave a preview of the Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study which he will present next April. His study will recommend some modest cuts in artillery warheads as a result of the continuing modernisation of nuclear artillery rounds.

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But it will conclude that any further reductions in the stockpile should be contingent on the introduction of a follow-on to LANCE (FOTL). Indeed, it will argue that if there is no FOTL the stockpile might need to be increased.

US Plans

3. The US expect to select a launcher for the FOTL (almost certainly the Multi-Launch Rocket System) within 2-3 months. The missile to go with it should also be chosen early next year. Development will take 3-4 years and production a further 12 months. This confirms that, if a replacement is to be available by 1995 when LANCE will cease to be effective, Congress will have to agree in 1989 to development funding. The US have also been working on other adjustment options, including the assignment of sea launched cruise missiles to SACEUR, the development of a tactical air to surface missile (TASM) and plans for the deployment of additional dual capable aircraft to Europe. The Americans have opened bilateral discussions with the Allies on the latter and are looking for decisions next Spring. We regard this as too ambitious, particularly in the light of German views that post-INF Treaty adjustments can be made only after the Comprehensive Concept has been agreed.

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Comprehensive Concept

4. The Germans (and others) insist that decisions on restructuring and modernisation must be integrated, within the Comprehensive Concept, with an arms control negotiating position on SNF. Work on this is moving very slowly, with the German Foreign Ministry deliberately dragging their feet. The North Atlantic Council has not yet got to grips with the key issue, namely whether there is a viable arms control option in the SNF field.

German Attitudes

5. There is a difference of view within the Government coalition. Genscher believes that a modernisation decision in 1989 would enable the SPD to win the 1990 Federal elections. His tactics are therefore to avoid such a decision. In support of this view, a recent poll suggested that 68% of Germans oppose SNF modernisation. Nevertheless, those close to Kohl continue to assure us that he personally remains committed to a decision on a FOTL before the elections, provided that the ground is properly prepared. There is also evidence from his recent public statements that he will support a decision next year although perhaps at the price of an Alliance commitment to future SNF arms control.

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French Attitudes

6. Mitterrand has publicly implied that NATO SNF modernisation should go ahead only if the Russians stall in the Conventional Stability Talks. We have told the French that this helps neither Kohl nor the Alliance.

Tactical Consideration

7. There are two major unknown factors:

(a) Will SACEUR's proposed reductions in the stockpile be an adequate price to secure Alliance agreement to a FOTL? Or will public opinion in the FRG - and other basing countries - insist that LANCE should be modernised only if the Alliance offers to enter into negotiations for reductions in SNF?

(b) What is the minimum Alliance commitment to a FOTL which will persuade Congress to fund its development? It is unlikely, if only for technical reasons, that specific numbers and deployment sites could be agreed in 1989. It is uncertain whether Congress will be satisfied with a decision which simply confirmed the need for such a system or whether they will insist on Allied agreement in principle to deploy.

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The Way Ahead

8. If the necessary decisions on modernisation and restructuring are to be achieved next year, we shall need to pursue a number of objectives:

(a) with the Germans we must continue to strengthen the hand of those (including Kohl and Scholz) who support modernisation. Your next meetings with Kohl will be important in exploring in private how best to prepare for a decision before the onset of electionitis next autumn. We have begun bilateral talks at official level aimed at demonstrating, particularly to the Foreign Ministry, the difficulties and dangers of engaging in arms control negotiations on SNF.

(b) We must persuade the Americans that they will need to give priority to this problem. This will require early engagement by the new Administration at a senior level. The US must also decide early in 1989 what is the minimum commitment to a FOTL which is needed from the Alliance if Congress is to agree to development funding. We must also endeavour to get the Americans to come up with an equitable package of additional dual capable aircraft deployment to Europe, which properly reflects the need for widespread burdensharing.

(c) With the French, I have explained to Dumas the

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threats which this issue poses for Alliance confidence. I have urged him not to pursue Mitterrand's link between SNF and CST. This is a theme which I hope you will be able to put direct to Mitterrand.

(d) In the Alliance as a whole we must conclude the Comprehensive Concept by the June NAC. Genscher agreed this timetable when I lobbied him on this on 14 November. But agreeing a report which actually leads to modernisation will be a different matter. As you pointed out to Bush, a Summit - provided it is not held too early - is more likely to reach agreement than an NAC at Foreign Minister level.

9. Tactically I believe we shall have to walk a narrow path. On the one hand we need to maintain firm, private pressure on the Germans. On the other hand we must avoid the issue becoming a public trial of strength for, or within, the Alliance. A virility test which led many of the smaller Allies to rally round Germany (and Italy) would be acutely divisive and in the end probably unsuccessful. So too would any impression that we, or the Americans, were siding with Kohl against Genscher in a domestic political battle: Kohl must deal, and be seen to deal, with Genscher in his own way.

10. I am copying this minute to other members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

REFERENCE

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cc/c



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

NO 13/5/32E

25 October 1988

Dear Lyn,

25/10

NPG: BELGIAN RESERVATIONS ON SNF MODERNISATION

We spoke briefly about the problems which have arisen with the Belgians over the work of the High Level Group on the restructuring and role of SNF (as set out in UKDEL NATO's tel no 391 and Washington tel no 2556) and which threaten to plunge this week's Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group into disarray.

My Secretary of State has agreed to send the attached message to Mr Coene; as discussed, I should be grateful if you could arrange for this to be telegraphed urgently to Brussels, for delivery as soon as possible, with copies to Washington, Bonn and UKDEL NATO. We will not be sending a signed original. As I mentioned, Mr Younger commented that it might also be sensible for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister to weigh in. You mentioned that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had already spoken to his opposite number; a decision on whether to invite the Prime Minister to enter the lists might perhaps sensibly await reactions to Mr Younger's message.

I am copying this letter and attachment to Charles Powell, No 18.

Yours sincerely
Diana HARTIN

(D R HARTIN)
Private Secretary

Lyn Parker Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DEFENCE SECRETARYDEFENCE MESSAGE FROM GCFR TO BELGIAN DEFENCE MINISTER

1. I am told by our Ambassador to NATO that you intend to reserve Belgium's position on the work of the HLG when we meet later this week at the Scheveningen NPG. Such a move, by Belgium, would have serious implications. I am therefore writing to urge you to reconsider.
2. Let me say at the outset that I understand your concern that the work of the HLG, and the actions of the NPG, should not be allowed to preempt or unduly constrain the outcome of NATO's Comprehensive Concept. I fully accept this. The point is also of course explicitly recognised in the two latest HLG reports, the draft Agreed Minute and the draft NPG Communique which all make clear that decisions are not sought now but will have to be taken in a wider political context (ie. that of the Comprehensive Concept). The SNF report actually stresses the intention of making a "contribution" to the Comprehensive Concept.
3. That said, let us be clear that such a contribution is essential. The Comprehensive Concept cannot be satisfactorily developed in the absence of a clear input from the defence side, including an authoritative assessment of politico/military requirements in the nuclear area. Only the NPG is able to provide this, through the vehicle of reports by the HLG endorsed by ministers.
4. In this context I attach great importance to the HLG's SNF report. We all know and understand that SNF is one of the more difficult and sensitive issues which the Comprehensive Concept will have to tackle. All the more important therefore to have a considered and balanced assessment from the NPG. I cannot accept that the report is untimely. On the contrary it comes to ministers at exactly the right time for them to offer it to the NAC and for the NAC to take it into account in its work on the Comprehensive Concept. To prevent this, or somehow call into question the

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status of the HLG report, would not help the Comprehensive Concept but obstruct it.

5. As regards the HLG's report on progress with restructuring, I would point out that this is simply the latest development (and a very modest one) in the step-by-step process which all nations agreed to in Brussels earlier this year. No commitments and no decisions are sought at this stage, but the work must continue if we are ever to be in position to take such decisions.

6. Finally I would urge you to consider the impact of a Belgian reservation outside the confines of NATO HQ: I have in mind in particular the impression it would give of the Alliance in disarray, and the potentially very damaging effect it could have on US Congressional perceptions of Allies' willingness to share the risks and burdens as well as the benefits of the Alliance.

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UKMIS NEW YORK PLEASE PASS SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MODERNISATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES: MITTERRAND'S VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. ON EVE OF MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO US AND UNGA, THE ELYSEE RE-FLOAT THROUGH THE PRESS THE IDEA THAT MODERNISATION OF SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES MIGHT BE DELAYED BY TWO TO THREE YEARS UNTIL IT IS CLEAR WHETHER THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS CAN ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. OFFICIAL DENIALS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ENVISAGE ANY DELAY OR REDUCTION IN FRENCH HADES PROGRAMME.
2. ONE OF MITTERRAND'S MAIN PRIORITIES IS TO SEE CST GET STARTED AND PRODUCE RESULTS. HE MAY SEE SOME SORT OF CST/TNW MODERNISATION LINKAGE AS AN INCENTIVE TO THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND AS HELPFUL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL. BUT HIS IDEAS ARE STILL TENTATIVE.
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR HADES AND FOR UK-FRENCH DIALOGUE.

DETAIL

4. ARTICLES IN 23 SEPTEMBER INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (JOSEPH FITCHETT) AND FINANCIAL TIMES (IAN DAVIDSON) REPORT AN UNNAMED SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIAL AS SAYING ON 22 SEPTEMBER THAT FRANCE IS CONSIDERING WHETHER TO MAKE A LINK BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT OF ITS SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS (CST). THE REPORTS DIFFER SLIGHTLY BUT THE MAIN POINTS ARE:
 - A) FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CST.
 - B) (FITCHETT) FRANCE MIGHT DELAY DEVELOPMENT OF THE HADES PRE-STRATEGIC GROUND BASED MISSILE (RANGE JUST UNDER 500 KM, DUE TO SUCCEED PLUTON IN ABOUT 1992) FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS TO SEE WHETHER

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CST CAN ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. MITTERRAND ENVISAGES A TWO TO THREE YEAR PAUSE IN THE 'AGGRESSIVE MODERNIZATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS'. (DAVIDSON HAS TOLD US THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE OFFICIAL RATHER TO BE SAYING THAT FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE CURRENT PROGRAMMES FOR THE PRESENT BUT MIGHT REVIEW THEM IN TWO OR THREE YEARS IF THE CST MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS.)

C) IF THE SOVIET THREAT WAS SUFFICIENTLY REDUCED, FRANCE MIGHT CONSIDER REDUCING OR CANCELLING THE HADES PROGRAMME AND RECONSIDER OTHER NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS (EG AMSP); BUT NOT (NOT) THE CENTRAL DETERRENT FORCE OF IRBMS AND SSBNS.

D) FRENCH THINKING WAS STILL TENTATIVE AND PRELIMINARY BUT MITTERRAND HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED SUCH IDEAS WITH KOHL AND WOULD EXPLORE THEM WITH THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER ALLIES.

5. THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED WAS BIANCO, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE ELYSEE. HE WAS ANSWERING QUESTIONS BY DAVIDSON AND FITCHETT AT A BRIEFING OF NON-FRENCH JOURNALISTS CONVENED ON AN UNRELATED SUBJECT. THE ELYSEE AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE DESCRIBED THE IHT AND FT REPORTS AS UNFOUNDED AND DENIED THAT THE HADES PROGRAMME WILL BE DELAYED OR REDUCED. BRICHAMBAUT, CHEVENEMENT'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, REINFORCED THIS DENIAL WHEN WE SPOKE TO HIM, AND WAS CLEARLY IRRITATED THAT THE ELYSEE HAD STARTED THIS HARE JUST BEFORE CHEVENEMENT'S OWN VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT CARLUCCI'S INVITATION. THE ELYSEE AND FMOD ARE ALSO DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE 1989 DEFENCE BUDGET MAINTAINS THE FINANCING FOR THE HADES PROGRAMME, AS INDEED FOR THE ASMP. HOWEVER, LE MONDE QUOTES ELYSEE SOURCES AS RECALLING THAT MITTERRAND IS OPPOSED TO MODERNISATION OF CERTAIN NATO NUCLEAR FORCES DURING THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS, THOUGH HE DOES NOT ENVISAGE LINKING FRANCE'S OWN NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES TO PROGRESS IN CST.

6. FOR COMMENTS SEE MIFT.

LLEWELLYN SMITH

YYYY

PAGE 2
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UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
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OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

16 September 1988

J D I Boyd Esq CMG
D U S
F C O

CDP
5/X.

Sean John,

SNF, THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT ETC

1. I corresponded with John Goulden and David Nicholls (not copied to all) on this subject before the summer break. Sadly it looks increasingly as though the collective concern we then identified about the difficulties of implementing the Chevening programme (leading to a major comprehensive concept statement in June 1989 and modernisation decisions in the autumn of that year) were only too well founded.

2. To judge from the papers I found waiting for me on my return from leave and from conversations I have had here and at the IISS Conference in Brighton, we face what one might call a double bind in trying to move things forward:

(a) the Germans, reflecting the wishes of Herr Genscher but also more widely held concerns in the Federal Republic, have embarked in Bonn on a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements of deterrence and their relationship with the arms control process. This analysis is not going to be completed in a hurry; until it is the FRG will not be able to carry through (or even to participate very fully in) the drafting of a comprehensive concept - it would seem more or less axiomatic from a German viewpoint that the comprehensive concept should break new ground and should deal with the issue of the negotiability or otherwise of short range nuclear systems (SNF); only in the context of such a comprehensive concept will the Federal Government take decisions on modernisation and on force adjustments; in German

/eyes



eyes modernisation is not in itself a reason for rushing the process since they see no objective need to take decisions on a follow-on to Lance (FOTL) until 1991/92 ie after the Federal elections (in which we can be sure that modernisation is going to be a major issue). It is for Christopher Mallaby rather than me to say but I have the impression that Chancellor Kohl himself may have decided in the last week or two not to try to force the issue through before the elections;

(b) for their part the Americans are, as so often of late, in a muddle. For nine months they (I am not sure exactly who!) have been preventing any progress with the comprehensive concept beyond the reaffirmation of existing arrangements - which was effectively completed at the turn of the year and enshrined in the Summit Declaration in March. They seem to fear that it would be impossible to control any serious discussion of the basics of Alliance strategy, of its relationship to arms control, the negotiability problem and so forth. But at the same time the Americans have been arguing that modernisation decisions have to be taken soon ie in accordance with the Chevening programme, since otherwise Congress will cease to fund the development programme for FOTL (and TASM) - vide the record of your meeting with Keel on 5 September. Those within the US machine (like Burt, the US Ambassador in Bonn) who have argued that German attitudes made these two American policy stances mutually contradictory have been told that this is a matter for the next Administration in Washington.

3. The immediate problem this stalemate throws up is how to maintain any momentum in the work of the Council on the Reykjavik mandate. We can struggle on with the FOC draft but substantive progress is not going to be easy to achieve. Fortunately there are now good prospects that a Western data initiative will be ready for use at the conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting and that a Western arms reduction proposal will be ready for announcement at the Ministerial Council meeting here in December. The paralysis of the other work on the Council agenda may, therefore, in the short term not matter so much as would otherwise have been the case. In so far as it does matter it would seem to be for the US and the FRG rather than the UK to come up with ideas for saving our blushes. The

/Deputy



Deputy Heads of the two delegations here, Kornblum and von Ploetz, are meeting to try to come up with ideas - probably some kind of expanded framework for future work - and will keep us in the picture. I have encouraged them in this undertaking.

4. It is less easy to be relaxed about the medium term prospects. Unless Mr Bush wins the Presidential election and appoints quickly a National Security Advisor (like Burt) who is thoroughly familiar with the issue, I cannot see any serious impetus being injected into the US approach until some weeks into the new President's term. If Dukakis wins the delay will, of course, be considerably longer. Nor are the resulting discussions likely, given German and French attitudes and the probable absence of any ground work, to be easy.

5. It seems to me therefore to be anticipating an improbably fortunate set of circumstances to expect that by early June 1989 heads of government or ministers will be in a position to deliver a ringing declaration on US/European relations including language on the most difficult topic of all - the role of SNF in deterrence and in arms control. If no agreement is reached and if as a consequence decisions are not taken at the autumn NPG, we can be confident that the modernisation decisions will have to wait until after the Federal elections in 1990. By that time those decisions may be a good deal more difficult to take than would be the case next year. The link with stock pile reductions (whose announcement, not least thanks to SACEUR's indiscretions, can hardly be postponed beyond next year) will have been lost; Gorbachev's charm offensive may have made further inroads into western opinion; the position of the SPD in the Federal Republic may have improved at the expense of the CDU - though hardly at the expense of Herr Genscher; the availability of any successor system to Lance may have been placed in question by the shortage (or absence) of funds for development in the US in the period 1989-1991; and finally, if European wavering on FOTL were to weaken the US commitment (not yet firmly established) to the development of TASM, we ourselves could face additional difficulties with decisions on the latter system. (Given the unavoidable need to replace the WE 177 we might then find ourselves looking again at the French option, but in a considerably weaker bargaining position.)

6. As I said in my letter of 6 June, the prospect of being forced to do without a successor to Lance would

/"have



"have profound implications for our approach to nuclear arms control in Europe generally and for our analysis of the requirements of flexible response". We therefore need to decide, probably rather soon:

(a) whether we attach such importance to FOTL that we are going to make a major effort, necessarily at the highest political level, to seek acceptance of the Chevening timetable; and whether, to that end, we are prepared to make any concessions to German concerns about SNF negotiability (the arguments in FCO telno 524 to Bonn, which I have just seen, are persuasive. But they have not convinced Holik and von Ploetz so far and I doubt whether they will convince their masters unless there is substantial additional input at the political level);

(b) whether we are going to wait on events until next year; or

(c) whether we are going to start to de-escalate our commitment on FOTL (which will at once diminish the chances of FOTL being developed); and, if so, what alternative courses of action we should take. Without FOTL, TASM - where we are markedly less dependent on the attitudes of other European allies - would assume an even higher priority than it already has. It would be essential to ensure that our policy on FOTL did not "infect" that on TASM.

7. The decisions facing the Alliance in this area seem to me to be in some ways the most important since the dual track decision ten years ago. The formulation of our national position is urgent because the question will have to be dealt with, in one way or another, during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in November (and also during that to be paid by Chancellor Kohl).

8. This letter is not the right place for a detailed analysis of the pros and cons of the options. Most of the politico-military points which will have to be resolved were raised in the correspondence referred to at the outset of this letter. The following is a brief list of what seem to me to be some of the more important issues:

(a) in purely defence terms the case for FOTL is good, but not, on present evidence, overriding - TASM is more important. The wider political



case (risk sharing, trans-Atlantic coupling etc) for FOTL seems considerably stronger - but only if we can persuade the Germans to say that this is so. It would be enormously damaging to make a major commitment of political capital and argument to secure FOTL and to fail - no doubt amid much acrimony;

(b) the Germans are going to have to be given something on SNF arms control and the negotiability issue. It may be that a simple rehearsal within the Alliance of the pros and cons, concluding that now was not the right time, would suffice. But it may not and, in any case, such a debate, once initiated, may be difficult to control. We need therefore to be clearer as to at what stage and on what basis we might be prepared to contemplate SNF negotiations. As I implied in my letter of 7 September to John Goulden, we should perhaps - building on the work of the HLG - be aiming to assess and then persuade the Germans that there is a robustly definable non-negotiable minimum requirement for a specific number and type of SNF systems which is needed to maintain an effective Alliance deterrent posture, whatever realistically foreseeable changes in Warsaw Pact conventional/nuclear deployment might take place. Systems above that total could be subject to negotiation at an appropriate time;

(c) if at some point the judgement is made that the odds against FOTL are too high or the political costs too great, we must continue to have in mind the need to get something out of the other side for our "sacrifice". To fail to get FOTL and to do so in such a way that we also failed to get reductions from the Warsaw Pact would be intolerable;

(d) the position of the French will be important. If the French go ahead with Hades, then the procurement by NATO of the not dissimilar FOTL might seem less of a problem - though there would no doubt be those who would argue that Hades would make FOTL unnecessary! If on the other hand Mitterrand decides not to proceed with Hades and to encourage Genscher in his arms control aspirations, our task will be that much more difficult;

(e) we need to know more about the life time of the present Lance. My discussions in Brighton led me to wonder whether Lance's future is so tightly circumscribed as we have been led to believe.

/It



It may be that as part of next year's force adjustment package we could announce the funding of a programme to further extend Lance until, say, 1998/2000. This would, of course, simply be to put off the evil day. The points in para 5 above would remain valid. But at least the Alliance would not appear simply to have given up on the idea;

(f) the value, in this context, of having the 40th Anniversary Summit at heads of government level will have to be kept under review. If there is thought to be a chance of getting a satisfactory outcome, the added pressure in the February/May 1989 period generated by an imminent summit could be useful. If on the other hand there is no such chance - or if we try and fail - a summit might be an embarrassment;

(g) these matters can only be handled to a limited extent in Brussels. The essential work will have to continue to be done in discussions elsewhere among the main players. However we should not forget that other members of the Alliance eg the Dutch, the Norwegians and the Danes, have strong views on the questions at issue and are in a position to affect the consensus we will eventually need.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Aelxander

cc: D Nicholls Esq CMG
DUS(P) MOD
Sir Christopher Mallaby KCMG
Bonn
Sir Ewen Fergusson KCMG
Paris
B J P Fall Esq CMG
Washington



UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

16 September 1988

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CM

Dear Charles,

SNF MODERNISATION ETC

I may be being unduly alarmist but it seems to me that the chances of the SNF modernisation issue ending in tears next year (or subsequently) are increasing. If I am right, the repercussions could be very considerable.

Be that as it may, the Prime Minister is likely to become directly involved with the question this autumn if only in the context of her visit to Washington in November and of the decision about whether or not to propose holding the 40th Anniversary meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London in June at heads of government level. You may therefore like to have a personal copy of the attached letter.

You might like to ask Teltsovici - if you have not already done so - about the last sentence of para 2 (b).

If you want to discuss further I shall be in attendance at lunches - kindly, I hope, the ideal place for an exchange on these matters!

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Alexander



MO 18/1/1L

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

His should dispose
of the issue.

EM 4/7

UK TNW SUCCESSOR SYSTEM: THE WAY AHEAD

In his minute of 29th June, Nigel Lawson returned to the issue of the new warhead for the UK TNW successor system and the related question of the future workload at Aldermaston.

2. For the last quarter of a century our possession, mostly through the WE 177 weapons non-strategic capability alongside our strategic force, has meant that we have had a range of nuclear options under our independent control. Without such a range the whole concept of an independent capability would be much weakened, and the value of Trident itself, reduced. We would, in effect, have no flexibility of nuclear response and therefore severely limited credibility for many scenarios. Given this, to acquire a new stand-off missile and then give it a US dual-key warhead would largely miss the point of acquiring the missile at all. In addition there is your point, recorded in your Private Secretary's minute of 17th June, that it is very important that we continue to remind the Americans of our determination to maintain an independent deterrent, which presupposes our own warhead design capability.

3. That said, it is legitimate to ask whether we will succeed in producing the TNW warheads in time for deployment with a new system at the turn of the century. We will of course properly take the Trident workload into account in our TNW planning. We have already frozen the designs for the UK Trident warhead and commenced production of the most critical components. We anticipate no difficulty in starting, when appropriate, a feasibility study for a new TNW warhead using specialist design resources released from the



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Trident project; indeed, we have already begun employing them on some general design concepts. The normal project management process of feasibility study, followed by project definition, for both warhead and delivery system, will then provide the basis for full confidence in development and production timescales. Our current view is that there should be no problems since Trident production, on present plans, ends in 1996; furthermore, while our future TNW stockpile studies have yet to be completed, it is likely that we will be thinking in terms of a relatively modest production run for the new warhead and certainly one involving fewer warheads than will be needed for Trident.

4. On the question of the options for the delivery system, I agree with the thrust of Geoffrey Howe's comments in his minute of 29th June.
5. I am copying this to members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

A.Y.

Ministry of Defence

4/1 July 1988



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PM/88/032

PRIME MINISTER

UK TNW Successor System

1. I have seen George Younger's minute of 24 June and your Private Secretary's reply of 26 June.
2. The concern which I expressed in my minute of 15 June was not, of course, that we should treat the ASMP as a serious option, but that we should keep ASLP alive as an option for the longer term. I therefore welcome George's comment that we must look properly at the realistic options, including the French possibility. I share his view that we must not allow missile collaboration to become a touchstone for Anglo/French relations. The case for continuing to study ASLP arises purely because of the technical and political uncertainties of cooperating with the Americans. We cannot be sure that SRAM II and SLAT will survive the Presidential changes and Congressional and budgetary pressures of the next few years in a form which meets our needs. I would rate the political uncertainties, which George's minute does not address, as at least as significant, over the period to the end of the century, as the technical ones.

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3. I therefore think it important that ASLP should be subjected to serious examination. It is for George to judge whether that can best be done by treating SLAT as proxy for ASLP or whether we need to set up a separate study outside the feasibility study. But however it is done, it is important that we should have as thorough an assessment as possible of the ASLP concept when we come to take decisions on TASM next year.

4. I am copying this minute to members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
29 June 1988

SECRET



Deputy

2nd

By 4

CCPC



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-270 3000

mt
PRIME MINISTER

UK TNW SUCCESSOR SYSTEM: THE WAY AHEAD

I have seen George Younger's minute of 24 June and your Private Secretary's response of 27 June.

It is clear from George's minute that the research and development programme for a national warhead is putting clear limits on the timescale of the feasibility study for the missile and so on the number of options which can be studied.

In my minute to you of 16 June, I referred to the major problems at Aldermaston and the possible requirements of the Trident programme. I said that we needed to look very carefully at whether we could support a TNW programme with a UK warhead in the timescale required. Your Private Secretary's response said that these points needed to be examined.

Since there is a clear interaction with the missile feasibility study, it would seem sensible to consider the position on the warhead before the feasibility study starts.

I am copying to members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

N.L.

[N.L.]

29 June 1988

DEFENCE INT PTS



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SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1988

Dear Brian,

UNITED KINGDOM THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPON
SUCCESSOR SYSTEMS: THE WAY AHEAD

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 24 June spelling out the reasons why he has not included the French ASMP in the feasibility studies for the successor system to our theatre nuclear weapons. She is content with the explanation given.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to Members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell
(C. D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



MO 18/5A

PRIME MINISTERUK TNW SUCCESSOR SYSTEMS: THE WAY AHEAD

top
I have read Geoffrey Howe's and John Major's minutes of 15th June; and I was grateful for Charles Powell's letter of 17th June to my Private Secretary. In brief, it will be no service to our decision-making to spend effort on unrealistic options, and equally no service to Anglo-French defence relations to allow expectations to build up about such options. But I accept entirely that we must look properly at the realistic ones, including the French possibility, and this is being done. I hope the following amplification of my earlier submission will be helpful.

2. As I have already indicated, there is very little time to complete the feasibility studies. To deploy the successor system by the turn of the century, we need to establish the research and development programme at the Atomic Weapon Establishment for a new warhead not much later than the end of next year; this requires us to have identified a delivery vehicle, and hence the payload space available for a new warhead design, by the Autumn of 1989. Our Equipment Policy Committee (which the Treasury and FCO both attend) assessed that there was little prospect of completing the Feasibility studies in time unless the options were reduced to no more than 2 or 3 systems. It followed that the least attractive possibilities had to be jettisoned. The Modular Stand Off Weapon (MSOW), which is a missile being considered for multilateral development for conventional applications, was dropped because it has no stealth characteristics and because converting it to nuclear use would almost certainly have created awkward political problems with the other nations involved. A variant of the UK Tomahawk cruise missile

Prime Minister
I think this adequately explains why the MOD are not doing a feasibility study of the French missile. These reasons are sound.
CBP
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was left out of account primarily because the Americans themselves were showing no interest in the system and there was therefore little chance of its development.

3. The French ASMP was taken out of the running largely on grounds of assessed performance. Basically, the ASMP is 1970s technology; by the time we would want to bring it into service, it would already be some 25 years old. Unlike the US SLAT and SRAM II, it does not incorporate any stealth characteristics and its range at low level, which is where we would wish to operate, falls far short of our requirements. In its primary low level deployment, the ASMP has a range of only 80km which would expose our aircraft to Warsaw Pact air defences to an unacceptable degree. ASMP achieves a satisfactory range flying at high level, but only at a cost of exposing the missile to enemy radars very soon after launch; at this level, its lack of stealth markedly reduces the chances of penetrating to the target. It is also a relatively inaccurate weapon, which would probably require a high yield warhead to achieve the necessary damage. Compared with the American systems, it was judged likely to turn out to be a costly option, particularly in terms of warhead development. A US system is likely to be based on a modern warhead with a design supported by many pre-feasibility nuclear tests. Given our close nuclear relationship with them, we are likely to obtain full design release together with full information on the technology involved and, indeed, warhead related hardware, an immense saving in cost and time for our programme. To put in place arrangements with the French for the exchange of nuclear design information, even if we could overcome both US and French sensitivities on this score, would inevitably mean delay.

4. Finally, while the French offered to examine the possibility of stretching ASMP (the so called ASMP II), they have no requirement for it; it would involve extra cost and development time; and the modest extra range which might be achieved would still fall short of our



requirements. If we are to be realistic, we must now focus on what seems most likely to meet our military needs in the tight timescale and what we might be able to afford.

5. Of course, I share your views, and Geoffrey Howe's, on the importance of strengthening Anglo-French relations in the defence field, including exchanges on nuclear matters; but there is a danger of making collaboration on nuclear missiles a touchstone of the relationship. This is why I spoke as I did to my new counterpart M. Chevenement about ASMP, so that from the outset he had a realistic understanding of the matter. At the same time, aware of the limitations of ASMP, and the merit of keeping our options open as far as possible, I have encouraged discussions with the French on their ideas for a successor (ASLP) to ASMP.

6. But in contrast to SRAM II and SLAT for which hardware already exists, ASLP is only at the conceptual stage, with no certainty that it will be developed and produced by the French. It is hardly a candidate for a formal feasibility study; but as the characteristics envisaged for it have much in common with SLAT, we shall in effect be able to assess its potential through the SLAT study.

7. In summary, I believe we are right to keep the number of options for formal study down to the minimum and to give the US route priority at this stage. Nevertheless, I made it clear during my meeting with M. Chevenement that we had a continuing interest in any French plans for follow on systems to the ASMP and that we would wish to meet periodically to exchange views. I will be able to repeat and to emphasise this message when I meet him again in early July.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

A.Y.

Ministry of Defence

24 June 1988

DEFENCE: INF PTS



NEW YORK



loc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 June 1988

Dear Brian,

UNITED KINGDOM THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPON SUCCESSOR SYSTEM

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 9 June about the choice of a successor system to our free-fall nuclear bombs. She has also seen the minutes by the Foreign Secretary and the Chief Secretary in which they argue that the option of cooperation with the French on a next generation stand-off missile should be included in the feasibility studies which the Defence Secretary proposes should now be carried out. She has considerable sympathy with the Defence Secretary's intention to focus the feasibility studies on the American systems SRAM II and SLAT. The next generation French weapon is not planned to enter service until about 2010 which is well beyond the timescale of our needs. It is regarded by the experts as the least promising and most expensive of the options. There is no point in doing a feasibility study just for political purposes. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister thinks it might be helpful if the Defence Secretary were to spell out in greater detail the reasons why he proposes to concentrate the formal feasibility studies on the American options so that colleagues are better able to judge the wider implications of his proposal.

I am copying this letter to members of MISC 7 and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(CHARLES POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

PRIME MINISTERNUCLEAR WEAPONS: SUCCESSOR TO FREE-FALL BOMBS

MISC 7 recently decided that MOD should examine all possible options for the successor system to our free-fall nuclear bombs.

The Defence Secretary's minute of 9 June said that he told the French that their ASMP would not meet our requirements but that we were ready to discuss collaboration on the next generation of stand-off weapons. Meanwhile he intended to carry out a feasibility study of two US options.

The Foreign Secretary and the Chief Secretary have both objected to this:

- the Foreign Secretary argues that MISC's decision was to study all options equally and this should include the French one. We also need to insure against a change of plan by the Americans (e.g. by a Democrat President) which might deprive us of an American option.
- the Chief Secretary makes similar points, adding that if we drop the French option, the Americans will have us over a barrel when it comes to negotiating prices, since there will be no competition.

For the Defence Secretary it can be argued that the next generation French weapon is not planned to enter service until about 2010, which is well beyond our time scale. The Americans will recognise that it is not a true competitor; and he will end up doing a feasibility study on a political weapon. The French system is regarded by the MOD as the least promising and most expensive of the options.

I do not see any need to make a meal of this. The first step might be for the MOD to justify their decision to exclude the French system from the feasibility study. Others can then judge whether this is reasonable. Agree?

CDP

Charles Powell

15 June 1988

Yes not

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FROM: CHIEF SECRETARY
DATE: 15 June 1988cc file
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PRIME MINISTER

UK THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPON SUCCESSOR SYSTEM: THE WAY AHEAD

George Younger sent me a copy of his minute of 9 June.

2 George proposes to limit the formal feasibility study to 2 US options. He will separately, and on a slower timescale, pursue discussions with the French, and possibly the US, on "longer term possibilities".

3 MISC 7 asked - MISC7(88)1st - for an evaluation of the possible options for our successor system. George has already discarded one of those mentioned in his MISC 7 paper - ASMP. He now appears to be discarding several other options and it would be helpful to know the reasons for this.

4 As regards the French, George does not specifically mention in his letter their new design described in his MISC 7 paper as "ASLP". I assume this will be one of the options he proposes to pursue more slowly.


5 I believe that work on ASLP should proceed at the same pace as the feasibility study. This would put us in a position to look at ASLP on an equal footing with the options in the feasibility study and to take decisions accordingly at the end of that study.

6 In addition, keeping the options moving forward at the same pace will also create useful competitive pressures. If we were to adopt George's proposal to push ahead with the two US options, it would put the US in a very strong bargaining position in subsequent procurement negotiations which they might exploit to our disadvantage.

SECRET

7 No doubt George's officials will be approaching mine in the normal way for Treasury financial clearance for this work.

8 I am copying this minute to MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "John M.", is written in a cursive style.

JOHN MAJOR

DEFENCE: INF PES.



15/11



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PM/88/024

PRIME MINISTER

UK TNW Successor System

1. I have seen George Younger's minute to you of ^{top air} 9 June.
2. I am a little surprised, so soon after MISC 7's conclusion that the possible options should be further evaluated, that he has already told the French that we have discarded consideration of the French option for TASM. I take it that this applies to ASMP's extended range version, ASMP II, as well as the basic version.
3. I agree that it is in all our interests to examine as thoroughly as possible the US options and to obtain the release of the necessary US technical data. But by excluding any French option from the feasibility study we will have no yardstick against which to measure the US options. The two possible US systems, SRAM II and SLAT, are, as I understand it, subject to a number of technical uncertainties. They are also surrounded by political uncertainties. If Governor Dukakis were to be elected and, as he has hinted, to freeze developments of both US stand-off missiles, the next generation French system (ASLP) may look more attractive.

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4. I realise that the ASLP is a concept at a very early stage of planning, and that its present in-service state, if developed, would be as late as 2010. But SLAT is still only under development as an aerial target system and has yet to fly in a form that would be suitable for TASM. I hope therefore that we can keep the French in play, to guard against US uncertainties and because the ASLP could be of interest to us.

5. I see that in his letter of 9 June to Mr Carlucci George Younger says that the US systems are "high on our list of options", but does not imply that they are the only ones. From his minute to you he appears to accept the need for discussion of ASLP, but outside the feasibility study, which I understand will be carried out by consultants. I am concerned that, in one way or another, we should use the period of the study to explore the ASLP option energetically.

6. If it emerged that the US will cooperate only if we forgo discussion of ASLP with the French, we will have to decide whether that is an acceptable condition. At this stage it surely makes sense to keep our options as wide as possible. I hope therefore that George Younger will agree either to include ASLP in the feasibility study or to ensure that ASLP is subjected to as thorough an evaluation as possible in the same timescale.



SECRET

7. I wonder incidentally whether M. Chevenement has understood that by the "next generation" we mean the ASLP and not the ASMP II. His interest in further early trilateral discussions seems a little surprising if he is clear that George Younger was talking only about the ASLP. This point might be worth clarifying when M. Chevenement visits London on 7 July.

8. I am sending copies of this minute of MISC 7 colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', is written above the typed name.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
15 June 1988

SECRET

DEFENCE INF PTS



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ET



Prime Minister

This is relevant to your talks tomorrow with President Mitterrand. In effect, we are turning our backs on cooperation with the French, & looking to the US for our needs. Discussing with French with concrete on the very long term.

MO 18/5A(V)

PRIME MINISTER

UK THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPON SUCCESSOR SYSTEM: 'THE WAY AHEAD'

Before you meet President Mitterrand tomorrow, you will wish to know that, on Monday, I had a short but very cordial first meeting with M. Chevenement, the new French Defence Minister, following the inauguration of the Battle of Normandy Museum at Caen.

2. We discussed, inter alia, the outcome of last week's Summit in Moscow, Alliance priorities post-INF and German difficulties with nuclear modernisation. I am pleased to say there was a large measure of agreement between us on all these issues. We were also at one in our assessment of the importance of the further development of the Anglo/French defence relationship, and of further co-operation over defence equipment procurement, in particular.

3. On the specific prospects for future Anglo/French nuclear co-operation, I judged it important to put our relationship, from the outset, on a completely frank footing. I made clear, therefore, as indeed I had previously intimated to M. Giraud, that we did not believe the ASMP would meet our immediate requirement for a replacement theatre nuclear weapon. But I also said that I hoped it would be possible to continue to explore opportunities for longer term collaboration on the next generation of such weapons.

M. Chevenement agreed. He hoped that the US could be involved too; and that the trilateral exchanges with them could be taken forward before the Presidential elections prevented any further progress.

4. In practical terms, I believe that this leaves us free to concentrate our own formal feasibility studies, for which time is very short, on what have become the two most attractive options,

French with concrete on the very long term. COP. 9/6



namely the US systems SRAM II and SLAT. (In this connexion you will wish to be aware that I am writing to Mr Carlucci to pursue the release of sensitive US technical data needed for our studies.) At the same time, but with somewhat less urgency and outside the formal feasibility studies, we shall seek to pursue our discussions with the French and, if possible, with the US as well, on longer term possibilities. This latter process should provide a more realistic basis for a continuing dialogue with the French in this area, whilst also keeping open the door to shorter term Anglo/French collaboration should, for any reason, the US systems prove to be unsuitable or unavailable to us following the US elections later this year.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to MISC7 colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence


9 June 1988

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MODUK FOR DACU 
MIPT AND MY TELNO 1213: INF RATIFICATION
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF 10 MAY:
1. LAST NIGHT, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP
OF THE SENATE, CHIEF OF STAFF HOWARD BAKER AND NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR COLIN POWELL AND THE LEADERSHIP AGREED TO PURSUE CERTAIN
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE INF VERIFICATION REGIME AT THE
SOVIET-US MINISTERIAL MEETING IN GENEVA TOMORROW. DEBATE ON INF
RATIFICATION WILL BE DELAYED UNTIL THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
WITH THE VERIFICATION REGIME CAN BE RESOLVED TO THE FULL
SATISFACTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE BIPARTISAN
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. WE FEEL THIS A PRUDENT AND REASONABLE
COURSE OF ACTION. THERE IS UNANIMITY BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION
AND THE BIPARTISAN SENATE LEADERSHIP THAT THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD
BE SATISFACTORILY AND PROMPTLY RESOLVED PRIOR TO RATIFICATION.
2. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THE NEED FOR
AN EXPEDITIOUS SOLUTION. SECRETARY SHULTZ AND GENERAL POWELL
WILL BE TRAVELLING TO GENEVA TONIGHT TO MEET WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE TOMORROW. WE HOPE TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES
QUICKLY. WE ARE STILL OF THE VIEW THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE
THE TREATY RATIFIED PRIOR TO THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. THE ADMINISTRA-
TION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE SENATE ON THESE ISSUES

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NNNN


 Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 cc PC 27

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1988

 Dear Charles,
 cc PC 27

High Level Group Work on Post-INF Restructuring
of NATO's Nuclear Forces

The Foreign Secretary ^{flap} has received copies of Mr Younger's minute of ~~21~~ April and your letter of ~~23~~ April. In view of the difficult political climate in which the High Level Group's discussions have taken place, he agrees that impressive progress has been made in agreeing firm pointers on NATO nuclear modernisation. There is much still to play for but it seems that there is a good chance of the NPG accepting that measures will be taken in a pragmatic, step-by-step way.


The Foreign Secretary agrees that the meeting should be presented in a positive way and endorses the points set out in your letter. He would also suggest that if asked whether decisions were made on what steps are required and how to take these forward, we should say that they were.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

[Handwritten signature: L Parker]
 (L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 PS/No 10 Downing Street

DEFENSE : INF PTS



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GERMAN VIEWS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

SUMMARY

1. THIS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL AGREE TO MODERNISE SOME TNF AT SOME STAGE. AN SNF ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION, PERHAPS NOT CONFINED TO UNILATERAL ARTILLERY REDUCTIONS, IS LIKELY TO BE ESSENTIAL AT LEAST IN RELATION TO FOTL. COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO KOHL'S HANDLING PROBLEM.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE RECENTLY DISCUSSED TNF WITH A NUMBER OF THE LEADING GERMAN FIGURES CONCERNED. THIS TELEGRAM IS A ROUNDUP OF THE PICTURE HERE IN ADVANCE OF THE NPG AND YOUR MEETING ON 29 APRIL.

3. THE RANGE OF VIEWS IS WIDE. WOERNER AND THE FMOD HAVE VIEWS CLOSE TO OURS. BUT HE WILL SOON BE GONE. GENSCHER IS BEING EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, INDEED ENIGMATIC, ON MODERISATION. KOHL IS BIDDING HIS TIME, TRYING TO POSTPONE THE POLITICAL DEBATE, WHILE GENTLY EDGING THE CDU TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF MODERNISATION IN PRINCIPLE. WITHIN THE CDU, VIEWS VARY CONSIDERABLY. THE OPPOSITION SPD, FOR THEIR PART, OPPOSE SNF MODERNISATION AND QUESTION THE ROLE OF GROUND-BASED MISSILES. THE REAL POLITICAL DEBATE, LET ALONE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS, HAS YET TO BE ENGAGED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT, UNUSUALLY, THERE IS NO LAND ELECTION (EXCEPT BERLIN, WHICH IS DIFFERENT) BETWEEN MAY 1988 AND 1990, WHEN THERE ARE FEDERAL ELCTIONS TOO - GAP OF OVER 18 MONTHS WHICH WE SHOULD USE.

4. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND IS THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY HERE OF NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. THE INF DEBATE IN 1983 HAS MADE SUBSEQUENT THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE DECISIONS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE DELICATE TO HANDLE: THE MAN ON THE LOCAL BUS IS NO LONGER AGNOSTIC

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ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN PARTICULAR ''RAKETEN'' (GROUND-BASED MISSILES), BE HE CDU OR SPD.

COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

5. SOME IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARGUE THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT IS ONLY, OR AT BEST PRIMARILY, ABOUT SNF ARMS CONTROL. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MORE GENERALLY ACCEPT THAT THE TASK IS WIDER, ALSO EMBRACING A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ALLIANCE'S THEATRE NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS. PRACTICALLY EVERYONE HERE WOULD ARGUE THAT ELABORATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT IS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR ANY DECISIONS ON SNF MODERNISATION. WE SEE NO SIGNS OF PREPARATIONS TO PUSH FORWARD THE WORK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, DESPITE KOHL'S PUBLIC POSITION THAT IT MUST BE COMPLETED BY NEXT SPRING.

SNF ARMS CONTROL

6. NO ONE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY EXPECTS TO ACHIEVE SNF MODERNISATION WITHOUT AN SNF ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION, AND OTHER TNF ADJUSTMENTS MAY WELL BE SUBJECT TO THIS TOO. TELTSCHIK DOES NOT EXCLUDE A GERMAN INITIATIVE ON IT BUT THERE IS SO FAR NO FIRM LINE ON WHAT THE FORM AND CONTENT OF AN SNF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE. SOME CDU MPS (RUEHE AND OTHERS) DO NOT BELIEVE THIRD ZERO IS AVOIDABLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEREFORE ADVOCATE UNILATERAL RESTRUCTURING OF WESTERN TNF. KOHL REGULARLY CALLS FOR UNILATERAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF SNF. NO ONE IN GOVERNMENT IS ADVOCATING TRIPLE ZERO, NOT EVEN GENSCHER (AT LEAST ON DUTY). THE GERMANS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE THE ONLY MISSILE RANGE NOT COVERED IN AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THIS LACUNA FUELS PUBLIC SUSPICION ABOUT SINGULARISATION. NEVERTHELESS KOHL, GENSCHER AND WOERNER ALL CONTINUE TO SAY THAT THE OVERRIDING PRIORITY IS PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

SNF MODERNISATION

7. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR THE GERMANS IS FOLLOW ON TO LANCE (FOTL). ON RANGE, THE GERMANS ARE LIKELY TO PREFER THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE - 400KMS PLUS - BECAUSE THIS HEADS OFF CRITICISM FROM THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN THE DANGER OF SINGULARISATION, AND PROVIDES A MORE USEFUL WEAPON SYSTEM, FOR WHICH THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL BATTLE WOULD BE WORTH FIGHTING. AGAINST THAT, THE SPD WILL MAKE HAY WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS WOULD BE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE INF TREATY, AND A QUALITATIVE UPGRADE FAR BEYOND MERE MODERNISATION. THERE WILL BE FDP PRESSURE TO HAVE NO MORE THAN 88 NEW SYSTEMS. SOME EXPERTS ARE TOYING WITH ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT COUNTING RULES USING WARHEADS IN THEATRE, AND EMBRACING FOTL UNDER THAT CEILING. ALL FACTION WITHIN TH COALITION TAKE IT AS READ NOW THAT FOTL DEPLOYMENTS, IF POSSIBLE

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AT ALL, WILL HAVE TO BE LINKED TO VERY RADICAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND THAT THE MILITARY WILL ACCEPT THESE.

8. ON TIMING OF A FOTL DECISION, THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE BALL LIES FIRST WITH THE AMERICANS. 1989 WOULD BE AN OBVIOUS WINDOW IN ELECTION TERMS FOR KOHL TO TAKE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON FOTL STATIONING (WITH SPECIFIC PROCUREMENT DECISIONS AFTER THE 1990 ELECTION). BUT GENSCHER MAY WELL SEEK TO DELAY EVEN THE DECISION IN PRINCIPLE UNTIL 1991. THE COALITION'S MAIN CURRENT PURPOSE IS TO PUT THE ISSUE ON THE BACK BURNER FOR NOW. THE SPD WILL SEEK TO MAKE LANCE MODERNISATION AN ELECTION ISSUE, BUT HAVE NOT SO FAR SUCCEEDED IN ENGAGING THE GOVERNMENT. VISIBLE DEPARTURE OF INF SYSTEMS DURING 1989 MAY COMPLICATE THE COALITION'S TASK.

OTHER TNF DECISIONS

9. NEW DCA DEPLOYMENTS, NEW SLCM DEPLOYMENTS, AND TASM SEEM IN PRINCIPLE NOT TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GERMANS, PROBABLY NOT EVEN FOR THE FDP. TIMING OF THE DECISIONS WILL BE MORE PROBLEMATIC, WITH GENSCHER (AND PROBABLY KOHL) LIKELY TO RESIST ANY "ISOLATED DECISIONS" ON WEAPON SYSTEMS IN ADVANCE OF ADOPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. AT THIS WEEK'S NPG THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT WILL BE CONTENT THAT FURTHER WORK/STUDIES BE COMMISSIONED. BUT WE DO NOT KNOW IF, SAY IN THE AUTUMN, THEY WILL SEEK TO RESIST DECISIONS ON EG DISCREET SLCM/SLBM ADJUSTMENTS.

LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS

10. SOME SERIOUS OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE SNF MODERNISATION DEBATE COULD HAVE FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES AND, IF MISHANDLED, COULD UNDERMINE FRG ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO STRATEGY, CURRENTLY NOT AT ISSUE. DESPITE THE FDP SEEKING TO PROFILE ITSELF ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE CDU, I BELIEVE GENSCHER DOES NOT QUESTION THE CONTINUING ROLE FOR THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GENERAL, WHATEVER HIS QUALMS ON PARTICULAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. KOHL HAS DONE LITTLE TO LEAD PUBLIC OPINION ON THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, BUT THIS MAY WELL BE A CALCULATED JUDGEMENT OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE THIS DELICATE ISSUE. HIS STEADFASTNESS AND DECISIVENESS HAVE NOT BEEN WANTING AT MOMENTS HE JUDGES CRUCIAL, EG INF STATIONING, SCRAPING PERSHING 1A, OR LEGISLATING BUNDESWEHR CONSCRIPTION BEFORE REPEAT BEFORE THE LAST ELECTION.

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File SP 26
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

23 April 1988

From the Private Secretary

Dear Brian,

HIGH LEVEL GROUP WORK ON POST-INF
RESTRUCTURING OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCES

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 21 April about the report of the High Level Group on the restructuring of NATO nuclear forces in the wake of the INF agreement. She agrees that it is a good report which meets all our main requirements. We should work hard for its endorsement at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Brussels next week. The Prime Minister agrees that the Defence Secretary may indicate at that meeting that the United Kingdom would be willing in principle to accept deployment of additional F111 aircraft to the United Kingdom as a contribution to implementing the Report's conclusions.

The Prime Minister would also like careful thought given to how we present the conclusions of the NPG. Ideally we should be able to say that the meeting built on the conclusions of the recent NATO Summit regarding the need to keep NATO's nuclear forces effective and up-to-date, that there was agreement on the steps required and that detailed implementation of them will now be pursued. This may be further than we can in practice go. But the Prime Minister would like the most forthcoming statement possible, both from the NPG and in our own presentation of its conclusions, so that the momentum of the NATO Summit is not lost.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworth (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

MODERNISATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES

I attach a note by the Defence Secretary covering a report by the High Level Group on the restructuring of NATO's theatre nuclear forces. The Defence Secretary will be attending a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group next week which will consider the report.

The report is actually rather a good one in the sense that it has in it all the recommendations which we want: that is, deployment of additional F1-11 aircraft to Europe, development of a stand-off missile and a successor to LANCE, and assignment of SLCMs to SACEUR. But they are only recommendations. Each one of the points will need to be negotiated directly between the United States and other countries concerned or the NATO authorities before they are put into effect.

That may raise some problems over presentation and how far we can represent endorsement of the report by the Nuclear Planning Group as implementation of the conclusions of the NATO Summit. My own view is that we can go quite a long way in this direction. The report indisputably takes forward the Summit conclusions. But you may like me to suggest to the Defence Secretary that he goes to the NPG meeting with a form of words describing a desirable outcome which we could use afterwards in the House and publicly, and make it his aim to get a result which matches the form of words. Something like: 'The NPG agreed, in pursuance of the conclusions of the NATO Summit, on the broad shape of a restructuring of NATO's nuclear forces, the detailed implementation of which will now be negotiated'. Agree? *Yes mk*

Agree also that the Defence Secretary can indicate the United Kingdom's willingness in principle to accept deployment of additional F1-11 aircraft to the United Kingdom as part of an overall package? *Yes mk*

C. D. POWELL

22 April 1988

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PRIME MINISTERHIGH LEVEL GROUP WORK ON POST-INF RESTRUCTURING OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES

You will wish to know where we now stand on the work on restructuring NATO's theatre nuclear forces following the INF agreement. A report on this by the High Level Group (HLG) will be the main item on the agenda of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting which I shall be attending in Brussels next week. I attach a copy of the report's conclusions and recommendations.

HLG Report

2. As its previous work has already provided a thorough theoretical analysis of the various possible post-INF adjustment options, the task of the HLG over the last few months has been to translate that analysis into a basis for action. The result, in this latest report, is a solid framework of guidance to the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) and nations, with the following main elements:

a. Emphasis on a coherent long-term plan. At one stage, some nations were inclined to concentrate solely on measures which could be implemented quickly, especially as these tended to involve only US offshore systems. But the HLG has now recognised that the main purpose of the restructuring exercise is to satisfy, in the absence of INF missiles, the politico/military requirement for a credible theatre-based capability at longer ranges, a capability which cannot be restored fully in the short term. The report's conclusions and recommendations, therefore, give special prominence to the deployment to Europe "as soon as practicable" of additional longer range dual capable aircraft (DCA), whilst making clear



that these will not fully meet the requirement until the introduction and widespread deployment of a stand-off missile in the mid to late 1990s.

b. Clarification of the longer range DCA package. For the first time, potential basing countries have been identified: the UK, and just possibly Italy, for additional F111 aircraft; and Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the FRG for F15E aircraft. This does not necessarily imply any commitment to deploy at this stage; and no country has yet given such a commitment. The US must, of course, investigate a number of practical and financial matters with the countries concerned before they will be in a position to put forward specific basing proposals.

c. Elaboration of other DCA-related measures, including possible range enhancements and improved survivability. These are to be pursued by individual nations in consultation with SHAPE.

d. Endorsement of a selective use role for US SLBMs and SLCMs. The NATO Military Authorities, together with the US authorities, are to develop appropriate concepts of operations, "to be implemented to complement adjustments to NATO's longer range DCA".

e. Recognition of the importance in a restructured force of a longer range successor to Lance, but also of the need for the role and mix of short range nuclear forces to be re-examined. The latter is to be a particular focus of SACEUR's next Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study, as well as a parallel study by the HLG. Any further (unilateral) reductions in this area will need very careful management if we are to extract the maximum price from them in terms of Alliance support for modernisation.



f. Guidance on the public presentational aspects of restructuring. The HLG concludes, rightly in my view, that the political acceptability of adjustments may depend critically on making clear, in public, that they do not undercut the real reductions in warheads in NATO Europe which will result from the INF agreement. We will wish to see this point covered in the NPG communique.

Way Ahead

3. Ministerial endorsement at the NPG of the HLG conclusions and recommendations will give effect to this approach and allow, in the words of the report:

"the further work necessary to refine and implement the adjustment measures [to] proceed as soon as practicable in a coherent step-by-step manner."

In the first instance, most of that further work will be for individual nations (as with development of an air launched missile and successor to Lance), or bilateral, involving negotiations between the US and potential basing countries (on DCA), or between the US and NATO Military Authorities (on SLBMs and SLCMs). But it will be important to maintain a collective, ministerial grip on the exercise, both because the adjustments need at some point to be brought together and seen as part of a coherent theatre nuclear posture for the Alliance, but also to sustain momentum behind the work and to discourage backsliding. The HLG is well placed to monitor implementation of the recommendations and to report progress to Ministers in the autumn.

UK Position

4. I consider that the HLG has made good progress in the relatively short time since the last NPG and I propose to urge my opposite numbers, in Brussels, next week to give their full backing to the report. In doing so, they will not of course be making any great commitment; that will have to come later as we get to grips with implementation of the various adjustments and when, no doubt, consensus will be more difficult to achieve. To help this process along, I anticipated last autumn that it might become necessary for the UK to give a lead. Your agreement to this was conveyed in your Private Secretary's letter to mine of 3rd November. I remain of that view and believe it would be helpful if, in discussion next week, I were to indicate the UK's willingness, in principle, to accept the additional FIII mentioned in the report as part of a balanced package of longer range DCA deployments. That position is implicit in the general line we have been pursuing already, and has been made known privately to some allies. But "Pour encourager les autres" it needs to be said explicitly in the NPG forum (though not, of course, in the communique). I should be grateful for your agreement to this.

5. I am copying this minute with its attachment to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

C.Y.

Ministry of Defence
21st April 1988

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

NATO's capability to hold at risk in selective use targets deep in the Warsaw Pact, particularly on Soviet territory, from European soil is central to the Alliance strategy of flexible response. With the elimination of INF missiles in the post-INF environment, deployment of additional longer-range DCA to Europe and measures to improve the existing DCA force in terms of increased range, penetrativity, flexibility, and survivability are essential to the restructuring effort. When armed with a TASM of at least 400km, such an adjustment would hold at risk almost the entire area covered by current land-based systems.

An effective minimum set of aircraft adjustments at the longer ranges might include restoring the number of F-111 in the United Kingdom to its previous higher level, and permanent or dual-basing of F-15E in Central and Southern Region countries on the continent of Europe as identified in the report. The United States should examine these possibilities in conjunction with SHAPE and the countries concerned.

There would be significant military as well as burdensharing advantages if some of these aircraft could be deployed far forward on NATO's flanks. Where permanent or dual basing does not appear to be feasible, the nuclear certification of reinforcement aircraft and aircrews should be pursued by the United States. The United States, in coordination with the countries concerned, should examine, for forward wartime deployment, the desirability of permanently basing some of these aircraft elsewhere on the continent of Europe or the use of additional F-111s permanently based in the United Kingdom for this purpose.

Given the increased reliance on DCA, other aircraft-, weapon- and airbase-related measures should be adopted to improve the effectiveness and survivability of NATO's DCA forces. Countries should examine the feasibility of certifying in a nuclear role DCA and aircrews currently planned for a conventional-only role, consider the future production of additional DCA, and consider making additional bases available for strike aircraft. DCA survivability is also being improved through the construction of protective aircraft shelters. The installation of WS³ vaults in the floors of these shelters will greatly improve the survivability of air-delivered weapons. To ensure timely implementation of this program, NATO should expeditiously establish its eligibility for common funding so that the United States can make initial funds available. As an interim measure, plans are near completion for on-base dispersal of air-delivered weapons to aircraft shelters in crisis or wartime. Even greater survivability would be possible if DCA and their weapons could disperse to alternate airbases. Procedures to permit such dispersal are being studied and should be developed as

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soon as possible. Measures to improve airbase survivability and recovery, including rapid runway repair capabilities, alternate launch and recovery surfaces, and active and passive defensive measures, should be pursued. Measures to improve the survivability of TNF command and control should continue to receive high priority for implementation.

Making TASM available for use by all NATO DCA would be the most suitable long-term means of maintaining and improving NATO's theater-based capability for holding longer-range targets at risk. TASM has been previously identified as offering improved penetrativity and target coverage. Deployment of TASM would help ensure the credibility of NATO's DCA and provide important opportunities for national participation. Noting SACEUR's preference for a TASM of at least 400km range, the United States and the United Kingdom should continue their efforts to develop TASM and maximize its range, consistent with technical, operational, financial, and possible arms control constraints. In the interim, countries should also determine the feasibility of extending DCA range through the use of larger fuel tanks and higher density fuels. Both of these measures would increase the operational flexibility of NATO DCA.

Improvements to NATO DCA, even in the longer term, cannot of themselves satisfy all requirements. Additional adjustments at longer ranges are needed. Some US TLAM/Ns should be made available to SACEUR for selective use. The United States, SACLANT and SACEUR should complete a concept of operations which will take into account the availability of an increasing number of these missiles over time. SHAPE should also complete planning for selective use, at higher levels of escalation, of some of the 400 US SLBM warheads committed to SACEUR. While TLAM/Ns and SLBMs are associated with Allied Command Europe (ACE), long-range bombers are less so and would therefore present more political difficulties. The incorporation of some ALCM-equipped B-52s into selective use planning could be pursued if further analysis identifies a requirement for additional longer-range selective strike capabilities.

In order to maintain the deterrent value of NATO's remaining nuclear forces over the entire spectrum of capabilities, emphasis must be maintained on improving short-range nuclear forces as agreed by Ministers at Montebello. The United States should initiate development of a FOTL with a range of at least 250km, preferably extending to 450km. The survivability of such a system should be enhanced relative to the current LANCE. Characteristics which maximize survivability should be integral to the concept and design of FOTL. The United States should continue to pursue the production of sufficient modern artillery rounds so that all older rounds currently in Europe can be withdrawn.

SHAPE should conduct a comprehensive study of NATO's nuclear weapons requirements that takes into account the elimination of INF missiles, the nuclear capabilities in afloat forces assigned to ACE, and external support from SACLANT and US

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and UK strategic missile forces. The study should also incorporate the conclusions and recommendations of this report. Special attention should be devoted to the potential for restructuring short-range nuclear forces, considering the benefits of extended range and the increased flexibility and survivability of modern weapons systems.

In this context, the HLG, in conjunction with NATO Military Authorities, should review the role of short-range nuclear forces in Alliance deterrent strategy, taking into account the relevant positions established in the General Political Guidelines.

The goal of the Alliance should be to restructure its nuclear force posture to maximize the deterrent effect of NATO's nuclear forces over the long term. Currently, no single system exists which could be based in Europe that would maintain NATO's selective use capabilities at longer ranges. The adjustments recommended here would have to be introduced as they become available. While final decisions on implementation of all the measures are neither necessary nor possible now, overall guidance is required from Ministers on the way ahead, so that the further work necessary to refine and implement the adjustment measures can proceed as soon as practicable in a coherent step-by-step manner.

Any decision on the long-term size and composition of the NATO European nuclear stockpile must await the determination of detailed requirements for the near- and longer-term by NATO Military Authorities. This determination should take into account NATO's policy of retaining the minimum level of nuclear forces consistent with our requirements and the fact that ongoing modernization as well as withdrawals as a result of the INF Treaty will both result in real reductions in the stockpile. The political acceptability of land-based adjustments may critically depend upon NATO making clear that its restructured force will not undercut those reductions. It is also important that improvements and adjustments be understood as natural, evolutionary changes in the structure of NATO's nuclear forces.

B. Recommendations

On the basis of advice from NATO Military Authorities and in continuing consultation with them, and recognizing the wider context in which future decisions will have to be made, the High Level Group makes the following recommendations for restructuring NATO's nuclear forces. Ministers should:

1. Endorse the conclusions of this report as a basis for planning and action as required by countries and NATO Military Authorities;

2. Invite the United States, in consultation with SHAPE and the countries concerned, to examine further the options for basing of additional F-111 and F-15E aircraft in Europe as soon as practicable;

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3. Invite countries to pursue, in coordination with SHAPE, the other DCA-related measures identified in the report, including examining the feasibility of nuclear certification of additional DCA and aircrews, considering the future production of additional such aircraft, and considering an expansion of the number of bases for strike operations;

4. In order to provide a basis for timely decisions on restructuring and future deployment options, reaffirm their continuing support, as expressed at Monterey, for US and UK efforts to meet the identified requirement for a TASM with a range maximized consistent with technical, operational, financial, and possible arms control constraints;

5. Invite NATO Military Authorities, working with appropriate US authorities, to develop a concept of operations for the utilization of TLAM/Ns and SLBMs in selective use, to be implemented to complement adjustments to NATO's longer-range DCA; and to analyze further, if necessary, the use of ALCM-equipped B-52s for selective employment;

6. In order to provide a basis for timely decisions on restructuring and future deployment options, reaffirm their continuing support, as expressed at Monterey, for US efforts to meet the identified requirement for a FOTL with a range maximized consistent with technical, operational, financial, and arms control constraints, and for production of sufficient modern artillery rounds to meet SACEUR's requirements;

7. Agree that full support should be given to expeditious completion of ongoing survivability improvement programs, and that new programs should receive appropriate priority from national and NATO authorities.

8. Invite SHAPE to develop, for presentation to Ministers, a comprehensive study of nuclear weapons requirements that takes into account established national positions, assumes entry into force of the INF Treaty, incorporates the conclusions and recommendations of this report, and analyzes the risks of not implementing the adjustments recommended, while devoting special attention to the potential for restructuring short-range nuclear forces;

9. Invite the HLG, in conjunction with NATO Military Authorities, to review the role of short-range nuclear forces in Alliance deterrent strategy, taking into account the relevant positions established in the General Political Guidelines;

10. Invite the Secretary General to make this report available to the North Atlantic Council so that the report's considerations may be taken into account in the Council's deliberations on NATO's comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament; and

11. Invite the HLG to monitor implementation of these recommendations, to assist NATO Military Authorities where necessary, and to report back to Ministers as appropriate.

SECRET

cc/b

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone ~~XXXXXX~~ 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/2/5E

25th November 1987

*Prime Minister
 This must be
 right.
 CDP 25/xi*

Dear Charles,

DELIVERY OF WARHEADS TO MOLESWORTH

Up to now we have understood that the first GLCM flight to Molesworth would never be activated. The vehicles and the missiles for the flight have been delivered to the base but the warheads have not yet arrived and our understanding from the US has been that Molesworth would not be certified to accept nuclear weapons before 15th December. Since GLCM deliveries will cease on signature of an INF Treaty the warheads would never be delivered and the flight would not be activated.

We have now heard that the Americans are bringing forward their nuclear certification process at Molesworth with the intention of completing it before the end of this month, and have filed a plan to move warheads by helicopter from Alconbury to Molesworth on 3rd December.

The helicopter delivery will be a visible event and may well attract publicity, and there could well be allegations that deliveries to Molesworth are being deliberately accelerated to beat the Treaty. But the move is quite legitimate; it is merely the completion of a process which began earlier this year and will give Molesworth a real capability which will enable us to gain full credit for the flight's removal at the beginning of the draw-down process following treaty ratification. The Defence Secretary and the Foreign Commonwealth Secretary have agreed not to stand in the way of the US plan.

Any speculation to the effect that deliveries have been deliberately accelerated would be just that, pure speculation; we do not reveal details of the deployment schedule and will refuse to

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street



comment other than to say that deployments continue up to Treaty signature and the details of deployment plans are secret.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Yours sincerely,
John Howe.*

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

CONQUEROR

Defensa .



COLECCIÓN

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PRIME MINISTER

THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS mf

You may like to take an early look at the paper for next week's MISC 7 meeting on next generation Theatre Nuclear Weapons.

There are two requirements:

- to find a replacement for our free-fall nuclear bombs.
The most likely candidate is an air-to-ground stand-off missile, either purchased from the Americans or developed in collaboration with the French;
- to upgrade LANCE to give it a longer range. For this we are entirely dependent on the Americans.

The problem in a nutshell is that:

- the need for these systems is increased by the INF Agreement;
- the costs are very substantial: at least £2.5 billion for a new ASM and several hundred million for a LANCE replacement;
- but MOD have made no significant provision in their Long Term Costings.

Given the squeeze on the defence budget, the Committee may have to consider whether we can afford to keep Theatre Nuclear Weapons as well as a strategic nuclear deterrent.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)
11 November 1987

DEFENCE: INF in Europe Pt 5

011-011



CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC
cc PA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1987

Here copy to
M. Taylor
CDP
14/5

Dear Charles,

INF: Public Line

I enclose as requested a draft public line on INF.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Ian Andrews (MOD) in case he has any comments.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLIC LINE: SRINF

BASIC LINE

- An agreement on LRINF must include constraints on shorter range systems. This is a long-standing NATO requirement.
- It could be met by equal ceilings at various levels down to zero.
- We could accept zero/zero SRINF provided that the detailed conditions adequately safeguard Western security.
- NATO now studying what level best meets the requirements of the Alliance as a whole.
- NATO's final position will be settled in these consultations.

For use as necessary

- Nuclear weapons will remain necessary for European security for the foreseeable future.
- We must maintain a suitable mix of conventional and nuclear systems to ensure deterrence.
- An LRINF agreement with constraints on shorter range systems will help, not hinder, this.
- Will then need to concentrate our efforts on eliminating CW and the massive imbalance in conventional forces.

PS (4)
 PS/Mrs CHALKER
 PS/LADY YOUNG

MR POWELL No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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ODI

MOD

MR RATFORD

MR FALL

MR FEARN

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SIC EME/EMA

MIPT: INF NEGOTIATIONS: THE OVERALL SITUATION

1. IF THE ARGUMENTS IN MIPT ON THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS DO NOT PREVAIL, THE ALLIANCE, I FEAR, IS GOING TO FIND ITSELF IN AN INCREASINGLY MESSY SITUATION. EVEN IF THEY DO PREVAIL, AND IF THE THIRD PARTY ISSUE IS ELIMINATED FROM THE DISCUSSION, VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES WILL REMAIN. BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD BECOME EASIER TO FOCUS ON THE PROS AND CONS OF TRYING TO DRAW THE LINE AT 1000 KMS RATHER THAN 500 KMS. (THE RETAINED SOVIET SYSTEMS IN THIS SCENARIO WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE A MAXIMUM RANGE A GOOD DEAL CLOSER TO 1000 KM THAN WOULD THE PERSHING). MY OWN INSTINCT IS THAT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO OPT FOR THE HIGHER CUT-OFF POINT, AND THUS TO COMMIT ITSELF TO PROCURING P1B AND THEN TO DEPLOYING IT IN THE FRG, IS ALSO TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO THE EXPENDITURE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL ON A SCALE WHICH MAY IN THE END OUTWEIGH ANY MILITARY BENEFITS.

2. IT IS ON THE GERMANS THAT THE MAJOR POLITICAL BURDEN WILL FALL. IT IS THEY WHO WILL HAVE TO PERSUADE THE US CONGRESS THAT THE PROBABILITY OF DEPLOYMENT ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE IS HIGH ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE FUNDING OF MODERNISATION. IT IS THEY IN DUE COURSE WHO WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY (I DO NOT SEE THAT THE BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT MAKES ANY SENSE IN THE SRINF CONTEXT AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE INTENTION MUST BE THAT DEPLOYMENT SHOULD ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE).

3. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THEREFORE, WE HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO TAKE THE GERMAN JUDGEMENT OF WHAT IS IN THEIR INTERESTS EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY. BUT IF, AT GERMAN BEHEST, THE ALLIES NOW CHOOSE TO GO DOWN THE PATH OF RETAINING A PERSHING CAPABILITY THERE WILL BE A PRICE TO BE MET LONG BEFORE WE KNOW WHETHER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION IS GOING TO BE REALISABLE AND SUSTAINABLE. AS SEEN FROM

THE DECISION IS GOING TO BE REALISABLE AND SUSTAINABLE. AS SEEN FROM
HERE SUCH A DECISION WOULD:

A. INHIBIT THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO FOCUS ON AND FINANCE THE
WIDE-RANGING IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY IN OUR DCA CAPABILITY AND THE
DEDICATION OF SLCM SYSTEMS TO SACEUR. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE
SRINF DEBATE, IT IS ARGUABLY IN THESE TWO AREAS THAT THE FUTURE
UNDERPINNING OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE FOUND,

B. DIMINISH OUR CHANCES OF SECURING FROM THE WEAKER BRETHREN AT
REYKJAVIK A COHERENT AND CONVINCING REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE
STRATEGY AND OF THE NEED FOR NATO TO RETAIN A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY,
AND

C. RISK IN THE END FAILING CONVINCINGLY TO QUOTE DRAW THE LINE
UNQUOTE ANYWHERE. THIS WILL IN TURN IMPAIR OUR EFFORTS TO DO
SOMETHING (EG MODERNISE LANCE) ABOUT THE ALARMING WARSAW PACT
SUPERIORITY IN THE 0-500 KMS (SRINF) RANGE BAND, LEAVE THE ARMS
CONTROL INITIATIVE WITH THE WARSAW PACT FOR A LONG TIME TO COME (CF.
THE LATEST POLISH PROPOSALS) AND GIVE FURTHER SUBSTANCE TO THE
SPECTRE OF DENUCLEARIZATION.

4. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN AN EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE
POSITION. FROM AN OBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS
ARE DEALING WITH THE WRONG MISSILE SYSTEMS AND AT THE WRONG TIME
(I.E. IN ADVANCE OF PROGRESS ON THE CONVENTIONAL FRONT). MOREOVER
ONE CAN ONLY SYMPATHISE WITH THE GERMANS AS THEY FACE UP TO THE
PROSPECT OF BEING SINGULARISED EITHER AS THE ONLY DEPLOYER OF
P1A/P1B OR AS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY TARGET AREA FOR A FORMIDABLE ARRAY
OF WARSAW PACT SNF MISSILE SYSTEMS. (THIS LAST IS ONE REASON WHY,
GIVEN OUR PRESENT PREDICAMENT, THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FROM A
POLITICAL AS WELL AS A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW FOR SETTING AS OUR
TARGET THE REMOVAL IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES OF ALL SHORT RANGE
LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS). BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO AVOID THE
CONCLUSION THAT AT PRESENT A CONFLICT IS BEING ALLOWED TO ARISE
BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE AND THOSE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC AS PERCEIVED BY THE SENIOR PARTNER IN ITS
GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE MUST BE A CASE FOR A
PRIVATE EFFORT TO PERSUADE BONN THAT THE LONGER TERM INTERESTS OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC MAY BEST BE SECURED BY ACCEPTING THE PRIORITIES
OF THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE.

5. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAVE SEEN YOUR TELNO 226 TO BONN. I
WONDER IF WE SHOULD NOT NOW BE LOOKING TO ARRANGE AN EARLY, DETAILED
AND AUTHORITATIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE GERMANS (EG IN STAVANGER) OF
OUR CONCEPT OF THE FIREBREAK AND WHAT IT WOULD INVOLVE? A DRAFT OF
THE KIND OF STATEMENT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MADE BY THE ALLIANCE AT
THE TIME ITS LRINF/SRINF DECISION WAS FORMALISED, EG AT REYKJAVIK,
MIGHT BE HELPFUL.

ALEXANDER

Secret

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(v30 pm) 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS (4)
PS/Mrs CHANCELLOR
PS/LADY YOUNG

MR POTTILL No.10 DOWNING STREET

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MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
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DACU
CDI

MOD

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MR THOMAS

MR BOYD

MR RATFORD

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MR FEARN

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SIC EME/EMA

MY TELNO 201, WASHINGTON TELNO 1009: LRINF/SRINF: THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS, ETC

SUMMARY

1. A UK POSITION IS NEEDED ON THE STATUS OF FRG P1A MISSILE SYSTEMS. SEEN FROM HERE THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE LIES IN MAKING CONTROL OF WARHEADS THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN DEFINING WHAT ARE THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE USE THE THIRD PARTY ARGUMENT TO KEEP THE P1S OUT OF THE INF RECKONING. THE CASE FOR RETAINING A P1 CAPABILITY MUST BE ARGUED IN THE CONTEXT OF US SRINF DEPLOYMENTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT AN ATTEMPT TO RETAIN THIS CAPABILITY WILL IN THE END BE TO THE OVERALL ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIANCE.

DETAIL

2. TURS EXPOSE THE PROBLEM OVER THE STATUS TO BE ACCORDED TO THE 72 FRG-OWNED P1A MISSILES AND THEIR US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROXIMITY OF THE NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING AT STAVANGER (14/15 MAY) AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER BILATEAL DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK ARGUE THE NEED FOR A CLEAR UK POSITION.

3. THE P1 MISSILE SYSTEMS ARE OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE FRG. THE WARHEADS REMAIN IN US CUSTODY IN THE FRG AT ALL TIMES AND CAN ONLY

WARHEADS REMAIN IN US CUSTODY IN THE FRG AT ALL TIMES AND CAN ONLY BE ACTIVATED BY US PERSONNEL ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT. THE INF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE, AT US INSISTENCE, CONCERNED US AND SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS ONLY. THE DRAFT US AND SOVIET LRINF TREATIES CONSTRAIN MISSILE SYSTEMS, NOT WARHEADS. THE US NEGOTIATORS ARE THEREFORE JUSTIFIED IN MAINTAINING THAT THE P1A MISSILES LIE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES HAVE ACCEPTED THIS: OBUKOV AND VORONTSOV HAVE BOTH STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO ELIMINATE P1A WARHEADS AS PART OF THE DOUBLE ZERO/ZERO DEAL.

4. IF THE FRG WERE TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY NOT TO PURSUE P1A MODERNISATION, THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM NEED NOT ARISE. THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES COULD PRESUMABLY BE GIVEN TO THE RUSSIANS OUTSIDE ANY TREATY, COUPLED WITH NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSES IN THE TREATY ITSELF.

5. BUT IF THE FRG WISHES TO RETAIN AND MODERNISE THE P1A, OR IF A DECISION IS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER DELAYED, THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO ADOPT A POSITION ON THE STATUS OF THE P1A MISSILES AND WARHEADS. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE TWO CASES TO CONSIDER.

6. CASE I. THE WEST CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT THE MISSILES ARE, AS FRG PROPERTY, OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF BILATERAL US/USSR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT ABOUT WARHEADS. TAKING MISSILES AND WARHEADS TOGETHER, THE P1As ARE THUS THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS WHICH MUST NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE GENEVA INF BALANCE SHEET. THIS APPROACH HAS TWO MAJOR IMPLICATIONS:

A. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THAT THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A EUROPEAN-BASED SRINF MISSILE CAPABILITY IN GERMAN HANDS, BUT WITH US WARHEADS, EVEN AFTER A GLOBAL ZERO US/USSR SRINF AGREEMENT. OR, IF THE DEAL WAS EQUAL US/USSR CEILINGS ABOVE ZERO, THAT THE FRG PERSHINGs WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL MILITARY BONUS TO NATO NOT MATCHED BY SOVIET SRINF DEPLOYMENTS. IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE THE RUSSIANS GOING ALONG WITH EITHER PROPOSITION.

B. EUROPEAN OPINION (EASTERN AS WELL AS WESTERN) WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT FRG PERSHINGs WERE THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE US/USSR NEGOTIATIONS AND, THEREFORE, ON A PAR WITH UK AND FRENCH DETERRENT CAPABILITIES. THE RESULTING PERCEPTION THAT THE FRG WAS A QUASI-NUCLEAR POWER WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE REPERCUSSIONS.

7. CASE II. THE WEST ACCEPTS THAT A US/USSR DEAL ON SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS HAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL US WARHEADS ON DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THAT CATEGORY. THIS ALSO HAS TWO MAJOR IMPLICATIONS:

C. NATO (AND ESPECIALLY THE US) HAS TO ACCEPT THAT A SOVIET QUOTE RIGHT TO MATCH UNQUOTE IN NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS COVERS ALL US WARHEADS IN WHATEVER CATEGORY IS UNDER NEGOTIATION. THIS WOULD SET A PRECEDENT, FOR INSTANCE, FOR DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATION ON THOSE SYSTEMS (THO' THIS, I HOPE, LIES A GOOD WAY IN THE FUTURE), AND

D. NATO (ESPECIALLY THE UK AND FRANCE) HAS TO ACCEPT THAT IT IS

D. NATO (ESPECIALLY THE UK AND FRANCE) HAS TO ACCEPT THAT IT IS CONTROL OF WARHEADS THAT DEFINES A THIRD PARTY SYSTEM, NOT OWNERSHIP OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IN ITSELF THIS POSES NO DIRECT THREAT TO TRIDENT. BUT THE PURITY OF THE PRESENT US POSITION ON EXCLUSION OF ANY THIRD PARTY ELEMENT (SYSTEM OR WARHEAD) WOULD BE BREACHED. THIS IN TURN CARRIES SOME RISK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED IN THE START TALKS TO REINTRODUCE NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS AFFECTING TRIDENT. OUR COUNTER WOULD BE OBVIOUS ENOUGH.

8. THE CONSIDERATIONS AT (A) AND (B) ABOVE SEEM TO ME VERY WEIGHTY. TO ARGUE THAT THE P1A AS A TOTAL SYSTEM IS A THIRD PARTY SYSTEM AND HENCE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE FRG HAS A NUCLEAR STATUS IN SOME SENSE AKIN TO THE UK OR FRANCE IS NOT IN THE END GOING TO BE ACCEPTABLE EITHER TO THE RUSSIANS OR TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. IT IS CORRECT (AND IN UK INTERESTS, SEE BELOW) TO ARGUE THAT THE P1A MISSILE IS OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A LINE THAT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN GENEVA. BUT TO ARGUE THAT NO ACCOUNT CAN BE TAKEN OF THE P1A WARHEADS IN STRIKING A DEAL IS EITHER TO EVOKE ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD PARTY ARGUMENT OR TO TEST ON THE TRANSPARENT TECHNICALITY THAT THE TREATY (AND THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS) WILL LEGALLY CONSTRAIN SYSTEMS NOT WARHEADS.

9. THE US NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN ADMIRABLY SENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO AVOID ANY PRECEDENT THAT MIGHT WEAKEN THE CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF UK TRIDENT FROM THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. NO-ONE WANTS TO MAKE THEIR JOB MORE DIFFICULT. BUT IN MY VIEW THE DETERMINING ARGUMENT IN RELATION TO THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS HAS TO BE THE CONTROL OF WARHEADS. THE RUSSIANS CANNOT MAKE A DEAL BREAKING ISSUE IF THEIR INABILITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE US COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO THE US AND ARE NOT UNDER US CONTROL. THEY MAY STILL SEEK TO CAPTURE TRIDENT THROUGH PROPOSING NEW NON-CIRCUMVENTION (IE NO TRANSFER OF SYSTEMS) PROVISIONS. IT IS THEREFORE DESIRABLE THAT THE US SHOULD, IN THE IMF NEGOTIATIONS, CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE EXCLUSION OF P1A MISSILE SYSTEMS WHILE LOOKING FOR SOME WAY TO RECOGNIZE US OWNERSHIP OF THE P1A WARHEADS IN THE FINAL DEAL. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN BONN ON 6 MAY VORONTSOV MORE OR LESS INVITED THE AMERICANS TO TAKE THIS LINE.

10. SOME IN WASHINGTON MAY HOPE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL DISAPPEAR WITH FRG ACCEPTANCE OF A TRUE DOUBLE ZERO DOWN TO THE RANGE OF THE SS 23. BUT, ON THE ANALYSIS IN THIS TELEGRAM, AN FRG DECISION TO HANG ON TO P1A AND/OR TO SEE IT MODERNISED, SHOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED ON A THIRD PARTY TICKET. IF THIS IS RIGHT WE SHOULD PERHAPS WARN OUR INTERLOCUTORS IN THE COMING WEEK THAT SUCH IS OUR VIEW.

11. SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

Secret

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS (3)
PS/INES CHALKER
PS/LADY YOUNG

MR DOBELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

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MR D NICHOLLS DC3(P)

PS/EUS

D. Nuc (POL) SY

MR THOMAS

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MR FALL

MR FEARN

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19.11.67

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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1023

OF 082359Z MAY 67

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

MY TELNO 964 : INF : DOD VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. JCS VIEWS ON ZERO ZERO SRINF LIKELY TO ISSUE BY 11 MAY.
WEINBERGER STILL NOT TAKING A CLEAR POSITION.

DETAIL

2. THE JCS HAVE STILL OFFERED NO MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SRINF OPTIONS. BUT CROWE IS REPORTEDLY DETERMINED THAT A JCS VIEW SHOULD BE FINALISED BY 12 MAY. OUR JCS CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT CONSENSUS EXISTS AMONG THE CHIEFS THAT SRINF ELIMINATION IS MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED NECESSARY CONDITIONS ARE ESTABLISHED AND APPROPRIATE DECISIONS TAKEN ON STRENGTHENING RESIDUAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE (LANCE FOLLOW-ON ETC). CROWE IS ALSO SAID TO BE DETERMINED NOT TO PRODUCE A LIST OF REQUIRED COMPENSATING MEASURES THAT (AS PER THE JCS STUDY ON BALLISTIC MISSILE ELIMINATION) WOULD EFFECTIVELY PLACE AN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF SRINF ELIMINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTACTS OUTSIDE THE JCS SAY THAT THE US ARMY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT LRINF AND SRINF ELIMINATION (PERSHING IS AN ARMY SYSTEM), AND HANDLING THE VIEWS OF GENERAL ROGERS (WHO HAS BEEN IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK EXPLAINING THEM) CLEARLY PRESENTS THE JCS WITH A PROBLEM. WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND, OUR DOD CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A JCS FINDING THAT SRINF ELIMINATION AND EQUAL GLOBAL SRINF CEILINGS ABOVE ZERO AND INVOLVING NATO DEPLOYMENTS ARE BOTH MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE BUT THAT ELIMINATION IS TO BE PREFERRED.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW ANY SUCH FINDING MAY AFFECT WEINBERGER.

Exactly
your
views

ABOVE ZERO AND INVOLVING NATO DEPLOYMENTS ARE BOTH MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE BUT THAT ELIMINATION IS TO BE PREFERRED.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW ANY SUCH FINDING MAY AFFECT WEINBERGER. DOD CONTACTS SAY THAT WEINBERGER HAS NOT INTERVENED (AS SOMETIMES IN THE PAST) TO GIVE THE JCS A LEAD IN THEIR DELIBERATIONS OR OTHERWISE TO TAKE A POSITION. BUT OFFICIALS CONFIRM THAT HE IS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT SRINF ELIMINATION. THIS WAS BORNE OUT BY REMARKS HE MADE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AT A EUROGROUP DINNER ON 7 MAY WHEN HE STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING SRINF ELIMINATION, UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF WHETHER RESIDUAL NATO NUCLEAR FORCES AFTER LRINF AND SRINF ELIMINATION WERE SUFFICIENT FOR DETERRENCE, SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN PERMITTING BOTH SIDES TO RETAIN SOME EQUAL LEVEL OF SRINF ABOVE ZERO. PACE KEEL (UKDEL NATO TELNO 196), THEREFORE, WE KNOW OF NO GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT WEINBERGER AT THIS STAGE SHARES SHULTZ'S PREFERENCE FOR SRINF ELIMINATION. AND THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT HIS INSTINCTS GO IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

JENKINS

YYYY

ORWDAN 1563

NNNN

19
v30 pmPS/MS CHANCELLER
PS/LADY YOUNG

MR POWELL No. 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)

PS/PUS

D. NUC (POL) SY

MR THOMAS

DACU

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MR FALL

MR FRANK

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GRS 2000

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 200

OF 061626Z MAY 87

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INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA

PART ONE OF TWO

MODUK FOR DUSP DACU, DNPS

SIC EMA/EMC/EMB

NAC 6 MAY: INF (YOUR TELNO 161)

SUMMARY

1. GLITMAN DESCRIBES BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE AT GENEVA WITH NO PLANS FOR CONCLUSION OF THIS ROUND UNTIL JOINT DRAFT INF TREATY IS PRODUCED. MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN, RELATED IN PARTICULAR TO CONTINUED RETENTION OF 100 LRINF WARHEADS. CONTINUED US PRESSURE FOR GLOBAL ZERO LRINF. ON SRINF, INDICATIONS THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS TO SHULTZ SHOULD BE SEEN AS PREFERRED SOVIET POSITION RATHER THAN OBUKOV'S STATEMENT OF 27 APRIL. HOWEVER, SOVIETS REMAIN FIRM ON INCLUSION OF FRG P1 IN ANY AGREEMENT. ITALY INDICATES SOME SUPPORT FOR SRINF ZERO OPTION BUT INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR RETENTION OF GERMAN P1A. PRELIMINARY EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR ZERO SRINF FROM NETHERLANDS, GREECE, NORWAY, SPAIN, CANADA, TURKEY, LUXEMBOURG. NO GOVERNMENT VIEWS FROM FRG OR FRANCE.

DETAIL

LRINF

2. GLITMAN DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AT GENEVA AS SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE WITH SUB-GROUPS AT WORK TO PUT THE TWO DRAFT TREATIES TOGETHER. NO DATE HAD BEEN SET FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS AND IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A JOINT DRAFT TREATY HAD BEEN PRODUCED. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS GIVING EVERY INDICATION OF BEING SERIOUS IN ATTEMPTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. WHILE THE SOVIET TREATY ADOPTED THE STRUCTURE OF THE US VERSION IN A NUMBER OF NON-CONTROVERSIAL AREAS, A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAINED AS HE HAD REPORTED TO THE SCG LAST WEEK (OUR

DIFFERENCES REMAINED AS HE HAD REPORTED TO THE SCG LAST WEEK (OUR TELNO 186). THE SOVIET INSISTANCE ON RETAINING 100 WARHEADS IN ASIA CAUSED PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, NOTABLY THE PROVISIONS IN THEIR DRAFT TREATY ALLOWING FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THESE REMAINING SYSTEMS BACK TO EUROPE SINCE ALL THEIR TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS, MANUFACTURING PLANTS AND STORAGE DEPOTS WERE LOCATED IN EUROPE. WHETHER THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF SYSTEMS AT TRAINING SITES IN EUROPE POSED A MILITARY THREAT OR NOT WAS, PERHAPS, DEBATABLE. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO PRACTICE MOVEMENT OF THEIR SYSTEMS FROM ASIA TO EUROPE WAS A MATTER OF SOME SIGNIFICANT CONCERN. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD ALSO ALLOW THE MODERNISATION OF THEIR RESIDUAL SYSTEMS AND SAID NOTHING ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON MIRY NUMBERS.

3. TURNING TO VERIFICATION ISSUES, THE SOVIET TREATY WAS LESS DETAILED THAN ITS US COUNTERPART AND WHILE IT APPEARED MORE INTRUSIVE IN CERTAIN AREAS (INSPECTION OF THIRD PARTY FACILITIES AND OF TEST AND TRAINING SITES), IT HAD NO PROVISION FOR INSPECTION TO VERIFY THE INITIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA NOR FOR INSPECTION OF SUSPECT SITES - POINTS WHICH THE US CONSIDERED TO BE IMPORTANT FOR ANY EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME. THERE ALSO APPEARED TO BE SOME SOVIET HESITANCY ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE THE TREATY CAME INTO EFFECT. IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROVIDE MORE DETAILS ON VERIFICATION UNTIL THEY HAD SEEN THE US PROTOCOLS. GLITMAN SAID THAT IT WAS HOPED TO TABLE THE PROTOCOLS ON DATA EXCHANGE AND DESTRUCTION, DISMANTLEMENT OR CONVERSION VERY SHORTLY.

4. GLITMAN STRESSED THAT, WHILE NOT BACKING AWAY FROM THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA, HE WAS TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH INEVITABLY AROSE FROM THE RETENTION OF 100 WARHEADS AND WHICH WOULD MAKE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY MORE DIFFICULT. VORONTSOV WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THIS ISSUE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE HINTS THAT GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES MIGHT STILL BE A POSSIBILITY. IT WAS THUS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE CONTINUED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE REMAINING 100 WARHEADS.

SRINF

5. ON SRINF, GLITMAN SAID THAT HE HAD PRESSED THE RUSSIANS ON THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS AND OBUKOV'S STATEMENT LAST WEEK. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE CONCEPT OF A ZERO OPTION IN EUROPE WITH A GLOBAL FIGURE ABOVE ZERO HAD BEEN FORMULATED IN THE LIGHT OF THE INITIAL US REACTION TO GORBACHEV'S OFFER BUT THAT A GLOBAL ZERO OPTION SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT. YESTERDAY, OBUKOV HAD TOLD HIM SPECIFICALLY THAT THE US RESPONSE SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PROPOSALS MADE IN MOSCOW. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY REMAINED FIRM ON INCLUSION OF THE FRC P1A IN ANY SRINF AGREEMENT. THEY HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE QUITE CONTENT TO HAVE NO REFERENCE AT ALL TO SRINF SYSTEMS IN ANY INF TREATY AND IN LATER DISCUSSION GLITMAN SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ANY SRINF PROPOSALS COULD WELL BE THE MOST LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE TO ANY US COUNTER-PROPOSAL WHICH SOUGHT TO ALLOW US SRINF DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE.

6. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO GREAT RUSH TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE SRINF ISSUE. SO FAR THE US SIDE HAD SET DOWN ITS NEGOTIATING CRITERIA BASED ON THOSE SET OUT IN THE SHULTZ LETTER OF 7 APRIL IE EQUALITY, GLOBALITY, NO THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS, INTEGRATION WITH LRINF AGREEMENT AND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. FOLLOWING LAST WEEKS SCG MEETING, THEY HAD TAKEN A FIRM STANCE ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A SOLUTION WHICH ALLOWED NO SYSTEMS IN EUROPE BUT SOME OUTSIDE EUROPE. THEY HAD ALSO REEMPHASISED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT GERMAN P1A REPRESENTED AN ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF COOPERATION OVER TWO DECADES AND COULD NOT THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED AS A POTENTIAL CIRCUMVENTION OF ANY SRINF AGREEMENT. GLITMAN ADDED THAT THE THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS

REPRESENTED AN ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF COOPERATION OVER TWO DECADES AND COULD NOT THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED AS A POTENTIAL CIRCUMVENTION OF ANY SRINF AGREEMENT. GLITMAN ADDED THAT THE THIRD PARTY PRINCIPLE WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE US BECAUSE OF THE PRECEDENTS WHICH COULD BE CREATED FOR, IN PARTICULAR, UK TRIDENT IN THE STRATEGIC TALKS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, GLITMAN SAID THAT EVEN IF MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WERE RESOLVED, IT WOULD INEVITABLY TAKE SOME TIME TO GET A DETAILED AGREEMENT TO THE 100 PAGES OR SO OF TEXT REPRESENTED BY THE TREATY AND ITS ASSOCIATED PROTOCOLS. HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD SOON GET AN INDICATION OF HOW SERIOUS THE SOVIETS REALLY WERE BY TACKLING THE QUESTION OF THE PHASING OF LRINF REDUCTIONS. WITH GOODWILL ON BOTH SIDES IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ON THIS.

DISCUSSION

8. ON INSTRUCTIONS, FULCI (ITALY) SAID THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET FULLY DEFINED ITS POSITION BUT COULD CONFIRM ITS SUPPORT FOR THE US NEGOTIATING EFFORT TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES FROM EUROPE. ON SRINF, HIS AUTHORITIES QUOTE LOOKED WITH INTEREST UNQUOTE ON THE PROSPECTS OF A ZERO OPTION APPLIED TO THE SS23 AND ABOVE. BECAUSE OF SCUD, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KEEP THE GERMAN P1A OPERATIONAL, BUT THIS DEPENDED ON THE FRG DECISION. IF A SRINF ZERO OPTION WERE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES) AND THUS ANY ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET OFFER WOULD NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RANGE FLOOR BELOW WHICH FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NATO'S NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WERE EXCLUDED AND STICKING FIRMLY TO THE CRITERIA OF GLOBALITY, EQUALITY, NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

9. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF HIS GOVERNMENT WERE THAT, PROVIDED ANY AGREEMENT MET THE CRITERIA SET DOWN BY SHLUTZ IN HIS LETTER OF 7 APRIL, A ZERO SRINF OPTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NETHERLANDS. HIS AUTHORITIES FAVOURED ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING 100 LRINF WARHEADS BUT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS SHOULD STAND IN THE WAY OF ANY AGREEMENT. ZACHARAKIS (GREECE) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON DISARMAMENT WAS WELL KNOWN. GREECE WAS OPPOSED TO ANY INCREASE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SAW NO ROOM FOR REJECTING THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS UNDER STRINGENT CONDITIONS MIGHT WELL LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF GORBACHEV'S OFFER AND THIS WOULD NOT HELP ALLIANCE INTERESTS. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT ELIMINATION OF SRINF MISSILES WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SINCE A VARIETY OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD REMAIN.

10. BERG (NORWAY) SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET IN MAKING A DECISION ON SRINF. THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF SRINF MISSILES. NORWAY ALSO SUPPORTED THE US OBJECTIVE IN ELIMINATING LRINF MISSILES. BERG ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE ALLIANCE COULD DO MORE TO EXPLOIT PUBLICLY ITS DESIRE FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS. OJEDA (SPAIN) SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO IN LINE WITH THE NETHERLANDS POSITION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT DURING KARPOV'S VISIT TO MADRID AT THE END OF APRIL THE LATTER HAD CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR THE RESIDUAL 100 LRINF WARHEADS WAS LINKED WITH KOREA, F16S IN JAPAN AND QUOTE OTHER CONCERNS UNQUOTE WHICH CLEARLY IMPLIED CHINA. GLITMAN CONFIRMED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE MAIN RATIONALE BEHIND THE SOVIET INSISTANCE ON RETAINING LRINF WARHEADS IN ASIA WAS INDEED CHINA AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, JAPAN BUT THIS WAS NOT AN ARGUMENT WHICH THE SOVIETS NORMALLY DEPLOYED IN PUBLIC. THEY HAD BEEN

SOVIETS NORMALLY DEPLOYED IN PUBLIC. THEY HAD PRODUCED QUOTE LUDICROUS UNQUOTE MILITARY ARGUMENTS IN GENEVA BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF US MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AS WELL AS US NAVAL BASES IN ASIA. OJEDA CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT KARPOV HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT THE SCUD ISSUE IN MADRID AND HAD REPLIED THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE SCUD WOULD LEAD TO A SOVIET DEMAND OF THE INCLUSION OF NATO DCA.

11. ROBIN (FRANCE) CONFINED HIMSELF TO ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY US RESPONSE WHICH PROPOSED SRINF CEILING ABOVE ZERO. GLITMAN REPLIED THAT, IN HIS VIEW IF WE WERE TO ASK FOR TRUE GLOBAL BALANCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE LIKELY TO SAY THAT THIS WAS TOO COMPLICATED AND TO TAKE SRINF SYSTEMS OUT OF THE TREATY LEAVING BOTH SIDES TO DO AS THEY WISHED IN TERMS OF FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS. HE ADDED THAT VERIFICATION WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT UNDER ANY AGREEMENT WHICH ALLOWED FOR THE RETENTION OF SRINF SYSTEMS BUT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT SUCH PROBLEMS WOULD BE INSURMOUNTABLE. THE VERIFICATION REGIME PROPOSED FOR LRINF SYSTEMS COULD BE APPLIED. BORCH (DENMARK) REFERRED TO THE ADOPTION ON 30 APRIL BY THE DANISH PARLIAMENT OF A MOTION SUPPORTING INF ELIMINATION. THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID THAT SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN ACHIEVING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WITH LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WOULD HOWEVER CONTINUE TO BE A NEED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS LONG AS THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE REMAINED. BORCH ADDED THAT, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GERMAN P1 COULD BE GENUINELY CONSIDERED AS A THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEM AND SAW NO REASON WHY INCLUSION OF THIS IN ANY INF AGREEMENT SHOULD SET ANY PRECEDENT FOR TRIDENT. GLITMAN EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE US LINE WAS THAT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WERE BILATERAL AND DID NOT INCLUDE SYSTEMS OPERATED BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY. ANY WEAKENING OF THIS POSITION WOULD LEAD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND BEING BALANCED NOT BY THE US BUT BY NATO FORCES ON THE OTHER. THE US HAD FOUGHT SUCCESSFULLY TO KEEP THE UK AND FRENCH FORCES OUT OF THE STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS AND GLITMAN FELT THAT IF WE CONTINUED TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON THE GERMAN P1 WE COULD ACHIEVE THE SAME SUCCESS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS ALTHOUGH THERE WAS ALSO A RISK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT SIMPLY REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ON SRINF.

12. SMITH (CANADA) SAID THAT THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO CANADA PROVIDED THE SCG CRITERIA WERE ADHERED TO. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO CONSIDER THE NUCLEAR TALKS IN ISOLATION. THE REYKJAVIK MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXPRESSION OF VIEWS ON CONVENTIONAL AND CW AS WELL AS NUCLEAR ISSUES. VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND IN PARTICULAR THE NEED FOR ON SITE INSPECTIONS WERE CRITICAL ASPECTS OF ALL AGREEMENTS. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REACH A DECISION BY THE END OF THE WEEK. BELGIUM SAW NO ADVANTAGES IN DELAY IN TAKING AN ALLIANCE DECISION WHICH COULD LEAD TO EMBARRASSMENT AT THE NPG AND DPC. OLCAY (TURKEY) SAID THAT ANY DISARMAMENT MUST CONTRIBUTE TO NATO'S SECURITY AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, ESPECIALLY IN PARTICULAR ALLIANCE REGIONS. THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS THAT REDUCTIONS IN LRINF AND SRINF MISSILES SHOULD BE GLOBAL AND THERE SHOULD BE A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF RESIDUAL WARHEADS IN ASIA WHICH, IF THEY REMAINED, MUST NOT HOLD ANY ALLIED TERRITORY AT RISK. OLCAY ADDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED QUOTE SIMULTANEOUSLY UNQUOTE BUT HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN IDEALISTIC SOLUTION. HANSEN (FRG) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED ON 27 APRIL NOT TO COMMENT ON THE SOVIET SRINF PROPOSALS UNTIL IT WAS AVAILABLE IN WRITING. GLITMAN'S ACCOUNT OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OBOKOV'S STATEMENT AND GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL SEEMED TO CONFIRM THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THIS APPROACH. CHANCELLOR KOHL WOULD STATE THE QUOTE OVERALL UNQUOTE FRG POSITION IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE TOMORROW.

APPROPRIATENESS OF THIS APPROACH. CHANCELLOR KOHL WOULD STATE THE
QUOTE OVERALL UNQUOTE FRG POSITION IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE TOMORROW.

PART TWO OF TWO

MODUK FOR DUSP DACU, DNPS
SIC EMA/EMC/EMB

13. I GAVE MY COLLEAGUES A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF BESSMERTNYK'S VISIT TO
LONDON ON 29 APRIL (YOUR TELMO 553). I THEN DREW ON TUR, MAKING IT
CLEAR THAT THE UK SUPPORTED A GLOBAL ZERO LRINF SOLUTION, THAT WE
HAD REACHED NO POSITION ON THE SRINF PROPOSAL BUT THAT ANY
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF SYSTEMS MUST HAVE THE
NECESSARY CONDITIONS ATTACHED AND THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST SET A FIRM
FLOOR BELOW WHICH NO FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD BE CONTEMPLATED UNTIL
THE CONVENTIONAL AND CW IMBALANCES HAD BEEN TACKLED. I STRESSED THAT
HMG ATTACHED OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF
UK NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FROM ANY OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. I THEN SAID
THAT IF THE ALLIANCE WERE TO PROPOSE EQUAL LOW CEILINGS FOR SRINF,
DEPLOYMENTS OF US AND GERMAN P1B MUST BE POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE AND
WE MUST BE CLEAR THAT SUCH DEPLOYMENTS WOULD ACTUALLY BE MADE. THE
ALLIANCE COULD NOT BE SEEN TO FALL BACK ON ZERO SRINF AS A SECOND
BEST OPTION.

ALEXANDER

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 889

OF 232351Z APRIL 1987

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

MY TELNO 888: INF: OSD VIEWS

1. PERLE MADE CLEAR TO FALL ON 22 APRIL THAT HE STRONGLY FAVOURED THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF SRINF (1000 - 500 K) PROVIDED SUCH ELIMINATION WAS GLOBAL, FORMED PART OF THE MAIN INF AGREEMENT, AND EXCLUDED THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS (PERLE NOTED THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THE GERMAN PIAS WERE NOT ON THE TABLE). IN HIS VIEW, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY WHEN ACCEPTING ELIMINATION TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS (BELOW 500 K). THE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROCESS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AS FAR AS EUROPE WAS CONCERNED AND THAT THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATED NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. REMAINING SYSTEMS WERE REQUIRED TO UNDERPIN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THE ALLIANCE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH NECESSARY RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNISATION, INCLUDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MONTEBELLO DECISIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF A LANCE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM (PERHAPS DUAL CAPABLE) WITH THE MAXIMUM PERMITTED RANGE. PERLE SAID THAT VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES ANYWAY MADE IT POINTLESS TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON SCUD. FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE A QUAGMIRE. AIRCRAFT IN PARTICULAR MUST BE KEPT OFF THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
2. PERLE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A FINAL DETERMINED EFFORT SHOULD ALSO NOW BE MADE BY THE US AND THE ALLIANCE TO ACHIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING 100 LRINF WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD BLUNT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO TAKE A REGIONAL APPROACH TO

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/ARMS

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ARMS CONTROL AND WOULD GREATLY SIMPLIFY LRINF VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. THE US COULD USE AS NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE SOVIET OPPOSITION TO ANY US RIGHT TO DEPLOY REMAINING LRINF WARHEADS IN ALASKA.

3. ADELMAN TOOK A VERY SIMILAR LINE WITH FALL ON 23 APRIL EXCEPT THAT HE THOUGHT THAT ANY STATEMENT RULING OUT NEGOTIATIONS ON SYSTEMS UNDER 500 K MIGHT BEST BE CAST IN TERMS OF NO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS BEING POSSIBLE UNTIL THE CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL IMBALANCES IN EUROPE WERE CORRECTED.

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 1208

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED PS
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D. PS/MRS CHALKER
SOVIET D. PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D. PS/PUS
NAD MR DEREK THOMAS
EED MR BOYD
WED MR RATFORD
PLANNING STAFF MR FALL
RES D. MR FEARN
INFO D. MR GRAITHWAITE
PUSD MR SLATER
NED MR BARRINGTON
CSCE UNIT MR GILLMORE
POD MR REEVE
HD/SAD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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2.
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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 888

OF 232350Z APR 87

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK

MY TELNO 872: INF: CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA

SUMMARY

1. MIXED CONGRESSIONAL AND MEDIA REACTIONS TO SOVIET SRINF PROPOSALS. BUT A GENERAL MOOD OF CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT AN AGREEMENT CAN NOW BE REACHED PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT GIVES A FIRM LEAD.

DETAIL

2. NO CLEAR CONSENSUS HAS YET EMERGED ON THE HILL ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. ON THE DEMOCRATIC SIDE, BYRD (SENATE MAJORITY LEADER) CAUTIONED THE ADMINISTRATION AGAINST QUOTE RACING INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS COSMETICALLY ATTRACTIVE BUT, AT BOTTOM, WORKS AGAINST THE COHESION AND STEADFASTNESS OF THE ALLIANCE UNQUOTE. ASPIN (CHAIRMAN, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE) ALSO WARNED AGAINST A ZERO-ZERO INF/SRINF AGREEMENT, WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD INEVITABLY DECOUPLE THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT FROM THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. SPEAKER WRIGHT, HOWEVER, CAME BACK FROM MOSCOW LAST WEEKEND FULL OF OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS (QUOTE PROBABLY THE BEST OPPORTUNITY --- SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION UNQUOTE). NUMN (CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE), WHO IS USUALLY THE BELL-WETHER OF DEMOCRATIC OPINION ON ARMS CONTROL, HAS SO FAR LAIN FAIRLY LOW: HE HAS REFERRED PUBLICLY TO ALLIED CONCERNS AND TO GENERAL ROGERS' DOUBTS ABOUT THE ZERO OPTION. BUT NUMN'S STAFF SAY THAT HE TOO BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ALLIANCE: HIS MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME LINK ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ELIMINATION OF INF/SRINF AND SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

3. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A VARIETY OF REACTIONS ON THE REPUBLICAN SIDE. KISSINGER AND SCOWCROFT HAVE CRITICISED ZERO INF/SRINF ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD UNDERMINE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND LEAVE EUROPE MORE VULNERABLE TO SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. DOLE (SENATE MINORITY LEADER) WAS CAUTIOUS ON THIS SUBJECT AFTER A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND REPUBLIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON 21 APRIL (QUOTE EVERYBODY, I THINK, IS EXPRESSING RESERVATIONS UNQUOTE). BUT OTHER REPUBLICAN LEADERS WERE MORE POSITIVE AFTER THE MEETING: CHENEY (REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN) SAID THAT THE WORRY ABOUT A DENUCLEARISED EUROPE QUOTE SIMPLY ISN'T VALID UNQUOTE: THE US WOULD STILL HAVE SEVERAL HUNDRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE THAT COULD BE DELIVERED BY AIRCRAFT. WARNER (SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE) TOLD US AFTER THE MEETING THAT, DESPITE THE RESERVATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED, HE PERSONALLY HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS

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MOVING TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEAL. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT, PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT GAVE A CLEAR LEAD, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT SECURING SENATE APPROVAL FOR IT.

4. MEANWHILE, MEDIA COMMENT IS NOW LARGELY FIRING UP ALONG TWO (CONTRASTING) LINES:

A) THAT ALLIED AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS ARE SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HOLD UP AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE INF AND SRINF IN EUROPE. A LEADING NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL OF 22 APRIL IS TYPICAL OF THIS VIEW. IT ARGUES THAT HAVING PRESSED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE SRINF, NATO EXPERTS QUOTE ARE NOT WILLING TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER WHEN YES MAKES SENSE UNQUOTE ... FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD BE MAINTAINED ... THE FRG IS MISTAKEN IN THINKING THAT THEIR COUNTRY WOULD BE LEFT AS THE ONLY BATTLEFIELD. QUOTE EVEN AFTER A ZERO-ZERO DEAL, HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH CAN STRIKE ANYWHERE WOULD REMAIN ELSEWHERE ... NONE OF THIS ARGUES THAT ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE IS PERFECT OR THAT IT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN A SINGLE STROKE. PRUDENCE CALLS FOR PHASING ... AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE MEDIUM AND SHORTER RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WILL NOT PRODUCE PEACE NOR END NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION. BUT IT DOES BRING A RARE CHANCE TO TEST THE POSSIBILITIES OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION UNQUOTE.

B) THAT ALLIED AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS ARE VALID, BUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNLIKELY TO HEED THEM. THE INFLUENTIAL COLUMNISTS EVANS AND NOVAK TYPIFY THIS VIEW, ARGUING ON 22 APRIL THAT WHATEVER THE REPUBLICAN HARD-LINERS AND THE ALLIES SAY QUOTE THE DEAL SEEMS COOKED ... CONGRESS WILL DEMAND THE ALLIES SPEND MORE MONEY FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMS ... BUT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS WILL NOT VOTE IT UNQUOTE. MOREOVER QUOTE THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM LOOMS DANGEROUSLY LARGE ... PREVENTION OF CHEATING ON THE NEW TREATY WILL DEPEND MORE ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE THAN ON US MONITORING. BUT IN THE HEADLONG RUSH FOR THE NEW PACT, THE REQUIREMENT FOR ANYTHING LIKE PRECISE VERIFICATION SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE SWEEP ASIDE ... UNQUOTE

5. AT A FURTHER MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON 22 APRIL (THIS TIME INCLUDING DEMOCRATS AS WELL AS REPUBLICANS) THE PRESIDENT IS REPORTED TO HAVE GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD NOT RUSH INTO AN AGREEMENT SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING ONE, AND TO HAVE PROMISED THAT THERE WOULD BE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS AND THE ALLIES BEFORE A TREATY WAS SIGNED. NEVERTHELESS, THE IMPRESSION IS NOW BEGINNING TO GROW, BOTH IN CONGRESS AND IN THE MEDIA, THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO GO FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE LINES NOW ON OFFER.

ACLAND

ORUSAN 1207

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED PS
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D. PS/MRS CHALKER
SOVIET D. PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D. PS/PUS
NAD MR DEREK THOMAS
EED MR BOYD
WED MR RATFORD
PLANNING STAFF MR FALL
RES D. MR FEARN
INFO D. MR BRAITHWAITE
PUSD MR SLATER
NED MR BARRINGTON
CSCE UNIT MR GILLMORE
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MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

MR D NICHOLLS DCUS(P)

PS/PUS

NPS

MR THOMAS

DACU

MR BOYD

CDI

KOD

MR RATFORD

~~MR PALL~~~~MR PRATT~~**IMMEDIATE**

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/ACDD

HD/SOVIET DEPT

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

RESIDENT CLERK

19.11.8

231645Z APR

GRS 440

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 331

OF 231645Z APRIL 87

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, PARIS, ROME

INFO PRIORITY BMG BERLIN

BMG BERLIN FOR AMBASSADOR

SRINF: MY TELNO 324

SUMMARY

1. CONTINUING INTERDEPARTMENTAL DIFFERENCES ON ZERO SRINF WILL NOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE NEXT WEEK AT EARLIEST.

DETAIL

2. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL SEEM INCAPABLE OF RESOLUTION BELOW MINISTERIAL LEVEL. KOHL AND WOERNER ARE ON OVERSEAS VISITS. A MEETING IS PLANNED FOR EARLY NEXT WEEK.

3. GENSCHER WILL ADVOCATE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ZERO SRINF OPTION. AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARGUE THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS A DECISION TO DEPLOY NEW NATO SRINF, AS SHULTZ IS REPORTED SAYING IN A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY (I.E. NO EMPTY RIGHT TO MATCH). AUSWAERTIGES AMT SEE NO CHANCE OF CONGRESS ACCEPTING AN LRINF AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS, AND NO CHANCE OF SOVIET UNION ACCEPTING ONE WITH. THEREFORE UNLESS SRINF ZERO OPTION IS ACCEPTED, THE WHOLE PACKAGE RISKS UNRAVELLING. THEY BELIEVE THIS WILL MOTIVATE KOHL TO BACK GENSCHER.

4. THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE STILL RESIST ZERO SRINF, INCLINING WE BELIEVE TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOW

IMMEDIATE**ADVANCE COPY**

INCLINING WE BELIEVE TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOW LEVELS IN THE RANGE 125-1000 KMS, WITH FREEDOM TO MIX. (A CLEARER FMOD POSITION MAY EMERGE AT THE HLG MEETING THIS WEEK). IF THE AMERICANS ARE NOW SAYING THAT SUCH A FREEDOM TO MIX HAS TO BE FILLED, IT MUST BE AN OPEN QUESTION HOW HARD WOERNER WILL FIGHT HIS CORNER, I.E. IN ARGUING NOW FOR NEW PERSHING IB DEPLOYMENTS IN THE FRG (AND PRESUMABLY IN NORTH ITALY AND BENELUX).

5. IN PRINCIPLE ALL DEPARTMENTS AGREE THAT THE GERMAN PERSHING IA MUST NOT BE AFFECTED BY CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS (THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS). SOME IN AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARGUE THAT DECISIONS ON PIA MODERNISATION ARE SEPARATE AND CAN IN PRINCIPLE BE TAKEN SUBSEQUENTLY, EVEN WITH ZERO SRINF. BUT OF COURSE ANY NON CIRCUMVENTION CONSTRAINTS IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO PRECLUDE MODERNISATION (EVEN IF THIS WERE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE GIVEN ZERO SOVIET AND US SYSTEMS ABOVE 500).

6. CDU SPOKESMEN (E.G. RUEHE IN WASHINGTON TODAY) CONTINUE TO ARGUE AGAINST ZERO SRINF. THEY PRESUMABLY CARRY THE CDU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY WITH THEM ON THIS.

7. A REPORT FROM THE FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON (PLEASE PROTECT) TODAY DESCRIBES SHULTZ AND STATE DEPARTMENT AS BEING IN FAVOUR OF ACCEPTING ZERO SRINF, AND PENTAGON MOVING FIRMLY IN THAT DIRECTION TOO, WITH LINGERING JCS HESITATIONS. THE REPORT ALSO SAYS THE AMERICANS ARE LOOKING FOR A CLEAR FRG RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S OFFER. (COMMENT: IT MAY BE THAT THE EASIEST OPTION FOR THE GERMANS WILL BE TO TAKE NO DECISION UNLESS AND UNTIL THE AMERICANS DECIDE FOR THEIR OWN REASONS TO ACCEPT ZERO SRINF).

BULLARD

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/LADY YOUNG

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)

PS/PUS

NPS

MR THOMAS

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MR BOYD

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MR RATFORD

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INF : US VIEWS ON TIMETABLE FOR ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ CONTINUES TO BELIEVE US SHOULD RESPOND TO SOVIET SRINF PROPOSALS BY THIRD WEEK OF MAY AT THE LATEST. DETAILED TIMETABLES FOR ALLIED CONSULTATIONS UNDER DISCUSSION HERE.

DETAIL

2. MRS RIDGWAY TOLD THE MINISTER ON 22 APRIL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING THE TIMETABLE FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON A RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO ELIMINATE SOVIET SRINF SYSTEMS.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON A RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO ELIMINATE SOVIET SRINF SYSTEMS.

3. MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHULTZ CONTINUED TO BELIEVE FIRMLY (AS HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE NAC) THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE DECISIONS BEFORE THE REYKJAVIK MINISTERIAL NAC. ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IN THE ADMINISTRATION FAVOURED THE FOLLOWING TIMETABLE: DISCUSSION AT THE SCG ON 28 APRIL, AT A FURTHER SPECIAL HLG ON 29 APRIL AND IN THE PERMANENT NATO COUNCIL ON ABOUT 6 MAY: IN THE LIGHT OF THESE, A PRELIMINARY DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT OVER THE WEEKEND 9/10 MAY: MESSAGES FROM HIM TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER: FINAL DISCUSSION AT THE MINISTERIAL NPG ON 14 MAY (HOPEFULLY ON THE BASIS OF ALLIED REPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGES) AND A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT IN TIME FOR A RESPONSE TO BE MADE TO THE RUSSIANS BEFORE THE MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND HERE (23-25 MAY). A SECOND SCHOOL HELD THAT THE TIMETABLE SHOULD BE ACCELERATED BY A WEEK OR SO, AND DECISIONS MADE BEFORE THE NPG MINISTERIAL. NOT SURPRISINGLY, WEINBERGER FAVOURED THE FORMER TIMETABLE INCORPORATING DISCUSSION AT THE NPG, AND SHULTZ THE LATTER

4. MRS RIDGWAY ADDED THAT SHULTZ WAS CONCERNED THAT ANY LONGER DELAY WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS UNACCEPTABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE TROUBLE. THE ISSUES WERE CLEAR: AS WERE THE DIFFERENCES IN ALLIED APPROACHES. THE DECISIONS WOULD NOT BECOME EASIER BY BEING POSTPONED: INDEED THE RISK OF ALLIED DISUNITY, ENCOURAGED BY THE RUSSIANS, WAS LIKELY TO GROW OVER TIME. THERE WERE ALSO OF COURSE DOMESTIC PRESSURES OPERATING ON THE PRESIDENT. AT PRESENT THESE WERE FOCUSSED MORE ON THE NEED FOR HIM TO DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP BY TAKING AN EARLY DECISION THAN ON THE PARTICULAR SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES, GIVEN THE VARIETY OF OPINIONS BEING EXPRESSED IN CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA.

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INF: WEINBERGER'S VIEWS ON SRINF ELIMINATION
SUMMARY

1. WEINBERGER CAUTIOUS ABOUT SRINF ELIMINATION BECAUSE OF VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES AND RESIDUAL THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE ASYMMETRIES. BUT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ELIMINATION WOULD INVOLVE UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS FAVOURING THE US.

DETAIL

2. WEINBERGER TOLD CDS ON 21 APRIL THAT CONSIDERABLE MOMENTUM WAS NOW BUILDING TO CONCLUDE AN INF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD INCORPORATE THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF (1,000 - 500KMS). WEINBERGER THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN SUCH AN OUTCOME SHOULD BE FULLY THOUGHT THROUGH AND SUBJECTED TO VERY CAREFUL ANALYSIS BEFORE WE TOOK A VIEW ON ITS POSSIBLE ACCEPTABILITY. THE JCS WERE PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN AN EXAMINATION OF WHETHER NATO WOULD RETAIN SUFFICIENT TARGET COVERAGE CAPABILITY IF NO NATO LRINF OR SRINF MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED. WOERNER HAD TELEPHONED WEINBERGER ON THE DAY AFTER SHULTZ'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE ENORMOUS WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE AND THE FACT THAT NATO WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH IT MORE DIRECTLY IN THE ABSENCE OF US LRINF AND SRINF. WEINBERGER HAD TOLD WOERNER THAT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WOULD BE LESS THREATENING IF PERSHING IIS WERE CONVERTED TO PERSHING IBS AND DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. WOERNER HAD REPLIED THAT THIS OPTION WAS NOT ON THE CARDS (WEINBERGER COMMENTED THAT WOERNER MIGHT NEVERTHELESS PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE P11/PIB CONVERSION OPTION SHOULD BE TAKEN UP).

3. WEINBERGER EMPHASISED HIS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE VERIFIABILITY OF AN INF AGREEMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ANY COMPONENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT COVERING SRINF. WEINBERGER STRONGLY FAVOURED THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF; ALLOWING THE RUSSIANS TO RETAIN 100 SS20 WARHEADS IN SOVIET ASIA CREATED VERY DIFFICULT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. THE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF WERE EVEN MORE FORMIDABLE AND THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY. WEINBERGER SAID THAT HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ASYMMETRICAL BALANCE IN THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES THAT MIGHT RESULT IF LRINF

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/AND

AND SRINF WERE ELIMINATED. REMAINING SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS EG SCUD WOULD HAVE A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE DEEP INTO WESTERN EUROPE WHEREAS REMAINING NATO MISSILE SYSTEMS (EVEN ASSUMING A LANCE FOLLOW-ON WITH LONGER RANGE THAN LANCE) WOULD HAVE NO CAPABILITY TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY OR TARGETS EAST OF WARSAW. WEINBERGER WAS ALSO CONCERNED GENERALLY ABOUT THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES THAT WOULD BE RETAINED BY NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT RESPECTIVELY AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS NOW IN PROSPECT. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT NATO WOULD, AT THE LEAST, HAVE TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY ITS EXPENDITURE ON CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE NO QUOTE VIETNAM DIVIDEND UNQUOTE (A REFERENCE TO HOPES THAT SIZEABLE FUNDS COULD BE DIVERTED FROM MILITARY TO SOCIAL PROGRAMNES AFTER THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR) AFTER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. AS WELL AS INCREASED EXPENDITURE ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE, WEINBERGER THOUGHT THAT THE SDI BECAME THE MORE IMPORTANT AS NATO'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WERE REDUCED.

4. WEINBERGER SAID THAT AN INF AGREEMENT OF THE SORT THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED TO BE PROPOSING WOULD CLEARLY NEVERTHELESS INVOLVE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, FAVOURING THE US. AND IT SHOULD REMAIN NATO'S OBJECTIVE TO ENSURE DETERRENCE AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES. ACCOUNT ALSO HAD TO BE TAKEN OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISSUES NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION.

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SRINF
SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL HAS RE-OPENED THE DEBATE WITHIN THE COALITION BETWEEN FDP AND CDU.

DETAIL

2. MOST PAPERS LEAD TODAY WITH REPORTS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY COALITION POLITICIANS OVER THE EASTER WEEKEND ABOUT WHAT RESPONSE NATO SHOULD MAKE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ZERO SRINF IN THE RANGE 500-1000 KMS.

3. GENSCHER, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH WELT AM SONNTAG DURING HIS CURRENT CENTRAL AMERICAN TRIP, SAID THE SOVIET PROPOSALS MUST BE GIVEN THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND THAT 'NO ONE SHOULD SWEEP THEM FROM THE TABLE WITHOUT WEIGHING THEM UP CONSCIENTIOUSLY'. HE NOTED THAT IN THE WEAPON CATEGORY 500-1000 KMS ONLY THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSED MISSILES (IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT GERMAN PERSHING IAS ARE NOT COUNTED). GENSCHER SPOKE AGAINST A PROCESS OF DE-NUCLEARISING EUROPE, BUT SAID THIS WAS NOT AT RISK BECAUSE NATO HAD MORE THAN SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (AIRCRAFT, SEA-BASED AND EVEN LAND-BASED) BELOW 500 KMS. GENSCHER'S INTERVIEW HAS BEEN TAKEN, (E.G. BY JOURNALISTS CLOSE TO THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT), AS IMPLYING THAT GENSCHER INCLINES TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ZERO DOWN TO 500, AS THEY SAY, DO THE AMERICANS.

4. WOERNER HAS EXPRESSED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY EXTENSION OF ZERO OPTION DOWN TO 500 KMS, WHILE TRYING TO AVOID PREEMPTING

ZERO OPTION DOWN TO 500 KMS, WHILE TRYING TO AVOID PREEMPTING CURRENT NATO DISCUSSIONS ON THIS, HE POINTED TO THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE AND SAID THAT ZERO DOWN TO 500 WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR A PROGRESSIVE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. A SLIPPERY SLOPE ENDING WITH ONLY BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE THE WORST SOLUTION FOR THE FRG.

5. CDU/CSU SPOKESMEN (DREGGER AND RUEHE -I.E. RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF THE PARTY) SAID THAT ANY ZERO OPTION DOWN TO 500 WOULD RENDER THE FRG A ZONE OF SPECIAL THREAT. ZERO IN THAT CATEGORY SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE AND IN THE NUCLEAR IMBALANCE BELOW 500 (I.E. THE SCUD PROBLEM). DREGGER SAID THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOW LEVEL IN THE RANGE 150-1000, BUT AVOIDING ZERO BETWEEN 500 AND 1000.

6. SCHAEUBLE (CDU), MINISTER AT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY, SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON ZERO OPTION FOR LRINF (I.E. IMPLICITLY SIDING WITH WOERNER AGAINST GENSCHER).

7. SPD LEADER VOGEL CHALLENGED KOHL TO ENSURE HIS MINISTERS SPOKE WITH ONE VOICE, BUT DID NOT HIMSELF COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE. (BAHR HAS IN THE PAST SUPPORTED ZERO SRINF WHILE SAYING THAT A TOTAL DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE CANNOT TAKE PLACE FOR AS LONG AS THE WARSAW PACT HAS CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY.) SCHEER BLAMED THE COALITION FOR STANDING IN THE WAY OF AN OPPORTUNITY FINALLY TO FREE EUROPE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

8. COMMENT. PENDING FURTHER INTERMINISTERIAL WORK THIS WEEK, GENSCHER'S COMMENTS HAVE STOPPED SHORT OF ADVOCATING ACCEPTANCE OF ZERO 500, AND WOERNER HAS STOPPED SHORT OF REJECTING IT OUTRIGHT. THERE HAS BEEN SUPRISINGLY LITTLE COMMENT ON THE RELEVANCE OF GERMAN PIA AND THIS QUESTION OF MODERNISATION.

WILLIAMS

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PRIME MINISTER

Among other things Prime Minister
 we would have
 do like zero/zero
 on this to never to
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 will not

US/Soviet Negotiations on INF

1. I attended George Shultz's briefing to the North Atlantic Council this morning on his visit to Moscow. Michael Alexander will be sending a telegraphic report later today, and I am annexing a short note summarising recent developments on INF.

2. Most of Shultz's report was devoted to INF, and the subject monopolised the subsequent discussion. Shultz made it clear that we were now faced with a Soviet proposal for zero/zero down to 500 kms and that we needed to reach a collective decision as soon as possible on how best to respond. He put forward three options:

(i) accepting the Soviet proposal provided that our other negotiating criteria were met (ie, that the zero/zero should be global, verifiable, confined to US and Soviet systems and part of the agreement on LRINF);

/(11)



(ii) rejecting the offer; and

(iii) making a counter-proposal.

3. Shultz set out the pros and cons of each in a way designed to appear neutral. But there is not much difference between the option of rejecting zero/zero and Shultz' idea of a counter-proposal, which would simply modify our present position of equal ceilings and a US right to match to take advantage of the Soviet readiness to destroy the 42 launchers currently deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Shultz emphasised that if we decided, in either case, to preserve the US right to match we should do so only if we were credibly determined to exercise that right. In other words, there would have to be a decision to deploy and an agreement on where deployment would take place. Shultz (with the Germans obviously in mind) also made it very clear that the US would be unlikely to favour going to the expense of producing a new weapon system for this purpose when the conversion of Pershing II to Pershing I presented a cheap and easy alternative.

4. In short, the message between the lines of Shultz's presentation confirmed what you will have seen from the report of my meeting with him in Washington last week: that he (and, he believes, the President) would find the zero/zero proposal hard to refuse.

5. Shultz went on to argue that, whether we accepted or rejected zero/zero down to 500 (including the SS23s), we would in effect be drawing a line below which zero/zero was unacceptable. To reject the proposal would draw that line above 900 kms; to accept would draw it at 500. Wherever we decided to draw this line, we should then stick to it and

/make



make sure that we deployed the systems we thought necessary to ensure the continuing viability of our strategy of flexible response. He emphasised that the US would continue to play its part in that strategy and to deploy in Europe nuclear weapons systems of ranges covering both SRINF and LRINF (SLBMS committed to SACEUR, nuclear capable aircraft and, in the shorter ranges, Lance and nuclear capable artillery).

6. As a result of discussion in which most were careful to keep their options open, it was agreed that the next steps would be a meeting of the HLG next week, a meeting of the SCG on 28 April and a meeting of the Council shortly thereafter in order to reach a common position as soon as possible. I emphasised that we needed decisions based on military advice as well as careful political judgement; that we had no reason to appear defensive about the necessary alliance consultations; and that we should keep in mind the whole range of systems available to support the strategy of flexible response as well as the particular category of land-based missiles.

7. Work in the Alliance will now proceed accordingly. It will have to focus not only on the 500 to 1000 kms range but on how best to deal with the still shorter range systems given the Soviet preponderance in these and in the clearly very relevant conventional and chemical fields. The NATO military authorities have been giving careful thought to the problem, and we shall be working very closely with the MOD to come up with a line which makes both political and military sense. We may conclude that we must reject zero/zero down to 500 kms, even on a global and verifiable basis. If so, we would need to explain convincingly to

/Western



Western public opinion why this was necessary - and, as Shultz said, be ready and able to carry through the matching deployment. If on the other hand we conclude that we should accept, then we should present a resulting agreement as a clear and decisive result of the firm policy which this and like-minded governments in NATO have pursued over the past few years - as indeed it would be. Your own tough line with Gorbachev in Moscow will be widely seen as having contributed to this.

8. George Younger and I will be keeping you in touch with the progress of our further work.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to George Younger and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', with a stylized flourish at the end.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 April 1987



ANNEX

DEVELOPMENTS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS

1. In the past six weeks Mr Gorbachev has launched three separate initiatives on INF.

Moscow, 28 February

2. Mr Gorbachev confirmed the Reykjavik understanding that all LRINF (range between 1000 and 5500 km) would be eliminated from Europe within the next five years, with reductions to 100 warheads on each side to be deployed on national territory outside Europe. He also confirmed that with the signature of such an agreement the Soviet Union would withdraw "longer range theatre missiles" (ie SS22) from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Thirdly, he proposed "immediate talks", but by clear implication separate from those on LRINF, with a view to reducing and eliminating "other theatre missiles". Most important, he reverted to his mid-1986 position that an INF agreement should be concluded without being linked to progress in the strategic negotiations or SDI.

Prague, 10 April

3. Mr Gorbachev confirmed his February position on LRINF. The novelty in his statement lay in his precise definition of those shorter-range systems which would be covered in the proposed separate talks on theatre missiles, unlinked to the

/LRINF



LRINF negotiations. These systems he defined as "operational-tactical missiles in the range between 500 and 1000 km" which should be reduced and then eliminated. In addition, he called for a full-blown CSCE Foreign Ministers' meeting to discuss "the radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, conventional armaments, and armed forces". This was similar to the proposal launched in the Budapest Appeal of June 1986, and subsequently advanced in the current CDE talks in Vienna by Warsaw Pact representatives. Thus, by last week Mr Gorbachev still envisaged three distinct negotiations on sub-strategic nuclear weapons :

- (a) LRINF (down to 1000 km);
- (b) SRINF (500 to 1000 km); and
- (c) "tactical" nuclear forces (below 500 km) linked with conventional forces (this negotiation apparently multilateral, while the two others would remain US/Soviet).

Moscow, 14 April

4. In his latest move Mr Gorbachev has now combined the first two sets of negotiations, in the sense that reductions/elimination of SRINF would form part of an LRINF agreement. He emphasised that the reduction in SRINF would be a "unilateral" Soviet move. While presenting this as meeting (and indeed more than meeting) Allied concerns about Soviet SRINF forces, he has made clear that there can be no question of US deployments in this range. In other words, the right to match is excluded by the Soviet willingness to come down to zero.



JRK.
CPC.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 April 1987

~~DEAD -
CPC~~
I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl, covering in turn a copy of his message to President Reagan about the INF negotiations. I should be grateful in due course for advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., MVO,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

085

CDPC
17 (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 April 1987

[Handwritten initials] *[Handwritten signature: Eric Austin]*

Jean Charles,

*CDP
4/4.*

INF: German Views

Sir Geoffrey Howe discussed with the Prime Minister on 6 April the ideas which the Germans have been floating on excluding constraints on shorter range INF systems (SS12/22s and SS23s) from a LRINF agreement, provided that there would be immediate follow-on negotiations on SRINF. You asked for further advice on the substance of the issues and we are working on this urgently with the MOD and with our allies. Meanwhile, it may be helpful to set out how Sir Geoffrey proposes to handle this issue in his talks tomorrow with George Shultz, and subsequently with the Germans.

The German fear is that our present position might encourage a Soviet offer (of which we have already had hints) of zero/zero on all systems down to 500 kms range; that such an offer would be politically difficult to refuse; that it would lead to loss of the theoretical US right to introduce a new system but also to the removal of 72 existing (German) Pershing IAs; that the remaining ground based nuclear systems in Europe would be located almost exclusively on the territory of the two Germanies; and, beyond that, that we would head closer to a denuclearisation of Europe.

In so far as the Germans are concerned to maintain an effective nuclear element in Europe we share their concerns about Soviet motives: the possibility of Soviet moves towards a wider zero/zero was covered in the briefing for the Moscow visit. But we do not share Genscher's view that the way to deal with this risk is to drop the idea of collateral constraints on SRINF within an agreement on LRINF.

/Our



Our latest information from Bonn (telno 300 attached) is that Kohl's letter to Reagan will in fact take a more cautious line. Sir Geoffrey told Genscher on 4 April that, while we too were worried about the extension of the zero/zero approach in Europe we did not believe the alliance should change its position now, particularly in advance of Shultz's visit to Moscow next week; that we must surely make a major effort to achieve our present negotiating objectives; and that we continued to attach importance to ensuring that a LRINF agreement could not be circumvented by SRINF. It is possible that the Germans are now moving closer to this position.

Sir Geoffrey has in addition received a message from Mr Shultz, asking him to help to ensure that the Germans keep to the alliance position. Shultz has also undertaken that, if the Russians do offer constraints on SRINF which set a ceiling below their current SRINF level he would neither accept nor reject it but consult with us and other allies. This strikes Sir Geoffrey as exactly right: we should certainly explore with our allies the response to a possible Soviet initiative (we have been pressing for this for some time), but there should be no changes in the Alliance position until this essential work has been done. When the Foreign Secretary sees Shultz he therefore intends to confirm our support for the current Alliance negotiating position. He will also stress the need for urgent consultations within the Alliance on what we can and cannot accept on SRINF and on what our position should be if the Russians do not accept our negotiating position, or come back with proposals on the lines which the Germans think they might.

/We



We are in close touch with MOD on the detailed work which now needs to be done in the relevant Alliance bodies. The new German proposals will have to be added to the list of issues for consultation.

Mr Alexander is being instructed to take a similar line - support for the allied position in Shultz's forthcoming talks in Moscow, coupled with the need for urgent consultations - when Paul Nitze briefs NATO on 10 April.

I am copying this to John Howe at the MOD.

*Yours ever,
A C Galsworthy*

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

Geheim

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar

8 April 1987

English translation
attached
GM


From Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from
Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and as well
a copy of his letter to President Reagan.

A courtesy translation is attached.

I am, From Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely



Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
L o n d o n

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T e l e g r a m m
von
Herrn Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
an
Ihre Exzellenz
Frau Margaret Thatcher
Premierminister des Vereinigten Königreichs
Grossbritannien und Nordirland

Liebe Margaret,

Bezugnehmend auf unseren früheren Gedankenaustausch möchte ich Sie davon in Kenntnis setzen, dass ich Präsident Reagan am 7. April 1987, auch im Hinblick auf den bevorstehenden Besuch von Aussenminister Shultz in Moskau, erneut die Haltung der Bundesregierung zu Fragen dargelegt habe, die sich im Zusammenhang mit einem INF-Abkommen stellen.

Zu Ihrer Unterrichtung füge ich eine Kopie meines Schreibens an Präsident Reagan bei.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Helmut Kohl

Geheim

Geheim

GEHEIM

T e l e g r a m m
von
Herrn Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
an
Seine Exzellenz
Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Herrn Ronald W. Reagan
Washington D.C.

Lieber Ron,

das enge Vertrauen, das wir in der Sicherheits- und Rüstungskontrollpolitik in den vergangenen Jahren aufgebaut haben, und die Überzeugung, dass angesichts des Verhandlungsstandes in Genf und des West-Ost-Verhältnisses insgesamt ein Abkommen über Mittelstreckenflugkörper grösserer Reichweite in Sicht ist, veranlasst mich, Ihnen erneut zu schreiben und auch im Hinblick auf den wichtigen Besuch von Aussenminister Shultz in Moskau die Haltung der Bundesregierung zu einigen Fragen, die im Zusammenhang mit der Mittelstreckenproblematik stehen, nochmals darzulegen.

Die Bundesregierung tritt seit Beginn der INF-Verhandlungen konsequent für die weltweite Beseitigung aller amerikanischen und sowjetischen Mittelstreckenflugkörper grösserer Reichweite ein. Die beiderseitige Eliminierung der LRINF-Flugkörper in Europa, wie sie zur Zeit in Genf verhandelt wird, wäre ein entscheidender Schritt zu diesem Ziel. Die amerikanischen Bemühungen, die globale LRINF-Null-Lösung in einem Abkommen zu verwirklichen, finden unsere volle Unterstützung.

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Im Hinblick auf Mittelstreckenflugkörper unterhalb der Reichweite von 1000 km befürwortet die Bundesregierung Folgeverhandlungen mit dem Ziel, alle diese Systeme auf ein niedriges Niveau mit gleichen Obergrenzen zu reduzieren. Sie erwartet deshalb, dass sich die Verhandlungspartner konkret und verbindlich verpflichten, sofortige Folgeverhandlungen, d.h. längstens in sechs Monaten nach Unterzeichnung des Abkommens, über Mittelstreckensysteme kürzerer Reichweite aufzunehmen.

Wir teilen grundsätzlich die Bündnisposition, dass bereits ein Abkommen, in dessen Mittelpunkt die LRINF stehen, begleitende Beschränkungen ("concurrent constraints") für SRINF-Flugkörper enthalten sollte.

Sollte die Sowjetunion während des Moskau-Besuch Ihres Aussenministers eine Null-Lösung für SRINF-Systeme im Reichweitenband von 500 - 1000 km vorschlagen, so würden wir es für richtig halten, dass Aussenminister Shultz - wie er in seinem Schreiben an Aussenminister Genscher am 6. April 1987 dargelegt hat - einen solchen Vorschlag weder akzeptiert noch zurückweist (neither to accept it nor to reject it), sondern dazu klärende Fragen stellt. Nach diesem Besuch sollte hierüber im Bündnis vertieft diskutiert werden.

Eine Null-Lösung für SRINF-Flugkörper in der Reichweite zwischen 500 und 1000 km hätte erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheitslage in Zentraleuropa. Für uns sind daher eingehende Bündniskonsultationen von entscheidender Bedeutung.

In diesem Zusammenhang möchte ich einen Gedanken aus meinem Gespräch mit Botschafter Burt am 3. April 1987

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wiederholen: Wenn wir eine Auseinandersetzung mit einem eventuellen sowjetischen Vorschlag für eine SRINF-Null-Lösung im Zusammenhang mit einem LRINF-Abkommen vermeiden wollen, könnte ein Verzicht auf constraints eine mögliche Alternative sein.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Helmut Kohl

Geheim

SUBJECT
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
766187

original is PM

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Telegram
from
Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
to
Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Margaret,

Further to our earlier exchange of views, I should like to inform you that in the letter which I sent to President Reagan on 7 April 1987 I reiterated, not least in view of the forthcoming visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, my Government's position on questions arising in connection with an INF agreement.

For your information I have enclosed a copy of the letter to President Reagan.

Yours sincerely,
Helmut Kohl

Geheim

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T e l e g r a m
from
Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
to
His Excellency
Mr. Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ron,

The close trust that we have developed on security and arms control policy in recent years and the conviction that, considering the state of the Geneva negotiations and of East-West relations in general, a LRINF agreement is within reach prompts me to write to you again today and, not least in view of the important visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, reiterate my Government's position on certain aspects of the INF complex.

Ever since the start of the INF negotiations, my Government has consistently advocated the worldwide elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF. The elimination of both sides' LRINF missiles in Europe, as currently being negotiated at Geneva, would be a decisive step towards this goal. The US efforts to translate the global LRINF zero option into an agreement have our full backing.

As for INF with a range of less than 1,000 km, my Government favours follow-on negotiations aimed at reducing all of these systems to low, equal ceilings. It therefore expects the negotiating parties to give a concrete, binding pledge to enter immediately into follow-on negotiations, i.e. not later than six months after the signing of the agreement.

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We basically subscribe to the Alliance position that an agreement devoted primarily to LRINF missiles should contain concurrent constraints on SRINF missiles.

If, during the visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, the Soviet Union were to propose a zero option for SRINF systems with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km, we would consider it right for Secretary of State Shultz, as stated in his letter of 6 April 1987 to Foreign Minister Genscher, neither to accept the proposal nor to reject it, but to ask certain questions for the sake of clarification. The matter should then be discussed in depth by the Alliance after his visit.

A zero option for SRINF missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km would have a considerable impact on the security situation in Central Europe. Extensive consultations within the Alliance are thus of crucial importance to us.

In this connection I should like to repeat a thought which I expressed in my talks with Ambassador Burt on 3 April 1987: If we want to avoid having to deal with a Soviet proposal for an SRINF zero option in connection with an LRINF agreement, the renunciation of constraints might be a feasible alternative approach.

Yours sincerely
(sgd) Helmut Kohl

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YOUR TELNO 281: INF: BILATERAL WITH GENSCHER, 4 APRIL
SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT IN VIEW OF RISK OF FURTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS, EG FOR ZERO/ZERO DOWN TO 500KM, AND GORBACHEV'S OPPOSITION TO A WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ABANDONING OUR REQUIREMENT FOR CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS AND GO FOR LRINF ZERO/ZERO DOWN TO 1,000KM, TIED TO IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON SYSTEMS BELOW 1,000KM. I POINTED OUT IMPORTANCE OF NOT DEPARTING PUBLICLY FROM THE AGREED WESTERN LINE. NATO WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION.

DETAIL

2. GENSCHER RAISED INF WITH ME IN THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMAL EC FOREIGN MINISTERS' WEEKEND AT CORSENDONK ON 4 APRIL. HE SAID, AS FORESHADOWED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TUR, THAT FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT ON LRINF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF PERSHING IIS FROM THE FRG. THEY WERE DETERMINED NOT TO AGREE TO

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THEIR CONVERSION INTO PERSHING IBS, SINCE THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN TO DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CURRENT WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION OF LRINF ZERO/ZERO. HE NOTED THAT IN MOSCOW THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV HAD DISAGREED OVER THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR THERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A RIGHT TO MATCH.

3. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM WAS HOW TO COMBINE CONSTRAINTS AND THE RIGHT TO MATCH. ON SYSTEMS WHICH WERE NOT SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINTS, THERE WAS BY DEFINITION A RIGHT TO MATCH. HE ASKED HOW WE WOULD REACT TO AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: TO AGREE TO ZERO/ZERO ABOVE 1,000KM WITH NO (NO) CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS, BUT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON THEM IMMEDIATELY.

4. GENSCHER WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PROPOSE, AS KARPOV HAD RECENTLY FLOATED IN GENEVA, THAT LRINF ZERO/ZERO SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ZERO/ZERO FOR SRINF IN THE 500-1,000KM RANGE. GENSCHER NOTED THAT IN RECENT QUINT DISCUSSIONS THE CONCLUSION HAD BEEN THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST TO REJECT. BUT IT WOULD GIVE THE GERMANS PROBLEMS OVER PERSHING IAS IN THE FRG, AS IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD COUNT THESE AS US OR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS.

5. GENSCHER SAID THAT, IF SHULTZ WERE FACED WITH A SOVIET PROPOSAL ALONG THESE LINES IN MOSCOW, HE COULD SIMPLY TAKE THE LINE THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER IT. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. ALTERNATIVELY, HE COULD FLOAT THE APPROACH GENSCHER WAS NOW SUGGESTING. SO FAR THIS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED ONLY IN A VERY SMALL GROUP IN BONN (HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY, BITTERLICH, SAID AFTERWARDS THAT SO FAR THE KEY PAPER HAD BEEN SEEN BY KOHL, GENSCHER, WOERNER AND TELTSCHIK ONLY). BUT A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED ON 6 APRIL, SO THAT KOHL COULD SEND REAGAN A MESSAGE IN GOOD TIME BEFORE SHULTZ VISITED MOSCOW. THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL POINT WAS, AS FORESHADOWED IN THE FRG GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF 18 MARCH, THAT WE COULD NOT RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS LONG AS THE RUSSIANS HAD CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY.

6. I SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION IN RECENT WEEKS HAD BROUGHT HOME THE UNDERLYING IMPORTANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE AS LAYERS OF INF WERE STRIPPED AWAY. BUT ANY CHANGE IN THE LINE WE TOOK WITH THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROACHED EXTREMELY CAUTIOUSLY. WE HAD ARGUED STRONGLY FOR THE RIGHT TO MATCH. IF THE RUSSIANS RESPONDED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR ZERO/ZERO DOWN TO 500KM, WE WOULD FIRST NEED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THIS WOULD BE JUST IN EUROPE, OR WORLDWIDE. IN EITHER CASE, A LOT OF VERY HARD THINKING WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE ACCEPTABLE. MEANWHILE WE HAD A FIRM WESTERN POSITION TO WHICH WE WERE COMMITTED: LRINF ZERO/ZERO, WITH CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION, AND A COMMITMENT TO IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, REACHED ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS ON OUR DETAILED REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK.

7. GENSCHER RECALLED THAT ADELMAN HAD DISCUSSED THE IDEA OF A SOVIET ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL DOWN TO 500KM WITH THE PRG AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE TAKING THE LINE THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL. BUT ADELMAN HAD ADDED, AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, THAT IF WE ACCEPTED A LOWER ZERO/ZERO THRESHOLD, WE WOULD NOT NEED ANY FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL: WE COULD SIMPLY STAND ON OUR RIGHT TO MATCH BELOW A LOWER THRESHOLD.

8. I SAID THAT ALL THIS WORRIED ME. LIKE GENSCHER, I WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF A CREEPING EXTENSION OF THE ZERO/ZERO APPROACH IN EUROPE. BUT I DID NOT BELIEVE WE COULD REACH ANY CONCLUSION FOR NOW. WE SHARED TWO BASIC ANXIETIES: A RELUCTANCE TO EMBARK ON PERSUADING THE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT A RERUN OF THE DUAL TRACK DECISION, AND A CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SALAMI TACTICS LEADING TO STEP-BY-STEP DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE (THE WORD 'DENUCLEARISATION' WAS IN ANY CASE ONE WHICH WE NEEDED TO GET AWAY FROM IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AS IT WAS ALL TOO EASILY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPURIOUS ATTRACTIONS OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE: IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SAY THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE USSR A MONOPOLY IN THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS IN EUROPE). THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION ON THESE PROBLEMS. MEANWHILE,

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IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID SOME MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE BEING
SEEN TO MOVE PARTWAY BEFORE A COMMON LINE HAD BEEN AGREED.

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INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY CSCEE VIENNA MODUK (FOR DACU)

VISIT OF KARPOV, 11 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THE US ARE RAISING NEW OBSTACLES IN GENEVA TO AN INF AGREEMENT (CONVERSION TO SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, LRINF IN ALASKA) AND RIGHT TO REDEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES AT SEA. US RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SRINF NOT ACCEPTED, THE AIM SHOULD BE TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE SRINF QUICKLY. IMPORTANCE OF US RIGHT TO MATCH UNDERLINED BY US. KARPOV'S CLAIM THAT THE UK WAS BACK PEDALLING ON CW REBUTTED. NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION OR NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON THE ABMT/START LINK.

DETAIL

2. KARPOV WHO WAS RETURNING FROM A VISIT TO CANADA AND THE US HAD A WORKING LUNCH WITH FALL AND PAID A BRIEF CALL ON THE MINISTER OF STATE.

INF

3. KARPOV TOLD MR RENTON THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD ASKED HIM TO CLARIFY BRITISH THINKING ON INF AND CW CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ON INF THE POSITIVE REFERENCE IN MR GORBACHEV'S 28 FEBRUARY

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STATEMENT TO AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON SRINF HAS BEEN MET WITH 3 NEW DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY THE US IN GENEVA. FIRST THE US WAS CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO CONVERT LONGER RANGE MISSILES INTO SHORTER RANGE (SPECIFICALLY PERSHING IIS INTO IBS) CARRIED WITH IT THE POSSIBILITY OF RECONVERSION. THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE ELIMINATION OF LRINF. THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF IN EUROPE. TALKS ON SRINF MIGHT BEGIN EVEN BEFORE AN AGREEMENT ON LRINF WAS CONDUCTED. SS229 AND 235 WITHDRAWN FROM THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA MIGHT BE DESTROYED. THE RANGE LIMIT MIGHT THUS BE LOWERED TO 500KM. SECOND, THE US HAD ALSO DEMANDED THAT CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE DESTROYED BUT THEIR DEPLOYMENT PERMITTED AT SEA. THIRD, THE US WAS ALSO INSISTING ON DEPLOYING 100 LRINF WARHEADS IN ALASKA. WHERE THEY COULD STRIKE THE SOVIET UNION. EQUIVALENT SOVIET FORCES WOULD NOT EVEN HAVE THE RANGE TO TARGET ALASKA.

4. IN DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH FALL NOTED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED MERELY ABOUT THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TO DETECT RECONVERSION, SUCH CONCERNS WERE LEGITIMATE AND THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED WERE NOT INSUPERABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND IF THE RUSSIANS WERE DENYING THE US A RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SRINF THIS WOULD BE RESISTED. WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO MOVE THE GOAL POSTS, BUT UNEQUAL CEILINGS FOR SRINF WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE. MR RENTON WELCOMED THE DELINKING OF INP FROM SDI. HE NOTED STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURES IN THE UK AGAINST ANY ACCEPTANCE OF UNEQUAL CEILINGS. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN SRINF WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND.

5. KARPOV MADE CLEAR THAT WHAT HE HAD SAID ON SRINF, INCLUDING DESTRUCTION OF SS22 AND 235 APPLIED ONLY TO EUROPE.

CW

6. KARPOV CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A COMMONALITY OF POSITION BETWEEN THE UK AND SOVIET VIEWS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION BUT THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE BRITISH POSITION HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD HIM HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS CHANGE. FALL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE BRITISH POSITION: CD715 REMAINED OUR POSITION, BUT WE WERE NOT WILLING TO DILUTE IT. TO DO SO WOULD NOT HELP OVERALL AGREEMENT. THE MULTILATERAL

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FILTER PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD IN OUR VIEW WEAKEN THE CHALLENGE PROCEDURE UNACCEPTABLY. SOVIET FEARS OF MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WERE EXAGGERATED.

7. KARPOV ASKED MR RENTON IF A MEETING TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE UK/USSR PARALLEL ACTION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION WAS POSSIBLE. MR RENTON REPLIED THAT A MULTILATERAL FILTER WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UK AND CONCESSIONS ON THIS WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY WEAKEN THE CHALLENGE REGIME. WE REMAINED WILLING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN GENEVA, BUT WE WOULD BE NO NEARER A SOLUTION UNLESS THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. HIS MESSAGE TO MR SCHEVARDNADZE WAS THAT THE UK PROPOSAL EXCLUDED A MULTILATERAL FILTER.

SDI/START

8. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION, KARPOV SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD AGREE WHAT WAS NOT (NOT) ALLOWED UNDER THE ABMT. THE US RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO INTRODUCE THE QUOTE BROAD INTERPRETATION UNQUOTE AT THE GENEVA TALKS. THIS HAD MADE PROGRESS VERY DIFFICULT, BECAUSE WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON THE ABMT, THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE ARMS REDUCTIONS. THAT WAS THE SOVIET POSITION AND THEY WERE NOT GOING TO CHANGE IT.

9. WASHINGTON: PLEASE PASS TO PAKENHAM.

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MODUK FOR DACU, DNP3
INF: MEETING OF SCG, 16 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. US CONFIRM THAT DISCUSSIONS ON INF IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON STRUCTURE OF INF AGREEMENT. BUT US INCLINED NOT TO SEE AGREED PROPOSAL FOR 100 INF WARHEADS IN EUROPE AS LIKELY FINAL OUTCOME. CONFIRMED THAT NO SOVIET REFERENCES TO UK-FRENCH FORCES: IN MARGINS OBHUKOV SAID THEY WOULD QUOTE NOT BE A PROBLEM UNQUOTE. GERMAN CONCERN OVER SHORTER RANGE INF, GROUP TO STUDY IN DETAIL.

DETAIL

2. GLITMAN (US INF NEGOTIATOR) REPORTED TO THE QUINT THAT, FOLLOWING LIMITED (BUT 'QUALITY TIME ') DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW, THE WASHINGTON TALKS ON 5/6 SEPTEMBER HAD PRODUCED SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON INF. THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF BASIC QUESTIONS PUT TO THEM BY THE US SIDE IN MOSCOW. (EVEN SO, START HAD OCCUPIED MORE OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS). THE RUSSIANS HAD NOW

CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT EQUAL LRINF LEVELS ABOVE ZERO IN EUROPE, AND EQUAL GLOBAL WARHEAD ENTITLEMENTS. THEY HAD SUGGESTED 100 WARHEADS FOR EACH SIDE IN EUROPE, WITH THE US DEPLOYING ONLY GLCMS THERE. SHOULD THE RUSSIANS FORMALLY CONFIRM THESE POINTS OF PRINCIPLE IN GENEVA, GLITMAN BELIEVED THAT COMMON GROUND ON THE STRUCTURE OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD THEN BE ESTABLISHED. HE AND HOLMES WERE RELUCTANT TO SPECULATE ON WHY THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN NEW PRIORITY TO INF AFTER NEGLECTING IT SINCE THE US FEBRUARY OFFER. NO DIRECT LINKAGE WITH START/SPACE WAS AN OBVIOUS CONSIDERATION. THE RUSSIANS IN MOSCOW HAD SPOKEN SEVERAL TIMES OF INF BEING READY FOR SOLUTION. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUED TO GIVE IT PRIORITY IN GENEVA IN THE CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLE SUMMIT.

3. GLITMAN EMPHASISED FOUR MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES:

- (A) ASIAN SS20S WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT: THE RUSSIANS HAD REFUSED TO ELABORATE THEIR PROPOSAL TO LIMIT SS20S IN ASIA OR TO SUGGEST THE MINIMUM LEVEL THEY REQUIRED.
- (B) SRINF CONSTRAINTS: IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THESE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ONLY AFTER AGREEMENT ON LRINF, THE US HAD REPEATED THAT CONSTRAINTS HAD TO BE ADDRESSED CONCURRENTLY WITH LIMITS ON LRINF.
- (C) GLCM/PERSHING II MIX: THE US WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT A BAN ON ALL PIIS. KARPOV HAD HINTED THAT THIS WAS NEGOTIABLE.
- (D) DURATION OF AGREEMENT: THE US HAD REJECTED THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF A TEMPORARY AGREEMENT. AN INTERIM AGREEMENT MUST REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY ANY FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

4. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT IN MOSCOW THE RUSSIANS HAD LINKED THE ISSUE OF UK-FRENCH FORCES TO THE DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT, AND TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR NO-TRANSFER. ON THE OTHER HAND, NEITHER THE FORCES OR THE NO-TRANSFER ISSUE HAD BEEN MENTIONED OVER THE TABLE IN WASHINGTON. DURING A SOCIAL OCCASION OBUKHOV HAD SAID TO A US OFFICIAL NOT ON NITZE'S TEAM THAT THESE FORCES QUOTE SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM UNQUOTE. GLITMAN COMMENTED THAT SOVIET SILENCE ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. HE ALSO WARNED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT REVIVE THE SUBJECT, PARTICULARLY VIA

NO-TRANSFER AND DURATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR POSITION WAS NOW CONSIDERABLY WEAKER, HAVING FAILED TO RETURN TO THE SUBJECT IN WASHINGTON. AND THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF US EQUALITY IN EUROPE AND GLOBALLY CLEARLY MEANT THAT THEIR NO INCREASE DEMAND COULD NO LONGER BE APPLICABLE. THE US CERTAINLY DID NOT INTEND TO REVERT TO THE SUBJECT THEMSELVES IN THE NEXT ROUND IN GENEVA.

5. ON VERIFICATION GLITMAN SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF ALLOWING IT TO BE LEFT TO THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION. THE SOVIET EXCUSE (LRINF TO BE ELIMINATED WITHIN 3 YEARS, SO NO NEED FOR VERIFICATION) WAS INVALIDATED BY THE INTERIM PROPOSAL FOR 100 WARHEADS. GLITMAN THEREFORE INTENDED TO PRESS THE ISSUE DURING THE NEXT ROUND. KARPOV HAD ALREADY INDICATED THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW IT SHOULD NOT EVENTUALLY PROVE A PROBLEM BUT THE US SIDE WERE LESS CERTAIN. A VERIFICATION PACKAGE WAS STILL BEING CONSIDERED BY THE AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON. THEY WOULD THEN BE LOOKING FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES (MAHLE (NSC STAFF) PRIVATELY INDICATED THIS MIGHT COME AROUND END-OCTOBER).

6. GLITMAN ADVISED AGAINST ATTACHING TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SPECIFIC NUMBERS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT AT THIS STAGE. IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLES OF AN AGREEMENT AND HOW TO BUILD ON THESE. THE US HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT WANTED TO REJECT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 100 WARHEADS IN EUROPE, IN VIEW OF THE REPEATED US WILLINGNESS IN THE PAST TO CONSIDER ANY LEVEL OF EQUALITY BETWEEN ZERO AND 572. THEY HAD THEREFORE INDICATED THAT 100 WARHEADS IN EUROPE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, PROVIDED THAT THERE WERE CONCURRENT AND PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN ASIA, SRINF CONSTRAINTS ETC. BUT GLITMAN THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS LIKELY TO INSIST ON WELL OVER 100 WARHEADS IN ASIA, GIVEN WHAT WAS BELIEVED TO BE THEIR REQUIREMENT AGAINST CHINA. THE EUROPE NUMBERS WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY MOVE UP AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED.

7. IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE QUINT, THE FRG AND WE IN PARTICULAR UNDERLINED THE NEED TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF A 100 WARHEAD LIMIT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING FOR BASING AND DISTRIBUTION, AND THE EFFECTS FOR DETERRENCE STRATEGY, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO SRINF. WE MADE THE POINT THAT THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP STUDY ON

DETERRENCE ASPECTS WAS RELEVANT IN THIS CONTEXT. GLITMAN BELIEVED THAT ANY NEW BASING COMPLICATIONS (BECAUSE OF LOWER WARHEAD NUMBERS ON THE WESTERN SIDE) SHOULD STILL BE MANAGEABLE, BUT WARNED THAT WE WERE APPROACHING THE STAGE WHEN HARD CHOICES WOULD NEED TO BE MADE. THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT RUN AWAY FROM THESE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ON 100 COULD PROVE UNCOMFORTABLE IN TIME IF IT LED TO AN ELIMINATION OF BOTH US AND SOVIET LRINF IN EUROPE, WHILE THE RUSSIANS MERELY PROZE THEIR FORCES IN ASIA I.E. EVENTUAL WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET DEMAND BEFORE THEIR PRESENT MOVE. HE HAD EMPHASISED TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE LOWER THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN EUROPE, THE MORE IMPORTANT BECAME THE NUMBERS IN ASIA AND THE SRINF CONSTRAINTS.

8. THE PRG, WITH ITALIAN SUPPORT, SPOKE STRONGLY BOTH IN THE QUINT AND OVER LUNCH ABOUT THE SHORTER RANGE THREAT. RUTH URGED THE NEED FOR QUOTE A PROPER PROSPECTIVE UNQUOTE ON SRINF IN THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO THE LRINF NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER PRESSURE, HOWEVER, HE INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR A CHANGE IN THE TRADITIONAL US LINE ON SRINF CONSTRAINTS. SUCH A STEP, HE CONCEDED, WOULD BE SEEN AS A TACTIC TO WRECK THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATION. GLITMAN NOTED THAT NITZE HAD TOLD KARPOV BLUNTLY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT ON LRINF IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. A DIFFICULT DISCUSSION WAS CONCLUDED BY GLITMAN NOTING A EUROPEAN PREFERENCE FOR A LEVEL HIGHER THAN 100 LR WARHEADS IN EUROPE. IT WAS AGREED (AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED DURING THE PLENARY SCG) THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GROUP SHOULD DISCUSS SRINF IN GREATER DETAIL, ON THE BASIS OF AN US PAPER.

9. GLITMAN REPEATED TO THE QUINT HIS COMMENTS AT THE PREVIOUS SCG ABOUT THE NEED TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF JAPANESE INTERESTS IN INF. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL, IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON DIFFERENT NUMBERS FOR EUROPE AND ASIA, THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE QUOTE DISCRIMINATION UNQUOTE AGAINST JAPAN, NOR ARGUE THAT THE FIGURES IN EUROPE WERE HIGHER THAN THEY THEMSELVES WANTED BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO MEET JAPANESE CONCERNS. THE MAIN ARGUMENT SHOULD REST ON THE EASE OF TRANSFER OF SOVIET

MISSILES FROM ASIA TO EUROPE. GLITMAN ACCEPTED A COMMENT THAT THE KEY TO THE ASIAN QUESTION REMAINED THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE CHINESE THREAT.

10. RUTH ARGUED THAT WITH LOW WARHEAD NUMBERS IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA (E.G. AROUND 100 EACH) THE PATTERN OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN THE LATTER BECAME VERY IMPORTANT, AND THE BASES AT BARNAUL AND NOVOSIBIRSK PARTICULARLY THREATENING. GLITMAN, HOWEVER, COUNTERED THAT THESE TWO BASES WERE THE LEAST CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THEY WERE ONLY marginally effective against any ally, JAPAN OR EUROPE, AND SO IN MANY WAYS THE LEAST SENSITIVE. IT WAS IN ANY CASE A RISKY BUSINESS TO CONSIDER INTERFERING IN THE PATTERN OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS WITHIN THE PERMITTED LIMITS, SINCE THEY COULD THEN DEMAND RECIPROCITY.

11. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT, WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT SOVIET TREATMENT OF MISSILES WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE, OBUKHOV HAD REFUSED TO CONFIRM EXPLICITLY THAT THESE WOULD BE DESTROYED. HE HAD HOWEVER REFERRED THE US BACK TO AN EARLIER STATEMENT OF HIS WHICH STATED THAT THEY WOULD DO SO. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON OF RELOADS. THE US SIDE RECOGNISED THIS AS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM WHICH NEEDED TO BE THRASHED OUT WITH THE RUSSIANS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, GLITMAN INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT HOWEVER SEE IT AS A MAJOR DIFFICULTY.

12. AT THE FULL SCG MEETING MOST REPRESENTATIVES SPOKE WARMLY IN SUPPORT OF RECENT US EFFORTS, AND CONGRATULATED THEM ON THE PROGRESS MADE. GLITMAN AND HOLMES WENT OVER IN CONSIDERABLY LESS DETAIL THE GROUND COVERED ABOVE ESPECIALLY IN PARAS 2, 4, 6 AND 8 ABOVE. SUBSEQUENT COMMENT ADDED LITTLE, BUT CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE 100 WARHEADS FIGURE WOULD LEAK SHORTLY (AND SOME SURPRISE THAT IT HAD NOT ALREADY DONE SO). THE US SIDE AGREED TO PRODUCE GUIDANCE WHICH MIGHT BE DEPLOYED BY ALL THE ALLIES. IN EARLIER QUINT DISCUSSION THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SUITABLE:

- (I) THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
- (II) THE STATEMENT IN THE DECEMBER 1983 PROGRESS REPORT BY NITZE THAT THE US WAS READY TO CONSIDER EQUAL LEVELS OF WARHEADS AT

SECRET

62854 - 1

ANY POINT BETWEEN ZERO AND 572, AND SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN 50 AND 400 IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE AT ISSUE.

- (III) THE DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN THE SOLIDARITY ALREADY SHOWN ON BASING ISSUES: THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF THIS BEING PUT AT RISK.
- (IV) THE US/WESTERN PREFERENCE FOR THE LOWEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN EUROPE, BUT THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBERS IN ASIA BECAUSE IN THE RE-TRANSFER THREAT.
13. THE GERMANS PRESSED HARD FOR THE NEXT SCG AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. THE US SIDE UNDERTOOK TO CIRCULATE A DATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
14. GRATEFUL IF POSTS WOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE CAVEAT ABOUT QUINT DISCUSSION IN PARA 16 OF MY TELNO 1345.

HOWE

OCMIAN 2854

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE D

SOVIET D

NEWS D

NAD

KED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

RES D

INFO D

PUSD

NED

CSCE UNIT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR RATFORD

MR DAUNT

MR FERN

MR BRAITHWAITE

MR SLATER

MR BARRINGTON

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70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A086/350

3 February 1986

Dear Dennis,

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

Following your letter to me of 25 November, (Philip Wynn Owen's of 27 November and Alan Davis's of 31 December), I am writing to confirm that the CMO designation should now be removed from the papers on the above subject. (These were listed in the annex to my original letter of 23 September to John Pitt-Brooke).

This means that although, of course, their classification will remain, they can be handled in the normal way and placed on departmental files.

I am sending copies of this to Ron Lawrence (Lord President's Office), Helen Tuffs (Lord Chancellor's Department), Peter Ricketts (FCO), Clare Pelham (Home Office), Sue Vandervord (Department of the Environment), Henry Steel (Attorney General's Office) and Charles Powell at No 10.

*Yours sincerely
Ros Mulligan*

(Rosalind Mulligan)
Assistant Private Secretary

Dennis Brennan Esq

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DEFRACK

INF

PT 5



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CCPC
✓

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

~~EF G note~~
CDB
27/11

Ros Mulligan
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON
SW1

27 November 1985

Dear Ros

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Thank you for your letter of the 23 September seeking agreement to the removal of the CMO designation from the list of correspondence in the annex to your letter.

I confirm that we have no objection to 'de-CMO' the correspondence originated by this office.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ron Lawrence (PS Lord President of the Council) Helen Tuffs (PS Lord Chancellor), Peter Ricketts (PS Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary), Dennis Brennan (PS Secretary of State for Defence), Clare Pelham (PS Home Secretary), Sue Vandervord (PS Secretary of State for the Environment) Henry Steel (PS Attorney General) and Charles Powell at No.10.

Yours sincerely,

Phil Wynn Owen

P WYNN OWEN

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence, INF; P+S



SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

Mr. Deane
Mr. Jones
Mr. Paul told me
the Embassy was pleased
with his message. They
doubt if they could be
any publicity.
3768 - 2

CONFIDENTIAL

6 AM 8/11

OCMIAN 3768
CONFIDENTIAL
OO THHAG
FM PCOLN TO THHAG
071130Z NOV
GRS 290

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 209B/85

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PCO
TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE
TELNO 150
OF 071130Z NOV 85
AND TO ROUTINE MCD UK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME,
AND TO ROUTINE MOSCOW, BRUSSELS

YOUR TEL 368: NETHERLANDS/INF

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR LUBBERS:
QUOTE. I CONGRATULATE YOU UPON YOUR RESOLVE OVER THE DECISION TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS. I KNOW WHAT PROBLEMS YOU HAD. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE'S FIRMFNESS OF PURPOSE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT IN GENEVA. ON THE QUESTION OF OTHER NUCLEAR TASKS, YOU KNOW OUR CONCERNS AND I VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR DECISION TO CONSULT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS ARE TAKEN. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS STILL MOST IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF BURDENS AMONG THE MEMBERSHIP. UNQUOTE.
2. WE SHALL TAKE NO STEPS HERE TO PUBLICISE THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO MR LUBBERS GIVING IT PUBLICITY IF HE WISHES.
3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY THE SUGGESTION THAT MESSAGES SHOULD BE SENT TO THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS. IN VIEW OF THE DUTCH INTENTION OF DROPPING TWO OF THEIR EXISTING NUCLEAR TASKS (ORION AND F16) WE THINK ONE MESSAGE ENOUGH AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO STRIKE A SUFFICIENTLY WARM AND POSITIVE NOTE

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3768 - 2

IN A MESSAGE TO DE RUITER. I HAD A WORD WITH VAN DEN BROEK AT HANOVER ON 5 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSISTENT STRENGTH OF HIS OWN STAND ON THIS ISSUE.

4. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ON THE NIGHT OF 4 NOVEMBER THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN LONDON WAS DAUBED WITH PAINT. THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO EXPLICIT CONNECTION WITH THE INF DEPLOYMENT DECISION, THOUGH THE TIMING SUGGESTS THAT OPPOSITION TO IT WAS PART OF THE MOTIVE (DETAILS FOLLOW BY BAG).

HOWE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED	PS
ACDD	PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D	PS/MR RIFKIND
SOVIET D	PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D	PS/FUS
HAD	MR DEREK THOMAS
KED	MR GOODALL
WED	MR SAMUEL
PLANNING STAFF	MR DAUNT
RES D	MR DAVID THOMAS
INPO D	MR BRAITHWAITE
PUSD	MR O'NEILL

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File MS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 November 1985

Dear Len,

INF DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS

Thank you for your letter of 6 November about the Netherlands Government's decision to deploy Cruise missiles.

18

The Prime Minister is content to send a message to Mr Lubbers in the terms proposed. I should be grateful if the telegram enclosed with your letter could be despatched.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JA

CPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
 Agree to send
 attached message
 to Mr. Lubbers?
 See Charles, CD? b/xi

6 November 1985

INF Deployment in The Netherlands

You will have seen from press reports that the Dutch Government duly decided to deploy Cruise missiles in the Netherlands in accordance with the NATO programme. I enclose, for ease of reference, Mr Margetson's telegram no 368 reporting this decision and reporting also the less welcome Dutch intention to shed two of its existing four nuclear tasks. The Foreign Secretary recognises the Dutch Government's domestic political reasons for its decision on nuclear tasks (over 3 million people in the Netherlands for example signed a petition against INF deployment). The consultations in NATO proposed by the Dutch about the nuclear tasks are unlikely to lead to a rethink. The effect is likely to be further difficulties over nuclear burden-sharing within the Allies.

Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks nevertheless that it would be right for the Prime Minister to congratulate Mr Lubbers on his firmness of purpose. He does not recommend that he or Michael Heseltine should send messages to Messrs van den Broek and de Ruiter for the reasons set out in the attached draft telegram.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram at the MOD.

Yours ever,
 Len Appleyard
 (L V Appleyard)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE	
ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	ZCZC CONFIDENTIAL FM FCO TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE TELNO OF 051725Z NOV 85 AND TO ROUTINE MOD UK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, BRUSSELS YOUR TEL 368: NETHERLANDS/INF 1. Grateful if you would pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lubbers: Quote. I congratulate you upon your resolve over the decision to deploy cruise missiles in the Netherlands. I know what problems you had. This is a significant contribution to the Alliance's firmness of purpose in the run-up to the Summit in Geneva. On the question of other nuclear tasks, you know our concerns and I very much welcome your decision to consult ^{within} with the Alliance before final decisions are taken. I believe that it is still most important to achieve an equitable sharing of burdens among the membership. Unquote. 2. We shall take no steps here to publicise the Prime Minister's message but there is no objection to Mr Lubbers giving it publicity if he wishes.			
		<i>Amud mb</i>			
YYY Y MAIN ADDITIONAL NNNN		Catchword:			
		File number	Dept WED	Drafted by (Block capitals) T A JONES	
				Telephone no 233 3266	
		Authorised for Initials Date/time despatch by:			
		For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	
				Processed by	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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1	<<<<
2	3. We have considered carefully the suggestion that messages
3	should be sent to the Foreign and Defence Ministers. In view of
4	the Dutch intention of dropping two of their existing nuclear
5	tasks (Orion and F16) we think one message enough and that it
6	would be difficult to strike a sufficiently warm and positive note
7	in a message to de Ruiters. I had a word with van den Broek at
8	Hanover on 5 November to express our appreciation for the
9	consistent strength of his own stand on this issue.
10	4. You should know that on the night of 4 November the
11	Netherlands Embassy in London was daubed with paint. There
12	appears to have been no explicit connection with the INF
13	deployment decision, though the timing suggests that opposition
14	to it was part of the motive (details follow by bag).
15	
16	HOWE
17	
18	YYYY
19	MAIN
20	MINIMAL
21	US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
22	ADDITIONAL
23	NO 10 DOWNING STREET
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For distribution order see Page	Catchword:
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UNCLASSIFIED
FM THE HAGUE
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO (040830Z)
TELNO 368
OF 021010Z NOVEMBER 85
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DUS(P) ACDS POL/NUC AND DNPS)
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON.
INFO PRIORITY BONN, ROME, PARIS, MOSCOW AND BRUSSELS.

NETHERLANDS/INF

SUMMARY

1. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A POSITIVE DECISION TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL BE SIGNED ON 4 NOVEMBER. THE DUTCH WILL SEEK EARLY NATO CONSULTATION ON THEIR PROPOSAL TO SHED THE F16 AND ORION NUCLEAR TASKS AND THEREBY REDUCE THEIR TASKS TO TWO (LANCE AND THE 8 INCH HOWITZER) :

DETAIL

2. AS REPORTED LAST NIGHT BY TELEPHONE TO THE RESIDENT CLERK, THE NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED AT 2030 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN A POSITIVE DECISION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF 48 CRUISE MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS. THE DEPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE SIGNED ON 4 NOVEMBER, AND WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE AS SOON AS IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT.

3. MR LUBBERS ALSO ANNOUNCED THE CABINET'S INTENTION TO DISCONTINUE THE ORION AND F16 NUCLEAR TASKS, LEAVING ONLY THE LANCE MISSILE SYSTEM AND THE 8 INCH HOWITZER. THE REDUCTION IN TASKS WOULD, 'MAKING DUE ALLOWANCE FOR MILITARY-TECHNICAL FACTORS', TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME AS CRUISE DEPLOYMENT ON DUTCH SOIL. NATO CONSULTATIONS COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS A FINAL DECISION ON NUCLEAR TASKS WOULD BE TAKEN. THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TO PRESENT THE FINAL DECISION ON NUCLEAR TASKS TO PARLIAMENT AT THE SAME TIME AS THEY SUBMITTED THE DRAFT LEGISLATION ON DEPLOYMENT (ABOUT THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER).

4. MR LUBBERS DESCRIBED AT LENGTH THE EFFORTS HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND TO THE APPEAL IMPLICIT IN THE 1 JUNE DECISION, ALL OF WHICH HAD FAILED. HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE LAST MINUTE INVITATION FROM THE RUSSIANS, OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS 'NOT A REAL INVITATION' BECAUSE IT WAS 'AN INVITATION TO POSTPONE, AND NOT AN INVITATION FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS'

HE ADDED THAT IN THE FUTURE HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR VAN DEN BROEK, WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO ANY SOVIET INVITATION TO TALKS "PROVIDED IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS WERE NOT ATTACHED TO IT" BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IN THE "NEW POST 1 NOVEMBER SITUATION" ANY PROPOSALS ARISING FROM SUCH TALKS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT TO THE NETHERLANDS NATO PARTNERS AND IN PARTICULAR THE NETHERLANDS "TREATY PARTNER" (THE UNITED STATES).

5. AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER OF 1 NOVEMBER FROM THE CABINET TO PARLIAMENT EXPLAINING THE DECISION IN MORE DETAIL FOLLOWS BY BAG LEAVING HERE 4 NOVEMBER.

6. SEEMIFT.

MARGETSON

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS	
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SOVIET D	PS/MR RENTON
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KAD	MR DEREK THOMAS
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MR SAMUEL
MR ~~WINTER~~ DAUNT
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
B. NPS (S) }
DACU }

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

UNCLASSIFIED
FM THE HAGUE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 365
OF 311515Z OCTOBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, MOSCOW.

NETHERLANDS INF DEPLOYMENT

1. THE PRIME MINISTER, MR LUBBERS, THIS AFTERNOON CONFIRMED IN PARLIAMENT EARLIER MEDIA REPORTS THAT HE RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON 30 OCTOBER INVITING HIM FOR TALKS IN MOSCOW WITH THE SOVIET PREMIER ON NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES. THE INVITATION WAS CONDITIONAL ON THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT DELAYING ITS DECISION ON CRUISEMISSILE DEPLOYMENT. LUBBERS TOLD PARLIAMENT THAT IN HIS OPINION THE INVITATION SHOULD NOT SERVE AS GROUNDS FOR THE CABINET TO DEFER TOMORROW'S DECISION.

MARGETSON

YYYY

11/11/85

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File

DSC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MISS MULLIGAN

CABINET OFFICE

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Your letter of 23 September to John Pitt-Brooke. I agree to the removal of the CMO designation from the papers concerned.

Charles Powell

23 September 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

DSC



70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A085/2420

23 September 1985

Dear John,

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

I am writing to seek your agreement and that of copy recipients to the removal of the CMO designation from the papers on the above subject. A list of the main correspondence is --- attached at Annex A though this will not include internal papers.

As you know, it is desirable to de-CMO papers, when they no longer require the additional protection offered by CMO procedures, as this greatly facilitates their filing and disposal. (Richard Hatfield's Private Secretary letter of 12 September (PS(85) 18) covers this point in greater detail).

The papers will of course retain their security classification and any other handling instructions.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and to Charles Powell at No 10.

*Yours
Ros*

(Rosalind Mulligan)
Assistant Private Secretary

J S Pitt-Brooke Esq

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

S/S Defence to PM	1 June 1984
Coles to Mottram	4 June 1984
Lord President to S/S Defence	5 June 1984
Mottram to Bone	4 June 1984
Chancellor of the Exchequer to S/S Defence	5 June 1984
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to PM	6 June 1984
S/S Environment to PM	12 June 1984
Home Secretary to PM	15 June 1984
Lord Chancellor to PM	20 June 1984
S/S Defence to PM	25 June 1984
Powell to Mottram	29 June 1984
S/S Environment to PM	28 June 1985
Romberg to Morris	12 July 1984
S/S Defence to PM	20 July 1984
Home Secretary to PM	24 July 1984
Peretz to Powell	27 July 1984
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to PM	24 July 1985
Powell to Mottram	25 July 1984



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 18/3

6th June 1985

ESP 6/7

New hen.

INTRODUCTION OF NEW US NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS INTO EUROPE

The US Ambassador, Charles Price, called on the Defence Secretary this morning, at Mr Heseltine's request, to discuss the introduction into Europe of new US nuclear artillery shells.

The Defence Secretary drew Ambassador Price's attention to the testimony given by Dr Wagner before a Sub-Committee of the House Appropriations Committee which implied that British Ministers had endorsed US plans to introduce new weapons systems into Europe but had denied this in the House of Commons. In fact our clear understanding of the position had been that we were engaged in a consultation process following the presentation by SACEUR to the Luxembourg NPG and that decisions would be taken in the Autumn. Now the US Government, without consultation with us or indeed without informing us, had introduced the new W79 artillery shell in advance of the further meeting of Ministers. Once this became known the British Government would be placed in a very difficult position. We could not argue that it was in accordance with the agreement reached by Ministers since in our view it was not. Nor could we say that we had been consulted. We should have no effective answer to opposition claims that consultation procedures within the Alliance were a sham.

Ambassador Price said that he did not know why Dr Wagner had given the evidence referred to. As to the W79 this was being deployed with US troops in Germany and the American Government had therefore consulted the West German Government about it. Deployment now was consistent with the agreed minute at the end of the Luxembourg NPG meeting which had: "invited the Permanent Representatives to provide a progress report to Ministers at the Autumn NPG meeting reflecting the status of implementation of SACEUR's recommendations". This clearly implied that there would

L Appleyard Esq
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office



be implementation of SACEUR's proposals between now and the Autumn and this was what the US Government had done.

The Defence Secretary said that he could not accept this interpretation. Effectively a decision that had been reserved to Ministers in the Autumn had been pre-empted by the US Government which had jumped the gun. SACEUR's detailed proposals had been unveiled only at the meeting itself and further detail had been promised to capitals subsequently. It was pointed out that a number of SACEUR's proposals were contentious and were not acceptable to the US Government: it could not therefore be a case of implementation of agreed recommendations. It was not simply a question for the US and West German Government: the US troops concerned were assigned to NATO and the weapons concerned were covered by NATO-wide considerations. In fact it was a classic example of the US Government going ahead without proper consultation and without suitable consideration of the public relations implications in Europe.

The Defence Secretary went on to point out that this was not the first occasion of this kind. He had heard of the President's original speech launching the Strategic Defence Initiative by telephone on his return from spending two days with Mr Weinberger at a Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Portugal. Last December in Brussels the US Government had failed to consult us over the launching of the Conventional Defence Initiative. It was ridiculous to behave in this way since, if we were consulted properly, we could be helpful in the launching of such initiatives. Either it reflected a paranoia over security and leaks or an American view that we were not important enough to be consulted. The effect on public opinion in this country could be very damaging.

Finally in discussion of what should be said if the issue arose in the House of Commons next week during the Defence Debate, it was agreed that it might be necessary to admit to a difference of opinion over what had been agreed at Luxembourg; the British Government's view was that implementation was a matter for consideration by Defence Ministers in the Autumn; if the deployment of the W79 became known, we should have to make it clear that we had not been consulted.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell.(No 10) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)



bc Sir P Craddock

13

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1985

**INTRODUCTION INTO EUROPE OF NEW US
NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS**

The Prime Minister has noted the Defence Secretary's further minute of 3 June about the potential political embarrassment caused by the US decision to deploy new W79 nuclear artillery shells to US forces in Germany. She intends to raise this matter with Secretary Shultz when she sees him on 7 June. It would be helpful if an appropriate line could be included in the briefing for that meeting.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

MO 18/3

PRIME MINISTER

Pine Linster 12
 Can night rise
 this with George
 Schultz on Friday.
 CAP. 3/6.

INTRODUCTION INTO EUROPE OF NEW US NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS

Immediately I heard that new W79 nuclear artillery shells were being deployed to US forces in Germany, I asked my office to inform yours of the background in some detail. Denis Brennan's letter to Charles Powell of 31st May sets out the position. I have now had the chance to discuss this matter, however, and I must tell you that that letter does not highlight sufficiently the potential political embarrassment caused by the United States action.

2. The Ministerial decision taken in 1983 to modernise the shorter range nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe whilst reducing their total numbers was in general, non-specific terms. Implementation was to be subject to a detailed study by SACEUR which would be put to the Alliance. This detailed study was made available to us on 26th March this year and the presumption here was that decisions consequent upon it would be taken in Autumn 1985 in the appropriate NATO meeting and following bilateral consultations and exchanges of views between SACEUR and the nations involved. In our case these are due to take place this week. At no stage have we been aware of the discussions which have been continuing between the Americans and the Germans to act in advance of a Ministerial consensus on the SACEUR study. It is only two weeks since I saw Cap Weinberger personally and only one week since General Vessey, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, had a private meeting with me. Consequently, Ministers of this department have repeatedly taken the public line that any specific modernisation arising from the Montebello decision would be subject to collective consideration and that no decisions have yet been made. This I believed to be the case.



3. Mr Weinberger has written the attached letter to me. It is a quite inadequate explanation but sadly characteristic of the way in which we were treated over SDI and indeed over the initiation of the Conventional Defence Improvements exercise.
4. The acute embarrassment is the evidence given by Dr Wagner before the House Appropriations Committee, (I attach an excerpt) which effectively presents the view that Ministers in Britain knew what was happening but had kidded along their public.
5. I do not need to tell you of the damage which would be caused by revelation of the fact that the Americans behave in this way, when it is the central thesis of the Alliance that we are involved in decision making and properly consulted, particularly on nuclear matters. Time and again, I have spelled out to them the consequences when Ministers in Europe are put in this position. It is sad that such protestations have so little effect, as each of these episodes appears simply to be a re-run of what went before.
6. As to the way forward, it is not possible for Ministers here to allow it to be thought that we misled Parliament when in practice we acted in the best of faith; and the best that we can now say in response to expected questioning is that there has been no collective NATO decision, at Ministerial or any other level, in respect of deployment of new systems and that British Ministers will address these matters in the NATO meeting scheduled for the Autumn in the context of implementation of the Montebello decision.
7. The tragedy of this incident is that, on defence grounds, I believe that there is an overwhelming case for proceeding to introduce the W79, as the United States have done. It is simply the handling of the matter which causes concern.
8. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

hsh
Ministry of Defence

3rd June 1985

SECRET

June 1, 1985

Dear Michael:

As you know, the President recently approved deployment of W79 8-inch non-enhanced radiation artillery rounds for US forces in Germany, to replace the current W33 rounds on a less than one-for-one basis. The first rounds were delivered to Germany on May 29.

This deployment is fully in accord with the Ministerial decision at Montebello to maintain a credible deterrent posture in NATO with a minimum number of nuclear weapons. The requirement for improved artillery rounds was a principal recommendation in this regard. The deployments also support SACEUR's statement at Luxembourg that we must have new nuclear artillery rounds in the Alliance.

Given the recognized need for improved artillery rounds, we began bilateral consultations with the Germans prior to SACEUR's presentation to the March NPG. We both feel that this action is required now. We do not feel that we need to delay this improvement measure until after the individual Alliance members with a nuclear role present their final views on SACEUR's overall plan.

The NPG agreed minutes from both Montebello and Luxembourg note the need for improvements in forces across the entire spectrum of capabilities. Deployment of the W79 non-enhanced radiation rounds is a very important step in meeting this need.

This action has been held very closely because of the potential for an inaccurate, but nevertheless sensational, association with the "neutron bomb" incident. Because of our special relationship, we informed MOD London prior to our deployment. The only other parties to receive advance notice were Lord Carrington and General Rogers.

I am sure you share my feeling that deployment of the W79 is vital to the modernization goals of the Alliance, and will help to enhance NATO's deterrent posture.

Sincerely,

/s/

Cap

SECRET

EXCERPT OF TESTIMONY GIVEN ON 20 MARCH 1985 by Dr. Richard Wagner, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy before the House Appropriations Committee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee

MR. FAZIO: I guess one of the questions that I would like to get more information on is the assertion that I have heard several times that the Europeans have agreed to deploy. I have some testimony that I have been able to get from the British Government, on June 7, 1984, from British Minister of Defence Procurement Geoffrey Pattie. No decisions have been made on replacement of existing 155 mm nuclear military rounds deployed in Europe. That was in the House of Commons. On January 8, 1985, Adam Butler, told the House of Commons that nuclear shells for artillery, deployed in the UK are provided by the United States of America. No proposal have (sic) been made for their modernization.

On February 26, 1985, in the House of Commons, NATO Ministers identified a range of possible improvements and SACEUR is undertaking the review, but no specific proposals have been made. All of this implies that as far as the British are concerned, the issue has certainly not been resolved in the kind of open and shut way that I think we have been led to believe in the response to the requirements of the Nunn-Johnston amendment, and what this Committee had experienced in the conference with the Senate Appropriations Committee on this issue.

In other words, the European agreement is far less tangible and more tenuous, I think it would be fair to say, than we have been told.

DR. WAGNER: I would disagree.

MR. FAZIO: I know you desire to move forward, but I am questioning where the evidence is.

DR. WAGNER: I think all of those statements are in the context of SACEUR not having made a numerical proposal for how he is going to split out his remaining reduced number. The official, agreed-to NATO statement, which I believe has to carry a tremendous amount of weight was issued in Montebello which did endorse modernization of the short range systems.

MR. FAZIO: I have a copy of that, and it does, in fact, make some general relationships. It does talk about modernization (section deleted)

...in Europe is one phase, but I am not sure that really ties it down. I understand on the 26th and 27th of this month the NATO nuclear planning group is meeting and at that time, according to Michael Heseltine, we shall have to discuss which of the remaining capabilities has to be modernized.

That is obviously a dual decision. How far can we make progress I cannot anticipate. In effect, they think the decision is still ahead of us.

DR. WAGNER: I think not. I think what they feel is still ahead of them is General Rogers three significant figure numbers. I am rather certain that they have committed to modernization of the short range systems. You know, they discussed that and (deleted)

MR. FAZIO: Is it their desire not to be explicit for home consumption?

DR. WAGNER: Probably.

MR. FAZIO: So we are left with some vague generalities which we interpret one way and the local folks in Britain and Germany to interpret another way? Isn't that really the political reality we are dealing with?

DR. WAGNER: Maybe so, I wouldn't call it a vague generality. I think it was a NATO document that was endorsed by the Ministers.

MR. FAZIO: I wonder if you expect anything more explicit from the Allies than what we have now?

DR. WAGNER: Yes. At some point. In terms of a public statement, I wouldn't know whether we will see a public statement that is more explicit than we have now.

Defence Pt 5

INF

3 JUN 1985

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Pure Minister

To note

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30/5



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-25302822 218 2111/3

MO 18/3

MT

31st May 1985

Dear Charles,

INTRODUCTION INTO EUROPE OF NEW US NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS

Officials here were informed by the US Embassy on 29th May that, following consultations with the German government, the United States are deploying new W79 nuclear artillery shells to their forces in Germany. No announcement is planned, but the chances of a leak must be high.

The W79 round is designed to replace the W33 nuclear shell and to be fired from the M110 8" howitzer currently in service in the nuclear role with the forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Turkey. But the initial delivery of W79 shells is for the use of United States forces only. We understand that only a small proportion (less than 10%) of the current total stock of W33 shells is currently being replaced.

The W79 is not an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but there have been press reports that it, together with a new nuclear round being produced by the United States for the 155mm gun, the W82, is convertible to ERW form. Speculation has centred on the suggestion that the United States is planning to introduce the neutron bomb into Europe by the back door.

In fact, we understand that the W79 is convertible to ERW only with some difficulty and under near laboratory conditions, which effectively means after reprocessing in the United States. (This is not, incidentally, the case with W82, which, subject to the availability of parts, could easily be converted in the field). Moreover, Presidential and indeed Congressional approval would be required before conversion could take place. At present, Congress has specifically prohibited the manufacture of either the W79 or the W82 in the ERW version. In itself, therefore, the "neutron bomb" issue would appear to be manageable in relation to the current deployment.

C Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street



The deployment, however, raises questions about the implementation of the decision taken by NATO Defence Ministers at the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Montebello in 1983 to reduce the total quantity of nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe and to modernise and improve what remained. The communique from that meeting recognised the need for the minimum level stockpile to be survivable, responsive and effective and spoke of Ministers having "identified a range of possible improvements". Implementation of the Montebello decision was made subject, however, to a report by SACEUR, which was only delivered at the NPG meeting in Luxembourg this March. The communique from the March meeting said that Ministers would consider SACEUR's recommendations, details of which were not disclosed, and continue close consultations on their implementation.

Against that background, the line taken by British Ministers in response to questions about the introduction of new nuclear systems in Europe has been that modernisation is the subject of confidential recommendations which are now being considered. The current deployment, although it may be argued is only a prudent modernisation consistent as to quantity with the ceilings set at Montebello, appears at variance with that line and indeed with the agreement to consult. An added complication is that it tends to support assertions made by the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for Atomic Energy that NATO Ministers specifically endorsed the introduction of new nuclear artillery shells into Europe as part of the 1983 Montebello decision. This was reported in the Observer on Sunday (cutting attached).

We have already pointed out to the United States authorities through their Embassy in London, that their decision, whether it becomes public or not, makes it difficult for us to hold the line that the implementation of the Montebello decision is the subject of collective, confidential Alliance consideration. We have also pointed out some of the difficulties with which British Ministers will be faced if news of the deployment becomes public. We have asked for clarification and explanations which may be helpful in developing lines of response.

We have also raised the matter with German officials. They appear more relaxed than we are, perhaps because, as host nations, they have had full explanations from the United States and because they have taken a more forward line with their public on stockpile modernisation.

My Secretary of State has asked me to let you know of this development. I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO).

Yours ever,
 Denis

(D BRENNAN)

MPs misled on neutron shells plan for Europe

by DAVID LEIGH

BRITAIN has secretly agreed to US plans to deploy in Europe new nuclear artillery shells of the 'neutron-bomb' type, according to American officials, who claim that Ministers are deliberately concealing details from Parliament.

In testimony to a Washington congressional committee, Dr Richard Wagner, assistant to the Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, was confronted with denials from British defence ministers that any proposals for 'modernisation' had been even made, let alone accepted.

In Washington, Dr Wagner poured scorn on statements made to the House of Commons. He said NATO Ministers had specifically endorsed the new 155 mm and 8-inch nuclear artillery shells as long ago as October 1983, along with cruise, Pershing, a new B-61 tactical bomb, and other missiles.

Dr Wagner was asked about denials by junior defence minister Adam Butler who said: 'No decisions have yet been made on replacement of the existing 155 mm nuclear military rounds.'

Dr Wagner said he disagreed that there was no tangible European agreement to deploy. The 1983 NATO meeting 'did endorse modernisation of the short-range systems.'

He was then presented with a statement in Parliament by Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine, which implied that Britain's decision remained still

to be made. Mr Heseltine had then said: 'We shall have to discuss which of the remaining capabilities have to be modernised. This is obviously a dual decision.'

Dr Wagner's comment was: '... I am rather certain they have committed to modernisation of the short-range systems.'

The rest of his explanation has been deleted from the Congressional transcript on grounds of confidentiality. It resumes with Dr Wagner being asked: 'Is it their desire not to be explicit for home consumption?' He replied laconically: 'Probably.'

He was asked: 'So we are left with some vague generalities which we interpret one way, and the local folks in Britain and Germany are to interpret another way...?'

'More explicit'

Dr Wagner replied that he expected something 'more explicit' from the Allies at some point, but 'I don't know whether we will see a public statement that is more explicit than what we have now.'

The only point which still remained to be decided, said Dr Wagner, was the precise numbers of each kind of 'battlefield' nuclear weapon to be deployed in future.

'It was a rather courageous thing for the Alliance in those governments to bite off a document that addresses the whole ball of wax and with as much emphasis on modernisation as it has... NATO does

come through, you know. They did come through on Pershing and Cruise and they are continuing to come through.'

The US Army in Europe has nuclear guns, anti-aircraft missiles and landmines, some of which are issued to British forces. For 16 years, it has been campaigning to modernise its artillery shell, arguing that it could be used against Soviet troops in 'flexible response' battles somewhere midway between conventional fighting and full-scale nuclear holocaust.

The new shell, a miniature nuclear bomb about six inches across, is highly controversial on both sides of the Atlantic. It will be adaptable for 'enhanced radiation' to make it similar to the 'neutron bomb' which was halted in 1978 by the Carter administration.

The Reagan administration has had difficulty getting funds to develop it. Claims that the European allies want, and indeed need it, for their new generation of nuclear artillery, are helpful in the quest for cash.

But in Britain, any admission that more tactical weapons are being deployed with a potentially aggressive nuclear war-fighting role, will attract the attention of the peace movement.

The 'modernisation' plans were agreed at Montebello in Canada in 1983, at a meeting where linked decisions to scrap some 2,000 obsolete tactical weapons in Europe were presented as a step towards disarmament by the West.

£7.5m bill for broken

ARTHUR OSMAN reveals a disturbing trend in home accidents

INJURIES caused by breaking glass in and windows caused two-thirds of the home accidents responsible for 50,000 and bottles were responsible for 17,000



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1985

Dear Charles,

INF Deployment in Belgium

The Belgian Government have brought to a close for the time being the debate over whether to go ahead with INF deployment. Mr Martens announced to the Belgian Parliament this afternoon that the first flight of 16 GLCM would be deployed at Florennes immediately. But he also outlined a complicated procedure, linked to progress at the Geneva talks, covering the remaining 32 missiles. He listed the following possibilities:

- (a) in the event of US/Soviet agreement on limited INF deployment in Europe, Belgium would take its share;
- (b) if, by the end of 1987, the talks had failed, Belgium would deploy in full;
- (c) if the negotiations were still going on at the end of 1987 there would be a 6 month postponement after which deployment would take place automatically on 1 July 1988 in the absence of an agreement.

This is a fairly tortuous outcome, and it is of course most regrettable that the Belgians have not felt able to opt unconditionally for full deployment. But at least the first flight of GLCM will be on the ground within a very short time. In terms of Alliance solidarity at the outset to the Geneva process, the Belgians have ensured that the American negotiating position is not seriously undermined, as might have been the case. There will also be a clear signal to the Russians of the West's refusal to accept Soviet demands for a moratorium. Separately the Belgian decision may reinforce Dutch resolve to go ahead when their decision is due in November, although that will depend on the level of SS20 deployments rather than on progress in Geneva.

Martens did not announce any timetable for delivery of the first flight. The US have told us that they intend to deliver the first equipment, including warheads, early this evening. As the Prime Minister is already aware, we

/are

MS
Prime Minister
Its a fine point: but
I don't think this quite
qualifies for a
message of pleasure
from
you,
CDP 15/3

SECRET



are cooperating fully with the Americans on the modalities.

In response to questions from the press, the FCO spokesman will say that we welcome the Belgian Government's decision to begin deployment of its share of NATO INF in accordance with the 1979 Ministerial decision. We shall also refer to the readiness of the Alliance to halt, reverse or modify its INF deployments in accordance with a negotiated agreement.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Prime Minister (2)

M&T 13/3

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WASHINGTON TELNO 824 (NOT TO ALL) : BELGIUM AND INF

1. THE BELGIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS DURING THE WEEKEND BUT A DEFINITIVE DECISION ON INF HAS EVIDENTLY STILL NOT BEEN TAKEN. THE DELAY IS PARTLY DUE TO THE LINKAGE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN INF AND THE ECONOMIC PACKAGE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE COALITION, ON WHICH THERE ARE STILL UNRESOLVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND LIBERALS.

2. DEHAENE (CVP MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS) IS AUTHORITATIVELY REPORTED TO BE RESISTING LIBERAL PRESSURE FOR CUTS IN SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND ALSO TO BE LEADING THE REARGUARD ACTION BY CVP LEFT-WING FOR A DELAY IN THE START OF INF DEPLOYMENT. HIS GROUP MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A KITE-FLYING PRESS REPORT LATE LAST WEEK SAYING THAT THE ARRIVAL OF INF WARHEADS WOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL JULY FOR TECHNICO-MILITARY REASONS, NAMELY INADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY. THIS IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND HAS BEEN FIRMLY DENIED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

3. SPECULATION IS BEGINNING THAT A GOVERNMENT DECISION ON THE MISSILES MAY NOW BE DELAYED SEVERAL MORE DAYS. CHERNENKO'S DEATH MAY MAKE THIS MORE LIKELY. ACCORDING TO MY US COLLEAGUE MARTENS HAD ALREADY LAST WEEK BEEN THINKING OF GOING TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER A DECISION TO DEPLOY ON TIME, IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE DECISION TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE CVP LEFT COULD WELL NOW PRESS MARTENS TO ATTEND CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL BEFORE A FINAL DECISION, IN ORDER TO SOUND OUT THE NEW SOVIET LEADER ON WHAT THE SOVIET REACTION WOULD BE TO A BELGIAN DECISION TO DELAY DEPLOYMENT. PUBLICLY MARTENS IS OF COURSE STILL COMMITTED ONLY TO TAKING A DECISION BEFORE THE END OF MARCH.

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4. MY US COLLEAGUE IS HAVING MARTENS AND TINDENHANS TO LUNCH TODAY TO MEET KAMPELMAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES. HE HAS PROMISED ME A REPORT ON THE OUTCOME THIS AFTERNOON. IF THIS DOES NOT PRODUCE ANY CLARITY ABOUT MARTENS' INTENTIONS, THE TIME MAY HAVE COME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONSIDER HAVING A WORD WITH MARTENS OR SENDING HIM A MESSAGE TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT WHAT IS BECOMING AN EXTREMELY UNDIGNIFIED FAILURE BY THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A DECISION, EVEN WHEN FULL ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF THE NEED FOR THE COALITION TO HOLD TOGETHER.

JACKSON

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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MR WESTON

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

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FROM UKDEL NATO 071037Z MAR 85
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 7 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE

BRUSSELS TELNO 81 TO YOU (NOT TO BONN): BELGIUM AND INF

1. CARRINGTON AGAIN SUMMONED THE US, GERMAN AND ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND MYSELF THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN MARTENS EARLIER TO-DAY, TOGETHER WITH TANDEMANS AND, FROM THE DESCRIPTION, THE DIRECTEUR DU CABINET. MARTENS HAD SAID THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT OPTION B IN MY TELNO 67 (TO POSTPONE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT UNTIL THE SUMMER) HAD NO MERIT. NEVERTHELESS HE STILL BELIEVED HE MUST HAVE SOME QUOTE BONE UNQUOTE FOR HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES. HE PROPOSED THEREFORE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST 16 AND TO ANNOUNCE THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THE FINAL 32 WOULD BE DELAYED BY SIX MONTHS, SUBJECT TO THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT TIME.

2. CARRINGTON ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE SECOND PART OF THIS PROPOSITION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD LEAVE THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY OPEN TO ALL THE PRESSURES THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NO DOUBT EXERT, INCLUDING ATTRACTIVE-LOOKING PROPOSITIONS IN GENEVA IN THE INF FIELD. TANDEMANS THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD MERELY STATE THAT THE FINAL 32 WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN MARCH 1988. IN DISCUSSION THIS IDEA WAS REFINED BY SUBSTITUTING QUOTE BY MARCH 1988 AT THE LATEST UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE IN MARCH UNQUOTE. MARTENS AND TANDEMANS SEEMED TO BE TAKEN WITH THIS, ALTHOUGH THE DIRECTEUR DU CABINET EXPRESSED DOUBTS. MARTENS WOULD BE MEETING THE REST OF HIS CABINET THIS EVENING AND STILL INTENDS TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION THIS WEEKEND.

3. CARRINGTON TOLD US THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THIS PROPOSAL, IF ADOPTED, WOULD NOT BE TOO BAD. IN PUBLIC THE DELAY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO TECHNICAL REASONS AND THE BULL POINT WAS THAT THE IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST 16 WOULD GO AHEAD, AND THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER REVIEW, BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL 1979 DECISION. CARRINGTON HOPED THAT WE WOULD RECOMMEND ACQUIESCENCE IN THIS PROPOSAL TO OUR GOVERNMENTS. ALL FOUR OF US AGREED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT TOO BAD AND WAS IN ANY CASE PROBABLY THE BEST WE COULD HOPE TO GET. I SAID THAT OUR FINAL DEPLOYMENT WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE IN 1988, WHICH MIGHT ALSO BE HELPFUL BACKGROUND IN PUBLIC PRESENTATION.

GRAHAM



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FROM UKDEL NATO 041050Z MAR 85
 TO PRIORITY F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 4 MARCH
 INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS
 INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON ROME BONN

BRUSSELS TELNO 74 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL):

INF DEPLOYMENT: BELGIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION

1. SPEAKING IN CONFIDENCE, WHICH HE ASKED US TO PROTECT, CARRINGTON TODAY TOLD THE US AND GERMAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE ITALIAN CHARGE, IN ADDITION TO MYSELF, THAT MARTENS AND TIMDEMANS CAME TO SEE HIM AFTER THEIR MEETING AT CHEQUERS ON SATURDAY 2 MARCH (PARA 3 OF T U R) MARTENS HAD SAID THAT HE HAD THREE CHOICES:

- A. TO DECIDE NEXT WEEKEND (THIS SEEMS TO BE THE CRUCIAL DATE) TO DEPLOY AND TO GO AHEAD WITH IT IMMEDIATELY;
- B. TO DECIDE NEXT WEEKEND TO DEPLOY BUT TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT UNTIL JUNE;
- C. TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT OF 16 WOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED, BUT THAT BEFORE THE FINAL 32 WERE DEPLOYED IN 1987 THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD REASSESS THE POSITION.

2. CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD MARTENS THAT HE THOUGHT THE LAST CHOICE WAS POSSIBLY THE WORST OF THEM ALL (EVEN THOUGH IT COULD BE REPRESENTED AS MERELY RESTATING THE POSITION UNDER THE 1979 DECISION), SINCE IT WOULD BE FASHIONING A FURTHER ROD FOR THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN BACK AND REASSESSMENT WOULD INVOLVE A SECOND POSITIVE DECISION. THE SECOND CHOICE SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE OR NO ADVANTAGE AND WOULD ALLOW CONTINUING PRESSURE FOR POSTPONEMENT. CARRINGTON'S FIRM ADVICE WAS TO GO FOR THE FIRST. MARTENS SAID THAT HE SAW ALL THESE ARGUMENTS BUT NEEDED A QUOTE BONE UNQUOTE FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT WHO WERE UNHAPPY. HE TOLD CARRINGTON, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS QUITE CONFIDENT OF CARRYING WHATEVER DECISION HE TOOK THROUGH PARLIAMENT.

3. CARRINGTON SAID THAT MARTENS HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD SPOKEN IN THESE TERMS TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHO HAD FIRMLY ADVISED THE FIRST CHOICE. CARRINGTON WISHED THE US, GERMAN AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS TO BE AWARE OF THE POSITION, WITHOUT GIVING AWAY THE FACT TO THE BELGIANS: IN THE EVENT THAT THE BELGIANS APPROACHED THESE GOVERNMENTS YET AGAIN, HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD ALL FIRMLY ADVISE THE FIRST CHOICE.

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4. THERE WAS SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION BUT ALL SAID THAT THIS WAS THE POSITION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND WOULD NO DOUBT BE MADE CLEAR AGAIN IF NECESSARY.

GRAHAM

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IMMEDIATE

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FM BRUSSELS 251200Z FEB 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE: WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY: BONN ROME PARIS THE HAGUE

INFO SAVING: ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG
MADRID OSLO OTTAWA

MY TELNO 65: BELGIUM AND INF

SUMMARY

1. MY US COLLEAGUE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SPECULATION THAT EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT DECIDES FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO, ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL JUNE. LORD CARRINGTON COULD NOT GET ANY REASSURANCES FROM TINDEMANS WHEN HE SPOKE TO HIM ON 23 FEBRUARY. SHULTZ IS EXPECTED TO TELEPHONE MARTENS ON REAGAN'S BEHALF TO STRESS THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENT ON TIME.

2. THE AMERICANS MAY BE OVER-REACTING. I DO NOT AT PRESENT RECOMMEND ANY MINISTERIAL INTERVENTION ON OUR PART IN ADVANCE OF MARTENS' VISIT ON SATURDAY, EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR A WORD BY YOU WITH TINDEMANS IN THE MARGINS OF THE FAC ON THURSDAY. I SHALL ALSO MYSELF BE TRYING TO SPEAK TO MARTENS ON 27 FEBRUARY IN PREPARATION FOR THE VISIT.

DETAIL

3. MY US COLLEAGUE SWAEBE HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED BY THE SPECULATION ABOUT POSSIBLE DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT FOR THE US AMBASSADOR TO NATO TO HAVE ENCOURAGED LORD CARRINGTON TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM TINDEMANS. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD ME AT DINNER LAST NIGHT THAT WHEN HE CONTACTED TINDEMANS ON 23 FEBRUARY HE TOLD TINDEMANS THE SPECULATION CAUSED HIM A PROBLEM SINCE HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM TINDEMANS EARLIER IN THE WEEK THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOW ABOUT TO DECIDE TO GO AHEAD ON TIME. HE ASKED THAT HIS CONCERN BE CONVEYED TO MARTENS. TINDEMANS COULD NOT GIVE HIM ANY REASSURANCES.

4. TINDEMANS HAS ALSO TOLD SWAEBE THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT IS IN MARTENS' MIND BUT IS WORRIED AT THE INFLUENCE WHICH THE RENEWED PRESSURE FROM THE LEFT WING OF THE CVP, SUPPORTED BY DEHAENE, THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, MAY HAVE ON MARTENS' FINAL DECISION. SWAEBE TELLS ME THAT THE US AUTHORITIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY EXERCISED FOR SHULTZ TO BE TELEPHONING MARTENS ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN.

COMMENT

5. AS I SAID IN MY TUR AND THE DRAFT BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FOR 2 MARCH, THE SITUATION REMAINS UNCERTAIN. THERE IS STILL SOME RISK THAT A DECISION TO DEPLOY ON TIME COULD LEAD TO THE LEFT WING OF THE CVP BRINGING THE GOVERNMENT DOWN. THE APPARENT RESURGENCE LAST WEEK OF ACW OPPOSITION CANNOT THEREFORE BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.

6. FOR SEVERAL REASONS HOWEVER I THINK US FEARS MAY BE EXAGGERATED:

- (A) COL (THE FRANCOPHONE LIBERAL SENIOR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER) RETURNED LAST WEEK FROM A TRIP ABROAD AND IMMEDIATELY REAFFIRMED IN FORCEFUL TERMS THE NEED FOR BELGIUM TO PLAY THE PART ASSIGNED TO IT AND THEREBY MAINTAIN ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY. FOR MARTENS TO BACK-TRACK NOW COULD CAUSE A CRISIS IN THE COALITION WHICH HE WOULD WISH TO AVOID.

(B) TINDEMANS' REMARKS TO SWAEBE ARE REVEALING. IT IS MARTENS' STYLE TO KEEP THING VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST, AND I AM NOT PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT HE IS STILL NOT COMMITTING HIMSELF PUBLICLY AND NOW FORESEES ANOTHER WEEK OR SO OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE COALITION ON BUDGETARY POLICY (PRESS REPORTS TODAY SUGGEST THAT THESE WILL CONTINUE ON 3 MARCH AFTER HIS VISIT TO CHEQUERS). A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME TO THEM OR SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON THEM IS IN A TYPICALLY BELGIAN WAY AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PACKAGE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY WHICH MARTENS IS CURRENTLY TRYING TO STITCH TOGETHER IN PREPARATION FOR THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS. I HAD NOT EXPECTED A DECISION ON MISSILES UNTIL THE END OF THE PRESENT WEEK, AND WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY PERTURBED IF IT WERE THEN DELAYED A FEW DAYS LONGER.

(C) A PEACE MARCH FROM FLORENNES, WHERE THE MISSILES WILL BE BASED, ENDED YESTERDAY IN BRUSSELS WITH SOMETHING OF A CARNIVAL AIR AND WILL NOT HAVE PUT ANY NEW PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT. (A BIGGER DEMONSTRATION ON 17 MARCH COULD HOWEVER DO SO).

(D) TODAY'S EDITIONS OF THE FLEMISH NEWSPAPERS REGARDED AS THE VEHICLES OF THE CVP AND ACW ARE PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY, SILENT ON THE QUESTION OF MISSILES.

7. THE POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE OF A FURTHER NEW ELEMENT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. A PACIFIST DELEGATION RETURNED FROM MOSCOW LAST WEEK BEARING THE SAME MESSAGE THAT MOSCOW GAVE THE LEADER OF THE BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTY RECENTLY VIZ THAT IF THE BELGIANS WOULD MAKE A GESTURE BY NOT DEPLOYING MISSILES OR DELAYING A DECISION THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROVIDE AN QUOTE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE UNQUOTE. MARTENS RECEIVED THE DELEGATION, WHEREAS THE MFA SPOKESMAN PUT OUT A STRONG STATEMENT SAYING THAT IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD DISCUSS MATTERS AFFECTING BELGIAN SECURITY WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT USING ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, AND THAT THE UNILATERAL GESTURE SOUGHT BY THE SOVIET UNION WAS DESIGNED TO BREACH NATO SOLIDARITY. HOWEVER, I READ LITTLE MORE INTO THIS AT THE MOMENT THAN THAT THE DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH BETWEEN TINDEMANS AND MARTENS ON THE MISSILE ISSUES CONTINUES AND THAT TINDEMANS NERVE MAY BE CRACKING A BIT.

8. SWAEBE WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER WE WERE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE AMERICANS. I HAVE TOLD HIM AND LORD CARRINGTON THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM INCLINED TO TRUST TO MARTENS SKILL AND GOOD INTENTIONS FOR THE MOMENT AND TO LEAVE IT TO MRS THATCHER TO EXERCISE ANY FURTHER PRESSURE AT PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY AT CHEQUERS NEXT SATURDAY. MARTENS' VISIT MAY IN ANY CASE ACT AS A SPUR FOR HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO REACH A POSITIVE DECISION BY THE END OF THE WEEK. MEANWHILE HOWEVER I WOULD SEEK TO SEE MARTENS MYSELF ON 27 OR 28 FEBRUARY IN PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT. IF THERE IS ANY MESSAGE WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO CONVEY AT THAT POINT, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

9. I THINK IT COULD BE USEFUL ALSO IF YOU WERE TO SPEAK TO TINDEMANS ON THURSDAY IN THE MARGINS OF THE FAC AND ASK HIM TO REITERATE OUR CONCERN AT ANY POSSIBLE DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT, SO THAT HE COULD USE THIS WITH MARTENS AT THE REGULAR MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON FRIDAY, WHEN A DECISION COULD WELL BE TAKEN.

10. MY FRG COLLEAGUE IS ALSO FAIRLY RELAXED. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE DID NOT SHOW ANY SIGNS OF CONCERN WHEN FEIT SAW HIM TOWARDS THE END OF LAST WEEK. NOR DOES FEIT BELIEVE THAT KOHL WOULD WANT TO INTERVENE AT THIS STAGE, EXCEPT PERHAPS TO TELEPHONE MRS THATCHER LATER IN THE WEEK TO ENCOURAGE HER TO SPEAK AS NECESSARY ON BEHALF OF ALL THE OTHER BASING COUNTRIES DURING MARTENS' VISIT.

11. HOWEVER, IF THINGS LOOK LIKE DETERIORATING WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER INVITING THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS TO WEIGH IN AGAIN, POSSIBLY USING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC NET.

FCO PLEASE PASS ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG MADRID
OSLO OTTAWA

JACKSON

NNNN

TOP SECRET



Copy No. ⁹4 of 4 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 February 1985

INF DEPLOYMENTS IN BELGIUM:
DELIVERY OF WARHEADS

The Prime Minister has noted Lord Trefgarne's minute of 22 February informing her that agreement has been given in principle to an overflight of the United Kingdom by United States Air Force aircraft carrying nuclear warheads sometime in the period 24 February-12 March.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(Charles Powell)

Mrs Carole Tolley
Ministry of Defence

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'CP' or similar initials.



PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Copy No 1 of 4 8

Prime Minister

CDP
22/2

LOOSE MINUTE

D/US of S(AF)DGT 28/1/4/0

Prime Minister

INF DEPLOYMENTS IN BELGIUM: DELIVERY OF WARHEADS

In view of your planned meeting with Mr Martens at Chequers on 2 March, you may wish to be aware that the United States are making contingency plans against the possibility of an imminent decision by the Belgian government to deploy the first GLCMs at Florennes. The United States authorities believe that following such a decision Mr Martens may ask for urgent implementation so that the first missiles and warheads are delivered immediately.

So as to be able to respond quickly to such a request the Americans have asked for our agreement in principle to an overflight of the United Kingdom by one United States Air Force aircraft carrying nuclear warheads sometime in the period 24 February - 12 March. We could not expect to have more than about 15 hours warning of a final decision to deploy in this timescale. The United States, as a matter of routine, transport nuclear weapons over and to this country by aircraft. But, in meeting this particular request we would have unusually short warning of the overflight timings and, in giving this move priority, we might have to disrupt our own movement programme since, as a matter of safety policy, only one nuclear weapon move takes place in or over the United Kingdom at any one time. These problems are by no means insuperable and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office have therefore informed the United States of the Ministry of Defence's agreement in principle to their proposal.

I am copying this to the Foreign Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

22 February 1985

US of S(AF)

Subject



FILE

27

cc: PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December, 1984

cc Master

BELGIUM AND INF DEPLOYMENTS

Thank you for your letter of 30 November about the pressure on the Belgian Government to postpone GLCM deployments in Belgium.

The Prime Minister raised this with M. Martens in the margins of the Dublin European Council, speaking along the lines recommended in your letter. Martens was not very forthcoming. He claimed that, although the proposed evaluation was delayed, this did not necessarily mean the postponement of deployment. He laid much stress on the fact that he faced elections next year. The Prime Minister left him in no doubt of the importance which she attached to Belgium holding firm to its commitment and avoiding any hint of lack of cohesion and determination in the Alliance at a crucial moment.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

C. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

51

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEANE THOMAS
MR ~~GOODALL~~ GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR GARRISON WESTON

Powell
MR ~~SMITH~~ NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR BELLISSE DUS(?) MOD
ED/DS17 MOD

ED/DEF DEPT
ED/ACCD
ED/BOV D
ED/HAD
ED/RED
RESIDENT CLERK

Prime Minister
You might mention
this to Martens in
Dublin, if there is
a chance.

CJD
25/11

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRUSSELS 271700Z NOV 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 27 NOVEMBER 84
INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY : BONN PARIS THE HAGUE ROME
INFO SAVING : UKMIS VIENNA COPENHAGEN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS

MY TELNO 203: BELGIUM AND INF

mt

SUMMARY

1. PRESSURE FROM THE CVP (FLEMISH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY) ON MARTENS TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT IS GROWING. MARTENS IS STILL TRYING TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN BUT MAY HAVE TO RESPOND TO THIS IN SOME WAY. MY US COLLEAGUE BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY EVEN TAKE A DECISION AGAINST THE PRESENT TIMETABLE THIS WEEK. HE IS LOBBYING ACTIVELY WITHOUT PUBLICITY AGAINST THIS AND HAS ASKED FOR SUPPORT FROM ME AND MY FRG AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES. HE MAY BE UNDULY ALARMED, BUT I AM TRYING TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION AND WILL REPORT FURTHER. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY IN ANY CASE WISH TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MARTENS IN THE MARGINS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. THE FORMAL BELGIAN GOVERNMENT POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONDUCT A FURTHER EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER DEPLOYMENT SHOULD GO AHEAD. MARTENS CONFIRMED THIS TO ME WHEN I SPOKE TO HIM PRIVATELY LAST WEEK. HE COMMENTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD CERTAINLY DONE BETTER THAN THE DUTCH, BUT THAT THE TIME-TABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT WAS NOW NOT SO CERTAIN. MARTENS'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER HAS ALSO TOLD ME THAT MARTENS IS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE TIMING MIGHT SLIP.

3. ALL THIS REFLECTS THE GROWING FEELING IN THE CVP (FLEMISH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) AND ALSO TO A LESSER EXTENT IN THE PSC (FRANCOPHONE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) THAT BELGIUM SHOULD DELAY DEPLOYMENT. THIS TREND OF OPINION HAS BEEN FUELLED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF RENEWED US/SOVIET ARMS TALKS, WHICH BOTH MARTENS AND THE CVP PARTY PRESIDENT SWAELEN HAVE PLAYED UP AS AN

DEPLOYMENT. THIS TREND OF OPINION HAS BEEN FUELLED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF RENEWED US/SOVIET ARMS TALKS, WHICH BOTH HARTENS AND THE CVP PARTY PRESIDENT SWAELEN HAVE PLAYED UP AS AN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION. ON 26 NOVEMBER THE CVP PARTY BUREAU, REFLECTING WHAT IT CLAIMS TO BE MAJORITY OPINION AMONG THE CVP GRASS ROOTS, CAME OUT CLEARLY IN FAVOUR OF POSTPONEMENT.

4. THIS SHIFT IN THE CVP'S POSITION HAS LED TO A PUBLIC ROW WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS' LIBERAL PARTNERS IN THE COALITION, WHO REMAIN FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF STICKING TO THE NATO TIME-TABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GOL (FRANCOPHONE LIBERALS) HAS PUBLICLY CRITICISED THE CVP'S POSTURE, SAYING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS OVER 55 20 DEPLOYMENTS AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF POSTPONING DEPLOYMENT IN BELGIUM MERELY BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. SWAELEN IN TURN CONDEMNED GOL'S REMARKS AS TENDENTIOUS AND UNHELPFUL AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RESUMED.

5. TINDMANS (WHO IS ON THE RIGHT OF THE CVP) WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO STICK TO THE TIME-TABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT AND FEARS THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD UNDERMINE BELGIUM'S CREDIBILITY NOT ONLY WITH RPKMFKHSSZTH-Q'D 285C 85' 0953,58-1) ADVERSARIES. HE UNDERLINED THESE POINTS PUBLICLY ON TV LAST NIGHT. FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRY OFFICIALS ALSO HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT TALKS AS IF IT WERE IN ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION. BUT RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIDED TO US (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT TINDMANS NOW DOUBTS WHETHER HE CAN CARRY THE CVP AND THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY TOO BELIEVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A DECISION TO DELAY DEPLOYMENT, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE BY MARCH OF ANY ACTUAL PROGRESS ON ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. MY US COLLEAGUE ALSO BELIEVES THAT GOL AND TINDMANS ARE ISOLATED IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (THOUGH I UNDERSTAND SOME OTHER MINISTERS SUPPORT THEM, INCLUDING EYSKENS, THE CVP MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY), AND CLAIMS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN INVITED TO STAY AWAY FROM A COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING THIS THURSDAY OR FRIDAY IF THEY INTEND TO QUOTE CAUSE TROUBLE UNQUOTE.

6. HARTENS' FIRST PRIORITY NOW IS TO WIN THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTIONS. HE AND OTHER CVP POLITICIANS ARE PROBABLY RIGHT IN BELIEVING THAT THE PARTY WOULD GAIN ELECTORALLY FROM A DEFERMENT OF INF DEPLOYMENT, ESPECIALLY IF IT COULD BE PRESENTED AS A POSITIVE BELGIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE NO DOUBT HOPES THAT BELGIUM'S ALLIES WILL ACCEPT THAT A CHANGE IN THE TIME-TABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE PRICE TO PAY IF IT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONTINUATION AFTER THE NEXT ELECTIONS OF THE PRESENT CENTRE-RIGHT COALITION COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING NATO POLICY.

7. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS NOW JUST TOLD ME IN SOME ALARM THAT THE CVP POSITION COULD BECOME THE GOVERNMENT POSITION VERY SOON, POSSIBLY ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY. HE IS PRIVATELY LOBBYING URGENTLY AT ALL LEVELS TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO TAKE AN EARLY DECISION AGAINST DEPLOYMENT IN MARCH, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD UNDERMINE ALLIANCE AND BELGIAN CREDIBILITY AND THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION. HE IS UNDERLINING THAT THE CVP POSITION IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION. NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH ARE NOT DUE TO BEGIN IN JANUARY. A DECISION NOW NOT TO DEPLOY IN MARCH WOULD ALSO UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT IN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED. TO MEMBERS OF THE

ARE NOT DUE TO BEGIN IN JANUARY. A DECISION NOW NOT TO DEPLOY
IN MARCH WOULD ALSO UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT IN
COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED. TO MEMBERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT HE IS ARGUING THAT EVEN IF THEY CANNOT NOW DECIDE
FINALLY IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT IN MARCH, THEY SHOULD AT LEAST
NOT DECIDE AGAINST IT, AND COULD STILL THEN DEPLOY IN MARCH.

8. THE US AMBASSADOR IS URGING ME AND MY FRG AND ITALIAN
COLLEAGUES TO SUPPORT THE US ACTION, AND HOPES ALLIED GOVERN-
MENTS WILL ALSO SUPPORT IT IN NATO. FEIT (FRG) TELLS ME THAT
HE RAISED THE MATTER AT LUNCH TODAY WITH SWALEN, WHO
ARGUED THAT HARTENS COULD NOT BOTH DEPLOY IN MARCH AND WIN THE
ELECTIONS AND THAT SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE WAS ESSENTIAL.
SWALEN SEEMED TO THINK THAT SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE WAS
ESSENTIAL. SWALEN SEEMED TO THINK THAT SOME KIND OF TEMPORISING
BY THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO WIN THE ELECTIONS AND
STILL DEPLOY IN DUE COURSE. FEIT IS NOT SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS
FROM HIS GOVERNMENT UNTIL HE HAS ALSO SPOKEN TO DEPREZ, LEADER
OF THE PSC, WHOM HE IS IN ANY CASE SEEING ON 28 NOVEMBER.
CAVAGLIERI (ITALIAN) TELLS ME THAT HE HAS BEEN KEEPING HIS
GOVERNMENT UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS AND IS REPORTING THE
US AMBASSADOR'S APPROACH WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATIONS
AS REGARDS ACTION.

9. SEE MIFT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAYING UKMIS VIENNA COPENHAGEN LUXEMBOURG
ATHENS DUBLIN

JACKSON

NNNN

RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON NOVEMBER 28 1951
ED: BOSTON 11 28 51
RE: THE MATTER OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY IN GERMANY
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE
WESTERN ALLIES IN GERMANY.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE
WESTERN ALLIES IN GERMANY, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA HAS REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE
WESTERN ALLIES IN GERMANY. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
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TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE
WESTERN ALLIES IN GERMANY.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 November, 1984

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister
 It is suggested that
 you should raise this
 matter with Mr. Martens in

Belgium and INF Deployments the margins of the
 European Council.

The Belgian Government are under growing pressure from the Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP), one of the main coalition partners, to postpone GLCM deployments in Belgium due to begin in March 1985, purportedly in order to allow US/Soviet negotiations to proceed. In line with their present policy of reviewing deployment at intervals in the light of prospects for arms control negotiations, an "evaluation" is due in December. The Government could decide to hold this back pending the Shultz/Gromyko meeting on 7-8 January. Martens himself has referred to the announcement of this meeting as an important element in the situation. The real nub of the problem is that Martens, and perhaps Tindemans, may have concluded that the CVP will not defeat the Socialists in an election (due in 1985) if they go ahead with deployment, and are therefore tempted to delay the latter.

EDP
 1/12

There is some force in the Belgian Government's worries and it is relevant that HM Ambassador Brussels believes that the present coalition is the best that we or the Alliance could hope for. No alternative government would be likely to proceed with deployment.

A decision to delay the evaluation would represent a policy of playing the issue long. We could not complain at such a decision in itself. But the Americans are very exercised over INF deployment in Belgium and the weak attitude they believe the Government are taking. The US Ambassador mentioned this to the Foreign Secretary on 27 November and asked us to take parallel action along with the Americans and other close allies to stiffen the Belgians. The immediate American objective is to prevent any irrevocable Belgian decision being taken before Martens visits Washington on 14 January.

The Belgian Embassy in Washington have commented (Washington telegram 3557 attached) that Martens resents US pressure, and believe that he would pay more attention to views expressed by the Prime Minister and by Chancellor Kohl, particularly if this was done in private and without publicity. Chancellor Kohl and Herr Genscher have both spoken to Martens in the last few days. There is some evidence (Brussels telno 305, which you have already seen) that Allied lobbying is having some effect.



Instructions to act with Tindemans have been sent to Sir E Jackson, who has also recommended that the Prime Minister should raise the question with Martens in the margins of the European Council. The Foreign Secretary supports this recommendation. If the Prime Minister agrees, she might wish to make the following points:

- (i) have followed closely recent development concerning INF deployment in Belgium. Understand the real political difficulties. How do you intend to proceed?
- (ii) Will not complain of a policy of keeping options open at this stage by delaying the intended evaluation. But believe any decision by Belgium not to go ahead or even to delay deployment would be very bad for the Alliance. A unilateral move could undermine prospects in resumed US/Soviet negotiations; it would be a significant success for the Russians at the precise moment when they appear to have concluded that their pressure tactics have not worked; it would make implementation in event of unsuccessful negotiations more difficult; and it would further complicate position of the Netherlands.
- (iii) Strongly urge the Belgians to maintain Alliance cohesion at this vital moment. Martens' speech to the Belgian Royal Defence Institute on 12 November ("As for Belgium, she will maintain solidarity with her European and Atlantic partners and she will assume her responsibilities. Our defence policy will be the expression of this") struck exactly the right note on the need for solidarity. No concessions should be made in advance of resumed negotiations.
- (iv) My own experience is that public opinion on this issue becomes significantly more settled once deployment actually begins.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram in the MOD and Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Ch
Prime Minister

28 September 1984

CDP
207A

Dear Charles,

NATO Strategy Meeting on 1 October: INF

On 26 September John Weston mentioned to you that Admiral Eberle (Director of Chatham House) apparently intends to brief the Prime Minister about his recent discussions with the Russians on INF during the so-called Edinburgh Conversations in Moscow this month. I enclose a copy of an internal FCO minute setting out the background.

Admiral Eberle may raise this subject at the Chequers meeting on 1 October. We have not yet been able to put the papers to Sir Geoffrey Howe, but I enclose a copy of a brief which will go in his weekend box. You may think that the Prime Minister would also find the brief useful as a late addition to the material for the 1 October meeting, should the subject come up.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Richard Mottram in the MOD and to Bryan Cartledge in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Amended. I do not think
the PM should say that
S12 was an
unofficial figure.

Mr Gabbie
Mr Alston

From: P J WESTON
Date: 26 September 1984
cc: Private Secretary
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Goodall
Mr Derek Thomas
Planning Staff
Soviet Department
ACDD
DS17, MOD
DUS(P), MOD
AUS(D Staff), MOD

The attached brief
has been cleared with (10).
I also attach a draft
PS letter is No 10.

25
27/9

Defence Department

EDINBURGH CONVERSATIONS, 17 - 20 SEPTEMBER IN MOSCOW: INF

1. I have had an account from the Americans on a strictly personal basis (not for quoting back please) of the discussions which Admiral Sir James Eberle (Director, Chatham House), Mr John Roper and General Sir Hugh Beach held in Moscow with the Russians on INF during the so called Edinburgh Conversations from 17 - 20 September. This account causes me some concern.

2. I am told that Admiral Eberle advocated a freeze on INF deployments at their current levels as a first step toward the resumption of nuclear arms control talks and that this was reflected in the communique released by the UK/US group at his specific suggestion. Mr Roper proposed that all nuclear issues should be lumped together to establish through negotiations a new East/West nuclear balance which might meet Soviet interests by taking into account French and British systems. Mr Roper reported HMG's position as being that in the context of a US/Soviet agreement involving significant reductions in strategic arms, the UK might enter into a separate bilateral understanding with the Soviet Union and he speculated about the possibility of reducing the scope of British plans for modernising our nuclear forces. Admiral Eberle suggested for illustrative purposes that a new European balance might consist of 250 SS20s, 100 INF deployments and 160 UK/French nuclear systems.

3. These ideas apparently attracted some interest on the part of the Soviet side, which included General Milstein and General Mikhailov. The latter, who is a serving general staff officer, is reported to have said that he would personally take up these ideas with the new Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev.


- 2 -

4. Admiral Eberle is reported to have told the Russians that he would be seeing the British Prime Minister shortly after his return to the UK to discuss the ideas raised during the Edinburgh Conversations including that of a freeze on INF deployments.

5. If the British side did speak as reported to the Russians, as the Americans evidently firmly believe, this could have unfortunate consequences. I do not mean to imply that there is no scope for new thinking about the evolution of Western positions in INF, should an opportunity present itself. But as President Reagan said in his message to the Prime Minister, now is not the time for pre-emptive concessions. A moratorium on INF deployments is the very thing that NATO has most reason to fear as the next Soviet propaganda move and the recent discussion of this possibility at the SCG in Brussels devoted much time to how we might cope with such a proposal, given the difficulties that it raises for the Dutch and the Belgians in particular. I fear that the over-activism of the British team, which to the best of my knowledge did not take place on the basis of prior consultations with the FCO and the MOD, can only complicate NATO's stance and risks undermining the British position.


6. Given that Sir James Eberle will be among those invited to Chequers for the Prime Minister's discussion on NATO strategy on 1 October we shall need to brief ministerial participants about these developments. And I should be grateful if the Department would put this in hand quickly in conjunction with the MOD. There is a further question of what this portends for the future of the Edinburgh Conversations and HMG's attitude to them, which no doubt Soviet Department will wish to consider in due course.

7. With the Private Secretary's permission, I forewarned Mr Powell at No 10 that Admiral Eberle was anxious to see the Prime Minister about all this and that the Department would wish to have an opportunity to brief before any such meeting took place.



26 September 1984

P J Weston



CHEQUERS MEETING ON NATO STRATEGY ON 1 OCTOBER
POSSIBILITY OF A FREEZE ON NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS (If Raised)

Points to Make

1. Place for discussion of substance of INF back at negotiating table.
2. Any UK encouragement to Russians on freeze or moratorium could seriously undermine NATO confidence and solidarity and complicate position in Netherlands and Belgium in particular.
3. Halt or reversal of NATO INF deployments only as part of negotiated agreement. Not as unilateral pre-emptive concession, which would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate reductions thereafter.
4. Freeze now at current levels would leave greater INF preponderance in Soviet favour than when 1979 decision first taken.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
28 September 1984



NBPN

CDP

JMR.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

27 July 1984

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Charles

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

I am writing to confirm, formally, that the Chancellor is content with the Defence Secretary's conclusion (his minute of 20 July) that we should hold to our announced plans to develop Molesworth and complete deployment in 1988.

Copies of this letter go to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours ever
David*

D L C PERETZ
Principal Private Secretary



✓
VSC
bc AC 6

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1984

Molesworth; The Second GLCM Base

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute (MO11/2/2) of 20 July to which he attached a further paper on the siting of cruise missiles.

The Prime Minister agrees that preparation of a second site at Molesworth should now be set in hand working to a timetable for deployment within the calendar year 1988. The Prime Minister understands that the Defence Secretary's recommendation in this sense is acceptable to colleagues. No OD discussion is thus required.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C.D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.



5
NBP7 (informed orally)
CDP
25/7.

PM/84/130

PRIME MINISTER

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

with CP?

1. I agree with the conclusion which the Defence Secretary has reached (his minute of 20 July). The overriding argument in my view is that we should not breach the 1988 deadline, or be seen to be planning for the possibility of breaching it.
2. I would also agree with the suggestion that there is now no need for an OD meeting to discuss the issue.
3. I am copying this minute to the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 July 1984

Reference INT P+4



25 JUL 1984

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Prime Minister

EDP
24/7.

Prime Minister

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLOM BASE

The Defence Secretary sent me a copy of his minute of 20 July, ^{with CP?}

As I said in my minute of 15 June, I am clear that, solely from the point of view of policing, the right course would be to concentrate at Greenham. But in the light of the additional information now available about the difficulties of that course, including the planning procedures, and about the delay, I am content, if colleagues agree, for the preparation of a second site at Molesworth to go ahead. I assume that the Defence Secretary is satisfied that Francis Pym's apparent undertaking that no housing would be built at Molesworth (see the Environment Secretary's minute of 12 June) is not an insuperable obstacle.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

L.B

24 July 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

We have checked with the Home Secretary. He and all other

members of OD are
content with the

Defence Secretary's

recommendation in favour

of Malesworth, & see no
need for OD discussion.

2. We have therefore taken
it off the agenda, leaving
only the Small States
item.



C D P 24/7.

Prime Minister

3



Defence Secretary now comes down firmly in favour of Molesworth if we are to meet our target date of 1988 for deployment. He suggests OD discussion on 25 July is not necessary, in the light of his paper.

MO 11/2/2

ms

PRIME MINISTER

MOLESWORTH: THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Home Secretary was strongest

I am grateful to colleagues for their comments on my minute of 1st June about Molesworth. In the light of these and following your Private Secretary's letter of 29th June, the attached further paper has been prepared which addresses in more depth the cost and time constraints of the alternatives, the implications of delay, and the military factors involved.

Supporter of concentration on Greenham. Await his views before deciding whether OD necessary?

2. I believe that we have had a valuable second look at the options but, in the light of the detailed work described below, I could not recommend to colleagues the option of siting all 160 missiles at Greenham Common. If colleagues are content, I would now propose to proceed with the preparation of a second site at Molesworth working to a timetable which I would negotiate with the Americans for deployment within the calendar year 1988.

C.D.P.
20/7
Yes
mr

3. In the light of the outcome of this further work, you may feel that an OD meeting to discuss these issues cannot be justified. For the present, given the sensitivities, I am therefore copying these papers only to those who received the earlier correspondence.

4. Copies go to the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

ms

Ministry of Defence
20th July 1984

(Approved by the Defence Secretary & signed in his absence)

NOTE BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OFFICIALS

MOLESWORTH : THE SECOND GLCM BASE

Background

1. On 17th June 1980 the Government announced that the 160 Cruise missiles to be based in the United Kingdom would be located at the RAF bases at Greenham Common in Berkshire (96 missiles) and Molesworth in Cambridgeshire (64 missiles). Our public position is that full deployment of all 160 missiles will be completed within a five year period (i.e. by the end of 1988); and in respect of Molesworth, it has been announced that missiles would be deployed there in about 1988. Decisions are now necessary on the development of RAF Molesworth to a timetable compatible with that position, or on a suitable alternative.

2. This paper does not address at all the question of whether the further deployment of 64 missiles will be necessary. While the short term prospects for INF arms control are poor, the picture could change completely before 1987/8, and it is possible that by then the US and Soviet Governments will have agreed to limit longer range INF missiles in Europe to a level well below 572. If the agreed level fell below 340 and if this number was shared out amongst all five basing countries in proportion to their present shares, Britain would be assigned less than 96 missiles and the question of a second GLCM site would lapse.

3. The original US proposal for the deployment of UK-based Cruise missiles was for concentration at a single site at RAF Greenham Common

(although the precise storage arrangements seem not at that time to have been planned in detail). Ministers accepted the then US position that there was no overriding military case in favour of two bases rather than one. The Government took the view, however, that a split deployment was preferable in political terms, particularly since concentration at Greenham Common was judged to be unacceptable in the Newbury area, given the proximity of Aldermaston and Burghfield and the then recent history of local hostility to the proposed deployment of USAF tanker aircraft to Greenham Common. The US authorities accepted this view (HMG having agreed to make a £4M contribution in cash or kind to their additional costs, and a contribution of manpower to the GLCM defence force) and by mutual agreement RAF Molesworth was selected as the second base.

4. There are considerable differences between the two sites. RAF Greenham Common was already in USAF hands as a standby airfield for use in times of emergency or war, and it still retains its status as a standby airfield for use by up to 40 KC-135 tanker aircraft. RAF Molesworth is a disused airfield, the runway having long since been disposed of. It is an unfenced and open site containing only a few hangars currently used by the USAF for the disposal of scrap metal by auction. It is ill-served by utilities and has no infrastructure.

5. The current USAF development plan for Molesworth, which is not public, envisages construction being completed in June 1987 with delivery of missiles taking place thereafter, leading to a declared IOC (Initial Operating Capability) for the first flight of December

1987/January 1988. All the missiles would then be deployed by the end of 1988. That timetable is achievable only if authority is given immediately for site surveys and planning consultation (activities which could not be kept covert), if there are no significant delays in respect of legal and planning issues relating to the site, and if the construction programme is accelerated. Such acceleration would entail costs, additional to the basic cost of some £20M, of approximately £1M if a decision to proceed were taken before Recess, rising to some £2.5M if it were deferred by 3 months. It is not yet clear whether this extra cost would be met from NATO, United States, or United Kingdom funds.

The One-Site Option

6. Whatever arrangements are made for developing facilities for the additional 64 GLCMs are likely to be politically controversial. In particular they are likely to attract attention from the anti-nuclear movement including attempts to interfere with and delay construction work. It would clearly be preferable, if it were possible, to manage the deployment of the additional 64 GLCMs in such a way as to avoid providing the anti-nuclear movement with a new focus of activity.

7. Molesworth already has a small resident peace camp; and it is a reasonable assumption that construction work there will be attended by continual demonstrations. This, of course, will pose resource problems to the local police forces of Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire as well as probably necessitating deployments of MOD manpower, possibly

including Servicemen, at perhaps quite an early stage. Once construction is complete, all the necessary operational equipment will have to be delivered by road from the nearest airhead which is at RAF Alconbury about 10 miles away. Although in 1984 anti-nuclear demonstrations have been considerably smaller and much more dispersed than in 1983, the future pattern is hard to predict and it is a prudent assumption that the developments at RAF Molesworth could attract demonstrations of the same size and character as seen earlier at Greenham Common.

8. Studies have therefore been made, on a very discreet basis, into concentration of all the missiles at RAF Greenham Common in line with the original US proposal and as an alternative to basing at RAF Molesworth. These have included consultations with RAF safety experts and senior PSA works advisers as well as a limited circle of US Air Force experts. They suggest that this option is in theory feasible although there are a number of serious practical problems; these are set out in the following paragraphs.

Land Acquisition

9. The US have advised us that insufficient land is now available at Greenham Common to house the additional weapons storage and other facilities required. Before accepting this advice, British officials examined with the US authorities the possibility of drastically altering the current concept of operations of the GLCM forces, to minimise the number of additional shelters to be built within established safety regulations. The US made clear that they would strongly resist such an alteration; moreover our studies have shown

that this would not help to avoid the need for extra land. Weapons storage facilities pose a particular problem since they must be sited in accordance with UK safety criteria which prescribe the necessary safety distances to be observed around each facility. RAF weapons safety experts have been consulted and they confirm the US view that additional land would be required to accommodate a second GLCM Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA) at Greenham Common, alongside the original. In addition, PSA advice is that land acquisition would probably also be necessary to accommodate associated operational and storage buildings hitherto planned to be built at Molesworth or Alconbury.

10. Further technical design work will be necessary to establish the precise amount and location of the extra land to be acquired, but it would almost certainly be common land in the possession of Newbury District Council. The Council is unlikely to part with this land voluntarily, as the reason for the requirement could not be withheld from them; and it would be necessary to exercise the Secretary of State for Defence's powers of compulsory acquisition. The Lord Chancellor has advised that for this compulsory acquisition it would not be necessary to implement the so-called Soames procedure which provides for a form of public inquiry, although it would mean departing from an undertaking given to Parliament by a previous Secretary of State that an inquiry would be held in such circumstances. However, MOD officials have received legal advice that the Secretary of State for the Environment would be statutorily obliged to hold a form of public inquiry before giving his consent to the enclosure of common land. Moreover, as a change of use would be involved,

consultation with the District Council under DOE Circular 7/77 would be necessary. An objection to the proposed development from the Council would necessitate a referral to the Secretary of State for the Environment who would need to consider whether to hold a non-statutory public inquiry before coming to a decision. These processes are potentially lengthy. Even if the Environment Secretary were - controversially - to decide not to hold a public inquiry before reaching a decision on planning, it is unlikely that the process of compulsory acquisition of land, a Circular 7/77 notification, referral of objections to the Environment Secretary, and the obligatory inquiry into the enclosure of common land could be accomplished in less than 12-18 months. An alternative to enclosure of common land would be to negotiate the extinction of commoners' rights over whatever area was chosen; but this too would take time and compensation would need to be paid.

11. In the worst case, there could be similar hurdles at Molesworth. Although the land is in MOD ownership, a bridleway across the site will need to be closed or diverted, and even if it is possible to achieve this without a public inquiry, it will take some time. In addition, land will be required for access roads. This will require the co-operation of the local highways authority. If there is significant local opposition, the Secretary of State for Defence would need to decide whether or not to invoke the Soames procedure. There could also be delays if the local planning authority opposed the plans for Molesworth on the grounds of change of use. There are indications, however, that these types of difficulties could more easily be overcome at Molesworth than at Greenham. Closure or

diversion of the bridleway, and acquisition of land for road access, could proceed in parallel with on-site construction if the need arose; the local planning authority is aware of the plans to deploy missiles to Molesworth and has so far raised no objections and opposition on the grounds of change of use could probably be successfully resisted. Moreover, our plans for Molesworth, unlike those for Greenham, involve no statutory requirement for a public inquiry.

Construction

12. PSA advise that the necessary building programme at RAF Greenham Common would be more complex than at Molesworth, since at Greenham Common it will be necessary not only to build around what has already been provided but possibly in some cases to expand existing facilities. Whereas planning and construction work at Molesworth should require a total timetable of 3 years, such work at Greenham Common would take approximately 3 months longer. In addition to this, no preliminary work has been done in respect of US requirements for Greenham Common and some 6 months must also be allowed for this.

Costs : Utilities

13. Under the standard NATO arrangements, HMG as the host nation is obliged to provide a base, free of charge, with utilities connected up to the NATO funded operational facilities. Any additional facilities required by the US on their own account are a matter for the US to fund nationally. Such UK costs at Greenham Common were relatively low, some £110,000. At Molesworth they are likely to be higher, partly because the existing utilities are inadequate, and also possibly roads in the immediate area of the base may need to

be improved. These costs cannot be determined without detailed site surveys and consultations with highways authorities.

Costs : Construction

14. The basic construction cost for the extra 64 missiles is some £20M. If an accelerated programme at Molesworth is carried out, this could add significantly to the cost, depending on when a decision to begin planning is taken. The cost of concentration at Greenham Common is difficult to quantify without detailed site surveys, but because of the complexity of working around what has already been provided, it could add perhaps £2M to the £20M programme; and there might be further costs arising from the possible acquisition of nearby land for housing US personnel. On the other hand, it is possible that we might be able to review the £4M contribution agreed by HMG when the two-base option was chosen.

Timetable

15. The present US target date for construction completion at Molesworth by June 1987 (with IOC at end 87/January 88) is already achievable only at some additional cost, currently estimated at some £1M increasing to £2.5M by early autumn, and further increasing as the time available for construction diminishes. Even with extra expenditure, any significant legal or planning problems could entail slippage from the target date, making it hard to achieve an IOC of end 87/January 88, let alone completion of full deployment by the end of 1988 as announced, without special Ministerial action.

16. It would be possible to delay the achievement of IOC at

Molesworth, to avoid the extra expenditure. A normal 3-year planning and construction programme commencing in May 1985 would allow construction to be completed in May 1988, with an IOC date of mid-88. However, this would seriously cut the time available to complete the deployment of all 64 missiles, and make it difficult to meet the announced date of 1988 for full deployment. Further, any legal or planning problems could produce further slippages and so it would be prudent to commence preliminary legal work as soon as possible.

17. In respect of concentration at Greenham Common, an initial estimate of the timetable suggests that, allowing six months for the US to clarify their requirements and for preparation of land acquisition proposals, followed by at least a 12-month public inquiry on land enclosure and a total planning and construction time of 3 years and 3 months, construction could be complete by mid-1989. This would probably allow just sufficient time for delivery of the first missiles and a declared IOC of end-1989, a year later than HMG's publicly announced date for full deployment and two years later than the date the US are working to for Molesworth IOC.

18. There is some evidence that the US may be looking at shorter construction times than those above for their Netherlands deployment. Any further acceleration of construction times at Molesworth or Greenham would add significantly to costs.

Policing

19. The provision of the necessary Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) presence at either Molesworth or an enlarged Greenham Common to

counter demonstrations will be difficult and expensive, both in relation to the cost of the MDP themselves and the necessary living, office, and ancillary accommodation required. Because of the size of the MDP contingency already at Greenham Common, which numbers 50, it would be less difficult to cope with an enlargement of that site than the development of Molesworth. Either way, from the point of view of planning the future deployment of the MPD and assembling the necessary resources, the sooner a choice is made the better.

The US Preference

20. Until very recently the US have refrained from committing themselves to a preference as between Molesworth and concentration at Greenham Common, and have concentrated on emphasising the importance they attach to HMG being seen to be committed to meeting the declared missile delivery date of 1988. In the last few weeks, however, representations have been made at Ambassadorial level to the effect that a final decision should be taken as early as possible and that Molesworth is their preferred location. This preference for Molesworth is probably based primarily on political perceptions as to the risks of other basing nations becoming aware of HMG's deliberations, and hence weakening their own resolve, and of the peace movement claiming a victory, rather than on any overriding military advice. US military sources have, however, made it plain that a split deployment offers considerable advantages in terms of peacetime training off-base, because of the additional training areas available in the Molesworth area, and in terms of covert operational deployment off-base in time of tension. These arguments are valid, and must be

given weight; but the military advantages of two bases over one have not been represented as overriding.

Presentation

21. In terms of presentation, there can be no doubt that a change in deployment decision will pose considerable challenges and will need very careful handling. The anti-nuclear movement would undoubtedly claim that their activities have forced HMG to change its plans to develop Molesworth, and they would represent it as a victory. Local opinion in Berkshire would be likely to be affronted, and the Government's good faith called into question. There would no doubt be a considerable, if temporary, political controversy.

22. In terms of the impact on Allies, much would depend on the timing and substance of an announcement, but provided that HMG was seen to be reiterating its commitment to accepting its full share of 160 missiles fully deployed by the end of 1988, that the decision was not presented in any way as a concession to the Soviet Union in arms control context, and that any announcement was so timed as to minimise the impact in other basing countries, problems should be manageable. It should be noted that full deployment of all 160 missiles at Greenham Common by the end of 1988 does not appear to be an option. The political ramifications of a significant delay in the UK deployment programme would be considerable, and could jeopardise successful deployment in other countries.

Summary

23. Decisions are needed on two closely related issues.

a. The first is the question of the preferred IOC date. The three options are as follows:

i. To follow the US proposal to work to an IOC date of December 1987/January 1988.

ii. To allow the IOC date to slip, perhaps to mid-88 while still aiming to complete full deployment of all 64 missiles by the end of 1988.

iii. To allow the IOC date to slip still further, as would be necessary to concentrate all the missiles at RAF Greenham Common.

HMG is publicly committed only to a date of 1988 for the completion of deployment to Molesworth. Option i. offers disadvantages in terms of cost; and there must be some doubt whether this earlier date can be met. Option ii. would be cheaper and easier in construction terms but with an IOC date of mid-88 and a target for full deployment by the end of 1988, it would be necessary to ask the US to change their deployment plans significantly. Option iii. would present serious difficulties, especially in terms of the effect on Allies, as it represents a major slippage from HMG's original commitment.

b. The second question to be considered is the choice of base. The choice of Molesworth has practical advantages, as

well as offering earlier achievement of IOC and completion of full deployment. The choice of the one-base option, using only Greenham Common, would deny the anti-nuclear movement a new focus for their activities; and would perhaps provide less problems from the security point of view.

These decisions need to be taken as soon as possible if the IOC dates discussed above can be met.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister.

There will be
another training 'excursion' from
Greenham Common tonight. It will
not of course be announced but
may be spotted.

CDP
23/7

ms



900
12/7
2

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A084/1992

11 July 1984

D. Richard

Molesworth: The Second GLCM Base

The Prime Minister has agreed that the issues raised in the Secretary of State for Defence's minute of 1 June on the question of a second GLCM base at RAF Molesworth and by subsequent minutes from Ministers should be considered at the meeting of OD arranged for 25 July. The Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Attorney General have been invited to attend for the discussion of this item.

Three members of OD, the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, were not included in the original circulation of papers which was made under the CMO procedure. I should be grateful therefore if, as required by the CMO procedure, you and the other Private Secretaries concerned would send a copy of each of the documents originated by your offices (see list attached) to those of the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. I should also add that the Prime Minister has instructed that the papers should go round under the most highly restricted procedure, that is to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell at No 10, to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Attorney General.

(Signature)

(R P Hatfield)
Private Secretary

R C Mottram Esq

List of relevant correspondence

1. Minute of 1 June 1984, ref.MO 11/2/2 from the Defence Secretary to the Prime Minister
2. Letter of 4 June 1984 from Mr Coles to Mr Mottram
3. Letter of 5 June 1984 from the Lord President of the Council to the Defence Secretary
4. Letter of 5 June 1984 from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Defence Secretary
5. Minute of 6 June 1984 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Prime Minister
6. Minute of 12 June 1984 from the Secretary of State for the Environment to the Prime Minister
7. Minute of 15 June 1984 from the Home Secretary to the Prime Minister
8. Minute of 20 June 1984 from the Lord Chancellor to the Prime Minister
9. Minute of 25 June 1984, ref.MO 11/2/2 from the Defence Secretary to the Prime Minister
10. Minute of 28 June 1984 from the Secretary of State for the Environment to the Prime Minister
11. Letter of 29 June 1984 from Mr Powell to Mr Mottram

Defence : int
pty



Print Hinks

CDP/z.

mt

Ref. A084/1907

MR POWELLMolesworth: The Second GLCM Base

Thank you for your minute of 29 June.

2. We understand that the Secretary of State for Defence will not be ready to circulate a paper before 19 or 20 July. We will put the subject on the agenda for the OD meeting already fixed for 25 July. The only snag about this date is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may be in China at that time; but his Private Office considers that, if he is, he will (with some reluctance) agree to be represented by Mr Luce at the meeting of OD.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

5 July 1984

INF: Defense Pt 4.




PART 4 ends:-

CD Powell to MOD 29.6.84

PART 5 begins:-

RTA to CDP (A084/1907) 5.7.84



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