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FILE TITLE:	SERIES
Deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe Modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe CLOSED	DEFENCE
	PART: 6

PART BEGINS:	PART ENDS:	CAB ONE:
April 1989	May 89	

PART CLOSED

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PREM 19/2617

SECRET

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PART 6 ends:-

Bonn Tel No. 578 28.5.89

PART 7 begins:-

SS/MOD to PM. 7.6.89

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FM BONN
TO DESKBY 281100Z FCO
TELNO 578
OF 281043Z MAY 89
INFO DESKBY 281100Z UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

SIC

BMG BERLIN TELNO 037 : GERMAN POSITION ON SNF

SUMMARY
1. TELTSCHIK CONFIRMS THAT KOHL'S ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ON THIRD ZERO HAS NARROWED. SUGGESTS THAT BUSH'S CFE INITIATIVE COULD EASE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING A FORMULA ON TIMING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

DETAIL
2. I TALKED TO TELTSCHIK THIS MORNING. HIS REMARKS WERE CONSISTANT WITH MY ASSESSMENT IN TUR OF KOHL'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT. HE SAID THAT FDP MINISTERS HAD NOT (NOT) THREATHENED RESIGNATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT AT LEAST ONE (MOELLEMANN, MINISTER OF EDUCATION) HAD SAID LAST WEEK THAT, IF THE COALITION CHANGED ITS POSITION ON SNF, THE FDP CONGRESS TAKING PLACE THIS WEEKEND COULD DISOWN THE FDP MINISTERS.

3. TELTSCHIK CONFIRMED THAT THE MAIN ARGUMENT IN THE COALITION IN RECENT DAYS HAD BEEN ABOUT WHETHER A THIRD ZERO COULD BE EXPLICITLY RULED OUT. CSU MINISTERS HAD FAVOURED EXPLICIT EXCLUSION OF A THIRD ZERO, AND FDP MINISTERS HAD VETOED THIS CONCESSION TO THE AMERICANS.

4. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT BUSH'S NEW IDEAS ON CFE, WHICH KOHL WELCOMED, SHOULD SHORTEN THE DURATION OF THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR KOHL AT THE SUMMIT TO ACCEPT A FORMULA ON THE LINES THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT START BEFORE THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETED.

MALLABY

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MAIN

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COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM ROME
TO DESKBY 281000Z FCO
TELNO 368
OF 280745Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR RESIDENT CLERK), WASHINGTON, PARIS
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN

SIC

NATO SUMMIT: BUSH'S VISIT TO ROME.

SUMMARY

1. ITALIANS GIVE POSITIVE REACTION TO NEW US PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND SEE A COMPROMISE ON SNF AS BEING WITHIN REACH. IF THERE IS A ROW AT THE NATO SUMMIT THEY WILL BE LINED UP BESIDE THE AMERICANS ON THE FIRST AND WITH THE GERMANS ON THE SECOND.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON BOTTAI ON THE EVENING OF 27 MAY TO GET A READ OUT ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH DE MITA AND ANDREOTTI THAT MORNING. BOTTAI READ FROM HIS OWN NOTES OF THE TWO HOUR MEETING WHICH HAD BEEN DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE NATO SUMMIT.

3. DE MITA BEGAN BY SETTING OUT HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE WEST HAD RESOUNDINGLY WON THE WAR OF IDEAS AND VALUES. PERHAPS ITALY WITH ITS LARGE COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS MORE KEENLY SENSITIVE TO THIS THAN ANY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, NATO HAD SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING WAR IN EUROPE FOR FORTY YEARS. BUT WE MUST NOW AVOID TWO PITFALLS. ONE WAS ASSUMING THAT PEACE HAD BROKEN OUT. THE OTHER WAS BEHAVING AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD CHANGED.

4. BUSH EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT GERMAN RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE ON SNF. HE ALSO WENT OVER HIS NEW PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, OF WHICH THE MAJOR ALLIES, INCLUDING THE ITALIANS, HAD BEEN INFORMED ON 25 MAY. DE MITA MADE CLEAR THAT THE ITALIAN REACTION TO BUSH'S NEW PROPOSALS WAS VERY POSITIVE. IN PARTICULAR THE INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT. HE AND ANDREOTTI RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR SOME MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. BUT (IN ANDREOTTI'S WORDS) IT WOULD ''ADD TO THE GLOBALITY OF THE MESSAGE THE WEST WANTED TO SENT TO THE EAST''. DE MITA BELIEVED THE NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS WOULD ALSO HELP KOHL, WHOSE POSITION THE REST OF US HAD TO TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY. IF HE LOST THE NEXT ELECTION WE WOULD BE FACED WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE CHANGED INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE FACED GERMANY WITH MAJOR TEMPTATIONS, INCLUDING NEUTRALISM ?, BUSH ASKED. DE MITA DID NOT THINK NEUTRALISM WAS YET A SERIOUS THREAT IN GERMANY. BUT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE ABLE TO CONVINCE ITS PEOPLE THAT NATO WAS MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES.

5. RETURNING TO SNF. DE MITA SAID HE HAD ASKED KOHL OUTRIGHT WHETHER GERMANY WAS IN FAVOUR OF A THIRD ZERO. KOHL'S REPLY HAD BEEN SPECIFIC: HE WAS AGINST BOTH A THIRD ZERO AND THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. ANDREOTTI THREW IN GENSCHER'S CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND. FIFTY YEARS ON FROM THE NAZI INVASION. ANDREOTTI SAW THIS AS A SUPPLEMENTARY FACTOR DRIVING THE GERMANS ON SNF WEAPONS WHICH WERE CLEARLY A GREATER THREAT TO THE EASTERN EUROPEANS THAN TO THE RUSSIANS.

6. DE MITA SAID HE HOPED BUSH WOULD BRING TO BRUSSELS A GENERAL MESSAGE ABOUT EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THIS WOULD BE NEEDED AS A CONTEXT FOR THE COMPROMISE THAT HAD TO BE REACHED ON SNF AND FOR THE NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. BUSH SAID THE PRESS HAD COMPLETELY MISINTERPRETED HIM ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS. HE WAS NOT IN THE LEAST HESITANT ABOUT GORBACHEV BUT ON THE CONTRARY VERY POSITIVE ABOUT WHAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE.

7. AT THE END OF THE MEETING. BUSH ASKED BAKER TO SUMMARISE THE US POSITION ON SNF AND THE NEW PROPOSALS. BAKER'S RESPONSE UNDERLINED THREE MAJOR STEPS THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN TOWARDS THE GERMANS.

I) THEY HAD AGREED TO POSTPONE DECISIONS ON PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF MODERNISED SNF WEAPONS.

II) THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF IN THE EVENT OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN CFE.

III) THEY WOULD BE TABLING NEW PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ACCELERATE REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS.

ON THE LAST POINT. BAKER COMMENTED THAT THE NEW US PROPOSALS SHOULD CREATE A MORE FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THE GERMANS BY BRINGING CLOSER THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF.

8. BAKER WENT ON TO SPECIFY TWO COROLLARIES. FIRST. THE US WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE PREPARED TO POSTULATE READINESS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO ACCEPT A THIRD ZERO. (BOTTAI HAD INFERRED FROM THIS THAT THE GERMANS MUST HAVE SOUGHT TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD ZERO IN UNSPECIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES). SECOND. THE US WOULD SUBSCRIBE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF ONLY REPEAT ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IN CFE HAD BEEN REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED.

9. IN THANKING BOTTAI FOR THIS PROMPT ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION. I SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF YOUR THINKING ON SNF WHICH I HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED TO HIM AND WHICH HAD NOT CHANGED. AS TO THE NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS. I DREW ON RECENT TELEGRAMS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERNS ON THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS. I EXPHASISED THAT THE PROPOSALS BORE ALL THE MARKS OF HAVING BEEN HASTILY PUT TOGETHER. OF NOT HAVING BEEN PROPERLY THOUGHT THROUGH. AND OF BEING DRIVEN PRIMARILY BY PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSIDERATIONS. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY THE ALLIANCE HAD PROCEDED IN THE PAST. NOR IN OUR VIEW WAS IT A WISE ONE. BOTTAI REPLIED THAT HE RECOGINSED THE NEW PROPOSALS WOULD GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES FOR OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH. BUT HE OFFERED NO COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS I HAD MADE.

COMMENT

10. IN THEIR PRESENT POLITICAL MESS. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CLEARLY DONE NO HOMEWORK THEMSELVES ON THE NEW AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THEY WERE BOUND TO FIND THE WRAPPING ATTRACTIVE (AS WILL THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT) AND HAVE LOOKED NO FURTHER THAN THAT. INDEED THE PROPOSALS AS OUTLINED CORRESPOND CLOSELY TO ITALIAN THINKING ABOUT HOW NATO SHOULD BE RESPONDING TO CHANGES IN THE EAST/WEST CLIMATE AND TO THEIR VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONDING TO GERMAN NEEDS AT PRESENT. IF IN ADDITION THE EARLY INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT IN CFE LOOKS LIKE GETTING THEM OFF THE 401ST SQUADRON HOOK. THEY WILL THINK SO MUCH THE BETTER.

11. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE ASSUMING THAT WE ARE ON THE BRINK OF A COMPROMISE ON SNF AND THAT THE NEW US PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS WILL IN THE END BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. IF THEY TURN OUT TO BE MISTAKEN AND THERE IS A ROW AT BRUSSELS. THEY MUST BE EXPECTED TO LINE UP WITH THE AMERICANS ON THE NEW US PROPOSALS AND WITH THE GERMANS ON SNF.

THOMAS

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ADVANCE 5
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MR GOULDEN 1
HD/SEC POL 1
MR KIDD SEC POL 1
RESIDENT CLERK 1
MAIN 130
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LIMITED 6
SEC POL 6
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DEFENCE 4
SEND 7
SOVIET 5
EED 6
CSCE UNIT 4
PLANNERS 3
WED 9
SED 7
PUSD 26
NAD 4
NEWS 9
INFO 11
RMD 1
RESEARCH 1
PS 7
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE 1
PS/PUS 1
PS/SIR J FRETWELL 1
MR BOYD 1
MR GOULDEN 1
MR RATFORD 1
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PRIME MINISTER

CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS: PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSALS

I attach preliminary analysis by the FCO and MOD. A more detailed response will follow after MOD representatives return from Washington.

As you will see, both departments are sceptical. The point which worries them most is the idea of a bilateral US/Soviet ceiling on stationed forces, ie. manpower. At present NATO's proposals deal with all stationed manpower (ie. British, French, Dutch, etc.) The Russians would probably try to apply the equal ceiling to this rather than to US forces alone, which would be massively to our disadvantage. Personally I am not sure that we need necessarily fall into this trap, but we should certainly urge the Americans to clarify their proposal and make sure they are aware of the dangers.

More generally, there is the tactical question of how far we want to go in criticising the US proposals when we shall need the President's support on other issues including SNF.

The FCO want to send the telegram attached to their letter to Washington urgently. I think it is all right provided we make clear the points in it are an attempt to get clarification and do not pre-empt the points you will make in Brussels.

Agree?

C. D. POWELL

26 May 1989
SL2AVI

SECRET AND PERSONAL 39a-c FL

Tomahawk

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 May 1989

CFE: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 26 May which I have now been able to discuss with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agrees that, despite our criticisms, the Americans will go ahead and table these proposals at the Summit with a view to their being discussed within NATO thereafter. Indeed, there are clear signs this evening that they are already being made public. She sees, therefore, no serious propsect of being able to head off any element in them in advance. We shall have to concentrate on trying to modify or amend them in discussion within NATO before they are formally tabled with the Warsaw Pact. Even this will be much more difficult once the proposals are public.

Against this background, the Prime Minister was not happy with the telegram which you are proposing to send to Washington. She thinks it would be better to be more interrogative and less assertive, making clear that our overall judgment of the proposals will be given at the NATO Summit and subsequently. I enclose a revised version which I think better meets her views. Subject to any comments, you may wish to despatch it to Washington.

BFI

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

OUT TELEGRAM

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Classification	Caveat	Precedence
SECRET		IMMEDIATE

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TC
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FM
TO
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AND TO

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME

MY TELS NOS 87, 88 AND 89 TO UKDEL NATO:
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: US INITIATIVE

1. We assume the Americans will not be deterred from tabling their ideas at the NATO Summit, despite the points which we put to them in London. Indeed, there are already signs that they are being leaked. We shall need to decide at the Summit itself how to formulate our immediate response, and you should not in your discussions with American officials seek to pre-empt this. Rather, you should focus on trying to obtain clarifications on the various points which the Prime Minister and I raised, on aircraft and helicopters, in particular the need to exclude DCAs.

2. You should in addition point out our particular concern about the proposal for a common ceiling on United States and Soviet ground and air manpower staioned outside their national territory. Points to make are:

- We have so far adopted an approach which involves the Alliance as a whole rather than just the two

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superpowers. We are worried about fragmenting the Alliance's negotiating position.

- NATO has already proposed a regime covering all stationed equipment. It would be difficult now to propose a different approach in respect of manpower, ie United States manpower only.

- The obvious response from the Russians would be to accept a ceiling of 275,000 provided it applies to all stationed forces' manpower. This would involve unacceptably high reductions on the Western side.

In order to help us to determine our position on the American initiative at the NATO Summit, it would be very helpful to have the Americans' comments on these aspects and their views on how the difficulties we foresee could be avoided or overcome.

3. Grateful for the earliest possible reply.

HOWE

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38

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF: Latest state of play of US/German Exchanges

You will have seen a copy of Washington telno 1457 (copy enclosed for ease of reference) giving details of the current state of play in the US/FRG exchanges on SNF. The Americans seem disposed to hold firm; and have made no concessions which would weaken their earlier text.

They are also now lobbying all NATO Allies in support of their position. I attach a copy of the position paper which they have sent to the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary does not think that we need make any formal response: the Americans are aware of our views. Nor does he see any need for us ourselves to conduct a lobbying exercise. In any further discussions of the subject in NATO between now and the Summit itself, Sir Michael Alexander will reiterate our position; and will avoid any commitment either way on the question of whether we could accept SNF negotiations on the terms proposed by the United States.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

130642
MDADAN 0232

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 251900Z FCO
TELNO 1469
OF 251800Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
OUR TELNO 1457: SNF

SUMMARY
1. GERMAN REPLY TO THE LATEST AMERICAN MESSAGE. NO NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES. EXPECTATION THAT THE MATTER WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO THE SUMMIT AS IT STANDS.

DETAIL
2. KIMMITT'S OFFICE HAVE TOLD US THAT KOHL RESPONDED TO THE PRESIDENT'S LATEST MESSAGE IN A LETTER OF 24 MAY. IT OFFERED NO MOVEMENT AND HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED AS AN EXPLANATION OF EXISTING POSITIONS RATHER THAN ANY NEGOTIATING OFFER. THE GERMANS STRESSED IN PARTICULAR THAT THE AMERICAN FORMULA ON TIMING AND THE ASSOCIATED CONDITIONALITY OF RESULTS IN THE CFE FIELD HAD NOT MET THE REQUIREMENT FOR QUOTE EARLY UNQUOTE SNF NEGOTIATIONS.
3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS ALSO A REFERENCE TO A READINESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AT THE SUMMIT AND THE AMERICANS SEEM INCREASINGLY RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING THAT THIS IS WHAT WILL HAVE TO HAPPEN.
4. IN PRACTICAL TERMS THERE IS IN ANY CASE PRECIOUS LITTLE TIME LEFT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY DEPARTS. THEY LEAVE AT 7.15 AM ON 26 MAY, ARRIVING IN ROME AT 10.15 IN THE EVENING (TIMES LOCAL). THEY THEN LEAVE ITALY ON 28 MAY, AT 3.30 PM, FOR BRUSSELS.

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MR GOULDEN
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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

May 25, 1989

Mr Lewis
Mr Elvare
Mr Cope

25/5

Dear Foreign Secretary:

The United States now believes that a wider Alliance effort will be required to resolve the SNF issue. Hence, Secretary Baker has asked that the attached points and U.S. position paper on SNF be provided to you and your counterparts in all NATO countries.

We still believe the best course is for the Germans to respond specifically to the attached position paper. Hence, we have not tabled it formally in the NAC. We would, of course, welcome your reaction.

Sincerely,

Henry E. Catto
Ambassador

Attachments:
SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, SW1.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2617 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 240730Z FCO
TELNO 1457
OF 242100Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MODUK, THE HAGUE

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
MY TELNO 1443 (NOT TO ALL): SNF
SUMMARY
1. AMERICANS PROVIDE DETAILS OF THEIR LATEST EXCHANGES WITH THE GERMANS, WITH A TEXT SETTING OUT THEIR POSITION. THEY SEEM TO BE HOLDING FIRM. THEY ARE ALSO PLANNING TO LOBBY MORE WIDELY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT.
DETAIL
2. KIMMITT TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING (24 MAY) WITH FURTHER DETAILS OF THE LATEST AMERICAN POSITION. HE CONFIRMED THAT KOHL'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF 22 MAY HAD NOT SHOWN ANY SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT ON THE GERMAN SIDE OR NEW LANGUAGE ON THE KEY ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED LATE YESTERDAY EVENING (23 MAY). HE HAD NOTED THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES AND SPELT OUT THE THREE POINTS WHICH CONCERNED THE AMERICANS (NO THIRD ZERO, TANGIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE AGREEMENT BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND SOME ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SUCCESSOR TO LANCE). HE HAD ALSO SET THESE OUT IN A FURTHER US POSITION PAPER FOR KOHL (TEXT IN MIFT). THIS, SAID KIMMITT, WAS THE SAME AS BEFORE (YOUR TELNO 961 ETC) BUT INCLUDED ONE ADDITION IN THE FORM OF A SHORT PARAGRAPH ON CFE OBJECTIVES, WHICH HAD BEEN LIFTED FROM THE TEXT OF THE MARCH 1988 SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. IT HAD BEEN ADDED BECAUSE KOHL REFERRED TO IT IN HIS OWN LAST MESSAGE AND THERE WAS NO OBJECTION, IF IT HELPED HIM, TO EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATION.
3. I ASKED WHETHER ANY MORE EXCHANGES WERE EXPECTED BEFORE THE SUMMIT. KIMMITT SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST ONE MORE COMMUNICATION FROM THE GERMANS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AS YET. HE UNDERTOOK TO LET ME KNOW AS AND WHEN ANYTHING NEW ARRIVED.
4. KIMMITT ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NOW INTENDED TO SHARE THE US POSITION WITH THE DUTCH, FRENCH AND WOERNER IN BRUSSELS. WE

HAVE SINCE LEARNT FROM HIS OFFICE THAT A MORE EXTENSIVE BRIEFING EXERCISE IS ABOUT TO BE SET IN MOTION, INVOLVING LOBBYING IN MOST ALLIANCE CAPITALS AND SIMILAR WORK BY THE US MISSION IN NATO. THIS HAS BEEN PROMPTED IN PART BY THE COMMENTS MADE AT THE PERM REPS LUNCH IN BRUSSELS (UKDEL NATO TELNO 167) AND BY A CONCERN, WHICH KIMMITT EXPRESSED TO ME, THAT THE GERMANS WERE WORKING ACTIVELY WITH PEOPLE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE AISLE. THE THRUST OF THE AMERICAN MESSAGE WILL BE THAT THEY BELIEVED THEY HAD MET ALL MAIN GERMAN CONCERNS - TO DEAL QUIETLY WITH THE ISSUE (A DIG AT THE COALITION'S DECISION TO GO PUBLIC), WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE SNF NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME POINT, AND A DELAY IN THE MODERNISATION DECISION: IT WAS NOW TIME FOR THE GERMANS TO RESPOND WITH A SIMILAR DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY.

5. OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE READY TO STAND FIRM ARE TO BE FOUND IN BAKER'S REMARKS DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE HERE ON 23 MAY: QUOTE WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND REACH AGREEMENT ON LANGUAGE BEFORE WE GET THERE (THE SUMMIT), BUT I'M NOT GOING TO PREDICT THAT THAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN. AND LET ME SAY THAT WE HAVE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS THAT, WHILE WE WOULD PREFER TO RESOLVE IT BEFORE WE GET TO THE SUMMIT, IT'S AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT MATTER THAT DEALS WITH THE SECURITY OF THE WEST AND THEREFORE IT SHOULD NOT BE RESOLVED AT ALL COSTS. SO IF WE HAVE TO TAKE IT ON AT THE SUMMIT, WE WILL TAKE IT ON AT THE SUMMIT UNQUOTE.

6. THE RISK THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME FURTHER MOVEMENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE BEFORE THE MEETING IN BRUSSELS CANNOT BE RULED OUT ENTIRELY. BUT IT IS OF SOME FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THEIR LATEST POSITION CONTINUES TO BE EXPRESSED IN THE SAME LANGUAGE AS BEFORE. IN PARTICULAR IT RETAINS THE PHRASE QUOTE EXCLUDING A ZERO OPTION UNQUOTE, AS OPPOSED TO EMPLOYING THE OTHER TERM QUOTE BUT NOT ELIMINATION UNQUOTE, WHICH BAKER MENTIONED TO YOU ON 23 MAY (YOUR TELNO 986).

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RESIDENT CLERK

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SECRET
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FM BONN
TO DESKBY 241500Z FCO
TELNO 558
OF 241439Z MAY 89
INFO DESKBY 241500Z WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNOS 544 AND 557: GERMAN POSITION ON SNF.

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER GERMAN MESSAGE THAT THEY ARE NOT THROWING IN THE TOWEL.

DETAIL

2. ALFRED DREGGER, PARLIAMENTARY LEADER OF THE CDU/CSU TELEPHONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS BEFORE YOU SEE GENSCHER TOMORROW:-

(A) THE LATEST US MESSAGE ''BRINGS US NO (NO) FURTHER FORWARD'';

(B) THE GERMANS DO NOT FEEL UNDER TIME PRESSURE AND WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TALKING AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IF NECESSARY;

(C) THEY CANNOT SEE WHY IT WOULD BE AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS TO NEGOTIATE AWAY THE ENORMOUS SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN SNF. WOULD IT NOT BE AWFUL, DREGGER ASKED, IF GORBACHEV DURING HIS VISIT TO BONN SUGGESTED THAT THE FRG AND SOVIET UNION AGREE ON THE AIM OF NEGOTIATED SNF REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL CEILINGS ABOVE ZERO?

COMMENT.

3. DREGGER MUST HAVE BEEN SPEAKING IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF KOHL'S MINISTERIAL MEETING THIS MORNING (SECOND TUR). I SEE THIS, LIKE THE REMARKS BY SUDHOFF AND TELTSCHIK (TURS) AS AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW US THAT THE GERMANS WILL NOT THROW IN THE TOWEL BEFORE OR AT THE SUMMIT.

4. WE HAVE TOLD TELTSCHIK'S OFFICE THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OMITTING SNF (TELECON GOULDEN/BUDD REFERS).

MALLABY

LIMITED
HD/SEC POL D
PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS

SECRET/DEDIP

PS/Sir J Fretwell
Mr Boyd
Mr Goulden
DUS(P) - MoD
PS/No 10 Downing Street.

34
A. Jill

GRS 350

SECRET
DEDIP
FM BONN
TO DESKBY 241400Z FCO
TELNO 557
OF 241320Z MAY 89
INFO DESKBY 211400Z WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

GERMAN POSITION ON SNF.

SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF LATEST AMERICAN VIEWS, TELTSCHIK REMAINS PESSIMISTIC.

DETAIL.

2. AFTER A MEETING BETWEEN KOHL, GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG, TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE GERMANS HAD THIS MORNING RECEIVED UNITED STATES COMMENTS ON THE GERMAN PAPER HANDED OVER IN WASHINGTON ON 22 MAY. THE AMERICAN PAPER IDENTIFIED TWO MATTERS ON WHICH THE GERMANS AND THE AMERICANS AGREED:

(A) THE NATO DECISION ON PRODUCTION AND STATIONING OF A SUCCESSOR TO LANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN 1992.

(B) THE AMERICANS WERE IN PRINCIPLE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. TELTSCHIK CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE TWO MAJOR GERMAN/AMERICAN DIFFERENCES:

(II) WHETHER THE DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY NATO NEXT WEEK SHOULD EXPLICITLY EXCLUDE A THIRD ZERO.

(III) THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CFE AND SNF NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHICH THE AMERICAN POSITION STILL WAS THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN ONLY AFTER THE RESULTS OF CFE HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

4. TELTSCHIK COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOW PESSIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED BEFORE OR AT THE SUMMIT.

S./

5. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE PROVISIONAL GERMAN VIEW WAS THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SHOULD STILL BE APPROVED AT THE NATO SUMMIT, EVEN IF SNF HAD TO BE LEFT OUT OF IT ALTOGETHER. TELTSCHIK ASKED WHAT OUR POSITION WOULD BE ON THAT.

6. DELIBERATIONS ON SNF ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY SMALL CIRCLE IN BONN. GEN. NAUMANN, FOR EXAMPLE, STOLTENBURG'S KEY ADVISER ON THE QUESTION, TOLD US TODAY THAT HE HIMSELF HAD NOT SEEN THE TEXT OF KOHL'S LETTER TO BUSH.

MALLABY

LIMITED

HD/SEC POL D
PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
PS/Sir J. Fretwell
Mr Boyd
Mr Goulden
DUS(P) - MOD
PS/No 10 Downing Street.

MRMACQ

T'

file

afo

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 May 1989

SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T100/89

Dear Kenneth,

Thank you for your letter of 3 May about the modernisation of NATO nuclear weapons.

Every one of us, of course, wants to see the world a safer and more peaceful place, not only for ourselves but for our children. My overriding concern is to find the best way to bring this about.

As far as Europe is concerned, we have had over the last forty-four years the longest period of peace in the modern history of our continent. I and other NATO leaders believe that this peace has been due in large part to the role in our continent of nuclear weapons - weapons which are designed not to be used in war, but to deter war. If these weapons are to be an effective deterrent then they cannot be allowed simply to decay. Therefore we shall need to modernise them from time to time. That is what we shall have to do, just as the Russians have done - they, for example, have modernised 95 per cent of their short-range nuclear missiles in the forward area in the last five years. We have made significant reductions in our stocks of nuclear weapons. We hope the Soviet Union will now do the same.

You are right to think that Mr. Gorbachev and I have a great deal of respect for each other. But I believe that

rspect is won by stating your convictions and sticking to them. That is why, when Mr. Gorbachev came to London last month, I told him that in our view nuclear deterrence was the best means of maintaining peace in Europe. This has not had any detrimental effect on East-West relations.

May I take this opportunity to say how much we have appreciated your role in the discussions which have taken place in recent weeks of Southern African regional problems. The stance taken by the Front Line States under your firm Chairmanship at their meeting in Luanda on 6 April was important in keeping the Namibian independence process, which is so vital for the region, on the rails.

I also note that you were present at the important 8-Nation Summit in Luanda on 16 May which met to discuss ways in which a wider African contribution might be made to the achievement of internal peace and reconciliation in Angola. I was glad to see that you collectively encouraged the Angolan government to pursue the process of reconciliation. Circumstances are today more favourable for peace in Angola than they have ever been. I hope that you and your colleagues will continue to do what you can to bring about negotiations designed to lead to a peaceful settlement to this long-running and bloody conflict.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

23 May 1989

Dear Charles

Letter to the Prime Minister from President Kaunda

I enclose a letter from President Kaunda to the Prime Minister about the modernisation of NATO's nuclear armoury.

It is not clear what has impelled President Kaunda to write in these terms at the moment, other than his recurrent tendency to preach. But the Foreign Secretary thinks that the best response would be the firm but polite restatement of our views set out in the enclosed draft letter.

The Foreign Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister might take the opportunity to encourage President Kaunda in the helpful line he has taken recently over Namibia and peace in Angola. There is no doubt that the firm position taken by the Front Line States at their meeting in Luanda on 6 April was an important step in getting SWAPO back in line after their disastrous incursion into Namibia at the end of March.

Yours ever

Bobby

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

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Confidential
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Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:
Dr Kenneth David Kaunda
President of the Republic of Zambia

Copies to:

To im.

SUBJECT:

memAcQ

Thank you for your letter of 3 May about the modernisation of NATO nuclear weapons.

Every one of us, of course, wants to see the world a safer and more peaceful place, not only for ourselves, but for our children. My overriding concern is to find the best way to bring this about.

As far as Europe is concerned, we have had, over the last 44 years the longest period of peace in the modern history of our continent. I and other NATO leaders believe that this peace has been due in large part to the role in our continent of nuclear weapons - weapons which are designed not to be used in war, but to deter war. If these weapons are to be an effective deterrent then they cannot be allowed simply to decay. Therefore we ~~will~~ shall need to

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modernise them from time to time. That is what we shall have to do, just as the Russians have done - they, for example, have modernised 95% of their short-range nuclear missiles in the forward area in the last five years. We have made significant reductions in our stocks of nuclear weapons. We hope the Soviet Union will now do the same.

You are right to think that Mr Gorbachev and I have a great deal of respect for each other. But I believe that respect is won by stating your convictions and sticking to them. That is why, when Mr Gorbachev came to London last month, I told him that in our view, nuclear deterrence was ~~for Europe~~ the best means of maintaining peace in Europe. This ~~does not imply any aggressive intent; quite the contrary. Nor should it have~~ has not led any a detrimental effect on East-West relations. ~~As you will know, our advocacy of this position has certainly not had such an effect on our relations with the Soviet Union.~~

May I take this opportunity to say how much we have appreciated your role in the discussions which have taken place in recent weeks of Southern African regional problems. The stance taken by the Front Line States under your firm Chairmanship at their

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GN

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

SNF

It seems that the Americans intend to tell the Germans that their respective positions remain too far apart, & the issue will have to be dealt with at the Summit.

CDP

SECRET AND PERSONAL

33 a-b

CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1989

SNF

Herr Teltschik telephoned me from Bonn this morning to discuss the latest situation on SNF. He said that the German Government had not been at all happy with the American response to the paper handed over by Stoltenberg. They did not feel that the concessions offered in their own paper had received adequate recognition or recompense. The most crucial point was now the timing of negotiations on SNF. The Germans could not accept the American position that negotiations could only start after tangible implementation of the results of the conventional force negotiations in Vienna. This would put off SNF negotiations into the next century. They would be sending a written answer to the Americans this afternoon which would try to narrow the differences, especially on this timing point. His own proposed visit to Washington had been once again postponed and it was not clear whether it would take place at all. The general feeling in Bonn was that the German Government had moved considerably: now it was up to the Americans to respond.

I said that we remained opposed to the very idea of negotiations as he would know. It followed that we had every sympathy with attempts to make the conditions for them as strict as possible. We would also want to see a third zero explicitly ruled out. Teltschik claimed that the German paper handed over by Stoltenberg had implicitly excluded this. I continued that one possibility was simply to rely on existing texts. I thought that, in the present situation, our preference was to take these issues to the NATO Summit itself and discuss them there. Teltschik said that it might well come to this.

The risk now is that the Americans will weaken further on the link between SNF negotiations and conventional force reductions. We need to consider how best to pre-empt this. For instance, should the Foreign Secretary speak to Mr Baker? Or has the time come for another message from the Prime Minister to the President? My personal view is that the former would be better at this stage.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

SNF

I attach two papers summarising developments. The important facts are:

- The Americans did not include any of our proposed amendments in the text which they gave the Germans. The Americans argue that their text adequately, although only implicitly, ensures that SNF negotiations would not take place until after a decision to deploy a successor to LANCE.

- Nonetheless, the Germans are rejecting the American text, principally because it relegates negotiations on SNF until after implementation of an agreement on conventional forces reductions.

The key question is whether the Americans now hold firm or let their bottom-line slip further in response to German demands. I have suggested that the Foreign Secretary ought to speak to Secretary Baker during the day to try to stiffen them, holding a further message or telephone call from you to President Bush in reserve for later.

Robin Butler has asked whether he and/or John Weston should go across to Washington to negotiate with the Americans. I do not myself see what this would achieve: the problem is not lack of contact with the Americans, it is the fact they are hell-bent on reaching accommodation with the Germans ahead of the NATO Summit. Our views are known to them: but it is not a message they want to hear.

CDP

mt

C. D. POWELL
22 MAY 1989

MRMACH

The National Archives

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SECRET
DEDIP
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 544
OF 221439Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 541 : GERMAN POSITION ON SNF

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER INDICATION OF GERMAN CONCERN AT THE COURSE OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS.

DETAIL

2. SUDHOFF, PUS-EQUIVALENT AT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND A CLOSE ADVISER TO GENSCHER, TOLD THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS AND ME TODAY THAT THE GERMANS WERE INCREASINGLY OF THE VIEW THAT AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED BEFORE OR AT THE NATO SUMMIT ON A FORMULA ABOUT SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS NOW MORE HAWKISH THAN THE ONE SET OUT IN NATO'S DECLARATION OF MARCH 1988. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO AGREE BEFORE THE SUMMIT THAT SNF WOULD BE OMITTED FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND THE DECLARATION, IN ORDER TO AVOID A MAJOR ROW AT THE SUMMIT.

COMMENT

3. I REPORT SUDHOFF'S REMARKS AS A FURTHER INDICATION OF GERMAN GLOOM AT THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY. THE REMARK ABOUT LEAVING SNF OUT OF THE NATO DOCUMENTS MAY BE INTENDED MORE AS A DEMONSTRATION THAT THE GERMANS WILL NOT GIVE IN OVER SNF NEGOTIATIONS THAN AS A DESCRIPTION OF GENSCHER'S INTENTIONS.

MALLABY

LIMITED
HD/SEC POL D
PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
Sir J Fretwell
Mr Boyd
Mr Goulden
DUS(P)-MOD

PS/No 10 Downing Str.

Secret/DEDIP

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 220730Z FCO

TELNO 1421

OF 220344Z MAY 89

INFO DESKBY 220900Z BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

BONN PERONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

UKDEL NATO PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

OUR TELNO 1402 : SNF

SUMMARY.

1. OUR COMMENTS CONSIDERED. ONLY ONE MINOR POINT INCLUDED IN THE TEXT GIVEN TO THE GERMANS.

DETAIL

2. IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN A READOUT FROM THE AMERICANS ON THEIR REACTION TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL NO 959, AND THE PRECISE CONTENTS OF THE US TEXT WHICH WAS HANDED TO STOLTENBERG BEFORE HE LEFT WASHINGTON ON THE EVENING OF 19 MAY. THE ABSENCE OF THE KEY PLAYERS IN MAINE OVER THE WEEKEND, TOGETHER WITH THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN BOSTON AND THE MITTERAND VISIT, HAVE BEEN MAJOR DIVERSIONS. WE HAVE HOWEVER NOW MANAGED TO REACH ZOELLICK,(EFFECTIVELY BAKER'S CHIEF OF STAFF).

3. ZOELLICK CONFIRMED THAT OUR COMMENTS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY BAKER TO KENNEBUNKPORT AND CONSIDERED CAREFULLY BY THE PRESIDENT BEFORE ANY TEXT WAS GIVEN TO THE GERMANS. ONE AMENDMENT WAS MADE AS A RESULT. THIS WAS THE ADDITION OF THE WORDS QUOTE FOR THESE MISSILE FORCES UNQUOTE AFTER THE REFERENCE TO EXCLUDING A ZERO OPTION AT THE END OF THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA 3 (TEXT AS IN YOUR TELNO 961). ZOELLICK SAID THAT OUR OTHER POINTS ON PRIOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET MISSILE NUMBERS AND PRIOR DECISION TO DEPLOY A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE WERE NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE IT WAS FELT THAT THEY WERE ALREADY IMPLICIT IN THE US VERSION. IN PARTICULAR, THE TIGHT LINKAGE OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS TO A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH WOULD NEED TO HAPPEN BEFOREHAND - IE TANGIBLE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN CFE NEGOTIATIONS - MEANT THAT THE MODERNISATION DECISION WOULD IN ANY CASE HAVE TO BE SETTLED SATISFACTORILY FIRST.

4. ZOELLICK ADDED THAT THE AMERICAN FORMULA WAS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE ANY FURTHER STUDY OF THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN THE ALLIANCE, STILL LESS WORK ON A NEGOTIATING MANDATE. THE CONDITIONS IN THE TEXT WERE THERE TO PROVIDE ALL THE GUIDANCE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED

UNTIL MUCH LATER ON. IF HOWEVER THE GERMANS REVERTED TO THEIR IDEAS (AS IN YOUR TEL NO 960) ZOELLICK EXPECTED THE AMERCIAN RESPONSE TO BE TOUGHER RATHER THAN MORE CONCILIATORY, POSSIBLY THEN DRAWING ON THE REST OF OUR POINTS.

5. THERE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN NO DECISION YET ON NEXT STEPS WITH THE GERMANS. ZOELLICK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT STOLTENBERG HAD LEAKED THE DETAILS OF THE US TEXT SO RAPIDLY TO THE PRESS AND PORTRAYED THEM IN A POSITIVE LIGHT. THEY HOPED ON REFLECTION THAT THIS WAS A DELIBERATE MOVE TO ISOLATE GENSCHER SO THAT HE WOULD NOW BE SEEN AS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A SOLUTION THROUGH HIS ATTITUDE TO THE THIRD ZERO AND OTHER ASPECTS.

6. FCO PLS PASS. NO 10.

ACLAND

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MDHIAN 5664

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO DESKBY 220700Z FCO
TELNO 541
OF 220445Z MAY 89
INFO DESKBY 220700Z UKDEL NATO
INFO DESKBY 221200Z WASHINGTON

GERMAN POSITION ON SNF.

SUMMARY.
1. GERMANS DISAPPOINTED WITH LATEST AMERICAN TEXT. WILL PUT FURTHER FORMULATIONS TO USA ON 22 MAY.

DETAIL.
2. FRG MINISTERS MET FOR TWO HOURS ON 21 MAY AND DISCUSSED THE AMERICAN PAPER GIVEN TO STOLTENBERG AS HE WAS LEAVING WASHINGTON ON 19 MAY. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT THE GERMANS WERE DISAPPOINTED. THEY DID NOT FEEL THAT THE AMERICANS HAD RECIPROCATED THE GERMAN CONCESSIONS TAKEN BY STOLTENBERG TO WASHINGTON. INDEED THE AMERICAN POSITION SEEMED TO BE HARDER THAN BEFORE STOLTENBERG'S VISIT. IT CERTAINLY DID NOT REFLECT WHAT BAKER AND OTHERS HAD SAID IN THE TALKS WITH STOLTENBERG.

3. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME THAT THE GERMANS WOULD STICK TO THE POSITION THAT A PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE WRITTEN INTO THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. THE GERMANS COULD ACCEPT A STATEMENT THAT NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN SNF WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNTIL AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF CFE. THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PRESENT AMERICAN POSITION THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL A CFE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

4. KASTRUP (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, AUSWAERTIGES AMT) TOLD ME ON 21 MAY THAT THE OTHER MAJOR GERMAN/AMERICAN DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WERE INSISTING ON EXPLICITLY RULING OUT A THIRD ZERO RELATING TO GROUND BASED SNF IN EUROPE. KASTRUP SAID THAT GENSCHER COULD FORESEE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE SUCH A THIRD ZERO COULD BE THINKABLE, I.E. WHERE THERE WAS CONVENTIONAL PARITY AND THE WEST RETAINED OTHER KINDS OF SNF SUCH AS AIRBORNE AND SEABORNE. THE US EMBASSY HERE THINK THAT GENSCHER MIGHT GIVE IN ON THIS POINT IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE NEGOTIATIONS ASPECT.

5. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE BRIEFING THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT KOHL WILL PUT NEW FORMULATIONS TO BUSH ON 22 MAY AND THAT AGREEMENT

HAS NOT QUITE BEEN REACHED. THIS IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REALLY FEEL, AND IS DESIGNED TO KEEP THE PUBLIC TEMPERATURE DOWN.

6. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME THAT KOHL MIGHT WANT TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE LATTER PART OF THE COMING WEEK. TELTSCHIK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS OFF FOR THE TIME BEING.

MALLABY

YYYY

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

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C D Powell

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

J. J. Wade.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

proceed on the understanding that any negotiations on forces of shorter land-based nuclear missiles will be conducted upon a prior decision by the Alliance to deploy a follow-on system to LANCE

US TEXT

1. The Alliance reaffirms its position that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, which is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. Where nuclear forces are concerned, land, sea and air-based systems are necessary in Europe.

2. In view of the huge superiority of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short-range nuclear missiles, the Alliance calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its short-range missile systems to current NATO levels.

and action by the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF to NATO levels

3. In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance states that its highest priority in negotiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions which will improve security by eliminating existing asymmetries. Following tangible implementation of such an agreement, the United States, in consultation with its Allies, is prepared to enter into negotiations to reduce American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels below the present levels of American land-based nuclear missile forces - excluding a zero option. The members of the Alliance proceed on the understanding that any negotiated reduction in these nuclear missile forces will not begin until after the full implementation of the results achieved in the negotiations on conventional forces.

for such missiles

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5. As regards these nuclear missile forces, their level and characteristics must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. In 1992, the Alliance will decide in the light of security developments on the introduction of a follow-on system for the LANCE missile into the Alliance and hence its production and deployment. The Alliance affirm the development of a follow-on system for the LANCE short-range missile.

either side

In 1992 the Alliance will decide on the numbers required of a follow-on system for the LANCE system & hence its production & deployment

30

File

PRIME MINISTER

SNF

I attach two papers summarising developments. The important facts are:

- The Americans did not include any of our proposed amendments in the text which they gave the Germans. The Americans argue that their text adequately, although only implicitly, ensures that SNF negotiations would not take place until after a decision to deploy a successor to LANCE.

- Nonetheless, the Germans are rejecting the American text, principally because it relegates negotiations on SNF until after implementation of an agreement on conventional forces reductions.

The key question is whether the Americans now hold firm or let their bottom-line slip further in response to German demands. I have suggested that the Foreign Secretary ought to speak to Secretary Baker during the day to try to stiffen them, holding a further message or telephone call from you to President Bush in reserve for later.

Robin Butler has asked whether he and/or John Weston should go across to Washington to negotiate with the Americans. I do not myself see what this would achieve: the problem is not lack of contact with the Americans, it is the fact they are hell-bent on reaching accommodation with the Germans ahead of the NATO Summit. Our views are known to them: but it is not a message they want to hear.

C. D. POWELL
22 MAY 1989

MRMACH

29 a MD 2DP4 a
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1989

SNF

Herr Teltschik telephoned me from Bonn this morning to discuss the latest situation on SNF. He said that the German Government had not been at all happy with the American response to the paper handed over by Stoltenberg. They did not feel that the concessions offered in their own paper had received adequate recognition or recompense. The most crucial point was now the timing of negotiations on SNF. The Germans could not accept the American position that negotiations could only start after tangible implementation of the results of the conventional force negotiations in Vienna. This would put off SNF negotiations into the next century. They would be sending a written answer to the Americans this afternoon which would try to narrow the differences, especially on this timing point. His own proposed visit to Washington had been once again postponed and it was not clear whether it would take place at all. The general feeling in Bonn was that the German Government had moved considerably: now it was up to the Americans to respond.

I said that we remained opposed to the very idea of negotiations as he would know. It followed that we had every sympathy with attempts to make the conditions for them as strict as possible. We would also want to see a third zero explicitly ruled out. Teltschik claimed that the German paper handed over by Stoltenberg had implicitly excluded this. I continued that one possibility was simply to rely on existing texts. I thought that, in the present situation, our preference was to take these issues to the NATO Summit itself and discuss them there. Teltschik said that it might well come to this.

The risk now is that the Americans will weaken further on the link between SNF negotiations and conventional force reductions. We need to consider how best to pre-empt this. For instance, should the Foreign Secretary speak to Mr Baker? Or has the time come for another message from the Prime Minister to the President? My personal view is that the former would be better at this stage.

6

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL 28 FILE KK

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 May 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF

Henry Kissinger telephoned me this afternoon to say that he had not yet been able to see senior American officials since his return to the United States, because they had all been tied up with President Mitterrand's visit. However, it was being put about we were happy with the American reply to the German proposals and that there was no problem. He wanted to check before talking to Secretary Baker and the President.

I said that we did not know what reply had been given to the Germans. If it was the text which we had been shown on Friday afternoon then we were very far from happy. If it included some amendments which we had proposed then it would be better. We had had no communication of any sort from the Americans since Friday evening. Henry Kissinger said he was interested to hear this. He would try to find out exactly what the position was and would continue to represent the Prime Minister's strong objections to SNF negotiations, at least without very stringent conditions.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

The attached telegram summarises yesterday's developments and is not unhelpful. Clearly the Americans are going to reach a decision on how to respond to the Germans in the course of today. I expect they will be in touch with us either in Washington or by the President telephoning you. I will let you know if we pick up anything more.

(C.D. POWELL)

20 May 1989

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SECRET
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FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 19-200Z FCO
TELNO 1402
OF JQOWQQRZ MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DUS(P)
BONN AND UKDEL NATO PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
YOUR TELNOS 959-961

SNF

1. THE AMERICANS HAVE REMAINED IN TOUCH WITH US DURING THE DAY ABOUT THE EXCHANGES AHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITH YOU AND NO 10. KIMMITT HAS NOW TELEPHONED AGAIN TO SAY THAT BAKER WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 961) AND LEFT IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS IN ORDER TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT KENNEBUNKPORT. BAKER'S ONLY COMMENT TO IS OFFICIALS HAD BEEN A DELP IC REMARK THAT AT ONE LEVEL HE FOUND THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE DISCOURAGING BUT AT ANOTHER LEVEL IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT 90 PER CENT OF THE MEETING WITH THE GERMANS IN STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY (19 MAY), WAS CONFINED TO BAKER AND STOLTENBERG, WIH NO OFFICIALS PRESENT.

WHEN THE TWO JOINED THE MAIN GROUP BAKER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE AN IMMEDIATE DEFINITIVE RESPONSE TO THE GERMAN TEXT. BUT HOPED TO DO SO VERY QUICKLY. STOLTENBERG HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORANCE OF THE COALITION MEETING ON 21 MAY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING AN ANSWER FOR THEN. THE EXPECTATION AMONG OFFICIALS HERE IS THA THIS WILL BE READY BY CLOSE OF PLAY ON SATURDAY.

3. KIMMITT ALSO SAID THAT A LINE TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH STOLENBERG. THE AMERICANS WOULD SAY THAT THE GERMANS HAD COME FORWARD WITH SOME NEW LANGUAGE WHICH HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY STOLTENBERG DURING HE VISIT. THIS WAS NOW UNDER REVIEW AND THE US REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT A COMPROMISE COULD BE WORKED OUT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. OFFICIALS FURTHER DOWN THE LINE ARE UNHAPPY THAT KIMMITT SHOULD HAVE REFERRED TO ANY COMPROMISE AND INTENDED TO TALK ONLY IN TERMS OF WORKING TOWARDS RESOLVING THE ISSUE. THIS ILLUSTRATES THE PRESSURE AT THE TOP LEVEL TO COME TO TERMS.

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5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO 10.

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 8226

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ORWBAN 8226
SECRET
DD 192200Z FCOLN
OO BONNN BRNAT MODAD
FM WASHI TO FCOLN
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SECRET
DEDIP
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 19-200Z FCO
TELNO 1402
OF JQOWQQRZ MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DUS(P)
BONN AND UKDEL NATO PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
YOUR TELNOS 959-961

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PRIME MINISTER

SNF

I attach a letter recording my further contacts with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft, together with the German and American texts. The amendments I have proposed apply, of course, to the American text. I hope I have conveyed the strength of your feelings on this matter. Quite what effect it will have I don't know. Scowcroft seems more sympathetic than Baker, but the latter seems to be calling the shots. Both will be conferring with the President in Maine this evening.

I suspect that the President will probably try to telephone you sometime in the next day or two. On balance, I think it is probably better to wait for that rather than to call him yourself. If you do speak, I would only make two points:

- I have gone in very hard on how dismayed and concerned you are about the course which the Americans are following. I hope you will reinforce this;

- the crucial amendment to the American text is of course the one which makes clear that any negotiations on SNF would be contingent on a prior decision by NATO to deploy a follow-on system to LANCE. I think you should say to the President that you would have great difficulty supporting the American text even with that addition. Without it, you are not prepared to support it, and there would obviously be a risk of a public split between the US and the UK which would be very regrettable. I think it is worth making this point. At the moment, the Americans are all too ready to accommodate the Germans and not sufficiently sensitive to our needs.

CHARLES POWELL

19 May 1989

Faxed to Chequers
0930 20/5

ORWBAN 8226
SECRET
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OO BONNN BRNAT MODAD
FM WASHI TO FCOLN
192114Z MAY
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ACLAND

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ORWBAN 8226

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ALSO ADVANCED TO:
MR POWELL, NO. 10
PS
PS/PUS
HD/SEC POL D
MR BOYD

190[redacted]Z
REFERRED TO MR GOULDEN. A.U.S.G. FOR DISTRIBUTION ADVICE
LNMDAN 1073 DRWBAN 8201
SECRET
DD 190900Z FCOLN
FM WASHI TO FCOLN
190030Z MAY
GRS 493

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 190900Z FCO
TELNO 1394
OF 190030Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO

FOLLOWING FROM MINISTER FOR GOULDEN (AUS)
OUR TELNO 1384 : SNF
1. AS FORESHADOWED IN TUR, SIR PERCY CRADOCK CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER THIS AFTERNOON AND WENT OVER THE GROUND ONCE MORE.
2. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE THE BEGINNING OF A DANGEROUS SLIDE TOWARDS A THIRD ZERO. HE HAD SEEN A NUMBER OF GERMANS OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PERSUASIONS IN RECENT DAYS. ALL HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. SOME THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO STOP SHORT OF A THIRD ZERO.
3. EAGLEBURGER CONTINUED THAT THE US WERE BEING TOUGH. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD STAY TOUGH. BUT ON THE ISSUE OF MODERNISATION THEY WOULD NOT PRESS TOO FAR. IF THERE WAS ROOM FOR COMPROMISE IT WAS OVER HOW FAST THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MOVE ON THE MODERNISATION DECISION. WE DID NOT NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THE NEGOTIATION ASPECT. EAGLEBURGER THEN QUALIFIED THAT BY SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT RULE OUT THAT AT THE SUMMIT THE US MIGHT BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A FORMULA INDICATING THAT ONCE CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES WERE REMOVED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE ON TO THE SNF PROBLEM. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE DYNAMIC OF THE SUMMIT WOULD LEAD TO SOME SUCH FORMULA. BUT HE WAS SURE THAT IF SO THERE WOULD BE FULL CONSULTATION WITH US. THE US WERE NOT GOING TO CUT A DEAL BEHIND ANYONE'S BACK. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE SILLY FOR THE SUMMIT TO DEAL ONLY WITH THE SNF ISSUE. IF THE ALLIANCE COULD COME UP WITH CREATIVE IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH EASTERN EUROPE. AND THE LONGER TERM THREAT POSED BY GORBACHEV. SNF COULD BECOME A LESS OBVIOUS PUBLIC ISSUE.
4. SIR PERCY CRADOCK SAID THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY IT WOULD BE TOLERABLE FOR THE SUMMIT TO FALL BACK ON EXISTING NATO TEXTS AND TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD ALREADY MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION BY AGREEING NOT TO PRESS FOR A MODERNISATION DECISION AT THIS TIME.
5. THE MINISTER ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY VOICES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION CALLING FOR THE ISSUE TO BE SETTLED BEFORE THE SUMMIT. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT THE VIEW OF BUSH, BAKER, SCOWCROFT OR CHENEY. WHAT PRESSURE THERE WAS CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, APART FROM THE GERMAN DESK IN STATE WHOSE JOB IT WAS TO WORRY ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE FRG.
COMMENT
6. EAGLEBURGER'S LINE WOULD CALL FOR MUCH THE SAME COMMENTS AS WE MADE ABOUT SCOWCROFT'S IN TUR IF IT WERE CLEAR THAT HE IS IN THE INNER LOOP ON THIS ISSUE. BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE MAY NOT

BE. HE WAS IN ANY CASE TALKING IN FRONT OF STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WHO WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT WHAT TRANSPIRED AT GATES' TALKS IN GERMANY OR HAVE BEEN AWARE OF SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS. WE SHALL REPORT FURTHER IF WE ARE ABLE TO DISCREETLY DISCOVER SOME MORE OF THE BACKGROUND. MEANWHILE, BOTH CRADOCK AND I ARE INCLINED TO STICK TO OUR ASSESSMENT.
7. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO POWELL (NO 10), PS, PS/PUS, BOYD AND HEAD OF SEC. POL. DEPARTMENT, FCO.

ACLAND

YYYY

DRWBAN 8201

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CC CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1989

SNF

Further to my letter of earlier this afternoon, I have now spoken to the Prime Minister and, on her instructions, been in touch again with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft.

I told both Baker and Scowcroft that the Prime Minister was very perturbed by this turn of events. She had placed weight on the assurance we had received that the Americans regarded talk of negotiations as premature. She thought the American text would be regarded as evidence of weakness. She wondered where the bottom line would be. In addition, she believed that, once we conceded the principle of negotiations, it would be impossible to persuade the European members of NATO to agree to deploy a successor to LANCE. Without in any way endorsing the American text, she had two main comments on it. First, it should make opening of negotiations dependent upon a decision to deploy a successor to LANCE. The last sentence of paragraph 3 should be amended to read:

> "The members of the Alliance proceed on the understanding that any negotiations on Soviet and American land-based missile forces will be contingent upon a prior decision by the Alliance to deploy a follow-on system to LANCE; and also that any negotiated reduction ...".

It would also be better if the penultimate sentence of paragraph 5 were amended to read:

> "In 1992 the Alliance will decide on the numbers required for a follow-on system for the LANCE short-range missile and hence its production and deployment."

Second, the Prime Minister thought the text should add a further condition for negotiations, namely that there should be substantial reductions in Soviet SNF towards NATO levels. This should also be inserted in paragraph 3.

Secretary Baker took note of these points and promised to put them to the President (he was about to leave Washington to

join the President in Maine). He was dubious whether the Germans would accept them: indeed, he doubted they would accept the original American text. I said that the Prime Minister would regard it as breaking faith with us if the Americans were to weaken the text even further before she had been able to speak to the President. Her preference would be to argue it out at the Summit. Secretary Baker said that the Americans differed with us on this point, although they would take the issue to the Summit if they had to. We might just have to accept that there was a difference of view between the US and the UK on this whole question. I pointed out that the difference had emerged only in the last twenty-four hours because the United States was contemplating changing its position.

General Scowcroft's attitude was somewhat better. He said that personally he thought our proposed amendment (I only gave him the text of the first one) was an improvement and he would be prepared to commend it to the President. I also made the point to him about avoiding any further weakening of the text without giving the Prime Minister an opportunity to discuss the issue with the President. General Scowcroft said that the Americans did not intend to 'give away the store'. He could promise that we would not be left out of any further discussions with the Germans. I took this to mean only that we shall continue to be consulted by telephone.

I am enclosing copies of the American and German text for the sake of completeness.

I am copying this letter and the enclosures to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GERMAN TEXT

1. The Alliance reaffirms its position that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the prevention of war, which is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. Where nuclear forces are concerned, land, sea and air-based systems are necessary in Europe as well in the present circumstances.

2. In view of the huge superiority of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short-range nuclear missiles, the Alliance calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce its capability in this field substantially. This would improve the chances of achieving results in negotiations.

3. In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the Alliance is prepared to enter into negotiations on American and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles of shorter range. The members of the Alliance proceed on the understanding that reductions to a level below the present Western SNF missile holdings will not be effected until after the implementation of results achieved in conventional negotiations.

A high level working group of the NATO Council will be set up:

- to specify the circumstances and conditions which will determine in the light of the declaration at Rekyavik in 1987 and Brussels in 1988 the date for the commencement of negotiations in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons;

- to define the aim of the negotiations, including the verification mechanisms; and

- to work out the details of a negotiating mandate.

4. At the same time the Special Consultative Group will elaborate an option for the inclusion of nuclear artillery ammuntion with a view to establishing equal ceilings at a drastically reduced level.

5. In 1992, the Alliance will decide in the light of political and security policy developments, and especially taking into account the results of all disarmament negotiations, whether the introduction of a follow-on system for the LANCE missile into the Alliance and hence its production and deployment, will be necessary in 1996 or not. The development of a follow-on system for the Alliance short-range missile is a national decisioin of the United

States.

Crucial and decisive for the Alliance's decision in 1992 is whether it proves possible:

- to achieve a greater degree of security at a lower level of nuclear and conventional forces overall;

- to conclude binding agreements with the Warsaw Pact to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action;

- to build through corresponding agreements a larger degree of mutual confidence on the basis of increased transparency and calculability of military behaviour.

SRWBZV

[Proposed UK amendments in manuscript].

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for such missiles

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4. Delete.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

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CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1989

Prime Minister
Mr. This is the first intimation of the strong. CDP 19/5

SNF

Secretary Baker telephoned me this afternoon - as I know he did you - to tell me about language which the Americans plan to table with the Germans on SNF. He said he thought that we would be satisfied with the language, which did not represent a significant move forward and would not undercut the Alliance position. The language would express willingness to negotiate on SNF provided important conditions were met:

> negotiations would start only when there was some tangible implementation of an agreement on conventional forces reduction;
>
> implementation of the SNF agreement would be tied to full implementation of an agreement on conventional forces;
>
> there would be a specific and express reference to no third zero.

In addition, the Americans would accede to the German request to delay a decision on modernisation until 1992. He would get someone to read me the precise language.

I said that, before hearing the language, I could tell him that the Prime Minister would be deeply dismayed by this message. It ran counter to assurances we believed we had received, even within the last twenty-four hours, that the US regarded any commitment to negotiations as premature. The Prime Minister remained opposed to any mention of SNF negotiations. She would certainly think the conditions which he had mentioned inadequate, not least the absence of any clear commitment to deployment of FOTL, and prior action by the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF to NATO levels. I was not able to consult her but did not believe she could support such a text. Secretary Baker, who seemed rather taken aback, said that he would be pleased to relay this view to the President. I said that I would be grateful if he would do so.

b.

Since dictating the above, Secretary Baker has telephoned me again. He said that he had talked to the President. The President felt that there really had to be some move forward on this issue. But he would delay giving a text to the Germans until we had had time to look at it and let them have specific comments. He had to emphasise that the President felt the need to be responsive to the paper which the Americans had received from the Germans. I repeated my objections both on the substance of the American text and the manner in which it was presented to us.

General Scowcroft then came through to me, and we had a rather similar discussion. He admitted that the Americans had shifted from the position which they had put to us only 24 hours earlier, namely that a commitment to negotiations would be premature. But he claimed that the conditions in the American text were sufficiently firm to ensure that NATO's essential security interests would be safeguarded. He claimed that the text - which I had still not seen - left no doubt that a decision must be taken on a successor to LANCE before there could be negotiations, even if the language was circumlocutory. I said this point had not been clear from what Secretary Baker had said to me. Moreover, the Americans did not appear to be making prior reductions in Soviet SNF to NATO levels a condition of negotiations. General Scowcroft said that he doubted whether the Germans would accept the text. I asked what would happen then: would the Americans simply offer more concessions? General Scowcroft said he hoped they would stand firm, but could not guarantee that there would be no further amendments. I said that the Prime Minister's preference would still be to argue this issue at the NATO Summit itself: that tactic had been very successful at the last Summit. General Scowcroft said the President's preference was to have the issue out of the way before the Summit if it could be done on satisfactory terms.

I am trying to relay this to the Prime Minister and get some response which I can convey back to the Americans.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

File
MRMACD
bc. PC

25a-b

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1989

SNF

Secretary Baker telephoned me this afternoon - as I know he did you - to tell me about language which the Americans plan to table with the Germans on SNF. He said he thought that we would be satisfied with the language, which did not represent a significant move forward and would not undercut the Alliance position. The language would express willingness to negotiate on SNF provided important conditions were met:

negotiations would start only when there was some tangible implementation of an agreement on conventional forces reduction;

implementation of the SNF agreement would be tied to full implementation of an agreement on conventional forces;

there would be a specific and express reference to no third zero.

In addition, the Americans would accede to the German request to delay a decision on modernisation until 1992. He would get someone to read me the precise language.

I said that, before hearing the language, I could tell him that the Prime Minister would be deeply dismayed by this message. It ran counter to assurances we believed we had received, even within the last twenty-four hours, that the US regarded any commitment to negotiations as premature. The Prime Minister remained opposed to any mention of SNF negotiations. She would certainly think the conditions which he had mentioned inadequate, not least the absence of any clear commitment to deployment of FOTL, and prior action by the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF to NATO levels. I was not able to consult her but did not believe she could support such a text. Secretary Baker, who seemed rather taken aback, said that he would be pleased to relay this view to the President. I said that I would be grateful if he would do so.

b

Since dictating the above, Secretary Baker has telephoned me again. He said that he had talked to the President. The President felt that there really had to be some move forward on this issue. But he would delay giving a text to the Germans until we had had time to look at it and let them have specific comments. He had to emphasise that the President felt the need to be responsive to the paper which the Americans had received from the Germans. I repeated my objections both on the substance of the American text and the manner in which it was presented to us.

General Scowcroft then came through to me, and we had a rather similar discussion. He admitted that the Americans had shifted from the position which they had put to us only 24 hours earlier, namely that a commitment to negotiations would be premature. But he claimed that the conditions in the American text were sufficiently firm to ensure that NATO's essential security interests would be safeguarded. He claimed that the text - which I had still not seen - left no doubt that a decision must be taken on a successor to LANCE before there could be negotiations, even if the language was circumlocutory. I said this point had not been clear from what Secretary Baker had said to me. Moreover, the Americans did not appear to be making prior reductions in Soviet SNF to NATO levels a condition of negotiations. General Scowcroft said that he doubted whether the Germans would accept the text. I asked what would happen then: would the Americans simply offer more concessions? General Scowcroft said he hoped they would stand firm, but could not guarantee that there would be no further amendments. I said that the Prime Minister's preference would still be to argue this issue at the NATO Summit itself: that tactic had been very successful at the last Summit. General Scowcroft said the President's preference was to have the issue out of the way before the Summit if it could be done on satisfactory terms.

I am trying to relay this to the Prime Minister and get some response which I can convey back to the Americans.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
-
PERSONAL FOR CHARLES POWELL
-
DEAR CHARLES,
-
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LATEST MESSAGE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE CONTINUE TO INSIST ON NO THIRD ZERO AND ON A COMMITMENT TO DEPLOYMENT OF FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE. WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH.
-
WARM REGARDS,
-
BRENT
-
£0194

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OF 181701Z MAY 89
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INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

SIC CFJ
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S PRESS CONFERENCE: SNF

SUMMARY
1. MITTERRAND SAYS MODERNISATION DECISIONS CAN PROBABLY WAIT AND THAT THE NATO SUMMIT CAN CONCLUDE THAT TIME REMAINS FOR REFLECTION. BUT FRANCE OPPOSES A THIRD ZERO.

DETAIL
2. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND GAVE A MAJOR PRESS CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY AT THE ELYSEE ON 18 MAY. ROCARD, DUMAS AND OTHER MINISTERS WERE PRESENT. MITTERRAND REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT FRANCE'S POSITION HAD DECLINED AND STRESSED HIS DETERMINATION THAT FRANCE SHOULD HOLD ITS RANK INTERNATIONALLY. HE LISTED FOUR OBJECTIVES FOR FOREIGN POLICY:

(A) CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENCE OF PEACE, PROMOTING DISARMAMENT WHEREVER REASONABLE, PROVIDED THAT A REAL BALANCE AND SECURITY WERE MAINTAINED

(B) EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION (ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, THE SOCIAL CHARTER, AUDIOVISUAL, ENVIRONMENT AND A EUROPE OF CITIZENS)

(C) ACTION ON DEVELOPMENT/DEBT

(D) DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. ON SNF MITTERRAND SAID THAT THE INTEGRATED ALLIES WERE CONTINUING THEIR DISCUSSIONS. FRANCE WAS NOT PART OF THIS DEBATE BUT COULD EXPRESS ITS VIEWS. HE WOULD DO SO AT THE NATO SUMMIT. IT WAS REASONABLE OF THE US AND FRG TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT TIME REMAINED FOR DISCUSSING SNF MODERNISATION BEFORE 1992. SOME ARGUED THAT AN IMBALANCE IN SOVIET FAVOUR ALREADY EXISTED: THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT. AS HE HAD SAID AT THE 1988 SUMMIT THE PRIORITY WAS

CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. AS HE HAD SAID THEN, DURING THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS THE ALLIES COULD SEE HOW THE CFE TALKS PROGRESSED BEFORE TAKING SNF MODERNISATION DECISIONS. HE DID NOT EXPECT DRAMA AT THE NATO SUMMIT, SINCE TIME REMAINED FOR REFLECTION. BUT IF OTHERS INSISTED ON POSITIONS BEING SET OUT CLEARLY, THEN HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE TIME HAD NOT COME, FAR FROM IT, FOR A THIRD ZERO.

4. MITTERRAND ALSO ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAN, ARAFAT'S VISIT, ARAB/ISRAEL, EC ISSUES, THE SOVIET UNION AND NORTH/SOUTH QUESTIONS. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES HERE. ON FRANCE-FRG RELATIONS HE ADMITTED THAT PROBLEMS EXISTED AT PRESENT (ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC/MONETARY FIELD) BUT WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR OVERCOMING THEM AND CONTINUING COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION. ON THE FRENCH DEFENCE PROGRAMME HE CONFIRMED THAT, BECAUSE OF OTHER PRIORITIES, THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT BUDGETARY CUTS, TO BE ANNOUNCED NEXT WEEK, BUT NO MAJOR PROGRAMME WOULD BE CUT. THE HADES PRE-STRATEGIC MISSILE WOULD BE MAINTAINED: FRANCE'S CONDITIONS FOR ENTERING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TALKS WERE FAR FROM BEING FULFILLED.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK

SIC CFJ

OUR TELNO 522: SNF

SUMMARY

1. I WILL BE GIVEN A COPY EARLY ON 19 MAY OF THE LATEST INTERNAL COALITION TEXT ON SNF. PRESS IS FOCUSING ON STOLTENBERG IN WASHINGTON, BUT FRG ACTIVE IN OTHER DIRECTIONS TOO.

DETAIL

2. I WILL BE SEEING TELTSCHIK AT 190745Z. WE WILL SEND BY FAX AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT STOLTENBERG WILL STAY IN THE US LONG ENOUGH (PARA 4 BELOW) FOR US TO BE ABLE TO COMMENT TO THE AMERICANS ON THE COALITION PAPER BEFORE HE LEAVES.

3. TODAY'S GERMAN PRESS HAS LITTLE NEW TO SAY ON SNF. BUT THE ACTING GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS CONFIRMED THAT KOHL SPOKE TO BUSH, MITTERRAND AND LUBBERS ON 17 MAY AND THAT GENSCHER WILL BE IN PARIS TODAY (19 MAY) TO SEE MITTERRAND, ROCARD AND DUMAS. THE ONLY EDITORIAL OF SIGNIFICANCE IS IN DIE WELT (CONSERVATIVE), WHICH CRITICISES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO CONVINCE ITS CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN NATO PARTNERS OF THE NEED FOR ''EARLY'' SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVING INSTEAD SOWN MISTRUST IN THE UK, USA AND FRANCE.

4. ACCORDING TO THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE STOLTENBERG WILL REPORT TO KOHL AND GENSCHER ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHEN HE RETURNS ON 21 MAY. KOHL WILL THEN DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND TELTSCHIK TO WASHINGTON ACCOMPANIED BY KASTRUP AND SOMEONE FROM FMOD. TELTSCHIK IS DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH SCOWCROFT DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS.

MALLABY

YYYY

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PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

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The National Archives

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cc file TD
bc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 May, 1989.

Dear Richard,

SNF

Monsieur Vedrine from the Elysee telephoned this morning about the press conference which President Mitterrand would give this afternoon. This would deal mostly with foreign affairs, and would cover the prospects for the NATO Summit. The President was conscious that he had not yet replied to the Prime Minister's message on SNF, and would not wish to be thought discourteous in speaking publicly about the issue before having done so.

M. Vedrine did not appear to know exactly what the President would say on the subject. Indeed no one was sure. He thought the President would probably repeat the line which he had taken with the press following his meeting with the Prime Minister in February. The main concern of the French Government was not to complicate the continuing discussions between the Germans and Americans. He understood that the Germans were taking proposals to Washington which marked an important step forward, but he had no details.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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The National Archives

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL, 10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Brent,

Thank you for your reply to my earlier message on SNF and your invitation to comment further. I have shown this to the Prime Minister. She very much welcomes your clear statement that the idea of SNF negotiations is at present premature. She thinks it the only safe position on which to stand, and the only one which keeps flexible response intact.

The problem with setting conditions for SNF negotiations is that you cannot foretell what the position will be like in a few years time, particularly in a period of great uncertainty. The only real point of discussing them is to define the conditions so starkly that the Germans realise that they are better off resting on existing NATO texts, ie. the communiqué of the last Summit and of the Foreign Ministers meeting in Reykjavik than trying to persuade NATO to adopt a new position.

On that basis, the two conditions which you suggest are clearly important but not in themselves sufficient. They should surely also include:

- explicit rejection of a third zero; and

- commitment to the deployment of FOTL, so that we can be sure there will at all times be a sufficiency of updated weapons to make flexible response a reality.

The Prime Minister recalls that Britain and the US went to the last NATO Summit, argued the position there and emerged with a communiqué which both Governments had been assured at the outset of the meeting was unobtainable. She thinks we would do better to rest on that language than move to a weaker text.

We would very much welcome an opportunity to comment on any

SECRET AND PERSONAL

text which emerges from your meeting with Herr Stoltenberg.

Once again, this is very much a personal message. Thank you for your help.

Warm regards,

Charles

C.D.P. 1/5

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FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
S E C R E T
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM CHARLES POWELL, 10 DOWNING STREET

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

DEAR BRENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPLY TO MY EARLIER MESSAGE ON SNF AND YOUR INVITATION TO COMMENT FURTHER. I HAVE SHOWN THIS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. SHE VERY MUCH WELCOMES YOUR CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE IDEA OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS IS AT PRESENT PREMATURE. SHE THINKS IT THE ONLY SAFE POSITION ON WHICH TO STAND, AND THE ONLY ONE WHICH KEEPS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE INTACT.

THE PROBLEM WITH SETTING CONDITIONS FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS IS THAT YOU CANNOT FORETELL WHAT THE POSITION WILL BE LIKE IN A FEW YEARS TIME, PARTICULARLY IN A PERIOD OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY. THE ONLY REAL POINT OF DISCUSSING THEM IS TO DEFINE THE CONDITIONS SO STARKLY THAT THE GERMANS REALISE THAT THEY ARE BETTER OFF RESTING ON EXISTING NATO TEXTS, I.E. THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE LAST SUMMIT AND OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN REYKJAVIK THAN TRYING TO PERSUADE NATO TO ADOPT A NEW POSITION.

ON THAT BASIS, THE TWO CONDITIONS WHICH YOU SUGGEST ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT BUT NOT IN THEMSELVES SUFFICIENT. THEY SHOULD SURELY ALSO INCLUDE:

- EXPLICIT REJECTION OF A THIRD ZERO: AND

- COMMITMENT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL, SO THAT WE CAN BE SURE THERE WILL AT ALL TIMES BE A SUFFICIENCY OF UPDATED WEAPONS TO MAKE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE A REALITY.

THE PRIME MINISTER RECALLS THAT BRITAIN AND THE US WENT TO THE LAST NATO SUMMIT, ARGUED THE POSITION THERE AND EMERGED WITH A COMMUNIQUE WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN ASSURED AT THE OUTSET OF THE MEETING WAS UNOBTAINABLE. SHE THINKS WE WOULD DO BETTER TO REST ON THAT LANGUAGE THAN MOVE TO A WEAKER TEXT.

WE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON ANY TEXT WHICH EMERGES FROM YOUR MEETING WITH HERR STOLTENBERG.

ONCE AGAIN, THIS IS VERY MUCH A PERSONAL MESSAGE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.

WARM REGARDS,

CHARLES

NNNN

22(A-C)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

B.0120

MR POWELL

CDP 18/5

SNF

Could I offer one comment on a point of detail arising out of your recent message to Brent Scowcroft? You state the first of the Prime Minister's arguments as follows:

> "NATO's existing SNF missiles are at the level which the Alliance considers necessary to maintain flexible response. That level is a matter for NATO's judgment not for negotiation."

2. This proposition is indisputable as it stands. But it will not bear unlimited weight. NATO's High Level Group report on "The Role of Short Range Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy", endorsed by NATO Defence Ministers in the NPG in October 1988, said "since SNF are intended primarily to deprive the Warsaw Pact of any confidence in being able to overwhelm NATO's conventional defence, a major reduction in the Warsaw Pact ability to do so could substantially reduce the need for SNF to a level which would depend on the number of targets that NATO would need to hold at risk within the new conventional balance...". From this it follows, at least in logic -

a. that if drastic Warsaw Pact conventional reductions are negotiated (and implemented) the level of NATO SNF necessary to maintain flexible response could well be lower, in NATO's own judgment.

b. If so, it would make sense for NATO to ask the question whether it should go ahead and establish that lower level unilaterally; or in so doing to extract some further advantage in terms of reductions in Warsaw Pact SNF. For, although there is no strict relationship between the SNF levels of the two Alliances, the NATO HLG report also states that part of the purpose of NATO's forces in Europe is "to deter enemy use of his own nuclear forces".

3. It is worth bearing in mind that although NATO has only 88 Lance launchers, there are associated with these launchers 692 nuclear missiles (though for obvious reasons this figure is not broadcast). Since some NATO military authorities consider this figure unrealistically high in relation to the small number of launchers (since there would never be time to get off all the re-fires) one needs to be careful about statements referring to "the level of NATO's existing SNF missiles". The more so since SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study 1988 envisages a number of possible force mixes for NATO after Lance modernisation, including some which show FOTL missile numbers significantly below the number of existing Lance missiles. Moreover, I understand it to be the NATO military view that whatever the levels at which FOTL missiles were set in the context of a force mix following modernisation, that level could be further reduced in a situation where the Warsaw Pact accepted conventional force parity within ATTU. It is no doubt this military judgment which explains why the Americans have tabled the proposition for the comprehensive concept that "if concrete results toward eliminating

offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further reductions in the level of nuclear forces".

4. None of this is to diminish the force of the argument in your message that prior NATO agreement to FOTL deployment in principle is also logically required by a readiness to envisage SNF negotiation.

P J Weston

Cabinet Office
18 May 1989

DEERINGÉ: JAN P. 6

21(A-8)

PRIME MINISTER

I showed you General Scowcroft's reply to my message of last night. You will remember that he says he would welcome any further comment. Should we take him up on this?

There are certainly some substantive points to be made. For instance, his note does not mention rejection of a third zero and commitment to the deployment of a follow-on to Lance as additional conditions for any negotiations. A reply could inject these thoughts and I attach a draft.

On the other hand, there is some danger of being drawn in to a discussion of the conditions for negotiations. Every time we take a step further down this road, it implies a greater readiness to envisage such negotiations. There is some evidence - see the two telegrams from Washington attached - that the Americans are havering on the subject of negotiation. We may have stopped them on the brink. Or they may be saying one thing to us and another to the Germans.

I find it hard to make up my mind whether to recommend a message or not. Even if we send it tonight, it is probably too late to effect the discussion with Stolenburg in Washington today. My slight inclination, therefore, is to wait until we know the results of these discussions before contacting Scowcroft again.

Agree to pause?
Or,
agree to send the attached message?

CDP

C. D. POWELL
18 MAY 1989

MRMACB

8

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL, NO.10 DOWNING STREET.

Dear Brent,

Many thanks for your reply to my earlier message, which I have shown to the Prime Minister. She is reassured to hear of your continuing conviction that negotiations on SNF missiles are premature. That's fine. She would not want to be left, [illegible]. It is the only position which keeps NATO [illegible] intact.

The preconditions which you suggest for entertaining the idea of negotiations are important ~~and welcome~~ but insufficient. You do not, however, mention two particular points which we take as axiomatic: (1) explicit rejection of a third zero (although I am sure this is your view); and (2) commitment to the deployment of a follow-on to LANCE. The latter must surely be necessary if we are to be sure that the Alliance will have the weapons it needs. [illegible]

I understand that Herr Stoltenberg is with you in Washington at the moment and may have brought with him a new German position paper. If your dicussions with him lead you to consider any German text, it would be a kindness to let us have the opportunity to comment on it.

We are most grateful for your help.

Warm regards,

CHARLES

plus a sufficiency of up-to-date weapons to make flexible response a reality.

I agree - last time we went to the NATO summit, agreed the position [illegible] communique, which we were told would be impossible to obtain. Better to stay where we are now than have a weaker communique.

JD3AFK

20(A-B)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF

Thank you for your letter of 18 May enclosing General Scowcroft's message.

We agree that his reply is on the whole more reassuring than other indications we have had recently of thinking in the US Administration.

Recognising the risk you identify, we nonetheless think it is worth going back to the Americans to make the point set out in the attached draft.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

B

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
C D Powell

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

Please pass following message to General Brent Scowcroft from Charles Powell, No. 10 Downing St.

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Dear Brent, Many thanks

Thank you for your reply to my earlier message, which I have shown to the Prime Minister. She is ~~I am sure that the Prime Minister will be~~ reassured to hear of your continuing conviction that negotiations on SNF missiles are premature. ~~She herself, as I have made clear, believes that for NATO now to countenance the possibility of such negotiations would be a mistake.~~

The preconditions which you have suggested for entertaining the idea of negotiations are important & welcome. ~~make no mention of~~ There is not, however, mention of two particular points which we take as axiomatic: explicit rejection of a third zero, and commitment to the deployment of a follow-on to LANCE. The latter seems quite minor and surely should be welcomed if we are ready to accept the additional condition you mention - no harm in giving the Russians the benefit of the doubt. ~~Although the Prime Minister would, I believe, be ready to accept the additional condition you mention - reduction of Soviet SNF to NATO's level - she would not regard it as of the same importance as these other two points. On one view indeed - depending upon the level arrived at - it could logically represent the point at which negotiations ought to stop rather than to start.~~

(although I am sure this is your view)

/Herr

SECRET AND PERSONAL

If I understand that

Herr Stoltenberg is, ~~I understand,~~ with you in Washington at the moment and may have brought with him a new German position paper. If your discussions with him lead you to consider any German text, ~~I hope~~ it would be ~~ok~~ a kindness to let us ~~that we might~~ have the opportunity to comment on it.

We ~~are~~ are ~~one~~ more grateful for your help.

Warm regards

Chris

GRS 550

19

SECRET
DEDIP
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 181800Z FCO
TELNO 1384
OF 181645Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO

Telegram from Percy.
CDP.

FOLLOWING FOR POWELL (NO. 10) FROM CRADDOCK

YOUR TELNO. 942: SNF

1. SCOWCROFT'S REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE IS SURPRISING. IN PARTICULAR HIS COMMENTS THAT QUOTE OUR THOUGHT IS THAT THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS IS AT PRESENT PREMATURE UNQUOTE AND THAT QUOTE WE HAVE NOT REALLY ADVANCED THIS POSITION TO ANYONE UNQUOTE ARE DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH WHAT HE AND GATES TOLD ME ON 17 MAY (WASHINGTON TELNO. 1365, SINCE REPEATED TO BONN AND UKDEL NATO). I HAVE GONE OVER THE GROUND AGAIN CAREFULLY WITH BRIAN FALL WHO ACCOMPANIED ME AT THE CALLS ON SCOWCROFT AND GATES AND HE AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WASHINGTON TELNO. 1365 ACCURATELY REPORTS THE POSITION AS IT WAS DESCRIBED TO US AND DRAWS CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE ALSO ACCURATE.

2. I FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET GATES' DISCUSSIONS WITH TELSCHIK, NAUMANN AND KASTRUP AND PLANNED GERMAN VISITS HERE AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN INDICATION OF AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE WITH THE GERMANS THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT TO A TEXT WHICH WOULD DISPOSE OF THE IMMEDIATE SNF PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF A WILLINGNESS TO ENVISAGE NEGOTIATIONS, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME AND SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. FURTHER COLLATERAL FOR THIS IS PROVIDED BY BAKER'S STATEMENT ON CBS ON 14 MAY (WASHINGTON TELNO. 1379) THAT QUOTE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A RESOLUTION OF THE IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BEFORE WE START GETTING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF UNQUOTE. BLACKWILL TOLD BRIAN FALL IN CONFIDENCE THIS MORNING THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER AND SCOWCROFT ON THIS ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND WAS SOUND ON THE SUBSTANCE. BUT THIS WOULD BE HIS FIRST NATO SUMMIT AND HE WOULD NOT WANT TO FIND HIMSELF DOING

 DEDIP BATTLE

BATTLE WITH HIS ALLIES AT IT. BLACKWILL NOTED THAT MUCH MORE VIGOROUS DEBATE AND DISPUTE WAS POSSIBLE IN EUROPEAN COUNCILS, WHERE THE MEMBERS MET MUCH MORE OFTEN.

3. MY CONCLUSION FROM ALL THIS IS THAT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN LESS THAN FRANK IN HIS REPLY, BUT THAT MAY IN PART BE BECAUSE YOUR MESSAGE HAS SERVED AS A USEFUL SHOT ACROSS THE BOWS AT A CRUCIAL TIME. IF SO, SO MUCH THE BETTER. I HAVE JUST SEEN CHENEY AND TAKEN A FIRM LINE WITH HIM, TO WHICH HE WAS ENTIRELY RECEPTIVE (THOUGH I DOUBT WHETHER HE IS QUITE IN THE BUSH, BAKER, SCOWCROFT LOOP ON THIS ISSUE). I SHALL BE SEEING EAGLEBURGER LATER TODAY AND SHALL TAKE A SIMILAR LINE. MEANWHILE, YOU WILL HAVE SEEN ALSO FROM WASHINGTON TELNO. 1379 THAT BAKER IN A DIALOGUE WITH FOREIGN REPORTERS ON 17 MAY TOOK A RATHER DIFFERENT TACK FROM HIS CBS INTERVIEW AND SAID THAT THE US POSITION WAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE A MISTAKE. THIS MAY BE NO MORE THAN A TACTICAL ADJUSTMENT BEFORE THE TALKS WITH STOLTENBERG, BUT IT MAY BE REASONABLE TO HOPE SOME PRUDENCE HAS BEEN INJECTED AND THAT AT LEAST THE SPEED OF THE SLIDE HAS BEEN CONTROLLED.

4. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS, PS/PUS, MR BOYD, MR GOULDEN, HEAD SEC POL DEPT.

ACLAND

NO DISTRIBUTION

MR POWELL, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

PS

PS/PUS

MR BOYD

MR GOULDEN

HD/SEC. POL. D.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2617 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: CHARLES POWELL TO PRIME MINISTER DATED 18 MAY 1989	
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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
PERSONAL FOR CHARLES POWELL
-
DEAR CHARLES,
-
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CABLE. I BELIEVE YOU MAY HAVE A SLIGHTLY INACCURATE VIEW OF OUR MINIMAL POSITION ON SNF.
-
WHAT I TOLD PERCY WAS THAT WE COULD NOT SUSTAIN PERMANENTLY A POSITION WHICH SAID NO NEGOTIATIONS EVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
-
INSTEAD, OUR THOUGHT IS THAT THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS IS AT PRESENT PREMATURE, AND AS A PRECONDITION EVEN FOR ENTERTAINING THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT ON EQUALITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF AND (PERHAPS) PRIOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET SNF FORCES TO OUR LEVEL.
-
WE HAVE NOT REALLY ADVANCED THIS POSITION TO ANYONE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS THE HEART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH GEOFFREY HOWE, AND THIS PRECISE FORMULATION IS MINE. I FEEL CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT I AM EXPRESSING THE PRESIDENTS PROSPECTIVE.
-
NEVER HAS THE NOTION OF PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS CROSSED OUR MINDS.
-
THIS MESSAGE, LIKE YOURS, IS A VERY PERSONAL ONE. I WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER COMMENT.
-
WARM REGARDS,
BRENT.
-
DECL: OADR
£0183

NNNN

102407
MDHIAN 5157

RESTRICTED (CORRECTED VERSION)
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1379
OF 172335Z MAY 89
AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

SNF

SUMMARY
1. INDICATIONS IN BAKER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NO LONGER RULES OUT THE PROSPECT OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED OTHER CONDITIONS ARE MET. MORE CAUTIOUS LINE SUBSEQUENTLY, THOUGH STILL SEEKING COMPROMISE. PRAISE FOR BRITISH ROLE.

DETAIL

2. HINTS OF ADMINISTRATION READINESS TO COMPROMISE OVER THE QUESTION OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS AFTER REMARKS BY BAKER DURING AN APPEARANCE ON THE CBS FACE THE NATION PROGRAMME ON 14 MAY (DETAILS ALREADY SENT BY FAX TO DEPARTMENT). THE KEY TO A POSSIBLE SHIFT WAS BAKER'S COMMENT THAT QUOTE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A RESOLUTION OF THE IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BEFORE WE START GETTING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF UNQUOTE. THIS LED TO AN ARTICLE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ON 15 MAY WHICH CITED COMMENTS FROM OFFICIALS WHO ACCOMPANIED BAKER ON HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW TO THE EFFECT THAT BAKER WAS TRYING TO FORGE A COMPROMISE WITH THE GERMANS, THE MAIN ELEMENTS BEING ACCEPTANCE OF A NEGOTIATION ON CONDITION THAT THERE WERE PRIOR TANGIBLE RESULTS FROM CFE TALKS AND SIMULTANEOUS LANCE MODERNISATION.

3. SINCE THEN BAKER HAS RETURNED TO THE FORMER MORE CAUTIOUS LINE. SPEAKING ON A USIA WORLDNET DIALOGUE WITH FOREIGN REPORTERS ON 17 MAY HE SAID THE FOLLOWING:

QUOTE - WE'RE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SEE IF WE CAN BRIDGE WHAT HAS BEEN A GAP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THESE ISSUES. WE'RE HOPEFUL THAT MINISTER STOLTENBERG WILL HAVE SOME IDEAS WHEN HE ARRIVES HERE IN WASHINGTON.

(ON A QUESTION WHETHER BRITAIN'S POSITION WAS AN OBSTACLE TO REACHING A COMPROMISE)

QUOTE - NO. QUITE FRANKLY I THINK ITS A DEFINITE ASSET. THE UNITED STATES POSITION IS QUITE STRONG AS WELL. WE

HAVE SAID BEFORE, AND WE WILL SAY AGAIN, THAT WE THINK THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE A MISTAKE. WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S CONCERN ABOUT TAKING A DECISION TODAY TO DEPLOY A MODERNIZED SYSTEM OF LAND-BASED MISSILES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT. SO WE SEE MODERNIZATION, QUITE FRANKLY, IN A BIT DIFFERENT LIGHT THAN WE SEE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE - WE THINK ITS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A RECOGNITION THAT ONCE YOU START TALKING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK THAT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL NOT PERMIT YOU TO RESIST THE BLANDISHMENTS OF A THIRD ZERO. AND A THIRD ZERO IN THIS AREA, WE THINK, WOULD BE A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE. IT WOULD DO GREAT HARM TO OUR STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AGAIN, A DEFENCE STRATEGY THAT WE THINK HAS KEPT THE PEACE FOR 40 YEARS. SO. WE THINK WE MUST TREAD VERY, VERY CAREFULLY IN THIS AREA. WE TAKE NOTE, FOR INSTANCE, OF THE FACT THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS A SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. AND WE'VE ONLY BEGUN TALKING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. WE TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS A SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN SHORT-RANGE OR IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. SO, WE THINK THAT THE FIRM POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IS AN ASSET, FRANKLY, TOWARD RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM. UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

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OF 171359Z MAY 89
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK

SIC CFJ

OUR TELNO 516

SNF: GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. STOLTENBERG EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON IN SEARCH OF A COMPROMISE. HE HAS WITH HIM A NEW TEXT SETTING OUT THE GOVERNING COALITION'S LATEST POSITION. KOHL HAS AUTHORISED TELTSCHIK TO GIVE ME A COPY.

DETAIL

2. THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (FAZ) REPORTS THAT STOLTENBERG IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON LATER TODAY FOR TALKS WITH CHENEY, QUAYLE AND BAKER. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE WITH HIM A NEW PAPER ON SNF WHICH HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE FDP AND CONSTITUTES HIS BRIEF. ACCORDING TO FAZ THIS PAPER DESCRIBES IN MORE DETAIL WHAT IS MEANT BY ''EARLY'' NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. IT REAFFIRMS DETERRENCE ON THE BASIS OF A SUITABLE MIX OF EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND UNDERLINES THAT THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE IN THE CONVENTIONAL AREA. SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF RESULTS ACHIEVED IN VIENNA AFTER AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. THIS IS MEANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CONVENTIONAL AND SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL, BUT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME CONNECTION IN TIME BETWEEN THEM. UNLIKE THE US THE FRG DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE SNF NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AGREEMENTS OVER CONVENTIONAL, STRATEGIC AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED IN VIENNA. INSTEAD THE FRG CONSIDERS THAT IT SHOULD BECOME CLEAR DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS (FOR INSTANCE OVER TANKS) WHETHER THE WARSAW PACT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT RADICAL CUTS.

3. HARTMANN, TELTSCHIK'S DEPUTY AT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY, CONFIRMED TO ME THIS MORNING THE EXISTENCE OF THIS PAPER, AND SAID THAT TELTSCHIK WANTED TO SEE ME TO EXPLAIN THE BACKGROUND (I AM SEEKING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT). HE DESCRIBED THE PAPER AS CONTAINING TWO MAJOR POINTS: A NEW POSITION ON THE TIMING OF

NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF, AND A CLEAR STATEMENT EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD ZERO.

4. VOLKER RUEHE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE CDU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, GAVE A RADIO INTERVIEW EARLY ON 17 MAY CLOSELY REFLECTING THE THRUST OF THE FAZ STORY DESCRIBED ABOVE. HE DESCRIBED THE AIM OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF AS BEING TO ACHIEVE REDUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES TO QUOTE EQUAL CEILINGS AT A LEVEL LOWER THAN AT PRESENT, BUT ABOVE ZERO UNQUOTE.

5. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE TOLD US THAT STOLTENBERG HAS WITH HIM VARIOUS DRAFTS FOR THE SNF PASSAGE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, ADDING THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO HAVE MUCH ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY ''EARLY'' NEGOTIATIONS BUT STOLTENBERG WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HAVE A ''CARTE BLANCHE'' TO FIND A COMPROMISE WITH THE AMERICANS. HE WOULD BE BASING HIMSELF VERY MUCH UPON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BONN GOVERNMENT DECLARATION.

6. IN AN INTERVIEW TO MARK HIS COMPLETION OF 15 YEARS AS FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON 16 MAY SAID HE AGREED WITH SHEVARDNADZE THAT RESULTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL SECTOR MIGHT BE ACHIEVABLE IN ONE TO TWO YEARS.

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MR BOYD

SECRET
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FM WASHINGTON
T[redacted]ESKBY 170900Z FCO
TELNO 1365
OF 170330Z MAY 89

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Prime Minister
As expected, the Americans are forging ahead with the Germans. CDP 17/5

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/NO. 10, PS, PS/PUS, GOULDEN, LEVER (SPD) BMG BERLIN TELNO 032 :

SNF : US/FRG CONTACTS

SUMMARY

1. GATES DESCRIBES HIS TALKS WITH TELTSCHIK AND OTHERS IN BONN. HE HAD SPELT OUT, WITHOUT COMMITMENT, THE ISSUES WHICH THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS IF THEY WERE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN WASHINGTON. SIR PERCY CRADOCK UNDERLINES HMG'S POSITION, MAKING CLEAR THAT IN OUR VIEW THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE INTERPRETED GATES' LINE WITH THEM AS AN INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY. SCOWCROFT FRANK IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION DID NOT EXCLUDE A REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED CERTAIN IMPORTANT CONDITIONS WERE MET.

DETAIL

2. SIR PERCY CRADOCK CALLED TO SEE GATES (NSC) THIS AFTERNOON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY HAD A SEPARATE SESSION WITH SCOWCROFT. GATES USED THE OCCASION TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE LATEST US/FRG CONTACTS IN BONN ON SNF.

3. GATES SAID THAT KOHL HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO TO SEND A PERSONAL EMISSARY TO BONN TO DISCUSS SNF. GATES, ACCOMPANIED BY ZOELLICK (COUNSELLOR TO THE STATE DEPT) HAD THEREFORE TRAVELLED DIRECTLY TO BONN FROM BRUSSELS AFTER BAKER'S BRIEFING OF THE NAC, AND HAD HAD TALKS WITH TELTSCHIK, NAUMANN AND KASTRUP (HOLICK WAS NOT PRESENT. THE GERMANS HAD GIVEN GATES A REVISED VERSION
OF THE COALITION STATEMENT, IN WHICH THE PRIMARY CHANGES WERE A) DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE AND B) THE ADDITION OF A ONE SENTENCE PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR UNILATERAL SOVIET SNF REDUCTIONS. GATES HAD FIRMLY REJECTED THIS AS WHOLLY INADEQUATE, BOTH ON THE MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS THERE HAD THEN BEEN DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH ABOUT LANGUAGE. GATES CLAIMED TO HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT HIS MANDATE IN BONN WAS TO LISTEN TO WHAT THE GERMANS HAD TO SAY, AND THAT HE WAS IN NO POSITION TO COMMIT THE US ADMINISTRATION : BUT HE HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT IF THE FRG WANTED ANY PROPOSAL WHICH INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN WASHINGTON, THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THREE FIRM REQUIREMENTS : A) SPECIFIC REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO, B) THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELT OUT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF NEGOTIATION ON SNF UNTIL AFTER THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS, AND C) NO QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY AGREEMENT ON SNF UNTIL AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CFE. GATES WAS ADAMANT THAT THIS WAS PUT TO THE GERMANS NOT AS AN OFFER BUT AS FOOD FOR THOUGHT. THE AMERICAN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GERMANS THE VERY STRINGENT CRITERIA THAT WOULD HAVE TO APPLY, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN KOHL'S HAND IN DEALING WITH THE COALITION AND WITH GENSCHER IN PARTICULAR.

4. THE NEXT STEP WAS THAT STOLTENBURG WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON THIS THURSDAY (18 MAY), FOLLOWING A FURTHER TELEPHONE CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOHL THIS MORNING (16 MAY).

5. GATES ADDED THAT TELTSCHIK HAD MADE CLEAR, IN RETURN, THAT REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO WOULD BE A VERY BIG PROBLEM. GATES HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT FELT VERY BADLY LET DOWN BY GERMAN BEHAVIOUR, AND THAT THERE WAS A FIRM POINT BEYOND WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT GO. THE GERMANS WERE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAD CREATED SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT BOTH AT HOME AND IN THE ALLIANCE, AND THAT IT WAS INTOLERABLE THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN, IN EFFECT, CONFRONTED PUBLICLY BY THE GERMANS WITH AN ULTIMATUM.

6. SIR PERCY CRADOCK SAID THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT NATURALLY WOULD AROUSE A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN IN LONDON. OUR POSITION, WHICH WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM, WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY TO A THIRD ZERO. THE US ADMINISTRATION NOW SEEMED TO BE TALKING ABOUT A POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THAT MARKED A VERY DEFINITE SHIFT. GATES, IN REPLY, SAID THAT HE WAS EXPLICIT IN HIS CONTACTS IN BONN THAT HE WAS IN NO POSITION TO OFFER THE FRG ANY ASSURANCES ABOUT THE US POSITION, EVEN IF THE GERMANS MET THE CONDITIONS HE HAD SPELT OUT. HE EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT HIS PURPOSE HAD BEEN A) TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT THE COALITION STATEMENT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND B) TO SPELL OUT THE AREAS THE GERMANS WOULD NEED TO ADDRESS IF THEY WERE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN WASHINGTON.

7. SIR PERCY CRADOCK SUBSEQUENTLY WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH SCOWCROFT AT GATES' SUGGESTION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS WOULD IN HIS VIEW INTERPRET THE LINE THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN BY GATES AS AN INDICATION OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON THE AMERICAN SIDE : IN EFFECT, THERE HAD BEEN AN INVITATION TO SHIFT THE DISCUSSION TO THE CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD GOVERN A NEGOTIATION ABOUT SNF. CRADOCK UNDERLINED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE POSITION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AS THE AMERICANS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE AWARE FROM HER EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE SUBJECT.

8. SCOWCROFT ACCEPTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION HAD BEEN MADE ENTIRELY CLEAR. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD NEVER BEEN SO QUOTE APOCALYPTIC UNQUOTE ABOUT THE DANGERS OF NEGOTIATION, PROVIDED THAT THE THIRD ZERO WERE FIRMLY EXCLUDED AND OTHER IMPORTANT CONDITIONS WERE MET. HE IMPLIED VERY CLEARLY THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO GET THE QUESTION SETTLED BEFORE THE SUMMIT, SO THAT THE SUMMIT ITSELF, IN ADDITION TO CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF NATO SUCCESS, COULD ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE NEXT 40 YEARS. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, HE WAS ROBUST ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A THIRD ZERO AND ON THE CONTINUING WESTERN NEED FOR SNF SYSTEMS HOWEVER FAR THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT CHOOSE TO REDUCE THEIR OWN.

COMMENT

9. GATES WAS OBVIOUSLY EMBARRASSED IN HIS EFFORTS TO PRESENT WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AS OTHER THAN A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE US POSITION, AND HE SEEMED CORRESPONDINGLY KEEN THAT SCOWCROFT SHOULD DO SOME OF THE TALKING ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. SCOWCROFT, FOR HIS PART, WAS PERFECTLY READY TO ENDORSE AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION THE NEED TO SHOW PRUDENCE IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT TO ALLIANCE STABILITY PRESENTED BY GORBACHEV, BUT WAS UNAPOLOGETIC ABOUT WHAT SEEMS TO BE A POLICY DECISION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL HERE TO TRY TO GET THE SNF ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THE SUMMIT ON THE BASIS OF A TEXT ENVISAGING NEGOTIATION IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

10 GATES EMPHASISED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THESE EXCHANGES WAS BEING HELD EXTREMELY TIGHTLY ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 8126

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PRIME MINISTER

See & approved CP

SNF

Following your discussion with the Foreign Secretary this evening, I have written to the FCO to make sure that your points are reflected in the instructions they sent Antony Acland. I attach a copy of my letter.

You also talked of the possibility of sending a message yourself. This is something we ought to hold in reserve. But an alternative would be for me to send a message on the hot line to General Scowcroft. I attach a draft. To be useful, it needs to go this evening.

I am also trying to contact Henry Kissinger, who is in Sweden, to encourage him to telephone Scowcroft.

CDP

Charles Powell

17 May 1989

"Hot Line" to White House.

149-b

Please pass following message to General Brent Scowcroft from Charles Powell, No.10 Downing Street.

Begins:

Dear Brent,

We have had an account of your talk with Percy Cradock about the position reached in your discussions with the Germans on SNF, and your apparent willingness to consider a text which admits the possibility of negotiations on SNF.

I ought to tell you that the Prime Minister continues to believe that this would be profoundly mistaken. To recapitulate her reasons:

- NATO's existing SNF missiles are at the level which the Alliance considers necessary to maintain flexible response. That level is a matter for NATO's judgment not for negotiation.

- once we embark on negotiations, the political pressures to go to a third zero would mount rapidly and become irresistible. Such a result would strike at NATO's jugular, by removing US ground-based missiles from Europe.

- moreover, once the concept of negotiations is accepted, it will be much more difficult to get NATO to agree to deployment of FOTL.

- acceptance of negotiations now would make it appear that NATO had given way to Soviet threats.

- there are also long term and potentially dangerous implications for NATO in appearing to yield to what are essentially German domestic political pressures on this point. The Prime Minister still thinks that Chancellor Kohl would prefer to see the US and UK

standing up to Genscher's efforts on this score.

Obviously there may be tactical reasons why you feel it necessary at least to debate with the Germans a text envisaging negotiations. But in that event, would it not surely be essential to set as conditions: (a) prior agreement by NATO to deployment of FOTL, (b) reductions in conventional forces not only agreed but actually being implemented, and (c) substantial progress towards an agreement on elimination of chemical weapons?

The Prime Minister continues to think that it would be better to go to the Summit with this issue unresolved and try to face down the Germans there, rather than give way beforehand on negotiations. She feels that the implications of this matter stretch far beyond the technical issues and go to the heart of NATO's strength and cohesion.

This is very much a personal message for you to let you know how very strongly the Prime Minister feels about this. More detailed instructions are also going to Antony Acland on the official net.

Warm regards,

yours

Charles.

CD?

139

O 172030Z MAY 89
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
S E C R E T
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM CHARLES POWELL, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.

DEAR BRENT,
WE HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALKS WITH PERCY CRADOCK ABOUT THE POSITION REACHED IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GERMANS ON SNF, AND YOUR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A TEXT WHICH ADMITS THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF.

I OUGHT TO TELL YOU THAT THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN. TO RECAPITULATE HER REASONS:

-NATO'S EXISTING SNF MISSILES ARE AT THE LEVEL WHICH THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THAT LEVEL IS A MATTER FOR NATO'S JUDGMENT NOT FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

-ONCE WE EMBARK ON NEGOTIATIONS, THE POLITICAL PRESSURES TO GO TO A THIRD ZERO WOULD MOUNT RAPIDLY AND BECOME IRRESISTIBLE. SUCH A RESULT WOULD STRIKE AT NATO'S JUGULAR, BY REMOVING US GROUND-BASED MISSILES FROM EUROPE.

-MOREOVER, ONCE THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS IS ACCEPTED, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO GET NATO TO AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL.

-ACCEPTANCE OF NEGGOTIATIONS NOW WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT NATO HAD GIVEN WAY TO SOVIET THREATS.

-THERE ARE ALSO LONG TERM AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IN APPEARING TO YIELD TO WHAT ARE ESSENTIALL GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES ON THIS POINT. THE PRIME MINISTER STILL THINKS THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE US AND UK STANDING UP TO GENSCHER'S EFFORTS ON THIS SCORE.

OBVIOUSLY THERE MAY BE TACTICAL REASONS WHY YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY AT LEAST TO DEBATE WITH THE GERMANS A TEXT ENVISAGING NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IN THAT EVENT, WOULD IT NOT SURELY BE ESSENTIAL TO SET AS CONDITIONS: (A) PRIOR AGREEMENT BY NATO TO DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL, (B) REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES NOT ONLY AGREED BUT ACTUALLY BEING IMPLEMENTED, AND (C) SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS?

THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUES TO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO TO THE SUMMIT WITH THIS ISSUE UNRESOLVED AND TRY TO FACE DOWN THE GERMANS THERE, RATHER THAN GIVE WAY BEFORENAND ON NEGOTIATIONS. SHE FEELS THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MATTER STRETCH FAR BEYOND THE TECHNICAL ISSUES AND GO TO THE HEART OF NATO'S STRENGTH AND COHESION.

THIS IS VERY MUCH A PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR YOU TO LET YOU KNOW HOW VERY STRONGLY THE PRIME MINISTER FEELS ABOUT THIS.
MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ARE ALSO GOING TO ANTONY ACLAND ON THE OFFICIAL NET.

WARM REGARDS,
YOURS
CHARLES.
BT

NNNN

SECRET AND PERSONAL

COSTAUW

File 12a

SUBJECT
cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 May 1989

SNF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a short discussion this evening about the evident intention of the Americans to consider and discuss with the Germans a text on SNF which would embrace the prospect of negotiations.

The Prime Minister said that she would wish instructions sent this evening to Sir Antony Acland in Washington to reiterate to the Administration at a high level our continuing strong opposition to such negotiations. We believe that they could only be damaging to NATO's security. Against the background of recent developments, we would also regard a text which admitted the possibility of negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of Soviet threats and a caving in to German demands, which could have far reaching implications for NATO's future strength and cohesion. Moreover, once it was accepted that NATO should embark on negotiations, the prospects of ever securing agreement to deployment of a successor to Lance would be virtually nil. If the Americans feel that they must debate the issue of negotiations with the Germans, they should surely argue that negotiations could only be envisaged once there was a firm commitment to the deployment of FOTL, and a satisfactory agreement reached and implemented on conventional force reductions, as well as progress in the talks on chemical weapons. Such conditions would be deliberately set as likely to be unacceptable to the Germans.

The instructions should also reiterate the Prime Minister's preference for arguing this issue out at the NATO Summit itself rather than settling for an unsatisfactory compromise beforehand. It might well be better for the Summit to fail to reach agreement at all on this subject than to reach one which represented a fundamental weakening of NATO's strategy and will.

The Prime Minister is considering whether to send a parallel message from No. 10 to the White House on the above lines.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

b

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

File X/h
+ Sir C Crosby

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 May 1989

SNF

I have shown the Prime Minister BMG Berlin telegram No. 32 about the compromise text on SNF apparently being discussed between the Americans and Germans. She is alarmed by this evidence that the American side are prepared to discuss a text which envisages negotiations. She hopes that our Embassy in Washington can make urgent contact with the Americans to try to discover overtly what is going on, and make the point very forcefully that we are not dealing here with a technical arms control issue but something which goes to the very heart of NATO's strategy and the future political orientation of Western Europe. Moreover, a text such as the one envisaged would mean the end of any prospect of modernisation despite the attempt in the fourth tiret to establish a link between modernisation and negotiations. Once it is agreed negotiations can take place, support for modernisation in the Alliance would ebb away completely.

I should be grateful if you could let me know urgently how matters stand in Washington.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

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INFO DESKBY 151200Z WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, MADRID

Prime Minister

SIC CFJ

Anthony Bullard must go in immediately. The whole tactics are in danger of wrecking no confidence.

This suggests that we are being treated cavalierly. CDP.

FROM AMBASSADOR

SNF: US/FRG CONTACTS

SUMMARY

1. EVIDENCE OF US/FRG DISCUSSION AIMED AT A COMPROMISE BEFORE NATO SUMMIT. OUTLINE OF COMPROMISE IN PARA 3.

DETAIL

2. DOBBINS, MINISTER AT US EMBASSY IN BONN, TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ON 14 MAY THAT, FOLLOWING BAKER'S MEETING WITH GENSCHER ON12 MAY, THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED US/FRG TALKS ABOUT COMPROMISE FORMULAE WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT ON SNF BEFORE THENATO SUMMIT. DOBBINS IMPLIED THAT THESE TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BONN. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER COALITION MEETING IN BONN ON 16 MAY TO CONSIDER THE POSITION REACHED, BUT THAT NO FURTHER US/FRG MEETING HAD SO FAR BEEN ARRANGED. DOBBINS SUGGESTED THAT HM EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON SHOULD ENQUIRE ABOUT US/FRG CONTACTS ON SNF WITHOUT REVEALING WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME.

3. THE COMPROMISE SO FAR ENVISAGED IN THE US/FRG CONTACTS, SAID DOBBINS, WAS:

A. FRG DROPS INSISTENCE ON QUOTE EARLY UNQUOTE NEGOTIATIONS
B. NATO ESTABLISHES WORKING GROUP ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
C. FRG AGREES TO FOUR US POINTS:
   - NATO DECLARATION EXPLICITLY REJECTS THIRD ZERO
   - START OF NEGOTIATION DEPENDENT ON SUCCESS IN CPE (OR POSSIBLY ON SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS FROM CFE)
   - ANY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT ON SNF CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNTIL AFTER CFE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED
   - THE LINK BETWEEN MODERNISATION AND NEGOTIATION IS RE-ESTABLISHED, SO THAT A DEFINITIVE DECISION TO HOLD

NO

that is serious?

They have sold the pass. The longer journey starts with the first step - and they are taking them. A defeat for the US. Briefing for Genscher

NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT A DECISION ON MODERNISATION ALSO BEING TAKEN.

– note not until of his total modernisation has taken place but a decision who – what the FRC can merge as it is merging now

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF

Mr Lubbers telephoned the Prime Minister this evening to give her an account of his talks in Washington last week on the subject of SNF.

Mr Lubbers said that he and President Bush had analysed the situation. It was not an easy one and there was no sort of agreement between the President and Chancellor Kohl. He had shown the President the compromise text which he had discussed with the Prime Minister at Chequers. The President acknowledged that some of the points in the paper were positive, in particular the concept of challenging the Soviets to come down to NATO levels on SNF. But, like the Prime Minister, he was absolutely and firmly against any reference to negotiations. At the end of their talk, the President had taken him aside and suggested that he should talk further to Chancellor Kohl with the message that there was some scope for progress on the basis of the Dutch text but that there could be no mention of negotiations.

The Prime Minister said that the President had been absolutely right. NATO must avoid getting involved in negotiations which would lead inexorably to a third zero and be a famous victory for Mr Gorbachev. Britain and the United States had already made their compromise by agreeing not to press for a decision on deployment of a successor to LANCE now. We were not prepared to concede any more. The issue of negotiations went to the very heart of NATO's strategy and the question whether the Americans would remain in Europe.

Mr Lubbers said that he had spoken again to Chancellor Kohl since his return to Europe, conveying the President's message, making clear that matters were at an impasse and it was Kohl's problem. Chancellor Kohl had promised to reflect and to contact Mr Lubbers again. If Kohl did so, he would in turn contact the Prime Minister. In any event, it would be useful if the two of them were to talk again in about a week's time to discuss the handling of the SNF issue at the Summit itself. Mr Lubbers added that Dr Woerner had recently told Mr Van den Broek that it was not worth discussing SNF any more

DT

with Genscher: all approaches should be made direct to Chancellor Kohl himself.

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful to Mr Lubbers for keeping her informed. She agreed that our efforts had to be focused on Chancellor Kohl. She was reassured to find that Britain, the United States and the Netherlands thought on very similar lines. We must not give in on the question of negotiations but stay quietly firm. She agreed that it would be useful to keep in touch.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SIC CFJ

BMG BERLIN FOR AMBASSADOR

SNF: GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY
1. GORBACHEV INITIATIVE WELCOMED AS STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION. FURTHER RECRIMINATIONS WITHIN COALITION.

DETAIL
2. THE GERMAN MEDIA HAVE PROMINENTLY REPORTED GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF SNF REDUCTIONS. KOHL HAS TODAY DESCRIBED THE INITIATIVE AS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, SAYING THAT HE SEES IT AS A RESULT OF HIS DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE ITS ''GROSS SUPERIORITY'' BOTH IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SNF. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD BE MEASURED ACCORDING TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO REMOVING THE CAPABILITY FOR SURPRISE ATTACKS AND INVASION. THE QUICKER THE WARSAW PACT'S CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY WAS REDUCED, THE BETTER THE PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON SNF. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS THEREFORE PRESSING FOR THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS. KOHL AGAIN EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AT THE NATO SUMMIT. THE COALITION PROPOSALS FORMED A GOOD BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE.

3. DEFENCE MINISTER STOLTENBERG AND CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY LEADER DREGGER HAVE SPOKEN SIMILARLY. STOLTENBERG HAS CALLED ON MOSCOW TO REDUCE ITS SNF TO THE WEST'S LEVEL. DREGGER HAS ARGUED FOR EQUAL, AGREED AND VERIFIED CEILINGS AT A LEVEL UNDER THE PRESENT NATO STRENGTH. AFTER BAKER'S BRIEFING IN BRUSSELS, GENSCHER IS REPORTED TO HAVE SEEN HIS POSITION CONFIRMED BY THE SOVIET INITIATIVE. HE SAID THAT DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE MADE IRREVERSIBLE AND BINDING THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. GEN NAUMANN (FMOD) HAS COMMENTED PRIVATELY THAT GORBACHEV'S INTITIATIVE WAS CLEVERLY TIMED AND PRESENTED (TO

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THE US RATHER THAN IN BONN): IT WOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN GENSCHER'S HAND IN THE COALITION.

4. PRESS REPORTS OF GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH YOU IN LONDON ON 11 MAY SAY THAT THERE WAS NO CONVERGENCE IN UK AND FRG POSITIONS. BUT GENSCHER IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE MEETING FOSTERED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE GERMAN POSITION.

5. RECRIMINATIONS WITHIN THE COALITION (MY TELNO 502) CONTINUE, WITH FURTHER CSU CRITICISM OF GENSCHER FOR NOT RULING OUT A THIRD ZERO, AND COUNTER-ATTACKS BY THE FDP. IN AN INTERVIEW ON 11 MAY, GENSCHER CALLED ON THE CDU AND CSU TO STAND FIRMLY BEHIND KOHL'S BUNDESTAG STATEMENT, AND ARGUED THAT HE HIMSELF HAD SIMPLY REPEATED WHAT KOHL HAD SAID. DREGGER, WHO HAS BEEN CRITICISED BY SOME CSU MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG FOR FAILURE TO CONSULT THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, HAS AGAIN STATED THAT THE CDU AND CSU SUPPORT THE COALITION'S POSITION. THE CSU PARLIAMENTARY LEADER HAS SAID THE SAME.

6. NAUMANN HAS TOLD US THAT HE RECENTLY AGREED COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WITH TELTSCHIK, BUT THAT GENSCHER VETOED IT BECAUSE IT WAS TOO SPECIFIC IN RULING OUT A THIRD ZERO (THIS PROBABLY REFERS TO THE EPISODE REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1319).

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN

(2)

Prime Minister

CDP 12/5

Jp 0785

MR POWELL

cc Sir Robin Butler

Gorbachev's Proposals on SNF and Conventional Force Cuts

Following Gorbachev's 10-11 May talks with Baker, the Russians have announced -

a. A unilateral withdrawal from Eastern Europe to Soviet territory of 500 short-range nuclear warheads, consisting of 166 "aviation weapons", 50 artillery shells and 284 missile warheads.

b. An offer to withdraw all nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe by 1991 if the Americans would do the same from Western Europe.

c. A Soviet proposal for conventional force cuts, with both sides to reduce by one million men to a level of 1.35 million each and with strike aircraft to be cut to 1,500, combat helicopters to 1,700, tanks to 20,000, armoured military vehicles to 28,000 and artillery to 24,000 each.

d. A Soviet proposal that the Soviet Union and the US should start work on a bilateral, verifiable agreement on the cessation of weapons production.

2. This is all less impressive than it looks.

3. The SNF initiative scarcely touches Soviet capabilities at all. It is warheads, not delivery vehicles, that are involved. The warheads are merely being withdrawn, not destroyed. And they are a small fraction of total Soviet SNF warhead holdings. Unlike NATO, the Russians have never given figures and NATO estimates are

subject to a wide margin of error. But 15,000 warheads for all Soviet delivery systems is in the right range (compared with NATO's actual destruction since 1979 of over one third of its total stock down to 4,600). There is nothing to prevent the reintroduction into Eastern Europe of the 500 warheads withdrawn (the 166 aircraft delivered weapons and 50 artillery shells particularly lack credibility). And the withdrawal of missile warheads leaves intact the Soviet Union's estimated 1,432 SNF missile launchers (compared to NATO's 88 LANCE launchers). There is nothing to prevent the Russians putting modernised conventional munitions on the missiles whose nuclear warheads have been withdrawn. These missiles may in any case only be reloads.

4. The call to remove nuclear munitions from Europe by 1991 is, of course, a heavy plug for the third zero, designed to appeal particularly to West German opinion.

5. As for Gorbachev's conventional forces proposals, they are an advance only in that he has put figures to earlier more generalised Soviet positions. The figures are identical or very close to those which UKDEL Vienna learnt some weeks ago the Warsaw Pact were likely to make. They do not resolve the data problem. There is no acknowledgment of the Foreign Secretary's proposal on behalf of NATO as long ago as 6 March for a common ceiling of 20,000 tanks.

6. The timing of the move on SNF in particular is clearly intended to keep up the pressure on the NATO summit. It may have been something Gorbachev had been intending to save for his 12-15 June trip to the FRG but which he could not resist using to add fuel to NATO divisions over SNF modernisation and negotiations. It is, of course, possible

that he will offer a further "gift" when he visits Kohl, especially if his present offer is coolly received in Western Europe, as seems likely.

This seems to me a case for corrective press briefing.

PERCY CRADOCK

12 May 1989

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OF 111925Z MAY 89
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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MEETING WITH GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER: SNF
SUMMARY
1. AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH WITH GENSCHER. BRITISH AND GERMAN POSITIONS NO CLOSER. GENSCHER DEPLOYED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS. REFUSED TO RULE OUT A THIRD ZERO. SOME SIGN THAT GENSCHER WENT AWAY WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CRITICISMS OF THE GERMAN PROPOSALS. HINTS THAT EVEN GENSCHER SEES SOME ELEMENTS AS DISPENSABLE. THERE WILL BE ANOTHER MEETING IN LONDON ON 25 MAY.
DETAIL
2. DISCUSSION CENTRED ON THE GERMAN PAPER AND OUR OBJECTIONS TO IT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HIGHLIGHTED FOUR MAIN FLAWS ON THEIR MODERNISATION PROPOSALS:
- THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO KEEP NATO FORCES UP-TO-DATE WHERE NECESSARY.
- THE REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR FORCES BEING NEEDED 'UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES' IMPLIED THE POSSIBILITY OF A EUROPE WITHOUT SUCH FORCES.
- THE REFERENCE TO DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL BEING A NATIONAL AMERICAN DECISION WAS AN INADEQUATE COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME.
- THE MISTAKEN MESSAGE THAT PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL WOULD REMOVE THE NEED FOR A FOTL. THE MAINTENANCE OF LAND-BASED SNF WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE, GIVEN THE RELATIVE INADEQUACY OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND THE VULNERABILITY OF AIRCRAFT-BASED SYSTEMS. IF IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT THERE COULD BE NO THIRD ZERO, THEN A COMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL MUST FOLLOW.
3. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT GERMANY WAS NOT TRYING TO CLOSE ANY OPTIONS. HE COULD, IF NECESSARY, ACCEPT THE REPETITION OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE 1988 NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION. BUT WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY SAY NOW WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED IN 1991 OR 1992. PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE GERMAN TEXT IMPLIED THAT VERY CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A

DECISION TO BE TAKEN NOT TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY FOTL. MANY IN GERMANY BELIEVED SUCH PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE. BUT NO-ONE COULD TELL. WE POINTED OUT THAT, EVEN IF THE CONDITIONS IN PARAGRAPH 5 WERE MET, THE ALLIANCE WOULD STILL NEED LAND-BASED SNF MISSILES FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND TRANSATLANTIC COUPLING.

4. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT GERMANY HAD NEVER YET FAILED TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE ALLIANCE. HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THE PARAGRAPH WHICH SAID THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOTL WAS A NATIONAL AMERICAN DECISION. THIS HAD BEEN NECESSARY FOR DOMESTIC REASONS. VOGEL (SPD) HAD RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON AND HAD PUBLICLY STATED ON GERMAN TELEVISION THAT THE DECISION WAS OUT OF GERMANY'S HANDS AND HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN BY VIRTUE OF THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE GERMAN PAPER WAS DESIGNED AS A RESPONSE TO THAT, IE A STATEMENT OF FACT THAT THE DECISION TO DEVELOP (WHICH HAD INDEED BEEN TAKEN) WAS AN AMERICAN NATIONAL DECISION AND NOT AN ALLIANCE ONE. HE STRESSED THAT PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF THE GERMAN PAPER WERE WHAT MATTERED: BY IMPLICATION PARAGRAPHS 2 (US DECISION) AND 4 (ARMS CONTROL ON ARTILLERY) WERE LESS CENTRAL.

5. GENSCHER WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT SPOIL WHAT OUGHT TO BE A CELEBRATION OF ITS 40 YEARS OF SUCCESS BY HAVING AN ARGUMENT OVER THESE ISSUES. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN RAISED AT THIS JUNCTURE. BUT HE WAS CONVINCED AN AGREEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE REACHED AT THE SUMMIT. BY ACCEPTING THE GERMAN LANGUAGE, BRITAIN WOULD BE GIVING UP NOTHING. BRITAIN WOULD BE SAYING THAT WE NEED FOTL. GERMANY WOULD BE SAYING THAT THAT WAS A DECISION TO BE TAKEN IN 1992. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RESPONDED THAT BY POSTPONING A DECISION UNTIL 1992 THE UK WAS ALREADY MAKING A MAJOR CONCESSION. BUT IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT THE GERMAN PAPER, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY ABANDONING ITS CONSENSUS THAT ITS POLICY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE REQUIRED LAND-BASED AS WELL AS AIR-BASED MISSILES IN ANY FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THE HEART OF THE ARGUMENT WAS THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A US COMMITMENT TO, AND PRESENCE IN, EUROPE. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE IMPLICATION THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO CFE WOULD OBVIATE THE NEED FOR FOTL. THE NUMBER OF MISSILES NEEDED MIGHT COME DOWN BUT NOT THE NEED FOR THE SYSTEMS THEMSELVES.

6. THERE WERE SIMILAR EXCHANGES ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT WE COULD VERY SOON BE FACED WITH A RUSSIAN CHALLENGE TO NEGOTIATE ON SNF. IT WAS HARD TO REFUSE NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED, TO DO SO WOULD BE A CONFESSION OF ALLIANCE WEAKNESS. THE GERMAN TEXT WAS DESIGNED TO SET OUT VERY

CLEARLY THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY NEGOTIATIONS MUST IMPLY A THIRD ZERO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GOULDEN SAID THAT THIS WAS NO REALISTIC. A NUMBER OF ALLIES ALREADY FAVOURED A THIRD ZERO. THE POLITICAL APPEAL OF A THIRD ZERO, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS ABOVE ZERO AND ON VERIFICATION WOULD ALL LEAD US INEXORABLY DOWN THE ZERO ROUTE - THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO THE RUSSIAN GOAL OF THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. GENSCHER DID ACKNOWLEDGE THIS RISK.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE SPECIAL GERMAN VULNERABILITY TO SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THOUGH GERMANY'S OVERALL EXPOSURE TO THE NUCLEAR RISK WAS NO GREATER THAN OUR OWN, GIVEN OUR POSITION AS A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER, THE NUMBER OF US BASES IN BRITAIN AND THE EXPECTED INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO BE BASED ON OUR SOIL. (GENSCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THIS.) WE BELIEVED THAT THE BEST WAY TO MEET GERMAN CONCERNS WAS THROUGH FOTL WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS LONGER RANGE, WOULD ENABLE US TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE ON BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS. BUT THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE GERMAN PROPOSALS ('WHETHER OR NOT' LANCE WAS NEEDED: SNF NECESSARY 'IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES') REINFORCED OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO GET INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS.

8. THE CONVERSATION WENT ROUND THESE ARGUMENTS MORE THAN ONCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE KEPT COMING BACK TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE THIRD ZERO, KNOWING THAT THIS WAS THE BIGGEST POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENSCHER AND KOHL. WHEN HE ASKED THE DIRECT QUESTION OF GENSCHER: DO YOU REJECT THE THIRD ZERO? GENSCHER DECLINED TO RESPOND EXCEPT BY REFERENCE TO THE PASSAGE IN THE GERMAN TEXT THAT LAND, SEA AND AIR-BASED SYSTEMS WERE NEEDED IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE CORRECT PHRASE WAS 'IN FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES'. GENSCHER LOOKED THOUGHTFUL.

9. GENSCHER HAD A PRIVATE WORD WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE END OF THE MEETING TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LARGE VOLUME OF LETTERS OF SUPPORT FROM BRITAIN FOLLOWING HIS INTERVIEW IN 'THE INDEPENDENT'. HE ALSO ASKED FOR OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KOHL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN VALUABLE TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE WHICH SHOWED THAT DIFFERENCES COULD BE AIRED FRANKLY BUT WITHOUT RANCOUR. HE RE-EMPHASISED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR POSITION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF LAND-BASED MISSILES AS ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE.

10. IN SPEAKING SEPARATELY TO THE PRESS, BOTH GENSCHER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE STUCK TO THEIR AGREED LINE THAT THEY HAD

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DISCUSSED A WHOLE RANGE OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE RENEWED THREAT FROM IRAN, AND THE NATO SUMMIT. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH ON ALL THESE ISSUES.

11. GOULDEN HAS BRIEFED THE US EMBASSY ON THE TALKS.

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SIC CFJ

SNF: GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. INFORMATION IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT GERMAN VIEWS ARE MOVING A LITTLE.

2. STRAINS IN THE COALITION OVER SNF REAPPEAR IN PUBLIC.

DETAIL

3. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CONSIDERATION OF COMPROMISES ON SNF WAS NOT YET COMPLETE. BUT THERE HAD BEEN SLOW MOVEMENT. TELTSCHIK ASKED PARTICULARLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT QUOTE WHAT HE WAS TELLING ME TO GENSCHER OR TO GERMAN OFFICIALS. THEN HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT POSITION WAS THAT THE GERMANS COULD ACCEPT:-

(A) MODERNISATION. REPEAT OF THE MARCH 1988 NATO LANGUAGE ABOUT THE NEED FOR A MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY

NO

(B) NEGOTIATIONS. REMOVAL OF THE CALL FOR QUOTE EARLY UNQUOTE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT RETENTION OF THE CALL FOR NEGOTIATION, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO TIMING, AND A GROUP OF EXPERTS IN THE ALLIANCE TO BE CHARGED WITH PREPARING THE LINES FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. I TOLD TELTSCHIK THAT THIS DEGREE OF MOVEMENT WOULD NOT BE NEARLY ENOUGH, ON EITHER MODERNISATION OR NEGOTIATION TO PRODUCE A RESULT IN NATO.

5. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE COALITION OVER SNF POLICY ARE AGAIN BECOMING EVIDENT. AT A MEETING OF THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ON 9 MAY, DEFENCE MINISTER STOLTENBERG CRITICISED GENSCHER FOR ADVISING HIS COALITION PARTNERS TO QUIETEN DOWN BUT REPEATEDLY SPEAKING UP

HIMSELF. ANNOUNCING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 15-17 MAY, STOLTENBERG SAID THE US-UK REJECTION OF EARLY SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, AS SHOULD US THREATS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS. OTHER SPEAKERS CRITICISED GENSCHER FOR INCREASINGLY OPEN ESPOUSAL OF THE THIRD ZERO.

6. TRANSPORT MINISTER ZIMMERMANN (CSU) DISMISSED THE US TROOP WITHDRAWAL THREATS. HE JUSTIFIED AGREEMENT TO THE COALITION PAPER AS NECESSARY TO THE COALITION'S SURVIVAL AFTER NEXT YEAR'S BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS: IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICAL SUICIDE TO DECIDE NOW ON DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SNF, BUT IN 1992 MODERNISATION WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE. ZIMMERMANN MADE HEADLINES BY CHARGING CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY LEADER DREGGER WITH ''THICKHEAD POPULISM'' FOR PRESENTING SNF AS A GERMAN NATIONAL QUESTION. CSU BACKBENCHERS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK OF DECOUPLING IN THE ALLIANCE.

7. SPD LEADER VOGEL, REACTING TO THE GOVERNMENT'S CALLS FOR COMPROMISE (MY TELNO 494) HAS WARNED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NOT TO AGREE IN NATO TO FORMULAE WHICH WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE TIMING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS, OR IMPOSE FURTHER CONDITIONS. THE LEFT OF CENTRE PRESS IS CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT TO STICK TO ITS DEMAND FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS. VOGEL AGAIN CRITICISED THE GOVERNMENT FOR MERELY POSTPONING, NOT RULING OUT, NEW SNF. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE US WOULD WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM GERMANY AS LONG AS BOTH SIDES HAD AN INTEREST IN THEIR PRESENCE.

MALLABY

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SNF: GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY
1. SNAPSHOT OF GERMAN VIEWS BEFORE YOU SEE GENSCHER ON THURSDAY. GERMAN GOVERNMENT HOPING FOR A COMPROMISE BEFORE NATO SUMMIT AND TRYING TO PLAY DOWN THE DISPUTE. STUDYING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT UK FORMULA ON MODERNISATION.

DETAIL
2. THE IMPRESSION BEING GIVEN BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS OF A WISH TO SEEK A COMPROMISE BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT, SO AS TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING. KOHL'S REMARKS TO BUSH, REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1271, EXEMPLIFY THIS.

3. GENSCHER IS TRYING TO DOWNPLAY THE SNF ISSUE, ARGUING THAT IT IS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO MAKE THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF THE ALLIANCE. HE CONTINUES TO STATE THAT THE FRG'S CALL FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT NEW, BUT REFLECTS THE NATO POSITION AGREED IN REYKJAVIK IN 1987 AND CONFIRMED AT THE SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS LAST YEAR. (THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE NATO COMMUNIQUES IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED HERE.) DESPITE HIS EARLIER REMARKS ABOUT ''CONTINENTIAL EUROPEANS'', GENSCHER NOW CLAIMS NOT TO SEE THE EMERGENCE OF ANGLO-SAXON AND CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN BLOCS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT THE FRG HAS A WEIGHTY VOICE BECAUSE IT MAKES THE LARGEST CONVENTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND SNF ARE BASED IN GERMANY.

No - not in UK,

4. GENSCHER'S VISIT TO LONDON (NOT YET PUBLIC HERE) LOOKS LIKE PART OF AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF AN OPEN ROW AT THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE UP FOR HIS INABILITY TO SEE YOU BEFORE THE COALITION POSITION WAS ANNOUNCED. HE KNOWS THAT THE FRG'S POSITION ENJOYS BROAD SUPPORT DOMESTICALLY AND WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. BUT THE GERMANS SEEM NOW TO HAVE REALISED THAT THE US CANNOT BE FORCED INTO SNF NEGOTIATIONS ANY MORE THAN THEY THEMSELVES CAN BE FORCED TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES.

IT IS NOW ASSUMED HERE THAT THE MODERNISATION QUESTION HAS BEEN SOLVED BY AGREEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE TO POSTPONE THE DECISION UNTIL 1992. MEDIA ATTENTION IS THEREFORE FOCUSSED ON THE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE OFFERED BY THE WORDS ''EARLY NEGOTIATIONS'' IN THE GERMAN POSITION. IT IS ALSO ASSUMED THAT SUCH A COMPROMISE WOULD LINK SNF NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME WAY TO PROGRESS IN CFE.

5. KOHL'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, TELTSCHIK, TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN ''CONTINUOUS'' DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULAE, AND CONFIRMED THAT ACCOUNT WAS BEING TAKEN OF THE UK LANGUAGE ON MODERNISATION (YOUR TELNO 309). I WILL SPEAK TO HIM AGAIN TOMORROW AND REPORT.

6. US SUGGESTIONS THAT A THIRD ZERO COULD LEAD TO TROOP WITHDRAWALS HAVE PROVOKED REACTIONS FROM SPD QUARTERS. HELMUT SCHMIDT HAS SAID IT WOULD BE NO DISASTER: HE REPEATED HIS IDEA THAT NATO COULD BE REPLACED BY A EUROPEAN DEFENCE SYSTEM INCLUDING FRENCH FORCES. AN SPD MP HAS WARNED ABOUT AROUSING A ''YANKS GO HOME'' MOVEMENT. AND DER SPIEGEL HAS COMMENTED THAT IF THE US AND UK INSIST THAT THE PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS ON GERMAN SOIL DEPENDS UPON THE GERMANS BEARING A BIGGER RISK - AND BEARING IT MORE OR LESS ALONE - THEN ''WE WOULD JUST HAVE TO LET OUR ANGLO-SAXON ALLIES GO''.

MALLABY

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF: US Position

You may find it useful to have the enclosed copy of a minute by John Goulden on his recent talks in Washington.

In any further exchanges over the next few weeks, there are a couple of points arising out of recent messages, conversations etc which may be worth having in mind:

(i) "up to date where necessary". We have queried the Dutch suggestion that this phrase should apply to all nuclear weapons rather than just to SNF. Tactically, we can try to get this phrase into the SNF paragraph, as we have suggested in last week's message to Kohl. But we should bear in mind that the phrase was agreed in March 1988 in the context of all weapons systems, conventional as well as nuclear;

(ii) "irreducible minimum". We should not press the argument that our LANCE force cannot be reduced. In terms of missiles, we could, in the right circumstances, certainly cut below the current figure of 682. In terms of launchers, the numbers may turn out to be meaningless if the dual-capable MLRS system is used;

(iii) "negotiations". It is worth bearing in mind that the formula for the Comprehensive Concept, which the Americans have already tabled, is as follows:

> "if concrete results toward eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further reductions in the level of nuclear forces".

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Secretary of State

From: P J Goulden

Date: 5 May 1989

cc: PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
PS/Sir J Fretwell
Mr Boyd
Mr Lever
Mr Burns, News Dept
Mr Griffiths, AUS (Pol) MOD

Private Secretary

SNF: US POSITION

1. During my visit to Washington on 3/4 May, I found the US position on SNF encouragingly robust. No-one seriously challenged our hard line view. On tactics everyone I spoke to accepted that our aim over the next two or three weeks should be to show no flexibility, to dismiss any talk of negotiations and generally to depress German expectations. As to the likely outcome, US officials expect either minimal language on both modernisation and arms control or the wholesale deferral of the issue until later. There are divided views about a study group on SNF, but most agreed that we should reject this up to and at the Summit.

2. I retain a feeling however that this tough US talk is tactical and may not continue up to the Summit. The grounds for unease are basically four:

(i) the US press, with some good exceptions, is critical of the Administration's stand. The US, it is argued, cannot simply refuse to negotiate; as leader of the Alliance, it should be seeking compromise rather than staking out an isolated Anglo-Saxon position;

(ii) officials like Blackwill (NSC) are uneasy about the degree of Congressional criticism, from moderates such as Nunn and Biden and staunch Republicans such as McCaine; as well as from defence insiders such as Paul Nitze. The Administration is being attacked for undermining Kohl and setting up the SPD, because of a missile system which has no lobby in Washington;

(iii) the Administration's line on SNF negotiations is more nuancé than ours. No-one wants negotiations in parallel with CFE, but many (including Cheney and Fitzwaters) hint that negotiations could be be set up after a CFE agreement. Bush's comments during the Mulroney visit also had the flavour that what matters is to get the sequence right;

/(iv)

(iv) although Baker was tough with Genscher last week, there must be a risk that his propensity for fixing will come to the fore after his visit to Moscow next week. His secretive methods mean that we may not know what he is up to until after the event.

3. We therefore need to follow the evolution of US thinking with minute care. Blackwill said to me that the Administration would have to review its position "daily". Several people commented to me that the pressures and temptations to cut a deal will grow as the Summit approaches. All of that said, the current signals from Washington are, thanks to German misbehaviour, more robust than I would have predicted two weeks ago.

P J Goulden

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SIC
OUR TELNO 1236 (NOT TO ALL): SNF
1. FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY PRESIDENT BUSH IN A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MR MULRONEY AFTER MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER ON 4 MAY:
QUOTE: I WANT THE NATO SUMMIT TO BE A SUCCESS AND WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH OTHERS TO SEE THAT THERE IS A COMMON NATO POSITION. THIS IS NO TIME FOR ONE TO COMPROMISE OR SOMEBODY NOT TO COMPROMISE. WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS TO THE GERMANS. I EXPECT WE'LL BE HEARING FROM THEM SOON. AND I'D PREFER TO DO WHATEVER NEGOTIATION AMONGST ALLIES (THAT) IS REQUIRED IN PRIVATE, RECOGNISING THAT WE ALL WANT THE NATO SUMMIT TO BE SUCCESSFUL. AND THERE'S A LOT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AND THAT'S FINE. I DON'T PLAN TO JOIN IN ON THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION. THE US POSITION IS WELL KNOWN. NATO'S LAST STATED PUBLIC POSITION IS WELL KNOWN, AND WE'RE PREPARED TO GO FROM THERE. UNQUOTE
QUOTE: WELL I'M ALWAYS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. BUT WE'RE NOT GOING TO GO FOR ANY THIRD ZERO OR GETTING SNF OUT OF WHACK IN TERMS OF NEGOTIATIONS. SO LET'S BE CLEAR ON THAT. UNQUOTE
QUOTE: LOOK, MY EMPHASIS WILL BE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ... WE'VE LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS THAT PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY HAS RAISED AND THAT'S REALLY ALL I CARE TO SAY ABOUT IT. UNQUOTE
2. MR MULRONEY REFRAINED FROM GIVING ANY DETAILS OF HIS 'SUGGESTIONS', AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY.

ACLAND

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ADVANCE 4

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OUR TELNO 1236: SNF

1. WE HAVE REPORTED AN ACCOUNT OF BUSH'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KOHL ON 5 MAY (TELECON TEBBIT/GASS). THIS HAS NOW BEEN AMPLIFIED BY BLACKWILL (NSC) DURING A CALL BY SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN ON 8 MAY.
2. THE NSC SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR DID NOT GET INTO MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE OR NARROW ANY OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THEY DID HOWEVER AGREE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS, WITH KOHL STRESSING THE NEED TO PRESERVE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING SOMETHING OUT BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT.
3. BLACKWILL ADDED THAT KOHL'S TONE HAD BEEN CONCILIATORY. HE HAD GONE ON TO ASK THAT SOMEONE ENJOYING THE PRESIDENT'S FULL CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE SENT TO SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN A DISCREET WAY. THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED AND GATES (DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER) WOULD BE STOPPING OFF IN BONN ON 12 MAY ON THE WAY BACK FROM MOSCOW, WHERE HE IS CURRENTLY WITH THE BAKER DELEGATION.
4. BLACKWILL EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS IN NO WAY RUNNING AFTER THE GERMANS OR IN A MIND TO OFFER CONCESSIONS. THE AMERICANS FELT THAT THERE WERE AT LAST SIGNS THAT KOHL WAS WOBBLING BACK TOWARDS THE RIGHT AND THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO DO ANYTHING THAT MIGHT STOP THAT RIGHTWARD WOBBLE. GATES WOULD BE GOING TO LISTEN, BUT WOULD HAVE NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE OR HAVE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR KOHL.
5. SIR M QUINLAN UNDERLINED OUR OWN VIEW THAT IT WOULD INDEED BE A SERIOUS TACTICAL ERROR TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS AT THIS STAGE OR TO BACKSLIDE ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS. BLACKWILL SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THAT.

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ADDITIONAL 18

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file DASAVO

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 May 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF

Chancellor Kohl telephoned the Prime Minister to continue their discussion of SNF this afternoon. In fact, he had virtually nothing new to say.

After a few pleasantries about the Prime Minister's 10th Anniversary, Chancellor Kohl said that the German Government were working on possible wording for the communiqué of the NATO Summit as he had promised the Prime Minister at Deidesheim. Various texts had been put forward by the United States Administration, the Canadian and Dutch Governments, and he had just received the United Kingdom's text on modernisation. His aim continued to be to reach an acceptable text for the Comprehensive Concept before Heads of Government sat down to meet at the Summit. He would work hard to get a solution and would telephone in about a week's time when he had got a bit further.

The Prime Minister said that she was glad to hear that Chancellor Kohl had now received our proposed wording which we had sent about a week ago. She would remind him that we had made our main compromise by not insisting on a decision on deployment of FOTL and could not be expected to do more. She hoped that the Chancellor would find our text helpful. We were not at all happy with the Dutch text and could not accept it. Our position remained that we could not agree to SNF negotiations, for the reasons which she had explained in Deidesheim. Chancellor Kohl confessed that, while he had received the British text, he had not actually studied it yet as he had been busy with a whole lot of meetings. But he would be in touch in a week or so and meanwhile he would urge that Teltschik and Charles Powell be in touch with each other. The Prime Minister agreed that this would be useful.

The Prime Minister continued that she had just seen President Ortega. In her view he was not to be trusted. He was anxious to obtain aid for Nicaragua and wanted the European countries to attend a Donors' Conference in Stockholm. She had made clear that the United Kingdom would not go to the Conference or give aid. We would wait and see

what happened in Nicaragua and whether or not the Government introduced genuine democracy. She doubted very much that they would. Chancellor Kohl said that he was also very sceptical about Nicaragua. He had been doubtful whether he ought to receive Ortega but had decided to do so. His message would be that Germany would want to see what democracy in Nicaragua looked like before giving any aid. The Prime Minister said this was absolutely right; we should judge Ortega by what he actually did not by what he said he would do.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER

TELEPHONE CALL WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

Chancellor Kohl is supposed to telephone you at about 1630 this afternoon to discuss SNF. There have in fact been no great developments since your meeting with him. We know that Kohl has telephoned President Bush but have no account of what passed, although subsequent press statements suggest that President Bush remained admirably firm. However, one or two other American officials have started talking about the importance of the "phasing" of discussions on SNF: this may only be a reversion to the Reykjavik formula, which you will remember read:

> "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings."

This did not talk of negotiations: only reductions.

I suggest that you leave it to Chancellor Kohl to make the running and see whether he has anything new to offer. For your part, you might make the following points:

- thank him for his hospitality in Deidesheim and Speyer, which you enjoyed very much;

Wonderful. An Prime Cand -.

- thank him also for his kind message of congratulations on your tenth anniversary;

Intermediate Greek media

- say that so far as you are concerned there has been no change in the overall situation. You believe that the issue of modernisation can be settled on the basis of (1) accepting the need for effective SNF for the foreseeable future, recognising the need to keep nuclear forces up to (2) date where necessary, and supporting US research and

development plans to provide for the option of a decision in 1992 on the development of FOTL. We have given Chancellor Kohl's staff some suggested wording on this (attached);

- but as you told him in Deidesheim, we have made our concession by agreeing to postpone a decision on deployment of FOTL. We cannot agree to a commitment to negotiations on SNF and you understand that President Bush remains equally firm on this point. You continue to believe that the best way to proceed is to challenge the Russians to make unilateral reductions to bring their SNF down to NATO levels;

- you are not happy with the compromise proposals which Mr. Lubbers showed to Chancellor Kohl and could not accept them;

- all the indications available to us are that the French remain opposed to SNF negotiations because of the difficulties this would cause for their own short-range nuclear weapons.

President Ortega

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
8 May 1989

PARAGRAPH FOR SUMMIT DECLARATION

For the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the concept of preventing war through deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will need to be kept up to date where necessary. This includes a continuing requirement for land-, sea- and air-based nuclear systems in Europe. A third zero for land-based missiles is therefore not acceptable.

LANCE will become obsolete in 1995 and a deployment decision on a successor will be needed in 1991/92. In order to keep open the necessary options, we reaffirm our support for US efforts to develop a follow-on to LANCE.

ccfc

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF

Our Embassy in Washington have received a brief account of President Bush's telephone conversation on 5 May with Chancellor Kohl about SNF.

The conversation did not enter into the detail of the SNF issue. Both sides stuck to their position. The Embassy report that they have had assurances from senior levels in the Administration that there has been no change in the US position.

The only element of substance to emerge from the conversation was reaffirmation that both sides wanted to find a solution to the problem and to that end there would be further contacts. The Embassy are trying to discover whether further meetings or telephone conversations between the Americans and Germans have been fixed.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

040455
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1236
OF 050013Z MAY 89
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OUR TELNO 1209: SNF

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT'S POSITION SET OUT PUBLICLY IN UNCOMPROMISING TERMS. OFFICIALS INCREASINGLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE ISSUE WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT FOR THE SUMMIT AND EITHER DEALT WITH THEN OR SET ASIDE FOR LATER. BUT GROWING CRITICISM, AND CONGRESSIONAL VOICES JOIN CALL FOR COMPROMISES ON ARMS CONTROL

DETAIL

2. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT WHEN THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER MET PRESIDENT BUSH DURING HER VISIT HERE YESTERDAY, MRS BRUNDTLAND RECEIVED A REBUFF ON SNF. THIS IS BASED ON BRIEFING BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN WHO REITERATED THE CASE FOR LANCE MODERNISATION AND SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED HIS STRONGLY HELD VIEWS THAT SNF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD QUOTE BE A MISTAKE UNQUOTE. PRESSED TO DISCUSS THE POINT AT WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT CONSIDER A NEGOTIATION, HE CONFINED HIMSELF TO THE FORMULA THAT CONVENTIONAL ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH FIRST: QUOTE, WE BELIEVE THE SEQUENCE IS IMPORTANT AND WE WANT TO ADDRESS THOSE ISSUES IN A VERY CALCULATED AND METHODICAL WAY UNQUOTE. OFFICIALS TELL US THAT A SIMILAR STATEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S TALKS WITH THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TODAY. DEFENCE SECRETARY CHENEY HAS REPEATED HIS STATEMENT THAT ANY SNF NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A QUOTE DANGEROUS TRAP UNQUOTE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IS IN THE DOLDRUMS. DURING THE US/UK POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS TODAY BOHLEN (STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT THE EXPECTED ARMS CONTROL LANGUAGE FROM BONN (PARA 4 OF TUR) HAD FAILED TO ARRIVE. INSTEAD THERE HAD BEEN AN UNSATISFACTORY COMMUNICATION FROM GENSCHER, WHICH OFFERED NOTHING NEW BUT ASKED FOR FURTHER PROPOSALS FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. BOHLEN SAID THAT THESE WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING. SHE WAS INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES BEFORE THE SUMMIT ITSELF.

4. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY BLACKWILL AT THE NSC IN

A SEPARATE TALK WITH GOULDEN. BLACKWILL SAID THAT THE NEW US AMBASSADOR WALTERS HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL WHEN HE PRESENTED CREDENTIALS ON 3 MAY. KOHL HAD SUGGESTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF SHOULD BE LINKED TO THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BUT IN PARALLEL RATHER THAN IN SEQUENCE. THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE TELEPHONING THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW (5 MAY, AT 1315Z), BUT NO PROGRESS WAS EXPECTED. THINKING IN THE NSC WAS THEREFORE BEGINNING TO TURN TOWARDS A SUMMIT IN WHICH THE MOST OPTIMISTIC SCENARO WAS FOR THE SNF ISSUE TO BE PLAYED DOWN OR SET ASIDE, WITH AS MUCH EMPHASIS AS POSSIBLE PLACED ON THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF ALLIANCE ACTIVITY. BLACKWILL'S ONLY CAVEAT WAS THAT CHANNELS WOULD NEED TO BE KEPT OPEN TO THE GERMANS AND OTHERS, JUST IN CASE THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY WERE TO EMERGE FROM THEM FOR SERIOUS TALKING TO RESUME: NOT THAT HE SAW ANY PROSPECT OF IT AT PRESENT.

5. MEANWHILE, CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION CONTINUES TO GROW, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. THE MOST INFLUENTIAL VOICE SO FAR AS BEEN SENATOR NUNN, WHO LAUNCHED AN ATTACK YESTERDAY DURING AN OPEN HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. NUNN SUGGESTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, PROVIDED THE GERMANS AGREED TO FOTL DEPLOYMENT, NO THIRD ZERO, AND A LINK TO CFE (NO SNF AGREEMENT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE OUTCOME OF CONVENTIONAL TALKS WAS KNOWN). ADMIRAL CROWE, WHO WAS TESTIFYING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE AT THE TIME, COMMENTED UNHELPFULLY THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IF ONLY THE GERMANS WOULD AGREE TO THE MODERNISATION ASPECT. CONGRESSMAN LES ASPIN HAS CALLED SEPARATELY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPLORATORY GROUP TO STUDY A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A BITTER VALEDICTORY FROM PAUL NITZE (WHO RETIRED OFFICIALLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK) IN WHICH HE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GERMANS TO AGREE TO MODERNISATION WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND WARNED THAT THE US AND BRITAIN WERE IN DANGER OF BEING ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE. THESE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN WELL PUBLICISED. BUT BLACKWILL ALSO TOLD US TODAY OF WIDESPREAD PRIVATE CONCERN AMONG THE SENATE LEADERSHIP INCLUDING SENATORS BIDEN AND MCCAIN (THE LATTER A STAUNCH REPUBLICAN).

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SNF: FRENCH VIEWS

1. IN THE MARGINS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING IN STRASBOURG ON 5 MAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE BRIEFLY TO DUMAS ABOUT SNF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE GERMANS TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE ON SNF MODERNISATION WHICH INCLUDED:

- ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SNF FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (IN OTHER WORDS, REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO),

- RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO KEEP NUCLEAR FORCES UP-TO-DATE WHERE NECESSARY,

THE NEED TO SUPPORT US RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS TO PROVIDE FOR THE OPTION OF A DECISION IN 1992 ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT SAFE TO TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF, NOR TO REFER TO A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. ANY INTRODUCTION OF THE WORD ''NEGOTIATIONS'' WOULD LEAD US TO THE SLIPPERY SLOPE.

3. DUMAS SAID THAT ON SNF MODERNISATION THE GERMANS WERE INSPIRED ENTIRELY BY DOMESTIC REASONS IN SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DECISION BEFORE 1992. HE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT FEAR THAT POSTPONEMENT OF A DECISION UNTIL 1992 MEANT THAT WE COULD EXPECT NO(NO) DECISION AT THAT TIME EITHER.

4. DUMAS SAID THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE UK AND FOR FRANCE. FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT SNF NEGOTIATIONS: THEY WOULD LEAD ONTO THE SLIPPERY SLOPE. HE COULD NOT SAY MORE FOR THE MOMENT. HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT MITTERAND.

5. DUMAS THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ALLIES TO PLAY UP THEIR CALL FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE VERY LARGE REDUCTIONS

IN THEIR NUMBERS OF SNF AND TO EMPHASISE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF LARGE SOVIET REDUCTIONS THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN TALKING ABOUT SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE GOT THROUGH TO GORBACHEV ON HIS VISITS TO WESTERN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED: THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAD REDUCED THE NUMBER OF THEIR WARHEADS IN EUROPE BY 35 PERCENT WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAD MODERNISED SOME 95 PER CENT OF SOVIET SNF.

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SIC CFJ

MY TELNO 474 : SNF : GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. GERMAN PRESS REPORTS DIFFERENT VIEWS IN WASHINGTON AND GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG LETTER. SPD LEADER VOGEL CONFIRMS THAT COALITION POSITION RESTS ON BROAD DOMESTIC CONSENSUS. STOLTENBERG'S VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO WORK AT THE PROBLEM.

DETAIL

2. SNF REMAINS THE MAJOR STORY. POINTS REPORTED INCLUDE:
(A) NO COMPROMISE YET IN SIGHT. BUSH'S POSITION TOUGH, BUT ALSO SUPPORT FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS FROM NUNN, NITZE AND OTHERS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1236). THREATS BY CHENEY AND SOME SENATORS THAT A THIRD ZERO WOULD LEAD TO WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM THE FRG.
(B) THE LETTER FROM GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG TO BAKER. IS SAID TO CONFIRM BONN'S READINESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS: TO SUMMARISE THEIR VIEW OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS AND THE GERMAN POSITION: BUT NOT TO MAKE ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS. IN WHAT LOOKS LIKE AUSWAERTIGES AMT BRIEFING, IT IS DESCRIBED AS A ''GOODWILL GESTURE, AFTER THE US FAILURE TO RESUME THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE AS AGREED''. ACCORDING TO ''INFORMED CIRCLES'', BONN ENVISAGES A SOLUTION COMPRISING DEFERRAL OF THE CONCRETE MODERNISATION DECISION UNTIL 1992 AND THE TASKING OF A WORKING GROUP TO WORK OUT A NATO MANDATE FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF PROGRESS IN CFE.
(C) IN INTERVIEWS GENSCHER HAS STATED THAT IT IS ''COMPLETELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE'' TO WANT TO KEEP SNF OUT OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. HE AGAIN REFERRED TO GROWING SUPPORT IN THE ALLIANCE FOR THE FRG POSITION.
(D) ACCORDING TO SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, ''SOURCES IN BONN'' REJECTED THE CANADIAN DUAL TRACK PROPOSAL AS A ''SIDE SHOW'': THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM 1979.
(E) ONLY DIE WELT (CONSERVATIVE) REPORTS MR YOUNGER'S PRESENTATION OF THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER AND HIS OPPOSITION TO EARLY SNF

NEGOTIATIONS.

3. PRESS COMMENT:
(A) A FEATURE IN DIE ZEIT (LEFT OF CENTRE) ON DEIDESHEIM COMMENTS THAT CONFLICTING INTERESTS BETWEEN LONDON AND BONN HAVE BEEN SIMMERING FOR A LONG TIME: HAVING COME LATE TO THE BOIL THEY ARE DOING SO ALL THE MORE FURIOUSLY.
(B) FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (LEFT OF CENTRE) COMMENTS THAT WASHINGTON, LONDON AND PARTS OF THE BONN COALITION HAVE FAILED FOR TOO LONG TO RECOGNISE THE CHANGED FEELINGS OF THE FEDERAL GERMANS. GORBACHEV'S POLICY HAS BEEN ONLY PART OF THE STORY. MORE SERIOUS WERE THE REAGAN YEARS IN THE US. AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ''OCCUPATION GENERATION''BY YOUNGER GERMANS WITH DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES.
(C) KOELNER STADTANZEIGER (LIBERAL/FDP) SAYS THAT CHENEY'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL THREAT WAS NOT TO BE TAKEN LITERALLY, GIVEN THE US STRATEGIC INTEREST IN EUROPE. THE QUESTION WAS WHEN HE AND BUSH WOULD SEE THAT THE REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WAS ''POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE''.
(D) RHEINISCHER MERKUR (CONSERVATIVE) COMMENTS THAT THE REAFFIRMATION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. HOW DOES MRS THATCHER SEE A FUTURE IN WHICH, HOPEFULLY, THE WARSAW PACT WILL HAVE ONLY A DEFENCIVE STRATEGY? SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FOLLOW CFE, BUT A MODERNISATION DECISION SHOULD FOLLOW POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH EASTERN EUROPE.

4. SPD LEADER VOGEL TOLD ME ON 3 MAY THAT THE COALITION'S POSITION RESTED ON BROAD CONSENSUS IN THE FRG. LIKE MANY OTHERS, HE LAID STRESS ON WINTEX, WHICH HE SAID HAD CAUSED CONSTERNATION IN ALL PARTIES IN THE BUNDESTAG. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT SPD POLICY ON THE THIRD ZERO, VOGEL DID NOT (NOT) ARGUE FOR AN IMMEDIATE THIRD ZERO. RATHER, HE SAID THAT LAND-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD BE DISPENSED WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF PROGRESS IN CFE TO REMOVE THE WARSAW PACT'S ABILITY TO UNDERTAKE AGGRESSION.

5. THE PRESS ARE BILLING BAKER'S NAC BRIEFING ON 12 MAY, AFTER HIS MOSCOW VISIT, AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF SNF. OTHER OPPORTUNITIES (NOT YET IN THE PRESS) COULD BE STOLTENBERG'S VISITS TO WASHINGTON (17 MAY) AND LONDON (26 MAY).

MALLABY

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SIC
OUR TELNO 1236 (NOT TO ALL): SNF
1. FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY PRESIDENT BUSH IN A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MR MULRONEY AFTER MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER ON 4 MAY:
QUOTE: I WANT THE NATO SUMMIT TO BE A SUCCESS AND WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH OTHERS TO SEE THAT THERE IS A COMMON NATO POSITION. THIS IS NO TIME FOR ONE TO COMPROMISE OR SOMEBODY NOT TO COMPROMISE. WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS TO THE GERMANS. I EXPECT WE'LL BE HEARING FROM THEM SOON. AND I'D PREFER TO DO WHATEVER NEGOTIATION AMONGST ALLIES (THAT) IS REQUIRED IN PRIVATE, RECOGNISING THAT WE ALL WANT THE NATO SUMMIT TO BE SUCCESSFUL. AND THERE'S A LOT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AND THAT'S FINE. I DON'T PLAN TO JOIN IN ON THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION. THE US POSITION IS WELL KNOWN. NATO'S LAST STATED PUBLIC POSITION IS WELL KNOWN, AND WE'RE PREPARED TO GO FROM THERE. UNQUOTE
QUOTE: WELL I'M ALWAYS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. BUT WE'RE NOT GOING TO GO FOR ANY THIRD ZERO OR GETTING SNF OUT OF WHACK IN TERMS OF NEGOTIATIONS. SO LET'S BE CLEAR ON THAT. UNQUOTE
QUOTE: LOOK, MY EMPHASIS WILL BE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ... WE'VE LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS THAT PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY HAS RAISED AND THAT'S REALLY ALL I CARE TO SAY ABOUT IT. UNQUOTE
2. MR MULRONEY REFRAINED FROM GIVING ANY DETAILS OF HIS 'SUGGESTIONS', AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY.

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OF 0415DOZ MAY 89
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MY TELNO 170: SNF MODERNISATION

1. THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 3 MAY PUTTING ON RECORD THE FOLLOWING VIEWS:

(A) THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO THE THIRD ZERO.

(B) THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD REDUCE ITS SNF STOCKPILES DOWN TO A LEVEL OF PARITY WITH NATO.

(C) TURKEY COULD SUPPORT AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS IF THE CFE TALKS HAD BEGUN TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS.

(D) TURKEY RESPECTS THE VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES IN THE CURRENT MODERNISATION DEBATE WITHIN NATO BUT REGARDS THE CURRENT DISAGREEMENT AS DAMAGIN FOR ALLIANCE UNITY.

(E) TURKEY WILL SUPPORT ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON MODERNISATION, BUT REMAINS UNWILLING TO TAKE ON ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES.

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FROM CABINET OFFICE, LONDON
TO THE WHITEHOUSE
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S E C R E T
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING STREET.>

DEAR BRENT,

VAN DEN BROEK TELEPHONED YESTERDAY TO TELL US ABOUT THE VISIT WHICH HE AND MR. LUBBERS PAID TO BONN ON 3 MAY. IT SEEMS THEY HANDED OVER A COPY OF A COMPROMISE TEXT FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. THIS ENVISAGES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GROUP TO ASSESS ISSUES WHICH WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE WARSAW PACT HAD REDUCED ITS LEVEL OF SNF MISSILES TO THAT OF NATO.

THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD MR. LUBBERS ON 27 APRIL WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL: NOR, I TAKE IT, COULD YOU. ONCE A WORKING GROUP TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS WAS ESTABLISHED WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES DRIVEN INEXORABLY TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, AND THENCE TO A THIRD ZERO.

IN TALKING TO CHANCELLOR KOHL, MR. LUBBERS HELPFULLY ARGUED STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD CONFIRM EXISTING NATO AGREEMENTS ON MODERNISATION. THE DUTCH GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE FROM THE MARCH 1988 SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO KEEP OUR WEAPONS +UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY+ AS LONG AS IT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE PASSAGE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WHICH DEALT WITH SNF. THE DUTCH THOUGHT THIS REASONALBE - WE DO NOT.

THE DUTCH ALSO TOLD CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SPEAK OF STAGES IN THE FUTURE WHERE LOWER LEVELS OF SNF MIGHT BECOME POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REFER TO THE LONG TERM PROSPECT OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ALTOGETHER.

THE PRIME MINISTER BELIEVES THAT DUTCH EFFORTS TO BROKER A COMPROMISE ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS ARE VERY DEFINITELY NOT HELPFUL AND THEIR COMPROMISE PROPOSALS STRIKE US AS WEAK AND UNSATISFACTORY. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO DETER THE DUTCH FROM PURSUING THEIR IDEAS. THE PRIME MINSTER FEELS SURE THAT, WHEN MR. LUBBERS VISITS WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, HE WILL RECEIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THEM. SHE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT, AS LONG AS THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REMAIN ABSOLUTELY FIRM ON THEIR REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR UP-TO-DATE SNF, WE SHALL ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.

WARM REGARDS

YOURS

CHARLES

MESSAGE ENDS

SRWBZC

cc FCO (10A-B)
Stephen Wall
PC

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL, NO.10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Brent,

Van den Broek telephoned yesterday to tell us about the visit which he and Mr. Lubbers paid to Bonn on 3 May. It seems they handed over a copy of a compromise text for inclusion in the Comprehensive Concept. This envisages the estalishment of a group to assess issues wich would be addressed in future negotiations on SNF. The negotiations would take place after the Warsaw Pact had reduced its level of SNF missiles to that of NATO.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Lubbers on 29 April we could not accept such a proposal: nor, I take it, could you. Once a working group to consider negotiations was established we would find ourselves driven inexorably towards the negotiations themselves, and thence to a third zero.

In talking to Chancellor Kohl, Mr. Lubbers helpfully argued strongly that we should confirm existing NATO agreements on modernisation. The Dutch gained the impression that the Chancellor would accept the language from the March 1988 Summit communiqué committing us to keep our weapons "up to date where necessary" as long as it did not appear in the passage in the Comprehensive Concept which dealt with SNF. The Dutch thought this reasonable - we do not.

The Dutch also told Chancellor Kohl that any specific reference to SNF negotiations would be difficult and that it might be better to speak of stages in the future where lower levels of SNF might become possible in the context of progress in the conventional force negotiations. They also raised the question of whether it might be possible to refer to the long term prospect of eliminating nuclear artillery altogether.

The Prime Minister believes that Dutch efforts to broker a compromise on SNF negotiations are very definitely not

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helpful and their compromise proposals strike us as weak and unsatisfactory. We shall do our best to deter the Dutch from pursuing their ideas. The Prime Minister feels sure that, when Mr. Lubbers visits Washington next week, he will receive no encouragement for them. She continues to believe that, as long as the United States and the United Kingdom remain absolutely firm on their refusal to contemplate SNF negotiations and on the requirement for up-to-date SNF, we shall achieve a satisfactory outcome.

Warm regards,

Yours,

Charles.

CDP

CC Pc

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF

Your letter of 3 May asked for a draft message from you to General Scowcroft informing him of Dutch activities on SNF. This is enclosed, as approved by the Foreign Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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Please pass following message, SHWBZC

MESSAGE FROM CHARLES POWELL TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT from Charles Powell No 10 Downing Street.

The Prime Minister has asked me to give you an account of a telephone conversation which she had yesterday with the Dutch Foreign Minister about SNF.

Dear Brent,

Telephoned yesterday to tell us about the visit which

Mr Van Den Broek told the Prime Minister that when he and Mr Lubbers visited Bonn on 3 May they handed over a copy of a compromise text for inclusion in the Comprehensive Concept which they showed to the Prime Minister on 29 April. The Dutch have tabled this text in NATO. The compromise which the Dutch are suggesting envisages the establishment of a group to assess issues which would be addressed in future negotiations on SNF. Those negotiations would take place after the Warsaw Pact had reduced its level of SNF missiles to that of NATO.

As the Prime Minister told Mr Lubbers on 29 April we could not accept such a proposal; nor, I take it, could you. Once a working group to consider negotiations was established we would find ourselves driven inexorably towards the negotiations themselves, as thence to a third zero.

— we do not.

In talking to Chancellor Kohl Mr Lubbers helpfully argued strongly that we should confirm existing NATO agreements on modernisation. The Dutch gained the impression that the Chancellor would accept the language from the March 1988 Summit communique committing us to keep our weapons "up to date where necessary" as long as it did not appear in the passage in the Comprehensive Concept which dealt with SNF. The Dutch thought this reasonable. The Dutch also told Chancellor Kohl that any specific reference to SNF negotiations would be difficult and that it might be better to speak of stages in the future where lower levels of SNF might become possible in the context of progress in the conventional force negotiations. They also raised the question of whether it might be possible to refer to the long term prospect of eliminating nuclear artillery altogether.

The Prime Minister believes that Dutch efforts to broker a compromise on SNF negotiations are unhelpful. It is much better for us to be absolutely clear that we are not prepared to accept SNF

very definitely not

either compromise proposals strike us as weak and unsatisfactory.

PHAABC

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negotiations. We should also continue to argue the need for NATO to face squarely the requirement for modernised SNF. The Prime Minister does not believe, for example, that omitting any reference to keeping weapons up to date where necessary from the passage on SNF in the Comprehensive Concept would be a satisfactory outcome.

The Prime Minister hopes, therefore, that when Mr Lubbers visits Washington next week he will receive no encouragement for the weak compromise proposals he has floated. She remains convinced that as long as the US and UK remain absolutely firm on their refusal to contemplate SNF negotiations and the need to modernise our existing weapons, then we shall achieve a satisfactory outcome.

We shall on hear to delete the Atlantic from pursuing this compromise proposals. The Prime Minister hopes that you will feel able to do so to see Mr Lubbers visits tonight next week give the impression that she is not a satisfactory. We the Prime Minister hopes that you from pursuing other ideas. The Prime Minister hopes that, when Mr. Lubbers visits tonight next week, he will receive no encouragement for them. She continues to believe that, as long as the US & the UK remain absolutely firm on their refusal to contemplate SNF negotiations and on the need for up-to-date SNF, we shall achieve a satisfactory outcome. Warm regards yours Charles.

FILE KKIAPD

SUBJECT
cc MASTER

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1989

SNF

The Netherlands Foreign Minister telephoned the Prime Minister late this afternoon on behalf of Mr. Lubbers, to report on their talks in Bonn this morning.

The Prime Minister said she was very sorry to hear the news of Mr. Lubbers' resignation. She understood that the Government was likely to remain in office on a caretaker basis for some time. Mr. Van den Broek said the most likely outcome was the holding of new elections in September. The Government would remain in office meanwhile, although it would not be able to take initiatives. He and Mr. Lubbers intended to go ahead with their visit to Washington next week.

Mr. Van den Broek continued that the talks in Bonn had been good and constructive. Chancellor Kohl appeared to be looking for compromises and accepted the need to avoid a divisive and quarrelsome NATO summit. The Dutch side had handed over the compromise text for the Comprehensive Concept, which they had already tabled in Brussels and had shown the Prime Minister at Chequers. (He did not make clear whether it had been amended to take account of our comments). Chancellor Kohl had seemed unaware of the text but had agreed to look at it without commitment. The Dutch side had argued strongly for confirming existing agreements and conclusions on modernisation. Their impression was that Chancellor Kohl would accept the phraseology from the communique of the last Summit about keeping all NATO's weapons up-to-date, provided it did not appear in the passage dealing with SNF (!) but elsewhere in the Comprehensive Concept. The Dutch thought this was reasonable: there was no need to rub it in. Kohl had seemed willing to accept language from the NPG confidential minutes on support for the US development programme, provided it was clearly stated that it did not pre-empt a decision on production and employment. The Dutch had suggested that, rather than explicitly rule out a decision on deployment until 1992, the communique should put it more positively by saying that "until 1992 we only need R & D".

Mr. Van den Broek continued that, on negotiations, Chancellor Kohl had shifted his position slightly and seemed prepared to consider linking SNF negotiations to progress in the talks on conventional force reductions. The Dutch had made clear that any specific reference to SNF negotiations would be difficult and that it might be better to speak of stages in the future where lower levels of SNF might become possible in the context of progress in the conventional force negotiations. They had also raised the question whether it might be possible to refer to the long term prospect of eliminating nuclear artillery altogether. This was something they wanted to discuss in Washington next week.

The Prime Minister said that there were several points in Mr. Lubbers' report that concerned her. She was disappointed to hear that the Dutch had handed over their paper: she had thought the conclusion reached at Chequers was that they should not do so. Mr. Van den Broek said that it had already been tabled in NATO before the Chequers meeting. The Prime Minister continued that it was counter-productive to try to find ways to finesse the point about negotiations. The fact was that Britain and the United States were not prepared to agree to negotiations and it would be much better to be clear about this. There had been an excellent editorial in the Wall Street Journal today, which summed up her views very well. She was not at all happy with the idea of omitting any references to keeping weapons up-to-date from the passage on SNF in the Comprehensive Concept: NATO must face up to its obligations. In general, she was reaching the conclusion it would be better to stay where we were than move to a less satisfactory position. Mr. Van den Broek, who seemed generally rather taken aback by the Prime Minister's reaction, said that Mr. Lubbers would be in touch again following his visit to Washington.

The Prime Minister has asked me to send a message to General Scowcroft, informing him of what the Dutch are up to and urging the Americans to give them no encouragement. If you would like to provide a draft, I should be grateful to have it tomorrow. But I am equally content to do it myself.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SNF : GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY
1. SNF REMAINS AT THE CENTRE OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN THE FRG. BROAD CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF COALITION'S POSITION. CONFIDENCE THAT GERMAN INTERESTS WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN A COMPROMISE OF SOME KIND AT NATO SUMMIT. KOHL'S APPARENT ATTITUDE (PARA 8).

DETAIL
2. SNF CONTINUES TO BE THE MAJOR TALKING POINT FOR POLITICIANS AND PRESS. THERE ARE REPORTS OF VISITS ON 2 MAY BY KOHL TO ROME AND GENSCHER TO PARIS. DE MITA IS REPORTED TO HAVE GIVEN KOHL HIS SUPPORT AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE NATO SUMMIT WOULD FIND A COMPROMISE. DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN ROME, KOHL SAID THAT IF THERE WERE PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, HE COULD SEE NO REASON WHY THERE SHOULD NOT BE SNF DISARMAMENT TOO. THIS MAY SUPPORT THE ITALIAN CLAIM (ROME TELNO 309) THAT KOHL ACCEPTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PROGRESS ON CFE. BUT KOHL'S WORDS WERE IMPRECISE. GENSCHER HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT FRANCE SHARED BONN'S CONCERN OVER THE WARSAW PACT'S SNF SUPERIORITY AND REFERRED TO STATEMENTS BY MITTERRAND THAT THE MODERNISATION DECISION WAS NOT URGENT. BUT PREVIOUS REPORTS NOTE THAT BONN CANNOT CLAIM FRANCE'S GENERAL SUPPORT.

3. IN INTERVIEWS, GENSCHER HAS WARNED COALITION POLITICIANS NOT TO QUESTION THE COMPROMISE COALITION PAPER. HE SAID THAT IN THE CURRENT NATO DECISION-MAKING PROCESS THE FRG HAD A ''DECISIVE WORD'': BONN MADE THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND SNF WERE DEPLOYED IN THE FRG.

4. ONE MAJOR THEME OF MEDIA COMMENT IS GERMANY'S CLAIM TO A SPECIAL INTEREST IN SNF: CDU PARLIAMENTARY LEADER DREGGER HAS STATED THAT THE UK AND US WERE IN THE FORTUNATE POSITION THAT THEY COULD NOT BE

HIT BY SNF. GERMAN RESENTMENT AT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ''FIREBREAK'' POLICY OF 1987 IS ANOTHER: LOTHAR RUEHL, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMS IN DIE WELT (CONSERVATIVE) THAT THIS PROMPTED THE FRG REACTION TO SNF. THEO SOMMER IN DIE ZEIT (LEFT-WING) LEAVES THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ''FIREBREAK'' POLICY WAS A MEANS OF LIMITING NUCLEAR WAR TO CENTRAL EUROPE. CONCERN CONTINUES TO BE EXPRESSED, EG IN TV DOCUMENTARIES AND IN DER SPIEGEL, ABOUT THE RECENT WINTEX SCENARIO. THE US IS INDICATED (WITH REFERENCE TO THE ''DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE'' REPORT) FOR WANTING TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WAR TO EUROPE AND LEAVE THE SUPERPOWERS UNSCATHED.

5. A COUPLE OF NEWSPAPERS REPLAY US PRESS REPORTS OF A US COMPROMISE PROPOSAL (MODERNISATION, UNILATERAL NATO REDUCTIONS, CHALLENGE WARSAW PACT TO MATCH). THE GERMAN PRESS AGENCY CARRIES THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DENIAL OF A NEW INITIATIVE.

6. SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (INDEPENDENT CENTRE) SEES SIGNS OF READINESS FOR COMPROMISE. ALLIANCE UNITY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE TIMING OF THE BEGINNING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THE COMPROMISE SHOULD CONSIST OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS, LINKED TO PROGRESS IN CFE. HANDELSBLATT (FREE TRADE) COMMENTS THAT BONN'S POSITION MUST BE RESPECTED AS THAT OF A SOVEREIGN MEMBER OF AN ALLIANCE OF FREE STATES. LOOKING AFTER DOMESTIC INTERESTS IN NATO IS NOT A NOVELTY, AS EXPERIENCE WITH ARMS COOPERATION SHOWS. RHEINISCHER POST (PRO CDU) EXPECTS NATO TO REACH A COMPROMISE LINKING THE START OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS TO A POSSIBLE MODERNISATION, AFTER 1992.

COMMENT

7. REPORTING ON SNF CONTINUES TO BE PROFUSE, BUT THERE IS AN IMPRESSION OF TREADING WATER. GERMAN COMMENTATORS AGREE THAT THE COALITION POSITION ENJOYS WIDE SUPPORT NOT ONLY IN THE FRG, BUT ALSO AMONG THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN ALLIES. KOHL AND GENSCHER ARE REGARDED AS STICKING UP FOR GERMAN INTERESTS AGAINST THE US AND UK. THERE IS NO SENSE OF PANIC: RATHER CONFIDENCE THAT THE NATO SUMMIT WILL REACH A COMPROMISE TAKING ACCOUNT OF GERMAN VIEWS.

8. KOHL MAY BE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A COMPROMISE LINKING THE START OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS TO TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN CFE. BUT THERE IS NO (NO) SIGN OF HIS BEING WILLING TO ABANDON THE AIM OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS. HE MUST BE HOPING THAT THE NATO SUMMIT WILL BOTH RESTORE ATLANTIC UNITY AND DEMONSTRABLY PAY HEED TO GERMAN INTERESTS. HE COULD THEN RESUME GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE FRG'S MAJOR ALLIES WHILE PRESERVING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL GAIN.

File (MRM) JDBAGJ/AEL/AEK

SUBJECT
cc MASTER.

cc MOD
CO
PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF

Thank you for your letter of 3 May about SNF. The Prime Minister duly had a brief discussion with the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary this afternoon.

The Prime Minister said that we should stand firmly on the position which she had set out in her message to President Bush, that is confirmation of existing NATO statements on modernisation, including support for the US development programme for FOTL, and rejection of negotiations on SNF. We had already made our concession by agreeing not to press for a decision at the forthcoming NATO Summit on deployment of FOTL. She had seen Washington telegram no 1209, which provided clear evidence that the United States Administration at the highest level was equally holding firm. In the circumstances, it would be a great mistake to start to consider, let alone discuss with the Americans, fall-back language. That would only create the impression that we were ready for compromise and would encourage those in the United States Administration who might be similarly inclined. All our efforts should be devoted to encouraging the Americans to stand firm and leaving them in no doubt of our determination to do so.

The Foreign Secretary said that his anxiety was that the US position might weaken. There would be those, even in the White House, who would be fearful of disagreement at the Summit. We ought to have some idea of what the least bad solution on SNF negotiations would be so that we had a bottom-line. The Prime Minister said that she doubted whether President Bush would want to return from a NATO Summit saying that he had backed down from his predecessor's position. She wished it to be quite clear that she did not accept, and would not wish us to propose, the sort of formula suggested at the top of page 3 of your letter. If the Americans did begin to weaken, then obviously there would be a new situation. But all our efforts must go into avoiding that.

MRM

There was no discussion at the meeting of the suggestions in your letter for action with other NATO countries. I judge, however, that the Prime Minister would agree that Sir Christopher Mallaby should pass the enclosed paragraph for the Summit Declaration - somewhat amended from your text - to Herr Teltschik. I also judge that she would be ready to send the proposed message to President Mitterrand in the revised form which I enclose.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PARAGRAPH FOR SUMMIT DECLARATION

For the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the concept of preventing war through deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will need to be kept up to date where necessary. This includes a continuing requirement for land-, sea- and air-based nuclear systems in Europe. A third zero for land-based missiles is therefore not acceptable.

LANCE will become obsolete in 1995 and a deployment decision on a successor will be needed in 1991/92. In order to keep open the necessary options, we reaffirm our support for US efforts to develop a follow-on to LANCE.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

As you know, I met with Helmut Kohl over the weekend, principally to discuss the question of short-range nuclear forces. I continue to believe that at the NATO Summit the Alliance should indicate clearly that up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces, including land, sea and air-based systems, will continue to be required in Europe for the foreseeable future. A deployment decision will not be needed until 1992. But in the meantime, the Alliance should support US efforts to develop the necessary land and air-based systems. This does no more than repeat decisions and conclusions already agreed by the Alliance and we must not resile from them.

I am, however, particularly concerned at the following elements of the German position which, I imagine, must similarly alarm you:

- By saying that land, sea and air-based systems are 'under the existing circumstances' needed in Europe it implies that they may soon not be. I do not believe that adequate and effective nuclear deterrence could be sustained without land-based systems.

- By calling for a mandate in the Comprehensive Concept for negotiations on SNF missiles aimed at equal ceilings, the German position sets us on the slippery

slope to a third zero (which is not explicitly excluded by the German paper).

- The same arguments apply to negotiations on nuclear artillery. Indeed if negotiations were to include artillery as well as missiles, and thus nuclear warheads as well as delivery vehicles, the technical as well as political pressures for air-launched weapons to be included as well would be enormous.

- Linking the introduction of FOTL to disarmament negotiations implies that a successful outcome to CFE would allow NATO to dispose of its SNF missiles. This is not so: they remain vital for implementing NATO's agreed strategy.

Although France is not of course directly involved in the modernisation of NATO's short-range nuclear forces, the prospect of SNF negotiations carries dangers for all of us, not least because the Russians would inevitably try to include British and French sub-strategic measures as well. I hope, therefore, that you will be willing to use your influence with Helmut - as I have tried to use mine - to dissuade his Government from the damaging path on which they are embarked. I continue to hope that if his main friends make known their concerns clearly, we can achieve a satisfactory outcome at the Summit.

His Excellency le President Mitterrand, G.C.B.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

3 May 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF

Following the Prime Minister's discussions with Signor De Mita, Mr Lubbers and Herr Kohl, the Foreign Secretary believes that it is now time to take stock on how to secure our objectives on SNF modernisation at the NATO Summit. The following comments are intended as background to the ministerial discussion this afternoon.

On modernisation, the Prime Minister's discussion with Herr Kohl suggests that there is still a reasonable prospect of securing an outcome based on the key points already agreed within the Alliance:

- an identified need for land-based and air-launched theatre nuclear forces in Europe; no third zero; therefore the need to update these capabilities for the 90s;

- a deployment decision to be taken in 1992; ergo Alliance support for US development programmes in order to keep the option open meanwhile.

Such an outcome would represent a significant concession by us and the Americans in that we would not be insisting on a deployment decision now; but it would be adequate to keep modernisation on track. Possible language on modernisation which might be offered to Chancellor Kohl is enclosed (see below).

On the arms control dimension, the position is, if anything, more worrying than we feared. Whatever his private thoughts, Herr Kohl now seems committed to SNF negotiations. He is unlikely to settle for unilateral cuts and a challenge to the Soviet Union to match NATO levels. To avoid defeat in the eyes of German public opinion, he will seek a perspective for negotiations in the longer term. Herr Kohl will try to hold out for the inclusion of the word "negotiations". He may seek to make reaffirmation of previous Alliance language conditional on major concessions by the US and ourselves on negotiations. This would not be a good deal for us and should be rejected. But in view of Chancellor Kohl's assurance to you that he stood by NATO decisions, and his willingness to consider a formula which lends support to the FOTL development

programme, we may be able to achieve an adequate position on modernisation without paying his price on arms control. And, if there are limits, as there are, on the extent to which the three main allies can secure the kind of explicit German commitment to modernisation which seemed possible only a few weeks ago, there are even clearer limits to German ability to commit these three allies (among others) to a negotiation. For the Alliance to be committed to the prospect of negotiations, all would need to agree. During the next four weeks the problem will, therefore, be how to consolidate the modernisation track without offering hostages to arms control.

So far, the Americans have stood firm in resisting negotiations. But they will come under conflicting pressures. They will not want to have Summit conclusions which appear to go back on those reached at the Reykjavik and Brussels meetings under President Reagan. But they will equally want to avoid a row at the Summit. They may be anxious to try to bridge the gulf between our position and that of the FRG and their Belgian, Norwegian, Danish, Luxembourg, Greek, Spanish and Canadian supporters. It is significant that the Americans, in tabling their language in Brussels, have not included the three points which we put to them two weeks ago. There therefore remains the risk that the Administration will compromise with the Germans in the hope of salvaging the Summit and buttressing Kohl's position. They may be tempted to look favourably on the Dutch proposal that the Alliance should "assess specific issues to be addressed in future negotiations" (copy of the text they have circulated for inclusion in the Comprehensive Concept is enclosed), although up to now they have been robust in opposing all mention of "negotiations".

Against this background, the Foreign Secretary thinks we need to have a clear view of what we could and could not contemplate and what our tactics should be.

The Germans may try to get round the argument on "negotiations" by pushing the idea that a high level group should draft an arms control mandate after the Summit. The Foreign Secretary considers that we should refuse to embark on any discussion of such a group. On this aspect we should go no further than agreement that the North Atlantic Council should continue to review all aspects of the Comprehensive Concept, possibly with special reference to SNF. This would ensure that SNF would continue to be considered along with all other arms control developments.

If, following the Prime Minister's message to President Bush, it looks as if the Americans are disposed to try to get an agreement in advance of the Summit, there are obvious tactical advantages in continuing to say that we will argue the issue out at the Summit if need be. But we want to avoid a situation in which the Americans make a move ahead of the

Summit and in a bilateral approach with the Germans, leaving us alone in arguing for our position. FCO and MOD officials are in Washington for pol/mil talks this week. Those contacts will help us to assess the American position.

An acceptable arms control perspective, which stops short of negotiations, may be worth considering if it prevents this issue remaining an open wound in the Alliance until 1991/92. Against the risk of a US-German deal, we may need to be ready to suggest language committing NATO, for example, to review, after the Soviet Union has come down to NATO's SNF levels and agreed to significant "concrete results" in CFE, the scope for further measures to reduce sub-strategic systems. The crucial element here will be to leave open whether such measures would be unilateral or multilateral.

We also need to continue to take action with other NATO countries as follows:

(i) The Netherlands. Although their position on arms control is far from sound, they have a crucial role if we are to avoid the impression that this is an issue between the Anglo-Saxons and the rest of the integrated structure of NATO. The Foreign Secretary intends, therefore, to keep in very close contact with Mr Van den Broek.

(ii) France. Although not directly involved, the French are also potentially important allies. French officials have been commenting on the German arms control position in apocalyptic terms. We tried to take advantage of this by ensuring that M. Dumas was fully informed of our position ahead of his own meeting with Herr Genscher in Bonn yesterday. Our assessment, backed indiscreetly by the French Ambassador here, is that we should also seek to involve President Mitterrand in a helpful way. Although he is a doubtful ally on modernisation, it would be worth trying to enlist his support against the German proposals on arms control. I enclose the text of a possible message.

(iii) The Federal Republic. In trying to make common cause with the US, France and Netherlands, we should keep in mind Herr Woerner's advice that any public suggestion of bullying Herr Kohl will merely harden German opposition. We should, therefore, continue to deploy our case vigorously in private without casting public doubts on Bonn's reliability as an ally. In the Prime Minister's next contact with Herr Kohl, due on 5 May, our tactic might be to try to clinch the key minimum formulae on SNF modernisation. Once this has been done, we will be better placed to soften up the German position on arms control. The Foreign Secretary, therefore, suggests that it may now make sense to follow up Herr Kohl's

request to see the Prime Minister's formulation in writing. On that basis, Sir Christopher Mallaby could pass the enclosed text to Herr Teltschik before the proposed telephone conversation with Herr Kohl on 5 May.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

JD3 AEL
C/O mem

PARAGRAPH FOR SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. For the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the concept of preventing war through deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will need to be kept up to date where necessary. This includes a continuing requirement for land-, sea- and air-based nuclear systems in Europe. A third zero for land-based missiles is therefore not acceptable.

2. A deployment decision will ~~be~~ needed to be taken in 1991/2 ~~in order to prevent land-based systems from becoming~~ when LANCE will become obsolete. In order to keep open the necessary options, we reaffirm our support for US efforts to develop a follow-on to LANCE.

GEHEIM

Nederlandse suggestie voor paragraaf over SNF-wapenbeheersing in het Comprehensive Concept.

" It is evident that NATO would gain substantial security benefits from a large reduction in the threat from the WTO's short-range land-based missile force. However, present Soviet overtures to negotiations clearly indicate the objective of broadening their scope to all American and other NATO nuclear weapons in Europe with a view to their complete elimination.

In the short term, therefore, arms control in the field of land-based missiles should be unilateral and applied by way of mutual self-restraint in defence planning. The Alliance will restructure its SNF-posture on the basis of the minimum requirements of its strategy and will unilaterally reduce its overall stockpile i.a. through a shift of emphasis from shorter to longer ranges. The WTO is to be challenged to translate its self-proclaimed doctrine of "sufficiency" into fact and to start reducing its overcapacity in SNF-missiles down to the Alliance's level. Such action would prepare the ground for initiating, in a further phase, negotiations on equal ceilings to even lower levels. Ceilings on such lower levels, providing for further mutual reductions but not elimination, could be considered in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance in Europe.

In the meantime the Alliance will assess (in the SCG) specific issues to be addressed in future negotiations such as the levels to be set, the items to be limited (launchers, missiles, complete systems), the problem posed by the dual capability of systems involved, verification and other relevant questions. "

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

DEPARTMENT: PRIME MINISTER TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

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~~POGMD~~

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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TO:

Copies to:

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

JDBAEK (c/o mem).

SUBJECT:

As you know, I met with Helmut Kohl over the weekend, principally to discuss the question of short-range nuclear forces. I continue to believe that at the NATO Summit the Alliance should indicate clearly that up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces, including land, sea and air-based systems, will continue to be required in Europe for the foreseeable future. A deployment decision will not be needed until 1992. But in the meantime, the Alliance should support US efforts to develop the necessary land and air-based systems. ~~Failure to agree on this would leave the Alliance looking weak and would offer the Soviet Union too much scope for exploiting our indecision.~~ I do not exclude the possibility of agreeing with Helmut a position on these lines on SNF modernisation which would leave the modernisation process firmly on track after the Summit.

Pte
This does no more than repeat decisions & conclusions already agreed by the Alliance, and we must

~~All these repeat decisions & conclusions~~ positions already agreed in NATO & ~~that it would be sheer folly~~ ~~to state~~ visible from Gen.

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DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
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PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

I am, however, particularly concerned at the following elements of the German position which, I imagine, must similarly alarm you:

- By saying that land, sea and air-based systems are 'under the existing circumstances' needed in Europe it implies that they may soon not be. I do not believe that adequate and effective nuclear deterrence could be sustained without land-based systems.

- By calling for a mandate in the Comprehensive Concept for negotiations on SNF missiles aimed at equal ceilings, the German position sets us on the slippery slope to a third zero (which is not explicitly excluded by the German paper).

- The same arguments apply to negotiations on nuclear artillery. Indeed if negotiations were to include artillery as well as missiles, and thus nuclear warheads as well as delivery vehicles, the technical as well as political pressures for air-launched weapons to be included as well would be enormous.

- Linking the introduction of FOTL to disarmament negotiations implies that a successful outcome to CFE would allow NATO to dispose of its SNF missiles. This is not so: they remain vital for implementing NATO's agreed strategy.

DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Although France is not directly involved in the modernisation of NATO's short-range nuclear forces, the prospect of SNF negotiations carries dangers for all of us, not least because the Russians would try to manoeuvre so as to include British and French sub-strategic systems as well.

I hope that you will be willing to use your considerable influence with Helmut to dissuade his Government from the damaging path on which they are embarked. I continue to hope that if his main friends make known their concerns clearly, we can achieve a satisfactory outcome at the Summit.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mrs. Ponsonby

SNF: CHANCELLOR KOHL'S TELEPHONE CALL

Chancellor Kohl has suggested postponing your talk on the telephone until 1630 on Monday 8 May. I hope this is acceptable.

CDP

Yes ok

CHARLES POWELL

3 May 1989

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT TO ROME: SNF

SUMMARY

1. ITALIANS CLAIM KOHL ACCEPTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF SHOULD BE MADE SUBJECT TO PROGRESS ON CFE AND THAT A THIRD ZERO SHOULD BE RULED OUT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. DE MITA HIMSELF WOULD BE PREPARED TO STATE ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IF SUCH SUPPORT IS NECESSARY.

DETAIL

2. VATTANI (DE MITA'S DIPLOMATIC COUNSELLOR) TELEPHONED ME LAST NIGHT TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF DE MITA'S DISCUSSION OF SNF WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 2 MAY. HE SAID KOHL HAD BEEN VEXED BY THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS VIEWS. HE INSISTED STRONGLY THAT THE FRG'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS STILL FIRMLY BASED ON THE TWO PILLARS OF NATO AND EUROPE. BUT IF ARMS REDUCTION WAS ON THE AGENDA, THE GERMAN PUBLIC WOULD SIMPLY NOT ACCEPT THAT SNF SHOULD NOT BE ON THE LIST.

3. VATTANI SAID THAT DE MITA HAD POINTED OUT TO KOHL THE CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE POSTURE OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT A THIRD ZERO WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND HAD ARGUED THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BE UNDERTAKEN ON SNF, THEY COULD NOT BE EMBARKED UPON UNTIL SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON CFE. ACCORDING TO VATTANI, KOHL HAD ACCEPTED THESE POINTS. THIS WAS THE NUB OF A VERY LONG DISCUSSION.

4. VATTANI SAID THAT DE MITA HAD ASKED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS OUTCOME. HE HAD UNDERLINED THAT IF THE POINT WERE REACHED WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF COULD BE UNDERTAKEN, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT A THIRD ZERO WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE OPTION. DE MITA FELT THAT IT WAS A PLUS THAT KOHL HAD ACCEPTED THAT.

5. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BALANCE, HOWEVER, KOHL HAD MADE CLEAR THAT AT THE NATO SUMMIT HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AGREE THAT SUPPORT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED FOR THE US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR MODERNISING SNF. THIS WAS A US DECISION. THE ALLIES HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN PROGRAMMES OF THIS KIND IN THE PAST. VATTANI SAID THAT DE MITA WANTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO KNOW THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH US ON THAT POINT IF IT PROVED NECESSARY. BUT THE INFORMATION HE WAS RECEIVING FROM WASHINGTON WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT INSIST ON IT. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT NO DECISION TO DEPLOY WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN BEFORE 1992 AND UNTIL THEN THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES. DE MITA, FOR HIS PART, WOULD PREFER THAT ALLIED SUPPORT SHOULD BE LEFT IMPLICIT. I CONTESTED THIS BUT UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON WHAT DE MITA HAD SAID.

6. VATTANI SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT DE MITA WOULD LIKE TO REMAIN IN TOUCH ON THIS QUESTION. HE FELT THAT A GOOD DEAL OF WORK STILL REMAINED TO BE DONE BEFORE 29 MAY IF THE ALLIANCE WAS TO REACH A FIRM COMMON POSITION. BUT AFTER HIS TALK YESTERDAY WITH KOHL HE WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS COULD BE DONE.

THOMAS

YYYY

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN

9(A-B)

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE SECRETARIES

The Foreign and Defence Secretaries have asked to see you tomorrow to discuss the way ahead on SNF following your meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

The way ahead is actually quite clear from your message to President Bush. Basically we stand on agreed NATO positions. We need to nail down the three points on modernisation (continuing requirement for SNF, keep up to date, support for the US development programme): and at the same time, agree to challenge the Russians to reduce their SNF unilaterally down to NATO levels, while holding out the prospect of further reduction in NATO's nuclear artillery once the decision on modernisation of SNF is taken.

I think the Foreign Secretary's purpose is to prepare you to go further than that (he will be writing with his views overnight). The FCO's assessment is that the Americans will try to negotiate an agreed text with the Germans before the Summit and may be ready to envisage further concessions to achieve that. We therefore need to consider what is our bottom line.

I do not know what they will propose. But - just to warn you - I imagine that the following will be some of the options they will wish to examine:

- repitition of the Reykjavik formula, repeated in the NATO Summit Communiqué ("in conjunction with"). We interpret it to mean reductions not negotiations. But since it is on the record we can hardly refuse to repeat it;

- acceptance of the possibility of further reductions (not negotiations) in NATO SNF, provided the Russians meet certain conditions, eg that they first reduce their SNF to NATO levels and there are 'concrete results' in the

B

conventional force talks;

- acceptance of the possibilities of negotiations to establish common ceilings for SNF (by implications below NATO's present levels) once there is conventional balance and chemical weapons have been eliminated;

- acceptance of the possibility of negotiations to establish common ceilings for SNF, once the Russians have reduced their SNF to NATO levels and there have been 'concrete results' in the conventional force talks;

- agreement that discussion should continue in NATO on the possible scope for eventual SNF negotiations;

- establishment of a special working group in NATO to consider the mandate for such negotiations.

These are some of the options which occur to me. None of them are palatable and personally I don't see any need to adopt any of them. We have already made our concession by agreeing not to press for a deployment decision at the Summit. Moreover, once you agree a bottom line, it seems rapidly to become our negotiating position. So if any concessions have to be made, it should only be much later.

It seems to me that the most logical position is to say that you can only determine the scope for reductions if any in NATO's SNF once we have decided on modernisation: and therefore the most you can do is to agree to look at the possibility of reductions/negotiations in 1992 when the modernisation decision is taken. If we postpone one decision, we postpone the other.

C.D.P

C. D. POWELL

2 May 1989

PM3ANI

(2)

PRIME MINISTER

SNF

You were asking why it is called the third zero. The answer is: the first zero was missiles between 1,000-1,500km in range: the second zero was 500-1,000km - even though these two were in fact treated in a single negotiation.

CDP

Charles Powell

2 May 1989

MJ2DNI

CDP (2)
MJZONJ
cc PC
Pfile
Prime Minister
CBM 2/5

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 May 1989

nf

SNF

The Italian Ambassador telephoned me this afternoon about Signor De Mita's talks with Chancellor Kohl in Rome today. Signor De Mita had wanted the Prime Minister to be informed about them immediately.

Signor De Mita's impression was that Chancellor Kohl was very firm in excluding a third zero. He had also said that, if the NATO Summit decided to postpone the modernisation decision until 1992, he would be able to conduct his election campaign on the basis of the need to strengthen NATO. Signor De Mita regarded these as positive points. He had put to Chancellor Kohl the same idea that he had mentioned to the Prime Minister, namely that while the NATO Summit might agree to SNF negotiations, such negotiations would not actually start until there had been concrete results in the talks on conventional force reductions. He had the impression that Chancellor Kohl would not altogether exclude this concept.

Signor De Mita's conclusion was that a solution embracing the points above could avoid a damaging split at the Summit, provided all concerned were prepared to work for them. I commented that Signor De Mita would recall that the Prime Minister had made clear that we were not prepared to agree to early SNF negotiations: we would not, therefore, regard the sort of outcome which he envisaged for the NATO Summit as acceptable.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RTS

The National Archives

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FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

SNF : VAN DEN BROEK CONTACTS GENSCHER AND BAKER

1. WHEN I SAW POST (PRIVATE SECRETARY TO VAN DEN BROEK) TO GIVE HIM THE INFORMATION IN YOUR TELEGRAM 300 TO BONN, HE TOLD ME THAT VAN DEN BROEK HAD SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE TO BOTH GENSCHER AND BAKER DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS.

2. GENSCHER HAD TAKEN A LINE VERY CLOSE TO WHAT HE HAD SAID ON 26 APRIL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE HAD EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. HE HAD SPOKEN AS IF THE GERMAN PAPER WAS A STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION, BUT ALTHOUGH PRESSED HE HAD MADE NO CONCESSION ON THE SUBSTANCE. HE HAD REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE WHICH KOHL WAS ATTACHING TO HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. VAN DEN BROEK HAD FOUND BAKER PESSIMISTIC. BAKER REGARDED THE GERMAN POSITION ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS AS A FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT AT THE NATO SUMMIT IF THE GERMANS WERE NOT READY TO BACK OFF. HE HAD DESCRIBED BUSH AS BEING RESOLUTE ON THIS QUESTION AND READY TO ACCEPT A ''BUSTED SUMMIT'' (BAKER'S EXPRESSION) RATHER THAN CONCEDE THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS WHICH THE GERMANS WERE CALLING FOR. BAKER HAD ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO CONTINUE ITS BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE GERMANS BUT WOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE UNTIL THEY HAD SEEN WHAT WAS IN THE COALITION STATEMENT.

4. POST COMMENTED THAT LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK HAD STILL NOT LOST HOPE OF FINDING A WAY THROUGH. THEY THOUGHT IT BETTER NOT TO CRITICISE KOHL AND GENSCHER TOO STRONGLY IN PUBLIC, IN PART BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT GENSCHER RELISHED A DEGREE OF ISOLATION, JUDGING THIS TO BE POPULAR IN ELECTORAL TERMS. MEANWHILE VAN DEN BROEK STILL THOUGHT A FORMULA FOR THE NATO SUMMIT COULD BE FOUND CONTAINING AN ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT OF SOME KIND. THE DUTCH WERE CONSIDERING

CIRCULATING THE LATEST VERSION OF THEIR OWN PAPER IN THE NAC NOW THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE GERMANS WERE TABLING WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS. THEY WERE CONSULTING WOERNER ABOUT THE WISDOM OF DOING THIS.

5. POST SAID THAT LUBBERS AND VAN DEN BROEK WOULD BE MEETING KOHL ON 3 MAY AS THEY WISHED TO HAVE A DIRECT DISCUSSION WITH HIM BEFORE SEEING BUSH ON 9 MAY.
JENKINS

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 18

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER 27 April 1989

SNF

If we are to follow the stand-off tactic, for which you indicated a preference in your meeting with the Foreign Secretary yesterday, it is critical that we should inform the Americans of our proposed tactics beforehand and line them up with us. The Genscher tactic on the other side is likely to be to use the interval to gather as many allies in NATO as possible (and there are a considerable number inclined that way) and then to strike a deal bilaterally with the Americans. We for our part will have to ensure that the Americans do not break ranks and that like us they keep their distance and exert maximum pressure right up to and into the Summit. We shall need to send a suitable message to them.

PERCY CRADOCK

MT

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PL file.

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FM OTTAWA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 305
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YOUR TELNOS 164-166: SNF MODERNISATION

SUMMARY

1. CANADIAN VIEWS REMAIN MUCH AS DESCRIBED IN MY TELNO 282. MR CLARK IS LIKELY TO WRITE TO YOU, MR BAKER AND MR GENSCHER VERY SHORTLY TO EXPLAIN WHY CANADA THINKS A QUOTE TWIN TRACK UNQUOTE POLITICALLY NECESSARY AND MILITARILY SUSTAINABLE AND TO URGE THOSE MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED ON EACH SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT TO LEAVE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE.

DETAIL

2. WE PUT THE ARGUMENTS IN YOU SECOND TUR TO NOBLE (DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL BUREAU) WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS DIRECTOR (FOWELL) AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SNIDER). AFTER A FIRST RUN OVER THE GROUND NOBLE HAD TO LEAVE TO BRIEF SI TAYLOR (PUS EQUIVALENT) IN PREPARATION FOR WOERNER'S VISIT AND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH MR CLARK TONIGHT. THE LATTER HAS BEFORE HIM DRAFTS OF LETTERS TO YOU, TO BAKER AND TO GENSCHER (NOT IDENTICAL) URGING YOU AND THE OTHERS NOT TO ALLOW POLARISATION OF THE ARGUMENT ABOUT SNF MODERNISATION TO REACH THE POINT WHERE AN AGREED DECISION AT THE NATO SUMMIT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE. MR CLARK IS HOWEVER DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE ONGOING PARLIAMENTARY ROW OVER THE HANDLING OF THE CANADIAN BUDGET LEAKS (MY TELNO 298 NOT TO ALL) AND MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SIGN THE LETTER UNTIL 28 APRIL.

3. THE LETTERS WILL ALSO EXPLAIN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEW ON THE SNF ISSUE, ON THE LINES OF CLARK'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING IN PARLIAMENT ON 25 APRIL: QUOTE THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE TOGETHER MODERNISATION AND NEGOTIATION BUILDING ON THE KIND OF SOLIDARITY THAT HAS PROVEN EFFECTIVE IN THE PAST. WE BELIEVE THAT THAT KIND OF SOLIDARITY ... CAN HELP THE WEST AND HELP THE EAST MOVE TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE REDUCTIONS IN OVERALL LEVELS UNQUOTE. NOBLE EXPECTED THAT CLARK'S LETTER WOULD GO ON TO MAKE THE POINTS REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 282 (INCLUDING CANADA'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO THE THIRD ZERO).

4. THE DEA OFFICIALS WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE POINTS WE MADE ABOUT THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FRG PAPER AND GRATEFUL FOR THE COMMENTARY IN YOUR THIRD TUR (A COPY OF WHOSE CONTENTS WE LEFT WITH THEM IN THE FORM OF A BOUT DE PAPIER). NOBLE WAS INITIALLY INCLINED HOWEVER TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE PRIMARILY TO BLAME FOR BRINGING THE ARGUMENT INTO THE OPEN. WE FIRMLY REBUTTED THIS, POINTING OUT THAT AT EACH STAGE, BEGINNING WITH KOHL'S 10 FEBRUARY INTERVIEW, IT WAS THE GERMANS WHO HAD RESILED WITH INCREASING OPENNESS FROM AGREED POSITIONS. NOBLE CONCEDED THIS POINT. BUT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE ALSO INCLINED TO BLAME THE US AND UK FOR MAKING MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GERMANS BY INTRANSIGENCE: WE SHOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO NEGOTIATE. WE REPLIED THAT EXPERIENCE IN MANY FIELDS SHOWED THAT, ONCE ON A SLIPPERY SLOPE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO STOP SLIDING. THE CANADIANS REITERATETED THEIR VIEW THAT THE TIME TAKEN TO ESTABLISH A MANDATE FOR A NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON SNF WOULD BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE COLOUR OF THEIR MONEY ON CFE AND THAT EVEN IN THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO SIDES WERE, AS YOU HAD SUGGESTED, IRRECONCILABLE, IT DID NOT FOLLOW THAT IT WOULD BE THE WEST WHICH HAD TO GIVE WAY.

5. WE LEFT A SPEAKING NOTE BASED ON YOUR SECOND TUR, WHICH FOWELL AND SNIDER THOUGHT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN REFINING THEIR OWN POSITION. THEY AGREED THAT THE PARAMETERS WE WERE PROPOSING FOR THE NATO SUMMIT DECISION COULD HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS UNREASONABLE OR INTRANSIGENT. THEY ALSO WELCOMED THE NEWS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE SEEING LUBBERS AND DE MITA: THEY HAD FEARED THAT THE ITALIANS IN PARTICULAR MIGHT PROVE PRICKLY IF THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING MARGINALISED.

URWICK

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CANADIAN BUDGET LEAK: SSNS

SUMMARY

1. LATE ON 26 APRIL A TV STATION REVEALED CONTENTS OF SUMMARY VERSION OF CANADIAN BUDGET, DUE TO BE PRESENTED ON AFTERNOON OF 27 APRIL. DECISIONS INCULDE CANCELLATION OF PLAN TO PURCHASE SSNS, AS WELL AS SHARP TAX INCREASES. POLITICAL AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THIS MAJOR LEAK UNCLEAR.

DETAIL

2. LATE ON 26 APRIL A COPY OF PAMPHLET SUMMARISING CANADIAN BUDGET PROPOSALS FELL INTO HANDS OF LOCAL TV NETWORK, WHICH LOST NO TIME IN BROADCASTING THE MAIN POINTS. THESE INCLUDE:

(A) CUMULATIVE REDUCTION OF DEFENCE BUDGET BY DLRS 2.7 BILLION OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS AND CANCELLATION OF PLANS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES,

(B) ADDITIONAL TAXATION DESIGNED TO RAISE BETWEEN DLRS 6-9 BILLION IN A FULL YEAR, THROUGH NEW TAXES ON LARGE CORPORATIONS (DLRS 1 BILLION), INCREASED SURTAX ON HIGHER INCOMES, INCREASED TAXES ON ALCOHOL, CIGARETTES AND GASOLINE,

(C) REDUCED SUBSIDIES ON VIA RAIL (PASSENGER SERVICES),

(D) CANCELLATION OF FEDERAL SUPPORT TO PROVINCIAL CHILD DAY CARE SCHEMES.

3. THESE MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO HALVE THE ANNUAL DEFICIT BY 1993. HOWEVER THE OUT-TURN FOR 1989 IS STILL EXPECTED TO BE A DEFICIT OF DLRS 30.5 BILLION (UP OVER DLRS 1 BILLION FROM 1988).

4. THE PREMATURE REVELATION OF THESE PLANS PRESENTS THE GOVERNMENT WITH A MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS. THEIR ATTEMPT TO SUMMON PARLIAMENT INTO IMMEDIATE SESSION WAS BLOCKED BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, WHICH DEMANDED THE RESIGNATION OF THE FINANCE MINISTER AND PRESENTATION OF A NEW BUDGET. THE OUTCOME ON BOTH ISSUES

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IS UNCLEAR. A BUDGET LEAK AS THIS SCALE APPEARS TO BE UNPRECEDENTED.

URWICK

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SNF MODERNISATION: ITALIAN POSITION

SUMMARY

1. ANDREOTTI DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF, BUT MAKES THESE CONDITIONAL ON PROGRESS IN THE CFE TALKS. HE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE THIRD ZERO, BUT GIVES A STRONG HINT THAT THIS IS NOT A REALISTIC OPTION FOR THE ITALIANS.

DETAIL

2. IN THE COURSE OF A SENATE DEBATE ON THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT THIS MORNING, FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI DELIVERED A SPEECH WHICH INCLUDED A SECTION ON SNF MODERNISATION. THE MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN NATO ALLIES, EG ON THE NEED TO KEEP SNF ''FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE'', ON THE DESIRABILITY OF REDUCING THE MINIMUM THRESHOLD OF SUCH WEAPONS AND THE NEED TO KEEP WHATEVER RESIDUAL FORCES ARE CONSIDERED NECESSARY UP-TO-DATE.

(B) ITALY BELIEVES THAT THE REDUCTION IN THE THREAT MUST LEAD TO A REAPPRAISAL OF NUCLEAR AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THEREFORE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, EVEN IF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PROPOSED RECENTLY BY THE WARSAW PACT.

(C) HOWEVER, SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MUST DEPEND ON ''SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES'' IN THE CFE TALKS. ONLY THEN WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE RESIDUAL SNF LEVELS.

(D) THE MODERNISATION ISSUE IS AN ''ARTIFICIAL PROBLEM'' THAT HAS BEEN ''UNDULY DRAMATIZED'' BOTH BY THOSE WHO SEEK TO BUILD UP THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR SECURITY AND THOSE WHO SEEK TO MAXIMISE PUBLIC FEARS ABOUT THEM. ITALY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SNF MODERNISATION IS AN URGENT PROBLEM, SINCE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT REPLACING SYSTEMS DUE TO BECOME OBSOLETE IN THE MID-1990S.

(E) THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A ''LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT'' BETWEEN THE FRG AND ITALY ON THIS ISSUE. ITALY UNDERSTANDS

FULLY FRG SENSITIVITIES AND HOPES. LIKE THE FRG, THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF WILL TAKE PLACE ''SOON''. ITALY HOPES ALSO THAT SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IN THE CFE TALKS WILL FACILITATE THE COORDINATION OF A COMMON NATO LINE.

(F) ITALY CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE SNF ISSUE DOES NOT UNDERMINE ALLIANE SOLIDARITY.

COMMENT

3. I WAS TOLD BY BOTTAI (SECRETARY-GENERAL, MFA) THIS MORNING THAT GENSCHER HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ANDREOTTI BY TELEPHONE TO LET HIM KNOW WHAT TODAY'S FRG STATEMENT WOULD CONTAIN. WHEN ASKED WHAT ITALY'S POSITION WOULD BE, ANDREOTTI HAD EXPLAINED ((CHARACTERISTICALLY) THAT THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS IN BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES. IN PARTICULAR, AS REGARDS NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF WEAPONS, ITALY DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY BUT WOULD WANT TO SUBORDINATE AN EVENTUAL DECISION ON THIS TO PROGRESS ON REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. GENSCHER HAD CLAIMED THAT THE NORWEGIANS, DANES, GREEKS AND SPANIARDS WERE ALL IN FAVOUR OF EARLY NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN ANDREOTTI'S STATEMENT. IT HAS ALL BEEN SAID BEFORE, MOST RECENTLY BY DEFENCE MINISTER ZANONE IN THE NPG. ONE POSITIVE ASPECT, HOWEVER, IS THAT ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EXPLICIT REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO, ANDREOTTI DOES MENTION ''RESIDUAL SNF LEVELS'' (PARA 2C ABOVE). THIS WOULD APPEAR TO SUGGEST THAT FOR THE ITALIANS THE THIRD ZERO IS NOT AN OPTION.

15. Security Policy

This public debate in the Soviet Union also shows how much movement is occurring there. But there is also uncertainty about whether the policy of reform initiated by General Secretary Gorbachov will last and prove successful. Nobody can definitively answer this question today. Who can deny the obvious problems?

Who of us was not depressed by the recent pictures from Georgia and by those from Armenia and Azerbaijan? They show that the current leaders still use tanks and soldiers to settle conflicts. Who can therefore rule out any setbacks?

As long as the Warsaw Pact possesses superior military arsenals and security risks persist, we in the West and especially in Europe cannot unilaterally reduce and neglect our own defence capabilities and preparedness.

We continue to believe that dialogue and co-operation with the East on the basis of a secure defence capacity must remain the common strategy of the Western Alliance.

Nor shall we allow a contradiction to be construed between a secure defence capacity and progress in disarmament and arms control with a view to amputating this twofold approach of our security policy in one direction or the other.

The Alliance will therefore reaffirm its common policy at the forthcoming summit in Brussels on 30 May. In so doing we shall also be guided by the recognition gained from the four decades since the war that friendship and close partnership marked by mutual trust with the three Western allies, with the United States, France and the United Kingdom, remain of vital importance to our national interests. We have defined our position for the deliberations within the Alliance:

First: The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany endorses the Alliance's observation that there is at present no foreseeable alternative to

the concept of preventing war through deterrence based on a suitable mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces. ? Up-to-date

In the case of nuclear forces, land-, sea- and air-based systems are under the existing circumstances needed in Europe, too.

Second: The development of a follow-on system to the Lance short-range missile is a national American decision. Supports U.S. efforts

Third: Within the framework of the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, the Alliance will issue a mandate for the early commencement of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles aimed at establishing equal ceilings at lower levels, as defined by the Alliance at Reykjavik in 1987 and at Brussels in 1988.

Fourth: For nuclear artillery, too, a negotiating mandate will be included in the comprehensive concept with a view to attaining equal ceilings at radically lower levels.

Fifth: In 1992 the Alliance will decide, in the light of political and security developments and especially the results of all disarmament negotiations, on whether or not it is necessary to introduce a follow-on system to Lance into the Alliance in 1996 and hence on the production and deployment of such a system.

The decisive and crucial factors in this respect will be whether it proves possible

- to achieve greater security at lower levels of nuclear and conventional forces as a whole,

- to conclude binding agreements with the Warsaw Pact on the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action,

— attempt being made during at

- to attain, through suitable agreements, a higher degree of mutual trust on account of increased transparency and predictability of military conduct.

This position was explained by Foreign Minister Genscher and Defence Minister Stoltenberg in their talks at Washington earlier on this week. We reached agreement with our American friends that the talks will be continued.

We shall do likewise with all other partners in the Alliance. I myself shall discuss this matter with Prime Minister Thatcher on Sunday and with Prime Minister de Mita of Italy on Tuesday.

It is our firm intention to reach consensus at the NATO summit on all these questions of defence policy, disarmament and arms control. It is in our fundamental interest to maintain the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and its capacity to act.

The Alliance has time and again demonstrated its readiness for disarmament. In the last few years it has, for example, unilaterally eliminated 2,400 nuclear warheads in Europe. The Federal Government for its part decided to dispense with the 72 Pershing Ia missiles.

President Bush has announced the accelerated, unilateral withdrawal of all chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany by the end of 1990.

We would have liked to see the Soviet Union at last following these steps and above all radically reducing its 14-fold superiority in the field of short-range nuclear weapons, especially since it possesses well over 10,000 warheads in the sector of strategic nuclear missiles.

During the INF talks, the Federal Government also demanded negotiations on short-range nuclear systems with a view to eliminating the existing imbalances through deep cuts and agreeing on equal ceilings. I called for such negotiations in various letters that I sent to President Reagan from 1986 onwards, and this is reflected in the NATO communiques adopted at Reykjavik on 12 June 1987 and at Brussels in March 1988.

Everyone will understand why the Federal Government is adopting this position. On account of the range of short-range systems, the Federal Republic of Germany is more strongly affected than the other members of the Alliance. I therefore consider it natural that our friends show the same understanding for our interests as we have shown for their interests on many occasions.

END

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END

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COMMENT

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KOHL'S GOVERNMENT STATEMENT: SNF AND NATIONAL SERVICE.

SUMMARY
1. IN THE BUNDESTAG TODAY KOHL SPELLED OUT COALITION'S POSITION ON SNF, WITH A NOD IN THE DIRECTION OF US, UK AND FRANCE, AND A PROMISE TO CONSULT ALLIES. POSTPONEMENT OF 18-MONTH NATIONAL SERVICE CONFIRMED.

DETAIL.
2. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM KOHL'S SPEECH:-

- THERE IS UNCERTAINTY WHETHER GORBACHEV'S REFORM POLICY WILL LAST AND BE SUCCESSFUL. NOBODY TODAY CAN ANSWER THIS QUESTION CONCLUSIVELY. THE LASTEST PICTURES FROM GEORGIA, ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN PROVE THAT THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP STILL USES TANKS AND SOLDIERS TO SETTLE CONFLICTS. WHO CAN RULE OUT SETBACKS?

- SO LONG AS THERE CONTINUE TO BE SUPERIOR MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE WARSAW PACT AND SECURITY POLICY RISKS, WE IN THE WEST AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE CANNOT UNILATERALLY REUDUCE AND NEGLECT OUR OWN DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND DEFENCE READINESS.

- THE COMMON STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE MUST REMAIN DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF ASSURED DEFENCE CAPABILITY. WE WILL NOT ALLOW A CONTRADICTION TO BE CONSTRUCTED BETWEEN ASSURED DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, IN ORDER TO AMPUTATE, IN ONE OR OTHER DIRECTION, THIS DOUBLE APPROACH OF OUR SECURITY POLICY.

- IN THIS SPIRIT THE ALLIANCE WILL AGAIN CONFIRM ITS COMMON POLICY AT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS ON 30 MAY. WE WILL ALSO BE GUIDED THERE BY THE EXPERIENCE OF FOUR DECADES OF POST-WAR HISTORY, THAT THE FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE AND TRUSTING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES, THE USA, FRANCE AND BRITAIN, WERE, ARE AND REMAIN OF VITAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

- WE WAVE FORMULATED OUR POSITION FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE AS FOLLOWS (KOHL THEN READ OUT THE TEXT OF THE COALITION'S SNF POSITION PAPER, UNCHANGED).

- FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENCE MINISTER STOLTENBERG EXPLAINED THIS POSITION AT THEIR TALKS IN WASHINGTON AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK. WE AGREED WITH OUR AMERICAN PARTNERS TO CONTINUE THESE TALKS.

- WE ARE ALSO DOING THIS WITH ALL OTHER PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE. I MYSELF WILL SPEAK ABOUT THESE QUESTIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER ON SUNDAY, WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER DE MITA ON TUESDAY AND DUTCH PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS ON WEDNESDAY. (AFTER LAUGHTER, KOHL ADDED TO HIS PREPARED TEXT: ''I SHALL WELCOME MRS THATCHER WITH MUCH PLEASURE TO THE FRG''.)

- IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AT THE NATO SUMMIT ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS OF DEFENCE POLICY, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE AN ELEMENTARY INTEREST IN ENSURING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S COHESION AND ABILITY TO ACT IN FUTURE. THAT WAS ALWAYS OUR POLICY AND WILL REMAIN SO.

- THE ALLIANCE HAS PROVED ITS READINESS FOR DISARMAMENT AGAIN AND AGAIN. IN RECENT YEARS IT HAS UNILATERALLY REMOVED 2,400 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PART DECIDED TO GIVE UP 72 PERSHING 1AS.

- PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT BY THE END OF 1990 - LIKEWISE UNILATERALLY - ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE FRG AHEAD OF TIME.

- WE WISH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FINALLY FOLLOW THESE STEPS AND, ESPECIALLY, DRASTICALLY REDUCE ITS 14-FOLD SUPERIORITY IN SNF, PARTICULARLY AS IT HAS AVAILABLE FAR MORE THAT 10,000 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

- THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORTRANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WITH THE AIM OF REMOVING THE EXISTING IMBALANCES THROUGH DRASTIC REDUCTIONS AND AGREEING EQUAL CEILINGS. I HAVE CALLED FOR THIS REPEATEDLY IN LETTERS SINCE 1986 TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND THAT WAS REFLECTED IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUES OF 12 JUNE 1987 (REYKJAVIK) AND MARCH 1988 (BRUSSELS).

- EVERYONE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS PRECISELY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHICH TAKES THIS POSITION. THE FRG, IN VIEW OF THE RANGE OF SNF, IS MORE SEVERELY AFFECTED THAN THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE. SO FOR ME IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT OUR FRIENDS HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR INTERESTS AS WE ON MANY OCCASIONS HAVE SHOWN FOR THEM.

BUNDESWEHR.

- THE SUCCESS OF OUR DISARMAMENT EFFORTS DEPENDS ON US BEING ABLE CREDIBLY TO GUARANTEE OUR SECURITY IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS THE PEACE-KEEPING TASK OF OUR ARMED FORCES (BUNDESWEHR).

- BECAUSE OF THE LOW BIRTH-RATE YEARS THE BUNDESTAG DECIDED IN APRIL 1986, AT THE PROPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, ON THE EXTENSION OF BASIC MILITARY SERVICE FROM 15 TO 18 MONTHS FROM JUNE 1989. TO ENSURE MORE FAIRNESS, WE ALSO ARRANGED MORE FAIRLY THE TESTS OF FITNESS FOR SERVICE AND REDUCED OBSTACLES TO CALL-UP.

- IN THE MEANTIME WE KNOW THAT SINCE THEN FAR MORE POTENTIAL CONSCRIPTS CAN BE CALLED UP. IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT IT IS SENSIBLE, PRECISELY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF MILITARY FAIRNESS, TO POSTPONE THE EXTENSION OF NATIONAL SERVICE FROM 1 JUNE 1989 UNTIL 1992. FREEDOM IS NOT COST-FREE, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO DEMAND MORE

SACRIFICES FROM OUR YOUNG MEN THAN ARE REALLY NECESSARY.

- THE BUNDESWEHR WILL NOT, AS A RESULT, HAVE ONE LESS SOLDIER. WE STAND BY OUR AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THEIR MODERN TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT.

- THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES SUPPORTING IT DECLARE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE BUNDESWEHR AND OUR SOLDIERS. THEY PERFORM AN HONOURABLE SERVICE FOR PEACE AND ARE GUARANTORS OF OUR FREEDOM. I THEREFORE OPPOSE ALL ATTEMPTS MORALLY TO BELITTLE MILITARY SERVICE AS OPPOSED TO CIVIL (ALTERNATIVE) SERVICE. HERE BEFORE THE BUNDESTAG I AGAIN REJECT FORCEFULLY THE LATEST CALLS FROM WITHIN THE TRADE UNIONS FOR MASS REFUSAL OF MILITARY SERVICE. I CALL UPON THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SPD AND ESPECIALLY THE DGB (TUC-EQUIVALENT) TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES CLEARLY FROM THIS ATTEMPT TO MISUSE AN INDIVIDUAL BASIC RIGHT FOR A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST OUR ARMED FORCES.

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MY TELNO 136:

SNF MODERNIZATION: LUXEMBOURG POSITION

SUMMARY

1. KASEL FORECASTS LINES OF LIKELY LUXEMBOURG POSITION WHICH GOES SOME WAY TOWARDS GERMANS ON DEFERRING MODERNIZATION DECISIONS BUT HOLDS OUT AGAINST NEGOTIATIONS NOW.

DETAIL

2. I ASKED KASEL PRIVATELY TODAY HOW GOVERNMENT VIEWS WERE EVOLVING. HE SAID HE EXPECTED A POSITION TO BE AGREED BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK, PROBABLY AFTER THE GERMAN STATEMENT TOMORROW. THE POSITION WAS LIKELY TO CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- MAINTENANCE OF NUCLEAR LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS NECESSARY FOR WESTERN DEFENCE.

- NO QUESTION OF A THIRD ZERO IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

- THE DECISION ON A SUCCESSOR TO LANCE TO BE TAKEN IN TWO STAGES:

  (A) AUTHORISE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NOW, ESSENTIALLY A MATTER FOR THE US. (KASEL COMMENTED THAT AT 150 MILLION DOLLARS THE COST WAS ABOUT EQUAL TO THE DEFICIT ON THE LUXEMBOURG RAILWAYS, I.E. NEGLIGEABLE).

  (B) A DECISION IN LATE 90/91 ON WHETHER TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY.

- NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF INEVITABLE IN DUE COURSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JUNE 1987 REYKJAVIC NAC: COULD BE CONSIDERED AT END 90/91 IN LIGHT OF PROGRESS IN OTHER ARMS LIMITATION TALKS:

NO QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS NOW (KASEL SAID POOS MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE EAST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO VISITED LUXEMBOURG YESTERDAY).

2. KASEL COMMENTED THAT THE LUXEMBOURG LINE ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS THEREFORE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE GERMAN. ON MODERNIZATION THE LOGIC WAS THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO PREPARE, BUT SHOULD NOT RISK SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGES TO THE RUSSIANS BY A DECISION TO DEPLOY NOW.

3. WE HAVE COMPARED NOTES WITH US EMBASSY WHO HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR ACCOUNT. THEY ARE RELATIVELY RELIEVED BECAUSE DURING SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S VISIT HERE SOME WEEKS AGO, FOREIGN MINSITER POOS SPOKE CLOSELY TO THE GENSCHER LINE. IT LOOKS AS IF MINISTER OF DEFENCE FISCHBACH, STIFFENED BY KASEL HIMSELF WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO HIM, HAS GONE SOME WAY TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION.

CAMPBELL

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AND TO IMMEDIATE OTHER NATO POSTS

SIC
CORRECTED VERSION

MODUK FOR DUS(P), D NUC POL SY
SNF MODERNISATION/ARMS CONTROL
1. AFTER THE US/FRG MEETING ON 24 APRIL CHENEY GAVE AN ADDRESS TO THE NATO SYMPOSIUM OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY. HIS COMMENTS ON THE SNF ISSUE ARE AS FOLLOWS. QUOTE THERE IS CLEARLY A DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ISSUES OF MODERNISATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREEMENT TO, OR AN EFFORT TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE BEST POSTURE STATEMENT WE'VE GOT ON AN ALLIANCE-WIDE BASIS IS WHAT WE PRODUCED LAST WEEK AT THE NPG MEETING, WHICH WAS A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IN OUR MILITARY POSTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE - BASICALLY A REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO, THE IDEA THAT WE NEED TO MAINTAIN UP-TO-DATE - I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE DIPLOMATIC TERM OF ART - UP-TO-DATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN ORDER TO DO THAT. THERE ARE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WHO WOULD LIKE TO GO BEYOND THAT IN TERMS OF MORE FIRM COMMITMENTS TO MODERNISATION, BUT I THINK WHAT WE HAVE THERE IS ADEQUATE. I THINK WE DON'T NEED TO TAKE SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC SYSTEMS AND SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE'VE GOT ENOUGH TO GO FORWARD - THE US DOES - WITH RESPECT TO OUR EARLY WORK ON FOLLOW-ON TO THE LANCE SYSTEM, AND I THINK THAT'S SUFFICIENT IN THE MODERNISATION AREA. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE A FIRM COMMITMENT NOW OR A SPECIFIC DECISION NOW BY A SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT TO MAKE A - TAKE A CERTAIN ACTION DOWN THE ROAD. WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS I BELIEVE VERY DEEPLY THAT THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. I RECALL ALL OF THE CONCERN THAT WAS RAISED ABOUT A THIRD ZERO AT THE TIME OF THE

INF ACCORDS. BUT WE NOW FIND OURSELVES WHERE THERE ARE, I THINK, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD LIKE TO MOVE FAIRLY RAPIDLY TO NEGOTIATE SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. I THINK THAT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR SEVERAL REASONS, PARTLY BECAUSE WE NEED TO REMIND OURSELVES THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE IS OVERWHELMING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. FACT. THAT WE'VE DEALT WITH THAT FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS BY HAVING DEPLOYED, IN EUROPE, TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS - SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CERTAINLY AS LONG AS THERE IS OVER-WHELMING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO RATIONALE AT ALL FOR US TO TALK ABOUT ELIMINATING OR OF SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THOSE SHORT-RANGE FORCES.
IT WE WERE TO MODERNISE, WE THEN MIGHT BE ABLE TO REARRANGE, ON A UNILATERAL BASIS, OUR OWN NUCLEAR SITUATION, AND, IN FACT, REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND CHARGES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THAT'S A POSSIBILITY POINTED OUT AT MONTEBELLO AND ELSEWHERE. BUT, I THINK FOR THE TIME BEING, FOR US NOW TO RUSH OUT AND BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SHORT-RANGE FORCES WOULD SIMPLY TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF CONVENTIONAL TALKS THAT ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT, I THINK, IN TERMS OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AND WOULD LET THE SOVIETS OFF THE HOOK IN TERMS OF LETTING THEM FOCUS ON THAT. THEY'VE ALWAYS HAD, AS THEIR PRIME OBJECTIVE, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE. THEY'VE RESTATED IT RECENTLY AGAIN, WHEN THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS MET, AND I THINK THERE'S A VERY REAL DANGER THAT IF WE START DOWN THAT ROAD, WE WILL IN FACT, END UP WITH A THIRD ZERO. I DON'T THINK THOSE GOVERNMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT FEEL CONSTRAINED BY PUBLIC OPINION NOW TO RUSH OUT AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD BE AY STRONGER WHEN, ONCE YOU GOT INTO NEGOTIATIONS, MR GORBACHEV TABLED HIS PROPOSAL FOR ZERO NUKES IN WESTERN EUROPE. I THINK IT WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR US TO START DOWN THAT ROAD. I THINK OUR POSTURE RIGHT NOW IS FINE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE WE NEED TO EMBARK UPON ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS. FOCUS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, - ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOCUS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS,
BUT FOR NOW I'D LEAVE THE SHORT-RANGE FORCES ALONE.

ACLAND

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1989

SNF

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had a brief discussion this evening of the position reached on SNF. The Foreign Secretary raised the question whether the Prime Minister should propose to Kohl a trilateral meeting of officials - British, American and German - to work out language on SNF for the communique of the NATO Summit. The Prime Minister said that she was reluctant to see us get drawn into a drafting exercise in which we would, in all likelihood, find ourselves being dragged towards compromise. She was concerned that the Americans, in particular, would begin to weaken. Her preference was to go on fighting for our views right up until the Summit itself, as she had told President Bush on 22 April. We should continue to put the maximum political and psychological pressure on the Germans, by stressing the grave risks to NATO and Western security from the way they were dividing the Alliance. She recognised that contacts between officials would in any case continue at various levels, and this could be useful in getting across our views. But it must be understood that Ministers were not giving compromise powers to officials.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CDP

Prime Minister
You may likes to see this.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1989

CDP
20/4

MT

SNF

Herr Teltschik telephoned me this morning from Bonn about comment in this morning's British press on the Prime Minister's forthcoming meeting with Chancellor Kohl. The German Ambassador has also been in to see me about the meeting and raised the same point. Both were puzzled and rather alarmed at the suggestion that the Prime Minister was going to go on television to appeal direct to the German people over the head of Chancellor Kohl. I said that such speculation had no authority and they would be well advised to ignore much of what the British press said. The Prime Minister had set out her position quite clearly in the House of Commons on 25 April. She would want to make SNF the main subject of her discussion with the German Chancellor and explain her views in detail. But none of us had any interest in increasing the public impression of disunity in the NATO Alliance; and while the Prime Minister would certainly not conceal her views on the substance, she would not want to carry on the dispute publicly with the Chancellor in front of the press and media.

Teltschik said that NATO delegations in Brussels would be formally briefed on the German position this afternoon, and the Chancellor would deal with it in his Government statement to the Bundestag tomorrow. He hoped that we would find the statement to the Bundestag reasonably helpful. There was still flexibility in the German position, which was only the German position. The Chancellor would make the point that agreement with Germany's three main allies - the United States, the United Kingdom and France - would be crucial. Germany's prime interest was to see that the main allies stick together and to avoid NATO's disintegration. I applauded the aim but said that it was too hard to reconcile with the position which the German Government was taking, particularly on SNF negotiations. It seemed to me that the only possible outcome on this point was one where the German Government acknowledged that there was no consensus within NATO for its view on the desirability of early negotiations with the Soviet Union. The result would be that the Alliance position remained as set out in the communiqué of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik and the last NATO Summit. No doubt Germany would continue to take the view

CONFIDENTIAL

that such negotiations were desirable, while recognising that there was in practice no prospect of them. This was not ideal, but it was better than divisive arguments or a failure to agree a text at the NATO Summit. We would of course also want to see a firm re-statement by the Summit of NATO's requirement for SNF, as well as support for the US development programme for a successor to LANCE. Teltschik did not see great problems with this - but then he never does. Throughout he was disconsolate and anxious to stress that the German position was dictated by domestic political necessity rather than any expectation that it would be adopted by NATO.

There was a lot more but I will not bother to record it since it is all familiar ground.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CDP 26/4

PRIME MINISTER 26 April 1989

SNF: TACTICS

top enc.

The differences between my approach and that in Charles Powell's minute of 26 April may be more apparent than real.

Of course you will want to use the strongest possible arguments with Kohl when you see him and in any public statement of our case thereafter and we shall need to give separate attention to this. Of course we shall at Ministerial level keep up maximum pressure.

But it is agreed we cannot have a void between this weekend and the Summit. It is agreed that officials will maintain contact. Language will have to be worked out either before or at the Summit. By leaving it until the last minute we leave the field open to the weakest drafts from a collection of weak allies and we risk the Americans, wishing to avoid a row, settling for something undesirable.

The object of a US/UK/German group is to keep a grip not only on the drafting but also on the Americans and Germans up to the Summit. The outcome could be quite simple: no reference to negotiations, plus a reaffirmation of the need for short range weapons and the need to keep them up-to-date. But our starting point would be much higher than this.

The officials would be working ad referendum and there would be no inconsistency in this work going on and statements from UK Ministers and press on the right lines at the same time.

In other words we can have it both ways.

PERCY CRADOCK

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr. Ingham

SNF: TACTICS

You will want to see Sir Percy Cradock's note (attached) dealing with tactics at and after your forthcoming meeting with Chancellor Kohl. In essence he recommends that US, UK and German officials should meet to work out, ad referendum, a passage for the NATO Summit communique.

The more I think about it, the more I have misgivings about this. Percy is certainly right that we cannot have a complete void between your meeting with Chancellor Kohl and the Summit. But:

- our differences with the Germans are not a matter of drafting. But to ask officials to sit down and negotiate a text suggests that they are. The fact is that we do not accept the goal of negotiations on SNF and do not want to find ourselves dragged towards compromise. Nor do we want to create opportunities for the Americans - who may be less firm - to be dragged in that direction.

- moreover we have already taken a major step towards the Germans (as have the Americans) by lowering our sights on what we want the NATO Summit to say on modernisation. In other words, we have made our concession in advance. The risk, indeed the likelihood, is that the Germans will treat this as the base-line from which to start to bargain on SNF negotiations. That puts us in a tactically weak position.

What is the alternative? It is a campaign conducted at political level and through the press to maximise pressure on the Germans, so that when the Summit comes they realise that their chances of getting their way on SNF negotiations are

negligible, and they are therefore faced at the Summit itself with the choice whether or not to split NATO and ruin Bush's first Summit. This is in essence a game of chicken and of course it has risks. But it seems to me better than the death by a thousand cuts which negotiation of a text at official level would involve. The strength of our position is that what the Germans want would involve changing NATO policy, while we rest on the status quo (on modernisation, it is arguably the other way round).

My view is therefore that we should marshal the best possible arguments for you to use in public on 30 April and thereafter. We need arguments which will not provoke German opinion to rally behind Kohl and Genscher, but rather point up the grave risks to NATO and western security from dividing NATO and calling in question Germany's loyalty to the United States and the Western Alliance. In short we want to play on German angst about their security and their place in the western world.

None of this precludes contacts between officials: the normal ant-like activity will carry on. But I think we should put the main weight of our campaign into political and psychological pressure rather than premature attempts to draft ambiguous texts.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL
26 April 1989

KK1AOX

cc PS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 April 1989

Dear Charles

SNF: Quotes from Chancellor Schmidt

/ I enclose the only quotation we have been able to find so far from Helmut Schmidt on the INF negotiations. These remarks were, of course, made in the context of moving towards a negotiation and are not therefore helpful in the SNF context. Indeed, since Schmidt's current position on SNF is even more feeble than that of the German Government, I am not sure how he could be used to help our case.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

"The Alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy". Helmut Schmidt, 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, refering to the need to maintain deterrence in Europe in the absence of the removal of disparities of military power in Europe.

But Dr Schmidt now advocates SNF negotiations and has questioned the need for a successor to LANCE with a range four times as great. In a speech on 18 November to the North Atlantic Assembly in Hamburg he said that NATO did not currently need to modernise its SNF because unlike in the 1970s it was not facing a new kind of threat from the Soviet Union.

PRIME MINISTER 25 April 1989

SNF: TACTICS

The German Ministers apparently remained unmoved in Washington. It looks as though we shall not have a visit from them this week. It also looks as if Kohl will announce his position on 27 April, though he will doubtless qualify it by saying it will be the basis for alliance discussions.

It follows from this that you are likely to have a thoroughly unsatisfactory session with Kohl at the weekend. You will want to express your views on SNF modernisation and negotiations publicly as well as privately and you have indeed put Kohl on notice of this in your most recent message.

But we cannot leave things at that. We shall still need to seek agreed language for the NATO Summit communique. Given the weakness of other NATO partners, the longer we leave the issue in open dispute the harder it will be to achieve tolerable language. In particular Bush will be keen to avoid a public relations failure at his first Summit and may in consequence prove willing to settle at an unacceptably low level. The alternative tactic of a stand-off, with maximum public pressure on the Germans until the Summit is probably impracticable and in any event, for reasons given above, too risky: time is not on our side.

I do not think it would be practicable or desirable for you, having stated the maximalist position to Kohl, to propose fall-backs (though it will be important to test whether the Germans might be prepared to abandon the SNF negotiation proposal; if they are, a tolerable solution should be more easily attainable). But some continuing mechanism will be needed to fill the void between your departure

and the Summit. This points to an early trilateral (US, UK, German) effort at official level to work out a passage for the communique following your meeting with Kohl. In order to maintain the pressure we shall at the same time have to remain very tough on the substance and urge the Americans to do the same (they are strong on the negotiations point, but markedly less so on modernisation). If we and the US remain at one we could still limit the damage and construct a situation from which Germany and NATO could recover over the next two to three years.

Only on specific instruction. No negotiation. But we can only draft strongly on our view.

The work in the group would of course be ad referendum; and it may be that satisfactory compromise language proves unattainable. But if we are to have any chance of keeping the situation under control we shall have to try for it quickly and in a limited forum, where we can keep a hold on Americans and Germans.

We are not going for compromise powers to officials. We are standing firm.

If you agree with this you will want to get Kohl's agreement to such a trilateral meeting at the end of your weekend talk.

PERCY CRADOCK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 April 1989

CMO 25/4.

Dear Charles,

SNF

I enclose a transcript of the interview on the 'World At One' by the Foreign Secretary, which you will wish to have before Prime Minister's Questions.

As I mentioned to you, the Dutch Foreign Minsiter telephoned at lunctime. I enclose a copy of the record. The Dutch intervention with the Germans is likely to be helpful as far as it goes.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

① [redacted]

PS/Mr. Wigmore
PS/PUS
Mr. Boyd
Mr. Goulden
Sir P.R. D.
② RAB
MR
③ File
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FOREIGN SECRETARY - INT - WORLD AT ONE - 25 APRIL 1989

FROM BGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE,

TO "WORLD AT ONE"

ON TUESDAY, 25 APRIL 1989

INTERVIEWER:

Listening to that interview in our Westminster studio has been the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe. Sir Geoffrey, did you find that reassuring?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think the central, most reassuring, point about it is the importance Herr Stoltenberg attaches to the need to secure an Alliance position, a recognition that the matter is still very much under discussion.

We believe it is important and it is important that that position should be based upon those already adopted by the Alliance.

INTERVIEWER:

He made it clear, however, that he did believe NATO should generally increase the pace towards talks. Are you saying that you see a certain softening in the West German line by his insistence that everyone must adhere to a common position?

FOREIGN SECRETARY - INT - WORLD AT ONE - 25 APRIL 1989

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Everyone must adhere to a common position, it is obviously the ideal objective of all of us. The discussion now taking place is to try to define that common position and it is related to two different questions: one is the modernisation of the defensive capability of the Alliance; the other is our approach to the whole question of arms control.

I think that we want to start and stick with the position which was outlined at the last NATO Summit only just over a year ago, that our security will continue to depend upon a strategy of deterrence that is based upon an adequate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary.

INTERVIEWER:

And the assumption is that NATO's strategy of flexible response would be greatly damaged by early negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Yes indeed, and we think that the modernisation, if we can achieve it, of the land-based short-range nuclear weapon, which is designed to increase its range, amongst other things, will actually help in achieving some of the objectives that our friends in Germany want.

FOREIGN SECRETARY - INT - WORLD AT ONE - 25 APRIL 1989

INTERVIEWER:

But Chancellor Kohl does not accept that modernisation, perhaps for internal political reasons, is desirable and NATO has moved to accommodate that position by agreeing not to stress early modernisation. Do you believe that it is possible to avoid the appearance, if only an appearance, of a rift at the NATO Summit, which is very important obviously for President Bush and indeed for all of you, if West Germany continues to insist that you must move collectively towards early negotiations?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

The position is this. NATO obviously wishes to achieve and maintain an agreed position. Our agreed position has been on clear premises up to now. It is important to achieve and maintain the right position and that discussion will take place right up to the NATO Summit as necessary.

And I want to make clear that we certainly have not dropped our idea, nor has I think anyone who attaches importance to it, the need to maintain a clear commitment to modernisation of the short-range nuclear capability.

INTERVIEWER:

And the West Germans have to accept that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY - INT - WORLD AT ONE - 25 APRIL 1989

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That is something that has been accepted, part of the commitment of NATO a year ago. The importance of it is that if we do modernise then we actually secure an extension of range that enables us to move further away from the idea of battlefield nuclear fighting, which the Germans understandably want, it enables us to move ahead with further unilateral reductions in our total of nuclear warheads, which again we all want.

So modernisation is a way towards reducing the totality of the nuclear threat in a fashion that is compatible with our continued security.

INTERVIEWER:

And the integrity of that policy depends on no early start to negotiations which could result in damage, in your view, to the flexible response?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Yes, because the Soviet approach to such negotiations is going to be dominated by their declared purpose of getting rid of all land-based nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, all NATO allies have been on record thus far as opposing a third zero of that kind, that is why we do not want to go down that road.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT) NNNN

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SNF: TELEPHONE CALL FROM DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. Van den Broek telephoned the Secretary of State at lunchtime to talk about SNF. He had seen the German paper and understood the US Government were outraged. The German position did indeed affect the basic principles which Van den Broek had hoped the Alliance would stand for. He had spoken to the NATO Secretary General, who was also very worried. Van den Broek said he was trying to get in touch with Genscher to ~~try to~~ find out what consultation procedures he envisaged and what scope there was for amending the German Government paper. Given the extent to which the Germans were responding to domestic public opinion, he did not hold out much hope of exercising effective influence.

2. The Secretary of State explained our position. We hoped that the German paper might still represent a bargaining position, albeit a very bad one. There was still some evidence of a difference of view between Genscher on the one hand and Stoltenberg and Kohl on the other. The Secretary of State

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reiterated our concern to avoid negotiations and a third zero. It was vital to maintain what had hitherto been an agreed Alliance position. Van den Broek agreed. He did not propose to say much in public for fear of worsening the situation and giving the Germans no alternative but retreat. But he would sound out Genscher and report when he and Lubbers met the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister on Saturday. He wondered whether, if the Germans did not budge, it would be better to change gear and leave everything undecided at the Summit. The Secretary of State thought this would be a bad outcome. Insofar as the German were advocating negotiations and the rest of the Alliance was likely to resist, then matters would no doubt remain undecided. But he was very reluctant to conclude that there could be no agreed Alliance position consistent with earlier decisions.

COMMENT

3. Although Van den Broek was obviously at a loss to know how best to influence the Germans, it was equally clear that his proposed intervention with Genscher is helpfully aimed at persuading the Germans to keep options open. He clearly shared our irritation at the way the German Government had unilaterally developed and gone public with its current line.

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SNF: GERMAN MEDIA

SUMMARY
1. WASHINGTON TALKS TODAY'S LEAD ITEM. SPD WELCOMES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. PRESS COMMENTS ARE MIXED. BRITISH REACTIONS WIDELY REPORTED.

DETAIL
2. THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG, AND ITS LACK OF RESULTS, IS THE MAIN STORY IN TODAY'S GERMAN PRESS. HEADLINES STATE ''BONN WANTS TO REMAIN FIRM IN DISPUTE WITH WASHINGTON'' - QUOTING GENSCHER BEFORE THE TRIP - AND ''BONN AND WASHINGTON ON COLLISION COURSE.'' GENSCHER'S WASHINGTON PRESS CONFERENCE (FOR GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS ONLY) IS REPORTED BY PAPERS WITH LATE DEADLINES. HE SAID EACH SIDE HAD SET OUT ITS VIEWS: DISCUSSION WOULD CONTINUE WITH THE AIM OF REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE ALLIANCE BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. HE ADDED ''I LEAVE WASHINGTON (FEELING) VERY CONFIDENT.'' STOLTENBERG CRITICISED SPECULATION ABOUT A CRISES IN THE ALLIANCE AND SPOKE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US ADMINISTRATION AND THE FRG GOVERNEMNT ON THE CENTRAL DECISION QUESTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. IN INTERVIEWS BEFORE THE TRIP, GENSCHER PLAYED DOWN ITS IMPORTANCE, SAYING THAT A DECISION WOULD BE MADE N THE ALLIANCE, NOT IN FRG-US TALKS. HE AGAIN ASSERTED THAT NATO'S 1987 AND 1988 COMMUNIQUES HELD OUT THE PROPSPECT OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THERE WAS BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE FRG POSITION FROM ''CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN ALLIES.''

4. SPD LEADERS HAVE WELCOMED THE COALITION'S POSITION. PARTY CHAIRMAN VOGEL HAS SPOKEN OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS IN PARALLEL WITH CFE. ''NO'' TO THE REPLACEMENT OF LANCE BY A NEW SYSTEM, AND WANTING TO KEEP THE DECISION OPEN UNTIL AFTER THE FEDERAL ELECTION.

5. THERE IS EXTENSIVE MEDIA COMMENT, BUT VIEWS ARE MIXED. SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (CENTRIST), FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE AND DIE WELT (BOTH CONSERVATIVE) SEE THE EXPLANATION FOR THE COALITION DECISION IN DOMESTIC POLITICS RATHER THAN SECURITY POLICY. THEY REFER TO GROWING ALLIED DOUBTS ABOUT FRG RELIABILITY. THAT WOULD NOT EVEN HELP GORBACHEV, BUT PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF HIS OPPONENTS, OTHER PAPERS HOWEVER, ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

6. AS A SUBSIDIARY THEME, BRITISH REACTIONS ARE WIDELY REPORTED, AND BRITISH PRESS REPORTS REPLAYED. THE FIRST REACTION FROM HMG IS DESCRIBED AS ''ALARM'' AND THE PRESS IN THE UK ARE SAID TO EXPECT A SHARP DISPUTE WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES KOHL ON 30 APRIL. UNDER THE HEADLINE ''IRON LADY WILL READ KOHL THE RIOT ACT'' ONE PAPER REPORTS FROM LONDON BRITISH CONCERN ABOUT THE FRG POSITION. IT SUGGESTS (WITH OTHERS) THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN UNDERSTANDING TO ACCEPT BONN'S STANCE ON MODERNISATION, IN RETURN FOR BONN WAIVING ITS WISH FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS. UNDERLYING BRITISH ANGER WAS HURT PRIDE AND A FEAR THAT LONDON WOULD HAVE NO REAL IMPACT ON MAJOR DECISIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY.

7. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN KLEIN IS SAID TO HAVE DENIED REPORTS THAT GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG WOULD STOP OVER IN LONDON ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. THE UK, LIKE OTHER ALLIES, WOULD BE BRIEFED PERSONALLY BY KOHL IN DEIDESHEIM.

8. PRESIDENT BUSH'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IS ALSO REPORTED: ACCORDING TO ''BRITISH GOVERNMENT SOURCES'' BOTH SPOKE CATEGORICALLY AGAINST SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

9. BRITISH NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT BRITAIN WAS READY TO RECEIVE MORE US DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT HAS ALSO BEEN REPLAYED.

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INFO DESKBY 251800Z MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS

SIC CFJ

BONN TELNO 442:
SNF: PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' LUNCH: 25 APRIL

SUMMARY
1. WORNER APPEALS TO GOVERNMENTS, AND IN PARTICULAR TO FRG, TO SHOW RESTRAINT. U S PERMREP MAKES IT CLEAR THAT DIFFERENCES WERE NOT BRIDGED AT WASHINGTON TALKS. GERMAN PERMREP ANNOUNCES THAT HE WILL INFORM COUNCIL OF GERMAN POSITION TOMORROW 26 APRIL. IN REPLY TO UK, HE INDICATES THAT GERMAN GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO COMMIT ITSELF IN DETAIL, THUS NOT LEAVING ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN GENERALITIES.

DETAIL
2. AT TODAY'S PERMREPS' LUNCH WORNER SAID THAT HIS ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT IN A MAJOR CRISIS BUT HAD TO DEAL WITH A SERIOUS PROBLEM. THIS COULD STILL BE MANAGED, PROVIDED THE UTMOST CARE WAS EXERCISED BY ALL PARTIES. THE GOVERNMENTS CHIEFLY CONCERNED SHOULD THEREFORE LOWER THEIR PUBLIC PROFILE. THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT PROCESS, WHICH WAS STILL IN THE DECISION-MAKING STAGE, SHOULD BE CONTINUED. WE COULD NOT ALLOW THE SUMMIT TO BE OVER-SHADOWED BY AN UNSOLVED QUESTION. THEREFORE THE QUESTION MUST BE SOLVED BEFORE THE SUMMIT, BUT NATIONS SHOULD NOT USE THE APPROACH OF THE SUMMIT AS A MEANS OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON EACH OTHER. THE ALLIANCE NOW HAD A UNIQUE CHANCE TO SHAPE THE FUTURE, AND ITS MEMBERS THEREFORE HAD AN HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO RISK AN INTERNAL SPLIT. WORNER URGED CAPITALS TO USE ALL THE CHANNELS AVAILABLE TO TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION EXISTED, BUT HE WOULD NOT SUGGEST IT AT THIS STAGE. EVERYONE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE IN TO A CERTAIN DEGREE. IN THIS CONTEXT HE ADDRESSED A SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THE CHANCELLOR WAS TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON 27 APRIL SEMICOLON HE SHOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT IT DID NOT COMPLICATE MATTERS.

3. KEEL (US), INVITED TO INFORM PERMREPS OF THE U S/GERMAN TALKS IN WASHINGTON, SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAD SET OUT THEIR POSITION ON

SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND MODERNISATION. HE WAS NOT AT LIBERTY TO REVEAL THE DETAILS, BUT HE COULD POINT TO WHAT HAD APPEARED IN THE GERMAN PRESS AND SAY THAT IT WAS CLOSE TO THE GERMAN OFFICIAL POSITION AS EXPLAINED BY GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG. KEEL EXPLAINED U S OBJECTIONS TO THE GERMAN POSITION POINT BY POINT ON STANDARD LINES, CONCLUDING THAT NO DIFFERENCES HAD BEEN BRIDGED AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONCERN IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE LACK OF FULL CONSULTATION BEFORE THE COALITION HAD ARRIVED AT ITS POSITION, AND THAT THAT POSITION HAD BEEN LEAKED TO THE PRESS. GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT ALL THREE COALITION PARTNERS HAD AGREED THE POSITION, WHICH WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC ON 27 APRIL. GENSCHER HAD INDICATED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING THE POSITION SUBSEQUENTLY WAS NOT RULED OUT, BUT NO CHANGE WOULD BE MADE BEFORE 27 APRIL. BAKER HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE U S WERE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS SEMICOLON IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF DIFFERENCES OVER SNF WERE TO DOMINATE THE SUMMIT, BUT U S VIEWS WOULD NOT CHANGE. KEEL CONCLUDED THAT THE U S HAD GONE A LONG WAY ON MODERNISATION REQUIREMENTS TO MEET THE GERMANS. THE DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE, BUT THE DIFFERENCES REMAINED STARK.

4. HANSEN (FRG) SAID THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. BOT KOHL INTENDED TO DEAL WITH SNF, INTER ALIA, IN HIS STATEMENT, AND HANSEN WOULD BE INFORMING THE COUNCIL TOMORROW IN ADVANCE OF WHAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD SAY. HE SAID THAT MOST POINTS IN THE GERMAN POSITION WOULD NOT COME AS A SURPRISE TO PARTNERS, WHO WOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THEM THROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. THE GERMANS HAD NOT INTENDED THAT THE COALITION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE LEAKED TO THE PRESS SEMICOLON HE REGRETTED THIS. BUT THE U S AND UK, FOR THEIR PART, HAD CLEARLY STATED THEIR POSITIONS IN PUBLIC. FROM WHAT HE HAD HEARD FROM BONN, GENSCHER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS WAS NOT SO GLOOMY AS THAT OF THE AMERICANS. IT WAS A MISTAKE TO DESCRIBE THE MATTER AS AN EXCLUSIVELY GERMAN-AMERICAN ISSUE.

5. I AGREED WITH HANSEN THAT THIS WAS NOT A PURELY BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN THE GERMANS AND THE AMERICANS SEMICOLON IT WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. I HAD NOTED HIS POINT THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD DEAL WITH SNF INTER ALIA. DID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO SET OUT THEIR POSITION IN DETAIL IN THE COUNCIL AND IN THE BUNDESTAG? THE PROCESSES OF CONSULTATION WERE BY NO MEANS EXHAUSTED. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TO DISCUSS SNF AMONG OTHER MATTERS WITH THE CHANCELLOR DURING THE COMING WEEKEND, BY LONG STANDING PRIOR ARRANGEMENT. THIS SHOULD SURELY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

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6. HANSEN REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR KOHL TO RESTRICT HIMSELF TO GENERALITIES. WORNER EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR ME. HE SAID THAT STATEMENTS WHICH WERE TOO DETAILED AND TOO FIXED WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO REACH A SOLUTION. HE APPEALED TO THE WHOLE ALLIANCE TO AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF COMPROMISE.

7. OJEDA (SPAIN) APPEARED TO DESPAIR OF FINDING A SOLUTION BEFORE THE SUMMIT. BIERRING (DENMARK) DID NOT EXCLUDE A COMPROMISE. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) THOUGHT THAT U S/GERMAN TALKS ALONE WOULD NOT WORK, AND URGED RETICENCE. FULCI (ITALY) SAID THAT THE SUMMIT COULD NOT BE A FAILURE, AND THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD NEVER YET HAD AN UNSOLVED CRISIS. KEEL SAID THAT WE WERE NOT IN A CRISIS SEMICOLON SNF NEGOTIATIONS WERE ONLY ONE SMALL PART OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, WHICH IN TURN WAS ONLY ONE PART OF THE ALLIANCE'S WHOLE AGENDA. HANSEN POINTED TO THE DOMESTIC GERMAN IMPORTANCE OF THE SNF ISSUE. ROBIN (FRANCE) ENDED THE DISCUSSION WITH AN EXPRESSION OF SCEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER EXHORTATIONS TO GOODWILL WERE ENOUGH SEMICOLON HE WAS NOT SO SURE THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO CRISIS.

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PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

NNNN

Prime Minister 7a-c

This is the Americans' record of yesterday's meeting. We should not admit to having it.

CDP 25/4.

SECRET

Secretary Baker, together with Defense Secretary Cheney, NSC Adviser Scowcroft and other U.S. officials, met for four hours on April 24 with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, Defens Minister Stoltenberg and an FRG team. The meeting allowed each side to outline its views, but did not bridge differences.

Secretary Baker expressed disappointment at the lack of consultation and publicizing of the FRG position, contrary to an earlier agreement that Washington and Bonn should seek quietly to come to a mutual understanding. Genscher emphasized that the FRG position on SNF given to the U.S. last week had been agreed to by all three coalition parties; he acknowledged later in the meeting that Chancellor Kohl's statement to the Bundestag on April 27 will reiterate this position on SNF as a "German" position. Stoltenberg implied that it could be changed in the light of Alliance consultations.

Genscher defended the FRG position on negotiations as consistent with the Reykjavik 1987 NAC communiqué and claimed Kohl had not known negotiations were a problem for the U.S. He was firmly rebutted on both points. He cited the huge Soviet superiority in SNF and particular German vulnerability to SNF as compelling reasons for negotiations.

Secretary Baker emphasized that the U.S. remained strongly opposed to negotiations; it would be unfortunate if differences over SNF were to dominate the Summit, but U.S. views would not change. He said the U.S. opposed negotiations because it feared they would lead to the denuclearization of Europe, a long-standing Soviet objective; he stressed that land-based nuclear missiles were inextricably tied to support for maintaining U.S. forces in Europe.

On modernization, Stoltenberg stressed that the FRG position left open the possibility of a production/deployment decision in 1992; he implied that fulfilling the conditions outlined in paragraph 5 of the FRG paper would represent a dramatic (and therefore unlikely) change in Soviet military posture. Secretary Baker stressed that the U.S. had gone some distance to meet the FRG positions on modernization.

At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the dialogue would continue. A press line was agreed on.

SECRET

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State Dept telegram on yesterday's talks in Washington, given to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Cattaneo this morning.

SECRET

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Head Sec Pol Dept

cc PS
PS/Mr Braddegan
PS/PUS
Sir T Bridges
Mr Boyd
Mr Calder

SECRET

Mr Gilmore
Head NMD
Head Americas

7c

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY BAKER ON THE GENSCHER VISIT

(posted in the State Department Press Office
afternoon of April 24)

We had useful and friendly discussions with Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg, on the subject of SNF within the Comprehensive Concept.

They explained their positions which the Chancellor will formally present in the Federal Republic of Germany on April 27. We explained ours. As a result, we understand their position better and they understand ours better.

We will continue our discussions in an effort to reach an agreement within the Alliance.

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B.095 CDP 25/4.

MR BOWELL

Mr Goulden, FCO
Mr Griffiths, MoD
Mr Woolley

SNF

The German Ambassador called on me this afternoon as part of his rounds to update himself before the Prime Minister's bilateral with Chancellor Kohl on 30 April. He said he realised that we were going through a difficult patch on SNF. The Chancellor had needed to formulate a coalition position on the subject now that the German Cabinet reshuffle had taken place and so that it could be introduced quickly in the Bundestag, to stake out domestic political ground in the face of upcoming elections. In practice the coalition position went no further than the views which the German Government had held consistently over the past two years, in particular that the Russians should be put under pressure by negotiation to remove their preponderance in SNF systems. His impression from the visit of Genscher and Stoltenberg to Washington was that there remained room for compromise within the Alliance on the SNF negotiation point, by which he clearly meant the establishment of a group by the NATO Summit to prepare a negotiating mandate. The only reason that these Ministers had hurried off to Washington, he said more than once, was because the weapons in question were American systems. He was not however speaking on the basis of recent instructions. It was clear to him that the Chancellor had decided that this should be treated at senior Ministerial level alone.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. I said the Ambassador should not under-estimate the seriousness with which recent developments were viewed in London. Could he explain why it was deemed so essential that the German Government should make a formal statement of its position to the Bundestag on 27 April, thereby appearing to preclude further significant bilateral consultation between now and the Summit as well as pre-empting proper Alliance consultation at the Summit itself? Would it not be possible to take the line in the Bundestag that the coalition parties had reflected long and hard on this issue since the reshuffle but wished to take further account of other allies' views at the highest level before announcing a definitive position? (The Ambassador said rather lamely that he did not know the answer to either of these questions.)

3. I said that we could not agree that the new coalition position as it had been leaked to the press (I observed in passing how odd it was that neither he nor British officials had had this document formally communicated to them) did not represent a departure from earlier positions. The Reykjavik and Brussels communiques had not called for early commencement of negotiations on SNF missiles, still less on nuclear artillery. There was no reference to the need to avoid a third zero. There was no challenge to the Russians unilaterally to reduce. The notion of NATO reductions as a function of restructuring had also apparently been discarded. Precisely because American systems were at stake it seemed bizarre that another ally should call for early negotiations in explicit contradiction to the United States standpoint. Moreover, though it was not for me to judge, I did not see how the Chancellor improved his

electoral chances by staking out the ground which was practically indistinguishable from that occupied by his domestic opposition.

4. I said that speaking personally I thought it would be a recipe for a public row at the Summit if the German Government announced a position on 27 April to the Bundestag which was substantially that already leaked to the press. Other allies also held strong views on the principles involved and as evidence of the Prime Minister's approach to questions of principle I could not resist quoting to him the analogy provided in paragraph 2 of page 215 of Hugo Young's recently published biography. Did the Chancellor really want President Bush's first NATO Summit and the 40th anniversary of NATO to go down in the history books as the occasion on which Germany had precipitated a major Alliance crisis of confidence?

5. The Ambassador took diligent note, on the clearly understood basis that we were swapping merely personal views and not speaking on instructions. He suggested that the bilateral on 30 April might also provide time for discussion on Gorbachev, Poland, other arms control, Southern Africa, the Middle East and the Madrid European Council, while conceding that SNF was likely to predominate. He departed equably enough but repeating that what the coalition had already decided was "a very basic position".

P J Weston

Cabinet Office
25 April 1989

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. .....

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

London, 25 April 1989

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed message of Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is attached.

I am, dear Prime Minister
Yours sincerely
Hermann Richthofen

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
London

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE
DA
LPE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 April 1989

SNF

I enclose a copy of Chancellor Kohl's reply to the Prime Minister's recent message on SNF which I have just received. It does not take us much further forwards.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 87

Prime Minister
A not very satisfactory reply to your message

(2)

Subject
cc OPS
MASTER

Courtesy Translation

25th April 1989

CDD 25/4

Message
from
Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
to
Her Excellency The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Dear Margaret,

at flap

Thank you very much for your message of 21 April 1989.

I remember, of course, what we agreed upon at our meeting in Frankfurt in February and I will stick to it.

Obviously I must consult the position of the Federal Government with the three parties of the coalition before I begin talks with our American friends, with you and with the other partners in the Alliance. The result of these consultations will be the basis for our talks next Sunday and for the following talks in the Alliance. This procedure, incidentally, is in accordance with the practice of all governments in the Alliance.

With kind regards,
signed Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany

25. April 1989

Botschaft
von
Herrn Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
an
Ihre Exzellenz
Frau Margaret Thatcher
Premierminister des Vereinigten Königreichs
Grossbritannien und Nordirland

Liebe Margaret,

für Ihre Botschaft vom 21. April 1989 danke ich Ihnen.

Selbstverständlich weiß ich noch, was wir bei unserem Zusammentreffen im Februar in Frankfurt verabredet hatten. Daran will ich auch festhalten.

Bevor ich jedoch die Gespräche mit den amerikanischen Freunden, mit Ihnen und anderen Partnern im Bündnis beginne, ist es ebenso selbstverständlich, daß ich die Position der Bundesregierung innerhalb der Koalition der drei Parteien abstimmen muß. Das Ergebnis dieser Abstimmung wird die Grundlage unseres gemeinsamen Gespräches am Sonntag wie für die folgenden Gespräche im Bündnis sein.

Im übrigen entspricht dieses Verfahren der Praxis aller Regierungen im Bündnis.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland

SECRET

FILE 6a-b KK

bc PC

(Copy sent to PM then destroyed - unread)

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 April 1989

SNF

General Scowcroft telephoned me late this evening to report on the meeting with Genscher and Stoltenberg. He said it had been a very difficult meeting and the Germans had remained adamant on their position. The Americans had said they could be fairly relaxed on modernisation but would remain very tough on the idea of negotiations on SNF. The Germans had, nonetheless, insisted there had to be negotiations to reduce the imbalance in SNF to common ceilings at NATO levels or just below. When the Americans argued that NATO could propose this unilaterally, the Germans responded that there must be a guarantee that the Russians would not go up again and this could only be achieved by negotiation. The Americans had insisted that this was a fundamental point for them: the President could not ask the American people to leave US forces in Europe if they were not properly protected. The Germans were unmoved and said that Chancellor Kohl would be announcing their position to the Bundestag on Thursday. Nonetheless, they had wanted to continue discussions and at one point suggested that the NATO Summit should set up a Study Group to look at these problems. The Americans had looked at German suggestions for the mandate for this group but did not find it at all promising. All in all, said Scowcroft, it had been a very tough meeting.

I said that the Prime Minister would be glad to hear that the Americans had remained firm on the point about negotiations. I did not think the Study Group at all an attractive idea. Scowcroft said that the Germans had tried to argue that negotiations had already been agreed in principle at the Reykjavik NATO meeting but the Americans had refused to accept this.

Scowcroft said that Stoltenberg had been visibly uneasy with the position reached. When the Americans had suggested telling the press that the talks had encountered difficulties, Stoltenberg had wanted to avoid this and say only that the two sides understood each others positions better and would continue discussions.

SECRET

66

Scowcroft said that he was gloomy about the prospects. He did not believe the Germans could now be stopped from announcing their position to the Bundestag. Now it was over to us to have a go. I said that the Prime Minister would take the view that, so long as the United States and the United Kingdom stuck together, we could eventually wear the Germans down. I did not know whether Genscher and Stoltenberg would be coming to London this week. In any event, the Prime Minister would see Kohl on Sunday and make her views very clear. Scowcroft wished us luck.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Title: LOBBY BRIEFING 4PM 24 APRIL 1989

We repeated this morning's lobby.

SNF

Asked about the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with President Bush on Saturday, we said that a substantial proportion of the discussion had been about SNF. There was not much between the US and the British positions. We said that this was the first substantial policy discussion that had taken place between them since Mr Bush came to office.

Asked about today's visit to the Prime Minister by the new US Ambassador, we said that the Prime Minister was taking the opportunity of having an introductory talk, but it was possible that SNF might come up . Asked about the invitation to Mr Stoltenberg and Mr Genscher, we said that the Germans had been invited not by the Prime Minister, but by the Foreign Office, and they had not been able to accept the invitation.

Outlining the Government's position on Germany and the SNF situation, we said that NATO was made up of 16 nation states, who had decided to have a modernised, effective deterrent. The argument now was not about the principle of updating SNF but of what was needed to achieve it. The US and Britain had set their face against negotiations on reduction of SNF because that could mean elimination of those weapons - the third zero option. That would not serve the interests of Western defence.

We denied that there was a synthetic hurry in our approach. We needed resolution and firmness to confront a USSR that was changing in its presentation of policy, but not necessarily in the nature of its policy. The USSR still had a preponderance in both chemical and conventional weapons. We welcomed change in the USSR, but said that we must still be capable of defending ourselves. We must not allow the years needed for development of the Lance replacement to be lost. It was important to defend not only West Germany, but also the 66,000 British and 330,000 US troops on German soil. We denied that we were issuing threats about withdrawing British and American troops from Germany. We stressed that we would use persuasion only.

We recognised the Germans political problems The British and the Americans would continue to press the arguments openly. In addition we accepted that there was a considerable amount of diplomatic activity to persuade other members of NATO of the need for modernisation. Other countries who had been helpful included Italy and the Netherlands. We pointed out that the Prime Minister was seeing not only Kohl, but also De Mita and Lubbers, over the weekend.

We denied that the Prime Minister had in any way been overtaken by events. On the contrary, she was entirely prepared to give a lead to the Germans. We agreed that the argument could continue throughout the summer, but stressed that there was no need for that to happen. Asked about whether we had any leverage in the argument on modernisation, we said that we would continue to put the arguments resolutely and with strength of purpose.

ENVIRONMENT MEETING

Asked about the seminar on global climate on Wednesday, we said that it was an opportunity for Ministers to clarify their thinking on the formation of environmental policy. We said that it was unlikely that it would lead to the formulation of an overall energy policy. That policy continued to be to encourage the promotion of cleaner technologies and energy efficiency. It was important to have a balanced energy policy for strategic reasons.

We said that it was inadequate to view environmental policy in national terms. That was why the British Government was seeking to work through established international organisations, particularly the United Nations Environment Programme. We did not agree with the current proliferation of organisations in this field. We described it as a formidable scientific challenge to balance the needs of a better standard of life in, for example, India and China, and the need to promote better environment.

PJA

PS/No. 10

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COMMENT

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FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 221730Z FCO
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OF 221721Z APRIL 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, MODUK

SIC

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

FOR RESIDENT CLERK

YOUR TELNO 740: SNF/NATO SUMMIT

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC. BOTH WELCOMED THE POINTS AND UNDERTOOK TO FEED THEM IN.
2. THE VIEW HERE IS THAT THE GERMAN TEXT IS LIKELY TO BE AN OPENING BID PITCHED AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE RATHER THAN THEIR FINAL POSITION OR WHAT KOHL COULD ACTUALLY SETTLE FOR. THEY HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GERMAN PRESS REACTION HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY SUPPORTIVE AND THAT THERE ARE SOME EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN THAT GERMANY MAY BE IN DANGER OF ISOLATING ITSELF FROM CLOSEST ALLIES. IN ANY EVENT, BOTH STATE AND NSC SAY THAT THEIR BRIEFING FOR THE MEETING WITH GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG ON 24 APRIL REMAINS ROBUST. THEY ENVISAGE WARNING THAT IF THE GERMANS INSIST ON GOING PUBLIC WITH A BAD POSITION BEFORE FULL CONSULTATION HAS TAKEN PLACE, THE AMERICANS WILL ANNOUNCE THAT THIS MAY REPRESENT THE VIEW OF ONE NATION BUT IS NOT THE POSITION OF THE ALLIANCE.
3. AS REGARDS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING ON 24 APRIL, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE TALKS WILL BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER 11 AM AND CONTINUE THROUGH LUNCH UNTIL GERMAN DEPARTURE AROUND 1600. THE AMERICANS DO NOT ENVISAGE BREAKING INTO SEPARATE GROUPS BUT PLAN TO STICK TO THE TACTIC OF A PLENARY APPROACH KEEPING DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS TOGETHER. SEVEN GERMANS ARE EXPECTED (IN ADDITION TO THE MINISTERS, KASTRUP, HOLIK, ONE FROM DEFENCE AND GENSCHER'S CABINET, TOGETHER WITH THE AA SPOKESMAN). THERE WILL BE NO-ONE FROM THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE. THE AMERICAN SIDE IS EXPECTED TO BE BAKER, SCOWCROFT, WOLFOWITZ (CHENEY MAY BE ATTENDING THE IOWA FUNERAL), LEHMAN, BLACKWILL AND KIMMITT.

ACLAND

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ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR 1
MR GOULDEN 1
HD/SEC POL D 1
MR GASS SEC POL D 1
RESIDENT CLERK 1
MAIN 136

PS/No. 10

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COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO DESKBY 221930Z FCO
TELNO 431
OF 221819Z APRIL 89
INFO DESKBY 221930Z MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

SIC
YOUR TELNO 291: SNF MODERNISATION/NATO COMMUNIQUE.

SUMMARY
1. ACTION TAKEN WITH TELTSCHIK. HE IS UNHAPPY WITH GERMAN POSITION. HOPES GENSCHER WILL BE ROUGHLY HANDLED IN WASHINGTON. HOPES GERMAN POSITION MIGHT THEN BE ALTERED. DOES NOT EXCLUDE THAT KOHL, IN POLICY STATEMENT ON 27 APRIL, COULD COVER SNF WITHOUT REVEALING GERMAN POSITION. I AM SCEPTICAL. AFTER CONSULTING THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, I PASSED ON YOUR INVITATION TO GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG TO VISIT LONDON ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. REPLY AWAITED.

DETAIL.
2. KOHL WAS NOT AVAILABLE SO I SPOKE TO TELTSCHIK IN LINE WITH YOUR TUR. AFTER SAYING THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND YOUR AUTHORITY, I REITERATED THE CONTENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KOHL OF YESTERDAY (YOUR TELNO 288). TELTSCHIK HAD SEEN THIS AND SAID HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT WITH KOHL ON 23 APRIL. KOHL WOULD HAVE TO MENTION SNF IN HIS POLICY DECLARATION ON 27 APRIL BUT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT NEED TO REVEAL THE GERMAN POSITION. THE ARGUMENTS FOR RETICENCE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WAS JUSTIFIED.

3. TELTSCHIK CONTINUED THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HOW GENSCHER WAS HANDLED IN WASHINGTON. HE HAD TOLD SCOWCROFT THAT HE HOPED GENSCHER WOULD BE TREATED ROUGHLY. IF THAT HAPPENED, THE GERMAN POSITION, WHICH WAS A BASIS FOR CONSULTATIONS AND NOT DEFINITIVE, WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT AGAIN. THERE WOULD INDEED BE ANOTHER COALITION MEETING AFTER GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON. SO FAR AS KOHL AND TELTSCHIK HIMSELF WERE CONCERNED, THERE COULD BE SCOPE FOR COMPROMISE. GETTING GENSCHER TO MOVE WOULD BE HARD.

4. I SAID THAT WE HAD RECEIVED NO OFFICIAL ACCOUNT FROM THE GERMANS OF THEIR POSITION. NOW ELEMENTS OF IT HAD LEAKED WE HAD RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT FROM THE AMERICANS. THE POSITION WAS NOT LIKELY TO PROMOTE ALLIANCE UNITY. IT RENEGED ON POSITIONS, E.G. ON SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A LANCE SUCCESSOR, WHICH THE FRG HAD ENDORSED IN THE NPG AND ELSEWHERE. IT QUALIFIED THE NEED FOR DETERRENCE BY THE EXPRESSION ''AT PRESENT''. IT QUALIFIED THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BY REFERENCE TO EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. IT TOOK AN UNACCEPTABLE STANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS AND A MANDATE AND ON REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. IT IMPLIED WRONGLY THAT NATO IN 1987 AND 1988 HAD CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE FORMULATION ON MODERNISATION NOT ONLY INVOLVED THREE YEARS DELAY BUT ALSO WAS POINTEDLY NON-COMMITTAL (''DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY'').
THERE WERE OTHER REASONS, TOO, WHY THE GERMAN POSITION WAS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTING.

5. TELTSCHIK WAS CLEARLY NOT SURPRISED BY MY RECRIMINATION. HE SAID HE REALISED THAT THE GERMAN POSITION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON OR LONDON. THE POSITION WAS PRIMARILY GENSCHER'S WORK. THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARTILLERY WAS STUPID. ONE GOOD THING WAS THAT THE FACTORS IDENTIFIED AS RELEVANT TO A MODERNISATION DECISION IN 1992 AMOUNTED TO A SET OF CONDITIONS FOR NOT MODERNISING WHICH WERE NOT FULFILLABLE. KOHL HAD STRENGTHENED THE LANGUAGE HERE BY MAKING THE FACTORS "DECISIVE AND CRUCIAL". I SAID THE FACTORS WERE NOT TIGHTLY DRAWN AND COULD BE SUBJECT TO WIDE INTERPRETATION.

6. TELTSCHIK UNDERTOOK TO PASS MY COMMENTS TO STOLTENBERG WHOM HE WOULD SEE BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS IMMEDIATLY TO KOHL.

7. AFTER CONSULTING THE PRIVATE SECRETARY I INFORMED TELTSCHIK THAT YOU WERE INVITING GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG TO LONDON FOR TALKS ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON. TELTSCHIK WELCOMED THE IDEA. I THEN PASSED YOUR INVITATION FOR GENSCHER TO KASTRUP, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AUSWAERTIGES AMT. HE ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON THE GERMAN POSITION AND I SPOKE IN LINE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE. I THEN PASSED TO GENERAL NAUMANN (FMOD) THE INVITATION TO STOLTENBERG. NAUMANN SAID HE REGRETTED THE GERMAN POSITION AND THOUGHT THAT STOLTENBERG HAD DOUBTS. THE POSITION, IN THE VIEW OF FMOD, WAS A STARTING POINT FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE HOPED THAT ALLIES WOULD PUT HEAVY PRESSURE ON GENSCHER.

MALLABY

YYYY

ADVANCE 5	
.ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR	1
MR GOULDEN	1
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MR GASS SEC POL D	1
RESIDENT CLERK	1
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NAD	4
WED	9
SED	7
PLANNERS	3
SEND	7
NEWS	9
INFO	11
PUSD	26
RESEARCH	1
LEGAL ADVISERS	6
PS	7
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR	1
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE	1
PS/PUS	1
PS/SIR J FRETWELL	1

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 267 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

SNF

President Bush wants to telephone you this afternoon, probably between 1530 and 1600, to discuss SNF.

I attach telegrams which set out the German position in detail. It is as described in my note of last night, and pretty awful. Genscher and Stoltenberg are going to Washington on Monday to discuss it. The Foreign Secretary is trying to persuade them to stop here on the way back. I assume that the President wants to talk to you about the response to the German proposals.

You will want to start by saying to the President how much we are looking forward to the arrival of the new American Ambassador tomorrow. You have arranged for him to come into No. 10 straightaway on Monday to meet you so that we get off to the best possible start.

Sounds

Thereafter you will want to make the following points:

- The Germans' position is clearly a victory for Genscher and cannot reflect Kohl's real views. We would not be helping Kohl by simply going along with it.

- We must leave the Germans in no doubt that their position is not acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom. And it would convey a disastrously weak signal on NATO's 40th Anniversary.

- The Germans should be urged not to declare their position publicly until there has been full consultation with their major allies. That includes the meetings with Genscher and Stoltenberg in Washington and your visit to Germany next Sunday to meet Kohl.

Amendment
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

- You recognise that we are not going to get the clear-cut decision on modernisation which you and the President both wanted. You are ready to work for a text with which both the UK, the US and the Germans can live. But it certainly cannot be the German text.

(1) No negotiations

- The most vital aspect is to make clear to the Germans that the US and the UK will not accept a commitment to embark on negotiations on SNF. We must both be absolutely firm on this.

(2)

- We also need to have it clearly stated that there is and will remain in the 1990s, an identified requirement for SNF as part of the strategy of flexible response. This must not be made dependent on hypotheses about future developments in arms control. The requirement does not depend on what the Russians do: it is a requirement of NATO's defence.

(3)

- We should also aim for some statement of Alliance support for continuing development work on a successor to Lance. It would not be fair to the United States to make this appear just an American decision. They deserve and should have the support of their Allies.

- You certainly favour trying to reach agreement before the Summit itself. But it must be agreement which takes account of the points above.

- If, despite our request, the Germans go public with their position we cannot remain silent. We should leave no doubt of where the United States and the United Kingdom stand. That will be most effective if the US and the UK are clearly together. You hope that officials can be tasked to work out a joint position.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

22 April 1989

22075

COMMENT

FM WASHINGTON
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1111
OF 211832Z APRIL 89
INFO FLASH UKDEL NATO. BONN
INFO DESKBY 212000Z MODUK

BIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
MIPT
BONN TELNO 420: SNF/NATO SUMMIT
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GERMAN PAPER WHICH WAS HANDED TO STATE DEPARTMENT (KIMMITT) EARLIER THIS MORNING. AS GIVEN TO US ORALLY.

QUOTE BEGINS
2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG ENDORSES THE ALLIANCE OBSERVATION THAT THERE IS AT PRESENT NO FORESEEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONCEPT OF PREVENTING WAR THROUGH DETERRENCE BASED ON AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. IN THE CASE OF NUCLEAR FORCES. LAND. SEA AND AIR BASED SYSTEMS ARE UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES NEEDED IN EUROPE TOO.
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FOLLOW-ON TO THE LANCE SHORT RANGE MISSILE IS A NATIONAL AMERICAN DECISION.
4. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT THE ALLIANCE WILL ISSUE A MANDATE FOR THE EARLY COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AIMED AT ESTABLISHING EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS AS DEFINED BY THE ALLIANCE AT REYKJAVIK IN 1987 AND IN BRUSSELS IN 1988. " No negotiations
4. FOR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY WARHEADS TOO A NEGOTIATING MANDATE WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WITH A VIEW TO ATTAINING EQUAL CEILINGS AT RADICALLY LOWER LEVELS. " No.
5. IN 1992 THE ALLIANCE WILL DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS AND ESPECIALLY THE RESULTS OF ALL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE INTO THE ALLIANCE IN 1996 AND HENCE ON THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A SYSTEM. up-to-date
6. THE DECISIVE AND CRUCIAL FACTORS IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE WHETHER IT PROVES POSSIBLE
- TO ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN GENERAL
- TO CONCLUDE BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE CAPABILITY FOR LAUNCHING SURPRISE ATTACKS AND INITIATING LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION
- TO ATTAIN THROUGH SUITABLE AGREEMENTS A HIGHER DEGREE OF MUTUAL TRUST ON ACCOUNT OF INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY

22075

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1110
OF 211830Z APRIL 89
INFO FLASH UKDEL NATO. BONN
INFO DESKBY 212000Z MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
BONN TELNO 420: SNF/NATO SUMMIT
SUMMARY
1. AMERICANS RECEIVE GERMAN TEXT WITH CONCERN ABOUT ITS CONTENTS. THEY INVITE OUR COMMENTS AND UNDERTAKE TO CONVEY THEM TO BAKER FOR THE MEETING WITH THE GERMANS ON MONDAY.
DETAIL
2. KIMMITT'S OFFICE HAVE TOLD US THAT THE GERMANS SAW HIM EARLIER THIS MORNING AND DELIVERED THEIR PAPER (TEXT IN MIFT). IN DOING SO. THEY SAID THAT THE PAPER WAS DESIGNED FOR CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. KIMMITT HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THE AMERICANS ATTACHED TO ENSURING THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE. THERE APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.
3. THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN BONN THAT GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG WOULD BE VISITING WASHINGTON ON 24 APRIL CAME SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CALL ON KIMMITT. THE GERMAN MINISTERS ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT AROUND 1030 AND LEAVE LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. THE AMERICANS HAVE ASSURED US THAT BAKER WILL HAVE THE POINTS IN OUR TEXT QUOTE AT HIS DISPOSAL UNQUOTE DURING THE CONSULTATIONS ON MONDAY. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO FEED IN ANY FURTHER POINTS THAT WE MIGHT WISH TO HAVE MADE AND HAVE ASKED FOR THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
4. INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE GERMAN TEXT ARE THAT IT COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN WORSE IN VIEW OF THE REFERENCES TO FOTL BEING A NATIONAL AMERICAN DECISION. THE CALL FOR A MANDATE FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SPECIFIC TREATMENT OF ARTILLERY. THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE 1996 UNQUOTE AND THE IMPLICIT DISMISSAL OF UNILATERAL NATO REDUCTIONS AS A MEANS OF EASING THE ISSUE.
5. THE AMERICANS ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT DETAILS OF THE GERMAN PAPER MAY ALREADY BE LEAKING. ACCORDING TO KIMMITT'S OFFICE THEIR OWN PRESS GUIDANCE WILL BE BRIEF AND GENERALISED, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SNF ISSUE IS A MATTER FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. WE HAVE HOWEVER GIVEN THEM OUR OWN CONTINGENCY PRESS LINE, EXPLAINING THAT IF LEAKS DO OCCUR WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR AT THIS STAGE WHEN THE CONSULTATIONS HAVE YET TO TAKE PLACE.

ACLAND

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ADVANCE 5

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PRIME MINISTER

SNF MODERNISATION

I ought to bring you up to date following our discussion this morning. The Germans have now reached an agreed position on SNF. It is unsatisfactory, which is not surprising, but slightly worse than we expected. The main points seem to be:

in current circumstances SNF will continue to be needed in Europe. [This is helpful, although the reference to current circumstances weakens it.]

a decision on production and deployment should be taken in 1992 in the light of political developments meanwhile. Certain criteria are set out. [This is thoroughly unhelpful, both for the length of time by which a final decision is postponed and the broad scope given for arguing over whether or not conditions have been met.]

the Federal Republic proposes early negotiations on SNF. [This is also bad, although of course it is only a German proposal.]

Apparently Genscher and Stoltenberg are to go to Washington on Monday to present their position. They may stop over in London on the way back.

The Germans have not so far made any public announcement and I have sent off your message to Kohl (attached) making clear that you will take it amiss if a public announcement is made, and will certainly be compelled to put your own point of view publicly when you are in Germany on 30 April.

In practice I think that the details are more or less bound to leak, in which case we would have to say that this may be the German position but it is not the NATO position and there is still a lot of hard bargaining to do.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

21 April 1989

176004
MDADAN 579D

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO DESKBY 211330Z FCO
TELNO 420
OF 211320Z APRIL 89
INFO DESKBY 211330Z UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 418: SNF

SUMMARY
1. GERMAN POSITION TO BE PRESENTED TO FCO TODAY AND THEN ANNOUNCED.

DETAIL
2. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER TO THE FCO TODAY THE DETAILS OF THE GERMAN POSITION HAMMERED OUT BY A COALITION DISCUSSION LAST NIGHT AND APPROVED BY KOHL AND THE OTHER PARTY LEADERS THIS MORNING. THE POSITION IS TO BE ANNOUNCED TODAY, AFTER MAJOR ALLIES HAVE BEEN INFORMED. OUR VIEWS (YOUR TELNOS 285 AND 286) WERE SEEN BY SCHAEUBLE, GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG BEFORE THE COALITION MEETING AND PLAYED A PART IN THE DISCUSSION.

3. MY FIRST READOUTS, FROM RUEHE AND THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, INDICATE THAT THE MAIN POINTS OF THE NEW POSITION ARE:

(A) IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES LAND, SEA AND AIR BASED SNF WILL CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED IN EUROPE. CONCEPT OF ''NO THIRD ZERO' NOT MENTIONED.

(B) A DECISION ON PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN 1992 IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MEANWHILE. CRITERIA AFFECTING THE DECISION ON MODERNISATION ARE SET OUT. ONE IS THE REMOVAL OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

(C) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC PROPOSES EARLY NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF.

4. THESE POINTS AND OTHERS ARE APPARENTLY INCORPORATED IN A SHORT POSITION PAPER. SO FAR THERE ARE NO GERMAN DRAFTS OF LANGUAGE FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OR THE NATO DECLARATION.

5. THIS LOOKS LIKE A VICTORY FOR GENSCHER. RUEHE, HOWEVER, IS CLAIMING THAT THE MENTION OF LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AT (A) ABOVE IS AN

176004
MDADAN 5790

IMPORTANT GAIN FOR THOSE SUPPORTING LANCE MODERNISATION IN DUE COURSE. I ARGUED STRONGLY TO RUEHE AND KASTRUP THAT, NOT LEAST SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD AGREED IN FRANKFURT TO DISCUSS SNF AGAIN AT THE END OF APRIL, ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS A BASIS FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES RATHER THAN DEFINITIVE.

MALLABY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 4

ADVANCE 4

.ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR
MR GOULDEN

~~HD/SEC POL D~~
MR GASS SEC POL D

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(CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF MODERNISATION

Thank you for your letter of 21 April about the Prime Minister's planned meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 30 April. I have discussed this further with her. Since you wrote, we now know that the Germans have reached an agreed position although not yet publicised it.

The Prime Minister is prepared to send a message to Chancellor Kohl urging that the German Government should not announce a position on SNF before their meeting on 30 April. But she wishes the message to spell out more explicitly the difficulties which a public announcement would cause for her. I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister would like to be despatched.

In amplification I should say that the Prime Minister does not regard it as reasonable that she should refrain from public comment about the German position, if it is by then public. Her view throughout has been that the case for modernisation needs to be clearly spelled out in the Federal Republic and she does not intend to resile from that now. She does not think the trade-off proposed in your letter between her acquiescing in an unsatisfactory German position on SNF and Kohl agreeing to take account of her difficulties over EMU is in any way a realistic proposition. There are no grounds to think that Kohl could deliver his side of such a bargain. And anyway she thinks the SNF issue far too important to be passed over in silence.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

When we met at Frankfurt in February we agreed to meet again at the end of April and to resume then our discussion about short-range nuclear forces. We jointly announced that arrangement to the media.

I hope therefore that a German position on short-range nuclear forces will not be announced before our talks on 30 April. To make such an announcement would inevitably give the appearance of undermining the point of our meeting and would put me in the position of having to react publicly on 30 April to whatever had been announced. I realise that you will have your own timetable for internal discussions, but I suggest that the need for consultation with allies would be a convincing reason for not stating the nature of your position.

EL3DMT

See 3 PM a

PRIME MINISTER

SNF MODERNISATION: YOUR MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

You are due to meet Chancellor Kohl on Sunday 30 April. There are clear indications that he intends to announce the German position on SNF modernisation/arms control in a speech to the German Parliament on 27 April. In the light of this you wondered whether it made sense to maintain the meeting. You would not wish to seem to be endorsing an unsatisfactory German position. At the least, you would feel bound to spell out publicly your disapproval of the German position.

I have consulted the FCO and Christopher Mallaby in Bonn on these points. Their advice is attached. In essence it is:

- you should maintain the visit because cancellation or postponement would be to pass up an opportunity to influence the Germans and would be evidence of a public rift in the Alliance;

- but you should send Kohl an immediate message urging him not to announce any final decision on modernisation until after your visit. President Bush is apparently ready to do the same;

- at a meeting with Kohl, you should not underline our differences publicly but should say privately to him that you acknowledge his political difficulties over SNF and expect him likewise to take account of your political difficulties over the proposal to summon an inter-governmental conference to amend the EC Treaty as proposed by the Delors Group.

Recommendations

I think the proposal that you should go ahead with the meeting is right. It is always a bad idea to miss a chance to influence someone: and a tolerable outcome on SNF is still

attainable.

I see no harm in sending a message urging Kohl not to make any public announcement of the German position until after your visit: after all it was agreed in Frankfurt that you would meet again to discuss it before conclusions were reached. But in practice I very much doubt whether Kohl can accept this. He is committed to making a full statement about the Government's policies to the Bundestag on 27 April and he can hardly fail to say something about the Government's position on SNF modernisation (although he might say it is subject to consultation with allies).

But I see great difficulties in biting your lip and saying nothing in public about the differences between Britain and Germany following a meeting with Kohl. Your view throughout has been that the case for modernisation needs to be clearly stated in Germany and you can hardly resile from that now. The FCO idea of negotiating a trade-off between your acceptance of his problems on SNF and his acknowledgement of yours on the Delors Group is fine as an idea, but no commitment he gave you would be worth much: if he cannot control his Government on SNF, he certainly cannot do so on EMU.

It seems to me therefore that the right course is to:

- stick to the meeting;

- send Kohl a message urging him to postpone any public announcement until after 30 April;

- speak your mind privately <u>and publicly</u> on 30 April.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

<u>21 April 1989</u>

EL3DMR

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

21 April 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF Modernisation

You asked in your letter of 19 April for advice on whether, in the light of the erosion of the German government's position on SNF modernisation, the Prime Minister should go ahead with her proposed meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 30 April.

We have sought the advice of Sir Christopher Mallaby. His views are in the attached telegram. He recommends that the the Prime Minister should not cancel her meeting with Kohl; but should send him a message asking him not to announce the German government's position on SNF until his meeting with her has taken place. A draft for such a message is in Bonn telno 414.

We understand that President Bush is being advised to telephone Chancellor Kohl to make a similar point, namely that the German government should not take any final decision until after the bilateral consultations with the United States which the Americans have for some time now been trying to arrange.

The Foreign Secretary endorses the idea that the Prime Minister should send a message to Chancellor Kohl asking him not to go public with a position on SNF modernisation which would be unwelcome to the British Government before the Prime Minister has had the chance to have a further talk to him on the subject.

The Foreign Secretary believes the Prime Minister should maintain her visit to Germany. However a cancellation or postponement was presented, it would inevitably be seen as a significant rift between the UK and Germany, which would only exacerbate disarray among the Alliance, cause dismay to the Americans and give comfort to the Soviet Union.

The question of whether the Prime Minister should go and remain silent on the issue or go and make clear in public our objections to the German position, depends on what Kohl says and does between now and 30 April. If he responds positively to the message from the Prime Minister which we have suggested, and does not announce a German position before the visit, then there is a good case for the Prime Minister

seeking to influence the German decision by making clear in public as well as in private during her visit the reasons why we believe NATO should take a decision this year to modernise and, more especially, the reasons why an arms control negotiation would be mistaken. If, on the other hand, Kohl has made a clear public statement on Genscher lines, which does not allow room for any further negotiation, then anything said in public would be likely simply to underline the Alliance's disunity, without affecting the position materially.

In those circumstances, there would, however, be a case for the Prime Minister saying privately to Kohl when they meet that:

- we believe the position he has taken is the wrong one - damaging to the credibility of the Alliance. But because a public row would do more damage and because of the importance of his continuing leadership of the FRG, we will not criticise him in public. We accept that he will have to judge what will and will not run in FRG politics;

- by the same token, she has to be the judge of what will and will not run in the UK, and that she must tell Kohl that an inter-governmental conference to amend the EC Treaty, as proposed by the Delors Group, will simply not run with the British Parliament. There are lots of positive steps in the monetary field we are prepared to take, but we hope Kohl will appreciate the limits on what is feasible for us.

As we discussed, that card is not an ace because Kohl will be under no pressure to make a commitment to us at that point and, when decisions do come to be taken within the EC later in the year, there will be counter-pressures on him from Genscher, President Mitterrand etc. But given that it will not anyway be in our interest to rock the boat if Kohl has taken up an irrevocable stance on SNF, we have nothing to lose and something to gain by playing this card.

In sum, the Foreign Secretary thinks:

(i) the Prime Minister should send a message to Kohl as suggested in Bonn telno 414;

(ii) she should go to Bonn whatever the decision taken by the Germans;

(iii) whether or not she says anything in public must depend upon what response Kohl makes to her message and what stance he takes in public between now and 30 April.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

172314
MDADAN 5626

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TO DESKBY 201430Z FCO
TELNO 413
OF 201346Z APRIL 89

Mr 9/4

SNF AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KOHL

SUMMARY

1. TO POSTPONE THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KOHL WOULD BE TO LOSE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE HIM. BETTER TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM NOT TO ANNOUNCE A DEFINITIVE SNF POSITION ON 27 APRIL. I RECOMMEND A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. THIS TELEGRAM RESPONDS TO YOUR REQUEST (MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LEVER) FOR ADVICE ON WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH HER MEETING WITH KOHL ON 30 APRIL.

3. KOHL'S COALITION IS IN SERIOUS POLITICAL DIFFICULTY. HIS POLICY STATEMENT IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 27 APRIL (WHICH I SHALL PREVIEW IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM) IS LIKELY TO INCORPORATE VARIOUS CHANGES OF POLICY DESIGNED TO REGAIN POPULARITY. HE WANTS AND INTENDS TO ANNOUNCE THEN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GERMAN POSITION ON SNF, NOW BEING HAMMERED OUT IN THE COALITION (MY TELNO 412). THAT POSITION IS ANYWAY LIKELY TO LEAK SOON AFTER IT IS AGREED. BUT AN ACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT BY KOHL IN HIS SPEECH ON 27 APRIL WOULD NOT ACCORD WITH HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN FRANKFURT IN FEBRUARY THAT THEY WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION OF SNF WHEN THEY MET AT THE END OF APRIL.

4. I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD SEND AN EARLY MESSAGE TO KOHL ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN MIFT. I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE OF HIS AGREEING NOT TO ANNOUNCE HIS POSITION ON 27 APRIL. BUT ONLY A CHANCE. HE MIGHT ALTERNATIVELY REPLY THAT HE MUST PRESENT A POSITION ON SNF ON 27 APRIL BUT WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES. THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO TRY TO EXERT SOME INFLUENCE ON 30 APRIL.

5. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TO SAY, NOW OR AFTER THE COALITION'S POSITION ON SNF HAS BECOME CLEAR, THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SHE IS UNABLE TO GO THROUGH WITH HER PLANNED VISIT, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE REINSTATED QUICKLY. THERE WOULD BE THESE DISADVANTAGES:

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(A) THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE LOST FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO INFLUENCE KOHL'S APPROACH TOWARDS GORBACHEV, PREPARATIONS FOR WHOSE STATE VISIT HERE IN JUNE ARE ACTIVELY IN HAND.

(B) THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD ALSO BE LOST TO PUT TO KOHL OUR VIEWS ON MAJOR CURRENT EC QUESTIONS IN THE RUN-UP TO MADRID. THERE ARE SIGNS OF ATTEMPTS TO BUILD A FRANCO-GERMAN CONSENSUS IN SEVERAL AREAS, WITH AN EYE TO THE COMING FRENCH PRESIDENCY. THE CHANCE TO INFLUENCE KOHL WOULD BE USEFUL WITH REGARD TO THE DELORS REPORT: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION, WHERE HE IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRENCH IDEAS: FRONTIERS AND PREVENTION OF CRIME: AND THE WITHHOLDING TAX.

(C) CANCELLATION OF THE MEETING WOULD BE SEEN AS REPRESENTING A SERIOUS RIFT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDEDRAL REPUBLIC ACROSS THE BOARD OF CURRENT BUSINESS. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GERMAN POLICIES IN GENERAL WOULD BE REDUCED.

(D) SUCH PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF A ROW BETWEEN KOHL AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD ADD TO THE GENERAL IMPRESSION HERE THAT HE IS ACCIDENT-PRONE. HIS CHANCES OF PUTTING AN END TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT BAD PATCH WOULD BE DIMINISHED.

6. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO CARRY THROUGH THE MEETING WITH KOHL ON 30 APRIL, BUT TO EXPRESS PUBLIC REGRET AT THE GERMAN POSITION ON SNF, WOULD IN MY VIEW PRESENT FEWER DIFFICULTIES THAN CANCELLATION OF THE MEETING. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SHOW, IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC REMARKS, THAT OTHER MATTERS HAD BEEN USEFULLY DISCUSSED. THE TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT SNF SHOULD, I SUGGEST, CONCENTRATE ON REGRET ABOUT THE GERMAN POSITION, NOT CRITICISM OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH KOHL IS WEAK IN MANY WAYS, ESPECIALLY AT PRESENT, A GOVERNMENT LED BY THE SPD WOULD CAUSE FAR MORE DIFFICULTIES IN THE ALLIANCE (MY DESPATCH OF 10 APRIL).

MALLABY

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OF 201601Z APRIL 89
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SIC CFJ
FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT: SNF

SUMMARY

1. NO REVELATIONS. KOHL TAKES DEFENSIVE TONE AT PRESS CONFERENCE. MITTERRAND SCEPTICAL ABOUT SOVIET CLAIMS NOT TO BE MODERNISING BUT SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS STILL TIME FOR REFLECTION BEFORE NATO'S SNF BECOME OBSOLETE.

DETIAL

2. AT THE JONT PRESS CONFERENCE CONCLUDING THE 19/20 APRIL FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT AND INAUGURATION OF JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE AND KOHL HAD DISCUSSED SNF MODERNISATION BUT FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS LEFT OVER FOR THE NATO SUMMIT. MITTERRAND SAID THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO COMPROMISE THE CURRENT DISARMAMENT PROCESS BUT NOR SHOULD EITHER SIDE EVER BE LEFT DANGEROUSLY EXPOSED. IT SEEMED THAT THERE WAS TIME FOR FURTHER REFLEXION BEFORE NATO'S SNF BECAME OBSOLETE. BUT THERE WAS ROOM FOR SCEPTICISM OVER GORBACHEV'S ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT MODERNISE THEIR SNF: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DEPENDED ON HOW MUCH MODERNISATION HAD ALREAD TAKEN PLACE, AND IT SEEMED HARD TO BELIEVE SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MODERNISATION SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S.

3. MUSITELLI (ELYSEE) PRIVATELY CONFIRMED THIS ACCOUNT. MITTERRAND HAD USED THE SAME FORMULATION OF FRENCH POLICY AS AT THE FRANCO-BRITISH SUMMIT. THE TWO LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT A NATO COMPROMISE WAS IN SIGHT, AND HAD NOT SPENT THAT MUCH TIME ON THE ISSUE.

4. KOHL DUCKED QUESTIONS ABOUT FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN BONN, SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE EXTENSION OF MILITARY SERVICE HE SAID THAT NO-ONE SHOULD DOUBT GERMANY'S WILL TO CONTRIBUTE FULLY TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE - HE WISHED THAT OTHERS DID AS MUCH AS GERMANY - AND HE CITED GERMAN DETERMINATION OVER INF

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DEPLOYMENT IN THE EARLY 1980S.

5. A REPORT ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SUMMIT WILL FOLLOW.

FERGUSSON

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INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, BONN

SIC CFJ
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
WASHINGTON TELNO 1094 AND BONN TELNO 412: SNF

SUMMARY
1. REMARKS MADE BY U S DEFENCE SECRETARY AT NPG PRESS CONFERENCE COULD BE USED BY FRG TO SUPPORT ARGUMENTS THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR STRONG LANGUAGE IN COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT TO MEET U S CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. MR YOUNGER WELCOMES NPG COMMUNIQUE AS STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS AND REJECTION OF THIRD ZERO. MY DISCUSSIONS WITH KEEL IN NPG MARGINS INDICATE THAT U S MISSION HERE EQUALLY SURPRISED AT KIMMITT'S REMARKS REPORTED IN FIRST TUR (PARA 5).

DETAIL
2. AT THE NPG PRESS CONFERENCE AT LUNCH-TIME, U S DEFENCE SECRETARY CHENEY WAS ASKED WHETHER THE NPG COMMUNIQUE (OUR TELNO 125) PROVIDED A SUFFICIENT REAFFIRMATION OF NATO'S REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID THAT IT DID. ALTHOUGH CHENEY WAS TALKING SOLELY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NPG AND NO DOUBT INTENDED MERELY TO INDICATE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE ALLIANCE FORWARD TO THE NEXT STEP, THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPLICIT QUALIFICATION TO THIS EFFECT MAY WELL BE QUOTED AGAINST US BY THE FRG IN ARGUMENTS ON THE STRENGTH OF WORDING NEEDED AT THE SUMMIT. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PUT THE APPROPRIATE GLOSS ON CHENEY'S REMARKS.

3. CHENEY ALSO SAID THAT FINAL DECISIONS ON FOTL WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED BEFORE 1991. ONCE AGAIN, ALTHOUGH HE WAS TALKING IN TERMS OF FINAL DECISIONS ON PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT, HIS REMARKS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT THE U S REQUIRED NO FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO MODERNISATION BEFORE THAT DATE. (MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT IN FACT CHENEY'S APPROACH ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE EMERGING CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS.)

4. AT THE SAME PRESS CONFERENCE MR YOUNGER EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE NPG, STRESSING THAT IT HAD PROVIDED A CLEAR REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY, THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A MIX OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE REQUIREMENTS TO UPDATE NATO NUCLEAR FORCES STEMMING FROM THE 1983 MONTEBELLO DECISION. HE FIRMLY REBUTTED ARGUMENTS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT REPRESENT PROGRESS TOWARDS A MODERNISATION DECISION AND ACCUSATIONS THAT IT DEMONSTRATED A SOFTENING OF THE UK POSITION ON MODERNISATION. WITH ITS FIRM ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO THE TYPE OF SYSTEMS WHICH NATO WOULD CONTINUE TO REQUIRE AND ITS UNANIMOUS REJECTION BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OF THE THIRD ZERO, THE NPG WAS A FURTHER SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE ALLIANCE'S 'STEP BY STEP' PROCESS TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A CREDIBLE DETERRENT. THE NEXT STEP WOULD COME WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. TIMELY DECISIONS MUST AND WOULD BE TAKEN WHEN NECESSARY BUT NONE HAD BEEN REQUIRED AT THIS MEETING.

5. MR YOUNGER ALSO REITERATED IN CLEAR TERMS THE UK POSITION ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS. CHENEY, AGREEING WITH MR YOUNGER, SAID MORE THAN ONCE THAT THE U S WOULD NOT REGARD SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AS APPROPRIATE. (EFFORTS BY THE NORWEGIANS AND OTHERS TO INTRODUCE ARMS CONTROL LANGUAGE INTO THE COMMUNIQUE WERE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED - AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION.)

6. I HAVE SPOKEN TO KEEL ABOUT KIMMITT'S REPORTED REMARKS ON THE MINIMALIST LANGUAGE REQUIRED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT (PARAGRAPH 5 OF FIRST TUR) AND THAT 'THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPHS 30 AND 31 WAS MORE OR LESS AGREED AMONG OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NATO'. HE WAS AS SURPRISED AS I AM ABOUT THE MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE ARISEN IN WASHINGTON.

7. IF BY 'OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' BAKER MEANS THE U S AND THE UK HE IS CORRECT AS FAR AS IT GOES - THOUGH OF COURSE THE GERMAN RESERVATION IS SHARED BY A NUMBER OF OTHER DELEGATIONS (SEE CCWG(89)4 2ND REVISE, FAXED TO LONDON ON 19 APRIL). BUT FOR THE REST THE POINTS MADE BY MR FALL TO KIMMITT ARE EXACTLY RIGHT. IN ALL THE DISCUSSION HELD HERE, THE UK HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT SUBSTANTIVE LANGUAGE ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO FLESH OUT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN PARAS 30 AND 31 AND THAT THE EXACT LOCATION OF SUCH LANGUAGE - THE 'MISSING LINK' IN PARA 51 OR THE SUMMIT DECLARATION - REMAINED A MATTER FOR DEBATE. KEEL HAS CONFIRMED TO ME THAT HE WAS IN NO DOUBT ABOUT WHERE WE STOOD. (AS YOU KNOW I DISCUSSED OUR IDEAS WITH HIM MORE THAN ONCE BUT NEVER GAVE HIM ANYTHING ON PAPER.) I AM SURE THE U S DELEGATION WILL HAVE

REPORTED APPROPRIATELY TO WASHINGTON - A PROCESS WHICH A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION RECENTLY DESCRIBED AS EQUIVALENT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO 'SHOUTING INTO A BLACK HOLE'.

ALEXANDER

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Mr Gass

MIPT: SNF AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KOHL.

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KOHL

BEGINS

WHEN WE MET AT FRANKFURT IN FEBRUARY WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT THE END OF APRIL AND TO RESUME THEN OUR DISCUSSION ABOUT SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. WE JOINTLY ANNOUNCED THAT ARRANGEMENT TO THE MEDIA. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT A GERMAN POSITION ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE OUR TALKS ON 30 APRIL. ~~I REALISE THAT YOU WILL NEED TO REFER TO THE SUBJECT IN YOUR POLICY STATEMENT~~ ON 27 APRIL, BUT I SUGGEST THAT THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES WOULD BE A CONVINCING REASON FOR NOT STATING THE NATURE OF YOUR POSITION.

ON THAT BASIS I AM SURE THAT OUR MEETING ON 30 APRIL CAN BE A USEFUL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT BUSINESS.

ENDS

MALLABY

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MR GOULDEN

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MR GASS SEC POL D
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To the ~~because the~~ world ~~then~~ ~~to make our~~ ~~future meeting~~ position. inevitably ~~also~~ to the public ~~to whether~~ ~~our meeting~~ ~~to give it~~ our meeting would put in the position of having to react publicly on 30 April to whatever had been announced.

DEFENCE : INF PTG

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF Modernisation/NATO Summit

Thank you for your letter of 19 April.

Sir Christopher Mallaby will be sending us advice shortly on the arguments for and against going ahead with the Prime Minister's visit to Germany. In the meantime, however, Sir Christopher Mallaby has recommended that we should feed in as quickly as possible to the Germans our views on the position which the NATO Summit should adopt.

// I enclose two draft telegrams. I have not yet been able to show them to the Foreign Secretary but it would be very helpful to have your comments as soon as possible so that we can despatch them this afternoon.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL		FLASH

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YOUR TELNO 410 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1094:
SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT

1. In the light of your advice (your TUR and your telcon with Lever) that our views on the wording of the NATO position on SNF modernisation/arms control should be fed into the Germans as soon as possible, and the uncertainty (Washington telno 1094) about whether, or when, the Americans are likely to take any further action, I should be grateful if you could take early action to ensure that the Germans are aware of our position. Subject to your views, this might best be done by your handing over to Teltschik, and sending to Genscher and Stoltenberg, a piece of paper setting out the wording which we would be prepared to accept for the key paragraphs of the comprehensive concept report. This is in MIFT. In addition you should make to Teltschik the following points:-

/// - We understand that thinking in the Coalition is moving in the direction of postponing until 1991/1992 any decision on the deployment or production of new SNF systems. British

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		Catchword: Ministers	
File number P07ABD	Dept SEC POL	Drafted by (Block capitals) P LEVER	Telephone no 270 3132
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Ministers regret this: they would have preferred a clear signal already this year that new systems will indeed be deployed.

- They recognise however the political sensitivty of the issue in Germany. They hope that the matter can be resolved in advance of the NATO Summit on the basis of a position around which all members of the Alliance can rally. They would not therefore wish to press for a ~~discussion~~ decision on deployment if this is unpalatable to the German government.
- Nonetheless, the Alliance's position must be one which reflects strength and confidence, not weakness. And it must not be so vague or ambivalent as to give rise to confusion or misunderstanding at the Summit. The essential points for inclusion in the Alliance's position at the Summit are:-

  (i) that effective and credible SNF systems will remain an essential part of NATO's strategy of flexible response in the 1990s;

  (ii) that the requirement for the modernisation of both the Alliance's air-delivered and surface-to-surface SNF systems is confirmed and support is given for the necessary development work, with decisions on numbers and deployment locations to be taken at the appropriate time;

  (iii) that in parallel with steps to keep NATO's SNF systems updated, there will be scope for substantial reductions in the overall number of nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly nuclear artillery and warheads;

  (iv) that the Alliance cannot accept calls for a "third zero" elimination of SNF systems.
- The language we are suggesting for the Comprehensive Concept report reflects these points. It builds on texts already under discussion in the North Atlantic Council and on language which, we understand, the Americans have put to the Germans bilaterally. It goes no further on the modernisation

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side than what the Germans have already accepted in the agreed confidential minute of the last NPG Ministerial meeting.

- The language includes an arms control dimension in terms which British Ministers believe should have political attraction. They do not (not) however see any scope for an East/West negotiation on SNF arms control. The Soviet Union's declared aim in such a negotiation is clear: the denuclearisation of Western Europe. This aim was explicitly repeated at the recent Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin. It is incompatible with NATO's continuing commitment to nuclear deterrence. To embark upon a negotiation, given this incompatibility of approach, would ~~be~~ court the risk of an inexorable slide towards the third zero. British Ministers therefore cannot accept any implied commitment to the initiation of such a negotiation. Nor would they be prepared to see established, or to participate in the work of, any Alliance body mandated to consider the terms of reference for ~~for~~ one.

- The Prime Minister hopes that the Coalition will not adopt any public position incompatible with these views until she has had a chance to discuss the matter with the Chancellor on 30 April.

3. You should convey the same message, in whatever terms you think appropriate, to Genscher and Stoltenberg and to any others whose voices in the Coalition deliberations you think would be important. In so doing you should make the point that though, at the end of the day, Germany's Allies cannot impose upon her the stationing of missiles which the Germans do not want, neither can the German government impose upon its key Allies (the Americans, the French and ourselves) an arms control negotiation which they believe to be daft and dangerous.

4. For Washington. You should inform the Americans that we are

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putting our preferred language directly to the Germans.

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MIPT: SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT

1. The text of the paragraphs in chapter 3 of the Comprehensive Concept dealing with the role of sub-strategic nuclear forces (paragraphs 28 - 31 of the latest draft (CCWG(89)4(Second Revise, corresponding to paragraphs 29 - 32 of the earlier version) would read as follows:-

"28. Nuclear forces below the strategic level provide an essential political and military linkage between the European and North American members of the Alliance and between conventional and strategic forces. The Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are not designed to compensate for conventional imbalances, though their levels must take into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. Their role is to ensure that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military action. Nuclear forces below the strategic level thus make an essential contribution to

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		Catchword: deterrence.	
File number P07ABE	Dept SEC POL	Drafted by (Block capitals) P LEVER	Telephone no 270 3132
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deterrence. Credible and effective sub-strategic nuclear forces, including land-based SNF systems in Europe, will remain a vital part of NATO's nuclear inventory during the 1990s and beyond.

"29. As regards the sub-strategic forces possessed by the members of the integrated military structure, their level and characteristics (diversity, survivability, penetration capability, accuracy, responsiveness and flexibility in use) must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. Force levels also depend on the flexibility and capability of the systems involved and hence, as agreed by the Alliance in 1988, the latter will be kept up-to-date. In this context particular attention is being given by the Allies to the long-standing requirement for sub-strategic systems of relatively longer range including air-launched and surface-to-surface missile systems. The requirement for the replacement of the Alliance's existing systems in both these categories has been confirmed. The Allies concerned expressed support for the continuation of the necessary development work.

"30. The updating of these sub-strategic systems would permit substantial stockpile reductions, particularly for nuclear artillery. Such a shift in emphasis towards longer range systems would have both military and political advantages. It is a clear example of how greater security can be achieved at a lower level of arms.

31. The wide deployment of such forces among countries participating in the integrated military structure of the Alliance, as well as the arrangements for consultation in the nuclear area, demonstrates solidarity and willingness to share nuclear roles and responsiblities. It thereby helps

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to reinforce deterrence."

4. The text for the missing paragraph (paragraph 49 in CCWG (89) 4 (Second Revise), corresponding to paragraph 51 of the earlier version) of the section in chapter 4 of the Comprehensive Concept report of sub-strategic nuclear forces would read:-

"As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate unilaterally its current, massive advantage over NATO in ground-based nuclear missile systems deployed in Europe. NATO has engaged in a substantial programme of unilateral reductions in its stockpile of nuclear weapons, reducing its stockpile by over one-third to its lowest level in more than twenty years. A further reduction of up to one-third of NATO's current stockpile - including cutting in half the number of the shortest range systems - could occur in the context of restructuring and updating NATO's nuclear forces with systems of longer range. While maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, we recognise that nuclear weapons, kept up to date with characteristics to perform their deterrent role credibly across the required spectrum of ranges, and taking into account the conventional and nuclear threat, will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Moreover, our priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. If concrete results toward eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further reductions in the level of nuclear forces.

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SNF: AKHROMEYEV IN PRAVDA

SUMMARY

1. AKHROMEYEV ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT NATO'S STRIKE AIRCRAFT CANCEL OUT THE WARSAW PACTS ADVANTAGE IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILES. DENIES RECENT MODERNISATION. ALLEGES THAT FOLLOW ON TO LANCE WILL BE EQUIVALENT TO SS-23.

DETAIL

2. PRAVDA OF 19 APRIL CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH MARSHAL S F AKHROMEYEV ON SNF. AKHROMEYEV'S FIRST ARGUMENT IS THAT THERE IS AN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING FIGURES:

	WARSAW PACT		NATO
TACTICAL MISSILES	1,608	2:1	136
ARTILLERY	6,000+	1:1	6,000+
STRIKE AIRCRAFT	2,783 (UP TO 1,000KMS)	1:1,5	4,075 (UP TO 1,000KMS PLUS)

HE THEN ACCUSES NATO OF BEING SELECTIVE IN CONCENTRATING ON MISSILES, WHEN THE GROSS NUMBERS ARE EQUAL.

3. AKHROMEYEV THEN DENIES THAT THE WP HAVE INDULGED IN MODERNISATION. THE FIGURES HE ADVANCES FOR TACTICAL MISSILES ARE:

TYPE	NUMBER	RANGE	INTRODUCED

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MDHIAN 1425

		(MAX)	
''LUNA'' (FROG)	658	70KM	1964
''TOCHKA'' (SS-21)	289	70KM	1975
''R-17'' (SCUD-B)	661	300KM	1962

4. AKHROMEYEV THEN GOES ON TO ALLEGE THAT FOTL WILL HAVE A RANGE OF 450KM AND IS THEREFORE ANALOGOUS TO THE OKA (SS-23) WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED TO SCRAP UNDER THE INF TREATY.

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ADDITIONAL 15

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 April 1989

SNF MODERNISATION: NATO SUMMIT

Thank you for your letter of 20 April proposing instructions to HM Ambassador in Bonn to put to the Germans our views on the position which the NATO Summit should adopt on SNF modernisation. I have not been able to consult the Prime Minister. But the two draft telegrams enclosed with your letter seem to me consistent with the line we have taken with the Americans. My main misgiving concerns the second indent of paragraph 1 of the first telegram. I think this leans further than the Prime Minister would wish in the direction of understanding for the German position, which she actually regards as misguided and weak. I propose therefore that the second and third indents be run together to read:-

> "Nonetheless it is important to try to reach a position around which all members of the Alliance can rally and it would be best to do this in advance of the NATO Summit itself. But this must be a position which reflects strength and confidence ....."

With that amendment the telegram could be despatched.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MDHIAN 1422

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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TO DESKBY 201100Z FCO
TELNO 412
OF 201020Z APRIL 89
INFO DESKBY 201100Z UKDEL NATO, DESKBY 201300Z WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS

SIC CFJ

WASHINGTON TELNO 1094 : SNF

SUMMARY
1. FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT DELIBERATIONS IN FEDERAL COALITION. ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY GERMAN REACTIONS TO OUR PROPOSED LANGUAGE. IF WE ARE TO PROPOSE LANGUAGE, WE SHOULD TO SO TODAY OR TOMORROW.

DETAIL
2. SCHAEUBLE, STILL MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY BUT FROM TOMORROW INTERIOR MINISTER, HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF THE COALITION MEETING ON 18 APRIL WHICH TALLIES GENERALLY WITH RUEHE'S ACCOUNT IN MY TELNO 410. SCHAEUBLE SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR COULD NOT BE AT THIS EVENING'S RESUMED COALITION DISCUSSION OF SNF. DECISIONS WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE TAKEN TODAY. BUT CLEAR POSITIONS, WHICH THE CHANCELLOR COULD BE EXPECTED TO ENDORSE, MIGHT WELL BE REACHED. THE COALITION HAD NOT YET FOCUSSED ON TEXTS OR WORDING. SCHAEUBLE SAID HE WAS ''NOT FAMILIAR'' WITH ANY AMERICAN DRAFT FOR THIS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, WHICH I INTERPRET AS MEANING THAT HE KNOWS THE AMERICANS HAVE PUT LANGUAGE TO THE GERMANS BUT HAS NOT YET CONSIDERED IT IN DETAIL.

3. SCHAEUBLE SAID THAT THE COALITION'S POSITION ON MODERNISATION WOULD BE THAT THE ALLIANCE DECISION ON PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF SNF SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL 1991/92 (AS DISTINCT FROM 1992 IN RUEHE'S ACCOUNT). SCHAEUBLE CONFIRMED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE DURATION OF THE POLICY OF ''NO THIRD ZERO'' WAS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE. HE SAID THAT HE AND OTHER CDU MINISTERS COULD ACCEPT THE FORMULA ''FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE''. BUT GENSCHER WANTED SOMETHING LIKE ''IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES''. ON THE QUESTION OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS, A NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE COALITION DISCUSSIONS REALISED THAT TO DEMAND IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS WAS MORE THAN THE NATO MARKET WOULD BEAR. THE IDEA OF THE NATO SUMMIT ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE TO DRAW UP A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WITH NO DEADLINE

FOR ITS REPORT, WAS A STRONG RUNNER IN THE DISCUSSION HERE.

4. IF WE DECIDE TO PUT BRITISH LANGUAGE TO THE GERMANS, IT WOULD BE BEST TO DO SO TODAY OR AT LATEST TOMORROW, BEFORE THE EVOLVING POSITIONS HERE ARE FIXED IN GERMAN DRAFTS. THE BEST WAY OF PRESENTING OUR LANGUAGE WOULD BE FOR ME TO SEE TELTSCHIK. I SHOULD GIVE A COPY TO THE FEDERAL MOD. ON BALANCE, I THINK IT WOULD ALSO BE PREFERABLE TO GIVE A COPY TO THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT: ALTHOUGH THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT WILL NOT BE FAVOURABLE TO OUR POSITION, THEY WOULD BE EVEN MORE NEGATIVE IF WE LEFT THEM OUT OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS.

5. I WOULD EXPECT THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 700 TO WASHINGTON TO BE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) THE NEW SENTENCE ABOUT SUB-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES REMAINING ''A VITAL PART OF NATO'S NUCLEAR INVENTORY DURING THE 1990S AND BEYOND'' ADDRESSES THE POINT IN DISPUTE HERE ABOUT THE DURATION OF ''NO THIRD ZERO''. I THINK THERE WOULD BE A CHANCE OF THE GERMANS BEING BROUGHT TO ACCEPT ''DURING THE 1990S AND BEYOND'' BUT GENSCHER WOULD FIGHT HARD TO DELETE THE LAST TWO WORDS. THE ALTERNATIVE FORMULA ''FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE'' IS CONTROVERSIAL AMONG THE GERMANS BUT THEY MIGHT ACCEPT IT IN THE END.

(B) THE SENTENCE ABOUT CONFIRMATION OF THE REQUIREMENT TO REPLACE AIR-LAUNCHED AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE SNF MISSILES WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GERMANS TO ACCEPT BECAUSE IT IMPLIES THAT THE REQUIREMENT IS WITHOUT LIMIT IN TIME. MANY IMPORTANT PLAYERS IN THE COALITION HOLD STRONGLY THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS IS A MATTER FOR THE AMERICANS. SO THEY WOULD NOT LIKE THE SENTENCE ABOUT THE ALLIANCE SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT WORK. BUT THERE SOULD BE SOME CHANCE OF GETTING THEM RELUCTANTLY TO ACCEPT IT.

(C) WE MIGHT GET THE GERMANS TO ACCEPT OUR ADDITIONAL SENTENCE ABOUT DECISIONS IN 1991 ON THE NATURE AND NUMBERS OF NEW SYSTEMS, BUT THEY WOULD TRY TO SUBSTITUTE ''DECISIONS ON PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT'' FOR ''DECISIONS ON THEIR NATURE AND NUMBERS'' AND ''1991/92'' FOR ''1991''

MALLABY

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MDHIAN 1180

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 190700Z FCO
TELNO 1080
OF 190305Z APRIL 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, MODUK

Highly unsatisfactory — we need to stop the US from finalizing a text with the Germans. CDS

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
FROM MINISTER

MY TELNO 1068: SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS HAVE PUT A TEXT TO GENSCHER ON BAKER'S INSTRUCTIONS. IT CONTAINS A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT ON TEXT IN MY TELNO 1059, IN RESPONSE TO POINTS YOU MADE TO BAKER, BUT IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LANGUAGE IN YOUR TELNO 700.

DETAIL

2. KIMMITT PHONED ME AT HOME THIS EVENING TO ADMIT (VERY BELATEDLY) THAT, ON BAKER'S EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS AND BEFORE RECEIPT OF OUR NOTE, THE US CHARGE IN BONN HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PUT TO GENSCHER THE TEXT IN OUR TELNO 1059 WITH THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT AMENDMENT: THE SENTENCE IN BRACKETTED PARAGRAPH 30 READING QUOTE FORCE LEVELS ALSO DEPEND ON THE FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS INVOLVED AND HENCE ON THE LATTER BEING KEPT UP TO DATE UNQUOTE HAD BEEN CHANGED TO READ QUOTE ... AND HENCE, AS AGREED BY THE ALLIANCE IN 1988, THE LATTER WILL BE KEPT UP TO DATE UNQUOTE. KIMMITT EMPHASISED THAT THIS CHANGE HAD BEEN MADE WITH A VIEW TO MEETING THE CONCERNS THAT YOU EXPRESSED TO BAKER. KIMMITT ADDED THAT DOBBINS WAS ALSO GETTING COPIES TO TELTSCHIK AND STOLTENBURG.

3. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN BEFORE WAITING TO SEE THE COMMENTS FOR WHICH YOU HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED AT YOUR MEETING WITH SCOWCROFT. KIMMITT, AFTER HAVERING A BIT, CLAIMED THAT HE HAD HAD NO IDEA THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE COMMENTS OVERNIGHT. HE, AND BY IMPLICATION BAKER, HAD BEEN WORKING IN GOOD FAITH ON THE POINTS WHICH YOU HAD MADE TO BAKER AT YOUR MEETING AFTER LUNCH.

4. I HAVE CROSS-CHECKED WITH BLACKWILL (NSC), MAKING IT CLEAR TO HIM AS I HAD TO KIMMITT THAT WE WERE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SCOWCROFT'S MEETING WITH YOU WAS INTENDED AS A WRAP-UP SESSION AND THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION AS A WHOLE. THAT IS CLEARLY THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW OF A

MEETING, AT WHICH SCOWCROFT GAVE EVERY IMPRESSION OF BEING IN THE DRIVING SEAT AND SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY. THAT IS ALSO THE IMPRESSION WHICH SCOWCROFT AND BLACKWILL GAVE US IN CONVERSATIONS IN THE COURSE OF TODAY. WHEN PRESSED ON WHAT WENT WRONG HOWEVER, BLACKWILL WAS UNABLE TO SAY MORE THAN THAT HE THOUGHT SOMEONE ELSE WAS BRIEFING THE BAKER TEAM ON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AT YOUR MEETING WITH SCOWCROFT. KIMMIT, FOR HIS PART STICKS TO THE LLNE THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THAT FURTHER COMMENTS FROM US HAD BEEN ASKED FOR AND WERE AWAITED, UNTIL AFTER BAKER'S INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT.

5. THIS DOES NOT FULLY EXPLAIN WHY WE WERE NOT TOLD EARLIER OF A SERIOUS PROBLEM WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN APPARENT TO KIMMITT'S OFFICE WHEN WE FIRST GOT IN TOUCH WITH THEM EARLY THIS MORNING. I AM HOWEVER (JUST) INCLINED TO PUT THIS DOWN TO A FAILURE OF COORDINATION RATHER THAN A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD. BUT THIS IS CONFIRMATION, IF MORE WERE NEEDED, THAT WHEN BAKER FEELS A DECISION IS NEEDED HE TAKES IT QUICKLY, AND WITHOUT TOO MUCH CONCERN FOR CONSULTATION: HIS STAFF FOR THEIR PART CLEARLY REGARD THEMSELVES AS THERE TO EXECUTE. BLACKWILL IS ALSO TAKING THE LINE THAT THIS IS A MISUNDERSTANDING.

6. ON THE SUBSTANCE, BLACKWILL'S VIEW IS THAT TEXTS ARE LIKELY TO BAT BACKWARD AND FORWARDS FOR SOME TIME. BOTH HE AND KIMMIT HAVE IMPLIED THAT, IF THE GERMANS (AS THEY EXPECT) RESPOND BY ASKING FOR MORE ON ARMS CONTROL THE AMERICANS WOULD RESPOND BY UPPING THE ANTE ON MODERNISATION DRAWING INTER ALIA ON OUR LANGUAGE. THIS MAY BE TRUE, BUT THERE IS CLEARLY LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEOUVRE GIVEN THE OVERRIDING AMERICAN CONCERN NOT TO PAY OUT TOO MUCH ON ARMS CONTROL.

7. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THIS UNHAPPY ENDING TO WHAT HAD SEEMED A MORE PRODUCTIVE CONSULTATION HAS BEEN BAKER'S FEAR THAT THE MEETING OF GERMAN MINISTERS TODAY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO TURN OUT BADLY IF GENSCHER WAS NOT ENGAGED PERSONALLY BY BAKER AND GIVEN A TEXT TO WORK UPON. FOR ALL THEIR APPEARANCE OF BEING IN CONTROL, THE NSC, FROM SCOWCROFT DOWNWARDS, SEEM TO HAVE BEEN LEFT TRAILING IN THE WAKE.

ACLAND

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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OF 191627Z APRIL 89
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INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS

SIC CFJ

MY TELNO 404: GERMAN POSITION OF SNF

SUMMARY

1. COALITION MEETING ON 18 APRIL INCONCLUSIVE: TO BE RESUMED ON 20 APRIL. AGREEMENT IN COALITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRODUCTION OR DEPLOYMENT DECISION BEFORE 1992. NO AGREEMENT YET ON HOW LONG ''NO THIRD ZERO'' POLICY SHOULD APPLY OR ON QUESTION OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE COALITION LEADERS MET FOR FOUR HOURS ON TUESDAY EVENING. VOLKER RUEHE (CDU DEPUTY PARLIAMENTARY LEADER), WHO WAS PRESENT, HAS GIVEN ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT. HE SAID THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DECISION BEFORE 1992 ON PRODUCTION OR DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, WERE A MATTER FOR THE US. THE TWO AREAS OF CONTINUED DISAGREEMENT IN THE COALITION WERE THE DURATION OF THE ''NO THIRD ZERO'' POLICY (IE HOW LONG LAND-BASED SNF WOULD BE NEEDED) AND WHAT MOVE THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS. RUEHE SAID THAT THE COALITION HAD NOT YET GOT SO FAR AS DISCUSSING LANGUAGE FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. KOHL WANTED DECISIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF SNF BEFORE HE MET THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ON 25 APRIL TO DISCUSS THE STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY HE IS TO DELIVER IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 27 APRIL. THIS WOULD COVER THE SNF DECISIONS, (WHICH THUS WOULD BE PUBLIC BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER SEES KOHL ON 30 APRIL).

3. I SAID THAT, IN THE UK'S VIEW THERE SHOULD BE NO THIRD ZERO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NATO WOULD CONTINUE TO NEED LAND-BASED SNF FOR DETERRENCE. IF CONVENTIONAL PARITY WAS ACHIEVED, WE COULD CONSIDER AGREEING TO COMMON SNF CEILINGS ABOVE ZERO. TO TRY TO DEFINE IN NATO CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE A THIRD ZERO POSSIBLE WOULD LEAD TO GREAT DISPUTE. RUEHE COULD ACCEPT ''FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE'' (BUT NOT ''PERMANENTLY''). HE SAID THAT

GENSCHER HAD ARGUED STRONGLY IN THE COALITION MEETING THAT A POLICY OF ''NO THIRD ZERO'' COULD NOT APPLY INDEFINITELY, BUT KOHL HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT LAND-BASED SNF WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. RUEHE HIMSELF HAD ARGUED THAT IT WAS UTOPIAN TO THINK THAT BY 1992 CONVENTIONAL PARITY WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AND LAND-BASED SNF WOULD NO LONGER BE NEEDED. HE COMMENTED THAT THE CDU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY KNEW THAT KOHL HAD REPEATEDLY RULED OUT A THIRD ZERO, AND WOULD NOT WELCOME THE APPEARANCE OF INCONSISTENCY ON THIS.

4. AS FOR SNF ARMS CONTROL, RUEHE SAID HE HAD AGAIN PUT FORWARD HIS PREFERENCE FOR A PACKAGE OF MODERNISATION AND UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS. BUT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF THE COALITION AGREEING TO THIS. A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE WOULD BE FOR THE NATO SUMMIT TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP TO WORK OUT A MANDATE FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS (ON THE LINES OF THE HALIFAX NAC'S DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE HLTF). GENSCHER WAS INSISTING ON IMMEDIATE SNF NEGOTIATIONS. I EXPLAINED AGAIN OUR REASONS FOR OPPOSING SNF NEGOTIATIONS: THEY WOULD CREATE ENORMOUS POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR A THIRD ZERO, AND THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF EAST AND WEST DID NOT PROVIDE A COMPATIBLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT NATO IF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN AT LAST THEY ARRIVED, INCLUDED BOTH A REFUSAL TO TAKE AN EARLY MODERNISATION DECISION AND INSISTENCE ON A MOVE TO EARLY NEGOTIATIONS.

5. TELTSCHIK HAS TOLD ME THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS, BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHEN.

MALLABY

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File
KKI AON
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1989

Dear Stephen,

SNF MODERNISATION

The Prime Minister told the Foreign Secretary this evening that she was extremely concerned by developments in Germany, in particular the erosion of German resolve on SNF and on the period of conscription. At the same time, it was clear the Americans were so anxious to get agreement on SNF ahead of the NATO Summit that they were prepared to sacrifice important points simply to avoid a quarrel. There now seemed a distinct possibility that the Americans and Germans might reach agreement on an unsatisfactory text on SNF modernisation ahead of her meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 30 April, and that the Germans would in any event take a firm public position on the issue in Chancellor Kohl's speech to the Bundestag on 27 April. This cast doubt on the value of her meeting with Kohl on 30 April. She was not prepared to go and give the appearance of endorsing a weak position. We should reinforce the message to the Americans that they should not finalise anything with the Germans before her proposed visit. It might also be necessary to let the Germans know that they could not expect a harmonious meeting on 30 April if they had themselves come out with a public statement of their position which was unsatisfactory to us. In that event, she would feel compelled to say publicly that we regretted German weakness. It might be preferable to postpone her visit altogether.

You may wish to seek the advice of HM Ambassador Bonn on the arguments for and against going ahead with this visit. There would of course be penalties in cancellation at this late stage. You will wish to bear in mind that the visit is due to be announced on Monday 24 April.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MRM

164375
MDHIAN 1160

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1068
OF 182015Z APRIL 89
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
YOUR TELNO 700: SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT
1. WE TOOK ACTION THIS MORNING WITH BLACKWILL (NSC) AND HANDED OVER A NOTE MAKING THE POINTS IN TUR. IT HAS ALSO GONE TO KIMMITT IN STATE DEPARTMENT. IN DOING SO WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE VIEWS WERE COUCHED IN A WAY WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO BE MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE BUT THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY ANY LESSENING OF THE CONCERNS ON THE PART OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT SETTLE FOR TOO LITTLE ON MODERNISATION, CERTAINLY AT THIS STAGE.
2. BLACKWILL SAID THAT SCOWCROFT WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE SPEED AND CONTENT OF THE RESPONSE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BAKER HAD ALREADY STIFFENED THE AMERICAN TEXT FOLLOWING YOUR MEETING WITH HIM YESTERDAY. THIS FULLER MESSAGE WOULD HOWEVER BE TAKEN CAREFULLY ON BOARD.
3. WE ASKED ABOUT FUTURE STEPS. BLACKWILL SAID THAT THE PLAN WAS STILL FOR SCOWCROFT AND BAKER TO SPEAK TO TELTSCHIK AND GENSCHER RESPECTIVELY LATER TODAY BUT THAT THIS WAS UNLIKELY TO BE A SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE.
4. I HAVE SINCE SPOKEN TO SCOWCROFT BOTH TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE AND TO SAY THAT WE SAW ADVANTAGE IN CONCENTRATING ON THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE AS THE CHANNEL RATHER THAN GENSCHER'S (NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR KOHL TO BE ABLE TO SHOW GENSCHER THAT NEXT WORD UNDERLINED HE (KOHL) HAD MOVED THE AMERICANS TOWARDS THE GERMAN POSITION). SCOWCROFT SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN RELIEVED TO SEE OUR SUGGESTIONS THIS MORNING, WHICH WERE FAIRLY SATISFACTORY. ON TACTICS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON FOR MAKING CONTACT WITH GENSCHER AT THIS STAGE WAS BECAUSE OF THE REPORT FROM THE US CHARGE IN BONN THAT GENSCHER WAS COMPLAINING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO CUT HIM OUT. BAKER HAD THEREFORE TELEPHONED EARLIER TODAY TO CALM HIM DOWN. BUT THE AIM WAS STILL TO REINSTATE THE VISIT HERE BY THE GERMAN HIGH LEVEL TEAM IN ORDER TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY. THERE

WAS TO BE A MEETING OF THE COALITION LATER TODAY AFTER WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH BONN TO SUGGEST ONCE MORE THAT THE TEAM NOW BE SENT. SCOWCROFT REPEATED THE UNDERTAKING TO KEEP US INFORMED ABOUT ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN THINKING OR EXCHANGES WITH THE GERMANS. I EMPHASISED THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTICULAR HOPE THAT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE MADE UNTIL SHE HAD SEEN KOHL ON 29 APRIL. SCOWCROFT REPEATED THAT HE WOULD LET US KNOW OF ANY DEVELOPMENT.

ACLAND

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ADDITIONAL 18

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MODUK FOR DUS(P)
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
S OF S'S MEETING WITH BAKER: SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT
SUMMARY
1. BAKER FLOATS MINIMAL PACKAGE INVOLVING VAGUE LANGUAGE ON MODERNISATION, AMOUNTING TO EFFECTIVE POSTPONEMENT OF ANY DECISION, AS THE PRICE FOR AVOIDING A COMMITMENT TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS. OUR POSITION RESERVED. BAKER HAS AGREED TO THINK AGAIN SCOWCROFT HAS
UNDERTAKEN NOT TO INITIATE CONTACT WITH THE GERMANS UNTIL HE HAS OUR COMMENTS, BUT HE ASKED FOR THESE URGENTLY ON 18 APRIL.
DETAIL
2. SNF ISSUES AND THE SUMMIT WERE COVERED ONLY BRIEFLY IN THE MAIN TALKS BUT WERE DEALT WITH IN DETAIL AT A SMALL MEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE SUBSEQUENTLY, IN BAKER'S OFFICE, WHEN HE FLOATED SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FOR COVERING THE SUBJECT IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT (TEXT IN MIFT)
3. BAKER SAID THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS FOR THE MATTER TO BE SETTLED WELL AHEAD OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF AND WAS LOOKING FOR EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GERMANS ON AN APPROPRIATE TEXT. THE LONGER GENSCHER WAS ABLE TO DELAY COMING TO TERMS, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE, AS THE SUMMIT DEADLINE APPROACHED, TO SECURE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME. BAKER INDICATED THAT HIS ATTITUDE WAS GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:-
A) A STRONGLY FELT DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT THE SNF ISSUE DID NOT DOMINATE THE SUMMIT AND PREVENT IF FROM BEING A POLITICAL SUCCESS.
B) CONCERN ABOUT THE TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY AND WITHIN THE FRG IN PARTICULAR
C) A CALCULATION THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE A MODERNISATION DECISION FOR A YEAR OR SO RATHER THAN FORCE THE ISSUE NOW AND RISK HAVING TO PAY TOO HIGH A PRICE ON ARMS CONTROL.
4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, BAKER EXPLAINED THAT OFFICIALS HAD LOOKED AT THE LANGUAGE CURRENTLY PROPOSED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND HAD RECOMMENDED A PACKAGE IN WHICH, IN RETURN FOR GERMAN AGREEMENT TO REMOVE THE SQUARE BRACKETS THEY HAD PLACED ON PARAGRAPHS 30 AND 31, THE UNITED STATES WOULD OFFER AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE INVOLVING FURTHER SIGNIFICANT SNF WARHEAD CUTS, AND A CFE LINK, BUT EXPLICIT EXCLUSION OF A THIRD ZERO AND NO REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS OR TALKS ON VERIFICATION. KIMMITT (THE ONLY US OFFICIAL WITH BAKER) SAID THAT CONSIDERATION

HAD YET TO BE GIVEN TO WHAT MIGHT BE SAID IN THE SUMMIT DECLARATION ITSELF BUT IMPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FORMULA. BAKER SAID THAT HE WAS ATTRACTED TO THIS APPROACH. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE GERMANS WERE ALMOST CERTAIN TO ASK FOR MORE ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT THE TACTICS IN THAT CASE WOULD BE TO DEMAND MORE SPECIFICITY ON MODERNISATION, RECOGNISING THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO HOW FAR ONE COULD GO BEFORE REACHING DANGER LIMITS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REJECT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO KEEP SNF MODERNISATION CLEARLY ON TRACK AND MOVING FORWARD. PRECISE DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS MIGHT NOT BE REQUIRED AT THIS STAGE, BUT A POSITIVE SIGNAL WAS STILL NEEDED. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A FORMULA ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED STOPPED SHORT OF THE NECESSARY CRITICAL COMMITMENT AND WOULD BE SEEN BY PRESS AND PUBLIC AS A FUDGE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE IDEA THAT SUCH WORDING MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD AS AN OPENING POSITION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GERMANS. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILED DRAFTING, HE NOTED THAT THE LANGUAGE DID NOT INVOLVE AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT EVEN TO KEEPING 'UP TO DATE' AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE INADEQUACY OF THE PHRASE ''PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN BY THE ALLIES TO THE LONGSTANDING REQUIREMENT'', WHEN A REFERENCE TO MORE POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR PARTICULAR SYSTEMS WAS CALLED FOR. FINALLY, HE EMPHASISED STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING A COMMITMENT TO SUCH A MINIMAL PACKAGE BEFORE THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD TAKEN PLACE: OPTIONS SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN AT LEAST UNTIL THEN.

6. BAKER UNDERTOOK TO REFLECT FURTHER. BUT HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THAT HE WAS UNLIKELY TO REVISE HIS THINKING VERY FAR UPWARDS. HE ALSO EMPHASISED THE URGENCY THERE WAS IN BEGINNING TALKS WITH THE GERMANS.

7. THIS ALSO CAME UP IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WHO, WHILE AGREEING WITH OUR PREFERRED OUTCOME, FELT IT VERY NECESSARY TO ENGAGE THE GERMANS SOON.

8. FINALLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW SCOWCROFT AND EXPRESSED OUR SERIOUS CONCERNS. HE REPLIED THAT THE INTENTION HAD BEEN TO CONTACT THE GERMANS EARLY ON 18 APRIL, BUT HE AGREED TO HOLD OFF UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIME FOR OUT COMMENTS TO ARRIVE.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WANT PROPOSALS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN TOMORROW MORNING. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE TO NO 10 AND MOD.

ACLAND

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ADVANCE 5
.NATO 1
MR GOULDEN 1
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RESIDENT CLERK 1
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AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, BONN, MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BAKER:
SNF MODERNISATION/NATO SUMMIT
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AS SUGGESTED BY BAKER:
BEGINS
IF THE FRG WOULD AGREE TO REMOVE ITS BRACKETS FROM THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:
''OPEN DOUBLE SQUARE BRACKETS ... OPEN SQUARE BRACKET SUB-STRATEGIC FORCES'CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET LEVEL AND CHARACTERISTICS (DIVERSITY, SURVIVABILITY, PENETRATION CAPABILITY, ACCURACY, RESPONSIVENESS AND FLEXIBILITY IN USE) MUST BE SUCH THAT THEY CAN PERFORM THEIR DETERRENT ROLE IN A CREDIBLE WAY ACROSS THE REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THREAT - BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR - WITH WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS FACED. FORCE LEVELS ALSO DEPEND ON THE FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS INVOLVED AND HENCE ON THE LATTER BEING KEPT UP TO DATE. IN THIS CONTEXT, PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN BY THE ALLIES TO THE LONGSTANDING REQUIREMENT FOR SUB-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF RELATIVELY LONGER RANGE - INCLUDING AIR-LAUNCHED AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS.CLOSE DOUBLE SQUARE BRACKETS OPEN SQUARE BRACKET III/30 - BRACKETED BY FRG CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET.
''OPEN DOUBLE SQUARE BRACKETS MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES COULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY CHARGES. SUCH A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS TOWARD LONGER-RANGE SNF WOULD BE WISE BOTH FROM A MILITARY AND A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. IT IS A CLEAR EXAMPLE HOW GREATER SECURITY CAN BE ACHIEVED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMS. CLOSE DOUBLE SQUARE BRACKETS OPEN SQUARE BRACKET III/31 - BRACKETED BY FRG CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET.

THEN THE US WOULD AGREE TO THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:
''- 51. AS A STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH TO FURTHER REDUCING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE,

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WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO ELIMINATE UNILATERALLY ITS CURRENT, MASSIVE ADVANTAGE OVER NATO IN GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. NATO HAS ENGAGED IN A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAM OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN ITS STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCING ITS STOCKPILE BY OVER ONE-THIRD TO ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS. A FURTHER REDUCTION OF UP TO ONE-THIRD OF NATO'S CURRENT STOCKPILE - INCLUDING CUTTING IN HALF THE NUMBER OF THE SHORTEST RANGE SYSTEMS - COULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRUCTURING AND UPDATING NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES WITH SYSTEMS OF LONGER RANGE. WHILE MAINTAINING OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE, WE RECOGNISE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, KEPT UP TO DATE WITH CHARACTERISTICS TO PERFORM THEIR DETERRENT ROLE CREDIBLY ACROSS THE REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR THREAT, WILL CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO MAKE A UNIQUE AND ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THAT DETERRENCE. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE CANNOT ACCEPT CALLS FOR A NEGOTIATED ''THIRD ZERO'' ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS. MOREOVER, OUR PRIORITY REMAINS TO RECTIFY THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. IF CONCRETE RESULTS TOWARD ELIMINATING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES ARE ACHIEVED IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TALKS, NATO WILL BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE AT THAT TIME FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES.'' ENDS

ACLAND

YYYY

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

I have seen Washington tel. nos. 1058 and 1059 about the Secretary of State's discussions in Washington on SNF modernisation. Since you are committed to further contact with the Americans during the day, you may like to have the following views before we depart for Luxembourg:

- the American position is too weak, particularly as a starting point. They should set their sights higher.

- the essential points for inclusion in a NATO Summit communiqué are first that effective and credible SNF will remain an essential part of NATO's strategy of flexible response in the 1990s. In common with all NATO's weaponry, they will need to be kept up to date.

- second, the Summit therefore confirms the requirement for modernised SNF and supports the necessary development work by the US, with decisions on numbers and location to be taken at the appropriate time.

- third, in parallel with steps to keep NATO's SNF missile systems up to date, there will be scope for substantial reductions in nuclear artillery charges.

- fourth, because effective and up to date nuclear weapons will remain a vital part of NATO's strategy, the Alliance cannot accept calls for a 'third zero' elimination of such systems.

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUMMARY
1. THE COALITION WILL DISCUSS SNF MODERNISATION ON 18 APRIL. THERE IS AN EXPECTATION THAT THE POSITION WILL CRYSTALISE AROUND GENSCHER'S LINE.

DETAIL
2. SNF WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE COALITION ON 18 APRIL. THE WEEKEND PRESS REPORT THAT THE VIEW IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IS THAT AN SNF MODERNISATION DECISION SHOULD NOT BE MADE AT THE NATO SUMMIT AND THAT NATO SHOULD CALL FOR SNF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. DER SPIEGEL REPORTS THAT THE FDP HAVE INSISTED UPON KOHL ENDING THE MODERNISATION DEBATE ''ONCE AND FOR ALL'' WHEN HE MAKES HIS STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POLICY ON 27 APRIL. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT HE SHOULD ACCEPT FDP POSITIONS ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND MODERNISATION.

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM GOULDEN
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR BAKER: SNF/SUMMIT
FCO PLEASE PASS TO PRIVATE SECRETARY OVER THE WEEKEND
1. MY CALLS IN THE LAST 3 DAYS ON A WIDE RANGE OF THE NEW POL MIL PEOPLE HAVE AMPLY CONFIRMED THE GLOOMY ASSESSMENT IN WASHINGTON TELNO 845. MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS HERE ACCEPT THE LOGIC OF THE POLICY SET OUT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 1 MARCH TO PRESIDENT BUSH. BUT THEY HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED BY REPORTING FROM BONN AND BY THE STREAM OF RECENT GERMAN VISITORS TO BELIEVE THAT OUR APPROACH IS UNREALISTIC AND RISKY: THAT IT COULD SUCCEED ONLY IF THE US WAS PREPARED TO HUMILIATE KOHL OR TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: AND THAT IT WOULD RUIN THE ATMOSPHERE AT PRESIDENT BUSH'S FIRST MEETING WITH NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT, WHILE US OFFICIALS ARE STILL PREPARED TO RUN THROUGH THE ARGUMENTS WITH THE GERMANS, THERE IS A DISPOSITION TO CONCEDE IN ADVANCE THAT A CLEAR DECISION ON MODERNISATION IS UNOBTAINABLE. BARRING SURPRISES, THE APPROACH WHICH OFFICIALS HAVE IN MIND FOR THE SUMMIT SEEMS TO BE TO ACCEPT A MINIMAL REFERENCE TO SNF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL AND TO CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON SECURING A DECLARATION WHICH DIVERTS THE WORLD'S ATTENTION FROM SNF BY MEANS OF VIVID LANGUAGE ABOUT WESTERN UNITY AND VISION FOR THE NINETIES.
2. AS THINGS SEEM TO BE EMERGING THIS APPROACH IS UNLIKELY TO BE SEEN BY THE PRESS AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A FAILURE FOR THE ALLIANCE AND A DEFEAT IN PARTICULAR FOR HMG. ATTENTION COULD PERHAPS BE DIVERTED IF THE ALLIES HAD ANY SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSAL WITH WHICH TO CATCH THE EYE: BUT ALTHOUGH THERE IS A READY MARKET IN WASHINGTON FOR AN ''INITIATIVE''. I HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE FRANTIC SEARCH WHICH IS UNDERWAY IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE ANYTHING SUBSTANTIVE.
3. IN DEPLOYING OUR LINE, I HAVE FOUND PEOPLE NOT UNRECEPTIVE BUT SURPRISED THAT WE ARE STILL PURSUING A MODERNISATION DECISION IN THE FACE OF ALL THE DEPRESSING NEWS FROM BONN. IT WOULD I THINK BE SALUTARY - AND WELCOME TO THOSE HERE WHO ARE NOT ALREADY DEMORALISED ON THIS ISSUE - IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE TO PUT OUR CASE FORCEFULLY ON 17 APRIL, PERHAPS DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS.
(A) THE MESSAGE FROM THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE OF AN ALLIANCE WHICH IS UNITED, READY TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN ITS DEFENCE STRATEGY AND NOT OBSESSED WITH SPECIFIC HARDWARE DECISIONS.

(B) SUCH A MESSAGE CANNOT BE CONVEYED CREDIBLY IF THE SNF ISSUE DOMINATES THE SUMMIT:
(C) NOR IF WE PRODUCE AN AMBIGUOUS FORMULA WHICH EACH ALLY PROCEEDS TO INTERPRET DIFFERENTLY.
(D) IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT CONGRESS DEMANDS IN ORDER TO FUND FOTL DEVELOPMENT. THE ALLIANCE NEEDS ENOUGH CLARITY ON MODERNISATION TO ENABLE US ALL TO HANG TOGETHER ON A COMMON LINE BEFORE WE TAKE THE SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IN 18-24 MONTHS TIME.
(E) IT IS TOO SOON TO CONCLUDE THAT THE CHOICE IS LIMITED TO A PRECISE AND DETAILED DECISION TO MODERNISE OR A FUDGE EVEN IF THE FORMER PROVES NOT TO BE ACHIEVABLE (AND WE SHOULD NOT TAKE THIS AS AXIOMATIC) IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE KOHL TO GIVE A REASONABLY CLEAR SIGNAL WHICH TAKES US FORWARD FROM THE 1988 SUMMIT DECLARATION. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE SUPPORT FOR US EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A FOTL AND TASM TO MEET AN IDENTIFIED NEED IN THE MID-NINETIES.
(F) IN PARTICULAR IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SIGNAL ANY CHANGE FROM THE LINE AGREED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT BUSH BEFORE SHE HAS SEEN KOHL ON 30 APRIL.
(G) AFTER THE MEETING, WE SHOULD TAKE STOCK ABOUT WHAT IS THE OPTIMUM OUTCOME FOR THE SUMMIT. US AND UK OFFICIALS SHOULD GET TOGETHER IN EARLY MAY TO EXPLORE LANGUAGE WHICH COMBINES A CLEAR SIGNAL ON MODERNISATION WITH AN ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION (SHORT OF NEGOTIATIONS) WHICH KOHL CAN PRESENT AS A REASONABLE COUNTERPART. (US-UK POL MIL TALKS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED IN WASHINGTON ON 3-4 MAY AND THE US SIDE HAS NOTED THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY COULD BE USED TO WORK OUT AN AGREED POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH KOHL).
4. THAT SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHERE BAKER, SCOWCROFT AND THE PRESIDENT ARE LIKELY TO COME DOWN. OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THAT ALL THREE WILL WANT TO DEVOTE TIME TO DISCUSSING THE ISSUE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THERE ARE ALSO PLANS FOR BAKER TO START WORKING ON GENSCHER AND HE MAY SPEAK TO HIM OVER THE WEEKEND. TWO CONSIDERATIONS ARE LIKELY TO WEIGH INCREASINGLY HEAVILY WITH MINISTERS HERE:-
(A) THE WORRY THAT IF THEY LEAVE IT MUCH LONGER, KOHL HIMSELF COULD PRESENT THEM WITH UNACCEPTABLY HIGH DEMANDS ON THE ARMS CONTROL SIDE, CLAIMING THAT THEY ARE NECESSARY FOR HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL, AND WITH INSUFFICIENT TIME TO MANAGE SUCH AN ULTIMATUM.
(B) THE DESIRE TO WRAP UP THE ISSUE IF POSSIBLE BY THE TIME BAKER GOES TO MOSCOW ON 10/11 MAY, GIVEN THE NEED FOR A SECURE ALLIANCE BASE FROM WHICH TO CONCENTRATE ON EAST-WEST ISSUES.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT THEREFORE PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT AND TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO FLUSH OUT VIEWS AND TO TRY TO PIN DOWN BAKER AND OTHERS ON WHAT THEY THINK THEY OUGHT TO BE DOING WITH THE GERMANS BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S OWN TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

ACLAND

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Prime Minister

CDP 11/4.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

11 April 1989

From the Private Secretary

MT

SNF MODERNISATION

I spoke to Herr Teltschik in Bonn this morning. He is provisionally booked to go to Washington tomorrow to discuss SNF modernisation, but was still awaiting final instructions. They depended on a very restricted meeting which the Chancellor was chairing at that very moment. Teltschik said that he had put a paper to the Chancellor with three options and was waiting to hear which was chosen. He was not prepared to discuss them on the telephone, beyond indicating that they included the one which we had discussed some weeks ago (equal ceilings with freedom to mix).

Teltschik said that he would be seeing General Scowcroft, but most of his meetings would be with a team of US officials led by Bob Blackwill of the NSC staff. He himself would be taking Kastrup (Political Director) - whom he described as a lot more reasonable than Holik - and General Nanmann. His talks would be exploratory, but he did not discount the possibility of reaching some sort of compromise. He would return from Washington at the end of the week but travel direct to Vienna. He would telephone me on his return to the office on 17 April.

Teltschik was in a fairly sombre mood, commenting that the survival of the German Government was currently in question. A major reshuffle was pending but it had still not proved possible to reach agreement on this. He thought it certain that the Defence Minister would go.

The Embassy in Washington will, I am sure, keep us posted about American views and intentions in these discussions.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc P.C

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 April 1989

Dear Charles,

SNF Modernisation

Your letter of 10 April asked for details on Soviet modernisation for use at Questions on 11 April. I enclose a paper which has been prepared in consultation with MOD officials.

Rebuilt 200 SS21 since 1981

The Soviet Union has modernised its nuclear forces at all ranges in recent years. The most persuasive example of this among its short range nuclear missiles is the introduction of over 200 SS21 launchers since 1981 - more than twice as many as NATO's holding of LANCE. It is more difficult to make a general comparison between the age of NATO's nuclear weapons and those of the Warsaw Pact. LANCE was first introduced into service in 1972 while the more numerous Warsaw Pact SCUD and FROG missiles are products of the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, the SCUDs in particular have been upgraded substantially in terms of accuracy, range and refire capability - they are not new systems but they have been modernised. With that caveat, MOD Defence Intelligence experts assess that 95% of Soviet (rather than Warsaw Pact) short-range nuclear missile systems in the forward area have been modernised in the last 5 years.

1972

1955) 23 years old

Persuasive as the evidence of Soviet modernisation is, it would be a mistake to predicate NATO's modernisation on that of the Soviet Union. The crux of our case is that we need a follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) for general deterrence reasons regardless of Soviet modernisation plans. Having given up four theatre systems in the last decade (GLCMs, PII, Nike Hercules and ADMS), we need to keep the remainder up-to-date in order to maintain flexible response. To imply that it is only because they are modernising that we must, would draw the criticism that the West is continuing an endless tit for tat arms race. It would also leave modernisation vulnerable to Soviet SNF withdrawals or offers of reciprocal abolition.

Furthermore, it is not our prime goal to argue that the Warsaw Pact are doing something which NATO is not. Although we can provide extensive details of Soviet modernisation of its nuclear weapons, we do not claim that the US has not done the same: for example, in theatre systems NATO has in the last decade deployed new nuclear artillery shells, SLCMs and dual-capable aircraft; at the strategic level, the US has also

/deployed

deployed the MX ICBM and developed the Advanced Cruise Missile. For this reason, we have not attempted to answer exactly your final requirement but have instead confined ourselves to examples of Soviet modernisation in recent years.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SOVIET SNF MODERNISATION

- Warsaw Pact deploys about 1450 SNF launchers in Europe which are capable of firing nuclear as well as conventional and CW munitions.

- These include:

  - Over 200 SS21s, all deployed since 1981 as considerably more accurate, longer range replacements for the FROG system. Since initial deployment SS21 has undergone several substantial modifications to improve range and accuracy. Most of the SS21s have been deployed with Soviet forces deployed close to the borders with NATO.

  - Over 600 SCUD launchers. Although first deployed in the mid-1960s a series of modernisation programmes have prolonged their life span and improved their accuracy.

  - Over 600 FROG 7 launchers. This rocket system was developed as a longer-range and more accurate replacement for the FROG 3/5. Although still effective it has been withdrawn from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and replaced by modern SS21s.

  - In total, we estimate about 95% of Soviet short range nuclear missile systems in the forward area have been modernised or replaced in the last 5 years.

  - We cannot tell what proportion of Warsaw Pact artillery is designated for delivery of nuclear shells but there are about 7000 artillery tubes which have that capability. They have been improved continuously through the 1980s as towed artillery is replaced by modern self propelled systems.

Age of LANCE compared with Warsaw Pact systems?

- LANCE introduced after many SCUDs and FROGs - but is at least 10 years behind the SS21. And SCUDs and FROGs have undergone a number of modernisation programmes to improve their capability. [LANCE has not been improved but merely had its life extended to 1995.]

Other Soviet Modernisation

- ICBMs. Two mobile ICBMs (SS24 and SS25) deployed since 1986.

- SLBMs. New SS-N-23 missile operational since 1986.

- SLCMs. SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile with range of over 3000 kms believed to be in process of deployment.

- ALCMs. AS15 long-range air-launched cruise missile deployed in 1984.

- Even more modern submarine and air-launched cruise missiles under development for deployment probably in early 1990s.

- The Blackjack heavy bomber is now being deployed.

- Dual capable aircraft. Continuous increase in number of modern dual capable aircraft. Eg. number of FENCER light bombers quadrupled to over 1000 since first deployed in late 1970s; number of BACKFIRE bombers more than tripled since 1980. Most of these aircraft capable of firing range of stand-off air to surface nuclear missiles.

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SNF : NEXT STEPS AND MORE FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY
1. FRG TEAM TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR SNF TALKS FROM 12 TO 14 APRIL. GENSCHER REPEATS CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT TO INCLUDE MANDATE FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS. DREGGER (CDU) REJECTS PRIME MINISTER'S WISH FOR MODERNISATION DECISION TO BE TAKEN AT THE NATO SUMMIT.

DETAIL
2. DURING BOYD'S VISIT TO BONN ON 6-7 APRIL, GEN. NAUMANN (FMOD) TOLD US THAT HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING TELTSCHIK TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL TALKS ON SNF BETWEEN 12 APRIL (PM) AND 14 APRIL (AM). THEY WOULD SEE AN INTER-AGENCY TEAM HEADED BY SCOWCROFT. NAUMANN COMMENTED THAT THE POSITION TAKEN BY KOHL AND FMOD WAS CLEAR: BUT HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER KOHL WOULD DISCUSS SNF WITH GENSCHER BEFORE THE WASHINGTON TALKS.

3. BOYD'S DISCUSSIONS CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT WITHIN THE COALITION. HIS INTERLOCUTORS COULD NOT SAY WHEN THE COALITION DISCUSSIONS WOULD RESUME. DER SPIEGEL HAS NOW REPORTED THE DISAGREEMENT AT THE WEU MINISTERIAL BETWEEN SCHOLZ AND SCHAEFER.

4. GENSCHER, IN AN INTERVIEW ON 10 APRIL (THE FIRST AFTER HIS FIVE-WEEK ABSENCE FOR AN OPERATION AND RECUPERATION) SAID HE SAW A ''VERY BROAD AGREEMENT'' FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF REDUCTIONS. HE EMPHASISED HIS HOPE FOR A CORRESPONDING MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NATO COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. GENSCHER AVOIDED ANSWERING DIRECTLY A QUESTION ABOUT THE POSITION OF BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG MINISTER PRESIDENT SPAETH, WHO HAS COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF A NEW DUAL-TRACK DECISION. (SPAETH IS REGARDED AS A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR SHOULD KOHL HAVE TO STEP DOWN AS CHANCELLOR.)

5. CDU PARLIAMENTARY LEADER DREGGER HAS REPEATED THAT HE FAVOURS

MODERNISATION, BUT THAT THERE IS NO RUSH. HE REJECTED MRS THATCHER'S WISH FOR A MODERNISATION DECISION AT THE NATO SUMMIT: THERE SHOULD BE NO DECISION ON THIS BEFORE 1992. HIS DEPUTY, VOLKER RUEHE, HOWEVER, HAS REPEATED THAT NATO'S NUCLEAR RESTRUCTURING DECISION SHOULD NOT WAIT FOR ELECTIONS.

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From the Private Secretary

10 April 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

Following Gorbachev's visit I think it would be useful to have a good line for the House of Commons on Soviet modernisation of their short range nuclear weapons. Would it be possible to have, in time for Questions on 11 April, a note on:

- the precise types of short range nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union has modernised in recent yers and the numbers;

- an indication whether they have any nuclear weapons still operational which are as aged as LANCE;

- some more general comparison of the relative modernity of Soviet and NATO nuclear weapons.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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file

cc

bc PC

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 April 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

Thank you for your letter of 3 April. I did in fact have a brief word with Teltschik yesterday and enclose a copy of my note about it. He remains determinedly but unconvincingly optimistic that something reasonable can be salvaged.

(CHARLES POWELL)

His Excellency Sir Michael Alexander, K.C.M.G.

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PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MARTENS ON DEFENCE

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE TIMELY. MARTENS TRYING TO HOLD BELGIAN POSITION OPEN AGAINST PRESSURE FROM COALITION PARTNERS.

DETAIL

2. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON DEFENCE TO MARTENS' DIPLOMATIC ADVISER (GRAULS). GRAULS HAD JUST EMERGED FROM A POLICY MEETING WITH THE DEFENCE CABINET ON SNF, AND HIS FIRST REACTION WAS QUOTE GOOD UNQUOTE. IT SET OUT THE KEY POINTS.

3. GRAULS ADMITTED MARTENS FACED A DIFFICULT SITUATION, BUT HE STOOD BY THE POSITION HE HAD SET OUT IN PARLIAMENT ON 29 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 449 OF 1 DECEMBER). THAT TEXT REMAINED THE LOCUS CLASSICUS FOR MARTENS: IT HAD BEEN PREPARED CAREFULLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE UNFORTUNATE BELGIAN STANCE AT THE NPG WITH AN EYE TO DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES TO COME. IT REFERRED TO COMMITMENTS ACCEPTED BY NATO PARTNERS, EG AT THE NATO SUMMIT AND WEU PLATFORM AS DID MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE. MARTENS HAD RECEIVED A FULL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM PARLIAMENT. HE WOULD USE IT VIS A VIS HIS COALITION PARTNERS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT BELGIUM HAD ACCEPTED CERTAIN COMMITMENTS AND PARLIAMENT HAD ENDORSED THIS STAND. HE WOULD RESTATE THE LINE AT NEXT WEEK'S DEBATE. MARTENS HAD BEEN VERY UNHAPPY AT THE BELGIAN FOOTNOTE AT LAST WEEK'S HLG.

4. GRAULS NOTED THAT PARTNERS IN THE COALITION WERE PROFOUNDLY SUSPICIOUS OF NATO DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE INF DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THEY WERE TRYING TO ENSURE AT EVERY STAGE THAT ACCEPTANCE OF ANY WORDING/PIECE OF PAPER DID NOT COMMIT BELGIUM TO MODERNISE AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE WAS NO COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY SNF MISSILES IN BELGIUM. THEY NEEDED GUARANTEES AT EACH AND EVERY STAGE. HENCE GRAULS NEEDED TO PERSUADE OTHER (SOCIALIST)

CABINETS THAT ACCEPTANCE OF TEXTS IN THE PRESENT PHASE DID NOT COMMIT BELGIUM TO EVERY SUBSEQUENT PHASE WITHOUT MORE ADO. IN THE LIGHT OF THE MEETING GRAULS HAD JUST ATTENDED WHICH WAS PREPARING THE BELGIAN POSITION FOR THE NPG, HE BELIEVED IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH OTHER NATO PARTNERS.

5. I SAID IT WAS REASSURING TO HEAR OF MARTENS' DETERMINATION: HE HAD GIVEN TESTIMONY OF SIMILAR DETERMINATION OVER INF. GRAULS' PRESENTATION OF THE PRESSURES ON MARTENS FROM GOVERNMENT PARTNERS WAS ALSO LESS BLEAK THAN WE FEARED: OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE FLEMISH SOCIALISTS WERE SEEKING TO COMMIT BELGIUM AGAINST MODERNISATION IN PRINCIPLE BEFORE AGREEMENT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OR THE NATO SUMMIT. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, PRIME MINISTER MARTENS' TACTICS WERE TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE OVERALL ISSUE OF MODERNISATION IN PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY PROVOKE SOCIALIST REJECTION, BUT TO MOVE ONE STEP AT A TIME. GRAULS CONFIRMED THIS AND SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE HIS PICTURE WAS OVER-OPTIMISTIC. MARTENS WAS DETERMINED THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE ISOLATED AT THE NATO SUMMIT: HE RECOGNISED BELGIUM'S CREDIBILITY AS A RELIABLE PARTNER WAS IN QUESTION. EVEN TOBBACK (FLEMISH SOCIALIST INTERIOR MINISTER AND GURU ON DEFENCE) HAD GIVEN SOME RECENT SIGNALS OF FLEXIBILITY. TOMORROW'S MEETINGS IN INDIVIDUAL PARTY HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT.

COMMENT

6. ONE STEP AT A TIME MAKES SENSE IN BELGIAN TERMS. BUT THE ISSUE WILL REMAIN A CLIFFHANGER. DESPITE GRAULS' OPTIMISM, THE FLEMISH SOCIALISTS ARE LIKELY TO EAT AWAY AT THE BELGIAN POSITION AT EVERY POSSIBLE STAGE. A LARGE ANTI-MODERNISATION DEMO ON 16 APRIL WILL STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND. MOREOVER TINDEMANS' ROLE IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE AND AND MORE EQUIVOCAL AS THE ELECTIONS APPROACH. THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WILL SERVE TO REMIND ALL COALITION PARTNERS THAT THE ISSUES GO WIDER THAN DOMESTIC BELGIAN POLITICS.

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 15

NATO

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PERSONAL AND SECRET

3a

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

3 April 1989

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CDP
4/4

Dear Charles,

SNF MODERNISATION

Obviously you have other things on your mind just now - indeed Gorbachev's Guildhall speech may, I suppose, change the terms of the SNF debate yet again. But, ignoring that uncomfortable prospect for the moment, I am conscious that Teltschik is due to go to Washington later this week or early next for talks on SNF with Scowcroft. Would it be worth having a word with him first, if only to remind him that no modernisation and no detail equals no arms control initiative cf the last paragraph of the enclosure?

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Alexander

PERSONAL AND SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO TELELETTER FCO
TELNO NFR
OF 0310382 APRIL 89
AND TO TELELETTER MOD. CABINET OFFICE, BONN, WASHINGTON

2a

FROM: SIR MICHAEL ALEXANDER KCMG
TO. P J GOULDEN ESQ CMG
AUSS, FCO

CC. D NICHOLLS ESQ CMG, DUS(P), MOD
P J WESTON ESQ CMG, CABINET OFFICE
SIR C MALLABY KCMG, BONN
B J P FALL ESQ CMG, WASHINGTON.

SUBJECT: SNF MODERNISATION.

1. SINCE WE SPOKE HERE ON FRIDAY I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS WHICH ARE, I THINK, WORTH REPORTING. THEY MOSTLY TOOK PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE MARGINS OF THE CSIS/CEPS QUADRANGULAR CONFERENCE.

US ATTITUDES
2. FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH KEEL CONFIRMS THAT THE FIGURES HE HAS BEEN PUTTING TO WASHINGTON ARE MORE OR LESS IDENTICAL WITH THOSE IN MY LETTER OF 16 MARCH TO JOHN BOYD. HE WOULD GO FOR A STOCKPILE OF 2,600 POST MODERNISATION - AS COMPARED WITH MY 2,500. THIS IS BASED ON AN INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL MISSILES AT THE SAME LEVEL AS THE PRESENT LANCE DEPLOYMENT IE 692 - AS OPPOSED TO MY SUGGESTED 500 PLUS. KEEL ACCEPTS THAT IN FACT SOME REDUCTION IN FOTL MAY BE POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL. IN THIS CASE HIS STOCKPILE FIGURE WOULD COME DOWN TO 2,500 OR LESS DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF THE CUT ONE MAKES AND ON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TRADE-OFFS. KEEL CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD HIS FIGURES PUT THROUGH THE RELEVANT COMPUTER PROGRAMMES IN WASHINGTON AND TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED, AT LEAST TO HIS OWN SATISFACTION, THAT THEY ARE MILITARILY VALID.

3. MIKE GLITMAN - NOW, AS YOU KNOW, U S AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM - TOLD ME ON SATURDAY THAT IN RECENT DAYS HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE MESSRS MARTENS, TINDEMANS AND COEME TO ACCEPT AN APPROACH VERY SIMILAR TO THAT IN MY PARAS 52-55. SEPARATELY FROM KEEL HE HAS ARRIVED AT THE SAME SORT OF FIGURES AS THOSE IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH. (LIKE KEEL HE IS RELUCTANT TO GO BELOW THE PRESENT LANCE NUMBERS BUT ACCEPTS THAT THIS MAY BE INEVITABLE.) HE HAS NOT HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON TO TAKE THIS LINE BUT HAS BEEN REPORTING HIS DEMARCHES TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND HAS NOT BEEN TOLD TO DESIST. IT IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE PRESENT STATE OF U S POLICY THAT GLITMAN AND KEEL APPEAR TO BE ACTING ENTIRELY INDEPENDENTLY.

4. THE SENIOR CONGRESSIONAL SPOKESMAN AT THE CONFERENCE, SENATOR ROTH (REPUBLICAN) HAS, LIKE CONGRESSMAN ASPIN AT WEHRKUNDE, BEEN GIVING COMFORT TO THE GERMAN PARTICIPANTS. LINKING MODERNISATION DIRECTLY TO THE GERMAN ELECTIONS, ROTH EXPRESSED DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER QUOTE WE ARE WISE TO PRESS SO HARD ON THE LANCE MODERNISATION QUESTION, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING .... I WONDER IF WE ARE READY TO PAY THE POLITICAL PRICE WHICH WE WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO PAY FOR LANCE MODERNISATION? UNQUOTE

DUTCH ATTITUDES

5. BOLKESTEIN, THE DUTCH DEFENCE MINISTER, APPEARS TO BE IGNORING VAN DEN BROEK'S DECISION THAT THE DUTCH SHOULD REST ON THEIR OARS FOR THE TIME BEING. HE TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS ADVOCATING AN APPROACH WHICH SOUNDS SIMILAR IN CONCEPT TO THAT IN MY LETTER UNDER REFERENCE. HE SUMMARISED IT BRIEFLY IN AN OFF THE RECORD STATEMENT TO A CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON SATURDAY. HE WILL BE SEEING COEME IN A DAY OR TWO IN BRUSSELS AND DREGGER, TO WHOSE ROLE HE EVIDENTLY ATTACHES IMPORTANCE, BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK. HE PLANS TO BE ACTIVE IN THE MARGINS OF THE WEU TODAY AND TOMORROW.

HIS PACKAGE IS:

(A) SUPPORT FOR THE U S FOTL (AND TASM) DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMM(S);

(B) EXPLICIT POSTPONEMENT OF PROCUREMENT/DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNTIL 1991;

(C) A CONSEQUENT OFFER OF A MAJOR STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS BASED ON A REDUCTION IN THE SHORT TERM OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY BY 50 PERCENT OR MORE AND AN OFFER TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ALTOGETHER IF, IN ADDITION TO MODERNISATION, PROGRESS IS MADE IN CFE;

(D) SOMETHING ON EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS.

HE, TOO, SEEMS TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF A STOCKPILE BELOW SACEUR'S FIGURE OF 3,000 BUT NOT YET TO HAVE COME UP WITH A SPECIFIC NUMBER.

6. BOLKESTEIN PROFESSES TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY THAT REALLY BOTHERS THE GERMANS - AND IN PARTICULAR DREGGER. IN HIS VIEW THE POLITICAL PROBLEM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD BE GREATLY EASED IF THERE WERE A NOT TOO DISTANT PROSPECT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SUCH ARTILLERY. I WARNED HIM THAT ATTEMPTS TO BE TOO SPECIFIC ON THIS WOULD CAUSE A MAJOR ROW WITH THE U S MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

GERMAN ATTITUDES

7. I HAD TWO SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH LAMBSDORFF OVER THE WEEKEND, ONE OF THEM OVER DINNER ON FRIDAY NIGHT. (BOLKESTEIN HAD BREAKFAST WITH LAMBSDORFF YESTERDAY AND GLITMAN ALSO HAD A GO AT HIM.) I NEED NOT RECORD MY SIDE OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN DETAIL. I MADE THE CASE FOR A DETAILED DECISION. I SAID THAT A FUDGE WOULD BE VERY BAD NEWS FOR THE ALLIANCE. I ADDED THAT I DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD HELP THE COALITION SINCE, ABSIT A DECISION NOT TO MODERNISE, THE SPD AND THE GREENS WOULD IN ANY CASE KEEP THE ISSUE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE CAMPAIGN AND WOULD PILLORY THE COALITION FOR THEIR INDECISION. I STRESSED THAT IF THERE WAS NOTHING ON MODERNISATION IN MAY, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING ON UNILATERAL SNF ARMS CONTROL - STILL LESS ON ANY OTHER KIND OF SNF ARMS CONTROL.

8. LAMBSDORFF'S REPLY CAN BE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS (HE USED MOST OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES AT ONE POINT OR ANOTHER). QUOTE INTELLECTUALLY I ACCEPT THAT YOU ARE RIGHT. THAT IS HOW THE ALLIANCE OUGHT TO PROCEED. BUT WHILE I AM ALL FOR A CLEAR CUT DECISION, IT WILL MAKE NO SENSE IF THE RESULT IS ELECTORAL SUICIDE FOR THE COALITION. IN THE PAST I HAVE MADE PUBLIC MY SUPPORT FOR MODERNISATION. BUT OTHERS, INCLUDING MY FRIEND GENSCHER, HAVE BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS, PERHAPS TOO CAUTIOUS. WE HAVE TO GET THROUGH FIVE LANDER ELECTIONS BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. THE PUBLIC MAY BE UNINFORMED AND MISGUIDED BUT THEIR VOTES COUNT. THE SITUATION MAY BE RIDICULOUS BUT WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MORE DISASTERS. IF NO DECISION ON MODERNISATIONS MEANS NO ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE, SO BE IT. A DOUBLE NEGATIVE WILL BE LESS DAMAGING FOR THE COALITION THAN A CLEAR DECISION IN FAVOUR OF MODERNISATION. THE MOST WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO IS TO REPEAT LAST YEAR'S SUMMIT LANGUAGE ABOUT QUOTE KEEPING UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY UNQUOTE AND REVERT TO THE QUESTION IN 1991. IF THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS BY THEN IN CFE AND ELSEWHERE I WILL ARGUE STRONGLY FOR MODERNISATION UNQUOTE.

C

9. BOLKESTEIN AND GLITMAN GOT BROADLY THE SAME MESSAGE - - AS INDEED DID THE CONFERENCE SINCE LAMBSDORFF, HAVING BEEN CHIDED BY BOLKESTEIN ABOUT THE COALITION'S PREVARICATION, TOLD ONE OF THE WORKING GROUPS QUOTE THERE IS NOT GOING TO BE ANY DECISION ON MODERNISATION NOW UNQUOTE. BOLKESTEIN PROFESSED HIMSELF UNDISMAYED.

10. KARSTEN VOIGT, THE SPD FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN, WAS ALSO AT THE CONFERENCE. I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE SNF ISSUE INTO CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM. BUT IT MAY BE WORTH RECORDING THAT HIS EXTREME FRIENDLINESS CARRIED DISTINCT OVERTONES OF TRIUMPHALISM. ONLY TOO OBVIOUSLY HE FEELS THAT THE TIDE IS FLOWING HIS WAY. HE WAS AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT THE SPD, UNLIKE THE LABOUR PARTY, HAD NEVER BEEN EITHER ANTI NATO OR IN FAVOUR OF UNILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THEY BELIEVED IN GETTING RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NEGOTIATION AND WERE ON THEIR WAY TO SUCCESS.

CONCLUSION

11. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IGNORE THE DEEPENING IRONY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION - NOT LEAST FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE COALITION IN BONN. VIRTUALLY EVERYONE TO WHO ONE TALKS WHO IS GENNUINELY FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUES SEEMS TO HAVE SIMILAR IDEAS AS TO THE SORT OF POLICY AT WHICH WE OUGHT TO BE AIMING. BUT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON HOW TO GET THERE. MEANWHILE THE SITUATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CONTINUES TO UNRAVEL. IF, COLLECTIVELY, WE PROVE UNABLE TO TAKE A GRIP OF THINGS WE RISK GIVING THE SOVIET UNION A FREE HAND TO DO WHATEVER IT LIKES IN THIS AREA IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD WHILE DEPLOYING ON OUR OWN SIDE (AND PRESUMABLY IN UNREDUCED NUMBERS) ONLY ONE MODERNISED SYSTEM VIZ THE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY WHICH THE GERMANS WITH SOME REASON DISLIKE MOST OF ALL.

SIGNED: SIR MICHAEL ALEXANDER KCMG

YYYY

UBLNAN 5376

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SECRET

CDP

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 April 1989

SNF MODERNISATION

I had a very brief word on the telephone this afternoon with Horst Teltschik about the latest position on SNF modernisation.

Teltschik said that he has still not been offered a date for a visit to Washington but expected it to be next week. The German government had not yet reached a formal position. He remained optimistic that it would be possible to reach one with which we could live. But it was difficult to take things forward at the moment. There were a lot of problems in the Coalition which had to be clarified, and SNF modernisation was part of the package needed to resolve them. At the same time the FDP were in an even worse position than the CDU and this might make it easier to bear down on them on SNF modernisation. He would keep me posted. It would be useful for us to have a talk quite soon.

I did not mention to him our knowledge of Kohl's meeting with Richard Burt. It is of course, quite hard to reconcile the outcome of that with what Teltschik said to me.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

PART 5 ends:-

PM to Martens 31. 3. 89 (T636189)

PART 6 begins:-

CDP to FCO (WAU) 3. 4. 89



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