

Confidential File

NATO's 30th Anniversary.
4 35th Anniversary
4 40th Anniversary

NATO

May 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
14.5.79							
12.7.79							
25.1.84							
31.2.84							
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1.6.87							
16.6.88							
23.10.88							
27.1.89							
23/3/89							

PREM 19/2787



Conservative Central Office

32 Smith Square Westminster London SW1P 3HH

Telephone 01-222 9000

Telex 8814563 Facsimile 01-222 1135

6/11/89
CF to file

Lady Olga Maitland
21, Cloudsley Street
Islington
London
N1 0HX

A. Powell
Agree with Harvey
Thomas. You need a big
Nato name as well to
make it worth while,
We must now have a
flop in view of our
movement

Dr. Houghton
What do you
think?
OH

23rd March 1989

cc: CHARLES POWELL FOR INFO

[Signature] 4/3

Dear Olga

NATO BIRTHDAY RALLY JUNE 9th

After our chat on the telephone some time ago, I really was rather concerned about the prospects for your rally in the Westminster Central Hall on Friday June 9th.

The purpose as I understand it, is to celebrate and promote the 40th birthday of NATO.

The objective I believe, is to stage a packed-out (2,700 people) youth concert with a superb programme of music and speakers.

The methods that you suggested were to seek the help of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office in getting top level speakers and support to add to the few thousand pounds that NATO is willing to put into the project. You would depend quite a bit on the Conservative Party to give outlets for your sales campaign.

I think I have summarised fairly accurately Olga, the project as you told it to me.

What concerns me is that the only "named" person on the programme at the present time is George Younger, the Secretary of State for Defence.

It is certainly a serious shame that Manfred Werner, the Secretary General of NATO, has declined.

I am really writing Olga, to say that from a purely professional point of view as a producer of these things, I do have quite serious doubts as to whether it would be wise to continue to go ahead and try and produce this kind of concert.

There are clearly political questions involved as well and the cruel fact is, that unless you have an absolutely top level programme, you will not put 2,700 people in the Central Hall Westminster and if you don't do that the news media will judge the event to have been a flop.

George Younger is great but if this is to be a NATO Rally without a specific Conservative Party emphasis, you need a very strong programme indeed and particularly the top man from NATO!

Sorry to be so very blunt, but I did think I ought to put a professional view down in a note to you!

Warmest greetings from Marlies and I.

Sincerely



HARVEY THOMAS
DIRECTOR PRESENTATION AND PROMOTION





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3

CP

MO 35E

26th January 1989

Dear Richard

*CDP
27/1*

NATO'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY

Map

Brian Hawtin wrote to Charles Powell on 13th October about our plans to celebrate NATO's 40th anniversary with a "Britain in NATO" exhibition on Horse Guards. Since neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Secretary will be available to attend a formal opening ceremony on 4th April, however, we have reviewed our plans.

It is now proposed that, on the morning of 3rd April, before the start of the WEU meeting, which opens the same day, there should be a short photocall at the exhibition at 0930. Instead of a speech, there would be a statement issued to the media on the same day.

There are a number of advantages in changing the opening from a ceremony on Tuesday to a photocall on Monday morning, apart from the avoidance of any awkwardness with the WEU meeting and a ceremony being held at Northwood on 4th April to mark the anniversary. It would allow the exhibition to be open to the public a day earlier, and would enable the media to have copy and photographs for publication on the day of the anniversary itself. My Secretary of State believes that it would be highly appropriate for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also to participate in the photocall, and for the statement to be issued jointly. I would be grateful if you would let me know if he is able to agree.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*John ... by
S. McCarthy*
 (S MCCARTHY)
 Private Secretary

Richard Gozney Esq
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NATO: 40th Anniversary

May 79





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October 1988

CF
please find FCO a copy
of letter of 16 October
to Brian
Hawtin
24/10

Dear Brian,

flap NATO's 40th Anniversary : 4 April 1989

Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 13 October to Charles Powell.

The Foreign Secretary welcomes the idea of marking NATO's 40th Anniversary in this way. If the Prime Minister is able to open the exhibition, he would be very happy to attend, provided that it does not conflict with his obligations to the WEU Ministerial meeting due to end that morning. He wonders whether, since the Defence Secretary will have similar obligations to the WEU, it would be more prudent to plan the exhibition ceremony for later in the day.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10 Downing Street) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B Hawtin Esq
PS/Defence Secretary

NATO

Anniversary May 79





cc/ps

FINE
DA
PE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 October 1988

NATO'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY

Thank you for your letter of 13 October in which you propose that the Prime Minister might open the exhibition "Britain in NATO" next April as part of the celebration of NATO's 40th Anniversary and take the opportunity to make a speech on the value of the Alliance. I have discussed this with the Prime Minister who thinks it is more the sort of occasion which the Defence Secretary should undertake. She would be grateful if he could do so on her behalf.

(C.D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

010



MO 35E

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

I think George ^{etc} ^{CD}
should have the publicity
on this one

Prime Minister
I do not think
this exhibition
sufficiently large or
impressive to warrant
your attendance, ~~at~~ nor to
serve as a platform for a major
speech. You have anyway
done about NATO, & there
will be little new
to add.
Agree not to do
this?
CDP
13/10

13 October 1988

Dear Charles,

NATO's 40TH ANNIVERSARY

The Prime Minister will be aware that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4th April 1949 and that 1989 is, therefore, the 40th anniversary year. My Secretary of State attaches considerable importance to marking this anniversary in an appropriate way, not least as it is essential, in the post-INF era, that we do all we can to maintain public support for the Alliance and to emphasise its success in keeping the peace.

We are planning, therefore, a number of events next year to mark the anniversary which include an enhanced version of our exhibition on the theme "Britain in NATO". The exhibition consists of panels, photographs and models tracing our national links with the Alliance. It will be sited initially in Horse Guards Parade and will then tour a number of regional centres.

Mr Younger considers that it would get the exhibition off to a most propitious start if the Prime Minister were able to open it, perhaps towards the end of the morning on 4th April. Her presence would ensure positive publicity for the exhibition and, indeed, for the anniversary. It would also provide the opportunity for a keynote speech on the continuing benefits of the Alliance. He would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister can agree to take this on.

My Secretary of State would, of course, hope to attend the opening ceremony himself. In order to emphasise the broader political aspects of the Alliance, he also wonders whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might wish to attend.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
B R HAWTIN

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER

You will wish to be aware that Cap Weinberger will be here later this week to address the conference to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan at which Mr. Tebbit is also speaking. However, he will have no official engagements or meetings with ministers (apart from a social engagement with George Younger) and will be steering clear of the press.

mf

CDP

C. D. POWELL

1 June 1987

SLHAJA

CIF PPS

(4)

Flat 24
35 Buckingham Gate,
London SW1E 6PA
01-828 3225

Prime Minister

CJP
20/5

20th May 1987.

mt

Dear Prime Minister -

I am deeply grateful
to you for your letter of 15th May
about the Marshall Scholarships.

It is almost-miraculous,
at a time like this, that you found
a moment to write. But the fact that
you did, and the positive views you
express about the value of the scheme,
will be a great encouragement to the
administrators of it, past and present,
on both sides of the Atlantic. I will



ensure that your message is made full use of.

Thank you too for recording a video-message for the celebration on June 3rd. Even though you will have other things on your mind at that time, we shall be remembering with gratitude your most helpful contribution to the continuing success of the Marshall Scholarships and, through them, to Anglo-American friendship. Thank you very much indeed.

Yours sincerely

Donald Tebbit.

Personal.

Flat 24
35 Buckingham Gate,
London SW1E 6PA
01-828 3225

CF?

EDP

21/5

20th May 1987

Dear Charles,

I am enormously grateful to the Prime Minister for her letter of 15th May about the Marshall Scholarships and for her video recording for the 40th Anniversary. I am also immensely appreciative of your part in arranging these important contributions to the continuing success of the scheme. It will be marvellous to be able to produce to the Commissioners, past and present, and to our American collaborators, this clear evidence that the work that has gone into making

the scholarships a success is valued
at the highest level of government.
I enclose a note of thanks in case
the PM. has a second to glance at
it. In any case, thank you
very much indeed for helping me
to promote and sustain a good
cause.

Yours ever

Donald.

Sir Donald Tebbit



file JCA
CC FCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 May 1987

Dear Sir Donald.

The 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan has reminded us all of the very great generosity shown by the Government and people of the United States of America towards us when we in Europe needed help so badly. One of the ways that we in Britain chose to show our gratitude was by establishing the Marshall Scholarship Scheme, which has now funded some 800 young Americans of outstanding character and ability to study in this country, living among us and learning our ways. The Scheme has made a most valuable contribution to Anglo-American understanding as those young people returned home to reach positions of eminence in their chosen fields.

I should not want this Anniversary to pass without taking the opportunity to thank you - and through you the successive members of the Commission and all those who have participated in selection committees in the United States - for all the excellent work that has been done. I look forward - we all look forward - to the Scheme's continued success in the years to come.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Sir Donald Tebbit, G.C.M.G.

OTS



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1987

Dear Charles,

40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan

The 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan at the beginning of June will also be a special occasion for the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission, which administers some £3/4 million of public funds (on the FCO vote) every year to bring young Americans of the highest calibre to study in the UK. It is a very successful operation which is a symbolic gesture of thanks from the UK to the US, though of course it is also very much in our interest to have a corps of high powered young Americans orientated towards the UK. Sir Donald Tebbit, the Chairman, and his colleagues on the Marshall Commission give up their time freely, as do others on selection committees in the US.

You decided that a reference to the Marshall Scholarships was not appropriate to the video message that the Prime Minister has kindly taped for the Marshall Anniversary celebrations. But I am told that you agreed with Nicolas Barrington that it might be possible for the Prime Minister to send a separate message to Sir Donald Tebbit for the anniversary relating to the scholarship scheme. It would be much appreciated, and an encouragement to all concerned.

/ I attach a draft.

Yours ever,
L. Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: No 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: Sir Donald Tebbit GCMG
 Chairman, Marshall Aid
 Commemoration Commission
 36 Gordon Square
 London WC1H 0PF

Your Reference

Copies to:

To Mr.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

The 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan has reminded us all of the very great generosity shown by the Government and people of the United States of America towards us when we in Europe needed help so badly. One of the ways that we in Britain chose to show our gratitude was by establishing the Marshall Scholarship Scheme, which has now funded some 800 young Americans of outstanding character and ability to study in this country, living among us and learning our ways. The Scheme has made a most valuable contribution to Anglo-American understanding as those young people returned home to reach positions of eminence in their chosen fields.

I should not want this Anniversary to pass without taking the opportunity to thank you - and through you the successive members of the Commission and all those who have participated in selection committees in the United States - for all the excellent work that has been done. I look forward - we all look forward - to the Scheme's continued success in the years to come.

cm

Enclosures—flag(s).....



DS-110
file

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 May 1987

Donald Tebbit wrote to me asking whether the Prime Minister would be prepared to video-tape a message for the event to celebrate the Marshall Speech and Plan on 3 June.

This she has now done and we are making arrangements to get the video tape to you. I enclose a transcript. You will note the paragraph about Cap Weinberger. If for any reason the event was postponed and held at a time which he could not manage, we could excise this paragraph from the tape. Please let me know if there are any problems.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Donald Tebbit.

C D POWELL

Sir Philip Adams, K.C.M.G.

CDP

MESSAGE TO COMMEMORATIVE MEETING ON 40th ANNIVERSARY
OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

I am happy to be able to join with you in celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan and to add my tribute to that of President Reagan.

General Marshall's speech and the Marshall Aid which followed it were magnificent examples of the American people's generosity, a spirit still reflected in the 330,000 American servicemen stationed with their families in Europe for our common defence.

No-one of my generation can forget that America has been the principal architect of a peace in Europe which has lasted 40 years. The debt which the free peoples of Europe owe to the United States, generous with its bounty, willing to share its strength, is incalculable.

I want to thank, too, all the organisations and the individuals who have come together to organise this evening's Anniversary meeting. They have shown by their effort how much the spirit of co-operation across the Atlantic still counts today.

May I say a special word of welcome to Secretary Weinberger who I know is with you this evening. Britain does not have a better friend than Cap Weinberger who is always a very welcome guest to our shores.

General Marshall's historic speech was made at a time of great turmoil and upheaval, a time which we look back upon as an age of giants: the great statesmen and visionaries who understood, in the aftermath of war, the continuing need to defend freedom and democracy from new enemies.

I believe that today we are at a point in history which may prove to be no less crucial than those post-war years. I have seen for myself the new "open-ness" which is beginning to show itself in the Soviet Union. There is a very long way to go, and as time goes by we shall make our judgement not on speeches but on events. But I believe that there is more hope now than for many years for a better relationship between East and West, and for carefully negotiated reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons.

But let us always remember that it was only because of the vision and the courage shown by such men as President Truman and General Marshall in creating a real partnership across the Atlantic that Europe was able to recover its strength and resolve. Forty years on we need those qualities in the same measure, to ensure that future generations on both sides of the Atlantic stand together in our common cause.

You have my heartfelt good wishes. Thank you.

MESSAGE TO
COMMEMORATIVE
MEETING ON 40TH
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MARSHALL PLAN

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our common cause.

You have my
heartfelt good
wishes. Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER

40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

You kindly agreed to record a short video message for the 40th Anniversary celebrations of the Marshall speech and plan which will be held in the Conference Centre in early June. Cap Weinberger will be the main speaker on the American side. President Reagan has already taped a message.

I have prepared the attached text. If you are content with it, we will set it up on the autocue, as with the other message earlier this week, which greatly reduced the time needed for recording.

Agree the text?

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)

29 April 1987

DCABXL

Yes ~~it~~
as ~~with~~ amended. Is it
log?

LO 5 A I I

MESSAGE TO COMMEMORATIVE MEETING ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

I am ^{happy} ~~delighted~~ to be able to join with you in celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan and to add my tribute to that of President Reagan ~~which you have just heard.~~

General Marshall's speech and the Marshall Aid which followed it were magnificent examples of the American people's generosity, ~~of spirit~~, ^{spirit} a generosity still reflected in the 330,000 American servicemen stationed with their families in Europe for our common defence.

No-one of my generation can forget that America has been the principal architect of a peace in Europe which has lasted 40 years. The debt which the free peoples of Europe owe to the United States, generous with its bounty, willing to share its strength, ~~seeking to protect the weak~~, is incalculable.

I want to thank, too, all the organisations and the individuals who have come together to organise this evening's ^{anniversary meeting} ~~commemorative~~ event. They have shown by their effort how much the spirit of co-operation across the Atlantic still counts ~~for us~~ today.

May I say a special word of welcome to Secretary Weinberger, who I know is with you this evening. Britain ~~has no better~~ ^{has no better} ~~does not have~~ a better friend than Cap Weinberger who is always a very welcome guest to our shores.

General Marshall's historic speech was made ^{at} a time of great turmoil and upheaval, a time which we look back upon ~~now~~ as an age of giants: the great statesmen and visionaries who understood, in the aftermath of war, the continuing need to defend freedom and democracy from new enemies.

I believe that today we are at a point in history which may prove to be no less crucial than those post-war years. I have seen for myself the new ~~spirit~~ of 'open-ness' which is beginning to ^{show} ~~make~~ itself ~~felt~~ in the Soviet Union. There is a very long way to go, ^{and as time goes by we shall make our judgment} ~~But they are learning the lesson~~ ^{not on speaker but on events} ~~that the world does not like Russian expansionism and does not want Communism.~~ ^{But} I believe that there is more hope now than for many years for a better relationship between East and West, and for ^{carefully rejected} ~~reductions~~ in the numbers of nuclear weapons.

But let us always remember that it was only because of the vision and the courage shown by such men as President Truman and General Marshall in creating a real partnership across the Atlantic that Europe was able to recover its strength and ^{resolve} ~~defend its liberty~~. Forty years on we need those qualities in the same measure, to ensure that future generations on both sides of the Atlantic ^{stand} ~~work~~ together in our common cause.

You have my heartfelt good wishes. Thank you.

DCABXM



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1987

Under text

*CD
29/4.*

Dear Charles


/ As promised in my letter to you of 24 April, I enclose a draft message for the Prime Minister to videotape for the Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street



Delighted

I am ~~happy and much honoured~~ to address this commemorative meeting and to pay my own tribute to the Marshall Plan.

*Be deliv
whn to
free
people of
Europe
to this*

General Marshall's speech and the Marshall Aid which followed were magnificent examples of the generosity of spirit of the American people. ~~It is good that we should be reminded of this and of all we owed then and owe now to the United States. As I said in my speech to Congress in 1985 'no one of my generation can forget that America has been the principal architect of a peace in Europe which has lasted 40 years'.~~

I pay warm tribute to all the organisations and individuals who have worked to arrange this commemorative event today. I hope also that among those present are at least some recipients of the Marshall Scholarships which successive British Governments have funded to enable some 800 young Americans of high ability to study in this country over the years. These form a small but important symbol of our gratitude.

But it is not enough to recall with thanks and admiration the part which Marshall Aid played in the revival of a Europe devastated by war. The present also offers challenges.

They lie all around us: in the conduct of the world's economic affairs, which we shall address in a few days' time at the Venice Summit; in the improvement of East/West relations; and in the maintenance of our liberties and security through the Transatlantic Alliance. We must meet them with the same vision, solidarity and courage shown by the leaders of four decades ago.

Now, as much as forty years ago, Europe and North America must stand together as twin pillars in the common cause of liberty, peace and prosperity. As we commemorate today the generosity and vision of Marshall Aid, we need not only to rededicate ourselves to our shared ideals but also to ensure that Europe uses its recovered strength to pull its full weight in an ever closer partnership of Western freedom. I certainly make that pledge for myself and for any British Government which I lead.

R27/4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 April 1987

COO
27/4

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 23 April about the request from Sir Donald Tebbit. It is excellent news that the Prime Minister would be prepared to video-tape a brief message for the 3 June commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan. We shall forward a draft message shortly.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

Air. D. Tebbit file

(79)

ECU

30/4



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1987

I enclose a copy of a personal letter which I have had from Sir Donald Tebbit about the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Marshall speech and plan. As you will see he asks whether the Prime Minister would agree to follow President Reagan's example by video-taping a short message for the ceremony on June 3 and 4. I also enclose a copy of the message which President Reagan taped for a similar celebration in the United States.

The Prime Minister would in principle be ready to do this but, given her other engagements, we need to be able to video-tape a message very soon, let us say not later than 8 May. I assume that the Foreign Office would favour her supporting the occasion in this way and would be ready to produce a draft message, which need not be as long as President Reagan's. I should be grateful if you could confirm to me that you are content with this and we will make the necessary arrangements for the video-taping.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ECU

MR. HORNE

cc Mrs. Gaisman

The Prime Minister has agreed to video-tape a message for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Marshall speech and plan on 3/4 June. The sooner we can get this done the better and I would like if possible to arrange the video-taping not later than 8 May. Could you please discuss with Tessa a date in the diary, perhaps in the week beginning 3 May. It would be prudent to allow half an hour. I have asked the Foreign Office to let us have a draft of a message.

ESP

CHARLES POWELL

23 April 1987

Arranged for
Thursday 30 April
at 1700 COI
Crew & auto are
booked for White
Room.

WJP.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1987

Thank you for your letter of 17 April, received only yesterday asking whether the Prime Minister would be ready to record a video message for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Marshall speech and plan on 3/4 June. I am reasonably optimistic that the Prime Minister will undertake this and will confirm as soon as possible. In your absence I will speak to Philip Adams.

(Charles Powell)

Sir Donald Tebbit, G.C.M.G.

PRIME MINISTER

40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARSHALL SPEECH AND PLAN

There is to be a major celebration, under the auspices of the English Speaking Union and the Marshall Commemoration Commission, of the 40th anniversary of General Marshall's speech and plan on 3 and 4 June in the UK. Cap Weinberger will be the main American speaker. The Foreign Secretary has apparently declined but Mr. Tebbit has agreed to speak.

President Reagan has provided a video message for the occasion. The organisers have asked whether you would agree to record a similar brief message. I know this tends to be time-consuming but it would be a great pity to make the celebrations too one-sided an American affair. If we could squeeze some brief recording time into the diary in the next two or three weeks, would you agree to record a brief message?

Yes

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)

22 April 1987

Personal.

PRIORY COTTAGE
CHURCH ROAD, TOFT
CAMBRIDGE CB3 7RH
COMBERTON (022026) 2510

17th April 1987

Dear Charles,

A voice from the distant past,
I fear! I am in fact writing about something
relating to our Washington days.

Among my "honorific" duties, I
am Chairman of the English Speaking Union
and of the Marshall Commemoration
Commission. In both capacities I am
concerned with the arrangements being
made to celebrate the 40th anniversary of
the Marshall speech and plan. We have
booked the Queen Elizabeth II Conference
Centre for an evening event on June 3rd
and a seminar on June 4th, the latter
being intended to focus on what Marshall
& Co would have been prescribing for today.

It is however about the evening
event on June 3rd that I am writing.
The principal U.S. speaker will be
Casper Weinberger. We thought that the

principal British speaker should have been the Foreign Secretary but have not been able to persuade him for reasons which escape me. However, Mr. Norman Tebbit is coming who - all classish prejudices apart! - will no doubt deliver a more moving and less costly speech. We also have a canned video message from President Reagan which will be shown after a short film except - for General Marshall's speech. I enclose the embossed text of the President's message.

We are anxious that the whole event should not be too one-sidedly American, especially as our financial sponsor (American Express) is also American. I have therefore been asked to enquire whether the Prime Minister could find it in her heart to record a video message to balance the President's.

I hesitate to ask because I realize

what a burden of work Mrs. Thatcher carries; but I know from her brief stays with me in Canberra how marvellously she throws herself into such events and what a tremendous impact she has on such audiences. It is the one thing which will prevent the British response from looking half-hearted.

If you need further information, either I or Philip Adams (01.262.1547 or 060872-679) could supply it. (He is Chairman of the Current Affairs Dept of the ESO, as well as a member of the Marshall Commission. I shall be in Australia from 1 May to 11 May.)

I should be most grateful if you could put this request forward. (I realize of course that if the election is in June all bets are off and the event would have to be postponed or cancelled.)

Barbara joins me in sending love to you & Carla, who I hope sees you occasionally!

Yours ever

Donald Kevin.

B.0151

MR POWELL

40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan



The English Speaking Union have sent me the attached message which President Reagan has recorded for the celebrations to mark the 40th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, which are being organised by the English Speaking Union and others.

2. The celebrations will take the form of an evening meeting and reception on Wednesday, 3 June, at the Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, followed by a seminar in the same place on the following day. The principal speakers on 3 June will be Mr Weinberger and Mr Tebbit.

CLG

C L G Mallaby

14 April 1987



CAC + PAC + 10 files
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PRESIDENTIAL TAPING: 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN
TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1987

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests: I am very happy to have this opportunity to join you in celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

That great undertaking ranks as one of the brightest pages in the history of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Rarely have nations worked so closely in peacetime to achieve a common goal as did the partners in the Marshall Plan.

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe's great cities were in ruins and its national economies devastated. Winston Churchill described the continent as "a rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."

President Truman and his Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, understood the importance of rebuilding Europe, of helping Europe become strong and united. Spurred by this vision, the U.S. Congress in 1948 approved a European recovery program, which quickly became known as the "Marshall Plan." Under that program, 13 billion dollars in U.S. economic and technical assistance was channeled into European reconstruction between 1948 and 1952.

This vast aid amounted to nearly 10 percent of the U.S. Federal budget. It was money well-spent. Between 1947 and the summer of 1951, Western Europe's total economic output increased by a quarter and industrial output increased by more than a third. Unemployment dropped and Churchill said, "[The

EMBARRASSED UNTIL DELIVERED


Marshall Plan] is what has made the difference." And those countries that participated in the Marshall Plan have gone on to enjoy four decades of unprecedented peace, prosperity, and freedom.

It's important to remember that the Marshall Plan was not just an American program. It was a joint European and American venture -- a partnership for prosperity. Secretary of State Marshall said that, in drawing up the recovery program, "the initiative must come from Europe." Yes, the success of the Marshall Plan depended on a strong European commitment to self-help and cooperation. As an American, I am proud that this commitment first bloomed with American help. It has since given birth to two institutions for economic growth: the European Economic Community and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

These are parts of its lasting legacy. Sixteen countries participated in the Marshall Plan, with Britain the recipient of the largest portion of aid. And even more countries were invited. Secretary Marshall, in proposing his Plan before Harvard's graduating class of 1947, declared, "Our policy is directed not against any party or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." How different life in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe might be today had they accepted our invitation to take part in the Plan.

What is the lesson of the Marshall Plan for us, 40 years later? Well, it is not a lesson just of American generosity. To quote Churchill again, "Had the positions been reversed, [Europe]

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED




should have done the same for [America].” The lesson is, rather, how much we in Europe and America can do when we work together. Any free association of sovereign nations is bound to have disagreements -- disagreements over political, economic, or security issues. But the remarkable success of the Marshall Plan in far more trying times than these should serve as an inspiration to us as we face the problems of today. It should renew our commitment to mutual cooperation. But most important, it should convince us, beyond the shadow of any doubt, that the freedom and prosperity of each of our peoples are ultimately in the best interests of us all.

Finally, may I offer my best wishes to all of you in London. I hope you have a useful and productive conference on the Marshall Plan, a bond that united us in those immediate post-war years and which still cements our unity today.

Thank you and God bless you.

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED



PRIME MINISTER ARTICLE ON NATO

The Russians have objected to that section in your article yesterday which referred to the deployment of cruise and Pershing to prevent the Soviet Union of establishing a monopoly of medium range missiles in Europe. The Opposition may accuse you of reverting to "megaphone diplomacy". If so you could quote the following extract from your article.

'We are not just looking for progress in Stockholm, where the agenda is confidence-building measures. We want agreements on conventional and chemical weapons. Above all we want agreements in the nuclear field. The Americans are ready to resume Start (Strategic talks in Geneva at any time. The Russians must show an equal willingness. They will not be understood or forgiven if they stay sulking in their tent. The Americans, supported by the allies, are looking for major reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. They have put forward radical proposals. They are prepared to be flexible. But at present all they can see is an empty chair.'

Building on the new realism



The late 1970s was a period of illusion and self-deception. Domestically, Western governments pretended their economies could live with the inflationary fever which wracked them. Internationally, they pretended that detente had ushered in a new and cooperative period in East/West relations. Overheated imagination weakened resistance at home and abroad.

In the 1980s we have brought the temperature down. The treatment has been difficult. It is much easier to pretend that things are all right than to put them right. Responsible economic management has replaced inflationary *laissez-faire*. Sound money is back in fashion. A hard-headed assessment of Western security has replaced a world of East/West make-believe. Secure defences have been restored. We have broken decisively with a period of intellectual laziness when the seductive charms of self-deception were leading us towards self-destruction. We are stronger and fitter and better able to deal with the issues that face us at home and abroad.

Events in the past four years leave no doubt that a reassessment of East/West relations, and a rebuilding of Western defences, was overdue. At the end of 1979, the Red Army invaded Afghanistan, the first time since the Second World War that it had been used outside the Warsaw Pact. It is still there. In 1980-81, we watched a drama of towering courage and terrible disappointment much closer to home, in Poland. Anyone still deluding himself about the true nature of communist power had only to watch the ruthless suppression of the Polish people's efforts to secure some of those civil and political freedoms which we take for granted. And all the time, despite their peaceful protestations, the Russians continued to deploy SS-20 missiles targeted against West European cities.

Those events reinforced the new mood of Western realism. But a realistic assessment of the nature of East/West relations was only the first step: the second was to act on that assessment. That is what Britain and the other members of the alliance have been doing.

In the past four years we have increased our defence spending, and we have implemented our decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles and so prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a monopoly of medium-range missiles in Europe. No Western government has taken pleasure in having to do either of these things. But the Soviet military build-up, and Soviet refusal to negotiate seriously in Geneva and Vienna about nuclear and conventional arms reductions, gave us no choice if we wished to ensure the continued strength and credibility of the Western alliance. By showing that we are ready to meet the Soviet military challenge we have reduced the risk that the Russians will mistake our resolve. By doing that, we have reduced the risk of war.

For it was not just the West that was deluding itself in the late 1970s. The Russians, to judge from their international conduct, had concluded that the Western attachment to detente was so great that we would turn a blind eye to Soviet behaviour that did not affect us directly, and even to some Soviet behaviour that did. They were wrong. Western governments have spent more on defence despite the recession. Western peoples have held firm on INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) deployment despite a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to frighten and confuse them. We must hope that



In the ninth of our series marking 35 years of Nato, Margaret Thatcher outlines her vision of the way ahead for the West

the Russians have re-learned the lesson that the West will not allow its interests to go by default. If so, with illusions shed on both sides, we can now pursue a realistic dialogue with the aim of negotiating agreements which are in the interests of East and West.

That is what the Western alliance has been saying to the Russians in recent months. It was the message of a number of speeches which I made in the last few months of 1983. President Reagan signalled it loud and clear in his speech on January 16. It was central to what I told Hungarian leaders when I visited Budapest in February, and the new Soviet leaders when I went to Moscow for the funeral of President Andropov. It is what the Nato allies said at the meetings of foreign and defence ministers in December, and what they have been saying since at the CDE (Conference on Disarmament in Europe) negotiations in Stockholm. We want an East/West dialogue that leads not to declaratory texts of little substance, but to concrete steps of practical value.

We are not just looking for progress in Stockholm, where the agenda is confidence-building measures. We want agreements on conventional and chemical weapons. Above all we want agreements in the nuclear field. The Americans are ready to resume Start (Strategic Arms Reduction talks) and INF talks in Geneva at any time. The Russians must show an equal willingness. They will not be understood or forgiven if they stay sulking in their tent. The Americans, supported by the allies, are looking for major reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. They have put forward radical proposals. They are prepared to be flexible. But at present all they can see is an empty chair.



The West will persevere. That is the way forward. But we must do so by settling patiently to the task of constructing a stable East/West relationship built on the rock of mutual understanding and respect, not on the sand of high-flown rhetoric and dramatic initiatives. This means building up our contacts with the Russians so that we can discuss the whole range of questions which concern us, not just arms control. For without a broad framework, and the understanding and confidence which comes from multiple and substantial contact, progress towards arms control agreements will be much more difficult. We must also expand and strengthen our links with the East European countries, remembering that each of them has a distinct history and tradition and a particular contribution to make. This is the stuff of steady, unspectacular diplomacy, not political theatre. There will be a place for summits between the leaders of East and West but they must not be seen as a substitute for

daily, undramatic contact; nor are they an end in themselves. East/West relations require time and patience if they are to be soundly built. Summits are usually the key-stone, not the foundation.

It is only 16 years until the year 2000. There is much to do if we are to begin the new century and the new millennium with hope and confidence.



We in Western Europe believe passionately in our democratic way of life, and we are determined to defend it. But we also believe in working to reduce the artificial barriers that divide the two halves of our continent. European stability must not for ever rest uneasily on the frozen postures of confrontation. That is why arms control is a Western priority. We want to reduce the number of weapons and the money spent on them. The question is whether the Russians want to do so too. There are some grounds for optimism. The determined way in which the allies have reasserted themselves in the past four years will have done much to persuade the Soviet leaders that they cannot hope to secure unilateral political and military advantages by refusing to negotiate seriously with us. They know now that we will meet the challenge in whatever form it comes. That provides a strong incentive to talk.

A further incentive is provided by the facts of economic life. The Soviet economy is growing much more slowly than it was and may slow even more. New weapons cost huge sums to design and produce, sums which could be spent with much greater benefit on civilian development. As the Soviet leaders reflect on the high proportion of the national budget which is absorbed by military spending they may well be attracted by arms control agreements which promise to check these spiralling costs.

This does not mean that agreements will be easy to reach. Nor does it mean that the West will conclude agreements unless they are balanced and fair. No agreement is better than a had agreement. Political factors also counsel realism. The prospects for progress may well be affected this year by a presidential election in the United States and a new leadership in Moscow. But if both sides display imagination, flexibility and political will, the second half of the 1980s may prove as fertile a time for genuine arms control agreements as the early 1980s was fallow. Certainly the British Government will be doing what it can to make it so.

The events of the past four years have not only led us to review the management of East/West relations. They have prompted us to think hard about the management of the Western alliance too.

Its enduring success is a monument to those who founded it 35 years ago. Their shared experience

of one war determined them to band together to try to prevent another. That remains our overriding priority. Their chosen instrument was an alliance in which all were committed to the defence of each. Our commitment remains the same. Indeed, as defence technology becomes steadily more complex and more expensive, the concept of common defence enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty is as relevant as it has ever been.

The value of the alliance does not change but the world around it does. The challenge confronting us is to ensure that the alliance adapts successfully to those changes. Some are integral to the defence debate itself:

- We must look hard at the resources the members of the alliance allocate to defence. Are we getting good value for money? How can we tackle the difficulties over weapons standardization?

- We must consider the role of conventional weapons in Nato's strategy. Will technological developments make it possible to rely more on them and less on nuclear weapons? What would be the financial implications of any shift in emphasis?

- We must think now about the implications of weapons in space. The concepts and the weapons themselves may still seem largely theoretical, but the speed of technological development means that they could soon be with us.

- We must also insist on the effective verification of arms control agreements. Mere declarations of intent are not enough. Success in the current negotiations for a total ban on chemical weapons, a high priority for the Government, would be an important demonstration of this principle.

The alliance must adapt to a changing political landscape too:

- We must agree on a political, as well as a military, strategy towards the Soviet Union. If East/West relations are to improve and develop, the members of the alliance must be united in their aims and coordinated in their actions.

- As part of this political strategy we must decide how best to handle East/West economic relations. This is a particularly difficult issue. Somehow we must agree on where to draw the line between strategic and non-strategic goods.

- In the next few years many of the problems for Western interests are likely to arise outside the Nato area. We must be ready to respond to these together. Close consultation is essential.

- We must remember that we ourselves are changing and not to take each other for granted. We must work at our friendship, reinforcing old links and forging new.

These are some of the issues confronting Nato which its new Secretary-General and my old friend and colleague Lord Carrington will be tackling in the months and years ahead. It is a formidable agenda. But the alliance will rise to it, just as it has risen to meet the challenges of the past 35 years. We shall not always agree on everything; we never have. That is inevitable in an association of free nations, and no cause for shame or recrimination. But where there is, and will be, no dispute is about our enduring commitment to shared democratic values, and to their common defence. We know they are a priceless asset; and we know that Nato is the guarantee that we shall be able to pass them on to those who follow us.



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

22 March 1984

A.J.C. 2/3

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Dear Richard,

The Bishop of London telephoned yesterday about Lady Olga Maitland's proposal for a service in Westminster Abbey to celebrate the 35th anniversary of the NATO alliance.

He said that the Dean and Chapter of Westminster had decided that they could not allow the Abbey to be used, on the grounds that they did not recognise 35 years as marking a sufficiently significant span of time for anything. (It strikes me that this is a pronouncement that one might in the fulness of time pray in aid in a personal capacity!) I told the Bishop that I thought Mr Heseltine and Lord Whitelaw had in any case succeeded in deflecting her from the idea of a church service, and he seemed greatly relieved.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles (No 10) and to Roger Bone (FCO).

Yours sincerely,
Janet Lewis-Jones.

JANET A LEWIS JONES

Richard Mottram Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO: 35th Anniversary May 79 .

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

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MASTER
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 March, 1984.

The Prime Minister held a brief meeting before Cabinet this morning to discuss the proposal by Lady Olga Maitland for a church service to celebrate the 35th anniversary of NATO. The Lord President's minute of 15 February refers. Lord Whitelaw, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and the Secretary of State for Defence were present.

It was agreed that, while Lady Olga's activities in support of the Government's defence policy deserved encouragement, a church service for the purpose stated might not be appropriate, and could well encounter a number of problems. There would be attempts by advocates of unilateral disarmament to influence the form of the service, and there could well be demonstrations outside the church.

Following a brief discussion, it was agreed that the Lord President and the Defence Secretary would have a further meeting with Lady Olga to bring these concerns to her attention. It could be explained to her that the Government had various activities in mind for the commemoration of the 35th anniversary. In particular, there was to be a special exhibition on 5 April at the Royal United Services Institution. Should Lady Olga wish to deliver a petition at No.10, the Prime Minister would be glad to receive her, and a small accompanying party, for a short meeting. We also intended to pay special attention to Dr. Luns when he visited London prior to his retirement as NATO Secretary General. The Prime Minister would receive Dr. Luns, and the Defence Secretary would consider giving a large reception for him. The Prime Minister would separately consider whether she wished to give a reception for Lord Carrington nearer the time when he would take up his duties as the new NATO Secretary General.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

Miss Janet Lewis-Jones,
Lord President's Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

EST.

PRIME MINISTER

35th Anniversary of NATO: Lady Maitland's
Proposal for a Service in Westminster Abbey
or St. Paul's Cathedral

You are to discuss this with the
Lord President, the Foreign Secretary and
the Defence Secretary before Cabinet.
Lord Whitelaw sees difficulties in the
proposal.

A. J. C.

14 March 1984

126
C/F file

MR. INGHAM

THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARTICLE FOR
THE TIMES ON NATO

You will see from the attached minute that the Prime Minister has now approved the article, subject to an insertion on page 8 about chemical weapons.

Would you now like to have the final text produced and sent to The Times.

AJC

13 March 1984

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR ARTICLE FOR THE TIMES ON NATO

You approved the text (attached) but asked for an insertion on page 8 about chemical weapons.

I suggest the following:

X

"We must also insist on the effective verification of arms control agreements. Mere declarations of intent are not enough. Success in the current negotiations for a total ban on chemical weapons, a high priority for the Government, would be an important demonstration of this principle."

Yes not

Agree this insertion?

Agree that your article may now be sent to The Times?

A. J. C.

12 March 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 March 1984

for John,

The Times: North Atlantic Treaty 35th Anniversary

Thank you for your letter of 8 March in which you requested a short passage on chemical weapons for inclusion in the Prime Minister's article for The Times.

You may like to consider the following:

"We must also insist on means to verify arms control agreements; mere declarations of intent are not enough. Success in the current negotiations for a total ban on chemical weapons, a high priority for the Government, will show that we can put this principle into practice."

^

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

NATO, 35th Anniversary

May 75



1961-65-



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 March 1984

The Times: North Atlantic Treaty 35th Anniversary

Thank you for your letter of 16 February with which you enclosed a draft article for the Prime Minister to contribute to The Times series on the 35th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Prime Minister has asked me to say that she is delighted with this draft and would like the authors to be warmly thanked. Could you convey to all those involved the Prime Minister's gratitude.

BF. | Mrs. Thatcher has only one comment on the text. She would like to include a fourth indent on page 8 dealing with the question of chemical warfare. Could you kindly suggest one or two sentences?

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FILE
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bc B1

BF

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⑤

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR ARTICLE FOR THE TIMES

You have undertaken to produce an article for The Times on the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of NATO. They are hoping to publish your article towards the end of March or very early in April. I attach a text which is the right length (i.e. nearly 2,000 words). The FCO and MOD agree with it. Bernard has also seen it and made some suggestions.

I also attach previous articles in the series - by Michael Howard, Norman Podhoretz, Craxi, Kohl and President Reagan.

If you would prefer, I can re-submit the text to you at the weekend.

A.J.C.

6 March, 1984

Nato is 35 years old. The Times has asked western leaders and political philosophers to consider the organization's future over the next 35 years, and their reflections will be published during the next few months. Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, sets the scene

Peace: the vital factors



Lord Ismay, Nato's first secretary general, once described the object of the alliance as being to keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down. For a third of a century it has been successful in these objectives except, fortunately, the third. The Germans have not been kept down but raised up; raised up, indeed, so successfully that today the younger generation finds it hard to understand that there was ever a German problem at all. The Soviets have certainly been kept out; by military deterrence, without doubt, but even more by the development of societies so successful, both politically and economically, that the younger generation, even those of the extreme left, find it even harder to understand why anyone in the West ever regarded the Soviet system as in any sense a competitor with their own. So far from extending its rule westward over Europe, the Soviets are finding it harder than ever to maintain their hold over the territories they overran in 1945.

Still, 35 years is a long time. The settlements after the Napoleonic wars and the German wars of unification lasted only 40-odd years, while the deeply flawed Versailles system collapsed after 20. All eventually ceased to reflect political realities or to contain irresistible new ambitions. When the existing order is no longer seen to express the real relationship of social and political forces, the chances are that someone will challenge or test its stability by the use of force. That is one way wars begin.

Have we reached such a position in Europe today?

Certainly much has changed in the course of a generation. For the United States, the Soviet Union is

no longer seen just as a regional danger in Europe but as a global adversary, threatening the *status quo* all over the world. Western Europe's economic recovery, and its failure to achieve military unity, has, so far from strengthening the cohesion of the alliance, created nagging problems of burden-sharing within it. A generation in Europe which takes security for granted and cannot understand the role of military force in providing it expresses its frustrations in a fretful anti-Americanism which often seems the main driving force behind the peace movement, both in West Germany and here. Finally, the economic and political problems within its empire have not prevented it from achieving and maintaining a position of military parity with the United States; a position which gives it greater confidence in its operations on the world scene, and would make all prospects of a purely conventional defence of western Europe quite hopeless but for the continuing deterrent of the possibility of general nuclear war.

Does any of this amount to the kind of seismic shift in social and political forces which destroys the underlying stability of the international order and places it at the mercy of crises and accidents? Have we moved, as is sometimes suggested, from a postwar into a pre-war era such as that of 1908-1914 or 1933-1939?

Certainly the world outside Europe is profoundly unstable. No new order has yet developed to replace that imposed by the old European empires. But the conflicts outside Europe are unlikely to result in Armageddon unless the super-powers involve themselves, and this will happen only if they are prepared to accept the appalling risks of nuclear confrontation. Whatever alarming quotations may be dug out of the strategic literature on both

sides, there is no indication that either the American or the Soviet leadership is prepared for anything of the kind.

As for Europe, in assessing the prospects for stability, we should look neither at the military balance nor at the nature of the weapons themselves. This has been the fundamental error of the past decade; one shared equally by the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States and the *doppelgänger* it has conjured up on this side of the Atlantic, the European Peace Movement. We must look deeper for the things that really matter.

Can the Soviet Union continue to control its east European empire? Will that control remain, indefinitely, and be politically acceptable to the West? Can the Germans, East and West, incrementally develop a relationship which will not call in question the entire postwar settlement of the Continent? Will the nations of western Europe be reduced to ungovernability by the social discontent arising from their economic problems and thus once more constitute an attractive target for Soviet penetration? And most important of all, will the United States continue to regard western Europe as a region so vital to its own security that it will persist, in spite of all the frustrations and humiliations involved, in maintaining so complex an alliance?



the underlying political structure remains stable it will not be

disturbed by weapons imbalances, or be at the mercy of crises, accidents and misperceptions. If it is not, then peace cannot be preserved either by anxiously matching weapon for weapon or by dramatic gestures of one-sided disarmament.

Peace in Europe is only likely to be threatened by a combination of three circumstances. First, growing instability in eastern Europe might drive a desperate Soviet Union to take the gamble of a *fuite en avant*; much as the bleak prospects in the Balkans led the Central Powers in 1914 into the actions which precipitated the First World War. Second, growing instability and political divisions in western Europe might make the Soviets believe they would run a negligible risk in taking the offensive. And finally, American impatience and disgust with their European allies might make the Soviets misread the signals, as they did so fatally at the time of Korea, and assume that the United States now regarded western Europe as expendable.

The first of these developments lies beyond our control, and we would be ill-advised to think otherwise. But it was to guard against the second and the third that Nato came into being, and for which it still exists. No doubt one day social and political forces beyond our control will make it impossible any longer to preserve the alliance, or better still, may make it unnecessary. But meanwhile, anyone seriously concerned with the preservation of peace should devote their best efforts to keeping the framework which has for so long made that peace possible in the best feasible state of repair. It is no less true today than it has been in the past: if we do not hang together, we shall assuredly hang separately.

35 years of Nato: Norman Podhoretz calls for greater support for Washington's policy worldwide to halt the steady American drift to isolationism



It seems remarkable in retrospect that public opinion in the United States should have been so steadfast for so long in its support of Nato.

Yet steadfast it has been, in spite of the seductive allures of isolationism, a temptation which runs much deeper in the American character than is generally understood in Europe.

To be sure, once the West European economies had recovered from the wounds of the Second World War, proposals were made every few years or so to get American troops out of Europe. But such proposals (usually associated with the name of former Senator Mike Mansfield) always excited more alarm in Europe than support in the US. Not only did they get nowhere within the American foreign policy establishment; they did not even make much political headway among the mass of ordinary Americans.

All this seems all the more remarkable when it is compared with the climate of opinion surrounding Nato today. If in the past the American foreign policy establishment was unambiguously and unshakably committed to Nato, today many leading members of that establishment, including some proudly present at the creation of the alliance, have turned against it.

The most vivid example of this change is the "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons principle advocated by a group of former government officials who have come to be known as the American "gang of four": George F. Kennan (the great theoretician of the containment strategy in the Truman administration), Robert S. McNamara (Secretary of Defence in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations), McGeorge Bundy (National Security Adviser to presidents Kennedy and Johnson), and Gerard Smith (Nixon's representative at the Salt negotiations).


It is still, I think, not fully recognized - least of all by the gang of four themselves - that a pledge of no-first-use would be tantamount to a withdrawal of the American commitment to the defence of Europe. But there is no escape from that conclusion. The threat of a nuclear response has always been, and remains, Nato's strategy for deterring the Soviet Union from exploiting its superiority in conventional forces to overrun Western Europe. American troops are there not to fight the invaders off but to make the nuclear threat "credible" by serving as a "tripwire". Under no-first-use, American troops, no longer needed for this or any other military purpose, would be withdrawn, thereby further weakening, and perhaps altogether cutting, the lifeline tying the US to the fate of Western Europe.

Top-level opposition, public resentment

What we have here, then, is the reappearance, in a nuclear-age mutation, of the isolationist tradition. That isolationism should once again have become an influential presence in American political life is not itself surprising; on the contrary, it was to be expected and was indeed predicted as a consequence of the defeat in Vietnam. But what is surprising, and portentous, is that isolationism should have returned under the sponsorship of men who once stood at the very head of the Atlanticist establishment.

Perhaps because such men are still unable to face up to the fact of their apostasy, the "gang of four" simply refuse to admit that no-first-use means for all practical purposes a withdrawal of the American commitment to the defence of Europe, and the dissolution of Nato. Within the intellectual community, however, proponents of this doctrine like Irving Kristol and the late Herman Kahn have been willing to acknowledge its implications. Yes, says Kristol, no-first-use would spell the end of Nato, but good riddance to it. The time has come for the Europeans to assume responsibility for their own defence and for the US to go it alone.

Kristol is by no means certain that the Europeans would take on this responsibility. But he is confident that a US disentangled



Blame yourself if the US goes it alone

from Nato would play a more forceful and energetic role in countering Soviet expansionism. Since this is the last thing the "gang of four" would like to see the US do, one has to distinguish between their brand of isolationism and Kristol's go-it-alone strategy. Yet these two schools of thought, so antagonistic in their objectives, are equally dangerous to Nato.

Thus, for the first time in its history, Nato now confronts a loss of support and even serious opposition from influential segments both of the US foreign policy establishment and of the intellectual community. To make matters worse, the alliance also confronts a growing degree of resentment within the populace at large. Night after night, seeing demonstrators on television vilify the United States for agreeing to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, more and more Americans have begun wondering out loud why "we should have to beg those people to let us defend them".

This is certainly one reason why the American "freeze" movement, which calls for an immediate halt ("mutual and verifiable", goes the pious and politically prudent qualifier) to the building and deployment of nuclear weapons, is so popular even among voters not normally given to dovish, let alone pacifist, sentiments. For in the present state of the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, a freeze would all but dissolve the American guarantee to Europe.

On the one hand, it would prevent deployment of the intermediate-range missiles from going any further, thus "decoupling" Western Europe and the United States; on the other hand, it would prevent modernization of the American strategic force, thus forcing the US

into a "minimum deterrence" posture (which is the nuclear-age equivalent of a "Fortress America" strategy and consistent only with an isolationist foreign policy).

Do these changes in American public opinion mean that Nato is doomed? Not quite. If the survey data can be trusted, most Americans still regard the isolationist temptation as a delusion. Since I count myself among them, and since I think my own feelings are reasonably representative, let me speak personally here instead of trying to read the entrails of the public opinion polls.

It is not because I am immune to the seductive power of the isolationist temptation that I resist it. I resist because I believe that an American withdrawal from the western alliance would result not - as some of my political friends and allies predict - in an assumption by the Europeans of the responsibilities and burdens of self-defence, but rather in a collapse in the face of Soviet power.

Far from envisaging a rise in the production of troops, tanks and missiles, I foresee an increase in the number of neutralists, pacifists and appeasers, leading ultimately to a condition of political subordination to the Soviet Union which has come to be called "Finlandization", but which I prefer to call "Red Vichyism" - all without a shot having been fired.

This would be calamity enough, but even this would not be an end of it. For I cannot see how freedom and democracy in the United States could survive their demise in Western Europe. Trotsky used to say that socialism could not exist in one country. No more can democracy. Isolated behind a wall of nuclear missiles in a world increasingly shaped by the influence and the will

of the Soviet Union, the United States would in my opinion be unable to hold on for long to its own political culture. There too the number of appeasers would rise as the power of the nation declined, with Red Vichyism coming to look like the safest of all political arrangements.

In defending Nato in these terms, which amount to saying that the United States is now mainly bound to Western Europe as a kind of hostage, I am poignantly aware of how wan, how lacking in vitality, the case has become. But what else can one do? Like millions of other Americans, I have grown more and more to resent the apparent absence in Western Europe of any enthusiasm for the alliance, or any appreciation of its achievement in preserving both the peace and the freedom of the countries living behind its shield.

We are repeatedly told that there is a "silent majority" in Europe - and again, if the polls can be trusted, a very large one - that does appreciate these things. But mostly we hear from the raucous minority, and what we hear is foul and offensive: that the United States is as bad as, or worse than, the Soviet Union, and that Ronald Reagan is a greater threat to the peace of the world than was Yuri Andropov.

Support is a two-way process

Even when this preposterous neutralism, or the pernicious hatred of America that often goes with it, is challenged by Europeans, it is usually done in language that seems weak and defensive, for example, "as between Moscow and Washington, on the whole, and with all due reluctance, I suppose I prefer Washington".

This kind of thing has already begun taking the heart out of American backing for Nato. For the fact is that Americans who support Nato need the support of European supporters of Nato. We need to hear from those Europeans who know that the free world is a reality and not counterfeit, to be referred to sardonically in inverted commas; that its institutions represent an immense human achievement not easily duplicated; that its survival is threatened by an imperialism fully comparable in political, moral and military terms to Nazi Germany in the late 1930s; and that the future of liberty and democracy depends on the power and resolve of the United States, not in Europe alone but in such other vital areas as the Middle East and Central America.

These were the ideas which gave birth to Nato 35 years ago. They are as valid today as they were then; indeed, they are made even more compelling today by the tilt in the military balance away from the United States and towards the Soviet Union.

Since to some degree the rise of neutralism in Europe and of its isolationist cousin in the United States is a frightened response to this development, the first order of business must be a military build-up aimed at creating a greater sense of western security. And if, as many advocate, such a build-up should include a strengthening of the conventional forces of the West along with a modernization of its nuclear arsenal, so much the better.

But military measures are not enough. They will have to be accompanied by a more positive European affirmation of solidarity with the United States in areas outside the jurisdiction of Nato, especially the Middle East and Central America.

Otherwise, the isolationist temptation will prove impossible to resist, even for Americans like myself. Though we believe that isolationism is not a viable policy, if the only alternative is being dragged down by our allies, even we would be forced to take our chances at trying to go it alone.

The author is editor of the *American Journal Commentary*.

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Previous articles in this series appeared on January 13 and 25. A full collection, marking Nato's 35th anniversary, is to be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.

Towards a wider peace



If we think of the Atlantic alliance in human terms, we see a man of full awareness, with full physical and intellectual powers.

As a baby he was rather weak, and many doctors shook their heads in doubt and scepticism. But he grew from strength to strength, until every anxiety was silenced. His degree thesis, the challenge of liberty, was respected even by his declared opponents.

He has developed his social relationships, widened the circle of his knowledge and, most important, has preserved the security of the western world. Today he faces his most difficult task, the challenge of peace.

The alliance has no precedent. In this, the most ideological century in history, it guarantees the safety of all its members while allowing them to develop freely without restriction of any kind. Under its protection, the great ideological challenge between East and West has been able to develop in peaceful terms.

In the 35 years since its inception, the protagonists and the setting — notably the boundaries of the East-West confrontation — have changed. As early as 1956, an alarm bell was rung at the outbreak of the Suez crisis, which resulted not only in a dispute between allies — the United States on one side and France and Britain on the other — but also an abrupt break between the West and the Arab world. The subsequent Arab-Israeli wars accentuated the awareness of the dangerous consequences which an open confrontation with the Arab world would have on the political and economic security of the West. This awareness became a dramatic realization of impotence in the 1973 conflict.



Not much good was done by the sudden, over-effusive love for the Arab world (a love which to many smelt of oil) which the major European countries began to show after 1967, forgetting their earlier attitudes in favour of Israel. This alienated Israel, thus losing the European nation the opportunity to play a moderating part and leaving this task to the USA.

To find a show of more specific intentions by the European countries, we must go to the EEC summit of December 1973 at Copenhagen, with its declaration of readiness "to give our own assistance in the search for peace and for guaranteeing a solution" to this conflict. This declaration was repeated at various times, always in the same tone, up to the Venice declaration of June 13, 1980, when the Nine went further by proclaiming their readiness "to participate, in the context of a global settlement, in a system of specific, obligatory international guarantees, including action on the spot".

None of these declarations stopped the course of events. Destabilization processes continue to assail many countries in Asia and

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Africa, spheres of influence have continued to change and to extend, and the dividing line of the East-West confrontation remains as changing and unstable as ever.

What shall we do? Clearly we cannot give up. Equally clearly, if the whole weight of the alliance is periodically moved over these changing boundaries, the result can only be an intensification of international conflict, condemning local disputes to perpetuity.

This leads us to ask: Is a global vision more useful than a regional view of individual conflicts? Does European and American policy coincide towards the individual countries of Asia and Africa? What relation is there between a stable western policy and the instability and unpredictability of some governments of these countries?

In seeking an answer to these questions, we see an obvious need for improved East-West relations, which would greatly assist in limiting local conflicts and taking most of the danger out of them.

We are living through a critical stage in our relations with the Soviet bloc. Detente should not become a

simple memory. One general consideration must be kept in mind: is it possible to think that world peace can be maintained by an increasingly intense and sophisticated balance of terror? Can the world live by inventing increasingly complicated and terrible instruments of offence and by intending equally complicated devices for defence?

I want to assert my conviction of the need to change course, of the impossibility of continuing on our present road indefinitely. I am not thinking about a situation in which one of the two contestants will put up his hands in surrender (the solidarity shown by the West with regard to the Soviet SS20 speaks for itself). I am thinking of an agreed, controlled change of direction; a reduction in armament that cannot be achieved if we argue over who was initially responsible for the arms race.

When *The Times* invited me to take part in the debate on the future of Nato, it asked me to "think aloud, even the unimaginable". Well, is it impossible to imagine an East-West agreement to renounce strategic and military advantages outside the area of the Atlantic Pact or the Warsaw Pact? Is it impossible to imagine an East-West understanding on the quantity, quality and nature of aid to the developing countries of the Third World? Is it impossible to imagine consistent activity aimed at preventing a war economy taking the place of a peace economy in all these countries, or death and degradation being the price which these people must pay for their yearning to survive?

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The Federal Republic of Germany has been a member of the Atlantic alliance since 1955. Together with the European Community, the alliance constitutes the foundation of my country's foreign and security policy. As a grouping of free democracies, it represents a defensive community founded on shared values and convictions. Its commitment to the "principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law" are of particular importance for the Federal Republic as part of a divided nation. Nowhere else has the alliance's commitment to these values been more clearly visible than with regard to the situation in Germany and Berlin. From these common values the alliance derives its dynamism and the strength to meet external and internal challenges.

Last year was a testing year for the Atlantic alliance. The start of missile deployment in accordance with the twin-track (deploy and negotiate) decision of 1979 showed that other members of the alliance can rely on the Federal Republic, just as we can rely on them. For my country the question was whether it is willing and able to counter, together with its allies, the Soviet claim to hegemony. Like the other members of the alliance, we stood the test.

The start of the deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles brings home to the Soviet Union that it stands no chance of acquiring, with its build-up of SS20 missiles, a tool for exercising political hegemony in Europe or for decoupling Western Europe from the United States. This is where the great significance of our steadfastness lies for the development of European security and East-West relations in Europe. We have kept our word.

This decision, specifically reflecting the reliability and continuity of German policy, will not fail to make an impression on the Soviet Union. Implementation of the twin-track decision shows that the alliance remains capable of action. It affirms that the alliance's cohesion has been strengthened by the unprecedentedly close consultations between the European members and the United States. It is essential that the alliance should display unity in the face of the Soviet Union's attempts to split it. This requires that full use be made of the existing consultative mechanisms.

Even after the start of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS20 build-up, the alliance's concept remains steadfast and clear cut: military security and a policy of détente, which - as stated as early as 1967 in the Harmel Report - are mutually complementary. According to that report, the Atlantic alliance has two main functions: to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity, and secondly, to pursue the search for lasting and constructive relations between East and West, which can also serve as a basis for solving controversial political issues wherever possible.

Bonn, bridging the barrier



East-West relations figured in the talks between Mrs Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday. Continuing our series marking Nato's 35th anniversary, Herr Kohl urges renewed effort to resume a realistic dialogue with Moscow while reaffirming his country's unswerving commitment to the Western alliance

Nato's strategy of flexible response serves this goal. We want to prevent any war, be it nuclear or conventional. In the current debate on the risk of nuclear war, the fact is frequently ignored that conventional weapons now have more devastating effects than ever before. In view of the Warsaw Pact's vast superiority in conventional forces, we remain dependent on a deterrent that effectively counters both this threat and the East's nuclear arsenal. To this end, we need a balanced triad of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. To eliminate its dependence on the early use of nuclear arms, the alliance must give priority to strengthening the conventional element of this triad.

Unilateral disarmament or renunciation of the war-preventing concept of deterrence would not promote peace, but endanger it. Peace and freedom are our most valuable assets. They must not be placed at risk by hazardous experiments. On this subject I said the following in my policy statement of May 4, 1983: "We cannot overnight eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Unilateral renunciation of such weapons would not reduce the nuclear threat directed towards us, but only increase the danger of war. There is only one way out of this dilemma: we must drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides, those which threaten our existence and those which we are now forced to maintain in the interest of our

security". These ideas remain fully valid.

Until such a time when comprehensive, verifiable disarmament renders military means of safeguarding peace superfluous, we shall remain dependent on the alliance's tried-and-true strategy of deterrence and defence founded on equilibrium.

At its ministerial meeting in Brussels last December, Nato renewed its extensive offer of cooperation with the East and sent a clear signal for the continuation of the dialogue on arms control. The alliance's unequivocal reaffirmation of its security policy must be accompanied by new efforts for disarmament talks. In the field of nuclear disarmament, particularly, the West has tabled proposals aimed at deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and hence at reversing the existing trend.

We have stressed that the start of deployment of western missiles does not establish an irreversible situation. We have also made it clear that any change in the deployment schedule can come about only as a result of a mutually acceptable agreement reached at the talks. The Soviet Union, too, has of necessity an interest in a continued dialogue on arms control and in tangible results that limit nuclear potentials and afford both sides greater security. Reason demands negotiations.

However, above and beyond security policy, we must consider the shape that relations between Nato and the Warsaw Pact are to take in

the future. We must show the leaders of Eastern Europe that after the start of missile deployment, their assertions still lack foundation: it does not involve a question of war or peace, nor does it constitute a step towards destabilization instead of the restoration of equilibrium, or the pursuit of a Western strategy of confrontation. Especially as a country in which the missiles are being deployed, we advocate a policy of moderation and understanding on the basis of equality, equilibrium and mutuality. Both sides can but benefit by cooperation for a shared future founded on the manifold ties and experiences of a shared past.

The genuine results of the policy of détente pursued in the 1970s must be consolidated and improved. The East-West dialogue is still under strain because Western Europe's vital security interests are being impaired by the Soviet policy of stockpiling more and more weapons and seeking to decouple Europe from the United States.

On Nato's thirtieth anniversary, five years ago, the then secretary-general, Dr Luns, said that détente had a different meaning for the West than for the East. While the West construes it as the dismantling of bureaucratic barriers in the wide field of human contacts as well as economic and commercial relations, the East interprets it in the narrow sense of "peaceful co-existence", permitting an unbridled ideological offensive. The Soviet Union and its allies must abandon this attitude: détente can be achieved in the long run only if neither side views it as an instrument for obtaining security advantages to the detriment of the other.

It is in our mutual interest to foster East-West relations. To this end a modicum of stability and steadfastness is required in the relationship between the two superpowers. This should be attainable in view of their parallel interests in essential areas: to prevent armed conflicts that could result in nuclear escalation, to achieve tangible results in disarmament negotiations, and to reap mutual benefits from economic cooperation.

Considerable importance attaches to intensifying the direct political dialogue between the superpowers. I would therefore welcome an early meeting between President Reagan and Mr Chernenko.

In the eyes of a German head of government, the German and European aspects of the foregoing considerations are of special significance. The two German states - the Federal Republic and the GDR - must, particularly at difficult junctures, contribute towards the preservation of peace by engaging in constructive cooperation. One of the principle aims of the latter is to ease the situation of the people in our divided nation. The Federal Republic and the GDR have a shared responsibility: peace must emanate from German soil.

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Deterrence and dialogue



As the Atlantic alliance celebrates its thirty-fifth anniversary, it is particularly appropriate to rededicate ourselves to the great task we set for ourselves in 1949. The more closely the nations of the alliance can work together, the better we will be able to preserve peace and stability, and the better it will be for people everywhere.

The values that bind Nato together are not abstract concepts. Individual liberty, the rule of law, and respect for dignity of the individual are priceless and real. They have been handed down to us at enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. They are the cement of the alliance and we can never take them for granted. And it is the success of democracy, not the military power of the totalitarians, that will shape the rest of this century.

The world has changed a great deal since the representatives of 12 states met in Washington, on April 4, 1949, to sign the treaty establishing the alliance. But the underlying unity and purposes of the Atlantic community have not changed.

The founding members of Nato pledged to safeguard the "freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and to consider an armed attack against any one of them an attack against them all. Having just experienced the most devastating conflict in history, alliance leaders knew first hand the dangers of war, and the requirement for unity to deter it.

But they had more than sound historical understanding. They had remarkable foresight. The structure of Atlantic cooperation which they built has ensured the longest period of European peace, stability and progress in history.

The challenges which the Atlantic alliance confronts today are no less difficult. If we face them with the same determination, creativity, and sense of responsibility we have shown in the past, the future will be secure. If we are to achieve true peace, we must work for it.

The bedrock of our alliance is our unshakable commitment to ensure our security through collective self-defence. There is no alternative but to maintain a credible deterrent military posture and political solidarity. The continuing growth of Soviet military power will require a sustained effort by all of us - to reduce disparities in the military balance, to broaden our cooperation, to make the necessary investments to keep the peace.

Nato is not solely a military alliance. We also seek to improve the well-being of our people. Sustained economic growth will be the key. In this regard, we need to resist protectionism while we expand our cooperation in the fields of science and technology. We have long recognized that developments beyond the treaty area are relevant to our own well-being.

Building a constructive relationship with the world beyond the treaty area will require great energy and wisdom. We need to work



In the sixth of our series marking 35 years of Nato, President Ronald Reagan calls for continued resolution in resisting the Soviet threat and declares there can be no limit in challenging breaches of human rights

together in addressing the human, social, political and economic conditions which create the instability on which radicalism and Soviet interventionism feeds. This does not mean expanding the treaty area. But it does mean working closer together in sharing the burdens and solving the problems.

Since its creation, Nato has always had to address the question of how best to deter Soviet attack. The future will be no different. And we have agreed on the outline of the answer: defence and dialogue. There is no evidence that future Soviet behaviour will be anything but a serious threat to our security and to those principles on which a humane international system must be based. The answer for the future will still be defence and dialogue, a policy of reasonable strength combined with the commitment to search for ways to reduce the risk of conflict. Our challenge is to follow a policy of realism; strong enough to protect our interests but flexible enough to spare no effort in finding a fair way to reduce the levels of arms.

A candle of freedom we must preserve

Sometimes, we in the free countries forget the richness of our most precious possession - freedom and human rights. People who live in tyranny, however, can see freedom much more clearly. It shines like a candle in the dark. It is our responsibility to speak out and to work hard for the dignity of mankind, to improve human rights, and to hold governments accountable for their behaviour. This challenge has no limits.

The experience of the past 35 years has prepared the nations of the Atlantic community to overcome these challenges. As long as we stand together we will remain secure. We have not learned rote formulas, to be applied to all situations whether they fit or not. What we have learned is that the alliance is truly durable. While we cannot take our partnership for granted, we can be certain that patience, cooperation, and hard work will pay off. Any undertaking will ultimately be judged by the challenges it accepts and by those it overcomes. We have accepted a worthy challenge and

overcome many of them over the years. There is no reason to doubt the future.

This continuing vitality is nowhere more evident than in the deepening of alliance consultations on the question of nuclear arms control and maintenance of the alliance's nuclear deterrent. The 1979 INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) decision, taken in response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles threatening Western Europe, is a shining example of the alliance's traditional approach to western security - the dual foundation of defence and dialogue.

Nato has implemented both tracks of that decision, despite unprecedented political and military threats from the Soviet Union. Nato was responsible for the initiation of the Geneva arms control talks, which the Soviet Union at first resisted. It was through consultations within Nato that our arms control positions were developed. And, it has been the unity and determination of Nato which has made possible the actions needed to maintain our nuclear forces in Europe.

Contrary to popular assertions, the alliance is reducing rather than increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. The alliance agreed that as INF weapons were introduced, existing weapons would be removed on a one-for-one basis.

In addition, however, last autumn Nato decided to reduce the Nato nuclear stockpile by an additional 1,400 weapons. Together with the 1,000 warheads removed three years ago these unilateral reductions will bring the number of weapons withdrawn since 1979 to 2,400. The overall Nato stockpile will be reduced by one third.

The INF experience is an extremely important lesson for the future. It shows the ability of democratic governments to work together. Despite the stress, even with governmental changes in all of the countries directly involved, we will have been able to maintain a coherent policy. Contrary to the pessimism of many critics, dictatorships do not have an inherent advantage when dealing with free people. When governments remain open, people will respond in the best interests of freedom and peace.

The US will continue to work with our allies to ensure deterrence

at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons, and to strengthen the capability of conventional forces to deter conflict and lessen the likelihood of war.

As we work to ensure a credible military posture, we are also creating the basis from which to seek more stable and productive East-West relations. On January 16 I underscored my personal commitment to building a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, on the basis of realism, strength, and dialogue.

The United States is prepared to pursue the dialogue with the Soviet Union in all areas of our relations, from arms control to regional issues, from human rights to bilateral concerns. While I cannot predict the intentions of the Soviet Union, I firmly believe that it is in the interest of both sides that arms control negotiations go forward in all areas which had been under discussion.

The East-West dialogue must also embrace the full range of issues contained in the Helsinki Final Act. If it does not, we cannot expect to strengthen mutual confidence and understanding. In our bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral channels of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the nations of the Atlantic community will continue to pursue improvements in the rights of the individual, in greater communication and access, and in meaningful dialogue on the wide range of issues affecting the people of the continent.

From isolationism to awareness

The United States did not come easily to the Atlantic alliance. Independence and continental isolation has been a long tradition. As President Washington put it: "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no or a very remote relation."

That may have been true two centuries ago, but that view was swept away in the violence of two world wars. It became clear that there was no sensible alternative to an active policy of collective security if the democratic nations of the West were to survive.

So long as the sense of common heritage and interests remains vigorous in the West, and so long as the world remains the dangerous and challenging place that it is today, then the Atlantic alliance must be strong and vibrant. On the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman stated: "If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace". I share President Truman's optimism.

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Nato 35 years old. The Times has asked western leaders and political philosophers to consider the organization's future over the next 35 years, and their reflections will be published during the next few months. Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, sets the scene

Peace: the vital factors



Lord Ismay, Nato's first secretary general, once described the object of the alliance as being to keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down. For a third of a century it has been successful in these objectives except, fortunately, the third. The Germans have not been kept down but raised up; raised up, indeed, so successfully that today the younger generation finds it hard to understand that there was ever a German problem at all. The Soviets have certainly been kept out; by military deterrence, without doubt, but even more by the development of societies so successful, both politically and economically, that the younger generation, even those of the extreme left, find it even harder to understand why anyone in the West ever regarded the Soviet system as in any sense a competitor with their own. So far from extending its rule westward over Europe, the Soviets are finding it harder than ever to maintain their hold over the territories they overran in 1945.

Still, 35 years is a long time. The settlements after the Napoleonic wars and the German wars of unification lasted only 40-odd years, while the deeply flawed Versailles system collapsed after 20. All eventually ceased to reflect political realities or to contain irresistible new ambitions. When the existing order is no longer seen to express the real relationship of social and political forces, the chances are that someone will challenge or test its stability by the use of force. That is one way wars begin.

Have we reached such a position in Europe today?

Certainly much has changed in the course of a generation. For the United States, the Soviet Union is

no longer seen just as a regional danger in Europe but as a global adversary, threatening the *status quo* all over the world. Western Europe's economic recovery, and its failure to achieve military unity, has, so far from strengthening the cohesion of the alliance, created nagging problems of burden-sharing within it. A generation in Europe which takes security for granted and cannot understand the role of military force in providing it expresses its frustrations in a fretful anti-Americanism which often seems the main driving force behind the peace movement, both in West Germany and here. Finally, the economic and political problems within its empire have not prevented it from achieving and maintaining a position of military parity with the United States; a position which gives it greater confidence in its operations on the world scene, and would make all prospects of a purely conventional defence of western Europe quite hopeless but for the continuing deterrent of the possibility of general nuclear war.

Does any of this amount to the kind of seismic shift in social and political forces which destroys the underlying stability of the international order and places it at the mercy of crises and accidents? Have we moved, as is sometimes suggested, from a postwar into a pre-war era such as that of 1908-1914 or 1933-1939?

Certainly the world outside Europe is profoundly unstable. No new order has yet developed to replace that imposed by the old European empires. But the conflicts outside Europe are unlikely to result in Armageddon unless the super-powers involve themselves, and this will happen only if they are prepared to accept the appalling risks of nuclear confrontation. Whatever alarming quotations may be dug out of the strategic literature on both

sides, there is no indication that either the American or the Soviet leadership is prepared for anything of the kind.

As for Europe, in assessing the prospects for stability, we should look neither at the military balance nor at the nature of the weapons themselves. This has been the fundamental error of the past decade; one shared equally by the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States and the *doppelgänger* it has conjured up on this side of the Atlantic, the European Peace Movement. We must look deeper for the things that really matter.

Can the Soviet Union continue to control its east European empire? Will that control remain, indefinitely, and be politically acceptable to the West? Can the Germans, East and West, incrementally develop a relationship which will not call in question the entire postwar settlement of the Continent? Will the nations of western Europe be reduced to ungovernability by the social discontent arising from their economic problems and thus once more constitute an attractive target for Soviet penetration? And most important of all, will the United States continue to regard western Europe as a region so vital to its own security that it will persist, in spite of all the frustrations and humiliations involved, in maintaining so complex an alliance?



Factors such as these will determine whether the balance is stable or not; not SS20s, Pershing 2s or numbers of Soviet tanks. If the underlying political structure remains stable it will not be

disturbed by weapons imbalance or be at the mercy of crises, accidents and misperceptions. If it is not, then peace cannot be preserved either by anxiously matching weapon for weapon or by dramatic gestures of one-sided disarmament.

Peace in Europe is only likely to be threatened by a combination of three circumstances. First, growing instability in eastern Europe might drive a desperate Soviet Union to take the gamble of a *fiute en avant* much as the bleak prospects in the Balkans led the Central Powers in 1914 into the actions which precipitated the First World War. Second, growing instability and political divisions in western Europe might make the Soviets believe the would run a negligible risk in taking the offensive. And finally, American impatience and disgust with their European allies might make the Soviets misread the signals, as they did so fatally at the time of Korea and assume that the United States now regarded western Europe as expendable.

The first of these developments lies beyond our control, and we would be ill-advised to think otherwise. But it was to guard against the second and the third that Nato came into being, and for which it still exists. No doubt one day social and political forces beyond our control will make it impossible any longer to preserve the alliance or better still, may make it unnecessary. But meanwhile, any one seriously concerned with the preservation of peace should devote their best efforts to keeping the framework which has for so long made that peace possible in the best feasible state of repair. It is no less true today than it has been in the past: if we do not hang together, we shall assuredly hang separately.

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Continuing our series on 35 years of Nato, Bettino Craxi, Italian Prime Minister, sees a relaxation of East-West tension as a prerequisite for limiting local wars in Africa and Asia and making Third World aid more effective

Not much good was done by the sudden, over-effusive love for the Arab world (a love which many smelt of oil) which the major European countries began to show after 1967, forgetting their earlier attitudes in favour of Israel. This alienated Israel, thus losing the European nation the opportunity to play a moderating part and leaving this task to the USA.

To find a show of more specific intentions by the European countries, we must go to the EEC summit of December 1973 at Copenhagen, with its declaration of readiness "to give our own assistance in the search for peace and for guaranteeing a solution" to this conflict. This declaration was repeated at various times, always in the same tone, up to the Venice declaration of June 13, 1980, when the Nine went further by proclaiming their readiness "to participate, in the context of a global settlement, in a system of specific, obligatory international guarantees, including action on the spot".

None of these declarations stopped the course of events. Destabilization processes continue to assail many countries in Asia and

Africa, spheres of influence have continued to change and to extend, and the dividing line of the East-West confrontation remains as changing and unstable as ever.

What shall we do? Clearly we cannot give up. Equally clearly, if the whole weight of the alliance is periodically moved over these changing boundaries, the result can only be an intensification of international conflict, condemning local disputes to perpetuity.

This leads us to ask: Is a global vision more useful than a regional view of individual conflicts? Does European and American policy coincide towards the individual countries of Asia and Africa? What relation is there between a stable western policy and the instability and unpredictability of some governments of these countries?

In seeking an answer to these questions, we see an obvious need for improved East-West relations, which would greatly assist in limiting local conflicts and taking most of the danger out of them.


We are living through a critical stage in our relations with the Soviet bloc. Detente should not become a

simple memory. One general consideration must be kept in mind: is it possible to think that world peace can be maintained by an increasingly intense and sophisticated balance of terror? Can the world live by inventing increasingly complicated and terrible instruments of offence and by intending equally complicated devices for defence?

I want to assert my conviction of the need to change course, of the impossibility of continuing on our present road indefinitely. I am not thinking about a situation in which one of the two contestants will put up his hands in surrender (the solidarity shown by the West with regard to the Soviet SS20 speaks for itself). I am thinking of an agreed, controlled change of direction; a reduction in armament that cannot be achieved if we argue over who was initially responsible for the arms race.

When *The Times* invited me to take part in the debate on the future of Nato, it asked me to "think aloud, even the unimaginable". Well, is it impossible to imagine an East-West agreement to renounce strategic and military advantages outside the area of the Atlantic Pact or the Warsaw Pact? Is it impossible to imagine an East-West understanding on the quantity, quality and nature of aid to the developing countries of the Third World? Is it impossible to imagine consistent activity aimed at preventing a war economy taking the place of a peace economy in all these countries, or death and degradation being the price which these people must pay for their yearning to survive?

Previous articles in this series appeared on January 13, January 25, and February 16. A full collection is to be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.



The Federal Republic of Germany has been a member of the Atlantic alliance since 1955. Together with the European Community, the

alliance constitutes the foundation of my country's foreign and security policy. As a grouping of free democracies, it represents a defensive community founded on shared values and convictions. Its commitment to the "principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law" are of particular importance for the Federal Republic as part of a divided nation. Nowhere else has the alliance's commitment to these values been more clearly visible than with regard to the situation in Germany and Berlin. From these common values the alliance derives its dynamism and the strength to meet external and internal challenges.

Last year was a testing year for the Atlantic alliance. The start of missile deployment in accordance with the twin-track (deploy and negotiate) decision of 1979 showed that other members of the alliance can rely on the Federal Republic, just as we can rely on them. For my country the question was whether it is willing and able to counter, together with its allies, the Soviet claim to hegemony. Like the other members of the alliance, we stood the test.

The start of the deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles brings home to the Soviet Union that it stands no chance of acquiring, with its build-up of SS20 missiles, a tool for exercising political hegemony in Europe or for decoupling Western Europe from the United States. This is where the great significance of our steadfastness lies for the development of European security and East-West relations in Europe. We have kept our word.

This decision, specifically reflecting the reliability and continuity of German policy, will not fail to make an impression on the Soviet Union. Implementation of the twin-track decision shows that the alliance remains capable of action. It affirms that the alliance's cohesion has been strengthened by the unprecedentedly close consultations between the European members and the United States. It is essential that the alliance should display unity in the face of the Soviet Union's attempts to split it. This requires that full use be made of the existing consultative mechanisms.

Even after the start of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS20 build-up, the alliance's concept remains steadfast and clear cut: military security and a policy of détente, which – as stated as early as 1967 in the Harmel Report – are mutually complementary. According to that report, the Atlantic alliance has two main functions: to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity, and secondly, to pursue the search for lasting and constructive relations between East and West, which can also serve as a basis for solving controversial political issues wherever possible.

Bonn, bridging the barrier



East-West relations figured in the talks between Mrs Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday. Continuing our series marking Nato's 35th anniversary, Herr Kohl urges renewed effort to resume a realistic dialogue with Moscow while reaffirming his country's unswerving commitment to the Western alliance

Nato's strategy of flexible response serves this goal. We want to prevent any war, be it nuclear or conventional. In the current debate on the risk of nuclear war, the fact is frequently ignored that conventional weapons now have more devastating effects than ever before. In view of the Warsaw Pact's vast superiority in conventional forces, we remain dependent on a deterrent that effectively counters both this threat and the East's nuclear arsenal. To this end, we need a balanced triad of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. To eliminate its dependence on the early use of nuclear arms, the alliance must give priority to strengthening the conventional element of this triad.

Unilateral disarmament or renunciation of the war-preventing concept of deterrence would not promote peace, but endanger it. Peace and freedom are our most valuable assets. They must not be placed at risk by hazardous experiments. On this subject I said the following in my policy statement of May 4, 1983: "We cannot overnight eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Unilateral renunciation of such weapons would not reduce the nuclear threat directed towards us, but only increase the danger of war. There is only one way out of this dilemma: we must drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides, those which threaten our existence and those which we are now forced to maintain in the interest of our

security". These ideas remain fully valid.

Until such a time when comprehensive, verifiable disarmament renders military means of safeguarding peace superfluous, we shall remain dependent on the alliance's tried-and-true strategy of deterrence and defence founded on equilibrium.

At its ministerial meeting in Brussels last December, Nato renewed its extensive offer of cooperation with the East and sent a clear signal for the continuation of the dialogue on arms control. The alliance's unequivocal reaffirmation of its security policy must be accompanied by new efforts for disarmament talks. In the field of nuclear disarmament, particularly, the West has tabled proposals aimed at deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and hence at reversing the existing trend.

We have stressed that the start of deployment of western missiles does not establish an irreversible situation. We have also made it clear that any change in the deployment schedule can come about only as a result of a mutually acceptable agreement reached at the talks. The Soviet Union, too, has of necessity an interest in a continued dialogue on arms control and in tangible results that limit nuclear potentials and afford both sides greater security. Reason demands negotiations.

However, above and beyond security policy, we must consider the shape that relations between Nato and the Warsaw Pact are to take in

the future. We must show to leaders of Eastern Europe that after the start of missile deployment, the assertions still lack foundation: does not involve a question of war or peace, nor does it constitute a step towards destabilization instead of the restoration of equilibrium, or the pursuit of a Western strategy of confrontation. Especially as a country in which the missiles are being deployed, we advocate a policy of moderation and understanding on the basis of equality, equilibrium and mutuality. Both sides can but benefit by cooperation for a shared future founded on the manifold ties and experiences of shared past.

The genuine results of the policy of détente pursued in the 1970s must be consolidated and improved. The East-West dialogue is still under strain because Western European vital security interests are being impaired by the Soviet policy of stockpiling more and more weapons and seeking to decouple Europe from the United States.

On Nato's thirtieth anniversary five years ago, the then secretary general, Dr Luns, said that détente had a different meaning for the West than for the East. While the West construes it as the dismantling of bureaucratic barriers in the wide field of human contacts as well as economic and commercial relations, the East interprets it in the narrow sense of "peaceful co-existence" permitting an unbridled ideological offensive. The Soviet Union and its allies must abandon this attitude if détente can be achieved in the long run only if neither side views it as an instrument for obtaining security advantages to the detriment of the other.

It is in our mutual interest to foster East-West relations. To this end a modicum of stability and steadfastness is required in the relationship between the two superpowers. This should be attainable in view of their parallel interests in essential areas: to prevent armed conflicts that could result in nuclear escalation, to achieve tangible results in disarmament negotiations and to reap mutual benefits from economic cooperation.

Considerable importance attaches to intensifying the direct political dialogue between the superpowers. We would therefore welcome an early meeting between President Reagan and Mr Chernenko.

In the eyes of a German head of government, the German and European aspects of the foregoing considerations are of special significance. The two German states – the Federal Republic and the GDR – must, particularly at difficult junctures, contribute towards the preservation of peace by engaging in constructive cooperation. One of the principle aims of the latter is to ease the situation of the people in our divided nation. The Federal Republic and the GDR have a shared responsibility: peace must emanate from German soil.

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A full collection of articles in this series will be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.

Deterrence and dialogue



As the Atlantic alliance celebrates its thirty-fifth anniversary, it is particularly appropriate to rededicate ourselves to the great task we set for ourselves in 1949. The more closely the nations of the alliance can work together, the better we will be able to preserve peace and stability, and the better it will be for people everywhere.

The values that bind Nato together are not abstract concepts. Individual liberty, the rule of law, and respect for dignity of the individual are priceless and real. They have been handed down to us at enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. They are the cement of the alliance and we can never take them for granted. And it is the success of democracy, not the military power of the totalitarians, that will shape the rest of this century.

The world has changed a great deal since the representatives of 12 states met in Washington, on April 4, 1949, to sign the treaty establishing the alliance. But the underlying unity and purposes of the Atlantic community have not changed.

The founding members of Nato pledged to safeguard the "freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and to consider an armed attack against any one of them an attack against them all. Having just experienced the most devastating conflict in history, alliance leaders knew first hand the dangers of war, and the requirement for unity to deter it.

But they had more than sound historical understanding. They had remarkable foresight. The structure of Atlantic cooperation which they built has ensured the longest period of European peace, stability and progress in history.

The challenges which the Atlantic alliance confronts today are no less difficult. If we face them with the same determination, creativity, and sense of responsibility we have shown in the past, the future will be secure. If we are to achieve true peace, we must work for it.

The bedrock of our alliance is our unshakable commitment to ensure our security through collective self-defence. There is no alternative but to maintain a credible deterrent military posture and political solidarity. The continuing growth of Soviet military power will require a sustained effort by all of us - to reduce disparities in the military balance, to broaden our cooperation, to make the necessary investments to keep the peace.

Nato is not solely a military alliance. We also seek to improve the well-being of our people. Sustained economic growth will be the key. In this regard, we need to resist protectionism while we expand our cooperation in the fields of science and technology. We have long recognized that developments beyond the treaty area are relevant to our own well-being.

Building a constructive relationship with the world beyond the treaty area will require great energy and wisdom. We need to work



In the sixth of our series marking 35 years of Nato, President Ronald Reagan calls for continued resolution in resisting the Soviet threat and declares there can be no limit in challenging breaches of human rights

together in addressing the human, social, political and economic conditions which create the instability on which radicalism and Soviet interventionism feeds. This does not mean expanding the treaty area. But it does mean working closer together in sharing the burdens and solving the problems.

Since its creation, Nato has always had to address the question of how best to deter Soviet attack. The future will be no different. And we have agreed on the outline of the answer: defence and dialogue. There is no evidence that future Soviet behaviour will be anything but a serious threat to our security and to those principles on which a humane international system must be based. The answer for the future will still be defence and dialogue, a policy of reasonable strength combined with the commitment to search for ways to reduce the risk of conflict. Our challenge is to follow a policy of realism; strong enough to protect our interests but flexible enough to spare no effort in finding a fair way to reduce the levels of arms.

A candle of freedom we must preserve

Sometimes, we in the free countries forget the richness of our most precious possession - freedom and human rights. People who live in tyranny, however, can see freedom much more clearly. It shines like a candle in the dark. It is our responsibility to speak out and to work hard for the dignity of mankind, to improve human rights, and to hold governments accountable for their behaviour. This challenge has no limits.

The experience of the past 35 years has prepared the nations of the Atlantic community to overcome these challenges. As long as we stand together we will remain secure. We have not learned rote formulas, to be applied to all situations whether they fit or not. What we have learned is that the alliance is truly durable. While we cannot take our partnership for granted, we can be certain that patience, cooperation, and hard work will pay off. Any undertaking will ultimately be judged by the challenges it accepts and by those it overcomes. We have accepted a worthy challenge and

overcome many of them over the years. There is no reason to doubt the future.

This continuing vitality is nowhere more evident than in the deepening of alliance consultations on the question of nuclear arms control and maintenance of the alliance's nuclear deterrent. The 1979 INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) decision, taken in response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles threatening Western Europe, is a shining example of the alliance's traditional approach to western security - the dual foundation of defence and dialogue.

Nato has implemented both tracks of that decision, despite unprecedented political and military threats from the Soviet Union. Nato was responsible for the initiation of the Geneva arms control talks, which the Soviet Union at first resisted. It was through consultations within Nato that our arms control positions were developed. And, it has been the unity and determination of Nato which has made possible the actions needed to maintain our nuclear forces in Europe.

Contrary to popular assertions, the alliance is reducing rather than increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. The alliance agreed that as INF weapons were introduced, existing weapons would be removed on a one-for-one basis.

In addition, however, last autumn Nato decided to reduce the Nato nuclear stockpile by an additional 1,400 weapons. Together with the 1,000 warheads removed three years ago these unilateral reductions will bring the number of weapons withdrawn since 1979 to 2,400. The overall Nato stockpile will be reduced by one third.

The INF experience is an extremely important lesson for the future. It shows the ability of democratic governments to work together. Despite the stress, even with governmental changes in all of the countries directly involved, we will have been able to maintain a coherent policy. Contrary to the pessimism of many critics, dictatorships do not have an inherent advantage when dealing with free people. When governments remain open, people will respond in the best interests of freedom and peace.

The US will continue to work with our allies to ensure deterrence

at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons, and to strengthen the capability of conventional forces to deter conflict and lessen the likelihood of war.

As we work to ensure a credible military posture, we are also creating the basis from which to seek more stable and productive East-West relations. On January 16 I underscored my personal commitment to building a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, on the basis of realism, strength, and dialogue.

The United States is prepared to pursue the dialogue with the Soviet Union in all areas of our relations, from arms control to regional issues, from human rights to bilateral concerns. While I cannot predict the intentions of the Soviet Union, I firmly believe that it is in the interest of both sides that arms control negotiations go forward in all areas which had been under discussion.

The East-West dialogue must also embrace the full range of issues contained in the Helsinki Final Act. If it does not, we cannot expect to strengthen mutual confidence and understanding. In our bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral channels of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the nations of the Atlantic community will continue to pursue improvements in the rights of the individual, in greater communication and access, and in meaningful dialogue on the wide range of issues affecting the people of the continent.

From isolationism to awareness

The United States did not come easily to the Atlantic alliance. Independence and continental isolation has been a long tradition. As President Washington put it: "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no or a very remote relation."

That may have been true two centuries ago, but that view was swept away in the violence of two world wars. It became clear that there was no sensible alternative to an active policy of collective security if the democratic nations of the West were to survive.

So long as the sense of common heritage and interests remains vigorous in the West, and so long as the world remains the dangerous and challenging place that it is today, then the Atlantic alliance must be strong and vibrant. On the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman stated: "If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace". I share President Truman's optimism.

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A full collection of articles in this series will be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown

FILE SH

CF



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February, 1984

35th Anniversary of NATO

The Prime Minister has seen Lord Whitelaw's minute of 15 February about Lady Olga Maitland's proposal for a service to celebrate the 35th anniversary of NATO.

BR-1

The Prime Minister would like to have a word with Lord Whitelaw, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Heseltine about the plans for the 35th anniversary and we have arranged for this discussion to take place after Cabinet on 15 March.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. DOLES

Miss Janet Lewis-Jones,
Lord President's Office

6

f

MR COLES

TIMES: NATO'S 25 YEARS

I agree this draft is a good read and well written. You may care to submit it, taking into account my comments as follows:

Page 1, last 3 lines of paragraph 2: "We are stronger and fitter and better able to deal with the issues that face us at home and abroad." This would eliminate one of the many "challenges in the draft.

Page 3: The last few sentences of paragraph 2 are somewhat optimistic - have the Russians learnt their lesson? Have both sides shed their illusions?

Page 3: I would imagine the Prime Minister will want to take credit for Washington, Party Conference and Guildhall speeches before she says President Reagan "signalled it loud and clear" on January 16.

Page 4: I wonder whether we want to be so insulting as to use the phrase, "sulking in their tent". Why not "... if they stay sitting on their hands at home."?


Page 5, (bottom): I am worried about the idea of seeking to end the division in Europe - or at least to work towards it. Won't it alarm the Russians as it is put? I would have thought it better to omit "The present division of Europe goes against the grain of history."

Page 8: I prefer the interrogative version of the second indent (see Brian Fall's covering letter).

Page 8, 3rd indent: What do we mean by "We must think now about the questions of weapons in space."? I am sure this will be misinterpreted unless it is fleshed out a little. I can foresee stories that the Prime Minister is intending to join the space weapons' race unless we state more clearly why we need to think about.

Page 9: There are a lot of "challenges" lying around in the text and 3 on this page. We could improve by changing "challenges" in the third indent to "problems for". In the last paragraph on this page I would prefer to eliminate another "challenge" by re-wording the short sentence "It is a challenging agenda" to "It is a formidable agenda."

I hope this is helpful.



B. INGHAM

20 February 1984

PRIME MINISTER

Caroline

This can wait up
to 3 weeks.

2/12

35th anniversary of NATO

I attach a letter from Sir Peter Blaker which shows that he has dropped the idea of a rally at Wembley.

But I also attach a minute from Lord Whitelaw which shows that Lady Olga Maitland is thinking in terms of a service at Westminster Abbey or St. Pauls Cathedral. Lord Whitelaw senses that this could become a rather difficult matter.

Would you like me to arrange for him to discuss this with ^{you,} the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary in the margins of Cabinet on a suitable day?

Yes please
not

A.S.C.

Mr. Dyer.

Could you pl. arrange?

A.S.C. 2/12

17 February 1984

(return page to me).



Mr. Hyman.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Do you want to take a
first look at this (at a quick
glance it seems not bad to me)?

London SW1A 2AH

16 February, 1984

A.J.C. $\frac{17}{2}$

Draft submitted to

Prime Minister. $\frac{17}{2}$

Dear John

The Times: North Atlantic Treaty 35th Anniversary

As requested in your letter of 3 January, I enclose a draft article for the Prime Minister to contribute to the series which The Times plans to publish to mark the 35th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The draft takes account of comments by the MOD but does not reflect their suggestion that the second point listed on page 8 (sidelined) should be redrafted to read:

'... We must look hard at the role of conventional weapons in NATO's strategy. We must try harder to improve our conventional forces and reduce the risks of the early use of nuclear weapons'.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has seen the draft, and does not think that the underlined passage is an improvement, particularly since the interrogative formulation in the text as it stands is more in line with the Editor's request that the article should be stimulating and provocative and should 'think out loud - even the unthinkable - about the future'.

Handwritten signature

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

The Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Blaker, KCMG MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

16th February 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 19th January about the suggestion that there should be a rally in the autumn to mark the fact that 1984 is the 35th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I note that October would have been a very difficult month for you to take part. I also take your point that the 50th anniversary would be a more important one than the 35th. However the feeling of those of us who were proposing this rally is that something needs to be done now to demonstrate support for NATO in view of the tendencies which are developing in some member countries.

However the decision has effectively been taken for us because the Information Directorate of NATO have now told me that they cannot finance anything on the scale which we had in mind. This has meant that we have had to drop the proposal for a rally.

However Peace Through NATO and Olga Maitland's organisation, Women and Families for Defence, will, I believe, be able to mark the anniversary by one or two more modest efforts.

*Yours ever,
Peter*

The Rt.Hon. Mrs M. Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.



PRIME MINISTER

Lady Olga Maitland asked to see me about her proposal for a service this year to celebrate the 35th anniversary of NATO. She says that Peter Blaker has discussed this with Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine, and that she has herself spoken to you about it.

She told me that you did not think Wembley a suitable venue, and she now suggests that the service should be held in Westminster Abbey or in St Paul's Cathedral; she says that the Bishop of London would support either. I warned her that the Deans concerned would have to be approached, and that on past experience I feared that they might prove unco-operative.

Lady Olga says that she is gathering a great deal of support for her plan; Caspar Weinberger, among others, has said he would attend such a service. I sense that all this could become rather difficult. You might perhaps like to have a talk about it at some time.

I am sending copies of this minute to Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in blue ink, possibly reading "C" or "D".

15 February 1984

16 JAN 1984





FCS/84/36

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

nbpm
DMB
3/2

35th Anniversary of NATO

1. Thank you for your letter of 25 January.
2. I welcome your plan to hold an exhibition to celebrate the 35th anniversary of NATO, and am grateful for your invitation for an FCO Minister to join you at the opening press conference. Richard Luce will be happy to attend. His presence will help to underline the political character of the Alliance; and, in particular, its role in arms control and the management of East/West relations, which form the essential complement to defence and deterrence.
3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 February, 1984

Nota : Nota's anniversary

May 1979.

610

PM has seen

Prime Minister (21)

To be aware.

DMS
26/1



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 13/1

25th January 1983

See letter

35TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

I propose to mark the 35th Anniversary of NATO in April by staging a major exhibition with the theme "35 Years of Peace in NATO: The British Contribution".

The exhibition will be opened in London on 5th April and run for about a week. Thereafter, I hope that it will travel to different parts of the United Kingdom and be shown at other major events around the country throughout the remainder of 1984.

As a means of ensuring the widest coverage of this important anniversary, I intend to hold a press conference to mark the opening of the exhibition on 5th April. I am writing to Dr Luns to invite him to join me at the press conference but if, as I suspect, his programme of farewell visits prevents him from attending, I hope that he will be able to nominate his Deputy to attend instead.

In order to place the 35th Anniversary in the context of its historic, international and defence significance, I hope that you will be able to agree that a Foreign Office Minister might also be able to join me at the press conference to open the exhibition.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

For use

Michael Heseltine

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP

26 JAN 1924



MR COLES

PRIME MINISTER'S NATO ARTICLE FOR THE TIMES

I have spoken to the Editor of The Times. He is aiming to publish the Prime Minister's article towards the end of March or very early in April. You have commissioned a text of 2,000 words. We shall need to put the draft in the Prime Minister's box on Friday, March 16.



B. INGHAM

23 January 1984



FILE

VC

FCO
MAD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 January, 1984

Dear Peter,

I have been giving thought to the suggestion in your letter of 19 December that I should attend and speak at a rally at Wembley in October on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

October is a very difficult month for me. But I also wonder whether it would not be wise to aim at a rather more modest celebration of the 35th anniversary of NATO. The 50th anniversary would be a different matter. You may like to reflect on this - I thought I should let you know my reservations.

Yours ever

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Blaker, K.C.M.G., M.P.

Ray



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Ingham

Do you have a view
about the attached
bill & put it to the
Prime Minister?

A. J. C. 17/1

A. J. C.

As you know I regard a 35th
anniversary as pretty artificial.
50th would be different. You are
quite right - a NATO rally would
have to be watched most-carefully
for military overtones. Indeed, I think
a theme - 'The Real Peace Movement'
with strong non-militarist content would
be desirable. Yours 17/1

PRIME MINISTER

NATO RALLY

Peter Blaker (see letter attached) is trying to arrange a major rally at Wembley Arena next October to mark the 35th anniversary of NATO. He is hoping that you will be prepared to attend part of it and give a short address. If we will give him a date - probably a Saturday or a Sunday in October - he will then establish whether Wembley Arena is available.

The FCO recommend that you agree to do this. But their letter (attached) does not go into the pros and cons. Clearly there are attractions in a high level demonstration of our support for NATO. On the other hand, you have already undertaken to write an article for the Times on the subject - and, though I find it hard to define it, the concept of a Wembley rally in support of NATO has militaristic overtones which could lead to criticism at the time *(Bernard shares my reservations)*.

We should clearly have to avoid the Party Conference.

Do you wish to attend and give a speech?

A.S.C.
October is a lean the month.
Could it we have something more modest for the 35th anniversary? It isn't like the 50th
pub

17 January 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 January, 1984

Dear John,

NATO Rally

Thank you for your letter of 20 December. The 35th anniversary of NATO will have a certain significance and will provide a useful peg on which to hang manifestations of our support for NATO. Sir P Blaker's proposed rally would provide an opportunity to obtain wide media coverage and the Prime Minister's presence would give an enormous boost to its success. We would therefore recommend that the Prime Minister agree in principle to attend part of the rally and to give a short address. I enclose a draft reply to Sir P Blaker.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister
DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

The Rt Hon Sir Peter Blaker KCMG MP

House of Commons

Copies to:

LONDON

SW1A 0AA

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 19 December.

CAVEAT.....

I welcome your plan to hold a rally to celebrate NATO's 35th Anniversary. It will be an excellent opportunity to underline NATO's success in preserving peace and with it the freedom and democracy of its member states. I am prepared in principle to attend part of the ceremony and to give a short address, provided of course that we are able to arrange a suitable date.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

RESTRICTED

FIVE
SA.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January, 1984

The Times: North Atlantic Treaty 35th Anniversary

I enclose a copy of a letter, dated 18 October, from the Editor of The Times to the Prime Minister. Mr. Douglas-Home invites the Prime Minister to contribute a 2,000 word article to a Times series in the first four months of this year linked to the 35th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Prime Minister initially considered that it would be better if the Foreign Secretary or the Defence Secretary contributed such an article. But Mr. Douglas-Home has now said that President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl have agreed to contribute articles and that he therefore hopes that the Prime Minister can agree to do so on behalf of the United Kingdom. He claims that the commitments from Mitterrand and Kohl are firm.

B/F/ In the light of this information, the Prime Minister considers that she ought herself to contribute an article. I should be grateful if, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, you could let us have a suitable draft by 15 February.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

MR COLES


35TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

Please see the attached papers.

You will note I have tried - and failed - to prevent the Prime Minister from getting involved in what to me is an entirely artificial anniversary.

We now need to commission the FCO, in consultation with MOD, to produce a 2,000 word forward-looking article for submission to the Prime Minister by the end of March for publication in April. (I would aim to get her the last word).

I think it would be better - and short circuit the process - if you were to do the commissioning through Private Office.



B. INGHAM

29 December 1983

Mr Ingham

PRIME MINISTER

TIMES: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 35TH ANNIVERSARY


You will recall from the attached correspondence that you declined an invitation to write a 2,000 word article to mark the 35th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. You agreed to pass the invitation to the Secretary of State for Defence and this I have done, informing Charles Douglas-Home, editor of The Times.

Mr Douglas-Home has now come back saying that he is not prepared to accept an article from Mr Heseltine. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl have agreed to contribute articles and he would only use one from you on behalf of the United Kingdom.

Mr Douglas-Home assures me that he has firm commitments from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl but we often discover that these promises are less than firm.

I do not believe you have the time to spend on a 2,000 word article to mark a 35th anniversary.

Content to insist that the invitation should be handled by the Defence Secretary?



B. INGHAM

22 December 1983

It can't be if Mitterrand & Kohl are ~~not~~ writing.

Please the F.O. will have to do one for me.

mt



10 DOWNING STREET

I am
instinctively
not happy.
ask Fleo?
But Blaker's
letter must
be acknowledged

1. Mr Ryder
2. Mr Coles

20/12

ck

Pse see attached letter
from Peter Blaker which
asks the PM to address
a rally for NATO in October.
As you know, the PM has
already turned down a
number of major invitations
in October eg Hansard Society
on the grounds that it will
include the Party Conference and
the State Opening.

AT

① 9/11
2) 16/11

Sir Peter BLAKER, MP

5/1

HL

cc MOD

BU FCO
MOD



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 December 1983

NATO Rally

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Sir Peter Blaker, M.P. asking whether she will attend and address a rally in the Wembley Arena in October to mark the 35th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

October is a busy month for the Prime Minister and the case will have to be a strong one if this request is to be met. I should be grateful for any advice which you, and Richard Mottram to whom I am copying this letter, may wish to offer.

BU
FCO and
MOD

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sec.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Blaker, KCMG MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

19th December 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

I have set up a steering committee to look into the possibility of a major rally for NATO to be held in London next autumn. As you know, 1984 will mark the 35th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO will be using the slogan, "NATO - 35 Years of Peace". The plan is that the rally should be non-Party and should be organised by a committee which is to be set up especially for the purpose, which would include representatives of organisations which support NATO, such as Women and Families for Defence and Peace Through NATO. The steering committee at the moment consists of Lady Olga Maitland, Harvey Thomas and Ken Aldred, who is the Director of Peace Through NATO, and myself.

We believe that the 35th anniversary of NATO gives us an opportunity to take an initiative for once on behalf of the Alliance and to claim the credit due to NATO for its success. The rally would involve participation by member countries of NATO and would include cultural, political and military aspects. Participants of all ages would be included. We visualise that about three-quarters of the events would be cultural with a quarter military and governmental.

It would give an enormous boost to the success of the rally if you were able to attend at least part of it and give a short address. There would not be many other political speakers, but we already have the informal agreement of Cap Weinberger to attend and speak briefly.

We would plan to hold the rally in the Wembley Arena where there would be room for 7,000 to attend. The rally would be professionally produced and would involve a substantial budget. We have already had preliminary contact with the Information Department of NATO and I am writing to them to see if NATO is able to give us some financial support. We visualise that the remaining sum would come from the sale of tickets and from private subventions.

The purpose of this letter is to ask whether you would be prepared in principle to attend and to give the short address I have mentioned. If, as I hope, you can agree in principle

contd.....

then we can set about finding a date when the Arena is available. We have in mind trying to arrange it on a Saturday or Sunday in October.

*Yours ever,
Peter.*

The Rt.Hon. Mrs M. Thatcher, M.P.,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

PRIME MINISTER

Please see the attached minute recording a request from Charles Douglas-Home for you to contribute an article to The Times to mark the 35th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I put this in to you on October 27 and I have no record of your giving an answer.

Charles Douglas-Home is now pressing for a reply.

Agree to pass it to the Foreign Secretary or Defence Secretary?

By

Yes not.

B. INGHAM

16 December 1983

PRIME MINISTER

THE TIMES - 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Charles Douglas-Home has written to you inquiring whether you are prepared to contribute a 2,000-word article to mark the 35th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty next year. They are inviting Heads of Government, leading academics, parliamentarians and representatives of industry and labour to contribute to the series running from January to April 1984. The series will be subsequently brought together in book form.

You will wish to consider whether to contribute, since this is a request from Charles Douglas-Home. It will however be very time-consuming and you may feel you ought to pass it over to either the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence.

Agree to pass to Sir Geoffrey Howe or Michael Heseltine?



B. INGHAM

27 October 1983

THE TIMES

Times Newspapers Limited, P.O. Box 7,
200 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8EZ (registered office)
Telephone 01-837 1234 Telex 264971 Registered no. 894646 England

From the Editor

18 October, 1983

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

120

Dear Prime Minister,

As you know, next year is the 35th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. We propose on The Times to celebrate the occasion by publishing an extended series of articles on the Alliance and its future. We are inviting heads of government, leading academics, parliamentarians and representatives of industry and labour to contribute to this series.

The series will run in the paper from January 1984 to April 1984, the month when the treaty was signed in 1949.

Shortly after the conclusion of the series the contributions will appear as a collection in book form to be published by Times Books.

We intend this series to be a contribution to Alliance thinking for the rest of the century. The sections will cover global affairs, defence and arms control, the economic challenges and responses, defence and domestic opinion in the West, regional security outside the Alliance area, and the views of selected heads of government in the Alliance countries.

We want to encourage those people whom we invite each to contribute a 2000 word article to think out loud - even the unthinkable - about the future, rather than to recycle existing and well known statements of position. In other words, we hope the series will be stimulating, provocative and forward looking, to make the maximum impact on public opinion.

Continued ...

2

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

18 October, 1983

I am writing to you, along with one or two other of your senior colleagues in the Alliance, to see if you would give your views on East/West and West/West relations, with particular reference to the importance of summit diplomacy in the next few years. I do hope you will be able to do this for us.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Charles Douglas-Home". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Charles Douglas-Home

From: J K Ledlie Esq OBE - Deputy Chief of Public Relations

Nato



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB

Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 2215

(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

D/DPR/15/8/2/1

12 July 1979

Clive Whitmore Esq
PS/Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Mr. Sanders MS NBLM

Some useful facts
for defensive use.
Production of this booklet
must, however, have cost
the equivalent of half a small
tank.

Dear Clive

"BRITAIN AND NATO" - 1979 BOOKLET

I enclose with our compliments a couple of copies of our new booklet "Britain and NATO" which we have just produced to mark the 30th Anniversary of the Alliance and British membership of it. The first section of the booklet explains the place of NATO in Western defence; the second section (pages 14 - 24) deals with the British contribution to the Alliance. The booklet replaces the small blue pamphlet entitled "NATO - The British Contribution to Allied Defence", which we issued in April last year.

I hope this new product may be of some interest and use to you. If you would like more copies at any time, we shall of course be happy to oblige.

Yours sincerely,

John

John
13/7



Britain and NATO

Thirty years of Collective Defence



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PREAMBULE DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Les Etats parties au présent Traité, Réaffirmant leur foi dans les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et leur désir de vivre en paix avec tous les peuples et tous les gouvernements. Déterminés à sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leur civilisation, fondés sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le règne du droit. Soucieux de favoriser dans la région de l'Atlantique nord le bien-être et la stabilité. Résolus à unir leurs efforts pour leur défense collective et pour la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité. Se sont mis d'accord sur le présent Traité de l'Atlantique Nord...

Fait à Washington le quatre avril, 1949.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Pour le Royaume de Belgique:

P. H. Spaak *Silvering*

For Canada:
Pour le Canada:

Arthur B. Pearson *H. H. King*

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
Pour le Royaume du Danemark:

Henrich Rasmussen *Arnold Karstmann*

For France:
Pour la France:

René Pleven *de Gaulle*

For Iceland:
Pour l'Islande:

Ólafur Benediktsson *Thorstein*

For Italy:
Pour l'Italie:

Alcide De Gasperi *Alberto Tomassini*

PREAMBLE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty...

Done at Washington, the fourth day of April, 1949.

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
Pour le Grand Duché de Luxembourg:

Jos Beets *Hugues Leffebvre*

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Pour le Royaume des Pays-Bas:

Willelm *E. N. van Kleffens*

For the Kingdom of Norway:
Pour le Royaume de Norvège:

Halvard M. Lange *Alfhaugen*

For Portugal:
Pour le Portugal:

João *Pedro Teófilo Pereira*

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord:

Ernest Bevin *Oliver Franks*

For the United States of America:
Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique:

Dean Rusk

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin signing the NATO Treaty



Signing of the NATO Treaty in Washington, 4 April 1949



Introduction

It is now 30 years since the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation into existence. That these have been years of peace and security in the North Atlantic area has been in large measure NATO's doing.

British defence policy today is based upon the North Atlantic Alliance; NATO is the keystone of Britain's own security. Britain's defence efforts are concentrated on NATO, in areas where they can best contribute to the strength of the Alliance and so to its own security.

Britain shares the benefits and obligations of Alliance membership. This booklet seeks to explain why Britain attaches such value to NATO, and what the Alliance is doing to guarantee peace in the North Atlantic area. Details are also given of Britain's substantial contribution to NATO's collective defence.

1949 1979

Symbol of NATO - the flags and headquarters in Brussels



Defence and Detente since 1949

The Origins of the Alliance

The origins of the North Atlantic Alliance can be traced back to the end of the second world war. By 1946, the Allied Forces in Western Europe had been reduced from over 5 million to under 1 million. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had continued to maintain its Armed Forces of over 4 million men on a war footing, and to pursue an expansionist foreign policy in Eastern Europe, in Berlin and elsewhere.

These events focused Western concern on the possibility of aggression. With the recognition of a potential threat to peace came also the crucial commitment of the United States to the defence of Europe. On 4 April 1949, 12 nations, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the USA, joined together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Its purpose was to preserve peace and security in the North Atlantic area and to encourage economic collaboration between member countries. These 12 countries were later to be joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952 and by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. The Treaty is in conformity with the provision of the United Nations Charter, which recognises the right of individual or collective self-defence.

Since then, the Alliance has weathered many crises, including the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, further Soviet pressures on Berlin and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the NATO area itself has enjoyed a substantial degree of peace and the Alliance has adapted itself successfully to profound changes in the political scene – not least the gradual improvement in East-West relations.

The Continuing Need for NATO

NATO continues to fulfil its main aim of maintaining peace in the North Atlantic area. With its key principle that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, it provides far greater security than any one member could achieve alone and has been an essential factor in maintaining peace in Europe for the last 30 years.

As long as a potential military threat remains, it will be necessary to provide armed forces sufficient to deter aggression, and to provide an effective response should deterrence fail. The total strength of the Warsaw Pact forces is now estimated at some 5 million men (excluding para-military forces) of which 3.6 million are Soviet. Clearly Britain cannot face this potential threat alone. The forces of our NATO partners stationed on the European mainland number almost 3 million men, of which well over $\frac{1}{2}$ million are US personnel. Britain's armed forces of some 320,000 make an important contribution to the Alliance's collective defence, but the

continued credibility of deterrence for each NATO country depends upon the combined efforts of all Alliance members. In providing a sufficient counterbalance to the power of the Warsaw Pact, the Alliance constitutes a firm basis of the security and the continued independence of its members.

While the commitment of all the NATO allies to the common defence reduces the risk of external aggression, an essential feature of the North Atlantic Alliance is the link it provides between Western Europe and North America. It is through NATO that the US makes its vital commitment to European defence. Britain, together with the other European allies, benefits from the protection and the deterrence afforded by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States; and the participation of US forces on the European mainland in the defence of NATO territory is indispensable in both political and military terms. The recent improvements in the state of readiness of the Warsaw Pact increase the importance of these US forces, and of the ability of the US to reinforce them in a crisis.


Today, the Alliance has two main functions. The primary task, and the one for which it was originally created, is to deter aggression and expansionism through military preparedness and political solidarity, and if necessary to resist armed attack against any member nation. At the same time, a major political objective of the Alliance is the achievement of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, accompanied by appropriate security guarantees; and it is to this end that the Alliance pursues its other function – the search for more stable and co-operative relationships throughout Europe, in which the underlying political issues can be resolved. Thus the task of defence and deterrence is of vital importance. But it goes hand in hand with another equally vital element in the Alliance's approach to security – a persistent striving for detente, including practical and verifiable measures of disarmament and arms control.

Over recent years the Alliance has placed increasing emphasis on reducing tension between East and West and lessening the burden of expenditure on arms, and on making full use of its machinery for consultation on arms control and disarmament issues. One way in which Alliance members can promote co-operative international relations is to strengthen their own free institutions, and by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded; a second is to promote conditions of security and wellbeing. Attempts to expand the area of co-operation with countries of the Warsaw Pact are an important part of the efforts of members of the Alliance in this second field. The Four Power Agreement on Berlin; the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT); the US, French and

British agreement with the Soviet Union on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War; the talks currently under way between the US, the UK and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations (MBFR); and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), all in their various way reflect the search for detente. Progress, however, is slow and uneven. Major political differences still exist and the reduction in tension between East and West has not yet been accompanied by a lessening of military confrontation. In spite of their public commitment to detente and disarmament, the Soviet Union continues to

give a far larger proportion of its resources to developing its military capability than does any country of the Alliance.

▼ NATO exercise in the Mediterranean: Anglo-Turkish co-operation



▼ NATO exercise in Norway: Royal Marines, US and Belgian officers



▼ US airborne troops about to emplane in RAF Puma helicopters




The Military Background

The forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have developed and changed in many ways, but the central problem remains the same: the Soviet Union maintains far larger forces than are considered necessary for its defensive purposes. The capability of these forces is formidable and growing. The assessment of the military balance between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact is complex and many-sided, and cannot be reduced to a single neat ratio. On any view, however, Soviet forces have in many areas been strengthened in size and quality on a scale which goes well beyond the need of any purely defensive posture.

Although the Soviet Union does not publish any comprehensive figures for defence expenditure, Western assessments suggest that the level of Soviet defence expenditure continues to account for about 11% to 13% of the Soviet Union's gross national product. Soviet defence expenditure is believed to have risen by an average of about 4% per year in real terms between the years 1973 and 1977 and the Soviet Union has also asked the Warsaw Pact countries to increase their defence expenditure.

Soviet forces continue to be improved both by increased numbers and more recently in terms of quality. Soviet naval forces continue to receive new classes of submarines, surface ships and aircraft. New classes of submarine introduced during the last 5 years include the Delta II and III (nuclear-powered ballistic-missile firing) Charlie II class (nuclear-powered cruise-missile firing) and the Alfa class (nuclear-powered attack). In addition the Kiev class aircraft-carrier construction programme continues and the long-range Backfire bombers have been introduced into the Naval Air Force. Soviet ground forces have been strengthened and improvements have been widespread especially in new tanks such as the T-64 and the T-72, in self-propelled artillery and in infantry combat vehicles. New missiles of advanced design have been introduced in quantity. The Soviet Air Forces have been extensively re-equipped, particularly in Tactical Air Force, which has acquired advanced swing-wing

▼ Soviet Bear being shadowed by Phantom over the North Atlantic



aircraft such as Fencer and Flogger. The introduction of a number of heavily armed and armoured attack helicopters has added significantly to the Warsaw Pact's anti-tank capability. New armaments including stand-off weapons are being introduced, as are better avionics for reconnaissance, target acquisition and weapon aiming. The introduction of the Backfire bomber and the road mobile SS-20 Ballistic Missile gives the Soviet theatre forces a less vulnerable, more accurate and more flexible capability than previously.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies are being progressively enhanced, by increases in the holdings of their combat equipment and by the introduction of more modern equipment, mainly of Soviet origin, into their air and ground forces. For example, the East German, Polish and Czechoslovak armies are being strengthened by more and improved air-defence missiles, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and obstacle-crossing equipment. In addition, East Germany has received modern assault helicopters and air-defence aircraft. Poland and Bulgaria have new swing-wing tactical aircraft and Hungary now has more modern air-defence aircraft.

► Soviet infantry advancing from its BMP mechanised infantry combat vehicle.

▼ Russian Kresta 2 seen from HMS Ark Royal during NATO exercise. The helicopter is a Wessex 11 from HMS Ark Royal's Search and Rescue Flight.




▼ Soviet crews prepare their mobile SA-6 low level SAMs for action




▲ Heavily armed Soviet attack helicopters give battlefield support



▼ Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet aircraft carrier Leningrad



▲ Soviet Flogger D swing-wing specialised ground-attack aircraft



▲ Soviet 'H' class nuclear submarine

NATO Today

NATO Strategy

Since its inception NATO has always based the strategies it has adopted on the premise that peace and stability can only be maintained if any potential aggressor is convinced that he stands to lose far more by the use of force than he could ever hope to gain. By discouraging aggression, the Alliance aims to ensure that the military capabilities of both itself and the Warsaw Pact are never employed. NATO's present strategy of "flexible response" has evolved to meet this aim. As its title suggests, this strategy is designed to give NATO the ability to respond to aggression in a way that is flexible enough to allow the appropriate degree of effective military action to be taken. This requires the possession of a triad of forces, embracing the whole spectrum of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear capabilities, which are sufficiently closely linked together to give the Alliance a chain of options from which to choose the appropriate method of countering aggression. If such defensive action ever proved necessary, its aim would be not only to achieve the appropriate military results, but also to signal to the aggressor the Alliance's resolve to defend itself to whatever extent the circumstances demanded.

The credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy depends largely upon the effectiveness and nature of its forces. While strategic and theatre nuclear weapons are vital to this strategy, it would be unrealistic and dangerous to rely on the nuclear response to deter all forms of aggression. The danger in allowing the conventional imbalance to grow unchecked is that it would lower the nuclear threshold and therefore make the deterrent strategy less credible. The Warsaw Pact might also be tempted to use its conventional superiority to gain a decisive advantage in any regional conflict. NATO must therefore maintain conventional forces to meet a conventional attack anywhere in the Treaty area without being forced to resort to nuclear weapons at any early stage of the conflict. This does not, however, mean that the Alliance needs to match the Warsaw Pact man for man, system for system; rather it means that NATO's collective resources must be adequate to conduct a stalwart conventional defence against any potential aggression. A sound conventional capability is all the more necessary in view of the policy of forward defence, whereby NATO's forces are deployed close to its frontiers with the Warsaw Pact in order to give clear evidence of the Alliance's determination to defend every part of its territories.

NATO Planning

In order to support this strategy, it is vital that NATO deploys forces and equipment in sufficient strength and in the right places, supported by adequate installations.

To ensure the adequacy of its forces and equipment, NATO assesses, under the general guidance of Defence Ministers, what forces are needed to fulfil its strategy and sets goals which individual member nations are invited to achieve. These procedures provide both the co-ordinated military plans which the Alliance needs and ensure so far as possible that NATO nations do all that they can to meet them.

NATO also has a common infrastructure programme which is financed multi-nationally by member nations to provide fixed installations essential to the deployment and operation of the armed forces. Projects include airfields, military headquarters, field pipelines and ports as well as missile, telecommunications, signals and radar installations. The NATO infrastructure programme has been in existence for almost as long as the Alliance itself and has proved one of the most effective co-operative defence efforts.

Proposals for the Future

NATO's planning procedures have worked well over the years. But the continuing military build-up of the Warsaw Pact has demanded special measures. Following the proposals made by President Carter at the 1977 London Summit, NATO has continued to demonstrate its determination to strengthen the Alliance. For example, it has:

- a. Implemented an immediate programme of short-term defensive measures in the fields of anti-armour defence, war reserve munitions, readiness and reinforcements.
- b. Agreed a Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP) designed to help adapt NATO's defence posture to meet the challenges of the 1980s. This provides for force improvements in priority areas and for a greater degree of Alliance co-operation, and will lead to an increase in the overall defensive capability from the resources already made available or planned. The participating countries have undertaken to follow through the programme with vigour. Moreover, most member nations have responded positively to NATO's call to aim at increases in defence expenditure in the region of 3% a year, saying that they intend to try to meet this aim.

The long-term defence programme was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the highly successful Washington Summit held in May 1978. On the same occasion, the Allied leaders approved a study of the long-term trends in East/West relations through the 1980s. This study concluded that the Soviet Union and its allies would remain interested in improving their contact with the West in certain spheres, including economic relations, but that the Soviet Union was likely

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

▼ Jaguar gr




to attach high priority to the steady enhancement of its military strength. The study confirmed that the Alliance's complementary approaches to security through combining defence and deterrence with the pursuit of detente, including practical and verifiable measures of disarmament, remain valid for the 1980s.

► Launching of NATO's first communications satellite at Cape Kennedy

▼ Ground terminal of communications satellite serves SHAPE and NATO HQ



▼ Laying pipelines – core of NATO's infrastructure projects



▼ Jaguar ground attack/reconnaissance aircraft of RAF Germany outside hardened shelter at Bruggen



The Anatomy of the Alliance

The Politico-Military Structure

Over the years, NATO has developed political and military machinery to ensure effective control over its forces and the strategy of flexible response. The highest authority of the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is composed of the 15 member countries. Military matters are handled in the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) on which those countries taking part in NATO's integrated defence system are represented. Both the NAC and DPC meet twice yearly at Foreign Minister and Defence Minister levels respectively. In addition, more regular meetings of the NAC and DPC are also held at Permanent Representative (Ambassador) level.


NATO's military organisation is headed by the Military Committee. This committee, which meets twice yearly in Chiefs of Staff session and regularly at Permanent Military Representative level, provides advice on military matters and gives guidance to the 3 major NATO Commanders of the Alliance – the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and the Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN). These Commanders are responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of NATO forces in the European, Atlantic and Channel Commands into which the Alliance area is divided.

▼ NATO's Defence Planning Committee meeting in Ministerial session


To support the process of consultation and collective decision making within NATO, a wide variety of measures exist – precautionary, preventative and defensive – which in a developing crisis, could be implemented to safeguard the essential interests or security of its members.

NATO's Forces


Generally the forces of member countries remain under national command in peacetime, but have been committed to one of the Supreme Commanders for use in a crisis or where circumstances demand. However, some forces are placed under international command in peacetime for specific tasks. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) for instance, is a multinational force with land and air components ready for action at very short notice in a threatened area of Europe, particularly the Northern and Southern Flanks. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the Standing Naval Force Channel are permanent naval forces consisting of ships drawn from NATO navies and these forces operate under SACLANT and CINCHAN respectively. In the Mediterranean, NATO also has the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean, which is activated periodically for exercises and port visits. This force is under the control of SACEUR. SACEUR and SACLANT also have special reinforcement forces which can be deployed to particular areas in an emergency.



The Politico-Military Structure



Major NATO Commanders




The NATO Commands

Allied Command Europe (ACE)

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for the area from the North Cape to the North African littoral and from the Atlantic to the eastern boundary of Turkey and for the Mediterranean and Baltic approaches. His headquarters are at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), Casteau, Belgium. The post of SACEUR is always filled by a senior US Officer who is also the national Commander of the US Forces in Europe. SACEUR has British and German deputies. Forces are committed to SACEUR by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, UK and USA.




▲ Norwegian ski troops taking part in combined NATO exercise



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


▲ Ships of six nations in NATO's Standing Force Atlantic
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)

The Allied Command Atlantic extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) are at Norfolk, Virginia. This post is always filled by a Senior US Naval Officer who is also the National Commander of the US Navy Forces in the Atlantic. He has a British Deputy. The countries committing forces to SACLANT are Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the USA.

Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN)

The Channel Command extends from the Southern North Sea through the English Channel. The Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN) are at Northwood, Middlesex. This post is always filled by a Senior British Naval Officer. Belgium, The Netherlands and the UK provide forces for CINCHAN. A Channel Committee of the Naval Chiefs of Staff of Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK serves as an advisory and consultative body to CINCHAN. CINCHAN also fills the British National appointment of C-in-C Fleet and the post of CINCEASTLANT, one of SACLANT's Major Subordinate Commanders.



European Defence Improvements

The
British
Contribution
NATO

Over the last 10 years, the European members of the Alliance have increasingly worked together to enhance the effectiveness of the European contribution to Alliance defence, and in particular to strengthen European defence equipment co-operation. The last decade has also seen a major change in the proportion of forces provided by the European NATO countries compared with those of the United States and Canada. In 1968 the US and Canada had 3.6 million men and women in their Armed Forces – compared with 3.2 million in NATO Europe; by 1978 the US/Canadian figure was down to just over 2 million whereas the European figure is now some 3 million. In peacetime the European members of NATO provide the bulk of the Alliance's ground and air forces in Europe and also make a major contribution to NATO's naval forces in European waters and in the Atlantic.

The Eurogroup

Following a British initiative in 1968, the Eurogroup was formed in response to a widely felt need for closer European co-operation within the Alliance. The Eurogroup now consists of all the European members of NATO, except France and Iceland. Its aim is to strengthen the whole Alliance by seeking to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence is as strong and cohesive as possible. It achieves this aim in two ways. First, it enables its members to improve the effectiveness of their contribution to the Alliance by co-ordinating their defence efforts more closely. Second, the Eurogroup provides an informal forum for the exchange of views by Defence Ministers on major political and strategic questions affecting the common defence.

The IEPG and CNAD

An aspect of European defence co-operation which is becoming more and more important as the cost and complexity of modern weapons grow is co-operation in the development and production of equipment. Of the various bodies set up to examine the scope for greater collaboration the most important are the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and NATO's Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD). France participates in both.

The Independent European Programme Group, which does not come under NATO's auspices, first met in 1976. It aims to promote standardisation and interoperability in equipment to foster European defence industries and by such means increase Europe's share of the flow of defence trade across the Atlantic.

The forum for discussion between Europe and North America of this "two-way-street" and related issues of defence equipment co-operation is provided by CNAD, which includes the USA and Canada. CNAD's activities are, however, much more wide-ranging than this: it works to promote standardisation and interoperability and to improve defence equipment planning within NATO. Some examples of collaborative ventures in which the UK has participated are on page 22.

▼ New Anglo/German/Italian FH70 – a 155-mm gun howitzer



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▼ Chief

The British Contribution to NATO

British Defence Policy


Britain commits the vast majority of her forces to the Alliance and makes a major contribution to collective defence, concentrating on the following areas where it can best contribute to the strength of the Alliance and its security :

- a. The United Kingdom Base and its immediate approaches.
- b. The Eastern Atlantic and Channel.
- c. The Central Region of Allied Command Europe.
- d. The NATO nuclear capability.

Britain also provides NATO with specialist reinforcement forces.

Apart from the substantial contribution to NATO, British forces have other commitments. Forces are stationed in Berlin, Belize, Brunei, Cyprus (including units forming part of the United Nations force), the Falkland Islands and Hong Kong.

▼ HMS Broadsword, the first of the Type 22 class frigates



▼ Chieftain main battle tank on exercise in Suffield, Canada



▼ Harrier takes off from a German road



British Defence Expenditure

Over the last decade, Britain has devoted more of its defence resources to the Alliance. This process was given further impetus by the 1974 Defence Review which aimed to maintain a modern and effective defence effort while bringing the level of British defence spending more into line with that of Britain's European allies.

The British Defence Budget for 1979/80 amounts to over £8500 million and some 41% of this budget (£3490 million) is devoted to the continuing process of maintaining current equipment and re-equipping our forces with the more modern equipment needed to match developments in the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries. On the latest NATO figures, Britain in 1978 spent a higher proportion of her Defence Budget on major new equipment than did any of the other members of the Alliance covered by the survey, including the USA. These figures also showed that in 1978 Britain devoted some 4.7% of her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence, a proportion exceeded only by the USA among the NATO members for which figures are available.

The UK has responded positively to NATO's call for increased defence spending to meet the growing capability of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. British defence spending in 1979/80 is planned to be 3% higher in real terms than in the previous year, and a further 3% real increase is planned for 1980/81.

Britain's Force Contributions

Britain makes a major contribution to the Alliance. It is the only European nation to contribute to each of the three elements of NATO's triad of forces (strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional); one of the two European countries to provide forces for all three Major NATO Commands; and one of the few countries to commit forces for more than one region of Allied Command Europe.


▼ British soldiers wearing Mk 3 NBC protective clothing



▲ Rapier low-level air-defence missile system



▲ FV432 on exercise in Canada



◀ HMS Churchill

▼ A Phantom

The UK Base

By virtue of its geographical position, Britain provides an important base for the conduct of operations in support of NATO strategy, and for the reinforcement of the Central and Northern Regions of Allied Command Europe. The UK base provides support for British forces assigned to NATO, including the RN Polaris submarines, British forces based in Germany and also for American forces stationed in this country or brought in as reinforcements. Units of all three Services are employed in the defence of the Home Base. The Royal Navy's role is to keep open the Polaris submarine deployment routes and to counter the mining threat to the approaches to the reinforcement ports; the Army's task is to guard key points and installations; and the RAF is responsible for the UK Air Defence Region of Allied Command Europe.

The aircraft of RAF Strike Command are based in Britain in support of all three Major NATO Commanders, and include specialist reinforcement forces for Allied Command Europe. In 1975 the Commander-in-Chief of Strike Command was appointed Commander-in-Chief UK Based Air Forces (CINCUKAIR), one of SACEUR's Major Subordinate Commanders, and as such he is responsible for the air defence of Britain and for the preservation of the integrity of the UK Air Defence Region, which stretches for some 1400 miles from North to South. For these tasks the Command deploys Phantom and Lightning fighters, Victor tankers, Shackleton Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-air missiles and the extensive UK ground radar control and reporting system. The Vulcan and Buccaneer forces, soon to be replaced by the Tornado, are based in Britain and committed to NATO in the strike/attack role. The RAF transport force of Hercules and VC10 aircraft and Wessex and Puma Helicopters is also available in support of NATO operations.

◀ HMS Churchill one of ten nuclear-powered fleet submarines in service

▼ A Phantom FGR 2 landing



▲ Mine countermeasure vessels of NATO Standing Naval Force Channel




▲ Puma helicopters

▼ Bloodhound missiles



The UK NATO and National Commands



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The Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas


The freedom of the Atlantic is crucial to the security of NATO and to the United Kingdom. The defence of Europe depends critically on the passage of reinforcements across the Atlantic and the use of the seas around Europe for the deployment of forces. Britain has a vital role to play in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas (which are shown on page 12) and contributes the largest part of the maritime forces readily available in these areas to the Alliance. Virtually the whole of the Royal Navy, the largest European NATO Navy, is assigned to NATO and permanent contributions are made to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic and to the Standing Naval Force Channel (see page 9).

A major re-equipment programme is being undertaken to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of Britain's maritime forces. This includes a continuing construction programme of nuclear-powered attack submarines (which the Royal Navy is the only Western European Navy to operate), the replacement of older frigates and destroyers by three new classes, the Type 21 frigate (all eight of which are now in service), the Type 22 frigate and the Type 42 destroyer. Nine replacement ships are now under construction. These new classes of ship are being equipped with advanced weapons systems, including the Exocet surface-to-surface guided missile system, the Sea Wolf close range self-defence

missile system and the Sea Dart sea-to-air defence missile system. Three of the new class of anti-submarine cruiser are also under construction and the first, HMS Invincible is expected to enter service in 1980. These will carry anti-submarine Sea King helicopters and Sea Harrier aircraft.

The Royal Air Force has assigned 4 squadrons of Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft to SACLANT and CINCHAN for maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. The Nimrod is undergoing an improvement programme to maintain its operational capability into the 1990s; the first Mk II aircraft will enter service this year. RAF Strike Command also makes available to SACLANT a squadron of Phantom air-defence aircraft and a squadron of Buccaneer aircraft for maritime strike/attack. An additional Buccaneer Squadron equipped with ex-RN aircraft will form in 1979 and the recent transfer of the ex-RN Phantoms will enable the RAF to assign more than double the present number of those aircraft to SACLANT for maritime air defence. The Victor tanker squadron and the Shackleton Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft are also available in support of maritime operations. An AEW version of the Nimrod is being developed to replace the Shackleton and will form part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System.

▼ HMS Birmingham, one of the Royal Navy's new Type 42 ships



Allied Command Europe

The Central Region

The Central Region of Allied Command Europe (which is shown on page 11) is the area of NATO which directly faces the largest concentration of Warsaw Pact land and air forces. Some 70% of Britain's regular and reserve army is assigned to Allied Command Europe. The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), consisting of 55000 men, makes an important contribution to the forward defence within NATO's Northern Army Group. The combat element of BAOR is 1st (British) Corps, which consists of four armoured divisions, an artillery division and the 5th Field Force (less certain elements which are based in the UK). 1st (British) Corps is equipped with over 600 Chieftain tanks and over 2000 other armoured vehicles including the Anglo-Belgian series of tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles, such as the Scorpion light tank, the Sultan command vehicle and Striker which carries Swingfire anti-tank missile. Artillery includes 105mm, 155mm, and 175mm self-propelled guns, supported by field artillery computer equipments. Tactical nuclear support is provided by Lance missile, the 203mm and the 155mm self-propelled guns, the latter being dual capable. The Rapier and Blowpipe missile systems, which replace the L40/70 gun, provide low-level air defence. In time of war, BAOR would be reinforced to more than double its peacetime strength by men and units of the regular and reserve forces. Reinforcements include the 7th and the balance of the 5th Field Forces and a number of other units stationed in the UK in peacetime. The TAVR provides support and combat units consisting of highly trained volunteers who are equipped to the same standard as Regular Army units with similar roles. Regular Reservists are also used to bring Regular and TAVR units up to their effective war strength.

RAF Germany forms part of NATO's 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF), to which all RAF Germany aircraft are assigned. The Commander-in-Chief RAF Germany also holds the NATO appointment of Commander 2 ATAF. RAF Germany maintains 7 squadrons of Buccaneer and Jaguar aircraft in the Strike/Attack and reconnaissance roles and 2 squadrons of Harrier aircraft operated from dispersed field sites, which provide air support for the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Two squadrons of Phantom interceptor aircraft are available in peace to police North German Air Space and for air defence in war. Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-air missiles provide local air defence for RAF airfields in Germany. RAF Germany remains one of our major contributions to NATO, and RAF units continue to achieve consistently high ratings in NATO tactical evaluation exercises.

Northern and Southern Regions

Britain contributes to the defence of NATO's two flank regions by providing specialist reinforcement forces which can be deployed to these areas in times of crises. The deployment options for these forces include reinforcing parts of North Norway and Denmark as well as North East Italy and the border areas of Greece and Turkey. Details of the forces concerned are given on page 21. There is also a permanent British presence in the Southern Region in the form of national units stationed in Gibraltar. In addition the Royal Navy usually provides a ship for NATO's Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean when it is activated and RAF Nimrods assist in the maritime surveillance task when they exercise in the Mediterranean area.

▼ 105 mm Light Gun airlifted by a Puma helicopter



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Britain's Nuclear Forces


Theatre Nuclear Forces

Deterrence of massive aggression cannot be left simply to conventional and strategic nuclear forces. Theatre nuclear forces play an indispensable role as the intermediate link in NATO's triad of forces. To retain credibility they must be kept up to date and in a safe and secure condition in peacetime and war. To this end, NATO is undertaking a programme of modernisation which will ensure that these forces can continue to play their part without in any way reducing the role of conventional defence. The introduction during the 1980s of the nuclear-capable Tornado aircraft in the strike role is one example of this programme of modernisation. This aircraft will have an improved ability to penetrate defences at very low level and to perform accurately in any weather by day or night. Current commitments in the land and air roles are met through the UK's contribution to NATO's short range nuclear capable artillery and the Lance surface-to-surface missile, and through the Vulcan, Buccaneer and Jaguar strike aircraft. At sea, UK maritime forces are supported by nuclear-capable aircraft and helicopters. When employed on nuclear missions UK aircraft and helicopters are armed with British nuclear weapons, in the form of bombs and depth charges respectively.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

The continuous patrol which is maintained at sea by the nuclear-powered submarines of the British Polaris force enables the United Kingdom to make a direct European contribution to NATO's strategic deterrent. Each of Britain's 4 Polaris submarines is equipped with 16 Polaris ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, and is capable of remaining undetected during its long periods of underwater patrol.

▼ RAF Vulcan strike aircraft retains its nuclear strike capability



▼ HMS Repulse: one of the Royal Navy's Polaris submarines



Britain's Contribution to NATO's Specialist Reinforcement Forces

The UK provides SACEUR and SACLANT with highly trained and well equipped forces for the specialist reinforcement roles mentioned on page 9.

Allied Command Europe (ACE)

ACE has two sets of reinforcement forces ; these consist of SACEUR's Strategic Reserve (SSR), and the ACE Mobile Force (AMF). The British contributions to these are at present :

SACEUR's Strategic Reserve

Army

SACEUR's Strategic Reserve (Land)
The United Kingdom Mobile Force (Land) (UKMF(L)). This is an air portable formation consisting of the 6th Field Force and Logistic Support Group. It is roughly equivalent in strength to a reinforced brigade group, and includes a limited parachute capability of one Battalion Group.

3 regular squadrons of the Special Air Service

ACE Mobile Force

Army

Land element.

An Infantry Battalion Group, a Logistic Support Battalion and other Support troops.

▼ Jaguar ground attack/reconnaissance of RAF Germany



▼ Infantry of AMF(L) Norway deplaning from Puma helicopter



SACEUR's Strategic Reserve

RAF

SACEUR's Strategic Reserve (Air).

Two squadrons of Jaguar offensive support aircraft and one squadron of Jaguar reconnaissance aircraft.

One squadron of Harriers (also assigned to the AMF(Air)).

One squadron of Canberra reconnaissance aircraft.

Twenty-two Puma helicopters. (UKMF)

ACE Mobile Force

RAF

Air Element.

One squadron of Harriers.

Four Puma helicopters.

Allied Command Atlantic

The combined United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force, consists of a Brigade Headquarters and 4 Royal Marine Commandos, an Amphibious Combat Group Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, together with associated amphibious shipping, combat, helicopter and logistic support. This Force is assigned to SACLANT, and its deployment options include the reinforcement of Northern Norway and of the Atlantic Islands. A large proportion of the Force is specially trained and equipped to operate in North Norway throughout the Arctic winter. Improved over-snow vehicles and Sea King Mark 4 helicopters have been provided to give these forces greater mobility. Agreement has been reached with the Norwegian Government to stockpile over-snow vehicles in Northern Norway from March 1979.

▼ Infantryman on exercise with a Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon



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The UK working to important Armament European page 13.

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► The Scorpi a light tank, o

▼ Martel air-



Britain and Collaborative Equipment Projects


The UK attaches great importance to co-operating wherever possible with her Allies in the development and production of defence equipment. Its record is second to none as shown by British participation in such major projects as the Jaguar Offensive Support Aircraft, the family of helicopters and Martel Missile with France ; the Tornado and 155mm Land Artillery systems with Italy and Germany ; and the Scorpion family of armoured vehicles with Belgium. Such projects contribute significantly to greater equipment standardisation, for example the Lynx helicopter has now been adopted by the Armed Forces of the UK, France, Netherlands and Norway. Wherever possible Britain also seeks to participate in common support programmes for equipment in use by other NATO countries.

The UK takes an active part in all the various bodies working towards equipment co-operation, the most important of which are the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) mentioned on page 13.

Progress in equipment co-operation does not come easily, but the UK will continue to play its part to the full. About 1/5th of the British equipment budget is at present spent on collaborative projects. This already significant proportion will increase as weapon systems become yet more sophisticated and costly and as the military need for standardisation and interoperable weapons increases.

► **The Scorpion** –
a light tank, one of the Anglo-Belgian family of tracked combat vehicles


▼ **Martel air-to-surface tactical strike missile**



▲ **Gazelle Army Air Corps helicopter on exercise**



▼ **RN Lynx can carry torpedoes and air-to-surface missiles**



Recent Improvements in Britain's Military Capability

To take account of developments in technology and changes in the capability of the Warsaw Pact, Britain's force contribution to NATO continues to be improved and updated. Among the major improvements made or announced during the last year or so are :

Royal Navy

a. During the last year, orders have been announced for the following new warships : 1 nuclear-powered Fleet submarine, HMS Ark Royal (the 3rd anti-submarine cruiser), one Type 42 destroyer, three Hunt Class Mine Counter Measure Vessels.

b. An order has also been placed for 15 Sea King Mark 4 medium lift helicopters to provide the Royal Marines with an improved mobility capability.

c. Following successful trials it is now intended to install a "Ski Jump" launching ramp in HMS Hermes and the anti-submarine cruisers, which will significantly enhance the operational performance of the Sea Harrier.

d. To counteract the increasing threat of mine laying in deep waters, procurement is planned this year of a new class of 12 Extra Deep Armed Team sweep vessels based on a commercial trawler design.

▼ **HMS Invincible new anti-submarine cruiser on sea trials**



▼ **Harrier in RN markings takes off from "ski jump" at Farnborough**




e. In order to improve the transport capability of the United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force, RFA Tarbatness is to be converted this year for amphibious tasks. The ship will have the capacity to accommodate and land a Commando Group, carrying its own landing craft and operating its own helicopters.

Army

a. In September 1978, the British Government decided to proceed with the project definition of a new main battle tank to replace the Chieftain from the late 1980s. The new tank will be of a turreted design with a British rifled bore gun, will carry a 4-man crew and will be protected by Chobham armour.

b. Improvements in the short term of the UK's armoured capacity include an improved armour-piercing round for the Chieftain tank which will soon enter service. The Milan anti-tank guided weapon entered service 6 months ahead of schedule in November 1977 : the delivery rate was also accelerated and by the end of 1978 the equipment had been issued to over half the BAOR mechanised Infantry Battalions due to receive it, i.e. at twice the rate of deployment originally planned. Development has now begun on the man-portable light anti-armour weapon to replace the Carl Gustav and the M72 rocket ; it will enter service in the early 1980s.

▼ **British experimental tank with Chobham armour**



▼ **Milan anti-tank guided weapon**



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c. Development is under way on further improvements to the Rapier missile system in the 1980s.

d. An increase of 6000 men has been approved in the planned size of the British Army.

e. A new unit has been formed : the Infantry Demonstration Battalion. This is a composite Battalion drawn from all the divisions of infantry and will be permanently stationed at the School of Infantry at Warminster. This relieves another Infantry Battalion for other tasks such as emergency tours.

Royal Air Force

a. The RAF plans to acquire a total of 385 of the collaboratively built Tornado aircraft, of which 220 will be the Interdictor Strike version, the Tornado GR1, to replace the Buccaneer and Vulcan squadrons. The remaining 165 aircraft will be the nationally developed Air Defence Variant (ADV), the Tornado F2, which will replace the Phantoms and Lightnings.

b. Other new aircraft to enter service during the 1980s include 11 Nimrod Airborne Early Warning aircraft and 2 squadrons of Chinook medium lift helicopters which will provide support to the Army in Germany.

c. A squadron of VC10 aircraft has been acquired for conversion as air-to-air refuelling tankers. These aircraft will complement the two squadrons of Victor tankers and extend the capability of our air defence forces.

d. Improvements to weapons systems include the Skyflash medium-range air-to-air missile, now entering service with the RAF Phantoms ; development work on the P3T air launched anti-ship missile and with US co-operation, the JP233 airfield attack weapons. Rapier surface-to-air missiles are progressively being fitted with the blindfire tracking radar DN181, which will give the missile much improved night/adverse weather performance.

e. The Hercules aircraft fuselages are to be stretched to provide additional air lift capacity.


f. A 6th Rapier surface-to-air missile squadron will be formed to protect RAF Lossiemouth.

g. An additional RAF Regiment Field Squadron is to be formed for airfield protection duties.

h. The RAF Regiment is to be re-equipped with Spartan, Sultan and Samson tracked combat vehicles.

► British troops on ladder from Chinook helicopter during US exercise

▼ Some of the 55,000 troops in BAOR cheering HM The Queen during her Jubilee



▲ Tornado – the new multi-national swing-wing aircraft for NATO



▲ RAF Hercules in new-camouflage colours




Conclusions

The greatest achievement of the Alliance during its 30 years of existence has been the maintenance of peace. This has been achieved through the possession of a sufficient range of forces to deter aggression. The map of Europe might have looked very different had the Alliance not been created. However, it is important for the Western democracies to sustain the effort required to maintain modern and effective armed forces in peacetime. In the foreseeable future, NATO has to ensure that it can continue to preserve its own stability and cohesion and to provide a reliable guarantee of security with which to ensure lasting peace in Europe.

The security of the West is not just a matter of military capability and readiness. However, as stated in the Communiqué issued following the Washington meeting of the Heads of State and Government in May 1978 "the efforts by the Allies to reduce tensions between East and West to discourage attempts to use military power for political ends can only be successfully pursued in the context of a stable military balance". Because of the continued expansion of the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, compared with the defensive size and posture of NATO forces, and in spite of Soviet statements that their massive forces were not designed to threaten Western security, Allied leaders in Washington felt that they had "no option but to continue two complementary approaches: on the one hand to strengthen their defensive capabilities and, on the other, to seek to promote negotiations on arms control and disarmament agreements." There is no incompatibility between these two courses; indeed there are grounds for believing that the best prospects for achieving agreement on measures which offer undiminished security at a lower level of armament and armed forces lie in those areas where the Alliance demonstrates its ability and determination to maintain adequate strength.

The defence effort of each of our NATO Allies is a direct contribution to Britain's own security and its continued freedom, as is the British contribution to their security. Thus the continued success of NATO is vital for the future wellbeing of Britain and its Allies. The British Government is determined to maintain the substantial contribution made by British forces to the collective defence of the West while at the same time continuing to play a positive role in the search for a lasting and just order throughout Europe.

Deployment of British Forces in the NATO area early 1979













List of Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic
AD	Air Defence
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AMF	Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
Armd	Armoured
Arty	Artillery
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
Bde	Brigade
Bn	Battalion
Bty	Battery
BCH	Helicopter Cruiser
Cdo	Commando
CINCEASTLANT	Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
CINCENT	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe

CINCHAN	Commander in Chief Channel and Southern North Sea
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINCOSOUTH	Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CINCUKAIR	Commander in Chief United Kingdom Air Forces
CINCEASTLANT	Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
CMS	Coastal Minesweeper
CNAD	Conference of National Armament Directors
COMASGRUTWO	Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Group 2
COMCENTLANT	Commander Central Atlantic
COMMAIRCENTLANT	Commander Allied Maritime Air Central Atlantic
COMMAIRCHAN	Commander Allied Maritime Air Force Channel
COMMAIREASTLANT	Commander Allied Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic
COMMAIRNORCHAN	Commander Allied Maritime Air Northern Channel
COMMAIRNORLANT	Commander Allied Maritime Air Northern Atlantic
COMMAIRPLYCHAN	Commander Allied Maritime Air Plymouth Sub-Area Channel
COMNORECHAN	Commander Nore Channel
COMNORLANT	Commander North Atlantic
COMPLYMCHAN	Commander Plymouth Channel
COMSUBEASTLANT	Commander Submarines Eastern Atlantic

CSCE	Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe
CVS	Commander in Chief Naval Forces
Div	Division
DLG	Directorate of Logistics
DPC	Directorate of Plans and Operations
EASTLANT	Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
Engr	Engineering
Flt	Flight
IBERLANT	Commander in Chief Iberian Peninsula
IEPG	Inter-Allied European Group
Inf	Infantry
LTDP	Land Tasking and Planning
MBFR	Medium Battle Force
MCM	Minicraft
MCMV	Maritime Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVOC	Navy Operations
Recce	Reconnaissance
Regt	Regiment





cc Mr. Peterson
NATO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1979

NATO's 30th Anniversary

Thank you for your letter of 10 May, in which you conveyed the Defence Secretary's suggestion that the Prime Minister might attend the Service of Thanksgiving for NATO's 30th Anniversary, which is to be held in Westminster Abbey on 22 May, and the lunch in Lancaster House which is to follow.

The Prime Minister much regrets that, owing to her other commitments on that day - and not least to the need to prepare for her first Prime Minister's Questions in the House of Commons that afternoon - she will be unable to attend either occasion.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.D. Gutteridge, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

ABD



MO 13/1

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-936-XXXX 218 2111/3

10th May 1979

Reyer - this is our first
question they do not
like to go out-
unless
with - on
I am sure.
mi

Prime Minister

The Service is at 12 noon on Tuesday,
22 May. Mr. Bygn's office tell me that
he does not wish to urge you to attend.
You have Questions that afternoon.
Would you like to go, and read a
Lesson?

Dear Bryan

NATO'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY

Bygn
14.5

You will be aware of the arrangements which have been made for the Service of Thanksgiving for NATO's 30th Anniversary to be held in Westminster Abbey. Its purpose will be to give thanks for 30 years of peace in Europe since the Alliance was formed in 1949. This has been recognised by a general invitation to the public to attend and by the issue of personal invitations to a wide range of representatives of national as well as Service life. A list of the categories from whom we are seeking to draw representatives is attached at Annex A. We await advice from the Palace whether The Queen will be represented.

Arrangements for the Service are now well advanced. It will be led by the Dean of Westminster. The address will be given by the Bishop of Durham. Total attendance cannot yet be forecast. But response from the public has so far been slow and, although we hope for a good attendance, we cannot, I fear expect the Abbey to be full.

The Defence Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to accept an invitation to attend the Service, and a luncheon afterwards for which the Defence Council will act as hosts in Lancaster House. A list of those being

/invited

B G Cartledge Esq
No. 10 Downing Street



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invited is at Annex B.

There is one specific point which Mr Pym would like to put to the Prime Minister. The Dean of Westminster has invited the Secretary General to read the second of the two lessons which will be included in the order of service and has expressed the hope that the Prime Minister might consent to read the first lesson. In view of the national character of the occasion, Mr Pym wonders whether the Prime Minister would be ready to agree to this.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), George Walden (Foreign & Commonwealth Office), Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(R L L FACER)



THE INVITED CONGREGATION

1. Representative of HM The Queen
2. The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet
3. The Leader of the Opposition and Members of the Shadow Cabinet
4. The Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party
5. Other Members of Parliament : possible list
 - a. The Speaker
 - b. Government, Labour and Liberal Party Defence and Foreign Affairs spokesmen (Lords and Commons) not included under other categories
 - c. members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly and United Kingdom representatives to Western European Union
 - d. the Chairman and members of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of the last Parliament
6. Former Prime Ministers, and former Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and for Defence
7. The Secretary General of NATO and UK Permanent Representative NATO
8. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and UK Military Representative
9. SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN
10. Ambassadors and Defence Attaches of NATO nations in London.
11. Members of the Defence Council and Service Boards
12. British Commanders in Chief in the United Kingdom and Germany
13. British Commanders holding subordinate NATO commands in the UK
14. Selected representatives of the Services and the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces
15. Selected representatives of civilian services eg police. fire service, ambulance service, Merchant Navy



A2

16. Five Star Service Officers
17. British former Major NATO Commanders and Chairmen of the Military Committee
18. Senior official representatives of Government Departments
19. President of the CBI and Secretary General of the TUC
20. Representatives of defence and associated industries
21. Representatives of the Greater London Council, the City of London and the City of Westminster
22. Representatives of the ex-Service Associations and of the Voluntary Services
23. Representatives of the British Atlantic Committee and other bodies active in the field of international defence relations.



PROPOSED GUEST LIST FOR LUNCHEON (INCLUDING WIVES)

Hosts

The Defence Council
Secretary of State
Other Ministerial members of the Defence Council
PUS
CDS
CNS
CGS
CAS
VCDS(P&L)
CSA
CDP

Guests

The Queen

The Queen's Representative

Ministers

Prime Minister
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary

The Opposition

Leader of the Opposition
Shadow Defence Spokesman
Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesman

NATO

Secretary General
Chairman of the Military Committee
SACEUR
SACLANT
CINCHAN

UK Permanent Representative NATO
UK Military Representative

British Commanders in Chief carrying NATO appointments

CINC BAOR
CINC RAF GERMANY
CINC RAF STRIKE COMMAND

/Government



B2

Government Officials

Secretary of the Cabinet
PUS Foreign & Commonwealth Office

NATO Nations

Ambassadors in London of NATO Nations

The Abbey

Bishop of Durham
Dean of Westminster

Also in attendance

Head of Protocol, Ministry of Defence
Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund