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3004

PREM 19/2847

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

SECURITY

AUGUST 1984

[illegible]

2/1/16

FROM: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



cc *Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office)*
Paul Stockton
(Lord Chancellor's Dept)

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

You may wish to be aware of this LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Andrew Turnbull Esq CBE
 Private Secretary
 10 Downing Street
 London SW1

A Turnbull
 10/1

15 December 1989

Dear Mr Turnbull

APPROACH FROM DAVID WALKER OF "THE TIMES"

David Walker, the public administration correspondent of "The Times", has approached my Secretary of State in connection with an article which he wishes to write seeking to discuss aspects of the release of Cabinet papers under the 30 years rule. The article proposes to refer to papers from the time when my Secretary of State's father was a Minister (I understand that at the time he was Minister of Housing and Local Government) and Mr Walker's aim is to discuss what papers available in the public domain 30 years on might reveal about the nature and character of the Government in question. I believe Mr Walker is also seeking views from Mr David Heathcoat-Amory and from Lord Hailsham.

Mr Brooke had considered the possibility that Walker may seek views on how the present Government might be viewed in 30 years time but, having spoken to Walker on a similar basis some 2 years ago feels that this is unlikely to present difficulties. My Secretary of State therefore proposes to accede to Mr Walker's request.

Yours sincerely

Stephen Pope

STEPHEN POPE

cc *PS/STS (A)*
Sir K Bloomfield
Mr Thomas
Mr Wood (L & A)



From: I D Brown, Departmental Record Officer
Ministry of Defence Room 7172
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1 0TD

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 921 1431

R Catford Esq
No 10 Downing Street
Whitehall
LONDON SW 1

Your reference

Our reference

Date D/CS(R) 1/4/6/15 (410)

15 October 1985

Dear Mr Catford,

AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION : RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

You will recall that earlier this year the Prime Minister was consulted about five Prime Minister -to- Prime Minister exchanges, between Sir Anthony Eden and Sir Robert Menzies, which our Counsel wished to show to the Australian Royal Commission on British Nuclear Tests. The Prime Minister agreed that those messages might be shown to the Royal Commission, on condition that their classification be strictly respected.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that three of these messages have inadvertently been released to all Counsel appearing before the Commission. Copies of the released papers are attached.

The information contained in the papers is already available from other sources which have been released without restriction on their use. It therefore seems unlikely that the release of these documents will, of itself, attract undue criticism in the UK or Australia.

Any attempt to retrieve the papers will merely serve to draw attention to them, and might well reach the press. However, steps are being taken to ensure that Australian officials do not formally release these papers into the public domain.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Stevens and Elizabeth Forbes (Cabinet Office) and Dr Patricia Barnes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours sincerely,

I D Brown

I will show a copy of this letter to the PM.

CM 2.17.85

*Mr Powell
You have been dealing with this - and will want to consider whether the PM needs to be told before 4.00 PM.
AKB
15/10*

message from Sir Anthony Eden about tests which
it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga in 1956.

We are making detailed plans for the subsidiary tests to be included in the series of atomic trials at Maralinga in the latter part of next year. We are naturally anxious to make fullest use of the opportunity afforded by these trials to carry out experiments to cover not only matters of purely military interest but also those affecting the assessment of the effects of atomic warfare on both public health and on agriculture.

2. The authorities responsible for research into the medical and agricultural aspects of atomic explosions are pressing for the inclusion in the trials of a number of experiments which involve the use of live animals. This is always a contentious subject and we have, therefore, after close consideration reduced the programme to what we regard as a minimum. The accompanying memorandum contains particulars of our proposals. It covers experiments for which an actual weapon explosion alone can give the necessary conditions or for which full scale tests are necessary to validate the conclusions drawn from work in the laboratory. My colleagues feel that it is highly desirable that this series of experiments should be carried out. I should, therefore, be grateful for your sympathetic consideration and hope that you will be able to confirm that your Government sees no objection.

3. There is another associated matter. We are anxious to study the effects of distant fall-out from atomic explosions on the bone tissue of animals. A convenient way of doing this would be to arrange for the collection of bone samples from sheep or rabbits from a number of widely separated places in Australia. This would, I believe readily be done by your agricultural services and I should be grateful for your agreement in principle so that our experts may make an approach to yours.

attached to
J743/2 - 30-8-55

BR/89/7
Sheet 1 & 2 Sheets

NB. Also appears as enclosure
to BR 7/1.

The following is proposed programme for experiments involving the use of live animals.

Ingestion Experiments

The essential object of the experiment is to feed sheep on live grasses on which fall out has been deposited. This effect of an atomic explosion cannot be simulated by scattering radio-active materials over pasture land and it is necessary to feed animals experimentally on grasses which have been exposed downwind of an actual atomic explosion. One of the explosions proposed for operation "Buffalo" would provide suitable conditions. It is, therefore, proposed that about 100 trays of growing grasses should be distributed at various distances from the point of explosion and that a small number of sheep would after the explosion be fed on these grasses. The animals would not be taken into the area of explosion and would not be exposed to an injurious level of direct radiation.

Blast Experiments

A programme of investigation is being carried out on the effect of certain aspects of blast waves from nuclear explosions on living creatures. Much of the programme is being conducted in the laboratory with simulated blast waves in a shock tube using small animals. There are certain limitations in this type of experiment which make it necessary to extend the measurements to the full scale. To be able to extrapolate the results so as to make them applicable to human beings larger animals such as goats are required. Caged animals, goats, rabbits and mice would be placed in pits or shelters at various distances from the point of explosion in a way that would reduce the possibility of injuries from heat and other causes. It should be possible to recover the animals a few hours after the explosion.

BR/89/7
Sheet 2 of 2 sheets.

Attached to
J 743/2 - 30-8-55

3



4

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Office of the High Commissioner for
the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

30th August, 1955.

J.743/2.

TOP SECRET.

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to forward you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Mawlinga later next year.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what reply you would like me to return.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G.W. Tory.

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, CH. QC. MP.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
Canberra.

BR/89/6

2nd September 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred for favour of urgent advice.

(Sgd.) A.S. Brown.
Secretary.

NB This letter also listed as BR 7/1.

5

3,4,5,

COPY

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

J.743/2D

19th September, 1955.

TOP SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to give you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden in reply to your own message of the 13th September about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga next year.

Yours sincerely,

G.W. TORY

The Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

COPY: Supply
Defence.

TOP SECRET

15R / 7 / 2

The 2nd Mar etc 6



COPY:

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN ABOUT TESTS
WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO CARRY OUT AT
MARALINGA IN 1956

I have received your reply to my recent message concerning the inclusion in the tests at Maralinga in 1956 of a series of experiments involving the use of live animals. I am most grateful for the agreement of yourself and your colleagues to our proposals. We are happy that details should be given to certain of your scientists. Arrangements had, in fact, already been made for Dr. R. Scott-Russell of our Agricultural Research Council to leave the United Kingdom on the 22nd September to discuss certain matters with C.S.I.R.O. and certain other Departments in Australia. He will have full details of our proposals and will be prepared to discuss them with any further Australian scientists with whom you may wish him to talk. I agree that this aspect of the tests is always liable to cause a disproportionate amount of public interest. I hope, therefore, that in the event of any public statements becoming desirable in Australia your officials and ours will as usual consult before any statement is made.

TOP SECRET

DR/7/2



TOP SECRET

PERSONAL MESSAGE DATED THE 24th MARCH FOR
MR. MENZIES FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN

"In my message of the 16th May, I told you that we were looking for a possible site in the Pacific for the full scale tests of megaton weapons which we will try out in 1957. We have now found a suitable site near Malden Island, some 3,500 miles east of Australia and clear of all inhabited islands. We shall have to establish an advanced air base on Christmas Island in the Line Group, but the test explosions will be high air bursts which will not involve heavy fall-out. We shall take full precautions to avoid danger to the Islands, shipping or fishing.

2. In carrying out the tests it would be of very great help to us if we could depend on Australia for certain logistic support for the air and naval task forces.

3. The help which I have in mind would include assistance in obtaining victuals, fuel and stores and perhaps some facilities for repairs for ships of the Royal Navy. We should also like to continue to use the technical and other facilities which we are installing at Edinburgh Field to support Maralinga. We should save much effort at the advanced air base if Edinburgh Field can be used without an interval after Operation "Buffalo", that is from December next as a rear maintenance base for our air squadrons.

4. We hope that we can count on your help in meeting these requirements and if others arise as planning proceed I will, if I may, put them also to you. I propose that we should make the detailed arrangements through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra at least until the operation becomes less secret and we can use other channels.

BR/83/1

Sheet 1 of 2 Sheets



TOP SECRET

22 p1
confidential. We shall shortly have to make certain aspects of the operation less highly secret and we will keep you informed. I will let you know in good time before any public announcements are made.

6. There will, of course, be no question of the weapon being assembled in Australia.

7. I am communicating similarly with Holland."

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

26th March, 1956.

BR/83/1
Sheet 2 of 2 sheets.

9

6-9

RECEIVED
TELETYPE

BR 179/19

Personal message
from Sir A Eden to
Mr Stenzis 22/10/56
(Unreversed)
(NB. Only test, unidentified
as part of records held
in FCO).
Tehoe.
Atc 38.

CONFIDENTIAL

(original classification of
message not given).

WITH OPERATION QUOTE BUFFALO UNQUOTE NOW SUCCESSFULLY
CONCLUDED I SEND YOU ONCE AGAIN OUR SINCERE THANKS FOR THE HELP
WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU PERSONALLY AND FROM THE
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. THE WHOLE TRIALS SERIES WAS CONDUCTED
WITHOUT A HITCH AND WAS A NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF A COMBINED COMMON-
WEALTH EXERCISE. THE HELP OF ALL THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENTS
AND THE ARMED SERVICES CONCERNED WAS INVALUABLE, BUT OUR SPECIAL
THANKS ARE DUE TO MR BEALE, YOUR MINISTER FOR SUPPLY.
UNQUOTE

LEAHY

BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTS IN AUSTRALIA

LIMITED

SPD
NED
DEFENCE D
ACDD
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
RESEARCH D(SSEA)
LRD
INFO D
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS

SIR W HARDING
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR WILSON
MR BARRINGTON
MR WESTON

COPIES TO:-

MR DOUGLAS TREASURY SOLICITORS
PL2(LS)CHS MOD
SEC(O/C) MOD
SC(NUC) 2 MOD
ACSA(N) MOD
D.A.C.U. MOD

AUS(PL) MOD
MR I D BROWN CS(R) MOD
ST CHRISTOPHER HOUSE
MISS H HARRISON RECORDS BRANCH
LRD RE 515 CORNWALL HSE.

²
CONFIDENTIAL

900000

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TOP SECRET

COPY

P.M.'s File No. 449/23

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

30th August, 1955

J.743/2.

TOP SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to forward you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga later next year.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what reply you would like me to return.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) G. W. Tory.

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

COPY - Min. and Dept. Defence
Min. and Dept. Supply

TOP SECRET

BR 7/1

NB. Envelope also listed as BR 89/7.
This letter also listed as BR 89/6.



Message from Sir Anthony Eden about tests which
it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga in 1956.

We are making detailed plans for the subsidiary tests to be included in the series of atomic trials at Maralinga in the latter part of next year. We are naturally anxious to make fullest use of the opportunity afforded by these trials to carry out experiments to cover not only matters of purely military interest but also those affecting the assessment of the effects of atomic warfare on both public health and on agriculture.

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Br 17/1



Tests which it is proposed to carry out
at Maralinga in the latter part of 1956.

The following is proposed programme for experiments involving the use of live animals.

Ingestion Experiments.

The essential object of the experiment is to feed sheep on live grasses on which fall out has been deposited. This effect of an atomic explosion cannot be simulated by scattering radioactive materials over pasture land and it is necessary to feed animals experimentally on grasses which have been exposed downwind of an actual atomic explosion. One of the explosions proposed for operation "Buffalo" would provide suitable conditions. It is, therefore, proposed that about 100 trays of growing grasses should be distributed at various distances from the point of explosion and that a small number of sheep would after the explosion be fed on these grasses. The animals would not be taken into the area of explosion and would not be exposed to an injurious level of direct radiation.

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11-13

Ref: J804/1

26th August, 1955

TOP SECRET

PH&C

In the temporary absence of the Acting High Commissioner owing to illness I refer to my letter No. J.804/1 of 9th July with which I enclosed a message from the Prime Minister to you about atomic tests in the Monte Bello Islands.


I now enclose a further message from Sir Anthony Eden to you together with the text of a draft public statement about our plans for tests in 1956, both at Monte Bello and Maralinga.

In transmitting the message I have been asked to explain that the public statement has deliberately been kept short in order that we may have something up our sleeve for a later announcement to satisfy public and press curiosity.

(Sgd.) A.G.R. Rouse

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, CH., QC., MP.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House, CANBERRA, A.C.T.

BR/87/2



PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

PERSONAL MESSAGE DATED 25TH AUGUST FOR
MR. MENZIES FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN

I understand that planning of the Monte Bello test about which I last communicated with you on the 8th July PM&C is going ahead and that your Government is proposing to send Naval vessels to the islands early next month to begin the laying of the moorings. This raises the question of publicity to which we have been giving some thought. It seems desirable to issue in the near future a general statement about our plans for tests in 1956 both at Monte Bello and Maralinga. We have therefore prepared a short draft the text of which is enclosed. I should be very grateful for your comments both on the substance of the statement and on the timing of its release. I take it that you would wish a parallel statement to be issued in Australia simultaneously with our statement in the United Kingdom.

Copied to PM+C
20.2.85
SB

BR/87/3.

15

14.15

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Mr. Hatfield

**AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON
BRITISH ATOMIC TESTS**

Thank you for your minute (A085/1992) of 25 July about the Royal Commission's request for further records.

I agree that we should not release those concerned with the industrial uses of atomic energy, nor those concerned with specific defence policy. I see no objection to the release of the letter of 11 September 1957.

(C. D. POWELL)

27 July 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A085/1992

MR POWELL

Australian Royal Commission on British Atomic Tests

--- We have received a request for six more records. Three are Prime Ministerial letters; I attach copies. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has examined them and while they see no objection to their release, the letters dated 9 April 1951 and 6 May 1953 are concerned with industrial uses of atomic energy, which is not within the Commission's terms of reference, so we do not propose to release them. The letter of 11 September 1957 is about the tests and I would be grateful for approval to release a copy to the Commission.

2. The other three records comprise two minutes of meetings with Commonwealth Prime Ministers both held on the same day during a Commonwealth Conference, and a letter from Sir Norman --- Brook, the then Secretary of the Cabinet. I attach copies of all three records.

3. These papers did not deal with the nuclear tests, but with Pacific defence policy, and the ANZUS and ANSAM pacts. They are not, therefore, relevant to the Commission's work and we do not propose to release them.



R P HATFIELD

25 July 1985

I. 6410

Dated: 7th April, 1951
1818Rec'd: 9th April, 1951
0830

DECYPHER FROM :

Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

TOP SECRET

64. TOP SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister.

Begins :-

I am now able to send you a reply to your message (telegram 39 of the 20th March) in which you asked for our help and co-operation in developing Uranium resources in Australia for the production of industrial power.

2. We shall be very glad to collaborate with you in this way to the best of our ability. There is, however, at the moment one difficulty which I believe Sir John Cockcroft mentioned in his talks with you here last January. We have to have regard to our commitments under the tripartite agreement between the United States, Canada and ourselves. Complete separation of power and military programmes for the use of atomic energy is not possible and a worthwhile programme for industrial power could not be carried out without the use of classified information for the transmission of which we have under existing arrangements to obtain the consent of the United States and Canada.

3. In these circumstances we should in the first place need to have from you an assurance that any Australian project in the industrial field would be dealt with as "classified" to the extent that this is necessary under the rules agreed with the United States and Canada. Would you let me know whether this is acceptable to the Australian Government?

4. You will know that we hope soon to receive American proposals for a change in the existing arrangements for collaboration which at present limits us rather narrowly and which we hope then to get on to a much broader basis. In the course of these negotiations with the Americans, we will raise the question of co-operation in your proposal provided, of course, that you can let me have the assurance referred to above. I am afraid, however, that these negotiations may take some time, and it would not be wise for us to attempt to put your project to the Americans as a separate issue in advance.

5. In these circumstances, we are doubtful whether the technical discussions which you propose between Professor Oliphant and Sir John Cockcroft would be really useful until we know the outcome of the negotiations with the United States and I would suggest that it would be better for these discussions to be postponed for the press. This need not, however, hold up essential preliminary work such as ore mining operations and preliminary concentration which will inevitably take some time. Your experts will doubtless wish to push ahead with the arrangements, and we should be very glad to collaborate with them at once on this initial work. Please let me know how best we may be of help to you in it. Ends.

Prime Minister and Dept.
National Development,
Min. & Dept. Supply.

TOP SECRET

FCU

88



W Beale told
to authorise these
facts - 20p secret

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

TOP SECRET

CABINET SECRETARIAT
6th May 1953
REGISTERED
15 MAY 1953
276/2/11
489/11/9

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been pleased to convey to you the following personal message from Sir Winston Churchill:

" We have recently been reviewing our policy in atomic energy. Looking forward over the next decade or so it is clear that we are on the threshold of great developments. In the military field the United Kingdom weapon programme now stands on its own feet and is not dependent on American information. In the industrial field we do not think we have much to learn from the United States; we are now starting to build our first power reactor from which we shall get an appreciable quantity of electricity by 1957.

In the course of this review I have learnt of the telegrams which passed in 1951 about Anglo-Australian co-operation in atomic energy matters. Had I dealt with these my whole inclination would have been

Released by Probert
and H. G. to No 10.

HR

The Rt.Hon.R.G.Menzies, C.H., Q.C.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, A.C.T.

TOP SECRET

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA

12

RPTD: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CANADA (SAVING)

(Sent 18.15 hours, 5th May, 1953)

CYPHER
PRIORITY

No. 340 TOP SECRET

Addressed to U.K. High Commissioner in Canberra
No. 340 repeated to U.K. High Commissioner in Ottawa
No. 75 Saving.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of message from Prime Minister
to Mr. Menzies. Begins.

We have recently been reviewing our policy in Atomic Energy. Looking forward over the next decade or so, it is clear we are on the threshold of great developments. In the military field the United Kingdom weapon programme now stands on its own feet and is not dependent on American information. In the industrial field, we do not think we have much to learn from the United States: we are now starting to build our first power reactor from which we shall get an appreciable quantity of electricity by 1957.

In the course of this review, I have learnt of the telegrams which passed in 1951 about Anglo-Australian co-operation in atomic energy matters. Had I dealt with these, my whole inclination would have been to send you a much more forthcoming answer, for I am sure that our two countries ought to work closely together in this vital sphere.

I gather that the difficulty which was held to bulk so large in 1951 was the terms of our arrangements with the United States which hamper us in working with the Commonwealth. We have tried and we shall go on trying to co-operate on atomic energy with the United States to the fullest extent open to us, but the attitude of Congress in this field is so rigid that we cannot count at the present time on being able to get really useful collaboration with them. And in any case, I am not content that we should continue to accept terms which preclude our co-operating with Australia as freely as we do with Canada under the tripartite arrangements.

Now that we are launching out into the industrial field ourselves, the suggestion for a joint programme of development which you made in 1951 can be fruitfully pursued. To this end, we are prepared to explain to the Americans that circumstances have changed since we made our postwar arrangements with them; and that we now feel we are justified in sharing with Australia and perhaps other members of the old Commonwealth secret information which is derived from our own research and experience - as the great bulk of our information is.

/We

We have also been looking at the long term supply of uranium. We intend that our joint purchasing arrangements with the Americans, about which you know, should continue; but they only concern defence requirements. These are now well covered and we think the time has come to consider future industrial needs, which may prove of the greatest importance to the economy of the United Kingdom as to that of Australia. The Americans - with their immense hydro-electric coal and oil resources - are much less interested in the industrial aspects. Ought we not therefore now to consider whether we should husband some part of available uranium resources for peaceful uses?

If we could devise some arrangement for mutual co-operation between our two countries, which would reserve some portion of your untapped and uncontracted uranium for a future joint power programme, I think this might prove of inestimable benefit to both our countries.

Before we broach anything of this to the Americans - and I would like to do this in the fairly near future - we would wish to know whether you think well in principle of this idea of a joint programme. If so we should be glad to arrange for our experts to follow it up with yours. Perhaps the forthcoming visit of the representatives of your Atomic Energy Commission to this country would give an opportunity to begin a discussion of some of the aspects. Ends.

Copy to:-

ATOMIC DISTRIBUTION

Foreign Office

Mr. E.H. Peck

DEFENCE DEPT.
DEF. 106/183/2

COPY)

TOP SECRET

10 Downing Street,
Whitehall

TOP SECRET

September 11, 1957

Dear Prime Minister,

Now that we have dealt with the immediate problem of our November megaton trial we have been considering possible requirements for future megaton tests thereafter. Despite the political uncertainties, which make it difficult to forecast exactly what will happen, it is, of course, necessary if any tests are to be held in 1958 to take some preliminary decisions now so that men and supplies can be available. A great deal of effort and expense has been incurred in preparation for the trial in November and we have therefore decided that we must plan for the Task Force to remain at Christmas Island until mid 1958, so that if the scientists are ready, further experiments can be carried out up to next May.

In this period we might wish to have up to three firing periods with one, or at the most, two rounds in each. This would include the series to be held in November, but the final number of rounds to be fired must depend on the results of each shot. After May 1958, we should have an interval of at least 18 months, during which we should hold no megaton trials; if all goes well, it might be longer.

I hope that you will find it possible to extend the assistance you have so willingly given to help us in mounting the November test to cover extra firing periods up to May 1958 if we decide that further tests should be held. If you agree in principle, I suggest that details should be discussed as before, through Service channels. I shall, of course, keep you fully in touch with our broad plans as the situation develops.

These plans for Christmas Island may affect our future plans for kiloton tests in Australia. We had been tentatively planning to have a trials series at Maralinga in the autumn of 1958, but the load imposed on Sir William Penney's team by the megaton trials is so great that if these are continued into 1958 there is no possibility of our being ready for a Maralinga trial in that year. In these circumstances we have decided not to begin at present to prepare for a Maralinga trial in 1958. This decision will be reviewed after the November test, but I thought you would like to know what our present planning is. Even if there are no trials at Maralinga in 1958, we hope to be able to continue, with your most valuable co-operation, kiloton trials at the range in subsequent years, and I should like to assure you that we have no intention whatever of holding future kiloton tests at Christmas Island instead of Maralinga. I should, however, explain that there may be in the course of these Christmas Island trials an isolated kiloton test, but this will be in pursuance of our megaton design work and form an integral part of the megaton trials.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) H. Macmillan

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

BK 829.2.

See also 829/2



WHITEHALL 5422

CABINET OFFICE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

17th December, 1952.

TOP SECRET

Dear Brown,

Mr. Menzies should by now have received a copy of the record of the meeting on Defence Policy held on Friday, 12th December. Would you kindly tell Mr. Menzies that it is sent for his personal use; that a copy has also been sent to Mr. Holland; but that no record of the meeting is being sent to the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia. In the United Kingdom copies have been circulated only to the few Ministers principally concerned.

Yours sincerely

Tomman Brook.

A. S. Brown Esq.,

D. 90p.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of S. W. W.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 7

19/10/254

DEFENCE POLICY

MINUTES of a Meeting held in the Prime Minister's Map Room
on FRIDAY, 12TH DECEMBER, 1952 at 12 noon

PRESENT

The Rt.Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
(In the Chair)

United Kingdom

The Most Hon. the Marquess
of Salisbury, Secretary of
State for Commonwealth
Relations

The Rt.Hon. the Earl Alexander
of Tunis, Minister of Defence

The Rt.Hon. J.P.L. Thomas, M.P.,
First Lord of the Admiralty

The Rt.Hon. Antony Head, M.P.,
Secretary of State for War

The Rt.Hon. Lord De L'Isle
and Dudley, Secretary of
State for Air

The Rt.Hon. R.A. Butler, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer

The Rt.Hon. Oliver Lyttelton,
M.P., Secretary of State for
the Colonies

The Rt.Hon. Viscount Swinton,
Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster

Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Rhoderick McGrigor,
First Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Staff

General Sir John Harding,
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff

Air Chief Marshal
Sir John Baker, Vice Chief
of the Air Staff

Australia

The Rt.Hon. R.G. Menzies, Q.C.,
Prime Minister of Australia

New Zealand

The Rt.Hon. S.G. Holland,
Prime Minister of
New Zealand

Pakistan

The Hon. Khwaja Nazimuddin,
Prime Minister of Pakistan

Ceylon

The Hon. Dudley Senanayake,
Prime Minister of Ceylon

Southern Rhodesia

The Rt.Hon. Sir Godfrey Huggins,
Prime Minister of
Southern Rhodesia

SECRETARIAT

Sir Norman Brook
Brigadier R.W. Ewbank

CONTENTS

UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE POLICY

THE PRIME MINISTER, in welcoming the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries, said that he thought they would all wish to take the opportunity of being together in London to have a discussion on defence questions. He was sorry that it had not been possible to arrange for this meeting to be held earlier, when other Heads of Commonwealth Delegations might also have attended.

UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE POLICY

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that the United Kingdom Government had recently made a thorough military examination of world conditions and trends, and had agreed in principle on what should be our future strategy. We felt that, owing to the development of the atom bomb and the growing efficiency of new weapons of war, the next conflict would be very different from anything we had experienced in the past. The opening phase of another war might well be of an unparalleled intensity. The first month or, at most, months would point clearly to the outcome, although the second stage might drag on for a long time as a "broken-backed war".

The United Kingdom Government now considered that, because of the atomic threat, allied to the growing strength of the free world, direct aggression by Russia was probably less likely now than, say, a year ago. But the cold war seemed likely to continue for a long time - as long as it paid the Russians to use this weapon, which so far had paid them good dividends. The United Kingdom Government therefore considered the cold war as first priority, and preparation for war as second priority, although preparations for war played an important part in the conduct of the cold war.

The United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom we had no Regular Army formations; they were all overseas. There were, however, some 15 Infantry Battalions, and the various depots and training establishments, all of which had been given a combatant role as active mobile columns for use in the event of a surprise invasion by airborne troops. In addition, we had 11²/₃ Territorial Army Divisions. Their state of readiness was that four were equipped Divisions, although they lacked certain items of modern equipment; the remainder were equipped with training scales only, although we naturally hoped to build up their equipment as time went on. The four equipped Divisions would be ready for battle within the first three months of war.

As regards the Royal Air Force, we had 83 Squadrons - approximately 900 aircraft - made up of Fighter, Bomber, Maritime, Transport and Reconnaissance Squadrons. In addition, there were in this country 14 Squadrons of the United States Air Force and three Fighter Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force, which were planned to go to Europe in war.

Our radar chain covered the east and south coasts from the Firth of Forth to Weymouth, with emergency facilities for the remainder of the country. This radar network was now undergoing a major and costly rehabilitation to increase both the effectiveness and the extent of the coverage. It was hoped before long to double the range of the high altitude coverage.

We had also re-established the Home Guard, with a peace establishment of about 90,000, towards which over 20,000 had so far enrolled. Recruitment to the various Civil Defence services, organised by the Home Office, continued steadily; and some 360,000 (nearly half the peacetime establishment) had so far been enrolled. We had about 20,000 trained Civil Defence instructors, and the main lines of our Civil Defence plans had been established.

If we were attacked by Russian aircraft carrying atom bombs, we should have to face very serious consequences. However, as far as we knew, the Russian Air Force would not be able to escort their bombers by fighters in an attack against this country from their present bases. Consequently, the defence of Western Europe was vital to us in these Islands, and it was most important that the Russians should be held as far East as possible. For this reason, our contribution to N.A.T.O., both on land and in the air, was also a direct contribution to the defence of our own country.

Western Europe

In Europe we had four Divisions, three of which were Armoured Divisions. These were supported by the 2nd Tactical Air Force, comprising some 27 Squadrons - approximately 400 aircraft.

The War at Sea

Although we did not envisage invasion by sea we recognised that one of our greatest dangers was an attack on our sea communications from mines laid round our coast and in our harbours, and from hostile U-boats operating against our shipping. In home waters, in our Home Fleet and Home Station, we had a total of one battleship, 7 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, one fast minelayer, 25 destroyers (including one Daring), 29 frigates, 29 submarines and 17 minesweepers.

The Middle East

In war, sooner or later, the Middle East would become once again an active theatre, but the pattern of defence in the Middle East had somewhat altered since the accession of Turkey and Greece to N.A.T.O. Any Russian advance towards the Canal Zone would now have to take account of the Turkish Army on its right flank. But we still attached high importance to our base in Egypt, and to the safety of our lines of communication through the Mediterranean. It was not generally realised that a military base for modern war comprised harbours, docks, dock facilities, extensive road networks, railways, pipelines, water filtration plants, hospitals, aerodromes, and the extensive labour force without which these facilities were almost valueless.

Our Mediterranean Fleet consisted of one aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 6 frigates, 8 submarines and 10 minesweepers.

Our Middle East Air Force consisted of 19 Squadrons - approximately 200 aircraft - comprising Bomber, Fighter, Reconnaissance Transport, and Maritime Squadrons.

In Gibraltar and Malta we had garrisons totalling between them 6,000 men, including a Royal Marine Commando Brigade in Malta. We now had the most valuable additions to our strength of two Vampire Squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force in Malta, and one Vampire Squadron of the New Zealand Air Force in Cyprus. We were indeed grateful for these contributions from our friends. Between Cyprus, Gibraltar and Cyrenaica we had some 8,000 men. In the Canal Zone itself we now had 66,000 men, including two Infantry Divisions and one Parachute Brigade. These troops were required, not only for the immediate protection of that vital area, but also to safeguard British lives and interests in Egypt.

We were most anxious to set up a Middle East Defence Organisation together with our friends and Allies, at the earliest possible date. We could not continue to carry this burden alone: if we could find satisfactory means of sharing it with others, this would give us great relief and help us to meet our heavy commitments elsewhere.

The Far East

Farther east we had some 30,000 troops in Malaya, including 23 Infantry Battalions - 7 British, 8 Gurkha, 5 Malay, 2 King's African Rifles, and one Fiji Battalion. Our Far East Air Force comprised 12 Squadrons (approximately 100 aircraft). All these forces, together with the appropriate naval support, were in continuous active operation against the Communist bandits in the cold war.

Malaya was a vital strategic and economic area for the British Commonwealth, and we were therefore closely concerned with events in French Indo-China. Any deterioration in Indo-China would have very serious repercussions in Malaya. If Indo-China were to fall, it was likely that both Siam and Burma would go over to the Communists. We should then have a heavy commitment for the defence of Malaya, for which the minimum forces required would be three Infantry Divisions. In Korea the Commonwealth Division was regarded by all as a very fine and very happy formation. The United Kingdom contribution to the United Nations forces was as follows:-

- 1 Aircraft carrier
- 2 Cruisers
- 7 Destroyers
- 9 Frigates

- 5 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Armoured Regiment
- 1 Field Regiment (R.A.)
- 1 Light Regiment (R.A.)

- 1 Flying Boat Squadron

At present there seemed no likelihood of our being relieved of this commitment in the foreseeable future.

World-Wide Commitments

Our most recent commitment was in Kenya, where we recently had to send a British Infantry Battalion from our Middle East garrison, to back up the Police and local Colonial Forces in operations against the Mau Mau.

In addition to the commitments already mentioned, we had an Infantry Battalion in Jamaica - a British commitment of very long standing - and Army garrisons in Berlin, Austria, Trieste, West Africa, East Africa, the Sudan, Somaliland, Akaba and Aden. In each of the first three of these - Berlin, Austria and Trieste - we had one Infantry Brigade. The commitments of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were equally widespread: for instance, the Royal Air Force had three Squadrons at Habbaniya in Iraq. All these far-flung duties accounted for the 850,000 men whom we now had under arms, spread all over the globe.

Conclusion

The Minister of Defence, summing up his review, said that our situation was complicated by the fact that we were trying to do three things simultaneously:-

- (i) Fight a cold war;
- (ii) Prepare for a world war;
- (iii) Maintain the security of the territories for which we were responsible.

For this reason the United Kingdom Government had to be continually reviewing its commitments, and the shape, size, organisation and equipment of the forces needed to carry them out. We had to do this within the framework of our present economic position. We were stretched to the utmost.

In the ensuing discussion the following points were raised:-

(a) Hong Kong. THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND asked whether Hong Kong could be successfully defended. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that this depended entirely on the weight of attack. So far there was no indication that the Chinese had any intention of launching a major attack on Hong Kong. We had a garrison there of about two Infantry Brigades and some 40 fighter aircraft, and we should certainly defend the Colony to the utmost of our ability.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that no place was necessarily defensible by itself. The safety of Hong Kong, like that of other outlying British possessions, rested on the knowledge that deliberate aggression against it would be regarded as an act of war against the British Crown, which would be resisted by British peoples, no doubt with the full support of the United Nations. A deliberate attack on Hong Kong would bring us all to the brink of world war. He doubted whether Russia would allow China to attack Hong Kong unless she herself was ready for a general conflict. Hong Kong's shield was the united shield. If the Colony were attacked, we should most certainly defend ourselves with all our might.

(b) Kashmir. THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN said that, until there was a settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir, Pakistan could give no substantial help to the Commonwealth's defence effort, either in war or in the cold war. It was this consideration which had prevented Pakistan from making a contribution to the United Nations Forces in Korea.

It was evident from the review which the Minister of Defence had given that the resources of the free world for the common defence were seriously strained. India and Pakistan represented a potential source of additional strength; they could contribute both man-power and resources - their men knew how to fight. In a world war threatening their independence and survival, he believed that both India and Pakistan would have to join. But they would not be able to give of their best if their differences had not previously been resolved.

Pakistan held a most important strategic position. If Russia sought to gain possession of the oil areas in the Middle East, there was no military strength on which we could rely in any of the Arab countries of the Middle East. Turkey would now be on one flank of the Russian advance: we should be greatly aided if we had a strong Pakistan on the other flank. But if Pakistan could not prepare in advance it would take too long before she could build up her military strength: meanwhile, serious damage would have been done to our cause.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA said that he was most interested to hear of Pakistan's readiness, in appropriate conditions, to contribute to Middle East defence. He himself deplored the continuance of the dispute over Kashmir. He believed that it could be settled quickly if there was a will to settle it; and it was certainly high time that it was settled.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND endorsed this view. He recalled that Mr. Menzies and he had made an offer two years ago that Australia and New Zealand should provide forces to supervise a plebiscite in Kashmir. This offer had come to nothing at that time; but, if it were thought that it could help in promoting a settlement, he would certainly be ready to consider whether it could be renewed.

(c) The Defence Effort of the United Kingdom. THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA said that the review by the Minister of Defence was most illuminating. It had given him a fresh appreciation of the scale of the defence burdens which the United Kingdom was carrying and of the extent to which her Forces were dispersed throughout the world. This exposition had been of the greatest value to him, and he wished to express his gratitude to Lord Alexander.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND said that Lord Alexander's survey was of immense value to him also.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF CEYLON said that he too had greatly appreciated the opportunity of hearing this very comprehensive account of the defence responsibilities which the United Kingdom had to discharge.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that if war came events would probably move faster in the first month than in the first year of any previous war. Arrangements for communication and movement might be greatly affected. In the first few weeks the Russian armies would probably make considerable advances into Western Europe - though, with every year that passed, the N.A.T.O. arrangements would increasingly delay and limit that process. There was also little doubt that the United Kingdom would suffer grievous damage in this initial phase.

By providing bases in East Anglia for the United States atomic offensive we had put ourselves in the front rank of the atomic war. But that offensive would create serious disorganisation in Soviet Russia. It might well produce a situation in which the central Soviet machine would be unable to conduct large-scale organised warfare. We had no desire to destroy the Russian peoples: our object would be to break the regime and to allow the common people and the subjugated satellites to set themselves free once more. He believed that it might be possible in war to break the iron control from the Kremlin.

We had been considering British commitments and responsibilities throughout the world. He again emphasised that many of these were not capable of defence as isolated projects. Rather must we depend on the might of the whole, assisted by all those who associated their fortunes with us. If any British territory were attacked by unprovoked aggression, he was persuaded, not only that we should all stand together, but that there would come to our aid, through the United Nations and the close ties which bound us to the United States, a vast power of defence. The hope of world peace was fortified by every step we took in joint association.

The Prime Minister suggested, and it was agreed, that it should be publicly announced that this meeting of defence questions had been held. He wished the world to know that we were not concerned only with our economic ties and common interests. The force of right must sometimes be assisted by the right of force. Finally, the Prime Minister emphasised the three-fold sentiments of the Commonwealth peoples: first, a universal desire for peace; secondly, resolution not to be subjugated or enslaved; thirdly, belief that the world would come through this perilous phase in its history, so that the power of science could be unleashed for the benefit of the toiling millions.

Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

15TH DECEMBER, 1952.



DL

SECRET

COPY NO 41

6/17/7

MINUTES of a Meeting held at
No.10 Downing Street, on
FRIDAY, 12TH DECEMBER, 1952 at 6.0 p.m.

PACIFIC DEFENCE

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.,
Prime Minister (In the Chair)

United Kingdom

The Most. Hon. the
Marquess of Salisbury,
Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations

The Rt. Hon. R.A. Butler, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer

The Rt. Hon. the Earl Alexander
of Tunis, Minister of Defence

General Sir John Harding,
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff

Australia

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, Q.C.,
Prime Minister of Australia

New Zealand

The Rt. Hon. S.G. Holland,
Prime Minister of New Zealand

SECRETARY:

Mr. G. Mallaby

CONTENTS:

ANZUS AND ANZAM

ANZUS AND ANZAM

MR CHURCHILL said that he was most anxious to find a solution of the problem caused by the exclusion of the United Kingdom from ANZUS. He and Mr. Eden had been disturbed by reports of the proceedings of the ANZUS Staff Planners, which seemed to show that ANZUS was seeking to extend its scope throughout the Pacific theatre, including South East Asia. It was not reasonable that such planning should go forward without the direct assistance of the United Kingdom and perhaps of France whose interests were closely involved. ANZAM, which was a closely defined geographical area and did not include the Americans, was no sort of substitute. The real object must be to create a central machinery of control for the whole Pacific area, including South East Asia, consisting of representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom. So long as that reality could be achieved, the outward forms were of comparatively small importance. He had great hopes that General Eisenhower would understand this point clearly, and he would be very willing to put it to him but in doing so must feel assured that he had the full support of Australia and New Zealand. In recent months he had found even the present United States Administration much more forthcoming, and they had shown great readiness to meet our point of view over the organisation of SACLANT, the elimination of IBERLANT and the proposed base at Lisbon and finally over the Mediterranean Command, where they were now ready to accept a British Admiral as Commander-in-Chief of the whole area under the general supervision of SACEUR. He felt confident that this forthcoming attitude would be even more in evidence when General Eisenhower became President.

MR. MENZIES emphasised the close and intimate interests of Australia in the problems of the South West Pacific and South East Asia. They had of course an equal interest in security against a resurgence of Japanese power and that was the reason why they had welcomed the Pacific Security Pact (ANZUS). He recalled that Mr. Dulles had originally discussed proposals for an Offshore Pact, in which Japan and the Philippines and perhaps Indonesia would also be included. His idea had been that Continental subjects involving the interests of other Powers would not be discussed. Mr. Menzies said that he had made it clear that Australia could not enter a Pact which included Japan, and that he regarded the Philippines as a mere liability. The Americans had then proposed the ANZUS Treaty and, with the full agreement of Mr. Attlee's Government, Australia and New Zealand had accepted the offer. Attempts had then been made by Australia and New Zealand to persuade the United States Administration to accept the association of the United Kingdom with ANZUS, either as a member or as an observer. The Americans had understood the special interest of the United Kingdom but had feared that, if any concession were made France and the Philippines and others would also clamour for the same rights. That would have meant the end of any effective planning and a grave danger to security of information.

Mr. Menzies said that Australia, like the United Kingdom, would welcome some machinery for comprehensive military planning throughout the Far East including South East Asia. The security of Malaya was of the utmost consequence to Australia. Australia would therefore support

any approach which Mr. Churchill felt willing to make to the new United States Administration. Clearly that should be the first course of action. Mr. Churchill would have great influence with the new President, and in any approach he made he could take it for granted that he had the fullest possible support from Australia and New Zealand. If, nevertheless, the new President found it impossible to arrive immediately at a wholly satisfactory solution, Mr. Menzies thought that it would be quite possible to proceed by stages. The first step would be to give reality to ANZAM planning. The second step would be to make the Americans realise the significance of ANZAM. The third step would be to arrange a system of liaison on a high military level between ANZUS and ANZAM. It would then follow as a natural consequence of this procedure that the planning done in ANZUS and ANZAM separately should fall into the hands of a joint ANZUS/ANZAM Committee.

MR. HOLLAND said that he supported all the proposals made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Menzies. He felt, however, that he must make clear the position of New Zealand. New Zealand had entered into commitments for sending a Division with air and naval support to the Middle East in war. In terms of manpower this was a commitment of 235,000 men, or 10 per cent of the whole population of New Zealand. The result was that there would be nothing left for home defence. It was essential, therefore, that New Zealand should have a Security Pact with the United States and Australia. They had signed this Pact with the full agreement of Mr. Attlee's Government in the United Kingdom. In consequence there was some resentment felt in New Zealand that criticism of ANZUS seemed sometimes to imply that New Zealand had done something disloyal to Great Britain in signing this Pact. Nothing surely could be further from the truth. He agreed that the ANZUS machinery left a good deal to be desired, but he did not think the principle underlying the ANZUS Agreement ought to be the subject of criticism. He was convinced that a satisfactory machinery, leading to a marriage of ANZUS and ANZAM, could be achieved on the lines suggested by Mr. Menzies. He had had some discussions with two American Admirals in Honolulu and he had found them most willing to undertake planning exercises with Australia and New Zealand and also with the United Kingdom. This sort of thing could be a prelude to joint machinery for the control of the whole Pacific theatre, including South East Asia. He thought it quite insufficient to press for the admission of the United Kingdom as an observer in ANZUS. This would be beneath the dignity of the United Kingdom which must be a full partner in Far Eastern planning.

MR. CHURCHILL said that he had been much encouraged by the discussion which had shown complete understanding with regard to certain fundamental propositions, which he would in due course discuss on a friendly basis with the new President of the United States.

It was agreed by the three Prime Ministers that a communique in the following terms should be issued to the Press for publication in the morning newspapers of Monday 15th December.

"The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand took the opportunity, provided by the Commonwealth Economic Conference, to discuss the situation in the Pacific and the problems of South East Asia. They reached complete understanding with regard to certain fundamental propositions which will, in due course, be the subject of friendly discussion with their Allies, the United States."

Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

13TH DECEMBER, 1952.





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Mr Hatfield
Cabinet Office

DOCUMENTS FOR AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION

Thank you for your minute of 28 June. I agree that the documents covered by it should be released to the Australian Royal Commission.

(C. D. POWELL)

1 July 1985

Tmg

Ref. A085/1769

MR POWELL

Documents for the Australian Royal Commission

The request (first made by Mr Inett of the MOD through the wrong channels) for copies of the enclosed documents, to be sent to Mr Robin Auld QC, Counsel for the British Government has surfaced again.

2. All appear to be in the Prime Minister's personal series and none now appears to be classified. They were asked for by the Commission itself, who apparently saw the MOD originals when they were taking evidence in the United Kingdom earlier this year.

3. With the one exception I have marked, the papers are unlikely to be of any help to the Commission; but that apart there does not seem to be any strong case for withholding them.

4. I would be grateful for agreement that these documents may be sent to the Treasury Solicitors for Counsel.



R P HATFIELD

28 June 1985

E49A

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

I have seen your minute of January 31 about the proposed nuclear trials in Australia this Autumn.

We must plan to go ahead with these trials as rapidly and quietly as possible. But we must recognise that out of all this discussion on disarmament something may emerge which will affect these plans.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air, and the Minister of Supply.

(Sgd) HAROLD MACMILLAN.

Rec'd 4/2/57

1.2.57

No 10 clewance

XY/194/02

D 31/169
New Year



Copies to: P.S./Secretary
P.S./Parl. Sec.
P.S./Dep. Sec. (A)
D.O.A.W. —

I attach a copy of a minute from the Prime Minister to the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Defence about the proposed nuclear trials in Australia this Autumn.

I. G. Macdonell

1.2.57

P.S./Minister.

XY/194/02

Reference

D-1/14 E60

D.G.A.W.

Copies: P.S. Perm. Sec.
Dep. Sec. A.
U.S. (S.A.W.)

23 JAN 1957 PShah

Attached is a copy of a minute from Minister of Defence to the Prime Minister on ANTLER.

12th June, 1957.

h. h. h. h. h.
P.S. Minister.

D.A.W. (Trials)

to be a full and complete record of the proceedings

194/02

194/02
194/02
194/02

14.6.57

St. Paul's
D.A.W.



D:888

E67A

PRIME MINISTER

The Australian Government have now agreed that our next series of kiloton weapon trials (known by the code name "ANTLER") should be held at Maralinga in the autumn; and they have made an announcement of their own about it.

Therefore, provided you have no objection, I propose to authorise the Minister of Supply to go ahead with the preparations.

Duncan Sandys

June 11th, 1957

(Copies to: Foreign Secretary
Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Minister of Supply Relations
Paymaster General)

PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRIALS IN AUSTRALIA
IN 1957


As you know, we held a successful series of trials of kiloton weapons at the Permanent Weapons Proving Ground at Maralinga in Australia in 1956. In addition to the series of megaton trials in the early summer of this year, it is essential that we carry out a further series of kiloton trials as soon as possible.

2. A draft programme of trials has been prepared by the scientific authorities with the primary objects of developing small warheads for surface-to-air guided weapons, developing more efficient and Service versions of RED BEARD and testing techniques that will lead to smaller megaton weapons. All the trials will be in the low kiloton range as indeed is required by the safety precautions laid down by the Australian authorities. The Chiefs of Staff have concurred in this programme and in the diversion from weapon production of the necessary quantity of fissile material.

3. Ministerial approval is necessary as early as possible for these trials in order that we can make a formal approach to the Australian Government, and make all the necessary arrangements in time to mount the tests this autumn. I should be grateful for your concurrence.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord President, the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, the First Lord, Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State for Air,

XY/194/02



206

Copy to 4 of 5 copies of
DS/2/57 E46
Copy to 8.
29, 24, 1

Copies to: P.S./Secretary
P.S./Parl.Sec.
Dep.Sec.(A)
D.G.A.A.

U.S./S.A.A.

I attach copy of minute from the Minister of
Defence to the Prime Minister about Operation Antler.

J. R. CHRISTIE

28th January, 1957.

P.S./Minister.

COPY

E46A

Copy 4 of 5 off
13/2/57 - Copy no. 8

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
S.W.1.

PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR TRIALS IN AUSTRALIA

As you know, we are holding megaton trials of nuclear weapons in the early summer of this year in the South Pacific. In addition we plan to undertake a further series of kiloton trials in Australia in the autumn.


2. All the Ministers concerned are agreed and, subject to your approval, I propose to make the necessary approach to the Australian Government as soon as possible.
3. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretaries of State for War and Air and the Minister of Supply.

Duncan Sandys

25th January, 1957

ATOMIC
TOP SECRET

Xy/194/02



P. Shet

108
Copy number

5 of

6 copies of D31/164

E47

Copies to: P.S./Secretary
P.S./Parl. Sec.
Dep. Sec. (A)
D.B./A.G.

U.S./S.A.G.

I attach copy of minute from the Prime Minister
to the Minister of Defence about Operation Antler.

J. R. CHRISTIE

29th January, 1957.

M.P./Minister.

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

E47A

January 29, 1957.

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: Minister of Defence's minute to the
Prime Minister DS/2/57 of January 25 about Nuclear
Trials in Australia.

The Prime Minister has minuted:

"I knew about the spring plans.

Are the other trials really
necessary?

What does Foreign Secretary say?

H.M.

28.1."

Initialed ... 29/1

Copy also sent to: Lord President, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary,
First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for
War, Secretary of State for Air, Minister of Supply.

PRIME MINISTER

In your minute of January 28 to the Minister of Defence you asked for my views on the nuclear trials proposed for this Autumn in Australia.


2. If the Ministry of Defence consider that these trials are important, it seems most desirable that they should take place as soon as possible. The latest U.S. disarmament proposals, growing public opposition to tests, and possibly future reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on Radiation, may make it more difficult to carry out tests in 1958. But the tests now planned, if carried out soon after the megaton tests in the Pacific, are likely to be overshadowed by the latter and so attract less attention particularly as they will take place inside Australia and hence without inconvenience to such sensitive countries as Japan. The trials in Australia last autumn did not attract much foreign comment.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to the Minister of Defence, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air, and the Minister of Supply.

(Sgd.) SELWYN LLOYD.

January 30, 1957.

xy/194/02



attach a copy of a minute from the Parliamentary
secretary to the Ministry of Defence to the Prime
Minister about nuclear trials in Australia this
year.

I. G. Macdonald.

31st January, 1987.

P.S./Minister.

DS/4/54- copy 3.
Copies to: P.S./Secretary
P.S./Parl. Sec.
P.S./Dep. Sec. (A)
P.O.A.S.

EW8
L1/2

15/0
2

COPY

COPY 5 of 6 OFF
Copy No. 3 of 10 copies of DS/4/57

E48A

PRIME MINISTER

In the absence of the Minister of Defence in Washington, I am replying to the questions which you asked on his minute to you (DS/2/57 of 25th January) about nuclear trials in Australia.

The Minister of Defence and the Service Ministers do indeed regard these trials as essential. The Foreign Secretary has been consulted and fully concurs in their taking place.

The proposals for these tests were drawn up by the Atomic Energy Sub-Committee of the Defence Research Policy Committee, and were endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff.

The primary objects are: to develop small nuclear warheads for defensive use in surface-to-air guided weapons; to develop more efficient, and Service, versions of the small aircraft bomb RED BEARD (which will be of great importance in giving nuclear capability to our tactical air forces in Germany); and to increase our scientific knowledge so as to enable us to produce smaller initiators for megaton weapons.

It is becoming pressingly urgent for us to approach the Australians and to get on with our preparations if the trials are to take place at all this year. And the Foreign Secretary has emphasised that the latest U.S. disarmament proposals do, of course, make it particularly important that we should go ahead with essential nuclear tests without delay.

(3gd.) MANCROFT

Ministry of Defence

31st January, 1957.

Copies of this minute go to the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Supply.

CONFIDENTIAL



DA

cte

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. HATFIELD
CABINET OFFICE

**AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION: RELEASE
OF DOCUMENTS**

Thank you for your minute of 22 May about the request from Counsel for the release to the Australian Royal Commission on Nuclear Tests of five personal messages from Sir Anthony Eden to Mr. Menzies.

The Prime Minister agrees to the release of the documents in question provided that the Commission agrees to respect their classification and not to publish them.

I am copying this minute to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(Charles Powell)

23 May 1985

JB,

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A085/1409

MR POWELL

Australian Royal Commission: Release of Documents

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have received a request from our Counsel appearing before the Australian Royal Commission on Nuclear Tests (now back in Australia) for the release of five personal messages (copies attached) from 1955-56 from the then Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden to Mr Menzies. Our Counsel believes that these documents would be helpful for the case that he is making to the Royal Commission.

2. The messages concern the arrangements for the text in the Monte Bello Islands and the use of support facilities; the use of live animals in the trials at Maralinga; publicity arrangements; and a message of thanks to Mr Menzies for the help he and his Government gave to Operation Buffalo. None of these messages raise issues of national security and we see no problems in making them available to the Commission. There are therefore no strong grounds for refusing to make these documents available to the Royal Commission. Nevertheless, the documents are still classified and they do reveal the details of discussions between Prime Ministers and, in accordance with the arrangements agreed with the Australians, we should ask for the current classification to be respected and that the documents should therefore not be published by the Commission.

3. I would be grateful if you would seek the Prime Minister's agreement to the release of these documents to the Royal Commission on the understanding that they should not subsequently be published.

4. I am sending a copy of this submission to Peter Ricketts without the attachments.

R P HATEFIELD

22 May 1985

Ref: J804/1

26th August, 1955

TOP SECRET

PH&C

In the temporary absence of the Acting High Commissioner owing to illness I refer to my letter No. J.804/1 of 9th July with which I enclosed a message from the Prime Minister to you about atomic tests in the Monte Bello Islands.

I now enclose a further message from Sir Anthony Eden to you together with the text of a draft public statement about our plans for tests in 1956, both at Monte Bello and Maralinga.

In transmitting the message I have been asked to explain that the public statement has deliberately been kept short in order that we may have something up our sleeve for a later announcement to satisfy public and press curiosity.

(Sgd.) A.G.R. Rouse

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, CH., QC., MP.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House, CANBERRA, A.C.T.

BR/87/2

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

PERSONAL MESSAGE DATED 25TH AUGUST FOR
MR. MENZIES FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN

I understand that planning of the Monte Bello test about which I last communicated with you on the 8th July PM&C is going ahead and that your Government is proposing to send Naval vessels to the islands early next month to begin the laying of the moorings. This raises the question of publicity to which we have been giving some thought. It seems desirable to issue in the near future a general statement about our plans for tests in 1956 both at Monte Bello and Laralinga. We have therefore prepared a short draft the text of which is enclosed. I should be very grateful for your comments both on the substance of the statement and on the timing of its release. I take it that you would wish a parallel statement to be issued in Australia simultaneously with our statement in the United Kingdom.

Copied to PM+C
20.2.85
SB

BR/87/3.

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL MESSAGE DATED THE 24th MARCH FOR
MR. MENZIES FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN

"In my message of the 16th May, I told you that we were looking for a possible site in the Pacific for the full scale tests of megaton weapons which we will try out in 1957. We have now found a suitable site near Malden Island, some 3,500 miles east of Australia and clear of all inhabited islands. We shall have to establish an advanced air base on Christmas Island in the Line Group, but the test explosions will be high air bursts which will not involve heavy fall-out. We shall take full precautions to avoid danger to the Islands, shipping or fishing.

2. In carrying out the tests it would be of very great help to us if we could depend on Australia for certain logistic support for the air and naval task forces.

3. The help which I have in mind would include assistance in obtaining victuals, fuel and stores and perhaps some facilities for repairs for ships of the Royal Navy. We should also like to continue to use the technical and other facilities which we are installing at Edinburgh Field to support Maralinga. We should save much effort at the advanced air base if Edinburgh Field can be used without an interval after Operation "Buffalo", that is from December next as a rear maintenance base for our air squadrons.

4. We hope that we can count on your help in meeting these requirements and if others arise as planning proceeds I will, if I may, put them also to you. I propose that we should make the detailed arrangements through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra at least until the operation becomes less secret and we can use other channel

BR/83/1

Sheet 1 of 2 sheets

TOP SECRET

22 p1
confidential. We shall shortly have to make certain aspects of the operation less highly secret and we will keep you informed. I will let you know in good time before any public announcements are made.

6. There will, of course, be no question of the weapon being assembled in Australia.

7. I am communicating similarly with Holland."

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

26th March, 1956.

BR/83/1
Sheet 2 of 2 sheets.

The personal message of 22 October 1956 unreferenced. Its text is as follows:

'Personal message from Sir Anthony Eden to Mr Menzies,' dated 22nd October 1956.

With operation 'Buffalo' now successfully concluded I send you once again our sincere thanks for the help we have received from you personally and from the Australian Government. The whole trials series was conducted without a hitch and was a notable example of a combined Commonwealth exercise. The help of all the Australian departments and the armed services concerned was invaluable, but our special thanks are due to Mr Beale, your Minister for Supply.'

W

cc Mr Black

Fco/c/30/7

J. 743/2

30th August, 1955.

TOP SECRET

275

I have been asked to forward you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga later next year.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what reply you would like me to return.

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Ait

Message from Sir Anthony Eden about tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga in 1956.

We are making detailed plans for the subsidiary tests to be included in the series of atomic trials at Maralinga in the latter part of next year. We are naturally anxious to make fullest use of the opportunity afforded by these trials to carry out experiments to cover not only matters of purely military interest but also those affecting the assessment of the effects of atomic warfare on both public health and on agriculture. This I am sure you will agree is a matter of the utmost importance.

2. The authorities responsible for research into the medical and agricultural aspects of atomic explosions are pressing for the inclusion in the trials of a number of experiments which involve the use of live animals. This is always a contentious subject and we have, therefore, after close consideration reduced the programme to what we regard as a minimum. The accompanying memorandum contains particulars of our proposals. It covers experiments for which an actual weapon explosion alone can give the necessary conditions or for which full scale tests are necessary to validate the conclusions drawn from work in the laboratory. My colleagues feel that it is highly desirable that this series of experiments should be carried out. I should, therefore, be grateful for your sympathetic consideration and hope that you will be able to confirm that your Government sees no objection.

3. There is another associated matter. We are anxious to study the effects of distant fall-out from atomic explosions on the bone tissue of animals. A convenient way of doing this would be to arrange for the collection of bone samples from sheep or rabbits from a number of widely separated places in Australia.

P14

This could, I believe, readily be done by your agricultural services and I should be grateful for your agreement in principle so that our experts may make an approach to yours.

TOP SECRET

Tests which it is proposed to carry
out at Maralinga in the latter part
of 1956

The following is proposed programme for experiments involving the use of live animals.

Ingestion Experiments.

The essential object of the experiment is to feed sheep on live grasses on which fall out has been deposited. This effect of an atomic explosion cannot be simulated by scattering radioactive materials over pasture land and it is necessary to feed animals experimentally on grasses which have been exposed downwind of an actual atomic explosion. One of the explosions proposed for operation "Buffalo" would provide suitable conditions. It is, therefore, proposed that about 100 trays of growing grasses should be distributed at various distances from the point of explosion and that a small number of sheep would after the explosion be fed on these grasses. The animals would not be taken into the area of explosion and would not be exposed to an injurious level of direct radiation.

Blast Experiments.

A programme of investigation is being carried out on the effect of certain aspects of blast waves from nuclear explosions on living creatures. Much of the programme is being conducted in the laboratory with simulated blast waves in a shock tube using small animals. There are certain limitations in this type of experiment which make it necessary to extend the measurements to the full scale. To be able to extrapolate the results so as to make them applicable to human beings larger animals such as goats are required. Caged animals, goats, rabbits and mice would be placed in pits or shelters at various distances from the point of explosion in a way that would reduce the possibility of injuries from heat or other causes. It should be possible to recover the animals a few hours after the explosion.

AH

W
289
FCO/C/30/12

J. 743/2D

19th September, 1955.

TOP SECRET

My Dear Prime Minister,

278A I have been asked to give you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden in reply to your own message of the 13th September about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga next year.

Yours sincerely

(Sgd) A.B.R. House

The Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, C.H., C.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

AH

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN ABOUT TESTS
WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO CARRY OUT AT
MARALINGA IN 1956

I have received your reply to my recent message concerning the inclusion in the tests at Maralinga in 1956 of a series of experiments involving the use of live animals. I am most grateful for the agreement of yourself and your colleagues to our proposals. We are happy that details should be given to certain of your scientists. Arrangements had, in fact, already been made for Dr R.Scott-Russell of our Agricultural Research Council to leave the United Kingdom on the 22nd September to discuss certain matters with C.S.I.R.O. and certain other Departments in Australia. He will have full details of our proposals and will be prepared to discuss them with any further Australian scientists with whom you may wish him to talk. I agree that this aspect of the tests is always liable to cause a disproportionate amount of public interest. I hope, therefore, that in the event of any public statements becoming desirable in Australia your officials and ours will as usual consult before any statement is made.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1985

I have seen your letter of 9 April to Miss Horder. All requests for release of these documents should be funnelled through the Cabinet Office and I shall be grateful if you would follow the normal procedure. The Prime Minister needs to be consulted on each occasion.

(Charles Powell)

Miss J G Veitch
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

88

• Charles

We have left this one
for you, as you have
dealt with the
previous releases.

Angela

15. 4. 85

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 275 3029

Miss A Hordern
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Your reference

Our reference LRR 444

Date 9 April 1985

1. We have had a request from our High Commission in Canberra that the two letters attached be made available to the Australian Royal Commission. These are simply conveyance of the contents of telegrams 1014 and 1131 from the CRO to Canberra which are attached for information.

2. There is no FCO objection to their release but I would be grateful to know whether you would agree to this course.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J G Veitch'.

Pf J G Veitch (Miss)
Sensitivity Review Unit
Library & Records Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

J.743/2D

19th September, 1955.

TOP SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to give you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden in reply to your own message of the 13th September about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga next year.

Yours sincerely,

G.W. TORY

The Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

COPY: Supply
Defence.

TOP SECRET

ISR / 7 / 2

COPY:

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN ABOUT TESTS
WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO CARRY OUT AT
MARALINGA IN 1956

I have received your reply to my recent message concerning the inclusion in the tests at Maralinga in 1956 of a series of experiments involving the use of live animals. I am most grateful for the agreement of yourself and your colleagues to our proposals. We are happy that details should be given to certain of your scientists. Arrangements had, in fact, already been made for Dr. R. Scott-Russell of our Agricultural Research Council to leave the United Kingdom on the 22nd September to discuss certain matters with C.S.I.R.O. and certain other Departments in Australia. He will have full details of our proposals and will be prepared to discuss them with any further Australian scientists with whom you may wish him to talk. I agree that this aspect of the tests is always liable to cause a disproportionate amount of public interest. I hope, therefore, that in the event of any public statements becoming desirable in Australia your officials and ours will as usual consult before any statement is made.

TOP SECRET

DR/7/2

TOP SECRET

COPY

P.M.'s File No. 449/23

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

30th August, 1955

J.743/2.

TOP SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to forward you the attached message from Sir Anthony Eden about the tests which it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga later next year.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what reply you would like me to return.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) G. W. Tory.

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

COPY - Min. and Dept. Defence
Min. and Dept. Supply

TOP SECRET

Wsr / 7 / 1

TOP SECRET

Message from Sir Anthony Eden about tests which
it is proposed to carry out at Maralinga in 1956.

We are making detailed plans for the subsidiary tests to be included in the series of atomic trials at Maralinga in the latter part of next year. We are naturally anxious to make fullest use of the opportunity afforded by these trials to carry out experiments to cover not only matters of purely military interest but also those affecting the assessment of the effects of atomic warfare on both public health and on agriculture.

2. The authorities responsible for research into the medical and agricultural aspects of atomic explosions are pressing for the inclusion in the trials of a number of experiments which involve the use of live animals. This is always a contentious subject and we have, therefore, after close consideration reduced the programme to what we regard as a minimum. The accompanying memorandum contains particulars of our proposals. It covers experiments for which an actual weapon explosion alone can give the necessary conditions or for which full scale tests are necessary to validate the conclusions drawn from work in the laboratory. My colleagues feel that it is highly desirable that this series of experiments should be carried out. I should, therefore, be grateful for your sympathetic consideration and hope that you will be able to confirm that your Government sees no objection.

3. There is another associated matter. We are anxious to study the effects of distant fall-out from atomic explosions on the bone tissue of animals. A convenient way of doing this would be to arrange for the collection of bone samples from sheep or rabbits from a number of widely separated places in Australia. This would, I believe readily be done by your agricultural services and I should be grateful for your agreement in principle so that our experts may make an approach to yours.

TOP SECRET

Ba 17/1

Tests which it is proposed to carry out
at Maralinga in the latter part of 1956.

The following is proposed programme for experiments involving the use of live animals.

Ingestion Experiments.

The essential object of the experiment is to feed sheep on live grasses on which fall out has been deposited. This effect of an atomic explosion cannot be simulated by scattering radioactive materials over pasture land and it is necessary to feed animals experimentally on grasses which have been exposed downwind of an actual atomic explosion. One of the explosions proposed for operation "Buffalo" would provide suitable conditions. It is, therefore, proposed that about 100 trays of growing grasses should be distributed at various distances from the point of explosion and that a small number of sheep would after the explosion be fed on these grasses. The animals would not be taken into the area of explosion and would not be exposed to an injurious level of direct radiation.

Blast Experiments.

A programme of investigation is being carried out on the effect of certain aspects of blast waves from nuclear explosions on living creatures. Much of the programme is being conducted in the laboratory with simulated blast waves in a shock tube using small animals. There are certain limitations in this type of experiment which make it necessary to extend the measurements to the full scale. To be able to extrapolate the results so as to make them applicable to human beings larger animals such as goats are required. Caged animals, goats, rabbits and mice would be placed in pits or shelters at various distances from the point of explosion in a way that would reduce the possibility of injuries from heat and other causes. It should be possible to recover the animals a few hours after the explosion.

Ba/7/1

TOP SECRET

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA (ACTING)

(Sent 02.00 hours, 17th September 1955)

CYPHER

PRIORITY

No. 1131

TOP SECRET

(16) Your telegram of 13th September No. 936.

B U F F A L O

Please give following message to Mr. Menzies from Prime Minister. Begins.

I have received your reply to my recent message concerning inclusion in tests at Maralinga in 1956 of a series of experiments involving use of live animals.

I am most grateful for agreement of yourself and your colleagues to our proposals.

We are happy that details should be given to certain of your scientists. Arrangements had in fact already been made for Dr. R. Scott-Russell of our Agricultural Research Council to leave United Kingdom on 22nd September to discuss certain matters with C.S.I.R.O. and certain other departments in Australia. He will have full details of our proposals and will be prepared to discuss them with any further Australian scientists with whom you may wish him to talk.

I agree that this aspect of tests is always liable to cause a disproportionate amount of public interest. I hope, therefore, that in event of any public statements becoming desirable in Australia your officials and ours will as usual consult before any statement is made. Ends.

Copy to:-

BUFFALO DISTRIBUTION

P.S. to Prime Minister (12)

P.S. to Foreign Secretary

P.S. to Lord President

M/Defence

Sir F. Brundrett

DEFENCE DEPT.

DEF. 55/56/21

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

Fco/c/11/3

1

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA (ACTING)

(Sent 13.30 hours 29th August 1955)

CYPHER
PRIORITY

ans at (16)

No. 1014 TOP SECRET

OPERATION BUFFALO

Please pass following to Prime Minister from Prime Minister.
Begins.

Personal and top secret.

We are making detailed plans for the subsidiary tests to be included in the series of atomic trials at Maralinga in the latter part of next year. We are naturally anxious to make the fullest use of the opportunity afforded by these trials to carry out experiments to cover not only matters of purely military interest but also those affecting the assessment of the effects of atomic warfare on both public health and on agriculture. This, I am sure you will agree, is a matter of the utmost importance.

(14) The authorities responsible for research into the medical and agricultural aspects of atomic explosions are pressing for the inclusion in the trials of a number of experiments which involve the use of live animals. This is always a contentious subject, and we have therefore, after close consideration, reduced the programme to what we regard as a minimum. My immediately following telegram contains particulars of our proposals. It covers experiments for which an actual weapon explosion alone can give the necessary conditions or for which full scale tests are necessary to validate the conclusions drawn from work in the laboratory.

My colleagues feel that it is highly desirable that this series of experiments should be carried out. I should therefore be grateful for your sympathetic consideration and hope that you will be able to confirm that your Government sees no objection.

There is another associated matter. We are anxious to study the effects of distant fall-out from atomic explosions on the bone tissue of animals. A convenient way of doing this would be to arrange for the collection of bone samples from sheep or rabbits from a number of widely separated places in Australia. This could, I believe, readily be done by your Agricultural Services and I should be grateful for your agreement in principle so that our experts may make an approach to yours. Ends.

Copy to:- BUFFALO DISTRIBUTION
P.S. to Prime Minister (12)
P.S. to Foreign Secretary
P.S. to Lord President
M/Defence

Sir F. Brundrett

DEFENCE DEPT.

291c

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Australian Request for Release
of Secret Papers

The Prime Minister was grateful for your further minute of 21 September (A084/2364), which she has noted. I have asked Miss Wilkinson to arrange for Mr. Ingham to be briefed on a line he can take in answer to enquiries from the British press about the release of these papers: this line will need to cover the references to Hollis.

24 September 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

C. Mr. Ingham

4

Prime Minister

As expected. You will see that the publication date is Monday.

Ref. AO84/2364

PRIME MINISTER

MS

The main interest for the British press will be the reference to Hollis as one of the people who helped to set up Australia's security organisation.

Australian Request for Release of Secret Papers

FERB

21.9.

Further to my minute of 20 September, I have now received
--- the attached reply from Sir Geoffrey Yeend.

2. As expected, the Australian Government has decided to release Dr Burton's oral and written evidence, although they have agreed to the deletion of material from other records (paragraph 11 of my minute of 2/August). We understand from our High Commission in Canberra that this decision was taken despite the Director of NSA having indicated his wish not to see the documents released. It is clear from Sir Geoffrey Yeend's message that domestic considerations proved paramount from Mr Hawke.

CONFIDENTIAL

RH

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence.

21 September 1984

SECRET

SECURITY
Access to classified Docs
by Allied Countries.

8/84

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

SECRET

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

CABINET OFFICE	
A	7190
21 SEP 1984	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No.	

AUSTRALIA HOUSE
STRAND
LONDON WC2B 4LA
01-438 8000

21 September 1984

c- *Sid A Duff*

Dear Sir Robert,

Sir Geoffrey Yeend has just cabled me to say that he has written to you about the release of the Petrov Royal Commission documents, but because the release date has had to be advanced to 24 September has asked that I pass the following text to you:

Begins.

Dear Robert

Since you wrote to me conveying your Prime Minister's view on the release of Dr Burton's evidence to the Royal Commission on Espionage, the issue has been the subject of careful consideration here.

I should mention that because of legitimate requests received under the Australian Archives Act for release of particular documents now more than thirty years old, a general release date has been set for the records of the Royal Commission of 24 September 1984. There is intense interest in the records (some 100 journalists and other media interests attended a preliminary briefing on release arrangements) and there is little doubt that the exclusion of any particular documents would be closely questioned.

As a result of this consideration the Government has taken the view that the records should be released intact except where security reasons dictate that some deletion is unavoidable, and that even then such deletion should be at the minimum. My Prime Minister is conscious that this decision will not meet all of Mrs Thatcher's wishes, as conveyed in your letter, but he has asked me to convey his assurance that the matter has been very carefully thought through here.

Specifically the material which will be excised from the records is:

- technical detail, as specified by the Defence Signals Directorate after consultation with UK authorities, from Petrov's example of the operation of a cipher pad;

SECRET

- . the names of MI5 officers
wherever appearing;
- . all details referring to
- . reference to the position of a UK Security
Liaison Officer in Australia.

Passages referring to Dr Burton and _____ have not been deleted, on the basis that no references to Australian diplomats or other officials, or to those of the other countries mentioned in the records, including the UK, should be exempted as constituting an unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs within the meaning of the Australian Archives Legislation.

The Government has decided that Dr Burton's oral and written evidence should be released. The Prime Minister has noted Mrs Thatcher's views on the wider difficulties for her Government which might attend the release of the Burton material, in particular the public speculation which it might generate. In the context of the statutory framework of the Australian Archives Act, he has weighed those difficulties against the difficulties which would confront the Australian Government were it to suppress arguments, some of which have already been published, advanced by critics of the Royal Commission. This has led to the conclusion that the Burton material should be released in full, but the Prime Minister stresses that the Government will continue to protect the sensitive sources at issue in this matter.

Mr Hawke has asked me, in conveying this information through you to your Prime Minister, to express his appreciation of the helpful attitude taken by the British authorities throughout on this matter of release of the Royal Commission records, and he reiterates his commitment to the maintenance of our mutually beneficial intelligence arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

(Geoffrey Yeend)
Secretary

Ends.

Yours sincerely
A.R. Parsons
A.R. Parsons

Sir Robert Armstrong, GCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet and
Head of the Home Civil Service
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AS

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
SECRET



he vs

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Australian Request for Release of
Secret Papers

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 20 September (AO84/2521) and agrees that if Mr. Hawke decides, contrary to our advice, to release the papers, we should proceed as you propose. It is, I suppose, possible that the Australians might think again if they receive a strong negative view from the Americans.

G. E. R. BUTLER

21 September 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

R7

Prime Minister

3

Agree with the line recommended in his minute? (The Australians might think again, I suppose, if the Americans tell them that they do not want the papers released).

Ref. A084/2521

PRIME MINISTER

Yes no

Australian Request for Release of Secret Papers

FERB

20.9

You will recall that Sir Geoffrey Yeend, Secretary of the Cabinet in Australia, wrote to me in May at Mr Hawke's request to seek our agreement to the public release of two papers related to the (Australian) Royal Commission on Espionage on the 1954 Petrov affairs. The full background is set out in my minute of 2 August. My letter of 6 August to Sir Geoffrey Yeend explained our reasons for wishing to see the papers withheld from release.

2. Mr Hawke announced on 13 September that all papers relating to the Petrov affair would be released on 24 September. The Department of the Prime Minister have told our High Commission in Canberra that they are not yet in a position to tell us what decision Mr Hawke has reached on the two papers, because of continuing consultations in Australia. It is clear, however, that Mr Hawke is under considerable domestic and party pressure not to withhold any of the Petrov papers. Our High Commission have had informal indications that Mr Hawke intends to release the two sensitive documents and that the Australians are also consulting the American authorities. Enquiries by our Embassy in Washington have established that no formal Australian approach has yet been made, although the NSA are expecting one.

3. If Mr Hawke does decide to release the papers, there will not, I think, be any point in making any further attempt to dissuade him. He is well aware of our views, and there are no new arguments for us to deploy. Although release is certainly undesirable on grounds of principle, the damage to our national interests from the two particular papers will not be great, particularly as one of them has already been published in a book in Australia. The most tiresome aspect is likely to be reactions here to the involvement of Sir Roger Hollis.

Sir A. Duff
confirms that this
means both the
transcript of
Dr. Burton's oral
evidence and
his written
submissions

SECRET



4. If the papers are released, and we are asked whether our agreement was sought to the release, I think we should say that it was, and that we made clear to the Australian Government why in our view they should not be released.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

20 September 1984



COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

2

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONGAUSTRALIAN REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF SECRET PAPERS

The Prime Minister has considered your minute (Ref. AO84/2227) about the Australian Government's request for the release of certain secret papers.

The Prime Minister notes that, because of his absence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has not been personally consulted on this. She would be grateful if his views could be obtained.

As a general rule, the Prime Minister does not believe that security documents should ever be released. In this case, her view is that both the oral and the written evidence should be withheld. It follows that, while she agrees to the first two paragraphs of your draft message to Sir Geoffrey Yeend, she is not content with the third paragraph. She has suggested re-drafting that paragraph as follows:-

"Dr. Burton's written evidence also gives us some problems, especially the opening sentence of Submission 7. The fact that someone has revealed such a document should not be allowed to influence our judgment. To do otherwise would mean that others could automatically determine our actions. The intelligence material referred to by Dr. Burton in his written submission was a joint United States/United Kingdom product, and we believe it should be withheld."

In consulting Sir Geoffrey Howe, you will wish to let him know the Prime Minister's views.

3 August, 1984

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Prime Minister

Agree the message

Which Sir R. Armstrongs proposer?

(Please see point mentioned
on para. 15).

FERB

Copy No 1 of 2 copies 2.8.

Ref. A084/2227

PRIME MINISTER

Australian Request for Release of Secret Papers

Sir Geoffrey Yeend, Secretary to the Cabinet in Australia, has written at Mr Hawke's request to seek our agreement to the release under Australia's new Archives Act of certain evidence submitted to the (Australian) Royal Commission on Espionage on the 1954 Petrov affair. At the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra have sought our agreement to the release of a number of minor documents relating to Petrov.

Background

2. In 1948/49 the Security Service passed to the Australian Department of External Affairs information which appeared to implicate certain Australian officials as Soviet agents. This information was gleaned from VENONA, a joint United States/United Kingdom intercept operation which read, inter alia, KGB telegraph traffic to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra at that time (the Australians were not told the nature of the source). The evidence of Soviet espionage helped lead to the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) on advice from the Security Service.

3. In April 1954, shortly before a general election in Australia, Petrov, a Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, defected to the Australians, bringing documents which revealed a Soviet agent network in Australia. Prime Minister Menzies immediately established a Royal Commission to investigate the information provided by Petrov. The public revival of the arguments about Soviet penetration in Australia, on which the Australian Labour Party had tended to take a soft line, may well

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have contributed to the Party's defeat in the May 1954 election. At any rate the ALP thought so at the time and have continued to claim this to this day. Information from Petrov also shed light on the defection of Burgess and Maclean.

4. The Petrov Commission sat from May 1954 until March 1955, and heard over 100 witnesses. Much of the evidence submitted was withheld from the Commission's published report for security reasons. This included that of Dr Burton, a former Secretary to the Department of External Affairs in Canberra (see paragraphs 7-10 below).

5. The effect of the 1983 Archives Act is to apply the 30-year rule to Australian Government records. The Act makes provision for exemptions from the rule, but the Australian view is that there is obvious historical interest in the Petrov case, and in the proceedings of the Royal Commission on Espionage, and they would like to see complete release of all documents if possible. Indeed, Sir Geoffrey Yeend told Sir Antony Duff in April that Mr Hawke personally attached importance to the release of all the Royal Commission documents that had previously been withheld.

6. Mr Hawke has his problems with his own Party over security and intelligence matters generally. He has on the whole adopted a pragmatic and robust line in support of the agencies, but it would obviously be helpful to him not to have to hold back any of these papers on security or intelligence grounds if that could be avoided. It is also relevant that we would wish to be helpful to Mr Hawke at a time when the question of conduct of the British nuclear tests in Australia is under scrutiny. On the other hand, as described below, the Australian request puts us in some difficulty.

The Burton Evidence

7. The request received from Sir Geoffrey Yeend relates to the transcript of oral evidence given to the Commission in November 1954 by Dr Burton, who had been Secretary of the Department of External Affairs from 1947 to 1950; and to written submissions

made subsequently by him. In those parts of his oral evidence which touched on British interests, Dr Burton described how two Security Service representatives came to see him in Australia in 1949 to convey the information which led them to believe that a Soviet espionage network existed in Australia, and to show the Australian authorities the need, as they saw it, for Australia to set up its own security organisation. Dr Burton named one of the representatives as Mr Roger Hollis. He also described how Hollis asked that one particular Australian official (Mr Hill) should be posted to London so that, in the absence of an Australian security organisation, the Security Service would keep an eye on him. According to Burton, Hill later described how he had been approached by and questioned by the Security Service during his time in London. Dr Burton's oral evidence also contained oblique references to the nature of the information provided by the Security Service; these references could lead to speculation that the information was based on the interception of Soviet communications.

8. The publication of this transcript would not directly harm British security or intelligence interests. There is no reference to VENONA as such. In any case, there is now nothing sensitive about the VENONA techniques. Nor would Dr Burton's evidence personally harm any British individuals. But -

a. It would set a precedent by releasing intelligence received from a foreign government which would not be released by that foreign government to its own public records office. In this country the Lord Chancellor might be put in some difficulty in regard to his present blanket exemption of Security Service archives.

b. In this case, it is not possible strictly to argue that the information passed constituted an intelligence exchange since there was no Australian intelligence organisation in existence at that time, and the normal

restrictions were not therefore applied. Nevertheless, it is important to resist the release of intelligence for non-intelligence purposes. The Australian authorities must now be well aware that, whatever was said at the time, the information they then received was intelligence obtained from a delicate source, and that it would not be passed to them today without the clear understanding that it would be protected in the long term.

c. The presence of Mr Peter Wright in Australia poses additional problems. Further publicity about the involvement of Hollis in the events which led to the setting up of ASIO would almost certainly excite further unpredictable comment from Wright; and from the Australian press, given the importance of the Petrov enquiry in Australian politics.

d. There is also an American angle. We do not know whether they have yet received a government-to-government approach similar to that of Sir Geoffrey Yeend to us, but we are aware that CIA have had an approach from ASIO, and that they would be opposed as a matter of principle to the release of the information for the same reasons as those set out in b above. We also know that NSA would oppose release if it meant that VENONA sources would be further revealed.

9. In his written submissions Dr Burton was concerned to make the case that Petrov was not nearly so valuable a source as the Menzies Government (for political purposes) had made out; and that the Menzies Government had in fact known (ie from Hollis's visits - although Hollis is not mentioned by name in the submissions) for some years most of the information he was said to have provided. In these papers Burton referred in general terms to British sources having provided "many years ago the basic knowledge attributed to Petrov"; and to the British desire to protect their source; "The secret British information already



referred to was communicated in 1948 under strict conditions in order to safeguard its source which was at that time being tapped continually and constantly, and indeed day by day".

10. The problem is that this written evidence has already been published in an appendix to a book called "Nest of Traitors" which came out in Australia in 1974. Official publication of the papers now would have the consequences referred to in paragraph 8 above, and would be contrary to presumed American wishes. On the other hand, it would be difficult for the Australian Government to withhold papers which had already been published.

The Other Material

11. These documents comprise a couple of extracts from unpublished Royal Commission documents, and some exchanges between the British and Australian Governments in 1954 and 1955. They present no difficulties in regard to either Hollis or VENONA. Some would fall outside our own 30-year rule, but this in itself should not be an obstacle to publication by the Australians (who want to release all Petrov-related papers, even though some fall outside their own 30-year rule). We can agree to the release of most of these papers, but some should be withheld on the grounds of avoiding possible harm to innocent individuals.

Conclusion

12. The issues involved have been fully discussed with the agencies and departments concerned. Their conclusion is that, despite Mr Hawke's interest in full release of all the Petrov-related documents previously withheld, it would be advisable not to agree to the release of the Burton transcript for the reasons given in paragraph 8.

13. With regard to Dr Burton's written submissions, any genuinely interested person is likely to go straight to the records which the Australian Government now intend to release in order to compare these against what has already been published; eg the appendix to "Nest of Traitors". If he does not find the

documents concerned, attention is inevitably drawn to the evidence; if he does find them it comes near to official confirmation of Sigint-related intelligence. In the circumstances, however, and given the Australian Government's position, it would seem wrong to withhold agreement to their release. But we should insist on the Americans also being consulted.

--- 14. The other material should be dealt with as in the annex to this minute.

15. With the agreement of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, I seek your approval to my sending a message to Geoffrey Yeend
--- as in the attached draft; and to asking the High Commission in Canberrra to convey our view on the other material.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

2 August 1984

I asked Sir Robert Armstrong why HIR had not been agreed with HIR Foreign Secretary. He said that HIR Foreign Secretary had been away in the last few days and he had not thought that the Foreign Secretary himself needed to be consulted; but he would copy the submission to HIR Foreign Secretary and get his view if you wished him to.

Yes - I do. I personally do not believe that security documents should even be released. *me*

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO
SIR GEOFFREY YEEND

I can now reply to your letter of 14 May about the release of Dr Burton's evidence to the Royal Commission on Espionage.

✓ We have looked most carefully at the transcript of Dr Burton's oral evidence to the Royal Commission. The Prime Minister asks me to say that, much as she would wish to comply with Mr Hawke's request, she has reluctantly concluded that the release of this material would be prejudicial to our security and intelligence interests, not least in the light of the current public controversies. Although Dr Burton's evidence does not directly reveal the sources of the information passed to the Australian Government by the British Security Service, it could well lead to public speculation and further revelation which would indeed be damaging. The Prime Minister hopes that Mr Hawke will understand the very real difficulties which the release of this paper would cause us.

Dr Burton's written evidence also gives us some problems, especially the opening sentence of

Submission 7. ~~We recognise that the fact that it~~
~~has already been published as an Appendix to~~
~~"Nest of Traitors" would make it very difficult for~~
~~men like them could automatically determine~~
~~our effort.~~
The fact that someone has recorded such a document should not be allowed to influence our judgment. To do otherwise would mean that others could automatically determine our effort.

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~~the Australian Government to withhold it, and we~~
~~would not wish to press for that.~~ The intelligence
material referred to by Dr Burton in his written
submission was, ~~however,~~ a joint United States/
United Kingdom product, and we ~~therefore have to~~ *believe it should*
~~ask that the United States authorities should be~~
~~consulted on this point.~~ *be withheld.*

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RECOMMENDATIONS ON RELEASE OF THE OTHER MATERIAL

1. Extract from a document handed over by Petrov

Request Australians to withhold release as the (innocent) British Embassy employee referred to, ~~is~~ is still living and would fall under our own rules preventing disclosure for 75 years of documents revealing personal details. (As the document was collected by the Australians we have no right to refuse permission for release.)

2. Extract from unpublished annex of Petrov Commission Report

Withhold agreement to release, as the document reveals Security Service investigation of Dr Burhop. Although Dr Burhop is now dead, he is thought to have a family still in the UK.

3. Telegram of 29 April 1954 from Australian High Commission in London

No objection to release.

4. Letter of 13 September 1955 from British High Commissioner in Canberra to Prime Minister's Department

Withhold agreement to release on the grounds that the final sentence reveals the existence of a United Kingdom Security Liaison Officer in Australia. The post still exists and involves liaison responsibilities also in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. But no objection if the Australians wish to release the letter without the final sentence.

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5. Further letter of 13 September 1955 from British High Commissioner in Canberra to Prime Minister's Department

No objection to release, but release is pointless unless the earlier letter is also released.

6. Letter of 20 September 1955 from British High Commissioner to Prime Minister's Department

No objection to release.

7. Letter of 14 February 1956 from British High Commission in Canberra to Prime Minister's Department

No objection to release.

8. Telegram of 13 February 1956 from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to British High Commissioner in Canberra

No objection to release.

9. Letter of 20 February 1956 from British High Commission to Prime Minister's Department

No objection to release.

10. Document on recruitment of interpreter for Petrov Commission

No objection to release of details on Birse, but withhold permission to release passage on _____ in view of reference to her employment by the Security Service.

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