

PREM 19/2865

**SECRET**Confidential Filing

Vint by the South African Foreign Minister,  
Mr. P. W. Botha

SOUTH AFRICAOctober 1979

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 March 1989

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN  
FOREIGN MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a talk lasting one and a half hours with the South African Foreign Minister this afternoon. Pik Botha was accompanied by the South African Ambassador.

South African politics

Pik Botha conveyed regards from President Botha and from Mr. de Klerk. The political situation in South Africa was complex and delicate. President Botha had returned to work and had today presided over a Cabinet meeting. His mind was clear and his speech firm. He was deeply hurt by the impression that he was being run out of office. He wanted to continue until the next election and leave with dignity. He felt that his contribution to reform in South Africa was not being given due weight. A delegation of senior Cabinet Ministers would talk to him gently and see if he could be persuaded to give up office. But unless a compromise could be found, he could stay as President for up to a year still.

Internal change and reform in South Africa

The Prime Minister said that she had consistently opposed sanctions against South Africa because they would only harm the interests of black people, without achieving the political progress we wanted to see. She had always been ready to give full credit for the reforms which had been undertaken by the South African Government. She very much welcomed the Namibia agreement and Pik Botha's part in achieving it. But more recently the pace of reform had slackened. The crucial step, which must be faced, was the release of Mandela. She understood the South African Government's concern that his release could lead to renewed violence. Certainly it would have to be carefully managed. But the down-side risk of not releasing him was enormous. Mandela had become a kind of touchstone for the West. His release would not on its own be sufficient to change attitudes towards South Africa. There would have also to be wider negotiations between representatives of all racial groups about the political future. But no black South African leader would be willing to talk while Mandela remained in prison. Meanwhile, pressure for more sanctions would grow, particularly in the United

States, and would become harder to resist. Her own opposition to sanctions would become more difficult to maintain unless she could show that it was a better way of achieving progress in South Africa.

The Prime Minister continued that we had consistently worked behind the scenes for progress in South Africa rather than trying to exert public pressure. That had been the purpose of sending Dr Leutwiler on his recent mission. The essential point he had been asked to convey, on behalf of Chancellor Kohl and herself, was that without the release of Mandela it would become progressively harder to resist further sanctions. Rather than show understanding of that dilemma, President Botha's response had been to ask what South Africa would get in return for releasing Mandela. Such an approach was unrealistic. South Africa was approaching a difficult time, with the need to repay bearer bonds and reschedule its debts. Governments and financial institutions would be reluctant to cooperate in the absence of internal progress, and in that event the financial pressures would become much more severe. It would be a tragedy if South Africa's development was held back. She had discussed this dilemma with Chancellor Kohl and they had decided to spell out their assessment of the response which South Africa could expect to Mandela's release in a note, which she handed over (copy enclosed).

Pik Botha read the note and commented that he found it very reasonable. He would take it back to President Botha. He was himself partly to blame for President Botha's approaching the problem in terms of what South Africa would expect from Mandela's release. He had encouraged the President to put it in these terms to Dr. Leutwiler as being preferable to a blank refusal to contemplate his release. Personally he totally agreed with the Prime Minister's views on Mandela. There were hesitations in the South African Cabinet. People felt that they had got the security situation under control and were reluctant to put it in jeopardy again. But he believed that release would and must come. Most South African political leaders now realised that they had to look de novo at the Group Areas Act, the Separate Amenities Act and the Population Registration Act in order to remove all racial discrimination, while preventing the inundation of the urban areas by a tidal wave of immigration. At the same time there was a desperate need for outside financial help. He had drawn up some ideas of his own for a development programme for Southern Africa. He would leave the Prime Minister a paper on this (copy enclosed). As the last vestiges of apartheid were eliminated, there was a need for economic help not just for South Africa but for Southern Africa as a whole.

The Prime Minister said that she welcomed Pik Botha's comments. But one had to return time and again to one central point: improving the economic conditions of black South Africans was not on its own enough. Of course it was necessary and we were contributing to it in a major way. But as their economic situation improved so the resentment of black South Africans at the absence of any role for them in

Government and political life would increase. There had to be negotiations between the Government and representatives of black South Africans. She wondered to what extent the South African Government had thought this through, both in terms of procedures for negotiation and the end point which they wished to reach. Pik Botha said that the South African Government's objective could be summed up in a few simple words: a social, economic and political order broadly acceptable to all South Africans. The Prime Minister replied that this was easy to say. But what did it mean in practice? It needed to be spelled out in detail. Pik Botha said that no solution in South Africa had any chance of being viable unless it was based on the reality of South Africa. The future lay in allowing natural groups to run their own affairs - the Zulus in Natal, the Xhosa in other areas, mixed communities in some parts of the country - coming together to govern South African jointly. This was the thinking behind talk of a great Indaba.

Pik Botha continued, speaking with some emotion, that there was enormous admiration among all races in South Africa for what the Prime Minister had done for the people of the country. She had saved them from the cruelty of sanctions and even from bloodshed. She had done far more for black people in South Africa than any black leader or any other world figure. People felt a tremendous gratitude for her understanding of the true difficulties of the South African situation and her refusal to allow herself to be intimidated by international opinion into doing what she knew to be wrong.

#### Namibia

The Prime Minister referred to the great importance of the Namibia settlement. It must be strictly observed by all the parties to it. She wondered what assessment the South African Government had made of the likely outcome of the elections there. Pik Botha said that he was cautious about making predictions after South Africa had got the Rhodesia elections in 1980 so badly wrong. He thought that SWAPO would get over 50 per cent but doubted it would reach two-thirds of the vote. SWAPO was trying to extend its contacts with South Africa. Nujoma had recently met the South African Ambassador in Bonn and had also been present at a meeting with President Kaunda and a senior South African official last week. Pik Botha added that he had no fear of an independent Namibia. The railway line went only one way and Walvis Bay remained in South African hands. There could be no question of tampering with that.

Pik Botha continued that there was one urgent matter he wished to raise with the Prime Minister. The United Nations Secretary General had recently issued a circular asking for further funds for the Namibia Institute and the Council of Namibia. These funds were exclusively for the benefit of SWAPO. It was flatly contrary to the terms of the Agreement for the United Nations to continue to show partiality for one party. Unless the collection of such funds was stopped promptly, South Africa might have to call a temporary halt to

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the process of implementing the Namibia Agreement. The Prime Minister said that Mr Botha should discuss this with the Foreign Secretary.

### Mozambique

Pik Botha said that he saw Mozambique as the next priority for South Africa. His aim was to organise a conference involving Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa to resolve the Frelimo/Renamo problem and bring peace. There were indications that President Mugabe might be prepared to talk to the South Africans about Mozambique if asked to do so by Chissano. Meanwhile South Africa was providing economic help to Mozambique as well as assistance in protecting the railway and main road routes.

The Prime Minister said that there were persistent reports that South Africa continued to supply Renamo. Pik Botha said that he could give a categorical assurance that South Africa was not providing such assistance. The Prime Minister asked whether he was really confident of this. Might there not be some groups among the military or even private individuals who were helping? Pik Botha said that he could not absolutely rule this out. But all the allegations which he had investigated so far had proved false. He would report the Prime Minister's concern to the South African Cabinet. He could assure her that South Africa wanted to see the war stopped. With assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States he believed that something dramatic could be achieved in the next few months.


The Prime Minister asked about President Chissano's health. Pik Botha said that he had asked Chissano straight out recently whether it was true he had cancer. Chissano had replied that he had been assured there was no malignancy.

### Further visits

The Prime Minister mentioned that we had heard that Finance Minister du Plessis might be visiting London in April. She would be very happy to see him when he came. Pik Botha said that he thought this would be very welcome. He would tell Mr du Plessis.

Some of the material in this letter is highly sensitive. It should be given a very limited distribution.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury) and to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,  
  
(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

## UK-FRG RESPONSE TO THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA

- We believe that Mandela's release is in South Africa's own interests;
- in our assessment it would create a new and improved climate of benefit to South Africa internally and in her relations with the outside world;
- it would also reinforce our joint stand against sanctions and other restrictive measures;
- and it would make it easier for us to play a helpful role over the problems facing South Africa in its dealings with the banks over bearer bonds;
- looked at realistically, it would not on its own lead to the dismantling of any sanctions;
- but if the South African Government were to build on Mandela's release to launch a dialogue between all political groups in South Africa, we would then see what could be done to meet South Africa's concerns on sanctions (although we could not give advance assurances affecting others).

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PROPOSAL FOR A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA  
(DEPSA)

8 March 1989

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Western governments, development agencies, and private business increasingly acknowledge the difficulty of halting, let alone reversing, Africa's economic decline, including that of SADCC member states. Together with the intense preparations for further European integration in 1992, this disillusionment has had an effect on Western interest in Africa.

At the same time, the conviction is being expressed in European political, financial and business circles that at least the southern part of the continent could achieve economic growth and political stability if Western capital and know-how were to enter into partnership with South African business and development institutions. This would help to strengthen and extend the existing network of intraregional commercial, infrastructural and related ties.

Numerous examples of such partnership already exist even though international efforts to isolate and boycott South Africa, have hampered this development. What is more, circumstances are changing: more and more African countries are openly acknowledging their need to cooperate with the RSA, while the RSA itself is irrevocably moving towards a social and political order based on the consent of all population groups.

On the one hand, the RSA is laying the groundwork for a new order at home and the normalization of relations with the rest of the continent. On the other hand, responsible opinion in Western Europe is concerned over the retrogression of a region whose close economic and other bonds with Europe - notably Britain, Portugal and the German Federal Republic - remain significant notwithstanding the present movement towards accelerated European integration.

Common interest suggests that Western Europe and the countries of Southern Africa should work together to develop as fully as possible the human and natural resources of the region.

#### A "MARSHALL PLAN" FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Sanguine expectations that the spectacular results of the Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of Europe after 1945 could be repeated in post-independence Africa, have been dashed. Capital funds, by themselves, do not bring about development. Managerial and technological competence, together with personal integrity and dedication on the part of those utilizing capital funds, are indispensable if economic progress is to be achieved.

South Africa is short of funds but has built up a wealth of technical and scientific knowledge and experience concerning African conditions. Western Europe is by no means devoid of similar knowledge and experience but its contribution to the development of Southern Africa must be sought above all in respect of finance.

This leads to the conclusion that urgent attention should be given to ways and means whereby Western Europe, and more

particularly the European Community, would cooperate with the countries of Southern Africa in developing the resources of the region.

The following notes outline an approach to such a tripartite endeavour, and suggest sectoral topics that can serve as the basis for more detailed planning. The ultimate goal is a multi-nation project to lay the groundwork for economic progress in Southern Africa, comparable in scope and impact to the historic European recovery Programme.

The countries of Southern Africa enjoy opportunities for economic upliftment unique in Africa. Through trade, transport, investment, labour migration, tourism, and technology transfers they interact closely and beneficially with the strongest and most diversified economy south of the Sahara. Commercial exchanges between countries stimulate development more effectively than handouts.

Western nations interested in the development of the region would support mutually profitable links between the countries of Southern Africa - rather than actively discouraging them, as is so often the case, eg, in respect of SADCC.

#### A TRIPARTITE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (DEPSA)

##### What is expected of the European Community

A programme to improve political and economic conditions through regional cooperation could entail the following on the part of the European Community:

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1. Acknowledge that South Africa has an essential contribution to make if Western efforts to uplift countries in the region economically are to have a chance of succeeding;
2. Pursue policies supportive of - rather than impeding - South African efforts to evolve a domestic social and political order broadly acceptable to all South Africans;
3. Grant and/or mobilize funds and expertise for extending and modernizing the physical infrastructures of the region;
4. Provide assistance for measures aimed at raising human productivity through education and training as well as public health and family planning programmes and housing;
5. Urge and assist Southern African governments to create economic and legal conditions conducive to attracting local and foreign private investments in processing, manufacturing and other productive ventures; and
6. Consider other appropriate measures to promote the development of the region, eg, steps to facilitate the importation of Southern African products into the European Community.

What is expected of South Africa

The RSA's contribution to DEPSA will be mostly in respect of technology, including research and advisory services, as well as the supply of goods and materials, notably in respect of the following:

1. Agriculture: appropriate techniques of crop and animal husbandry, mechanization, irrigation and marketing; seed control and improvement; plant and animal health; protection against insect and other pests; inland fisheries; training of farm labour and supervisory personnel; agro- as well as forest-based industrial activities.
2. Mining: All aspects, including prospecting, development, production, management, training and living conditions of labour, testing of machinery and equipment.
3. Building and construction: low-cost housing; road and dam construction, water supplies for domestic and agricultural purposes;
4. Business development: promotion of small-scale industrial and commercial ventures; creation of marketing facilities, business training;
5. Human health: organization of preventive and curative services, family planning, diagnostic services, research;
6. Education and training: specialized facilities to impart basic skills, train artisans, technicians, medical and veterinary personnel;
7. Diverse technical fields such as transport, telecommunications, use of fissionable materials, industrial effluents and waste disposal, environmental protection;
8. Trade and investment will continue to play a crucial role. Apart from investments, South Africa has

traditionally supplied its neighbours with building materials, equipment, machinery, spares, pharmaceutical products, agrochemicals and food.

The foregoing enumeration merely indicates the wide range of activities in respect of which the RSA is already contributing towards the development of Southern Africa. A more comprehensive list would go well beyond the scope of the present memorandum.

Given the broad spectrum of Africa-related technological know-how available in South Africa, common sense suggests that outside governments and development agencies seeking to promote the material welfare of the peoples of Southern Africa, should make maximum use of this locally available expertise. It would be wasteful and counter-productive to ignore the availability of such expertise.

#### PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS TRILATERAL COOPERATION

Practical steps to implement tripartite co-operation involving the European Community (or individual EC member countries), and the countries of Southern Africa in promoting the development of the region, will have to be planned in consultation with all the governments of the region: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Closer analysis will indicate that the leading West European nations will serve their own interests best if they do whatever lies within their power to facilitate and encourage:

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- intra-regional understanding and cooperation in Southern Africa, and
- active involvement of West European business interests and institutions throughout the region.

8 March 1989

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

You are to see Pik Botha for an hour tomorrow afternoon (although you have some flexibility to over-run this time). He will see the Foreign Secretary later in the evening. The meeting will not be announced in advance but will be confirmed once it has started.

Private Meeting

Mr. Botha wants to begin the meeting without anyone else present on his side (but understands that I will be there: this will be important for the discussion on Namibia). During this initial, private session, there are three issues to cover:

- how he sees the leadership question in South Africa being resolved and the timing of an election;
- what he thinks can be done on Mandela;
- your possible visit to Namibia. (Even if you finally decide not to go, it is important to take this opportunity to mention the possibility of a visit.)

You will want to tell him about your visits to Zimbabwe and Malawi and say that you are contemplating a half-day visit to Namibia on Saturday 1 April. The purpose is to demonstrate support for the Agreement, to see British forces and to visit the Rossing mine. You assume that the South African Government would find such a visit useful. But in presentational terms, it is important that they should not seek prominent participation in it. You would need to be satisfied on two conditions:

- that there would be absolute secrecy about it until the last minute. It might be better if he did not mention this to anyone other than his most senior ministerial colleagues;
- second, a firm undertaking that President Botha and South African ministers will not seek to involve themselves in the visit.

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- You will want to make clear that you have not taken a decision to go yet and probably will not do so until very shortly beforehand.

#### Main Meeting

You might then invite others to join you. The main points to cover are:

- Internal developments in South Africa  
You will want to refer to Leutwiler's meeting with President Botha and our response to the points subsequently put to us. You will want to make clear that the response has been agreed with Chancellor Kohl and that you are speaking on behalf of both governments. You could hand over the attached text.
- Namibia  
You will want to stress how important it is that the agreement should be implemented meticulously. The prospects of avoiding further sanctions at CHOGM in October will depend very much on progress with implementation of the Namibia Agreement. The Namibia election comes within days of CHOGM.
- Mozambique  
You will want to mention that Chissano will be coming to see you at Nyanga during your visit to Zimbabwe. You will also want to stress the importance of South Africa pursuing a consistent policy towards Mozambique. Your purpose will be to strengthen Pik Bothas's hand against this in the South African security apparatus who are still providing support for Renamo.
- Detainees  
While welcoming the release of a significant number of detainees, you should observe that the continued detention of people for more than two and a half years without trial is indefensible.
- Visit of Mr. du Plessis  
You should say to Mr. Botha that you understand that Mr. du Plessis is coming to London in April and you would hope to see him while he is here.

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These points are dealt with more fully in the attached note from Robin Renwick.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

14 March 1989

mr

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 March 1989

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with the South African  
Foreign Minister, 15 March

Pik Botha is calling on the Prime Minister at 1600 on 15 March. The Foreign Secretary is giving a working dinner for him that evening. Mr Botha's planned visit to Bonn has been cancelled (your letter of 10 March).

/ Cape Town telnos 117 and 118, attached, outline the main areas to be covered with Mr Botha. He will wish to hear from the Prime Minister how the UK and the FRG might react if the South African Government were to release Nelson Mandela. I attach the form of words agreed with Chancellor Kohl, which the Prime Minister may wish to hand over on their joint behalf.

On Namibia, the Foreign Secretary agrees with the points made by Sir Robin Renwick in Cape Town telno 118. It will be especially important to emphasise to Mr Botha that no final decision will be taken until much nearer the time, and the importance of there being no leak meanwhile.

Since sending his telegrams, Sir Robin Renwick has had a further word with Barend du Plessis, who has confirmed his intention to visit Britain for talks with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on 10 April (the fact of a meeting at Prime Ministerial level should if possible not be disclosed even after the fact). It would help Mr du Plessis if the Prime Minister were to say to Pik Botha that if, as we understand, Mr du Plessis is coming here next month, we would like to have talks with him.

*Yours ever*

*Richard Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 118  
OF 101015Z MARCH 89

MIPT: PIK BOTHA'S VISIT

1. Pik Botha's office has indicated that he would like part of his conversation with the Prime Minister if possible to be tete a tete. He will not want Killen to be present for the more sensitive bits.

2. The Prime Minister will want to ask Pik Botha how he sees the leadership situation being resolved here and the timing of an election: and to discuss privately with him the possibility of a visit to Namibia. On the latter point, he would need on his return to get a firm undertaking that President Botha would not seek to interfere in any way with such a visit and that South African Ministers would not seek to involve themselves. Given the leakiness of the system here, Pik Botha should be asked not to discuss the possibility with his staff and it will be worth emphasising to him that a final decision would not be taken until much nearer the time.

RENWICK

LIMITED  
HD/SAFD  
HD/CAFD  
PS  
PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/PUS  
PS/SIR J FRETWELL  
MR TOMKYS  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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SOUTH AFRICA: Vint by Pale Botter  
Oct 79

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

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Prime Minister  
You will want  
to be aware  
of this.  
10 March 1989  
ms CDD  
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VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

I should record that Peter Hartmann in Chancellor Kohl's office telephoned me to say that Pik Botha would not now be visiting Bonn. He had wanted to see Herr Genscher but that would be impossible since Genscher would be in hospital. He had been offered a meeting with Schauble but had declined. I asked why Chancellor Kohl was not seeing him: a clear implication of the discussion with the Prime Minister in Frankfurt had been that he would do so. Hartmann said rather evasively that Chancellor Kohl only very rarely saw visiting Foreign Ministers. I commented that this was a rare sort of visit. Was it that the Chancellor did not wish to see him unless Herr Genscher was tarred with the same brush? Hartmann allowed that there might be something in that. I said that I thought it was rather disappointing.

Hartmann enquired whether we would nonetheless still hand over the proposed response to the South Africans, following Leutwiler's mission. I said that we would do so, making clear that it had been agreed with Chancellor Kohl. Hartmann did not demur.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM CAPE TOWN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 117

OF 091200Z MARCH 89

PIK BOTHA'S VISIT

1. In the meeting with the Prime Minister, Pik Botha will be expecting the following issues to be raised.

## NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

2. The Prime Minister will want to emphasise to Pik Botha the importance we attach to the Namibia independence process going forward as planned. If that process is on track at the time of the Commonwealth Conference in Kuala Lumpur in October we shall be in an extremely strong position to resist pressure for further sanctions. We shall be maintaining pressure on all parties to comply with the terms of the agreement (Pik Botha is concerned about the continued presence of SWAPO forces south of the 16th Parallel in Angola, contrary to the Geneva agreement). It is imperative that there should be no back-sliding on South Africa's part. This is a point I have made to all senior members of the South African Government, but it will have much greater force if it comes from the Prime Minister direct.

## SOUTH AFRICA/MOZAMBIQUE

3. The Prime Minister may wish to tell Pik Botha that she will be seeing Chissano as well as Mugabe in Zimbabwe. We have strongly supported the efforts Pik Botha and the Foreign Ministry here have made to achieve a major

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improvement in relations with Mozambique. As Pik Botha knows (he saw him in Maputo on 10 February), Chissano is disposed to make a real effort on his side and possibly to visit South Africa to help consolidate the process. Since the meeting in October between President Botha and Chissano, there still have been some reports of covert South African assistance to RENAMO. It is essential that South Africa should pursue a consistent policy towards Mozambique. There are real possibilities for cooperation both on Cahora Bassa (but RENAMO have intensified their attacks on the power line) and, especially on the reconstruction and security of the road/rail link between Maputo and South Africa on which the volume of traffic through the port of Maputo largely depends. It is important that we should continue to strengthen Pik Botha's hand against those elements of the military here who still are opposed to normalisation. Pik Botha will argue that peace will never be restored to Mozambique until there is some accommodation with RENAMO.

4. The Prime Minister may wish to say something to Pik Botha about the detainees, on which Archbishop Tutu has thanked her for her support. The Minister for Law and Order has released 280 of the 850 or so long-term detainees. But it is indefensible that some of the detainees have been in prison without trial for two and a half years. We hope that all the remaining cases will be reviewed. The detainees should either be charged or released.

#### MANDELA AND INTERNAL NEGOTIATION

5. On the central issue - the follow-up to Leutwiler's visit here - the Prime Minister will wish to give Botha a response on the lines of your telnos 51. That will put the ball firmly back in the South African court.

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6. On Mandela, several Cabinet Ministers with whom I have discussed the issue recently (including Barend du Plessis, Viljoen, Stoffel van der Merwe and Dawie de Villiers) say that, after the elections they favour his release. But the entire security establishment continue to argue that this would 'start the revolution' all over again. It certainly would be extremely hazardous to release Mandela without offering negotiations. Pik Botha and Barend du Plessis understand, and we have pointed out to all other members of the South African Government, the economic consequences for South Africa of not moving towards the release of Mandela. If he were to die in jail there would be an explosion in the townships which would be repressed. That in turn would lead to the further isolation of South Africa and those links, once broken, could not be restored. The more intelligent members of the South African Government understand that South Africa cannot survive indefinitely in a state of siege and that the real danger this country faces is not so much a revolution as slow economic strangulation. We have no wish to see that happen, given inter alia consequences it would have for the much more fragile economies in the rest of Southern Africa.

7. We are aiming to follow up these discussions with Pik Botha with Barend du Plessis. We should use this occasion to give Barend du Plessis the cover he will need to come to London. We are arranging for Lloyds or Sir Angus Ogilvy to invite him. I hope the Prime Minister might conclude this part of the discussion with Pik Botha by saying that if Barend du Plessis is coming to Europe after the Easter break, we will want to have discussions with him. This would then help us in nailing down the proposed meeting with him on 10 April.

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8. Despite his bluster and play-acting, Pik Botha is a positive influence on most of these issues. He invested a great deal of personal effort in putting through the Angola/Namibia agreement and is trying to consolidate the new relationship with Mozambique. He continues to argue within the Government for the release of Mandela and will try to use his meeting with the Prime Minister to help towards that goal. But it is important also to bear in mind that on internal issues here he always is in danger of appearing to promise more than he can perform. This was a factor in the ultimate debacle over the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group and while working hard on him to advance matters, we should not fall into that trap ourselves.

9. Please see MIFT.

RENEWICK

LIMITED

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

PS

PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/PUS

PS/SIR J FRETWELL

MR TOMKYS

MR FAIRWEATHER

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

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LPC

*From the Private Secretary*

5 March 1989

**VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER**

The Prime Minister has seen Cape Town telegram number 102 about Pik Botha's visit. She has commented that it would be wrong to try to discourage him from addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee.

(C.D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM CAPE TOWN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 102

OF 021020Z MARCH 89

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF SAFO

MY TELNO 67: PIK BOTHA'S VISIT.

1. I TOLD THE HEAD OF PIK BOTHA'S OFFICE THIS MORNING THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO ANNOUNCE HIS MEETING AND DINNER WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1200 HOURS ON 15 MARCH, BUT NOT BEFORE. I DID NOT THINK THAT THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER IT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

2. EVANS SAID THAT THERE HAD NOW BEEN AN APPROACH FROM THE GERMANS (PRESUMABLY IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL). PIK BOTHA WOULD BE LEAVING HERE ON 12 MARCH AND HOPED TO HAVE MEETINGS WITH KOHL AND GENSCHER IN BONN ON 13 MARCH. HE WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 14 MARCH AND IT APPEARED THAT HE MIGHT BE INVITED TO ADDRESS THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT AFTERNOON. IF HE DID, THAT WOULD BECOME PUBLIC. BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT ANNOUNCING THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT NOON ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. PIK BOTHA WOULD BE LEAVING LONDON ON 16 MARCH FOR TALKS IN ROME WITH ANDREOTTI. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MRS BOTHA, EVANS AND ANOTHER PRIVATE SECRETARY. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE ENVISAGED A WORKING DINNER, SO I DID NOT THINK THAT WIVES WOULD BE INCLUDED.

3. YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD SEEK TO DISCOURAGE PIK BOTHA FROM ADDRESSING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THOUGH I RATHER DOUBT IF IT WOULD BE WORTH IT.

*He can't possibly do that.*

RENWICK

LIMITED

HD/SAFO

HD/NEWS D

PS

PS/Mrs Chalker

PS/PS

Mr Nuno

Mr Fairweather

ADDITIONAL:

PS/No 10 Downing St.

HD/Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /DEDIP

CONFIDENTIAL / DEDIP

GRS 215  
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CONFIDENTIAL  
FM CAPETOWN  
TO IMMEDIATE FCOLN  
TELNO 067  
OF 151545Z FEB 89

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF SAFD

VISIT BY PIK BOTHA

1. I CALLED ON PIK BOTHA THIS AFTERNOON AND TOLD HIM THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED TO HAVE TALKS WITH HIM IN LONDON BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO AFRICA. THE PRIME MINISTER COULD OFFER 4PM ON 15 MARCH OR A MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 22 MARCH. OTHER TIMES WERE NOT GOING TO BE POSSIBLE.
2. PIK BOTHA CONSULTED HIS DIARY AND, ALTHOUGH 15 MARCH IS BUDGET DAY HERE, SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT BEST TO GO FOR THE EARLIER DATE. HE WAS GLAD THAT HE WOULD HAVE THE CHANCE TO EXPLAIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW DIRECT TO US BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER WENT TO AFRICA. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THE TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE. HE CLEARLY HOPES THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE DINNER WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 15 MARCH.
3. I ASKED HOW THE PRESIDENT WAS. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS MAKING A GOOD RECOVERY. THOSE WHO THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT NOT RETURN WERE GOING TO BE IN FOR A SURPRISE.
4. FOR THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA/MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA/NAMIBIA AND THE DETAINEES, PLEASE SEE MY TURS.

RENWICK

LIMITED.

HD/SAFD

PS

PS/Mrs Challen

PS/PUS

Mr Munro

Mr Fairweather

PS/No 10 Downing St.

HD/Assessment Staff, Cabinet Office.

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
FM NEW DELHI 250700Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 939 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1983



IMMEDIATE



NR BARCLAY NO 10

Downing Street

ADVANCE COPY

1) Carline : good

2) pa

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO LONDON

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 02 DECEMBER.
2. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME THAT DAY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT PERMIT A CALL.
3. MRS. THATCHER WISHES THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CAREFULLY HANDLED SO THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS DO NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAVE BEEN IN ANY WAY SHUBBED. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD EXPLAIN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE BEEN GLAD TO RECEIVE HIM AT ANY OTHER TIME BUT THAT SHE HAS ONLY TWO WORKING DAYS BETWEEN HER RETURN FROM NEW DELHI AND HER DEPARTURE FOR ATHENS AND HER PROGRAMME IS ALREADY COMPLETELY FULL. SHE HOPES THAT AN APPOINTMENT CAN BE ARRANGED WHEN HE IS NEXT IN LONDON.
4. PLEASE COPY TO BARCLAY AT NO. 10.

WADE-GERY

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 November 1983

*Note: PM consulted in India and  
decided against (see New Delhi  
tel no 939 of 25 Nov).*

*gms  
28/11*

*Jan Th...*

South African Foreign Minister

Mr Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, will be in London on 2 December and will have talks and lunch with the Foreign Secretary. When Mr Botha last visited London in 1980 he called on the Prime Minister. Sir Geoffrey recommends that, if the Prime Minister's diary permits, she should see Mr Botha for a short call on this occasion too.

There are special reasons for recommending a call. Our policy is to pursue a policy of contact and dialogue with South Africa, and to use this in an effort to influence South African policies where we believe they are damaging to Western and UK interests. The South Africans undoubtedly welcome and value ministerial contact with us, but they are acutely sensitive to our approach to Southern African problems and in particular to our public statements about these. This was clearly demonstrated in their sharp reaction to the Prime Minister's correspondence on Southern African policy with Mr Ian Lloyd MP (which Mr Lloyd published).

Sir Geoffrey will use his meeting with Mr Botha to explain the Government's policy fully, and, where necessary, to set the record straight. He believes the Prime Minister could usefully reinforce this and the South Africans attach particular importance to her views. Moreover, the Prime Minister will have just come back from CHOGM and a call would provide an early opportunity to discuss with a leading member of the South African Government topics which will have been much talked about in New Delhi.

/...

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

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Critics of the Government might possibly seek to represent the call as providing evidence of a gathering momentum in our relationship with South Africa, but this could be easily rebutted. Moreover we believe black African governments approve of such contacts providing they are used for frank talking on the central issues of Namibia, internal reform and destabilisation.

In the recent referendum of white voters Mr Botha played a leading role in putting the Government's case and after the result became known he was one of the main heroes of the hour. He is now being talked of, almost for the first time, as a possible future Prime Minister.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone'.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

file

J. A. P.  
as

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 November 1980

As you know, the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, called on the Prime Minister this morning. I enclose a copy of the record of their conversation.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

M



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Mr Botha said that it was important for him to be frank with the Prime Minister. He did not want to mislead her. The South African Government were not yet optimistic about the P.I.M. Mr Urquart was undoubtedly a man of integrity. But it would not be possible for the South African Government to talk directly to SWAPO at a P.I.M. The South African Government could not be responsible for decisions taken at a P.I.M. It was for the Namibian parties not the South African Government to participate. The internal parties were insisting on equal treatment at the P.I.M. It was also evident that the P.I.M. should be able to talk about anything. If the participants wanted to "dream up a constitution" they should, in the view of the South African Government, be allowed to do so - although the South African Government was not insisting that they did so. Some of the parties wanted guarantees built into the situation before any election took place. Otherwise there was a risk that they would be swept away. The Prime Minister repeated that many of the African leaders understood the problems which faced South Africa. They understood in particular that the South African Government had to bring the Namibian parties along. But if, having shown understanding, they were now to be disappointed, this was bound to rebound unhelpfully against South Africa. The British Government were very anxious to see a peaceful evolution in South Africa. We recognised that our destiny was linked with that of the region. But we would not be able to hold the Africans much longer. She was very worried by what Mr Botha had just said.

Mr Botha asked the Prime Minister to view the situation in its continental context. Africa was dying. The trade deficit of the Black African countries this year would be around \$40 billion. 300 million people in the Continent were drinking poisoned water. The Africans themselves admitted that only 8 African States were likely to survive economically the next three years. Black Africa was a lost cause. The South African Government were not prepared to accept that a Communist flag should fly in Windhoek. There was no possibility of a peaceful evolution in Namibia because the South African Government had no intention of surrendering Walvis Bay.

/The Prime Minister

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- 3 -

The Prime Minister said that she believed Africa would somehow survive. Bankruptcy had often been predicted for African states but they seemed to get through. They would in time learn to exploit their resources more effectively. Mr Botha should not assume that it was only a question of economics and hunger: questions of dignity also mattered. The Africans had held back on Namibia. Now they required a response. South Africa must give it to them. The British Government were anxious that South Africa should be seen in the best light. Mr Botha said that it was not his government which had deviated from the original plan for Namibia. They were not prepared to allow the Soviet Union in. The Prime Minister said that in the absence of South African flexibility, the Russians might get there quicker. If nothing happened before the end of the General Assembly, something would give way. There would be an explosion. The P.I.M. was something on to which the moderate Africans could hold.

Mr Botha said that his Government were willing to move away from discrimination in South Africa. They were willing to accommodate moderate African leaders. But they were not willing to agree to the destruction of South Africa. The present UN plan would put Moscow in power in Namibia. He could not force the present black leaders in the country to accept a plan which would destroy them. He wondered whether the British and South African Governments could not discuss the matter further, e.g. between the intelligence experts. The Prime Minister said that the fears to which Mr Botha had referred should be allowed to come out at the P.I.M. She shared Mr Botha's anxieties about the role of the Soviet Union. But it was a failure to act by South Africa which would give the Soviet Union control in Namibia. The views of African leaders generally towards the Soviet Union had evolved positively since Afghanistan. The West was gaining. But South African intransigence could reverse this process. African leaders would be encouraged to say " we told you so".

Mr Botha then described at length the scale of South Africa's involvement with neighbouring countries and the failings of the African leaders there. Referring to Zimbabwe, he said that competents were

/being

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- 4 -

being replaced by incompetents, that strife was increasing and that the country was going down the drain. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary said that they disagreed. Mr Botha commented that Mr Nkomo had sought the help of the South African Government in toppling Mr Mugabe but that they had refused.

At the end of the discussion, Mr Botha said that as from January, Britain would not be isolated in their support and encouragement of the South African Government. The Prime Minister said that Governor Reagan would no doubt adopt the same general posture as her own. He also, when in office, would be likely to urge the South African Government to show flexibility on such issues as Namibia. In this sense, South Africa had already "had the best" of Governor Reagan.

The conversation ended at 1145.



12 November, 1980

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 November 1980

I spoke to Paul Lever a few minutes ago about the attached letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Humphrey Barclay. Paul undertook to commission a piece for inclusion in the Prime Minister's briefing for her meeting with Mr. Botha tomorrow morning.

mo

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*original in CR.*

THREE PAGES YARD  
CHISWICK LONDON W4 2PA

01-994 5575

10th November 1980

Dear Prime Minister,

I understand that you will be seeing Mr. R.F. Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, during his visit to this country this week.

May I request you to take up with him the matters arising from the attempted murder of myself on South African soil by three Transkei security policemen in February 1979.

Last autumn between seventy and eighty members of both Houses of Parliament, including two former Prime Ministers and three former Foreign Secretaries wrote to the South African Ambassador in London on my behalf and Mr. Winston Churchill wrote to Mr. Botha. I enclose a copy of Mr. Botha's letter to Mr. Churchill dated 22nd November 1979.

The Ambassador wrote an almost identical letter to the Peers and Members of Parliament who had written to him. I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote to the Ambassador in which I pointed out the serious inaccuracies contained both in his letter and that of Mr. Botha.

I enclose a cutting from the South African Daily Dispatch of February 19th 1979 from which you will see that the British Embassy in Pretoria released the fact that I had received messages of sympathy from the Queen and Dr. David Owen who were in Saudi Arabia at the time.

page two

I also enclose an extract from Hansard of August 4th 1980 which contains a speech made on my behalf by Mr. Sam Silkin.

The facts can easily be summarised. The South African Attorney General has twice refused to prosecute my assailants despite the fact that he has their names and ranks and despite the fact that the attempted murder took place in South Africa. I have been told that it is open to me to bring a private criminal prosecution. Despite the fact that I have now visited South Africa twice this year the South African police have declined to take any evidence from me upon which any decision by the Attorney General would normally be based.

My Senior Counsel, Mr. Johan Kriegler S.C., the Chairman of the Bar Council of South Africa has been unable to secure an undertaking from the South African authorities that if a private criminal prosecution were to be brought by me a request for extradition would be made by the South African authorities in order that these men can be tried in the South African courts.

I cannot believe that if a South African citizen had been kidnapped from a hotel in Transkei, beaten up, put in the boot of a car, driven into South Africa and threatened with being shot, the South African Government would take the same negative attitude as it has towards me. I apologise for taking up with you a purely personal matter but I hope that you will agree that the British Government has a duty to safeguard and protect the interests of its citizens. The Foreign Office, through our Ambassador in Pretoria, has made representations on my behalf but to no avail. I hope the South African Government will agree to institute extradition proceedings if a private criminal prosecution is brought by me.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Harold Berridge*

The Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 November 1980

*Type letter for PM's  
signature*

*Dear Michael,*

South African Foreign Minister

Mr Pik Botha will be paying a courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 11.15 am on 12 November, accompanied by the South African Ambassador. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will attend the meeting, and will then accompany Mr Botha back to the FCO for substantive talks (followed by a lunch).

Flag A /  
Flag B /

I enclose a brief for the meeting, and personality notes. Lord Carrington is likely to discuss Namibia and other Southern African questions in detail with Mr Botha, and therefore suggests that we should aim to direct the conversation at No 10 to wider and more general issues. The brief includes a reference to the possibility that Mr Botha will revert to the idea of a meeting of Prime Ministers. While the Prime Minister might be a shade more positive on this subject than on previous occasions (when Mr Botha has been told that the Prime Minister's engagements ruled out any such meeting for the foreseeable future), it would be as well not to encourage the South Africans to think that discussion of dates could begin at once or that anything could be said or implied in public. It may be that the possibility of such a meeting could help to bring the South African Government to agree to implementation of the UN plan for Namibia, but we cannot yet see how the present round of negotiations led by the UN will turn out. Lord Carrington would not want to make a move without first consulting our partners, which can most usefully be done only when the prospects from the latest UN round are clearer.

/As

CONFIDENTIAL



Flag C 1

As requested in your letter of today's date, I enclose a separate note about the case of Mr Humphrey Berkeley. We do not recommend that Mr Berkeley's case should be taken up with the South Africans at the Prime Minister's level, but suggest that the FCO should continue to deal with it.

Flag D /

I enclose a draft reply which the Prime Minister may wish to send to Mr Berkeley following the meeting with Pik Botha.

Yours ever  
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St

BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

UK/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

1. Very glad to have had Mr Luce's first-hand report of his visit to South Africa. We want improved relations which depend on Namibia progress and movement towards Government based on consent of all peoples in South Africa.

2. [If raised] I hope to meet Mr P W Botha at an appropriate moment when we and Southern Africa can most benefit from such a meeting. Hard to see now when would be best. We have each so many short-term preoccupations, including shared problems such as Namibia.

NAMIBIA

3. Moment for final decision close. Five committed to UN Plan. Failure disastrous for Southern Africa and severe blow to Western efforts to contain spread of Soviet influence.

4. We acknowledge South African commitment to all Namibians. South Africa will still be able to influence independent Namibia. UN elections do not mean capitulation to Marxism and instability.

5. Extraordinary that negotiations have survived so much delay. Hope that all concerned will seize present opportunity and not create further obstacles. Present UN-led discussions have raised wide hopes which, if disillusioned, could end prospects for settlement.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

6. We have noted reforms in apartheid legislation. I am the only Western leader publicly to welcome them [twice] - December 1979 in New York [and 10 November at Guildhall]. We cannot do more than encourage and welcome.

/7...

7. No wish to dictate South Africa's constitutional future but what prospects of meaningful reform to satisfy black political aspirations?

#### SANCTIONS

8. UK opposition well known but South Africa must realise our interests in rest of Africa mean we cannot veto in all circumstances. Extent of pressure depends on South Africa, especially over Namibia.

#### ZIMBABWE

9. Mr Mugabe has made an encouraging start. He needs to show his people that his moderate policies are producing tangible results. He requires the backing of pro-Western countries to see him through.

#### AFRICAN NATIONALISM

10. President Masire of Botswana impressed me as moderate and sensible, stressed importance of regional co-operation at Maputo Conference. Rhetoric apart, such co-operation necessary. Important to steer towards constructive goals and not give Soviet Union opportunities.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

MR BOTHA'S VISIT

1. No indication of any bilateral matters Mr Botha wishes to discuss. He is going on to Paris for dinner with M Francois Poncet on 15 November.

UK/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS (not to be revealed)

2. Mr Luce visited South Africa in September. He hoped to see Mr P W Botha, but the latter's anger over the Prime Minister's reception of Dr Slabbert, the leader of the opposition, prevented this. Mr Luce had a long and difficult meeting with Mr P. W. Botha.

3. Mr P W Botha has dropped hints before that he would welcome a meeting. He was told that the Prime Minister's diary was under very heavy pressure. It might be worth considering offering a meeting as a Namibia inducement provided one or more other Western countries do the same but we cannot yet assess the probability of success, or the need for some extra push to secure South African Namibia agreement.

NAMIBIA (May be drawn on freely)

4. Consultations on the outcome of the UN Mission to Pretoria (20-25 October) continue. Waldheim (through his special representative Mr Ahtisaari) has discussed South Africa's willingness to consider implementation of the UN Plan beginning on 1 March 1981, with Presidents Nyerere, dos Santos and Kaunda. They have responded favourably. Assuming South African agreement to the terms of the

/Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary General's report to the Security Council, a Pre-implementation Meeting of all the parties (including the internal) will be held in the first week of December to conclude the agreement.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

5. Nothing in current reform programme to give blacks any say in decision-making. President's Council excludes blacks and has few coloureds of note. Three Bills announced 30 October to remove 'hateful discrimination': proposals complex and could mean tighter controls on black movement to urban areas.

SANCTIONS

6. UK trade with OAU countries about three times that with South Africa and investments about equal: South Africans beginning to realise they cannot rely on us to veto. Some African states (eg Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique) acknowledging how damaging sanctions would be for them.

ZIMBABWE

7. Zimbabwe has made an encouraging start. Mr Mugabe shrewd and capable. Main difficulty amalgamation of three former armies. Our military training team (130 soldiers headed by Maj Gen Palmer) has key role in supervising integration into Zimbabwe Army of some 10,000 former ZANLA and ZIPPA personnel.

8. Press exaggerate security problems and white emigration. Overall security good. Emigration less than expected: certainly not a white 'exodus'. Reports that Mr Mugabe proposes to expropriate white farmland denied by Zimbabwe Government.

/AFRICAN

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AFRICAN NATIONALISM

9. President Masire of Botswana stressed the importance of the Maputo Conference 27-28 November for regional cooperation and lessened dependence on South Africa. The latter sees this as an anti-South African move and risks provoking controversy by opposing it.

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
10 November 1980

THE HON ROELOF FREDERICK (PIK) BOTHA; SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Born 1932. Educated at Pretoria University. Joined the Department of Foreign Affairs as legal adviser in 1953, where the ambition that still dominates him quickly became apparent. After a successful career in diplomacy he entered politics, being elected to Parliament in 1970 as member for Wonderboom, Pretoria. He gave up his seat when he was appointed South African Ambassador to the UN in 1974 (and concurrently to the USA in 1975). Mr Vorster chose him as Foreign Minister while he was still Ambassador. He took up his appointment on 1 April 1977, being elected to Parliament as MP for Westdene, Transvaal, a month later. In September 1978 he stood as a candidate in the Prime Ministerial election with the support of the Transvaal verligte group but secured a rather ignominious 22 votes in the first ballot; in the second ballot his supporters transferred their votes to Mr P W Botha and effectively secured the latter's election. His intervention in the election despite lack of seniority as a Minister, his exploitation during the election of his personal popularity with the electorate at large, and his personal role in bringing about the downfall of Dr Mulder have been greatly resented by the Transvaal party machine. He appears uncertain of his position in the Cabinet and, although a faithful supporter of the Prime Minister, he is regarded with suspicion by the conservative wing of the National Party. He has no power base within the party.

Pik Botha is one of the few South African Ministers with charisma. He appears frequently on television and projects himself with great success as a self-confident vigorous defender of South African interests. He is polemical, aggressive, impulsive, prone to emotional outbursts, and stretches the truth when it suits him. His brinkmanship and stubbornness in negotiation have complicated the problems of the Western Five over the Namibia issue; equally, his interventions in the Rhodesian negotiation sometimes seemed unhelpful and not in South

/Africa's...

Africa's own wider interests. Often he seems to believe that his political ambitions can be better advanced by shows of toughness than by seeking the friendship and understanding of western governments. In internal affairs he is on the side of the angels, and as a leading member of the verligte faction is convinced of the need for change.

Married to a quiet but friendly wife; four children.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### THE HON MARAIS STEYN - AMBASSADOR OF SOUTH AFRICA

Mr Steyn was born on Christmas Day 1914, in Cape Province. He attended the University of Cape Town, where he gained a BA, and the University of Witwatersrand, where he gained an LL.B. When appointed Ambassador to Britain he was Minister of Community Development, of Coloured Relations and of Indian Affairs in the South African Government.

Mr Steyn was a journalist with Afrikaans newspapers supporting the United Party (UP) in Johannesburg and Cape Town from 1938 until 1940 when he joined the Government Information Services. He was Political Secretary from 1942-48, UP Member of Parliament for Yeovil from 1948 and later Deputy Leader of the UP Parliamentary Party. He resigned from the party in 1973 and joined the National Party, becoming a National Party MP in 1974. Most recently he represented Turffontein (Johannesburg).

Mr Steyn was appointed Minister of Tourism and Indian Affairs in 1975, largely because of the then Prime Minister's desire to widen his support in the Cabinet. He lost tourism from his portfolio in 1978 and gained Community Development in 1976 and Coloured Relations in 1979. His performance as Minister of Community Development was not impressive, although within his party he seems to be well regarded.

A forceful and often witty speaker, Mr Steyn is regarded as being on the 'enlightened' or verligte wing of his Party. He is an excellent debater (in both Afrikaans and English) and a man of charm, intelligence and gaiety. He has a friendly attitude to Britain and has hitherto been willing to talk frankly off the record.

In 1940 Mr Steyn married Miss Susan Moolman; they were separated in 1968 but have for some time been reunited (although they do not refer to this). Now about 60, Mrs Steyn is a pleasant and well-groomed lady, who also speaks excellent English. They have four grown-up children, two sons and two daughters.

Southern Africa Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

14 October 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE ASSAULT ON MR HUMPHRY BERKELEY

### BACKGROUND NOTE

1. In February 1979 Mr Berkeley (who was at that time Diplomatic Representative to the Transkei 'Government') was abducted from his hotel in Umtata, the capital of Transkei, by Transkei security police, assaulted, driven over the border <sup>threatened with murder but</sup> in the boot of a car, then left in South Africa. Since then he has been trying to obtain redress.
2. Mr Berkeley initially sought to get the South African authorities to extradite those responsible and to prosecute them in respect of those offences <sup>which took place</sup> in South Africa. HMG made representations to the South African Government in support of Mr Berkeley's case in February 1979 and October 1979. The South African Government however refused to initiate a prosecution largely on the grounds that the abduction and alleged assault took place in the Transkei, which the South Africans treat as an independent sovereign state. They suggested that Mr Berkeley should take the matter up with the Transkei authorities. (We cannot ourselves have any dealings with the Transkei authorities since this would be inconsistent with our position of no recognition of the Transkei as an independent sovereign state.)
3. On the matter of the offences in South Africa, the Eastern Cape Attorney General decided not to prosecute in October 1979 on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
4. Since then Mr Berkeley has sought (allegedly with some success) to bring both civil proceedings and a criminal prosecution in the Transkei. He also hopes to bring a private criminal prosecution in South Africa against those responsible for his abduction and assault in respect of those offences which took place in South Africa. In order to bring a private prosecution however he needs the help of the South African authorities to extradite those responsible from the  
/Transkei

Transkei to the Republic. He would like a guarantee from the South African authorities that they will undertake the necessary extradition procedures. The legal position is however extremely complex and we have not so far made representations to the South African authorities over this particular question.

Southern African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

HS

BF 21/11/23

4 November 1980

South African Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 31 October and has agreed to see Mr. Botha from 1100-1130 on Wednesday 12 November. I should be grateful if you could arrange for a brief to reach me the previous evening.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



*Pm's Minister.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*I think it would be wise  
to see him. You could fit him  
in from 11.00 - 11.30 on Wed.  
12 November. Agree?*

31 October 1980

*Ans. Yes  
3/x1*

*Dear Michael,*

South African Foreign Minister

Mr 'Pik' Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, is visiting the UK from 10-12 November and has asked to meet the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Mr Botha told Sir Michael Palliser on 30 October that he would be addressing the Conservative Party's Foreign Affairs Committee.

Lord Carrington is giving a lunch for Mr Botha on 12 November preceded by talks in the FCO. He hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to see Mr Botha. She last met him on 17 October 1979.

At a time when the South African government are facing important decisions on Namibia, it could be most useful for the British Government's views to be expressed at the highest level to Pik Botha and, through him, to the South African Prime Minister. However, in case developments between now and Mr Botha's visit make a meeting between him and the Prime Minister less desirable, we would not propose to inform the South Africans of the appointment until nearer the time.

An additional factor is that, against the background of the Prime Minister's meeting in September with Dr van Zyl Slabbert, the South Africans would doubtless react badly if Mrs Thatcher did not meet Pik Botha.

*Yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

South Africa

PS/PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING ST

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TO PRIORITY PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

*Prime Minister*

*ms*

*MA 4/8*

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA LUANDA LUSAKA GABORONE  
SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO

VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY HAVE ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH ME  
DURING VISIT BY PIK BOTHA FROM 8 TO 10 SEPTEMBER. WE ARE REPLYING  
THAT I SHALL NOT BE HERE BUT THE LORD PRIVY SEAL WILL SEE MR BOTHA  
AT 4 PM ON THE 9TH.
2. IF ASKED, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM THAT MR BOTHA HAS AN  
APPOINTMENT AND ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE VISIT AND CALL ARE AT  
MR BOTHA'S REQUEST.
3. WE SHALL WELCOME ANY INDICATIONS YOU CAN PICK UP ABOUT THE REASONS  
FOR PIK COMING TO LONDON IN SEPTEMBER AND ANY PARTICULAR MATTERS HE  
IS LIKELY TO RAISE.
4. YOU (AND OTHER RECIPIENTS AT THEIR DISCRETION) MAY LET REPRESENT-  
TATIVES OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE FIVE KNOW OF THIS APPOINTMENT AND  
CONFIRM THAT WE SHALL AS USUAL BE CONSULTING OUR PARTNERS NEARER  
THE TIME ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT USE THE MEETING TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS  
ON NAMIBIA.

CARRINGTON

NAMIBIA STANDARD

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FM PRETORIA 271600Z DEC

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 1037 OF 27/12/79

*South Africa*

*ans*

OUR TELNO 1031:PRESS COMMENT ON A MEETING BETWEEN THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND MR P W BOTHA

1. THE LEADING ARTICLE IN 'TRANSVALER' TODAY ENTITLED  
"MR BOTHA AND MRS THATCHER" SAYS THAT WHILE THERE CANNOT YET  
BE ANY CERTAINTY, THERE ARE NOW PROMISING INDICATIONS THAT  
THE PRIME MINISTERS OF BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICAN WILL GET TO  
MEET EACH OTHER SEMICLN AND A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO  
LEADERS COULD HAVE IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THIS PART  
OF THE WORLD. BUT IF THE TALKS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL THERE ARE  
CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE MET.

2. FIRST AND FOREMOST THE TALKS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE  
IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA COULD ACCEPT WITH SELF  
RESPECT. "EVEN BRITAIN, WHICH PROBABLY UNDERSTANDS OUR  
PROBLEMS BETTER THAN ANY OTHER POWER, BECAUSE SHE ACTUALLY  
CREATED MANY OF THE PROBLEMS HERSELF, HAS OVER THE PAST FEW  
YEARS JOINED WITH THE WESTERN LEFT IN CRITICISING US.  
BUT AS PRIME MINISTER PW BOTHA SAID WHEN HE MET THE WESTERN  
FIVE IN PRETORIA SQUARE BRACKET IN OCTOBER 1978 SQUARE BRACKET  
'SPEAK WITH US AND WE ARE READY TO LISTEN'. AND WHEN MRS MARGARET  
THATCHER SPEAKS WITH US - AND WE BELIEVE THAT SHE IS OF A  
CALIBRE OF LEADERSHIP WHERE THIS CAN BE DONE IN A FULLY  
MEANINGFUL WAY - THERE IS ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST STAND AT THE  
TOP OF THE AGENDA. THIS IS THE COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT ON OUR PART  
OF THE WORLD WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY MAKING INEXORABLE PROGRESS.  
THE TWO LEADERS WILL HAVE TO UNDERTAKE A LOOK INTO THE MIDDLE  
OF THE 1980S AND EVEN FURTHER".

3. EDITORIAL CONTINUES THAT UP TO NOW THE WESTERN APPROACH HAS BEEN TO TRY TO PUSH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THIS WAY AND THAT OVER THEIR VERY DIFFICULT INTERNAL RACIAL PROBLEMS. THIS HAS CAUSED SO MUCH FRUSTRATION AND DESPAIR THAT THERE HAS EVEN BEEN TALK OF A POSSIBLE "RUSSIAN OPTION", HOWEVER FAR FETCHED THAT MAY SOUND. THE SUCCESS OF A PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING WILL THUS BE MEASURED AS MUCH BY THE NEW CLIMATE WHICH IT GENERATES AS BY THE VISIBLE CONSEQUENCES WHICH IT MAY HAVE AS REGARDS RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND OTHER PROBLEMS.

LEAHY

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TEL NO 1032 OF 24/12/79

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Prime Minister.

Fils

1. THE SUNDAY TIMES REPORT IS CLEARLY BASED ON AN UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING BY PIK BOTHA, WHO IS KNOWN TO BE A FREQUENT CONTACT OF THE PARTICULAR JOURNALIST, BUT HE HIMSELF IS QUOTED TODAY AS SAYING THAT REPORT IS "SPECULATIVE" EXCLAM. THE RAND DAILY MAIL'S COMMENTS ARE BASED ON ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS THEY PUT TO ME YESTERDAY.

2. ALTHOUGH PIK BOTHA AND I HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON SATURDAY MORNING HE MADE NO MENTION OF ANY OF THIS. NEXT TIME WE TALK I SHALL TAKE HIM UP ON IT.

2. I ASSUME THAT PIK BOTHA'S PURPOSE IN FLYING THIS KITE WAS TO MAKE SOME POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1031 OF 24/12/79

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

SPECULATION ABOUT A VISIT BY P.W.BOTHA TO LONDON.

1. TWO SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS HAD FIRM BUT SPECULATIVE REPORTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER, MR P.W.BOTHA, WOULD SHORTLY BE VISITING LONDON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THE END OF JANUARY. ONE REPORT IN THE AFRIKAANS RAPPORT DATED LONDON CARRIED THE HEADLINE "BRITISH EXPECT MEETING BETWEEN TWO PREMIER'S". THE OTHER APPEARED IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SUNDAY TIMES AND WAS BASED ON "POLITICAL CIRCLES IN PRETORIA" IT SAID, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU WERE SYMPATHETIC TO A PROPOSED MEETING AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN RAISED WHEN PIK BOTHA CALLED ON THE PRIME MINISTER IN OCTOBER.

2. THE STORY IS STILL RUNNING IN TODAY'S PAPERS. ONE OF THE AFRIKAANS PAPERS CALLS THE VISIT A "TREMENDOUS BREAKTHROUGH". THE RAND DAILY MAIL UNDER A HEADLINE "DOUBTS ABOUT P.W.-THATCHER TALKS FORECAST" SAYS THAT WELL-PLACED DIPLOMATIC SOURCES HAD CHARACTERISED THE REPORTS AS "SPECULATIVE AND PREMATURE". THE SAME SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "IT IS SPECULATION. NOTHING HAS BEEN ARRANGED. NOTHING HAS BEEN SET IN MOTION" SEMICLN BUT THEY DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BETTER UNDERSTANDING THAT HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT PAVE THE WAY TO A MEETING. A MEMBER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STAFF SAID YESTERDAY "MR BOTHA HAS NO COMMENT TO MAKE. I KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THE MATTER".

+11

Prime Minister

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 8 NOV.

South Africa

*Ami Amile*

*mb*

PIK BOTHA : POSSIBLE LONDON VISIT.

1. THE AFTERNOON NEWSPAPERS HERE CARRY REPORTS THAT PIK BOTHA IS PREPARING TO FLY TO LONDON AT SHORT NOTICE FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OVER THE LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS. THE REPORTS LINK HIS VISIT TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S PRESENCE IN LONDON.
2. STROEBEL , THE MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY , HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE MINISTER HAS ORDERED HIS STAFF TO BE ON STANDBY FOR A POSSIBLE LONDON VISIT . HE ADDED , HOWEVER , THAT BOTHA HAS BEEN IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE WITH LONDON (SA EMBASSY AND RHODESIAN DELEGATION ) AND THAT THE VISIT MAY NOT MATERIALISE.
3. STROEBEL SAID THAT THE VISIT WOULD HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH KAUNDA'S PRESENCE THERE , BUT SUGGESTED THAT INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION MAY HAVE PROMPTED THE PLAN .
4. YOU MAY ALREADY BE AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY . IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU WOULD WISH ME TO SAY TO PIK BOTHA IN ORDER TO PREVENT HIS MATERIALISING I OUGHT TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS EARLY TOMORROW MORNING .

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MR ASPIN  
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 November 1979

Dear Dr de Villiers,

How very kind of you to send me Mr. Botha's gift of some South African proteas. These are really lovely, and I have put them in my flat here at No. 10.

With best wishes and thank you for writing as you did.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Dr. Dawid J. de Villiers.

88



SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY,  
TRAFALGAR SQUARE,  
LONDON,  
WC2N 5DP.

1 November 1979

My dear Prime Minister

The South African Foreign Minister, Mr. R. F. Botha, has asked me to present you with this gift of South African Potlucks and to thank you once again for being able to receive him at such short notice on 17 October 1979

I should like to add my own personal appreciation of your understanding of our concerns and to wish you God's blessing on the task which is yours as Prime Minister

Yours sincerely

Nawu Dinku

*'T' messaged copy on Rhodesia, Pt 8, Situation S, Africa*

MESSAGE FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

Foreign Minister Botha has reported to me on his discussions with you and with Lord Carrington, and I would like to thank you for receiving him at such short notice. I was particularly glad to receive your assurances on those issues regarding Rhodesia that are of great concern to me and my Government. We now have a clearer picture of the position. I value your understanding of our efforts and initiatives in South and Southern Africa, and I hope there will be other opportunities to exchange views on these matters of common interest.

Please accept my best wishes,

MESSAGE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO LORD CARRINGTON

I am most grateful to have had the opportunity of bringing myself up to date on <sup>the</sup> Zimbabwe-Rhodesia discussions and of conveying to you the South African Government's concerns. My discussions in London have enabled me to give my Government a clearer understanding of how matters stand and what the British Government's intentions are. On the basis of the assurances and explanations given to me by you and your Prime Minister, I would like to let you know that my Government will be prepared to continue its support of the Government of Bishop Muzorewa on the assumption that the electoral process would be completed before the end of December 1979. May I wish you well in your endeavours.

Both dated London, 21 October 1979

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 October 1979

Dear George

As you know the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, called on the Prime Minister at 6 p.m. this evening. I enclose a record of the discussion. I should be grateful if you could give the record an even more limited distribution than that normally accorded to records of Prime Ministerial conversations.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, MR PIK BOTHA, AT  
10 DOWNING STREET ON 17 OCTOBER AT 1800

---

Present: Prime Minister  
Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary  
Mr. M. O'D B. Alexander

Mr Pik Botha  
H.E. Dr. Dawid de Villiers

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After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. Botha said that he had been asked by his Prime Minister to say that he very much hoped it might be possible to arrange a meeting between himself and the Prime Minister at an opportune moment. Mr. P.W. Botha considered that it would be extremely useful for the two Prime Ministers to be able to discuss their common problems and to get to know each other better. The Prime Minister recalled that she had met Mr. P.W. Botha when he was the South African Defence Minister. She said that it would be virtually impossible for her to meet Mr. P.W. Botha in the months immediately ahead. Her diary was already overcrowded. Mr. Botha made it clear that his Prime Minister was thinking of a visit to London rather than of a visit by Mrs. Thatcher to South Africa. He did not attempt to pursue the matter further.

Mr. Botha said that his Prime Minister had asked him to make clear how grateful he was for the Prime Minister's response to his initiatives in South Africa. Mr. P.W. Botha's ambition was to bring the leaders of the black and the Asian communities to share his vision of Southern Africa. This was based on a belief that South Africa could and should play a bigger role in the social and economic development of the entire region. The region contained 40 million people. It possessed a good infrastructure and a large internal market. It was in every sense the most highly developed region in Africa. It had enormous resources of gold and other minerals, of the various metals and of water. South Africa's knowledge and

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expertise e.g. in the areas of agriculture, treatment of disease, and industry was tailored to the African situation. The region was one of great importance. Given the chance, the present South African Government aimed to show the other African countries that co-operation with them would be worth seeking. Within South Africa the Government's objective was to convince the whites that the blacks were their natural partners. If Mr. P.W. Botha's policies succeeded, the result would be a solid and stable region in Southern Africa which it would be easier for the West to support.

The Prime Minister said that she needed no convincing about the importance of South Africa. She considered that Mr. P.W. Botha's efforts had not received enough recognition in the West. His recent initiatives were part of a continuing process. The setbacks he had encountered in the recent by-elections had underlined how courageous his policies were. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he agreed with the Prime Minister. Mr. Botha's point about making it easier for Western Governments to support Southern Africa was of particular importance. The greater the movement to which they could point within South Africa, the better.

Mr. Botha said that despite the difficulties, the South African Government had the will to complete their programme. But they would be unable to do so if the Marxists won in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The Prime Minister said that everyone would be lost if the Marxists won. It was essential to have moderate Governments, supported by the white population, in both Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and in Namibia. Britain's objective was to achieve a lasting solution in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia of the type secured in Kenya. This would allow the country to flourish, would give the neighbouring countries a better chance and would make co-operation with South Africa easier. We would try to get others to share our view of the situation in the region as a whole. A constitutional settlement supported only by South Africa and

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/the United Kingdom

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the United Kingdom would leave Zimbabwe/Rhodesia isolated. There had been two aspects of Bishop Muzorewa's Constitution which had had to be rectified because they had no parallel in any other Constitution granted by Britain. Both points had been put right. There was now a Constitution which was in all respects similar to those we had granted to many other countries on gaining independence. Britain recognised that what Rhodesians wanted was an end to the war: we intended to offer the ballot in exchange for the bullet. Great difficulties remained and progress at the Conference had been too slow. Bishop Muzorewa had been away from Salisbury too long. None the less we were on course. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary added that it was essential that Britain should be seen to be being reasonable in the conduct of the negotiations. As it was he had already been accused by many of attempting to wreck the Conference.

Mr. Botha said that it was important that Bishop Muzorewa's position should not be weakened. There was no-one in Rhodesia who would look after his interests. His power base lay in his link with the Security Forces. If this were to be severed, the Bishop would be a laughing stock in the country. Access to the levers of power/<sup>was what</sup> mattered in African politics. Looking further ahead, Mr. Botha said that he was concerned about the possibility that Mr. Nkomo would be allowed to participate in the elections even though he had not accepted any agreement in London. If this happened, Mr. Nkomo would have a platform that would enable him to destroy Bishop Muzorewa. He would say that he had sought a better agreement in London but that the Bishop had sold out to the British. The Prime Minister said that there was force in Mr. Botha's point but that in our view Mr. Nkomo should not be allowed to participate in the election unless he accepted the Constitution. As regards Bishop Muzorewa's position, the aim would be for him to return to Salisbury with definite achievements e.g. the lifting of sanctions and the return to legality, to his credit.

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/Mr. Botha

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Mr. Botha said that South Africa had a military presence in Rhodesia at the Bishop's request. This consisted of equipment rather than men. South Africa was also giving financial support to the tune of some 40 million rand per month. If they were to decide to end their presence, they would wish to do so soon. South Africa could not afford a repetition of what had happened in Angola where they had appeared to capitulate under external pressure. (It had evidently been Mr. Botha's intention at this point to describe the alternative course of action which South Africa might pursue if the situation deteriorated and they decided not to withdraw. However, in the event the conversation took a different direction and he never returned to the point.)

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that South Africa would not decide to pull out of Rhodesia. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was entirely reasonable for Bishop Muzorewa to have purchased the South African equipment. If there were a British presence in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia during the interim period, no questions would be asked about the equipment.

Mr. Botha said he was concerned that the United States Government might try to exert pressure on the British Government. The Prime Minister said he need have no concern on that score. We would do our best to bring the Americans along and would remind them of our extensive experience in the problems of the region. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not believe the American Government could afford not to follow HMG's line. Mr. Botha referred to intercepts available to the South African Government of President Nyerere's conversations with colleagues. President Nyerere's interpretation of what he had been told by the Americans did not altogether square with the Prime Minister's view. It was of course possible that President Nyerere had misunderstood what the Americans were saying. The Secretary of State said that he thought President Nyerere was probably wide of the mark. The only

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worry was that the Americans might not regard the interim arrangements as fair. But they could probably be brought round.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Botha reverted to his Prime Minister's vision of the development of Southern Africa as a whole. He said that Mr. P.W. Botha intended to have a meeting with South African industrialists and financiers on 22 November at which he would be seeking financial support for his grand design. The meeting ended at 1835.

*Phub*

17 October 1979

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 October 1979

*Dear Michael,*Rhodesia: The Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr Pik Botha

Arrangements have been made for the South African Foreign Minister to see the Prime Minister at 6.00 pm this evening. Lord Carrington will see Mr Pik Botha earlier in the afternoon and will accompany him to the meeting.

We must try to get the South African Government to understand that it is our common objective to see a moderate government in Rhodesia, which will work with the white community (and continue co-operation with South Africa): and that, if we are to contribute to a more stable situation in Rhodesia, it is essential to bring the present negotiations out in a way which will attract support for Rhodesia after independence from our principal western allies, including the United States.

The South Africans played a reasonably helpful role during the discussions on the Constitution. They did not support Mr Ian Smith in his opposition to our proposals. Since then, however, in addition to public statements by both P W and Pik Botha threatening military intervention in Rhodesia, the South Africans have been exerting pressure on the Salisbury Delegation about the pre-independence arrangements. The South African objectives are:-

- a) to ensure that the Patriotic Front are not given a chance to win elections;
- b) to get us to take over some of the burden of supporting Rhodesia (the extent of their financial and military support is becoming extremely onerous for them).

The South Africans have put pressure on Bishop Muzorewa not to hand over any executive authority to a British representative in the period before elections are held; and have told General Walls that this could affect their military supplies. They have also tried - unsuccessfully - to persuade Muzorewa not to agree to new elections. Part of their concern is that our interim arrangements could affect their support for the Rhodesian forces; and that we would not allow the Rhodesian forces to deal with violations of a ceasefire.

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

/Bishop



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Bishop Muzorewa has resisted this South African pressure. He has told the South Africans that elections are necessary for him to get wider recognition. He is prepared to agree that he and his Ministers should commit themselves to the election campaign. General Walls told us this morning that he also considers the South African concern to be exaggerated: the kind of arrangements we have in mind should not affect his relations with them. He advised us to impress on the South Africans that our objectives are similar; and that it is in their interests as well as ours to seek international support for Rhodesia. General Walls will himself be seeing Pik Botha later in the day.

Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation accept that there will have to be elections supervised under our authority to bring the independence Constitution into effect. We will not accept any interference in the period before elections with the Rhodesian security forces, the police or the administration.

Mr Pik Botha is likely to argue that what is required is for us to lift sanctions immediately. We must point out that the lifting of sanctions by ourselves alone will not help to produce stability in Rhodesia, and that we must try to get wider international acceptance and support.

Mr Botha is likely to make much of the need not to undermine Muzorewa's authority. Under our plans, Muzorewa will be able to return to Rhodesia having negotiated the immediate lifting of sanctions and with the certainty of legal independence within a matter of weeks. The British representative would consult with Muzorewa at each stage and would ensure that the Rhodesian commanders were able to do what was necessary in the interests of security.

To summarise, the points which we must impress most strongly on Mr Botha are that:

- (a) our objective is an independent Rhodesia with some measure of Western support, not simply an independent Rhodesia which has to rely solely on South Africa;
- (b) to achieve Western support, we do have to be seen to be making a genuine attempt at negotiation;
- (c) part of the negotiating process (if we get that far) will inevitably focus on the constitutional and governing authority in Rhodesia during the interim period. It is not part of our intention to weaken Muzorewa's position politically - on the contrary; but the South Africans must allow us to play the hand so as not to lose Western support.

/I enclose

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/ I enclose a personality note on Mr Botha. It is possible that we will propose a meeting between the Prime Minister and the South African Prime Minister. The timing of such a meeting would need to be considered very carefully.

Yours etc

Paul Lyne

PP

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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BOTHA, THE HON R F ('PIK')

Minister of Foreign Affairs and MP for Westdene, Transvaal

1. Born 1932. Educated at Pretoria University. Joined the Department of Foreign Affairs as legal adviser in 1953, where the ambition that still dominates him quickly became apparent. After a distinguished career in diplomacy he entered politics, being elected to Parliament in 1970. He gave up his seat when he was appointed South African Ambassador to the UN in 1974 (and concurrently to the USA in 1975). Mr Vorster chose him as Foreign Minister while he was still Ambassador and he took up his appointment on 1 April 1977, being elected to Parliament in another Constituency (Westdene) a month later.

2. 'Pik' Botha is a vigorous defender of South Africa. He is prone to emotional outbursts and is not averse to stretching the truth when it suits him. A leading member of the verligte faction in the Cabinet where he has argued the importance of maintaining the friendship of foreign powers against the verkrampte wing to whom the prospect of South Africa as a laager is less unattractive. His handling of South Africa's negotiations with the Five Western members of the Security Council since April 1977 have been a prime example of this, although his fear that too apparent a desire to be friends with the West will harm his political ambitions, because his electorate would interpret it as bowing to foreign pressure, often causes him to be more hard-line in public.

3. Intensely ambitious, he was one of the three principal candidates to succeed Mr Vorster in September 1978. Bitter criticism from the northern political establishment in the National Party for his alleged rôle in splitting their vote and depriving Dr Connie Mulder, the northern candidate, of the Premiership may have temporarily damaged Pik Botha's influence in Cabinet - though this has been counter-balanced by open support from P W Botha. He has recently

/failed

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failed in his attempt to be elected as one of the three vice-presidents of the powerful Transvaal National Party.

4. Married to a quiet but friendly wife; four children.

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*S. Africa*



*Assumed*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*fs.*

*Rms*

16 October 1979

*Dear Michael,*

Visit to London by the South African Foreign Minister

As I told you by telephone, the Minister at the South African Embassy informed us this afternoon that Mr Pik Botha proposed to come to London on 17 October. Mr Louw said that Mr Botha had been instructed by the South African Cabinet to make this journey, as would be coming as the personal representative of the Prime Minister. Mr Louw asked for an early meeting with Lord Carrington to discuss Rhodesia. He also expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would agree to receive Mr Botha.

We have arranged for Mr Botha to call on Lord Carrington at 3.30 tomorrow afternoon. In the light of that meeting, Lord Carrington will wish to recommend whether or not the Prime Minister should receive him.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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