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Visits to the United Kingdom by the
Soviet Defence Minister

SOVIET UNION

June 1989

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/18/4L

1st August 1989

Prime Minister 2

Recd

4/8 mb

Dear Charles,

MESSAGE FROM SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER

I attach a copy of a message to Mr Younger from General Yazov, the Soviet Defence Minister.

Yours sincerely
I.M. Woodman

(I M WOODMAN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Mr. Younger,

On behalf of the Soviet Military delegation please accept my best thanks for the warm and hearty welcome you gave the delegation during the official visit to Great Britain.

Would you be kind enough to convey my thanks to Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher for her great consideration and interesting talk.

I hope that our acquaintance with new Secretary of State for Defence Mr. King will be continued and we will have another opportunity to exchange our views on a wide range of issues.

We are confident that meetings and talks that we had during the visit will further mutual understanding and confidence between the USSR and Great Britain and their Armed Forces.

My wife joins me in sending our best regards and wishes of good health and happiness both to you and to Mrs. Younger.

Sincerely yours,

D.Yazov
General of the Army
Minister of Defence
of the USSR



MO 6/18/4V

Crime Minister
ms *CDP*
1/P

NOTE OF FINAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE USSR: MOD, 28TH JULY 1989

General Yazov paid a final call, lasting some 40 minutes, on the Secretary of State for Defence this morning. He was accompanied by the principal members of his party including Admiral Chernavin, General Sukorukov, Colonel General Borsuk, Colonel General Chervov, Lieutenant General Larin, Rear Admiral Khuzhokov, Colonel Uvarov and Lieutenant Colonel Globenko. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig (CDS), General Sir Richard Vincent (VCDS), Mr Griffiths (AUS(Pol)) and Air Commodore Cheshire were also present.

2. Mr Younger welcomed the opportunity for a final discussion. He had very much enjoyed having General Yazov as his guest and hoped that he had enjoyed his programme of visits. The staffs should work together on detailed suggestions for further contacts at all levels. He understood that there was a helpful proposal for VCDS to visit the Soviet Union later this year; he hoped that CDS could pay a visit during 1990. General Yazov said that he had been planning on a visit by CDS this year; VCDS would also be very welcome. He could show CDS and VCDS the Asian and European parts of the Soviet Union respectively.

3. Turning to his impressions of his visit, General Yazov said that it had greatly improved his understanding of British Forces, their training, and how much they were in love with their motherland. He was very appreciative of the openness throughout his visit; if someone was just pretending that they were a friend, he would not have been given such an open demonstration of everything. He was convinced that this represented the United Kingdom's true feelings and his visits to all three Services had been superb and conducted in a spirit of goodwill. He had not had to plead to be shown anything; Mr Younger's subordinates had been very eager to show him around. He believed the draft proposals for mutual exchanges would be improved by visits from CDS and VCDS though he believed that there should be contacts at all levels including between soldiers and sergeants, as well as generals. He would very much like members of the British Armed Forces to know more about their Soviet counterparts, and vice versa, otherwise they would have a picture only of an enemy and would live in an atmosphere of suspicion.

4. Continuing, General Yazov said he wanted peace for the present generation and for their grandchildren. He had been very insistent in his discussions on the importance of peace, but wished to stress



that this did not imply that the Soviet Union was weak. He talked about peace as he wanted mankind to live forever and not to vanish by the products of its own hand, namely armaments. Each State should be able to protect itself but mankind should be wise enough to avoid another world war. He believed that Britain was a very decent partner and state which carried great authority and respect. If the UK, US, France and FRG fought for peace they should also be able to persuade others to do so with the possible exception of Israel who was not subordinate to anyone.

5. Mr Younger said that the British people felt as strongly about the importance of peace as anyone. He agreed that to believe in peace did not mean that you were weak. If friendship, confidence and openness existed, States could be sufficiently strong, even at lower levels of armaments, to have confidence in one another and their security. General Yazov agreed. After the wreath laying ceremony in Westminster Abbey the Deacon had made a speech devoted to the memory of the Unknown Warrior. He too had spoken of the struggle for peace; if politicians struggled for peace, armies would not have to wage war. Clausewitz wrote that war is a continuation of policy but he (Yazov) believed that politics should nowadays proceed from the assumption that war was not an obligatory continuation of policy. All politicians should have brakes; the UN was just such a brake if it could be made to function more effectively. Over the years, however, it had made many resolutions which were not honoured by everyone, particularly by Israel. The Russians had a saying that human blood was not water which was why he too wished to join the struggle for peace.

6. Mr Younger said that the arms control negotiators should strive for agreements which were satisfactory to both sides and which made both sides feel secure. General Yazov said that he had called on the new Foreign Secretary the previous day; Mr Major had touched on arms reductions matters but in a way that he found strange and which seemed to place the carriage ahead of the horse. Mr Major had opened discussion by mentioning verification and stressing the importance of agreeing on proposals for verification first; he (Yazov) understood that that was the position of both the US and the UK but was not sure what it meant. It was important to ask first what arms we wanted to reduce, to what levels, to achieve the actual reductions and then to create mechanisms for verification. It was more difficult to discuss verification as an abstract concept. For example, the terms of the INF Treaty were public but agreement on the number of missiles to be reduced by each side had come before consideration of the means of controlling such reductions. That was the logical sequence. The Soviet Union was very ready to receive staff for verification purposes and to use technical, or any other means, of verification on a reciprocal basis. His own visit had been an effective way of establishing a system of communications and verification was one means of communication. He reiterated that he



was very ready to receive verification experts and asked that Mr Younger should tell the US that he was ready to do anything necessary, provided that it was on the basis of full reciprocity.

7. Mr Younger commented that verification was essential for building confidence. The fact that good friendship and contact existed should make verification easy for many types of armaments. General Yazov interjected that confidence and trust must come first. Mr Younger agreed and added that that was why it should not prove too difficult to verify reductions in tanks. But there were other areas where verification would be more difficult and the problems must be talked through. For example, even with the greatest confidence, friendship and openness it would be very difficult to get proper and adequate verification on chemical weapons. The reason was simply because they were so easy and cheap to manufacture; they could be produced in tiny locations all over the country. A lesser difficulty, but one on which discussion was also needed, was the problem of verifying deployment of aircraft and pinpointing exactly where they were. He did not wish to say that in either case verification was impossible but the problems underlined the need to talk through how this might best be done, frankly and openly.

8. General Yazov commented that Mr Younger was right; difficulties were inevitable but it seemed to him that success depended more on the leaders of States than on the negotiators. If one State was to decide to deceive another in order to produce some binary or chemical weapons instead of fertilisers, that would be deception and contrary to confidence building. He wished to reach a situation in which the primary task of all concerned was to preserve the balance of interests and not to seek unilateral advantage. Mr Younger reiterated that the difficulties of verification must be addressed. He had greatly enjoyed meeting General Yazov and was confident that the British people wished to see relations with the Soviet Union improved. They were immensely impressed at the task President Gorbachev had taken on and warmly supported his efforts. The President could be confident that he had the best wishes of HMG and the British people for success in perestroika and all the other reforms he had embarked upon.

9. General Yazov expressed his thanks, and that of his entire team, for the invitation to visit the United Kingdom. He was sorry that he had only been able to get to know Mr Younger at the end of his period in office but he would be very welcome to visit the Soviet Union at any time and had provided a good foundation on which those in charge of the Ministry of Defence in future could build. He looked forward to developing bilateral relations and to establishing the same degree of co-operation with Mr King. He also wished to express his deep gratitude for the meeting with the Prime Minister and to assure her that everything she had said would be



passed on to President Gorbachev. Mr Younger expressed his thanks for these remarks. He knew Mr King was looking forward to working closely with General Yazov, as a friend, in the years ahead. (Note: General Yazov's party made it clear, in the margins, that an invitation to Mr King to pay a return visit would be forthcoming but that, for protocol reasons, they did not wish to extend the invitation through Mr Younger.)

28th July 1989
Ministry of Defence

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cc: MOD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 July 1989

Dear General Yazov.

May I thank you most warmly for the very generous gifts which arrived after your visit to No. 10. We very much appreciated them.

The Defence Secretary reported to Cabinet this morning that your visit is proving very successful, and this news was received with great satisfaction.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency General D. Yazov

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1989

Dear Brian,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a talk lasting some fifty minutes with the Soviet Defence Minister this morning. General Yazov was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador and an aide. The Defence Secretary was also present. General Yazov was in high good humour, apart from the increasing and visible irritation at Zamyatin's frequent interventions.

Soviet Internal

General Yazov opened by conveying warm regards to the Prime Minister from Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Ryzhkov. The Prime Minister said that she continued to admire Mr. Gorbachev's vision. She recalled telling members of the intelligentsia during her visit to Moscow in 1987 that it was not enough to support Mr. Gorbachev at the beginning: it was when he ran into difficulties that he would really need their support. Change invariably produced problems before benefits. People were inclined to take advantage of liberties before they were ready to assume responsibilities. General Yazov agreed: the Soviet Union faced a situation where the majority thought more about its rights than about its responsibilities. The Prime Minister continued that, all the same, it was a very exciting time which we were watching with great interest and some concern. An awful lot rested on Mr. Gorbachev's shoulders. General Yazov acknowledged that Mr. Gorbachev had to deal not only with the theoretical aspects of perestroika but also the practical implementation. People wanted everything at once, without pausing to think about the difficulties. The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Gorbachev had a good group of people round him, and a conviction and commitment which communicated themselves to others. General Yazov said there was also a toughness of character. Gorbachev was a man of strong will. He was also now taking more trouble to communicate with ordinary people. He had many loyal friends, as the Prime Minister had observed. The Prime Minister suggested that she was more used to opposition than

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Mr. Gorbachev was. General Yazov said solemnly that Soviet Ministers needed to get used to opposition.

The Prime Minister said that she also thought highly of Mr. Ryzhkov. We hoped that he would visit the United Kingdom later this year. The Ambassador said that he would do so. General Yazov said that Ryzhkov had been very much involved with presenting his new government to the Supreme Soviet. Every candidate had been grilled. There had been a lot of goodwill, and a lot of not so goodwill as well. This was a symptom of general dissatisfaction rather than directed at individual Ministers. The Prime Minister said that it was difficult to get people to understand that government could not do everything.

The Prime Minister continued that the difficulties being experienced with strikes and with the nationalities must present the armed forces with particular problems in helping to police disturbances and provide aid to the civil power. This was no doubt a new role for the Soviet armed forces. General Yazov thought that the nationalities problem was the most serious single difficulty faced by the Soviet Union. The problem had been artificially created during the war years, with the displacement of indigenous populations, many of whom now wished to return to their original territory. But economic problems were also a major worry. The Prime Minister asked how this year's harvest would be. General Yazov said that the Soviet Union lay in the zone of "risky agriculture". There had been drought this year in Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. But people tended to talk too much about problems and forget advantages. Healthy forces in Soviet society supported perestroika and he believed that results would be forthcoming. He hoped the Prime Minister would return to the Soviet Union soon. The Prime Minister said that she hoped to visit Kiev next year.

Arms Control

The Prime Minister said that the various arms control negotiations seemed to be going quite well, in particular the conventional forces reduction negotiations. Inevitably there would be difficulty when we got down to detailed discussion. She wondered how General Yazov saw the prospects. General Yazov said that, following the recent exchange of concrete proposals, the conventional forces negotiations had come alive. He was confident there would be results. He was less happy about the START negotiations. The parameters for these had been set in 1987 and drafting ought to be moving ahead. But the United States had taken up positions on, for instance, cruise missiles and the counting rules for bombers which were harmful to Soviet interests. More generally, the Soviet Union was making substantial unilateral reductions in its forces and weapons and was withdrawing six armoured divisions from Western Europe. As Defence Minister he was constantly having to answer letters from the public asking why the Soviet Union was disarming itself. The Prime Minister said she hoped he pointed out in reply the massive imbalance which existed in the Soviet Union's favour. There seemed to be indications

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that the equipment being withdrawn tended to be of the older variety. General Yazov contested this: many of the divisions had the latest equipment including T72 and T80 tanks. They were returning to the Soviet Union and being disbanded. The Prime Minister commented that each side had to be sure of its defence at each stage of negotiated reductions.

Chemical Weapons

The Prime Minister continued that Britain had done some unilateral disarmament of its own during the 1950s by getting rid of its chemical weapons. Unfortunately other had not followed suit and chemical weapons remained a major concern. General Yazov said that the Soviet Union welcomed talks on the problem and was ready to destroy all its chemical weapons. It had built a special plant for the purpose. The Ambassador intervened to refer to the recent talks with Mr. Karpov, which had cleared up misunderstandings. The Prime Minister said she was not at all sure this was the case. She had spoken bluntly to Mr. Gorbachev about our misgivings whether the Soviet Union was coming clean with us on the subject of chemical weapons.

General Yazov said that the United Kingdom was free to inspect any installation or base in the European part of the Soviet Union to check that Soviet information was correct. He would not deceive so charming a lady - oh yes you would, said the Prime Minister - but would tell her frankly that all Soviet CW agents had now been concentrated in one particular area, so that they were ready for destruction. The Prime Minister repeated that we felt the Soviet Union had been less than frank with us. General Yazov responded that this may have been so in the past but was not any more. The Ambassador said that, when Mr. Gorbachev returned to the Soviet Union after his talk with the Prime Minister on this subject, he had called together all the military and industrial people and told them that she doubted their figures. He had asked for a full report. The result had been to send Mr. Karpov and his colleagues to the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister said that the visit had not by any means laid to rest all our fears. Mr. Gorbachev had told her that he would look into our misgivings and she relied on him to do so.

Soviet Armed Forces

The Prime Minister asked whether force reductions caused problems of morale in the Soviet armed forces. General Yazov said that the reductions really only touched the officers. Reductions in the ranks were achieved by reducing recruitment. Students were already exempt and students who had been drafted earlier were being discharged. He was trying to avoid discharging young officers, preferring to get rid of those who had served their time. The main problem was to find suitable accommodation for them. They all wanted to go back to the big cities, but the Government was insisting that they must live, for sometime at least, in the area where they last served. There was some pressure from those with technical


qualifications to leave the armed forces early and join co-operatives and small enterprises. He was not inclined to prevent this.

Conclusion

The Prime Minister said that General Yazov's visit was historic and an indication of the steadily improving relations and increasing trust between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. General Yazov expressed warm gratitude for the invitation to pay the visit and the very interesting and promising programme. He knew that the great Marshal Zhukov had always wanted to visit the United Kingdom but had been prevented by the Cold War. It was his special privilege to be the first Soviet Defence Minister to come here. The Prime Minister said that the number of those who remembered the Second World War and its hardships was decreasing. There was a special duty on that generation to see that it never happened again.

The meeting ended with some exchanges about the need for Mr. Gorbachev to take a proper holiday. General Yazov thought that he would do so from or shortly after 4 August.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Alex Allan (HM Treasury) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C.D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

ceBuckley

TEMPORARILY
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G. Young
9/8/2016

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER

You are to have an hour's meeting with the Soviet Defence Minister tomorrow. He will be accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador. George Younger will also be present.

He has long been rumoured to be for the chop and indeed only just survived confirmation by the Supreme Soviet last week, as a result of Mr Gorbachev's personal intervention.

Nonetheless, the meeting is important. It will be the first contact at Ministerial level since the expulsions, and to that extent marks the return of normality. It is also the first ever visit by a Soviet Defence Minister to the United Kingdom (or to a European NATO country) and therefore a significant step forward in our relations in that area.

You might start by referring to your message to Mr Gorbachev, explaining the coincidence of our Ministerial reshuffle. You particularly arranged for George Younger to stay on as Defence Minister to the end of the week so that he could act as General Yazov's host. You hope he will also take the opportunity to get to know Mr King.

You might then go on to make a few comments about the Soviet internal scene. We have been impressed by the pace and scale of political change, and continue to express our full support for Mr Gorbachev's efforts. We note the very considerable problems which he faces, but applaud the courage and determination with which he is tackling them.

On the defence side, there are three main areas to cover:

- Conventional Force Reductions. NATO's proposals are a major step forward and we hope there will be a positive Soviet response. The Soviets have complained because we

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- 2 -

do not distinguish between strike and defensive aircraft and deal only with US manpower in our proposals. The answer is that we do not think it makes sense to distinguish between different types of aircraft which have a combat capability. And on manpower, we think it sensible to deal only with US and Soviet-stationed forces, since these are the two countries with territories outside Europe. If he tries to tackle you on the need for maritime arms control, you should remind him that we need our maritime forces to redress the acute geographical asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the latter with its huge hinterland.

- Chemical Weapons. You will want to make the same point as you made to Mr Gorbachev viz that we still found it difficult to accept Soviet claims to have stopped production of CW, and to have only 50,000 tonnes of CW agent, and never to have deployed CW in Eastern Europe. We shall only get the confidence necessary for a CW Agreement when both sides are entirely open about their capabilities.

- Nuclear Weapons. Yazov tends to follow the propaganda line about abandoning nuclear deterrence and eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000. You are better equipped than anyone to counter these arguments.

CDP

C. D. POWELL
24 July 1989

DS2ASG

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CCB/Dr.
RC

MO 6/18/4L

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

24 July 1989

Dear Charles,

CALL BY THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER, ARMY GENERAL DMITRI YAZOV
 ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 1200-1300, 25TH JULY

The Soviet Defence Minister, Army General Dmitri Yazov will be calling on the Prime Minister at 1230 on Thursday 25th July. This meeting (and that with Deputy Prime Minister Biryukova) will be the first with Soviet Ministers in London since Mr Gorbachev's visit in April and the 19th May expulsions. The Prime Minister may therefore like to take the opportunity to reaffirm the Government's support for the Soviet reform programme and our firm commitment to the further strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union.

Political Background

2. The key development in the Soviet Union since late May has been the Inaugural session of the Congress of People's Deputies and the new Supreme Soviet. The debate in both has frequently been sharp, and may not have been welcome to General Yazov, as it focused on the Army among other sensitive issues (such as the leadership, privileges and the KGB). The Supreme Soviet also came close to refusing to confirm Yazov's appointment. Seventy-seven deputies voted against him and sixty-six abstained. Defeat was only averted by a vigorous intervention in his favour by Gorbachev himself. Despite its predominantly traditionalist composition, the Supreme Soviet rejected ten other Ministerial nominations including Deputy Prime Minister Kamentsev.

3. While the Prime Minister will obviously be aware of General Yazov's likely sensitivity on this subject, it would still be appropriate for her to express the interest felt by the British Government, Parliament and many other circles in Britain in the working of the new Congress and Supreme Soviet - which constitute the most far-reaching advance to date in the process of perestroika. The Prime Minister may also wish to express the Government's admiration for the contribution made by Mr Gorbachev as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the extent to which his role as architect and his skill as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet have won him yet further international recognition.

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street



4. If the conversation moves to the Soviet Union's current economic problems (notably the shortages leading to the coal miner's strikes, and the growing nationality pressures), the Prime Minister may like to congratulate the Soviet leadership on the courage they have shown in recognising that reforms are bound to lead to the emergence of a plurality of voices and demands - a process which is pivotal in any open society. She might wish to add that while it is not for Western governments to interfere in matters which are internal questions for the Soviet Union, these problems can never be resolved until they and their root causes are honestly confronted. The Prime Minister could add that we are doing our best to help the reforms through providing training courses for Soviet managers.

5. On Defence issues, there are three main areas which the Prime Minister might discuss with Yazov:

The need for progress at the CFE talks

6. As the Prime Minister will be aware, the Warsaw Pact pressure on NATO to discuss manpower, helicopters and aircraft, and (less explicitly) to agree a timescale for reductions increased when the Warsaw Pact tabled its own proposals for zonal arrangements and ceilings, in May. NATO took the initiative again with President Bush's proposals tabled at the Summit. Formal proposals reflecting the Bush initiative were worked out and tabled in time for the end of the current round in Vienna on 13 July, an indication of the high priority we give to reaching an early agreement. Initial Soviet reactions (including that of Gen Yazov) have been welcoming, while noting that the West's proposals do not distinguish between strike/attack and defensive aircraft, and deal only with US manpower on the Western side.

7. A particular concern for the UK has been to ensure that our Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability is preserved. Work on this indicates that the 15% cuts in aircraft can be found without touching our DCA. The full military implications of the NATO Summit initiative are now being analysed. As now expanded it would allow somewhat higher aircraft and helicopter holdings than the Warsaw Pact's proposals. The definition of aircraft is significantly different and there are no zonal restrictions on them, or on helicopters. The Bush proposal for US and Soviet forces in Europe on the other hand, is considerably lower than those proposed by the Warsaw Pact. The proposed NATO timescale, too, is much shorter than the Warsaw Pact's who had proposed completion by 1994 for the first phase of reductions.

8. The Prime Minister could develop the discussion with Yazov along the following lines:



- our expanded proposal tabled on 13 July is an indication of the high priority we attach to reaching an early agreement.
- Gratified by the degree of convergence in both alliances' proposals; hope that outstanding definitional problems will not prove too difficult.
- Look forward to a positive Soviet response when negotiations resume in September, and to rapid progress towards agreement.
- NATO manpower proposals address only US and Soviet stationed manpower; in view of differences between stationing forces by small European states within Europe, and movement of forces by super powers into the area that is a necessary distribution. Soviet Groups of Forces, at 600,000, is over ten times the size of BFG; we believe the forces of the two major stationing nations with extra ATTU territories to be the first priority.
- Do not believe it makes any sense to attempt to distinguish between different types of aircraft which have a combat capability.

9. General Yazov might well raise the need for maritime arms control. The Prime Minister might respond that the pressing need is to deal with the security problems posed by the huge imbalances in land forces; NATO's maritime forces are an essential part of our defence because of our need to protect reinforcement and supply routes, they help to redress the acute geographical asymmetry between the alliances whilst they cannot seize and hold territory.

The need for greater openness on Chemical Weapons

10. This is one area where we have yet to witness the greater Soviet openness about military matters which we are beginning to see in other areas. The continuation of these attitudes inevitably casts some shadow over other areas. Official level discussions following Mr Gorbachev's visit earlier this year have yielded minor clarification, but not removed our main concerns.

11. The Prime Minister could reiterate that we have considerable difficulties in accepting Soviet claims about their CW capabilities, including the claim to have stopped production; to have only 50,000 tonnes of CW agent; and to have never deployed CW in Eastern Europe. We are also concerned that Soviet research and development of new agents continues. The Prime Minister should emphasise that the confidence necessary for a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable CW ban can only be built through greater openness about CW capabilities.



12. If Yazov refers to the lack of US openness, The Prime Minister should point out that the US have made available a great deal of information about their CW capabilities, including stockpile composition and the location of their CW production facilities.

The role of nuclear weapons


13. Yazov has been a strong advocate of the need to abandon nuclear deterrence and to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. To the French, he said that their independent deterrent (and ours) should be included in arms control negotiations when the time is right. With the Spanish he claimed that modernisation of Lance (and lengthening its range) would circumvent the INF Treaty. He appears to hold a deep distrust of the United States, and has - rather overtly - tried to emphasise differences of interest between Europe and North America.

14. On the general issue, the Prime Minister will wish to emphasise the unique role that nuclear weapons play in deterring any outbreak of conflict, and point out that they cannot be "dis-invented". To do their job effectively, these weapons need to be kept up to date where necessary and NATO is fully agreed on this. The Warsaw Pact is not in a position to criticise since it has already carried out an extensive modernisation programme covering both missiles and artillery.

15. On the issue of the UK's strategic deterrent, the Prime Minister should reiterate that our position is well known. We regard Polaris/Trident as the minimum credible force for deterrence. We have never said never to associating our deterrent with the arms control process. But before we could consider how best to contribute to the process very substantial cuts in superpower arsenals (beyond 50%) would be necessary; and no improvement in Soviet strategic defences.

16. The Prime Minister may wish to reaffirm our desire for a continuing substantial high level dialogue with the Soviet leadership, symbolised by General Yazov's own visit. She may like to mention the invitation to Prime Minister Ryzhkov to visit the UK.

17. I am copying this note to Stephen Wall (FCO) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Your sincerely


(B R HAWTIN)
 PS/S of S

YAZOV, ARMY GENERAL DIMITRY TIMOFEEVICH

MINISTER OF DEFENCE, USSR; CANDIDATE MEMBER OF POLITBURO

Born November 1923, Russian.


Fought on Leningrad front in World War II. Graduate of Frunze Military Academy and General Staff Academy.

- 1973 - Lieutenant General (in Azerbaijan).
- 1976-9 - Deputy Commander, Far East Military District.
- 1979-80 - Commander, Central Group of Forces, Czechoslovakia.
- 1980-84 - Commander, Central Asian Military District.
- 1984-87 - Commander, Far East Military District.
- 1987 - Deputy Minister of Defence, responsible for personnel.
- 1987 (May) - Minister of Defence.
- 1987 (June) - Full member of Central Committee and candidate member of Politburo.

Yazov's appointment as Minister of Defence in May 1987 (after the Rust incident) came as a surprise: he was promoted over several more senior figures. He may have come to the attention of Gorbachev in July 1986 when the Soviet leader met the "Command Staff" of the Far East Military District. Yazov has the reputation of being a strict and

demanding commander, one who takes a strong interest in the welfare of his officers and soldiers and has a good relationship with his colleagues.

He has not previously travelled to any European NATO country, but had three meetings with his US opposite number.



STRICTLY PERSONAL

SUBJECT.
ce ops
Master.



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 137a/89

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

24 July, 1989.

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. President.

We are very much looking forward to the visit of Defence Minister Yazov beginning on 25 July. It will be a most important step forward in our relations.

I want to alert you personally to one point about the visit. We are today carrying out a number of Ministerial changes in our Government. One result of these is that our Defence Minister, George Younger, will be announcing his retirement. However, he will remain in office for the period of General Yazov's visit and will act as his host, while taking the opportunity to introduce his successor, Tom King.

I wanted you to be absolutely clear that the timing of these changes is purely coincidental, and no discourtesy whatever is intended. Nor do the changes in any way diminish the importance which we attach to the visit. It should go ahead exactly as planned. I shall myself be seeing General Yazov, and look forward to a very full and substantial discussion with him.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

President Mikhail Gorbachev

Kho

CM

CONFIDENTIAL

24 July 1989

My dear Geoffrey.

In view of the visits due from Marshal Dimitri Yazov and others I feel some information I have may be helpful.

Soviet sources tell me Mr Gorbachev is concerned that ideas he has promoted are not provoking response of the order he expected from the West.

Without doubt this is substantially a problem that his closest advisers are closeted in the Kremlin and that he continues to mistrust the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This has resulted before in misunderstanding of the authority and value of a number of Western political institutions and the failure to phase advance marketing of ideas if he needs a response at a particular time.

His two current problems are the lack of response to his speech to the Council of Europe on 6 July and the proposals made to the G.7 meeting in Paris.

Clearly there is a (typical) misunderstanding in the Kremlin of the power of the Council of Europe to respond collectively to such phrases as 'Recognition and respect for the sovereign right of every nation to choose freely a social system constitute the major prerequisite for a normal European process', 'a common (European) home' (deliberately left out of the Guildhall speech), and 'talks on tactical nuclear systems between all countries concerned'. (No doubt Marshal Yazov can be tested as to his understanding that the accuracy of his ICBMs enable them to be used as tactical weapons!)

On the G.7 letter it appears Mr Gorbachev is upset that the West does not realise that Soviet overseas aid commitments are 87 billion roubles, of which one third is in hard currency and that added to the 34 billion roubles debt to the West means the USSR is a player in global financial matters who cannot be ignored (just because it is not yet ready for convertibility, free trade etc).

One is constantly surprised at the ham-fistedness of the Soviets, particularly when it appears they really do mean well.

over/

However, despite all, the MFA appears enthusiastic about Mr Gorbachev's leadership although the 'London-split' between Mr Zamyatin, as a member of the Central Committee and the career diplomats rolls on. I understand he is very upset that the Prime Minister did not quietly warn Mr Gorbachev about our then impending spy revelations so they could be shipped out quietly. He appears to be caught by Gorbachev between 'Not knowing' what was going on and the 'Need to know' what was going on. Not healthy for a man proud of being in the 'inner circle'.

Jan ever

KW

Kenneth Warren, *MP*

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe MP
Secretary of State
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AH

cc Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP ✓
The Prime Minister
Rt Hon George Younger MP
Secretary of State for Defence

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 July 1989

I enclose a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev which should be delivered on the afternoon of 24 July in Moscow to his office. The text should go by DEYOU telegram to our Ambassador in Moscow (or his deputy) and receive no distribution.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*File to
be PC*

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 June, 1989.

VISIT OF THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Thank you for your letter of 16 June about the possible visit of General Yazov at the end of July. The Prime Minister will certainly wish to see him if he comes, and I should be grateful if you could be in touch with Mrs. Ponsonby about a possible time.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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CPD 1



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/18/4V

16 June 1989

Y R's letter

Agree to see him?

CDN 17/6

Dear Charles,

VISIT OF SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER TO THE UK

You will recall that, as a further step in our gradual resumption of defence contacts with the Soviet Union, the possibility of a meeting between the Defence Secretary and the Soviet Defence Minister, General Yazov was raised during Mr Gorbachev's visit to the UK in April. The Soviets were interested and enquired through our Defence Attache in Moscow whether General Yazov could make an official visit to the UK in July. In response, we have offered 25th-28th July as possible dates, with a fall-back in September. We are still waiting to hear from Moscow whether these dates will be acceptable, although the Embassy's view is that, barring unforeseen developments, Yazov will come in July.

We have, therefore, worked up an outline programme which provides an opportunity for discussions and for visits to each of the three Services. We also hope that Yazov might be prepared to give a speech at Chatham House. There are obvious security constraints to what we can do, but it is nevertheless possible to provide an interesting programme (and we hope that in doing so the Soviets will reciprocate during a return visit.) A copy of the outline programme is attached.

You will note that the programme includes a call on the Foreign Secretary. I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would also wish to meet General Yazov, perhaps on 25th or 28th July.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Your sincerely,
Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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ANNEX A

OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR VISIT OF GEN YAZOV (PROVISIONAL)

25th July Tuesday

* 10.15	Arrive Heathrow
* 11.15	Guard of Honour at MOD
* 11.30-12.00	Tete a tete in MOD
12.15 for 12.45	Lunch at Lancaster House
14.00-16.00	Plenary talks at Lancaster House
16.00-17.00	Press Conference at Lancaster House (tbc)
17.30	Call on FCS

Evening social engagement in London

* Times could be earlier if Yazov arrives on 24th July

26th July Wednesday

08.00	Leave hotel
08.30	Leave Heathrow
10.00	Arrive RAF Leuchars
10.00-12.00	Tour and display
12.00	Depart Leuchars (Lunch on board)
13.00	Arrive Stornoway
13.15	Depart by helicopter for CVS at sea
13.45	Arrive CVS
13.45-15.45	Tour of ship
15.45	Depart CVS by helicopter
16.15	Arrive Stornoway
16.30	Depart Stornoway
17.15	Arrive Edinburgh airport
17.45	Hotel in Edinburgh
1930 for 2000.	Edinburgh Castle dinner hosted by GOC Scotland

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27th July Thursday

08.30 Depart Edinburgh
09.30 Arrive Heathrow
10.15 Arrive Aldershot (met by CINC UKLF)
10.30 - 12.45 Briefing and display at Parachute Regt Depot.
Opportunity to talk to officers and men and visit accommodation.
13.00 Arrive RMA Sandhurst
Lunch hosted by Commandant
14.30 Visit to Academy and cadets under training
16.30 Depart for London
Evening Soviet reception

28th July Friday

09.30 Final call on Secretary of State
10.30-11.30 Speech at Chatham House
12.00 Either Soviets depart for Moscow
Or lunch (at Royal Hospital?) and depart
1415

NB. Call on PM may need to be fitted in.

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Grey Scale #13



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

