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MR POWELL ✓

c Sir Robin Butler

THE SOVIET CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

The Congress of People's Deputies opened on 25 May in Moscow and is expected to finish today. It is a new body, created to further popular participation in the business of Government as part of Gorbachev's programme of political reform. Many of its 2,250 Deputies (of whom 2,155 are present) won their seats through genuinely competitive elections. The Congress has elected a Supreme Soviet of 542 deputies, which is expected to go into session as a permanently functioning body when the Congress ends.

2. Atmosphere The Congress has built on, and taken further, the atmosphere of unfettered debate introduced at the Party Conference in June/July 1988. From the first minutes it was clear that the Congress was not going to follow the traditional pedestrian scenario of previous Soviet "Parliaments". The first substantial speech from the floor was by Academician Sakharov, who challenged the official agenda. Thereafter virtually every official proposal has been challenged. Nationality issues have been debated, in the case of Armenia/Azerbaijan and the Tbilisi events, with bitterness. The entire proceedings have been shown live on Moscow's second television channel. (Gorbachev turned down a proposal in the course of the Congress that TV coverage should be abandoned as it was allegedly encouraging some Deputies to indulge in self-advertisement.) Gorbachev was prepared for all this; he has handled the debate with an adroit mixture of sympathy and firmness. He has insisted on the importance of procedural points, despite the impatience of many delegations. Here he has had to make up for a remarkable absence of detailed preparation for the Congress. Moreover, the technical arrangements have been scarcely adequate; much time has been lost through the laborious counting of heads and the failure to produce on time the necessary lists of those standing for elections.

3. The "Moscow Group". Much of the impulse for real debate has come from a loose grouping of Moscow radicals, including the former Moscow Party

leader, Eltsin, Academician Sakharov, the special investigator into corruption, Gdlyan (himself now under investigation) and a number of intellectuals (Gavriil Popov, a leading academic economist, Academician Zaslavskaya, the historians Yuri Afanasiev and Roi Medvedev and a young researcher, Stankevich, recently returned from studying US congressional practices). Their main aims have been: to enhance the status of the Congress, which will convene only occasionally, over that of the Supreme Soviet; to ensure that democratic procedures are established for the functioning of the Congress; and to ensure genuine elections to the Supreme Soviet and its Chairmanship. This group, together with well prepared Deputies from the Baltic Republics, have dominated the debate, but, to no one's surprise, lost the voting. They are a small minority in the Congress. They have managed, however, to muster some 400 votes for their procedural proposals, and a respectable 831 votes for a proposal to suspend for the duration of the Congress unpopular legislation from last year regulating the holding of public meetings.

4. Elections. The Congress had to elect a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, a new quasi-presidential office. There was never any doubt that Gorbachev would get the job, but the principle of competitive elections was established by an unknown Deputy putting himself forward as an alternative; and Gorbachev's election was not unanimous. In the debate preceding the election, Gorbachev was subjected to questioning about his country houses, his wife and, more substantially, the whole principle of combining Party and State office, to which he gave a spirited reply. Gorbachev's nominee for the post of First Deputy Chairman, Lukyanov, was similarly treated.

5. The elections to the Supreme Soviet were more contentious, largely because the amended Constitution stipulates that the Supreme Soviet's two chambers should reflect the balance of population and national minorities in the country, but gives no indication as to how this principle should be incorporated into practice. In the event, Deputies were, as expected, presented with a list of nominations exactly corresponding to the seats available. The Moscow group insisted that in areas affecting them, the lists should be extended so as to offer a genuine choice. But they paid the price: they themselves were largely voted out by what one of their number called "the aggressively subservient majority". The major casualty in this process was Eltsin, who, however, later gained a seat after an elected Deputy stepped

down in his favour, thus defusing a potentially ugly situation (there had been large demonstrations in favour of Eltsin in Moscow on Sunday). Time will show what role the new Supreme Soviet will play. Perhaps the most important fact is that as a body it will be loyal to Gorbachev and provide him with a counterweight to the Party and Government bureaucracy.

6. Set speeches. Two are on the agenda - Gorbachev's as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which he made yesterday, and Ryzhkov's as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, reporting to its superior organ - the Congress - which he will make today. First reports of Gorbachev's speech indicate that he took a line designed to strike a balance between traditionalists and reformers, as he has throughout the Congress. He will have pleased reformers by revealing a defence spending figure of 77 billion roubles, nearly four times the official figures hitherto (but about half what we and the CIA believe to be the real figure), and proposing its reduction. He also proposed a Commission to investigate excessive Party privilege. But he will also have pleased Party officials, now on the defensive after their electoral debacle in March, by calling for a postponement of the local elections, due in the Autumn, ostensibly because the legislation is not ready.

7. Interim Conclusions. A success for Gorbachev's "democratisation" programme and for Gorbachev himself. The further enhancement of his powers and his masterly performance at the Congress have already set him apart from and above the rest of the Politburo. The Congress so far has shown that debates in the embryonic Soviet Parliament can be as lively and disorderly as in any Western parliament. But there is a lack of any established procedural mechanism to focus and channel the debate. At the moment, Gorbachev's personal authority alone keeps the proceedings under control. The Constitutional relationship between the Congress and the Supreme Soviet has also been shown to be too vague, and will continue to be a source of friction. In the longer term, the question may well arise of how long the radical minority will maintain its enthusiasm for a system in which it has no prospect in the foreseeable future of winning the important votes.

PERCY CRADOCK

31 May 1989

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CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES: DAY 5: GORBACHEV'S REPORT: THE ECONOMY.

SUMMARY

1. BUDGET DEFICIT AND IMBALANCE IN THE CONSUMER MARKET STILL CAUSING SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND JUSTIFIABLE POPULAR DISCONTENT. BUT THERE COULD BE NO HOLDING BACK THE REFORM PROCESS. THE COUNTRY NEEDED A FULL BLOODED SOCIALIST MARKET. ITS MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT HAD BEEN DEVISED. BUT THE CHANGE COULD NOT BE MADE IN ONE GO. THE REAL FIGURE FOR MILITARY SPENDING IN 1989 WAS 77.3 BILLION ROUBLES.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV FINALLY DELIVERED HIS PRESIDENTIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 30 MAY. THIS TELEGRAM SETS OUT THE MAIN POINTS ON THE ECONOMY. HIS REMARKS ON POLITICAL REFORM, NATIONALITIES POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY ARE IN MIFTS. COMMENT FOLLOWS SEPARATELY.
3. GORBACHEV BEGAN BY SETTING OUT SOME OF THE ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF PERSTROIKA. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS WAS 15% UP ON THE LAST FIVE YEAR PLAN: DESPITE THE DIFFICULT FINANCIAL SITUATION AN EXTRA 12 MILLION ROUBLES HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR HEALTH AND EDUCATION. THERE HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE COMPLETION OF NEW MEDICAL CLINICS, KINDERGARTENS, HOSPITALS, ETC. THE SERVICES SECTOR WAS EXPANDING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF 15%. MORE THAN FIVE MILLION FAMILIES HAD RECEIVED PRIVATE PLOTS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS.
4. BUT PEOPLE WERE STILL NOT FEELING THE BENEFITS OF PERSTROIKA. THIS WAS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE DISTORTED FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE UNBALANCED CONSUMER MARKET. CONSUMER SHORTAGES WERE GIVING RISE TO STRONG AND LEGITIMATE DISCONTENT. THE STATE WAS CONTINUING TO LIVE BEYOND ITS MEANS. BUDGET EXPENDITURE WAS STILL GROWING FASTER THAN NATIONAL INCOME. THIS WAS SIMPLY IMPERMISSIBLE. IT WAS THE RESULT OF A SERIOUS MISCALCULATION FOR WHICH THE USSR MINISTRY OF FINANCE WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE. AN INDEPTH AND COMPETENT DISCUSSION OF

THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE CONGRESS.

5. THE MOST URGENT TASK WAS TO NORMALISE THE CONSUMER GOODS MARKET. THE CURRENT IMBALANCE WAS NULLIFYING ANY POSITIVE CHANGE WHICH HAD OCCURRED SO FAR UNDER PERESTROIKA. SOME PROPOSED SOLVING THE PROBLEM BY MOVING STRAIGHT TO A FULL MARKET ECONOMY. THE LEADERSHIP DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BRING ENORMOUS DISRUPTION. BUT THERE HAD TO BE A RAPID INCREASE IN THE OUTPUT OF CONSUMER GOODS. THE TASK THIS YEAR WAS TO INCREASE THEIR PRODUCTION BY 37 BILLION ROUBLES: ESTIMATES SUGGESTED THAT THIS INCREMENT SHOULD TOTAL 55-60 BILLION ROUBLES IN 1990. THE GOVERNMENT (IE PRESUMABLY RYZHKOV IN HIS SPEECH) SHOULD MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE SHORTAGE OF STAPLE GOODS AT THE CONGRESS. AN AUSTERITY BUDGET HAD TO BE DRAWN UP. THE CONGRESS SHOULD GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS. THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPORTS BOTH OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES AND TO REPLENISH THE CONSUMER MARKET SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

AGRICULTURE.

6. THE PROGRAMME FOR INCREASING FOOD OUTPUT WOULD NOT WORK WITHOUT A RADICAL REORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. BUT THOSE MANAGING FARMS WERE OBSTRUCTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEASE-HOLDING. THEY CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT THE WAY FORWARD WAS THROUGH INCREASED INVESTMENT. THE CONGRESS SHOULD DISCUSS WHAT MEASURES NEEDED TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF THE MARCH PLENUM JUST HANGING IN THE AIR. INDUSTRY SHOULD PRODUCE THE KIND OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY THAT WAS REALLY NEEDED BOTH BY FARMS AND LEASEHOLDERS AND AT REASONABLE PRICES.

SOCIAL ISSUES

7. DESPITE THE DIFFICULT FINANCIAL SITUATION URGENT MEASURES WERE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE MORE THAN 40 MILLION PEOPLE ON LOW-INCOME. A NEW PENSIONS LAW WAS BEING DRAFTED: SUCH AN IMPORTANT LAW SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE CONGRESS. PRIORITY MUST ALSO BE GIVEN TO IMPROVING MEDICAL SERVICES AND TO THE ENVIRONMENT., THE QUANTITY OF HARMFUL SUBSTANCES IN THE ATMOSPHERE EXCEEDED PERMISSIBLE LEVELS IN A 100 OR MORE CITIES. PROJECTS FOR BUILDING CANALS, ATOMIC POWER STATIONS AND CHEMICAL ENTERPRISES HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SHARP DISCUSSION DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSIONS MUST URGENTLY DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS, THE COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE EVERY FAMILY WITH A SEPARATE FLAT BY THE END OF THE CENTURY HAD TO BE MET. THE SUPREME SOVIET SHOULD HAVE STANDING COMMISSIONS TO DEAL WITH THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND OF WOMEN.

PRIVILEGES

8. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE HAD TO REMAIN A PRIORITY. THE SYSTEM OF PRIVILEGES - BE IT DIFFERENTIAL PENSIONS, FREE HOLIDAYS, SPECIAL MEDICAL SERVICES OR HOUSING, AND OTHER MATERIAL AND CULTURAL BENEFITS - ALLOCATED TO DIFFERENT SOCIAL, AND PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, HAD TAKEN SHAPE OVER MANY YEARS. THE PURPOSE OF THESE BENEFITS HAD TO BE TO STIMULATE TALENT AND TO HELP THOSE GROUPS OF THE POPULATION THAT NEEDED IT. ABERRATIONS HAD TO BE ERADICATED. THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT ON ALL BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES ON THE BASIS OF THIS CRITERIA.

REDISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

9. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THERE HAD TO BE A SHARP REDUCTION IN OUTLAYS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. CUTS OF DIFFERENT LEVELS WERE BEING SUGGESTED - FROM SMALL TO TENS OF PERCENT. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE ITS PROPOSALS FOR SUCH CUTS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET WHERE THEY SHOULD BE STUDIED.

DEFENCE SPENDING

10. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO REDUCE MILITARY EXPENDITURE WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCE CAPABILITY. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS MILITARY SPENDING HAD BEEN FROZEN. THIS HAD SAVED TEN BILLION ROUBLES. THE REAL FIGURE FOR MILITARY SPENDING IN 1989 WAS 77.3 BILLION ROUBLES. THE CONGRESS WOULD BE INVITED TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER CUTS IN THE 1990/91 MILITARY BUDGET OF TEN BILLION ROUBLES OR 14%. THERE HAD BEEN SOME REDUCTION IN SPENDING ON SPACE PROGRAMMES: BUT SPACE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES WERE BENEFITTING THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. THERE HAD TO BE AN END TO THE UNNECESSARY SECRECY - THE 'INTERNAL COCOM' WHICH AFFECTED THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIES.

THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME

11. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND WITH EXPERTS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF REFORM. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE STRATEGY WAS RIGHT. BUT THERE HAD BEEN INCONSISTENCY AND FOOT DRAGGING IN IMPLEMENTATION. THERE WAS A VIEW DEVELOPING THAT THE REFORM WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND THAT THE PROCESS SHOULD THEREFORE BE SLOWED. THIS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THE WAY FORWARD WAS THROUGH CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM PROGRAMME. BUT THE PROGRAMME COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AT ONE GO. THERE HAD TO BE A CONSISTENT PROCESS OF DEVELOPING AND MODIFYING PLANNING METHODS, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, PRICES, TAXATION,

THE WAGES SYSTEM AND ALL OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. MUCH OF THIS IN GORBACHEV'S VIEW COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE OUTSET OF THE 13TH FIVE YEAR PLAN (I.E. BEFORE 1991)

12. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT REFORM WAS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT A RADICAL REVISION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIST PROPERTY. THE ONLY CONDITION WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXPLOITATION OF THE WORKERS AND NO ALIENATION FROM THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION. THE CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE TO PROPERTY ALSO REQUIRED THE CREATION OF A FULL-BLOODED SOCIALIST MARKET. THE MARKET WAS NOT OMNIPOTENT: BUT A MORE EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC MECHANISM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN DEvised. THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED.

13. A SPECIAL GOVERNMENT BODY TO COORDINATE AND OVERSEE THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORM SHOULD BE CREATED AND HEADED BY A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. THE SUPREME SOVIET SHOULD ALSO HAVE APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS,

14. SEE MIFTS.

BRAITHWAITE

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MIPT 934: SOVIET UNION: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES: DAY 5:
GORBACHEV'S SPEECH: FOREIGN POLICY.

SUMMARY

1. THE MAIN THRUST OF SOVIET POLICY EXPANDED IN FAMILIAR TERMS. FURTHER DETAILS ON ROLE OF SUPREME SOVIET AND THE CONGRESS WILL PLAY IN FORMING POLICY.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV DEVOTED A RELATIVELY SHORT SECTION OF HIS SPEECH TO FOREIGN POLICY. HE BEGAN WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF NEW THINKING. ITS ACHIEVEMENTS WERE LISTED. UNUSUALLY HE COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THERE WERE STILL HANGOVERS FROM THE PAST AND QUOTE THEREFORE WE CAN NOT DENY OURSELVES AN ARMY AND ABANDON WEAPONS. THE SAME GOES FOR MILITARY ALLIANCES, WHOSE PRESERVATION DOES NOT DEPEND ON US ALONE UNQUOTE.

3. GORBACHEV SAID THAT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS DIRECTED TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. HE AGAIN GAVE PRIMACY TO RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA WAS AN EVENT OF WORLD SIGNIFICANCE. THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN FORMING A NEW TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH STEMMED FROM THE COMPLEX PROCESSES UNDERWAY IN THE DIFFERENT STATES. THIS COULD BE OVERCOME BY MUTUAL RESPECT, NON INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S AFFAIRS, DEEP INTEREST IN THE EXPERIENCE OF EACH AND A READINESS FOR COMMON TOLERANT WORK.

4. GORBACHEV TALKED IN VAGUE TERMS ABOUT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE, AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE QUOTE VLADIVOSTOCK LINE UNQUOTE AND ASIA-PACIFIC AFFAIRS. THERE WERE LOWER KEY REFERENCES TO RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA.

5. GORBACHEV OUTLINED FIVE QUOTE THESES UNQUOTE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. FIRST, NATIONAL SECURITY SHOULD BE GUARANTEED PRIMARILY BY POLITICAL MEANS. SECOND, NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE REDUCED AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DEFENSIVE

POTENTIAL OF STATES TO LIMITS OF REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY. THIRD, THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES WAS UNACCEPTABLE: SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY HAD TO BE RESPECTED. FOURTH, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY DIALOGUE BASED ON THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS. FIFTH, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WANTED TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN WITH ALL THE WORLD ON A BASIS WHICH WAS MUTUALLY PROFITABLE AND EQUAL: THEY WOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN DRAWING UP AND ABSOLVING THE REGULATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR, OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AND OPPORTUNITY.

6. GORBACHEV SAID THAT IN THE PAST, THE PRACTICE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HAD RUN COUNTER TO THE QUOTE HIGH PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY UNQUOTE. VARIOUS ACTIONS HAD BEEN COMMITTED WHICH HAD MEANT A SERIOUS LOSS TO THE COUNTRY. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF THE COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT TASKS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL REFORM WAS TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING AGAIN. IN FUTURE, ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY WOULD ONLY BE TAKEN AFTER THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS COMMISSIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE, FOR EXAMPLE DECISIONS ON RELATIONS WITH ALLIES OR THE CONCLUSION OF TREATIES, SHOULD ALSO BE PRESENTED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES. THESE REMARKS WERE GREETED WITH APPLAUSE.

7. GORBACHEV EXPLAINED THAT THE CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL BY THE CONGRESS OF THESE IDEAS WAS NOT ONLY LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT BUT ALSO POLITICALLY. QUOTE FAR FROM EVERYBODY IN THE WEST BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE CHOSEN THIS COURSE FOR EVER AND DO NOT INTEND TO CHANGE IT. EVEN HERE, THERE ARE STILL PEOPLE WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE FUNDAMENTAL ESSENCE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. SOME PEOPLE REGARD IT AS A TACTIC, A TEMPORARY ZIG-ZAG OR EVEN AS A CONCESSION TO THE WEST. I THEREFORE WANT TO UNDERLINE THAT THIS IS OUR DEEPLY ROOTED STRATEGIC LINE, EXPRESSING THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, AND WE BELIEVE MEETING THE INTERESTS OF MANKIND. UNQUOTE..

BRAITHWAITE

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MY I.P.T AND MY TELEGRAM 910: EXPULSIONS: SOVIET ATTITUDES AND OUR
NEXT STEPS

SUMMARY

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S RESPONSE TO OUR FIRST REACTION TO THEIR
PROPOSED CEILING, AND USPENSKYS COMMENTS, SHOW THAT THEY WANT TO PLAY
THIS AFFAIR AS COOLLY AS POSSIBLE. THEY SAY THAT THEIR REACTION TO
OUR EXPULSIONS WAS INEVITABLE, GIVEN THE DELICACY OF THE INTERNAL
SITUATION HERE, AND THE NEED TO PRESERVE THEIR "INTERNATIONAL SELF
RESPECT." THEY HAVE MADE NO FURTHER THREATS. USPENSKY SAID
EXPLICITLY THAT THE MFA DID NOT WANT TO MAKE LIFE UNNECESSARILY
DIFFICULT FOR THIS EMBASSY, AND THAT THEY WILL GIVE US TIME TO SORT
OURSELVES OUT. THIS INCREASES OUR ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN THE NEXT
STAGE.

DETAIL

2. OUR OFFICIAL CONTACTS ARE SHOWING THEMSELVES MORE THAN ANXIOUS TO
CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL. THEY REGRET THE ROW. MANY OF THEM
EXPRESS SYMPATHY FOR THE BRITISH VICTIMS, AND SHOW NO DISPOSITION TO
BELIEVE THE ACCUSATIONS LEVELLED AGAINST THEM. NOR - APART FROM THE
MFA OFFICIALS WHOSE DUTY IT IS - DO THEY CRITICISE OUR EXPULSION OF
SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM LONDON. THEY KNOW, ONLY TOO WELL, THAT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REMAIN GROSSLY
INFLATED AND ARE INADEQUATELY CONTROLLED. THEY DOUBTLESS HOPE THAT
THE FURTHER "DEMOCRATISATION" OF SOVIET SOCIETY WILL CHANGE THIS
IN TIME: A PROPOSAL FOR A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE
SECURITY AGENCIES HAS JUST BEEN PUT TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES'
DEPUTIES. USPENSKY HINTED AS MUCH TO ME.
3. OUR UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS EXPRESS THESE THOUGHTS MORE OPENLY. THEY
REMAIN PERFECTLY WILLING TO SEE US.
4. THOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS NATURALLY VERY SCANTY, THERE ARE EVIDENTLY
CONFLICTING INTERESTS AMONG THE SOVIET POLITICIANS AND AGENCIES
INVOLVED:

GORBACHEV

5. HIS OVERRIDING AIM IS TO REMAIN IN POWER AND TO CARRY THROUGH HIS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. HE FACES INERTIA AND OPPOSITION. HE DOES NOT NEED NEW DOMESTIC ENEMIES. HE SEEMS THEREFORE FROM THE BEGINNING TO HAVE STRUCK AN IMPLICIT BARGAIN WITH THE KGB: THEY CAN CONTINUE, OR EVEN EXPAND THEIR OPERATIONS ABROAD; HE WILL REACT DECISIVELY AGAINST RETALIATION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WHEN THEY ARE CAUGHT. IN RETURN THE DAMAGE TO HIS FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE CONTAINED, AND THEY MUST BEHAVE THEMSELVES AT HOME. HENCE HIS RESPONSE TO THE US, CANADIAN AND JAPANESE EXPULSIONS.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MAY WELL BE RIGHT IN HINTING THAT OUR ACTION CAME AT A DOMESTICALLY EMBARRASSING TIME FOR GORBACHEV. HE IS RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF A DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPEHAVAL, FROM WHICH HE NEEDS AS LITTLE DISTRACTION AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR HIM TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE WHY THEIR COUNTRY IN NOW IN A MAJOR PUBLIC ROW WITH BRITAIN AND MRS THATCHER, FOR WHOM HE AND THEY HAVE THE GREATEST ESTEEM. HE MAY ON THE OTHER HAND, THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT, THESE DAYS, BE GETTING ITSELF INTO THIS KIND OF SCRAPE. THIS MAY LIE BEHIND THE LOW-KEY AND INTERROGATIVE ATTITUDE OF HIS CLOSE DIPLOMATIC ADVISER CHERNYAYEV (WHO MAY HIMSELF BE A CLOSET LIBERAL) WHEN I SAW HIM ON 19 MAY. CERTAINLY THE DAMAGE LIMITATION IN WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED MUST HAVE BEEN ENDORSED BY GORBACHEV HIMSELF.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

7. UNDER SHEVARDNAZE, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE A LIBERALISING FORCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS AS WELL AS INCOMPARABLY MORE SKILFUL THAN IN THE PAST IN PROMOTING SOVIET INTERESTS ABROAD. ROWS PROVOKED BY THE KGB ABROAD SERVE NEITHER OF THESE INTERESTS. ALL THE OFFICIALS WE HAVE SO FAR DEALT WITH (EXCEPT THOSE WE SUSPECT COME FROM THE KGB ANYWAY) HAVE SHOWN VARYING DEGREES OF REGRET AND EMBARRASSMENT. USPENSKY AND OTHERS WHO HAVE INVESTED PERSONAL CAPITAL IN A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN MAY FEEL PERSONALLY EXPOSED. BUT THEY ARE AT PRESENT USING THEIR LINKS WITH THIS EMBASSY - AND PRESUMABLY THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE REST OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY - TO MANAGE THE FALL OUT, AS BEST THEY CAN.

THE KGB

8. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, NO EVIDENCE OF KGB ATTITUDES. THEY (AND ESPECIALLY THEIR DIRECT PREDECESSORS THE NKVD) ARE NOWADAYS SUBJECT TO INCREASING PUBLIC CRITICISM, WHICH MUST LEAVE THEM MORE THAN USUALLY ANXIOUS TO DEFEND THEIR POSITION. THEY HAVE AN OBVIOUS INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THEIR OPERATIONS AND STAFF AT HOME AND ABROAD. THEY DOUBTLESS ARGUE THAT THE FOREIGN TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE THEY PRODUCE IS VITAL TO A SOVIET ECONOMY IN DESPERATE NEED OF REFORM. THEY MAY ARGUE THAT THE FOREIGN MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE MANACE IS AS GREAT AS EVER, THOUGH THIS RUNS COUNTER TO GORBACHEV'S OWN PUBLIC POLICY. THEY CONSTITUTE, IN ANY CASE, A MENACE TO GORBACHEV OR ANY OTHER LEADER, IF ONLY BECAUSE THEY COULD BACK A RIVAL. THESE MAY BE REASONS WHY GORBACHEV WOULD LIKE TO CUT THEM BACK. THEY ARE ALSO REASONS WHY HE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DO SO. BUT NOW THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE MADE THEIR INITIAL COUNTERSTRIKE THE KGB DO NOT AT PRESENT SEEM TO BE CALLING THE SHOTS IN THE PRESENT AFFAIR. IN EARLIER ROWS THEY WOULD HAVE DETERRED OUR CONTACTS FROM SEEING US, AND THEIR PATHETIC "EVIDENCE" AGAINST THE BRITISH JOURNALISTS WOULD HAVE BLOWN UP IN THE SOVIET PRESS, WHICH AS FAR AS I KNOW IT HAS NOT. THESE ARE SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SIGNS.

Conkbe
his
UK
counterpart

NEXT STEPS.

9. WE HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES: TO CONTINUE THE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO REDUCE THEIR INTELLIGENCE EFFORT IN BRITAIN: AND TO LIMIT THE ~~DAMAGE~~ TO THIS EMBASSY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" MEANS THAT THE BROADER RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT NOW BE MUCH AFFECTED.

10. ON THE FIRST, THE RUSSIANS ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONTROL THEIR AGENTS. OUR ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS, AND THEY KNOW WE WILL ACT AGAIN IF NECESSARY. WE SHOULD REPEAT THIS EXPLICITLY FROM TIME TO TIME AS I DID YESTERDAY WITH USPENSKY. BUT WE NEED NOT TO RUB THEIR NOSES IN IT. IN THE LONGER RUN, THERE MAY WELL BE SCOPE FOR A BROADER BRASCH DISCUSSION BETWEEN OFFICIALS OR EVEN BETWEEN MINISTERS. BUT THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS THE RUSSIANS WHO HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY: AND IT MAY BE SOME TIME, IF EVER, BEFORE DOMESTIC SOVIET POLITICS MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.

11. ON THE SECOND, I SHALL BE MAKING PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY EARLY TELEGRAM. BROADLY SPEAKING, OUR AIMS MUST BE
A) TO PRESERVE AS MUCH OF THIS EMBASSY'S PRESENT ACTIVITIES AS POSSIBLE, AND TO KEEP OPEN THE PROSPECT OF EXPANSION IF FEASIBLE.
B) TO AVOID LETTING THE RUSSIANS PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH BRITISH PRIVATE INTERESTS IN MOSCOW.

12. THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER THREATENING TO WITHDRAW THE SOVIET STAFF OF BRITISH PRIVATE INTERESTS. THIS MEANS THAT, IF THE SIZE OF THE EXPATRIATE STAFFS OF THE EMBASSY AND THE REST REMAIN UNCHANGED, THE CHIEF EFFECT OF THE SOVIET MOVE WOULD BE TO CUT THE EMBASSY'S LOCAL STAFF FROM ABOUT 100 TO ABOUT 60. (I DO NOT HAVE OUR EXACT FIGURES AVAILABLE: AND DEFINITIONS ARE VAGUE, WHICH GIVES US USEFUL ROOM FOR ARGUMENT). WE HAVE BEGUN TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS IN DETAIL.

13. ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE INTERESTS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY AFFECTED, A NUMBER OF FIRMS WISH TO SET UP HERE. THEY WILL BE TOLD BY THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY CAN HAVE VISAS FOR THEIR EXPATRIATES PROVIDED THE EMBASSY GIVES UP A SLOT. WE SHALL HAVE TO TELL BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE PRIVATE BRITISH INTERESTS THAT WE NEED AN EMBASSY OF A DEFINED SIZE: AND THAT THEY MUST SORT THE REST OUT THEMSELVES. THE RUSSIANS, TOO, WILL BE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO FIND WAYS ROUND THEIR OWN OBSTACLES. HERE AGAIN, LACK OF CLARITY WILL BE USEFUL.

13. AS FOR THE NEXT ROUND, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT I SHOULD GO BACK TO USPENSKY NEXT WEEK WITH YOUR INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IN ORDER TO KEEP THE POT BOILING: BUT THAT A MORE SPECIFIC APPROACH (WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE DISCUSSION OF FIGURES) SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL YOU AND WE HAVE HAD TIME TO WORK OUT ALL THE IMPLICATIONS IN DETAIL.

BRAITHWAITE

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SVLWAN 2923

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*Can be
his
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(countermeasures)*

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 909
OF 270545Z MAY 89

FCO TELS 687 AND 688, AND MY TELNO 906.
EXPULSIONS/BILATERAL RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE TRANSMITTED THROUGH FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV. HE:
 - A. SPEAKS OF THE LEADERSHIP'S CONCERN TO PROTECT THEIR DIGNITY AT A SENSITIVE TIME.
 - B. ACKNOWLEDGES BRITISH SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA.
 - C. WARMLY RECIPROCATES THE INTENTION OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL.
 - D. WILL IF POSSIBLE TRY TO ARRANGE THE ''SYMBOLIC GESTURE'' OF A MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE.
 - E. MAKES A PITCH FOR IMPROVED CONDITIONS FOR THE RUSSIANS IN LONDON.

DETAIL

2. SHEVARDNADZE INSTRUCTED KOVALEV TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE FROM ME ON THE EVENING OF 26 MAY. SHEVARDNADZE IS GENUINELY TIED UP WITH THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES. BUT IS ALSO BECAME CLEAR THAT KOVALEV WISHED TO VET MY DEMARCHE BEFORE EXPOSING HIS MINISTER. FRIGIDITY COMES NATURALLY TO KOVALEV. ON THIS OCCASION, HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO BE WARM FROM THE BEGINNING.
3. HANDING OVER YOUR MESSAGE (WITH THE AMENDMENT IN MY TUR), I SAID THAT YOU VALUED YOUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND HAD THEREFORE INSTRUCTED ME TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO HIM. I EMPHASISED THREE POINTS
 - YOUR AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA, A PROCESS WHICH WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION BUT FOR THE WORLD. YOU WOULD BE FOLLOWING THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST.
 - OUR INTENTION TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL, WHICH WE THOUGHT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RECIPROCATED. I GAVE EXAMPLES.
 - OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT A RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE MOSCOW CEILING. THE DETAILS WERE OF COURSE NOT A MATTER FOR MINISTERS.
4. I SAID THIS WAS THE POLITICAL MESSAGE I HAD TO CONVEY FROM YOU TO SHEVARDNADZE, WHOM I WISHED TO SEE, HOWEVER BRIEFLY.
5. KOVALEV SHOWED SOME RELIEF THAT I HAD NO RABBITS UP MY SLEEVE.

HE ACCEPTED AND WOULD REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT YOUR ATTITUDE TO PERESTROIKA. HE HAPPILY REPEATED THAT BUSINESS AS USUAL WAS ALSO THE SOVIET APPROACH. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT INITIATED THIS EPISODE, BUT ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS HAD PLAYED THE PART OF THE 'REACTING SIDE.' WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 'DOSTOINSTVO' (DIGNITY/SELF-RESPECT) AND PRESTIGE OF THE SOVIET SIDE, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME LIKE THIS (REFERRING TO THE CONGRESS).

6. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE KOVALEV:

- SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY SOVIET HANDLING OF THE BRITISH JOURNALISTS.
- COMPLAINED VIGOROUSLY ABOUT THE VERY DIFFICULT WORKING CONDITIONS, UNDER THE LIMITS OF OUR CEILING, OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON.
- LOOKED AHEAD TO FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND 2ND EUROPEAN DEPT, BUT URGED US TO THINK OF SOLUTIONS TO THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE PROBLEM.

7. HAVING READ YOUR MESSAGE, KOVALEV ACKNOWLEDGED THE 'SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE' OF A MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TO EXPRESS THE 'WILL OF OUR POLITICAL LEADERS.' SHEVARDNADZE WAS EXTREMELY BUSY, BUT KOVALEV WOULD RECOMMEND THAT HE SEE ME. HE DID NOT KNOW IF EVEN TEN MINUTES WOULD BE POSSIBLE. IF NOT, THIS WOULD SIMPLY BE THE RESULT OF SHEVARDNADZE'S TIMETABLE.

8. IN CONCLUSION, I REMINDED KOVALEV THAT FOR US IT WAS A MATTER NOT ONLY OF SELF-RESPECT BUT OF SECURITY. WE WOULD NOT COMPROMISE ON OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY.

COMMENT

9. WHETHER OR NOT I GET TO SEE SHEVARDNADZE, THIS MEETING HAS SERVED THE INTENDED PURPOSE. THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE FEELING KOVALEV WISHED TO CONVEY. HE IN TURN DID NOT QUESTION BRITISH MOTIVES AND WILL CONVEY THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO THE LEADERSHIP. IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER TWISTS IN THE PUBLIC ARENA, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ON THE WAY TO CONTAINING THE QUESTION OF SECURITY AND SOVIET MISBEHAVIOUR, AND TO ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THAT DISCUSSION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT IN ITS OWN RIGHT. WE SHALL KNOW MORE WHEN THE RUSSIANS REPLY TO SIR J FRETWELL'S DEMARCHE, PERHAPS EARLY NEXT WEEK.

BRAITHWAITE

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification RESTRICTED	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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CAVEAT
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TO
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OF
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1 ZCZC
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8

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T102/89
SUBJECT cc Mather
OPS

9
10
11 YOUR TELNO 899: CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES
12 1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
13 PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ASAP. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
14 2. TEXT BEGINS
15 I SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION AS
16 CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH
17 CLOSE ATTENTION THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S
18 DEPUTIES, WHICH IS CLEARLY A VITAL LANDMARK IN YOUR PROGRAMME
19 OF PERESTROIKA AND DEMOCRATISATION. AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR
20 DISCUSSIONS DURING YOUR VISIT TO LONDON IN APRIL, THIS IS A
21 MATTER OF VERY DEEP INTEREST TO ALL OF US HERE. ONCE AGAIN I
22 OFFER MY SUPPORT FOR THESE HISTORIC CHANGES. MARGARET THATCHER.
23 TEXT ENDS.
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MAIN
ADDITIONAL
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Mr. Poyser



~~Do you
Please let
me know
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offer
is~~

Mr Kinnoch's office will contact
PS/S of S if Mr Kinnoch wishes
to publicise the exchange (para 3).
Press Offices are under instruction

With the compliments of
not to release details until

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

they hear further.

Resident Clerks
26/5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Rt Hon Neil Kinnock, MP
2A Clovelly Road
London
W5


26 May 1989

Dear Mr Kinnock

Thank you for your letter of 26 May about a story in the media suggesting that the Soviet nationals whose expulsion we have ordered were subjecting Labour MPs to blackmail.


This story, about the reasons for the expulsion of the Soviet nationals in question, owes nothing to any official briefing. I can assure you that there has been no suggestion of any association of Labour MPs in the activities for which the Soviet diplomats and other Soviet nationals are being expelled.

You wrote to me in Privy Councillor terms and this reply therefore comes to you on the same basis. But I should have no objection if you wished to publicise this exchange.

Yours sincerely


F Gordon, Resident Clerk

Approved by the Foreign
Secretary and signed in
his absence from London.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Office of the
Leader of The Opposition

26 May 1989

IN CONFIDENCE

Dear Sir Geoffrey

I understand that on the BBC's Nine O'Clock News last night, John Sergeant reported that senior British sources were briefing to the effect that one main reason for the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from Britain was that Labour Members of Parliament were under threat of blackmail.


I am writing strictly on Privy Council terms to ask you what - if anything - is the basis of these reports.

It has been the long-standing practice that the relevant Party Leader is informed if allegations of this kind are made but, as you will know, I have received no information of any kind about this matter from your Department, from the Security Services or from any other source.

I do think that I should at the very least be given the necessary background information and I am sure that, on reflection, you will agree.

I will, of course, provide any co-operation that is appropriate in these matters.

Yours sincerely

PP 

RT HON NEIL KINNOCK MP
(Dictated by Mr Kinnock but signed in his absence)

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

PRIME MINISTER FROM DUTY CLERK

Charles C

per cabinet.

Sent 2205.

Letter

2615.

I have had a word with Charles about the attached proposed message.

He thinks that it is well worth sending in the present difficult climate and that it says the right things.

Content?

26 May, 1989.

29a-5

D103
No 104
File 1

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LNCYAN 6891 SVLNAN 2707
SECRET
OO CAOFP
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN
241739Z MAY
GRS 565

SECRET
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 241800Z FCO
TELNO 873
OF 241739Z MAY 89

PERSONAL FOR RATFORD (AUSS)
MIPT: CEILINGS: COMMENTS

1. KRASNOV HAS GIVEN US A VERY USEFUL - AND DELIBERATE - ATMOSPHERIC READING. I DO NOT THINK HE WAS PLAYING GAMES. RUSSIANS ARE TEMPERAMENTALLY PRONE TO SEE CONSPIRACIES, EVEN WHERE NONE EXIST, AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT. NEVERTHELESS, THE MFA'S LINE, AS EXPRESSED BY KRASNOV IS CREDIBLE: I.E. THAT THERE IS A RISK OF SETTING OFF THE BOX OF FIREWORKS, AND THAT THEY GENUINELY DO NOT WANT THIS. THERE WAS NO HINT OF THREAT OR BLUSTER IN KRASNOV'S TONE AND HE IS ALWAYS HAPPY TO BLUSTER IF HE THINKS (USUALLY WRONGLY) THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE.
2. THE SUBJECT DIVIDES INTO TWO PARTS:

A) POLITICAL/BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

3. IF WE CAN TURN DOWN THE PUBLICITY NOW, I DO NOT THINK THAT LASTING AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE WILL HAVE BEEN DONE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO GET THE RIGHT MESSAGE. IT IS NO SURPRISE TO HEAR (IMPLICITLY, FROM KRASNOV) THAT CERTAIN QUARTERS MAY BE TELLING GORBACHEV THAT HE WAS CONNED IN LONDON AND THAT WE HAVE A CUNNING "CAMPAIGN" UNDERWAY. WE ANTICIPATED THIS, AND TRIED TO HEAD IT OFF. WE NEED TO DO MORE.
4. I THEREFORE THINK THAT I SHOULD SEE CHERNYAYEV (OR FAILING THAT, SHEVARDNADZE) SOON. WE CAN KEEP THE KOSSOV CARD IN RESERVE. IN ESSENCE, THE MFA APPEAR TO BE SUING FOR PEACE. THE PROOF OF THIS WILL LIE IN THE WAY THEY NEGOTIATE THE CEILING. BUT IN THE MEANTIME, GORBACHEV MAY WELL BE HAVING ANOTHER FIT OF NERVES ABOUT THE REAL WESTERN ATTITUDE TO PERESTROIKA, SUCH AS HE HAD AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL.

5. TO SEE EITHER SENIOR INTERLOCUTOR, I ~~SHOULD~~ NEED MORE SUBSTANTIVE INSTRUCTIONS THAN PARA 3 OF FCO TELNO 8660. I AM NOT PROPOSING ANOTHER WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER: TOO SOON, NOT HER TURN, WRONG TONE. BUT I NEED SPECIFIC ORAL INSTRUCTIONS ENDORSED BY THE PM (FOR CHERNYAYEV) OR THE S OF S (FOR SHEVARDNADZE). IF I HAD A WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SHEVARDNADZE, IT SHOULD BE BRIEF AND SHOULD LEAVE THE SUBSTANCE FOR MY ORAL POINTS ('THE AMBASSADOR WILL EXPLAIN TO YOU...').

6. THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO RUN AFTER THE RUSSIANS. THEY ARE AT THE MOMENT COMING TO US: WITH THE MESSAGE THAT THEY WANT TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE AND DO NOT WANT TO FREEZE THE RELATIONSHIP. TACTICALLY, THOUGH PERHAPS ONLY FOR THE TIME BEING, THEY ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE WANTED, AND WE SHOULD RESPOND WITH A POLITICAL MESSAGE TO REINFORCE THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING THEM FOR A RIDE. IT COULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO CONCRETE POLITICAL ISSUES, AND NEED NOT REFER IN ANY DETAIL TO THE CEILING QUESTION.

B) CEILINGS

7. I SUGGEST THAT THE STRATEGY SHOULD BE TO:

(A) LET THE DUST SETTLE. WITH LUCK, THE MFA WILL TAKE SOME TIME OVER THEIR REPLY. WE SHOULD THEN MOVE DELIBERATELY, BUT WITHOUT GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE MERELY STALLING.

(B) AIM TO DIVIDE THE MFA FROM THE KGB/UPDK, AND TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH THE FORMER

(C) PREPARE A DETAILED LIST OF GENUINE ASYMMETRIES, QUANTIFIED WHERE POSSIBLE, TO DEPLOY IN NEGOTIATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS LOCAL STAFF. YOU WILL WISH TO BUTTRESS WITH DETAILED EVIDENCE THE FIGURE OF 400 DEPLOYED BY YOU TO GOOD EFFECT. WE SHOULD NOT THROW NUMBERS ABOUT IN PUBLIC FOR FEAR OF ENTRENCHING POSITIONS.

8. I SHALL SEND SEPARATELY FURTHER THOUGHTS ON DETAILED NEGOTIATING POINTS.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SVLNAN 2707

NNNN

SECRET
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 241745Z FCO
TELNO 872
OF 241721Z MAY 89

28a-c
Pl. file

PERSONAL FOR RATFORD (AUSS)
MY TELNO 867: CEILING: MEETING WITH MFA

SUMMARY

1. SPEAKING "OFF THE RECORD," BUT CLEARLY ON INSTRUCTIONS, KRASNOV (MFA) EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AND UNDERLINES THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO KEEP THE CURRENT EXERCISE WITHIN ITS CONFINES. THE RUSSIANS ARE NERVOUS ABOUT FURTHER RETALIATION BY US, AND WISH TO NEGOTIATE ON THE CEILING, BUT CANNOT CLIMB DOWN FROM WHAT THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE KEY LIES IN THE FINE PRINT.

DETAIL

2. DURING THE MEETING REPORTED IN TUR KRASNOV ASKED TO SPEAK PRIVATELY TO THE H^{OF C.} THE PRIVATE DISCUSSION LASTED HALF AN HOUR, OFF THE RECORD, WITHOUT NOTES. KRASNOV SPOKE WITH PASSION AND APPARENT SINCERITY, AND WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. HE WAS CLEARLY SPEAKING TO INSTRUCTIONS.

3. KRASNOV BEGAN BY SAYING THAT GORBACHEV SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ACTED IN THIS WAY. GORBACHEV WAS ASKING WHY SHE HAD CHOSEN THIS TIME TO LAUNCH A "CAMPAIGN": AND WHY SHE HAD NOT RAISED THE MATTER WITH HIM PERSONALLY IN LONDON. WHAT DID THIS MEAN FOR THEIR "PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP." WERE WE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS? KRASNOV SAID SOME PEOPLE WERE INTERPRETING THE BRITISH ACITON IN A MUCH WIDER CONTEXT: AND MORE IN THAT VEIN.

4. LYNE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN ENTIRELY MISTAKEN READING. HE COULD NOT SAY WHY THE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN NOW, EXCEPT THAT THERE WAS NEVER A RIGHT TIME FOR SUCH THINGS AND THAT IT HAD ITS OWN DYNAMIC. BUT HE COULD SAY THAT WE HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO LIMIT THE AFFAIR TO THE NARROW FIELD OF SECURITY - AND THAT THE TIMING HAD NOT BEEN DICTATED BY ANY ULTERIOR MOTIVE. FAR FROM SEEKING TO DAMAGE THE PERSONAL OR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO EXPLAIN IN HER PRIVATE LETTER TO GORBACHEV WHY SHE WAS OBLIGED TO ACT AND IN WHAT CONTEXT. LYNE TOOK KRASNOV IN DETAIL THROUGH THE EVIDENCE: THE PERSONAL LETTER, MY MEETING WITH CHERNYAYEV, THE DECISION NOT TO PUBLICISE THE EXPULSIONS WHICH HAD LEAD TO DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S SILENCE), THE RATCHET, AND OUT GENERAL POLICY STANCE. THERE WAS NO CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER POLICY OR EVENT. IT WAS EMPHATICALLY NOT OUR INTENTION TO DAMAGE GORBACHEV'S STANDING OR PERESTROIKA. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON PERESTROIKA HAD BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR. THERE WAS NO "CAMPAIGN."

5. KRASNOV SUGGESTED THAT BRITISH PUBLICITY WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS. HE REFERRED TO STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO MY BRIEFING OF JOURNALISTS ON 21 MAY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I HAD FOREARNED USPENSKY OF THE LATTER, BUT SAID USPENSKY HAD BEEN VERY UPSET.

6. LYNE MADE THE OBVIOUS POINTS IN REPLY. WE HAD NOT ONLY INTENDED TO AVOID PUBLICITY, BUT HAD SUCCEEDED UNTIL OUR HAND WAS FORCED BY THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE. EVEN THEN, WE HAD ONLY GIVEN OUT THE BARE FACTS. HE DREW A CONTRAST WITH PREVIOUS EPISODES. ²⁸ ⁶ ~~ONCE~~ THE NEWS HAD BECOME PUBLIC, SOME COMMENT WAS INEVITABLE. IT HAD COME FROM BOTH SIDES (INCLUDING GERASIMOV, WHO HAD STIRRED THE POT WITH HIS INACCURATE AND ALARMIST BRIEFING ON MONDAY). MINISTERS COULD NOT THEN AVOID REPLYING TO QUESTIONS AND CRITICISM EG IN PARLIAMENT. BUT WE WERE NOT FANNING THE FLAMES, AND HAD UNDERLINED OUR DETERMINATION TO DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING NATIONAL SECURITY.

7. LYNE SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST COURSE WAS TO ALLOW THE DUST TO SETTLE, AND THEN DEAL CALMLY AND RATIONALLY WITH THE ISSUE OF CEILINGS. POLEMICS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ACCIDENTALLY TO SET OFF A CHAIN REACTION. WE ASSUMED THIS WAS THE INTENTION ALSO OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IF SOME ON THE SOVIET SIDE PRODUCED A DIFFERENT ANALYSIS OF BRITISH MOTIVES AND ARGUED FOR A DIFFERENT FORM OF RESPONSE, THEY SHOULD BE CORRECTED FIRMLY.

8. KRASNOV SAID DIRECTLY THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT A CHAIN REACTION. HE WAS VERY NERVOUS THAT A CYCLE OF RETALIATION AND COUNTER-RETALIATION COULD BEGIN. MANY ON THE SOVIET SIDE THOUGHT THE UK WAS ABOUT TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS. HE ASKED POINT BLANK IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO 'CUT' SOVIET LOCALLY-ENGAGED STAFF IN LONDON. LYNE SAID WE HAD SET OUT TO MAKE A SINGLE SURGICAL EXCISION, WHICH THE BEHAVIOUR OF THOSE CONCERNED HAD MADE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. IT, TOO, HAD NOT BEEN OUR INTENTION TO PROVOKE A RETALIATORY CYCLE. SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE MADE OBSERVATIONS ABOUT LOCALLY-ENGAGED STAFF, BUT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY THREAT. THE QUESTION OF SUCH STAFF WAS ONE OF MANY COMPLEX CONSIDERATIONS WHICH OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN A PROCESS OF RATIONAL DISCUSSION. A DIRECT MIRROR IMAGE BETWEEN LONDON AND MOSCOW WAS UNACHIEVABLE, AS CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SO DIFFERENT. BUT, THROUGH DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE RIGHT PEOPLE, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF BROAD PARITY. THAT PARITY MUST INCLUDE THE RESOURCES FUNCTIONALLY NECESSARY TO CARRY FORWARD THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF RELATIONS - INCLUDING TRADE, INFORMATION AND VARIOUS EXCHANGES.

9. LYNE SAID THAT ALL DEPENDED ON THE FINE PRINT. IF THE MOSCOW CEILING WAS ENACTED IN THE MANNER IMPLIED BY UPDK'S BRUSQUE BEHAVIOUR ON MONDAY OR BY GERASIMOV TO THE PRESS, IT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF MANY BRITISH AND SOVIET STAFF. IT WOULD THUS CONSTITUTE A MASSIVE SECOND STRIKE AGAINST US. LYNE SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON HOW WE MIGHT THEN REACT, BUT INVITED KRASNOV TO WORK THE CONSEQUENCES OUT FOR HIMSELF. KRASNOV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT IN FACT THE MFA'S INTENTION. IT WAS NOW UP TO THE MFA TO ENSURE THAT UPDK DID NOT HAVE THIS UNINTENDED EFFECT. THIS WAS WHY HE WAS SPEAKING TO KRASNOV, NOT TO UPDK. SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT WOULD HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION AT BOTH ENDS AND OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

10. LYNE ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY KRASNOV'S EARLIER FORMAL RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCH TO THINK THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD NOW BE CONSIDERED WITH GREAT CARE, AND THAT WE COULD DISCUSS THESE VERY COMPLICATED QUESTIONS SENSIBLY. THE INITIAL SOVIET POSITION WAS LITERALLY IMPRACTICABLE, AND HAD IGNORED MANY RELEVANT FACTS. ITS AUTHORS HAD MADE A SERIOUS ERROR IN OVERLOOKING LOCALLY-ENGAGED STAFF IN LONDON. 2

11. KRASNOV DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH ANY OF THIS, SAVE TO POINT OUT THAT THE DECISION TO IMPOSE A CEILING WAS FIRM AND IMMUTABLE.

12. KRASNOV MADE A SINGLE ATTEMPT, PRESUMABLY FOR FORM'S SAKE TO SAY THAT THE SIMPLEST SOLUTION AND THE BEST STEP FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE THE LIFTING BY BOTH SIDES OF ALL CEILINGS. LYNE IGNORED THIS, BUT AT A DIFFERENT STAGE REGISTERED THE POINT (TO WHICH KRASNOV ALSO DID NOT REPLY) THAT AT SOME STAGE THE MFA WOULD HAVE TO CONTROL THOSE WHOSE BEHAVIOUR IN LONDON WENT BEYOND THE BOUNDS. C

FURTHER STEPS

13. IT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT NO ULTIMATUM WAS NOW IN EFFECT, AND THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE MFA TO REPLY, WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY LEAD TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. LYNE SAID THAT WE HAD TO GIVE SOME INFORMATION TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, WHILE SEEKING TO GET THE TEMPERATURE DOWN.

14. SEE MIFT FOR COMMENTS

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SVLNA 2705

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
UK COMMS ONLY
FM MOSCOW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 871
OF 241600Z MAY 89

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

SIC

EXPULSION ⁶ ATMOSPHERICS

1. AS REPORTED THE MFA TOLD US IN TERMS TODAY THAT THEY WERE CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL.
2. IT IS WORTH RECORDING THAT THIS HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE SO FAR IN PRACTICE. SPECIFICALLY:
 - (A) WE HAVE HAD A STEADY FLOW OF INVITATIONS TO BUSINESS MEETINGS WITH THE MFA AND OTHER MINISTRIES THIS WEEK, SOME IN RESPONSE TO LONG-STANDING REQUESTS.
 - (B) THE ATMOSPHERE IN THESE MEETINGS HAS BEEN ELABORATELY COURTEOUS. THE OFFICIALS CONDUCTING THEM WILL WITHOUT DOUBT HAVE CHECKED THEIR LINE FIRST WITH THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT. OUR INTERLOCUTORS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANGER: THEY HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN COOL. SOME HAVE VOLUNTEERED PERSONAL REGRET AT THE UNHAPPY EVENT, COUPLED WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL NOT DISTURB THE WIDER RELATIONSHIP.
 - (C) THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS COMMISSION ARRANGING LORD BOUNG'S PROGRAMME FELL OVER THEMSELVES IN A MEETING WITH THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR TO OFFER EVERY POSSIBLE COMFORT AND FACILITY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
 - (D) SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE CONTINUING TO COME TO SOCIAL EVENTS AT THE RESIDENCE.
 - (E) EVEN OUR DEFENCE SECTION HAVE HAD (UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON - MIPT) AN ENTIRELY SMOOTH RIDE IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NAVAL VISIT - THEIR INTERLOCUTORS BEING KOZLOV (ONE OF THE THREE OFFICERS ON OUR LATEST PNG LIST).
3. IN HIS PRESS BRIEFINGS, GERASIMOV HAS BEEN IRONIC RATHER THAN HOSTILE. HIS STATEMENT ON MONDAY STIRRED THE POT, BUT THIS WAS MAINLY BECAUSE HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD HIS FACTUAL BRIEF. IN PRIVATE, AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, HE HAS TAKEN THE SIDE OF THE EXPELLED JOURNALISTS.
4. PRESS REPORTING, WHICH WE ARE ALSO COVERING SEPARATELY, HAS BEEN ROUTINE RATHER THAN EXTREME. IT STARTED WITH A PROLONGED SILENCE.

COMMENT

5. WE KNOW FROM AMPLE PAST EXPERIENCE THAT THE OFFICIAL MOOD HERE AND BODY LANGUAGE IS WELL DISCIPLINED AND CLOSELY RESPONSIVE TO THE PARTY LINE. I SEE TWO REASONS FOR THE CURRENT POSTURE:
 - (A) THE MFA GENUINELY DO NOT/NOT WISH TO DISRUPT BILATERAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL
 - (B) SOME OFFICIALS (EG GERASIMOV) ARE KEEN TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THOSE WHO TAKE THESE DECISIONS.
6. OF COURSE THERE ARE GOING TO BE ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS. BUT IS PRESUMABLY SUITS US TO TREAT THESE AS ACCIDENTS, AND TO GET THE MFA TO COOPERATE IN GETTING THEM UNDER CONTROL. I AM ADVISING MY OWN STAFF, AND THE BRITISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY, THAT THEY SHOULD PURSUE ALL THEIR PLANS ON A BUSINESS-AS-USUAL BASIS UNLESS THIS BECOMES IMPRACTICABLE FOR SOME REASON

BRAITHWAITE

PRESS LINE : CALL BY SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRS

Sir John Fretwell summoned Mr Ivanov this afternoon on the subject of the ceiling which the Russians have said they intend to impose on the British Embassy and other British organisations in Moscow. It would appear that the proposed ceiling would include Soviet staff employed by the British Embassy and other organisations in Moscow.

Sir John Fretwell made clear that we can, in any event, see no justification for such a ceiling which would damage Anglo-Soviet relations.

Sir John Fretwell went on to say that the measures apparently proposed by the Russians would not involve parity of treatment. The British ceiling, which has been in place for many years, applies only to Soviet staff in the Soviet Embassy, trade delegation and various other organisations. It has however never included British nationals who are employed by the organisations concerned. We understand that some 400 British nationals are employed by these organisations.

Sir John Fretwell said that the British Government therefore expect the Soviet authorities to reconsider their proposal. If the Soviet Union are serious in seeking to establish parity of treatment they need to think again about the full implications of the formulae they have put forward.

What does this mean?

- This is what we have said to the Russians. It is for them to work out the significance of their proposals. But since the measures applied in London affect only Soviet citizens, it makes no sense for Moscow to propose measures which would affect both British and Soviet nationals.

Does it mean you will take measures against British nationals
working for Soviet organisations.

- It means what it says. It is for the Russians to ensure that their proposals involve the parity of treatment they appear to intend.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

London SW1A 2AH

23 May 1989

CDP
24/5

Dear Charles,

The application of a ceiling to British organisations
in Moscow

On the Foreign Secretary's instructions, the Political Director, Sir John Fretwell, summoned the Soviet Chargé (Ivanov) earlier this afternoon and spoke in accordance with the attached note, which he subsequently handed over. Fretwell stressed that the measures described by Sergeyeve to our Embassy in Moscow did not involve parity of treatment. The ceiling which we imposed applied only to Soviet staff at the Embassy and certain other organisations, but did not extend to British nationals employed by Soviet organisations. Fretwell pointed out that we understood that some 400 British nationals were employed by these organisations. He also drew particular attention to the last sentence of the note.

Ivanov responded by complaining about the ceiling which we imposed in 1971, saying that it complicated the work of the Soviet Embassy. He added that his authorities had felt that the imposition of a ceiling on the British Embassy and organisations in Moscow was "a necessary measure" following the "unfriendly action" of last week's expulsions.

Fretwell did not allow the discussion to focus on the expulsions issue, but stressed that the measures proposed by the Soviet authorities were not parallel to the ceiling which we impose, and would not contribute to an improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations. Ivanov undertook to report to his authorities the points which had been made.

We have now sent Sir Rodric Braithwaite an account of this meeting, and have asked him to take action in parallel with Chernyayev in Mr Gorbachev's office. This will also provide an opportunity for the Ambassador to refer again to the Prime Minister's letter to Mr Gorbachev.

I enclose a copy of our press line about Ivanov's call.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

Jans.
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

SPEAKING NOTE

1. The Minister at the Embassy in Moscow, Mr Noel Marshall, was summoned by Mr Sergeyev, a Deputy Head of UPDK, on the afternoon of Monday 22 May. Mr Sergeyev said that the total number of staff, both British and Soviet, working for British organisations in Moscow would have to be reduced to 205. The organisations concerned included the Embassy, British firms, banks, airline companies, and press representatives. Soviet staff included individually engaged domestic staff.

2. We should like to point out that the measures described by Mr Sergeyev do not involve parity of treatment. The British ceiling applies only to Soviet staff in the following categories:

Diplomats at the Soviet Embassy

Non-diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy

Staff appointed temporarily to the Soviet Embassy when they will be staying in the UK for more than 3 months

Diplomats and officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation

Staff appointed temporarily to the Soviet Trade Delegation when they will be staying in the UK for more than 3 months

Staff of various ancillary organisations (including Aeroflot, shipping organisations, Intourist, newspaper representatives and Tass, the Moscow Norodny Bank and various trading organisations)

Staff appointed temporarily to these ancillary organisations when they will be staying in the UK for more than 3 months.

This ceiling does not however include the British nationals who are employed by the organisations listed above. We understand that some 400 British nationals are employed by these organisations.

3. In addition the ceiling does not cover well over 100 other Soviet officials who are working in the UK in various capacities.

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office wish therefore to point out that the ceiling proposed by Mr Sergeyeve does not rest on a sound basis of parity. We should be grateful if the Soviet authorities would take a fresh look at their proposals in the light of this consideration. If the Soviet Union are serious in seeking to establish the principle of reciprocity they need to think again about the full implications of the formulae they have put forward.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 May 1989

file No
CO3 BHT
cc fro
S/LC

Thank you for your letter of 18 May about the visit of Mr. Lukonin, on which Richard Gozney has also written. In the light of this advice, the Prime Minister has agreed that it would not be appropriate to see Mr. Lukonin.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Haddrill, Esq.,
Department of Energy.

2



27a

file

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 May 1989

See copies.


EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE CZECH EMBASSY

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief discussion this evening about the expulsion of members of the Czech Embassy which is due to take place later this week. The Foreign Secretary said that, in the light of the considerable publicity over the Soviet expulsions, he saw advantage in postponing action against the Czechs until after the NATO Summit. This would avoid any charge that we were simply trying to create an effect at the Summit itself. The Prime Minister said she thought it much better not to hold up the action but to go ahead as planned. It would not be appropriate to do it next week when Parliament was in Recess. Nor would it be fair to take action while President Bush was here, since it would steal press interest from his visit. The Foreign Secretary accepted the validity of these points and agreed that, subject to any second thoughts, action should go ahead later this week.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	2873	
Extract details:	minute from Craddock to Powell dated 22 May 1989	
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GRS 244

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TO FLASH FCOLN
TELNO 842
OF 221417Z MAY 89

TELECON AMBASSADOR/PRIVATE SECRETARY

APPLICATION OF CEILING TO BRITISH ORGANISATIONS IN MOSCOW.

1. THE MINISTER WAS SUMMONED BY SERGEYEV, ONE OF THE DEPUTY HEADS OF UPDK AT 1630 MOSCOW TIME ON 22 MAY.
2. SERGEYEV SAID THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH KOVALEV'S STATEMENT ON 20 MAY (MY TELEGRAM 831) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF STAFF, BOTH BRITISH AND SOVIET, WORKING FOR BRITISH ORGANISATIONS IN MOSCOW WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED TO 205. THE ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED INCLUDED THE EMBASSY, BRITISH FIRMS, BANKS, AIRLINE COMPANIES AND PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. SOVIET STAFF INCLUDED INDIVIDUALLY-ENGAGED DOMESTIC STAFF.
3. SERGEYEV INVITED US TO MAKE PROPOSALS WITHIN A WEEK AS TO HOW WE PROPOSED TO RESPOND TO THIS DEMAND.
4. MARSHALL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT. HE RESERVED HMG'S POSITION ON ALL ASPECTS OF WHAT SERGEYEV HAD SAID.
5. UPDK CLAIMED THAT 110 SOVIET STAFF WORK FOR THE EMBASSY AND 114 FOR THE NON-EMBASSY CATEGORIES COMBINED. TOTAL: 224. ACCORDING TO OUR CURRENT WORKING ESTIMATE THERE ARE 78 UK-BASED MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF INCLUDING BRITISH TEACHERS AT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SCHOOL AND JUST UNDER 50 UK-BASED IN THE NON-EMBASSY CATEGORIES. TO THIS WE MAY NEED TO ADD NANNIES AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO OTHERS. SAY 140 AS A WORKING FIGURE. THIS WOULD LEAVE ROOM FOR 65 SOVIETS WITHIN THE QUOTA.
6. GERASIMOV'S PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON SERIOUSLY CONFUSED THESE FIGURES.
7. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS FOLLOW.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SVLNAN 2510

NNNN



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH
MILLBANK LONDON SW1P 4QJ
01 238 2290

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

3 pp's

22 May 1989

Dear Charles,

VISIT BY MR LUKONIN

below
I wrote to you last week about Lord Marshall's suggestion that the Prime Minister should meet the Soviet Minister for Nuclear Power.

Lord Marshall has just returned from the Soviet Union and has asked me to forward the enclosed letter to the Prime Minister. You will see that he remains of the view that the meeting with Lukonin should take place. He is particularly concerned that the Soviets might lose sight of the WANO initiative if a proposed reorganisation of the energy sector takes place. He feels that the support of the Prime Minister for WANO at a meeting with Lukonin would help to ensure the Soviets remained committed.

There was some suggestion during my Secretary of State's recent visit to Moscow that the energy sector would be re-organised. However, the Soviets are very conscious of the need to restore public confidence in nuclear power. If President Gorbachev makes changes we would expect his objective to be to enhance the effectiveness with which the problem is being tackled and to encourage further initiatives such as WANO. We would not, therefore, change our earlier advice to the Prime Minister but you should certainly take full account of Lord Marshall's letter.

Lord Marshall suggests that the Prime Minister might wish to write to President Gorbachev and encloses a draft. We would not object to this but I would recommend that the Prime Minister also includes a brief reference to the useful contacts that have been developed between the NII and their opposite numbers, the State Committee for the Supervision of Atomic Energy Plants.

*You see,
Stephen*

STEPHEN HADDRILL
Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER

SOVIET MINISTER FOR NUCLEAR POWER

Lord Marshall suggested that you ought to see Mr. Lukonin, Soviet Minister for Nuclear Power, when he visits the United Kingdom in July.

Both the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Energy disagree with this advice. They say Lukonin is only a senior official, not the man in charge: he carries no political weight: Mr. Parkinson will be seeing him anyway: and if we let in Soviet Ministers at this level, we shall be opening a floodgate.

Agree not to see Mr. Lukonin?

ESP

C.D . POWELL
22 MAY 1989

MG.

RESTRICTED

ca/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1989

Dear Charles,

Soviet Minister of Nuclear Power

Thank you for your letter of ¹⁷4 May about a possible call on the Prime Minister by Lukonin. I have seen Stephen Haddrill's letter to you of 18 May giving the Energy Secretary's view.

There is certainly no objection to the Prime Minister receiving Lukonin if she feels committed to Lord Marshall. But the Foreign Secretary does not consider that Lukonin has any real claim on her time. Far from being a major political figure, he is the equivalent, in broad terms, of a senior official in the Department of Energy and would not normally merit a call on the Prime Minister. Receiving Lukonin might also create something of a precedent.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

SOVIET UNION - Leningrad PRC

224
M09



CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 836
OF 210939Z MAY 89

YOUR TELNO 651 AND MY TELNO 835:

EXPULSIONS: PRESS BRIEFING

1. I BRIEFED THE 3 EXPELLED JOURNALISTS AT 210700Z AND 5 OTHER BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS (FINANCIAL TIMES, INDEPENDENT, OBSERVER, REUTER, LBC) AT 0800Z.

ON THE RECORD

2. I TOLD THE SECOND GROUP ON THE RECORD THAT I WAS CALLED IN AT 10.15 LAST NIGHT BY FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV TO BE TOLD THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE EXPELLING 11 MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, INCLUDING 3 JOURNALISTS, AND DECLARING 3 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY PNG. I GAVE THE NAMES AND RANK, SAVE THAT I IDENTIFIED THE PNG LIST ONLY BY RANK AND DESIGNATION. THE EXPELLEES HAD TWO WEEKS IN WHICH TO LEAVE.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS MIRROR-IMAGE RETALIATION WITH NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION. IT FOLLOWED ACTION TAKEN IN LONDON ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WAY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS DEVELOPING. WE HAD NO DESIRE THAT THE WIDER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE AFFECTED.

4. I EXPLAINED THAT A GLOBAL CEILING HAD BEEN IMPOSED, ALSO AS A MIRROR IMAGE. I DECLINED TO GIVE NUMBERS OR TO SPECULATE HOW IT WOULD OPERATE.

EXPELLEES

5. I HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN OVER THE SAME GROUND WITH THE EXPELLEES, COMBINED WITH A LONG DISCUSSION OF THEIR PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I EXPRESSED SYMPATHY AND OFFERED LOGISTICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE. FOR THEIR PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY I READ THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET ACCUSATION AGAINST BRITISH EXPELLEES IN MY TELNO 831 (NB I DID NOT/NOT READ THIS TO THE SECOND GROUP). I SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE NO/NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUAL.

6. THE 3 ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH I REFERRBD TO YOU. I EMPHASISED THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO TRY TO CARRY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL. THAT WAS THEIR WISH TOO, PERSONALLY OVER THE NEXT FORTNIGHT AND WITH REGARD TO THEIR OFFICES. THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR REPLACEMENT THAN PERSONALLY TO USE THE SCOOP.

7. ROXBURGH IS IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT POSITION, AS HE WAS IN

THE THROES OF RESIGNING FORM THE SUNDAY TIMES AND SEEKING ACCREDITATION FROM SEPTEMBER AS THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW 'SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT.' HE TOOK THE NEWS VERY HARD, THOUGH IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ALL THREE ACCEPTED IT AS WELL AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.

MFA

8. I WARNED THE HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT OF THE LINE I WAS ABOUT TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS. USPENSKY AFFECTED SURPRISE, AND IMPLIED THAT I WAS NOT ACTING IN TERMS OF THE CONVERSATION WITH KOVALEV. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD SAT ON THE NEWS. I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD TOLD KOVALEV THAT THE NEWS WAS BOUND TO LEAK ONCE PEOPLE BEGAN TO MOVE, AND THAT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TELL THE THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS IMMEDIATELY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CHOSEN TO EXPEL THEM. THERAFTER WE HAD LITTLE CONTROL OVER THE STORY, BUT WE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL OVER THIS STORY.

9. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS CONTRAST BETWEEN USPENSKY'S OLD-FASHIONED LINE AND CHERNYAYEV'S, SENSIBLE COMMENT TO ME THAT THE STORY WOULD INEVITABLY COME OUT.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 15

CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

~~ADVANCE COPY~~

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 210700Z FCO
TELNO 835
OF 210655Z MAY 89

YOUR TELEGRAM 651: EXPULSIONS

IN CIRCUMSTANCES OUR NEXT STEPS, INCLUDING PRESS HANDLING AND ANY FURTHER ACTION, WE NEED TO KEEP OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS FIRMLY IN MIND. THESE WERE CLEARLY INDICATED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV:

A) TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

B TO ENCOURAGE A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY SO THAT IN FUTURE SOVIET OFFICIALS IN BRITAIN ENGAGE EXTENSIVELY AND OPENLY IN THE PROMOTION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS

C) SO TO HANDLE THE PRESENT AFFAIR, AS TO FORWARD BOTH OF THOSE OBJECTIVES. HENCE THE PERSONAL APPROACH TO GORBACHEV HIMSELF AND THE INTENTION, STATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, TO LIMIT PUBLICITY.

2. NOTHING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE YET DONE WAS SURPRISING OR UNFORESEEABLE. THERE WAS NEVER MUCH CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD NOT RETALIATE, AND NO CHANCE THAT THEY COULD AVOID HITTING INNOCENT PEOPLE. IT WAS ALWAYS LIKELY, AS WE KNEW, THAT THEY WOULD CORRECT THE ANOMALY, AS THEY SAW IT, WHEREBY WE IMPOSED A CEILING AND THEY DID NOT. THAT IS WHAT THEY DID WITH THE AMERICANS, JAPANESE AND CANADIANS. WE KNOW AND DISCOUNTED THESE RISKS IN ESTABLISHING OUR THREE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND IN TAKING THE ACTION WE HAD TO TAKE.

3. CHERNYAYEV'S INITIAL REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE MAY INDICATE THAT GORBACHEV'S CLOSE ADVISERS, AT ANY RATE, ARE OPEN TO NEW THINKING. IT MAY BE THAT GORBACHEV HIMSELF WILL NOW FEEL THAT HE HAS SO FAR DEVOTED INSUFFICIENT PERSONAL ATTENTION TO AN ISSUE, THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF WHICH FOR THE ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND FOR THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE WEST HE MAY NOT HAVE APPRECIATED. BUT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CHANGE QUICKLY THE INGRAINED ATTITUDES OF THE KGB, AND IT IS CERTAINLY TOO SOON FOR US TO EXPECT TO SEE THE RESULTS. THE LEAVEN WILL WORK SLOWLY, IF AT ALL.

4. IN GOING FOR RAPID, MIRROR-IMAGE RETALIATION, THE RUSSIANS ARE FOLLOWING THEIR OWN RECENT PRECEDENT. THIS IS WHY THEY HAVE INCLUDED THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS AND SO GREATLY COMPLICATED OUR ABILITY TO LIMIT PUBLICITY. BUT OUR POLICY REASONS FOR GOING FOR THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF PUBLICITY, AND ESPECIALLY OF OFFICIAL COMMENT, REMAIN VALID. BY THROWING OUR JOURNALISTS RATHER THAN SAY, AN EMBASSY INFORMATION OFFICER) THEY HAVE IN FACT MADE A POLITICAL

MISTAKE.

5. WE ARE ENTITLED TO FEEL A STRONG AND NATURAL RESENTMENT AT THE RUSSIANS' BASIC INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, AND AT THEIR REACTIONS TO THE JUSTIFIED STEP WE HAVE TAKEN. BUT BOTH OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES, AND OUR WIDER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, ARE BEST FURTHERED IF GORBACHEV WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE POLICIES SHOULD BE MODIFIED. HE WILL FIND IT HARDER TO DO SO, OR TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SOME CHANGE, IF BRITISH OFFICIAL COMMENT IS UNRESTRAINED, AND IF WE NOW TAKE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SOVIET INTEREST, OR IF WE MAKE POLITICAL GESTURES, SUCH AS CANCELLING VISITS. THIS WOULD PROVOKE COUNTER-RETALIATION, AND NOT PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

6. I WOULD WELCOME A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO CHERNYAYEV. BUT I WOULD NEED A GOOD REASON: EG TO DELIVER ANOTHER MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, FOR WHICH AT PRESENT I SEE NO JUSTIFICATION.

7. I WILL SEND SEPARATELY SOME IDEAS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US OF THE NEW CEILING. YOU WILL GATHER FROM THE FOREGOING THAT I AM NOT IN FAVOUR OF ANY FURTHER RACHETING DOWN OF THE RUSSIANS, UNLESS THEY ENGAGE IN SOME NEW PROVOCATION. A WAR OF CEILINGS OR VISAS WOULD NOT SERVE OUR OBJECTIVES. WE MUST WAIT TO SEE HOW THE SOVIET CEILING IS APPLIED. WE MAY BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IF WE DO NOT REACT NOW ON A WORST CASE ASSUMPTION.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM PRIVATE SECRETARY, HEMANS (SOVIET DEPARTMENT), BURNS (NEW DEPARTMENT) AND POWELL (NO 10).

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10.

MR POWELL, NO 10.

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

25 I(a)

EXPULSIONS

You will want to see the two attached telegrams.

The first records Roderic Braithwaite's meeting with Chernayev (who is Gorbachev's Charles Powell). This was remarkably realistic and shows that your tactic of sending Gorbachev a message has paid off in the first instance. You will note that Chernayev regards it as inevitable that news will eventually leak.

The second telegram records a failed attempt by Braithwaite to see the Foreign Ministry this morning. They are clearly waiting for instructions and meanwhile avoiding him. It must be likely that the traditional Russian attitudes will predominate and we shall hear that a number of our people are to be expelled although this may not be until Monday.

I think so far this has gone as well as could be expected -
thanks to you.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

20 May 1989

SECRET
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 834
OF 202321Z MAY 89

MY TELS 830, 831, 832: EXPULSIONS: COMMENTS AND FURTHER ACTION

1. THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE CONCERNS THE PRESS HANDLING ON WHICH I SHALL NEED YOUR COMMENTS OR ASSENT BY 210400Z IF POSSIBLE (EG BY A SHORT TELEPHONE CALL TO H OF C ON 202-3724): SEE PARAS 5-6 BELOW. AS FOR MORE GENERAL PRELIMINARY COMMENT, I ASSUME THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE 'LEADERSHIP' (RUKOVODSTVO) IN KOVALEV'S SPEAKING NOTE IS THE NEAREST WE SHALL GET TO A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE: BUT THAT IT IS AN INDICATION THAT, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE RUSSIANS INTEND TO PERMIT NORMAL BUSINESS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT FURTHER GESTURES SUCH AS THE CANCELLATION OF PLANNED VISITS. BEYOND THAT, THE RUSSIANS HAVE GONE FOR SOMETHING CLOSE TO A MIRROR IMAGE, EXCEPT ON THE CEILING WHERE THEY HAVE ACTED TO REPAIR WHAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS SEEN AS AN ANOMALY. AS IN THE PAST, THEY HAVE PICKED ON SOME PEOPLE WITH AN ESPECIALLY CLOSE INTEREST IN AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET UNION: ADAM NOBLE (AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS SPECIALIST FROM RESEARCH DEPARTMENT) ANGUS ROXBURGH OF THE SUNDAY TIMES, (A SOVIET EXPERT BEFORE HE BECAME A JOURNALIST) AND TO SOME EXTENT HELEN PICKERING AND NIGEL SHAKESPEAR (BOTH OF WHOM HAVE A NUMBER OF SOVIET FIRENDS AND A GENUINE INTEREST IN THE PLACE).

2. IN SOME RESPECTS THE LIST IS MARGINALLY LESS DAMAGING THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. ALL 3 JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN HERE A FAIRLY LONG TIME. WO PURFIT IS DUE TO LEAVE IN AUGUST. NO GREAT DAMAGE IS INFLECTED BY THE LIST OF THREE STAFF BARRED FROM RETURNING (HARE HAS INDEED RESIGNED FROM TSD). MOST CONSPICUOUSLY, MY DEFENCE AND AIR ATTACHE IS NOT NAMED, ALTHOUGH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART WAS EXPELLED.

3. THIS DOES NOT DIMINISH THE FACT THAT THE EXPULSIONS ARE A SEVERE PERSONAL BLOW TO THE INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR FAMILIES (WHOSE INTERESTS WE MUST TREAT WITH THE MAXIMUM OF SYMPATHY) AND TO THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE. WE SHALL CONSIDER THE STAFFING IMPLICATIONS IN DUE COURSE.

CEILING

4. WE RECENTLY SENT YOU FIGURES FOR BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET EMPLOYEES IN MOSCOW, AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY. IMPOSITION OF A SOVIET CEILING IS WHAT WE FEARED. THE CRUX IS HOW IT WILL WORK.

IF TAKEN LITERALLY, A CEILING OF 205 FOR ALL BRITISH RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR LOCAL STAFF WOULD INFLICT GRAVE DAMAGE (THE EMBASSY ALONE WOULD COME CLOSE TO THIS NUMBER). BUT IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL WISH TO EXPEL LARGE NUMBERS OF COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND JOURNALISTS, OR REMOVE THEIR STAFF. WE SHALL HAVE TO FEEL OUR WAY (WITHOUT OF COURSE ASKING DIRECT QUESTIONS) AND REPORT FURTHER.

ACTION WITH THE PRESS

5. I RECOMMEND THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR STRATEGY OF KEEPING OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM AND OF NOT HEAPING FUEL ON THE FLAMES. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. IT WILL IMPROVE OUR - PERHAPS SLIM - CHANCES OF PERSUADING GORBAHCEV TO IMPOSE A DIFFERENT LINE IN THE FUTURE. WE CAN ASSUME THAT THE CORRESPONDENTS AND THEIR EDITORS WILL MAKE THE RIGHT POINTS WITHOUT TOO MUCH OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE, SO LONG AS IT IS MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ACTED PURELY IN RETALIATION AGAINST A NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED ACTION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

6. BUT THE STORY WILL BREAK AS SOON AS I BRIEF ROXBURGH, HARRIS AND GLOVER-JAMES (IF HE IS HERE: HE MAY BE IN BUDAPEST). I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

A) AT 210400Z (IE 0800 LOCAL) WE INVITE THE THREE JOURNALISTS TO CALL AT THE EMBASSY AN HOUR LATER.

B) 210500Z: I TELL THE THREE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED THEIR DEPARTURE: THAT CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY ARE ALSO LEAVING. THIS IS AN ACT OF STRAIGHT RETALIAITON AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE. I CANNOT GIVE DETAILS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO INFORM THEIR RELATIVES. THEY MUST ADDRESS ANY ENQUIRIES ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN LONDON TO NEWS DEPARTMENT.

C) THIS MEANS THAT THE STORY WILL BEGIN TO BREAK ON THE BBC ETC BY 0700Z. IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO EMBARGO THE INFORMATION. AND FOR CREDIBILITY AND GOOD ORDER TO BOTH YOU AND I WILL NEED TO SAY SOMETHING FURTHER DURING THE DAY.

D) AT 1100Z YOU DEPLOY SUCH FURTHER DETAILS AS YOU ARE GOING TO GIVE. I SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY CONVENE ALL THE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW, AND GIVE THEM THE COMPLETE LIST OF NAMES. I SHALL EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS RETALIATION AND REFER ALL FURTHER ENQUIRIES TO YOU. (THEY WILL GET THE NAMES ANYWAY, SO THERE IS NO SENSE IN NOT VOLUNTERING THEM).

NAVAL VISIT

7. HMS BRISTOL IS DUE IN LENINGRAD ON 26 MAY. ALTHOUGH RUSSIANS

HAVE YET TO GRANT DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE, THIS IS NOT UNUSUAL AND NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID TO SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE CANCELLING THE VISIT.

8. TWO OF MY THREE NAVAL ATTACHES ARE BEING EXPELLED. HOWEVER, THE VISIT WILL HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE 14 DAYS. I SHALL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH MY DEFENCE STAFF IN THE MORNING, AND WILL THEN TELEGRAPH AGAIN.

PNG LIST

9. YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY WISH TO CONTACT THE THREE PEOPLE NAMED AS BARRED FROM RETURNING. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTONS ON WHETHER I SHOULD ALSO GIVE OUT THEIR NAMES AT 1100Z TOMORROW.

BRAITHWAITE

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MY 2 IPTS: MEETING WITH KOVALEV

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL ACCOUNT OF MY MEETING WITH KOVALEV, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USPENSKY (HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT).
2. KOVALEV READ THE SPEAKING NOTE IN MIPT. I SAID I WOULD NOT COMMENT ON HIS ASSERTION THAT WE DID NOT HAVE FACTS TO SUPPORT OUR ACTION. HE KNEW BETTER THAN I THAT OUR ACTION WAS JUSTIFIED. SIR J FRETWELL HAD TOLD ZAMYATIN THAT WE WOULD VIEW ANY SOVIET RETALIATION MOST SERIOUSLY. I QUOTED THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH OF FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT EXPAND ON THIS POINT, BUT WOULD ADD SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS.
3. I AGREED WITH KOVALEV THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS A CAPITAL WHICH SHOULD BE PRESERVED. HE WOULD KNOW FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR GORBACHEV THAT SHE AND THE GOVERNMENT SHARED THIS VIEW. ALTHOUGH THE MATTER IN QUESTION WAS A NARROW ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS, IT HAD BEEN AND REMAINED A CONSIDERABLE BURDEN ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WE WERE SEEKING TO DEVELOP. WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS ON MANY OCCASIONS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF DOING SOMETHING ABOUT THIS. WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT AND COULD NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY OF PRESERVING NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE FACE OF A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN TO INTRODUCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INTO BRITAIN. BUT WE HAD BEEN FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH, TO QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAD STEP BY STEP RECONSTRUCTED THEIR STAFF IN LONDON. WE HAD HAD NO ALTERNATIVE OTHER THAN TO DO WHAT WE HAD DONE.
4. I SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY OF REMOVING THIS BURDEN WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THOSE AGENCIES. THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR POLICY PRESEVED PRECISELY THAT 'ENEMY IMAGE' OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IN SO MANY OTHER WAYS WAS BEING DISSOLVED. OUR ACTION SHOULD HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE, AS OUR POLICY HAD BEEN CONSTANTLY REITERATED.
5. I COMMENTED THAT THE VERY WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES STEMMING FROM THE EXPANDING RELATIONSHIP REQUIRED THE PRESENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES OF OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES ENGAGED IN LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. I REJECTED THE DESCRIPTION IN KOVALEV'S DEMARCH OF THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES NAMED. THESE WERE INNOCENT PEOPLE. BY RETALIATING AGAINST THEM THE SOVIET UNION GAVE FURTHER SIGN THAT IT

HAD NOT YET TAKEN ALL THE STEPS NECESSARY TO REMOVE ITS NEGATIVE IMAGE. THIS WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR, ANY MORE THAN OF THE UK.

6. I NOTED THAT KOVALEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT INTEND TO PUBLICISE THE EXCHANGE. PUBLICITY WAS INEVITABLE AS PEOPLE PREPARED TO LEAVE, ESPECIALLY AS SOME WERE JOURNALISTS. BUT WE WOULD SEEK TO AVOID GENERATING COMMENT. I CONCLUDED THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU. I HAD TO RESERVE YOUR POSITION ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION. YOU WOULD OF COURSE MAKE UP YOUR OWN MIND ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO ME.

7. KOVALEV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SPEAKING NOTE HAD ESSENTIALLY COVERED ALL THE POINTS I HAD MADE. HE REJECTED MY REFERENCE TO THE GUILT OF THE SOVIET EXPELLEES, AND WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT REINFORCING THE 'ENEMY IMAGE.' WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT SPEAKING IN SUCH TERMS. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING CONFIDENCE.

8. I CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS FOR US TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE ANY FURTHER. WE MUST LEAVE THIS TO THOSE WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO JUDGE.

BRAITHWAITE

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OF 201958Z MAY 89

MY IPT EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK
FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF KOVALEV'S SPEAKING NOTE
BEGINS
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROTESTS STRONGLY AT THE UNFRIENDLY AND
PROVOCATIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES AGAINST A NUMBER
OF OFFICIALS OF SOVIET ORGANISATIONS (UCHREZH DENIA) IN LONDON. THE
SOVIET AUTHORITIES CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE GROUNDLESS ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST THE SOVIET OFFICIALS, WHOSE ACTIVITIES FULLY ACCORD WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND WITH
THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR. THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES HAVE ADDUCED NO FACTS TO THE CONTRARY.
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE STEP TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
CONTRADICTS THE CHARACTER AND LEVEL OF OUR RELATIONS. MUCH HAS BEEN
DONE IN THE RECENT PERIOD TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMON MOVEMENT OF OUR
TWO COUNTRIES TOWARDS COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THIS IS
A MOST VALUABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR BOTH STATES. THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP (RUKOVODSTVO) CONSIDERS THAT THE HIGH LEVEL OF
ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SHOULD BE
PRESERVED. UNFORTUNATELY THE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE
BRITISH SIDE CLEARLY ACTS IN THE OPPOSITE SENSE.
WHEREAS THE ACCUSATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST A NUMBER OF
SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON ARE ENTIRELY INVENTED, THE SOVIET
AUTHORITIES HAVE FIRM EVIDENCE THAT CERTAIN OFFICIALS (SOTRUDNIKI) OF
BRITISH ORGANISATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS (UCHREZH DENIA I
PREDSTAVITELSTVA) IN MOSCOW WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING ILLEGALLY IN THE
INTERESTS OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
FOR THESE REASONS, 11 BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN 2 WEEKS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN
IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. AT THE
SAME TIME, THREE BRITISH CITIZENS FORMERLY WORKING IN MOSCOW ARE
DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (SEE THE ATTACHED LIST). IN ADDITION,
HENCEFORWARD, ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, A QUOTA IS ESTABLISHED FOR
THE PERSONNEL OF THE BRITISH ORGANISATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS IN
MOSCOW, INCLUDING THE SOVIET CITIZENS WORKING THERE, EQUAL TO THE
PRESENT NUMERICAL QUOTA OF PERSONNEL IN SOVIET INSTITUTIONS IN
BRITAIN - IE 205 (TWO HUNDRED AND FIVE).
IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE

CONFIDENTIAL

112513
MDHIAN 530

BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
ENDS
RUSSIAN TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

BRAITHWAITE

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TELNO 830
OF 201942Z MAY 89



EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV AT 1015 PM LOCAL ON SATURDAY 20 MAY.
2. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE FOLLOWING EIGHT MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY AND THREE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN TWO WEEKS:
MICHAEL ANDERSON, SECOND SECRETARY
CAPT CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NAVAL ATTACHE
ADAM NOBLE, SECOND SECRETARY
HELEN PICKERING, VICE CONSUL
WARRANT OFFICER LAING PURFITT, JUNIOR MEMBER OF DEFENCE STAFF
LT CDR CHRISTOPHER WATSON, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE
PAUL SHARP, THIRD SECRETARY
MAJOR NIGEL SHAKESPEAR, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE
IAN GLOVER-JAMES, ITN
ANGUS ROXBURGH, SUNDAY TIMES
JEREMY HARRIS, BBC
3. THE FOLLOWING EX-MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY WERE DECLARED PNG
- CAPTAIN JOHN DYKES, FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE
- ''RICHARD'' TURNER, FORMER ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE (PRESUMABLY MEANS ROGER TURNER, ANA UNTIL 1988)
- DEREK HARE, FORMER MEMBER OF TECHNICAL STAFF
4. WE ARE INFORMING THOSE CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE THREE JOURNALISTS. EMBASSY STAFF WILL BE TOLD TO KEEP THE NEWS TO THEMSELVES FOR THE TIME BEING.
5. I PROPOSE NOT/NOT TO WAKE THE JOURNALISTS WITH THIS UNPLEASANT NEWS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE CAUSE THE STORY TO BREAK BEFORE YOU HAD TIME FOR PREPARATION OR THE FULL FACTS TO HAND. BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT I CAN DELAY INFORMING THEM BEYOND 0800 LOCAL TOMORROW MORNING (210400Z). GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT YOU AGREE TO THIS.
6. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF KAVELEV'S SPEAKING NOTE. FURTHER REPORT AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW

BRAITHWAITE

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MXHPAN 1835

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Ria Minister

This is a full
set of Allegations
on the explosions,
together with the
manuscript of the
Foreign Secretary's
remarks.

C.D.P.

P.T.O.

Moscow Tel No	830	20/5/89	○
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~	834	~	
~	835	21/5/89	
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PRIME MINISTER

EXPULSIONS

You will want to see the two attached telegrams.

The first records Roderic Braithwaite's meeting with Chernayev (who is Gorbachev's Charles Powell). This was remarkably realistic and shows that your tactic of sending Gorbachev a message has paid off in the first instance. You will note that Chernayev regards it as inevitable that news will eventually leak.

The second telegram records a failed attempt by Braithwaite to see the Foreign Ministry this morning. They are clearly waiting for instructions and meanwhile avoiding him. It must be likely that the traditional Russian attitudes will predominate and we shall hear that a number of our people are to be expelled although this may not be until Monday.

I think so far this has gone as well as could be expected -
thanks to you.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

20 May 1989

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GRS 1100

PS / Mr. Wainwright
PS / PUS
PS / Sir J. Fretwell
HD / SOV D
HD / NEWS
HD / PUS
DHD / PUS
MR. RATTOLD

6

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCU
TELNO 826
OF 191721Z MAY 89

FCU TELNO 633: EXPULSIONS

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S ADVISER TAKES THE NEWS CALMLY, ENGAGES IN RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT, ACKNOWLEDGES THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBLE APPROACH, AND THANKS ME FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO HIM.

DETAIL

2. I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT 1700 LOCAL TIME FOR HALF AN HOUR. HE WAS RELAXED AND ALONE.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD CALLED ON CHERNYAYEV BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED HER PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BE CONVEYED DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, AND BECAUSE IT CONCERNED ORGANS OF STATE OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, I EMPHASISED THAT THIS MATTER CONCERNED ONE NARROW - BUT VERY IMPORTANT - ASPECT OF A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IN OTHER RESPECTS HAD DEVELOPED VERY WELL OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. I DREW ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID ABOUT THE CEILING AND ABOUT NOT INITIATING PUBLICITY. CHERNYAYEV COMMENTED THAT THE STORY WOULD EVENTUALLY GET INTO THE PRESS. I AGREED THAT THE DEPARTURES WOULD BE NOTICED, BUT STRESSED THAT WE OURSELVES WERE NOT MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OR GENERATING COMMENT. OUR FIRM DETERMINATIONS TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY WOULD NOT CHANGE. BUT WE WISHED THE PRESENT AFFAIR TO BE PLAYED IN THE LOWEST POLITICAL KEY POSSIBLE.
4. HAVING READ THE LETTER AND SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTES, CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE PEOPLE NAMED AND KNEW NOTHING OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER. HE WAS THEREFORE IN NO POSITION TO COMMENT. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT EXPECTED HIM TO COMMENT AT THIS STAGE. BUT, AS YOU HAD SAID TO SHEVARDNADZE DURING THE MEETINGS IN APRIL THIS SERIOUS IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS A HANDOVER FROM THE PAST AND SHOULD BE CHANGED. WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN HER LETTER SHOULD BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.
5. DESPITE HIS PREVIOUS DISCLAIMER, CHERNYAYEV THEN QUESTIONED ME IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT THE EXPULSIONS. HE AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEVELOPING WELL. THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS NOW EXCHANGED VIEWS WAS WELCOME; IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE AS IN OTHERS. HE APPRECIATED THE MANNER IN WHICH WE HAD CHOSEN TO HANDLE IT, INCLUDING THE DECISION NOT TO REDUCE THE CEILING. THERE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS OFFICER, BEFORE GORBACHEV'S VISIT ABOUT

C

HANDLE IT, INCLUDING THE DECISION NOT TO REDUCE THE CEILING. THERE HAD BEEN SOME BRITISH PRESS STORIES BEFORE GORBACHEV'S VISIT ABOUT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. MRS THATCHER HAD NOT RAISED THIS QUESTION DIRECTLY WITH GORBACHEV. PERHAPS THAT WAS NATURAL, GIVEN THE SCALE OF THE MATTERS THEY WERE DISCUSSING. BUT WERE WE SURE OF OUR EVIDENCE AGAINST THOSE NAMED? WHAT, HE ASKED (LAUGHING), CONSTITUTED ESPIONAGE?

6. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE CASE AGAINST THE EXPELLEES, AS HE WOULD APPRECIATE. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT TAKEN HER DECISION LIGHTLY. THE MATTER HAD BEEN CONSIDERED VERY THOROUGHLY. WE HAD BEEN PLACED IN A SITUATION IN WHICH WE WERE OBLIGED TO ACT. THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION OPENLY, AND ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE COVERT OR DID NOT RESPECT THE LAW. CHERNYAYEV AGREED THAT LAWS HAD TO BE OBSERVED.

7. CHERNYAYEV TOOK THIS IN GOOD PART. HE SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THE RUSSIANS THOROUGHLY APPRECIATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO MATTERS OF STATE; HE WAS SURE HER APPROACH WOULD HAVE BEEN EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE. IT WAS INDEED A QUESTION OF METHODS; AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP TRUST. I AGREED; WE WERE TRYING TO DEVELOP CONTACTS AND RELATIONS IN DIFFERENT AREAS. WITH THE EXPANSION IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BOTH THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD INCREASING ROLES TO PLAY. THAT WAS WHY WE HAD DECIDED NOT TO LOWER THE CEILING; THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH LEGITIMATE WORK FOR OFFICIALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

8. CHERNYAYEV WONDERED WHETHER WE WERE PENALISING PEOPLE WHO HAD GOT ON TO A BLACKLIST BECAUSE OF PAST INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS - EG WORKING FOR THE KGB(SIC) - WHICH WERE NOW DISCONTINUED. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE A PROBLEM HERE. CHERNYAYEV MENTIONED CHETVERIKOV (THE HEAD OF COPYRIGHT AGENCY VAAP, TO WHOM WE REFUSED A VISA IN APRIL) AS AN EXAMPLE; CHETVERIKOV HAD BEEN THROWN OUT OF FRANCE BUT THAT WAS LONG AGO AND HE WAS NOW ACCEPTED BOTH IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES. I SAID THAT WE NEVERTHELESS HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER PEOPLE IN THIS CATEGORY HAD ABANDONED THEIR PREVIOUS AFFILIATIONS. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT WE DID NOT AT ALL APPRECIATE THE WAY IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO FORCE US TO GIVE VISAS TO KNOWN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR POSTS IN LONDON BY WITHOLDING VISAS FOR BRITISH OFFICIALS POSTED TO MOSCOW WHOM THEY KNEW TO BE INNOCENT. THIS DID NOT AND WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THEIR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE OUT. IT MERELY COMPLICATED THE CONDUCT OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS.

9. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED POINT BLANK WHETHER OUR CASE AGAINST THE EXPELLEES WAS BASED ON "CONCRETE ACTIVITIES IN THE PRESENT TIME." I SAID THAT IT WAS INDEED. CHERNYAYEV REPLIED: "SO YOU ARE SURE OF THESE CASES?" I SAID THAT WE WERE.

10. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV WAS NOT IN HIS OFFICE, BUT WAS PREPARING FOR THE PLENUM ON MONDAY. HE WOULD REPORT TO GORBACHEV WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER AND WOULD TELEPHONE HIM TONIGHT. CHERNYAYEV ASKED IF I WOULD BE ACTING ALSO WITH THE MFA, AND SAID THAT I HAD BEEN RIGHT TO COME DIRECTLY TO HIM FIRST. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE OUR EXPLANATION AND TO CONVEY IT STRAIGHT TO GORBACHEV. THIS AS A "NORMAL" WAY OF DOING BUSINESS.

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COMMENT

11. CHERNYAYEV'S REACTION WAS REMARKABLY RELAXED. HE UTTERED NOT A SINGLE CROSS WORD. AS THE MEETING WENT ON HE BECAME MORE AND MORE JOGULAR. FAR FROM TREATING THIS AS A SLAP IN THE FACE OR A DELIBERATE DISPLAY OF BRITISH TOUGHNESS, ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN THE DECISION RELUCTANTLY AND THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE AT STAKE ON WHICH OUR ATTITUDE WAS NOT SELF-EVIDENTLY UNREASONABLE. HE ALSO SEEMED GLAD TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE WITHOUT AN MFA SPIN ON IT. HE DID NOT, OF COURSE, OFFER ANY INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL DRAW THE RIGHT CONCLUSION FOR THE FUTURE.

12. THE DEFINITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE AS CALM AS THIS. STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR RETALIATION WILL BE MADE, AND WILL DOUBTLESS PREVAIL. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION HERE THAT FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES AND POLICIES WILL BE AFFECTED. BUT IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT CHERNYAYEV DID NOT DRAW ANY NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE WIDER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP. HOW THE STORY EVENTUALLY PLAYS IN THE BRITISH PRESS WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON GORBACHEV AND THE RUSSIAN REACTION IN GENERAL; THE LOW KEY APPROACH IS CLEARLY RIGHT.

13. USPENSKY IS UNABLE TO SEE ME UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING AT 2090830Z HE WILL BE PREPARED AND HIS REACTION WILL BE MORE TRADITIONAL. SO FAR, HOWEVER, SO GOOD

BRAITHWAITE

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ADVANCED R.C.

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DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 20800Z FCO
TELNO 829
OF 200738Z MAY 89

MY TELEGRAM B26: EXPULSIONS

WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE MFA FOR MY MEETING WITH USPENSKY THIS MORNING,

I WAS MET BY MURADYAN OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, WHO SAID THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. USPENSKY WAS IN HIS OFFICE, BUT HE WAS IN A MEETING WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL LUNCH. HOWEVER HE HAD ALREADY HAD REPORTS FROM ZAMYATIN AND CHERNYAYEV, AND DID NOT THINK A FURTHER MEETING ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD ADD TO WHAT HE ALREADY KNEW.

2. I SAID TO MURADYAN THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO SEEM DISCOURTEOUS TO USPENSKY BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM AS I HAD TO CHERNYAYEV. IN ADDITION I WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO USPENSKY, WHICH I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY: A) I WANTED TO APOLOGISE FOR HAVING HAD AT THE LAST MINUTE, TO DUCK OUT OF THE SEMINAR WHICH USPENSKY HAD ORGANISED FOR ME AND THE CHANCERY IN THE MFA'S COUNTRY HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE WOULD NOW UNDERSTAND WHY: I HAD BEEN BUSY ALL DAY WITH TELEGRAMS. BUT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WE REGARDED IT AS A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUING BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MFA AND THE EMBASSY.

B) I HAD ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER AND IN SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE:

I) WE INTENDED TO PLAY THIS AFFAIR IN A LOW KEY:

II) WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF LEGITIMATE BILATERAL BUSINESS; HENCE THE DECISION OVER THE CEILING:

III) WE WOULD TAKE VERY UNKINDLY TO RETALIATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO USPENSKY SHOULD HE DECIDE A MEETING WAS USEFUL.

3. USPENSKY WAS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF GOING TO GROUND LAST NIGHT: HE HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED ME A MEETING AT 191930LOCAL. I WOULD HAVE LIKED THE OPORTUNITY TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF HOW ZAMYATIN HAD REPORTED, AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ANY BIAS. I GUESS USPENSKY WILL NOW SEE ME ON THIS MATTER UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE CONSIDERED SOVIET RESPONSE. I DOUBT IF WE LOSE MUCH THEREBY.

File
attached to
Moscow
telno 830

PRIME MINISTER

The text of this telegram has been relayed to Charles who agrees with Braithwaite that the journalists will be told tomorrow morning. He is in contact with Bernard Ingham and has a contingency press line prepared. However, he emphasised that we would not initiate publicity at this end.

Diana Smith

Diana Smith
DUTY CLERK

20 May 1989

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Rels.

PRIME MINISTER

The text of this telegram has been relayed to Charles who agrees with Braithwaite that the journalists will be told tomorrow morning. He is in contact with Bernard Ingham and has a contingency press line prepared. However, he emphasised that we would not initiate publicity at this end.

Diana Smith

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Diana Smith
DUTY CLERK

20 May 1989

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FFFF AND FLASH FOR CABINET OFFICE

ZZ CAOFF

FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

201942Z MAY

GRS 269

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FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 830

OF 201942Z MAY 89

EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV AT 1015PM LOCAL
ON SATURDAY 20 MAY.

2. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE FOLLOWING EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY
AND THREE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN TWO WEEKS:

MICHAEL ANDERSON, SECOND SECRETARY

CAPT CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NAVAL ATTACHE

ADAM NOBLE, SECOND SECRETARY

HELEN PICKERING, VICE CONSUL

WARRANT OFFICER LAING PURFITT, JUNIOR MEMBER OF DEFENCE STAFF

LT CDR CHRISTOPHER WATSON, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE

PAUL SHARP, THIRD SECRETARY

MAJOR NIGEL SHAKESPEAR, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE

IAN CLOVER-JAMES, ITN

ANGUS ROXBURGH, SUNDAY TIMES

JEREMY HARRIS, BBC

3. THE FOLLOWING EX-MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY WERE DECLARED PNC

- CAPTAIN JOHN LYKES, FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE

- "RICHARD" TURNER, FORMER ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE (PRESUMABLY
MEANS ROGER TURNER, ARA UNTIL 1988)

- DEREK HARE, FORMER MEMBER OF TECHNICAL STAFF

4. WE ARE INFORMING THOSE CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
THE THREE JOURNALISTS. EMBASSY STAFF WILL BE TOLD TO KEEP THE
NEWS TO THEMSELVES FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. I PROPOSE NOT/NOT TO WAKE THE JOURNALISTS WITH THIS UNPLEASANT
NEWS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE CAUSE THE
STORY TO BREAK BEFORE YOU HAD TIME FOR PREPARATION OF THE FULL FACTS
TO HAND. BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT I CAN DELAY INFORMING THEM
BEYOND 0800 LOCAL TOMORROW MORNING (210400Z). GRATEFUL FOR
CONFIRMATION BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT YOU AGREE TO THIS.

6. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF KAVELEV'S SPEAKING NOTE. FURTHER REPORT
AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SVLNAN 2405

ADVANCED R.C.

HD/SOVIET
HD/POSD
DEL HD/POSD
HD/NEWS

PS
PS/MR WANDERGRAVE
PS/PO3
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR RATFORD

SECRET
DESKBY 200800Z F C O
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN
200738Z MAY
GRS 340

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MUSCOW
TO DESKBY 20800Z FCO
TELNO 829
OF 200738Z MAY 89

✓
23 EA

MY TELEGRAM 826: EXPULSIONS

WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE MFA FOR MY MEETING WITH USPENSKY THIS MORNING,
I

WAS MET BY MURADYAN OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, WHO SAID THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. USPENSKY WAS IN HIS OFFICE. BUT HE WAS IN A MEETING WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL LUNCH. HOWEVER HE HAD ALREADY HAD REPORTS FROM ZAMYATIN AND CHERNYAYEV, AND DID NOT THINK A FURTHER MEETING ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD ADD TO WHAT HE ALREADY KNEW.

2. I SAID TO MURADYAN THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO SEEM DISCOURTEOUS TO USPENSKY BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM AS I HAD TO CHERNYAYEV. IN ADDITION I WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO USPENSKY, WHICH I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY:
A) I WANTED TO APOLOGISE FOR HAVING HAD AT THE LAST MINUTE, TO DUCK OUT OF THE SEMINAR WHICH USPENSKY HAD ORGANISED FOR ME AND THE CHANCERY IN THE MFA'S COUNTRY HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE WOULD NOW UNDERSTAND WHY: I HAD BEEN BUSY ALL DAY WITH TELEGRAMS. BUT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WE REGARDED IT AS A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUING BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MFA AND THE EMBASSY.

B) I HAD ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER AND IN SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE:

- I) WE INTENDED TO PLAY THIS AFFAIR IN A LOW KEY:
- II) WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF LEGITIMATE BILATERAL BUSINESS: HENCE THE DECISION OVER THE CEILING:
- III) WE WOULD TAKE VERY UNKINDLY TO RETALIATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO USPENSKY SHOULD HE DECIDE A MEETING WAS USEFUL.

3. USPENSKY WAS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF GOING TO GROUND LAST NIGHT: HE HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED ME A MEETING AT 191930LOCAL. I WOULD HAVE LIKED THE OPORTUNITY TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF HOW ZAMYATIN HAD REPORTED, AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ANY BIAS. I GUESS USPENSKY WILL NOT NOW SEE ME ON THIS MATTER UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE CONSIDERED SOVIET RESPONSE. I DOUBT IF WE LOSE MUCH THEREBY.

Advanced
HD SOVIET D
PS/PUS

NO DISTRIBUTION.

SECRET
F L A S H FCO
FM MUSCO TO FCOLN
191721Z MAY
GRS 1100

PS
PS (Mr Waldgrave)
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
HD/SOVD
HD/NEWS
HD/PUSD
DHD/PUSD
MR RATFORD.

23 Ia

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 826
OF 191721Z MAY 89

FCO TELNO 633: EXPULSIONS

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S ADVISER TAKES THE NEWS CALMLY, ENGAGES IN RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT, ACKNOWLEDGES THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBLE APPROACH, AND THANKS ME FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO HIM.

DETAIL

2. I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT 1700 LOCAL TIME FOR HALF AN HOUR. HE WAS RELAXED AND ALONE.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD CALLED ON CHERNYAYEV BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED HER PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BE CONVEYED DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, AND BECAUSE IT CONCERNED ORGANS OF STATE OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, I EMPHASISED THAT THIS MATTER CONCERNED ONE NARROW - BUT VERY IMPORTANT - ASPECT OF A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IN OTHER RESPECTS HAD DEVELOPED VERY WELL OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. I DREW ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID ABOUT THE CEILING AND ABOUT NOT INITIATING PUBLICITY. CHERNYAYEV COMMENTED THAT THE STORY WOULD EVENTUALLY GET INTO THE PRESS. I AGREED THAT THE DEPARTURES WOULD BE NOTICED, BUT STRESSED THAT WE OURSELVES WERE NOT MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OR GENERATING COMMENT. OUR FIRM DETERMINATIONS TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY WOULD NOT CHANGE. BUT WE WISHED THE PRESENT AFFAIR TO BE PLAYED IN THE LOWEST POLITICAL KEY POSSIBLE.
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BRAITHWAITE

NNNN

SECRET

~~CCFO~~

23a-



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 May 1989

See Charles,

mb

Ric Anstr
CDP
19/5

Soviet Expulsions

As agreed, Sir John Fretwell summoned the Soviet Ambassador this afternoon and spoke to the attached note. In conclusion he handed Mr Zamyatin a copy of the letter from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev, explaining that Sir Rodric Braithwaite was delivering the original of this letter in Moscow.

Zamyatin replied in predictable terms. He denied that his staff had been involved in intelligence activities, adding that they, like our Embassy staff in Moscow, acted strictly in accordance with their obligations under the Vienna Convention. His own aim and that of his Embassy had been solely to work for the improvement of UK/Soviet relations, an improvement which had been illustrated by recent meetings at the highest level. He then argued that the action against his staff indicated that this progress had evidently been viewed with displeasure by certain circles within the Government, who were intent on seeking issues which would darken the bilateral relationship. He added that it was significant that the action had been taken immediately before the NATO Summit. He said that the Soviet leadership would no doubt respond to HMG's action by adopting "adequate measures".

In concluding the meeting, Sir John Fretwell reiterated that the Government had no intention or desire to damage UK/Soviet relations. On the contrary, our decision was designed to stop activities which were incompatible with, and harmful to, the improvement of the relationship.

Zamyatin appeared to be taken aback when the purpose of the summons became clear. The fact that he was accompanied by a private secretary rather than a more senior member of his staff also tends to confirm that he had no inkling of what the meeting would be about. Our impression was that he was less vehement than might have been expected. But his comments did not provide any significant indication as to whether or how the Soviet leadership may decide to retaliate.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

Jans
John Wall
(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SPEAKING NOTE

The British and Soviet Governments agree that Anglo-Soviet relations are better than they have ever been. This has been an important factor in the highly welcome improvement in East-West relations over the last two or three years. As you know, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary attach the highest importance to improving this more fruitful and constructive relationship and continuing the valuable political dialogue which has been established.

It is therefore a source of deep dismay that the one area which has regularly cast serious clouds over our relations, Soviet intelligence activities in Britain, has obliged me to speak to you today. I shall give you a copy of my speaking note.

The Government have incontrovertible evidence that the following eleven Soviet citizens resident in Britain have been engaged in unacceptable intelligence activities:

/A A Bagin

Embassy Driver

Air Attache

Soviet Trade Delegation

Novosti Press Agency

Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Attache, Soviet Embassy

TASS

Komsomolskaya Pravda

Assistant Air Attache

Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Assistant Naval Attache

I must therefore ask you to arrange for these officers to leave the United Kingdom within 14 days, that is, not later than 2 June.

The following three Soviet citizens, who have also been engaged in unacceptable activities and have now left the country, are also declared persona non grata:

former Military Attache

former Assistant Military

Attache

formerly at the Soviet Trade

Delegation

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

/You

You will understand that this is a decision which we would much rather not have had to take. But we have no hesitation in acting as we have.

We have made clear to the Soviet authorities in every possible way over the years that we will not tolerate the kind of large scale subversive and hostile intelligence activities which the Soviet intelligence agencies have continued to carry out. Although there have been no expulsions since 1985, we have been obliged to refuse a succession of visa applications from Soviet citizens whom we know to be intelligence officers. We have repeatedly invited the Soviet Union to change its policy and remove the source of this obstacle to even better relations. We much regret that your authorities have chosen to disregard these warnings. These activities are particularly inappropriate at a time when there is an unprecedented degree of contact between our two countries and so much information is so freely available. It is also entirely out of keeping with the new policies and attitudes which the Soviet leadership have proclaimed on many occasions.

The British government will not be deflected by this incident from the search for good

/Anglo-Soviet

Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations, we welcome representatives of your growing political, commercial, cultural and press interests in Britain. Their presence here is important to an expanding relationship. For this reason, the British Government have exceptionally decided on this occasion not to reduce the number of Soviet personnel permitted to live in Britain. This will remain for the present at 205.

We expect that these posts vacated by the departing intelligence personnel will in future be occupied by Soviet officials engaged in the promotion of legitimate business. This decision should be seen as evidence of our wish not to sour our otherwise good relations nor to make the otherwise legitimate work of the Soviet community more difficult. In this same spirit we shall not be initiating publicity for these decisions. Naturally, we shall not be able to avoid confirming the expulsions if news of them becomes public from other sources.

The British Government will, however, be watching very closely how the Soviet Union make use of this concession. On this will depend our attitude to the appropriate size of the Soviet community. We

/shall

shall not be deflected from similar action against unacceptable activities in the future if this becomes necessary. Those in the Soviet Union who have the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations and Soviet diplomacy at heart have a particular responsibility to act to prevent such incidents in future.

Any retaliatory action by the Soviet side will be viewed most seriously as a signal of Soviet readiness to inflict further deliberate damage on Anglo-Soviet relations. Retaliation would also be completely unjustified. It would amount to action against innocent people, which would damage the activities in which British citizens in the Soviet Union are engaged, promoting greater contacts and closer relations in accordance with the wishes of both governments.

You should know that Sir Rodric Braithwaite is due to deliver today a message from the Prime Minister to the Soviet General Secretary about this matter. I will give you a copy of that message with this speaking note. I should be grateful if you would report all I have said to your authorities.

/For

For our part we are ready to put this incident behind us in the hope that there will be no need for it to be repeated in the future, as it has been so many times in the past. But I have to say that there are other members of the Soviet community whose activities give us cause for concern. Your authorities will be aware of them.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London

19 May 1989

SECRET

DEDIP

FM MOSCOW

● FLASH FCO

TELNO 826

OF 191721Z MAY 89

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
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES	PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM	2873	
(one piece/item number)		
Extract details:	letter from Wall to Powell dated 19 May 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION		
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	13/03/18	<i>M. L. W.</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED		
MISSING AT TRANSFER		
NUMBER NOT USED		
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)		
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)		

cc/p.



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH
MILLBANK LONDON SW1P 4QJ
01 238 2149

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

18th May 1989

Dear Charles,

My Secretary of State has seen your letter of ^{17th} 4 May to Richard Gozney about the visit of Mr Lukonin to the UK in July.

Mr Lukonin is one of a number of Ministers responsible for various parts of the energy sector. Although ranked in the Soviet system as a Minister, he is essentially a technician and manager reporting to Scherbina, one of the Deputy Prime Ministers. He is not a political figure of weight. He is, however, responsible for a substantial civil nuclear programme and is a pleasant and affable man.

Mr Parkinson met Lukonin in Moscow recently and will be seeing him again during his visit to the UK. The Secretary of State feels that if the Prime Minister sees him this might open the door to the number of Soviet Ministers of similar standing from the energy industries alone. If the Prime Minister decides not to see Lukonin, Mr Parkinson will of course, ensure that he is well received.

I should be most grateful if you would let me know what decision the Prime Minister reaches. A copy of this letter goes to Richard Gozney.

*Yours ever,
Stephen.*

S HADDRILL
Principal Private Secretary

SOVIET UNION. Relations Part 2

SECRET AND PERSONAL

21a-d



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1989

Yes

*Prime Minister
Content with this
revised press line,
for use only if*

Dear Charles,

Soviet Expulsions

the news

Thank you for your letter of 18 May. As requested, I enclose a revised, and more restrictive, press line.

what?

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and the Director General of the Security Service.

*CDP
18/5*

*James
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRESS LINE

[Until we decide to confirm]

It is true that a number of Soviet diplomats have been expelled?

- I am afraid I cannot help you.

[In the event that we decide to confirm]

- I can confirm that the Soviet Ambassador was asked to call on Sir J Fretwell at 1400 on Friday 19 May. He was informed that 11 present members of the Soviet community in London, and a further 3 who have recently departed on transfer, had been carrying out activities incompatible with their status. Sir John asked Mr Zamyatin to arrange for the withdrawal within 14 days of the 11 present members of the Soviet community in London. He said that we were also declaring the Soviet officials who had recently left Persona Non Grata.

- Sir John made clear to the Ambassador that such activities were particularly regrettable at a moment when Anglo-Soviet relations were better than at any time in the past. He also made clear the British Government's strong hope that the unacceptable activities which had given rise to this action and similar actions in the past would now cease. For its part the British Government would continue to work hard for further improvement in Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations while remaining vigilant about its own security interests.

/Who

C

Who were the 14 concerned?

- I am afraid that I cannot give you the details.

Why not?

- We look at these issues on a case-by-case basis. In this case we have decided not to give publicity.

What were they up to?

- In accordance with our invariable practice, unable to give any details of activities involved.

Why did you not announce the expulsions in the first place?

- We look at these issues on a case-by-case basis and, on this occasion, decided not to initiate publicity.

But why not?

- It is not our policy to comment on individual cases.

[Unattributably] The expulsions will have left the Russians in no doubt of our determination to deal with unacceptable activities. On this occasion, we saw no advantage in initiating publicity at a time of considerable promise in East-West relations.

Has the ceiling been lowered?

- No, it remains at 205, with a sub-ceiling of 46 for the diplomatic community.

/Why

Why has it not been lowered?

- We regard the present level as appropriate for legitimate activities. In the hope that these will prosper, we decided to make an exception on this occasion and not lower the ceiling.

Was there any contact between the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev?

- Not prepared to go into detail on nature and level of our dealings with Soviet Government.

Retaliation?

[If there has not yet been retaliation]

- Sir John made clear to the Soviet Ambassador that we would take the most serious view of any retaliation, which would be totally unjustified.

[In the event of Soviet retaliation]

- This is entirely unjustified and a deliberate attempt to damage Anglo-Soviet relations by taking action against innocent people engaged in promoting contacts and exchanges in keeping with the otherwise improved climate of our relations.

What will you now do?

- We have expelled those whose activities we found unacceptable. We have made our views on the Soviet retaliation clear to the Soviet authorities. We are prepared to go on working for improved relations. We have made plain to the Russians what this entails on their side.

SUBJECT
CC MASTER.
DPS.

SECRET



File
PRIME MINISTER'S ^{FCO}
PERSONAL MESSAGE ^{PC-}
SERIAL No. 94/89 ^{OK 500}

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 May, 1989.

Dear General Secretary,

We have established the practice of speaking frankly about any subject, however wide our differences. This has done much to reduce the climate of suspicion which characterised the past. I am writing to you now in that spirit. I do not intend to disclose the contents of this letter.

I have today approved a decision which I had hoped not to take. As your advisers know well, successive British Governments have pursued a resolute and consistent policy over the presence in Britain of representatives of the Soviet Intelligence Services.

I had hoped that the action taken by my Government in 1985 would clear away, once and for all, a major obstacle both in British/Soviet relations and to the creation of more co-operative and friendly relationships in Europe. I have been disappointed. Your country's intelligence services have, step by step, reconstructed their staff in London. Their operatives have engaged in activities which no Government could accept. We have expressed our concern repeatedly and at many levels. No corrective action has been taken by the Soviet side, and we are left with no alternative but to require the removal of certain intelligence officers whose activities in Britain have nothing to do with their stated purpose for being in Britain and are hostile to our security.

SECRET

We welcome representatives of your growing political, commercial, cultural and press interests in Britain. Their presence here is important to our expanding relationship. The presence of your intelligence officers works in precisely the opposite direction.

I have decided to depart from our previous practice and not to foreclose the posts occupied by the departing intelligence personnel, in the expectation that these posts will in future be occupied by Soviet officials engaged extensively and openly in the promotion of legitimate business. I have also given instructions that publicity for the removal of your intelligence personnel is not to be given by any British official. These have not been easy decisions. But they are intended to offer a positive way forward. I shall be looking for a similarly positive approach from the Soviet side.

I am sorry that I have to write to you in this vein, so soon after your outstandingly successful visit to London. But I would be wrong to conceal from you my deep concern about a problem we should surely put behind us.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

President M. S. Gorbachev



20

FL
SRWBZQ

CCP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

18 May 1989

From the Private Secretary

SOVIET EXPULSIONS

Thank you for your further letter of 17 May about the press line for use when news of our expulsion of members of the Soviet community begins to leak. The Prime Minister agrees that we shall have to admit to the numbers involved. But she does not wish us to release names or other details commenting that this would be a betrayal of her undertaking to Mr. Gorbachev. We shall need a defensive line on why we are not reducing the ceiling for the Soviet diplomatic community. I should be grateful, therefore, if you could prepare a more restrictive press line, on a contingency basis, so that we have a working text which can be finalised at short notice. It would be helpful to have this in the course of today.

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

19A-E

cc 10



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1989

Sean Chalks,

Pl. bring forward
on 23 May.

CBD 1875.

Czech Expulsions plot

Further to my letter of 15 May, I attach the speaking note which we propose to use with the Czech Ambassador on Wednesday 24 May.

As already agreed, we shall not initiate publicity in the hope of avoiding Czech retaliation. We propose, therefore, as in the case of the Russians, to decline to comment on what seem to be purely speculative questions. In the event of a more substantive leak or retaliation by the Czechs, which becomes public, the attached defensive press lines will be used. We have suggested including the names of those involved for the reasons explained in my letter of 17 May about the Soviet expulsions.

167 paper

You will see that in the Speaking Note the Czechs will be warned that retaliation could result in the imposition of a ratchet and ceiling system on the number of staff allowed at their Embassy in London and possibly jeopardise the Foreign Secretary's visit in July. Whether or not those threats should be implemented will have to depend on the extent of any retaliation.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

James
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET (until used)

SPEAKING NOTE FOR USE WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK AMBASSADOR

- The British Government continues to attach great importance to UK/Czechoslovak relations. This is underlined by our regular ministerial visits and political consultations and the expansion of contacts in all areas. Your Government's constructive and helpful approach over the problems of plastic explosives has been a good example of how our two countries can co-operate;
- We look forward to the development of a more constructive and fruitful relationship between our two countries;
- It is therefore the more regrettable that I have to raise again a problem about which I spoke to you last September.
- I shall give you a copy of this speaking note and should be grateful if you would report all I have said to your authorities.
- I have to draw to your attention the fact that the following four members of your staff have engaged in unacceptable intelligence activities in this country incompatible with their status:-

[Redacted]

Press Attache

[Redacted]

Second Secretary

[Redacted]

Third Secretary

[Redacted]

Technical Adviser,

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

/I must therefore

SECRET (UNTIL USED)

C

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 2(4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

- I must therefore ask you to arrange for [redacted] to leave the United Kingdom within 14 days, that is, not later than 7 June;

- I made clear to you only last September that we will not tolerate the kind of hostile intelligence activities which Czechoslovak intelligence agencies have nevertheless continued to carry out. Despite regular warnings of this kind, such activities continue. We have also been obliged to refuse numerous visa applications from identified Czechoslovak intelligence officers;

- We very much regret that the Czechoslovak authorities have chosen to disregard these warnings. The British Government will not, however, be deflected from their efforts to improve Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. For this reason we have decided not to initiate any publicity for the expulsions;

- Any retaliation would be totally unjustified. I must remind you of the warning which I gave you last year about the possibility of the imposition of a system of ratchet and ceilings limiting the number of Czechoslovak diplomats and officials in the UK;

- Furthermore, we are well aware that other intelligence officers remain in your Embassy and retaliation could also result in action against them;

- We have no wish to risk this matter damaging the further development of our relations or jeopardising the Secretary of State's planned visit to Prague in July;

- For our part we are ready to put this incident behind us in the hope that there will be no need for it to be repeated in the future.

SECRET (UNTIL USED)

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SECRET (until used)

CZECHOSLOVAK EXPULSIONS: ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

(to be used only if the story leaks)

1. The Czechoslovak Ambassador was asked to call on Sir John Fretwell on Wednesday 24 May. He was informed that four members of his staff, [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] had been found to have engaged in activities incompatible with their status. Mr Fidler was asked to arrange for their withdrawal within 14 days.

2. The Ambassador was told that we continue to attach importance to UK/Czechoslovak relations. But, while we wish to build up those relations, we are not prepared to relax our policy on the sort of activities in which the four expellees have engaged.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SECRET (until used)

e

SECRET (until used)

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (on the record)

[In the event of no retaliation]

What actually did those expelled do? What damage have they done to national security? A link with Van Harlem/Ludvik?

1. It is our invariable practice not to comment on such matters

Do you expect any retaliation?

2. Any retaliation would be totally unjustified

Are any further expulsions planned?

3. No, but we shall continue to take appropriate action against any foreign officials who engage in unacceptable activities

Why did you not announce the expulsions in the first place?

4. We look at each case on its own merits and on this occasion decided not to initiate publicity

But why not?

5. It is not our policy to comment on individual cases.

[Unattributably, if pressed]

The expulsions have reaffirmed to the Czechoslovaks our determination to deal with unacceptable activities and we saw no advantage in initiating publicity.

/Personal details

SECRET (until used)

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Personal details

8. [redacted] Press Attache

Age:39, married, arrived UK September 1986

[redacted] Second Secretary, Czechoslovak Embassy

Age:over 21 (38), married, arrived UK November 1986

[redacted] Third Secretary, Czechoslovak Embassy

Age:35, married, arrived UK April/May 1986

[redacted] Technical Adviser, Czechoslovak Embassy

Age:35, married, arrived UK September 1986.

How many Czechoslovaks have been expelled from UK?

9. Two in 1983
Two in 1984
Three in 1988

Did the Czechoslovaks retaliate on those occasions?

10. They did not in 1983. In 1984 they expelled two members of our Embassy staff in Prague and two others in 1988

[If Czechoslovaks retaliate]

11. This is entirely unjustified and a deliberate attempt to damage Anglo-Czechoslovak relations

/Will this

SECRET (until used)

SECRET (until used)

Will this mean a reduction in the ceiling on the number of Czechoslovaks allowed in their Embassy here?

12. We have not operated a ceiling on them.

[In the event of unreasonable retaliation]

13. But, in view of the totally unjustified retaliation, we have now informed the Ambassador that we shall be imposing such a ceiling to limit their staff to .

SECRET (until used)

SOVIET UNION (Relata) PT 12



RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW
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OF 171058Z MAY 89
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SOVIET INTERNAL: 14 MAY RE-RUN ELECTIONS

SUMMARY

1. A POPULAR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATE WINS A REMARKABLE VICTORY IN LENINGRAD AFTER PUBLICLY LINKING LIGACHEV WITH ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION. KOROTICH ELECTED.

DETAIL

who interviewed you for Ogonyok.

2. RE-RUN ELECTIONS TO FILL THE REMAINING 198 SEATS IN THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES WERE HELD ON 14 MAY. FULL RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. FROM THE PRELIMINARY REPORTS SO FAR PUBLISHED IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MOST DRAMATIC AND POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IS THE VICTORY IN LENINGRAD OF NIKOLAI IVANOV, A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATING HIGH LEVEL CORRUPTION. IN THE LENINGRAD NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DISTRICT HE WAS ONE OF 28 CANDIDATES ON THE BALLOT BUT STILL WON AN OUTRIGHT VICTORY IN THE FIRST ROUND WITH MORE THAN 60% OF THE VOTE. TO HAVE DONE THIS AGAINST SO LARGE A FIELD IS REMARKABLE.

3. IVANOV, TOGETHER WITH HIS WELL-KNOWN FELLOW PROSECUTOR, GDLYAN, HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO HIGH LEVEL PUBLIC CRITICISM IN THE PAST WEEKS FOR THE ALLEGED USE OF ILLEGAL METHODS IN PURSUING THEIR INVESTIGATIONS. IN A LIVE DISCUSSION PROGRAMME ON LENINGRAD TELEVISION ON 12 MAY IVANOV SAID THAT LIGACHEV'S NAME WAS AMONG THOSE WHICH FIGURED IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE LENINGRAD MAFIA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT LIGACHEV WAS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER BASE IN MOSCOW IN WHAT HE SAW AS A SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN PARTY POLICY. HE CLAIMED ALSO THAT IT WAS NOW OFFICIAL POLICY TO HOLD BACK ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MAFIA. ON 13 MAY THE CENTRAL PRESS CARRIED A REPORT ON A MEETING OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM CRITICISING STATEMENTS MADE BY GDLYAN AND IVANOV ABOUT SUPPOSED INFRINGEMENTS OF LEGALITY COMMITTED BY UNNAMED POLITICAL LEADERS. THE REPORT REVEALED THAT A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE PRESIDUM WAS LOOKING INTO THE

COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE TWO PROSECUTORS.

4. IN MANY WAYS, IVANOV'S VICTORY IN LENINGRAD IS AS REMARKABLE AS THAT OF ELTSIN IN MOSCOW ON 26 MARCH. WE KNOW OF NO EVIDENCE THAT LIGACHEV WAS ORCHESTRATING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST IVANOV AND GDLYAN. NEVERTHELESS, AS WITH ELTSIN, THE MASSIVE VOTE FOR IVANOV REPRESENTS A RESOUNDING POPULAR SNUB FOR LIGACHEV. ONCE AGAIN, OFFICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT A CANDIDATE SEEMS TO HAVE BACKFIRED BADLY. THE RESULT ALSO EMPHASISES AGAIN THE EXTENT TO WHICH PARTY PRIVILEGE AND CORRUPTION IS AN EMOTIVE ISSUE FOR THE MAN IN THE STREET AT A TIME WHEN HIS OWN STANDARD OF LIVING IS UNDER PRESSURE. IVANOV AND GDLYAN (WHO ALSO WON AN IMPRESSIVE ELECTORAL VICTORY IN MOSCOW ON 26 MARCH) ARE REHORTEDLY CLOSE ASSOCIATES OF ELTSIN. THERE WILL BE MANY IN THE PARTY BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THESE THREE WILL FORM THE NUCLEUS FOR A POPULIST CAMPAIGN WITHIN THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES AND ELSEWHERE AGAINST PARTY PRIVILEGE.

5. KOROTICH, EDITOR OF OGONEYK, WHO WITHDREW FROM A MOSCOW CONSTITUENCY IN MARCH BECAUSE OF ATTEMPTS TO OBSTRUCT HIS CAMPAIGN, HAS BEEN ELECTED WITH 80% OF THE VOTE IN KHARKOV IN THE UKRAINE. YEVTUSHENKO HAS BEEN ELECTED FROM ANOTHER KHARKOV CONSTITUENCY. THESE WILL ALSO STRENGTHEN THE LIBERAL WING IN THE NEW CONGRESS.

6. BUT THERE ARE ALSO ONE OR TWO EYE-OPENING RESULTS WHICH SEEM CERTAIN TO PRODUCE ALLEGATIONS OF MALPRACTICE. THE PARTY FIRST SECRETARY IN DUSHANBE (TADZHIKSTAN) WHO, STANDING UNOPPOSED, GOT ONLY 28% OF THE VOTE ON 26 MARCH, HAS JUST BEEN ELECTED, AGAIN UNOPPOSED, WITH 82% OF THE VOTE. THE FIRST SECRETARY OF PSKOV OBKOM WHO ALSO FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY 50% IN A CONTESTED ELECTION ON 26 MARCH, HAS JUST RECEIVED 73% OF THE VOTE THIS TIME - THIS TIME UNOPPOSED, IN A CONTEST IN WHICH THE CANDIDATE WHO WAS AHEAD OF HIM ON THE PREVIOUS ROUND, AND ALL OTHER POTENTIAL OPPONENTS, HAD BEEN ELIMINATED BY THE LOCAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION.

7. BUT SINCE A MAJORITY OF THESE LAST 198 SEATS WERE CONTESTED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES, WITHOUT A DECISIVE OUTCOME, RUN-OFFS WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE MAJORITY OF CONSTITUENCIES INCLUDING IN MOSCOW. THESE WILL TAKE PLACE ON 21 MAY SO THAT ALL THE CONSTITUENCIES SHOULD BE FILLED BY THE TIME OF THE CONGRESS MEETS ON 25 MAY.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

Prime Minister



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

This responds to

my representation of your view that we should say less than proposed in the FCO press line. Perhaps it would be best

17 May 1989

Dear Charles, for me to seek Bernard's judgement tomorrow on what in the letter we can get away with.

Soviet Expulsions

Agree?

Thank you for your letter of 16 May about the proposed expulsions of members of the Soviet Embassy due to take place on 19 May.

CAD
17/5
us
m

The Foreign Secretary agrees that we must be able to demonstrate to Mr Gorbachev that we have complied with our undertaking not to initiate publicity. He believes that when we do deploy the press line set out in your letter (and this will only be done after a further check with you), we should tell the press how we informed the Russians of our decision. This means saying publicly that Sir John Fretwell did so in a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on the afternoon of 19 May. The Foreign Secretary also believes that we shall have to tell the press of the numbers involved. If we declined to reveal at least these details, the press are likely to make considerable play of what will seem in their eyes to be unprecedented secretiveness. This could lead to speculation that we have been engaged in some sort of deal with the Russians which would be unhelpful.

Why?

That is probably right

Somewhat similar considerations apply to the question of whether we should ourselves go beyond numbers, and offer the names or other details of those whom we have expelled. It is our normal practice, once we confirm expulsions, to give this kind of minimal detail and to refuse absolutely to be drawn further. To give less could be interpreted by the media as being over-protective of Soviet sensibilities. It will certainly provoke the press into using every possible means to discover the names of those involved. This could stimulate a large media presence outside the Soviet Embassy and elsewhere which will complicate the task of our own Security Services.

No


The Foreign Secretary thinks, therefore, that we may need to deploy the names in the press line. An alternative would be to decline to name the expellees until the press had themselves begun to identify the individuals involved. But the Foreign Secretary is concerned that, if we hold back beyond this, the result will be to inflate rather than contain the story.

This would be a betrayal of my undertaking to contacts.

Yours,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Saw Under Relation Priv.



SECRET AND PERSONAL



17
M. P. M.

(Sb)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 May 1989

GORDIEVSKY

Thank you for your letter of 16 May about the Soviet request to meet Gordievsky. The Prime Minister has noted the action proposed and is content.


I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office).

C. D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

A The National Archives

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 May 1989

Dear Stephen,

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy came to see me this afternoon to brief me on the outcome of the Baker visit to Moscow. His account did not seem to me to differ very much from that we have already received from the Americans. But I would just record three points:

- Adopting his most conspiratorial manner, Kossov said that there was a school of thought in the Soviet establishment that thought it would be better to rule out a third zero on SNF and set the aim instead at common ceilings somewhere between NATO's current level and zero. I said that this would not get us further forward: we were not in the game of negotiations on SNF at all. It was for the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF unilaterally to our levels, and to stop protesting about modernisation when they knew very well that they had modernised their own SNF.
- Dropping his voice lower still, Kossov said that he was aware that we had doubts whether the Soviet military had told Gorbachev the whole truth about the quantities of chemical agent held by the Soviet armed forces. We were not absolutely alone in sharing these doubts. But the information which the Prime Minister had given Mr. Gorbachev was not on its own sufficient for him to call for a full scale investigation of the position. His military advisers continued to dismiss the Prime Minister's claims. Was their any further information we could offer? I said that the Prime Minister had spelled matters out very clearly to Mr. Gorbachev. I would consider whether they was anything further we could say but I doubted it.
- Lastly, when telephoning me yesterday to make this appointment, Kossov was very keen to have an early lunch with me, preferably on Friday this week, to the point of being quite insistent about it. I said that I did not have any free lunches to mid-June. But I was left wondering why he was so keen on Friday.

Good evening
Chris Smith
 (C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

E 00 1575

2G/3157

From: Mr C K Davies
Date: 15 May 1989

MR P J WESTON

cc Mr C Powell
Mr S Hemans,
FCO, Soviet Dept**MOSCOW "HOT-LINE": CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS**

1. The next round of talks with the Soviet Side will take place in Moscow on 22 - 25 May 1989. We shall be fielding a 5-man team including a representative from British Telecom International (to cover the new satellite and data links) and an interpreter.
2. The hardware for the new facsimile link has been delivered to the Soviet Side. It cost them £278,000. Our requirements are more modest (but on the other hand we have easy access to spares and additional supplies) and amounted to about £78,000.
3. At the meeting we expect to agree arrangements and procedures for commencing system tests early in July 1989. There is however, further software development for the computer control system and this may not be complete until the end of the year. We are well on target for becoming fully operational by July 1990.

C. K. Davies

C K DAVIES
Telecommunications Secretariat

SECRET



203 B/W JLB Khs 14.
afr PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 May 1989

SOVIET EXPULSIONS

Thank you for your letter of 15 May about the proposed expulsion of members of the Soviet Embassy which is to take place on 19 May.

The Prime Minister has studied the papers carefully. She is generally content with the speaking note, although she points out that the passage at the top of page 5 starting "We hope" is inconsistent with our no publicity approach. She does, however, have more problems with the proposed press line. Even if news of the expulsions does begin to leak out, either because of the disappearance of members of the Soviet community here or as a result of retaliatory action by the Russians, she would much prefer not to go into the degree of detail proposed in your draft press line. At least at the first stage, her preference would be to do no more than confirm that a number of members of the Soviet community in London have been asked to leave because of activities incompatible with their status, that we had expressed the hope that such unacceptable activities would now cease, and that we would continue to work hard for further improvement in Anglo/Soviet and East/West relations while remaining vigilant about our security interests. This would avoid going into detail about names and be easier to reconcile with the Prime Minister's note to Mr. Gorbachev that we should do everything possible to avoid publicity.

I should be grateful if you would give urgent consideration to this and let me see a revised press line.

Once the news has broken - as we must assume it will - I do not think the Prime Minister would object to a confidential briefing of our allies in the margins of the NATO Summit.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

13(A-K)



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

This is the proposed speaking note for use with the Soviet Ambassadors, & the press line for use if - and only if - news leaks from Moscow. Context? Contain also that we brief NATO Allies at the summit, if the news has broken? Sea Chunks, get expulsions

15 May 1989

Soviet Expulsions

As promised in my letter of 5 May, I now attach the speaking note which we would propose to use with the Soviet Ambassador on 19 May, together with defensive press lines. We have it in mind that, to reduce the risk of publicity, Sir John Fretwell, rather than Sir Patrick Wright, should summon Zamyatin. This will also reduce the amount of warning the Russians will have that something is up.

at fear
summit,
if the news has broken?
CDD
15/1

On the press line, your letter of 10 May recognises that it would be difficult to honour the Prime Minister's undertaking once news of the expulsions leaks and we are directly challenged. The attached press line covers the line to take before and after a decision to confirm the expulsions is taken. The problem will be with the timing of any such decision. Given her undertaking to Mr Gorbachev, the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to be consulted. We shall, therefore, contact you immediately if our News Department come under pressure from the press to confirm our action.

On a point of detail, you will see that the press line declines to confirm that the Prime Minister has sent a personal message to Mr Gorbachev. If we confirm that the Prime Minister has written to Mr Gorbachev, and the Russians subsequently retaliate, the press may portray the message as having failed to avoid retaliation.

Finally, the Foreign Secretary sees a possibility, in the event of Soviet retaliation and the expulsions consequently becoming public, that the media, either in this country or abroad, may seek to misrepresent the reasons for our action. For example, the expulsions might easily be portrayed as a political manoeuvre to influence public opinion in the run-up to the NATO Summit. He therefore thinks there may be advantage in briefing our Allies in the margins of the NATO Summit about the real reasons which lie behind our decision. We would, of course, only do this if news had broken. If the Prime Minister agrees, we will ensure that appropriate briefing is included in the material that is being prepared for the Summit.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and the Director General of the Security Service.

John Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SPEAKING NOTE

The British and Soviet Governments agree that Anglo-Soviet relations are better than they have ever been. This has been an important factor in the highly welcome improvement in East-West relations over the last two or three years. As you know, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary attach the highest importance to improving this more fruitful and constructive relationship and continuing the valuable political dialogue which has been established.

It is therefore a source of deep dismay that the one area which has regularly cast serious clouds over our relations, Soviet intelligence activities in Britain, has obliged me to speak to you today. I shall give you a copy of my speaking note.

The Government have incontrovertible evidence that the following eleven Soviet citizens resident in Britain have been engaged in unacceptable intelligence activities:

/A A Bagin

Embassy Driver

Air Attache

Soviet Trade Delegation

Novosti Press Agency

Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Attache, Soviet Embassy

TASS

Komsomolskaya Pravda

Assistant Air Attache

Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Assistant Naval Attache

I must therefore ask you to arrange for these officers to leave the United Kingdom within 14 days, that is, not later than 2 June.

The following three Soviet citizens, who have also been engaged in unacceptable activities and have now left the country, are also declared persona non grata:

former Military Attache

former Assistant Military

formerly at the Soviet Trade

/You

speaking note attached

You will understand that this is a decision which we would much rather not have had to take. But we have no hesitation in acting as we have.

We have made clear to the Soviet authorities in every possible way over the years that we will not tolerate the kind of large scale subversive and hostile intelligence activities which the Soviet intelligence agencies have continued to carry out. Although there have been no expulsions since 1985, we have been obliged to refuse a succession of visa applications from Soviet citizens whom we know to be intelligence officers. We have repeatedly invited the Soviet Union to change its policy and remove the source of this obstacle to even better relations. We much regret that your authorities have chosen to disregard these warnings. These activities are particularly inappropriate at a time when there is an unprecedented degree of contact between our two countries and so much information is so freely available. It is also entirely out of keeping with the new policies and attitudes which the Soviet leadership have proclaimed on many occasions.

The British government will not be deflected by this incident from the search for good

/Anglo-Soviet

Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations, we welcome representatives of your growing political, commercial, cultural and press interests in Britain. Their presence here is important to an expanding relationship. For this reason, the British Government have exceptionally decided on this occasion not to reduce the number of Soviet personnel permitted to live in Britain. This will remain for the present at 205.

We expect that these posts vacated by the departing intelligence personnel will in future be occupied by Soviet officials engaged in the promotion of legitimate business. This decision should be seen as evidence of our wish not to sour our otherwise good relations nor to make the otherwise legitimate work of the Soviet community more difficult. In this same spirit we shall not be initiating publicity for these decisions. Naturally, we shall not be able to avoid confirming the expulsions if news of them becomes public from other sources.

The British Government will, however, be watching very closely how the Soviet Union make use of this concession. On this will depend our attitude to the appropriate size of the Soviet community. We

/shall

shall not be deflected from similar action against unacceptable activities in the future if this becomes necessary. [We hope the Soviet authorities will also reflect seriously on the implications of the activities of their intelligence agencies for the perception of the Soviet Union by Western governments and Western public opinion.] Those in the Soviet Union who have the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations and Soviet diplomacy at heart have a particular responsibility to act to prevent such incidents in future.

*This is
in line with
the
"no publicity
approach"*

Any retaliatory action by the Soviet side will be viewed most seriously as a signal of Soviet readiness to inflict further deliberate damage on Anglo-Soviet relations. Retaliation would also be completely unjustified. It would amount to action against innocent people, which would damage the activities in which British citizens in the Soviet Union are engaged, promoting greater contacts and closer relations in accordance with the wishes of both governments.

You should know that Sir Rodric Braithwaite is due to deliver today a message from the Prime Minister to the Soviet General Secretary about this

/matter

matter. I will give you a copy of that message with
with this speaking note. I should be grateful if you
would report all I have said to your authorities.

For our part we are ready to put this
incident behind us in the hope that there will be no
need for it to be repeated in the future, as it has
been so many times in the past. But I have to say
that there are other members of the Soviet community
whose activities give us cause for concern. Your
authorities will be aware of them.

PRESS LINE

[Until we decide to confirm]

It is true that a number of Soviet diplomats have been expelled?

- I am afraid I cannot help you.

[In the event that we decide to confirm]

- I can confirm that the Soviet Ambassador was asked to call on Sir J Fretwell at _____ on Friday 19 May. He was informed that 11 present members of the Soviet community in London, and a further 3 who have recently departed on transfer, had been carrying out activities incompatible with their status. Sir John asked Mr Zamyatin to arrange for the withdrawal within 14 days of the 11 present members of the Soviet community in London. He said that we were also declaring the Soviet officials who had recently left persona non grata.

Do we need to go into such detail. It looks as if I can find back - we will no publicise incidents. Do we have to give names? (see overpage)

- Sir John made clear to the Ambassador that such activities were particularly regrettable at a moment when Anglo-Soviet relations were better than at any time in the past. He also made clear the British Government's strong hope that the unacceptable activities which had given rise to this action and similar actions in the past would now cease. For its part the British Government would continue to work hard for further improvement in Anglo-Soviet and East-West relations while remaining vigilant about its own security interests.

/(Following

(Following to be volunteered in anticipation of inevitable questions):

- Those concerned were:

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In addition the following three have been PNG'd retroactively:

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

former Military Attache

Age: 48, married, left UK December 1988

former Assistant Military Attache

Age: 38, married, left UK October 1987

formerly at the Soviet Trade

Delegation

Age: 38, married, left UK May 1989

- In accordance with our invariable practice, unable to give any details of activities involved.
- Sir John made clear to the Soviet Ambassador that we would take the most serious view of any retaliation, which would be totally unjustified.
- Have made clear to the Russians our wish for improved UK-Soviet and East-West relations. No doubt those in the Soviet Union working for better relations will be asking those responsible for these unacceptable activities why those activities are continuing.

Why did you not announce the expulsions in the first place?

- We look at these issues on a case-by-case basis and, on this occasion, decided not to initiate publicity.

But why not?

- It is not our policy to comment on individual cases.

[Unattributably] The expulsions will have left the Russians in no doubt of our determination to deal with unacceptable

/activities

activities. On this occasion, we saw no advantage in initiating publicity at a time of considerable promise in East-West relations.

Has the ceiling been lowered?

- No, it remains at 205, with a sub-ceiling of 46 for the diplomatic community.

Why has it not been lowered?

- We regard the present level as appropriate for legitimate activities. In the hope that these will prosper, we decided to make an exception on this occasion and not lower the ceiling.

Was there any contact between the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev?

- Our communications with the Soviet authorities must remain confidential

[In the event of Soviet retaliation]

- This is entirely unjustified and a deliberate attempt to damage Anglo-Soviet relations by taking action against innocent people engaged in promoting contacts and exchanges in keeping with the otherwise improved climate of our relations.

What will you now do?

- We have expelled those whose activities we found unacceptable. We have made our views on the Soviet retaliation clear to the Soviet authorities. We are prepared to go on working for improved relations. We have made plain to the Russians what this entails on their side.

SOVIET UNION: Relations
Pt 12





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1989

See paper.

EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET AND CZECH EMBASSIES

Thank you for your letter of 10 May on this subject. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a further word about it this evening. It was agreed to proceed with the Czech expulsions some 5 or 6 days after the expulsion of members of the Soviet Embassy on 19 May.

The Prime Minister expressed some concern that the assurance in her letter to Mr. Gorbachev that we would not give publicity to the expulsions would be difficult to honour once news of them began to leak out and we were directly challenged about them in Parliament or by the press. The best way to deal with this would be for H M Ambassador in Moscow to make the point, in handing over the letter, that while we would not initiate publicity, we could not avoid confirming the expulsions if news of them became public from other sources.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and the Director General of the Security Service.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1989

Dear Charles,

Expulsion of members of the Soviet and Czech Embassies

Thank you for your letter of 8 May.

The Foreign Secretary has looked again at whether to expel the Russians and Czechs simultaneously. While there are no operational reasons why the expulsions should not be carried out at the same time, his view remains that linkage of the expulsions will almost certainly produce a concerted and stronger reaction. The point of separating them is to give us a chance of avoiding Czech retaliation. (Whatever we do we do not think we can avoid Russian retaliation.)

That said, there is no reason why the separation could not be by one week, as the Prime Minister suggests. Indeed, if the Czech expulsions followed five or six days after the Russians, the latter's retaliation, which normally comes within three or four days, might generate sufficient publicity to distract media attention from the Czech departures. This might encourage the Czechs not to retaliate, given that in the past they have not retaliated when there has been no publicity. We cannot, of course, offer any guarantees, but on balance the Foreign Secretary thinks that we should expel the Czechs in the week beginning 22 May.

As regards the Prime Minister's concern that action against the Russians first would forewarn the Czechs,

[redacted] The timing now proposed will keep the delay to a minimum.


I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

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Jones
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 May 1989

EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF SOVIET AND CZECH EMBASSIES

Thank you for your letter of 5 May about the proposed expulsion of members of the Soviet and Czech Embassies.

The Prime Minister is generally content with what is proposed:

- she agrees the list of those to be expelled;
- she is content for the expulsions of the Russians to take place on 19 May;
- she agrees to write to Mr. Gorbachev in the terms suggested in the draft enclosed with your letter and I will now get this typed.

The only outstanding question is whether to expel the Russians and Czechs simultaneously or separately. The Prime Minister's view is that it would be better to get both sets of expulsions out of the way before the NATO Summit and President Bush's visit. In practice that would mean doing them at most only a week apart. There is also the consideration that action against the Russians would warn the Czechs. You may like to reflect further on whether it would not be best to carry out all the expulsions on 19 May.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and the Director General of the Security Service.

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER

EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET AND CZECH
EMBASSIES

You have agreed in principle to the expulsion of a number of members of the Soviet and Czech Embassies in London because of their espionage activities. We now need to take a number of operational decisions.

Whom to expel?

The Security Service recommend 11 Russians (one fewer than before) whose cases you have already studied, and four Czechs. Full details of the Czechs are in the papers annexed but I do not think you need read them. There is no doubt that they are intelligence officers and active ones at that.

When to act?

The recommendation is that we should do it before the NATO Summit on 29/30 May. The Security Service are keen to act on a Friday, which leaves three possible dates: 12, 19 or 26 May. 12 May is the last day of the London Information Forum and better avoided. 26 May is right on the eve of the NATO Summit and might look as though we were acting to distract attention from NATO's own problems at the Summit. This points to 19 May. If the Russians retaliate - as they will - it will be an opportunity to underline at the Summit how little they have changed.

How to do it?

We want to minimise the impact on our relations with the Soviet Union. There are two ways we can try to do this. First, we could exceptionally not reduce the ceiling on the Soviet official community in Britain by the number of people expelled. This might help avoid a downward spiral and limit the Russians' retaliation. Second, we could volunteer that we would take no action to publicise the expulsions. But we have to recognise that the news is bound to leak out sooner or later, since journalists are involved.

B.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Should you write to Mr. Gorbachev?

It is suggested that you should write to Mr. Gorbachev to explain why we are taking action, to underline our desire to limit the consequences, and to tell him that we shall not lower the ceiling or give publicity to our action. I think this is right, not least in psychological terms. You have always been direct with him and should be on this occasion. I attach a draft of a message for your approval.

Should we expel the Russians and Czechs together or separately?

There are arguments both ways. Expelling them altogether gets it over in one fell swoop but makes it more likely that the Czech expulsions will also become public knowledge. Expelling the Czechs three weeks later would perhaps diminish the appearance of a concerted attack on the Communist countries and would give us a better prospect of avoiding publicity and thus persuading the Czechs to limit retaliation. The FCO recommendation is for separate expulsions. I continue to believe it is better to get it all over in one go and try to draw a line under the episode rather than extend the agony. I see no need to show any delicacy towards the Czechs who are behaving abominably.

Agree:

- Numbers to be expelled?
- To carry out expulsions simultaneously?
- To act on 19 May?
- To write to Mr. Gorbachev in the terms proposed?

Yes

Yes -

Yes

CJP

CHARLES POWELL
5 May 1989

I am worried
 I don't see how
 3 weeks - However action
 on one would warn the Czechs.
 If not together could the two almost
 be taken out - (two days) apart.
 If it would
 reduce publicity
 that would help.
 I think both
 actions should
 be taken before
 the end of May. We don't
 want it hang over us while
 President Bush is here

7 (A-W.)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 May 1989

Dear Charles,

Expulsion of Members of the Soviet
Czech Embassies

Thank you for your letter of 19 April recording the Prime Minister's discussions with the Director General of the Security Service. The Security Service evidence of Czech wrongdoing has now been received and is attached. The Foreign Secretary finds the evidence convincing and recommends that the four Czechs named should be expelled.

Since their last discussion on 26 April, the Foreign Secretary has again considered whether action should be taken simultaneously against the Soviet and Czech Embassies. It has the obvious attraction of avoiding two separate incidents. But it could provoke a coordinated response and, if the expulsions became public, might be portrayed as a deliberate campaign, leading to an even greater row than if action were taken separately. Separate action would also afford us greater flexibility both in our initial action and in the event of retaliation. It might also reduce the possibility of Czech retaliation. There is virtually no chance of avoiding publicity and retaliation for the Russian expulsion (see below) but a reasonable one of avoiding publicity for the Czechs - if we act against them separately and later. In the past, the Czechs have been less inclined to retaliate if there is no publicity. On balance, therefore, the Foreign Secretary believes that the Russians should be expelled first, followed by the Czechs two or three weeks later.

Publicity

The Foreign Secretary does not believe that we shall be able to keep the Russian expulsions quiet. Eleven Russians, including three journalists, can hardly leave at short notice without it becoming apparent. Normally, Soviet retaliation follows quickly (3/4 days).

/If

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



If there are British journalists amongst the retaliatory expulsions the expulsions will certainly leak then.

Nevertheless, we could try to minimise the impact of the expulsions by telling the Russians that we would not initiate publicity. In addition, we could exceptionally not ratchet down the ceiling on the Soviet official community. The intention would be not to provoke the possible withdrawal of local staff in Moscow (as happened to the Americans) and to avoid the downward spiral at a time when more, rather than less, people are needed to service the growing bilateral relationship. In order to ensure that the Russians did not interpret this as a sign of weakness, Sir Patrick Wright would tell their Ambassador that our decision was exceptional and should be regarded as evidence of our wish not to let this episode sour our otherwise good relations nor to make the legitimate work of the Soviet community more difficult. He would not imply in any way that the ratchet had been discarded for ever. He would say that we would be watching very closely how the Russians made use of this concession: if they simply sought to refill the posts with KGB and GRU officers, we would not hesitate to use the ratchet again.

In addition, the Foreign Secretary believes that there is a case for a personal message from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev at the time of the expulsions. This, too, might help to minimise the impact of the expulsions on relations. A draft is attached. If the Prime Minister is content, we would instruct Sir Rodric Braithwaite to deliver the text of the letter at the same time as Sir Patrick Wright takes action with the Soviet Ambassador here.

As to the Czechs, even though a Press Attache is amongst the four to go the Foreign Secretary believes that there is a reasonable chance of avoiding publicity - if action is taken against them separately and later. Given that they have in the past tended not to retaliate on a one-for-one basis where there has been no publicity, the Foreign Secretary recommends that the Czech Ambassador should be told that we do not intend to publicise the expulsions. To further reduce the risk of retaliation, Sir Patrick Wright might tell the Czech Ambassador that if they do retaliate, we shall consider imposing a ceiling and ratchet system against them.

/Timing



SECRET AND PERSONAL

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C

Timing

Given that publicity for the Russian expulsions at least seems inevitable, the best timing for action against them would seem to be before the NATO Summit on 29-30 May.

There are therefore three possible dates - 12, 19 or 26 May. Of these, 26 May is a holiday (but not for the Russians); is very close to the NATO Summit, and could be misinterpreted as deliberately provocative. It also immediately precedes a visit to the Soviet Union by Mr Clarke scheduled for 28 May (although whenever we take action in this period this visit is vulnerable). 12 May is the last day of the London Information Forum and might well be seen as a deliberately cynical choice of timing. 19 May, on the other hand, means that our own action (and probable Soviet retaliation) will have taken place before the NATO Summit. This could assist our Summit purposes if Soviet retaliation, including the possible cancellation of Mr Clarke's visit, portrayed the Russians in a hostile and thoroughly old fashioned light.

The Foreign Secretary thinks therefore that the Russians should be told of our decision on 19 May.

Since the Czech expulsions do not involve the same operational considerations, we could take action against them in early June. This would allow a decent interval before the Foreign Secretary's visit to Prague, scheduled for 3 July, and would still precede Mr Gorbachev's visit to the FRG. But if, on the other hand, the Prime Minister decides, despite the arguments above, to take simultaneous action, the Czechs could easily go on 19 May.

The Foreign Secretary has considered whether the expulsions might disrupt our talks with the Czechs about Semtex; but this seems unlikely since it would necessitate them drawing attention to the expulsions and would only damage their image with the rest of the world.

Numbers

The Prime Minister will wish to know that the number of 11 Russians now to be expelled results from

/two

SECRET AND PERSONAL



two departures from the original 12 proposed and the addition of a KGB operational driver. The Director General referred to the latter when he saw the Prime Minister on 19 April. A revised list of those to be expelled is attached.

SNF

The question arises as to what effect the expulsions might have on German thinking over SNF. The likely answer is probably not very much. The West German public is all too used to spying scandals in their own country. And there will no doubt be accusations from some quarters, if only the media, that we have deliberately timed the expulsions to influence the debate on SNF. The German public wants to believe that the Soviet threat is disappearing and will probably tend to rationalise KGB activity as part of old thinking which has been predictably slow to bend to perestroika. Nevertheless, the expulsions might be helpful with some of the other Allies at the NATO Summit.

To sum up, the Foreign Secretary recommends that 11 Russians and 4 Czech officials should be expelled in two separate actions, the first being against the Russians on Friday 19 May. The Czechs would be expelled about two weeks later. Neither event should be publicised in order to try to minimise their impact on bilateral relations. In addition we hope that the Prime Minister will agree to sending a personal message to Mr Gorbachev along the attached lines. The Home Secretary agrees with these recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would let me know whether the Prime Minister would be content to proceed on this basis. If so, we shall, of course, let you have copies of the relevant Aides Memoire, Speaking Notes and Press Lines nearer the time action is to be taken.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director General of the Security Service.

Jaws,


J S Wall

Private Secretary

SECRET AND PERSONAL

E.

LIST OF PROPOSED SOVIET EXPELLEES

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SECRET

F.

LIST OF PROPOSED CZECHOSLOVAK EXPELLEES

[REDACTED] - age 39
Press Attache
Identified FMV Intelligence Officer

[REDACTED] - age 36
Technical Adviser, Commercial Section
Identified FMV Intelligence Officer

[REDACTED] - age 38
2nd Secretary, Scientific and Technical Attache
Identified FMV Co-opted worker

[REDACTED] - age 35
3rd Secretary, Political
Identified FMW Intelligence Officer

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SECRET

Date 18 May



Send to
Stephen Wall, FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

~~Debbie A.~~

~~Cd. you please
hold on to
this until we
arrive a decision
from FCO on
the date.~~

Date 18 May

→ FCO

Stephen Wall

CDI
9/15

DSF (Revised Sept 85)

SECRET

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teletype~~/~~dispatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Copies to:

slhbfj

~~TOP SECRET~~

Secret

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

We have established the practice of speaking frankly about any subject, however wide our differences. This has done much to reduce the climate of suspicion which characterised the past. I am writing to you now in that spirit. I do not intend to disclose the contents of this letter.

I have today approved a decision which I had hoped not to take. As your advisers know well, successive British Governments have pursued a resolute and consistent policy over the presence in Britain of representatives of the Soviet Intelligence Services.

/I

Enclosures flag(s)

SECRET

SECRET

I had hoped that the action taken by my Government in 1985 would clear away, once and for all, a major obstacle both in British/Soviet relations, and to the creation of more cooperative and friendly relationships in Europe. I have been disappointed. Your country's intelligence services have, step by step, reconstructed their staff in London. Their operatives have engaged in activities which no Government could accept. We have expressed our concern repeatedly and at many levels. No corrective action has been taken by the Soviet side, and we are left with no alternative but to require the removal of certain intelligence officers whose activities in Britain have nothing to do with their stated purpose for being in Britain and are hostile to our security.

We welcome representatives of your growing political, commercial, cultural and press interests in Britain. Their presence here is important to our expanding relationship. The presence of your intelligence officers works in precisely the opposite direction.

/I have

SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....

In Confidence

I have decided to depart from our previous practice and not to foreclose the posts occupied by the departing intelligence personnel, in the expectation that these posts will in future be occupied by Soviet officials engaged extensively and openly in the promotion of legitimate business. I have also given instructions that publicity for the removal of your intelligence personnel is not to be given by any British official. These have not been easy decisions. But they are intended to offer a positive way forward. I shall be looking for a similarly positive approach from the Soviet side.

I am sorry that I have to write to you in this vein, so soon after your outstandingly successful visit to London. But I would be wrong to conceal from you my deep concern about a problem we should surely put behind us.

RESTRICTED



T6
M. G. M.

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

4 May 1989

From the Private Secretary

See Liked.

SOVIET MINISTER OF NUCLEAR POWER

The Prime Minister has given Lord Marshall of Goring a commitment that she would see the Soviet Minister of Nuclear Power when he visits the United Kingdom in early July.

I understand that Mr. Lukonin will be here from 8-16 July. The Prime Minister could see him at 15.30 on 10 July. But before confirming this, I should be grateful to know that you and the Department of Energy are content.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Haddrill, (Department of Energy).

you directly

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

2

RESTRICTED

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SIC EMA/EMC/EME

SOVIET INTERNAL: GEORGIA *ms*

SUMMARY

1. A MEMBER OF THE MEDICAL COMMISSION EXAMINING THE VICTIMS OF 9 APRIL STATES CATEGORICALLY THAT A POISONOUS GAS, AND NOT JUST TEAR GAS, WAS USED. MORE THAN 100 PEOPLE NOW SUFFERING FROM ITS EFFECTS. THE MILITARY STILL REFUSING TO IDENTIFY THE GAS OR ADMIT IT WAS USED. BITTERNESS IN GEORGIA GROWING.

DETAIL

2. ON 27 APRIL TWO MEMBERS OF CHANCERY ATTENDED AN INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL BRIEFING ORGANISED FOR SOME SOVIET JOURNALISTS ON RECENT EVENTS IN GEORGIA. THOSE PRESENT INCLUDED SHENGELIYA, CHAIRMAN OF THE GEORGIAN WRITERS UNION, AND MEMBER OF THE GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION INVESTIGATING THE EVENTS OF 9 APRIL, AND A GEORGIAN DOCTOR WHO HAD BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN TENDING THE VICTIMS OF 9 APRIL AND WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE MEDICAL INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION. AMATEUR VIDEOS OF THE BREAKING UP OF THE DEMONSTRATION AND INCLUDING INTERVIEWS WITH HOSPITALISED SURVIVORS, WERE SHOWN.

3. THE MAIN INTEREST OF THE BRIEFING LAY IN WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT THE USE OF GAS. THE DOCTOR SAID THAT LEADING TOXICOLOGISTS FROM LENINGRAD AND MOSCOW HAD VISITED TBILISI, EXAMINED THE PATIENTS AND SIGNED A STATEMENT THAT THEY WERE SUFFERING FROM CHEMICAL POISONING: AND THAT THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH THEIR SYMPTOMS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY TEAR GAS IN WHATEVER QUANTITIES IT HAD BEEN USED. ACCORDING TO THE DOCTOR, THE ARMY AND MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR WERE STILL DENYING THAT ANY GAS HAD BEEN USED EXCEPT THE CHERMUKHA TEAR GAS (OUR TELNO 700). WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE MILITARY, IT WAS PROVING IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY THE GAS USED, AND HENCE TO DECIDE ON THE METHOD OF TREATMENT FOR ITS VICTIMS.

4. THEIR NUMBER WAS CONTINUING TO INCREASE. THERE WERE NOW OVER 100 PEOPLE IN HOSPITAL SUFFERING FROM CHEMICAL POISONING. THE GAS USED WAS HEAVY AND WAS STILL ACTIVE. IT WAS COLLECTING IN BASEMENTS OF BUILDINGS. ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO A GROUP OF SCHOOLCHILDREN HAD BEEN ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL BECAUSE ONE OF THEIR CLASSROOMS WAS AFFECTED. THE SYMPTOMS OF THOSE POISONED WERE VARIED, AND WERE PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS PHYSICAL. THE GAS AFFECTED THE NERVOUS SYSTEM AND CAUSED BREATHING DIFFICULTIES. SOME WERE SUFFERING FROM HYSTERIA AND VARIOUS FORMS OF PSYCHOSIS. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL HOW MANY OF THE ORIGINAL 16 DEATHS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY CHEMICAL POISONING. APPARENTLY THE AUTOPSIES WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT DID NOT PROVE THINGS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. BUT THE TWO WHO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY DIED IN HOSPITAL HAD DEFINITELY BEEN POISONED BY GAS. THE DOCTOR CONFIRMED THAT 14 OF THE ORIGINAL 16 DEAD HAD BEEN WOMEN AND AGED FROM 16 TO 70.

5. THE VIDEO SHOWED AN INTERVIEW WITH A GEORGIAN HOSPITALISED BECAUSE OF THE GAS WHO SAID HE RECOGNISED IT BECAUSE HE HAD USED IT IN AFGHANISTAN. IT INDUCED PARALYSIS FOR ONE OR TWO MINUTES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST THE AFTER-EFFECTS WHICH HAD TO BE ADMINISTERED WITHIN SIX HOURS. THERE WAS NO CORROBORATION OF THIS IN OTHER INTERVIEWS.

6. ALTOGETHER, 1,117 PEOPLE HAD SOUGHT MEDICAL TREATMENT AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION. 343 HAD BEEN HOSPITALISED. FOUR OF THE GAS VICTIMS WERE STILL IN A CRITICAL CONDITIONS. SOME OF THE STUDENTS WHO HAD BEEN ON HUNGERSTRIKE HAD BEEN AFFECTED BY THE GAS AND WERE ALSO IN A BAD STATE. THERE WERE WILD RUMOURS GOING AROUND ABOUT THE LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE GAS - INCLUDING THAT IT CAUSED IMPOTENCE.

7. THE VIDEO FILMS BEGAN WITH EXTENSIVE SHOTS OF A PEACEFUL CROWD SINGING HYMNS AND SAYING PRAYERS. THE PATRIARCH, WHO HAD CLEARLY BEEN WARNED THAT THE TROOPS WERE ABOUT TO MOVE IN, PLEADED WITH THE CROWD TO DISPERSE TO AVOID 'THE VERY SERIOUS AND IMMEDIATE DANGER'. TANKS WERE SEEN APPROACHING THE SQUARE TO THE CHANTS AND JEERS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS. SOME DEMONSTRATORS KICKED AND THREW STICKS AND STONES AT THE TANKS WHILST OTHERS APPEARED TO BE MARSHALLING THE CROWD TO A SAFE DISTANCE.

8. WHAT ENSUED WAS UNCLEAR, THOUGH RIOT POLICE WITH PERSPEX SHIELDS WERE LINED UP FACING DEMONSTRATORS AND MOVING THEM BACK. ONLY ONE OR TWO INSTANCES OF SHOVELS BEING WIELDED BY TROOPS WERE CAUGHT ON THE FILM. A COMMENTATOR AT THE MEETING WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT ON 9 APRIL

POINTED OUT WHAT HE SAID WERE TROOPS DELIBERATELY ENCIRCLING AND BEATING A PORTION OF THE CROWD. BUT THIS WAS NOT SELF-EVIDENT FROM THE FILM. A SUBSEQUENT SECTION OF THE FILM WAS SHOT INSIDE THE MORTUARY. ONLY ONE OR TWO OF THE DEAD HAD OBVIOUSLY BLOODY WOUNDS, ALTHOUGH THE FILM COMMENTARY AND AUDIENCE REPEATED CLAIMS ABOUT THE USE OF SHOVELS.

9. THERE WERE ALSO VIDEO INTERVIEWS WITH HOSPITALISED SURVIVORS INCLUDED ONE WITH WITH A MEMBER OF THE GEORGIAN MILITIA WHO SAID HE HAD BEEN BEATEN WITH TRUNCHEONS WHILST TRYING TO HELP WOMEN TO SAFETY. THERE WAS AN INTERVIEW WITH A YOUNG TEENAGER WHO HAD BEEN SHOT THE DAY AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION, PRESUMABLY DURING THE CURFEW SEMICOLON FILM OF A SOLDIER SHOOTING AT A CAR PASSENGER ATTEMPTING TO FILM A TANK SEMICOLON AND AN INTERVIEW WITH A GEORGIAN WHO HAD BEEN BEATEN UNCONSCIOUS AND HAD HAD BOTH ARMS BROKEN FOR FAILING TO PRODUCE HIS IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO PATROLLING TROOPS.

CONCLUSION

10. THIS WAS AN EMOTIONAL MEETING WITH A NUMBER OF GEORGIANS PRESENT. ALLOWANCE HAS TO BE MADE FOR THAT IT WAS DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO PRESENT THE GEORGIAN CASE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MILITARY ARE PAINTING THEMSELVES INTO AN INCREASINGLY AWKWARD CORNER. THE INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION MAY NOW CONCLUDE THAT A POISONOUS GAS WAS USED. AND SHEVARDNADZE AND OTHERS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO MAKE THE FINDINGS PUBLIC. THE MILITARY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN HELPING TO TREAT THE GAS VICTIMS WILL BE FURTHER INCREASING GEORGIAN BITTERNESS, AND FUELLING THE BELIEF, ALREADY APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD IN GEORGIA, THAT THE EVENTS OF 9 APRIL WERE DELIBERATELY ENGINEERED BY ''CERTGAIN FORCES'' IN MOSCOW. THE AFFAIR IS NOT GOING TO DIE DOWN.

11. A MEMBER OF CHANCERY HAS MANAGED TO GET TICKETS TO TBILISI FROM 2-4 MAY, AND THIS SHOULD PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION.

12. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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.CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)
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MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH

ADDITIONAL 13

ARMS CONTROL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

NNNN

Charles

1530 on
Monday 10
July AP 4/5

~~Amended~~
Oh dear! Can you
repose a line
please
WR

CENTRAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING BOARD

Sudbury House, 15 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AU. Telephone 01-634 5111

From the Chairman
The Lord Marshall of Goring Kt, CBE, FRS

28 April 1989

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
Cabinet Office,
10 Downing Street,
London,
SW1

STRICTLY PERSONAL

R315

Dear Prime Minister,

In our conversation at lunch on Wednesday you generously volunteered to meet the Minister of nuclear power from the USSR, Minister Lukonin.

He will be with us from Saturday, 8 July to Sunday, 16 July. He will be visiting my home in Oxfordshire both weekends and will spend the week travelling the country looking at nuclear facilities, and spending some time here in London. If you could meet him for a few minutes either here in London, or at Chequers, he would go home a very proud and happy man. But I shall say nothing whatever to him in advance for fear your diary is too crowded or the appointment is cancelled at the last minute.

For your background information, Minister Lukonin was appointed to his present post by President Gorbachev after the Chernobyl accident. He reports to the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister Shcherbina, who is the senior man at the Kremlin in charge of energy in general.

I believe Lukonin and Shcherbina to be pro-Gorbachev men. I am certain that the people immediately under Lukonin are extremely pro-Gorbachev.

I am copying this letter to no-one.

Yours sincerely,

Walter Marshall

Marshall of Goring

cc PC
BT




PRESS LINE: GORDIEVSKY

- confirm that we have raised the case of Gordievsky's wife and two young daughters with the Russians a number of times, and at a number of levels, on a humanitarian basis as a family reunification case.
- we have pressed the Russians for a long time to resolve all Anglo/Soviet family reunification cases and have made considerable progress. This is most welcome.
- what we have proposed for the Gordievsky family is that they should all meet in Britain to decide their future.
- Britain has placed no obstacles in the way of families of British defectors who wish to visit the USSR.
- it is neither surprising nor embarrassing that we should have raised this with the Russians, who have an obligation undertaken at the recent Vienna CSCE meeting to allow family members to travel.
- not prepared to go into further details.

[If asked whether Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary will raise this during Mr Gorbachev's visit]

- cannot go into details of what the Prime Minister/Foreign Secretary will raise but cannot exclude that this will be one of the subjects.

As necessary

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W. W. W.



see memo
etc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

27 April 1989

From the Private Secretary

see Stephen,

The Prime Minister has read with great interest your Secretary of State's minute of 25 April about his visit to the Soviet Union and is most grateful to him for reporting so fully.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary and Trade Secretary.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES D. POWELL

Stephen Haddrill, Esq.,
Department of Energy

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SOVIET INTERNAL: CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, 25 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. ONE DAY PLENUM HONOURABLY RETIRES A LARGE AMOUNT OF DEAD WOOD FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THIS IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE PARTY. BUT IT WILL LESSEN OPPOSITION TO REFORM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

DETAIL

2. THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MET FOR ONE DAY ON 25 APRIL. IT ACCEPTED A REQUEST FROM 110 FULL AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND MEMBERS OF THE REVISION COMMISSISON TO BE RELIEVED OF THEIR DUTIES ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ALL THOSE LEAVING THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD PREVIOUSLY RETIRED FROM THEIR OFFICIAL PARTY OR GOVERNMENT JOBS. IN A SHORT OPENING SPEECH GORBACHEV THANKED THOSE DEPARTING FOR THEIR SERVICES. A FURTHER 20 PEOPLE SPOKE, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE RETIRING.

3. THE PLENUM ALSO PROMOTED 24 CANDIDATE MEMBERS TO FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE PARTY RULES PREVENT GORBACHEV FROM BRINGING OUTSIDERS INTO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. PLENUMS CAN ONLY PROMOTE CANDIDATE TO FULL MEMBERS. OPPORTUNITIES TO COOPT HIS OWN MEN IN PLACE OF THOSE RETIRING WERE THEREFORE LIMITED. MANY OF THOSE PROMOTED ARE WORKERS ABOUT WHOM WE KNOW NOTHING: OF THE OTHERS, MOST SEEM TO FIT GENERALLY INTO THE GORBACHEV MOULD. THEY INCLUDE VELIKHOV, A VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PRIMAKOV, THE DIRECTOR OF THE IMEMO INSTITUTE, AND FALIN, THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NOW REDUCED FROM 307 TO 257 FULL MEMBERS. OVER HALF THE CURRENT REGIONAL PARTY FIRST SECRETARIES AND FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE BALTIC AND CAUCASIAN REPUBLICS ARE STILL NOT MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

4. MOST OF THE 110 RETIRED MEMBERS ARE OLD FIGURES FROM THE BREZHNEV DAYS. THEY INCLUDE TWO FORMER POLITBURO MEMBERS, GROMYKO AND SOLOMENTSEV, WHO RETIRED LAST YEAR. THEY ALSO INCLUDE A FEW RECENTLY DISGRACED FIGURES SUCH AS THE FORMER PARTY BOSSES OF ARMENIA AND AZERBAIDJAN DISMISSED LAST YEAR. BUT NONE OF THE DEFEATED AT THE POLLS ARE INVOLVED. THIS IS NOT THEREFORE A POST-ELECTION PURGE -

PAGE 1
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*All of whom
came
to
London*

BUT THE REMOVAL OF DEAD WOOD. NEVERTHELESS, THE OLD BREZHNEV HANDS AS LONG AS THEY REMAINED IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE COULD HELP SLOW THE PROCESS OF PERESTROIKA. LAST MONTH'S AGRICULTURAL PLENUM COULD WELL HAVE BEEN AN EXAMPLE OF THIS. THIS RATHER ELEGANT OPERATION SHALL MAKE IT EASIER IN FUTURE FOR GORBACHEV TO GET REFORMS THROUGH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IT ALSO ENABLES HIM TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS KEEPING THE REFORM MOMENTUM GOING.

5. THE FULL TEXT OF THE PLENUM PROCEEDINGS INCLUDING GORBACHEV'S CLOSING REMARKS IS TO BE PUBLISHED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MAIN THEME WAS THE PERFORMANCE OF PARTY OFFICIALS IN THE MARCH ELECTIONS. TWO NOTABLE VICTIMS, SOLOVIEV, THE LENINGRAD PARTY CHIEF, AND SAIKIN, THE MAYOR OF MOSCOW, BOTH SPOKE AT THE PLENUM. BUT RUMORS THAT THEY AND OTHERS WOULD SUFFER DEMOTION AT THIS PLENUM HAVE PROVED UNFOUNDED. INDEED ONE OF THE PLENUM'S PURPOSES SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO REASSURE ELECITON VICTIMS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PURGE FORM MOSCOW. MEDVEDEV STRESSED AGAIN AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE PLENUM THAT THE POSITION OF THESE OFFICIALS SHOULD BE DECIDED BY LOCAL AND NOT CENTRAL PARTY BODIES.

BRAITHWAITE

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MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Soviet Central Committee Plenum

Yesterday's Plenum resulted in the removal from the Party's Central Committee and Auditing Commission of nearly all the officially designated pensioners on those bodies (some were said to have been too ill to sign the common address of resignation). The figures are: 74 resignations of full members of the Central Committee (out of a total of 301); 24 candidate members (out of 157), and 12 members of the Auditing Commission (out of 82).

2. The reason why there were so many pensioners in the Party's leading policy-making bodies in the first place lies in the fact that the Central Committee and Auditing Commission are elected at Party Congresses. The latest Party Congress took place in February/March 1986, when Gorbachev had been in power for less than a year and was not strong enough to dispose of all the Brezhnev era officials. Since then, he has achieved the retirement of most of them. But apart from a few who have been expelled from the Central Committee because they have been facing criminal charges, loss of job has not entailed loss of Central Committee status. The Central Party bodies have thus been peopled with an increasing number of "dead souls". Gorbachev wanted the Party Conference in June/July 1988 to rectify this situation, but, as he acknowledged yesterday, the idea was rejected.

3. In place of the 110 removed, a mere 24 have been promoted from candidate to full membership of the Central Committee. The reason again lies in the Party Rules, which allow for such promotions between Congresses, but not for the co-opting of new members from outside the existing

Central Committee. The promotees include some undoubted supporters of Gorbachev, particularly in the foreign affairs field, but also some token workers, one of whom was among those attacking Eltsin at the last Plenum and is probably not well-disposed towards Gorbachev.

4. Gorbachev has been hinting since January that a Plenum was due in April, but had previously linked it with the forthcoming Congress of People's Deputies, which has now been postponed till late May. He may, therefore, have exploited the opportunity to hold a different Plenum from the one originally envisaged in order to force through the radical pruning of the Central Committee which he has long desired. The Party's poor showing at the recent elections will have given him the necessary ammunition.

5. The changes strengthen Gorbachev's position. They have eliminated the latent possibility of the remaining Brezhnevites mounting a coup against him in the Central Committee. But Gorbachev will still have to wait till the next Party Congress (due in 1991) before he can radically revamp the Central Committee. Whether the rejuvenation and slimming down of the Party's leading bodies will have a palpable effect on the popular view of the Party remains to be seen. Gorbachev's similar exercise last September, when he removed the elderly from the top leadership, did not have much effect on popular perceptions, to judge by the election results.



PERCY CRADOCK

26 April 1989

Prime Minister

VISIT TO THE USSR

As you know, I visited the Soviet Union earlier this month to open the British Soviet Chamber of Commerce Month and to promote trade in the energy sector.

I was struck most forcibly by the change in the attitudes of the Soviet Government and people since I last made an official visit in 1979. Almost everybody I met, from Deputy Prime Minister Kamentsev to a power station manager, was eager to discuss openly the problems facing them. President Gorbachev has quite remarkably removed the people's fear of its Government within only three years. It was also clear that he has been successful in promoting younger and more far-sighted men into positions of power across a broad spectrum of Ministries. Of the four Ministers I met with responsibilities for different parts of the energy sector, only Schadov, the coal minister, was of the old school.

The rapid opening of public debate had, however, given expression to public discontent on a scale which the Government is finding hard to deal with. This was demonstrated during my discussions on nuclear power. They are determined to expand their nuclear programme by over 50% (it presently accounts for 12% of electricity generation and is planned to reach 20% by 2000) but each Soviet has a power of veto over new stations being built in their areas, which they now appear keen to exercise. The Government has also had to close the nuclear power station in Armenia even though it was completely untouched by the earthquake. Mr Lukonin, the Minister for Atomic Energy, emphasised that this decision was due to the extent of public concern about the possible effect of another earthquake and not because the Government believed there was any threat to safety. Mr Lukonin and other Ministers repeatedly questioned me about the

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Jim Hunter

CDD
26/4.

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way in which we dealt with public opposition to nuclear power and how we were able to pursue a new nuclear programme despite the public disquiet after Chernobyl. The deputy nuclear Minister had in fact spent some time at Hinkley Point learning about our inquiry process. I suspect that some Soviet Ministers below Gorbachev and the Politburo lack the experience needed to take on an open political debate effectively and are perhaps uncertain about exercising strong leadership in the new climate.

A number of Ministers also stressed the commitment of the Soviet Government to environmental protection and in particular the need to reduce CO₂ and SO₂ emissions from power stations. There was concern about the greenhouse effect and about more local problems caused by the poor emission controls on their power plants and major factories. They emphasised the unique contribution which nuclear power can make to solving these problems, and it was partly for this reason, that the public concern about nuclear power disturbed them. They fully endorsed the need for a concerted international effort to find solutions. They also agreed with me that the most intractable problems lay with the Third World and the conflict between economic growth and industrialisation on the one hand and the restraint of carbon emissions on the other. I believe this is an area where we will find much common ground with the Soviets. I believe that you would find it a constructive subject for discussion when you next meet President Gorbachev.

On the trade front, the BSCC month and exhibition was well organised, had a strong UK presence, and appeared to be attracting a good audience of senior managers from Russian industry. Good progress has already been made in the energy sector. Since 1986 my Department has been trying to promote trade in a series of Anglo/Soviet working groups. The USSR

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is rapidly expanding and modernising its power plant industry, and oil and gas are key foreign exchange earners which are being exploited as quickly as possible. However, the working groups have met with varying degrees of success and one of my objectives was to stimulate greater discussion within them of practical ways of increasing trade in this sector. I was pleased to be able to agree that plant manufacturers should in future be included in the discussions of the key electricity group, and that there should be some restructuring on the Soviet side of the oil group to promote discussion of practical opportunities. These groups are a particularly good forum for the discussion of joint venture arrangements, which can, of course, be a useful means of overcoming the USSR's chronic shortage of hard currency.

I also took with me a group of businessmen from major companies, including John Brown, Taylor Woodrow, Rolls Royce and GEC, who have been collaborating with Russian industry for some time and J. P. Kenney who signed contracts for offshore supply equipment whilst we were there. My objective was to introduce them to senior Soviet Ministers and give them an opportunity to raise any problems they had encountered in trading with the USSR. I believe they felt the visit was very constructive. Mr Kamentsev was most helpful in dealing with their problems and ensuring that the appropriate officials were asked to resolve any problems. Most were also able to arrange to give detailed presentations on their companies to the various Ministries.

The Soviets continue to show great interest in barter trade. It is, of course, a key way of overcoming their currency shortage. Here again I was able to help the businessmen overcome some of the obstacles mounted by Soviet officialdom. The potential for counter trade in the energy sector is high. The Soviets are

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particularly keen to export gas to the UK and David Young and you may find this pressed on you. Our policy has historically been to favour the development of the North Sea over foreign imports but I have not ruled out their proposal. I have explained to them that as a result of our past policy the UK gas market is fully supplied for the foreseeable future. However, I have also pointed out that the restructuring of the electricity industry is already bringing forward new proposals for power stations burning gas and I should have no objection to the Soviet Union negotiating to supply this new market.

Overall, the visit convinced me that there are great benefits to be earned by UK Ministers with responsibility for sponsoring a particular industrial sector bringing British businessmen and the Soviet Government together. It gives the businessmen an otherwise impossible opportunity to meet the decision takers and cut through the bureaucracy, which, despite Perestroika, is still immense and ponderous. I also believe that the Russian Ministers are often surprised by the competitiveness of our companies and by their drive and willingness to co-operate; direct contact does much to break down the sorry picture which British industry earned for itself in earlier decades.

On the political front Gorbachev has made immense strides forward but the task is still enormous. The party and the Government have built a structure which protects itself against change. Gorbachev has, for example, told local Communist party chiefs to cut the size of their organisations; they have responded by moving party workers into local government and so control their area as before. The coal ministry has 2.5 million employees, not only mining coal and manufacturing equipment but growing the food these people need and running a complex retail organisation; the Ministry is effectively self-sufficient and impervious to the outside world.

These institutions will take time to reorganise: the question is whether the people, burdened by a dead economy but excited by political reform, will be prepared to wait.


I am copying this to Geoffrey Howe, David Young and Sir Rodric Braithwaite. I should particularly like to thank Sir Rodric for his invaluable advice and for the tremendous assistance which he and the embassy as a whole gave me during my visit.

C.P.

Secretary of State for Energy

21 April 1989

CAFPS



CAF
24/24

Coldham Hall, Stanningfield, Suffolk
Tel: 0284 828 559

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

21st April 1989

Dear Charles,

Gorbachev's Pan European All-Party Conference

I said yesterday that I thought that the EDU had been making the wrong noises about the above. In fact I now understand they have said nothing at all. I think it will be helpful if they did. They should publically oppose the conference until "multi partyism" (described by Gorbachev as rubbish) is established in the Soviet Union.

It would be very nice to see you and Carla here for or over one weekend, if you are ever allowed time off.

No need to acknowledge this.

David Hart

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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From the Private Secretary

21 April 1989

9a

EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE
SOVIET AND CZECH EMBASSIES

I am sure you will have noticed there was a rather crucial misprint in my letter of 19 April on this subject. I enclose a corrected version for your records.

I am copying this letter to Colin Walters (Home Office) and to the Director-General of the Security Service.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Jo

The Great Britain—USSR Association

A company limited by guarantee

R21/4
14 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HW

Director J C Q Roberts

Tel 01-235 2116

CF for Kiev file

CD
21/4.

Mr Charles Powell
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AA

20 April 1989

Dear Mr Powell,

Following our conversation yesterday I have prepared for Bernard Ingham at his request a background note on the British 'show' next year in Kiev for which this Association has the overall responsibility. In the hope that it might be helpful to you I am sending you a copy of it for reference purposes.

Yours sincerely,
J.C.Q. Roberts

J.C.Q. ROBERTS
Director

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BRITISH MONTH IN KIEV (provisional title)

June 1990

BACKGROUND

In 1966 a Soviet Week was held in Leeds under the auspices of the Great Britain-USSR Association. No reciprocity had been negotiated and it was not until 1978 that the Association managed to put on a return event - the British Week in Novosibirsk.

Ever since then the Soviets pressed us for another Soviet week in Britain. In view of the state of relations in the period following the intervention in Afghanistan, the Association declined to proceed.

The upturn in relations following Mr Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984, itself stemming originally from an Association initiative, made it possible for the question of an exchange of Weeks to be considered afresh. In April 1986 the Association opened discussions with the Soviet side. Partly due to their being obstructive about our insistence on a reciprocal deal this time round, it was not until February 1987 that the Association finally signed the agreement covering a Soviet Week in Birmingham in 1988 and a British Week in Kiev in 1990. Thus it was possible for a mention of this to be included in the Memorandum of Understanding signed during the Prime Minister's visit to the USSR in March 1987.

The Soviet Week in Birmingham eventually ran to a month, and in January 1989, when the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Adamishin, called on the Association, he confirmed that the British side too could run to a month.

...../cont

The Great Britain - USSR Association

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14 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HW

Director J.C.Q. Roberts

Tel 01-235 2116

- 2 -

PLANS FOR KIEV JUNE 1990

There will be a centrepiece exhibition, organised and funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, intended primarily to give a picture of contemporary Britain as a successful, innovative and modern state. One of the major cultural events, presuming contracts are signed as anticipated, will be the opening in Kiev of the ENO's Soviet tour. They plan to play Handel's 'Xerxes' on 7 and 9 June, and Britten's 'Turn of the Screw' on 8 and 10 June.

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We intend to feature in a way yet to be decided both Birmingham, which hosted the Soviet Festival in 1988 and Edinburgh, which expects to sign a twinning agreement with Kiev during 1989. A decision will be taken about the possibility of industrial/commercial involvement in the Kiev event in the light of participating companies' assessments of the British Business Month in Moscow in April 1989.

The Association's Chairman, Director and Projects Controller plan to visit Moscow and Kiev in June 1989 to reach more detailed agreements covering the above, as well as other proposals under consideration. The Princess Royal has indicated her willingness to open the British Month in Kiev and it is expected that the Association's President, Lord Whitelaw, will also be present.



JCQR/VH 20.4.89

Attachment

Association's Annual Report 1988 (see page 7 for summary of Soviet Festival in Birmingham)

BRITISH MONTH IN KIEV (provisional title)

June 1990

BACKGROUND

In 1966 a Soviet Week was held in Leeds under the auspices of the Great Britain-USSR Association. No reciprocity had been negotiated and it was not until 1978 that the Association managed to put on a return event - the British Week in Novosibirsk.

Ever since then the Soviets pressed us for another Soviet week in Britain. In view of the state of relations in the period following the intervention in Afghanistan, the Association declined to proceed.

The upturn in relations following Mr Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984, itself stemming originally from an Association initiative, made it possible for the question of an exchange of Weeks to be considered afresh. In April 1986 the Association opened discussions with the Soviet side. Partly due to their being obstructive about our insistence on a reciprocal deal this time round, it was not until February 1987 that the Association finally signed the agreement covering a Soviet Week in Birmingham in 1988 and a British Week in Kiev in 1990. Thus it was possible for a mention of this to be included in the Memorandum of Understanding signed during the Prime Minister's visit to the USSR in March 1987.

The Soviet Week in Birmingham eventually ran to a month, and in January 1989, when the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Adamishin, called on the Association, he confirmed that the British side too could run to a month.

...../cont

The Great Britain - USSR Association

A company limited by guarantee

14 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HW

Director J.C.Q. Roberts

Tel 01-235 2116

- 2 -

PLANS FOR KIEV JUNE 1990

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
THE
GREAT BRITAIN
USSR
ASSOCIATION

Annual Report
1988

The Association was founded in 1959 with the aim of fostering on a politically impartial basis professional, cultural and human contacts of all kinds between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It is a British organisation and works in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through which it receives an annual grant-in-aid, and the British Council. It is also in touch with official bodies in the USSR and with the Soviet Embassy in London. It enjoys the active support of the British Government and of the Opposition. Its Council includes representatives of a large number of British organisations covering most of the main fields of our national life, including professional, educational and artistic bodies, businesses and trade unions. The services it offers to its members include receptions in London and at our branches throughout the country to enable members to meet visitors from the USSR, the use of an extensive library, lectures and film shows, and the provision of information and advice to researchers and to those wishing to visit the USSR. There are regular circulars providing information concerning Association activities and other matters of interest to members, who also receive free of charge our periodical *Britain-USSR* a vehicle for informed and independent writing on the Soviet Union for the general reader. Membership of the Association is not confined to those with specialist knowledge.


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The Great Britain-USSR Association

14 Grosvenor Place, London SW1X 7HW



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The Rt Hon Viscount Whitelaw CH MC

Past Presidents

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The Rt Hon Lord Wilson of Rievaulx
KG OBE FRS

Vice-Presidents

The Most Rev and Rt Hon Lord
Archbishop of Canterbury MC
Sir John Lawrence Bt OBE
Sir Frank Roberts
GCMG GCVO
The Rt Hon Lord Shackleton
KG OBE

Chairman

Sir Curtis Keeble GCMG


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KCMG MP (Con)
The Rt Hon John Smith QC MP (Lab)
John Cartwright MP (SDP)
Sir Russell Johnston MP (SLD)

Hon Treasurer

G FN Reddaway CBE

Headquarters Staff



Director

John C O Roberts

Projects Controller

Anne Vaughan

Projects Assistant

William Powell

Librarian/Editor of *Britain-USSR*

Gwyneth Learner

Membership Secretary

Adele Nicholson

Secretarial Assistant

Virginia Halewood

Accountant

Harold Kahn

Council

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Sir Isaiah Berlin OM CBE
The Rt Hon Lord Bottomley
of Middlesborough OBE
Professor A D P Briggs
Oswald Bursin
Victoria Charlton*
Ian Christie*
Winston Churchill MP
Tom Clarke CBE JP MP
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Professor A G Cross
Sir David Crouch
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Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
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Terry Doyle*
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Colin McMillan
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John Pinder OBE
George Robertson MP
Geoffrey Robinson MP
Mary Seton-Watson
Peter Temple-Morris MP
George Walden CMG MP
Kenneth Warren MP
Elizabeth Wilson
David Winter OBE

Organisations

Association of Teachers
of Russian
British Academy
BBC
British Council
British-Soviet Chamber
of Commerce
British Association for Soviet
and East European Studies
Central Bureau for Educational
Visits and Exchanges
CBI
Courtauld
Fellowship of Engineering
English Centre of PEN
International
Rank Xerox
School of Slavonic and East
European Studies
TUC

* Denotes member of Executive Committee

Corporate Members

We wish to thank the following companies for their continuing support of our work:

APV	Hawker Siddeley International
Barry Martin Group	John Brown
BPCC Group Services	John Spiers Publishing
Courtaulds	Marlar International
Davy Corporation	MB Group
Department of Trade & Industry	McKenna & Co
Entertainment Corporation	Morgan Grenfell & Co
GEC	Rank Xerox
Harold Holt	Rolls Royce
	Theodore Goddard



We also gratefully acknowledge cooperation during 1988 from:

All-Union Musical Society, Moscow	Royal Institute of International Affairs
Association of Teachers of Russian	Royal Society
BAFTA	School of Slavonic & East European Studies
Birmingham City Council	Selly Oak Hospital
British Embassy, Moscow	Sovexportfilm
British Film Institute	Union of Architects of the USSR
Capital Radio	Union of Artists of the USSR
Central Office of Information	Union of Cinematographers
Central Television	Union of Journalists of the USSR
Cooper Estates	Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship
Council of Engineering Institutions	Union of Theatre Workers of the USSR
Department of Trade and Industry	Union of Writers of the USSR
Derbyshire County Council	United Farmers Ltd
East European Interchange	University of Birmingham
Embassy of the USSR	University of Bristol
Foreign & Commonwealth Office	University of Edinburgh
Granada Television	University of Exeter
Imperial College	University of Glasgow
Institute of State and Law, Moscow	Heriot Watt University
Law Society	University of Leeds
The Lord Chief Justice	University of Manchester
Lord Mayor of Birmingham	University of Nottingham
Lord Mayor of Swansea	University of Sheffield
Midland Bank	University of Strathclyde
Mullard Space Laboratory	University of Surrey
Museum of Modern Art, Oxford	University of Sussex
National Film Theatre	University College of Swansea
National Library of Scotland	Wells Cathedral
National Union of Journalists	
Pebble Mill Studios	
Queen's University of Belfast	
Polytechnic of Central London	



Statement by the Chairman

In last year's report I was optimistic about the possibility of the Association having resources more commensurate with the role it ought to play in a developing British-Soviet relationship. I am happy to say that my optimism has been justified and the following pages tell something of the Association's expanding activities over the last twelve months.

We were further strengthened during the year when Viscount Whitelaw did us the honour of agreeing to serve as the fifth in the distinguished line of Presidents of the Association. At the same time membership is growing, and all in all we can look forward with confidence to the future.



A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read "C. H. V. ...". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Chairman

Association Headquarters

At the beginning of this year the Association underwent a major review of its operations and staffing by the Foreign Office, the result of which was an increase in grant-in-aid to enable it to react to the increased interest in the Soviet Union and undertake more activity relating to bilateral projects. To effect this, the Association was authorised to recruit two new members of staff to cope with the increased workload: William Powell as Projects Assistant and Virginia Halewood as part-time Secretarial Assistant.

The Association was honoured that Lord Whitelaw agreed to become its new President. He was formally elected at the annual Council Meeting at the House of Commons in June. New Executive Committee and Council members were also elected including Professor Tony Briggs, University of Birmingham, George Walden CMG MP, Ralph French OBE, Director, East Europe Relations, ICI, Penelope Lively, author, and Barry Martin of Barry Martin Group, to whom we are indebted for his encouragement and assistance in the design of this year's Annual Report.

During the year staff have represented the Association on numerous occasions ranging from the Director attending the welcoming ceremony at the Guildhall for President Reagan on his arrival in London from the Moscow Summit to the Projects Controller and the Projects Assistant attending a live performance by the rock group Big Country at the Soviet Embassy. The Association has also received many visitors, both Soviet and British, at its headquarters. Apart from those mentioned later, these include the Mayor of Kiev and the new British Ambassador, Sir Roderic Braithwaite, prior to his taking up his post in Moscow.



Soviet Week

During the month of October the City of Birmingham was host to a Soviet Festival, the first part of an exchange of 'Weeks' under Association auspices, forming part of an inter-governmental agreement signed during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in April 1987. The second part will be a British Festival in Kiev in the summer of 1990. A delegation of Soviet VIPs led by the Deputy Prime Minister of the RSFSR, Leonid Gorshkov, attended the opening of the Festival. Also present were Lt General Vladimir Shatalov and Professor Svyatoslav Fyodorov (see also *Science*), Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, *Pravda* Political Observer, Professor Zoya Zarubina, Vice-President of the USSR-Great Britain Society, Oleg Ivanitsky, Vice-President of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries (SSOD), Nikolai Gubienko, Artistic Director of the Taganka Theatre, Larissa Vassilieva, poetess, and Mark Taimanov, chess master.

The following exhibitions from the Soviet Union were included in the Festival: *Restoration of Museum Treasures*, *Space Research*, *Children's Art* and *Painters of Soviet Russia*. Other activities included a trade forum involving the British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Birmingham Chamber of Industry and Commerce, a fashion show by Soviet designers from the Leningrad Fashion House which was staged in a central department store, over thirty simultaneous chess matches at the Council House and local schools, the showing of Soviet films at city cinemas, a telebridge between audiences in Birmingham and Kiev and performances in the city centre by a music and dance group from Zaporozhye, Birmingham's Soviet twin city.

Some members of the delegation also spent a few days in London and enjoyed the hospitality of the Association, including meetings arranged for them at Parliament and the Foreign Office.



The Millennium

The Association marked the Millennium of Christianity in Russia by inviting two distinguished speakers to address members. In February Metropolitan Anthony of Sourozh of the Cathedral of the Assumption and All Saints addressed the Annual General Meeting of the Association



and in October the Archbishop of Canterbury, who is also a Vice-President of the Association, spoke about his visit to the USSR in June for the Millennium celebrations.

The Association's Scottish Branch arranged an eight-strong church delegation led by the Bishop of Edinburgh, the Right Reverend Richard Holloway, and accompanied by the Branch's Chairman, Lt Cdr Dairmid Gunn. The aim of the visit was to convey the good wishes of the Scottish Episcopal Church to the Russian Orthodox Church on the occasion of its thousandth anniversary. Various meetings took place as well as visits to Zagorsk, Vladimir and Yaroslavl.


Law



Arkady Vaksberg

One of the most successful events this year was a colloquium on criminal law hosted and organised by the Association, in cooperation with barrister and Association member Brian Wrobel, and held at 14 Grosvenor Place. The Soviet delegation consisted of members of the Institute of State and Law, and was led by Deputy Director of the Institute, Professor Valery Savitsky, with Dr Igor Petrukhin, Dr Alexander Larin, Professor Evelina Melnikova and Vladimir Entin. Various members of the British legal profession attended the sessions held over four mornings, including the Lord Chief Justice, Shadow Chancellor John Smith QC MP, and a number of solicitors and barristers. The range of topics discussed was vast and the lively discussion demonstrated the genuine desire of the Soviet delegation to understand and implement in the Soviet Union certain aspects of the British legal system. Visits were also arranged to Crown and Magistrates' Courts, the Old Bailey, Gray's Inn, Hammersmith Police Station and Wormwood Scrubs. The delegation had an informal discussion with members of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group at the House of Commons and met people from the legal profession unable to attend the colloquium sessions at a reception held by the Law Society and at lunches and dinners hosted by the Association.

The lawyer and investigative journalist Arkady Vaksberg visited Britain in February as a guest of the Association. Mr Vaksberg's stamina was put to the test as his request to visit Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham and Cambridge as well as London in less than a week was fulfilled. Intensive one-day programmes were arranged by our local representatives enabling professionals in both journalism and law to meet him for discussions in these two areas, which are most certainly at the forefront of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. The Association would like to thank representatives Martin Dewhurst (Glasgow), Philip Radcliffe (Manchester), Professor Tony Briggs (Birmingham) and Kitty Stidworthy (Cambridge), for their help.



Literature



Anatoly Rybakov

In January the Association hosted a visit to the UK by the editor of *Novy Mir*, Sergei Zalygin, accompanied by his wife and Vladimir Stabnikov from the Union of Writers of the USSR. As Mr Zalygin is also a prominent environmentalist it was thought appropriate that he should spend a week outside London. Mr and Mrs Zalygin first travelled to South Wales with the Projects Controller, where the programme included a visit to a farm in the Brecon Beacons, specifically requested by Mr Zalygin, and a reception in Swansea for local members to meet him which was also attended by the Lord Mayor of Swansea. On the way to Exeter, the Archdeacon of Wells hosted a tea party for the group which then attended Evensong at Wells Cathedral. After a relaxing weekend in Exeter at the home of Dr Roger Cockrell and Mrs Cockrell, both Association members, the Zalygins went on to Bristol where they were the guests of Bristol University. Back in London Mr Zalygin was able to meet publishers and writers as well as members of the House of Commons Environment Select Committee. University Russian departments in Swansea, Bristol and London as well as members of the Association were privileged to hear Mr Zalygin talk frankly about literature and *perestroika*. Towards the end of the visit the Director took Mr and Mrs Zalygin to Oxford for the day. After a lunch hosted by the Association's Oxford representative, they called to see Lydia Pasternak Slater (see photo on page 14), sister of Boris Pasternak, whose novel *Dr Zhivago* had just been published for the first time in the USSR by Mr Zalygin. This highly successful visit could not have been achieved without the efforts of Association representatives Gareth Williams (South Wales), Dr Derek Offord (South West) and David Elliott (Oxford).

In May the Association hosted the London leg of a visit from another eminent figure in the literary world, Fazil Iskander (see photo on page 15), who was in Britain under Durham, Edinburgh and Glasgow University auspices. During his short visit Mr Iskander spent an evening at the Association giving a recital of his poems and talking about literature in the Soviet Union to an audience of members and guests. The Association was also pleased to host in December a talk on publishing in the Soviet Union by writer/journalist Arkady Vaksberg, who was visiting Britain privately. Our representative in Cambridge, Kitty Stidworthy, gave a lunch reception for the writer Andrei Bitov during his visit to Cambridge under British Council auspices.

The Association also organised visits for British writers to the Soviet Union. In May the Projects Controller took a group of British writers to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Union of Writers of the USSR. The group comprised Paul Bailey, Alan Bennett, Christopher Hope, Timothy Mo, Craig Raine and Sue Townsend. Apart from round table discussions with Soviet writers, visits to publishers were arranged as well as a reading by the writers from their own books to an audience of students at Moscow State University. The group also visited Lvov and Orel and met local writers. In September the group came to the Association to answer questions on the trip from an audience of members and guests.

Also in September the Scottish Branch of the Association arranged for the poet Ron Butlin to visit Moscow, Kiev and Tbilisi as the first in what is hoped will be a series of exchanges between Scottish and Soviet poets in conjunction with the Union of Writers of the USSR. Mr Butlin was accompanied by another poet, Tom Pow, whose trip was sponsored by the Scottish Arts Council. A comprehensive programme of recitals and meetings was arranged, principally with university students, in the three cities. Association staff have also given advice to other writers intending to travel to the Soviet Union independently and it was a particular pleasure to be approached by Sir Isaiah Berlin prior to his first visit to the Soviet Union for over thirty years.


To celebrate the forthcoming centenary of the birth of Anna Akhmatova a reading of her poetry was given at 14 Grosvenor Place by Sir Dimitri Obolensky (in Russian) and by Association member and translator of poetry Richard McKane and actor and playwright Margaret Robertson (in English). The Association also held a lunch reception to mark the publication in English by Century Hutchinson of Anatoly Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*, with Mr and Mrs Rybakov present themselves as well as Russian-speaking Association contacts in the literary world. Also well attended was a reception at 14 Grosvenor Place to launch a children's book *Focus on the Soviet Union*, written by Elizabeth Roberts and published by Hamish Hamilton.




Television and Film

In April the Association hosted with BAFTA a visit by a delegation of television programme-makers from the Soviet Union – a follow-on to the season of British television in Moscow and Tashkent in 1986. A group of six people from the world of creative television was selected by the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR. From Moscow: Yuri Beliankin (writer, producer and documentary film-maker), Alexander Proshkin (film director and producer at Mosfilm) and Yuri Bogomolov (television and film critic). From Tashkent: Gani Rasulev (script-writer and editor-in-chief of Uzbektelefilm). From Tbilisi: Georgy Levashov-Tumanishvili (film producer) – see photo on page 14. From Tallinn: Tynis Kask (producer/director). A showing of excerpts from their work at BAFTA for Association and BAFTA members illustrated a diversity, originality and boldness that amazed even the best-informed authorities on Soviet television present. This was followed by questions to the panel from the audience which resulted in exciting and candid discussion. During their stay some of the group visited television companies in Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham to gain knowledge of British television programming. The organisation of this year's event was helped enormously by the efforts of Terry Doyle, Executive Committee Member of the Association and BBC television producer, Peter Fiddick Media Editor of *The Guardian*, and Elizabeth Roberts.

The Association gave financial support to the National Film Theatre to enable it to bring to the UK a group of Soviet film directors whose films had been previously banned and to screen a selection of them. The directors were Kira Muratova, Alexander Sokurov and Andrei Smirnov. Later in the year the Association gave a private showing of Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance* to a full house of Association members.



Theatre



In May/June the Chairman of the Scottish Branch of the Association and the Assistant Secretary, Meg Luckins, took a nineteen-strong delegation to Moscow, Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn. The group travelled as tourists but a programme of visits and meetings was arranged beforehand by the Scottish Branch in conjunction with USSR-Great Britain Society branches in all the cities visited. The group consisted of people interested in arts, graphics, crafts etc, and professional programmes were arranged for them in all four cities. The theatrical sub-group most successfully achieved the aim of establishing contacts in theatre in the Baltic Republics to build on for future export of British theatre. More contacts were made and some rekindled at the Edinburgh Festival during which the Scottish Branch provided assistance and entertainment for the Soviet participants. Several Association members in Scotland also offered hospitality to the visitors. The Assistant Secretary took one of the visitors, the playwright Alexander Gelman, and his wife to Perth Theatre to meet Joan Knight, Director of the Theatre (and also one of the members of the theatrical delegation to the Baltics referred to above), and to see a performance of *Jesus Christ, Superstar*. Mr Gelman and his wife also stayed in London for a few days at the home of the Director, who, among other outings, took them to the Notting Hill Carnival (see photo on page 14).

The Association was called upon for advice particularly in the early planning stages of a visit by a group of drama students from the Moscow Arts Theatre. The visitors, hosted by IFTA (International Federation for Training in the Arts) came to train and perform at the Royal Shakespeare Company. Financial support was given by the Association to the Almeida Festival to provide hospitality for the composers Vyacheslav Artyomov, Elena Firsova and Dmitri Smirnov, who were in Britain for performances of their works in the Almeida Festival. In April the British premiere of *Stars of the Morning Sky* was performed in Glasgow by the Maly Dramatic Theatre of Leningrad. During their stay in Glasgow the Association's representative, Mr Martin Dewhirst, arranged hospitality for the cast.

Science



Lt. Gen. Vladimir
Shatalov



Professor Svyatoslav
Fyodorov

The Soviet VIP delegation to the Soviet Week in Birmingham included an eye-surgeon and an astronaut. Very much in the public eye at the moment is Professor Svyatoslav Fyodorov, whose pioneering work in the field of eye microsurgery, as well as his 'conveyor-belt' technique of operating on patients, has won him world-wide recognition. During his stay in Birmingham he performed several operations at Selly Oak Hospital including one on Professor Tony Briggs. Professor Fyodorov, who is also President of the USSR-Great Britain Society, spoke to Association members at 14 Grosvenor Place about how *perestroika* has helped him to develop successfully the functioning of his clinic on a profit-making and profit-sharing basis. The other distinguished scientist on the team was Lt General Vladimir Shatalov, Commander of the space training centre Star City, and himself an experienced cosmonaut. Lt General Shatalov described how Star City operates to the audience attending the Open Forum session at Birmingham University. In London, the Association arranged for him to visit the Mullard Space Laboratory at Holmbury St Mary, Surrey, and the British National Space Centre, London. The Royal Aeronautical Society hosted a lunch in his honour and the Royal Society held a meeting for discussions with professionals in his field, including the Director of Jodrell Bank, Sir Francis Graham-Smith.

In May Madame Valentina Tereshkova (see photo on page 14) was the guest of honour at a lunch held at 14 Grosvenor Place. Madame Tereshkova, who was the first woman in space, is Chairman of the Union of Friendship Societies, a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The last time she visited the Association was in 1964 when Lord Attlee, the Association's President at the time, hosted a reception for her. The Scottish Branch also held a reception in her honour this year while she was in Edinburgh.

Earlier in the year the Association gave an evening reception, to which members were invited, for a group of Soviet scientists participating in the second UK-USSR Symposium on High Energy Lasers under Imperial College and Royal Society auspices. In September Nikolai Vereshchagin, the leading Soviet expert on mammoths, was in Britain on a private visit. Prior to calling at the Association, he was accompanied on a visit to the Linnaean Society at the Royal Academy by the Projects Assistant, who acted as interpreter during a guided tour of the collections.

In April the Association arranged for Ursula Vaughan Williams to travel to Leningrad at the invitation of the All-Union Musical Society to attend three Soviet premieres of her husband's symphonies. During one of these performances Mrs Vaughan Williams recited the words of a song she had written and which her husband had set to music, while Gennady Rozhdestvensky read the Russian translation.

Later in the year Russian-speaking members came to the Association to hear a talk by Dr Viktor Borovsky on the life of Fyodor Chaliapin to mark the publication of his book entitled *Chaliapin – A Critical Biography*. Over the year the Director and Mrs Roberts have entertained Sergei Leiferkus, baritone with the Kirov opera, and his wife during his visits to Britain for his debut recital at the Wigmore Hall and for performances at the ENO and Opera North.

The artist Boris Birger (see photo on page 15), who is best known for his portraits of Soviet intelligentsia, was a guest of the Association in February. An exhibition of his paintings was shown at the Museum of Modern Art, Oxford, arranged by David Elliott, Director of the Museum and the Association's representative in Oxford, and a reception was held there for local members with Mr Birger present. He also gave a talk at 14 Grosvenor Place about the effect of *perestroika* on art in the Soviet Union.

In the present climate of *glasnost* there has been a marked increase of interest in the Association's well-stocked library and in the number and variety of queries received, from primary school projects and tourist enquiries to scholarly research on such topics as modern Soviet theatre, art, the Republics of the Soviet Union, law and education. New bilingual computer technology is proving to be a great asset to the library and has considerable potential for future expansion. Conservation work on a number of items in the library's collections has been given attention during the year. The library continues to receive a wide variety of Soviet newspapers and periodicals and to acquire both newly-published books and other books of interest. The Association would like to record once again its gratitude to members and others who have donated books and other items to the library in the past year.

In particular, the Association is grateful to Lady Soames, who has most thoughtfully donated the medal presented to her mother, Mrs Winston Churchill, in Moscow in May 1945 in recognition of her work as founder of the British Red Cross Aid to Russia Fund. Lady Soames has also given the Association the Victory Brooch presented by Svetlana Stalina to Sarah Churchill when they both accompanied their fathers to the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

Music



Art



Library



'Britain-USSR'



The journal was published three times this year and the following is a brief résumé of the articles which appeared.

April issue: An edited transcript of Academician Abel Aganbegyan's lecture at Chatham House in November 1987. Academician Aganbegyan is a senior adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev on economic policy, and his lecture was given under Association auspices. Peter Hill, Political Correspondent, BBC, described a visit to the USSR made by leading British journalists, also under Association auspices. Michael Frayn's article related how his play *Noises Off* was produced and received in Moscow and Claire Coltsmann wrote about the first performances by Western drama students in Lithuania and Latvia. Dr Muriel Heppell contributed a scholarly article, *The Baptism of Rus*, which traced the development of Christianity in Kiev and Moscow and untangled the confusions that surround it. Professor Marcus Wheeler's article *Awaiting the Millennium* examined the contemporary relationship between Church and State, which he was able to observe at close quarters as part of a delegation of Irish Churchmen invited to Moscow by the Patriarchate.



September issue: The far-reaching consequences of *glasnost* upon the Soviet televiewing millions were examined in Peter Fiddick's article which covered the recent visit by Soviet television and film producers (see also *Film and Television*). Ursula Vaughan Williams wrote about the beauty of Imperial St Petersburg which she observed during her visit in April organised by the Association (see also *Music*). David Sulkin's article described the revived interest in children's theatre in the USSR. Katharine Vivian wrote about the Symposium on Georgian Languages at Tbilisi State University which she attended. In the year in which Valentina Tereshkova visited the Association, Daniel Broido, Association member since its early days, wrote about the last time he attended a reception in honour of this distinguished cosmonaut at the Association's Headquarters in 1964 and about how by a strange coincidence he was able as a result to trace a long-lost friend. Alexander Shouvaloff reviewed Dr Viktor Borovsky's biography of Fyodor Chaliapin and David Jackson reviewed Alan Bird's all-embracing history, *Russian Painting*.

December issue: Professor Tony Briggs summarised the Soviet Festival in Birmingham, its participants and events, and in particular his experiences as a patient of the eye surgeon Professor Fyodorov. Brian Wrobel's article on the Lawyers' Colloquium, organised by the Association and involving Soviet jurists at a very senior level, made clear the finer distinctions between British and Soviet law (see also *Law*). Kitty Hunter Blair reviewed *The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky* by Mark Le Fanu. Terence Garrett reviewed *Science and Technology in the USSR* edited by Michael Berry, and John Massey Stewart reviewed *One Day in the Life of the Soviet Union*.

Membership Activities

The Association currently has the support of a nationwide membership of individuals and organisations interested in various aspects of the USSR. The membership circular continues to be published three times a year giving details of the lectures, films and receptions it organises for members as well as information on activities, concerts, exhibitions etc of interest to members. There is also a 'noticeboard' section for members' use. Many of the Association's membership evenings have been mentioned elsewhere. The following is a summary of the others. In March Dr Richard Fisher described the expedition he led from London via the USSR to Beijing along the ancient Silk Road in Summer 1987. In June Kathy Berton Murrell gave a talk illustrated by slides entitled *Unknown Moscow* based on the ten years she spent living there. In November the Association hosted a reception for members to meet a group of Soviet teachers studying at Ealing college.

Association members responded to requests in the circular for hospitality to Soviet students at the Universities of Surrey, Sussex and Leeds, as well as at Ealing College. The Association continues to offer complimentary membership for one year to new graduates in Russian.



Scottish Branch

The following talks were arranged by the Scottish Branch: *Marshak and Burns; Reforms, Resistance and Results; A Russian Childhood* by Eugenie Fraser; and *Art and Design in the Republics*. The Third Shotlandia Annual Lecture was delivered this year by the Bishop of Edinburgh. Throughout the year excursions to theatres and concerts were arranged for groups of members as well as receptions to meet visitors from the Soviet Union, particularly during the Edinburgh Festival and at the beginning of the academic year, when an informal gathering was organised for members to meet Soviet teachers working and living in various parts of Scotland.


Apart from activity mentioned elsewhere, Branch staff entertained at home a variety of Soviet visitors to Scotland including a Lithuanian children's writer, Violetta Palchinskaite, and Professor Yuri Levin from Leningrad, the expert on Ossian. Representing the Association, staff were invited to receptions for visiting dignitaries, including Madame Tereshkova and the Mayor of Kiev. The Chairman presided over a seminar at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, entitled *Gorbachev's Reforms and the Future of the Soviet Union*, and later gave a short paper on *The Russian Orthodox Church* at the Scottish Slavonic Seminar in St Andrew's University.

Welsh Branch

The Association's Welsh Branch arranged the following talks for members: *My Russian Relatives* by Donald Swann, *The USSR in Africa* by Ronald Watts, *The Marco Polo Expedition* by Dr Richard Fisher, *The Royal Parks of St Petersburg* by Peter Hayden, and *Literature and Politics in Gorbachev's Russia* by Dr David Gillespie. A showing of the *Pushkin Trilogy*, three animated films by Andrei Khrzhanovsky, was arranged as well as a reception for members to meet an exchange group of young people from Voroshilovgrad.

Northern Ireland Branch

The Northern Ireland Branch arranged various talks for local members including *Perestroika in the Soviet Media* by Dr Brian McNair of the University of Ulster and *The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict* by Dr Tamara Dragadze of SOAS, London.



A Madame Valentina Tereshkova in the Library of the Association.
B Alexander Gelman at the Notting Hill Carnival.
C Sergei Zalygin at Oxford visiting Lydia Pasternak Slater, sister of Boris Pasternak.

D Georgy Levashov-Tumanishvili in Grosvenor Place.
E Mr & Mrs Fazil Iskander with the Director and his dogs.
F Boris Birger at work on the Director's portrait.



Annual

Balance sheet as at 31st March 1988

	1988	1987
	£	£
FIXED ASSETS		
Tangible assets	6,797	3,981
Investment	1,528	1,528
	<u>8,325</u>	<u>5,509</u>
CURRENT ASSETS		
Debtors	1,770	2,892
Cash at bank and in hand	112	17,309
	<u>1,882</u>	<u>20,201</u>
CREDITORS: amounts falling due within one year	3,428	19,754
NET CURRENT (LIABILITIES)/ASSETS	<u>(1,546)</u>	<u>447</u>
TOTAL ASSETS LESS CURRENT LIABILITIES	<u>6,779</u>	<u>5,956</u>
Financed by:		
CAPITAL AND RESERVES		
Income and expenditure account	3,779	5,956
Maintenance reserve	3,000	—
	<u>6,779</u>	<u>5,956</u>

These accounts were approved by the Executive Committee on 16th November 1988
 Sir Curtis Keeble GCMG Chairman
 G F N Reddaway CBE Hon Treasurer

Report of the Auditors to the members of the Great Britain-USSR Association

We have audited the financial statements in accordance with approved auditing standards.

In our opinion the financial statements, which have been prepared under the historical cost convention, give a true and fair view of the state of the Association's affairs at 31st March 1988 and of the excess Income over Expenditure and source and application of funds for the year ended on that date, and comply with the Companies Act 1985.

GANE JACKSON SCOTT
 CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS
 62 DOUGHTY STREET
 LONDON WC1N 2LQ

16th November 1988

Accounts

Detailed income and expenditure account for the year ended 31st March 1988

	1988	1987
	£	£
INCOME		
Main grant	116,000	107,000
Supplementary grants	32,833	23,000
British Council subvention	—	7,500
	148,833	137,500
Subscriptions, donations and other income received	15,538	14,540
Bank interest and investment income less tax	928	1,614
	165,299	153,654
HEADQUARTERS EXPENDITURE		
Salaries and National Insurance	54,734	50,262
Pension scheme	7,863	4,310
Rents, rates, insurance, heating and cleaning	30,248	30,385
Repairs and maintenance	1,117	539
Postage and mailing	1,484	1,617
Printing and stationery	6,575	5,250
Telephone and telex	2,430	2,178
Travel and subsistence	1,616	740
Leasing of office equipment	2,838	2,839
Sundries	3,087	4,426
Audit fee for year	660	600
Depreciation - office equipment	1,429	793
Legal and professional	—	(169)
	114,081	103,770
DIRECT EXPENDITURE ON PROJECTS		
CSCÉ implementation	32,833	31,492
Other (branches, entertaining, library, lectures, publishing)	17,562	15,483
	50,395	46,975
EXCESS OF INCOME OVER EXPENDITURE FOR THE YEAR	823	2,909

Association Branches and Local Representatives



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Chairman:
Secretary:

Lt Cdr Dairmid Gunn RN (rtd)
Elizabeth Smith (to 31/12/88)
Meg Luckins (from 1/1/89)
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Martin Dewhurst
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Glasgow representative:



WELSH BRANCH

Chairman:
Secretary:

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Dept of Russian
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Gareth Jones
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Bangor, Gwynedd
Elaine Dalziel
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North Wales representative:

Gwent representative:



NORTHERN IRELAND BRANCH

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Secretary:

Her Grace the Duchess of Abercorn
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BIRMINGHAM

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Dept of Russian Language &
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The University
Nottingham NG7 2RD

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Oxford OX1 1DP

SHEFFIELD

Mr A G Waring
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


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
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
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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1989

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EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE
SOVIET AND CZECH EMBASSIES

The Prime Minister talked to the Director-General of the Security Service this evening about the proposed expulsion of members of the Soviet Embassy.

The Director-General confirmed that the level of KGB and GRU activity remained high and the case for expulsions remained as strong as ever. In addition, there was evidence, which would shortly be submitted to the Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary, of unacceptable activity by Czech intelligence in the United Kingdom. The Security Service would be recommending the expulsion of a number of members of the Czech Embassy.

The Prime Minister recalled that she had agreed to action against the Soviet Embassy some 4 to 6 weeks after Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom. There could be distinct advantages to taking action against the Czech Embassy at the same time, to avoid two separate incidents. In deciding the precise timing we should have regard to other international events. It would be desirable to act before the NATO Summit, to show that our resolve had not weakened. Another consideration was the timing of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the FRG: action by us on the eve of this visit might convey a useful message. She would like to see the arguments set out. The Director-General made the point that his Service would,

The Prime Minister confirmed her preference for handling the expulsions as discreetly as possible, so that the Russians were at least given the option of avoiding public recrimination and a major row in our relations. Again, she would like to see recommendations on how this might be achieved.

I am copying this letter to Philip Mawer (Home Office)
and to the Director-General of the Security Service.

b

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Cable Sew
cc PC

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1989

Dae Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE
SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a short talk with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Petrovsky, before the opening of the CSCE Information Forum this morning.

Mr. Petrovsky said that he brought warm greetings from Mr. Gorbachev who wished to confirm officially his invitation to the Prime Minister to visit the Soviet Union in 1990. At the same time he was instructed to say that the Soviet authorities agreed to the holding of a British Week in Kiev in 1990, and Mr. Gorbachev would be happy to go there to meet the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that this was very good news. She thought a regular dialogue was to the benefit of both Governments. Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Britain had been very much appreciated and aroused enormous interest. She had reported the results to Cabinet and her report had been very positively received. She hoped that the friendly and constructive relationship which had developed between them would help Mr. Gorbachev through difficult times while he was trying to achieve great things in the Soviet Union. She was grateful for the invitation for 1990 which she accepted with pleasure.

Mr. Petrovsky said that Mr. Gorbachev's visit had also been rated highly in the Soviet Union. There had been a special Politburo meeting shortly after Mr. Gorbachev's return, at which the results of the visit had been discussed. The conclusion reached was that relations with Britain had greatly improved not just in spirit but also in substance.

Mr. Petrovsky referred to the aims of the London Information Forum. The Soviet Union intended to help achieve a positive outcome by words and deeds. The Prime Minister said that she hoped the meeting would take further steps going beyond what had been agreed at Vienna. Mr. Petrovsky said there was now a new quality to East/West dialogue and the Soviet Government was optimistic about the prospects for progress in the conventional force reduction negotiations. They were looking closely at NATO's proposals; and while they did not agree with all of them they saw a chance to move forward.

M

There was a brief discussion of the significance of the elections in the Soviet Union and of developments in Georgia.

It was agreed to tell the press that the Prime Minister had received Mr. Gorbachev's message expressing pleasure with his visit. Both sides wished to establish a continuous dialogue at the highest level and in that spirit Mr. Gorbachev had invited the Prime Minister to visit the Soviet Union in 1990, with both leaders going to Kiev. The Prime Minister had accepted the invitation. She had also expressed her gratitude for Mr. Gorbachev's message of sympathy following the tragedy at Hillsborough in Sheffield.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,



(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

You are to have a very brief meeting with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister at the Conference Centre before you open the CSCE Information Forum. Mr. Petrovsky has an oral message for you from Mr. Gorbachev.

I understand that there are three parts to the message:

- he is instructed to give you an account of the discussion in the Politburo following Mr. Gorbachev's return from his visit to Britain;
- he will confirm Mr. Gorbachev's invitation to you to visit the Soviet Union next year;
- he will have a concrete proposal about possible dates and format of next year's meetings which are "very interesting". I think they may embrace the idea that you and Mr. Gorbachev would jointly visit the British Week in Kiev.

Mr. Petrovsky speaks fluent English.

CDP
ms
CHARLES POWELL

17 April 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

Rich Bush (2)

*CAP
19/4.*

PRIME MINISTER

17 April 1989

SOVIET CRITICISM OF LENIN

ms

As you know, the debate on Soviet history so far has focussed mainly on Stalin's crimes and the nature of the Stalinist political system. The advocates of reform like to represent perestroika as a rejection of Stalinism and a return to the values and precepts of Lenin. They condemn Stalinism as a deformation of socialism. However, as glasnost develops, writers are beginning to step over the fine dividing line between Stalin and Lenin and suggest that the roots of the problem lie in the Revolution itself and that Lenin is not exempt.

An article in Sovetskaya Kultura of April last year fired the first shot. It suggested that Lenin laid the foundations for Stalin's repressive system by permitting violations of the constitution and legality and an excessive concentration of power in the hands of the Party. An article in Novy Mir of last year criticised specific aspects of Lenin's policies: the economic errors of war communism, draconian measures against the peasantry, the establishment of concentration camps and the Red Terror. Another writer, from the Russian nationalist end of the political spectrum, explained his refusal to join the anti-Stalin Memorial Society on the grounds that any monument should commemorate victims of repression in 1918, 1919 and the early 1920's as well.

In September and October last year a more authoritative article, in Pravda, by two members of the staff of the Institute of Marxism/Leninism suggested that the origins of Stalin's command-administrative system could be traced in part to Lenin's views on socialism expressed in 1917 (but afterwards abandoned) and the authoritarian aspects of his New Economic Policy.

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The most striking example of this new line of thought however, is a four-part article in a popular science monthly by a Dr Alexander Tsipko, a philosopher who formerly worked at the Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System and more recently in the Central Committee apparatus, probably in the International Department under Yakovlev. Tsipko asks

"Why deceive ourselves and mythologise Stalin and what he did? Both he and his activities are the outcome of a revolutionary movement which began long before Stalin came to power"

Tsipko goes on to question some of the basic tenets of the doctrine:

- (a) In all countries without exception, including Khomeni's Iran, "the fight against the market, against money-commodity relations, has always led to authoritarianism, to the hegemony of the bureaucratic apparatus". Marx did not perceive this difficult question since there was insufficient historical experience to raise it.
- (b) Tsipko questions whether collectivisation and even the nationalisation of land were really necessary or constituted progress.
- (c) He questions whether "firm guarantees of personal freedoms and democracy are possible when all members of society are employed by the proletarian state and have no independent sources of existence".

He adds "What Stalin offered as socialism was very similar to the projects outlined by Marx, Engels and Lenin".

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In the second part of the same article Tsipko pursues the theme of doctrinal flaws in Soviet socialism, quoting Dostoievsky's warning about a society which attempts to subordinate its whole life to the precepts of an abstract theory. Long before Stalin the Bolsheviki placed the defence of the Revolution above traditional concepts of law, democracy and the highest moral norms. He condemns the Red Terror and the "monstrous tension created by the class approach in a country where 80% of the population were conceived as an obstacle on the path to the ideal".

In the third and fourth parts of the article he attacks the messianism of the Russian revolutionary tradition: "Everything we are suffering from today is rooted in the neglect of everyday needs, the needs and concerns of man, of normal natural life". He cites the Great Leap Forward in China and observes that Communist experiments which sacrifice the present to the future and universal morality to Communist morality lead to nothing but Stalinism.

The official line remains that there is a clear distinction between the democratic and humane Lenin and the pure ideals of the October Revolution on the one hand and the later distortions and excesses under Stalinism on the other. The chief ideologist, Medvedev, has criticised those who say "that the commandadministrative system goes back to Lenin" and has prevented the publication of works by Solzhenitsyn which include attacks on Lenin. Evidently with Gorbachev's support, he has decided to protect the one big remaining taboo. Official reformist lawyers carefully ignore Lenin's well known contempt for the law and select only those quotations which can serve as a basis for the "socialist legal state". Other reformists say that this generation has enough to do getting rid of Stalinism and that Lenin should be left to a future generation.

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Despite this, it is clear that the tide of enquiry and criticism is moving on and that Lenin is no longer sacrosanct. The problem is that if Lenin's role and the Revolution itself are impugned there will be no historical ground left for the Party to stand on.



PERCY CRADOCK

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GEORGIA: DISMISSAL OF REPUBLICAN LEADERS

SUMMARY

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE ON 14 APRIL, A PLENUM OF THE GEORGIAN PARTY ON THAT DAY ACCEPTED THE RESIGNATION OF PARTY FIRST SECRETARY PATIASHVILI. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GEORGIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS ALSO BEEN REPLACED. EMOTIONAL AND SOMBRE PLEA BY SHEVARDNADZE TO THE GEORGIAN PARTY NOT TO DISRUPT PERESTROIKA.

DETAIL

2. PATIASHVILI HAS BEEN REPLACED AS PARTY SECRETARY BY THE RECENTLY APPOINTED GEORGIAN KGB CHIEF GIVI GUMBARIDZE. NORDARI CHITANAV, HAS REPLACED CHKHEIDZE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. THE FATE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE GEORGIAN SUKPREME SOVIET, WHO HAS ALSO OFFERED TO STEP DOWN, HAS YET TO BE DECIDED.

3. SHEVARDNADZE'S SPEECH TO THE GEORGIAN PLENUM ON 14 APRIL WAS SHOWN ON TELEVISION, AND WAS PUBLISHED IN THE CENTRAL PRESS ON 16 APRIL. HIS PERSONAL ANGUISH AT EVENTS IN HIS HOME REPUBLIC CAME THROUGH CLEARLY. IN HIS SPEECH, HE SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THE "BITTER" DECISION TO REPLACE PATIASHVILI, AND REPEATEDLY LINKED EVENTS SUCH AS THE GEORGIAN TRAGEDY AND THE FATE OF PERESTROIKA. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF SHEVARDNADZE'S SALIENT POINTS:

- ON THEIR VISIT TO GEORGIA, HE AND RAZUMOVSKY HAD HAD THE TASK OF ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH AND ENSURING THAT THERE COULD BE NO REPETITION OF THIS TRAGEDY. THIS WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE PROCESSES TAKING PLACE IN THE COUNTRY. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRAGEDY WENT FAR BEYOND GEORGIA. SO MANY HOPES FOR A BETTER FUTURE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WERE RIDING ON PERESTROIKA. NO ONE IN THE WORLD COULD BE INDIFFERENT TO THREATS TO PERESTROIKA, WHETHER THEY CAME FROM IRRESPONSIBLE PEOPLE

WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF DEMOCRATISATION AND GLASNOST: OR FROM THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH VARIOUS DUTIES WHO HAD NOT SHED THE FALSE PRINCIPLES OF THE PAST.

- SHEVARDNADZE QUOTED AT LENGTH THE REMARKS OF GORBACHEV (''THE ARCHITECT OF PERESTROIKA'') ABOUT THE DAMAGE DONE IN TBILISI TO THE INTERESTS OF PERESTROIKA.
- THE ''DIFFICULT DECISION'' (TO REPLACE PATIASHVILI) DEMONSTRATED ADHERENCE TO THE IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND READINESS TO FOLLOW THE PEOPLE'S WILL. ''BUT DEMOCRACY WITHOUT SELF-DISCIPLINE IS THE ESSENCE OF ANARCHY AND FREEDOM WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY IS SUICIDAL.... EVEN THE BROADEST RIVER HAS BANKS.'' ANY POPULAR MOVEMENT MUST HAVE ITS LIMITATIONS.
- EVERY PERSON BEARING GUILT FOR 9 APRIL WOULD BE NAMED.
- PATIASHVILI HAD NOT DECIDED ALONE TO USE FORCE AND INTRODUCE THE CURFEW. MANY OF THOSE NOW CRITICISING HIM HAD CALLED FOR THIS. BUT HIS RESIGNATION WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY WHICH PERESTROIKA WAS TRYING TO INCULCATE IN EVERY COMMUNIST.
- ''OUR COUNTRY'' HAD SURVIVED THE STRAINS OF GENERATIONS BY PRESERVING ITS ''SPIRITUAL, MORAL AND INTERNATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF WE DO NOT HAVE THIS, PERESTROIKA WOULD NOT STAND EVEN THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS''.
- IN A CENTRAL PASSAGE OF HIS SPEECH, SHEVARDNADZE HELD OUT THE PROMISE OF A BETTER FUTURE IF THE CURRENT REFORM PROCESSES COULD BE CARRIED THROUGH. HE NOTED HOW HE HIMSELF HAD JUST CAST HIS FIRST EVER VOTE WHICH REQUIRED A CHOICE OF CANDIDATE. HE HAD TAKEN PART IN VERY SHARP DEBATES IN GEORGIA WHICH WOULD NOT HITHERTO HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. BUT THE ELEMENTARY READINESS TO HEAR AN OPPONENT'S OPINION WAS ABSENT, AND SOME VIEWS HAD VERGED HYSTERIA. ''WE ARE STILL FAR FROM THAT CONDITION, WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY, WHEN EVERY CITIZEN HOLDS DEMOCRACY DEAR AND DEFENDS IT.''
- HE THEN ATTACKED UNOFFICIAL GROUPS, MOTIVATED BY CAREERIST AIMS, WHICH HAD EVEN PUT YOUNG SCHOOL CHILDREN IN THE FRONT RANK OF ILLEGAL DEMONSTRATIONS.
- THE WORK OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY WAS CLEARLY INADEQUATE. THE PARTY HAD NOT TAKEN SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF SOCIAL INTERESTS.

THERE WAS AN ABNORMAL BARRIER BETWEEN THE PARTY AND A PART OF THE POPULATION. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP A "CULTURE OF DIALOGUE". THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP HAD NOT LIVED UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOCIETY.

- SHEVARDNADZE FOUND IT HARD TO JUSTIFY THE LOCAL PARTY'S DECISION TO RESORT TO TROOPS, "AND TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE FROM BEHIND TANKS AND ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS". THE PARTY HAD ACTED TOO HASTILY, WITHOUT EXHAUSTING ALTERNATIVE COURSES. BUT HE SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDER, COLONEL GENERAL RODIONOV, FROM BLAME. RODIONOV HAD ARGUED AGAINST THE DECISION.

- HE HOPED THE CURFEW COULD BE LIFTED SOON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS 17 APRIL IF SCHOOLS, UNIVERSITIES AND WORK PLACES RETURNED TO NORMAL THEN.

4. IN SEPARATE REPORTS, THE PRESS HAVE REPORTED THE DAY OF MOURNING ON 16 APRIL IN TBILISI, AND CONTINUING TENSION ARISING FROM HOOLIGAN ELEMENTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROVOCATIVE LEAFLETS. THE CURFEW IS CAUSING PROBLEMS IN THE MARKETS. REPRESENTATIVES OF UNOFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT POST-MORTEMS.

BRAITHWAITE

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SIR PERCY CRADOCK

VISIT TO MOSCOW

The Prime Minister would have no objection in principle to your proposed visit to Moscow. But you will recall that certain decisions are to be taken in about a month's time which could make a visit less opportune and less welcome to the Soviet side, at least in the short term.

(C. D. POWELL)

12 April 1989

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*Rice Minister @
Agree?
CDD
11/4*

PRIME MINISTER

11 April 1989

VISIT TO MOSCOW

Flag A. Rodric Braithwaite, our Ambassador in Moscow, has suggested that I might make a short visit to Moscow later this year. He thinks it could help the work of the Embassy in opening one or two doors and assist in our understanding of Soviet policies and the way in which the Soviet leadership receives co-ordinated advice on foreign affairs, security and defence.

I should be happy to go on this basis, though I do not overestimate my ability to cast light in dark places. Whether highly revealing or not, however, a visit at the present time would be fascinating.

I would of course go in my capacity as your Foreign Affairs Adviser.

I do not think we should seek meetings with the Soviet intelligence people and the Ambassador agrees.

The Foreign Office are content. The JIC rules permit the journey, provided I remain within the care of the Embassy, as I would.

Possible dates are June or October, more probably the latter.

I should be grateful for your agreement.

*You will recall
other decisions to be
made between now or
then
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MY TELNO 82: SOVIET SUBMARINE

SUMMARY

1. NORWEGIAN EXPERTS CONFIRM (A) THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RADIOACTIVE LEAKAGE SO FAR (B) THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE AREA, AND (C) THAT THEY HAVE NO COMPLAINT AS YET ABOUT SOVIET RESPONSE.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT FURTHER WITH JOHAN BAARLI, DIRECTOR OF THE STATE INSTITUTE FOR RADIATION SAFETY (SIS), ABOUT THE MEASURES WHICH THE NORWEGIANS HAVE TAKEN TO MONITOR RADIOACTIVE EMISSION FROM THE SUBMARINE WRECK.

3. BAARLI CRITICISED THE DELAY BETWEEN MILITARY DETECTION OF THE INCIDENT AND OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION TO HIS INSTITUTE (FOR WHICH THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAS PUBLICLY APOLOGISED). HE HAD HOWEVER BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ATMOSPHERIC AND WATER SAMPLES SUFFICIENTLY QUICKLY TO DETERMINE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RADIOACTIVE DISCHARGE AT THE TIME WHEN THE SUBMARINE SANK. THE ORION AIRCRAFT WHICH REACHED THE LOCATION WITHIN AN HOUR OF THE SINKING (MY TUR) HAD TAKEN AIR-SAMPLES. NORWEGIAN COASTGUARD VESSELS HAD TAKEN WATER-SAMPLES ON THE MORNING OF 10 APRIL, INCLUDING SAMPLES OF WHAT THE NORWEGIANS BELIEVED TO BE OIL-SPILL FROM THE SUBMARINE ITSELF. TESTS ON ALL THESE SAMPLES HAVE PRODUCED NO TRACES OF RADIOACTIVITY.

4. ON 10 APRIL THE FISHERIES RESEARCH SHIP 'ELDJARN' HAD TAKEN FURTHER WATER SAMPLES FROM THE SEA BED NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE SUBMARINE WRECK (THE NORWEGIANS BELIEVE THAT THEY KNOW THE EXACT LOCATION), USING METHODS THAT ARE REGULARLY ADOPTED IN FISHERIES RESEARCH. THE WATER SAMPLES WILL BE EXAMINED AT THE SIS LABORATORIES IN OSLO AND THE RESULTS PUBLISHED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. BAARLI

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SAID THAT HIS OWN INSTITUTE AND THE FISHERIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE WOULD MONITOR THE WRECK 'AS LONG AS IT REMAINED THERE AND POSED A THREAT'.

5. BAARLI SAID THAT THE NORWEGIANS NOW AWAITED A SOVIET RESPONSE TO THEIR REQUEST (REPORTED IN TUR) FOR INFORMATION (WHICH WAS NOT MILITARILY SENSITIVE) ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE REACTOR. HE BELIEVED THAT, THROUGH THE CONTACTS ESTABLISHED SINCE CHERNOBYL, THE RUSSIANS SHOULD CO-OPERATE ADEQUATELY IN THE PRESENT CASE.

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MODUK FOR DI(WP) AND TECHINT NAVY

OUR TELNO 618 (NOT TO ALL): SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT

IZVESTIYA OF 10 APRIL PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER, YAZOV, ABOUT THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE.

2. YAZOV SAID THE BOAT'S LOG HAD BEEN RECOVERED AND WAS BEING STUDIED. A SEPARATE LOG HAD BEEN OPENED ON THE REACTOR. 'IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE REACTOR WAS SHUT DOWN IN A STANDARD PROCEDURE BEFORE THE SUBMARINE SANK. IT HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN RELIABLY (SIC). WE CAN RULE OUT ITS HOUSING (KORPUS) BREAKING UP.

3. THE MINISTER CONFIRMED THAT THE SUBMARINE HAD CARRIED TEN TORPEDOES, TWO OF THEM WITH NUCLEAR CHARGES. 'THESE TORPEDOES POSE NO THREAT EVEN WHEN SUBMERGED TO A GREAT DEPTH'.

3. AS TO THE CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT, YAZOV SAID THAT 'IF ONLY THE SEVENTH COMPARTMENT HAD BURNT OUT THE BOAT WOULD HAVE REMAINED SEA-WORTHY. BUT, AS IS KNOWN, THE SIXTH COMPARTMENT HAS ALSO BURNT OUT COMPLETELY. THE CREW HEARD SEVERAL EXPLOSIONS TWO OR THREE HOURS LATER. IT MAY BE SUPPOSED THAT WITH THE INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE SUBMARINE, SPECIAL DEVICES BEGAN TO EXPLODE. THERE WERE SEVEN OF THESE ON BOARD. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE HULL HAS CRACKED IN PLACES.

4. YAZOV CONFIRMED THAT FOUR MEN DIED IN THE COMPARTMENTS. THE OTHER CASUALTIES WERE PRESUMABLY DUE TO EXPOSURE IN THE ICY SEAS.

5. THE NORTHERN FLEET POLITICAL DIRECTORATE TOLD IZVESTIA THAT ACCORDING TO INITIAL REPORTS THE FIRE STARTED IN AN ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT. THE BOAT SURFACED TO DEAL WITH IT, AND ALL SOVIET VESSELS IN THE AREA WERE DIVERTED TO THE SUBMARINE'S AID.

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8 April 1989

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear General Secretary

I was grateful for your message during the night of 7/8 April about the tragic loss of a Soviet submarine and your assurances about the negligible risk of nuclear contamination. May I express to you my condolences for the loss of life and ask that my sympathies be conveyed to the families of those concerned.

I am sorry that you should have returned from your very successful visit to the United Kingdom to confront this sad event. But I am sure you will have felt how very pleased everyone was to have you and Mrs. Gorbachev here, reflected in the genuine warmth of the welcome you received. It was a great occasion and an important step forward in Anglo-Soviet relations.

With warm good wishes to you and Mrs. Gorbachev.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

President M. S. Gorbachev

PERSONAL

MEM



file man

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1989

Dear Resident Clerk,

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister wishes to send President Gorbachev. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be telegraphed to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible.

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1989

SOVIET SUBMARINE

This is to confirm the information which I passed to you and the Ministry of Defence Resident Clerk during the night.

The Soviet Embassy telephoned me shortly after 0300 hours this morning to convey a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Gorbachev about the sinking of the Soviet submarine north of Norway. The same message was being conveyed to President Bush and to the Norwegian Prime Minister.

Mr. Gorbachev wished the Prime Minister to be aware of an accident aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine north of Norway and in the vicinity of Bear Island. There had been a fire on the submarine and loss of life. Efforts to save the boat had failed and it had sunk in waters of a depth of some 1500 metres. The nuclear reactors had been shut down before the submarine had sunk. The risk of a nuclear explosion or contamination was assessed as negligible. Efforts to rescue the crew members were continuing. The assurance about the negligible risk of nuclear explosion or contamination was repeated.

I said that the Prime Minister would be grateful for this information. I knew that she would wish to pass on her condolences for the loss of life and would no doubt send a message to this effect to Mr. Gorbachev. I would report the information to the appropriate authorities.

Subject to your views, I suggest that we should tell the press in the course of the morning that this message was received during the night and refer in particular to the assurance to the negligible risk of nuclear explosion or contamination.

I am copying this letter to the Resident Clerk in the Ministry of Defence and the JIC Duty Officer in the Cabinet Office.

C. D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER

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A Soviet nuclear submarine has suffered an accident in the course of the afternoon in the vicinity of Bear Island in the north of the North Sea. There was a fire in the nuclear reactor. At least twelve of the crew are thought to be dead. The Soviet military are doing all that is necessary to recover the vessel.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

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From the Private Secretary

6 April 1989

I am writing on behalf of Charles Powell to thank you for your letter of 31 March, with which you enclosed one from Mr Haeev to the Prime Minister.

P. A. BEARPARK

His Excellency Mr Leonid M Zamyatin

ca



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 April 1989

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Interview with Izvestia

/ I enclose a letter from Mr Laptev, Editor-in-Chief of Izvestia, to the Prime Minister thanking her for granting him an interview on 22 March.

/ You may like to know that the interview was published in Izvestia on 29 March (copy enclosed). We have checked the text against the transcript. Mr Laptev has stuck very closely to what the Prime Minister said apart from a few stylistic alterations and has not added any comments. The interview appeared along with a picture of the Prime Minister beside the headline "We are moving towards a new era".

When Sir Rodric Braithwaite called on Laptev on 3 April, he was most enthusiastic about the interview and repeated his gratitude to the Prime Minister for giving him so much time. He said that he had received many telephone calls and letters of appreciation from ordinary people who had found the interview of exceptional interest.

Yours ever,

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

TRANSLATION

To the Prime Minister of Great Britain
Mrs Margaret Thatcher

Esteemed Prime Minister!

Allow me once again to express my deep gratitude to you for our warm meeting and substantial discussion. I am sure that in publishing this interview, we are not only satisfying our readers' interest in the British head of government's views on current problems which affect the peace, but we are also taking an important step in the development of mutual understanding between the peoples of our countries.

Let me assure you of my sincere respect. I wish you success.

I Laptev
Chief Editor of 'Izvestiya'
Newspaper

ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

ГОСПОЖЕ МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР

Уважаемая госпожа Премьер-Министр!

Позвольте еще раз выразить Вам глубокую благодарность за теплую встречу и содержательную беседу с Вами. Я уверен, что, публикуя это интервью, мы не только удовлетворяем интерес наших читателей к взглядам Главы правительства Великобритании на актуальные проблемы, волнующие мир, но и делаем важный шаг в развитии взаимопонимания между народами наших стран.

Примите заверения в искреннем уважении и пожелания успехов в Вашей деятельности.



И. Лаптев,

Главный редактор газеты "Известия"

29. III. 89.

Уважаемая госпожа Премьер-Министр, прежде всего благодарю Вас за любезное согласие на это интервью. Мой первый вопрос как бы Вы прокомментировали изменения в современном мире за последние три-четыре года? В чем видите основные мотивы и причины этих изменений?

— Я думаю, есть три изменения, которые следует отметить. Первое, конечно, — это то, что в западном мире произошел очень заметный рост благосостояния и уровня жизни.

Это достигнуто благодаря предпринимчивости, талантам и способностям народов, в такой политической обстановке, которая соответствовала этой предпринимчивости. В то же время мы все стремились к тому, чтобы наша экономика была здоровой в своей основе, и добился этого. Это означает, что мы аккуратно относимся к тому, как мы управляем финансами, не обещали больше, чем могли сделать. Потому что, если вы трактуете больше, чем зарабатываете, или если начинается инфляция, это значит, что у вас будут неприятности. Следовательно, гораздо предпочтительнее твердо и разумно вести финансы и неуклонно улучшать положение, чем пытаться достичь скачкообразно огромного роста производства, что часто ведет затем к его сокращению. Этот подъем благосостояния и уровня жизни дал нам возможность не только больше иметь в нашей жизни, но создать также достаточное богатство, чтобы повысить уровень социального обеспечения.

В принципе это та схема, которую, как я знаю, вы пытаетесь ввести в Советском Союзе. Ведь ясно, что правительства не знают, как руководить предприятиями, — поэтому мы не участвуем в делах самого предприятия. Предприниматели же, бизнесмены, которые годами привыкли вести эти дела, улавливать перемены, создавать новые товары, знают, что нужно людям. Им мы и предоставляем руководить промышленностью.

По-моему, второй важной болевой перенесенной стало огромное улучшение в отношениях Восток—Запад. Я думаю, что это достигнуто прежде всего благодаря широте взглядов господина Горбачева и людей, находящихся рядом с ним. Не прощаясь взглядом на то, что вы хотите для своей собственной страны, но и идей общественной жизни, идей, которые, как нам кажется, абсолютно правильны, которые включают усилия самого вашего народа, его ответственность, его выбор, мобилизацию его талантов. Это абсолютно соответствует тому, во что верим мы, — и именно это, плюс тот факт, что у руководства наших стран одновременно оказались подходящие люди — господин Горбачев, президент Рейган, возможно, также и я — сделало отношения Восток—Запад намного ближе.

Важно, что это произошло не только в области обороны. Речь о гораздо большем, чем взаимное уважение обеими сторонами права на безопасность, чем попытка договориться о сокращении вооружений с тем, чтобы оборона и безопасность обеспечивались на более низком уровне вооружений. Перемены значительно глубже: выросла торговля, расширились культурные обмены, обмены между людьми, больше людей стало путешествовать за пределы Советского Союза и больше приезжать в СССР. То есть изменения носят восторженный характер. Они сопровождалась в вашей стране большей свободой слова, свободой вероисповедания, свободой начинать какое-то дело и делать его самостоятельно. Наблюдать все это просто изумительно.

Третье важное изменение в том, что увеличилось число вопросов, которые переходят границы государств, как например, окружающая среда. Вопросы окружающей среды не признают границ. И мы все должны беспокоиться об основных системах Земли, о всей атмосфере вокруг Земли. Как вы знаете, сегодня широко обсуждается парниковый эффект, состояние озонового слоя. Если кто-то повредит его, будет затронут каждый из нас. Если мы все не примем участия, то мы не сможем сохранить все это невероятным и действующим так, чтобы поддерживалась жизнь. Это одна проблема. Затем существует загрязнение морей и великих рек, кислотные дожди и, к сожалению, многое другое. Все это такие вещи, которые затрагивают всех людей. Далее, мы должны вместе думать о проблемах, связанных с демографией самого человека:

единить усилия, чтобы бороться с этим.

— В Советском Союзе, конечно, обратили внимание на то, как вы откликнулись на речь М. С. Горбачева в ООН. Нарисованный им «прообраз» будущего мира показался, как мы поняли, близким вашим представлениям о будущем. В чем вы видите сходства и различия в философских подходах наших двух стран к формированию этого будущего и какую роль отводите здесь новому политическому мышлению?

— Давайте я скажу так: я очень ясно вижу по речам господина Горбачева, что он настроен так же, как и я, — нужно больше опираться на людей, вовлекать их в политический процесс, нужно помнить, что свобода несет с собой ответственность, и т. д.

Но вот что я хочу сказать: легко создать новые города, какие-то строения из кирпича и

давно возникшим международным проблемам, как, например, Ангола и Намибия. Кубинцы из Анголы сейчас собираются уходить. Народ в Намибии получит возможность выбрать свое собственное правительство. Мы вместе поработали над некоторыми проблемами отношений между Ираном и Ираком, хотя, как вы знаете, в последнее время мы разошлись по одному-двум вопросам в связи с Ираном.

По-моему, мы сумели начать процесс увеличения доверия между нами. Конечно, установление доверия потребует немало времени, и над этим надо трудиться. Мне кажется, и наш народ, и американцы имеют природную склонность к доброжелательности. Ведь все мы — представители рода человеческого. Это проявилось, в частности, в том, как наш народ очень быстро откликнулся на последствия землетрясения в Армении, потому что мы все по-

развитию великих культур, того фантастического искусства, которое мы все знаем, которое постоянно развивается и изменяется. Боже мой, именно ваши русские промышленники в царское время поняли современное искусство, они увидели Матисса и поняли, что происходит что-то замечательное... Великое художественное возрождение в Европе и великие покровители художников, увидевшие фантастические таланты, возможности, способности и оказавшие им помощь, они оставили нам великое наследие — великую архитектуру, ремесла, разившиеся в то время, и бог знает, что еще. Вы знаете все это, потому что Эрмитаж является одной из мировых сокровищниц, а некоторые из ваших знаменитых зданий воплощают архитектуру того времени.

Я часто говорю об этом. В какую бы страну я ни направ-

регаются ресурсы, там возникает голод и засуха. Но ведь и в Африке смотрят на некоторые страны Запада и считают, что должны иметь то же, что и мы. Это займет много времени, но помочь им мы стараемся. Недостаточно взять и обеспечить их товарами и продовольствием, в этом случае они просто окажутся на иждивении. У них должно появиться достоинство и независимость в понимании того, как нужно вести дела и создавать промышленность для самих себя. Мы можем стабильно помогать им в этом.

— Думаю, мы не преувеличим, если скажем, что Ваша встреча с М. С. Горбачевым в Черкессе в 1984 году — это своего рода поворотный пункт в современных отношениях между нашими странами...

— Мы никогда не забудем эту встречу. Мы сразу

увидели. Это были сознательные усилия. Я устроила несколько конференций за круглым столом семинаров, мы сделали учебники и так далее.

Примерно два года в году я подробно рассматриваю какую-то отдельную проблему. Возможно, что-то в области внешней политики, в отношениях Восток—Запад, в европейских делах, в помощи «третьему миру» в окружающей среде — те проблемы, которые затрагивают нас всех. Или это какой-либо из аспектов внутренней политики: может быть, возможность получения образования, может быть подготовка к новым технологическим изменениям, возможное воздействие новых технологий на жизнь людей. Мы берем один из этих вопросов и стараемся проанализировать его развитие, чтобы подготовиться к тому, что оно предвидит.

— Кажется, я уже злоупотребляю Вашим временем?

— Тогда я буду кратко отвечать на Ваши вопросы, потому что у нас их много. Наши торговые отношения расширились. Мы с господином Горбачевым поставили цель, которую по-моему, мы сможем достичь, — довести (товарооборот — Ред.) до 2,5 миллиарда рублей. В очень скором времени состоится Британская неделя в Москве, месячный британско-советской торговли в Москве. Затем в 1990 году пройдет Британская неделя в Киеве, которую мы очень ждем. Конечно, нам очень много визитов деятелей культуры в нашу страну. Ваши школьники побывают у нас, наши — у вас. Это имеет огромное значение. Ибо часто речь идет о будущем, о будущем, о будущем. Ибо часто речь идет о контактах людей.

— Да, идет огромная работа и результаты ее уже заметны. Но вот еще один вопрос: мы — и особенно мы, журналисты, много потрудились в создании и здесь на Западе, у нас в Советском Союзе «разрыв врагов». Это был главный герой «холодной войны». Теперь этот герой постепенно сходит со сцены. Можем ли мы сегодня сказать, что и сама «холодная война» исчезает?

— Я уже говорила, что «холодная война» подвергается очень серьезной оттепели, но допустить, что настоящей причиной «холодной войны» была крайне жесткая сталинская система. Ист. казалось, что коммунизм не предлагает той индивидуальной свободы и той личности личности, которые имеют абсолютно фундаментальное значение для нас.

— Спасибо за теплые слова в адрес нашего руководителя, господина Премьер-Министр, но я закончу свой вопрос следующим образом: поскольку это действительно был поворотный пункт в наших отношениях, что подтолкнуло Вас лично к такому повороту? Что заставило Вас содействовать изменениям в англо-советских отношениях? Как Вы оцениваете их обострение сегодня и каково Ваше мнение об их будущем?

— Я не вполне знаю, как вы ведете дела в Советском Союзе, но здесь, в этой комнате, в этом доме, в парламенте, мы постоянно обращаем наши мысли к будущему — к будущему нашей страны, будущему Европы, будущему отношений Восток—Запад, к развитию экологических проблем.

Итак, существовала проблема Восток—Запад. Во многом в ее основе лежали вопросы обороны и контроля над вооружениями. Мы посчитали, что нельзя дальше допускать, чтобы это было основой. И в первую очередь мы попытались расширить контакты в осуществлении хельсинкского процесса, хельсинкских договоренностей 1975 года.

Мы начали выяснять, можем ли мы добиться более широких контактов между Востком и Западом, в искусстве, в науке — наследием, которое постепенно распространилось на всех людей, оно дает людям большую возможность выбора — правительства, при котором жить, выбора своего пути. И имея все это, мы действительно должны быть способны избрать дорогу дружбы и сотрудничества. Не крепостные стены вокруг Европы строить, а сделать ее примером сотрудничества для всего остального мира! Ибо, как я уже сказала, большая часть проблем в отношениях между странами, которые мы сегодня обсуждаем, касается всех народов.

В этом духе мы будем развивать Европейское экономическое сообщество. Конечно, у нас будет фундаментальная, глубокая и обязывающая дружба с Соединенными Штатами, которые, как я часто говорю, в определенном отношении являются народом Европы по ту сторону Атлантики. Они такой

Затем мы поняли, что наступает время, когда, видимо, произойдут перемены в советском руководстве. Мы решили попытаться познакомиться с людьми, которые, как нам казалось, должны быть влиятельными в будущем, в расчете на то, что вы у нас были достаточно популярны и Вас глубоко ува-

— Позвольте мне в ответ это сказать, что в Москве Советскому Союзу Вы очень популярны и Вас глубоко ува-

Маргарет ТЭТЧЕР:

МЫ ДВИЖЕМСЯ К НОВОЙ ЭРЕ

Интервью Премьер-Министра Великобритании газете «Известия»



цементу, новые колледжи, новые дома, новые дороги — все это легче сделать, чем изменить человеческую психологию, сознание людей. Люди привыкают вести себя определенным образом и всегда сопротивляются переменам. И все же, не изменяясь, невозможно приобщиться к тем большим достижениям, которые может предложить вам остальной мир. Это очень сложный процесс, и мне иногда кажется, что вы в Советском Союзе пытаетесь сделать в течение, скажем, 5—10 лет то, на что нам понадобилось более столетия.

Здесь (в Англии. — Ред.) великий Акт о реформе 1832 года стал началом процесса, когда да все новые группы людей получили право голоса. Но это происходило не вдруг. Это пошло от людей, в руках которых находилось руководство страной. Затем следующий слой заявил: «Нет, мы тоже хотим участвовать!» Потом следующий, нищестящий слой заявил: «Нет, мы тоже хотим участвовать!» И так далее. Это действительно заняло довольно много времени, пока не сложилось так, что каждый человек имеет право голоса. Мы шли к этому постепенно, одновременно постоянно увеличивая ответственность промышленников, увеличивая ответственность руководителей и все больше разная, что означает такую ответственность.

Основная свобода, о которой, как я слышала, говорит господин Горбачев, — это свобода выбора. Вы выбираете, какую работу вы хотите получить. Вы упорно и много трудитесь, зарабатываете, сколько сможете, а затем выбираете, что купить на ваши деньги, в то время как кто-то другой производит необходимые товары. Наша проблема не в том, чтобы наполнить магазины, мы можем наполнить их вновь и вновь. Люди должны выбирать, что покупать, и, если они решают что-то не покупать, эта вещь так и остается на полке. А ее производитель оказывается в затруднительном положении — он не понял, что нужно, и сделал совсем не ту вещь. За это он страдает, понесет ущерб. Таким образом, выбор, ответственность, свобода означают, что вы должны выполнять свои обязанности. Свобода влечет за собой ответственность.

Я думаю также — это, во-вторых, — что наши взгляды сблизились в области оборонной политики. Каждое государство должно защищать себя и имеет право существовать в безопасности. Изменилось в Советском Союзе, как мне кажется, то, что вы переменили свой подход на близкий к нашему, — достаточ-

но если происходит такое стихийное бедствие, необходимо помощь. И тогда все барьеры падают, вы идете и оказываете эту помощь.

Но я подчеркиваю то, с чего начинала в политике труднее всего изменить характер, взгляды людей. Надо быть очень терпеливым. Нужно все время объяснять людям свой взгляд на будущее, убеждать их разделить этот взгляд. Знаете, наша религия гласит: там, где нет такого провидения, народ гибнет. Поэтому необходимо, чтобы люди понимали, видели будущее, и не надо стремиться достичь его гигантскими прыжками — в жизни так не бывает. Движение вперед идет день за днем, неделя за неделей, месяц за месяцем, идет не в результате чудес, а благодаря постоянным, упорным, самоотверженным усилиям. Мне кажется, что для достижения этого вам необходимы определенные работники, способные осуществлять руководство на каждом отдельном уровне. Я все время говорю: ни один генерал не может выиграть сражения, если у него нет полковников, подполковников, майоров, капитанов, сержантов и капралов, — у каждого своя роль в руководстве, и все общество построено так же. На каждом уровне в народе должны быть свои лидеры, которые могли бы воодушевлять людей идти дальше. И пусть даже дело становится все более трудным — все равно надо продолжать движение к поставленной цели.

Следующий мой вопрос, госпожа Премьер-Министр, иного плана. Вы, конечно, знаете, что какое-то время назад Европа предвещала судьбу «старшего» политического центра. Но сегодняшние реалии поразительно показывают нам, что политическая Европа остается мощной и, более того, растущей силой. Каким Вы видите будущее Европы? Насколько сильны с Вашей точки зрения интеграционные процессы в Европе, которые могли бы открыть пути к строительству общего европейского дома?

— Конечно, понятие «Европа» гораздо старше Европейского экономического сообщества. Когда мы говорим о европейском идеале, то это гораздо больше, чем Европейское сообщество, и исторически гораздо глубже. Если посмотреть на эту более широкую Европу, в которой столицей некоторых стран Варшавского пакта являются такой же частью Европы, как и некоторые западные, если посмотреть на это исторически, то мы увидим, что Европа, очевидно, была тем первым местом, где великие религии иудаизма и христианство действительно закрепились. От-

появились — если это Индия, то мое троетактное приветствие Моголам — они построили замечательные вещи. Если это Советский Союз — троетактное приветствие царям — они оставили фантастические памятники, восхитительные наследия. Были покровителями великих искусств, — вспомните Фаберже, — великих прекрасных вещей. Их создавали люди смелые, наделенные воображением и уверенностью в себе. Мы, современники, получили это наследие и постарались сделать так, чтобы то, что было привилегией и роскошью для немногих, стало повседневно необходимым и повседневно доступным для многих. Это, во-вторых.

Третье, что я скажу о европейском идеале, включающем нас всех, это то, чему служит наука. Научные методы впервые нашли свое применение в Европе: есть гипотеза о каком-то явлении, ее проверяют с помощью наблюдений и выводят затем научные закономерности из результатов эксперимента, а если они не совпадают с гипотезой, то нужно изменить свои идеи. Весь этот метод был разработан в Европе, в физических науках, в медицинских, и — вот это я очень хотела бы подчеркнуть — в Европе, единственной во всем мире, науку повернули на пользу людей. В других частях света тоже делали открытия, как, например, в Китае, но знание там не стремились сделать прикладным. Поэтому великая промышленная революция началась совершилась на Западе, а не на Востоке или в Индии.

Таким образом, мы обладаем изумительным наследием — в философской и политической культуре, в искусстве, в науке — наследием, которое постепенно распространилось на всех людей, оно дает людям большую возможность выбора — правительства, при котором жить, выбора своего пути. И имея все это, мы действительно должны быть способны избрать дорогу дружбы и сотрудничества. Не крепостные стены вокруг Европы строить, а сделать ее примером сотрудничества для всего остального мира! Ибо, как я уже сказала, большая часть проблем в отношениях между странами, которые мы сегодня обсуждаем, касается всех народов.

В этом духе мы будем развивать Европейское экономическое сообщество. Конечно, у нас будет фундаментальная, глубокая и обязывающая дружба с Соединенными Штатами, которые, как я часто говорю, в определенном отношении являются народом Европы по ту сторону Атлантики. Они такой

поняли, что перед нами исключительный человек с очень сильным характером. У нас состоялась беседа, какие редко происходят между политиками. Она была весьма откровенной, каждая из сторон хотела понять другую, и эта дискуссия была необыкновенно конструктивной и теплой, оживленной, основанной на глубоком взаимном уважении...

— Спасибо за теплые слова в адрес нашего руководителя, господина Премьер-Министр, но я закончу свой вопрос следующим образом: поскольку это действительно был поворотный пункт в наших отношениях, что подтолкнуло Вас лично к такому повороту? Что заставило Вас содействовать изменениям в англо-советских отношениях? Как Вы оцениваете их обострение сегодня и каково Ваше мнение об их будущем?

— Я не вполне знаю, как вы ведете дела в Советском Союзе, но здесь, в этой комнате, в этом доме, в парламенте, мы постоянно обращаем наши мысли к будущему — к будущему нашей страны, будущему Европы, будущему отношений Восток—Запад, к развитию экологических проблем.

Итак, существовала проблема Восток—Запад. Во многом в ее основе лежали вопросы обороны и контроля над вооружениями. Мы посчитали, что нельзя дальше допускать, чтобы это было основой. И в первую очередь мы попытались расширить контакты в осуществлении хельсинкского процесса, хельсинкских договоренностей 1975 года.

Мы начали выяснять, можем ли мы добиться более широких контактов между Востком и Западом, в искусстве, в науке — наследием, которое постепенно распространилось на всех людей, оно дает людям большую возможность выбора — правительства, при котором жить, выбора своего пути. И имея все это, мы действительно должны быть способны избрать дорогу дружбы и сотрудничества. Не крепостные стены вокруг Европы строить, а сделать ее примером сотрудничества для всего остального мира! Ибо, как я уже сказала, большая часть проблем в отношениях между странами, которые мы сегодня обсуждаем, касается всех народов.

Затем мы поняли, что наступает время, когда, видимо, произойдут перемены в советском руководстве. Мы решили попытаться познакомиться с людьми, которые, как нам казалось, должны быть влиятельными в будущем, в расчете на то, что вы у нас были достаточно популярны и Вас глубоко ува-



созданием и здесь на Западе, и у нас в Советском Союзе «об-
раза врага». Это был гл...
герой «холодной войны»...
перь этот герой постепенно
дит со сцены. Можем ли мы
годия сказать, что и сама «хо-
лодная война» исчезает?

бизнесмены, которые гдями
привыкли вести эти дела,
управлять переменами, созда-
вать новые товары, знают, что
нужно людям... мы и пред-
ставляем ру... дить промыш-
ленностию.

По-моему, второй важной
полой перемены стало огром-
ное улучшение в отношениях
Восток—Запад. Я думаю, что это
достигнуто прежде всего бла-
годаря широте взглядов госпо-
дина Горбачева и людей, нахо-
дился рядом с ним. Не про-
сто взглядов на то, что вы хо-
тите для вашей собственной
страны, но и идей осуществле-
ния этого, идей, которые, как
нам кажется, абсолютно пра-
вильны, которые включают уси-
лия самого вашего народа, его
ответственность, его выбор,
мобилизацию его талантов. Это
абсолютно соответствует тому,
во что верим мы, — и именно
это, плюс тот факт, что у руко-
водства наших стран своевре-
менно оказались подходящие
люди — господин Горбачев, пре-
зидент Рейган, возможно, также
и я — сделало отношения Вос-
ток—Запад намного ближе.

Важно, что это произошло не
только в области обороны. Речь
о гораздо большем, чем взаим-
ное уважение обими сторонами
права на безопасность, чем
попытка договориться о сокра-
щении вооружений с тем, чтобы
оборона и безопасность обеспе-
чивались на более низком
уровне вооружений. Перемены
значительно глубже: выросла
торговля, расширились культур-
ные обмены, обмены между
людьми, больше людей стало
путешествовать за пределы Со-
ветского Союза и больше прие-
зжает в СССР. То есть изменения
носят всесторонний характер.
Они сопровождали в вашей
стране большей свободой слова,
свободой вероисповедания, сво-
бодой начинать какое-то дело и
делать его самостоятельно. Наб-
людать все это просто удиви-
тельно.

Третье важное изменение в
том, что увеличились число
вопросов, которые переходят
границы государств, как, напри-
мер, окружающая среда. Во-
просы окружающей среды не
признают границ. И мы все
должны беспокоиться об основ-
ных системах Земли, о всей ат-
мосфере вокруг Земли. Как вы
знаете, сегодня широко обсу-
ждается парниковый эффект, со-
стояние озонового слоя. Если
кто-то повредит его, будет
затронут каждый из нас. Если
мы все не примем участия,
то мы не сможем сохранить все
это невосполнимым и действующим
так, чтобы поддерживалась
жизнь. Это одна проблема. За-
тем существует загрязнение
морей и великих рек, кислотные
дожди и, к сожалению, многое
другое. Все это такие вещи,
которые затрагивают всех лю-
дей. Далее, мы должны внести
думать о проблемах, связанных
с природой самого человека:
почему некоторые люди стано-
вятся наркоманами или слишком
много выпивают? Это ведь тоже
проблемы, которые не призна-
ют границ. Боюсь, что и терро-
ризм тоже не знает границ, и
если подумать, то это тоже
своего рода «человеческое за-
грязнение» среды, в которой мы
живем. И нам необходимо объ-

цементы, новые колледжи, но-
вые дома, новые дороги — все
это легче сделать, чем изменить
человеческую психологию, соз-
нание людей. Люди привыкают
вести себя определенным обра-
зом и всегда сопротивляются
переменам. И все же, не изме-
нялся, невозможно приобрести к
тем большим достижениям, ко-
торые может предложить вам
остальная мир. Это очень слож-
ный процесс, и мне иногда ка-
жется, что вы в Советском Сою-
зе пытаетесь сделать в тече-
ние, скажем, 5—10 лет, на что
нам понадобилось более
столетия.

Здесь (в Англии. — Ред.) вели-
кий Акт о реформе 1832 го-
да стал началом процесса, ко-
гда все новые группы людей по-
лучали право голоса. Но это
происходило не вдруг. Это по-
шло от людей, в руках которых
находилось руководство стран-
ной. Затем следующий слой за-
явил: «Нет, мы тоже хотим уча-
ствовать!» Потом следующий,
ниже стоящий слой заявил: «Нет,
мы тоже хотим участвовать!» И
так далее. Это действительно
занило довольно много времени,
пока не сложилось так, что каж-
дый человек имеет право голо-
са. Мы шли к этому постепенно,
одновременно постоянно увели-
чивая ответственность промыш-
ленников, увеличивая ответст-
венность руководителей и все
больше разъясняя, что означает
такая ответственность.

Основная свобода, о которой,
как я слышала, говорит госпо-
дин Горбачев, — это свобода выбо-
ра. Вы выбираете, какую работу
вы хотите получить. Вы упорно
и много трудитесь, зарабатываете,
сколько сможете, а затем
выбираете, что купить на ваши
деньги, то время как кто-то
другой производит необходимые
товары. Наша проблема не в
том, чтобы наполнить магазины,
мы можем наполнить их вновь и
вновь. Люди должны выбирать,
что покупать, и, если они решают
что-то не покупать, эта вещь
так и остается на полке. А ее
производитель оказывается в за-
труднительном положении — он
не понял, что нужно, и сделал
совсем не ту вещь. За это он
пострадает, понесет ущерб. Та-
ким образом, выбор, ответствен-
ность, свобода означают, что вы
должны выполнять свои обя-
занности. Свобода влечет за со-
бой ответственность.

Я думаю также — это, во-в-
торых, — что наши взгляды сбли-
зились в области оборонной поли-
тики. Каждое государство долж-
но защищать себя и имеет пра-
во существовать в безопасно-
сти. Изменилось в Советском
Союзе, как мне кажется, то, что
вы переменили свой подход на
близкий к нашему, — достаточ-
ность обороны дает защиту от
нападения. Не оружие для напа-
дения, а достаточную оборону.
То есть только такое оружие,
которое достаточно, чтобы за-
щититься от любого нападения,
известного или неизвестного, это
требуются предусматреть.

Мне кажется, мы сближаемся
также и в подходе к некоторым

яли: если происходит такое
стихийное бедствие, необходи-
ма помощь. И тогда все барьеры
падают, вы идете и оказыва-
ете эту помощь.
Но я подчеркиваю, с чего
начала: в политике труднее все-
го изменить характер, взгляды
людей. Надо быть очень терпе-
ливым. Нужно все время объяс-
нять людям свой взгляд на бу-
дущее, убеждать их разделить
этот взгляд. Знаете, наша рели-
гия гласит: там, где нет такого
провидения, народ гибнет. По-
тому необходимо, чтобы люди
понимали, видели будущее, и не
надо стремиться достичь его
гигантскими прыжками — в жи-
зни не бывает. Движение впе-
ред идет день за днем, неделя
за неделей, месяц за месяцем,
идет не в результате чудес, а
благодаря постоянным, упорным,
самоотверженным усилиям. Мне
кажется, что для достижения
этого вам необходимы опреде-
ленные работники, способные
осуществлять руководство на
каждом отдельном уровне. Я все
время говорю: ни один генерал
не может выиграть сражения,
если у него нет полковников,
подполковников, майоров, капи-
танов, сержантов и капралов, —
у каждого своя роль в руково-
дстве, и все общество построено
так же. На каждом уровне в на-
роде должны быть свои лидеры,
которые могли бы воодушевлять
людей идти дальше. И пусть да-
же дело становится все более
трудным — все равно надо про-
должать движение к поставлен-
ной цели.

Следующий мой вопрос,
госпожа Премьер-Министр, много
спаса. Вы, конечно, знаете,
что какое-то время назад Евро-
пе предприняли судьбу «ста-
реющего» политического цен-
тра. Но сегодняшние реалии по-
казывают нам, что политически
Европа остается мощной и, бо-
лее того, растущей силой. Ка-
ким вы видите будущее Европы?
Насколько сильны, с Вашей то-
чки зрения, интеграционные про-
цессы в Европе, которые могли
бы открыть пути к строитель-
ству общего европейского дома?

— Конечно, понятие «Евро-
па» гораздо старше Европейско-
го экономического сообщества.
Когда мы говорим о европейском
идеале, то он гораздо больше,
чем Европейское сообщество, и
исторически гораздо глубже. Е-
сли посмотреть на эту более ши-
рокую Европу, в которой стои-
цы некоторых стран Варшав-
ского пакта являются такой же
частью Европы, как и некоторые
западные, если посмотреть на
это исторически, то мы увидим,
что Европа, очевидно, была тем
первым местом, где великие ре-
лигиозный иудизм и христианство
действительно закрепились. От-
сюда уже и пошла идея — свет-
ская идея — каждая отдельная
личность, каждый человек что-
то значит. Вот откуда на самом
деле идут права человека! Каж-
дая личность имеет значение. Не
система важна, а каждая лич-
ность. В Европе эта идея дейст-
вительно стала той главной ос-
новой, которая привела к разви-

лялась — если это Индия, то
мое троекратное приветствие
Моголам — они построили заме-
чательные вещи. Если это Со-
ветский Союз — троекратное
приветствие царям — они оста-
вили фантастические памятники,
восхитительное наследие, были
покровителями великих искусств,
— вспомните Фаберже, — вели-
кие прекрасные вещи. Их соз-
давали люди смелые, наделен-
ные воображением и уверенно-
стью в себе. Мы, современники
их, получили это наследие и по-
старались сделать так, чтобы
это было привилегией и роско-
шью для немногих, стало
последнее необходимым и по-
надобно доступным для мно-
гих. Это, во-вторых.

Третье, что я скажу о евро-
пейском идеале, включающем
нас всех, это то, чему служит
наука. Научные методы впер-
вые нашли свое применение в
Европе: есть гипотеза о каком-
то явлении, ее проверяют с по-
мощью наблюдений и выводят
затем научные закономерности
из результатов эксперимента, а
если они не совпадают с гипо-
тезой, то нужно изменить свои
идеи. Весь этот метод был раз-
работан в Европе, в физических
науках, в медицинских, и — вот
это я очень хотела бы подчер-
кнуть — в Европе, единственной
во всем мире, науку повернули
на пользу людей. В других ча-
стях света тоже делали откры-
тия, как, например, в Китае, но
знание там не стремились ве-
лкие прикладным. Поэтому ве-
ликая промышленная революция
начала совершаться на Западе,
а не на Востоке или в Индии.

Таким образом, мы обладаем
изумительным наследием — в фи-
лософской и политической куль-
туре, в искусстве, в науке — на-
следием, которое постепенно
распространилось на всех лю-
дей, оно дает людям большую
возможность выбора — прави-
тельства, при котором живут,
выбора своего пути. И имея все
это, мы действительно должны
быть способными избрать дорогу
дружбы и сотрудничества. Не
крепкие стены вокруг Евро-
пы строить, а сделать ее при-
мером сотрудничества для все-
го остального мира! Ибо, как я
уже сказала, большая часть
проблем в отношениях между
странами, которые мы сегодня
обсуждаем, касается всех наро-
дов.

В этом духе мы будем раз-
вивать Европейское экономиче-
ское сообщество. Конечно, у нас
будет фундаментальная,
глубокая и обязывающая дру-
жба с Соединенными Штатами,
которые, как я часто говорю, в
определенном отношении явля-
ются народом Европы по той
сторону Атлантики. Они такой
же европейский народ, просто
они переплыли океан, переехали
отсюда туда. Поэтому наши
связи неразрывны.

Затем, все мы должны начать
думать о других частях света.
Так, последние гигантские про-
блемы существуют в Африке.
Там происходит эрозия почвы,

поняли, что перед нами исклю-
чительный человек с очень
сильным характером. У нас со-
стоялась беседа, какие редко
происходят между политиками.
Она была весьма откровенной,
каждая из сторон хотела понять
другую, и эта дискуссия была
необыкновенно конструктивной
и теплой, оживленной, основан-
ной на глубоком взаимном ува-
жении...

— Спасибо за теплые слова
в адрес нашего руководителя,
госпожа Премьер-Министр, но
я закончу свой вопрос следу-
ющим образом: поскольку это
действительно был поворотный
пункт в наших отношениях, что
подтолкнуло Вас лично к такому
повороту? Что заставило Вас
действовать изменениям в
англо-советских отношениях?
Как Вы оцениваете их состояние
сегодня и каково Ваше мнение
об их будущем?

— Я не вполне знаю, как вы
ведете дела в Советском Союзе,
но здесь, в этой комнате, в
этом доме, в парламенте, мы по-
стоянно обращаем наши мысли
к будущему — к будущему на-
шей страны, будущему Евро-
пы, будущему отношений Вос-
ток—Запад, к развитию эколо-
гических проблем.

Итак, существовала проблема
Восток—Запад. Во многом в ее
основе лежали вопросы оборо-
ны и контроля над вооружения-
ми. Мы посчитали, что нельзя
далее допускать, чтобы это
было основой. И в первую оче-
редь мы попытались расширить
контакты в осуществлении
хельсинского процесса, хель-
синских договоренностей 1975
года.

Мы начали выяснять, можем
ли мы добиться более широких
контактов между Востоком и За-
падом, можем ли установить
лучшие отношения между нами и
по-настоящему обсуждать наши
различные системы. И я сделала
две вещи. Я решила отправиться
с визитами в те восточноевро-
пейские страны, с которыми у нас
были длительные отношения,
в конце концов мы вступили в
войну из-за Польши, когда Гит-
лер вторгся туда. У нас были
длительные отношения с Венг-
рией. И вот я отправилась в
Венгрию, а министр иностранных
дел посетил ряд других стран,
поскольку больше узнаете о лю-
дях, если разговариваете с ни-
ми.

Затем мы поняли, что насту-
пает время, когда, видимо, про-
зойдут перемены в советском ру-
ководстве. Мы решили попы-
таться познакомиться с людьми,
которые, как нам казалось,
должны быть влиятельными в
будущем, в расчете на то, что
были достаточно по-
стоянными в связи. Таким обра-
зом, это были позитивные, кон-
структивные усилия. Мы определили
новую стратегию во внешней по-
литике и двинули ее вперед.
Это было вполне позитивно. Все
время мы говорили, что наши
основные друзья — в Америке,
но именно потому, что есть ос-
новные друзья, мы, сохраняя ста-
рых друзей, можете расширить

Беседу вел
И. ЛАПТЕВ.

«ЗАКЛАДЫВАЕМ ФУНДАМЕНТ ВЗАИМОПОНИМАНИЯ»

В Сочи продолжает работу проводящийся под эгидой ООН междуна-
родный семинар по проблеме превращения Индийского
океана в зону мира.

Темой первого рабочего дня
семинара были вопросы устано-
вления мер доверия в регионе.
Заседание открыл своим докладом
представитель Германской
Демократической Республики,
заместитель председателя Спе-
циального комитета ООН по
Индийскому океану Вильгельм
ГРЮНДМАН. По выражению од-

ного из участников семинара,
он предложил детально, пункт
за пунктом проработанные реко-
мендации по ключевым пробле-
мам, таким, как ограничение
деятельности иностранных во-
енно-морских сил в океане, по-
степенное свертывание военных
баз, отказ от ядерного оружия.
Доклад Грюндмана дал тол-

чок оживленному обсуждению,
вызвал споры. Представители
некоторых развивающихся
стран, например, настойчиво
отнеслись к идее перенести на-
копленный европейскими госу-
дарствами опыт по установле-
нию мер доверия на специфиче-
скую почву совсем иного ре-
гиона. В речах участников се-
минара слышались нотки со-
мнения: все ли страны бассейна
Индийского океана достигли
той степени открытости обще-
ства, которая необходима для
успешного претворения в жизнь
мер доверия?

После завершения заседа-
ния я попросил поделиться сво-
ими впечатлениями советника по

стоянного представительства
Франции при ООН А. ГАЗО-СЕКРЕ.

— Мне кажется, участники
семинара еще не вошли в рабо-
чий ритм. Пока много общих
деклараций, не подкрепляемых
конкретными предложениями.
Кажется, не все выступавшие
осознали: мы приехали на семи-
нар не для ведения официаль-
ного неформального обмена мие-
ниями, который помог бы пред-
ставителям пятидесяти госу-
дарств найти общий язык, за-
ложить фундамент взаимопони-
мания.

М. ЮСИН,
спец. корр. «Известия».

СОЧИ.

Беседы в Бангкоке

БАНГКОК, 29 марта. (ТАСС).
Здесь состоялась дружеская бе-
седа заместителя министра ино-
странных дел СССР И. А. Рого-
чева и заместителя министра
иностранных дел СРВ Чан Ку-
анг Ко. В обстановке полного
взаимопонимания обсуждались
вопросы, стоящие на повестке
дня 45-й сессии Экономической
и социальной комиссии ООН для
Азии и Тихого океана (ЭСКАТО),
а также ситуация, складываю-
щаяся вокруг кампунгского
урегулирования в последнее
время.

Состоялся также консульта-

ции между И. А. Рогочевым и
государственным министром
иностранных дел и националь-
ного развития Сингапура Пите-
ром Суном, принимающим уча-
стие в работе сессии ЭСКАТО.

Советский представитель
встретился с министром торго-
вой Тайланда Субин Пинканом.
Состоялся заинтересованный
разговор о состоянии и пер-
спективах советско-тайландских
торгово-экономических связей,
налаживания новых форм сот-
рудничества, в том числе в де-
ле создания совместных пред-
приятий.

②
celc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 April 1989

Rich Dennis

ADP 4/4

Jean Charles,

Soviet Elections

The main reporting telegrams have been copied to No 10. You may find useful a brief look at the overall results and their implications.

The turnout was generally good, at around 85%, except for Armenia, where a nationalist-inspired boycott reduced it at least to 53%.

Not all the results have yet been published. But in nearly 300 of the 1500 seats voted on recently there either has to be a run-off between the two leading candidates, or, where only one or two candidates were on offer and no-one secured a majority of votes cast, a new election with new candidates. The Congress of Peoples Deputies is unlikely to meet until well into May at the earliest. It is unclear how the 542-member Supreme Soviet will be elected and therefore how open the system will be to manipulation. Mr Gorbachev himself should have no difficulty being elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet but it may not be unanimous.

The single most dramatic result was that of Yeltsin in the all-Moscow national-territorial constituency where he received some 89% of the vote, over 5 million votes in all. But elsewhere in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and a string of other Soviet cities, senior party officials and mayors were defeated, often when unopposed. The most notable casualty was Solovyov, the Leningrad party leader and candidate Politburo member who failed despite being the only candidate. In the Baltic States, the Popular Fronts did extremely well, notably in Lithuania. There and in Estonia, the party first secretaries were elected only because the Popular Fronts did not run against them. In Latvia, where the Latvian population is less than 50%, the party first secretary just scraped in.

/The



The official reaction has been slow to appear. The main press virtually ignored the results for several days. Gorbachev has now set the tone. The people are the masters and have spoken. The vote was for perestroika and accelerated reform. The appropriate conclusions have to be drawn. It is not yet clear how far the party losers will be encouraged to step down, but Gorbachev has ruled out an immediate purge.

There is only one possible interpretation of the voting trend, patchy though it was: a clear protest against unpopular, out of touch party officials and particularly against those who sought to make a mockery of the elections by standing unopposed. The vote for Yeltsin was a specific phenomenon but again directed at least in part against old-style party methods used against him, both when he was sacked and more recently, during the election campaign. It is far from clear what people were voting for. The traditional party apparatus was what they were voting against.

Gorbachev almost certainly did not anticipate the results. He may have been shocked by some of them. Having seen the clear popular mandate given to Yeltsin he has probably been asking himself how he would have done if he had stood himself rather than using the party list where no choice was given and only the Central Committee voted. The results could stiffen the resistance of the orthodox. Party morale has certainly suffered. But Gorbachev is likely to exploit the result to his own advantage, and that of radical reform. He is already presenting the outcome as a vote for more change and is not doing too much to soften the impression that losers should look to their future in public life.

For the longer term the people have shown that they are not sunk in apathy and cynicism, that they are no longer afraid and that they have had enough of old style party domination and falsification. The logic of the situation demands some form of organised pluralism. Gorbachev has ruled out a multi-party system but the orthodox fears of loss of party control are clearly growing. The Baltic popular vote in effect for autonomy/independence will no nothing to calm such fears. The warning noises out of Moscow about Baltic nationalism are growing louder but in today's circumstances Pravda editorials do not have the effect they once had.

/Mr Gorbachev

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Mr Gorbachev is now riding his own tiger. He has allowed the people a voice. They have used it to more drastic effect than he expected. In New York he spoke of freedom of choice for all nations. His own people are now beginning to demand it. For the moment they may be with him in wanting to go forward with reform despite the lack of material success so far. They could decide that they want to go further than he seems willing to contemplate. The Prime Minister will no doubt want to explore all this with him.

I am copying this to the Private Secretary of Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,
Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, ACTOR

MY TELNO 558: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE MEDIA: ELECTIONS AND
AGRICULTURE: COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. IN THE FIRST LEADERSHIP COMMENT ON THE ELECTIONS GORBACHEV REASSURES THE PARTY THAT THERE IS TO BE NO MAJOR CHANGE OF DIRECTION. THE PARTY APPARATUS WILL HAVE TO DRAW THE LESSONS FROM ELECTORAL DEFEATS AND PUT ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER. THE OPENING OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES' DEPUTIES AND THE SUPREME SOVIET TO BE POSTPONED FOR A MONTH. ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DEFINE AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

DETAIL

ELECTIONS

2. WHILE THE FRONT PAGES OF WESTERN NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH COMMENTARIES ON LAST SUNDAY'S ELECTION RESULTS, THE SOVIET PRESS, DESPITE GLASNOST, HAS BEEN LARGELY SILENT. THEY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR GUIDANCE FROM ABOVE. THIS SPEECH OF GORBACHEV'S WAS THEREFORE EAGERLY AWAITED AS THE FIRST INDICATION OF LEADERSHIP REACTION TO THE RESULTS. GORBACHEV STRESSED IN HIS SPEECH THAT THIS WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT: THE RESULTS HAVE NOT YET FULLY STUDIED. NEVERTHELESS, THE SPEECH FOLLOWS A POLITBURO DISCUSSION ON 28 MARCH AND PRESUMABLY THEREFORE REFLECTS A GENERAL LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS.

3. NATURALLY ENOUGH, GORBACHEV INTERPRETS THE ELECTIONS AS A VICTORY FOR PERESTROIKA AND DEMOCRATISATION. ACTIVE POPULAR PARTICIPATION IS SEEN AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE BEHIND PERESTROIKA. NEVERTHESS, THE TONE OF THE SPEECH IS NOTICEABLY DEFENSIVE. IT IS DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE PARTY AND WARN OTHERS THAT, HOWEVER SURPRISING THE RESULTS, THERE IS TO BE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN POLICY. HE DWELLS AT SOME LENGTH ON THE NEED FOR THE PARTY TO CONTINUE TO PLAY ITS LEADING ROLE IN PROMOTING PERESTROIKA. HE WARNS AGAINST CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS, AND REFERS TO THE NEED

TO DEFEND PERESTROIKA FROM DEMAGOGUES AND ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS. ELTSIN IS NOT MENTIONED ONCE.

4. ON THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF WHAT IS TO HAPPEN TO THE NUMEROUS PARTY LEADERS WHO FELL FOUL OF THE ELECTORATE, GORBACHEV IS CAREFULLY VAGUE. HE NOTES THAT THE REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE PROBLEMS WERE THOSE WHERE PERESTROIKA WAS NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH. THOSE WHO HAD FAILED TO GET ELECTED SHOULD NOT TAKE TRAGEDY OUT OF THIS. THEY SHOULD HOWEVER, DRAW THE APPROPRIATE LESSONS. THE MESSAGE SEEMS TO BE THAT LOCAL PARTIES ARE TO BE LEFT TO PUT THEIR OWN HOUSES IN ORDER: ELECTION FAILURES ARE NOT TO BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR FORCING THROUGH A WIDE-RANGING PURGE OF THE REGIONAL PARTY APPARATUS FROM THE CENTRE. GORBACHEV AND THE PARTY APPARATUS WILL BE WELL AWARE THAT THEY HAVE TO FACE ANOTHER ROUND OF LOCAL AND REPUBLIC LEVEL ELECTIONS IN THE AUTUMN AND THAT IF PERSONNEL AND POLICY CHANGES ARE NOT MADE MANY PARTY ORGANISATIONS WILL FACE FURTHER AND MORE FAR-REACHING ELECTORAL EMBARRASMENTS.

5. GORBACHEV CONFIRMS IN THIS SPEECH THAT THE NEED TO ORGANISE A LARGE NUMBER OF REPEAT ELECTIONS WILL REQUIRE A POSTPONEMENT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES. MOST OF THE RE-RUN ELECTIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE ON 14 MAY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE CONGRESS IS LIKELY TO MEET IN THE SECOND HALF OF MAY.

AGRICULTURE

6. DESPITE LIGACHEV'S ATTEMPT TO PAPER OVER THE CRACKS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE RECENT PLENUM (OUR TELNO 472) WE ARE STILL HEARING REPORTS OF CONTINUING LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. THE DOCUMENTS FROM THE PLENUM HAVE STILL NOT BEEN PUBLISHED. THIS SUGGESTS THERE HAS BEEN MORE HAGGLING. GORBACHEV SAYS IN THIS SPEECH THAT THEY WILL BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY.

7. MOST OF HIS COMMENTS ON AGRICULTURE ARE A RE-HASH OF HIS PLENUM SPEECH. HIS PURPOSE IN REVERTING TO THIS SUBJECT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO TRY TO LAY DOWN CLEAR GUIDELINES AS TO WHAT LEADERSHIP POLICY ON AGRICULTURE NOW IS - PARTICULARLY ON THE VEXED ISSUE OF LEASING. ON THE KEY POINT ABOUT WHAT TO DO ABOUT LOSS-MAKING FARMS, GORBACHEV TRIES TO STEER A MIDDLE COURSE.

HE REJECTS THE IDEA OF CONTINUING SUBSIDIES - THE LIGACHEV LINE. BUT HE RESERVES HIS STRONGEST LANGUAGE FOR THOSE JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS WHO CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE THE IMMEDIATE DISMANTLING OF THESE FARMS AND THEIR HANDING OVER TO LEASEHOLDERS. ONE CANNOT, HE

SAYS, SIMPLY DISREGARD THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED NOR THE FACT THAT THESE FARMS ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 20% OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. HE SAYS, AS HE DID IN HIS PLENUM SPEECH, THAT THERE WILL BE SOME CASES WHEN COLLECTIVE FARMS HAVE TO BE EITHER MERGED OR GIVEN OVER TO LEASEHOLDERS. THE MAIN WAY FORWARD MUST BE TO REDUCE SUBSIDIES BY ENCOURAGING THE FARMS TO BE MORE EFFICIENT. HOWEVER, HE HAS NO MORE CONVINCING ARGUMENTS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE THAT HE HAD AT THE PLENUM.

8. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS SPEECH THAT GORBACHEV IS INTENDING TO CAPITALISE ON LIGACHEV'S POST-ELECTION DISCOMFITURE TO FORCE THROUGH A MORE RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE COLLECTIVE SYSTEM: BUT A FINAL VERDICT ON THIS WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL WE SEE THE PLENUM DOCUMENTS AND THE DRAFT LAW ON LEASING.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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PS/PM
PRESS SEC PM

SIR P CRADOCK

NNNN

26/4

Mr. C. Powell
Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
Downing Street, 10

31 March 1989

Dear Mr. Powell,

Please pass on to the Prime Minister the attached letter from Mr. I. Haeev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR in which he thanks the British Government for the earthquake relief assistance provided to Tajikistan.

May I on behalf of myself and the USSR Embassy in London join him in expressing our gratitude.

Sincerely yours,

L. Zamyatin

L. Zamyatin

USSR Ambassador

Jp 0763

MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Prime Minister

COO

2/4.

mt

Soviet Election Results

I attach a note written within the Assessments Staff giving a first reaction to the Soviet elections of 26 March. A considered Assessment of the results and their implications will be made in mid-April when all the results have been received and studied.

mt
Cl

PERCY CRADOCK

31 March 1989

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SOVIET ELECTION RESULTS: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

1. The full results of the Soviet Elections will not be published until 5 April. But enough information has come in to indicate that, in a high turnout, the voters have used the freedom denied them for 70 years to deliver a stinging rebuke to the Party establishment. This has been particularly striking in the 3 major cities, where all the top local Party and Soviet figures who stood for election were defeated.

- In Moscow, Eltsin's victory over a factory director with nearly 90% of the vote (over 5 million votes) far exceeded expectations. Moreover, those of the city's leading political figures who stood, lost. Two Politburo members who should have stood in Moscow (Vorotnikov, President of the Russian Republic, and Zaikov, Moscow Party leader) escaped defeat only by standing (respectively) in the countryside and on the Party list.

- In Leningrad, the three leading Party and Soviet figures all lost, including the most senior head to roll, the Leningrad regional Party leader, Soloviev, a Candidate Member of the Politburo. He had stood unopposed, but failed to amass the necessary 50% of the votes cast. (The voters used the option, always theoretically open to them, but rarely used in the past for fear of reprisals, of simply excising the single name on the ballot sheet).

- In Kiev, the local Party and Soviet leaders, both standing unopposed, also failed to get 50% of the votes. The Ukrainian Party leader,

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Shcherbitsky, who ought to have stood in Kiev, escaped to his home base of Dnepropetrovsk, where, standing unopposed, he gained 75% of the votes.

2. Scattered results from around the country show that a number of other regional Party leaders, particularly in the Ukraine, and mostly standing unopposed, failed to be elected. At least 5 senior military commanders have also been defeated, a number of them by more junior officers.

3. In the Baltic states, the results show that the Popular Fronts, not the local Communist Parties, call the shots: the Popular Fronts won almost all the seats they contested. The Party leadership got through by and large only where the Popular Fronts deliberately held off. In other Republics the results have been uneven. In Kazakhstan most of the Party leaders seem to have got through unopposed. In Armenia there was a near boycott.

4. In general, the population showed greater activity than anyone had expected. Prompted in many cases by the local intelligentsia, they humiliated in particular those Party leaders who had best manipulated the pre-election process to stand unopposed or against only token opposition. The results took the leadership by surprise. A Politburo meeting was convened on 28 March to discuss them. Gorbachev summoned media chiefs on 29 March. He took the predictable line that the results showed support for *perestroika* and that the electorate's rejection of individual Party leaders indicated that *perestroika* was moving too slowly. Their defeat was "no tragedy", but cause for reflection. He did not imply that their jobs were at stake in the immediate future. He again rejected any talk of a multi-Party system as a result of the elections.

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5. Gorbachev's feelings are probably mixed. He has succeeded handsomely in what we judged to be his two principal aims: to involve the population in politics and to put the entrenched apparatchiks on their mettle. Gorbachev now has something of a popular mandate to press on with perestroika and weed out those who resist it. But success on this scale will generate a new set of problems. In particular:

- Whatever explanations are offered, the results will be seen as a vote of no confidence in the Party's rule. This will shake morale in the Party, through whom Gorbachev still has to govern. Those Party apparatchiks who have been thrown to the wolves will be less than ever enamoured of Gorbachev, particularly as he himself escaped facing the electorate through being elected on the Party slate.

- Pressure for some sort of organised opposition, either the sanctioning of factions within the Party or a multi-Party system, will increase. Gorbachev currently wants neither.

- The scent of victory may arouse unfulfillable expectations among the population;

- The elections will further fuel nationalist movements, particularly in the Baltics.

6. Next steps. In a total of 275 constituencies the elections were inconclusive. In 76 of them, where there were three or more candidates, and none received 50% of the votes, the top two will have a run off on 9 April.

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In the other 199, where no more than two candidates stood and none reached 50%, the whole process of nomination, registration and election will have to be gone through again, with new elections on 14 May.

7. The new Congress of 2,250 People's Deputies should have gathered for its first annual meeting at the end of April, but this has now been postponed until after the second round of elections. Its two tasks will be: to elect a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Gorbachev can still expect to get the job, albeit probably not with a unanimous vote); and to elect a Supreme Soviet of 542 Deputies, divided into two Councils, of the Union and of Nationalities (one fifth of whom are to be renewed annually). Little thought seems to have been given as to how to do this fairly. The process will offer Party officials an opportunity to attempt to recoup their losses by excluding awkward Deputies; it will be watched keenly by the now politically aware Soviet public.

8. Conclusion. The vote was against the Party establishment rather than for reform. Gorbachev can draw some immediate satisfaction from it, but the ultimate message is that the Party cannot hold on to its present monopoly of power for ever.

31 March 1989

D315/WSI 5

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the department for Enterprise

SPC

The Rt. Hon. Lord Young of Graffham
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

The Rt Hon John MacGregor MP
Minister of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
Whitehall Place
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ADP o/R

To see,

REC 6

30/3

Direct line 215 5422
Our ref PB6AGD
Your ref
Date 29 March 1989

Dear John,

POSSIBLE SALE OF UK GRAIN TO THE USSR

I have seen your letter of 1 March to Geoffrey Howe and his reply of 8 March about the possibility of the UK supplying 1 million tonnes of grain.

Like Geoffrey, I see no difficulty in principle in marking Mr Gorbachev's visit with a deal of this kind. The Soviet Union needs to import about 35 million tonnes this year, and the UK is in as good a position as other countries to respond. Grain already represents a significant proportion of what we export to the Soviet Union. Such a sale would provide a good headline figure and would certainly help our trade deficit in the short-term, though its benefits would not be lasting.

I believe, however, that it would be more worthwhile for UK trade as a whole if Mr Gorbachev's visit could be marked by the conclusion of longer-term projects such as some of the major capital projects which a number of British companies are pursuing. The latest indications I have from companies are that there could be several ready for signature at the time, and I am making provision in the programme for Mr Kamentsev, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister for foreign trade, who will be accompanying Mr Gorbachev, for a signing ceremony at Lancaster House.

Mr French is in Moscow at the moment. My officials have heard that he has made contact with the Soviet foreign trade organisation Exportkhleb and that, with the encouragement of the Soviet Ambassador, they do appear to be willing to discuss

dti

the department for Enterprise

the purchase of grain both now and in the future. Mr French will no doubt report to your officials upon his return next week.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe, John Major and Sir Robin Butler.

F. L. Harris

The logo for the Enterprise Initiative, featuring the word "Enterprise" in a stylized font with an arrow pointing upwards and to the right, and the words "the" and "initiative" in smaller text above and below it respectively.

the
Enterprise
initiative

SOVIET UNION: Relations

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MY TELNO 523: PRELIMINARY SOVIET ELECTION RESULTS: FIRST THOUGHTS

SUMMARY

1. FIRST RESULTS SUGGEST THE ELECTIONS WILL GIVE A MAJOR JOLT TO THE POLITBURO STRUCTURE. THE SOVIET ELECTORATE HAVE SEIZED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE VENT TO THEIR FRUSTRATIONS. GORBACHEV AND OTHERS HAVE A LOT OF HARD THINKING TO DO.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO PUBLISH THE ELECTION RESULTS SYSTEMATICALLY. SO FAR ONLY A SMALL PROPORTION OF THE RESULTS ARE KNOWN. BUT IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THESE ELECTIONS REPRESENT A MUCH BIGGER POLITICAL UPSET THAN SEEMED POSSIBLE EVEN A FEW DAYS AGO. THE PARTY APPARATUS WILL HAVE HAD AN EMBARRASSING SHOCK.

3. THE MOST STARTLING RESULT SO FAR IS THAT IN LENINGRAD. HERE THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A MASSIVE VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE IN THE LOCAL PARTY MACHINE. THE FUTURE OF SOLOVYOV, A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO, AND SOME OF HIS SENIOR PARTY COLLEAGUES MUST NOW BE IN DOUBT. THE SAME IS TRUE TO A LESSER EXTENT IN THE UKRAINE. HERE THE NEGATIVE VOTE AGAINST SUCH KEY FIGURES AS MASIK PROBABLY REFLECTS IN PART WIDESPREAD POPULAR RESENTMENT AGAINST THE SHCHERBITSKY MACHINE AND THEIR ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE ELECTIONS BY THE USE OF SINGLE CANDIDATE CONSTITUENCIES. BUT FEW WILL HAVE EXPECTED THE POEPL TO HAVE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION SO VIGOROUSLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

4. THOSE RESULTS WHICH WE HAVE SEEN FROM THE BALTIC STATES CONFIRM AGAIN THE INCREASING POLITICAL POWER OF THE POPULAR FRONTS. IN ESTONIA WHERE THE POPULAR FRONT ENDORSED THE PARTY LEADERSHIP, VYALYAS AND HIS COLLEAGUES SAILED THROUGH WITH PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT VYALYAS GOT 90% OF THE VOTE. IN LITHUANIA ON THE OTHER

HAND TWO OF THE THREE LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES IN THE REPUBLIC WERE DEFEATED BY SAJIDIS-BACKED CANDIDATES, AND THE PARTY LEADER, BRAZUSKAS, PROBABLY ONLY GOT THROUGH BECAUSE HIS SAJUDIS OPPONENT WITHDREW.

5. THE ELTSIN VICTORY IS EVEN MORE MASSIVE THAN HIS SUPPORTERS COULD HAVE HOPED. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MILLION OUT OF THE 6.7 MILLION ELECTORATE TURNED OUT TO VOTE FOR HIM. THIS RESULT WAS ANNOUNCED BRIEFLY ON YESTERDAY EVENING'S TV AND THIS MORNINGS PRESS WITHOUT COMMENT, WHICH SUGGESTS THERE IS, AS YET NO AGREED LINE TO TAKE. THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE MOSCOW PARTY APPARATUS WAS FURTHER EMPHASISED WHEN SAIKIN, THE MAYOR OF MOSCOW AND THE ONLY SENIOR FIGURE FROM THE MOSCOW APPARATUS TO CONTEST AN ELECTION, FAILED TO GET THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF VOTES.

6. FOR GORBACHEV THESE RESULTS PROBABLY BRING MIXED FEELINGS. I SET OUT IN MY TELNO 521 SOME OF THE HEADACHES THE ELTSIN VICTORY WOULD CAUSE HIM. THE FAILURES OF THE PARTY MACHINE IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY INCREASE THE FORCE AND URGENCY OF QUESTIONS. GORBACHEV HAS ALL THE AMMUNITION HE NEEDS TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR CONTINUED RADICAL REFORM. BUT THE NEED TO RESTORE PARTY MORALE AND PUBLIC RESPECT FOR THE PARTY MAY NOW SEEM TO HIM EVEN MORE PRESSING. IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS HOW THIS CAN BE DONE. THIS MASSIVE VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE IN THE PARTY ESTABLISHMENT WILL HIGHLIGHT FOR ALL THE DANGERS OF MORE PLURALISM. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT IT WILL RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER SOMETHING URGENT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PLACATE THE CONSUMER.

7. MORE IMMEDIATELY, A WAY HAS TO BE FOUND OF HANDLING RE-RUN ELECTIONS IF THOSE CONSTITUENCIES WHERE NO CANDIDATE GOT THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF VOTES. NEW CANDIDATES WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND. THERE WILL OBVIOUSLY BE PRESSURE, EG IN LENINGRAD, TO PUT FORWARD RADICAL POLITICAL FIGURES WHO COULD FURTHER EMBARRASS THE PARTY MACHINE. RE-RUN ELECTIONS HAVE TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN TWO MONTHS.

BRAITHWAITE

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②
Richard

copy
2/4

Sir Gordon White K.B.E.
Chairman

R 30/13

27th March 1989

Dear Charles,

I thought that the Prime Minister might be interested to see this article following our conversation about how we could help Soviet industry to improve.

With kind regards,

Yours age
Gordon

Charles D. Powell, Esq.
Private Secretary Foreign Affairs
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1



PETER MORENUS/The Post-Standard

Local dignitaries and a group of Soviet business people look over the shoulder of a Smith Corona worker.

Soviets Tour Smith Corona Plant

Business Delegation Becomes Acquainted With U.S. Products

By JOHN S. TONELLO

CORTLANDVILLE — Smith Corona workers looked up from their assembly lines with curiosity Tuesday afternoon as a delegation of four Soviet Union business people and several other dignitaries were escorted through the Route 13 plant.

The visit was to acquaint the Soviets with the typewriter factory's production, products and people, a Smith Corona official said. All four are representatives of Vneshtorgizdat, the 65-year-old Soviet company that in December entered into an agreement with Smith Corona to distribute electronic typewriters and word processors in the Soviet Union.

Vneshtorgizdat — Russian for Foreign Book Publisher — is the largest company of its kind in the Soviet Union.

Today, the company's representatives are expected to be briefed on the detailed technical aspects of the Smith Corona products, said Jim Tucker, Smith Corona vice president.

"We held a training session with them (Vneshtorgizdat officials) in Moscow the first week of December and received an excellent response."

— Jim Tucker,
vice president

"We held a training session with them (Vneshtorgizdat officials) in Moscow the first week of December and received an excellent response," Tucker said.

The Soviet representatives included Vladimir Prokopov, director general of Vneshtorgizdat, Maxim V. Vasilenko, Leonid A. Zhestkov and Katarina Khoroshilova. The group, along with an American lawyer working in Moscow, arrived in the U.S. Sunday. All speak English.

"It's interesting," Khoroshilova said of the manufacturing process during the walking tour of the Smith Corona plant. She admitted jovially, however, that she and her col-

leagues were suffering from some of the effects of jet lag.

U.S. Rep. Sherwood L. Boehlert, R-Utica, and Smith Corona President G. Lee Thompson from company headquarters in New Canaan, Conn., were among the dignitaries posing for pictures and touring the Cortlandville facility with the Soviets Tuesday.

Smith Corona and Vneshtorgizdat officials will combine their efforts in designing the equipment expected to be marketed in the Soviet Union, Tucker said. The typewriters will have keys and print in Cyrillic — the Russian alphabet. Word processors will give user commands in Russian.

No prototypes have been built yet, Tucker said.

Smith Corona, which employs about 2,150 workers at its 450,000-square-foot local facility and 700 at its Singapore location, is the world leader in the portable electronic typewriter market. It recently has begun to expand into portable word-processing technology and already has established European markets.

Vneshtorgizdat began exhibiting and demonstrating Smith Corona products in major cities throughout the Soviet Union in mid-December, but David P. Verostko, director of Employee Relations at Smith Corona, said Tuesday it was too early to say whether the Soviet trade agreement would mean more jobs at the Cortlandville facility.

copy (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 March 1989

no

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The Minister
well worthwhile.

EGD
22/3.

Dear Charles,

The Prime Minister's interview with Korotich, the editor of Ogonyok, appeared in the edition published in Moscow on 13 March. I enclose a facsimile copy.

We have checked the text against the transcript. It is very full and faithful. The interview appeared under a picture of the Prime Minister with Korotich, with the headline "Freedom incurs responsibility". There was no accompanying commentary except a sentence of thanks to the Prime Minister and a reference to the benefits of cooperation between different social systems.

We understand from the Embassy that the interview has been widely read and appreciated.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



Выражая глубокую признательность госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер за это интервью, мы надеемся, что оно укрепит в наших читателях понимание непреложного факта: диалог двух социальных систем, поиски взаимопонимания в изменяющемся мире являются единственно возможным путем развития при всей спорности наших взаимных оценок. Европейский, всемирный дом человечества может существовать лишь в том случае, если те, кто в нем живет и трудится, будут устремлены к сотрудничеству.

**СВОБОДА
СОПРЯЖЕНА
С**

ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ

FAX No: 270 3282

TO: J E Holmes Esq
Soviet Dept

FROM: A J Longrigg, MOSCOW

(Ogonyok No 11)

**Интервью
премьер-министра
Великобритании
МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР
главному редактору
журнала «Огонек»
ВИТАЛИЮ КОРОТИЧУ**

ответственности, знающих, что, хотя земля принадлежит им и их семьям, они в то же время ответственны перед другими.

Именно так наш строй достиг зрелости. У вас же был иной политический строй, при котором людям обычно указывали, что им надо делать. Ваша основная трудность заключается в том, что хотя в будущем, да и сейчас в вашей стране найдется немало талантливых и способных людей, действующих с чувством ответственности и готовых принимать самостоятельные решения, им все еще предстоит привыкать к происходящим переменам.

Людям всегда было свойственно прибавляться перемен. Да и к тому же следует учитывать огромные масштабы вашей страны. Нашим людям незнакомы трудности с получением сырья. Скажем, человек заводит свое дело, знает, где заказать сырье, уверен, что оно поступит более или менее в срок, иначе поставщику не избежать неприятностей. У него нет никаких проблем с валютой, необходимой для оплаты заказа.

интервью, мы надеемся, что оно укрепит в наших читателях понимание непреложного факта: диалог двух социальных систем, поиски взаимопонимания в изменяющемся мире являются единственно возможным путем развития при всей спорности наших взаимных оценок. Европейский, всемирный дом человечества может существовать лишь в том случае, если те, кто в нем живет и трудится, будут устремлены к сотрудничеству.

СВОБОДА СОПРЯЖЕНА С ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ

— Вам, вероятно, известно, что Вы очень популярный политический деятель Запада у нас в стране. Во многом это связано с активизацией контактов между нашими странами, с Вашими встречами с М. С. Горбачевым. Считаете ли Вы, что процессы, проходящие сейчас у нас в Советском Союзе, связаны с жизнью вашей страны и с жизнью людей во всей Европе?

— Думаю, они приведут к переменам как во всем мире, так и в жизни Советского Союза. Некоторые из ваших трудностей заключаются в том, что вы пытаетесь за относительно короткий промежуток времени осуществить перемены, на которые уходят многие годы. В нашей стране процесс демократизации утверждался постепенно, в течение многих лет по мере того, как сначала знать ограничила королевскую власть, затем народ ограничил власть знати, а после этого шаг за шагом происходил процесс предоставления всем гражданам права голоса по принципу «один человек — один голос». И, конечно же, у нас в стране люди могут голосовать за отдельные партии, отдавая предпочтение той или иной форме управления страной.

Этот довольно затяжной процесс

стал реальностью, поскольку именно этого хотел народ. Конечно же, нынешнего уровня демократии и благосостояния нельзя было бы достичь без широких свобод, например, свободы открыть собственное дело, пусть даже при наличии небольшого числа ограничений и определенных элементов планирования.

Кроме того, вот уже много лет фермеры в нашей стране пользуются правом на владение землей — правом, которого нет в Советском Союзе. Они сами решают, что им сеять и что выращивать, держать ли молочный скот или овец и т. д. Все это они решают сами, как и какую продукцию продавать на рынке, где им приходится конкурировать с другими фермерами, бороться за сохранение своей клиентуры среди посредников, поскольку, как известно, каждый стремится купить товар лучшего качества с тем, чтобы затем иметь возможность его выгодно перепродать.

Все они должны заботиться о качестве своей продукции — ведь рядом находится масса других конкурирующих с ними покупателей и продавцов. Но определяющими факторами являются возможность самому принимать решение и сознание того, что земля или другое имущество принадлежит именно

вам, что вы разоритесь, если ваша продукция не понравится потребителю, что если вы заложите слишком высокую цену или предложите товар низкого качества, то ваш покупатель тут же уйдет к другому продавцу.

Именно в этом заключается суть понятия, которое мы называем рынком. Рынок — это то место, куда люди приходят, чтобы ознакомиться с лежащими на прилавках товарами и прицениться к ним. Фермер или владелец прилавка не обанкротится лишь в том случае, если сможет предложить нужный товар хорошего качества по приемлемой цене.

Потребовалось много лет, прежде чем Запад пришел к этому. Я всегда считала большой ошибкой тот факт, что после отмены крепостного права царское правительство не пошло на предоставление крестьянам земли в размерах, достаточных для того, чтобы они могли на ней жить, строить дома, обзаводиться семьей, производить продовольствие не только для себя и семьи, но и для обмена на продукцию других производителей. Если бы это случилось, у нас в стране было бы сейчас огромное число людей, привыкших принимать самостоятельные решения, действовать с чувством

и то же время ответственности перед другими.

Именно так наш строй достиг зрелости. У нас же был иной политический строй, при котором людям обычно указывали, что им надо делать. Ваша основная трудность заключается в том, что хотя в будущем, да и сейчас в вашей стране найдется немало талантливых и способных людей, действующих с чувством ответственности и готовых принимать самостоятельные решения, им все еще предстоит привыкать к происходящим переменам.

Людям всегда было свойственно бояться перемен. Да и к тому же следует учитывать огромные масштабы вашей страны. Нашим людям знакомы трудности с получением сырья. Скажем, человек заводит свое дело, знает, где заказать сырье, уверен, что оно поступит более или менее в срок, иначе поставщику не избежать неприятностей. У него нет никаких проблем с валютой, необходимой для оплаты заказанного сырья, поскольку вот уже в течение многих лет наша валюта является свободно конвертируемой. Он знает заранее, сколько квалифицированных рабочих ему потребуется, и готов подрядить их. Правда, при наличии достаточно высокой квалификации рабочие скорее всего потребуют от предприятия или работодателя весьма высокую плату за свой труд. В этом случае работодатель скорее всего скажет: «Знаете, я никак не могу заплатить вам столько, сколько вы хотите, потому что стоимость готового изделия окажется не по карману потребителю».

Со временем мы свыклись с таким положением вещей. Однако и у вас, и в любой другой стране найдется немало людей, которые предпочитают не заводить свое собственное дело, полагаясь при этом на более предприимчивых, на тех, у кого они могут получить работу.

Законодательство нашей страны определяет основные условия договора между работодателем и работником, предполагающие, в частности, оплату труда работника не натурой, а наличными. Работник должен получать столько, чтобы он мог жить по-человечески, а в случае незаконного увольнения он имеет право обратиться в суд. На каждого работника работодатель выплачивает страховой взнос в систему государственного страхования, причем не только с учетом выплачиваемой

нуждаться. Ваши выступления должны ускорить этот процесс должны увенчаться успехом. Посмотрите, что происходит в соседних с вами странах — членах Варшавского пакта, скажем, в Венгрии. Я увидел в венгерских магазинах намного больше товаров по сравнению с тем, что мне было показано в одном из московских универсамов. Да и в наших магазинах гораздо больше товаров, чем у вас.

Я уже сказала, что ваши усилия должны увенчаться успехом. В более конкретном плане, как мне представляется, вы могли бы перейти от довольно жестко регламентированной коммунистической системы, в условиях которой люди не могут проявлять инициативу, а делают лишь то, что им приказано, к более свободной экономике, открывающей гораздо более широкие возможности в плане производства товаров и услуг и в целом более широкие возможности для людей. Все это возможно, необходимо лишь немного терпения, чтобы это получить, а о том, что это возможно, говорят события, происходящие в соседних с вами странах.

Сейчас уровень жизни ряда стран понизился из-за того, что они придерживаются системы, в условиях которой люди делают лишь то, что им приказано. Сколько же от этого уязвлено и гибнет талантов и способностей!

У нас принято считать, что могущество и престиж страны зависят в первую очередь от таланта и способностей ее народа. Вместо того, чтобы подавлять эти способности, говорить людям, что им нельзя делать того-то и того-то, им надо разрешать делать все, при условии, что трудовая деятельность не будет ставить под угрозу здоровье и жизнь людей, что выпускаемые товары безопасны для людей и отвечают их разумным потребностям, при условии поощрения конкуренции и ликвидации монополии в любой области, поскольку монополия неэффективна и приводит к плохим результатам. При соблюдении всех этих условий пусть люди занимаются тем, что им больше по душе. Именно так можно добиться более высокого уровня жизни, более полного удовлетворения потребностей людей. Ведь что может вызвать у людей чувство большего удовлетворения, чем понимание, что человек работает с пользой для себя, что он имеет возможность сам определить, как ему действовать дальше, какую продукцию поставить на рынок, скажем, в следующем году?

что в нем сразу же раскрывается человек незаурядный, огромного мужества, весь устремленный в будущее своей страны, обладающий аналитическим складом ума, что позволяет ему правильно анализировать и устранять выявленные недостатки.

Хотя это и не такое уж редкое качество у политического деятеля, именно оно выделяет его среди прочих людей как политика, влияющего на формирование будущего, убежденного в правильности выбранного им курса, обладающего мужеством, необходимым для того, чтобы довести дело до конца, убежденного в том, что это даст народу его страны возможность жить гораздо лучше, почувствовать себя настоящими полноценными людьми, у каждого из которых будет чувство собственного достоинства, возможность проявить свой талант, воспользоваться своими правами. Здесь нужно сказать еще вот что: когда строишь планы на будущее, на более отдаленное будущее, как это делала я и как это делает он, нельзя отклоняться от намеченного курса, как бы тяжело тебе ни приходилось в каждый конкретный момент. Например, вы выступаете за резкое повышение качества продукции, бракуете продукцию недостаточного высокого качества. В этом случае скорее всего произойдет следующее: производители покажутелю начнут ползти вниз, ибо вы бракуете некачественную продукцию. А производителям продукции требуется время для решения производственных проблем, связанных с закупкой сырья, определением производимого ассортимента и установлением стоимости продукции.

С чем мне пришлось столкнуться?.. Расходы страны в целом оказались слишком высокими, мы тратили деньги не на то, что нам было необходимо, у нас было слишком много ограничений. Отсюда возник и целый ряд трудностей, ведь некоторые понимают демократию следующим образом: «Г-жа Тэтчер, я голосовал за вас и за вашу партию, а теперь ваш черед сделать что-то для меня». От демократии ничего не останется, если следовать принципу: «Услуга — за услугу, ведь я за вас голосовал». Нет, из такой демократии ничего не выйдет, равным счетом ничего.

Демократия не означает ожидание от государства каких-то подарков. Демократия означает такое правительство, которое дает возможность трудиться

только упорный труд, но и, скажем, возможность иметь в своем районе публичную библиотеку, книги которой будут доступны всем, будут давать всем знания и открывать перед людьми новые возможности. Главным фактором демократии является возможность заниматься самосовершенствованием, получить профессию, скажем, инженера, узнать о богатствах мира, познакомиться с великими произведениями искусства и литературы. Отсюда и стремление людей открыть у себя в районе хорошую библиотеку.

А вслед за этим у людей возникает тяга к путешествиям, желание посмотреть мир, пробуждается дух гражданственности, патриотизма. В стране, где люди действуют с чувством ответственности, возникает общество, движимое чувством общей ответственности, сознанием того, что обеспечить общее благосостояние можно лишь путем удовлетворения запросов потребителя, повышением качества предлагаемых товаров. Нужно уметь хорошо чинить ботинки, хорошо шить одежду, производить продовольствие высокого качества. Только путем обеспечения благосостояния других можно обеспечить и свое собственное благосостояние. Здесь все построено на взаимности.

Г-н Горбачев понимает, что все советские люди могли бы жить гораздо лучше, что для этого достаточно предоставить свободу действий вашим творчески мыслящим, инициативным людям. Понятно, что все скопом вряд ли начнут активно заниматься предпринимательством. Но достаточно кому-то начать, как к ним потянутся массы людей, все остальные члены общества. Г-н Горбачев понимает, что личная свобода человека в сочетании с политическими свободами демократического общества и при наличии экономических свобод могут создать высокий уровень материального благосостояния. Ведь именно свобода делает достойной и осмысленной жизнь каждого человека. Г-н Горбачев понимает, что ему придется столкнуться с некоторыми трудностями, но он не теряет веры в людей. Ведь когда они увидят открывающиеся перед ними возможности и воспользуются ими, жизнь начнет меняться в лучшую сторону.

Жизнь уже начинает довольно стремительно изменяться в лучшую сторону, скажем, в Венгрии, где людям удалось кое-чего добиться еще в эпоху Брежнева и Андропова, когда они полу-

можно лишь путем перемен, путем использования их в своих интересах, постоянно устремляясь при этом в будущее. Уверена, что никто не захочет вернуться в прошлое, где не было ни радио, ни телевидения, ни авиалинейных сообщений.

Перемены требуют аналитического склада ума, прозорливости, мужества. Для их осуществления необходимы время и вера в пользу перемен. Но ведь смысл жизни и состоит в переменах, ведь перемены позволяют каждому из нас проявить свой особый талант, свои способности...

— ...и выполнить намеченное?

— Чем дальше вы заглядываете в будущее, тем более высокие цели вы ставите перед собой и своим народом. Но ни один генерал не в состоянии воевать в одиночку — он должен уметь увлечь за собой людей, каждый из которых должен в то же время сознавать пользу своего личного вклада. То же самое происходит и в политике.

Я часто задаю себе вопрос, как бы я себя повела, окажись на его месте. Ведь и я иногда принимаю какое-то решение, а потом начинаю от него отказываться, сомневаться в том, принесет ли оно пользу. Все это происходит потому, что в глубине души остаются сомнения, удается ли довести до сознания людей правильность принятого решения.

...Многие предпочитают уходить в частный сектор. Но ведь нужны и учителя, и врачи, и чиновники, да к тому же квалифицированные чиновники. Работа найдется для каждого, однако максимальную пользу можно извлечь в том случае, если обладающие большим талантом и способностями люди получат возможность заниматься своим делом, будь то в промышленности или торговле. Именно тогда они смогут повысить общее благосостояние, увлечь своим примером других, позволить всем разделить плоды их предпринимательской деятельности.

В нашей семье отец был твердым, решительным человеком, да и мать, портниха, обладала большой твердостью характера. Именно поэтому они и решились открыть собственное дело. Правда, оно было небольшим, другие затевали дела и покрупнее.

— А можно ли совместить обязанности ведущего политического деятеля с чисто человеческими радостями?

— Думаю, это вполне возможно.

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Хотя члены моей семьи и разбросаны по всему свету, мы остаемся очень близкими людьми и больше всего радуемся, когда собираемся вместе на рождественские или другие большие праздники. Мы начинаем обмениваться массой впечатлений, главное в которых — мысли о будущем.

Некоторые считают, что премьер-министр страны живет в Лондоне на Даунинг-стрит, 10. Это не совсем так. В основной части здания устраиваются официальные встречи и приемы. А жилые помещения находятся наверху. У нас очень уютная, скромно обставленная квартира. Постоянной прислуги нет. Каждый день убирать квартиру приходит чудесная женщина, очень аккуратно и тщательно выполняющая все свои обязанности. Без нее нам просто не обойтись.

Но если я остаюсь вечером с моим мужем Деннисом дома, а возвращаемся мы домой довольно поздно, мне приходится нестися на кухню, чтобы приготовить ужин. Мне это очень нравится, и я не отрываюсь от реальной жизни. Порой приходится ходить и по магазинам. И вообще я стараюсь почаще бывать на улице, на свежем воздухе.

У меня есть свой избирательный округ. Это огромный плюс демократической системы. Я бываю там по пятницам, провожу, как правило, восемь или девять встреч. Приходится посещать заводы, учреждения, дома для престарелых, беседовать с молодежью. Провожу так называемые «вечера встреч с избирателями». Записавшиеся на прием жители моего избирательного округа в беседах со мной упрекают меня в том, что правительство не выполняет обещаний по осуществлению тех или иных программ, на которые избиратели внесли какую-то часть своих средств. Приходится заниматься всеми этими вопросами в рабочем порядке, что опять-таки позволяет мне не отрываться от реальной действительности.

Также по пятницам у меня бывают поездки в другие районы страны, и я таким образом находясь в постоянном контакте с трудящимися.

Самое опасное — это отгородиться от людей, оторваться от народа, утратить с ним связь. Очень важно чувствовать себя частью народа, не прерывать с ним контактов даже при поездках за границу. В свое время

моего отца интересовали международные события и мы их в семье оживленно обсуждали. Когда началась война, мы ничуть не сомневались в правоте нашего дела, в том, что нельзя позволить тирану править всем миром.

Считаю, что мы поступили правильно, своевременно занявшись рядом фундаментальных научных разработок. Ведь если бы Гитлер получил в свои руки ядерное оружие раньше нас, это означало бы крушение свободы во всем мире. А получилось же, как я иногда говорила об этом, находясь в Германии, что Германия вновь обрела свободу в 1945 году, в день окончания войны.

Сейчас нам приходится заниматься и другими проблемами, проблемами окружающей среды, перенаселенности в мире. За время моей жизни население мира удвоилось. Это произошло благодаря проводившимся в мире медицинским исследованиям, в том числе и исследованиям, осуществленным нашими двумя странами. Они дали поразительные результаты. В Англию по приглашению королевского медицинского общества приехал крупный советский иммунолог, с которым я беседовала о научных исследованиях. Кроме того, я побывала у вас в Центре исследований по кристаллографии, что для меня представляет особый интерес, поскольку я в свое время занималась кристаллографией. Медицинские исследования позволили победить некоторые болезни, сохранить жизнь большому количеству людей, обеспечить нормальные условия жизни и в тропических районах.

Научные исследования в области сельского хозяйства позволяют нам производить достаточно продовольствия для всего населения мира — риса, пшеницы, мяса и т. д. Сейчас можно прокормить от 7 до 8 миллиардов человек. Но в связи с этим возникают и определенные проблемы.

Новая передовая технология обвеепила прорыв не только в космосе, но и в других областях. Созданы прекрасные энергодобывающие отрасли, огромная химическая промышленность. В то же время, добывая нефть и уголь, которые накапливались в течение миллиардов лет и которые мы расходим в течение всего лишь нескольких десятилетий или, скажем, столетий, мы сильно загрязняем атмосферу планеты. Эту проблему нам также необходимо решить.

годы войны, и я никогда не забуду, что мы допустили ослабление нашего оборонного потенциала после первой мировой войны. Меня тогда еще не было на свете, но люди того времени знали, что первая мировая война была поистине ужасной, и это было действительно так. Хотя применялись только обычные вооружения. Еще большие ужасы пришлось испытать народам в последней войне. Все это было настолько ужасно, что сейчас мир знает — это не должно повториться.

Мы тогда допустили ослабление нашего оборонного потенциала. К власти в Германии пришел Гитлер, который все больше и больше укреплял германскую военную мощь. Мы же думали, что правота нашего дела сама по себе достаточна, но затем, значительно позже, пришло понимание, что и нам надо, причем очень быстро, крепить наш оборонный потенциал.

Возможно, нам следовало это сделать раньше — всем вместе объединиться и заявить Гитлеру: «Если вы начнете войну, мы объединимся в борьбе против вас и победим». Но этого мы не сделали. Он же расправился с нами поодиночке, пока в конце концов мы не вынуждены были признать, что так он нас всех победит. Сначала он захватил Австрию, потом Судетскую область в Чехословакии, и казалось, что это все, к чему он стремится. Но затем немецкие войска вошли в Прагу, а мы по-прежнему отказывались от борьбы. После этого он вторгся в Польшу, и тут уж мы сказали: «Хватит!»

В этом выразилась вера нашего народа в свободу. Мы начали войну за свободу другого народа, зная, что если мы не защитим его свободу, то война скоро придет и к нам. Однако мы, как я уже говорила, допустили ослабление нашего оборонного потенциала. Именно поэтому я никогда не допущу, чтобы это произошло вновь. Хотя со времени второй мировой войны не было ни одного крупного конфликта, произошло 140 других конфликтов — Вьетнам, Корея... — 140 конфликтов между соседними народами.

В мире широко распространен терроризм, есть жестокие люди, которые для достижения своей цели готовы использовать оружие. Путь к сохранению мира в том, чтобы ясно сказать потенциальному агрессору — в случае нападения он проиграет. Именно поэтому мы со-

на в честь нашей победы в битве, названной Битвой за Англию. Итак, мы выступили... В войну вступили США, Гитлер напал на Советский Союз. В нашей общей борьбе нам пришлось отдать все свои силы: ведь у немцев было много оружия, и они были хорошими солдатами.

Трудно предугадать, откуда придет следующая опасность. Это могут оказаться люди, заинтересованные в производстве химического оружия на Ближнем Востоке, а ведь химическое оружие имеет крайне губительные последствия. Поэтому приходится постоянно быть начеку, поддерживать на должном уровне свой военный потенциал и в то же время вести переговоры, чтобы не тратить на вооружения столько, сколько сейчас приходится тратить. В то же время необходимо сохранять уверенность в безопасности своей страны, в том, что у вас есть союзники, на которых можно положиться в случае нападения.

Действительно, положению сейчас выглядят более обнадеживающим. Я рада видеть и всегда приветствую все то хорошее, что происходит в мире, смелые, далеко идущие планы. При этом я понимаю, что настоящим политиком может быть лишь человек, обладающий перспективным мышлением, упорно стремящийся к осуществлению своих планов, пусть даже на это потребуются 10 или более лет. В то же время мы должны оставаться свободными, нельзя допустить разрушения бастионов свободы.

— Свобода сопряжена с ответственностью...

— У этого изречения Джорджа Бернарда Шоу есть и продолжение: «Позтому-то многие и боятся ее». И это действительно так.

Многие люди у вас в стране не выжили к ответственности и боятся ее. Но есть другие, которые приветствуют ответственность, и именно с такими людьми можно всегда идти вперед. Великие битвы истории были выиграны, великие школы философии и религии были созданы горсткой людей, которые упорно шли вперед, увлекая за собой все новых и новых последователей. Именно так мы добились прогресса.

— Как вы думаете, будет ли ХХI век лучше, чем ХХ? Будет ли лучше жить наши внуки?

— Я бы ответила на ваш вопрос сле-

жу так называемые «вечера встреч с избирателями». Записавшиеся на прием жители моего избирательного округа в беседах со мной упрекают меня в том, что правительство не выполняет обещания по осуществлению тех или иных программ, на которые избиратели внесли какую-то часть своих средств. Приходится заниматься всеми этими вопросами в рабочем порядке, что опять-таки позволяет мне не отрываться от реальной действительности.

Также по пятницам у меня бывают поездки в другие районы страны, и я таким образом нахожусь в постоянном контакте с трудящимися.

Самое опасное — это отгородиться от людей, оторваться от народа, утратить с ним связь. Очень важно чувствовать себя частью народа, не прерывать с ним контактов даже при поездках за границу. В свое время люди у нас считали, что международные дела их не касаются. Но это неверно. Ведь мы тоже пострадали в тех многочисленных войнах, которые бушевали во всем мире. Так что международные дела оказывают самое непосредственное воздействие на жизнь людей во всех странах, могут обернуться для них и разрушениями, и трагедией. Именно поэтому мы должны поддерживать мощный оборонный потенциал, с тем чтобы никто никогда не осмелился на нас напасть. Только так можно построить мир, вести переговоры о его укреплении.

Но эти внешние связи страны не исчерпываются. Нам приходится все время покупать в других странах товары и сырье, которых нам не хватает. Поэтому торговля, а вместе с ней конкуренция имеют большое значение.

В мире постоянно происходит обмен товарами и людьми — ведь для того, чтобы увидеть чудеса света, необходимо путешествовать. Так уж устроена жизнь. Хотят путешествовать и молодые люди. Понимая, что мы все являемся жителями одной планеты, молодежь хочет увидеть собственными глазами, что на этой планете происходит, поговорить с ровесниками из других стран.

В годы моей юности путешествовали мало, поскольку не было для этого ни технических, ни материальных возможностей. Я росла в очень тяжелое время, время становления гитлеризма. Мы кое-что знали о том, что происходит в окружающем нас мире, хотя и жили в небольшом городке. Дело в том, что

ству людей, обеспечить нормальные условия жизни и в тропических районах. Научные исследования в области сельского хозяйства позволяют нам производить достаточно продовольствия для всего населения мира — риса, пшеницы, мяса и т. д. Сейчас можно прокормить от 7 до 8 миллиардов человек. Но в связи с этим возникают и определенные проблемы.

Новая передовая технология обеспечила прорыв не только в космосе, но и в других областях. Созданы прекрасные энергодобывающие отрасли, огромная химическая промышленность. В то же время, добывая нефть и уголь, которые накапливались в течение миллиардов лет и которые мы расходим в течение всего лишь нескольких десятилетий или, скажем, столетий, мы сильно загрязняем атмосферу планеты. Эту проблему нам также необходимо решать вместе.

Скажу, что нам очень повезло, что мы живем именно в наше время, время, когда перед каждым открываются столь широкие возможности для проявления своего таланта и способностей. Народам мира пора наладить гораздо более тесные связи в решении вопросов сотрудничества, что позволит значительно повысить уровень жизни не только в материальном плане, но и в плане личного удовлетворения от совместного труда.

Наше время — это время большого созидательного потенциала, время, когда, в чем я глубоко убеждена, подавляющее большинство людей нашей планеты имеют возможность заканчивать рабочий день с чувством законной гордости, зная, что они принесли какую-то пользу, что их рабочий день не пропал зря, что они хорошо выполнили свою работу, за которую они получают хорошую оплату. От этого улучшается настроение, поскольку вокруг себя видишь только хороших людей, только хорошее.

Демократия важна, поскольку она позволяет рассчитывать на то, что вокруг тебя будут только хорошие люди, хотя человек понимает, что имеются и плохие люди, совершающие дурные поступки. И все же главное в том, чтобы позволить каждому человеку проявить свои самые лучшие качества, а не подавлять их.

— *Но для этого необходимо, чтобы на нашей планете был мир. Еще ребенком я застал войну...*

— Мое детство пришлось тоже на

После этого он вторгся в Польшу, и тут уж мы сказали: «Хватит!»

В этом выразилась вера нашего народа в свободу. Мы начали войну за свободу другого народа, зная, что если мы не защитим его свободу, то война скоро придет и к нам. Однако мы, как я уже говорила, допустили ослабление нашего оборонного потенциала. Именно поэтому я никогда не допущу, чтобы это произошло вновь. Хотя со времени второй мировой войны не было ни одного крупного конфликта, произошло 140 других конфликтов — Вьетнам, Корея... — 140 конфликтов между соседними народами.

В мире широко распространен терроризм, есть жестокие люди, которые для достижения своей цели готовы использовать оружие. Путь к сохранению мира в том, чтобы ясно сказать потенциальному агрессору — в случае нападения он проиграет. Именно поэтому мы создали наши крупные союзы — ведь в одиночку не выстоять, — и на время они сохраняются.

Тем не менее мы хотели бы определенно заявить, что если мы будем вести переговоры, это позволит нам поддерживать надежный оборонный потенциал на более низком уровне.

Потенциал этот нам в любом случае необходим — а вдруг что-то случится и появится какой-нибудь новоявленный диктатор. Ведь сейчас потребуются значительно больше времени, чем в 1939 году, для создания современного оружия. Кроме того, надо постоянно следить, чтобы кто-нибудь не скрыл какие-либо вооружения, которые могли бы быть эффективно использованы против нас. А для этого нам необходим контроль.

Продвигаясь вперед, мы используем опыт прошлого. Как я уже сказала, мы понимали, что нам придется воевать с Гитлером, который потом напал и на Советский Союз. Мы же все продолжали медлить, хотя видели, как вся Европа оказалась под властью Гитлера. Мы все раздумывали, нападёт он на нас или нет, мобилизуя при этом все ресурсы для того, чтобы дать самый решительный отпор врагу, если он хоть одной ногой ступит на нашу землю. В конце концов он напал на нас с воздуха, причем у нас было значительно меньше самолетов и летчиков. И все же британцы оказались самыми храбрыми летчиками в мире и помогли нам выстоять. Я до сих пор помню торжественную службу в церкви, которая была устрое-

нельзя допустить разрушения бастионов свободы.

— *Свобода сопряжена с ответственностью...*

— У этого изречения Джорджа Бернарда Шоу есть и продолжение: «позтому-то многие и боятся ее». И это действительно так.

Многие люди у вас в стране не привыкли к ответственности и боятся ее. Но есть другие, которые приветствуют ответственность, и именно с такими людьми можно всегда идти вперед. Великие битвы истории были выиграны, великие школы философии и религии были созданы горсткой людей, которые упорно шли вперед, увлекая за собой все новых и новых последователей. Именно так мы добились прогресса.

— *Как вы думаете, будет ли XXI век лучше, чем XX? Будут ли лучше жить наши внуки?*

— Я бы ответила на ваш вопрос следующим образом. На протяжении всей истории люди либо рождались диктаторами, либо становились ими, захватывая власть благодаря своему личному обаянию и привлекательности, а захватив власть, использовали ее для угнетения людей.

Нам следует сделать так, чтобы никакой новоявленный диктатор не смог утвердиться у власти, а для этого нам необходима определенная сила.

В этом подлинный смысл защиты свободы в правовом обществе. Действительно, в XXI веке ситуация окажется более обнадеживающей. Известно, однако, что в мире продолжат происходить жестокие кровопролитные столкновения, например, на Ближнем Востоке, где было 4 или 5 таких столкновений. В ходе ирано-иракской войны вновь было применено химическое оружие, которое не использовалось в последней мировой войне. Это вызывает огромную тревогу. Мы должны добиться такого положения, при котором любой потенциальный агрессор будет заранее знать цену агрессии и то, что он никогда не выйдет победителем.

Буквально несколько слов, чтобы закончить наш разговор о сохраняющихся трудностях. Здесь уместно было бы вспомнить слова, сказанные Уинстоном Черчиллем в самый разгар войны: «Наши трудности, наши проблемы огромны, но пусть хотя иногда перед нашим взором открываются залитые солнцем вершины». Я бы посоветовала всем помнить эти слова.

— *Большое спасибо за беседу.*



Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HH

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From the Minister

*2.1) Fine Minister
seems possible.
EBO
22/3*

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

EXPORTS OF GRAIN TO THE USSR

I mentioned to you yesterday the proposed deal with the USSR for the purchase through trade channels of around 1 million tonnes of UK grain to be announced at the time of Mr Gorbachev's visit. This is complicated by other action we are contemplating.

Given the relatively low UK harvest in 1987 and 1988, there are only limited quantities of UK grain which could be shipped before this year's harvest. We could not comfortably spare any feed wheat, without the risk of creating problems for our own livestock industry. We have, however, been pressing the Commission to facilitate for this deal the sale of over 500 thousand tonnes of UK barley in intervention and supplementary sales of up to 250 thousand tonnes from the free market. We envisaged that the Russians might be persuaded to accept the balance of the supply in the latter half of the year following the harvest. The arrangements for the proposed sale could go to the Cereals Management Committee in April with a view to shipment in the period May/July.

I have, however, been considering whether it is wise to continue to pursue these arrangements in the Community in view of possible other developments which could affect imports of essential supplies for compound animal feeds as well as any grain imports

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which may be necessary to supplement our own end-of-season stocks. This would inevitably put severe pressure on grain supplies and prices. We would lay ourselves open to severe criticism if, in those circumstances, we had agreed to export substantial volumes of barley to the USSR.

I have, therefore, concluded that the best way of proceeding would be not to continue to seek the necessary arrangements in the Community at this stage, but to take stock of the position in the middle of April, when we will have a better idea of the risk of serious problems at the ports. We should, therefore, seek, during Mr Gorbachev's visit, to agree in principle on a further major USSR purchase of grain from the UK, but to make clear that this may need to be met from grain from the 1989 harvest. This would nevertheless constitute an important step towards the agreed target of increasing Anglo/Soviet trade by 40% by 1990.

I am copying this minute to Sir Robin Butler.



JOHN MacGREGOR

Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food
22 March 1989

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 181030Z FCO

TELNO 476

OF 180946Z MARCH 89

AND TO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

AND TO PRIORITY EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

MY TELNOS 472 AND 473: SOVIET UNION: CC PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE:
CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. AS EXPECTED, GORBACHEV WOUND UP THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM OF 15-16 MARCH WITH A SHORT SPEECH (PUBLISHED ON 18 MARCH) ON THE NEW AGRICULTURAL INITIATIVE. WE STILL AWAIT PUBLICATION OF THE DRAFT LAW ON LEASING. GORBACHEV WELCOMED THE CONSENSUS FOR RADICAL REFORM MEASURES AND DESCRIBED MOST THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT AS BEING THE DISMANTLING OF THE CENTRALISED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN AGRICULTURE. ATTITUDES TO OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTION WOULD NEED RE-DEFINING AND MORE WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS. BUT THE PLENUM HAD SUCCEEDED IN LAYING THE BASIS OF A NEW AGRICULTURAL INITIATIVE.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF STATE/REPUBLIC AUTHORITY OVER FARMS, HE STRESSED THAT THE STATE SHOULD SEEK TO FULFIL ITS NEEDS NOT BY THE SYSTEM OF COMPULSORY STATE ORDERS BUT ON A CONTRACTUAL BASIS WITH FARMERS (CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW). BUT HE REJECTED THE THE PROPOSAL OF THE LITHUANIAN FIRST PARTY SECRETARY THAT UNION REPUBLICS SHOULD BE FREE TO SET THEIR OWN PRICES FOR FOOD PRODUCTS. REPUBLICS WOULD HAVE LIMITED POWER OVER SEASONAL GOODS PRICES (FRUIT, POTATOES AND OTHER VEGETABLES) BUT PEOPLE HAD TO BE PROTECTED FROM 'PRICING ANARCHY'. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE PLENUM HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO TINKER WITH PRICES NOW. HE REPEATED THAT RETAIL-PRICE REFORM WOULD NEED 2-3 YEARS PREPARATION, AND WOULD NOT PROCEED BEFORE THE PUBLIC HAD HAD A CHANCE TO AIR THEIR VIEWS.

3. HE CONCLUDED WITH A LENGTHY DIGRESSION ON THE GENERAL NEED TO IMPROVE HOUSING, SERVICES AND SOCIAL AMENITIES AVAILABLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. CREDIT GRANTED BY THE BANKS FOR BUILDING INDIVIDUAL HOUSES HAD DOUBLED LAST YEAR, GIVING AN IDEA OF THE SCALE OF THE HOUSING DEMAND. MORE ALSO NEEDED TO BE DONE TO MAKE BUILDING MATERIALS AVAILABLE. OF COURSE, HE ADDED, THE TOWNS HAD PROBLEMS

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T00. BUT HE WOULD PUT THE PROBLEM OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN FIRST PLACE.]

BRAITHWAITE

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DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE

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SOVIET INTERNAL/SOVIET ECONOMY
HD/SOVIET

MR RATFORD
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

BRITISH EMBASSY
MOSCOWSir Percy Cradock GCMG
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

16 March 1989

Dear Percy,

1. When we met last month during Kamentsev's visit, I floated the thought that you might like to make a brief familiarisation visit to Moscow at a suitable moment. I did not have a chance to discuss this in the FCO, but am copying this letter to Patrick Wright, John Boyd and David Ratford.
2. You and they will obviously form your own view on the value of such a visit. But from the angle of this Embassy, I think it would be a useful addition to our schedule of contacts and consultations with the Russians this year, given the right timing. The Russians will undoubtedly have taken a close interest in your appointment to No.10, and will have a broad idea of the scope of your job, including your role in coordinating the Intelligence fraternity. I see this as an advantage, rather than the opposite. I think it would guarantee a high level of interest in seeing you, and perhaps access to parts of the Soviet machine that we reach infrequently, if at all. I would hope to use your visit to widen and reinforce the bridgehead we have been trying to make into the Central Committee. I would also expect senior MFA officials to want to meet you. (We would have to consider carefully how to respond to any suggestions of a meeting with the KGB. Although my American counterpart has called almost accidentally on Kryuchkov, my present inclination is that we should not rush into the same game. I am far from sure that the balance of advantage would lie on our side).
Another area which you might explore would be the academic fringe of the Soviet policy-making machine - viz leading Institutes, such as IMEMO, the Institute of the United States and Canada, and the Institute of Europe. These people are much closer to the policy-making machinery here than their opposite numbers in London. It would be particularly useful if, through your visit, we could from a clearer impression of the way the Soviet leadership receives coordinated advice on foreign affairs, security and defence. At the moment, we can do little more than guess at the interplay between the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee and related agencies.



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. Since we met, I have looked at the schedule of visits for the remainder of the year. From now until the beginning of June, there is not much daylight. We have a window in the second and third weeks of June, btween two Ministerial visits. If you were able to come, that might be a good time. I would not recommend that you should come here between mid-July and mid-September, because of the Soviet holiday season. If mid-June is not possible, I hope that you might be able to come in the Autumn.

Yours ever,
Rodric

Rodric Braithwaite

cc: Sir Patrick Wright KCMG, PUS
D J E Ratford Esq CMG
J Boyd Esq CMG

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ECR



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*CDP
17/3*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

DEFENCE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Thank you for your helpful *at Flap* minute of 10th March. I am quite happy for you to proceed, as proposed, on issuing an invitation to Yazov to visit this country later this year. If, of course, Mr Gorbachev takes the initiative in issuing an invitation, I would very much like to take advantage of it.

2. We will now also proceed with arrangements for my visit to Hungary and are looking at dates in early September. I will, of course, keep you informed as this progresses.
3. I am copying this to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robin Butler.

A.Y.

Ministry of Defence

16 March 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET UNION: Relations

Pt 12

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FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 161600Z FCO
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EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH ON AGRICULTURE:
COMMENT
SUMMARY

1. DESPITE THE BUILD UP, NOT AN EXCITING OCCASION. NOT SURPRISING AS THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWS IN THE LEADERSHIP (PARTICULARLY BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND LIGACHEV) ON THE DIRECTION OF AGRICULTURAL REFORM SHOULD TAKE. THE SPEECH SHOWS HEAVY SIGNS OF COMMITTEE DRAFTING, BUT LEANS SUBSTANTIALLY MORE IN THE GORBACHEV RATHER THAN THE LIGACHEV DIRECTION. BUT IT IS UNLIKELY TO PAVE THE WAY TO THE BREAKTHROUGH ON FOOD SUPPLIES THAT GORBACHEV NEEDS.

DETAIL

2. THIS PLENUM HAS BEEN BILLED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AS AN OCCASION ON WHICH MAJOR DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE WOULD BE TAKEN. IT IS TAKING PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL PRESSURES GENERATED BY THE ELECTION PROCESS, AND RENEWED SPECULATION ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF GORBACHEV'S POSITION. IT WAS PRECEDED BY WHAT WAS VIRTUALLY A PUBLIC ROW BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND LIGACHEV ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. IN AN ELECTION ADDRESS IN OMSK ON 2 MARCH LIGACHEV BLUNTLY CRITICISED SOME ASPECTS OF GORBACHEV'S POLICY ON LEASING: AND FIVE DAYS BEFORE THE PLENUM HE EMBARKED ON A DEMONSTRATIVE VISIT TO PRAGUE WHERE HE AGAIN MADE CLEAR HIS BELIEF THAT COLLECTIVISED AGRICULTURE COULD WORK WITHOUT ANY RADICAL RESTRUCTURING PROVIDED IT GOT THE NECESSARY RESOURCES. AS ONE JOURNALIST CONTACT HERE SUMMED UP HIS VIEWS - 'I HAVE SEEN THE PAST AND IT WORKS.'

3. DESPITE THE BUILD-UP, WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE BY SOVIET CONTACTS HERE NOT TO EXPECT ANY MAJOR BREAK-THROUGHS AT THE PLENUM. JUDGING BY THIS SPEECH, THIS WAS WISE ADVICE. ON THE TWO MAIN ISSUES FACING THE PLENUM - THE REFORM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE (IE THE FUTURE OF GOSAGROPROM) AND THE INTRODUCTION OF LEASING - IT DOES NOT TAKE THINGS VERY MUCH FURTHER. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS A MAJOR POLICY SPEECH - PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ON AGRICULTURE FOR SOME YEARS. IT HAD CLEARLY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE POLITBURO BEFOREHAND, AND SHOWED ALL THE SIGNS OF COMPROMISE AND COMMITTEE DRAFTING. FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT WE CAN RECALL FOR A

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MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE SPEECH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWN IN FULL ON TELEVISION. IT WAS READY BY GORBACHEV WITH, AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, FEW IF ANY DEPARTURES FROM THE AGREED TEXT.

4. THE SPEECH WAS HONEST ABOUT THE GRAVE DEFICIENCIES OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE. GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE GAP BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN STANDARDS WAS WIDENING RATHER THAN NARROWING AND HE NOTED THAT ANYTHING BETWEEN 20 AND 40PERCENT OF PRODUCTION WAS STILL BEING LOST BECAUSE OF MISMANAGEMENT. GORBACHEV ALSO WENT FURTHER THAN HE (BUT NOT ACADEMICS) HAS GONE BEFORE IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE TRAGEDY OF COLLECTIVISATION. MILLIONS, HE SAID, HAD BEEN TORN AWAY FROM THE LAND AND DIED IN CAMPS OR EXILE.

5. ONE DAY THE KEY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND LIGACHEV CONCERNS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEASEHOLDERS AND THE COLLECTIVE FARM STRUCTURE. LIGACHEV AND MANY OTHERS ARE CONCERNED THAT IF FAMILIES OR GROUPS ARE ALLOWED TO LEASE LAND AND OPERATE OUTSIDE COLLECTIVE FARMS EG IF BANKRUPT FARMS ARE TO BE HANDED OVER TO THEM, THIS WILL UNDERMINE AND DISCREDIT SOCIALISED AGRICULTURE. AS LIGACHEV SAID IN OMSK - 'IS THIS WHAT WE CREATED SOCIALISM FOR?' IN THIS SPEECH GORBACHEV FIRMLY DEMOLISHES THE ARGUMENT (WHICH, IN A CLEAR REFERENCE TO LIGACHEV, HE DESCRIBES AS 'ENTRENCHED') THAT THE PROVISION OF MORE MACHINES, FERTILISERS AND INVESTMENT WILL SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS. HE DEMONSTRATES REGION BY REGION THAT PAST INVESTMENT HAS NEVER PAID OFF IN TERMS OF INCREASED OUTPUT. NEVERTHELESS WHEN HE COMES ON TO LEASING HE TREADS VERY CAUTIOUSLY. HE SAYS THAT THE MAIN DIRECTION OF LEASING MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS - THOUGH HE ADDS THAT THERE MAY BE CERTAIN OCCASIONS WHEN THIS WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE. BUT HE STRONGLY RULES OUT PROPOSALS THAT COLLECTIVE FARMS SHOULD BE DISBANDED.

6. PREDICTABLY, GORBACHEV SAYS THAT A MAJOR RESTRUCTURING OF THE AGRICULTURAL PRICING SYSTEM ON MORE MARKET-ORIENTATED LINES MUST WAIT A FEW YEARS AND, IN PARTICULAR, UNTIL THE COUNTRY IS READY FOR A COMPLETE OVERHAUL OF THE RETAIL PRICE SYSTEM. THE MEASURES HE PROPOSES TO INTRODUCE FROM 1 JANUARY NEXT YEAR, HOWEVER, ARE A MODEST BUT SENSIBLE STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME SEASONALITY INTO BOTH STATE PURCHASES AND RETAIL PRICES FOR FRUIT AND VEGETABLES WILL ENCOURAGE INCREASED OUTPUT WITHOUT ADDING TO THE HEAVY BURDEN OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES. SEASONALITY WILL IN PRACTICE MEAN PRICE RISES AND THE LEADERWHIP WILL DOUBTLESS BE WATCHING WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST THE PUBLIC REACTION TO THIS. THE DECISION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PRICING REGIONS WILL MEAN A REDUCTION IN THE UNECONOMIC ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY - BUT WILL PLACE A STILL GREATER BURDEN ON THE BACKWARD STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.

7. GOSAGROPROM IS TO BE ABOLISHED: BUT WITHIN SECONDS GORBACHEV

ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ORGANISATION, 'THE STATE COMMISSISON FOR FOOD AND PURCHASES.' THOSE WHO KNOW THEIR SOVIET UNION WILL SAY - ''PLUS CA CHANGE.'' THE NEW ORGANISATION, HOWEVER, WILL BE SMALLER THAN THE GROSSLY OVER-SIZED GOSAGROPROM. MORE POWERS ARE TO GO TO LOCAL AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS. BUT IN MOSCOW THERE MAY BE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN THE FUNCTION OR EVEN PERSONNEL OF THE TWO ORGANISATIONS - THOUGH MURAKHOVSKY HIMSELF WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO GO.

CONCLUSION

8. THOSE WANTING RADICAL AGRICULTURAL REFORM WILL BE DISAPPOINTED WITH THIS SPEECH. IT DOES NOT PAVE THE WAY FOR A BREAKTHROUGH IN REORGANISING AGRICULTURE. THIS IS PROBALBY INEVITABLE GIVEN THAT IT IS A LEADERSHIP AND NOT A GORBACHEV SPEECH. BUT THERE ARE NEVERTHELESS SOME MODEST GAINS FOR GORBACHEV. HE WILL GET PARTY BACKING FORM THIS PLENUM FOR THE VIEW THAT SOME RADICAL REORGANISAITON IS NECESSARY AND FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF LEASING. WITHOUT A FIRMER STEER FROM THE TOP ON HOW LEASING IS TO BE ORGANISED, HOWEVER, THIS MAY NOT MEAN MUCH IN PRACTICE. THE AGRICULTURAL BREAK-THROUGH GORBACHEV NEEDS HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. IT WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO COME EVENTUALLY. BUT IT IS UNLIKELY TO COME IN TIME TO HELP THE CONSUMER OVER THE NEXT TWO AWKWARD YEARS BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS IN 1991, WHEN THE POLICIES OF THE LEADERSHIP WILL BE FORMALLY UNDER REVIEW.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Defence Contacts with the Soviet Union

1. Thank you for your minute of 24 February, ^{at 12.00} in which you set out progress with the Soviet authorities about resumption of defence contacts. I am pleased to hear that the Russians have responded positively.

2. As far as ministerial visits are concerned, we have made it clear that we should welcome the inclusion of Defence Minister Yazov in Mr Gorbachev's visit in April. This is still open, although Shevardnadze implied in Vienna when I saw him that Yazov will not come. If the Russians choose not to take up this suggestion, I suggest that either the Prime Minister or I might use the visit to issue an invitation on your behalf to Yazov for a visit later this year. If you were happy with this, we could tip the Russians off in advance and possibly even steer them towards some dates. We could say that you would be happy to go there if that suited them better.

/3.

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3. A visit to Hungary in September would seem a good idea. I see no reason to hold up planning for this because of uncertainty over a Moscow visit. It would be preferable from all points of view not to visit Moscow and Budapest as part of the same trip. But I see no problem in your going to both in the same year, and do not think it matters much whether Budapest or Moscow comes first.

4. I am copying this to the Prime Minister and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 March 1989

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FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR RATFORD (AUSS) AND HEMANS (SOVIET DEPT)

UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN MOSCOW

SINCE MY TELEGRAM 153 OF 30 JANUARY, THE SENSE OF STRAIN SURROUNDING GORBACHEV'S REFORM POLICIES HAS CONTINUED. OBSERVERS SUCH AS KOROTICH BELIEVE THAT THE FORTHCOMING PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE AND THE ELECTIONS (EXPECTED AROUND 14-16 MARCH) WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT TEST. THOUGH WE HHAVE OBSERVED NONE OF THE LONGER TERM INDICATIONS LISTED IN TUR, THERE HAVE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BEEN A NUMBER OF SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL EVENTS IN TOWN.

A) AT ABOUT 1900 HRS ON 6 MARCH, THERE WAS A MAJOR TRAFFIC JAM FROM MANEZHNYAYA (THE ROAD ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE KREMLIN), TAILING BACK ACROSS THE BOLSHOI KAMENNY BRIDGE TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THE RIVER. SOME DOZENS OF TROLLEY BUSES WERE INVOLVED. BECAUSE OF ROAD WORKS, ULITSA MANEZHNYAYA HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR MONTHS TO ALL EXCEPT TROLLEY BUSES AND DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL CARS. THE FRONT OF THE JAM, AND ITS CAUSED, WERE NOT OBSERVED

B) AT 1400 HOURS ON 7 MARCH, GERASIMOV RANG H OF C TO SAY THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE ME LATER THAT AFTERNOON, BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WAS RETURNING FROM VIENNA ON 7 MARCH, INSTEAD OF 8 MARCH AS EXPECTED.

C) HEAVY TRAFFIC IN CENTRAL MOSCOW ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 MARCH SLOWED UP MOVEMENT, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE INFLUX OF PEOPLE AND VEHICLES ON THE EVE OF THE WOMEN'S DAY HOLIDAY.

D) ALSO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 MARCH, MOUNTED POLICE WERE REPORTED TO BE CONTROLLING A CROWD OUTSIDE THE CONSERVATIVE IN ULITSA GERTZENA. THE CROWD WAS SAID TO CONSIST OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET TICKETS FOR A CONCERT BY THE EMIGRE VIOLINIST KREMER, WHO HAS NOT PLAYED IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE HE DEFECTED IN THE EARLY 1970'S.

E) AT 1800 HRS ON 7 MARCH, A SPRINKLING OF POLICE WITH WALKIE TALKIES WAS OBSERVED ALONG THE ROAD IN FRONT OF LOMONSOV UNIVERSITY, AT THE APPROACH TO ULITSA GERTSENA. THE TWO BRIDGES ACROSS THE MOSCOW RIVER ON EACH SIDE OF THE KREMLIN WERE ALSO CLOSED. THE PRECAUTIONS WERE DOUBTLESS CONNECTED WITH THE BOLSHOI MEETING (PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW) AND MAY HAVE BEEN NO MORE EXTENSIVE THAN USUAL.

2. MEMBERS AND DEPUTY MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO HAVE BEEN ELECTIONEERING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS. THE

POLITBURO HELD ITS REGULAR MEETING LAST WEEK. THE MEETING WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULT SUBJECT OF AGRICULTURAL REFORM. UNUSUALLY (BUT NOT UNPRECEDENTEDLY) IT LASTED FOR TWO DAYS (2 AND 3 MARCH)

3. TOO MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PLACED ON THESE PHENOMENA, EACH OF WHICH IS CAPABLE OF A SIMPLE EXPLANATION. MEANWHILE, TODAY'S PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA REPORT THAT GORBACHEV, VOROTNIKOV, ZAIKOV, RYZHKOV AND BIRYUKOVA (IN THAT ORDER) ATTENDED A FESTIVE MEETING ON THE EVENING OF 7 MARCH TO CELEBRATE WOMEN'S DAY. A NUMBER OF UNNAMED MINISTERS WERE ALSO PRESENT.

4. I AM REPORTING THESE EVENTS IN A RESTRICTED WAY BECAUSE, OF THEMSELVES, THEY ARE NOT A REASON FOR ALARM. IN GENERAL THE ATMOSPHERE (MEDIA, STREETS, MINISTRIES ETC) IS NOT/NOT ABNORMAL, BUT I THINK IT WORTH KEEPING OUR EARS CLOSE TO THE GROUND, PARTICULARLY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE PLENUM.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 1

MR NICHOLSON
(CABINET OFFICE)

NNNN



A. Powell
V. dull. We must encourage the PM to live in the sp. from 12/3
Mr. Higham

cc Press Office
PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 March 1989

A bit stodgy, but I suppose that is inevitable. FCO are making on some Dear Charles, proposed answers, which will certainly need revision. CAL/2/3

Prime Minister's Interview with Izvestia

I enclose a letter from Mr Laptev, Editor in Chief of Izvestia, to the Prime Minister with which he encloses a series of questions which he wishes to put to her during the interview on 22 March.

We shall be sending you briefing to cover these and other questions nearer the time. We shall also arrange for an interpreter to be present during the interview.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

To: The Prime Minister of Great Britain

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher

Dear Madam Prime Minister,

I was pleased to receive your letter with the news that you had kindly agreed to give an interview to "Izvestiya". Please accept my warmest thanks for the chance to meet and talk with you on 22 March. I am convinced that the readers of our newspaper will pay great attention to your opinions, Madam Prime Minister, on a range of international questions, which I enclose with this letter.

With your permission, Madam Prime Minister, I would like to discuss three or four further questions in the course of our talk.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your health and happiness.

With great respect,

(signed)

I. D. LAPTEV

Editor in Chief

QUESTIONS

1. Prime Minister, may I ask you first of all to characterise and comment on the main changes in the international situation over the last three or four years. What, in your view, are the underlying impulses and reasons for these changes?
2. We, in the Soviet Union, listened attentively to your assessment of the proposals contained in Mr Gorbachev's speech at the UN. It seems to us that the "model for the world of the future" outlined in these proposals was close to your own ideas. Where do you see the areas of concordance and divergence in the philosophical approaches of our two countries toward shaping such a world? What role do you think New Political Thinking can play in this process?
3. Many political pundits predicted that Europe would become 'outmoded' as a political centre. Today's reality has shown the opposite. As in the past, Europe in many areas is determining the pace of international relations and giving a practical example in the solution of a series of complex problems. Prime Minister, how do you see the future of Europe? In your view, how strong are its unifying principles, which could open up constructive routes towards building the Common European Home?
4. It would not be an exaggeration to regard your meeting with Mr Gorbachev at Chequers in December 1984 as opening a new phase in Anglo-Soviet relations. Today these consist of a rapidly developing, substantive package, which has a perceptible effect on any changes in the situation in Europe and the world. Mrs Thatcher, could you tell us what played the decisive part in your decision to pursue such abrupt changes in relations with the Soviet Union? How do you assess their state today, and their prospects?

5. In your statements, you have supported Mr Gorbachev's idea of the primacy of common human values in relations between states, noting that such an approach strengthens international confidence and predictability of policy. How do you assess the putting of this idea into practice, and what do you think needs to be done to develop international co-operation to defend and strengthen such values?

6. Recently we have seen more signs of burgeoning practical co-operation between the USSR and Britain in solving a number of international problems, bearing both on the disarmament field and on the solution of chronic regional conflicts. Prime Minister, in what directions do you see such co-operation growing and will it spread to new areas?

7. Today we have dozens of Joint Ventures with Western firms operating in the Soviet Union, and, it seems, quite successfully too. Their number is likely to increase several times over in the near future. However, British industrialists and financiers are showing distinct hesitation in this area. What is the reason, do you think? And one last question: what would be your attitude to a review of the COCOM regulations and lists in favour of greater liberalisation of trade and economic relations with the USSR? What will be your position?



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ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

госпоже Маргарет ТЭТЧЕР


Глубокоуважаемая госпожа Премьер-Министр!

Я был счастлив получить Ваше письмо с вестью о Вашем любезном согласии дать интервью газете "Известия". Сердечно благодарю Вас за возможность встретиться и побеседовать 22 марта. Убежден, что читатели нашей газеты с огромным вниманием отнесутся к суждениям госпожи Премьер-Министра по ряду вопросов международной жизни, которые я прилагаю к данному письму.

Кроме того, госпожа Премьер-Министр, если Вы разрешите, я хотел бы обсудить 3-4 вопроса дополнительно в устной беседе.

Примите мои искренние пожелания благополучия и здоровья.

С глубоким уважением,


И. Лавтсев,

главный редактор газеты
"Известия"

ИНТЕРВЬЮ ГАЗЕТЕ "ИЗВЕСТИЯ",
В О П Р О С Ы ,
которые газета хотела бы задать премьер-министру
Великобритании госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер

1. Госпожа премьер-министр, хотел бы просить Вас прежде всего дать Вашу характеристику и интерпретацию основных перемен в международной обстановке за последние три-четыре года. Каковы, на Ваш взгляд, коренные движущие силы и мотивы этих перемен?

2. В Советском Союзе в свое время обратили внимание на высказанную Вами оценку положений, содержащихся в выступлении М.С.Горбачева в ООН. Нарисованный им "прообраз мира будущего", как нам представляется, оказался близок Вашим представлениям. В чем Вы видите сочетаемость и различия в философских подходах двух стран к формированию такого мира? Какую роль отводите в этом процессе новому политическому мышлению?

3. Многие политические оракулы предсказывали Европе судьбу "стареющего" политического центра. Практика наших дней показывает, однако, обратное. Европа, как и в прошлом, во многом определяет ритм современных международных отношений, показывает пример практического решения ряда сложнейших проблем. Как Вам, госпожа премьер-министр, видится будущее Европы? Насколько, по Вашему мнению, сильны в ней объединяющие начала, которые могли бы открыть конструктивные пути к строительству общего европейского дома?

4. Не будет преувеличением считать, что Ваша встреча с М.С.Горбачевым в Чекерсе в декабре 1984 г. открыла новый этап в советско-английских отношениях. Сейчас они представляют собой динамично развивающийся и содержательный комплекс, весьма ощутимо влияющий на любые изменения обстановки в Европе

и мире. Скажите, госпожа Тэтчер, что было определяющим в Вашем решении пойти на такие крутые перемены в отношениях с Советским Союзом? Как Вы оцениваете их нынешний этап и перспективы?

5. В своих заявлениях Вы поддержали высказанную М.С.Горбачевым мысль о примате общечеловеческих ценностей в межгосударственных отношениях, отметив, что такой подход укрепляет международное доверие и предсказуемость в политике. Как Вы оцениваете реализацию этого принципа на практике, и что Вы считаете необходимым сделать для развития международного сотрудничества в защите, утверждении таких ценностей?

6. В последнее время появилось немало ростков практического взаимодействия СССР и Англии в решении ряда международных проблем, относящихся как к сфере разоружения, так и урегулированию застарелых региональных конфликтов. Как Вам, госпожа премьер-министр, видятся пути наращивания такого сотрудничества, распространения его на новые сферы?

7. Сегодня в Советском Союзе работают, и судя по всему, довольно успешно, десятки совместных с западными фирмами предприятий. Уже в близкой перспективе их число многократно возрастет. Однако английские промышленники и финансисты проявляют здесь заметную сдержанность. Как Вы считаете, почему? И еще один вопрос: как бы Вы отнеслись к пересмотру положений и списков КОКОМ в сторону большей либерализации торгово-экономических отношений с СССР? Какова будет Ваша позиция?

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Ria Minister
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PRIME MINISTER

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Our Relations with the Russians

atlet

1. I was interested in David Young's minute to you of 16 February and the frank comments of the Soviet Minister for the Chemical Industry reported by Alan Clark. Such comments are heard increasingly frequently from our Soviet and East European interlocutors and are not confined to private conversations. Parts of the Soviet press have exposed Soviet short-comings in a far more comprehensive and damning way than even hostile Western commentators ever did. Several leading Soviet economists have given astonishingly frank accounts of the fundamental economic problems facing the Soviet Union, writing from a more or less openly "capitalist" standpoint. Criticism of the Soviet/socialist system has always been more frequent in Eastern Europe. You will have noticed the recent root and branch condemnation of Soviet communism and all its works by a Hungarian communist party commission looking into the 1956 uprising.

2. Pessimism about the prospects for Soviet economic reform is also widespread and open in the Soviet Union. It is usually focussed on the excessive centralism still

/inherent



inherent in the system, and the lack of real prices (an issue being delayed for political reasons). Hesitantly trying to graft bits of a market mechanism on to the existing system has served largely to increase confusion and introduce further distortion.

3. David Young raises two particular questions:

(i) Gorbachev's prospects: I entirely agree that there is a basic mismatch between the immediate need for concrete improvements in living standards for the Soviet population and the time it is likely to take to produce them. (I would expect it to take far longer than the two or three years which David mentions). New investment is not necessarily the solution. Soviet ability to waste capital investment remains largely intact. Much more radical changes in attitudes/ownership/distribution/retailing/pricing and rouble convertibility are needed before goods of the right sort and quality begin to appear in any numbers. The important thing will be to demonstrate that the prospects are there. Until that can be done the prospects for perestroika are gloomy. That is not the same as saying that Gorbachev is in danger of failing. The threat to him is from the so-called conservatives in the hierarchy, and their motivation is based more on concern about glasnost, political reform, the leading role of the party and their own position than about the economy. There is no alternative programme on offer (although we hear

/that



that conservative economists are working on one) and no focus for opposition. Gorbachev is more likely to be forced to trim his sails than to be forced out. And when under pressure in the past he has retaken the initiative and moved ahead. He could well surprise us again, eg at a Plenum Meeting on Agriculture in mid-March.

(ii) Economic relations with the West: I agree that we should not encourage Gorbachev to borrow (there is no sign that he wishes to even though Soviet indebtedness has not reached unmanageable proportions): I also agree that the prospects for increased East/West economic activity are poor unless the Soviet Union's hard currency earning capacity improves. The problem is to identify ways in which this can be done, which also accord with Western commercial interests. (This is not to say that massive foreign currency expenditure is the only way in which Soviet standards of living can be raised.)

4. All this is relevant to Mr Gorbachev's April visit. He will no doubt tell you of his difficulties. He is engaged in a process which is bound to involve at best serious disappointment and frustration:

(a) The basic lesson is that free enterprise is the only long-term answer. Neither Mr Gorbachev nor the Soviet people will yet accept this, nor do they wish to see too obvious a Western label on Soviet reforms. Entrepreneurs are still viewed with great suspicion, even hostility, in the Soviet Union.

/(b)



(b) Soviet economists are not themselves agreed on the way ahead. Some argue (as George Soros does) for an "open sector" and for special economic zones. Others put the emphasis on a big rouble mark-up on imported consumer goods plus innovations such as share ownership, in order to mop up surplus rouble purchasing power. The problems of price reform and convertibility have yet to be faced. The aim of establishing a disciplined monetary and banking system, and bringing the budget deficit under control, has only recently been acknowledged let alone addressed.

5. We are already doing a certain amount:

(a) We are responding in areas where a Western role has been requested. Management training is being provided both by the Government and by British commerce and industry. More can and will be done. Joint ventures are slowly being established (there are so far 13 Anglo-Soviet joint ventures) which may also help in the long run to introduce Western control and management techniques. British banks are making their expertise available to the Soviet banking reform process.

(b) Consortia are already being established to increase Soviet foreign currency earning power in parallel with imports from the West. New areas such as mineral/oil exploration are being looked at to see if increased efficiency can cut down waste and improve export earnings.

/(c)



(c) However the British gas industry however see no requirement to purchase Soviet natural gas for the foreseeable future thus closing off possibly the only area in which Britain could relatively rapidly do something to increase Soviet foreign currency earning capacity in a significant way.

6. The signs are that Mr Gorbachev will not come with any major request for Western or specifically British assistance. I believe there is only very limited scope for offering him practical advice. There may be scope to make the point that Britain is well-placed to supply not only goods but also the management expertise and advice which the Soviet economy and Soviet enterprises clearly need as they adapt to changed circumstances. We could also point to the availability of a wide range of British consultancy firms highly respected internationally and experienced at injecting new life into old industries and companies. British consultants are already beginning to take a close interest in the Soviet market. Some big British firms may also be ready to help on the management side, although it is difficult to see how they could become involved to great effect in practice.

7. I am copying this to David Young and Nigel Lawson (with a copy of David's original minute).

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 March 1989

SOVIET UNION: Relatives #12





cc/c

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FCS/89/041

CDP
dj

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

Possible Sale of UK Grain to the USSR

1. Thank you for your ^{at least} letter of 1 March. I see no major difficulties in a grain deal of the kind proposed, and would be happy to see our trade with the Soviet Union, which is in substantial and long-standing deficit, develop in this way. It would be particularly useful, as you say, if we could get a commitment for future years. I see no particular difficulty in making the necessary arrangements with the Commission.

2. I have only two hesitant notes to sound

(i) The Soviet Ambassador has something of a track record of "personal" initiatives. It is difficult to be sure in this case, as in others, how much backing he has from higher up in Moscow. He may have cleared his lines with the party and Gorbachev's office, even if the grain import agency has only later been brought in. You may wish therefore to encourage Ralph French to secure the necessary assurances.

(ii)

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(ii) Public presentation will be crucially important. A grain sale is not the ideal commercial deal to mark the Gorbachev visit from our point of view. Even though we regularly sell grain to the Russians, and I assume this sale would be on normal commercial terms, there may still be some criticism given the involvement of export refunds. Some might seek to compare it to controversial butter sales in the past and claim we are trying to keep Gorbachev sweet (and afloat) by offering him commercial favours. We should be able to deal with such arguments without too much trouble. But this would involve stressing the lack of direct government involvement in such commercial business, a line which would to some extent cut across Zamyatin's wish for high-profile publicity during the visit to underline good official relations.

3. I am copying this to the Prime Minister, David Young, John Major and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 March 1989

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SOVIET UNION: Relations
Pt 12



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1989

ANDREI VAVILOV

As you expected, Vavilov got in touch with me on Friday evening, following his arrival in London. He said that he had received my letter in Geneva. He hoped that we would have a chance to meet. We agreed to look out for each other at the reception for the Ozone Layer Conference.

We did not actually have time for much personal chat. I enclose his card with his home and office telephone numbers. His wife had enjoyed her time in London very much. His son was now back at University in Moscow.

I introduced him to the Prime Minister, who spent a few minutes chatting to him and found him knowledgeable and urbane.

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about my talk with him.

CHARLES POWELL

James Richards, Esq.,
Century House



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1989 6/3

Prime Minister
 You may find
 this of interest.
 CDP

ms

SOVIET UNION

The department may be interested in a few impressions of what is going on in the Soviet Union gleaned from Andrei Vavilov, one of the Soviet delegates attending the 'Saving the Ozone Layer' Conference. I have known Vavilov for some twenty years. He was in the Embassy in London in the early 1970s and was subsequently one of Brezhnev's interpreters. He is now Deputy Head of the Science and Technology division of the Soviet MFA. He also knows Crispin Tickell.

By Vavilov's account, the Soviet Union was in poor shape. The economic situation was worse than two or three years ago. Entrenched opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was gaining strength. Gorbachev's personal popularity was at its lowest point. His greatest weakness was that he talked too much. People simply could not take him on television any more, they switched off after a while.

Vavilov commented that the Soviet Union did in effect have a party system although it operated under the general umbrella of the Communist party. Gorbachev himself represented the middle of the road group. The hardliners were grouped round Ligachev and Chebrikov. The reformists looked increasingly to Yeltsin. He thought we underestimated Yeltsin, who was far from being a spent force. He would win a landslide in the forthcoming elections. He wanted to do much the same as Gorbachev, but using 'honest' people. Gorbachev's great failure had been in not clearing out relics of the Brezhnev regime at the middle levels. These were people who had done very nicely out of the old system. By withdrawing their co-operation, they were ensuring that the present reforms ran into difficulties.

Vavilov said that one of the biggest problems in the Soviet Union was racketeering. It had now reached monumental proportions, and the reforms had if anything encouraged it. The potential profits even from legitimate activity were considerable. He had a friend who had set himself up in business selling ski articles, who was making 50,000 roubles a month.

Vavilov said that Mrs. Gorbachev remained unpopular. The latest craze in Moscow was wearing buttons with jokes and slogans. Many of these were critical of Mrs. Gorbachev.

Vavilov lamented the difficulty of dealing with the military in the Soviet Union (he was handling arms controls issues in his last job). They became hysterical when you tried to get involved in their affairs. He thought Akhromeyev a great loss. He at least had always been calm and thoughtful.

Vavilov did not think much of his delegation leader at the Conference (the Minister for the Chemical Industry, I think). He had given a very clumsy interview to the press, suggesting that the scientific evidence about damage to the ozone layer was not at all reliable.

He was also disparaging about Zamyatin, who was very much old school. He was unlikely to last long in London, and would be replaced by some-one more in tune with the times.

This all sounds rather negative. But strangely Vavilov seemed quite confident that things would work out. He did not think the clock could be put back in the Soviet Union.

Vavilov went on at some length about the astonishing impact of the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union in 1987. It was still talked about, in particular the way in which she had despatched the journalists in the television interview (I gather that Soviet journalists were not a widely admired breed and three hundred million Russians had long wanted to do to them exactly what the Prime Minister had done). She was far and away the most popular figure in the Soviet Union.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



FILE
12
PK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1989

**BRITISH WEEK IN KIEV, 1990:
ROYAL INVOLVEMENT**

Thank you for your letter of 3 March suggesting that we should tell the Russians that a senior member of the Royal Family will be able to open British Week in Kiev in June 1990. The Prime Minister agrees that The Princess Royal should be invited to do this and the Russians so informed.

The Prime Minister would also be ready to tell Mr. Gorbachev that she would like to visit the Kiev event herself and invite him to meet her there.

(C.D. POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



213 PPS
ATT Prime Minister (4)
STEPAN TELLEZKI
16. BRYNGWYN RD.
CYMCOED. CARDIFF.
CF2 6PQ.

3 March. 1989.

Dear Prime Minister.

I was immensely pleased to receive your letter regarding my views on how the Gorbachev reforms are doing.

I know how extremely busy you are, therefore I kept the details as short as possible.

If I may, I will periodically send you briefs, and keep you informed with my up to date information and my views with the developments in the Soviet Union and East West Relation in general.

My family in the Ukraine will be immensely proud and blessed for your good wishes to them, as they are fully informed of your great work, support and dedication to freedom, human rights, religious persecution, peace and social justice.

I am still well booked with my speaking engagements up and down the Country, flying the flag for our Party and for you in particular.

Many joins me in wishing you and Dennis our most sincere and warmest regards, and many congratulations on becoming grand-parents.

Yours ever
Stepan

010

Prime Minister

CEC



Here are two proposals

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Here:

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

Temporarily Retained

(i) that the Princess Royal

should open British Week in Kiev in June 1990

Agree?

3 March 1989

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED IN THE RECORDS
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

(ii) that you might

tell the Russians that

Yes

Dear Charles,

perhaps meeting Mr. Gorbachev

Agree

British Week in Kiev, 1990: Royal Involvement

CDP
3/3
Yes
not

Preparations are now underway for the "British Week" (it in fact will last rather nearer a month) which is to be held in Kiev in 1990. This will be the second leg of an exchange of British and Soviet weeks, the first leg having been a Soviet Week in Birmingham in October 1988. It will be the most prestigious British event in the Soviet Union for many years. We have been planning on the basis of the British Week taking place in June 1990. However, no date has yet been fixed and the Soviet authorities are now arguing for September (although without making much of a case). June suits us better for a range of practical reasons and above all because we hope the English National Opera Company will (with British Council support) be performing in Kiev from 5 to 11 June. It is essential that the Week should have a prestigious cultural centrepiece and nothing else on this scale is planned for the Soviet Union in 1990.

We believe that one way to clinch the argument in favour of June would be to tell the Russians that a senior member of The Royal Family would be able to open it in June. We had anyway been considering who might open the Week and had concluded that it would give the right sort of message about the importance which we attach to the Week if it were opened by The Princess Royal. We understand that

she would be prepared to open the British Week in Kiev if it took place in June. The Foreign Secretary welcomes the idea. Early agreement on this would allow him to raise the issue of the timing of the Week when he sees Mr Shevardnadze in Vienna on 6 March.

As you know, we have recently been looking at the pattern of Royal visits to the Soviet Union in connection with Prince Edward's planned visit to Moscow in his capacity as Patron of the National Youth Theatre. The Prime Minister agreed that such a visit would be a suitable first step in the gradual escalation in the level of Royal Visits to the Soviet Union. A visit by The Princess Royal to Kiev to open the British Week in 1990 would be an appropriate next stage. Although in protocol terms Prince Edward is senior to The Princess Royal, his visit to the Soviet Union will have a lower profile



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(because he will be there purely in his capacity as Patron of the National Youth Theatre).

In December we had also planned to suggest to the Prime Minister that she might tell Mr Gorbachev that she would like to visit the Kiev event herself and invite him to meet her there. This had no connection with the dates which at that stage were not an issue. If this possibility could be mentioned when the Foreign Secretary meets Mr Shevardnadze, it could both tilt the balance firmly in favour of June, and sow the idea in Mr Gorbachev's mind before he arrives in April.

I am copying this letter to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Jaw.
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Unofficial translation
from Russian

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom

Dear Prime Minister,

It gives me great pleasure on behalf of the people and the Government of Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic to convey to you our sincere gratitude for the assistance which the Government of Great Britain provided to those who suffered from the earthquake in the Gissar region of Tajikistan.

The relief supplies transported by air are now being distributed among grateful people of the region. In this we see an expression by the British people of good will in regard to our people as well as a manifestation of such qualities common to all mankind as humanism and mercy.

Expressing once again my gratitude I would like to ask you, dear Prime Minister, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

I.Haeev
Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Tajik SSR

Dushanbe
2 March 1989



Совети Вазирони
ҶСҶ Тоҷикистон

Совет Министров
Таджикиской ССР

ЕЕ ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОЖЕ МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР
ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ
ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

Лондон

Ваше Превосходительство,

Мне доставляет большое удовольствие от имени народа и Правительства Таджикской Советской Социалистической Республики выразить сердечную признательность за оказанную Правительством Великобритании помощь пострадавшим от землетрясения в Гиссарском районе Таджикистана.

Прибывшие самолетами грузы этой помощи распределяются сейчас среди благодарных жителей района. В этом мы видим выражение добрых чувств английского народа к нашему народу, проявление таких общечеловеческих качеств, как гуманизм и милосердие.

Выражая еще раз свою благодарность, прошу Вас, уважаемая госпожа Премьер-Министр, принять уверения в моем самом высоком уважении.

И. Хаёев

И. ХАЁЕВ

Председатель

Совета Министров Таджикской ССР

г. Душанбе
2 марта 1989 г.



Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HH

From the Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Downing Street
London

1 March 1989

Dear Geoffrey,

POSSIBLE SALE OF UK GRAIN TO USSR

Mr Rafe French, the Chairman of the British/Soviet Chamber of Commerce has passed on to my officials a proposal put to him by the Soviet Ambassador that Mr Gorbachev's visit to this country might be marked by the announcement that the USSR will purchase 1 million tonnes of UK grain. The purpose would be to underline the importance the Soviet authorities attach to achieving the target of a 40% increase in Anglo-Soviet trade by 1990, agreed during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow.

This is apparently a personal initiative by the Ambassador, by-passing normal channels. He insisted to Mr French that there must be strict confidentiality at this stage, since the official Soviet grain import agency knows nothing about the matter as yet. Nevertheless we must clearly take the approach seriously.

The USSR remains the world's biggest grain importer and buys from all main world suppliers. Within the Community, France is easily the biggest supplier to the USSR and trade has tended to take place under framework deals between the two countries: the most recent was concluded during Mitterand's visit to Moscow last year.

The UK has, of course, been a major grain exporter for a number of years. Amounts going to the USSR have varied considerably from year to year. We have not before been offered a deal of the sort now proposed. Apart from any political significance, I am anxious that we should follow up this approach for commercial reasons, given the importance of the USSR market. It could open the way to additional grain exports in future years, thus minimising expenditure on intervention. I would aim to get some sort of commitment about the future from the Soviet authorities if at all possible.

cc/c 2

*Prime Minister
You will want to
be aware of this.
CDP
1/3*

In the absence so far of any direct contact with the Russians, we do not know over what period they would want the 1 million tonnes to be shipped. Given our relatively low harvests in 1987 and 1988 and the quantities already committed for export in 1988/89, I would on present forecasts need to limit the quantity to be shipped before this year's harvest to some 750,000 tonnes.† But the more accurate forecasts that should be available by the time of Gorbachev's visit may allow that quantity to be increased; and, in any event, there is no reason to suppose that they would be unwilling to take the balance of the 1 million tonnes in the autumn.

The EC Commission controls the sale of grain out of intervention (from where the bulk of shipments between now and the 1989 harvest would have to come) and detailed policy on export refunds. They would therefore have to facilitate the deal, just as they have in the case of French deals in the past. It will be necessary to get their assurance on this before taking matters further with the Soviet authorities, and I would therefore aim for my officials to approach them at senior level and in strict confidence. This must be done quickly, before the FEOGA funds allocated for cereals exports in 1988/89 become fully committed.

Before going ahead, I thought that you and David Young should be aware of this approach so that you can let me know if you see any snags. It is clearly important that we move quickly to follow it up.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister, David Young, John Major and Sir Robin Butler.

† We shall have to assess the figures carefully, as we would be subjected to heavy criticism if we left ourselves short; and then on the possible implications which your officials will consider with the Commission and other Departments affected here.

Yours ever,



JOHN MacGREGOR

80

cc/rc

23 BUCKINGHAM GATE · LONDON · SW1E 6LB

TELEPHONE: 01-630 7118
FACSIMILE: 630 1049

EM
20/2

28th February 1989

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe MP,
1 Carlton Gardens,
London,
SW1

Dear Sir Geoffrey,

Whatever else Gorbachev may be, he is brilliant at PR and I am increasingly concerned that he is succeeding in altering Western popular perceptions of the Soviet Union, sometimes without there being much supporting evidence for the changes.

I believe that the principal question for the West is whether the Soviet Union has abandoned some of the more aggressive of its fundamental international goals, or just changed its methods for achieving them or simply put them into abeyance for the time being because of its internal crisis. At present the indications are ambiguous.

Accordingly, I am organising a briefing under CFB auspices entitled 'Making Sense of Gorbachev' on March 30th, a few days before Gorbachev arrives in Britain principally to try to provide the British media with a deeper understanding of what is going on in the Soviet Union.

There will be four or five speakers including Dr Edward Luttwak who will speak on Soviet strategy; General Ted Atkeson who will speak on Soviet military doctrine; Dr Judith Shelton who will speak on the Soviet economy and Vladimir Bukovsky who will speak on the political situation in the Soviet Union. I hope that another, important Editor of a Soviet informal publication will be able to attend and I am trying to make arrangements for this now.

-2-

I have invited newspaper editors and senior foreign policy staff from newspapers and television and radio. The speakers will present their papers and answer questions. I would be delighted if one or two of your senior officials would like to attend.

Alternatively, the briefing could be extended to a private afternoon session for Ministers and Officials if you thought it would be of interest to them. I would be able to circulate copies of the speakers' papers in advance to those who were going to attend the afternoon session so that they could prepare questions and so that the speakers could be excused presenting their papers twice in one day.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'David Hart', written in a cursive style.

DAVID HART

cc: Lord Harris

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Ingham

You are to give an interview to the Editor of Ogonyok on 28 February. You will find in the folder a telegram about him from our Ambassador in Moscow. He is an unusual and rather controversial figure. The Soviet Embassy are clearly rather sensitive about your seeing him. But he is said to enjoy Gorbachev's personal favour.

The FCO letter in the folder has some suggestions for points you might cover in the interview, dwelling quite a lot on Anglo/Soviet relations.

I don't think this is right. Your "formal" interview with the Soviet press before Mr. Gorbachev's visit is with the Editor-in-Chief of Izvestia. That will take place in March, and it is then that you should set out your thoughts on Anglo/Soviet relations, on the forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev and so on.

It would be better to use the interview with Ogonyok to talk much more about your own philosophy and how you are implementing it in this country. The purpose would be to get over to its readers just how radical your policies are and how much more exciting and innovative they are than the policies of socialism (even as applied by Mr. Gorbachev), and how much more they do for ordinary people. You want to give them your vision of society and underline the enormous gap which remains between Gorbachev's perestroika and a real free society. The purpose is not to be critical of Gorbachev - indeed you will want to be supportive in your comments about him - but to widen the horizons of the readership in the Soviet Union.

In short, I think it should be quite a racy and daring interview, focussing much more on our politics and on you personally than on the normal themes of East/West relations.

C D P

(C.D. POWELL)

24 February 1989



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1989

Dear Charles,

Interview with the Prime Minister by Korotich,
Editor of Ogonyok, 28 February

Thank you for your letter of 25 January in which you confirmed that the Prime Minister had agreed to give an interview to Vitaly Korotich, the Editor of the Soviet weekly magazine, Ogonyok, on 28 February at 1200. *file with CAP*

Korotich is visiting the UK from 26 February to 5 March as a category II sponsored visitor. I attach a personality note and a copy of his programme. //

I explained in my letter to you of 10 January that Ogonyok, which is a leading proponent of glasnost in all spheres, is by far the most popular weekly magazine in the Soviet Union with a circulation of 3.2 million. Korotich will be targetting his interview towards the general Ogonyok reader who is likely to be interested in the Prime Minister's political career and philosophy.

Korotich has told us that he would like the Prime Minister to talk about parliamentary democracy and about the policies of the Government. He would like to ask the Prime Minister about Anglo-Soviet relations, her attitudes to the Soviet Union and to Mr Gorbachev. He will also be looking for some indication of how she sees prospects for Mr Gorbachev's visit.

The Prime Minister may like to underline that Anglo-Soviet relations are in better shape than at any time since the war. The last few years have seen a rapid growth in the bilateral contacts. Cooperation is developing well both in traditional areas such as agriculture, education and culture and in new areas such as health, drugs, nuclear safety, and management training. Increasingly exchanges and visits are taking place directly between individuals in the two countries with very little government involvement: this is obviously a trend which we are keen to encourage. The massive response of the British public to the tragic earthquake disaster in Armenia illustrated the increasing warmth between the two countries.

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Good progress is being made towards achieving the target set by the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev in 1987 of increasing the value of bilateral trade by 40% to 2.5 billion roubles in 1990, although the level of British exports remains disappointing. 13 UK/Soviet joint ventures have been established so far and there are a number of others in the pipeline. A major British Trade Month will be held in Moscow in April.

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to say how much she enjoyed her visit to the Soviet Union in March 1987 and that she is very much looking forward to welcoming Mr and Mrs Gorbachev to the UK. It is encouraging that Mr Gorbachev has been able to find time for an early visit to the UK, particularly when there is so much happening in the Soviet Union in March and April - including elections to the Congress of Peoples Deputies and Central Committee plenums on the economy and agriculture. The visit will provide a good opportunity to carry forward the frank, high-level dialogue which has developed between the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev.

The Prime Minister may wish to say that she follows the progress of Mr Gorbachev's political and economic reform programme with great interest and is looking forward to hearing direct from Mr Gorbachev how he sees the way forward. The Prime Minister may wish to underline her support for perestroika and glasnost and say that she hopes that Mr Gorbachev is able to keep up the momentum.

The Prime Minister may also wish to tell Korotich that she intends her talks with Mr Gorbachev to range extensively over the whole East West agenda from arms control to regional questions, the future of Europe and human rights. She will no doubt want to emphasize that although very great progress has been made in all areas, the legacy of suspicion and fear will require an extended period to eradicate.

Korotich would also like to ask what the Prime Minister thinks are the essential qualities of a political leader as they apply for example to herself and to Mr Gorbachev. He is also interested in hearing how the Prime Minister combines her official duties with family life. He would particularly like to ask the Prime Minister how easy it is for a woman to become Prime Minister and how the Prime Minister thinks her role has changed during her years in office.

Korotich has asked whether it would be possible for him to be given an official picture of the Prime Minister for the cover of Ogonyok. I assume that you would be able to meet this request. He has also asked whether it might be possible for a photograph to be taken of him with the Prime Minister which he could then include in the magazine, alongside the

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article. If the Prime Minister is happy for such a photograph to be taken, I shall ask the COI to make the necessary arrangements and to let your office have the details.

Because of his absence in Tokyo, this letter has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary. We shall let you know early on 27 February of any comments he may have.

Yours ever,
Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

VITALY ALEKSEEVICH KOROTICH
CHIEF EDITOR OGONYOK MAGAZINE

Korotich (born Kiev, May 1936) trained as a doctor before turning to poetry and writing.

From 1978 to 1986 he was Chief Editor of the Ukrainian journal Vsesvit, which publishes works of literature by foreign authors in Ukrainian. During this time he also held the post of Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union.

In June 1986, Korotich was appointed Chief Editor of the national weekly magazine Ogonyok. He transformed it from a staid establishment journal into the most adventurous and talked about journal in the country and the chief standard-bearer of glasnost. Its circulation has increased to about 3.2 million but its readership is much higher. It is known for controversial articles on such subjects as the Stalinist repressions, official corruption and human rights and was one of the first publications to call for a monument to the victims of Stalin's purges.

Korotich almost certainly enjoys Gorbachev's support and seems to see him quite often. His position in Ogonyok would appear to be secure as long as this remains the case.

Korotich is a controversial and somewhat ambiguous figure. Ogonyok's blend of tough investigative journalism and penchant for taking up sensitive issues has made Korotich one of the folk heroes of perestroika. But he has also made a lot of enemies. He caused a stir at the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, when, in response to accusations that his journal had slandered Conference delegates, he announced that he had submitted the names of several who were currently under investigation for bribery. Most of those he named have since been arrested. In January this year, a meeting to try to have him proposed as a candidate for the elections to the new Congress of People's Deputies was disrupted by supporters of the extreme nationalist group Pamyat. He was eventually nominated in one of the Moscow constituencies for the 26 March elections, but he has now been formally dropped from the list of candidates.



OV2/1718

Programme of arrangements made by the
Central Office of Information for the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr Vitaly A KOROTICH

Editor-in-Chief

Ogonyok Magazine

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

26 February - 5 March 1989

Accompanied by Enid Ackers, Central Office of Information.

Programme Organiser:

Fiona McAdam
Overseas Visitors and Information Studies
Central Office of Information
Hercules Road, London SE1 7DU

Direct Line: 01-261 8291
Switchboard: 01-928 2345 Ext 8291

Sunday 26 February

ARRIVAL
LUNCH ENGAGEMENT

1040

Arrive at London Heathrow Airport on flight SU 241 from Moscow.

Welcomed on arrival by Miss Fiona McAdam, Overseas Visitors and Information Studies, Central Office of Information.

Continue by car to the St Ermin's Hotel, SW1 (Tel: 01-222 7888), where accommodation has been reserved.

1300

Lunch as a guest of the Hon Robert Rayne, Central Television.

Also present:

Mr Richard Creasey, Central Television

Ms Veronyka Bodnarec, Film Producer, Central Television

Mr Igor Iakimenko, Ogonyok Magazine

(Details of venue to follow).

Monday 27 February

PROGRAMME DISCUSSION
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
BRITISH LIBRARY
LUNCH ENGAGEMENT
HEINEMANN LTD
BBC RADIO FOUR
EVENING ENGAGEMENT

0915

Met at the hotel by Mrs Susan Fasken, Head, Europe Group, Overseas Visitors and Information Studies, Central Office of Information and Miss Fiona McAdam, Programme Organiser.

Miss McAdam will discuss the programme arrangements.

0945

Leave the hotel by car with Enid Ackers who will accompany the visitor to his appointments.

1000

Arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, King Charles Street, SW1.

Received by the Hon William Waldegrave MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Monday 27 February cont'd

1030 Leave King Charles Street by car.

1100 Arrive at The British Library, Great Russell Street, WC2 (Information Desk).

Met by Dr Christine Thomas, Curator of the Russian and Soviet Collection and continue on a tour of the Slavonic and East European department.

1230 Leave Great Russell Street by car.

1245 Arrive at Simpsons in the Strand, 150 The Strand, WC2.
for
1300

Joined for lunch by:

Mr Charles Wilson, Editor, The Times

Mr Edward Mortimer, Foreign Editor, The Financial Times

Mr Dan Triesman, News and Features, The Daily Telegraph

Mr Stephen Crawshaw, Soviet Union and East European Editor, The Independent

Mrs Susan Fasken, Overseas Visitors and Information Studies, Central Office of Information

1430 Leave the Strand by car.

1515 Arrive at Heinemann Ltd, Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, SW3.

Met by Mr Tom Weldon, Senior Editor and Mr Piers Russell Cobb, Publicity Director for discussions.

1715 approx Leave Fulham Road by car.

1800 Arrive at the BBC, Broadcasting House, Portland Place, W1.

Met by Mr Frank Smith, Editor of Radio Four's 'The World Tonight' Programme.

Introduced to Mr David Sells, Presenter for a brief interview.

1845 approx Leave Portland Place by car.

1930 Arrive at the Palace Theatre, Shaftesbury Avenue, W1.

Monday 27 February cont'd

Attend a performance of 'Les Miserables'.

2245 approx

Leave the Palace Theatre by car for return to the hotel.

Tuesday 28 February

THE PRIME MINISTER
LUNCH ENGAGEMENT
BBC RUSSIAN SERVICE
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Morning

Free

1200

Arrive at 10 Downing Street, SW1.

Received by The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher FRS, MP, The Prime Minister.

1245

Leave Downing Street.

1300

Arrive at Rules Restaurant, 35 Maiden Lane, The Strand, WC2.

for

1315

Joined by:

Mr Peter Snow, Presenter, BBC2's Newsnight Programme

Mr Andrew Taussig, Controller, BBC European Service

Ms Masha Slonim, Presenter of the "Argument" Programme, BBC Russian Service.

Later

Leave Maiden Lane by car.

1500 approx

Arrive at the BBC Russian Service, Bush House, The Strand, WC2, with Ms Slonim.

The visitor will take part in an interview for the BBC Russian Service programme 'Argument'.

1630 approx

Leave the Strand by car.

1715

Arrive at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, SW1 (Henry Price Room).

The visitor will participate in private discussions with the Institute's members.

Later

Leave St James's Square by car.

1945

Arrive at the Comedy Theatre, Panton Street, SW1.

Tuesday 28 February cont'd

Met by Mr Tom Weldon, Senior Editor, Heinemann Ltd, Mr Piers Russell Cobb, Publicity Director, Heinemann Ltd, Mr Victor Borlich, Agent for Best of Ogonyok and Ms Kathy Porter, Translator for Best of Ogonyok.

2000 Attend the performance of 'A Walk in The Woods'.

2200 Leave Panton Street by car for return to the hotel.

Wednesday 1 March

RANK XEROX LTD
CHANNEL FOUR
LUNCH ENGAGEMENT
WILTON PARK CONFERENCE

0830 Leave the hotel by car.

0900 Arrive at Rank Xerox Ltd, 16 Westbourne Grove, W2.

Met by Mr Ralph Land OBE, General Manager, Eastern Export Operations for discussions on the company's experience of doing business in the Soviet Union.

1000 Leave Westbourne Grove by car, for return to the hotel.

1030 Met by Mr Dan Triesman, News and Features, The Daily Telegraph, who will interview the visitor.

1115 Mr Triesman will leave the hotel.

1145 Joined by Ms Sue English, Foreign Editor, Channel Four News.

The visitor will take part in a brief, recorded interview.

1230 Leave the hotel by car.

1300 Arrive at the Traveller's Club, 106 Pall Mall, SW1.

Lunch as a guest of Mr D J E Ratford CMG CVO, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Later Continue by car to Wilton Park, Conference Centre, West Sussex.

The visitor will attend the conference on 'Reform in the Soviet Union: Achievements and Problems for Perestroika, Glasnost and Democratisation'.

He will also lead a panel discussion on 'Glasnost and Perestroika: A Balance Sheet'.

Thursday 2 March

WILTON PARK - LONDON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
LUNCH ENGAGEMENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS
BBC WORLD SERVICE

0900 Leave Wilton Park by car with End Ackers for return to London.

1145 Arrive at the Palace of Westminster, (St Stephen's Entrance), SW1.

Met by Mr David Howell MP, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee and continue discussions with Committee members.

1245 Proceed to the Harcourt Bar for pre-lunch drinks.

1300 Joined for lunch in the Harcourt Grill Room with members of the government and opposition parties.

Later Leave Westminster by car.

1600 Arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, King Charles Street, SW1.

Received by The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe QC, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

1645 Leave King Charles Street by car.

1750 Arrive at the BBC World Service, Centre Block Reception, Bush House, Aldwych, WC2.

Met by Ms Sue Waldram, Producer, The World of Books programme.

The visitor will take part in a brief interview.

1830 Continue to Room 834, Centre Block.

Met by Ms Kari Blackburn, Editor of the 'News Hour' Programme.

Introduced to Mr Oliver Scott, Presenter, for a brief interview.

1900 Leave Aldwych by car.

1930 Arrive at The Travellers' Club, 106 Pall Mall, SW1.

Met by Mr Brian Beedham, Editorial Consultant, The Economist, for informal discussions.

Thursday 2 March cont'd

Later Continue to dinner as a guest of Mr Beedham.

Later Return to the hotel by car.

Friday 3 March

FREE

Saturday 4 March

LONDON - OXFORD
OXFORD - LONDON
CHANNEL FOUR

0830 Leave the hotel by car.

1000 Arrive at the Randolph Hotel, Beaumont Street, Oxford.

Met by Sir Bryan Cartledge KCMG, Principal of Linacre College.

The visitor will have discussions with various Soviet experts and will also give a brief informal talk to a group of graduate students. (Details to follow)

1630 Leave Oxford by car.

1800 Arrive at ITN, 48 Wells Street, W1.

Met by Mr Nigel Gardiner, European Correspondent, Channel Four's 'World This Week' Programme.

The visitor will take part in a live interview.

Sunday 5 March

DEPARTURE

1030 Leave the hotel by car.

1140 Arrive at London Heathrow Airport.

1245 Depart on flight SU 242 to Moscow.

24 February 1989

Sov. Union - Relations P112





copy

MO 6/18/4L

*CDP
24h*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

DEFENCE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

at top on lower file

I was grateful for your minute of 5th December agreeing that we could begin to talk informally to the Soviet Authorities about resumption of defence contacts. We have now done so with the full involvement of your officials, and I am pleased to say that our approaches have been received positively. At a meeting on 20th February, representatives from the Soviet Embassy told my officials that they accepted our suggestions for an exchange of ship visits, an exchange between the Royal Air Force Staff College and the Gagarin Academy and for meetings between senior commanders in British Forces Germany and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. These are now being followed up through the Embassy in Moscow; we are looking at a list of possible further measures to propose to them.

2. At the meeting, the officials from the Soviet Embassy also made it clear that a meeting of Defence Ministers would be welcome. As you know, this is something which I too am anxious to arrange as soon as possible. It is still not clear whether General Yazov will accompany Mr Gorbachev to this country in April. If unfortunately he does not, we should take that opportunity to stress the desirability of an early meeting between Defence Ministers. Meanwhile, it might be helpful for our Embassy to give initial consideration to how best to proceed quickly if Yazov does not come in April: either I could visit Moscow or Yazov could come here. My preference would be for the former if a specific invitation



could be stimulated as my American and German and Turkish colleagues have recently done so; my French colleague is due to go there in April. I believe it is most important that the British voice on defence matters should also be fully in evidence in the Soviet Union.

3. I have also been invited to visit Hungary in September, and should like to accept. To do so would be in keeping with our policy of developing defence contacts with the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries; it would be particularly appropriate in view of the recent moves towards democratisation in Hungary for which it could be seen as a signal of approval. However, my priority would be a visit to the Soviet Union if that could be arranged and I should, therefore, be grateful to know that you would have no objections to my visiting both countries this year if that possibility were on offer.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

24 February 1989

C.Y.

Sw. Amer. Relations Pr II.

6-110
11-93



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

26th February 1989

Dear Stefan,

A note to say that
I am immensely grateful to you
for writing down in such detail
your views on how the Gorbachev
reforms are doing. You have
given me the kind of information and
insight that I could not have got
from anyone else.

Please give my warm good

Wishes to your family who are
still in the USSR. Denis joins me
in sending warm regards to you
or your family here.

Yours ever

Nagant

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 338
OF 231349Z FEBRUARY 89

1. cc Mr Powell No 10
2. Dade Wm
R.S.

VISIT OF KOROTICH
SUMMARY

1. KOROTICH IS A CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL FIGURE WHO, TOGETHER WITH HIS MAGAZINE HAS BECOME ONE OF THE SYMBOLS OF GLASNOST. HE IS THE MAN THE TRADITIONALISTS LOVE TO HATE. HIS VIEWS WILL PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR THOSE WHO MEET HIM TO GET A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINE OF HOW PERESTROIKA IS GOING.

DETAIL

2. VITALY KOROTICH, CHIEF EDITOR OF OGONYEK, WILL BE PAYING A SPONSORED VISIT TO THE UK FROM 26 FEBRUARY UNTIL 5 MARCH. HE WILL BE CALLING ON YOU ON 1 MARCH AND WILL HAVE A 45 MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 28 FEBRUARY. THIS IS LIKELY TO BE PUBLISHED IN OGONYEK IN THE SECOND HALF OF MARCH, BEFORE GORBACHEV'S VISIT. I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN AN INDICATION OF THE GROUND KOROTICH WILL WISH TO COVER IN THIS INTERVIEW IN MY TELNO 206. IN THIS TELEGRAM I OFFER SOME BACKGROUND ON KOROTICH AND HIS POLITICAL ROLE WHICH I HOPE WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU AND OTHERS WHO ARE TO MEET HIM.

3. KOROTICH HAS BEEN A WRESTLER, A POET, A JOURNALIST AND A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE UKRAINIAN WRITERS UNION. HE TOOK OVER THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OGONYEK IN THE SUMMER OF 1986 UNDER GORBACHEV AND IN THE PAST TWO AND HALF YEARS HAS TRANSFORMED IT FROM A STAID ESTABLISHMENT JOURNAL INTO THE MOST ADVENTUROUS AND TALKED-ABOUT MAGAZINE IN THE COUNTRY, WITH A CIRCULATION OF 3.2 MILLION AND A READERSHIP THAT IS MUCH HIGHER. UNDER KOROTICH OGONYEK HAS LED THE WAY IN DEBUNKING STALIN AND IN EXPOSING PRESENT DAY CORRUPTION AND BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE.

4. OGONYEK'S BLEND OF TOUGH INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND PENCHANT FOR TAKING UP SENSITIVE ISSUES HAS MADE KOROTICH ONE OF THE FOLK-HEROES OF PERESTROIKA. LAST YEAR A 1500 SEAT THEATRE WAS FILLED TO CAPACITY JUST TO HEAR HIM ANSWER QUESTIONS. BUT HE HAS ALSO MADE A LOT OF ENEMIES. AT LAST YEAR'S PARTY CONFERENCE OGONYEK CAUSED A MINOR SENSATION BY ALLEGING THAT A NUMBER OF DELEGATES HAD BRIBED THEIR WAY TO THE CONFERENCE. KOROTICH WAS CALLED TO THE CONFERENCE PLATFORM TO ANSWER FOR HIS ACTIONS. HE WAS LATER VINDICATED: BUT IT WAS ALREADY APPARENT AT THIS STAGE THAT FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC AND TRADITIONALIST CULTURAL ESTABLISHMENT HE HAD COME TO REPRESENT THE

UNACCEPTABLE FACE OF PERESTROIKA.

5. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE LIBERAL AND TRADITIONALIST CULTURAL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH KOROTICH AT ITS CENTRE HAS BROADENED OUT INTO OPEN WARFARE CONDUCTED THROUGH THE COLUMNS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE JOURNALS. SIX PROMINENT RUSSIAN WRITERS DESCRIBED OGONYEK IN A LETTER PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA LAST MONTH AS THE "'SCUM'" BUBBLING FORTH ON THE CREST OF PERESTROIKA. A FEW WEEKS AGO A GROUP FOR THE ANTI-SEMITIC PANYENT ORGANISATION BROKE UP AN ELECTION MEETING AT WHICH KOROTICH WAS PUTTING FORWARD HIS CANDIDACY. GORBACHEV ATTEMPTED TO CALL HIS TROOPS TO ORDER IN HIS SPEECH TO THE INTELLECTUALS IN JANUARY (MY TELNO 36) BUT IT IS STILL SMOULDERING. ONLY THIS WEEK VIKTOR AFANASIEV, THE INFLUENTIAL CHIEF EDITOR OF PRAVDA, TOOK UP THE CUDGELS WITH KOROTICH OVER SOME UNFLATTERING REMARKS THE LATTER HAD PUBLISHED ABOUT AFANASIEV'S ROLE AS A PROPAGANDIST FOR THE BREZHNEV REGIME.

6. KOROTICH ALMOST CERTAINLY ENJOYS GORBACHEV'S SUPPORT AND, I BELIEVE, SEEM HIM QUITE OFTEN. I WOULD JUDGE THAT HIS POSITION AT OGONYEK WILL BE SECURE AS LONG AS THIS REMAINS THE CASE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IF HE IS UNSEATED IT WILL BE AN IMPORTANT SETBACK FOR GLASNOST. KOROTICH'S RELATIONS WITH LIGACHEV ARE STRAINED. BUT HE TOLD ME WHEN I INVITED HIM TO LUNCH RECENTLY THAT HE SAW LIGACHEV, FOR ALL HIS CONSERVATISM, AS A DECENT ENOUGH MAN. LIGACHEV HAD APPARENTLY RUNG HIM ON NEW YEAR'S EVE WITH BEST WISHES AND HAD PRAISED HIM FOR BEING A BONNY FIGHTER.

7. KOROTICH IS AN ENGAGING AND WITTY CONVERSATIONALIST. HE IS OF COURSE A HIGHLY PARTISAN SUPPORTER OF GORBACHEV AND PERESTROIKA. BUT YOU AND OTHERS WHOM HE MEETS WILL NEVERTHELESS FIND HIS VIEWS ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SCENE, GORBACHEV'S POSITION AND THE STRENGTH OF PRO AND ANTI-PERESTROIKA FORCES STIMULATING AND WELL INFORMED. HE TOLD ME AT LUNCH THAT HE DID NOT THINK GORBACHEV WAS UNDER ANY PARTICULAR THREAT AT THE MOMENT. BUT HE HAS ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW RECENTLY TO MY US COLLEAGUE THAT "'MARCH COULD BE A VERY CRUCIAL MONTH'" GIVEN CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE ELECTION PROCESS AND FORTHCOMING CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE. KOROTICH HIMSELF IS LIKELY TO BE STANDING FOR ELECTION TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES ON 26 MARCH, BUT HAS TOLD US THAT HE SEES HIS FUTURE AT OGONYEK WHERE HE HAS MORE INFLUENCE RATHER THAN IN THE SUPREME SOVIET.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SOVIET VOTE YELTSIN TAPS ANTI-PARTY MOOD

Moscow Maverick Makes Comeback

TOR

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

By Paul Quinn-Judge

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW

BORIS YELTSIN'S face flushes, then contorts with rage when his old rival, Yegor Ligachev, is mentioned. His booming voice becomes even louder:

"I don't understand why they don't remove him," the ousted Moscow Communist Party boss bellows to his supporters. "I know everything about this man and his scheming."

After months of news blackouts, Boris Yeltsin is back in the limelight. He is running hard for election to the new Soviet parliament, which, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev promises, will have real power. If it does, Mr. Yeltsin wants part of it.

His supporters hope to see him "at the very top of the leadership, alongside Gorbachev." Yeltsin is more tactful, but admits to planning a bloc inside the new parliament. Yeltsin has not yet decided where to run. But he seems to be most tempted by a special territorial district that embraces the whole of Moscow. The slate here will be decided today. By Thursday Yeltsin will have to declare his preference. Then the real electoral campaign will begin.

The official press still ignores him, but meeting after meeting in Moscow confirms his appeal. His ideas are hazy, his delivery is poor, he seems to have trouble thinking on his feet. But his supporters don't care. Yeltsin is a true Russian knight," says a retired Army colonel at one elec-

tion meeting. He is "upright and straightforward," says another. "He was the first person here to tell us what's what," a third speaker says.

Yeltsin is tapping a deep current of anti-party feeling. The campaign for March 26 elections has shown a remarkably high degree of popular hostility toward



BORIS YELTSIN

the Communist Party apparat, or bureaucracy. Yeltsin's supporters are consciously making him the symbol of anti-apparat feeling.

A recent unpublished public opinion poll showed Yeltsin as the second most popular political figure in the country — and, given the tendency of many respondents still to be polite about the top leader, he may be the most popular.

The poll divided Soviet society into six categories, from supporters of radical reform to conservative Russian nationalists. Yeltsin did poorly among radical reformers, largely people with the equivalent of university education. But

See MOSCOW next page

MOSCOW from page 1

his popularity matched Mr. Gorbachev's in most other political groups, and overtook the Soviet leader in two: Russian nationalists and those most concerned about the declining living standards.

Cautious in conversation with foreign journalists, he is more open, in chats with delegates to the meetings being held to finalize a slate of candidates in each electoral district.

The meetings are nine-hour marathons. During breaks, Yeltsin's admirers gather round to listen to their hero. Most are awestruck by his imposing presence: his larger than life features, his shock of white hair, his deep and slightly thick voice. He prefers talking to listening, and sometimes puts a firm hand on a listener's arm if he shows any desire to interrupt.

But the brief conversations, coupled with his short official presentations at the electoral meetings, slowly build up a picture of his views. He says he is "100 percent" behind Gorbachev on foreign policy, and differs with him only on tactics on most other questions. But he has a tendency to be all things to all men:

- He wants to organize a "left revolutionary bloc" in the new Supreme Soviet. This would probably consist of about 30 percent of the approximately 440 members of the standing parliament, he says. Lapsing into the military jargon favored by party officials, Yeltsin describes them as the "forward reconnaissance" of perestroika (restructuring).

His admirers ask him about a multiparty system. Gorbachev has just described the idea as "rubbish." Yeltsin says it is premature: We're "not ready organizationally or psychologically" for more than one party. There should be a nationwide discussion of the idea.

- The leadership should have concentrated first on improving living standards and only then moving onto political changes. That's like saying let's patch up the house before we pull it down, objects an elector at one of the meetings. Yeltsin and most of the audience ignore the criticism.

- During one break, a military officer asks whether "all these cuts and the declassifying of military information" aren't harming

the country. Yeltsin nods sympathetically. "We have to be very careful how we approach this; he says. And we have to look after all the officers who are going to be demobilized in the troop cuts. They need help too. So do the bureaucrats who will lose their jobs in the reforms, says a policeman. They're human after all. Yeltsin nods sympathetically.

- There should be 90 percent cuts in the internal strength of the KGB, the security and counterintelligence organization, he says during one intermission chat. Its external intelligence gathering activities should not be touched.

To a large degree Gorbachev and Mr. Ligachev have made Yeltsin what he is today. The speech which led to his dismissal from the Communist Party Politburo, a still-unpublished impromptu address to the Central Committee in October 1987, could have been a simple act of political self-destruction. Instead, party leaders organized a brutal and well-publicized meeting which dismissed Yeltsin from his position as Moscow party chief.

This turned him into a national hero. The "coarse, indecent attacks" on Yeltsin by members of the Moscow party establishment, one elector said, showed how badly Yeltsin had scared the leadership. A subsequent news blackout seems to have confirmed rank-and-file feelings that Yeltsin was indeed their man. So did an emotional speech by Ligachev at the 19th party conference last summer.

Complaints at the conference that Yeltsin arbitrarily fired Moscow officials reinforced pro-Yeltsin feeling. "So he made life miserable for the bureaucrats," a Muscovite said immediately after the conference, "They make life miserable for us all the time."

Soon after fall from the top, Yeltsin put out feelers to radical intellectuals. He was a founding member of the anti-Stalinist organization "memorial," he and other founders unsuccessfully invited Alexander Solzhenitsyn to become a member.

Radical intellectuals are now slightly leery of Yeltsin. "He's rough, tough, and honest," says the writer Yuri Koryakin. But like Ligachev, Mr. Koryakin adds, Yeltsin inclines toward solving things by reinforcing discipline.

Prime Minister
Ken were asking about
Mr. Yeltsin and may
find this article of
interest. He is not
unreservedly a good
thing. CDD
2/73

2

Matheson & Co. Ltd.,
3 Lombard Street,
London EC3V 9AQ

17 February, 1989.

The Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave MP
House of Commons,
London SW1A 0AA

Prime Minister
A fascinating

- 1) Minister letter.
- 2) Soviet Dept. *CBP*
- 3) Research Dept *1/3*
- ERD*
- for Comms Dept*

Dear William,

If you were serious in what you said about helping HMG advise the Soviet Union how to achieve some economic success I would of course be happy to do whatever I can.

It is, however, a most intractable problem. The obvious solution - to eliminate socialism - can hardly be the message which Mr. Gorbachev wishes to receive or which it would be diplomatic for HMG to convey (even Sakharov's manifesto falls well short of that). It might, however, be possible to dismantle parts of socialism. The Soviet Communist Party would then have to rely on economic or political compartmentalisation to protect the rest of their empire from catching the freedom virus.

I do not believe the problem can be tackled from a mainly economic standpoint. The macro-economic levers which we try to pull in the West (money supply, deficit budgeting, etc.) are pretty ineffective even here, where we are constantly confronted with a combination of instrument fog and unexpected effects. To attempt to use such mechanisms in the Soviet Union, where there is, so far as one can tell, no effective economy at all, would lead to abject failure. Thus the approach must be (a) politico-economic and (b) commercial.

It is tempting to try to draw on the Chinese experience, but this would be unsound. The Chinese are culturally homogeneous and have three dynamic capitalist communities with a combined population of over 25 million bordering directly on mainland China - Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. As a result South East China has a rapidly growing natural trade and is becoming a profitable low-cost production base for goods chiefly designed and marketed by Hong Kong. None of these features apply to the U.S.S.R., the nearest equivalent being Finland, which is not culturally homogeneous with Russia and whose external trade is 1/5th that of Hong Kong's and Taiwan's combined (whereas the USSR's is three times that of China - a "weight" discrepancy of 15 times).

Thus the Comecon has acted historically not just as a military buffer but as an economic screen, distancing the Soviet Union from contact with the West and substituting as trading partners (on what is effectively an enforced bartering basis) states which are themselves inefficient. It is the perfect recipe for poverty. This role of the Comecon might, of course, change if Central Europe were to evolve along pluralistic lines and to become associated with the Common Market - an evolution which would have major political consequences.

Returning to the idea of de-socialisation, it would in my judgement be more effective to dismantle parts of the system almost in toto than to dismantle it partially across the board. Agriculture seems the obvious place to start, since it makes few demands on innovation, marketing, competitiveness or organisation - Nature performs most of the capitalist role. The return of the land to the people would lead to a massive increase in production which would more than

compensate for any higher open market prices. Moreover, without wishing to re-open the controversy between Mao and Stalin over the revolutionary potential of the countryside, I would think the Party might regard farmers as relatively "safe", if only because they would be dispersed, busy and concentrating on making money.

I have read superficially of Gorbachev's proposals for agricultural tenancies but I have no independent opinion as to their likely effectiveness. My cast of mind would be sceptical on the grounds that they probably fail to go to the root of the matter, i.e. ownership. Be that as it may, once farm productivity is increased, the problem of distribution will remain - how to get the produce into the cities. Clearly private ownership of trucking, warehousing, food processing and shops would go a long way towards solving this difficulty, but then the compartmentalisation of socialism would be jeopardised; and to this I have no answer.

A second relatively separable area is foreign exchange. Since the Soviet external account is largely a balanced book - i.e. a quota system for imports matching the commodity value of exports - it would cost virtually nothing to float the ruble and make it convertible.

The ruble would doubtless drop like a stone, but this would price some Soviet goods into export markets and contribute to the rationing of imports by price allocation (i.e. the market) rather than by official planning; this would improve efficiency considerably. A collapsed ruble might also lead to some foreign investment in the U.S.S.R.

A third useful act of dismemberment would be the freeing of the Baltic States, except for defence and foreign policy. (By "freeing" I mean progressively allowing the Baltic States their own currency, banking system, legal system, economic arrangements and political system). This would bring to the

North West of the USSR the prospect of something akin to the Chinese success. However, the political ramifications are presumably extremely radical. I don't know enough to be able to judge whether the taste of independence in the Baltic might lead to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Certainly Gorbachev's recent remarks in Moscow suggest that there is great reluctance to move in this direction.

An approach which is sometimes advocated is joint ventures. These, however, are full of problems. Those which work best in China are the ones which are just over the border, where the Hong Kong parent can influence the production efficiency and the quality of the output and where the foreigner is effectively paid in product (which could be anything from lifts to ice-cream) rather than dividends.

All this is difficult enough in China; the absence of law is, for example, a drawback. In Russia, with long distances, a recalcitrant workforce and language problems, it would be harder still.

Nor do I see much prospect for itinerant labour, which has built a number of infrastructure projects in the Middle East and elsewhere, the method being to import a re-exportable army of, e.g., Korean building workers - among other examples are the Turkish "guest-workers" in Germany. The success of this approach owes everything to the fact that the host countries have spare cash and no labour, whereas the U.S.S.R. has no spare cash and demoralised, but abundant, labour. (There are, moreover, depressing Soviet precedents with Gulag-type overtones, the latest being the forced labour of Vietnamese deportees).

The fashionable approach nowadays is what might be called "capitalism within anti-capitalism" - the notion of introducing incentives, redundancies, profitability,

management accountability and other trappings of an open economic society without changing the basic framework of Planning, KGB and Party control, Residence Permits, Price Controls and State ownership. In my opinion this approach stands little chance of success. It is like introducing fish without water. Free market business practices need a free society in which to operate. I should think such policies will backfire badly, discrediting both their authors and the very idea of a more open society. I realise that this is a pessimistic prognosis for Gorbachev's central strategy of Perestroika, but it is what I believe.

Finally, there are Western loans. These arouse passion disproportionate to their importance. To create a net benefit to the U.S.S.R. they would have to be invested in Soviet projects (or the easing of bottle-necks) earning foreign currency at a rate of over 12% on capital, which I dare say is rather marginal, not to say unlikely. It would not be surprising if a fair amount of such loans found their way into subversion; on the other hand, the Soviets have long been punctilious payers, and they tend to regard foreign loans as being as much a burden as a help.

The more one considers the question, the more one comes back to human and ideological elementals. People will not work for corrupt land or property owners backed by authoritarian regimes, which explains the failure of Latin America; still less will they work for corrupt bureaucracies embodying totalitarian regimes, which explains the failure of Eastern European communism. To say anything different is to fudge the issue beyond repair. On this analysis, the central question is how quickly and how comprehensively the U.S.S.R. can pull back from socialism and what cover story can be concocted for pretending that something different is happening. There should, at least, be no shortage of experts in creating legends.

I have not in this letter dealt with a variety of peripheral, but related, matters such as freedom of travel and scholarships abroad, nor have I dealt with sub-forms of ownership, such as co-operatives, partnerships and joint stock companies. In any event, I feel fairly sure I will now have effectively disqualified myself from any role at all. Nevertheless, I do gladly repeat the offer to help.

Yours,

Rodney

Rodney Leach

2G/3157

From: Mr C K Davies
Date: 17 February 1989

MR P J WESTON

*evm
17/2*

cc Mr C Powell

'HOT-LINE' COMMUNICATIONS

You may be interested to see the attached article about the 'hot-line' system between the US and USSR.

The new system we are putting in place for operational use in about August next year will be very similar to that shown in the picture under 'MOCKBA'.

The article appeared in the USSR in the Soviet magazine Oqonek in October last year. This is a weekly 'pro-perestroika' journal of general interest which is widely read in the USSR. The translation is by my 'hot-line' staff.

C. K. Davies

MR C K DAVIES
Telecommunications Secretariat

Enc

If someone wants to make a call from Moscow to, let's say, Washington, one can be sure that the conversation would take place although sometimes, it's true, there would be a delay which could be ignored. But if the conversation has to take place between the heads of state of the USSR and USA then the slightest delay is intolerable as it might cost the human race too dear. It was like that, for example, in the autumn of 1962 when literally the fate of the world depended on the mutual understanding between Nikita S Krushchev and J Kennedy. The "Caribbean Crisis" blew over safely but a problem remained: communication between the Kremlin and the White House must be instant, reliable and permanent.

Recently, our own and American communications staff had a small unofficial celebration - the 25th anniversary of the "hot line". It probably isn't worth elaborating on the precise reason for adopting this name for this particular channel of communication. It began operating on 31st August 1963 and, at that time, the whole world welcomed the announcement of the fact with relief: a significant step had been taken towards reducing tension. We will not be discussing other steps in this direction now; we are only talking about a communication link - but, incidentally, since that time, nothing has been reported anywhere about the "hot line". It exists - full stop! The governments of both countries decided, at the time, that openness was unacceptable. Only very recently did this topic, too, become accessible to the press.

Previously it seemed that everything proceeded thus: the head of government goes into a special room, the duty communications operator immediately picks up the receiver of a special telephone No, this is wrong. There never was a telephone, not even at the very beginning ie 25 years ago. Even then, communication was established by enciphered teletype or, more accurately, through two low-speed telegraph lines. Outwardly, it was reminiscent of people at both ends of a line exchanging telegrams. In principle, this arrangement has been operating right up to the present although the technology for exchanging communications has become immeasurably more complicated.

At first it was arranged that the route of the line would be via the cable lying on the sea bed. Since the cable was never considered sufficiently reliable, the link was duplicated by a short wave radio channel through a relay in Tangier. But the era of the communications satellite arrived and, in 1977, the "hot line" became cosmic. It is probably worth adding that all these technical matters are the subject of specific discussions between representatives of the two governments and official international documents are agreed.

next such agreement or, more accurately, the 1984 addition to the agreement, concerned a cipher facsimile channel. It is now possible to transmit maps, charts and diagrams - in brief, any kind of graphic information.

How all this happens can be seen in the photographs we publish. Some of the photography was done in the United States; the other photographs are our own. Here, for example, is the duty control room in the Kremlin. Three "three-storied" banks of equipment - these are the terminals of three parallel but not interconnected "hot line" communication links. Two links go via two satellites, the third by transatlantic cable. There is also a fourth link, the technical channel, for servicing the whole communications system. The reason for such a complicated arrangement is understandable: one of the satellites may go out of action, the underwater cable may break, but Moscow and Washington do not lose contact.

The equipment itself - display units, personal computers, facsimile communication equipment and printing devices - may be regarded as ordinary, standard equipment but, of course, it represents the last word in technology. It stands to reason that it must be identical for ourselves and the Americans - the line operates in common! Only the rows of characters visible on the display units "fly off" into the ether - this is the actual information, the secrecy of which ensures a peaceful life for us. There, in fact, are all the secrets of the "hot line".....

But there is yet another side to the 25th anniversary of its history - the technical side. Before reaching the Soviet display unit from the American, or vice versa, these characters, transformed into signals, must complete an extremely long journey. From the Kremlin to the antennae of Moscow's Oostankinskaya Tower, then to Dubna near Moscow, then through outer space to the continent of America and through the satellite station of West Virginia to Washington. In order to get some idea about the work of this enormous bridge of communications, we went to Dubna, on the bank of the quiet river bearing the same name, where the invisible link tears itself away from the earth and heads into outer space.

We knew that we were going to a special sort of place and expected long drawn out proceedings with a system of passes and security complications but, without a second's delay, holding press passes in our hands, we passed the bored guard in a cowboy shirt in the small entrance hall with "International Research Centre for Satellite Communications "Dubna - Intercosmos"" incised on a plate.

The whole area of the Centre could be seen as clearly as the palm of your hand. Two more or less solid buildings, a few structures rather like small detached houses and a whole complex of different sized antennae; differing in dimension but uniformly reminiscent of either gigantic saucers, placed crookedly on edge, or enormous white umbrellas scattered along the edge of the wood. These picturesque parabolas directed towards the sky even climbed onto the roof of a large three-storied house and this township of antennae made so grave an impression that I admit that, initially, it even grated on me that government communications were equipped on such a grand scale. (But the thought immediately came to mind - how does one talk from Moscow, for example, to Serpukhov or, from there, with Valda.) Our conversation with one of the duty engineers started with this question and it immediately became clear that the Dubninskij Centre not only carries out these very important functions but a series of other tasks as well.

It is from this very place that all telephone conversations from our country to countries in the Atlantic region are relayed to a satellite and, what is more, by means of a transit, Dubna connects telephone subscribers from socialist countries in Europe, through outer space, with subscribers in the USA, Canada, Cuba, Syria etc. Telegraphic communications are passed along the same satellite channels through Dubna. Remember, moreover, that we have long been accustomed to television showing us foreign video clips of current news several times a day. Well, these video clips are first received in Dubna and it is from here that they are transmitted to the telecentre in Ostankino. And have these "telebridges" become common? Up till now, for example, I thought that one of their ends was leaning directly against the Ostankinskaya Tower. This proves not to be the case, only from Dubna, from these "umbrella-like" antennae does communication really become cosmic.

Incidentally, why are there so many of these antennae? This is the time to introduce the man I have been talking to, Valdimir Mochalov, the head of Section 2. "Each antenna serves its lines of communication: one goes through our own "Intersputnik" system, another through the American "Intelsat" system. Satellites are launched in such a way that they, as it were, hang continually above a single point of the terrestrial sphere - approximately over the centre of the Atlantic....".

The cosmos, satellites, the depths of the oceans, distant continents Now, in our conversation, these were not abstract concepts but the ordinary working vocabulary of the man sitting opposite me. He said all these words with familiarity in a workaday fashion with a barely discernable local pronunciation. This little detail somehow particularly underlined the fact that we were

in a little town in the very centre of primordial Russia - right on the banks of the Volga Valdimir Ivanovich confirmed that he came from this area, from the town of Murom. He had worked in a factory, studied at the institute by correspondence course and, when he had gained his diploma, became an engineer at the long-range cosmic communications station in Gus-Khrustal'nij which serves the countries in the region of the Indian Ocean. But he was invited to Dubna when the new station was built here before the Moscow Olympics and the most experienced and best-qualified specialists were recruited for it. A particularly important role was intended for the new communications centre. It seemed symbolic to me that, in the search for high grade specialists in satellite communications, there was no need to ransack the whole country. Many of the people we managed to speak to here pronounced words in that same, characteristic local fashion.

However, there aren't very many people here and the three floors of the large building under its canopy of huge antennae seems rather empty in comparison with the abundance of electronics with which the building is literally stuffed.

"Now this is the rack", Mochalov indicated a "cupboard" of equipment with luminous peep-holes, "which serves the "hot line" At the moment", Mochalov threw a glance at the oscillograph screen, "this is a "cold line" - there is no link, but a check is scheduled every hour".

"What does it consist of?"

"The operators who are on duty round the clock in Moscow transmit a test message".

"And in Dubna"

"We are manned 24 hours a day here too: we reckon, according to Greenwich time. I did mention that we don't deal only with government communication links, but also telephone, telegraph, television - everything that goes through space. Right now, you are interested in the "hot line" - no interruption of communications whatsoever can be tolerated there, of course. But when, let's assume, an "ordinary" relay of a television transmission from another continent is in progress, the responsibility is just as great: we have no right to permit a break in the picture. It's bad if even a second's interference is our fault: more than five seconds - well, that's really a state of emergency".

"And supposing, as everyone jokes these days, "the interference isn't on our territory".

would be in vain. Space communication is, in fact, very reliable, more often than not malfunctioning occurs on the ground; the communications operator is not to blame. We merely observe the quality of the signal going out to or arriving from the satellite".

"Do you talk to the Americans yourself?"

"Yes, we have a channel for service communications, we conduct essential discussions by teleprinter. Look, you can see it here".

Vladimir Ivanovich picked up a paper tape - the teleprinter accepted the message: "MSK from FD. Good morning, dear colleagues.....".

"That means: Moscow is taking a message from the American station in Fort-Detrick, Pennsylvania via the "Intersputnik"* system. Further on - our response: there are no problems, communications normal. But here, the operators in Section I are linked to the "Ehtam"* station via "Intelsat". We take Russian as the operating language. In Section 1 they take English".

Section 1 - here it is, alongside Section 2. There is nothing like a wall dividing them, there is not even even a theoretical dividing line between the "States" in the common room. There are no boundaries here and there are none in space The time has probably not yet come when we can dream that boundaries in general will disappear but the fact that we are now already trying to remove them, little by little, is a very good sign.

Translator's Note

*I have simply transliterated these satellite names. "Intersputnik" could be translated as "Intersatellite". "Ehtam" could also be written as "Atam".




ВАШИНГТОН




«Слитиз Москвы, кто-то захочет позвонить, скажем, в Вашингтон, то можно быть уверенным, что такой разговор состоится — иногда, правда, с задержкой, на которую можно и не обращать внимания. Но если разговор должен состояться между главами государств СССР и США, то и малейшая задержка недопустима — она может обойтись человечеству слишком дорого. Так было, к примеру, осенью 1962 года, когда от взаимопонимания между Н. С. Хрущевым и Д. Кеннеди буквально зависела судьба мира. Карибский кризис, окончательно миновал, но оставшаяся проблема — связь между Кремлем и Белым домом, должна быть немедленно, надежно и постоянно».


«Недавно наши и американские связи отметили маленький неофициальный юбилей — двадцатипятилетие существования «горячей линии», наверное, не стоит уточнять, почему именно так принято называть этот особый канал связи. 31 августа 1963 года она начал действовать, и сообщение об этом весь мир воспринял тогда с облегчением: какой-то заметный шаг к разрядке напряженности был сделан. Мы не будем сейчас обсуждать другие шаги в этом направлении, мы говорим только о канале связи — но, кстати, с тех пор о «горячей линии» нигде ничего не сообщалось, существует — и точка. Правительства двух стран решили тогда, что гласность здесь не».

Продолжение на стр. 25





Борис СМЕРЛОВ,
фото Игоря ГАВРИЛОВА
Снимки с американской стороны предоставлены
Госдепартаментом США и журналом «Лайф».



МОСКВА



СЛОВО ЧЕРЕЗ КОСМОС

Начало на центральной вкладке.

приемлема. И лишь совсем недавно эта тема тоже стала доступной для печати.

Прежде казалось — все происходит так: руководитель государства заходит в особую комнату, дежурный связист тут же снимает трубку специального телефонного аппарата... Нет, это неверно. Телефона не было даже с самого начала, то есть двадцать пять лет назад: связь уже тогда осуществлялась шифровкой по телетайпам, точнее говоря — по двум низкоскоростным телеграфным каналам. Внешне это напоминало, будто люди по оба конца линии обмениваются телеграммами. В принципе эта схема действует и поныне, хотя неизмеримо усложнилась сама технология передачи сообщений.

Сначала трасса была организована по кабелю, лежащему на дне океана. Поскольку надежность кабеля всегда считалась недостаточной, связь дублировалась коротковолновым радиоканалом через ретранслятор в Танжере. Но пришла эра спутников связи, и в 1977 году «горячая линия» стала космической. Наверное, стоит добавить, что все эти технические вопросы специально обсуждаются представителями двух государств, принимаются официальные международные документы. Очередная такая договоренность — вернее, дополнение к соглашению 1984 года — касалась факсимильной шифрованной линии: теперь можно передавать карты, схемы, рисунки — короче, любую графическую информацию.

Как все это происходит, видно на снимках, которые мы публикуем. Часть фотографии сделана в Соединенных Штатах, другие снимки — наши. Вот, например, дежурная аппаратура в Кремле. Три «трехтактных» стэнда с приборами — это терминалы трех параллельных, не связанных между собой каналов «горячей линии»: два канала идут через два спутника, третий — по трансатлантическому кабелю. Есть и четвертый канал, технический, — для обслуживания всей этой системы связи. Понятно, зачем нужна такая сложная схема: может выйти из строя один из спутников, может порваться подводный кабель, но Москва и Вашингтон не потеряют контакта.

Сам аппарат — дисплеи, персональные компьютеры, установочные факсимильные связи, распечатывающие устройства — может считаться обычной, стандартной, но, конечно, соответствующей последнему слову техники. Разумеется, у нас и у американцев она должна быть одинаковой: ведь работает единая линия! В эфир «уносятся» лишь шеренги цифр, видимых на голубых экранах дисплеев, — это та информация, секретность которой обеспечивает нашу с вами спокойную жизнь. Вот, собственно, и все тайны «горячей линии».

Но есть еще одна сторона двадцатипятилетней ее истории — техническая. Прежде чем попасть с американского дисплея на советский или наоборот, эти цифры, преобразованные в сигналы, должны совершить длиннейшее путешествие. Из Кремля — к антеннам московской Останкинской башни, затем — в подмосковную Дубну, потом через космос — на американский континент и через спутниковую станцию Западной Виргинии — к Вашингтону. Чтобы получить представление о работе этого огромного моста связи, мы отправляемся в Дубну, на берег тихой речки с тем же названием, где невидимая линия, оторвавшись от земли, устремляется в космос.

Мы знали, что едем на какой-то особый объект, и ожидали канители с пропускной системой, сложности охраны, но... без секундной задержки, держа в руках редакционные удостоверения, миновали скупающего вахтера в ковбойке, в маленькой проходной с табличкой «Международный Экспериментальный центр спутниковой связи «Дубна — Интеркосмос».

Вся территория Центра просматривается как на ладони: два более или менее солидных здания, несколько построек типа коттеджей, и — целый комплекс разнокалиберных антенн, отличающихся по размерам, но одинаково напоминающих либо поставленные криво на ребро гигантские блюдца, либо великаныские белые зонтики, разбросанные по зеленой опушке. Эти живописные параболы, нацеленные на небо, забралась даже на крышу большого трехэтажного дома, и весь этот антенный городок производил настолько серьезное впечатление, что, признаюсь, меня поначалу даже покорило — с каким размахом оборудована правительственная связь (сразу вспомнилось, каково поговорить из Москвы, например, с Серпуховом или, там, с Валдаем). С этого вопроса и начался наш разговор с одним из дежурных инженеров, и сразу выяснилось, что дубнинский Центр выполняет не только эту важнейшую функцию, но и ряд других задач.

Именно отсюда транслируются на спутник все телефонные разговоры, которые ведутся из нашей страны со странами атлантического региона, да еще

«транзитом» Дубна связывает через космос телефонных абонентов из европейских социалистических стран с абонентами из США, Канады, Кубы, Сирии и так далее. По тем же спутниковым каналам ведется через Дубну телеграфная связь... Кроме того, вспомните: мы уже давно привыкли, что телевизионное по многу раз в день показывает нам зарубежные видеосообщения сегодняшних новостей — так вот, эти видеосообщения принимаются сначала в Дубне, а уж оттуда передаются на телецентр в Останкино. А ставшие привычными «телемоности»? Мне, например, до сих пор казалось, что они упираются одним из своих концов прямо в останкинскую телебашню, оказывается, нет, лишь от Дубны, с этих вот «зонтных» антенн связь становится по-настоящему космической.

Кстати, почему этих антенн так много? Здесь пора представить моего собеседника — начальника 2-го цеха Владимира Мочалова.

— Каждая антенна обслуживает свои трассы связи: одна идет через нашу систему «Интерспутник», другая — через американскую систему «Интелсат». Спутники запускаются так, что как бы висят все время над одной точкой земного шара — примерно над центром Атлантики...

Космос, спутники, океанские глубины, далекие континенты... Сейчас, в нашем разговоре, это были не какие-то отвлеченные понятия, а обычная служебная терминология сидящего напротив меня человека. Он произносил все эти слова буднично, привычно, с чуть заметным местным оканьем. И эта мелочь как-то особенно подчеркивала, что мы находимся в маленьком городке самого центра исконной России — на самом берегу Волги... Владимир Иванович подтвердил: да, он выходец из этих мест, из города Муром. Работал на заводе, учился заочно в институте, а получив диплом, стал инженером на станции дальней космической связи в Гусь-Хрустальном, та станция обслуживает страны региона Индийского океана. А в Дубну его пригласили, когда здесь перед Московской Олимпиадой была построена новая станция и на нее набирали самых опытных и квалифицированных специалистов: новому центру связи предназначались особенно ответственные роли. И мне, например, кажется символическим, что в поисках высококлассных специалистов по спутниковой связи не пришлось обшаривать всю страну: многие, с кем удалось здесь поговорить, произносят слова с тем же местным оканьем.

Впрочем, людей здесь не так уж много, и три этажа большого здания под сенью огромных антенн кажутся пустоватыми по сравнению с тем обилием электроники, которой этот дом буквально начинен.

— Вот эта стойка, — показывает Мочалов на «шкаф» аппаратуры со светящимися глазами, — обслуживает «горячую линию». Сейчас, — Мочалов бросает взгляд на экран осциллографа, — это «холодная линия»: связи нет. Но каждый час запланирована проверка.

— В чем она состоит?
— Операторы, которые в Москве дежурят круглосуточно, передают проверочные тексты.

— А в Дубне...
— Здесь тоже круглосуточная работа, мы отсчитываем время по Гринвичу — ведь я говорил, что у нас не только правительственная линия связи, но и телефон, телеграф, телевидение — все, что идет через космос. Вот вы интересуетесь сейчас «горячей линией» — там, конечно, любой сбой в связи недопустим. Но когда, предположим, идет «обычная» трансляция телепередачи с другого континента, ответственность не меньше — мы не имеем права допустить срыва изображения: если секундные помехи по нашей вине — уже плохо, если больше пяти секунд — это настоящее ЧП.

— А если, как теперь все шутят, «помехи не на нашей территории»?

— Нет, вы напрасно, космическая связь действительно работает очень устойчиво, сбоя чаще всего возникают на земле, не по вине связистов. Мы только следим за качеством сигнала, который уходит «на борт» спутника или приходит оттуда.

— А сами с американцами разговариваете?
— Да, у нас есть канал рабочей связи, мы по телетайпу ведем необходимые переговоры. Вот видите, — Владимир Иванович берет в руки бумажную ленту, — телетайп принял сообщение: «МСК от ФД. Добрый день, дорогие коллеги...» Это значит — Москва по системе «Интерспутник» принимает сообщение с американской станции в Форт-Детрик, штат Пенсильвания. Дальше — наш ответ, проблем никаких, связь нормальная. А вот через «Интелсат» операторы первого цеха связываются со станцией «Этам». У нас рабочим языком принят русский, в первом цехе — английский...

Первый цех — вот он, рядом со вторым, их не разделяет не то что стенка — даже черточки условной нет между «государствами» в этом общем зале. Нет границы здесь, нет ее в космосе... Наверное, не пришло пока еще время мечтать о том, чтобы границ не стало вообще, но то, что мы уже сейчас понимаем, их убираем, — очень добрый знак!



ИЗОБРЕТАТЕЛЬ И ЗАКОН

Вопрос — кому быть хозяином изобретения — дискутируется не одно десятилетие. Предложения разные, например, изобретения может быть его автор или предприятие, где оно создано. Иногда возникают промежуточные варианты. Академик Велихов полагает, что в патенте могут быть указаны два патентообладателя — автор изобретения и предприятие, где оно было создано. Причем оба патентообладателя пользуются равным правом и распоряжаются изобретением на основе заключаемого ими соглашения.

Сейчас право на изобретение принадлежит государству. Общее мнение таково: система не соответствует новому хозяйственному механизму. Государство практически экспроприирует изобретение у его автора. Оно остается беспризорным. Отсюда беды с внедрением.

От действующей системы решили отказаться и пришли к мнению, закрепить изобретение за предприятием, где оно сделано. То есть сначала изобретение забирает государство, теперь на него претендует предприятие. Права на уникальные творческие результаты, выражающие личность автора, отделяют от этой личности.

Говорят при этом о новом хозяйственном механизме, о необходимости заинтересовать предприятие в создании и использовании изобретений. Но экономическая реформа предполагает, что основными являются те выгоды, которые зарабатаны. Остальное относится к нетрудовым доходам. Если изобретение есть результат труда его автора, а предприятие создавало лишь благоприятные условия для творчества, адекватной компенсации были бы лишь льготы, а не использование в собственном производстве. Дальнейшая судьба изобретения пусть остается в руках изобретателя. И не надо опасаться его прозвона. Не будет он препятствовать использованию своего детища, не враг он самому себе. И пусть поступает так, как сочтет правильным. Хочет — отдаст конкретному предприятию. Хочет — государству в целом.

Главные проблемы сейчас — с внедрением изобретения не по месту их создания. Существует объективные трудности и при бесплатном внедрении, а система закрепления за предприятием рассчитана на введение платежей. Это может стать еще одним препятствием широкому использованию нового. Если прибыль для предприятия главное, оно еще подумает распробовать эти изобретения, ведь более выгодным может оказаться монопольное производство. Или, зная цену за него такую, что приобретение станет нерациональным.

Да и не справится одному предприятию, у которого свои дела хватает, с распространением изобретения. Нужен посредник.

Что же касается компромиссного предложения о совместном хозяйстве, то совершенно невозможно предположить, чтобы каждый из «хозяев» изобретения самостоятельно и независимо от другого продавал на него лицензию. Или — один использовал в производстве, а другой продавал лицензию. Вообще при столкновении двух прав в выигрыше всегда экономически более сильный партнер. Автора связывают с предприятием не только изобретательские, а прежде всего административные служебные отношения. Опыт показывает, что противостоять давлению своего работодателя он как правило, не в состоянии и вынужден соглашаться. Компромисса на деле нет.

Я коснулся только одного сюжета из проекта Закона об изобретательстве. Их, значительно больше. Боюсь, что ситуация с ними не лучше.

Объявлено, что проект Закона будет опубликован для всеобщего обсуждения. Не свелось бы дело к чисто формальной процедуре, как, увы, уже бывало. Подлинное обсуждение — это его видимость, требует времени. Может быть, стоит опубликовать консультирующе-проект, опыт показывает, что месяц-двух для серьезного проведения этой работы недостаточно. Нереально короткие сроки рассчитаны на принятие лишь мелких поправок и одобрение проекта в целом. Обсуждение необходимо проводить до одобрения проекта в высших инстанциях. Иначе велика опасность, что все сведется к формальности. Не загубить бы изобретательство на много лет вперед.

Виктор ДОЗОРЦЕВ,
доктор юридических наук, профессор

Prime Minister

COP
19/2

mt

PRIME MINISTER

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

... I thought you should see the attached minute from Alan Clark. It brings out the extraordinary state of confusion in the Soviet camp but I believe it can also be taken to indicate the opportunities for us both politically and commercially.

2. Kamentsev himself provided more sweetness than light and I am not sure whether we advanced the cause of many British companies or projects. Nonetheless he did seem to invite commercial proposals of a more daring nature than we have hitherto considered practical politics and my officials are taking steps to ensure that you will be able to raise two or three with Gorbachev without too much risk of upsetting him when he arrives in April.

3. Turning to the political side, the main economic reason for fearing for Perestroika seems to be the mismatch between the immediate need for more consumer goods in Soviet shops and the two or three years that it will take Gorbachev to get production from his proposed investment in machinery to make these goods, coupled with his determination not to borrow to fill the gap.

4. While I doubt if we ought to persuade him to borrow unless we can see a good chance of his avoiding a repeat of the Polish

dti

the department for Enterprise

[But what?]
fiasco on a more serious scale, I do think the time has come for us to push more radical proposals for increasing the USSR's hard-currency income.

I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe.



D Y

16 February 1989

Department of Trade and Industry

To:

Secretary of State

cc Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster

From:

Minister for Trade

13 February 1989

Jain

mt

You should have a note of my meetings in the last week with three senior, though second-tier members of East European Governments. At the Lancaster House dinner last week for Kamentsev

I had Bespalov the Soviet Minister for the Chemical Industry on my right hand. After a somewhat taciturn beginning he suddenly asked me why the DTI existed at all (!): 'What is the role of the Department when all industrial decisions and contracts are undertaken by the private sector?'

Temporarily Retained

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

After some moments of general discussion on these lines, he confided that his own position was 'quite impossible'. He no longer had directive powers; individual managers were making their own decisions about production programmes, tending always to opt for what was easiest.

"But what about the market? If they were satisfying a demand well and good, surely?" No, they didn't have to bother about that. They were making things for which there was no demand '...because it was more convenient'.

"Sack them". He had no powers.

"Put them under arrest" (I tried to coax out any latent Stalinism). That could only be done in wartime.

Bespalov lamented what sounded very like the Russian equivalent of the Employment Protection Act: 'it is against the law to dismiss anyone other than for a criminal offence'. There was a conspiracy between managers, who came in late and left early, and workers who 'also liked to stay in bed'. (Shades of Devonport Dockyard!).

I should emphasise that Bespalov struck me as being an intelligent, liberal minded human being. But he is deeply gloomy about Perestroika, said things had been done in the wrong order - political reforms had come 'at random' before the economy was strong enough to support them. As Perestroika developed Gorbachov had been obliged to make concessions 'to different groups'. The reforms were completely out of balance.

Emboldened, I gave the advice which I offered to the Central Praesidium in October 1987 when I was Chairing the Joint Commission. "Privatise agriculture and road haulage, and everything else will fall into place". He, as they did then, received this in complete silence.

Our conversation was long and intense. I won't delay you by repeating it all but I find it astonishing that a senior member of (any) Government should express himself with such reckless candour about the policy of the administration of which he is a member, to a complete stranger who holds Ministerial office in another country, and that country not even an ally.

Then today I hosted a lunch for Obzina, Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. He is a heavy Stalinist of the old school - Military Technical Academy, Army role in the 1968 uprising, etc. But with a certain brutal geniality. In Prague last year I had baited him with the fact that in 1939 Czechoslovakia was the fourth richest country in Europe; now after 50 years of socialism it was the 17th. He remembers this. Anyhow, in my speech at the end of the meal I referred to the Joint Socialist Market, said something diplomatic about how this showed things were '...on the move in the Comecon countries politically and economically'. Blandish stuff. In our conversation he had made contemptuous references to 'fashionable reforms' but to my amazement in his response he said, on his feet to the whole room:

'On the move? To move one has first to be upright. But we have been brought to our knees, indeed you could say we were lying on our back.'

Then this evening I had a meeting with Jastrzebski, the Polish Minister for External Economic Relations. His misgivings showed from yet another angle. In recommending the reforms, he said, significantly, they had now got enough momentum and would survive, one way or another, 'possible political changes'.

"Changes?"

'Of direction. Returns' (sic) .

You will appreciate the significance that all three of my interlocutors , politicians with different responsibilities, in different countries, should have expressed their anxieties so recklessly. Even allowing for the fact that my own somewhat uninhibited style invites indiscretion I found this surprising, and ominous.

My own view, for what it is worth, is that Gorbachov will survive. Not only is he tough and clear-headed but he has worked his way up from the very bottom of the system. It is not as if he were some intellectual like Kerensky imposed from outside as window-dressing; or some Pahlevi autocrat who got it by inheritance. He must know every rock and gully on the approach march where he might suffer an ambush, or could entrap his enemies.

But these encounters, coming so close and being so consistent in tone, do not augur well for his prospects.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'A' with a horizontal line through it, and a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

ALAN CLARK

2



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From The Minister of State

Rich Roberts
WR
16/2

15 February 1989

Dear Prime Minister,

You will recall that when you met members of the Water Bill Committee, we had a wide-ranging discussion which touched on conditions in the USSR and Mr Gorbachev's difficulties in reviving the spirit of enterprise.

The name of Stefan Terlezki cropped up in our discussion, and when I met him later in the week, I sought his opinion. His views were sufficiently interesting for me to ask him to set them down and he has done so. He addresses the main issue on page 4.

Yours sincerely
WR

WYN ROBERTS

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW 1



Wyn Roberts Esq MP.,
The Minister of State,
LONDON SWIA 0AA.

16 Bryngwyn Road,
Cyncoed,
CARDIFF CF2 6PQ

Dear Wyn,

7th. February 1989.

It was good to see you last week at the Pontypridd By-Election Adoption Meeting of Nigel Evans. I must congratulate you on your excellent and invigorating speech, which I am sure, recharged the batteries of everyone present. You truly sent everyone off to the Pontypridd constituency with a lot of ammunition at their disposal, in order to work hard for Nigel and achieve a good and favourable result. I shall campaign for him also.

The point you made about the Prime Minister's interest in mr Gorbachev's perestroika which doesn't seem to work and the reason why, and what did I think about it - well, I can speak and write volumes on the past and present social, political and economic situation in the Soviet Union, but I will try to keep it as short as possible, and should be more than happy to help if asked. I hope you will be able to give Margaret a copy of this letter.

My views regarding the situation in the Soviet Union is without doubt, that things are happening in Russia today, and there must be no turning back.

As Ukrainian by birth, and with personal experience, I understand the situation better than reading about it a hundred times, and so, I try to understand the West's reaction to glasnost and perestroika, and ask myself, how would I react?

I think I would be pleased it is happening, but afraid of rejoicing prematurely. I think I would have mixed feelings and emotions, and want to believe it was true, but fearful of being mistaken. I would be sceptical, cautiously optimistic and so, it is vital to understand the present situation.

There is a certain mental fatigue in the people in the soviet Union. It comes from the gulf between the words that leaders used to speak and what the people saw around them.

In the past, no one wanted to do anything until they were ordered to do so. Now, the people enjoy speaking freely (limited), but they want a home for their families, good food on the table, and the most basic commodities and



necessities in their daily lives. And for the man in the street, the economic benefits have yet to materialise. Things are worse now than before, and so Mr Gorbachev has insurmountable problems to overcome, if indeed he can.

The question needs to be asked - whilst Mr Gorbachev has stated his aim is to make the Marxist-Leninist-Communist system better, and the steps he has taken are quite radical, can he attempt such changes without admitting that Socialism has failed?

Personally speaking, I am an optimist, because optimism is an obligation. I just wonder, whether Mr Gorbachev is likewise minded? Does he want to see perestroika and glasnost a reality in his life-time, or in his grand-children's lifetime?

I feel that we should be wary of Gorbachev's seductive smile. He is a great performer and communicator, but in Winston Churchill's formulation - "to think about Russia was to confront a riddle rapt in mystery inside an enigma".

What Mr Gorbachev has been speaking about, alongside glasnost and perestroika, is only a little of the truth that has been obvious since 1917.

He tells us that it was Stalin and Brezhnev who should be blamed for everything that has happened in Russia. And so they should, but not for everything. Because it was Lenin, not Stalin or Brezhnev who started it all. Lenin built the system of tyranny, the slave-labour camps and allowed torture and executions with impunity. Mr Gorbachev knows that.

Once again, he tells us that Stalin and Brezhnev's atrocities must not be forgotten, and Leninism-Communism in its purity, must be adhered to. I find this irreconcilable.

The evidence against Lenin is overwhelming. He established the Russian Secret Police and NKVD, and I, and regrettably my father, his family, relations and friends have experienced. The horror, atrocities and prosecutions carried out by the NKVD was horrendous. The NKVD was given ultimate power over people and never subjected to legal restraints.

Lenin's concentration and slave-labour camps were kept full and to a great extent, it remains so today. He believed in terror as a means of suppressing internal opposition. In 1921, Lenin forced a passage of resolutions forbidding any criticism of his regime. I ask myself, is this the inheritance to which Mr Gorbachev is so anxious to retain or return to? Or does he secretly dislike Lenin as much as he dislikes Stalin and Brezhnev, because rejecting Lenin, whilst remaining a Marxist-Leninist-Communist is extremely difficult.



I believe Mr Gorbachev when he says he is a Leninist, therefore, he has nothing to teach me about freedom, or how to maintain a decent, free and democratic society. He may convince me only on condition that, perestroika and glasnost continues to succeed. But then, I ask myself, can a siberian bear become a vegetarian?

I welcome whole-heartedly the INF Agreement as it is a step in the right direction, to be sure. And in spite of Mr Gorbachev's announcement of a reduction in arms, I strongly believe that NATO's strategy of extended nuclear deterrent must be unchanged and where necessary, modernized.

I believe that we should maintain the necessary strength in nuclear and conventional arms, in order to speak from and defend if and when required our freedom and liberty, because in spite of the Russian pronounced reduction, they still out-number the West on sea, land and in the air. After all, in man-power alone, the Russians have 5,500,000 troops and 4-5 million reservists, which in itself, speaks volumes for the West to be on guard at all times.

As I said, I certainly want glasnost and perestroika to succeed, but then, when you take Mr Gorbachev's statement: "that glasnost means you can say anything you like, providing it does not harm Socialism -sov-speak - Leninism-Communism", in other words, you can discuss anything except, the most important question of all - Has Communism ever worked? And if not, should something-else be tried? And who decides what "harming Socialism means"?

Last November, Mr Gorbachev said that his reforms are facing difficulties and that many people have become apathetic towards the ideals of Communism. He told Moscow activists in the Young Communist League (the Komsomol) "... the process of democratisation, the unfolding of Socialist democracy's potential, is not going smoothly". He even acknowledged that people brought up in the 1960s and 1970s, "are sometimes spoken of as a lost generation, for whom Communism has presumably become meaningless". He also said that "many things are making people angry, and there has been no noticeable improvement in getting food and consumer good to the people". He went on to say, "despite the cynics in all generations, loyalty to the October Revolution of 1917, faith in Socialism and in our choice had been preserved". "Perestroika, should not end up like the locomotive which had just enough steam for a single blast of it's whistle. "We have already blown the whistle. Now we must roll ahead and pick up speed".

Well, he may be talking a lot of sense, but in the end, he has to pretend to believe much of the fantasy of the Russian past and Utopian future. He cannot break the bond of that fantasy.



Take glasnost, which has not touched foreign affairs, or any aspect of current Soviet foreign policy. The Nationalities question, as the Russians refer to their problem of empire. Mr Gorbachev and his subordinates cannot understand why the "little brothers" (as the Soviet minorities are sometimes referred to), are not truly grateful for the Russian conquest. At least the Afghans can be dismissed as mad Muslims, never members of the empire.

To allow small nations to edge away from within the Soviet Union maybe too hard for Mr Gorbachev and his subordinates to stomach. Although, he should be credited with getting rid of the old-guard in the armed forces and the Kremlin. But, he must still fight the generals. The army is not a "disappearing institution", it still takes 15-25 % of the GNP for its expenditure, without too many questions being asked. Most senior officers in the Russian Army are dyed-in-the-wool hard nosed Marxist-Leninist-Communist party men, who see the armed forces as the bastion of Marxism-Leninism-Communism-socialist State.

There are about 30 members of the armed forces and KGB in the Communist Party's 300 Member Central Committee. There is compulsive military service of two years, which is extremely harsh and unattractive, if one has to serve in Vladivostok, Mongolia, Alaska, the Arctic Peninsula and Siberia. The conscripts only receive £3.80 per month, the meagre minimum for a conscript. There is no glasnost, no perestroika written into their service contract.

The problems for Mr Gorbachev are horrendous. He must use his trendy charisma and charm to pacify and contain 285 million people in some sort of orderly manner and take action, which in my opinion is imperative to re-educate the masses, so that he can sustain stability and give perestroika a chance to succeed.

The reason why perestroika is not working at the moment is not hard to define. The Armenians, the Balts, Moslems - approximately 17 million of them - the Georgians, Belorussians and Ukrainians are not exactly on the same wave-length with glasnost and perestroika, they have other ideas.

Mr Gorbachev I am sure, is fully aware that the KGB is still a force to be feared. It is the largest and most oppressive organisation in the history of the world, with more staff than the American CIA; the British Secret Service; the French; German, Canadian, Israeli and Chinese - all put together. Then there is the CRU, about 600,000 which is the main military intelligence Directorate Service, which carries out sabotage and terrorist activities in the United States, Europe, Africa and the Middle East.



On top of all that, you have the local informers and aparatchicks, coupled with 22 million bureaucrats most of whom do not know what economics is all about. followed by 21 million dedicated hard-core Communist Party Members, neither of which will relinquish their power easily. Followed by 42 million strong Komsomol Youth Organisation, which is one of the strongest organisations within the Communist Party. Also, the Pioneer Youth, to which my father prevented me from joining whilst at school, which is modelled by the Communist educational system into Marxist-Leninist-Socialist ideology.

All this illustrates quite clearly the problem Mr Gorbachev is having in his drive for glasnost and perestroika.

Perestroika may bring gifts and Mr Gorbachev may only succeed if he can involve the people in running the country. Otherwise, it will be throttled by beurocracy, the military and inerthia.

Democracy must be seen to mean rolling back the state adn creating a new political and social culture of pluralism and diversity, outside the state and the party.

Mr Gorbachev, I am sure, will sink or swim according to whether or not he will succeed in modernising an economy that is growing increasingly backward. He will stand accused by the conservatives of undermining the fundamentals of Socialism, but if his revolution succeeds by half, a great deal more will be up for grabs.

I believe we should maintain friendly relations with Russia: And the Prime Minister is right to be cautious about human rights, political prisoners and religion, which is still not fully met, especially where 5 million Ukrainian Catholics are concerned. it took Lenin, Stalin adn the bolshevicks 70 years to create the unacceptable face of marxist-Leninist-Socialism, it will take at least 20 years to change it, and Mr Gorbachev may not last that long.

On the other hand, it is just conceivable that, mr Gorbachev may survive for the next 20 years, subject to certain factors, a dn continue with Marxist-Leninist ideology, while in the meantime, western leaders will come and go (I hope Margaret will stay for a long time) therefore, Lenin's declaration - "Prolitarian in all land Unite" must not become a reality, as long as the West speaks from strength at all times.

When I spoke to Mr Gorbachev and most of the members in his party when they visited London in December 1984, at the invitation of the IPU, and then subsequently speaking to Mr Schevarnadze at the Foreign Office about the Soviet Union, human rights, tourism, exchange of students and school children, professional and ordinary people, relatives and friends between our two countries, both



Mr Gorbachev and Mr Schevornadze agreed that, it was a very good idea ect. That was about 5 years ago, and although there have been changes, but a lot remains to be desired.

Over the past twelve months or so, I have spoken to teachers and others that have come on a visit to this country from the Soviet Union. They told me a lot about the economic, social and political situation, as well as the harvesting after the Chenobyl disaster which is quite staggering. Just a few weeks ago, one teacher told me that and I quote " the ice has cracked, but it is not floating yet".

If Mr Gorbachev lasts for the next 10 years, the ice may well begin to float.

*With Best Wishes
yours ever
Stefan*

Stefan Terlezki CFA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister (2)
This is on the outer
fringes of glasnost.

MR POWELL

14 February 1989

CB
14/2

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

Very recently the Leningrad journal 'Neva' published an article by a young scientist which is the most outspoken yet in its attack on the Soviet Communist Party and to some extent on Gorbachev himself. I attach a copy of a minute by Mr Murrell in Foreign Office Research Department which sums the piece up. I think the Prime Minister would find it worth reading.

The attack on the Party as bearing prime responsibility for the sorry state in which the Soviet Union finds itself is of course the logical conclusion of the present more open debate and in some ways it is surprising that it has taken so long for the intellectuals to get round to making the point in public. Their Chinese counterparts were quicker off the mark during the "Peking spring" of 1978-79. Gorbachev should be able to weather this kind of criticism and to dismiss it as politically unrealistic. However, it is a further example of the polarisation of the debate and it could be more dangerous to him if it provokes, as is only too likely, a counter-blast from the "right" wing.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

From: G D G Murrell
Date: 9 February 1989

cc: Sir John Fretwell
Mr Ratford
Mr Ling
Mr Grant, News Dept
The MacLaren, Planners
Mr Spence, Info Dept.
Mr Nicholson, Cabinet Office
Mr Longrigg, Moscow
Mr Bevan, Ukdel NATO
PUSD

Mr Hemans

GLASNOST AND THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL REFORM

1. The first issue for 1989 of the Leningrad journal "Neva" has published an article by a young scientist which sets a new benchmark for outspokenness in the debate on political reform. The article entitled "The Structure of Power and the Tasks of Society" is remarkable not so much for its arguments, eq in favour of an eventual multi-party system, as for its tone of condescension almost contempt in discussing the role of the Party, and its unceremonious treatment of statements by Party spokesmen including Gorbachev himself. The author, Sergei Andreev (absolutely no relation to Nina Andreeva) is a candidate of biological science who works as a senior researcher at the Geological Institute in Tyumen.

2. Andreev's initial thesis is that the economic-managerial apparatus, which exceeds in numbers the kolkhoz peasantry, has developed into a "new class" whose existence is dependent on extensive economic development and thus threatened by reform. The Party apparatchiki, whose careers depend on the economic indicators of their region, have fully identified with the managerial bureaucracy and become an instrument of this "new class". Thus the Soviet state is not run by its elected people's representatives but by the dictatorship of a new class which pursues its own and not the national interest: "which means that perestroika has every chance of ending in failure". Andreev advances the proposition that since perestroika is described as a revolution, the active opposition to it should logically be termed counter-revolution; and he refers to resistance to economic reform which looks like "well organised sabotage".

3. According to Andreev the task of society therefore is to return real power to the Soviets and destroy this new class. In principle the Party is the power which should undertake this task but a it is presently organised it is incapable of doing so. Andreev notes that according to the Constitution the Party is "the guiding force of Soviet Society and the nucleus of the political system". Following the logic of this article of the constitution "one must acknowledge

/ that

RESTRICTED

That it is precisely the Party leadership which has lead the country to economic crises and moral decline. Having gradually ceased to serve the people, and expressing more and more the interests of the industrial managerial apparatus, Party organs have by political measures led society into an unacceptable path. There are no constitutional principles by using which the people could correct the Party apparatus in the event of its carrying out an incorrect state policy". The Party had retrospectively admitted the mistake of the Stalin cult and then put Khrushchev on a pedestal. It removed Khrushchev and the figure of Brezhnev appeared. "Again the Party restrospectively admits its mistakes - but it would be better not to make these mistakes". Moreover there are no guarantees either for the Party or the people that another such personality will not appear.

4. The problem is thus to make the Party accountable to the people. Andreev proposes that the policies for the country's development should originate from the Supreme Soviet and that its decisions should form the basis for the Party's activities, rather than the other way round.

"If today we do not allow the people to govern themselves and help to establish such a process in a democratic way - tomorrow the people will take that right by force smashing all obstacles in their path".

5. Andreev's principle specific proposal is for setting up a popular Alliance or Front with its own newspaper. To possible objections that such an organ would become the centre of opposition Andreev replies that constructive opposition is necessary since in the Party press there is no real criticism of the higher echelons. "The Council of Ministers never figures in this context and the General Secretary is an untouchable and exemplary figure and so it went on for 3 decades until it "suddenly" turned out that ministers needed to be replaced and in some cases shot for the "correct" policies which we had just been approving". The General Secretary begins to look either like a voluntarist or a short-sighted politician and the Party apparatus, which had been working like a well-oiled machine, for some reason needs to be completely replaced from top to bottom. All these "suddenlys", this mass awakening, is so damaging to the psychology of Soviet people that the arrival of a new political figure is received with an understandable scepticism."

6. Turning to the organization of the Party itself and its relationship to society Andreev criticises Article 61 of the Party Rules, which stipulates that Party groups should operate within all organizations and associations. Andreev suggests that this is unwarrantable interference "in view of where the Party leadership, not overburdened with outside criticism, has led our economy and ideology". Andreev proposes that the Popular Front should operate on an equal footing with the CPSU. The problem is that only an outside power can force Party organs to act as they should since the Party lacks the power itself.

7. Andreev also proposes that workers, peasants and the

/ intelligentsia

intelligentsia should form associations to defend their interests which would be an intermediate stage in the development of political Parties which would like other major organizations operate on an equal footing with the CPSU. It would represent a "form of co-existence and mutual help for the CPSU on the basis of equality with major public organizations".

8. Gorbachev gets short shrift for his remarks in his report to the Party Conference criticising what he called the exploitation of democracy for anti-democratic ends "from re-drawing frontiers to setting up opposition Parties". Changing frontiers, Andreev agrees, should be only within the competence of the Supreme Soviet. "But setting up new Parties in the circumstances, as people like to say, of the one Party system which has developed historically" - this is a normal question of normal democracy and to forbid raising it in principle means in principle to forbid democracy. A lot of things have developed "historically" with us including the administrative command system which the Party itself headed by Gorbachev is now getting rid of. Therefore references to history sometimes turn against those who resort to them". The Obkom First Secretaries Kalashnikov and Mesyats who also attacked calls for a multi-Party system at the Party conference are dealt with by Andreev even more tartly.

9. Andreev firmly rejects the idea of combining the leadership of Party committees and Soviets, especially the idea that one person should be General Secretary and President, which he describes as "impermissible".

"The whole history of our society shows that excessive concentration of power harms democracy. Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev... are there not enough examples of this kind." It is he adds "characteristic" that there was no mention of this proposal in the Theses of the Party conference; and suggestions for a referendum on the issue or the experimental introduction of the idea in some areas which were made at the Conference were ignored. "The conference, alluding to lack of time decided to proceed headlong in pursuit a single aim - the strengthening of the Party role as the avantgarde of society".

10. Elsewhere in the article Andreev notes that to raise the question of the Party sharing power with the people is bound to rouse the fury of many Party officials brought up for decades in the belief that it is not the CPSU which serves the people but the people who serve the Party. He also makes the remarkable observation that should the threat of a "sharp departure from Leninist norms" again arise it would be urgently necessary to set up a new political force which would be bound to take the form of a Party. Such a force would be needed inter alia in order to protect communists from "unjustified repressions" since history suggests that they would be the first to suffer.

11. Andreev scarcely troubles to disguise his thesis that the Party is incapable of leading the country out of the mess it has created and that new political forces must be created to push and guide the

/ Party

Party in the right direction. He does not go quite so far as to say that the Party should stand aside but he does indicate that if it fails to mend its ways people will take power by force; and he also warns that in the event of a new threat of Stalinist reaction society would have to create a new political force to prevent it. Even in these days of rampant glasnost his ideas are strikingly far-reaching and very bluntly expressed. He may prove to be right when he anticipates at one point in his article that it will in due course be subjected to "devastating criticism".



G. D. G. Murrell
Soviet Section
Research Department
OAB 3/70 210 6255



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 February 1989

ARMENIAN EARTHQUAKE

I enclose a copy of a message of thanks to the Prime Minister from Mr. Gorbachev for the help received from the United Kingdom following the earthquake in Armenia. I understand that separate messages have gone to The Queen and to the Foreign Secretary.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

"Her Excellency

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

Prime Minister of Great Britain

13 February 1989

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

On behalf of the Soviet leadership and of all the Soviet people I wish to express sincere gratitude to the people and Government of Great Britain, personally to You , Mrs. Prime Minister, for sympathy and assistance in connection with a destructive earthquake in Armenia.

All of us have derived for ourselves a hard but valuable lesson from the tragedy in Armenia - only by joint efforts mankind is capable to solve global problems facing it, not waiting until their acuteness starts endangering the very life on the planet.

The earthquake has evoked an unprecedented wave of compassion and solidarity in all corners of the world. We see in that a clear evidence of positive changes taking place in the world, a growing understanding of the very fact that Europe, the whole Earth - is our common home.

I am sure that experience of mutual understanding and cooperation, accumulated in the Soviet-British relations during difficult days will serve to the benefit of further reapproachment and strengthening confidence between the peoples of our countries.

Yours Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev"

"Ее Превосходительству
Госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер
Премьер-Министру Великобритании

13 февраля 1989 года

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

От имени Советского руководства и всех советских людей хочу выразить искреннюю признательность народу и правительству Великобритании, лично Вам, госпожа премьер-министр, за сочувствие и помощь в связи с разрушительным землетрясением в Армении.

Из трагедии в Армении мы все извлекли для себя тяжелый, но полезный урок — только совместными усилиями человечество способно решать стоящие перед ним глобальные проблемы, не дожидаясь пока степень их остроты станет угрожать самой жизни на планете.

Землетрясение вызвало беспрецедентную волну человеческого сострадания и солидарности во всех уголках земного шара. В этом мы видим яркое свидетельство происходящих в мире позитивных перемен, растущее понимание того непреложного факта, что Европа, вся земля — наш общий дом.

Уверен, что опыт взаимопонимания и сотрудничества, накопленный в советско-британских отношениях в трудные дни, послужит дальнейшему сближению и укреплению доверия между народами наших стран.

С уважением,

М.Горбачев"

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T31/89

Unofficial translation

SUBJECT *cc MASTER OPS*

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Prime Minister
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С уважением,

М. Горбачев"

Prime Minister (2)
COP
7/2.

PRIME MINISTER

7 February 1989

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

There are interesting indications of internal opposition to perestroika and increasing gloom among Soviet leaders on the subject coming to us now.

Soviet Speeches

Soviet leaders are now openly admitting the existence of such opposition and abandoning their past pretence that it was only a form of passive resistance from the ranks of the Party and government bureaucracy and others who did well out of the old system. Among the examples are

- a) Yakovlev in an interview with Der Spiegel in January said that such vehement resistance to perestroika had not been expected. "We firmly believe that the conservative threat is the most serious threat to perestroika".
- b) Yakovlev in a speech at Perm in December said that if perestroika was defeated or failed "we could be threatened not only by return to the past, to the era of stagnation, but by an aggressive and vengeful conservatism, celebrating its victory".
- c) Gorbachev, speaking to the intellectuals on 6 January, warned that opponents on the right and the left, ie "conservatives" and "avant-garde", would find common purpose and join forces against the reforms.

- d) Politburo member, Vorotnikov in a speech in December said

"It would be an unforgivable delusion not to see that there are forces both to the right and to the left who speak out against perestroika. It is not only a question of stuffy bureaucrats. Opposition to perestroika is in evidence at every level: among the top administrators and in the middle levels of management, where people long ago got out of the habit of doing real work, and where the sense of responsibility has become atrophied. Such people are everywhere, in all sectors, but today we must restore order above all among the specialist cadres in the agro-industrial complex. To be honest, there are even people among the workers and peasantry who fail to comprehend the essence of perestroika".

- e) Medvedev, the Party's chief ideologist, in a speech in December spoke of a polarisation of opinions and of a serious danger presented by the "conservative-dogmatist" wing, who blamed economic reform, especially economic decentralisation and co-operatives, for current problems. He also singled out economic managers and specialists who did not want to work in the new way.

Opposition to glasnost and political reforms

The Party apparat is naturally resentful of these developments. Medvedev, in a speech in December, commented on the ambivalent attitude to glasnost among the Party. Vorotnikov accused Party organisations of dragging their feet over the political reforms. Yakovlev berated officials for their fear of democracy, glasnost and pluralism. In an interview in Pravda on 2 January, Onikov, a propaganda

worker in the Central Committee apparatus, spoke at some length about Party resistance to perestroika.

Opposition to Economic Reforms

This opposition is potentially the most serious threat, if we put aside the risk of an explosion among the nationalities. It takes various forms, ranging from simple human envy of the prosperity of others, to extreme Russian nationalist views, which reject the adoption of any western-style economic ideas, eg the market and material incentives, and claim that there is a purely Russian "spiritual" alternative. In between these extremes there is a broad band of distaste for what is seen as the self-enrichment by co-operatives through exploitation of an economy characterised by shortages. In addition it seems that people involved in the black market oppose the reforms and could be actively sabotaging them.

The reformist economist Shmelev has said recently that it was quite reasonable to suggest the establishment of small private businesses employing hired labour (still illegal in the Soviet Union). He added however that the first such business to start up would be burnt to the ground the next night by others in the same street. His assumption is based on the experience of many co-operatives: one pig farm was set on fire three times by local people who resented the high price of co-operative meat (even though there was none available from the state sector); ^{at} a meeting on agriculture on 13 January a former worker described how he and other lease-contract workers were attacked with knives by former colleagues on a collective farm.

The idea of co-operatives and of leasing has come under strong pressure from conservatives in the leadership. Ligachev, for example, has repeatedly made it clear that to him co-operatives are only acceptable as subordinate units

within a state enterprise or collective farm, but not as private or independent businesses. Zaikov, Moscow's First Party Secretary, seems to share these views. Recent restrictions have been introduced on both the range of the activities of co-operatives and the prices they charge.

There also seems to be a change of heart among reformist economists about retail price reforms. Many who previously strongly supported the need for the abolition of food subsidies and a rise in prices have developed cold feet because of the likelihood of a further drop in support for perestroika and possibly serious strikes. Gorbachev, however, indicated in his 6 January speech that he means to press ahead with price reform while ensuring that low income groups are properly compensated. It is doubtful whether this will be possible in practice.

In general the economy is in such a mess that whatever course of action is taken, matters are only likely to get worse before they can get better. A drop in living standards looks increasingly inevitable, in a society where living standards are already pitifully low and where, on Soviet admission, 43 million people are estimated to be living below the poverty line. The possibility of unemployment is widely feared. Promises of relocation of redundant workers remain unconvincing, given the chronic housing shortage in industrial areas.

In a review of economic progress since 1985, Ryzhkov on 14 January, only a few days before the poor grain harvest result was published, said that "the reform is proceeding very painfully, extremely painfully". He listed the current four most serious problems as: shortages of consumer goods and excess spending power; food shortages; the budget deficit; and growing international debt.

Loss of support among the intelligentsia

A further cause of concern for the leaders is the gradual loss of support from the intelligentsia. The writers have turned to increasingly vicious attacks on each other. These reflect a growing polarisation between reformists in the party and the hitherto silent majority, who are now capitalising on the lack of popular success of perestroika to accuse the leadership of abandoning socialism at home and abroad. While there is still little published material available, the strength of this attack can easily be deduced by Gorbachev's lengthy repudiations in his speech to the intellectuals of 6 January and at the Moscow Party Conference on 21 January.

Gorbachev's own position

As I have said in earlier minutes, Gorbachev's position is not immediately threatened. There is a clear lack of alternative policies and candidates. But he has not made the headway one would have expected following the partial eclipse of Ligachev. He may also have to consider certain concessions in order to strengthen his political position. As indicated above, the "quick fix" solutions of co-operatives and lease-contracting are running into trouble. The former are popularly seen as responsible for continuing shortages and rising prices. Gorbachev has not really stood out for them and new controls over them have been introduced. On the latter, ie leases, Gorbachev is currently giving the impression that, like Ligachev, he sees leasing as designed to operate strictly within the confines of state and collective farms. He earlier gave free run to the implication that they would supplant the old structures

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in all but name. Some of this manoeuvring could be tactical and we shall not get a clear view of the agricultural scene until the plenum on the subject in March. But Gorbachev is clearly under pressure.

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PERCY CRADOCK

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CHAIRMAN

Mr. Powell *3/2.*
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REPLACEMENT OF KULIKOV AS C-IN-C WARSAW PACT

1. Marshal Kulikov (aged 67) has been replaced as C-in-C Warsaw Pact after 11 years in the post, by General Lushev. He will become an Inspector in the Defence Ministry (the retirement position for superannuated senior generals).
2. Lushev (65) is currently First Deputy Defence Minister for General Affairs. Before that he was C-in-C Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) and before that Commander of the politically important Moscow Military District (MMD). In his numerous writings he has stressed the increased reliance on conventional forces, rather than nuclear. He has also written on discipline. His new appointment reflects his experience in GSFG and the MMD, rather than patronage by Gorbachev. In his new post he will be responsible for ensuring that the plans formulated by the Soviet General Staff for restructuring of WP forces resulting from Soviet withdrawals and NSWP forces cuts, effectively co-ordinated with the national Ministries of Defence.
3. Earlier this week our DA in Moscow reported that he had heard that a decision had been taken on 6 January to replace both Kulikov and his Chief of Staff, Gribkov, with Lushev and Colonel General Lobov (aged 53, currently First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the "front man" for comments on the troop reductions), respectively but there had been Czech and East German resistance to the plan. Lushev was apparently in hospital after a heart attack.

4. The C-in-C Warsaw Pact is largely a political figurehead but he is responsible for Pact cohesion and the transmission of Soviet policy to Pact allies. In time of war we believe that operational matters in the West would be run by the Q-in-C of the relevant Theatres of Military Operations with the C-in-C WP being responsible for Pact cohesion and security of the rear areas and lines of communication.

EA Drou

for H BURKE

3 February 1989

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MEETING WITH ALEXANDER YAKOVLEV

SUMMARY

1. RELAXED DISCUSSION WITH YAKOVLEV, WHO EXPRESSES WARM INTEREST IN THE FORTHCOMING BILATERAL SUMMIT. NOT YET DECIDED WHO WILL ACCOMPANY GORBACHEV TO THE UK. YAKOVLEV GIVES A CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN SUBJECTS LIKELY TO COME UP, WITH SOME EMPHASIS ON DISARMAMENT. HE DEMONSTRATES THAT EVEN AT POLITBURO LEVEL THERE IS NO CLARITY OF THE NEXT STEPS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. WITH A VIEW TO MY VISIT TO LONDON NEXT WEEK, I PAID AN INTRODUCTORY CALL ON ALEXANDER YAKOVLEV (CHAIRMAN OF THE POLITBURO COMMISSION ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS) ON 1 FEBRUARY. HE WAS TO RECEIVE THE VISITING LABOUR PARTY DELEGATION LATER IN THE DAY. HE WAS THE SOUL OF GENIALITY, AND WE HAD A RELAXED CONVERSATION FOR 50 MINUTES. (FULL RECORD BY BAG). MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS.

GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO LONDON

3. YAKOVLEV COULD NOT SAY WHETHER HE WOULD ACCOMPANY GORBACHEV TO LONDON, OR WHETHER THE PARTY WOULD INCLUDE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES. THE COMPOSITION HAD YET TO BE DISCUSSED. IN PLANNING HIS ITINERARY, GORBACHEV HAD CHOSEN TO STICK TO THE SCHEDULE AGREED FOR DECEMBER, AND WAS CONTENT WITH THE BROAD OUTLINE OF THE DECEMBER PROGRAMME. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE PLENTY OF TIME FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS. THERE WAS A VERY GOOD ATMOSPHERE IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS. YAKOVLEV REFERRED TWICE TO THEIR 'MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING' AND COMMENTED ON THEIR ABILITY TO DISAGREE ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN A NORMAL WAY, WITHOUT THIS AFFECTING THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE. 'WE HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT MRS THATCHER SINCERELY WANTS PEACE AND A MORE HEALTHY SITUATION IN EUROPE'.

SUMMIT TOPICS

4. YAKOVLEV SAID IT WAS NATURAL THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

SHOULD HAVE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS ALSO IN THE SOVIET INTEREST. I SAID WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SOME CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET THINKING ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME. YAKOVLEV DESCRIBED THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME AS A ''TENDENCY'' (NOT ''ARCHITECTURE'') LEADING TO THE GOAL OF A PEACEFUL DEMILITARISED EUROPE, INN WHICH THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO AND THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WOULD BE RESPECTED.

5. ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS, YAKOVLEV EXPECTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD EXPLAIN THEIR CURRENT APPROACH TO START, AND ALSO MENTIONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS SOME SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE DATA PUBLISHED BY THE WARSAW PACT, AND AGREED THAT DATA REQUIRED BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION BETWEEN SPECIALISTS. HE SAID THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO BRING UP THE MODERNISATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: I REPEATED OUR VIEW THAT THEY HAD ALREADY MODERNISED THEIR ARSENAL. REVERTING TO START, HE HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEM OF SLCMS, AND COMPLAINED ABOUT THE AMERICAN REJECTION OF SOVIET VERIFICATION PROPOSALS. SDI WAS STILL A PROBLE.

6. YAKOVLEV LISTED HUMANITARIAN AND REGIONAL QUESTIONS AS OTHER TOPICS. ON THE LATER, THERE WAS A PARTICULAR NEED TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS OVER THE NEAR EAST, GIVEN THE DANGERS OF THAT REGION AND THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR MORE PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM BETWEEN US, AND COMMENTED THAT THOSE WHO WERE DRIVEN BY ''IDEOLOGICAL FANATICISM'' WERE NOT NORMAL PEOPLE.

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

7. YAKOVLEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS ANALYSINNG THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF US EXTERNAL POLICY BEFORE TRYING TO DEFINE ITS POSITIONS. HOWEVER, AT THE NEW YORK MEETING, BUSH HAD SHOWN THAT HE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ALSO TO ECOLOGY. YAKOVLEV SAID THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT HIDING THEIR ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, AND HAD DISCUSSED THEM WITHIN EUROPE. I COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS OF INTEREST TO US TOO, AND MENTIONED THE OZONE LAYER CONFERENCE IN LONDON.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

8. FROM A FAIRLY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (INCLUDING THE NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES FROM THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, OF WHICH YAKOVLEV IS A MEMBER), IT WAS CLEAR THAT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DECIDED CONCERNING THE NEXT STEPS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DOUBTS WHETHER THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PROCEDURES WERE CORRECT, YAKOVLEV SAID FIRMLY THAT THE MATTER WAS CLOSED AND THEY WOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO REVIEW

BY THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. PROCEDURES FOR WINNOWING OUT EXCESS CANDIDATES FOR THE NEXT ROUND HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT. THIS WOULD BE DONE ''OVER TIME''. THE ELCTIONS HAD LED TO A NUMBER OF GRUMBLES (FOR EXAMPLE, HE HIMSELF REGRETTED THE FAILURE OF SAGDEEV TO WIN NOMINATION), BUT THAT WAS PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

COMMENT

9. YAKOVLEV SAID NOTHING PARTICULARLY SURPRISING. ALTHOUGH HE RECEIVES MANY WESTERN VISITORS, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR. HIS MANNER, AND THE FACT OF GRANTING THIS APPOINTMENT AT FAIRLY SHORT NOTICE, IS ANOTHER INDICATOR OF THE MOOD ENGENDERED BY THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. AS IN MY CONVERSATION WITH CHERNYAYEV (MY TELNO 91), THERE WAS NO DOUBTING THE SINCERITY OF HIS TRIBUTE TO THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND THE PRIME MINISTER. WE WERE ABLE TO TOUCH ON SEVERAL CONTENTIOUS POINTS, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY DATA, WITHOUT ANY SHARPENING OF HIS TONE.

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