

Confidential filing

Visit of President Nyerere

Visits by the President to Great Britain.

TANZANIA

AUGUST 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>21.8.79</del>							
<del>23.8.79</del>							
<del>30.8.79</del>							
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<del>27.5.88</del>							
<del>3.6.88</del>							
9.6.88							
<del>1.7.88</del>							
6.4.89							

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 April 1989

GUEST OF GOVERNMENT VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER OF  
TANZANIA

Thank you for your letter of 28 March proposing that the Tanzanian Prime Minister be invited to pay a visit to the United Kingdom as a Guest of Government in December.

The Prime Minister does not think she can give sufficient attention to a visit then, and would prefer to delay the invitation until next year.

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ccpk. (1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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28 March 1989

I should like to give  
him a most welcome here properly  
and I don't think we can do it at that  
time.  
Mr Sean Dominic,

Prime Minister  
really do not  
think we can be  
asked to have a Head  
of Government visit  
just before  
Christmas.  
Anyway  
he has been  
very  
disobliged  
over  
Namibia  
Agree to  
postpone  
this?  
CDD

Guest of Government Visit to UK by  
Prime Minister Warioba of Tanzania

I am writing to let you know that we are hoping to  
invite Mr Joseph Warioba, the Prime Minister of Tanzania,  
to visit Britain this year as a Guest of Government. The  
earliest convenient time might be the week beginning  
11 December.

Following President Mwinyi's successful visit to  
Britain in June 1988, the Foreign Secretary's visit to  
Tanzania in September 1988 secured further understanding  
of our policy on southern Africa, and of the importance  
of adherence to IMF economic discipline. Warioba's visit  
would allow us to encourage these positive trends.

Warioba rose to prominence under President Nyerere  
as a skilled and able lawyer. He was Attorney-General  
and later Justice Minister. President Mwinyi appointed  
him as Prime Minister on acceding to the Presidency in  
1985. Warioba provides an important link between the  
government and the Party, which is still dominated by  
Nyerere. He is a potential successor to Mwinyi. The  
next Presidential elections are due in 1990.

The agreement with the IMF, reached in 1986, was  
reaffirmed in November 1988, although Mwinyi encountered  
some stiff resistance from within the Party. The Party  
has for the moment been won over to the need for an  
Economic Recovery Programme. The Foreign Secretary found  
Warioba more open-minded on economic issues during his  
visit last September than he had expected.

Gradual liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy is  
providing useful opportunities for British trade and  
should also encourage investment. The changing political  
climate under Mwinyi has given us an opening to counter

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Chinese and Soviet influences, both in the sphere of aid and trade. We have also been supplying non-lethal military equipment and more military training to the Tanzanian armed forces.

Tanzania is one of the Front Line States. Routes through Tanzania and the port of Dar es Salaam are important for the other Front Line States. Warioba's visit would allow us to put across our views on regional issues, particularly Southern Africa. Under Mwinyi, Tanzania has taken a more pragmatic view of southern African issues. They are in favour of the establishment of an FLS observer mission in Windhoek and seem inclined to play a role in influencing SWAPO towards sensible policies. The transfer of a number of ANC bases to Tanzania from Angola as part of the quadripartite agreement on Angola/Namibia strengthens the case for talking to them about regional issues.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister would be able to offer a call and, if possible, a lunch or dinner on either 11, 12 or 13 December. If this is convenient, we intend to instruct our High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to put these dates to the Tanzanians with a view to the Prime Minister issuing a formal invitation in due course.

Yours ever,

*Richard Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq  
10 Downing Street

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WPC

1st July, 1988

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W. 1,  
UNITED KINGDOM.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T104/88

Subject cc melt  
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Dear Prime Minister,

It gives me great pleasure to write this letter to express my deep appreciation to you and to Her Majesty's Government for making my recent visit to your great country very enjoyable and fruitful. I am particularly grateful for the very warm welcome and gracious hospitality given to me, my wife and my delegation throughout our stay in London.

The excellent arrangements made for my visit enabled me to see some of Britain's great economic, social, scientific and technological achievements. My visits to the British Aerospace, the Brook Bond Tea Factory, the Overseas Development Natural Resources Institute and the Brown Candover Estate were especially exciting and enlightening. A great deal of what I saw has a lot of relevance to Tanzania's economic and social development. We hope to learn from your long experience and great achievements through increased cooperation between our two countries.

I was therefore pleased to note during my visit that we still share a common desire to strengthen the excellent relations and the mutually beneficial cooperation which happily exist between Britain and Tanzania. This desire was reaffirmed during the fruitful discussions I had with you and other members of the British Government.

I was particularly encouraged by the British Government's willingness to continue to assist us in our efforts to revive our staggering economy. The additional



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financial assistance of Pounds 10 million which you so kindly pledged during my visit will greatly improve our capability to implement the Three-Year Economic Recovery Programme. The Government and the people of Tanzania highly value the assistance we continue to receive from Britain. Once again I wish, on their behalf, to express our sincere gratitude for this valuable assistance.

Our discussions on important international issues have also reaffirmed our common objectives for peace, freedom, justice and racial equality in Southern Africa and in the world as a whole. I believe that we will continue to work closely together in the pursuit of these objectives.

Meanwhile, please accept my best wishes for your continued good health.

Yours sincerely,

*A. H. Mwinyi*

Ali Hassan Mwinyi  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA



SUBJECT  
cc MASTER.



File PM/DSG

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 June 1988

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA

The Prime Minister had a meeting this evening with the President of Tanzania. President Mwinyi was accompanied by Mr. Mkapa, the Foreign Minister; Mrs. Mkame, Deputy Minister for Communications; and Mr. Nyakyi, the High Commissioner. Our High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam was also present.

Introduction

The Prime Minister wished President Mwinyi a very warm welcome to the United Kingdom. She recalled the good working relationship which she had enjoyed with his predecessor and the help we had received from Tanzania at the time of the negotiations to bring Zimbabwe to independence. We had watched with the greatest interest the changes which President Mwinyi was making and admired the difficult decisions which he had taken. She would like to hear his account of the prospects for Tanzania.

President Mwinyi said that he was very grateful indeed for the invitation to visit the United Kingdom and touched by the interest taken by the Prime Minister in the affairs of his country. He would like to give an account of the successes, as well as the failures and bottle-necks of the Tanzanian economy.

Tanzanian economy

The President then gave a graphic and well-ordered account of Tanzania's difficulties. From 1961-79 the country's economy had been at a sound footing. But thereafter it had changed dramatically for the worse. By the time he had taken over as President, output was declining in every sector, per capita income was falling, agriculture was in disarray and the external account was in growing deficit. There was an acute shortage of foreign exchange and an accumulation of payments arrears. The manufacturing sector was running at 20/30 per cent of capacity. Fifty per cent of the country's food was being imported. The transport system was in utter disarray and the whole country had virtually come to a stand-still at one point with an acute shortage of fuel.

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The President continued that it was against this background that he had drawn up an Economic Recovery Programme and sought international help to finance it. The programme had addressed itself to three main areas: reviving agriculture and in particular Tanzania's export crops; rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure; and the improvement of capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector. Steps were also being taken to restore balance in the budget and in the external account. Generous support had been received from the donor community and he wished to express very sincere and genuine thanks to Britain for its tremendous help. It was impossible to imagine what things would have been like without it. In particular he had appreciated our speedy and efficient aid disbursement which was a model to others who promised help and then took ages to deliver it.

The President continued that the Economic Recovery Programme was now in its second year and was showing some positive results. Growth last year had been 3.5 per cent and was likely to be nearly 4 per cent this year. Increased prices for farmers had helped the country to become self-sufficient in maize, although not in rice and wheat. They had also been able to double the output of cotton, although world prices had fallen sharply. There had been less success in other sectors. Capacity utilisation was still low in industry and the transport infrastructure was in a poor state. Moreover, some of the measures on which the IMF had insisted had caused considerable chaos and social disruption. Tanzania had been forced to de-value its currency by 470 per cent in local currency terms, interest rates had been adjusted sharply upwards and were currently at 27 per cent and a credit ceiling had been imposed. One result was that the cost of imports had increased five times and this was imposing severe hardship in the agricultural sector. Some farmers were no longer able to afford fertilisers. Of course the depreciation of the exchange rate had enabled the government to pay farmers more, but this had not been enough to offset increases in costs. Real wages had fallen dramatically. The major bottle-neck remained transport, despite the generous assistance from the United Kingdom in providing trucks and helping with road building. One result was that many of Tanzania's export crops could not be transported to the ports. This led to a vicious circle in which the failure to export led to falls in production ending with the country importing things which it ought to produce itself. The President concluded that he had wanted to share Tanzania's worries with Britain as a close friend, in the hope that together they could find solutions.

The Prime Minister said that we very much admired the steps which the President was taking to put the economy to rights and sympathised with the difficulties which he faced. His people were being asked to make great sacrifices. But they would think it worthwhile if they saw there was light at the end of the tunnel. She hoped that he would persist in the negotiations with the IMF and reach an agreement. The President interjected that his people had followed him



efully, but he could only lead them so far. Some of the demands being placed on him by the IMF, particularly on the exchange rate, were unrealistic. The Prime Minister continued that, in response to the President's account of Tanzania's difficulties, we were ready to provide an additional £10 million of aid. £4 million of this would be balance of payments support linked to the IMF programme and £6 million would be for projects. We were sure that every penny would be put to very good use. The President should discuss the details with Mr. Patten on 10 June. President Mwinyi expressed very great gratitude.

#### Mozambique

The Prime Minister said that the Tanzanian troops serving in Mozambique must be a considerable strain on the country's resources. President Mwinyi confirmed this. There were still some 3,000 Tanzanian forces there. But he was optimistic about the future. Renamo's back had been broken. Conditions in Mozambique were still very bad, but some semblance of normal life was now returning to Zambezia Province. Even so, civil administration was virtually non-existent outside the major cities and towns. Tanzania was trying to provide some assistance with training, and in particular military training, so that there would be some structure in place when they left. They were also looking forward to receiving the promised non-lethal assistance from the Commonwealth countries; at least some of that should come to Tanzania. The Prime Minister said that we had been able to help to some extent in changing American attitudes to Mozambique, which had been useful in unblocking assistance.

#### Angola

The Prime Minister made a brief reference to developments in Angola and our hope that the negotiations involving Angola, South Africa, the Cubans and the Americans would continue. She believed that the Soviet Union was ready to put pressure on the Cubans to withdraw. We were, however, very concerned about the movement of Cuban troops towards the Namibian border.

#### South Africa

The Prime Minister gave a brief assessment of developments in South Africa. Mr. Mkapa said that he hoped that Britain would make strong representations to the South African Government about the banning of anti-apartheid organisations, and seek the release of Nelson Mandela on humanitarian grounds. The Prime Minister said that we had already acted on both counts, but in general found it more effective to act discreetly behind the scenes. Quiet pressure was more likely to be effective with the South Africans than public harassment. President Mwinyi said that sanctions were a form of pressure. The Prime Minister explained why we did not consider sanctions the right way to help South Africa. She also gave an account of the assistance which we were providing to black South Africans.

SADCC

President Mwinyi referred with appreciation to the help which Britain was providing through SADCC.

Invitation

President Mwinyi extended an invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Tanzania to get to know its people and see the progress that was being made. The Prime Minister said she would very much like to go at some stage.

I am sending copies of this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,  
Charles Powell*

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PRIME MINISTER

## POINTS FOR PRESIDENT MWINYI

Those present will be, in addition to the President:

Mr. Mkapa - Foreign Minister  
Mrs. Mkame - Deputy Minister for Communications  
Mr. Nyakyi - High Commissioner

Our High Commissioner will also be present. They all return for dinner at 1945.

1. Welcome. Hopes for a successful visit.
2. Tanzanian Economy. Progress of discussions with the IMF.
3. Aid. We are ready to offer a further grant of £10 Million which you will announce in your speech tonight. Of this £6 million would be for project aid and £4 million will be programme aid linked to agreement with the IMF. Details to be discussed with Mr. Patten on Friday.
4. Debt. Chancellor's proposals, French proposals, prospects at the Economic Summit.
5. Trade. We look forward to introduction of their new Investment Code.
6. South Africa, Mozambique, Angola.
7. Claims. Grateful for assurance given to Foreign Secretary yesterday on compassionate grounds.

CDI

CDP

9 June, 1988.



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CDP 8/6.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA HELD AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL AT 0945 ON 8 JUNE 1988

The Rt Hon Sir G Howe QC MP  
Mr Imray  
Mr Marsden  
Mr Parker

HE Ali Hassan Mwinyi  
The Hon B W Mkapa  
HE Mr A B Nyaki

The Economy

1. President Mwinyi thanked the British Government for his visit and for continued support for Tanzania's economic recovery. The economy was improving slowly but the problems were great and intensifying in some areas. He wanted to discuss the problems with his friends in Britain. The IMF was inclined to be too academic. Tanzania had made a massive devaluation which had given farmers a real advantage. But the cost of essential inputs had become crippling (trucks, fertilisers, spare parts etc). Export crops were stuck because of lack of transport. The Foreign Secretary congratulated President Mwinyi on the progress so far. The UK was glad to provide substantial aid but it was crucial that Tanzania should go on working with the IMF. The Lawson initiative was an important attempt to relieve debt burdens but creditors had not yet agreed to proposals for lower interest rates. He suggested that Tanzania and others should lobby in favour of the proposals.

Claims

2. The Foreign Secretary thanked President Mwinyi for his offer to Mrs Chalker to try to settle some compassionate claims. This was of disproportionate importance. The President confirmed that he would do this.

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### Mozambique

3. The Foreign Secretary referred to the important role of Tanzania in Mozambique. He thought the situation was improving slightly: the Gersony report had opened eyes in the United States and there was some indication that South Africa was trying to make the Nkomati accord a reality. In South Africa there was a struggle between the Foreign Ministry and the military on this. President Botha's position would be crucial. President Mwinyi agreed. Mozambique desperately needed assistance for strengthening the civil administration. When the Tanzanian army provided security in an area people came back from the bush but civil administration was inadequate. The Foreign Secretary appreciated the burden involved for Tanzania. Perhaps the Commonwealth Mozambican fund could contribute. The UK provided 30% of that. President Mwinyi said that the Tanzanians would like to leave Mozambique as soon as possible while safe-guarding the gains through training for the Mozambicans (who had asked for training for 6,000 people). The Foreign Secretary referred to the military training Britain is giving Mozambique in Zimbabwe.

### Angola

4. The Foreign Secretary thought there might be some signs of progress on Resolution 435. Shevardnadze had given him the impression the Soviet Union would be prepared to be constructive. Castro, however, had made a very belligerent speech and Cuban troops were close to the South Africans. President Mwinyi asked who was to move out first. The Foreign Secretary said the timetable provided for simultaneous withdrawal. President Mwinyi thought it would be easier for the South Africans to return quickly than the Cubans. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that they would be further away after leaving Namibia. Mr Mkapa said that if assistance to UNITA was cut off the problem would become an internal one. The Foreign Secretary agreed that there could be no military solution. There would have to be some reconciliation between the two groups. The UK had been glad to have the last round of talks in London. When



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Mr Mkapa asked if the UK intended to become more involved, the Foreign Secretary said we had good contacts but did not intend to become more directly involved in negotiations. He asked whether Tanzania had plans to do so. President Mwinyi said no.

#### South Africa

5. The Foreign Secretary said that the developments in general in South Africa had been thoroughly retrograde but President Botha's April 21st speech demonstrated that he had finally decided to cut himself off from the Conservative Party. Colin Eglin had described the government as being in a no-man's land. They had stopped going further to the right but now did not know where to go. The UK was keeping up the pressure to whittle away at the Orderly Internal Politics bill. As regards the ANC there were press reports of an internal debate. The Foreign Secretary referred to his speech at the Royal Commonwealth Society in which he had argued that every bombing or South African raid would make a solution harder to achieve. Mr Mkapa agreed that it was useful that the UK had influence on the legislative aspects. He hoped the UK would also press for the release of political prisoners, especially Mandela. The Foreign Secretary confirmed that UK did so.

#### Other International Issues

6. The Foreign Secretary said it was very encouraging that the Soviet Union had been persuaded to withdraw from Afghanistan. But the problems ahead were immense. It would not be possible to organise reconciliation in the way that the UK had done in Zimbabwe. The proof of success would be the return of 5 million refugees.

7. President Mwinyi asked what could be done for the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary replied: patient pressure on both sides in the Arab/Israel dispute. Mr Shultz was now pressing Israel firmly in favour of a settlement on the grounds that their long-term security depended on this. The Soviet position was not necessarily unhelpful. President Mwinyi asked what could be done on the

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Iran/Iraq war. The Foreign Secretary replied that everyone in the world agreed that they should help to stop it. Perhaps the Iraqis' recent successes would lead the Iranians to re-think. Could the Non-Aligned Movement not help more? President Mwinzi replied that the NAM had tried but the Iranians would not listen.

8. The Foreign Secretary referred to the importance of re-establishing an international ban on the use of chemical weapons (which the Iraqis now openly admitted to using).

9. President Mwinzi said he hoped Foreign Secretary would visit Tanzania soon. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped to be able to do so before too long.

Distribution

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Substitute for yesterday's version





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

7 June 1988

Dear Charles,

Guest of Government visit to the UK by  
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi Tanzania, 6-10 June: Call on the  
Prime Minister, 1730, 9 June

President Mwinyi is calling on the Prime Minister at 1730 on 9 June for talks. The Prime Minister is also hosting a dinner that evening for the President. You agreed that the President could be accompanied during the call by his Foreign Minister, Mr Mkapa; Zanzibar Deputy Minister for Communications and Transport, Mrs Makame; and High Commissioner Mr Nyakyi. Mr Colin Imray, British High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, would also attend.

UK Objectives

Our general aims in this visit are to encourage Mwinyi's IMF backed Economic Reform Programme (ERP) and Tanzania's increasingly pragmatic diplomacy; to demonstrate our political and practical support for the frontline states; to strengthen Mwinyi's political hand at home by giving him a successful visit; to persuade him to take steps to begin to settle UK compassionate claims cases; and to promote a more favourable climate for foreign investment.

President Mwinyi's Position

Mwinyi, previously President of Zanzibar brought up there, succeeded Julius Nyerere as President in November 1985. With his Finance Minister, Msuya, he has been primarily responsible for the ERP which has had a modestly successful first two years. Thanks also to an excellent crop the programme is still popular. But there are strains. Mwinyi is in a bumpy patch in relation with the IMF. There are tensions in relations between the Mainland and Zanzibar (see paragraph 14). And the single ruling Party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which under the Constitution determines policy and is still led by Nyerere, is not united behind the ERP and is unhelpful on issues such as devaluation and dismantling parastatals. The senior hard liners in the party cling to many of the outmoded tenets of African socialism for both ideological and selfish reasons. Mwinyi needs this visit to boost his prestige without promoting new strains with Nyerere and the Party. He will want to show that he returns with some new aid in his pocket and visible UK support for his policies.

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### Economy

Tanzania is poor (GDP per head \$240 (1986)). However, after years of sharp decline economic growth has recovered under the ERP, and is now just above average population growth (c 3.7% and 3.4% respectively). The major turning point came in 1986 with agreement on an IMF Standby Arrangement. The shilling was devalued sharply, producer prices further improved, and a start made to tackle excessive state controls. An IMF Structural Adjustment Facility loan over 3 years was approved in October 1987, and targets set to June 1988.

The SBA was not fully drawn on, and expired in February 1988. Relations with the IMF are now strained. There are two main contentious issues: the rate of devaluation and monetary growth. The exchange rate remains overvalued (official rate T.Shs 95=\$1, parallel rate 200+). Monetary growth is well above its programme ceiling mainly because of financial losses and borrowing by the maize marketing board (National Milling Corporation) - which, is a buyer of last resort and has had to purchase large volumes of grain in a bumper year. Other parastatals also need reform. The Tanzanians remain reluctant to see a further major devaluation of the shilling. A Fund Article IV mission was in Dar Es Salaam in May to try to resolve these issues.

The Prime Minister may wish to commend President Mwinyi for the progress made so far, but urge him to take the difficult political decisions needed to remain in agreement with the IMF and continue the structural reforms. Tanzania is categorised low-income debt-distressed by the World Bank (debt repayment accounts for 60% of export earnings). It rescheduled its official debts in the Paris Club in September 1986 but has not kept up moratorium interest payments. It will need to reschedule again once it has a new IMF programme in place. The Prime Minister could refer to the Chancellors's initiatives. Tanzania would benefit from longer rescheduling and grace periods as proposed by the Chancellor and lower Paris Club interest rates, if agreed by then. It is also eligible for ESAF, though it will need first to improve its track record.

### Aid

The Prime Minister might tell President Mwinyi that the UK has been glad to give Tanzania substantial support for the ERP through our bilateral aid and our participation in multilateral aid programmes. Tanzania is now among the largest recipients of British aid in Africa, a radical change

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after many years in which as a result of disagreements over the economic policy framework, there were few new commitments. Total bilateral aid disbursements in 1987/88 amounted to £28 million. In 1987 we were the sixth largest bilateral donor to Tanzania.

Tanzania's principal requirement has been (and will continue to be) for balance of payments support (programme aid) and we have responded with pledges totalling over £50 million in this form of aid, including £20 million offered by Mr Patten when he was in Tanzania at the end of January. The Tanzanian Government has commented very favourably on the speed of disbursement and effectiveness of our aid. But we have emphasised throughout that the release of such programme aid is dependent on an IMF-backed reform programme being agreed and in place. Our other major involvement on the capital aid side centres on our participation (£6m) with the World Bank and others in a rehabilitation programme for Tanzanian railways; and the completion of a major hospital project in south west Tanzania. Technical cooperation is being provided in education (the university and the improvement in English Language Teaching in secondary schools), at the Port of Dar es Salaam, and in the health and agriculture sectors. There are now about 35 British financed experts in Tanzania and we are financing the training of some 170 Tanzanians a year in the UK.

#### New Aid Offer to President Mwinyi

For the visit of President Mwinyi the major aid question is the nature of any new offer that should be made, bearing in mind the country's continuing need both for balance of payments support and to help finance economically sensible projects - and President Mwinyi's need for a successful visit. Mr Patten considers that it would be appropriate for the offer of a grant of a total of £10 million to be made by the Prime Minister when she sees the President £4 million of this should be in the form of programme aid and thus added to the £20 million offered by Mr Patten. (In principle this would be for expenditure this financial year but its release will be dependent on Tanzania remaining on track with the International Monetary Fund the outcome of their current negotiations will be known in the next few weeks). The remaining £6 million would be intended to help finance project or sector proposals over the next two years or so, subject as usual to our being satisfied that any such proposals were satisfactory in institutional and economic terms.

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If the Prime Minister agrees with this approach it will be important in presenting the offer described to ensure that a clear distinction is drawn between the programme aid in question and the money to be allocated to projects. The programme aid is conditional and may well be frozen if the Tanzanians fall out with the IMF. But the project aid would not be subject to the same conditionality and would enable us to maintain a core programme in Tanzania, as we have done in the past. The Prime Minister could explain that we will consider in the context of these new pledges certain proposals that are included in a Tanzanian aide memoire that has just been presented by the Tanzanians for our consideration. There will however have to be proper appraisal of them. Mwinzi is meeting Mr Patten on Friday 10 June.

Trade

The UK and Tanzania have enjoyed a good trading relationship despite Tanzania's deep rooted economic difficulties. There was a marked increase in UK exports last year -£91.9m (1987) compared to £62.9m (1986). This increase (46%) means that Tanzania was our 5th largest market in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1987. We continue to be her largest export market, although Tanzania's exports slumped quite badly in 1987, mainly because of the fall in the price of tea and coffee, her main exports. British investment is significant (£32m - 1984 figures) but it has remained stagnant over recent years. Restrictions on the repatriation of profits, a commercial debt backlog stretching back several years and a lack of a clear investment code continue to deter potential investors. However, the Tanzanian Finance Minister, Cleopa Msuya, who visited the UK in March, was clearly keen to encourage further UK investment and we hope that some at least of the outstanding problems will be addressed by the introduction of a new investment code (expected on 16 June to coincide with the Budget). The Prime Minister might tell Mwinzi that British companies remain keen to do business in Tanzania if the climate is right. It will be important that their concerns (about the repatriation of dividends, access to local borrowing and to foreign exchange earnings etc) are met.

Kilamco

The very large Kilamco project involves a fertiliser (ammonia and urea) plant south of Dar es Salaam at a cost of about \$425 million. This would utilise Tanzania's gas reserves to generate foreign exchange income. Sizeable overseas private investment would be required as well as financing by international institutions and export credit

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agencies. The project has been slow to get off the ground (mainly because of doubts about Tanzania's creditworthiness and the viability of the project on which repayment of the investment is dependent). The UK could play a major part in the project implementation and ECGD has been approached for \$120 million implying a Departmental Maximum Liability of around \$190 million. ECGD is ready in principle to support a loan to finance UK supplies, subject to several important conditions. The fate of the project now depends largely on whether banks are prepared to bear their share of the risk and on the attitudes of other agencies including the World Bank. No request has been made for aid financing, and we have no wish to inspire one. This kind of project, commercial in character, should essentially be funded by the private sector and international development institutions.

The Prime Minister might say that British firms are very ready to play a part in the Kilamco project and that ECGD is also sympathetic, but its participation will depend on the project's viability and the readiness of other creditors - both official and private - to play their full part. We shall look also for assurances from the Tanzanian authorities that the domestic part of the finance will be available within Tanzania's own budgetary and foreign exchange constraints.

Zanzibar

Mwinyi was born on the mainland but has spent most of his life on Zanzibar, where he was President from 1984 to 1985. Zanzibaris have provided much of the impetus for his economic reforms. There are however tensions with the mainland. This is partly because many prominent Zanzibaris are associated with economic liberalisation and are therefore resented by the Party old guard. There is a feeling on Zanzibar that the mainland has exploited its natural resources and brought the islands down to its own economic level by incompetent management. There is also residual tension between the two main ethnic communities on the islands, those of Arab and those of African descent. Recent unrest on Zanzibar, (which has seen rioting in recent weeks) is at least in part a reflection of more widespread discontent with both Nyerere and the party.

It will be important for Mwinyi to show during his visit that he has the interests of Zanzibar at heart. He will wish to discuss the islands and return home with some tangible gains for them. Zanzibar has benefitted from our aid programme (e.g. through research on clove disease and other technical co-operation). In addition, we have just announced a modest gift of money for the maintenance of Zanzibar

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Archives (in effect the archives of the former British colonial administration). The Prime Minister might mention this as evidence of our understanding of the political problem.

#### South Africa

Alongside the process of economic liberalization Mwinzi has introduced a welcome note of realism in external relations. He has kept a very low profile on South Africa. Though he, and the Tanzanian government as a whole, disagrees with HMG on sanctions he is unlikely to make an issue of this during his visit. The Prime Minister might wish to outline the positive measures we are taking over Mozambique (paragraph 18 below) SADCC, the FLS generally and positive measures.

#### East Africa

Mwinzi has sought cautiously to help repair relations between Kenya and Uganda and has presided over an improvement in Kenya/Tanzania relations. President Moi is due to pay a State Visit to Tanzania shortly and we know that Mwinzi intends to use the opportunity to urge on him the importance of greater East African cooperation. Tanzania maintains a military training mission in Uganda. The Prime Minister might acknowledge Tanzania's constructive role in the region. Mwinzi (a Muslim) is also sensitive to the dangers of the spread of Libyan and Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism in East Africa. (Tanzania has Christian and Muslim communities of roughly equal size.)

#### Mozambique

Tanzania's principal external concern is Mozambique. The Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) has had some 3,000 troops stationed in Mozambique (principally in Zambesia province) since December 1986. Their role has been to hold territory liberated by government troops. They have suffered a number of losses to Renamo attacks and are reported to be concerned about the level of Mozambican government commitment to supporting their operations. The Tanzanian government has therefore reportedly decided to withdraw its troops to the province of Cabo Delgado, bordering Tanzania. It is conceivable that the Tanzanians might eventually withdraw some or even all their troops from Mozambique altogether. As part of our strategy of support to the FLS we have provided £500,000 worth of logistical equipment (landrovers and radio sets) to help the TPDF in its operations in Mozambique. This equipment has begun to arrive in Dar. Shipping should be

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complete by the end of June. The Prime Minister might say that we share Tanzania's concern about the security situation in Mozambique and are glad to have been able to help (we are helping in similar ways in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique itself).

Claims

UK claims in Tanzania relate to successive nationalisations and exchange control blockages (total claims known to HM Government is about £1m private claims and over £90m commercial claims including ECGD). The difficulties of the economy and shortage of Foreign exchange has prevented the Tanzanians from meeting these claims, but there has been a little recent progress on the most compassionate cases. The Prime Minister might acknowledge Tanzania's growing and special problems but ask for compassionate cases - eg pensions of elderly people of limited means - to be considered sympathetically (we have notified 6 particularly pressing cases and have given the Ministry of Finance details of other claims).

I am sending copies of this letter to Myles Wickstead (ODA) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*L Parker*  
(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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6 June 1988

NOT USED  
See letter dated 7/6/88.

cc PC  
p-up

Dear Charles,

CAF  
7/6

Guest of Government Visit to the UK by  
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Tanzania, 6-10 June:  
Call on the Prime Minister, 1730, 9 June

President Mwinyi is calling on the Prime Minister at 1730 on 9 June for talks. The Prime Minister is also hosting a dinner that evening for the President. You agreed that the President could be accompanied during the call by his Foreign Minister, Mr Mkapa; Zanzibar Deputy Minister for Communications and Transport, Mrs Makame; and High Commissioner Mr Nyakyi. Mr Colin Imray, British High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, would also attend.

UK Objectives

Our general aims in this visit are to encourage Mwinyi's IMF backed Economic Reform Programme (ERP) and Tanzania's increasingly pragmatic diplomacy; to demonstrate our political and practical support for the frontline states; to strengthen Mwinyi's political hand at home by giving him a successful visit; to persuade him to take steps to begin to settle UK compassionate claims cases; and to promote a more favourable climate for foreign investment.

President Mwinyi's Position

Mwinyi, previously President of Zanzibar brought up there, succeeded Julius Nyerere as President in November 1985. With his Finance Minister, Msuya, he has been primarily responsible for the ERP which has had a modestly successful first two years [and, with crop production helped by very good weather,] is still popular. But there are strains. Mwinyi is in a bumpy patch in relation with the IMF. There are tensions in relations between the Mainland and Zanzibar (see paragraph 14). And the single ruling Party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which under the Constitution determines policy and

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is still led by Nyerere, is not united behind the ERP and is unhelpful on issues such as devaluation and dismantling parastatals. The senior hard liners in the party cling to many of the outmoded tenets of African socialism for both ideological and selfish reasons. Mwinyi needs this visit to boost his prestige without promoting new strains with Nyerere and the Party. He will want to show that he returns with some new aid in his pocket and visible UK support for his policies.

Economy

Tanzania is poor (GDP per head \$240 (1986)). However, after years of sharp decline economic growth has recovered under the ERP, and is now just above average population growth (c 3.7% and 3.4% respectively). The major turning point came in 1986 with agreement on an IMF Standby Arrangement. The shilling was devalued sharply, producer prices further improved, and a start made to tackle excessive state controls. An IMF Structural Adjustment Facility loan over 3 years was approved in October 1987, and targets set to June 1988.

The SBA was not fully drawn on, and expired in February 1988: relations with the IMF are now strained. There are two main contentious issues: the rate of devaluation and monetary growth. The exchange rate remains overvalued (official rate T.Shs 95=\$1, parallel rate 200+). Monetary growth is well above its programme ceiling mainly because of financial losses and borrowing by the maize marketing board (National Milling Corporation) [which, like Europe's CAP, is locked into the payment of excessive subsidies.] Other parastatals also need reform. The Tanzanians remain reluctant to see a further major devaluation of the shilling. A Fund Article IV mission was in Dar Es Salaam in May to try to resolve these issues.

The Prime Minister may wish to commend President Mwinyi for the progress made so far, but urge him to take the difficult political decisions needed to [get a new IMF agreement,] and continue the structural reforms. Tanzania is categorised low-income debt-distressed by the World Bank (debt repayment accounts for 60% of export earnings). It rescheduled its official debts in the Paris Club in September 1986 but has not kept up

/moratorium

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moratorium interest payments. It will need to reschedule again once it has a new IMF programme in place. The Prime Minister could refer to the Chancellor's initiatives. Tanzania would benefit from longer rescheduling and grace periods as proposed by the Chancellor and lower Paris Club interest rates, if agreed by then. It is also eligible for ESAF, though it will need first to improve its track record.

Aid

The Prime Minister might tell President Mwinyi that the UK has been glad to give Tanzania substantial support for the ERP through our bilateral aid [and multilateral aid programmes.] Tanzania is now among the largest recipients of British aid in Africa, a radical change after many years in which as a result of disagreements over the economic policy framework, there were few new commitments. Total bilateral aid disbursements in 1987/88 amounted to £28 million [ Mr Patten announced an additional £20 million during his visit to Tanzania in February 1988.]

Tanzania's principal requirement has been (and will continue to be) for balance of payments support (programme aid) and we have responded with pledges totalling over £50 million in this form of aid, including £20 million offered by Mr Patten when he was in Tanzania [in January.] The Tanzanian Government has commented very favourably on the speed of disbursement and effectiveness of our aid. But we have emphasised throughout that the release of such programme aid is dependent on an IMF-backed reform programme being agreed and in place. Our other major involvement on the capital aid side centres on our participation (£6m) with the World Bank and others in a rehabilitation programme for Tanzanian railways; and the completion of a major hospital project in south west Tanzania. Technical cooperation is being provided in education (the university and the improvement in English Language Teaching in secondary schools), at the Port of Dar es Salaam, and in the health and agriculture sectors. There are now about 35 British financed experts in Tanzania and we are financing the training of some 170 Tanzanians a year in the UK.

/New

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New Aid Offer to President Mwinyi

For the visit of President Mwinyi the major aid question is the nature of any new offer that should be made, bearing in mind the country's continuing need both for balance of payments support and to help finance economically sensible projects - and President Mwinyi's need for a successful visit. Mr Patten considers that it would be appropriate for the offer of a grant of a total of £10 million to be made by the Prime Minister when she sees the President £4 million of this should be in the form of programme aid and thus added to the £20 million offered by Mr Patten. (In principle this would be for expenditure this financial year but its release will be dependent on Tanzania remaining on track with the International Monetary Fund the outcome of their current negotiations will be known in the next few weeks) - the remaining £6 million would be intended to help finance project or sector proposals over the next two years or so, subject as usual to our being satisfied that any such proposals were satisfactory in institutional and economic terms.

If the Prime Minister agrees with this approach it will be important in presenting the offer described to ensure that a clear distinction is drawn between the programme aid in question and the money to be allocated to projects. The programme aid is conditional and may well be frozen if the Tanzanians fall out with the IMF. But the project aid would not be subject to the same conditionality and would enable us to maintain a core programme in Tanzania, as we have done in the past. The Prime Minister could explain that we will consider in the context of these new pledges certain proposals that are included in the Tanzanian aide memoire that has just been presented by the Tanzanians for our consideration, [after proper appraisal.] Mwinyi is meeting Mr Patten on Friday, 10 June.

Trade

The UK and Tanzania have enjoyed a good trading relationship despite Tanzania's deep rooted economic difficulties. There was a marked increase in UK exports last year - £91.9m (1987) compared to £62.9m (1986). This increase (46%) means that Tanzania was our fifth

/largest

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largest market in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1987. We continue to be her largest export market, although Tanzania's exports slumped quite badly in 1987, mainly because of the fall in the price of [her main exports -] tea and coffee. British investment is significant (£32m - 1984 figures) but it has remained stagnant over recent years. Restrictions on the repatriation of profits, a commercial debt [pipeline stretching back] several years and a lack of a clear investment code continue to deter potential investors. However, the Tanzanian Finance Minister, Cleopa Msuya, who visited the UK in March, was clearly keen to encourage further UK investment and we hope that some at least of the outstanding problems will be addressed by the introduction of a new investment code (expected on 16 June to coincide with the Budget). The Prime Minister might tell Mwinyi that British companies remain keen to do business in Tanzania if the climate is right. It will be important that their concerns (about the repatriation of dividends, access to local borrowing and to foreign exchange earnings etc) are met.

Kilamco

The very large Kilamco project involves a fertiliser (ammonia and urea) plant south of Dar es Salaam at a cost of about \$425 million. This would utilise Tanzania's gas reserves to generate foreign exchange income. Sizeable overseas private investment would be required as well as financing by international institutions and export credit agencies. The project has been slow to get off the ground (mainly because of doubts about Tanzania's creditworthiness and the viability of the project on which repayment of the investment is dependent). The UK could play a major part in the project implementation and ECGD has been approached for \$120 million implying a Departmental Maximum Liability of around \$190 million. ECGD is ready in principle to support a loan to finance UK supplies, subject to several important conditions. [ The fate of the project now depends largely on the attitudes of other agencies and on whether capital costs can be kept down far enough to ensure project viability. ]

The Prime Minister might say that British firms are very ready to play a part in the Kilamco project and that ECGD is also sympathetic, but its participation will depend on the project's viability and the readiness of

/other

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other creditors - both official and private - to play their full part. We shall look also for assurances from the Tanzanian authorities that the domestic part of the finance will be available within Tanzania's own budgetary and foreign exchange constraints.

Zanzibar

Mwinyi was born on the mainland but has spent most of his life on Zanzibar, where he was President from 1984 to 1985. Zanzibaris have provided much of the impetus for his economic reforms. There are however tensions with the mainland. This is partly because many prominent Zanzibaris are associated with economic liberalisation and are therefore resented by the Party old guard. There is a feeling on Zanzibar that the mainland has exploited its natural resources and brought the islands down to its own economic level by incompetent management. There is also residual tension between the two main ethnic communities on the islands, those of Arab and those of African descent. Recent unrest on Zanzibar (which has seen rioting in recent weeks) is at least in part a reflection of more widespread discontent with both Nyerere and the party.

It will be important for Mwinyi to show during his visit that he has the interests of Zanzibar at heart. He will wish to discuss the islands and return home with some tangible gains for them. [Apart from our aid to Zanzibar (most recently an economic policy study by Peat Marwick McLintock)] we have just announced a modest gift of money for the maintenance of Zanzibar Archives (in effect of British colonial administration). The Prime Minister might mention this as evidence of our understanding of the political problem.

South Africa

Alongside the process of economic liberalization Mwinyi has introduced a welcome note of realism in external relations. He has kept a very low profile on South Africa. Though he, and the Tanzanian government as a whole, disagrees with [Mrs Thatcher] on sanctions he is unlikely to want to make an issue of this during his visit [unless challenged.] The Prime Minister might wish

/to outline

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to outline the positive measures we are taking over Mozambique (paragraph 18 below) SADCC, the FLS generally and positive measures.

East Africa

Mwinyi has sought cautiously to help repair relations between Kenya and Uganda and has presided over an improvement in Kenya/Tanzania relations. President Moi is due to pay a State Visit to Tanzania shortly and we know that Mwinyi intends to use the opportunity to urge on him the importance of greater East African cooperation. [ ] The Prime Minister might acknowledge the President's constructive role [ ] and perhaps refer to the residual amount of money in the UK aid framework (currently £500,000) earmarked for specifically East African projects. ] Mwinyi (a Muslim) is also sensitive to the dangers of the spread of Libyan and Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism in East Africa. (Tanzania has Christian and Muslim communities of roughly equal size.)

Mozambique

Tanzania's principle external concern is Mozambique. The Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) has had some 3,000 troops stationed in Mozambique (principally in Zambesia province) since December 1986. Their role has been to hold territory liberated by government troops. They have suffered a number of losses to Renamo attacks and are reported to be concerned about the level of Mozambican government commitment to supporting their operations. The Tanzanian government has therefore reportedly decided to withdraw its troops to the province of Cabo Delgado, bordering Tanzania. It is conceivable that the Tanzanians might eventually withdraw some or even all their troops from Mozambique altogether. As part of our strategy of support to the FLS we have provided £500,000 worth of logistical equipment (landrovers and radio sets) to help the TPDF in its operations in Mozambique. This equipment has begun to arrive in Dar. Shipping should be complete by the end of June. The Prime Minister might say that we share Tanzania's concern about the security situation in Mozambique and are glad to have been able to help (we are helping in similar ways in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique itself).

/Claims

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Claims

UK claims in Tanzania relate to successive nationalisations and exchange control blockages (total claims known to HM Government is about £1m private claims and over £90m commercial claims including ECGD). The difficulties of the economy and shortage of Foreign exchange has prevented the Tanzanians from meeting these claims, but there has been a little recent progress on the most compassionate cases. The Prime Minister might acknowledge Tanzania's growing and special problems but ask for compassionate cases - eg pensions of elderly people of limited means - to be considered sympathetically (we have notified 6 particularly pressing cases and have given the Ministry of Finance details of other claims).

I am sending copies of this letter to Myles Wickstead (ODA) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Lowes ever*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA

You have a meeting next Thursday with President Mwinyi of Tanzania and are giving a dinner for him in the evening. You may like to look at the papers for the meeting over the weekend.

Mwinyi is much better news than Nyerere in the sense that he is much more pragmatic on economic matters and maintains a studiously low profile on South Africa. He has got off to quite a good start but Nyerere remains chairman of the ruling party and is a constant thorn in Mwinyi's flesh.

Tanzania is a very poor country, indeed one of the poorest in the world. Debt repayment accounts for 60 per cent of export earnings. The Tanzanian economy is doing rather better thanks to Mwinyi's policies but there are strains at present in relations with the IMF, in particular about the rate of devaluation and monetary growth. The main current task is to get a new IMF programme in place.

Our main objectives in having him here are:

- to encourage him in his more sensible policies
- to build up his prestige so that he can prevail over the old socialists. A visit which is an obvious success will do this.
- to improve the climate for our trade and investment.

The main means for achieving our aims is an additional dollop of aid which you will be able to offer. Chris Patten can find an extra £10m. which can be announced during the visit. Of this £4m. will be balance of payments help and will be linked to agreement with the IMF. The remaining £6m. will be project help.

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His main external concern will be with Mozambique where Tanzania has 3,000 troops stationed. We are providing them with some logistical equipment. He will undoubtedly be interested in your views about the prospects there and in Southern Africa generally.

We have one particular bilateral problem and that is claims. They are far too broke to pay their commercial claims at present but there are a number of compassionate cases e.g. pensions for elderly people of limited means on which they ought to help.

I have also put in the folder your speech at dinner.

C.D.P

Charles Powell

3 June 1988



DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Reference

PS

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

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PS NO 10

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CAVEAT .....

SUBJECT:

GUEST OF GOVERNMENT VISIT TO THE UK BY

PRESIDENT ALI HASSAN MWINYI TANZANIA, 6 - 10 JUNE:

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 1730, 9 JUNE

1. President Mwinyi is calling on the Prime Minister at 1730 on 9 June for talks. The Prime Minister is also hosting a dinner that evening for the President. You agreed that the President could be accompanied during the call by his Foreign Minister, Mr Mkapa; Zanzibar Deputy Minister for Communications and Transport, Mrs Makame; and High Commissioner Mr Nyakyi. Mr Colin Imray, British High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, would also attend.

UK Objectives

2. Our general aims in this visit are to encourage Mwinyi's IMF backed Economic Reform Programme (ERP) and Tanzania's increasingly pragmatic diplomacy; to demonstrate our political and practical support for the frontline states; to strengthen Mwinyi's political hand

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at home by giving him a successful visit; to persuade him to take steps to begin to settle UK compassionate claims cases; and to promote a more favourable climate for foreign investment.

### President Mwinyi's Position

3. Mwinyi, previously President of Zanzibar brought up there, succeeded Julius Nyerere as President in November 1985. With his Finance Minister, Msuya, he has been primarily responsible for the ERP which has had a modestly successful first two years. Thanks also to an excellent crop, the programme is still popular. But there are strains. Mwinyi is in a bumpy patch in relation with the IMF. There are tensions in relations between the Mainland and Zanzibar (see paragraph 14). And the single ruling Party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which under the Constitution determines policy and is still led by Nyerere, is not united behind the ERP and is unhelpful on issues such as devaluation and dismantling parastatals. The senior hard liners in the party cling to many of the outmoded tenets of African socialism for both ideological and selfish reasons. Mwinyi needs this visit to boost his prestige without promoting new strains with Nyerere and the Party. He will want to show that he returns with some new aid in his pocket and visible UK support for his policies.



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Economy

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4. Tanzania is poor (GDP per head \$240 (1986)). However, after years of sharp decline economic growth has recovered under the ERP, and is now just above average population growth (c 3.7% and 3.4% respectively). The major turning point came in 1986 with agreement on an IMF Standby Arrangement. The shilling was devalued sharply, producer prices further improved, and a start made to tackle excessive state controls. An IMF Structural Adjustment Facility loan over 3 years was approved in October 1987, and targets set to June 1988.

5. The SBA was not fully drawn on, and expired in February 1988. Relations with the IMF are now strained. There are two main contentious issues: the rate of devaluation and monetary growth. The exchange rate remains overvalued (official rate T.Shs 95=\$1, parallel rate 200+). Monetary growth is well above its programme ceiling mainly because of financial losses and borrowing by the maize marketing board (National Milling Corporation) - which is a buyer of last resort and has had to purchase large volumes of grain in a bumper year. Other parastatals also need reform. The Tanzanians remain reluctant to see a further major devaluation of the shilling. A Fund Article IV mission was in Dar Es Salaam in May to try to resolve these issues.

6. The Prime Minister may wish to commend President Mwinyi for the progress made so far, but urge him to take

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the difficult political decisions needed to remain in agreement with the IMF, and continue the structural reforms. Tanzania is categorised low-income debt-distressed by the World Bank (debt repayment accounts for 60% of export earnings). It rescheduled its official debts in the Paris Club in September 1986 but has not kept up moratorium interest payments. It will need to reschedule again once it has a new IMF programme in place. The Prime Minister could refer to the Chancellor's initiatives. Tanzania would benefit from longer rescheduling and grace periods as proposed by the Chancellor and lower Paris Club interest rates, if agreed by then. It is also eligible for ESAF, though it will need first to improve its track record.

Aid

7. The Prime Minister might tell President Mwinyi that the UK has been glad to give Tanzania substantial support for the ERP through our bilateral aid and our participation in multilateral aid programmes. Tanzania is now among the largest recipients of British aid in Africa, a radical change after many years in which as a result of disagreements over the economic policy framework, there were few new commitments. Total bilateral aid disbursements in 1987/88 amounted to £28 million. In 1987 we were the sixth largest bilateral donor to Tanzania.

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8. Tanzania's principal requirement has been (and will continue to be) for balance of payments support (programme aid) and we have responded with pledges totalling over £50 million in this form of aid, including £20 million offered by Mr Patten when he was in Tanzania at the end of January. The Tanzanian Government has commented very favourably on the speed of disbursement and effectiveness of our aid. But we have emphasised throughout that the release of such programme aid is dependent on an IMF-backed reform programme being agreed and in place. Our other major involvement on the capital aid side centres on our participation (£6m) with the World Bank and others in a rehabilitation programme for Tanzanian railways; and the completion of a major hospital project in south west Tanzania. Technical cooperation is being provided in education (the university and the improvement in English Language Teaching in secondary schools); at the Port of Dar es Salaam, and in the health and agriculture sectors. There are now about 35 British financed experts in Tanzania and we are financing the training of some 170 Tanzanians a year in the UK.

New Aid Offer to President Mwinyi

9. For the visit of President Mwinyi the major aid question is the nature of any new offer that should be made, bearing in mind the country's continuing need both for balance of payments support and to help finance economically sensible projects - and President Mwinyi's



need for a successful visit. Mr Patten considers that it would be appropriate for the offer of a grant of a total of £10 million to be made by the Prime Minister when she sees the President, £4 million of this should be in the form of programme aid and thus added to the £20 million offered by Mr Patten. (In principle this would be for expenditure this financial year but its release will be dependent on Tanzania remaining on track with the International Monetary Fund the outcome of their current negotiations will be known in the next few weeks). The remaining £6 million would be intended to help finance project or sector proposals over the next two years or so, subject as usual to our being satisfied that any such proposals were satisfactory in institutional and economic terms.

10. If the Prime Minister agrees with this approach it will be important in presenting the offer described to ensure that a clear distinction is drawn between the programme aid in question and the money to be allocated to projects. The programme aid is conditional and may well be frozen if the Tanzanians fall out with the IMF. But the project aid would not be subject to the same conditionality and would enable us to maintain a core programme in Tanzania, as we have done in the past. The Prime Minister could explain that we will consider in the context of these new pledges certain proposals that are included in a Tanzanian aide memoire that has just been presented by the Tanzanians for our consideration. There will however have to be proper appraisal of them. Mwinyi

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is meeting Mr Patten on Friday 10 June.

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Trade

11. The UK and Tanzania have enjoyed a good trading relationship despite Tanzania's deep rooted economic difficulties. There was a marked increase in UK exports last year -£91.9m (1987) compared to £62.9m (1986). This increase (46%) means that Tanzania was our 5th largest market in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1987. We continue to be her largest export market, although Tanzania's exports slumped quite badly in 1987, mainly because of the fall in the price of tea and coffee, her main exports. British investment is significant (£32m - 1984 figures) but it has remained stagnant over recent years. Restrictions on the repatriation of profits, a commercial debt backlog stretching back several years and a lack of a clear investment code continue to deter potential investors. However, the Tanzanian Finance Minister, Cleopa Msuya, who visited the UK in March, was clearly keen to encourage further UK investment and we hope that some at least of the outstanding problems will be addressed by the introduction of a new investment code (expected on 16 June to coincide with the Budget). The Prime Minister might tell Mwinyi that British companies remain keen to do business in Tanzania if the climate is right. It will be important that their concerns (about the repatriation of dividends, access to local borrowing and to foreign exchange earnings etc) are met.

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Kilamco

12. The very large Kilamco project involves a fertiliser (ammonia and urea) plant south of Dar es Salaam at a cost of about \$425 million. This would utilise Tanzania's gas reserves to generate foreign exchange income. Sizeable overseas private investment would be required as well as financing by international institutions and export credit agencies. The project has been slow to get off the ground (mainly because of doubts about Tanzania's creditworthiness and the viability of the project on which repayment of the investment is dependent). The UK could play a major part in the project implementation and ECGD has been approached for \$120 million implying a Departmental Maximum Liability of around \$190 million. ECGD is ready in principle to support a loan to finance UK supplies, subject to several important conditions. The fate of the project now depends largely on whether banks are prepared to bear their share of the risk and on the attitudes of other agencies including the World Bank. No request has been made for aid financing, and we have no wish to inspire one. This kind of project, commercial in character, should essentially be funded by the private sector and international development institutions.

13. The Prime Minister might say that British firms are very ready to play a part in the Kilamco project and that ECGD is also sympathetic, but its participation will depend on the project's viability and the readiness of other creditors - both official and private - to play



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their full part. We shall look also for assurances from the Tanzanian authorities that the domestic part of the finance will be available within Tanzania's own budgetary and foreign exchange constraints.

Zanzibar

14. Mwinyi was born on the mainland but has spent most of his life on Zanzibar, where he was President from 1984 to 1985. Zanzibaris have provided much of the impetus for his economic reforms. There are however tensions with the mainland. This is partly because many prominent Zanzibaris are associated with economic liberalisation and are therefore resented by the Party old guard. There is a feeling on Zanzibar that the mainland has exploited its natural resources and brought the islands down to its own economic level by incompetent management. There is also residual tension between the two main ethnic communities on the islands, those of Arab and those of African descent. Recent unrest on Zanzibar, (which has seen rioting in recent weeks) is at least in part a reflection of more widespread discontent with both Nyerere and the party.

15. It will be important for Mwinyi to show during his visit that he has the interests of Zanzibar at heart. He will wish to discuss the islands and return home with some tangible gains for them. Zanzibar has benefited from our aid programme (eg through research on clove disease and other technical cooperation). In addition,



we have just announced a modest gift of money for the maintenance of Zanzibar Archives (in effect the archives of the former British colonial administration). The Prime Minister might mention this as evidence of our understanding of the political problem.

#### South Africa

16. Alongside the process of economic liberalization Mwinzi has introduced a welcome note of realism in external relations. He has kept a very low profile on South Africa. Though he, and the Tanzanian government as a whole, disagrees with HMG on sanctions he is unlikely to make an issue of this during his visit. The Prime Minister might wish to outline the positive measures we are taking over Mozambique (paragraph 18 below) SADCC, the FLS generally and positive measures.

#### East Africa

17. Mwinzi has sought cautiously to help repair relations between Kenya and Uganda and has presided over an improvement in Kenya/Tanzania relations. President Moi is due to pay a State Visit to Tanzania shortly and we know that Mwinzi intends to use the opportunity to urge on him the importance of greater East African cooperation. Tanzania maintains a military training mission in Uganda. The Prime Minister might acknowledge Tanzania's constructive role in the region. Mwinzi (a Muslim) is also sensitive to the dangers of the spread of



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Libyan and Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism in East Africa. (Tanzania has Christian and Muslim communities of roughly equal size.)

Mozambique

18. <sup>at</sup> Tanzania's principle external concern is Mozambique.

The Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) has had some 3,000 troops stationed in Mozambique (principally in Zambesia province) since December 1986. Their role has been to hold territory liberated by government troops. They have suffered a number of losses to Renamo attacks and are reported to be concerned about the level of Mozambican government commitment to supporting their operations. The Tanzanian government has therefore reportedly decided to withdraw its troops to the province of Cabo Delgado, bordering Tanzania. It is conceivable that the Tanzanians might eventually withdraw some or even all their troops from Mozambique altogether. As part of our strategy of support to the FLS we have provided £500,000 worth of logistical equipment (landrovers and radio sets) to help the TPDF in its operations in Mozambique. This equipment has begun to arrive in Dar. Shipping should be complete by the end of June. The Prime Minister might say that we share Tanzania's concern about the security situation in Mozambique and are glad to have been able to help (we are helping in similar ways in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique itself).



CONFIDENTIAL

Claims

19. UK claims in Tanzania relate to successive nationalisations and exchange control blockages (total claims known to HM Government is about £1m private claims and over £90m commercial claims including ECGD). The difficulties of the economy and shortage of Foreign exchange has prevented the Tanzanians from meeting these claims, but there has been a little recent progress on the most compassionate cases. The Prime Minister might acknowledge Tanzania's growing and special problems but ask for compassionate cases - eg pensions of elderly people of limited means - to be considered sympathetically (we have notified 6 particularly pressing cases and have given the Ministry of Finance details of other claims).

I am sending <sup>copies</sup> ~~copy~~ of this letter to ~~Treasurer~~ <sup>COO(M)</sup> Hyles Wickstead (and to Treasurer Woolley (Cabinet office))

East African Department

FCO

3 June 1988

JJ8AFI

CONFIDENTIAL



B.R.

MR. POWELL

**VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA:  
TUESDAY 9 JUNE**

The timing of the Guard of Honour for President Mwinyi of Tanzania has been changed from 1710 to 1725. The talks will begin at 1745.

DM

PP TESSA

3 June 1988





From the Bailiff  
of the Royal Parks

Mr P. Taylor  
10 Downing Street  
SW1

Department of the Environment

2 Marsham Street  
London SW1P 3EB  
Telephone 01-212 8502

Mrs. Gaisman

Dear Mr Taylor

**HORSE GUARDS PARADE: CONTROL OF CAR PARKING: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS**

Following consultations with the Heads of Security of the buildings adjacent to Horse Guards Parade, it has been agreed that measures should be taken to further increase security in relation to the control of car parking on Horse Guards Parade.

With effect from Monday 20th June, 1986, the delineation of the no parking area of 30 metres, which extends around the perimeter of the parade ground, will be marked by linked pedestrian barriers. These barriers will extend around the edge of the ground where it abuts Horse Guards Approach Road and thereby prevent pedestrian access except by means of the central roadway.

From the above date all pedestrian movement from St. James's Park to Whitehall will be channelled via the central roadway. Permit holders will gain access to the parking zones by way of a linkway on either side of the central roadway and once having parked their car will leave the area by the same route. Holders of Building Passes will still be able to gain access and egress to their offices by using the central roadway but they will no longer be able to walk diagonally across the Parade Ground.

It is appreciated that these new measures will cause some inconvenience to permit holders and those members of staff used to having unrestricted access to the parade ground. However, I am sure that such minor inconvenience is a small price to pay for improved security which will be of benefit to us all.

I should be grateful if you would kindly inform all permit holders of the contents of this letter. I feel that with their co-operation the new arrangements will work well.

Yours faithfully,

R. A. Stephenson

R.A. Stephenson  
Bailiff of the Royal Parks



100%  
RECYCLED PAPER



Post Room

Sim TO ARRANGE NEW DELIVERY TIME WITH GPO

Mrs Richards

DISTRIBUTION: ALL DEPARTMENTS

FCO Circular: 146/88

File Ref: TXV 027/304/1

Date: 11 May 1988

For Information: All staff

## GUARDS OF HONOUR

1. President Ronald Reagan, President Mwinyi of Tanzania and Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia will visit the United Kingdom as Guests of HM Government from 2-3 June, 6-10 June and 13-16 June respectively. The Prime Minister will welcome each visitor with a Guard of Honour in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle as follows:

✓ Thursday 2 June  
1800 hours

: President Ronald Reagan

Change Time // Thursday 9 June  
1710 hours

: President Mwinyi of Tanzania

✓ Monday 13 June  
1145 hours

: Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

2. I should be grateful if staff would make alternative parking arrangements. Cars should not be parked in the courtyard between 0800 and 1900 hours on 2 June and 9 June and from midnight on Sunday 12 June to 1400 hours on Monday 13 June.

3. Cars will not be allowed to enter the Quadrangle between 1600 hours and 1900 hours on Thursday 2 June and 9 June, and from 1000 hours to 1230 hours on 13 June. Communications Operations Department are making alternative arrangements for the collection and delivery of mail. Pedestrian access will not be affected but, will, of course, be subject to normal security procedure. Departments expecting calls by important visitors during the ceremonies should make arrangements with both the Reception desk and with Security for an alternative entry for their visitor(s).

4. Staff are welcome to watch the ceremony but for security reasons are asked not to take photographs from buildings overlooking the ceremony. They should also bear in mind that under PSA rules nobody is allowed to watch ceremonies from roofs, balconies, cornices or other projecting features

CONFIDENTIAL

MARABA



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*Pl-File  
E*

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FM NAIROBI

TO IMMEDIATE ODA

TELNO DEVDIV 453

OF 271123Z MAY 88

AND TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, FCO, UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON

FM BDDEA

TANZANIA: MWINYI'S VISIT AND THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME

SUMMARY

1. OUTCOME OF CURRENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN TANZANIA AND IMF AND WORLD BANK OVER FUTURE CONTENT OF ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME UNLIKELY TO BE SETTLED BEFORE MWINYI'S VISIT. WE SHOULD REASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT OUR PLEDGE OF #20M NEW PROGRAMME AID REMAINS ON OFFER AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT AT THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 11 - 12 JULY, TANZANIA AND THE TWO IFIS WILL BE ABLE TO REPORT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS FOR US TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A START WITH COMMITTING THIS ADDITIONAL REPORT.

DETAIL

2. DAR'S T/L OF 9 MAY AND WASHINGTON'S TELNO 112 HAVE SET SCENE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IMF AND GOT IN TANZANIA AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GOT AND BANK IN WASHINGTON ON INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION AND TRADE ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (IRTAC). THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH ARTUS WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN FROM DAR. AT OUR REQUEST BHC HAVE CHECKED BACK WITH PORTER, THE WORLD BANK REPRESENTATIVE IN DAR.

3. ALTHOUGH UNABLE TO GIVE A DETAILED PICTURE OF THE PROGRESS OF FUND NEGOTIATIONS PORTER CONFIRMED THAT AT THIS STAGE THEY ARE DISCUSSING A SECOND SAF ARRANGEMENT (ALTHOUGH HE SAW A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WOULD BE CONVERTED INTO AN ESAF AT SOME FUTURE STAGE). ARTUS' GLOOMY ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER THE FIRST SAF DOES NOT HOWEVER SEEM TOTALLY JUSTIFIED. THE PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN CONTROLLING CREDIT ARE WELL DOCUMENTED AND IN RECENT MONTHS ADJUSTMENT OF THE EXCHANGE RATE HAS SLOWED CONSIDERABLY. BUT PERFORMANCE AGAINST OTHER QUANTITATIVE AND POLICY BENCH MARKS HAS BEEN MORE FAVOURABLE: THE OUTTURN OF RECURRENT EXPENDITURE, TOTAL EXPENDITURE AND THE OVERALL BUDGET DEFICIT ARE LIKELY TO BE CLOSE TO TARGET: REAL INTEREST RATES WILL BE VERY CLOSE TO POSITIVE LEVELS BY MID 1988: THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF GRAIN MARKETING, AND GRAY AND BAKER HAVE DEFINED A SET OF



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POLICIES WHICH SEEM TO MEET FUND AND BANK CONCERNS: AN ACTION PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND SERVICES OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM WILL BE READY BY MID 1988: STUDIES ON THE MARKETING OF COTTON, COFFEE AND TOBACCO (THE EXPORT CROPS WITH THE MOST SERIOUS MARKETING PROBLEMS) ARE COMPLETE AND POLICY OPTIONS ARE BEING CONSIDERED: REFORM OF THE TARIFF SYSTEM IS EXPECTED IN THE JUNE BUDGET.

4. SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF SECOND SAF IS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON EXCHANGE RATE ISSUE AND AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMMES WHICH EMBRACE THE FOOD MARKETING, EXPORT CROP MARKETING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORMS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT NOW HAS IN FRONT OF IT. PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE BUDGETARY CONTROL SEEM GOOD BUT UNDERSTANDABLY FUND WILL HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN ATTAINABILITY OF CREDIT CONTROL WITHOUT CLEAR MOVEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL MARKETING.

5. THE BANK FOR THEIR PART WILL NOT PRESENT IRTAC TO THEIR BOARD UNLESS THERE IS AN AGREEMENT ON ACCELERATED EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION WHICH WILL PREVENT EXCESS DEMAND THROUGH THE OGL. THIS ISSUE MAKES A FIRM LINK BETWEEN FUND AND BANK NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION ALTHOUGH IRTAC CONDITIONS ARE FOCUSED ON THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR THE CREDIT WILL NOT BE APPROVED UNLESS THE BANK IS ALSO CONFIDENT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OVERALL RECOVERY EFFORT. WITHOUT THE IRTAC THE BANK IS UNLIKELY TO PROCEED WITH THE CGM.

6. MWINYI'S VISIT THUS COMES AT A DELICATE TIME IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM. RELEASE OF MR PATTEN'S JANUARY 1988 PLEDGE OF AN ADDITIONAL #20M OF PROGRAMME AID IS DEPENDENT ON MAINTENANCE OF THE ERP WHICH WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WE WOULD EXPECT TO BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROGRAMME AGREED WITH THE IMF. THIS CONDITION WILL OBVIOUSLY NOT HAVE BEEN FULFILLED BY THE TIME OF MWINYI'S VISIT, AND IT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNALS TO RELEASE ANY OF OUR NEW MONEY SO SOON.

7. HOWEVER BY THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING PROPOSED FOR 11 - 12 JULY THE PICTURE SHOULD BE MUCH CLEARER: THE NEW TANZANIA BUDGET WILL HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED: THE IRTAC NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONCLUDED: AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF ADVANCED (THOUGH NOT, WE ANTICIPATE, COMPLETED). THE CGM WILL GIVE THE TANZANIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ON RECORD THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ERP AND THEIR FURTHER INTENTIONS. IT WILL PROVIDE US WITH AND CAN READILY BE PRESENTED TO THE TANZANIANS AS, A NATURAL OCCASION TO REVIEW WHETHER TO RELEASE ALL OR PART OF THE #20 MILLION.



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8. HERE WE SUGGEST THERE MAY TURN OUT TO BE SOME SCOPE FOR FLEXIBILITY, THOUGH NOT TO BE REVEALED AT THIS STAGE. IF, AS SEEMS POSSIBLE THE BANK'S IRTAC HAS BEEN AGREED BY THE TIME OF THE CG AND PROSPECTS FOR A NEW SAF ARE GOOD, THOUGH THE DETAILS REMAIN TO BE SETTLED, WE MIGHT CONSIDER COMMITTING PART OF THE PLEDGE AS COFINANCING OF THE IRTAC WITH THE REMAINDER LINKED TO LATER AGREEMENT ON THE SAF.

9. OUR AIM FOR MWINYI'S VISIT SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE TANZANIANS TO MAKE A DETERMINED AND POSITIVE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE IBRD AND IMF IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. SO WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE CONDITIONALITY OF OUR PROGRAMME AID PLEDGE WHILE REASSURING THE PRESIDENT WE ARE READY TO MOVE QUICKLY ONCE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CGM PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE BUT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OF DOING THIS.

10. IN THE NEXT 4 - 6 WEEKS BDDEA WILL DO ADDITIONAL WORK ON THE MECHANICS AND TARGETS OF A FUTURE PROGRAMME AID OPERATION IN TANZANIA SO THAT ONCE WE ARE IN A POSITION TO COMMIT MONEY DISBURSEMENT CAN BEGIN QUICKLY. ALREADY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS HAVE REVEALED A STRONG DEMAND FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FROM RECIPIENTS WHO BENEFITTED IN 1986/87 AND 1987/88, AS THEIR BUSINESSES REVIVE. AS THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS CONTINUES HOWEVER THE ARGUMENTS FOR BACKING MARKET JUDGEMENTS BECOME STRONGER AND WE SHOULD LOOK TO DISBURSE A PROPORTION OF THE #20M THROUGH THE OGL. THIS WOULD BE EASIER IF WE WERE ABLE TO UNTIE, ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE CROWN AGENTS OFFICE IN DAR GIVES SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD MANAGE TIED AID DISBURSED THROUGH THE OGL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF UKDEL IMF/IBRD COULD ESTABLISH WHETHER ANY OF THE OFFERS OF CO-FINANCING FOR THE IRTAC WHICH THE BANK HAVE HAD SO FAR ALSO ENVISAGE UNTYING.

JOHNSON

YYYY

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PAGE 3  
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ADDITIONAL 1

MR WICKS NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN



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cc: Mr. Bates  
Sir P Craddock

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

26 May 1988

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MWINYI:

PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

Thank you for your letter of 25 May about the announcement of President Mwinyi's visit. We are content with the proposed terms of the announcement and agree that it should be made on 31 May.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

*celc*



*J. Powell*  
*ok, with minor amendments, partly to*  
*Dr. Hyatt de-Hwale Eye etc!*  
*26/5*  
*File with me. ok?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 May 1988

*cu*

*Dear Charles,*

Visit of President Mwinyi of Tanzania: Press Announcement

News Department have, I understand, already been in touch with your press office about the press handling of the forthcoming visit by President Mwinyi. They have agreed that it would be useful for us to provide the enclosed draft press release and background note.

We consider - given the Bank Holiday - that it would be most appropriate for the announcement to take place early next week after Whitsun, perhaps on 31 May. The Tanzanian High Commissioner is content with this proposal.

If you agree, I should be grateful if you could let me know so that we can inform the High Commission in Dar es Salaam before the announcement is made.

*Yours ever*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



VISIT BY PRESIDENT MWINYI OF TANZANIA

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

At the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, His Excellency President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania will pay an official visit to the United Kingdom from 6 to 10 June 1988.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....  
In Confidence

NOTES TO EDITORS

63,  
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania is visiting the UK as an official guest of Her Majesty's Government at the invitation of the Prime Minister between 6 and 10 June. This is his first official visit to this country. He will be accompanied by his wife, Mrs Sitti Mwinyi, his Foreign Minister, Mr Benjamin Mkapa, and a number of other ministers and officials.

During his visit President Mwinyi will have an audience of the Queen and will hold talks with the Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mrs Chalker and Mr <sup>Chis</sup> Patten. He will have contact with a wide range of politicians, businessmen and others interested in Tanzania, including the Lord Mayor of London.

Mr Mwinyi became President in October 1985, succeeding Julius Nyerere (who remains Chairman of Tanzania's single ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi). He was formerly President of Zanzibar. His policies of economic reform

and liberalisation have been supported by the IMF (with whom Tanzania signed an agreement in August 1986) and the World Bank. The UK has pledged Tanzania some £70 million of balance of payments support and other aid over the past two years, (£50M of which has already been allocated) in association with this economic recovery programme. <sup>U.K.</sup> ~~Our~~ aid has been welcomed by the Tanzanian Government for its speed and effectiveness.

~~The UK~~ <sup>The UK</sup> have also provided a certain amount of logistical equipment (transport and radios) in support of the presence in Mozambique of Tanzanian troops defending vital transport links.

~~President Mwinzi is 63 years old.~~

JJ9AOW





cc MALTA: Relations Nov 80

SRI LANKA: Visit of Pres Jayawardene

P12

SAUDI ARABIA: Visit by Crown Prince Abdullah Oct 82

TANZANIA: Visit by Pres Nyerere Aug 79

TURKEY: Visit by Pres Evren Mar 88

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

Shwskf

etc

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1988

Dear Tom

FORTHCOMING FOREIGN VISITORS: SPEECHES

It may be helpful to set down the likely requirement for draft speeches on occasions when the Prime Minister is giving a lunch or dinner for a distinguished foreign visitor over the next few months. They are as follows:

- President Reagan. This will be a small dinner and a speech by the Prime Minister is likely to be of a highly personal nature. But it would be helpful if Sir Antony Acland could be asked to suggest one or two points for it, in particular references which would give the President pleasure (i.e. specific events, decisions or achievements of his Presidency). It would be helpful to have this by 26 May.

- President of Tanzania. We need a draft for an after-dinner speech by 26 May (to allow for the Whitsun recess). It should have some historical and personal allusions.

- Crown Prince Abdullah. We need to establish whether or not there will be speeches. If there are to be, then a draft will be needed by Wednesday 8 June.

- President Evren. Again we need to decide whether there will be speeches. If there are, then a draft would be needed by 6 July.

- President Jaywardene. I am not sure whether his visit is confirmed yet. Assuming it is, we shall need a speech (bearing in mind that the Prime Minister has already made speeches both at Downing Street and in Sri Lanka on occasions when he has been present). A draft please by Wednesday 20 July.

- Prime Minister of Malta. We shall need a draft speech by 7 September.

you directly  
(C. D. POWELL)  
Chris Powell

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED



*file DS  
bc: pc*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

21 April 1988

VISIT OF PRESIDENT MWINYI

Thank you for your letter of 21 April about the visit of President Mwinyi. I agree that we should have a guard of honour in the Foreign Office courtyard immediately before the President's call at Number 10.

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

*DS*



RESTRICTED

*cc/c*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1988

*Dear Charles,*

Guest of Government Visit by President Mwinyi of Tanzania  
6 - 10 June 1988

The Prime Minister wrote on 18 March formally inviting President Mwinyi of Tanzania to visit the UK in June as a Guest of Government. As you will see from the enclosed telegram, the President has now formally accepted.

*BF //* Mwinyi is due to call on the Prime Minister at 1730 on Thursday 9 June: the Prime Minister is subsequently hosting a dinner for him. We recommend that the Prime Minister agree to the mounting of a guard of honour immediately before the call at No 10.

*however,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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RESTRICTED

TOP COPY  
Q DIST ?

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MDHIAN 5651

JET 027/1

RESTRICTED  
FM DAR ES SALAAM  
TO DESKBY 141030Z FCO  
TELNO 145  
OF 140905Z APRIL 88

MIPT  
MWINYI'S VISIT  
1. TEXT OF LETTER TO PM IS:

QUOTE

DEAR HON PRIME MINISTER

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER DATED 18TH MARCH, 1988  
IN WHICH YOU INVITED ME TO VISIT BRITAIN FROM 6 TO 10 JUNE THIS  
YEAR. I FEEL GREATLY HONOURED BY YOUR KIND INVITATION.

I AM DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE FRIENDLY  
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION WHICH EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.  
IT IS WITH GREAT PLEASURE, THEREFORE, THAT I WISH TO CONFIRM  
MY ACCEPTANCE TO VISIT YOUR GREAT COUNTRY AS A GUEST OF HER  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. I HOPE THAT THE VISIT WILL ACCORD US AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WAYS AND MEANS OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING  
OUR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION.

IN THE MEANTIME, PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR  
CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH.

YOURS SINCERELY,  
ALI HASSAN MWINYI  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPLUBLIC OF TANZANIA

UNQUOTE.

IMRAY

YYYY



TANZANIA: visits by Pres Aug '79



cc. FLO  
EDP  
25/4

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
SERIAL No. T46AA88

cc/c.

THE STATE HOUSE,  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
TANZANIA.

**SUBJECT cc MASTER  
OPS**

7th April, 1988

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W. 1,  
UNITED KINGDOM.


Dear Hon. Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter dated <sup>18th</sup> March, 1988 in which you invited me to visit Britain from 6 to 10 June this year. I feel greatly honoured by your kind invitation.

I am deeply conscious of the need to strengthen the friendly relations and cooperation which exist between our two countries. It is with great pleasure, therefore, that I wish to confirm my acceptance to visit your great country as a guest of Her Majesty's Government. I hope that the visit will accord us an opportunity to discuss ways and means of further strengthening our mutually beneficial cooperation.

In the meantime, please accept my best wishes for your continued good health.

Yours sincerely,



Ali Hassan Mwinyi  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA



TANZANIA: Union of President

Aug 79



Subject cc Ops  
Master



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

cc FCO  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T37/88

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 March 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I was delighted to hear from our High Commission that you would be able to visit Britain from 6 to 10 June.

May I now confirm that we have great pleasure in inviting you here as a guest of Her Majesty's Government on those dates.

As well as confirming the long-standing friendship of our two countries, the visit will mark the good progress that we have made recently in working together on important practical matters of interest to us both. I am particularly glad that we have been able to make a substantial contribution to supporting Tanzania's Economic Recovery Programme.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will be in contact with your High Commissioner on the arrangements for your visit.

I much look forward to seeing you here in London.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi

ea





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1988

Dear Charles,

Guest of Government visit by President Mwinyi of  
Tanzania, 6-10 June

You wrote on 4 February to confirm that the Prime Minister would give a dinner for President Mwinyi on 9 June during his Guest of Government visit.

Mwinyi has now accepted our invitation for 6-10 June. The Prime Minister might therefore like to send a formal letter of invitation on the lines of the attached draft.

Yours ever,  
L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO: *ATX*  
 H.E. Ali Hassan Mwinyi  
 President of the United Republic  
 of Tanzania

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

SUBJECT:

I was delighted to hear from our High Commission that you would be able to visit Britain from 6 to 10 June.

May I now confirm that we have great pleasure in inviting you here as a guest of Her Majesty's Government on those dates.

*copying*  
 The visit will mark, as well as long-standing traditional friendships, the good progress that we have made recently in working together on important practical interests for both our countries. I am particularly glad that we have been able to make a substantial contribution to supporting Tanzania's Economic Recovery Programme.

*the end of our mission*

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will be in contact with your High Commissioner on the arrangements for your visit.

Enclosures flag(s) .....

I much look forward to seeing you here in London.

*GA.*



TANZANIA & British Relations  
March 80



Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T588/85

Prime Minister (4)

COP

THE STATE HOUSE,  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
TANZANIA.

13/4.

23rd March 1985

Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.  
UNITED KINGDOM

cc Master

OPS  
M

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Now that I have returned to Dar es Salaam I am able to write to thank you very much for the kindness with which you, your Ministers, and other British citizens received me during my visit to the United Kingdom. I really enjoyed this stay in London, as well as the brief visit to Reading University. I also hope and believe that the discussions I held with yourself and the Secretary of State and other Ministers in the Foreign Office, as well as with so many different individuals and groups, will have further promoted the understanding, and therefore the good and friendly relations, between our two countries.

On a personal note, I would like to express my own pleasure at meeting and talking with you again, and my thanks for the kindness with which you spoke of me at the lunch you gave for me at 10 Downing Street. It was also good to see there so many old friends of my own and of Tanzania.

May I ask you to convey my appreciation and that of my colleagues to all the Ministers and Officials of your Government who made such excellent arrangements for my visit. We were extremely well looked after and made to feel very much at home even while being treated as honoured guests.


We shall undoubtedly be in touch again before I relinquish my office, but I am happy to take this opportunity to send my personal good wishes to you, as well as my greetings to other friends and the members of your Government.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere



# The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2876</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Appleyard to Powell dated 19 March 1985</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 March 1985

*CRP 20/3*

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with President Nyerere on 20 March  
at 12 noon

Your Press Office have asked us to provide a press  
release for the talks later today between the Prime Minister  
and President Nyerere. I attach a draft.

*Yours ever,*  
*Peter Rickards*

*PR.*  
(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL



FUE

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

20 March 1985

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Nyerere earlier today. I had to leave the meeting some five minutes before the end to deal with guests arriving for lunch and was not therefore able to record fully the discussion on arms control and nuclear matters. I understand, however, that it followed entirely predictable lines.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Michael McCulloch (ODA).

Yours sincerely

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



*SUBJECT*  
*a Master Set.*

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 20 MARCH 1985 AT  
1200 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary  
Mr. Ewen Fergusson  
High Commissioner,  
Dar-Es-Salaam  
Mr C D Powell

President Nyerere  
The Hon Benjamin Mkapa  
The Hon Dr Msimu  
Abdulrahman  
High Commissioner for  
Tanzania  
Mr Joseph Butiku

Namibia

The Prime Minister said that she had the impression that negotiations over Namibia were stuck. Although there was no formal linkage with Cuban withdrawal from Angola the reality was that there would not be a settlement until the Cubans left. That in turn was linked to the internal situation in Angola where it seemed that neither President Dos Santos nor Mr. Savimbi were strong enough to defeat the other and Dos Santos needed Cuban help to maintain his position.

President Nyerere said this was not at all the position. The original reason for the Cubans to go to Angola had been the South African invasion. If any linkage existed it was the other way round. South Africa must stop using Namibia for acts of aggression against Angola. The Prime Minister commented that the most promising factor in the situation was the financial strain on the South Africans of maintaining their position in Namibia. This was a strong incentive for them to get the problem solved. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought that some headway was being made, although only very slowly, by American diplomacy. President Nyerere said that the only proper way to proceed was that laid down in SCR 435. South African troops must pull out of Namibia until only 1500 remained and these confined to their barracks. At



that point 5,000 Cuban troops would withdraw from Angola. The linkage established between South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola was an American linkage. The obsession with Cuba stemmed from the Americans, not the South Africans. The Prime Minister said that the fact remained that unless the Cubans did withdraw there would be no progress.

So the negotiations are indeed stuck concluded President Nyerere. Just as I said agreed the Prime Minister.

Mozambique

The Prime Minister said that President Machel was in acute difficulty. Despite the Nkomati Accord, Renamo was still active. When she had seen President Machel in Moscow, he had started by saying that Renamo was "run by the South Africans" then modified this to "being run from South Africa". He had been as distressed as she had ever seen him. We had earlier encouraged the South Africans to be helpful in their dealings with him.

The Foreign Secretary asked whether President Nyerere knew who was sustaining Renamo. President Nyerere said that it was the South Africans. He had always told President Machel that Tanzania would understand if he decided to sign the Nkomati Accord. But he would not get a thing from it. It was only recently that Machel could bring himself to admit even privately that it was the South Africans who were helping Renamo. The Prime Minister said that her impression was that it was more a question of whether the South Africans were being as helpful as they might be in stopping aid reaching Renamo. President Nyerere said that there were two Governments in South Africa on this issue: those committed to Nkomati and those committed to supporting Renamo. The Prime Minister referred to the steps announced by Mr. Botha on 16 March to deal with those suspected of aiding Renamo. President Nyerere said that he hoped that from now on South Africa would carry out its part of the bargain. It would be



helpful if HMG would urge this.

The Prime Minister asked what neighbouring states like Zimbabwe and Tanzania could do to help. President Nyerere said that they would provide the little help which they could. The basic problem was that while South Africa did not wish Machel to go because there was no alternative to him except chaos, they did not want him to consolidate his position either. The Prime Minister suggested that one should not always be too choosy about people's motives: it was enough for them to be on the right side. She had held high hopes for stability in Southern Africa following Zimbabwe's independence. She feared that dreams of this were now evaporating. President Nyerere disagreed: it was simply taking longer to realise the dreams than had been expected.

#### Military Training

Mr. Fergusson observed that we were offering a small number of places for Mozambiquean officers with BMATT in Zimbabwe. The Foreign Secretary added that we were also providing more military training for Uganda. President Nyerere said that this was very welcome. The Prime Minister noted that we were providing military training and loan service personnel in some 35 countries world-wide.

#### South Africa

The Prime Minister said that she felt that her meeting with President Botha had achieved some practical results. She had decided that it was best to focus on a limited number of issues in her talks with him and had selected South African policies of forced removals and townships. There seemed to have been a significant change of policy on the former and in particular the Kwangema had been allowed to stay on their land. President Nyerere observed that it had been massive rioting which had led to the South African Government's second thoughts as much as anything said to them. The Prime Minister continued that her representations on townships seemed to have



had no effect. At least President Botha had not objected to a fierce discussion of South Africa's internal affairs. She noted that President Nyerere looked sceptical. President Nyerere said that he was listening.

Arms Control

President Nyerere asked the Prime Minister's assessment of what was likely to happen in the arms control talks in Geneva. The Prime Minister gave a full account of her views, stressing that the nuclear deterrent had succeeded in keeping the peace for 40 years. She thought it would be several weeks if not months before one could form a clear picture of the prospects for the Geneva negotiations although she believed that both sides were sincere in seeking agreement. President Nyerere asked whether the Prime Minister really still believed in deterrence; and secondly whether it would not be the case that the Strategic Defence Initiative would destroy deterrence. He was duty bound by his colleagues at the Six Power Conference in Delhi to raise their declaration with the Prime Minister. He then proceeded to do so. The Prime Minister responded firmly.

The meeting ended at 1310.

C.D.P.

20 March 1985



PRIME MINISTER

TALKS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE, 1200 NOON ON WEDNESDAY, 20 MARCH

President Nyerere comes at 1200 noon for talks, followed by lunch at 1300 hrs for 1315. At present the talks are planned for five-a-side (Foreign Secretary, Fergusson and our High Commissioner on our side).

*Yes not*

Content with this? Or prefer tête-à-tête plus note-takers?.

If five-a-side, prefer Cabinet Room? Or White Drawing Room?

I attach notes for a speech at lunch.

*e.d.?*

19 March, 1985

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MWALIMU JULIUS K NYERERE,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA,  
17-21 MARCH 1985

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS  
(to be read in conjunction with the printed programme)

Sunday 17 March

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed, a Representative of the British Airports Authority will escort the greeting party from the Hounslow Suite to the tarmac. His Excellency the High Commissioner for the United Republic of Tanzania and Mrs Nyakyi will board the aircraft and accompany the President and his Ministers to the tarmac where the following will welcome them:

The Viscount Boyne,  
Lord in Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen

The Rt Hon Timothy Raison MP  
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
and Minister for Overseas Development

Mr J A Sankey,  
Her Majesty's High Commissioner at Dar es Salaam

Brigadier Alan Cowan,  
Secretary, Government Hospitality

Group Captain Robert Thomson,  
Government Hospitality Escort Officer

Wing Commander Tommy Cody,  
Government Hospitality Escort Officer

The remainder of the Official Suite and the unofficial party will then disembark and the party will proceed to the Hounslow Suite (seating plan at Annex I).

Transport

Cars are provided by Government Hospitality for the President and the members of the Official Suite throughout the visit. Seating plans are attached at Annex I.



Guard of Honour Ceremony in the Foreign and Commonwealth  
Office Quadrangle

The procedure is described at Annex II.

Participation of the Official Suite in the President's  
programme

His Excellency Mr A B Nyakyi, the High Commissioner of the United Republic of Tanzania to London, and Mr J A Sankey, Her Majesty's High Commissioner at Dar es Salaam, will accompany His Excellency President Nyerere throughout the programme.

Other members of the Official Suite, as listed at page 1 of the printed programme, will be present as follows:

Monday 18 March

Guard of Honour in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Quadrangle

All members of the Official Suite

Courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street

The Hon B Mkapa  
The Hon Dr M Abdulrahman  
Mr Butiku

Lord Mayor's Luncheon at Mansion House

All members of the Official Suite

Reception hosted by Mr Rifkind at Lancaster House

All members of the Official Suite

Dinner hosted by Mr Rifkind at Lancaster House

The Hon B Mkapa  
The Hon Dr M Abdulrahman  
Mr Butiku  
Mrs Bantu  
Miss Wicken

Tuesday 19 March

Luncheon hosted by Her Majesty The Queen at Buckingham Palace

The Hon B Mkapa  
The Hon Dr M Abdulrahman  
Mr G Rutihinda  
Mr J Butiku  
HE Ambassador J W Opanga  
Miss Joan Wicken

Wednesday 20 March

Talks with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street

The Hon B Mkapa  
The Hon Dr M Abdulrahman  
Mr Butiku

Luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street

All members of the Official Suite

Address and Reception at Royal Commonwealth Society

All members of the Official Suite


Dinner hosted by the Commonwealth Secretary-General

The Hon B Mkapa  
The Hon Dr M Abdulrahman  
Mr Joseph Butiku  
Miss Joan Wicken

Thursday 21 March

Visit to University of Reading

All members of the Official Suite



R E Morgan  
Protocol Department  
FCO

VALAAY



CAR PLANS

Aircraft to Hounslow Suite on 17 March and Hounslow Suite to  
Aircraft on 21 March

Car 1	His Excellency the President The Viscount Boyne Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Magere Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Rt Hon Timothy Raison * Special Branch Officer
Car 5	The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Mrs Nyakyi Brigadier Cowan
Car 6	Mr Rutihinda Mr Butiku Miss Wicken Mr Sankey
Coach	Mrs Bantu Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mr Mwazyunga Mr Shawa Mr Mzee Miss Haule Mr Qorro Mr Mngumi Mr Mbando Mr Mwalukuta Wing Commander Cody

\* On 21 March Sir Edwin Arrowsmith will travel in place of the Rt Hon Timothy Raison in car 3.

Hounslow Suite to Claridge's-Ballroom Entrance

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Butiku Special Branch Officer
Car 4 (High Commissioner's Car)	Mrs Nyakyi Miss Wicken Mr Sankey

Hounslow Suite to Claridge's - Main Entrance

Car 5	Mr Rutihinda Mrs Bantu Mr Magere Wing Commander Cody
Car 6	Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mr Mwazyunga
Car 7 (High Commission Car)	Mr Mzee Mr Shawa Miss Haule
Car 8 (High Commission Car)	Mr Qorro Mr Mngumi Mr Mbando

Claridge's to Westminster Cathedral Conference Centre and return

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson



Car 3 The Hon Benjamin Mkapa  
The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman  
Mr Butiku  
Mrs Nyakyi  
Special Branch Officer

Car 5 Mr Rutihinda  
Mrs Bantu  
Mr Sankey  
Wing Commander Cody

Car 6 Miss Wicken  
Mr Halahala  
Professor Makene  
Mr Mwazyunga

Car 7 Mr Shawa  
Miss Haule  
Mr Mwaisuple

Claridge's to FCO Quadrangle - in advance of His Excellency  
the President

Car 3 The Hon Benjamin Mkapa  
The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman  
His Excellency Mr Nyakyi  
Mr Sankey  
Special Branch Officer

Car 4 Mrs Bantu  
(High Commissioner's Car) Miss Wicken  
Mrs Nyakyi

Car 5 Mr Rutihinda  
Mr Butiku  
Wing Commander Cody

Car 6 Mr Halahala  
Professor Makene  
Mr Kuyomba  
Mr Shawa

Car 7 Mr Mohamed  
(High Commission Car) Mr Qorro  
Mr Mbando

Claridge's to FCO Quadrangle - President's motorcade

Car 1 His Excellency the President  
Major Makwaia  
Special Branch Officer

Car 2 Special Branch Officer  
(Police Car) Mr Simbeye

Car P His Excellency Ambassador Opanga  
(Protocol Car ) Group Captain Thomson

FCO Quadrangle to 10 Downing Street - walking

His Excellency the President  
The Hon Benjamin Mkapa  
The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman  
His Excellency Mr Nyakyi  
Mr Butiku  
His Excellency Ambassador Opanga  
Major Makwaia  
Mr Sankey  
Group Captain Thomson

FCO Quadrangle to Claridge's

Car 4 (High Commissioner's Car)	Mrs Bantu Miss Wicken Mrs Nyakyi
Car 5	Mr Rutihinda Wing Commander Cody
Car 6	Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mr Kuyomba Mr Shawa
Car 7 (High Commission Car)	Mr Mohamed Mr Qorro Mr Mbando

10 Downing Street to Claridge's

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Butiku Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer



Claridge's to Mansion House and return

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Butiku Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer
Car 5	Mr Rutihinda Miss Wicken Mrs Nyakyi Mrs Sankey Wing Commander Cody
Car 6	Mrs Bantu Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mr Shawa

Claridge's to Lancaster House

As for the journey to the Mansion House.

Lancaster House to Claridge's - after Reception

Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Mr Kuyomba Wing Commander Cody
Car 6	Mr Rutihinda Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mrs Nyakyi Mr Shawa

Lancaster House to Claridge's - after Dinner

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	Major Makwaia Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer
Car 5	Mr Butiku Mrs Bantu Miss Wicken

Claridge's to Buckingham Palace and return

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyumba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer
Car 4 (High Commissioner's Car)	Miss Wicken Mrs Nyakyi Mrs Sankey
Car 5	Mr Rutihinda Mr Butiku

Claridge' to Royal Air Force Club

As for the journey to the Mansion House.



Royal Air Force Club to High Commissioner's Residence and then to Claridge's

Car 1	His Excellency the President The Hon Benjamin Mkapa Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Rutihinda Mr Butiku Miss Wicken Special Branch Officer
Car 5	Mrs Bantu Mr Halahala Professor Makene Mr Shawa

Royal Air Force Club to Claridge's

Car 6	Mr Sankey Mrs Sankey Wing Commander Cody
-------	--

Claridge's to 10 Downing Street for talks

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Butiku

Claridge's to 10 Downing Street for Luncheon

Car 5                      Mr Rutihinda  
                              Mr Halahala  
                              Professor Makene  
                              Wing Commander Cody

Car 6                      Mrs Bantu  
                              Miss Wicken  
                              Mrs Nyakyi  
                              Mrs Sankey

10 Downing Street to Claridge's after Luncheon

Car 1                      His Excellency the President  
                              His Excellency Mr Nyakyi  
                              Special Branch Officer

Car 2  
(Police Car)              Special Branch Officer  
                              Mr Simbeye

Car P  
(Protocol Car)            His Excellency Ambassador Opanga  
                              Major Makwaia  
                              Mr Kuyomba  
                              Group Captain Thomson

Car 3                      The Hon Benjamin Mkapa  
                              The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman  
                              Mr Butiku  
                              Special Branch Officer

Car 5                      Mr Rutihinda  
                              Mr Halahala  
                              Professor Makene  
                              Wing Commander

Car 6                      Mrs Bantu  
                              Miss Wicken  
                              Mrs Nyakyi  
                              Mrs Sankey

Claridge's to Royal Commonwealth Society

As for the journey to the Mansion House.



Royal Commonwealth Society to Commonwealth Secretary-General's  
Residence and then to Claridge's

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer
Car 5	Mr Butiku Miss Wicken Mr Shawa

Royal Commonwealth Society to Claridge's

Car 4 (High Commissioner's Car)	Mrs Bantu Mrs Nyakyi Mrs Sankey
Car 6	Mr Rutihinda His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Mr Halahala Professor Makene Wing Commander Cody

Claridge's to University of Reading and then to Hounslow Suite

Car 1	His Excellency the President His Excellency Mr Nyakyi Special Branch Officer
Car 2 (Police Car)	Special Branch Officer Mr Simbeye
Car P (Protocol Car)	His Excellency Ambassador Opanga Major Makwaia Mr Kuyomba Group Captain Thomson
Car 3	The Hon Benjamin Mkapa The Hon Dr Msimu Abdulrahman Mr Sankey Special Branch Officer
Car 5	Mr Rutihinda Mr Butiku Miss Wicken Wing Commander Cody

Car 6

Mrs Bantu  
Mr Halahala  
Professor Makene  
Mr Shawa  
Mr Gregory-Hood

Car 7  
(High Commission Car)

Mr Magere  
Mr Qorro  
Mr Mwazyunga



GUARD OF HONOUR - Procedure

1. A Guard of Honour found by 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards under the command of Major I H McNeil with the Regimental Colour, the Band of the Coldstream Guards and the Corps of Drums of the Battalion will be formed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle on Monday 18 March at 1000 hours to greet His Excellency President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania. High Commission staff and other spectators are requested to arrive not later than 0930 hours.

2. At 0948 hours Mr M Rifkind, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, will arrive in the Quadrangle; he will be met to the left of the dais by Major General James Eyre, General Officer Commanding London District, who will be accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel E B L Armitstead, Brigade Major, Household Division. At 0950 hours the members of the Official Suite will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle by car via King Charles Street. They will alight from their cars just beyond the dais (ie to the east of the latter) where they will be received by Mr Rifkind. They will remain near the Colour points on the east side of the Main Archway (see diagram attached). The cars will proceed to the east of the King Charles Street Archway and await the arrival of the President. As soon as these cars have entered the Quadrangle the cars of the Official Suite should proceed to park in the south west corner of the Quadrangle.

3. At 0957 hours the Prime Minister will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle through the main Archway; she will be met at the Archway by Major General James Eyre. The Major General will then escort the Prime Minister to the right (west) of the dais where she will receive the President.

4. At 1000 hours the President will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office via King Charles Street.

5. The Prime Minister will welcome the President and present Major General Eyre, who will escort the President to his place on the dais. The Prime Minister will then take up a position on his right and behind the dais. The Captain of the Guard of Honour will order "Guard of Honour, Royal Salute, Present Arms" and the Band will play the Tanzanian National Anthem. After the Captain of the Guard of Honour has ordered "Shoulder Arms" and "Order Arms", he will present his Guard of Honour to the President, and the Major General will accompany the President and the Guard Commander on the inspection. The President's A.D.C. will follow them.

6. The Prime Minister should remain in the vicinity of the dais with the Brigade Major until the inspection is completed and the Major General has accompanied the President back to the dais. The President will introduce his Ministers to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will then escort the President to 10 Downing Street. Those accompanying the President for the courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street will follow.

7. Meanwhile, the Major General and the Brigade Major will have taken their leave of the President and will authorise the dispersal of the Guard of Honour once the President has departed for 10 Downing Street.

#### Wet Weather Programme

8. In the event of wet weather the Parade will not be cancelled. The programme will continue as scheduled up to the point where the inspection of the Guard of Honour should begin. If there is heavy rain at that point in the programme, and the President does not wish to inspect the Guard of Honour, the Prime Minister should lead the President to 10 Downing Street.





DOWNING ST. WEST BUILDING

DOWNING ST.

DOWNING ST. EAST BUILDING

Main Archway

PRESS

PM

MG

GofH

MINISTER OF STATE

OFFICIAL SUITE

HIGH COMMISSION STAFF & SPECTATORS

PRESIDENT'S car will park here

GUARD OF HONOUR

BAND

OLD HOME OFFICE BUILDING

WHITEHALL


APPROACH ROUTE FOR CARS

KING CHARLES ST. BUILDING

KING CHARLES ST.

**GUARD OF HONOUR CEREMONY  
FCO QUADRANGLE**

- + ..... Colour Points
- GofH..... Guest of Honour
- PM..... Prime Minister
- MG..... Major General



DISTRIBUTION

Buckingham Palace

Private Secretary (2)  
Press Secretary (2)

10 Downing Street

Private Secretary (2)  
Press Secretary (2)  
Mr Joce (1)

Tanzanian High Commission (12)

CSMA


Dr Woolhead (1)

GOC London District (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (2)  
PS/Mr Rifkind (2)  
PS/Mr Raison (2)  
Mr D M D Thomas (1)  
Mr Fergusson (1)  
Mr J R Johnson (1)  
Mr Wenban-Smith (1)  
EAD: Mr Ling (6)  
News Department (3)  
Protocol Department (12)  
Resident Clerks (1)  
Miss R Hazell (1)  
Mr Sankey, c/o Heads of Mission Section (1)  
Government Hospitality Fund (20)





D.R.  
  
PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE

There is a formal welcoming ceremony for President Nyerere with a Guard of Honour in the FCO Quadrangle on Monday at 1000 hours. You are familiar with the procedure. But I attach a note in case you want to refresh your memory.

After the ceremony, President Nyerere walks back to Downing Street with you for a brief informal call (15 minutes) and departs at 1030 hours.

Your official talks with him are on Wednesday when you also give him lunch.

15 March 1985

old FEO. Morgan  
(2733582)



10 DOWNING STREET

Copy Per.

13/3/85

FEO protocol req:-

For the Courtesy Call  
on Monday by Pres. Nyerere  
are you content with:-

UK.

TANZANIA

PM  
Rykind  
High Com.  
P. Sec.

President  
2 Ministers  
(For. & Zanzibar)  
P. Sec.

High. Com.

?

Mintri.



M. Don Wood (Fu Br. 2)

In Jakarta.

(16) → Hotel.

RAF - commercial

liability

limit \$75,000

(death) - (Warsaw)

Fee/Cat. off.

On Gov - Civil Service Pers.

para 96 Scheme - 'CS. Pension  
Explained'

total <sup>incap</sup> → 85% of pay.  
death → up to 3 months pay.

RESTRICTED



file SH  
ccpc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 February 1985

VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA

Thank you for your letter of  
26 February.

I note your proposals for attendance  
at the Prime Minister's talks. It is  
possible that the Prime Minister may  
wish some of the conversation to be  
tete-a-tete, but apart from that what  
you suggest is fine.

C D POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

(w)



210  
RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 February, 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of President of Tanzania: Discussions with the Prime  
Minister at 12 Noon on Wednesday 20 March

The main framework for President Nyerere's visit here as guest of Government is now fairly firmly settled. I enclose a copy of the latest version of the outline programme.

The meeting with the Prime Minister on 20 March will provide the main opportunity for political talks with President Nyerere. Although he seems to have decided firmly not to stand for re-election as President of Tanzania at next October's elections, he has two more years to run as Chairman of Tanzania's single political party, the Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM - Revolutionary Party) and we expect him to continue to take a keen interest in the main lines of Tanzania's internal and external policies.

It seems probable that President Nyerere will turn his attention increasingly to a number of major international issues. He holds strong views on Southern Africa and will wish to take every opportunity to push for a stronger line against South Africa (we can expect to be a major target). He believes that the world economic system is rigged against the interests of developing countries and that the latter should use all their political muscle to counter the predominance of the developed countries, especially the industrialised West. He is also taking a growing interest in disarmament. Because he is highly articulate and an elder statesman both of Africa and of the Commonwealth, his views receive disproportionate attention. The fact that he has mishandled his own country's economy counts for little with those who admire the way that he has stuck to his political ideals. It is unlikely that we shall succeed in converting him, but his visit at least provides a rare opportunity to secure his recognition that our own approach to these issues and our analysis of the world situation are equally sincere and equally principled. We shall, of course, let you have detailed briefing nearer the time of the visit.

The Foreign Secretary, who will be in Brussels for a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 18-19 March,

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/will

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will be available for the talks on 20 March and suggests that the talks also be attended by Mr Rifkind, Mr Fergusson, and our High Commissioner to Tanzania, Mr Sankey. We do not yet know whom President Nyerere will be bringing with him. Should his Foreign Minister (Mr Benjamin Mkapa) come to London, he would no doubt wish to take part in the discussions, together with the Tanzanian High Commissioner here, Mr Anthony Nyakyi.

I am copying this to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





Visit of President and Mrs Nyerere 17-21 March 1985

Outline Programme

Sunday 17 March

1400 Arrival by private aircraft. (Met by Her Majesty The Queen's Special Representative and a Cabinet Minister.)

No Official engagements.

Stay at Claridges Hotel

Monday 18 March

1000 Guard of honour in FCO quadrangle followed by courtesy call on Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. Mr Rifkind to accompany

1045- Talks with Mr Raison at Eland House  
1130

1230 Lord Mayor's luncheon at Mansion House. Mr Luce to attend for  
1315

1530 Call by Dr Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury

1630 Call by Cardinal Hume, Archbishop of Westminster  
(Not yet confirmed)

1830 Reception hosted by Mr Rifkind for OAU Heads of Missions resident in London and their wives

[Theatre party: Twelfth Night]

Tuesday 19 March

Morning free for calls

1315 Luncheon with HM The Queen at Buckingham Palace

Evg Return hospitality at the Tanzanian High Commission

Wednesday 20 March

0930 Call by the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon Mr Neil Kinnock MP

1030 Call by the Rt Hon James Callaghan MP

1200 Talks with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street [Secretary of State, Mr Rifkind and Mr Fergusson to attend]



- 1300 Lunch hosted by the Prime Minister  
pm Free for calls
- 1800 Address Royal Commonwealth Society, followed by  
reception (Mr Rifkind or Mr Raison to attend)
- 2000 Private dinner (hosted by Commonwealth Secretary  
General)

Thursday 21 March

- 1000 Visit Reading University with Vice Chancellor in  
attendance
- 1200/ Early lunch  
1230
- 1330 Leave for Heathrow
- 1500 Depart by private aircraft





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 February, 1985

*CR 25/2*  
Dear Caroline,

President of Tanzania

I understand that you have made a provisional appointment in the diary for the Prime Minister to receive President Nyerere of Tanzania with a Guard of Honour at 10.00 am on Monday, 18 March, in the FCO Quadrangle, followed by a brief courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street.

I am writing to let you know that this appointment can now be confirmed. The Guard of Honour will follow the usual form and a rehearsal will take place at 10.00 am on Tuesday, 12 March. A member of the Press Office may wish to attend the rehearsal.

*Yours ever*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Mrs Caroline Ryder  
10 Downing Street

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FILE

cc: PC  
CR

WJ

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 January, 1985

PROPOSED VISIT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE

Thank you for your letter of 21 January about the proposed arrangements for President Nyerere's visit.

59 The Prime Minister is content that President Nyerere should come in the week beginning 17 March. The arrangement which would suit her best would be to hold talks on the morning of Wednesday, 20 March followed by a lunch (rather than a dinner that evening). The Prime Minister would, in addition, be happy for a Guard of Honour ceremony to be held in the FCO Quadrangle and to receive President Nyerere for a courtesy call on the first day of his visit. You will wish to talk to Caroline Ryder to set a time for this.

(C.D. Powell)

CST

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Talks planned by lunch C.R.P.C. (1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January, 1985

Prime Minister

Yes  
no

Agree to:  
(a) Guard of Honour ceremony & courtesy call at beginning of visit.  
(b) talks & lunch at end?

Dear Charles,

Proposed Visit of President Nyerere

C.D.P. 22/1

In your letter of 5 November, you confirmed the Prime Minister's agreement that President Nyerere should be invited to Britain as a Guest of the Government and mentioned her preference for the week beginning 18 March rather than the dates initially put forward. The Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State House officials have now indicated that a visit during that week should be possible. They propose that President Nyerere, whose visit to Yugoslavia is scheduled to end on 16 March, should fly to London on Sunday 17 March, and that his programme should begin the following day. They further propose that he should leave London on Thursday 21 March.

MP

I would be grateful if you could confirm that the Prime Minister will be free to hold talks with President Nyerere on the afternoon of Wednesday 20 March and host a dinner for him that evening.

Since these appointments fall at the end of his visit, the Prime Minister may well feel it appropriate for the President to pay a courtesy call on her at the beginning of his programme. If the Prime Minister is agreeable to this suggestion, she may also agree that a Guard of Honour would more suitably be held in the FCO Quadrangle immediately preceding the few minutes conversation at No 10. (The possible alternatives are rather unsatisfactory: a Guard of Honour at the airport on arrival on Sunday, or before the talks and dinner on Wednesday). We would not expect the Guard of Honour and the courtesy call to take more than half an hour all told.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Tanzania: Visit of Nyere





FILE

cc: PC  
B

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 November, 1984

PROPOSED VISIT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE OF TANZANIA

Thank you for your letter of 2 November about the proposed invitation to President Nyerere to visit Britain.

The Prime Minister agrees that he should be invited next year as a Guest of the Government. However neither of the dates mentioned are particularly convenient for her, and she would prefer the week beginning 18 March, with a strong preference for 20 March for her talks and dinner with Nyerere.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November, 1984

Prime Minister

Agree to invite,  
subject to dates  
fitting?

CDP  
21/11

Dear Charles,

Proposed Visit of President Nyerere of Tanzania

In June this year, the Royal Visits Committee supported the recommendation that President Nyerere should be invited here during 1985 as a Guest of Government. The Secretary of State has agreed to the idea and I now seek the Prime Minister's approval so that we can issue a formal invitation to the Tanzanian President.

President Nyerere has said he will stand down from the Presidency during 1985. The elections which would herald his departure will probably take place towards the end of 1985. In order to avoid a time which will be very hectic for President Nyerere, it would probably be best if we were to aim for dates for the visit early in the year. I understand that informal enquiries of your Office and the Palace indicate that the week beginning 4 March or that beginning 11 March would fit into present diary plans. Either of those weeks would be suitable for the Secretary of State, and our Post in Dar es Salaam do not at present know of any reasons why President Nyerere could not travel to the UK during one of those weeks.

Budd? 13/11?

Our aim in inviting President Nyerere before he steps down would be to acknowledge the considerable respect he enjoys as an elder African and Commonwealth statesman, and as Chairman of the Front Line states. It is likely also that he will retain his position as Chairman of Tanzania's sole political party after he quits the Presidency. He will therefore remain an important influence on the internal Tanzanian scene and on its external policies.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*Tanzania*

15 September 1979

Talk with President Nyerere

As you know, the Prime Minister gave a working dinner for President Nyerere at No.10 last night. I enclose a copy of the record of the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M.O'D.B. ALEXANDER



G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MASTER SET

RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE  
OVER A WORKING DINNER AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1979  
AT 2030

Original on: —  
Tanzania: Aug 79

Present: Prime Minister  
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
Lord Harlech  
Sir Antony Duff  
Sir Peter Preston  
H.E. Sir Peter Moon  
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

President Nyerere  
Mr. Benjamin Mkapa  
(Minister for Foreign Affairs)  
H.E. Mr. Amon Nsekela  
(Tanzanian High Commissioner  
in London)  
Captain Joseph Butiku  
(Private Secretary)

Constitutional Conference

President Nyerere said that so far as he could judge the Constitutional Conference had so far gone well. A good atmosphere had been established and this was important. It would be important not to push the participants too hard. He was confident that progress could be made. It was unlikely that the Conference would break down on the question of the constitution. In particular it would be surprising if the Patriotic Front were to try to break on this issue. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Patriotic Front might not find the concept of reserved seats for the white population unacceptable.

President Nyerere said he did not see a major difficulty here. The Patriotic Front wanted a settlement and knew that, while they might be tempted to ignore Bishop Muzorewa, they could not ignore Mr. Smith. President Nyerere commented that the original Tanzanian constitution had not accorded the President all the powers he needed: this had not prevented him from changing the constitution subsequently. (The implication that the Patriotic Front could change the constitution if and when they came to power was clear.)

Interim Arrangements

President Nyerere said that in his judgement the Conference would have to take up the question of the interim arrangements at an early stage. If he were leading the Patriotic Front delegation he would be saying that the constitution could be discussed by

/the lawyers

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the lawyers while the main Conference got down to discussing the transitional period. He asked what Lord Carrington had in mind. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he was conscious that the negotiations in Geneva had broken down on the question of transitional arrangements and that it would be important to try to keep the arrangements as simple as possible. The Prime Minister said that there would have to be a ceasefire and the armed forces in the field would have to return to their barracks. It had been agreed in Lusaka that the bullet was going to be exchanged for the ballot and that HMG should concentrate on the arrangements for the election. It would be the responsibility of the military commanders to get their soldiers into barracks before the election campaign began. It would be the responsibility of the victor in the election to weld the existing armies into a single national force.

President Nyerere rejected this approach. If HMG wanted a peaceful Zimbabwe the problem of the three armies had to be solved now. If the participants in the Conference wanted a free and fair election the armies would have to be merged before that election. This was a condition for a peaceful transition. If they were not prepared to accept the merging of the armies it could only be because they were not prepared to accept the results of the election. The men who controlled the armies were at present in London and there was no need to postpone tackling the issue. If HMG allowed the discussion to be postponed it would mean that they were only trying to get out of the situation and that they were prepared to condemn the country to civil war. If HMG and the Zimbabweans agreed to proceed to independence with three armies in the field, he would not seek to interfere. But, equally, he would not back the settlement. He would not support any arrangement that guaranteed a civil war and he had no interest in postponing the civil war. He would rather that it took place now.

Sir Antony Duff said that it would be impossible to achieve agreement now on the creation of a single army. It might be possible to move to discussion of a merger once agreement had been reached on the constitution and other aspects of the interim arrangements but the negotiation was certain to be difficult and prolonged. A lengthy pause between agreement



on the constitution and the holding of an election would be extremely dangerous. Analysing President Nyerere's fears about the implications of the continued existence of three armies after an election, Sir Antony Duff pointed out that the newly elected government would be basing the national force either on the forces at present based in Salisbury or on those at present opposing them. In the first case, the loyalty of the present defence force was assured. The Patriotic Front would have to decide to allow their forces to be merged and presumably, an election having been held and they having lost, they would be deprived of the support of the Front Line States. It would be impossible for them to continue the struggle. In the second case, the national force would be based on the Patriotic Front's own soldiers. Some of the forces of Bishop Muzorewa's administration would adhere and many would leave the country. Again, it would be impossible for them to continue fighting. President Nyerere asked about the South African reaction to the defeat of Bishop Muzorewa's administration in an election. Would they not back Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Smith in continuing the struggle? The Prime Minister said that the South African reaction would be irrelevant because many of the whites would, in any case, leave Zimbabwe. Sir Antony Duff said that the risk of continuing civil war after an election, described by President Nyerere, existed but was not a large one. President Nyerere said that he was not prepared to accept it.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was realistic to suppose that in the aftermath of an election the losers would be able to continue the struggle. The pressure of world opinion would be intense. She asked President Nyerere whether he would continue to support the Patriotic Front, supposing they lost the election, against a democratic constitution and an elected government negotiated in accordance with the Lusaka agreement. President Nyerere said that if he was not put in a position to tell the Patriotic Front to disband/<sup>their forces</sup> before the election he would not be able to do so after an election. Sir Antony Duff asked whether, in the event that an effort was made to secure the merger of the armies before an election and failed, President Nyerere would be prepared to back whatever other agreements might be reached at the Constitutional Conference. President Nyerere said that if a serious effort to create a single army were made and failed the

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/question



question then would be whether HMG were prepared to put in a military force or to organise a Commonwealth force. If they were not prepared to do this, the Conference was a waste of time. The Prime Minister asked if President Nyerere thought it would be helpful to introduce a fourth army into Zimbabwe where it would simply become bogged down in guerilla warfare. President Nyerere did not respond. The Prime Minister asked what proportion of the Patriotic Front's forces would be prepared to go on fighting once a constitution had been agreed and the arrangements for an election were in train. Mr. Mkapa said that if no agreement on a merger had been reached, he would expect the Patriotic Front's commanders to ensure that their men remained in the field. So long as the various armies were in being a genuine election campaign would be impossible.

President Nyerere said that if his government were satisfied that HMG were implementing the Lusaka agreement in full, they would not back the Patriotic Front in rejecting it. They would if necessary ask forcefully why the Patriotic Front wished to keep their army in being. They were already telling SWAPO that they could not use their troops in Angola and Namibia to reject the results of an election in Namibia. They were telling ZANU and ZAPU the same. But who was telling Smith? If HMG were not prepared to pursue the issue, they were, he repeated, wasting their time at the Constitutional Conference. One had only to think of what Mr. Sithole would have done earlier this year if he had had an army behind him. If a civil war broke out following agreement on a constitution, the United Kingdom would not be involved but Tanzania would. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that ~~President Nyerere's approach to the problem represented~~ by the three armies was logical but, in his judgement, impracticable. He considered that HMG's approach was the right one and that the President's fears were misplaced.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if General Walls were prepared to say before an election that he would accept the government resulting from that election whatever its complexion, the military commanders of ZANLA and ZIPRA would be prepared to do the same. President Nyerere, while not replying directly to the Prime Minister's question, said that it would be important to

/make an



make an effort to secure commitments of the kind she had outlined. But once the commitments had been obtained, IMG would then have to ask why the commanders would not proceed forthwith to the creation of a single army. His test of the genuineness of any agreement would be the merger of the armies. The Prime Minister said that an undertaking from the military commanders would nonetheless be a very substantial step forward.

President Nyerere began the concluding part of the discussion by saying that he was sure that the Patriotic Front wanted a settlement. Long discussions with them in Lusaka and Havana had convinced him that they had come to London to do business. It would be essential now to maintain the momentum of the discussions and not to allow any of the participants to absent themselves from London. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary urged that President Nyerere should see the Patriotic Front while he was in London and press them to participate constructively in next week's discussion of the constitution. President Nyerere, having noted the importance of not allowing Bishop Muzorewa to get away with nothing more than agreement on the constitution, said that while he would tell the Patriotic Front of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's concern, he was not prepared to exert any pressure on them. The Prime Minister ended the discussion by saying that if things did not go well at the Conference she might well wish to get in touch again with the Presidents of the Front Line States.

The talk ended at 2230.

M. O. B. [unclear]



MR. ALEXANDER  
(Approved by PM)

SEATING PLAN FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S WORKING DINNER  
FOR PRESIDENT NYERERE OF TANZANIA ON FRIDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER  
1979 IN THE SMALL DINING ROOM AT 10 DOWNING STREET  
AT 8.00 P.M. FOR 8.30 P.M.

---

Captain Joseph Butiku

Sir Peter Moon

Sir Peter Preston

Mr. Benjamin Mkapa

Mr. Amon Nsekela

THE PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Secretary

President Nyerere

~~Mr. Daniel Mloka~~

The Rt. Hon. Lord Harlech

Sir Antony Duff

Mr. Michael Alexander

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1979

Dear Michael,

*At back  
of file*

*mw*

The Prime Minister's Dinner for President Nyerere  
14 September

I enclose briefs on Namibia and on aid for Tanzania for the Prime Minister's dinner for President Nyerere. Our principal objective at the dinner will be to secure President Nyerere's support for the course which the Government are pursuing at the Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia. I am sending the brief on this separately, taking account of developments at the Conference.

Although Namibia will be very much a secondary issue, it would be timely if the Prime Minister could refer briefly to the subject in terms of brief No 2. (President Nyerere may himself raise it). The Five are now briefing the South African Government, SWAPO and the Front Line States about the detailed plan for a demilitarised zone. The British Government has been asked by the Five to discuss this with representatives of the Front Line States now in London to monitor the Constitutional Conference.

For his part, President Nyerere may seek to sound us out on the future of our aid programme in Tanzania, particularly our response to his appeal for special assistance in the wake of the Ugandan war. The cuts in public expenditure mean that we are unlikely to offer very much in this context, but we can reassure the President that our mainstream aid programme is to continue on lines commensurate with Tanzanian need. (The Permanent Secretary at the ODA, Sir Peter Preston, will be present at the dinner).

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'DB Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1979

*Dear Michael,*Rhodesia: Constitutional Conference

This letter follows Lord Carrington's minute PM/79/74 in which he set out our approach to the Constitutional Conference.

Lord Carrington made clear in his opening speech that we regard it as essential in the Conference to seek a measure of agreement first on the general outline of the independence Constitution, before going on to tackle the pre-independence arrangements. In his opening statement, Bishop Muzorewa made a strong defence of the existing constitutional arrangements, but implied that he was prepared to discuss our outline proposals. The Patriotic Front, as expected, sought to evade discussion of the main elements of the constitution and to insist on prior agreement on the pre-independence arrangements.

We have now managed to get over the initial procedural hurdle and have moved to item one of our agenda: "The Independence Constitution". In an attempt to focus discussion on this item we have tabled our fuller constitutional proposals (Annex B to Lord Carrington's minute). The Prime Minister's meeting with Nyerere will therefore come at a most important stage. We have to continue to urge the Commonwealth African Presidents to persuade the Patriotic Front to negotiate seriously on the Constitution. This is a necessary preliminary to being able to demonstrate to them and to a wider audience that, if the Patriotic Front will not co-operate, the responsibility for failure to reach agreement will lie with them.

It will be important to enlist Nyerere's support for our constitutional proposals. In doing so it will be necessary to make clear to him that we regard it as indispensable to an agreement that, for a limited period, there should be a reasonable proportion of white representatives in the House of Assembly elected by the white community. The proportion should not exceed 20% and must fall short of the minority required to block constitutional amendment or a wide range of legislation. This is the point of principle at issue for us.

In order to enlist Nyerere's support - if we can obtain it - for constitutional proposals on these lines it will be important to convince him that we are prepared to deal satisfactorily with the pre-independence arrangements. In discussion with him, and in our subsequent contacts with the other African Presidents, we must make it clear that we are prepared to accept the implications of the call

/in the

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street





CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

in the Lusaka communique for "free and fair elections properly supervised under the authority of the British Government". It will then be up to the Presidents to ascertain whether the Patriotic Front are prepared to put their political standing to the test in elections in which they would have a fair - but no more than that - chance of winning.

/ The brief which I enclose with this minute is designed to achieve that objective. The Prime Minister could start from the position that we wish to enlist Nyerere's help in ensuring that the Patriotic Front continue (if they have so started) or begin (if they have not) to engage in serious discussion of our fuller constitutional proposals. If President Nyerere attempts to defend the Patriotic Front's initial attempt to stall on the independence Constitution until the "transfer of power" had been discussed, it will be necessary to tell him that - so far as the British Government is concerned - the question of to whom power is to be transferred must be settled by the people of Rhodesia in free elections, supervised under our authority. We should obviously do so in terms designed to reassure him that we recognise that there are real issues to be settled in this connection, when the time comes to deal with them.

/ Exactly how far it would be prudent to go in discussing the pre-independence arrangements with Nyerere is a matter for careful consideration. I am enclosing, in addition to the brief for the meeting, background papers which illustrate the kind of military and administrative arrangements for the transition which might need to be discussed in the unlikely event of an agreement on an independence constitution and of an expression of willingness by the Patriotic Front to take part in elections without a dominant position in advance. As these papers show, such a situation would pose many difficult problems, of which the difficulty of making military arrangements in these circumstances would be the worst, and quite possibly insuperable. But, as preparation for a talk with Nyerere, the Prime Minister may wish to have these problems in mind because he will expect us to have thought about them, and may himself mention them. He may, for example, ask whether we are prepared to contemplate a return to legality - which could involve the appointment of a British Commissioner - and the introduction of a Commonwealth, or some other neutral, force in the period before elections are held.

We have not yet discussed any such ideas with Bishop Muzorewa. There is a risk that what is said to Nyerere in this connection will be relayed to Muzorewa and misunderstood by him. In talking to Nyerere this consideration should be balanced against the need to convince him of our readiness to accept the implications of the Lusaka agreement, and to make the Patriotic Front in due course a fair offer on the electoral process. The Prime Minister will probably not wish to go further than is suggested in paragraphs 12 and 13

/of the

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-3-

of the notes for the meeting. On one point we must stand absolutely firm with Nyerere - that in our Conference there can be no discussion with the parties of the pre-independence arrangements until agreement has been reached on the independence constitution and on the principle of free and fair elections, properly supervised under our authority.

These papers are intended to provide a basis for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's meeting with the Prime Minister at 5.30 pm tomorrow, to discuss the handling of the working dinner with President Nyerere. As I explained to you, the papers have been written in the light of Lord Carrington's comments on a previous draft, but have not yet been seen by him in their present form.

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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Tanzania

48

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 August 1979

Rhodesia: President Nyerere

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has approved, with one or two minor amendments, the text of the message from her to President Nyerere enclosed with your letter to Bryan Cartledge of 29 August. I enclose a copy of the text which she will be signing in the course of the day: I will send you the signed version for onward transmission as soon as it is available.

I have also mentioned to you on the telephone that the Prime Minister would be prepared to offer President Nyerere a working dinner at No. 10 on the evening of Friday 14 September. The maximum number of places at the meal will be twelve: it would obviously be desirable to limit the numbers still further if possible. Eight might be ideal.

MA

Guest list: Sept 7<sup>th</sup> - 12.00.

Reception: Sept 12<sup>th</sup> - 17.00

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JS



MRS. BURGESS

c.c. Mr. Pattison

The Prime Minister has agreed to have a working dinner for President Nyerere on Friday, 14 September. Could you please liaise with Michael Alexander about the guest list.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

30 August, 1979.

E.R.  
①  
PRIME MINISTER

President Nyerere

You agreed earlier this month to see President Nyerere at No. 10 at 1000 on 15 September. (The President is passing through London on his way back from a State Visit to Ireland.)

We have now learned that President Nyerere will have to leave London so early on the morning of 15 September as to make a meeting that day virtually impossible. However President Nyerere, who will be arriving in London at noon on Friday 14 September, would be prepared to place himself at your disposal at any time on the afternoon or evening (however late) of 14 September. If you were prepared to see him on the Friday evening, Caroline believes that your engagements in Devon could be arranged so as to make a meeting in London possible after 8 p.m.

The options would seem to be a small working dinner at 8 p.m. or a meeting after dinner at 9 p.m. There would be obvious attractions from President Nyerere's point of view in offering him a meal. Would you be prepared to do so?

*Ann*

*August*  
29 September 1979



①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1979

Prime Minister: This reply will of course, if you agree the text, go in telegraphic form. I have changed the date in para 1 from 15 September to 14 September on the assumption that you will agree to see Pres. Nyerere on your return from Harare (separate minute attached)

Dear Boyer,

Rhodesia: President Nyerere's Message

*1 min. 29/8  
Agreed. Add  
is action  
revised  
regards  
and,  
in response  
to his  
letter  
sentinal  
my*

President Nyerere has sent a message to the Prime Minister about Rhodesia (Dar-es-Salaam telno 695 enclosed).

President Nyerere will be leaving Dar-es-Salaam on 1 September to attend the non-aligned summit meeting in Havana. He and President Kaunda will be meeting the Patriotic Front leaders in Havana. Our aim must be to ensure that the two Presidents support the action we have taken following the Lusaka agreement. We are in touch privately with President Kaunda (we will be reporting further on this), who has said that he will be prepared to support a step by step approach, whereby we shall be seeking to reach agreement first on the independence constitution, before going on to discuss pre-independence arrangements.

I attach a draft reply which the Prime Minister may wish to send to President Nyerere.

*Yours ever,  
Stephen*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/despatch/box~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: PRESIDENT NYERERE

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message about Rhodesia. I am glad to be keeping in touch and grateful to you for setting out your thoughts in advance of the Constitutional Conference. I look forward to <sup>seeing</sup> ~~the opportunity~~, when you are in London on <sup>14</sup> ~~15~~ September, to discuss <sup>the position then reached</sup> ~~the problems which will arise~~ at the Conference.

You raised the question of the parliamentary representation of the white community. I fully understand the point you make, but we have to have regard to the reality of the situation in Rhodesia, both in historical perspective, and in the light of what is likely to be practicable. I do not in fact regard it as unreasonable that (for the first few years after independence only) there should be provision for the election of a number of representatives of the minority community by that community themselves. (Such a provision has been a common feature of all previous attempts to achieve a settlement, including the Anglo-American proposals). A provision of this sort is by its nature transitional; and it must not operate in such a way as to

/ allow

Enclosures—flag(s).....



allow the representatives of the minority to exert a blocking power over a wide range of legislation. This <sup>would be</sup> ~~is~~ unprecedented: I made clear at Lusaka my views on this point.

I much agree with your second point. We do indeed intend to act at the Conference as the de-colonising power. We have convened a constitutional conference and its task will be to reach agreement on the independence constitution for Zimbabwe. We are - deliberately - adopting a step by step approach; unless we seek to build up areas of agreement before moving on to tackle other difficulties, we shall get nowhere. We have put forward outline proposals for a Constitution. If there is a measure of agreement on that outline, we shall be ready to bring forward the necessary more detailed proposals.

Once progress has been made towards agreement on the independence constitution, we can move on to discuss the manner in which it should be implemented. The first point must be acceptance by the parties that new elections will be held, properly supervised under the British Government's authority. We have exercised that authority before and Commonwealth observers would be present to see how it was exercised on this occasion. As I said in Lusaka, we are prepared to carry out our responsibility in this and in other respects. The arrangements for new elections must permit the parties to participate in them with an equal chance of success. It will be our responsibility to ensure that that is so; and the responsibility of the Commonwealth to witness the manner in which the elections are carried out.

/ There

There is one particular way in which we need your help in this venture. The success or failure of our determined effort to achieve a negotiated settlement is likely to depend on the influence you and the other Commonwealth African leaders are able to exert. It will be extremely difficult to get Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues to accept different constitutional arrangements on the key issues and <sup>to agree</sup> that new elections should be held. There will be no chance of agreement if, for their part, the leaders of the Patriotic Front reject, as they have done in their statement in Dar-es-Salaam, the British Government's constitutional proposals and its authority to supervise elections. I note that Mr Mugabe is already saying that he expects the Conference to fail.

It is our intention at the Conference to act as suggested in your message. We must seek to get as much agreement as possible from both sides. We are determined to transfer power on the basis of a Constitution which we can defend as a democratic document and which the rest of the world will recognise as such. That is exactly our approach. Both sides will I hope realise that it is likely to be costly for them if they seek to frustrate a political solution on these lines. ~~I look forward to discussing with you the position we have reached on 15 September.~~

*Warm personal regards,*



# CONFIDENTIAL

GR 130

RESTRICTED

FM DAR ES SALAAM 290700Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 700 OF 29 AUGUST

YOUR TELNO 282 AND MY TELNO 698: PRESIDENT NYERERE

1. THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL IN THE MFA HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO ASK, ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF STATE HOUSE, IF THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER CAN BE CHANGED. HAVING LOOKED AT THEIR FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS THE PRESIDENT WILL NOW NEED TO LEAVE LONDON VERY EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 15 SEPTEMBER. THIS WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT DOWNING STREET AT 1000. HE IS MOST ANXIOUS FOR A MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER AND HAS SAID THAT HE IS AT HER DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME ON THE AFTERNOON OR EVENING (HOWEVER LATE) OF 14 SEPTEMBER. HIS PLANE ARRIVES LONDON FROM DUBLIN AT ABOUT 12 NOON THAT DAY.

2. MR WAKIL ASKED FOR A REPLY IF POSSIBLE BEFORE THE PRESIDENT LEAVES DAR ES SALAAM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.

HINCHCLIFFE

## FILES

RHOD D  
CADS  
N AM D  
NEWS D  
FUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
ES & SD  
CCD  
FRD  
UND  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
(MR FREELAND)  
(MR FIFOOT)  
ECON D

PCD  
DEF D  
OID  
PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN  
MR WILLSON  
MR BYATT

## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

RHODESIA -POLICY

# CONFIDENTIAL



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subject file  
Rhodesia - Situation

GRS 800

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DESKBY 251130Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 250900Z AUGUST 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 695 OF 25 AUGUST

T84/79T

from Nyerere  
to IM

Pt 5

Ly

Paul

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T84/79T

MIPT: RHODESIA. FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY  
TEXT OF MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSURES. I WAS VERY  
GLAD TO RECEIVE THESE DOCUMENTS WHEN I RETURNED TO DAR ES  
SALAAM ON TUESDAY, 21ST AUGUST.

FIRST LET ME SAY THAT YOUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A RHODESIAN  
CONSTITUTION SEEM TO ME TO BE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE LUSAKA  
AGREEMENT.

THERE ARE HOWEVER THREE POINTS I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE NOW THAT  
I HAVE CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTS YOU SENT TO ME. THE FIRST  
IS ON A DETAIL IN YOUR OUTLINE. I NOTICE THAT YOU ENVISAGE  
THE WHITE MEMBERS OF THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT BEING ELECTED  
ONLY BY WHITE CITIZENS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IDEA, AND I AM  
SURE IT IS WHAT IAN SMITH WOULD LIKE. BUT I THINK IT WOULD  
BE A MISTAKE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY  
ITSELF, ESPECIALLY IN THE LONG RUN. THE ORIGINAL TANGANYIKAN  
PRACTICE WAS THAT CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN SEATS HAD TO  
BE EUROPEANS, NOMINATED BY EUROPEAN CITIZENS FROM THAT  
CONSTITUENCY, BUT THE WHOLE MULTI-RACIAL ELECTORATE TOOK PART  
IN THE CHOICE BETWEEN THOSE EUROPEANS WHO HAD BEEN NOMINATED.  
THIS SYSTEM HAD TWO IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IT MEANT  
THAT THE EUROPEAN CANDIDATES HAD TO CONSIDER THE INTERESTS  
AND IDEAS OF THE AFRICAN VOTERS AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN VOTERS,  
AND IN PARTICULAR AVOID PROVOCATIVE RACIAL STATEMENTS.  
SECONDLY, THE AFRICAN VOTERS WERE FORCED TO CONSIDER EUROPEAN  
CANDIDATES AS POTENTIAL POLITICAL ALLIES, RATHER THAN AS PEOPLE  
AUTOMATICALLY HOSTILE TO THEMSELVES. THE SYSTEM THUS BROKE  
DOWN RACIAL STEREOTYPES AND ASSISTED THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION  
OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. I BELIEVE IT IS AN IMPORTANT RESULT  
OF HAVING STARTED WITH THIS SYSTEM THAT WE IN TANZANIA NOW  
HAVE SEVERAL NON-AFRICANS WHO WERE ORIGINALLY ELECTED TO THE  
RESERVED SEATS BUT WHO NOW GET ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT ON THEIR  
OWN MERITS IN COMPETITION WITH AFRICAN CANDIDATES IN THEIR  
CONSTITUENCY.

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LET ME NOW



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LET ME NOW TURN TO MORE BASIC POINTS, WHICH SEEM TO ME TO BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS NEW INITIATIVE ON RHODESIA. I BELIEVE IT IS VITAL THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NOT GO TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AS A 'NEUTRAL', ARBITRATING BETWEEN CONTENDING GROUPS. BRITAIN, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF LORD CARRINGTON AS CHAIRMAN, SHOULD ATTEND AND ACT AT THE CONFERENCE AS THE DE-COLONISING POWER IT IS. IT SHOULD SHOW ITSELF ANXIOUS TO GET AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE FROM ALL THOSE INVOLVED, AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON DETAILS., BUT AS DETERMINED TO TRANSFER POWER TO PEOPLE ELECTED UNDER A CONSTITUTION WHICH BRITAIN CAN DEFEND AS A DEMOCRATIC DOCUMENT AND WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL RECOGNISE AS SUCH. IF BRITAIN ATTENDS THE CONFERENCE AS AN ARBITRATOR ONLY, THE RHODESIANS WILL ARGUE INTERMINABLY AND SOON START TRYING TO MAKE THE OTHER PARTY - OR BRITAIN ITSELF - APPEAR AS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT BREAK-UP OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH THEY THEMSELVES DESIRE. I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE WHICH I BELIEVE THIS MATTER TO HAVE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE.

MY SECOND POINT FOLLOWS ON FROM THAT. IN LUSAKA WE STATED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS WOULD BE "PROPERLY SUPERVISED UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, AND WITH COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS". THE WORRY WHICH REMAINS IN MY MIND - AND I BELIEVE YOU WOULD RATHER THAT I WAS COMPLETELY FRANK WITH YOU ON THESE IMPORTANT MATTERS - IS WHETHER YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE - POLITICALLY AND IN OTHER WAYS - TO GET ITSELF INTO THE POSITION WHERE IT REALLY DOES HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY AND POWER ON THE GROUND TO CARRY OUT THIS FUNCTION TO THE FULL. I NOYICED THAT YOU RESERVED THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, AND I AM NOT QUESTIONING THAT; HOW YOU GET AUTHORITY AND EXERCISE IT IS - I FULLY ACCEPT - YOUR AFFAIR. BUT THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF YOUR AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA IS CRUCIAL TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION THERE AND TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP IN GETTING THESE ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AFRICA. I CAN ARGUE FOR BRITAIN'S AUTHORITY AND IMPARTIALITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES FIGHTING THE ELECTION. I CANNOT ARGUE FOR AUTHORITY WIELDED IN PRACTICE BY THOSE WHO ARE NOW RUNNING RHODESIA - ANY MORE THAN YOU COULD DO IT IT WERE WIELDED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. I DO REALISE THAT IN RAISING THIS POINT I AM DISCUSSING THE 'INTERIM' BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION IS SETTLED WHEREAS YOUR



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STRATEGY IS TO DEAL WITH ONE STEP AT A TIME. BUT I DO SO BECAUSE GETTING AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION - WHICH WILL ITSELF GREATLY EASE THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS - WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE EMPHASIS AND IMPORTANCE BRITAIN GIVES TO SATISFYING EVERYONE THAT IT REALLY INTENDS TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY DURING THE ELECTIONS AND THE RUN-UP TO THEM. IT IS REALLY A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION.

I SUPPOSE THAT BOTH MY MAJOR POINTS AMOUNT TO THE SAME THING: THAT BRITAIN HAS TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN THIS AGREED PROCESS OF DE-COLONISING RHODESIA ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS AN EASY THING FOR A BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1970S - I HAVE ALREADY SEEN REPORTS THAT NEWSPAPER EDITORS ETC. ARE CALLING UPON YOUR GOVERNMENT TO BE 'NEUTRALS' AT THE CONFERENCE. AND I DO RECOGNISE THE SPECIAL DIFFICULTY OF BRITAIN ASSUMING AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA, WHERE IT HAS NEVER EXERCISED IT ON THE GROUND. BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THE OBVIOUS EXISTENCE OF BRITISH AUTHORITY DURING THE INTERIM, AND AT THE CONFERENCE, IS THE ONLY WAY TO SUCCESS. THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH MY VERY WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

HINCHCLIFFE

FILES  
RHODESIA D  
EAD  
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PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/AUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR BYATT

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Tanzania

212



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 August 1979

1) BT 13.9.79  
~~BT~~

President Nyerere

Thank you for your letter of 20 August about President Nyerere's stop-over in London on 14/15 September, on his way back from a State Visit to Ireland.

The Prime Minister would like to offer President Nyerere a meal but, as she will be away from London on the evening of 14 September and has engagements in her constituency from 12 noon on 15 September this will not possible. The Prime Minister nevertheless hopes that President Nyerere will be able to call at No. 10 at 1000 on Saturday, 15 September for an hour's talk. I should be grateful if you would confirm in due course that this is acceptable to the President.

If it is, I should be grateful if you would arrange for briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Nyerere to reach Michael Alexander not later than 1700 on Thursday 13 September: last minute up-dating will, of course, probably be necessary in the light of developments in the Constitutional Conference.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc Miss Womersley.

1

PRIME MINISTER

President Nyerere

President Nyerere is passing through London on 14/15 September, on his way back from a State Visit to Ireland. He would like to call on you: it might indeed be very useful for you to talk to him at the end of the first week of the Constitutional Conference.

You are visiting Devon on Friday, 14 September; and you have constituency engagements from 12 noon onwards on Saturday, 15 September. Could you agree to see President Nyerere at No.10 at 1000 on 15 September? As he leaves for Dar es Salaam that day, it does not look as if it will be possible for you to offer him a meal. *AM.*

*O from .*

*AM.*

22 August, 1979.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 August 1979

*Dear Bryan,*

The Tanzanian High Commission have informed us that after making a State Visit to Ireland, President Nyerere will fly to London on the morning of 14 September and will depart for Dar-es-Salaam on the morning of 15 September. The High Commission have been instructed to seek a call by President Nyerere on the Prime Minister on 14 September, if this is feasible.

Although the date of President Nyerere's stopover in London is no doubt dictated by those of his State Visit to Ireland, the timing is pointed in the context of the Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. Whatever stage the Conference may have reached, Lord Carrington thinks that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to see President Nyerere, if this is at all possible. Could you let me know if the Prime Minister would be free to do so?

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,**Stephen*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

# Grey Scale #13



**A** 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

