

Confidential Folder

Visit by Angolan Ambassador in
Brussels, Mr Dunem, in May
1980.
Visits of President Dos Santos

ANGOLA

MAY 1980

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PRETORIA: FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

YOUR TELNO 88: ANGOLA: VISIT OF PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS TO BRITAIN

1. FIRST SECRETARY, ANGOLAN EMBASSY, CALLED ON CAFD TODAY AND CONFIRMED THE RUMOUR THAT PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HAS CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO LONDON SCHEDULED FOR APRIL. DOS SANTOS HAS ALSO CANCELLED THE REST OF HIS TOUR, TO FRANCE (INCLUDING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG) AND THE NETHERLANDS.

2. SENHORA PEREIRA SAID THE TOUR HAD HAD TO BE CANCELLED FOR QUOTE REASONS OF STATE UNQUOTE. SHE COULD NOT BE SPECIFIC AS TO WHAT THESE MIGHT BE, BUT THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO CONCENTRATE ON REGIONAL ISSUES AS WELL AS INTERNAL MATTERS.

3. FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY: THE ANGOLANS HAVE CONTACTED BLO WINDHOEK ABOUT A POSSIBLE BILATERAL WITH DOS SANTOS. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PROGRAMME IS VERY FULL, BUT A SHORT MEETING IN THE MARGINS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. WE ARE SENDING TO WINDHOEK SUGGESTED POINTS TO MAKE.

HURD

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From the Private Secretary

23 January 1990

Dear Bob,

ANGOLA

Thank you for your letter of 22 January about the visit of President dos Santos in April. The Prime Minister would be able to see him at 1600 on Wednesday 18 April. I agree that Mrs Chalker should inform the President of this when she sees him later this month.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DTS

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1990

Amendes
Is this family?
CDS

Charles
1600 on Wed
18 April

Dear Charles,

AP 23/1

Angola

President dos Santos has been invited to London as guest of honour at the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) Tenth Anniversary Seminar to be held on 17 and 18 April. The Angolan Ambassador has asked that the President might be received by the Prime Minister.

The Foreign Secretary strongly recommends that the Prime Minister should see dos Santos. Angola is at a crossroads. The MPLA Government have publicly acknowledged that there is no military solution to their conflict with UNITA. But the peace process remains stalled. We know that the Angolan Government have great respect for the Prime Minister and the British role in Southern Africa and that dos Santos would take serious account of what she had to say. This would give her a chance to use her influence to urge him to resume peace negotiations with UNITA.

The Prime Minister could also encourage dos Santos to speed up the pace and scope of the political reforms upon which he has embarked as a way of accommodating UNITA politically. A meeting would help buttress him against the hardliners in his own party who remain opposed to his reforms.

The Prime Minister could explain our policies towards South Africa and encourage dos Santos in his own reappraisal of Angola's relations with South Africa. She could promote British commercial interests in Angola, which is potentially a wealthy country with large mineral reserves, principally oil and diamonds. BP is the most important British commercial presence. As the economy is liberalised and if peace is restored, there could be rich pickings for British investment and exports.

We know that the Americans would strongly welcome a meeting. In the absence of diplomatic relations between the US and Angola we have been acting as a confidential channel

/between



between the two, a role much valued by both sides. There are signs that the Americans are taking steps to improve their relations with the Angolans; but they will welcome the assessment of dos Santos the Prime Minister would make and the opportunity a meeting would give to remove various misapprehensions from his mind. However, should dos Santos' request (and this is the second request) for a meeting be refused, there is a danger that the ability of our Ambassador in Luanda to continue to act as a confidential channel between the Angolans and the Americans would be undermined, and the importance of our role in Angola viz à viz the Americans diminished.

The Foreign Secretary therefore hopes that the Prime Minister will see dos Santos in April. He would also meet him. If the recommendation is agreed, Mrs Chalker might meet President dos Santos at the SADCC Annual Consultative Conference in Lusaka on 30 January and tell him that the Prime Minister will see him.

Yours ever,

Richard Cross

pp. (R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street



cc ANFOCA : *Multilateral Situation*

PR2

cc SOUTH AFRICA:

Pl. file Situation in Namibia PR4

271450Z
FOR DUTY CLERK - NO. 10 D.S.
COMMENT: DIST GIVEN ON INSTRUCTIONS OF SUPVR/JMS

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AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

SUMMARY

1. MEETING WITH PIK BOTHA. HE CONFIRMS CONTINUANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN BRAZZAVILLE ON 8/9 JUNE. BUT SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF CUBAN FORCES INCREASING RISK OF MILITARY CLASHES MEANWHILE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL BE MAKING COUNTER-PROPOSALS BASED ON SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM NAMIBIA. EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR SOME DEAL BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON PIK BOTHA, I ASKED HOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS INTENDED TO PROCEED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD PROPOSED A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE AMERICANS, ANGOLANS AND CUBANS IN BRAZZAVILLE ON 8/9 JUNE. PIK BOTHA IS LIKELY TO LEAD THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION. BUT HE WAS SERIOUSLY WORRIED BY THE BUILD-UP OF CUBAN FORCES NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. SEVEN REGIMENTS HAD BEEN MOVED SOUTH. IN HIS MEETING WITH VAN DUNEM IN BRAZZAVILLE, HE HAD EMPHASISED THE DANGERS OF THIS MOVEMENT AT A TIME WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE GETTING UNDER WAY. IN PARTICULAR HE HAD TOLD VAN DUNEM THAT IF THE CUBAN FORCES CAME CLOSE TO THE CALUEQUE DAM JUST INSIDE THE ANGOLAN BORDER, THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS RISK OF A CLASH WITH SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES STATIONED AT THE DAM. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE BEEN THERE SINCE 1970. THE PIPELINE FROM THE DAM REGULATES THE FLOW OF WATER TO THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC PUMPING STATION ON THE RUADANA FALLS AND ALSO THE SUPPLY OF WATER FOR IRRIGATION IN OWAMBOLAND. VAN DUNEM HAD APPEARED TO TAKE THESE WARNINGS SERIOUSLY, AND PIK BOTHA HAD REPORTED ACCORDINGLY TO THE PRESIDENT. THESE MESSAGES HAD ALSO BEEN RELAYED TO THE AMERICANS, CUBANS AND RUSSIANS. BUT SINCE THEN THERE HAD BEEN A CLASH NEAR CALUEQUE ON 21 MAY. EIGHT CUBANS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE ANGOLANS HAD NOT ANNOUNCED THIS CLASH. BUT THERE ALSO HAD BEEN A BOMBARDMENT OF A CAMP AT THE DAM ON 23 MAY. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ANGOLANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO BE TOLD THAT THEY COULD NOT MOVE CUBAN TROOPS AROUND IN THEIR OWN TERRITORY. BUT IT WAS NOT THE MOMENT TO MOVE THEM FURTHER SOUTH NOW. IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD WRECK HIS EFFORTS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT IN THE EASTERN SECTOR, SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD PUSHED AS FAR NORTH AS DUITO CUANAVALA AND BEYOND. THE CUBANS AND ANGOLANS HAD FOUND A WAY OF COUNTERING THAT, BY MOVING SOUTH IN THE WESTERN SECTOR. ALL OF THIS INCREASED

THE NEED TO GET THE CUBANS OUT OF ANGOLA. WE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE BRAZZAVILLE MEETING. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD GO TO BRAZZAVILLE AND RAISE THESE CONCERNS DIRECT WITH THE CUBANS AND ANGOLANS THERE.

4. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE AGREED, PROVIDED THE CUBANS DID NOT PRESS CLOSER TO THE BORDER MEANWHILE. THIS WAS MAKING THINGS DIFFICULT FOR HIM POLITICALLY, AND WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD COUNTER-PROPOSALS. AURET IS DUE BACK HERE TOMORROW (DROCKER HAS BEEN BRIEFING HIM ON HIS TALKS WITH ADAMISHIN). THE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH THE SADF, THOUGH NOT YET WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT. THE TIME SCALE WAS ALL-IMPORTANT. PIK BOTHA HAD GOT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO AGREE THAT THEY COULD NOT GO BACK ON THEIR 1985 POSITION, THOUGH THERE MIGHT HAVE TO BE SOME MODIFICATIONS. FROM THE BEGINNING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 TO ELECTIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES IN NAMIBIA, THE TIME SCALE WAS SEVEN MONTHS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL HAD TO TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY. UNDER SCR 435 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP LEVELS IN NAMIBIA WOULD BE REDUCED PROGRESSIVELY. AFTER 3-4 MONTHS THERE WOULD BE 1,500 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN TWO CAMPS MONITORED BY THE UN. BY THE TIME THAT POINT HAD BEEN REACHED, ALL THE CUBANS WOULD NEED TO HAVE GONE. THE SAG WAS PREPARED TO SHORTEN OR LENGTHEN THE SEVEN MONTH PERIOD. BUT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF SCR 435 MUST TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY.

5. IN 1985 THERE HAD BEEN 30,000 CUBANS IN ANGOLA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD PROPOSED THAT EIGHTY PER CENT SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING 6,000 TO BE WITHDRAWN LATER. THERE WERE NOW AT LEAST 45,000 CUBANS IN ANGOLA. THE 6,000 FIGURE COULD BE MAINTAINED. BUT THE DEPARTURE OF ALL THE REST WOULD HAVE TO START IMMEDIATELY.

6. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A VERY TRUNCATED TIME-TABLE. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT IF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WAS GOING TO TAKE LONGER, THE TIME-SCALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 SHOULD ALSO BE EXTENDED. I ASKED PIK BOTHA ABOUT HIS IMPRESSION OF ANGOLAN INTENTIONS. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE ANGOLANS DID WANT A WAY OUT OF THE WAR.

7. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THEY HAD GAINED VERY LITTLE FROM THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN THEM. STRAUSS HAD POINTED THIS OUT TO GORBACHEV. THE RUSSIANS WERE WITHDRAWING FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA WAS NOT COMPARABLE: THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT LOSING MEN IN ANGOLA. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS WORTH TRYING TO SEE IF THEY WANTED A POLITICAL SOLUTION: THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL AT STAKE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THE TALKS IN LONDON HAD GAINED AN IMPRESSION OF TENSION BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND ANGOLANS. THEY THOUGHT THAT THE ANGOLANS PROBABLY DID WANT A WAY OUT. THEY WERE NOT AT ALL SURE ABOUT THE CUBANS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE DITCHING ONE OF ITS ALLIES. THE CUBAN FORCE MOVEMENTS ON THE GROUND WERE OMINOUS. THEY MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR ANOTHER ATTACK ON UNITA AND JAMBA.

8. I SAID THAT IT DID NOT SEEM VERY LIKELY THAT THIS WAS THE DIRECTION FROM WHICH FAPLA OR THE CUBANS WOULD TRY TO STAGE ANOTHER ATTACK ON JAMBA. I HAD TOLD GENERAL MALAN THAT OUR IMPRESSION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION. BUT THE SOLUTION WOULD

HAVE TO INCLUDE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE A SETTLEMENT LIMITED TO ANGOLA.

9. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT CONTEST THIS. HE CLAIMED THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 435, UNDER THE CONDITIONS HE HAD DESCRIBED. BUT COULD THE CUBAN FORCES REALLY BE WITHDRAWN WITHOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA? WITHOUT CUBAN SUPPORT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS DID NOT SEE HOW THE MPLA COULD SURVIVE AGAINST UNITA. I SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS, NO DOUBT, WOULD BE POSING THIS QUESTION IN THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE, HOWEVER, TO APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A NEW PRE-CONDITION.

COMMENT

10. IF THE POSITION DESCRIBED ABOVE IS ENDORSED BY P W BOTHA THIS WILL REPRESENT A VICTORY FOR PIK BOTHA OVER MALAN'S ATTEMPTS TO RENEGE ON UNSCR 435 OR TO INSIST THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL MUST PRECEDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION CONTAINS SOME NEGOTIATING FAT, BUT THEY WILL STICK ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MATCHING TIME-SCALES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM NAMIBIA AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WILL REMAIN IN THE FORE-FRONT OF SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING (A) BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT IN ITS ABSENCE THE MPLA WILL STILL NEED EXTERNAL SUPPORT (AND SO WILL UNITA) AND (B) BECAUSE OF P W BOTHA'S STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SAVIMBI. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL NOT BE PREPARED SIMPLY TO ABANDON SAVIMBI AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR AN OUTCOME WHICH ACCOMMODATES HIM IN SOME WAY. THE PRESIDENT IS THOUGHT LIKELY TO SUPPORT PIK BOTHA'S APPROACH, THOUGH THE HEAD OF HIS OFFICE TELLS ME THAT P W BOTHA BELIEVES THAT THE ANGOLANS WANT A WAY OUT, BUT DOUBTS IF THE CUBANS WILL BE PREPARED TO LEAVE. I SAID THAT IN THAT EVENT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD BE AIMING TO CALL THEIR BLUFF IN NEGOTIATIONS.

11. WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO GET THIS PASSED ON TO CROCKER.

RENWICK

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

23 June 1987

From the Private Secretary

POSSIBLE VISIT OF PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS OF ANGOLA

Thank you for your letter of 22 June about the approach from the Angolan authorities proposing that President Dos Santos should be invited to pay an official visit to the United Kingdom in late September.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should not invite President Dos Santos to pay an official visit but should say that if he were to be passing through London in late September we would do our best to arrange a programme for him. It must however be made clear that there is no guarantee that the Prime Minister would be available to see him.

Charles Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

to



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1987

Agree that we should
not invite President Dos
Santos on an official
visit: but leave the door open for
him to come here unofficially for
Dear Charles, a day? (He is unlikely to accept).
Yes no

CDP 22/6

Possible Visit of President Dos Santos of Angola

Our Ambassador in Luanda has been approached by the Angolan authorities with a proposal that President Dos Santos should be invited to pay an official visit from 26-28 September. He has also reported that Dos Santos has been invited by President Mitterrand to visit France in September and that he may also visit the Netherlands.

Notwithstanding the French invitation (perhaps intended to compensate for Savimbi's reception there last year), the Foreign Secretary would not wish to recommend an invitation to Dos Santos to pay an official visit to Britain in view of the situation prevailing in Angola and the lack of any firm evidence of a wish by the MPLA Government to move away from dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba. Nor would such a visit at our invitation be readily understood in Washington. In any case the dates proposed are not well chosen since they include the weekend of 26/27 September.

The request for a visit seems to have been inspired in part by the success of President Chissano's recent visit. But Angola is not Mozambique. Nevertheless it is mildly encouraging that the Angolans are showing signs of greater willingness to put substance into their relationship with us. A wholly negative reply might prejudice this process and the Foreign Secretary considers that we should tell the Angolans that should Dos Santos wish to stop off for a day on Monday 28 September, we would do our best to arrange a programme for him including meetings with senior Ministers, although it would be by no means certain that the Prime Minister would be free. It is probably unlikely that Dos Santos would accept an invitation on this basis, if only because it would not compare well with the reception granted to President Chissano. However our response should leave the door open for a gradual development of relations with the Angolan Government should they provide further evidence of a wish to move closer to the West.

Yours ever,
A C Galsworthy

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29323 - 1

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TO PRIORITY LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 136 OF 28 MAY

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN LUSAKA LAGOS GABORONE MAPUTO DAR ES
SALAAM

SAVING PARIS WASHINGTON OTTAWA BONN ADDIS ABABA SALISBURY

YOUR TEL NO 210: ANGOLAN EMISSARY

1. THE ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS, VAN DUNEM, DELIVERED A MESSAGE DATED 14 MAY FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 27 MAY (TEXT IN MIFT). IN CONVERSATION WITH ME BEFOREHAND VAN DUNEM CONCENTRATED ON SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS. SOUTH AFRICA WAS FORCING THEM TO TURN FOR ARMS TO THE USSR.
2. I SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MESSAGE OF 12 MAY HAD ENCOURAGING FEATURES WHICH SHOULD BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY. VAN DUNEM WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS AND THE CAPACITY OF THE UN TO PREVENT SOUTH AFRICA MANIUPULATING THE ELECTIONS. HE OBJECTED TO SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE UNITA AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.
3. I SAID THAT WE WOULD GO ON WORKING FOR A FAIR SETTLEMENT. ONE TROUBLE WAS THAT SWAPO WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THAN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.
4. VAN DUNEM SPOKE SIMILARLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER ADDING THAT BRITISH PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE QUOTE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN THE AREA UNQUOTE.
5. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO THE POOR HEALTH OF THE MERCENARIES IMPRISONED IN ANGOLA AND ASKED WHETHER DOS SANTOS HAD COME TO ANY CONCLUSION AS TO CLEMENCY. VAN DUNEM SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO DOS SANTOS.
6. DOS SANTOS MESSAGE WAS ABOUT UNITA. THE ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATION (PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 ABOVE) WAS INSPIRED BY THE COMMUNIQUE OF 25 MAY (YOUR TEL NO 216). VAN DUNEM TOLD US THAT SIMILAR

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29323 - 1

MESSAGES ARE GOING TO OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS - HE MENTIONED FRANCE AND GERMANY IN PARTICULAR. IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES FROM THE PRESS NEWS DEPARTMENT AND NO 10 ARE CONFIRMING THAT A MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THAT IT AND THE DISCUSSION WITH VAN DUNEM CONCERNED SOUTHERN AFRICA AND PARTICULARLY NAMIBIA. THEY WILL NOT BE DRAWN ON WHETHER IT DEALT WITH UNITA.

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CARRINGTON

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TO PRIORITY LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 28 MAY

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO CAPETOWN, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, ADDIS ABABA, SALISBURY

MIPT: ANGOLAN EMISSARY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE:

IN THE INTEREST OF SAFEGUARDING PEACE, THE COMMON ACTION IN FAVOUR OF THE LIBERATION OF THE STILL OPPRESSED PEOPLES IN OUR CONTINENT, AND WORLD PEACE, I HAVE THE HONOUR OF SENDING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY DELEGATE, WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS AND TO INFORM YOU OF IMPORTANT VIEWS RELATED TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION WHICH PREVAILS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF OUR CONTINENT.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE NOTICE WITH CONCERN THAT A NEW PLOT IS BEING PREPARED AGAINST OUR COUNTRY ALONG OUR SOUTHERN BORDER. THIS PLOT IS DIRECTLY ENGINEERED BY THE RACIST REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA IN AN UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. UNITA - THE DOCILE PUPPET OF SOUTH AFRICA IS ARMED, PROVIDED WITH MUNITIONS, INFILTRATED INTO OUR COUNTRY AND SUPPLIED WITH MASSIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IN ORDER TO MASSACRE THE UNARMED CIVIL POPULATION AND WRECK VITAL ECONOMIC SECTORS FOR OUR COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT.

IN THIS CONTEXT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE REALISATION OF A POLICY OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRATERNAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SOUVERAIN COUNTRIES IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE CONTINUED SUPPORT GIVEN TO PUPPET GROUPS IN THE SERVICE OF ENEMIES AGAINST PEOPLES AIMING AT PEACE AND PROGRESS. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, FAITHFUL TO ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, WILL CONTINUE TO PRACTICE A POLICY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD, OF NON AGGRESSION, NON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

1

CONFIDENTIAL

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29322 - 1

IN ABSOLUTE RESPECT TO THE OAU, UN AND OF THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT'S CHARTERS.

DUE TO THE CRITICAL SITUATION WHICH PREVAILS IN THIS PART
OF OUR CONTINENT, I AM SURE YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL NOT REMAIN
WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING ONCE MORE IN FINDING THE MOST CORRECT
WAY TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND DEFENCE FOR THE PEOPLES NAMELY THOSE
WHO ARE STILL UNDER RACIST AND COLONIALIST DOMINATION.

I WISH TO YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY, MY THANKS IN RECEIVING MY
DELEGATE, WHO IS ENCHARGED WITH THE TASK OF EXPLAINING TO YOU
QUESTIONS WHICH WORRY US.

ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE FEELINGS OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA WORKER'S PARTY AND OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.

LUANDA 14TH MAY 1980

CARRINGTON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 May 1980

on Angola - situation

- Oct 79

ANGOLAN EMMISARY

The Angolan Ambassador at Brussels, Sr. van Dunem, called on the Prime Minister as arranged this afternoon. I enclose the Portuguese language text and a copy of the English language text of the message from President dos Santos which he left with the Prime Minister. (dated 14-5-80)

In handing over the message, Sr. van Dunem apologised for the postponement of his previous appointment. President dos Santos had wished to wait until the situation was a little clearer before having his message delivered. Angolan territory was being repeatedly bombed by the South Africans, most recently on 21 May when there had been 200 Angolan casualties. The Angolan Government wished to work for peace and security in the region. They regarded expenditure on the purchase of weapons as a waste of money which they could ill afford to spare. So long as the threat to Angola persisted, the Angolan Government had no option but to ask "their Cuban and Russian friends" to remain in the country. This was a pity.

The Prime Minister asked Sr. van Dunem whether he thought the Cubans would leave if the Namibian problem was resolved. Sr. van Dunem said that he was sure they would go. They had come into the country in order to help repel an invasion. Like anyone else, the Angolans would prefer to live their own lives. Nobody liked to have other people on their own land. The Angolans had chosen a Socialist system but they sought good relations with everyone. They were anxious, for instance, that their trade should resume its natural pattern, i.e. that it should be principally with Western nations.

Sr. van Dunem said that President dos Santos was confident that British pressure on South Africa would be highly effective in securing an improvement in the situation in the area. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that he was delivering similar, but not identical, messages from President dos Santos to the Heads of Governments in Bonn and Brussels. The Prime Minister said she might well wish to discuss President dos Santos' message, once she had studied it, with

/Chancellor

Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Martens. There might be an occasion to do so at the European Council Meeting in Venice.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned by what she heard about the health of the British mercenaries at present in prison in Angola. She knew that HM Ambassador had raised the question with the Angolan Foreign Minister recently. She also knew that the men had been properly sentenced and had served only part of their terms. However, she wondered whether President dos Santos had yet come to any conclusion as to whether or not clemency would be extended to the mercenaries. She did not wish to press the point, but would be grateful if Sr. van Dunem could tell President dos Santos that she had raised it. Sr. van Dunem said that he would convey the message to the President.

MA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

22 May 1980

Paul

Dear Michael,

Angolan Emissary

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's use when the Angolan Ambassador at Brussels, Sr van Dunem, calls at 4.15 p.m. on Tuesday 27 May to deliver a personal message from President dos Santos. We understand that the message is likely to be mainly concerned with Namibia; but we hope that the Prime Minister's gesture in receiving the emissary personally will also have a bearing on recent requests to the Angolans to consider clemency for the British ex-mercenaries imprisoned there.

Lord Carrington will be seeing Sr van Dunem at 3.45 on 27 May.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O' D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

*Is it the not a little precious
bearing in mind the number of Cubans in
Angola? In Angola seriously thinking that the
sol. to the Namibian problem will mean the
withdrawal of the Cubans?
MB
Can I ask?*

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO MAKEMESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. Sorry not been possible to see Ambassador earlier. Please convey to President dos Santos thanks for his message. Will study it carefully and send substantive reply in due course.

NAMIBIA [Assuming message is on this subject]

2. Angola has key role. South African reply an important development. We should build on its positive elements. The UN, the Western Five and Namibia's neighbours should work together. Need a period of consultation before Secretary General Waldheim responds.

3. South Africans seem willing to make progress. Uncertain about their final intentions, but encouraged that they accept that Namibia can only be settled with UN involvement and the cooperation of SWAPO.

SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS ON ANGOLA [Defensive]

4. We have deplored them in public. We regret loss of life and property and appreciate Angolan resentment and frustration. UN Plan best hope of ending the violence.

UK/ANGOLAN RELATIONS

5. Would like to see improvement in Anglo/Angolan relations. Trade is increasing between our two countries. Welcome visit by Minister of Industry and Energy (now in UK) and Minister of Agriculture (due in July).

MERCENARIES

5. Improvement in relations impeded by plight of the seven British subjects imprisoned in Luanda since 1976. The prisoners' health has been deteriorating. Hope President dos Santos will consider granting clemency now they have served a reasonable portion of their sentences.

ESSENTIAL FACTSMESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. A personality note on Ambassador van Dunem is attached.

NAMIBIA

2. The Ambassador has said that President dos Santos' message concerns Southern Africa. Presumably this means Namibia.

3. The long-awaited South African reply was delivered on 12 May. Its constructive elements are that South Africa has:

(a) recommitted itself to an international settlement and a demilitarised zone.

(b) Agreed to various technical and military arrangements for the DMZ, thus narrowing the area of disagreement.

(c) Indicated that if their conditions can be met, they will go ahead with the UN Plan.

|| (d) Dropped its insistence on UN monitoring of SWAPO in Angola and Zambia.

4. In the week beginning 26 May the Five and the UN will begin consultations with the Front Line States and SWAPO on the terms of Waldheim's response to South Africa. We expect it to issue in two to three weeks. Lord Carrington and Dr Waldheim discussed Namibia on 22 May and agreed that the Five and the UN should work with the Front Line States to build on the South African reply. Dr Waldheim asked the Five to encourage the Front Line to maintain the positive mood in New York.

5. South Africa makes frequent small incursions into Angola in pursuit of SWAPO and from time to time hits Angolan lives and property. A recent Angolan communique protests against new attacks on such targets. If Angola took these or future South African raids to the Council, there would be the usual pressure for Chapter VII action. The UK abstained with France and the US on Resolution 454 of 2 November 1979. We deplored the South African attacks but with negotiations on the DMZ about to begin we were reluctant to take sides.

6. Angola has most at stake of the Front Line States. They consider the UN Plan the key to pacification in the South, with-

.../drawal



2.

ESSENTIAL FACTS...Cont'd

drawal of Cubans and increased economic development. The Angolan Minister of Industry and Energy told Mr Luce on 22 May that Angola believed a solution was 'close', and that there should be a period of consultation among the Five, the UN and the African States involved to resolve outstanding problems. He did not question our view on the potential of the South African reply.

ANGLO/ANGOLAN RELATIONS: MERCENARIES

7. Since the seven British mercenaries were sentenced to 16-30 years imprisonment in 1976, consular access has been granted on only five occasions. The prisoners were last visited on 5 May. Their health had deteriorated since the previous visit in March and gave cause for concern. However, medical facilities exist which enable the men to receive treatment for their various ailments.

8. On instructions HM Ambassador at Luanda raised the release of three prisoners with the Angolan Foreign Minister on 11 April. President dos Santos has reaffirmed President Neto's policy of clemency. HM Ambassador asked the Angolan Government to extend the late President's policies to the British prisoners. The Foreign Minister undertook to consult his colleagues.

Central African Department
22 May 1980



DUNEM, Fernando José França Dias van

Angolan Ambassador to Belgium and the European Community since March 1980.

Born on 24 August 1934 at Luanda, Angola

Degree in Law, Utrecht University; Doctorate in Law, Aix-en-Provence University (1969).

1964-65 Research Assistant at Institute of International Law, Utrecht University

1969-71 Professor in Public, and Constitutional Law, University of Bujumbura (Burundi)

1970-72 Deputy Legal Adviser, Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

1973-78 Head of Personnel, OAU

1978-79 Deputy Executive Secretary, of OAU Secretariat at Geneva

He speaks fluent English and French.

An urbane and capable man, he was personally selected by the late President Neto as Ambassador to Belgium and the European Communities.

He is married and has two children.

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T/III/AA/80

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

La Situation - Oct 19.

Presidente da República

In the interest of safeguarding peace, the common action in favour of the liberation of the still oppressed peoples in our Continent, and World peace, I have the honour of sending to Your Excellency, my delegate whose purpose is to contribute to the strengthening of relations and to inform you of important views related to the actual situation which prevails in the Southern Part of our Continent.

On the other hand we notice with concern, that a new plot is being prepared against our Country along our Southern border. This plot is directly engineered by the racist regim of South Africa in on declared war against the people's Republic of Angola. UNITA- the docile puppet of South Africa is armed, provided with munitions, infiltrated into our Country and supplied with massive logistic by support by the South African Army in order to massacre the unarmed civil population, wreck vital economic sectors for our Country's development.

In this context, Your Excellency, the realization of a policy of economic co-operation and the stablishment of fraternal relationships between the Souverain Countries is adversed affected by the continued support given to puppet groups in the service of enemies against peoples aiming peace and progress.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF UNITED KING-DOM
L O N D O N

The People's Republic of Angola, faithful to its fundamental principles will continue to practise a policy of good neighbourhood of non aggression, non interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of peaceful coexistence in absolute respect to the O.A.U., U.N. and of the Non-Aligned Movement's Charters.

Due to the critical situation which prevails in this part of our Continent, I am sure Your Excellency will not remain without contributing once more in finding the most correct way to achieve peace and defence for the peoples namely those who are still under racist and colonialist domination.

I wish to you, Your Excellency, my thanks in receiving my Delegate, who is encharged with the task of explaining to you questions which worry us.

Accept, Your Excellency, the feelings of my highest consideration.

JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA-WORKER'S PARTY AND OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

LUANDA, 14TH MAI 1980



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República

No interesse da salvaguarda da Paz, da acção comum em favor da libertação dos Povos ainda oprimidos no nosso Continente e da Paz no Mundo, tenho a honra de enviar a Vossa Excelência o mensageiro, com o objectivo de contribuir para o estreitamento das nossas relações e expôr dados importantes relacionados com a situação actual na Parte Sul do nosso País.

Constatamos por outro lado, com preocupação, que uma nova conspiração está a ser preparada a partir da nossa fronteira sul. Fomenta directamente essa conspiração, o regime racista da África do Sul, que move contra a República Popular de Angola uma guerra não declarada. É seu instrumento dócil o grupo fantoche - UNITA - que é armado, municiado e infiltrado através das nossas fronteiras, com massivo apoio logístico do exército sul-africano para massacrar populações civis indefesas e sabotar sectores económicos vitais para o desenvolvimento do nosso País.

Neste contexto, Excelência, a realização de uma política de cooperação económica e o estabelecimento de relações de fraternal amizade entre os Países Soberanos, é profundamente afectada pela continuidade de ajudas a grupos fantoches, ao serviço de inimigos dos Países amantes da Paz e do Progresso.


SUA EXCELÊNCIA
MARGARET THATCHER
PRIMEIRO MINISTRO DO REINO UNIDO DA GRÃ-BRETANHA
LONDRES

A República Popular de Angola, fiel aos seus princípios fundamentais, continuará a praticar uma política de boa vizinhança, não agressão, não ingerência nos assuntos internos dos outros Países, coexistência pacífica, em respeito absoluto das cartas da OUA, da ONU e do Movimento dos Países Não-Alinhados.

Face à situação preocupante que prevalece nesta parte do nosso Continente, não deixará, certamente, Vossa Excelência de contribuir uma vez mais, para se encontrar as vias mais correctas e justas para a conquista da Paz e a defesa dos nossos Povos, nomeadamente daqueles que ainda se encontram sob dominação racista e colonialista.

Exprimo a Vossa Excelência o meu agradecimento por dignar-se a escutar o mensageiro, a quem incumbo de transmitir as questões relevantes que nos preocupam.

Queira Vossa Excelência, aceitar sentimentos da mais alta consideração.



JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

PRESIDENTE DO M.P.L.A. - PARTIDO DO TRABALHO
PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

LUANDA, 14 DE MAIO DE 1980.-

E.R.

Angola

MR. ALEXANDER

Apparently you agreed that the Prime Minister should see the Angolan Ambassador to Brussels, Mr. Dunem. He is passing on a message from his President.*

I have requested a brief.

ES.

* Arranged for Monday 12 May 14.45.

8 May 1980

Now postponed.

Both sides agree!

Print - 9/5

BF 9/5/80

9 May 1980

I am writing to confirm that the
Angolan Ambassador in Brussels, Mr. Dunem,
is to pay a short courtesy call at 1445
on Monday 12 May. Could you kindly produce
a brief to reach this office by close
of play tomorrow, 9 May?



Malcolm Adams, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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