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Seminar on Defence Questions  
(~~In attached folder: Briefing entitled "Conventional  
Army Control and Data Strategy"~~)

DEFENCE

July 1989

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PREM 19/2937



10 DOWNING STREET

Chapman

Defense Semines  
at Chapman

I have arranged  
this to take place  
on Sat 27 Jan  
starting at 0930  
and ending with  
lunch. Foreign  
Sec, Defense Sec,  
Alan Clark and  
William Waldegrave  
are all invited  
but need a letter of  
confirmation.

AP  
8/1

MR. POWELL (o/r)

*Spoke  
encl*

Simon Webb from Tom King's Office wanted your view on the guest list for the defence seminar on 27 January. I understand that Alan Clarke has been invited. Apparently Archie Hamilton has been doing a lot of the internal work in MOD on NATO and could he come instead/as well. I have been non-committal, since I know you want to keep this meeting very small. Could you bear to have a word with Simon when you get back?

*DM*

DOMINIC MORRIS

3 January 1989

C:\wpdocs\parly\defence (pmm)

MRS. PONSONBY

The Prime Minister needs a small seminar type meeting at Chequers at the very end of January or early February. The essential participants are the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Mr. Waldegrave and Mr. Alan Clark. Could you please try and identify a half day - possibly a Friday or Saturday - when this could be done.

CDP

13 December 1989

DEFENCE: Senior



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

16 October 1989

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister, who is now on an overseas visit, to thank you for your letter of 10 October. I know that she will be most grateful for your comments. She will also appreciate your open invitation to visit RAND; all I can say on that is that you will appreciate the enormous pressures on her diary, but I will ensure that the possibility of such a visit is borne in mind.

(PAUL GRAY)

James A. Thomson, Esq.

M

R14/10

James A. Thomson

President and  
Chief Executive Officer

October 10, 1989

Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA  
England


Dear Madame Prime Minister:

It was a pleasure and a great honor to meet you and join you in discussing CFE at Chequers on September 30, 1989. I hope the discussion was useful to you as you guide your government's policy toward the Vienna talks. Great challenges to the West lie ahead.

I want to extend an open invitation for you to visit us here at RAND. A visit here would afford an opportunity to cover a substantive agenda on a range of issues. Please do not hesitate to add RAND to the itinerary of a future trip to the U.S. West coast.

Thank you again for your hospitality. As an American, it was a special honor to be included in such a meeting.

Sincerely,



JAT:cr

DEFENCE : Seminar

PA



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15/1/89

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 October 1989

CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

I enclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Brower who attended the Prime Minister's recent seminar on Conventional Force Reductions in Europe. I do not think a reply is needed.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

DT

FILE SH  
etc



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 October 1989

*Dear Brian,*

FOLLOW-UP TO THE CHEQUERS SEMINAR

Thank you for your letter of 2 October about the follow-up work to the Chequers Seminar on the implications of conventional force reductions. The Prime Minister naturally expects the Defence Secretary to exercise overall supervision of the work and any recommendations to come forward from him. But she would also think that, as recorded in my note of the Seminar, the Minister for Defence Procurement should take the initiative within MOD in preparing options in respect of our future equipment needs.

*Yours sincerely,  
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence





ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

R13/10

CABINET  
DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
OFFICE  
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

OA-302  
NATO HQ  
1110 BRUSSELS  
Belgium

Tel: (32-2) 728 45 21/41 44  
Fax: (32-2) 728 46 66

4 October 1989

Mr C D Powell  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA  
UK

*No reply needed*

*CD 13/X.*

*Dear Charles*

Many thanks for arranging the weekend meeting; I much appreciated the opportunity. I am enclosing details of my travel costs.

I promised the Prime Minister that I would continue to send in papers on the subjects we discussed. In this, or in any other sphere of Soviet affairs on which she would like my advice, for what it is worth, she has my complete support. I do not think the issues of procurement and force structure were in fact covered in sufficient depth, given the time constraints.

There was a tendency to confuse the current problem ("we must have a new tank, EFA", etc.) with the potential value of these weapon systems in 10-15 years' time when, according to Soviet analysts, weapons development will make them obsolescent. The Soviet view is that it makes sense to cut down on the procurement of a new generation of today's weapons platforms (tanks, ships, planes), upgrade existing ones, and direct the resources saved (a) into technological development which will help the national economy and provide for new kinds of weapons in the future if they are needed; and (b) into developing more efficient weapons systems for existing platforms, upgrading tank armour (as the Israelis have done with M-60), stand-off bombs, etc. This, it seems to me, would make as good sense for the UK as it does for the USSR.

2/....

On the issue of force structure and deployment, there is an alternative to forward defence. We practised it until 20 years ago. The enclosed illustration shows current brigade locations - set up for defence in depth - and current GDP and reinforcement positions. The problem is that the effectiveness of the M+4 and M+10 falls very quickly if force density is reduced, especially if a quality and quantity gap opens up between, say, the Belgian corps and the German corps, etc. However, to alter the current system will present our army in particular with some difficult institutional problems.



However, if I go on much longer, this will become a paper in its own right, and my main intention was to thank you for your help, so I shall close.

*Donnelly*  
*Chris*

CHRISTOPHER DONNELLY  
SOVIETOLOGIST-IN-RESIDENCE


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RED BANNER

ALLIES AND ALLIANCES



The location of NATO brigades in peacetime and their deployment and reinforcement at certain periods after mobilisation. Restrictions of terrain mean that the earlier after mobilisation that the war starts, the greater is the Soviet advantage, both in terms of the ratio of force to space and the ratio of force to force.

goes according to plan and forces allocated to NATO (such as III US Corps) are not dispatched elsewhere to meet other, more pressing, national needs.

The map on p. 250 and figure above therefore, show in outline the structure and strength of the conventional military force that would face the Soviet commander in event of war. To this must be added an awareness of NATO's battlefield nuclear capacity, the UK and French strategic deterrent, and the US strategic nuclear commitment. NATO also has several distinct features which could, from the Warsaw Pact viewpoint, confer an advantage in event of war. These are: a greater political and economic resilience; greater potential for the long term development of military strength; and a superior technological base which, given time, could be turned to military advantage.

All these factors must be taken into account by any Soviet strategist whose task it is to develop plans to accomplish the defeat of NATO in the event of war. In the concluding chapter of this book I will attempt to sketch a few of the main principles by which such a strategist might be guided.

Warsaw Pact or Soviet forces defending their own territory with some allied assistance.

The mobilisation and deployment of NATO forces in reaction to a crisis requires political decisions in each member state. It is possible, perhaps even probable, that the various countries may take differing lengths of time to make these decisions. Nowhere will the decision be easy, particularly in the confused and alarming period of crisis that is likely to precede the outbreak of hostilities. The figure above is not a Soviet assessment, but is taken from Western sources. A careful Soviet study of NATO would certainly produce a more detailed picture, but this one is sufficiently accurate for our purpose, which is to depict the density and location of NATO forces on the day the decision to mobilise is taken, and at certain times thereafter, assuming, of course, that the mobilisation

Notes and References

- 1 D. Chamberlain, "Burden Sharing in the Warsaw Pact", in SSRC Research Paper E25, "Gorbachev, Economics and Defence", September 1987.

Warsaw Pact forces in war see, Dr J. Yurchiko, "Command and Control for Coalitional Warfare: The Soviet Approach", Also in Signal Magazine, December

Possible Lines of Development in Soviet Military/Arms

Control Policy in the Event of Gorbachev Succeeding in Remaining in Power

By P H Vigor, SSRC, RMA Sandhurst

Introduction

A. Three things need to be borne in mind when studying Mr Gorbachev: (i) he is the first Soviet leader to have had a proper university education; (ii) he is also the first to have had no military experience, apart from a short period of reservist training while a student at Moscow University, so he has no ties of comradeship or loyalty with the Soviet Armed Forces. This allows him to scrutinise Soviet defence policy in a detached and objective fashion; (iii) he insists that he is a true Leninist; that the Soviet Union's difficulties have arisen because Lenin's teachings have been corrupted by Stalinism and Brezhnevism; and that his (Gorbachev's) reforms, glasnost' and perestroyka, are aimed at getting the USSR back on the Leninist road to Socialism. For this he needs an efficient, modern economy.

B. In reading the rest of this paper, it also needs to be borne in mind that never in the history of the USSR has the Soviet military defied the Communist Party. In Gorbachev's time, as in Stalin's and Khrushchev's, Marshals of the Soviet Union have been sacked left, right and centre without any stirrings from the Armed Forces; and new strategies have been forced upon them. This is because, right from the early days of the Revolution, the Party devised a means of keeping the Armed Forces subject to it, which the political leaders of the French Revolution signally failed to do.

So now, assuming that Gorbachev is sufficiently successful to remain in

power, what are the military/arms control policies which he is likely to adopt?

His chief concern, we have agreed, is domestic policy, in the sense that his aim is to introduce Leninist Socialism into the USSR. It is therefore surely significant that he has resurrected a Leninist formula, used also by Stalin, to the effect that the foreign policy of any country is subordinate to its domestic policy, and that the latter determines the former.

In other words, what a government does in the field of foreign/military/arms control policy ought, above all, to serve its own people's interests. What was done in this field by Khrushchev and Brezhnev often did not do this (Cuba, Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan).

But Gorbachev's rapprochement with China, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the sharp reduction in aid to Mozambique, Angola and Cuba must surely have helped to reduce Soviet military expenditure, something which is obviously necessary if perestroika is to succeed; and any reduction in tension between the Warsaw Pact and NATO will have a similar result.

Indeed, if the confrontation between the Pact and NATO can be eliminated, there is no reason why the Soviet Union should need to keep any large, offensively-orientated forces in Eastern Europe and European Russia at all. They cannot be needed to repel NATO aggression; because Marshal Akhromeyev, on his return to Moscow from the USA, has announced publicly to the Soviet media that he is positive that the West has no intention of attacking the USSR. Other authoritative Soviet statements to this effect have also been made recently.

Nor has Gorbachev any reason to start a war against the West. In the

early days of Soviet rule, the hope of exporting the revolution by force might have been a sufficient motive but not nowadays. Furthermore, the mood of the Soviet people and the state of the Soviet economy make it impossible for the Politburo to start a war against a major enemy, even if it wanted to. In addition, the force of circumstances compels it to devise a purely defensive military strategy; firstly because it cannot afford any longer the hugely expensive blitzkrieg-orientated armies which it deploys at present, and also because the USSR under Gorbachev will only go to war if it is attacked.

Gorbachev, of course, has announced that the working out of an exclusively defensive strategy is exactly what he is engaged in; but his words have been received with scepticism by the West because of the continued high level of Soviet arms production and other matters. However, there is now some evidence that the Soviet military are indeed engaged in trying to work out a doctrine which will guarantee Soviet security by a purely defensive strategy. This evidence is as follows:

(i) During the 'twenties, when the new Red Army was being created, there was a great debate about what type of force it should be. Should it be designed to fight the traditional Russian war of attrition (ie, of trading space for time), or should it be designed to fight a short, sharp war of annihilation on the enemy's territory? As we all know, it was the latter course that was decided upon; and until very recently Soviet military writing ignored the arguments for the former. Now, however, several pieces have been appearing, asserting that a strategy of attrition might have considerable merit under present circumstances; and the name of that strategy's chief proponent, Svechin, has been favourably mentioned.

(ii) When General Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, was in Washington recently, he said that a compelling reason for not turning SAG into a

regular force was that such a system would not give him sufficient reserves. We should note that a strategy of attrition demands very large reserves for its success.

(iii) A strategy of attrition, backed by sufficient reserves, would permit of gigantic cuts in the SAP, especially now that Moscow fears neither an attack by China nor by NATO. Furthermore, cuts of this size would be very welcome to Gorbachev.

(iv) The disadvantage of a strategy of attrition is that, if war should come, it will be one's own territory and one's own people who will suffer. From the Soviet viewpoint, this disadvantage would be minimised if it were East European space which the war of attrition would trade for time, and the East Europeans who would suffer. By this reckoning, therefore, the Warsaw Pact will not be allowed to dissolve; and the degree to which the Pact is in fact permitted by the Russians to weaken will be an important indicator of the accuracy of this present analysis.

We will end it by trying to make an estimate of the extent to which the present strength of the SAP could be reduced if the Soviet Government were in the event to decide upon a strategy of attrition. For the Ground Forces and the Rocket Forces combined, 1 1/2 million seems possible to the present writer. Interestingly enough, this is approximately the figure which Tsar Alexander III thought to be sufficient to ensure the security of his Empire in the 1890s.

# SPECTRUM ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED

7800 Lowmoor Court Springfield, Virginia 22153  
(703) 451-7439 Fax: (703) 451-7439

October 4, 1989

Mr. C.D. Powell  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA  
United Kingdom

*Dear Mr. Powell*

It was a privilege to attend the conference at Chequers on Saturday, 30 September and to be able to participate, however small my contribution, in such a vital discussion, I much appreciate your role in setting it up.

I felt that my recommendations on procurement were somewhat twisted during the subsequent discussion on Saturday afternoon, but I did not want to waste the Prime Minister's time on a debate over nuances. The current problem was addressed, but not the future problem. To summarize my views on technology and procurement:

1. Today and for the next 5-10 years, the main battle tank will remain the dominant weapon system on the land battlefield.
2. For NATO's conventional defense posture to be viable it cannot afford deep cuts in the number of main battle tanks over the next 5-10 years. Indeed, the number of battle tanks available today is only marginally sufficient.
3. Weapon systems, like tanks, take a long time to procure and subsequently have a long service lifetime.



4. It is unwise to invest in a new platform if it will become militarily ineffective before its service lifetime expires, unless there is a significant near term probability of conflict and the new platform will contribute mightily to the outcome of that conflict, or unless that platform will subsequently become a major export item.
5. It is my assessment, an assessment shared by many military conceptual thinkers, that the main battle tank will lose its dominance on the land battlefield between 1995-2015 as long range, indirect fire, top attack anti-tank weapon systems continue to evolve.
6. No defense force can afford to depend on a single weapon system that can be decisively countered. We must expect a whole family of advanced anti-tank systems to evolve using a variety of technologies to hold the tank at risk.

Therefore, my recommendations would be to:

- a. Procure advanced all weather AH-64 anti-tank helicopters with long range Hellfire anti-tank missiles for BAOR as the most cost effective way of increasing its near term military potential.
- b. Upgrade the existing BAOR tank fleet, particularly with a new integrated commanders station that corrects the poor human engineering of both the Challenger and Chieftain.
- c. Use the money saved by not procuring a wholly new tank to invest in the weapon, sensor, and command and control technologies required to make long range, indirect fire, top attack anti-tank weapon systems viable as soon as possible, thereby putting BAOR and UK industry on the leading edge of technology, and maximizing the export potential of these systems.

Immediately after the meeting on 30 September, Chris Donnelly indicated that the Prime Minister had requested a further paper on these issues. I shall, of course, be honored to prepare a more detailed paper for your review and use.

Once again, thank you for the invitation and for making all the arrangements which made the weekend most successful.

*Yours very sincerely,  
Kenneth S. Brower*

PRIME MINISTER

CHEQUERS SEMINAR: FOLLOW-UP WORK

My record of the Chequers Seminar on conventional force reductions allocates part of the follow-up work - that on our defence procurement needs in the light of CFE - to Alan Clark. I attach the paragraph in question. It reflects faithfully what you said at the time.

Tom King has objected to this because - I think - he does not trust Alan Clark not to pursue particular hobby-horses of his own (Alan is rather rashly talking about a mandate to conduct his own personal defence review). He has, therefore, written to say that he (Tom King) will exercise personal charge and supervision of all the follow-up work, because of its importance. He hopes for a reply conveying your agreement to this.

This is a problem of personalities: I think you have to support Tom King. Agree that I should reply in the terms he wishes?

C.D.P.

Yes - but leave Alan

some self-respect  
and initiative

C. D. POWELL

4 October 1989

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
to prepare the options.

Following the seminar, there was a separate discussion among official participants of the follow-up work which now needs to be put in hand. This comprises:

- further in-house work on the apportionment of cuts and the right structure of forces. This should also deal with the question of equitable burden-sharing. The purpose of the work is to stimulate informed consideration within NATO as soon as possible. This is for MOD and FCO, consulting the Treasury as necessary.
- a fresh look at our own defence procurement needs in the light of CFE. The purpose would be as much to identify what we can do without as what we need. It should pay particular attention to the scope for greater inter-operability. Minister (Defence Procurement) should take the lead with the Treasury and FCO also involved.
- a study of acceptable outcomes to eventual SNF negotiations. This is for FCO and MOD jointly.
- a note on the most effective public presentation of a CFE agreement. This is MOD and FCO jointly.

These papers should be submitted to the Prime Minister when ready.

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MO 7/4/1L

2 October 1989

*Dear Charles,*

SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CFE AGREEMENT FOR NATO'S  
STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND EQUIPMENT

Thank you for your letter of 2nd October and the summary record of the discussion at Chequers. As I explained, my Secretary of State has noted the attribution of follow up work in the final paragraph of your letter. However, given the importance of the issues, he has asked me to make it clear that he will be exercising personal charge and supervision of this work, including that on defence procurement needs, and of the necessary consultation with the FCO and Treasury.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Brian Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 October 1989

SEMINAR ON CFE

We asked MOD to send out copies of the paper prepared for the CFE Seminar at Chequers on 30 September. Professor Martin of Newcastle University did not receive his. It now appears that the copy was addressed to him at Nottingham University. I do not know whether it has yet been returned to MOD: if not, it is still at large somewhere. You may like to consider taking steps to retrieve it.

Charles Powell

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 October 1989

Dear Brian,


SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CFE AGREEMENT FOR NATO'S  
STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND EQUIPMENT

The Prime Minister held a seminar at Chequers on 30 September to consider the implications of a CFE Agreement for NATO's strategy, operational concepts and equipment. I enclose a list of those who took part.

I also enclose a summary record of the discussion including instructions on follow-up work. The record should be seen only by those directly concerned with work on these matters, although all official participants should also receive a copy. I should be grateful if you and Stephen Wall would arrange this.

It was agreed at the seminar that no views expressed there would be attributed to individuals or to the occasion, and that nothing would be said to the press about the substance of the discussion. This injunction should be strictly observed. It will not have escaped your notice that details of the seminar, which was supposed to be confidential, were published by the Daily Telegraph's defence correspondent on 30 September.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  
  
Charles Powell

Brian Hawtin Esq  
Ministry of Defence

PS

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List of Guests attending the Seminar on Saturday, 30 September  
at Chequers at 9.30 a.m.

The Prime Minister	
Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, MP	Chancellor of the Exchequer
Rt. Hon. John Major, MP	Foreign Secretary
Rt. Hon. Tom King, MP	Defence Secretary
The Hon. Alan Clark, MP	Minister for Defence Procurement
Professor Lawrence Freedman	Department of War Studies, Kings College, London
Mr. Chris Donnelly	Office of Secretary General, NATO
Mr. Ken Brower	Department of Soviet Studies, RMC Sandhurst
Mr. Francois Heisbourg	Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies
General Sir Martin Farndale	former Commander-in-Chief, BAOR
Professor Laurence Martin	Vice Chancellor, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Mr. James Thomson	Vice President, Rand Corporation
Mr. Philip Karber	Vice President and General Manager, National Security Programmes, BDM Corporation, Washington
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig	Chief of Defence Staff
General Sir Richard Vincent	Vice Chief of Defence Staff
General Sir Brian Kenny	Commander-in-Chief, BAOR
Sir Michael Alexander	NATO Ambassador
Sir Michael Quinlan	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence
Mr. John Weston	Deputy Secretary, FCO
Professor J.R. Oxburgh	Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence
Sir Percy Cradock	Cabinet Office
Mr. Charles Powell	Prime Minister's Private Secretary



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SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
IN EUROPE FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND  
EQUIPMENT

Discussion started from an assessment of the likely outcome of the CFE negotiations. Both sides were working towards the goal of an agreement next year. There were still difficulties over limits on aircraft and over Soviet insistence that limits on stationed personnel should apply to the forces of the European allies as well as the United States. There were also important issues to be resolved, within the Alliance before Western proposals were complete, for instance how to deal with entry and exit of forces into and out of the area and how to prevent equipment allegedly produced for export being used to circumvent the agreement. Nonetheless, the general assumption was that an agreement would be reached next year which would eventually leave NATO's forces at 85-90 per cent of their current levels.

Although some thought that an CFE agreement might create greater instability, the general judgment was that an agreement on the lines being negotiated would be very much to NATO's advantage. But this judgment was subject to some important qualifications:

- there must be adequate verification (and in this context, it would be important to know what was going on East as well as West of the Urals). If major East/West differences persisted on sub-zones within the ATTU area, one solution might be to dispense with these, while retaining Western stationing and sufficiency rules. But there was a strong feeling that this could seriously weaken NATO's ability to verify an agreement on the Warsaw Pact side: the sub-zones were an important early warning device. We

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also needed to think not just about verification itself, but how NATO would respond in the event of non-compliance by the other side.

- it seemed possible that the Russians would try to postpone negotiations on aircraft and limits on stationed personnel to a subsequent stage. The general view was that this was not desirable. Not least it would open up the wider question of what constituted "a CFE agreement" in relation to the opening of SNF negotiations.
- it was vitally important to get the implementation of a CFE agreement right on the NATO side. It would be a disaster if all Member States tried to cash their cheques at once. We must avoid competitive striptease and go for an orderly draw-down of forces, both as regards the pace and the pattern of reductions. Much more work needed to be done urgently within NATO to determine how reductions should be apportioned, and on post-CFE force planning. A political mechanism was needed within NATO to deal with this. The aspect of implementation could be crucial in determining whether an agreement was in practice advantageous to NATO or not.
- at the same time, the draw-down of forces must be equitable as between NATO countries. The United Kingdom should not be left bearing an unfair share of the burden.
- finally, it was noted that the requirement for force modernisation would increase as numbers were reduced. This would limit the scope for financial savings from CFE.

There was then some discussion of how a CFE agreement looked from a Soviet perspective. The majority view was that the Russians needed an agreement badly for economic reasons and in

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order to increase pressure for denuclearising Western Europe. They would in all likelihood press for further cuts after an initial agreement. Their position was driven by the desperate state of the Soviet economy. There would be clear savings for the Soviet Union in terms of reducing numbers of personnel. They would also be relieved of the need to invest in large quantities of current battle-field equipment (tanks, artillery, APCs) which would speedily become obsolete. This would leave them free to invest more in high technology.

Against this it was noted that the Soviet military were already having difficulty in implementing the unilateral cuts ordained by Mr Gorbachev and in destroying equipment, much of which was being put into store. It was doubtful that they would be really keen to commit themselves to reductions going beyond the cuts envisaged in the CFE negotiations, despite having tabled proposals to this end. Nor would there necessarily be short-term economic advantages, given the difficulty of absorbing manpower into the productive economy. But the majority view was that the Soviet leadership would for political reasons want to maintain the momentum of reductions whatever the views of the military.

This led on to a discussion of follow-on to the present CFE negotiations. It was noted that the Russians had already proposed further cuts of 25 per cent. Many voices were being raised in America in favour of further reductions: indeed there was quite a widespread assumption that NATO forces could eventually be reduced to 50 per cent of current levels. Such cuts were seen as an important source of savings. NATO itself had said that further cuts could be considered once the present negotiations were complete. Moreover a CFE agreement, particularly if combined with successful negotiations on START and CW, would reduce people's perception of the Soviet threat. The real challenge on CFE2 would not come from the Soviet Union but from our own citizens. They would want to see their "peace dividend". It would be difficult in presentational terms for NATO to be seen to be opposed to further negotiations. It was therefore only prudent to start

now to think through a strategy for subsequent stages of reductions.

Against this, it was noted that we could not predict with any certainty how the Soviet Union would evolve: the lesson of Tiananmen Square should not be forgotten. Rapid change in Eastern Europe could lead to greater instability. NATO must keep enough forces to defend itself against any potential threat. History showed that it was weakness that caused wars not sure defence. NATO's members must also have adequate forces to meet their out-of-area obligations where these existed. Moreover reductions below the levels currently envisaged would bring NATO to the point where force/area ratios made forward defence untenable, requiring a major change of strategy. There were thus arguments for drawing a clear line now, beyond which NATO would not contemplate further reductions. For all these reasons we should avoid referring to CFE1 (or 2 or 3) and be careful not to create a firm public assumption that there would be further cuts.

The implications of CFE could not be considered without taking account of political developments in Germany, given that NATO's strategy of forward defence was designed very largely with the needs of Germany's defence in mind. Developments in Eastern Europe and more particularly in East Germany were reawakening interest in German reunification, and there were some signs that the German Government was increasingly positioning itself diplomatically in order to promote the prospects of reunification. On the left of German politics there was a tendency to ask, not what NATO's strategy should be, but whether it needed a strategy at all. These developments underlined the need to anchor Germany firmly into the West and to work out the modifications to NATO's strategy which CFE would require in close collaboration and agreement with the German government.

CFE had to be seen also in the context of other arms control negotiations. The recent US/Soviet meeting had given fresh impetus to the START talks. It now seemed likely that SLCMs

would be dealt with separately. It was also relevant that the SDI programme was undergoing a change in direction away from spectaculars and back towards being a research programme intended to put the United States in a position to deploy a system at some point in the (possibly distant) future. It was probably this consideration which had led the US Administration to welcome the recent reformulation of the Soviet position on the link between SDI and START: they were not in practice intending to schedule tests which would raise questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The most likely outcome of the debate on modernisation of the US strategic deterrent was a decision to put the MX missile on rails and keep money in the budget for the development of Midgetman. Funding of production of Trident might be delayed to allow further testing.

Discussion then came on to the implications of CFE for NATO's strategy, operational concepts and equipment. It was not always possible in the discussion to draw a clear line between the implications of a CFE agreement as presently envisaged and the consequences of possible additional cuts further down the line. With this proviso in mind, a number of points emerged:

- the strategy of flexible response would not be affected by a CFE agreement. Indeed the importance of Theatre Nuclear Weapons would increase. There was some suggestion that the Soviet side might be coming to the view that they too needed SNF as they reduced their conventional forces (thus moving towards a flexible response strategy of their own). Gorbachev's latest position on equal SNF ceilings above zero was not inconsistent with this. But there was not enough evidence at this stage to confirm such speculation. At all events this underlined the importance of maintaining the agreed NATO position that any eventual negotiations on SNF must establish ceilings above zero. In practice there was very little room to reduce below existing numbers of launchers. It also strengthened the case for a successor to LANCE, for

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TASM and for the US to commit SLCMs to NATO to compensate for for the loss of Cruise and Pershing.

- no immediate change would be required in the strategy of forward defence although it might be necessary to fight the battle in a different way. But it was noted that the concept of forward defence was not in practice very precise: fewer than 15 per cent of NATO's forces were actually in the positions which they would defend at the outbreak of a conflict. Moreover NATO was already hard pressed to maintain the strategy of forward defence even before the 15 per cent cuts envisaged in the CFE agreement. In most scenarios, the nuclear threshold was reached alarmingly soon.
  
- a crucial question following a CFE agreement would be the size of the covering force to deal with a Soviet break-through. This force must be prepared to fight a longer battle than hitherto and more aggressively, to give time for reinforcements to arrive. Beyond that the overall size of NATO's forces would not be as important as the time taken to respond. NATO would need larger and better equipped reserve forces which could respond to mobilisation on the Soviet side. It was noted that NATO leaders would face difficult political decisions in time of crisis, to match the pace of build up on the other side. In addition NATO forces would need to be more mobile: the secret would be to have good, strong mobile reserves. There could also be greater use of barriers and other force multipliers.
  
- on equipment, it was noted the Warsaw Pact would gain in terms of relative quality of equipment from a CFE agreement, since they would discard the older 60 per cent of their holdings, while the corresponding figure for NATO would be only 10 per cent. The most important requirement for NATO would be to achieve

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greater inter-operability between NATO countries. Reductions in equipment holdings as a result of a CFE agreement would offer a unique opportunity to achieve this, which must be taken. There should also be scope for more common funding of projects and for greater role specialisation. Reliability and maintainability of equipment would become even more important post-CFE. Overall NATO would need to retain a full mix of weapons, bearing in mind also the requirements of out-of-area commitments. The role of the tank would in no way diminish and the case for replacing Chieftain would be strengthened. There would be a need for improved C<sup>3</sup>, for a better ability to survey the whole battlefield, and more effective communications. There was scepticism about reliance on smart weapons with their dependence on sensors.

- it would also be very important for NATO to maintain its R&D effort. The UK's own R&D effort was spread too wide: there should be a division of labour between the European members of NATO, with more specialisation. It was very rarely if ever possible to justify development of particular weapon systems in terms of to spin-off for the civilian economy. It was more often a case of spin-on from the civilian economy.

Finally, it was clear that these issues would all require very skilful presentation. A CFE agreement should be hailed for the major achievement that it was. But we should also recognise the dangers. The euphoria created by a CFE agreement would increase the difficulty of maintaining public support for defence and for nuclear deterrence. Strong emphasis would need to be given to the continuing role and relevance of NATO in the face of the new dangers which could arise as a result of instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must explain also that NATO's need for SNF was not conditioned by any specific level of Soviet conventional forces.

A number of broad conclusions were drawn, reflecting the points above. The main ones were:

- a CFE agreement on the basis of the NATO proposal would be generally advantageous to the West.
- but this would only be so if we got the implementation right, avoiding premature and competitive reductions on the Western side.
- a CFE agreement would enhance the importance of flexible response and of theatre nuclear weapons, strengthening the case for modernising our SNF.
- we should impress on public opinion the magnitude of the task of implementing a CFE agreement, in order to take attention away from the question of further reductions.
- forward defence should not be abandoned in the wake of a CFE agreement. But it would evolve in the direction of more mobile defence and a much greater role for reserves, which would need to be considerably strengthened.
- we should take the opportunity of CFE to improve inter-operability in NATO's equipment. We should maintain a strong R&D effort to keep NATO at the leading edge of new technology.
- we must maintain adequate forces and equipment not just for the UK's NATO commitment, but also for our other roles and responsibilities.
- particular attention needed to be given to the presentation of NATO strategy. This should not stress



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the Soviet threat exclusively, but the need for NATO to have a sure defence against any eventuality.

Following the seminar, there was a separate discussion among official participants of the follow-up work which now needs to be put in hand. This comprises:

- further in-house work on the apportionment of cuts and the right structure of forces. This should also deal with the question of equitable burden-sharing. The purpose of the work is to stimulate informed consideration within NATO as soon as possible. This is for MOD and FCO, consulting the Treasury as necessary.
- a fresh look at our own defence procurement needs in the light of CFE. The purpose would be as much to identify what we can do without as what we need. It should pay particular attention to the scope for greater inter-operability. Minister (Defence Procurement) should take the lead with the Treasury and FCO also involved.
- a study of acceptable outcomes to eventual SNF negotiations. This is for FCO and MOD jointly.
- a note on the most effective public presentation of a CFE agreement. This is MOD and FCO jointly.

These papers should be submitted to the Prime Minister when ready.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1989

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CDP =/K.

Dear Chairman,

SEMINAR ON CFE

- attached

Many thanks for your letter of 1 October enclosing a draft note on Saturday's seminar. In general this struck me as a masterly compilation but I have put some suggestions in pencil on the draft as you requested.

Yours  
truly  
P J Weston

P J Weston

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SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
IN EUROPE FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND  
EQUIPMENT

Discussion started from an assessment of the likely outcome of the CFE negotiations. Both sides were working towards the goal of an agreement next year. There were still difficulties over limits on aircraft and over Soviet insistence that limits on stationed personnel should apply to the forces of the European allies as well as the United States. There were also important issues to be resolved <sup>and over it</sup> [on verification and non-circumvention] for instance how to deal with entry and exit of forces into the area and how to prevent equipment allegedly produced for export being used to circumvent the agreement. Nonetheless, the general assumption was that an agreement would be reached next year which would eventually leave NATO's forces at 85-90 per cent of their current levels.

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Alliance  
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writing  
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complete

Although some thought that an CFE agreement might create greater instability, the general judgment was that an agreement on the lines being negotiated would be very much to NATO's advantage. But this judgment was subject to some important qualifications:

- there must be adequate verification (and in this context, it would be important to know what was going on East as well as West of the Urals). It was <sup>speculated</sup> reported that we might in the negotiations have to ~~dispense with sub-zones~~. The view was strongly expressed that this could seriously weaken NATO's ability to verify an agreement on the Warsaw Pact side: the sub-zones were an important early warning device. We also needed to think not just about verification itself, but how NATO would respond in the

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persisting on  
sub-zones within  
the NATO area,  
one solution  
might be to  
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a sufficient rule

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event of non-compliance by the other side.

- it seemed possible that the Russians would try to postpone negotiations on aircraft and limits on stationed personnel to a subsequent stage. The general view was that this was not desirable. Not least it would open up the wider question of what constituted "a CFE agreement" in relation to the opening of SNF negotiations.
  
- it was vitally important to get the implementation of a CFE agreement right on the NATO side. It would be a disaster if all Member States tried to cash their cheques at once. We must avoid competitive striptease and go for an orderly draw-down of forces, both as regards the pace and the pattern of reductions. Much more work needed to be done urgently within NATO to determine how reductions should be apportioned, and on post-CFE force planning. A political mechanism was needed within NATO to deal with this. The aspect of implementation could be crucial in determining whether an agreement was in practice advantageous to NATO or not.
  
- at the same time, the draw-down of forces must be equitable as between NATO countries. The United Kingdom should not be left bearing an unfair share of the burden.
  
- finally, it was noted that the requirement for force modernisation would increase as numbers were reduced. This would limit the scope for financial savings from CFE.

There was then some discussion of how a CFE agreement looked from a Soviet perspective. The majority view was that the Russians needed an agreement badly for economic reasons and would press in all likelihood for further cuts after an initial agreement. Their position was driven by the desperate

state of the Soviet economy. There would be clear savings for the Soviet Union in terms of reducing numbers of personnel. They would also be relieved of the need to invest in large quantities of current battle-field equipment (tanks, artillery, APCs) which would speedily become obsolete. This would leave them free to invest more in high technology.

Against this it was noted that the Soviet military were already having difficulty in implementing the unilateral cuts ordained by Mr Gorbachev and in destroying equipment, much of which was being put into store. It was doubtful that they would <sup>likely</sup> be keen to commit themselves to reductions going beyond the cuts envisaged in the CFE negotiations. Nor would there necessarily be short-term economic advantages, given the difficulty of absorbing manpower into the productive economy. But the majority view was that the Soviet leadership would for political reasons want to maintain the momentum of reductions whatever the views of the military.

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This led on to a discussion of follow-on to the present CFE negotiations. It was noted that the Russians had already proposed further cuts of 25 per cent. Many voices were being raised in America in favour of further reductions: indeed there was quite a widespread assumption that NATO forces could eventually be reduced to 50 per cent of current levels. Such cuts were seen as an important source of savings. NATO itself had said that further cuts could be considered once the present negotiations were complete. Moreover a CFE agreement, particularly if combined with successful negotiations on START and CW, would reduce people's perception of the Soviet threat. The real challenge on CFE2 would not come from the Soviet Union but from our own citizens. They would want to see their "peace dividend". It would be difficult in presentational terms for NATO to be seen to be opposed to further negotiations. It was therefore only prudent to start now to think through a strategy for subsequent stages of reductions.

Against this, it was noted that we could not predict with any certainty how the Soviet Union would evolve: the lesson of Tiananmen Square should not be forgotten. Rapid change in Eastern Europe could lead to greater instability. NATO must keep enough forces to defend itself against any potential threat. History showed that it was weakness that caused wars not sure defence. NATO's members must also have adequate forces to meet their out-of-area obligations where these existed. Moreover reductions below the levels currently envisaged would bring NATO to the point where force/area ratios made forward defence untenable, requiring a major change of strategy. There were thus arguments for drawing a clear line now, beyond which NATO would not contemplate further reductions. For all these reasons we should avoid referring to CFE1 (or 2 or 3) and be careful not to create a firm public assumption that there would be further cuts.

The implications of CFE could not be considered without taking account of political developments in Germany, given that NATO's strategy of forward defence was designed very largely with the needs of Germany's defence in mind. Developments in Eastern Europe and more particularly in East Germany were reawakening interest in German reunification, and there were some signs that the German Government was increasingly positioning itself <sup>diplomatically</sup> (on arms control issues) in order to promote the prospects of reunification. On the left of German politics there was a tendency to ask, not what NATO's strategy should be, but whether it needed a strategy at all. These developments underlined the need to anchor Germany firmly into the West and to work out the modifications to NATO's strategy which CFE would require in close collaboration and agreement with the German government.

CFE had to be seen also in the context of other arms control negotiations. The recent US/Soviet meeting had given fresh impetus to the START talks. It now seemed likely that SLCMs would be excluded. It was also relevant that the SDI programme was undergoing a change in direction away from spectaculars and back towards being a research programme

intended to put the United States in a position to deploy a system at some point in the (possibly distant) future. It was probably this consideration which had led the US Administration to welcome the recent reformulation of the Soviet position on the link between SDI and START: they were not in practice intending to schedule tests which would raise questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The most likely outcome of the debate on modernisation of the US strategic deterrent was a decision to put the MX missile on rails and keep money in the budget for the development of Midgetmen. Funding of production of Trident might be delayed to allow further testing.

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- the strategy of flexible response would not be affected by a CFE agreement. Indeed the importance of Theatre Nuclear Weapons would increase. (There was some suggestion that the Soviet side might <sup>take</sup> a different view on SNF as it reduced its conventional forces, <sup>and move</sup> towards a flexible response strategy of <sup>its own</sup>, although this was generally discounted.)
- This underlined the importance of maintaining the agreed NATO position that any eventual negotiations on SNF must establish ceilings above zero. In practice there was very little room to reduce below existing numbers of launchers. It also strengthened the case for <sup>a successor to</sup> ~~modernisation of~~ LANCE, for TASM and for the US to commit SLCMs to NATO to compensate for for the loss of Cruise and Pershing.
- no immediate change would be required in the strategy of forward defence although it might be necessary to fight the battle in a different way. But it was noted

be coming to the view that they too needed

Gorbachev's latest position on SNF ceilings above zero was not inconsistent with the US, but there was not enough evidence at this stage to transform this speculation. At all events,

that the concept of forward defence was not in practice very precise: fewer than 15 per cent of NATO's forces were actually in the positions which they would defend at the outbreak of a conflict. Moreover NATO was already hard pressed to maintain the strategy of forward defence even before the 15 per cent cuts envisaged in the CFE agreement. In most scenarios, the nuclear threshold was reached alarmingly soon.

- a crucial question following a CFE agreement would be the size of the covering force to deal with a Soviet break-through. This force must be prepared to fight a longer battle than hitherto and more aggressively, to give time for reinforcements to arrive. Beyond that the overall size of NATO's forces would not be <sup>as</sup> important as the time taken to respond. NATO would need larger and better equipped reserve forces which could respond to mobilisation on the Soviet side. It was noted that NATO leaders would face difficult political decisions in time of crisis, to match the pace of build up on the other side. In addition NATO forces would need to be more mobile: the secret would be to have good, strong mobile reserves. There could also be greater use of barriers <sup>and other</sup> (as) force multipliers.
  
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equipment would become even more important post-CFE. Overall NATO would need to retain a full mix of weapons, bearing in mind also the requirements of out-of-area commitments. The role of the tank would in no way diminish and the case for replacing Chieftain would be strengthened. There would be a need for improved C<sup>3</sup>, for a better ability to survey the whole battlefield, and more effective communications. There was scepticism about reliance on smart weapons with their dependence on sensors.

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Finally, it was clear that these issues would all require very skilful presentation. A CFE agreement should be hailed for the major achievement that it was. At the same time we should recognise the dangers. The euphoria created by a CFE agreement would increase the difficulty of maintaining public support for defence and for nuclear deterrence. Strong emphasis would need to be given to the continuing role and relevance of NATO in the face of the new dangers which could arise as a result of instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must explain also that NATO's need for SNF was not conditioned by any specific level of Soviet conventional forces.

A number of broad conclusions were drawn, reflecting the points above. The main ones were:

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- we should take the opportunity of CFE to improve inter-operability in NATO's equipment. We should maintain a strong R&D effort to keep NATO at the leading edge of new technology.
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- particular attention needed to be given to the presentation of NATO strategy. This should not stress the Soviet threat exclusively, but the need for NATO to have a sure defence against any eventuality.

Following the seminar, there was a separate discussion among official participants of the follow-up work which now needs to be put in hand. This comprises:

- further in-house work on the apportionment of cuts and the right structure of forces. This should also deal with the question of equitable burden-sharing. The purpose of the work is to stimulate informed consideration within NATO as soon as possible. This is for MOD and FCO, consulting the Treasury as necessary.
  
- a fresh look at our own defence procurement needs in the light of CFE. The purpose would be as much to identify what we can do without as what we need. It should pay particular attention to the scope for greater inter-operability. Minister (Defence Procurement) should take the lead with the Treasury and FCO also involved.
  
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These papers should be submitted to the Prime Minister when ready.

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*Charles*  
*Enin. One as for*  
*additions*  
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SIR PERCY CRADOCK

I attach a draft record of Saturday's Seminar on CFE. I would be very grateful if you could propose any amendments or additions which you consider necessary and let me have it back as soon as possible.

*CDP*

CHARLES POWELL  
1 October 1989

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SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
IN EUROPE FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND  
EQUIPMENT

Discussion started from an assessment of the likely outcome of the CFE negotiations. Both sides were working towards the goal of an agreement next year. There were still difficulties over limits on aircraft and over Soviet insistence that limits on stationed personnel should apply to the forces of the European allies as well as the United States. There were also important issues to be resolved on verification and non-circumvention, for instance how to deal with entry and exit of forces into the area and how to prevent equipment allegedly produced for export being used to circumvent the agreement. Nonetheless, the general assumption was that an agreement would be reached next year which would eventually leave NATO's forces at 85-90 per cent of their current levels.

Although some thought that an CFE agreement might create greater instability, the general judgment was that an agreement on the lines being negotiated would be very much to NATO's advantage. But this judgment was subject to some important qualifications:

- there must be adequate verification (and in this context, it would be important to know what was going on East as well as West of the Urals). It was reported that we might in the negotiations have to dispense with sub-zones. The view was strongly expressed that this could seriously weaken NATO's ability to verify an agreement on the Warsaw Pact side: the sub-zones were an important early warning device. We also needed to think not just about verification itself, but how NATO would respond in the

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event of non-compliance by the other side.

- it seemed possible that the Russians would try to postpone negotiations on aircraft and limits on stationed personnel to a subsequent stage. The general view was that this was not desirable. Not least it would open up the wider question of what constituted "a CFE agreement" in relation to the opening of SNF negotiations.
  
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*and in order to increase pressure for disarmament w. Europe. They*

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state of the Soviet economy. There would be clear savings for the Soviet Union in terms of reducing numbers of personnel. They would also be relieved of the need to invest in large quantities of current battle-field equipment (tanks, artillery, APCs) which would speedily become obsolete. This would leave them free to invest more in high technology.

Against this it was noted that the Soviet military were already having difficulty in implementing the unilateral cuts ordained by Mr Gorbachev and in destroying equipment, much of which was being put into store. It was doubtful that they would be keen to commit themselves to reductions going beyond the cuts envisaged in the CFE negotiations. Nor would there necessarily be short-term economic advantages, given the difficulty of absorbing manpower into the productive economy. But the majority view was that the Soviet leadership would for political reasons want to maintain the momentum of reductions whatever the views of the military.

This led on to a discussion of follow-on to the present CFE negotiations. It was noted that the Russians had already proposed further cuts of 25 per cent. Many voices were being raised in America in favour of further reductions: indeed there was quite a widespread assumption that NATO forces could eventually be reduced to 50 per cent of current levels. Such cuts were seen as an important source of savings. NATO itself had said that further cuts could be considered once the present negotiations were complete. Moreover a CFE agreement, particularly if combined with successful negotiations on START and CW, would reduce people's perception of the Soviet threat. The real challenge on CFE2 would not come from the Soviet Union but from our own citizens. They would want to see their "peace dividend". It would be difficult in presentational terms for NATO to be seen to be opposed to further negotiations. It was therefore only prudent to start now to think through a strategy for subsequent stages of reductions.

Against this, it was noted that we could not predict with any certainty how the Soviet Union would evolve: the lesson of Tiananmen Square should not be forgotten. Rapid change in Eastern Europe could lead to greater instability. NATO must keep enough forces to defend itself against any potential threat. History showed that it was weakness that caused wars not sure defence. NATO's members must also have adequate forces to meet their out-of-area obligations where these existed. Moreover reductions below the levels currently envisaged would bring NATO to the point where force/area ratios made forward defence untenable, requiring a major change of strategy. There were thus arguments for drawing a clear line now, beyond which NATO would not contemplate further reductions. For all these reasons we should avoid referring to CPE1 (or 2 or 3) and be careful not to create a firm public assumption that there would be further cuts.

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- no immediate change would be required in the strategy of forward defence although it might be necessary to fight the battle in a different way. But it was noted

that the concept of forward defence was not in practice very precise: fewer than 15 per cent of NATO's forces were actually in the positions which they would defend at the outbreak of a conflict. Moreover NATO was already hard pressed to maintain the strategy of forward defence even before the 15 per cent cuts envisaged in the CFE agreement. In most scenarios, the nuclear threshold was reached alarmingly soon.

- a crucial question following a CFE agreement would be the size of the covering force to deal with a Soviet break-through. This force must be prepared to fight a longer battle than hitherto and more aggressively, to give time for reinforcements to arrive. Beyond that the overall size of NATO's forces would not be important as the time taken to respond. NATO would need larger and better equipped reserve forces which could respond to mobilisation on the Soviet side. It was noted that NATO leaders would face difficult political decisions in time of crisis, to match the pace of build up on the other side. In addition NATO forces would need to be more mobile: the secret would be to have good, strong mobile reserves. There could also be greater use of barriers as force multipliers.
  
- on equipment, it was noted the Warsaw Pact would gain in terms of relative quality of equipment from a CFE agreement, since they would lose the lower 60 per cent of their holdings, while the corresponding figure for NATO would be only 10 per cent. The most important requirement for NATO would be to achieve greater inter-operability between NATO countries. Reductions in equipment holdings as a result of a CFE agreement would offer a unique opportunity to achieve this, which must be taken. There should also be scope for more common funding of projects and for greater role specialisation. Reliability and maintainability of

equipment would become even more important post-CFE. Overall NATO would need to retain a full mix of weapons, bearing in mind also the requirements of out-of-area commitments. The role of the tank would in no way diminish and the case for replacing Chieftain would be strengthened. There would be a need for improved C<sup>3</sup>, for a better ability to survey the whole battlefield, and more effective communications. There was scepticism about reliance on smart weapons with their dependence on sensors.

- it would also be very important for NATO to maintain its R&D effort. The UK's own R&D effort was spread too wide: there should be a division of labour between the European members of NATO, with more specialisation. It was very rarely if ever possible to justify development of particular weapon systems in terms of to spin-off for the civilian economy. It was more often a case of spin-on from the civilian economy.

*but emphasis should be placed on the magnitude of the task of orderly implementation.*

Finally, it was clear that these issues would all require very skilful presentation. A CFE agreement should be hailed for the major achievement that it was, ~~At the same time~~ *we should also* recognise the dangers. The euphoria created by a CFE agreement would increase the difficulty of maintaining public support for defence and for nuclear deterrence. Strong emphasis would need to be given to the continuing role and relevance of NATO in the face of the new dangers which could arise as a result of instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must explain also that NATO's need for SNF was not conditioned by any specific level of Soviet conventional forces.

A number of broad conclusions were drawn, reflecting the points above. The main ones were:

- a CFE agreement on the basis of the NATO proposal

would be generally advantageous to the West.

- but this would only be so if we got the implementation right, avoiding premature and competitive reductions on the Western side.
- a CFE agreement would enhance the importance of flexible response and of theatre nuclear weapons, strengthening the case for modernising our SNF.
- we should impress on public opinion the magnitude of the task of implementing a CFE agreement, in order to take attention away from the question of further reductions.
- forward defence should not be abandoned in the wake of a CFE agreement. But it would evolve in the direction of more mobile defence and a much greater role for reserves, which would need to be considerably strengthened.
- we should take the opportunity of CFE to improve inter-operability in NATO's equipment. We should maintain a strong R&D effort to keep NATO at the leading edge of new technology.
- we must maintain adequate forces and equipment not just for the UK's NATO commitment, but also for our other roles and responsibilities.
- particular attention needed to be given to the presentation of NATO strategy. This should not stress the Soviet threat exclusively, but the need for NATO to have a sure defence against any eventuality.

Following the seminar, there was a separate discussion among official participants of the follow-up work which now needs to be put in hand. This comprises:

- further in-house work on the apportionment of cuts and the right structure of forces. This should also deal with the question of equitable burden-sharing. The purpose of the work is to stimulate informed consideration within NATO as soon as possible. This is for MOD and FCO, consulting the Treasury as necessary.
  
- a fresh look at our own defence procurement needs in the light of CFE. The purpose would be as much to identify what we can do without as what we need. It should pay particular attention to the scope for greater inter-operability. Minister (Defence Procurement) should take the lead with the Treasury and FCO also involved.
  
- a study of acceptable outcomes to eventual SNF negotiations. This is for FCO and MOD jointly.
  
- a note on the most effective public presentation of a CFE agreement. This is MOD and FCO jointly.

These papers should be submitted to the Prime Minister when ready.

FILE  
JK



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

1 October 1989

*Dear John,*

**SEMINAR ON CFE**

I enclose my draft note on Saturday's Seminar on CFE. If you would like to suggest any amendments or additions please note them on the text and let me have it back in the course of the day if possible.

*Yours sincerely,  
Charles Powell*

**CHARLES POWELL**

John Weston, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

I attach a draft record of Saturday's Seminar on CFE. I would be very grateful if you could propose any amendments or additions which you consider necessary and let me have it back as soon as possible.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL  
1 October 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEMINAR ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS  
IN EUROPE FOR NATO'S STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND  
EQUIPMENT

Discussion started from an assessment of the likely outcome of the CFE negotiations. Both sides were working towards the goal of an agreement next year. There were still difficulties over limits on aircraft and over Soviet insistence that limits on stationed personnel should apply to the forces of the European allies as well as the United States. There were also important issues to be resolved on verification and non-circumvention, for instance how to deal with entry and exit of forces into the area and how to prevent equipment allegedly produced for export being used to circumvent the agreement. Nonetheless, the general assumption was that an agreement would be reached next year which would eventually leave NATO's forces at 85-90 per cent of their current levels.

Although some thought that an CFE agreement might create greater instability, the general judgment was that an agreement on the lines being negotiated would be very much to NATO's advantage. But this judgment was subject to some important qualifications:

- there must be adequate verification (and in this context, it would be important to know what was going on East as well as West of the Urals). It was reported that we might in the negotiations have to dispense with sub-zones. The view was strongly expressed that this could seriously weaken NATO's ability to verify an agreement on the Warsaw Pact side: the sub-zones were an important early warning device. We also needed to think not just about verification itself, but how NATO would respond in the

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event of non-compliance by the other side.

- it seemed possible that the Russians would try to postpone negotiations on aircraft and limits on stationed personnel to a subsequent stage. The general view was that this was not desirable. Not least it would open up the wider question of what constituted "a CFE agreement" in relation to the opening of SNF negotiations.
  
- it was vitally important to get the implementation of a CFE agreement right on the NATO side. It would be a disaster if all Member States tried to cash their cheques at once. We must avoid competitive striptease and go for an orderly draw-down of forces, both as regards the pace and the pattern of reductions. Much more work needed to be done urgently within NATO to determine how reductions should be apportioned, and on post-CFE force planning. A political mechanism was needed within NATO to deal with this. The aspect of implementation could be crucial in determining whether an agreement was in practice advantageous to NATO or not.
  
- at the same time, the draw-down of forces must be equitable as between NATO countries. The United Kingdom should not be left bearing an unfair share of the burden.
  
- finally, it was noted that the requirement for force modernisation would increase as numbers were reduced. This would limit the scope for financial savings from CFE.

There was then some discussion of how a CFE agreement looked from a Soviet perspective. The majority view was that the Russians needed an agreement badly for economic reasons and would press in all likelihood for further cuts after an initial agreement. Their position was driven by the desperate

state of the Soviet economy. There would be clear savings for the Soviet Union in terms of reducing numbers of personnel. They would also be relieved of the need to invest in large quantities of current battle-field equipment (tanks, artillery, APCs) which would speedily become obsolete. This would leave them free to invest more in high technology.

Against this it was noted that the Soviet military were already having difficulty in implementing the unilateral cuts ordained by Mr Gorbachev and in destroying equipment, much of which was being put into store. It was doubtful that they would be keen to commit themselves to reductions going beyond the cuts envisaged in the CFE negotiations. Nor would there necessarily be short-term economic advantages, given the difficulty of absorbing manpower into the productive economy. But the majority view was that the Soviet leadership would for political reasons want to maintain the momentum of reductions whatever the views of the military.

This led on to a discussion of follow-on to the present CFE negotiations. It was noted that the Russians had already proposed further cuts of 25 per cent. Many voices were being raised in America in favour of further reductions: indeed there was quite a widespread assumption that NATO forces could eventually be reduced to 50 per cent of current levels. Such cuts were seen as an important source of savings. NATO itself had said that further cuts could be considered once the present negotiations were complete. Moreover a CFE agreement, particularly if combined with successful negotiations on START and CW, would reduce people's perception of the Soviet threat. The real challenge on CFE2 would not come from the Soviet Union but from our own citizens. They would want to see their "peace dividend". It would be difficult in presentational terms for NATO to be seen to be opposed to further negotiations. It was therefore only prudent to start now to think through a strategy for subsequent stages of reductions.

Against this, it was noted that we could not predict with any certainty how the Soviet Union would evolve: the lesson of Tiananmen Square should not be forgotten. Rapid change in Eastern Europe could lead to greater instability. NATO must keep enough forces to defend itself against any potential threat. History showed that it was weakness that caused wars not sure defence. NATO's members must also have adequate forces to meet their out-of-area obligations where these existed. Moreover reductions below the levels currently envisaged would bring NATO to the point where force/area ratios made forward defence untenable, requiring a major change of strategy. There were thus arguments for drawing a clear line now, beyond which NATO would not contemplate further reductions. For all these reasons we should avoid referring to CFE1 (or 2 or 3) and be careful not to create a firm public assumption that there would be further cuts.

The implications of CFE could not be considered without taking account of political developments in Germany, given that NATO's strategy of forward defence was designed very largely with the needs of Germany's defence in mind. Developments in Eastern Europe and more particularly in East Germany were reawakening interest in German reunification, and there were some signs that the German Government was increasingly positioning itself on arms control issues in order to promote the prospects of reunification. On the left of German politics there was a tendency to ask, not what NATO's strategy should be, but whether it needed a strategy at all. These developments underlined the need to anchor Germany firmly into the West and to work out the modifications to NATO's strategy which CFE would require in close collaboration and agreement with the German government.

CFE had to be seen also in the context of other arms control negotiations. The recent US/Soviet meeting had given fresh impetus to the START talks. It now seemed likely that SLCMs would be excluded. It was also relevant that the SDI programme was undergoing a change in direction away from spectaculars and back towards being a research programme

intended to put the United States in a position to deploy a system at some point in the (possibly distant) future. It was probably this consideration which had led the US Administration to welcome the recent reformulation of the Soviet position on the link between SDI and START: they were not in practice intending to schedule tests which would raise questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The most likely outcome of the debate on modernisation of the US strategic deterrent was a decision to put the MX missile on rails and keep money in the budget for the development of Midgetmen. Funding of production of Trident might be delayed to allow further testing.

Discussion then came on to the implications of CFE for NATO's strategy, operational concepts and equipment. It was not always possible in the discussion to draw a clear line between the implications of a CFE agreement as presently envisaged and the consequences of possible additional cuts further down the line. With this proviso in mind, a number of points emerged:

- the strategy of flexible response would not be affected by a CFE agreement. Indeed the importance of Theatre Nuclear Weapons would increase. (There was some suggestion that the Soviet side might take a different view on SNF as it reduced its conventional forces, and move towards a flexible response strategy of its own, although this was generally discounted.) This underlined the importance of maintaining the agreed NATO position that any eventual negotiations on SNF must establish ceilings above zero. In practice there was very little room to reduce below existing numbers of launchers. It also strengthened the case for modernisation of LANCE, for TASM and for the US to commit SLCMs to NATO to compensate for for the loss of Cruise and Pershing.
- no immediate change would be required in the strategy of forward defence although it might be necessary to fight the battle in a different way. But it was noted

that the concept of forward defence was not in practice very precise: fewer than 15 per cent of NATO's forces were actually in the positions which they would defend at the outbreak of a conflict. Moreover NATO was already hard pressed to maintain the strategy of forward defence even before the 15 per cent cuts envisaged in the CFE agreement. In most scenarios, the nuclear threshold was reached alarmingly soon.

- a crucial question following a CFE agreement would be the size of the covering force to deal with a Soviet break-through. This force must be prepared to fight a longer battle than hitherto and more aggressively, to give time for reinforcements to arrive. Beyond that the overall size of NATO's forces would not be important as the time taken to respond. NATO would need larger and better equipped reserve forces which could respond to mobilisation on the Soviet side. It was noted that NATO leaders would face difficult political decisions in time of crisis, to match the pace of build up on the other side. In addition NATO forces would need to be more mobile: the secret would be to have good, strong mobile reserves. There could also be greater use of barriers as force multipliers.
  
- on equipment, it was noted the Warsaw Pact would gain in terms of relative quality of equipment from a CFE agreement, since they would lose the lower 60 per cent of their holdings, while the corresponding figure for NATO would be only 10 per cent. The most important requirement for NATO would be to achieve greater inter-operability between NATO countries. Reductions in equipment holdings as a result of a CFE agreement would offer a unique opportunity to achieve this, which must be taken. There should also be scope for more common funding of projects and for greater role specialisation. Reliability and maintainability of

equipment would become even more important post-CFE. Overall NATO would need to retain a full mix of weapons, bearing in mind also the requirements of out-of-area commitments. The role of the tank would in no way diminish and the case for replacing Chieftain would be strengthened. There would be a need for improved C<sup>3</sup>, for a better ability to survey the whole battlefield, and more effective communications. There was scepticism about reliance on smart weapons with their dependence on sensors.

- it would also be very important for NATO to maintain its R&D effort. The UK's own R&D effort was spread too wide: there should be a division of labour between the European members of NATO, with more specialisation. It was very rarely if ever possible to justify development of particular weapon systems in terms of to spin-off for the civilian economy. It was more often a case of spin-on from the civilian economy.

Finally, it was clear that these issues would all require very skilful presentation. A CFE agreement should be hailed for the major achievement that it was. At the same time we should recognise the dangers. The euphoria created by a CFE agreement would increase the difficulty of maintaining public support for defence and for nuclear deterrence. Strong emphasis would need to be given to the continuing role and relevance of NATO in the face of the new dangers which could arise as a result of instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must explain also that NATO's need for SNF was not conditioned by any specific level of Soviet conventional forces.

A number of broad conclusions were drawn, reflecting the points above. The main ones were:

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- but this would only be so if we got the implementation right, avoiding premature and competitive reductions on the Western side.
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- we should impress on public opinion the magnitude of the task of implementing a CFE agreement, in order to take attention away from the question of further reductions.
- forward defence should not be abandoned in the wake of a CFE agreement. But it would evolve in the direction of more mobile defence and a much greater role for reserves, which would need to be considerably strengthened.
- we should take the opportunity of CFE to improve inter-operability in NATO's equipment. We should maintain a strong R&D effort to keep NATO at the leading edge of new technology.
- we must maintain adequate forces and equipment not just for the UK's NATO commitment, but also for our other roles and responsibilities.
- particular attention needed to be given to the presentation of NATO strategy. This should not stress the Soviet threat exclusively, but the need for NATO to have a sure defence against any eventuality.

Following the seminar, there was a separate discussion among official participants of the follow-up work which now needs to be put in hand. This comprises:

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- a fresh look at our own defence procurement needs in the light of CFE. The purpose would be as much to identify what we can do without as what we need. It should pay particular attention to the scope for greater inter-operability. Minister (Defence Procurement) should take the lead with the Treasury and FCO also involved.
  
- a study of acceptable outcomes to eventual SNF negotiations. This is for FCO and MOD jointly.
  
- a note on the most effective public presentation of a CFE agreement. This is MOD and FCO jointly.

These papers should be submitted to the Prime Minister when ready.



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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING ROOM 6173  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2116/6390

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

30th September 1989

Dear Prime Minister

mt

Thank you very much  
for your hospitality today. I  
hope that we will be able  
to make a helpful - positive  
contribution to the next  
stage of work on these  
complex Arms Control issues

Yours sincerely

David Craig

PRIME MINISTER

Seminar at Chequers on Conventional Force Reductions

I attach the full list of participants and the papers for the meeting.

You might like to be guided by the following rough timetable:

0930	Assemble in Great Hall (most will probably arrive by 0915)
0945	First session in Great Parlour
1115-1130	Coffee break
1130-1245	Second session in Great Parlour
1315	Lunch
1500-1600	Concluding session for <u>official participants only</u>

I have drawn up a table plan for the meeting which mixes official and unofficial participants round the table. I have tried to do the same for lunch, putting you between the two American participants (since in the nature of things you are likely to have only this opportunity to talk to them).

I have also done a short note (attached) suggesting whom you might invite to speak first under each main heading.

Finally I attach some background papers and articles by some of the participants. You will recall - and may like to look again at - the papers by Donnelly and Brower.

*C.D.P.*  
C. D. POWELL

29 September 1989

List of Guests attending the Seminar on Saturday, 30 September  
at Chequers at 9.30 a.m.

The Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, MP

Rt. Hon. John Major, MP

Rt. Hon. Tom King, MP

The Hon. Alan Clark, MP

Professor Lawrence Freedman

Mr. Chris Donnelly

Mr. Ken Brower

X Mr. Francois Heisbourg

General Sir Martin Farndale (2)

Professor Laurence Martin

Mr. James Thomson

Mr. Philip Karber

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig Chief of Defence Staff

X General Sir Richard Vincent

X General Sir Brian Kenny (D)

Sir Michael Alexander

Sir Michael Quinlan

Mr. John Weston

Professor J.R. Oxburgh

Sir Percy Cradock

Mr. Charles Powell

Chancellor of the Exchequer

Foreign Secretary

Defence Secretary

Minister for Defence Procurement

Department of War Studies,  
Kings College, London

Office of Secretary General, NATO

Department of Soviet Studies,  
RMC Sandhurst

Director, International Institute  
of Strategic Studies

former Commander-in-Chief, BAOR

Vice Chancellor, University of  
Newcastle-upon-Tyne

~~Vice~~ President, Rand Corporation

Vice President and General  
Manager, National Security  
Programmes, BDM Corporation,  
Washington

Vice Chief of Defence Staff

Commander-in-Chief, BAOR

NATO Ambassador

Permanent Secretary,  
Ministry of Defence

Deputy Secretary, FCO

Chief Scientific Adviser,  
Ministry of Defence

Cabinet Office

Prime Minister's Private Secretary

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR THE MEETING ON SATURDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER

Mr. John Weston	General Sir Richard Vincent
Mr. Chris Donnelly	Mr. Francois Heisbourg
The Hon. Alan Clark	Sir Michael Quinlan
General Sir Martin Farndale	Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson
Mr. Charles Powell	Mr. James Thomson
PRIME MINISTER	The Hon. John Major
Professor Laurence Martin	Mr. Philip Karber
General Sir Brian Kenny	Rt. Hon. Tom King
Professor Lawrence Freedman	Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig
Sir Michael Alexander	Mr. Ken Brower
Sir Percy Cradock	Professor J.R. Oxburgh

ENTRANCE

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON SATURDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER

Mr. Charles Powell	Professor J.R. Oxburgh
Sir Michael Quinlan	General Sir Richard Vincent
General Sir Brian Kenny	Mr. Francois Heisbourg
Sir Michael Alexander	Rt. Hon. John Major
Professor Laurence Martin	Mr. James Thomson
Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson	PRIME MINISTER
Professor Lawrence Freedman	Mr. Philip Karber
The Hon. Alan Clark	Rt. Hon. Tom King
Mr. Chris Donnelly	General Sir Martin Farndale
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Craig	Sir Percy Cradock
Mr. John Weston	Mr. Ken Brower

ENTRANCE

PRIME MINISTER

## SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

You have a seminar on conventional arms control at Chequers on Saturday. I attach the MoD's discussion paper, which has been circulated to all participants. You have not yet had the time to read it in full and may like to look further at it during the week.

We also need to think about the questions which need to be asked in order to get the most out of the Seminar. My own thoughts are as follows:

(i) What outcome do we assume from the current CFE talks? Will it be close to the NATO proposals? Or shall we be dragged significantly towards the Warsaw Pact proposals? Are the implications for NATO's strategy and equipment actually very different in either case?

(ii) The implications of a first-stage CFE Agreement for NATO's strategy. There are two elements to NATO's strategy: flexible response and forward defence. If anything a CFE agreement surely strengthens the case for flexible response: we shall need a credible nuclear deterrent more than ever (which is why we insisted that SNF negotiations should only consider common ceilings above zero). The case for maintaining forward defence is less clear-cut. The Germans will certainly want us to maintain it for political reasons. It will make less sense militarily. But whether or not we do so will depend in part on the answer to the question...

(iii) Do we envisage a CFE Agreement as lasting for a substantial period? Or will it be followed by negotiations for further cuts? It could be argued that we should set our face against further cuts after a CFE Agreement, on the grounds that what remains is the minimum we need for sure defence. In practice, it seems likely that a CFE Agreement next year will be a staging post on the way to further cuts. In that case, we ought to be thinking now about longer-term changes to NATO's strategy (and the equipment to implement it), rather than simply clutching on to the

①  
Please  
send down to  
Chequers for  
Friday  
evening

existing strategy (as the MoD paper suggests). This would virtually guarantee the wrong procurement decisions. In short, we should be looking at the problems not just in the perspective of 1990 but of say 1995/6 (which is when we will get the equipment we order now).

(iv) If we agree that NATO's strategy of forward defence cannot be regarded as immutable what changes do we envisage in:

- operational concepts. Ought we to be thinking of smaller and more mobile forces? Should we not have to rely more upon reinforcement and less upon stationed forces?
- should we be more radical still and prepare for major reductions in BAOR and more concentration on air defence and naval forces?
- if we think matters are going to develop that way, what are the implications for our equipment programme? At one level, should we be concentrating less on tanks and more on anti-tank weapons? At another, should we be investing more in aircraft and ships and less in tanks and artillery? We don't want to end up with the equipment we have ordered now determining the strategy for ten years from now, rather than the other way round.

These are not unlike the questions in the MoD paper, but rather more specific. My main concern about the MoD paper is the implication that we can stand pat in terms of strategy, concepts and equipment following a first CFE agreement and think later about what the implications of subsequent reductions would be. That carries a real risk that we shall end up spending a great deal of money on equipment, e.g. a new tank, which will not be much use in the longer term. If we are convinced that conventional force reductions are going to be a continuing process, we ought to be considering changes in operational concepts and equipment plans now.

C D P  
(C. D. POWELL)

26 September 1989

[REDACTED]

Some Questions for Discussion

A. Is it agreed that there seems neither need nor scope, following a NATO-version CFE agreement, to depart from the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence (paras 5-7, 10)? Would a WP-version agreement (granted that it is much less attractive - Annex B) radically change this view?

B. Would a NATO-version agreement point to any particular direction of change in operational concepts? in force structures? in particular equipment needs? in balance of investment? (Paragraphs 13-16)

C. What might usefully be done in NATO to minimise risks that individual members may implement post-agreement reductions badly suited, in character or scale, for maximising remaining collective defence? (Paragraphs 12b, 17)

D. What key features must be maintained, or improvements secured, in other aspects of the strategic scene if the security benefits of a CFE agreement are not to be undermined? (Paragraphs 8-9)

E. Should force level cuts going substantially deeper than current proposals be expected to compel outright abandonment of the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence? If not, what might be the likely direction of adjustment in their application? (Paragraph 20)



F. What might be done to improve our ability to assess the implications of deeper-cut options, so as to improve our ability to select those which will best suit our purposes?

(Paragraphs 19, 20a)

G. Can anything usefully be done now to reduce risks that a major CFE agreement might generate a public mood that East/West security no longer has to be worked for and paid for?

(Paragraphs 17, 20g)

Chequers Seminar on Conventional Arms Control:  
Possible Structure of Discussion

1. The progress of the CFE Talks and the likely outcome.

You might ask JOHN WESTON to report: and MICHAEL ALEXANDER to give a view from NATO. This is primarily a technical matter.

2. The implications of a CFE agreement on the lines currently being negotiated for NATO's Strategy.

You might ask GENERAL VINCENT to give an MOD view and GENERAL KENNY to give a view from BAOR.

3. The implications for Soviet Strategy and operational concepts. What lessons can we draw from the unilateral Soviet cuts so far?

You might like to ask CHRIS DONNELLY to speak on this.

4. But will it stop there? Or should we not be assuming further cuts and making our plans accordingly? How would this affect NATO's strategy? How should we adjust?

This is more speculative. You might invite MR THOMSON and/or MR KARBER - both from the US - to lead off, and FRANCOIS HEISBOURG of the Institute of Strategic Studies to comment, and SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN.

5. What specific changes ought we to envisage in operational concepts and equipment?

On operational concepts, you might ask SIR MARTIN FARNDALE to comment. On equipment, it might be PROFESSOR OXBURGH and MR BROWER.

6. How do we handle public opinion and avoid a growing mood that East/West security no longer has to be worked for and paid for?

This is more for the politicians and you might ask JOHN MAJOR and TOM KING to speak.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Can you find

this of interest.

He is attending

your seminar at the

end of the month

CBA

# François Heisbourg on conflict management

As the world commemorates the beginning of the Second World War from the presumably safe distance of 50 years and many are proclaiming the "end of the cold war", it may seem somewhat odd to focus on potential future causes of conflict in Europe. After all, the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe and the prospects for massive conventional arms cuts are welcome developments. Yet to say that Europe runs the risk of new and dangerous instabilities is not simply succumbing to the analyst's professional tendency to point out that every silver lining has its dark cloud.

The post-Second World War order in Europe, so threatening and yet so stable, so basically unacceptable and yet so reassuringly predictable, is unravelling at an accelerating pace which may make peaceful adjustment difficult and sow the seeds of future instability.

We are now witnessing in Europe a concurrent process of gradually greater unity in the European Community and the rapid disintegration of Eastern Europe as a politically and economically homogeneous entity. This diverging evolution is not, in itself, necessarily a negative development because regeneration east of the Elbe can clearly not be accommodated within the framework inherited from the late Forties. The question is whether this period of reshuffling will be the prelude to a later convergence between these (or some of these) countries and Western Europe.


In view of its current travails, Hungary, in particular, may be well placed to participate in the broader Western European economic and political mainstream. However, the current flux may simply lead to a basically messy situation. In the worst case, it could be accompanied by a combination of acute ethnic strife, economic basket cases and an ineptly reopened German question. The all too numerous similarities between Poland and Argentina, the parlous state of the Yugoslav federation, and East European uncertainties do not allow one to exclude such a gloomy scenario and its implications for the next generation in terms of war and peace.

Three sets of internal events in Eastern Europe may be crucial in determining the long-term drift of events. First, and currently the foremost, is the question whether the reforming states — Hungary and Poland — will be politically able to absorb the extremely harsh austerity measures without which durable economic take-off simply cannot occur. Given the Polish and Hungarian political situations, it is as yet impossible to say whether the proponents of harsh but necessary remedies will outweigh the populist forces in the new democracies.

Second, when will Czechoslovakia enter the group of reforming states? The CSSR has the dual advantage of having a relatively low debt burden vis-à-vis the West (some \$5bn versus approximately \$40bn for Poland and \$18bn for Hungary) and a population which has twice this century experienced true democracy. Furthermore, the Czechs have a history of reacting to changes, pleasant or unpleasant, in a measured fashion. Provided pluralism emerges before internal change becomes unmanageable, a reforming Czechoslovakia would be well-equipped to succeed in the transition from the political and economic "exceptionalism" imposed on Eastern Europe during the post-war period towards full participation in the global economy and adoption of democratic values.

Last, but definitely not least, what will happen after Erich Honecker leaves the political scene in East Berlin? What fate will befall a state with no democratic legitimacy, no nation to call its own and an ideological basis largely disowned by Moscow itself? The manner in which the German Democratic Republic could collapse, fade away, and/or confederate with the FRG can only be of pivotal importance.

These centres of attention (and there are naturally others: whither Romania



## Avoiding another world war

### WORLD VIEW

after Nicolae Ceausescu? Will Yugoslavia fall apart?) will be heavily influenced by events elsewhere. Moscow's attitude towards accelerating reform will naturally be of prime concern with the risk of nationalist disruption in the USSR negatively affecting policy vis-à-vis Hungary and Poland. Moscow's attitude to reform has been benign, and its main problems are with the bunker-states (Czechoslovakia, GDR, Romania). But there are probably thresholds in the security arena which could not be crossed without Moscow reacting brutally.

The West's role may also be decisive in orientating the course of events at crucial stages in Eastern Europe. When outcomes are narrowly poised even limited action can make all the difference. The size of the states involved ensures that any additional Western input will have a good deal more impact there than if it were dispersed in the immensities of the USSR. The West, in all its incarnations, be they politico-military (Nato) politico-

economic (European Community), economic (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Monetary Fund etc) or value setting (Council of Europe) therefore has every reason to think through its Ostpolitik with particular care.

In this respect, a number of proposals have been made, including the impressive set of measures suggested by Mark Palmer, the American ambassador in Budapest. Without adding to the list here, it may be useful to lay a few markers which can help in shaping specific policies as circumstances call for new initiatives and reactions.

It is up to each state to determine its security policy. Were Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact, that choice should be respected by the West. However, as in the past, the West will not run the risk of world war to prevent the USSR from overriding such a decision. Living with an increasingly "hollow" Warsaw treaty

may therefore be the more sensible course for societies heavily engaged in economic and political transformation.

In the economic sphere, the West has good reason to link the provision of capital and politico-economic reform since the latter is a condition of the appropriate use of the former. This is a lesson learnt after the wasteful loans of the Seventies, which now present such a burden to reforming Poland and Hungary. Not surprisingly, blanket debt forgiveness is sought by many in Poland. There will be strong and justified Western resistance to this, not least because this would make the future influx of private capital from Western banks highly unlikely: "once bitten, twice shy".

If the West is serious about facilitating positive and peaceful change in Europe, then ambitious measures, albeit short of straight debt forgiveness, will eventually have to be considered in the form of debt rescheduling, debt holidays, provision of new working capital, all linked to concrete and initially painful economic reforms. Such assistance, going beyond current US and EC aid, will hopefully be offered, not too little and not too late.

One connected issue will grow in importance, that of massive emigration. This is already at historically high levels in the case of West Germany since it is estimated that more than 400,000 ethnic Germans from the GDR, Poland, USSR and so on are expected to settle in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1989. This represents more people than the annual flow of refugees from the GDR during the Fifties, which peaked at 330,000 a year. The influx of 320,000 Bulgarian Turks into Turkey is another example. These ethnically and politically motivated shifts of population are creating internal difficulties for the host countries. In the future numbers are bound to increase and the motivations change. How will Western Europe greet several million job-seeking prospective *Gastarbeiter* from east of the Elbe? This is a complex question which will have to be handled by the EC as a whole.

Ultimately, the future of stability and peace in Europe will rest on its political organisation, and in this respect Germany's evolution will be the key. Any limit by West Germany's partners that the right of self-determination should not be applied to the GDR or that its terms should exclude the choice of reunification should be strenuously avoided. Such policies would, at worst, ensure that reunification, if it came about, would be inimical to Germany's neighbours' security interests. Conversely, the best way to facilitate a stabilising outcome to self-determination is to continue to consider that right as a Western aspiration and not simply a German one. Similarly, everything which incorporates the FRG's Ostpolitik in a robust West European framework will be to the good. In other words, a successful "1992 process" is of geo-strategic as well as of political and economic importance. In time, the European Community may also attract as associate states the budding democracies from Eastern Europe, provided they have managed to break out of the mould of central planning.

One of the great achievements of the European Community has been to eliminate from its collective psyche the notion of the use of force to resolve disputes between its members. The states of Central Europe and the Balkans, many of which have relatively recently adjusted boundaries, have no experience of such self-elected restraint as opposed to the brutal order imposed by the Soviet Union. The great risk during the next decades is that with the loosening of the constraints of an alien system, old disputes, old anxieties and new antagonisms will flourish in a deeply split Eastern Europe without a new and benevolent order being created. The common security interest for the West, for Eastern Europe, and indeed for the Soviet Union, is to avoid creating the conditions of future conflict.

The author is the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

A Quick Look at the Events of 7th December 1988.

Review (2)  
You may like  
to see these two

1. Gorbachev's offer at the UN contains a great deal of PR, as is to be expected.

interesting & provoking  
pages which Chris  
Donnelly of

2. Given the Soviet need to reorganize their forces to a more mobile corps/brigade structure with a better balance of tanks to infantry and support arms, the promised reduction is offering no real cut in military effectiveness at all.

Sandhurst has  
sent me. CBP 9/11

3. But, the General Staff opposed unilateral cuts on the grounds that these would not bring military advantage. Gorbachev has overridden their advice and we may expect to see more resignations to follow that of CGS Akhromeyev.

4. The proposed reductions do contain something very interesting for NATO. Engineer equipment is essential to a high speed offensive. Unlike air assault forces it could not be moved back into East Germany without alerting NATO intelligence and providing warning of attack.

5. In sum, Gorbachev has achieved the maximum propaganda advantage for the minimum of impact on his military power. Even the timing of the announcement of Akhromeyev's "resignation" was guaranteed to enhance Gorbachev's image as a "man of peace". But he has also offered NATO an unequivocal means of determining a Soviet intent to launch an attack.

RESUME - GORBACHEV, ECONOMICS AND DEFENCE.

C N DONNELLY - 7 December 1988.

1. As a Marxist, Gorbachev's foreign policy (including military and arms control policies) is dictated by his domestic needs. In his eyes, the depth of the social and economic crisis facing the USSR is enormous, far more serious than many Western observers appreciate.
2. Time is not on Gorbachev's side. He needs to create visible improvement in living conditions and food supply very rapidly. In the three and a half years since he came to office, there have been no improvements in this sphere, and the Soviet population is being increasingly disillusioned with this failure.
3. But economic problems are the symptoms of the Soviet Union's sickness, not the cause. The cause is political and political change must precede economic change.
4. To accomplish change, Gorbachev needs to achieve not only a complete reorganization of the political, social and economic system but also to reorientate people's thinking. Perestroika means both these things.
5. Creating some manoeuvrability in society necessitates creating instability. Stability is the enemy of manoeuvre in a society just as much as in a fighter aircraft. Stalin quieted the people by terror, Brezhnev quieted them with promises of stability (much valued, by ordinary people given Soviet 20th Century history) and an abundance of vodka, sausage and medals.

6. Gorbachev calls this stability stagnation and to create the social instability necessary for change has instituted glasnost'. Glasnost' (from Russian Golos, 'voice') means speaking out and challenging bureaucracy, inefficiency, sacred cows, vested interest, unearned privilege.

7. Many people, particularly the 70-80 million veterans of WWII and the post-war reconstruction are frightened by the instability and social unrest unleashed by glasnost', hate what Gorbachev is doing, and provide a serious resistance to his reforms.

8. Many educated people are either cynical about Gorbachev or doubt his chances of success. These resist perestroika through apathy or keep their support hidden for fear of Gorbachev's successor taking a Stalinist path.

9. Soviet industry has been unable to reform itself in the past three and a half years. It has been incapable of utilizing high technology resources and skilled manpower transferred from the Defence Industries. The military near-monopoly of high technology and scientific research and development has resulted in very poor performance in basic science. Outside the narrow confines of the defence industries, the USSR has no base on which to build science and industry for the 21st Century.

10. Reorganizing the economy and reallocating resources from defence to the civilian sector is rendered more difficult by the lack of any reliable means of financial accounting. Gorbachev has no way of knowing what the real military drain on his economy amounts to.

11. If Gorbachev cannot 'kick-start' Soviet society and the economy within the



not three years, he does not think he can do it at all. If he fails, the result will be either (1) a new leader who will try to do the job by means of Stalin-style repression, or (2) civil disturbance and the disintegration of the USSR, or (3) a return to stagnation and a second class status for the USSR.

12. To achieve such improvement in so short a time, Gorbachev needs from the West (a) finance, (b) technology, and particularly (c) industrial expertise in large quantities and very quickly. Current Western attitudes make this unlikely.

13. Whereas in the West anyone, (politicians, journalists, civil servants, concerned churchmen, etc.) can offer a view on defence issues, in the USSR the General Staff has a monopoly. The party determines the outline policy, but the General Staff decides how it should be implemented. It is an immensely powerful body. No NATO country has any equivalent.

14. The General Staff, perceiving a NATO nuclear and conventional threat, and with the lessons of history firmly in mind, have prepared a really excellent military system to maximise the USSR's ability to mobilize military power for war. For the last 43 years, the entire Soviet economy has been totally distorted not least by its orientation towards defence.

15. Furthermore the Soviet Armed Forces have been uniquely organized, trained and equipped by the General Staff to fight an offensive war, because only this makes military sense to the General Staff given the USSR's geo-strategic position. This concept of war and perception of a threat is reinforced by ideology, which has become a fixed framework of thought, even though it is for most people no longer the inspirational faith which it was in Lenin's day.

16. Serious training problems have eroded the Soviet military system's ability to carry out its excellent doctrines, and since 1984, NATO concepts have forced a reassessment of the military need to exercise in defensive operations. However, military logic insists that only an offensive (or a decisive counter-offensive) capability will ensure Soviet survival in war.

17. The General Staff accept the need to reduce defence expenditure and reduce the size of their armed forces. In military terms, it is now possible and indeed preferable to move towards smaller and higher quality armed forces. But the General Staff have always refused to accept the validity of a less provocative "non-offensive" defence posture, considering it to be military nonsense.

18. Gorbachev has been attempting during 1988 to erode the power and break the monopoly of the General Staff in defence thinking. Civilian and Party defence think tanks, press articles, the debate on conscription, the reduction of military honours at national festivals, the reform of the General Staff structure and the frequent sackings and promotions all point to this.

19. If he can persuade Western governments and Western populations of his peaceful intent, then Gorbachev may be able to obtain Western help without a showdown with the General Staff. But if not, such a showdown must come. Gorbachev argues that for the last 20 years the General Staff have been preparing against the wrong threat. It is not Western armies, but the very evident superiority of Western living standards which poses the greatest threat to the Soviet political system. In preparing to defend against the 'NATO military threat', the USSR has laid itself open to the socio-economic threat.

20. But the General Staff has been excellent in providing good advice to Gorbachev as to how to use arms control to improve Soviet security relative to the West. This is essential advice.

21. Because of the efficiency of their doctrinal concepts and procurement system, the USSR can at present match the quality of almost all Western weapons systems despite its operating from a poorer technological base. This is likely to be the case for the next few years, as weapons systems fielded within this time period will, in the main, use today's technology.

22. However, weapons fielded in the next century will quite likely incorporate advanced technology which the USSR will not be capable of manufacturing in industrial quantities unless Gorbachev's reforms are outstandingly successful. Consequently it is in the Soviet interest to slow down the rate of military technological investment in the West.

23. A reduction in the Western perception of a threat will help accomplish this. It will also help ease restrictions on technology transfer and economic aid, and facilitate the much needed diversion of scarce high tech resources out of the military into the civilian sphere. This, however, will go first to improving basic scientific research, rather than into consumer goods. The improvement of living standards, Gorbachev hopes, will come initially from an increase in private sector small scale service industries.

24. We must expect Gorbachev to try and get the best of any 'deal' with the West, both in civilian and military terms. If the USSR reduces its military strength drastically, then it also cuts its superpower status.

25. Nevertheless, if Gorbachev does think that the crisis facing the USSR is so serious, then he may have to take on the General Staff and enforce a deployment acceptable to NATO, so as to convince the West of his peaceful intent. Activity in the Third World will reflect such a decision.

26. The Soviet Armed Forces have an excellent system for mothballing divisions and equipment and remobilizing them quickly. They also calculate that they would benefit from an overall reduction on defence density in Europe. Removal of the nuclear threat will continue to be the prime military goal of arms control. For this reason the General Staff pinned its flag to the mast of 'no unilateral' cuts because, whilst these might not significantly affect Soviet military power, they would not bring the military advantage that a reduction in the density of NATO forces would.

27. The extraordinary 19th Party Conference called this summer was an attempt to re-enthuse the Soviet population and body politic with Gorbachev's policies. Consideration had previously been given to relinquishing the Communist Party monopoly on power in favour of a pluralistic system of some sorts. This was rejected in favour of Gorbachev's plan to create a 'logical opposition' within a one-party state by strengthening the Soviets, withdrawing the Party from day-to-day administrative duties, and reviving the moral authority which the Party has lost.

28. At the September 30th Party Plenum, Gorbachev's frustration with the continued lack of progress vented itself in a purge of those who had been dragging their feet, and resulted in a very much rejuvenated Politburo (average age now 61). A similar thing seems to be happening in other Party organizations

and in the military. The KGB has remained untouched, but keeps discreetly in the background as the safety net in case the instability created in the Party and in society threatens the very existence of the Party or its grip on power.

29. Eastern European nations have reacted differently to Gorbachev's policies. Hungary has taken political reforms a step further than Moscow; Czechoslovakia has repudiated them; East Germany does not see the need to change; Romania is in the grip of Stalinism.

30. With his strengthened position in the Party and vis a vis the General Staff, Gorbachev is very likely to use his trip to the West to further recruit Western support for his policies, both amongst governments and populace. His position means that he will have a much greater latitude and flexibility to respond positively to any Western proposals made to him during his trip. He may even feel able to make more substantial offers on arms control, but these must be expected to accrue to the Soviet advantage one way or another. If it were otherwise, Gorbachev would not be doing his duty by his country.

Talk to IISS: 15 May 1989

DEFENCE POLICY WITHOUT THE THREAT?

The question mark is a wonderful device for a talk such as this, because it provides instant recognition that the title itself begs an important question - the durability of the threat that has provided the basic rationale for British defence provision since the late 1940s.

I accept that the future character and direction of the Soviet Union is uncertain and that we have not seen anything yet to warrant abandoning established policy. However, I believe that we have seen enough to indicate some possible directions for the future and to make it worthwhile to begin to address the issues so raised. Moreover, there is a risk of the debate getting excessively bound up on 'whither Gorbachev' - as if everything depended on the political skills of one man, and

also that the obvious alternative to whatever it is he has in store for us is a return to the Brezhnev years. For many this would not be unwelcome, for this was the time when the Soviet Union helped us avoid awkward questions by conforming so well to an adversary image.

So my objective today is to start to look beyond the current phase, to identify trends and possibilities, and to begin to assess their implications for British defence policy. My starting point for this is that thus far the sense of historic change that is felt by practically all students of international affairs has thus far made no impact whatsoever on defence policy.

There have been the normal procurement questions - tanks, fighter aircraft, AWACS - but it is symptomatic of the entrenched lines of current thinking that they have been seen to raise important industrial rather than strategic or even

tactical issues, relevant to foreign policy only in terms of the extent and location of industrial cooperation with allies. The most recent procurement question concerning the future of the main battle tank was dominated in public over whether it should be built in Britain or the United States. The operational problem of determining the appropriate mix between armour and attack helicopters was considered a matter for the specialists. Of course helicopters too only hit the defence headlines in terms of whether we should cooperate with Europe or the United States in their manufacture, and the extraordinary shenanigans in high-places that this issue prompted, but not the shifts in Army thinking which led to Westland's troubles in the first place.

The question early in the 1980s concerning the proper balance between the continental and the maritime commitment has been settled as a draw. CMND 8288, The Way Forward, which set out John Nott's defence review offered a clear statement of



priorities in favour of the continental. Undoubtedly the Nott experience has discouraged imitation amongst his successors. He was undermined by both the controversy stimulated by his review, especially among the maritime lobby, and then by Argentina.

The defence budget is now set at that level sufficient to avoid a major review of priorities.

The Government is capable of forcing the issue to the fore when it wants to do so - notably with the question of the British nuclear deterrent at election time. In political circles the defence issue is now synonymous with the future of the national nuclear strike force. The Government's success in this regard has now led the Opposition to search for a formula equivalent to that adopted by the Government for the budget - it seeks that level of commitment to the nuclear force to avoid the issue being used against it at the next election.

We can discuss the extent to which it can be said to have succeeded in this task later. What is noteworthy in the Labour document - at least the advance version published in the Guardian - is how little it has to say on the overall framework within which the defence policy has been framed. This was true in this decade's election campaigns. As if to legitimize its radicalism on the nuclear issues Labour expressed loyalty to NATO and conventional defences in its policy statements.

The fact that this is all rather dull is a problem only for academics and commentators. For civil servants and their ministers it comes as something of a relief. They, however, have to be more concerned as to whether it is tenable.

The case for caution is set out in this year's defence White Paper. It speaks positively about the Gorbachev reforms and the 'new thinking' but it makes two critical qualifications:

But we should be under no illusion about this new sense of realism; it is designed to serve Soviet interests, not those of the West. (para 105)

And

But we cannot rely for our security on the public pronouncements of the current Soviet leadership, welcome as they are; we must be sure that changes in the Soviet Union are fundamental and irreversible. For as long as an objective military threat remains, we must, as NATO leaders reaffirmed in Brussels last year, maintain the forces necessary for deterrence.

The Labour document recognizes that we are in 'epoch-making' period, and argues that the changes proposed by Gorbachev are genuine and have a broad constituency and possibly 'irresistible'. It sees a 'political compulsion for peace'. It also sees an 'economic compulsion' evident in the superpowers and also Britain. We can't afford to spend as much on armaments

as before. But it draws no conclusions from all of this other than that conditions are unusually promising for multilateral disarmament. It interrogates the future only to ask about disarmament and a relaxation of the standard East-West tensions. It looks forward - with Thatcher, Bush, Gorbachev and Genscher - to

an end to the mutual distrust and hostility that have bedeviled both East and West since the end of the second world war.

The terms of the debate are thus agreed by both Government and opposition. We can now visualise an end to the cold war. We believe that Mr Gorbachev is pushing things in the right direction. We are watching how he passes key tests in the field of human rights and disarmament.

The only difference is really over the extent to which Western concessions can give this process a spur.

This is fine but it carries an important risk. First, if we are simply adopting a wait and see posture then we are likely to be wholly unprepared for the quite different strategic environment that we may face during the 1990s and into the next century. Moreover, this line of reasoning is flawed in that it assumes that defence policy is simply about ensuring a coherent military response to a threat from the East. It suggests that a withering away of the Soviet 'threat' would provide the case for a withering away of our own defence effort.

There is a risk of getting caught in a mental set that is not only unable to address the other tasks for our military effort, but also in conceding the primary role of Soviet attitudes and behaviour in shaping the current security arrangements. It assumes that what happens in the future is largely up to them, or else that whatever we do is a matter for disarmament negotiations.

My thesis is that we may well be moving into a much more active strategic period, that is one where our defence and foreign policy must become geared to the creation of new structures of security rather than the management of the status quo.

## II

Britain's approach to European security has been that of the balance of power. We have sought to prevent any continental state achieving a hegemonic power - Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The preferred method has been tactical alliance, backed where necessary by an expeditionary force. The two world wars of this century convinced British policy-makers in the late 1940s that if this goal was to be pursued against the new challenge of the Soviet Union then the old methods, which had not succeeded by themselves against Germany, would certainly not suffice.

The new formula required the United States to take on the balancing role. Because past experience suggested that American enthusiasm for this role would be - at best - inconstant it would need to be tied in through formal treaty commitments and a peace-time garrison. London could not ask of Washington more than it was prepared to offer itself, so Britain has in its own defence policies taken on - on a much smaller scale - all those tasks which it deemed essential for the United States. In its own break with the past it has accepted an overt and open-ended peace-time alliance and a continental commitment for the Army. It has even shadowed the American nuclear guarantee to Europe with one of its own, basing key elements of its nuclear capability in West Germany and - notionally at least - assigning its strategic forces to SACEUR.

This has turned Britain into a paragon of NATO orthodoxy. Its proudest boast was that it contributed to all NATO regions with all types of armaments. One rarely detected any divergence of

view from British government pronouncements and the prevailing view at NATO headquarters. This was hardly surprising as the conceptual framework within which NATO operates was largely an Anglo-American creation.

The other key element in this framework was West Germany. It made a covenant with its allies in the 1950s. Part of this was to be its political rehabilitation in return for promises that it would not return to its bad old ways. Political conditions at the time prevented this promise being reinforced by a toleration of permanent division; NATO took on the cause of German re-unification but did nothing to pursue it. In practice its rearmament was only acceptable because it was divided.

The military aspect of the covenant was an offer of bases and forces in return for a promise that West Germany's territorial interests would be respected - that is that it was not being set up as a superpower battleground but, through forward



defence, it would be able to stand up to Soviet power whether directly or indirectly applied. Because of the tremendous conventional power that the Warsaw Pact could bring to bear, it was accepted from the time of German rearmament that Germany's basic guarantee was nuclear deterrence, so that any attempt to dilute deterrence appeared as a readiness to sacrifice German interests.

### III

This policy has succeeded brilliantly. I believe it to be irrelevant to ask whether without NATO and/or nuclear weapons we would now be living under communism. Without the alliance Europe would have remained fragmented and vulnerable to Soviet influence in ways that would have been inimical to both civil liberties or economic prosperity. The price we paid was not great in resource terms - with occasional blips its has been declining as a proportion of GDP since the Korean rearmament

petered out. We have had to live under the 'shadow of the bomb', and we have been obliged to accept that little could be done for those caught in the Soviet sphere.

This is the system that is reaching the end of its natural life. It is doing so because of the decline of the Soviet Union as a superpower. This process is irreversible; it began long before Gorbachev and is unlikely to be arrested by either the current leadership or its successors. The weaknesses were identified during the Brezhnev period. It is true that the Soviet Union has a formidable nuclear armory and we must give it due respect because of that. But for most issues of international conflict nuclear weapons are quite beside the point.

The Soviet position has been sustained through hegemony in Eastern Europe and a readiness to act in support of anti-Western movements in the Third World. However it has been

handicapped since the start of the 1970s by the evident failure of its economic system to produce the resources to sustain this effort. The attempt to do so has led to a dramatic misallocation of resources which is only now being addressed and must lead to a decline in Soviet military power. You may not have to be a Marxist to believe that military and political power depend on a strong material base, but if you are a Marxist this conclusion is inescapable. This economic failure of the Soviet Union and other systems created in its image is the fundamental strategic fact. Gorbachev, Perestroika, Glasnost and all that are merely symptoms. Suppress them and the disease will persist and manifest in other forms.

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It may take time before this decline is fully reflected in Soviet forces. The Soviet military will still be arguing that too precipitate unilateral disarmament would be reckless. It will have its own priorities for cuts which will seek to sustain its front-line strength. Nonetheless, with or without

disarmament negotiations, it is almost impossible to see the Soviet Union maintaining armed forces of the current quantity and quality at the turn of the century.

This will encourage a development which has already been The consequences of this are already evident in Soviet behaviour outside of Europe where we have seen a considerable retrenchment. Substantial military involvement in Third World conflicts is unwise and expensive. The Soviet experience has been unimpressive. Not only was it obliged to abandon its position in Afghanistan, but it has also failed to resolve the Angolan, Cambodian, Ethiopian conflicts on the terms it was seeking in the 1970s. This does not mean that the Soviet Union will not be an important player in regional conflicts, through advisors and arms transfers as well as diplomatic support, but it does suggest that it will be much more cautious in its commitments.

I do not want to dwell long on the 'out of area' question here although I have no doubt that it is going to become more critical. All I would note is that as the ability of the great powers to influence regional conflicts has declined, the conflicts themselves have not become more tractable and can still show signs of authentic local viciousness. We may well be moving into a period of some quite unstable local balances within which our interests are implicated but into which we should only advance with caution. The caution might be eased should one of its principal causes in the past - the thought of having to cope with Soviet-backed forces - no longer seem so pressing.

However I want to concentrate for now on Europe. The significance of the withdrawal of Soviet power from the Third World is nothing compared to the significance of its potential withdrawal from Europe. We are of course a long way from a withdrawal. Yet the loss of self-confidence in the Kremlin when

it comes to telling others how to conduct their political affairs is already having a profound impact. Developments that would have been quite unthinkable a few years ago are now everyday occurrences and we are witnessing the emergence of a genuinely pluralist Eastern Europe. What has been most striking is the evidence of the fragility of the Soviet Union itself - with evidence of increasing popular discontent with rule from Moscow. Here the 'new thinking' finds its limits. Troops have been used regularly over recent months - apparently with varying degrees of central control - within a number of the Soviet 'Republics'. However the intolerance of independence movements with the Soviet Union throws into relief the tolerance of those just without.

There are many reasons to applaud this process, but we should do so with open eyes for it contains obvious dangers. We do not know the limits of Soviet tolerance, and one of these movements may overstep the mark, or a shift in the power balance within

the Kremlin may encourage the view that the rot must be stopped by a dramatic assertion of strength. More awkward still, an effective collapse of Soviet hegemonic power in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, may unleash disturbing political forces.

It would be nice to believe that the Gorbachev era will push to the fore charming civilized Sakharov types but it could also result in a narrow nationalism that has caused this continent much grief in the past. The cocktail of liberated nationalism, economic failure and environmental neglect is extremely potent. It offers a recipe for great tension.

I do not want to speculate as to how all this will work out. *Coalition / people = masses*  
The process is uneven and uncertain. For the moment all that is necessary to note is that it introduces a fluidity that has been absent from European politics that has been absent since the formation of the cold war alliances.

This sense of change in Central Europe barely touches Britain. We are aware that things are stirring and that this has implications for us. However as I noted earlier we tend to interpret this within a rather conventional framework: the Soviet Union poses a threat as a result of both its ideological character and its military strength. Reduce both and it will be less of a threat, but there are certain tests which have to be passed. The debate concerns the nature of the tests and the reversibility of any progress in passing them. So British policy is naturally 'wait and see', warnings about staying together until the Eastern changes are fundamental and irreversible.

The result of this posture is that we now find ourselves asserting a NATO orthodoxy against the very country it was designed to protect, but a country which because of its geography and history is overly-sensitive to the shifts in



central European politics. As the fear of Soviet hegemony subsides it is replaced by a consciousness of the concessions to sovereignty paid when the fear was much greater. Whether it ~~appreciates~~ ~~this~~ or not, West Germany is in the process of renegotiating its post-war covenant with its allies.

Why should we argue against this for the orthodoxy? If our objective was to prevent Soviet hegemony over the continent then we too might come to the German conclusion that such hegemony is beyond Soviet capacity. Do we then have a reason for an extraordinary peace-time alliance and a continental commitment? Why should we spend a greater proportion of our GDP on defence in order to maintain stability on the Central Front when the country most involved says that stability is no longer a problem, and that the best way to finally remove a threat from the East is to ensure that we no longer pose a threat to the East?

I am of course overstating the position here because the argument has not yet reached this point. But it is important to be aware of these issues because they could come to the fore of public debate. This could result not only from a steady improvement in East-West relations and further evidence of fragmentation in the East. Two other factors could encourage it. The first would be if the United States began a deliberate process of withdrawal. While we might hesitate to set an example for the United States, we might well be tempted to follow one. Second, the delicate balancing act between commitments and resources that set the parameters for British defence policy could tilt in the direction of a defence review if the political costs of cuts were seen to decline. In the circumstances I am describing it is by no means clear that the preference for the continental commitment as expressed in The Way Forward in 1982 will be so strong. We can look at the latest White Paper and note that almost £4.5 billion is spent each year on the Central Front as against just over £2 billion

on the Eastern Atlantic, or that the Central Front has an adverse impact on our balance of payments to the tune of some £1.4 billion each year.

I should make it clear that I am not advocating withdrawal from the Central Front. Far from it. But I think it is important to be aware of the sort of political debate that could encourage moves in this direction and that it could soon be promoted by a cynical realpolitik rather than a sentimental idealism. If our only need for military involvement in continental Europe is to prevent its dominance by a hegemonic power, our success in seeing off the Soviet threat justifies withdrawal. In this way we could pay a heavy price for the trumpeting of the Soviet threat in the earlier part of the decade.

Whatever happens to the Soviet Union we still have a close interest in the political development of Europe. The key difference between the practice of balance of power in previous

periods and now is that Europe provides our main economic and political base, and this is becoming more so. We do not have the American option of cutting ourselves off from Europe, even though the Channel still does provide an extra margin of safety. Much of our international influence is exercised through Europe.

How might Europe develop under the new circumstances? It may not change much - with ideological and economic organization holding the two blocs in place even though the military structures decay. A variation on this prospect might result from the greater cohesion of the West compared with the East so that the former will continue to integrate while the latter fragments. But this could be unstable for the fragmentation will spread into the West whose markets will provide an inevitable magnet for the atoms of the East. This leads on to a third model, where the Western bloc expands to include the acceptable parts of the East and the neutrals - say the

Austrians and then the Hungarians. But this too is unstable for blocs will form within the expanded community, and meanwhile the position of the excluded becomes even more desperate. The excluded area, dominated still by Russia, will become more conflictual. This leads to the fourth model of a fluid, pluralist Europe, in which the EEC cannot develop because ideas of integration are continually subverted by a growing preoccupation within the West over local power blocs. French policy, for example, is already become sensitive to this prospect as it sees its own ties with Germany being loosened as the latter creates its own sphere of influence - extending into the East - based on economic strength.

What conclusions might we draw from this.

First, if it is the case that an old European political logic is reasserting itself then we might naturally find our closest partner in France. This has already become evident but in a

rather negative sense of mutual interest in protecting independent nuclear deterrents. So long as NATO was working within the established framework then Britain's natural European partner was West Germany. In the absence of this framework then this will no longer be the case.

Second, any political liaisons in Europe will be influenced by our conduct within the EEC. I believe this to be a critical change in security policy. Within the traditional framework the EEC role was always circumscribed and will remain so within the purely military sphere. Moreover Britain gained its influence within Europe through its position within NATO, an organization with which it was entirely comfortable. This was in contrast to the EEC, an organization of which it is a much more circumspect member. There is still little point in discussing European defence cooperation as if this was simply a question of substituting for American contribution to NATO by greater cooperation in the face of a constant threat. That is still

really a debate for the old framework.

The critical importance of the EEC for our security policy is that basic political relations are forged in this critical forum. If we stand aloof from the process of European integration then we cannot expect to influence the consequences for this integration in the security sphere. Moreover, if economic and political instruments are becoming more crucial in East-West relations then the Community role must increase.

State  
reception

My third point is that NATO still has a role as the mechanism for drawing North America into questions of European security and as a security framework for West Germany. I will not add my voice to those calling for a new Harmel. This Institute is well represented in the campaign. I take it as given that the Alliance must become more a community of shared values as much a convenient agglomeration to deal with a particular threat. I also take it as given that one of the most difficult tasks

ahead will be to sort out the processes of 'burden-shedding' that most NATO members will expect to indulge in, if current political trends continue. Arms control may help in managing this process but probably less than many hope. The nuclear issue will be the most difficult. Although I would not overestimate the importance of the Lance replacement issue per se, nuclear deployments remain critical political symbols. As the objective of these deployments has been largely to reassure West German elites, if they no longer wish to be reassured then the case for deployment is weakened. One cannot help wondering whether West German politicians may rue the day they sent this message to Washington - and to London.

My third point is that we need new mechanisms of pan-European security cooperation. If we are going to move to a looser framework then we should start thinking about forms of crisis management other than those connected with a set-piece East-West confrontation. The most obvious structure would be based



on the CSCE. The system brings in all relevant countries; it has also shown itself adaptable in devising new institutional structures, of which the most notable has been the CFE, while by its nature brings together the economic, political and the military. It does not, however, have a crisis management nor a dispute resolution aspect. One possibility might be to develop a European Security Council, along the lines of the UN Security Council and with similar types of members (permanent and rotating) and similar rules based on the CSCE.

Fourth, we should recognize that a continuation of the current trends also raises questions concerning the legitimacy of standing armies. This is less of an issue in Britain as it is elsewhere in Europe. By and large the British armed forces are well established, have noble traditions, are reasonably popular, have done what was asked of them - eventually - and have not attempted to seize political power. Moreover Britain has long seen armed forces as multi-functional. Even without

the Russians there will be plenty to keep them busy. However, I suspect that among NATO nations the most important question in terms of restructuring armed forces will turn out to be viability rather than non-offensiveness, which interpreted strictly is far too demanding a standard.

Lastly, let me emphasize that my concern in this lecture has been to look beyond the current debate on Gorbachev's motives and staying power. We may well never need to consider many of the points I have raised here because the institutions of East-West conflict may prove to be more durable than many now suppose. If we are moving into a brave new world then I would submit that the time to begin to think about the novel security problems we could then face is now.

[4523 words]

IN CONFIDENCE

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND NATO STRATEGY

Present Proposals

1. NATO's conventional arms reduction proposals seek parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in key elements of offensive combat forces in Europe. The residual levels would be 85-95% (depending on equipment category) of current NATO levels. The Warsaw Pact would have to reduce to around 50% of current holdings - that is, even after the announced unilateral cuts have been made, to eliminate some 18,000 tanks, 17,000 artillery pieces, 28,000 armoured troop carriers, 9,000 aircraft and 3,000 helicopters. The NATO cuts would be around 3,000 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, 600 armoured troop carriers, 1,000 aircraft and 200 helicopters. Supporting measures would reduce forces stationed forward; limit equipment holdings by any one country; and monitor, and make more visible, reinforcement and mobilisation. All these measures would bite principally on the Soviet Union, for which the package would in total mean enormous change. Details are at Annex A. The central aim is to reduce drastically the scale and immediacy of the threat now posed by the force-levels advantage and aggressive posture of the Warsaw Pact.

## The Negotiations

2. The negotiations have already reached agreement on the concept of equal ceilings and on several of the overall levels proposed by NATO. Aircraft and manpower remain major issues; and other apparently-technical difficulties over such matters as definitions and zones of application may well reflect significant conflicts of military concern, and prove hard to resolve. Verification and stabilisation measures have yet to be discussed in detail. Nevertheless, economic and political imperatives may induce the Soviet Union to agree on terms close to the overall NATO package; and this note addresses the implications for military security on that basis. As Annex B explains, however, agreement close to the Warsaw Pact proposals would improve NATO's relative position by much less, and we must remember the uncertainties and two-way pressures of negotiation. The outcome will be affected not only by the interplay at Vienna but still more by the wider context, with much Western public opinion in flux and far-ranging change - radical and fast-moving, yet uneven and precarious - under way virtually throughout the Warsaw Pact.

3. NATO has set a target for agreement by May 1990, with reductions completed by 1992/3. This is exceptionally demanding, especially for Soviet forces. Political momentum nevertheless is such that the lower force levels could well be established by the mid-1990s. But that is still several years away; meanwhile, NATO would continue to be confronted by Warsaw Pact capabilities much like those now in place.

#### Further Possibilities

4. NATO has indicated that further cuts could be considered after successful implementation of the current proposals, and the Soviet Union has envisaged cuts to much lower levels. It cannot be likely that a further step-change would be achieved before the end of the century; but it is not too soon to start thinking about the basic strategic factors which bear on it.

#### Needs of NATO Strategy

5. NATO's military strategy for deterrence in peace and for preventing defeat in war rests on the concept of flexible response. The essence of this is that NATO should manifestly have a set of options (conventional and nuclear) wide enough, in all the varied possible scenarios of attack on Alliance members, to provide capabilities for meeting aggression effectively enough at its own level either to repel it or, at worst, to engage it in major conflict and delay; and for responding if necessary to likely defeat at any one level by formidable action in a measured way at a higher level rather than by either surrender or holocaust. The underlying aim, given that in the nuclear age the notion of comprehensive victory in the classical sense has lost reality, would be to induce the attacker to desist at as low a level of conflict as possible, while he still has much to lose.

6. This concept has been in place ever since Soviet attainment

of major nuclear capability made "tripwire" ideas incredible and unacceptable. It is hard to see that any other basic concept could ever now make sense, whatever may happen to particular force relativities. The concept does not however define the precise range of response options required, or their individual robustness; these have varied significantly in the past, and stand to be affected by any major changes in force relativities or deployments, whether from CFE or otherwise.

7. The concept of flexible response has been partnered by that of forward defence - the concept that aggression must be met by heavy resistance before it has made any large inroad into NATO territory (so that, in effect, wholesale trading of space for time is not one of the flexible-response options). Here too precise plans and capability to implement have varied over the years; but again it is hard (albeit less for absolute conceptual reasons than because of the natural concerns of the Alliance's front-line members) to see any prospect of fundamental change.

8. The combined concept of flexible response and forward defence depends critically on a credible link from conventional to nuclear options, virtually irrespective of non-nuclear force relativities. There can be no realistic prospect, in the NATO/WP situation, of conventional-force changes so vast that Warsaw Pact victory at that level became militarily impossible (and the option of first nuclear use then truly redundant); and NATO must anyway retain nuclear options in face of a nuclear USSR. The range of such options needs to provide a wide choice

of controllable and militarily relevant actions, and also to keep all aspects of aggressor capability under potential nuclear threat. Nothing in CFE or a "deeper-cuts" extension stands to change this; conversely, the retention of dual-capable systems contributing importantly to the nuclear spectrum must be a key constraint upon CFE options.

9. This illustrates the general need to view CFE constantly within the wider picture of security and arms control activity as a whole. A CFE outcome making NATO's options more robust at the conventional level, but partnered by (for example) a serious attenuation of its effective nuclear options or a further strengthening of Soviet predominance in CW options, could still amount to a bad strategic bargain overall.

#### Impact of CFE Agreement on NATO Strategy

10. The cuts envisaged by the NATO CFE proposals would still leave NATO forces able to implement forward defence broadly on present lines, and in flexible-response terms NATO conventional options would be valuably strengthened; separate analyses by SACEUR, US, UK and FRG all agree that WP prospects in a standing-start attack would be much worsened, and even in a post-reinforcement setting they could expect to prevail, at best, only after longer delay and higher cost.

11. But key realities would remain. The Warsaw Pact would still be militarily better poised than NATO for aggression, and so for

seizing the aggressor's advantage of choosing time and place; sharper WP focus on maximising quality could significantly offset the relative numerical shift; and geography would still give the Soviet Union the edge in rapid mobilisation and reinforcement. NATO would have in prudence to maintain a thorough deterrent hedge against the exploitation of these realities even after a successful CFE agreement. This need is the stronger for the ability (already freshly shown) of totalitarian societies to change direction, and the likelihood of uncertainty and instability in the East whatever the future of Mr Gorbachev and his programme.

12. This basic imperative sharpens the significance of key negotiations and implementation issues besides those of overall numbers. These include:

a. Non-Circumvention. The fact that any agreement would formally exclude the Asian part of the Soviet Union (as well of course as the United States) has been given added point by the inclusion of aircraft, with their inherent mobility. It is the more important to establish rules which provide visibility and monitoring in adjacent territory outside the area. This consideration however appeals to European NATO countries more than to the USA.

b. Distribution of Reductions. The security gains



of the outcome would depend on how wisely the Alliance manages decisions by whom, where, and in what form cuts should be taken. Political and economic pressures could hinder the establishment of the best overall force balance. It will be necessary moreover to implement reductions in a controlled way, protecting security throughout an unsettling process. Beyond this lies the possible difficulty of preventing individual countries from falling away further below their "shares" of the CFE levels under domestic political euphoria.

c. Stabilisation and Verification. The Western CFE proposals envisage that reductions will be accompanied by stabilisation measures to make WP forces less able to concentrate and mobilise unexpectedly. (These measures would be separate from those being discussed in the CSBM talks, which could make a further though modest contribution.) Such measures could significantly enhance the overall improvement to Western security from a CFE agreement. In parallel, a complex and intrusive verification regime will be unavoidable. This will have very substantial and continuing costs for inspecting and monitoring WP activities and for protecting our own.

### NATO's Residual Forces

13. The structure of NATO's forces, their operational concepts and the pattern of their equipment, including relative priorities for investment in modernisation, have always needed to be kept under review, for example in the light of technological advances. A CFE agreement would be an important new factor to be taken into account, though it is not immediately clear that it would in itself point to any particular direction of change. The numerical reductions on the NATO side would be modest, and the operational effect of the much bigger ones on the WP side seems more likely to be towards reducing the likelihood of certain attack scenarios (which have not in practice narrowly determined NATO dispositions or equipment) such as standing-start, than towards radically altering the character (though breadth and weight might be reduced) of a major post-reinforcement attack. But while there is therefore no initial presumption for structural change on the NATO side, continuing study will be needed of such issues as:

- the offensive and defensive air mix
- the relative importance of surveillance and reconnaissance
- the balance between in-place and reinforcement forces

- the regular/reserve mix
- the relative importance of barriers
- the numerical balance among anti-armour systems
- the best way to apportion between roles
- the overall helicopter limit

14. Reduced numbers must be likely to heighten the importance, on both sides, of modern quality in what remains. We must expect Soviet plans and actions to reflect this.

15. Though proportionately modest, the reductions in numbers (including those in US manpower) might still be large enough for some countries and some categories to raise afresh issues of specialisation, rationalisation and burdensharing. One aspect might be the redistribution between nations of modern equipment otherwise due for destruction.

16. There seems no reason to expect change in the case for effective modern nuclear-delivery capability or in its pattern; numbers might, but need not, be marginally affected. The relative importance of reinforcement capability, including infrastructure and movement (notably trans-Atlantic) would tend to increase; so might that of CW unless effectively constrained by agreement. The need several countries, including the UK, have

for capability to meet non-NATO tasks would not be affected; this would remain a constraint upon changes in their NATO-committed forces.

17. The direct implications of a CFE agreement would be partnered by a massive public and political impact. This could deeply affect the willingness of electorates to sustain the scale of defence effort which objective analysis suggests would still be required. The reality that the agreement would not in itself invalidate the essence of NATO's current defence policies, and that these policies would remain the best insurance for our security, might be unpalatable to many; and maintaining them as the basis for material effort and resource provision could prove a major political challenge.

#### Beyond CFE

18. For these and other reasons we could expect that after any CFE agreement there would be early and continued pressure to move to deeper cuts. What limits must the key requirements for an effective NATO strategy impose on this process?

19. A Europe in which Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces were reduced to (say) 50% or less of current NATO levels is inevitably one which would be seeing other dramatic changes. It is hard to specify at all closely the wider political and security framework within which military strategy would have to operate. At a more technical level of analysis, we need a better

capability to understand the military dynamics of a European theatre with greatly-reduced forces. Our present techniques and experience give us reasonable confidence about assessing likely effects within the general scale of current NATO proposals; but the assumptions, modelling and methodology become increasingly vulnerable as we extrapolate beyond that.

20. Some broad points can however be hazarded:

a. The deeper the cuts the less satisfactory it is to analyse security, or to shape it, primarily in terms of peacetime force levels. The situation has to be assessed dynamically; deployment, reinforcement and mobilisation become increasingly dominant (and the quality of stabilisation measures affecting these increasingly significant) in gauging the relativities and stability of opposing defence postures. The deeper the in-area cuts the more reinforcement capability matters; the more significant therefore the geographical asymmetry between East and West becomes; and the more difficult accordingly it might become to strike strategically-acceptable arms control deals on a formally symmetrical basis.

b. Assessing the validity of forward defence becomes much more complex.

At present it involves combat-ready forces able to respond immediately and effectively at the border of NATO territory, and backed up by extensive reinforcement arrangements. At some point, reductions in in-place forces would simply not allow this to be done in short-warning scenarios, though there is no necessary reason (provided reinforcement capability still exists) why it should become impossible in other scenarios. Some preliminary (mainly US) analysis suggests that at around 70-80% of current NATO force levels all-scenario forward defence of the present kind would cease to be sustainable in the Central Region.

c. Further cuts beyond those now envisaged could thus raise strategic questions of major political significance. They need not exclude the possibility of an effective Alliance defence posture still within the basic concept of flexible response; it need not even entail formally abandoning forward defence. But NATO members - especially the FRG - might well have to accept (as indeed might be objectively reasonable, given the major change in threat) both that short-warning scenarios should be discounted, with reliance on force regeneration and reinforcement, and probably also (as an extension of changes already made in the recent past) that a more mobile operational

concept, with a less absolute rejection of trading ground for time, should be adopted.

d. Such a reshaping, however, could also profoundly affect Alliance linkages which have hitherto been regarded as crucial. The forward-stationed forces of the nuclear powers would certainly be much smaller absolutely, and perhaps also as a proportion of NATO's in-place forces, than they are now. However solemn the continuing declaratory commitments, readiness for reinforcement from the rear would not have the same impact on confidence and deterrence as the permanent physical presence of large stationed forces. In the general political setting which deep cuts would imply this might not matter; but the resulting posture might be less robust than the present one if the political scene later darkened again.

e. The deeper the cuts sought, the likelier that they would (for European countries with wide responsibilities like those of the UK and France) run up against the constraint of minimum capability needed for other purposes, especially since both the total forces of the superpowers and those of third-world countries would be unconstrained. It might also become increasingly difficult to ring-fence the current CFE subject-matter and to

put aside (for example) maritime arms control.

f. It must in general be increasingly likely, as cuts reach deeper, that thresholds would be crossed for major change in operational concepts and requirements, force structures and investment priorities. But it is impossible to suggest what specific change might be without choosing particular conjectural assumptions, from among a wide range of possibilities, about the character of a new agreement.

g. The problem of sustaining domestic political support, across every member of the Alliance, for the effort needed to sustain a coherent strategy would be still further intensified, possibly even to a point where the commitment of all to a collective strategy and an integrated military structure lost credibility.



Some Questions for Discussion

A. Is it agreed that there seems neither need nor scope, following a NATO-version CFE agreement, to depart from the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence (paras 5-7, 10)? Would a WP-version agreement (granted that it is much less attractive - Annex B) radically change this view?

B. Would a NATO-version agreement point to any particular direction of change in operational concepts? in force structures? in particular equipment needs? in balance of investment? (Paragraphs 13-16)

C. What might usefully be done in NATO to minimise risks that individual members may implement post-agreement reductions badly suited, in character or scale, for maximising remaining collective defence? (Paragraphs 12b, 17)

D. What key features must be maintained, or improvements secured, in other aspects of the strategic scene if the security benefits of a CFE agreement are not to be undermined? (Paragraphs 8-9)

E. Should force level cuts going substantially deeper than current proposals be expected to compel outright abandonment of the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence? If not, what might be the likely direction of adjustment in their application? (Paragraph 20)

F. What might be done to improve our ability to assess the implications of deeper-cut options, so as to improve our ability to select those which will best suit our purposes?

(Paragraphs 19, 20a)

G. Can anything usefully be done now to reduce risks that a major CFE agreement might generate a public mood that East/West security no longer has to be worked for and paid for?

(Paragraphs 17, 20g)

## Annex A

CFE - THE ALLIANCE PROPOSALS AND THEIR EFFECTOVERALL CEILINGS FOR EACH ALLIANCE:

	Ceiling	Reductions required by:	
		NATO	Warsaw Pact*
MBT	20,000	2,809	18,100
Artillery	16,500	1,239	17,085
ATC	28,000	610	27,800
Aircraft	5,700	990	8,893
Helicopters	1,900	195	3,440

LIMITS ON NATIONAL HOLDINGS:

	Ceiling	Reductions required by:	
		NATO	Soviet Union*
MBT	12,000	-	24,490
Artillery	10,000	-	22,700
ATC	16,800	-	22,280
Aircraft	3,420	-	3,563
Helicopters	1,440	-	2,506

LIMITS ON FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY:

MBT	3,200	-	7,370
Artillery	1,700	-	4,950
ATC	6,000	-	4,880
Manpower (US/USSR only)	275,000	30,500	325,000


\* after unilateral reductions have been made.

GEOGRAPHICAL SUB-LIMITS

The geographical sub-limits shown on the attached map have been proposed to limit destabilising concentrations from the Atlantic to the Urals.

# ATLANTIC TO THE URALS - PROPOSED ALLIANCE SUB-LIMITS

- (1) 
  - MBT's 20,000
  - Artillery 16,500
  - ATC's 28,000
- (2) 
  - MBT's 11,300
  - Artillery 9,000
  - ATC's 20,000
- (3) 
  - MBT's 10,300
  - Artillery 7,600
- (4) 
  - MBT's 8,000
  - Artillery 4,500
  - ATC's 11,000



CFE - WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The Warsaw Pact have made three separate sets of proposals. Their initial proposals were more wide ranging, but less detailed than NATO's. The main features were:

- In addition to tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, they included combat aircraft, helicopters and manpower.
- Three phased programmes: Phase 1 (1991-94) - reductions to 10-15% below the level of the weaker alliance; Phase 2 (1994-97) - reduce by approximately 25%; Phase 3 (1997-2000) - reductions and restructuring to ensure a wholly defensive character.
- Zones of "lower levels of armaments" along the line of contact between the two alliances.

The second set of proposals (their exact relationship with the first set was unclear), tabled in May, followed the format of NATO's, with numerical ceilings, sufficiency and stationing rules, and zones:

- Reductions to Equal Ceilings throughout ATTU

	Ceiling	Reductions by:	
		NATO	Warsaw Pact
Tanks	20,000	2,809	18,100
Artillery	24,000	+6,241	9,585
ATC	28,000	610	28,000
Aircraft	1,500	5,190	13,093
Helicopters	1,700	395	3,640
Manpower	1.35m		

- Limits on National holdings

Tanks	14,000	-	22,490
Artillery	17,000	-	15,700
ATC	18,000	-	21,080
Aircraft	1,200	-	1,268
Helicopters	1,350	-	1,497
Manpower	920,000	-	1,051,500

- Limits on forces Stationed outside national territory

Tanks	4,500	-	6,070
Artillery	4,000	-	2,650
ATC	7,500	-	3,380
Aircraft	350	365	246
Helicopters	600	715	716
Manpower	350,000	135,189	250,000

- Geographical Sub-Limits shown on the attached map.

The third proposal (tabled by the Czech delegation) was for alternative geographical sub-limits, also shown on the attached map.

### Implications of the Warsaw Pact Proposals

In broad outline the Warsaw Pact have accepted the Western approach of asymmetrical reductions to equal ceilings, limits on stationed forces, a "sufficiency" rule, and zonal limits. Subject to agreement on definitions, there is agreement on overall ceilings for tanks and ATCs. The prospect over artillery is less clear; the WP proposal for a higher overall ceiling could reflect a doctrinal requirement for greater numbers of artillery rather than a definitional problem.

However, the detail of the zonal ceilings in the May proposals does affect the sustainability of forward defence. The choice of zonal boundaries would allow the East more real scope than NATO to exploit the overall ceilings. For example, NATO would be required to withdraw just under 5,000 tanks from the Central Region; these could, in theory, be held in the Rear Area (UK, France, Spain and Portugal), but the practicality of this, particularly in terms of redeployment to the Central Region in an emergency, is questionable. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, would be required to withdraw only to the Western Military Districts.

The Czech zonal proposals would ease these problems, but still allow a concentration of tanks in the Central Region some 50% higher than that under the NATO proposals. The delineation of zonal boundaries would also pose serious political problems for some NATO members. In addition, there could be much higher proportions of Soviet (as distinct from NSWP) forces stationed forward than under the NATO proposals.

The impact on NATO aircraft and helicopters would involve cuts in strike aircraft of 40-50% in the forward area and 40-60% in the rear, with a reduction of stationed aircraft by some 50%. The latter could mean the loss of just over 300 US and Canadian strike aircraft from Europe. Similarly, NATO helicopters in the Central Region would be reduced by about 60%, and manpower by about 60%. (The aircraft reductions which the US might have to make under the Alliance's proposals would be unlikely to come from the Central Region.) As a result, the contribution of aircraft as NATO's best instrument for reaction to surprise attack would be weakened.

# CFE — WARSAW PACT ZONING PROPOSAL

	Pers	MBT	Arty	ATC	Ac	Hel
Central Area	0.57m	8700	7600	14,500	420	800
Forward Zone	0.43m	7300	8900	6,000	660	500
Rear Zones	0.35m	4000	7500	7,500	400	400



# WARSAW PACT ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL PROPOSALS (29 JUN 89)

Sub-ceilings for both alliances

	Central	North	South	Rear	Total
PERS	910,000	20,000	270,000	190,000	(1,350,000)
AC	1,120	30	290	40	(1,500)
HEL	1,250	35	260	60	(1,700)
TKS	13,300	200	5,200	1,360	(20,000)
ARTY	11,500	1,000	8,500	3,000	(24,000)
ATC	20,750	150	5,700	1,350	(28,000)





FILE 80  
Defence Seminar  
file

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

17 September 1989

Thank you for your note. I have had a word with the Prime Minister who would be very happy for you to attend the Seminar. I will tell the Secretary of State's office. In due course your office will need to let Mrs. Goodchild here know how you plan to arrive (car number, etc.).

(C. D. POWELL)

The Hon. Alan Clark



FILE SRW

MRS. GOODCHILD

You will want to note that Alan Clark, Minister of State Defence Procurement, will now attend the Seminar at Chequers on 30 September. I have asked his office to let you know arrival details. Could you please make sure Dorothy knows we are one more.

(C. D. POWELL)

17 September 1989

(SRW)

PRIME MINISTER

Alan Clark has sent me the attached note. He wants to attend the seminar at the end of the month on the implications of conventional arms control. I think you ought to invite him given that he is in charge of procurement of weapons systems and seems to be taking a characteristically robust and independent line. I do not see that it would be necessary to balance him with an FCO Minister of State: but you might like me to tell Tom King in advance that you are intending to invite Alan.

Agree?

C.D.P. Yes not

(C. D. POWELL)

17 September 1989



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

Charles Powell Esq

*Charles,*

I am writing with a request which, if you think appropriate (or likely to be granted) you could put to the Prime Minister.

As background I report that I find this Department absolutely enthralling and am extremely grateful for being posted here. The MOD is much maligned, and certainly it has developed administrative drag to the proportions of an art form. But it still runs beautifully like an old Rolls Royce; and has an abundance of resources, in terms of personnel. This means one can find individuals to research any concept however outrageous and (somewhere) others who will testify in its support.

It is clear to me that a major encumbrance of our Defence Policy is that expenditure is being programme-led by a few major systems, whose now obsolescent predecessors were themselves put in place to cope with threats and disparities that have long since altered in shape and character. The while, of course, they attract round them considerable vested interests both military and industrial - and not only in the UK.

The first thing that I did on arrival here was to ask for a dossier on every weapons system contract (except Trident) with four columns showing:

Estimated Cost. Projected Cost. Delivery Starts. Cancellation Cost.

This caused a certain intake of breath, as you can imagine, but duly came up. During my leave I read every single 'contingency' paper drafted by the CoS Committee (I am the only Member of the Government who does not wear glasses for reading, but by the time I am through I expect to be half blind) and found them disappointingly derivative and unoriginal.

and unoriginal./

Anyhow, it is very much easier to think the unthinkable at times when not only opinion/common sense argue for change but there is also the prospect of this being reinforced by Treaty obligations. I refer of course to CFE.

I am particularly concerned to avoid going deep into contractual situations where the money will just be gurgling down the drain until CFE put a final stop to it. Anticipating these changes and phasing them in with the likelier defence realities of the Nineties is crucial and is clearly linked to my two principle objectives:

1. to find ways of saving money
2. to find the formula which will allow us to play the Defence Card effectively at the next election.

Neither is impossible.

For these reasons, I should like to suggest that, if protocol allows it I am permitted to attend the CFE seminar at Chequers on 30th September. I am quite prepared to remain mute, but it is easier to absorb such material viva voce than in reading edited reports afterwards.



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 September 1989

**CHEQUERS SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL**

Could you very kindly arrange for the enclosed papers for this seminar to reach the two American participants, Messrs. Thomson and Karber. I understand Mr. Thomson may already be in Europe. But no doubt the Embassy in Washington will know.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Page despatched  
E.H.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

6/11 Weekend loose  
not

You are holding a seminar at Chequers on 30 September on the implications of conventional force reductions for NATO's strategy. It was agreed that MOD would prepare a discussion paper to be circulated to participants beforehand. I attach their draft. Much of it has been written by Michael Quinlan. We really need to get it out before your departure for Japan, if the participants are to have the time to reflect on it.

The paper's main points are:

- the cuts envisaged by NATO's proposals would not require any change in the present strategy of flexible response and forward defence. Indeed they would improve NATO's position compared with now;
- but the Soviet Union would still be better poised than NATO for military aggression and would maintain its geographical advantage when it comes to reinforcement. The need for strong defence, including an effective, modern nuclear delivery capability, would therefore remain unchanged;
- but the political impact of a CFE could be to weaken public support for the scale of defence effort which would still be required. And there would probably be pressure to go beyond a first agreement and make even deeper cuts;
- it is much harder to calculate what the implications for NATO's strategy of these deeper cuts would be. Some American analysis suggests that if NATO's forces fell to 70-80% of their current levels, it would be impossible to sustain forward defence. We would need to move to a more mobile operational concept, with greater reliance on reinforcement;

- with deeper cuts we would also run up against the constraint of the need to maintain a minimum capability for other tasks outside NATO. It would also become more difficult to resist inclusion of navies in arms control negotiations;
  
- the political problems of sustaining support for defence would become even more acute.

The paper is thorough, although quite technical and rather unadventurous. But it is probably wiser not to put more radical thoughts down on paper in case they leak and cause trouble. It provides quite a good basis to launch a discussion, starting from a common basis of fact, even though we shall in practice need to consider more far-reaching options for Britain's defence policy than are here set out.

Agree to circulate the paper?

C.D.P?

Yes not

C. D. POWELL  
14 SEPTEMBER 1989

MRMAPG

IN CONFIDENCE

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND NATO STRATEGY

Present Proposals

1. NATO's conventional arms reduction proposals seek parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in key elements of offensive combat forces in Europe. The residual levels would be 85-95% (depending on equipment category) of current NATO levels. The Warsaw Pact would have to reduce to around 50% of current holdings - that is, even after the announced unilateral cuts have been made, to eliminate some 18,000 tanks, 17,000 artillery pieces, 28,000 armoured troop carriers, 9,000 aircraft and 3,000 helicopters. The NATO cuts would be around 3,000 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, 600 armoured troop carriers, 1,000 aircraft and 200 helicopters. Supporting measures would reduce forces stationed forward; limit equipment holdings by any one country; and monitor, and make more visible, reinforcement and mobilisation. All these measures would bite principally on the Soviet Union, for which the package would in total mean enormous change. Details are at Annex A. The central aim is to reduce drastically the scale and immediacy of the threat now posed by the force-levels advantage and aggressive posture of the Warsaw Pact.



## The Negotiations

2. The negotiations have already reached agreement on the concept of equal ceilings and on several of the overall levels proposed by NATO. Aircraft and manpower remain major issues; and other apparently-technical difficulties over such matters as definitions and zones of application may well reflect significant conflicts of military concern, and prove hard to resolve. Verification and stabilisation measures have yet to be discussed in detail. Nevertheless, economic and political imperatives may induce the Soviet Union to agree on terms close to the overall NATO package; and this note addresses the implications for military security on that basis. As Annex B explains, however, agreement close to the Warsaw Pact proposals would improve NATO's relative position by much less, and we must remember the uncertainties and two-way pressures of negotiation. The outcome will be affected not only by the interplay at Vienna but still more by the wider context, with much Western public opinion in flux and far-ranging change - radical and fast-moving, yet uneven and precarious - under way virtually throughout the Warsaw Pact.

3. NATO has set a target for agreement by May 1990, with reductions completed by 1992/3. This is exceptionally demanding, especially for Soviet forces. Political momentum nevertheless is such that the lower force levels could well be established by the mid-1990s. But that is still several years away; meanwhile, NATO would continue to be confronted by Warsaw Pact capabilities much like those now in place.

#### Further Possibilities

4. NATO has indicated that further cuts could be considered after successful implementation of the current proposals, and the Soviet Union has envisaged cuts to much lower levels. It cannot be likely that a further step-change would be achieved before the end of the century; but it is not too soon to start thinking about the basic strategic factors which bear on it.

#### Needs of NATO Strategy

5. NATO's military strategy for deterrence in peace and for preventing defeat in war rests on the concept of **flexible response**. The essence of this is that NATO should manifestly have a set of options (conventional and nuclear) wide enough, in all the varied possible scenarios of attack on Alliance members, to provide capabilities for meeting aggression effectively enough at its own level either to repel it or, at worst, to engage it in major conflict and delay; and for responding if necessary to likely defeat at any one level by formidable action in a measured way at a higher level rather than by either surrender or holocaust. The underlying aim, given that in the nuclear age the notion of comprehensive victory in the classical sense has lost reality, would be to induce the attacker to desist at as low a level of conflict as possible, while he still has much to lose.

6. This concept has been in place ever since Soviet attainment

of major nuclear capability made "tripwire" ideas incredible and unacceptable. It is hard to see that any other basic concept could ever now make sense, whatever may happen to particular force relativities. The concept does not however define the precise range of response options required, or their individual robustness; these have varied significantly in the past, and stand to be affected by any major changes in force relativities or deployments, whether from CFE or otherwise.

7. The concept of flexible response has been partnered by that of forward defence - the concept that aggression must be met by heavy resistance before it has made any large inroad into NATO territory (so that, in effect, wholesale trading of space for time is not one of the flexible-response options). Here too precise plans and capability to implement have varied over the years; but again it is hard (albeit less for absolute conceptual reasons than because of the natural concerns of the Alliance's front-line members) to see any prospect of fundamental change.

8. The combined concept of flexible response and forward defence depends critically on a credible link from conventional to nuclear options, virtually irrespective of non-nuclear force relativities. There can be no realistic prospect, in the NATO/WP situation, of conventional-force changes so vast that Warsaw Pact victory at that level became militarily impossible (and the option of first nuclear use then truly redundant); and NATO must anyway retain nuclear options in face of a nuclear USSR. The range of such options needs to provide a wide choice

of controllable and militarily relevant actions, and also to keep all aspects of aggressor capability under potential nuclear threat. Nothing in CFE or a "deeper-cuts" extension stands to change this; conversely, the retention of dual-capable systems contributing importantly to the nuclear spectrum must be a key constraint upon CFE options.

9. This illustrates the general need to view CFE constantly within the wider picture of security and arms control activity as a whole. A CFE outcome making NATO's options more robust at the conventional level, but partnered by (for example) a serious attenuation of its effective nuclear options or a further strengthening of Soviet predominance in CW options, could still amount to a bad strategic bargain overall.

#### Impact of CFE Agreement on NATO Strategy

10. The cuts envisaged by the NATO CFE proposals would still leave NATO forces able to implement forward defence broadly on present lines, and in flexible-response terms NATO conventional options would be valuably strengthened; separate analyses by SACEUR, US, UK and FRG all agree that WP prospects in a standing-start attack would be much worsened, and even in a post-reinforcement setting they could expect to prevail, at best, only after longer delay and higher cost.

11. But key realities would remain. The Warsaw Pact would still be militarily better poised than NATO for aggression, and so for

seizing the aggressor's advantage of choosing time and place; sharper WP focus on maximising quality could significantly offset the relative numerical shift; and geography would still give the Soviet Union the edge in rapid mobilisation and reinforcement. NATO would have in prudence to maintain a thorough deterrent hedge against the exploitation of these realities even after a successful CFE agreement. This need is the stronger for the ability (already freshly shown) of totalitarian societies to change direction, and the likelihood of uncertainty and instability in the East whatever the future of Mr Gorbachev and his programme.

12. This basic imperative sharpens the significance of key negotiations and implementation issues besides those of overall numbers. These include:

- a. Non-Circumvention. The fact that any agreement would formally exclude the Asian part of the Soviet Union (as well of course as the United States) has been given added point by the inclusion of aircraft, with their inherent mobility. It is the more important to establish rules which provide visibility and monitoring in adjacent territory outside the area. This consideration however appeals to European NATO countries more than to the USA.
- b. Distribution of Reductions. The security gains

of the outcome would depend on how wisely the Alliance manages decisions by whom, where, and in what form cuts should be taken. Political and economic pressures could hinder the establishment of the best overall force balance. It will be necessary moreover to implement reductions in a controlled way, protecting security throughout an unsettling process. Beyond this lies the possible difficulty of preventing individual countries from falling away further below their "shares" of the CFE levels under domestic political euphoria.

c. Stabilisation and Verification. The Western CFE proposals envisage that reductions will be accompanied by stabilisation measures to make WP forces less able to concentrate and mobilise unexpectedly. (These measures would be separate from those being discussed in the CSBM talks, which could make a further though modest contribution.) Such measures could significantly enhance the overall improvement to Western security from a CFE agreement. In parallel, a complex and intrusive verification regime will be unavoidable. This will have very substantial and continuing costs for inspecting and monitoring WP activities and for protecting our own.

### NATO's Residual Forces

13. The structure of NATO's forces, their operational concepts and the pattern of their equipment, including relative priorities for investment in modernisation, have always needed to be kept under review, for example in the light of technological advances. A CFE agreement would be an important new factor to be taken into account, though it is not immediately clear that it would in itself point to any particular direction of change. The numerical reductions on the NATO side would be modest, and the operational effect of the much bigger ones on the WP side seems more likely to be towards reducing the likelihood of certain attack scenarios (which have not in practice narrowly determined NATO dispositions or equipment) such as standing-start, than towards radically altering the character (though breadth and weight might be reduced) of a major post-reinforcement attack. But while there is therefore no initial presumption for structural change on the NATO side, continuing study will be needed of such issues as:

- the offensive and defensive air mix
  
- the relative importance of surveillance and reconnaissance
  
- the balance between in-place and reinforcement forces

- the regular/reserve mix
- the relative importance of barriers
- the numerical balance among anti-armour systems
- the best way to apportion between roles  
the overall helicopter limit

14. Reduced numbers must be likely to heighten the importance, on both sides, of modern quality in what remains. We must expect Soviet plans and actions to reflect this.

15. Though proportionately modest, the reductions in numbers (including those in US manpower) might still be large enough for some countries and some categories to raise afresh issues of specialisation, rationalisation and burdensharing. One aspect might be the redistribution between nations of modern equipment otherwise due for destruction.

16. There seems no reason to expect change in the case for effective modern nuclear-delivery capability or in its pattern; numbers might, but need not, be marginally affected. The relative importance of reinforcement capability, including infrastructure and movement (notably trans-Atlantic) would tend to increase; so might that of CW unless effectively constrained by agreement. The need several countries, including the UK, have



for capability to meet non-NATO tasks would not be affected; this would remain a constraint upon changes in their NATO-committed forces.

17. The direct implications of a CFE agreement would be partnered by a massive public and political impact. This could deeply affect the willingness of electorates to sustain the scale of defence effort which objective analysis suggests would still be required. The reality that the agreement would not in itself invalidate the essence of NATO's current defence policies, and that these policies would remain the best insurance for our security, might be unpalatable to many; and maintaining them as the basis for material effort and resource provision could prove a major political challenge.

#### Beyond CFE

18. For these and other reasons we could expect that after any CFE agreement there would be early and continued pressure to move to deeper cuts. What limits must the key requirements for an effective NATO strategy impose on this process?

19. A Europe in which Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces were reduced to (say) 50% or less of current NATO levels is inevitably one which would be seeing other dramatic changes. It is hard to specify at all closely the wider political and security framework within which military strategy would have to operate. At a more technical level of analysis, we need a better

capability to understand the military dynamics of a European theatre with greatly-reduced forces. Our present techniques and experience give us reasonable confidence about assessing likely effects within the general scale of current NATO proposals; but the assumptions, modelling and methodology become increasingly vulnerable as we extrapolate beyond that.

20. Some broad points can however be hazarded:

a. The deeper the cuts the less satisfactory it is to analyse security, or to shape it, primarily in terms of peacetime force levels. The situation has to be assessed dynamically; deployment, reinforcement and mobilisation become increasingly dominant (and the quality of stabilisation measures affecting these increasingly significant) in gauging the relativities and stability of opposing defence postures. **The deeper the in-area cuts the more reinforcement capability matters;** the more significant therefore the geographical asymmetry between East and West becomes; and the more difficult accordingly it might become to strike strategically-acceptable arms control deals on a formally symmetrical basis.

b. **Assessing the validity of forward defence becomes much more complex.**

At present it involves combat-ready forces able to respond immediately and effectively at the border of NATO territory, and backed up by extensive reinforcement arrangements. At some point, reductions in in-place forces would simply not allow this to be done in short-warning scenarios, though there is no necessary reason (provided reinforcement capability still exists) why it should become impossible in other scenarios. Some preliminary (mainly US) analysis suggests that at around 70-80% of current NATO force levels all-scenario forward defence of the present kind would cease to be sustainable in the Central Region.

c. Further cuts beyond those now envisaged could thus raise strategic questions of major political significance. They need not exclude the possibility of an effective Alliance defence posture still within the basic concept of flexible response; it need not even entail formally abandoning forward defence. But NATO members - especially the FRG - might well have to accept (as indeed might be objectively reasonable, given the major change in threat) both that short-warning scenarios should be discounted, with reliance on force regeneration and reinforcement, and probably also (as an extension of changes already made in the recent past) that a more mobile operational

concept, with a less absolute rejection of trading ground for time, should be adopted.

d. Such a reshaping, however, could also profoundly affect Alliance linkages which have hitherto been regarded as crucial. The forward-stationed forces of the nuclear powers would certainly be much smaller absolutely, and perhaps also as a proportion of NATO's in-place forces, than they are now. However solemn the continuing declaratory commitments, readiness for reinforcement from the rear would not have the same impact on confidence and deterrence as the permanent physical presence of large stationed forces. In the general political setting which deep cuts would imply this might not matter; but the resulting posture might be less robust than the present one if the political scene later darkened again.

e. The deeper the cuts sought, the likelier that they would (for European countries with wide responsibilities like those of the UK and France) run up against the constraint of minimum capability needed for other purposes, especially since both the total forces of the superpowers and those of third-world countries would be unconstrained. It might also become increasingly difficult to ring-fence the current CFE subject-matter and to

put aside (for example) maritime arms control.

f. It must in general be increasingly likely, as cuts reach deeper, that thresholds would be crossed for major change in operational concepts and requirements, force structures and investment priorities. But it is impossible to suggest what specific change might be without choosing particular conjectural assumptions, from among a wide range of possibilities, about the character of a new agreement.

g. The problem of sustaining domestic political support, across every member of the Alliance, for the effort needed to sustain a coherent strategy would be still further intensified, possibly even to a point where the commitment of all to a collective strategy and an integrated military structure lost credibility.

### Some Questions for Discussion

- A. Is it agreed that there seems neither need nor scope, following a NATO-version CFE agreement, to depart from the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence (paras 5-7, 10)? Would a WP-version agreement (granted that it is much less attractive - Annex B) radically change this view?
- B. Would a NATO-version agreement point to any particular direction of change in operational concepts? in force structures? in particular equipment needs? in balance of investment? (Paragraphs 13-16)
- C. What might usefully be done in NATO to minimise risks that individual members may implement post-agreement reductions badly suited, in character or scale, for maximising remaining collective defence? (Paragraphs 12b, 17)
- D. What key features must be maintained, or improvements secured, in other aspects of the strategic scene if the security benefits of a CFE agreement are not to be undermined? (Paragraphs 8-9)
- E. Should force level cuts going substantially deeper than current proposals be expected to compel outright abandonment of the basic concepts of flexible response and forward defence? If not, what might be the likely direction of adjustment in their application? (Paragraph 20)

F. What might be done to improve our ability to assess the implications of deeper-cut options, so as to improve our ability to select those which will best suit our purposes?

(Paragraphs 19, 20a)

G. Can anything usefully be done now to reduce risks that a major CFE agreement might generate a public mood that East/West security no longer has to be worked for and paid for?

(Paragraphs 17, 20g)

## Annex A

CFE - THE ALLIANCE PROPOSALS AND THEIR EFFECTOVERALL CEILINGS FOR EACH ALLIANCE:

	Ceiling	Reductions required by:	
		NATO	Warsaw Pact*
MBT	20,000	2,809	18,100
Artillery	16,500	1,239	17,085
ATC	28,000	610	27,800
Aircraft	5,700	990	8,893
Helicopters	1,900	195	3,440

LIMITS ON NATIONAL HOLDINGS:

	Ceiling	Reductions required by:	
		NATO	Soviet Union*
MBT	12,000	-	24,490
Artillery	10,000	-	22,700
ATC	16,800	-	22,280
Aircraft	3,420	-	3,563
Helicopters	1,440	-	2,506

LIMITS ON FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY:

MBT	3,200	-	7,370
Artillery	1,700	-	4,950
ATC	6,000	-	4,880
Manpower (US/USSR only)	275,000	30,500	325,000

\* after unilateral reductions have been made.


GEOGRAPHICAL SUB-LIMITS

The geographical sub-limits shown on the attached map have been proposed to limit destabilising concentrations from the Atlantic to the Urals.



# ATLANTIC TO THE URALS - PROPOSED ALLIANCE SUB-LIMITS

- (1)
- MBT's 20,000
  - Artillery 16,500
  - ATC's 28,000
- (2)
- MBT's 11,300
  - Artillery 9,000
  - ATC's 20,000
- (3)
- MBT's 10,300
  - Artillery 7,600
  - ATC's 18,000
- (4)
- MBT's 8,000
  - Artillery 4,500
  - ATC's 11,000



CFE - WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The Warsaw Pact have made three separate sets of proposals. Their initial proposals were more wide ranging, but less detailed than NATO's. The main features were:

- In addition to tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, they included combat aircraft, helicopters and manpower.
- Three phased programmes: Phase 1 (1991-94) - reductions to 10-15% below the level of the weaker alliance; Phase 2 (1994-97) - reduce by approximately 25%; Phase 3 (1997-2000) - reductions and restructuring to ensure a wholly defensive character.
- Zones of "lower levels of armaments" along the line of contact between the two alliances.

The second set of proposals (their exact relationship with the first set was unclear), tabled in May, followed the format of NATO's, with numerical ceilings, sufficiency and stationing rules, and zones:

- Reductions to Equal Ceilings throughout ATTU

	Ceiling	Reductions by:	
		NATO	Warsaw Pact
Tanks	20,000	2,809	18,100
Artillery	24,000	+6,241	9,585
ATC	28,000	610	28,000
Aircraft	1,500	5,190	13,093
Helicopters	1,700	395	3,640
Manpower	1.35m		

- Limits on National holdings

Tanks	14,000	-	22,490
Artillery	17,000	-	15,700
ATC	18,000	-	21,080
Aircraft	1,200	-	1,268
Helicopters	1,350	-	1,497
Manpower	920,000	-	1,051,500

- Limits on forces Stationed outside national territory

Tanks	4,500	-	6,070
Artillery	4,000	-	2,650
ATC	7,500	-	3,380
Aircraft	350	365	246
Helicopters	600	715	716
Manpower	350,000	135,189	250,000

- Geographical Sub-Limits shown on the attached map.

The third proposal (tabled by the Czech delegation) was for alternative geographical sub-limits, also shown on the attached map.

## Implications of the Warsaw Pact Proposals

In broad outline the Warsaw Pact have accepted the Western approach of asymmetrical reductions to equal ceilings, limits on stationed forces, a "sufficiency" rule, and zonal limits. Subject to agreement on definitions, there is agreement on overall ceilings for tanks and ATCs. The prospect over artillery is less clear; the WP proposal for a higher overall ceiling could reflect a doctrinal requirement for greater numbers of artillery rather than a definitional problem.

However, the detail of the zonal ceilings in the May proposals does affect the sustainability of forward defence. The choice of zonal boundaries would allow the East more real scope than NATO to exploit the overall ceilings. For example, NATO would be required to withdraw just under 5,000 tanks from the Central Region; these could, in theory, be held in the Rear Area (UK, France, Spain and Portugal), but the practicality of this, particularly in terms of redeployment to the Central Region in an emergency, is questionable. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, would be required to withdraw only to the Western Military Districts.

The Czech zonal proposals would ease these problems, but still allow a concentration of tanks in the Central Region some 50% higher than that under the NATO proposals. The delineation of zonal boundaries would also pose serious political problems for some NATO members. In addition, there could be much higher proportions of Soviet (as distinct from NSWP) forces stationed forward than under the NATO proposals.

The impact on NATO aircraft and helicopters would involve cuts in strike aircraft of 40-50% in the forward area and 40-60% in the rear, with a reduction of stationed aircraft by some 50%. The latter could mean the loss of just over 300 US and Canadian strike aircraft from Europe. Similarly, NATO helicopters in the Central Region would be reduced by about 60%, and manpower by about 60%. (The aircraft reductions which the US might have to make under the Alliance's proposals would be unlikely to come from the Central Region.) As a result, the contribution of aircraft as NATO's best instrument for reaction to surprise attack would be weakened.

# CFE — WARSAW PACT ZONING PROPOSAL

	Pers	MBT	Arty	ATC	Ac	Hel
Central Area	0.67m	8700	7600	14,500	420	800
Forward Zone	0.43m	7300	8900	6,000	680	500
Rear Zones	0.36m	4000	7500	7,500	400	400



# WARSAW PACT ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL PROPOSALS (29 JUN 89)

Sub-celings for both alliances

	Central	North	South	Rear	
PERS	816,000	20,000	278,000	150,000	(1,300M)
AC	1,120	30	290	80	(1,600)
HEL	1,250	30	390	80	(1,700)
TKS	13,300	200	5,250	1,300	(20,000)
ARTY	11,500	1,000	8,500	5,300	(24,000)
ATC	20,780	160	5,750	1,350	(20,000)





8W  
Sent to all participants  
(see invitation letter)  
except for Sir Peter Levene  
who is not going.

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

copy of document paper  
forwarded to reference  
14 September 1989  
University  
of Newcastle 25/9/89

Dear Foreign Secretary,

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The Prime Minister was very glad to hear that you are able to attend the Seminar on Conventional Arms Control at Chequers on Saturday 30 September and looks forward very much to seeing you then.

In my earlier letter, I promised to circulate a short paper in advance of the Seminar. I now enclose this. It is not intended to be an agenda, but rather to set the scene and serve as background for discussion at Chequers. It is for use solely in connection with the Seminar and should not be copied or referred to in any other publications.

Yours  
C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

The Rt. Hon John Major, M.P.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 7/4/1L

14 September 1989

Dear Charles,

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 13th September. As requested, I attach 25 copies of the paper for the forthcoming Chequers Seminar.

Your sincerely  
B R Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



*the Prime  
BH. CDP  
cable*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 September 1989

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 12 September covering a draft paper for the forthcoming Seminar on Conventional Arms Control. The Prime Minister is unlikely to be able to read the paper before the week-end. I think the likelihood is that she will agree to its circulation. Since we leave for Tokyo on Monday morning and shall need to send the paper out before we go, I suggest that we should assume the text is all right and I should be grateful if you would let me have 25 copies by the evening of 15 September.

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

*BHP*

M. Powell

cc Mr. Powell

MR. TURNBULL

Seminar at Chequers  
30 September

We spoke briefly about whether the hotel bills, travelling and out of pocket expenses of the 'outsiders' attending the Seminar should be paid out of PM Entertainment Cost Centre (MCS 77120) or PS/Overseas Affairs (MCS 77510). You said that you thought the latter.

I have since heard that the Ministry of Defence will only pay for the two Americans coming from America (Messrs. Thomson and Karber and Mr. Thomson's girlfriend).

This therefore leaves the following guests' expenses to be met by No. 10

**Hotel Expenses and Travel within UK**

- Professor Martin
- Mr. Laurence Freedman
- Mr. Chris Donnelly
- Mr. Ken Brower

**Travel Expenses only**

- Mr. Heisbourg
- General Farndale

Could you please confirm that you and Charles Powell to whom I am copying this minute agree with the above?

Sue Goodchild  
—

12 September 1989



CONFIDENTIAL



*file*

*DSZATS*

*bc: PC  
S9*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 August 1989

CHEQUERS SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS:  
30 SEPTEMBER

Thank you for your letter about accommodation for James Thomson during the Chequers Seminar. We are happy to provide accommodation for his long-term girlfriend (and if necessary her air fare from Germany). The Ministry of Defence will be in touch direct with you about air tickets to ensure that we get the best possible deal.

C. D. POWELL

R. P. Ralph, Esq.  
British Embassy  
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
 Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 7/4/1L

30 August 1989

Dear Charles,

CHEQUERS SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS

Thank you for your letter of 24th August, forwarding one from our Embassy in Washington about Mr Thomson's plans.

We think we can stretch the agreement, already given, to cover a double room for Mr Thomson for two nights, noting that we should now save something on his air fares. I note from your letter of 31st July to participants that No 10 are making the accommodation arrangements; you may take it that the Ministry of Defence will meet the costs for both Dr Karber and Mr Thomson, plus long term girlfriend. As for air travel, our experts will be in touch direct with the Washington Embassy about the arrangements to ensure that we get the best deal (as I suggested in my letter of 24th July) and now taking into account Mr Thomson's prior engagement in the FRG.

Your sincerely  
 Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)  
 PS/S of S


P.S. You may like to know that Mr Thomson has just written to Sir Michael Quinlan reporting his appointment as President and Chief Executive of Rand from 16 August.

Charles Powell Esq  
 No 10 Downing Street

DEFENCE: *same*

*ALY 87*

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*cdg*



*seen by CDG  
14/9*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 7/4/1L

12 September 1989

*Dear Charles,*

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 27th July. *(copy)* As requested, I attach the paper you asked us to produce as the basis for discussion at the Seminar. The FCO have been involved in its preparation; it has been cleared by my Secretary of State.

Technically, the material in the annexes to the paper is classified (unlike the main text); but as the talks proceed, it will become widely available. We do not believe, therefore, that we need to classify the paper but once you distribute it, it should be marked "In Confidence"; you will also wish to remind participants that it is solely for their use in connection with the Seminar and should not be copied or referred to in any other publications.

If you let me know if the Prime Minister is content with the paper, we will provide the requisite number of copies, including the maps, for distribution.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the attachment to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely  
B R Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

ITC  
MRCM  
cc PC

PRIME MINISTER

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

You are holding a seminar at Chequers on 30 September on the implications of conventional force reductions for NATO's strategy. It was agreed that MOD would prepare a discussion paper to be circulated to participants beforehand. I attach their draft. Much of it has been written by Michael Quinlan. We really need to get it out before your departure for Japan, if the participants are to have the time to reflect on it.

The paper's main points are:

- the cuts envisaged by NATO's proposals would not require any change in the present strategy of flexible response and forward defence. Indeed they would improve NATO's position compared with now;
- but the Soviet Union would still be better poised than NATO for military aggression and would maintain its geographical advantage when it comes to reinforcement. The need for strong defence, including an effective, modern nuclear delivery capability, would therefore remain unchanged;
- but the political impact of a CFE could be to weaken public support for the scale of defence effort which would still be required. And there would probably be pressure to go beyond a first agreement and make even deeper cuts;
- it is much harder to calculate what the implications for NATO's strategy of these deeper cuts would be. Some American analysis suggests that if NATO's forces fell to 70-80% of their current levels, it would be impossible to sustain forward defence. We would need to move to a more mobile operational concept, with greater reliance on reinforcement;

SAM

- with deeper cuts we would also run up against the constraint of the need to maintain a minimum capability for other tasks outside NATO. It would also become more difficult to resist inclusion of navies in arms control negotiations;
  
- the political problems of sustaining support for defence would become even more acute.

The paper is thorough, although quite technical and rather unadventurous. But it is probably wiser not to put more radical thoughts down on paper in case they leak and cause trouble. It provides quite a good basis to launch a discussion, starting from a common basis of fact, even though we shall in practice need to consider more far-reaching options for Britain's defence policy than are here set out.

Agree to circulate the paper?

CD?

C. D. POWELL  
14 SEPTEMBER 1989

MRMAPG



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2928 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

SIR PETER LEVENE KBE  
CHIEF OF DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

CDP 101/7

29 August 1989

C D Powell Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

Thank you for your letter of 31 July, to which I am only now able to reply as I have been on leave. I know that my Private Secretary explained to Mrs Goodchild that I would not be free to attend the meeting which the Prime Minister has arranged at Chequers on 30 September.

I very much regret that I will not be able to be present on that day, but am nevertheless most appreciative of the invitation. There are a number of points which I would particularly have wished to make were I to have attended, and I am arranging to discuss these with General Vincent in order that he can put them forward during the discussion.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

KAHZA



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 August 1989

CHEQUERS SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS

You kindly agreed that the MOD would meet the travel costs of the two proposed American participants in this seminar. I enclose a copy of a letter from the Embassy in Washington. You will see that Dr. Karber will take up the offer of a first class ticket and two nights accommodation. In the case of Mr. Thomson, we shall be asked to meet only a proportion of the fare. But the Embassy wonder whether we could also meet the accommodation costs of his "long term girlfriend", who will be accompanying him. I do not know what view the MOD takes on these matters! But since we are saving on the fare, could we contemplate a double room?

(C. D. POWELL)

John Colston, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL



20

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 August 1989

I am writing in Charles Powell's absence to acknowledge receipt of your letter about the Chequers Seminar on Conventional Force Reductions on 30 September.

I shall make sure he sees it as soon as he returns.

(CAROLINE SLOCOCK)

R. P. Ralph, Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
Washington D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



*Charles o/r*

Charles Powell Esq  
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London

*Dear Charles,*

CHEQUERS SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS : 30 SEPTEMBER

1. Thank you for your letter of ~~28~~ <sup>five weeks</sup> July to Roger Bone, whom I succeeded recently.

2. We have delivered the letters to Thomson and Karber, who would both be delighted to attend. On present plans Karber will travel from the US, and would therefore avail himself of the offer of ticket and accommodation. Thomson's plans are less straightforward, in that he will already be in Europe (in the FRG, at the function being chaired by Chancellor Kohl !), so it will be a question of paying a proportion of his fare. An additional complication is that his long-term girlfriend will be accompanying him to the FRG. Could we provide at least accommodation for the two of them in London ?

*Yours ever*

*Ralph*

R P Ralph

DEFENCE: Seminar, July 89

WASHINGTON D.C.  
C. D. ROYAL





## 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 July 1989

*Dear Michael,*

From time to time the Prime Minister organises discussions by small groups bringing together those in Government and those outside it, to discuss a current issue of foreign or defence policy. She has in mind to hold such a meeting at Chequers on Saturday 30 September to discuss the impact which conventional arms reductions are likely to have on NATO strategy and on United Kingdom defence policy. The Prime Minister very much hopes that you will agree to take part.

The main meeting, involving all participants, will last from 0930 to 1500. There will then be a more restricted session from 1530 to 1730 for British Government participants only, to draw specific conclusions for United Kingdom defence policy and weapons procurement. A fuller agenda and a paper which will provide a basis for discussion will be circulated nearer the time.

Since Chequers is not altogether easy to reach by public transport, we shall arrange overnight accommodation at a nearby hotel for the night of 29/30 September for those participants who so wish. All accommodation and travel expenses will, of course, be reimbursed.

It would be helpful to know fairly soon whether you will be able to take part. If you prefer to reply by telephone the number to ring is (01) 222 8141. Please ask for Mrs Goodchild. Further details about the meeting will follow in early September.

This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because knowledge of the meeting should be confined to the participants themselves.

(C. D. POWELL)

Sir Michael Quinlan, K.C.B.,  
Ministry of Defence.

similar letter to

Rt Hon John Major )  
Rt Hon Nigel Lawson ) with covering  
Rt Hon Tom King ) PS letter  
Sir Michael Quinlan KCB, MOD  
Chief of Defence Staff, Marshal of the RAF  
Sir David Craig GCB, OBE  
Chief Scientific Adviser, MOD,  
Professor E R Oxburgh  
Commander in Chief BAOR  
General Sir Brian Kenny KCB CBE  
Vice Chief of Defence Staff  
General Sir Richard Vincent KCB DSO  
Sir Peter Levene KBE  
Professor Laurence Martin DL  
Professor Lawrence Freedman  
Chris Donnelly  
Ken Brower  
Francois Heisbourg  
General Sir Martin Farndale KCB

ALL THE ABOVE SENT TO MOD FOR ONWARD  
TRANSMISSION

Sir Percy Cradock  
Sir Michael Alexander, CMG, NATO  
John Weston CMG, FCO

James Thomson, USA,  
Philip Karber, USA  
sent via Roger Bone in Washington

DRAFT LETTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

From time to time the Prime Minister organises discussions by small groups bringing together those in Government and those outside it, to discuss a current issue of foreign or defence policy. She has in mind to hold such a meeting at Chequers on Saturday 30 September to discuss the implications for NATO's strategy and Britain's military role in that strategy of current conventional force reduction proposals. *major UK conventional arms reductions are likely to have an NATO strategy in United Kingdom defence*

The Prime Minister very much hopes that you will agree to take part.

The main meeting, involving all participants, will last from 0930 to 1500. There will then be a more restricted session from 1530 to 1730 for British Government participants only, to draw specific conclusions for United Kingdom defence policy and weapons procurement. A fuller agenda and a paper which will provide a basis for discussion will be circulated nearer the time.

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This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because ~~we would prefer~~ knowledge of the meeting <sup>should</sup> ~~to~~ be confined to the participants themselves.

GM

We shall need copies of the attached  
letter for:

[Addresses from MOD]

Vice

✓ Francis Kenny

✓ Chancellor

✓ Alan Kenny

✓ Sir Michael Quinlan

✓ Chief of Staff <sup>Craig</sup> MOD

① Chief Logistic Advisor, MOD

② Commander-in-Chief BAOR Kenny

MOD Vice Chief of Staff Vincent

✓ Sir Peter Levene MOD

✓ Sir Percy Goddard

✓ Sir Michael Alexander NATO

✓ Mr John Weston, FCO

② Professor Lawrence North <sup>channel</sup>

③ Lawrence Friedman

? Chris Donnelly

? Ken Brown

④ Francois Heisbourg

⑤ General Farnelle

⑥ James Thomson USA

⑦ Philip Karber USA

④ c/o Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St, WC2E 7NQ

⑤ c/o Lloyds Bank  
Cox & King's Branch  
6 Pall Mall, SW1

① Dept. of Earth Sciences  
Downing St, Cambridge  
CB2 3EQ.

② Univ Newcastle UT  
NUT, NE1 7RU.

③ c/o Dept. of War Studies  
King's College,  
Strand WC2R 2LS



17  
17

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 July 1989

**SEMINAR AT CHEQUERS, 30 SEPTEMBER**

I enclose for your records the letter of invitation which is going out to participants in the Seminar on Conventional Force Reductions at Chequers on 30 September.

**CHARLES POWELL**

A C S Allan Esq  
HM Treasury





## 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 July 1989

From time to time the Prime Minister organises discussions by small groups bringing together those in Government and those outside it, to discuss a current issue of foreign or defence policy. She has in mind to hold such a meeting at Chequers on Saturday 30 September to discuss the impact which conventional arms reductions are likely to have on NATO strategy and on United Kingdom defence policy. The Prime Minister very much hopes that you will agree to take part.

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(C. D. POWELL)

The Right Honourable Nigel Lawson, M.P.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL



7.6  
99

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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30 July 1989

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CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

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(C. D. POWELL)

The Right Honourable John Major, M.P.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL



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96

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 July 1989

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**CHARLES POWELL**

Brian Hawtin Esq  
Ministry of Defence



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 July 1989

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(C. D. POWELL)

The Right Honourable Tom King, M.P.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



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EAMCAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

28 July 1989

The Prime Minister is holding a seminar on conventional force reductions and their implications for NATO strategy at Chequers on 30 September. We would like to invite two American experts, James Thomson (Vice-President of the Rand Corporation) and Philip Karber (of the BDM Corporation). I enclose letters of invitation to them and would be most grateful if you could arrange for their delivery. In doing so, could you say that we would pay first-class return fares (the MoD will purchase the tickets) and two nights accommodation. It would be helpful to know fairly soon whether they can come.

CHARLES POWELL

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

h



*SW*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

31 July 1989

*Dear Mr. Thomson,*


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This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because knowledge of the meeting should be confined to the participants themselves.

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
 (C. D. POWELL)

Mr. James Thomson

SW



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1989

Dear Mr. Karber,


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This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because knowledge of the meeting should be confined to the participants themselves.

Yours sincerely,  
  
 (C. D. POWELL)

Mr. Philip Karber





CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 July 1989

*cm*  
*file with CD*  
Dear Charles,

Seminar on Conventional Arms Control

With his letter of 24 July, Brian Hawtin enclosed some draft language for inclusion in the letter to participants at the autumn seminar on Conventional Arms Control.

The first sentence of the second paragraph suggested by Brian Hawtin:

"The central aim would be to strengthen the UK input to Alliance policy."

might suggest        that our input to Alliance policy had so far been weak. You might want to consider replacing this sentence with something on the lines of:

"The central aim would be to consider the impact which conventional arms reductions are likely to have on NATO strategy and on UK defence policy."

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Richard Somy*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Defenses - Hawaii July 89



file

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 July 1989

*Dear Sir,*

**SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL**

Thank you for your letter of 24 July. Richard Gozney wrote on the same subject on 20 July.

The Prime Minister has decided on the list of participants enclosed with this letter. I will be writing to those concerned. I am most grateful for your agreement to finance the travel costs of American participants, and am content with the terms which you suggest.

BF?

The next step is to produce the paper. The Prime Minister would like to see this in the first week of September.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL) -

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary  
Chancellor  
Defence Secretary  
Sir Michael Quinlan  
Chief Defence Staff  
Chief Scientific Adviser, MoD  
Commander in Chief, BAOR  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
Sir Peter Levene  
Sir Percy Cradock  
Sir Michael Alexander  
Mr. John Weston  
Mr. Charles Powell  
Professor Lawrence Martin  
Laurence Freedman  
James Thomson (Vice-President, Rand Corporation)  
Chris Donnelly  
Ken Brower  
Francois Heisbourg  
Philip Karber  
General Farndale

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

You agreed to hold a seminar on Conventional Arms Control at Chequers on Saturday 30 September. The proposed non-official participation was:

General Bernard Rogers (ex-SACEUR)  
Richard Perle  
General Farndale (ex-BAOR)  
Professor Lawrence Martin  
Lawrence Freedman  
Chris Donnelly (Sandhurst)  
Ken Brower (who wrote the paper on platforms and anti-platforms)  
Dr. James Morrison (an American expert)

This has produced conflicting reactions.

The FCO are against Donnelly and Brower: think General Rogers and General Farndale duplicate each other: think Lawrence Martin is out of touch: say that Richard Perle takes little interest in conventional force negotiations: want to add some French and Germans, notably Francois Heisbourg of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London: and think there should be a defence industrialist like Frank Cooper. Hisbourg is French, but settled here and a considerable expert.

The MOD think Lawrence Martin would be useful: support the inclusion of Heisbourg: suggest Peter Levene as bridging the Government/industry gap: are agnostic about Germans: agree that Richard Perle has not shown much interest and that Philip Karber (a major American expert) would be better: and suggest that General Rogers, General Farndale and current Commander in Chief BAOR would overlap.

My suggestion is that we revise the list as follows:

Professor Lawrence Martin  
Lawrence Freedman  
James Thomson (Vice President of Rand Corp)  
Chris Donnelly ✓  
Ken Brower  
Francois Heisbourg  
Philip Karber  
General Farndale  
Peter Levene

This would give us six British, two Americans and an  
anglicized Frenchman. Content? *Yes*

I attach a copy of the letter of invitation which I propose to  
send out.

*e.d.p.*

CHARLES POWELL

27 July 1989

*L036kv*



MO 7/4/1L

 c/c  
 002 27H  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

24 July 1989

Dear Charles,

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter of 11th July <sup>Pls.</sup> about the proposed seminar. As requested, I attach a draft paragraph for inclusion in the letter to the proposed participants. We are also content to meet the travel and accommodation costs of the American participants - we suggest that this should cover first class return air fares and two nights accommodation. We can discuss the mechanics of this nearer the time but we are likely to get a better deal if MOD buy the air tickets.

Perhaps I could take this opportunity, to offer a few further comments on participants, in the light of Richard Gozney's letter of 20 July:

- a. On our information, it must be unlikely that Michael Howard will be available.
- b. Despite his duties at Newcastle, Lawrence Martin keep up fairly substantial involvement with the strategic-studies world; his broad view would be particularly useful if Michael Howard cannot come;
- c. As to Germans, Ruehl and (particularly) Kaiser are very good for the broad geo-political view; Professor Helga Haftendorn from the Free University of Berlin is also good value. But if specific expertise is needed they are rather broad-brush; Peter Stratmann from Ebenhausen is more at home with the hard military facts.
- d. We support the inclusion of Francois Heisbourg;
- e. If an industrialist is needed, and we are agnostic on the point, Sir Frank Cooper might seem a slightly odd choice. Alex Daly of GKN (helicopters, APCs) might be more apt. But by far the best course, in our view, for this purpose would be to revive the attendance of Sir Peter Levene.

Charles Powell Esq  
 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



f. We take the FCO's point about Richard Perle. Philip Karber of the BDM Corporation would offer more directly relevant expertise;

g. We would agree that, if General Rogers and CinC BAOR both come, Sir Martin Farndale may have no very distinctive additional contribution to offer.

On timing, 2nd October is also far from ideal as it clashes with the first day of the (long planned) visit by the North Atlantic Council. I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely,  
Brian Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

The Prime Minister is keenly conscious of the very extensive challenges - with both great opportunities and not inconsiderable risks - which face the Western Alliance in the arms control field following the new impetus given by the NATO Summit at the end of May. She would like accordingly to help develop understanding of the complex issues; and to this end she plans to hold a small private seminar, lasting a full day, at her Chequers residence on [date].

The central aim would be to strengthen the UK input to Alliance policy. About half the participants would be from within the UK Government - senior Ministers, military leaders, civilian officials - and about half individuals (not only British) invited from outside government to contribute their general expertise to a frank and wide-ranging dialogue. The Prime Minister has asked me to say that she much hopes that you might be able and willing to join the seminar on that basis.

Defence : Seminar July 89



027/KCA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 July 1989

Dear Charles

Seminar on Conventional Arms Control

Thank you for your letter of 11 July <sup>FAP.</sup> containing a draft list of participants for the seminar on conventional arms control which the Prime Minister envisages holding on 2 October.

Of the eight names mentioned:

- only one, James Thomson (who incidentally is not, unlike Messrs Martin and Freedman, a Professor, but is Vice President of the Rand Corporation) has himself done any serious work on conventional arms control and its implications;
- Generals Rogers and Farndale have had military command experience in Europe within the last five years or so. But their views of NATO's conventional capabilities will be less up-to-date than, and will to some extent duplicate, the expertise of the current CINC BAOR;
- Professors Martin and Freedman are strategic theorists: of the two, Professor Freedman follows current international developments fairly closely, but Professor Martin is these days principally tied up with his management duties as Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University;
- Chris Donnelly is an expert in Soviet military doctrine, but does not, I believe, claim any particular expertise in either conventional arms control or NATO strategy;
- And if Donnelly were to participate there seems little reason to invite another Sandhurst representative, Ken Bower, as well.
- Richard Perle is of course a long-standing and prominent participant in the debates on nuclear policy issues in the United States. But he has not hitherto taken any particular interest in conventional arms control or conventional force planning.

/The



CONFIDENTIAL

The Foreign Secretary thinks it would be a mistake for a seminar of this kind to be organised on a purely Anglo-American basis. Either all the participants should be British; or, if the net is to be cast wider, then at least one French and one German voice should be heard as well. The Foreign Secretary's preference would be to include Francois Heisbourg of the IISS and a reputable and knowledgeable German analyst such as either Dr Lothar Ruehl or Dr Karl Kaiser. He also believes that it would be worth including on the list Professor Michael Howard, in order to have someone who is able to look at the broader perspectives of East-West and West-West relations; as well as at least one British defence industrialist (perhaps Sir Frank Cooper?), preferably not someone whose company has a direct interest in current major projects such as EFA or the Challenger II tank.

On this basis the eight non-official participants might consist of:

Lawrence Freedman  
Michael Howard  
Francois Heisbourg  
Lothar Ruehl/Karl Kaiser  
James Thomson  
Chris Donnelly  
An industrialist  
Lord Carrington or Martin Farndale

We have mentioned to you separately the Foreign Secretary's difficulty with the date of 2 October, which clashes with the first EC Foreign Affairs Council of the autumn.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence: July '89

Seminar on Defence.



*ce/c*

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-270 3000

*Bin*

13 July 1989

C D Powell Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

*Dear Charles*

**CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE**

The Chancellor has seen your letter of 4 July to Brian Hawtin.

He welcomes the Prime Minister's suggestion of a seminar in September or very early October on NATO strategy and Britain's military role, including looking at the implications for defence procurement plans, and looks forward to participating in the seminar.

I am copying this letter to Stevan Wall (FCO), Brian Hawtin (MOD), and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours  
Alan*

**A C S ALLAN**  
Principal Private Secretary

DEFENCE : Semarang, July 89



13 JUL 1989

COPIES

13



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 July 1989

Dear Charles,

EM 11/7

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 4 July to Brian Hawtin about the Prime Minister's idea of a seminar on conventional arms control. I have now seen Brian's reply of 7 July conveying the Defence Secretary's reactions.

Like the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary welcomes the idea of such a seminar. He assumes that it will cover three main themes:

- the prospects in both the short and longer term for conventional arms control;
- the future of NATO strategy;
- the implications of the above for the structure and equipment procurement plans of the British armed forces.

Participation will presumably need to reflect the particular emphasis which the Prime Minister wishes to place as between these three themes. But if all three are to be touched upon at the seminar, then the Foreign Secretary hopes that participation can be balanced between those who deal in hardware and those whose interests are more political.

In practical terms, the Foreign Secretary hopes that a place at the seminar could be found for one FCO official (John Weston would be the obvious candidate). As regards the non-official participants, it would seem sensible to avoid duplication of expertise. There would be little point in inviting two former SACEURs as well as a recent Chairman of the Military Committee; or in having the current Commander in Chief BAOR as well as one of his predecessors; or a former Permanent Representative to NATO as well as our present one. We agree also with Brian Hawtin's comment that General Abrahamson would be unlikely to have much of interest to say in the conventional field. Richard Perle would certainly be better value from that end of the political spectrum; but even he has spent most of his time on nuclear, rather than conventional, issues. Omitting one of the two previous SACEURs and General Abrahamson would also help ensure that the balance of participation was not too heavily American-weighted.

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Steph  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary



DEFENCE: Service on Defence Trustee

July 1989

60-720 1A1

MRS. PONSONBY

File this  
as one Goodchild

LOBBK 0

SEMINAR ON DEFENCE

Could you please let Chequers know that the Seminar on 2 October will be attended by some 20/22 people. It will start at about 0930 and finish at about 1730 with lunch for all the participants. I will speak to Sue Goodchild about the possible need for overnight accommodation in nearby hotels.

CHARLES POWELL

11 July 1989

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CONFIDENTIAL



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come (bookhold)

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1989

SEMINAR ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your letter about the proposed seminar on the implications of conventional force reductions for NATO strategy and Britain's military role. I have also seen the letter from Stephen Wall and Sir Robin Butler's minute.

I have spoken further to the Prime Minister and she has agreed that the Seminar should be held at Chequers on Monday 2 October. She has also agreed a draft list of participants as follows:

OFFICIAL

Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary  
Defence Secretary  
Chancellor or Chief  
Secretary  
Sir Michael Quinlan  
CDS  
MOD Chief Scientific  
Adviser  
Vice chief of the  
Defence Staff  
Commander in Chief  
BAOR (essential in  
the Prime Minister's  
eyes)  
Sir P Cradock  
Sir Michael Alexander  
Mr. John Weston

NON-OFFICIAL

General Bernard Rogers  
Richard Perle  
General Farndale  
Professor Lawrence Martin  
Lawrence Freedman  
Chris Donnelly  
Ken Bower  
Professor James Thomson

The list could be extended very slightly when we see how acceptances go.

The Prime Minister envisages spending about two-thirds of the day in discussion with all participants, with a final session limited to official participants.

The next step is for me to send out letters of invitation to the proposed participants. It would be helpful if you could do the first draft of a paragraph for

2

that letter setting out the nature and the purposes of the Seminar on the lines described in my original letter, but more fully. I would like to issue this before the end of the month. It would also be helpful if you could set in hand work on a framework paper which could be circulated to participants early in September.

There is one final point on which we would welcome your help. We shall need to offer to pay the fares of American participants and their accommodation costs in this country. The Prime Minister thinks it would be appropriate for the MOD to undertake this. No. 10 will meet the other costs of the Seminar.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

PRIME MINISTER

## CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

You have agreed to have a seminar at Chequers on Monday, 2 October on the implications of conventional force reductions in Europe for NATO strategy and Britain's military role, looking also at the implications for our defence procurement plans. I propose to ask the MoD to draft a bidding letter setting out in slightly greater detail the nature of the seminar, and also to take the lead in producing a framework paper which could be circulated to participants early in September.

We need to give some thought to the question of participation. I assume that, you would as usual want to keep the numbers down to about 20 if possible, with slightly more non-official participants than official. We might have a final session with only official participants present. On this basis I have the following suggestions:

Official

Foreign Secretary  
 Defence Secretary  
 Chancellor or Chief Secretary  
 PUS MoD  
 Chief of the Defence Staff (obligatory in MoD's eyes)  
 MoD Chief Scientific Adviser  
 Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
 Sir Michael Alexander  
 John Weston

I would have thought there ~~was~~ <sup>agreed</sup> something to be said for having the Commander in Chief BAOR, who after all has to implement the strategy, but MoD see "no added advantage" in bringing him in. //

We must include him. *ms*

Non-official participants

(A) British

- Lord Carrington
- ✓ Chris Donnelly
- ✓ Ken Bower (he is Donnelly's associate who wrote the paper you found useful on platforms versus anti-platforms; but MoD see "no particular merit in having him.
- ✓ Lawrence Freedman (you read his lecture at the weekend)
- ✓ General Farndale (~~but Cabinet Office prefer General Bagnall~~)
- ✓ Professor Lawrence Martin
- Professor Sir Michael Howard (but now in US)

(B) Non-British

(I think it is worth having some non-British, as we do not have that many experts.)

- ✓ General Bernie Rogers
- Professor James Thomson (RAND Corporation)
- ✓ Richard Perle
- Francois Heisbourg (Director of the IISS in London: French by nationality)
- Robert O'Neill (Michael Howard's successor at Oxford)
- Walter Slocombe (US expert)

We would not get all the Americans, but might go for two of them.

Could you very kindly tick those whom you are willing to invite.

Content to proceed as planned?

CDP  
CDP

10 July, 1989.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 7/4S

7th July 1989

OM 10/3

Dear Charles,

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 4th July. The Defence Secretary warmly supports the Prime Minister's idea of a seminar, covering both the immediate issues posed by the CFE negotiations and broader questions such as those on NATO's future raised in Sir Michael Alexander's recent despatch. He has given some thought as to how the seminar might best be set up; his suggestions are given below, following the order of your letter.

Themes

The Defence Secretary agrees that the broad themes are very much on the right lines. It will be important to identify in advance key issues and questions for the discussion to focus upon. We think it particularly important to consider the implications of possible developments for military requirements - both force structure and the equipment mix. Our defence procurement planning flows of course from the military requirements, and it is the impact of CFE negotiations and other developments on these that needs to be looked at.

Timing

Late September/early October seems about right. But clearly, much will depend on the availability of participants. (You may like to have in mind that some of the US people one might consider may well travel to Europe for the IISS Annual Conference in Oslo on 14th September.)

Participants

We note that the Prime Minister is disposed to include some non-British participants as well; for the kind of brainstorming session envisaged and the kind of issues that will arise this seems fruitful. It would necessarily tend to constrain discussion of British policy issues (for example, on specific procurement projects) not least because some of the candidates - Heisbourg is a notable example - maintain close links with Governments. But we

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street



take it that the Prime Minister would not see the seminar as an appropriate vehicle for such particular discussion.

The Defence Secretary would like to give further thought to the list of participants, but his initial comments and suggestions are as follows. He believes that the official team needs to include CDS and the MOD Chief Scientific Adviser; we would also see advantage - given the need to discuss both military requirements and the military aspects of arms control - in VCDS attending, if necessary in preference to CDP. We would see no added advantage in bringing in Commander-in-Chief BAOR. It would seem very desirable, given the character of the subject-matter, to include a senior official from the FCO. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will no doubt have views on this, but one possibility (given his background and next posting) might be John Weston.

On non-official participation we think that your suggestions provide a good basis; but we do have a number of comments. We suggest that either Bernie Rogers or Andrew Goodpaster should participate, but not both. Our strong preference would be Rogers; it is many years now since Goodpaster was SACEUR. We pause slightly on John Keegan - not so much because of his journalistic links as because we wonder whether he would make a contribution positive and distinctive enough to warrant finding room for him when numbers are so tight.

On academics, we suggest that Laurie Martin could make a more solid contribution than Phil Williams (who is on the point of emigration to America); and we see no great merit in including Brower (particularly as Donnelly is in the team). His place might better be occupied by Sir John Killick, who is still very much in touch with strategic thinking and has experience as Ambassador in both Moscow and NATO. Lynn Davies would be an acceptable choice though we suggest that either Jim Thomson, who has good environmental experience and is very active in RAND work on European defence, or Walt Slocombe, would make a heavier-weight contribution. We also suggest, for similar reasons, that Richard Perle would be able to give more relevant value on this occasion, than Jim Abrahamson.

#### Papers

We are very ready to take the lead in producing a framework paper; we would see this concentrating on the conceptual issues and posing questions to stimulate debate. If the Prime Minister is content, given that CFE business is still very much on the move, we suggest that it should be circulated to participants in early to mid September. We also suggest that, once the framework and issues are more clearly defined, it might be useful to ask one of the non-official participants to contribute a paper. Who might best do that and what it might best concentrate upon could be determined later.





I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*J. Kolston*  
for (B R HAWTIN) *Absent on duty*  
Private Secretary

CAB  
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Ref. A089/1849

MR POWELL

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

I understand that the Ministry of Defence will be providing you with some suggestions for attendance at the proposed seminar on future defence policy in Europe. May I make two comments.

2. The first is that this seminar should clearly be a valuable preliminary to, not substitute for, discussion in OD. The seminar clearly cannot be an occasion for making decisions and some of the discussion will be inhibited by the presence of the non-British participants.

3. On the participants, I think that the CDS should be present, and I doubt whether the Chief of Defence Procurement has much to contribute. I recommend that Mr Weston, who will by then be Deputy Secretary in charge of the Defence and Arms Control and Disarmament Departments in the FCO should attend.

4. On non-official attenders, I would prefer General Bagnall to General Farndale, and I doubt whether Keegan or Abrahamson have much to contribute. Bernard Rogers might have more to contribute. Other candidates worth considering are Karl Kaiser or Christoph Bertram from Germany, Thierry de Montbrial and Pierre Lellouche from France, Professor Sir Michael Howard and Professor James Thomson of the Rand Corporation, who is particularly strong on the conventional force balance in Europe and who has also worked for successive US Administrations in a policy making role.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

7 July 1989

PRIME MINISTER

DEFENCE POLICY

I am setting out to organise a seminar in December on the possible effects of Conventional Force Reductions on NATO's Strategy.

Meanwhile you might like to read the attached, rather interesting lecture by Lawrence Freedman, who is a candidate for an invitation.

It suggests some of the questions which ought to be examined at a seminar. I think you will find it interesting.

C D P

ms

(C. D. POWELL)

7 July 1989

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

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SEMINAR ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS

I asked Mr. Chris Donnelly to suggest some additional names for this seminar. Most of the suggestions he came up with were already on my list. But he has in addition suggested:

- Ed Luttwak
- David Greenwood
- Mike Hermann (Nuffield College)
- General Uhle-Wettler (ex-Bundeswier)
- James Wooley (leading Democrat defence expert)

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

CDP

C. D. POWELL

5 July 1989

SLHBID

*M. Powell to see*

PRIME MINISTER

Charles has told me that you would like to hold a defence seminar sometime in the early autumn. Despite it being the recess, this period is already becoming extremely busy. You are away in Japan from 18-24 September, have a science seminar on 27 September and a regional tour in Wales on 29 September. This takes you up to the week preceding the Party Conference which you will want to keep relatively free and, after that time, you will be away in Blackpool and then Kuala Lumpur until 25 October.

The only dates that look at all possible for the defence seminar are Saturday 30 September, when you could invite people to come to Chequers, or Monday 2 October, when you could hold a seminar at Chequers or No.10.

Can you please indicate which you would prefer?

*2nd Oct*  
*ms*

*Amanda*

AMANDA PONSONBY

4 July 1989

PM3ARM

1630 Area Chairmen, Sir Peter Lane + JW  
 1830 LOOK IN AT NEWSPAPER PRESS FUND RECEPTION + BI

Thursday 28 September

Cabinet?  
 KEEP FREE?

Friday 29 September

REGIONAL TOUR

Sunday 1 October

Keep free?

Monday 2 October

1830-2000 Reception for Earl of Stockton Memorial Fund

Tuesday 3 October

0900 Keep free for speech writing + JW  
 1730 Sir Emmanuel Kaye + Joy  
 1830 Look in at BI's Reception

Wednesday 4 October

Lunch with Association of American Correspondents + BI

Thursday 5 October

Cabinet?  
 1800-1900 Drinks with members of North Atlantic Council +CDP

Friday 6 October

Keep free for AP

Sunday 8 October

KEEP FREE FOR JW

Monday 9 - Friday 13 October

? DEPART NO 10 FOR BLACKPOOL  
 PARTY CONFERENCE +DT?

Monday 16 October

Keep free for briefing  
 1630c DEPART FOR CHOGM + DT

Tuesday 24 October

? RETURN TO LONDON

Thursday 26 October

Cabinet ?

Friday 27 October

1600-1700 Teatime reception for Trilateral Commission + CDP  
 No. 10  
 DEPART FOR CHEQUERS?



## 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1989

## CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

*papers filed in Defence Arms Control P116*

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 29 June, and the paper enclosed with it, on Conventional Arms Control in Europe. She has also read Sir Michael Alexander's recent despatch on NATO's future. Both documents raise very broad questions about our future defence policy in Europe and the Prime Minister thinks that the time has come to have a seminar on this, drawing on a wider spectrum of opinion than would be available in OD. I will write in more detail about this in due course, but you might like the following points as guidelines.

Themes

The Prime Minister would like the seminar to take a radical look into the future, considering both the implications for NATO's strategy and Britain's military role in it of current Conventional Force Reduction proposals; and the constraints which an effective strategy for NATO will put on the scope for future Conventional Force Reductions. She will also want it to look at the implications for our defence procurement plans.

Timing

I cannot yet propose a date, but am thinking in terms of late September, or very early October, at Chequers.

Participation

This will be difficult. The Prime Minister is emphatic that she does not want more than 20 people and would want a majority to be from outside Government and the Services. Some very preliminary suggestions are:

Official

Prime Minister  
Defence Secretary  
Foreign Secretary  
Chancellor  
PUS, Ministry of Defence  
Commander-in-Chief, Germany  
Chief of Defence Procurement  
Sir Michael Alexander

Non-official  
(including retired)

Lord Carrington  
Martin Farndale  
Bob O'Neill  
Francois Heisbourg  
Jim Abrahamson  
Chris Donnelly  
Bernie Rogers  
Andrew Goodpaster  
General Altenburg  
John Keegan  
Lynn Davies (John Hopkins)  
Lawrence Freedman  
Phil Williams (Southampton)  
Ken Brower (Sandhurst)

Papers


We would need a framework paper and a draft bidding letter, for both of which we would look to MOD for help.

I should be grateful for any immediate comments on the theme and participants which your Secretary of State may have before I take this further. I am copying my letter also to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Brian Hawtin Esq  
Ministry of Defence





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