

PREM 19/2961

PART ONE

Confidential Filing

Internal Situation  
UN Third Committee Resolution  
Relations with El Salvador.

EL  
SALVADOR

PREM 19/2961

December 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>3.12.81</del>		30.3.82		17.5.84		22.1.90	
4.12.81		<del>1.1.82</del>		29.5.84		\	\
<del>3.2.82</del>		26.4.82		13.6.84		PTI	
<del>6.7.82</del>		<del>30.4.82</del>		<del>12.7.84</del>		ENDS	
11.2.82		<del>30.4.82</del>		16.7.84		/	/
<del>15.2.82</del>		4.3.83		25.7.84			
17.2.82		<del>7.3.83</del>		1.8.84			
<del>19.2.82</del>		14.6.83		6.8.84			
25.2.82		<del>23.6.83</del>		<del>22.10.84</del>			
1.3.82		21.7.83		4.4.85			
<del>3.3.82</del>		19.8.83		9.4.85			
18.3.82		31.8.83		3.6.85			
<del>22.3.82</del>		<del>13.9.83</del>		12.4.85			
		23.9.83		29.10.85			
		26.4.83		7.3.86			
		14.12.83		20.3.86			
		<del>6.1.84</del>		21.3.86			
		28.2.84		13.10.86			
		8.3.84		16.10.86			
		21.3.84		25.10.86			
		29.3.84		3.6.88			
		3.5.84		<del>23.8.89</del>			
		4.5.84		23.5.89			
				6.12.89			
				4-1-92			

● PART 1 ends:-

Pres. CRISTIANI to PM. 22.1.90

PART 2 begins:-

foo to COP. 15.2.90









PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T10A/90

*Lic. Alfredo Cristiani*  
*Presidente de la República*

San Salvador, 22 de Enero de 1990

SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

Señora Ministro:

Con verdadera complacencia y alta satisfacción me he enterado de la Declaración de los Miembros de la Comunidad Europea, quienes han expresado su satisfacción por los Acuerdos alcanzados por los Jefes de Estado de América Central, el 10, 11 y 12 de diciembre, en Costa Rica, contenidos en la Declaración de San Isidro de Coronado.

Me satisface Vuestra Declaración especialmente cuando subraya "el firme rechazo a la fuerza y la reafirmación de apoyo a los procesos democráticos pluralistas", principios fundamentales para consolidar la democracia, que constituyen la esencia de la conducción de nuestro Gobierno.

Creo que el proceso democrático se inicia con la elección libre de un Gobierno en eventos con la participación de Partidos políticos de los más encontrados pensamientos políticos y filosóficos; se reafirman con una franca apertura a quienes puedan discrepar con la orientación gubernamental por medio de la absoluta libertad de expresión; se hace sólida con el respeto a la ley, a la justicia y a los derechos humanos y continúa en la permanente y constante búsqueda de las mejores soluciones para los problemas económicos y sociales de los pueblos.

Como es de Vuestro conocimiento, nuestro país ha sido víctima de una agresión armada iniciada en 1979, que se recrudeció con el paso del tiempo y que explotó con violencia extraordinaria el 11 de noviembre de 1989, cuando el FMLN desató toda la furia de la guerra y de las armas sobre la población civil del área metropolitana de San Salvador y de otras ciudades del interior, con el propósito de tomar el poder político por la vía de las armas. Ante estas acciones, el

SU EXCELENCIA DOÑA  
MARGARET HILDA THATCHER  
PRIMERA MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO  
DE GRAN BRETAÑA E IRLANDA DEL NOROCC





*Lic. Alfredo Cristiani*  
*Presidente de la República*

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Gobierno se vió obligado a ejercer el derecho de legítima defensa del Estado, para salvaguardar los intereses del Pueblo Salvadoreño y para mantener la estructura democrática de nuestra organización social.

Sin atender los llamados vehementes hechos por los Cinco Presidentes Centroamericanos en la Reunión de Tela (Honduras) y San Isidro de Coronado (Costa Rica), los que actúan bajo el signo de la irracionalidad y fuera del Derecho Interno e Internacional, continúan con su lucha ciega por destruir el proceso democrático en el cual estamos inmersos. Desde el 1ro. de junio que asumí la Presidencia de la República extendí mi ofrecimiento al FMLN para iniciar un diálogo franco, permanente y sincero y así poder encontrar los puntos de tangencia para llegar a un acuerdo que ponga fin al sangramiento de los salvadoreños y a la destrucción de su infraestructura económica. Seguimos con esos esfuerzos firmes e invariables, aún cuando el FMLN dejó de cumplir con los compromisos que firmó en México y, abruptamente, suspendió el diálogo de manera unilateral, dejando de asistir a la Reunión programada en Caracas el 20 y 21 de noviembre del año pasado.

Como en la Declaración de los Doce de la Comunidad Económica Europea y sus Estados Miembros rechazan la fuerza y reafirman su apoyo a los procesos democráticos pluralistas, apelo a Vuestro Gobierno su adhesión al Proceso de Esquipulas II, a los Acuerdos tomados por los cinco Presidentes Centroamericanos en Alajuela (Costa Rica), Costa del Sol (El Salvador), Tela (Honduras), y San Isidro de Coronado (Costa Rica) a efecto de que el FMLN cese las hostilidades en El Salvador y se incorpore como fuerza política al proceso democrático, gestionando ante el Gobierno de Cuba para que suspenda la ayuda militar a la fuerza irregular que actúa en nuestro país, y al Gobierno de Nicaragua para que cumpla con el espíritu y la letra de los Compromisos firmados por los Cinco Presidentes Centroamericanos en aquellas históricas reuniones.

Reitérole los sentimientos de mi más distinguida consideración.



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CRISTIANI TO  
THE PRIME MINISTER, DATED 22 JANUARY 1990

I have learnt with real pleasure and great satisfaction of the Declaration of the Twelve in which they expressed their satisfaction with the agreements reached by the Central American Heads of State on 10, 11 and 12 December in Costa Rica, and which are contained in the Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado.

I was particularly pleased with the passage in the statement which underlined "the firm rejection of any resort to the use of force and the reaffirmation of support for processes of democracy and pluralism". These are fundamental principles for the consolidation of democracy and they constitute the essence of the way our Government conducts itself.

I believe that the democratic process begins with the free election of a Government with the participation of political parties representing the most commonly found political and philosophical viewpoints. It is confirmed by a frank and honest opening to these others who are at liberty to differ from the Government's line by means of absolute freedom of expression. The democratic process is made solid by respect for the law, justice and human rights, and by the permanent and constant search for the best solutions to economic and social problems.

As you know, our country has been the victim of armed aggression since 1979, which grew with the passage of time and which exploded with extraordinary violence on 11 November 1989, when the FMLN unleashed all the fury of war and of weapons on the civilian population of San Salvador and other cities with the intention of taking political power by force. In the face of these actions, the government was obliged to exercise the right of legitimate defence of the state, in order to safeguard the interests of the Salvadorean people and to maintain the democratic structure of our social society.



Without heeding the vehement calls made by the five Central American Presidents at Tela (Honduras) and San Isidro de Coronado (Costa Rica), those who act under the mark of irrationality and outside domestic and international law, continue their blind struggle to destroy the democratic process in which we are immersed. Since 1 June, when I assumed the Presidency of the Republic, I have offered the FMLN an honest, permanent and sincere dialogue to find points of convergence in order to reach an agreement to put an end to the bloodshed of Salvadoreans and to the destruction of their economic infrastructure. We continued with these firm and unvarying efforts, even when the FMLN failed to comply with the promises it undertook in Mexico and, abruptly, suspended the dialogue in a unilateral way, failing to attend the meeting scheduled for 20/21 November 1989 in Caracas.

In the Declaration of the Twelve, the EC and its member states reject force and reaffirm their support for a pluralist democratic process. I appeal to your Government to support the Esquipulas II process, the agreements made by the five Central American Presidents in Alajuela (Costa Rica) Costa del Sol (El Salvador), Tela (Honduras) and San Isidro de Coronado (Costa Rica) to the effect that the FMLN should cease hostilities in El Salvador and should incorporate itself as a political force in a democratic process. I also look for support in persuading the government of Cuba to suspend military help to the irregular forces in our country and the Nicaraguan Government to comply with the spirit and the letter of the agreements signed by the five Central American Presidents in their historic meetings.

STATEMENT OF THE TWELVE ON THE SAN JOSÈ SUMMIT

The European Community and its member states welcome the agreement reached by the Heads of State on Central America on 10 and 11 December in Costa Rica on several important problems concerning the future of that region.

Noting the firm rejection of any resort to the use of force and the reaffirmation of support for processes of democracy and pluralism, the European Community and its member states consider that this step confirms the will of the countries of Central America to define, themselves, solutions capable of re-establishing dialogue and negotiation and of restoring peace, efforts which the Community has consistently supported. It is now up to all of the parties, both within and outside the region, to refrain from taking positions which would form an obstacle to the implementation of the decisions taken by the five presidents.

14 December 1989

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El Salvador: Relaciones

Dec 81







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 January 1990

*Dominic Morris*

*DM*

El Salvador: Letter from President Cristiani

I enclose a letter dated 26 October from President Cristiani to the Prime Minister thanking her for receiving him in London on 26 September. The letter was held up in the Salvadorean administrative machine. It has only now been received in London.

Since the letter was written, President Cristiani and the Prime Minister have exchanged correspondence about the murder of the six Jesuit priests in San Salvador. We do not think the earlier letter needs a reply. Although it makes a number of points about trade and aid, these are by way of commentary on matters raised during the September visit and they have to some extent been overtaken by events. The proposed visit by an ECGD official had to be shelved due to the security situation in El Salvador, as the Salvadoreans are aware. We have also explained to them that there are no funds available for a bilateral aid programme, but that we might be able to provide some additional help through scholarships. We shall be discussing this further with the Salvadoreans.

*Yours ever*

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T215C/89

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SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS.

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 December 1989

*Jean R. President*

Thank you for your letter of 24 November asking for assistance in the investigation into the killing of the six Jesuit priests on 16 November.

I share your outrage at this appalling crime, and would like to help if we can. I have asked officials to consider urgently what help we could provide. Our Chargé d'Affaires will discuss with the appropriate authorities in San Salvador. It might be, for example, that the most useful contribution would be forensic expertise, either to visit San Salvador, or indeed to examine materials in a laboratory in the United Kingdom.

I take this opportunity to reaffirm my own support for your Government at this difficult time.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Raymond Storer*

His Excellency Lic Alfredo Cristiani Burkard

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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6 December 1989

*David Charles*

El Salvador: Request for British Assistance in  
Investigating the Murder of six Jesuit Priests

President Cristiani has written to the Prime Minister asking for British help in investigating the murder of the six Jesuit priests on 16 November. It is clear that the Salvadoreans have police assistance in mind. I enclose a copy of the President's letter, which has been faxed from the Embassy in San Salvador.

There is no doubt that President Cristiani was genuinely appalled by the murders. He immediately ordered a full investigation; and he attended the priests' funeral. We issued a statement at the time condemning the murders.

The Salvadorean Government has also asked for police assistance from Spain and the United States. Both have agreed (although Spain has not yet decided what form the assistance should take); and both hope that we will also respond positively.

Two of the Jesuits were Spanish nationals and three others of Spanish birth. They included the Rector of the Catholic University of San Salvador and other prominent intellectuals. They had been threatened before by extremists who saw them as supporters of the FMLN. According to a witness (who is now in the United States) the murders were carried out by a group of armed men in uniform who blew open the door of the priests' residence with a grenade. The priests' cook and her daughter were also killed.

The circumstantial evidence suggests that an army unit may well have been responsible. President Cristiani himself has not ruled out this possibility. After ten

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years of civil war there are people on both sides, including in the army, who regard it as legitimate to kill the intellectual supporters of the other side. The army, which has suffered many casualties in the recent fighting, may resent a real investigation. Army spokesmen have said that the murders were probably committed by the FMLN in order to discredit the army. Without genuine and open-minded cooperation from the army, the help of foreign police experts is unlikely to prevent the investigation from running into the sand. There would also be practical difficulties in sending British investigators to El Salvador (language, physical security, etc). Our police are also concerned at the duplication and wire-crossing which could occur if several foreign police forces were to be involved.

The Foreign Secretary believes that we should reply quickly and positively to President Cristiani but leave the details for discussion in San Salvador. We have spoken to the Home Office and the police, and we think that we are more likely to be able to offer some form of forensic help than to send police to El Salvador. He has asked our Chargé to take action with the Salvadoreans to find out what help they need.

/ I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Cristiani.

*Townsend*  
*R N Peirce*

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*Lic. Alfredo Cristiani*  
Presidente Constitucional de la República  
y  
Comandante General de la Fuerza Armada

San Salvador, November 24, 1989

The Honorable  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher  
Primer Minister of  
The United Kingdom

Dear Mrs. Primer Minister:


I have sent through my Foreign Ministry and the British Embassy, an urgent request for assistance in the investigation of the assassination of the Jesuit priests and their Salvadorean help.

I honestly hope that your government, along with those of Spain and the United States, will be able to meet this request.

It is essential for the continuity of our democracy that this horrendous crime be solved. Therefore, the assistance of expertise in investigative matters is very important, not only to support our own investigative team, but for the transparency of the results.

We are sure that this criminal act was designed to discredit our government and our armed forces, at a time when we were facing a major offensive by the FMLN marxist-guerillas against the civilian population of our Capital and other important cities. For this reason and as a moral imperative, we are committed to solving the case and bring those involved to justice, whoever they may be.

Respectfully Yours,

  
Alfredo Cristiani



C: / Foreign / cristiani  
Pm

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

His Excellency  
President Alfredo Cristiani [Burkard]  
President  
El Salvador

Thank you for your letter of 24 November asking for assistance in the investigation into the killing of the six Jesuit priests on 16 November.

I share your outrage at this <sup>appalling</sup> terrible crime, and would like to help if we can. I have asked officials to consider urgently what help we could provide. Our Chargé d'Affaires will discuss with the appropriate authorities in San Salvador. It might be, for example, that the most useful contribution would be forensic expertise, either to visit San Salvador, or indeed to examine materials in a laboratory in the United Kingdom.

I take this opportunity to reaffirm my own support for your Government at this difficult time.

Am.

Subject cc Master  
ops.



PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T188-189

October 26th, 1989

It was a great honor to meet with you in London on last September 26th, and to be able to inform you of the situation in Central America and in my country. We are determined, as Government, to bring back to El Salvador the peace and prosperity we once enjoyed, but as we discussed it, this will not be an easy task after ten years of conflict and social bitterness.

We have just completed the second round of dialogue with the FMLN in Costa Rica. Although the outcome of the meeting did not produce a favorable result, we have agreed to continue the meetings next month in Caracas, Venezuela. I can assure you, Mrs. Prime Minister, that our commitment remains intact to provide the necessary political space for the FMLN to participate in the democratic process.

While in London, the Minister of Economy and the Vice-Minister of Planning met with Mr. Minister Richard Ryder at HM Treasury, and also with the Overseas Development Administration and Export Guarantee Credit Department. The British Embassy has told me that ECGD may shortly send a representative to El Salvador, to examine our situation. I am sure their visit will be fruitful and that thereafter Britain will be able to take full advantage of the trade opportunities offered by our programme of economic recovery, to be led by public sector infrastructure works and private industry investment and expansion in our economic climate.

HER EXCELLENCY  
MRS. MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON, ENGLAND





PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

In the 1970's Britain had an excellent assistance programme in El Salvador, in veterinary work and running our principal Technical Institute in Santa Tecla. Both are areas of importance to our development. With the beginning of our troubles, that highly regarded programme lapsed. I am concerned that the Technical Institute should again provide the high standard of training that our young people need, and from which our industries can recruit high calibre technicians. If your Government could once again assist the Technical Institute, which we are privatising in the interest of efficiency to a business orientated foundation, it would assist us. Three or four technical experts from England would ensure that the Institute, once again, would be an effective force.

It is my intention to visit other European countries next year, and I hope it may be possible to continue our discussion on that occasion, by when, I trust, the peace process in El Salvador will be well advanced.

Again let me thank you for the time you dispensed us during our visit to London and for your interest in our country.

  
Alfredo F. Cristiani

MEETING RECORD

Subject CC 710757

File M  
abc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

26 September 1989

## PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with the President of El Salvador. President Cristiani was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and the Salvadorean Ambassador.

The Prime Minister congratulated President Cristiani on his election and on the start he had made in solving El Salvador's problems. She had discussed Central American problems with Vice President Quayle at the Party Leaders meeting of the International Democratic Union in Tokyo. He had said that the quantities of arms reaching both Nicaragua and the FMLN guerillas in El Salvador were greater than a year ago. This was a sobering reminder of the extent to which the Soviet Union continued to support subversion in far-off parts of the world.

President Cristiani confirmed this report. The fault lay mostly with Cuba which was providing arms to the FMLN guerillas through Nicaragua. Even President Ortega now admitted this. However, there was increasing pressure on the FMLN to negotiate and a first meeting had taken place in Mexico which would be followed up by further negotiations in October. In reply to the Prime Minister's question about the source of the pressure on the FMLN, President Cristiani said that it stemmed mostly from general international support for the Central American peace plan. Moreover, the guerillas knew that they could not win militarily, and their numbers were decreasing. It seemed that the political wing of the movement was ready to re-engage itself in the political process.

The Prime Minister expressed reservations about whether it was right to negotiate with terrorists at all. President Cristiani said hastily that he was not negotiating on their terms but simply, from a humanitarian point of view, offering them a bridge back into the democratic process. He absolutely agreed with the Prime Minister that they must not be allowed to call into question El Salvador's existing Constitution.



The Prime Minister said that President Cristiani had been democratically elected and she had wanted to show by her meeting with him that Britain was on the side of genuine democracy in Central America. She had no faith in democracy in Nicaragua, despite the promises made by President Ortega. She asked which other leaders President Cristiani would be meeting during his visit to Europe. President Cristiani said that he would be seeing the Pope but no-one else. He would go to New York to address the United Nations next week and might return to Europe next year. The Prime Minister said she thought it disgraceful that other Heads of Government were not seeing him.

The Prime Minister asked about President Cristiani's economic programme. The President said there was an unfortunate background. Previous governments had thought nothing could be done while the conflict with the FMLN was going on. There was also a strong state sector, covering some 60 per cent of the economy. His government were pushing ahead with privatisation and had been seeking advice in the United Kingdom. Exports remained weak, with particular problems for coffee and sugar. It had to be remembered that some 70 per cent of El Salvador's GNP was derived from agriculture. He was implementing a substantial programme of land reform, issuing some 11,000 titles over the last three months. He thought that the economy was now starting to move ahead, but the need to finance substantial armed forces was a heavy burden.

The Prime Minister asked about the judicial system. President Cristiani said that it did not work well because of intimidation and bribery. But the Government had agreed to a substantial increase of funds for the judiciary, to enable those most at risk to be protected.

President Cristiani referred to the success of the FMLN in attracting funds and support from overseas through various solidarity organisations. He had discovered that FMLN's 'diplomatic service' was three times as large as that of the Government. The Prime Minister said that it was important for the new Government to do everything possible to get its message across. The President's speech to the United Nations would be important in this respect. She wished to reiterate our support for democracy in El Salvador.

The President did not raise either aid or the International Coffee Agreement. Generally, he came across as a quiet, sensible and thoughtful man, with a clear idea of where he is going.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely,*  
  
C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
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10 DOWNING STREET

~~Prime Minister~~

You may like to  
see this from  
today's Time

Magazine.

You are seeing

President Christiani at

12 00 today..

CAF

2/29



## Conversations with Two Foes

*In an exclusive pair of interviews, El Salvador's President and a rebel leader explain why peace may now be possible*

After ten years of a bloody civil war that has claimed some 70,000 lives, there are no eternal optimists left in El Salvador. Blind hope went out of fashion after then President José Napoleón Duarte met with failure in three meetings with the leftist guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. Since the last talks in 1987, the two sides have dug in with renewed determination. Now, four months after Alfredo Cristiani, 41, succeeded Duarte as President, there is new talk of reconciliation. Representatives of the government and the F.M.L.N. met two weeks ago in Mexico City to develop a framework for future dialogue. The most promising result of the get-together is that the two sides have agreed to resume their discussions in Costa Rica in mid-October.

Cristiani and Joaquín Villalobos, 38, the F.M.L.N.'s top comandante, agreed to talk with TIME separately last week about the prospects for peace. Though they clearly remain divided on important issues, each man spoke without rancor of his enemy and acknowledged that a fight to the end is no longer feasible. "It's time to look for an agreement and forget about [past] accusations," said Cristiani. Villalobos, in turn, conceded that a prolonged war "no longer corresponds to the reality of the world. If a revolutionary asked me today what to do, I would say, 'Conspire to launch a short-term war.'"

Both men displayed a willingness to yield on demands that once seemed immutable. Cristiani abandoned the government's requirement that the guerrillas lay down their arms as a prerequisite to serious negotiations. While insisting that the rebels must eventually surrender their weapons, he said it was "not necessarily a first step." The President, whose rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) has strong links to El Salvador's armed forces, also offered publicly for the first time to consider a drastic reduction in military manpower. If the talks succeed, he said, "there would be a demobilization of the armed forces. We don't believe there's a need for a 55,000-man army if there is peace."

Villalobos also demonstrated a greater flexibility. In what appeared to be a fundamental shift of philosophy, the co-




**"We can't aspire to an armed revolution that the Soviet Union will subsidize."**

Joaquín Villalobos

**"There is room for coexistence with everybody."**

Alfredo Cristiani



mandante said that given the changes in the international climate, the time for violent struggle has passed. "We can't at this time aspire to an armed revolution that the Soviet Union will subsidize," he said. He suggested that the F.M.L.N. would now be willing to embrace a "multiparty system." Asked if he could coexist with the right, Villalobos responded, "Of course," but went on to say of ARENA, "After you reaffirm your legitimacy in an electoral contest in which we all participate, you have every right to turn back every reform you wish and to do with the country what you will."

Signaling a new candor, Villalobos

said the F.M.L.N. had "made mistakes," including a failure to negotiate a peace agreement in 1980. He also acknowledged that the rebels have received arms from Nicaragua. Although Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said as much to Cristiani last August, it was the first public admission from the F.M.L.N.

Such forthrightness will be essential if the two sides are going to settle their monumental differences. Before there can be an election in which both sides will agree to participate, for instance, there must be a permanent cease-fire. In mid-September the F.M.L.N. announced an eleven-day unilateral truce, but Cristiani claims that the rebels have not honored it. Said he: "They're still attacking our forces and using [land] mines."

Peace talks have been known to founder on far less. As of now, the discussions are scheduled to begin Oct. 16 and to continue on a monthly basis, as proposed in Mexico City. Cristiani is heartened by this timetable. "What happened to Mr. Duarte was that he had isolated meetings with [the F.M.L.N.]," he said. "If one of those meetings failed, that was it." Cristiani expressed a willingness to discuss the F.M.L.N.'s proposals for judicial and electoral reform. At the same time, he shot down key elements of the F.M.L.N.'s nine-point plan put forward in Mexico, most notably the guerrillas' bid to move up legislative and municipal elections scheduled for 1991.

Both men seemed to suggest that once a peace is negotiated, the U.S., which has supplied more than \$3 billion in military and economic assistance over the past decade, will recede to the political sidelines. Cristiani said that after a settlement is achieved, "this military aid should turn into economic aid and keep on flowing into the country while it recovers economically." Villalobos, who called for an end to U.S. military aid, voiced skepticism that the Bush Administration "would choose to continue indefinitely its support for the war." He also hoped for "proper relations" with the U.S. Last week the U.S. Senate voted to boost military aid to El Salvador by \$5 million, to \$90 million.

As for keeping the peace talks on track, Cristiani expressed doubts about the guerrillas' aim of achieving a permanent settlement by the end of January, warning that it could take all five years of his administration to achieve an accord. "If the process that we've agreed to in Mexico keeps going, there's always hope," he said. "But it won't be easy."

—By Jill Smolowe.

Reported by Ricardo Chavira/Mexico City and John Moody/San Salvador



MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR MS

You are to see President Cristiani of El Salvador on Tuesday. The meeting is likely to be controversial, for the reasons set out in the FCO letter in the folder. The left in Europe pillory him, because some years ago his party was implicated with right-wing death squads. In fact he is - by all accounts - an enlightened and progressive businessman. The violence is coming not from his side but from the FMLN guerillas supported by Cuba and Nicaragua. But such is the power of the lie (and the feebleness of some of your European colleagues) that virtually no other European Head of Government has agreed to see him. The Labour Party will certainly kick up a fuss and there will be demonstrations.

The points to raise with him are:

- the prospects for peace negotiations with the FMLN. The guerillas have lost support inside El Salvador, and talks with the Government started in Mexico some ten days ago. They seem to be going well.
- his programme of economic reform, which is largely Thatcherite.
- his difficulties with the collapse of coffee prices following the failure of negotiations for a new International Coffee Agreement. There is not much we can do to help: and we believe that in the long term a free market will be better for the producers.
- his wish for aid. We are giving only £300,000 (for scholarships) and ODA/FCO do not want to do more, regarding El Salvador as an American problem.
- his anti-terrorism legislation. This is too draconian and risks getting him an unnecessarily bad name for over-riding



human rights. We know the problem well from our own experience. He will want to draw the legislation very tightly so that it cannot be used to restrict normal political life, or those going about their ordinary business.

But it is not so important what you say. What he really wants is recognition as a democratically-elected President coping with a thankless task, and that he will get from the fact of his meeting with you.

C. D. POWELL

24 September 1989



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

22 September 1989

*John Arches*

*mk*

Call by the President of El Salvador

The Prime Minister will see President Cristiani of El Salvador at noon on 26 September. We understand that he will be accompanied during the meeting by his Foreign Minister, Manuel Pacas, and by the Salvadorean Ambassador, Mauricio Rosales. I enclose a personality note on the President.

President Cristiani was elected this March and took office in June. He visited the UK in February while still Presidential candidate for the National Republican Alliance (ARENA), and saw Lord Glenarthur. It was originally expected that the present visit would form part of a wider European tour. But domestic commitments (President Bush is expected to visit El Salvador in early October), perhaps combined with an unwillingness to receive him at an appropriate level in other EC capitals, have now limited his itinerary to Rome.

The meeting will no doubt be controversial in some quarters. El Salvador, which became a by-word for human rights abuse in the early 1980s, is a favourite hobby-horse for some Opposition MPs. Cristiani's party, ARENA, is still linked in the public mind to the right wing death squads which operated with impunity in the early 1980s. At that time political killings were running at several hundred a month, fuelling the cause of the FMLN guerrillas. The massive US aid needed to keep the economy on its feet and pay for the civil war against the FMLN (who were in turn backed by Cuba and Nicaragua) was jeopardised. But in 1984 the Christian Democrats won a free election, and during his term of office President Duarte (whom the Prime Minister met in 1984), with US support, implemented economic and social reforms and made great progress in improving the country's track record in human rights.

However, Duarte failed either to win the civil war or to turn around the economy. The Christian Democrats' popularity suffered also from internal divisions and widespread allegations of corruption. Meanwhile, ARENA had improved its image inside the country, with respected businessmen like Cristiani coming to the fore. As a result, ARENA achieved outright victories in Legislative elections in 1988 and the Presidential election in 1989.

/Many

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Many (including the US Government) feared this would increase polarisation and lead to intensification of the civil war. The FMLN did their best to bring about such a development, with a heightened campaign of urban terrorism (car bombs, electricity blackouts and murders of key political figures, including an ARENA Cabinet Minister). Their intention was evidently to provoke the far right into taking the law into their own hands, precipitating a return to the "dirty war" of the early 1980s, and forcing the US to halt aid. Cristiani has, however, refused to play into their hands and has so far succeeded in keeping his extreme right in check. There has been some increase in human rights violations from the right as well as the left, but no indication that the Government has sanctioned such action. With few exceptions the army has so far shown restraint and discipline.

Meanwhile, FMLN tactics have attracted increasing condemnation from the poor, who are usually the principal victims of their actions, and from international opinion. Pressure on the FMLN increased in August when President Ortega promised at the Central American Summit in Tela to stop supporting them. In this situation the FMLN, previously intent on all-out victory, seem to have lowered their sights. They accepted an offer of talks made by Cristiani's Government and introduced a ten day cease-fire and an indefinite end to mine-laying and attacks on the economic infrastructure. The first round of talks in Mexico on 13 September ended with agreement to continue negotiations. The prospects for peace now look better than for a long time.

The war is not the only problem facing Cristiani. The economy, battered by years of fighting and economic sabotage, and hemmed in by State controls, is in desperate need of revitalisation. Cristiani and his economic team (many, like him, businessmen by background) have moved fast to tackle these problems. Important reforms have been introduced to liberalise the economy and stimulate job creation. (Privatisation is high on the Government's agenda). Official sanction has been given to the parallel market (effectively a devaluation of the currency). The Government has said it will denationalise the banking system and remove commodity exports (principally coffee) from State control.

Coffee remains El Salvador's principal export, and its main source of (non USAID) foreign exchange. It is possible that Cristiani may raise with the Prime Minister the implications for El Salvador of the collapse in June of negotiations for a new International Coffee Agreement. We believe that the free market in coffee which has existed since the collapse of negotiations in June is in the long term interests of producers, although the shock of adjustment may

/be

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be severe. The Central Americans, too, believe demand will ensure that they will be able to sell more of their coffee (albeit at a lower price) and be better off in the long run. But El Salvador faces particularly severe short term losses.

If this is raised, the Prime Minister may wish to assure President Cristiani that we appreciate the difficulties caused by the collapse of coffee prices, and that we, together with our EC partners, are ready to be constructive about a new coffee agreement. She will wish to make it clear, however, that the defects of the 1983 ICA (the two-tier market and the shortage of mild coffees) must be remedied. We believe it would be a mistake to rush into new negotiations now; a period of reflection is needed.

In his meeting with the Prime Minister Cristiani will, however, be concerned principally to win her political support, to enhance his credentials as a democratically elected President whose economic philosophy is similar to that of the British Government, and to begin to shed the image of far-right bogeyman which he has inherited because of his Party's former association with death squads. Cristiani will attach particular importance to the UK leg of his tour, not just because Bonn and, perhaps, Paris, lacked the nerve to receive him at the highest level, but also because we are seen as having been consistently objective in assessing the situation there. We raise human rights concerns where necessary, but give credit where it is due; we have taken a more robust line on FMLN excesses than have our European partners, and we do not allow our policy to be formulated by the human rights lobbies. The Salvadoreans have also been favourably impressed by our scepticism towards the Sandinistas.

When Cristiani visited the UK in February he told us that if elected he would uphold respect for human rights and the legal process. He has so far honoured that undertaking. However, his Party has tabled in the Congress some very draconian amendments to the penal code, which are intended to help the fight against terrorism but which could in effect criminalize legitimate political activity. The Salvadorean Government is aware of our concern over this.

The Prime Minister may wish to assure Cristiani of our continuing objectivity in assessing the situation in El Salvador, and to congratulate him on the encouraging start he has made in tackling his country's formidable problems. She could tell him that we are not influenced by those who fall back on easy slogans without taking the trouble to understand the changes occurring in El Salvador, or who pursue alleged human rights cases without checking the facts. She may, however, wish to warn the President that the Government's

/human

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human rights performance will inevitably continue to come under close scrutiny; and to express our own hope that, in amending the law to ensure that subversives receive proper punishment, care will be taken to avoid infringing the human rights and freedoms of those - such as voluntary aid workers and trade unionists - who are going about their normal business.

The Prime Minister may also wish to offer our support for President Cristiani's efforts to seek a political solution to the civil war. She might ask him for his assessment of the FMLN's intentions and their motivation, and whether he could sell a negotiated settlement to the Armed Forces and to the militants of his own party.

Cristiani knows it is unrealistic to hope for significant aid from the UK. Our aid for El Salvador is at present very small: in 1988 it amounted to just £154,000, of which £140,000 went to NGOs for their work with refugees returning to the country. There is, however, provision for aid totalling £30,000 in the current financial year, mainly intended for scholarships in the UK. This element has traditionally been underused. Following a successful visit earlier this year by his Minister of Agriculture, Cristiani may now try to secure a modest aid package which could be presented as proof of British support. He will be accompanied in some of his engagements by his Minister of the Economy (Arturo Zablah) and the Vice Minister of Planning (Ernesto Altschul), who have also requested separate calls on the Treasury, ECGD and Sir Alan Walters. If the subject of aid is raised, the Prime Minister might make the point that British aid policy is to concentrate on the Commonwealth and the poorest countries.

Tanzans

R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



PERSONALITY NOTEALFREDO FELIX CRISTIANI BURKARD

President of El Salvador

Born in 1947, Mr Cristiani (a first generation Salvadorean of Swiss and Italian parentage) was educated at the American School in San Salvador, and at Georgetown University in the United States. After graduating in Business Administration (1968) he worked his way up in the family businesses, becoming President of their insurance company, SISA, and of their pharmaceutical importing and wholesaling business (which represents, amongst others, ICI and Glaxo). He also has coffee (and formerly also cotton) interests. He has served as President of the cotton growers cooperative (COPAL), the Coffee Processors and Importers Association (ABECAFE), and as Vice President of ANEP, the Salvadorean organisation of Private Enterprises.

Uninvolved in politics until 1984, when he joined ARENA, working in the campaign office. He progressed swiftly, becoming a Director of the Party's National Executive in 1984-85, and its President in 1985-88. Elected member of the National Assembly for San Salvador Department in 1985. Nominated as ARENA's candidate for the Presidential election of 19 March 1989, in which he won a convincing first round victory. He took office on 1 June.

Mr Cristiani is exceptional in having earned respect and personal trust across the spectrum in El Salvador. He is genuinely concerned about the problems of poverty and human rights abuse, and is determined to bring peace to El Salvador - but not at any price. He is not afraid to take tough decisions, and has brought a new and dynamic style of leadership to El Salvador. He operates as a Chairman of the Board, expecting his Ministers to get on with their jobs and bring only serious problems to him. He does, however, expect to be kept informed, and is said to have an exceptional capacity for retaining and using information.

A very wealthy man. He has considerable personal charm, which he hopes to use to good effect during his present visit in meetings with a number of the voluntary agencies which have traditionally been deeply suspicious of ARENA.

Cristiani is a devoted family man and a keen sportsman. He holds pilots licences for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. A former moto-cross champion, he loves to drive himself, to the despair of his security team. Married to Margarita Llach (also from one of El Salvador's leading families). They have three children, the youngest of whom is still at the British School in San Salvador.

Speaks fluent English.

MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA DEPT  
22 September 1989



PERMITS  
MAY 19 1955



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

FILE  
DA:  
PC

*From the Private Secretary*

24 August 1989

PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR

The Prime Minister has agreed to see  
President Cristiani at 1200 on Tuesday  
26 September. I hope this is convenient.

(C.D. POWELL)

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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memAKM  
cc AP



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 August 1989

*Dear Richard,*

REQUEST FOR CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER  
BY THE PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR

You wrote on 7 August suggesting that the Prime Minister might meet President Cristiani of El Salvador in the last week of September or the first week of October.

The Prime Minister has agreed to do this but is not able to fit it in in the first week of October because of the preparations for the Party Conference. We shall be in touch separately about dates.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Caroline Slocock*

CAROLINE SLOCOCK

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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*call*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Prime Minister*  
*Content to see*  
*President Cristiani?*

7 August 1989

*Jean Cardinalie,*

*CMS*  
*7/8*  
*Let's look*  
*Not the first week*  
*in October. We don't*

Request for Call on the Prime Minister  
by the President of El Salvador

*have enough*  
*to do before in*  
*mid the speech*

President Cristiani of El Salvador, who took office in June this year, is planning a European tour starting on 22 September. He has asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister in the last week in September or the first week in October.

*for the*  
*Cardinalie*  
*not*

Cristiani's visit will be a private one. He hopes to spend two or three days in the UK, accompanied by a delegation of businessmen who would follow a separate but related programme. He has told our Chargé in San Salvador that he will arrange the rest of his European tour around a meeting with the Prime Minister. His intention is to visit also France, Germany, Spain and Italy but he will not propose dates until he knows if and when the Prime Minister will see him. The other countries to be visited are all aware of his interest but have taken no decision on the level at which he will be received. They may well be influenced by the Prime Minister's decision.

The Prime Minister received Cristiani's predecessor, President Duarte, at Chequers in 1984. The proposed visit by Cristiani is, however, potentially a good deal more controversial. His party (ARENA) is a favourite target of human rights groups and other activists, who point to its association with death squads in the early 1980s under the leadership of Roberto d'Aubuisson who remains an influential figure in the party (but is not a member of the government). Following a mischievous article in the Observer on 23 July, these groups have already got wind of a possible visit, and have begun a letter writing campaign in protest.

Nevertheless, there is a good case for the Prime Minister to offer President Cristiani a meeting. His visit will follow closely the pattern set by the visit of President Ortega in May (coming at his own request, making all his own arrangements). But whereas the Prime Minister saw Ortega to offset the warm and over-credulous reception we expected him to receive from some of our European

/Partners

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Partners, in Cristiani's case we may wish to show a friendlier face than he may see elsewhere on his travels.

Cristiani won the Presidential election in March this year with a convincing first round victory. Our official observer found the election to be reasonably free and fair, despite the best efforts of the FMLN guerrillas to disrupt polling by raising the level of fear and intimidation. He has an ARENA majority in the National Assembly following similarly clean elections in March 1988. Cristiani is a wealthy businessman from the moderate wing of ARENA, and the indications are that he is doing his best to get a grip on the party machine, and to ensure that important positions in Government are filled by like-minded moderates who wish to uphold legality and respect for human rights. It is clear that he faces a lot of pressure from the extremist wing of the party (of which Roberto d'Aubuisson remains the charismatic leader), who are pressing for a more vigorous approach to the civil war, and in particular for tough new anti-terrorist legislation. It is not yet clear which tendency will prevail. A fairly radical and potentially repressive toughening of the penal code may be the price Cristiani will have to pay to retain his party's support for legality and the repudiation of death squad operations. Meanwhile the FMLN guerrillas are pursuing a policy of assassinating ARENA politicians and sympathisers in a clearly deliberate attempt to heighten tension and provoke violent retaliation.

President Cristiani is under no illusions about the damage which new repressive legislation could do his government in international opinion, most importantly in the United States. But there is a danger that, under the influence of NGOs and human rights groups, some of our European partners may jump the gun in ostracising Cristiani, and thus play into the extremists' hands. We could balance this by taking the opportunity to show our support for Cristiani, making plain at the same time our concern that his government should continue to show proper respect for human rights. It would be helpful in press briefing following a call to make clear the emphasis put on this aspect.

If the Prime Minister were to see Cristiani, it would go down well in Washington, for whom it is an important priority to bolster the moderates in ARENA (following his election Cristiani was received by President Bush in Washington). It would also provide a useful opportunity to

/congratulate

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congratulate Cristiani on his economic policies, his determination to eradicate corruption, and his interest in privatisation.

Yours sincerely,  
Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

Miss Caroline Slocock  
10 Downing Street

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(41)

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MOLOAN 4076

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T60i/89

RESTRICTED  
FM FCD  
TO PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR  
TELNO 31  
OF 232043Z MARCH 89  
INFO PRIORITY YEGUCIGALPA

28 MAR 1989

SUSPECT of MANTU  
OPS

FROM MCAD (38)  
YOUR TELNO 62: MESSAGE TO NEW PRESIDENT  
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CRISTIANT FROM THE  
PRIME MINISTER, AS SOON AS THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS ARE  
OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED.

BEGINS: I CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR VICTORY IN THE RECENT  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR HIGH OFFICE.  
ENDS

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 22

MAIN 22

MINIMAL NEWS DEPT  
MCAD

NNNN



FILE KIC

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 March 1989

**EL SALVADOR: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

Thank you for your letter of 23 March about the outcome of the Presidential election in El Salvador. I agree that the Prime Minister should extend the usual courtesy of a message of congratulations to Sr. Cristiani and the enclosed text may be sent.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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RESTRICTED

FM FCO  
TO PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR  
TELNO

INFO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA

YOUR TELNO 62: MESSAGE TO NEW PRESIDENT

1. Please transmit the following message to Cristiani from the Prime Minister, as soon as the results of the elections are officially confirmed.

BEGINS: I congratulate you on your victory in the recent Presidential elections, and wish you success in your high office.  
ENDS

HOWE

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MAIN  
LIMITED  
MCAD  
NEWS DEPT

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 March 1989

Den Charles

El Salvador: Presidential Election

Although the result has yet to be officially confirmed, it is clear that the right-wing Arena candidate, Fredi Cristiani, has won a convincing victory in the Presidential election which took place in El Salvador on 19 March.

The preliminary view of our official observer is that the election was properly prepared, that voting was secure and secret, and that a real choice was offered to voters. There is no suggestion of fraud. Turnout was lower than hitherto, no doubt partly because of the high level of intimidation, for which the FMLN guerrillas were mainly responsible. Nevertheless the fact that the election has brought a change of Government shows that democracy is alive in El Salvador.

Arena has an unsavoury past. Cristiani is not however personally associated with its record of human rights abuse. During a recent visit to Britain he stressed his determination to prevent any repetition of the events of the early 1980s. But he will need international support if he is to succeed in asserting moderate policies over the wilder elements in the party (led by the Party's honorary life President, Roberto d'Aubuisson).

The Arena victory will cause difficulties for the US Administration. It will face congressional resistance to the continued provision of the substantial military and economic assistance given to the outgoing Duarte government. It has however little option but to work with Cristiani. In a statement after the election, the State Department described the voting as free and fair: confirmed its readiness to support the winner in the democratic process; and underlined that its future relationship would depend on the Arena Government's adherence to democracy and respect for human rights.

/The





The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should send a short congratulatory message along the lines of the attached draft telegram, when the result is officially confirmed.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Peirce', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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RESTRICTED

FM FCO  
TO PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR  
TELNO

INFO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA

YOUR TELNO 62: MESSAGE TO NEW PRESIDENT

1. Please transmit the following message to Cristiani from the Prime Minister, as soon as the results of the elections are officially confirmed.

*I congratulate you*  
BEGINS: ~~Please accept my congratulations~~ on your victory in the recent Presidential elections, ~~and~~ wish you ~~every~~ success during ~~in~~ your ~~term~~ of office. ENDS

HOWE

YYYY  
MAIN  
LIMITED  
MCAD  
NEWS DEPT

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MCAD

MRS D HOLT

2473



File: EL SALVADOR:  
Relations Dec 81.

cc PS/Mr Eppan  
Mr Gillmore (4)  
Mr Feam

UNCLASSIFIED  
#CS020/4.

077247  
MDHOAN 7336

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 032000Z SAN SALVADOR  
TELNO 70  
OF 031330Z JUNE 88  
INFO ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

Mr HST b/c f.i.  
Mr Rodriguez DL 7/6  
cc Mr Clark  
R, PA ACS, 026/3 JPC

ACC014/1 125 .

YOUR TELNO 125: PRESIDENT DUARTE

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOR PRESIDENT DUARTE. QUOTE I WAS SAD  
TO HEAR OF YOUR ILLNESS, AND WISH YOU A SPEEDY AND FULL RECOVERY  
UNQUOTE.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 1

MAIN 1

NO DISTRIBUTION

MCAD

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 86B/88

SUBJECT  
cc OPS  
MASTER



FILE

KK

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

*June!*  
2 May 1988

BT: || Thank you for your letter of 2 June enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Duarte. This may issue.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*SP*





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 June 1988

050

GR

cc/c

"Note you  
to your letter  
of 2 June  
indicating a draft  
message from the  
PM to President  
Duarte. This may have"

Dear Charles

El Salvador: Message to President Duarte

Our Charge in San Salvador reports that President Duarte of El Salvador is seriously ill. According to US sources, he has been diagnosed as having cancer, though this is not yet public knowledge. He has been flown to Washington for further tests and treatment.

The Prime Minister received President Duarte in 1984, shortly after his election. We have given him consistent support as genuinely committed to the Democratic process. We recommend that the Prime Minister should send him wishes for a speedy recovery.

I enclose a draft telegram to our Charge d'Affaires in San Salvador, instructing him to deliver an appropriate message to the Presidential Palace.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

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IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE SAN SALVADOR

TELNO

OF 011215Z JUNE 88

AND TO INFO ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

YOUR TELNO 125: PRESIDENT DUARTE

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOR PRESIDENT DUARTE. QUOTE I WAS SAD TO HEAR OF YOUR ILLNESS, AND WISH YOU A SPEEDY AND FULL RECOVERY UNQUOTE.

HOWE

NNNN

MCAD

J CLARK

270 2475



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T193/86

*SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS*

25 OCT 1986/0631

ZCZC CLM9303 MUK887 DFA047 298610239349

GBXX CO SRSR 104

SAN SALVADOR ELSALV 104/100 25 0124 VIA TRT

EXCMO. SRA MARGARET THATCHER M.P.  
PRIMER MINISTRO DE GRAN BRETANA  
LONDRES SW1

*228/10*

AGRADEZCO INFINITO SU CONCEPTUOSO MENSAJE CON MOTIVO DEL TERREMOTO QUE ASOLO NUESTRA CIUDAD CAPITAL. EN IGUAL FORMA LE EXPRESO EN NOMBRE DE MI PUEBLO NUESTRA ETERNA GRATITUD POR LA AYUDA MATERIAL QUE HASTA LA FECHA NOS HA BRINDADO, Y LE QUEDARE PERSONALMENTE AGRADECIDO DE TODO EL ESFUERZO DE AYUDA QUE PUEDA HACER PARA LA RECONSTRUCCION DE SAN SALVADOR, QUE HA SIGINIFICADO UNA PERDIDA GIGANTESCA DE DOS MIL MILLONES DE DOLARES QUE OBTIAMENTE SOBREPASAN LA PEQUENA CAPACIDAD DE NUESTRO PAIS.

JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE

PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

*Pl. copy to  
Fo.  
A. J. V. (Telegram  
O thanks for  
President of El  
Salvador for  
help received  
after earthquake)  
CDV*

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

number instructions

enquiries dial the number in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

COL NIL

Duty Clerk



CDP  
B/X

With the compliments of  
*Miss*  
*Assistant*  
THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1870/86.

SUBJECT : EL SALVADOR  
relations pb  
Dec 81  
cc master  
O.P.S  
J  
M2200g  
STS 581/86

October 15, 1986

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London, United Kingdom

From: External Relations  
El Salvador  
Ref.: 9558/1  
Tlx: 20599, No Source Answerback

San Salvador, 15 October 1986.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to write to you in order to thank you for your messages of sympathy for my people and government.

I also respectfully request your Government's cooperation by its considering the possibility of providing us with specific aid for the items to be outlined by my Ambassador.

[Complimentary close]

José Napoleón Duarte  
President of the Republic

10, DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL S.W. 1

*With the Private Secretary's  
Compliments*

Translation  
required please.

Duty Clerk.



**WORLD LETTER**

October 15, 1986

EXCELENTISIMA SEORA  
DOA MARGARET THATCHER M.P.,  
PRIMER MINISTRO  
LONDRES, REINO UNIDO DE GRN. BRETA.

FROM: RELACIONES EXTERIORES  
EL SALVADOR  
REF#: 9558/1  
TLX: 20599, No Source Answerback

SAN SALVADOR, 15 DE OCTUBRE DE 1986.

SEOR PRIMER MINISTRO:

TENGO EL HONOR DE DIRIGIRME A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA, EN  
OCASION DE AGRADECERLE LAS MUESTRAS DE SOLIDARIDAD EN EL  
DOLOR DE MI PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO.

ASIMISMO, RESPETUOSAMENTE SOLICITO LA COOPERACION DE  
SU ILUSTRADO GOBIERNO, EN EL SENTIDO DE CONSIDERAR LA POSI-  
BILIDAD DE PROPORCIONARNOS AYUDA ESPECIFICA EN LOS RUBROS  
QUE MI EMBAJADOR LE EXPONDRA.

APROVECHO LA OPORTUNIDAD PARA TESTIMONIAR A VUESTRA  
EXCELENCIA LAS SEGURIDADES DE MI MAS ALTA CONSIDERACION.

JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE  
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA

- SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

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UNCLASSIFIED  
OO TEGUC  
FM PCOLN TO TEGUC  
131600Z OCT  
GRS 161

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T187146

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM PCO  
TO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA  
TELNO 129  
OF 131600Z OCTOBER 1986

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO PRESIDENT DUARTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COPY IS BEING SENT TO  
THE SALVADOREAN EMBASSY IN LONDON.

BEGINS

I WAS DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO HEAR OF THE SEVERE EARTHQUAKE WHICH  
HAS HIT EL SALVADOR. THIS IS A TERRIBLE BLOW TO YOUR COUNTRY.  
MAY I EXTEND THROUGH YOU MY DEEPEST SYMPATHIES TO THE FAMILIES  
OF THE DEAD, INJURED AND HOMELESS. AS YOU WILL KNOW WE HAVE  
ALREADY SENT IN EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FROM BELIZE AND MORE HELP  
IS ON THE WAY. WE STAND READY TO HELP FURTHER AT THIS TIME OF  
TRAGEDY IN YOUR COUNTRY.

ENDS

HOWE

OCCIAN 8724  
LIMITED  
HEAD

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PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR FEARN  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR THOMAS

COPIES TO  
DISASTER UNIT, ODA  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES STAFF  
CRS OFFICE





ccfc

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1986

Dear Charles,

El Salvador Earthquake: Message of Condolence

No 10 were kept informed during the weekend about the earthquake which hit El Salvador on Friday night. It would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a message to President Duarte, whom she last met in June 1984. I enclose a draft telegram.

There is no reliable information yet on the death toll from the earthquake. The damage appears to have been confined to the capital of El Salvador. Figures to date vary from 600 to over 1000 killed, with many more injured and homeless. So far as we have been able to check the small British community are unhurt although some have lost their homes.

Emergency aid has been authorised and a Puma helicopter from British Forces Belize arrived in El Salvador yesterday carrying medical supplies: it will also examine what further British assistance could be provided in the rescue work. The crew met President Duarte. A 707 aircraft organised by the ODA in conjunction with the British Red Cross and jointly funded by the EC will take off today carrying tents, blankets and medical supplies. HM Ambassador (who is resident in Tegucigalpa) has been authorised to spend up to £50,000 for emergency equipment, particularly generators. The total cost of the Government's assistance so far amounts to about £200,000.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

# OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	Caveat	Precedence <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 ZCZC 2 UNCLASSIFIED 3 4 FM FCO 5 TO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA 6 TELNO 7 OF 131600Z OCTOBER 1986 8 9 10 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister 11 to President Duarte as soon as possible. Copy is being sent to 12 the Salvadorean Embassy in London. 13 Begins 14 I was deeply distressed to hear of the severe earthquake which 15 has hit El Salvador. This is a terrible blow to your country. 16 May I extend through you my deepest sympathies to the families 17 of the dead, injured and homeless. As you will know we have 18 already sent in emergency assistance from Belize and more help 19 is on the way. We stand ready to help further at this time of 20 tragedy in your country. 21 Ends 22 23 HOWE 24 25 /// 26 YYYY // 27 MAIN / 28 LIMITED 29 MCAD		
YYYY MAIN ADDITIONAL NNNN	Catchword: <b>CONSULAR</b>		
	File number	Dept <b>Private Office</b>	Drafted by (Block capitals) <b>R N Culshaw</b>
	Telephone no. <b>4641</b>		
	Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time		
	For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number
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# OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	Caveat	Precedence <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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|      | 16 | PS/MR EGGAR               |
|      | 17 | PS/PUS                    |
|      | 18 | MR GILLMORE               |
|      | 19 | MR FEARN                  |
|      | 20 | MR BARRINGTON             |
|      | 21 | MR THOMAS                 |
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For distribution order see Page	Catchword:
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VK  
CP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 October 1986

El Salvador Earthquake:  
Message of Condolence

Thank you for your letter of 13 October enclosing a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Duarte about the earthquake in El Salvador.

I am sure the Prime Minister would want to send a message and I agree that you should despatch the draft enclosed with your letter.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CP



SUBJECT  
ce ops  
master



OK  
EK  
ce ops

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T58/86.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 11 February about the 42nd session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at Geneva. We warmly support your efforts to improve the human rights situation in El Salvador, and we have publicly paid tribute to your success in achieving a dramatic improvement since you took office.

As you will now know, we voted in favour of the resolution on El Salvador, at the United Nations, in company with the United States and the great majority of members of the Human Rights Commission. But we made clear in our explanation of vote that we should have preferred it to have taken fuller account of your Government's success in securing improvements. We shall continue to argue for proper recognition of this. You will, I know, continue your efforts to deal with any abuses.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Senor Ing José Napoleón Duarte

BT

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 March 1986

*Dear Carlos,*

El Salvador

Thank you for your letter of 7 March in which you enclosed a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of El Salvador. I enclose a translation of the letter and a draft reply from the Prime Minister.

President Duarte asked for our support at the 42nd session of the UN Commission on Human Rights at Geneva, 3-14 March 1986. A resolution on El Salvador was approved on 12 March by 39 votes in favour (including the UK and US) to nil, with 4 abstentions (Syria, China, Jordan and Cameroon). The Salvadoran Government will be disappointed that it did not bring to an end arrangements for UN monitoring of the human rights situation, but we and the US Government both considered that the resolution was couched in terms which merited our support. It is also significant that the new Salvadoran Ambassador recently told the Foreign Secretary that reasonable and balanced external criticism strengthened his Government's efforts to curb abuses.

*Yours ever,*

*R N Culshaw*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
The Prime Minister

Reference  
NM3ABV

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HE José Napoleon Duarte  
President of the Republic of  
El Salvador

Copies to:

EL3AZF

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

~~Dear President Duarte~~

CAVEAT.....

~~I~~ Thank you for your letter of 11 February 1986 about the 42nd session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at Geneva. As you know we warmly support your efforts to improve the human rights situation in El Salvador, and <sup>we</sup> have publicly paid tribute to your success in achieving a dramatic improvement since you took office. ~~I very much hope that you will continue to achieve success in these efforts.~~

As you will now know, we voted in favour of the resolution <sup>on El Salvador in 1986</sup> together with the United States and the great majority of members of the Human Rights Commission. <sup>that</sup> ~~But~~ we should have preferred it to have taken fuller account of <sup>success which</sup> ~~the efforts made by your Government to improve the~~ human rights position <sup>But we</sup> and made this clear in our explanation of vote.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

With warm regards regards

your  
Government's  
~~efforts~~  
efforts to  
success

in favour  
improvements.  
We shall  
continue to argue  
for proper recognition  
of this. You will, I think,  
continue to continue your efforts to deal with any abuses

EC SALVADOR, relations - 12/81



20 HL





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 March 1986

I enclose a copy and message to the Prime Minister from the President of El Salvador. I should be grateful for a translation and draft reply in due course.

(Charles Powell)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R

SUBJECT

ccops  
Mark

STS 156/86

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE San Salvador, 11 February 1986

SERIAL No. T30C/86

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I have the honour to write to Your Excellency in connection with the Forty Second Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to be held in Geneva, Switzerland from 3 February - 14 March 1986 where there is to be further examination of "the situation in El Salvador regarding Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" based on the final report to be presented by the Special Representative for El Salvador, Professor José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo.

As Your Excellency knows, there has been progress on the subject of human rights in El Salvador since I became President of the Republic as a result of my Government's efforts and commitments to achieve a strengthening of the democratic process by the introduction of comprehensive measures designed to ensure full recognition of and to promote the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Salvadorean people.

Nevertheless, these commitments, efforts and measures, sincerely and meticulously adopted by my Government with a view to furthering the protection and promotion of Human Rights in my country, continue to be called in question in the United Nations due to the politico-ideological interests of certain governments which are unwilling to recognise the tangible progress made in this field and are moreover adopting subjective stances which have led to biased and partial Resolutions which do nothing to strengthen the democratisation process in El Salvador.

Proof of this is the fact that despite the evidence in the latest reports submitted to the General Assembly by the Special Representative that the policy of the Salvadorean Government is to respect human rights, the relative resolutions do not reflect this fact, rather, they detract from the merits of our efforts and belie the firm decision and readiness of my Government to give full implementation to those rights.

Likewise, I should point out to Your Excellency that the case of El Salvador is being considered according to terms of reference which



the Government of El Salvador has not recognised for reasons of principle, due to the legitimacy of my Government based on the will of the people freely expressed in democratic and regular elections, a fact which makes the selective and discriminatory treatment given to the El Salvador case in that forum incompatible with the democracy upheld by the Salvadorean Government.

However, faithful to its democratic principles and international pledges and taking into account the process of pacification and humanization in which we are engaged, the Government of El Salvador has maintained and will continue to maintain a policy of active cooperation with the UN Commission on Human Rights and with all activities leading to lasting and universal application of human rights as laid down in our Magna Carta and in the international legal instruments on the subject.

In view of the above and having regard to the relations of friendship and cooperation between our democratic Governments, I would like to ask Your Excellency to give us the understanding and support of your illustrious Government so that the case of El Salvador may not continue to be treated in a special, selective and discriminatory way, according to terms of reference which my Government, being legitimately and democratically elected, neither recognises nor deserves.

In the firm belief that we can count on the approval and backing of your illustrious Government, I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

José Napoleon Duarte  
President of the Republic



PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

'T' when translation  
annus.

San Salvador, 11 de febrero de 1986

e 23

SEÑORA PRIMER MINISTRO:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Vuestra Excelencia, en ocasión de referirme al Cuadragésimo Segundo Período de Sesiones de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, que se celebrará en Ginebra, Suiza, del 3 de febrero al 14 de marzo del presente año, en la que nuevamente se examinará "la situación de los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Fundamentales en El Salvador", con base en el informe definitivo que presentará el Representante Especial para El Salvador, Profesor José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo.

Sobre el particular y como es del conocimiento de Vuestra Excelencia, la situación de los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador ha evolucionado positivamente desde que asumí la Presidencia de la República, como resultado de los esfuerzos y compromisos de mi Gobierno para lograr el fortalecimiento del proceso democrático, mediante la aplicación de medidas integrales conducentes a obtener una plena vigencia y promoción de los derechos civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales del pueblo salvadoreño.

Sin embargo, estos compromisos, esfuerzos y medidas que mi Gobierno ha adoptado sincera y escrupulosamente para ampliar la protección y promoción de los Derechos Humanos en mi país, continúan siendo cuestionados en el ámbito de las Naciones Unidas, debido a intereses político-ideológicos de ciertos gobiernos





PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

..2

que no quieren reconocer los avances tangibles en esta materia y, más bien, adoptan posiciones subjetivas que han dado origen a Resoluciones tendenciosas y parciales que no coadyuvan al fortalecimiento del proceso de democratización en El Salvador.

Prueba de ello, es que no obstante de que en los últimos informes presentados ante la Asamblea General por el Representante Especial, se deja constancia de la política del Gobierno de El Salvador hacia el respeto de los Derechos Humanos, las resoluciones al respecto no reflejan tal concepción y, por el contrario, le restan méritos a nuestros esfuerzos, e incluso desnaturalizan la firme decisión y actitud de mi Gobierno por lograr la plena vigencia de estos derechos.

Asimismo, cabe mencionar a Vuestra Excelencia que el caso de El Salvador esta siendo considerado a través de un mandato que el Gobierno de El Salvador no ha reconocido por razones de principio, debido a la legitimidad que caracteriza a mi Gobierno, la cual se fundamenta en la voluntad popular expresada en elecciones libres y periódicas, lo que hace que el tratamiento selectivo y discriminatorio del caso de El Salvador en tal foro, sea incompatible con la condición democrática que sustenta el Gobierno salvadoreño.

No obstante, el Gobierno de El Salvador fiel a sus principios democráticos y a sus compromisos internacionales, y teniendo en cuenta el proceso de pacificación y humanización



PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

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en que estamos empeñados, ha mantenido y mantendrá una política de cooperación activa con la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas y con todas las actividades conducentes a la vigencia permanente y universal de los derechos humanos, prescritos en nuestra Carta Magna y en los instrumentos jurídicos internacionales sobre la materia.

Por lo anteriormente expuesto, y en consideración a las relaciones de amistad y colaboración existentes entre nuestros Gobiernos democráticos, tengo a bien solicitar a Vuestra Excelencia nos corresponda con la valiosa comprensión y apoyo de su Ilustrado Gobierno, a efecto de que al caso de El Salvador no continúe otorgándosele el carácter especial, selectivo y discriminatorio de un mandato, que mi Gobierno, por su misma esencia legítima y democrática, no puede reconocer ni merece.

Con la firme seguridad de que contaremos con la anuencia y solidaridad de su Ilustrado Gobierno, aprovecho la oportunidad para expresar a Vuestra Excelencia, las seguridades de mi más alta y distinguida consideración.



JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE  
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA.

EXCELENTISIMA SEÑORA  
DOÑA MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIMER MINISTRO,  
LONDRES, GRAN BRETAÑA.



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS



R20

Rina Austin  
A nice letter  
that is for  
for your support  
during the  
difficult time of  
the daughter.

San Salvador, Octubre 29 de 1985.

PRIME MINISTER  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No: T202AA/85  
CJP  
29/xi

Excelentísima Señora  
Margaret Thatcher,  
Primer Ministro,  
Londres, Gran Bretaña.

Excelencia:

Tengo a mucha honra dirigirme a Vuestra Excelencia, con el objeto de patentizarle mi gratitud imperecedera por el total y pleno respaldo brindado tanto a título personal como a nombre de Vuestro Ilustrado Gobierno, el cual a no dudar, constituyó desde el inicio de este doloroso y reprochable incidente, el apoyo sustancial que sirvió de base para que las negociaciones obtuviesen el resultado de la liberación de mi querida hija, señora Inés Guadalupe Duarte Durán, de su compañera Ana Cecilia Villeda y de los Alcaldes, Regidores y Empleados Municipales.

Vuestro oportuno y decidido apoyo Excelencia es testimonio fehaciente de los lazos de amistad y comprensión que felizmente han existido entre nuestros dos Pueblos y Gobiernos y que hoy en día se han fortalecido aún más.

Al renovar a Vuestra Excelencia mi gratitud personal, así como de mi familia entera, hago propicia la ocasión para reiterarle las muestras de mi distinguida consideración y alta estima.

JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE,  
Presidente de la República

Subject  
cc minister  
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T163185

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TO DESKBY 121400Z TEGUCIGALPA  
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OF 121030Z SEPTEMBER 85

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT DUARTE FROM THE  
PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS: I WAS DISMAYED AND DISTRESSED TO HEAR OF THE KIDNAP  
OF YOUR DAUGHTER INES GUADELUPE. MY THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU  
AT WHAT WILL BE AN AGONISING TIME FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. I  
PRAY THAT SHE MAY BE RELEASED UNHARMED QUICKLY. ENDS.

HCWE

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MAIN

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PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

MICHAEL THOMAS

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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SPW

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 September 1985

**KIDNAP OF DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT DUARTE**

Thank you for your letter of 11 September. The Prime Minister would indeed want to send a message to President Duarte and I enclose the text which she has approved and should be grateful if it could be despatched immediately.

PK  
10/9/85  
from  
retr

(C. D. POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7  
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT  
DUARTE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS:

I was dismayed and distressed to hear of the  
kidnap of your daughter Ines Guadelupe. My  
thoughts are with you at what will be an agonising  
time for you and your family. I pray that  
she may be released unharmed quickly.

ENDS





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister  
Agree message?

11 September 1985

CDP

Dear Charles,

El Salvador: Kidnap of daughter of President Duarte

There are news reports which have been confirmed by our Embassy in El Salvador that the daughter of President Duarte was kidnapped last night by unknown people. One of her bodyguards was killed. We think that it would be much appreciated if the Prime Minister send President Duarte a message. In making this recommendation we have it very much in mind that the Prime Minister has met President Duarte twice. A draft message is attached.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

# OUT TELEGRAM

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 June 1985

MILITARY TRAINING IN EL SALVADOR

Thank you for your letter of 31 May about military training in El Salvador.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should stand by our original decision to offer military training and notes that it is now proposed to provide this at Sandhurst.

(CHARLES POWELL)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

ECU

Prime Minister

Agree X?

AT 3/5

cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Yes nr

31 May 1985

Dear Charles,

Military Training for El Salvador

Following her meeting with President Duarte last July the Prime Minister wrote to him on 6 August agreeing to make available one or two Staff College places for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers.

In October the Salvadorean authorities informed our Charge d'Affaires that staff courses would be too sophisticated for their needs and enquired whether other types of training might be available instead. Following discussion with our Defence Attache at Mexico City who periodically visits El Salvador, they drew up a list of their priorities which was received by us on 8 January. The Ministry of Defence then considered which courses would best meet the Salvadorean suggestions and it was decided that courses at the Royal Military College Sandhurst would be most appropriate for their needs.

The Salvadorean delay in deciding on the type of training they needed has made it unlikely that training can start before 1987 instead of 1986 as we originally hoped. Places for courses at Sandhurst are allocated in the February of the year before that in which the course begins, and places for the course starting in 1986 were thus allocated last February. Only if there are cancellations will Salvadoreans be able to attend. We have asked the Ministry of Defence to give priority to Salvadorean applications for cancelled places and asked the Salvadoreans to expedite their applications.

There has, predictably, been a good deal of hostility from some quarters in this country to the decision to extend our cooperation with El Salvador in this way. Since 13 February, when the Government's offer to President Duarte for training for military officers in Britain was referred to publicly by the Salvadorean Army Chief of Staff, 20 PQs have been put down and the FCO has responded to 182 MPs letters and some 453 letters from members of the public criticising the Government's decision.

The great bulk of this activity appears to have resulted from an extensive and largely inaccurate lobbying campaign, much of it instigated by a circular letter issued by OXFAM 3000,

/a political





a political offshoot of OXFAM which encouraged its supporters to write to their Member of Parliament and Ministers. Lady Young took up with the OXFAM Director the question of their apparent involvement in questionable political activity. Mr Stringer explained that OXFAM 2000 is a self-financed and separate organisation over which the main OXFAM management do not exercise control. The other major British charitable organisations and many Church groups have also been strident in their condemnation of our offer of military training for El Salvador.

Despite all this, no significant reason has been offered for reconsidering our original decision. The Foreign Secretary is in no doubt that we should go on presenting it positively. He is also considering more generally the role of charities in promoting or supporting political campaigns of this kind. It would clearly be unwise, in his view, to court the risk of "Minister slams OXFAM" type headlines and he has asked for the search to concentrate on less direct, but probably more effective methods.

*Yes evr,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

EL SALVADOR, Internal Sit, Dec 1981



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*Subject*

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T66 AA/85

*ccMaster  
OPS*

RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED

FM FCO 090847Z APR 85  
TO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 9 APRIL

YOUR TELNO 63: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DUARTE. YOU SHOULD DELAY DELIVERY UNTIL  
THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED.

BEGINS

WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR PARTY'S VICTORY IN THE NATIONAL  
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. FOLLOWING THIS FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF  
THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR, I WISH YOU  
AND YOUR GOVERNMENT EVERY SUCCESS IN TACKLING THE MANY  
CHALLENGES THAT STILL REMAIN. YOU WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE  
OUR SUPPORT IN YOUR EFFORTS TO SECURE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS AND  
STABILITY, BOTH IN EL SALVADOR AND IN THE REGION.

HOWE

LIMITED

MCAD  
PROTOCOL DEPT  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
SIR W HARDING  
MR DAVID THOMAS

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RESTRICTED



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 April 1985

EL SALVADOR

The Prime Minister has agreed that the message to President Duarte attached to your letter of 3 April, should be sent as drafted. She has noted that delivery will be delayed until the election results are confirmed.

MARK ADDISON

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2



ow.  
RESTRICTED



Prime Minister.  
Agree message?  
About 3/4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April, 1985

Dear Charles,

Yes Mr

El Salvador: Message of Congratulation to President Duarte

The El Salvador National Assembly and municipal elections took place on 31 March. President Duarte's Christian Democrat Party (PDC) are unofficially estimated to have won a majority with 32 or 33 seats (compared with their previous 24) against the 22 seats of the far-right ARENA Party in alliance with the National Conciliation Party (PCN).

Our Ambassador reports that voting was orderly and free from any sign of interference at the polls. These elections consolidate three years of democratic development in El Salvador.

We recommend that the Prime Minister send a short message of congratulation to President Duarte on his party's victory as she did when he won the Presidential election in June 1984. I enclose a draft.

The result is as yet unofficial. The Electoral National Council announcement is expected within the week. I suggest that the Embassy should delay the delivery of the message until the results are confirmed. ||

Yes ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

		Classification and Caveats <b>RESTRICTED</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>PRIORITY</b>
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FM FCO	6	FM FCO	APRIL 85
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	YOUR TELNO 63: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	
	10	1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime	
	11	Minister to President Duarte. You should delay delivery until	
	12	the election results are officially confirmed.	
	13	BEGINS	
	14	Warm congratulations on your Party's victory in the National	
	15	Assembly elections. Following this further demonstration of	
	16	the consolidation of democracy in El Salvador, I wish you	
	17	and your Government every success in tackling the many	
	18	challenges that still remain. You will continue to have	
	19	our support in your efforts to secure democratic progress and	
	20	stability, both in El Salvador and in the region.	
	21		
///	22	HOWE	
//	23	NNNN	
/	24		
	25		
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	
File number		Dept	Catchword
		Private Office	Minimal
Drafted by (Block capitals)			MCAD
PETER RICKETTS			PS
Telephone number			PS/Lady Young
			PS/Mr Renton
Authorised for despatch			Sir W Harding
			Mr David Thomas
			PD
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		





cc MASTER SET

## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 October, 1984

*Dear Peter,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with Senor Rey Prendes, Minister  
of the Presidency, El Salvador, at 1700 hours  
on 22 October at 10 Downing Street

The Prime Minister received Senor Rey Prendes for a brief meeting this evening. He was accompanied by the Charge d'Affaires of El Salvador.


Senor Rey Prendes said that President Duarte had been horrified by the bomb attack in Brighton and wished the Prime Minister to be aware of his deep concern. He had very much enjoyed his meeting with the Prime Minister in July. He now wished her to be informed of his meeting with the FMLN/FDR leaders. Senor Rey Prendes then handed over a letter (enclosed).

The Prime Minister said that she understood that the talks with the rebels had been surprisingly successful. Could Senor Rey Prendes give her a brief account? Senor Rey Prendes said that the meeting had indeed been very positive. The guerilla leaders had been respectful, indeed almost humble, addressing President Duarte as President. They had made clear that they would accept a pluralistic society and would not seek to impose socialism or communism. They fully understood that President Duarte could not move from the constitution; they were not seeking its abrogation. These were all good signs for the future.

The Prime Minister asked why Senor Rey Prendes thought that the attitude of the guerillas had changed. Was it because the Government forces had been gaining the upper hand in the conflict? Had the meeting between the European Community, Central American Governments and the Contadora states in San Jose helped? Senor Rey Prendes said he thought both factors were important. But it was necessary to be prudent about the Contadora process. The protocol to the draft Act of Contadora needed revision. Unless there were proper controls, Nicaragua would continue to supply arms to the guerillas.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Duarte now envisaged a ceasefire. Senor Rey Prendes said that this could only come at the end of the process. If there was a ceasefire now, the guerillas would take certain towns and establish a rival Government. One had to be able to see the shape of a final agreement before moving to a ceasefire.

The Prime Minister asked when the next round of talks would take place. Senor Rey Prendes said that they would be around 21 November. The next round would not be in La Palma, but more likely at the International Airport or the Archbishop's Palace in San Salvador. Meanwhile, President Duarte would try to gather a broad front of all the internal parties to meet with the guerillas in the next round.

Yours sincerely,  


C. D. POWELL

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office





File vs  
PC  
cl.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

20 October 1984

*Dear Mr. Ricketts,*

El Salvador: Visit to Britain by  
Senor Rey Prendes

Thank you for your letter of 19 October about the visit to Britain of Senor Rey Prendes.

The Prime Minister is willing to see him but for 10 minutes only. I should be grateful if you could arrange for him to come to 10 Downing Street at 1715 on 22 October. It should be made clear to him in advance that the meeting will be an extremely brief one.

*Yours sincerely,  
C.D. Powell*

(C.D. POWELL)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VSC

Prime Minister  
 can have agreed  
 to see him  
 for ten  
 minutes on  
 Monday.  
 CJP  
 25/10.

CALL BY SEÑOR REY PRENDES, MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY, EL SALVADOR,  
 ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 17.15 hrs.  
 ON MONDAY 22 OCTOBER

CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Please thank President Duarte for his letter. Admire his achievement in bringing the FMLN/FDR leaders to the negotiating table.
2. Welcome your assessment of meeting and prospects for national reconciliation.
3. Convinced Contadora offers best prospect of resolving the conflicts of the region. Our presence at San José meeting underlined our and EC support for efforts towards a peaceful settlement. What are prospects for agreement in accordance with Contadora principles?
4. Understand details of our aid programme to be worked out in November when Minister of Planning comes here. Wish to demonstrate our firm support for democratic rule in your country.
5. (If request is made for British training of Salvadorean military) I told President Duarte in my letter of 6 August that we can offer one or two scholarships to British staff colleges for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers. We could not offer to train the Salvadorean army in Belize; Belize is as you know an independent country.



CALL BY SEÑOR REY PRENDES, MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY, EL SALVADOR  
ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 17.15 hrs ON MONDAY 22 OCTOBER

CENTRAL AMERICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Señor Rey Prendes is bringing a personal letter from President Duarte for the Prime Minister. It is likely to deal with his recent peace initiative and will reply to her letter of 6 August.
2. Señor Rey Prendes is effectively the most senior and influential Minister of President Duarte's Cabinet. Together with the Minister of Defence, he accompanied President Duarte to the meeting with the FMLN/FDR at La Palma on 15 October. He is therefore in a position to provide a first-hand account of the historic meeting. He attended the EDU Conference in Oslo in June, where he met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He is participating in the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Conference on Central America in Croydon 19-21 October.
3. On 8 October President Duarte announced in his speech to UNGA an invitation to the insurgent leaders to meet him for talks on 15 October. The latter had been pressing for some time for such talks. The meeting, which was successful beyond all expectations, opens up a real prospect of national reconciliation. But formidable difficulties remain. Both sides agreed to the creation of a joint commission under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of San Salvador "to seek ways of bringing about peace and humanizing the armed conflict."
4. Reports indicate that the last three months have been relatively quiet militarily and that the armed forces have probably now taken most of the initiative from the guerrillas. A regular stream of guerrilla deserters and captured documents have improved /the



the Salvadorean army intelligence and seem to point to slow, steady progress against the insurgents. However, there is still a long way to go, and insurgent activity since the meeting on 15 October has been undiminished.

5. The San José meeting of EC (plus Spain and Portugal), Central American (Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador) and the Contadora Group (Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Panama) Foreign Ministers at San José 28-29 September was seen by all participants as a success. The meeting coincided with important developments in the Contadora peace process: Nicaragua announced on 22 September willingness to sign the present revised draft Act of Contadora on condition it was agreed immediately, without modification and with US signature of a protocol endorsing the treaty. The other Central Americans want amendments particularly on verification and control measures for security aspects such as arms level reductions, and further negotiations are expected. Honduras has called a meeting of the five Central American states on 19 October to discuss next steps.

6. The Prime Minister wrote to the President on 6 August to inform him that we would resume a modest technical assistance programme and make available £100,000 for urgently needed civilian equipment/supplies. She also offered one or two scholarships for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers to attend staff college in the UK. We understand there are no vacancies before 1986. No applications have been received but Duarte spoke of this offer at a press conference in September. The nature of the UK technical cooperation programme for El Salvador is being worked out. It is likely to comprise a moderate number of training awards in the UK. We are also awaiting a response from the Salvadorean authorities giving their views on how best to spend the £100,000 of aid we offered for urgently needed supplies. We understand that Dr Fidel Chavez Mena, Minister of Planning (ex-Foreign Minister), who will be visiting the UK as a COI sponsored visitor at the end of November, will discuss this in detail with the ODA.

/7.



B 7. The Economist of 6 October published an editorial advocating that Britain should train the Salvadorean army in the event that Honduras maintained its decision to refuse to allow the Americans to continue their training of the Salvadorean military in Honduras. The article suggested that training of Salvadorean troops by Britain could take place in Belize and concluded that "President Duarte knows that a request for British assistance would get a sympathetic response." The Prime Minister of Belize has expressed concern about the article and commented that the Economist seems to have forgotten that Belize is independent. It would be undesirable for Belize to be drawn into the Central American conflict in this way since it would make both Belize and the British troops there a target for left-wing subversion or terrorist activity.

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MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA DEPARTMENT

19 October 1984



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 August, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

Let me say again how very glad I was to have the opportunity to talk with you on 21 July. I was heartened by your robust approach to the problems which you are having to tackle. Your election marked a vital stage in restoring to the people of El Salvador hope in the future through democratic progress. You have our full support in this endeavour.

During our very interesting conversation, you raised with me the possibility of economic aid for El Salvador and of the provision of scholarships for some of your military officers.

I have looked into this and can now tell you that we are ready to reintroduce a programme of technical co-operation with El Salvador. Training awards in Britain might form the main element of this.

In addition we should be pleased to provide £100,000 worth of urgently needed civilian supplies or equipment.

We are ready to discuss your requirements and priorities with your officials through our Mission in San Salvador so that these aid offers can be rapidly implemented.

As regards scholarships for military officers, we shall



make available as soon as possible one or two staff college places for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers with a working knowledge of English. Arrangements for military scholarships at staff colleges and other institutions are made well in advance. Our Ministry of Defence will be considering later this year applications for courses in 1986, and we shall be happy to have nominations from you for those courses. I shall ensure that you are informed if any earlier vacancy becomes available.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Roger Shatto

CM

MCAE  
B

# Shaping them up



## How Britain—and Europe?—could help in Central America

Britain faces an opportunity—and a challenge—to show that Europe has begun to understand the problems of Central America. The opportunity arises because the United States has run into two related problems.

On September 21st the Nicaraguan government gave the Americans a jolt by saying that it accepted all the provisions of a treaty proposed by the Contadora group of countries that is trying to bring peace to Central America. The Reagan administration, which had supported the treaty, thereupon found itself mumbling reservations. The treaty calls for the removal of all foreign bases and foreign military advisers from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica. If put into force as matters stand now, it would limit the ability of the United States to help the government of El Salvador, without any real means of making sure that Nicaragua stops supplying the guerrillas who are trying to overthrow that government.

The second setback was the announcement by Honduras, on September 27th, that it will no longer allow the Americans to train Salvadorean troops on Honduran soil. The Hondurans are using this issue in the hope of prising a concession out of El Salvador in the ancient border dispute between the two countries, which has for years complicated life for the Salvadorean troops trying to fight the guerrillas operating near the border.

### Europe is learning, and Europe should help

If Honduras cannot be persuaded to change its mind—which may still be possible—there is a gap to be filled. The Salvadoreans have neither the experience nor the resources to do their own military training. The United States congress would resist any move to send more American trainers to El Salvador. The job could be done in the United States itself, but very expensively: some \$20m per battalion (and each battalion needs to be re-trained every year or so, because El Salvador calls up its young men for only 12-month periods). Britain can help to plug the gap.

El Salvador needs a police force that has been shown how to act as policemen rather than as political

enforcers. Its army needs officer-training of the Sandhurst sort. Above all, it needs a continuing supply of infantrymen properly trained in anti-guerrilla warfare. Britain has a much-admired record for helping other countries to learn these skills. Most of the job could be done in the region. The costs would be relatively low, and the United States would presumably be happy to pay most of them. Belize, the not-far-away former British colony which Britain still guards against a (now unlikely) attack by Guatemala, would be one good place to train Salvadoreans.

A training operation by Britain, even a modest one, would amount to more than providing British know-how. It would also be a political statement: in favour of government by election instead of by gun in El Salvador. Since June, the country has been run by the legitimately elected President Duarte, who has been weeding the far-right killers out of El Salvador's armed forces. The number of death-squad murders has sharply declined in recent months. A British offer to train Salvadoreans would send a message of encouragement for the attempt to preserve the civilised middle ground of politics in Central America against the extremes of both right and left.

It is important that such a message should come from Europe. The recent visits to Europe by President Duarte and Costa Rica's President Monge have helped to make Europeans realise that the centre can still be saved in Central America, and that the United States is trying to save it. Last weekend's meeting in Costa Rica's capital between the foreign ministers of the European community and their Central American colleagues carried that education process a stage further, as well as providing a modest increase in EEC aid to the region. But the centre is unlikely to hold if the democratically elected government of El Salvador falls to an attack supported from outside the country.

President Duarte knows that a request for British assistance would get a sympathetic response. Let the request be made, and answered. Europeans should have a policy for Central America, not just lament it.





BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: SENOR LICENCIADO JULIO ADOLFO  
REY PRENDES, APPOINTED MINISTER FOR THE PRESIDENCY,  
31 JULY 1984

Born 5 October 1932, Santa Ana, El Salvador.

BA political sciences Tulane University, New  
Orleans, USA.

Previous positions include an appointment at the  
Central Reserve Bank, 1958; Director-General of Tourism,  
Ministry of Economy (1959-1961); Visiting Professor,  
School of Journalism, 1960; Director (and Co-Owner) of  
Magazine 'Exitos', 1962; Chief of Public Relations,  
Central American Bank Economic Integration, 1962/63;  
served as Christian Democrat (PDC) Member on the  
Legislative Assembly, June 1964 to May 1972 and June 1974  
to May 1976; Mayor of San Salvador, November 1979 to  
December 1981; elected to Constituent Assembly and  
served from April 1982 to December 1983, and Vice  
President of the Legislative Assembly, December 1983 to  
31 July 1984.

/Senor

Señor Rey Prendes is a founder member of PDC, and Secretary General of PDC from June 1982 to September 1984. He was Head of the PDC 1984 Presidential campaign. Accompanied President Duarte at negotiations with FMLN/FDR at La Palma, October 1984. He attended the EDU Conference in Oslo in June 1984 and is participating in the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Conference in UK 19-21 October on Central America.

Señor Rey Prendes is married with 6 children. He speaks English.



010

*ccf*



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 October 1984

*I really don't think you need see him.*

*You gave a lot of attention to Duarte, and you can*

*Sen Charles consider his letter without having delivered personally. This is what FCO Ministers should do.*

El Salvador: Visit to Britain by Senor Licenciado Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, Minister of the Presidency

*Agree not*

Senor Rey Prendes, who is effectively the most senior and influential Minister of President Duarte, will be in the UK from 19-23 October. The Salvadorean Foreign Ministry have just informed us that he will be bringing a message from President Duarte to the Prime Minister about the dramatic meeting held with the FMLN/FDR guerrillas on 15 October. The message, which the Foreign Ministry hope can be delivered personally to the Prime Minister, also contains a response to the Prime Minister's letter of 6 August.

*to see him?  
CDP  
19/10*

Senor Rey Prendes, together with the Minister of Defence, accompanied President Duarte to the meeting with the FMLN/FDR. The meeting, which was successful beyond all expectations, opens up a real prospect of national reconciliation. Both sides agreed according to the joint communique to the creation of a joint commission "to seek ways of bringing about peace and humanising the armed conflict".

*Just  
10 minutes  
No more  
not*

The Minister is speaking at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation EDU Conference on Central America in Croydon during the weekend of 19-21 October.

Sir Geoffrey Howe realises that the Prime Minister will be very busy at the beginning of next week, but believes that she would wish to consider receiving Senor Rey Prendes, in view of her successful meeting with Senor Duarte, and the subsequent encouraging developments in El Salvador. Sir Geoffrey will himself be in Luxembourg on 22 and 23 October; if the Prime Minister were unable to see Senor Rey Prendes, he will arrange for Mr Renton to see him and take delivery of the message.

*Tom ever,*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

*Peto Ricketts*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL

GA 565

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SAN JOSE 191900Z OCT 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 405 OF 19 OCTOBER 1984

INFO WASHINGTON, TEGUCIGALPA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA,  
HAVANA, PANAMA CITY

mf

EL SALVADOR: DUARTE /GUERRILLA TALKS

1. AT LUNCH WITH MYSELF AND OWEN, RUBEN ZAMORA GAVE FDR PERSPECTIVE ON LA PALMA MEETING. MAIN POINTS WERE:

(A) DUARTE'S PROPOSAL FOR TALKS, UNDOUBTEDLY WELL-INTENTIONED, HAD COME AS SURPRISE. HOWEVER, FDR HAD FOR 3 MONTHS BEEN HAVING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH OFFICERS OF THE EL SALVADOR ARMY (DURING FIRST MONTH WITHOUT DUARTE'S KNOWLEDGE). THE ARMY AS WELL AS THE CHURCH HAD BEEN IMPORTANT INFLUENCES ON DUARTE.

(B) AT LA PALMA, OPENING POSITIONS ONLY HAD BEEN STAKED OUT. BUT ATMOSPHERE WAS GOOD AND BOTH FMLN AND FDR WERE HAPPY SO FAR.

(C) THE FACT THAT DUARTE HAD NOT TRIED TO ENTICE THE FDR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MARCH ELECTIONS WAS MOST WELCOME. REASON FOR THIS WAS PROBABLY THAT DUARTE KNEW THAT IF LEFT TOOK PART, THEY WOULD DRAW VOTES AWAY FROM CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS.

(D) NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY BE PROTRACTED. FMLN/FDR PREFERRED BUILDING BLOCK APPROACH, TRYING TO FIND COMMON GROUND OVER MAJOR CONCERNS, RATHER THAN THE STAKING OUT OF DETAILED DEMANDS (AS THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAD SET OUT BY DOING).

(E) GUERRILLAS WANTED NEXT ROUND TO BE IN SAN SALVADOR BUT WOULD LIKE VENUE TO BE KEPT SECRET FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE; CONCERN WAS OF COURSE SECURITY.

(F) ABSENCE OF COMANDANTE VILLALOBOS HAD REALLY BEEN FOR THE STATED REASON: HE COULD NOT GET, BY LAND, TO LA PALMA IN TIME.

(G) FMLN AND FDR WERE WORKING IN CLOSEST COLLABORATION, BUT ZAMORA CONCEDED THAT FMLN (UNLIKE FDR) VIEW OF POLITICAL PLURALISM DID NOT EASILY ADMIT POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATION OF POWER AFTER REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESS.

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2



## CONFIDENTIAL

2. ZAMORA MAINTAINED THAT THE GOAL MUST BE TO ESTABLISH RULES OF THE GAME FOR EL SALVADOR WHICH WOULD BIND ALL PARTIES. DIVISIONS WERE GREAT, BUT THE CHURCH WAS A POWERFUL FORCE FOR CONCILIATION.

3. ZAMORA SAID THE SANDINISTAS WERE IN FAVOUR OF TALKS IN EL SALVADOR, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS AWKWARD FOR THEM IN THE DOMESTIC NICARAGUAN CONTEXT.

SUMMERSCALE

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

CENTRAL AMERICA  
STANDARD (~~PALACE~~)  
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MOD D14  
MR ARBUTHNOTT ODA

CONFIDENTIAL



*Ing. José Napoleón Duarte*  
*Presidente Constitucional*  
*de la República*

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T 174<sup>B</sup> / 84** *cc MASTER*  
*OPS*

*San Salvador*  
*El Salvador*  
*18 de octubre de 1984*

*Excelentísima Señora*  
*Margaret Thatcher*  
*Primer Ministro*  
*No. 10 Downing Street*  
*London, SW1, Inglaterra.*

*Grande y Buena Amiga:*

*En el deseo de mantener y estrechar aún más las relaciones de amistad que felizmente existen entre El Salvador y el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, he tenido a bien designar al Señor Licenciado Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, Ministro de la Presidencia y uno de mis colaboradores más cercanos para que presente un saludo personal a su Excelencia.*

*El Señor Licenciado Rey Prendes, está perfectamente enterado de los sentimientos que animan a mi Gobierno hacia el ilustrado Gobierno de vuestra Excelencia y, el conocimiento que tengo de sus relevantes cualidades me da plena confianza de que cumplirá fielmente su cometido.*

*En tal virtud he designado al Señor Licenciado Rey Prendes para que explique a vuestra Excelencia en detalle, los alcances del "Encuentro en La Palma" y los propósitos de mi llamado en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 8 de octubre de 1984, cuando invité a los jefes del movimiento guerrillero a reunirse conmigo, sin armas y con el testimonio de la Conferencia Episcopal, para incorporarse al proceso democrático que está realizando mi Gobierno en nuestro esfuerzo y lucha por la paz y la justicia social en El Salvador.*

*Ruego a vuestra Excelencia acoger con benevolencia al Señor Licenciado Rey Prendes para el éxito de su misión y dar entera fe y crédito*





*Ing. José Napoleón Duarte*  
*Presidente Constitucional*  
*de la República*

- 2 -

a cuanto Os manifieste en nombre de mi Gobierno y muy especialmente cuando Os reitere los votos que formulo por el engrandecimiento del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte y por el bienestar personal de vuestra Excelencia de quien soy

*Leal y Buen Amigo,*



*Presidente de la República*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER **PRIME MINISTER'S** August, 1984

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T 141/84**

cc MASTER  
OPS

*Dear Mr. President,*

Let me say again how very glad I was to have the opportunity to talk with you on 21 July. I was heartened by your robust approach to the problems which you are having to tackle. Your election marked a vital stage in restoring to the people of El Salvador hope in the future through democratic progress. You have our full support in this endeavour.

During our very interesting conversation, you raised with me the possibility of economic aid for El Salvador and of the provision of scholarships for some of your military officers.

I have looked into this and can now tell you that we are ready to reintroduce a programme of technical co-operation with El Salvador. Training awards in Britain might form the main element of this.

In addition we should be pleased to provide £100,000 worth of urgently needed civilian supplies or equipment.

We are ready to discuss your requirements and priorities with your officials through our Mission in San Salvador so that these aid offers can be rapidly implemented.

As regards scholarships for military officers, we shall

*2*



make available as soon as possible one or two staff college places for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers with a working knowledge of English. Arrangements for military scholarships at staff colleges and other institutions are made well in advance. Our Ministry of Defence will be considering later this year applications for courses in 1986, and we shall be happy to have nominations from you for those courses. I shall ensure that you are informed if any earlier vacancy becomes available.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Rangana Shetty

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: HE Ing Jose Napoleon Duarte  
President of El Salvador

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

SAHACP

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

~~Dear Mr President~~

CAVEAT.....

Let me say again how very glad I was to have the opportunity to talk with you on 21 July. I was heartened by your robust approach to the problems which you are having to tackle. Your election marked a vital stage in restoring to the people of El Salvador hope in the future through democratic progress. You have our <sup>full</sup> support in this endeavour; ~~our appointment of Mr Julian Amery as the British Government's special representative at your inauguration was an expression of our goodwill.~~

During our very interesting conversation, you raised with me the possibility of economic aid for El Salvador and of the provision of scholarships for some of your military officers.

*have looked into this & can now tell you that*  
~~I am now glad to tell you that we are ready to~~  
*we shall be ready to*  
 reintroduce a programme of technical cooperation with El Salvador; ~~we suggest that~~ training awards in Britain might form the main element of this.

In addition we should be pleased to provide ~~about~~  
~~£50,000~~ *£100,000* worth of urgently needed civilian supplies or /equipment.

*Please type for PM's signature. Sent to FCO for despatch after signature CM.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



EL SALVADOR: Int. Sit. Rec 81

equipment.

Through our Mission in San Salvador <sup>We shall be</sup> very ready to discuss <sup>your requirements</sup> with your officials <sup>your requirements</sup> and ~~priorities~~ so that these aid offers can be rapidly implemented.

With regards ~~to~~ <sup>As</sup> scholarships for military officers, we would ~~hope~~ <sup>shall</sup> to make available as soon as possible one or two <sup>Staff College</sup> places for suitably qualified Salvadorean officers with a working knowledge of English. Arrangements for military scholarships at staff colleges and other institutions are made well in advance. Our Ministry of Defence will be considering later this year applications for courses in 1986, and we ~~would~~ <sup>shall</sup> be happy to have nominations from you for those courses. ~~We shall let you~~ <sup>I shall ensure that you are informed</sup> know if any earlier vacancy becomes available.

With best wishes.

CB

50 JUL 1984  
11 11 1984

059

File



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 August 1984

EL SALVADOR

Thank you for your letter of 30 July about the line which the Prime Minister might take with President Duarte in response to his request for economic aid and other assistance.

The Prime Minister is grateful for the efforts which have been made to meet some of President Duarte's requests, as well as for the information from US sources of Nicaraguan support for the guerrillas in El Salvador.

The Prime Minister thinks, however, that what we have to offer President Duarte is still very modest. She agrees that in practice it is not feasible to offer places to El Salvadorean officers on Staff College courses before 1986, and hopes that the offer itself will have some reassuring effect. But she thinks that the offer of civilian supplies and equipment should be increased to £100,000 if it is to have any significant impact.

BT

I should be grateful if you could let me know urgently whether the additional money can be found within the aid programme so that the Prime Minister's letter to President Duarte can issue early next week.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CJP



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The response to your request to see what more can be done for El Salvador. The answer is:

not much: return a technical cooperation programme (but Duarte did not seem very interested);  
 : a cash grant of £50,000 for urgent civilian equipment;  
 : two places on military courses in 1986.

The choice is:

Dear Charles,

(a) agree reluctantly that this is the most that can be done  
 (b) press for cash grant to be increased to say £100,000.

El Salvador

Please refer to your letter of 21 July about the line the Prime Minister might take with President Duarte in response to his requests for economic aid and other assistance.

Please tick (a) or (b)

CJP

30/7

We had already been reviewing the situation in El Salvador in the aftermath of the elections. Things are still volatile and the outlook hard to predict; serious abuses of human rights persist, although at a diminished level, and the military situation is one of stalemate. Nevertheless the election of President Duarte in reasonably free and fair elections is an important and hopeful development. We should therefore look for ways of giving greater substance to HMG's present policy of encouraging the emergence and consolidation of democracy in El Salvador. We should, in considering how this might be done, take account particularly of:

- (a) the great importance attached by the US Administration to strengthening Duarte's position;
- (b) our own and wider Western interests in preventing the spread of Cuban and Soviet influence in Central America;
- (c) our interest in promoting a constructive consensus within the European Community and of minimising EC/US differences over El Salvador.

We need also to take account of the general situation in Central America, the state of British Parliamentary and public opinion on El Salvador, and the financial and other practical constraints on our own freedom of action.

In the light of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Duarte we have, as requested in your letter of 21 July, considered whether we might be able to make a modest offer of help.

/We





We have concluded that direct balance of payments support, in the form of programme aid, carries too many complications. It would have to be too hedged around with conditions and would draw us in much closer than is desirable at this stage.

Instead we should offer to resume a technical cooperation programme for El Salvador, concentrated on training. The main ingredient would be awards for training in the UK. This would take a little time to set up. We should also therefore offer to provide, as an immediate gesture, a gift of urgently needed civilian supplies or equipment, to the value of about £50,000.

A combined offer along these lines would we believe have the dual merits of providing something tangible and visible at once, with the implication of continuing support through the re-establishment of a technical cooperation programme.

President Duarte also asked about the provision of scholarships for some of his military officers. We could offer El Salvador one or two places on military courses in 1986. We understand from the MOD that there are no vacancies at Staff Colleges in the UK before then unless some of the presently confirmed candidates withdraw. Any bid by El Salvador for courses in 1986 would have to be considered later this year. We can therefore invite President Duarte to put forward candidates soon. There could of course be a language problem; and Salvadorean candidates might well need some time to improve their English before coming to the UK for the special language course which is provided for foreign students on these courses.

Considerable research has not turned up the recent statement in Europe by Daniel Ortega about the Nicaraguan elections which President Duarte cited. However there have been a number of similar statements of which I enclose a selection.

The Nicaraguan Electoral Law which was promulgated on 15 March and which had been modified during discussion with opposition parties is generally regarded as fair; for example, it provides government funding for the election campaign of all parties, equal access to the media, and punishment for infringements of the electoral law. The question is whether the authorities will allow the campaign to be conducted in conditions which fully respect the law. The election campaign period was initially announced as 56 days but was extended to 12 weeks following strong complaints from the opposition parties. According to press reports today the most outspoken opposition party, the Coordinadora Group, have refused to

/participate





participate in the elections because the Government have refused to negotiate with the US-backed Contras. Several of the other opposition parties have now registered to meet the Government's deadline but are continuing to demand further concessions from them before deciding whether to take part in the elections. The State of Emergency has still not been fully lifted, although Ortega announced last week that it would be reviewed on 20 October. Meanwhile certain provisions have been eased so as to allow freedom of movement, of association, of mobilisation and of the press (except on military matters). In theory this would allow considerable freedom to campaign. The main doubt is whether the all-pervasive influence of the Sandinistas will allow conditions which would give equality of opportunity to all parties contesting the elections.

The Prime Minister also asked about evidence of Nicaraguan support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. We do not have the capacity to obtain independent evidence of this ourselves, but the US Departments of State and Defence published on 18 July a report of the evidence available to them. The relevant extract is attached.

I enclose a draft letter which the Prime Minister may wish to send to President Duarte.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



"The elections in Nicaragua will not be to dispute power but to strengthen the revolution."

Daniel Ortega, 24 December 1981

"The power of the people cannot be overthrown either by bullets or votes."

Daniel Ortega, 5 December 1983

"Every electoral process known in Nicaragua up to now has been corrupt and dominated by the powerful class for its own benefit; we need to find our own methods chosen in conformity with our revolutionary reality."

Carlos Nunez, 14 January 1984



EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF US DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENCE OF  
18 JULY ON NICARAGUAN ASSISTANCE TO THE GUERRILLAS (FMLN) IN  
EL SALVADOR

The Nicaraguan support structure for the Salvadoran DRU has been incorporated into the FSLN's party structure and state apparatus. The "Comision Politica," headed by FSLN national coordinator Bayardo Arce, is in charge of facilitating propaganda and diplomatic support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Nicaraguan military support for the FMLN is coordinated through the "Comision Militar," which is composed of Cuban and Nicaraguan staff officers working with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders based in Managua.(31) This body operates out of the Ministry of Defense in Managua under the control of Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra. Joaquin Cuadra, the Cuban-trained Sandinista Army chief of staff, directs the day-to-day supervision of the "Comision Militar."

THE NICARAGUAN SUPPLY OPERATIONS FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS  
Arms shipment through Nicaragua to Salvadoran guerrillas increased dramatically after the formation of the DRU in June 1980. Communist governments and other "revolutionary" sponsors abroad began to send Western-made weapons, including M-16 rifles, through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas. To accelerate donations of arms for the so-called "final offensive," which was launched in January 1981, Cuba and other Soviet-bloc countries also agreed to replace any arms that the Sandinistas donated.(32)

The rate and composition of the supply flow to guerrillas in El Salvador has varied, depending on a number of factors. During the initial rapid buildup from November 1980 to January 1981, arms and ammunition made up much of the shipments and the flow in arms was heavy. Since then, the Salvadoran guerrillas and their mentors in Managua have varied the flow of arms and supplies, depending on their



tactical requirements and the interdiction efforts they have encountered. Throughout, there has been a steady flow of ammunition, explosives, medicines, and clothing. There have also been sporadic increases in the movement of guerrilla weapons to meet the demands of planned offensives or the organization of new guerrilla groups.

The supply network between Nicaragua and El Salvador follows various routes. Deliveries routinely go by land, using Honduran territory, and by air and sea. Questioned by the New York Times about the arms flow from Nicaragua, former guerrilla Commander Montenegro said that the guerrilla units under his command in 1981 and 1982 in San Salvador and north of the city received nearly all of their arms from Nicaragua. They received monthly shipments, mostly via the overland route through Honduras in specially designed trucks. Montenegro said that guerrilla commanders were under orders from their commander in chief (in Nicaragua) to give false information when asked about arms supplies, i.e., that the arms were captured or purchased when in fact they had come from Managua. (33)

Vessels disguised as fishing boats leave from Nicaragua's northwestern coast and then transfer arms to large motorized canoes which ply the myriad bays and inlets of El Salvador's southeast coast.

Two active Nicaraguan transshipment points for delivery of military supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas were attacked and damaged by anti-Sandinista forces in September 1983. These were located at La Concha in Estero de Padre Ramos, 40 km NW of Corinto, and at Potosi on the Gulf of Fonseca. Western reporters visited La Concha. (34) A radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility disguised as a fishing cooperative served as a center of arms trafficking on the island. Local fishermen reported seeing wooden crates being unloaded from military vehicles and put into motor-powered launches. The site was littered with empty ammunition boxes.

Arms continue to be shipped from points in Nicaragua across the Gulf of Fonseca to southeastern El Salvador. The Salvadoran government has had some success in disrupting the internal Salvadoran part of the supply network. For example, on May 21, 1984, two Salvadoran patrol teams in the Isla Montecristo area near the Lempa River delta engaged a small group of guerrillas in an exchange of fire, killing two guerrillas and capturing one. Acting on information provided by the prisoner, on May 25 the Salvadoran army raided a guerrilla camp north of where the prisoner had been captured. After a stiff fight, the camp was taken and destroyed. The camp's main purpose had been to serve as a link in the supply route from Nicaragua. Thirty-four large canoes were captured. Among the documents found at the site were maps of the coastal area depicting guerrilla-controlled supply routes. Once weapons and supplies are landed in southeastern El Salvador, they are transported along trails, primarily by backpack, to the northern war zones. Recent reports indicate that young Salvadorans forced into service with the guerrillas are being used to carry arms as their initial duty in the guerrilla ranks. (35)

Honduran authorities have occasionally interdicted some weapons passing overland through Honduras from Nicaragua to El Salvador. A dramatic interdiction occurred in January 1981, when a refrigerated trailer truck from Nicaragua, passing through Honduras on its way to El Salvador, was found to be carrying more than 100 M-16 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition, including rockets and mortar



shells, in its hollowed roof. The guerrillas are using a combination of automobiles, small vans, trucks, mules, and people with backpacks for transporting arms overland. A group of Salvadoran guerrillas were caught by Honduran authorities in March 1983 with arms and a map tracing a route from Nicaragua through Honduras to El Salvador. Also the Hondurans have succeeded in locating safehouses and breaking up some groups including Honduran and Salvadoran guerrillas. A former Nicaraguan security official reported in 1983 that arms were also transported through Mexico and Guatemala to the Salvadoran guerrillas. He also said that increased reliance was being placed on small aircraft to fly supplies from Nicaragua to El Salvador.(36)

Salvadoran military and civilian observers have frequently sighted light aircraft flying from Nicaragua. The number of such flights increases significantly prior to major guerrilla operations. Some of these flights originated at an airstrip on a former sugar plantation at Papalonal, north of Managua. The main drop points are located in guerrilla-controlled areas of Morazan Province in northeastern El Salvador. In addition to dropping material by parachute, the planes land on roads, highways, and dirt airstrips for offloading. Many of the crew members for these arms flights are foreign nationals, recruited for the airborne supply operations by Jose Trejos, a Costa Rican who organized air delivery of weapons for the Sandinistas while they were fighting Somoza. He was identified by Bolanos Hunter as the technical coordinator for the Sandinista airlift to guerrillas in El Salvador.(37)

The collaboration of Nicaragua with Cuba and other suppliers of arms for Central American guerrillas, particularly Nicaragua's active participation in providing logistical support and the free use of its territory for smuggling of military supplies, has been of immeasurable help to guerrillas in the region. Bolanos Hunter maintains that the FMLN in El Salvador in 1983 was far better armed than the Sandinistas were in Nicaragua in mid-1979, just prior to taking power.(38)

American reporters, interviewing Western European and Latin American diplomats in Nicaragua during April 1984, were told that the Nicaraguan government is continuing to send military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents and to operate training camps for them inside Nicaragua. One European diplomat in Managua was quoted: "I believe support for the revolutionaries in El Salvador is continuing and that it is very important to the Sandinistas."(39)

#### SOURCES OF FMLN ARMAMENTS

In mid-1980, an FMLN delegation led by Salvadoran Communist Party chairman Shafik Handal visited Cuba, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia to obtain arms for use in El Salvador. Soviet officials helped to arrange for large-scale shipment of U.S. arms, most of which had been captured by Vietnamese forces. These arms were shipped first to Cuba, then airlifted to Nicaragua for subsequent shipment to the guerrillas in El Salvador. This arrangement disguised the Soviet-bloc origin of the weapons and helped lend credence to FMLN propaganda that the guerrillas arm themselves with weapons captured from the Salvadoran Army or bought on the black market. Many of the M-16s captured from or turned over by guerrillas to the El Salvador government still bear serial numbers indicating that they have been shipped to Vietnam by the U.S. during the conflict there. Others have had the serial numbers filed off to hide their origin. Former guerrilla leader Montenegro, speaking of the arms that



the guerrillas began receiving in December 1980, said: "After that the majority of arms was given by Vietnam, American M-16s. The arms came from Vietnam to Havana. Havana to Managua. Managua to El Salvador."(41)

In addition to Vietnam, Montenegro also identified Algeria, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua as suppliers of arms.(42) Grenades used by Salvadoran guerrillas are of Soviet-bloc origin, and some military equipment captured from the guerrillas bears markings in Amharic, a language native only to Ethiopia.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) also has helped ship arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. In January 1982, PLO leader Yasser Arafat boasted publicly of the PLO's links to the Salvadoran guerrillas: "We (PLO) have connections with all revolutionary movements throughout the world, in Salvador, Nicaragua -- and I reiterate Salvador -- and elsewhere in the world."(43) Again the same month, he was quoted in Beirut's *As Safir* as saying his group had sent pilots to Nicaragua and guerrilla fighters to El Salvador.(44)

Libya also has shipped arms to Nicaragua. It is likely that a portion of this materiel was destined for El Salvador. Guerrilla leader Cayetano Carpio, leader of the FPL faction, was visiting Libya when his FPL colleague, Melida Anaya Montes, was murdered in Managua by other FPL members in a power struggle.(45) In April 1983, Brazilian authorities seized four Libyan transport aircraft (three Soviet-made Ilyushin, and one U.S.-made C-130) that had stopped in Brazil while en route to Nicaragua with nearly 100 tons of armaments, labeled as "medical supplies." Some Libyan arms shipments subsequently arrived in Nicaragua, including one flight that, according to the Trinidad press, was denied permission to refuel in Trinidad and Tobago on August 23, 1983.

#### TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND STAGING OF THE FMLN

Salvadoran President Alvaro Magana told a Spanish newspaper on December 22, 1983, that "armed subversion has but one launching pad: Nicaragua. While Nicaragua draws the attention of the world by saying that for two years they have been on the verge of being invaded, they have not ceased for one instant to invade our country."

The close ties between the Sandinista leaders and Salvadoran guerrilla leaders are well known. Events surrounding the deaths in Managua of Salvadoran guerrilla leaders in April 1983 provided public confirmation of the presence of top guerrilla leaders in Nicaragua and of their close relationship with the Sandinista leadership. In the April 6 announcement of the stabbing death of Melida Anaya Montes, the second in command of the Salvadoran FPL forces, the Nicaraguan minister of interior revealed her permanent residence in Managua.(46) Carpio's death on April 12, allegedly by suicide, was made public by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior at the request of the Salvadoran guerrillas.(47)

Captured guerrillas and Nicaraguan defectors have confirmed that Central command and control, training, communications, and other support activities were established for Salvadoran guerrillas in Nicaragua. After the Grenada events in later 1983, the Sandinistas allowed rumors to spread that the guerrilla command and control center would leave Nicaragua. Immediately thereafter, some of the FDR politicians departed, but there is no indication that the guerrilla leaders or their command center were transferred.



Safehouses are maintained in Managua for the exclusive use of the FMLN. Guerrillas posing as refugees are funneled into these installations through Sandinista front organizations such as the Comité de Solidaridad con la Lucha Salvadoreña. At these safehouses FMLN members rest and receive medical treatment. They often are assigned there to await new instructions or arrangements for special training at guerrilla camps elsewhere in Nicaragua or in Cuba.(48)

A former Salvadoran guerrilla commander described how instructions were passed to guerrilla field units in El Salvador through the network of FMLN communications facilities in Nicaragua. Several of these facilities were located in northwest Nicaragua. One or possibly two of these communication facilities were attacked on February 2 and 3, 1984, by aircraft of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).(49) Another radio was near the outskirts of Managua in a residential area at the end of Via Panama. Its high frequency transmitters had long antennae that could be seen from the Pan American Highway; it was moved to a more secluded location after authorities concluded it had become too visible.(50)

At least three military camps in Nicaragua have been used exclusively as training areas for Salvadoran guerrillas.(51) They include the base of Ostional in the southern province of Rivas, a converted National Guard camp in northwestern Nicaragua close to the River Tamarindo, and the camp of Tamagas, about 20 kilometers outside Managua. These training facilities have been operated by Cuban military personnel serving as instructors and administrative staff. The direct Nicaraguan presence has been limited to one representative officer and the camps' security forces. In the Tamagas camp, FMLN guerrillas undergo special instruction in sabotage techniques. The camp has been run by a Cuban major who trained the FMLN team that carried out the January 1982 assault on the Salvadoran Air Force base of Ilopango during which the major part of El Salvador's military aircraft were destroyed. Alejandro Montenegro, who commanded that attack, later revealed details of his team's training in Tamagas as well as prior guerrilla instruction in Cuba.(52)

THE HONDURAN FRONT



*CFR*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*NBM*

25 July 1984

Dear Charles,

*BF*

*I have asked the FCO to withdraw this letter. Re*

*reply on Scholarships in*

*palenque, illegality, some of the allegedly unauthorised quotations would grace the long part regarding the*

El Salvador

Thank you for your letter of 21 July about the visit of President Duarte of El Salvador and follow up action. Ministers are looking urgently into the question of aid for El Salvador and we will write again about that shortly.

*we have*

*Now*

*letter*

*expected by the end of the week*

*CFD*

Scholarships for Salvadorean Officers to Attend Staff College in the United Kingdom

There are no vacancies at Staff College in the UK before 1986 and it would not therefore be possible to offer Salvadorean officers places before then. Allocation of places is determined by the Ministry of Defence and any bid by El Salvador for courses in 1986 would have to be considered later this year. There could of course be a language problem as students would need to have a good working knowledge of English before attending a short intensive advance English course provided for foreign students. Human rights considerations are taken into account in deciding on eligibility for courses.

Statement by Ortega about Elections

A considerable search for the recent statement in Europe by Daniel Ortega has not produced results. However there have been a number of similar statements of which I attach a selection. The Nicaraguan Electoral Law which was promulgated on 15 March and which had been modified during discussion with opposition parties is generally regarded as fair. The question is whether the law will be fully respected. The election campaign period was initially announced as 56 days but was extended to 12 weeks following strong complaints from the opposition parties. The opposition are demanding further concessions from the Government before deciding, probably later this week, whether to take part in the elections. The State of Emergency has still not been fully lifted, although Ortega announced last week that it would be reviewed on 20 October. Meanwhile certain provisions have been eased so as to allow freedom

/of





of movement, of association, of mobilisation and of the press (except on military matters). In theory this would allow considerable freedom to campaign. The main doubt is whether the all-pervasive influence of the Sandinistas will allow conditions which would give equality of opportunity to all parties contesting the elections.

We shall send you a draft letter from the Prime Minister to President Duarte covering all the points raised once the question of aid has been considered further.

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



'The elections in Nicaragua will not be to dispute power but to strengthen the revolution'.

Daniel Ortega 24 December 1981

'The power of the people cannot be overthrown either by bullets or votes'.

Daniel Ortega 5 December 1983

'I ask the peasants to recognize the efforts which the FSLN have made for them and when the time comes to vote for the FSLN'.

Jaime Wheelock December 1983

'The elections will be open and wide with a secret, direct vote for a President, Vice President and National Constituent Assembly'.

Carlos Nunez 14 January 1984

'Every electoral process known in Nicaragua up to now has been corrupt and dominated by the powerful class for its own benefit; we need to find our own methods chosen in conformity with our revolutionary reality'.

Carlos Nunez 14 January 1984



EL SALVADOR INT Sit: Dec 81.



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bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 July 1984

EL SALVADOR

I have written to you separately recording the Prime Minister's conversation with President Duarte. There are a number of points which require to be followed up.

The Prime Minister would like to know whether we can meet President Duarte's request for scholarships for El Salvadorian officers to attend Staff College in the United Kingdom. She hopes that we can offer some assistance in this area.

The Prime Minister would also like some research done to track down the reported statement by Ortega about the Nicaraguan elections. My recollection is that President Duarte said that Ortega had made the statement in Baden-Baden about a week ago. The Prime Minister would also like to have a note on concrete evidence available to us, much of it no doubt from American sources, of Nicaraguan assistance to Left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador.

BF | The Prime Minister is concerned that, despite their friendly talk, President Duarte has departed the United Kingdom much disappointed with the absence of any offer of aid. She has discussed this with Sir Geoffrey Howe. The Prime Minister suggested that we should consider whether it was right to go on blocking a Community initiative on aid to Central America, but made clear that her strong preference was to do something for El Salvador bilaterally. She was inclined to think that a small amount of our aid programme would be better employed supporting President Duarte in his struggle to establish democracy rather than being lavished upon India. She was not suggesting a programme for the whole of Central America but one specifically for El Salvador. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he shared the Prime Minister's preference for something in the bilateral field. He thought that we might have some small room for manoeuvre. He would look into it. I should be grateful if you could let me know fairly rapidly the outcome of this reflection.

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If we are able to make a modest offer of help, the Prime Minister would like to write to President Duarte to tell him this as a follow-up to their talk.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Peretz (HM Treasury), Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

MR. C. D. POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Subject  
cc Master.

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SARACT

bc P. C

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 July 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR  
SATURDAY 21 JULY AT CHEQUERS

The Prime Minister received President Duarte of El Salvador at 10 o'clock this morning at Chequers for an hour's talk. The President was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Dr. Tenorio, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Blandon.

Welcoming President Duarte, the Prime Minister recalled their discussion last year and asked the President to tell her as much as possible about developments in El Salvador and in Central America generally. President Duarte said that he was basically optimistic about the situation in El Salvador. Attempts were being made by both the extreme Right and the extreme Left to destabilise democracy. Left-wing guerrillas were harming the economy, particularly now in the planting season. He expected a new offensive in September or October. But he thought time was working against the guerrillas. The Centre was gradually gaining strength. He thought that, if his Government could hold the situation until the end of the year, it would gradually gain the upper hand. For his part, he was doing his best to control the problems of violence and the death squads.

President Duarte continued that the problems of El Salvador could not be dissociated from the problems of the region as a whole. Nicaragua was supplying the guerrillas in El Salvador. The elections in Nicaragua were likely to be a sham. The Sandinistas had made clear that, whatever the results, their power would not be put at risk. The Sandinistas created hostility towards the United States as a means of strengthening their hold on the country. He himself did not believe that the United States was likely to invade Nicaragua. The Prime Minister said that Britain well knew the problems of guerrilla warfare: we had had experience in Malaya in the 1950s. It was vital that President Duarte's democratic Government should prevail. If the result of a second democratic election was not the defeat of the guerrillas and a return to a peaceful life,

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there was a risk that people would despair of democracy. The Prime Minister continued that there was now much more support and understanding in Europe for democratic governments in Central America. It would be important to be able to demonstrate that elections in Nicaragua were hollow compared with those in El Salvador. It was also important to have evidence of this which could be used as well as evidence of Nicaraguan support for guerrillas. President Duarte said that a leading member of the Nicaraguan Government, Sr. Ortega, had recently said publicly in Europe that the Nicaraguan elections would not put the power of the Sandinistas at risk. The Prime Minister said that she would try to obtain the quotation which was very damning.

President Duarte said that the purpose of his present trip was to get moral support from Europe for his Government. He had earlier paid a very successful visit to Washington and had received backing not just from President Reagan and the Administration but also from leading Democrats. He had also been very satisfied with his reception in Bonn. The United States had been generous in its support for his Government but, even so, their assistance was only enough to enable El Salvador to survive. They needed support from other countries if they were to have a chance of developing beyond the point of survival. That was why he wanted Europe to be present in Central America and not just leave it all to the United States. Without American aid, El Salvador would long ago have fallen into Communism. He was not seeking military help from Europe but aid to win the economic and political battle.

The Prime Minister asked what El Salvador's particular needs were. President Duarte said the prime need was for balance of payments help. The Salvadorian economy was based on sugar, coffee and cotton. Sugar prices were very low, coffee prices declining and the guerrillas prevented the planting of cotton. In the medium term he would like to see some trade concessions by the European Community to allow El Salvador and other Central American countries establish basic industries, for instance textiles. The Prime Minister said that any concessions on textiles would be very difficult indeed: our own textile industry had shed over 200,000 jobs in recent years. In reply to a further question from the Prime Minister, President Duarte said that the most pressing needs for imports were for fertilisers, medicines, chemicals and dairy products.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Duarte had seen M. Thorn in Brussels. President Duarte said that he had. He had been given to understand that the Community was preparing an initiative on aid for Central America. It seemed to him essential that Community Foreign Ministers



should not come to the meeting with the Contadora and Central American Ministers in September empty handed. Political support alone would not be enough. It had to be sustained with economic assistance, for instance lines of credit for development banks. The Prime Minister commented that it was a difficult moment. The United Kingdom already contributed substantial aid to the Caribbean countries and to Belize. She enquired whether President Duarte was also seeking technical assistance. President Duarte replied that this was not as urgent as balance of payments help.

President Duarte continued that he had one specific request to make and that concerned training for officers in the El Salvadorian Armed Forces. El Salvador could not itself run any Staff College in the present situation. He was very anxious to have proper training for his officers at the stage of promotion of Major to Lieutenant Colonel. This could make a vital contribution to ensuring greater integrity in his Armed Forces. He wondered whether Britain could offer scholarships for a number of officers to attend Staff College courses. He was making the same request to other West European countries. The Prime Minister undertook to look into the possibilities.

Finally, President Duarte said that a new civilian government would soon be taking office in Guatemala. He hoped that this would lead to some easing of problems between Guatemala and Belize. The Prime Minister observed that we had been trying to achieve an improvement in relations for years. But there seemed to be constant setbacks with every change of government in Guatemala. President Duarte said that he had great admiration for the Prime Minister of Belize, Mr. Price. The Prime Minister said that she would ideally like to withdraw British Forces from Belize but feared that this would destabilise the area.

The Prime Minister and President Duarte agreed that they would tell the press that they had discussed the problems of El Salvador and of Central America generally. They had agreed on the importance of enabling democracy to prevail in Central America and the Prime Minister had expressed her support for democratic government in El Salvador.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Peretz (HM Treasury), Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

MR. G. D. POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Call by President Duarte of El Salvador

President Duarte will call on you from 10 until 11 tomorrow at Chequers. He will have arrived earlier that morning from Bonn: and will be leaving at lunchtime for Lisbon.

He will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister (Dr Tenorio) and his Chief of Staff (Colonel Blandon).

A brief and a personality note are attached. You will also want to see the attached telegram about his visit to Bonn.

You will recall that you met President Duarte in June 1983.

You may want to range rather more widely than the brief suggests and cover the situation in Central America in general with particular attention to Nicaragua.

I fear that the aid offer we can make - technical assistance of £14,000 - is paltry, particularly set against the promise of DM50 million which he has just received in Bonn. I suggest that you say, towards the end of the talk, that following your discussions you will ask for recommendations on the resumption of our bilateral aid programme. This will give a chance to try to extract a <sup>little</sup> bit more from the ODA.

You will wish to be aware that President Duarte will give a press conference at mid-day at Heathrow.

CDP

20 July 1984

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*Q. 25/7.*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 July 1984

*Dear Charles,*

Visit by President Duarte of El Salvador: 21 July

President Duarte will be calling on the Prime Minister at 1000 on 21 July at Chequers. He will be accompanied by his Foreign Minister Dr Jorge Eduardo Tenorio, and his Chief of Staff Colonel Blandon. President Duarte speaks good English and no interpreter is necessary. We shall ensure that he arrives at Chequers shortly before 1000.

I enclose a brief together with a personality note on the President, and a copy of a paper on UK policy towards El Salvador. You might find the latter useful, but the brief is self-contained and we do not believe that the Prime Minister need read the policy paper as well.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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English and American Literature

English Literature



CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT DUARTE OF EL SALVADOR  
21 JULY AT 1000

POINTS TO MAKE

1. **Congratulations on your election.** UK official observers and most others reported favourably on the elections' fairness. Appreciate difficulties in organising elections in face of armed opposition.

2. **Aware of problems facing you.** **How do you envisage tackling them?**

3. **How do you see prospects for national reconciliation?** Can some of the less extreme guerrillas, e.g. Ungo, be brought back into the political process in time for National Assembly elections next year?

4. **What prospect of an early reduction in human rights abuses attributed to the security forces?** Public opinion here has hitherto been very critical of human rights situation. Encouraged by your commitment to an improvement and by steps already taken but note reports of 134 killed or disappeared as a result of death squads activities in June 1984.


5. **(If raised) We shall consider resuming a modest aid programme** though there are many calls on our finite aid resources, including from poorer countries.

Contadora

6. **Sir G Howe hopes to attend Foreign Ministers' meeting at San José in September.** We and our European partners wish to encourage a workable political settlement.

7. **What are your views on the draft Act of Contadora?** Can a settlement be achieved and made to work?





## BACKGROUND

1. President Duarte won the second round of the Presidential election on 6 May, beating the right-wing ARENA party candidate, Major D'Aubuisson (54% - 46%). Turn-out was 75%. He was inaugurated on 1 June; Mr Julian Amery MP represented the Foreign Secretary. The UK official observers (Sir James Swaffield and Dr David Browning) made a meticulous and generally favourable report on both rounds on the election. International opinion regards the elections as fair, and even UK critics such as Lord Chitnis have acknowledged the same.

2. On his inauguration Duarte pledged his government to end human rights abuses by the security forces. To this end he has dismissed certain senior officers; obtained the conviction of the murderers of 4 American nuns in 1981; disbanded intelligence units associated with the 'death squads'; and tightened the rules about arrest and detention. He is also committed to seek national reconciliation but military opposition to any substantial concessions in any negotiations with the FDR/FMLN\* will be an important constraint. Duarte can also expect bitter opposition from the right. Some senior elements in the military accept the need for a negotiated solution, however, and most observers agree the army is unlikely to be able to win the war by military means. (40,000 army and police face some 10,000 insurgents). Equally the insurgents do not have the capacity to achieve a decisive military victory, although they are capable of spectacular operations (eg an attack on a hydro-electric dam on 28 June).

3. The various factions of the FDR/FMLN are divided about negotiating with the Duarte government an end to the guerrilla war. The more moderate elements (mostly FDR) seek genuine negotiations (although their terms are unlikely to be acceptable to the right-wing opposition to Duarte); the dominant hard-liners (mostly FMLN) see negotiations as a tactical device in the pursuit of the long-term objective of bringing about a Marxist-Leninist revolution. Duarte's election platform included a pledge to negotiate. At his inauguration the FDR/FMLN publicly proposed talks without preconditions. Duarte responded publicly that he would accept if

\* The combination of political (FDR) and paramilitary (FMLN) <sup>the</sup> elements of the opposition forces in El Salvador.



The guerrillas ceased their military operations. The FDR/FMLN rejected this. They have dropped the previous preconditions which were the banning of the right-wing ARENA party; the dismantling of the security apparatus; the integration of the insurgent armed forces with the army; and full FDR/FMLN participation in new elections. But these remain their aims.

4. Duarte has moved cautiously on the subject of negotiations, but some contacts through intermediaries may have started. His aim will be to detach the guerrilla moderates (eg the radical Christian Democrat, Ungo) from the hard-liners. But he is under pressure from parts of his power base (the Church, the unions) to make visible progress in achieving a negotiated end to the conflict. It is unclear whether this will happen quickly enough to allow the participation of the moderates in the National Assembly elections planned for March 1985.

5. Duarte faces a critical economic situation: GDP fell by about 25% between 1978 and 1983; exports fell by 40% and unemployment is running at about 33%. US economic assistance (nearly \$335 million in 1984 if the full package is approved) is essential to the country's economic survival. US military assistance in 1984 totals \$465m so far with a further \$65m pending. Since Duarte's election he has received assurances of FRG (Dm 20m (£5.4m)) and Italian aid (amount unknown).

6. British aid was suspended from 1979. We have it in mind to offer a modest technical co-operation programme of about £14,000 in the next financial year. Commitment to a larger programme is inadvisable until the human rights situation has clearly improved; human rights groups maintain that since Duarte's inauguration civilian deaths at the hands of the security forces have been running at an undiminished rate. Tutela Legal, the Archbishop of Salvador's respectable human rights organisation, claimed that 134 had died or disappeared as a result of death squad activity in June.



Regional peace moves: Contadora

A new draft Contadora agreement (the 'Act of Contadora') was put to the Central Americans in early June. They have reacted cautiously but negotiations on the text are likely. El Salvador has given a qualified welcome; Nicaragua has more fundamental difficulties with it (especially its provisions for pluralist democracy).

8. Direct US-Nicaraguan talks are to continue after Shultz's surprise visit to Managua on 1 June and meetings between Schlaudeman (US roving Ambassador) and Tinoco (Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister).

9. A meeting of European (EC, Spain and Portugal), Contadora (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela) and Central American Foreign Ministers (El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala) is due to take place in San José, Costa Rica in September. The Foreign Secretary hopes that dates can be agreed enabling him to attend. The meeting, called on the initiative of Costa Rican and FRG, is expected to reaffirm European support for a political settlement of the Central American crisis. It may also tackle the question of an EC/Central American economic co-operation and aid agreement, about which we have serious reservations.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 July 1984



## E L S A L V A D O R

DUARTE, José Napoleon, Ingeniero

President of El Salvador (1984)

Aged 58 years. Duarte is the leading politician of the Christian Democratic Party. Educated in the United States (civil engineer) he is an ex-Mayor of San Salvador. He lost the 1972 Presidential elections which allegedly were rigged to favour the government candidate. Subsequently arrested he was tortured by the army and exiled to Venezuela with which he maintains close political and family contact. In 1979 he returned to El Salvador and participated in the coalition Junta when reformist army officers overthrew the government of General Romero.

When the more radical members left the Junta in 1980 to ally themselves with the guerrillas, Duarte headed a Christian Democratic/army Junta from 1980-82. This government introduced sweeping but not fully implemented agrarian and financial reforms but failed to either defeat or reach agreement with the guerrillas. When the Christian Democrats failed to win the 1982 elections, Duarte retired from the Presidency and concentrated on organising the Christian Democratic Party for the 1984 election. Sponsored by Konrad Adenauer Foundation, he visited Germany, Britain, Belgium, Italy and Spain in 1983, meeting heads of government and promoting the cause of moderate Salvadorean politics. In May 1984 he was elected President, defeating the ARENA candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson.

A sincere, tenacious and ambitious politician dedicated to a better way of life for the Salvadorean people. Anathema to the right wing and strongly supported by the U.S. government.

Speaks good English. Married with six children.



## UK POLICY TOWARDS EL SALVADOR

Purpose of this paper

1. This paper is designed to serve as a starting-point for discussion of a possible revision of UK policy towards El Salvador following President Duarte's election and as an input to the Planning Staff paper on Central America now in preparation. Planning Staff and ODA views have been taken into account.

## BACKGROUND

1979-1983

2. From the outbreak of serious internal conflict in El Salvador in 1979 British relations with El Salvador, never substantial, were reduced to a minimum. Physical security problems led to the decision to close the Embassy in 1980. The outstandingly bad human rights record of the government security forces caused the running-down and halting of the aid programme from 1979, the administration and effectiveness of which were in any case hampered by the prevailing conditions of violence. Arms sales, including those of non-lethal equipment, were suspended in 1978, also on human rights grounds. Relations at a political level were maintained by the accreditation of a non-resident ambassador, but remained insignificant. The call in July 1983 on the Prime Minister and Lady Young by Sr. Duarte, then out of office, constituted a discreet but important contact.

3. In contrast to the UK attitude after 1979 the Americans, in part reacting to the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua that year, gave vigorous support to successive governments in El Salvador, primarily to prevent further economic collapse and to enable the armed forces to resist the increasing challenge from the left-wing FMLN insurgents. In doing so the US Administration incurred strong domestic criticism on the grounds that support was being given despite grave human rights abuses and that direct US military involvement would become inevitable.



4. The UK and our European partners faced even greater domestic pressure to stay at arm's length from El Salvador. There was good reason for public disgust with the human rights situation, but public feeling was fanned by skilful left-wing propaganda against US policies on behalf of the FMLN. There was widespread scepticism about the wisdom of US attempts to reverse by force what was perceived as an inevitable social revolution, and European governments by and large kept their distance.

#### Transition

5. This situation had begun to change even before President Duarte's election on 6 May 1984 under what are generally accepted as fair democratic conditions. The UK defied prevailing liberal orthodoxy by sending observers to the 1982 National Assembly elections, which proved to be acceptably fair. This point was not conceded by most critics, but it became evident that public opinion began to accept that there were more sides to the argument. This process was sufficiently advanced for the UK to be joined by the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Canada in sending observers in 1984 to the Presidential election.

6. In December 1981 the US Congress imposed the condition on further US aid to El Salvador that the human rights situation should measurably improve. Although in November 1983 the Administration were obliged to evade this condition by a procedural device, the spirit of it was followed when Vice-President Bush, visiting San Salvador for the purpose, made it clear to the Government that the Administration was in earnest in insisting on a real improvement.

#### The present

7. President Duarte took office on 1 June 1984, committed to a policy of national reconciliation, ending the abuse of human rights and investigation into the activities of the death squads. But too vigorous an investigation into the past activities of the death squads, (and effective judicial follow-up action) might increase friction with the security forces and the danger of a coup. At the same time Duarte must retain the confidence of the military in order both to enhance their operational effectiveness and to strengthen his negotiating hand with the guerrillas. He is therefore likely

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to proceed cautiously. As a concession to feeling among the military, who are inclined to suspect he may make imprudent concessions in negotiations with the FDR/FMLN, Duarte has retained the previous Minister of Defence, Vides Casanova, and other senior officers; but some officers associated with death squad activities have been transferred to less sensitive posts. So far the FDR/FMLN have been the demandeurs in seeking negotiations and Duarte has shown no sign of playing his cards too soon. The insurgents have stepped up their attacks from late June as a mark of their disappointment at his rejection of their overtures. The Americans expect them to mount a larger offensive in October, at Cuban instigation, to embarrass President Reagan in the run-up to the US presidential election and in the expectation that he would not step up US military support for El Salvador before the election. In addition to the constraints posed by the attitude of the military and by the continuing insurgent war, Duarte faces labour unrest (partly FMLN-inspired) and systematic opposition to his legislative plans by the extreme right-wing majority in the National Assembly.

8. Duarte's election has restored some respectability to El Salvador and the proposals for progress towards the US Administration's objectives look more hopeful than a year ago. The presence of the Mexican Foreign Minister, Sr. Sepúlveda, at Duarte's inauguration on 1 June is taken to signify a change in the Mexican attitude: until then the Mexicans, who play host to the FDR/FMLN headquarters, seemed to have virtually counted on an insurgent victory. The French, whose position was close to that of the Mexicans, now seem to admit that Duarte's government does have some moral legitimacy. The Germans offered considerable sums of aid the moment Duarte's victory was confirmed.

9. Nevertheless the outlook in El Salvador is still uncertain and it remains a contentious issue for the US Congress and public opinion. The extent to which the Contadora process may contribute to stabilising the situation in El Salvador is hard to forecast: hitherto the Contadora negotiations have tended to focus on Nicaragua and its relations with its neighbours rather than on the insurgency in El Salvador. New successes by the guerrillas and/or perceived failure by Duarte to live up to expectations would be

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likely to generate renewed political controversy in the US and abroad and to face the US Administration and its allies with difficult choices.

#### Future UK policy

10. The UK shares with the US, EC and most regional countries the aim of establishing and consolidating democracy in Central America. If democratic rule can be shown to bring about economic development and social justice, there will be a better prospect of isolating the guerrillas and preventing further destabilisation of the region, with its strategic consequences for US defence policy. Future UK policy should be to continue to promote the consolidation of democracy in El Salvador. It could do so by lending political support to the Duarte government, for as long as it respects democratic processes and works for a radical improvement in the human rights situation. Support could most effectively be given by political gestures, such as high-level meetings, and by encouraging our European partners to take a similarly constructive attitude. Some such political gestures of UK support for the democratic process in El Salvador have already been made: the sending of observers to the elections in 1982 and 1984, and of Mr Julian Amery MP as the Secretary of State's representative at President Duarte's inauguration on 1 June. The re-opening of the Embassy in San Salvador in mid July, announced in March, also displays our interest. These gestures have been appreciated, and can be followed up. Longer-term tangible assistance to El Salvador, in the form of aid or clearance for arms sales, should be considered carefully in the light of evidence of the new government's success in tackling human rights abuses.

11. Failure to demonstrate support for the new democratic government would disappoint the Americans, and undo the good done by the despatch of UK observers to the elections. Lukewarmness about El Salvador might give the undesirable impression to other emerging democracies that we are unprepared to back successful reform when it happens. A positive UK response, adding to the momentum already provided by the favourable West German and Italian attitudes, could help to promote a constructive EC consensus on El Salvador. This would pay dividends in counteracting impressions current in the US

/that



that the Europeans are misguided and unhelpful over Central America.

12. The UK is unlikely to have the aid resources available to make more than a gesture of support for the democratic process in El Salvador. By comparison with generous US funding of aid projects, any UK contribution would always look tiny. Further, ODA see a number of difficulties in mounting a new aid programme in El Salvador. The poor human rights record of the Salvadorean Government was one of the major reasons for terminating aid after 1979. Ministers will wish to consider whether even a token amount of aid should be provided until the Duarte Government shows its ability to end human rights violations by the security forces. Other constraints are practical. Adequate administration of a conventional technical co-operation programme would require an increase in Embassy staff resident in San Salvador, but in any case the continuing risk to aid personnel from violence effectively rules out long-term to projects at present. These difficulties might be overcome by confining a new programme to the provision of a token sum for scholarships in the UK, perhaps in the order of £14,000, in addition to the existing £5,000 for the Heads of Mission Gift Scheme. This might enable us to make a modest political gesture in favour of the Duarte Government while avoiding both disproportionate administrative costs and significant public criticism in the UK.

13. Any change in the existing ban on arms sales to El Salvador would, however, probably lead to protests. It is worth recalling that public protests including an appeal by Cardinal Hume led to an end to arms sales in 1978: the Archbishop of El Salvador is still reporting serious violations of human rights. It is too early to judge what success the new Salvadorean Government may have in their campaign to achieve an end to human rights violations by the security forces. In any case, sales prospects are poor, given Salvadorean dependence on US military aid for their purchases. But should clear progress have been made by the end of 1984, consideration might be given to authorising the sale of non-lethal equipment.



## CONCLUSIONS

### Conclusions

14. The situation in El Salvador is still volatile and the outlook hard to predict. Serious human rights abuses persist, albeit at a diminishing level, and the military situation is one of stalemate. Nevertheless the election of President Duarte in what were, given the circumstances, free and fair elections is an important and hopeful development. We should now look for ways of giving greater substance to HMG's present policy of encouraging the emergence and consolidation of democracy in El Salvador. In considering how this might be done we should take account of:

- a) the great importance which the US Administration attaches to strengthening Duarte's position;
- b) our own and wider Western interests in preventing the spread of Cuban and Soviet influence in Central America;
- c) our interest in promoting a constructive consensus within the European Community and of minimising EC-US differences over El Salvador;
- d) regional efforts to defuse the Central American crisis (e.g. the Contadora process) and ways in which we and our allies and partners could most usefully contribute to them;
- e) the state of British parliamentary and public opinion on the developing situation in El Salvador;
- f) financial and other practical constraints on our own freedom of action.

15. Against this background, specific actions which we can take in the near future in support of our objectives are likely for the most part to consist of gestures of political support for democracy and social justice in El Salvador. In time it may be appropriate for these to be supplemented by the restoration of a modest bilateral aid programme. There is no urgency to consider restoring clearances for arms sales.

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FM BONN 191345Z JUL 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 713 OF 19 JULY

INFO ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE, BRUSSELS, PARIS, WASHINGTON, ROME

INFO SAVING MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA

VISIT BY PRESIDENT DUARTE TO BONN, 16-17 JULY

## SUMMARY

1. CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE DURING THE VISIT REFLECTED LONG-STANDING LINKS BETWEEN THE CDU AND DUARTE'S PDC. DUARTE SOUGHT AND RECEIVED MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN EL SALVADOR AND CENTRAL AMERICA AS A WHOLE. KOHL CONFIRMED THE RESUMPTION OF GERMAN AID FOR EL SALVADOR.

## DETAIL

2. DUARTE, ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER TENORIO, WAS RECEIVED AS AN OLD FRIEND. HE CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT, KOHL, GENSCHER, STRAUSS (IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BUNDESRAT), AID MINISTER WARNKE AND EHMKE OF THE SPD. THE FOLLOWING, BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, AS WELL AS PRESS REPORTS, MAY BE USEFUL FOR DUARTE'S VISIT TO LONDON.

3. IN HIS TALKS WITH KOHL AND GENSCHER, DUARTE SAID THAT THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME IN EL SALVADOR NEEDED DEMOCRATIC FRIENDS. THE AMERICANS WERE TOO CLOSE AND TOO BIG TO PLAY THE ROLE ALONE. HENCE HIS WISH TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE.

4. DUARTE PRAISED THE EFFORTS OF THE CONTADORA GROUP BUT SAID THAT, SUFFERING INCREASINGLY FROM THE RECESSION THEMSELVES, THEY LACKED THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH TO PERSUADE THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA TO ADOPT THEIR IDEAS. EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR CONTADORA HAD SO FAR BEEN "ROMANTIC"; SYMBOLIC SUPPORT, HOWEVER WELL MEANT, WOULD DO NOTHING TO REDUCE THE PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AMERICA. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS THE KEY PRECONDITION FOR POLITICAL STABILITY. HE HOPED THAT THE SEPTEMBER MEETING OF THE EC/CENTRAL AMERICAN/CONTADORA FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SAN JOSE WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS.

5. ON NICARAGUA/EL SALVADOR, DUARTE REPEATED HIS OFFER TO START A DIALOGUE WITH GUERILLA FORCES IN EL SALVADOR PROVIDED THERE WERE "NO WEAPONS AT THE TABLE". HE CRITICISED NICARAGUA'S "INCREASINGLY OPEN" SUPPORT FOR THE GUERILLAS. DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF CONTADORA, NICARAGUA SHOWED NO SIGNS OF RESPONDING TO HIS CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION. ORTEGA'S RIDICULOUS CLAIM RECENTLY THAT THE FRG WAS A US PUPPET WAS AN INDICATION OF THE INCREASING SENSE OF ISOLATION FELT BY THE SANDINISTAS.

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16



6. IN RESPONSE KOHL AND GENSCHER PLEDGED THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CONTADORA. THE ELECTION OF DUARTE HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. THEY HOPED THAT IT WOULD CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDERNEATH THE LEFT AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS AND ALLOW THE PEACE NECESSARY FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THEY WELCOMED DUARTE'S AIMS OF DIALOGUE, SOCIAL REFORM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. KOHL EXPRESSED THE FRG'S READINESS TO HELP EL SALVADOR SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.

7. IN THIS LAST RESPECT THE GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED DURING THE VISIT THAT IT WAS REINSTATING ITS AID PROGRAMME FOR EL SALVADOR. A TOTAL OF DM 50.6 MILLION WAS BEING SET ASIDE FOR FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, DM 27.6 MILLION OF WHICH RELATED TO EARLIER PLEDGES AND HAD NOT BEEN DISBURSED. THE AID WOULD BE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

DM 30 MILLION	INVESTMENT GOODS, SPARE PARTS, RAW MATERIALS ETC
DM 8 TO 9 MILLION	CREDITS FOR SMALL AGRICULTURAL UNDERTAKINGS
DM 8 TO 9 MILLION	HOUSING
DM 3 MILLION	TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON SLUM CLEARANCE, AGRICULTURAL REFORM ETC.

COMMENT

8. DUARTE HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH THE FRUITS OF THE VISIT. HE HAS RECEIVED THE FULL POLITICAL BACKING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHICH, WHEN SCHMIDT WAS CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN MORE FAVOURABLY INCLINED TOWARDS DUARTE'S LEFT WING OPPONENTS. HE HAS ALSO COME AWAY WITH A SIZEABLE AID PROGRAMME. WHILE MORE THAN HALF THE AID IS OLD MONEY AND THE PROGRAMME WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO START UP, THUS SPREADING DISBURSEMENT, IT IS GENEROUS IN FRG TERMS (MORE THAN DOUBLE THAT GOING TO COSTA RICA OR HONDURAS). BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT DUARTE WILL STILL BE LOOKING TO THE SAN JOSE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC SUPPORT.

9. IF ANYTHING NEW EMERGES FROM TOMORROW'S COMMUNITY BRIEFING WE WILL TELEGRAPH FURTHER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS

TAYLOR

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

CENTRAL AMERICA

STANDARD (PALACE)

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NAD

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COPIES TO:-

ASSESSMENTS STAFF CABINET OFFICE

MOD D14

MR ARBUTHNOTT ODA

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

16 July 1984

Visit of President Duarte of El Salvador

Roger Bone telephoned me on 13 July to say that President Duarte was unable to accept the Prime Minister's invitation for talks on 20 July but could manage 21 July.

The Prime Minister will in fact be extremely busy on 21 July with preparation for a Parliamentary debate the following week. It will be difficult for her to find more than one hour for President Duarte and any meeting would have to be at Chequers. I should be grateful if you would explore the possibilities of a meeting between 10 and 11 or between 3.30 and 4.30 at Chequers that day. The numbers should be very restricted, ideally to President Duarte plus one, plus an interpreter.

CP

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

67

ep.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DUARTE

We conveyed your invitation to President Duarte to come to Chequers for a talk on 21 July. He has now, however, decided that he will not be able to visit the UK at all on this particular trip. He was, however, very grateful for your invitation and hopes he will have another chance to meet you before very long.

C.D.P.

ms

C D Powell

16 July 1984



PRIME MINISTER

President Duarte

You agreed yesterday to see President Duarte when he was in Europe if it could be fitted in to your programme. The only time he could manage would be on Saturday 21 July. You will be at Chequers. Agree to see him at Chequers on that day?

I am told that he understands all the difficulties in setting up a meeting at short notice and would not be surprised if you were unable to see him this time.

*Yes - but please*

*remember that I may have to*

*CJP*

13 July 1984

*Speaks in the*

*Supply day*

*debate on the*

*Monday will*

*need quite a lot*

*of time for*

*prep on the Wednesday  
not*

RESTRICTED

EU



cc PC ✓

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 July 1984

El Salvador: President Duarte

Thank you for your letter of 11 July in which you suggested that President Duarte should be invited to make a stop-over in London on 19 or 20 July to meet the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister would be ready to invite President Duarte but the days in question are both very difficult. The only real opportunity for a meeting would be at 11.00 am on 20 July. I shall be grateful if you would arrange for an invitation to be conveyed to President Duarte to call on the Prime Minister at that time, making clear that this is the only opportunity which she will have to see him on his present tour.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SM





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 July, 1984

Dear Charles,

El Salvador: President Duarte

You will be aware that President Duarte took up office on 1 June following his victory in the elections to which the United Kingdom sent official observers. His election offers the best hope yet for the consolidation of democracy in El Salvador, the ending of the 6-year insurgent war and economic stabilisation. While it is too early to judge his performance, and while the difficulties facing him are great, the Secretary of State considers we should give encouragement to these aims without delay.

A political gesture of support for his efforts would be appropriate. He faces enormous difficulties and needs international support. The US Government take the line that "an hour of visible support now would be worth a week's visit next year". The chance to make such a gesture may be offered by a visit he is making to Bonn from 16-18 July, and to Rome on 19 July. We understand that he does not wish to absent himself from El Salvador for very long at this time but would undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to see the Prime Minister. It would seem advantageous to invite him to make a stop-over in London on 19 or 20 July for a meeting with the Prime Minister if her timetable allowed. We hope to arrange a longer visit in due course, perhaps next year. The Americans would warmly welcome such an invitation and it would be consistent with the concern we share with the FRG and Italy for the situation in El Salvador. Since Duarte's election was generally regarded as fair and he is committed to a policy of national reconciliation and respect for human rights, he has had some success in restoring international respectability to El Salvador. A visit should not therefore provoke strong domestic criticism.

You will recall the positive meeting the Prime Minister had with Sr Duarte, then out of office, in July last year. I should be grateful if consideration could be given to a meeting with the Prime Minister on 19 or 20 July.

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)  
Private SecretaryC D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

cc PC 1

Print Minister

Can't do the 15<sup>th</sup> - only the 20<sup>th</sup>.

Agree to invite President Duarte?

C D P 11/7



British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

CC MASTER OPS

EL SALVADOR: <sup>CF</sup> Wt Sit: Dec 81.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T98/84

NNNN

13 JUN 1984 2101

ZCZC CLM6517 MUX875 DFN285 165430155920

GBXX CO SRSR 063

SANSALVADORELSALV 063/000 13 1550 VIA TRT

H.E. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER  
NO.10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

R4/b

ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR THANK  
YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CONGRATULATIONS AND  
KIND WORDS. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED  
COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES  
IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY TO STRENGTHEN THE  
FRIENDSHIP WHICH LINK OUR NATIONS. SINCERELY

JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE

PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA

COL NO.10 SW1

TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions



File

255

29 May 1984

We had a word on the telephone about the enclosed teletype from the Minister for External Relations of the Government of El Salvador. You explained that arrangements had been made for a representative to attend the inauguration ceremony for Senor Duarte at the end of this week.

BF // I should be grateful if you could arrange for a suitable Ministerial reply to be sent to the Minister for External Relations.

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Handwritten initials or mark.

298

Acs 01/1

UNCLASSIFIED

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PP TEGUCIGALPA  
GRS 183  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM PCO 241300Z MAY 84  
TO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 24 MAY  
INFO SAN JOSE

NO DISSEMINATION

ACD

P.A.

YK 3/5

JM 3/5

UK REPRESENTATION AT INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE  
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE SENT TODAY TO M.F.A.  
BY DIRECT TELEGRAM AND BY POST TO YOU AT HOTEL PRESIDENTE  
AND TEGUCIGALPA.  
YOUR EXCELLENCY

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE RIGHT HON JULIAN  
AMERY MP, HAS BEEN SELECTED AS THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT  
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE CEREMONIES FOR THE  
TRANSMISSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF  
EL SALVADOR ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE TO HIS EXCELLENCY SENOR JOSE  
NAPOLEON DUARTE.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT MR AMERY MAY BE GIVEN  
ALL APPROPRIATE AND NECESSRY FACILITIES FOR THE DISCHARGE OF  
HIS MISSION.

IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, MR AMERY  
WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MR COLUM SHARKEY, HER MAJESTY'S  
AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR, AND CAPTAIN M R NUTT RN, HIS  
DEFENCE ATTACHE.

I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO YOUR  
EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.  
GEOFFREY HOWE

HOWE





Agreed with Private Office (287)

Let S/S letter 129/84  
Sent by letter MCA

to Salar. NFA

concerning - Delayed in  
partly by

10 DOWNING STREET translation . 1

From the Private Secretary

ACS oul,

29 May 1984

Kind a quick  
reply from

Lady Young and  
de best. 2/85

Dear Peter,

We had a word on the telephone about the enclosed teletmessage from the Minister for External Relations of the Government of El Salvador. You explained that arrangements had been made for a representative to attend the inauguration ceremony for Senor Duarte at the end of this week.

BS/Barclay  
Young  
The D.  
Rams

I should be grateful if you could arrange for a suitable Ministerial reply to be sent to the Minister for External Relations.

2/85

Yours ever,

David

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Y- MAY 1984/2048

ZCZC CLM8097 MUK319 EST953

GBXX OO SRSR 218

SAN SALVADOR/EL SALV C A 218/206 15-17/05 1030

Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

Prime Minister

London

Great Britain

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Government of El Salvador, I have the honour to address Your Excellency for the purpose of inviting your Government to be represented at the Republic's Presidential inauguration ceremony which is to take place here in San Salvador on 31 May, and 1 and 2 June.

The invitation is extended in the first instance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, by the Grace of God Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The ceremony at which Senor José Napoleón Duarte will assume the Presidency will take place on 1 June.

The Head of the Special Mission and his wife and two members of the Mission will be official guests of the Government of El Salvador which will defray all their accommodation, food, internal transport and security expenses.

I request Your Excellency to let our Foreign Ministry know as soon as possible how many people the special mission will comprise.

[Courtesy close]

FIDEL CHAVEZ MENA

Minister for External Relations





229

*With the Compliments of*

LIBRARY AND RECORDS DEPARTMENT  
TRANSLATION SECTION

24/5/84

Needs a no!

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

17 MAY 1984/2048

ZCZC CLM8097 MUK319 EST953

GBXX OO SRSR 218

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[Courtesy close]

FIDEL CHAVEZ MENA

Minister for External Relations



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Phone No. 31  
501

17 MAY 1984/2048  
ZCZC CLM8097 HUK319 EST953  
GBXX CD SRSR 218  
SAN SALVADOR/EL SALV C A 218/206 15-17/05 1030

EXCHA. SENORA  
DONA MARGARET THATCHER M.P.  
PRIMER MINISTRO  
LONDRES GRAN BRETANA

CR  
We need a translation  
(at least 1 do)

EXCELENCIA:

TENGO EL HONOR DE DIRIGIRME A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA PARA INVITAR  
EN NOMBRE DEL GOBIERNO DE EL SALVADOR A VUESTRO ILUSTRADO  
GOBIERNO PARA QUE SE HAGA REPRESENTAR EN LOS ACTOS DE TRANSMISION  
DE LA PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA, QUE TENDRAN LUGAR EN ESTA  
CIUDAD LOS DIAS 31 DE LOS CORRIENTES Y 1RO. Y 2 DE JUNIO PROXIMO  
ENTRANTE.

LA INVITACION ESTA DIRIGIDA EN PRIMER TERMINO A SU MAJESTAD  
ELIZABETH II, POR LA GRACIA DE DIOS REINA DEL REINO UNIDO DE  
GRAN BRETANA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE.

EL ACTO EN

COL EXCHA. M.P. EXCELENCIA: 31 1RO. Y 2

enquiries dial the number  
in your dialling instructions

Telegram

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shown in your dialling instructions

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TELECOM

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EST953 EXCMA, SRA DONA MARGARET THATCHER PAGE2ND 114/106

QUE ASUMIRA LA PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA EL SENOR INGENIERO  
JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE, TENDRA LUGAR EL DIA 1RO. DE JUNIO.

EL JEFE DE LA MISION ESPECIAL Y SU SENORA ESPOSA Y DOS  
MIEMBROS DE LA MISION SERAN HUESPEDES OFICIALES DEL GOBIERNO  
DE EL SALVADOR Y SUS GASTOS DE ALOJAMIENTO, ALIMENTACION, TRANS-  
PORTE INTERNO Y SEGURIDAD CORRERAN POR CUENTA DEL GOBIERNO  
SALVADORENO.

RUEGO A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA COMUNICAR A ESTA CANCELLERIA  
A LA MAYOR BREVEDAD POSIBLE EL NOMBRE DE LOS INTEGRANTES DE LA  
MISION ESPECIAL.

APROVECHO LA OCASION PARA REITERAR A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA LAS  
MUESTRAS DE MI MAS ALTA Y DISTINGUIDA CONSIDERACION

FIDEL CHAVEZ MENA

MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

COLL 1RO.

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*SUBJECT*

*cc Ops  
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Mister*

UNCLASSIFIED

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GF8  
FCW /17 MAY PO LDN CBGS GR 57 171122Z CHARGE FCO LON  
ETATPRIORITY PRIORITY ING. JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE, PRESIDENTE ELECTO,  
PASAJE NO 1, COLONIA SAN BENITO, SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR.

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO 171122Z MAY 84  
TO PRIORITY EL SALVADOR, ING. JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE, PRESIDENTE  
ELECTO, PASAJE NO 1, COLONIA SAN BENITO, SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR  
TELEGRAM NUMBER U/N OF 17 MAY

PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR VICTORY IN THE  
RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS  
DURING YOUR TERM OF OFFICE.

SIGNED: MARGARET THATCHER (MRS)  
PRIME MINISTER  
NO. 10,  
DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON SW1

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 820/PU**

LIMITED  
MCAD

1  
UNCLASSIFIED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 May 1984

*CF  
pa*

T Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

*Dear Mr Flesher  
PFC approve  
II*

*Dear Tim*

WHITE PAPER : REPORT ON THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL  
ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR

We propose to publish as a White Paper on 23 May the above  
report by Sir James Swaffield and Dr David Browning. A  
report on the first round was published on 2 May.

I should be grateful if you and those to whom I am copying this  
letter, would confirm that there is no objection to publication.

*Yours ever  
Philip*

P H Johnson  
Parliamentary Clerk

cc: D C R Heyhoe Esq  
Office of the Lord Privy Seal  
and Leader of the House  
70 Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1

C Roberts Esq  
Chief Whip's Office  
12 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1





CC PC

FILE  
da

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 May 1984

El Salvador: Presidential Elections

Thank you for your letter of 14 May. The Prime Minister has approved the congratulatory message to Senor Duarte which could be delivered as soon as the recent election results are officially confirmed.

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

010

① cc/c



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Apex attached message  
to Senor Duarte - to be delivered  
when results are officially  
confirmed?

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1984

A.F.C.  $\frac{14}{5}$

Dear John,

El Salvador: Presidential Elections

Although the results have yet to be officially confirmed, it is already clear that the Christian Democrat candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte, won the elections which took place in El Salvador on 25 March and 6 May for the Presidency. Duarte, who is strongly supported by the Americans, offers the best hope for progress towards democracy and reconciliation in El Salvador. I attach a paper on the implications of his victory.

Senor Duarte paid a short call on the Prime Minister on 19 June, 1983 during a three days' sponsored visit.

We wish to support and encourage Duarte's efforts to achieve real democracy and reform. We recommend that the Prime Minister send a short congratulatory message to the new President, as soon as the results are officially confirmed, probably by the end of next week. The President takes office on 1 June. The Americans would welcome such a gesture of support for Duarte. They have expressed their gratitude for our decision to send observers to the election. A draft telegram is attached.

Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



## THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VICTORY OF DUARTE IN THE EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

1. José Napoleón Duarte has won the Presidential elections in El Salvador, having obtained 54.05 per cent of the votes in the run-off with his extreme right-wing opponent Roberto d'Aubuisson who gained 45.95 per cent. These results are still subject to official confirmation. Our Ambassador has reported that the election took place in an atmosphere of relative peace and with greatly improved administration. More than 80 per cent of the electorate participated. The British official observers reported that their general conclusion is that the election of 6 May did provide the people with the opportunity to decide who should be their President through a reasonably fair, secure and secret ballot. Respect of this decision by all sections of Salvadorean society, together with prosecution of terrorism, within the due process of law, is now essential if the electoral process is to be a means of their achievement of a proper democracy.

2. Duarte, a Christian Democrat, represents the moderate centrist option in El Salvador against both the extreme right-wing and the left-wing guerrillas. His victory opens up the best prospect for democracy in El Salvador. His success will depend to a large extent on strong support from the US Government which he will undoubtedly receive. President Reagan in his Address to the Nation on 9 May urged Congress to give swift approval to his requests for increased military and economic aid to El Salvador. He warned that Cuban backed left-wing guerrillas could topple the newly elected Government by the autumn if US assistance was not immediately forthcoming. Duarte's victory will probably facilitate the US Government's efforts to secure Congressional approval for the funds urgently needed to strengthen US assistance to the Salvadorean army.

3. However, Duarte faces a formidable task. The civil war is at stalemate but the strength of the guerrillas is increasing. He has promised to open a dialogue with all political currents including the extreme right-wing and the left-wing guerrillas and to set-up a special commission to track down the death squads. But at least until early 1985 when Assembly elections take place he will have to work with a National Assembly in which D'Aubuisson and his right wing allies predominate. He also faces an antagonistic private sector and an army and police whose senior command is known to dislike his policies of social reform and national reconciliation and who will oppose his efforts to put an end to the death squads.

4. Duarte was robbed of his Presidential victory in 1972 by last minute rigging the results and subsequently arrested and beaten by the Army. He participated and was later President of the civilian/military junta from 1980-82. He was almost powerless during that period to introduce social or economic changes or to control the military; and the abuse of human rights in those years was probably at the highest level ever.

5. The situation has changed considerably since then. Duarte is in a much stronger position as an elected President. The fact that he enjoys US support will give him some leverage with the military, who are dependent on US support and supplies. But he will have to move very carefully and will need international support and goodwill if he is to succeed in achieving progress towards a real democracy.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE


10 May 1984



# OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>RESTRICTED</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>PRIORITY</b>
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GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 141530Z MAY 84
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	Please transmit the following message to Ing. Jose Napoleon
	10	Duarte from the Prime Minister, as soon as the results of
	11	the elections are officially confirmed.
	12	<b>BEGINS</b>
	13	Please accept my warmest congratulations on your victory
	14	in the recent presidential elections. I wish you every
	15	success during your term of office.
	16	<b>ENDS</b>
	17	
	18	HOWE
	19	NNNN
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number ACS 011/1	Dept MCAD	Distribution Limited MCAD News D Protocol D PS PS/Lady Young PS/Mr Whitney Sir W Harding Mr David Thomas
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Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



*file No*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 May 1984

EL SALVADOR

Thank you for your letter of 2 May about the invitation to the United Kingdom to be officially represented at the International Fair in San Salvador in November 1984.

I do not need to trouble the Prime Minister with this. I am sure that she would agree that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should reply on her behalf - and along the lines which you suggest.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*PR*





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

~~Prime Minister~~

2 May 1984

~~Agree to  
the response  
proposed by the  
Foreign Secretary?~~

Dear John

El Salvador

I enclose a letter from Dr Fidel Chavez Mena, Minister for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador to the Prime Minister inviting the United Kingdom to be officially represented at the XI International Fair at San Salvador from 3-20 November 1984. This was forwarded to us by the Salvadorean Ambassador to London.

Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that it would be more appropriate for him to reply on behalf of the Prime Minister. HM Ambassador at Tegucigalpa (who is also accredited to El Salvador) had earlier received an invitation to this fair and passed it to the Department of Trade and Industry for them to notify British firms who might wish to participate. He commented at that time that we have nothing to gain by having an official stand at the fair, which the COI estimate would cost £45-50,000. We share this view and propose that in replying Sir Geoffrey should politely turn down the invitation.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, C. A.

DIRECCION GENERAL DE ASUNTOS  
ECONOMICOS Y SOCIALES

No.

San Salvador, marzo 15 de 1984


Señora Primer Ministro:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Vuestra Excelencia, en ocasión de referirme a la invitación que a nombre de mi Gobierno esta Cancillería presentó a su Excelentísimo Embajador acreditado ante nuestro pueblo y Gobierno, para que su país participe en la XI Feria Internacional que se realizará del 3 al 20 de noviembre de 1984, en esta ciudad.

Deseo manifestar a Vuestra Excelencia, la importancia que mi Gobierno le otorga a este evento, el cual dentro de las actuales circunstancias por las que mi país atraviesa, se convierte en el deseo ferviente de cada uno de los salvadoreños que con esfuerzo y empeño, hacemos de esta Feria, la expresión de paz y concordia, como resultado del proceso de democratización en que estamos empeñados en lograr.

Mi Gobierno por mi medio reitera a Vuestra Excelencia la atenta invitación, para que su país asista oficialmente a nuestra XI Feria Internacional, con lo que se le dará mayor realce al evento.

Al agradecer la atención que esta nota le merezca, aprovecho complacido la oportunidad para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia, las demostraciones de mi distinguida consideración y estima.

  
FIDEL CHAVEZ MENA  
MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Excelentísima Señora  
Margaret Thatcher M.,  
P. Primer Ministro de  
Gran Bretaña



FREE TRANSLATION

Opening courtesies. . .to confirm the invitation, which in the name of my Government was presented by the Foreign Ministry to His Excellency the British Ambassador accredited to our people and Government for your country to participate in the XI International Fair which will take place from 3 to 20 November 1984 in this city (San Salvador).

I wish to inform Your Excellency of the importance which my Government, by agreeing to hold this fair in the present circumstances which my country is going through, attaches to this event. All Salvadoreans are pledged to make this fair an expression of peace and harmony as a result of the process of democratisation we are seeking to achieve.

On behalf of my Government and myself I reiterate to Your Excellency this invitation for your country to take part officially at our XI International Fair, thereby enhancing the event.

Usual closing courtesies.

**RESTRICTED**

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

RESTRICTED

FM TEGUCIGALPA 212100Z MAR 84

22/3

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 21 MARCH

AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE, PANAMA CITY,  
CARACAS, BOGOTA, HAVANA, BELMOPAN, UKMIS NEW YORK AND EC POSTS

EL SALVADOR: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

SUMMARY

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION NEXT SUNDAY IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY AND A SECOND ROUND MAY BE NECESSARY. THE ELECTION PROCEDURE, ALTHOUGH IMPERFECT SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF IT IS COMPLETELY AND IMPARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED ON ELECTION DAY. IF VIOLENCE INTERFERES WITH THE ELECTION THE GUERRILLAS WILL BE TO BLAME. THE ELECTION WILL NOT SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S DEEP SEATED PROBLEMS BUT SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THE PEOPLE'S WISH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN A COUNTRY MORE USED TO DICTATORSHIP THAN DEMOCRACY.

1. ON 25 MARCH THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE WILL GO TO THE POLLS TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. IF NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WINS MORE THAN 50% OF THE VOTES THE TWO LEADERS WILL CONTEST A SECOND ELECTION WITHIN A MONTH. THIS WILL BE DECIDED BY SIMPLE MAJORITY PROBABLY ON 29 APRIL OR 6 MAY. THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL TAKE OFFICE ON 1ST JUNE.

2. EIGHT PARTIES HAVE PROPOSED CANDIDATES BUT ONLY THREE HAVE ANY CHANCE. THESE ARE NAPOLEON DUARTE FOR THE LEFT OF CENTRE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON FOR THE EXTREME RIGHT WING ARENA AND FRANCISCO GUERRERO FOR THE RIGHT OF CENTRE CONCILIACION NACIONAL. THEY WILL PROBABLY FINISH THE FIRST ROUND IN THAT ORDER WITH NONE OF THEM WINNING MORE THAN 50% OF THE VOTE. THE OTHER FIVE PARTIES ARE PARTICIPATING ONLY TO SHOW THEIR RELATIVE SUPPORT. TWO SMALL PARTIES REPRESENTING THE UNION OF THE EXTREME LEFT (FDR) AND THE GUERRILLAS (FMLN) HAVE REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION.

3. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN HAS FEATURED TWO THEMES - THE CIVIL WAR AND THE ECONOMY. POLICIES TO DEAL WITH BOTH ARE SIMPLISTIC. DUARTE FAVOURS DIALOGUE WITH THE FDR/FMLN AND A QUOTE SOCIAL PACT UNQUOTE TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. D'AUBUISSON WOULD PROMOTE HARSHER MEASURES AGAINST THE FMLN AND ITS SUPPORTERS AND RETURN THE ECONOMY TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE PRAGMATIC GUERRERO WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER IS POLITICALLY VIABLE. ELECTORAL PROPAGANDA HAS BEEN PREDICTABLY ABUSIVE WITH DUARTE A PARTICULAR TARGET FOR THE RIGHT WING ATTACK.

**RESTRICTED**

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4. THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER DUARTE OR GUERRERO BUT WILL ACCEPT WHOEVER IS ELECTED. HOWEVER ITS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL DEPEND ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH HIS POLICIES ARE ACCEPTABLE IN THE UNITED STATES. A WIN BY D'AUBUISSON WOULD PRESENT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

5. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ISOLATED REPORTS OF FAVOURITISM BY ARMY COMMANDERS TOWARDS CERTAIN PARTIES, THE ARMY IS UNLIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH VOTING. THE FMLN WILL TRY TO DO SO. THEY HAVE BEEN CONFISCATING IDENTITY CARDS ON COUNTRY BUS ROUTES TO PREVENT PEOPLE FROM VOTING AND HAVE SET OFF BOMBS IN THE CAPITAL. FOUR RIGHT WING POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. DESPITE REPORTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ELECTIONS THE FMLN HAS REFUSED TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE ON ELECTION DAY AND HAVE PROMISED TO INTENSIFY THEIR ATTACKS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HOWEVER IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH THE ELECTION PROCESS. THE TEST WILL BE THE SIZE OF THE VOTE.

6. THE ELECTIONS ARE CONTROLLED BY A CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. THESE ENSURE POLITICAL SUPPORT BUT SQUABBLE MORE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS WHO WERE INDEPENDENT. THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW SEEMS FAIR, PARTICULARLY BY LATIN AMERICAN STANDARDS. IF VOTING IS IMPARTIALLY CONTROLLED ON ELECTION DAY THE RESULT SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

7. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS WHICH MAY ATTRACT CRITICISM ARE:-

(A) THE ELECTORAL REGISTER'S DATA BASE (IDENTITY CARDS CHECKED AGAINST BIRTH/DEATH RECORDS) IS NOT 100% ACCURATE. MUNICIPAL RECORDS ARE NOT ALWAYS KEPT EFFICIENTLY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

HOWEVER THE ELECTORAL REGISTER IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY BY THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM OF ACCOUNTANTS DELOITTE, HASKINS, SELLS LTD. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MORE TIME TO VERIFY THE BASE DATA. NEVERTHELESS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER TO USE A FIRM NOT SO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE UNITED STATES.

(B) THE ELECTORAL REGISTER INCLUDES AN ESTIMATED 600,000/800,000 SALVADOREANS WHO HAVE LEFT EL SALVADOR. AS THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR VOTING AT EMBASSIES OR BY POST THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE.

HOWEVER OVERSEAS VOTING IS NOT ACCEPTABLE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES (AND IS NOT PROVIDED FOR IN NICARAGUA'S NEW ELECTORAL LAW). THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD ARE PROBABLY TOO GREAT. EMIGRES MAY RETURN TO VOTE AND THE PREVIOUS SALVADOREAN LAW WAS NOT CHANGED TO EXCLUDE THEM.

<sup>2</sup>  
**RESTRICTED**

/(c) TO

(C) TO REDUCE FRAUD, CITIZENS MUST VOTE IN THE MUNICIPALITY IN WHICH THEY OBTAINED THEIR IDENTITY CARDS. HOWEVER SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND PERSONS HAVE BEEN FORCED BY THE VIOLENCE TO MOVE TO OTHER PARTS OF EL SALVADOR AND WILL BE UNABLE TO DO SO.

SPECIAL VOTING STATIONS WILL BE SET UP TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER THERE WILL BE SOME LOSS OF VOTES DUE TO THIS DISTORTION OF THE NORMAL VOTING PATTERN. IT ALSO PROVIDES PERHAPS THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY FOR PERSONS TO VOTE MORE THAN ONCE. THEIR NAMES WILL BE ON BOTH THEIR ORIGINAL CONSTITUENCY VOTING LIST AND ON THOSE AVAILABLE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS.

(D) THE ELECTORAL COUNCIL ESTIMATES THAT OF THE COUNTRY'S 261 MUNICIPALITIES, VOTING WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IN 22 WHICH ARE CONTROLLED BY THE GUERRILLAS (MANY OF THEM NO MORE THAN VILLAGES). MOREOVER MUNICIPAL RECORDS WERE DESTROYED IN A NUMBER OF TOWNS BRIEFLY OCCUPIED BY THE GUERRILLAS.

GUERRILLA CENTRES ARE MOSTLY IN THINLY POPULATED AREAS FROM WHICH MOST OF THE POPULATION HAS FLED. IT IS THE NUMBER OF VOTERS, NOT MUNICIPALITIES, WHICH COUNTS. DISPLACED PERSONS WILL BE ABLE TO VOTE UNDER (B) ABOVE. THE ELECTORAL COUNCIL ALREADY HOLDS DUPLICATES OF DESTROYED MUNICIPAL RECORDS WITH WHICH TO PREPARE NEW RECORDS. IN THE 1982 ELECTIONS 28 MUNICIPALITIES WERE AFFECTED BY GUERRILLA ACTION. THE ELECTORAL COUNCIL CONSIDERS THAT ONLY 20,000 - 30,000 VOTES WILL BE LOST BUT DOUBLE THAT NUMBER SEEMS MORE LIKELY.

(E) SOME OF THE ESTIMATED 40,000 CIVILIANS KILLED IN THE RECENT YEARS ARE UNKNOWN AND ARE THEREFORE STILL INCLUDED IN THE ELECTORAL REGISTER. AN ESTIMATED 30,000 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES INCLUDED IN THE ELECTORAL REGISTER WILL NOT VOTE TO DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

THIS SHOULD REDUCE THE TOTAL BY ANOTHER 50,000.

(F) DELOITTE, HASKINS, SELLS LTD. ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST 40,000 DUPLICATE IDENTITY CARDS.

8. ACCORDING TO THE NEW ELECTORAL REGISTER THE THEORETICAL ELECTORATE IS 2.6 MILLION VOTERS. FROM THIS ONE MUST DEDUCT ABOUT 800,000 VOTES BECAUSE OF (A) TO (F) ABOVE TO OBTAIN A REALISTIC POTENTIAL VOTE OF ABOUT 1.8 MILLION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DECIDE THE SIZE OF THE POTENTIAL ELECTORATE AS A POLL OF SAY, 1.27 MILLION VOTES, COULD BE PRESENTED AS EITHER 49% OR 70% OF THE ELECTORATE.

3  
**RESTRICTED**

19. THERE



## RESTRICTED

9. THERE WILL BE A LARGE TURNOUT FOR THE ELECTION - PROBABLY 1.5 MILLION. DUARTE SHOULD RECEIVE 40% PLUS OF THE VALID VOTES, D'AUBUISSON AND GUERRERO SHOULD SHARE ABOUT 50% AND THE OTHER FIVE CANDIDATES DIVIDE UP TO 10%. SPOILED VOTES, OFTEN SEEN AS REFLECTING SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS, SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10%.

10. IF THERE IS A SECOND ROUND THE RIGHT WING WOULD COMBINE AGAINST DUARTE. HOWEVER D'AUBUISSON'S UNPOPULARITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THIS ON ESSENTIAL U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID, MAY CAUSE SOME RIGHT WING VOTERS TO ABSTAIN. THE FINAL RESULT WOULD THEN BE CLOSE. KEY FACTORS WILL BE THE EXTENT BY WHICH DUARTE AND D'AUBUISSON CAN EXCEED 40% AND 30% RESPECTIVELY IN THE FIRST ROUND.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

SHARKEY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

GENERAL AMERICA

STANDARD

MCAD

NAD

S AM D

FID

WIAD

SOV DEPT

RED

UND

SECURITY DEPT

BCD (E)

COPIES TO

ASSESSMENTS STAFF

CABINET OFFICE

MOD DIA

MR ARBUTHNOTT, ODA

4  
RESTRICTED



FILE

67

10 DOWNING STREET

OD:	LCO	MOD
	(FCO)	LPS
	HMI	CDL
	LPO	CO
		DTI

*From the Private Secretary*

28 February, 1984

EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 27 February. She agrees that we should send observers to the El Salvador elections and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should announce this decision in the House this week as soon as suitable candidates have been selected.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

67





Prime Minister

Content that we should again  
send observers to the  
El Salvador election?

PM/84/34

A.J.C. 12/2.

PRIME MINISTER

Yes Sir.

#### El Salvador Elections

1. In March 1982 we sent two official observers to the Constituent Assembly elections in El Salvador. Our decision to do so was welcomed by the Americans and was vindicated by the useful report which they submitted.
2. Presidential elections are to take place on 25 March. We have again been invited to send observers. To do so would be consistent with our 1982 decision and the policy we have followed since then. I therefore propose to accept and to announce this in the House this week as soon as we have selected suitable candidates. As in 1982 they will be independent figures of acknowledged public standing.
3. In 1982, none of our EC partners sent observers to the constituent Assembly elections. We and the US are likely to be less isolated this time. The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have expressed interest in a joint observer mission of the Ten. This has been blocked by France and Greece. But the Germans and possibly the Dutch may still send national observers, as might the Canadians who declined to do so in 1982.
4. There will of course be criticism in Parliament and elsewhere, as there was in 1982. The lines of our response are clear: the decision is consistent with our aim of

/encouraging



encouraging the development of democracy everywhere in Central America; the fairness or otherwise of elections ought not to be prejudged; and our observers will be there to report the facts as they find them.

5. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be 'G. Howe', is written above the printed name.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 February 1984





Jo K  
CFL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 January 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 December about the new Constitution and the forthcoming presidential elections.

Her Majesty's Government welcome the approval by the Constituent Assembly of the new Political Constitution, and the announcement that Presidential elections will be held on 25 March 1984.

I have the honour to convey to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Alfonso Moises Beatriz

CF

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 January 1984

Dear John,

El Salvador

*Typ letter pl.  
No 5/1*

As you asked in your letter of 21 December, I enclose a draft reply for your signature on behalf of the Prime Minister to the Salvadorean Ambassador.

The new Political Constitution was agreed by the Salvadorean Constituent Assembly on 15 December only after five months of bitter debate. Its most important articles set the framework for land reform, and for the holding of elections (planned for 25 March this year). On paper at least, the approval of the Constitution is a step in the right direction. But the actual impact of the Constitution will depend on the effectiveness with which these articles are implemented; both the elections and the land reform programme are opposed by the extremes of the political spectrum on the left and the right.

We have, therefore, proposed a fairly low key welcome in replying to the Ambassador. Lady Young has written in similar terms in response to a letter to the Foreign Secretary.

*Yours ever,*

*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



DRAFT: ~~XXXXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXX~~/despatch/~~XXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/~~XXXXXX~~

FROM:

Reference

PS/Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

H E Alfonso Moisés Beatriz  
 Embassy of El Salvador  
 Flat 9  
 62 Welbeck Street  
 LONDON W1

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Your Excellency,

CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 December about the new Constitution and the forthcoming presidential elections.

*Her Righty*

~~THE~~ Government welcome the approval by the Constituent Assembly of the new Political Constitution, and the announcement that Presidential elections will be held on 25 March 1984.

I have the honour to convey to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Handwritten signature*  
 5.  
 1

Enclosures—flag(s).....

El Salvador - Internal Site. Dec 81.

15 JAN 1984





RESTRICTED

GR 453

RESTRICTED

FH WASHINGTON 350040Z JAN 64

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 27 OF 4 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE, MEXICO CITY.

TEGUCIGALPA TELNO 1 TO FCO: EL SALVADOR

1. THE AMERICANS REGARD THE SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON THE INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ AT EL PARAISO AS AMONG THE WORST REVERSES SUFFERED BY THE SALVADOREAN FORCES IN THE ENTIRE WAR. THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY LOST MORE THAN 100 SOLDIERS, THEIR HIGHEST CASUALTY TOLL IN A SINGLE BATTLE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN INTER-AGENCY REVIEW OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY SITUATION WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN THE ADMINISTRATION SHORTLY ASKING CONGRESS FOR AS MUCH AS DLRS 100 MILLION IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID FOR EL SALVADOR. THE INTENTION WOULD BE TO EXPAND THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES BY ABOUT 20 PERCENT (IE 5-6000 TROOPS) AND TO PROVIDE EXTRA HELICOPTERS. CONGRESSMAN LONG, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE (WHICH LAST YEAR REDUCED BY HALF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST FOR DLRS 110 MILLION IN SUPPLEMENTARY AID FOR EL SALVADOR, LEAVING AN ADDITIONAL DLRS 15 MILLION DEPENDENT ON LAND REFORM PROGRESS AND ON BRINGING TO TRIAL THE KILLERS OF THE NUNS), HAS SAID THAT FURTHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE APPLIED TO ANY NEW MILITARY AID REQUESTS. HE ADDED THAT, "THERE'S GOT TO BE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE WHOLE SALVADORAN SYSTEM OF JUSTICE. THEY'VE HAD 30,000 KILLINGS AND NOT ONE CONVICTION." CONGRESSMAN BARNES, THE DEMOCRATIC CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE, HAS ALSO SAID THAT HE WILL OPPOSE MORE MILITARY AID FOR EL SALVADOR. BARNES'S OFFICE, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US THAT SOME AT LEAST OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROBABLY BE AUTHORISED AT THE END OF THE DAY, ALBEIT WITH NEW CONDITIONS.

2. THERE IS LESS CONCERN HERE ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CUSCATLAN BRIDGE, GIVEN THAT TRAFFIC IS ABLE TO PASS OVER A DAM 600 METRES UP RIVER AND THAT LOCAL ENGINEERS ARE EXPECTED TO CONSTRUCT A BAILEY BRIDGE IN A FORTNIGHT OR SO.

RESTRICTED

13. IT HAS

RESTRICTED

3. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAJOR JOSE RICARDO POZO AND LT COL ARISTIDES ALFONSO MARQUEZ WILL BE RECEIVING OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. THIS IS REGARDED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS A USEFUL PARTIAL RESPONSE TO VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S STRICTURES DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO EL SALVADOR (OUR TELNO 3739 OF 16 DECEMBER).

WRIGT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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RESEARCH DEPT  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
  
MR WRIGHT  
MR URE  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
MR CARTLEDGE  
SIR C TICKELL 2

COPIES TO:  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
CABINET OFFICE

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39

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 December 1983

*Dear Peter,*

EL SALVADOR

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Ambassador of El Salvador. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister.

BT/

*Yours ever*

*John G. Cole.*

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JP



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 December 1983

*Seu Antomado,*

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 20 December. A reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

*Yours sincerely*

*A. J. Cole.*

His Excellency Alfonso Moises Beatriz





EMBAJADA DE EL SALVADOR  
LONDRES

The Prime Minister  
House of Commons  
London SW1A 0AA

20th December, 1983.

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have the honour to inform you on behalf of my government, that on 15th December 1983, the Salvadorean Constituent Assembly, by nominal and public vote, gave its final and unanimous approval to the new Political Constitution.

This new Constitution will take effect on 20th December 1983 on which occasion the Constituent Assembly will hold a solemn session in the presence of the other Powers of the State (Executive and Judicial), the Honourable Diplomatic Corps, the politic parties, and ecclesiastic authorities.

I would also like to inform you that presidential elections will be held on 25th March 1984. The citizens elected will commence their duties on 1st June 1984 and will remain in office until 31st May 1989.

These events are firm steps taken to secure peace in my country within the framework of democracy, justice and liberty.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to the Prime Minister the assurance of my highest consideration.

*Yours, sincerely,*

*Alfonso Moisés Beatriz*  
Alfonso Moisés Beatriz  
Ambassador



file

RM



cto

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 December 1983

Dear Senor Duarte,

Thank you for sending me a message on 24 November about the forthcoming Presidential elections in El Salvador. We share your desire to see democracy upheld and reinforced in El Salvador.

As I said in my letter to you of 26 September one of the first priorities in countries such as El Salvador must be to restore peace and stability. To this end the British Government, in common with her European partners, will continue to explore ways of playing a constructive role in the efforts being made to promote peace, stability and democratic freedom in Central America.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Senor Ing. Jose Napoleon Duarte

---

da



RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 December 1983

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

A.D.C. 9/12

El Salvador

Your letter of 28 November asked for a draft reply to the message of 24 November from ex-President Duarte to the Prime Minister, for signature by either the Prime Minister or the Private Secretary as appropriate. We consider a reply from the Prime Minister would be appropriate since the Prime Minister has met him personally, and wrote to him on 26 September. I enclose a draft reply.

Sr Duarte, leader of the Christian Democrat Party, is so far the only candidate to have announced his intention to stand in the Presidential elections to be held on 25 March 1984. The reply to Sr Duarte refers to this announcement, but avoids any apparent endorsement of his candidature.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Reference

Prime Minister

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Excellency  
Senor Ingeniero Don Jose Napoleon  
Duarte

Copies to:

**PRIVACY MARKING**

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

Thank you for sending me a message on 24 November about the forthcoming Presidential elections in El Salvador. We share your desire to see democracy upheld and reinforced in El Salvador.

**CAVEAT**.....

As I said in my letter to you of 26 September one of the first priorities in countries such as El Salvador must be to restore peace and stability. To this end the British Government, in common with her European partners, will continue to explore ways of playing a constructive role in the efforts being made to promote peace, stability and democratic freedom in Central America.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



EL SALVADOR - Int. Sv

UNIVERSITY OF SALVADOR - EXERCISE  
Dec-87

EXAMINE - TRANSLATION

UNIVERSITY OF SALVADOR

EXERCISE



13/12

Senor DUARTE

28 November 1983

I enclose a teletmessage which the Prime Minister has received from Senor Duarte. I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply, for Prime Ministerial or Private Secretary signature as you consider appropriate.

DB

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RM



British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

24 NOV 1983 2255  
ZCZC CLM1392 MOK758 DFU671 328310281070  
GBXX CO SRSR 050  
SANSALVADORELSALV 050/044 24 1754 VIA TRT

*David*

DONA MARGARETH THATCHER  
10 DOWNING STREET SW1  
LONDRES

*'X' Correspondence Section to send to FCO for action as necessary.*

ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE APROBO ANOCHE, DECRETO CONVOCATORIA ELECCIONES PRESIDENTE PARA 25 MARZO 1984. DECISION PERMITE ESPERANZAS SALIDA DEMOCRATICA. SOLICITOLE DECLARACION DE APOYO SU GOBIERNO EN FAVOR DEL PROCESO DEMOCRATICO DE EL SALVADOR.

ATENTAMENTE  
ING JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE

*David - Re above 'X'*

COL 10 SW1 25 1984.

*H.E. Senor Ing. Jose Napoleon Duarte is a former President of El Salvador. He called on the PM on 19.7.83 and is on her Xmas Card list. Perhaps you should write to FCO. JC, 25/11*

NNNN

Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
Telegram



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 September 1983

*JD*  
*JLB*  
*C. F. L.*  
Dear Senor Duarte,

Thank you for your letter of 1 September about the presentation of proposals for the development of Central America to European Community aid donors.

We have followed with interest the Special Meeting in Brussels on Economic Development in Central America. I share your hope that it may contribute to better understanding of Central American problems among donor countries. I also hope that trade and private investment will be encouraged to play their part in the development of the region. But I am sure you will agree that the first priority in countries such as your own must be to restore peace and stability without which the necessary climate of confidence will be absent. This is vital in itself, but will also contribute to the further strengthening of democracy and help to set the region on a new path.

It was a great pleasure to meet you during your recent visit to London and to learn at first hand about the problems of your country and of your hopes for the future.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Senor Ing. Jose Napoleon Duarte





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

*Please type*

*AR 1/2*

*Dear John,* El Salvador

Your letter of 13 September asked for advice on the form and content of a reply to Ing. Duarte's letter to the Prime Minister of 1 September. Since the Prime Minister received Ing. Duarte on 19 July we consider that a personal reply from her would be appropriate. I enclose a draft.

As we do not give aid to El Salvador at present and are cautious about increasing either bilateral or multilateral aid to other Central American countries the draft is couched in deliberately non-committal terms.

I suggest we should forward the Prime Minister's reply to Senor Duarte through HM Ambassador at Tegucigalpa who is also accredited to El Salvador. The next bag for Tegucigalpa leaves the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Monday 26 September.

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Excellency Senor Ing. Jose  
Napoleon Duarte  
SAN SALVADOR

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 1 September about the presentation of proposals for the development of Central America to ~~donors of the~~ European Community *aid donors.*

CAVEAT.....

We have followed with interest the Special Meeting in Brussels on Economic Development in Central America. I share your hope that it may contribute to better understanding of Central American problems among donor countries. I also hope that trade and private investment will be encouraged by the proposed measures to play their part in the development of the region although I am sure you will agree that the first priority in countries such as your own must be to restore peace and stability without which the necessary climate of confidence will be absent. This is vital in itself but will also contribute to the further strengthening of democracy and help to set the region on a new path.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

~~Perhaps I may add that~~ It was a great pleasure to meet you during your recent visit to London and to learn at first hand about the problems of your country and of your hopes for the future.

*for 23/7*



A SHIVAJI  
Dec 82

22 SEP 1982  
11 21  
G 4  
K 1

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FLV 241

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 September, 1983

The Prime Minister has received the attached letter from the ex-President of El Salvador, Mr. Duarte, following her meeting with him in July. I should be grateful for your advice on the form and content of a reply to Mr. Duarte.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

259



Ing. José Napoleón Duarte

San Salvador, El Salvador, C. A.

September 1, 1983

Her Excellency  
Margareth Thatcher  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street, SW1  
London, England

Excellency:

This coming september 13 to 15, and in Brussels, Belgium, will take place the Special Meeting of the Program for the Economic Development of Central America. This event which has been organized by the Inter-American Development Bank, will present an analysis of our economies, and the investment priorities of our five Central American countries to the European Financial Community.

Remembering what you expressed to me during our conversations in London this past month of July, and knowing your faith in the principle that true peace and social justice can only be achieved in a society that guarantees to its members political liberty and democracy, I would like to point out some aspects of this meeting in Brussels which are not only of interest for El Salvador, but for all our region:

- i) For the first time, the five Central American countries are presenting to the consideration of the International Financial Community, the nature of their economic problems.
- ii) In this meeting, Central America will show to the European Economic Community that there is a regional approach to our economic problems, rather than an individual one. It could not be otherwise, the crisis in El Salvador, for example, has strong repercussions for the countries in the area and viceversa.
- iii) It should be pointed out, that our proposals to the European Community do not address themselves to amounts or financing needed, but to social and economic development as means to find the peace so necessary to overcome the region's crisis.
- iv) Our particular interest in this meeting began during my government (1980-1982), when we gave this project the uppermost importance, and basically due to my conviction that peace in Central America, is, represents the peace and the opportunity for progress so much needed in El Salvador.

Her Excellency  
Margareth Thatcher

-2-

September 1, 1983

Even if El Salvador delegation to this Special Meeting does not belong to the Christian Democratic Party, I feel sure they will do their best to see that El Salvador's interests and points of view do come across. The European Community, and thanks to this event, will have the opportunity to hear our financial schemes, and jointly or through bilateral arrangements, it would be able to suggest alternative ways and new avenues to solve our economic and technical problems.

As you can see, your support and your services to El Salvador in pursuit of these objectives, along with other courageous political leaders of Europe, will be appreciated and compromise our gratitude.

We continue our struggle to create a peaceful and democratic nation here in El Salvador.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

José Napoleón Duarte

JND:md





FILE

JH

cc: Fed

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 August, 1983

Dear Mr. Dobson,

Thank you for your letter of 4 August about rumours of the involvement in El Salvador of British personnel from the British Forces in Belize. There are no British military personnel in El Salvador and personnel on local leave from Belize are not permitted to go there.

There is an Honorary British Consul normally resident in San Salvador, and members of the British Embassy in Tegucigalpa visit El Salvador regularly.

The British garrison is in Belize solely to assist that country against external aggression. It would be quite outside its terms of reference for any members of the garrison, or any of the small number of aircraft there, to be deployed elsewhere in Central America.

I can categorically assure you, therefore, that the rumours to which you refer are completely without foundation.


Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Frank Dobson, Esq., M.P.

—

lor

# **A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2961</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Letter from Laing to Private          Secretary, No.10 dated          19 August 1983, with enclosures.</i>	
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Ing. José Napoleón Duarte  
San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A.

11 August 1983

Mrs Thatcher  
Prime Minister

*Copy to Mr. Holmes F/C-O.  
then f-a. A.S.C. 15/7*

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Please accept my most cordial and respectful greetings.

I am extremely grateful for all the kindness shown to me during my visit to your great nation. I shall long remember the satisfaction of meeting you personally and our valuable exchange of ideas on the current problems affecting peaceful co-existence and the democratic system in my country and in Latin America; I felt your spirit of deep understanding and the strength of your words expressing support for those of us who are fighting in order that El Salvador may enjoy a truly democratic regime and a worthy, humane standard of living.

In the hope that we may pursue close links of friendship, I take this opportunity to assure you of my highest esteem.

Ing. José Napoleón Duarte.

*Ing. José Napoleón Duarte*

*San Salvador, El Salvador, C. A.*

11 de agosto de 1983

Excma. Doña Margaret Thatcher  
Ministro de Gran Bretaña.

Honorable Señora Thatcher:

Con todo respeto tengo el placer de hacer llegar a su dignísima persona, mi más distinguido y especial saludo.

Expreso a V.E. con infinita admiración, mis altos agradecimientos por toda la gentileza de que fui objeto en mi visita a esa Gran Nación y quedará en mi recuerdo de manera im-  
perdurable, la satisfacción de haberle conocido personalmente, así como el valioso cambio de impresiones que sostuvimos sobre los problemas que actualmente afectan la convivencia pacífica y el sistema democrático en mi país y América Latina; encontrando su noble espíritu de comprensión y sus palabras de aliento que expresan un gran apoyo a quienes estamos luchando porque El Salvador disfrute de un régimen auténticamente democrático y un nivel de vida digno y humano.

En espera de mantener estrechos nexos de amistad con su ilustrísima persona, aprovecho la ocasión para presentarle mis demostraciones de especial aprecio y alta estima.

Ing. José Napoleón Duarte





Frank DOBSON MP

23/8



Br.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 August 1983

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Frank Dobson MP.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Dobson, to reach me by ~~10~~ August.

23.

(Timothy Flesher)

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

✓

FROM: FRANK DOBSON MP

CC:MAV ✓



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Rt. Hon. Mrs. M. Thatcher MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON, SW1

4 August 1983

RS

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Involvement of British Personnel in Central America

I have received a letter from Belize which says that it is a common rumour there that British military and civilian personnel are involved as "advisers" in El Salvador and that actions in support of the Government of El Salvador have been launched from Belize and possibly Britain's Caribbean guard ship.

I have, of course, no means of checking on such rumours. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could make clear -

- (a) what British personnel are at present in El Salvador and what their functions are;
- (b) whether any air strikes have been launched by British aircraft anywhere in Central America;
- (c) whether Britain has supplied intelligence or surveillance assistance to any Government or other group in Central America, including the United States;
- (d) whether Britain intends to give any military or other assistance to the current US adventures in Central America.

Yours sincerely,

*F. Dobson*  
— PP

FRANK DOBSON MP

Dictated by Mr. Dobson and  
Signed in his absence





10 DOWNING STREET

19 July 1983

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT

cc Mr. Secretary

file DA

Dear Sir,

El Salvador: Visit of Former President

Thank you for your two letters of 18 July. Mr. Duarte called on the Prime Minister for 20 minutes this morning.

The Prime Minister said that we had done everything possible to help the democratic process in El Salvador. The turnout in the last elections had been most impressive.

Mr. Duarte said that those elections were just the beginning of the development of a democratic process in El Salvador. The next Presidential election would be held in December. He hoped that a sufficient proportion of the population would participate so that the centre was strengthened and the extremes, who created all the problems, were isolated. His objective in visiting European countries was to try to seek support for the democratic process. He believed that he had a very strong possibility of winning the December election. He was taking the risk of travelling freely around the country in order to inspire popular faith in democracy.

The Prime Minister asked how, if elected, Mr. Duarte would seek to ensure that all the arms of Government behaved in a disciplined way. Mr. Duarte replied that the authorities must in future act within rather than above the law. But help was needed. A European presence was necessary. The Americans could not stand alone in the area.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Duarte said that he was not yet sure whether yesterday's appointment of Dr. Kissinger to head a bipartisan commission on Central American problems was a good idea. But it might help to dissolve domestic opposition to American policies.

If the December elections were successful they would be a turning point. The results would be an executive with sufficient power to deal with the problems confronting El Salvador. He believed in strong Government. During his last period in office he had operated a pact with the Army which had left the latter a good deal of free rein. His hope this time was that his Government would be sufficiently strong to control the Army. In the last

/ two

20



two years the guerrillas had grown in strength and now numbered some 8,000 to 12,000. But they had lost popular support.

He thought there would be three or four candidates in the elections - himself, a candidate from the PCN, a military candidate and a candidate of the Arenas Group. If elected, he would continue the structural changes, including land reform, on which he had embarked previously. But the most important task would be the reform of state institutions and the control of violence.

As regards the wider problems of Central America, he believed that Mexico's efforts were directed towards helping Nicaragua. They were certainly not helping El Salvador. The efforts of the Contadora Group were to some extent praiseworthy. But they tended to ignore the reality of the American and Cuban presence. The Contadora Group's appeal of 18 July, envisaging the removal of all American and Cuban advisers from Central America, was not practical. The declaration made by the Spanish Prime Minister to Nicaragua had gone unnoticed in Europe but it was very important. It called for free elections, respect for human rights, a free press and freedom of movement.

With regard to Guatemala, President Rios Montt was inconsistent. Sometimes he appeared to be a genius; at others his actions were close to lunatic. The Prime Minister of Belize was doing a first class job and Guatemala was at least listening to him. The President of Venezuela was trying hard to prod the Contadora Group to take positive action, largely because he was greatly concerned about the intentions of Nicaragua.

In conclusion Mr. Duarte reiterated that he had asked all his friends in Europe to work for a European presence in Central America.

*Your ever  
John Colson.*

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





12-15 19/7/83  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 July 1983

Dear John,

El Salvador: Visit of Ex-President José Napoleon Duarte

Ex-President Duarte is here today and tomorrow, 18 and 19 July, on a Category II sponsored visit. He is calling on Lady Young at noon and Mr Whitney is giving a luncheon in his honour. But he said on arrival that he was particularly anxious to see the Prime Minister.

Senor Duarte is the leader of the moderate Christian Democrat Party. He stands a good chance of winning the forthcoming Presidential elections in El Salvador and, if elected, would make a genuine effort to curb human rights abuses, press ahead with political reforms and try to make the Salvadorean military more effective. His candidature is strongly backed by the US and German Governments. He has been on a tour of European countries, largely organised by the German Christian Democrat Party. In Spain, he was received by Prime Minister Gonzalez, in Germany, by Chancellor Kohl and in Italy, by Prime Minister Fanfani. He was also received by the Pope.

Although we had not originally put forward a request for a call on the Prime Minister because Senor Duarte's visit was mounted at short notice, we would be grateful if the Prime Minister would consider the possibility of receiving him for a very brief call. The ideal timing would be either at 12 noon tomorrow morning, shortly before Senor Duarte is due to arrive at the House of Commons for lunch or possibly in the Prime Minister's room at the House immediately after Question Time tomorrow afternoon, 19 July.

John's ever,

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 July 1983

*Dear John*

I attach a brief and personality note for Ex-President Duarte's call on the Prime Minister at 12.15 tomorrow 19 July.

The Prime Minister may wish to avoid leading on the question of election observers (para 6 of the Points to Make in the brief), in order not to encourage at this stage a request for us to send observers as we did last time. Sir Geoffrey Howe has asked for an assessment to be made of the case for and against responding positively to such a request.

*Yours ever*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

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EL SALVADOR

CALL BY EX-PRESIDENT JOSÉ NAPOLEÓN DUARTE : TUESDAY 19 JULY 1983

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Concerned at rising tensions in region. Fighting in El Salvador and threat of serious conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras affect stability of whole area.
2. Recognise region's problems deeply rooted in poverty, injustice and political inequality. No easy solutions.
3. Appalled by continuing human rights violations, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala. Flow of refugees unabated.
4. How do you see Central American scene in, say, 5-10 years time?

El Salvador

5. Heartened that you have not abandoned hope of a political solution. But will be difficult against background of violence. How do you rate Army's chances against the guerrillas?

Elections

6. Understand have now been set for November 1983. Will your Government be asking again for international and national observer groups? What improvements could be made on 1981 arrangements?
7. No sign that guerrillas willing to take part in elections. Problem is how to demonstrate that their physical safety is not at risk. If FDR/FMLN did take part, what would be their chances?
8. Guerrillas have indicated desire for substantive negotiations without preconditions (ie ceasefire) with Government. Talks in such circumstances must risk giving political power to left-wing

/extremists

extremists who have little chance of gaining it through the ballot box. What are your views?

9. If you win, how will you tackle El Salvador's problems?

#### ESSENTIAL FACTS

##### El Salvador Elections

1. The Salvadorean Government have brought forward the Presidential Election due in March 1984 to November 1983 although rumours of a later date persist. They hope this will resolve the present political stalemate. In spite of a massive turnout, the March 1982 elections failed to give the moderate Christian Democrats an effective majority over the right-wing parties and the neutral interim President has been unable to exert full authority. Some reports suggest that the Salvadorean Government lack the funds and organisational ability to run the elections properly in November, but the US is prepared to provide US\$6.2 million to finance the Electoral Council's work and will provide computer and technical help.

2. The left are unlikely to take part in elections. They will claim (as they did in March 1982) that their lives would be at risk. But they also know they can probably count on little popular support from the electorate, while the more extreme do not want an electoral solution at all. However the FDR parties are free to participate and the Peace Commission has invited them to do so.

3. The US hope that the election will return a strong moderate Government (eg; under Napoleon Duarte) with a sufficient mandate to press ahead with reforms, stamp out human rights abuses and tackle the ineffectiveness of the Salvadorean military. This would help restore domestic and international credibility and strengthen the Government's hand in any negotiation with the guerrillas. But it may not work that way: the right-wing may win and even Duarte may not be able to impose his will as he and the US would wish if he is elected.

/International observers



International observers

4. It is likely that international observers will be invited to witness and, by virtue of their presence, to help ensure fair play at the elections, probably on the same basis as in March 1982. HMG sent two (Sir J Galsworthy and Prof David Bowett). Observers will probably include representatives from the OAS.

DUARTE JOSE NAPOLEON, INGENIERO

Ex-President of the Republic

In his early fifties. Duarte is the leading politician of the Christian Democratic Party. Educated in the United States, he is an ex-Mayor of San Salvador. He lost the 1972 Presidential elections which allegedly were rigged to favour the government candidate. He was subsequently arrested and beaten by the army. Exiled to Venezuela, he returned in the late seventies and participated in the coalition Junta of 1979 when reformist army officers overthrew the government of General Romero. When the more radical members left the Junta in 1980 to ally themselves with the guerrillas, he headed a Christian Democratic/army Junta from 1980-82. This government introduced sweeping if not fully implemented agrarian and financial reforms but failed to either defeat or reach agreement with the guerrillas. After the right wing parties won the 1982 elections, Duarte was forced to retire from office. He is now busy reorganising the Christian Democratic Party for the 1983 election.

A sincere, tenacious and ambitious politician dedicated to a better way of life for the Salvadorean people. Anathema to the right wing.

Speaks English. Married with children.



El Salvador

GRS 850

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FM WASHINGTON 232315Z JUN 83

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1743 OF 23 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, BELMOPAN, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE,  
BOGOTA, ROUTINE PANAMA CITY, CARACAS, BRIDGETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO SAVING BIS GUATEMALA CITY

**CENTRAL AMERICA**

*lead in file.*

SUMMARY

1. DURING CALLS BY THE PUS YESTERDAY, SENATOR STONE (THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY) AND MICHEL (ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS) EMPHASISED U S SUPPORT FOR THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE, AND REALISATION THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO NO EARLY SOLUTION. THEY RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SALVADOREAN GUERRILLAS ABOUT POWER-SHARING, BUT INDICATED A READINESS TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS ON WAYS IN WHICH THE GERRILLAS MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

DETAIL

**EL SALVADOR**

2. MICHEL SAID THAT IT HAD TAKEN YEARS FOR THE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE TO THIS POINT, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY IMPROVEMENT. WHAT WAS NEEDED FOR ANY LASTING RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WAS A BROAD AND SUSTAINED EFFORT ON THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FRONT, PLUS ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE INSURGENCY PROBLEM. MICHEL CLAIMED TO DERIVE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD BEGUN TO TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE GUERRILLAS, WHOM THEY SUBSTANTIALLY OUT-NUMBERED. THEY HAD ALSO BEEN OPERATING A CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMME, PUSHING BACK THE GUERRILLAS FROM FARMING AREAS AND HELPING WITH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THE AMERICANS ATTACHED TO PROGRESS ON THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME.

3. WHILE MICHEL RULED OUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUERRILLAS AIMED AT POWER-SHARING, HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE GUERRILLAS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING THEM INTO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (IE PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS). THE PUS ASKED WHETHER THE SALVADOREANS WOULD WANT FOREIGN OBSERVERS FOR THEIR ELECTIONS, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE HAD TAKEN NO POSITION ON THIS. MICHEL EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD.

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/H. STONE



4. STONE SAID THAT BEFORE HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION HE HAD BEEN ADVISED BY THE MEXICAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON OF THE NEED TO LET THE LATINOS MOVE AT THEIR OWN PACE AND IN THEIR OWN TIME. THIS HAD BEEN HIS GUIDING PRINCIPLE. THE PUS NOTED THAT THIS ADVICE WAS FINE IF THERE WAS TIME. STONE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT EL SALVADOR WAS NOT GOING TO FALL AND THAT NICARAGUA WOULD INVADE NEITHER HONDURAS NOR COSTA RICA. THE PUS ASKED WHETHER THE SALVADOREAN GUERRILLAS WERE STILL RECEIVING MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM NICARAGUA. STONE SAID THAT THEY WERE, BUT THAT THE SUPPLIES WERE MAINLY IN THE FORM OF MUNITIONS. THE GUERRILLA STRENGTH (5-7,000) WAS THE SAME LEVEL AS TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO, AND THEY HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH WEAPONS. UNTIL RECENTLY, THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN WEAPONS FROM CAPTURED GOVERNMENT FORCES, BUT THE KILLING OF PRISONERS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ENCOURAGING THE GOVERNMENT FORCES TO FIGHT ON RATHER THAN SURRENDER. STONE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED TO SEE EL SALVADOR DEVELOP IN THE SAME WAY AS HAD COLUMBIA, WHERE THE GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE END HAD PROVEN TO HAVE LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO PROCEED DELIBERATELY IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE SALVADOREAN LEFT, AND THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY.

#### CONTADORA INITIATIVE

5. THE PUS ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ABIDE BY ANY CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES THAT MIGHT BE RECOMMENDED BY THE CONTADORA GROUP. MICHEL SAID THEY WOULD. THE AMERICANS WERE ENCOURAGED THAT THE INITIATIVE WAS FORCING THE CONTADORA FOUR TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE REGION'S PROBLEMS. THEY HOPED THE INITIATIVE WOULD HELP THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO EVOLVE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BIS GUATEMALA CITY.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FH MEXICO CITY 142240Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 554 OF 14 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MIPT: STONE'S TOUR OF CENTRAL AMERICA: EL SALVADOR

1. PRESEL SAID THAT STONE HAD ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE SALVADOREAN PEACE COUNCIL. PRESIDENT MAGANA HAD PRESIDED.
2. AT THIS MEETING IT HAD BEEN UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO AUTHORISE STONE TO ENTER WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS INTO DISCUSSION WITH THE SALVADOREAN GUERRILLA ORGANISATIONS. THE GUERRILLAS HAD LEFT MESSAGES IN VARIOUS CAPITALS, INCLUDING MANAGUA AND MEXICO TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WISHED TO SPEAK TO STONE. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD GIVEN ANY ANSWER. THE FACT THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAD PUBLICISED THEIR REQUEST SEEMED MOST UNPROMISING. PRESEL REPLIED THAT THOSE WHO HAD RECEIVED THE MESSAGES FOR STONE HAD SAID THAT STONE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE POSITION ON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. STONE HAD THEREFORE SEEN NO ONE FROM THE FDR ALTHOUGH HE WAS AWARE OF UNGO'S PRESENCE IN MEXICO.
3. PRESEL SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT NOW HAD A DIFFICULT DECISION TO TAKE. SOME WOULD ARGUE AGAINST ANY DEALINGS WITH THE GUERRILLAS AT ALL, THE MORE SO IN THE PRESENT MOOD IN WASHINGTON. OTHERS WOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS A CHANCE NOT TO BE MISSED BEFORE US INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR BECAME ANY DEEPER. IN HIS OWN VIEW A PRECONDITION OF ANY SUCH TALKS WOULD BE COMPLETE SECRECY. IF THE GUERRILLAS WERE TO REVEAL THAT THEY WERE TAKING PLACE OR WHAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION AT THEM, THEN THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BREAK OFF AND REPUDIATE THEM. THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE ENORMOUS PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OVER WHEN, HOW AND WHERE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. MOREOVER THE GUERRILLAS' IDEA OF AN AGENDA WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE AMERICANS'. NEVERTHELESS WITH THE GREEN LIGHT FROM THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT, THE US GOVERNMENT WAS IN A NEW SITUATION, AND WOULD HAVE TO THINK ITS POLICY THROUGH AGAIN.

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S E C R E T

4. I ASKED HOW WIDELY THIS NEWS WAS KNOWN. HE REPLIED THAT ON THE US SIDE IT WAS CONFINED TO STONE, HIS PRESENT TEAM, SHULTZ AND A RESTRICTED NUMBER IN WASHINGTON. SO FAR AS HE KNEW IT HAD GONE NO FURTHER.

5. PRESEL WENT ON TO SPEAK OF THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE SALVADOREAN ARMY. HOWEVER GOOD THE ADVICE IT MIGHT RECEIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES, IT SEEMED INCAPABLE OF TAKING THE AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH WERE NECESSARY TO COPE WITH THE INSURRECTION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE OUTGOING US AMBASSADOR IN EL SALVADOR DESERVED WELL OF HIS COUNTRY. HE HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB IN TELLING WASHINGTON THE SOMETIMES UNPALATABLE TRUTH ABOUT EL SALVADOR.

6. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY AND SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 542 OF 7 MARCH 1983,

INFO ROUTINE MEXICO CITY, BELMOPAN, TEGUCIGALPA, HAVANA, SAN JOSE.

MY TELNO 498: US/EL SALVADOR

## SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION CONCERN ABOUT EL SALVADOR HAS CONTINUED TO GROW. OPINIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE ONCE AGAIN SHARPLY DIVIDED. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS URGENTLY FOR DOLLARS 60 MILLION EMERGENCY MILITARY AID PROGRAMME TO ENABLE THEM TO MAINTAIN BROADLY THE CURRENT LEVEL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. BUT THERE IS AN UNDERCURRENT OF SUPPORT OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION AND EVEN, TO SOME EXTENT, WITHIN IT, FOR ENCOURAGING A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GUERRILLAS.

## DETAIL

2. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE TAKING AN INCREASINGLY GLOOMY VIEW ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR. SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE WORRIED AT HOW INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ARMY (D'AUBUISSON VERSUS DEFENCE MINISTER GARCIA) HAVE RESULTED IN A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN STRATEGY: THE REGIME'S FORCES HAVE NOW BEEN FORCED INTO A DEFENSIVE POSTURE INVOLVING RESPONSE TO ATTACK RATHER THAN SWEEPS AGAINST GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS. IT IS ASSUMED HERE THAT THE REBELS CAN ONLY BE DEFEATED OR HELD OFF THROUGH THE USE OF AN OFFENSIVE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, AND THERE IS GROWING CONCERN LEST THE LOSS OF INITIATIVE TO THE GUERRILLAS PRECIPITATE A SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MORALE. A REPORT ON THESE PROBLEMS BY MRS KIRKPATRICK FOLLOWING HER VISIT TO EL SALVADOR LAST MONTH IS SAID TO HAVE PARTICULARLY DISTURBED MR REAGAN. WHAT MAKES MATTERS WORSE IS THAT THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOW SAID TO HAVE ONLY 30/40 DAYS' SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE THEREFORE MAINTAINING PRESSURE IN CONGRESS FOR INCREASED MILITARY AID (PARAGRAPH 2 OF TUR).

3. THEY STILL FIRMLY RULE OUT ANY IDEA OF INVOLVING US PERSONNEL IN COMBAT IN EL SALVADOR, BUT THE PRESIDENT INDICATED AT THE WEEK-END THAT THE NUMBERS OF US MILITARY TRAINERS MAY BE INCREASED ABOVE 55. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE TRAINERS WILL BE ALLOWED CLOSER TO ACTUAL COMBAT SITUATIONS. PROVIDED THEY DO NOT TAKE PART IN ACTUAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, THESE CHANGES WILL NOT (NOT) REQUIRE FORMAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL BUT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE STRONG OPPOSITION ON THE HILL.

4. THIS SITUATION HAS LED TO A HARDENING IN ADMINISTRATION RHETORIC. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE A NUMBER OF STRONG STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEED TO RESIST SUBVERSION IN EL SALVADOR. 'EL SALVADOR IS ON THE FRONT LINE IN A BATTLE THAT IS REALLY AIMED AT THE VERY HEART OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND EVENTUALLY AT US'. THE DOMINO THEORY HAS RESURFACED. EVEN SHULTZ HAS TESTIFIED BEFORE CONGRESS

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IN TERMS REMINISCENT OF HIS PREDECESSOR AND WAS AT ONE STAGE DRAWN INTO IMPRUDENT CRITICISM OF CHURCH LEADERS, SOME OF WHOM HE ACCUSED OF WANTING "TO SEE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN EL SALVADOR IMPROVED". THIS HAS TRIGGERED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CRITICISM OF HIM IN THE US PRESS WHICH HAS UNTIL NOW GIVEN HIM AN EASY RIDE.

5. THIS HEIGHTENED RHETORIC, COUPLED WITH THE BRINGING FORWARD OF ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR, IS DESIGNED TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S AID PROPOSAL. THE PRESIDENT IS DUE TO LOBBY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AGAIN TOMORROW, THE SECOND SUCH MEETING IN TEN DAYS. BUT OUR CONTACTS ON THE HILL POINT OUT THAT NOT ONLY MOST DEMOCRATS BUT A NUMBER OF REPUBLICANS HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATIONS. THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR A PROPOSAL BEING CIRCULATED IN BOTH HOUSES WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PROVISION OF FURTHER AMERICAN MILITARY AID CONTINGENT ON THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SALVADOREAN AUTHORITIES AND THE GUERRILLAS, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY OPPOSES. AS SHULTZ PUT IT SUCCINCTLY, THE REBELS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SHOOT THEIR WAY INTO GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE PRIVATELY CONCERNED THAT IF THE SALVADOREAN REGIME ALLOWED GUERRILLA PARTICIPATION IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT, EITHER IT WOULD BE SWEEPED AWAY BY THE RIGHT WING OR THE GUERRILLAS WOULD PROGRESSIVELY DRIVE OUT OPPOSITION AS THE SANDINISTAS DID SO SUCCESSFULLY IN NICARAGUA.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION COULD IN THEORY GET ROUND OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS BY DRAWING ON A SPECIAL CONTINGENCY FUND OUTSIDE CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO TRY THIS BUT THEY MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT LESS AID THAN THEY ARE SEEKING AND A GREATER DEGREE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF ITS POLICY IN EL SALVADOR. IN THE MEANTIME THE US ATTITUDE TO REGIONAL ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION REMAINS QUIETLY SCEPTICAL.

7. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S TOUGHER LINE REFLECTS A DECLINE IN STATE DEPARTMENT INFLUENCE. ENDERS' BUREAU PREPARED A DISCUSSION PAPER WHICH CONTAINED THE IDEA OF DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT AND THE REBELS AS ONE POSSIBLE OPTION, PROVIDED THE GUERRILLAS, COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THEMSELVES TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SEVERAL STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE PRESENTED A ROSIER PICTURE THAN THAT BROUGHT BACK BY MRS KIRKPATRICK LAST MONTH, BUT IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE LATTER WHICH CAUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION AND REIGNITED HIS PERSONAL CONCERN.

8. THERE ARE ECHOES OF VIETNAM IN ALL THIS. PEOPLE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THAT THE PROCESS OF US INVOLVEMENT THERE BEGAN WITH INCREASING NUMBERS OF MILITARY ADVISERS. THE PENTAGON ARE TRYING TO REDUCE THIS EFFECT BY DESCRIBING THE US PERSONNEL IN EL SALVADOR AS "MILITARY TRAINERS". BUT THIS WILL DECEIVE NO-ONE. THE STAKES HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY RAISED BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S INSISTENCE

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/ THAT



# CONFIDENTIAL

THAT THE FUTURE OF EL SALVADOR IS A MATTER OF US NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS ISSUE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT TEST OF THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO GET WHAT HE REGARDS AS A VITAL ELEMENT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE NEW CONGRESS.

WRIGHT

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## CONFIDENTIAL

El Salvador

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FM WASHINGTON 022300Z MAR 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 498 OF 2 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE HMY BRITANNIA (FOR PS/S OF S). ROUTINE MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE, BELMOPAN, PANAMA CITY, HAVANA, CARACAS, BOGOTA.

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U.S./EL SALVADOR

SUMMARY

1. THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE SALVADORAN REGIME'S DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION. U.S. OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HAVE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OF PREVENTING THE OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME AS WELL AS CONTINUED AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT GUERILLA PARTICIPATION IN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. A CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LAUNCHED TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO AUTHORISE THE IMMEDIATE PROVISION OF AN EXTRA DOLLARS 60 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. THIS REQUEST IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER STRONG RESISTANCE ON THE HILL.

DETAIL

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ALARMED BY A FLOW OF GLOOMY ASSESSMENTS FROM EL SALVADOR INDICATING THAT THE REGIME'S MILITARY SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE PRECARIOUS. FAILURE BY THE LAST CONGRESS TO PASS A FOREIGN AID BILL HAS MEANT THAT ONLY DOLLARS 26 MILLION WAS ALLOCATED FOR MILITARY AID THIS YEAR (THE ADMINISTRATION ORIGINALLY SOUGHT DOLLARS 63.3 MILLION). A STRING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS, INCLUDING SHULTZ, WEINBERGER AND ENDERS, HAVE TESTIFIED IN THE LAST WEEK THAT THE REGIME FACES A DANGER OF MILITARY DEFEAT IF A FURTHER DOLLARS 60 MILLION IS NOT IMMEDIATELY MADE AVAILABLE. THE PRESIDENT SUMMONED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON MONDAY TO URGE SWIFT ACTION. CONGRESS REMAINS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. THERE MAY BE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THE AID CONTINGENT ON A SALVADORAN COMMITMENT TO ENTER INTO EARLY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FDR.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IS THAT THE REGIME'S MILITARY DEFEAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A SEVERE SET-BACK FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. SHULTZ WAS VERY FIRM ABOUT THIS DURING TESTIMONY ON THE HILL EARLIER IN THE WEEK AND CAME CLOSE TO BEING TESTY IN FACE OF CRITICISM.

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4. THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS OPPOSED TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE GUERILLAS WHICH WOULD BRING THE LATTER INTO A COALITION GOVERNMENT. SHULTZ INSISTED THAT THE REBELS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED QUOTE TO SHOOT THEIR WAY INTO POWER UNQUOTE AND THAT THEY SHOULD SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO ELECTIONS. IN THIS REGARD, FORMER SENATOR STONE HAS JUST VISITED EL SALVADOR TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING FORWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GUERILLAS TO PARTICIPATE. THE IDEA IS APPARENTLY THAT THIS SHOULD GAIN MORAL FORCE BY BEING TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE POPE2W VISIT.

5. THOUGHT IS ALSO BEING GIVEN TO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS IN EL SALVADOR: THERE ARE CURRENTLY LESS THAN 40 IN EL SALVADOR, AND THESE ARE PREVENTED FROM PLAYING ANY PART IN COMBAT. ANY ATTEMPT TO ALTER THEIR ROLE WOULD BE VERY STRONGLY RESISTED IN CONGRESS AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL EVEN IN ACHIEVING A SMALL INCREASE IN THEIR NUMBERS.

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( Repetition to SAN JOSE PANAMA CITY  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts. )

CONFIDENTIAL

DA  
bcc Press Office

HL

EL Salvador

30 April 1982

Observers' Report: El Salvador Election

I confirm that we have no objection to the publication arrangements you propose.

M A PATTISON

B.E. Bowley, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

577



El Salvador

FM TENDICRMLPA 301750Z

TO IMMEDIATE FOD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 30 APRIL  
AND TO ROUTINE SAN JOSE, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, MANAGUA  
INFO BELMOPAN, PANAMA CITY, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION GUATEMALA  
CITY.

mf

EL SALVADOR - NEW PRESIDENT

1. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY ELECTED SR. ALVARO MAGAÑO BY  
35 VOTES TO 17 AS PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR. HE WAS  
OPPOSED BY THE ARENA CANDIDATE SR. HUGO BARRERA. VICE PRESIDENTS  
ELECTED WERE SR. RAUL MOLINA (P.C.R.) AND SR. GABRIEL GUTIEREZ  
(ARENA).

2. MAGAÑO AGED 60 WAS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR P.C.R. IN 1969  
BUT IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS A MODERATE INDEPENDENT (BY  
SALVADOREAN STANDARDS). HE IS A BANKER. HE WAS SUGGESTED BY THE ARMY  
WHEN THE THREE LEADING PARTIES (P.D.C., ARENA AND P.C.R.) WERE  
UNABLE TO AGREE ON A CANDIDATE. P.D.C. AND P.C.R. WERE UNWILLING  
TO ACCEPT THE CANDIDATE PROPOSED BY ARENA WHICH NEEDS P.C.R. SUPPORT  
TO CONTROL THE ASSEMBLY.

3. RESULT MAY BE SEEN ABROAD BY SOME AS RETURN TO TRADITIONAL  
INTERFERENCE BY MILITARY TO CONTROL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER IN THIS  
CASE INITIAL INCLINATION TO AVOID SUCH CRITICISM WAS OVERTAKEN BY  
CONCERN THAT AN ARENA PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RECEIVE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL  
SUPPORT AND THAT SUCCESS OF ELECTIONS WOULD BE FRITTERED AWAY BY  
SCRAMBLING POLITICIANS. BOTH GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS MILITARY ASKED  
SALVADOREAN ARMY LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCESS TO PRODUCE MORE  
WIDELY SUPPORTED CANDIDATE.

4. IT IS TOO EARLY TO FORECAST HOW EFFECTIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT  
WILL BE. KEY FACTOR IS WHETHER THE ASSEMBLY WILL TRY TO CONTROL  
GOVERNMENT POLICY OR BE RIVEN OFF TO CONSIDER NEW CONSTITUTION  
AND FUTURE ELECTIONS AS IN HONDURAS IN 1980/81.

FOD PASS TO ALL.

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*Mr Ingham*

*I see no problem: the report is already in the House Library. Agree?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

*MAP 29/iv.*

*Pattison*

*Yes. But - I do wish we could reach a case iron, top-down agreement on simultaneous publication & placing in Library. Any Member would give the report now in the library to a journalist, leading to presentation on someone else's terms.*

*Dear Mike,*

OBSERVERS' REPORT : EL SALVADOR ELECTION

We propose to publish on Friday 7 May as a White Paper the report of the United Kingdom observers sent to the recent election in El Salvador.

Publication in the Command Paper series is fore-shadowed in a written answer by Mr Douglas Hurd to Mr Jocelyn Cadbury on 22 April (Official Report, Column 140, copy attached).

I should be grateful if you, and those to whom I am copying this letter, would kindly confirm that there is no objection to publication.

*Yours ever,  
Brian*

B E Bowley  
Parliamentary Clerk

cc: D C R Heyhoe Esq  
Office of the Lord President of the Council  
and Leader of the House  
70 Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1

P Moore Esq  
Government Chief Whip's Office  
12 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1



**Mr. Wiggin:** Work is now complete, and the first occupants will be moving in shortly; I expect all the flats to be occupied by the end of next month.

### NORTHERN IRELAND

#### Police (Numbers)

**Mr. Ralph Howell** asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for Norfolk, North 11 February, *Official Report*, c. 420, regarding the total numbers employed by the police forces in Northern Ireland, why figures at constant prices are not now readily available.

**Mr. John Patten:** I refer my hon. Friend to the reply given on 31 March 1982 by my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore).—[Vol. 21, c. 124.]

However, the annual staff costs at outturn prices for Royal Ulster Constabulary and Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve officers and civilian support staff for the financial years referred to in my earlier reply are as follows:

	RUC and RUC 'R' Officers £	Civilian Support Staff £	Total £
1971-72	13,464,000	546,000	14,010,000
1979-80	84,823,000	4,990,000	89,813,000
1981-82	139,370,000	7,000,000	146,370,000

### EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

#### Community Documents (Explanatory Memoranda)

**Mr. Stainton** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what arrangements are made for public access to explanatory memoranda on European Community documents.

**Mr. Hurd:** We have arranged that after explanatory memoranda have been delivered to Parliament, copies will be sent to four "Depository Libraries" which, by their own direct arrangements with the European Commission, already maintain a supply of the documents to which the memoranda relate. These libraries are the lending and reference divisions of the British library, the City of Westminster central library and the Liverpool and District scientific, industrial and research library. Copies of the memoranda will also be made available to the national libraries of Scotland and Wales, and to Queen's university library, Belfast.

I hope that these arrangements, which have been agreed by the Scrutiny Committee, will help to improve public understanding of the Community.

### FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

#### Israeli Settlements, West Bank

**Mr. Marlow** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will seek, through the European initiative, to minimise Israeli settlements on the West Bank with the objective of preventing problems similar to those in Sinai when an eventual settlement is reached.

**Mr. Hurd:** The Israeli Government are well aware of our strong views on the need for them to halt the expansion of their settlements in the occupied territories. As the Venice declaration makes clear, we and our partners in the Ten regard these settlements as a serious obstacle to the peace process, and illegal under international law.

#### South Atlantic Islands (British Sovereignty)

**Mr. Wigley** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the historical basis of British assertion of sovereignty, respectively, over (a) Port Egmont, (b) West Falklands, (c) East Falklands, (d) South Georgia, (e) the South Sandwich Islands, (f) South Orkneys, (g) South Shetlands and (h) Graham Lands.

**Mr. Pym:** The United Kingdom has sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, its dependencies and the British Antarctic territory. The basis for British title to each of the individual islands, island groups and territories specified in the question differs according to the historical circumstances in which they came under United Kingdom possession, control and occupation, taking into account the administrative units of which they now form part. We have no doubt about our title to each of the possessions listed.

#### El Salvador

**Mr. Cadbury** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when he expects to receive the report of the United Kingdom observers sent to the recent elections in El Salvador.

**Mr. Hurd** [pursuant to his reply, 6 April 1982, c. 306]: A full report has now been received by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House today, pending its publication in the Command Paper series.

### SOCIAL SERVICES

#### Safety of Medicines

**Dr. Roger Thomas** asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will establish an investigation into the safety of medicines used for treating broncho-respiratory diseases, including those which can be purchased over the counter, in view of suggestions that some may be cardiotoxic.

**Mr. Kenneth Clarke:** Matters relating to adverse reactions to medicinal products are the responsibility of the licensing authority advised as necessary by the Committee on Safety of Medicines. The authority is aware of recent reports of the cardiotoxicity of some products used for the relief of symptoms of broncho-respiratory disease. These reports are being considered though they would seem to contain little that is new.

#### Unemployed Nurses

**Dr. Roger Thomas** asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will estimate the number of unemployed nurses who are not registered as unemployed.

**Mr. Kenneth Clarke:** No. There is no information available on which such an estimate could be based.



El Salvador

FM FOO 251730Z APRIL 1982  
TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
TEL NO GUIDANCE NUMBER 78 OF 26 APRIL 1982

WIPGT: EL SALVADOR

BACKGROUND (FOR USE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS ONLY)

1. INSTEAD OF GIVING GREATER SUPPORT FOR THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY LED BY PRESIDENT DUARTE, AS WAS WIDELY HOPED, 60 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE VOTED FOR PARTIES TO THE RIGHT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. THESE PARTIES HAVE FORMED A COALITION LED BY MAJOR ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON OF ARENA, NOW PRESIDENT OR SPEAKER OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. AN INTERIM HEAD OF STATE HAS YET TO BE APPOINTED TO REPLACE PRESIDENT DUARTE. IT IS

UNLIKELY THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARE CONTINUING.

2. THE PROPOSAL BY THE MEXICANS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EXILED MODERATES OF THE SALVADOREAN LEFT AND THE GOVERNMENT MUST NOW BE REGARDED AS UNLIKELY TO BE IMPLEMENTED. GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING; THOUGH GUERRILLA LEADERS WILL HAVE REALISED THAT THE TURNOUT AT THE ELECTIONS HAS UNDERMINED THEIR CLAIM TO ENJOY SUBSTANTIVE POPULAR SUPPORT. FOR THEIR PART, THE ARMED FORCES MAY LAUNCH AN INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS.

3. THE US GOVERNMENT ARE STILL CONSIDERING THEIR POSITION, BUT HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS MUST CONTINUE. THE LATTER WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED US ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR. WE RECOGNISE THE PRIMACY OF US INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND SEE NO IMMEDIATE SCOPE FOR AN EC ROLE.

PYM

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TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

TEL NO GUIDANCE 77 OF 26 APRIL 1982

EL SALVADOR

INTRODUCTION

1. THE FINAL REPORT OF OBSERVERS APPOINTED BY HMG TO MONITOR THE SALVADOREAN ELECTIONS WAS MADE PUBLIC ON 23 APRIL. (COPIES HAVE BEEN SENT TO CERTAIN POSTS. FURTHER COPIES WILL SHORTLY BE AVAILABLE FROM HMSO). THIS MAY STIMULATE INTEREST BOTH IN THE REPORT ITSELF AND IN HMG'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS.

LINE TO TAKE

2. THE OBSERVERS' REPORT SHOWS THAT AN EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH PROPORTION OF THE ELIGIBLE ELECTORATE IN EL SALVADOR-ABOUT 75 PER CENT-TURNED OUT TO VOTE DESPITE A CALL BY THE GUERRILLAS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. THIS WAS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE WANT TO SEE THEIR FUTURE DECIDED BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND NOT BY MILITARY MEANS. IT WAS A CONSIDERABLE MORAL SETBACK FOR THE GUERRILLAS (ALTHOUGH IS UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT).

3. THE REPORT ALSO CONCLUDED THAT:-

A) THE SALVADOREAN ELECTORAL LAW CONTAINED SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE A RESULT REFLECTING THE SENTIMENTS OF THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE.

B) THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS WAS FAIR; THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE OF INTIMIDATION, COERCION, OR BALLOT-RIGGING.

C) MOST SALVADOREANS INTERVIEWED SAID THAT THE FAILURE BY THE LEFT TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES WAS BECAUSE THEY LACKED SUPPORT, THOUGH THE FEAR OF THE LEFT FOR THE SAFETY OF THEIR CANDIDATES WAS NOT WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

4. WE SEE THE ELECTIONS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF EL SALVADOR'S PROBLEMS. WE LOOK TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO CURB HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, TO BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ABUSES TO TRIAL, AND TO MAINTAIN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NECESSARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. IT IS FOR THEM TO DECIDE WHAT FORM THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND FURTHER REFORMS SHOULD NOW TAKE. BUT WE CALL ON ALL THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR TO BRING IT TO AN END AND TO HELP FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK.

BACKGROUND (TO BE USED FREELY)

5. SEE GUIDANCE TEL NO 19 OF 17 FEBRUARY.

/ 6. FOLLOWING



6. FOLLOWING A REQUEST BY THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT HMG APPOINTED TWO DISTINGUISHED INDEPENDENT FIGURES, PROF. DEREK BOWETT QC, PRESIDENT OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE AND SIR JOHN GALSWORDY KCVO, CMG, FORMER BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, TO OBSERVE THE SALVADOREAN ELECTIONS. THEY WERE ASKED TO REPORT AS THEY FOUND. OFFICIAL OBSERVERS WERE SENT BY 16 OTHER COUNTRIES AND A NUMBER OF UNOFFICIAL OBSERVERS ATTENDED. THE BRITISH OBSERVERS WERE THE FIRST TO ARRIVE AND VISITED EIGHT OF THE COUNTRY'S 14 DEPARTMENTS.

7. THE ELECTIONS HELD ON 28 MARCH WERE FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WITH THE INTENTION OF ELABORATING A CONSTITUTION IN PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS IN 1983.

8. SEE NIPGT.

PYM

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TELEGRAM NO 1056 OF 31 MARCH  
INFO MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE : EL SALVADOR

AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 31 MARCH, PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS ASKED WHETHER THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AN EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT WHICH ABANDONED SOCIAL REFORMS OR WHICH WAS HEADED BY AUBUISSON.

2. REAGAN SAID HIS ADMINISTRATION WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. THEY WOULD FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IF THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR TURNED AWAY FROM REFORMS. BUT BEFORE ANYONE WENT LOOKING FOR TROUBLE THEY SHOULD CONSIDER INSTEAD THE INSPIRING EXAMPLE SET BY THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND BY THE COURAGE OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD SHOWN A REAL DESIRE FOR DEMOCRACY. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC AND WOULD SHELTER BEHIND HIS OPTIMISM TO AVOID A SPECIFIC ANSWER TO THE QUESTION.

HENDERSON

THIS TELEGRAM  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 31 MARCH  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY (FOR MR LUCE)

YOUR TELNO RB. EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUMMARY OF OBSERVERS REPORT.

BEGINS

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE,  
FROM SIR JOHN GALSWORTHY AND PROFESSOR BOWETT.

1. IN THE TALK WE HAD WITH YOU ON 4 MARCH FOLLOWING OUR NOMINATION AS BRITISH OBSERVERS OF THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR, IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD SEND YOU, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE EVENT, A SUMMARY OF OUR MAIN IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH WILL BE SET OUT IN DETAIL IN OUR SUBSEQUENT REPORT. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

2. GENERAL COMMENTS.

(A) THE SALVADOREAN AUTHORITIES PROVIDED US WITH VERY ADEQUATE FACILITIES TO SEE WHAT WE WANTED. THE ONLY LIMITING FACTORS WERE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION WHICH EVOLVED FROM DAY TO DAY, THE AVAILABILITY OF REASONABLY SECURE MEANS OF TRANSPORT, AND TIME:

(B) THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SALVADOREAN AUTHORITIES FOR OUR PERSONAL SAFETY WERE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT BEING OPPRESSIVE. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DEAR-LEAD US OR TO SUBJECT US TO OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA. WE WERE GIVEN ACCESS TO THOSE INVOLVED IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AT ALL LEVELS:

(C) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SEND OBSERVERS IN AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH THE OBJECTIVE FACTS OF THE SITUATION WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC ALIKE.

3. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CAMPAIGN

(A) THOUGH WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS, THE TRANSITIONAL ELECTORAL LAW CONTAINED NO OPPORTUNITIES FOR EASY FRAUD AND EMBODIED A FAIRLY SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES:

(B) THE RIGHT TO VOTE WAS BASED ON THE POSSESSION OF A VALID PERSONAL IDENTITY CARD. WE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE ABSENCE OF ELECTORAL ROLLS (AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE UK) DETRACTED IN ANY WAY FROM THE VALIDITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. ON PAST OCCASIONS THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN AN ACTUAL MEANS OF FRAUD (EG THE USE OF OUT-OF-DATE ROLLS), AND, GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION

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/ WHICH



WHICH HAVE RESULTED FROM GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, INSISTENCE ON THIS OCCASION ON A PERSON VOTING ONLY WHERE HE OR SHE HAPPENED TO HAVE BEEN DOMICILED ON REACHING VOTING AGE WOULD HAVE DEPRIVED LARGE NUMBERS OF THE ELECTORATE OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE. THERE WERE RUMOURS THAT UNSPECIFIED NUMBERS OF FALSE IDENTITY CARDS WERE BEING ISSUED, BUT WE COULD FIND NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS ALLEGATION AND WE DO NOT IN ANY CASE CONSIDER THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN PRACTISED ON A SCALE SUFFICIENT TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF A SUSTAINED AND WIDE-SPREAD CAMPAIGN BY THE LEFT TO STEAL AND DESTROY AUTHENTIC IDENTITY CARDS:

(C) THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED (FOR THE FIRST TIME) OF THE INVISIBLE MARKING OF PERSON'S FINGER AND IDENTITY CARD TO PREVENT MULTIPLE VOTING PROVIDED IN OUR VIEW AND ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD AGAINST THIS TYPE OF FRAUD:

(D) IN ADDITION TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES PRESENT AT EACH POLLING STATION, MANY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS (SUCH AS DOCTORS, TEACHERS, AGRICULTURISTS ETC.) WITH NO APPARENT POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL CONNECTION WERE COOPTED TO PARTICIPATE IN OPERATING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AT ALL LEVELS. THEIR COLLUSION WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ESSENTIAL PRE-REQUISITE FOR ANY LARGE SCALE ATTEMPT AT FRAUD:

(E) WHILST THE INTENSITY OF PARTY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING VARIED ACROSS THE COUNTRY, NO SINGLE PARTY HAD A MONOPOLY OF MEDIA SPACE OR TIME, AND WE SAW NO INHERENT REASON WHY ANY GIVEN PARTY SHOULD NOT GET ITS MESSAGE ACROSS IF IT WISHED. WE HEARD OF NO REPORTS OF DISORDER AT PUBLIC MEETINGS, AND ONLY ONE OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES WAS DESCRIBED TO US AS HAVING USED IN TWO PLACES COERCIVE CAMPAIGNING METHODS. ON THE OTHER HAND WE HEARD NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS OF WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION BY LEFT-WING GROUPS:

(F) THE DECISION OF THE ARMED FORCES NOT TO VOTE AND TO CONFINE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, OF VOTING BOOTHS AND RETURNS, UNDOUBTEDLY LENT ENHANCED CREDIBILITY TO THE WHOLE EXERCISE IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC.

#### 4. THE ELECTIONS

(A) THE TURNOUT OF VOTERS WAS UNPRECEDENTED AND VASTLY EXCEEDED EXPECTATIONS. THE FINAL TOTAL IS LIKELY TO BE ABOUT 1.2 MILLION OR 75% OF THE ELECTORATE. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO CLEARER DEMONSTRATION OF THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE'S OVERWHELMING PREFERENCE FOR A SETTLEMENT BY THE BALLOT RATHER THAN THE BULLET:

(B) THE LEFT DID THEIR BEST TO DISRUPT THE VOTING BY ATTACKS ON POLLING BOOTHS IN THE CAPITAL AND THE TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF CERTAIN TOWNS AND VILLAGES, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COUNTRY (USULUTAN). THE IMPACT WAS MINIMAL AND THE STOICISM OF THE VOTERS MOST IMPRESSIVE:

(C) THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AT THE VOTING BOOTHS OWING TO DISORGANISATION, THE NON-DELIVERY OF BALLOT PAPERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS DELAY IN DISTRIBUTING FURTHER SUPPLIES OF



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VOTING PAPERS TO MEET THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED DEMAND. BUT THESE DEFICIENCIES WERE MOSTLY REMEDIED AND ARE UNLIKELY, IN OUR VIEW, TO HAVE HAD MUCH EFFECT ON THE ULTIMATE RESULTS, THOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY NUMBERS OF VOTERS WERE UNABLE TO CAST THEIR VOTE BEFORE THE BOOTHS CLOSED:

(D) THE VOTING STATIONS WE VISITED, BOTH IN THE COUNTRY AND IN THE CAPITAL PROVIDED ADEQUATE CONDITIONS OF PRIVACY FOR THE VOTER, AND THE COUNTS WHICH WE PERSONALLY WATCHED WERE PROPERLY AND CAREFULLY CONDUCTED. WE HEARD OF NO COMPLAINTS BY PARTY WATCHDOGS WHO WERE PRESENT IN STRENGTH:

(E) THE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES WERE USED TO REPEL GUERRILLA ATTACKS, TO PATROL THE SMALLER ROADS CONNECTING OUTLYING VILLAGES WITH POLLING CENTRES, AND TO ASSIST WITH ORDERLY CROWD CONTROL AT SOME OF THE LATTER. WE SAW NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF ANY ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE OR COERCE PEOPLE INTO VOTING:

(F) THE RETURNS FROM THE POLLING STATIONS, EXCEPT THOSE IN OR CLOSE TO THE CAPITAL, WERE SLOW TO COME IN AND THE FINAL DEFINITIVE COUNT HAD NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED BY THE TIME WE LEFT ON 31 MARCH. FROM THE ENQUIRIES WE MADE, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THIS DELAY WAS DUE TO THREE CAUSES:

(I) THE SHEER SIZE OF THE VOTE WHICH EXCEEDED ALL FORECASTS:

(II) THE COMPLICATED SYSTEM OF COUNTING THE VOTES AND PREPARING THE FINAL REPORTS OF RETURNING OFFICERS. THE SYSTEM, DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE FRAUD, WAS OVER-SOPHISTICATED FOR MANY OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN OPERATING IT, AND THIS NECESSITATED A GOOD DEAL OF RE-CHECKING TO RECONCILE ARITHMETICAL DISCREPANCIES:

(III) THE INADEQUACY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS HEAVILY OVERLOADED:

(G) DESPITE THIS DELAY THERE WAS NO CREDIBLE REPORT OF FRAUD AND NO REQUESTS FOR THE NULLIFICATION OF ELECTIONS. NOR HAD ANY OTHER COMPLAINTS BEEN LODGED BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE TIME WE LEFT:

(H) OUR VIEW (AND THE CONSENSUS OF OTHER OBSERVERS WITH WHOM WE COMPARED IMPRESSIONS) IS THEREFORE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR, AND THAT THEY REPRESENTED A MASSIVE AND SPONTANEOUS REJECTION OF THE CONFRONTATION ADVOCATED BY THE LEFT.

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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

(A) WE WERE NOT OF THE OPINION THAT CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE (STILL LESS IN THE MAIN CENTRES OF POPULATION) WERE SUCH AS TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS IRRELEVANT AND THEIR OUTCOME INVALID. WE ENCOUNTERED A WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT, DESPITE THE DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH THEY WERE BEING HELD, ELECTIONS OFFERED NOT THE SOLUTION, BUT THE FIRST AND ONLY PRACTICABLE STEP TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENCE:

(B) MOST PEOPLE ATTRIBUTED THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF THE LEFT PRIMARILY TO FEAR ON THE LATTER'S PART THAT THEY WOULD BE SHOWN TO ENJOY VERY LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT, AND SECONDLY TO THEIR DOCTRINAL CONTEMPT FOR ELECTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FEAR OF THE LEFT FOR THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF LEFT-WING CANDIDATES, HAD THERE BEEN ANY, WAS NOT WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.

6. D FINAL COMMENT

WE WORKED THROUGHOUT AS A TEAM AND THE ABOVE REPRESENTS OUR JOINT VIEW, NOT A COMPROMISE BETWEEN DIVERGENT IMPRESSIONS.

SIGNED: DEPEK DOWETT

JOHN GALSWORDY

ENDE

SHARKEY

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*El Salvador*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 231 OF 30 MARCH

INFO WASHINGTON TEGUCIGALPA SAN JOSE HAVANA UKMIS NEW YORK  
PARIS.

WASHINGTON TELNO 1025: EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

1. THE HIGH TURN-OUT IN THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY MOST OF THE MEXICAN PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION AS AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS FOR THE RULING JUNTA AND AS A SET-BACK FOR THE GUERRILLAS. EVEN THE LEFT-WING PRESS HAS GRUDGINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GENUINE ELECTIONS TOOK PLACE.

2. ASKED YESTERDAY ABOUT THE MEXICAN VIEW ON THE ELECTIONS, PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID THAT IT WAS NOT FOR MEXICO TO HAVE AN OPINION. THIS WAS FOR THE SALVADOREANS THEMSELVES. THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT THE PATH CHOSEN TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WAS LEGITIMATE AND INSTITUTIONAL, AND WOULD ELIMINATE VIOLENCE. MEXICO FERVENTLY RESPECTED THE INTERNAL PROCESSES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, IN THE SAME WAY THAT MEXICO WANTED ITS INTERNAL PROCESSES TO BE RESPECTED BY OTHERS. THE FACT THAT THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO RISK THEIR LIVES TO GO OUT TO VOTE WAS QUOTE A BEAUTIFUL SPECTACLE UNQUOTE.

3. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

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 FM WASHINGTON 300042Z MAR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1025 OF 29 MARCH

INFO SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA MEXICO CITY HAVANA UKMIS NEW YORK  
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MY TELNO 995: EL SALVADOR

1. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE AVOIDING DETAILED COMMENT UNTIL THE FULL RESULTS ARE KNOWN, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN GREATLY RELIEVED BY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN EL SAVADOR. THESE APPEAR TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUED ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, NAMELY A HIGH TURN-OUT AND A GOVERNMENT LED BY DUARTE AND THE CENTRISTS AND COMMITTED TO THE REFORMS HE HAS BEEN SEEKING TO INITIATE. HAIG HAS WELCOMED THE HIGH TURN-OUT AS A MILITARY AS WELL AS POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR THE GUERILLAS. THE SIZE OF THE POLL HAS EXCEEDED US EXPECTATIONS. THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WILL BE ABLE TO FORM A COALITION WITH ONE OF THE SMALLER PARTIES, BUT WHICH MAY EXCLUDE MAJOR D'AUBUISSON AND ARENA.
2. THE US MEDIA, FROM WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SINGULARLY FAILED TO WIN SUPPORT FOR ITS POLICY, HAVE CLEARLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. THE SIGHT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF EL SALVADORANS VOTING IN A TECHNICALLY WELL CONDUCTED ELECTION AT CONSIDERABLE INCONVENIENCE OR DANGER TO THEMSELVES, HAS BEEN IN IMPRESSIVE CONTRAST TO THE PROTEST MEETINGS HELD IN US CITIES OVER THE WEEKEND BY OPPONENTS OF US POLICY ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION IS AWARE THAT THE ELECTION WILL NOT END THE FIGHTING, THE LARGE POLL AND THE EVIDENT DETERMINATION OF EL SALVADORANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WILL ENABLE THEM TO CONTINUE SUPPORT; AND WILL, THEY HOPE, STRENGTHEN DUARTE'S HAND VIS A VIS THE MILITARY COMMANDERS AND IN ANY ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOME ELEMENTS AT LEAST OF THE OPPOSITION.

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FM TEGUCIGALPA 291540Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 29 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MEXICO CITY ROUTINE SAN JOSE BELMOPAN  
918 GUATEMALA CITY HAVANA

EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

1. THERE WAS A LARGE AND ENTHUSIASTIC POLL IN YESTERDAY'S SALVADOREAN ELECTIONS. VERY EARLY RESULTS (10 PERCENT OF POLL) AT 1200Z GIVE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 40 PERCENT, ARENA 30 PERCENT, PCN 15 PERCENT, ACCION DEMOCRATICA 10 PERCENT AND PPS/POP 5 PERCENT. TURNOUT ESTIMATED TO BE IN EXCESS OF 50 PERCENT EXCEEDING EVEN THE JUNTA'S EXPECTATIONS.
2. THERE WAS SOME VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE DAY BUT THIS DID NOT AFFECT THE MAJORITY OF VOTING CENTRES. THERE WAS SPORADIC SHOOTING IN THE CAPITAL AND ONE INCIDENT THERE IN WHICH ABOUT A DOZEN GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED. GUERRILLA VIOLENCE ISOLATED THE PROVINCIAL TOWN OF USULUTAN WHICH I WAS UNABLE TO ENTER. IN A SMALL NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN THE GUERRILLA-HELD AREAS, VOTING WAS NOT POSSIBLE. AN ESTIMATED 5 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE WAS THUS PREVENTED FROM VOTING. THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE OF THREATS TO VOTING COMMITTEES BY THE GUERRILLAS AND BURNING OF BUSES UNDOUBTEDL REDUCED PARTICIPATION IN COUNTRY AREAS.
3. THE PATIENT AND GOOD-HUMOURED QUEUES OF THOUSANDS OF VOTERS WHO STOOD FOR HOURS IN THE HEAT (AND OFTEN WALKED MANY MILES TO GET THERE) INDICATED CLEARLY THE PEOPLE'S WISH FOR ELECTIONS. ADMINISTRATION OF THE POLLING CENTRES WAS ON THE WHOLE SATISFACTORY. AT TIMES THE CUMBERSOME ELECTORAL PROCEDURE AND THE LACK OF EXPERIENCE CAUSED ERRORS. HOWEVER I RECEIVED NO SUGGESTIONS OF FRAUD OR INTERFERENCE BY ARMY.
4. I SPENT ELECTION DAY PARTLY IN CAPITAL AND PARTLY VISITING PROVINCES OF LA UNION, SAN MIGUEL, AND USULUTAN. IN THE TWO PREVIOUS DAYS, I TOURED THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SANTA ANA, SONSONATE, LA LIBERTAD AND MORAZAN. IN SAN FRANCISCO DE GOTERA WHICH BORDERS GUERRILLA-HELD AREA, I VISITED THE BRITISH NUNS (YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBER 71 AND 77) AND FOUND THEM IN GOOD FORM AND NOT INTERESTED. I CHECKED AGAIN LAST NIGHT BY PHONE AS THERE HAD BEEN SHOOTING ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THEIR TOWN AND THEY WERE SAFE.

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5. THE BRITISH OBSERVERS HAVE VISITED A WIDE AREA OF THE COUNTRY AND HAVE BEEN PLEASED WITH WHAT THEY SAW. THEY HAVE HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM AND COOPERATION FROM THE AUTHORITIES. THEY WERE IMPRESSED AS WERE THE MANY OTHER OBSERVERS BY THE LARGE TURNOUT, THE ANXIETY OF THE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE AND THE ABSENCE SO FAR OF ANY EVIDENCE OF FRAUD.

6. IN GENERAL, THE RESULT HAS BEEN A VICTORY FOR HOLDING ELECTIONS AND A DEFEAT FOR THE GUERRILLAS' ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THEM.  
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SHARKEY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE TECUCICALPA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 OF 29 MARCH

YOUR TELEGRAM 88: OBSERVERS

1. THE OBSERVERS WILL PRESUMABLY GIVE YOU A COPY OF THE SUMMARY OF THEIR REPORT FOR TELEGRAPHING (WITH REPETITION TO MEXICO CITY FOR MR LUCE) AND WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL ON ARRIVAL HERE. I HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO COME INTO THE OFFICE ON 2 APRIL (I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM IF POSSIBLE) AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR THEM TO BE MET AT HEATHROW.

CARRINGTON

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FM TEGUCIGALPA 001730Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 00 OF 22 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY SAN JOSE WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING BIS GUATAMALA CITY

EL SALVADOR: ELECTIONS.

1. HOPEFULLY NEXT SUNDAYS ELECTIONS WILL BEGIN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SO LONG DENIED TO THE ELECTORATE AND REVEAL THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE CENTRE AND RIGHT WING PARTIES. IF THEY FAIL THROUGH FRAUD, DISINTEREST OR INTIMIDATION THE ALTERNATIVE IS LIKELY TO BE A RIGHT OR LEFT WING AUTHORITARIAN REGIME.
2. SIX PARTIES WILL PARTICIPATE (I) CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (PDC) (II) NATIONAL REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) (III) NATIONAL CONCILIATION PARTY (PCN) (IV) DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (AD) (V) SALVADOREAN PEOPLES PARTY (PPS) (VI) PEOPLES DIRECTION PARTY (POP). SEVENTH PARTY, ACTION RENEWAL PARTY (PAR), DID NOT NOMINATE ITS CANDIDATES IN TIME AND THESE WERE DISQUALIFIED. AN EIGHTH, "BUSINESSMEN FARMERS AND WORKERS" FAILED TO OBTAIN THE 2000 SIGNATURES NEEDED FOR LEGALISATION AS A PARTY.
3. ONLY THE FIRST THREE PARTIES HAVE CANDIDATES NATIONWIDE. THE OTHER THREE WHICH ARE SMALL HAVE LIMITED THEIR NOMINATIONS DUE TO LACK OF FUNDS AND PARTY ORGANISATION. THE CONTEST IS REALLY BETWEEN PDC, ARENA AND PCN.
4. ON POLICIES THE PDC FAVOURS CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM FIRMER CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND (ALTHOUGH NOT ADMITTED PUBLICLY) POST ELECTORAL TALKS WITH FDR TO INCORPORATE THEM INTO THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE. ARENA WANTS A RUTHLESS ANTI GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN (PRECEDED BY AN AMNESTY) AND AN END TO THE DUARTE REFORMS. PCN ACCEPTS THE REFORMS SO FAR IMPLEMENTED BUT WANTS NO MORE. IT RESERVES ITS POSITION ON WHICH OF THE OTHER TWO PARTIES IT WOULD SUPPORT IN A COALITION UNTIL IT SEES THE RESULTS. IDEOLOGICALLY IT IS CLOSER TO ARENA BUT KNOWS THAT DUARTE IS NECESSARY TO RETAIN U.S. SUPPORT. THE THREE SMALL PARTIES (AD, PPS AND POP) HAVE NO RECOGNISABLE POLICIES BUT ARE NOT AVERSE TO TALKS WITH THE FDR.
5. THE SIZE OF THE ELECTORATE IS UNKNOWN BUT IS ESTIMATED AT 1 1/4 MILLION; LIKELY PARTICIPATION IS 30 - 50 PER CENT. MORE THAN 500,000 VOTES WILL BE SEEN AS VICTORY FOR THE ELECTIONS, WHOEVER WINS; LESS THAN 400,000 WILL BE A VICTORY FOR THE QUERRILLAS. THE 70 SEAT CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WILL APPOINT A NEW PRESIDENT AND CABINET.

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6. THE PDC SHOULD WIN WITH ARENA A CLOSE SECOND PCN A POOR THIRD AND THE THREE SMALL PARTIES TAKING NO MORE THAN 10 PER CENT OF THE VOTE. PROBABLY NO PARTY WILL WIN A MAJORITY AND EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THE PDC WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IF THEY HAVE A DECISIVE ROLE. DUARTE WILL NOT LEND HIS NAME TO A COALITION WHICH WOULD USE HIM TO RETAIN U.S. SUPPORT WHILE STOPPING REFORMS NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE INEQUALITIES OF THE PAST - TO WHICH THE GUERRILLA INSURGENCY IS A RESPONSE, WHOEVER HELPS THEM.

7. IF ARENA AND PCN FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE WHITE HOUSE COULD RESIST CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO STOP ESSENTIAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID. IF THE PDC WINS OR DOMINATES A COALITION GOVERNMENT THE U.S. WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE ITS AID, DUARTE'S INFLUENCE OVER THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE STRENGTHENED AND TALKS COULD BE STARTED TO INCORPORATE THE FDP INTO SALVADOREAN POLITICAL LIFE. HOWEVER THESE WOULD NOT BE TO FORM A NEW BROADER GOVERNMENT WITH THE FDP/ FMLN UNLESS THE LATTER COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ELECTION RATHER THAN POWER SHARING.

8. THE BEST RESULT WOULD BE A PDC MAJORITY FOLLOWED BY TALKS WITH THE FDP AND NEW ELECTIONS WITHIN A LIMITED TIME. THE WORST WOULD BE AN ARENA VICTORY. THE MOST LIKELY IS A PDC LED COALITION. FCO PASS ALL AND PASS SAVING TO BIS GUATANALA CITY.

SHARKEY

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 OF 22 MARCH  
INFO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY SAN JOSE WASHINGTON  
INFO SAYING BIS GUATAMALA CITY

EL SALVADOR: ELECTIONS.

1. HOPEFULLY NEXT SUNDAYS ELECTIONS WILL BEGIN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SO LONG DENIED TO THE ELECTORATE AND REVEAL THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE CENTRE AND RIGHT WING PARTIES, IF THEY FAIL THROUGH FRAUD, DISINTEREST OR INTIMIDATION THE ALTERNATIVE IS LIKELY TO BE A RIGHT OR LEFT WING AUTHORITARIAN REGIME.
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8. THE BEST RESULT WOULD BE A PDC MAJORITY FOLLOWED BY TALKS WITH THE FDR AND NEW ELECTIONS WITHIN A LIMITED TIME. THE WORST WOULD BE AN ARENA VICTORY. THE MOST LIKELY IS A PDC LED COALITION. FCO PASS ALL AND PASS SAVING TO BIS GUATAMALA CITY.

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TO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 18 MARCH

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EL SALVADOR: OBSERVERS

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM ITN THAT THEY WISH TO SEND THEIR REPORTER JON SNOW CURRENTLY IN EL SALVADOR TO FILM THE ARRIVAL OF OUR OBSERVERS. WE DO NOT INTEND TO DIVULGE THEIR TRAVEL PLANS BUT YOU SHOULD BRIEF THE OBSERVERS THAT THEY WILL BE THE FOCUS OF PRESS ATTENTION FROM THE MOMENT THEY ARRIVE. WE HAVE ALREADY ADVISED THEM TO TRY TO AVOID MAKING STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS. THE LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE IS THAT THEY ARE IN EL SALVADOR TO OBSERVE THE ELECTIONS AND ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A REPORT IN WHICH THEIR FINDINGS WILL BE MADE KNOWN.
2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR TELNO 228 OF 17 MARCH TO MEXICO CITY, MINISTERS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENCE OF LT COL CHEVASSE SHOULD NOT ATTRACT TOO MUCH ATTENTION BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT IT MIGHT CAUSE. (ALTHOUGH IT WILL CLEARLY BE DIFFICULT). WE SUGGEST HE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO REMAIN IN THE BACKGROUND WHEN THE PRESS IS PRESENT. FOR THIS REASON IT MIGHT BE BETTER IF HE WERE NOT AT THE AIRPORT WHEN THE OBSERVERS ARRIVE (AS PROPOSED IN YOUR TELNO 72) BUT WE MUST LEAVE THIS TO YOU AND HIM TO JUDGE.

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FM MEXICO CITY 050040Z MAR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAMNUMBER 145 OF 5 MARCH  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA, HAVANA

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: EL SALVADOR

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED IN MEXICO BY THE FRENTE FARIBUNDO MARTI DE LIBERACION NACIONAL-FRENTE DEMOCRATICO REVOLUCIONARIO (FMLN-FDR) ON 27 FEBRUARY.

QUOTE

A SPOKESMAN OF THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC COMMITTEE OF THE FMLN-FDR HAS TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE FMLN-FDR HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED AND ACCEPTED THE PEACE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO ON 21 FEBRUARY. THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED BY JOSE NAPOLEON RODRIGUEZ RUIZ, A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AND THE PROPOSALS FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA PUT FORWARD BY THE MEXICAN PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO ARE A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL POLICY WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT HAS MAINTAINED. THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE ARE PROFOUNDLY GRATEFUL FOR THIS.
2. THE FMLN AND THE FDR WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO PEACE TALKS, WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS, AIMED AT LEADING TO A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION. ON THIS WE EXPRESS OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE MEXICAN LEADER.
3. WE ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD BECOME A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT.

/ 4. WE APPEAL

4. WE APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD, TO GIVE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO THIS INITIATIVE IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

UNQUOTE.

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TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 050900Z FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 5 MARCH  
PRIORITY N INFO WASHINGTON, TEGUCIGALAPA, SAN JOSE, HAVANA

TEGUCIGALPA TELNO 59: EL SALVADOR: FDR/FMLN'S RESPONSE TO  
MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE

1. THE MEXICAN PRESS HAS REPORTED WIDELY THE FDR/FMLN'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO'S PROPOSALS FOR BRINGING PEACE TO CENTRAL AMERICA. THE TEXT OF THEIR STATEMENT IS IN MIFT.

2. THE FDR/FMLN HAVE MADE NO PUBLIC REFERENCE TO A REDUCTION IN THEIR ORIGINAL NEGOTIATING DEMAND THAT THE SALVADOREAN ARMED FORCES MUST BE DISMANTLED AS PART OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. BUT AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN MY TELNO 134, FDR/FMLN REPRESENTATIVES RECENTLY TOLD MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT ALTHOUGH THEY BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO RID THE ARMED FORCES OF CORRUPT ELEMENTS, THEY PROPOSED TO PRESERVE THE DEMOCRATIC CADRES. DR RODRIGUEZ RUIZ OF THE RESISTENCIA NACIONAL, HAS SINCE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THIS IS ONE OF FIVE POINTS CONTAINED IN A NEW NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT WHICH THE FDR/FMLN HAVE PASSED TO THE VENEZUELAN, MEXICAN AND US GOVERNMENTS. DR RODRIGUEZ HAS UNDERTAKEN TO GIVE US A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IN THE MEANTIME, HE SUMMARISES ITS CONTENTS AS FOLLOWS: THE FDR/FMLN

1) AGREES TO ALLOW THE SALVADOREAN ARMED FORCES TO REMAIN INTACT, PROVIDED THAT THEY PURGE THEMSELVES OF CORRUPT ELEMENTS:

2) PROPOSES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUNTA IN WHICH ALL POLITICAL GROUPS WILL BE REPRESENTED:

3) PROPOSES THAT A PLEBISCITE SHOULD BE HELD SIX MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT TO SEEK POPULAR ENDORSEMENT OF THE JUNTA AND THAT LOCAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD A DETERMINED PERIOD THEREAFTER:

4) ACCEPTS A MIXED ECONOMY AND THE CONTINUED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME:

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5) PROPOSES A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT.

3. DR RODRIGUEZ ADDED THAT IF THE SALVADOREAN REGIME WERE TO AGREE TO SUSPEND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS, THE FDR/FMLN WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON PARTICIPATING IN NEW ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE SECURITY GUARANTEES.

4. HECTOR OQUELI OF THE FDR/FMLN EXTERNAL COMMITTEE TOLD MY FIRST SECRETARY RECENTLY THAT THE FDR HAD TALKS WITH A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL IN DECEMBER, AND THAT FURTHER CONTACTS WERE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS. I THEREFORE SUSPECT THAT THE DOCUMENT CONCERNED IS NOT QUITE AS RECENT AS DR RODRIGUEZ WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE AND THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS THEN. MOREOVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE TERMS OF THE DOCUMENT QUITE MATCH UP TO DR RODRIGUEZ'S SUMMARY.

PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

TICKELL

[REPETITION TO TEGUCIGALPA REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,  
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 5 MARCH

EL SALVADOR: ELECTIONS

1. THE US AMBASSADOR PASSED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG TO ME ON 1 MARCH:

" THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 16 INFORMING ME THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT PLANS TO SEND ELECTIONS OBSERVERS TO EL SALVADOR. YOUR FAVORABLE DECISION WAS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED AND WE GREATLY VALUE, ONCE AGAIN, BEING ABLE TO COUNT ON YOUR HELP. LET ME ADD AS A PERSONAL NOTE HOW GRATEFUL I AM TO HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER.

CARRINGTON

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FM PCO 031430Z MAR 82

TO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 3 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON : BUENOS AIRES : CARACAS : MEXICO CITY

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MOSCOW : OSLO : STOCKHOLM : HOLY SEE

EL SALVADOR: ELECTION OBSERVERS

1. IN A DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA LAST NIGHT (2 MARCH) THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ANNOUNCED THAT THE UK OBSERVERS TO BE SENT TO THE EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS ON 28 MARCH WILL BE: PROFESSOR DEREK BOWETT QC, PRESIDENT OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE AND SIR JOHN GALSWORTHY KCVO, CMG, RETIRED HM AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO CITY.
2. YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR. COPY RECIPIENTS HAVE DISCRETION TO INFORM GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.
3. TEXTS OF THE OPENING SPEECH BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND THE WINDING UP SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE (MR LUCE) FOLLOW BY COI LPS CHANNELS. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE SPEECH OF THE LORD PRIVY SEAL IF ASKED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH WE ENVISAGE THAT THE OBSERVERS WILL CARRY OUT THEIR TASK IN EL SALVADOR.

CARRINGTON

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FM WASHINGTON 022355Z MAR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 689 OF 2 MARCH  
INFO MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA.

*mt.*

YOUR TELNO 365: OBSERVERS FOR EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

1. STATE DEPARTMENT AGREE THAT THE US EMBASSY AT SAN SALVADOR MAY ACT AS A CHANNEL FOR URGENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGES TO AND FROM OUR OBSERVERS. THESE SHOULD BE PASSED VIA THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON: GIESE (DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AMERICA) SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONTACT MELTON DIRECT.
2. THE TEAM OF US OBSERVERS HAS NOW BEEN ANNOUNCED: LED BY SEN KASSEBAUM, IT WILL COMPRISE CONGRESSMAN BOB LIVINGSTON (R - LOUISIANA), TED BRIGGS (STATE DEPARTMENT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS), REV THEODORE HESBURGH (PRESIDENT OF NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY), CLARK KERR (PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY), TOGETHER WITH TWO ELECTION EXPERTS, RICHARD SCAMMON AND HOWARD PENNIMAN.
3. WE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE US OBSERVERS' SECURITY AND PROGRAMME. THESE WILL BE SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING ORGANISED BY THE SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES FOR OTHER OBSERVERS.

HENDERSON

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CENTRAL AMERICA: EL SALVADOR

It is hoped that Members will find the following notes helpful for the debate on Tuesday, 2nd March 1982 on Central America.

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Conservative Party International Office,  
Conservative Research Department  
32 Smith Square,  
London SW1

RS/CDB  
1st March, 1982



## EL SALVADOR

### Introduction

El Salvador is the smallest state in the Central American isthmus and has the highest population density of any country in the western hemisphere: nearly 5 million people in an area a little larger than Wales.

From being a Spanish colony since 1528, El Salvador gained its independence in 1840. Until 1931 it was governed by a succession of civilian governments, backed by the military; their promised reforms never came about. In 1931-2 the collapse of the coffee price brought economic disaster, followed by a peasant uprising led by the Communist Farabundo Marti which was suppressed by the military with such brutality that political opposition was effectively stifled until the mid-1960s.

Until very recently economic and political power has been concentrated in the hands of "los catorce", originally 14 families but latterly several thousand people who dominated the agricultural and financial life of the country. These were supported by the military until the mid-1940s when a split occurred between those army officers who saw the need for economic and social reform, and others who remained aligned with the oligarchy. The reformers seized power in 1948: El Salvador was described at the time as "the only country in Latin America in which the armed forces organisation is both leading and supporting the nation along the pathway of democratic, evolutionary, social revolution" (Edwin Lieuwen, "Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America"). This dichotomy in the military has marked El Salvadorean politics ever since.

The process of peaceful change was slow. Constitutions of 1950 and 1962 presented a democratic face to the world, but elections were rigged by the military to ensure their continuance in power. However, reforms were introduced, notably in the mid-1960s an overhaul of the banking laws so as to make badly needed credit available to small farmers. An industrial expansion had taken place in textiles, chemicals and steel. The effect was to make El Salvador the leading exporter of goods and agricultural products in Central America, and the leading members of the Central American Common Market.

The subsequent growth of an articulate middle class led to increased political awareness. The Christian Democratic Party, founded in 1960, saw its candidate Jose Napoleon Duarte elected Mayor of San Salvador in 1964, and in 1968 it won 19 of the 52 seats in the unicameral National Assembly. Also in 1968 the Salvadorean Peasant Union was formed and produced its own programme for land reform which, however, was not acceptable to the government.

The Roman Catholic Church also changed during the 1960s. Whereas it had been a monolithically conservative supporter of the landed classes, the activities of Catholic intellectuals infused with the social gospel had a radicalising effect on some priests and the student population, and the church added its voice in support of reforms.

In the face of an undeniable improvement in the social and economic structure of the country, the Salvadorean Communist Party began an internal debate on whether to wage armed revolution or to participate in the system through the electoral process. Founded in 1925, the Communist Party had been unable to recruit more than a handful of supporters since the suppression of the peasants' uprising which it had inspired in 1931-2. Increasing economic prosperity and the gradual emergence of a political opposition with the power to attract all sections of the population cut the ground from under its feet, and in 1970 the PCS split into several factions.

.../Some of



Some of these groups then began a deliberate policy of destabilisation designed to provoke repression and a consequent polarisation of attitudes in the population at large. Kidnappings, terrorist attacks and random violence produced the hoped-for backlash, and the political and economic life of El Salvador has been on a downward spiral ever since.

### The 1970s

Three political events were crucial in the last decade:

1) In 1972 Duarte was the Christian Democratic candidate in the presidential election with Guillermo Ungo as his running mate on a coalition ticket. (Ungo then headed the Social Democratic National Revolutionary Movement.) They won but were deprived of office by the candidate of the right wing National Conciliation Party. Duarte was tortured by the military, and then allowed into exile. The oligarchy persuaded the Government to defer further reforms notwithstanding increasing inflation, recession and unemployment. Inevitably the pressures continued to grow.

2) In 1977 General Carlos Romero became President. Protests at the way he had been elected were suppressed, and moderate left wing leaders fled the country. Tension increased and extremist groups of left and right engaged in killings of political opponents.

3) In October 1979 President Romero was overthrown by two reform-minded soldiers, Colonels Gutierrez and Majano. They set up a five-member junta, including three civilians, and appointed a team of Ministers drawn from representatives of the military, the Christian Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party (including Guillermo Ungo, now its leader) and various left-wing groups. They announced a programme of economic reform, whose two main features were:

- (a) the nationalisation and redistribution of all land holdings up to 500 acres; and
- (b) the nationalisation of all banks.

They also announced that elections for a constituent Assembly would be held in March 1982.

In November 1979 Duarte returned from exile.

### 1980

From the start these reforms antagonised both the extreme right, whose interests were directly prejudiced, and the extreme left for whom the success of such programmes would have removed a cause of contention through which they might achieve their own political goals. The left acted immediately to deny the junta the one condition essential to the success of its programme: time, with the result that a largely moderate and well-intentioned government has found itself caught in the crossfire between left and right. The ensuing campaign of terror and counter-terror reached a horrifying climax with the murder by rightists of Archbishop Romero, a staunch defender of human rights, in the act of celebrating the mass in March 1980.

Meanwhile the 3 civilian members of the junta and several Ministers, including Ungo, had resigned, claiming that the Government could not institute its planned reforms. They were replaced by 2 Christian Democrats, including Duarte, and one independent. The Christian Democrats had by now split, with some joining the Social Democrats in opposition. As the security

.../situation



situation deteriorated so did relations between Col. Majano, who was willing to reach an understanding with the less extreme parties of the left which had formed themselves into the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), and the more conservative Col. Gutierrez. Col. Majano was ousted and exiled. In December 1980 Duarte was elected President with Col. Gutierrez as Vice-President and Commander of the Armed Forces.

### 1981

On 10th January the military wing of the FDR, the FMLN (the Farabundo Marti Peoples' Liberation Front) launched its "final offensive", which was, however, anticlimatic and inconclusive. The guerillas were too inexperienced to handle the considerable amounts of sophisticated weaponry supplied to them by sympathisers, and a forecasted peasant uprising failed to happen. However the "final offensive" did cause President Carter to review his Central American policy and to resume arms sales to El Salvador for the first time in four years (see below "U.S. Aid"). In March the acting Archbishop spoke out against the guerillas: he said that although the regime's record on human rights left a lot to be desired, the reforms were working and the peasants were turning against the Communists.

### The level of violence

About 8,000 people died in El Salvador in 1980. World attention focused on the outrage of the murder of Mgr Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador in March, the killing in December of three American nuns and a social worker, and the abduction from a press conference and subsequent murder of six moderate opposition leaders. According to their own published propaganda, the guerillas estimated that they were responsible for the deaths of 4,000-6,000 people in the period January 1980 - June 1981. Independent observers have drawn attention to the fact that many civilian atrocities are the result of private vendettas or common crime; bodies are then made to look as if either the guerillas or the paramilitary groups are responsible.

On 25th February 1981 Lord Carrington made a statement in which he said:-

"Her Majesty's Government note, with concern, the continuing violence inside El Salvador and the suffering and hardship this causes to the people of that country. We condemn such violence from whatever quarter. Her Majesty's Government look to the Government of El Salvador to take all possible steps to protect the Salvadorean people from violations of basic human rights and, in particular, to exercise firm control over all Government institutions and organisations."

### Human Rights

Notwithstanding the extreme difficulties facing them, the junta is attempting to maintain some degree of justice. Six National Guardsmen have been dismissed from the army as a first step towards putting them on trial for the murder of the American nuns, despite stiff opposition from the military to the investigation into the affair or any attempt to punish those suspected of the killings. The Government has also abolished President Romero's intelligence agency and moved about 1,000 men regarded as extremists out of key posts or out of the army altogether.

A resolution on human rights violations in El Salvador presented in the Third Committee of the General Assembly in December 1980 condemned the Salvadorean government but contained no reference to the excesses of the left wing. The United Kingdom's efforts to persuade



the co-sponsors to make minor amendments failed. The UK abstained but in an explanation of vote supported that part of the resolution which called for an investigation by the UN Human Rights Committee. The UK maintained a similar position in plenary on 15th December, when the vote was 70 for, 12 against with 55 abstentions. Of the other EEC countries France and Italy also abstained. The rest (including Greece) voted for the resolution.

### Land Reform

The major issue in El Salvador's recent history has undoubtedly been the concentration of land in the hands of the oligarchy. El Salvador is primarily an agricultural economy with a peasant labour force. Some 50% - 60% of the labour force is engaged in agriculture. The main cash crop is coffee with tobacco and sugar also produced on a substantial basis. According to the Financial Times (12th February 1980), prior to the reforms 2% out of the population owned 60% of the land.

Since the reforms were put in hand, 990,000 of the 3.7 million acres of agricultural land have been transferred to 210,000 formerly landless peasants - roughly 1.25 million people. Another 1,850,000 acres remain in the hands of the 120,000 small owner-operator families.

A macabre indication of the success of this programme is seen in the level of violence directed against the new peasant co-operatives by both left and right. A number of peasants benefiting from it have been killed.

### U.S. Aid Policy

Prior to the overthrow of President Romero in 1979, the US had a limited economic assistance programme and no military assistance programme. With the installation of the reform government the US substantially increased its economic aid, to enable the Salvadorean Government to combat terrorism, end violations of human rights and thus ensure stability in which to implement the planned reforms. But the murder of the nurse and the six moderate opposition leaders in November 1980 provoked such widespread revulsion that the US Government suspended its economic aid; it was resumed later when the US declared itself satisfied with the progress of a government investigation.

It is commonly thought that President Carter was determined to deny El Salvador military aid, but a document prepared by his Administration in late 1980 spelt out his intention to increase substantially US political and military involvement in El Salvador. In any case, the guerillas' "final offensive" in January 1981 caused Washington to react sharply, and for the first time in four years President Carter authorised the despatch of military equipment to El Salvador.

Following his inauguration in January 1981 President Reagan increased military assistance to El Salvador to a total of \$35.4 million in the year ending September 1980. The World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank all committed large sums.

When President Duarte visited Washington in September 1981 he was promised a total of \$136 million for the year, compared to \$10 million in 1979. This is still less than a quarter of the estimated \$625 million of capital which was taken out of the country in 1981 by private investors (Financial Times, 23rd October 1981). Duarte has made it

.../clear



clear that his first need is for economic aid to keep the ravaged economy afloat.

In his speech to the Organisation of American States in February 1982, President Reagan said he would be asking Congress to approve a trade and aid package of \$350 million (£192 million) for Central American and Caribbean countries, of which \$100 million would be expected to go to El Salvador. However there has been some criticism of US aid policy, stressing as it does incentives for private investment rather than Government sponsored aid directed towards rebuilding the infrastructure.

#### US Military Involvement

President Reagan has repeatedly stressed that he has no plans to send combat troops to El Salvador. There are however about 54 military advisers in the country. A NATO exercise in the Gulf of Mexico is planned for this month.

#### Communist Involvement

The US State Department issued a white paper in February 1981 showing that in the previous six months Communist sources had sent 600 tons of sophisticated weaponry to El Salvador. One of the most crucial developments was the bringing together by Castro, at a meeting in Havana in 1980, of the different Marxist-Leninist organisations into the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) as a precondition of Cuban assistance. Mr. Eagleburger, the Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for European Affairs, toured European countries in February 1981 with documentary evidence of Cuban involvement in El Salvador's affairs, and arms shipments from Nicaragua. After studying the evidence, the Foreign Office produced a statement saying "This points to activities which can only be regarded as gross interference in the internal affairs of El Salvador and HMG support the Government of the United States in calling for it to end". The Prime Minister later endorsed the American view that there had been outside interference. (Hansard, 2nd March 1981, col. 19).

#### The Franco-Mexican Initiative

In August 1981 Mexico and the newly elected Socialist Government in France issued a joint statement which recognised the left-wing guerillas as "a representative political force" which should be included in negotiations aimed at finding a political solution to the conflict. Ironically this had the effect of prompting most Latin American countries to publicly endorse Duarte's government, which they had not previously done. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela issued a joint statement supporting Duarte; Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru sent expression of support to Duarte; and Brazil joined the others in accusing France and Mexico of intervention in El Salvadorean affairs.

An offer of mediation made last month by Mexico has been ignored by the US after being welcomed by Cuba and Nicaragua.

#### The Socialist International

The Socialist International has taken a vocal line in support of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR, composed of some eighteen formerly independent moderate and far left groups - including a Social Democratic Party and some Christian Democrats - and led by Guillermo Ungo). The

.../non-communist



non-communist organisations within the FDR are however not represented in the command structures of the DRU (formed in Havana, see above) or its fighting arm, the FMLN. Their role is limited to cultivating support abroad, with the aim of isolating the Salvadorean Government from the international community. Their propaganda has succeeded in persuading the German SPD (although not the Government) and the British Labour Party to issue statements in support of the FDR.

The Socialist International has not explained its standards for claiming the the FDR was "the legitimate representative of the Salvadorean people" (statement issued at the third meeting of the Socialist International's Latin American and Caribbean Committee, 28th February - 1st March 1981). The only party in the FDR which has ever contested an election is the Socialist MNR, which won 1.7% of the vote in 1971, and the movement would seem to be denying itself a chance of future legitimacy by refusing to participate in the election scheduled for later this month.

The Socialist International's calls for a negotiated solution sound somewhat hollow in the face of repeated statements from the guerillas that the Salvadorean crisis could only be solved militarily because there was no longer room for a political solution. The Economist of 25th April 1981 said that a document entitled "The Negotiations Manoeuvre" which had fallen into American hands has revealed that many of the top rebel commanders still see negotiations as a ruse for seizing power rather than as a way of bringing a conciliated peace to El Salvador.

#### The Media

The Times of 11th February 1982 reported that the American media were becoming divided about the bias of news commentary on El Salvador. As an example the Wall Street Journal is quoted: "A 'news analysis' [In another paper, presumably the New York Times] charged the Government of sowing confusion by questioning press reports 'without presenting detailed evidence to support its position'. The analysis posed the question of 'how American diplomats gather information abroad,' but not the same question about American reporters."

#### British Aid

The UK has only very minor bilateral aid commitments with El Salvador and these were initiated by the last government.

The Government has contributed £100,000 to an appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross for displaced civilians in El Salvador and £100,000 to the UNHCR programme for refugees outside El Salvador. Aid worth about £1.6 million has also been given by the European Community, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Catholic relief agencies. Further EC aid is being considered. The British share of all EC aid is some 20%.

Some controversy surrounded reports that the Government gave £1 million to the Salvadorean Government through an Inter American Development Bank loan. This loan was approved in December 1980. Ten of the 12 Board Directors supported it. Two Directors abstained, including the one representing Britain and several other Western Members of the Bank. The British Government did not make a direct bilateral loan to El Salvador. The £1 million quoted in the Press represented a hypothetical share attributable to Britain's general contribution to the Bank's Fund for Special Operations, from which the loan was financed. Much of the money was spent on fertilisers and agricultural machinery.



## The British Government's Attitude

The British Government has consistently deplored the violence in El Salvador (see above p. 3, statement by Lord Carrington). Mr. Luce said in the House of Commons on 19th October 1981:

"HMG have repeatedly made clear their wish to see an early end to the violence in El Salvador and the attainment of a just political settlement through the holding of elections."

On 18th March 1981 Mr. Ridley said in a written answer:

"A political solution to the conflict in El Salvador is greatly to be preferred to the continuation of the present fighting, and we would of course support any realistic proposals that seemed likely to bring this about" (Hansard, 18th March, 1981, col. 127).

## The Elections

President Duarte has announced that elections will be held on 28th March. All Salvadorean political groups that accept democratic procedures are eligible to participate. The elections have been welcomed internally by a meeting of senior churchmen of all denominations and by the associations of agricultural co-operatives, and externally by the Central American Democratic Community (formed in January 1982 of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica) and the Latin American Workers' Organisation CLAT. CLAT, which represents some 25 million workers throughout Latin America, voted unanimously at a recent meeting to support the elections in El Salvador, and this despite their Secretary-General being a Communist. The Organisation of American States has voted 19-0 (with Mexico abstaining) to send observers to the elections.

Mr. Luce has announced that Britain will be sending two observers to the elections, subject to the Government being satisfied about their security arrangements (Hansard, 17th February, 1982, col. 121). He gave further assurances in this connection on 25th February (Hansard, 25th February 1982, col. 458-9). This decision has been taken because:-

- 1) President Duarte is seeking to produce a legitimate government through the democratic process, even though he admits that the security situation will render that process imperfect;
- 2) representative bodies of opinion within the country support them;
- 3) as a democratic country we are not prepared to pre-judge the conduct or outcome of another country's elections;
- 4) we do not believe that the opposition groups should have the right of veto over the elections by refusing to take part. Our refusal to send observers could be claimed by them as a vindication of their position.

.../5)

- 5) the opposition argument that their candidates' lives would be endangered were they to participate, while credible also applies to all other candidates;
- 6) any democratic course of action is worth trying that might stand a chance of breaking the present cycle of violence.

In view of the Opposition's desire to support "the democratic forces in El Salvador totally and without question" (Mr. Heffer, Hansard, 5th November 1981, col. 146, and Mr. Healey, *ibid.*, col. 130), we would hope that they would also welcome President Duarte's sincere attempt to make the democratic process work.

In an effort to remove possible sources of intimidation President Duarte has announced that the Army will be confined to barracks on election day. Criticism has been made of the fact that electoral registers will not be used, but these were last drawn up in 1978 and are now completely out of date. Instead the Government-appointed Electoral Commission has recommended that voters' thumbs should be marked with indelible ink. This system proved an acceptable substitute for registers in Zimbabwe, where the same problem applied.

The main candidate of the right is ex-Major d'Aubuisson, leader of the hard-line anti-communist ARENA party.



El Salvador

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 546 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE, MEXICO CITY AND HAVANA

MY TELNO 505 : EL SALVADOR

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR IS CAUSING INCREASING CONCERN IN WASHINGTON. SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT FORCES CANNOT DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS WITHOUT MORE EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL MILITARY SUPPORT; AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE LIMITED US TRAINING ASSISTANCE WILL TURN THE TIDE SOON (THE BATTALION BEING TRAINED AT FORT BRAGG WILL NOT BE READY FOR ANOTHER FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS).

2. FACED WITH CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO FURTHER INCREASES IN DIRECT MILITARY AID, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SEEKING MORE INDIRECT WAYS OF HELPING TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE LIAISON HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED (IN PARTICULAR A RADAR/PATROL BOAT SYSTEM HAS BEEN SET UP TO CONTAIN ARMS INFILTRATION ACROSS THE GULF OF FONSECA). SENIOR OFFICIALS, FROM THE PRESIDENT DOWN, ARE CONTINUING THEIR POLICY OF REFUSING TO DENY RUMOURS OF SUPPORT FOR THE NICARAGUAN EXILES. THE AIM IS TO KEEP THE CUBANS AND NICARAGUANS UNCERTAIN THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE RULED OUT ANY OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THEM.

3. HAIG LAID EMPHASIS IN HIS SPEECH TO THE OAS IN ST LUCIA ON ORGANIZING REGIONAL OPPOSITION TO CUBAN SUBVERSION, AND THIS HAS BECOME A FEATURE OF US POLICY. ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AREAS OF AMERICAN ACTIVITY HAS BEEN THEIR ENCOURAGEMENT OF DISCREET SUPPORT FOR DUARTE FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICANS. ENDERS MENTIONED TO ME THAT VENEZUELA WAS INVOLVED (WE HAVE SINCE LEARNED THAT THIS IS THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS WELL AS FUNDING OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS' ELECTION CAMPAIGN). ARGENTINA IS ALSO BELIEVED BY SOME HERE TO BE PROVIDING SOME COVERT SUPPORT AND IT IS HOPED BY THE AMERICANS THAT THE BRAZILIANS MAY ALSO JOIN THIS EFFORT, ALTHOUGH SO FAR THEY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO DO SO. IN ADDITION, THE HONDURAN AND EL SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES ARE COORDINATING OPERATIONS TO CUT OFF GUERRILLA ROUTES INTO HONDURAS.

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4. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO FACE SHARP DOMESTIC CRITICISM ON THE RISKS OF BEING SUCKED INTO CLOSER INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. DOLLARS 60 MILLION HAS BEEN ALLOCATED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN FY 1983, BUT THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT MORE WILL BE NEEDED. OFFICIALS ARE PESSIMISTIC THAT CONGRESS WOULD APPROVE ADDITIONAL FUNDING, THOUGH ON HIS RETURN FROM SAN SALVADOR AND MANAGUA A REPRESENTATIVE OF SPEAKER TIP O'NEILL HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE SITUATION OF SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT MERITS EXTRA US SUPPORT.

5. THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE EL SALVADOR QUESTION IN A SPEECH AT THE OAS NEXT TUESDAY, WHEN HE IS DUE TO ANNOUNCE DETAILS OF THE LONG AWAITED CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE. STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF ALLOCATING TO EL SALVADOR DOLLARS 100 MILLION OF THE DOLLARS 300 - 350 MILLION BEING SOUGHT FROM CONGRESS FOR THE PLAN. THEY ARE NOT SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ACCEPTED THEIR ADVICE, SINCE SOME OF HIS ADVISERS ARE ANXIOUS TO EMPHASIZE THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INITIATIVE AND CONCERNED THAT SETTING ASIDE ALMOST A THIRD OF THE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO EL SALVADOR WOULD DETRACT FROM THIS EMPHASIS.

HENDERSON

[REPETITION TO TEGUCIGALPA REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February 1982

Dear John, <sup>MAJ</sup>

El Salvador

I enclose a copy of the text of a Written Parliamentary Answer announcing our decision to send observers to the elections in El Salvador. This should be published at 1700 today.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

**RESTRICTED**

**RESTRICTED**

17 February 1982

- C Mr Peter Bottomley (Greenwich, Woolwich West): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if Her Majesty's Government have reached a conclusion on whether to send observers to the elections in El Salvador.

MR RICHARD LUCE

Pursuant to my reply of 3 February and subject to their being satisfied about security, the Government have now decided to send observers to monitor the electoral process in El Salvador.

The elections are to take place on 28 March. We are in touch with the Government of El Salvador about the precise arrangements. We envisage, however, that we shall send 2 official observers to El Salvador sometime before the election day (28 March) to enable them to form a view of the election campaign and other preparations and that they will remain in El Salvador to see the poll take place, the votes counted and the result announced. We have not yet chosen observers but they will be of independent public standing and we will ask them to form their own conclusions about the elections in the light of their experience in El Salvador.

A copy of their report will be placed in the Library of the House and made public.

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*El Salvador*  
*mf*

GRS 1208

RESTRICTED

FM FCC 171530Z FEBRUARY 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN POSTS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 17 FEBRUARY 1982

EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION FROM THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT TO SEND 2 OFFICIAL OBSERVERS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ON 28 MARCH IN EL SALVADOR.  
LINE TO TAKE
2. I) WE BELIEVE THAT THE SEARCH SHOULD CONTINUE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF EL SALVADOR.  
II) MODERATE ELEMENTS IN EL SALVADOR ARE UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE FROM EXTREMISTS FROM THE LEFT AND RIGHT BUT DESERVE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT.  
III) THE SENDING OF OBSERVERS, WHICH IS CONDITIONAL ON OUR BEING SATISFIED AS TO THEIR SAFETY, IS AN INDICATION THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO PRE-JUDGE THE CONDUCT OR OUTCOME, EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD.  
IV) THE UK HAS FEW HISTORICAL OR CURRENT LINKS WITH EL SALVADOR. LEGITIMATE PUBLIC CONCERN WHICH HAS LATELY BECOME OUTRAGE OVER EVENTS THERE REQUIRES THAT WE TRY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION FROM IMPARTIAL ENQUIRY.  
V) IF WE DECLINE THE INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS. OPPONENTS OF THE ELECTIONS WILL CLAIM OUR DECISION AS A VINDICATION OF THEIR OPPOSITION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GUERRILLAS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF-VETO OVER THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.  
VI) OUR OBSERVERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CHOSEN. THEY WILL BE OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC STANDING.  
VII) OUR OBSERVERS (AND THE EL SALVADOR AND US GOVERNMENTS) WILL KNOW THAT THEY ARE EXPECTED TO REPORT AS THEY FIND, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EXPERIENCE IN EL SALVADOR.

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VIII) THEIR REPORT WILL BE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT AND MADE PUBLIC.

BACKGROUND (FOR USE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS ONLY)  
ELECTIONS

3. ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE BEEN INVITED BY PRESIDENT DUARTE TO PARTICIPATE. HE HAS GUARANTEED THE SAFETY OF ALL CANDIDATES, THOUGH THERE ARE LEGITIMATE DOUBTS ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS GUARANTEE. CAMPAIGNING IS BOUND TO BE RESTRICTED, DISRUPTION OF THE POLL ALL TOO LIKELY AND THE LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED OR EXILED REFUGEES ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE.

4. PARTIES TO THE LEFT OF DUARTE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HAVE REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE. THEY CLAIM THAT WHILE RIGHT WING DEATH SQUADS OPERATE UNHINDERED BY THE SECURITY FORCES, AND IN SOME CASES WITH THEIR COMPLICITY, OPEN CAMPAIGNING IS IMPOSSIBLE AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARANTEES OF SAFETY WORTHLESS. THEIR FEARS ARE LEGITIMATE.

5. THE GUERRILLAS HAVE RECENTLY STEPPED UP THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOVERNMENT FORCES. IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TARGETS HAVE BEEN ATTACKED, WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. RIGHT WING CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN THREATENED AND ONE HAS BEEN ASSASSINATED.  
THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT

6. PRESIDENT DUARTE IS A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT WHO PROCLAIMS HIS BELIEF IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND SEEKS TO INTRODUCE REFORM. HE IS LEFT OF CENTRE, AND UNDER ATTACK FROM EXTREMES OF BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT. HE HEADS A 4-MAN JUNTA WHICH INCLUDES 2 OTHER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND A SERVING GENERAL. HE APPEARS TO COMMAND SUPPORT FROM MODERATE ELEMENTS INCLUDING SOME MIDDLE RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS AND, THROUGH ELECTIONS, WHICH HE ADMITS WILL BE IMPERFECT, SEEKS TO LEGITIMISE HIS GOVERNMENT.  
OPPOSITION

7. HE IS OPPOSED BY RIGHT WING DIEHARDS IN THE MILITARY WHO HAVE SUPPORT FROM THE PRIVILEGED ESTABLISHMENT, THOUGH MANY OF THESE HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. MORE SERIOUS IS THE OPEN INSURGENCY ON THE LEFT. FORMER DISPARATE TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE UNITED TO FORM THE FMLN (FARABUNDO MARTI LIBERATION FRONT) WHOSE MILITARY CAPABILITY



HAS GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. THE FMLN ARE IN ALLIANCE WITH THE FDR (DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTOINARY FRONT) WHOSE LEADERS ARE IN EXILE IN MEXOCO CITY. THEY INCLUDE A NUMBER OF RESPECTED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICANS WHO HAVE ABANDONED DUARTE AND THROWN IN THEIR LOT WITH THE LEFT, BUT WHO CLAIM TO BE OF MODERATE SOCIALIST PERSUASION. THE FDR IS LED BY DUARTE'S 1972 RUNNING MATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY, GUILLERMO UNGO.

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT

8. THE FMLN/FDR ALLIANCE PUT FORWARD IN OCTOBER 1981 PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN REPEATED. THESE WERE REJECTED BY DUARTE WHO CLAIMED THEY WERE TANTAMOUNT TO DISMEMBERMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES. DUARTE HIMSELF HAS ALSO PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONDITION THAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS. THE GUERRILLAS, REJECTING THIS, HAVE CONTINUED TO URGE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ELECTIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM GUERRILLA COMMANDERS OFFERING TALKS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN DETAILS OF THEIR NEW PROPOSALS. SECRETARY HAIG HAS DESCRIBED THEM AS QUOTE DRIPPING WITH PROPAGANDA UNQUOTE.

SALVADOREAN CHURCH

9. THE SALVADOREAN BISHOPS IN JANUARY 1981 ISSUED A STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE ELECTIONS AS QUOTE A FAINT GLIMMER OF HOPE, A POSSIBLE BEGINNING OF A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS UNQUOTE. THEY REMINDED CATHOLICS OF THEIR QUOTE OBLIGATION OF CONSCIENCE TO VOTE UNQUOTE AND REGRETTED OPPOSITION TO THE ELECTIONS.

OAS

10. AT A MEETING OF THE OAS IN ST LUCIA IN DECEMBER 1981, THE DUARTE PROPOSAL TO HOLD ELECTIONS WAS OVERWHELMINGLY ENDORSED (22 VOTES TO 3). ONLY NICARAGUA, MEXICO AND GREMADA VOTED AGAINST. A NUMBER OF OAS MEMBER COUNTRIES ARE SENDING OBSERVERS.  
LATIN AMERICA

11. THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR ENJOYS SUPPORT FROM COSTA RICA, HONDURAS AND OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NICARAGUA AND HAS WITH HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA RECENTLY BEEN



INCLUDED IN A NEW CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY. MEXICO IS HOSTILE, COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE ELECTIONS. OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, NOTABLY ARGENTINA, SUPPORT THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT BUT SOME DO SO ONLY DISCREETLY. NOT ALL WILL BE SENDING OFFICIAL OBSERVERS TO THE ELECTIONS.

US

12. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS CONCLUDED THAT DUARTE OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF BUILDING UP IN EL SALVADOR A MODERATE, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF THE CENTRE. THEY HAVE RECOGNISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE ARMY AND THE EXTREME RIGHT BUT ARE UNDER CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO WITHHOLD FURTHER ASSISTANCE IN THE FACE OF DUARTE'S CONTINUING INABILITY TO CONTROL THE SECURITY FORCES AND PREVENT FURTHER ATROCITIES. THE UNITED STATES IN 1981 GAVE AID WORTH DOLLARS 140 MILLION OF WHICH DOLLAR 36 MILLION WAS OF MILITARY AID. A FURTHER DOLLAR 55 MILLION MILITARY AID HAS JUST BEEN ALLOCATED. THE US BELIEVES THAT THE GUERRILLAS ARE SUSTAINED, SUPPLIED AND ACTIVELY ASSISTED BY CUBA WITH NICARAGUAN SUPPORT AND COMPLICITY. THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR IS SEEN IN WASHINGTON AS BEING OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE.

EC

13. FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND IRELAND HAVE NOT BEEN INVITED TO SEND OBSERVERS. GREECE AND DENMARK HAVE DECLINED INVITATIONS. FRG, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG AND ITALY HAVE STILL TO DECIDE. ALL ARE UNDER GROWING PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC INDIGNATION AT EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR AND ARE LOSING SYMPATHY WITH THE CONTINUED INABILITY OF DUARTE TO PREVENT FURTHER ATROCITIES.

14. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE PARLIAMENTARY 1981 FCO BRIEF: BACKGROUND TO THE TROUBLES IN EL SALVADOR.

15. PLEASE REPORT SIGNIFICANT LOCAL REACTION TO OUR DECISION ON OBSERVERS.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH:

ATHENS	MOSCOW	LIMA	TEL AVIV
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COPENHAGEN	BUENOS AIRES	GUATEMALA	OTTAWA
THE HAGUE	CARACAS	LA PAZ	KINGSTON
LUXEMBOURG	MEXICO CITY	PANAMA	PORT OF SPAIN
PARIS	BRASILIA	QUITO	GEORGETOWN
ROME	RIO DE JANEIRO	SAN JOSE	BRIDGETOWN
GENEVA (UEMIS)	BOGOTA	SANTO DOMINGO	NASSAU
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FM WASHINGTON 171730Z FEB 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 518 OF 17 FEBRUARY  
INFO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE.

YOUR TELNO 286: OBSERVERS FOR EL SALVADOR

1. ACCOMPANYING THE PUS ON A CALL ON EAGLEBURGER TODAY, I HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE ASKING THAT IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY TO HAIG.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE NEWS WOULD BE EXTREMELY WELL RECEIVED. IT COULD HELP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHOM THE AMERICANS WERE URGING TO SEND OBSERVERS. HAIG WAS ABOUT TO SEE THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY TO TRY TO TWIST THEIR ARMS.

3. I TOLD EAGLEBURGER OF THE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY AT HOME INVOLVED IN COMING TO THIS DECISION. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS DONE IN THE LIGHT OF OUR GENERAL ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO SHOW THE AMERICANS SUPPORT ON A MATTER OF GREAT SENSITIVITY. THE PUS AND I BOTH EMPHASISED THE POLITICAL PROBLEM AT HOME. EAGLEBURGER AGAIN SPOKE OF THE U.S. GRATITUDE FOR THIS MOVE, IN KEEPING WITH WHAT THEY TRADITIONALLY RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH WHEN THE GOING WAS DIFFICULT.

HENDERSON

[REPETITION TO TEGUCIGALPA REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,  
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POST]

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EL SALVADOR STANDARD

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
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FM FCO 161730Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 285 OF 16 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA AND PRIORITY SAN JOSE



OUR TELNO 70 TO KUALA LUMPUR, EL SALVADOR

1. I HAVE DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT'S INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS.

2. AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE BY WRITTEN ANSWERS TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT AT 1700 GMT ON WEDNESDAY 17 FEBRUARY. THE TEXT OF THE ANSWERS WILL BE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY. YOU WILL SEE THAT I HAVE MADE OUR DECISION SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. I WISH TO LET SECRETARY HAIG KNOW IN CONFIDENCE IN ADVANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ARRANGE TO DELIVER THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IN MIFT TO HIM, IF POSSIBLE IN PERSON, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE MORNING (YOUR TIME) OF WEDNESDAY 17 FEBRUARY.

4. IN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO HAIG THAT WE SHALL, AS PROMISED IN MY MESSAGE, TAKE ACTION IN BONN, ROME BRUSSELS AND OTTAWA ONCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE TO ENSURE THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UK DECISION AND THE REASONS FOR WHICH IT WAS TAKEN. WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING TO TAKE ACTION IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CAPITALS TO INFORM GOVERNMENTS OF OUR ACTION.

5. WE EXPECT CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC INTEREST AND CRITICISM HERE AS SOON AS THE NEWS BREAKS. NO DOUBT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE WILL BE REPORTING REACTIONS BUT YOU SHOULD LEAVE THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE DOMESTIC COST OF OUR SUPPORT IN THIS.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 286 OF 16 FEBRUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE TEGUCIGALPA  
PRIORITY SAN JOSE.

EL SALVADOR: MIPT

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO HAIG:  
BEGINS 'THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 FEBRUARY.

YOU WILL BE PLEASED TO LEARN THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO SEND  
OBSERVERS TO THE SALVADOREAN ELECTIONS AS LONG AS WE CAN BE SURE  
ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY. AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS  
EFFECT WILL BE MADE TO PARLIAMENT AT 1700 LONDON TIME WEDNESDAY  
17 FEBRUARY. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DECISION  
MUST REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE.

WE SHALL OF COURSE INFORM THE SALVADOREAN GOVERNMENT  
AND OUR EC PARTNERS ONCE PARLIAMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN THE NEWS.  
I INTEND TO INSTRUCT OUR EMBASSIES IN A NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE  
CAPITALS TO INFORM OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF OUR DECISION AND THE  
REASONS WHICH LIE BEHIND IT SO THAT THEY CAN STUDY THE IMPLICA-  
TIONS FOR THEM OF OUR RESPONSE. I HOPE AS A RESULT THAT SOME OF  
THEM MAY DECIDE TO SEND OBSERVERS ALSO.

WE SHALL MAKE CLEAR TO PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC THAT OUR  
OBSERVERS WILL BE OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC STANDING AND WILL BE  
EXPECTED TO REPORT WITHOUT BIAS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR OWN  
OBSERVATIONS. WE SHALL UNDERTAKE TO MAKE THEIR REPORT PUBLIC.  
YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT  
THEIR REPORT WILL BE FAVOURABLE.

WE SHARE YOUR DESIRE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEMOCRATIC  
POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR. LEFT WING  
ELEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE AN

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EFFECTIVE VETO OVER THAT PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL PROVE TO BE A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND THAT THEY WILL PAVE THE WAY TO A MORE JUST AND STABLE SOCIETY THERE. BUT OUR OBSERVERS WILL JUDGE AS THEY FIND.

I HOPE THAT WE CAN KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH OVER EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR AT THIS IMPORTANT AND DELICATE TIME.' ENDS

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FM OTTAWA 162210Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 98 OF 16 FEBRUARY

SAVING TO SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA

YOUR TELNO 53: EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

1. MEMBER OF CHANCERY TRIED THIS MORNING TO PROBE THE CANADIANS ABOUT THEIR THINKING ON SENDING OBSERVERS.

2. THE CANADIANS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE TO BE STRUCTURED ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVERS (AS WITH ZIMBABWE) BUT THE EL SALVADORIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE. THE CANADIANS NOW REALISE WITH ANXIETY THAT THEY MUST MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DECISION TO SEND OBSERVERS AND THIS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS ENDORSING THE ELECTION PROCESS.

3. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE BOTH FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND FROM PARLIAMENTARIANS NOT TO SEND OBSERVERS. DEA LAST WEEK RECEIVED ABOUT 1,000 LETTERS ASKING THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT NOT TO SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS; THIS IS REMARKABLE FROM A PUBLIC NORMALLY APATHETIC ABOUT FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO HAVING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF A REPORT ON CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN PUBLISHED LAST DECEMBER BY A HOUSE OF COMMONS SUBCOMMITTEE WHICH EXPRESSED "THE GRAVEST DOUBTS" ABOUT THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. MOREOVER, THREE MPS CAME BACK AT THE END OF A VISIT LAST MONTH TO SALVADORIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN HONDURAS CONVINCED THAT CANADA'S POLICY OF SUPPORTING ELECTIONS WAS WRONG.

4. ANOTHER FACTOR IN CANADIAN THINKING IS RELUCTANCE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE US LINE, WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS AGGRESSIVE AND AS EXACERBATING THE SITUATION.

5. ACCORDING TO DEA, THE MATTER IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE DESK OFFICER DREW ATTENTION TO A RADIO INTERVIEW IN 4 FEBRUARY IN WHICH MR MACGUIGAN SAID: "WE'RE CERTAINLY NOT PLANNING ANY DECISION ON THAT (IE. THE SENDING OF OBSERVERS); WE'LL WAIT TO SEE HOW THE CAMPAIGN DEVELOPS AND HOW PARTIES ARE ALLOWED TO BEHAVE AND DO BEHAVE IN THE CAMPAIGN". THE DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE MADE AT THE LAST MOMENT WHEN CANADA HAS SEEN THE REACTION OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES.

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6. ONE OPTION UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS MERELY TO SEND A POLITICAL OFFICER FROM THE EMBASSY IN COSTA RICA TO COVER THE ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR NORMAL METHODS OF COVERING AN ELECTION IN A COUNTRY WHERE THEY HAVE NO EMBASSY BUT HARDLY QUALIFIES AS "OBSERVING".

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FM TEGUCIGALPA 152015Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 34 OF 15 FEBRUARY

INFO SAN JOSE, WASHINGTON AND MEXICO CITY.

M.I.P.T. EL SALVADOR.

1. EL SALVADOR IS ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR. NEITHER THE JUNTA NOR THE GUERRILLAS IS ABLE TO WIN MILITARILY OR WILLING TO MEET THE OTHER'S CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND ARMY SEEK LEGITIMACY THROUGH ELECTIONS AND THUS INCREASED U.S. AID AND OVERSEAS ACCEPTANCE.

THE F.D.R./F.M.L.N. ARE TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE ELECTIONS BOTH BY REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE AND BY THREATENING THOSE WHO DO. THE ARMED FORCES <sup>CHAFE</sup> ~~CHAE~~ UNDER FOREIGN CRITICISM OF EXCESSES OF SOME OF THEIR UNITS AND NEED 6 MONTHS TO A YEAR BEFORE THE IMPACT OF THE NEW US TRAINED BATTALIONS WILL TAKE EFFECT. THE PUBLIC IS WEARY OF VIOLENCE, UNACCUSTOMED TO HONEST ELECTIONS AND FACING INCREASED ECONOMIC HARDSHIP. THE SITUATION IS GETTING WORSE NOT BETTER.

2. ARMED FORCES. DIFFICULT TO ASSESS MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES BUT ROLE SO FAR HAS BEEN LARGELY DEFENSIVE WITH SENIOR OFFICERS DESKBOUND. OPERATIONS ARE OFTEN KNOWN WELL IN ADVANCE. RECENT ATTACK ON THE ILOPANGO BASE WAS A SERIOUS BLOW TO CONFIDENCE. ATTACK MOUNTED FROM INSIDE THE BASE WITHOUT CASUALTIES DESTROYED 6 HELICOPTERS, 5 OURAGANS AND 5 C47 AIRCRAFT - HALF THE AIR FORCE. THE US HAS REPLACED THE HELICOPTERS. THE ATTACK, PRESS CRITICISM AND A FLOW OF FOREIGN (MAINLY US) POLITICIANS EXPECTING STANDARDS THE ARMY KNOWS CANNOT ALWAYS BE MET IS CREATING SOMETHING OF A SIEGE MENTALITY.

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3. ELECTIONS. DUARTE SEEMS CONFIDENT BUT WILL BE LUCKY TO WIN A CLEAR MAJORITY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HOW INTIMIDATION WILL AFFECT RESULT BUT AT THIS POINT POLLS SUGGEST CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND RIGHT WING BLOCK OF PARTIES ARE RUNNING EQUAL WITH ABOUT ONETHIRD OF THE VOTES UNCOMMITTED. IF DUARTE WINS MAJORITY HE WILL BE IN STRONGER POSITION WITH ARMY AND FDR. IF RIGHT WING COALITION EMERGES US ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE MORE DIFFICULT CHOICE FROM WHICH THEY MAY SEEK TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES IN THE FACE OF MOUNTING CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM. IN THAT CASE RIGHT WING AND ARMY MIGHT FORGE ANOTHER CIVILIAN/MILITARY JUNTA AND EL SALVADOR WOULD SLIDE INTO A REAL CIVIL WAR.

4. JUNTA SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TOWARDS WHICH PROPOSED ELECTIONS FLAWED AS THEY ARE OFFER A START. THEY WILL ALSO SHOW EXTENT OF NON FDR SUPPORT AND PROVIDE BETTER NEGOTIATING BASE FOR FUTURE TALKS WHICH MUST COME. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS ARE I THINK WILLING FOR LATTER BUT ARMY REFUSES INTEGRATION OF FORCES WITH FMLN AND FDR SEEKS DIRECT NEGOTIATION OF POWER RATHER THAN ELECTIONS. THERE SEEMS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THIS IMPASSE CAN BE BROKEN UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS.

5. OBSERVERS. NEITHER PRESIDENT NOR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RAISED PARTICIPATION WITH ME (ALTHOUGH SECRETARY GENERAL OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY DID). PROBLEM IS NOT TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE GOOD AS CAN BE EXPECTED BUT ABSENCE OF FDR, LACK OF UP TO DATE ELECTORAL REGISTER AND LIKLIHOOD OF VIOLENCE TO CANDIDATES (AND INDEED VOTERS). HOWEVER FDR DECISION IS THEIR OWN, SAFETY OF CANDIDATES CANNOT BE GUARRANTEED IN ANY SALVADOREAN ELECTION (VIP. GUERRILLA THREATS) AND UP TO DATE ELECTORAL RECORDS ARE NOT COMMON IN LATIN AMERICAN ELECTIONS. QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS MOVE TOWARDS BEGINNING OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IS BETTER THAN (A) PRESENT DE FACTO REGIME WHICH INADEQUATELY REPRESENTS THOSE WHO ARE BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS OR (B) CONTINUATION OF FIGHTING UNTIL ONE SIDE IS FORCED TO AGREE TO OTHER CONDITIONS. NEITHER OF LATTER ALTERNATIVES WILL HELP THE GROWTH OF STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AREA. THE ELECTIONS MIGHT DO SO. HOWEVER WE SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT ONE CANNOT EXCLUDE RISKS TO OBSERVERS OR INDEED MYSELF IF WE PARTICIPATE.



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6. MASSACRES. TRUTH IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN.

IN CASE OF EL MOZOTE AND NUEVA TRINIDAD THE ARMY AND THE FMLN RESPECTIVELY ATTACKED VILLAGES HELD BY THEIR OPPONENTS AND DECKOIIDED THEM KILLING MANY INHABITANTS IN THE PROCESS. WITH EL-MOZOTE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN EXCESSES AFTERWARDS. NUMBERS SUGGESTED IN BOTH CASES SEEM EXAGGERATED (POPULATION OF BOTH 3-400 WITH ELMOZOTE SWOLLEN BY FMLN SUPPORTERS). IN NUEVA TRINIDAD 15 SOLDIERS AND ABOUT 40 CIVILIANS DIED IN GUERRILLA ATTACK (PRESS REPORTS SUGGESTED 200). EL MOZOTE IS STILL IN GUERRILLA HELD AREA AND OBSERVERS FROM ICRC, UNHCR, AND CHURCH APPARENTLY WERE NOT INVITED. I REMINDED DUARTE AND GARCIA OF IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING TO JUSTICE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR EXCESSES. THEY AGREED BUT CLAIMED INTERNATIONAL LEFT WING CAMPAIGN TO EXAGGERATE CASES , POINTED TO CASE OF NUNS AS EXAMPLE OF JUSTICE AND SAID THAT IN BLOODY GUERRILLA WAR WITH INEXPERIENCED TROOPS WHOSE FAMILIES WERE SOMETIMES KILLED BY GUERRILLAS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE PERFECT. AS WITH DEMOCRACY IT WAS A GOAL TOWARDS WHICH THEY WERE WORKING.

7. AS IT IS DIFFICULT IN EL SALVADOR TO EXPLORE POLITICAL OPTIONS OUTSIDE CENTRE RIGHT I SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY

IN MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE ASKED TO DEVELOP CONTACT WITH UNGO, MAJANO ETC ON INFORMAL BASIS.

DANISH AMBASSADOR (WHO OFFERED ME LUNCH WITH UNGO IF I PASSED THAT WAY) MIGHT BE USEFUL STARTING POINT.

MY POSITION LIMITS MY ACTIVITIES IN EL SALVADOR BUT EVENTS ARE MOVING TOO QUICKLY FOR US TO RESTRICT KNOWLEDGE OF FDR THINKING TM THEIR OCCASIONAL PROPAGANDA VISITS TO EUROPE.

FCO PASS TO SAN JOSE, WASHINGTON AND MEXICO CITY.  
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CABINET OFFICE

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

return to AJC

15 February 1982

Dear John,

h-a.  
VOR 16. 1/2El Salvador

Thank you for your letter of 11 February asking for an assessment of the situation in El Salvador, the attitude of others and British policy; and a rather more detailed line for handling public criticism of our policy. I enclose a background paper on El Salvador and a defensive line to take in two parts, one covering human rights and the second covering British assistance.

Lord Carrington has not seen this material but Mr Luce has commented that the three main points which we should seek to get across in countering criticism of our policy are the following:

- (i) We deplore violence on both sides and have condemned it.
- (ii) The best step towards removing this violence is through democratic elections.
- (iii) We have been helping on the humanitarian side (£200,000 bilaterally, 20% share of European aid on £1.6 million).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



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## EL SALVADOR

### BACKGROUND

1. El Salvador is a violent country. Five years ago, homicide was the second most frequent cause of death. Virtually since 1932 when the military put down a popular movement with over 30,000 deaths, El Salvador has been under military government. Power and wealth lay with the privileged few (the oligarchy or so-called 14 families).

2. In 1972 Jose Napoleon Duarte, a Christian Democrat, was elected President, with the present leader of the exiled democratic front (FDR) Guillermo Ungo, as his running mate. The military frustrated the election result, tortured Duarte and sent him into exile. In October 1979 the military government was overthrown in a bloodless coup but the junta which assumed power and contained Christian Democrats and military moderates lasted only 4 months. The defection of moderates from the revolutionary junta in December 1979 was a response to the entrenched right-wing extremism of the army. Duarte was brought in later as President but although his Christian Democrat credentials were excellent, he was from the beginning only imperfectly in control of the military.

### PRESENT POLITICAL LINE UP

3. Duarte is a left of centre reformist President. Two members of his 4-man junta have similar credentials. The other is a General who does not. The moderate voice in the army is ineffective, its most prominent advocate (Col Majano) having gone into voluntary exile.

4. On the left at least 5 terrorist organisations active in El Salvador throughout the 70s have coalesced to form the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front). The Front has a military

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/command

command (DRU) under which up to 8,000 guerrillas are fighting in El Salvador (total population 4 million). Press reports claim that up to one-third of the country is under guerrilla control. The FMLN is in alliance with the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front) whose leadership is in exile in Mexico City. Led by Ungo, the FDR includes many respected Christian Democrats whose claim to a representative role in Salvadorean politics is good.

5. To the right of Duarte there are 5 political parties of varying degrees of extremism. From their ranks and from the ultra-right members of the military and the other security forces (Treasury Police) come the members of the unofficial death squads. Their activities since October 1979 have undoubtedly been responsible for assassinations and atrocities on a massive scale.

#### THE PRESENT SITUATION

6. Duarte has been trying for a year to assert his control over extremists on both wings. He has had little success. He admits his failure to control the well publicised excesses of the right. He claims, probably with some justification, that there has been some improvement. The international press give a contrary impression. Guerrilla organisations with their terrorist origins do not hesitate to use intimidation, torture and summary execution. They are, however, well aware of the importance of propaganda and their public image and have succeeded in presenting themselves as a popular liberation movement.

7. The military situation was until the beginning of this year at stalemate. The army had been able to hold the guerrillas in check but inflict little damage to their operational capability. The guerrillas for their part had not succeeded in sparking a popular uprising. The mass of people appeared to be politically apathetic and interested only in an end to the fighting.



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8. In January the guerrillas scored a number of crucial successes, the biggest of which was the destruction in one attack of a significant number of aircraft. The resultant lack of reinforcement capability and mobility appears to have made the position of the army much more vulnerable. A US decision to provide \$55 million of immediate military aid will at best do no more than make up the loss suffered.

#### DUARTE'S POLICY

9. He is a reformist President. He has maintained a programme of sweeping land reform, involving the confiscation of large estates and setting up peasant collectives. The aim of these reforms is laudable but achievement is patchy. Reform of the fiscal system has also been undertaken. His detractors claim that these reforms are cosmetic. They have probably earned Duarte a good deal of recrimination from the right.

10. He seeks to legitimise his government by holding early elections (28 March) recognising that these will not be fully representative and will be held in adverse conditions. He calculates that even partially successful elections will add to his government's stature and credibility and weaken the position of the extremists on both flanks. Even though the FDR/FMLN have refused to participate, it is possible that a high turnout of positive voters for Duarte could undermine the claims of the left to have sweeping popular support. But this would only be so if the elections were free of malpractice and intimidation. Electoral history in El Salvador is the reverse of reassuring. Conditions for the elections will be about as bad as they could be given the guerrillas' declared determination to disrupt the electoral process at all costs. They have already threatened candidates with assassination. At least one right-wing candidate has already been killed.

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THE INTERNATIONAL LINE UP

11. Other Central American countries, with the exception of Nicaragua, are in favour of the elections. Costa Rica and Honduras in particular are urging the international community to send observers as Duarte has requested. Mexico is hostile to Duarte and believes that only through recognising the FMLN/FDR alliance and entering into negotiations can a solution be found. The junta have refused to contemplate negotiations for which preconditions have hitherto been demanded by the FDR/FMLN. The rest of Latin America is probably privately in support of Duarte but publicly there have been few unambiguous expressions of support for his policies. Some but not all Latin American countries are sending observers to the elections.

12. The OAS in a resolution at St Lucia in December came out strongly in favour of Duarte's policies and against outside intervention in El Salvador.

13. Cuba, whose role in unifying the factions of the FMLN was probably crucial, strongly supports the revolutionary alliance, probably provides practical assistance and training but is not believed to have personnel in El Salvador.

EC MEMBER STATES

14. All have difficulty in monitoring events. Only the Italians have a permanent Ambassador in San Salvador. There is mounting demand from outraged public opinion in Europe for decisive condemnation of Duarte and the junta. The most critical in their public statements have so far been France and the Netherlands, with Denmark, Ireland and Greece now a close second. France participated in August 1981 with Mexico in a declaration which acknowledged the FMLN/FDR as a representative political force.

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15. Belgium, Italy and the FRG, with their strong Catholic influence, have open minds about the attempts of the junta to bring violence under control. They all support the objectives of what is in theory a left of centre reforming government. They, too, are under pressure from public opinion to distance themselves from Duarte.

16. Denmark and Greece have refused to send observers to the elections. France, the Netherlands and Ireland were not invited. FRG, Belgium, Italy Luxembourg and the UK have yet to announce a decision.

#### US POLICY

17. The US sees developments in El Salvador as Cuba inspired, and a direct consequence of the replacement in Nicaragua of the dictator Somoza by a revolutionary government of the left. Washington is convinced that Nicaragua has given active assistance to the guerrillas and is still doing so on a large scale. Cuban involvement with military supplies, training, and other forms of support is believed in Washington to be beyond doubt.

18. The US therefore view events in El Salvador in East-West terms. They consider that, despite his difficulties with the military and with extremists of the right, Duarte is the best chance in the long term for moderate democracy in El Salvador. They have supported him with \$104 million of economic aid last year and \$36 million of military aid, to which must be added a further \$55 m just agreed. There are currently some 50 military advisers in El Salvador. They have no combat role.

19. President Reagan has refuted charges that the US is preparing for the involvement of combat troops. He has also denied that the US is preparing military action against Nicaragua or Cuba, though Secretary Haig has publicly stated that the problem of El Salvador must be dealt with 'at source'. The

Administration has in effect kept its options open.

20. The Administration's policy towards Central America and the Caribbean has been dictated by what it sees as a new phase of aggressive expansion of Cuban influence which began with the Sandinista struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua. The US has pursued uncompromising policies towards Grenada and latterly Nicaragua, continuing its restrictive measures against Cuba. The US recognises the contribution to instability in the region which is made by social injustice and economic hardship. In an attempt to deal with this, the US has launched a Caribbean Basin Initiative with the support of Canada, Mexico and Venezuela, the details of which are about to be announced. These will include increased aid as well as trade and investment opportunities for countries of the region.

21. The Administration has come under growing criticism in Congress for its refusal to withhold assistance from the Duarte Government in El Salvador, and for its increased military aid. There are fears of a second Vietnam. Even so, the Administration has been critical of the human rights record of the Salvadorean Government and authorities (atrociously bad, as is that of neighbouring Guatemala where a US backed military regime also faces growing insurgency.) Overriding in American assessments is the strategic importance of Central America as an area in which potential Cuban and Soviet influence could spread, ultimately threatening the long border between Mexico and the US.

#### UK INTERESTS

22. Britain has few historical links with El Salvador. Trade is dwindling and there are few remaining investments of significance. The resident British community is small (probably less than 100) and also dwindling.



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23. Our current interest in El Salvador is thus essentially political:

- a) To support US policy because we share US fears of growing instability and communist infiltration in Central America (which could also have repercussions for Belize).
- b) Washington are making support for their stand in El Salvador a test of transatlantic solidarity. We have had to disappoint the US on other requests for help in the region.

24. We have to recognise widespread and growing public revulsion at highly publicised reports of bloodshed and intimidation. We have condemned these in international fora as well as in Parliament and will continue to do so.

25. We are trying to improve our own independent sources of information. HM Ambassador in Tegucigalpa has just taken over responsibility for El Salvador. (HM Ambassador in San Jose has been accredited to El Salvador since the resident Mission was closed there in February 1980.) HM Ambassador in San Jose will have more time to devote to Nicaragua.

26. The human rights situation in El Salvador is undoubtedly bad. But much media reporting is biased and anti-America. Because of this, indignation in this country is leading to demands for us to distance ourselves from US policy.

27. Wider considerations suggest that declining to send observers would not be the best way of doing this; it would both disappoint the US government and destroy any basis for further representations to them (our thinking on this was set out in PS letter to No 10 of 11 February.)

Mexico & Central America Dept  
15 February 1982

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cc MAP

HL

El Salvador

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 February 1982

El Salvador Elections: Observers

Thank you for your letter of 11 February.

The Prime Minister is content that Observers should be sent to the El Salvador elections on 28 March.

As we agreed on the telephone this morning, the timing of any Written Parliamentary Answer announcing this decision will need to take into account whatever may transpire on El Salvador during Prime Minister's Question time tomorrow. Perhaps we could be in touch thereafter.

A. J. COLES

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John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Contact that observers  
should go?

A.S.C.  $\frac{11}{2}$

11 February 1982

Yes not

Dear John,

El Salvador Elections: Observers

Lord Carrington would like the Prime Minister to know that he has decided in principle that we should accept the invitation from the Government of El Salvador to send observers to the elections due to take place there on 28 March.

The arguments for and against sending observers are finely balanced. You will be aware that the decision has been given a keen political edge by current public concern, both here and abroad, over events in El Salvador. Of our EC partners, France opposes the elections and most of the others are still making up their minds and possibly waiting for us to give a lead. Only a handful of other countries have so far announced that they are sending observers, although the Americans tell us that positive decisions have been taken by some others and we hope that one or two of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries may also do so.

Critics of the El Salvador Government say the elections will be unrepresentative. It is certainly the case that left wing opposition parties have refused to take part. It could also be argued that we should avoid further involvement in the area.

On the other hand, the US Government attach great importance to the elections and clearly see the sending of observers as a test of Western support for their position. We have just received a message from Secretary Haig urging us to send observers. This follows earlier representations by the US Ambassador. We have already had to decline to help the US in a number of respects in Central America. We therefore feel that there are powerful trans-Atlantic reasons for sending observers.

/We also



We also believe that refusal to send observers will be claimed by opponents of elections as a vindication of the position adopted by the Salvadorean guerillas, who would have effectively exercised a veto over the democratic process. Ministers can fairly say that it would be wrong to prejudge the issue in a part of the world where we are not well informed but which has clearly become an area of major public concern. Lord Carrington believes that a decision to send observers will be defensible in Parliament, therefore, despite the clamour that such a decision will arouse.

There is some hope that an early decision on our part to send observers will encourage other countries, possibly including Germany, Italy or Belgium, to follow our lead. It should also give us a rather stronger position from which to discuss events in El Salvador with the Americans, which we shall certainly wish to do. In telling them of our decision we shall have to warn them that we cannot guarantee that our observers will come up with findings that are to their liking and that indeed, given that the opposition parties have refused to take part, their report may well not be favourable.

We are giving further consideration to the choice of people to be sent (a team of two is most likely). Meanwhile, we propose that the announcement should be made to the House of Commons next week in a written reply. The US Government will be told slightly in advance and arrangements will be made for the Salvadorean Government and our EC partners to be informed.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



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10 DOWNING STREET

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E

El Salvador

*From the Private Secretary*

11 February 1982

EL SALVADOR

On one or two occasions recently, the most recent being today, the Prime Minister has come under some pressure at Question time about the Government's policy towards El Salvador. The subject is likely to remain a live one over the coming weeks leading up to the elections in El Salvador.

I think it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could be given a rounded assessment of the situation in El Salvador, together with a description of US policy and the attitudes of EC Member States as well as of British policy and involvement. It would also be helpful if you could suggest a rather more detailed line than has been necessary so far for handling public criticism of our policy (there seemed to me to be points in Mr. Luce's interview on the Today programme on 10 February on which the Prime Minister might usefully draw). I suppose, also, that it might to some extent be necessary to set El Salvador in the broader Central American context.

I should be grateful if a short paper covering the above points could reach me by Monday night so that it will be fresh in the Prime Minister's mind if the subject comes up again at Questions on Tuesday 16 February.

B/F ✓

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

TELEGRAM NO. 70 OF 6 FEBRUARY '82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

EL SALVADOR: MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG

1. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

BEGINS 'DEAR FOREIGN SECRETARY:

AS YOU KNOW, THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONVOKED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS FOR MARCH 28 AND HAS INVITED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SEND OBSERVERS TO WITNESS THE ELECTION PROCESS. EIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES ARE CURRENTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTION PROCESS AND A BROAD RANGE OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS INCLUDING THE SALVADORAN BISHOPS COUNCIL, THE EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION AND THE LABOR-CAMPESINO ORGANISATION, THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC UNION, HAVE ALL SUPPORTED THE ELECTION PROCESS AND URGED SALVADORAN CITIZENS TO VOTE.

ELECTIONS ARE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARDS A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR, AND TOWARD ENDING THE TRAGIC HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES LAST MONTH ENDORSED THE SALVADORAN ELECTION PROCESS BY AN OVERWHELMING 22-3 VOTE AND URGED MEMBER STATES TO SEND ELECTION OBSERVERS. ON JANUARY 27, AT THE OCCASION OF THE INAUGURATION OF HONDURAN PRESIDENT SUAZO IN TEGUCIGALPA, THE UNITED STATES, COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA JOINED THE THREE NATIONS OF THE NEWLY FORMED CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IN A NEW DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR'S ELECTORAL PROCESS.

THE UNITED STATES IS RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE SALVADORAN REQUEST BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ARE IMPORTANT GUARANTEES AGAINST THOSE EXTREME ELEMENTS WHICH WISH TO CORRUPT THE PROCESS THROUGH INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE.

I HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN WITH THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES IN ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN EL SALVADOR BY SENDING ELECTION OBSERVERS. YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO A PEACEFUL AND MODERATE DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME IN EL SALVADOR HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROMOTING NON-EXTREMIST SOLUTIONS IN ALL OF CENTRAL AMERICA.

I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE YOU SOON IN MADRID.  
SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M HAIG, JR.' ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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SAI)

PS

PS/RS

PS/MRUCE

PS/PUS  
MR DAY  
MR URE  
CABINET OFFICE

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*El Salvador*

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FM WASHINGTON 040125Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 3 FEBRUARY

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11 to US  
Mr Day  
Mr VAE  
Mr Bennett  
Mr Goodwin*

MIPT

ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR

1. THE AMERICANS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A RESPECTABLE TURN OUT BY FOREIGN OBSERVERS DURING THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR.

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT MINISTERS WILL BE CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION SOON. THERE ARE ADMITTEDLY COGENT REASONS FOR ASSUMING THAT THESE ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE FULLY REPRESENTATIVE AND I FULLY APPRECIATE THE STRENGTH OF OPPOSITION IN THE UK TO THE SENDING OF A BRITISH GROUP OF OBSERVERS. BUT TO SEND SUCH A TEAM DOES NOT COMMIT IT TO DECLARING THE ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR: QUITE APART FROM THE FACT THAT BY REFUSING TO SEND ONE WE WOULD ESSENTIALLY GIVE THE GUERRILLAS A RIGHT TO INVALIDATE THE ELECTIONS SIMPLY THROUGH NON-PARTICIPATION, WE WOULD ALSO BE SEEN AS FAILING TO SUPPORT THE AMERICANS IN A MATTER OF REAL IMPORTANCE TO THEM.

3. AS YOU KNOW, WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA HAVE BEEN GENERALLY SEEN IN WASHINGTON AS OSCILLATING BETWEEN NEUTRALITY AND UNHELPFULNESS: WE OURSELVES HAVE HAD TO DISAPPOINT THE AMERICANS ON A NUMBER OF MINOR ISSUES RELATING TO OUR RELATIONS WITH CUBA (E.G. RADIO MARTI, ECGD COVER ETC): IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT WE HAVE TO CONSIDER THE REQUEST FOR OBSERVERS AT THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR. ONE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO PERSUADE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO UNDERTAKE THE TASK: THIS

COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO UNDERTAKE THE TASK: THIS MIGHT HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING ANY AWKWARDNESS WHICH COULD BE CAUSED IF AN OFFICIAL (AS OPPOSED TO A PARLIAMENTARY) GROUP FELT OBLIGED TO CRITICIZE THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS.

4. ONE FINAL POINT: WITH A GOOD DEAL OF PRESSURE, WE PERSUADED THE LAST US ADMINISTRATION TO SEND AN OFFICIAL TEAM TO OBSERVE THE ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE. THIS WAS NOT A WHOLLY RISK-FREE OR UNCRITICISED MOVE ON THEIR PART, BUT THEY OBLIGED IN A MATTER OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO US. IT WOULD IN MY VIEW BE APT FOR US TO REPAY THAT GESTURE NOW AT A TIME WHEN AMERICAN POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA FACES SO MANY PROBLEMS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



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FROM UKDEL NATO 100215Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 10 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/MINISTER)

BONN PARIS WASHINGTON

PRIORITY MOSCOW

PS  
ND FLOUSSN  
*[Handwritten signature]*

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
QUADRIPARTITE DINNER 9 DECEMBER: CENTRAL AMERICA.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SAW THE PROBLEM AS MORE SOVIET OR MORE CUBAN IN ORIGIN. MR HAIG SAID HE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS MORE SOVIET. IT WAS RUSSIANS, NOT CUBANS, WHO WERE RUNNING THE NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE, JUST AS THEY WERE DIRECTING CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND CONTROLLING LIBYAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE PROBLEM IN CENTRAL AMERICA WOULD LEND ITSELF TO REMEDIAL ACTION IF THE RUSSIANS WERE WILLING: IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE ANY BACKING DOWN ON THEIR PART. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY WOULD NO DOUBT CONTINUE, BUT THE RUSSIANS COULD TURN OFF THEIR OWN ROLE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHAT CONCLUSIONS THE UNITED STATES DREW FROM THIS ANALYSIS. HAIG SAID THAT AMERICA WOULD HAVE TO QUOTE WORK THE PROBLEM WITH THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS UNQUOTE, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO WORK ON THE SOCIAL INJUSTICES AND HELP THOSE IN DANGER TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. HE HAD FOUND A GROWING CONSENSUS IN SOUTHERN AMERICA THAT THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM LAY OUTSIDE THE HEMISPHERE.



## NICARAGUA

3. HAIG DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS EXTREMELY WORRISOME. EVEN MEXICO WAS WORRIED, ALTHOUGH NOT TO THE POINT OF BEING WILLING TO COORDINATE HER ACTIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. NICARAGUA WAS NOT YET IN THE SOVIET GRASP, AND A RECENT POLL SHOWED THAT ONLY 27 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTED THE REGIME. BUT THAT WAS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH EVENTS WERE MOVING. HE HAD TOLD THE NICARAGUAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EARLY DATE FOR ELECTIONS WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, AND THAT IF NICARAGUA STOPPED INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF HER NEIGHBOURS, NOBODY WOULD INTERFERE IN HERS. AS THINGS STOOD, THE COSTA RICANS FOR EXAMPLE WERE IN A STATE OF TERROR.

4. CHEYSSON SAID THAT FRANCE WAS NOT QUITE CONVINCED BY THIS ANALYSIS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTED EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED, EVEN IN CUBA. THE SANDINISTA'S WERE NOT FULLY IN CONTROL OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEM; THEY HAD ONLY BEEN IN POWER FOR 2 YEARS. BUT THEY APPEARED TO ENJOY GOOD SUPPORT AMONG THEIR OWN PEOPLE. (MR HAIG DISSENTED.) CERTAINLY NICARAGUA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FALL INTO SOVIET HANDS. BUT MILITARY ACTION WOULD NOT PREVENT THIS. THE ELECTION RESULTS IN HONDURAS HAD BEEN A GOOD SIGN AND COULD BE A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR NICARAGUA. MR HAIG AGAIN DISAGREED; HE QUOTED THE HONDURAN FOREIGN MINISTER AS TELLING HIM THAT THE ELECTION HAD TAKEN PLACE QUOTE THROUGH THE BARREL OF A GUN UNQUOTE.

## EL SALVADOR

5. HAIG SAID THAT THERE WERE 32 AMERICAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS IN SALVADOR, COMPARED WITH 6,000 CUBANS PROVIDING NOT JUST ADVICE BUT COMMAND AND CONTROL TO THE GUERRILLAS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE GROWING CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE FACTS IN THE REGION. THE WORST THING WOULD BE FOR THE US TO THROW ITS WEIGHT AROUND, BUT IT COULD NOT SIT SILENTLY EITHER. EVERY FOREIGN MINISTER HE HAD SPOKEN TO HAD URGED THE US TO CONTINUE ON ITS PRESENT COURSE, ALTHOUGH ADDING THAT HIS OWN COUNTRY COULD NOT SAY THIS IN PUBLIC. IN THE SHORT TERM HAIG WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT EL SALVADOR. THERE HAD BEEN SOME RECENT MILITARY SUCCESSES AND SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS. WE SHOULD ALL DO WHAT WE COULD TO ENCOURAGE A HIGH TURN-OUT AND A CREDIBLE ELECTION; A LOW TURNOUT WOULD HELP ONLY THE TWO EXTREMES. BUT WHETHER CREDIBLE ELECTIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HAIG DID NOT KNOW. AND IF THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA WAS NOT SOLVED, THERE WOULD IN THE LONG RUN BE DISASTER IN SALVADOR.



6. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO SEND THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR BACK TO SAN SALVADOR, BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY THERE HAD BEEN ACTIONS AGAINST GERMAN PROPERTY IN THE COUNTRY. HE WOULD FEEL HAPPIER IF OTHER AMBASSADORS ALSO RETURNED TO THEIR POSTS. (THIS HINT WAS NOT TAKEN UP.)

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED THAT BRITAIN WAS AMONG THOSE ASKED TO SEND OBSERVERS TO WATCH THE PROPOSED ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. DUARTE WAS NO DOUBT SINCERE IN OFFERING TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES, BUT IT WAS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER HE COULD REALLY DO THIS.

#### GUATEMALA

8. HAIG SAID THAT GUATEMALA MADE SALVADOR LOOK LIKE A THRIVING DEMOCRACY. BUT THE US HAD EVIDENCE OF A HEAVY CUBAN HAND BOTH THERE AND IN COLOMBIA, WHICH WAS A REAL DEMOCRACY. CHEYSSON INTERVENED TO SUGGEST THAT IT WAS FAILURES BY THE REGIME, PERSECUTION OF THE INDIANS ETC WHICH HAD GIVEN THE CUBANS THEIR CHANCE IN GUATEMALA. HAIG DID NOT DISAGREE. BUT HE SAW A STATISTICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN VIOLENCE FROM THE LEFT AND FROM THE RIGHT. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW PLURALISM COULD BE PROMOTED. IN SALVADOR THERE HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIAL LAND REFORM AT A PACE PERHAPS FASTER THAN THE COUNTRY COULD ABSORB. IN GUATEMALA THE US HAD NOT PROVIDED HELP. BUT A REVOLUTION THERE WOULD THREATEN VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS: HE MENTIONED OIL, THE PANAMA CANAL AND MEXICO.

9. LORD CARRINGTON CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY COMMENTING THAT US INTERESTS WERE OF COURSE AFFECTED IN CENTRAL AMERICA MORE THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER POWER.

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1875 OF 4 DECEMBER

CALL BY JUDGE CLARK

CENTRAL AMERICA

*h-a.  
102 8/12*

1. CLARK SPOKE SEPARATELY TO ME AND TO THE LPS ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. HE WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON EL SALVADOR DRAFTED BY THE MEXICANS, FRENCH AND OTHERS. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE FRENCH HAD EMBROILED THEMSELVES IN THIS ISSUE, ORIGINALLY WITH THE JOINT FRANCO-MEXICAN STATEMENT AND NOW IN THE RESOLUTION. CLARK SAID THAT HE WOULD BE COMPLAINING TO THE IRISH ABOUT THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION. HE THOUGHT THE MEXICANS WERE NOW A BIT EMBARRASSED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING, AND THERE WAS SOME INDICATION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PUSHED.

NICARAGUA

3. CLARK SAID THAT THERE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT CUBAN ADVISERS IN NICARAGUA WERE NOW BEING REPLACED BY RUSSIANS. THIRTY TO FORTY NICARAGUAN PILOTS HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM TRAINING IN BULGARIA. NICARAGUAN SECURITY FORCES HAD RECENTLY BEEN INCREASED FROM 15,000 TO 50,000. THE ADMINISTRATION INTERPRETED DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AS A CONSCIOUS SOVIET TEST OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RESOLVE IN THE AREA. THEY HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE, THOUGH THEY WOULD CONSULT US BEFORE MOVING. THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE NOT WITHOUT MILITARY OPTIONS SUCH AS INTERDICTION. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF ARGENTIAN, COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN HELP ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. THERE WAS NO WAY THE ADMINISTRATION COULD SIT BACK FOR MUCH LONGER.

EL SALVADOR

4. CLARK SAID THAT THEY HAD THEIR HANDS SOMEWHAT TIED BY HAVING ONLY FIFTY TWO ADVISERS IN EL SALVADOR AND THE US WAS NOT WINNING. THE REAL STORY ABOUT EL SALVADOR WAS NOT GETTING OUT AND THERE WAS A NEED FOR CONSTANT OBSERVATION AND MORE REPORTING.

CONFIDENTIAL



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A SOLUTION WOULD ONLY COME THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS WHICH THE FAR LEFT WOULD NOT ALLOW.

5. EAGLEBURGER SAID SEPARATELY TO BULLARD THAT A COMPLETE STUDY WOULD SHORTLY BE SUBMITTED BY HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA OR AGAINST CUBAN ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONVINCED THAT HE MUST MOVE TO DECIDE AMONG THE OPTIONS. DECISIONS WERE LIKELY BEFORE CHRISTMAS, BUT THEIR NATURE COULD NOT YET BE FORESEEN.

6. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT PATIENCE WAS WEARING THIN IN WASHINGTON AND US POLICY WAS IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTY. IT WAS PROVING IMPOSSIBLE TO RETURN EL SALVADOR TO STABILITY. YET, AS THE CONFLICT CONTINUED, DUARTE MIGHT BE DRIVEN INTO THE HANDS OF THE FAR RIGHT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

DIST

LIMITED

MCAD

PLANNING STAFF (MR MALLABY)

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A ACLAND

MR BULLARD

MR DAY

MR URE

*El Salvador*

3 December 1981

El Salvador: UN Third Committee  
Resolution

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 1 December on this subject.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*26*





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1981

*Primi Minister*

②

*Dear Michael,*
*Print 2/41*

El Salvador: UN Third Committee Resolution

You should be aware of an awkward problem with which we have been faced by the tabling in the UNGA Third Committee - without consultation with us - of a draft Resolution on El Salvador by France, Mexico and others. This is expected to come to a vote/within the next two days.

at any time

I enclose a copy of the draft Resolution in its original form, together with UKMis New York telegrams 1376 and 1402 and outward telegrams of instructions to New York and Washington. The Americans intended to vote against the Resolution in its original form: and have expressed irritation at apparent European unwillingness to give their Central American policy the support which they expect. Following discussions in New York, the draft is expected to be softened: but it is not known whether the Americans would be prepared to abstain if satisfactory amendments were obtained.

Lord Carrington is naturally concerned to avoid friction over this Resolution with the US Government, whose sensitivity on Central American affairs is well known. Nevertheless if Britain, alone among the Ten, was to abstain on a Resolution so amended as to constitute a reasonable comment on El Salvador's performance, our action would be very difficult to defend domestically. Public (and media) concern about El Salvador shows no sign of diminishing. Lord Carrington has therefore taken the view that we should if necessary be prepared to part company with the Americans over the Resolution, but should do our best to ensure that our actions are properly understood in Washington. It of course remains our preferred option to abstain in the company of other European members (possibly the FRG and Italy), though there is no chance of a common abstention by the Ten. Our posts in New York and Washington have been instructed accordingly.

*yours ever*  
*Rodric Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St



General Assembly

Distr.  
LIMITED

A/C.3/36/L.62  
20 November 1981

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-sixth session  
THIRD COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 12

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

The situation of human rights and fundamental freedom in El Salvador

Algeria, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands,  
Sweden and Yugoslavia: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the permanent validity of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Conscious of its responsibility to promote and guarantee the maintenance of those principles and to contribute to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,

Reiterating once more that all Member States have an obligation to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to fulfil in this respect the obligations they have undertaken through the various international instruments in this field,

Recalling resolution 35/192 approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, which, among other things, expresses deep concern for violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador, especially in view of the death of thousands of people and the climate of repression and insecurity which prevails in that country and deplores the assassinations, disappearances and other serious violations of human rights in El Salvador,

Reiterating the appeal made by the General Assembly in said resolution 35/192 for the cessation of violence and the re-establishment of full respect for human rights in El Salvador and for Governments of all States to refrain from supplying arms and lending other forms of military assistance in the current circumstances,



6 Bearing also in mind resolution 32 (XXXVII) of the Commission on Human Rights, approved by the Economic and Social Council in May, 1981, which notes the persistence of the climate of violence and insecurity which prevails in El Salvador,

7 Endorsing the appeal to the Salvadorean parties involved, made by the Commission on Human Rights in the said resolution 32 (XXXVII), to arrive at a peaceful settlement and put an end to violence in order to prevent further loss of lives and alleviate the suffering of the people of El Salvador,

8 Taking note of resolution 10 (XXXIV) adopted by the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which states that only respect for article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, will assure to the Salvadorean nation, through the participation of all its political forces, the full exercise of its fundamental rights in establishing a democratically elected government, but also notes that at the present time these conditions do not exist in El Salvador,

9 Having studied the Interim Report of the Special Representative for El Salvador, appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, contained in document A/36/608, which confirms the seriousness of the situation prevailing in El Salvador and, among other things, provides evidence on the general attitude of passiveness and inactivity of the present Salvadorean authorities with respect to the constant human rights violations in that country,

10 Noting that the situation in El Salvador, as clearly shown in the Interim Report of the Special Representative, has its root causes in internal political, economic and social factors,

1. Reiterates its deep concern for the situation prevailing in El Salvador and the suffering of the Salvadorean people;
2. Requests once more the Salvadorean parties involved to arrive at a negotiated political solution in order to establish, in an atmosphere free from intimidation and terror, a democratically elected government;
3. Deeply deplores all acts of violence and all grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and regrets in particular the persistence of a situation in which governmental paramilitary organizations and other armed groups continue to act with total contempt for the life, security and tranquillity of the civilian population;
4. Draws the attention of all parties concerned to the fact that the rules of international law, as contained in common article three of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, are applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character and requests the parties involved to apply a minimum standard of protection to the affected population;

5. Reiterates its appeal to all States to abstain from intervening in the internal situation in El Salvador and suspend all supplies of arms and any type of military support, so as to allow the political forces in that country to restore peace and security;

6. Affirms once more that it corresponds only to the Salvadorean people, to exercise its right to determine freely its political status and freely pursue its economic, social and cultural development and to establish the conditions and undertake the changes most adequate to its aspirations as a people and as a nation without external interference of any kind;

7. Urges the Government of El Salvador to adopt the necessary measures to ensure full respect of the human rights of its population in all their expressions, primarily by creating conditions which could lead to a political solution to the present crisis through the full participation of all representative political forces in that country;

8. Requests the Commission on Human Rights to thoroughly examine the situation in El Salvador in its thirty-eighth session, on the basis of the final report of the Special Representative;

9. Decides to maintain under consideration, during its thirty-seventh session, the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador, in order to examine anew this situation in the light of additional elements provided by the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council.

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ACS 022/2

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- 1 DEC 1981

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INDEX	PA	Action Taken
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CONFIDENTIAL  
 DESKBY 010900Z  
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010117Z DEC 81  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1402 OF 30 NOVEMBER  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

11 YOUR TEL NO 808; THIRD COMMITTEE; EL SALVADOR.

GIVEN THE INTEREST OF OTHER EC MEMBERS IN ESTABLISHING A COMMON COMMUNITY POSITION IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON EL SALVADOR THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF OUR STANDING ASIDE FROM ALL DISCUSSIONS OF THE TEXT (PARA 4 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) . AT THE REQUEST OF THE EC COSPONSORS WE THEREFORE INFORMED THEM OF OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS, WHICH THEY HAVE PUT TO THE OTHER COSPONSORS. THE LATTER WERE INCLINED TO CONSIDER OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 5 AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 9. BUT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO THE DELETION OR SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE GOVERNMENTAL UNQUOTE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3. THEY INSIST AT LEAST ON THE INCLUSION OF AN ADJECTIVE (SUCH AS QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE, QUOTE SEMI OFFICIAL UNQUOTE, QUOTE STATE AFFILIATED UNQUOTE OR QUOTE STATE SUPPORTED UNQUOTE) WHICH WOULD INDICATE A CONNECTION WITH THE STATE APPARATUS.

THE RESOLUTION MAY BE VOTED ON 1 DECEMBER - BY WHICH TIME THE COSPONSORS' POSITION MAY HAVE MODERATED, OR HARDENED. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS BY 011400Z ON WHETHER ANY FORMULATIONS ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE FOR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND FOR CONFIRMATION THAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN IF A SATISFACTORY FORMULATION IS NOT AGREED ON THIS (AS WELL AS PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 5 AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 9).

PARSONS

- LIMITED
- MCAD MR GOODISON
  - UND MR DONALD
  - SPD MR URE
  - NAD MR FERGUSSON
  - EESD MR DAY
  - NEWS D MR BULLARD
  - ECD (E) MR HANNAY
  - SIR A ACLAND LORD BRIDGES

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

↓	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE 01400Z

1 ZCZC  
 2 GRS  
 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 4  
 5 DESKBY 011400Z  
 6 FM FCO 011300Z DEC 81  
 7 TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER *SVI*  
 9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
 10 Your telno 1402: EL SALVADOR  
 11 FOLLOWING FROM URE  
 12 1. Thank you for these comments. The paragraphs below have  
 13 been approved by Mr Luce but not yet seen by the Secretary of  
 14 State whom we cannot consult until approximately 1500Z hours.  
 15 If you have to take any decisions before then you should be  
 16 guided by what follows. As soon as we have the Secretary of  
 17 State's reaction we will telegraph Flash.  
 18 2. Our objectives, in order of preference, are  
 19 (a) If FRG or Italy were ready to abstain with us, perhaps  
 20 with Belgian support, we would choose to abstain. In  
 21 casting your abstention, you should explain the reasons  
 22 for our difficulty over the present unbalanced text,  
 23 emphasising that our position in no way conflicts with our  
 24 earlier voting in the Human Rights Commission, nor does it  
 25 diminish our concern at the human rights situation in El

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword Salvador.
File number	Dept	Distribution
initiated by (Block capitals) J B URE (AUSS)		<i>PS</i> <i>PS / Mr Luce</i> <i>PS / PUS</i> <i>Sir A Astor</i> <i>Mr Barber</i> <i>Mr Day</i>
Telephone number 233-4269		<i>MCAD</i>
Authorised for despatch	<i>J B Ure</i>	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
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1 <<<<

2 Salvador.

3 We assume, however, that the co-sponsors' willingness  
4 to consider our suggested amendments for preambular  
5 paragraph 5, operative paragraph 5 and preambular  
6 paragraph 9 indicates that they may already be confident  
7 of having the Germans and Italians on board. If this  
8 is so we may have to assume that the only remaining  
9 difficulty in the co-sponsors' amended text may lie in  
10 operative paragraph 3. This leads us to

11 (b) If the co-sponsors will accept quote semi-official  
12 unquote or quote state affiliated unquote in place of  
13 quote governmental unquote in operative paragraph 3 and  
14 also agree our proposals for preambular and operative  
15 paragraph 5 and preambular paragraph 9 we should join  
16 the European consensus and vote with the Ten in favour.  
17 In that event please take the initiative in explaining  
18 to the Americans (Washington may wish to take parallel  
19 action) that we achieved significant amendment to the  
20 original draft in order to avoid unacceptably one-sided  
21 criticism of the Duarte Government, and felt in consequence  
22 we should support the resolution.

23 (c) If all our partners in the Ten accept an unamended text,  
24 or one in which amendments do not meet our minimum  
25 requirements, you should abstain, with a full explanation  
26 of our vote. (See 2(a) above).

28 CARRINGTON

29 NNNN

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telegram

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Catchword

GRS 228

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DESKBY 010900Z

FM WASHINGTON 301915Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3611 OF 30 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 808 TO UKMIS NEW YORK : EL SALVADOR

1. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO FOLLOW THE DETAILED TO-ING AND FRO-ING ON DRAFT RESOLUTION L62 FROM HERE WITHOUT HAVING ALL THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ETC.

2. BUT I MUST EMPHASISE THAT IF THE OUTCOME TURNS OUT TO BE THAT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 AND WE DECIDE TO VOTE WITH THE TEN, THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION WOULD BE ONE OF SOME INDIGNATION. WE HAVE HEARD FROM VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAFF THAT APPARENT EUROPEAN INTENTIONS ON THE RESOLUTION HAD AROUSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN THE WHITE HOUSE. THE AMERICANS CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY HMG IN PARTICULAR DO NOT WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SUPPORT DUARTE'S INTENTION TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN MARCH, PROVIDED A TOLERABLE DEGREE OF LAW AND ORDER CAN BE ACHIEVED, SOMETHING WHICH THEY BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO ENSURE. IN PARTICULAR THEY CANNOT SEE WHY WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT OF THE LEFTIST PARTIES THAT THEIR REFUSAL TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS SHOULD PREVENT ELECTIONS BEING HELD AT ALL. THERE IS ALSO A FEELING THAT DIRECT EUROPEAN INTEREST IN EL SALVADOR IS MINISCULE AND THAT IF EUROPE IS NOT GOING TO HELP THE US TO RESTORE STABILITY BY SUPPORTING THE CENTRE, IE THE DUARTE GOVERNMENT, FOR ALL ITS FAULTS, THEY SHOULD AT LEAST REFRAIN FROM MAKING THE US TASK MORE DIFFICULT.

HENDERSON

LIMITED

MCAD	EESD	MR GOODISON	MR DAY
UND	NEWS D	MR DONALD	MR BULLARD
SPD	ECD (E)	MR URE	MR HANWAY
NAD	SIR A ACLAND	MR FERGUSON	LORD BRIDGES

CONFIDENTIAL



# OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	↓	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE 011900Z
ZC	1	ZCZC	
S	2	GRS	
ASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
VEATS	4		
SKBY	5	DESKBY 011900Z	
ICD	6	FM FCO 011445Z DEC 81	
IE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON	
L NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK	
	10	Your telno 3611 and my telno 819: EL SALVADOR	
	11	1. If in the event we are obliged to follow the course	
	12	envisaged in paragraph 2(b), when you come to explain our vote	
	13	to the US Government you should make the following points:	
	14	(i) We tried to follow the "worst is best" <sup>course</sup> <del>option</del> but	
	15	others were intent on improving the draft and we could	
	16	not prevent this happening. The option of abstaining	
	17	on a really bad resolution was therefore denied to us.	
	18	(ii) When the resolution had been amended (and once this	
	19	process was in hand we took a part in ensuring that the	
	20	amendments were substantive and helpful) it was no longer	
	21	so unbalanced that public opinion in the UK would have	
///	22	understood our abstaining on it.	
///	23	(iii) Our action <sup>in this case</sup> was not prompted by any perceived requirement	
1	24	for EC solidarity on this resolution. On the contrary,	
	25	we were surprised and disconcerted by the French and	
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword others
File number		Dept	Distribution PS PS/Mr Luce PS/PUS Sir A Acland Mr Bullard Mr Day Mr Ure MCAD UND ECD(E)
Drafted by (Block capitals) J B URE (AUSS)			
Telephone number 233-4269			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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<< 1 <<<<

2 others sponsoring a resolution in the original terms

3 without any prior consultation with us as the

4 Presidency or as an individual partner in the EC. They

5 thus put us in a difficult position from which we have

6 done our best to protect US interests as well as our own.

7

8 CARRINGTON

9 NNNN

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
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