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Confidential filing

Situation in the Middle East

Conflict between Iraq / Kuwait / Saudi Arabia

UK policy towards conflict

MIDDLE EAST

PL 1 : May '79

PL 23 : 13 Aug '90

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PREM 19/3076							

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SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 August 1990

Dear Sir,

IRAQ

Early yesterday evening the Foreign Secretary briefed the Prime Minister on the telephone on his conversation with Secretary James Baker earlier that afternoon. This is to confirm our telephone conversation yesterday in which I reported on the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with the Foreign Secretary. The main points were as follows.

The Foreign Secretary said that the US were pressing to get a formal UN Resolution condemning the Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. The US were seeking a Resolution which dealt with the question of nationals alone because they realised that a wider Resolution on sea interdiction would be unlikely to succeed at this stage. The Prime Minister recognised the reasons for this approach but commented that a wider Resolution might soon be necessary. The Prime Minister added that it was important to find out more about the Chinese position. She was also concerned about the Indians who, historically, have taken a great deal of Iraq oil.

The Foreign Secretary relayed Mr. Baker's account of President Bush's meeting with King Hussein of Jordan. The feeling of the American Administration was that this meeting had gone well. The US had undertaken to look at ways in which Jordan could be compensated if sanctions were fully applied. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that Jordan should not be allowed to be the breach in the dyke. It was important that no food from Jordan should be sent to Iraq; and the Saudis must be persuaded to provide oil. Giving the Jordanians compensation was a much better solution than allowing Jordan to drive a coach and horses through the UN sanctions. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought King Hussein's main difficulty was less economic than political. Secretary Baker had said that King Hussein's equivocal stance was helping to keep him in power and was not therefore a bad thing. That said, the Foreign Secretary thought that King Hussein was hypnotised by Saddam. He was also very hurt by the Prime Minister's message. The Prime Minister said that we had better let King Hussein know that Saddam will lose - this would be the key psychological message to get across.

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The Foreign Secretary went on to give an account of his conversation with Mr. Baker on the meeting of the Western European Union on Tuesday. He had stressed the importance of harvesting small contributions. It would be important for the US to tread carefully on suggesting that forces should be put under US command. Mr. Baker had understood this. The Prime Minister said that what they should seek is not co-ordination under US command but co-ordination with the US. With that simple change of word many of their difficulties would disappear.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned by the dilatory way that OPEC was proceeding: why were they holding a meeting next week? - the meeting should be on Monday. It was clear that we would have to put up oil production to whatever is necessary. The Saudis were willing to do so and she gathered the UAE were thinking of doing so too. We must get positive signals on increasing production out of OPEC as soon as possible, she thought.

The position on foreign nationals in Iran and Kuwait was discussed. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed that it now seemed highly likely that foreign nationals would be detained at key installations. Saddam Hussain was behaving like Hitler and using psychological warfare. His aim might well be to provoke hostile action. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of the UK studying his psychological warfare tactics carefully and responding in a suitable way. The Foreign Secretary told her that the Foreign Office's psychological warfare department had been re-activated: he was currently studying a paper from the unit. The Prime Minister said that the UK would need to get across loud and clear in broadcasts to Iraq the message that Saddam would lose and that we will carry on long enough to make sure that he does. Another key point was that Saddam had led the Iraqis into a long and costly war with Iran. 100,000 Iraqis lives had been lost and a quarter of a million Iranians had died. All this was for nothing now that Iraq had conceded the territory which had been the point of issue. This proved Saddam was a selfish, despotic dictator.

More generally, we had to get across the point to the domestic and international media that this crisis had happened because this dictator had taken Kuwait by force contrary to international law. The Prime Minister said that she was concerned that commentators were already beginning to lose sight of this fundamental fact. Not just westerners, but streams and streams of other people were leaving Iraq and Kuwait because they feared living under Saddam. We had to stress that the power of self-defence was far older than any UN Resolution - it was important not to get bogged down in talk on the detailed powers available under UN Resolutions.

The Foreign Secretary said that he was beginning to think that the Government should recall Parliament. Cranley Onslow had spoken to him and said that he thought that Parliament would need to be called back soon and the Foreign Secretary saw advantage in not being forced into doing it. The Prime Minister said that she saw his point but that we should get past the immediate crisis on foreign nationals before doing so. The Lord President was away

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and at this stage there was little which could usefully be discussed by Parliament. If there were clashes over blockading that might be different but we should seek to regain the initiative before Parliament was recalled.

I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H M Treasury), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Caroline

CAROLINE SLOCOCK

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CC
23^a (A-V)
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MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

Prime Minister

As you suggested,
I have set up a
meeting at 9.30
for Alan Clark to
brief you. The Foreign
Secretary and Mr
King would also
like to attend.

PRIME MINISTER

QATAR - BAHRAIN - ABU DHABI - DUBAI EMIRATES

CAS

19/8

I returned this morning to Brize Norton at 0340 hours to find my personal staff on leave and no typist at MOD so I am particularly grateful for the use of the No. 10 facilities to dictate this text.

I believe the mission was successful in attaining the objective that you set; that is to say of giving your personal regards to the Ruling Families, underlining UK support for them and pointing out the speed and effectiveness of our military response. I believe this opinion to be shared both by Duncan Slater (AUS - FCO) and General Sir Richard Vincent who accompanied me, as well as by the Ambassadors and chargé at the various posts, all of whom responded splendidly to the less than 24 hour notice of my visit. The arrangements were impeccable.

In the interests of brevity I have set out my analysis of the situation and recommendations below, and attach the fuller Meeting Notes (taken by my PS) as a numbered annex.

19 August 1990

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1. I have little doubt that the Americans intend to take direct military action as soon as their heavy armour arrives from Norfolk Virginia, about mid-September. If not before.

My grounds for this belief, in ascending order of quality, are:

- a. Chatter in the bazaars.
- b. The sheer scale of the US input. There are now 1,200 beds (three military hospitals) in place, plus such special units such as (a) 'Wild Weasle' electronic counter-measures squadron suitable primarily for deep intrusion. The total of combat aircraft is now over 300.
- c. The opinion, expressed to me in a most interesting talk on the tarmac at Riyadh Military Airport at 2300 hours last night of our Ambassador to Saudi, gleaned from his own contacts.
- d. The opinion of Air Marshal Sandy Wilson (Force Commander) whom I also spoke to at length at Riyadh - who attends the daily briefings called by the Resident US Commander - from conversation with his American counterparts.

2. Both the Ambassador and Wilson expressed to me their concern at being excluded from attending at, or seeing reports of, the strategic - as distinct from tactical - planning process which is evolving rapidly. Sandy Wilson asked particularly that we should have some attendant, in the USA, at the JCS meetings.

(Of course I do not know the extent to which you yourself are privy to this evolution or even if, given the degree of implied consent therein, you would wish to be and I made no comment).

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3. Air Marshal Wilson has made himself widely liked by his USAF counterparts and is already well dug in with the Saudi AF as a result of his earlier tour here training the Tornado pilots. But he believes that our relatively minor contribution is diminishing our claim to full disclosure. He was particularly supportive of my suggestion (incorporated in VCDS flash signal of 16 August to MOD concerning which I telephoned Dominic Morris) that a Squadron GR1 Tornado ground attack aircraft be despatched as soon as practicable. These aircraft have full night attack capability and the Americans have particularly asked for them as this is a capability where they are deficient. I believe this would greatly enhance the status of our contributions in the US (and Arabian) eyes.

4. There remains the broader question of whether or not it is prudent wholly to be identified with US action which, customarily is crude and extravagant; where memories and myth could proliferate to our long-term disadvantage; the extent to which the consequent imbalance would create new problems, enhancement of Israeli and Iranian dominance, anxieties on the part of the Soviet Union, etc. - this is a subject on which you will want to temper expert advice with your own instinct.

I must admit that my own instinct is to go in heavily and urgently. Fear and power are Saddam's principal weapons. When these are stripped from him the streets of other capitals will soon empty of demonstrators. In Arabia, as in many regions, Machiavelli's precept that 'it is better to be feared than loved' holds true.

5. Awareness of this is deeply imbued in the Ruling Families to whom I spoke. All were delighted that you should have instructed me to call on them. All took the view (this is generally accepted lore throughout Arabia), that it was only your fortuitous presence, with the Grace of Allah etc, etc - at Bush's side in Aspen when the crisis broke that ensured such a decisive response.

All implied, with varying degrees of directness, misgivings as to American resolution over the longer haul and stated their reliance on the UK strengthening this. All agree that Saddam must be eliminated or there could be no 'safety' in the Region.

But I detected a considerable apprehension that the whole situation could go terribly wrong. Not in the sense of the traditional nightmare scenario where superpower conflict follows quarrels between client states; but of a collapse of the existing social order throughout Arabia. A chain reaction of assassinations and displacement. The fate of Nuri El Said murdered by the mob, or of Anwar Sadat shot by his own bodyguard, still cast a shadow.

This explains their relative indifference, when pressed, to the stationing of additional aircraft or accretions to the Fleet's strength. It was requests for 'Ground Forces' that repeatedly emerged during successive private conversations (usually in the car between rendez-vous) as being a wish for infantry, no more than company strength, and light armour, Scorpion and Scimitar to be billeted close to the Amir's Palace " ... as a guard against terrorists".

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Ry-S
21/11/16

A squadron of Blues and Royals from the LHR counter terrorist force (Op Trustee) would involve a qualitative enhancement of our presence, and arouse comment. Dick Vincent is examining the possibility that at Bahrain an enhanced RAF Regiment presence, nominally to protect the forward Jaguar deployment, might do the trick.

E

6. My Arab hosts expressed particular concerns about access to intelligence. Dick Vincent and I have evolved a scheme whereby a senior officer would do the rounds once a week offering a (of course highly sanitised) intelligence briefing at the highest level.

Dick is satisfied that this could be done without us suffering any inconvenience or violation of our understandings with the US. Certainly it would be very much welcomed and could well give us access to some interesting nuggets of information from those on the visiting list. These visits would also provide a useful entree for the DESO representative (see below) when appropriate.

7. Whatever deployment policies we adopt I must emphasise that this is an unparalleled opportunity for DESO; a vast demonstration range with live ammunition and 'real' trials. We must get into our heads that

- i. ^{supply of} the balance of payments is a more intractable and ? damaging problem than the military 'Threat'
- ii. that armaments are our most successful manufactured export
- iii. that where demonstration, or diversion of existing stocks is resisted on grounds that disruption of existing deployments would imperil our security, the obverse of this argument is now valid. We must be prepared to consider such diversions where large orders could follow. For example the Emirates could take enough Warrior to allow us a penalty-free extraction from our own commitments to GKN. And there is still a lot of real interest in Challenger II (subject, of course, to how MI Abrams stands up in combat conditions). At the end of the Annex I have pencilled a list of current defence sales prospects at the start of the crisis. These are now likely to be brought forward and increased in volume if we do our stuff.

Prime Minister

This Annex
is not
available
longer

CPS

19/8

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8. Finally, I cannot resist referring to certain passages of the Defence Paper which I submitted to you in December. You may think this to be a good illustration of how long-range force projection, speed of response, National prestige and trading advantage can all be closely inter-related.

9. I am copying this note to Douglas Hurd and Tom King.



19 August 1990

MINISTER OF STATE (DEFENCE PROCUREMENT) VISIT TO THE GULF:
15-18 AUGUST 1990

MEETINGS

A	Qatar	Amir (Shaikh Khalifa)
B	Qatar	Chief of Staff (Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah)
C	Bahrain	Amir (Shaikh Isa)
D	Bahrain	Crown Prince (Shaikh Hamad)
E	Bahrain	Minister of Defence (General Khalifa)
F	UAE - Abu Dhabi	Chief of Staff (General Mohammed said al Badi)
G	Abu Dhabi	President (Shaikh Zayed)
H	UAE - Dubai	Minister of Defence (Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid)



H

ANNEX A

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/70

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP), SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THANI, THE AMIR OF QATAR, AND SHAIKH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL THANI ON 16 AUGUST 1990

After an exchange of pleasantries, during which Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's personal greetings to the Amir and the Amir replied, saying he was an extremely close friend of the Prime Minister, the Amir went into a long description of events at the recent Cairo Summit. He gave details of states which had supported, abstained or opposed action against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Specifically, he said that Libya and the PLO had opposed, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan and Algeria had abstained; and Tunisia had been absent. He criticised Tunisia quite sharply saying that its positive attitude towards Saddam Hussein had been prompted by promises from Saddam that he would support moves to retain the headquarters of the Arab League in Tunis.

2. The Amir continued to criticise other Arab States on the basis that they had accepted bribes from Saddam - some of these bribes to be paid with the wealth of other Gulf States (which he intended to take over) saying at the same time that this wealth rightly belonged to all Arabs. He did not specifically name names, but he clearly was referring to states who had either abstained or voted against the resolution.

3. The Amir went on to criticise Arafat personally and later made the point that the Palestinian populations in certain of the Gulf States were particularly dangerous to their hosts. However, in the case of Kuwait (where he said there was currently a famine developing) he pointed out that many Palestinians were now leaving for Saudi Arabia or Jordan. He said this would turn out to be a good thing for Kuwait once the legitimate government had been restored.

4. The Amir added that he had had many conversations with friendly Heads of State, both Arab and Western. His own evaluation of the very satisfactory and rapid response by the West was that this had been instigated almost entirely by the Prime Minister herself. It was, he said, a great good fortune that Mrs Thatcher had been with President Bush at Aspen at the time of the Iraqi invasion. If she had not moved with such speed, Saddam, who wished to become the King of Oil, would

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have jumped immediately into all the Gulf States. He had embarked on a study of his ancestors in order to prove that he was descended from the Prophet which would legitimise his leadership of the Arab world.

5. The Amir said that he had predicted this crisis and had warned of it; he hoped to take forward his close friendship with the Prime Minister and it was his wish to consult closely with the United Kingdom during a visit to London later this year.

6. The Amir remarked upon Saddam's character and intentions, saying that he had lied to King Hussein and also to President Mubarak and also to the world, particularly in 1980 when, in the Iraqi National Charter, he recommended that no Arab country should ever invade another Arab country. The Amir thought that Saddam was co-operating with Iran simply because he found himself cornered. If there were positive developments in their relationship, this would not be to the world's advantage. It was very essential that the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government should take place as soon as possible. The Amir wanted to make clear that it was not simply the leading families of the Gulf but also the ordinary people who demanded this. Those of a contrary view were very few in number - and mostly Palestinian.

7. He asked that the current blockade be total. He also wished us to approach Iran in order to persuade them (even if they reached an agreement with Saddam) to enforce the blockade, which was a UN requirement. Nobody should trust Saddam. The Amir said that, after the end of the Iran/Iraq war, many Gulf Heads of State had visited Baghdad. He himself had been there to attend the Arab Summit but he wanted to emphasise that this had not been a formal visit to the Government of Iraq. Finally, he reiterated his appreciation of the Prime Minister's message.

8. Mr Clark responded that he was most grateful for the Amir's comprehensive resumé of the situation in the Gulf and Qatar's own position. He had found it extremely valuable. He would make sure that his views and the other information were conveyed to the Prime Minister and other appropriate quarters. Mr Clark added that the UK shared Qatar's disappointment that some states had seen fit not to support the general Arab consensus against the Iraqi invasion. He congratulated the Amir on his great vision in predicting the current situation and discerning that the Prime Minister's fortunate presence at Aspen had been crucial in the current Western response. He was glad the Amir had plans to visit London where he would be welcome.

9. Mr Clark was particularly glad that the Amir clearly felt so strongly that the world should be satisfied with nothing less than the full restoration of the Kuwaiti Government. The Amir intervened at this point to say that GCC members would not believe fully in the friendship offered by the West until the legitimate Government of Kuwait had been restored. The Amir also mentioned here that the Tunisian President had given personal assurances of his support.

10. Mr Clark then went on to support the Amir's remarks about the need for the blockade to be total and for Iran to be kept in line with the UN Resolution. The Amir now interrupted again to ask what action would be taken if the embargo did not achieve the object desired - would we use force? Mr Clark sought the Amir's own personal views on this to which the Amir said he could see no alternative. Mr Clark then asked the Amir two questions. Firstly, whether there was any additional equipment or presence which Qatar would welcome. The Amir responded that this was technical and should be discussed with his Chief of Staff. However, he felt that Qatar was now adequately protected both by bases in the area and by ships in the Gulf. He added that all Qatari facilities would be at the disposal of HM forces in the area. Second, Mr Clark asked specifically whether it would be helpful to the Amir and his very close senior circle, should HMG offer a regular intelligence summary of developments in the region. The Amir accepted this with enthusiasm. He added that Qatar would respond in kind, pointing out that his remarks about the Palestinians leaving the area were being shared with the UK before anybody else.

11. The Amir then sought Mr Clark's views on the role of Syria, saying that the Syrian Vice President was currently in Iran. He also, apparently lightheartedly, asked for legal assistance in ensuring that the large loans that Qatar had made to Iraq were repaid. Mr Clark replied that in some situations a gun was more useful than a lawyer.

12. The Amir then reported on a visit by the French. He said specifically that he found the French attitude equivocal; he had, indeed, made the point that their response had been slow and unsubstantive. At one visit most of the conversation had been devoted to the whereabouts of the KIO balances.

13. At the end of the discussion, the Crown Prince made some remarks about Saddam playing a very dangerous game in that, as a Ba'athist his appeals to Islamic fundamentalists would seem very shallow. He was also in a difficult position reaching agreement with Iran following 8 years of war and suffering. His people would not thank him for this.



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ANNEX B

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/70

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND COLONEL SHAIKH HAMAD BIN
ABDULLAH AL THANI, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, QATAR ARMED FORCES -
16 AUGUST 1990

After an exchange of greetings, the Chief of Staff asked a number of questions about the visit itself and about the intentions of the Western forces (not just the UK forces in the area), and how HMG saw the situation developing. Mr Clark reassured the Chief of Staff about our intentions and made clear that we were happy to listen to any requests for assistance that the Qataris might wish to make. General Sir Richard Vincent then gave the Chief of Staff comprehensive details about the current deployments and possible future options, and our detailed military assessment of Iraq's intentions.

2. The Chief of Staff was clearly concerned about the vulnerability of those forces currently deployed and about our robustness in the face of any possible setbacks or attacks. He stated that we should seize the initiative and attack Saddam himself. He said that his own action had been confined so far to co-ordination with other GCC states; he had not increased training missions. He was also concerned about Iraqi chemical and missile capabilities and the policy of the Iraqis to convert civilian aircraft (which he claimed were still flying on normal routes over the region) to carry weapons.

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4. The conversation then turned to morale on either side. The Chief of Staff said that Iraqi forces in Kuwait were of two types: hardened soldiers, mainly the Republican Guard of whom there were 'up to' four Divisions, who were prepared to die, and very young, frightened and unhappy militiamen who would not be effective in the event of a conflict. He added that a number of Iraqi soldiers, coming from the North of Iraq, were suffering in the heat as much as Western forces would be. Saddam had underestimated the loyalty of the Kuwaiti internal opposition to the legitimate Kuwaiti Government; he had also underestimated the immediate response of the West to his invasion. The Chief of Staff thought, however, that Saddam Hussein would aim for stalemate and hope the Western Forces would become demoralised and go away.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

August 1990

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE ALAN CLARK,
MINISTER(DP) AND HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA, THE AMIR OF
BAHRAIN

1. After an initial exchange of greetings during which Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's message and personal regards (warmly received and reciprocated), the Amir immediately launched into a review of the situation, which he thought very serious. He emphasised his disappointment that there had been no earlier response from HMG to his exchange of messages with the Prime Minister at the beginning of the crisis. He added that he was still thinking that HMG would help; to include the deployment of land forces, if possible. He was particularly keen that the British should be present in Bahrain because of the long friendship between the two countries. He reminded the Minister that the Royal Navy had already been made welcome.

2. Mr Clark responded that we had already deployed two squadrons of aircraft including those within 3 minutes of Bahrain in Saudi Arabia. The Jaguar squadron was presently in Oman, where it had been sent because of the pre-existing facilities there for Jaguar aircraft; the Amir would be aware that the Omanis operated Jaguars of their own. The Minister added that, in two weeks' time, when the assembly of naval forces was complete, we would have 11 ships in total in the Gulf area. These included fleet support ships which would not only enable us to send more combat ships should the need arise, but would also be carrying helicopters. There were also Royal Marines with close range missiles aboard these ships.

3. Mr Clark then made a specific request of the Amir that we should be allowed to rotate (ie to station for periods) some aircraft in Bahrain. It would be very useful for us to be able to bring aircraft forward in this way. This would of course entail the stationing of some ground forces for maintenance and ground protection. He also asked whether

the Amir would be content for some Nimrod aircraft to stage through Bahrain. At this point the Amir asked whether these proposals were agreed by HMG and whether Mr Clark was empowered to make them. Mr Clark gave the necessary assurance and then introduced VCDS to acquaint the Amir with details of other aspects of our proposals, and operational matters.

4. The Amir listened with great interest and questioned how long it would take for all these proposals to be implemented. On being told "tomorrow", at least for the aircraft, with ground crew following as soon as possible thereafter, the Amir stated categorically that we were invited to place whatever we considered appropriate in Bahrain. At that point the Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, exhibited some hesitation and said that details of such deployments would have to be discussed with the Bahraini armed forces later in the day. These discussions would also have to include equipment needs.

5. The Amir then engaged the Minister in conversation about the situation in Iraq and Kuwait and the attitudes of other countries including the Eastern bloc. He said it was most important that there was a total blockade and the USSR should be as closely associated with it as possible. He also questioned the resolve of HMG in the face of the recent Iraqi assembly of western European citizens and, in referring to the Falkland Islands, he wondered whether this situation was sufficiently difficult for the West to be deterred from any strike which may in due course become necessary. Mr Clark said that we kept all our options open but the UK was foremost in rejecting the notion that hostages could force concessions in policy.

6. On closing the meeting the Amir reiterated his regards to the Prime Minister and thanks for this demonstration of close co-operation with Bahrain by HMG.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/9

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFA, THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN - 17 AUGUST 1990

Following an exchange of greetings in which Mr Clark referred to the Amir's request in the previous session to UK air and further naval deployments to Bahrain, the Crown Prince reiterated that, while Bahrain fully understood the concept of existing deployments adequately covering the whole Gulf, they thought that this time it was important for a number of reasons that there were UK forces in Bahrain itself. He said Bahrain would do everything it could to help the UK in its efforts. (He mentioned in an aside that it was good to think of UK troops returning, it reminded Bahrainis of the Qassem crisis in 1961.)

2. The Crown Prince then mentioned that he had telephoned Prince Sultan and, during the conversation, had told him of Mr Clark's visit and that its purpose was to enquire what additional help was required in the region. Prince Sultan had said the news of Mr Clark's visit was 'wonderful' and he had sent his regards.

3. The Crown Prince then said that Bahrain did not feel far from NATO (though it was not clear whether this was in the geographic or fraternal sense). He said he was looking for strategic co-operation or a MOU on a defence relationship which would go further than the current agreement. The GCC was not yet a deterrent and there were many threats; today Iraq, tomorrow Iran again. If HMG helped Bahrain to help itself, we could have what we liked in return. He wanted not too much and not too little, but definitely not the latter.

4. Mr Clark asked whether any agreements should be public; the Crown Prince confirmed that the fact of them should be - but not the details. It would be a deterrent to aggression, and lack of clarity would enhance the effect. He felt a new agreement would ensure that our response was quicker next time. He wanted all the GCC to co-operate on this. He would announce to the world that it was Bahrain who requested a UK

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military presence. For the time being, however, any reinforcement should be seen as part of the enforcement of the UN resolution. He felt even King Hussein would come around once he had solved his internal difficulties. Iraq must be removed from Kuwait, but the outcome depended on God. Mr Clark questioned whether God would be sympathetic; the Crown Prince said God was on the side of the just.

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MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/9

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND GENERAL KHALIFA
BIN AHMAD AL KHALIFA, BAHRAIN MINISTER OF DEFENCE -
17 AUGUST 1990

1. Mr Clark was given a current intelligence briefing on the situation in Kuwait. General Khalifa welcomed the offer of an exchange of intelligence and asked about the stationing of aircraft. VCDS said a reconnaissance team could be in Bahrain the following day and aircraft a day later. General Khalifa was happy with the arrival of the team but said he would rather wait and see whether aircraft were required. The Americans had just arrived and Bahrain's skies would be full.
2. In offering to ensure that DESO met the Bahrain requirement for NBC suits, VCDS warned against inferior equipment being offered by others. He introduced Major Gardiner who could advise on SF matters and who could be left behind if necessary. He reminded the Minister that the UK stance was essentially defensive and no ground force presence was currently considered, though he invited him to let HMG know of any special reasons for this request for ground forces.
3. General Khalifa emphasised that Bahrain had made a point of requesting "ground forces" because they were aware of their shortcomings and priorities, and this area was their most important shortcoming.
4. Finally, it was agreed that the points of contact for intelligence exchange should be the Chief of Staff and the Defence Minister.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/1

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER (DP) AND MAJOR GENERAL MOHAMMED SAID AL BADI, CHIEF OF STAFF, UAE ARMED FORCES - 18 AUGUST 1990

1. The Chief of Staff came to Mr Clark's hotel to accompany him to the President's Palace. He reaffirmed UAE's pleasure at Mr Clark's visit which was extremely timely and important. He was also appreciative of the Prime Minister's initiative in persuading the US and UN to take action.
2. Mr Clark responded by thanking the Chief of Staff for his warm welcome and confirming his impression of the Prime Minister's role. He expressed his contempt for Saddam and his behaviour and emphasised that his threats to Western citizens would not save him from retribution. He added that he was looking forward to seeking the President's views and recounting them to the Prime Minister on his return. He also said that, were any requests made for support or assistance, he would report them immediately.

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4. VCDS then asked the Chief of Staff to investigate a difficulty whereby Dubai was not participating to the necessary degree in Royal Naval training. The Chief of Staff said he had not heard about this but would look into it. He thought the principle should cause no difficulty. VCDS finally mentioned the subject of the staging of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Chief of Staff further agreed that this too would be possible.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN SHAIKH ZAYED BIN SULTAN AL NAHYAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND MINISTER (DEFENCE
PROCUREMENT) - 18 AUGUST 1990

1. Having exchanged greetings, Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's message and sought the President's views and advice on the situation.
2. Shaikh Zayed said the UK must always come before all other countries in the UAE's reckoning but he was no longer sure that UAE had been a priority to HMG. Mr Clark hoped that His Highness would accept that the fact of his presence as the Prime Minister's personal emissary was testimony to the great importance and high esteem which HMG attached to the Shaikh and his country. We particularly valued what was said in the earlier exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister and had taken this into account in formulations of our operational profile. The President was well satisfied with this reply and volunteered the maxim that "he who has strong relationships with others will always find acceptable excuses for his failings". He felt free to mention his disappointment direct to a good friend but would not be making it public. He went on to affirm that all members of the GCC were agreed on their condemnation of the invasion. Some other countries had been seduced into supporting Saddam but they had been covetous. The Gulf needed nothing from him and knew him to be untrustworthy. His pronouncements changed constantly and he placed no value on support or loyalty. It was impossible to forecast how he could be ousted or how he might react to force; he was irrational. He had spent nine years fighting Iran, destroying in the process the economy of his country and pauperising his people, and yet now he was prepared to make peace.



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, UAE MINISTER OF DEFENCE - 17 AUGUST 1990

1. Following the customary greeting, Shaikh Mohammed asked where the UAE's oldest friend had been in their hour of need. They had felt forgotten and snubbed but now were glad of Mr Clark's presence. He asked his opinion.
2. Mr Clark emphasised the good fortune of the Prime Minister's presence at Aspen at this critical juncture and his conviction that she would ensure that the present action was carried through to the appropriate conclusion. He was concerned at Saddam's irrational behaviour and felt that no solution could be expected while he survived. Shaikh Mohammed agreed. At the moment, Saddam felt that he could not lose. He would try to raise Arabs everywhere in revolution. Even if he failed gloriously against the West he would be a hero. He was not sure what he had achieved but, to some, he was already one. He no doubt hoped that the US and UK would eventually leave and the Gulf would be his. He had only to wait.
3. Mr Clark said the UK, at least, would not leave while his friends needed her. He reiterated that HMG never made deals over hostages and those detained now would not deflect our resolve. He asked what Shaikh Mohammed's view of Iran was. HMG would like to resolve our differences and improve relations. Any messages to this effect would be helpful. His Highness said that Rafsanjani was a clever and moderate man who should not be judged by what he was obliged to say at present.
4. Mr Clark then asked what the UK could do for UAE. Shaikh Mohammed wondered about intelligence. UAE was not equivocating; Mr Clark had to remember that he was going home that night, the UAE could not leave.

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Mr Clark added that he understood that there was a difficulty about releasing AIM 9L to Dubai. He would take this up with the US. His Highness was again grateful and said there might be numerous other small requests; Mr Clark promised that these would be looked at carefully and sympathetically by the Ambassador.

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MINISTER OF STATE (DEFENCE PROCUREMENT) VISIT TO THE GULF:
15-18 AUGUST 1990

Defence Sales Prospects

A United Arab Emirates

i Abu Dhabi

ii Dubai

iii Oman

iv Bahrain

B Saudi Arabia

C Egypt

D Jordan

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D/DESS/178/3

7 August 1990

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Ref your MO 6/17/155 dated 6 August 1990.

Further to my brief earlier today, here is the separate brief promised on major defence sales business currently under discussion or negotiation.



A W H BARRETT
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07-Aug-1990 Tue

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CURRENT DEFENCE SALES PROSPECTS

The following major defence sales business is currently under discussion or negotiation:

1. UNITED ARAB EMIRATESa) ABU DHABI

- 36 Black Hawk helicopters from Westland. Approx Value £325M.
- Possible supply of 400+ Warrior Desert Fighting vehicles from GKN. [Approx Value £450M]. Warrior hot-weather trial about to commence in Abu Dhabi.
- EW Equipment for UAE Air Force from MEL. Approx Value £15/20M.
- Possible long-term interest in Challenger II tank if adopted by British Army.

b) DUBAI

- Air Defence Package. Missile [Laser Fire] from BAe. Approx Value £50M.
- Radar Command & Control system from Marconi. Approx Value £42M

c) OMAN

- Contract just signed for 16 Hawk aircraft from BAe. Value £224M.
- Ocean Capable Patrol Craft from Vosper Thornycroft. Approx Value £60/80M per vessel. [Bid in at £80M but Oman is looking for a cheaper package].
- Interest in Warrior Desert fighting vehicle. [Trials in 1991]. Approx value £55M
- Interest in 40+ Challenger II tanks if adopted by British Army.

d) BAHRAIN

- Preliminary consideration of Hawk from BAe. [Numbers and value not yet decided].
- Plessey Radar signed a contract in November 1989 for a Watchman Radar. Value £3.75M
- Contract signed in Dec 1989 for 8 patrol boats from Halmatic for Coast Guard. Value £8M
- Engineering related equipment (bridging, airfield damage repair, EOD etc. Estimated Value £5M

e) QATAR

- Fast strike craft - Vosper Thornycroft pursuing prospect for 3 vessels. Estimated value £75M

2. SAUDI ARABIA [non-Al Yamamah]

- New phase of Communications Project for National Guard. Value £3/400M
- Range of equipment via Minister of Interior for National Security Force and Frontier Force. [Total and value not yet decided]
- British Hovercraft (Westland) have submitted proposals to supply 8 Hovercraft and refurbish 8 others for the Frontier Force. Value £200M
- GKN Sankey are hopeful of securing a contract for 200 Warrior vehicles, with the Saudi Land Forces. Value £200M
- Racal and Plessey are both bidding for a command, control and communication system for the land forces. Value £100M.
- International Hospitals Group have bid for the operation and maintenance of National Guard hospitals in Jeddah and Riyadh. Value £125M.
- International Hospitals Group have also bid for the operation and maintenance of 4 more hospitals. Value £750M
- Vickers Defence Systems are promoting Challenger II to meet the requirement for 300 Main Battle Tanks. Value £250m
- IMS are bidding for a contract to supply NBC equipment. Value £160m.
- Siemens Plessey Defence Systems are pursuing a contract for Electronic Warfare systems. Value £100m

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- Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering are leading a UK bid to set up a hydrographic service in Saudi. This will comprise vessels, training and infrastructure. Value £100m.

3. Egypt

- Sale and refit ex-RN submarines [O-boats]. Maximum of 6 contemplated. Value £30m per boat
- local manufacture of ground to air jammers by Plessey Value £100m

4. Jordan

- Completion of Jordanian Defence Package if, under re-scheduling banks make money available. Approximately £70m outstanding from original package. main items are:

EW equipment
HF/VHF radios
Fast Patrol Boats
Air Combat Simulators
Mirage F5 Avionics upgrade
Naval Base facilities

- Completion of KHALID tank gearbox refurbishment programme. Funded and administered by UK MOD. Value £8m.

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D/DESS/178/3

7 August 1990

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Ref your MO 6/17/155 dated 6 August 1990.

Brief as requested in your reference.



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OD - 8 AUGUST 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT - SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

1. This brief provides information on current sales prospects to Middle East countries and requests from those countries for urgent supplies or logistic support in the light of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

2. As soon as they became aware of the invasion, the DTI took action not to issue any export licences to Iraq or Kuwait. On 3 Aug they revoked all licences for military equipment. A review of dual civil/military was to have taken place, but the UN Embargo has rendered this unnecessary - all licences for both countries are now effectively revoked.

Iran

3. Sales of lethal equipment and any non-lethal equipment which would significantly enhance their capability in a conflict are banned by the existing Ministerial guidelines announced on 29 Oct 1985. In their current negotiations with IMS on pre-Revolution contracts, the Iranians have suggested the supply of new equipment, eg MBTs, as part of a settlement. The difficulty over this has been explained to them, but further requests could arise.

Saudi Arabia

4. At Annex is a background note on Project Al Yamamah, covering also the current Tornado delivery position, the Saudi Government attitude, and at Attachment a copy of the relevant paragraphs of the MOU on HMG obligations in time of tension. Secretary of State will note that the Saudis have not asked the UK to accelerate deliveries, or for additional equipment under the MOU.

5. The Saudi National Guard has, however, asked (through the DA) for supply from British Army stocks of 10,000 respirators and 20,000 NBC suits, plus "gloves etc" (which we understand to mean chemical agent monitors and associated equipment). This presents difficulty for the Army, who may need the stocks themselves - see separate brief of operational matters. Against this background, the DESO is discussing with Industry how they could meet the requirement.

6. BAe have received an enquiry from the Saudi Air Force for NBC kit for 1000 people. This is to include NBC prophylactic medicines, air filtration equipment etc. BAe are continuing to lead on this requirement.

7. The Saudi National Guard have indicated a possible requirement for Field Dressings and Shell Dressings (Minimum 1000

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of each). Commercial suppliers and MOD's Director Medicine have been advised of this possible order and asked to stand ready. The National Guard also called on the UK MOD SANGMED Project Team in Riyadh for advice on setting up 2 field medical units, which are now believed to be operational somewhere in the desert.

8. A UK company Passive Barriers Ltd have been approached by a Saudi company wishing to obtain equipment for physical protection equipment for airfields, border checkpoints and pipelines; also associated equipment and maps of border areas with Iraq and Yemen.

UAE

9. BAe have suggested that they could lease some Tornado aircraft and Rapier missile batteries to UAE. This could involve the need for direct RAF support. D Commitments staff have, however, made clear the difficulty of supplying such support. BAe also wish to include NBC kit in the package. This too will present difficulty because they would be calling on the same NBC suppliers as the DESO is to meet the Saudi request.

Other Middle East Countries

10. We are not aware of any other requests for urgent requirements from other ME countries.

Current Sales Prospects to Middle East Countries

11. Separate brief to follow.

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ANNEX

PROJECT AL YAMAMAH (SAUDI ARMED FORCES PROJECT)

BACKGROUND

Project Al Yamamah is the name given by the Saudis to the initial supply contract signed in 1985 with the UK for provision of Tornado (IDS and ADV), Hawk and PC-9 trainer aircraft plus associated weapons equipment and support. The scope of the Project has since been greatly enhanced by the signature in 1988 of a further Formal Understanding confirming Saudi interest in additional Tornados, Hawk 200s, Sandown Class MCMVs, Black Hawk Helicopters, construction of new Air Bases, and associated support and equipment including weapons and defence systems. If implemented, these new requirements would extend the Project well into the 21st Century and would increase the value of the Project from the initial figure of £5 billion to at least £15-20 billion.

ORGANISATION

The UKMOD Saudi Armed Forces Project Office (SAP) manages the Project on behalf of the Saudi Government. The main office, Castlewood House in London, comprises some 120 Service and Civilian staff; there is also a UKMOD Team permanently based in Saudi Arabia comprising some 70 Service and Civilian staff based at Riyadh, Dhahran and Khamis Mushayt.

The obligations of these individuals and of HMG in periods of tension are set out in the Government-to-Government MOU controlling the Project. The relevant paragraphs of the MOU are at Attachment A.

SAUDI GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES

Thus far, the Saudi Government has not asked for any special or additional support or help from HMG. Apart therefore from notifying ACAS of the current alert status of the RSAF and asking for all due support from the three Commands if requested by the Saudi Government, we have taken no specific action within UKMOD. The Saudis have certainly not asked us to accelerate deliveries nor have they asked for additional equipment beyond that already being supplied; we are not surprised since this seems entirely in-line with their (Saudi) approach of avoiding any provocative action that could be misinterpreted by their neighbours.

DELIVERY POSITION

Of the original 48 Tornado IDS ordered, 26 have been delivered so far and total delivery should be complete by August 1991. Of the original 24 Tornado ADV, 20 have been delivered with the remaining 4 due to be delivered as quickly as possible. All

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30 Hawk, all 30 PC-9, the 2 Jetsteams and the 4 BAe 125 originally ordered have been delivered.

On weapons, deliveries are substantially complete on everything ordered except a selection of ammunition.

Deliveries due in the immediate future are 1 Tornado IDS and 3 Tornado ADV likely to be delivered towards the end of this month; there is also 1 Sandown Class Ship nearing completion (with Saudi RSNF crew under training in the UK) and Ship 02 under construction but delivery and acceptance of these is still some way away.

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ATTACHMENT A

EXTRACT FROM AL YAMAMAH MOU

"36. It is understood between the Governments that, subject to consultation, United Kingdom civilian or military personnel will remain available in Saudi Arabia for preparation, including arming and support, of aircraft during an armed conflict, but that under no circumstances will they be permitted or requested or required otherwise to participate in such a conflict undertaken by the armed forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

37. In the case of the outbreak of war, or any other event that might endanger the safety of foreign employees, the Saudi Arabian Government will be responsible for any costs incurred by the United Kingdom Government in retaining or replacing the appropriate employees in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, subject to the agreement of the Saudi Arabian Government to those arrangements. The United Kingdom Government can, after consultation with the Saudi Arabian Government, withdraw or replace personnel whose safety is endangered or suspend the arrangements provided for in the MOU.

38. The Saudi Arabian Government will be responsible for and will reimburse the United Kingdom Government for loss of, or damage to property owned by BAe, its subsidiary companies, sub-contractors, their personnel and dependants or the Team, its dependants, its servants and representatives located in Saudi Arabia, where such loss or damage is sustained due to or arising out of acts of war, conflict or any other act of violence or interference affect that property whatsoever."

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AB *Mary Morris, David -*
a good note
MS

The Attorney General telephoned the Prime Minister this evening to discuss Rules of Engagement (I monitored the call as you had just left No. 10 and the Attorney General was in no mood to be stalled)!

He started by saying that he was totally content with the revised Rules of Engagement and the Prime Minister commented that she had seen his department's letter and the Foreign Office comments which she had received by fax this afternoon in Cornwall.

They then went on to discuss the situation in the Middle East in general terms. The Prime Minister was keen to know if it was possible to use international law as another weapon against Saddam Hussain. The Attorney General responded by saying Hussain was clearly not the sort of man to pay heed to any form of law, international or otherwise, and that if anything we should consider international law to be more of a shield than a sword. The Prime Minister felt that it was important that we reminded all concerned of Iraq's initial act of aggression against Kuwait and did not lose sight of this amongst all the allegations of aggression and military build-up by the US and her allies.

They also discussed the magnitude of the American military presence and whether this might be construed as being an offensive force rather than a defensive one. The Prime Minister considered that from what we know of the threat posed by Iraqi forces the proposed levels of American military hardware were totally consistent with an effective defensive force. Another reason for maintaining a strong military presence is to reassure friendly Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia, of our capability to withstand attack and also in the sense that the American forces may well be dispersed anyway to counter threats in other locations.

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The conversation concluded with the Prime Minister telling the Attorney General about tomorrow's meeting and inviting him to attend. He replied that it would be very worthwhile and looked forward to seeing her tomorrow.



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DAVID STACEY
(Duty Clerk)
19 August 1990

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Prime Minister
The latest report

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TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
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OF 191725Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE CINCFLEET
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKLF
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET DHAHRAN
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET THUMRAIT

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OPERATION GRANBY
MODUK FOR DROW
JOINT COMMANDERS ASSESSREP 009/AUG EFDT191800Z AUG
COVERING PERIOD 181800Z AUG TO 191800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. IRAQ HAS CONFIRMED THAT BRITONS IN IRAQ WHO FAIL TO REPORT TO HOTELS NOMINATED BY THE IRAQIS WILL BE ROUNDED UP AND TAKEN TO KEY SITES IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN PROBABLY SEES THIS AS A WAY OF PARALYSING WESTERN DECISION MAKING CAPACITY. IRAQ IS REDEPLOYING ITS FORCES WITHIN KUWAIT AND IS REINFORCING THEM WITH NEW UNITS

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT REMAIN IN A RELATIVELY UNCHANGED POSTURE. FORCES IN THE SOUTH ARE DEPLOYED BEHIND A DEFENSIVE LINE WHICH RUNS PARALLEL TO AND SOME 10 TO 20KM INSET FROM THE SAUDI BORDER. THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI TROOPS WITHIN KUWAIT AND IT IS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE. IRAQI MAINTAINS FIGHTER OPS OVER KUWAIT AND SOUTHERN IRAQ. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM AIRFIELDS IN KUWAIT. IRAQI STRENGTH IN KUWAIT IS ESTIMATED AT 1100-1200 TANKS, 1100-1200 APC AND 800 ARTILLERY PIECES. TROOP NUMBERS ARE ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 104000. INT ASSESSMENT: THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT STILL FACILITATES A RAPID SHIFT TO AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE, BUT A LACK OF CRITICAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY MAKES ANY IMMEDIATE OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA UNLIKELY

3. OWN SITUATION

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET
B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN HAVE CARRIED OUT ROUTINE TRAINING: UP TO 18 AUG, 56 IN-THEATRE SORTIES HAD BEEN FLOWN. F4S AT AKROTIRI HAVE CONTINUED TO HOLD 2 AT RS10 DURING DAYLIGHT AND RS60 OVERNIGHT. AT THUMRAIT, THE JAGUAR DETACHEMNT FLEW 14 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY (INCLUDING TWO AIRCRAFT

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WHICH FLEW RETURN TRANSITS TO BAHRAIN). THE NIMROD MR2 AT SEEB FLEW
2 SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES (A TOTAL OF 9 OP SORTIES HAVE BEEN
FLOWN TO DATE) WE ARE STILL EXPERIENCING COMMUNICATIONS
DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN SEEB AND CTG 321.1 AND BY SIGNAL BETWEEN SEEB
AND UK. 2. NIL 3. NIL
C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL. 3. NIL
4. ASSESSMENT. NO CHANGE FROM ASSESSREP 008/AUG
5. INTENTIONS
A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3
ESTABLISHED BASES
B. TO COMPLETE THE LOGISTIC BUILD UP
C. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION
IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS
D. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH
E. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY
6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESSREP 001/AUG
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MR TOMKYS
MR GOULDEN
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)
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Phase Mission?
Latest report for
Crispe Tiddell
as promised.

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INFO DESKBY 191930Z WASHINGTON
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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

MS
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1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE AMERICAN PRE-WORKING PAPER CIRCULATED AT THE MEETING OF THE FIVE ON 19 AUGUST:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 660, 661, 662,

HAVING CALLED UPON IRAQ TO END ITS OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY WITHDRAWING IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY ALL OF ITS FORCES TO THE LINES OCCUPIED ON AUGUST 1, 1990:

HAVING DECIDED IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREACH OF THE PEACE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

DEEPLY CONCERNED IN PARTICULAR BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF IRAQI FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF KUWAIT AND THE THREAT POSED TO NEIGHBORING STATES:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662 AND IN PARTICULAR THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

(RECOMMENDS/AFFIRS), IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS, THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER, INCLUDING USE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS, OF SUCH AIR, SEA OR LAND FORCES, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THESE RESOLUTIONS.

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Russians - check this
and China

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IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
~~HD/EEB~~
HD/SOVIET D
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE D10
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

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FOR ATTENTION DUTY CLERK NO 10
COMMENT:

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FM RIYADH
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 693
OF 190945Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL OEC, OTHER OPEC POSTS, ANKARA
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, UKMIS VIENNA

MY TELNO 683: SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF SAUDI WISH TO HOLD IMMEDIATE OPEC MEETING. FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SAUDI INTENTION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

DETAIL

2. SAUDI NEWSPAPERS TODAY CARRY A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH PETROLEUM MINISTER HISHAM NAZER GAVE IN JEDDA ON 18 AUGUST. NAZER CONFIRMED THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS PRESSING FOR AN IMMEDIATE OPEC MEETING TO BOOST INTERNATIONAL OIL PRODUCTION TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SHORTFALL IN SUPPLIES. NAZER CONSIDERED THIS ACTION ESSENTIAL TO STAVE OFF RECESSION AND INFLATION IN OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES. HE (CLEVERLY) DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PLIGHT OF POOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND ASSURED THEM THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT LET THEM 'GO DOWN THE DRAIN'.

3. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PUBLIC, NAZER ALSO DECLARED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS READY TO ACT UNILATERALLY IF NO CONSENSUS COULD BE FOUND WITHIN OPEC. HE SAID THE KINGDOM COULD BOOST ITS PRODUCTION BY 2 MILLION BPD IN A 'VERY SHORT PERIOD', AND THOUGHT THAT VENEZUELA AND UAE COULD ADD A FURTHER 500,000 BPD EACH. NAZER CONCEDED THAT SOME OPEC MEMBERS (HE SINGLED OUT INDONESIA) THOUGHT STOCKS SHOULD BE DRAWN DOWN BEFORE ANY INCREASE IN PRODUCTION TOOK PLACE. BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT AN EMERGENCY OPEC MEETING WAS REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY TO FACE UP TO THE CRISIS. OTHERWISE, IN 'TWO WEEKS OR SO' THE WORLD FACED AN OIL MARKET DESTABILISED NOT BY MARKET FORCES, BUT BY IRAQI AGGRESSION. NAZER ADDED THAT FAILURE BY OPEC TO MEET WOULD LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO IT ALONE.

COMMENT

4. A PETROLEUM MINISTRY SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT THE SAUDIS WILL NOW WAIT TO SEE OPEC MEMBERS' REACTIONS TO NAZER'S COMMENTS. IF, AS THE SOURCE SUSPECTED THERE IS STILL INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR AN OPEC MEETING, THE SAUDIS WILL ABANDON THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION AND RAISE PRODUCTION UNILATERALLY UNDER SOME OTHER AD HOC COVER.

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COMED	5
ECONOMIC ADVISERS	3
MED.	13
NENAD	6
LAD	14
WAD	6
SEAD	10
MR FAIRWEATHER	1
MR TOMKYS	1
MR GORE-BOOTH	1
ADDITIONAL 45	
OIL	45
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[CHARLTON]	

SECRET
FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 190717Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 5705
AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 1125
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF HONINGTON
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF WITTERING
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF MARHAM
AND TO IMMEDIATE FORY
AND TO IMMEDIATE COMTWOATAF
AND TO IMMEDIATE AFSOUTH

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SIC ACA/U2H/I9M
SECTION OWN OF TWO.
ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS PD
FROM DIS, DI(ROW), IRAQ CRISIS CELL

OPERATION GRANBY INTELLIGENCE SITREP AS AT 190600Z AUG 90

MILITARY SITUATION IN KUWAIT

1. IRAQI GROUND FORCES POSTURE IN KUWAIT REMAINS RELATIVELY UNCHANGED. THE BUILD UP OF MOST FORCES IN THE SOUTH IS BEHIND A DEFENSIVE LINE RUNNING PARALLELED TO, AND SOME 20 TO 30 KMS NORTH OF, THE KUWAITI BORDER. NO FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS INTO KUWAIT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. HOWEVER THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI DIVISIONS WITHIN KUWAIT. ELEMENTS OF THE 6TH ARMoured DIVISION ARE STILL IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA NORTH OF AL JAHRA AND IT CANNOT BE CONFIRMED WHETHER THE 6TH ARMoured DIVISION HAS TAKEN OVER SOME OF THE FRONT LINE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER DIVISIONS. IT IS LIKELY THAT REDEPLOYMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE. A SECOND DEFENSIVE POSITION HELD BY AN INFANTRY BRIGADE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED ON THE COASTAL HIGHWAY CLOSE TO THE SAUDI BORDER.
2. TOTAL IRAQI STRENGTH IN KUWAIT IS ESTIMATED TO BE 1100-1200 TANKS, 1100-1200 ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND 800 ARTILLERY PIECES, TROOP STRENGTH IS ESTIMATED AS 104,000.
3. CONSOLIDATION OF AIR DEFENCE HAS CONTINUED. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE IRAQI FORCES ARE ATTEMPTING TO BRING KUWAITI AIR DEFENCE ASSETS INTO OPERATION INCLUDING SA8 GECKO.
4. THERE ARE RUMOURS OF A SUICIDE CAR BOMB ATTACK BY ONE OR MORE KUWAITIS ON A HOSPITAL AT AL JABARIYAH, IN KUWAIT CITY, BEING USED

BY IRAQI TROOPS.

MILITARY SITUATION IN IRAQ

5. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT IRAQI FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ARE BEING BASED IN KUWAIT. HOWEVER FOUR HIP AND EIGHT LIGHT HELICOPTERS REMAIN AT AL SALEM AIRFIELD. TWO HIND HELICOPTERS REMAIN AT AHMED AL JABER AIRFIELD IN KUWAIT.

6. IN NORTHERN IRAQ THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE IRAQI 5TH CORPS REMAINS FACING TURKEY IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

7. IT IS REPORTED THAT AL TAJI SRBM FACILITY HAS OUTLOADED AT LEAST 30 PROBABLE AL ABBAS AIRFRAMES SINCE THE START OF THE CONFLICT. THE AL ABBAS IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE SCUD WITH A CLAIMED EXTENDED RANGE OF 900 KMS.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

8. THE USS REID FIRED WARNING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF THE TWO SMALL IRAQI TANKERS BABA GURGUR AND KHANAQUIN IN THE APPROACHES TO THE ARABIAN GULF. THE ARMS CARRIER BALQUEES REMAINS IN PORT AT TARABALUS, LIBYA. THE OIL TANKERS AL FAO AND AL QADISIYAH HAVE LEFT THE AREA OF MUAJJIZ OIL TERMINAL ON SAUDI ARABIA'S RED SEA COAST HAVING BEEN REFUSED AUTHORITY TO UNLOAD CRUDE.

9. THE IRANIAN NAVY CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE VESSEL ON PATROL IN THE NORTHERN GULF AND ONE IN THE SOUTHERN GULF MONITORING THE BUILD UP OF FOREIGN WARSHIPS IN THE AREA AND MERCHANT SHIPS TRANSITING THE GULF.

10. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY OF IRAQ, SAMI ABDUL RAHMAN, HAS SOUGHT FINANCIAL HELP FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN KURDESTAN ALONG THE TURKISH/IRAN BORDER. DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR THE KURDS SUCCESSFULLY TIED DOWN THE EQUIVALENT OF 6 IRAQI DIVISIONS FOR LONG PERIODS.

11. IRAQ MOVED A SECOND BATCH OF 1000 IRANIAN POWS TO THE BORDER TOWN OF KHANAQUN (3421N 4523E) ON 18 AUGUST. ON 18 AUGUST IRAN RETURNED ITS FIRST BATCH OF 1000 IRAQI POW AT KHORSRANI (UNIDENTIFIED).

12. THE IRANIAN NEWS AGENCY (IRNA) REPORTED ON 18 AUGUST THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM WESTERN BORDER AREAS OF IRAN, WHICH BEGAN ON 17 AUGUST, CONTINUES. IRAQI FORCES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM POSITIONS ALL ALONG THE BORDER FROM SAYYID SADIQ 3522N 4554E TO AREA SOUTH OF ABADAN 3020N 4817E.

13. AIR DEFENCE HAS BEEN OBSERVED TO BE ACTIVE IN THE AREA OF BANDAR ABBAS ON THE IRANIAN COAST ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. FIVE 1-HAWK LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED, AN INCREASE FROM

R
THE USUAL TWO.

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SIC ACA/U2H/I9M
FINAL SECTION OF TWO.
ASSESSMENT

14. IT IS NOT THOUGHT LIKELY THAT FORMATIONS BEING USED IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE WOULD BE USED IN THE FIRST ECHELON OF AN OFFENSIVE. IRAQI REDEPLOYMENTS IN KUWAIT HAVE STILL NOT ACHIEVED THE RELEASE OF SUFFICIENT FORCES TO CREATE AN ADEQUATE STRIKE FORCE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. THUS WE ASSESS THAT IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT ARE STILL DEFENSIVELY DEPLOYED THOUGH WITH AN INCREASED CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT A SHORT WARNING LIMITED STRIKE. AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE
BT

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OF 191400Z AUGUST 90

INFO FLASH MODUK ACTOR

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNO 276 (NOT TO ALL): FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF 81 BRITISH CITIZENS TAKEN FROM THE REGENCY PALACE HOTEL:

PAUL WESTWOOD	HILARY WESTWOOD	TRUDI TAYLOR
WENDY MAJOR	DONALD MAJOR	DAVID CROSS
CAROLINE JOHNSON	BARBARA GRIFFITH	SANDRA GUEST
CHRISTOPHER MALONEY	KENNETH BEST	JOSEPHINE BEST
LINDA DOWIN	ERIC WATSON	JOHN CHAPPELL
JENNIFER CHAPPELL	JOHN P M CHAPPELL	MAUREEN CHAPPELL
ERICA MASTERS	DAVID FORT	EDWARD HAMMETT
PAUL DIEPPE	DAVID BANKS	EDWARD MAY
DAVID MYERS	BIGNIEW KUNICK	ALAN MATHESON
PENNY MATHESON	MALCOLM LOOK	JACKY MILLER
KEITH BARKER	GEORGE PARIS	BOB WHITLING
NEAL DYER	PETER SALTER	DENISE DYER
CHARLIE KRISTIANSON	NICKY WAYE	MIKE COOPER
JOAN PEPPER	VIVIENNE BROOK	ROY GRANT
ANNA OLIVER	JACQUELINE LOMAX	JANET MCLEAN
CAROLE BEVIS	CLIVE EARTHY	GLEN BURTON
MALCOLM BUTCHER	PETER EVERSHERD	MAXIME WOODS
JANE BATESON	MARIA BELL	HELEN CURTIN
JACQUELINE HUNTER	NICOLA LOVE	CLAIRE PALMER
SANDRA DAVIES	DEREK STODDARD	SALLY MAYES (HAYES)
ALEXIS PATTIE	JULIE EXTON	JOYCE OKWUOSAH
TRACEY HATTERSLEY	KEN MORAN	JENNY GRIFFITHS
PHIL LONG	LES BAXTER	PAT MORRIS
MARIE HALL	KERRY AGNEW	JULIE DYER
BRYONY GREWDON	ANDREW PLUMRIDGE	GEORGE BISWAS
SANDRA ALLEN		

2. THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PROBABLY TAKEN BUT MAY CONCEIVABLY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM KUWAIT
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 438
OF 190830Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH MODUK BAGHDAD ACTOR
INFO DESKBY 190930Z UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE EC OSTs ME POSTS CANBERRA

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FLASH

YOUR TELNO 518 TO BAGHDAD: FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ.

SUMMARY

1. PROTEST DELIVERED TO AL-DOURI. NO INFORMATION FORTHCOMING.
ROUNDING UP TO CONTINUE. IRAQI EMBASSY TO CLOSE ON 24 AUGUST:
STRONG ADVICE TO LEAVE BEFORE THEN. SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO MAKE
FOUR-POWER DEMARCHE THWARTED.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON AL-DOURI AT 190630Z AND DELIVERED A STRONG PROTEST
AT THE DETENTION OF BRITISH CITIZENS AND THEIR TRANSFER TO VARIOUS
DESTINATIONS AGAINST THEIR WILL. I ASKED TO BE GIVEN
A FULL LIST OF ALL BRITISH CITIZENS INVOLVED, TO BE TOLD WHERE THEY
ALL WERE AND TO BE GRANTED THE RIGHT OF CONSULAR ACCESS. AL-DOURI
SAID HE WOULD TAKE NOTE OF MY PROTEST, THOUGH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
MADE IN BAGHDAD (I SAID WE WOULD BE PROTESTING THERE TOO, AND NO
DOUBT ALSO IN LONDON). HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE EVERYONE
WAS, BUT I COULD BE ASSURED THEY WERE BEING WELL LOOKED AFTER.
HE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE ME A FULL LIST IN DUE COURSE, BUT
IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO VISIT THEM QUOTE FOR THE
MOMENT UNQUOTE.

3. AL-DOURI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WAS SHORTLY TO BE AN
ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE RADIO (MY TELNO 435), INSTRUCTING QUOTE
ALL WESTERNERS PLUS THE AUSTRALIANS UNQUOTE TO REPORT TO VARIOUS
HOTELS. WHEN I COMMENTED THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THOSE WHO HAD
REPORTED SO FAR WOULD NOT EXACTLY ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO OBEY,
AL-DOURI SAID HE HAD WARNED ME YESTERDAY WHAT WAS INTENDED: THOSE
WHO WENT TO THE HOTELS TODAY WOULD ALSO BE TRANSFERRED TO
QUOTE KEY INSTALLATIONS UNQUOTE IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. THOSE WHO DID
NOT REPORT TO THE HOTELS WOULD BE ROUNDED UP AND TAKEN DIRECT TO THE
SITES. I MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THOSE DETAINED WERE KEY WORKERS

IN THE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANT, AND AL-DOURI SAID THE AUTHORITIES WERE CHECKING WHAT THOSE THEY ROUNDED UP DID, AND WOULD SEND BACK THOSE WITH USEFUL JOBS, WHO WERE PREPARED TO WORK.

4. AL -DOURI SAID THE IRAQI EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSING ON 24 AUGUST. WHEN WOULD I BE LEAVING KUWAIT? I SAID I WOULD BE STAYING HERE, AS WOULD ALL MY EC COLLEAGUES AND, I THOUGHT, MOST OTHER AMBASSADORS. HAVING CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS OUR OFFICIAL POSITION AL-DOURI SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE TO STAY: HE WOULD DO HIS BEST FOR US, BUT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD CUT OFF OUR WATER AND ELECTRICITY (IT WOULD, HE ADDED, BE ILLEGAL TO USE A GENERATOR) AND WOULD HAVE NO HESITATION ABOUT ROUNDING UP ALL THOSE WHO STAYED AND TAKING THEM TO BAGHDAD QUOTE BY FORCE UNQUOTE. I COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD CROSS THAT BRIDGE WHEN WE CAME TO IT: A LOT COULD HAPPEN IN FIVE DAYS. MEANWHILE, MY GOVERNMENTS' POSITION WAS FIRM.

5. I SAID THERE DID NOT SEEM MUCH MORE TO BE SAID. I WOULD, HOWEVER, BE RETURNING LATER, TOGETHER WITH MY US, GERMAN AND FRENCH CLGBAGUES.

6. WHEN THE FOUR OF US ATTEMPTED TO SEE AL-DOURI TOGETHER, HOWEVER, AT 190730Z, WE WERE TOLD THE EMBASSY WAS CLOSED AND WE SHOULD COME BACK ON 20 AUGUST.

WESTON

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DIFFUSION RESTREINTE

REF: SITUATION IN KUWAIT.

THE DANISH EMBASSY IN KUWAIT INFORMS THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRES THAT THIS MORNING 101 GUESTS WERE
TAKEN FROM REGENCY PALACE, MOSTLY BRITISH, INCLUDING
13 WHO WERE CAUGHT AT SAUDI BORDER. ALSO THIS MORNING
24 GUESTS WERE TAKEN FROM KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL HOTEL.
(15 UK, 5 US, 3 GERMAN AND 1 FRENCH).

END OF TEXT

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OF 190515Z AUGUST 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, HELSINKI, ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA
INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, HAVANA, BAGHDAD, UKDEL NATO, ACTOR, LIMA

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOREIGN COMMUNITIES

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 664:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING THE IRAQI INVASION AND PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF
KUWAIT AND RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662,

DEEPLY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE
NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT,

RECALLING THE OBLIGATIONS OF IRAQ IN THIS REGARD UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW,

WELCOMING THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PURSUE URGENT
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ FOLLOWING THE CONCERN AND
ANXIETY EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON 17 AUGUST 1990,

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:

1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ PERMIT AND FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE
DEPARTURE FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ OF THE NATIONALS OF THIRD COUNTRIES
AND GRANT IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING ACCESS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO
SUCH NATIONALS:

2. FURTHER DEMANDS THAT IRAQ TAKE NO ACTION TO JEOPARDIZE THE
SAFETY, SECURITY OR HEALTH OF SUCH NATIONALS:

3. REAFFIRMS ITS DECISION IN RESOLUTION 662 (1990) THAT
ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ IS NULL AND VOID, AND THEREFORE DEMANDS
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ RESCIND ITS ORDERS FOR THE CLOSURE OF

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMMUNITY OF THEIR PERSONNEL, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH ACTIONS IN THE FUTURE:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ: PROGRESS REPORT

The main developments since we last spoke have been:

Iraqi Peace Offer

President Saddam set out at 16.00 hours our time new conditions for ending the Gulf crisis and for releasing trapped foreign nationals. He said that US and other western forces should leave the region under UN supervision and economic sanctions should stop. He said that the question of Kuwait should be dealt with like other inter - Arab disputes, including the Western Sahara and Syrian occupation of part of the Lebanon. There was no mention of Israel.

The US response has been low key. CEEFAX reports that "US officials said the terms did not appear to meet the conditions for a withdrawal from Saudi Arabia." The UK are not planning a formal response.

UN

Your comments on the draft Resolution were fed to Crispen Tickell. The Political councillors will be meeting this evening to put together a composite draft Resolution which is likely to include some of our points. A draft is then likely to be considered tomorrow morning New York time though it is not yet sure in which forum. The FCO are reasonably hopeful that a Resolution will be agreed but they are not sure on what timescale.

Captive Foreign Nationals

Not a great deal more here. I am told that the Britons who sought refuge in our Baghdad Embassy are still there.

There are reports that Iraq is to let some Europeans leave as "a gesture of goodwill". The Iraqi news agency said some Swiss,

Austrians, Swedish, Finns and Portuguese will be allowed to leave. The reasons for this are variously reported. CEEFAX says that the Iran Speaker had said this was because their countries were not imposing sanctions on the import of food, medicine and other goods to Iraq. Skynews said it was because they had not contributed forces. This account is further contradicted by an earlier account that the Iraqi Ambassador in Switzerland had told the Swiss Government that their nationals would be held because they were supporting a Security Council Resolution.

Clashes and Military Assesment

No reports of clashes. Latest reports that we have on the military situation suggest that Iraqi forces on the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia border are still defensively deployed though with an increased capacity to carry out a short warning limited strike - but an offensive against Saudi Arabia in the near future seems unlikely.

Recall of Parliament

Tam Dalyell phoned today to ask you to recall Parliament. He said the families of the Britons in Iraq and Kuwait would expect it. But he added that his request was not endorsed formally by Gerald Kaufman.

OPEC

The Saudis have called for an immediate OPEC meeting to boost international production, saying it would act unilaterally if no consensus could be found in OPEC or if OPEC did not meet.

I attach a selection of today's telegrams. We are awaiting a

telegram from Sir Crispen Tickell about today's UN activities
which I will send up to you when it arrives.

CTS

Caroline Slocock

19 August 1990

Seen

PRIME MINISTER

GULF EDITORIALS

The rapidly-changing situation in the Gulf means that the news pages this morning are somewhat out of date. The editorials, however, generally give back up to a firm military response from the west to the Iraqi actions.

The Sunday Times, Sunday Telegraph and News of the World call for an early strike against Saddam. The Sunday Times says that "it is to Bush's credit that he has organised an international resistance to Saddam; if it results in war, there should be no doubt that, like the war against Hitler, it would be a just war, to be pursued until Saddam has been toppled. And if war with Sadd. is inevitable, better it comes now rather than later".

The Sunday Telegraph says "that Bush should attack Iraq now". Peregrine Worsthorne says "without the Iraq challenge the extent of European isolationism would have remained obscure. It is now out in the open for all to see".

Support for military action also from the Sunday Express and the Sunday Mirror. The Express says "daily the net closes tighter around Saddam and his brutal regime. He is hemmed in. For him the issue now is one of survival. For neither George Bush nor Margaret Thatcher is going to suffer a loss of nerve. The Mirror says "we have to make it clear that whatever the cost, whatever the threat there will be no retreat from the defence of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and no stepping back from liberating Kuwait from illegal occupation. There should be no slackening in the build up of forces to deter his conquest of the Middle East.

The Correspondent emphasises the need for a mandate from the Security Council to enforce the embargo. If the Security Council will not move beyond the measures it has taken so far, then legitimate national interests will force Britain and the US to move without a UN crutch. It would then become imperative to appeal to our European allies. If they wish to maintain the flow

of oil, protect their nationals and preserve the stability of this crucial region, they cannot sit on their backsides and rely on others to do the dirty work. If the vaunted unity of Europe is to mean anything, it must hope that pulls together come the crunch.

The People says that Saddam's treacherous tactics should not be treated as the trigger for the all-out war which some see as inevitable. If the civilised world stands firm against a defiant dictator, there is still a hope of ending the Middle East's agony by a peaceful means.

The Observer and the Mail on Sunday demand immediate recall of Parliament. The Observer says that "this affair cannot be run with the Prime Minister and virtually the whole cabinet on holiday, and public responses left to the trembling lip of a junior Foreign Office Minister. Mrs. Thatcher's place is in Downing Street, to which she should return this weekend. The House of Commons should then be recalled as soon as possible". The Mail on Sunday says that the Government has brutally sidelined Parliament by failing to recall.

The Independent on Sunday says that "a statesmanlike and gradualist policy acted out in the UN is unlikely to withstand domestic political pressure in Britain and the US. The awful fact is that by taking thousands of civilian hostages, Iraq has made military intervention by the US and Britain more rather than less likely. If the fighters and the marines go in the casualties will probably include some western hostages. It is a dreadful prospect, but it is no reason for changing western policy.



PP PHILIP AYLETT

19 August 1990

c:\philip (slh)

Seen

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The Correspondent emphasises the need for a mandate from the Security Council to enforce the embargo. If the Security Council will not move beyond the measures it has taken so far, then legitimate national interests will force Britain and the US to move without a UN crutch. It would then become imperative to appeal to our European allies. If they wish to maintain the flow

of oil, protect their nationals and preserve the stability of this crucial region, they cannot sit on their backsides and rely on others to do the dirty work. If the hub-vaunted unity of Europe is to mean anything, it must mean a Europe that pulls together come the crunch.

The People says that Saddam's treacherous tactics should not be treated as the trigger for the all-out war which some see as inevitable. If the civilised world stands firm against a defiant dictator, there is still a hope of ending the Middle East's agony by a peaceful means.

The Observer and the Mail on Sunday demand immediate recall of Parliament. The Observer says that "this affair cannot be run with the Prime Minister and virtually the whole Cabinet on holiday, and public responses left to the trembling lip of a junior Foreign Office Minister. Mrs. Thatcher's place is in Downing Street, to which she should return this weekend. The House of Commons should then be recalled as soon as possible". The Mail on Sunday says that the Government has brutally sidelined Parliament by failing to recall.

The Independent on Sunday says that "a statesmanlike and gradualist policy acted out in the UN is unlikely to withstand domestic political pressure in Britain and the US. The awful fact is that by taking thousands of civilian hostages, Iraq has made military intervention by the US and Britain more rather than less likely. If the fighters and the marines go in the casualties will probably include some western hostages. It is a dreadful prospect, but it is no reason for changing western policy.



PP PHILIP AYLETT

19 August 1990

c:\philip (slh)

PRIME MINISTER

GULF EDITORIALS

The rapidly-changing situation in the Gulf means that the news pages this morning are somewhat out of date. The editorials, however, generally give backing to a firm military response from the west to the Iraqi actions.

The Sunday Times, Sunday Telegraph and News of the World call for an early strike against Saddam. The Sunday Times says that "it is to Bush's credit that he has organised an international resistance to Saddam; if it results in war, there should be no doubt that, like the war against Hitler, it would be a just war, to be pursued until Saddam has been toppled. And if war with Saddam is inevitable, better it comes now rather than later".

The Sunday Telegraph says "that Bush should attack Iraq now.". Peregrine Worsthorne says "without the Iraq challenge the extent of European isolationism would have remained obscure. It is now out in the open for all to see".

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PP PHILIP AYLETT

19 August 1990

c:\philip (slh)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM AMMAN
TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO
TELNO 434
OF 191300Z AUGUST 98

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T195190

MIPT: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

SUBJECT cc ops
MASTER

BEGINS

I HAVE READ YOUR TWO MESSAGES WITH GREAT CARE AND ATTENTION TO THE SUBSTANCE THEY CONTAINED. HOWEVER, I HAVE TO TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOUR, AS WE COMMUNICATE AS FRIENDS AT THIS TIME OF CRISIS, THAT THEIR TONE WAS UNWORTHY OF YOU MY FRIEND.

I REGRET THAT MY TIME DID NOT PERMIT ME TO AVAIL MYSELF OF YOUR INVITATION TO STOP IN LONDON TO MEET YOU ON MY WAY BACK FROM MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

OF COURSE, OUR RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES WILL, IN THE MEANTIME, CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE OVER ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

I AM,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN

ENDS

27 PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 15.

REEVE

PS No 10 Downing St

59.
①

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM AMMAN
TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO
ILLNO 434
OF 191030Z AUGUST DM

me
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T195190

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I AM,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN

ENDS

2. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PG/NO. 10.

REZVE

5-10.
PS NO 10
DOWNING ST

(2)

TKS

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIRP
FM AMMAN
TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO
TELNO 433
OF 191030Z AUGUST 90

*Refer to me
of air when
Charles
me*

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. MRFET CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 19 AUGUST WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED TO ME BY THE HEAD OF THE ROYAL COURT TODAY (19 AUGUST). ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
2. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE KING WOULD HAVE INCLUDED IN THIS MESSAGE THE HOPE THAT HE AND MRS THATCHER WOULD MEET AGAIN SOON IF HE HAD NOT MEANT IT. AND THE FINAL PARAGRAPH COULD IMPLY SOME ANCLINATION TO DISTANCE HIMSELF PERSONALLY - A HINT THAT BUSINESS MIGHT BE CONDUCTED ONLY AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL FOR THE TIME BEING - UNTIL THIS MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE.
3. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR LINES TO THE KING SHOULD REMAIN OPEN AS THE CRISIS DEVELOPS. HE IS TAKING ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS HIMSELF AND THERE IS NO-ONE ELSE WHO CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO PROVIDE RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS.
4. I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT RESPOND TO HIS SECOND PARAGRAPH BY INVITING HIM TO BRITAIN AS SOON AS HE IS ABLE TO COME. AND THAT SHE SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THE DISCUSSION SHOULD COVER ALL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. MRS THATCHER MIGHT ALSO WISH TO MENTION THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO VISIT AMMAN ON 4/5 SEPTEMBER WITH THE AIM OF MAINTAINING THE DIALOGUE WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.
5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10.

REEVE

596.

PS NO 10

DOWNING ST

(2)

TKS

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM AMMAN
TO DESKDY 191300Z FCO
TELNO 433
OF 191030Z AUGUST 90

*Refer to me
again when
Charles returns
me*

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5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10.

REEVE

(56B)

SECRET

24A(a-b) 077430
MDADAN 0106

SECRET
FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 182359Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH

PRIME MINISTER
Still no sign of an imminent offensive. 25/8/90.
ADVANCE COPY
Reports on BL team as noted!
MS

SIC 19M
CRDA 0903

OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP EIGHT 18 AUG 1990

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION GRANBY WILL BE ISSUED DAILY AT 2359Z. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS THEY REQUIRE.
2. INTELLIGENCE. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT CONTINUE TO BE DEFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS. ALTHOUGH THIS COULD CHANGE AT SHORT NOTICE IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
3. POLITICAL SITUATION. MIN(DP), THE HON ALAN CLARK MP, CONTINUED HIS VISIT TO THE GULF AREA. HIS VISIT TO BAHRAIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, HE OBTAINED BAHRAINI AGREEMENT TO THE ROTATION OF RAF AIRCRAFT AND CLARIFIED OTHER DETAILS. MR CLARK WAS IN ABU DHABI EARLIER TODAY, WHERE HE MET THE PRESIDENT AND CROWN PRINCE BEFORE TRAVELLING ON TO DUBAI FOR A MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE RETURNS TO THE UK TONIGHT. CONCERN CONTINUES TO GROW AT IRAQI THREATS TO MOVE UK AND OTHER NATIONALS HELD IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ TO MILITARY AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS. EGYPT HAS FORMALLY CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ON 26 AUG. THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM REPORTS TODAY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM IN KUWAIT ARE FIT AND WELL. UK EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAS STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM THERE. IT IS REPORTED THAT BRITISH WIVES HAD JOINED THEIR HUSBANDS BUT IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TEAM REMAIN IN THE HOTEL OR HAVE BEEN MOVED ELSEWHERE.
4. US DISPOSITIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US AIR FORCE DISPOSITIONS. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE US HAS ACTIVITATED STAGE 1 OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET MEASURES TO HELP CARRY CARGO AND TROOPS ON OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE FLEET CONSISTS OF COMMERCIAL PLANES FROM 29 US COMPANIES AND FOR STAGE 1 INVOLVES SOME 38 AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO IN-THEATRE TROOP DISPOSITIONS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US NAVY DISPOSITIONS.
5. ROYAL NAVY OPERATIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH YORK AND BATTLEAXE ON PATROL IN THE SOUTHERN GULF AND JUPITER DUE TO RESUME HER PATROL

Bot 3 members picked up by 7

LATER TODAY. RFA ORANGELEAF WILL BE AT FUJAYRAH UNTIL SUNDAY. THE PICTURE FOR OTHER NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE GULF IS UNCHANGED. OF NOTE IS THE FOLLOWING NAVAL INCIDENT OBSERVED FROM AN ON-TASK NIMROD-UNIT MONITORED THE USS REID FIRING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOW OF AN IRAQI TANKER OUTBOUND FROM THE GULF.

6. RAF OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE IN-THEATRE AIR ASSETS. THE JAGUARS PLANNED TO FLY SOME 16 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY AND THE F3S FROM CYPRUS WERE UK-BOUND WITH TANKER SUPPORT.

7. LOGISTICS. THE OVERALL THE LOGISTIC SITUATION REMAINS SATISFACTORY AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A MEDICAL SURGICAL TEAM IS DEPLOYING TO DHAHRAN TODAY.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT

BT

YYYY

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22

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MR TOMKYS
MR GOULDEN
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)
HD/NENAD
HD/UND
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/PUSD
DEPUTY HD/PUSD
HD/ISD(O)
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE)
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



SECRET UK EYES A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO6/17/15

18~~th~~ August 1990

PRIME MINISTER

Dear Dominic

Ministers have agreed revised ROE to cover the extension of ARMILLA Patrol operations to include the enforcement, if necessary, of the UN embargo against Iraq and Kuwait (subject to two outstanding detailed provisos contained in your letter to me of 15 August - these are dealt with below). It will be necessary to amplify this with clear guidance to commanders on the spot on the manner in which they are to conduct monitoring and enforcement operations, especially in circumstances where they may not have time to consult London for advice or instructions. (If we receive good advance intelligence relating to a particular vessel it will of course be possible to provide specific instructions to ARMILLA and, indeed, to take action with the flag state or charterer if appropriate). I attach amplifying instructions which have been prepared in consultation with the FCO, Legal Advisers and the Law Officers' Department and approved by my Secretary of State.

There are two points to bring out. First, the instructions assume that it is HMG's instruction to stop all embargoed cargos (and not simply oil). This is entirely consistent with the Government's public statements but, as far as I am aware, there has not been an explicit decision that RN enforcement action should extend to all types of cargo (other than the very limited permitted exemptions). Although identifying non-oil sanctions breaking involves greater difficulties - including the definition of genuine exemptions - the Defence Secretary believes that we should include all cargoes.

This brings me to the second point. The operating instructions envisage that force should not be used where it is not possible to establish clearly that a particular ship is acting in breach of the embargo. This is not likely to be a significant problem in relation to outbound ships but it may be difficult in some circumstances to demonstrate an inbound ship is bound for Iraq or Kuwait, or to disprove claims that some or all of its cargo is exempt with sufficient confidence to justify the use of force. Quite apart from the legal aspects, there would be a risk of serious presentational damage and of loss of international support for the embargo, if Iraq could plausibly claim that force had been used against an "innocent vessel".

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



The Prime Minister's two outstanding provisos related to the IAZ and enforcement action in the territorial waters of coastal states. On the first we have as yet had no authoritative response from the Iranians (although given the breakthrough in peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq, the future of the IAZ may in any case be limited). For the moment the Defence Secretary believes that it would be prudent not to extend the scale of our operations in the IAZ (or to overfly it with Nimrod aircraft) unless we receive a positive indication from the Iranians (although the position will be kept under review). It is therefore intended that ARMILLA ships should simply transit through the IAZ as they have done for some time, monitoring merchant shipping as they do so. ARMILLA will not be permitted to intercept ships within the IAZ without specific authorisation from London.

We have asked the FCO to follow up the matter of enforcement in the territorial waters of coastal states and will amend instructions to ARMILLA as and when permissions are obtained. It is proposed that these procedures (and the associated ROE) will come into force at 1200Z on Sunday 19 August.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R BINSTEAD
(Private Secretary)

AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS ON MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
EMBARGO BY RN VESSELS

Introduction

1. The task is to contribute to the multinational effort to monitor all shipping in order to confirm the effectiveness of the UN embargo on trade with Iraq, to identify possible embargo breaking vessels, and, if necessary, take action to enforce the embargo.

Monitoring

2. All merchant ships encountered are to be notified to MOD(UK)(N) stating name, position, last and next ports of call and, where appropriate, its trading schedule within the Gulf. Wherever possible draught marks of tankers are to be reported.

3. An Embargo Surveillance Centre has been set up in the Department of Transport London with responsibility for coordinating information from all sources on all trade to and from Iraq and Kuwait. There is to be a maritime cell within this organisation with the specific aim of providing Naval and MPA units within theatre with intelligence on possible sanctions breakers.

Embargoed cargoes

4. All cargoes, including food, bound for or from Iraq or Kuwait are embargoed, with the exception of inbound medical supplies and foodstuffs identified by HMG as being for humanitarian purposes.

Enforcement Action

5. Where advance intelligence is available in relation to a particular vessel specific instructions will normally be

signalled.

6. Where no specific instructions have been received but where there is clear evidence of a breach of sanctions - for example where a laden tanker is identified outbound from Iraq or Kuwait or where a vessel admits to being inbound for Iraq or Kuwait with a cargo not covered by a specific exemption (see para 4 above) - the vessel is to be informed that it is in breach of sanctions, that it will be reported to the UN and appropriate governments and that it is to be diverted to a destination other than Iraq/Kuwait (if inbound) or forbidden to proceed further (if outbound). Minimum necessary force may be used to secure compliance within the limits and procedures laid down in the Rules of Engagement which have been issued. If a suspect vessel refuses to comply with instructions even after the full range of action permitted by the ROE, it is to be shadowed as far as practicable and urgent instructions sought from MOD(UK).

7. If a commander has reason to believe that a vessel may be acting in breach of sanctions he is to inform the vessel concerned and seek its cooperation in clarifying the position. Depending on the response given and the circumstances, this may require seeking to put a party on board the suspect vessel, within the limits and procedures laid down in the ROE, to inspect documents and/or cargo. The situation should be reported to MOD(UK)N immediately and, if time permits, further detailed guidance sought.

Inbound Ships

8. Where evidence of embargo breaking is inconclusive - such as where an unexpected vessel claims that it is carrying exempted cargo or is bound for ports other than in Iraq or Kuwait - the following procedure is to be followed:

- (a) If a vessel refuses to cooperate it is to be informed that this will be reported to the UN and, if known and

where appropriate, flag state and/or the state of the charterer;

(b) The vessel is to be shadowed for as long as practicable to allow time for further instructions to be sought from MOD(UK);

(c) Force is not to be used unless specifically authorised by MOD(UK).

9. Outbound Ships

(a) A vessel may be allowed to proceed if it is established that it is empty. In such cases the circumstances should be reported immediately both to MOD(UK) and to units of other national forces engaged in sanctions monitoring;

(b) Where there is doubt as to whether or not a vessel is carrying cargo or whether the cargo is outbound from Iraq or Kuwait, the vessel may be instructed to accept a boarding party and, if it refuses, enforcement action may be taken within the limits and procedures laid down in the ROE. Alternatively, if the element of doubt is considerable and to allow time for further investigation and, where appropriate, contact with the flag state or charterer the ship may be allowed to proceed. MOD(UK) should be informed immediately and other units operating in the area alerted to ensure that a further interception can be achieved.

55A

Seen

SECRET UK EYES A



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO6/17/15

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(2)

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
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(Private Secretary)

SECRET UK EYES A

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from Binsread to Morris dated 18 August 1990, with enclosures.</i>	
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FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS LINE

As the Foreign Secretary said yesterday, preventing foreign citizens from leaving Kuwait and Iraq is illegal and is the tactic of the outlaw down the ages.

Any attempt to enforce this threat would be completely unacceptable and contrary to all norms of international behaviour .

We will continue to work for freedom of movement for foreign nationals and for their freedom to leave Iraq and Kuwait.

We will not be satisfied until there is a safe and orderly evacuation of those who wish to leave.

18 August 1990

ADVANCE COPY

Prime MinisterGorbachev's
Statement on the
situation
SS.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1535

OF 180800Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME, PARIS, BONN, ~~situation~~,
 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ACTOR, BAGHDAD, RIYADH, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO,
 INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
 INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, PEKING, TOKYO, NEW DELHI,
 INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

SIC

IRAQ/KUWAIT: STATEMENT BY SOVIET LEADERSHIP, 17 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE CRISIS GORBACHEV CONDEMNS IRAQ AND FEARS A CHAIN REACTION. HE CALLS FOR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE GULF CONFLICT.
2. SHEVARDNADZE SEPARATELY PLEDGES SOVIET COOPERATION WITH ALL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
3. EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS TO JORDAN UNDER WAY. SHEVARDNADZE REFERS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND EXPRESSES RELUCTANCE TO CLOSE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KUWAIT.

DETAIL

4. ON 17 AUGUST GORBACHEV MADE A SPEECH, MAINLY ON INTERNAL MATTERS, TO SERVICEMEN IN ODESSA - HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE GOING ON HOLIDAY ON 30 JULY. HE INCLUDED A SHORT PASSAGE ON THE GULF. THE FULL TEXT HAS YET TO BE PUBLISHED, BUT GORBAHCEV'S MAIN POINTS WERE:
 - A) A CALL FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PREVENT ESCALATION INTO A FULL-SCALE MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
 - B) THE USSR WOULD ACT 'SOLELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS...WE COUNT ON THE REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY OF ARAB STATES AND THEIR REGIONAL ORGANISATION. WE RELY ON THE POWERS AND RIGHTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS AND SECURITY COUNCIL'.
 - C) STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ: 'WE HAVE WITNESSED AN ACT OF PERFIDY AND A BLATANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER - IN SHORT, A VIOLATION OF EVERYTHING THE WORLD COMMUNITY NOW PINS ITS HOPES ON AS IT SEEKS TO PUT CIVILISATION

ON THE TRACKS OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT'

- D) NEED TO PREVENT A CHAIN REACTION: 'IT IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO STOP MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREVENT THEM FROM SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RESTORE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW... THE USE OF FORCE TO REDRAW BORDERS, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO ANNEX A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, THREATENS A PERILOUS CHAIN REACTION ENDANGERING THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY'.
- E) JUSTIFICATION OF SOVIET STANCE: 'FOR US TO REACT IN A DIFFERENT WAY WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE AS THE ACT OF AGGRESSION WAS COMMITTED WITH THE HELP OF OUR WEAPONS, WHICH WE AGREED TO SELL TO IRAQ ONLY TO MAINTAIN ITS DEFENCE CAPABILITY RATHER THAN TO SEIZE FOREIGN TERRITORIES AND WHOLE COUNTRIES.'

SHEVARDNADZE

5. AT HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GENSCHER ON THE SAME EVENING, SHEVARDNADZE CALLED FOR 'ENERGETIC COLLECTIVE EFFORTS' AND SAID THAT USE OF THE UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE COULD GIVE 'A DIFFERENT WEIGHT AND DIFFERENT RESULTS' TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE SAID: 'WE ARE UNANIMOUS THAT ALL STATES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SHOULD PROMOTE AND TAKE ALL MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED TO THE FULL. THIS IS NOT AN EASY TASK AND WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN THIS RESPECT.'

6. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, SHEVARDNADZE:

- A) DESCRIBED THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA AS 'TEMPORARY'
- B) FORECAST FURTHER RESOLUTE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IF THE CRISIS PERSISTED
- C) EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CLOSE THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

7. MFA SPOKESMAN SAID ON 17 AUGUST THAT:

- A) FIRST GROUP OF 230 SOVIET EVACUEES FROM KUWAIT HAD LEFT BAGHDAD THAT MORNING AND WAS DUE IN AMMAN ON THE EVENING OF 18 AUGUST
- B) SECOND GROUP (123, INCLUDING 27 WOMEN AND 23 CHILDREN) REACHED BAGHDAD ON 17 AUGUST, WOULD LEAVE FOR JORDANIAN BORDER ON 19 AUGUST.
- C) THIRD GROUP TO LEAVE KUWAIT ON 19 AUGUST.

LOGAN

YYYY

0520 PRIME MINISTER (8)

UNCLASSIFIED

The Iraqi speaker's statement
(according to the Iraqi press)

076755
MDADAN 0036

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DJS

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FM BAGHDAD

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 854

OF 180600Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, ME POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PEKING, MOSCOW, MODUK, ACTOR

SIC I9M

INTERNMENT

SUMMARY

1. AS WAS ACCURATELY SUMMARISED BY THE BBC WORLD SERVICE THIS MORNING, THE SPEAKER OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS SAID (ACCORDKING TO TODAY'S PRESS, THOUGH THERE IS NO MENTION IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE BAGHDAD OBSERVER) THAT NATIONALS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DESCRIBED AS INTENDING AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ ARE TO BE INTERNED.

DETAIL

2. SA'DI MAHDI SALIH SAID (PRESUMABLY YESTERDAY) THAT CERTAIN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT INTENDED TO TAKE HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, PARTICULARLY THE US, HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN TO KEEP THE CITIZENS OF THOSE OGVERNMENTS IN IRAQ AAND ON THE BASIS OF IT HAD STIRRED UP A CAMPAIGN FULL OF FABRICATIONS.

3. THE WHOLE WORLD KNEW THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAD ASSEMBLED FORCES IN THE REGION IN AN UNPRECEDENTED WAY, WERE INTENDING TO COMMIT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND WERE BEHAVING WITH AN ARROGANCE THAT BROKE ALL THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN DEALINGS. SIMILARLY THEY INTENDED A WAR OF STARVATION AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

4. A PRIMARY DUTY WAS TO PROTECT PEOPLES FROM AGGRESSION AND TO ENSURE PEACE: ANYTHING THAT IN THE END SERVED THIS NOBLE AIM ACQUIRED A FUNDAMENTAL LEGALITY THAT WAS THE ESSENCE OF HEAVENLY AND EARTHLY LAWS AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. ACCORDKINGLY THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAD DECIDED TO KEEP AS THEIR

PAGE 1
UNCLASSIFIED

GUESTS THE CITIZENS IN IRAQ OF THE HOSTILE COUNTRIES IN QUESTION SO LONG AS IRAQ WAS THREATENED WITH AGGRESSIVE WAR. THE MEASURE WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL TANGIBLE AND ADEQUATE GUARANTEES WERE SUBMITTED TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE THAT THE DANGER OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THEM HAD PASSED.

6. THE IRAQI PEOPLE CONSIDERED THAT THIS MEASURE WOULD KEEP WAR AWAY AND SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ALL GOOD PEOPLE IN THE WORLD SHOULD USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES THAT WERE PARTICIPATING WITH IT IN PLANNING AGGRESSION TO ABANDON THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND LEAVE THE REGION IN PEACE.

7. THE SPEAKER SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY WAS COORDINATING WITH A NUMBER OF MINISTRIES AND STATE ORGANISATIONS THAT HAD THE CAPACITY TO KEEP THE FOREIGNERS AS THEIR GUESTS IN ESTABLISHMENTS ANYWHERE IN IRAQ FROM ZAKHO TO AL-NIDA-, FOR EXAMPLE ESTABLISHMENTS BELONGING TO THE MINISTRY OF OIL AND THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY MANUFACTURE AND THE ARMED FORCES, SUCH AS AIR BASES AND THE REFINERY COMPLEX IN KUWAIT.

WALKER

YYYY

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PRIME MINISTER

to be aware.
DTS

OF 181330Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH MODUK WASHINGTON ACTOR BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS ME POSTS UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK

M

MY TELNO 426: CONSULAR ADVICE.

1. TOGETHER WITH THE US AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS AND THE FRENCH CHARGE I CALLED ON AL DOURI THIS AFTERNOON TO PROTEST ABOUT THE MEASURES THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL HOTEL.
2. AL DOURI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE HOLDING PEOPLE IN HOTELS INITIALLY TO CHECK THEIR PERSONAL PARTICULARS AND ESTABLISH THEIR STATUS. THEREAFTER, THEY WOULD BE MOVED TO MILITARY AND OTHER KEY SITES IN KUWAIT. THE IRAQIS HAD REASON TO FEAR AN ISRAELI ATTACK. AND THERE WERE RELIABLE REPORTS FROM PARIS THAT AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO RESCUE PEOPLE FROM THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL AND REGENCY PALACE HOTELS.
3. WE PROTESTED STRONGLY AT THIS UNACCEPTABLE ACTION, WHICH AL-DOURI SAID WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI SPEAKER (BAGHDAD TELNO 854). I ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS IRAQI GOVERNMENT POLICY (YOUR TELNO 508 TO BAGHDAD) AND AL DOURI SAID HE ASSURED US IT WAS. ASKED WHETHER OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FOUR COMMUNITIES WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO SITES OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE HE CONFIRMED THIS WAS THE CASE. BUT THEY WOULD BEGIN WITH THOSE IN HOTELS.

COMMENT

4. WE ARE ADVISING PEOPLE TO STAY AT HOME AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE SOME TIME BEFORE LARGE NUMBERS ARE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. AS I LEFT THE IRAQI EMBASSY, HOWEVER, I MET 13 BRITS WHO HAD BEEN PICKED UP IN THE DESERT, HAVING FAILED IN AN ATTEMPT TO CROSS INTO SAUDI ARABIA (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM). THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNITY'S MORALE WILL BE CATASTROPHIC. MY US COLLEAGUE SAID TO AL DOURI, IT WILL GREATLY INCREASE TENSION IN THE AREA.

WESTON

PAGE 1
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TOTAL P. 02

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ

You will have seen the press reports and telegrams sent down to you about the detention of foreign nationals. I have been in touch with the Foreign Office over the course of the morning. I thought you might like to know the latest information we have and how the Foreign Secretary is handling the situation.

You may have heard on the latest news bulletin that there are Iraqi reports of foreign nationals now being moved. These are rumours and we have no confirmation of them. We have heard in the last half hour or so that the American Ambassador was told by the Iraqi Ambassador to Kuwait that US nationals attempting to leave the country would be shot. However, the Iraqis say that US nationals would not be rounded up.

We are still urgently seeking information on who is covered by this announcement. There was a report on the one o'clock news that the two million Egyptians in Iraq and Kuwait are exempt. I am told by the Foreign Office that the press say that there will be a statement by the Iraqi Minister of Labour about the position at 4 o'clock. They assume this is 4 o'clock our time.

The UK have made strong protests to the Iraqi Ambassador in London. The Foreign Secretary is planning to put down a further statement of his own along similar lines to the Foreign Office statement you have already seen. More generally, the Foreign Secretary thinks that we should allow the UN Secretary General time to pursue his initiative. This would also appear to be the US view though we are still getting information on the US position - they have of course been asleep through much of the morning.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that the next step may be to approach the UN for a Resolution perhaps going more widely than simply the position on hostages. He thinks this is primarily the US position too.

Yesterday Cranley Onslow spoke to the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Secretary had asked for an account of the conversation to be relayed to you. Mr Onslow said that he thought Parliament should be recalled now for a one day session. He did not think that we could last until October; and he thought it would be useful to discuss the position on UK hostages. The Foreign Secretary has spoken to the Lord President, who is in Queensland, the Lord President said that from such a distance it was difficult to judge. But in his view, it was not necessary yet to recall Parliament. The Foreign Secretary will want to speak to you about this tomorrow when he sees you.

I will keep you in touch with any further significant developments

Caroline Slocock

18 August 1990

CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERIRAQ

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Caroline Slocock

18 August 1990

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PRIME MINISTER
A more pessimistic
view from JHQ
25. 19/8.

SIC I9M/IAG
OPERATION GRANBY
MODUK FOR DROW
JOINT COMMANDERS ASSESSREP 008/AUG EFDT 181800Z AUG
COVERING PERIOD 171800Z AUG TO 181800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. ATTENTION CONTINUES TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF WESTERN CITIZENS IN IRAQ. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE DISPERSED TO SITES WITHIN IRAQ, WHICH THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THE WEST REGARD AS HIGH VALUE TARGETS. MILITARILY, THE IRAQI GROUND FORCE BUILD UP CONTINUES. US WARSHIPS HAVE FIRED SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF AN IRAQI MERCHANT SHIP IN THE GULF.

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IN KUWAIT, IRAQI DEPLOYMENTS HAVE PRODUCED A FORCE STRUCTURE SUITED TO EITHER ATTACK OR DEFENCE. ELEMENTS OF 5 MECH DIV HOLD THE RIGHT FLANK AND ELEMENTS OF 6 ARMD DIV ARE REPORTED TO BE MOVING INTO POSITION ON THE LEFT FLANK. THESE NEW DISPOSITIONS AND THE FACT THAT THESE DIVS ARE NOW FULLY FORMED IN KUWAIT WILL GIVE THE IRAQIS THE OPTION TO ATTACK AT VERY SHORT NOTICE. IRAQI AIR ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH EAST OF THE COUNTRY AND OVER KUWAIT IS SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN OF LATE.

3. OWN SITUATION.

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET.

B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN CONTINUE IN THEATRE TRAINING. OF THE 6 PHANTOM F4 AT AKROTIRI 2 ARE ON QRA, AT 10 MINS READINESS BY DAY AND 1 HR BY NIGHT. THE REMAINING TORNADO F3 HAVE NOW RECOVERED TO THE UK. 20 SQN RAF REGT IS EXPECTED TO BE PROVIDING SHORAD AT AKROTIRI BY 190500Z AUG USING 4 RAPIER FIRE UNITS. THE JAGUAR DET AT THUMRAIT FLEW ALL 12 AIRCRAFT TODAY. ON 19 AUG IT IS PLANNED FOR 2 JAGUAR AND 1 VC10K TO VISIT BAHRAIN. FOUR JAGUAR AND 1 VC10K ARE AT 1 HR READINESS. TWO OF THE 3 NIMRODS AT SEEB FLEW SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES TODAY. THE SECOND MONITORED (ELECTRONICALLY) THE INCIDENT IN WHICH THE USS

REID AND USS GAINSBOROUGH FIRED SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF THE IRAQI TANKER KHANAQIN. POOR DATA CONNECTIVITY IS HAMPERING THE CO-ORDINATION OF OPERATIONS WITH THE SURFACE FLEET. 2. NIL 3. NIL. C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL. 3. NIL.

4. ASSESSMENT. IT IS ASSESSED THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS POSSIBLE WITHIN 8-12 HRS BUT, GIVEN THE LACK OF ANY LARGE SCALE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AIR ASSETS, WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE A PRECURSOR TO AN ATTACK, IT IS THOUGHT TO BE UNLIKELY.

5. INTENTIONS.

A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3 ESTABLISHED BASES.

B. TO PROVIDE SHORAD AT AKROTIRI.

C. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS.

D. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH.

E. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY.

F. TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO DEPLOYED UNITS.

6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESSREP 001/AUG.

BT

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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

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(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

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(BY TUBE H29)

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PAGE 2

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TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 182359Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH

PRIME MINISTER
still no sign of an
imminent offensive.

055 19/8.

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CRDA 0903

OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP EIGHT

18 AUG 1990

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION GRANBY WILL BE ISSUED DAILY AT 2359Z. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS THEY REQUIRE.

2. INTELLIGENCE. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT CONTINUE TO BE DEFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS. ALTHOUGH THIS COULD CHANGE AT SHORT NOTICE IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. POLITICAL SITUATION. MIN(DP), THE HON ALAN CLARK MP, CONTINUED HIS VISIT TO THE GULF AREA. HIS VISIT TO BAHRAIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, HE OBTAINED BAHRAINI AGREEMENT TO THE ROTATION OF RAF AIRCRAFT AND CLARIFIED OTHER DETAILS. MR CLARK WAS IN ABU DHABI EARLIER TODAY, WHERE HE MET THE PRESIDENT AND CROWN PRINCE BEFORE TRAVELLING ON TO DUBAI FOR A MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE RETURNS TO THE UK TONIGHT. CONCERN CONTINUES TO GROW AT IRAQI THREATS TO MOVE UK AND OTHER NATIONALS HELD IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ TO MILITARY AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS. EGYPT HAS FORMALLY CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ON 26 AUG. THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM REPORTS TODAY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM IN KUWAIT ARE FIT AND WELL. UK EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAS STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM THERE. IT IS REPORTED THAT BRITISH WIVES HAD JOINED THEIR HUSBANDS BUT IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TEAM REMAIN IN THE HOTEL OR HAVE BEEN MOVED ELSEWHERE.

4. US DISPOSITIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US AIR FORCE DISPOSITIONS. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE US HAS ACTIVITATED STAGE 1 OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET MEASURES TO HELP CARRY CARGO AND TROOPS ON OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE FLEET CONSISTS OF COMMERCIAL PLANES FROM 29 US COMPANIES AND FOR STAGE 1 INVOLVES SOME 38 AIRCRAFT.

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO IN-THEATRE TROOP DISPOSITIONS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US NAVY DISPOSITIONS.

5. ROYAL NAVY OPERATIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH YORK AND BATTLEAXE ON PATROL IN THE SOUTHERN GULF AND JUPITER DUE TO RESUME HER PATROL

But 3 members
picked up by
Iraqis?

LATER TODAY. RFA ORANGELEAF WILL BE AT FUJAYRAH UNTIL SUNDAY. THE PICTURE FOR OTHER NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE GULF IS UNCHANGED. OF NOTE IS THE FOLLOWING NAVAL INCIDENT OBSERVED FROM AN ON-TASK NIMROD-UNIT MONITORED THE USS REID FIRING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOW OF AN IRAQI TANKER OUTBOUND FROM THE GULF.

6. RAF OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE IN-THEATRE AIR ASSETS. THE JAGUARS PLANNED TO FLY SOME 16 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY AND THE F3S FROM CYPRUS WERE UK-BOUND WITH TANKER SUPPORT.

7. LOGISTICS. THE OVERALL THE LOGISTIC SITUATION REMAINS SATISFACTORY AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A MEDICAL SURGICAL TEAM IS DEPLOYING TO DHAHRAN TODAY.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT

BT

YYYY

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SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
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TO ~~FLASH~~ FCO
TELNO 431OF 181915Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON BONN PARIS ACIOR MDRUK UKMIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POST ME POSTSADVANCE COPY
PRIME MINISTERNot clear if they were
picked up because they
were - B&T members.
DTS

BONN TELNO 532: FOREIGN COMMUNITIES.

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT AT LEAST 27 BRITONS (PLUS 1 AMERICAN) HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO A MILITARY INSTALLATION ON THE JAHRA ROAD (KNOWN AS THE G1 COMPLEX). THEY WERE PICKED UP, SO WE UNDERSTAND, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY DRIVING FOUR WHEEL DRIVE VEHICLES IN KUWAIT CITY. THOSE DETAINED DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EXFILTRATION ATTEMPTS. AMONG THE 27 ARE THREE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM: KEVIN FALLOW, CLIVE HALL AND BRIAN HUGHES; AND 8 DEPENDANTS, AND FIVE KEY EMPLOYEES WORKING FOR BEI WITH THE LOCAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION COMPANY: THEIR ABSENCE IS LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS IN POWER SUPPLY QUITE SOON.

2. WE ALSO NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT 24 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL IN TWO MINIBUSES (BREAKDOWN: 14 BRITONS, 5 AMERICANS, 4 GERMANS AND 1 FRENCHMAN). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THEIR LIKELY DESTINATION BUT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS WILL GIVE THEM QUOTE VIP TREATMENT UNQUOTE. (IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE BRITONS REPORTED EARLIER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT NINE CREW MEMBERS/PASSENGERS FROM BA 149 WERE MOVED TO THE INTERNATIONAL FROM THE AIRPORT HOTEL.)

3. I CANNOT CONTACT AL DOURI TONIGHT, BUT WILL TRY TO DO SO IN THE MORNING. HE WILL NO DOUBT TEL ME, HOWEVER, THAT HE WARNED ME THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN AND THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE ARE SIMPLY FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD.

4. TELEGRAM FOLLOWS WITH NAMES OF BRITONS MOVED TO G1 COMPLEX.

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MDADAN 0090

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FM KUWAIT
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 431

OF 181915Z AUGUST 90
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picked up because they
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BONN TELNO 532: FOREIGN COMMUNITIES.

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT AT LEAST 27 BRITONS (PLUS 1 AMERICAN) HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO A MILITARY INSTALLATION ON THE JAHRA ROAD (KNOWN AS THE G1 COMPLEX). THEY WERE PICKED UP, SO WE UNDERSTAND, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY DRIVING FOUR WHEEL DRIVE VEHICLES IN KUWAIT CITY. THOSE DETAINED DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EXPILTRATION ATTEMPTS. AMONG THE 27 ARE THREE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM (KEVIN FALLOW, CLIVE HALL AND BRIAN HUGHES) AND 8 DEPENDANTS, AND FIVE KEY EMPLOYEES WORKING FOR BEI WITH THE LOCAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION COMPANY: THEIR ABSENCE IS LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS IN POWER SUPPLY QUITE SOON.

2. WE ALSO NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT 24 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL IN TWO MINIBUSES (BREAKDOWN: 14 BRITONS, 5 AMERICANS, 4 GERMANS AND 1 FRENCHMAN). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THEIR LIKELY DESTINATION BUT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS WILL GIVE THEM QUOTE VIP TREATMENT UNQUOTE. (IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE BRITONS REPORTED EARLIER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT NINE CREW MEMBERS/PASSENGERS FROM BA 149 WERE MOVED TO THE INTERNATIONAL FROM THE AIRPORT HOTEL.)

3. I CANNOT CONTACT AL DOURI TONIGHT, BUT WILL TRY TO DO SO IN THE MORNING. HE WILL NO DOUBT TEL ME, HOWEVER, THAT HE WARNED ME THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN AND THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE ARE SIMPLY FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD.

4. TELEGRAM FOLLOWS WITH NAMES OF BRITONS MOVED TO G1 COMPLEX.

WESTON

YYYY

ulca

20J(a-b)



THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT

13

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 01-276 3000

Ms J R Binstead
Private Office
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2HB

My Ref: P/PSO/9685/90

Your Ref:

17 AUG 1990

Serial No: 1997

Copy No 2 of 5.

Dear Jane,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

Elizabeth Wilmshurst's letter of 13 August conveyed the Attorney General's advice in response to your letter of 11 August. There is little that my Secretary of State could add to that in relation to the action against foreign ships.

In the case of British ships we have power to search British flag ships, including dependent territory ships, under the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) Orders and the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Dependent Territories) Order. However, the power to search is restricted to Authorised Officers as referred to in Section 692(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, ie a commissioned officer on full pay in HM naval or military service, any officer of the Secretary of State for Transport, any officer of Customs or any British Consular officer. This would pose no problems for the Royal Navy. However, the power would not permit foreign states to stop and search British ships. If they did so they might be at risk of legal action from the ship owners/operators, though one would expect that if sued in their own Courts, they would be able to plead the equivalent to our defence of "Act of State", and if sued in UK Courts they would refuse to submit to UK jurisdiction, pleading sovereign immunity.

If that was not thought satisfactory, the UK could seek effectively to take upon itself the liability of the searching state by asking it to search the ship on our behalf ie as our agent. This would effectively transfer liability to the UK Government which would then itself be open to legal action, as the search would not have been carried out within the powers conferred by the Sanctions Order and the defence of "Act of State" is not available under UK law against UK citizens. This risk could be mitigated if the Sanctions Orders were to permit

the UK Government to authorise other states to stop British ships in support of the embargo. However it is doubtful whether this would be worth a special amendment and perhaps need only be borne in mind if further Orders had to be made for some other reason.

Although, therefore, there appear to be no insuperable legal problems to permitting other nations to stop and search British ships, there are probably presentational advantages in not doing so at the present time and certainly not until we have good evidence of specific vessels being involved in sanctions breaking. Even in those cases it would be preferable to seek to use Royal Navy ships to stop and search if it is possible to do so. Good US/UK liaison could help.

British owned but foreign flagged ships are, of course, in the same position as foreign owned and flagged ships.

/ I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No. 10), Stephen Wall (FCO), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and to Sonia Phippard.

Yours sincerely

Sonia Whiteley

S C WHITELEY
Private Secretary



201 cjk
THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

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Direct line 071-828 1368

SECRET UK EYES A

The Hon Dominic Asquith
P/S The Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

17 August 1990

Dear Dominic

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

I refer to your letter of 15 August to Jane Binstead.

The draft RoE have now been agreed. The process of consultation on the draft did not give rise to questions about flag State consents. But the Attorney General has asked me to say that if such questions arise in the future he will be happy to look at the matter again. In such a case he will welcome the views of your lawyers and those of the MOD.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Jane Binstead and Sonia Phippard.

Yours faithfully
(Signature)
E S WILMSHURST

SECRET UK EYES A

SBA

11



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
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SECRET UK EYES A

The Hon Dominic Asquith
P/S The Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
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17 August 1990

Handwritten signature

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I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Jane Binstead and Sonia Phippard.

Handwritten signatures and initials

E S WILMSHURST

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET
 FM JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE
 TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
 TELNO U/N
 OF 171945Z AUGUST 90
 AND TO IMMEDIATE CINCFLEET
 AND TO IMMEDIATE UKLF
 AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
 AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET DHAHRAN
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET THUMRAIT

~~SECRET~~ PRIME MINISTER

Yesterday's sitrep

- indications of moves
 to improve defensive
 position with
 reinforcements

ADVANCE COPY

ms

JJS

SIC I9M/IAG
 OPERATION GRANBY
 MODUK FOR DROW

JOINT COMMANDERS ASSESSREP 007/AUG EFDT 171800Z AUG
 COVERING PERIOD 161800Z AUG TO 171800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST 12 HOURS. IN KUWAIT, IRAQI TROOPS CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE COAST. MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE JORDANIAN PORT OF AQABA CONTINUE, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL AS THE EFFECT OF UN IMPOSED SANCTIONS BEGIN TO TAKE EFFECT

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IN KUWAIT, IRAQ IS CONTINUING TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE. ENGINEERING AND FORTIFICATION WORK CONTINUES ALONG THE COAST. ELEMENTS OF TWO REGULAR ARMY DIVISIONS, 5 MECH AND 6 ARMD HAVE ARRIVED IN KUWAIT. 5 MECH DIV IS CURRENTLY LOCATED IN SOUTH WEST KUWAIT AND 6 ARMD DIV NORTH OF AL JAHRA. THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BOTH DIVISIONS ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN KUWAIT IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. THE ARRIVAL OF THESE REINFORCING UNITS GIVES IRAQ A STRENGTH SIMILAR TO THAT REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE IN THE IRAN IRAQ WAR. IN IRAQ, AT TAJI SSM STORAGE FACILITY, SCUD RELATED ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING. NO SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT THE THREE KNOWN SSM LAUNCH SITES. ASSESSMENT: IRAQI FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO REINFORCE AND IMPROVE THEIR DEFENCES ALONG THE COAST AND SAUDI BORDER, WHILE RETAINING THE CAPABILITY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AT SHORT NOTICE

3. OWN SITUATION

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET
 B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN HAVE CARRIED OUT ROUTINE TRAINING: 8 SORTIES WERE FLOWN ON 16 AUG AND THAT RATE IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. 6 RAFG F4 AIRCRAFT HAVE ARRIVED IN AKROTIRI AND WERE AT RS30 AT 171800Z AUG. THE 6 REMAINING F3S IN

AKROTIRI ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER TO UK ON 18 AUG. 8 RAPIER FUS OF 20 SQN RAF REGT ARRIVED IN AKROTIRI ON 17 AUG. THE THUMRAIT JAGUAR DETACHMENT HAVE BEEN HOLDING 4 AIRCRAFT AT ONE HOUR READINESS IN THE 4 TIMES CBU FIT. NO FLYING WAS PLANNED TODAY IN RESPECT OF THE OMANI SABBATH. THE NIMROD DETACHMENT AT SEEB WERE DUE TO FLY 2 SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES ON 17 AUG. THE FIRST SORTIE WAS AIRBORNE AT 0345Z 2. NIL 3. NIL

C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL 3. NIL

4. ASSESSMENT. NO CHANGE FROM ASSESREP 006/AUG

5. INTENTIONS

A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3 ESTABLISHED BASES

B. TO PROVIDE SHOARAD AT AKROTIRI

C. TO COMPLETE THE LOGISTIC BUILD UP

D. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS

E. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH

F. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY

6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESREP 001/AUG

BT

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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HD/ECD(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

CABINET OFFICE D10

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

PAGE 2

SECRET

SECRET

(S)

075227

MDHIAN 3837

SECRET
 FM MODUK
 TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
 TELNO U/N
 OF 171140Z AUGUST 90
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 5705
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 1125
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF HONINGTON
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF WITTERING
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF MARHAM
 AND TO IMMEDIATE FORY
 AND TO IMMEDIATE COMTWOATAF
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AFSOUTH

PRIME MINISTER

Para 17 concluding
 offensive action still
 unlikely in short term
 OTS.

SIC ACA/UZH/I9M
 ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS PD FROM DIS, DI(ROW), IRAQ CRISIS
 CELL.
 OPERATION GRANBY INTELLIGENCE SITREP AS AT 160600Z AUG 90
 MILITARY SITUATION IN KUWAIT
 1. (S) THE SEVEN REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND DIVISIONS KNOWN TO BE
 IN KUWAIT ARE:
 A. ARMOURED
 (1) HAMURABI
 (2) MEDINAH
 B. MECHANISED
 (1) TAWAKALNA
 C. INFANTRY
 (1) FAO
 (2) BAGHDAD
 (3) NEBUCHADNEZZAR
 (4) ADNAN
 2. (S) HAMURABI ARMOURED DIVISION.
 A. IT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE:
 (1) 7,12 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
 (2) 15 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 (3) 8,9,17 ARMOURED BRIGADES (IT IS LIKELY THAT THE 8 ARMOURED
 BRIGADE HAS BEEN REALLOCATED TO THE TAWAKALNA DIVISION).
 B. THE HAMURABI IS THOUGHT TO BE HOLDING THE WHOLE OF THE SOUTHERN
 KUWAIT BORDER.
 C. ALL BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION WERE IDENTIFIED ON THE MOVE IN
 SOUTHERN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
 D. THIS DIVISION HAS BEEN REFERRED TO PREVIOUSLY AS A MECHANISED
 INFANTRY DIVISION.

3. (S) THE MEDINAH ARMoured DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 2,10 ARMoured BRIGADES.
(2) 11 INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(3) 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
B. ALL BRIGADES EXCEPT 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE WERE OBSERVED ON THE MOVE.
4. (S) THE TAWAKALNA MECHANISED DIVISION.
A. THIS DIVISION PROBABLY CONSISTS OF ITS OWN 18 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE, 8 ARMoured BRIGADE DETACHED FROM HAMURABI AND THE PREVIOUSLY UNALLOCATED 1 ARMoured BRIGADE.
5. (S) THE FAO INFANTRY BRIGADE.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 24 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(2) 25,27,28 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
B. ONLY THE 25 INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED.
6. (S) BAGHDAD INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 4,5,6 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
(2) 21 COMMANDO BRIGADE.
B. OF THESE BRIGADES ONLY THE COMMANDO BRIGADE WAS NOT OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
7. (S) NEBUCHADNEZZAR INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF 19,20,22,23 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
B. 19 AND 22 BRIGADES ONLY WERE OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
8. (S) ADNAN INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. NO INFORMATION IS HELD ON THE CONSTITUENT BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION
9. (S) SPECIAL FORCES.
A. REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND HAS A SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION CONSISTING OF 3 AND 16 SF BRIGADES AND 26 MARINE BRIGADE.
B. ONLY 16 SF BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED ON THE MOVE PRIOR TO INVASION AND IT IS NOT CONFIRMED THAT ALL THIS DIVISION TOOK PART.
- REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.
10. (S) SADDAM HUSSEINS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY OF ALL MUSLIMS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONFRONTATION IN KUWAIT.
11. (S) SADDAM MAY NOW HOPE TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER FOR USE ON OTHER FRONTS. HE HAS NO FORMATIONS IN THE WEST OF IRAQ FACING SYRIA AND MAY NEED MORE TROOPS TO REINFORCE HIS NORTHERN BORDER WITH TURKEY. HE WILL CERTAINLY TEND TO CONCENTRATE A RESERVE FORCE SOMEWHERE IN CENTRAL IRAQ, EVEN IF ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE READY DIVISIONS ARE MOSTLY INFANTRY. ANY REDEPLOYMENT

WILL PROBABLY GO SLOWLY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE RESOURCES INVOLVED BUT ALSO BECAUSE IRAQ WILL LOOK FOR SIGNS OF MATCHING IRANIAN ACTION.

12. (S) NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW MANY DIVISIONS MAY BE AT HIS DISPOSAL. THE COST OF MOBILISING THE EXTRA DIVISIONS ANNOUNCED AFTER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT MAY HAVE PROVEN TO BE TOO GREAT IN ECONOMIC TERMS, MANY OF THE SKILLED MEN MAY PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN THE ECONOMY AND CANNOT BE SPARED. THE FLESHING OUT OF DIVISIONS THAT HAD BEEN PARTLY DEMOBILISED ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME MAY ALSO HAVE MADE HEAVY DEMANDS ON MANPOWER.

13. (S) OVERALL WHILE THESE TROOPS COULD GIVE SADDAM MORE DEFENSIVE UNITS THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE SITUATION IN KUWAIT IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM.

14. (S) OMANS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE WILL BE A BATTALION GROUP OF 1175 MEN TO INCLUDE A BATTERY OF 105MM AND JAVELIN SAM.

15. (S) QATAR HAS COMPLAINED IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS TO IRAQ AT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA TO IRAQIS RESIDENT IN THAT STATE. ASSESSMENT.

16. (S) IRAQ HAS NOW RENOUNCED THE GAINS WHICH IT OBTAINED FROM 8 LONG YEARS OF WAR WITH IRAN. THIS MAKES IT THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE ADVANTAGE FROM THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO SEEK TO MOBILISE ARAB SUPPORT FOR A PURPORTED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHILE STRENGTHENING DEFENCES IN KUWAIT.

17. (S) WE HAVE STILL TO OBSERVE THE SORT OF REINFORCEMENT OF THE IRAQI INVASION FORCE IN KUWAIT WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIAN TERRITORY ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE BUILD UP OF AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. WE THEREFORE ASSESS THAT OFFENSIVE ACTION IS UNLIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM

BT

YYYY

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

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

At his request Sir Jeffrey Sterling and Raphael Ricanate called into see me this afternoon. Ricanate is Chairman of OSG which has strong banking and shipping interests in Israel (it is claimed to be the largest private sector company in Israel). He said that both public and political opinion in Israel was very fearful that Saddam Hussain would embark on another "mad" military venture within the next few weeks. They doubted that he would simply sit tight and use the weapons of western hostages/Arab rhetoric and terrorist attack to contain the situation (from his point of view.

There was strong public support for the Israeli government's low profile approach to the Gulf crisis. Everybody recognised that that was in Israel's best interest. Israel had said publicly that if Iraq invaded Jordan they would have become involved, but in no other circumstance. The Israelis recognised that even if there were Iraqi inspired terrorist attacks, immediate retaliation would be counter productive. The mood in Israel had become calmer over the last few days since the impression had got about that Iraq did not have long range missiles capable of delivering biological or chemical warheads. Conventional long range missiles the Israelis could live with and the Israeli air force would be able to deal with the rest.

The mood in the occupied territories was surprisingly quiet. There was of course a lot of pro-Saddam feeling among the Palestinians but that had not so far turned into demonstrations. Ricanate thought that, provided Saddam did not engage in further military ventures, sanctions would work and could be made to stick. The key was Aqaba. Trade through there was very slow but he for one had been surprised at the apparent readiness of King Hussein to apply sanctions on cargoes trying to come through Aqaba. They had expected the Jordanians to play for an American

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- 2 -

blockade. The feeling in Israel was that King Hussein was a clever operator who would survive. The fact that Syria had come out against Iraq had actually strengthened Hussein's position considerably: it enabled him to begin to move away from the overtly pro-Iraqi stance without sacrificing the respect of his subjects.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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AUG 17 '90 14:38 FROM NUMBER 10

048 PAGE.002

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cuk

PM/90/057PRIME MINISTERIran

1. Following Charles Powell's letter of 12 August to William Waldegrave's Private Secretary, I am writing to let you know of the action we are taking to establish early contacts with the Iranians.

2. I have instructed Sir Crispin Tickell to propose to his Iranian opposite number a meeting of officials from London and Tehran in Geneva at the end of next week. The British official will be briefed to go with a broad agenda. The aim will be to demonstrate UK interest in early resumption of relations, and to explore the scope for resolving the outstanding issues of Rushdie, Cooper and the hostages. We should not give the impression that all three are absolute pre-conditions for resumption.

3. We shall take stock following this first meeting in Geneva. I would like to return to the question of relations with Syria after my forthcoming visit to the area.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

ck

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(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17 August 1990

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
17 August, 1990.
JMG/JMM/193.

Charles Powell, Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1A 2AA.

Dear Charles,

Herewith an interesting article along the lines of one of my notes.

As ever.



AP, James Goldsmith.

(Dictated by Sir James over the telephone and signed in his absence.)

CDP
25/8

What's the Soviet game in the Gulf?

VIRTUAL ALLY

By Edward Jay Epstein

The Soviet Union is America's "virtual ally" in the Iraqi confrontation, according to *The New York Times*. News Quiz:

A virtual ally is one that:

- A) Gives good joint communiqués condemning Iraq.
- B) Provides Iraq with more than 8,000 military advisers and other specialists—and does not withdraw them even after condemning its invasion of Kuwait.
- C) Sells Iraq the helicopters, landing craft, surface-to-air missiles, T-72 tanks, night-fighting equipment, and spare parts it needed for its blitzkrieg of Kuwait.
- D) Votes in support of the United States in the U.N. Security Council for an embargo that will cause the price of oil to skyrocket.
- E) Fails to join the U.S. blockade of Iraq on grounds it has not been legally authorized by the U.N.
- F) Maintains its friendship treaty alliance with Iraq even after its invasion.
- G) Supplies Iraq over the past year with advanced MiG-29 fighters with extended range kits and surface-to-surface missiles that now threaten Saudi Arabia.
- H) Trains Iraq's general staff officers and helped organize its intelligence service over the past three decades.
- I) Hosts a fishing vacation in Siberia for the U.S. Secretary of State at the height of the crisis.

The answer, of course, is: all of the above. These actions may seem confusing if not inconsistent, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union has a common interest with the United States in maintaining the peace and

stability of the Persian Gulf and its oil production. But is that the case? Even in the glasnostized world of joint communiqués and fishing vacations, the United States and the USSR have sharply different interests in the Persian Gulf.

First, the United States is the world's largest importer of energy and the Soviet Union is the world's largest exporter, which means that when there is chaos in the Persian Gulf, and the price ratchets up, it is the United States' loss and the Soviet Union's gain. The United States imports an average of about 7 million barrels of oil a day, which means that each dollar increase drains more than \$2 billion a year from the U.S. economy (while higher fuel prices divert resources from other, more productive, activities). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, exports 3.3 million barrels of crude oil a day (about the same as Saudi Arabia) and, in addition, sells Europe almost an equivalent amount of natural gas, the price of which is contractually tied to the price of a barrel of oil. So each dollar rise generated by Persian Gulf tensions adds nearly \$2 billion a year to the foreign earnings of the Soviet Union. Energy already provides the USSR with 70 percent to 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. If the price of oil were driven up to \$40 a barrel, as it was in Iraq's prior war in the Gulf in 1980, the Soviet Union could expect to increase its hard currency earnings by nearly \$40 billion a year, not to mention the increased earnings its gold, silver, and diamond exports would bring in (precious metals go up in a crisis—gold has already risen \$50 an ounce—and the Soviet Union is the world's second-largest producer of gold, after South Africa). This would go a long way to ameliorating its economic problems. On the other hand, such a price increase would undoubtedly plunge the United States into a depression.

Second, tension in the Persian Gulf benefits Soviet arms sales. The Soviet Union is the primary arms supplier to all the radical states—Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iran. With war in the Gulf, and an American blockade, these countries can be expected to buy more Soviet planes, missiles, and radar, either to protect themselves from Iraq or to counter the American intervention. This means more Soviet advisers, more training facilities, and more revenues. Much of the money for Syrian arms comes from Saudi Arabia, which pays the Soviet Union for most arms purchases by loading Saudi oil onto Soviet tankers—a quasi-blackmail arrangement worked out after Carlos the Terrorist (who was protected by the Soviet intelligence services and operated from Hungary) kidnapped Sheikh Yamani and other OPEC ministers from a Vienna meeting in 1973. (In order to get its oil minister back, Saudi Arabia became amenable to financing less well-endowed Arab regimes.) Iran, which is now modernizing with Soviet equipment, and Libya also pay with oil. In all, the Soviets now get a half million barrels a day for their arms, and this will increase. The Soviets, despite their new status as virtual allies, ship

part of the Arab oil to Cuba to help subsidize its activities in Latin America.

Third, the more risky Persian Gulf oil becomes, the more attractive Soviet gas becomes. Soviet natural gas is an alternative to Persian Gulf crude for both Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union already is delivering some 40 billion cubic meters of gas a year to Europe from its Ural and Siberian fields (as well as from Iran and Afghanistan). It has also been quietly negotiating a deal under which Japan would develop gas fields in eastern Siberia and build a pipeline across the Sakalin peninsula to the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. If the crisis goes on for a year or so, Japan reasonably can be expected to sign up for Soviet gas.

Unlike the United States, then, the Soviet Union gains from an extended embargo in the Persian Gulf. The hotter the crisis, the better. It loses only if Iraq gives up, or is otherwise defeated.

The odd part of this virtual alliance is not merely the conflict of interest but the unwillingness of the United States to ask the sort of questions it would have asked in the pre-glasnost era if a Soviet military client, with a friendship treaty, invaded a U.S. ally. According to one Pentagon source, the United States had not even determined the role or number of Soviet technicians advising the Iraq army. All that the Soviets will say officially is, "I think the advice to Iraq to attack Kuwait did not come from our advisers." This still leaves open such questions as:

1) Did the USSR have advance knowledge of well-designed Iraqi plans to invade Kuwait? After all, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached to the helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the invasion, and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the three generations of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained by Moscow.

2) What was the mission of Colonel General Albert Makashov, the former commander of Volga-Urals Command, to Baghdad as Soviet military counselor two weeks prior to the invasion?

3) How could Iraq be sure that Syria would not take advantage of its confrontation with the United States, unless it had made some arrangement with Syria in advance? If so, did the Soviets act as the intermediary?


4) Is the Soviet Union going to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to call for a non-military solution—i.e., an embargo but not air or naval actions—which will lead to a prolonged stalemate?

5) How are the Soviets able to make arrangements for Soviet citizens to leave Iraq, and why are there no Soviet hostages?



If it turns out the Soviet Union is pursuing its own interest in the Persian Gulf, the result could be an endless crisis and zooming oil prices. With a virtual ally like that, who needs enemies?

EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN is the author of *Deception: The Invisible Wall Between the KGB and the CIA* (Simon and Schuster).

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Henry A. Kissinger

— received by me
roddy

August 17, 1990

Dear Mr. Powell:

Pursuant to our conversation last weekend, I am sending you a galley proof of my article on the subject. It will appear next week in the Washington Post and other papers but I wanted you to have it now as you might want to bring this to the attention of the Prime Minister before it appears in print.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Charles Powell
10 Downing Street
London

Prime Minister

Letter dictated but not read by Mr. Kissinger from Kent, Connecticut

A convincing piece, although no discussion of the 'hostage'

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problem. See in particular page 9, which is what he said to me. CDP
20/2

The crisis over Kuwait marks a watershed for the Bush Administration. Success will boost world morale and the world economy as well as strengthen the President's domestic leadership. Failure will blight all subsequent efforts, domestic as well as international.

So far the Administration has risen to the challenge with subtlety, skill and fortitude. But the game has only begun. The President's dramatic decision to deploy a major military force in Saudi Arabia has raised not only the prospects of success but also the stakes of defeat. The United States has in fact passed the point of no return.

It therefore becomes crucial to assess properly how success and failure are to be defined. The UN Security Council has unanimously demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the legitimate government. The United States has justified its interdiction of the sealanes as a response to a request of the expelled Kuwaiti government.

In these circumstances, should Iraq manage to remain in Kuwait or exercise indirect control through some puppet, the American show of force will turn into a debacle. If in the end Iraq controls Kuwait and U.S. forces stay in Saudi Arabia, the crisis will have ended in a demonstration of the irrelevance of America and of world opinion. In any event, neither Arab nor American politics would long sustain significant troop deployments in Saudi Arabia. The argument that we have saved Saudi Arabia will be overwhelmed by the perception of an

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American failure that would shake political, economic, and financial stability everywhere. Indeed, even attainment of the U.N. objectives might provide only a breathing space if Saddam Hussein remains in office and Iraq continues to build up its nuclear and chemical weapons potential.

Time is not on our side. American staying power in the face of public, regional and allied pressures is usually inversely proportional to the scale of our deployment. Thus, if after a certain interval the conflict appears to settle down to a siege, the United States will be obliged to consider new measures to bring it to a conclusion.

There is little debate about the significance of Hussein's actions. Without provocation or warning, Iraq overwhelmed Kuwait, whose national existence is as old as Iraq's, and overthrew the dynasty that had governed there for 250 years. Moreover, this naked aggression was justified in a manner that challenges the very political structure of the Middle East. For Saddam Hussein argued that all the frontiers of the region were artificially drawn to divide the Arab nation and that the time had come for the rulers in Baghdad to erase these frontiers and to achieve Arab unity through force of arms. Success for Iraq in Kuwait would usher in a series of upheavals certain to culminate in a general Middle East war.

A government as cautious and as dedicated to anonymity as Saudi Arabia's would never have asked for the assistance of foreign troops had it not considered the very survival of the state at stake. Nor would the Arab summit have condemned a

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brother country. Nor would Egypt, Syria and Morocco have sent troops to assist Saudi Arabia. Likewise, in the developing world, where so many countries have more precarious and even more recent frontiers as well as covetous neighbors, a victory by Iraq could inaugurate a time of troubles.

The vital interests of the industrial states are affected most directly. If Iraq succeeds in making the annexation of Kuwait stick, it could determine the price of oil by black-mailing the states of the Arabian peninsula which together with Kuwait and Iraq control ^{more than} ~~some~~ 40% of the world's oil reserves into reducing their oil production. The result would be to destroy the already tenuous balance between supply and demand and drive up the price of oil which would lead to world-wide recession, unemployment and inflation.

This would explain the extraordinary unanimity of the world's condemnation of Iraq, enlisting even the Soviet Union now going through its crisis of communism. into which the crisis of communism has enlisted even the Soviet Union.

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies all of which are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is were prepared to do in concert; or, it could take the lead in opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal burden.

There were ample excuses for avoiding a decision. The most.

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fashionable is the argument that the defense of the area should be an Arab matter. But in the end, alibis can not change the consequences of failure to resist. None of the Arab states are strong enough even in combination to defeat the Iraqi army, toughened in a 10-year war, supplied with advanced military technology during that time by the Soviet Union and France and buttressed by economic assistance from the other industrial democracies, including the United States. Such an argument marks the reemergence of American isolationism, especially among the conservatives. Allowed to prevail, it would and it must conclude with America's abdication at the very moment when the old East-West conflict has been won.

Another argument to avoid a U.S. role is that even if Iraq controlled all the oil in the Gulf, it would still have to sell it in a world market governed by the laws of supply and demand. But were Iraq to achieve its strategic design, it would be able to determine the level of supply by taking production away from sparsely populated principalities in the Arabian peninsula without hurting its own population. The ability to cause a world-wide economic crisis is not the sort of power to be left in the hands of a ruler who has attacked two of his six neighbors, is engaged in mortal conflict with two others, and has used poison gas against his own dissident population.

The Administration must have concluded that the first two options would almost certainly have ended with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent. That would produce the

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collapse of the moderate governments in the region including Egypt. Ultimately, a general Middle East war would have been probable; the immediate crisis would have been ducked by making a later catastrophe inevitable.

Having committed the United States to a leadership role, President Bush made another crucial decision. The American military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President Bush and his advisors opted for a massive deployment. They seem to have reasoned that the U.N.'s unexpected sanction might change Saddam Hussein's calculation. He may well not have originally intended to seize the Saudi oil fields. Had there been no meaningful resistance, he would not have needed to do so. The rulers of the Arabian peninsula in Saudi Arabia as well as in the Emirates would have yielded to Iraqi pressures or been overthrown, more likely both.

But once the sanctions were voted, Saddam Hussein's calculus was bound to change. So long as oil prices remain steady, the sanctions are likely to be sustained for many months. And prices ^{will} remain at more or less present levels if Saudi Arabia increases its production by 2.5 million barrels. The remaining ~~1.6 million barrels of the 4.1 million barrel~~ present shortfall (at least until the winter) caused by the loss of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, can be placed together (at least until the winter) from Venezuela, the Emirates,

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Nigeria and other small producers. But if Saudi production ^{do not} ~~can~~ ^{increase or, which is} ~~be destroyed or even severely~~ reduced, the absence of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil ^{would} ~~will~~ lead to an explosive rise in oil prices. With ~~Saudi production crippled~~ and a world wide depression looming, it would become increasingly difficult to maintain sanctions; Saddam Hussein would win the endurance contest.

President Bush and his advisors must have concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if necessary.

There is now widespread public support; the United Nations is nearly unanimous; NATO countries have sent naval and air contingents; an Arab multinational force is in place. The test, however, will not be the extent of the support but its durability. For that reason, this is a time for ~~at the same time,~~ the Administration needs to calculate very carefully the window of opportunity it has available to achieve its objectives.

The Administration must take care not to wallow in the wide domestic and international support it now enjoys. For the perfectly legitimate concern about the probability of success expressed by talk show hosts and newspaper columnists coupled with insistent reassurances by Administration spokesmen will over time weaken the credibility of the American enterprise. The longer it lasts the more American governmental procedures and Congressional inquiries will take their toll. At some

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point the familiar question of the light at the end of the tunnel is bound to surface.

The situation within the Middle East is also likely to grow more precarious the longer the crisis festers. The impact on the Arab world of anti-Western propaganda from Baghdad and the skillful linking of the issues of Kuwait and of Palestine must not be underestimated. The region is now polarized as never before and radicalism is on the rise. A coup in one of the Emirates or sabotage in the oil fields would send another shock through the region. It would upset the already precarious balance between supply and demand in the world oil markets, driving up oil prices, causing unemployment and inflation, and risking the solidarity backing the sanctions. The refusal of France to permit its navy to participate in the sea interdiction may be a foretaste.

Time is therefore of the essence. The time required for the sanctions to work must be balanced against the factors undermining international cohesion. Such an analysis must keep in mind that the acid test of the sanctions will be not how much oil is prevented from leaving the region but how few supplies are allowed to enter Iraq. Iraqi oil exports are relatively easily blocked. But Iraq's frontiers are long and less bulky goods such as food can seep in. And the likelihood of this happening will grow the longer the crisis lasts and the more Iraq's neighbors conclude that they may have to live with the Iraqi dictator, however dangerous he may be.

A sharp and short crisis is far more in the interest of all

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concerned with moderation than a long siege. I am not in a position to know whether sanctions can work within the time constraints outlined here. I also realize that the United States must consider the risk that a more aggressive course might take away some of the current international support. As things stand, that support would not survive the appearance of an American defeat. The United States stands to lose the most from a long siege whatever the relative immediate economic impact on Europe and Japan. An ignominious withdrawal following the debacle in Lebanon and any withdrawal however dressed up without achieving our objectives would be ignominious would end America's stabilizing role in the Middle East. And no other country could take its place. It would also undermine the single most important asset left in America's relations with Europe and Japan America's contribution to the security of its allies. It would gravely weaken the Bush Administration's capacity to overcome the economic crisis that would inevitably follow.

It would be a mistake to focus only on America's difficulties. In the end, Iraq is a heavily indebted developing country with a population of only 16 million that has just ended a debilitating ten-year war with Iran, and which has hostile relations with four of its six neighbors. It is in no position to enter into a protracted conflict with the United States. Saddam Hussein proved during the Iran war that he is prepared to negotiate when necessary. His most recent offer agreed to the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait,

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out
done by King


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albeit under outrageous conditions. It may be the beginning of an attempt at negotiation obscured by bluster once the reality of the stark choices before Iraq sinks in. Then the offer to withdraw may reemerge stripped of its absurd baggage.

But the United States cannot afford to be diddled and it simply cannot afford to lose. If it should be concluded that sanctions are too uncertain and diplomacy unavailing, the United States will need to consider a surgical and progressive destruction of Iraq's military assets especially since an outcome that leaves Saddam Hussein in place and his military machine unimpaired might turn out to be only an interlude between aggressions.

It would be irresponsible for an outsider to press for a course of action in a situation so dependent on information not available to the kibitzer. But it is important to understand that America has crossed its Rubicon. All those concerned with global peace and world economic well being should subordinate whatever tactical misgivings they may have to standing behind the only policy that can now succeed.

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Just a few points of interest from this morning's telegrams.

President Bush/King Hussein

I attach the full reporting telegram from the FCO of that meeting. It adds little to the read-out I gave you last night but it is interesting that President Bush thought it worth while debriefing President Mubarak straight after that meeting.

UK Residents in Kuwait

The cloud is still there, but less menacing than it was yesterday. Our Embassy and the US have put out broadcasts cancelling yesterday's advice and are now advising the community to stay at home. It is clear from Iraqi meetings with the diplomatic corps in Kuwait that they are trying to drive a wedge between the UK and US residents on one hand and those of the other Western powers on the other. My assessment, with which Robin Butler agrees, is that the Iraqis still plan to use the bargaining lever which the foreign residents provide but do not yet have a clear plan about how to use it. Yesterday's move probably reflected instructions from Baghdad but the Iraqis found it administratively impossible to carry those instructions out on the ground.

Action in the UN

US State Department have urged caution about an emergency Security Council meeting on evacuation of foreign residents. Their fear is that some UN delegations will be unsound and that a resolution could in any case be counter productive with Saddam Hussein. We are continuing to press the UN Secretary General to do what he can with the Iraqis but indications are that the Iraqis have already rejected the idea of a personal emissary from Perez de Cuellar. FCO are continuing informal consultations about the possibility of a UN convoy to evacuate all foreign nationals.

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De Cuellar has issued helpful clarification of his earlier remarks on the use of Article 51 to enforce sanctions. In brief, what he now says is, provided the use of the word "blockade" is avoided, the action being taken is legal.



DOMINIC MORRIS

17 August 1990


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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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- 2 -

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DOMINIC MORRIS

17 August 1990

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SIC

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN: 16 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. INITIAL ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGED BY HUSSEIN'S PERFORMANCE; HE DID NOT ATTEMPT A MEDIATION ROLE AND PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON SANCTIONS. DIFFERENCES REMAIN BUT RELATIONS PARTLY REPAIRED. DETAILED ACCOUNT PROMISED FROM GATES.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, WELL BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME, WITH BUSH EXTENDING THE DISCUSSION BY ACCOMPANYING HUSSEIN ONTO THE PLANE WHICH TOOK HIM FROM KENNEBUNKPORT. AS A RESULT, BUSH AND HIS ENTOURAGE WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ONLY A BRIEF READOUT SO FAR. THE NSC HAVE TOLD US THAT A FURTHER ACCOUNT WILL BE PROVIDED BY GATES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHO IS LIKELY TO CONTACT LONDON DIRECT. MEANWHILE THE FOLLOWING COMES FROM WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC.

3. WELCH SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO ALL THE SPECULATION BEFOREHAND, HUSSEIN BROUGHT NO HIDDEN AGENDA, NO NEWS OF SECRET MEETINGS, SPECIAL REQUESTS OR MESSAGES FROM SADDAM. (BUSH HAS NOW CONFIRMED AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE: QUOTE THERE WAS NO INTERMEDIARY MISSION THAT I DETECTED AT ALL UNQUOTE.)

4. WELCH CHARACTERISED THIS MEETING AS BEING PRIMARILY ABOUT REPAIRING US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS, AND GETTING HUSSEIN SUFFICIENTLY BACK ON SIDE RATHER THAN A MEANS OF EXPLORING POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. TO THAT EXTENT IT HAD BEEN A MODEST SUCCESS. THE TWO MEN HAD GOT ON WELL TOGETHER AND THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A BASICALLY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HUSSEIN HAD BEEN NOTABLY AT EASE SUBSEQUENTLY DURING HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, AS DISTINCT FROM EVIDENT ANXIETY WHEN

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QUESTIONED OVER SUBSTANCE. SIMILARLY BUSH HAD PUT A POSITIVE COMPLEXION ON THE EVENT IN HIS OWN REMARKS TO THE PRESS: QUOTE WE'VE HAD SOME GOOD MEETINGS HERE TODAY ... I THINK HE'D LIKE TO FIND SOME WAY TO BE HELPFUL ... I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT IN SPITE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE GRIEVOUS A WEEK OR SO AGO, THAT ON THE PART OF THIS PRESIDENT, AND I THINK OF THE UNITED STATES ENTIRELY, WE'D LIKE TO SEE BETTER RELATIONS UNQUOTE.

5. WELCH SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE MAINLY BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN A GENERALLY ENCOURAGING LINE ON SANCTIONS INCLUDING ON SHIPMENTS THROUGH AQABA, HE SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS (THERE IS SOME DOUBT IN THE NSC AT THIS STAGE WHETHER HE ACTUALLY SAID QUOTE WAS COMPLYING UNQUOTE). AS WAS CLEAR FROM HUSSEIN'S PUBLIC REMARKS, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT THE SANCTIONS COVERED, WHETHER HUMANITARIAN FOODSTUFFS WERE EXEMPT AND AT WHAT POINT SUCH EXEMPTION APPLIED. BUT WELCH ARGUED THAT SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE AND WERE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE UN. IT COULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS AN ENTIRELY DISINGENUOUS POINT. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT BUSH WOULD PORTRAY THE DISCUSSION ON SANCTIONS AS PROVIDING THE ASSURANCES THE AMERICANS REQUIRED (AS INDEED HAS BEEN THE CASE).

6. THAT SAID, THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED US OBJECTIVES AND HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THEM THROUGH. HUSSEIN HAD NOT DISGUISED HIS VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THE WRONG THING, THAT ARAB OPINION WAS AGAINST THEM AND THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS THE RIGHT WAY OUT. HUSSEIN WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE HE HAD CHOSEN. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD LOST ALL CONFIDENCE IN ANYTHING SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT SAY.

7. AFTER THE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDI, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUSH IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. INDEED THE ABOVE ACCOUNT WAS BASED MAINLY ON BUSH'S REMARKS TO MUBARAK, WHICH WELCH (PLEASE PROTECT) HAD MONITORED AS NOTETAKER.

8. FULL TEXT OF BUSH'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

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From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Roger Freeman Esq MP
Minister of State
Department of Transport
2 Marsham Street
London

Foreign and Comm
London SW

17 August

BCC

Float
SCD

Prime Minister

Tom King MP
John Major MP
John Wakeham MP
David Waddington MP
Peter Lilley MP
Sir Patrick Mayhew
Sir Robin Butler

Dear Roger,

C100721/P

AVIATION SECURITY *hap*

William Waldegrave has asked me to reply to your letter of 14 August. Clearly the whole question of the security of British shipping and airline activity in the region of the Gulf needs to be kept under close review. So do the security arrangements for our airlines' operations elsewhere given the enhanced threat from terrorist activity. I know that our respective officials have been in close touch, particularly to ensure that other countries take their responsibilities towards aviation security as seriously as the current situation warrants. I note that procedures for identification of aircraft in the vicinity of naval ships in the Gulf have been reissued, but hope that air traffic control authorities are routing civil aircraft well away from the danger zones.

While our Emergency Unit and the Transport Co-ordination Centre are open to deal with the current crisis I am confident that the short term arrangements for preventing civil aircraft from flying into war zones will operate effectively. But we do need to establish longer term procedures with your National Air Traffic Control Services to prevent a repetition of BA 149's misfortune. I have instructed staff here to look at this problem urgently with your officials.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Major, John Wakeham, David Waddington, Peter Lilley, Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

John Gaver
Mark

Mark Lennox-Boyd

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10 DOWNING STREET

cc MOD

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1990

Iraq/Kuwait: President Bush's Meeting with
King Hussein and Prince Saud

Robert Gates telephoned me at midnight last night to give a quick read-out on the meeting which the President had had that day. He was unable to give a full read-out since much of the session with King Hussein had been restricted to the principals plus single note-taker. (Much of the ground is covered in similar terms in the report and telegram from Washington.)

The King had spent much of the meeting going over the role that Jordan had sought to play in securing an Arab solution and the difficulties that situation caused for Jordan. He made clear that he had no message or letter from Saddam Hussein and was not trying to act as an intermediary. He said that he had given direction for compliance with the UN resolution on sanctions. His people were seeking legal clarification from the UN about the full extent of the resolution. They were in particular exploring two issues: how far the humanitarian exception applied to foodstuffs, and whether, if Iraqi debt to Jordan was repaid in oil and the Iraqis were not getting any new money for it, did that fall in the sanctions resolution. The King said that Aqaba was not a problem. Through trade had in any case slowed to a trickle and goods which would be in breach of the sanctions resolution would not be allowed through. Gates commented that this was particularly welcome news for the Americans, who were very wary about the difficulties for them of enforcing sanctions off Aqaba.

There was some non-specific discussion of economic assistance for Jordan. The President expressed a general willingness to work with other countries to help Jordan, recognising that they had special problems, but Jordan needed to be seen to be implementing effectively the UN resolutions. The tone of the meeting and the lunch thawed considerably. Gates's only other comment was that while in terms of substance it had not been worth three hours, overall the Americans thought the time had been well spent in re-establishing good relations with Jordan and helping to bring King Hussein back on side.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The President went almost immediately into a meeting with Prince Saud. Again, there was limited discussion of substance. The Prince was full of Saudi gratitude for the action which the Americans and others had taken. There was a discussion on the US/Saudi framework agreement on military forces which for obvious reasons Gates did not want to go into over an open line. He commented that Prince Saud had been very up-beat. The Prince was highly optimistic that, provided the international community continued to work effectively, the sanctions would bite and would achieve the desired results. The Saudis were already getting reports of dissidence within Iraq. The Prince thought that these reports were genuine and that disaffection with Saddam would grow quite rapidly in the coming weeks. Saddam's greatest asset might be his massive military forces; they also posed the greatest threat to him.

A copy of this letter goes to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence).

DOMINIC MORRIS

S. L. Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

44

(1)

UNCLASSIFIED COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

071567
MDLIAN 3570

UNCLASSIFIED
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
PM EAST BERLIN
TO PRIORITY PCO
TELNO 492
OF 161530Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY DT: (BYNANT DT3, DM BERLIN, BONN)

Prime Minister

X is a small piece of good news. Your letter to de Maiziere was clearly worthwhile

dm

YOUR TELNO 196: GDR CEMENT WORKS

1. FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 24 JULY TO DE MAIZIERE ABOUT RMC'S EFFORTS TO BUY THE RUESDERSDORF CEMENT WORKS WE HAVE FOLLOWED UP REPEATEDLY WITH THE TREUHANDANSTALT. WE HEARD THIS MORNING FROM THEM THAT RMC HAD COME OUT TOP IN A COMPETITION AGAINST SEVERAL OTHER BIDDERS. RMC'S LAWYERS CONFIRM THE NEWS! THEY SAY THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE VERY SOON (AND ASK THAT THE NEWS SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL ANNOUNCED). RMC WERE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVENTION.

2. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER WHEN WE HEAR DIRECTLY FROM RMC.

3. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I HAVE HAD A LETTER FROM MR PETER WALKER MP ON BEHALF OF BRITISH GAS TO COMPLAIN THAT THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SHUT OUT OF THE COMPETITION TO ACQUIRE A GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY (VERBUNDNETZGAS) IN THE GDR, VALUED AT OVER POUNDS 350 MILLION AND ASKING IF I CAN HELP IN ANY WAY. BRITISH GAS FEAR THAT A CONSORTIUM FROM THE FRG LED BY RUHRGAS HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR. THEY HAVE WRITTEN IN STRONG TERMS TO GOHLKE AT THE TREUHANDANSTALT. I PROPOSE TO TELL THE TREUHANDANSTALT THAT WE REGARD THESE MATTERS AS COMMERCIAL ONES WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS. AT THE SAME TIME WE BELIEVE IT TO BE IN THE GDR'S INTEREST, AND CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES THAT AS MANY COMPANIES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMPETE ON EQUAL TERMS. THAT WAS WHAT THE TREUHANDANSTALT DECIDED TO INSIST ON OVER RUESDERSDORF AND IT SHOULD DO THE SAME IN THIS CASE. ANY OTHER APPROACH WILL NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE UK.

EYERS

YYYY

44

(1)

UNCLASSIFIED COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

071567
MDLIAN 3570

UNCLASSIFIED
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
FM EAST BERLIN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 492
OF 161530Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY DTI (BYRANT 013), BM BERLIN, BONN

Prime Minister

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dm

YOUR TELNO 196: GDR CEMENT WORKS

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EYERS

YYYY

PRIME MINISTER

1. Dominic has spoken to Bob Gates and has been promised a report of the Hussein/Bush meeting as soon as possible. Hussein is seeing Prince Saud straight after Bush. The report should be ready about 10 pm tonight.
2. // Bob Gates was quite receptive to the suggestion of a UN plane or convoy to get western citizens out. There would need to be a Special Session of the Security Council to back it.
- || 3. The Special Session of the Security Council in New York is likely to produce the right results.

Mohica

16/8

CNN. - Impractical to comply. -
4,000

SECRET

002030
abcFROM: CHIEF SECRETARY
DATE: 16 August 1990

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF CRISIS: JORDAN

The FCO have sent me an advance copy of the paper which William Waldegrave is submitting to you tonight about Jordan.

2. I recognise the importance of keeping the King's support for the sanctions policy. I recognise, too, the damage which this is likely to do to his already-precarious economy. It is not clear that such assistance will be enough to win his support. But I agree that we have little option but to try.

3. However, the costs must be kept within bounds. First, we need to distinguish between Jordan's financial position before the crisis (very largely the result of mismanagement and failure to agree an earlier programme with the IMF, or keep it on track once it was agreed) and the additional costs imposed by the sanctions policy. Our help should be confined to the latter; at a later stage, it will be necessary, in conjunction with the IMF and the IBRD, to tackle the underlying economic mess. We should also distinguish, as the paper does, between the gross costs of imposing sanctions, and the cost to Jordan of the crisis itself. (Many other countries are going to be damaged by the crisis; some, like Turkey and Egypt, by the imposition of sanctions).

4. Second, as the FCO paper proposes, we must do everything possible to broaden the base of such support. I entirely agree that we must look to the Japanese Government for a very large part of the cost, particularly given their inability to contribute to the military effort. We must also look to Saudi Arabia and, if possible, to the former Kuwaiti regime. The latter has very large

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assets in Britain, some part of which it should be persuaded to release for this purpose. Beyond the contributions from these sources the costs must be shared between the United States, the European Community (collectively or severally - I prefer the latter course) and the other major states involved in the imposition of sanctions.

5. I note that the FCO paper cannot, at this stage, put a figure on the costs. I suppose that, illustratively, they could easily fall in the range of £20 - £50 million for the UK. I do not for one moment suggest that these costs should not be incurred, if you judge that this is necessary in order to secure the King's support. But I shall be bound to seek offsetting savings, elsewhere in Douglas Hurd's programmes, and possibly by looking further afield. As John Major said at the initial Ministerial meeting about the crisis, its very nature makes it more, not less, necessary that we should continue with our own policies of restraint at home. And that must mean keeping public expenditure within its existing limits.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to William Waldegrave and to Sir Robin Butler.



NORMAN LAMONT
(Approved by the Chief Secretary and signed in his absence)

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T194A190



SUBJECT *matter*
OB

TRANSLATION

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
LONDON

I have received with thanks and appreciation your message of 9th August, 1990 in which you have kindly informed me of the position of the friendly Government of the United Kingdom and of the measures you intend to take in co-ordination with other states to ensure the effective implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions for enforcing total embargo on Iraq in order to put an end to its aggression against Kuwait, and to restore the complete sovereignty and independence of this sisterly country, as well as to contribute British forces to the multi-national effort for the collective defence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other threatened states of the Gulf.

In your letter you refer to the possibility of using the facilities at Doha from time to time, in addition to further assistance that might be required depending on the circumstances in the future. Undoubtedly, the State of Qatar which has supported resolutions taken in this regard by the U.N. Security Council, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Arab League, and the Cooperation council for Arab Gulf States, would welcome every constructive effort for the implementation of these resolutions and the assertion of international legitimacy as well as the enforcement of the unanimous will of the international community, as represented by these fora.

On the basis of the foregoing and on our awareness of our international obligations, and in particular those emanating from U.N. Security Council Resolution 661, and the U.N. Charter which asserts the right of individual and collective self-defence for member states, I hereby would like to inform you of our approval to grant the required facilities that may be needed due to the circumstances.

On the other hand, and in response to your request, I have already issued the necessary instructions to our Ministry of Interior to facilitate the departure of the British citizens until such a time when the present situation in the Gulf area gets back to normal.



- 2 -

I was pleased to receive in Doha today H.E. Alan Clark, British Minister of State for Defence Procurement at the Ministry of Defence, and exchange views with him on the current serious developments in the Gulf region, as well as our respective positions towards these developments. We have also discussed several other important matters. At my request Mr. Clark will kindly convey to you my views regarding these matters.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our deep appreciation for the just and constructive position taken by the friendly government of the U.K. vis-a-vis this serious crisis, which does not only threaten the security and stability of the Gulf region, but also the security, peace and welfare of other peoples throughout the world.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my personal satisfaction for the growth and the enhancement of our distinct bilateral relations in various fields, due to the continued coordination and consultations between us in matters of mutual interest for our two friendly countries and peoples.

With my deep appreciation and high regards,

Yours Sincerely

*Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani
Amir and Prime Minister
of the State of Qatar*

*Diwan Amiri: Moharram 25, 1411 A.H.
corresponding to August 16, 1990.*

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ١ -

فخامة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة.

تلقيت ببالغ الشكر والتقدير رسالتك المؤرخة ٩ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ التي حرصت فيها على احاطتي بموقف المملكة المتحدة الصديقة ، والتدابير التي تعتزم اتخاذها ، بالاشتراك مع دول أخرى ، لضمان تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي بفرض مقاطعة شاملة على العراق بغية إنهاء عدوانه على دولة الكويت واستعادة سيادة هذه الدولة الشقيقة واستقلالها كاملين ، وكذلك مشاركة القوات البريطانية في الجهد الدولي المشترك للدفاع الجماعي عن المملكة العربية السعودية والدول الأخرى المهددة في الخليج . وقد تطرقت فخامتكم في رسالتك الى ما قد يتطلبه ذلك من استخدام التسهيلات المتاحة في الدوحة من آخر ،

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٢ -

بالإضافة الى أية مساعدات أخرى قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا.

ومما لا شك فيه أن دولة قطر التي ساندت قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي ، ومنظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ، وجامعة الدول العربية ، ومجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية الصادرة في هذا الصدد ، ترحب بكل جهد بناء يرمي الى تنفيذ هذه القرارات ، وتأكيد الشرعية الدولية ، ووضع الارادة الإجماعية للمجتمع الدولي ، متمثلة في قرارات الهيئات المذكورة ، موضع التنفيذ .

وبناء على ما تقدم ، وادراكا من دولة قطر لالتزاماتها الدولية ، وعلى الأخص تلك المنبثقة عن قرار مجلس الأمن الدولي رقم ٦٦١ ، وميثاق الأمم المتحدة الذي يؤكد حق الدول ،

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٣ -

فرادى وجماعات ، في الدفاع الشرعي عن النفس ، فإننا نوافق على منح التسهيلات المطلوبة التي قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا .

من ناحية أخرى ، واستجابة لطلبكم ، فقد أصدرت تعليماتي الى وزارة الداخلية بالمعاونة في تسهيل مغادرة البلاد لمن يرغب في ذلك من الرعايا البريطانيين الى أن تنجلي الظروف الطارئة التي تحيط بمنطقة الخليج في الوقت الراهن.

وقد أسعدني أن استقبل في الدوحة صباح اليوم سعادة السيد ألن كلارك وزير الدولة لشئون المشتريات الدفاعية ، وأن أتبادل معه وجهات النظر حول الوضع الخطير القائم حاليا في

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٤ -



منطقة الخليج وموقف حكومتينا ازائه. وقد
تناولت مباحثاتنا العديد من الأمور الهامة التي
رجوت سعادته أن ينقل لفخامتكم وجهة نظري
الكاملة بشأنها .

ولا يسعني في ختام رسالتي إلا أن
أؤكد فائق تقديرنا للموقف العادل البناء الذي
اتخذته المملكة المتحدة الصديقة في هذه الأزمة
الخطيرة التي لا تهدد أمن واستقرار منطقة الخليج
فحسب بل أمن وسلام ورخاء شعوب العالم
أجمع.

كما أغتنم هذه المناسبة للاشادة بما
بلغته العلاقات الثنائية المتميزة بين بلدينا من قوة
وتطور في مختلف المجالات بفضل التنسيق القائم

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٥ -



بيننا وحرصنا على التشاور المستمر في الأمور
ذات الاهتمام المشترك بين بلدينا وشعبينا
الصديقين .

مع أسمى تقديري وفائق اعتباري .

صديقكم الوفي ،
خليفة بن حمد

خليفة بن حمد آل ثاني
أمير دولة قطر

قصر الدوحة : ٢٥ محرم ١٤١١ هـ

الموافق : ١٦ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ م



TRANSLATION

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Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
LONDON

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CDP (2)

Emir Hamid

Re answer of

Kuwait's letter,

brought back

by Alan Clark.

CDP

20/2



- 2 -

I was pleased to receive in Doha today H.E. Alan Clark, British Minister of State for Defence Procurement at the Ministry of Defence, and exchange views with him on the current serious developments in the Gulf region, as well as our respective positions towards these developments. We have also discussed several other important matters. At my request Mr. Clark will kindly convey to you my views regarding these matters.

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I would also like to take this opportunity to express my personal satisfaction for the growth and the enhancement of our distinct bilateral relations in various fields, due to the continued coordination and consultations between us in matters of mutual interest for our two friendly countries and peoples.

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Yours Sincerely

Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani
Amir and Prime Minister
of the State of Qatar

Diwan Amiri: Moharram 25, 1411 A.H.
corresponding to August 16, 1990.

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ١ -

فخامة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة.

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بالإضافة الى أية مساعدات أخرى قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا.

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بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٣ -

فرادى وجماعات ، في الدفاع الشرعي عن النفس ،
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في ذلك من الرعايا البريطانيين الى أن تنجلي
الظروف الطارئة التي تحيط بمنطقة الخليج في
الوقت الراهن.

وقد أسعدني أن استقبل في الدوحة
صباح اليوم سعادة السيد ألن كلارك وزير الدولة
لشئون المشتريات الدفاعية ، وأن أتبادل معه
وجهات النظر حول الوضع الخطير القائم حاليا في



منطقة الخليج وموقف حكومتينا ازائه. وقد تناولت مباحثاتنا العديد من الأمور الهامة التي رجوت سعادته أن ينقل لفخامتكم وجهة نظري الكاملة بشأنها .

ولا يسعني في ختام رسالتي إلا أن أؤكد فائق تقديرنا للموقف العادل البناء الذي اتخذته المملكة المتحدة الصديقة في هذه الأزمة الخطيرة التي لا تهدد أمن واستقرار منطقة الخليج فحسب بل أمن وسلام ورخاء شعوب العالم أجمع.

كما أغتنم هذه المناسبة للاشادة بما بلغته العلاقات الثنائية المتميزة بين بلدينا من قوة وتطور في مختلف المجالات بفضل التنسيق القائم

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٥ -



بيننا وحرصنا على التشاور المستمر في الأمور
ذات الاهتمام المشترك بين بلدينا وشعبينا
الصديقين .

مع أسمى تقديري وفائق اعتباري .

صديقكم الوفي ،

خليفة بن حمد

خليفه بن حمد آل ثاني
أمير دولة قطر

قصر الدوحة : ٢٥ محرم ١٤١١ هـ
الموافق : ١٦ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ م

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DDMIAN 4039
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 091030Z RIYAD
OO ACTOR TCDRE
FM FCO LN TO RIYAD
090915Z AUG
GRS 203

1322

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 091030Z RIYADH
TELNO 405
OF 090915Z AUGUST 90

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
SHAIKH JABER:

BEGINS

IT WAS WITH OUTRAGE AND DISMAY THAT I HEARD OF THE INVASION OF
YOUR COUNTRY BY IRAQ. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SINCE BEEN DOING ALL
WE CAN, WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES, TO
REVERSE THIS MONSTROUS ACT OF AGGRESSION. I AM ENCOURAGED, AND
I HOPE YOU ARE TOO, BY THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE RECEIVED IN THE ARAB
WORLD AND BY THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE
RAPID PASSING OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660 AND 661
DEMONSTRATES UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY AND RESOLVE ON THE PART OF
THE UNITED NATIONS TO COUNTER THIS AGGRESSION. I BELIEVE IT IS
VITAL THAT YOUR HIGHNESS' VOICE CONTINUES TO BE HEARD LOUDLY AND
CLEARLY ABROAD, REMINDING THE WORLD THAT THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT IS FUNCTIONING, EXPRESSING YOUR OWN
DETERMINATION TO RETURN TO YOUR COUNTRY AND URGING THE REST OF
THE WORLD TO CONTINUE ITS ROBUST SUPPORT AND ITS REJECTION OF
IRAQ'S AGGRESSION.

I OFFER MY DEEPEST PERSONAL SYMPATHY AND CONDOLENCES FOR THE
DEATH AND INJURIES AMONG MEMBERS OF YOUR HIGHNESS' FAMILY.

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

HURD

YYYY
CYCLADHLAND
MAIN
LIMITED
IRAQ/KUWAIT
MED

DDMIAN 4039

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1004
OF 162300Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, EC POSTS
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ANKARA, LIMA, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

File

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KUWAIT/IRAQ: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENTS.

SUMMARY

1. UN SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE ISSUE A CLARIFICATION OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN LIMA.

DETAIL

2. A REUTER'S PRESS LINE, ISSUED ON 16 AUGUST, REPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS SAYING THAT "MILITARY FORCE TO ENFORCE UN SANCTIONS ON IRAQ, WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL, WOULD BE A BREACH OF THE UN CHARTER" AND QUOTED HIM AS SAYING "ANY INTERVENTION, WHATEVER THE COUNTRY, WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH EITHER THE LETTER OR THE SPIRIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER."

3. FOLLOWING THIS, THE UN SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGINS

THE FOLLOWING IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SPOKESWOMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

CONTRARY TO WHAT PRESS DISPATCHES MIGHT INDICATE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF TODAY IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN LIMA IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE HAS BEEN SAYING FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A "BLOCKADE" AS SUCH REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE IT FALLS UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT NO TIME HAS USED THE TERM "BREACH OF THE CHARTER".

IN THAT CONTEXT, AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID TO THE PRESS ON MONDAY WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE "BLOCKADE",

"I UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORD 'BLOCKADE' FROM A UNITED NATIONS

POINT OF VIEW IS NOT THE RIGHT ONE. WHAT WE ARE SEEING IS THAT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, SOME DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES - AND EVEN ARAB COUNTRIES - BUT NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ONLY THE UNITED NATIONS, THROUGH ITS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, CAN REALLY DECIDE ABOUT A BLOCKADE. THAT'S WHY I THINK WE HAVE TO AVOID THE WORD 'BLOCKADE'.'

END OF TEXT

TICKELL

YYYY

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HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE D10
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SUBJECT MATTER

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FILE SH
etc

MEETING RECORD



10 DOWNING STREET . . .

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 August 1990

Dear Sir

**PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SHEIKH SABAH OF KUWAIT**

After the usual opening exchange of courtesies, Sheikh Sabah said that he had just returned from a visit to Washington and wished to put to the Prime Minister the same question he had put to the Americans: was the operation only for the defence of Saudi Arabia or was it also to free Kuwait?

The Prime Minister replied that the forces that had gone to Saudi Arabia were there to protect the territorial integrity of that country and all of the Gulf States. Alan Clark was currently paying a visit to the Gulf States because the Bahrainis and the UAE had invoked the Treaty of Friendship. The frigates in the Gulf area were available to help them, and there was a possibility of a visit by our Tornado Squadron to Bahrain. If Sheikh Sabah was asking whether there was a military option to re-take Kuwait the Prime Minister's answer was that no option had been permanently ruled out. The first step had been to secure the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and to prevent Saddam Hussein following his seizure of Kuwait by further invasions. At the same time the sanctions flowing from the UN resolution were there to put pressure on Iraq. We were determined to see it through and there was no question but that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and that the duly constituted government of Kuwait should be restored.

Sheikh Sabah (somewhat truculently) said that this was not an answer to his question. Did the UK government need a formal request from the Amir to intervene militarily? The Prime Minister reaffirmed that we and the international community had taken firm action; that the logical sequence had been first to stop Iraq taking over other countries and second, to secure the effective implementation of sanctions. Our fleet was there to help in that process and thus ensure that Iraq was the loser from its invasion. But the Sheikh should be in no doubt that the forces were there for the defence of the Saudis and the Gulf States. The Prime Minister pointed out that many nations, particularly Moslem States, were assisting with sending troops. Other nations had responded well despite the economic cost; Turkey in particular had been marvellous. The sanctions resolution would secure its intended effect. The Prime Minister said that she readily understood Sheikh Sabah's concern about

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people in Kuwait. We too understood and shared that concern, particularly since there were many British nationals in Kuwait. She welcomed the diplomatic activity which Sheikh Sabah and the Amir were undertaking. It was important that the legitimate government should be active, and be seen to be active on behalf of the interests of the Kuwaitis and the citizens from other countries who were trapped in Kuwait.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Dominic

(DOMINIC MORRIS)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

16 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

To see. Van den Broek said much the same on Radio 4 this morning. He + the Dutch in general have been the most helpful of the other EC countries.

Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with the Dutch Foreign Minister

Mr Van den Broek telephoned the Foreign Secretary this evening to discuss the WEU meeting in Paris on Tuesday to discuss the Gulf crisis. The Foreign Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may be interested in an account of their conversation. *DM*

Mr Van den Broek raised the question of participation at the WEU meeting. The French were pressing for attendance as observers by EC members who were not members of the WEU. Mr Van den Broek understood that we and the Germans took the view that to exclude the Turks from attending in these circumstances would be unacceptable. Could we then agree that a meeting should be restricted solely to WEU members? The Foreign Secretary said that we could accept either this solution or attendance by observers, but including the Turks.

There was then some discussion of what the WEU should seek to achieve. Mr Van den Broek said that what was needed was a firm commitment on coordination of the forces of WEU member states going to the Gulf. For the Belgians, in particular, this was essential. The Italians and Germans, as well as the Dutch, also thought this important. We therefore needed a formula which blessed the best possible coordination. The Foreign Secretary agreed.

Mr Van den Broek continued that, in the light of recent developments, it might also be necessary for the Security Council to take another look at the implementation, and if necessary enforcement, of sanctions. This was not to imply any criticism of the position which had been taken by the US and UK. But the French had been striking a different attitude in a way which did not augur well for future WEU cooperation. In addition, Mr Van den Broek thought that the Iraqis would be only too happy if the UK or US was obliged to enforce the embargo. This would fuel pro-Iraqi and anti-US sentiment. There would be advantage if the WEU could achieve a consensus on how to take forward action in the UN. Ideally, the Security Council would agree that use of force should not be excluded in order to enforce the sanctions.

The Foreign Secretary said that we did not believe that at the time of SCR 661 it would have been possible to specify a blockade in order to enforce sanctions but it was very

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important that they should be observed. While we had no objection in principle to further Security Council Resolutions, the worst thing would be to try and fail. It was not clear that the support would be present for a further Resolution now. Accordingly, we did not think that the WEU should push for a Resolution which was not available.

Mr Van den Broek said that he understood this, although a further Resolution would solve a great many problems.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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(41) *copy*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ² 16 August 1990

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ms
James Gass
[Signature]

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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20



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



16 August 1990


Dear Dominic**IRAQ/KUWAIT : RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

FCO Ministers have no comment on the ROE profile for the revised concept of operations for the Armilla patrol attached to Jane Binstead's letter to you of 14 August. We are clarifying one or two individual points of detail with the MOD at official level.

We are asking the MOD to ensure that any interceptions or other incidents are reported immediately to the FCO for passing if necessary to our Mission in New York.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).



Dominic Asquith
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq
No.10 Downing Street

586

LO



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 August 1990

[Handwritten signature]
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

[Handwritten signature]
 Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith
 PS/Mr Waldegrave



Dominic Morris Esq
 No.10 Downing Street

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TELNO 137
OF 161330Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MODUK, ACTOR
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

Prime Minister
To see. I spoke to Alan Clark this morning. He is in good form + very pleased with the way the visit is going.

DM

VISIT OF MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT : 15-16 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED. MUCH REASSURED BY MINISTER'S VISIT AS PERSONAL EMISSARY. AMIR RESPONDS FAVOURABLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. CONTENT TO LET UK FORCES USE QATARI FACILITIES.

DETAIL

2. HON ALAN CLARK, MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT ACCOMPANIED BY VCDS, GENERAL SIR RICHARD VINCENT, 5 OFFICIALS AND 5 FROM THE UK MEDIA VISITED QATAR BRIEFLY FOR 24 HOURS FOR TALKS WITH THE AMIR, THE HEIR APPARENT AND QATAR MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OFFICIALS.

3. THE AMIR WAS IN AN EBULLIENT MOOD. HE WAS FULL OF PRAISE AND APPRECIATION OF 'HIS VERY CLOSE FRIEND' THE PRIME MINISTER AND WAS HIGHLY PLEASED WUTH THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 8 AUGUST. MR CLARK WAS HANDED A SEALED WRITTEN REPLY LATER IN THE DAY. THE AMIR SAID HE PROPOSED TO VISIT LONDON IN THE WINTER AND DISCUSS THE CRISIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

4. THE AMIR WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL (''ASHAMED'') OF SOME OF HIS ARAB NEIGHBOURS AT THE ARAB SUMMIT AND TOTALLY CONDEMNED SADDAM HUSSEIN (CALLING HIM A FOX, LIAR AND A KILLER). HE MADE VERY PLAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED OUR HELP IN MAINTAINING A TOTAL BLOCKADE ON IRAQ AND TO STOP POTENTIAL LEAKAGE THROUGH IRAN. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SADDAM COULD NOT BE TRUSTED.

5. THE AMIR DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED UP LATER. HE DID HOWEVER OFFER QATAR FACILITIES FOR OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

IN RETURN THE AMIR OFFERED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN) IN THE AREA.

6. THE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF WAS LESS SUCCESSFUL (PROBABLY A FEATURE OF THE COS' PERSONALITY) AND THE MAJORITY OF THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE HAD NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR HELP. THEIR FEARS ABOUT CW HAD DIMINISHED FOLLOWING RECENT TECHNICAL BRIEFING. HE SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE STAGING OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN DOHA - MAINLY FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS.

COMMENT

7. THE AMIR WAS VERY FLATTERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN AND WELCOMED OUR FIRM INTEREST. THIS HAS GONE DOWN VERY WELL AND HAS SET THE SCENE ADMIRABLY FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PROPOSED VISIT ON 1 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID HE HAD MADE SOME CAUSTIC REMARKS ABOUT THE FRENCH 'BEING TOO LATE' TO THE FRENCH ENVOY WHO VISITED ON 14 AUGUST WITH A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERAND. MR CLARK WILL REPORT IN FULLER DETAILS OF THE VISIT ON HIS RETURN.

RICE
YYYY

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Prime Minister

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FM KUWAIT
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 397
OF 161200Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH BAGHDAD ACTOR MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS ME POSTS

① This is text of the advice that
the BBC are
broadcasting.

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FCO say - it is virtually identical
to advice which US Embassy
in Kuwait has given to
their citizens.

MY TELNO 396: KUWAIT/IRAQ: FUTURE OF BRITISH COMMUNITY

② Mr Hurd is due back
at c 1800 hrs.

I have suggested

that as soon as he is briefed on
the position
he gives
you a
phone
call.

1. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, WHOSE COMMUNITY HAS ALSO BEEN REQUIRED
BY THE IRAQIS TO MOVE TO ONE LOCATON, HAVE ALREADY ISSUED
ADVISE LOCALLY TO THEIR COMMUNITY. THIS IS NOW REACHED THE
EARS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AND I AM THEREFORE ADVISING THE
COMMUNITY ON VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL LINES. THE TEXT WE ARE USING,
WHICH I HOPE THE BBC CAN BROADCAST URGENTLY IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE ADVISED US THAT, INORDER BETTER TO
PROTECT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, THEY WANT ALL BRITISH CITIZENS
LOCATED IN ONE PLACE IN KUWAIT. THEY HAVE SAID THAT BRITISH
CITIZENS MUST MOVE TO THE REGENCY PALACE HOTEL ON 16 AUGUST.
THE IRAQIS HAVE STATED THAT IF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY DO NOT
MOVE VOLUNTARILY THEY WILL FACE UNSPECIFIED DIFFICULTIES
THE EMBASSY TAKES THIS TO MEAN THAT THE IRAQIS WILL TAKE
MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT BRITISH CITIZENS ARE MOVED TO
ONE LOCATION. IF YOU CHOOSE TO MOVE PLEASE TAKE ALL FOOD FROM
YOUR RESIDENCE WITH YOU TO GIVE TO THE HOTEL MANAGEMENT TO
HELP THEIR FOOD STOCKS. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU TAKE NO MORE THAN
ONE SUITCASE PER PERSON WITH YOU TO THE HOTEL.

UNQUOTE.

WESTON

YYYY

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PS/MRS CHALKER
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MR GOULDEN
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HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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SIR P CRADOCK,
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070747
MDHIAN 3570

SECRET
FM BAGHDAD
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 832
OF 161530Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH MODUK, WASHINGTON, EC POSTS

✓

SIC ACA/U2H
YOUR TELNO 253 (NOT TO ALL)

POSSIBLE DETENTION OF BRITISH COMMUNITY IN KUWAIT
FROM DA INFO DI(ROW)A2 CRISIS CELL

1. AT LEAST 40 CIVILIAN BUSES HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED AT BAGHDAD CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION THIS EVENING. EN ROUTE BETWEEN WEST BAGHDAD AND BRITISH EMBASSY I SAW AT LEAST 12 CIVILIAN BUSES BEING MARSHALLED INTO A CONVOY BY POLICE. WHEN I APPROACHED BUS DRIVERS AT THE RAILWAY STATION AND ASKED WHAT BUSES WERE FOR I WAS TOLD THEY WERE TO BE USED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR A SPECIAL TASK.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE BUSES MAY BE BEING USED EITHER FOR AN EVACUATION EXERCISE, OR AS REQUIRED FOR REPATRIATION OF IRANIAN POW WHICH IS REPORTEDLY DUE TO BEGIN TOMORROW. HOWEVER THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER INDICATIONS IN LAST FEW DAYS OF PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION AND IF BUSES WERE FOR TRANSPORT OF POW THE RAILWAY STATION WOULD NOT BE AN OBVIOUS PLACE FOR THEM TO ASSEMBLE. THEIR LOCATION AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PREPOSITIONED TO TRANSPORT DETAINEES BROUGHT BY RAIL FROM BASRA.

WALKER

YYYY

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GOULDEN

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MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BERMAN
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE)

NNNN

PAGE 2
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FM BAGHDAD
TO WASH FCO
TELNO 823
OF 161129Z AUGUST 90

Prime Minister

1150Z
2975

Two straws in the wind
on Iraqi intentions for British
citizens from Kuwait.

DM

MS

MIPT: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN KUWAIT

WE HAVE OBTAINED VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM A FRIENDLY
EMBASSY (VERY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES IF
IT LEAKED AND THE SOURCE WAS SPOTTED, WHICH IT WELL MIGHT BE) TO THE
EFFECT THAT A LARGE CAMP AT TAJI HAS RECENTLY BEEN EVACUATED
OF ITS ASIAN LABOUR FORCE INHABITANTS. THERE ARE SUGGESTIONS
THAT THE SAME HAS HAPPENED AT OTHER IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL/MILITARY
SITES.

2. THE UNPLEASANT THOUGHT OCCURS THAT JUST AS OUR CITIZENS
IN THE MANSOUR MELIA HOTEL MAY BE THERE TO LESSEN THE CHANCES OF
THE BOMBING OF BAGHDAD BY THE AMERICANS SO THE INTENTION IS TO
PROTECT INDUSTRIAL/MILITARY SITES BY ACCOMMODATING SIZABLE NUMBERS
OF WESTERN DETAINEES NEAR THEM.

3. I AM DELIBERATELY NOT REPEAT NOT COPYING THIS TEL TOKBMR WESTON.

WALKER

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

072766
MDADAN 9806

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 170100Z FCO
TELNO 1955
OF 162358Z AUGUST 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, MODUK, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, ACTOR

SIC

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN: 16 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. INITIAL ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGED BY HUSSEIN'S PERFORMANCE: HE DID NOT ATTEMPT A MEDIATION ROLE AND PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON SANCTIONS. DIFFERENCES REMAIN BUT RELATIONS PARTLY REPAIRED. DETAILED ACCOUNT PROMISED FROM GATES.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, WELL BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME, WITH BUSH EXTENDING THE DISCUSSION BY ACCOMPANYING HUSSEIN ONTO THE PLANE WHICH TOOK HIM FROM KENNEBUNKPORT. AS A RESULT, BUSH AND HIS ENTOURAGE WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ONLY A BRIEF READOUT SO FAR. THE NSC HAVE TOLD US THAT A FURTHER ACCOUNT WILL BE PROVIDED BY GATES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHO IS LIKELY TO CONTACT LONDON DIRECT. MEANWHILE THE FOLLOWING COMES FROM WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC.

3. WELCH SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO ALL THE SPECULATION BEFOREHAND, HUSSEIN BROUGHT NO HIDDEN AGENDA, NO NEWS OF SECRET MEETINGS, SPECIAL REQUESTS OR MESSAGES FROM SADDAM. (BUSH HAS NOW CONFIRMED AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE: QUOTE THERE WAS NO INTERMEDIARY MISSION THAT I DETECTED AT ALL UNQUOTE.)

4. WELCH CHARACTERISED THIS MEETING AS BEING PRIMARILY ABOUT REPAIRING US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS, AND GETTING HUSSEIN SUFFICIENTLY BACK ON SIDE RATHER THAN A MEANS OF EXPLORING POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. TO THAT EXTENT IT HAD BEEN A MODEST SUCCESS. THE TWO MEN HAD GOT ON WELL TOGETHER AND THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A BASICALLY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HUSSEIN HAD BEEN NOTABLY AT EASE SUBSEQUENTLY DURING HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, AS DISTINCT FROM EVIDENT ANXIETY WHEN

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTIONED OVER SUBSTANCE. SIMILARLY BUSH HAD PUT A POSITIVE COMPLEXION ON THE EVENT IN HIS OWN REMARKS TO THE PRESS: QUOTE WE'VE HAD SOME GOOD MEETINGS HERE TODAY ... I THINK HE'D LIKE TO FIND SOME WAY TO BE HELPFUL ... I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT IN SPITE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE GRIEVOUS A WEEK OR SO AGO, THAT ON THE PART OF THIS PRESIDENT, AND I THINK OF THE UNITED STATES ENTIRELY, WE'D LIKE TO SEE BETTER RELATIONS UNQUOTE.

5. WELCH SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE MAINLY BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN A GENERALLY ENCOURAGING LINE ON SANCTIONS INCLUDING ON SHIPMENTS THROUGH AQABA. HE SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS (THERE IS SOME DOUBT IN THE NSC AT THIS STAGE WHETHER HE ACTUALLY SAID QUOTE WAS COMPLYING UNQUOTE). AS WAS CLEAR FROM HUSSEIN'S PUBLIC REMARKS, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT THE SANCTIONS COVERED, WHETHER HUMANITARIAN FOODSTUFFS WERE EXEMPT AND AT WHAT POINT SUCH EXEMPTION APPLIED. BUT WELCH ARGUED THAT SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE AND WERE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE UN. IT COULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS AN ENTIRELY DISINGENUOUS POINT. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT BUSH WOULD PORTRAY THE DISCUSSION ON SANCTIONS AS PROVIDING THE ASSURANCES THE AMERICANS REQUIRED (AS INDEED HAS BEEN THE CASE).

6. THAT SAID, THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED US OBJECTIVES AND HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THEM THROUGH. HUSSEIN HAD NOT DISGUISED HIS VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THE WRONG THING, THAT ARAB OPINION WAS AGAINST THEM AND THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS THE RIGHT WAY OUT. HUSSEIN WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE HE HAD CHOSEN. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD LOST ALL CONFIDENCE IN ANYTHING SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT SAY.

7. AFTER THE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDI, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUSH IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. INDEED THE ABOVE ACCOUNT WAS BASED MAINLY ON BUSH'S REMARKS TO MUBARAK, WHICH WELCH (PLEASE PROTECT) HAD MONITORED AS NOTETAKER.

8. FULL TEXT OF BUSH'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

37

ADVANCE 37

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/EED
HD/SOVIET D
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL ✓ seenPRIME MINISTERIRAQ/KUWAIT

You should be aware of one potentially worrying development affecting British nationals in Kuwait. Early this morning the Iraqis summoned in our Ambassador in Kuwait and insisted that "for their own safety" all members of the British community should be gathered in one location: the Regency Hotel. Our Ambassador has consulted EC colleagues in Kuwait to see whether they have had a similar demand. We have not yet had a read out on that. The FCO have informed the Red Cross and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and our Mission in New York are raising it with Perez de Cuellar.

The MOD are consulting confidentially on the military net with other Western powers to see what contingency military action they have planned to protect nationals trapped in Kuwait and Iraq; and we are separately checking the legal basis for any such action.

A convoy of dependants and non-essential staff from the Embassy and the BLT in Kuwait are heading for Baghdad. Places on the convoy have been offered to any other UK citizen in Kuwait.

William Waldegrave is holding a Press conference this afternoon. He will cover the position of the convoy and, if the story has broken, the Iraqis' latest move on British residents in Kuwait.



DOMINIC MORRIS

16 August 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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DOMINIC MORRIS

16 August 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS BRIEFING

GIVEN BY FCO MINISTER OF STATE, MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE,

IN LONDON,

ON THURSDAY, 16 AUGUST 1990

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

When I originally asked you to come in - and I am grateful to you for coming - I intended to have a broad-ranging press conference dealing with the whole situation. Since then, there has been a development which I regard as a grave and sinister development.

The Iraqi military authorities occupying Kuwait have instructed the British community, which numbers some thousands of people - men, women and children - to assemble at a hotel in Kuwait. It is clear to me that that cannot be because they believe that they are going to be, as they put it, "safer" in that hotel. I have no proof of this, but I fear that it is in preparation for moving those people somewhere else. I would like to express the anger of the British people if any such step is taken.

We are, of course, consulting our allies and our colleagues to find out whether similar demands have been made of other communities. We believe they have been made of the Americans and perhaps some others.

This is a further example of the duplicity of the Iraqi regime. Some of you may have heard the Iraqi Ambassador this very

lunchtime talking about the safety of what he called "guests of the Iraqi people".

I hope that these reports and the storm of protest which will break around the head of Iraq if she pursues any policy of interning people will make her draw back even at this late stage from any such policy, if that is what she contemplates.

Thank you! As you can imagine, I have quite a lot now to do, so I will have to cut this a little short, but let us have a few questions!

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL):

What was the reason given for assembling these people at one particular place? Are they to be treated as hostages or internees?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

The reason given was that it would be for their safety but that if they did not assemble, there would be trouble for them.

QUESTION:

What is the deadline for this assembly and where is it supposed to take place?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It takes place at the Regency Hotel in Kuwait.

QUESTION:

And this applies to all British residents?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

In Kuwait. There is as yet no clear deadline. We are, of course, urgently protesting in Baghdad and everywhere else.

QUESTION:

Are the diplomats affected?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I have asked the diplomats in the British Embassy in Kuwait that some of their number should join the assembling British community at the hotel so that if they are moved anywhere else there should be diplomats with them.

QUESTION:

But they are not required to leave officially?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

No.

QUESTION:

How many British people are we talking about being asked to assemble?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We are talking about the order of two-and-a-half thousand people. We have broadcast a message with the help of the BBC on our emergency system to pass the Iraqi message to the community.

QUESTION:

What is your advice to those people, Mr. Waldegrave?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

The advice the ambassador in Kuwait has broadcast to them makes it clear that though we hope this will not happen, they should come prepared with some minimum stocks of movable food and other

kit, but they should be prepared to supplement the food at the hotel if that is where they stay for some time but to have some minimum kit with them if they go elsewhere.

QUESTION:

Not cooperate? Not resist the order?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

There is a clear threat in the Iraqi message that there will be trouble for people if they do not assemble there.

QUESTION;

....Iraqi instruction?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We will give it to you shortly.

QUESTION:

There is a discrepancy in your figures of 2,500; the figure of 4,000 was mentioned before.

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I am sorry! 4,000.

QUESTION:

Do you assume they will be sent eventually to Baghdad or to Iraq?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

What we fear is that they will be interned somewhere; I should think most likely in Iraq somewhere. I have no proof of that and part of the purpose of raising this so swiftly is to try to deter even at this last stage such a policy from taking place.

QUESTION:

If they carry out their threat to round these people up, what action will we take other than protest?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We will be considering that over the next few hours.

QUESTION:

Did this come out of the blue or was there any thought that it might happen connected with the decision to move people out to Baghdad?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It came out of the blue - there was no connection.

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL):

Are you raising this at the United Nations?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We are raising it with the United Nations; we are raising it in every relevant fora; we are raising it with our colleagues

in the EEC, with our allies and with other countries whose nationals may be affected.

QUESTION:

....convoy that is supposed to be leaving today has left?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It left - it has not arrived.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)



071-828 1884

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE

LONDON SW1E 6JP

The Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave MP,
Minister of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs,
Downing Street,
London,
SW1.

Handwritten: 16 August 1990

Handwritten: Dear William, will request will be required

We spoke on the telephone this morning about the telegram which was sent yesterday to UKMIS, New York (Tel No. 441). The telegram referred to our legal justification for naval interception, and contained the sentence:

"We have known all along that our legal justification is sketchy in the absence of a Security Council Resolution authorising enforcement action of that kind."

I was glad to learn from you that you had already taken steps to secure the withdrawal of that passage.

I have advised my colleagues that the United Kingdom is entitled to take measures including the use of force to secure the enforcement of a trade embargo, in response to a request from the legitimate government of Kuwait issued in reliance upon the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. I have never expressed the view that our legal justification is sketchy. It is not.

I know you share my view that, in these circumstances, special care must be taken not to disseminate even in draft communications anything that conveys any lack of confidence in the legality of the steps we are taking in defence of Kuwait under Article 51 of the UN Charter.



071-828 1884

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Cecil Parkinson, John Wakeham, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

Liddy

Ref. A090/2025

Prime Minister 2

MR MORRIS

To see.
JrGulf Situation: Handling Arrangements

The Prime Minister might wish to have, for her return, a note of the present arrangements for handling the Gulf situation.

Standing Daily Arrangements

2. There is a JIC Sit Rep, available by 9.30 am. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room is open at 9.00 am for a relay of the MOD briefing on intelligence, military situation and media. An Ad Hoc Group meets in the Cabinet Office at 11.00 am, under the Chairmanship of a Foreign Office Minister or the Cabinet Office, including FCO, MOD, Treasury/Bank, DTI, Department of Energy, Department of Transport, Home Office and Law Officers' Department, to run through the Sit Rep and co-ordinate action, including handling of the media. The Department of Transport has set up a ~~Sanctions Co-ordination Centre~~ ^{Embargo Surveillance Centre} which receives intelligence from all sources about movement of civil ships and aircraft in the area and produces a daily assessment of threats to the embargo: the report of this group is also considered at the Cabinet Office 11.00 am meeting.

This is the core content intelligence →

Other Arrangements

3. The JIC produces further assessments of specific features (eg Iraq's offer to Iran, the position of Jordan) as required.

4. The Prime Minister may wish to hold at least one meeting of OD(G) next week; the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence are due to be in Paris on Tuesday for the WEU meeting but otherwise they and the Secretary of State for Energy and Chief of the Defence Staff are all in the UK next week, although they

would have to come up to London. I plan to be away from tomorrow, but Mr Appleyard and Mr Reeves will be in the office next week; and Mr Reeves will be available throughout the weekend.

- 5. I attach a chart showing the location of all members of the Cabinet. It will be clear that it would be a major exercise to set up a meeting of the full Cabinet, but it could of course, be done with a little notice if necessary.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

16 August 1990

* - members of OD(G)

(CDS is available through office)

	Mon 20 Aug	Tues 21 Aug	Wed 22 Aug	Thur 23 Aug	Fri 24 Aug
Lord President	Australia ←————→				
Lord Chancellor	Scotland ←————→				
Foreign Secretary *	Devon	Paris	Devon	————→	
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Spain ←————→				
Home Secretary	Scotland ←————→				
SS/ Defence *	Scotland or Wiltshire	Paris	Wiltshire	←————→	
Chancellor of the Duchy	France ←————→				
SS/ Health	Yugoslavia ←————→				
SS/ Education	Italy ←————→				
SS/ Scotland	Scotland ←————→				
SS/ Transport	Bahamas ←————→				
SS/ Energy *	Hampshire	✓	✓	Wales	
Lord Privy Seal	Woodbridge ←————→				
SS/ Social Services	Essex ←————→				
SS/ Environment	Italy ←————→				
SS/ Northern Ireland	In office or	Wiltshire ←————→			
Min Agriculture	Suffolk ←————→				
Chief Secretary	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SS/ Employment	France ←————→				
SS/ Wales	Wirral	✓	Wirral	Suffolk —————→	
SS/ Trade & Industry	✓	✓	✓	✓?	✓?

COMMENT:

①

188(A-D)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 160100Z FCO

TELNO 1936

OF 152310Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW *later today.*

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ACTOR

*Prime Minister
to see. The British input**to us preparations for the
President's meeting with King Hussein**I have asked
FCO to get earliest
possible read-out from
the meeting**DM*YOUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN
MODUK FOR DUS(P)

SUMMARY

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE AND NSC WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. US SEE ISSUES AND POLICY IN LARGELY SIMILAR TERMS TO OURSELVES. ACUTELY ALIVE TO ISRAELI DIMENSION AND WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH TEL AVIV. WILL BE FORMULATING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON AQABA OVER NEXT 48 HOURS. INTEND TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON SANCTIONS, WITH ANY HELP TO KING HUSSEIN CONDITIONAL ON EFFECTIVE JORDANIAN ACTION FIRST. PREPARING AGAINST A POSSIBLE NEED TO COUNTER A PEACE PLAN WHICH HUSSEIN MAY FLOAT. SWIFT READ OUT ON HUSSEIN'S VISIT PROMISED.

DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON YOUR TUR ON 15 AUGUST, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO SCOWCROFT'S REQUEST FOR A BRITISH INPUT. I GAVE THE GIST TO KIMMITT: AND TOOK COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST, STATE) THROUGH THE DETAILS, LEAVING BEHIND A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. COUNSELLOR (POL/MIL) TOOK ACTION IN PARALLEL WITH WELCH (NSC).

3. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE EXPLORING WITH THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN IF THE LATTER'S SCHEDULE COULD ACCOMMODATE A STOPOVER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT THE KING WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON - SEE MIFT NOT TO ALL). COVEY TOOK NOTE, AND PROMISED AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE KING WENT ON TO LONDON.

*This at the
Ambassador Amman's
suggestion.*

4. COVEY CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AT AQABA. THE US HAD WORKED ASSIDUOUSLY WITH TEL AVIV TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A LOW ISRAELI PROFILE WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. SO FAR, THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WELL. INDEED, SHAMIR HAD POINTED OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS EVIDENCE OF FULL ISRAELI COOPERATION AND NOT JUST GRUDGING ACQUIESCENCE. BUT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM.

5. COVEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WRESTLING WITH THE AQABA PROBLEM. IT WAS EASIER TO FRAME INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE GULF THAN OFF AQABA. THEY WOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING DRAMATIC STEPS UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT, BUT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FRAMING APPROPRIATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRUCIAL. THE AMERICANS WOULD GREATLY PREFER JORDANIAN COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO. IF THIS HAPPENED, INTERDICTION MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. THEIR IMPRESSION AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE QUOTE PLODDING ALONG IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQUOTE, BUT FACED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THESE

A

(2)

INCLUDED PRIOR CONTRACTS, A CONTINUING NEED FOR IRAQI (OR SUBSTITUTE) OIL AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE KING WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GUARANTEES OF RELIEF IN CERTAIN AREAS, (PARTICULARLY OIL) BEFORE JORDAN COULD FULLY COMPLY. THE US WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO, BUT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO EARN ITS RELIEF.

6. COVEY THOUGHT THAT THE KING WOULD INDICATE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, BUT WOULD TRY TO BRUSH THIS QUESTION ASIDE. HE WOULD WISH MAINLY TO FOCUS ON JUSTIFICATION OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. HE STILL SEEMED BITTER THAT HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE SO LITTLE SUPPORTED BY EGYPT AND THE SAUDIS. COVEY SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM. IF SO, HE WAS KEEPING IT VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST: THE US AMBASSADOR HAD ACCOMPANIED HUSSEIN AND THE COURT ON HIS AIRCRAFT, AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A WHISPER OF ANY IRAQI MESSAGE. THE KING MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO CLOSE ANY HOLES IN THE SANCTIONS NET. WHEN THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM WAS IN PLACE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES. THE US WOULD THEREFORE NOT REBUFF THE KING, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE GOT THE SEQUENCE RIGHT.

7. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC. HE SAID THAT THE POINTS IN TUR WERE TIMELY AND WELCOME. SCOWCROFT HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH POWELL THAT OUR VIEWS SHOULD BE INSERTED FIRMLY INTO THE BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN.

8. WELCH EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BRING HUSSEIN FULLY UP TO THE MARK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE BLOCKADE. LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, SEEMED TO BE GETTING THROUGH AQABA AT PRESENT (AND THE RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO AN IRAQI VESSEL AS OPPOSED TO BEING GRANTED LANDING RIGHTS AND TRANSPORTED ACROSS JORDAN). HUSSEIN WOULD NEED HELP IF HE WERE TO DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND KEEP IT UP (THE NSC ESTIMATED THAT HE STOOD TO LOSE DOLLARS 900 MILLION OR 25 PER CENT OF GNP PER YEAR). BUT HELP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR COOPERATION WITH THE SANCTIONS EFFORT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE BY NAVAL MEANS IF NECESSARY.

*Ruby Caldwell
This is probably over-optimistic*

9. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES, WELCH SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN A QUOTE GOOD ONE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WANTED TO COME AND TALK PERSONALLY. HUSSEIN HAD ADDED QUOTE SANCTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT BUT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND REALLY NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS SPECULATED THAT IN ADDITION TO ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY JORDANIAN POLICY, HUSSEIN WOULD PUT FORWARD A PLAN, EITHER OF SADDAM'S OR HIS OWN. THE NSC HAD JUST HEARD FROM A NOT NECESSARILY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND AMERICAN/WESTERN FORCES FROM THE REGION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND A REPLACEMENT OF EXTERNAL TROOPS BY AN ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE. IF HUSSEIN PROPOSED THIS, HE WOULD BE TOLD THAT NO PLAN COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IMPLIED THAT IRAQI AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE, WHICH FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OR WHICH ALLOWED SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED PREMATURELY. THE US COULD NOT SET ITS FACE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT, BUT ANY SUCH PLAN HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE, AND WITH THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE RIGHT ORDER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN SADDAM'S DUPLICITY.

10. STATE AND THE NSC CONFIRMED THAT, AS AT NOON LOCAL TIME, HUSSEIN HAD NO APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON TODAY (15 AUGUST) BEFORE THE MEETINGS IN KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST.

*Prime Minister**Background for the**proposed telephone**conversation with**Sheikh Sabah.*

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
 FM WASHINGTON
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELNO 1933
 OF 152108Z AUGUST 90
 INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD
 INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, AMMAN, ANKARA, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW
 INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, ACTOR

US/KUWAIT: SHAIKH SABAH IN WASHINGTON
 SUMMARY

1. SHAIKH SABAH CALLS ON BUSH, BAKER AND CHENEY TO EXPRESS KUWAITI GRATITUDE. US TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE KUWAITIS TO MAINTAIN HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AND TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES BEARING THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 15 AUGUST, I ASKED ABOUT SHAIKH SABAH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. COVEY SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER AND WOULD SEE CHENEY TODAY (THE LATTER AS A COURTESY AND TO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR US SUPPORT). SABAH HAD NOT HIMSELF HAD MUCH OF SUBSTANCE TO RAISE WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT THE VISIT HAD GIVEN THE KUWAITIS SOME VISIBILITY AND OFFERED THE AMERICANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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B - THE US WOULD OFFER ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO CONDUCT A PROGRAMME OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. THEY HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THE KUWAITIS APPOINT AN APPROPRIATE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, WHO SPOKE ENGLISH AND COULD HANDLE THE PRESS. COVEY NOTED THAT THE KUWAITIS NEEDED TECHNICAL ADVICE IN THIS AREA. THEY DID NOT KNOW QUITE HOW TO PROCEED. BUT THEY WERE MAKING EFFORTS: THEY HAD OPENED A QUOTE RESISTANCE RADIO STATION UNQUOTE IN CAIRO, WHICH THE US WOULD HELP SUPPORT.

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 150800Z FCO

TELNO 1828

OF 150115Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, RIYADH

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, ACTOR

*Prime Minister**These are the only 2 telegrams  
in about US stance at forthcoming  
meeting with King Hussein.**JM**15/8*BUSH PRESS CONFERENCE

## SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A 40 MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON DEVOTED ROUGHLY EQUALLY TO US BUDGET MATTERS (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND IRAQ/KUWAIT.

## DETAIL (IRAQ/KUWAIT)

2. THE PRESIDENT COVERED A LOT OF FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT HE WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ON JORDANIAN OBSERVANCE OF THE UN SANCTIONS AND ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN: HE SAID QUOTE I OUGHT TO LET KING HUSSEIN TELL ME WHAT IS HAPPENING. IF A COUNTRY IS PERMITTING A FLOW OF COMMERCE, IT WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE SANCTIONS. HE IS COMING HERE AND I WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK TO HIM AND EXPLAIN US VIEWS. UNQUOTE. BUT THE PRESIDENT ADDED, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT STOPPING SHIPS GOING INTO AQABA, QUOTE IF IT'S A HOLE THROUGH WHICH COMMERCE FLOWS IN AN OTHERWISE TIGHT NET, I WOULD CERTAINLY THINK THAT AQABA SHOULD BE CLOSED TO IRAQI COMMERCE. UNQUOTE. ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JORDAN (AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION) ECONOMICALLY, BUSH SAID QUOTE I THINK WE WOULD, PROVIDED JORDAN JOINED THESE OTHER COUNTRIES IN FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SANCTIONS. UNQUOTE.

3. COMMENTING ON THE POLICY OF INTERDICTION THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE WE ARE ACTING WITHIN OUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND I THINK THE WORLD WANTS TO SEE THESE CHAPTER (SIC) 51 SANCTIONS CARRIED OUT AND THAT IS THE ROLE THE US IS TRYING TO DO ... WE ARE DOING IT THE WAY OUR ATTORNEYS AND OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD RECOMMEND, AND I THINK WE ARE DOING IT PROPERLY, AND I HOPE WE ARE DOING IT TO THE DEGREE THAT ALL SHIPS WILL TURN BACK IF THEY ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN ACTION. UNQUOTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE FOR THE UN OR FOR A UN JOINT COMMAND. HE SAID: QUOTE THAT IS NOT THE PLAN RIGHT NOW, BUT WE ARE TALKING TO SEE HOW WE CAN MAKE THIS NAVAL PRESENCE MOST EFFECTIVE. BUT THAT (A UN

COMMAND) IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE.  
REFERRING TO SOVIET IDEAS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN  
RESOLUTIONS HE ADDED QUOTE I DO NOT THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT  
YOU HAVE A UN FLAG IN ORDER FOR COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR  
RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I WOULD BE SOMEWHAT OPEN MINDED TO TALK  
FURTHER ALONG THOSE LINES. UNQUOTE. (SEE MY TELNO 1928, NOT TO  
ALL).

5. THE PRESIDENT RULED OUT SADDAM'S QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE  
PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION: QUOTE NO. I DO NOT SEE  
ENOUGH POSLTIVE ELEMENTS THERE TO THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE A  
BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION AT ALL. IT WAS BRINGING IN EXTRANEIOUS  
PROBLEMS, AND IT DID NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE FUNDAMENTAL  
PROBLEM, WHICH IS THAT THEY HAVE GOT TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT AND  
THEY HAVE GOT TO LET THE RIGHTFUL RULERS RETURN TO KUWAIT. SO I  
DO NOT SEE THAT AS A POSSIBILITY TO NEGOTIATION FROM THOSE  
PROPOSALS AT ALL. UNQUOTE.

6. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF IRAQ/KUWAIT SECTIONS BY FAX TO FCO  
EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 323

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 1930  
OF 150120Z AUGUST 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, ACTOR

US/JORDAN: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN TO VISIT US FOR MEETINGS WITH BUSH AND BAKER. ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACING JORDAN AND ARE PREPARED TO HELP. IMPORTANT TO AVOID FURTHER DESTABILISATION. BUT THE KING MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING US SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 14 AUGUST, HE CONFIRMED THE CNN STORY THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON. BUSH HAD TELEPHONED HUSSEIN ON 13 AUGUST AND THE KING HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN VISITING. BUSH HAD AGREED AND THE KING WOULD NOW SEE BAKER IN WASHINGTON ON 15 AUGUST, TRAVELLING ON TO KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST TO SPEND A DAY WITH BUSH.

3. AS BACKGROUND, MACK SAID THAT THE NEW US AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS ON 14 AUGUST AND INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. THE KING'S INTEMPERATE SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT - WIDELY INTERPRETED BY THE AMERICAN MEDIA AS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE US - HAD NOT CHANGED ADMINISTRATION VIEWS. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE KING WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DID NOT WISH QUOTE TO PULL THE PLUG ON HIM UNQUOTE. BUT MACK SAID THAT WHILE THE US WOULD TAKE AS SYMPATHETIC AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE, THEY WOULD BE BLUNT ON A COUPLE OF POINTS:

A) THEY WOULD WISH TO LAY DOWN VERY FIRM CRITERIA FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS BY JORDAN. THE CLEAR MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE THAT IMPLEMENTATION MATTERED. BUT THE US RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON JORDAN'S ECONOMY, GREATER THAN ON ANY OTHER STATE. THEY WERE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO FIND WAYS TO HELP. THEY WERE ENCOURAGED THAT THE EC WERE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY COULD DO. THE US MIGHT GO TO THE SAUDIS, WHILE CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE. JORDAN NEEDED OIL TO REPLACE IRAQI SUPPLIES, AND THE SAUDIS WERE AN OBVIOUS SOURCE. BUT THE KING



WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS.

B) PREVENTING LEAKAGE THROUGH AQABA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF JORDANIAN SERIOUSNESS. MACK SAID THAT QUOTE IT WOULD BE A SHAME UNQUOTE IF HUSSEIN DID NOT CONTROL AQABA. IF HE DID NOT, THE US WOULD HAVE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO.

C) THE US WOULD ALSO WARN STRONGLY AGAINST QUOTE MONEY LAUNDERING FOR THE IRAQIS UNQUOTE.

4. MACK SAID THE US FULLY SHARED UK CONCERNS ABOUT PREVENTING THE DESTABILISATION OF JORDAN. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER ON TWO COUNTS: FIRSTLY, IT WOULD ONLY GIVE THE IRAQIS (AND THE SYRIANS) MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION: AND SECONDLY, IT COULD INVITE ISRAELI INTERVENTION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THIS. MACK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SO FAR THE ISRAELIS HAD ACTED WITH COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT.

MEYER

YYYY

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PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET UK EYES A

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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*uk*

*103*

15 August 1990

*Dear Jane,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO *file*

Your letter of 11 August to Elizabeth Wilmshurst regrettably failed to reach us until well after the Attorney-General's advice conveyed in Elizabeth Wilmshurst's reply of 13 August.

Mr Waldegrave spoke to the Attorney General about these matters on the telephone today. He has asked me to say that he hopes that no options will be ruled out at this stage, provided that they are consistent with our basic legal justification for the RN enforcement of the embargo. The aim must be to achieve the most effective enforcement while maintaining the broadest international support for what we shall be doing. There may well be circumstances in which both of these aims would be furthered by our having Flag State consent, though we would not of course want a situation where we had to seek it in every case. I gather that these aspects are already under consideration amongst the lawyers in the context of the draft RoE. *file with DM*

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Sonia Phippard.

*Yours sincerely*

*Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith  
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Miss J R Binstead  
PS/Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

SECRET UK EYES A

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Seen by DM  
Faxed to PM 15.8.

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 August 1990

*Dear Amin*

**IRAN/IRAQ: PEACE AGREEMENT**

You asked for a preliminary assessment of the implications of the announcement today by President Saddam Hussein that Iraq has agreed on the terms of a peace settlement with Iran. I attach Baghdad telno 803 which summarises Saddam's broadcast.

The agreement effectively addresses all the main problems outstanding between Iran and Iraq, ie Iraqi occupation of Iranian territory, sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab and repatriation of prisoners of war. Saddam has conceded on all three points. Eight years of conflict with Iran have produced no net benefit for Iraq.

One issue not covered in Saddam's public announcement was non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This was an important part of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Iranian violation of it was used by Saddam as the principal pretext by Iraq for the 1980 invasion. It no doubt forms part of the agreement. It has no doubt been dealt with in the agreement.

There has been a noticeable warming of the public atmosphere between Iran and Iraq over the past 3-4 months. Bilateral discussions have been taking place, but we were not aware they had reached their final stages. There have, however, been some indications of Iranian connivance in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It seems possible from today's announcement that the peace agreement was cooked up before the invasion, and that the deal may have involved Iran agreeing to stand aside militarily in return for Iraq accepting a peace settlement wholly on Iran's terms.

The main question is whether Iran will agree to allow goods to be imported for Iraq through Iranian ports

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in breach of SCR 661. We have no evidence either way on this point. As far as we know, the Iranians have said nothing publicly about sanctions. The temptations will be considerable, despite Iran's wish to exploit the present situation to mend its fences with the West. Sanctions-busting would have clear implications for UK/Iran relations (on which we shall be commenting separately). We can expect the Americans to be exploring the potential in this changed situation for moving closer to Iran. Iran is likely to remain wary of the Soviet Union. A peace settlement - broadly meeting the objectives of SCR 598 - is likely to remove any remaining inhibitions on arms sales to Iran by eg France and Italy.

It is difficult to see how Saddam Hussein could now climb down over Kuwait in a way which would meet SCR 660. It is the only international "success" he can point to at home. He will be more determined than ever to sit it out. As mentioned above, sanctions leakage through Iran could prove crucial. Meanwhile Saddam Hussein is at least likely to enjoy rhetorical support from Iran over both Israel and the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf.

The Secretary-General will no doubt report in due course to the Security Council on the extent to which SCR 598 has been implemented.

*Yours sincerely  
Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith  
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq  
No.10 Downing Street

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INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR

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IRAN/IRAQ: PEACE AGREEMENT

SUMMARY

1. IRAQ AND IRAN AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE IRAN/IRZQ BORDER STARTING FROM 17 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. IRAQ RADIO BROADCAST AT 1100 LOCAL ON 15 AUGUST THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI DATED 14 AUGUST IN WHICH HE SAID (AS HEARD BY US) THAT, FOLLOWING DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN AND THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BEGINNING WITH THAT OF 24 APRIL FROM SADDAM TO RAFSANJANI, IRAQ NOW WISHED TO REMOVE ALL OBSTACLES TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW IRAQ TO CONFRONT PROVOCATIONS IN THE REGION AND TO FACE FOREIGN AGGRESSION.

3. SADDAM THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) IRAQ AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN A LETTER OF 8 AUGUST SENT FROM RAFSANJANI VIA THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA TO SADDAM. THESE CALLED FOR A SETTLEMENT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE SHATT AL-ARAB WOULD BE DIVIDED ON THE BASIS OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT. PARTICULAR ATTENTION WOULD ALSO BE DEVOTED TO ARTICLES (DELAING WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION RESPECTIVELY) 6 AND 7 OF UNSCR 598 .

(B) DELEGATIONS FROM EACH SIDE WOULD VISIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF (A) ABOVE AND ON THE CONTENTS OF A LETTER SADDAM HAD SENT TO RAFSANJANI ON 30 JULY (NO FURTHER DETAILS GIVEN).

(C) IRAQI TROOPS WOULD BEGIN TO WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY ON 17 AUGUST LEAVING ONLY A 'SYMBOLIC' NUMBER OF TROOPS AND BORDER GUARDS IN PLACE.

(D) THERE WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN IRAQ AND IRAN. IRAQ WOULD REPATRIATE THE FIRST BATCH OF IRANIAN POWS ON 17 AUGUST.

4. SADDAM CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO EVERYTHING RAFSANJANI HAD WANTED SO AS TO ALLOW IRAQ TO CONFRONT THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE REGION WITHOUT HINDRANCE.

COMMENT

5. ONCE IRAQ HAD SEIZED KUWAIT, THE SHATT AL-ARAB BECAME OF MINOR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ. AND ONCE SADDAM WAS FACED WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEIZURE, HIS PRAGMATISM MADE AGREEMENT WITH IRAN ONE COULD EASILY SEE HIM GOING FOR. HOWEVER SADDAM COULD STILL, GIVEN HIS EARLIER POSITION ON THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT, AND THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE RECOVERY HAS SINCE ACQUIRED FACE DIFFICULTIES DOMESTICALLY OVER THIS VOLTE-FACE. SADDAM'S LETTER IS ALSO FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT HE INTENDS NO WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT: INDEED, FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW NOW WOULD LEAVE IT A NET LOSER. ✓

6. AS SADDAM MAKES REFERENCE TO A LETTER OF 30 JULY TO RAFSANJANI, THE IRANIANS MAY CONCEIVABLY HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF IRAQI PLANS BEFORE THE INVASION.

7. NO SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE IN THE LETTER OF THE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL OR OF THE SECURITY-COUNCIL IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

8. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR US IS THAT ENFORCING SANCTIONS WILL PROBABLY BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT.

WALKER

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ADVANCE 22

.IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE 1

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MR TOMKYS 1

MR GORE-BOOTH 1

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*Prime Minister*

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INFO PRIORITY KUWAIT, ACTOR

*Background for the  
proposed telephone  
conversation with  
Sheikh Sabah.*

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*H-H,  
Cullis  
Report  
u.s.  
Saudi  
Arabia  
Ottogerson*

US/KUWAIT: SHAIKH SABAH IN WASHINGTON  
SUMMARY

1. SHAIKH SABAH CALLS ON BUSH, BAKER AND CHENEY TO EXPRESS KUWAITI GRATITUDE. US TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE KUWAITIS TO MAINTAIN HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE AND TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES BEARING THE BRUNT OF UN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 15 AUGUST, I ASKED ABOUT SHAIKH SABAH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. COVEY SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER AND WOULD SEE CHENEY TODAY (THE LATTER AS A COURTESY AND TO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR US SUPPORT). SABAH HAD NOT HIMSELF HAD MUCH OF SUBSTANCE TO RAISE WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT THE VISIT HAD GIVEN THE KUWAITIS SOME VISIBILITY AND OFFERED THE AMERICANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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- B - THE US WOULD OFFER ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO CONDUCT A PROGRAMME OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. THEY HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THE KUWAITIS APPOINT AN APPROPRIATE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, WHO SPOKE ENGLISH AND COULD HANDLE THE PRESS. COVEY NOTED THAT THE KUWAITIS NEEDED TECHNICAL ADVICE IN THIS AREA. THEY DID NOT KNOW QUITE HOW TO PROCEED. BUT THEY WERE MAKING EFFORTS: THEY HAD OPENED A QUOTE RESISTANCE RADIO STATION UNQUOTE IN CAIRO, WHICH THE US WOULD HELP SUPPORT.
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UNQUOTE FROM THE US AND UK, THEY WOULD AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE. BUT KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN TO BE IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS EFFECTIVELY. AFTER JORDAN WOULD COME TURKEY, FOLLOWED BY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS LIKE EGYPT, MOROCCO AND EVEN SYRIA (COVEY COMMENTED ON THE IRONY HERE: SYRIA WAS STILL ON THE US TERRORIST LIST, BUT THE US WERE LOBBYING ON THEIR BEHALF FOR KUWAITI ASSISTANCE).

3. COVEY NOTED THAT KUWAITI SUPPORT FOR JORDAN DID NOT HAVE TO BE PUBLIC. INDEED, THE MORE DISCREET, THE BETTER. THE KUWAITIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN GENEROUS, BUT THEY NEEDED NOW TO BE PURPOSEFUL AND TO FOCUS THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. THE US WERE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE AND REINFORCE THIS PROCESS.

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(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
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RESIDENT CLERK

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SECRET



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 August 1990

The Prime Minister has seen the unnumbered telegram of 14 August from BDS Washington on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. She has noted that the Saudis would welcome "a battalion of British ground and special forces and to assist with behind the lines activities". She has commented that we need to treat that rather cautiously.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Miss Jane Binstead,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

17 ccpc



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828-1386

SECRET UK EYES A

Miss J R Binstead
P.S.
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

28/8/90

15 August 1990

Dear Ms Binstead

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO.

— Ask with DM

I refer to your letter of 14 August to Charles Powell, which contains the RoE profile for naval enforcement of the trade embargo in the Gulf.

The Attorney General is content with the RoE.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Dominic Asquith and Sonia Phippard.

[Handwritten signature]

E S WILMSHURST

SECRET UK EYES A

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Prime Minister

There are the only 2 telegrams
in about US stance at forthcoming
meeting with King Hussein.

ans JM

15/8

BUSH PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A 40 MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON DEVOTED ROUGHLY EQUALLY TO US BUDGET MATTERS (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND IRAQ/KUWAIT.
DETAIL (IRAQ/KUWAIT)
2. THE PRESIDENT COVERED A LOT OF FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT HE WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ON JORDANIAN OBSERVANCE OF THE UN SANCTIONS AND ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN: HE SAID QUOTE I OUGHT TO LET KING HUSSEIN TELL ME WHAT IS HAPPENING. IF A COUNTRY IS PERMITTING A FLOW OF COMMERCE, IT WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE SANCTIONS. HE IS COMING HERE AND I WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK TO HIM AND EXPLAIN US VIEWS. UNQUOTE. BUT THE PRESIDENT ADDED, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT STOPPING SHIPS GOING INTO AQABA, QUOTE IF IT'S A HOLE THROUGH WHICH COMMERCE FLOWS IN AN OTHERWISE TIGHT NET, I WOULD CERTAINLY THINK THAT AQABA SHOULD BE CLOSED TO IRAQI COMMERCE. UNQUOTE. ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT JORDAN (AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION) ECONOMICALLY, BUSH SAID QUOTE I THINK WE WOULD, PROVIDED JORDAN JOINED THESE OTHER COUNTRIES IN FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SANCTIONS. UNQUOTE.
3. COMMENTING ON THE POLICY OF INTERDICTION THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE WE ARE ACTING WITHIN OUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND I THINK THE WORLD WANTS TO SEE THESE CHAPTER (SIC) 51 SANCTIONS CARRIED OUT AND THAT IS THE ROLE THE US IS TRYING TO DO ... WE ARE DOING IT THE WAY OUR ATTORNEYS AND OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD RECOMMEND, AND I THINK WE ARE DOING IT PROPERLY, AND I HOPE WE ARE DOING IT TO THE DEGREE THAT ALL SHIPS WILL TURN BACK IF THEY ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN ACTION. UNQUOTE.
4. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE FOR THE UN OR FOR A UN JOINT COMMAND. HE SAID: QUOTE THAT IS NOT THE PLAN RIGHT NOW, BUT WE ARE TALKING TO SEE HOW WE CAN MAKE THIS NAVAL PRESENCE MOST EFFECTIVE. BUT THAT (A UN

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COMMAND) IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE, REFERRING TO SOVIET IDEAS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS HE ADDED QUOTE I DO NOT THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU HAVE A UN FLAG IN ORDER FOR COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT I WOULD BE SOMEWHAT OPEN MINDED TO TALK FURTHER ALONG THOSE LINES. UNQUOTE. (SEE MY TELNO 1928, NOT TO ALL).

5. THE PRESIDENT RULED OUT SADDAM'S QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION: QUOTE NO. I DO NOT SEE ENOUGH POSITIVE ELEMENTS THERE TO THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE A BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION AT ALL. IT WAS BRINGING IN EXTRANEIOUS PROBLEMS, AND IT DID NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM, WHICH IS THAT THEY HAVE GOT TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT AND THEY HAVE GOT TO LET THE RIGHTFUL RULERS RETURN TO KUWAIT. SO I DO NOT SEE THAT AS A POSSIBILITY TO NEGOTIATION FROM THOSE PROPOSALS AT ALL. UNQUOTE.

6. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF IRAQ/KUWAIT SECTIONS BY FAX TO FCO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

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323

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1930
OF 15012DZ AUGUST 90
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US/JORDAN: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN TO VISIT US FOR MEETINGS WITH BUSH AND BAKER. ADMINISTRATION RECOGNISE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACING JORDAN AND ARE PREPARED TO HELP. IMPORTANT TO AVOID FURTHER DESTABILISATION. BUT THE KING MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING US SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 14 AUGUST, HE CONFIRMED THE CNN STORY THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON. BUSH HAD TELEPHONED HUSSEIN ON 13 AUGUST AND THE KING HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN VISITING. BUSH HAD AGREED AND THE KING WOULD NOW SEE BAKER IN WASHINGTON ON 15 AUGUST, TRAVELLING ON TO KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST TO SPEND A DAY WITH BUSH.

3. AS BACKGROUND, MACK SAID THAT THE NEW US AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS ON 14 AUGUST AND INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. THE KING'S INTEMPERATE SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT - WIDELY INTERPRETED BY THE AMERICAN MEDIA AS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE US - HAD NOT CHANGED ADMINISTRATION VIEWS. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE KING WAS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DID NOT WISH QUOTE TO PULL THE PLUG ON HIM UNQUOTE. BUT MACK SAID THAT WHILE THE US WOULD TAKE AS SYMPATHETIC AN APPROACH AS POSSIBLE, THEY WOULD BE BLUNT ON A COUPLE OF POINTS:

A) THEY WOULD WISH TO LAY DOWN VERY FIRM CRITERIA FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS BY JORDAN. THE CLEAR MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE THAT IMPLEMENTATION MATTERED. BUT THE US RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON JORDAN'S ECONOMY, GREATER THAN ON ANY OTHER STATE. THEY WERE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO FIND WAYS TO HELP. THEY WERE ENCOURAGED THAT THE EC WERE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY COULD DO. THE US MIGHT GO TO THE SAUDIS, WHILE CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE A SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE. JORDAN NEEDED OIL TO REPLACE IRAQI SUPPLIES, AND THE SAUDIS WERE AN OBVIOUS SOURCE. BUT THE KING

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WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS.

B) PREVENTING LEAKAGE THROUGH AQABA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF JORDANIAN SERIOUSNESS. MACK SAID THAT QUOTE IT WOULD BE A SHAME UNQUOTE IF HUSSEIN DID NOT CONTROL AQABA. IF HE DID NOT, THE US WOULD HAVE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO.

C) THE US WOULD ALSO WARN STRONGLY AGAINST QUOTE MONEY LAUNDERING FOR THE IRAQIS UNQUOTE.

4. MACK SAID THE US FULLY SHARED UK CONCERNS ABOUT PREVENTING THE DESTABILISATION OF JORDAN. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER ON TWO COUNTS: FIRSTLY, IT WOULD ONLY GIVE THE IRAQIS (AND THE SYRIANS) MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION: AND SECONDLY, IT COULD INVITE ISRAELI INTERVENTION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THIS. MACK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SO FAR THE ISRAELIS HAD ACTED WITH COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT.

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PAGE 2

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 August 1990

Thank you for your letter of 14 August to Charles Powell with a complete ROE profile for the ARMILLA patrol. The Prime Minister has agreed this subject to three provisos:

- first, that the Attorney General (or Solicitor General) has agreed it;
- second, that the Iranians confirm their agreement to surveillance operations within the IAZ by ARMILLA ships and MPS before any such operations take place within the IAZ;
- third, that the specific agreement of friendly Gulf States should be obtained before enforcement operations are conducted within their territorial waters.

I am sending copies of this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Julie Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

DOMINIC MORRIS

Miss Jane Binstead,
Ministry of Defence.

16
 file
 c/g/Binstead
 b.c.
 pc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ²

Better than nothing but better still if

15 August 1990

the World Service

did not make a
leak of it!

Dear Dominic,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Charles Powell's letter to me of 14 August referred to a BBC World Service report.

The report in question (a transcript of which I enclose) quotes the impressions of two expatriates that "most of the relevant Diplomats were either away on leave or had flown out of Kuwait during the early stages of the Iraqi invasion".

Mr Waldegrave spoke in strong terms to David Witherow and to John Tusa, pointing out that these impressions were utterly fallacious and that before publicising them the BBC should have checked with the Foreign Office. He asked that the BBC publicly refute the impressions. Mr Tusa agreed that a refutation would appear in the 4 pm World Service News Report today. This has indeed happened. I attach the transcript of the relevant news report. Mr Waldegrave thinks this pretty speeding response is tolerable.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely

Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith
PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORT AT 1300, 13 AUGUST 1990

"Two women I've interviewed in London are particularly critical of the lack of help available from the British and American embassies in Kuwait. Their impression is that most of the relevant diplomats were either away on leave or had flown out of Kuwait during the early stages of the Iraqi invasion. Escapes have been organised instead by what they call groups of volunteers working with Kuwaitis. "

NMP

XN49 1524 15/08/90

LINES : T=31 P=26

1533

DESPATCH FROM =LONDON =

BY =JACK THOMPSON =

TAPE NO:238

=KUWAIT SITUATIONER/DIPLOMATS =
D. 1745

CUE: The Foreign Office in London says the overall situation in Kuwait appeared to be getting worse. Our foreign affairs correspondent, Jack Thompson, says reports from the British embassy in Kuwait suggest an almost total absence of law and order in the country.

The Foreign Office spokesman said general conditions in Kuwait appeared to be deteriorating. There were reports of wholesale looting - he didn't say who by. Food and petrol were still available but the banks had stayed closed. There'd been no significant improvement in the internal telephone service and no evidence of a civil police force. These reports are based on information supplied by the British embassy in Kuwait which like all others in the country has been told by the Iraqis to move its operations to Baghdad by the twenty-fourth of the month. Britain has twenty-five diplomats and officials in Kuwait. Contrary to impressions gained by some expatriates who've managed to get out of Kuwait, all but three of them were on duty at the time of the Iraqi invasion. The Foreign Office said the embassy had tried to stay in touch with the British community in Kuwait through a system of district wardens but with phone lines down this had not been easy. One of the diplomats is the consul, Mr Larry Banks. The Foreign Office said he'd again been unsuccessful in attempts to find the body of Mr Douglas Croskery, the British businessman shot dead by Iraqi troops as he'd tried to cross into Saudi Arabia at the weekend. The spokesman said that yesterday Mr Banks had been given full co-operation by the Iraqi military who'd provided an escort headed by a lieutenant-colonel to search an area



Minister

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telegram no. 371, reporting the slur carried by the BBC World Service. She is incensed by this and hopes that the Foreign Secretary or Mr. Waldegrave will take it up at the highest level with the BBC and insist upon a public apology.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

The Honourable Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COMMENT:

15B(a-b)

SECRET
 1 WASHINGTON
 2 DESKBY 160100Z FCO
 3 ELNO 1936
 4 152310Z AUGUST 90
 5 NFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW
 6 NFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN
 7 NFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, AOTR

Prime Minister

to see. The British input

to US preparations for the
 President's meeting with King Hussein
 later today.

I have asked
 FCO to get earliest
 possible read-out from
 the meeting

OUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN
 ODUK FOR DUS(P)
 SUMMARY

ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE AND NSC WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE
 TO THE PRESIDENT. US SEE ISSUES AND POLICY IN LARGELY SIMILAR
 TERMS TO OURSELVES. ACUTELY ALIVE TO ISRAELI DIMENSION AND WILL
 MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH TEL AVIV. WILL BE FORMULATING RULES
 OF ENGAGEMENT ON AQABA OVER NEXT 48 HOURS. INTEND TO TAKE A FIRM
 LINE ON SANCTIONS, WITH ANY HELP TO KING HUSSEIN CONDITIONAL ON
 EFFECTIVE JORDANIAN ACTION FIRST. PREPARING AGAINST A POSSIBLE
 NEED TO COUNTER A PEACE PLAN WHICH HUSSEIN MAY FLOAT. SWIFT READ
 OUT ON HUSSEIN'S VISIT PROMISED.

DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON YOUR TUR ON 15 AUGUST, MAKING CLEAR THAT
 WE WERE RESPONDING TO SCOWCROFT'S REQUEST FOR A BRITISH INPUT. I
 GAVE THE GIST TO KIMMITT; AND TOOK COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST, STATE) THROUGH THE DETAILS,
 LEAVING BEHIND A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR
 TUR. COUNSELLOR (POL/MIL) TOOK ACTION IN PARALLEL WITH WELCH
 (NSC).

3. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE EXPLORING WITH THE JORDANIAN
 DELEGATION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME
 MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN IF THE LATTER'S SCHEDULE COULD
 ACCOMMODATE A STOPOVER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON
 (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT THE
 KING WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON - SEE
 MIFT NOT TO ALL). COVEY TOOK NOTE, AND PROMISED AN IMMEDIATE REPORT
 ON KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE
 KING WENT ON TO LONDON.

4. COVEY CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT
 SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AT
 AQABA. THE US HAD WORKED ASSIDUOUSLY WITH TEL AVIV TO MAKE CLEAR
 THAT A LOW ISRAELI PROFILE WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE
 UNILATERAL ACTION. SO FAR, THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WELL.
 INDEED, SHAMIR HAD POINTED OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE
 MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.
 THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS EVIDENCE OF FULL ISRAELI
 COOPERATION AND NOT JUST GRUDGING ACQUIESCENCE. BUT THEY WOULD
 MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM.

5. COVEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WRESTLING WITH THE
 AQABA PROBLEM. IT WAS EASIER TO FRAME INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL
 ACTIVITY IN THE GULF THAN OFF AQABA. THEY WOULD TRY TO AVOID
 TAKING DRAMATIC STEPS UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT, BUT WERE
 IN THE PROCESS OF FRAMING APPROPRIATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
 HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRUCIAL. THE AMERICANS WOULD GREATLY
 PREFER JORDANIAN COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING THE
 ECONOMIC EMBARGO. IF THIS HAPPENED, INTERDICTION MIGHT NOT BE
 NECESSARY. THEIR IMPRESSION AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE
 JORDANIANS WERE QUOTE PLODDING ALONG IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
 UNQUOTE, BUT FACED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THESE

This is the
 Jordanian
 suggestion.

IN DEED PRIOR CONTRACTS, A CONTINUING NEED FOR IRAQI (OR SUBSTITUTE) OIL AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE KING WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GUARANTEES OF RELIEF IN CERTAIN AREAS, (PARTICULARLY OIL) BEFORE JORDAN COULD FULLY COMPLY. THE US WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO, BUT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO EARN ITS RELIEF.

6. COVEY THOUGHT THAT THE KING WOULD INDICATE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, BUT WOULD TRY TO BRUSH THIS QUESTION ASIDE. HE WOULD WISH MAINLY TO FOCUS ON JUSTIFICATION OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. HE STILL SEEMED BITTER THAT HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE SO LITTLE SUPPORTED BY EGYPT AND THE SAUDIS. COVEY SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM. IF SO, HE WAS KEEPING IT VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST: THE US AMBASSADOR HAD ACCOMPANIED HUSSEIN AND THE COURT ON HIS AIRCRAFT, AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A WHISPER OF ANY IRAQI MESSAGE. THE KING MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO CLOSE ANY HOLES IN THE SANCTIONS NET. WHEN THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM WAS IN PLACE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES. THE US WOULD THEREFORE NOT REBUFF THE KING, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE GOT THE SEQUENCE RIGHT.

7. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC. HE SAID THAT THE POINTS IN TUR WERE TIMELY AND WELCOME. SCOWCROFT HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH POWELL THAT OUR VIEWS SHOULD BE INSERTED FIRMLY INTO THE BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN.

8. WELCH EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BRING HUSSEIN FULLY UP TO THE MARK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE BLOCKADE. LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, SEEMED TO BE GETTING THROUGH AQABA AT PRESENT (AND THE RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO AN IRAQI VESSEL AS OPPOSED TO BEING GRANTED LANDING RIGHTS AND TRANSPORTED ACROSS JORDAN). HUSSEIN WOULD NEED HELP IF HE WERE TO DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND KEEP IT UP (THE NSC ESTIMATED THAT HE STOOD TO LOSE DOLLARS 900 MILLION OR 25 PER CENT OF GNP PER YEAR). BUT HELP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR COOPERATION WITH THE SANCTIONS EFFORT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE BY NAVAL MEANS IF NECESSARY.

9. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES, WELCH SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN A QUOTE GOOD ONE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WANTED TO COME AND TALK PERSONALLY. HUSSEIN HAD ADDED QUOTE SANCTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT BUT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND REALLY NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS SPECULATED THAT IN ADDITION TO ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY JORDANIAN POLICY, HUSSEIN WOULD PUT FORWARD A PLAN, EITHER OF SADDAM'S OR HIS OWN. THE NSC HAD JUST HEARD FROM A NOT NECESSARILY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND AMERICAN/WESTERN FORCES FROM THE REGION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND A REPLACEMENT OF EXTERNAL TROOPS BY AN ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE. IF HUSSEIN PROPOSED THIS, HE WOULD BE TOLD THAT NO PLAN COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IMPLIED THAT IRAQI AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE, WHICH FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OR WHICH ALLOWED SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED PREMATURELY. THE US COULD NOT SET ITS FACE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT, BUT ANY SUCH PLAN HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE, AND WITH THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE RIGHT ORDER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN SADDAM'S DUPLICITY.

10. STATE AND THE NSC CONFIRMED THAT, AS AT NOON LOCAL TIME, HUSSEIN HAD NO APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON TODAY (15 AUGUST) BEFORE THE MEETINGS IN KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST.

(2)

Think this is
probably an
Iraqi
policy
statement

① 039^a

ISA (a-b)

mf

COMMENT:

SECRET

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 142100Z WASHINGTON

TELNO 1419

OF 142030Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN

SUMMARY

1. SCOWCROFT/POWELL CONVERSATION ON INTERDICTING SHIPPING AT AQABA. SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD SAY TO HUSSEIN ON ASSISTANCE IF HE IMPLEMENTS SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. POWELL SPOKE TO SCOWCROFT ON 14 AUGUST. HE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE USE OF AQABA TO EVADE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY ACTION YET TO INTERDICT SHIPPING GOING TO OR FROM AQABA. WE SAW THAT MAINLY AS A TASK FOR THE AMERICANS OR OTHER WESTERN NAVIES, SINCE OUR EFFORT WAS MAINLY IN THE ARABIAN GULF. THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO TRY TO INTERDICT SUCH SHIPPING. BUT UNTIL SOMETHING WAS DONE, AQABA WOULD REMAIN A MAJOR HOLE IN THE SANCTIONS ARRANGEMENTS. SCOWCROFT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS FULLY SHARED OUR CONCERN. HE HAD JUST COME OFF THE TELEPHONE WITH HUSSEIN WHO HAD ASKED TO COME ACROSS TO THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS AND OTHER PROBLEMS. THE KING HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH INDICATION OF HOW HELPFUL OR OTHERWISE HE WAS GOING TO BE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY A GOOD SIGN THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING. SCOWCROFT SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE AMERICANS IF WE COULD LET THEM HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE PUT TO THE KING.

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD MAKE THIS FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE AMERICANS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SEES THE KING:
- REINFORCEMENT OF POWELL'S REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR WESTERN AND PREFERABLY THE US NAVY TO BLOCK THE HOLE AT AQABA AND THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO STOP THE ISRAELIS GETTING IN ON THIS ACT,
- THE NEED TO GIVE THE KING CLEAR REASSURANCE ABOUT FINANCIAL HELP IF HE IMPLEMENTS UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. OUR THOUGHTS ARE THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT OFFER TO SET UP AND LEAD AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF POTENTIAL DONORS INCLUDING PERHAPS JAPAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. URGENT CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN IN WHITEHALL TO HOW WE MIGHT HELP IF SUCH A GROUP IS SET UP AND WE HOPE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS SHORTLY,
- THE USEFULNESS TO THE KING OF WHATEVER ASSURANCE THE PRESIDENT CAN GIVE THAT THE US WILL NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, ONCE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS BEEN RESOLVED,

4. AS BACKGROUND. THE (UK/US EYES) JIC ASSESSMENT ON JORDAN IS ISSUING TONIGHT (14 AUGUST) AND IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU.
5. POWELL ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST TO SCOWCROFT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID BEING HEAVY-HANDED IN ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF WESTERN NAVIES IN THE GULF. THIS SORT

OF COORDINATION FUNCTIONED BEST IF IT WAS DONE AT AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL, WITHOUT A LARGE POLITICAL FLAG STUCK TO IT. GENERAL SCOWCROFT SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF SENSITIVITIES IN THIS AREA AND WAS GLAD TO HAVE THEM DRAWN TO HIS ATTENTION.

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SIR P CRADDOCK		1
CHIEF ASSESSMENT STAFF		1
(GOBLE)		

PRIME MINISTER

Tom King's office have been on. He is furiously about Alan Clark going to the Gulf, thinks it all wrong and wants to talk to you urgently.

I think it would be a great mistake to change course now. A very large number of people in Whitehall know about the intended visit, a VC10 has been booked and a press announcement prepared. Contact has been made with our embassies in the small Gulf states. We shall look proper charlies if we go into reverse.

Could you please let Monica know what time you would be prepared to speak to Tom King?

Charles Powell

14 August 1990

We spoke about

this

me

022

UNCLASSIFIED

060536
MDADAN 9189

UNCLASSIFIED
FM RIYADH
TO DESKBY 140730Z FCO
TELNO 643
OF 140700Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT

*You will receive
a signature of
this.*

EXFILTRATION FROM KUWAIT

1. VICTOR MALLET FROM THE FINANCIAL TIMES HAS TELEPHONED TO TELL US THAT HE, ACCOMPANIED BY MIKE TREW, SUCCESSFULLY REACHED RIYADH THIS MORNING, HAVING CROSSED THE BORDER LAST NIGHT.
2. WE SHALL BE DEBRIEFING MALLET AND TREW (WHO IS AN EX ARMY OFFICER) LATER TODAY, AND SHALL REPORT FURTHER.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE

30 33

IRAQ/KUWAIT
 PS
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
 PS/PUS
 MR TOMKYS
 MR GORE-BOOTH
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 HD/MED
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 HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
 SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE D10
 (BY TUBE H29)
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
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 MR LS SMITH

HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T1944/90
SUBJECT CC MASTER
OPS

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



faxed to Party CCPC ✓

29/8/90

T

CAP 300

Filed on MIDDLE EAST:
Situation A23

14th August 1990

The Right Honourable Maragaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

I wish to thank you for your recent letter and your expressions of concern for Bahrain. The United Kingdom's continued support and assistance to Bahrain is most welcome and deeply appreciated at the current time.

I am aware that the delegations from both our countries are now engaged in talks regarding the current situation, assessing the threat to Bahrain and giving consideration to what steps can be taken to counter any further Iraqi aggression and to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

The positive response of the United Kingdom in the deployment of aircraft in the region and the strengthening of the Armilla patrol is a most valuable contribution to the international effort. The ships of the Armilla patrol are always welcome in Bahrain and the usual facilities will continue to be available to them. I am also able to confirm that Bahrain is willing, during the current crisis, to make facilities available to the RAF to station aircraft in Bahrain both to defend Bahrain and her neighbour, Saudi Arabia, and also to facilitate the international response to the problem. Bahrain is also making arrangements to increase the facilities available to other friendly countries as part of her contribution to the international effort to resolve the current situation. There will, of course, be the need for all parties to coordinate their activities as the events unfold.

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- 2 -

As you may be aware, my Government has requested the supply of certain military equipment to Bahrain for defensive purposes. I should be grateful if this request can receive urgent and sympathetic consideration.

I would like to thank you again for your confirmation of support for Bahrain and for the response and initiatives taken by the United Kingdom and her allies in trying to resolve the current crisis in this region.

With sincere personal regards,

Isa bin Sulman

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

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SECRET
FM BDS WASHINGTON
TO FLASH MODUK RE
TELNO U7N
OF 140046Z AUGUST 90
AND TO FLASH FCO LONDON

SECRET

Prime Minister

I think we need
to react x a bit

cautiously

COB

Yes

SIC EAO/ZMC/ZOK
FOR DG MKTG, PS/HDES, DG SAP, FROM: HDES
SUBJECT: ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA.
I VISITED HRH PRINCE BANDAR AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON
EARLIER TODAY. BANDAR WAS IN EXCELLENT FORM AND HIGHLY
COMPLIMENTARY AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS
CENTRAL ROLE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN
ASPEN AND IN WASHINGTON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN MUSTERING SUPPORT.
BANDAR OPENED WITH THE ISSUE OF TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH IS
BEING ADDRESSED ELSEWHERE. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED IRAQ
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EFFECT ON SAUDI DEFENCE THINKING. BANDAR ENVISAGES THE
NEED TO BUILD UP DEFENCE FORCES TO 600,000 (HALF RESERVISTS)
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*Continued
CBM
Yes*

X

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OF 140046Z AUGUST 90
AND TO FLASH FCO LONDON

SECRET

Prime Minister

I think we need to react X a bit

Cautiously

CBM

Yes

SIC EAO/ZMC/ZOK
FOR DG MKTG, PS/NDIS, DG S&P, FROM: NDIS
SUBJECT: ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA.
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HD/SECROL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE D10
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

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 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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 RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 2
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copy



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

14th August 1990

Prime Minister

Have they been

Agree Rules of Engagement?

approved by the
A-6 or S-6?

DM

15/8

Dear Charles Provided either agrees

you I approve subject
to the confusion at X or Y below me.

I wrote to you yesterday evening with (inter alia) our proposal for a revised concept of operations for the ARMILLA patrol to include the tasks of monitoring and, if necessary, enforcement of UN sanctions in addition to its existing tasks in support of British shipping and friendly Gulf states. In my letter I said that a complete ROE profile for this concept would be submitted today. The attached profile has been agreed by the COS and by my Secretary of State. The Defence Secretary would be grateful to know that the Prime Minister and other colleagues are content so that appropriate instructions can be issued to the Patrol.

There are three points to which I would draw particular attention. First, the profile permits ARMILLA ships and MPS to conduct surveillance operations (but not interceptions) within the Iranian Advisory Zone (outside Iranian territorial waters). Although the ARMILLA ships already penetrate the IAZ on an occasional basis, it would not be prudent to extend this or to include Nimrod aircraft without the tacit agreement of the Iranians and arrangements have been made to obtain this via their Mission to the UN in New York. Although the initial reaction in New York was relaxed, we will need confirmation before this particular provision can be implemented.

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Finally, as foreshadowed in my previous letter, the proposed ROE would extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30' N (just north of Bahrain) to allow the Patrol to provide support to shipping as far as the Saudi ports of Al Jubayl and Ra's Tammarah.

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



I am sending copies of this letter and attachment to Dominic Asquith (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Jane R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

SECRET UK EYES A

CONFIDENTIAL



[Handwritten signature]

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

*Mr Boyce,
Emergency Unit
work is in hand,
I believe
cc PS/Mr Handejanat
cc Mr Guckian,
RAD*

DAS:JTE 14/vii
14 August 1990

See Dominic.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has again referred to the need for effective counter-propaganda against Iraq. I have explained that the Department are working on putting together material and this needs to be done carefully if it is to have the maximum effect. The Prime Minister hopes very much we can have something ready by the end of the week.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Minister.

(Gave to PM)
From: N J Guckian
Middle East Section
Research & Analysis Dept
OAB 2/65 210 6436

Date: 14 August 1990

Mr Boyce
Emergency Unit

cc
→ PS/Mr Waldegrave

EXAMPLES OF IRAQI BRUTALITY, 1968-1990

1 Mr Powell's letter of 13 August 1990 to PS/Mr Waldegrave requested examples of brutality by Saddam Hussain's regime for use by the Prime Minister. The attached is taken from sources ready to hand and is not drawn from any secret sources. In addition to a general introduction, I include specific examples of brutality over the period since the Ba'ath party came to power in 1968. It is far from exhaustive.

2 I include as examples the execution of Farzad Bazoft and the Swede this year, given that they are still very much in the public memory. However, I share David Hope's view that they should not be used by officials because of the complications it may cause in the case of Mr Richter.

N J Guckian

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Reference.....

Minister

From: N J Guckian
Middle East Section
Research & Analysis Dept
OAB 2/65 210 6436

Date: 14 August 1990

Mr Boyce
Emergency Unit

cc
→ PS/Mr Waldegrave

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N J Guckian

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Page 1

THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME UNDER SADDAM HUSSAIN

Introduction

1 The Ba'ath Party seized power in a military coup in July 1968, and has ruled Iraq ever since. Saddam Hussain became Vice President in 1969 and succeeded President Hassan al-Bakr in 1979, though he had been the real power in Iraq since the mid 1970s.

2 Since 1968 the regime has ruled by fear: it is one of the most repressive in the world. The government, with Saddam Hussain at its head, consists of ruthless men who do not hesitate to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed or have disappeared over the years, most of whom have gone unreported. Iraqi dissidents and exiles have been hunted down and assassinated abroad. The government has subjected its citizens to forced relocation and deportations, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary and political executions almost as a matter of course.

3 Saddam Hussain has set the tone for the system of murder and repression and has personally killed opponents. He surrounds himself in an aura of terror, and over the years he has progressively killed or edged out all possible rivals. Often, this is done under the veil of revolutionary justice. For example, RCC decree No 6 of November 1986 (which is still in force) prescribes the death penalty for the deliberate and public insult of the President, the RCC, the Ba'ath Party and the National Assembly.

Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

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children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

Examples

A) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraqi for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

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H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):
In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.

I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:
Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.

J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988:4-5,000
Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"

K) Saddam Hussain's son, Udai: On 19 October 1988, Udai Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.

L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section
RAD FCO
14 August 1990



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

Prime Minister

14th August 1990

Agree Rules of Engagement?

DM

15/8

Dear Charles

~~attached~~

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Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street





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Yours sincerely,

Jane R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Attachment to letter from Binstead to Powell dated 14 August 1990 (Two copies: 1 original, 1 annotated by PM)</i>	
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

See Dominic.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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BF 11

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL



tw
A: SANCTIONS

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has noted reports that a number of countries are engaged in preparing to break or circumvent sanctions against Iraq.

She welcomes the effective action we have taken in the case of South Africa. The particular problem of Jordan is being discussed separately. She has commented on Hungary's apparent intention to evade sanctions and said that we should find a way to bring this to the attention of the Hungarian authorities. We should not be giving assistance, in this case from the Know-How Fund, to countries which are defaulters on sanctions. She thinks we should also consider an approach to Malaysia.

BF // You no doubt have these points in hand, but I should underline the Prime Minister's personal interest in seeing this followed up.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

The Hon Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

tw

DOMINIC
CAROLINE

IRAQ/KUWAIT

High Intelligence
Staff (of Seowcroft)
PM
PC
FERB
W. Waldegrave
MOD Minister

and no others

There is quite a well-established drill for this week. JIC do a highly-classified morning Sitrep. which takes in all overnight information. It arrives about 1015 and should be faxed down to the Prime Minister. With this, she is unlikely to need any telegrams.

William Waldegrave chairs a coordination meeting at 1100 every day, which is attended by Robin Butler and Percy Cradock among others. There is no need for you to go: but one or other of them will probably touch base before or after. There is a written note of its conclusions in the early afternoon, which is a useful summary of action in hand. I would not send it to the Prime Minister since it might only stimulate interventions: but it is handy for answering/parrying her questions. Any specific requests for authority to do something will reach you in Private Secretary letters from FCO (probably Dominic Asquith this week) or MoD, and should be faxed down.

The situation next week is less clear. The Prime Minister is back on Tuesday, and both the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary are in the country and available. I imagine the Prime Minister will want to chair a meeting to take stock on Tuesday or Thursday (in diary terms a meeting on Wednesday would be difficult). Barring accidents I would go for Thursday, which should carry you through the weekend and Bank Holiday.

I have told the White House of my whereabouts and advised them to contact either of you in an emergency.

On my own front, the papers for the Finnish visit should come in next week. I will process them on return, and do a short speech. I have already done a draft speech for the EDU.

C. D. P.
(C. D. POWELL)

14 August 1990

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SECRET



12(a-b) file

JA

WFE

10 DOWNING STREET - -

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

I spoke to General Scowcroft at lunchtime to convey our concern about the use of the port of Aqaba to evade sanctions against Iraq. We were not aware of any action yet to interdict shipping going to or from Aqaba. We saw that mainly as a task for the Americans or other Western navies, since our effort was mainly in the Arabian Gulf. The worst outcome would be if the Israelis were to try to interdict such shipping. But until something was done, Aqaba would remain a major hole in the sanctions arrangements. General Scowcroft said that the Americans fully shared our concern. Quite by coincidence, he had just come off the telephone with King Hussein who had asked to come across to the United States immediately to talk to the President about this and other problems. He would probably come on Thursday morning. The King had not given much indication of how helpful or otherwise he was going to be, although it was probably a good sign that he had asked for a meeting. General Scowcroft said that it would be very helpful to the Americans if we could let them have any thoughts about what might be put to the King. I said that I would arrange for these to be passed through the Embassy in Washington.

I took the opportunity to suggest to General Scowcroft that it was important to avoid being heavy-handed in attempts to co-ordinate the actions of Western navies in the Gulf. This sort of co-ordination functioned best if it was done at an operational level, without a large political flag stuck on it. General Scowcroft said he had not been aware of sensitivities in this area and was glad to have them drawn to his attention.

I told General Scowcroft that the Prime Minister would find it helpful to have, on a very private basis, some indication of the likely American response to CW attack by the Iraqis should that happen. General Scowcroft said he would like to talk to me about that at some point. I said that I would be away for a few days. He said he would put some thoughts in a message.


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- 2 -

b

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C.D. POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,
Office of the Minister of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



file 10

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

Dear Jane,

BM
Thank you for your letter of 14 August about the problems which have arisen over the Rules of Engagement for our Tornado aircraft in Saudi Arabia. I have shown this to the Prime Minister who is seized of the problem. She understands that every effort will be made to resolve it tomorrow, so that our aircraft can start combat air patrols. If the fact of the present disagreement were to become public, it would be damaging both to us and to the multinational force. I hope you will be able to let us have some recommendations by tomorrow evening.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Miss Jane Binstead,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET UK EYES A

9(a-9) cdf



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

14th August 1990

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

You will want to see
this advice. There should be
a clear recommendation
tomorrow. CAP. 14/8

You asked for advice on the demarche from Prince Bandar,
reported in Washington's telegram 1915, in which he asked for our
air defence Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be brought in line with US
and Saudi Rules.

Following the deployment of Tornado F3 aircraft to Dharam, we
have been attempting to clarify the concept of operations with the
US and Saudi Arabia and, in particular, to establish whether the
ROE agreed for OP GRANBY (attached to Simon Webb's minute of 9
August) were compatible with US and Saudi instructions.

A UK team visited Washington on 10/11 August and, as a result
of its discussions, we were reassured that the UK and US ROE were
broadly similar. In essence, we believed both forces had
instructions to fire on Iraqi combat aircraft only after they had
committed a hostile act or were unmistakably preparing to commit
one. Collateral for this interpretation was given by our liaison
officer with Cinc CENTCOM.

On Sunday evening (12 August) the Air Commander British Forces
Arabian Peninsula, (ACBFAB) advised that the concept of operations
already in place utilised AEW patrols by Saudi and USAF E3(AWACS)
aircraft to identify Iraqi aircraft and control interceptions; and
that this information was then passed to a Saudi Sector Operations
Commander (SOC), who has the authority (if time permits in
consultation with the superior formation in Riyadh) to order or
deny an engagement. AVM Wilson was tasked by the Joint Commander
to advise on both the reliability of E3 identifications and the
criteria for deciding whether an Iraqi aircraft was hostile, in
order to ascertain whether this concept of operations was
acceptable and compatible with the ROE currently in force.
He has now advised that, while the identification arrangements
appear satisfactory, the Saudis would regard any Iraqi aircraft
(military or civilian) which penetrated Saudi airspace by more than
10nm as hostile, regardless of whether it had committed any hostile
act. This is not consistent with our ROE nor with what we had
understood had been approved in Washington, though we are informed

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



that the US are now operating to these Saudi ROE.

If this is so it poses an acute dilemma for us. We are participating in a joint operation at the invitation of the Saudi Government and it is manifestly essential that our ROE are consistent with the US and Saudi forces; and that we operate within the overall arrangement for the co-ordination of the air defence of Saudi Arabia. If the Saudis are indeed operating the system outlined above, there are potential difficulties which need to be resolved in regard to both the position in international law and their prudence. On the former, it is essential that any action can be justified as a necessary and proportionate response to the perceived threat. On the latter, it is vital to avoid any accident or incident which could result in the escalation of tension in the area or provide an excuse for further acts of Iraqi aggression. It is clear, however, that, if we cannot agree to Saudi co-ordination, we could well find ourselves marginalised and not accepted as part of a joint operation: indeed we are at present not being used on combat air patrols.

We sought, as a matter of the greatest urgency, clarification, from both Washington and Riyadh, on the precise nature of the criteria the Saudi SOC will use to order aircraft to engage Iraqi aircraft. It is implicit in the reply from Jedda (Tel No 101) that Iraqi aircraft which intrude into Saudi airspace by more than 10nm will be engaged, but this is being checked.

Meanwhile our further enquiries in Washington have confirmed that the directive issued to the military by the Joint Chiefs of Staff allows the E3 AWACS only to designate an aircraft as potentially hostile and that the fighter pilot must confirm for himself that it has committed or is about to commit a hostile act before he may open fire (the criteria for "hostile act" being similar to our own).

There therefore appears to be a divergence between the directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the rules being applied in theatre. The US authorities have undertaken to clarify the situation and inform us of the outcome. Once this has been done we will be in a position to submit advice about UK Rules of Engagement and recommend the terms of a response from the Prime Minister to Prince Bandar.

C



I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department) who may wish to comment, and also to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

SECRET

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SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 132330Z FCO
TELNO 1915
OF 132225Z AUGUST 90
AND TO DESKBY 132330Z MODUK
AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, ACTOR

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, PRINCE BANDAR, ASKED ME TODAY (13 AUGUST) TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. BANDAR SAID THAT A PROBLEM HAD ARISEN REGARDING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROES) FOR THE BRITISH TORNADOES IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI AIR FORCES WERE OPERATING UNDER COMMON ROES WHICH ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT WHEN RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH A HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. BRITISH RULES ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT ONLY WHEN VISUAL CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE SAUDIS CONSIDERED THAT THIS LACK OF STANDARDISATION IN THE ROES COULD GIVE RISE TO OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES AND POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT. THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE SENIOR BRITISH AIR FORCE OFFICER IN SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE RULES COULD BE CHANGED, IF AT ALL, ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH CABINET. PRINCE BANDAR THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SAUDI RECOMMENDATION THAT THE BRITISH ROES SHOULD BE CHANGED TO STANDARDISE THEM WITH THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI RULES.

COMMENT

3. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PARA 7 OF RIYADH TELNO 634 WHICH PUTS A RATHER DIFFERENT SLANT ON SAUDI ATTITUDES TO ROES. BUT BANDAR IS USUALLY WELL INFORMED AND UNLIKELY TO BE BEHIND THE GAME. IT MAY BE THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE HAS OVERCOME SAUDI RELUCTANCE. BUT IF PRINCE BANDAR IS RIGHT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE HERE THAT UK VIEWS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE LEADING PROVIDER OF AIR DEFENCE AND THE REQUEST (HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY ARRIVED AT) OF THE HOST NATION.

MEYER

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FM JEDDA
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 101
OF 140800Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH RIYADH, MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (BDS)

SIC AAA/ZAC/I9M

MODUK PSE PASS TO JFHQ HIGH WYCOMBE
RIYADH FOR FORCE COMMANDER
WASHINGTON FOR BDS

FROM AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA

YOUR TELNO 427 TO RIYADH: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

1. I SUSPECT TUR WAS SENT BEFORE AVM WILSON SENT HIS SIGNAL 132000Z TO JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE LAST NIGHT. I DISCUSSED MISMATCH WITH AVM WILSON LAST NIGHT HE HAD EXPLORED WITH US COMMAND AND RSAF. HAVING AT LAST SEEN TEXT OF US/SAUDI ROE WILSON APPEARED REASSURED THAT THEY DID HAVE SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS TO ACHIEVE PROPER VERIFICATION OF HOSTILE AIR TARGETS AND SO AVOID MISTAKEN ENGAGEMENT. COMBAT AREA IS CLOSED TO CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC (AIR ROUTES REROUTED). WILSON ALSO ARRANGED FOR RAF OFFICER TO BE PRESENT IN SAUDI GROUND ADOC DURING RAF PATROLS(CAPS), AND ASCERTAINED THAT BOTH US AND SAUDI AWACS FLIGHTS WILL HAVE US PERSONNEL ON BOARD. WILSON DESCRIBED US ROE AS VERY SPECIFIC, AND INVOLVING SOUND ARRANGEMENTS TO CROSS CHECK POTENTIAL TARGETS. HE ALSO REGARDED 10 MILE BUFFER ZONE AS SUFFICIENT TO CATER FOR IRAQI PROVOCATIVE PROBES. AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN OVER 10 MILES INSIDE SAUDI AIRSPACE WOULD FALL ON SAUDI TERRITORY (AN IMPORTANT POINT).
2. WILSON HAS ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED WE ACCEPT US/SAUDI ROE. MOREOVER UNTIL WE DO, AMERICANS/SAUDIS REFUSE TO USE F3 ON CAPS. BOTH FORCE COMMANDER AND AM STUART PAUL SAY IT IS OPERATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN E 3 AWACS CREW TO CONTROL ENGAGEMENTS USING TWO SETS OF ROE SIMULANEOUSLY.
3. WE NOW HAVE SITUATION IN EFFECT GROUNDED UNTIL COMMON ROE ARE WORKED OUT. NOT ONLY DOES THIS VITIATE OUR AIR DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AT A TIME WHEN IT IS MUCH NEEDED ON CAP, BUT IT ALREADY CALLS IN QUESTION WITH SAUDI MILITARY REALITY OF OUR

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COMMITMENT TO COME TO THEIR AID. OUR CAUTION WILL VERY QUICKLY UNDERMINE POLITICAL IMPACT OF OUR SWIFT CONTRIBUTION, AND RISKS OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RSAF. THEIR CONCERN AND RESENTMENT WILL RISE QUICKLY TO SULTAN AND THE KING (IT MAY ALREADY HAVE DONE SO, AS GENERAL TURKI WARNED WILSON LAST EVENING,) NEGATIVE EFFECTS I NEED NOT SPELL OUT.

4. IN LIGHT OF AVM WILSON'S VIEW THAT US/SAUDI ROE HAVE SOLID SAFEGUARDS, AND GIVEN POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS IMPLICATIONS ONCE SAUDIS PERCIEVE US AS NOT FULLY ALONGSIDE AMERICANS AND THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME OF DANGER, I URGE MOST STRONGLY IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE OF ROE ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY STAND. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO SIT ON THE GROUND.

5. AVM WILSON AGREES TO LOGDING WITH UN, AND ASKS THIS TO BE PURSUED BY WASHINGTON.

DUGGAN

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM ROME
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELNO U/N
OF 141300Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

SIC I9M

SUBJECT IS ITALIAN RESPONSE TO GULF CRISIS

FROM ADA

AGENCY PRESS RELEASE REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING CABINET DECISION EARLY PM TODAY TWO LUPO CLASS FRIGATES PLUS THE SUPPORT SHIP STROMBOLI ARE TO SAIL FORTHWITH TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO JOIN FRIENDLY NAVAL FORCES ALREADY IN THE AREA. THEIR MISSION COULD BE EXTENDED TO THE GULF AREA FOLLOWING DECISIONS THAT MAY BE TAKEN AT WEU CONFERENCE 21 AUG. THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS COULD BE PUT TO BOTH HOUSES OF A RECALLED ITALIAN PARLIAMENT ON EITHER 22 OR 23 AUG.

WOOD

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SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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8(A-E)

SECRET

DEDIP

FROM AMMAN

TO FLASH FOO

TELNO 415

OF 140800Z AUGUST 93

FOR HEAD NENAD

YOUR TELNO 269

POLITICAL SITUATION IN JORDAN

SUMMARY

1. THE KING'S PRESENT ATTEMPT TO BALANCE SUPPORT FOR SADDAM AGAINST HIS UN OBLIGATIONS IS NOT SUSTAINABLE FOR VERY LONG. IF THE CRISIS CONTINUES, HE WILL PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS TO APPLY SANCTIONS MORE FULLY THAN AT PRESENT. HE CAN PROBABLY DO THIS WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO HIS OWN POSITION. BUT HE WILL SEEK TO AVOID A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT AND, MOST IMPORTANT, HE WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. THE KING IS AT PRESENT ATTEMPTING A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN TACIT SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER. IN PRACTICE THIS WOULD MEAN APPLYING SOME SANCTIONS WHILE EVADING OTHERS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HOPES TO KEEP HIS LINKS WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN OPEN, AND THIS HE WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE AN ARAB SOLUTION AND TO WARN AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IF THIS BALANCING ACT WERE TO SUCCEED, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HARNESS AND CONTROL THE WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT HERE FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN. IN THAT CASE, HIS OWN POSITION WOULD REMAIN SECURE; BUT THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY WOULD CONTINUE TO DECLINE; THE KING'S LINKS WITH THE WEST WOULD BE WEAKENED; AND IF SANCTIONS BREACHES WERE APPARENT, HE WOULD PRESUMABLY FAIL TO SECURE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE UN.

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3. I SEE THIS STRATEGY AS ONLY SUSTAINABLE OVER A VERY SHORT PERIOD. THE LONGER THE CRISIS CONTINUES, THE MORE PRESSURE THE KING WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT FROM THE WEST TO COMPLY FULLY WITH SANCTIONS (AND I ASSUME THAT SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS WOULD BE OFFERED TO ACHIEVE THIS). IF SADDAM REMAINS ISOLATED, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN APPEARING TO PROLONG HIS SURVIVAL WILL BE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS FOR JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, NOT TO MENTION THE WEST.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE KING THAT HE WILL FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTIONS WOULD PRESENT AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HOW SERIOUS THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE. MY OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE KING COULD PROBABLY GET AWAY WITH IT, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS LEFT WITH NO CHOICE. BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO MATCH SUCH A STATEMENT WITH MORE ANTI-WESTERN AND PRO-SADDAM RHETORIC. THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. THE REACTION OF SADDAM HIMSELF IS AN IMponderable. IN THE WORST CASE, HE MIGHT SEEK TO INCITE A POPULAR UPRISING.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, I BELIEVE THAT THE KING WILL TRY TO DUCK ANY FORM OF PUBLIC POSITION ON SANCTIONS. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES THAT THE CRISIS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE BEYOND A FEW WEEKS, HE WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT THAT JORDAN HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO APPLY SANCTIONS MORE FULLY. I SUSPECT THAT HE MAY ALREADY BE REACHING THIS POSITION. THIS WILL ENABLE HIM TO TAP WESTERN (AND POSSIBLY ARAB) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO SHORE-UP JORDAN (AND WOULD BE, EVEN IF SANCTIONS WERE NOT APPLIED). HE WILL NO DOUBT SEEK TO STAY ON TERMS WITH SADDAM AND THE PRICE FOR THIS MAY WELL BE ATTEMPTS TO BREACH SANCTIONS SECRETLY. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY AS THE IMPLICATIONS OF SANCTIONS BECOME CLEARER - BOTH THEIR EFFECTS ON JORDANIANS AND THE CONTRIBUTION THEY WOULD MAKE TO UNDERMINING SADDAM'S POSITION. BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE KING COULD MANAGE THIS ASPECT, PARTICULARLY IF HE CONTINUES IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO ADVOCATE AN ARAB SOLUTION AND TO CRITICISE WESTERN INVOLVEMENT.

6. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT WE WILL NEED TO MOUNT SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON THE KING TO PERSUADE HIM THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE

● FULLY IMPLEMENTED (AND TO MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF BREACHES). I BELIEVE THAT HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO DO THIS, AND THAT HE CAN DO SO WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO HIS POSITION. BUT WE SHALL HAVE TO EXPECT THAT HE WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESENT PUBLIC LINE (FUZZY ON SANCTIONS, CRITICAL OF THE WEST). AND MOST IMPORTANT, HE WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS. VAGUE PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE WILL ACHIEVE NOTHING. WE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

7. THERE ARE RISKS TO THE KING'S POSITION, AND TO THE HASHEMITE LINE, WHICHEVER WAY HE JUMPS. IF HE WERE OVERTHROWN, I ASSUME THAT ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF IT DID NOT THROW IN ITS LOT COMPLETELY WITH SADDAM AT THE OUTSET, WOULD TRY TO GIVE HIM FULL SUPPORT. I WOULD EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL.

8. I SET OUT BELOW TWO BALANCE SHEETS FROM THE JORDANIAN POINT OF VIEW: THE FIRST, IF JORDAN APPLIES SANCTIONS; AND THE SECOND, IF JORDAN REFUSES TO DO SO. THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY FAR FROM COMPREHENSIVE AND BEG MANY QUESTIONS. BUT THEY MAY BE USEFUL AS A QUARRY.

9. JORDAN APPLIES SANCTIONS

A. CREDIT

(I) JORDAN CAN EXPECT TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH GCC STATES, EGYPT, SYRIA, WESTERN STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION.

(II) AID WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO HELP JORDAN SURVIVE AND LONG. THIS MIGHT LEAD ON TO AN ESTABLISHED AID FRAMEWORK POST-CRISIS.

(III) JORDAN'S EXTERNAL MARKETS MAY BE DIVERSIFIED WITH CORRESPONDING LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS AS THE ECONOMY IS WEANED FROM HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON IRAQ.

(IV) (CONCEIVABLY); ONCE THE CRISIS IS OVER, THE US MIGHT BE MORE READY TO TACKLE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM MORE FORCEFULLY.

B. DEBIT

- (I) SEVERE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION DESPITE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE.
- (II) THE GOVERNMENT MUST DEAL WITH PUBLIC UNREST WHICH MAY REQUIRE SUPPRESSION.
- (III) IF SO, THIS COULD SIGNAL THE END OF JORDAN'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT.
- (IV) IRAQI RETALIATION OR PRESSURE WHICH COULD BE UNPREDICTABLE. IRAQI MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD LIKELY BE SEEN BY THE ISRAELIS AS A DIRECT THREAT TO ISRAELI DEFENCE INTERESTS.
- (V) SADDAM MAY REFUSE TO ALLOW EXPATRIATES TO MOVE FROM KUWAIT OF IRAQ TO JORDAN.

10. JORDAN DOES NOT APPLY SANCTIONS

A. CREDIT

- (I) CONTINUING STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE KING.
- (II) JORDAN DOES NOT ATTRACT IRAQI THREATS OR RETALIATION.
- (III) KING MIGHT HAVE LEVERAGE TO PERSUADE SADDAM TO RELEASE FOREIGN NATIONALS TO JORDAN.

B. DEBIT

- (I) FURTHER DETERIORATION IN JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH GCC, EGYPT, WESTERN STATES, AND PROBABLY SYRIA.
- (II) NO EXTERNAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT.
- (III) ECONOMIC DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF TRANSIT TRADE AS SANCTIONS BITE.
- (IV) THE RISK OF INCURRING SANCTIONS ITSELF AS A SANCTIONS BUSTER WITH FURTHER ECONOMIC DAMAGE.

(V) THE DANGER THAT ISRAEL WOULD REGARD JORDAN'S CLOSER ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ AS POTENTIALLY THREATENING AND TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION, EITHER BY BLOCKADING AQABA OR DIRECTLY AGAINST JORDAN.

(VI) IF SADDAM IS OVERTHROWN, ALMOST TOTAL ISOLATION IN ARAB WORLD AND LOSS OF TRADE AND OTHER LINKS WITH IRAQ, AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD.

REEVE

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DEP. HD/PUSD

PS

PS/Mr Waldegrave

PS/PUS

Mr Tomkys

Mr Goulden

Mr Miles

Mr Berman

PS/No 10 - Downing St.

Chief Assessment Staff - Cabinet Office.

Sir P. Gadock - No 10 D. St.

CONFIDENTIAL

KW



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TKM

10 DOWNING STREET - -

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESS POOLS

At Mr Waldegrave's meeting this morning, it was agreed to ask the Prime Minister whether she would accept occasional small press pools being organised for visits to our Forces in the Gulf.

I have subsequently spoken to the Prime Minister on this point. She is prepared to agree provided they are under strict control (better control than during the Falklands war, the Prime Minister has commented). On no account should there be any discussion with them of Rules of Engagement or other operational matters.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead and David Hatcher (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT



The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telegram no. 371, reporting the slur carried by the BBC World Service. She is incensed by this and hopes that the Foreign Secretary of Mr. Waldegrave will take it up at the highest level with the BBC and insist upon a public apology.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

The Honourable Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3076</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <u>Telex Telegram to MOD</u> <u>(un-numbered)</u> <u>14/8/90</u>	
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060463
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FM KUWAIT
TO DESKBY 140645Z FCO
TELNO 371
OF 140555Z AUGUST 1990

ADVANCE COPY

Disgraceful
Ch

The F.C. Sec must take this as well when I have a public apology mt

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT.

KUWAIT/ IRAQ

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE BBC WORLD SERVICE CARRIED AT LEAST TWICE YESTERDAY (AT 1200Z AND 1500Z) "EYE WITNESS" REPORTS THAT BOTH THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN EMBASSIES WERE WITHOUT "KEY PERSONNEL" AT THE TIME OF THE IRAQI INVASION, AND THAT THOSE ACTUALLY HERE HAD FLED BEFORE THE IRAQI HORDES.

2. I APPRECIATE THAT THE BBC IS INDEPENDENT, BUT AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE BOTH STATEMENTS ARE BOTH MALICIOUS AND TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. I CAN ONLY ASSUME BLACKLEY IS THE SOURCE OF THE STORY EXCLAM.

WESTON

YYYY

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- The F.C. Sec must take their words with them & have a public apology
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

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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OF 141430Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, MODUK, CINCFLEET, SNOOME, RNLO GULF DUBAI

SIC I9M

RIYADH PASS TO AIR VICE MARSHALL S WILSON (ADC)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAHRAIN

Prime Minister
Alan Clark will
report further after
his visit. If he confirms
the Bahraini view, we
shall
have
to
find some
more

SUMMARY

1. AMIR AND CROWN PRINCE INSISTENT THAT BRITAIN SHOULD MAKE
SOME DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN. NO REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE. WELCOME FOR BLOCKADE. NO BAHRAINI DEPLOYMENT TO
ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA. EXPECTATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN
WILL BE DISLODGED BY US MILITARY ACTION.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE AMIR AND (WITH FOF2, CO YORK AND LEADER BMAT)
THE CROWN PRINCE TODAY. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THEIR VIEWS
ON THE NEED FOR MORE UK HELP TO BAHRAIN AND MY ATTEMPTS TO
DAMPEN EXPECTATIONS (MY U/N 141350Z AUG TO MOD).

aircraft.
CBA
14/8

3. THE AMIR DID NOT GIVE ME THE EXPECTED REPLY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE THANKED ME FOR IT BUT, AS THERE IS NO
CURRENT UK DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN, HE CLEARLY FELT HE HAD
NOTHING TO SAY IN WRITING. I EXPLAINED WHY I THOUGHT OMAN HAD
BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE JAGUARS AND STRESSED THAT BOTH RAF AND RN
DEPLOYMENTS WERE FOR THE DEFENCE OF BAHRAIN AS OF OTHER FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES. THAT CUT NO ICE.

4. THE AMIR MADE THE FOLLOWING OTHER POINTS:

(A) HE WELCOMED OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE BLOCKADE OF IRAQ BUT
ASKED WHAT FORCE THERE WAS IN THE CLAIM THAT IT WAS ILLEGAL.
I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE KUWAITIS AND THAT WAS
ENOUGH.

(B) HE WAS SURE, THOUGH HAD NOT BEEN TOLD, THAT THE US WOULD FIND A PRETEXT TO MOUNT AN OPERATION AGAINST THE IRAQIS IN KUWAIT AS SOON AS THEIR FORCES WERE READY. I STRESSED THAT UK DEPLOYMENTS WERE PURELY DEFENSIVE.

(C) BAHRAIN DID NOT (NOT) INTEND TO SEND TROOPS TO THE ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA BEYOND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE PENINSULAR SHIELD.

(D) HE HOPED NO MORE BRITONS WOULD LEAVE: I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THOSE WHO INTENDED TO GO HAD GONE.

5. THE CROWN PRINCE ALSO EXPECTED SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE FORCED OUT OF KUWAIT BY MILITARY ACTION. I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE ARAB FORCE: HE SNORTED - OF COURSE NOT, BY THE AMERICANS. HE WELCOMED UK DEPLOYMENTS. THE AMERICANS NEEDED THAT, BOTH AS SUPPORT AND TO KEEP THEM IN CHECK. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONFLICT. WHAT SORT OF IRAQ WOULD THERE BE? IT MIGHT DISINTEGRATE. I SAID THAT A STABLE STRONG IRAQ UNDER MODERATE LEADERSHIP WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A DESTABILISING DISINTEGRATION. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT THE GCC WOULD NEED TO TAKE ITS DEFENCE MORE SERIOUSLY IN FUTURE AND WOULD BE LOOKING FOR FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES: THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES IN FUTURE TO BE PUT OFF BY THE NOISES OF THE RADICALS. HE (LIKE THE AMIR) LAMENTED KING HUSSEIN'S TOTAL LOSS OF GRIP, SYMBOLISED BY HIS USE OF THE TITLE SHERIF, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RISK INHERENT IN THE POTENTIAL COLLAPSE OF JORDAN.

SHEPHERD

YYYY

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PAGE 2

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062313
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FM KUWAIT
TO DESKBY 141715Z FCO
TELNO 380
OF 141620Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ACTOR, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT

MY TELNO 364: CROSKERY

1. MY CONSUL HAS SPENT THE WHOLE DAY IN ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO LOCATE MR CROSKERY'S BODY.
2. THE IRAQI MILITARY AUTHORITIES GAVE US FULL COOPERATION AND PROVIDED AN ESCORT AT LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEVEL (EX SANDHURST /CAMBERLY STAFF COLLEGE) THROUGHOUT THE SEARCH. A LARGE AREA AROUND A POINT 2 KMS NE OF RUGI WAS QUARTERED BUT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF A BODY OR EVIDENCE OF A SHOOTING. IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED AT AL SALMI CLAIMED THEY HAD NOT FIRED ANY SHOTS IN RECENT DAYS, NOR HAD THEY HEARD THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE.
3. WHILE THERE IS NO WAY OF TELLING WHETHER THE IRAQIS ARE PLAYING STRAIGHT, I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT I CAN SEE LITTLE FURTHER ACTION WE CAN TAKE.

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
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SIR P CRADOCK,



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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 2
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KW



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

BF // This is to confirm that the proposed message from the Prime Minister to President Mubarak can issue, as we informed the Emergency Unit last night.

CHARLES POWELL

The Hon. Dominic Asquith
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

K

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FLLF

kw

ce PC
T Perks.

10 DOWNING STREET

or Hatcher

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

MINISTER (DP)'S VISIT TO THE GULF

I have had a further word with the Prime Minister this morning about Mr Clark's visit to the Gulf. On the understanding that he is departing tomorrow 15 August, she agrees that it would be appropriate to use a VC10, although she hopes that advantage will be taken of the flight to ferry out others required in the Gulf and/or supplies.

The Prime Minister would wish Mr Clark to give her warm personal regards to each of the Rulers whom he meets and to underline Britain's support for them. He might usefully point out the speed and effectiveness of our military response to the Gulf conflict compared with the slower and more distant French response. He should not make any specific commitments about further British forces, but should report back with any requests. The Prime Minister assumes that the FCO will provide political briefing.

We would be ready to announce Mr Clark's visit from No 10 as soon as we have agreement of the Governments concerned. I attach a draft of the sort of statement we would intend to make. I should be grateful if you could give any comments to Terry Perks in the No 10 Press Office. I understand that Mr. Clark does not intend to take press on the aircraft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

David Hatcher Esq
Ministry of Defence

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At the request of the Prime Minister, the Honourable Alan Clark, M.P., Minister of State (Defence Procurement), will visit Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE from 15-17 August.

During his visits, Mr Clark will meet members of the Ruling Families and Ministers to discuss developments in the region following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Background

The precise itinerary is:

Bahrain - August

Qatar - August

Abu Dhabi - August

Dubai - August



THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT

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FROM THE MINISTER FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 0AA

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 01-276 3000

My Ref:

Your Ref:

COP
12/8

14th August 1990

Dear William,

AVIATION SECURITY

The Department of Transport is actively pursuing various aviation and shipping questions in relation to the crisis in the Gulf: this letter is to inform you and our colleagues of our actions on aviation security. The position has taken account of the assessment of the threat prepared by the Security Services on 9th August and subsequent events.

The threat to British airline operations outside the United Kingdom has increased, in particular in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region. The security of civil aviation is a host state responsibility, and at the request of this Department the FCO has asked British posts to consult the appropriate authorities in foreign states to convey to them our perception of an increased threat, and to invite them to ensure the security of British airline operations. We have informed British airlines of this and have asked them to review the security arrangements they are afforded overseas and to bring to the attention of this Department any major difficulties which cannot be resolved locally.

British airlines (including Cathay Pacific) have been reminded about the procedures they should adopt when operating in the vicinity of warships. These procedures were developed during hostilities in the Gulf in 1988. The Ministry of Defence have been asked to remind the Royal Navy about the procedures, and the FCO have been invited to ask posts in Gulf states to bring them to the attention of the Commanders of foreign naval units in the area. The US Navy will be very sensitive to aircraft movements in the vicinity of their ships and our instructions are consistent with their procedures.

The routing of aircraft in the Gulf area is already affected by the closure of Iraq and Kuwait airspace. Routing civil aircraft clear of areas of conflict will be undertaken by the appropriate air traffic control authorities in the area, and

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British airlines (primarily British Airways) are alert to the situation. The question of developing advice to airlines in response to changes in the situation is being addressed by this Department and the FCO: the FCO has been invited to communicate directly with the National Air Traffic Control Services in order that they may relay timely advice to airlines.

The threat to Civil Aviation interests in the UK is assessed low. The Department is sensitive to the Security of US airline operations in the UK, but considers that the enhanced measures in place to meet the longstanding threat are sufficient. The Department will monitor the security of British airlines operating in the UK, and also aircraft of Australia and France and other airlines of countries which have committed forces in the Gulf.

The United States Federal Aviation Authority have not issued any specific instructions or advice to United States airlines since the crisis in the Gulf developed. The FAA have merely relayed to US airlines "travel advisory" notices which the US State Department has issued for the guidance to US citizens.

The security of aviation will be kept under constant review.
/ I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Major, John Wakeham, David Waddington, Peter Lilley, Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

*How's over
Roger*

ROGER FREEMAN

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

Prime Minister

14 August 1990

Mr Waldegrave will hold a press conference with the Arab press tomorrow to put the case in terms they can understand & but in view of X below he will go easy
In Charles, no personal attacks on Saddam Hussein.

You asked in your letter of 13 August to my Private Secretary about material for propaganda against Saddam Hussein. This is, of course, not difficult to come by and the press has been full of horror stories both from the past and from the present. I attach a list of some of the best known horrors going back to 1959.

There is a problem about this approach, however. The more the Government trumpets Saddam's atrocities, the more the question comes up, why did you go on doing business with him for so long? (We, like the Americans, kept credit lines open throughout the Iran/Iraq war, for example.) What is more we now have a large number of potential hostages to add to the unfortunate Ian Richter who is still in jail in Baghdad. My own view is that there is really no need for the Government to feed the flames of anti-Saddam feeling because they are blazing merrily away in any case. I do not think that propaganda in this country is really the issue; it is winning the battle in the Arab states which is important and that is a much more complex issue. They do not doubt Saddam's ruthlessness; that is probably partly why the radicals respect him.

The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Charles Powell Esq
No.10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME UNDER SADDAM HUSSAIN

Introduction

1 The Ba'ath Party seized power in a military coup in July 1968, and has ruled Iraq ever since. Saddam Hussain became Vice President in 1969 and succeeded President Hassan al-Bakr in 1979, though he had been the real power in Iraq since the mid 1970s.

2 Since 1968 the regime has ruled by fear: it is one of the most repressive in the world. The government, with Saddam Hussain at its head, consists of ruthless men who do not hesitate to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed or have disappeared over the years, most of whom have gone unreported. Iraqi dissidents and exiles have been hunted down and assassinated abroad. The government has subjected its citizens to forced relocation and deportations, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary and political executions almost as a matter of course.

3 Saddam Hussain has set the tone for the system of murder and repression and has personally killed opponents. He surrounds himself in an aura of terror, and over the years he has progressively killed or edged out all possible rivals. Often, this is done under the veil of revolutionary justice. For example, RCC decree No 6 of November 1986 (which is still in force) prescribes the death penalty for the deliberate and public insult of the President, the RCC, the Ba'ath Party and the National Assembly.

Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

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children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

ExamplesA) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraqi for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

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- H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):
In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.
- I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:
Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.
- J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988:4-5,000
Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"
- K) Saddam Hussain's son, Udai: On 19 October 1988, Udai Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.
- L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section
RAD FCO
14 August 1990

WJG



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

Prime Minister

14 August 1990

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Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

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children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

Examples

A) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraqi for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

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H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):
In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.

I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:
Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.

J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988:4-5,000
Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"

K) Saddam Hussain's son, Udai: On 19 October 1988, Udai Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.

L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section
RAD FCO
14 August 1990

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister is concerned to see that some of the smaller Gulf States feel that we have not been sufficiently attentive to their security needs and concerns in the present crisis, and are disappointed that we have decided to put our main military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman in preference to them. She has also noted the intense diplomatic activity being conducted by the French Government in sending emissaries of Ministerial level around the world and in particular through the Gulf to explain what France is doing and to offer help. In the light of this, she thinks that a Minister should travel immediately out to the Gulf to convey reassurance to the smaller states, explain the measures we are taking and offer to meet any particular needs. The states in question are Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar. At the same time we should try to arrange for early rotation of some of our military aircraft through Bahrain and possibly the UAE to give visible evidence of our presence, in addition to the visit of HMS York to Bahrain. The Prime Minister would not want to see the present crisis erode our traditionally strong position in these states.

The Prime Minister is aware that both the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary have it in mind to visit the area and our forces at the end of the month or in early September. She sees the present need as more limited and more urgent: an immediate demonstration of our support and concern. There would be no need to take in Oman and Saudi Arabia or visit our own forces at this stage. Forty-eight hours should be sufficient.

The Prime Minister assumes that it would be impossible for you to get away since you are coordinating the Government's response to the present crisis. She would hope that a Defence

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

- 2 -

Minister could make a visit later this week, perhaps as early as tomorrow. I understand that Minister (DP) is on call.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead and Julian Scopes (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

The Hon William Waldegrave MP

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telex Washington to MOD</i> <i>13/8/90</i>	
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OF 132225Z AUGUST 90
AND TO DESKBY 132330Z MODUK
AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, ACTOR

SECRET

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*We discussed
If Commodore Wilson is
satisfied with
US rules of engagement
and then
Prime Minister agree the
proposed
change
I am discussing
with MOD e will let you
have a
recommendation*

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, PRINCE BANDAR, ASKED ME TODAY (13 AUGUST) TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. BANDAR SAID THAT A PROBLEM HAD ARISEN REGARDING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROES) FOR THE BRITISH TORNADOES IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI AIR FORCES WERE OPERATING UNDER COMMON ROES WHICH ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT WHEN RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH A HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. BRITISH RULES ALLOWED ENGAGEMENT ONLY WHEN VISUAL CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE SAUDIS CONSIDERED THAT THIS LACK OF STANDARDISATION IN THE ROES COULD GIVE RISE TO OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES AND POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT. THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE SENIOR BRITISH AIR FORCE OFFICER IN SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE RULES COULD BE CHANGED, IF AT ALL, ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH CABINET. PRINCE BANDAR THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SAUDI RECOMMENDATION THAT THE BRITISH ROES SHOULD BE CHANGED TO STANDARDISE THEM WITH THE AMERICAN AND SAUDI RULES.

COMMENT

3. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PARA 7 OF RIYADH TELNO 634 WHICH PUTS A RATHER DIFFERENT SLANT ON SAUDI ATTITUDES TO ROES. BUT BANDAR IS USUALLY WELL INFORMED AND UNLIKELY TO BE BEHIND THE GAME. IT MAY BE THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE HAS OVERCOME SAUDI RELUCTANCE. BUT IF PRINCE BANDAR IS RIGHT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE HERE THAT UK VIEWS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE LEADING PROVIDER OF AIR DEFENCE AND THE REQUEST (HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY ARRIVED AT) OF THE HOST NATION.

MEYER

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13/8

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CONFIDENTIAL FROM RIYADH

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MDADAN 9060

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL *T192A190* ~~ADVANCE COPY~~

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM RIYADH
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 637

OF 131255Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

The Kuwaiti request. We have announced that we now have the legal basis to justify interdiction of shipping.

MIPT: YOUR TELNO 415 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1908:

IRAQ/ KUWAIT

KUWAITI REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

FROM: STATE OF KUWAIT
— AMIRI DIWAN

TO: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER
— PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
LONDON

*CD?
13/8*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I AM WRITING TO EXPRESS THE GRATIFICATION OF MY GOVERNMENT WITH THE DETERMINED ACTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER NATIONS HAVE TAKEN AND ARE UNDERTAKING AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT TO DEAL WITH IRAQI AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE EFFORTS BE CARRIED FORWARD AND THAT THE DECISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BE FULLY AND PROMPTLY ENFORCED. I THEREFORE REQUEST ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT AND IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENCE AS RECOGNISED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TAKE SUCH MILITARY OR OTHER STEPS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO FULLY RESTORE OUR RIGHTS ARE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED.

AMIR OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

JABEL AL AHMAD AL SABAH

MUNRO

CONFIDENTIAL FROM RIYADH

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MDADAN 9060

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
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

IRAQ/KUWAIT
 PS
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
 PS/PUS
 MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE BOOTH~~
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 HD/MED
 HD/NENAD
 HD/NAD
 HD/EED
 HD/SOVIET D
 HD/SED
 HD/UND
 HD/ACDD
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD
 HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE D10
 (BY TUBE H29)
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
 EMERGENCY UNIT
 RESIDENT CLERK

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A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Undated, unsigned document</i> <i>"South Africa: Oil imports from Iraq"</i>	
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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

It is apparent that some of the smaller Gulf States are a bit miffed that we have decided to put our military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman, and none into them. This applies particularly to Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, both of whom have spoken in this sense. Abu Dhabi has also pointed out that we have not sent any emissaries to explain things and reassure them, while the French have already had someone out from Paris to do the rounds (probably selling arms I should think).

I think it would be a good idea for us to get someone out there pretty swiftly. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary intend to go at the end of the month/early September, but I am sure we cannot wait that long. William Waldegrave cannot really be spared at present, as he is acting as Minister in Charge here. The obvious candidate for a quick trip to see our forces and to call on the Bahrainis and UAE would be Archie Hamilton. Agree that we should try to interest him in this mission?

C.D.P.

Yes ^{OK} not him to go. If need be surely we can

send another question of Torres
no

C. D. POWELL

13 August 1990

C:\wpdocs\foreign\iraq (pmm)

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

It is apparent that some of the smaller Gulf States are a bit miffed that we have decided to put our military assets into Saudi Arabia and Oman, and none into them. This applies particularly to Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, both of whom have spoken in this sense. Abu Dhabi has also pointed out that we have not sent any emissaries to explain things and reassure them, while the French have already had someone out from Paris to do the rounds (probably selling arms I should think).

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C. D. P.

C. D. POWELL

13 August 1990

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FM AMMAN
TO DESKBY 131630Z FCO
TELNO 414
OF 131420Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BANK OF ENGLAND, TREASURY, DTI, MODUK, UKDEL IBRD
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR, CABINET OFFICE
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT

SIC

JORDAN AND SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR OF CENTRAL BANK AND WITH MINISTER OF FINANCE. THE LATTER MAKES CLEAR THAT, APART FROM EXPORT LICENCES TO IRAQ, SANCTIONS ARE NOT YET BEING APPLIED AND THAT JORDAN CANNOT APPLY THEM WITHOUT GUARANTEES OF COMPENSATION.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED TODAY (13 AUGUST) ON THE GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK AND ON THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. MIFT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS (AND COSTINGS) WHICH JORDAN WILL FACE IN APPLYING SANCTIONS.

3. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED US OF THEIR INTENTION TO APPLY SANCTIONS, NOTHING IN PRACTICE HAS YET BEEN DONE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CANCELLING EXPORT LICENCES TO IRAQ, TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION. JARANEH SPELT OUT THE SITUATION VERY CLEARLY. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A MANAGEABLE CRISIS FOR JORDAN. UNLESS JORDAN RECEIVED COMPENSATION, THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS WOULD BRING THE COUNTRY TO ITS KNEES WITHIN 3 MONTHS. AN ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY OF OIL ALONE WOULD COST DOLLARS 600 M PER YEAR. THE TOTAL COST OF SANCTIONS TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WOULD BE AT LEAST DOLLARS 1BN. UNLESS COMPENSATION COULD BE GUARANTEED, HE, AS FINANCE MINISTER, WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE HIS HIS GOVERNMENT THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT APPLY THE SANCTIONS.

4. I POINTED OUT TO JARDAEH THAT THE DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AND NOTIFIED TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, HE REPLIED APART FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXPORT LICENCES, THE COUNTRY

CONTINUED TO FUNCTION AS USUAL: IT HAD NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT A DECISION TO CONTINUE OPERATING WITH IRAQ WOULD MEAN THAT JORDAN WOULD FORFEIT ALL SUPPORT FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD (INCLUDING ARAB STATES) WITH NO GUARANTEE THAT THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ WOULD BE SUSTAINABLE. JARDANEH CONCEDED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY. WHATEVER JORDAN DID, SHE WOULD LOSE. THE TIME-SCALE WAS ALSO IMPORTANT. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT IN THE SHORT TERM (WHICH HE DEFINED AS 6 MONTHS) THE FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF JORDAN CONTINUING TO CONTINUING TO COOPERATE WITH IRAQ. IN THE LONGER TERM, HE CONCEDED THAT THE ARGUMENTS MIGHT POINT IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HE EMPHASISED THAT MANY OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE OUTSIDE HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT OTHERS PROBABLY HAD A DIFFERENT VIEW.

COMMENT

5. THE KING HAS MADE NO PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT ON SANCTIONS OTHER THAN HIS INITIAL REFERENCE TO JORDAN UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER (MY TELNO 397). THE RESULT IS THAT THE POPULATION AT LARGE, AND MUCH OF THE COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, IS PROBABLY UNAWARE OF THE DECISION TO APPLY SANCTIONS. THE REASON FOR THE KING'S FAILURE TO SPEAK UP IS CLEAR: GIVEN THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR SADDAM IN JORDAN, AN UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS WOULD PROBABLY BRING THE MOBS OUT ON THE STREETS IN VERY QUICK TIME.

6. IN ANY CASE, WHAT MATTERS, I SUGGEST, IS NOT SO MUCH THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT THE EARLY APPLICATION OF THE SANCTIONS, IN FULL. IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE SHALL NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO STIFFEN THE RESOLVE OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. BUT WE SHALL ONLY SUCCEED IF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER MAJOR WESTERN PLAYERS, WE CAN OFFER THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES THAT BY APPLYING SANCTIONS, JORDAN WILL NOT SIMPLY BE COMMITTING SUICIDE. THE QUESTION OF OIL SUPPLIES (WHICH AT PRESENT COST JORDAN NOTHING SINCE THEY ARE IN LIEU OF DEBT REPAYMENT FROM IRAQ) IS PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL. UNLESS EARLY HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ARE ORGANISED TO CONSIDER ALL THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN APPLYING SANCTIONS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY TRY TO FUDGE THE ISSUE, WHICH WILL LEAVE A GLARING HOLE IN THE SANCTIONS FENCE. THE FACT THAT THIS MAY LEAD TO JORDAN LOSING WESTERN AND ARAB SUPPORT WILL CUT LITTLE ICE UNLESS WESTERN OFFERS OF SUPPORT ARE TRANSLATED INTO FIRM COMMITMENTS.

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FM THE HAGUE
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AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, MODUK NAVY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, EC POSTS

SIC I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT : DUTCH CONTRIBUTION TO GULF FORCE *MW*

SUMMARY

1. DUTCH GOVERNMENT TO SEND TWO FRIGATES TO GULF.

DETAIL

2. AT AN EXTRAORDINARY CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING, THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT AGREED TO SEND TWO FRIGATES TO THE GULF. THE SHIPS, THE ANTI-AIR WARFARE FRIGATE WITTE DE WITH AND THE STANDARD CLASS PIETER FLORISZ, ARE EXPECTED TO SAIL ON 20 AUGUST AND TO ARRIVE IN THE GULF SOME 14 DAYS LATER.
3. ALL OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION. THE GENERAL PREFERENCE AMONG MPS IS THAT THE SHIPS SHOULD OPERATE AS PART OF A UN FORCE, BUT IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE.
4. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK WANTS THE MODALITIES OF THE DEPLOYMENT TO BE WORKED OUT IN A WEU CONTEXT.
5. DEFENCE ATTACHE UNDERSTANDS FROM MODNL NAVY THAT NL DEFENCE ATTACHE LONDON IS IN TOUCH WITH MODUK NAVY NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP OVER COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF DUTCH CONTRIBUTION. DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS FURTHER BEEN TOLD INFORMALLY THAT RNLN IS KEEN TO LINK UP WITH ROYAL NAVY ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND FUELLING.

FLOWER

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SIC 19M

OPERATION GRANBY.

DA MEETING WITH AMIRAL LANXADE - MILITARY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

1. DA HAD A SHORT SITUATION UPDATE WITH AMIRAL LANXADE 131030Z AUGUST. MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS :

A. SAUDI/GULF STATES.

ACCORDING TO LANXADE THE SAUDIS HAVE NOW OFFICIALLY ASKED FRANCE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE QUAI HOWEVER, ARE SAYING THAT THE STATUS OF THIS REQUEST IS UNCLEAR. A PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL ENVOY (BIANCO) IS BEING SENT TO SEE KING FAHD AND WILL NO DOUBT CLARIFY THIS. ANOTHER ENVOY IS GOING TO THE UAE TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THESE HIGH LEVEL MISSIONS.

B. FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS.

NO FURTHER REINFORCEMENT IS ENVISAGED AT THE MOMENT. IT IS THOUGHT THAT HELOS ETC + 800 ARMY PERSONNEL ON CLEMENCEAU PLUS CIVILIANS/MILITARY TECH ASSISTANCE IN GULF REPRESENTS A GOOD CONTRIBUTION. LANXADE WAS AT PAINS TO EMPHASISE THAT FRENCH CIVILIANS WERE CONTINUING TO WORK ON FR EQUIPMENT ON FRONT LINE AIRFIELDS.

C. CONTROL OF FORCES IMPLEMENTING QUARANTINE.

THERE IS FRENCH CONCERN THAT THE QUOTE CO-ORDINATION UNQUOTE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY ORGANISED IN QUARANTINE OPS. DA WAS ABLE TO INFORM LANXADE THAT A MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR 141200Z IN PARIS BETWEEN SEC(OS)/CAPTAIN SUNTER (DNW) AND FRENCH EQUIVALENTS WHICH WOULD GO SOME WAY TO RESOLVE THIS. DA WAS CAREFUL NOT TO SAY THAT CAPTAIN SUNTER HAD ALREADY HAD ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS.

D. WEU.

AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING ON 20/21 AUGUST FRANCE WILL STRESS NEED

FOR CO-ORDINATED ACTION IN IMPLEMENTING A QUARANTINE. FURTHERMORE LANXADE SEES A NEED FOR AN ORGANISED ROTA BETWEEN NATIONS ON VARIOUS - NAVAL - TASKS, EMBARGO AND MINESWEEPING BEING EXAMPLES.

E. FIGHTER AFFILIATION.

DA ALSO MENTIONED IN PASSING THE RAF REQUEST FOR DISSIMILAR AIR DEFENCE TRAINING BETWEEN MIRAGE AND TORNADO. THEY AGREED THAT DA WOULD PROCESS THIS THROUGH CEMA. AMIRAL POULIQUEN IS CLEARING WITH FAF THIS AFTERNOON - POSSIBLE FOR 2 DAYS TIME AT LEEMING, YORKSHIRE.

2. LANXADE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH ARE MOST CONCERNED AT THE PRO-HUSSEIN AGITATION IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES, NOTABLY ALGERIA AND TUNISIA.

LLEWELLYN SMITH

YYYY

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PS/PUS	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR TOMKYS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/MED	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
HD/NENAD	SIR P CRADOCK,
HD/NAD	(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
HD/EED	CABINET OFFICE D10
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 639

OF 131530Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, JAKARTA, MODUK

SIC AAA/I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. AMERICAN ACCOUNT OF KELLY VISIT. AMERICANS AND SAUDIS AGREE ON NEED FOR EXILED KUWAIT LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A HIGHER PROFILE. PROBABLE USE OF FROZEN KUWAITI FUNDS TO ASSIST TURKEY. SAUDIS SEEKING MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NON-ARAB ISLAMIC STATES.

DETAIL

2. US DCM HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KELLY'S VISIT HERE ON 11/12 AUGUST. DUNFORD SAID THAT, AS WE WOULD KNOW, KELLY HAD SUCCESSFULLY VENTRILOQUIZED THE REQUIRED LETTER TO BUSH FROM SHAIK JABER ABOUT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN A HURRY, AND HAD OVERRIDDEN KUWAITI MISGIVINGS ABOUT ISSUING THE AMIR'S LETTER TO BUSH BEFORE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH OTHER STATES. THEY HAD HOWEVER PRESSED THE KUWAITIS TO ISSUE SUCH LETTERS TO OTHER COUNTRIES SOON, INCLUDING THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, EGYPT AND MOROCCO (BUT NOT IRAN). THE KUWAITIS HAD SEPARATELY INFORMED THE AMERICANS OF THEIR INTENTION OF ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT CALLING ON ALL STATES TO TAKE STEPS, MILITARY AND OTHER, TO LIBERATE KUWAIT (C/F MY TELNO 636).

3. DUNFORD SAID THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED AT SADDAM'S SUCCESS IN PUTTING HIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE ARAB WORLD. THEY WERE LOOKING FOR A PR COUNTER, AND KELLY HAD URGED SHEIK JABER AND THE KUWAITI LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A HIGH PROFILE WORLDWIDE, THEREBY GIVING THE LIE TO THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A QUARREL BETWEEN THE US AND IRAQ (THIS THINKING PRESUMABLY UNDERLINES SHAIKL SABAHAST AHMED'S CURRENT TOUR TO LONDON AND OTHER CAPITALS).

PAGE 1

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

4. DUNFORD SAID THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF FROZEN KUWAITI ASSETS DURING KELLY'S VISIT. THE KUWAITIS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT FROZEN KUWAITI MONEY SHOULD BE USED TO ASSIST TURKEY, AND THE US AGREED THAT KUWAITI MONEY PREVIOUSLY DESTINED FOR EGYPT TO ASSIST WITH FOOD PURCHASES SHOULD BE RELEASED. DUNFORD DID NOT MENTION JORDAN.

5. DUNFORD SAID THAT , AT KELLY'S MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD, THE LATTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SAUDIS SHARED THE US VIEW ON THE NEED FOR A HIGHER KUWAITI PROFILE. SAUD TALKED OF THE DESIRABILITY OF COLLECTING AND RE-EQUIPPING KUWAITI REGULAR SOLDIERS WHO HAD FLED TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE US AMBASSADOR HAD INTERJECTED THAT THIS WOULD BE ALRIGHT SO LONG AS THE KUWAITIS WERE NOT STATIONED TOO NEAR THE BORDER, WHERE THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PROVOCATIVE ACTION, WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT WANTED TO AVOID. SAUD HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT FURTHER SERIOUS ARAB DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WERE IN PROSPECT POST-CAIRO. HE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE SEEKING A MILITARY CONTRIBUTION FROM NON-ARAB MUSLIM STATES, AND MENTIONED INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA BY NAME (WE HAVE SEPARATELY PICKED UP ON UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE OFFERED TROOPS).

MUNRO

Keep them observing Saudi

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE 36

IRAQ/KUWAIT

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

CABINET OFFICE DIO

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

EMERGENCY UNIT

RESIDENT CLERK

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INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

KUWAIT/IRAQ: SITREP 131600Z

SUMMARY

1. EUPHORIA AT OPEN BORDER ANNOUNCEMENT DISPELLED BUT MANY KUWAITIS AND EXPATS TRIED AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO GO SOUTH. CONSTANT REPORTS OF LOW MORALE IN IRAQI ARMY. AIRPORT SERVICEABLE.

DETAIL

2. EXFILTRATION: RCC ANNOUNCEMENT OF BORDERS OPEN SET MANY PEOPLE LOADING THEIR WAGONS AND FLEEING THIS MORNING. MOST HAD RETURNED THIS EVENING AFTER LONG QUEUES OR BEING TURNED BACK BY THE IRAQIS. ABDALY BORDER ONLY OPEN AFTER PROBABLE COMPLETION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS. SALEMY ROAD NOW BEING USED AS TEMPORARY RUNWAY 10 KMS WEST OF JAHRA AND LINED WITH MILITARY CANTONMENTS. KHAFJI ROAD AND ROADS VEERING WEST TOWARDS WAFRA RIGOROUSLY BLOCKED SUGGESTING TOTAL MILITARY NO-GO AREA.
3. MILITARY: STORIES, SOME FIRST-HAND OF IRAQI ARMY LOW MORALE, ABSENCE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DISORGANISATION. THEY VARY FROM CONSUL'S EXPERIENCES IN WAFRA AREA WHERE ORDINARY SOLDIERS WERE MILLING AROUND WITHOUT FOOD, MAPS OR DIRECTION AND ASKING WHETHER THEY WERE GOING, BACK TO OTHERS SELLING THEIR UNIFORMS AND WEAPONS FOR KD. CONSUL REPORTS NO PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT, TROOPS THINNED OUT, FEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS ALONG ROADS SOUTH AND NO TANKS DUG IN ON ASAFAR MOTORWAY AS BEFORE. WAFRA AREA WAS CLEARLY SENSITIVE AND REMARKS OF IRAQI OFFICERS SUGGESTED IT WAS SOME SORT OF HQS AND FORCE CONCENTRATION. LARGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND PRIVATE CARS COULD BE SEEN IN THE DISTANCE IN THE WAFRA FARMS AREA.
4. ANGLICAN CHAPLAIN REPORTS AHMADI TROOPS THINNED OUT. RELIABLE BRITS REPORT ONLY TWO TANKS FROM MESSILA TO SHUWAIKH, A FEW MOBILE AA AND THINNED OUT MACHINE GUN/MORTAR NESTS. AHMADI HOSPITAL BARELY

WORKING WITH ALL BRITISH STAFF WITHDRAWN AND IN HIDING. IN MANGAF AREA BEACH MORTARS HAVE MOVED A BLOCK INLAND. TROOPS IN FINTAS/MANGAF AREA AND THOSE REMAINING IN CITY SEEM BETTER QUALITY.

5. FAILAKA FERRY SEEN LEAVING RAS AL SALMIYA WITH AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS.

6. CIVILIAN POPULATION: FOOD AND PETROL SUPPLIES CONTINUE BUT LAWLESSNESS STILL RISING. CARS SMASHED IF THEY CANNOT BE DRIVEN AWAY. IRAQIS STILL SEARCHING BLOCKS OF FLATS IN FINTAS/MANGAF AREA LOOKING FOR ARMS. SOME REPORTS OF ASSAULTS ON WESTERNERS AND CONSTANT REPORTS OF USING THEM AS CHAUFFEURS AT GUNPOINT.

7. BANKS STILL CLOSED AND KUWAITIS REPORTED TO HAVE THROWN AWAY KEYS TO VAULT SYSTEMS. SOME TELEPHONE EXCHANGES WORKING AGAIN AND ONE OR TWO INWARD CALLS RECEIVED ON ANBASSADOR'S LINE.

8. AIRPORT: USABLE ACCORDING TO BA REP WHO REPORTS HELPFUL ATTITUDE

OF IRAQI AIRWAYS STAFF OVER MAINTAINANCE OF BA 149. CREW STUCK AT AIRPORT. BA REP BELIEVES AIRPORT WILL REOPEN AS DOMESTIC AIRPORT TOMORROW. MUCH GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TAKEN TO BASRA.

9. UTILITIES: STABLE. PURIFICATION CHEMICALS AVAILABLE FOR FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE.

10. RESISTANCE: NO RELIABLE INFORMATION BUT A PETROL TANKER STRANDED ON FOURTH RING ROAD IN THE MORNING OF 12 AUGUST DESTROYED EARLY EVENING (12TH).

WESTON

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

PAGE 2
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Q1. JAK.

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OF 132230Z AUGUST 90
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INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, BUCHAREST, ADDIS ABABA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA
INFO PRIORITY BOGOTA

YOUR TELNO 438 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS

SUMMARY

1. CONSIDERABLE FEELING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT UNILATERAL MILITARY MEASURES TO ENFORCE SCR 661 WOULD GO BEYOND WHAT THE COUNCIL HAS AUTHORIZED, AND THAT MILITARY ACTION SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN IF SANCTIONS WERE SHOWN NOT TO WORK. I TAKE THE LINE IN TUR.

DETAIL

2. MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 13 AUGUST. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNCIL TO CALL FOR RESTRAINT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ALREADY PUTTING INTO EFFECT UNPRECEDENTED SANCTIONS AGAINST A STATE WHICH HAD REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS. CERTAIN POWERS WERE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING MILITARY ACTION AT THE REQUEST OF A MEMBER STATE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THIS WAS QUITE LEGITIMATE. BUT SOME OF THOSE POWERS APPEARED TO BE ARROGATING TO THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO PUT INTO PRACTICE DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT THE COUNCIL BEING CONSULTED. IN FACT THOSE POWERS WERE APPLYING ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD TAKEN NO DECISION TO DO SO. THIS SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: THE LOGIC WOULD BE THAT ANY STATE COULD HENCEFORTH TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION TO ENFORCE A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION. THE UNITED NATIONS HAD NEVER ACTED ON THAT BASIS IN THE PAST. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED THAT SANCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE, IT COULD DECIDE TO APPLY ADDITIONAL MEASURES. BUT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS COULD NOT ASSUME THIS RIGHT FOR THEMSELVES. SENDING SHIPS TO MONITOR SANCTIONS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM TRYING TO ENFORCE THE COUNCIL'S DECISIONS WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.

3. I SAID WE WERE PLEASED THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED QUICKLY: IT WAS IMPORTANT IT SHOULD BE VISIBLY IN

ACTION. RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662 HAD BEEN PASSED TO BRING THINGS BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE. BUT THREATS TO OTHER STATES IN THE REGION HAD INDEPENDENTLY EMERGED: A BRITISH CITIZEN HAD BEEN KILLED YESTERDAY. I THEN READ OUT THE FIRST THREE POINTS IN TUR.

4. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THE CRISIS WAS ESCALATING. YEMEN WANTED THE COUNCIL TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONTAIN IT. THE COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR RESTRAINT, AS IT NORMALLY DID IN SUCH A SITUATION.

5. WATSON (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT AMERICAN ACTION WAS IN LINE WITH SCR 661, AND REQUESTS FROM STATES IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE MOST RECENT OF THESE HAD BEEN THE LETTER FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SANCTIONS HAD TO BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED. THEY HAD BEEN PRETTY SUCCESSFUL SO FAR BUT SOME SHIPMENTS WERE STILL REACHING IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONLY INTERDICT SHIPPING IF THIS WAS NECESSARY. IT WOULD ACT IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITH WHOM KUWAIT HAD MADE A SIMILAR REQUEST.

6. FORTIER (CANADA) EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE ARABS HAD NOT YET FOUND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER SET OUT SPECIFIC STEPS: THE COUNCIL HAD MOVED METHODICALLY FROM SCR 660 TO SCRS 661 AND 662. NONE OF THOSE DECISIONS PROVIDED FOR THE MILITARY MEASURES NOW BEING SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES. A BLOCKADE WOULD REQUIRE ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER, AND WENT BEYOND THE MEASURES IN SCR 661. BEFORE THE COUNCIL MOVED TO ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42, THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO ASSESS WHETHER SANCTIONS WERE WORKING. CANADA WAS SENDING 3 SHIPS TO THE GULF, AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO PREVENT AGGRESSION. CANADA WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE USE OF FORCE.

7. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD STOPPED IRAQ MOVING BEYOND KUWAIT. THE CRITICAL POINT HAD NOW BEEN PASSED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE TIME TO SEE WHETHER SANCTIONS WERE EFFECTIVE. THIS MEANT WAITING FOR THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE'S MEETING ON 17 AUGUST AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. THE COUNCIL COULD THEN ASSESS WHETHER FURTHER STEPS WERE NECESSARY.

8. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE WAS PLEASED THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SET UP QUICKLY: ON 10 AUGUST FRANCE HAD SENT IT DETAILS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. FRENCH SHIPS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE REGION BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH NATIONALS THERE AND

MADAM 7150
(4)

SCRS 660, 661 AND 662. IF IT APPEARED THAT THE EMBARGO WERE NOT BEING RESPECTED, FRANCE WOULD DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION.

9. LI (CHINA) EXPRESSED ALARM AT THE GROWING TENSION IN THE REGION. SCRS 660, 661 AND 662 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. BUT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD JUST STARTED ITS WORK. CHINA OPPOSED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE REGION BY MAJOR POWERS AND CALLED FOR RESTRAINT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE EFFORTS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL TO FIND A SOLUTION.

10. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AGREED WITH EARLIER CALLS FOR RESTRAINT. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEGUN ITS WORK; COLLECTIVE CONSIDERATION WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT EVENTS MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

11. THE (ROMANIAN) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE HOW THE SYSTEM OF PEACE AND SECURITY WORKED WHEN SMALL STATES WERE UNDER THREAT. CLEARLY, MORE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE NEEDED ON THIS ISSUE.

COMMENT

12. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FEELING IN THE COUNCIL THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MUST BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO WORK, AND THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION TO ENFORCE THEM WAS PREMATURE. APART FROM WATSON (UNITED STATES) AND ME, NO-ONE THOUGHT THAT SCR 661 AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER PROVIDED LEGAL COVER FOR ACTION BEYOND MONITORING. THIS IS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE UN LEGAL ADVISERS.

13. MOST DEVOUTLY HOPE THAT NO-ONE WILL TRY TO BREAK SANCTIONS AND THEREBY CAUSE A MILITARY INCIDENT. IF THERE WERE TO BE SUCH AN INCIDENT, IT WOULD BE VITAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SANCTION-BUSTER WAS TO BLAME. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE COUNCIL COULD WELL BE PERSUADED TO MOVE TO A NEW RESOLUTION AGAINST IRAQ UNDER ARTICLE 42. OTHERWISE, AND IF THE INCIDENT WERE MESSY, THERE WOULD BE A REAL RISK OF THE BLAME BEING LAID ON THOSE ENFORCING THE SANCTIONS, AND THE PRESENT BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE FIVE AND IN THE COUNCIL FALLING APART.

14. A DOG WHICH DID NOT BARK WAS THE IRAQI PROPOSALS SET OUT IN BAGHDAD TELNO 754. NO-ONE EVEN MENTIONED THEM.

TICKELL

SECRET

7(a-d) c.c.p.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

13~~th~~ August 1990

CO 14/8

Dear Charles

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US DEMARCHE

I enclose a copy of a US Demarche on the setting up of a Multinational Naval Force to give full effect to the sanctions under SCR 661, received here today by Minister(DP).

We are currently examining this text urgently, in concert with the FCO. Some aspects of it are not entirely satisfactory. I will advise you further shortly.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Simon Whitely (Transport), Elisabeth Wilms~~h~~hurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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b

DEMARCHE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT TO ACT WITH KUWAIT IN EXERCISING THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AND AFFIRMED IN UNSC RESOLUTION 661, TO TAKE SUCH MILITARY OR OTHER STEPS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO RESTORE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS ARE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED.

-- IN SO DOING, THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS ALSO ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO ORGANIZE AND COORDINATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT THAT IT HAS SENT A LETTER TO YOUR GOVERNMENT INVITING YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT.

-- WE HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT THAT WE ARE READY TO ORGANIZE AND COORDINATE THIS EFFORT.

-- THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WE ENVISION WOULD BE COMPOSED OF NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATING UNDER THEIR OWN NATIONAL COMMAND BUT COORDINATED BY THE UNITED STATES, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

-- ITS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO THE SANCTIONS SPECIFIED IN UNSC RESOLUTION 661 BY INTERDICTING, AS NECESSARY, MARITIME TRAFFIC SEEKING TO VIOLATE THE SANCTIONS BY CARRYING PROHIBITED TRADE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE THERE WILL NOT BE A NEED FOR EXTENSIVE, OR PERHAPS ANY, INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES, AND WE INTEND TO PURSUE A VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO ASSURE THE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVENESS.

-- THIS EFFORT WILL BE STRONGLY REINFORCED BY OUR READINESS TO ACT TOGETHER IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

-- IF YOU ARE READY TO JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT, WE ASK THAT YOU INSTRUCT YOUR APPROPRIATE NAVAL AUTHORITIES TO CONTACT THE COMMANDER OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, TO INITIATE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION EFFORTS. VESSELS ALREADY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION MAY BE INSTRUCTED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE U.S. COMMANDER OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE MIDDLE EAST, LOCATED IN BAHRAIN (WE ALSO REQUEST THAT YOU NOTIFY US THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS).

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WE WANT TO BE PREPARED FOR A NAVAL INTERDICTION EFFORT AIMED AT GIVING FULL EFFECT TO THE UN SANCTIONS AND THAT NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO COORDINATE THIS INTERDICTION EFFORT SHOULD GO FORWARD IN MILITARY CHANNELS.

-- THE GENERAL GUIDELINES WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE INTERDICTION EFFORT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- ALL COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BOUND OUT OF IRAQ OR KUWAIT, AND ALL COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BOUND INTO IRAQ OR KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES, SHOULD BE INTERDICTIONED. (BECAUSE WE ESTIMATE THAT IRAQ HAS A 3-6 MONTH SUPPLY OF FOOD STUFFS, WE DO BELIEVE FOOD SHOULD BE INTERDICTIONED.)

-- OUR INTENTION WILL BE TO TURN AWAY ANY VESSELS NOT ACTING IN COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 661. IF A VESSEL REFUSES TO TURN AWAY OR SUBMIT TO NECESSARY INSPECTIONS, MEASURES SHORT OF FORCE WILL FIRST BE USED. IF NEEDED, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE FORCE WILL BE USED.

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- 3 -

LEGAL BASIS

-- A COORDINATED MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATION TO INTERDICT COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS BEING TRANSPORTED TO AND FROM IRAQ AND KUWAIT BY SEA IS CONSISTENT WITH--INDEED IT IS DESIGNED TO GIVE EFFECT TO--UNSC RESOLUTION 661 WHICH IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON TRADE WITH IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

--A MULTINATIONAL NAVAL INTERDICTION EFFORT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMED IN UNSCR 661.

--WE ARE MOVING AHEAD WITH THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT KUWAIT HAS REQUESTED. THERE IS AMPLE AUTHORITY FOR THE CURRENT EFFORT IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE IRAQI ATTACK ON KUWAIT, AFFIRMED BY THE COUNCIL IN UNSCR 661.

--AS WE EXAMINE, IN ADDITION, WHETHER AND HOW THE UN CAN PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, WE NEED TO BE MINDFUL THAT ESTABLISHING SUCH A FORCE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. WE INTEND TO EXPLORE THE MATTER FULLY WITH MEMBERS OF THE UNSC.

SECRET



To: MR MACLEAN *J* *Az*

cc Ms Phippard
Mrs Thomson (or)
Mr Morris (No 10)

From: T J Sutton
Date: 13 August 1990

RECALL OF PARLIAMENT : LETTER FROM MR WALLACE

The Lord President discussed with me the further letter from Jim Wallace of 9 August (copy attached for you and copy recipients).

He agreed that there is no cause for us to modify the position the Government has adopted following the meeting of Ministers last Wednesday. But, since we have taken steps to ensure that the Official Opposition are briefed on the actions the Government is taking, he thinks it important that Mr Wallace should also be spoken to by either or both of MoD and FCO, in order to prevent him stirring up public discussion of whether or not the House needs to be recalled.

I suggested to the Lord President that you might, in the first instance, speak to Mr Wallace, and then if it seemed necessary arrange for someone in MoD and/or FCO to speak to him as well. The Lord President agreed. Could you therefore please take this on?

7.

T J SUTTON
Principal Private Secretary

TJS/aw

FROM: JIM WALLACE MP
CHIEF WHIP, SOCIAL AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATS



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL RECEIVED	
- 9 AUG 1990	
ACTION FOR	
COPIES TO	

Sir Geoffrey Howe MP,
Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House,
Privy Council Offices,
Whitehall,
London,
SW1A 2AT

9th August 1990

Dear Sir Geoffrey,

Thank for your letter of 6th August regarding the recall of the House of Commons.

Following yesterday's news that British troops are being sent to the Gulf to join US led forces in protecting Saudi Arabia, I would urge you to reconsider your position.

Whilst my colleagues and I support the Government's decision to commit U.K. forces, we believe that it would be preferable if the multi-national forces in the Gulf came under United Nations command. We strongly recommend that Parliament should be given an opportunity to debate such matters.

There must also be serious potential threat to the lives of the British military personnel engaged in this action, and it would be appropriate if Parliament had an opportunity to endorse the Government's decision and in doing so reassure our service men that they have the full support of Parliament.

Given these latest developments, my colleagues and I believe that the House should be recalled as soon as it is practicable to discuss the growing crisis and to endorse the Government's action.

Yours sincerely,
Jim Wallace



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7 OF 131330Z AUGUST 90
8

Prime Minister

Agree this message please?

COO

13/8

9 YOUR TELNO 518: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

10
11 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to
12 President Mubarak:

13 Begins

14 I wanted to say how much I have admired your strength and
15 diplomatic skills in dealing with the enormous problems that
16 have been created by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The rallying
17 of Arab support for Kuwait and for the measures taken by the
18 United Nations is of the greatest importance. I know how much
19 you personally have done to achieve this. Your decision to send
20 attachments of Egyptian forces to assist our friends in Saudi
21 Arabia and the Gulf is of great significance and very welcome to
22 us in Britain.

23 Thank you too for Egypt's ready cooperation in granting
24 over-flying rights for Royal Air Force aircraft on their way to
25 the Gulf.

26 I know how difficult decisions are at this moment for our
27 friends in the Arab world. If I may say so you have set a great
28 example in firm action in support of the principle that
29 aggression must not be allowed to succeed.

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NN

Catchword

File number

Dept

Drafted by (Block capitals)

Telephone no

POVAAT

NENAD

S W J FULLER

Authorised for despatch by Initials Date/time

For COO use only

Consent reference

Telegram number

Processed by

Prime Minister

Prime Minister

Not very apposite
- although the word
point has some shade.

August 13, 1990

We have to
check the word point
but

I have three suggestions which I think might be both useful and politically helpful.

eop13/8

important
that work
power

First, as the days go by there may be more and more suggestions for a recall of parliament. Would it not be sensible for the Government itself to suggest this? A full discussion in the House of Commons (as in the House of Lords) could add to the weight of support which you already have and give our actions in the Gulf even greater authority. Further, if you were to initiate the idea, it would embarrass the Opposition.

force

Second, would it not be advisable to try and arrange that all the different forces which have come to the help of Saudi Arabia should be formally classified as United Nations forces, fighting indeed under a United Nations flag as occurred in the case of the free world's response to the invasion of Southern Korea in 1950? This would no doubt mean a new vote in the Security Council, but if, as seems possible, the enterprise in the Middle East has to continue for a some time, that vote would be invaluable both in holding together the Allies and also our public opinions. There might be a supreme United Nations commander who, in the circumstances, could, as in 1950, be nobody else than an American and, if the plan were launched soon, there should presumably be no argument about that.

place.
Do we
know
about
the
monitoring
committee?
not

In the long run, the world in its post cold-war phase will probably want to have some kind of international police force against aggression, and it would seem best to try and achieve this under the existing institution of the United Nations*.

Third, whether or no this United Nations identity is achieved, would it not be politically useful, in relation to the other policies which we are pursuing in the European Community, for you to stress, in public statements, the European side of our collaboration in the peacekeeping forces. I remember that President Giscard d'Estaing insisted that "Europe's voice could not be silent" in the settling of the destiny of Africa or some such phrase when he sent his paratroops in the Congo in 1978.

Hugh Thomas

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

* The United Nations force in 1950 was, of course, made possible by the so-called "United for Peace" resolution passed by the General Assembly at a time when the Soviet Union was boycotting the organisation.

Prime Minister

1

Prime Minister

Not very apposite

- although at least
point has some shoe.

August 13, 1990

I have three suggestions which I think might be both useful and politically helpful.

eOP131P

First, as the days go by there may be more and more suggestions for a recall of parliament. Would it not be sensible for the Government itself to suggest this? A full discussion in the House of Commons (as in the House of Lords) could add to the weight of support which you already have and give our actions in the Gulf even greater authority. Further, if you were to initiate the idea, it would embarrass the Opposition.

Second, would it not be advisable to try and arrange that all the different forces which have come to the help of Saudi Arabia should be formally classified as United Nations forces, fighting indeed under a United Nations flag as occurred in the case of the free world's response to the invasion of Southern Korea in 1950? This would no doubt mean a new vote in the Security Council, but if, as seems possible, the enterprise in the Middle East has to continue for a some time, that vote would be invaluable both in holding together the Allies and also our public opinions. There might be a supreme United Nations commander who, in the circumstances, could, as in 1950, be nobody else than an American and, if the plan were launched soon, there should presumably be no argument about that.

In the long run, the world in its post cold-war phase will probably want to have some kind of international police force against aggression, and it would seem best to try and achieve this under the existing institution of the United Nations*.

!!!
Third, whether or no this United Nations identity is achieved, would it not be politically useful, in relation to the other policies which we are pursuing in the European Community, for you to stress, in public statements, the European side of our collaboration in the peacekeeping forces. I remember that President Giscard d'Estaing insisted that "Europe's voice could not be silent" in the settling of the destiny of Africa or some such phrase when he sent his paratroops in the Congo in 1978.

Hugh Thomas

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 August 1990

Dear Charles,

*Dispatched
ON 13/8.*

A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

You agreed over the weekend that it would be right to propose to the Prime Minister that she send a message of gratitude and encouragement to President Mubarak in the wake of his spirited performance in rallying Arab support against Iraq, particularly in pushing through at the Cairo Summit on 10 August the resolution calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and military assistance to Saudi Arabia.

/ The enclosed draft is a more fullsome version of that suggested in Cairo telno 518.

Yours sincerely

Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith
Private Secretary to
The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Charles Powell Esq
PS/No.10

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SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 130600Z FCO
TELNO 1911
OF 130248Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, AMMAN
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, MOSCOW, PEKING, PARIS
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, ACTOR
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US POLICY
SUMMARY

1. A WIDE-RANGING MEETING WITH KIMMITT. AGREEMENT TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON EXCHANGES WITH KING HUSSEIN. US INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EC ECONOMIC HELP FOR JORDAN.
2. SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR A DEMARCHE IN BAGHDAD ON DETAINED FOREIGNERS, BUT AMERICAN THINKING STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE, INCLUDING ON CONTACTS WITH RUSSIANS.
3. BAKER INTERESTED IN UK IDEAS ON USING MILITARY COMMITTEE. INITIAL VIEW THAT COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE ROLE IF IT FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS AND HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION. US WILLING TO BE GUIDED BY UK ON WEU ROLE.
4. US DETERMINED TO WARN SADDAM OFF USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND AGAINST ATTACK ON JORDAN.
5. US AGREES NOT TO ISSUE FURTHER ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION WITHOUT UK AGREEMENT.
6. HINTS THAT US CONSIDERING EARLY THINNING OUT OF DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT.
7. US UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS ON REASONABLE DEMAND FROM BONA FIDE KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVES.
8. US BELIEVES SCR 661 APPLIES TO ALL ACTIVITY ANYWHERE BY IRAQI AIRWAYS: KIMMITT ASKS WHAT HMG AND OTHER EUROPEANS ARE DOING.

DETAIL

9. I SPENT 45 MINUTES WITH KIMMITT (UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS) LATE ON 12 AUGUST TO COMPARE NOTES ON A NUMBER OF CURRENT ISSUES.

JORDAN

10. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON OUR DEALINGS WITH THE KING, AND GAVE HIM, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF AMMAN TELNO 410 (NOT TO ALL), REPORTING MR REEVE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE KING AND THE HANDING OVER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

11. KIMMITT THANKED ME, AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON THE OUTCOME OF AMBASSADOR HARRISON'S MEETING WITH THE KING, PROBABLY ON 13 AUGUST.

12. KIMMITT ALSO ASKED ABOUT A PRESS REPORT WHICH HE HAD SEEN EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT DI MICHAELIS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP MITIGATE THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON JORDAN: COULD WE ELABORATE? I SAID THAT I WAS UNBRIEFED, BUT WOULD INVESTIGATE: GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. FOREIGNERS DETAINED IN IRAQ

13. I TOLD KIMMITT, AGAIN ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV, IN WHICH SHE HAD ENCOURAGED THE RUSSIANS TO CONTINUE TO STAND ALONGSIDE THE INTERANTIONAL COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH IRAQ. IN PASSING ON MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE, OUR AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASKED TO URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONALS WERE STILL DETAINED. WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING IN LONDON WHAT FURTHER DEMARCHE MIGHT BE MADE IN BAGHDAD TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED IN BOTH IRAQ AND KUWAIT. EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THE HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S IRAQ/KUWAIT TASKFORCE, AMBASSADOR MCCARTHY, HAD TOLD US THAT THE US WOULD IN PRINCIPLE SUPPORT AN APPROACH OF THE KIND SUGGESTED IN YOUR TELNO 1426 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL): WE WERE CANVASSING IDEAS ON WHAT PERMUTATION OF COUNTRIES WAS MOST LIKELY TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I THEN GAVE KIMMITT A COPY OF BAGHDAD TELNO 758 (NOT TO ALL) GIVING MR WALKER'S PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON REPRESENTATIONS TO THE IRAQIS.

15. IN RESPONSE, KIMMITT INDICATED THAT AMERICAN THINKING ON A FURTHER DEMARCHE TO THE IRAQIS WAS STILL AT A FORMATIVE STAGE. PRESIDENT BUSH ATTACHED HIGH PRIORITY TO THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD LIMITED CONTACTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES' EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT: AND THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONSIDERATION OF WHAT FURTHER USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE ICRC MECHANISM. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES MAKING DEALS WITH IRAQ: THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS IN PUBLIC THAT ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT JUST AMERICANS, AND CIVILIANS AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, SHOULD BE FREE TO LEAVE.

16. KIMMITT CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW CONSIDER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FURTHER AND THEN CONSULT US AGAIN. HE THOUGHT THAT BAKER MIGHT HAVE MENTIONED THE ISSUE TO SHEVARDNADZE, AND ASKED HIS STAFF FOR TALKING POINTS FOR BAKER TO USE WHEN HE NEXT SPOKE TO SHEVARDNADZE.

MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES AND THE UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

17. I THANKED KIMMITT FOR ALERTING US TO BAKER'S ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED A KUWAITI REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND THAT IN THE US VIEW THIS PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR QUOTE INTER-DICTION UNQUOTE (MY TELNO 1908, NOT TO ALL). THE QUESTION NOW WAS WHAT IF ANY USE MIGHT BE MADE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

18. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER HAD TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST IN THE IDEAS IN YOUR TELNO 435 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL) WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE CONSIDERING FURTHER ON 13 AUGUST. HE PROMISED US A REACTION LATER THAT DAY OR BY 14 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. BAKER'S VIEW WAS THAT US AND UK THINKING ON THIS WAS MOVING IN VERY MUCH THE SAME DIRECTION. BAKER THOUGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OPERATIONAL ROLE FOR THE UN, DOUBTED WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THE UN FOR FURTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND AGREED THAT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE NAVAL SIDE. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO QUOTE OPERATIONALISE UNQUOTE THE SOVIET SUGGESTION (WHICH WAS NOT A FORMAL PROPOSAL) WHILE THE CHINESE REMAINED UNENTHUSIASTIC. KIMMITT ENDED BY REPEATING THAT THE MAJORITY VIEW IN THE US GOVERNMENT WAS TO FAVOUR AN APPROACH ON THE LINES SUGGESTED BY THE UK WHICH KEPT THE SOVIET UNION IN PLAY, FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS, BUT HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION.

19. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT FOR AN INITIAL REACTION TO THE IDEAS ON A ROLE FOR THE WEU IN YOUR TELNO 1403 (NOT TO ALL). KIMMITT'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE GUIDED BY HMG'S INSIGHTS ON WHETHER INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF WE THOUGHT A WEU ROLE HELPED BRING OTHERS SUCH AS THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS ALONG, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM FROM THE AMERICANS. THE US AND UK SAW EYE TO EYE ON NOT UNDERMINING NATO'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP A ROLE IN THE CRISIS. CLEARLY THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WANT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU TO CUT ACROSS THAT. SUBJECT ONLY TO THAT RESERVATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER ROLE FOR THE WEU THE UK RECOMMENDED. KIMMITT ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH BAKER.

US REACTION TO IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

20. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT IF HE COULD ELABORATE ON GENERAL SCOWCROFT'S AGREEMENT, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON TELEVISION ON 12 AUGUST (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL), THAT IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. THERE MIGHT BE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS REMARK.

21. STRESSING THAT HE WAS UNSIGHTED ON SCOWCROFT'S REMARKS, KIMMITT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS PUT DOWN A SERIES OF MARKERS THAT IRAQI USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD INVITE A SEVERE US RESPONSE. KIMMITT HAD

EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST READ INTELLIGENCE WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE INTENTION WAS TO MAKE SADDAM THINK TWICE OR THREE TIMES ABOUT USING ANY SUCH WEAPONS. BUT, TO KIMMITT'S KNOWLEDGE (WHICH HE SAID WAS INCOMPLETE, SINCE HE WAS NOT PRIVY TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY), THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQ: AND HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER IT HAD EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED.

US REACTIONS TO IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN.

22. I THEN ASKED ABOUT SCOWCROFT'S COMMENT THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN WOULD BE REGARDED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SEEN NO SIGNS THAT IRAQ WAS PLANNING TO MOVE AGAINST JORDAN, BUT WERE ANXIOUS TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO PREVENT THIS BECOMING A US/ISRAEL/THE WEST VERSUS THE ARABS DISPUTE.

ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION

23. I SAID THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME CONFUSION ABOUT ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION (MY TELNO 1909, NOT TO ALL): THE AMERICANS WERE NOW APPARENTLY CONSIDERING A SECOND LETTER, REFLECTING THE KUWAITI REQUEST. WE HAD NOT LODGED OUR NOTIFICATION, AND DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE OUR REQUEST FROM KUWAIT UNTIL 13 AUGUST AT THE EARLIEST.

24. KIMMITT, WHO WAS UNAWARE OF THE PLAN FOR A SECOND AMERICAN LETTER, IMMEDIATELY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS (WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISERS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO US) THAT THE SECOND LETTER SHOULD NOT BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL THE QUOTE BRITS UNQUOTE HAD SIGNED ON. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO SIDES MOVED IN STEP, AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD PROBABLY NOW WAIT UNTIL WE HAD RECEIVED OUR REQUEST FROM THE EMIR: IN ANY EVENT, THEY WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT OUR SAY SO.

DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT

25. I GAVE KIMMITT, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF KUWAIT TELNO 354. KIMMITT PROMISED TO LET US HAVE US VIEWS ON THIS AS SOON AS THEY HAD BEEN REFINED.

26. HE THEN ASKED ME MORE GENERALLY WHAT BRITISH THINKING WAS ON MAINTAINING A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT. THE US INSTINCT WAS TO MOVE OUT AS MANY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING ONLY A CORE BEHIND. THE AMERICAN CONCERN WAS THAT DIPLOMATS PRESENTED A MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR HOSTAGE-TAKING/TERRORISM THAN ORDINARY CIVILIANS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, KIMMITT SAID HE THOUGHT THE US PRESS WOULD UNDERSTAND IF THE US DECIDED TO MOVE DIPLOMATS OUT IF ITS BEST

EFFORTS TO SECURE FREE PASSAGE FOR US NATIONALS HAD FAILED. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS.

FREEZING OF KUWAITI ASSETS

27. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT WHAT THE US HAD BEEN DOING ABOUT UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS TO BE USED BY KUWAITI MISSIONS ETC (YOUR TELNO 1405, NOT TO ALL).

28. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE BASIS FOR US THINKING WAS THAT THE FREEZE WAS PROTECTIVE. IF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI AUTHORITIES WISHED TO USE THOSE ASSETS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, IT WAS NOT FOR THE US AUTHORITIES TO QUESTION WHETHER THAT USE WAS JUSTIFIED. THEY HAD THEREFORE GIVEN A GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR THE RUNNING OF KUWAITI MISSIONS. THEY WERE DISCUSSING WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HERE (WHOM THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND A RELIABLE INTERLOCUTOR) HOW MUCH NEEDED TO BE RELEASED FOR OTHER KUWAITI GOVERNMENT PURPOSES. THE US TREASURY (KIMMITT MENTIONED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, ROBSON) HAD BEEN TOLD TO UNFREEZE FOR THE KUWAITIS WHATEVER THEY ASKED FOR WITHIN REASON. THE TREASURY WOULD, HOWEVER, REPORT ANY EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST.

29. KIMMITT ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQI DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK HAD BEEN EXEMPTED FROM THE GENERAL FREEZE ON IRAQI ASSETS.

IRAQI AIRWAYS

30. FINALLY, STRESSING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, I MENTIONED TO KIMMITT THAT AIRLINE SOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD PICKED UP A SUGGESTION THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WERE PRESSING IRAQI AIRWAYS AND THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON TO TRY TO TRANSFER CASH TO IRAQ.

31. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PICKED UP SIMILAR REPORTS, AND WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT ONE THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE PLANNING TO MOVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM IN STOLEN LIQUID KUWAITI ASSETS OUT OF IRAQ. THE US VIEW WAS THAT UNSCR 661 PROHIBITED ALL ACTIVITY BY IRAQI AIRWAYS IN ANY COUNTRY. AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP WAS CONSIDERING A SEPARATE ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR MOVING AGAINST IRAQ AIRWAYS: AND THE FBI HAD ALREADY CLOSED IRAQI AIRWAYS OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES. KIMMITT ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED BY ANY REPORTS THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY: WHAT WAS THE POSITION? GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

32. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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MAIN 34

NO DISTRIBUTION
 PS
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
 PS/PUS
 MR TOMKYS
 MR GORE-BOOTH
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 HD/MED
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 HD/SOVIET D
 HD/SED
 HD/UND
 HD/ACDD
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
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HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD
 HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
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 (BY TUBE H29)
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 (PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 131200Z FCO

TELNO 1490

OF 131108Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, KUWAIT

ADVANCE COPY

FCO TELS 1425/26: IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE CONVEYED VIA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, BELONOGOV. BELONOGOV DISTANCES SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM EARLIER IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO CONTRADICTS WEEKEND TASS STATEMENT ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM IRAQ: NO AGREEMENT YET GIVEN BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SEEKS OUR VIEWS ON SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT UN MACHINERY AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

DETAIL

3. I WAS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV EARLY ON 13 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV IN TUR.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. I UNDERLINED THE VALUE OF CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIVE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET ROLE. BELONOGOV EXPRESSED RECIPROCAL SATISFACTION AT EFFECTIVE JOINT ACTION IN NEW YORK, AND PRAISED THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

5. BELONOGOV THAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 'VIEWED WITH UNDERSTANDING' THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION BY OTHER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB GOVERNMENT'S AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

6. I ASKED ABOUT KING FAHD'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO SEND ITS OWN FORCES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH

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DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE USSR STOOD CLEARLY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CONTINUE TO CONCERN ITSELF CLOSELY WITH THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

7. I INVITED BELONOGOV TO EXPAND ON SOVIET STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 'REBIRTH' OF THE MSC, GIVEN THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AFTER THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR. HE HOPED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD SERIOUSLY REVIEW THIS OPPORTUNITY. HE DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO MORE DETAIL BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WAS CONSIDERING SENDING YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE, PERHAPS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, ON THIS SUBJECT. WE COMMENTED THAT A MESSAGE IN WHATEVER FORM SHEDDING MORE LIGHT ON SOVIET THINKING WOULD BE TIMELY. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE WOULD BE IN BALANCING THE MERITS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST A NEED FOR URGENT EFFECTIVE ACTION, WHICH CUMBERSOME UN PROCEDURES COULD VITIATE. BUT WE AND OTHERS WERE OBVIOUSLY READY TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL NEEDS. BELONOGOV CONCLUDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO WORK OUT A ROLE FOR THE UN: HE EXPECTED THIS PROBLEM TO BE WITH US FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS.

8. REVERTING TO THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MFA SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ON 9 AUGUST HAD DESCRIBED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUILD-UP OF TENSION. BELONOGOV DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM HIS MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN. THESE DAYS, SOVIET MASS MEDIA REPORTS NO LONGER REPRESENTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POSITION. HE REITERATED, WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS, HIS EARLIER REMARK ABOUT SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION. HE ADDED THAT CAREFUL NOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION OF THE PURELY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE STATES DEPLOYING FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WERE NOT INTENDING TO INITIATE MILITARY OPERATIONS. I DESCRIBED OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

EVACUATION

9. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 11 AUGUST (MY TELNO 1488), AND UNDERLINED THE CONTINUING VALUE OF VERY CLOSE COORDINATION ON THIS ASPECT. BELONOGOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN INTENDING TO MEET THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE DURING THE DAY TO DISCUSS THE IRAQI ORDER TO CLOSE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. IN THE EVENT, THE FRENCHMAN HAD CALLED ON HIM ON 12 AUGUST: HE WOULD SEE THE AMERICAN AND THE CHINESE LATER TODAY. HE WISHED TO SEEK OUR VIEWS ON THE 'CONCRETE QUESTION' OF HOW

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TO DEAL WITH IRAQ'S DEMAND. AS THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RECOGNISE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION, IT COULD NOT JURIDICALLY ACCEDE TO THE DEMAND TO CLOSE ITS EMBASSY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE COMPETING PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALREADY SEEKING TO EVACUATE THEIR CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, SAVE FOR SOME EMBASSY STAFF. THE SITUATION THERE WAS TENSE AND LIKELY TO DETERIORATE. THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING FOOD AND WATER WAS GROWING, AND COULD ONLY BE EXACERBATED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AIR AND SEA PORTS. KUWAIT DEPENDED ON IMPORTED FOOD. IRAQ ALSO IMPORTED MUCH FOOD. IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IRAQ, UNDER SANCTIONS, WOULD SUPPLY KUWAIT. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF HIS PEOPLE, WITH SHOOTING CONTINUING AND IRAQI SOLDIERS BEHAVING COARSELY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT IRAQI ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT. MOST OF THE 880 SOVIET CITIZENS IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED ON ECONOMIC PROJECTS WHICH HAD NOW STOPPED, GIVING THEM NO REASON TO STAY.

10. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO EVACUATE MOST OF ITS CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, BUT THE EVACUATION HAD NOT/NOT STARTED. A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR USE OF THE AIRPORT AND SEAPORT HAD BEEN REFUSED. THE ONLY ROUTE LAY OVERLAND. THIS RAISED COMPLICATED TRANSPORT PROBLEMS, GIVEN THE DISTANCE AND SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPED TO COME UP WITH A PLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HAVE A UNITED POSITION ON THE KUWAIT ASPECT.

11. SO THAT I CAN REPLY, GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON OUR INTENTIONS OVER THE KUWAIT EMBASSY, AND ANY FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PUT TO THE MFA ON KUWAIT.

12. TURNING TO EVACUATION FROM IRAQ, BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION TO TRY TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS FROM IRAQ, EXCEPT FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HE 'HOPED' THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THIS.

13. I ASKED ABOUT THE TASS REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET FAMILIES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN REACHED WITH IRAQ. THE TASS ACCOUNT WAS PARTIALLY WRONG. THE SITUATION IN BAGHDAD WAS VERY COMPLICATED, AND DECISIONS WERE MADE ONE DAY AND CHANGED THE NEXT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I REGRETTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PUT THEIR NAMES TO THE 9 AUGUST JOINT DEMARCHE. BELONOGOV SAID THEY WERE IN A SPECIAL SITUATION IN IRAQ: THEY HAD 'TOO MANY PEOPLE THERE'.

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FCO TELS 1425/26: IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE CONVEYED VIA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, BELONOGOV. BELONOGOV DISTANCES SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM EARLIER IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO CONTRADICTS WEEKEND TASS STATEMENT ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM IRAQ: NO AGREEMENT YET GIVEN BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SEEKS OUR VIEWS ON SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT UN MACHINERY AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

DETAIL

3. I WAS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV EARLY ON 13 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV IN TUR.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. I UNDERLINED THE VALUE OF CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIVE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET ROLE. BELONOGOV EXPRESSED RECIPROCAL SATISFACTION AT EFFECTIVE JOINT ACTION IN NEW YORK, AND PRAISED THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

5. BELONOGOV THAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 'VIEWED WITH UNDERSTANDING' THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION BY OTHER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB GOVERNMENT'S AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

6. I ASKED ABOUT KING FAHD'S REPORTED STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO SEND ITS OWN FORCES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH

DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE USSR STOOD CLEARLY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CONTINUE TO CONCERN ITSELF CLOSELY WITH THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

7. I INVITED BELONOGOV TO EXPAND ON SOVIET STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 'REBIRTH' OF THE MSC, GIVEN THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AFTER THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR. HE HOPED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD SERIOUSLY REVIEW THIS OPPORTUNITY. HE DID NOT WISH TO GO INTO MORE DETAIL BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WAS CONSIDERING SENDING YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE, PERHAPS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, ON THIS SUBJECT. WE COMMENTED THAT A MESSAGE IN WHATEVER FORM SHEDDING MORE LIGHT ON SOVIET THINKING WOULD BE TIMELY. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE WOULD BE IN BALANCING THE MERITS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST A NEED FOR URGENT EFFECTIVE ACTION, WHICH CUMBERSOME UN PROCEDURES COULD VITIATE. BUT WE AND OTHERS WERE OBVIOUSLY READY TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL NEEDS. BELONOGOV CONCLUDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO WORK OUT A ROLE FOR THE UN: HE EXPECTED THIS PROBLEM TO BE WITH US FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS.

8. REVERTING TO THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MFA SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ON 9 AUGUST HAD DESCRIBED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUILD-UP OF TENSION. BELONOGOV DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM HIS MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN. THESE DAYS, SOVIET MASS MEDIA REPORTS NO LONGER REPRESENTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POSITION. HE REITERATED, WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS, HIS EARLIER REMARK ABOUT SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION. HE ADDED THAT CAREFUL NOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION OF THE PURELY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE STATES DEPLOYING FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WERE NOT INTENDING TO INITIATE MILITARY OPERATIONS. I DESCRIBED OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

EVACUATION

9. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 11 AUGUST (MY TELNO 1488), AND UNDERLINED THE CONTINUING VALUE OF VERY CLOSE COORDINATION ON THIS ASPECT. BELONOGOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN INTENDING TO MEET THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE DURING THE DAY TO DISCUSS THE IRAQI ORDER TO CLOSE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. IN THE EVENT, THE FRENCHMAN HAD CALLED ON HIM ON 12 AUGUST: HE WOULD SEE THE AMERICAN AND THE CHINESE LATER TODAY. HE WISHED TO SEEK OUR VIEWS ON THE 'CONCRETE QUESTION' OF HOW

TO DEAL WITH IRAQ'S DEMAND. AS THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RECOGNISE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION, IT COULD NOT JURIDICALLY ACCEDE TO THE DEMAND TO CLOSE ITS EMBASSY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE COMPETING PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALREADY SEEKING TO EVACUATE THEIR CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, SAVE FOR SOME EMBASSY STAFF. THE SITUATION THERE WAS TENSE AND LIKELY TO DETERIORATE. THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING FOOD AND WATER WAS GROWING, AND COULD ONLY BE EXACERBATED BY THE CLOSURE OF THE AIR AND SEA PORTS. KUWAIT DEPENDED ON IMPORTED FOOD. IRAQ ALSO IMPORTED MUCH FOOD. IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IRAQ, UNDER SANCTIONS, WOULD SUPPLY KUWAIT. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF HIS PEOPLE, WITH SHOOTING CONTINUING AND IRAQI SOLDIERS BEHAVING COARSELY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT IRAQI ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT. MOST OF THE 880 SOVIET CITIZENS IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED ON ECONOMIC PROJECTS WHICH HAD NOW STOPPED, GIVING THEM NO REASON TO STAY.

10. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO EVACUATE MOST OF ITS CITIZENS FROM KUWAIT, BUT THE EVACUATION HAD NOT/NOT STARTED. A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR USE OF THE AIRPORT AND SEAPORT HAD BEEN REFUSED. THE ONLY ROUTE LAY OVERLAND. THIS RAISED COMPLICATED TRANSPORT PROBLEMS, GIVEN THE DISTANCE AND SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPED TO COME UP WITH A PLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HAVE A UNITED POSITION ON THE KUWAIT ASPECT.

11. SO THAT I CAN REPLY, GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON OUR INTENTIONS OVER THE KUWAIT EMBASSY, AND ANY FURTHER POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO PUT TO THE MFA ON KUWAIT.

12. TURNING TO EVACUATION FROM IRAQ, BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT/NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION TO TRY TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS FROM IRAQ, EXCEPT FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HE 'HOPED' THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THIS.

13. I ASKED ABOUT THE TASS REPORT THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED TO THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET FAMILIES. BELONOGOV SAID THAT NO SUCH AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN REACHED WITH IRAQ. THE TASS ACCOUNT WAS PARTIALLY WRONG. THE SITUATION IN BAGHDAD WAS VERY COMPLICATED, AND DECISIONS WERE MADE ONE DAY AND CHANGED THE NEXT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I REGRETTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PUT THEIR NAMES TO THE 9 AUGUST JOINT DEMARCHE. BELONOGOV SAID THEY WERE IN A SPECIAL SITUATION IN IRAQ: THEY HAD 'TOO MANY PEOPLE THERE'.

15. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET MFA MIGHT CONVENE A REGULAR CONSULTATIVE GROUP OF THE MAJOR INTERESTED EMBASSIES AT WORKING LEVEL, TO POOL INFORMATION IN MOSCOW (AND SAVE THE MFA THE TIME TAKEN UP BY INDIVIDUAL CALLS): BELONOGOV WAS SHY OF THIS. HE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR COORDINATION TO BE CENTRED IN THE GROUP IN WASHINGTON. FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS WISH WAS TO CONCENTRATE HERE ONLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE CLOSURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

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From the Private Secretary

13 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has raised four points on which it would be helpful to have early comments from the FCO and MOD:

- ✓ (i) she is keen to get the blockade (or 'interdiction', as the Americans have it) going. My understanding is that the Americans have their request from the Kuwaitis, and are poised to start. We hope to receive a request today. The Prime Minister wants to know when we start allocating duties between navies: decide which countries will interdict in the Red Sea and which in the Gulf: what the coordinating mechanism will be and so on.
- (ii) *ANSWER by FCO* the Prime Minister believes that we must constantly be putting the case against Saddam Hussein, as Mr. Waldegrave did very effectively yesterday. We must get out details of his appallingly brutal record. The FCO and other agencies should work up a fully documented brief, perhaps in collaboration with the Americans.
- ✓ (iii) on the military side, the Prime Minister wants to know what rules apply to hot pursuit across the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders in the event of penetration and/or attacks by Iraqi aircraft. Is that covered by existing ROE? Or should we extend the ROE to cover such eventualities?
- ✓ (iv) the Prime Minister would also like to see a considered military view on how we (and the Americans) would respond to a chemical attack, either on our forces or on Saudi installations.

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It would be helpful to have at least a preliminary view on these points by this evening and a fuller report by tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence), Julian Miller (Mr. Hamilton's Office, Ministry of Defence), and to Sir Robin Butler.

Your friend,
C.D. POWELL
[Signature]

The Hon. Dominic Asquith,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc/c

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13 August 1990

Ms J R Binstead
Private Office
Secretary of State for Defence
Main Building
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LONDON S W 1

C 80
13/8

3 (A-B)

Dear Ms Binstead

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

-HAP

The Attorney General has seen your letter to me of 11 August asking for his views on certain questions from the Secretary of State for Defence. He has also had the benefit of the oral views of FCO Legal Advisers.

The Attorney has already advised that in the absence of a further UN resolution which expressly authorised the use of force in enforcing the oil embargo, measures for that purpose which were taken in response to a request from the legitimate Government of Kuwait could be justified in principle by reference to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, as preserved by Article 51 of the Charter.

To act on the request of a State whose flag ship is believed to be infringing the embargo would provide an alternative legal justification for Royal Navy operations. The RN would in effect be acting on behalf of the flag State in enforcing the latter's domestic law.

The Attorney advises that if any request made by a third State were to be acted upon by an RN ship, then the requested degree of force could not be exceeded, and secondly the request would have had to be accompanied by an indemnity against any civil liability arising from such action. Even then



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such an indemnity might prove unreliable when tested in the courts of the foreign jurisdiction.

The Attorney considers that such advantage as may be derived from gaining an alternative legal justification by these means is heavily outweighed by the consequential implication that there is something wrong with the Article 51 justification.

The Attorney does not consider that the position is any different if the flag State concerned was a member of the Security Council.

As a general principle, the Attorney is of the view that it remains highly desirable that in the context of legal justification for our actions we maintain a common footing with the US and our other allies.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Stephen Wall, Simon Whiteley and Sonia Phippard. I am also copying to Frank Berman (FCO Legal Advisers) and to Peter Ellis (MOD Legal Advisers).

Yours sincerely
E S Wilmshurst

E S WILMSHURST

Faxed to PM 14.8.90 *CPD*

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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Telephone 071-21 82111/3

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Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15S

13th August 1990

Answers to some of the questions which you put yesterday. On naval operations, the RN would scour inside the Gulf & the USN would operate a quarantine outside the Straits of Hormuz.
IRAQ/KUWAIT I will see if I can find

You wrote to Dominic Asquith this morning about four subjects raised by the Prime Minister. cut more from Brent Scowcroft about the

The question of putting the case against Saddam Hussein is, of course, one on which the Foreign Office should lead but the MOD has a number of comments on the Prime Minister's other points. This reply has been agreed by my Secretary of State but it has not been possible, in the time available, to discuss these with other Government Departments. planned US response to chemical.

①

First, on the question of intercepting ships, after discussions with the US it appears that the most effective RN contribution, at least initially, would be to provide two ships to patrol inside the Gulf working in cooperation with the USN vessels stationed outside the Strait of Hormuz. The concept is explained more fully in the attached paper. RN surveillance operations have already begun in the Gulf and this co-operative arrangement could begin to operate within two days, subject to finalisation of practical details with the USN in the Gulf. (This is in hand.) At present we have no indications that there are any suspect vessels in the Gulf area. *CPD 14/8.*

If enforcement action is to be fully effective ROE permitting the use of force, if necessary, will be required. Detailed ROE are being prepared, developed from those agreed in principle by OD(G) last week; these will be submitted tomorrow. To strengthen further the basis for enforcement action and for presentational reasons it might also be helpful to secure the agreement of major flag states that the RN may, if necessary, stop, board and search any of their vessels suspected of sanction breaking.

This concept of operations would also allow the ARMILLA patrol to maintain existing roles in support of British shipping and the

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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Gulf states. The current Iraqi threat is not judged sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of accompaniment of merchant shipping, although once shipping resumes use of the Saudi ports of Al Jubail and Ras Tanura it will be necessary to extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30'N. With 3 DD/FF deployed to the area, a sustainable patrol level is 2 DD/FF on operations in the Persian Gulf with 1 DD/FF stood down to the Gulf of Oman or a Gulf port at 24 hours notice, carrying out maintenance or showing a diplomatic presence.

The attached paper also discusses the need for international collaboration to collect and disseminate merchant ship intelligence. We believe that the UK is well placed to assume this focal role, which would also have the advantage of broadening the multinational nature of the naval operations in the Gulf. The Secretary of State has given instructions that this should be pursued urgently in consultation with the US.

② As far as pursuit of Iraqi aircraft is concerned, it was agreed following Simon Webb's letter of 9 August that UK aircraft would not fly over or within 25 miles of the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Republic of Yemen or Jordanian borders. Once Iraqi aircraft had carried out offensive action against targets on friendly territory or attacked our own or friendly aircraft, it would no longer be appropriate to impose such restrictions on our activities. We are considering as a matter of urgency how we should extend the ROE in the event of such aggression but we will need to consult the FCO and the Law Officers' Department. The proposed changes will be circulated shortly with a view to seeking automatic implementation of revised ROE in the event of further aggression.

③ Finally, so far as the response to a chemical attack is concerned, the UK would be concerned to ensure that a response was measured, sent the right political message and was proportionate to the Iraqi attack. We should, of course, need to bear in mind our responsibilities and undertakings as set out in the Negative Security Assurance. The UK has no assets in the theatre of operations which could, by themselves, deliver an effective response to an Iraqi chemical attack. The Jaguar aircraft could form part of an offensive force but they are essentially ground support aircraft. Any conventional response against fixed targets would, therefore, have to be US led. It could cover the range from pin point attacks to saturation bombing, depending on intelligence current at the time.

Tornado GR1 strike aircraft could be deployed to the Gulf to take part in a strike on Iraqi chemical production facilities and delivery systems. The number of aircraft required and the protection needed (such as defence suppression) to destroy an Iraqi chemical production facility would require further study and depend on the precise target. The Defence Secretary has instructed that

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this be set in hand. Any operation would take a few days to mount once political approval had been received, and would need to be co-ordinated in-theatre.

Our current understanding is that the US response plans envisage conventional retaliation using B52s from Diego Garcia and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Carrier Battle Groups. It could also include F111s from Turkey and F16s from the Gulf. We do not, however, have details of their plans and have been advised that the correct approach for information of this nature would be from you to Brent Scowcroft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (FCO), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Prime Minister

13th August 1990

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14/8.

First, on the question of intercepting ships, after discussions with the US it appears that the most effective RN contribution, at least initially, would be to provide two ships to patrol inside the Gulf working in cooperation with the USN vessels stationed outside the Strait of Hormuz. The concept is explained more fully in the attached paper. RN surveillance operations have already begun in the Gulf and this co-operative arrangement could begin to operate within two days, subject to finalisation of practical details with the USN in the Gulf. (This is in hand.) At present we have no indications that there are any suspect vessels in the Gulf area.

If enforcement action is to be fully effective ROE permitting the use of force, if necessary, will be required. Detailed ROE are being prepared, developed from those agreed in principle by OD(G) last week; these will be submitted tomorrow. To strengthen further the basis for enforcement action and for presentational reasons it might also be helpful to secure the agreement of major flag states that the RN may, if necessary, stop, board and search any of their vessels suspected of sanction breaking.

This concept of operations would also allow the ARMILLA patrol to maintain existing roles in support of British shipping and the

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Gulf states. The current Iraqi threat is not judged sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of accompaniment of merchant shipping, although once shipping resumes use of the Saudi ports of Al Jubail and Ras Tanura it will be necessary to extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30'N. With 3 DD/FF deployed to the area, a sustainable patrol level is 2 DD/FF on operations in the Persian Gulf with 1 DD/FF stood down to the Gulf of Oman or a Gulf port at 24 hours notice, carrying out maintenance or showing a diplomatic presence.

The attached paper also discusses the need for international collaboration to collect and disseminate merchant ship intelligence. We believe that the UK is well placed to assume this local role, which would also have the advantage of broadening the multinational nature of the naval operations in the Gulf. The Secretary of State has given instructions that this should be pursued urgently in consultation with the US.

2) As far as pursuit of Iraqi aircraft is concerned, it was agreed following Simon Webb's letter of 9 August that UK aircraft would not fly over or within 25 miles of the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Republic of Yemen or Jordanian borders. Once Iraqi aircraft had carried out offensive action against targets on friendly territory or attacked our own or friendly aircraft, it would no longer be appropriate to impose such restrictions on our activities. We are considering as a matter of urgency how we should extend the ROE in the event of such aggression but we will need to consult the FCO and the Law Officers' Department. The proposed changes will be circulated shortly with a view to seeking automatic implementation of revised ROE in the event of further aggression.

3) Finally, so far as the response to a chemical attack is concerned, the UK would be concerned to ensure that a response was measured, sent the right political message and was proportionate to the Iraqi attack. We should, of course, need to bear in mind our responsibilities and undertakings as set out in the Negative Security Assurance. The UK has no assets in the theatre of operations which could, by themselves, deliver an effective response to an Iraqi chemical attack. The Jaguar aircraft could form part of an offensive force but they are essentially ground support aircraft. Any conventional response against fixed targets would, therefore, have to be US led. It could cover the range from pin point attacks to saturation bombing, depending on intelligence current at the time.

Tornado GR1 strike aircraft could be deployed to the Gulf to take part in a strike on Iraqi chemical production facilities and delivery systems. The number of aircraft required and the protection needed (such as defence suppression) to destroy an Iraqi chemical production facility would require further study and depend on the precise target. The Defence Secretary has instructed that

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this be set in hand. Any operation would take a few days to mount once political approval had been received, and would need to be co-ordinated in-theatre.

Our current understanding is that the US response plans envisage conventional retaliation using B52s from Diego Garcia and Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Carrier Battle Groups. It could also include F111s from Turkey and F16s from the Gulf. We do not, however, have details of their plans and have been advised that the correct approach for information of this nature would be from you to Brent Scowcroft.

I am copying this letter to Dominic Asquith (FCO), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Jean R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

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(A-B)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/50

13 August 1990

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CDP
13/8

IRAQ/KUWAIT

John
Minister(DP) has seen Charles Powell's letter to Dominic Asquith of 13 August 1990. Mr Clark would like a number of points to be taken into account in drafting a response. He would also like them to be borne in mind more generally in the formulation of operational activity in the Gulf:

a. Naval units and aircraft should always be armed unless particular circumstances make this impossible; this applies in particular to the MCMVs which, because of their very shallow draft, are ideally suited to intercepting coastal shipping in waters which would be hazardous for larger naval units;

b. While accepting the paramountcy of our close integration at command level with the United States Navy, it is important to bear in mind that the various European contingents are reluctant to accede to this arrangement in the same degree (or, in the case of the French, not at all). In conversation between Mr Clark and the Dutch Defence Minister this morning, this point was made very plain but the Dutch Minister did imply he would be quite ready to subordinate Dutch Naval units to an overall RN command and he believed that the other European Navies would be also of this view;

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c. As far as possible, legal restraints on hot pursuit and analogous action should be moderated so as to leave the decision in the hands of the senior officer on the spot which, in the case of aircraft, could mean the commander of the aircraft actually engaged. The question of hot pursuit cannot sensibly be considered

i. until the existing 25 mile restriction is lifted and

ii. appropriate defence suppression equipment, preferably under RAF command, is in place.

2. Mr Clark has not yet had sight of the full arguments against dispatch of a CVS to the theatre, although he understands that ARK ROYAL is at 48hrs notice. If a full defence suppression capability under sovereign control is to be put in place, this will mean at least one squadron of Harrier GR5s. Operational experience has shown that the CVS is a very useful adjunct to a mixed deployment of GR5s or Sea Harrier. However, he recognises that a CVS is a major Naval asset and, for this reason, would be particularly interested to see the advice which lay behind last week's decision.



D R A HATCHER
APS/Minister(DP)

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL):

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PUBLIC COMMENTS BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
SUMMARY

1. BAKER, CHENEY AND SCOWCROFT APPEAR ON THE TV NETWORKS' QUOTE NEWSMAKER UNQUOTE SUNDAY PROGRAMMES.

DETAIL

2. SECRETARIES BAKER AND CHENEY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SCOWCROFT EACH GAVE INTERVIEWS TODAY (12 AUGUST) TO THE THREE MAJOR TV NETWORKS' SUNDAY CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMMES. THEY ALL STRESSED THAT THE US TROOP BUILD UP, AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, WERE AT THE REQUEST OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS WERE A DEFENSIVE MEASURE AND A DETERRENT TO FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION IN THE REGION. ALL THREE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN AS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF US FORCES LIKELY TO BE DEPLOYED OR WHAT FUTURE MILITARY OPTIONS MIGHT BE OPEN TO THE PRESIDENT. QUOTE I WOULD NOT WANT TO PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT THE US RESPONSE MIGHT BE IN TERMS OF VARIOUS MILITARY CONTINGENCIES, BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE US HAS A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCE IN THE AREA, THERE IS MORE ON THE WAY, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE A RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM SHOULD HE BE REQUIRED TO USE MILITARY CAPABILITY UNQUOTE (CHENEY). THEY WERE ALSO CAREFUL NOT TO PREDICT ANY TIMEFRAME FOR SANCTIONS TO BITE OR HOW LONG US FORCES WERE LIKELY TO REMAIN. THEY ALL REFERRED TO THE UNPRECEDENTED WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF SADDAM AND SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS. THERE WAS PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR US (AND OTHER) CITIZENS WHO WERE BEING PREVENTED FROM LEAVING IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

3. BAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM KUWAIT FOR SUPPORT TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS: QUOTE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS JUST REQUESTED OF US AND OTHER NATIONS SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS THEY HAVE MADE THE FORMAL REQUEST NOW THAT IS NEEDED UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO HAVE A LEGAL BASIS FOR STOPPING

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THE EXPORT OF OIL AND THAT SORT OF THING ... WE NOW HAVE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERDICTING THOSE KINDS OF SHIPMENTS ... WE NOW HAVE A FORMAL REQUEST TO IMPLEMENT THOSE SANCTIONS AND WE INTEND TO DO THAT ... THE MEASURES THAT WE USE WILL BE THOSE MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. UNQUOTE.

4. SCOWCROFT, REFERRING TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DESCRIBED THEM AS A TERROR WEAPON AND THAT THEIR USE WOULD BE TAKEN VERY, VERY SERIOUSLY. HE AGREED THAT ITS (CW) EFFECT AGAINST UNPROTECTED CIVILIANS OR TROOPS WOULD HAVE VERY SIMILAR EFFECTS TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION, SCOWCROFT SAID QUOTE I THINK HIS (SADDAM'S) INVASION OF JORDAN WE WOULD TREAT IN A SIMILAR MANNER TO HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT. UNQUOTE.

5. FULL TEXTS BY FAX TO FCO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

YYYY

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