

CAB ONE

PART 24

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CAB ONE

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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Situation in the Middle East
Conflict between Iraq / Kuwait / Saudi Arabia
UK Policy towards the conflict

MIDDLE EAST

PT1: Mar 1979



PT24: 20 August 1990

CAB ONE

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 1056

OF 230915Z AUGUST 90

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO

(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

FOR TOMKYS

MY TELNO 1046: GERMAN REACTION TO GULF CRISIS

1. WHEN I TALKED TO THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ON 22 AUGUST ABOUT THE TIMING OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION, KASTRUP WAS AT PAINS TO ARGUE THAT THE FRG'S OVERALL CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN EFFORTS IN THE CRISIS WAS ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL. IN THAT CONTEXT HE SAID QUOTE WHEN IT COMES TO DISCUSSING ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES SUFFERING ECONOMICALLY FROM THE CRISIS, WHERE DO YOU THINK THEY WILL LOOK FOR THE MONEY? UNQUOTE. IF YOU WANT ME TO FOLLOW THIS UP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ARTICLE 50 OF THE UN CHARTER (PARA 3 OF FCO TELNO 471 TO UKMIS) PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

2. DURING A SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH HARTMANN (ACTING DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO KOHL) ON 22 AUGUST, HE TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT A NEW IDEA ABOUT GERMAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BY SOME OFFICIALS BUT SHELVED. THIS WAS THAT MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS TO TURKEY, AS A NATO MEMBER, WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AND MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IF THAT COUNTRY WAS CLEARLY THREATENED IN DUE COURSE BY IRAQ. HARTMANN SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG TO HINT PUBLICLY AT THIS POSSIBILITY, BECAUSE THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE NATO TREATY COULD BE TRIGGERED BY THE PRESENT CRISIS AND WOULD GREATLY HEIGHTEN PUBLIC CONCERN IN THE WEST. IF A CLEAR THREAT TO TURKEY EMERGED LATER, THE IDEA MIGHT BE RECONSIDERED IN BONN.

We considered it - the first day - it is so obvious.

3. EVEN IF KOHL AND THE DEFENCE MINISTER LATER ESPOUSED THIS IDEA, I THINK GENSCHER WOULD BE RELUCTANT. DECISIONS WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY THE APPROACH OF ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS ON 2 DECEMBER AND PERHAPS BY THE INTENSE PREOCCUPATION WITH UNIFICATION AND THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE GDR.

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4. HARTMANN BESOUGHT ME NOT TO REPORT HIS REMARKS. PLEASE COULD PARA 2 BE TREATED WITH EXTREME DISCRETION AND NOT QUOTED BACK TO ANY GERMANS.

5. WE HAVE A SEPARATE INDICATION THAT THE FEDERAL MOD ARE CONSIDERING THE EVACUATION FROM TURKEY OF 600 CIVILIANS (NOT ALL GERMAN) WHO HAVE GONE THERE FROM IRAQ.

MALLABY

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SIC I9M/Z8G

UAE/US RELATIONS : CHENEY'S VISIT.

SUMMARY

1. US RIDING HIGH. SEEKING UAE INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT WITH DEFENCE COSTS.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF CHENEY'S BRIEF VISIT HERE ON 20 AUGUST.

3. WALKER SAID THAT THE PARTY WAS OVERWHELMED BY THE WARMTH OF SHAIKH ZAYED'S WELCOME. IN TERMS NORMALLY RESERVED ONLY FOR THE BRITISH, ZAYED LECTURED MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AND CABINET ATTENDING THE MEETING ABOUT THE CLOSENESS OF UAE/US RELATIONS. THE US HAD COME QUICKLY TO DEFEND THE UAE. THEY STOOD SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE EMIRATES IN THEIR TIME OF DIFFICULTY. THE UAE WOULD NOT FORGET AND WOULD IN TURN ALWAYS STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE AMERICANS IN FUTURE.

4. WALKER SAID THAT CHENEY HAD TWO PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES :

A) TO ASK UAE TO INCREASE OIL PRODUCTION AND

B) TO LOOK FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE COST OF THE US OPERATION.

ON A) ZAYED HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT HOPED THE POSITION WOULD BE EASIER SOON. HE HAD AGREED TO B).

COMMENT

5. NOT SURPRISINGLY THE AMERICANS ARE RIDING HERE AT THE

MOMENT. UNTIL RECENTLY ZAYED GAVE ALL US VISITORS A ROASTING ABOUT THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND WAS ONCE QUOTED AS DESCRIBING AMERICA AS THE ARAB WORLD'S NUMBER TWO ENEMY. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER PALESTINE WILL AGAIN BECOME A MAJOR BILATERAL PROBLEM IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. ZAYED'S ARAB NATIONALIST STREAK IS BOUND TO BE LESS IN EVIDENCE FOR A WHILE. THOSE AROUND HIM SAY HE REMAINS SHOCKED BY THE ACTIONS OF SADDAM, A MAN ZAYED BELIEVED HE UNDERSTOOD AND WITH WHOM A FRIENDSHIP SEEMED TO BE DEVELOPING.

6. ON OIL ZAYED'S RESPONSE TO CHENEY WAS PROBABLY A REFERENCE TO THE PROPOSAL FOR AN OPEC SUMMIT WHICH COLLAPSED LATER THE SAME DAY. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE UAE WILL BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT GETTING OUT AHEAD OF AGREED OPEC QUOTAS FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WAS QUOTA BUSTING WHICH GOT THEM INTO TROUBLE WITH IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE SEMI COLON IRAN HAS WARNED THEM AGAINST INCREASING NOW SEMI COLON AND THERE IS NO ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE SINCE AT TODAY'S PRICE AND PRODUCTION LEVELS (DOLLARS 30 AT 1.5 MBPD) REVENUES ARE NEARLY TWICE AS HIGH AS BEFORE THE INVASION.

7. ON DEFRAYING US COSTS I SUSPECT THE UAE CONTRIBUTION WILL BE THE FREE SUPPLY OF LOCAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT EG FUEL, ACCOMMODATION AND TRANSPORT. THE HANDING OVER OF CASH IS, IN OUR EXPERIENCE, LIKELY TO PROVE MORE DIFFICULT. ON THE OTHER HAND US PROSPECTS OF SECURING MAJOR ARMS SALES MUST HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY.

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LEBANON HOSTAGES : BRIAN KEENAN

1. WHEN I SAW THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (KHARRAZI) ON 23 AUGUST HE TOLD ME THAT BRIAN KEENAN WOULD BE RELEASED BY 1900 LOCAL ON 24 AUGUST.
2. I SAID THAT I WAS GRATEFUL FOR ANY ROLE THAT IRAN HAD PLAYED IN THE RELEASE.
3. KHARRAZI SAID, SOMEWHAT TO MY SURPRISE, THAT THIS WAS A SIGN OF GOOD WILL WHICH SHOWED WHAT ROLE IRAN MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY OVER OTHER HOSTAGES. KEENAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED A MONTH AGO, BUT IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES HAD PREVENTED THIS.
4. WE HAVE NOT (NOT) TOLD THE IRISH MISSION ABOUT THIS. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY MY CONVERSATION WITH KHARRAZI ABOUT ANGLO-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

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INFO IMMEDIATE BOGOT, ACTOR, ESC LONDON, MODUK

SIC

FORMER TEXT

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS LATEST TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FIVE ON 23 AUGUST:

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990) AND DEMANDING THEIR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION:

HAVING DECIDED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

DETERMINED TO BRING THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ TO AN END AND TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT:

DEPLORING THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE STEMMING FROM THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND DETERMINED TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH LOSSES:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), AND 664 (1990) AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

1. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA WITH EFFECT AS FROM 1800 HOURS EDT (2200 GMT) AUGUST 24, 1990 TO USE SUCH MINIMUM FORCE AS MAY BE NECESSARY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO HALT ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD

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MIDTIME SHIPPING IN ORDER TO VERIFY THEIR CARGOS AND DESTINATIONS AND TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES RELATED TO SUCH SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990).

2. INVITES MEMBER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER TO COOPERATE WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 661 (1990) IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE STATES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF THIS RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SHORE AND BUNKERING FACILITIES.

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION USING AS APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE TO SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND ITS COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 661.

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.


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MR APLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister ①

Notes for your visit

review.

CAD?

You are to make a short visit to the Gulf Support Group Helpline in the Connaught Rooms at 3 pm tomorrow.

Helpline was formed about ten days ago to offer comfort and practical advice to those who have friends or relatives trapped in Iraq or Kuwait. You will meet Robert Hayward MP, the moving force behind the Gulf Support Group, who has a close friend trapped in Kuwait.

The attached briefing was prepared for the Foreign Secretary, who made a successful visit yesterday.

PROGRAMME

15.00 Arrive at New Connaught Rooms, met on steps by Robert Hayward, who will lead you through the lobby and into a lift to the Third Floor.

15.05 Met at lift by Joanna Copley, one of Robert Hayward's fellow co-ordinators. She will take you into the Operations Room, where phone calls are answered. You will meet some of the volunteers, although you will not of course be listening to the conversations, which are confidential.

THIS IS A SMALL ROOM, BUT A VERY SMALL PRESS POOL -- ONE STILL CAMERA, ONE TV CREW -- WILL BE PRESENT. NO REPORTERS WILL BE ALLOWED

15.15 Joanna Copley will take you down a narrow corridor into the rest room, where you will be able to meet some more volunteers.

YOU WILL BE ASKED TO POSE FOR A QUICK PHOTOGRAPH WITH SOME OF THE VOLUNTEERS AT THIS POINT.

The press will leave after the photograph, and you will then have the opportunity of seeing the logbook which details the calls that have been made. You will also have the chance to discuss with Robert Hayward and Joanna Copley how they see Helpline developing.

15.25

To lift for descent to Ground Floor, accompanied by Robert Hayward.

AS YOU LEAVE THE BUILDING, PRESS WILL BE PRESENT ON YOUR RIGHT. THEY WILL ASK YOU FOR YOUR REACTIONS TO THE WORK OF HELPLINE.

Charles and I will accompany you on your visit.

ms

Philip Aylett

PHILIP AYLETT
Press Office
23 August 1990

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO HELPLINE OFFICES, 22 AUGUST

BACKGROUND

1. Helpline was formed last week when two of three unofficial organisations established following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait merged. Its purpose is to offer comfort and practical advice to those who have friends or relatives trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. The moving force behind it is Mr Robert Hayward MP, who has a close friend who is trapped in Kuwait. Helpline, which is staffed entirely by volunteers, was initially critical of the FCO's failure, as they saw it, to keep in touch with families. It has now established a reasonable working relationship with the FCO Consular Emergency Unit. Mr Hayward and others visited the Emergency Unit on 15 August, and met Mr Waldegrave.

2. Mr Hayward has warned us of a number of points which he hopes to raise with the Secretary of State:

(i) Finance - Provision for Exfiltrators from Iraq/Kuwait

The Department of Social Security has sent a circular letter to all local DSS Offices instructing them to deal sympathetically and promptly with applications for help. They consider that existing social security provisions should be sufficient to meet immediate needs of those who cannot provide for themselves.

(ii) Lack of Cooperation by Banks and Building Societies on Funds for Ex-Filtrators and UK-Based Dependants of Detainees in Iraq and Kuwait

We have no evidence of such lack of cooperation. But lack of access to bank accounts, and shortage of money for mortgage payments, could obviously be problems. Have Helpline any suggestions?

HELAAN

(iii) Foreign Office Communication with Mr Hayward's Helpline Organisation

Since Mr Hayward and his colleagues visited the FCO on 15 August the Emergency Unit has sent copies of all situation reports by fax to Helpline. We have also been in contact by telephone whenever there have been significant developments. Helpline, for their part, have been very helpful in putting members of the public in touch with the FCO when they believe that there would be anything to be gained from such contact.

(iv) Counsellors: Are FCO Officials Qualified to Deal with the Notification of Distressing (Non-Death) News to Relatives?

No. The members of the FCO telephone team, who are working in shifts to man the 10-line unit around the clock, have to rely mainly on their natural tact when dealing with distressed relatives. Some are more gifted than others. Their role is to inform relatives and friends what is happening, not to provide counselling. They have been guided by a qualified Counsellor in the FCO's Medical Welfare Unit on how to handle distressed relatives gently.

(v) Financing of Mr Hayward's Helpline

Helpline have told us that they are approaching companies with employees who are trapped for help. The Secretary of State may wish to enquire what response they are getting. British Telecom announced last week that they would contribute £2,500.

Mr Waldegrave told Mr Hayward on 15 August that the FCO would certainly find a way of helping Helpline. We have since told Mr Hayward that we expect to be able to give him some of the income from the Emergency Unit 0898 profit-earning information line. We have asked him for a

breakdown of his costs.

(vi) Social Security Problems Faced by Returnees

See (i) above. The Department of Social Security have told us in confidence (not for use) that they hope to be able to lend Helpline an expert for the duration of the crisis to advise members of the public on how to claim benefits.

(vii) The Accommodation of Mr Hayward's Helpline Offices

The present accommodation is being provided free of charge. There is no possibility of the FCO providing accommodation for Helpline when they have to move out of the Connaught Rooms in two weeks' time. But if they include rent in their projection of costs we shall see if we can help.

(viii) What the Government Is/Is Not Doing to Help those in Kuwait and Iraq

The Secretary of State will not require briefing on this item.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO HELPLINE OFFICES, 22 AUGUST

POINTS TO MAKE

- Appreciate what helpline are doing to comfort and inform families and friends of those trapped in Iraq and Kuwait.
- Grateful to those who are generously giving their time as volunteers.
- FCO will continue to support, and will give financial help.

cc Miss Spence
Mr Young
News Dept.

HBLAAN

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

FILE KK
36(a-c)
C Foreign Iraq

bc PC
SUBJECT
cc MASTER

23 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: MEETING OF MINISTERS

The Prime Minister held a meeting this morning with the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Energy Secretary, the Attorney General and the Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Waldegrave), to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf crisis. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock were also present. This letter summarises the main action points.

UN Security Council Resolution on Enforcement of Sanctions

The meeting had before it the text of the draft Resolution in UKMIS New York tel. no. 1061. The Attorney General raised a drafting point relating to operative paragraph one, recommending commas after the word "shipping" in the fourth line and "destinations" in the fifth line, to avoid any ambiguity.

The Foreign Secretary reported that the Americans hoped to achieve a positive vote on the draft resolution in the course of today, having agreed with the Soviet Union that it would not be implemented until 2200z on Friday 24 August. But there were still doubts about the position of some of the non-Permanent Members of the Security Council. There would be intensive lobbying during the day.

The Prime Minister drew attention to the way in which the United States had changed the ROE for their naval forces in the Gulf area over the past two days, in relation to the changing prospects of securing the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution. We had had to follow suit. This was undesirable and unfair to the Commanding Officers of USN and RN ships. It should not happen again. Her strong view on this should be brought to the attention of the White House. I will take action on this.

Aid to Jordan

It was noted that the Commission were proposing urgent assistance to Jordan from the Community budget, whereas we had argued for national contributions. We should continue to maintain this position at the forthcoming meeting of Political

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Directors of the Twelve, and argue for those countries which were not contributing to the multi-national force in the Gulf to play the major part in helping Jordan and Turkey.

British Citizens in Iraq and Kuwait

The Foreign Secretary reported that the Embassy in Amman would be trying to persuade the Jordanians to re-open their border to let through the convoy of British Embassy dependants which had left Baghdad earlier this morning.

The question was also raised whether the Jordanian action in closing the Jordan/Iraq border applied to lorry traffic going from Jordan into Iraq in breach of UN sanctions.

It was noted that representatives of the United Nation's Secretary General were in Baghdad to discuss the question of foreign citizens with the Iraqi Government, but had not made any progress.

The Attorney General was invited to ensure that the argument that we would hold individual Iraqi's accountable for any maltreatment of British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait could be legally sustained.

International Committee of the Red Cross

The Minister of State Foreign Office reported that, following the Prime Minister's strictures and his own visit to Geneva, he believed that the ICRC would bend all its efforts to trying to help foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait. The Prime Minister directed that we should give particular prominence to the case of the British family in Kuwait, who had been taken away at gun point with their baby. We should ask the ICRC to intervene in this specific case and draw the widest possible public attention to it as an example of Iraq's inhuman conduct.

The Minister of State Foreign Office reported that he had also visited the United Nations' Human Rights Commission and encouraged them to pass a condemnatory resolution on Iraq's behaviour, as they had in the case of the massacre in Tiananmen Square. It was agreed that maximum publicity should be given to this also.

Helpline

The Foreign Secretary reported on his visit to the Helpline headquarters, which had been organised by Mr. Robert Hayward M.P. The FCO would provide some modest funds for the service. The Prime Minister said she would try to arrange a visit there herself.

Embassies in Kuwait

It was noted with satisfaction that even those EC countries whose citizens were being allowed to leave Iraq and Kuwait had agreed to keep open their Embassies in Kuwait after the Iraqi deadline for closure of 24 August.

Despatch of Additional British Forces to the Gulf

The proposals for despatch of additional British forces to the Gulf set out in the Defence Secretary's minute of 22 August to the Prime Minister were agreed and will be announced by the Defence Secretary at a press conference this morning. It was noted that the additional Tornado GRI aircraft would be stationed in Bahrain.

Enforcement Action in Support of the United Nations Embargo

The meeting considered the Defence Secretary's undated minute on enforcement action in support of the United Nations embargo. The Attorney General endorsed points (a) to (h) in the annex to that minute, but raised questions about the final paragraph in relation to proportionality. It was agreed that these would be further discussed between the Attorney General and the Defence Secretary and a report made to the next meeting. The Prime Minister urged caution in the use of boarding parties.

Longer-Term Prospects

The Foreign Secretary underlined the importance of ensuring that the United Kingdom was fully involved in any planning conducted by the United States for possible military action to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. We must not find ourselves confronted with proposals for such action, in which we would inevitably be involved, at short notice. It seemed unlikely, however, that the Americans would contemplate such action before their mechanised divisions arrived in theatre in early October. It was agreed that we should take every opportunity to keep in close touch with American thinking. General Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, should be encouraged to visit London. Our own Commander-in-Chief was likely to meet the American Commander of CENTCOM in the Gulf shortly. The Prime Minister would probably see the President in New York at the end of September.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Secret

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YOUR TELNO 467: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. UK/US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CURRENTLY IN FORCE PERMIT OUR FORCES TO ATTACK POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED IRAQI AIRCRAFT UNDER SPECIFICALLY DEFINED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AIR COMMANDER BRITISH FORCES IS CONCERNED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT MOUNT AN ATTACK BY THEIR PILOTS FLYING KUWAITI AIRCRAFT AND HAS THEREFORE ASKED MOD FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE RULES TO INCLUDE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT CARRYING KUWAITI MARKINGS. I SEE MERIT IN THIS APPROACH.

2. REGARDING THE NEED FOR KUWAITI AGREEMENT, THE PRECISE CONDITIONS WE CHOOSE FOR OUR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IS A MATTER FOR HMG TO DECIDE. WE MAY CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE TO ISSUE A WARNING, ESPECIALLY TO THIRD PARTIES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT NEED THEIR AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO INSTITUTE THEM. I COULD TAKE THIS UP WITH THE KUWAITIS WHEN I SEE THEM IN TAIF ON 25 AUGUST BUT AM RELUCTANT TO DO SO. SURELY THIS IS A MATTER FOR HMG ALONE? IF YOU STILL WISH ME TO CONSULT KUWAITIS PLEASE CONFIRM BY DESKBY 250500Z

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OF 231810Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY OPEC POSTS, OECD POSTS, UKDEL NATO, ESC LONDON

IRAQ/KUWAIT : IEA OIL MARKET COMMITTEE, 23 AUGUST.

SUMMARY

1. CHANCE OF ONLY MODEST NET SUPPLY SHORTFALL IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, BUT CONCERN AT PRICE RISE. SECRETARIAT WILL REVISE PAPER FOR GOVERNING BOARD ON 31 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. SECRETARIAT (ROOM DOCUMENT BY HAND OF JANET WRIGHT, D/EN) STRESSED WE DID NOT FACE SAME PROBLEMS AS 1979.80. THERE WAS SPARE CAPACITY AND WE HAD LARGE STOCKS. EXPECTED OPEC PRODUCTION INCREASES COMBINED WITH CONTINUED COMPANY STOCKDRAW COULD REDUCE THE SHORTFALL TO 0.3MBD, THOUGH WITHOUT AN OPEN RESPONSE, SHORTFALL COULD EXCEED 2.5MBD.

3. US (BRODMAN) WARNED THAT WE LOOKED LIKELY TO FACE A TIGHT MARKET FROM NOW ON. COMPANIES WOULD HAVE USED MUCH OF THEIR STOCK, AND IF CURRENT BACKWARD ACTION REVERTED TO CONTANGO (FUTURES PRICES ONCE MORE HIGHER THAN SPOT), THEY MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO DRAW MORE. BUT THERE WERE WELCOME SIGNS OF INCREASING SAUDI PRODUCTION: AND IN ADDITION TO VENEZUELA AND UAE, MEDICO AND COLOMBIA WERE LIKELY TO PRODUCE AN EXTRA 100,000 BD EACH. HE WELCOMED CONFIRMATION OF DEFERRED MAINTENANCE ON NINIAN AND BRENT FIELDS, WHICH WOULD ADD 200,000 BD TO NORTH SEA OUTPUT. HOWEVER THE TIGHT MARKET WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO REGIONAL AND/OR QUALITY SHORTAGES FORCING PRICES UP. (HE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT USDOE WERE PLANNING ON DOLLARS 30/BBL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE).

4. JAPAN SHARED THE WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT LATEST PRICE RISES REFLECTED UNCERTAINTY RATHER THAN SHORTAGE. LAST WEEK, WHEN CONFUSION OVER SAUDI ALLOCATIONS CAUSED A STIR, MITI HAD INTERVENED, REMINDING COMPANIES OF THE FUNDAMENTALS, ALLOWING THEM TO REDUCE MINIMUM STOCK REQUIREMENTS AND ASKING THEM TO INCREASE REFINERY THROUGHPUT TO HELP THE PRODUCT MARKET. IRAN HAD OFFERED TERM INSTEAD OF SPOT CONTRACTS, BUT IT NOW SEEMED THAT JAPANESE COMPANIES WERE WAITING TO SEE HOW FAST SAUDI PRODUCTION INCREASED.

BOTH JAPAN AND US SAID THEY HAD STOPPED ADDING TO STRATEGIC RESERVES.

5. NO DELEGATIONS COMPLAINED OF CRUDE SHORTAGES, OR OF DIFFICULTIES WITH CRUDE MIX, BUT CONTINUING CHANGES IN THE REFINING INDUSTRY COULD CAUSE REGIONAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES (AND THE US SAID AVIATION FUEL WAS ALREADY AFFECTED BY MILITARY ACTIVITY). PRICES WERE OF GENERAL CONCERN, THOUGH EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION WERE NOT YET SIGNIFICANT. ONLY FRANCE REPORTED PRICE CONTROL MEASURES - BUT LIMITED TO A LINK TO THE ROTTERDAM SPOT CRUDE PRICE. EUROPEANS GENERALLY SAW THEMSELVES RELATIVELY INSULATED BY HIGH TAX LEVELS ON PETROL. EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAD LOOKED AT LONG-TERM PRICE EFFECTS: AT DOLLARS 30/BBL, GROWTH DOWN BY 1 PER CENT IN 1991, WITH CONSUMPTION DOWN 1MBD IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF NEXT YEAR.

6. SECRETARIAT WILL PUT A NUMBER OF DETAILED COMMENTS (AS WELL AS NEW DEVELOPMENTS) INTO A REVISED PAPER FOR THE 31 AUGUST GOVERNING BOARD. IF CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE NOT CREATED A TRIGGER SITUATION (AND MRS STEEG SAID SHE WOULD GIVE AN ORAL PRESENTATION ON SOME OF THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS), THE GB WILL STILL NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO AGREE SOME FORM OF CO-ORDINATED STOCKDRAW AND DEMAND RESTRAINT ACTION, IF ONLY TO TRY TO CALM A NERVOUS MARKET. MRS STEEG TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT MOST OF HER SOUNDINGS OF COMPANIES SUGGESTED THAT CONCERTED ACTION WOULD ADD TO NERVOUSNESS. BUT THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY BOARD MEETS ON 30 AUGUST AND WILL HAVE VIEWS.

FCO ADVANCE TO D/ENERGY

LLEWELLYN SMITH

YYYY

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MR D LOVE OT2/2 DTI/VIC ST
MR PETTER OT4/1 DTI/VIC ST
MR G NUTTALL OT4/2L DTI, VIC ST



SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 240830Z FCO

TELNO 2028

OF 232330Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, ACTOR
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCO, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE ESC LONDON

SECRET

ADVANCE COPY

34 (A-D)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

SUMMARY

1. AUTHORITATIVE CONFIRMATION THAT AMERICAN POLICY IS WHAT THEY SAY IT IS, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND MASSIVE DEFENSIVE CONTAINMENT: BOTH DESIGNED TO INDUCE AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, BOTH NEEDING TIME TO WORK. NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT JORDAN OR ISRAEL MEANWHILE. OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ STILL CONSIDERED A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, FOR WHICH NO CURRENT PLAN EXISTS, WHICH THE US WOULD NOT HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO MOUNT FOR SOME TIME AND FOR WHICH THEY WOULD LOOK FOR UN COVER AND BROAD ARAB SUPPORT. RECOGNITION THAT PUBLIC REACTION TO - EG TREATMENT OF HOSTAGES COULD ALTER THE PICTURE. DEEP GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH ROLE.

DETAIL

2. I HAD A HALF AN HOUR ONE ON ONE WITH KIMMITT AT MY REQUEST ON 23 AUGUST. I MADE IT CLEAR IN ADVANCE I WAS NOT ACTING ON EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT MY PURPOSE WAS TO TRY TO LOOK A LITTLE FURTHER AT THE LIKELY EVOLUTION OF WESTERN POLICIES SO AS TO CONFIRM THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING ON THE SAME LINES.

3. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT, FOR THE PRESENT, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THERE WERE NO MAJOR NEW IRAQI MOVES, WE SEEMED FIRMLY ON THE TWIN TRACK OF SHORING UP THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND ENFORCING AND IMPOSING UN SANCTIONS. A PATTERN WAS THEREFORE SET FOR THE NEXT 6-8 WEEKS. IT COULD STILL BE UPSET BY DIFFICULTIES IN JORDAN OR COMPLICATIONS FROM ISRAEL AS WELL AS BY POSSIBLE IRAQI MOVES. BY OCTOBER HOWEVER, THE US BUILD-UP SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, WIDENING THE RANGE OF OPTIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO BY THEN BE ABLE TO TAKE A BETTER VIEW OF WHETHER OR NOT OUR CURRENT STRATEGY WAS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE TWIN

OBJECTIVES OF ASSURING THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES AND, SECONDLY, OF RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT. THERE HAD BEEN WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT NOT SURVIVE AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND/OR THAT IF HE DID HE WOULD REMAIN SUCH A THREAT THAT HIS EVENTUAL REMOVAL FROM POWER WOULD BE NECESSARY. I WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW HOW US VIEWS WERE DEVELOPING IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS. B

4. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE SCENARIO I HAD PAINTED BUT WOULD PUT THREE IMMEDIATE GLOSSES ON IT. THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED, AS HE KNEW WE WERE, ABOUT JORDAN. THEY FULLY ACCEPTED THE NEED TO HELP THE COUNTRY ECONOMICALLY. BUT HE DID NOT THINK A JORDANIAN COLLAPSE WAS IMMEDIATELY IN PROSPECT. NOR HAD THE UNITED STATES COME TO ANY MILITARY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT

WHAT THEY SHOULD DO IF KING HUSSEIN'S REGIME CAME TO BE ENDANGERED BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN VACILLATIONS. THE IMMEDIATE TASK WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE KING, IN HIS OWN LONGER TERM INTERESTS, MADE UP HIS MIND TO SUPPORT THE ARAB MAJORITY AND THE WESTERN POWERS AND THEN TO STICK TO THAT POLICY. HE THOUGHT THIS THE BEST WAY OF PROMOTING THE REGIME'S SURVIVABILITY. HE REPEATED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO MILITARY PLANS IN RELATION TO JORDAN. IF THE IRAQIS CROSSED THE FRONTIER WITH JORDAN WE SHOULD BE IN A WHOLE NEW AND DANGEROUS SITUATION. IN THE MEANTIME THE AMERICANS HAD, AS I WOULD KNOW, BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP THEIR HEADS DOWN. HE DID NOT EXPECT TROUBLE FROM THAT QUARTER. HIS SECOND COMMENT ON MY EXPOSITION WAS THEREFORE THAT HE TRUSTED WE HAD IN PRACTICE NO PRESSING NEED TO ANTICIPATE ISRAEL COMING DIRECTLY INTO THE EQUATION.

5. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE THIRD POINT HE WANTED TO MAKE WAS THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, WE SHOULD BEWARE OF ANY ASSUMPTION THAT RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT WOULD NECESSARILY ENTAIL OR DEPEND ON THE DOWNFALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE HAD AFTER ALL SURVIVED THE WAR WITH IRAN, AND ALL ITS CONSEQUENCES INCLUDING WHAT AMOUNTED TO HIS RECENT SURRENDER TO THAT COUNTRY. SO KIMMITT DID NOT THEREFORE THINK WE SHOULD AT THIS STAGE TIE OUR POLICIES DIRECTLY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FATE. PERHAPS I WOULD HAVE NOTED THAT US OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID THIS TRAP. THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT WAS, ARGUABLY, MAINLY A METAPHOR FOR THE FREE FLOW OF OIL.

6. THE POSITION WOULD CHANGE, KIMMITT CONTINUED, AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER OR BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. HE AGREED THAT WE OUGHT BY THEN TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SANCTIONS WERE GOING TO WORK. THE PICTURE LN REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES WOULD ALSO

C
LOOK VER DIFFERENT. HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN SICKENED BY THE SIGHT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RUFFLING THE HAIR OF LITTLE BRITISH CHILDREN ON CNN AND TELLING THEM THEY WOULD GO ON GETTING THEIR MILK AND CORNFLAKES. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SCENES LIKE THIS WOULD BE OVER THE NEXT 6-8 WEEKS. BUT WE COULD BE SURE THAT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS THE PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE WOULD WORSEN. THIS WAS A NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. ITS PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT WAS HARD TO ASSESS. IT MIGHT BE THAT THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED WOULD GET ANGRIER AND ANGRIER BUT THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD NOT SEE IRAQI POLICY AS SUFFICIENTLY PROVOCATIVE AS TO JUSTIFY ANY FIRM OFFENSIVE ACTION.

7. KIMMITT SAID THAT IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT BY THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER THE US BUILD-UP WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS THE OPTION OF A QUOTE MORE FORWARD LEANING UNQUOTE POLICY THOUGH NOT, HE THOUGHT, THE ABILITY TO MOUNT AN ALL OUT OFFENSIVE, HE DID NOT INTEND TO IMPLY THAT THIS WAS THE US PURPOSE. A SUBSTANTIAL ARAB ELEMENT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT. THE DANGERS IN THE US ACTING ALONE WERE OBVIOUS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY EVEN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN GETTING THE PROMISED TWO EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS INTO SAUDI ARABIA, WITH THE AMERICANS HAVING TO ACT AS A MARRIAGE BROKER BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT BY CONVEYING FROM ONE TO THE OTHER THAT EGYPT WOULD SAY YES IF SAUDI ARABIA ASKED. THE AMERICANS WOULD, SECONDLY, WANT UN COVER FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICY SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD IN ANY CASE WANT TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, ONCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS UNDER SCR 661 TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ASKING FOR A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO ASSURE THE ENFORCEMENT OF SCR 660.

8. KIMMITT SAID THERE WAS NATURALLY SPECULATION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION AS TO LONGER TERM AMERICAN PURPOSES. I WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE HEARD A VARIETY OF VIEWS. THE PRESS WAS HAVING A FIELD DAY. HE COULD ASSURE ME HOWEVER THAT NO AGREED LONGER TERM POLICIES HAD BEEN WORKED AT OR THROUGH, LET ALONE DECIDED UPON, AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO DO IF THE PRESENT TWIN TRACK APPROACH DID NOT PRODUCE RESULTS. THE AMERICANS WERE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE RISKS OF GETTING STILL MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED. AND THEIR ENERGIES WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS GETTING CURRENT POLICIES IMPLEMENTED.

9. I THANKED HIM, REPEATING THAT MY MAIN OBJECTIVE IN COMING TO SEE HIM HAD BEEN TO CONFIRM THAT OUR THOUGHTS WERE RUNNING IN PARALLEL AND TO REPEAT THAT IT SEEMED TO US VERY DESIRABLE TO

THINK THROUGH OUR LONGER TERM POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES TOGETHER. HE HAD ANSWERED AS BEST HE COULD, GIVEN ALL THE UNKNOWNNS, MOST OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS I HAD PREPARED FOR MYSELF IN ADVANCE INCLUDING WHERE THE AMERICANS SAW THE BALANCE LYING BETWEEN PRESERVING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION AND ENSURING UNCOVER. IT SEEMED TO ME A BASIC FACT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THAT VIRTUALLY ALL THOSE INVOLVED HAD BURNED THEIR BOATS. NO ONE AS A RESULT COULD LOOK AHEAD WITH ANY CERTAINTY. BUT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR HIM ENDORSE THE IDEA THAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SHARE THEIR INNER MOST THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS.

10. KIMMITT COMMENTED IN CONCLUSION THAT HE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD WANT TO GET WHAT THEY COULD OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, INCLUDING AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE THE RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BECOME A MAJOR CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD BREACH SANCTIONS.

11. AS I LEFT, I TOLD KIMMITT THAT HIS HANDLING OF THE CRISIS HAD ATTRACTED MUCH ADMIRATION IN LONDON AND AT NEW YORK AS WELL AS IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE KNEW THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION IN RECENT MONTHS ABOUT THE UK/US RELATIONSHIP. THE FACT WAS HOWEVER THAT WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE IT ALWAYS SHOWED THAT IT WAS THE BRITISH ON WHOM THE AMERICANS COULD RELY. OTHERS WHO HAD RECENTLY LOOMED SO LARGE WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN.
COMMENT

12. I BELIEVE KIMMITT WAS BEING TRUTHFUL WHEN HE SAID THERE WAS NO AGREED US POLICY AS TO WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IF THE PRESENT APPROACH DOES NOT WORK AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET EVEN COME TO AN ABSOLUTELY FIRM VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST GO IF A SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND. HIS ACCOUNT ALSO SEEMED TO ME TO CHIME WITH THE ANALYSIS IN MY TELNO 2011 (NOT TO ALL). THAT SAID, THERE WAS NATURALLY A STATE DEPARTMENT FLAVOUR TO HIS COMMENTS: PERHAPS PARTICULARLY AS TO THE NEED FOR BROAD ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MORE FORWARD LEANING POLICY IN FUTURE AND THE NECESSITY FOR UN COVER IN THAT EVENT. THOSE WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH THE PENTAGON NATURALLY EXHIBIT A MORE MARTIAL STAMP (MY TELNO 2008). THE AMERICANS WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED TO BEGIN MORE SERIOUSLY TO ADDRESS LONGER TERM ISSUES AS AND WHEN EVENTS ALLOW THEM TO LIFT THEIR EYES FROM CURRENT PRE-OCCUPATIONS. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM UP TO THE MARK IN SHARING THEIR THOUGHTS WITH US.

WOOD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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
ADVANCE

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TELNO 2020
OF 231900Z AUGUST 90
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. KIMMITT HAS JUST TOLD ME SHEVARDNADZE HAS ASKED BAKER FOR ANOTHER DAY'S GRACE BEFORE A RESOLUTION IS PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SO THAT THE SOVIET POSITION CAN BE WORKED THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. SHEVARDNADZE HAS SAID THAT SATURDAY WOULD BE AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE.

2. KIMMITT'S RECOMMENDATION TO BAKER IS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD AGREE PROVIDED A SOVIET YES ON 25 AUGUST IS CLEARLY IN PROSPECT. HIS UNDERSTANDING IS THAT FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US, UK AND FRENCH NAVAL COMMANDERS ON THE USS LASALLE, A FURTHER DELAY OF 24 HOURS WOULD HAVE NO OPERATIONAL EFFECT. ALL FOUR OF THE TANKERS WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN TRACKED ARE NOW IN YEMENI WATERS BUT THE NEXT VIOLATOR WILL NOT COME INTO QUESTION UNTIL SUNDAY 26 AUGUST.

WOOD

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38 32

IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

~~MR GORE BOOTH~~

MR FAIRWEATHER

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HD/NAD

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HD/UND

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HD/NEWS D

HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1076

OF 23220Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PEKING, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, EC POSTS
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKDEL OECD, TOKYO, HELSINKI
INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, OTTAWA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA, HAVANA
INFO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA, BOGOTA, ACTOR, ESC LONDON, MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE VALLETTA

SIC

MY TELNO 1072: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

*But see next
Telegram.*

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER MEETING OF THE FIVE. POSSIBLE TIMETABLE FOR ACTION ON 24 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET AGAIN AT 1930Z ON 23 AUGUST. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN TOLD THAT BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SPEAKING ON THE TELEPHONE. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT HIS HIGHER AUTHORITIES, AND THIS WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME. HE WOULD RING BACK TOMORROW, 24 AUGUST AROUND NOON.

3. PICKERING SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ACCEPTED THIS FURTHER DELAY. HE ADDED THAT HE NOW HAD AUTHORITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON SANCTIONS-BUSTING TO THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE LATER TODAY, 23 AUGUST. (A MEETING HAS BEEN FIXED FOR 2200Z). HE HAD ALSO AGREED TO GIVE THE NON-ALIGNED A BRIEFING ON HOW THE AMERICANS SAW THE ELEMENTS IN THE RESOLUTION WORKING OUT IN PRACTICE TO TRY AND REASSURE THEM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT PLANNING TO ENGAGE IN 'COWBOY' OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID THE SOVIET UNION VALUED ITS HIGH LEVEL CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. A HISTORIC DECISION WAS BEING TAKEN. IT HAD TO BE PROCESSED CAREFULLY.

4. I ASKED WHAT THE TIMETABLE WOULD BE IF BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE AT NOON ON 24 AUGUST AND THERE WAS AGREEMENT. PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE WERE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT, AS LOZINSKIY HAD INDICATED TO HIM THERE MIGHT BE, THEY COULD BE STUDIED AT A MEETING OF THE FIVE AT 1700Z ON 24 AUGUST. THE TEXT WOULD THEN

BE CIRCULATED OFFICIALLY (IN BLUE) TO COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD REQUEST INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR 1930Z OR 2000Z. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL MEETING AND ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION. THERE MIGHT WELL BE A DEBATE: THE U S HAD NO WISH TO STIFLE DISCUSSION.

5. I POINTED OUT THAT IF INDEED THERE WERE CHANGES TO THE TEXT, WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CLEAR THEM WITH OUR GOVERNMENTS. THE SOONER WE GOT THE FINAL TEXT THE BETTER. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME TO SELL THE TEXT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY IF THERE WERE ANY CHANGES OF IMPORTANCE.

6. STRESSING THAT I WAS SPEAKING IN CONFIDENCE, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THE FIVE ON THE EVIDENCE ABOUT THE MALTESE GOVERNMENT TRYING TO BREACH SANCTIONS (PARA 4 OF YOUR TELNO 408).

COMMENT

7. DEVELOPMENTS ARE NOW BEING DICTATED BY THE CONTACTS BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND BAKER. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PICKERING'S AND LOZINSKIY'S COMMENTS WAS THAT BOTH EXPECTED SHEVARDNADZE'S REACTION TO BE POSITIVE. WHETHER OR NOT AMENDMENTS OF SUBSTANCE ARE PROPOSED, IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE NECESSARY TO UPDATE THE DEADLINE. PICKERING (PLEASE PROTECT) SAID TO ME PRIVATELY THAT IT MIGHT BE PUT BACK BY ANOTHER 24 HOURS. IT WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

TICKELL

YYYY

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HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MAFF
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK



NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The overnight

Cols. Two features:

(i) it now looks
virtually certain that
we shall get the
UN resolution but
not till Saturday. The
Americans seem content.

(ii) the State Dept. confirm
what Scowcroft told me
on military options. C.D.P.

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UK EYES ALPHA

230730Z MODUK

FM BAGHD TO MODUK

230630Z AUG

INFO DESKBY 230730Z FCO

INFO DESKBY 230730Z UKDEL NATO

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ACTOR, MODUK FOR CINCFLEET, HQSTC

SIC AAA/ACA/ZAC/EAD

FOR DESBY 230730Z SEC(O)(C) FROM DA. INFO FCO (MED) AND BDS
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK FOR CINCFLEET AND HQSTC

IRAQ/KUWAIT DECONFLICTION

REF A SEC(O)(C) ACA/ZAC/EAD 291910Z AUG 90 (NOTAL)
REF B BAGHDAD TELNO 923 TO FCO

1. ON RECEIPT OF REF A I CONTACTED USDA TOCX CONFIRM DETAILS OF REPORTED US EXCHANGE OF ROE WITH IRAQIS. REPORT IN REF B BASED ON INFORMATION USDA GAVE TO ME AND NATO COLLEAGUES ON 22 AUG 90.
2. USDA CLARIFIED THAT TO DATE EXCHANGE CONSISTED OF A US AIDE MEMOIRE SUBMITTED TO IRAQI MFA ON 15 AUG 90 AND A SIMILAR IRAQI AIDE MEMOIRE DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON ON 21 AUG 90. USDA GAVE ME COPIES OF BOTH AIDE MEMOIRES. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

A. US AIDE MEMOIRE

BEGINS

US ARMED FORCES OPERATING IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITHIN THE GULF, THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, THE GULF OF OMAN, THE ARABIAN SEA, THE RED SEA, AND THE STRAIT OF BAB EL MANDEB, ARE TAKING ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE THREAT OF ATTACK.

WATERBORNE CRAFT AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF IRAQ SHOULD REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF US FORCES.

CONFIDENTIAL

There is a rather different story
am
mt

12/21/90

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IRAQI AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN A THREATENING MANNER WILL BE PLACED AT RISK BY US DEFENSIVE MEASURES.

IN PARTICULAR, ILLUMINATION OF US FORCES WITH WEAPONS FIRE CONTROL RADAR WILL BE VIEWED AS HOSTILE INTENT AND WILL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE US DEFENSIVE REACTION.

WE STRESS THAT MEASURES IN SELF-DEFENSE WILL BE EXERCISED BY US FORCES IN THE REGION. THE MEASURES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT UNDULY INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT.

ENDS

B. IRAQI AIDE MEMOIRE

BEGINS

1. THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES OPERATING IN IRAQI TERRITORIAL WATERS, INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND WATERWAYS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION IN THE ARAB GULF REGION, HAVE TAKEN DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE THREAT OF ATTACK FROM ANY SIDE.

2. FOREIGN MILITARY VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT SHOULD REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES.

3. FOREIGN AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN A THREATENING MANNER WILL BE PLACED AT RISK BY OUR DEFENSIVE MEASURES.

4. IN PARTICULAR, THE ILLUMINATION OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT AND VESSELS, BY FOREIGN FORCES, WITH WEAPONS FIRE CONTROL RADAR ON IRAQI TERRITORY AND IN IRAQI TERRITORIAL WATERS WILL BE VIEWED AS HOSTILE ACTION AND WILL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE DEFENSIVE REACTION.

5. ANY APPROACH BY FOREIGN NAVAL PIECES TO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS WILL BE CONSIDERED A SIGN OF HOSTILE INTENT.

6. WHILE KEEN AT MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IN THE ARAB GULF AND AVOIDING REGRETABLE INCIDENTS, IRAQ RESERVES TO ITSELF THE NATURAL RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

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ON/

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ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED POINTS AND IN VIEW
THE CONTENT OF YOUR AIDE-MEMOIRE DATED 15 AUGUST 1990 AND
OF THE AGREEMENT FOR AVOIDING INCIDENTS IN THE GULF, SIGNED
BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES ON 16 AUGUST 1987, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT
PROPOSES THAT A MEETING BE HELD ON THE LEVEL OF
EXPERTS FROM OUR TWO SIDES WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING INCIDENTS
UNDER THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

ENDS

3. USDA COMMENTED THAT INFORMATION IN LAST PARA OF IRAQI
AIDE MEMOIRE WAS QUOTE SENSITIVE UNQUOTE: HE SAID THAT
EVERY TWO MONTHS SINCE 16 AUG 87 AGREEMENT US AND IRAQIS
HAD EXCHANGED EMERGENCY CONTACT FREQUENCIES. CONTRARY TO WHAT HE
HAD SAID ON 22 AUG 90 (REFLECTED IN PARA 4 OF REF B) USDA SAID
THAT THE US HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO IRAQI REQUEST FOR AN EXPERT
LEVEL MEETING AND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT RESPONSE WOULD
BE.

4 COMMENT

A. ANY CONFUSION CAUSED BY INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED
BY USDA ON 22 AUG 90 REGRETTED. OTHER NATO MODS MAY HAVE
BEEN SIMILARLY MISINFORMED AS A RESULT OF WHAT THEIR
ATTACHES WERE TOLD.

B. USDA (PLEASE PROTECT) WAS NOT SURE WHETHER TEXT OF AIDE
MEMOIRS, IN PARTICULAR INFORMATION DISCLOSED
IN IRAQI AIDE MEMOIRE CONCERNING 16 AUG 87 AGREEMENT
AND PROPOSED EXPERT LEVEL MEETING, WAS RELEASABLE. PLEASE NOTE
CAVEAT UNLESS/UNTIL US AUTHORITIES PROVIDE DETAILS OFFICIALLY.

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*I think the
Americans risk being
diddled by the Russians
CBB.*

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

1. AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FIVE THIS MORNING, MY U S COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) DESCRIBED A PRIVATE DISCUSSION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH OUR SOVIET COLLEAGUE.

2. LOZINSKIY SAID HE WAS STILL AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION. BUT READING BETWEEN THE LINES, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SHEVARDNADZE WANTED STILL MORE TIME. INSTEAD THEREFORE OF PROCEEDING TO A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TODAY, THE RUSSIANS COULD WELL PREFER TO POSTPONE THE PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION TO SATURDAY 25 AUGUST.

3. I SAID TO PICKERING THAT THIS SEEMED TO MAKE NONSENSE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S EARLIER REQUEST TO PASS THE RESOLUTION TODAY, BUT POSTPONE ITS IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL 2200Z ON 24 AUGUST. PICKERING SAID THAT BAKER WOULD SHORTLY BE TAKING UP THIS POINT WITH SHEVARDNADZE. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SURE OF SOVIET MOTIVES. WERE THEY TRYING TO GET ALL THEIR NATIONALS OUT? DID THEY WANT THE TANKERS NOW ON THEIR WAY TO ADEN TO GET THERE? WERE THEY GIVING THE IRAQIS SOME KIND OF BILATERAL ULTIMATUM WHICH NEEDED MORE TIME?

4. PICKERING PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW WHAT CAME OUT OF THE IMPENDING BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION. PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD, HE SAID, BE MOST RELUCTANT TO POSTPONE THE DEADLINE BEYOND 2200Z ON 24 AUGUST. BUT THE TRAFFIC WAS NOW ALL TAKING PLACE AT THE TOP, AND HE COULD NOT FORESEE THE RESULT.

TICKELL

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK
SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS PUSHING HARD FOR A RESOLUTION TODAY. WOULD WELCOME UK HELP WITH SOME OF RECALCITRANT NON-ALIGNED (COLOMBIA, MALAYSIA, YEMEN, CUBA). PRESIDENT BUSH MAY CALL COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT TODAY.

DETAIL

2. WOLFE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BUREAU) TELEPHONED AT 1500Z TO EMPHASISE AGAIN THAT THE US WOULD BE PUSHING HARD FOR A RESOLUTION ON ENFORCEMENT TODAY. BUT THERE WAS STILL DIFFICULTY WITH SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED, IN PARTICULAR COLOMBIA, MALAYSIA, YEMEN AND CUBA. THE US INTENDED TO LEAN HARD ON THE FIRST THREE, AND PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD RING THE COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT LATER TODAY TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE US WERE WORKING ASSIDUOUSLY TO GET A RESOLUTION: THE IRAQIS WERE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CIRCUMVENT UN SANCTIONS: THE PERMANENT FIVE WERE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON A TEXT WHICH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ALSO FOUND ACCEPTABLE: BUT THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR WAS MAKING AN UNHELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE: THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE AT STAKE: WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, ENFORCING THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT. THE PRESIDENT WAS THEREFORE ASKING FOR THE COLOMBIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO BE INSTRUCTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE REST OF THE COUNCIL.

3. WOLFE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT MALAYSIA WAS QUOTE ONE OF YOURS UNQUOTE. WE BRIEFED HIM ON OUR APPROACH IN KUALA LUMPUR THIS MORNING (KL TELNO 429), FOR WHICH HE WAS GRATEFUL, BUT SAID THAT THE US WOULD WELCOME ANY EXTRA EFFORT THAT WE COULD MAKE WITH THE MALAYSIANS. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO GET A RESOLUTION TODAY, BUT TO GET IF POSSIBLE A UNANIMOUS VOTE.

WOOD

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MY TELNO 404: NATO CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. IRAQI CAPACITY FOR OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION INCREASED. FURTHER U S SHOPPING LIST OF POSSIBLE WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IMS SURFACE REPORT OF POSSIBLE LIBYAN SANCTIONS - BREAKING. FEW IF ANY ALLIED NATIONALS GETTING OUT OF KUWAIT/IRAQ (TURKEY THE ONLY EXCEPTION). UNANIMITY ON MAINTENANCE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT AFTER 24 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MET AGAIN TODAY (23 AUGUST).

MILITARY SITREP

3. IMS REPORTED THAT ELEMENTS OF 11 IRAQI DIVISIONS WERE NOW IN KUWAIT. IRAQI FORCES INCLUDED 165,00 TROOPS, 1350 TANKS, 1550 APCS AND 750 ARTILLERY PIECES. SOME UNITS NOW IN KUWAIT HAD COME FROM THE IRAQI BORDER. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF IRAQI REINFORCEMENT OF THE BORDER WITH TURKEY, NOR OF SCUD DEPLOYMENT IN KUWAIT (U S SAID HIS EMBASSY IN KUWAIT HAD SPOTTED SCUD THERE). THE IRAQI CAPABILITY FOR A SHORT OR NO WARNING OFFENSIVE ACTION HAD INCREASED. BUT OTHER INDICATORS OF IMMINENT ACTION (EG MISSILE CAPABILITY MOVED SOUTH AND USE OF AIRFIELDS IN KUWAIT BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT) WERE ABSENT. LIBYA WAS REPORTEDLY SHIPPING CARGO TO BAGHDAD BY AIR. THIS COULD INCLUDE CRITICAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPPLIES.

4. UK NOTED THE REPORT ON LIBYA: THERE WAS A NEED TO FOLLOW THIS AND OTHER EVIDENCE OF SANCTIONS - BREAKING CLOSELY. IT REMAINED VITAL THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED.

WESTERN MILITARY COOPERATION

5. U S, ON INSTRUCTIONS, READ OUT A FURTHER SHOPPING LIST OF MATERIEL WHICH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES COULD USEFULLY SUPPLY: MINESWEEPERS, RORO AND CONTAINER SHIPS, LONG-RANGE WIDEBODIED

PASSENGER AND CARGO AIRCRAFT, PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, POWER GENERATORS AND WATER SYSTEMS. (TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTE BY FAX TO FCO AND MOD IN DUE COURSE). NORWAY SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE READY TO SUPPLY FORCES WERE UN FORCES TO GO TO THE AREA. NORWAY WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE NATO FORCES DRAWN DOWN BY DEPLOYMENTS OUT OF AREA AND COULD OFFER CW DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT.

FOREIGN NATIONALS

6. TURKEY REPORTED PRESIDENT OZAL'S SUMMONING OF THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND TRANSMISSION OF A MESSAGE TO SADDAM. OZAL HAD WARNED IRAQ OF THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES LIKELY TO RESULT FROM DETENTION OF FOREIGNERS. TURKS CONTINUED TO LEAVE IRAQ WITHOUT HINDRANCE ACROSS THE TURKISH BORDER. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NORWAY (WHO REPORTED THE DEPARTURE OF 8 NORWEGIAN DEPENDENTS OF UN PERSONNEL) NO-ONE ELSE HAD REPORTS OF ANY OF THEIR OWN NATIONALS SUCCESSFULLY LEAVING IRAQ/KUWAIT. NETHERLANDS REPORTED THAT THE NEUTRALS (FINNS, SWEDES AND SWISS) WERE ALSO NOT BEING ALLOWED OUT. U S SAID THERE WERE NOW 41 U S RESTRICTEES (WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN) IN IRAQ. IT WAS NOT KNOWN HOW MANY (IF ANY) U S CITIZENS WERE BEING HELD IN KUWAIT. UK BRIEFED ON THE SITUATION OF UK NATIONALS IN LINE WITH TODAY'S FCO SPOKESMAN.

EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

7. U S REITERATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT CLOSE THEIR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. A CONVOY OF EMBASSY DEPENDENTS FROM THE EMBASSY WAS HOWEVER EN ROUTE TO THE JORDANIAN BORDER. THE U S HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO JORDAN OVER THE CLOSURE OF THIS BORDER AND WAS SEEKING TO HELP JORDANIANS COPE WITH THE VOLUME OF REFUGEES. UK BRIEFED ON OUR POSITION AND ON CONTACTS WITH THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, DRAWING ON THE FCO SPOKESMAN. CANADA, FRG, BELGIUM AND DENMARK REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTIONS TO MAINTAIN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. U S AND UK EMPHASISED THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE.

ARAB REECTIONS

8. FRG REPORTED ON GADDAFI'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE. DESPITE ANTI-U S REHETORIC IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT HE HAD CONDEMNED THE IRAQI INVASION AND HOSTAGE TAKING AND URGED A SOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. U S REPORTED THAT THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT WAS INSPIRING DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE U S EMBASSY THERE.

NEXT MEETING

9. THE COMMITTEE WILL RECONVENE TOMORROW, 24 AUGUST AT 0830Z.

ALEXANDER

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: ISRAELI ATTITUDES

SUMMARY

1. CONFUSION OVER EILAT TRANSIT FOR EGYPTIAN WORKERS STORY:
DECISION NOT TO DECIDE ON DISTRIBUTION OF GAS MASKS: SHAMIR SAYS
ISRAEL WILL NOT ASSIST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO INVOLVE ISRAEL IN
THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION, AND MAKES REASSURING NOISES IN JORDAN'S
DIRECTION: FIRST INDICATION OF FIRM ISRAELI ASSESSMENT THAT IRAQ HAS
CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS MISSILES.

DETAIL

2. THE EGYPTIANS LOCALLY ARE DENYING REPORTS PUT ABOUT BY FOREIGN
MINISTER LEVY (MY TELNO 282) THAT THEY REQUESTED ISRAEL TO ALLOW
EGYPTIAN MIGRANT WORKERS FROM IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO TRANSIT FROM AQABA
TO EILAT ON THEIR WAY TO TABA. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HERE TOLD
ME THAT LEVY FIRST MADE THE OFFER OF EILAT TO THEM, NOT VICE VERSA.
THEY REPORTED LEVY'S APPROACH TO CAIRO. BUT LEVY'S GOING PUBLIC HAD
CAUSED THEM PROBLEMS.

3. A MEETING OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (CHAIRERD
BY SHAMIR) ON 22 AUGUST DECIDED NOT TO DECIDE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
GAS MASKS, FOLLOWING LEVY'S CHALLENGE TO ARENS ON THIS SUBJECT (MY
TELNO 279, NOT TO ALL). THE MATTER HAS BEEN REFERRED TO A SMALLER
SUBCOMMITTEE IE. PUT ON HOLD. SHAMIR APPARENTLY PREVENTED ANY
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING.

4. IN A TV INTERVIEW ON 22 AUGUST SHAMIR SAID SADDAM HUSSEIN SOUGHT
TO ENGAGE ISRAEL IN HOSTILITIES IN ORDER TO BREAK OUT OF HIS
ISOLATION AND GALVANISE THE ARAB WORLD. ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE
PROVOKED. 'ISRAEL HAS NO INTEREST IN AIDING SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO
WANTS TO INVOLVE US IN THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION'. BUT, IF ATTACKED,
ISRAEL WOULD ENSURE ITS ENEMIES PAID A 'TERRIBLE PRICE'. SHAMIR ALSO
SAID ISRAEL WANTED TO SEE KING HUSSEIN PRESIDING OVER A STRONG AND

STABLE JORDAN.

5. YEHOYADA HAIM (DEPUTY DIRECTOR MFA POLITICAL RESEARCH CENTRE, AND PART OF THE MFA TEAM LEADING ON THE CURRENT CRISIS), TOLD ME ON 22 AUGUST THAT WHILE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED (ON TERMS HE SUGGESTED WOULD BE AT LEAST SATISFACTORY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, FOLLOWING A WEAKENING OF WESTERN RESOLVE AND A GROWTH IN PRO-IRAQI FEELING IN THE ARAB WORLD), THE PROBABILITY OF A MILITARY CONFLICT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER. HE HAD NO CLEAR SCENARIO FOR THE INITIATION OF CONFLICT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT AMONG SADDAM HUSSIN'S MILITARY OPTIONS THE ISRAEL CARD WAS THE MOST ATTRACTIVE IN TERMS OF ITS IMPACT ON THE ARAB WORLD. SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT SEEK TO PROMPT ISRAELI ACTION BY MOVING TROOPS INTO JORDAN. A MISSILE ATTACK (HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AL ABBAS AS WELL AS SCUD) WAS A HIGH PROBABILITY. HAIM SAID 'IT SEEMS' IRAQ HAD CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS MISSILES. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS KEEPING QUIET ABOUT THIS SINCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 'WORDS CAN LEAD TO WARS'.

6. ISRAEL'S DILEMMA, HAIM SUGGESTED, WAS THAT INITIATING A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THIS MISSILE THREAT WOULD PLAY INTO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HANDS, WHILE NOT TAKING ANY ACTION MEANT LIVING WITH THE THREAT OF A CW MISSILE ATTACK. THE RECENTLY REPEATED IRAQI ASSURANCE ONLY TO USE CW IN RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK COULD BE TAKEN NO MORE SERIOUSLY THAN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ASSURANCES TO MUBARAK NOT TO INVADE KUWAIT.

COMMENT

7. LEVY HAS COME OUT BADLY ON BOTH THE EILAT TRANSIT AND THE GAS MASKS ISSUES. HE IS BEING CRITICISED FOR GOING PUBLIC TOO QUICKLY, LACK OF SENSITIVITY, PLAYING POLITICS (RIVALRY WITH ARENS) AND BREAKING THE GENERALLY UNITED 'PLAY IT COOL' GOVERNMENT LINE. THE DECISION TO REFER THE GAS MASKS QUESTION TO A SMALL SUBCOMMITTEE IS BEING SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR ARENS' ARGUMENT THAT DISTRIBUTION MIGHT BE MISPERCEIVED BY IRAQ AS AN INDICATION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLANNING A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE.

8. ON HAIM'S REMARKS, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE HEARD AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT IRAQ NOW HAS A CW MISSILE CAPABILITY, AND THAT AL ABBAS IS OPERATIONAL. CONTACTS WITH THE IDF OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS SUGGEST THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITY IS SKETCHY, AND THAT SOME IN THE MILITARY ARE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HAIM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAEL REMAINING UNINVOLVED.

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YOUR TELNO 205: BUCHAN FAMILY

SUMMARY

1. SOMMARUGA RECEPTIVE. REAFFIRMED ICRC'S CLEAR RIGHT TO ACT IN KUWAIT. INTENSE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE ENTRY. NEW PROGRAMME IN JORDAN. EC PROMISE OF FUNDS.

DETAIL

2. SOMMARUGA RECEIVED ME AT 3PM TODAY, 23 AUGUST, AND ACCEPTED THAT THE PLIGHT OF THE BUCHAN FAMILY WAS INDEED AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF IRAQI CONTEMPT FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. THEY WERE REDOUBLING THEIR EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO KUWAIT. THEIR EMISSARY IN BAGHDAD HAD AT LEAST NOW BEEN ABLE TO MEET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS AT DIRECTOR LEVEL AND TO DELIVER SOMMARUGA'S LETTER TO TARIQ AZIZ PROPOSING A VISIT.
3. SOMMARUGA SAID THAT HE HAD APPRECIATED MR WALDEGRAVE'S CALL AND USEFUL DISCUSSION. AT THE MEETING OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ICRC THIS MORNING, THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRICTURES, ON WHICH HE HAD DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC COMMENT. SOME HAD ARGUED THAT THEY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ICRC WAS NO WESTERN STOOGE, OTHERS TOOK THE CONTRARY VIEW.
4. SOMMARUGA EMPHASIZED THAT, FRUSTRATED AS THEY WERE AT NOT BEING ABLE TO GET INTO KUWAIT, THEY WERE IN ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAD A CLEAR RIGHT TO DO SO UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.
5. SOMMARUGA SAID THAT AT THE REQUEST OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT, THEY WERE NOW ABOUT TO MOUNT AN OPERATION IN JORDAN, MAINLY CLOSE TO THE IRAQI BORDER, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES AND THE JORDAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY, TO HELP THE MASS OF PEOPLE LEAVING IRAQ. THEY WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHO WERE OFFERING MONEY FOR TRANSPORT FOR EGYPTIANS STUCK THERE TO GET BACK TO EGYPT.

6. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SWEDEN, WE HAVE TAKEN ACTION AT LOWER LEVEL WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE BUT I HOPE TO GET MARTENSON BY TELEPHONE LATER TODAY.

7. I SUGGEST NEWS DEPARTMENT, IF ASKED, SIMPLY CONFIRM THAT I HAVE DULY CARRIED OUT MY INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT OTHER MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH SOMMARUGA SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AS USUAL.

MORLAND

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SIC U2G
IN MODUK FOR DI ROW A1B

OUR TELNO 166: SYRIA: ATTITUDE TO IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS

SUMMARY

SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE WESTERN VIEW OF THE CRISIS IN THE GULF. BUT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE REGIME IS OUT OF STEP WITH POPULAR SENTIMENT.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED YESTERDAY EVENING (21 AUGUST) ON MOHAMMAD KHUDR, THE HEAD OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIVISION IN THE SYRIAN MFA, TO SEEK AN UPDATE ON THE SYRIAN VIEW OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE GULF.

3. KHUDR'S COMMENTS WERE IN LINE WITH THOSE OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHARA' TO A TROIKA GROUP OF EC HEADS OF MISSION ON 9 AUGUST (OUR TELNO 166 REFERS): SYRIA CONTINUED TO SUPPORT MOVES TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS WITHIN AN ARAB CONTEXT, AND BELIEVED THAT A SINE QUA NON FOR ANY SOLUTION WAS THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND THE RESTORATION TO POWER OF THE AL-SABAH REGIME. IN ADDITION, KHUDR DREW MY ATTENTION TO ARTICLES IN THAT DAY'S PRESS, WHICH QUOTED AT LENGTH OBSERVATIONS MADE BY ASSAD DURING THE EMERGENCY SUMMIT IN CAIRO, TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS SHOULD BE ASCRIBED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN ALONE, AND NOT TO THE WEST'S REACTION TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT: 'THE EVENT CAUSED FOREIGNERS TO COME AND IT IS NOT THE FOREIGNERS WHO BROUGHT ABOUT THE EVENT. IF WE WANT TO DRIVE THOSE FOREIGNERS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LET US FIND A SOLUTION FOR THIS EVENT...LET US REMOVE ANY PRETEXT THEY MAY USE'.

4. I ASKED KHUDR ABOUT SYRIA'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. HE SAID THAT SYRIA FULLY SUPPORTED THE RELEVANT SCRS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE GRACE TO ADMIT THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO TRADE

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BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES TO BE AFFECTED (EXCEPT SOME SMUGGLING WHICH HE DID NOT BELIEVE ANYONE COULD REASONABLY HOPE TO CONTROL). ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING, KHUDR SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD SUPPORT MOVES TO ENFORCE AN EMBARGO WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN SCR.

5. KHUDR ASKED FOR DETAILS ON THE POSITION OF OUR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. I BRO

KUWAIT. I BRIEFED HIM ON THE LATEST SITUATION. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT WOULD ALSO BE STAYING PUT AFTER THE 24 AUGUST DEADLINE.

6. OVERALL, KHUDR CONFESSED THAT HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BE OPTIMISTIC IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAID THAT AT PRESENT HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF ANY EASY WAY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

COMMENT

7. KHUDR'S COMMENTS ACCORD FAIRLY CLOSELY WITH WHAT WE UNDERSTAND ASSAD HAS BEEN TELLING A STREAM OF HIGH LEVEL VISITORS OVER THE LAST WEEK, INCLUDING JOHN KELLY (US UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ME AFFAIRS) ON 14 AUGUST, FRANCOIS SHEER (DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FRENCH MFA) ON 15 AUGUST, AND MIKHAIL SETENKO ('ROVING AMBASSADOR' IN THE SOVIET MFA) ON 16 AUGUST. TO JUDGE FROM WHAT FRENCH AND US COLLEAGUES HAVE TOLD ME ASSAD ADOPTED A BULLISH ATTITUDE WITH ALL THREE, PARTICULARLY SHEER, WHO APPARENTLY SET OUT TO EXPLAIN FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT ENFORCING A NAVAL BLOCKADE AND TO DEMONSTRATE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PROBLEMS MANY ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE FACING WITH PUBLIC OPINION, AND WAS SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK WHEN ASSAD RETORTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION MATTERED NOT A JOT AND T A E FU

S SUIPORTED
FIRM ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAQ.

8. WHATEVER ASSAD'S COMMENTS ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION TO SHEER (HE APPARENTLY ADOPTED A MORE REASONED TONE WITH KELLY ON THIS SUBJECT), THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYING TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA DOES SEEM TO SUGGEST A DEGREE OF CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE (OUR TEL U/N TO MODUK OF 20 AUGUST AND OUR 168 OF 22 AUGUST - NOT TO ALL). AMONG SYRIANS I HAVE TALKED TO THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY FOR IRAQ AND EVEN FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN PERSONALLY (I MYSELF HAVE WITNESSED A GROUP OF YOUTHS CHANTING HIS NAME IN PUBLIC). THERE

PAGE 2
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SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LITTLE SYMPATHY HERE FOR THE KUWAITIS (OR OTHER GULF ARABS) AT THE BEST OF TIMES AND EVEN IF MANY (NON-OFFICIAL) INTERLOCUTORS DO CONDEMN THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION, THEY ARE EQUALLY FORTHRIGHT IN CONDEMNING THE WEST'S REACTION AND IN PARTICULAR THE MOVES TO ENFORCE A NAVAL BLOCKAGE IN ORDER TO (AS THEY SEE IT) STARVE THE IRAQIS INTO SUBMISSION.

9. ACCORDING TO ARAB DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES THERE IS A CLEAR AIR OF CONFUSION AMONG OFFICIALS IN THE MFA OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE CRISIS. THE OFFICIAL LINE FROM THE TOP FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST GO, BUT THAT SYRIA MUST DO ITS BEST TO PRESERVE THE STRENGTH OF IRAQ AND ITS ARMY FOR ANY FUTURE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, OFFICIALS APPEAR TO BE AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN HOW THIS TIES IN WITH SYRIA'S PRESENT (APPARENT) SUPPORT FOR THE WEST, AND HOW THIS IN TURN TIE IN WITH ASSAD'S TRADITIONAL POLICY OF STANDING AGAINST THE US AND FOREIGN DOMINATION IN THE REGION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 340

OF 231000Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, MODUK, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, OTHER GULF POSTS, SANA, 'A

SIC: A2T

MY TELNO 336: VICE-CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF'S VISIT

1. A M BENNETT TOLD VCDS AND ME LAST NIGHT (22 AUGUST) OF REQUESTS MADE BY US DEFENCE SECRETARY OF THE SULTAN DURING THE VISIT TO SALALAH. CHENEY APPARENTLY ASKED FOR:

(A) IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK BY YEMEN ON SAUDI ARABIA, PERMISSION FOR US FORCES TO COUNTER-ATTACK FROM OMAN. THE SULTAN REFUSED, SAYING IF SAUDI ARABIA NEEDED HELP IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, OMANI FORCES WOULD INTERVENE DIRECT.

(B) AGREEMENT TO CONVOKE IN OMAN A CONFERENCE OF ALL THE NAVIES NOW REPRESENTED IN THE GULF TO DISCUSS COORDINATION. THE SULTAN REFUSED, SAYING IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO HOLD IT ELSEWHERE, E.G. BAHRAIN.

(C) PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS AGAINST ANY IRAQI SHIP WHICH MIGHT PUT INTO AN OMANI PORT. THE SULTAN REFUSED, SAYING OMAN WOULD TAKE ANY NECESSARY ACTION.

(D) PERMISSION TO INTERCEPT IRAQI SHIPS IN OMANI TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE SULTAN GRANTED THIS (ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN THE SPECIFIC CASE OF THE IRAQI TANKER KHANAQIN, THE AMERICANS MADE A FURTHER REQUEST).

COMMENT

2. THESE DECISIONS BY THE SULTAN FIT WITH HIS GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO RAISE THE PROFILE OF THE U.S. FORCES IN OMAN. HE MADE IT CLEAR TO VCDS AND ME THAT HE FEARED BEING SWAMPED BY U.S. FORCES AND IS CONCERNED TO KEEP THEM IN THEIR PLACE. FOR THIS REASON HE ASKED FOR BRITISH AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AT THUMRAIT (TUR) IN ORDER TO PREVENT A U.S. TAKE-OVER OF THE BASE.

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SIC

IRAQ/KUWAIT: VIEWS OF SOVIET MFA: 23 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER SOVIET ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF SUSTAINING COLLECTIVE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN, THOUGH WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN HIS ATTITUDE YET.
2. EXPLANATION OF CLOSURE OF SOVIET EMBASSY IN KUWAIT.
3. IRAQI AGREEMENT TO ALLOW EVACUATION OF SOVIET DEPENDENTS BY AIR FROM 23 AUGUST.

DETAIL

4. WE HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH ILCHEV (COUNSELLOR NEAR EASTERN DIRECTORATE, MFA) AND TARASENKO (HEAD OF PLANNING DIRECTORATE) ON 23 AUGUST. DISCUSSION OF UN ASPECTS HAS BEEN REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM, NOT TO ALL.

HAMMADI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND CONTACTS WITH IRAQ

5. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS DESCRIBED THE MESSAGE DELIVERED BY HAMMADI IN TERMS WHICH CLOSELY MATCHED THE MESSAGE DELIVERED TO YOU BY ZAMAYATIN TO YOU (FCO TELNO 1464 TO MOSCOW). THEY SAID FURTHER BRIEFING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT MIGHT BE CIRCULATED TO PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE WERE ASSURED THAT RYZHKOV, SHEVARDNADZE AND BELOUSOV HAD ALL DRIVEN HOME THE MESSAGE THAT THERE WAS NO GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD STAND FIRM ON SANCTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD REJECTED AS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE AN ATTEMPT BY HAMMADI TO SET OUT IRAQ'S HISTORIC CASE AGAINST KUWAIT. DISCUSSION OF THE HOLDING OF THIRD COUNTRY HOSTAGES HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY SHARP. HAMMADI HAD SPOKEN FAITHFULLY

TO HIS MASTER'S VOICE. THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED HIM TO TAKE SADDAM HUSSEIN THE MESSAGE THAT HE WAS ISOLATED INTERNATIONALLY, AND THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE SO LONG AS IRAQ MAINTAINED ITS PRESENT COURSE. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT MADE ANY NEW SUGGESTIONS TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

6. THE MFA CONCLUDED THAT HAMMADI'S VISIT HAD BEEN A NECESSARY AND USEFUL EXERCISE. THEY HAD MAINTAINED VERY FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF MESSAGES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THEY WERE TRYING TO INJECT A SENSE OF REALISM. THEY WOULD CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE. THEY WERE SEEING LITTLE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN PERSONALLY: ILICHEV SAID THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD SEEN SADDAM ONLY ONCE, TO RECEIVE THE FIRST IRAQ REPLY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT WAS THEREFORE HARD TO JUDGE HIS MOOD. IT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT FAR FROM CERTAIN, THAT THE SOVIET ENVOY, SYTENKO, WOULD SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN WHEN HE REACHED BAGHDAD IN A FEW DAY'S TIME.

7. THE ONLY NEW POINT OF SUBSTANCE TO EMERGE WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD AGREED TO ALLOW A FURTHER EVACUATION OF SOVIET DEPENDENTS FROM BAGHDAD BY AIR. THE FIRST FLIGHT WAS EXPECTED ON 23 AUGUST. ABOUT 950 WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE DUE TO LEAVE IRAQ, EVIDENTLY BY AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD STILL LEAVE OVER 7,000 SOVIET 'SPECIALISTS' IN THE COUNTRY. THE OFFICIAL SOVIET LINE (GIVEN TO US BY ILICHEV) WAS THAT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN TO WITHDRAW THESE SPECIALISTS. ILICHEV SAID THAT, EXCEPT FOR THOSE DIRECTLY WORKING ON IMPORT/EXPORT OPERATIONS, IT DID NOT BREACH UN SANCTIONS FOR THEM TO REMAIN AT THEIR POSTS. TARASENKO SPOKE MORE FRANKLY. HE SAID THAT MOST OF THE SOVIET WORKERS WERE KEEPING THEIR HEADS DOWN AT HOME. THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO EXTRACT THEIR PEOPLE STEP BY STEP. THEY HAD NOT ANNOUNCED A GENERAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW FOR FEAR OF PROVOKING THE IRAQIS.

SOVIET EMBASSY IN KUWAIT

8. THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KUWAIT HAD CLOSED ON 21 AUGUST WITH THE EVACUATION OF ITS FINAL STAFF. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS GAVE AN IDENTICAL EXPLANATION. THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE LIKED TO LEAVE TWO OR THREE PEOPLE, BUT THEY KNEW FROM PAST EXPERIENCE THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE CUT OFF WATER AND ELECTRICITY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STAFF TO OPERATE. AND THEIR SAFETY WOULD HAVE BEEN AT RISK. THIS WAS A PURELY PRACTICAL DECISION.

FURTHER STEPS

9. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS ARGUED THAT SANCTIONS WERE LIKELY TO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT, BUT THAT IT WAS STILL TOO SOON FOR SADDAM

HUSSEIN TO HAVE FELT THE DISCOMFORT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW TIME FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO WORK, AND NOT RUSH OUR FENCES. WE SHOULD ANALYSE THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT OF SANCTIONS CLOSELY, AND IT WAS VITAL TO SUSTAIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS. IRAQ COULD BE EXPECTED TO TRY ALL MANNER OF TRICKS TO DRIVE WEDGES WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TARASENKO (WHO IS CLOSE TO SHEVARDNADZE) SAID IT WOULD BE A MIRACLE IF SADDAM HUSSEIN CHOSE TO DISGORGE WHAT HE HAD SWALLOWED, BUT WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT SANCTIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY WORK. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD BEEN DRIVEN INTO A CORNER AND WAS VULNERABLE. THIS SHOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A DENOUEMENT. HE MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE REMOVED FROM WITHIN. OR, TO JUDGE FROM HIS SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN, HE MIGHT EVENTUALLY SHIFT HIS GROUND. HE HAD SO FAR BEEN EXTREMELY RIGID, BUT WAS A VERY 'IMAGINATIVE' PERSON WHO MUST BY NOW UNDERSTAND THAT HE COULD NOT GET AWAY WITH KUWAIT.

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN NAVAL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

10. WE ASKED TARASENKO ABOUT SPECULATION THAT THE USSR MIGHT EVENTUALLY INCLUDE ITS NAVAL VESSELS IN COLLECTIVE EFFORTS IN THE GULF UNDER UN AUSPICES. WHILE HE DID NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE THIS, HE REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO CARRY THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS THIS FAR. STRONG VOICES HAVE BEEN RAISED AGAINST THIS INTERNALLY. (HE SPOKE ENTIRELY OPENLY OF THE RELUCTANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS TO OBEY POLITICAL DIRECTIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC MANNER.)

ROLE OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPERTS IN IRAQ

11. A COLONEL OGURTSOV TOLD A PRESS BRIEFING AT THE SOVIET MFA ON 22 AUGUST THAT THERE WERE 193 SOVIET MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN IRAQ. HE SAID THAT AN INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN ISSUED NOT TO POST FURTHER MILITARY SPECIALISTS TO IRAQ AND THE OVERALL NUMBER WOULD DIMINISH 'AS THE CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS ENDED.'

12. TARASENKO SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT OGURTSOV HAD NOT REFLECTED THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT. RYZHKOV HAD DIRECTED ALL AGENCIES TO COMPLY WITH SANCTIONS. THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE MILITARILY WITH THE AGGRESSOR. ALL COOPERATION HAD BEEN TERMINATED. THE MFA HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT OGURTSOV'S STATEMENT, WHICH REPRESENTED A LACK OF COORDINATION. THE MFA SPOKESMAN WOULD PROBABLY ISSUE A CLARIFICATION. CONCEIVABLY OGURTSOV MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRYING TO MISINFORM THE IRAQIS. THE RUSSIANS WERE OF COURSE CONCERNED THAT THEIR MILITARY SPECIALISTS SHOULD NOT BECOME HOSTAGES. BUT IF THIS HAD BEEN OGURTSOV'S INTENTION, HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE.

COMMENT

13. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NEITHER INTERLOCUTOR EXPECTED MUCH OF SIGNIFICANCE TO EMERGE FROM SYTENKO'S TOUR AROUND THE MIDDLE EAST. NOR, IN GENERAL, DID THEY PLACE MUCH FAITH IN EFFECTIVE ARAB ACTION. NEITHER HAD ANYTHING TO VOLUNTEER ON PRINCE BANDAR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. TARASENKO GAVE A CONVINCING IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE UNSHAKABLY FIRM IN THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ALONGSIDE THE AMERICANS AND THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS.

14. PSE ADVANCE TO MISS HARFORD.

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TELNO 755
OF 230900Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PRETORIA

LORD PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO AUSTRALIA: TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER HAWKE
SUMMARY

1. A VERY FRIENDLY 50 MINUTE EXCHANGE. HAWKE CONSIDERABLY EXERCISED ABOUT IRAQ/KUWAIT. NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY ON ANTARCTICA. PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ON ARMS SALES REASONABLY WELL RECEIVED.

DETAIL

CONSTITUTION ACT

2. HAWKE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING WARM GRATITUDE TO HMG FOR MAKING AVAILABLE ONE OF THE TWO ORIGINALS OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT 1900.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

3. HAWKE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS TERRIBLY WORRYING. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN CONSIDERED THE SITUATION RATIONALLY, HE MUST REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT HE SHOULD CUT AND RUN. HOW LONG WOULD IT BE BEFORE SOMEONE IN IRAQ MOVED TO GET RID OF HIM (HE HAD HEARD OF ONE ATTEMPT). PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SO FAR HANDLED THE SITUATION EXTREMELY WELL. HAWKE THOUGHT HE MIGHT SPEAK TO BUSH AGAIN LATER IN THE DAY. THE OUTCOME OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION MEETING HAD BEEN VERY SATISFACTORY. AUSTRALIA WAS GETTING CONFUSED SIGNALS ABOUT IRAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EMBARGO: THERE MIGHT BE SOME LEAKAGE THERE.

4. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS PERHAPS A LITTLE MISLEADING. WHILE THERE WAS TALK OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, IN PRIVATE THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO BE PRESSING THE IRAQIS HARD ON THE KEY POINTS. HAWKE AGREED.

5. THE LORD PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE EXTREMELY AWKWARD SITUATION IN WHICH JORDAN FOUND ITSELF. HAWKE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A LONG LETTER FROM THE CROWN PRINCE THE OTHER DAY. HUSSEIN FACED AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX SITUATION. UNFORTUNATELY, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD

APPEAL FOR SOME ELEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH HAWKE HAD URGED HIM TO PUT PRESSURE ON JAPAN TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CRISIS, PERHAPS THROUGH PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID TO SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES. THE LORD PRESIDENT AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FIND WAYS OF HELPING KING HUSSEIN.

URUGUAY ROUND

6. HAWKE SAID THAT THE MIDDLE EASTERN EVENTS HAD SOMEWHAT DISSIPATED THE EMPHASIS THAT SHOULD HAVE PROPERLY BEEN BUILDING UP WITH REGARD TO THE URUGUAY ROUND. THE OUTCOME OF THE G7 SUMMIT HAD BEEN WELCOME BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED UP CONVINCINGLY. HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE HELPFUL ROLE THAT THE UK HAD ALWAYS PLAYED ON THIS SUBJECT. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID THAT WE WOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE.

EASTERN EUROPE

7. HAWKE ASKED WHAT OUR CURREN JUDGEMENT OF GORBACHEV WAS. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID THAT NO-ONE COULD BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE FUTURE. GORBACHEV FACED A WHOLE CLUTCH OF PROBLEMS. BUT THE FACT THAT HE HAD SURMOUNTED SO MANY OF THEM SO FAR GAVE US SOME CONFIDENCE FOR THE FUTURE. IT WAS SAD THAT IT HAD TAKEN SO LONG FOR HIM TO SHOW REAL INSIGHT INTO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HAWKE AGREED. FOR ALL ECONOMIC REFORMERS, PAIN CAME BEFORE PROGRESS. ON EAST GERMANY, THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID IN ANSWER TO HAWKE'S QUESTION THAT BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION WERE DETERIORATING. CHANCELLOR KOHL MUST BE BECOMING WORRIED AT THE COSTS INVOLVED. BUT HIS PERSONAL GUESS WAS THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE REDRESSED OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO, GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE WEST GERMAN ECONOMY, THE COMPARATIVE SMALLNESS OF THE EAST GERMAN POPULATION, COMMON LANGUAGE ETC.

ANTARCTICA

8. HAWKE SAID THAT WE HAD A CIVILISED DIFFERENCE ON THE CRAMRA ISSUE. AUSTRALIA SEEMED TO DETECT A CHANGE IN THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE DIRECTION OF OUR ACCEPTING THE NEED FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTION LINKED TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID THAT WE HAD NOT SHIFTED IN OUR VIEW THAT CRAMRA SHOULD BE PRESERVED. WE WISHED TO RESPOND INTELLIGENTLY TO THE FRENCH/AUSTRALIAN POSITION BUT THERE WAS A REAL GAP BETWEEN US. HAWKE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH ITS POSITION VERY HARD. IT WAS ILLOGICAL TO TRY TO ENSHRINE A BAN ON MINING IN A MINING TREATY. HE BELIEVED THAT WORLD OPINION WOULD COME ROUND TO THE AUSTRALIAN

POSITION. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THAT IMPRESSION. WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THE DAY CAME WHEN THERE WAS PRESSURE TO MINE IN THE ANTARCTIC, THERE WAS A PROPER STRUCTURE AVAILABLE FOR THAT SITUATION. HAWKE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO FEELING OF CONFRONTATION WITH US ON THIS ISSUE, JUST A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.

SOUTH AFRICA

9. HAWKE SAID THAT HAVING BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF SANCTIONS, AUSTRALIA OUGHT NOW TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF DISCUSSING WHETHER THE TIME HAD COME TO DISMANTLE SANCTIONS. AS SOON AS THERE WAS AN INDICATION FROM WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA, ESPECIALLY FROM MANDELA, THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO MOVE, AUSTRALIA WOULD WISH TO BE IN THE VANGUARD. EVERYONE WAS THRILLED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (THE RECENT CARNAGE EXCEPTED). HE HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN TO BOTH MANDELA AND DE KLERK, CONGRATULATING THE LATTER PARTICULARLY WARMLY ON THE COURAGE HE HAD SHOWN AND THE PROGRESS MADE. THE LORD PRESIDENT WELCOMED THESE REMARKS.

ASIAN PROBLEMS

10. THE LORD PRESIDENT PRAISED THE AUSTRALIAN INPUT INTO ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. HAWKE COMMENDED THE EFFORTS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE. THE KEY POINT WAS CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE KHMER ROUGE.

11. THE LORD PRESIDENT THANKED HAWKE FOR AUSTRALIA'S SUPPORT ON HONG KONG AND ON THE VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE. HAWKE SAID THAT THERE WAS A STRONG AUSTRALIAN INTEREST AT STAKE IN THE LATTER ISSUE. A FEW BOAT LOADS OF CAMBODIANS HAD ALREADY REACHED AUSTRALIA: THEY COULD NOT IN ANY SENSE BE CLASSED AS POLITICAL REFUGEES.

BRITISH ARMS SALES IN AUSTRALIA'S REGION

12. HAWKE SAID THAT HE WELCOMED THE LETTER HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER CONTAINING OUR AGREEMENT TO INFORM AUSTRALIA ABOUT CERTAIN ARMS SALES. THE LETTER WAS HOWEVER FAIRLY HIGHLY QUALIFIED, PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLY SO FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. BUT HE WOULD NOT CARP. HE HOPED A BASIS COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

13. THE LORD PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THAT RESPONSE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GIVE THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS A CHANCE

TO OPERATE. IF WE WERE CAUTIOUS, IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE THIS WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED ARRANGEMENT AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED. WE BELIEVED THAT MALAYSIA WOULD NOW NOT BE PURCHASING TORNADO: AND THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT DO SO EITHER. (COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HAWKE INTENDS TO REPLY TO THE LETTER).

14. HAWKE ASKED THE LORD PRESIDENT TO PASS ON HIS WARM REGARDS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE PLANNED TO VISIT LONDON IN JANUARY FOR THE COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

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YOUR TELNO 383 TO OTTAWA: IRAQ/KUWAIT -
NEXT STEPS IN THE UN

SUMMARY

1. MALAYSIANS AGREE ON THE NEED FOR FIRM IMPLEMENTATION BUT HAVE SERIOUS HESITATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE. DR MAHATHIR TAKING A PERSONAL INTEREST.

DETAIL

2. I SPOKE THIS MORNING TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE MFA. MAJID AGREED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ACT QUICKLY TO SHOW ITS DETERMINATION TO HAVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 ENFORCED. THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO KNOW, HOWEVER, MUCH MORE PRECISELY WHERE A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT NOW CIRCULATING MIGHT LEAD. THIS WAS A VERY DELICATE QUESTION FOR THE MALAYSIANS AND THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TAKING A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE DRAFT. THE MALAYSIANS WANTED TO SEE THE CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF FORCE MORE CLEARLY DEFINED AND TO KNOW WHAT 'MINIMUM FORCE' MEANT. THEY WERE AWARE THAT THE CHINESE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS AND HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE DRAFT WITH THE OTHER NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, SOME OF WHOM HAD SIMILAR DOUBTS.

3. MAJID SAID THAT HE TOO WANTED TO GET ON WITH THINGS BUT IT WAS NO GOOD TRYING TO FORCE THROUGH A RESOLUTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE THE WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL.

COMMENT

4. AS EXPECTED, THE MALAYSIANS ARE BEING MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS WHEN IT COMES TO DEEDS RATHER THAN WORDS AND WILL REMAIN SO AT LEAST UNTIL THEY ARE SURE THAT ALL THEIR CITIZENS ARE OUT OF IRAQ/KUWAIT. MAJID WANTS TO BE HELPFUL BUT THE INTEREST OF THE PRIME MINISTER IS GOING TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO GET MALAYSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE SORT OF IMPLEMENTATION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

SPRECKLEY

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EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A CIRCULAR NOTE FROM THE MFA DATED 23 AUGUST INFORMING US THAT 'EACH EMBASSY IN KUWAIT MAY LEAVE BEHIND A MEMBER OF ITS ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF TO STAY IN THE BUILDING WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR PRIVILEGES TO CARE FOR THE FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT THEREIN'. THE (PRESUMABLY BAGHDAD-BASED) EMBASSY MUST ALSO SEND A NOTE TO THE MINISTRY INFORMING IT THAT THE OFFICER HAS BECOME A MEMBER OF ITS STAFF IN BAGHDAD. ALTERNATIVELY, ANY EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD MAY SEND A MEMBER OF ITS OWN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF TO ITS FORMER EMBASSY IN KUWAIT SO LONG AS IT SENDS A NOTE TO THE MINISTRY IN THIS RESPECT.
2. NO DOUBT YOU WILL LET US KNOW IF DESPITE THE OBVIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS YOU WISH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EITHER OF THE ABOVE ALTERNATIVES.

WALKER

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YOUR TELNOS 525 AND 530: EMISSARIES OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. DAYAL AND ANNAN CAME ROUND FOR A DRINK WITH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR AND ME LAST NIGHT: DAYAL (PLEASE RESPECT HIS CONFIDENCE) WAS CLEARLY NERVOUS ABOUT SEEING TOO MANY AMBASSADORS LEST WHAT HE WAS DOING BE LEAKED IN THE FORM OF VARIOUS CONFLICTING REPORTS. HE EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE MATERIAL I HAD SENT ROUND TO HIS HOTEL BASED ON FCO TELNO 530.
2. DAYAL (WHO DID NOT LET ANNAN DO MUCH OF THE TALKING) SAID THAT HE HAD HAD THREE HOURS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE LATTER HAD (A) SPOKEN BITTERLY OF THE KUWAITI RULING FAMILY, WHO ACCORDING TO HIM HAD DELIBERATELY TRIED TO RUIN IRAQ'S ECONOMY BY THEIR OIL PRICING POLICY, (B) SPOKEN BITTERLY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL - IT HAD NOT GIVEN IRAQ THE CHANCE TO SET OUT ITS POINT OF VIEW, IT HAD TAKEN ONLY SEVEN HOURS TO PRODUCE A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING IRAQ WHEREAS IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IT HAD FAILED TO CONDEMN IRAN OVER SEVEN YEARS, AND (C) RESERVED HIS GREATEST BITTERNESS FOR THE US, WHICH HE HAD APPEARED CONVINCED INTENDED TO DESTROY IRAQ.
3. TO JUDGE BY DAYAL'S SKETCHY ACCOUNT, TARIQ AZIZ HAD THEN DEFENDED IRAQ'S POLICY OF DETAINING WESTERN FOREIGNERS WITH ARGUMENTS WE HAVE ALL HEARD MANY TIMES RECENTLY. ALTHOUGH DAYAL HAD NOT HEARD HIM SAY THAT THE POLICY OF SENDING THE FOREIGNERS OFF TO INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS APPLIED ONLY TO FOREIGNERS IN KUWAIT, NOT TO THOSE IN IRAQ PROPER (PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 900), HE HAD HEARD HIM TALK OF THE POSSIBILITY OF LETTING CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNER LEAVE THE COUNTRY. WE URGED THAT DAYAL SHOULD PIN TARIQ AZIZ DOWN ON ANY SUCH CONCESSIONS (HE EXPECTED TO SEE HIM AGAIN TODAY). WE ALSO URGED THAT IN WHATEVER WAY WAS POSSIBLE FOR A UN MAN ON A MISSION OF THIS SORT HE SHOULD PIN THE MINISTER DOWN BY STATING IN PUBLIC WHATEVER HE MIGHT HAVE CONCEDED: BUT DAYAL CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE AN INCORRECT WAY TO PROCEED. ANNAN AT ANY RATE TOOK THE POINT THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD

NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO BACK ON ANYTHING THEY MIGHT HAVE SAID ONCE THEIR VISITORS HAD DEPARTED.

4. DAYAL SAID THAT HIS OWN MAIN FOCUS HAD BEEN ON THE RIGHT OF CONSULAR ACCESS. TEMPESTA SUGGESTED HE SHOULD ASK HIMSELF TO SEE SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP THE ROAD FROM KUWAIT AND THEN SENT OFF TO INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS. DAYAL SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS IDEA, BUT HEULOOKED DOUBTFUL. DAYAL SAIAUD TIBT HIS POLICY LINE WAS TO PRESS FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL FSREIGNERS ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS: BUT I SUGGESTED THAT ZS A PRAGMATIC MATTER AND ON THE ASIS OF WHAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD ALREADY SAID (PARA 3 ABOVE) HE MIGHT IN ADDITION TRY TO SQUEEZE OUT OF THE IRAQIS AGREEMENT THAT CERTAIN CATEGORIES (MOTHERS WITH SMALL CHILDREN, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS, AND PEOPLE NEEDING MEDICAL ATTENTION) SHOULD BE LET GO.

5. WE HAD AN ENJOYABLE TALK WITH DAYAL, WHO IS GOOD COMPANY, AND I HOPE WE FILLED IN SOME OF THE GAPS IN HIS KNOWLEDGE, BUT TEMPESTA AND I RATHER DOUBTED WHETHER HIS APPROACH WAS TOUGH ENOUGH TO DENT THE THINKING OF THIS REGIME.

WALKER

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MR KING/MR WALDEGRAVE - PC - 23 AUGUST 1990

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FROM EGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

HELD BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, MR TOM KING,

AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH MINISTER OF STATE,

MR WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE,

ON THURSDAY, 23 AUGUST 1990

=====

Prime Minister

TRANSCRIPT A

You may like to glance at the passages which have underlined in this in case you do the pen conference tomorrow. can

MR KING:

Two weeks ago I announced the initial deployment of British forces to the Arabian Peninsular as part of the multinational effort to defend Saudi Arabia and other threatened states in the area and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Since then we have been fully involved also in the United Nations' efforts to restore Kuwait's independence through peaceful means and in support of the UN embargo.

Following consultation with our friends in the region and with the United States and the visit of the Minister of State, Alan Clark, and Sir Richard Vincent the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, on how we can further improve the defensive capability in the region, I have decided to deploy a further squadron of Tornado aircraft. It is likely that they will be based at Bahrain. These will be Tornado GR1 aircraft which will provide a capability day and night to counter any attack by Iraqi armour or concentration of forces.

- 2 -

We are also evaluating the possible deployment of an RAF Regiment detachment with Rapier surface to air missiles and other forces for their security, taking account of other defensive capabilities already present.

We are keeping under close review how we can best help the region in this time of tension and in this connection I shall be visiting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states earlier next week to discuss the situation with their governments and at the same time to visit our own forces in the area.

oooOoooo

(QUESTIONS AND ANSWER)

QUESTION:

Secretary of State, the Tornado is a deep-strike bomber, does this give you a capability to attack into Iraq, is this one of the considerations you had? And when you talk about other forces, are you talking about Army troops?

MR KING:

In response to the first question, the value of this aircraft, it has a night and day capability and it does have a good anti-armour capability as well and so it is a very useful addition as entirely for defensive, not for aggression at all, but to reinforce the defensive capability of the forces to prevent Iraqi aggression. This has come out of discussions with our friends in the region, with the United States as well, and it is quite clear that this is one way in which we can help most effectively reinforce the defensive capability that we have. There is a scale of Iraqi armour and the need to ensure we have an adequate defence against any aggression.

That has been our first objective which we hope we are achieving to ensure that we retain the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and that has been our concern and this contribution I may say has been welcomed. And although it is likely to be based in Bahrain, obviously the very close proximity of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, this has been discussed and welcomed by the Saudi Arabian government as well and for logistical reasons they welcome the idea also that it should be located in Bahrain.

On your second point, I refer to the fact that we are evaluating now. If these are likely to be in Bahrain, we need to evaluate the scale of air defence for our squadron in Bahrain. There are other forces there already so it is a matter of seeing what is there and how we can ensure that we have proper defences which are both of the Rapier surface-to-air side, but there may also be the need for security on the ground to secure the airfield area. And this is being evaluated now and the team will go very shortly, they are likely to go tomorrow to evaluate this and see the most effective way to do this.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible)

MR KING:

Within 5 - 7 days the squadron will be there.

QUESTION:

Where is the squadron coming from?

MR KING:

Germany.

QUESTION:

Is it connected to the fact that ... in Cyprus?

MR KING:

As I have said, we are evaluating whether it is necessary to go. To be clear about this, I made an earlier announcement two weeks ago that they would be going but because at that time I did not say where they would be going because with the number of resources arriving it was not at that time quite clear where they were going, but as we know they are now located in Dhahran, Dhahran already had satisfactory surface-to-air defences, and so it was not necessary. So we have forward based them in Cyprus and it is now likely to be that detachment that will then move forward if the evaluation indicates that their presence is necessary.

QUESTION (Guardian):

At an earlier stage in this crisis there were reports that the United States would have liked for a variety of reasons the British to contribute some ground forces as such as opposed to simply people to protect an airfield or whatever. Was that a factor in your considerations and if so why did you in the end decide not to take that particular route?

MR KING:

I think the United States are very appreciative and they have shown their appreciation of the speed with which we responded and the very effective way in which we responded to the multinational efforts to firstly ensure the defence of Saudi Arabia and to prevent further aggression. Obviously it is a matter of judgment as to which is the most effective way to do it and I would say this, that my announcement today is certainly very much welcomed by the United States, it is felt to be the most helpful way in the immediate area

that we could help in this respect. Obviously a Tornado GR1 Squadron does make a very effective additional contribution to the defence, particularly in the anti-armour phase.

QUESTION:

The GR1 is a nuclear capable aircraft, will you be making any clarification when they are deployed that they are armed with conventional weapons only?

MR KING:

We never comment on that but I think I have made clear the purpose for which they are being sent.

QUESTION:

We were told on the ground at Dhahran two days ago that if there was a deployment of ground defence troops for any airfield in the Gulf states that logically such a deployment for logistical and self-supporting purposes would need to be a battalion group. You have intimated now possibly that the deployment you are considering for Bahrain may be in some way probably less than that. Can you clarify whether in your judgment logistically in view of the temperatures and the rest that a battalion group is the sensible singular unit to send or not?

MR KING:

I do not ask a team to go and evaluate it and make up my mind in advance what the answer should be - that is the reality. We are going to see the most effective way in which this can be done.

I have seen various speculation about it, I would not like to

encourage that speculation further because genuinely we are looking to see how this might be most effectively done and the team will go tomorrow.

QUESTION (Flight International):

Can you tell us the name of the squadron from West Germany that is going, the number, and also whether you plan to send a further Rapier detachment to Cyprus to relieve the one that may be going to the Gulf? Or are you sending hawks to take point defence of Akrotiri?

PANEL SPEAKER:

The squadron will come from Germany but we are evaluating which is the best one. There is no difficulty about choosing a number of squadrons from Germany.

MR KING:

And on the Rapier defence side I think not at this stage yet, not at this stage.

QUESTION:

There is obviously a focus these days on the difference between offensive and defensive. The Americans have tried to make it clear that this is not supposed to be an American show but clearly it is an American show if there is to be any question of an offensive. Is there any planning by the British Government that they will take part in an offensive action if it is decided in Washington that is what is needed?

MR KING:

No there is no such plan at all. We are going entirely for defensive purposes to safeguard the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, in other words to protect Saudi Arabia against suffering the same fate that Kuwait has suffered by the naked aggression of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Our method to then see the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait is by the effective application of the United Nations embargo and that is why we attach such importance to the successful establishment of that embargo.

The Foreign Secretary and I were in Paris for the Western European Union on Tuesday and there was, I am glad to say, unanimous agreement round that table of all the members of the WEU that the United Nations Resolution 661 must be effective. That is the way that we must be sure it is effective and effective quickly and that is why we attach so much importance to it and we have no offensive plans.

QUESTION:

... presumably any plan by Washington to mount an offensive action?

MR KING:

I have said precisely what our position is, that is our position. We want to see the resolution of this, the ending of the aggression, the restoration of legitimate government achieved by peaceful means. It is very important indeed for the world, for the Arab nations themselves, for the Arab people, that this is done and that is why we are anxious that the most effective peaceful way to do this is a United Nations embargo that is effective.

MR KING:

We believe, and it is the agreement of the United Nations, that is the action that the United Nations will take and calling on all member states to take such action. And I said at the Western European Union meeting that I had never been at an international gathering of that kind at which there was such unanimity of purpose. And I think that people are noticing out of the United Nations the striking feature of the Security Council where actions are being taken without a dissenting voice, for instance in condemning the aggression, and we are anxious to see that United Nations action is genuinely effective and quickly.

QUESTION:

Are you considering sending out the Welsh Guards and if so when might you do that?

MR KING:

No, that was the answer to the question I was asked. We are now evaluating the most effective way to secure our situation, if the squadron is located in Bahrain, likely to be located, the most effective way to secure the ground situation there. And there will be no further comment until we have the fruits of that evaluation. But I shall of course myself be there early next week and I shall be looking myself at the situation on the ground.

QUESTION:

Would it be fair to say that the decision you are announcing today is as much a political one as a military one?

MR KING:

No, it is identified very much as a gap that needs to be filled in effective defensive structure to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia. I see this as another very significant stone in the wall that now is the shield that is defending Saudi Arabia from suffering the fate that Kuwait suffered. And it is one that has been identified on a military basis as the most effective contribution we can make.

QUESTION:

... Western Intelligence sources in Riyadh quoted this morning as saying that Scud launchers have not been moved into Kuwait, what is the current assessment on that and what chemical or crude nuclear capability they might have?

MR KING:

The answer to that is I think that is correct.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT A, CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT B)

FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, MR. TOM KING

AND

FCO MINISTER OF STATE, MR. WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE

IN LONDON,

ON THURSDAY, 23 AUGUST 1990

TRANSCRIPT B - (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT A)

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

A brief follow-up to the statement we made earlier in the week about action in Geneva with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Human Rights Commission:

We have been laying with them today examples of some of what the Prime Minister has called the totally scandalous use of families with small children in the gathering together of people by the Iraqi authorities in Kuwait and we considered that the best way to do this in order to emphasise the urgency which we feel about this, was to give an example, not that this example is the only one; it stands as an example, we fear, of other such families - but the Buchan family with two small children who have now been taken by the Iraqi authorities and placed in a hotel, which is presumably part of the announced policy of Iraq, which they talked about at the end of next week. We think this is a particularly repugnant example of this

policy, that Saddam Hussein should be threatening to shelter his forces behind women and children.

This morning, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Geneva was instructed to draw this particular case to the attention of the Chairman of the ICRC, Mr. Sommaruga, who I saw the day before yesterday, and to the Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights, Mr. Martinson (phon), but I have to say this is not the only case where children are being held - we have given this as an example to stand for the others - but I would be happy to answer questions on the wider consular and other aspects.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION:

Can you tell us how many children?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

The Buchan family have two children. We believe that there are some more children probably now being held in a variety of different locations in Kuwait with families so this is not the only case but it is one that is particularly well-documented.

QUESTION:

Can you tell us how many exactly?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I cannot tell you exactly but there are a number of others.

QUESTION:

Can you tell us what it is you want the Red Cross to do?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

What we want the Red Cross to do is to get in there, to start applying the requirements of the Fourth Geneva Convention which apply. They have the right to access; they have the right to take protected persons - and all our citizens should be protected persons - out of the zone; and incidentally, the Fourth Geneva Convention specifically mentions the use of civilians - of protected people - to protect military or other sensitive facilities in a military sense; that is actually covered directly in the Fourth Geneva Convention, so we want them in there. I very much hope that the Iraqis, who have been using the ICRC in their own prisoner swap with Iran and therefore must accept their neutrality, will give access to them as a matter of absolute urgency.

QUESTION:

Can you tell me what action the Foreign Office will take if Baghdad carries out its threat to remove diplomatic immunity from embassies that refuse to close tomorrow?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

Our view is that this is an illegal order which derives from an illegal act and we will ignore it.

QUESTION:

Was the Prime Minister aware, do you know, when she made her comments about the Red Cross at her news conference the other day, that this team from the International Red Cross had just arrived in Baghdad?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I think that the style of the Red Cross is to pursue matters in a very diplomatic and quiet way in getting access; we respect that but we do note that in a number of other situations round the world the humanitarian organisations seem to have made a rather louder noise and we wanted to emphasise that this acute situation - there has not been a situation like this in the modern world - should be bringing absolutely unanimous efforts and condemnation of all the humanitarian organisations.

The one which is a good example is the Human Rights Commission of the UN. The Special Advisory Sub-Committee is in session in Geneva; they happened also to be in session at the time of Tiannenman Square and they at once passed a motion condemning it. We hope that such a motion will be passed this week also - and I have some confidence that it will be. These are independent experts, not governmental representatives. It is essential to get every single one of the international organisations, from which Iraq has herself profited for example in terms of the prisoners of war, to work in this situation.

QUESTION:

If any of the women and children are indeed harmed in Kuwait

or Iraq, would you then consider that that was reason for abandoning the defensive posture and taking more positive action against the government?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

What I would say to that before perhaps passing that back to the Secretary of State, is that the Foreign Secretary made a rather important point yesterday when he said that those who take the responsibility for illegal acts should remember that there may ultimately be no hiding place in the long term for responsibility for those acts.

I think I will pass it to the Secretary of State.

MR. KING:

If I may just add to what William Waldegrave said, I think the point is that it is not just those responsible but it is that individual people bear the responsibility for the acts they carry out and will be held so responsible as the Foreign Secretary has made clear.

We have made absolutely clear that we wish this matter to be resolved by peaceful means. We wish there to be an end to aggression and we wish to see the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.

The question of barbaric behaviour of the the kind that we are seeing at the present time, taking babies at gun-point from people's houses and forcing them into whatever circumstances they are, is barbaric behaviour and anybody who perpetrates that sort of behaviour has to be ready to face the consequences of it.

I am not going to say any more than that, but the reality is that civilised nations of the world in the end will not tolerate that sort of behaviour. That is the stark truth of the matter.

We have a responsibility to our people. I have a keen direct interest because we have a British Liaison Team working in Kuwait - a number of people helping, non-combatants - who have been taken in total violation of the Geneva Convention and they have wives, they have children. It is quite unacceptable behaviour and we shall not rest until that matter is put right and people are restored the liberty to which they entitled under the law.

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

I might just add one thing if I may, Secretary of State: I, as you know, have responsibility for the Middle East under the Secretary of State in the Foreign Office and have a very large number of Arab friends. Saddam Hussein has been comparing himself to Saladin and the difference in behaviour from that great courteous prince to a man who is willing to put his famous army behind women and children is rather marked and if my friends in the Arab World think that is a champion worth backing, well they are backing a loser!

JACK THOMPSON (BBC WORLD SERVICE)

Mr. Waldegrave, I understand there are four diplomats left at the embassy in Kuwait, including the ambassador, Mr. Weston. You have said that we will ignore any attempt by the Iraqis to close that embassy down but in practical terms, what if the Iraqis

actually roll up at the front door and try and remove Mr. Weston and the diplomats? What is the UK's response going to be then?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

We will not ask Mr. Weston to resist by force - that would be foolish - but if they are going to impose an illegal order, they will have to impose it on us. We are going to take no cognisance of it until they were to take such action and in that respect, we are in complete unanimity not only with the countries of the Twelve but a wider group of countries, including Japan and a number of others too.

JACK THOMPSON:

Do you expect them to do it when the deadline comes?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

It is rather difficult to say. They have been in quite a muddle in recent days and have said one thing in Kuwait, another thing in Baghdad. I do not know. Let us see!

QUESTION:

Can you confirm that Iraqi planes and troops are now in Yemen and also that, following the signing of the Sudanese-Iraqi Military Cooperation Pact, that there are now Iraqi fighter planes in the Sudan?

MR. KING:

I think it is no secret that there were some Iraqi planes there before the conflict started. I cannot comment further on that.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible - re offensive action by British forces not being ruled out if the provocation increases or continues)

MR. KING:

We wish to see this settled by peaceful means but we rule out no option. If you say would we just sit down under any provocation, no matter how grave, and make no effort to seek to restore the correct situation, then that would not be correct.

We are determined to achieve our rights; we are determined to achieve the liberty of British subjects. We wish to see this settled by peaceful means but we do not rule out any option.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible but re war)

MR. KING:

I add nothing to what I have said. I have said quite clearly that we wish first of all to achieve the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. First of all the immediate emergency: this country was very speedy in the action that we took to come to the immediate assistance of our friends and allies in the area to ensure firstly that there was no further aggression. Now, we are

embarked, in concert with our friends and allies in the United Nations in a quite a remarkable show - it is worldwide - to see this aggression ended. We wish to see it ended by peaceful means. We do not wish to see fighting; we do not wish to see conflict. We did not start this problem; we are not the people responsible for this barbarous behaviour; we are not the people who murdered our own citizens - as William Waldegrave discussed it, Saddam Hussein must probably be on record as the man who has already killed more Arabs than any other man in history - and we are determined to see that this barbarous treatment that our nationals are suffering is ended at the earliest moment and that the rule of law is preserved and restored in the world - as important for Arab peoples as it is for peoples anywhere else in the world.

QUESTION:

(Very faint) Do you have any information about the Iraqis putting up their....to allow the evacuation of refugees?

MR. KING:

I have heard some accounts of that but I would not want to comment on it further. There have been a number of, I think, rather misleading stories and I am not sure quite what the present situation is, to be honest, on that.

QUESTION:

Can I ask the Secretary of State and perhaps Mr. Waldegrave a question about the Kingdom of Jordan?

Is the Office of IMF still functioning in Amman and what are its present operating instructions in view of the crisis?

MR. KING:

My understanding is that it is. I must admit my eye has not been closely on that ball in the last couple of days, but I think it is. My understanding is that it is but obviously we are keeping everything under review at the present time.

QUESTION:

Can I ask the Chief of the Defence Staff what types of aircraft were in Sudan and Yemen prior to the crisis starting?

MR. KING:

My answer was only about the Yemen. I think I am correct in saying that there were some aircraft there. In case there is any misunderstanding about what I said, I was not able to comment and did not know anything about the Sudan point.

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF:

I do not want to go into details now on this. There have been a variety of aircraft over a period of months but I would not want to be drawn on which particular ones for obvious reasons.

QUESTION:

..an apparently related incident, that of Mr. Keenan, another hostage. There was some suggestion that he may be released. Have you got anything to say, Mr. Waldegrave?

MR. WALDEGRAVE:

Not really! We hope it is true; it came from an ... report, as I understand it. There have been previous reports before, but we have no other information. We hope it is true.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT B AND END OF WHOLE TRANSCRIPT)

CCP



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

32 (A-B)

MO 6/17/15J

Prime Minister

23rd August 1990

This completes

the exchanges on
naval ROE context?

Dear Charles

CDP
23/8

Yes -
A-h is
context
not

UN EMBARGO: ENFORCEMENT ACTION

In your letter of 23 August to Simon Gass you recorded that the Defence Secretary and Attorney General were to consider further the options outlined in the final paragraph of the Annex to Defence Secretary's minute describing enforcement action in support of the UN embargo, especially in relation to the issue of proportionality.

Both measures described in that paragraph (assault boarding parties and disabling fire) are at the extreme end of the scale of force available and, as noted, would involve serious risks to life as well as risk of damage and pollution. This could indeed give rise to accusations of disproportionality and problems of justification in both legal and political terms.

They were included principally in order to give a complete picture of the options available for stopping ships but, as the Defence Secretary made clear in paragraph 8 of his minute, we believe that the actions available in the sequence (a) to (h), ending with the firing of live (HE) ammunition at the bridge should be sufficient to halt the most determined Master. If the crew did not themselves halt the vessel (not least because of the risks to themselves of continuing with a disabled bridge), it is most unlikely that they would be willing or able to resist a boarding party.

The Defence Secretary shares the Prime Minister's caution about the possible use of assault boarding parties against armed opposition. Quite apart from the legal aspects - particularly in relation to appropriate ROE - our further study has underlined the extent of the practical problems that would be involved and the risk of casualties to our own forces. It should, however, remain an option for an RN Commander to use an ordinary boarding party to secure a ship of any stage in the sequence measures if he judges

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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that this is practical and that it will not be met by armed resistance (although it would of course be armed in case a need for self-defence were to arise).


For all these reasons, the Defence Secretary believes that these options should only be considered further in the very unlikely event that the sequence of measures identified in paragraphs (a) to (h) of the Annex to his minute prove inadequate.

I am sending copies of this letter which has been cleared with the Attorney General's office to Simon Gass (FCO), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), and to Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).


Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

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e

KUWAIT - BAGHDAD CONVOY

1. ALL UK AND LE STAFF IN BRITISH EMBASSY CONVOY ARRIVED SAFELY AT EMBASSY BY 1915Z. BAGGAGE TRUCKS ARE IN BAGHDAD BUT HAVE NOT YET APPEARED AT EMBASSY. ONE OF DRIVERS HAS MADE CONTACT AND THEY SHOULD BE HERE SHORTLY.

2. TWO SECRETARIES FROM NETHERLANDS EMBASSY AND WIFE OF FORMER COUNSELLOR AT NORWEGIAN EMBASSY ARRIVED WITH PARTY. THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN CONTACTED.

WALKER

YYYY

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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(BY TUBE H29)
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(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon John Wakeham FCA JP MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
LONDON
SW1E 5HE

23 August 1990

Dear Secretary of State,

IRAQ/KUWAIT - INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

I understand that there is to be a further meeting of the International Energy Agency next week to review the market situation and discuss whether members can rest on the decisions taken on 9 August or whether further steps, such as stock draw-down, should be sanctioned.

I know that you appreciate the Treasury's wider interest in this question, because of its implications for economic management. Could I therefore ask that your officials get in touch with mine at an early stage of the preparation for this meeting, and that at Ministerial level we keep in close contact?

Copies of this letter go to members of OD.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Rutnam

FP FRANCIS MAUDE

(Approved by the
Financial Secretary,
and signed in his
absence.)

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a: / gulf. ws

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 August 1990

The Gulf Crisis: Jordan

Thank you for your letter of 23 August about assistance to Jordan to offset the effects of imposing sanctions against Iraq. This was discussed at the Prime Minister's meeting this morning, and it was agreed that we should continue to argue for national contributions (rather than an EC contribution), and should look to countries which are not contributing to the multi-national force to take on this burden instead.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), Eamonn Taylor (ODA) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

S. L. Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ws

ws

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 August 1990

Dear Charles,

The Gulf Crisis: Jordan

Thank you for your letter of 21 August.

Political Directors will on 24 August discuss proposals by the Commission for economic assistance to those countries which will suffer as a result of imposing sanctions against Iraq. The Foreign Secretary and Mr van den Broek declined to accept these proposals on the nod when they were put by Mr Matutes without any supporting paper to the EPC lunch in Paris on 21 August. He proposes to instruct our representative to take a cautious line, and ask for precise details of the Commission's intentions. He agrees with the Prime Minister that those countries not contributing to the multinational forces in the Gulf should play the major part. The best option for us is for the EC Twelve to make national contributions coordinated as necessary, as assistance through the EC budget will attract normal cost sharing arrangements.

This raises a particular point on Jordan. You will now have seen (Washington telno 2003) that the Americans are urgently considering bilateral and multinational assistance, on condition, of course, that Jordan fully imposes sanctions. This is welcome. The Americans are best placed to bring pressure to bear on major potential donors such as Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Kuwaitis. At the same time, the Europeans have a role to play in encouraging the wider international community to contribute, and we will be instructing our representative at tomorrow's meeting accordingly. Our most useful role will be to encourage bilateral European contributions (eg from the Germans). The Foreign Secretary's visit to Jordan on 5 September will give an opportunity to underline HMG's role in coordinating international assistance.


I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), Eamonn Taylor (ODA) AND Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

MIDDLE EAST : Siludra 1911



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: MEETING OF MINISTERS

The Prime Minister held a meeting this morning with the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Energy Secretary, the Attorney General and the Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Waldegrave), to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf crisis. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock were also present. This letter summarises the main action points.

UN Security Council Resolution on Enforcement of Sanctions

The meeting had before it the text of the draft Resolution in UKMIS New York tel. no. 1061. The Attorney General raised a drafting point relating to operative paragraph one, recommending commas after the word "shipping" in the fourth line and "destinations" in the fifth line, to avoid any ambiguity.

The Foreign Secretary reported that the Americans hoped to achieve a positive vote on the draft resolution in the course of today, having agreed with the Soviet Union that it would not be implemented until 2200z on Friday 24 August. But there were still doubts about the position of some of the non-Permanent Members of the Security Council. There would be intensive lobbying during the day.

The Prime Minister drew attention to the way in which the United States had changed the ROE for their naval forces in the Gulf area over the past two days, in relation to the changing prospects of securing the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution. We had had to follow suit. This was undesirable and unfair to the Commanding Officers of USN and RN ships. It should not happen again. Her strong view on this should be brought to the attention of the White House. I will take action on this.

Aid to Jordan

It was noted that the Commission were proposing urgent assistance to Jordan from the Community budget, whereas we had argued for national contributions. We should continue to maintain this position at the forthcoming meeting of Political

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Directors of the Twelve, and argue for those countries which were not contributing to the multi-national force in the Gulf to play the major part in helping Jordan and Turkey.

British Citizens in Iraq and Kuwait

The Foreign Secretary reported that the Embassy in Amman would be trying to persuade the Jordanians to re-open their border to let through the convoy of British Embassy dependants which had left Baghdad earlier this morning.

The question was also raised whether the Jordanian action in closing the Jordan/Iraq border applied to lorry traffic going from Jordan into Iraq in breach of UN sanctions.

It was noted that representatives of the United Nation's Secretary General were in Baghdad to discuss the question of foreign citizens with the Iraqi Government, but had not made any progress.

The Attorney General was invited to ensure that the argument that we would hold individual Iraqi's accountable for any maltreatment of British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait could be legally sustained.

International Committee of the Red Cross

The Minister of State Foreign Office reported that, following the Prime Minister's strictures and his own visit to Geneva, he believed that the ICRC would bend all its efforts to trying to help foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait. The Prime Minister directed that we should give particular prominence to the case of the British family in Kuwait, who had been taken away at gun point with their baby. We should ask the ICRC to intervene in this specific case and draw the widest possible public attention to it as an example of Iraq's inhuman conduct.

The Minister of State Foreign Office reported that he had also visited the United Nations' Human Rights Commission and encouraged them to pass a condemnatory resolution on Iraq's behaviour, as they had in the case of the massacre in Tiananmen Square. It was agreed that maximum publicity should be given to this also.

Helpline

The Foreign Secretary reported on his visit to the Helpline headquarters, which had been organised by Mr. Robert Hayward M.P. The FCO would provide some modest funds for the service. The Prime Minister said she would try to arrange a visit there herself.

Embassies in Kuwait

It was noted with satisfaction that even those EC countries whose citizens were being allowed to leave Iraq and Kuwait had agreed to keep open their Embassies in Kuwait after the Iraqi deadline for closure of 24 August.

Despatch of Additional British Forces to the Gulf

The proposals for despatch of additional British forces to the Gulf set out in the Defence Secretary's minute of 22 August to the Prime Minister were agreed and will be announced by the Defence Secretary at a press conference this morning. It was noted that the additional Tornado GRI aircraft would be stationed in Bahrain.

Enforcement Action in Support of the United Nations Embargo

The meeting considered the Defence Secretary's undated minute on enforcement action in support of the United Nations embargo. The Attorney General endorsed points (a) to (h) in the annex to that minute, but raised questions about the final paragraph in relation to proportionality. It was agreed that these would be further discussed between the Attorney General and the Defence Secretary and a report made to the next meeting. The Prime Minister urged caution in the use of boarding parties.

Longer-Term Prospects


The Foreign Secretary underlined the importance of ensuring that the United Kingdom was fully involved in any planning conducted by the United States for possible military action to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. We must not find ourselves confronted with proposals for such action, in which we would inevitably be involved, at short notice. It seemed unlikely, however, that the Americans would contemplate such action before their mechanised divisions arrived in theatre in early October. It was agreed that we should take every opportunity to keep in close touch with American thinking. General Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, should be encouraged to visit London. Our own Commander-in-Chief was likely to meet the American Commander of CENTCOM in the Gulf shortly. The Prime Minister would probably see the President in New York at the end of September.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).


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Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 August 1990

Jordan: Refugees

Thank you for your letter of 23 August about the help which the UK can give to Jordan to cope with the increasing flow of displaced foreign citizens from Iraq and Kuwait. I think the Prime Minister would agree that we should offer half a million pounds as a humanitarian gesture, in addition to our share of the proposed EC relief (although my understanding is that the Commission are proposing that the EC contribution should be used for an airlift).

C. D. POWELL

S. L. Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



cc/rc

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 August 1990

Dear Charles,

Jordan: Refugees


The Prime Minister has asked what response the UK can make to help Jordan cope with the increasing flow of displaced foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are offering support to the Jordanian Red Crescent Society (JRCS), who will bear the main burden of ministering to the refugees. The obvious pressure points are at the Iraq/Jordan border crossing point ~~()~~, in Amman and in Aqaba. It is difficult to gauge accurately the rate of refugee crossings, but additional JRCS facilities outside these areas could be needed. The ICRC are initially supplying some medical assistance to a JRCS border transit facility. If the needs expand rapidly, the JRCS are likely to appeal to the whole international Red Cross and Red Crescent family for funds, goods-in-kind and personnel. At that stage and in that order of preference, the British Red Cross Society would expect to help (from their own resources - a UK appeal is not considered likely). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has not at this stage been invited by Jordan to become involved, for it is still not clear that they fulfill all the internationally accepted criteria of the term 'refugee'.

We suggest that a generous gesture from HMG would be to offer the JRCS up to £500,000, to enable them to obtain the goods necessary to set up transit facilities within Jordan to help the refugees to pass quickly through and beyond Jordan. We would expect their needs to include community and family tents, simple cooking facilities, water treatment equipment, field sanitation and basic medical supplies. The choice would be theirs.

I should add that the European Commission are examining the possibility of allocating an emergency aid credit of 1 million ECU for relief items for refugees arriving in both Jordan and Egypt. The UK share of this credit will be approximately £140,000.

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street


(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT: MEETING OF MINISTERS, 23 AUGUST

The points you will want to cover are:

1. Situation at the UN. Are we now confident of getting a resolution ready?
2. Breaches of Sanctions. We still do not seem to be getting accurate information quickly enough, or making the most effective use of the information we do have.
3. Despatch of additional forces. We should announce the despatch of the additional Tornados and RAF Regiment this morning (it is beginning to leak). Are we doing any contingency planning about possible despatch of ground forces?
4. Rules of Engagement. Is the Attorney satisfied with the latest MOD minute on how we would deal with ships which fail to stop? There are differences between our RoE and those of the Americans: do these matter?
Apparent charge sailing by U.S.?
5. British Citizens. Are we persuading the Jordanians to open the frontier to let our convoy of Embassy dependents across? What further news do we have of those British citizens taken from their homes in Kuwait? Is the Attorney happy with the argument that individual Iraqis will be held responsible for any maltreatment of British citizens?
6. Embassies in Kuwait. How solid is the front of those determined to stay (the US are firm)? What do we expect the Iraqis to do? How will we react?
7. King Hussein's Peace mission. Do we know what he will propose?

8. US/Iraq: Rules of Engagement. Is it really the case that the Americans have given the Iraqis their rules of engagement in the interest of 'deconfliction'? Or is it a garbled report?

9. Oil situation. You will want to ask the Energy Secretary to report.

10. Press Conference. Should there be one today? Who will take it? Who will announce despatch of Tornados?

C.D.P.

Known
Archie's Fuel

Building
up stocks

C. D. POWELL

23 August 1990


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Petrol / Gasoline


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Info - low
entirely wrong.



North Sea - Iranian north

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INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM, WASHINGTON

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YOUR TELNO 468: ANGLO-IRANIAN RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE IRANIANS TAKE US BACK TO SQUARE ONE, PRESSING FOR A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING IN GENEVA TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITHOUT DISCUSSING COOPER, HOSTAGES ETC. NO PROSPECT NOW OF A MEETING ON 24 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR (KHARRAZI) ON 22 AUGUST AND MADE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TUR.

3. KHARRAZI MADE FIVE POINTS:

- (A) ANGLO-IRANIAN RELATIONS HAD NOT YET COME UP IN THE MAJLES, WHICH WAS DISTRACTED BY THE GULF CRISIS.
- (B) THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD FIRMLY DECIDED THAT NEW YORK SHOULD BE THE CHANNEL FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH US. THEY WERE CONFUSED THAT THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN WAS NOT ONLY FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK (WHICH WAS FAIR ENOUGH) BUT ALSO ACTIVE. HE HAD TRIED TO SEE THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER FOUR TIMES ON 22 AUGUST.
- (C) THE AGENDA FOR THE GENEVA MEETING SHOULD BE AGREED IN NEW YORK. IT SHOULD INCLUDE ONLY 'CURRENT' ISSUES, SUCH AS THE RESTORATION OF RELATIONS AND THE GULF CRISIS. OLD PROBLEMS COULD BE DEALT WITH LATER.
- (D) THE MEETING SHOULD BE AT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, IE MR WALDEGRAVE AND VAEZI. RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WAS A POLITICAL MATTER AND SHOULD BE DONE AT A POLITICAL LEVEL.
- (E) THE STATEMENT ON THE RESTORATION OF RELATIONS SHOULD BE 'VERY SHORT AND PRECISE'.

3. I SAID I WAS GLAD ABOUT (A). I WAS BAFFLED ABOUT (B). OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS' POSITIONS WERE IDENTICAL, IE THAT THE MAIN CHANNEL WAS NEW YORK AND THE SWEDISH CHANNEL WAS FOR PASSING INFORMATION AS SUITED EACH OF US. I SUGGESTED THAT KHARRAZI AND I BOTH REPORTED THIS TO OUR CAPITALS.

4. ON (C), I RECALLED AT SOME LENGTH THE HISTORY OF MY CONTACTS WITH KHARRAZI AND ZARIF: WHY WE HAD SUGGESTED A MEETING IN GENEVA PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NEEDED TO OVERCOME THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR POSITIONS: AND WHY IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE MEETING WERE INFORMAL WITH NO FIXED AGENDA. I CAREFULLY REHEARSED OUR POSITION ON THE NEED TO REMOVE CERTAIN OBSTACLES FOR EXAMPLE OVER COOPER AND HOSTAGES, BEFORE RELATIONS COULD BE RESTORED. IT FOLLOWED THAT POINT (D) ALSO CAUSED US DIFFICULTY. WE DID NOT WANT A POLITICAL LEVEL MEETING IN ORDER TO WRANGLE OVER COOPER. IF FOR EXAMPLE THE IRANIANS WERE TO PUT COOPER ON TO AN AEROPLANE TOMORROW, THEN THINGS WOULD LOOK VERY DIFFERENT. A MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD BE HARD TO KEEP QUIET, WHICH WAS WHAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO TRY TO DO. POINT (E) COULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN WE GOT TO THE POINT OF RESTORING RELATIONS.

5. KHARRAZI ARGUED AT SOME LENGTH THAT WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA FOR A GENEVA MEETING IN NEW YORK. I COMMENTED THAT WE SEEMED TO BE BACK TO THE POINT WE WERE AT IN EARLY JULY. I WAS SORRY THAT AN INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK SEEMED TO HAVE FAILED. I WAS READY TO TALK TO HIM AGAIN ABOUT THE OBSTACLES WHICH NEEDED TO BE TACKLED BEFORE WE COULD RESUME RELATIONS. I WAS ALSO WILLING TO DISCUSS THE BROADER ISSUES. BUT IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT A MEETING IN GENEVA ON 24 AUGUST WAS NOW NOT ON. KHARRAZI AGREED.

6. AT THAT POINT I HAD TO END THE MEETING FOR ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT. KHARRAZI SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AGAIN TOMORROW. HE HAD SOME OTHER POINTS TO PUT. WE HAVE PROVISIONALLY AGREED 231900Z. HE SAID HE ALSO HOPED TO HAVE AN ANSWER FOR ME ON NIMROD FREQUENCIES (ABOUT WHICH PLEASE SEE MIFT).

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WASHINGTON TELNO 2013: NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK

1. AS YOU KNOW (MY TELECON WITH GASS), MY U S COLLEAGUE TOLD ME BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE FIVE WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS THIS AFTERNOON ON 22 AUGUST THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD JUST INDICATED TO BAKER THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT GO ALONG WITH THE PROPOSED DRAFT ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION IF IT INCLUDED A 48-HOUR MORATORIUM CLAUSE. WE HAVE SINCE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THIS IDEA (TELECON GASS/CLIFF).

2. THE AMERICANS ARE PLANNING FIRST A MEETING OF THE FIVE AT 1430Z, THEN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEN A FORMAL MEETING WITH ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION TOMORROW 23 AUGUST. BUT THERE MAY BE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES. THE MALAYSIAN AND COLOMBIAN AMBASSADORS ASKED TO SEE ME LATE ON 22 AUGUST AND SAID THAT MOST NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT DRAFT WENT FAR ENOUGH. THEY WANTED A REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 42, AND FULL USE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER. THEY ALSO WANTED CASES OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING TO BE REFERRED FIRST, HOWEVER RAPIDLY, TO THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE.

3. THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE NOT UNITED ON THIS ISSUE. BUT I CONFIRMED THIS EVENING THAT MOST WANT STRONGER LANGUAGE THAN IS NOW IN THE DRAFT. THEIR MOTIVES ARE MIXED. SOME SEE THE RESOLUTION AS A MEANS FOR RESTRAINING U S UNILATERAL ACTION BY GIVING THE UNITED NATIONS A CO-ORDINATING ROLE. OTHERS GENUINELY FEEL THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS TO TAKE A REAL LEAD IN BRINGING THE NECESSARY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON IRAQ. THE MAJOR DISSENTER IS CHINA. THIS EVENING THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES SEEMED TO BE MAKING A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE THAT THE TIME FOR ENFORCEMENT HAD COME AND THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD TAKE ON THE NECESSARY RESPONSIBILITIES.

4. IN DEFENDING THE CURRENT TEXT, PICKERING AND I HAVE ARGUED THAT IT OCCUPIES A MIDDLE POSITION, THAT ARTICLE 42 IS UNNECESSARY, AND

THAT THIS IS THE BEST THAT CAN NOW BE ACHIEVED. WE SHALL SEE
TOMORROW IF THE RUSSIANS AND NON-ALIGNED MAKE COMMON CAUSE IN THE
COUNCIL. WE ARE NOT HOME YET.

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REF A. BDLS CANBERRA I9M/K2D 210005Z AUG (CIVIL AIRCRAFT)(NOTAL)
B. FCO AAA/I9M 171500Z AUG (POL/MIL)

1. USAF BUILD-UP CONTINUES WITH NOW SOME 700 PERSONNEL, 20 B52, AND TANKERS. PERSONNEL LIKELY TO RISE TO 1,000 BY WEEKEND AND UNDERSTAND THERE ARE PLANS TO BRING IN FURTHER 8 B 52 AT SOME STAGE
2. HAVE RE-BRIEFED USAF ON POLITICAL APPROVAL IN LIGHT OF REF B
3. THE LACK OF A JOINT SERVICE COMMANDER ON-ISLAND IS CAUSING SOME FRICTION BUT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
4. STATE DEPARTMENT (SIDMAN) HAVE VETUED ANY FILMING BY USAF FILM CREW THAT ARRIVED UNANNOUNCED ON ISLAND AND THEY ARE BEING RETURNED TO CONUS
5. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH CONSF HAVE TURNED DOWN BDLS REQUEST FOR CIVIL AIRLINER REFUELLING (REF A)
6. USAF ARE CURRENTLY DECIDING WHICH MEMBER OF THE MARRIED COUPLE THEY INADVERTENTLY BROUGHT ON ISLAND WILL BE RTB

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The main

overnight (Telegram).

Position at the

UN as I explained

to you last night:

vote likely today.

Details of arrival of

US Armoured Division - not

until early October. C. P. 2/24

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TO DESKBY 230100Z FCO

TELNO 2014

OF 222359Z AUGUST 90

INFO DESKBY 230100Z UKMIS NEW YORK

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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRAQI TANKERS

1. KIMMITT TOLD ME THAT IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE IRAQI TANKERS CURRENTLY IN OMANI WATERS (WHICH WOULD BE ENTERING YEMENI WATERS IN THE NEXT 12-24 HOURS), A FURTHER IRAQI TANKER - THE AIN ZALAH (MY TELNO 1997) - WHICH HAD EARLIER DOCKED IN ADEN, HAD NOW DISCHARGED ITS CARGO OF IRAQI CRUDE. THIS WAS OF CONCERN, AND MIGHT BE AN EXAMPLE OF SANCTIONS BUSTING, IN US EYES AT LEAST, THOUGH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT DISPUTE IT.

2. KIMMITT SAID IN THIS CONTEXT THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD ASKED BAKER IF THE US HAD EVIDENCE OF IRAQI CIRCUMVENTION OF SANCTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD ACTIVE MILITARY MEASURES BEEN TAKEN. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ARGUED THAT A TANKER MOORED AT ADEN WHICH DID NOT UNLOAD ITS CARGO MIGHT NOT TECHNICALLY BE A BREACH OF SANCTIONS (KIMMITT ADDED AS A GLOSS THAT BAKER HAD INTERPRETED THIS AS SHEVARDNADZE POSSIBLY SEEKING QUOTE A HOOK UNQUOTE ON WHICH TO HANG AN INTERDICTION RESOLUTION). THE US WERE THEREFORE LOOKING FOR FACTS - IN ESSENCE QUOTE A SMOKING GUN UNQUOTE - WITH WHICH THEY COULD GO BACK TO THE RUSSIANS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE US WERE SEEKING DATA AND ASKED IF WE OR THE FRENCH COULD CONTRIBUTE. I GAVE BOLTON (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AFFAIRS), WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, YOUR TELNO 474, AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE CO-ORDINATING WITH THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK ABOUT PUTTING THIS INFORMATION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. KIMMITT MADE IT CLEAR THE AMERICANS HAD PARALLEL INFORMATION. THEY WOULD BE SUGGESTING TO THE EGYPTIANS IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO HOLD UP THE BALQUEES FOR PROLONGED INSPECTION.

3. ON AN OPERATIONAL POINT, KIMMITT NOTED THAT IRAQI TACTICS WERE TO STAY WITHIN TERRITORIAL WATERS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PASSING DIRECTLY FROM OMANI TO YEMENI WATERS. THE US HAD ASKED THE OMANIS EITHER TO STOP THE TANKERS THEMSELVES OR TO LET THE US ENTER THEIR WATERS TO DO SO. THE OMANIS HAD AGREED TO THE LATTER AND WOULD NO DOUBT EXTEND THAT AGREEMENT TO BRITISH AND FRENCH WARSHIPS. THE US COULD ALSO APPROACH THE YEMENIS FOR SIMILAR RIGHTS ON 25 AUGUST.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS QUOTE RELUCTANTLY DECIDED UNQUOTE TO ACCEED TO RUSSIAN REQUEST FOR 48 HOUR MORATORIUM ON INTERDICTION OF IRAQI SHIPPING. US WILL THEREFORE PRESS FOR A RESOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF A MORATORIUM ON NAVAL ACTION UNTIL 1800 EDT ON 24 AUGUST. IF A RESOLUTION IS UNOBTAINABLE BY THEN, US WILL TAKE ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED US/UK/FRENCH CO-ORDINATION MEETINGS AMONG COMMANDERS IN THE GULF.

Speed
DETAIL

2. KIMMITT ASKED ME AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CALL LATE ON 22 AUGUST. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD SPOKEN TODAY. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION THAT WOULD AUTHORISE IMMEDIATE ACTION AGAINST IRAQI SHIPPING. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ARGUED THAT ANOTHER 48 HOURS WAS NEEDED TO LET HIS STRONG MESSAGE TO HAMMADI SINK IN AND FOR THE UN PROCESS TO RUN ITS COURSE. THIS RUSSIAN POSITION HAD CAUSED DIFFICULTY IN WASHINGTON AS FIVE IRAQI VESSLES WERE DUE TO MOVE INTO YEMENI TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE NEXT 12-24 HOURS (SEE MIFT).

3. BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD QUOTE VERY RELUCTANTLY UNQUOTE DECIDED TO ACCEED TO THE SOVIET REQUEST. THE US WOULD THEREFORE TAKE NO NAVAL ACTION FOR 48 HOURS. THE PRESIDENT HAD COME TO THIS DECISION DESPITE HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MITTERRAND AT WHICH A COMMON VIEW HAD EMERGED THAT WE NEEDED TO ACT QUICKLY AND HAD THE AUTHORITY TO DO SO. THE PRESIDENT FELT THE BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE TALK ALTERED THINGS: WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD. THEIR ARGUMENT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. BUT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT WAIT LONGER THAN 48 HOURS, AND HAD SET A DEADLINE OF 1800 HRS EDT ON 24 AUGUST. IF THE RUSSIANS DID NOT AGREE TO A RESOLUTION, THE US (AND HOPEFULLY ITS ALLIES) WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION. KIMMITT NOTED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT GIVEN A CLEAR GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION. BUT THE US FELT THEY WERE ON BOARD AND THAT ACCEEDING TO THEIR REQUEST

WOULD REMOVE MOSCOW'S PROCEDURAL RESERVATIONS, THEREBY PUTTING THEM UNDER MORAL PRESSURE. KIMMITT FELT THAT RUSSIAN HESITATION WAS NOT BASED ON PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE RESOLUTION BUT WAS ESSENTIALLY PRESENTATIONAL IE HAMMADI'S RECENT VISIT AND THE NEED TO GIVE THE IRAQIS TIME QUOTE TO DO THE RIGHT THING UNQUOTE.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO AGREE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. WE COULD GO ALONG WITH A 48 HOUR MORATORIUM CLAUSE (TELECON WOOD/GASS). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS.

5. KIMMITT SAID THAT PICKERING HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PUSH FOR AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION TODAY. A CLAUSE WOULD BE INSERTED IN THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH WOULD POSTPONE ACTION UNTIL 1800 EDT ON 24 AUGUST. AS A FALL-BACK, HE HOPED FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT A RESOLUTION IN ITS PRESENT FORM WOULD BE ADOPTED WITHIN 48 HOURS. IF A RESOLUTION WAS NOT OBTAINABLE TODAY (OR INDEED BEFORE 24 AUGUST) THE US WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WOULD TAKE ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51. HE BELIEVED, IN ADDITION, THAT IF A CLEAR CASE OF SANCTIONS BREACHING COULD BE SHOWN TO THE RUSSIANS BEFORE 24 AUGUST THEY WOULD AGREE TO IMMEDIATE ACTION.

5. THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO DIRECTED SECRETARY CHENEY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS (POWELL) TO BEGIN WORKING WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS TO CO-ORDINATE THE START OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE GULF ON THE EXPIRY OF THE US DEADLINE. THE US HOPED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE UN HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION, THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO TAKE CONCERTED JOINT ACTION. THERE WOULD BE A MEETING OF REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THE USS LASALLE IN BAHRAIN AT 1300 LOCAL ON 23 AUGUST TO BEGIN TO DISCUSS JOINT OPERATIONS. THERE WOULD BE A NEED TO CO-ORDINATE MILITARY ACTION AND POOL INFORMATION ON THE IRAQI-FLAGGED VESSELS WHICH WERE POTENTIAL TARGETS. KIMMITT UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS CO-ORDINATION WAS TAKING PLACE MAINLY ON MILITARY CHANNELS AND HIS BRIEFING WAS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. I SAID I WOULD NONETHELESS SEEK INSTRUCTIONS.

6. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR DETAILS ON IRAQI TANKERS.

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FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. US ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THAT THEY WILL NOT CLOSE THEIR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT ON 24 AUGUST. AMBASSADOR AND SKELETON STAFF WILL REMAIN IN DEFIANCE OF IRAQI ORDER TO LEAVE. APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SHOW SOLIDARITY.

DETAIL

2. STATE CALLED IN THE ENTIRE CORPS (SOME 130 PLUS) AT 1500Z TODAY TO BE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHICH WILL ISSUE AT THE PRESS BRIEFING AT 1600Z TODAY:
QUOTE CONSISTENT WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 662, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ALONG WITH MOST OTHER NATIONS REPRESENTED IN KUWAIT, HAS REJECTED THE IRAQI DEMAND FOR THE CLOSURE OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND WILL BE RETAINING A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THAT COUNTRY. AMBASSADOR HOWELL WILL REMAIN IN CHARGE. THIS IS CONSISTENT NOT ONLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BUT ALSO WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS TO THE AMERICAN PRIVATE COMMUNITY WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS, HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THE FREEDOM TO LEAVE AND RETURN TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE IRAQI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ACCORD THEM THEIR BASIC RIGHTS. WE WILL ALSO INSIST THAT AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE FULL PROTECTION WHICH THEIR STATUS ACCORDS THEM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT WE PLAN TO HAVE SUFFICIENT DIPLOMATIC STAFF AT THE EMBASSY IN KUWAIT TO LOOK AFTER THEIR SAFETY AND WELFARE, WHICH REMAINS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY. THEY WILL SERVE OUR COMMUNITY TO THE

BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. CITIZENS SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OTHERS TO INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 WHICH DEMANDS THAT IRAQ PERMIT AND FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGNERS FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ, AS WELL AS IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING CONSULAR ACCESS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS UNQUOTE.

3. MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) SAID THAT THE USG WANTED TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS THAT HAD EXCHANGED INFORMATION ON THE CRISIS AND HAD DEMONSTRATED INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ON MEASURES TO FIND A SOLUTION. HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE CLOSE COOPERATION ON THE GROUND IN KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD WHERE SO MANY WERE LIVING AND WORKING UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS.

4. THE US DECISION TO KEEP THEIR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT BEYOND 24 AUGUST HAD BEEN MADE IN THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY WOULD BE DEFYING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE IRAQI OCCUPYING FORCES. BUT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE IN KUWAIT AS LONG AS US CITIZENS WERE HELD THERE AGAINST THEIR WILL. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION AS TO WHAT THE US WOULD DO ABOUT ITS EMBASSY IF THE IRAQIS ALLOWED ALL US CITIZENS TO LEAVE KUWAIT AND IRAQ, MACK WOULD NOT BE DRAWN. BUT HE INTIMATED THAT THE US WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL DIMENSION - THEY DID NOT RECOGNISE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. THIS WOULD REMAIN A FACTOR IN US CALCULATIONS.

5. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE TO IRAQ THAT THERE WAS INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY. THIS WAS NOT AN IRAQ/US ISSUE: IT CONCERNED THE ENTIRE WORLD: EVERYONE HAD A ROLE TO PLAY: A TOUGH ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WAS REQUIRED BY ALL. HE ASKED EMBASSIES TO COMMUNICATE TO CAPITALS THE US DECISION TO REMAIN IN KUWAIT. HE URGED ALL GOVERNMENTS TO ISSUE SIMILAR NATIONAL STATEMENTS (PARA 2 ABOVE) TO DEMONSTRATE TO IRAQ AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION THE DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ON THIS POINT AND TO BRING THE GREATEST PRESSURE TO BEAR ON IRAQ. AT A MINIMUM, MACK HOPED THAT GOVERNMENTS WOULD ISSUE STATEMENTS THAT WOULD INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A - CONSISTENT WITH UNSCR 662, OUR GOVERNMENT IS RETAINING ITS DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT AND WILL NOT ACCEDE TO DEMANDS THAT MISSIONS CLOSE ON 24 AUGUST.

B - A DEMAND FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 664 INCLUDING FULL CONSULAR ACCESS TO DETAINED CITIZENS AND THE IMMEDIATE AND FREE PASSAGE OF FOREIGNERS OUT OF KUWAIT AND IRAQ.

6. MACK ADDED THAT US EMBASSY STAFF IN KUWAIT WOULD BE DRAWN DOWN (KUWAIT TELNO 467). THEY WERE ORDERING SPOUSES, CHILDREN AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL TO LEAVE. THOSE REMAINING (8 IN TOTAL, WITH ONE SPOUSE STAYING ON TO PROVIDE SECRETARIAL SERVICES) WOULD ATTEMPT TO CARRY ON CONSULAR DUTIES. (COMMENT: THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW MANY STAFF WE INTEND TO KEEP IN OUR MISSION AFTER 24 AUGUST). THE US CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE IRAQIS EXTEND TO THOSE REMAINING DIPLOMATS (OF ALL NATIONALITIES) THEIR FULL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. IF BAGHDAD IGNORED THIS DEMAND IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR IRAQ TO BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT
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MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

PAGE 3
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SECRET
 FM WASHINGTON
 TO DESKBY 222000Z FCO
 TELNO 2008
 OF 221910Z AUGUST 90
 INFO DESKBY 222000Z MODUK
 INFO DESKBY 222000Z UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, ACTOR

*Pages 1-3 are
 over the top. But
 para. 4 is of
 interest. mo*

SIC I9M
 MY TELNO 2006
 MODUK FOR DUS(P)
 IRAQ/KUWAIT: POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS

SUMMARY

1. POSSIBILITY OF IMMINENT US ACTION TO DISABLE IRAQI TANKERS CONTINUES - THOUGH UNDER CLOSE POLITICAL CONTROL. DETAILS ON THE LONGER TERM BUILD UP OF US GROUND AND AIR FORCES, TIMESCALES AND INTENTIONS.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE OBTAINED FROM CLARKE (ASSISTANT SECRETARY POL-MIL BUREAU, STATE) A FULL READOUT ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, COVERING BOTH THE MARITIME OPERATION AND THE GROUND/AIR BUILD UP IN AND AROUND SAUDI ARABIA. CLARKE SAID THAT IT REPRESENTED THE LATEST STAGE OF PENTAGON PLANNING - AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF IT - BUT WE HAVE CHECKED TO ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO CROSSED WIRES WITH THE ACCOUNTS OBTAINED SEPARATELY FROM THE PENTAGON BY THE DEFENSE STAFF IN THE EMBASSY.

3. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO THE NSC. THE ELEMENT OF MOST IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CONCERN IS THE NAVAL EMBARGO AND RELATED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. WE HAVE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING (PROMPTED IN PART BY THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 1464):

- A. PRESIDENTIAL COMMAND AUTHORITY WAS GIVEN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (21 AUGUST) FOR THE US COMMANDER IN THE GULF TO USE FORCE TO DISABLE ANY UNCOOPERATIVE VESSELS AT THE LATEST POINT AT WHICH THE US INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES JUDGED SUCH INTERCEPTION TO BE FEASIBLE - IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE UN HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION BY THEN. THAT TIME WAS GIVEN AS 1800 HOURS EASTERN TIME - 2200Z - TODAY (22 AUGUST). DISABLEMENT WOULD BE BY MEANS OF A BLIND ROUND (SAND FILLED) FIRED INTO THE BRIDGE:

- B. THE DEADLINE WAS HOWEVER NOW UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE UN TODAY. HIGH PRIORITY WAS PLACED ON SECURING THE FURTHER RESOLUTION IN NEW YORK. BAKER WAS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK TO SHEVARDNADZE IN THE HOPE THAT THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP THEY HAD BUILT UP WOULD ENABLE RUSSIAN RETICENCE TO BE OVERCOME. EITHER WAY CLARKE THOUGHT THAT THE NEED FOR ACTION TO DISABLE UP TO 3 VESSELS MIGHT STILL ARISE IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS:
- C. AS A RESULT OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GULF STATES THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT TO COVER ENFORCEMENT INSIDE THE TERRITORIAL SEAS OF THOSE STATES. THEY WERE ASKING FOR PURSUIT IN MOST CASES BLANKET AGREEMENT RATHER THAN AD HOC) AND ONLY IN OMANI AND UAE WATERS, FOR AGREEMENT TO USE FORCE IF NECESSARY. CLARKE NOTED OUR INTEREST IN BEING KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED.
4. TURNING TO THE POSITION ON THE GROUND IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE ASKED CLARKE WHETHER THE REFERENCE IN THE US/SAUDI FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT TO THE INITIATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OUTSIDE SAUDI TERRITORY (PLEASE PROTECT) IMPLIED AN EXPECTATION OF NEEDING TO TAKE DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SADDAM IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, SOONER OR LATER. CLARKE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN IN DETAIL BUT INDICATED BY A NOD AND A WINK THAT THAT WAS INDEED THE PLANNING ASSUMPTION. THIS PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH HAD BEEN BY FAR THE HARDEST TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SAUDIS, BUT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT. IT WAS TO BE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY SUCH ACTION COULD BE LATER RATHER THAN SOONER, IN VIEW OF THE TIME NEEDED TO BUILD UP A CAPABILITY TO DO THE JOB QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY.
5. CLARKE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING DETAILS ON FORCE STRENGTHS:

A. AT PRESENT EFFECTIVE FORCES WERE CONFINED TO NAVAL FORCES AND AIRCRAFT: 44 F15 AT ABU DHABI: 48 A10'S (ANTI-TANK) AND 48 AIR DEFENCE F15 AT DHARHAN: 24 F15 AT THUMRAIT: 44 F16 AT DUBAI: 20 ANTI SAM F4 AND 18 HARRIERS AT BAHREIN: 18 F117 (STEALTH) AT KHAMRIS. ON 23 AUGUST THIS WOULD BE AUGMENTED BY 2 SQNS OF F111E (FROM LAKENHEATH) AND MORE A10 TO TAIF. MARINE F18 AND A6S WOULD ALSO THEN BE AVAILABLE:

B. THE TIMETABLE FOR THE GROUND FORCE BUILD UP WAS:

18 AIRBORNE CORPS

3 X BDES 82 AB DIV - 24 AUG

1 X BDE 101 AB DIV - 07 SEP
 1 X BDE 24 INF DIV (MECH) - 28 AUG
 1 X BDE 197 INF BDE - 9 SEP
 ARMD DIV - 2 OCT — N.R.
 2 X BDE 1ST CAV
 3 ARMD CAV REGT (BDE STR)
 1 X BDE 2 ARMD DIV

US MARINE FORCES

1ST MEB - 13 SEP
 4TH MED - 14 SEP
 7TH MEB - 23 AUG

- C. THUS A FULL IN-PLACE FORCE OF 3 HEAVY DIVISIONS WITH TANKS WAS STILL 10 WEEKS AWAY:
- D. A FUTHER REQUEST FOR C 135S TO BE STATIONED AT CYPRUS WAS CURRENTLY ON-HOLD AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GREEKS OR TURKS WOULD AGREE TO TAKE SOME AT LEAST OF THE REQUIREMENT:
- E. THE AMERICANS UNDERSTAND PRINCE BANDAR TO HAVE BEEN ASKING THE UK AND RUSSIANS FOR A GROUND FORCE PRESENCE POSSIBLY ON 21 AUGUST (WE HAVE NO INFORMATION OF THIS). CLARKE COMMENTED QUOTE IF SO, WE NEED TANKS UNQUOTE.

5. IF THE FULL BUILD UP IS ACHIEVED, CLARKE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE AROUND 200,000 US TROOPS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING 50,000 NAVAL.

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21/9

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 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)
 MR GOULDEN
 HD/NENAD
 HD/UND
 HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD
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 DEPUTY HD/PUSD
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 SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
 CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
 (CABINET OFFICE)
 RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
TELNO U/N
OF 221910Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
INFO IMMEDIATE BDS WASHINGTON

SIC ACA/ZAC/EAD
FROM: SEC (O)(C) FOR DA.
SUBJECT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: DE-CONFLICTION.
REF: YR TELNO 923 OF 221100Z TO FCO.

1. HAVE SEEN HMAS SIGNAL AT REF. SLIGHTLY SURPRISED BY IMPLICATION AT PARA 4 THAT US AND IRAQIS HAVE EXCHANGED QUOTE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT UNQUOTE. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CLARIFY WHAT, EXACTLY, HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE IRAQIS.
 2. FOR BDS WASHINGTON. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SHED ANY LIGHT ON THIS FROM YOUR END
- BT

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT
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MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
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(BY TUBE H29)
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MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <p style="text-align: center;">..... <i>PRGM 19</i></p> PIECE/ITEM <i>3077</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Operation Franky</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>22/08/90</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Telegram dated 22 August 1990</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>112445</i> <i>MDADM 0773</i></p>	
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MO 6/17/15D

Prime Minister

The Defence Secretary
recommends a squadron of
Tornado ground attack to
Bahrain: plus an RAF
Regiment Rapier detachment:

PRIME MINISTERENHANCEMENTS TO UK FORCES IN THE GULF

Following our discussions on Monday, the Chiefs of Staff have now given me further advice on enhancing the UK contribution to the defence of Saudi Arabia and other friendly Gulf states. I have discussed this with the Foreign Secretary.

You might like
to announce the Tornado

2. The main conclusion is that we should now deploy a squadron of Tornado GR1 aircraft to the theatre. If Iraq attacked, these 12 aircraft would provide a valuable adjunct to US and Saudi capabilities with their specialised anti-tank and anti-airfield weapons and low-level and night capability. The Tornados, drawn from UK and Germany, would be ready for operations some 5 - 7 days after our decision. Presentation would, however, need careful handling since this could also be seen as offering a broader offensive capability. The clear military preference would be for deployment to Bahrain, with Tabuk in north-west Saudi Arabia as a fall-back option. We are currently checking with the Bahrainis that they are content, and can accommodate the aircraft; we are also letting the Saudis know what we have in mind. Subject to the results of this consultation, which I will report on at our meeting tomorrow, and the agreement of colleagues, I could make an announcement on Thursday afternoon.

CBD
22/8

3. In my original announcement I said we would be sending an RAF Regt Rapier detachment to defend the location of the initial Tornado ADV Squadron. In the event, as they went to Dahrhan which was



b

already well defended, we held the Rapier detachment in Cyprus. If the Tornados are accepted by Bahrain, the Rapier detachment will be needed there, and we would deploy them in support. By this route we can also seek to reassure the Bahrainis about other aspects of their security raised with Alan Clark, but I can go further into detail with them next week when I visit the country.

4. We also have in mind to deploy forward the Jaguars currently based in Oman to Bahrain where they would be more useful in the event of an attack. Deployment of the Tornado GR1s is however the first priority and I suggest we leave a decision on the Jaguars on one side for the time being: the Bahrainis are not being consulted about this but I have asked HM Ambassador to advise whether this additional deployment would be manageable in Bahrain.

5.

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G. Gray

3/1/17

6. We will need to decide shortly whether the three mine counter-measure vessels, and the associated survey ship HERALD, should continue to the Gulf area (our announcement was that they would initially deploy to the eastern Mediterranean). There is an argument for getting them into their potential area of operating at the earliest opportunity. There is also a question of whether to add a fourth frigate to the naval forces in the Gulf, depending in part on others' contributions. I will make firm recommendations on these issues shortly.

SECRET



7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Attorney General, and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "TK".

Ministry of Defence
22nd August 1990

(T K)

SECRET

Secret

21(a-f)

①



Prime Minister

the further method on
naval enforcement ROE.
An assault boarding party
does not sound a
promising option.
Aimed fire at the bridge
is thought likely to stop
most ships, but could be

MO6/17/15

PRIME MINISTER

ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN SUPPORT OF UN EMBARGO

In my Private Secretary's letter of 20 August we outlined the sequence of available enforcement measures permitted by our current ROE against sanction breaking ships, and indicated that we were looking at what further measures might be appropriate.

2. We have identified two broadly viable options to be used as a follow-on to firing at the funnel of a ship which fails to stop. One would be to fire small calibre fire at the bridge, after due warnings, the other - to land an assault boarding party of sufficient size and with sufficiently robust ROE to overcome any armed resistance.

3. There are a series of escalating steps within the option of firing at the bridge. After appropriate warnings which would give sufficient time to clear the bridge the first step would be a single shot fired at the bridge using small calibre weapons (30mm or less) and solid (non-explosive) ammunition (to reduce collateral damage, in particular the possibility of fires which could cause extensive damage to or loss of the vessel). If the vessel still failed to comply with instructions, after further warnings the next step would be a multiple shot burst at the bridge, still using small calibre weapons and practice ammunition, but ultimately resorting to normal (HE) ammunition if necessary, again after an appropriate warning.

4. As for an assault boarding party, the current ROE provide for circumstances in which a boarding party is landed on a acquiescent vessel. They also allow for landing a boarding party on a vessel which is not acquiescent but where specific armed resistance is not anticipated. In these circumstances the boarding party would operate to JSP 385, that is they would be permitted to fire in self defence.

5. The current ROE do not, however, cover a scenario where there is reason to believe that the Master and members of the

followed by
further
steps
to
disable.
The
Attorney
views
are
still
anted.
You
will
want
to
discuss
forward
morning.
COD
22/8



b

crew will put up armed resistance. In these circumstances an assault boarding party comprising RM personnel might be put on the vessel, either boarding from alongside or landed by helicopter. (Such an assault party could not however be expected to cope with the extreme case where hostages are used to prevent the use of force, which would have to be dealt with on a 'one-off' basis in direct consultation with London.)

6. An assault boarding party of sufficient size to overcome armed resistance would exceed the capacity of a single helicopter carried by a destroyer or frigate. Further consideration is being given both to the size of boarding party which would be required and to ways in which it could be deployed. In parallel we are looking at whether rules of engagement based on the principle of self-defence would be sufficient to allow a boarding party to take over the vessel. This work is being done as a matter of urgency and I will report further in a couple of days time.

7. In the meantime, we have refined the available measures outlined in my letter of 20 August in the light of these further possible steps. The sequence of available enforcement measures, from warnings through firing on the bridge, all the way to complete disablement, is shown in the note attached behind. You will wish to note the following points:

i. Depth charges The dropping of depth charges for warning purposes is now included as a discrete step. It is assessed that the closest safe distance is 100 yards; this would be likely to cause severe shake but no real damage to the vessel. We have considered whether depth charges should be used to attempt to stop a vessel, but have concluded that this could cause damage which would result in spillages, or could damage the engine and steering gear to an extent that the vessel became uncontrollable;

ii. Aimed fire at the funnel The ROE now allow for firing by small calibre weapons using practice ammunition, and as a separate measure, firing using HE ammunition. We have decided to withdraw the option of firing the main armament of the RN ship, as this intrinsically carries greater risk of collateral damage because of difficulties involved in aiming a 4.5 inch gun at a single point on the vessel but is unlikely to be significantly more effective as a means of persuasion.

8. The Navy believe that the full sequence of events listed in the Annex, including the additional steps leading ultimately to



the firing of live small-calibre ammunition at the bridge, should be sufficient to halt the most determined master. Since the full sequence of measures under the existing ROE would normally take several hours, there would normally be sufficient time to consult London before firing on the bridge or mounting an assault boarding party. In the very unlikely event that these steps were not sufficient, the way forward would be to seek progressively to disable the vessel using main armament or missiles with a serious risk of loss of life, major damage (or even loss of the vessel) and consequent pollution (in the case of tankers).

9. The additional steps I have identified clearly go considerably further than the current measures adopted by our allies and potential allies. Indeed, we understand that the US are urgently reassessing their stance on the enforcement of the embargo while the issue is considered by the UN, and that in the meantime US ROE relating to the use of force have been put on hold. Until we have had an opportunity to discuss this tomorrow, I have issued similar instructions that RN ships should not use force without specific authorisation from a Defence Minister.

10. Finally, we have also been pursuing the question of operations in the IAZ through our contacts at the UN. The Iranians have said that they would raise no difficulties about Nimrods operating in the IAZ (outside their territorial seas) and we have passed them details of radio frequencies which our aircraft will monitor to ensure that we can communicate with them if necessary. The Iranians have been much less explicit about ships but Sir Crispin Tickell has advised that they appear to have tacitly accepted that our warships will be operating within the IAZ but have not indicated what their attitude might be if we were to carry out interceptions there. Sir Crispin believes that it is unlikely that we will persuade the Iranians to be more explicit on this point. In these circumstances, I believe that we should allow ARMILLA ships to carry out surveillance activity as required within the IAZ (outside territorial seas) but interceptions may only be carried out with explicit authority from London. If we were to exclude the possibility of interceptions within the IAZ (through which the major shipping lanes to Iraq and Kuwait pass) we would risk leaving a loophole in enforcement. We should therefore consider rapidly the need for interceptions within the IAZ on a case by case basis, particularly taking into account the feasibility of arranging for the ship to be monitored and intercepted on leaving the IAZ.

d



11. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy, Attorney General, and the Cabinet Secretary.

SW

TK

(Approved by the Defence Secretary and
initialled in his absence)

SECRET UK EYES A

ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN SUPPORT OF UN EMBARGO

The purpose of these measures is to implement the UN embargo of all cargoes, including food, bound to or from Iraq or Kuwait (with the exception of inbound medical supplies). Inbound vessels found to be in breach of the embargo are to be diverted to destinations other than Iraq or Kuwait. Outbound vessels in breach of the embargo are not to be allowed to proceed. The following sequence of measures may be used to secure compliance:

(a) Initial interrogation by radio and/or other means to establish basic information;

(b) If further investigation is necessary (to inspect cargo/papers) request agreement to accept boarding party;

If the master refuses to accept a boarding party or, where appropriate, to accept diversion instructions the following steps may be used;

(c) harassment which does not result in damage; and, after exploring all other avenues of communication and manoeuvring, and after giving the vessel every opportunity to comply with instructions:

(d) warning shots may be fired (after due warning) initially no closer than 300 yards from the target, reducing to 100 yards;

(e) alternatively, or in addition, warning depth charges may be dropped after due warning, initially no closer than 300 yards from the target, reducing to 100 yards;

(f) aimed shots at the funnel by small calibre weapons using solid ammunition (after due warning), beginning with single shots and progressing to burst fire;

(g) aimed shots at the funnel by small calibre weapons using live (HE) ammunition (again after due warning), beginning with single shots and progressing to burst fire;

This will be covered by John Peters



F

If the vessel still failed to comply with instructions, the following steps might be taken:

(h) after specific warnings (to stop the vessel and vacate the bridge), small calibre (30 mm max) fire at the bridge, initially a single shot using solid (i.e. non-explosive) shot, escalating (after due warning) to a multiple burst using solid ammunition and a multiple burst using live (HE) ammunition.

At any stage in the preceding sequence there may be an opportunity to land a boarding party.

Where the vessel still failed to stop, and/or where there was good reason to believe that the Master and crew would put up armed resistance, the further options would be to land an assault boarding party (the practical and legal implications of this are being studied further) or to seek progressively to disable the vessel using major armaments with serious risk of loss of life, major damage to (or loss of) the vessel and consequent pollution.

20(a-d) ②

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE

SUSPECT VESSELS AND CARGOES REPORT

AS AT 0600Z HRS 22 AUGUST 1990

P. H. H. H.

COP

22/8

1. At 0431Z on 21 August two Iraqi oil tankers attempted to break the Embargo and are being shadowed by the US Navy. Tankers are the BABA GUR GUR 36,397 tonnes dwt, and the KHANAQIN 35,338 tonnes dwt. Vessels have left the Gulf of Oman and are travelling south east, possibly towards the Gulf of Aden (see Note 2).

2. BALQEES, a RO/RO ferry, Iraqi registered, carrying military equipment from Poland and East Germany, (loaded before invasion and embargo), (UNCLASSIFIED), unloaded equipment in Tripoli on 19 August (SECRET). Reassigned as passenger ferry in Red Sea (SECRET). It is possible that part of the cargo could be transhipped to Iraq by air (see next para).

3. There is still no evidence of cargo unloaded from ships in Tripoli being transferred to aeroplanes bound for Amman and Baghdad. But we now know that Libyan Arab Airlines flew 4 Ilyushin IL76T flights from Tripoli to Baghdad for general cargo.

ADEN

4. Reuters reported on 21 August that Iraq has a processing deal with the Aden refinery under which it supplies 30,000 barrels per day of crude. The products allegedly sold by Aden on Baghdad's account (see Note 1).

Report from British Embassy Aden that two unidentified tankers are alongside terminal jetty. One of which appears in ballast, the other was confirmed, 1800Z on 21 August, to be discharging oil (Aden telno 198 to FCO). There are two more vessels, also unidentified, in outer harbour (see also para 6 Ain Zalah).

/5.

5. We now have evidence of Iraqi bound ships unloading cargoes in North African ports. But there is no evidence so far of these cargoes being reloaded on other ships or on aeroplanes bound for Amman and Baghdad. The ESC is working closely with those concerned to monitor the situation. SECRET

6. AIN ZALAH Iraqi tanker 36,330 tonnes dwt, eta Aden 0700Z on 21 August. Original Yemeni assurance that vessel would be refused permission to dock has apparently been rescinded. Yemeni Foreign Minister told US Ambassador that AIN ZALAH would be allowed to dock but not discharge cargo. Vessel is believed to require repairs and to be carrying 26,500 mt crude or fuel oil for Aden refineries company.

7. The HUAZ SARONTA (Philippines) left Southampton 10 August for Aqaba, carrying defence equipment. Now believed in port Pwaeus and considering offloading cargo.

8. HINK JIN HAI (Chinese freighter) carrying 14,200 tonnes Iraqi fertiliser stopped by US Naval vessel 18 August (NFI).

9. JOLCOS LEADER (Greek) carrying Canadian wheat etc. Aqaba 24 August. Consider seeking UK cooperation in contacting owners.

Note 1

Oil storage capacity at Aden:

- | | | |
|----|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| a. | Little Aden Refinery | 655,000 tons of products |
| | | 211,000 tons crude in 92 tanks |
| b. | Little Aden Port | |
| | Storage | 105,000 tons products in 20 tanks |
| c. | MA 'allam (Main | |
| | Harbour) | 327,788 tons in 29 tanks |

Note 2

Earlier reports (MOD) that KHANAQIN claimed to be in ballast BABA GUR GUR now believed to be carrying 240,000 barrels Basrah light crude.

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE

USABLE INFORMATION

1. Reuters reported on 21 August that the 36,330 tonne Iraqi vessel AIN ZALAH unloaded its cargo that day at the refinery in Aden, Yemen. (We have collateral.) The vessel is listed by Lloyds as a crude carrier.

2. Reuters also reported that Iraq has a processing deal with the Aden refinery under which it supplies 30,000 barrels per day of crude. The products are allegedly sold by Aden on Baghdad's account.

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SIC I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: DE-CONFLICTION

1. THE US CHARGE WAS SUMMONED BY MFA UNDER-SECRETARY HAMDOON ON 21 AUGUST. HAMDOON TOLD WILSON THAT IN VIEW OF THE BUILD-UP OF POTENTIALLY OPPOSING FORCES IN THE GULF IRAQ WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THE US WAYS OF AVOIDING CLASHES (ESPECIALLY BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS). HAMDOON, WHO WAS IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON UNTIL LATE 1987, SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND AMERICANS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, POSSIBLY DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN MID-1987 FOLLOWING THE USS STARK INCIDENT, WHICH HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DEFUSED IN THIS WAY. HAMDOON ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A MEETING OF EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES TO PURSUE THIS POINT.

Since then Iraq has invaded Kuwait

2. WILSON TOLD US THAT HE HAD SIMPLY UNDERTAKEN TO REPORT THE SUGGESTION AND HAD NOT DRAWN HAMDOON OUT FURTHER ON HOW AND WHERE ANY MEETING OF EXPERTS MIGHT BE SET UP.

COMMENT

3. GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON COULD REPORT REACTIONS THERE TO THIS PROPOSAL, BOTH ON ITS PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ON WHETHER THE AMERICANS SEE IT AS BEING IN ANY WAY A SMALL OLIVE BRANCH. SEEN FROM HERE THE LATTER LOOKS REMOTE, SINCE THE PROPOSALS WERE CONVEYED AT THE SAME TIME AS SADDAM'S STRONGLY WORDED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH WAS BEING READ OUT ON IRAQI TELEVISION (MY TELNO 922 - NOT TO ALL).

4. PS. THE DA WAS INFORMED BY HIS US COLLEAGUE ON 22 AUGUST THAT THE RESPECTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND CONTACT FREQUENCIES HAVE NOW BEEN EXCHANGED AND THAT A MEETING AT EXPERT LEVEL IS TO TAKE PLACE.

On whose authority?

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*I hope ours have not
been revealed*

WALKER

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OF 221808Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION OF THE FIVE ON THE MORNING OF 22 AUGUST:

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990) AND DEMANDING THEIR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION:
HAVING DECIDED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
DETERMINED TO BRING THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ TO AN END AND TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT:
DEPLORING THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE STEMMING FROM THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND DETERMINED TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH LOSSES:
GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), AND 664 (1990) AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

1. CALLS WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA TO USE SUCH MINIMUM FORCE AS MAY BE NECESSARY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO HALT ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MARITIME SHIPPING, IN ORDER TO VERIFY THEIR CARGOES AND DESTINATIONS AND TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES RELATED TO SUCH SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990).

2. INVITES MEMBER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 661 (1990) IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE STATES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF THIS RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SHORE AND BUNKERING FACILITIES.

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO CO-ORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION USING

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AS APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE TO SUBMIT
REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 661.

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

ENDS.

TICKELL

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From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Iraq / Kuwait : Security Council

I attach the latest draft, which
is very similar to the one you
approved (it has "and" and
"as appropriate"). It has emerged
from a meeting of the five, &
been the to capitals for
instructions. The owners are

Reasonably good. But the
vote may not be until
tomorrow morning. Crippin

assesses that, if good
progress is being made, the

Americans may hold off


until then.

The Attorney is being

consulted.

CDP
22/12

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3077</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Craddock to Powell dated 22 August 1990</i>	
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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22 August 1990

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Dear Charles,

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Richard

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22/8

Iraq/Kuwait: Secretary of State's Conversation with
Mr Gerald Kaufman

As you may know, since the beginning of the Iraq/Kuwait crisis, the Secretary of State has been in touch with Mr Kaufman about once a week to brief him on the situation. Mr Kaufman called on the Secretary of State this morning for a talk, which was conducted on a Privy Councillor basis. In fact, nothing of great sensitivity passed between them.

There was a brief discussion on our progress towards a new Security Council resolution and on the plight of British nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. Mr Kaufman then said, in a manner which reflected some preparation, that he fully understood the distinction between our efforts to enforce the United Nations embargo and our efforts to deter aggression. He supported both of these aims. He recognised that hostilities would certainly break out if Iraq launched an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that under those circumstances, we could not conduct purely defensive military action. Some offensive action against Iraq would need to be part of the engagement. He believed that Article 51 and the request for action by the Government of Kuwait provided a legal basis for the US and its allies to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait in order to end the Iraqi aggression, but he believed that this would be a catastrophic error because of the consequences, which would be felt round the world.

The conversation then moved to the possibility of Parliament being recalled. The Foreign Secretary spoke along the lines used yesterday by the Prime Minister during his press conference. Mr Kaufman said that he had been in touch with Mr Kinnoch both before and after his holiday. Although the Labour Party was keeping the matter under review, it was unlikely to press for the recall of Parliament unless events took a new and serious turn.

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 221830Z FCO

TELNO 453

OF 221715Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, RIYADH, TRIPOLI

INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, RABAT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE SANAA, ACTOR

YOUR TELNO 548 TO PARIS:

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED. KING'S TRAVEL PLANS NOT YET CLEAR. HE REPORTS ON VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ TO AMMAN. THE KING IS WORKING ON THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM AND HOPES TO DEVELOPE A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE WIDER CRISIS.

DETAIL

2. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE KING THIS AFTERNOON (22 AUGUST). HE RECEIVED IT WELL AND COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED VERY MUCH TO SEE MRS THATCHER SOON. HOWEVER, SHE WOULD NO DOUBT UNDERSTAND THAT HIS IMMEDIATE PREOCCUPATION WAS TO QUOTE DE-ESCALATE UNQUOTE A CRISIS WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, COULD STILL EXPLODE AT ANY MOMENT. HE WAS THEREFORE NOT YET SURE WHEN HE COULD GET TO LONDON BUT WOULD INFORM ME AS SOON AS HE COULD IDENTIFY A DATE. MEANWHILE, HE WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT WEEK.

3. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER ANYTHING USEFUL HAD EMERGED FROM THE VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ ON 21 AUGUST. HE SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. I WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE SEEN WHAT TARIQ HAD SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IE THAT THE HOLDING OF THE WESTERN COMMUNITIES IN KUWAIT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO DETER THE AMERICANS FROM ATTACKING (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT). HE (THE KING) FELT THAT THERE WAS SOME HOPE OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITIES IF, IN RETURN, A FIRM ASSURANCE COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT INITIATE HOSTILITIES. I SAID THAT, GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SADDAM TAKING FURTHER UNPREDICTABLE

*He is putting himself
at the head of the
pro-Iraq clubs. That
will only make his own
position work
with the
anti-Iraq
group
not*

not for the maps

STEPS, A CAST-IRON ASSURANCE WOULD BE ASKING A GREAT DEAL. HOWEVER, IT WAS ENCOURAGING TO HEAR THAT THE KING WAS WORKING ON THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES. I KNEW THAT YOU WOULD BE MOST ANXIOUS TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY PROPOSALS RELATING TO THEM WHICH THE KING MIGHT BE DISCUSSING.

4. THE KING WENT ON THE SAY THAT HE WAS ALSO CONTINUING TO DEVELOP HIS IDEAS FOR SOME SORT OF TRADE-OFF (PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 442, NOT TO ALL) WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM. HE FELT THAT HE NEEDED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH HAD NOT TAKEN A FIRM POSITION AGAINST IRAQ. HE INTENDED TO VISIT SANAA ON 23 AUGUST AND, PROBABLY AFTER THE WEEKEND, VARIOUS NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES (HE MENTIONED ALGERIA, MOROCCO, AND QUOTE PERHAPS EVEN LIBYA UNQUOTE). HE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP WITH THESE COUNTRIES A SENSIBLE PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT PAVE THE WAY FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. THE KING ALSO MENTIONED HIS CONCERN OVER THE EVER-GROWING NUMBER OF REFUGEES FLOODING INTO JORDAN. HE THOUGHT THAT STEPS MIGHT HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO CONTROL THE FLOW THROUGH THE IRAQI-JORDANIAN BORDER.

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 897 (NOT TO ALL): ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. LARGE INCREASES IN FOOD PRICES SINCE 2 AUGUST, BUT FEW OTHER VISIBLE SIGNS THAT SANCTIONS ARE BITING.

DETAIL

2. OECD COMMERCIAL OFFICERS MET AGAIN ON 21 AUGUST TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ.

FOREIGN NATIONALS

3. NONE OF THOSE PRESENT CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS ANY MAJOR POPULAR PRESSURE IN THE COUNTRIES THEY REPRESENTED FOR CHANGES IN THEIR EXISTING POLICY ON SANCTIONS AS A RESULT OF RECENT IRAQI STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. THE AUSTRIAN AND SWISS REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS HAD STATED THAT SOME OF THEIR NATIONALS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE NONE HAD IN FACT DONE SO. THEY HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD BY THE MFA THAT IN FACT AUSTRIANS AND SWISS CURRENTLY IN KUWAIT WOULD NOW NEED EXIT VISAS. THE SWISS REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT THAT THE REASON FOR THIS WAS TO ALLOW THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO KEEP A CHECK ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS IN THE COUNTRY, SO THAT THEY COULD ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT RELEASE ALL OF A COUNTRY'S NATIONALS AND LOSE A BARGAINING CHIP.

4. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT EGYPTIAN WORKERS WERE STILL BEING ALLOWED BY THE IRAQIS TO REMIT HARD CURRENCY THOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW FAR THIS WAS HAPPENING IN PRACTICE.

FOOD

5. THE AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE EXPLAINED THAT AUSTRALIA HAD AGREED TO SUPPLY 1.55 MILLION TONNES OF WHEAT TO IRAQ IN 1990. OF THIS, ALL BUT 400,000 TONNES HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED. NO MORE SHIPMENTS WOULD BE SENT. HOWEVER, THERE WAS CURRENTLY 60,000 TONNES ON WHAT WAS BELIEVED TO BE AN IRAQI SHIP HEADING FOR AQABA OVER WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO AUTHORITY, WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY BE DELIVERED.

6. IT APPEARED THAT IRAQ'S GRAIN STORES WERE VIRTUALLY FULL. THE AUSTRALIAN WAS AWARE THAT A FREIGHTER CARRYING WHEAT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO UNLOAD ITS CARGO WHEN IT DOCKED AT UMM QASR AT THE END OF JULY, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF STORAGE SPACE.

7. THE AUSTRALIAN SAID THAT THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN CANBERRA HAD MADE A REQUEST FOR THE AUSTRALIANS TO SUPPLY FURTHER WHEAT ON 'HUMANITARIAN' GROUNDS. THIS HAD BEEN REJECTED. THE SWISS SAID THAT, IN RESPONSE TO AN ENQUIRY, HE HAD TOLD THE MINISTRY OF TRADE THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE SWISS POSITION NOT TO EXPORT POWDERED MILK TO IRAQ.

8. THE TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT, FROM A WIDE-RANGING SURVEY HE HAD CONDUCTED, HE ESTIMATED THAT FOOD PRICES HAD INCREASED BY MORE THAN 100 PERCENT SINCE 2 AUGUST.

IRAQI AIRWAYS

9. THE SWISS, AUSTRIANS, DUTCH, FRENCH, ITALIANS AND OURSELVES SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN ASKED TO ALLOW IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHTS FROM THEIR COUNTRIES TO AMMAN TO ENABLE IRAQIS TO RETURN HOME. IN EVERY CASE THE REQUEST HAD BEEN REJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT ALLOW OTHER NATIONALITIES TO TRAVEL ON THE FLIGHT FROM AMMAN. THE TURK SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ALLOWING IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHTS FROM AMMAN TO ISTANBUL. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IRAQIS HAD TRAVELLED TO ISTANBUL FROM AROUND THE WORLD AND THOUSANDS WERE NOW WAITING AT ISTANBUL AIRPORT FOR FLIGHTS.

SANCTIONS BUSTING

10. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF REPORTS OF INCREASED NUMBERS OF LORRIES TRAVELLING FROM JORDAN TO IRAQ. THE NORWEGIAN, WHO HAD ARRIVED FROM AMMAN THE PREVIOUS DAY, SAID THAT, WHATEVER THE POSITION OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, JORDANIAN BUSINESSMEN WOULD CONTINUE TO FIND WAYS TO SHIP GOODS TO IRAQ. HE ALSO SAID

THAT THE CAPTAIN OF A FLOATING NORWEGIAN GRANARY MOORED AT AQABA HAD BEEN PHYSICALLY THREATENED BY JORDANIANS WHEN HE HAD TRIED TO STOP THE UNLOADING OF WHEAT BOUND FOR IRAQ.

11. THERE WAS SOME SPECULATION WHETHER, IN ORDER TO AVOID SANCTIONS, IRAQ MIGHT ASK OTHER OIL PRODUCERS TO SELL OIL ON ITS BEHALF, AS KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD DONE FOR IT DURING THE GULF WAR. ALGERIA, LIBYA AND IRAN WERE ALL CONSIDERED COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE BOTH CAPABLE AND WILLING TO DO THIS. IT WAS REMARKED THAT SADDAM HAD SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BENJEDID OF ALGERIA ON 20 AUGUST (MY TELNO 898).

BAGHDAD FAIR

12 A NUMBER OF THOSE PRESENT HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE MINISTRY OF TRADE IN THE LAST WEEK ABOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION AT THE BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIR. IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT, TO EMPHASISE THE SOLIDARITY OF SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD SEEK TO INFORM THE MINISTER FOR TRADE COLLECTIVELY OF THEIR DECISION NOT TO TAKE PART (SEE MY TELNO OTEX 35)

COMMENT

13 AS WELL AS THE APPROACHES TO THE SWISS AND AUSTRALIANS FOR FOOD, THE IRAQIS HAD ALSO ASKED THE TURKS TO PROVIDE SPARE PARTS FOR BUSES AND LORRIES. WE CAN EXPECT STEADILY INCREASING NUMBERS OF SIMILAR REQUESTS OVER THE COMING WEEKS AS SANCTIONS BEGIN TO BITE. DESPITE THIS, ALL PRESENT AT THE MEETING AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A LONG HAUL. IT IS NOT CLEAR, FOR INSTANCE, WHETHER CURRENT FOOD SHORTAGES RESULT FROM A LACK OF STOCKS RATHER THAN PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTION. THERE HAVE BEEN FEW OTHER INDICATIONS THAT SANCTIONS ARE HAVING AN EFFECT: THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO NOTICEABLE DETERIORATION IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES (EG ELECTRICITY, WATER, ETC), AND SHOPS ARE, IN GENERAL STILL WELL STOCKED WITH IMPORTED GOODS (AT A PRICE).

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YOUR TELNO 473 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS IN THE
UN

SUMMARY

1. US INSTRUCTIONS TO PICKERING SIMILAR TO YOURS. SHEVARDNADZE TOLD BAKER AT 5 PM GMT IF IT WAS SHOWN IRAQIS WERE BREACHING SANCTIONS THE RUSSIANS WOULD IMMEDIATELY VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. I GAVE BOLTON AN ACCOUNT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 473. HE CONFIRMED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO PICKERING WERE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE THAT WE WOULD TAKE. THE AMERICANS ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVING A VERY EARLY, AND FIRM, RESOLUTION. ADMIRAL KELLY WOULD BE BRIEFED TO GIVE THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE A COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF IRAQI SHIP MOVEMENTS.

3. BOLTON SAID THAT BAKER HAD SPOKEN TO SHEVARDNADZE AT NOON (EDT). SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT IF HE COULD BE SHOWN ONE FACT DEMONSTRATING THAT THE IRAQIS WERE IN BREACH OF SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS THE RUSSIANS WOULD GIVE IMMEDIATE SUPPORT TO THE FAST PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. THEY ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUING TO WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY RECOGNISED US RIGHTS UNDER 661 TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 51. THEY THOUGHT THAT IF ENFORCEMENT HAD TO TAKE PLACE IT WOULD BE BETTER DONE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A FRESH RESOLUTION.

4. BOLTON SAID SHEVARDNADZE KNEW THERE WERE FURTHER IRAQI TANKERS AT SEA. IT FOLLOWED THAT THE RUSSIANS KNEW THE IRAQIS WERE IN BREACH OF 661. BAKER HAD IMPRESSED ON SHEVARDNADZE THAT IF NO FRESH RESOLUTION WERE TO BE ADOPTED TODAY, 22 AUGUST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACT ANYWAY, UNDER ARTICLE 51, EVEN THOUGH THAT WOULD JEOPARDISE THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT ON WIDER UN AUTHORITY. BOLTON ADDED THAT ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO HELP REINFORCE THE LATTER POINT WITH THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE WELCOME.

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COMMENT

5. WE HAVE OF COURSE BEEN NEAR THIS POINT BEFORE AND I WOULD NOT NECESSARILY TAKE BOLTON'S ASSERTION OF US DETERMINATION TO STOP THE NEXT TANKER WITH OR WITHOUT FRESH UN AUTHORITY AS GOSPEL. BUT THE AMERICANS MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGERS OF CRYING WOLF, AND WE HAVE HAD OTHER INDICATIONS THEY MAY BE DETERMINED THIS TIME.

WOOD

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on*

YOUR TELNO 437: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION AMONG THE FIVE LEADS TO PRODUCTIONS OF SLIGHTLY MODIFIED TEXT (SEE MIFT). CHINESE (AND EVEN RUSSIANS) MAY BE COMING ROUND, BUT WANT TO REFER EVIDENCE OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING TO THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 221915Z.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET AT 1430Z ON 22 AUGUST. LI (CHINA) AND LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) WERE STILL WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. WE ALSO DID NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS: YOUR TUR DID NOT ARRIVE IN TIME.
3. WE WORKED ON THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO BRING IT AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO A DRAFT THAT COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL THE FIVE. THE RESULTS ARE IN MIFT. TWO MINOR AMENDMENTS TO OPERATIVE PARAS 1 AND 4 HAD BEEN SUGGESTED TO THE AMERICANS BY THE MALAYSIANS, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE NON-ALIGNED COLLEAGUES. AS FAR AS I CAN SEE, THE TEXT AS IT STANDS IS ACCEPTABLE.
4. DURING A TWO-HOUR MEETING THE SIGNIFICANT POINTS WERE:
- (A) WE, THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH PRESSED FOR ACTION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
 - (B) THE CHINESE AND THE RUSSIANS EMPHASIZED THAT EVIDENCE OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, WHO WOULD THEN REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BEFORE A RESOLUTION COULD BE ADOPTED. NOT ONLY DID THEY WANT THIS PROCEDURE FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, BUT THEY THOUGHT THIS WOULD HELP WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.
 - (C) THE AMERICANS DID NOT ASK FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TODAY.
 - (D) ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS VITAL TO TAKE THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WITH US.
5. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE TERM 'MINIMUM

FORCE''. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) AND I EXPLAINED THIS CONCEPT AS BEST WE COULD TO TRY AND BRING LOZINSKIY AND LI ROUND. LI STILL MAINTAINED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT TO USE FORCE AT THIS STAGE. LOZINSKIY SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO USE FORCE TO STOP SHIPS IN ORDER TO CHECK THEIR CARGOES, BUT STILL REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR A GRADUATED APPROACH. BUT RUSSIAN THINKING ABOUT THE PRACTICAL MILITARY STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IS MUDDLED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER DISUCSSION ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF MINIMUM FORCE WHEN AMBASSADORS MET ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) AT 1730Z.

6. THE FIVE AGREED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS, IF POSSIBLE IN TIME FOR THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE MSC, ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE SAID THEY WOULD NOT GET THEIRS UNTIL LATER. THE PLAN IS THAT AS SOON AS A TEXT IS AGREED AMONG THE FIVE (EVEN IF IT IS AD REFERENDUM) THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE BRIEFED AND THEIR COMMENTS SOUGHT. THIS MAY EVEN HAPPEN IN PARALLEL WITH CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE MSC THIS AFTERNOON, 22 AUGUST. IT WAS AGREED THAT AN ATTEMPT TO BOUNCE THE OTHER MEMBERS, AS ON THE NIGHT OF 20/21 AUGUST, WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

7. IN PRACTICE I DO NOT THINK THAT IN SUBSTANCE THE SOVIET POSITION IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. EVEN THE CHINESE ARE COMING ROUND. BUT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF REFERRING EVIDENCE TO THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (WHICH CAN BE SUMMONED VERY QUICKLY) BEFORE A RESOLUTION CAN BE ADOPTED.

8. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 221915Z.

TICKELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

35

ADVANCE

3532

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

221757Z

COMMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 473
OF 221515Z AUG 90
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON
AND TO DESKBY 221800Z PARIS
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

Prime Minister
Here are the
information which
FCO sent to
New York. Good mb
CAN
22/8

YOUR TELNO 1058: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS IN THE UN SUMMARY

1. THE AMERICANS MUST NOT WEAKEN. IN ORDER TO REINFORCE JUSTIFICATION FOR A GOOD ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION, INSTRUCTIONS TO USE AD HOC MSC CONSULTATIONS AS CONDUIT FOR PASSING INFORMATION ON SANCTIONS BREACHES. HMG'S BOTTOM LINE.

DETAIL

2. MINISTERS ARE CONCERNED BY YOUR ACCOUNT OF THE APPARENT SOFTENING IN THE US POSITION AND HOPE YOU CAN STIFFEN PICKERING. THEY BELIEVE THE KEY POINTS FOR US MUST BE:

- NO DIMINUTION OF THE POWERS WE ALREADY HAVE UNDER ARTICLE 51 EVEN IF THIS DELAYS ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION. THIS IS ESSENTIAL.

- A SINGLE RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF FORCE TO INTERDICT SHIPPING.

3. RATHER THAN TRAVEL DOWN THE ROAD OF DRAFTING AMENDMENTS WHICH COULD WEAKEN THE TEXT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MINISTERS, YOU RIGHTLY DREW ATTENTION TO THE MECHANISMS IN PARA 4 AS OFFERING A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL YOUR COLLEAGUES THAT WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISING TIDE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL BREACHES OF SANCTIONS. IF PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO NOT ACT PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO IDENTIFY AND STOP LOOPHOLES, SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE FLOUTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YET AGAIN AND HOLDING IT UP TO RIDICULE. THUS WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE FIVE USE THE AD HOC MECHANISM OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION NOT ONLY ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL VESSELS BUT ALSO IN A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY LOOPHOLES IN ENFORCEMENT. WHAT ARE THE TRADE ROUTES? WHAT HAS SLIPPED THROUGH? HOW DID THE IRAQI TANKERS SLIP THROUGH THE NET? AND SO FORTH. A CONSTRUCTIVE SHARING OF INFORMATION IN THIS HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE FORUM SEEMS TO US TO PROVIDE THE MEANS WHEREBY THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE ARE KEPT ENGAGED AND PROVIDED WITH THE EVIDENCE THEY NEED THAT ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT IS NECESSARY.

5. INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE FIVE AND/OR THE PRESIDENT COULD THEN FEED BACK APPROPRIATE MATERIAL TO THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE FOR THE NECESSARY POLITICAL FOLLOW UP IN EMERGENCY SESSION IF NECESSARY. WE HOPE TO LET YOU HAVE BY THE START OF YOUR FIRST MEETING INFORMATION TO FEED IN TO THE FIVE TO HELP BACK THESE ARGUMENT. BOLTON'S REMARKS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1998) REINFORCE THE CASE WE HAVE BEEN MAKING IN WHITEHALL.

6. THE ABOVE IS, OF COURSE, QUITE DISTINCT FROM ANY MEASURES WHICH WE MAY JUDGE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES UNDER ARTICLE 51. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF SEEKING PRIOR AUTHORISATION OR APPROVAL FOR SUCH ACTIONS. REPORTING WHICH MIGHT IN ANY CASE BE NECESSARY UNDER ARTICLE 51, WOULD BE EX-POST FACTO UNLESS THE ASSISTANCE OF ANOTHER STATE WAS BEING SOUGHT.

7. WE ARE PURSUING URGENTLY THE QUESTION OF THE IRAQI TANKER,

WHICH IS LIABLE TO CONTINUE TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE US
POSITION. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW.
8. PLEASE BRIEF THE AMERICANS.

HURD

YYYY
MAIN 229
IRAQ/KUWAIT 210
LIMITED 6
MED 13
[..ADD GEOGRAPHICAL/]
[..FUNCTIONAL AS NECESSARY]
ADDITIONAL 43
IRAQ/KUWAIT 43
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)
[....MAFF TO BE ADDED IF]
[...DEALING WITH SANCTIONS]
[MC MURRIE]

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

CR

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The Prime Minister was most disturbed to see from UKMIS New York tel. no. 1058 what she interprets as a most unfortunate weakening in the American position on a Security Council Resolution on enforcement of the embargo against Iraq. In particular she thinks it quite wrong to accept the Soviet notion of a graduated response and is amazed that the Americans in New York seem ready to agree to this. It seems to her that this would involve our giving up the powers we have under Article 51 and the request from the Amir of Kuwait, with only a vague prospect of getting them back under one or more Security Council Resolutions. She thinks our bottom line must remain:

- no diminution of the powers we already have under Article 51, even if this delays adoption of a resolution in New York:
- and only a single resolution to provide all necessary authority for the use of force to interdict shipping.

She would like instructions sent in this sense to Sir Crispin Tickell and to the Embassy in Washington, and has asked me to speak to General Scowcroft.

Incidentally the text of the Security Council Resolution in UKMIS New York tel. no. 1048 appears to relate only to interdiction at sea. The Prime Minister has asked whether we would need another resolution to justify interdiction of attempts to evade the embargo by land or in the air.

I should be grateful for advice.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department) and to Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of earlier today, I should record that General Scowcroft subsequently telephoned me back to say there seemed to be some degree of mutual incomprehension between our two Missions in New York. He was not pretending that the U.S. Permanent Representative was a tower of strength. But all the information reaching the White House suggested that our Permanent Representative was on a very different wavelength to the Prime Minister. He seemed to see his main role as that of intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union: and was constantly watering down U.S. drafts. I said that I do not think this sort of exchange was going to get us very far. Both our Permanent Representatives had done extraordinarily well to get four excellent resolutions agreed. The Prime Minister's only concern was that we should not lean over so far to attract Soviet support that we ended up with a resolution on enforcement which was less effective than the powers that we already had. General Scowcroft said that he entirely agreed with that. The fact was that the sanctions were being openly breached: several tankers were en route from Iraq to Yemen. The present U.S. intention was to intercept them anyway, if there was not an agreed Security Council resolution by 6.00 p.m. New York time today. I said that, in the light of the Prime Minister's last conversation with the President, she would sympathise with that. Meanwhile we would go on doing everything possible to secure a satisfactory resolution as soon as possible.

I do not think it would be appropriate to copy this letter more widely. But I have informed Roger Tomkys of my conversation with Scowcroft.

Charles Powell

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

Dear Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

I wrote to you earlier today with the Prime Minister's views on the discussions in the U.N. Security Council on a new resolution on enforcement of the embargo against Iraq, and on the future of Embassies in Kuwait. I subsequently spoke on both points to Robert Gates in the White House (since General Scowcroft was otherwise engaged).

On the question of Embassies in Kuwait, Gates said that American policy was exactly the same as ours. They intended to try to maintain their Embassy after 24 August, although they would be somewhat reducing numbers.

On the Security Council resolution, he was surprised by my suggestion that the Americans appeared to be leaning too much towards Soviet views. This did not tally with his own account. He agreed that our bottom line should remain as set out in my letter earlier today. He would pursue the point with General Scowcroft and with the U.S. Mission in New York.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990


File
Dear Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES

The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telno. 457 about continued diplomatic representation in Kuwait after 24 August. She disagrees strongly with the view expressed in it that the Iraqi hint that Embassies would be allowed to leave a member of their home-based staff in Kuwait after 24 August to act as Consul is a step forward. We have publicly committed ourselves to keeping an Embassy after that date. We must stick to that and should continue to regard our Ambassador as Ambassador, whatever the Iraqis may call him. She attaches great importance to our preserving that position and to maintaining solidarity on it among the Twelve and with the United States. Anything else would imply acceptance of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

The Prime Minister realises that the situation is evolving very rapidly and may have changed by this morning. She also knows that the Iraqis may take matters into their own hands after 24 August by removing our Ambassador. But it is very important that they should be placed in that position, rather than that we (and the United States and the Twelve) should concede in advance. She asked the Foreign Secretary this morning to do everything possible to stiffen our partners among the Twelve - recognising that this is likely to be difficult given that several of them have received permission for all their citizens to leave Kuwait and Iraq - and to ensure that the Americans remain firm. I will also speak to General Scowcroft.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Jp 01095

MR POWELL

cc Mr Appleyard
Mr Wall, FCO
Mr Tomkys, FCO

Meeting with HRH Prince Bandar - 21 August

Prince Bandar called on me for an intelligence briefing on 21 August. Invited to give his views, he said he was off to Moscow that night. He said that he had been working with Secretary of State Baker on how best to enlist Russian support. Recently, with King Fahd's approval, he had requested, through the Soviet Embassy in Washington, that the Russians send troops ("perhaps just a battalion of paratroopers") to Saudi Arabia. At the same time the Saudis offered to purchase for cash large numbers of Soviet anti-tank weapons.

2. The Prince said that the Saudis wanted Soviet involvement as a means of "sending a message" to leftist groups in the Middle East and, above all, to the Iraqis.
3. Two days ago the Russians replied that they had studied his proposal. They said that they were willing to consider any action under the UN flag. They stressed, however, that they were not closing the door to the Saudi request. They proposed face-to-face discussion in Moscow.
4. To Soviet surprise the Prince had replied on the spot that he was authorised to fly to Moscow at once. This disconcerted the slow-moving Soviet bureaucracy. In the absence of a Soviet reply he told the Soviet Embassy that he was flying to London and could fly on from there. When he reached London invitations were waiting for him (including one delivered through the Kuwaiti Embassy in Moscow, which represents Saudi interests).



5. Prince Bandar said that the Saudi fall-back position was that if the Russians could not provide direct support, they should at least agree to the Security Council approving the enforcement of sanctions.

6. With some pleasure, the Prince claimed that a similar approach had worked well with the Chinese: he had first asked for Chinese air defence forces to protect the CSS-2 missiles; when this had thrown the Chinese into a spin he asked that they should play a positive role in the UN and not veto action by the Security Council. This they had gratefully accepted.

7. On Saddam Hussein, the Prince argued that he had grossly underestimated international reaction to his invasion of Kuwait - not just on the part of the West, but also that of Saudi Arabia itself.

8. After the invasion Saddam had been in an almost light-hearted mood when he had spoken to King Fahd by telephone. The next day he had sent his deputy Prime Minister, Ibrahim, to see the King to discuss the situation. He promised that Ibrahim would be the bearer of a solution proposal. But once it became clear that the Iraqis were not willing to leave Kuwait, the King told Ibrahim to tell Saddam that he had made a big mistake and had created a grave situation. Saddam had also been surprised by the robust response from Egypt and Syria. Saudi Arabia now expected that Egypt would send one to two heavy armoured divisions to join the Multi-National Force.

9. Prince Bandar said that, in his view, the situation had now reached the point of no return. Recovery of Kuwait by itself was not enough. Unless Saddam was ousted, the region would remain threatened by Iraq. There would be a string of crises if the MNF withdrew.



10. The world could not wait much longer. Public opinion would become less supportive and if Saddam was not ousted Iraq's menacing military capabilities would continue to grow.

11. He continued that "our" aim should be to draw Saddam into making a false move which would serve as a *casus belli*. If Saddam did not make a false move, then we should raise our objective to the military liberation of Kuwait, which could only be achieved by suppressing Iraqi forces in Iraq itself.

12. Bandar believed that Western and Saudi airpower would make it possible for the West quickly to gain control of the skies. For political reasons, however, ground force operations should be "spear headed" by Arab troops.

PERCY CRADOCK

22 August 1990

CONFIDENTIAL



File

be: PC

DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RM

file



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

See Simon.

IRAQ/KUWAIT: COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

Thank you for your letter of 21 August setting out the main lines of a counter-propaganda campaign against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The Prime Minister has approved these and would like to see them implemented very rapidly and actively. She has inquired whether we have the right staff to do so with the greatest effect, and suggests the Foreign Secretary might like to consider whether we should bring in someone from outside with specialist experience in this field to give overall direction and ensure a really sharp campaign. The Foreign Secretary may like to reflect on this.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL

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(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(NON-PAPER)

A. file
(Iraq/Kuwait)

U.S. GOVERNMENT NOTICE TO MARINERS AND VESSEL INTERCEPTION PLAN

GENERAL INFORMATION

- A. BASIS OF OPERATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, REQUESTED A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE SUCH MILITARY OR OTHER STEPS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES DESIGNED TO RESTORE KUWAITI RIGHTS ARE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED. (RESOLUTION 661 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIFICALLY AFFIRMS THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, IN RESPONSE TO THE ARMED ATTACK BY IRAQ AGAINST KUWAIT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER.) IN PARTICULAR, THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT HAS REQUESTED THE UNITED STATES TO COORDINATE AND COMMENCE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATIONS TO INTERCEPT MARITIME TRADE WITH IRAQ AND KUWAIT THAT IS PROHIBITED BY RESOLUTION 661. THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO THESE REQUESTS.

- THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SANCTIONS PROVIDED IN RESOLUTION 661 DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE ACTIONS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT PROHIBITED SHIPMENTS FROM ENTERING OR LEAVING THEIR TERRITORIES. INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS WILL REINFORCE THESE NATIONAL ACTIONS AND VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO MAKE THESE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE. ALL SUCH INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- B. TRADE TO BE INTERCEPTED. AMONG OTHER THINGS, UNSC RESOLUTION 661 ESTABLISHES MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST: (1) THE EXPORT OF ALL COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS ORIGINATING IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT AFTER THE DATE OF THE RESOLUTION (AUGUST 6); AND (2) THE EXPORT TO IRAQ OR KUWAIT OF ANY COMMODITIES OR PRODUCTS, WHATEVER THEIR STATE OF ORIGIN, EXCEPT FOR "SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES, AND, IN HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES, FOODSTUFFS" THESE SANCTIONS APPLY NOTWITHSTANDING ANY CONTRACT ENTERED INTO OR LICENSE GRANTED BEFORE THE DATE OF THE RESOLUTION. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING TRADE WILL BE INTERCEPTED:

I. SHIPMENTS FROM IRAQ OR KUWAIT. THE INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS WILL PREVENT THE MARITIME SHIPMENT OF ALL COMMODITIES OR PRODUCTS ORIGINATING IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT, REGARDLESS OF PORT OF EMBARKATION OR TRANSSHIPMENT POINT. THIS WILL INCLUDE ALL PRODUCTS PRODUCED IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT FROM MATERIALS PRODUCED ELSEWHERE.

- II. SHIPMENTS ^{TO} ~~FROM~~ IRAQ OR KUWAIT. THE INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS WILL PREVENT THE MARITIME SHIPMENT OF ALL COMMODITIES OR PRODUCTS TO IRAQ OR KUWAIT (WHATEVER THEIR DECLARED FINAL DESTINATION), OR TO OTHER PORTS IN THE REGION FOR TRANSSHIPMENT TO IRAQ OR KUWAIT, EXCEPT FOR SUPPLIES

INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES. THE BURDEN WILL BE ON THE SHIPPER TO ESTABLISH THE BONA FIDE CHARACTER OF SUCH SHIPMENTS. MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL ONLY BE PERMITTED TO PASS IF AN APPROPRIATE REQUEST HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE AUTHORITIES OF THE COUNTRY OF EXPORT OR AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION, CERTIFYING THE PRECISE QUANTITY AND TYPE OF SUPPLIES INVOLVED AND THE MEDICAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED. THE SHIPMENT OF FOODSTUFFS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED AT THIS TIME.

- C. METHOD OF INTERCEPTION. INTERCEPTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY NAVAL FORCES STATIONED IN THE VICINITY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, AND OTHER CHOKE POINTS, PORTS AND PIPELINE TERMINALS AS NEEDED. THE NAVAL UNITS OF EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY WILL ACT UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND, UNDER OVERALL COORDINATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

- NOTICE OF INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS WILL BE PUBLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN INTERNATIONAL NOTICE TO MARINERS AND PROMULGATED IN OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, INCLUDING LOCAL MARINE BROADCASTS. SPECIAL LIAISON WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH STATES IN THE AREA, STATES WHOSE FLAG VESSELS CONDUCT SUBSTANTIAL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING INFORMATION AND COOPERATION FROM THESE GOVERNMENTS AND MINIMIZING DISRUPTION TO LEGITIMATE MARITIME COMMERCE.

- COMMERCIAL SOURCES, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, MILITARY AND NAVAL ASSETS, AND OTHER MEANS WILL BE USED TO IDENTIFY SHIPS THOUGHT TO BE CARRYING CARGO TO OR

FOR IRAQ OR KUWAIT. SHIPS ENTERING OR LEAVING THE INTERCEPTION AREAS WILL, AS APPROPRIATE, BE ASKED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION AND INFORMATION AS TO THEIR ORIGIN OR DESTINATION AND THEIR CARGO. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE NORMALLY OBTAINED BY RADIO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE INTERCEPTION VESSEL AND THE SHIP SEEKING TO ENTER OR LEAVE THE AREA.

- IF THE INTERCEPTION VESSEL IS UNABLE TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE INFORMATION IN THIS MANNER, IT WILL BOARD THE SHIP AND CONDUCT SUCH INSPECTION OF RECORDS OR CARGO AS MAY BE NECESSARY OR (IF NECESSARY FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS) ESCORT THE SHIP TO A NEARBY PORT FOR SUCH INSPECTION. WHERE NECESSARY, THE INTERCEPTION VESSEL WILL CONTACT THE LIAISON AUTHORITIES OF THE INTERCEPTION FORCE OR APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO CONFIRM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SHIP. WARSHIPS, AUXILIARIES, AND OTHER SHIPS THAT ARE STATE-OWNED OR OPERATED AND USED ONLY ON GOVERNMENT NONCOMMERCIAL SERVICE ENJOY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO BOARDING AND INSPECTION. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, BE INTERCEPTED AND DIVERTED.

- ONCE THESE INQUIRIES OR SEARCH IS COMPLETED, THE SHIP IN QUESTION WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED UNLESS THE COMMANDER OF THE INTERCEPTION VESSEL IS SATISFIED THAT THE INTERCEPTED VESSEL IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME.

- RATHER THAN BE SUBJECT TO A SEARCH, INTERCEPTED SHIPS WILL BE PERMITTED TO TURN AWAY FROM THE INTERCEPTION AREA, IN WHICH CASE THE INTERCEPTION FORCE WILL NOT INSIST ON THE ABOVE PROCEDURES OR TAKE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE SHIP.

- D. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERCEPTION. TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT, INTERCEPTION WILL BE ENFORCED WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE. OTHER METHODS WILL BE USED TO INDUCE A SHIP TO PROVIDE NECESSARY INFORMATION, TO SUBMIT TO NECESSARY INSPECTION OR TO REFRAIN FROM PROCEEDING ON ITS INTENDED COURSE, INCLUDING RADIO AND VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS, MANEUVERS BY THE INTERCEPTION VESSEL, AND WARNING SHOTS. WHERE NECESSARY THE MINIMUM PROPORTIONATE FORCE NEEDED TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WILL BE USED, INCLUDING BOARDING OPERATIONS OR DISABLING THE SHIP. ANY HOSTILE ACTION BY THE SHIP WILL BE COUNTERED BY NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE FORCE.

- E. COORDINATION. THE UNITED STATES, IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST IT HAS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, IS COMMUNICATING WITH ALL OTHER STATES WHO HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE GOK TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT, FOR PURPOSE OF COORDINATING THE VARIOUS NATIONAL FORCES. WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THESE OTHER NATIONS TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS FOR COORDINATION, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHANNELS FOR COORDINATION OF INFORMATION ON MARITIME TRAFFIC AND APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES, FOR OPERATIONAL COORDINATION, AND FOR LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Gulf Crisis

I attach the main overnight

Programs, & some of editorials.

Press coverage of your performance

yesterday is very good - as a
glance at the front pages will show.

No significant changes on

the ground. Some progress at the
UN, but still a way to go.

C.D.P. 22/8

SECRET
FM BAGHDAD
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 909
OF 211332Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY MODUK KUWAIT ACTOR

SIC I9M

MY TELNO 879: FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT SITES WHERE THE IRAQIS APPEAR TO BE CONSIDERING HOUSING WESTERN DETAINEES:
 - (A) A BRAZILIAN ENGINEER WORKING AT AL-ISKANDERIYA SAID ON 20 AUGUST THAT A NUMBER OF BRITISH DETAINEES HAD ALREADY BEEN MOVED TO THE SITE.
 - (B) ITALIANS WORKING AT THE DORA POWER STATION JUST SOUTH OF BAGHDAD CLAIM THAT ACCOMMODATION IS BEING PREPARED ON SITE FOR FOUR FOREIGN FAMILIES.
 - (C) A VILLA CLOSE TO AN ELECTRICAL SUB-STATION JUST NORTH OF BAGHDAD IS BEING MADE READY TO HOUSE A FAMILY OF DETAINED AMERICANS.
 - (D) THE YUGOSLAV DA INDICATED TO US THAT ACCOMMODATION FOR THE DETAINEES WAS BEING PREPARED AT A "VERY SENSITIVE" SITE. HE WOULD NOT GIVE THE NAME, BUT WE GUESS THAT HE IS REFERRING TO THE NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE AT TAMIYA (50 KM NORTH OF BAGHDAD), WHERE WE KNOW YUGOSLAVS ARE EMPLOYED.
 - (E) EMPLOYEES OF BIWATER PROCESS WORKING AT TAJI HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH INTERNMENT ON THE SITE IF THEY DO NOT CONTINUE TO WORK THERE (HENCE THE PRESENCE OF THE FIVE BIWATER PERSONNEL IN OUR EMBASSY COMPOUND - MY TELNO 890, PARA 2).
2. GRATEFUL EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION ABOUT RELEASING ANY OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS TEL AND MY TUR: IT COULD TOO EASILY BE TRACED BACK TO THE FOREIGNERS FROM WHOM IT HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

WALKER

YYYY

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MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BERMAN
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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 212200Z WASHINGTON

TELNO 1467

OF 212000Z AUGUST 90

INFO DESKBY 212200Z UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, EC POSTS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SECRETARY BAKER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER THIS EVENING AFTER THE WEU AND EPC MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN PARIS.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE WEU MEETING HAD GONE WELL. IT WAS RATHER LIKE A PLEDGING CONFERENCE WHICH HAD ALSO SET IN HAND COORDINATION OF FORCES ON THE SPOT. WE WOULD NEED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS ON HOW TO TAKE THIS COORDINATION FURTHER FORWARD. BUT IT APPEARED THAT ALL THE WEU MEMBERS AGREED THAT AT SOME POINT WE WOULD NEED TO TAKE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. THE DIFFERENCE LAY BETWEEN THOSE (THE UK AND FRANCE) WHO THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF FORCE WAS PERMITTED BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 51 AND THE REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT, AND THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS NEEDED. THE FRENCH WERE QUITE CLEAR THAT SHIPS COULD BE USED FOR QUOTE CONSTRAINT UNQUOTE.
3. BAKER SAID THAT A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE PREFERABLE AND THE US WOULD KEEP PRESSING FOR IT. HE HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS, ALTHOUGH THE TANKER WHICH HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN THE CAUSE FOR FORCING THE PACE WAS NOW NO LONGER A PROBLEM. BUT THE US NAVY WAS SHADOWING ANOTHER TANKER AND HE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE, IN A FEW HOURS, A READ-OUT ON WHEN THE CRITICAL POINT FOR STOPPING THAT TANKER WOULD BE REACHED. THE US APPRECIATED THE NEED TO KEEP WORKING CAREFULLY WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE US WANTED TO KEEP A SOLID FRONT.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE MR BAKER AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH ZAMYATIN, WHO HAD CLAIMED THAT THE PROBLEM IN NEW YORK LAY WITH THE CHINESE AND NON-ALIGNED.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN GAVE BAKER A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN PARIS WHICH HAD LARGELY FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE OF OUR EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT AFTER 24 AUGUST. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW HAD BEEN THAT WE SHOULD ASK OUR STAFF THERE TO

REMAIN UNTIL, PHYSICALLY AND PRACTICALLY, THEY COULD NO LONGER DO SO. WE MUST SHOW THE MAXIMUM SOLIDARITY WITH OUR CITIZENS. WE DID NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE RISK INVOLVED FOR THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND. THIS MADE IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL STAY IN LINE.

6. BAKER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE US POSITION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COME OUT THE SAME. A DECISION WAS AWAITING THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL THAT THE EMBASSY IN KUWAIT WOULD NOT CLOSE DOWN ON 24 AUGUST - THE IRAQIS HAD NO RIGHT TO INSIST. BUT THE US MIGHT REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF ITS STAFF TO THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO KEEP CONTACT WITH US CITIZENS. HE AGREED THAT HE WOULD LET US KNOW IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THAT DECISION WOULD BE CHANGED.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT IN THE EPC DECLARATION WAS THE LINE THAT INDIVIDUAL IRAQIS WHO COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS AGAINST FOREIGN NATIONALS WOULD BE HELD PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISDEEDS. EC MINISTERS THOUGHT THIS WOULD HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT. BAKER THOUGHT THIS AN EXCELLENT IDEA AND ASKED IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE LANGUAGE WHICH MINISTERS HAD USED TO BE SENT TO HIM.

8. FINALLY, BAKER SAID THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT DO WITH REGARD TO IRAQI REPRESENTATION IN OUR COUNTRIES. HE HAD NOTHING IN PARTICULAR IN MIND. BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ACT IN CONCERT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE MUST LOOK AT IT, ALTHOUGH HE SAW A DANGER THAT WE COULD GET INTO A TIT FOR TAT EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD LEAVE US WITH NO-ONE IN BAGHDAD.

HURD

YYYY

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PAGE 2
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A. H.

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO 1463

OF 212132Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, TOKYO
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, UKDEL NATOIRAQ/KUWAIT: CALL BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR, 21 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DELIVERS MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE REPORTING TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 20 AUGUST WITH SAADOUN HAMMADI, IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME ON 21 AUGUST TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 20 AUGUST WITH IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (TEXT IN MIFT).

3. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THIS COMPLICATED AND ANXIOUS SITUATION. I EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE WHICH I WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY. I HOPED THAT THE POWERFUL SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT. I GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE WEU MEETING IN PARIS EARLIER TODAY.

4. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THAT IF WE WERE TO AVOID WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SANCTIONS ALREADY IMPOSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COHESION WHICH HAD BEEN SUCH A FEATURE OF THE UN'S RESPONSE TO IRAQI INVASION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF A FURTHER RESOLUTION YESTERDAY IN NEW YORK. THOSE WHO HAD WILLED THE END SHOULD ALSO WILL THE MEANS. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MONITOR AND TRACK SHIPS: COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN THE AREA, OR WHO MIGHT SEND FORCES THERE, HAD TO HAVE THE MEANS TO STOP SHIPS. IF WE WANTED A PEACEFUL ENDING TO THE CRISIS, WE NEEDED A RESOLUTION WHICH GAVE THE LEGAL MEANS TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. I ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY THE STRONG HOPE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT A NEW RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED ON THE LINES UNDER DISCUSSION. THE PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED.

5. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED A NUMBER OF PROBING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE

BASIS FOR, AND SCOPE OF, THE NEW RESOLUTION. I MADE CLEAR THAT I WAS CONCERNED MORE ABOUT THE BASIC POLITICAL QUESTION THAN THE PRECISE DRAFTING, WHICH WAS A MATTER FOR OUR DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK. WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAD CLEAR LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR USE OF MINIMUM FORCE IN THE GULF IN PURSUANCE OF SCR 661. BUT SOME COUNTRIES FELT THAT THEY NEEDED THE ADDITIONAL COVER OF A UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION. WE WERE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THAT. INDEED, THE WEU COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED TODAY, HAD CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE FURTHER USEFUL STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET DIFFICULTY?

6. THE THRUST OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE APPEARED TO BE THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT A NEW RESOLUTION WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS COVER FOR ATTACKING IRAQ, OR IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. I MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE. RATHER, WE WERE CONCERNED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN EMBARGO. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR MADE REASSURING NOISES ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A FURTHER RESOLUTION IN THIS SENSE.

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Prime Minister

15 (a-f)

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The promised paper
on propaganda.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

SECRET AND PERSONAL

It suggests the Times (which have been obvious for some time) & at means of propagating them.

21 August 1990

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait

The task is to get on and do it. Confer with proposals, & will

You wrote to Dominic Asquith on 13 and 14 August about counter-propaganda against Iraq. Mr Waldegrave replied on 14 August. The Foreign Secretary held a meeting yesterday. This letter sets out more fully what we are doing.

The main targets for a propaganda effort should be the Iraqi people, other Arabs sympathetic to Iraq and the wider Muslim world. Material will need to be carefully tailored for different audiences. The general theme needs constant repetition - that the crisis is wholly Saddam Hussein's fault because of the illegal and unjustified annexation of Kuwait. There are two other main themes which we need to emphasise. First, that Saddam Hussein is a failure. Particular points to bring out would be:

- (a) Number of lives lost in the Gulf war and nothing gained;
- (b) Economic cost of the war and Baathist rule: Iraq is a naturally rich country impoverished by debt and underdevelopment;
- (c) The disservice he has done the Arab cause by diverting attention from the plight of the Palestinians, dividing the Arab world and, by his behaviour, tarnishing the Arab people in the eyes of the world.
- (d) Military ineptitude - having to hide his soldiers behind a screen of foreign civilians, women and children.

The second theme is Saddam Hussein's brutality. Material would concentrate on

- (a) The track record inside Iraq (see, for example, the enclosed Research Department paper);
- (b) Subversion of friendly neighbouring states, including the use of terrorism in pursuit of his aims.

SECRET & PERSONAL

Can we think of such a specialist? give overall direction. Agree?]

Waldegrave to Yes
coordinate?
C 87
21/8

[You might suggest that hire in a specialist from private sector, with

experience in this field, to



SECRET & PERSONAL

- (c) The fact that foreign workers of all nationalities are fleeing Kuwait and Iraq, initially for economic reasons but increasingly because of the brutality meted out to them by the Iraqis.

All these themes need urgent amplification. Propaganda material will need to be disseminated

Overt

Wider Arab audiences can be reached through the BBC, the Arabic press and the British press. We are already in close touch with the BBC and have set up weekly briefing sessions with them. The Arabic Service are helpfully finding Arab and Islamic voices to put the case against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We can help them do this. The Arabic press can be approached in London and Paris as well as in capitals. The Arabic press in London has become more influential since the close-down of Beirut as a media centre. The press here have regular briefings at the FCO and we shall continue to ensure that they get plenty of material. Mr Waldegrave has used one of these briefings to get across our message on Saddam Hussein. Other Arab media will be supplied by Posts with material. We are preparing specific guidance to add to the general material they receive. The British press can best be targeted through briefings to reliable Middle East experts. A list is being drawn up.

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SECRET & PERSONAL
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If the Prime Minister thinks that these are the right lines of action they will be rapidly followed through and amplified. The Foreign Secretary is asking Mr Waldegrave to take charge.

At the WEU and EC meetings in Paris today there was much interest in the Foreign Secretary's references to the need for political warfare. He promised to circulate a paper. Not all these ideas are suitable for EC discussions. But there would be clear advantage in getting European and American resources to work on the same lines.

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET & PERSONAL

THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME UNDER SADDAM HUSSAIN

Introduction

1 The Ba'ath Party seized power in a military coup in July 1968, and has ruled Iraq ever since. Saddam Hussain became Vice President in 1969 and succeeded President Hassan al-Bakr in 1979, though he had been the real power in Iraq since the mid 1970s.

2 Since 1968 the regime has ruled by fear: it is one of the most repressive in the world. The government, with Saddam Hussain at its head, consists of ruthless men who do not hesitate to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed or have disappeared over the years, most of whom have gone unreported. Iraqi dissidents and exiles have been hunted down and assassinated abroad. The government has subjected its citizens to forced relocation and deportations, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary and political executions almost as a matter of course.

3 Saddam Hussain has set the tone for the system of murder and repression and has personally killed opponents. He surrounds himself in an aura of terror, and over the years he has progressively killed or edged out all possible rivals. Often, this is done under the veil of revolutionary justice. For example, RCC decree No 6 of November 1986 (which is still in force) prescribes the death penalty for the deliberate and public insult of the President, the RCC, the Ba'ath Party and the National Assembly.

Human Rights Organisations

4 Human Rights Organisations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have consistently condemned Iraq's record. Most recently, in February 1990, the Middle East Watch's report on human rights in Iraq commented as follows:

"Iraq is a well organised police state and its government is one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today. ... With the exception of freedom of worship, the Iraqi government denies its citizens all fundamental rights and freedoms and ruthlessly suppresses even the smallest gestures of dissent."

5 In February 1989, Amnesty International, in its report entitled: "Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression", highlighted brutality towards children as routine in Iraqi prisons - mainly to make them give information about relations. To quote a short passage:

"At least 30 methods of torture have been used in Iraqi prisons. ... We have received reports of

children having been victims of beatings, whippings, sexual abuse and electric shock treatment. Some young people are reported to have died after torture."

6 A final general example of the Iraqi regime's appalling disregard for human life was the eight year Iran-Iraq conflict, in which over 100,000 Iraqis and over 250,000 Iranians died.

Examples

A) Attempted Assassination of President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959.

Saddam Hussain, at the age of 22, played a prominent role in this abortive attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President. According to David Hirst, in today's Guardian, it was not his first. In his teens he is said to have murdered a shepherd, and before 1959 had committed three more murders.

B) Murder of Nasir Al-Hani, first Foreign Minister after the 1968 Ba'athist coup. In 1968, his body was found riddled with bullets in a ditch outside Baghdad. This was the first of a series of Ba'athist political killings which it was believed was to assure that Saddam Hussain had no rival.

C) Hardan Tikriti, former Ba'athist Defence Minister. In 1971 he was machine gunned down in Kuwait by Iraqi security.

D) 1 July 1973 Attempted Coup, led by the Director of Security, Nazim Kazzar. This was followed by mass executions of Iraqi officers, including Kazzar.

E) Assassination in London on 9 July 1978 of General Abdul Razzak al-Naif, (a former Prime Minister of Iraqi for a short period in 1968). The Iraqi murderer, Salim Hassan, was caught and is currently serving a life sentence for terrorist murder in a British prison.

F) Saddam Hussain becomes President of Iraq: In July 1979, Saddam Hussain replaced President Hassan al-Bakr. In the following purge, some accounts suggest that 500 senior Ba'athists were executed in the first two weeks of his Presidency. The purge was not only directed against dissidents (Kurds, Communists and disaffected Shia), but also against Ba'athists and old associates who might have been a threat to him. The deaths not only occurred via quasi-legal proceedings in the revolutionary courts, but also by the security apparatus who shot victims in the street, including central Baghdad. At least five members of the RCC were murdered, with Saddam insisting that a number of his colleagues on the RCC personally did the killing.

G) Execution of Bakr Sadr, April 1980; Shia religious leader. This was followed by another purge of army officers, with at least twenty being executed.

H) Destruction of the town of Al Dujayl (40 miles NE of Baghdad):
In July 1982, an assassination attempt occurred near this village. According to a report in the Economist, Iraqi security's retaliation was swift and brutal. 150 families disappeared, assumed murdered, and the rest of the inhabitants (the village had 2,000 people) were deported, the men were sent north and the women and children to the south. The village was then completely destroyed.

I) Murder of Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim in Khartoum in January 1988:
Leading Iraqi Shia exile who fled Iraq in 1969, and brother of the leader of a prominent Shia opposition group in Iraq. According to the press, the Iraqi authorities are held responsible for the death of twenty two members of the Hakim family.

J) CW Attack on Kurdish Village of Halabja, 16 March 1988:4-5,000
Kurdish civilians were killed. The attack was aimed at revenge on the Kurdish inhabitants who had assisted the Iranians and as a warning to other Kurds of what to expect if they defied the Baghdad authorities"

K) Saddam Hussain's son, Udai: On 19 October 1988, Udai Saddam Hussain killed a Palace employee. Though in detention for a period of three months, he was released without charge and sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Geneva. He was subsequently expelled from Switzerland and is currently back in Iraq.

L) Execution of Journalist for the Observer, Farzad Bazoft on 15 March 1990, and Swedish national, Jalil Mahdi Salih Nu'aymi on 11 July 1990

Middle East Section
RAD FCO
14 August 1990

SECRET



SUBJECT CCMASTER

14(AC)
me for
c/c

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1990

Dear Jimon,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Prime Minister had a long talk this afternoon with Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, who will be seeing the Foreign Secretary later this evening. I have to say that throughout this conversation, Prince Bandar was unusually overwrought and elated and did not invariably make sense.

I should be grateful if you could ensure that this letter is given a very restricted circulation and seen only by those people with a strict need to know.

The Prime Minister began by congratulating Prince Bandar on his interview on Channel 4 the previous evening. She had been very struck by his phrase that Saddam Hussein was sheltering behind women and children, and had adopted it herself at her own press conference. Prince Bandar preened himself mightily and said that he was sure the psychology of the remark was right: it was very demeaning to Saddam Hussein. We should get the BBC Arabic Service to carry it extensively. The Prime Minister said that it was very important to wage a skilful propaganda campaign against Saddam Hussein.

The Prime Minister said she had been very glad to be able to talk at length with King Fahd. Subsequently Alan Clark had visited a number of smaller Gulf states and we were now considering whether to send extra aircraft to the region. Prince Bandar jumped in to say there was a very strong case for stationing Tornado IDS in Saudi Arabia. Although the Americans had very considerable air power, there was still a need to strengthen the multinational force's overall anti-tank capability. The Prime Minister said that she was awaiting recommendations from the Chiefs of Staff, both on this and on how we could increase the sense of personal security of some of the Gulf rulers. Prince Bandar said this would be very desirable. He wondered whether the Prime Minister had considered sending ground forces to Saudi Arabia, for instance a paratroop brigade. He thought this would be an excellent step and hoped the Prime Minister would keep it in mind.

Prince Bandar continued that the Prime Minister's presence in Aspen at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had been God-given and enabled her to exercise a crucial influence on the

SECRET

President. This had ensured a firm American reaction. He and Prince Saud had themselves seen the President at Kennebunkport a few days ago, having previously talked to President Mubarak and President Assad. The joint conclusion of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria was that Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to get away with the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Half measures would not achieve this, and the notion of proportionate response would not be enough. We would have to go after him fully and clear him out. He thought the US Administration were clearly moving in this direction and would be willing to look at scenarios. Meanwhile, the Egyptians were intending to step up their forces in Saudi Arabia, possibly to a whole division. Syria was also adopting a firm position and was a useful link to the Iranians. There were hopes that the latter would stir up the Kurds. President Ozal was also admirably steady.

Prince Bandar continued that the bottom line was that Saddam Hussein must be removed. Either he would do something to provide an excuse for the Americans to strike at Iraq: or the Americans would build up their strength sufficiently to liberate Kuwait. It would be important to have credible Arab participation in the latter exercise. But, given the time it took to get mechanised divisions into place, it was unlikely to be feasible much before the middle of September. His own assessment was that the Americans could deal with Iraq's air force within 24-36 hours, and then attack other targets with impunity. It was always a mistake to under-estimate one's enemy. But we should not over-estimate Saddam Hussein. His forces had not distinguished themselves during the war with Iran, which had been a much weaker adversary.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

S. Gray

24/12/2016

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The Prime Minister reminded Prince Bandar that our chosen instrument for securing Saddam Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait was the United Nations embargo. The immediate priority was to make this effective, and we were seeking a further UN Security Council Resolution to achieve that. There were still difficulties over this with the Chinese and, to a lesser degree, the Russians. Prince Bandar interrupted that he was travelling straight from London to Moscow. He would urge the Russians to join in a multi-national naval force to implement the embargo. The Prime Minister said she had been rather disturbed by reported remarks by Mr. Shevardnadze to the effect that Iraq's peace proposals had elements which ought to be considered. Prince Bandar should make clear to the Russians that now was not the time for faint hearts. In particular, it was vital that any further UN Resolution enforcing the embargo should not weaken the powers which we already had under Article 51 of the UN Charter.


Prince Bandar said that the Americans had suggested that President Bush might visit US forces in Saudi Arabia in the period 5-7 September; and that there might even be a summit meeting of countries contributing troops. The Saudis were not very keen on this, since it would look as though it was part of preparations for an attack on Iraq, but would find it difficult

to refuse a visit if the Americans insisted. The Prime Minister said she agreed it was very important to get the timing of a visit right. Her view remained that we must give sanctions time to work. We should not rule out the military option. But that could only be considered when the Americans were 100 per cent certain that they had sufficient forces in place to win.

Prince Bandar made some disparaging comments about the role of the PLO in the present crisis. The leadership had shot themselves not in the foot but in the head. The Saudis had reminded the PLO that it was precisely because they opposed the occupation of territory by force that they opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. They were taking discreet action to squeeze Palestinians in Saudi Arabia and to make life difficult for the PLO generally. Prince Bandar continued that the Saudis were no less disappointed with King Hussein's performance. They had always helped him. But now he was not just keeping his options open, but supporting Saddam Hussein's cause. He had to realise who his true friends were. The Prime Minister commented that Jordan, Yemen and the PLO had all made the crucial mistake of thinking that Saddam Hussein would win. Actually he was going to lose and the danger was they would lose with him.

Prince Bandar repeated that he hoped the Prime Minister would keep in mind the possibility of sending additional Tornado ground attack aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and of putting in some paratroopers or some other ground forces as well. He would be going to Riyadh after his visit to Moscow but would then pass through London again on the way back and might ask to see her once more. He would also welcome a military briefing, to see to what extent our thoughts paralleled those of the American military.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



file
JA
PK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1990

SUBJECT CLUSTER

Dear Simon,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE
OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Prime Minister had a meeting this afternoon with Yusuf Alawi, the Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He was accompanied by the Omani Ambassador.

Yusuf Alawi conveyed the Sultan's greetings and his appreciation of the strong stand taken by the Prime Minister on the Gulf crisis. The Prime Minister said we, for our part, very much appreciated the swift and positive response we had had from the Sultan on the question of stationing forces in Oman.

Yusuf Alawi continued that the Sultan had asked him to brief the Prime Minister on the visit which he (Alawi) had paid to Tehran the previous week, during which he had seen both President Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati. Both had confirmed that Iran supported and would implement the Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iraq. They were not over-impressed with Saddam Hussain's offer to accept Iran's terms for settling the dispute between the two countries. The most interesting development was Rafsanjani's determination to improve relations between Iran and the West. On this, Rafsanjani commented that the United States and Britain invariably raised the problem of hostages in Lebanon. He was personally committed to do what he could to secure their release. Indeed he had been asked to take a step in that direction as a mark of good faith and had done so. He had expected the United States to take some steps in return, by getting Israel to release Hizbollah prisoners held in South Lebanon. But nothing had happened. Rafsanjani had emphasised that he must have something to show for the release of American and British hostages. Yusuf Alawi said that he had told Rafsanjani frankly that the Israelis would insist on the return of the Israeli officer held prisoner in Lebanon. Rafsanjani had replied that he would be ready to do everything possible to achieve this. He believed that the time had come for the whole hostage matter to be settled, and removed as an obstacle to better relations between Iran and the West.

CONFIDENTIAL

Yusuf Alawi continued that Rafsanjani had also talked about his internal position, dismissing reports that he had to defer to left-wing extremists. He claimed to have the unfettered ability to take decisions. Rafsanjani had also spoken of Iran's willingness to provide military assistance to the smaller Gulf states: and to start mobilising Kurdish and Shia opposition to Saddam Hussain. He was co-ordinating closely on this last point with Syria and Turkey.

Yusuf Alawi said that the Sultan concluded from these exchanges that Rafsanjani was genuine in his wish to overcome the past and take a step forward in relations with the West. He hoped that we would feel able to respond. He was not being starry-eyed: he recognised the need to maintain a balance of power in the region between Iraq and Iran. But at the moment that pointed strongly towards strengthening ties with Iran. The Sultan would like to know whether Oman could be of any assistance to us over this.

The Prime Minister said she was very grateful for this account. The Sultan had always stressed the importance of keeping open channels to Iran. We had been trying to get back on a better footing with Iran even before the latest crisis over Kuwait, but had made disappointingly little progress. The Salman Rushdie affair did not make it any easier. But we were anxious to restore contacts and move towards renewing relations. Anything which Oman could do to help would be welcome. Yusuf Alawi said that Velayati had taken the line that, following the helpful statements by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on the Salman Rushdie affair, all that remained was to agree on restoration of diplomatic relations. The Prime Minister said that it was not quite so simple: there was the question of the hostages in Lebanon, the continuing threat to Rushdie's life, and the imprisonment of Roger Cooper. Yusuf Alawi said he was under the impression that the problem over Cooper had already been resolved: that was certainly the impression given by the Iranians. He thought it was better not to raise the Salman Rushdie affair: it would die away. A fatwa was only advisory. He had explained the position over hostages: if we were able to persuade the Israelis to co-operate in securing the release of prisoners held in South Lebanon, he believed the release of Western hostages could be achieved. The Prime Minister suggested that Yusuf Alawi go over the ground in greater detail with the Foreign Secretary the following day. But he could assure Rafsanjani of her interest in seeing contacts restored.

The Prime Minister continued that she was encouraged that Rafsanjani had said that Iran would uphold sanctions. It was vital that they should be implemented effectively. There was some evidence that other Arab countries were circumventing or intending to circumvent them. Saddam Hussain must not be allowed to get away with the invasion of Kuwait, and sanctions were the chosen instrument to prevent this. Yusuf Alawi said that the real aim must be to see Saddam Hussain removed from the scene altogether.


The Prime Minister said she had tried to convey to the Sultan her anxiety about the position taken by the Yemen. Yusuf Alawi said that the Yemen Foreign Minister had been in Salalah to see the Sultan yesterday. He had claimed that the Yemen supported sanctions and would not accept Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but had wanted to leave themselves some margin of manoeuvre in order to be able to influence Iraq. The Sultan had made clear that they could not be on both sides of the fence.

Yusuf Alawi said that the Sultan was also worried about the possibility of subversion in some of the smaller Gulf states. The Prime Minister said that we were looking into the possibility of sending further military assistance to them.

Yusuf Alawi asked what the position would be if, against expectations, Saddam Hussain were to withdraw from Kuwait. The Prime Minister said there would have to be some sort of international force to protect Kuwait and prevent a repetition of the Iraq invasion, and perhaps guarantees for Kuwait and other Gulf states as well.

The Prime Minister referred to our disappointment over King Hussein's conduct during the present crisis. Yusuf Alawi said that the King had become increasingly unwilling to accept advice from anyone, including the Sultan. The Prime Minister said that, even so, we should not make it difficult for the King to return to the fold.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1058
OF 212345Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS, HELSINKI, ADDIS ABABA
INFO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN, KINSHASA, HAVANA, BOGOTA, KUALA LUMPUR
INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, OTTAWA, MODUK, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

SIC

MY TELNOS 1047 - 1049: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

*This won't do.
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SUMMARY

1. FURTHER MEETING OF THE FIVE. AMERICANS STRESS THEY WISH TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF THE FIVE AND OF THE COUNCIL. SOME SIGNS OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE FLEXIBILITY. FURTHER MEETINGS ON 22 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET AT 1500Z ON 21 AUGUST. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING (MY TURS) HAD SHOWN THAT A DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS RELATED TO SANCTIONS COULD WORK. BUT IF ACTION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE YEMENIS MIGHT NOT HAVE GIVEN SUCH A RAPID AND POSITIVE RESPONSE. PRESIDENT BUSH HAD NOW TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT HE WANTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WHICH EVERYONE COULD AGREE AND IN A TIMESCALE THEY COULD ACCEPT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SECURE AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE IN THE FIVE, BUT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PROCESS.

3. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE PREVIOUS EVENING HAD BEEN USEFUL IN SOME RESPECTS. THEY HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR FURTHER MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SCR 661. WITH REGARD TO YEMEN THEY HAD SHOWN HOW EFFECTIVE A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT COULD BE. WHEN IT WAS CLEARLY THE VIEW OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR POLITICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL REASONS TO MOVE TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT, THE FIVE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FROM THE COUNCIL. BUT THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO JUMP OVER STEPS IN MOVING TO THE USE OF FORCE. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WOULD SOON RECEIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, AND THEN PREPARE ITS OWN REPORT. IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO WAIT FOR THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT. IF THIS STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN

BREACHES OF SANCTIONS, THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR CASE FOR THE COUNCIL TO SANCTION THE USE OF FORCE. BUT FOR THE MOMENT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION. IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN THE UNANIMITY OF THE COUNCIL AND HE APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES NOT TO INSIST ON VOTING AT PRESENT.

4. LI (CHINA) AGREED WITH LOZINSKIY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE USE OF POLITICAL PRESSURE AND THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. ON TIMING HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVES HAD JUST ARRIVED IN IRAQ TO DEAL WITH THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED IT WOULD HELP TO REDUCE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FIVE IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT NOT TO RUSH INTO A VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE ON THE WORDING. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 COULD BE AMENDED TO READ:

"CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 661 (1990), TO VERIFY AS NECESSARY THE CARGOES AND DESTINATIONS OF ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MARITIME SHIPPING AND TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES RELATED TO MARITIME SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990)".

5. BLANC (FRANCE) ENDORSED WHAT THE OTHERS HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE COHESION OF THE FIVE. FRANCE WAS READY TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT AS IT STOOD.

6. I REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER ON 21 AUGUST. I SAID THE HARD QUESTION WAS WHERE WE WENT NEXT. IN PRINCIPLE I WAS NOT AGAINST GOING THROUGH THE MACHINERY OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ASK IT TO ACT VERY QUICKLY. WE COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT TEXT AS IT STOOD. THE PROPOSED CHINESE AMENMENT TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 WOULD NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. BUT I WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD HELP TO EASE THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IF WE LOOKED MORE CAREFULLY AT THE MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH THE COUNCIL MIGHT ACT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. WE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE COULD BE USED. IF LOZINSKIY COULD LET US HAVE DETAILED THOUGHTS ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THESE POINTS WITH MORE PRECISION, THEREBY MAKING THE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATIVE PARA 1 LESS ACUTE.

7. I SAID THIS BROUGHT US ON TO THE QUESTION OF THE INFORMAL

CONSULTATIONS OF THE MSC DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 AUGUST. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE ISSUES THERE. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE USEFUL IF AMBASSADORS, RATHER THAN POLITICAL COUNSELLORS, ATTENDED THIS MEETING. THIS WAS AGREED. I ALSO SAID THAT ONCE BROAD AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED AMONG THE FIVE, (EVEN IF THERE WAS STILL SOME LOOSE ENDS) IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE FIVE TO BRIEF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

8. PICKERING SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE SHOULD PLAY A PART. HE WOULD CONSULT WASHINGTON TO SEE IF HE COULD MAKE A PRESENTATION ON BREACHES OF SANCTIONS. THIS WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 24 HOURS. HE THOUGHT THAT MY SUGGESTION OF LINKING THE PROBLEMS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 4 WOULD BE A USEFUL WAY OF TAKING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT HELP THE CHINESE POSITION IF THE WORDS 'MINIMUM FORCE' WERE ELIMINATED FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. LI SAID THIS WAS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION: HE WOULD NEED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS.

How do they expect to enforce sanctions

9. LOZINSKIY SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO SUGGEST AT PRESENT ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. BUT THE SOVIET UNION'S ESSENTIAL CONCERN WAS NOT TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE TO THE NAVIES IN THE AREA. PICKERING INTERJECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HOPED THAT THE THREAT OF FORCE WOULD BE A DETERRENT AND THAT IN PRACTICE FORCE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE USED. LOZINSKIY SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT CLARIFICATION. THE TEXT AS IT STOOD APPEARED TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE WITHOUT ANY LIMITS. THIS WOULD BE SEEN BY IRAQ AS A DECLARATION OF WAR. THERE SHOULD BE A GRADUATED APPROACH TO THE USE OF FORCE: IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AND TO THE IRAQIS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID PROVOKING A DISPROPORTIONATE REACTION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. FIRST THERE SHOULD BE A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR MINIMAL USE OF FORCE. THIS SHOULD ACT AS A CLEAR WARNING. THEN THERE SHOULD BE PROVISION TO MOVE TO A SECOND STAGE IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A MORE WIDE-RANGING USE OF FORCE. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH A MECHANISM IN THE RESOLUTION, OR BY MEANS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION.

10. PICKERING SAID THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR HIM. HE THOUGHT THE UNITED STATES COULD ACCEPT THE NOTION OF A GRADUATED RESPONSE. DETERRENCE WOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN ANY RESOLUTION, AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING. HE AGREED WITH LOZINSKIY THAT THE OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO PROVOKE AN INTELLIGENT AND RATIONAL REACTION FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN.

I don't like this & am surprised the Americans seem willing to accept it. We wd. be giving up existing powers under Art. 51 with only a vague promise of getting them all back again.

11. IT WAS AGREED THAT AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 1430Z ON 22 AUGUST. LOZINSKIY AND I WOULD REFLECT ON THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. LI WOULD OBTAIN FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. PICKERING WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH THE (FINNISH) CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ABOUT THE ROLE IT MIGHT PLAY.

COMMENT

12. THIS WAS A USEFUL DISCUSSION. PICKERING AND LOZINSKIY WERE BOTH ANXIOUS TO RE-ESTABLISH COOPERATION AND COURTESIES BETWEEN THEM, AND ALL AGREED THAT THE UNITY AND COHESION OF THE FIVE MUST BE MAINTAINED. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE CHINESE PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE, AND EVEN PUT FORWARD A DRAFTING AMENDMENT (HOWEVER UNSATISFACTORY). ONCE OR TWICE PICKERING WAS ALMOST TOO CONCILIATORY. WE HAVE YET TO SEE WHETHER LOZINSKIY AND LI CAN BE BROUGHT TO ANYTHING NEAR OUR POSITION.

13. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL AT OUR MEETINGS TOMORROW IF WE COULD CONTRIBUTE SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT HOW WE SEE FUTURE PROCEDURES. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I HAVE SAID THAT THOSE WITH NAVAL FORCES IN THE REGION WOULD HAVE TO COORDINATE ON THE SPOT (WHILE ACCEPTING THAT SOME MIGHT HAVE TASKS WHICH WENT BEYOND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661). THE RESULTS OF SUCH COORDINATION WOULD THEN GO TO THE MEMBERS OF THE MSC AND/OR TO THE MSC ITSELF. WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT MECHANISMS OF THE MSC WOULD BE USEFUL AND APPROPRIATE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE MSC WOULD THEN SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FELT THAT THEY WERE PROPERLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MSC'S WORK. WITHOUT IT WE COULD SOON GET INTO POLITICAL TROUBLE. AT THE SAME TIME WE COULD NOT PERMIT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ATTEMPT DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS OR DEPEND ON ITS AUTHORITY IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.

14. IN BROAD TERMS THE OTHERS AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS. BUT WE NEED TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE IMPLICATIONS. THEY ARE OF COURSE NO MORE THAN AN EXTRAPOLATION OF THE LANGUAGE WE OURSELVES PUT FORWARD IN PARA 4 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

TICKELL

YYYY

*But an extrapolation that could be
fatal to enforcement
the embargo*

DISTRIBUTION

35

ADVANCE

332

IRAQ/KUWAIT
 PS
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
 PS/PUS
 MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE BOOTH~~
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
 HD/MED
 HD/NENAD
 HD/NAD
 HD/SED
 HD/UND
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/NPDD
 HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE D10
 (BY TUBE H29)
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
 MAFF
 EMERGENCY UNIT
 RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1051

OF 211800Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE SANA'A, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, BOGOTA

INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, HELSINKI, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

PARIS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON TELNO 1994 : IRAQI TANKER

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT WOLF (STATE DEPARTMENT) SPOKE TO THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AT AROUND 0800 LOCAL. THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CAME TO SEE ME AT 1030: WHILE HE WAS IN MY OFFICE WOLF RANG. PICKERING SAID THAT PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON HAD NOW CALMED DOWN AND APPRECIATED THE NEED TO PROCEED CAREFULLY WITH AS WIDE SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL AS POSSIBLE.

2. AT THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS (FULL REPORT FOLLOWS) PICKERING SAID THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THIS MORNING THAT HE WANTED A RESOLUTION ON WHICH EVERYONE COULD AGREE AND IN A TIMESCALE THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT. HE MADE NO REQUEST FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TODAY (21 AUGUST) OR EVEN TOMORROW (22 AUGUST).

TICKELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

34

ADVANCE

3431

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

COMMENT:

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1048
OF 210635Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

PARIS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED DURING
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE
EARLY HOURS OF 21 AUGUST:

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) AND
664 (1990) AND DEMANDING THEIR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION:

HAVING DECIDED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER VII
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

DETERMINED TO BRING THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ TO AN END AND
TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY,
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT:

DEPLORING THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE STEMMING FROM THE IRAQI INVASION
OF KUWAIT AND DETERMINED TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH LOSSES:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH
RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), AND 664 (1990) AND
IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING
IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

1. CALLS WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE
DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA TO USE SUCH MINIMUM FORCE AS
MAY BE NECESSARY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
VERIFY THE CARGOES AND DESTINATIONS OF ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD
MARITIME SHIPPING AND TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES
RELATED TO MARITIME SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990).

2. INVITES MEMBER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER TO
COOPERATE WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS AS MAY
BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION
661 (1990).

3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE
REQUIRED BY THE STATES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF THIS RESOLUTION,
INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SHORE AND BUNKERING FACILITIES.

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO COORDINATE THEIR
ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION USING
AS APPROPRIATE THE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE
WHICH SHOULD SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR TO THE
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 661.

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

Thin Air

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version.

CDP

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not on

land or

in the

air.

CDP

Do we
need

another

resolution

for land

and

air?

no

ENDS

TICKELL

YYYY

ADVANCE	31	
IRAQ/KUWAIT		1
PS		1
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE		1
PS/PUS		1
MR TOMKYS		1
MR GORE-BOOTH		1
MR FAIRWEATHER		1
HD/MED		1
HD/NENAD		1
HD/NAD		1
HD/SED		1
HD/UND		1
HD/CONSULAR D		1
HD/NEWS D		1
HD/NPDD		1
HD/SECPOL D		1
HD/AMD		1
HD/ECD(E)		1
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY		1
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE		1
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE		1
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE		1
(BY TUBE H29)		
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST		2
SIR P CRADOCK,		1
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)		
CABINET OFFICE DIO		1
(BY TUBE H29)		
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE		1
AUS (C) MODUK		1
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK		1
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND		1
EMERGENCY UNIT		1
MAIN	233	
IRAQ/KUWAIT		203
LIMITED		6
MED		13
UND		6
NAD		5
ADDITIONAL	43	
IRAQ/KUWAIT		43
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)		
[VARDY]		

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106103
MDADAN 0540

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FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1043

OF 211706Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, MODUK, MADRID, LISBON, UKDEL NATO, THE HAGUE

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, ROME

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

SIC

MY TELNO 1015 : FRG MILITARY REACTION TO GULF CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. KOHL FALLS IN WITH GENSCHER'S POSITION THAT FRG FORCES SHOULD NOT NOW BE SENT TO THE GULF. BUT COALITION PARTIES AND SPD AGREE ON PRINCIPLE OF AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW BUNDESWEHR PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS AUTHORISED BY THE UN IN FUTURE. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT MAY WELL NOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL NEXT YEAR, AND GERMAN MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE PRESENT GULF CRISIS SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY.

2. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO SEND A DESTROYER TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

DETAIL

3. IN MEETINGS OF MINISTERS AND OF BUNDESTAG COMMITTEES ON 20 AUGUST IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF RESTRICTING BUNDESWEHR DEPLOYMENT TO THE NATO AREA. IT WAS ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE COULD BE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT OUT OF AREA DEPLOYMENTS IN LINE WITH UN DECISIONS.

4. STOLTENBURG ANNOUNCED ON 20 AUGUST THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE SENDING A DESTROYER - LUETJENS - TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO JOIN THE FRG MINESWEEPING CONTINGENT AND AS A DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY.

COMMENT

5. FEDERAL PUBLIC OPINION HAS NOT SO FAR SHOWN GREAT INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF GERMAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF CRISIS. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD CHARACTERISTICALLY TEND TOWARDS RESTRAINT AND HESITATION IN SUCH A MATTER. EDITORIAL OPINION HAS BEEN SPLIT, WITH SUPPORT FOR GENSCHER'S VIEW THAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ALLOW DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF AND FOR KOHL'S THAT IT DOES. ONE FREQUENT THEME IS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO SOMETHING MORE TO

DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH ITS WESTERN ALLIES, PERHAPS BY PROVIDING GREATER MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE US.

6. VOLKER RUEHE, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CDU, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS ON 20 AUGUST, TELLS ME THAT KOHL ARGUED FOR AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF, ESPECIALLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION MADE GERMAN SUPPORT FOR US POLICY IN THE GULF BOTH EXPEDIENT AND RIGHT. GENSCHER IS LIKELY TO HAVE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOLITIC FOR GERMANY TO RISK ACCUSATIONS OF THROWING ITS MILITARY WEIGHT AROUND AT A TIME WHEN IT SHOULD BE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WORLD THAT UNITED GERMANY WOULD POSE NO THREAT. KOHL EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT HE COULD NOT RISK A CONFRONTATION WITH THE FDP, WHOSE POSITION IS SHARED BY THE SPD OPPOSITION.

7. RUEHE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS COMMON GROUND THAT THE AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO ALLOWING DEPLOYMENT OUT OF AREA ONLY FOR OPERATIONS THAT WERE AUTHORISED, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY LED, BY THE UN. THE FMOB IN THE PAST HAS WANTED AN AMENDMENT GIVING GREATER LATITUDE. THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTING THE AMENDMENT TO UN-AUTHORISED OPERATIONS WILL MEAN THAT GERMANY, PERHAPS FOR MANY YEARS, WILL BE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS DECIDED ON IN OTHER FORA, FOR INSTANCE WEU.

8. RUEHE TOLD ME THAT THE CDU WOULD TRY TO GET AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THE SAME PACKAGE AS THE AMENDMENTS REQUIRED BY GERMAN UNIFICATION, I.E. IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SPD AND FDP WOULD INSIST THAT THE AMENDMENT CONCERNING OUR OF AREA DEPLOYMENT BE AUTHORISED BY THE ALL GERMAN PARLIAMENT, I.E. NOT BEFORE EARLY 1991. RUEHE'S FEELING, WHICH I SHARE, IS THAT THE CHANCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN TIME TO ALLOW GERMAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRESENT GULF CRISIS MUST BE EXTREMELY SLIGHT.

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MITTERRAND PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. TOUGHER FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAQ. MITTERRAND DESCRIBES POSSIBLE MEASURES WHICH THE FRENCH NAVY COULD TAKE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. FRENCH PARLIAMENT TO BE RECALLED ON 27 AUGUST. A FRENCH RECONNAISSANCE UNIT TO BE SENT TO UAE AND ADVISERS TO SAUDI ARABIA.
2. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS EVENING AFTER A RESTRICTED MINISTERIAL MEETING, MITTERRAND CONFIRMED THAT FRANCE WAS TOUGHENING ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAQ. HE SAID THAT AN EMBARGO NEEDED TO BE PROPERLY ENFORCED, OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE A SHAM. MEASURES WHICH THE FRENCH NAVY COULD EMPLOY, DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WERE OBSERVATION, SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTION OF SUSPECT VESSELS QUOTE TO GO BEYOND THIS, ORDERS FROM MILITARY HIGH COMMAND WERE NECESSARY. IF IT WAS A QUESTION OF FIRING ON A SHIP, THE ORDERS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE PRESIDENT, AS ARMED FORCES CHIEF. NO PART OF THIS PROCEDURE WAS RULED OUT. BUT SO FAR THE QUESTION HAD NOT ARISEN. WE ARE SIMPLY ADOPTING DISPOSITIONS SO THAT WE CAN CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS UNQUOTE. MITTERRAND ADDED THAT AS A RESULT OF HUSSEIN'S ACTIONS, THERE WAS A QUOTE LOGIQUE DE GUERRE UNQUOTE, IE A DOWNWARD CYCLE TOWARDS WAR. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ESCAPE FROM THIS DOWNWARD CYCLE WITHOUT ABANDONING THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF DEFENDING THE RULE OF LAW, BUT DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY BROKEN OFF AND QUOTE SO FAR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SEVERED UNQUOTE.
3. OTHER MAJOR POINTS FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE WERE AS FOLLOWS:
 - PARLIAMENT TO BE RECALLED IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON 27 AUGUST BECAUSE OF THE GULF CRISIS

- FIRST USE BY MITTERRAND OF WORD QUOTE HOSTAGES UNQUOTE TO DESCRIBE FRENCH CITIZENS DETAINED BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

- CATEGORICAL DENIAL THAT FRANCE ENGAGED IN SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS TO FREE ITS CITIZENS.

(THIS FOLLOWS, INCIDENTALLY, NEWS OF AN IRAQI STATEMENT TODAY THAT AS A RESULT OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN EMBARGO, FRANCE WOULD NOT LONGER BE CONSIDERED A FRIEND : ENFORCEMENT ACTION BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD MEAN THAT FRENCH CITIZENS HENCEFORTH BE TREATED LIKE AMERICANS)

- ANNOUNCEMENT THAT A FRENCH RECONNAISSANCE UNIT WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE UAE, AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION. FRENCH TECHNICIANS TO BE SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA WHERE KUWAITI MIRAGE F1 PLANES RESCUED FROM KUWAIT DURING THE IRAQI INVASION ARE NOW BASED.

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MIPT

WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING
(PARIS 21 AUGUST 1990)

COMMUNIQUE

1. THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS OF WEU MET ON 21 AUGUST 1990 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE GULF CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND THEN THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. THE MEETING WAS HELD PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3, OF THE WEU TREATY, THE ROME DECLARATION OF OCTOBER 1984 AND THE PLATFORM ON EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS OF OCTOBER 1987, WHICH PROVIDES FOR MEMBER COUNTRIES TO CONCERT THEIR POLICIES ON CRISES OUTSIDE EUROPE INsofar AS THEY MAY AFFECT EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS.
2. THE MINISTER OF THE WEU MEMBER STATES REPEAT THEIR UNRESERVED CONDEMNATION OF THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ AND CALL ON IRAQ TO COMPLY IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660 AND 662. THEY RESTATE THEIR FIRM DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO COMPLY WITH THE EMBARGO OF IRAQ IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 AND TO RENDER IT EFFECTIVE. THEY CALL ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE ANY FURTHER USEFUL MEASURES TO THIS END.
3. MINISTERS DECLARE THAT THE DETERMINATION THEIR COUNTRIES INTEND TO DISPLAY IN UPHOLDING THE LAW IS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ENDING AGRESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. THE ACTION THEY HAVE INITIATED IS AIMED TO UPHOLD RESPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES, WHICH MUST OBTAIN IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES, THAT CONCERNS THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY AND SERVES AS A SAFEGUARD FOR ALL ITS MEMBERS.

4. FACED WITH A SITUATION THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AFFECTS THE ARAB STATES, MINISTERS EMPHASISE THE SOLIDARITY LINKING THEIR COUNTRIES TO THE ARAB WORLD AND THEIR RESOLVE TO SUPPORT ITS EFFORTS TO SEEK A SOLUTION FROM WITHIN WHICH RESPECTS THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR ONGOING COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH THE ARAB WORLD.

5. MINISTERS EXPRESS THEIR ACUTE CONCERN AND INDIGNATION AT THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES AND AT THE INHUMAN TREATMENT INFLICTED ON SOME OF THOSE NATIONALS. THEY WARN IRAQ OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD INEVITABLY ENSUE WERE THEIR SAFETY TO BE PLACED AT RISK. THEY REITERATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 AND DEMAND THAT IRAQ COMPLIES WITH IT WITHOUT DELAY.

6. THEY STRESS THAT WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES, BEARING IN MIND THE VITAL EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN THE STABILITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES OF THE AREA, INTEND TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS FURTHER ENHANCING THE UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY THAT HAS DEVELOPED SINCE THE AGGRESSION AND HAS LED TO EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE SUFFERING FROM THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION DESERVE THEIR SOLIDARITY.

7. MINISTERS WELCOME THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY MEMBER STATES IN SUPPORT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 AND IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM STATES IN THE GULF REGION, WITH THE AIM OF OBLIGING IRAQ UNCONDITIONALLY TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAITI TERRITORY AND RESTORE KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY.

8. THEY HAVE DECIDED CLOSELY TO COORDINATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AIMED AT IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE MEASURES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 7, AS WILL AS ANY FURTHER MEASURES THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY ADOPT, ALSO ASSURING, BY COMMON AGREEMENT, THE PROTECTION OF THEIR FORCES. BUILDING ON THE EXPERIENCE ACQUIRED, INCLUDING THE CONSULTATION MECHANISMS DURING THE GULF OPERATIONS IN 1987 AND 1988, THEY HAVE INSTRUCTED AN AD HOC GROUP OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES TO ENSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE COORDINATION IN CAPITALS AND IN THE REGION. THIS SHOULD COVER AMONG OTHER THINGS OVERALL OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND SPECIFIC GUIDELINES FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN FORCES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING AREAS OF OPERATION, SHARING OF TASKS, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE. CONTACT POINTS ARE BEING NOMINATED IN THE MINISTRIES

OF DEFENCE TO ASSIST WITH COOPERATION AT THE PRACTICAL/TECHNICAL LEVEL AND, AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP, TO PREPARE FOR A MEETING OF CHIEFS OF DEFENCE STAFF TO BE HELD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

9. MINISTERS EMPHASISE THAT COORDINATION WITHIN WEU SHOULD ALSO FACILITATE COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES DEPLOYING FORCES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

10. THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING.

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WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS, 21 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. GOOD MEETING HELD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. PRESS COMMUNIQUE (TEXT IN MIFT) INCLUDES DECISION BY WEU MEMBERS ON CLOSE COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS IN THE GULF REGION AND THE SETTING UP OF AN AD HOC FOREIGN AND DEFENCE EXPERTS GROUP. THE LATTER WILL COORDINATE OVERALL OPERATIONS CONCEPTS, AREAS OF OPERATION, TASK SHARING, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE. THEY SHOULD ALSO PREPARE FOR AN EARLY MEETING OF CHIEFS OF DEFENCE STAFF.

DETAIL

2. ALL WEU COUNTRIES WERE REPRESENTED BY FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS. DENMARK, GREECE AND TURKEY SENT OBSERVERS.

3. OPENING THE PROCEEDINGS AS PRESIDENCY, DUMAS (FRANCE) SAID THAT THE WEU WAS FACED WITH AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION. IRAQI AGGRESSION THREATENED TO WIPE A SMALL INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN COUNTRY OFF THE WORLD MAP. THIS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL RULES OF BEHAVIOUR WAS WITHOUT PRECEDENT SINCE WW 2. THE RISK OF ARMED CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF WAS OBVIOUS. IRAQI ACTION AGAINST WESTERNERS WAS DEEPLY WORRYING. FOLLOWING THE ACTION TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NATO AND BY THE TWELVE, THERE WAS A GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT THE WEU WOULD MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. THESE OPENING REMARKS WERE ECHOED BY ALL DELEGATIONS IN THEIR INTERVENTIONS.

4. CHEVENEMENT (FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER) SAID THAT THE WINDOW OF SAUDI VULNERABILITY TO IRAQI INVASION HAD PASSED ABOUT A WEEK AGO. WESTERN FORCES ENJOYED TOTAL NAVAL SUPERIORITY AND THE BALANCE OF AIR POWER WAS SHIFTING IN THEIR FAVOUR WITH THE CONTINUING

REINFORCEMENT OF US AND OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE REGION.

5. CHEVENEMENT GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF FRENCH MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS ON THE LINES ALREADY REPORTED. HE CLARIFIED THE LATEST INSTRUCTIONS TO FRENCH NAVY COMMANDERS: THEY WERE ENTITLED TO STOP AND SEARCH MERCHANT SHIPS AND IF NECESSARY FIRE WARNING SHOTS (BUT NO MORE). FRENCH BOARDING PARTIES WOULD BE ARMED.

6. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) ARGUED THAT ON THE BASIS OF ITS SUCCESSFUL 1987/8 OPERATION THE WEU SHOULD SET OUT CLEARLY THE NEED FOR COORDINATION IN SPECIFIC AREAS AND PROVIDE FOR JOINT COMMAND. THESE SUGGESTIONS DREW BROAD SUPPORT (BUT WITH FRENCH RESERVATIONS IN PARTICULAR ON JOINT COMMAND.)

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ECHOED VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTIVE WEU ROLE DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. WEU WAS HOWEVER NOW FACED WITH A MUCH GREATER CRISIS. IT DIRECTLY CONCERNED A MEMBER OF NATO WITH A COMMON BORDER WITH IRAQ - TURKEY. THE DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT HAD BEEN IMPRESSIVE. MILITARY MEASURES TO PROTECT SAUDI ARABIA HAD BEEN RAPID, EFFECTIVE AND JUSTIFIED. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL COUNTER OFFENSIVE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO WEAN ARAB SUPPORT AWAY FROM THE WEST (THIS IDEA DREW GENERAL SUPPORT AND APPEARS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE COMMUNIQUE). THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDED THAT THE WEU NEEDED TO GIVE A CLEAR POLITICAL SIGNAL TO SHOW THAT IT WAS RESPONDING IN A COORDINATED WAY TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. THE QUESTION OF COMMAND WAS NOT IN DOUBT - IT CLEARLY COULD ONLY BE ON A NATIONAL BASIS. CAREFUL THOUGHT HOWEVER NEEDED TO BE GIVEN TO EFFECTIVE COORDINATED MEASURES. EXPERIENCE DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR SHOWED THAT THIS WAS OFTEN BEST DONE LOCALLY BY NAVAL COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. BUT THEY NEEDED GUIDANCE FROM CAPITALS. THE WEU'S OBJECTIVE MUST BE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN EMBARGO.

8. MR KING GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH NAVAL AND AIR ASSETS IN THE REGION, MENTIONING THE PRESENCE OF ROYAL MARINE BOARDING PARTIES AND JAVELIN DETACHMENTS ON BRITISH VESSELS IN THE GULF. AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT BRITISH WARSHIPS HAD BEEN GIVEN NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN EMBARGO. HE ADDED THAT THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE WEU COORDINATION WAS TASK SHARING. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID ANY WEAK LINK WHICH SANCTION BUSTERS COULD EXPLOIT. EACH WEU COUNTRY INVOLVED WITH POLICING ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED TO OPERATE IN A CLIMATE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THAT ALL THE WEU FORCES INVOLVED WERE DOING THEIR JOB

PROPERLY. EFFECTIVE COORDINATION WITH NON-WEU FORCES EG US, AUSTRALIA AND CANADA WAS ALSO IMPORTANT.

9. GENSCHER (FRG) DREW ATTENTION TO THE NEW CLIMATE OF EAST/WEST CO-OPERATION IN WHICH THE US AND SOVIET UNION WERE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS. THE FRG WAS PREVENTED FROM DESPATCHING FORCES TO THE AREA UNDER ITS BASIC LAW. BUT AT A MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD FOUND A CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF THE NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. THIS PROCESS WOULD INEVITABLY BE LINKED WITH UNIFICATION AND WOULD THEREFORE TAKE MORE THAN A FEW DAYS OR WEEKS TO EFFECT. GENSCHER DREW ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE EMBARGO FOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS JORDAN AND TURKEY WITH CLOSE ECONOMIC LINKS TO IRAQ. THE QUESTION OF AID TO COUNTRIES MAKING FINANCIAL SACRIFICES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. STOLTENBERG (FRG DEFENCE MINISTER) ADDED THAT AS WELL AS ALLOWING US FORCES SPECIAL FACILITIES AT GERMAN BASES THE FRG WAS PROVIDING SPECIAL CW DETECTION EQUIPMENT (HE DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER.)

10. SPAIN, BELGIUM AND ITALY ADDED LITTLE TO POINTS MADE BY OTHERS BUT MADE A STRONG BID FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY COUNCIL COVER FOR ACTION BY THE WEU. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE ASKED TO ADOPT ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ EFFECTIVELY.

11. IN A HASTY SUMMING UP OF THE DISCUSSION ON WEU COORDINATION, CHEVENEMENT SAID THAT TWO MAIN QUESTIONS HAD BEEN RAISED :

- A) WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF WEU COORDINATION ?
- B) HOW AND WHERE SHOULD THAT COORDINATION BE CARRIED OUT ?

THE ANSWER TO A) WAS CLEARLY THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. APPROPRIATE ROE NEEDED TO BE WORKED OUT TO IMPLEMENT THIS. ON B), CHEVENEMENT SAID THAT WEU SHOULD ESTABLISH AN AD HOC GROUP OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES WHO SHOULD BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY (THEIR FIRST MEETING WAS SCHEDULED SHORTLY AFTER THE MINISTERIAL SESSION.) THEY SHOULD HARMONISE ROE AND PREPARE FOR AN EARLY MEETING OF WEU CHIEFS OF DEFENCE STAFF. NAVAL COMMANDERS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING ON THE SPOT, BUT IF NECESSARY THERE COULD BE MEETINGS IN CAPITALS. COORDINATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE TO ENSURE THE BEST USE OF WEU NAVAL ASSETS AND EFFECTIVE CONTROL AT CHOKE POINTS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE AREA.

COMMENT

12. ALL DELEGATIONS WERE KEEN TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE WEU COORDINATION WITHOUT QUIBBLING ABOUT LEGAL NUANCES. THE TEXT AGREED PROVIDES USEFUL GUIDELINES FOR FURTHER WORK AT THE EXPERT LEVEL, BEGINNING WITH A MEETING THIS AFTERNOON.

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER:
21 AUGUST: WEU MEETING

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1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BREAKFASTED WITH DUMAS BEFORE THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING. MIFT (NOT TO ALL) COVERS THEIR EXCHANGE ON 2+4.

2. DUMAS SAID THAT THE FRENCH MEDIA HAD CLAIMED THAT EUROPE WAS ABSENT IN THIS CRISIS. THIS WAS FALSE. HE WANTED FROM THE MEETING POSITIVE RESULTS ON CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN WEU COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT DUMAS USED THE MEETING ALSO TO BRING PARTNERS UP-TO-DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. ON CO-ORDINATION OF NAVAL FORCES, DUMAS SAID THAT WEU COUNTRIES SHOULD DO, AT THE LEAST, WHAT THE UK/NETHERLANDS/BELGIUM HAD DONE DURING THE GULF WAR. WE SHOULD START WITH AGREEMENT ON CO-ORDINATION WITHIN THE WEU AND THEN PROVIDE FOR CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHERS ENGAGED IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS. AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP DRAWING ON BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS WOULD MEET THIS AFTERNOON. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO AGREE ON POLITICAL GUIDELINES ON CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN NAVAL FORCES ON THE SPOT. THE FRENCH SAW PROBLEMS IN ASSIGNING ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY, EG FOR ONE COUNTRY ALONE TO POLICE THE AREA OFF AQABA.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALL THIS ENTAILED CO-ORDINATION WITH THE AMERICANS (THOUGH NOT SUBORDINATION TO THEM). IT WOULD BE EASIEST TO CARRY THIS OUT IN WASHINGTON. HE HOPED THAT FRANCE, AS WEU PRESIDENT, WOULD WORK OUT HOW TO ORGANISE THIS. HE ASKED FOR FRENCH VIEWS ON THE DUTCH IDEA OF A SPLIT UK/FRENCH COMMAND, THE FRENCH BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDITERRANEAN CONTRIBUTORS. DUFOURCQ EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED FOR THE LATEST FRENCH VIEWS ON THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ENFORCING THE EMBARGO. DUMAS SAID

THAT THE EMBARGO MUST BE MADE EFFECTIVE. FRANCE HAD NOW TWICE ANNOUNCED THAT QUOTE MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT UNQUOTE MIGHT BE NECESSARY BUT HAD DELIBERATELY BEEN UNSPECIFIC ABOUT DETAILS. THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN IGNORED BY THE MEDIA. HE WANTED TO HAVE A RANGE OF MEASURES AVAILABLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER HE WAS SATISFIED ABOUT THE EXISTING LEGAL BASIS FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW THAT A FURTHER UN RESOLUTION WAS THEREFORE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.

6. IN A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS, DUMAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT AMERICAN INSISTENCE ON THEMSELVES STEERING THE CO-ORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION.

EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW THE TWELVE SHOULD INSTRUCT THEIR EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT IN THE FACE OF THE 24 AUGUST DEADLINE. DUMAS SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQI THREATS BUT SHOW THE WORLD THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IF THEY REMOVED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE EMBASSIES OF THE TWELVE MIGHT PERHAPS MOVE TOGETHER INTO ONE EMBASSY : WHICH EMBASSY WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED THROUGH DISCUSSION ON THE SPOT ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS.

LLEWELLYN SMITH

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INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 301: DETAINED BRITISH CITIZENS

1. OUR PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOCATIONS OF BRITISH DETAINEES IS AS FOLLOWS:-

- A) GROUP FROM PYRAMID MOSQUE VILLA JOINED THOSE AT HAMAD AL SABAH PALACE ON 20 AUGUST, MAKING A TOTAL THERE OF 35.
- B) HOUSE OF PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, MEDICAL CAMPUS, SHUWEIKH HOUSES 13, INCLUDING ONE FRENCH.
- C) MEDICAL INSTITUTE, NEAR JAIWAN (G1) CAMP HOUSES 25.
- D) WE BELIEVE THAT THE JAIWAN (G1) CAMP GROUP MAY HAVE BEEN REDISTRIBUTED AROUND THE OTHER LOCATIONS (ROGER KNIGHT WAS ORIGINALLY THERE, FOR INSTANCE)
- E) MERIDIEN HOTEL HOUSES FOUR FAMILIES, INCLUDING THAT OF JOHN GOWLAND.

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED A STORY THAT 50 BRITISH, ONE OF THEM IDENTIFIED AS DAVID CROSS, AND MANY BELIEVED TO BE BA CREW AND PASSENGERS FROM THE REGENCY (TOGETHER WITH PERHAPS SOME FROM THE LATIFA TOWERS IN FAHAHEEL) HAVE BEEN HOUSED AT THE FORMER BLT IBI CAMP AT FAHAHEEL. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CHECK THIS SO FAR BUT IT MAKES SENSE AND ACCOUNTS FOR JUST ABOUT ALL THOSE WE KNOW TO HAVE BEEN CAUGHT UP IN THIS FUTILE EXERCISE.

3. MRS DOROTHY GOODWIN, TEMPORARY LE III SUMMER STAFF AT THE EMBASSY AND WARDEN FOR KAC, WHO DISAPPEARED SEVERAL DAYS AGO, AND WAS FEARED POSSIBLY TO BE ONE OF THE BODIES SEEN IN THE DESERT (YOUR TELNO 299) ALIVE AND WELL AND GONE TO GROUND ON 20 AUGUST.

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
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MY TELNO 455 (NOT TO ALL): FUTURE OF EMBASSIES

SUMMARY

1. PERMIT RECEIVED FOR EC STAFF CONVOY TO BAGHDAD ON 23 AUGUST. FIRST SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN IRAQI POSITION WITH REGARD TO CONTINUED REPRESENTATION HERE AFTER 24 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. WHEN THE FRG AMBASSADOR AND I CALLED ON AL-DOURI AT 211500Z TO COLLECT THE PERMITS FOR THE STAFF CONVOY ON 23 AUGUST, HE LECTURED US ON THE FUTILITY OF LEAVING AMBASSADORS HERE AFTER MIDNIGHT (MIDNIGHT) ON 24 AUGUST. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID BEFORE: WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONES LINES WOULD ALL BE CUT. HE ADDED THAT NEITHER THE AMBASSADOR NOR HIS STAFF WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY: NOR WOULD ANYONE BE ALLOWED IN TO VISIT THEM. IN SHORT, THERE WAS NO POINT IN THEIR BEING HERE.

3. AFTER MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE AND I HAD BOTH REPLIED ON STANDARD LINES, AL-DOURI SAID THAT, IF AMBASSADORS LEFT, IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO LEAVE A MEMBER OF THE HOME - BASED STAFF BEHIND, FOR EXAMPLE THE CONSUL, TO LOOK AFTER THE EMBASSY AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNITY. THE OFFICER WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO FLY THE FLAG OR DISPLAY A BRASS PLATE, BUT HE COULD LIVE IN THE EMBASSY AND MOVE IN AND OUT FREELY. SERVICES TO THE EMBASSY WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE CUT. THE OFFICER WOULD HAVE NO OFFICIAL POSITION, AND INTERVENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN BAGHDAD.

4. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND I BOTH UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS NEW SUGGESTION. ENCOURAGED BY THIS, AL-DOURI SAID THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST STAGE: THE SECOND STAGE MIGHT BE FOR THE OFFICER CONCERNED TO BE ADDED TO THE DIPLOMATIC LIST IN BAGHDAD. ALTERNATIVELY, A MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY STAFF IN BAGHDAD COULD COME DOWN AND TAKE OVER THE EMBASSY, ON THE TERMS DESCRIBED ABOVE, EVEN BEFORE AMBASSADORS LEFT ON 24 AUGUST.

COMMENT

5. THE IRAQI OFFER IS CLEARLY A STEP FORWARD. IT WOULD ENABLE US TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE HERE AND PROVIDE SOME SORT OF SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNITY (AL-DOURI CONFIRMED THAT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THOUGH THE GERMAN MIGHT IN VIEW OF QUOTE THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN BONN UNQUOTE THAT GERMAN FORCES COULD ONLY BE USED IN THE NATO AREA). NOW THAT MOST OF THE OTHER EC COMMUNITIES ARE BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE, I DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE EC SOLIDARITY MUCH LONGER (BOTH THE DANE AND THE SPANIARD ARE HOPING TO LEAVE WITH THEIR COMMUNITIES ON 22 AUGUST). I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS AL-DOURI'S OFFER OUT OF HAND, DESPITE THE OBVIOUS LEGAL DIFFICULTIES. THE OFFER NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER URGENTLY, PRESUMABLY IN BAGHDAD EITHER ON A BILATERAL OR AN EC BASIS

6. THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY HAVE CALLED A MEETING TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL AT 220530ZM. I WILL REPORT FURTHER THEREAFTER.

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PARIS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD THIS AFTERNON BY AL DOURI OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY THAT EC NATIONALS EXCEPT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH (AND POSSIBLY THE GERMANS-COLOMBO WAS UNSURE) ARE NOW FREE TO LEAVE IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

2. HMA IS TRYING TO SEE AL DOURI NOW TO CLARIFY THE POSITION.

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KUWAIT RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

SUMMARY

1. RESISTANCE MOVEMENT EVOLVING AN INFRASTRUCTURE - PLAYING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ROLE. SUCCESSFUL SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ON IRAQI SOLDIERS ELICIT SIGNS OF IRAQI CONCERN. STRATEGY OF BEHIND-THE-LINES SUBVERSION IN ANTICIPATION OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. SABAH IMPORTANT SYMBOL BUT CANNOT WALK BACK IN AND TAKE OVER WHERE THEY LEFT OFF.

DETAIL

2. THREE WEEKS AFTER THE INVASION, THE KUWAIT RESISTENCE (KR) HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS AN UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT CAPABLE OF MOUNTING ATTACKS ON IRAQI MILITARY TARGETS AND DEFENDING (AND EFFECTIVELY RUNNING) CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL AREAS.

3. THE DEGREE OF ORGANISATION AND COORDINATION IS UNCLEAR BUT REPORTS SUGGEST THAT AT LEAST A LOOSE INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS BASED ON THE STILL FUNCTIONING DIWANIYA SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH MANY MEMBERS OF THE BIG KUWAITI MERCHANT FAMILIES HAVE FLED TO SAUDI ARABIA THEY HAVE ALL KEPT AT LEAST ONE RELATIVELY SENIOR MEMBER IN KUWAIT WHO IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE KR.

4. THE KR'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED MAINLY AFTER DARK AND RANGE FROM TORCHINGS OF ABANDONED VEHICLES (CIVILIAN AND MILITARY) TO SHOOTING IRAQI SOLDIERS. THERE ARE DAILY REPORTS OF NIGHT-TIME FIRE-FIGHTS AND TORCHINGS. AN UNSUCCESSFUL MORTAR ATTACK ON THE IRAQI EMBASSY EARLIER THIS WEEK RESULTED IN INCREASED FORTIFICATIONS AROUND THE EMBASSY BUILDING AND THE KR'S POLICY OF PICKING OFF SOLDIERS INDIVIDUALLY OR IN PAIRS HAS RESULTED IN SOLDIERS NOW PATROLLING IN GROUPS OF FOUR. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE THE KR HAVE ORGANISED THEMSELVES EFFICIENTLY INTO NEIGHBOURHOOD SELF-HELP GROUPS MAINTAINING COMMUNICATION THROUGH CELLNET PHONES AND POOLING RESOURCES TO OVERCOME E.G. FOOD SHORTAGES. IN

ADDITION SOME AREAS ARE PROTECTED BY ARMED VIGILANTE GROUPS WHO HAVE MADE THE AREAS NO-GO AREAS FOR IRAQI SOLDIERS . IN MANY OF THESE (MAINLY RESIDENTIAL) AREAS KUWAITIS HAVE OFFERED REFUGE TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IRAQI SOLDIERS ARE UNWILLING TO CONDUCT HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCHES.

5. THE KR HAS ALSO MOUNTED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN E.G. ISSUING BROADSHEETS, PAINTING SLOGANS AND PUTTING UP POSTERS OF THE EMIR AND CROWN PRINCE. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ATTEMPTS BY THE IRAQIS TO PAINT OVER THE POSTERS AND GRAFFITI BUT THERE IS NO SIGN YET OF A REAL CLAMPDOWN.

6. THE IRAQI REACTION HAS BEEN UNCERTAIN. THE CITY IS NOW SULLENLY QUIET WITH LITTLE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY OR TRAFFIC AND AN EDGY HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. TROOPS PATROLLING THE CITY ARE WATCHFUL AND CLEARLY STILL ADJUSTING TO BEING AN UNWANTED ARMY OF OCCUPATION. THE LARGE ASIAN AND ARAB COMMUNITIES ARE FEARFUL OF THE SOLDIERS AND OFFER THEM NO PROSPECT OF FRATERNISATION . AS THE CITY DECAYS RESENTMENT

AGAINST THE IRAQIS INCREASINGLY FINDS EXPRESSION IN ACTIVE OR (IN MANY OF THE BANKS FOR EXAMPLE), PASSIVE RESISTANCE.

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO DISCERN ANY STRATEGY TO KR ACTIVITIES BUT IN GENERAL THEY APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE BEHIND THE LINES FORCE TO COMPLIMENT THE MAJOR (EXTERNAL) FORCE BE IT ECONOMIC OR MILITARY. THE SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ON SOLDIERS AND VEHICLES ARE INTENDED AT THIS STAGE TO UNSETTLE THE OCCUPYING ARMY AND DISRUPT WHERE POSSIBLE THEIR LOGISTIC SUPPORT (MILITARY WATER TANKERS ARE FOR EXAMPLE A FAVOURITE TARGET) THERE ARE SOME REPORTS THAT THE KR HAS OCCUPIED STRATEGIC BUILDINGS (E.G. SALWA) A LITTLE WAY BACK FROM THE SEA FRONT IN ANTICIPATION OF A SEA BORNE LANDING. BEYOND THAT THERE IS NO SIGN OF STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT.

COMMENT

8. THE LIGHT IRAQI GARRISON IN KUWAIT CITY IS NO DOUBT INTENDED TO DENY THE KR A TARGET AND PREVENT FOR THE MEANTIME A FLARE UP IN THE CITY WHICH WOULD BE AN UNWELCOME DISTRACTION FROM MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH.

9. ALTHOUGH THE SABAH ARE AN IMPORTANT SYMBOL FOR THE KR THERE

IS LESS THAN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THE REPORTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KR OF BASIL AL SABAH AND THE DEATH OF FAHD AL SABAH DURING THE INVASION GO SOME WAY TO REDEEMING THE SABAH'S REPUTATION BUT THE FACT THAT THEY FLED THEIR COUNTRY WHEN OTHERS WERE PREPARED TO STAY AND FIGHT AND THE MEMORY OF THE INEQUALITIES AND SOME WOULD ARGUE, INCOMPETENCE OF THEIR RULE ARE NOT FORGOTTEN. THE MERCHANT FAMILIES (AND ESPECIALLY THE NON KUWAITIS INVOLVED IN THE KR ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT THE SABAH TO RESUME THEIR POSITION AND THEIR UNRIVALLED WEALTH IN TOTO WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY AMELIORATING THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO STAYED AND FOUGHT.

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YOUR TELNO 1458: GULF CRISIS: JORDAN

SUMMARY

1. US ACTIVELY CONSIDERING IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, WITH FOLLOW-UP OVER THE NEAR AND LONGER TERMS. BOTH BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE ENVISAGED. WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD JORDAN TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. I TOOK ACTION ON TUR ON 21 AUGUST WITH MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST). I LEFT A COPY OF THE POINTS IN YOUR PARA 3 AS A SPEAKING NOTE, HAVING DRAWN ON THEM DURING OUR TALK AND ALSO GAVE MACK A COPY OF THE PAPER FAXED TO US 17 AUGUST (WHILE EMPHASISING THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF ITS VIEWS).

3. MACK SAID THAT US ECONOMISTS AGREED THAT THE COST TO JORDAN'S ECONOMY OF IMPLEMENTING UN SANCTIONS WOULD BE ROUGHLY DOLLARS ONE BILLION PER ANNUM. THE US WAS TAKING A 3-STAGE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM: HOW TO HELP JORDAN IMMEDIATELY, IN THE SHORT-TERM (SAY TO THE END OF 1990) AND THEN OVER THE LONGER TERM. MACK SAID THAT FINAL DECISIONS HAD STILL TO BE MADE, BUT THEY WOULD BE MADE QUICKLY, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. JORDAN NEEDED TWO THINGS IMMEDIATELY: OIL AND CASH.

(A) OIL: STATE ESTIMATED THAT JORDAN NEEDED 60,000 BPD TO REPLACE FORMER IRAQI SUPPLIES. THE US MIGHT TRY TO APPROACH THE SAUDIS AS EARLY AS 22 AUGUST TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD PROVIDE. THE APPROACH WOULD REMAIN CONDITIONAL ON JORDAN FULLY IMPLEMENTING UN SANCTIONS (MACK WAS INTERESTED BY THE KING'S SEEMING INDIFFERENCE TO THIS IN PARA 5 OF AMMAN TELNO 442, A COPY OF WHICH I ALSO GAVE HIM). EVEN WITH FULL IMPLEMENTATION, HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO PERSUADE. THE KING WAS NOT POPULAR IN RIYADH. BUT ARGUMENTS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF A NEIGHBOURING MONARCHY - BOTH MAJOR SAUDI INTERESTS - SHOULD ULTIMATELY PREVAIL.

(B) CASH: THE US WOULD APPROACH THE KUWAITIS ABOUT MONEY FOR JORDAN. THEY WERE THE MOST OBVIOUS SOURCE, BUT THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES TOO. THESE INCLUDED UAE, BRUNEI AND JAPAN (SEE BELOW).

4. AFTER TACKLING JORDAN'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS, OTHER OPTIONS WERE AVAILABLE IN THE NEAR TERM. THE US WOULD WISH TO COORDINATE WITH THE UK BEFORE TALKING TO THE JORDANIANS. WE WERE THE KEY TO QUOTE LIAISON WITH THE EC UNQUOTE. I POINTED OUT THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 50 MECU, EC AID FUNDS WERE LARGELY SPOKEN FOR. WE THOUGHT IT BETTER FOR COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TO ACT BILATERALLY. MACK ACCEPTED THIS, BUT SAID WE COULD BE HELPFUL IN APPROACHING THE GERMANS. THE US WERE ALSO INCLINED TO LEAN HARD ON THE JAPANESE, IN BOTH THE NEAR AND LONGER TERMS. THEY HAD ALREADY MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS IN TOKYO, ARGUING THAT JAPAN SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MORE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. TOKYO HAD ALREADY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO ASSIST JORDAN. ALSO IN THE NEAR TERM, US AID MONEY CURRENTLY ALLOTTED TO PROJECTS IN JORDAN MIGHT BE CONVERTED TO CASH. THIS WOULD REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER PERMISSION AND MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO GO TO CONGRESS. IN SOME SENSES THIS WAS ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL, AS IT WAS DIVERTING LONG TERM ASSISTANCE FOR SHORT TERM NEEDS. BUT THE REQUIREMENTS WERE URGENT. STATE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER QUOTE SCROUNGING FOR FALLOUT FROM OTHER PROGRAMMES UNQUOTE, AND WOULD SEEK TO EXTEND THEIR PL 480 ASSISTANCE (FOOD AID).

5. OVER THE LONGER TERM, THE US WOULD LOOK AT SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATIONS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL (AND MACK NOTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN POPULAR IN CONGRESS EVEN BEFORE THE CRISIS FOR WHAT WAS FELT IN SOME QUARTERS, PERHAPS UNFAIRLY, TO BE HIS EQUIVOCAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PEACE PROCESS). SUCH APPROVAL WOULD REQUIRE NOT JUST A COMMITMENT TO SANCTIONS, BUT A PERIOD OF DEMONSTRATED ADHERENCE AND PERHAPS EVEN DAMAGE TO THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY. SOME BILATERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS ALSO POSSIBLE. THE QUOTE SOUTHERN REGIONAL AMENDMENT UNQUOTE PERMITTED SALE OF MILITARY SURPLUS FROM THE EUROPEAN THEATRE. SOME LOW TECH BUT MUCH NEEDED EQUIPMENT - EG TRUCKS - COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO JORDAN FOR ITS WELL-TRAINED BUT POORLY-EQUIPPED FORCES. THIS WOULD ALSO HAVE AN INDIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFIT AS IT WOULD HELP REDUCE JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE. OTHER, NON-BLLATERAL AVENUES INCLUDED:
(A) THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: THESE WERE WORTH CONTACTING, ALTHOUGH THE US SHARED OUR PREFERENCE FOR BILATERAL AVENUES OF ASSISTANCE (AND WANTED IN PARTLCULAR TO STEER JORDAN

AWAY FROM AN APPEAL TO THE UN UNDER ARTICLE 50).

(B) PARIS CLUB: A RESCHEDULING OF JORDAN'S DEBTS MIGHT BE EXAMINED.

(C) THE US MIGHT PUSH FOR AN ACCELERATION OF THE UNITY DAM AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN (ONE OF THE JORDAN VALLEY PROJECTS).

(D) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A QUOTE FRIENDS OF JORDAN CLUB UNQUOTE OF DONOR NATIONS, WHO MIGHT MEET AND CONCERT ACTIVITY.

6. I ASKED MACK TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. MACK UNDERTOOK TO DO SO, WHILE NOTING THAT SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WELL ALSO BE PASSED BY TELEPHONE AT POLITICAL LEVEL. IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY SECURITY COMPONENT TO THE PACKAGE, MACK THOUGHT THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE TRIANGLE OF US/UK/JORDAN.

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OUR TELNO 1994: YEMEN AND IRAQI TANKER

1. WHEN I CALLED ON MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST) ON 21 AUGUST, HE TOLD ME THAT THE US HAD A QUOTE YEMEN PROBLEM UNQUOTE THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS. HE THEN TELEPHONED THE YEMENI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON IN MY PRESENCE, AND TOLD HIM THAT WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO SAY WAS QUOTE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND YEMEN UNQUOTE. THE US HAD RECEIVED AN ASSURANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM THE YEMENI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE IRAQI TANKER - THE AIN ZALAH - WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO DOCK AT ADEN. WHEN THE US AMBASSADOR (DUNBAR) HAD FOLLOWED THIS UP IN SANA'A, HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE TANKER WOULD NOW BE PERMITTED TO DOCK, BUT WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE ITS CARGO OF IRAQI CRUDE OIL. MACK TOLD THE YEMENI AMBASSADOR THAT WHILE THE ASSURANCE THAT THE AIN ZALAH WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OFF-LOAD WAS WELCOME, THE DECISION TO ALLOW IT TO DOCK WAS A STEP BACK FROM THE ASSURANCE RECEIVED IN NEW YORK. THIS HAD CAUSED QUOTE DISAPPOINTMENT UNQUOTE IN WASHINGTON. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS AT QUOTE THE TOP OF THE US AGENDA UNQUOTE. MACK ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY TO HIS GOVERNMENT THE STRENGTH OF US CONCERN. THE YEMENI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR DUNBAR THAT YEMEN WOULD NOT BREAK SANCTIONS. THE FUTURE OF US/YEMENI BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD DEPEND ON YEMEN ADHERING TO THAT UNDERTAKING.
2. MACK TOLD ME THAT WHILE THE US WOULD BE MONITORING PROCEEDINGS IN ADEN BY SATELLITE, HE THOUGHT THAT THE UK MIGHT HAVE A BETTER CAPABILITY ON THE GROUND. ANY ASSISTANCE WE COULD RENDER IN ESTABLISHING WHETHER THE TANKER DISCHARGED ITS CARGO OR NOT WOULD BE GREATLY WELCOMED. AMBASSADOR DUNBAR WOULD BE SPEAKING TO HMA SANA'A, BUT MACK WANTED TO REITERATE WASHINGTON'S

INTEREST.

3. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS BACK TO STATE ON OUR CAPACITY TO MONITOR THE SITUATION.

WOOD

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INFO IMMEDIATE SANA'A, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, PEKING, PARIS, BOGOTA
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*Le Foreign Secretary
is going to see
the Soviet*

Richardson now.

But reports from

New York suggest

PARIS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNO. 1463 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQI TANKER
SUMMARY

1. US QUOTE BOUND AND DETERMINED UNQUOTE TO OBTAIN A RESOLUTION TODAY. THEY ASK FOR HELP WITH RUSSIANS, COLOMBIANS AND WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. BUT IF NO RESOLUTION IS OBTAINED TODAY, THEY WILL NOT/NOT STOP TANKER.

was urgent.

DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON TUR WITH WOLF (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BUREAU). HE SAID THAT THE US HAD QUOTE DODGED A BULLET LAST NIGHT UNQUOTE. THE YEMENIS HAD PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD ABIDE BY SCR 661, BUT ONLY THE PROSPECT OF IMMINENT COUNCIL ACTION HAD CHANGED THEIR MINDS. THE COUNCIL COULD NOT KEEP PLAYING QUOTE LAST-MINUTE, EDGE-OF-THE-PRECIPICE TYPE GAMES UNQUOTE. ITS CREDIBILITY WAS AT RISK AND WOULD BE UNDERMINED IF IT DID NOT MOVE SWIFTLY TODAY. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD EXPLOIT ANY PERCEIVED HESITATION. FAILURE NOW WOULD SHATTER THE UNANIMITY AND PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL AND THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO IMPLEMENT SCR 661 WOULD BE ERODED.

*CO2
mb*

3. AS A RESULT, WOLF SAID THAT THE US WOULD GO ALL OUT TODAY TO OBTAIN A RESOLUTION. THEY WOULD QUOTE PUT THE SPURS IN UNQUOTE. BUT THEY NEEDED HELP. WOLF SAID THAT WE HAD PROPOSED A NUMBER OF HELPFUL DRAFTING AMENDMENTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE REMOVED THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS RESOLUTION WOULD INITIATE QUOTE OPEN HUNTING SEASON UNQUOTE ON IRAQ. BUT THE RUSSIANS WERE TAKING QUOTE AN INCREDIBLE STANCE UNQUOTE REGARDING THE GRADUATED USE OF FORCE. THEY SEEMED WEDDED TO THE LINE THAT IT SHOULD BE PERMISSIBLE TO STOP AND SEARCH VESSELS, BUT NOT SEIZE THEM. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. BAKER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO SHEVARDNADZE LAST NIGHT AND WOULD TRY TO SPEAK TO HIM TODAY.

ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO ASSIST WOULD BE WELCOME. STATE WOULD ALSO BE CALLING IN THE NON-ALIGNED THIS MORNING AND WOULD MAKE A PARTICULARLY STRONG EFFORT WITH THE COLOMBIANS. IT WAS ALSO VITAL TO ENSURE SOLIDARITY AMONG OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (FRANCE, CANADA, FINLAND). WOLF SAID AGAIN THAT THE US WOULD WELCOME OUR ASSISTANCE IN NEW YORK AND IN CAPITALS.

4. THE US QUOTE BOTTOM LINE UNQUOTE WAS TO OBTAIN A RESOLUTION TODAY. WHAT HAPPENED LAST NIGHT COULD NOT GO ON. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN QUOTE MICRO DETAIL UNQUOTE: IT SHOULD INSTEAD SET POLICY - WHICH WAS TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS - AND THEN AGREE TO ENFORCE IT. ONLY A RESOLUTION COULD NOW DEMONSTRATE SUFFICIENT DETERMINATION.

5. IF A RESOLUTION WAS NOT OBTAINABLE TODAY, HOWEVER, WOLF SAID THAT THE US DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO STOP THE IRAQI TANKER. THEY WOULD PERMIT IT TO GO THROUGH TO ADEN. THIS WOULD TEST YEMENI ASSURANCES. IF IT WAS UNLOADED, THIS WOULD PROVIDE SOLID EVIDENCE OF SANCTIONS EVASION WITH WHICH TO GO BACK TO THE COUNCIL.

WOOD

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OF 210055Z AUGUST 90

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INFO SAVING HOUSTON, MIAMI, LOS ANGELES, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE

OUR TELNO 1883: IRAQ/KUWAIT: THE US DOMESTIC DIMENSION
SUMMARY

1. MOST AMERICANS STRONGLY APPROVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE CRISIS SO FAR, ARE PROUD OF AMERICA'S RESPONSE, AND ARE RELIEVED AT THE SCALE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. BUT THEY ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT HOW THE HOSTAGES CAN BE SAVED AND SADDAM EXPELLED FROM KUWAIT IF SANCTIONS DO NOT SOON WORK, AND SEE NO EASY OR EARLY WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

2. MOST AMERICANS REMAIN CONFUSED AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY'S NEW INVOLVEMENT IN EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEIR APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS SO FAR IS TEMPERED BY ANXIETY ABOUT WHERE IT WILL ALL END. AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE, CONGRESSMAN LEE HAMILTON, SAID ON TELEVISION ON 19 AUGUST ABOUT HIS CONSTITUENTS:

QUOTE THE FASCINATING THING TO ME IS THEY REALLY CANNOT MAKE UP THEIR MIND. THEY WANT TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. THEY DO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. THEY'RE UNEASY ABOUT IT. I THINK THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS THEY HAVE REAL DOUBTS IN THEIR MIND WHETHER OR NOT THEY WANT THE UNITED STATES TO BE THE SUPERPOWER, TO BE THE LEADER. THEY WANT, IN A WAY, TO BE THE LEADER. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT THE BURDENS OF LEADERSHIP: SENDING YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN, TAXES, AND ALL THE REST UNQUOTE.

3. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, AMERICANS SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE CRISIS BY MARGINS APPROACHING 80 PER CENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CRITICISM OF HIS PERFORMANCE FROM ANY PUBLIC FIGURE. HIS DECISION TO DEPLOY US FORCES SWIFTLY AND IN SUCH NUMBERS HAS BEEN WIDELY PRAISED, AS A COURAGEOUS STEP WHICH MAY HAVE DETERRED FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION. SO TOO HAS THE SKILL

WITH WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS MARSHALLED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE US ACTION, IN TERMS BOTH OF FORCES IN THE REGION AND OF VOTES AT THE UN. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD RELIEF AT THE SPREAD - IF NOT THE SCALE - OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES, QUALIFIED ONLY BY DOUBTS ABOUT ITS STAYING POWER AND POPULAR OPINION IN PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD.

4. AMERICANS ARE ALSO PLEASED THAT EVENTS HAVE REMINDED THE WORLD THAT THERE REMAINS ONE SUPERPOWER, WHICH CAN BE CALLED UPON IN TIMES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. AND THE PRESS AT LEAST HAVE DRAWN UNFAVOURABLE COMPARISONS WITH THE RELATIVE QUIESCENCE OF JAPAN AND GERMANY, WHILE SINGLING OUT BRITAIN AND THE PRIME MINISTER FOR SPECIAL PRAISE.

5. ONE MINOR BUT AWKWARD PROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE HIS DECISION NOT TO BE HELD HOSTAGE IN THE WHITE HOUSE WITH THE PRACTICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL DIFFICULTIES OF MANAGING THE CRISIS FROM MAINE WITH OCCASIONAL FORAYS TO WASHINGTON. WHETHER, IN THE FACE OF RISING CRITICISM, HE STICKS TO HIS PLAN TO STAY ON QUOTE WORKING VACATION UNQUOTE UNTIL EARLY SEPTEMBER REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

6. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, MOST COMMENTATORS SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE NEWS IS BAD, BUT COULD BE MUCH WORSE. AFTER EARLY SCARE STORIES OF POTENTIALLY HUGE RISES IN OIL PRICES, THE MARKETS SEEM TO HAVE STABILISED AT UNCOMFORTABLE THOUGH MANAGEABLE LEVELS. AND, ALTHOUGH MANY ANALYSTS NOW EXPECT THAT AMERICA WILL BE TIPPED INTO A SHALLOW RECESSION BY THE GULF CRISIS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ECONOMY HAD ALL BUT STALLED EVEN BEFORE THE EVENTS OF THE PAST THREE WEEKS. THE PRESIDENT AND PRESS ARE UNITED IN EMPHASISING THAT THE CRISIS MUST NOT BE USED AS AN ALIBI FOR FAILURE TO CUT THE DEFICIT, EVEN IF THE CUT MAY BE SMALLER THAN HOPED FOR.

7. THE OVERALL SENSE IS THUS THAT A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST LEFT THE PRESIDENT LITTLE OPTION BUT TO REACT AS HE DID: AND THAT, AS INTERVIEWS WITH GENERALS AND GIS HAVE SHOWN, AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES ARE GOING ABOUT THEIR DUTY IN A WAY IN WHICH THE NATION CAN TAKE QUIET PRIDE.

8. BUT THAT IS JUST PART OF THE STORY. ONLY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS - WITH BASES EMPTYING, LINES OF LORRIES HEADING FOR THE PORTS, AND THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS AND THE RESERVE AIR AND SEA TRANSPORT FLEETS - HAS THE SCALE OF THE MILITARY COMMITMENT BEGUN TO SINK IN. THE PUBLIC HERE NOW SEEMS TO BE COMING TO BELIEVE THAT, IF WAR BREAKS OUT, IT MAY BE ON A SCALE COMPARABLE TO KOREA OR VIETNAM: AND THAT, IF IT DOES NOT, THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM OFFERS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS.

9. BY BREAKING THE ADMINISTRATION'S TABOO ON CALLING FOREIGNERS

HELD IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ HOSTAGES (MY TELNO 1981, NOT TO ALL), THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION UNDERLYING MUCH OF THE ANXIETY HERE: WHAT IF SADDAM SIMPLY SITS TIGHT, AND THE US AND OTHER FORCES ARE STUCK IN THE SAND, FOR MONTHS OR EVEN YEARS? FOR HOW LONG WILL THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRICE OF WHAT ONE CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER CALLED SITZKRIEG BE SUSTAINABLE? 10. ALREADY THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED CALLS FOR EARLY MILITARY ACTION TO RESOLVE SUCH A STALEMATE. BUT MOST AMERICANS DO NOT YET SEEM TO SHARE KISSINGER'S VIEW - SET OUT IN A WIDELY SYNDICATED ARTICLE ON 19 AUGUST - THAT QUOTE SURGICAL AND PROGRESSIVE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S MILITARY ASSETS ... (IS) ... THE ONLY POLICY THAT CAN NOW SUCCEED UNQUOTE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SIGNS THAT MOST AMERICANS WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT VIGOROUS MILITARY ACTION IF THE HOSTAGES WERE HARMED, OR THERE SEEMED NO OTHER WAY OF SAVING AT LEAST SOME OF THEM: AND THAT, AT LEAST AT PRESENT AND WITHOUT BEING FACED WITH A REAL CHOICE, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS MORE PREPARED TO SUBORDINATE THE WELFARE OF THE HOSTAGES TO WIDER NATIONAL INTERESTS THAN IT WAS WITH IRAN IN 1979-80. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF THE CHOICE SEEMED TO BE BETWEEN A HUMILIATING WITHDRAWAL OF MOST US FORCES FROM ARABIA WITH SADDAM STILL IN CONTROL OF IRAQ AND KUWAIT OR DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ AND/OR KUWAIT, PUBLIC OPINION HERE WOULD PROBABLY FAVOUR THE LATTER, WHILE PERHAPS BLAMING THE PRESIDENT FOR LANDING THE UNITED STATES IN SUCH A DILEMMA. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE COSTS OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS WERE PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC AT THE TIME.

11. THAT IS, HOWEVER, STILL SOME WAY DOWN THE ROAD. FOR NOW, MOST AMERICANS ARE STILL TRYING TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE SCALE OF THE CRISIS, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN US POLICY IMPLIED BY THE DEPLOYMENT IN ARABIA. WITH THE FIRST OBJECTIVE - OF DETERRING AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA - APPARENTLY FULFILLED, THE PUBLIC HERE IS LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE ON HOW THE NEXT TWO ARE TO BE FULFILLED, AND AT WHAT COST: SAVING THE HOSTAGES, AND EXPELLING SADDAM FROM KUWAIT. WITH A FORTNIGHT TO GO BEFORE CONGRESS REASSEMBLES, THE PRESIDENT WILL NEED TO WORK HARD TO EXPLAIN HOW HE EXPECTS TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS, AND HEAD OFF WHAT MANY COMMENTATORS HERE REGARD AS AN ALMOST INEVITABLE EROSION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR A COSTLY OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENT WHICH, BARRING AN UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ, THE UNITED STATES SEEMS TO HAVE NO OBVIOUS OR EARLY MEANS OF ENDING.

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 817 : ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. IRAQIS BEGIN TO INSTITUTE RATIONING. PROBLEMS OVER SUPPLY OF FOOD POSSIBLY GREATER THAN WE HAD EARLIER THOUGHT.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE LEARNT FROM IRAQI CONTACTS THAT A FORM OF RATIONING HAS BEEN INSTITUTED IN BAGHDAD (AND WE ASSUME THE REST OF IRAQ) OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. THE ROOD STUFFS TRADING COMPANY, AN OFF-SHOOT OF THE MINISTRY OF TRADE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD TO RETAIL OUTLETS HAS ORDERED THAT THE CITY BE DIVIDED INTO A NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS. EACH DAY, THE COMPANY DELIVERS A SET AMOUNT OF TEA, FLOUR, SUGAR AND RICE TO EACH AREA. THE POLICE HAVE ALSO DISTRIBUTED TO SHOPKEEPERS LISTS OF ALL THOSE REGISTERED AS LIVING IN THE AREA, AND GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY SHOULD SELL ONLY A SET AMOUNT PER DAY OF THE FOUR COMMODITIES LISTED ABOVE TO THOSE ON THE LIST.

3. THE SYSTEM IS SOMEWHAT HAPHAZARD AND IS CLEARLY OPEN TO ABUSE, PARTICULARLY BY SHOPKEEPERS. IT ALSO MAKES NO PROVISION FOR FOREIGNERS, WHO ARE NOT REQUIRED TO REGISTER IN THE SAME WAY AS IRAQIS AND WHO, SO FAR AS WE CAN ESTABLISH, ARE NOT INCLUDED ON THE LISTS. AT PRESENT, FROM OUR EXPERIENCE, THE SYSTEM IS NOT BEING RIGIDLY IMPOSED, BUT PRESUMABLY, IF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION GETS WORSE, WE CAN EXPECT A MORE ORGANISED FORM OF RATIONING, PROBABLY LEAVING IT OPEN TO FOREIGNERS TO PURCHASE WHATEVER THEY CAN FIND AT THE BEST PRICE THEY CAN GET.

4. ALTHOUGH IN THE TUR WE REPORTED THAT FROM OFFICIAL STATISTICS

IRAQ HAD ENOUGH WHEAT TO CONTINUE FEEDING ITS POPULATION FOR 240 DAYS, THIS INCREASINGLY APPEARS TO BE AN OVER-ESTIMATE. AN OFFICIAL WITH THE AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD CURRENTLY TRAPPED IN BAGHDAD TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO RELIABLE FIGURES ON THE STATE OF IRAQI AGRICULTURE HE BELIEVED THAT IRAQ'S TOTAL WHEAT CONSUMPTION WAS IN THE REGION OF FOUR MILLION TONNES PER YEAR. ITS HOME PRODUCTION COULD PROVIDE NO MORE THAN A QUARTER OF THIS.

5. IN ADDITION, SO FAR AS THE OFFICIAL WAS AWARE, IRAQ'S GRAIN STORAGE CAPACITY WAS BETWEEN 500,000 AND 800,000 TONNES. (HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WERE STRATEGIC RESERVES ABOUT WHICH HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED. THIS MEANT THAT IRAQ MIGHT BEGIN TO RUN OUT OF WHEAT WITHIN THREE MONTHS.

6. THE OFFICIAL ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT TWO SHIPS CARRYING APPROXIMATELY 50,000 TONNES OF WHEAT EACH HAD DOCKED AT AQABA AND KUWAIT JUST BEFORE 2 AUGUST. HE ASSUMED THAT THEIR CARGOES HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED TO IRAQ. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD MAKE ONLY A SLIGHT DIFFERENCE TO IRAQ'S POSITION.

7. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE PHILLIPINES EMBASSY WERE ASKED BY THE IRAQIS WHETHER THEIR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DELIVER 50,000 TONNES OF RICE AND 10,000 TONNES OF COOKING OIL TO BANDAR ABBAS IN RETURN FOR AN (UNSPECIFIED) QUANTITY OF OIL, TO BE SHIPPED OUT OF AQABA. NO INDICATION OF HOW THE RICE AND COOKING OIL WERE TO BE TRANSPORTED TO IRAQ WAS GIVEN BUT THE IMPLICATION IS OBVIOUS. THE EMBASSY CLAIM THAT THE OFFER WAS REJECTED OUT OF HAND: FOR ONE THING, THEY APPARENTLY DOUBTED THAT SUCH A SHIPMENT COULD BE ARRANGED.

WALKER

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TELNO 336

OF 210950Z AUGUST 90.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, RIYADH, ACTOR

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ANKARA, TOKYO, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY DELHI, KHARTOUM

SIC :A2G/A2T/A2X/ZAC

VISIT OF VICE-CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

SUMMARY

1. MOST OPPORTUNE VISIT TO SALALAH AND THUMRAIT AND LONG MEETINGS WITH THE SULTAN GIVING FULL SCOPE FOR DISCUSSING BILATERAL DEFENCE RELATIONS AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF.

DETAIL

2. ON 20 AUGUST THE SULTAN RECEIVED VCDS, MYSELF, AM BENNETT AND MAJOR-GENERAL BASKERVYLE-GLEGG AT HIS SALALAH SUMMER PALACE FOR TEA LASTING ABOUT ONE AND A HALF HOURS. THE SULTAN LOOKED TIRED AT THE END OF A LONG WORKING DAY WHEN HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED IN AUDIENCE THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE YEMENI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY. HE WAS HOWEVER KEEN TO TALK ABOUT THESE VISITS AND THE GULF CRISIS MORE WIDELY. VCDS HAD ALREADY SPENT SIX HOURS THE PREVIOUS EVENING AT DINNER WITH THE SULTAN (WITH ONLY AM BENNETT AND DPM QAIS ZAWAWI PRESENT) AND HAD COVERED MUCH OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION, SO THAT WE CONCENTRATED MORE ON THE SULTAN'S VIEWS IN THE LIGHT OF HIS VISITORS' MESSAGES.

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

3. HE SAID THAT THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD COME TO EXPLAIN AND TO EXPLORE WHAT JAPAN COULD DO TO HELP. NAKAYAMA HAD TALKED EXCLUSIVELY IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE SULTAN DID NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS. I MENTIONED MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DESPATCH OF MINESWEEPERS TO THE GULF BUT THE SULTAN SAID NAKAYAMA HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS.

YEMENI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

4. THE SULTAN SAID THAT AL-DALI APPEARED TO WANT TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT YEMEN WAS TAKING A MORE MODERATE POSITION AND HAD NO INTENTION OF CAUSING TROUBLE IN THE OMANIS' AND SAUDIS REAR. THE SULTAN SAID HE HAD REMARKED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD THING BECAUSE ANYONE CAUSING SUCH TROUBLE (HE ADDED BY WAY OF EXAMPLE SUDAN, AND RUMOURS OF THE IRAQIS STATIONING MISSILES THERE) COULD EXPECT TROUBLE IN RETURN. HE THOUGHT HE HAD REGISTERED A POINT.

US DEFENCE SECRETARY

5. CHENEY WAS RUNNING BEHIND TIME AND HAD CUT OUT HIS INTENDED VISITS TO THUMRAINT (UNLIKE VCDS WHO HAD SPENT A VALUABLE MORNING THERE). THE SULTAN SAID HE WAS PERPLEXED ABOUT CHENEY'S MESSAGE. HE HAD OF COURSE BRIEFED ON THE US MILITARY SITUATION AND EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR OMANI COOPERATION BUT HAD BEEN CURIOUSLY SILENT ON THE PROSPECTS.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

6. I WAS KEEN TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF PRESS VISITORS AND REFERRED TO THE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN THE US MEDIA OF THIER FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. I SAID WE HAD A SIMILAR NEED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK AND WIDER WITH INFORMATION ABOUT OUR DEPLOYMENTS IN OMAN. SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO WIN THE PROPAGANDA WAR IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE SULTAN INDICATED HE HAD SEEN MY LETTER TO ALI MAJID AND SPOKE IN TERMS IDENTICAL WITH THOSE IN THE LATTER'S REPLY TO ME ON 19 AUGUST (MY TELNO 324). HE RECOGNISED OUR NEEDS BUT THERE WERE ALSO THE NEEDS OF OMAN WHICH ALWAYS TRIED TO FOLLOW A 'MIDDLE PATH'. HE SAID THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH INFORMATION MINISTER ROWAS YESTERDAY, THAT 'THE DOOR SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN TO THE PRESS BUT VISITS SHOULD BE WELL COORDINATED AMONG THE MINISTRIES'. (COMMENT: WE TOOK THIS TO CONFIRM THE HINT IN ALI MAJID'S LETTER THAT OMAN WOULD ALLOW IN A SMALL NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS. I PROPOSED TO FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY WITH ROWAS TO SEE WHAT CAN BE ARRANGED SOON. THE OPPOSITION OF THE SERVICE COMMANDERS STILL PERSISTS (I SPOKE AT LENGTH WITH COSSAF ABOUT THIS EARLIER AND THEY WILL HAVE TO BE TALKED ROUND.)

THE GULF CRISIS

7. THE SULTAN SHOWED HIMSELF ALIVE TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM INSPIRED BY PALESTINIAN GROUPS BASED IN IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE. HE WAS SCORNFUL OF ARAFAT FOR BACKING IRAQ TO THE PALESTINIANS' COST.

8. HE THOUGHT THAT THE KUWIATIS WOULD SEND SOMEONE TO OMAN AS PART OF THIER REGIONAL TOUR TO PUBLICISE THEIR CAUSE.

9. HE DID NOT THINK THE IRAQ/IRAN AGREEMENTS WOULD LEAD TO IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE AN INCREASE IN SMUGGLING INTO IRAQ.

10 HE WAS UNSURE WHERE INDIA STOOD. ALTHOUGH INDIA HAD BACKED THE UN RESOLUTIONS IT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN QUIET OTHERWISE. WE SPECULATED INCONCLUSIVELY ON WHTHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY QUID PRO QUO FOR THE AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ ON PERMITTING INDIANS TO LEAVE KUWAIT.

1. HE DID NOT INTEND THAT OMAN SHOULD EXPLOIT ANY DIFFICULTIES OF OTHER GULF STATES. HE HAD IMPOSED A BAN ON THE EXPORT OF BASIC COMMODITIES BECAUSE THE HIGHER PRICE COMMANDED BY THEM IN DUBAI WAS LEADING TO LOCAL SHORTAGES AS MERCHANTS RUSHED TO SELL THERE.

ANGLO-OMANI COOPERATON

12. VCDS THANKED THE SULTAN FOR THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM THE OMANI FORCES. THE SULTAN REMARKED THAT HE VALUED HIGHLY THE ASSISITANCE WE HAD OFFERED. AS FOR COOPERATION, HE SAID THAT WAS WHAT FRIENDSHIP WAS ABOUT. HE WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY OF HELP WITH AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS FOR THUMRAIT ON WHICH VCDS IS REPORTING SEPARATELY. HE ALSO UNDERTOOD FULLY THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO DEPLOY THE JAGUARS ELSEWHERE (THUMRAIT IS IN ANY CASE BECOMING OVER-CROWDED WITH AMERICANS) ON WHICH VCDS IS REPORTING EXCLUSIVELY TO CDS.

COMMENT

13. GIVEN THAT THE VISIT WAS ARRANGED MONTHS AGO, IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY. IT HAS ENABLED VCDS TO STRIKE AN EXCELLENT RAPPORT WITH THE SULTAN, AUGURING WELL FOR OUR FUTURE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP. VCDS WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE PRIVATE DINNER ON THE PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEM RAISED BY THE SULTAN ON THE DEFENCE MOU. IT SHOULD NOT HOWEVER PREVENT THE SIGNATURE GOING AHEAD AS PLANNED IN THE CONTEXT OF SAYYID FAHER'S VISIT TO FARNBOROUGH.

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
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
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SIC

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SOVIET ROUND-UP, 21 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSES IRAQI 'PROPOSALS' AND SITUATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS WITH VISITING IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.
2. SOVIET ENVOY SYTENKO CONTINUING HIS MIDDLE EASTERN ITINERARY.
3. MOST SOVIET CITIZENS NOW EVACUATED FROM KUWAIT: FINAL BATCH OF 166 DUE TO DEPART.

DETAIL

4. IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAMMADI IS VISITING MOSCOW ON 20/21 AUGUST. HE HAD THREE HOURS OF TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON 20 AUGUST. THESE WERE REPORTED TO HAVE FOCUSED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING THE CRISIS AND ON THE SITUATION OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ. SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASISED THAT THE TALKS WERE CONSULTATIONS AND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, NOT NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT, DURING THIS VISIT AND LATER, 'MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS' WOULD BE DEVELOPED.
5. THE TWO MINISTERS WERE DESCRIBED AS DISCUSSING POSSIBLE WAYS OF OVERCOMING THE CRISIS SO AS TO AVERT A SHARPER CONFRONTATION, WHICH COULD RESULT IN A MILITARY CONFLICT WITH UNFORSEEABLE CONSEQUENCES. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED IN A TASS INTERVIEW THAT ELEMENTS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S LATEST PROPOSALS DESERVED ATTENTION. THE RUSSIANS WERE STUDYING THE DETAILS AND WOULD RESPOND APPROPRIATELY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF MANY IN THE WEST TO THE PROPOSALS.
6. IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT, THE SITUATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS WAS SAID TO HAVE RECEIVED PARTICULAR ATTENTION. SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED

SATISFACTION AT IRAQI CO-OPERATION IN THE RETURN HOME OF SOVIET CITIZENS, AND CALLED FOR A SIMILAR DECISION TO BE APPLIED TO THE CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES. ELABORATING IN HIS TASS INTERVIEW, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAD HELPED TO MAKE THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS 'NORMAL, PAINLESS AND WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTIES'. THE FIRST TWO GROUPS OF SOVIET EVACUEES FROM KUWAIT HAD REACHED MOSCOW. SOVIET WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE NOW RETURNING ALSO FROM IRAQ. SOVIET SPECIALISTS REMAINED THERE FOR THE TIME BEING. A DECISION ABOUT THEM WOULD BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED DISCUSSION WITH HAMMADI ABOUT THEIR NATIONALS AS 'VERY USEFUL, WITH CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS' AND SAID:

'WE CARE NOT ONLY FOR OUR PEOPLE BUT ALSO FOR CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES. WE WOULD NOT LIKE TO CLAIM THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR IN SETTLING THIS QUESTION. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ALSO OUR DUTY, AS WELL AS THAT OF ANY CIVILISED STATE, TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF OTHER STATES, PEOPLES AND EVERY CITIZEN OF ANY STATE OR PEOPLE'.

7. WE HAVE ASKED THE MFA TO BRIEF US ON THE CONCLUSION OF THIS VISIT.

SYTENKO MISSION

8. HAVING VISITED DAMASCUS, CAIRO AND TRIPOLI, SOVIET SPECIAL ENVOY SYTENKO HAD REACHED SANA'A BY 20 AUGUST, AND WAS DUE TO TRAVEL THENCE TO JORDAN, IRAQ AND POSSIBLY OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

EVACUATION DETAILS

9. COMMENTING SEPARATELY ON SCR 664, THE MFA SPOKESMAN SAID ON 20 AUGUST THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF CITIZENS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, 'IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE BASIC RULES OF HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND A RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS'.

10. THE SECOND GROUP OF SOVIET EVACUEES FROM KUWAIT (124 PEOPLE) REACHED MOSCOW ON 20 AUGUST. THE THIRD GROUP (363) IS EXPECTED ON 21 AUGUST. THE FINAL 166 SOVIET CITIZENS IN KUWAIT ARE DUE TO LEAVE THAT COUNTRY 'SOON'.

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MY 2 IPTS: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH, 17 AUGUST: FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ASPECTS

SUMMARY

1. ROBUST DEFENCE OF SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY IN THE FACE OF CRITICISM AND OLD THINKING FROM SOME OF THE MILITARY. ASSERTS THAT POLICY ENDORSED BY PARTY AND SUPREME SOVIET. FAMILIAR LINE ON EASTERN EUROPE: NO ALTERNATIVE NEED FOR MILITARY REFORM. THE REVIVED DEFENCE COUNCIL TO PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE. MAINTAINING THE UNION WAS A PREREQUISITE OF SECURING NATIONAL DEFENCE.

DETAIL

2. AFTER HIS LONG DEFENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES AGAINST THE ORTHODOX OPPOSITION, GORBACHEV WAS EQUALLY COMBATIVE ON THE ISSUES CLOSEST TO THE HEARTS OF THE OFFICER CORPS HE WAS ADDRESSING. HE RECALLED THAT SPEAKERS AT THE RUSSIAN AND USSR PARTY CONGRESSES, 'INCLUDING SOME MILITARY OFFICERS' HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY. HE HOPED THAT HIS PRESENT AUDIENCE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY HE HAD REACTED ANGRILY. HOWEVER THE CONGRESS HAD ENDORSED THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WHICH HAD ALREADY HAD PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. HIS MESSAGE TODAY WAS 'ALL STATE BODIES (INSTANTSII), CONNECTED WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ARE OBLIGED TO BE GUIDED BY THAT IN THEIR ACTIVITIES'.

3. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S LINE HAD BEEN FURTHER UNDERLINED BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR. THIS WAS BEING REFLECTED IN DEEDS AS WELL AS WORDS. ONE MIGHT ARGUE THAT THESE HAD BEEN TIMID SO FAR, BUT NOT WITH THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION: THE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE IRREVERSIBLE INTENTION TO CUT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS HAD INDISPUTABLY STRENGTHENED SOVIET SECURITY.

4. IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO REEXAMINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY SECURITY.

PREVIOUSLY THIS HAD BEEN REDUCED ESSENTIALLY TO THE MILITARY ELEMENTS. 'FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT AGREE WITH, OR UNDERSTAND, OUR FOREIGN POLICY, ITS WEAKEST POINT SEEMS THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. I WON'T WASTE TIME EXPLAINING THE OBVIOUS: ANY ATTEMPT TO BLOCK THOSE CHANGES BY FORCE WOULD NOT HAVE STRENGTHENED OUR SECURITY, BUT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT US TO THE BRINK OR ARMED CONFLICT WITH NATO. IT WOULD AT LEAST HAVE DESTROYED ALL THAT HAD BEEN DONE IN PREVIOUS YEARS TO PUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON A HEALTHY FOOTING...I DON'T NEED TO ADD THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED AND CONDEMNED BY THE PEOPLES OF THOSE COUNTRIES...LET US CONSIDER SENSIBLY AND HONESTLY THE QUESTION HOW OUR SECURITY HAS SUFFERED FROM THE EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. I AM CONVINCED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE REINFORCED ON SOUNDER MORE RELIABLE PRINCIPLES.'

5. GERMANY WAS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE SOVIET IDEAS OF SECURITY HAD BEEN SHAPED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WAR. 'BUT THE POST-WAR PERIOD HAS ENDED. THERE HAVE BEEN POSITIVE CHANGES IN EUROPE...WHICH HAVE ALLOWED THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND OUR POSITIVE RESPONSE TO IT.' HE ADDED, 'EVERYTHING WAS THOUGHT THROUGH THOROUGHLY, WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF ALL THE REALITIES. IN A WORD, I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR POLICY ON A UNITED GERMANY WAS THE ONLY SOUND AND CORRECT ONE AVAILABLE.'

6. TURNING TO DEFENCE QUESTIONS, GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE BASIC SITUATION OF ARMED OPPOSITION HAD CHANGED RADICALLY. WE WERE MOVING TO A QUALITATIVELY NEW INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF STATES MILITARY POLICIES, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE IF THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER WORLD WAR. 'THE DIRECT THREAT OF A WAR MOUNTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISAPPEARED.' BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO WITHOUT THE ARMED FORCES APPROPRIATE FOR A MAJOR STATE, A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE SATURATION OF THE WORLD WITH ARMS. THE REALISATION OF THIS FACT HAD PROMPTED THE SOVIET UNION ON THE PATH OF DEMILITARISATION, WHICH IT INTENDED TO FOLLOW DOGGEDLY. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACT 'WITH THE HIGHEST SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, WITH CONSTANT REGARD TO THE RELIABLE SECURITY OF THE NATION. THIS MEANS THAT THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE JUST (IDTA NA RAVNYKH), ON THE BASIS OF OBSERVING BALANCE AT ALL STAGES.

7. MILITARY REFORM TRADITIONALLY FOLLOWED THE ENDING OF WAR. TODAY WAS THE SAME, SINCE THE COLD WAR HAD NOW COME TO AN END, AND THE ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE POLICY.

8. FIRST, TO DEFINE, IN BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY, THE NECESSARY SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE ANALYSIS OF UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION ON THE DOCTRINES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USA, NATO, AS WELL AS, JAPAN, CHINA, IRAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA, A STRING OF ARAB STATES, ISRAEL AND THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA. THEN ONE WOULD NEED TO SET THE OBJECTIVES AND SPECIFIC TASKS NEEDED FOR GUARANTEEING THE DEFENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE NUMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE, AND IN THE CONSTITUENT ARMS. SECOND, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CURRENT MAKE-UP OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES WAS CORRECT. SHOULD THERE BE FIVE ARMS OF SERVICE?

8. THIRD WAS THE QUESTION OF CALCULATING, ON A NEW RATIONAL BASIS, TAKING STRICT ACCOUNT OF DEFENSIVE SUFFICIENCY, WHAT RESOURCES COULD BE DEVOTED TO DEFENCE. GORBACHEV IDENTIFIED VARIOUS BUDGET AREAS: DAY TO DAY RUNNING COSTS, INVOLVED IN MAINTAINING READINESS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, BULK (SERIINYE) PURCHASES OF EQUIPMENT AND ARMS, DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL AND OFFICERS' FAMILIES, ACCOMODATION CAPITAL AND RUNNING COSTS, EDUCATION ETC. A PRESSING PROBLEM WAS THE COSTS INVOLVED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM ABROAD. THE SOCIAL ISSUE, JUST AS THE PROBLEMS SUFFERED BY OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES REQUIRED NOT ADHOC SOLUTIONS BUT A PROPER PROGRAMME, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOW EXAMINING.

9. FOURTH, GORBACHEV ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF A PROFESSIONAL ARMY. THE PREVAILING VIEW FAVOURED THE MIXED APPROACH OF A PROFESSIONAL CADRE OF OFFICERS, SENIOR NCOS AND LONG-TERM CONTRACT SOLDIERS, SUPPLEMENTED BY SERGEANTS AND PRIVATES FOUND BY UNIVERSAL CONSCRIPTION. BUT OTHERS THOUGHT THE TIME HAD COME TO MOVE TO A FULLY PROFESSIONAL ARMY. HIS FIFTH POINT WAS TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SERVICE SHOULD BE UNION-WIDE, OR ORGANISED ON A TERRITORIAL BASIS, OR A MIXTURE OF THE TWO. EARLIER, HE HAD INSISTED, WHEN TALKING OF THE NEW UNION TREATY THAT THE DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUENT REPUBLICS WAS INDIVISIBLE, AND THERE COULD NOT BE ANY SYSTEM OF REPUBLICAN ARMIES.

10. GORBACHEV SAID THAT ALL THESE ISSUES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN 'THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENCE COUNCIL' IN SEPTEMBER, BEFORE BEING PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP WAS NORMAL AND THEIR WORK PROCEEDED IN A BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER. A DEFENCE COUNCIL HAD BEEN FORMED TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT, WHICH WOULD DISCUSS AND EXAMINE ALL MILITARY QUESITONS. IT WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE CORRESPONDING COMMITTEES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.

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GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO OFFICERS IN ODESSA, 17 AUGUST

1. ON 17 AUGUST, GORBACHEV CHOSE A MILITARY AUDIENCE IN THE CRIMEA (WHERE HE HAS BEEN HOLIDAYING) FOR HIS FIRST MAJOR SETPIECE SPEECH SINCE THE PARTY CONGRESS. MY TWO IFTS SUMMARISE THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS (GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ON IRAQ WERE REPORTED SEPARATELY ON 18 AUGUST). THIS TELEGRAM COMMENTS ON THE SPEECH.
2. THE SPEECH EMBRACES THREE MAJOR ITEMS FROM THIS AUTUMN'S POLITICAL AGENDA (TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY, RESHAPING OF THE FEDERATION IN A NEW UNION TREATY, AND MILITARY REFORM BASED ON A REAPPRAISAL OF DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS). GORBACHEV ALSO DEFENDED HIS EXTERNAL AND SECURITY POLICY, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE, GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND ARMS REDUCTION, BEFORE WHAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE A CRITICAL AUDIENCE.
3. WE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE IMPACT OF THIS ONE SPEECH. GORBACHEV IS NO LONGER SEEN BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE AS THE MAN CALLING THE SHOTS (NO SINGLE LEADER IS, IN THE DIFFUSE STATE OF SOVIET POLITICS). THE LENGTH AND REPETITIVENESS OF HIS SPEECHES TEND TO EVOKE POPULAR INDIFFERENCE AND CYNICISM. FOR THREE YEARS HE HAS BEEN PROMISING THAT THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF PERESTROIKA IS OVER, THAT IMPLEMENTATION IS BEGINNING, THAT PERESTROIKA WILL REALISE THE SOCIALIST IDEAL. HE CUSTOMARILY TAKES ALTERNATE SWIPES AT THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT. ALL OF THESE THINGS HE DID AGAIN.
4. THAT SAID, THE SPEECH DESERVES ATTENTION:
 - GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL COURAGE IS UNABATED. HE PULLED NO PUNCHES ON MILITARY REFORM, SECURITY POLICY OR INTERNAL CHANGE.
 - HE HAS COME OUT MORE STRONGLY THAN EVER, AND WITH FEW QUALIFICATIONS, FOR A 'FULL-BLOODED' MARKET ECONOMY AS THE LOCOMOTIVE FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY.
 - HIS PHRASEOLOGY IS STRIKING - ON THE LAST STAND OF THE COMMAND/ ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, ON PRIVATISATION AND DISMANTLING STATE MONOPOLIES, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FULL

OWNERSHIP TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES, ON THE ROLE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES. ALL ARE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF HIS RECENT SHIFT TOWARDS THE RADICAL ECONOMISTS.

- GORBACHEV HAS NOT ABANDONED SOCIALISM, BUT OFFERS A WATERED-DOWN VERSION: A PROCESS/MOVEMENT/SET OF CONCEPTS, NOT A FIXED MODEL. HE TRACES ITS DECLINE TO THE WAR COMMUNISM WHICH LENIN SOUGHT TO REPUDIATE AT THE END OF HIS LIFE.
- THE MESSAGE FOR THE POPULACE IS BLEAK. THE MARKET WILL OBLIGE THEM TO WORK HARDER AND BETTER. IT IS NOT A PAINLESS SOLUTION. 'HARD TIMES AWAIT US ALL IN THE NEXT YEAR AND A HALF'.
- GORBACHEV ADDRESSES SQUARELY THE DANGER THAT THE UNION MAY DISINTEGRATE. HIS ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS BREAK-UP IS IMPECCABLY REASONED AND WILL BE SUPPORTED BY MANY RUSSIANS - BUT HE IS UP AGAINST WAVES OF NATIONALIST EMOTION.

5. GORBACHEV'S CONCLUDING PASSAGE, ON MILITARY REFORM, IS TAILORED TO HIS AUDIENCE ONLY IN THE PLACE IT ASSIGNS TO THE DEFENCE COUNCIL, THROUGH WHICH THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP CAN FIGHT THEIR CORNER AS THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET FORCES IS DEBATED. GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGES THE DEEP UNHAPPINESS OF CAREER SERVICEMEN ABOUT THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, WARNING THAT MATERIAL RESOURCES ARE FINITE, HE OFFERS THEM LITTLE COMFORT. MOST INTERESTINGLY, HE TAKES AN OPEN VIEW IN THE GROWING DEBATE ON THE MERITS OF A PROFESSIONAL VOLUNTEER ARMY.

6. READ TOGETHER WITH PRONOUNCEMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND BY RYZHKOV AND PROTAGONISTS IN THE ECONOMIC REFORM COMMISSIONS, BY KGB CHAIRMAN KRYUCHKOV, AND DEFENCE MINISTER YAZOV (AT THE SAME ODESSA MEETING), IT APPEARS THAT THE AUTUMN POLITICAL SEASON HAS OPENED EARLY THIS YEAR.

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INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, EC POSTS, MODUK, ACTOR, ME GULF POSTSIRAQ/KUWAIT: MR WALDEGRAVE'S VISIT TO GENEVA: CALL ON SOMMARUGA
(ICRC)

1. MR WALDEGRAVE BEGAN BY CONVEYING GREETINGS FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM DURING HIS VISIT EARLY NEXT YEAR.
2. SOMMARUGA LOST NO TIME IN RESPONDING VIGOROUSLY TO THE REPORT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STRICTURES ON THE ICRC'S APPARENT INACTIVITY IN SPITE OF REQUESTS FOR ACTION IN KUWAIT AND IARQ. HE RECALLED THE ICRC'S FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC DECLARATIONS THAT IRAQ'S INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT LED TO A SITUATION OF CONFLICT IN WHICH ALL FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS APPLIED. THEY WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO USE THEIR PRESENCE IN IRAQ FOR THE PURPOSES OF PRISONER EXCHANGE ETC TO PERSUADE THE IRAQIS TO GIVE THEM ACCESS TO KUWAIT WHERE THEY HAVE NO REPEAT NO REPRESENTATION. THE IRAQIS HAD TWICE REFUSED THIS ACCESS. HE HAD DESPATCHED A SENIOR OFFICIAL LAST NIGHT, WHO HAS BEEN TRYING IN BAGHDAD TODAY TO GET CONTACT WITH THE IRAQI MFA AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL. SOMMARUGA HIMSELF WAS PACKED AND READY TO FLY TO BAGHDAD IF HE COULD GET TO SEE TARIQ AZIZ, TO WHOM HE HAD ALREADY WRITTEN ASKING THAT THE ICRC SHOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THEIR MANDATE. HE HAD ALSO TELEPHONED ARAFAT, AS ONE OF SADDAM'S FEW INTERLOCUTORS.
3. SOMMARUGA STRESSED THE DANGER THAT PUBLICITY FOR WESTERN PRESSURE ON THE ICRC MIGHT MAKE THEIR TASK EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THEIR OPERATIONS DEPENDED ON THEIR NEUTRALITY AND FREEDOM FROM POLITICS. SOMMARUGA ALSO EXPLAINED THEIR LATEST INITIATIVE WITH THE JORDAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY TO HELP PEOPLE THROWN OUT OF IRAQ. SEE MIFT.
4. MR WALDEGRAVE EXPLAINED THE GREAT ANXIETY FELT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE FRUSTRATION THAT THE ICRC HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CARRY OUT THEIR CLEAR MANDATE. FEELINGS WERE RUNNING EXTREMELY HIGH. NOW THAT CONSULAR ACCESS WAS DENIED TO BRITISH AND OTHER FOREIGNERS IN BAGHDAD, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN BROUGHT OUT FROM KUWAIT, SURELY THE RED) CROSS'S MANDATE UNDER THE CONVENTIONS SHOULD ALLOW THEM TO

ACT IN IRAQ AS WELL AS KUWAIT. SOMMARUGA SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW LEGALISTIC DIFFICULTIES TO PREVENT THEIR OPERATING BUT MADE THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT THEY COULD DO NOTHING WITHOUT IRAQI AGREEMENT. THE ICRC'S INTENSIFIED ACTIVITY OVER THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS AT LEAST GAVE THEM A PRESENCE IN IRAQ BUT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO KEEP THIS HUMANITARIAN TASK SEPARATE FROM THE KUWAIT PROBLEM.

5. MR WALDEGRAVE EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THIS FRANK OUTLINE OF THE ICRC'S POSITION. HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO FOREIGNERS TRAPPED IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. SOMMARUGA WAS EMPHATIC THEY WOULD NOT.

MORLAND

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~

MR FAIRWEATHER

~~MR GOULDEN~~ MR GREENSTOCK

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/NAD

HD/SED

HD/UND

HD/CONSULAR D

HD/NEWS D

HD/NPDD

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

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(BY TUBE H29)

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~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

I had a private word on the secure line this afternoon with General Scowcroft, who is with the President in Kennebunkport.

I started by asking him to convey your congratulations to the President on his speech yesterday. You thought it had been excellent. General Scowcroft said the President would be pleased. He had already noted that you had said some pretty firm things at your press conference today. He was glad to hear you coming over loud and clear.

I then gave General Scowcroft an account of your telephone conversation with President Vassiliou. General Scowcroft was intrigued by this and said he would pass on the gist to the President.

Having dealt with these preliminaries, I said there was a sensitive matter which I wanted to raise on a personal basis. The Americans were no doubt doing some thinking about military options against Iraq. Obviously they would hold this tight, and we could understand that they might not want to reveal the details of their thinking, even to their close allies. We had good liaison with their people on the ground in Saudi Arabi about the tactical situation and contacts with CENTCOM. If they felt able to take us into their confidence about their strategic military thinking, I knew you would welcome that, although you would certainly not want to press inordinately. Any message could be conveyed in a way to ensure that it would reach you alone, if that was what they preferred.

General Scowcroft said that he had no doubt the President would want to share even their most secret plans with you. But they were not quite far enough along with them yet to do so. There was a growing feeling among a number of most senior American officials that the United States might have to acquire a

military option, either in response to some action by Iraq or because sanctions would not do the job of getting the Iraqis out of Kuwait. He had himself talked very privately to General Colin Powell yesterday, and they had a few preliminary thoughts. They related to things which the United States might have to do in order to resolve the situation. But they had not even shared these with the President yet. Of course if sanctions were to bite sooner, then military action would not be necessary. But he would be very happy to explain their thinking in greater detail to me on the secure line in a few days time, on the understanding that it would be passed on only to you.

I said I knew you would be grateful for this. I deduced from his remarks that the Americans had no military action in mind for the next two or three weeks at least, in the absence of any provocation by the Iraqis. General Scowcroft confirmed that this was so. We left it that he would contact me when their thinking had developed somewhat further.

General Scowcroft added that the President had telephoned President Mitterrand later yesterday afternoon and had found him much more supportive than before, including on the issue of the use of force (he did not specify whether this referred to implementing the UN embargo or military action against Iraq).

TEMPORARILY RETAINED J. Gray 24/12/2016

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It is rather hard to believe that the Americans have not taken their thinking on military options further. In practice, I am sure that the Pentagon and CENTCOM at least must have done so, although they may not have political endorsement for their plans. But I think this is probably as much as we can get for now from General Scowcroft. If I hear nothing further from him by the weekend, I will have another word.

I am not copying this minute to anyone else. You will wish to consider whether to say anything to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary - perhaps that we have been in touch with the Americans at a very high level about military options and have the impression that they do not have anything in mind at this juncture, but have promised to keep you in touch as their thinking develops.

CHARLES POWELL
21 August 1990

C.D.?

Thank you very much.

No need to say anything
= to others
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT CC MASTER

21 August 1990

Dee Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT VASSILIOU

The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone this afternoon to President Vassiliou, at the latter's initiative.

The President said that he had just returned from holiday and wanted to telephone to express his admiration for the Prime Minister's firm and decisive handling of the Gulf crisis. She had obviously played a crucial role in helping President Bush to reach the right decisions. The Prime Minister thanked the President for his kind words, commenting that she had simply been in the right place at the right time.

President Vassiliou continued that he was sure Britain and the United States were doing the right thing. He wanted the Prime Minister to know that Cyprus was entirely at the disposal of both Governments for any use they needed to make of it under the present circumstances. He felt very strongly about this. The Prime Minister said this was a most generous offer and she would inform President Bush. President Vassiliou went on that Cyprus had been one of the first to apply the United Nations embargo, even though it was quite damaging to the Cyprus economy. Strict and effective implementation of the UN sanctions was essential. But he wanted to say again that if Britain and the United States needed anything else, whether it be use of the SBAs or Cyprus airport itself, he would agree to it immediately, even if all political parties in Cyprus were opposed. The Prime Minister repeated her gratitude for this offer.

President Vassiliou said that he had studied the whole situation very carefully and reached the conclusion that the West did not have the option of sitting out Saddam Hussein. He doubted that the UN embargo on its own would do the trick. As soon as Britain and the United States were ready logistically, they should attack Iraq. Delay would be equated with weakness. People would begin to forget the rationale for the original intervention if action was held up, and a negative attitude towards US forces would develop. Saddam Hussein would present himself as a martyr, and that would rouse strong feelings among the Arab masses. If we created a martyr, we would be the losers and terrorism would exceed anything we had yet known. He was convinced, therefore, that we had to be ready to throw Saddam

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
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Hussein out of Kuwait quickly. The Prime Minister said that any action taken by the United States must be assured of success. President Vassiliou thought we should not overestimate Iraq's war machine: it was not as good as it might appear.

President Vassiliou said that he had just seen a deputation from the PLO who had informed him that Arafat was taking a peace plan to Baghdad, which would require Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. In that event US and other Western forces could also withdraw. The Prime Minister expressed interest, but pointed out that Kuwait would still remain very vulnerable and some arrangements would be needed to guarantee its future security.

The Prime Minister repeated that she was very grateful for the President's telephone call. She hoped to see him soon. The President said that he had been speaking from the heart. If we could ensure that Iraq's aggression would fail, it might make it easier to undo the results of earlier aggressions. The President added that he would be passing through London on his way to and from New York to address the UNGA. The Prime Minister said that she hoped to see him then.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1990

Dee Ginn

THE GULF CRISIS: JORDAN

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 20 August about a possible international rescue package to help mitigate the consequences for Jordan of implementing UN sanctions against Iraq. She has not made any direct comment but agrees I am sure, that some international assistance will be needed and that the UK will have to contribute. She is not convinced that we should leave it to the United States to take a lead. Depending on reactions at the meeting of the Twelve being attended by the Foreign Secretary today, she is inclined to think that Europe should be ready to give a lead in securing help for Jordan. In particular, those countries which are not contributing forces to the multi-national effort in the Gulf could do their bit by giving financial assurance to countries such as Jordan and Iraq, and by encouraging other donors such as Japan and the wealthier Arab States to do likewise.

The Prime Minister has not taken a view on the point in paragraph 7 of the Foreign Secretary's minute and paragraph 5 of the Chief Secretary's minute of 16 August about the funding of a UK contribution to assistance to Jordan.

I am copying this minute to Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), Eamonn Taylor (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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File in

MR. INGHAM

I attach a letter to the Prime Minister from Lloyd Turner of Today. It was discussed briefly at the meeting of officials which the Prime Minister chaired on the Gulf crisis on 21 August. It was noted that the pool facilities extended to British journalists over the last week to visit our forces in the Gulf resulted in good publicity. No further such visits were planned at present. The Prime Minister expressed her continuing reservations about being too generous with facilities for the press, in the light of experience during the Falklands campaign. But you may want to give further consideration to this and submit a draft reply.

C. D. POWELL

21 August 1990

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file 10(A-C)
A: IRAQ

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1990

SUBJECT CCMASTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with the Attorney General, the Minister of State, FCO (Mrs. Chalker) and the Minister for Defence Procurement to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf crisis. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock were also present.

United Nations Security Council Resolution on enforcement of sanctions against Iraq

I have written separately about this. I understand that there is now a later draft text (UKMIS New York telegram no.1048) which meets the main concerns expressed at the meeting.

OECD

It was noted that there had been a useful discussion in the OECD the previous day on the implementation of sanctions, with general acceptance that the sanctions should apply to export of food to Iraq.

ICRC

It was noted that the UK had already participated in two approaches to the ICRC (on 8 and 10 August) to seek their intervention over Iraq's treatment of foreigners, both in Iraq itself and in Kuwait, but without much effect so far. The Minister of State, FCO (Mr. Waldegrave) would be seeing the ICRC in Geneva this afternoon. We should continue to press hard for their involvement and draw attention publicly to their failure to act up until now. The Prime Minister subsequently referred to this at her press conference.

Assistance to Jordan to cope with refugees

It was noted that our Ambassador in Amman was in favour of our offering some practical assistance with the reception arrangements for refugees from Iraq at the Iraq/Jordan border. The Minister of State, FCO (Mrs. Chalker) agreed to investigate urgently what the ODA might provide and make a recommendation.

SECRET

Advice to British citizens in Jordan

It was reported that the US Government had given low-key advice to its citizens in Jordan to consider leaving, and this had created a very bad effect with the Jordanian authorities. It was agreed that there was no case for giving similar advice to British citizens at this juncture.

British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait

It was noted that 134 British citizens in Kuwait had now been rounded up by the Iraqi authorities. Although we had no precise information on their whereabouts, there was reason to think that they had not (or not yet) been placed in military areas or installations. We had no news of the whereabouts of some 223 British citizens who had initially been taken from Kuwait to Baghdad.

Rules of engagements for the Armilla Patrol

The Minister for Defence Procurement reported that the Defence Secretary would shortly be putting further recommendations to the Prime Minister about the rules of engagement for ships of the Armilla Patrol, in the event that ships suspected of breaking the UN embargo did not respond to warning shots or to shots aimed at the funnel.

Dispatch of further RAF aircraft to the Gulf

The Minister for Defence Procurement reported that the Defence Secretary would be putting recommendations to the Prime Minister very shortly for the dispatch of further aircraft to the Gulf and for steps we might take to strengthen the personal protection of the Rulers of some of the smaller Gulf States. The Prime Minister emphasised her determination that our military contribution should be an adequate one and the United Kingdom should not be marginalised.

Military and civil air training for Iraqis

The Prime Minister asked for confirmation that we were not any longer providing military or civil air training for Iraqis.

Sanctions-busting

The Prime Minister expressed concern at intelligence reports which indicated that Libya and Yemen (and possibly other countries) might already be engaged in breaking the UN embargo by airlifting cargo to Iraq. She asked for urgent consideration of steps which might be taken to prevent this.

Financial assistance to Jordan

It was noted that the Foreign Secretary would be discussing with European colleagues today the possibility of financial assistance to help Jordan cope with the consequences of applying sanctions. The Prime Minister agreed to raise with Prince Bandar the possibility that Saudi Arabia would supply oil on favourable

SECRET

- 3 -

terms to Jordan, possibly restoring the Saudi Arabia/Jordan pipeline which has fallen into disuse.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead and David Hatcher (Ministry of Defence), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Attorney General's Chambers) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Cite 

MR. INGHAM

I attach a note from Alexandra Henderson which is for you not me. I have taken no action on it.

As a general point, I think we shall want opportunities for the Prime Minister to speak out publicly on the Gulf crisis.

C. D. POWELL
21 August 1990

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OF 210045Z AUGUST 90

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUMMARY

Cut
1. US CONSIDER THAT SCR 664 BUTTRESSES THEIR LEGAL POSITION ON RETAINING AN EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. THEY WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH IRAQI DEMANDS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR EMBASSY OR THE ROUNDING UP OF US NATIONALS, BUT WILL NOT RESIST FORCIBLE MEASURES. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DEMAND FREEDOM TO DEPART, CONSULAR ACCESS TO US NATIONALS AND A RETENTION OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES FOR STAFF IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. US URGING ALL FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PROTEST TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT BOTH IN BAGHDAD AND IN CAPITALS AND TO MAKE STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS (LIKE PRESIDENT BUSH TODAY). URGING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RESIST IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM SANCTIONS BY PROPOSING DEALS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DETAIL

← 2. STATE DEPARTMENT HELD A FURTHER MEETING ON 20 AUGUST TO REVIEW THE SITUATION ON FOREIGN NATIONALS. MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
A - SCR 664 HAD IN THE VIEW OF STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISERS BUTTRESSED US DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN EMBASSY IN KUWAIT AFTER 24 AUGUST. ANY CONCERN ABOUT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR MAINTAINING A PRESENCE HAD BEEN REMOVED. BUT IN PRACTICAL TERMS A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE VERY SOON ABOUT HOW TO REACT TO THE 24 AUGUST DEADLINE. THE US HAD DETECTED NO GIVE IN THE IRAQI POSITION, EITHER ON EMBASSIES OR ON THE ROUNDING UP OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND THEIR TRANSPORTATION TO IRAQ TO BECOME QUOTE HUMAN SHIELDS UNQUOTE. US ADVICE TO THEIR NATIONALS WAS IDENTICAL TO OUR OWN: TO REMAIN IN THEIR HOMES, KEEP A LOW PROFILE, NOT COOPERATE WITH THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES BUT AT THE SAME TIME NOT RESIST FORCIBLE MEASURES. AS REGARDS THEIR EMBASSY, THE US WERE STILL INCLINED TO REMAIN, BUT WERE MINDFUL OF THE THREAT IF THEY DID:

THE IRAQIS COULD CUT OFF FUEL, WATER, TELEPHONES AND ELECTRICITY. THERE WAS ALSO THE RISK THAT THEY MIGHT BE FORCIBLY EJECTED. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE STILL CONSIDERING HOW THEY WOULD REACT. MACK SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE DECISION REACHED BY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS TOMORROW, WHICH WOULD HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON US THINKING. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO REMAIN IN STEP ON THIS.

B - IRAQ: THE SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED. RUMOURS PERSISTED THAT THE US COMMUNITY WOULD BE ROUNDED UP, AND SOME HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN THE US RESIDENCE. THERE WAS STILL NO CONSULAR ACCESS TO 35 US CITIZENS IN THE RASHID HOTEL. TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN MOVED BUT HAD NOT SAID WHERE.

C - 24 AUGUST DEADLINE: MACK SPECULATED THAT 24 AUGUST MIGHT BE THE DATE ON WHICH THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO CRACK-DOWN ON KUWAITI CITIZENS. HE NOTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT YET REALLY OCCUPIED KUWAIT CITY. THEY MIGHT NOW SEEK TO DO SO AND DID NOT WANT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AS WITNESSES TO WHAT COULD BE A BLOODY PROCESS.

D - ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT BUSH'S USE OF THE WORD QUOTE HOSTAGE UNQUOTE IN HIS BALTIMORE SPEECH (ON WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY) SIGNALLED A CHANGE IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL TEMPERATURE, MACK AVOIDED DIRECT COMMENT. HE NOTED THAT US RELUCTANCE INITIALLY TO USE THIS WORD HAD BEEN BASED ON A READING OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS OF 1979. IT WAS FELT THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S INTENSE FOCUS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE PROLONGED IT, BY MAKING CLEAR TO THE IRANIANS THE VALUE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT WANTED EITHER TO HAND THE IRAQIS AN EARLY ADVANTAGE OR TO CORNER THEM. BUT RECENT IRAQI ACTIONS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY POINT IN SEMANTIC NICETIES: THIS WOULD ONLY GIVE THE IMPRESSION DOMESTICALLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DODGING THE ISSUE. YET THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ALSO CONCERNED NOT TO OVER-DRAMATISE THE SITUATION. THE HOSTAGE SITUATION WAS IMPORTANT BUT IT WAS NOT THE ONLY CONCERN. IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, THEIR MILITARY BEHAVIOUR AND THEIR AGGRESSIVE STANCE IN THE REGION (AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US ECONOMIC INTERESTS) WERE ALSO HIGH-PROFILE ISSUES.

E - MACK NOTED THAT THERE WERE INCREASING SIGNS OF AN IRAQ STRATEGY TO TRY TO DIVIDE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EG BY OFFERING FREE PASSAGE FOR CERTAIN NATIONALITIES (SWISS, AUSTRIAN

SWEDES, PORTUGUESE, FINNS AND NOW INDONESIANS AND ARGENTINES), POSSIBLY IN RETURN FOR IGNORING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. THIS WAS POTENTIALLY QUOTE A SMART MOVE BY SADDAM UNQUOTE, BUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS CURRENT SOLIDARITY.

F - FOOD: MACK SAID THAT US INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERED THAT IRAQI FOOD STOCKPILES WERE LARGE AND MIGHT INDICATE AN ELEMENT OF PRE-PLANNING. THERE WOULD BE SHORTAGES IN CERTAIN AREAS BUT GENERALLY STOCKS WERE GOOD FOR 6 MONTHS. WHAT IRAQ WAS SHORT OF AT PRESENT WAS MONEY. THIS WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR ABILITY TO EVADE SANCTIONS. MOST SANCTIONS-BUSTERS WOULD REQUIRE CASH PAYMENT. THE FREEZING OF IRAQ'S (AND KUWAIT'S) OVERSEAS ASSETS HAD BEEN GENERALLY EFFECTIVE. IRAQI IMPORTS WERE ABOUT DOLLARS 17 BILLION PER ANNUM. WHILE THEY COULD TIGHTEN THEIR BELT ON THE FOOD SIDE AND BEGIN AN AUSTERITY PROGRAMME, THEIR INDUSTRIAL PLANT WOULD BEGIN TO RUN DOWN. IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO PURCHASE EXPERTISE, INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT OR SPARES. MACK THOUGHT AS A CONSEQUENCE THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE A MEANS OF LEVERAGE NOT JUST AGAINST US MILITARY ATTACK, BUT AS A MEANS OF ATTEMPTING TO LIFT THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO.

G - THE US WERE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS WHAT THEY SHOULD DO WITH IRAQI DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN THE US. THEIR MEASURES WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY BASED ON RECIPROCITY, SHORT OF ACTUALLY PREVENTING IRAQI DIPLOMATS FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY. FURTHER TIGHTENING OF INTERNAL TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND PRESSURE ON BANK ACCOUNTS WOULD BE EXAMINED. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CALIBRATE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AS THE US DID NOT WISH TO PRECIPITATE FURTHER COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST THEIR EMBASSY IN IRAQ.

H - SECURITY: MACK REMARKED THAT IN BOTH KUWAIT AND IRAQ, US EMBASSIES WERE DOWN TO QUOTE VERY SHORT BURN TIMES, UNQUOTE ON CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ETC. THE US WAS ALSO SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY IN YEMEN TO HAVE ORDERED THE DEPARTURE OF DEPENDANT AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL (54 PEACE CORPS WORKERS, AID AND MILITARY MISSION PERSONNEL). IN JORDAN, THE US HAD AUTHORISED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE FOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL (PUTTING JORDAN ON THE SAME BASIS AS QATAR, UAE AND EP IN SAUDI ARABIA). TRAVEL ADVISORIES HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN PARALLEL FOR US NATIONALS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, EACH DISCOURAGING NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL.

3. STATE HAVE CALLED ANOTHER MEETING FOR 21 AUGUST.

WOOD

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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE : SITUATION REPORT
AT AT 0600 HRS 21 AUGUST 1990

SUSPECT VESSELS REPORT : 21 AUGUST 1990

BALQEES

Roll on freight ferry, Iraqi flag, carrying military equipment from Poland and E Germany. (Unclassified).

Probably unloading equipment in Tripoli. (SECRET).

TARIQ IBN ZIYAD

Tanker, Iraqi flag. En route Portugal to Tripoli. In Tunisian waters. (SECRET).

We now have evidence of Iraqi bound ships unloading cargoes in North African ports. But there is no evidence so far of these cargoes being reloaded on other ships or on aeroplanes bound for Amman and Baghdad. The ESC is working closely with those concerned to monitor the situation. (SECRET).

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OF 210725Z AUGUST 90.
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, OTHER GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE SANA'A

INTERCEPTION OF IRAQI TANKER:MY TELECONS WITH BOYCE(EMERGENCY UNIT)

1. ACCORDING TO THE OMANI PALACE OFFICE (SINCE CONFIRMED BY THE US EMBASSY) ,THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN AUTHORISED TO ENTER OMANI TERRITORIAL WATERS TO INTERCEPT THE IRAQI TANKER KHANAQIN EN ROUTE TO ADEN.

2. MY INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT IN PARALLEL HAVE NOT ARRIVED BUT IN VIEW OF THE OMANI RESPONSE TO THE AMERICANS I AM NOT TAKING ANY ACTION.

CLARK

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RESIDENT CLERK

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SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 August 1990

See Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL

The Prime Minister discussed the draft UN Security Council Resolution on enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq, the text of which is in UKMIS New York tel. no. 1043, with the Attorney General and the Ministers of State (FCO and MOD) this morning. It was vital to get the text right, since once agreed the resolution would constrain our independent right under Article 51 to use force. In that respect, the alternative formulations in operative paragraph 2 ("and" and "in order to") were of crucial importance. We could not in any circumstances agree "in order to", since that would be too constraining in the context of the rest of the paragraph. We must have "and" or (as a fall-back) "and otherwise in order to". Without one or other of these, we could not agree the resolution.

It was also essential to include the words "as appropriate" in operative paragraph 4. We could not have a blanket obligation to submit all our actions to the Military Staff Committee.

The Prime Minister wishes these points to be conveyed immediately to the Foreign Secretary and to Sir Crispin Tickell in New York. I will convey our strong view on these two points to the White House.

I am copying this letter to Roger Tomkys (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence), to Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Attorney-General's Office), and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Percy Cradock

Ad Hoc Group on The Gulf: 11.00 am on Tuesday
21 August 1990 at No 10

The agenda has been circulated. You will have received today's intelligence update, and also the JIC assessment entitled "The Iraq crisis: Saddam plays with time". You should have seen Mr Reeves's letter of 20 August recording the action agreed at yesterday's meeting of the Group. The latest Sit Rep from the Embargo Surveillance Centre (ESC) is attached to this brief. Some of the points will already have been covered in your Ministerial meeting earlier today.

Item 1: Current Situation - FCO

2. The main themes today are:

(a) United Nations

124 Kuwait
66 Kuwait City
Fruit in person
Baghdad 223
- No record check
75 - Embassy demand
10 in Kuwait
Leaving 5
E.C. collection
convey
Baghdad - 21

- Security Council met last night to discuss a new Resolution authorising the use of force. The discussion was adjourned early this morning without agreement. The Russians and Chinese were without instructions. The Yemenis confirmed that if the Iraqi tanker (below) docked in Aden, they would apply UNSCR 661. The US now reflecting further on UN action.

(b) Iraqi Tankers

I.C.R.C.

- The Omanis have given the US permission to intercept an outward bound tanker (KAHANAKIN) in their waters. The tanker is probably heading for the Aden refinery. The Yemenis (above) have

8th August
U.S. USSR
EC-12. Prohibited
10th August - freight
departure of foreign networks
No information

B



SECRET AND PERSONAL

confirmed they will apply UNSCR 661. The second tanker BABA GUGUR is inbound and reportedly unladen.

(c) Britons in Iraq and Kuwait

- What do we know about numbers removed and where they have been taken?
- Is our advice to them (to stay at home and lie low) still the best that can be given?
- UN emissaries to Baghdad (Mr Dayal and Mr Annan) - anything to report?
- What has been done about Mr Richard Branson's offer of an aircraft to retrieve detainees who might be released through the intercession of the Rev. Jesse Jackson? (FCO and DTP were tasked at yesterday's meeting with following this up.)
- Assistance to Jordan
The Foreign Secretary minuted you yesterday proposing an international effort which the US would have to lead. He expects the matter to be discussed at today's EPC Ministerial meeting.
- What has been done to follow up your instruction yesterday about UK assistance with air or other transport for foreign refugees from Iraq? Have we contacted UNHCR or ICRC?

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(e) Counter-propaganda to the Arab world

- The Foreign Secretary undertook to send you yesterday a paper on psychological warfare. This issue is very important and urgent. When will the paper be ready?

Item 2: Current Situation - MOD

3. The main topics of interest are:

(a) The military situation

- Any significant change since yesterday?

(b) Further British deployments to the Gulf (NOT FOR DISCUSSION)

You will not wish to discuss these at 11 a.m., and will no doubt have been briefed at 10 a.m. The Chiefs of Staff meet this afternoon to consider the options, on the basis of Mr Powell's letter of 20 August recording your decisions on additional aircraft.

(c) Rules of engagement (ROE) (NOT FOR DISCUSSION)

Again you will not wish to discuss at the 11 o'clock Group.

Item 3: Observance of the UN embargo

4. Arising out of the attached Embargo Surveillance Centre's (ESC) Sit Rep, you may wish to ask:

- whether the ferry carrying military equipment from Poland and East Germany is the ship referred to in today's papers as carrying 17 armoured bridgelayers. It is important to prevent this cargo from reaching its destination.

D

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- how far can the embargo at sea be circumvented by air freighting (Berlin airlift style)? Presumably this depends on Iraq having access to heavy freight aircraft. Is there any sign of this?

5. You may wish to ask whether the ESC (who were established only at the end of last week, and are still settling down) have yet produced material that can be forwarded, if necessary in sanitised form, to the UN Sanctions Committee to assist enforcement of the embargo.

Item 4: Safeguards against terrorism

6. The JIC assessed the Iraqi terrorist threat last week (JIC(90)(IA)54). TO(P) met under my chairmanship yesterday to review the threat and the measures Departments are taking to guard against it. You may wish to invite me to report.

Item 5: Points outstanding from the Group's previous meetings

7. The Home Secretary is expected to minute you today proposing a package of measures to tighten immigration controls on Iraqis which was endorsed by the Group last week. (The package might have been more severe but for the risk to British nationals.) You might remind the Home Office that its report to you is still owing.

8. The Group agreed yesterday that it was important that the humanitarian exception for foodstuffs in Security Council Resolution 661 should be rigorously interpreted, and that this should be made clear to the UN Sanctions Committee and the ICRC. You may wish to check that the FCO are putting this message across.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

Item 6: Any other business

9. You may wish to go round the table. Department of Energy should be asked to report on OPEC's refusal to convene an emergency session.

- Will the Saudis now boost their oil production?
- Is appropriate pressure being put on them to do so?
- Are the oil markets behaving reasonably?
- Are the oil companies profiteering? (Early in the crisis President Bush appealed to American oil companies to play their part by showing restraint over prices.)

Item 7: Publicity

10. You will of course be giving a press conference, for which briefing is being prepared separately. Mr Aylett (No 10) will be present to identify issues of interest to the press today.

Next meeting

11. Same time and place tomorrow, under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship.

L V Appleyard
L V APPLEYARD

Cabinet Office
21 August 1990

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE : SITUATION REPORT
AT AT 0600 HRS 21 AUGUST 1990

SUSPECT VESSELS REPORT : 21 AUGUST 1990

BALQEES

Roll on freight ferry, Iraqi flag, carrying military equipment from Poland and E Germany. (Unclassified).

Probably unloading equipment in Tripoli. (SECRET).

TARIQ IBN ZIYAD

Tanker, Iraqi flag. En route Portugal to Tripoli. In Tunisian waters. (SECRET).

We now have evidence of Iraqi bound ships unloading cargoes in North African ports. But there is no evidence so far of these cargoes being reloaded on other ships or on aeroplanes bound for Amman and Baghdad. The ESC is working closely with those concerned to monitor the situation. (SECRET).

A. M

POINTS FOR PRESS CONFERENCE

Substantive and 1 from the rule flow.

A

1. Our starting point is that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is absolutely illegal and unacceptable. If it were to succeed, no small state could ever feel safe again. *President Bush set out the issues admirably in his excellent speech yesterday*

2. There has been an unprecedented degree of unity by the United Nations in condemning Iraq's action and imposing a comprehensive embargo.

3. That is a reflection on Saddam Hussain's appalling reputation as some-one who attacks other countries, other Muslim countries, at will: and subjects his people to nearly ten years of pointless war with hundreds of thousands of casualties. *Now trying to hide behind western women & children.*

Wandy
at night

B

4. The first priority is to enforce the UN embargo and make it one hundred per cent effective. We have already had considerable success. But ^{naval} action will be needed if there are attempts to breach it. We believe we have the authority for that under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the request from the Amir of Kuwait. Discussions are also going on in the UN Security Council about a further resolution. We hope these will have a successful outcome.

C

5. The second priority is to respond to the request from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to defend them against Iraqi attack. The United States has given a magnificent lead. We have remained in the closest touch with them, and sent substantial forces - both naval and air forces - to the area. We are considering whether that contribution should be increased.

C
D

6. Let me emphasise: both the US and Britain see the presence of our forces as defensive. That is their purpose. But you don't send military forces unless they are also ready to fight if necessary.

Enforce sanctions by effective collective action. Embargo must have teeth

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Counsellor

repugnance to
all involved
countries

Kuwait
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7. We are obviously very worried about the way in which Iraq is treating British and other foreign citizens - and the anguish which this is causing their families. It is, as the Foreign Secretary said yesterday, ^{repugnant} ~~repulsive~~: and the repugnance of the international community for Iraq's action is clear. We are doing everything we can for them, working collectively with other European countries, the United States, the Soviet Union and others, as well as through the International Committee of the Red Cross. We shall try to keep members of our Embassy in Kuwait so that they can provide help. It is Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of our people and we shall hold them to that.

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LF

~~Responsibility~~

F

8. As you know, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary are in Paris today for meetings of the WEU and the EC Twelve. I hope these meetings will strengthen the resolve of some of our European friends who have not yet done so, to make a military contribution in the Gulf. I hope it will also confirm solidarity in dealing with the question of our citizens.

and

many

9. I myself had a further talk with President Bush yesterday - and of course my office and the White House have been in constant touch since the President and I met in Washington on 6 August. I shall be seeing the Omani Foreign Minister and Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia later today.

10. Let me just say again: our purpose is to see that the United Nations embargo is strictly enforced and other states defended against attack, so that the lesson is learned that Iraq's aggression will not succeed. We shall not be intimidated.

21 August 1990

Disappointed

lack of action



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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

The Gulf Crisis

I attach the main overnight
Telegramms.

I understand that the UN
Security Council ~~broke~~ broke at


0230 without result. The Americans

are particularly fidgety about an

Iraqi tanker in the Gulf of

Oman, which is due in Aden at

1500 today. Apparently the Yemenis said



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in the Security Council that

they would observe sanctions &
impound the tanker. It is not

clear yet whether the Americans

regard this as sufficient assurance

to delay using force to

halt it.

C.D.P.

21/8.



PM/90/058

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
Re Foreign Security; thoughts
on aid to Jordan. The
balance of payments cost to
Jordan of sanctions is likely
to be around \$1bn. a year.

The Gulf Crisis: Jordan

Some sort of collective effort

1. King Hussein has given a commitment to President Bush that Jordan will enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. It remains to be seen how thoroughly this commitment will be implemented. The King may well be tempted, given his relations with Saddam Hussein and the level of support for Iraq in Jordan, to allow some leakage. Nevertheless his undertaking is an important step forward. We shall do everything we can to keep the King up to the mark. It is essential that Jordan should not be allowed to create a loophole in the UN Embargo.

to help
is
needed.

2. The implementation of sanctions would produce a major economic crisis in Jordan, with a prospect of instability, carrying risks for the regime. The JIC assessed prospects last week. Instability in Jordan would greatly heighten the risk of confrontation between Israel and Iraq.

The
Foreign
Security
will write
in Europe
tomorrow.

3. I attach a paper prepared in the FCO and discussed with other Departments which assesses Jordan's economic position and lists some possible options for international assistance. The conclusion to be drawn from the paper is that the impact of the crisis on the Jordanian balance of

Meanwhile, he
says he
cannot
make
any

/payment

additional
funds from
his own
budget.

P.S. Chief Sec's who attached.

CDP 2078



01
Jackson?

payment will be around \$1 billion over a 12 month period. Jordan's economic position was already precarious. Assistance of this order of magnitude would not guarantee the maintenance of stability. But without it collapse looks inevitable.

4. Before the meeting between King Hussein and President Bush we suggested to the Americans that they look at the possibility of setting up and leading a group of international donors. At the meeting the President raised the possibility of international assistance in very general terms. James Baker confirmed to me over the telephone on 18 August that the US had undertaken to explore the possibilities for economic assistance. I am now instructing our Embassy in Washington to discuss these possibilities further with the Americans on the basis of our paper. The obvious potential donors include Japan, the Government of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi relations with Jordan are at the moment in poor shape, for obvious reasons, but the Saudis too have a considerable interest in stability in Jordan.

5. Jordan's predicament will no doubt be raised at tomorrow's EPC ministerial meeting in Paris. The paper concludes that European assistance would be best mounted done through national contributions perhaps coordinated among the Twelve, rather than through a contribution through the EC budget. But it should be for the US, and not the Twelve to lead.



6. I should make clear that our support for any sort of international rescue package would be conditional on Jordan implementing sanctions in a satisfactory manner. The quicker that this can be established the better the chances of an early solution to the crisis, with financial savings for all, including those other countries badly affected by the imposition of sanctions.

7. The Chief Secretary has addressed (his minute of 16 August) the possible size of a UK contribution and how it should be funded. I cannot agree that I should have to abandon priority FCO/ODA objectives and activities elsewhere and cut their corresponding budgets. These budgets are already under heavy pressure this year and beyond. It will be essential for any UK contribution to international assistance for Jordan to be properly funded from the Reserve, in the same way as has happened in previous international crises.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to Norman Lamont, Lynda Chalker and to Sir Robin Butler.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

20 August 1990

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JORDAN: THE EFFECTS OF THE GULF CRISIS

1. This paper is a preliminary attempt to assess the implications for the Jordanian economy of recent events in the Gulf. It does not aim to draw policy conclusions. The paper falls into two parts. The first attempts to set out how far Jordan's already precarious economic situation will have deteriorated as a result of recent events. It also considers how far this is affected by whether or not the Jordanians themselves apply the UN embargo. The second looks at possible ways to reduce the risk that the economy (and perhaps the regime) will collapse. All the figures are provisional - in part because of the haste with which the paper has been put together, in part because it is impossible to foresee how events will develop. An annex sets out more fully the assumptions on which the figures are based.

2. The most recent comprehensive balance of payments scenario for Jordan was prepared by the IMF for a review of Jordan's SBA programme (paper dated 21 May). We have taken this as the base line against which to compare Jordan's current situation. Ever since Jordan called in the IMF and rescheduled its debt in the Paris Club last year, it has been clear that the financing position for 1990 would be tight. To balance the external account in 1990 the Fund optimistically assumed an 11% increase in exports, 15% increase in remittances, \$380 million in Arab aid, \$50 million of new money from the commercial banks, and some \$100 million in fast disbursing money from the World Bank. Some of these assumptions already appeared implausible even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: owing to slippage particularly on fiscal targets, the Jordanians and the IMF were planning to renegotiate the programme in August.

I. The Financial Cost to Jordan of the Gulf Crisis

3. Over the last few years, as a consequence of Jordan's support for Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war, the Jordanian economy has become heavily dependent on Iraq. In 1988 Iraq accounted for 10% of Jordan's total imports and takes 16% of its exports. A further

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what?
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2.5% is exported to Kuwait. Oil imports, which account for about one sixth of the import bill, come predominantly from Iraq (65% in 1988); Kuwait supplied a further 10%. The services sector, which accounts for two thirds of GDP, is heavily oriented towards Iraq.

4. The impact on Jordan's balance of payments of fully supporting the embargo might be as much as \$1 billion in a full year. Visible exports would fall by around \$230 million in a year if alternative markets are not found. The oil price rise, together with resourcing of imports previously received from Iraq under a trade clearing arrangement, will cost a further \$170-270 million, assuming an oil price of \$25/barrel is maintained. Workers' remittances, which amount to \$0.7 ^{billion} ~~million~~ a year and come mostly from Gulf countries, are likely to fall. The value of services provided for Iraq is estimated to be in the region of \$100 - 200 million (Amman telnos 394 and 415), all of which would be lost. Aid from Iraq and Kuwait will presumably cease as would cash debt repayments from Iraq.

5. A breakdown of these figures is set out below. Given the complicated nature of the trade clearing arrangements between Jordan and Iraq, these figures are particularly uncertain; explanatory notes are attached at Annex A.

	\$ million
<u>Trade account</u>	
(1) Visible exports	- 230
(2) Additional cost of oil imports	- 170 / 270
<u>Invisible account</u>	
(3) Workers remittances	- 175 / 375
(4) Services	- 100 / 200
(5) Arab aid receipts	- 50 / 150
<u>Capital account</u>	
(6) Debt repayment from Iraq	- 70

Total	- 800 / 1295

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6. In addition to these costs, other inflows, totalling over \$300 million, which Jordan was expecting this year are likely to be held up for the duration of the crisis. Jordan's IMF programme is likely to remain in suspense, holding up disbursements of some \$40 million. This in turn would hold up a \$75 million tranche of the World Bank's Investment and Trade Policy Loan (ITAL). The Jordanians were hoping for \$150 million of Japanese cofinancing with this loan. The \$50 million new money expected as part of the London Club rescheduling is also likely to be held up.

Cost to Jordan of supporting the embargo

7. If Jordan supports the embargo, it could not continue to receive Iraqi oil. The advantage to Jordan of sourcing oil from Iraq is that it can pay by barter rather than cash. (This would of course allow Iraq to obtain food from Jordan up to the value of the oil supplied. As Iraq's capacity to make cash payments diminishes on account of the blockade, there would be a decreasing incentive for Jordan to export to Iraq beyond this level.) Continuation of Iraqi supply could therefore substantially reduce the trade account losses identified at both (1) and (2) above. But evading the embargo would not prevent the losses on the invisible account, since remittances and aid receipts would still be affected, and Iraq has no cash to pay for services. So, even if Jordan does not support the embargo, it faces losses of at least \$300 - 800 million on the balance of payments.

Cost to Jordan of not supporting the embargo

8. If Jordan were flagrantly to circumvent the UN embargo, the four fifths of its trade with countries other than Iraq would be severely affected, as would expected capital account inflows. There is even the threat that the embargo might be extended to all trade through Aqaba. The net result could be even larger losses than outlined above. Surreptitious circumvention of sanctions might not generate such a marked response.

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II. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY

Oil supplies

9. The most effective relief that could be given to Jordan would be oil supplies on favourable terms. The Tapline pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Jordan, although in poor repair, has a 0.5mbd capacity (more than current Iraqi supplies) and could quickly be upgraded to supply Jordan (Amman telno 632). Alternatively more limited supplies could be shipped from the Saudi terminal at Yanbu to Aqaba. If Saudi Arabia is prepared to contribute to efforts to support Jordan (see para 22 below), the provision of free or subsidised oil might be the most attractive form for their contribution.

Alternative markets for exports

10. The 11% increase in exports this year projected by the IMF already seemed optimistic, given the upheaval in Eastern European countries which are the main market for Jordanian phosphate. Exports to Iraq are predominantly agricultural and manufactured goods (mainly construction materials and textile products). With protected world markets for both agricultural and textile goods, finding markets for these products will be difficult. With the likelihood of slower world growth, the prospects for construction materials do not look good either.

Reducing debt service payments

11. According to latest IMF figures, Jordan was due to make interest payments of some \$500 million and principal payments of some \$200 million this year. This includes:

- about \$200 million to Paris Club creditors (about £24 million to the UK); this is interest only, since Jordan's last Paris Club rescheduling covered principal for 1990;
- about \$80 million to commercial banks; this again is interest only since the banks have offered to reschedule principal for 1990 (the deal is yet to be concluded due to the Jordanian wish for concessions on debt reduction and new

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money);

- about \$60 million in interest and \$90 million in principal to the IFIs;

- about \$100 million in interest and principal to Arab and other countries.

Only a very small amount of this has so far been paid; it was questionable even before the invasion whether anything like the full amount would actually have been paid by the end of the year.

12. It is now very likely that Jordan will default on some or all of these payments - with damaging consequences for future flows from ECAs and banks. If it defaults on Paris Club payments, these might presumably be rescheduled post facto following a further IMF agreement. For Jordan to go into arrears with the IFIs would seriously damage its long-term reputation.

Reducing imports

13. The IMF projected imports to rise by 5% this year, after a fall of 12% last year. There is little scope for import compression, particularly given the current level of popular unrest.

Drawing down reserves

14. The IMF projected a rise of some \$140 million in reserves from their very low 1989 level. This will almost certainly not now happen, but there is no scope for further reserve drawdown.

Money from the IFIs

15. The IMF cannot provide further assistance to Jordan until it gets its adjustment programme back on track. We must assume this will not be till after the crisis is over. It would be contrary to our normal policy to encourage the IMF to put further money at risk in Jordan while the political situation is so uncertain. The World Bank may continue disbursing on project loans, but fast-disbursing lending will have to await reactivation of the IMF programme. The IFIs may be able to help in picking up some of the

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mess afterwards, including making good any drawdown from the scanty reserves, but there is no prospect of any immediate help from this source.

Money from EC

16. "Topping up" the Third Financial Protocol to the EC/Jordan Cooperation Agreement At the EPC Ministerial meeting on 10 August, M Delors suggested that one way for the EC to help Jordan would be to provide further funds through the Third Financial Protocol (3FP). The 3FP provides 100 mecu to Jordan, over four years, expiring on 31 October 1991. 63 mecu is in the form of European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, and 37 mecu is in the form of grants from the Community's budgetary resources. The funds are used for development projects in Jordan, mainly agriculture, water resources, industry and education. Delors said that these funds were already exhausted. Our records show that only 57% of the EIB loans, and 50% of the grants have been committed, though the rest may have been earmarked in discussion between the Commission and the Jordanians.

17. A "top-up" could be effected by a Council decision to allocate additional funds to the 3FP from within existing resources (there is 50 mecu spare in the 1991 budget). But amendments to the 3FP would require approval by the European Parliament as well as the Council. This process would probably not be complete until October or November at the earliest, although the EC could state its political commitment in advance. The funds themselves would probably not be available before early 1991. The UK contribution would be in the order of 20% of the total. Attribution would fall to the ODA.

18. Community Facility for Jordan: The Community could agree to a range of measures for Jordan in a similar way as was done last year for Poland and Hungary. These measures ranged from the provision of food aid to support for Hungarian and Polish currencies in the form of loans at advantageous rates (Hungary was given a medium term loan of \$1 billion in principle guaranteed from the EC budget). The EC also offered large EIB loans (\$1

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billion for Hungary and Poland). These measures were taken in response to specific needs assessed by Commission fact-finding teams.

19. Again, if modest enough, such a move could stay within agreed financial ceilings (ie under 50 mecu in 1991). A larger EC gesture would involve a revision of the Financial Perspectives. This would erode budget discipline (containment of the budget is a major UK objective) and might create an unhelpful precedent for other countries wanting EC assistance. The UK contribution would again be about 20%: the question of attribution would be a potential difficulty.

20. Co-ordinated Contributions by the Twelve on a National Basis: This might be the most effective "European" approach. See para 25 below.

Money from Arabs

21. Arab States have been making direct financial contributions to Jordan since at least 1978, but only Saudi Arabia's payments have been at all regular. Under pledges made at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in May Jordan has already received \$295 million from other Arab states this year. Principal sums have been Saudi Arabia (\$100 million), UAE (\$60 million) and Kuwait (\$50 million plus \$35 million in oil). In July the Jordanian Finance Minister claimed firm pledges for a further \$75 million; this would have brought the total to more than the \$360 million Arab aid envisaged in the 1990 budget.

22. The prospects for further help in the current crisis depend on the attitude of Saudi Arabia. The Jordanians had hoped that the \$100 million from Saudi Arabia would be first installment of their assistance, but the Saudis have presented it as a non-recurrent payment. There has been increasing Saudi reluctance to support Jordan financially, partly because of Saudi Arabia's own financial concerns, partly because they feel they have been paying more than their share, and partly because they believe Jordan has not always spent the money wisely. King Hussein has not helped himself by

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publicly criticising the positioning of US forces in Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis may take into account the strategic importance of discouraging Jordan from evading the embargo, and averting the collapse of the regime.

23. The other Gulf states, particularly the UAE, could be approached for contributions: broadly the same considerations apply to them, although they have traditionally been more laggardly in their donations, and are less immediately threatened by a Jordanian collapse.

Kuwaiti Funds

24. If Saudi Arabia took the lead in an Arab aid effort, a further contribution might be forthcoming from Kuwaiti funds. At their recent meeting, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister did not respond to Mr Waldegrave's suggestion that funds might be used to assist those countries suffering as a result of the embargo. The freeze on Kuwaiti assets might present legal obstacles to the use of funds to assist Jordan, although many Kuwaiti-owned businesses are continuing to operate and generate income. But depending on developments, the Kuwaitis might find it difficult to resist pressure from the other Arabs.

Money from Western Donors

25. Jordan was already in discussion with Japan about the provision of \$150 million balance of payments support in connection with its adjustment programme. Although these discussions will be in abeyance pending the reactivation of the IMF programme, Japan might be persuaded to make a financial contribution on an emergency basis. President Bush has already told Prime Minister Kaifu that a financial contribution from Japan would be welcome to compensate for its inability to contribute to the military effort against Saddam Hussein. Japan is perhaps more likely to contribute as part of a combined effort with other donors, in which the US would have to take a lead.

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26. If there were an international fund involving the US and Japan, we could press our European partners that the Twelve should agree to contribute (on a national basis) to such a Fund. The amount of the contributions could be co-ordinated and the outcome published as an effort by the Twelve. Something similar was done in the case of the US-launched \$1 billion Polish Stabilisation Fund (UK contribution \$100 million). Such a collective approach might be the best way to obtain realistic contributions from European countries.

Help from the UK

27. The UK would be expected to contribute to any International Fund. One possible form for such a contribution would be balance of payments aid. This could not be done on the basis of existing PES provision.

28. The Jordanians have suggested that we might provide them with technical assistance on the application of sanctions. It is not clear what expertise we could offer; and the provision of such assistance could identify us too closely with the extent to which the Jordanian authorities are implementing sanctions.

Use of Article 50 of the UN charter

29. Article 50 of the UN charter allows the Security Council to decide that assistance be provided to countries suffering as a result of sanctions imposed by the UN. The UN does not itself have any balance of payments funds which could be triggered by such a decision, and any assistance its agencies could in the longer term provide Jordan is not relevant to the immediate problem. On previous occasions where Article 50 has been invoked (for Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana in the context of sanctions against Rhodesia) the Security Council have appealed for help from bilateral donors. It is possible that a decision under Article 50

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would make it easier for some donors to contribute (perhaps Japan, Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti Funds and France). But any decision in favour of Jordan could lead to a long queue of other claimants. India, Bulgaria and Turkey are already reported to be seeking support under the Article.

Economic Relations Department/ Economic Advisers
15 August 1990 (7pm version)

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ANNEX A: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON CALCULATIONS

1. The figures have been calculated in the following way:

(1) Exports: 16% of Jordan's exports go to Iraq; a further 2.5% go to Kuwait. Jordan's total exports are around \$1,250 million giving a total for lost exports of \$230 million. This is broadly in line with the \$200 million figure quoted in Telno 415 from Amman. It of course assumes that products are not diverted elsewhere.

(2) Oil imports: Jordan imports 2.4 million tons of crude oil (approximately 19 million barrels) a year of which. In addition it imports 0.6 million tons of oil products. In 1988 75% of this came from Iraq and Kuwait; the balance came from Saudi Arabia. It is not clear what price Jordan currently pays for its oil. It claims it receives oil from Iraq at a discounted prices as repayment for war debt. This is not supported by IMF data for 1988, although the situation may have changed since the end of the Iran/Iraq war. Telno 425 from Amman claims the total oil import bill in the first half of the year was only \$163 million, (implying an annual figure of \$326 million). At world market prices for the first half of the year (roughly \$18/barrel) Jordan would have had to pay roughly \$215 million for this (\$430 for a year). If Jordan is now forced to pay current world prices (say \$25/barrel) it would face an annual oil import bill of \$597 million. (Telno 415 quotes Jordanian estimates of \$600 million). The additional cost is therefore \$170 (compared with a no discount baseline of \$430 million) but could be as high as \$270 million (if the discounted baseline of \$326 million is correct).

(3) Remittances: 330,000 Jordanians work abroad, of which half are in Saudi Arabia. They remitted \$0.9 ^{b/}million in 1987 and 1988 but only \$0.6 ^{b/}million last year. This year IMF projections for remittances are \$0.7 ^{b/}million. It is not clear how remittances will be affected but with workers returning home and others not remitting a 25-50% fall in remittances does seems plausible.

(4) Services: there is no data to confirm the figures quoted in telno 394 and 415 form Amman on the value of Jordan's export of services to Iraq. Net services excluding remittances amount to only \$20 million - \$1,280 in receipts and \$1,260 on payments. The receipts include travel (\$548 million) investment income (\$40 million) and other services, mostly freight and insurance, accounts for \$412 million. On

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this basis the upper and lower range \$ 100-200 million of the figures quoted in the telegrams seem reasonable and have been used.

(5) Aid: of the \$431 million aid Jordan received in 1988 \$293 was bilateral aid form Arab countries. This year Jordan has already received \$295 million in Arab aid: UAE \$60m, Kuwait \$50m, Iraq \$25m, Qatar \$20m, Oman \$5m, and Saudi Arabia \$100m. But more than this was pledged: Iraq was due to pay another \$25m. The Jordanian Minister of Finance described the Saudi figure of \$100 million as a first instalment although the Saudis are treating it as a non-recurrent payment. At the very least Jordan is likely to receive \$50 million less than it expected to from Iraq and Kuwait. The \$150 million figure implies no further receipts at all.

(6) Debt repayment: Iraq was due to repay Jordan \$144 million in monthly sums (in addition to discounted oil supplies). It is not clear how much of this has been paid only that the last monthly payment was two months overdue. The \$70 million figure is based on the assumption that roughly half of the figure was paid in the first half of the year.

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20th August, 1990.



*Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman
44a, 44b, Montpelier Square
London SW7
Telephone: 01.584 6782 Telex: 918775
Fax: 01.225 0339*

Ref: 453/90.

TOP URGENT

Mr. Charles Powell,
Private Secretary to
The Prime Minister,
Ten Downing Street,
London, SW1.

*Replied
25/8*

Dear Mr Powell,

I would like to request an appointment for His Excellency Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, to meet The Prime Minister in order to deliver a letter from His Majesty Sultan Qaboos.

His Excellency will be arriving in London at 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday, 21st August, and leaving early on Saturday morning 25th August.

I should be most grateful to receive your confirmation as soon as possible.

Abdulla Mohamed Al-Dhahab,
Ambassador.



FILE KIC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

ack - mod.

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1990

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from the Amir of Qatar in response to her message of 9 August.

n I should be grateful for your advice please, to reach me by 27 August.

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

off



ccp

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 86621 (Direct Dialling)
071-21 89000 (Switchboard)

Minister of State
for Defence Procurement

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/70

20 August 1990

Dear Charles,

PAKT 23

--- I enclose a letter from the Amir of Qatar to the Prime Minister. This was handed to Mr Clark during his recent trip and has not been opened. We have not kept a copy but would obviously be interested to know of its contents if they are relevant to us.

Yours

David

D R A Hatcher
Assistant Private Secretary

Charles D Powell Esq.,
10 Downing Street

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102524
MDHOAN 4677

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FM FCO
TO FLASH PARIS
TELNO 548

SUBJECT CO MASTER
O/S

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T196190

OF 201915Z AUGUST 90
AND TO DESKBY 210600Z AMMAN
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER ME POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY : IRAQ/KUWAIT : MESSAGE FOR
KING HUSSEIN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO KING HUSSEIN WHICH, PROVIDED THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS
CONTENT, SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY AMMAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TRIGGER TELEGRAM.

BEGINS :

OUR AMBASSADOR HAS CONVEYED TO ME YOUR MESSAGE OF 18 AUGUST.
I AM GLAD THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND
HAVE A THOROUGH TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHO FELT THAT THE
MEETING HAD GONE WELL. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR BEING ABLE
TO TALK THROUGH THESE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES TOGETHER. I HOPE
VERY MUCH THAT WE SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY SOON TO DO SO,
AND TO GO INTO THE MANY DIFFERENT ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE JORDAN'S NEED FOR
SOME FORM OF MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP MEET THE COSTS
TO JORDAN OF APPLYING UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

I SHOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU, AND
HOPE YOUR MAJESTY WOULD LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU INTEND TO COME
TO LONDON. MEANWHILE, I THINK YOU KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN
SECRETARY IS HOPING TO VISIT JORDAN IN THE FIRST WEEK OF
SEPTEMBER. IF YOU WERE ABLE TO SEE HIM THEN, IT WOULD BE MOST
HELPFUL. IT IS VITAL THAT BRITAIN AND JORDAN SHOULD MAINTAIN
THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONTACT IN THESE VERY DIFFICULT TIMES.
ENDS

HURD

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PAGE 2
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cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1990

MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN

Thank you for your letter of 20 August enclosing a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to King Hussein. I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister has approved. Provided the Foreign Secretary is content, it may be despatched to our Ambassador in Amman for delivery.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PC
EAM
FCU
bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET - -
LONDON SW1A 2AA

(Despatched
unsigned)

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 August 1990

Our Ambassador has conveyed to me your message of 18 August. I am glad that you were able to visit the United States and have a thorough talk with the President, who felt that the meeting had gone well. There is no substitute for being able to talk through these very difficult issues together. I hope very much that we shall have an opportunity soon to do so, and to go into the many different aspects and implications of the present crisis. This would include Jordan's need for some form of multilateral assistance to help meet the costs to Jordan of applying United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

I should be happy to meet at any time convenient to you, and hope Your Majesty would let me know when you intend to come to London. Meanwhile, I think you know that the Foreign Secretary is hoping to visit Jordan in the first week of September. If you were able to see him then, it would be most helpful. It is vital that Britain and Jordan should maintain the closest possible contact in these very difficult times.

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal, G.C.B.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

Our Ambassador has conveyed to me your message of 18 August, ^{for} ~~for~~ which I am grateful. I am ~~also~~ glad that you were able to visit the United States and have a thorough talk with the President, who felt that the meeting had gone well. There is no substitute for being able to talk through these very difficult ^{issues} ~~issues~~ face to face, and I hope very much that we shall have an opportunity soon to do so, ^{and to go} ~~We need to go into~~ ^{many different} ~~all~~ the aspects and implications of the present crisis. This would include Jordan's need for some form of multilateral assistance to help meet the costs to Jordan of applying United Nations sanctions against Iraq, ^{as well as the} ~~as well as the~~

I should be happy to meet at any time convenient to you, and hope Your Majesty would let me know when you intend to come to London. Meanwhile, I think you know that the Foreign Secretary is hoping to visit Jordan in the first week of September. If you were able to see him then, it would be most helpful. It is vital that Britain and Jordan should maintain the closest possible contact in these very difficult times.

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal, G.C.B.



DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SW1A 2NS

Telephone 071-210 3000

From the Secretary of State for Social Security

Prime Minister?

You asked me to look into this report. It would seem that a very limited and small payment might in theory be available to Iraqi students.

20 August 1990.

But we are not aware of any applications.

Caroline Slocock
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Caroline,

DAILY STAR ARTICLE - "IRAQUIS GET THE DOLE"

MS 20/8

You asked for a note on the article which appeared in the Daily Star today.

The article is factually incorrect - there are only 895 students in this country rather than the 2,000 mentioned, and this has been made quite clear to the Daily Star. At this stage we are not aware of any Iraqi students who have made a claim for benefit. Should circumstances arise where any student is without financial support, it may be possible for an urgent case payment to be made for a limited period at a reduced rate of 90 per cent of the normal Income Support allowance. I must emphasise again however, that no such claims have been made.

I am enclosing a copy of the line to take.

Debbie Heigh

DEBBIE HEIGH
Private Secretary

IRAQUIS GET THE DOLE

Article in Daily Star 20 August 1990

Line to take:

Income Support serves as the "safety net" for people in need who are not eligible for other forms of financial support.

It is not freely available to everyone entering the country but those who have been given leave to stay temporarily in this country by the Immigration Authorities, for example students, can get benefit in special circumstances under the Urgent Cases rules.

One such circumstance is where, having previously supported themselves in this country, their funds from abroad are temporarily disrupted. Payment can be made for a limited period.

D3B
Adelphi
20 Aug 1990

IRAQUIS GET THE DOLE

Article in Daily Star 20 August 1990

Line to take:

Income Support serves as the "safety net" for people in need who are not eligible for other forms of financial support.

It is not freely available to everyone entering the country but those who have been given leave to stay temporarily in this country by the Immigration Authorities, for example students, can get benefit in special circumstances under the Urgent Cases rules.

One such circumstance is where, having previously supported themselves in this country, their funds from abroad are temporarily disrupted. Payment can be made for a limited period.

D3B
Adelphi
20 Aug 1990





Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

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20 August 1990

Dear Caroline,

CG 25P

Message for King Hussein

The Prime Minister will have her own view on how far she is ready to conciliate King Hussein's hurt feelings, reflected in his message of 18 August (Amman talnos 433 and 434). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's advice is that his own proposed visit to Amman (already trailed with Crown Prince Hassan) and some general words of encouragement would strike the right balance.

/ I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Miss Caroline Slocock
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN

Thank you for your message of 18 August.

In these dangerous times, it is essential that we should be able to communiante cordially and face together the threat to the security of the whole of your region which Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has brought about. I am sorry that you should have taken exception to my earlier messages but they were a mesage of the importance I attach to working with you for the restoration of regional security and the full implementation of SCR 660.

I share your hope that we will be able to meet again soon. Meanwhile I know that Douglas Hurd has mentioned to Crown Prince Hassan his intention, if at all possible and if it is welcome to you, to come to Jordan during his visit to the region in the first week of September. I agree with you that we must maintain the closest possible contact and ensure that there are no possible misunderstandings between such firm friends.

SECRET



PL6
EM

A: Foreign (Iraq)
bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT: ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT

The Prime Minister has reflected further on the discussion earlier today as to whether we should send some additional aircraft to the Gulf. She has concluded that the sensible course would be to send some more air defence aircraft, to be based in or among the smaller Gulf States (Bahrain, UAE, Qatar). At the same time, some Tornado ground attack aircraft could be brought forward to Cyprus - if they are not there already - so that they could be moved forward into Saudi Arabia relatively easily should the situation warrant it.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Miss Jane Binstead
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

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OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP TEN 20 AUG 1990

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION GRANBY WILL BE ISSUED DAILY AT 2359Z. ADDRESSES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS THEY REQUIRE.
2. INTELLIGENCE. AT LEAST ONE RGFC DIVISION HAS BEEN RELIEVED FROM ITS POSITION ON THE FEBA IN KUWAIT. TWO MORE RGFC DIVISIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE RELIEVED WHICH WILL ALLOW ALL THREE DIVISIONS TO REGROUP, RESOLVE THEIR LOGISTIC PROBLEMS AND PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. WHEN THIS PROCESS IS COMPLETE THE RGFC DIVISIONS WILL POSE A GREATER THREAT: HOWEVER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE STATIONED IN NORTHERN KUWAIT OR SOUTHERN IRAQ WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE WARNING TIME OF THEIR COMMITMENT.
3. POLITICAL SITUATION. IRAQ HAS CONFIRMED THAT ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS IN KUWAIT ARE TO CLOSE BY FRIDAY. AFTER THEN, DIPLOMATIC STAFF WILL BE TREATED AS ANY FOREIGN NATIONAL. A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IS TO TAKE PLACE TOMORROW IN PARIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL ATTEND. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 HAS BEEN PASSED. THIS RESOLUTION EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AND DEMANDS THAT IRAQ PERMIT THEIR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE.
4. US DISPOSITIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL FORCE DISPOSITIONS. HOWEVER, THE US MARINE CORP PLANS TO DEPLOY 40 AV8 HARRIERS, 11 C130 HERCULES, 72 F18 HORNETS AND 20 A6 INTRUDER AIRCRAFT TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA BY THE 23 AUG 90.
5. ROYAL NAVY OPERATIONS. BATTLEAXE AND JUPITER ARE ON PATROL IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE GULF. HMS YORK IS IN JEBEL ALI COMPLETING AN OLYMPUS ENGINE CHANGE AND THE FRA ORANGELEAF IS ON PATROL IN THE GULF OF OMAN. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE DEPLOYING UNITS.
6. RAF OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF RAF AIR ASSETS ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. THE HIGH FLYING RATE HAS NOW REDUCED. THE OFFENSIVE SUPPORT WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TO CYPRUS AND RESUPPLY MISSIONS CONTINUE. SINCE ARRIVAL THE TORNADO F3S AT DHAHRAN HAVE FLOWN 56 SORTIES AND THE

JAGUARS AT THUMRAIT HAVE COMPLETED 34 SORTIES. AT SEEB NIMRODS ARE FLYING 2 MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES PER DAY IN THE GULF OF OMAN AND THE SOUTHERN GULF. THEY ARE PROVIDING SUCH A GOOD SERVICE TO THE USS INDEPENDENCE THAT US MPA HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM OPERATING IN THE GULF. IN CYPRUS THE 4 RAF REGT RAPIER BLINDFIRE UNITS ARE IN POSITION AT AKROTIRI. THE AVFUEL REPLENISHMENT SHIP IS EXPECTED TOMORROW, AND FUEL IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED A PROBLEM. MEANWHILE ON THE PR FRONT A VC-10 CARRYING A PRESS PARTY LEFT BRIZE NORTON THIS MORNING TO VISIT UK FORCES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. THEY ARE DUE IN DHAHRAN SHORTLY BUT HAVE NOT BEEN GRANTED PERMISSION TO CONTINUE ON TO OMAN.

7. LOGISTICS. NO NEW LOGISTICS PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

8. MILITARY CONFLICT. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT
BT

YYYY

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(CABINET OFFICE)
RESIDENT CLERK

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O 202017Z AUG 90
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE

BT

S E C R E T AND PERSONAL
MESSAGE FROM CHARLES POWELL
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

IF YOU COULD FIND FIVE OR TEN MINUTES IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE
DAYS FOR A TALK ON THE SECURE LINE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. I
KNOW HOW PRESSED YOU ARE: BUT THERE ARE SOME POINTS WHICH THE
PRIME MINISTER HAS ASKED ME TO RAISE. I CAN MAKE MYSELF AVAILABLE
WHENEVER CONVENIENT TO YOU. PERHAPS YOU COULD LET ME KNOW WHEN
WOULD BE A GOOD TIME.

YOURS,

CHARLES.

ENDS

NNNN

①

PRIME MINISTER

Prince Bandar is in town and has asked to see you tomorrow afternoon. I have put him in the diary for 1600. He has also asked for intelligence briefing. I am trying to arrange for this immediately beforehand.

C DP

MS

(C. D. POWELL)
20 August 1990

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UK COMMS ONLY

FM RIYADH

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 703

OF 200845Z AUGUST 90

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INFO PRIORITY SANA'A, PARIS, CABINET OFFICE, MOSCOW, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CANBERRA, ESC LONDON
INFO SAVING JFHQ RIYADH

SIC AAA/I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US DEFENCE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN DHAHRAN

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS VISIT TO US TROOPS IN DHAHRAN, CHENEY EMPHASISED THAT US FORCES WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA AT THE REQUEST OF KING FAHD. THEY WOULD STAY FOR AS LONG AS THE SITUATION REQUIRED, AND LEAVE AS SOON AS THEIR TASK WAS COMPLETED, OR WHEN ASKED TO DO SO BY KING FAHD. HE ADDED THAT US FORCES WERE WORKING ALONGSIDE THE FORCES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER FOREIGN UNITS DEPLOYED IN THE GULF. THEY HAD A THREE FOLD MISSION: TO DETER FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION ('WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS THAT IF THEY LAUNCH ANY ASSAULT ON SAUDI ARABIA THEY WILL BE MEETING AMERICAN AND SAUDI FORCES'): TO PROTECT SAUDI TERRITORY, IN COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES: AND TO UNDERTAKE TRAINING PROGRAMMES AND MILITARY MANOEUVRES WITH THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES AND OTHERS IN THE REGION SO AS TO RAISE THE LATTER'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

COMMENT

2. THE INITIAL FEELING OF RELIEF AMONG SAUDIS AT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES HAS BEGUN TO SUBSIDE, AND THE INEVITABLE QUESTIONS ARE BEING ASKED ABOUT US INTENTIONS. A REMARK TO THE PRESS BY CHENEY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE GULF TO THE EFFECT THAT US TROOPS WERE LIKELY TO BE IN SAUDI FOR A LONG TIME RAISED EYEBROWS AMONG OUR SAUDI CONTACTS. QUESTIONS ARE BEGINNING TO BE ASKED AS TO WHETHER THE AMERICANS REALLY INTEND TO LEAVE, AND ALSO WHO IS PAYING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT. THERE ARE ALSO SOME SIGNS OF CONCERN THAT THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES ARE BEING PUSHED TO ONE SIDE. THIS REACTION MAY SEEM UNGRATEFUL, BUT IT IS RELATED TO THE UNDERLYING

SENSITIVITIES ABOUT FOREIGN INTERVENTION (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) PER SE. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, CHENEY'S REMARKS IN DHAHRAN WERE INTENDED TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE QUESTION OF A CONTINUING US PRESENCE HERE. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A SIMILAR LINE, AND WILL DO SO WITH GROWING NUMBER OF UK JOURNALITIST BEING LET IN.

3. ASSUMING WE (AND THE AMERICANS?) ARE MEEING MOST OF THE COSTS OF OUR RESPECTIVE DEPLOYMENTS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD NOW MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY, AND TRY ALSO TO NAIL THE NEGATIVE CRITICISM RELATING TO COSTS. THE SAUDIS ARE UNLIKELY TO WISH TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF COST IN THEIR OWN MEDIA. BUT MIGHT IT BE POSSIBLE TO STIMULATE A WORLD SERVICE/ARABIC SERVICE ITEM OR INTERVIEW TO PUT RECORD STRAIGHT ON WHERE COSTS OF OUR CURRENT DEPLOYMENT FALL? IT WOULD BE HELPFUL P.R. HERE.

MUNRO

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FM KUWAIT
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 448
OF 201500Z AUGUST 1990
INFO IMMEDIATE TO BAGHDAD

FLASH

YRTELNO. 289: COMMUNITY SIZE.

1. OUR ORIGINAL ESTIMATE OF ABOUT 3,000 BRITISH PASSPORT HOLDERS IN KUWAIT ON 1 AUGUST WAS BASED ON A GUESS THAT ABOUT HALF THE COMMUNITY WAS ON LEAVE OR GOING WITHIN A FEW DAYS (MANY MEN SEND THEIR FAMILIES AHEAD AND THEN TAKE THEIR ONE MONTH PER YEAR IN AUGUST WHEN KUWAIT MORE OR LESS CLOSES DOWN). IN ADDITION TO THIS WE ESTIMATED 100 AUSTRALIANS, 100 IRISH AND POSSIBLY 500 ASSORTED COMMONWEALTH WHO DO NOT HAVE REPRESENTATION HERE AND WHO DO NOT NORMALLY GET AROUND TO MAKING CONTACT WITH US, EG KENYANS, SEYCHELLOISE, MAURITIANS AND WEST INDIANS. A SURPRISING NUMBER OF PEOPLE CLAIMING DUAL NATIONALITY ALSO SURFACED WHEN IT APPEARED WE MIGHT ORGANISE AN AIRLIFT.

2. IN VIEW OF OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE WE SHOULD NOW BE INCLINED TO REDUCE THE TOTAL OF BRITISH CITIZENS TO ABOUT 2,300= AND TO REDUCE THE OTHER NUMBERS TO A TOTAL OF ABOUT 500 COMMONWEALTH AND IRISH. WE KNOW THAT OVER TWO HUNDRED BRITISH HAVE REACHED SAUDI ARABIA, AND A FURTHER 200 OR SO HAVE GONE TO BAGHDAD, WHETHER VOLUNTARILY OR NOT. MANY OF THE MAIDS, MAURITIAN OR SEYCHELLOISE, WILL REMAIN INVISIBLE UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT, BUT SOME WILL HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS.

3. ESTIMATES FOR OTHER COMMUNITIES ARE FRENCH 250, GERMANS 200, US 2,000, DUTCH 150, ITALIAN 80.

WESTON
ADVANCE

31 27,

IRAQ/KUWAIT
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PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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FM PARIS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 959

OF 201157Z AUGUST 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ANKARA, OTHER EC POSTS, ACTOR

INFO IMMEDIATE ESC LONDON,

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PEKING

MY TELNOS 956 AND 957 AND TELECON CATON/EMERGENCY UNIT :

FOREIGN COMMUNITIES : FRENCH REACTION *ms*

SUMMARY

1. FRENCH USE TOUGHER LANGUAGE ABOUT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF BUT UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS REFLECTS NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. QUAI ANNOUNCE THAT 27 FRENCH NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. MITTERRAND TO HOLD ANOTHER RESTRICTED COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING ON 21 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. THE FRENCH HELD OFF SAYING ANYTHING OFFICIALLY ABOUT THE FATE OF THEIR NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF 19 AUGUST. BUT AT 12.30 LOCAL THEY ANNOUNCED THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO FRENCH NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF TO 'APPLY VERIFICATION, CONTROL AND CONSTRAINT MEASURES WITH FIRMNESS' TO ENSURE THAT THE U N EMBARGO WAS RESPECTED. THE QUAI SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT NO EMBARGO MADE SENSE UNLESS IT WAS EFFICIENT BUT GAVE NO DETAILS ABOUT WHAT MEASURES WERE INVOLVED. IT IS UNCLEAR AS YET WHETHER THE INSTRUCTIONS TO FRENCH NAVAL FORCES HAVE BEEN CHANGED : THE QUAI DIRECTOR FOR THE U N IMPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT.

3. THEN AT 13.30 LOCAL AFTER INFORMATION HAD BEGUN TO LEAK ON FRENCH TV LUNCHTIME NEWS ABOUT FRENCH PEOPLE BEING MOVED, THE QUAI ANNOUNCED THAT TWENTY-SIX FRENCH PEOPLE IN HOTELS IN BAGHDAD AND ONE FRENCHMAN IN A HOTEL IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. FRANCE HAD PROTESTED OFFICIALLY BOTH IN BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT AND HAD ASKED TO BE TOLD WHERE THEY WERE AND TO BE PUT IN CONTACT. THE QUAI SPOKESMAN ADMITTED THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAD TOLD FRANCE ON 18 AUGUST OF THEIR INTENTION TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE MEASURES THEY HAD ANNOUNCED RECENTLY CONCERNING FOREIGNERS, ADDING THAT FRENCH EMBASSIES IN

KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD WERE IN DAILY CONTACT WITH FRENCH NATIONALS AND WERE ABLE TO OFFER ADVICE AS THE SITUATION EVOLVED.

4. THE QUAI SPOKESMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT FRANCE REAFFIRMED ITS COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE COMMUNITIES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ WERE CURRENTLY UNDER THREAT. FRANCE WAS PLAYING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE U N SECURITY COUNCIL TO FURTHER THE INTER-NATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS TO FREE ALL FOREIGNERS HELD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

5. AN ELYSEE SPOKESMAN SEPARATELY ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CALLING A RESTRICTED COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING FOR 1700 LOCAL ON 21 AUGUST. THOSE PRESENT WOULD BE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE, EDUCATION, DEFENCE, INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC SERVICE MINISTERS.

COMMENT

6. THE QUAI HAVE THROUGHOUT BEEN MORE RETICENT WITH INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR CITIZENS THAN WE HAVE. THEY WERE CAUGHT ON THE HOP OVER THE WEEKEND AND HAD TO COME CLEAN ABOUT FRENCH CITIZENS BEING MOVED. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO SPECULATION (EG FITCHETT IN TODAY'S HERALD TRIBUNE) - STRONGLY DENIED BY THE QUAI - THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A SEPARATE DEAL THROUGH ARAFAT. I DO NOT SEE IT AS IN OUR INTEREST TO GIVE ANY CURRENCY TO SUCH SPECULATION. IT COULD WELL BE THAT THE FRENCH HAD SIMPLY (LIKE OTHERS) BEEN URGING ARAFAT TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH IRAQ ON BEHALF OF TRAPPED CITIZENS.

LLEWELLYN SMITH

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 882: SADDAM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. SADDAM'S LATEST PEACE PROPOSALS CONTAIN LITTLE TO COMMEND THEM. WE SHOULD NOT HOWEVER BE TOTALLY DISMISSIVE OF THEM IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT, IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOKING SADDAM UNNECESSARILY

DETAIL

2. IN AN OPEN LETTER TO THE FAMILIES OF FOREIGNERS 'WHOM THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAVE DECIDED TO HOST UNTIL THE END OF THE CRISIS' IN IRAQ, WHICH WAS READ OUT ON IRAQI TELEVISION ON THE EVENING OF 19 AUGUST, SADDAM HUSSEIN PROPOSED (IN SUMMARY) THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD PLEDGE TO GUARANTEE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES IN HIS 12 AUGUST INITIATIVE (MY TELNO 754), AND THAT US AND WESTERN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SAUDI ARABIA. AS SOON AS THIS WAS ACHIEVED THE FOREIGNERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IRAQ FOR THE DESTINATION OF THEIR CHOICE.

3. SHOULD ANY PART OF THE PROPOSAL BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT FOR ANY REASON, IRAQ WOULD ACCEPT A WRITTEN COMMITMENT FROM THE US TO WITHDRAW ITS AND ITS ALLIES FORCES FROM ARAB TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH A TIMETABLE NOT TO EXCEED THE LENGTH OF TIME IT HAD TAKEN THESE FORCES TO DEPLY IN THE REGION.

4. SADDAM SAID THAT PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD DECLARE THAT HE WOULD NOT USE FORCE AGAINST IRAQ AND THAT HE RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL LAW. ALL PARTIES SHOULD END THE BLOCKADE OF IRAQ IMMEDIATELY AND CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH IT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT. THE QUESTION OF KUWAIT SHOULD BE LEFT FOR THE

ARABS TO DEAL WITH, LIKE THE SYRIA/LEBANON AND WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEMS(SIC)

5. SADDAM SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THE FOREIGNERS' DISTRESS AT NOT BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ALL THE EVENTS IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE BAN ON FOREIGNERS TRAVELLING, RAN COUNTER TO THE WISHES OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OTHER PARTIES, NOTABLY THE US AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS.

6. SADDAM BLAMED THE US AND ITS ALLIES FOR NOT INTERVENING TO HALT THE GULF WAR AND ACCUSED THEM, SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, OF WAGING ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST IRAQ. HE REITERATED HIS STANDARD ARGUMENT THAT KUWAIT HAD ALWAYS BEEN A PART OF IRAQ, SAYING THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE WANTED NOTHING MORE THAN TO REUNITE DIVIDED FAMILIES. WHY DID PRESIDENT BUSH AND MRS THATCHER WANT TO STARVE THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ TO DEATH, HE ASKED.

7. SADDAM REITERATED THAT THE FOREIGN FORCES WERE IN THE REGION NOT TO DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA BUT TO WAGE WAR ON IRAQ. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAD SOUGHT TO AVOID A CATASTROPHE BY BANNING FOREIGNERS' TRAVEL. THIS COULD OPEN A DOOR TO A DIALOGUE AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

COMMENT

8. DESPITE NIZAR HAMDOON'S PLEAS THAT WE SHVULD EXPLORE THIS INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY, I SEE LITTLE TO RECOMMEND IT. ALTHOUGH SADDAM INDICATES THAT THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN HIS 12 AUGUST INITIATIVE ARE STILL ON THE TABLE (PARA 2 ABOVE), HE MAKES NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, AND THE EXAMPLES OF REGIONAL DISPUTES BEING TACKLED BY THE ARABS ARE HARDLY LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE OPTIMISM THAT KUWAIT WOULD FARE BETTER IF DEALT WITH SOLELY BY THE ARABS.

9. SADDAM CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT HE CAN USE FOREIGN HOSTAGES AS A LEVER TO BREAK FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS' RESOLVE ON SANCTIONS, WHILE IGNORING THE FACT THAT DETAINING FOREIGN NATIONALS IS NOT ONLY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW BUT ALSO A PRIME CAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN TENSION.

10. THAT SAID, NIZAR HAMDOON MAY HAVE BEEN INDICATING THAT SADDAM IS INTERESTED IN SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION AND THAT THIS 'INITIATIVE' REPRESENTS A FIRST STEP ON THAT ROAD.

ALTHOUGH THE INITIATIVE IS CLEARLY TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS, WE SHOULD PERHAPS NOT DISMISS IT OUT OF HAND, BUT SO AS TO DENY SADDAM THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCUSE US OF INTRANSIGENCE. WE ALSO DO NOT WANT TO GIVE HIM ANY EXCUSE TO TAKE YET MORE DRASTIC ACTION WHEN IT APPEARS THAT TIME, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, IS AGAINST HIM.

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Psychological warfare

Help for Jordan refugees.

My his to Iraq or from Iraq?

PRIME MINISTER

AD HOC GROUP ON THE GULF

You are to chair the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf tomorrow. I have suggested that they assemble here. You will find the agenda for the meeting and the points discussed at today's meeting immediately below this note.

I imagine that your main objective will be first to invigorate the Group: and second to check points which may come up at your press conference.

Cabinet Office will do a fuller brief in the morning.

Running through the agenda items briefly:

Current situation - oral report by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

You will have already gone through most of the items at the preceding meeting of Ministers. The Group's interest is likely to focus on the prospects for a UN Resolution permitting the use of force to implement the embargo, and the US's determination to interdict the two Iraqi ships currently moving up the Gulf. I am afraid that a vote on the UN Resolution is unlikely until tomorrow at the earliest.

Another issue is the continued removal of British people from Kuwait, and the renewed Iraqi warning that all foreign Embassies in Kuwait must close by Friday this week. You will want to satisfy yourself about the action we are taking on both issues (which will feature largely at the press briefing).

Current situation - oral report by the Ministry of Defence

The main question here concerns the additional aircraft we should send to the area. You have ruled that extra air defence aircraft should go to the smaller Gulf States: and Tornado ground attack aircraft be moved forward to Cyprus.

U.N. resd.
Iraqi ships where?
Info from satellites?
Kuwait Embassy

Observance of the UN embargo

There is still considerable ambivalence about Jordan's role. There are also suspicions that Iran may not enforce the embargo very effectively.

Safeguards against terrorism

You could ask Transport and the Security Service to report on their meeting with British Airways; and Mr. Appleyard to report on the meeting of the Terrorism Sub-committee.

Press Pools for the Gulf

You may want to raise the issue of slightly expanding pool facilities for the British Press to visit our forces in the Gulf.

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20 August 1990

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PARIS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: US POLICY

SUMMARY

1. OFFICIALS IN STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S EARLY RETURN TO WASHINGTON DOES NOT PRESAGE ANY CHANGE IN POLICY WHICH REMAINS AS BEFORE: READINESS FOR THE LONG HAUL, IN TERMS OF BOTH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY BUILD UP. BUT SOME CONCERN THAT POSSIBLE INTERDICTION OF IRAQI TANKERS AND ENFORCED CLOSURE OF WESTERN MISSIONS IN KUWAIT COULD BE POTENTIAL FLASH-POINTS THIS WEEK.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE OBTAINED AN ASSESSMENT FROM CLARKE (ASSISTANT SECRETARY POL-MIL BUREAU, STATE) ON THE STATE OF US MILITARY PLANNING AND INTENTIONS IN THE GULF. CLARKE WAS THE SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WHO ACCOMPANIED CHENEY ON HIS FIRST VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 6 AUGUST AND REMAINS CLOSELY INVOLVED.
3. CLARKE SAID THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S PREMATURE RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND HIS MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS TO REVIEW POLICY LAST NIGHT (19 AUGUST) SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH. IF IT DEMONSTRATED ANYTHING IT WAS THAT BUSH WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL MISTAKE MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER OF REMAINING ABSENT FROM WASHINGTON WHEN A HOSTAGE CRISIS BROKE. HAVING HIMSELF TAKEN THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE TO DEFINE THE DETAINED FOREIGN NATIONALS AS HOSTAGES IN HIS SPEECH IN BALTIMORE THIS MORNING (OUR TELNO 1981), THE PRESIDENT WAS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO KENNEBUNKPORT AND (WITH SCOWCROFT) CONTINUE TO WATCH OVER EVENTS FROM THERE.
4. ON THE BROADER STRATEGY, CLARKE THOUGHT THAT THIS REMAINED

VERY MUCH AS SET OUT TO KING FAHD IN SAUDI ARABIA ON 8 AUGUST. THE AMERICANS HAD TALKED ABOUT TWIN TRACKS TO FAHD: UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF ADEQUATE MILITARY FORCES TO DEFEND THE KINGDOM. BOTH WERE LONG TERM, IN THE SENSE THAT IT COULD TAKE MONTHS FOR EITHER TO BE EFFECTIVE. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE LONG HAUL, PROVIDED - UNLIKE VIETNAM - THERE WAS A CLEAR OBJECTIVE IN SIGHT AND THAT ANY LIVES LOST WERE NOT PERCEIVED AS BEING SACRIFICED IN VAIN. BUT CLARKE EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO PLAN TO ORGANISE POLICY TO INITIATE WHAT HE CALLED, THE WORST-CASE OPTION - IE FULL SCALE WAR WITH IRAQ.

QUOTE NEITHER SIDE IS READY FOR THAT UNQUOTE. AN OPERATION TO RESCUE HOSTAGES WAS EQUALLY UNREALISTIC. NOR WERE US FORCES SEEKING TO PROVOKE LIMITED MILITARY ACTION, ESPECIALLY WHILE THEY WERE RELATIVELY WEAK ON THE GROUND. AT PRESENT THE AMERICANS HAD ONLY 17 TANKS IN SAUDI ARABIA (PRE-POSITIONED STOCK FROM DIEGO GARCIA). ALTHOUGH THREE ARMoured UNITS HAD RECEIVED NOTICE TO MOVE TO SAUDI ARABIA, ONLY ONE HAD BEGUN TO SAIL AND IT WOULD BE ANOTHER 6 WEEKS AT LEAST BEFORE AN ARMoured DIVISION WAS FULLY IN PLACE. THE PLAN COULD OF COURSE GO WRONG ANY DAY, SHOULD SADDAM HUSSEIN DECIDE TO STRIKE OUT, BUT THAT HAD ALWAYS BEEN A RISK.

5. THERE WERE ALSO TWO POTENTIAL FLASH POINTS (CLARKE'S WORDS) THIS WEEK. THE FIRST CONCERNED THE TWO IRAQI TANKERS WHICH WERE HEADING TOWARDS ADEN WITH THEIR OIL SHIPMENTS, POSSIBLY WITH A VIEW TO BEING REFLAGGED THEREAFTER. A DECISION WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN ON 21 OR 22 AUGUST ON WHETHER TO USE FORCE TO STOP THEM. SECONDLY THERE WAS THE IRAQI STATEMENT THAT EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT WOULD BE FORCIBLY CLOSED ON 24 AUGUST, WHICH COULD ESCALATE AWKWARDLY GIVEN OUR CURRENT PREFERENCE FOR DRAWING DOWN STAFF BUT RETAINING A TOKEN PRESENCE.

6. AS REGARDS THE POSITION OF ISRAEL, CLARKE ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD KEEP THEIR HEADS DOWN, PROVIDED THE RED LINE THAT THEY HAD DRAWN (ANY INTRODUCTION OF IRAQI FORCES INTO JORDAN) WAS NOT CROSSED. CLARKE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE THIS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO IRAQ.

7. WE HAVE SINCE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH THE NSC. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON DID NOT HERALD ANY CHANGE IN POLICY OR INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE MILITARY TRACK. INDEED WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) ARGUED THAT THERE WAS SOME GROUND FOR HOPE IN THE IRAQI STATEMENTS LAST WEEK, WHICH HAD CAREFULLY AVOIDED FORECLOSING ALL AVENUES TOWARDS A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, (DESPITE THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE TERMS OFFERED SO

FAR). THERE WAS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BITE QUICKLY, GIVEN THAT HOARDING HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE A CAPITAL OFFENCE.

8. WELCH ADDED ONE GLOSS ON HANDLING THE IRAQI TANKERS: HE CONFIRMED THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN TO FORCE THE SHIPS TO STOP WHILE EFFORTS WERE STILL UNDERWAY IN THE UN TO SECURE A FURTHER RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD PROVIDE MORE SATISFACTORY LEGAL COVER FOR SUCH ACTION. AMBASSADOR PICKERING HAD SECURED THE STAY OF EXECUTION HE HAD REQUESTED. IF THE UN RESOLUTION WAS FORTHCOMING, THE US NAVY WOULD THEN ACT. IF THE UN RESOLUTION WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, THE NAVY MIGHT STILL ACT, THOUGH A FURTHER DECISION WOULD BE NEEDED FROM THE PRESIDENT IN THAT CASE.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH OF 20 AUGUST
 SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT BUSH CALLS FOREIGNERS DETAINED IN IRAQ/KUWAIT HOSTAGES, AND HOLDS IRAQ RESPONSIBLE FOR AMERICANS' SAFETY. HE EMPHASISES AMERICA'S DETERMINATION WITH HER ALLIES TO RESIST AGGRESSION, WITH FREQUENT ALLUSIONS TO WORLD WAR II AND KOREA.
 DETAIL

2. IN A SPEECH TO THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS CONVENTION IN BALTIMORE ON 20 AUGUST (FULL TEXT FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT), THE PRESIDENT EXPLICITLY CALLED THE FOREIGN NATIONALS DETAINED IN IRAQ HOSTAGES, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF AMERICAN CITIZENS HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL. HE ALSO SET OUT FIVE LESSONS LEARNED IN THE PAST 18 DAYS, AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO URGE THE SENATE TO UPHOLD HIS NOMINATION OF JUDGE SOUTER TO THE SUPREME COURT AND TO CRITICISE ATTEMPTS BY CONGRESS TO CUT THE DEFENCE BUDGET EVEN FURTHER THAN THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MADE ON IRAQ/KUWAIT:

- A. HE EXPRESSED PRIDE IN THE SUPPORT THAT THE US WAS GETTING FROM AROUND THE WORLD, AND MENTIONED TELEPHONE CALLS EARLIER ON 20 AUGUST TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND OZAL:
- B. THIS WAS A QUOTE CRISIS THAT WILL REQUIRE AMERICAN PLANNING, PATIENCE, AND YES, PERSONAL SACRIFICE. BUT A CRISIS THAT WE MUST AND WILL MEET IF WE ARE TO STOP AGGRESSION, HELP OUR FRIENDS, AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF COUNTRIES AROUND THE GLOBE UNQUOTE:
- C. US ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO QUOTE RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF KUWAIT AND DETER THOSE WHO THREATEN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE US ... OUR CAUSE ... WOULD NOT BE EASY, OUR CAUSE IS RIGHT UNQUOTE:
- D. QUOTE AMERICA WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED ... AMERICA STANDS

- AGAINST AGGRESSION, AGAINST THOSE WHO WOULD USE FORCE TO REPLACE THE RULE OF LAW UNQUOTE:
- E. THE FIRST LESSON QUOTE AS VIVID AS THE MEMORIES OF NORMANDY, KHE SANH, PORK CHOP HILL UNQUOTE WAS THAT QUOTE AGGRESSION MUST AND WILL BE CHECKED UNQUOTE:
- F. THE SECOND LESSON WAS THAT QUOTE BY ITSELF, AMERICA CAN DO MUCH: TOGETHER WITH ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AMERICA CAN DO MUCH MORE FOR PEACE AND FOR JUSTICE UNQUOTE. HE PRAISED THE SAUDIS AND KING FAHD FOR THEIR HELP IN RESISTING AGGRESSION, AND SALUTED QUOTE THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE RESPONDING TO THE EMIR OF KUWAIT'S CALLS FOR THE FULL ENFORCEMENT OF US SANCTIONS:
- G. QUOTE RESTRICTIONS ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS FROM MANY COUNTRIES (WERE) UNACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE:
- H. TWO POINTS FOR THE LEADERS OF IRAQ: THE DETENTION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS WAS AGAINST THE ARAB TRADITION OF HOSPITALITY, AND ALL FOREIGNERS SHOULD BE RELEASED NOW:
- I. QUOTE WE'VE BEEN RELUCTANT TO USE THE TERM QUOTE HOSTAGE UNQUOTE, BUT WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN SPECIFICALLY OFFERS TO TRADE THE FREEDOM OF THOSE CITIZENS OF MANY NATIONS HE HOLDS AGAINST THEIR WILL IN RETURN FOR CONCESSIONS, THERE CAN BE LITTL DOUBT THAT WHATEVER THESE INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE CALLED, THEY ARE IN FACT HOSTAGES. AND I WANT THERE TO BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING. I WILL HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF AMERICAN CITIZENS HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL UNQUOTE:
- J. THANKS TO GORBACHEV FOR HIS CONDEMNATION OF THE INVASION:
- K. A THIRD LESSON WAS THE QUOTE STEADFAST CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN WILL UNQUOTE:
- L. THE FOURTH LESSON WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE PLANNED REDUCTION IN US ARMED FORCES (25 PERCENT BY 1995) DID NOT MEAN A REDUCTION IN AMERICAN STRENGTH:
- M. THE FIFTH AND FINAL LESSON WAS THE NEED FOR A CONTINUED STRONG DEFENCE BUDGET: THE DEFICIT COULD NOT BE ATTACKED BY ATTACKING THE HEART OF AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES. WHEN IT CAME TO NATIONAL DEFENCE, MOST AMERICANS KNEW THAT FINISHING SECOND MEANT FINISHING LAST:
- N. QUOTE AUGUST 1990 HAS WITNESSED WHAT HISTORY WILL JUDGE ONE OF THE MOST CRUTIAL DEPLOYMENTS OF ALLIED POWERS SINCE WORLD WAR II UNQUOTE: AND
- O. QUOTE HALF A CENTURY AGO, THE WORLD HAD THE CHANCE TO STOP A RUTHLESS AGGRESSOR AND MISSED IT. AND I PLEDGE TO YOU, WE WILL NOT MAKE THAT MISTAKE AGAIN UNQUOTE.
4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO TRIED TO STRIKE A NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC

CHORDS, WITH ANECDOTES ABOUT AMERICAN SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE GULF, AND ENDED BY QUOTING EISENHOWER'S WORDS TO THE ALLIED FORCES ON THE EVE OF D-DAY. THERE WERE REPEATED ALLUSIONS TO THE KOREAN AND SECOND WORLD WARS, AS WELL AS BATTLES IN VIETNAM.

COMMENT

5. THE ONLY NEW POINT OF SUBSTANCE IN THIS SPEECH WAS THE PRESIDENT'S DESCRIPTION OF THE DETAINEES AS HOSTAGES. OTHERWISE, HE DID HIS BEST, IN A SPEECH WHICH SHOWED SIGNS OF HASTE IN PREPARATION AND DELIVERY, TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN ACTION IN THE GULF, WHICH HE CAST REPEATEDLY IN TERMS OF THE DETERMINATION OF AMERICA AND HER ALLIES TO STAND UP TO A RUTHLESS AGGRESSOR, WHOM BUSH IMPLICITLY COMPARED TO HITLER.

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FOREIGN SECRETARY - PC - LONDON - 20 AUGUST 1990

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FROM JAMES LEE FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

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IN LONDON,

ON MONDAY, 20 AUGUST 1990

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Prime Minister 20/8

You will want to see this before your own press conference tomorrow

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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

As you know, the Prime Minister has returned to London and she chaired a meeting this morning of the Ministers most closely concerned with the Iraq-Kuwait crisis; there have been further meetings and I will try and answer your questions. I do not want to make a long statement.

We went over the ground fairly thoroughly with those of you who were with us on Friday about British nationals in Kuwait and Iraq and, of course, this still continues to BE head of our concerns.

As I said on Friday, we are in a stage now which may last for a bit, when there are each day alarms and stories, some of them true, some of them not true, which circulate and which are extremely difficult to verify and find out whether they are correct or not.

What is not in doubt is that the Iraqis, by their own profession, are moving our citizens around, moving other western citizens around, and are using them as a shield and you will have seen that we have taken every opportunity over the week-end, public and private, to point out to the Iraqis that this behaviour is illegal and repulsive.

FOREIGN SECRETARY - PC - LONDON - 20 AUGUST 1990

- 2 -

It was a British initiative at the Security Council which helped first of all to secure informal conclusions and then a specific recommendation, as a result of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has sent his Chef de Cabinet, Mr. Dayal, to the area - he hopes to reach Baghdad tomorrow - and he will be operating on the basis of the very clear and welcome Resolution which the Security Council passed about foreign nationals in Kuwait.

William Waldegrave will be seeing tomorrow Mr. Somorooga (phon), who is the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross and that will be in Geneva.

Tomorrow, after the WEU meeting in Paris, we will be having a European Community meeting of the Twelve and I will seek to make sure that the solidarity of the Twelve on this subject of foreign nationals, which has been very good up to now, is fully maintained.

We have got difficult decisions to take, particularly as regards our embassies in Kuwait which the Iraqis have said should close by the 24th. We are not accepting that instruction and we will seek to make sure that we have people in Kuwait able to keep in touch with our community there for as long as physically possible. That is just an illustration of the kind of difficulties, the kind of problems which we will have to tackle over the coming days and which we will do our best to tackle together.

Just a word about the WEU meeting in Paris tomorrow: that will be, I believe, a successful effort to bring together, under the cover of the WEU all the contributions which the different WEU members have been pledging in recent days and I hope that we can do that. The forces will stay under national command, our forces, French forces, Dutch forces, other forces, there is no question of

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that. What needs to be worked out is effective coordination of their effort including, of course, coordination with the Americans, with the Australians, with the Canadians, with others outside the WEU who are joining in this effort.

Can I just repeat finally, before I answer your questions, that the purpose of our deployment, as we made clear at the time of the decision, is to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia or other friendly states in the Gulf; and secondly, to help to implement the Resolution which the Security Council has already passed about sanctions against Iraq, following their annexation of Kuwait. Those are the two purposes of our deployment and that continues to be the position.

-----oo-----

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

JOHN DICKIE (DAILY MAIL)

Does that statement of your two purposes mean that at the moment you are opposed to any military solution? If so, have you conveyed that to President Bush?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

The President of the United States has been very clear all the way through that the purpose of the United States deployment is as I have stated ours, that it is a build-up of forces adequate to deter further attack.

I believe myself that we lived through a very dangerous few days when there was a real prospect of an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. I hope that has been deterred. One cannot be sure, dealing with someone like Saddam Hussein. That was the reason why we moved so quickly and why we, alongside the United States, have sent in aircraft up-front to the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia.

We may have moved past that moment of immediate danger but that deterrent needs to remain in place and so do the forces which are needed to implement the Security Council Resolution, that is to say the embargo against Iraq.

JOHN DICKIE:

Does that mean you are opposed to a military solution?

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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That means that those are the purposes for the forces down there at the moment. I think, in answering your question - certainly other questions - I said that neither we nor the Americans or others have ruled out further measures if sanctions prove ineffective so that is the position. We have never ruled that out, but that is not the purpose of our deployments.

QUESTION:

Are you planning to call in the Iraqi ambassador if necessary...any other diplomatic action...take against Iraqis here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

The Iraqi ambassador is constantly being called in; he is left in no doubt day-by-day of what I have said, that the action taken by the Iraqis as regards foreign nationals is illegal and repulsive, so he has no doubts about that.

I am very keen that our embassy in Baghdad and so long as possible our embassy in Kuwait, should be able to function at full strength in helping the British community. It bears out a point I have tried to make for many months now: by having an ambassador in a place, we are not doing a benefit to the country involved - we are doing a benefit, among others, to the British citizens involved and so that influences our handling of the Iraqi embassy here.

QUESTION:

What positive action, Foreign Secretary, do you think can be taken to ensure the safety of British citizens in the region without

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endangering other people?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I mentioned three things: the action taken by the Secretary-General of the UN as a result of our initiative in the Security Council; I mentioned a visit that the Minister of State will make to the Red Cross tomorrow; I mentioned coordination, solidarity among the Twelve. In addition to those three things, which are part of the continuing effort, our officials in Kuwait and Baghdad are doing their utmost - doing a formidable job - to keep in touch with people in difficulty, find out what is happening. It is extremely difficult to do so. I pay tribute to Rob Haywood; I pay tribute to those who are in the same business. We are in close touch with them, tracing what is happening. Trying to relieve with accurate information the anxieties of friends and families is going to be a very difficult business which may, as I say, go on for some time but we are putting the necessary effort into that.

QUESTION:

Two questions:

First of all, is Britain seeking UN cover for a blockade against Iraq? Secondly, would Britain, under any circumstances, be prepared to risk British or indeed any of the expatriate lives by military action?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

On the first point, there are more or less continuous

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discussions in New York by the Permanent Members of the Security Council, by informal meetings of the Security Council as a whole, by formal meetings. All this seems to be more or less continuous.

We have no doubt, as you know, about the legal basis of the action which we are taking to implement the embargo. Since there are others who are anxious to help but have a different legal view, there would be advantage in having a Resolution which put that beyond doubt. Whether that Resolution is attainable, whether it is attainable today or tomorrow, I do not yet know, but it is certainly something which is being discussed in a very friendly and constructive way, I must say, particularly by the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

On your second point, I do not think I want to add what has been said. I have set out again, I have repeated, paraphrasing and not in any way modifying what President Bush has said. I have set out the purposes, the reasons for which we are asking British sailors and airmen to go to the Gulf, the reason why they are now there. We have never ruled out further measures, if those prove to be necessary but they have not been decided upon and they are not the subject of present work.

QUESTION:

...the embassy in Kuwait, I understand that a short time ago the Iraqi authorities said that diplomats who did not move to Baghdad would lose their diplomatic immunity and be treated like other foreign nationals. Did that influence your decision to keep the embassy there open at all?

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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

This is a difficult business. We have discussed it with our partners; I have discussed it with my fellow Foreign Ministers and will do so again tomorrow.

Our view at the moment is that we should try and keep British officials in Kuwait as long as possible so that they can keep in touch and give what help they can to members of the British community. I say "as long as possible" - I do not know how long that will be.

QUESTION:

(inaudible)

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think that in the circumstances we have just been talking about it would be a great move to take refuge in the British Embassy in Kuwait. There are a number of Britons in the British Embassy in Baghdad and the ambassador will just have to handle that situation as best he can; he is clearly not turning people away but equally, there are hazards and difficulties about trying to receive British citizens into those premises.

QUESTION:

...this evening in New York says that Britain and the US are actually going to put forth a specific Resolution asking to spell out what military steps would be taken to enforce the trade sanctions against Iraq. Can you tell us at all about what that Resolution will say or what kind of steps you specifically are going to ask?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think I have covered that really. I said there were discussions going on, particularly among the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council. We have no doubts about the legal cover for the action which we are taking, legal cover based on the collective right of self-defence, which is set out in Article 51 of the Charter, and the very specific request for help which we have had from the Kuwaiti Government, so we have no doubt about that.

There are others who have a somewhat different legal view - the Soviet Union I am thinking of in particular. If we can find a United Nations Resolution which clears up that matter, which clears that difficulty out of the way, obviously there would be a considerable advantage in getting it. Whether it is possible, as I said, today or tomorrow, I do not yet know.

QUESTION:

Foreign Secretary, there does seem to be now a feeling that there is now an inevitability about armed conflict in the Gulf, particularly from America; indeed, Henry Kissinger said over the week-end that America has now crossed the Rubicon.

Would you agree that this is now likely to happen?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

No!

JOHN DICKIE:

Secretary of State, can you clarify that answer you gave about Baghdad? Has ... Walker the authority to accept British

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citizens into the embassy or residence and in fact, have any done so already?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Of course he has the authority and as I have said, a number of Britons have been there for, I think, a day or so.

It is not something which we would specifically wish to encourage because it might not be something which could be sustained for very long but the ambassador, whom I know well and you know well, is a very sound man of good judgement. He of course has authority to deal with the situation. He will not be turning British people away; he will be seeking to make the best arrangements he can for their convenience and safety.

QUESTION:

Foreign Secretary, did you discuss with the Prime Minister the talk about the recall of Parliament?

Further to that, can you characterise her response and her mood at the moment and tell us when you think we might hear from her?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have discussed the recall of Parliament with the Prime Minister - I did that yesterday. All I can say about that is that no decision to recall Parliament has been taken. You had better ask No. 10. I do not think it will be, in the nature of things, terribly long before your desire to hear from the Prime Minister in person is gratified.

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QUESTION:

Do you have any information where British nationals in Kuwait who have been rounded up have been taken and if so, where>

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

No precise information; that is why I said there are all kinds of stories and reports which are difficult to verify and people have certainly been moved though not I think so far from their own homes. The people who have been moved are people who have been in hotels and there are reports, which we are seeking to verify, about where they have been taken. I have no reports of them being harmed in this process but that, of course, does not alter the fact that, as I have said, it is an illegal and thoroughly repulsive policy which we are doing our best to check and reverse.

QUESTION:

If they are not far from their homes, do you...

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Not taken from their homes yet.

QUESTION:

Taken from hotels?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That is our information to date.

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QUESTION:

Could you explain why you are so confident that military conflict can be avoided? You gave a one-word answer to the question the other side of the room.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I was asked if I believed it to be inevitable and I said "No!" That is my belief.

QUESTION:

Are you going to have any further advice, other than that which has been offered through the BBC World Service, to those in Kuwait? For instance, should people go into hiding, British citizens, should they go into hiding?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think the advice which we are giving is a sensible one: they should stay at home and keep a low profile. I think that, in the circumstances, is the best advice.

QUESTION:

What is your reaction to reports today that....(inaudible) Should friendly embassies give refuge to nationals from countries that are threatened by...

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have no information about that and I certainly would not like to sit around this table in London and give a hard and fast

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answer on that, how people should behave in particular circumstances.

We have had very good cooperation, very good solidarity, among all western embassies, both in Kuwait and Baghdad, on these matters and I am very anxious that should continue and we will be able to carry that further in the meeting in Paris tomorrow.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

20k August 1990

Prime Minister
 088 20/8

Dear Charles

ARMILLA PATROL: ENFORCEMENT ACTION *copy attached*

Caroline Slocock wrote to Simon Gass earlier today about a number of matters arising from the Prime Minister's meeting this morning. I am writing with the requested clarification on the circumstances in which and extent to which ARMILLA ships might use force to stop sanction breaking ships.

The circumstances in which it might be necessary to resort to force can be divided into two broad categories:

- (a) where there is clear evidence of a breach of sanctions - for example when a laden tanker is intercepted outbound from Iraq - and the master refuses to obey instructions from the intercepting ship;
- (b) where the evidence is inconclusive but a ship identified as outbound from Iraq or Kuwait (and thus prima facie in breach of sanctions) refuses to accept a boarding party to establish whether or not it is carrying cargo from those countries. In this event force may be used to secure acceptance of a boarding party. If there is considerable doubt about the evidence, however, commanders have discretion to allow the ship to proceed while further enquiries are made, and after alerting other units to ensure that a further interception can be achieved if necessary.

In the case of inbound ships where the evidence is inconclusive (including cases where the master refuses to co-operate), force is not to be used without specific authorisation from London - although both the suspicion of sanctions breaking and the refusal to co-operate would be reported to the UN. This recognises the legal and international presentational difficulties if Iraq could plausibly claim that force had been used against an "innocent" vessel.

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street



The sequence of enforcement measures available within the current ROE is as follows:

- (a) initial interrogation by radio etc;
- (b) if further investigation is necessary (to inspect cargo/papers) request agreement to accept boarding party.

If the master refuses to co-operate with investigation or, where appropriate, to accept diversion instructions the following steps may be used:

- (c) harassment which does not result in damage;

and, after exploring all other avenues of communication and manoeuvring, and after giving the vessel every opportunity to comply with instructions:

- (d) warning shots may be fired or charges dropped (after due warning), initially no closer than 300 yards from the target, reducing to 100 yards;
- (e) aimed fire at the funnel by small calibre weapons (again after due warning);
- (f) in the last resort (and after specific warning) aimed fire at the funnel by the main armament (but not missiles) of the ship.

If a vessel refuses to comply with instructions even after the full range of these steps has been followed, it is to be shadowed as far as practicable while urgent instructions are sought from London. Although it would be a very determined master who would be prepared to run the risks involved, we are nevertheless considering as a matter of urgency what further steps might be taken to stop a vessel in such circumstances. My Secretary of State will report on the results of this at the Wednesday Ministerial meeting.

I am copying this letter to Simon Gass (FCO), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department), Sir Percy Cradock, and to Sonia Phippard and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

Is this really possible?

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 398: NATO CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. IMS REPORTS YEMENI FORCES ON MAXIMUM ALERT. U S OUTLINES THE TYPE OF SUPPORT NOW NEEDED FROM ALLIES. U S BRIEFS ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. LETTERS FROM SHEVARDNADZE SUPPORT U S POLICIES, AND CONDEMN IRAQI TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DETAIL

2. IN TODAY'S POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, THE IMS REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE FROM NATIONS HAD IMPROVED. IRAQI DIVISIONS FACING TURKEY, SYRIA AND IRAN IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY HAD NUMBERED EIGHT BEFORE THE START OF THE CRISIS, AND HAD NOW BEEN REINFORCED BY TWO (ONE DIVISION AVERAGES 15,000 MEN): ALL IN DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THERE HAD BEEN 35 IRAQI DIVISIONS ON THE ITALIAN BORDER BEFORE THE CRISIS, ALTHOUGH MANY OF THESE HAD BEEN PARTLY DEMOBILISED: THEY WERE ALMOST ALL INFANTRY, AND THUS OF LITTLE POTENTIAL VALUE IN ANY ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA. IRAQ WAS NOW BELIEVED TO HAVE 1200 TANKS, 1200 APCS, 800 ARTILLERY PIECES AND 104,000 MEN FACING SAUDI ARABIA. YEMENI FORCES HAD BEEN PLACED ON MAXIMUM ALERT, AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE TO DIVERT SOME FORCES TO ITS SOUTH-WESTERN BORDER.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3. U S SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT, AS REQUESTED BY SAUDI ARABIA, THE U S HAD DEPLOYED FORCES AND TAKEN STEPS TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS. THE U S WANTED THE BROADEST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HE COULD NOW IDENTIFY THE FORMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AS THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES ASSEMBLED. THESE INCLUDED: MINESWEEPERS: AIR/SEA LIFT CAPABILITIES: GROUND FORCES: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT: LOGISTICS (TRANSPORT, PORTABLE HOUSING, REFRIGERATION PLANT, POWER GENERATION PLANT, WATER SYSTEMS): PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AGAINST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK AND DE-CONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT. U S

ADDED THAT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY WAS IMPORTANT: MATERIAL SUPPORT SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO ARAB STATES WHICH WERE SUPPORTING THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT.

4. IN ELABORATION, U S SAID THAT EXTRA MINESWEEPER ASSETS WERE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, GIVEN THE KNOWN CAPABILITY OF IRAQ TO CONDUCT MINING. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR MORE GROUND FORCES.

5. ON THE NAVAL EFFORT, U S SAID THAT ALL SHIPS SHOULD REMAIN UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND, BUT THERE SHOULD BE COORDINATION OF EARLY WARNING AND AIR DEFENCE.

6. IN CONCLUSION, U S SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES INTENDED, THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, TO REQUEST SUPPORT FROM NATO'S SATELLITE FACILITY FOR THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, HE UNDERTOOK TO CIRCULATE HIS SPEAKING NOTE (BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT IN DUE COURSE)

FOREIGN NATIONALS

7. UK REPORTED THE LATEST INFORMATION FROM EMERGENCY UNIT ON BRITISH NATIONALS IN THE AREA, AND ASKED FOR AS MUCH CORRESPONDING INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS. ITALY SAID HIS AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD REQUESTED, BUT NOT YET RECEIVED, AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO DELIVER THE DEMARCHE AGREED AT THE END OF LAST WEEK BY THE 12: THIS DID NOT MENTION THE QUESTION OF CLOSURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. TOMORROW'S WEU MEETING WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AND EPC MEETING. FOLLOWING AN ITALIAN INITIATIVE, THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUMMONED THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND MADE A STRONG DEMARCHE ON THE BEHALF OF THE NNA ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

8. DENMARK SAID THAT THE IRAQI OFFER OF SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAD NOT SENT MILITARY FORCES DID NOT APPARENTLY AMOUNT TO MUCH: LENGTHY EXIT PROCEDURES WERE INVOLVED. HE REPORTED THAT DIPLOMATS WERE NOW ABLE TO TRAVEL TO AND FROM IRAN AND KUWAIT.

9. U S SAID THE HUNGARIANS HAD DECIDED TO CLOSE THEIR KUWAIT EMBASSY: THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT DO SO. HE CONFIRMED THE DANISH INFORMATION ABOUT MOVEMENTS OF DIPLOMATS: THE U S WMBASSY WAS TRYING TO GET DEPENDENTS ON TO FLIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 'HIGH PROFILE' MEMBERS OF THE NON-DIPLOMATIC U S COMMUNITY HAD BEEN GIVEN REFUGE IN THE U S AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN BAGHDAD. AT TWO MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, ON 16 AND 18 AUGUST, THE

U S POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF U S CITIZENS, ESPECIALLY RELATING TO CONSULAR ACCESS AND THE ORDER ON ASSEMBLY, HAD BEEN SPELT OUT, WITHOUT CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. A LETTER FROM SHEVARDNADZE TO BAKER HAD STATED THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELL THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IT APPEARED THA THE IRAQIS WERE INSISTING THAT SOVIET EXPERTS IN IRAN CONTINUE TO WORK. THE SOVIET EMBASSY WAS TELLING THEM NOT TO. IT SEEMED THAT SOVIET CITIZENS IN IRAN (AS DISTINCT FROM THOSE FROM KUWAIT) WERE NOT BEING PERMITTED TO LEAVE.

POLITICAL SITUATION

10. U S DESCRIBED, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, RECENT MEETINGS AT THE UN ABOUT ACTIVATING THE MSC. DESCRIBING THE STEPS TAKEN TO HALT TWO IRAQI TANKERS, HE SAID THAT THE U S BELIEVED THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MOVE TO AUTHORISE THE USE OF MINIMUM FORCE (ALTHOUGH THE U S REMAINED CONVINCED THAT ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 WAS JUSTIFIABLE). IT WAS NOT THE U S'S INTENTION TO RELY ON ARTICLE 42, SINCE THIS RELATED TO UN FORCES, OF WHICH THERE WERE AT PRESENT NONE.

SOVIET VIEWS

11. U S SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD WRITTEN TO BAKER EXPRESSING STRONG SUPPORT FOR U S ACTIONS TO DATE, ADDING THAT UN SOLIDARITY MUST BE MAINTAINED. FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THE FIRST PRIORITY REMAINED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: BUT IF THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED, IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO LOOK FOR WAYS IN WHICH MILITARY ACTION COULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE UN.

IRAN

12. ITALY SAID THAT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD TOLD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWELVE, EFTA AND CANADA THAT IRAN WOULD SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND WOULD EXAMINE ANY REQUEST TO SEND TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA. THERE HAD BEEN NO CRITICISM OF THE U S.

YUGOSLAVIA

13. ITALY SAID THAT YUGOSLAVIA REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT TRADE SANCTIONS. 50,000 JOBS DEPENDED ON TRADE WITH IRAQ, ESPECIALLY SMALL BUSINESSES IN SLOVENIA. THERE WERE 10,000 YUGOSLAVS IN IRAQ/KUWAIT, AND YUGOSLAVIA DEPENDED HEAVILY ON IRAQI OIL. U S BELIEVED THAT YUGOSLAVIA WOULD CONTINUE TO USE ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE NNA MOVEMENT, AND WOULD GRADUALLY MOVE TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS.

TERRORISM

14. FRG SAID THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT

IRAQ HAD POSSIBLY CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER OF BLANK KUWAITI PASSPORTS: THESE COULD BE USED IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

SYRIA

15. U S SAID HIS AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS HAD HAD A MEETING WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD VISITED TEHRAN. THE LATTER HAD PRESSED THE IRANIANS TO TREAT THE KUWAIT INVASION, AND THE IRAQI CONCESSIONS, AS TWO SEPARATE ISSUES. IRAN HAD CONFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 661. GREAT PRESSURE WAS BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON SYRIA AND IRAN TO RELAX THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF IRAQ, BUT SYRIA WOULD REMAIN FIRM. IRAN SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE WEST HAD CONFIDENCE THAT TEHRAN WOULD ALSO BE STEADFAST.

16. THE COMMITTEE WILL RE-CONVENE TOMORROW 20 AUGUST AT 0800Z.

CARTER

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JORDAN'S REFUGEE PROBLEM

REFERENCE: TELECON HOPE IN EU/ALLEN IN AMMAN

SUMMARY

1. REFUGEES ARE CROSSING IN LARGE NUMBERS. THEIR EMBASSIES ARE COPING IN AMMAN BUT, IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR JORDANIAN EFFORT, REFUGEES FACE SEVERE PROBLEMS AT THE FRONTIER. ICRC NOT YET IN ACTION. WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF JORDANIAN ATTITUDE TO OUTSIDE HELP BUT WORTH MAKING THE OFFER.

THE PROBLEM

2. PRECISE FIGURES FOR THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES FROM IRAQ AND KUWAIT CROSSING INTO JORDAN ARE NOT OBTAINABLE. BUT OUR RESEARCHES WITH EMBASSIES IN AMMAN UNDERPIN THOSE CARRIED BY THE MEDIA. THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAS SAID THAT OVER 100,000 HAVE CROSSED INTO JORDAN SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN - APPROXIMATELY 17,000 ARRIVED ON 19 AUGUST. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE 10,000 AT THE JORDANIAN/IRAQI FRONTIER, AL-RUWAISHID, 4,000 AT MA'AN, 3,000 AT AL-GUWAIRAH AND 2,000 AT AQABA: 17,000 EGYPTIANS HAVE ALREADY LEFT BY FERRY: THE INDIANS HAVE 350 IN AMMAN, 135 ON THEIR WAY - THEY ARE EXPECTING 300-400 A DAY: THE FILIPPINOS HAVE 1,000: THE PAKISTANIS ABOUT 700 IN AMMAN. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GUESS HOW MANY MORE REFUGEES MAY CROSS INTO JORDAN. IT IS PROBABLY FAIR TO ESTIMATE UP TO 20,000 A DAY FOR THE TIME BEING.

3. THE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL AT THE BORDER. MOSQUES HAVE BEEN OPENED TO HOUSE REFUGEES OVERNIGHT. ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAS ASKED THE IRAQIS TO REDUCE THE NUMBERS LEAVING IRAQ SO THAT THE JORDANIANS MAY COPE BETTER. FOREIGN EMBASSIES HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO MANAGE FROM THEIR OWN RESOURCES - BOOKING HOTELS,

HIRING FLATS AND ALLOWING REFUGEES TO CAMP IN THEIR GROUNDS. THE FILIPPINOS, PAKISTANIS AND EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT APPLIED TO THE JORDANIANS FOR HELP. THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD US THAT THE JORDANIAN MFA HAS NOT RESPONDED TO AN OFFER OF HELP. HE HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE LOCAL RED CRESCENT TO PROVIDE A PERMANENT MEDICAL PRESENCE AT AL-RUWAISHID, BUT HE HAS NO ICRC MANDATE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS THE REFUGEES ARE NOT REFUGEES UNDER ICRC DEFINITIONS BECAUSE IRAQ IS NOT TECHNICALLY A COUNTRY IN CONFLICT.

4. HOW MIGHT WE HELP QUES. OUR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT THE PARAMOUNT NEED IS FOR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO THOSE AT THE JORDANIAN/IRAQI FRONTIER WHERE WATER, SANITATION AND SHADE ARE ALL LIMITED AND WHERE DELAYS IN ONWARD TRANSPORT TO AMMAN ARE SEVERE. TENTS FOR SHADE, FIELD SANITATION AND CLINICS (WITH DRUGS) AND FIELD KITCHENS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY NEEDED.

5. PROBABLY THE REFUGEES AT PRESENT ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN A RELUCTANCE, PARTICULARLY BY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, TO SEEK OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE JORDANIANS AND THE JORDANIANS' OWN INABILITY AND LACK OF RESOURCES TO MOUNT A MAJOR SUPPORT OPERATION AT THE FRONTIER. HELP OFFERED BY A THIRD PARTY, BEING CLEARLY HUMANITARIAN IN NATURE MIGHT THEREFORE BE WELCOME, BUT WE CANNOT TAKE THIS FOR GRANTED. THE JORDANIANS MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ASSISTANCE WHICH APPEARED TO PUT IN DOUBT THEIR OWN ABILITY TO ORGANISE THE EVACUATION. THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE BRITISH PRESS CONTINGENT IN AMMAN IS ALSO RELEVANT. THEIR COVERAGE OF THE STORY WOULD BE A BONUS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, BUT IT MIGHT ADD TO JORDANIAN RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT OUTSIDE HELP. IN SHORT, I CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE WORTH MAKING THE OFFER. WE SHOULD ALSO EXPECT THE LARGE BRITISH PRESS CONTINGENT IN AMMAN TO WANT TO COVER THE STORY AND THUS BRING MORE ATTENTION TO BEAR ON THE PLIGHT OF THOSE DISPLACED BY IRAQ'S INVASION.

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TELNO 442

OF 201800Z AUGUST 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 280: YOUR VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMES YOUR PROPOSED VISIT. DESCRIBES HIS LATEST THINKING. STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH MEDIATION: NOT FOCUSSED ON SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN AT 1800 HRS TODAY (20 AUGUST). IT WAS REASSURING THAT HE READILY AGREED TO RECEIVE ME. HE LOOKED VERY TIRED BUT WAS IN A MORE POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND THAN AT MY LAST AUDIENCE.

3. HE WELCOMED YOUR PROPOSAL TO VISIT AMMAN ON 4/5 SEPTEMBER AND MADE A NOTE OF THE DATE. I EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF A VISIT TO OTHER REGIONAL CAPITALS BUT THIS DREW NO COMMENT. HE SEEMED RELAXED ABOUT THE IDEA. BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT HE WILL BE HERE TO RECEIVE YOU AND I SHALL MAKE A POINT OF FOLLOWING UP WITH HIS SENIOR ADVISERS.

4. I HAD BEEN INTENDING TO MAKE THE CALL A BRIEF ONE BUT THE KING CLEARLY WANTED TO TALK. THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE WERE:

- HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF GOING TO BAGHDAD BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET HOLD OF SADDAM HUSSAIN. HE HAD THEREFORE SENT BAGHDAD A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. TARIQ AZIZ WOULD BE VISITING AMMAN ON 21 AUGUST FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.
- THE KING MADE CLEAR THAT PART OF HIS PRESENT DIALOGUE WITH SADDAM RELATES TO THE FOREIGN COMMUNITIES BEING HELD

IN KUWAIT, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE IRAQI POSITION.

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- HE STILL SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HE MENTIONED A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN IRAQ WITHDRAWAL (THOUGH ALLOWING THEM TO KEEP SOMETHING) AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY IN THIS, HE THOUGHT, WAS THE RETURN OF THE KUWAIT RULING FAMILY. QUOTE ABOUT WHICH THE LESS SAID THE BETTER UNQUOTE. PERHAPS SOME PLEBISCITE COULD BE ARRANGED. I SAID THAT CREATIVE DIPLOMACY MIGHT CERTAINLY BE NEEDED BUT FOR THE MOMENT WE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO APPLYING ECONOMIC PRESSURES AS A MEANS OF INDUCING A CHANGE IN SADDAM'S POSITION. THE KING SAID HE DOUBTED WHETHER PRESSURE WOULD WORK.

- HE IS THINKING OF RENEWING CONTACTS WITH ARAB NEIGHBOURS. HE WAS IN TWO MINDS ABOUT THIS AND WOULD NOT DECIDE UNTIL HE HAD TALKED TO TARIQ AZIZ. HE HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH FAHD FOR SOME TIME, DITTO THE LOWER GULF STATES, BUT HE REALISED THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION MEANT INVOLVING THEM. HE SPOKE BITTERLY ABOUT MUBARAK WHOM HE HAD WORKED HARD TO BRING BACK INTO THE ARAB FOLD. I REMARKED THAT MUBARAK SEEMED NEVERTHELESS TO HAVE BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT.

COMMENT

5. THE KING ALSO SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS ABOUT HIS REGRETS OVER WHAT HE SEES AS THE LOST MEDIATION OPPORTUNITY. HE SEEMS ENTIRELY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE NEED TO GO ON TRYING. HE SAID NOT A WORD ABOUT SANCTIONS, BEARING OUT THE COMMENTS I HAVE HAD FROM OTHER SENIOR ADVISERS THAT HE IS NOT FOCUSING ON THAT ISSUE (THOUGH I HAVE PREVIOUSLY RAISED IT WITH HIM AND ALL HIS SENIOR ADVISERS). NO DOUBT, TOO, HE THINKS THAT THE FULL APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS WILL REDUCE HIS CHANCES OF BROKERING A DEAL WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN. I CONTINUE TO THINK THAT THIS HIGH-WIRE ACT WILL NOT BE

SUSTAINABLE FOR VERY LONG SINCE IT IGNORES THE ECONOMIC REALITIES: NO WESTERN OR ARAB ASSISTANCE AS LONG AS SANCTIONS ARE NOT APPLIED.

REEVE

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TELNO 1042

OF 202019Z AUGUST 90

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

FLASH

PARIS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNOS 1036 AND 1037: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION AMONG THE FIVE. CHINESE NOT PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARDS MILITARY ACTION UNDER UN AUSPICES AT LEAST UNTIL SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAS CONCLUDED THAT MEASURES IN SCR 661 ARE BEING BREACHED. RUSSIANS STILL WANT GRADUATED APPROACH AND A CLEAR-CUT ROLE FOR MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. WE ARE MOVING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BUT TIME IS NEEDED TO BRING THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE ALONG. FURTHER MEETING ON 21 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET AT 1500 ON 20 AUGUST AND DISCUSSED THE TEXT IN MY SECOND TUR.

3. I SAID I WAS UNHAPPY THAT SO MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION WAS LEAKING TO THE PRESS. AFTER OUR MEETING YESTERDAY I THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID. YET THE NEW YORK TIMES HAD EVEN REFERRED TO A BRITISH DRAFT TEXT. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID THERE WAS SERIOUS CONCERN IN MOSCOW THAT THE PRESS WAS BEING USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE FIVE TO MOVE FORWARD. LI (CHINA) AGREED. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) ADMITTED THAT THE SOURCE FOR THE PRESS LEAKS MUST BE THE U S GOVERNMENT AND EXPRESSED HIS EMBARRASSMENT. HE WOULD PASS ON OUR COMMENTS TO WASHINGTON.

4. PICKERING SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES NOW HAD MORE EVIDENCE OF IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO BREACH SANCTIONS. THEY HAD INFORMATION ON FOUR IRAQI TANKERS HEADING OUT OF THE GULF AREA, ALL CARRYING OIL. THE BABA GURGUR HAD JUST ENTERED THE ARABIAN SEA FROM THE GULF OF OMAN. THE KHANAQIN WAS IN THE GULF OF OMAN. BOTH TANKERS WERE BELIEVED TO BE HEADING FOR ADEN. THE BURZURGAN HAD JUST PASSED THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ INTO THE GULF OF OMAN AND AL KARAMA WAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF HAVING LOADED ON 15 AUGUST AT THE IRAQI PORT OF UMM QASR. THE DESTINATION OF THESE TWO VESSELS WAS UNKNOWN.

5. PICKERING SAID HE WOULD NOW DISTRIBUTE A FURTHER DRAFT WHICH ATTEMPTED TO FIND A COMPROMISE ON THE PARAGRAPHS IN BRACKETS IN THE TEXT IN MY SECOND TUR. (THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN US SIGHT OF THIS SHORTLY BEFORE THE MEETING).

6. LOZKINSKIY SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE COHESION OF THE FIVE. FURTHER ACTION SHOULD ENJOY THE SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED OVER SCRS 660, 661, 662 AND 664. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE EXPLICIT ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ACTION. THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONCERNED TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE KOREAN PRECEDENT, IN WHICH UN INVOLVEMENT HAD BEEN ONLY NOMINAL. THERE WAS NOW A MUCH GREATER DEGREE OF CO-OPERATION AMONG THE FIVE.

7. LI SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT CHINA BELIEVED ALL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. CHINA SUPPORTED THE USE OF MECHANISMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT OPPOSED BIG POWER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF MILITARY ACTION IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED NATIONS. SUCH ACTION WAS LIABLE TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT. IT WAS UP TO THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER MEASURES TO ACHIEVE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN SCR 661. THESE COULD THEN BE DISCUSSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. BUT CHINA DID NOT FAVOUR IN PRINCIPLE A DECISION ON MILITARY ASPECTS AT THIS STAGE. NOR WAS IT IN FAVOUR OF SUBMITTING DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN THIS REGARD.

8. WE THEN WENT THROUGH THE NEW AMERICAN COMPROMISE TEXT. IT STILL CONTAINED THE ESSENCE OF OPERATIVE PARA 1 OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 1037. LI AND LOZINSKIY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WENT FAR TOO FAR. IT APPEARED TO GIVE THE AMERICANS LICENSE TO DO ANYTHING THEY WISHED. I SUGGESTED REMOVING THE REFERENCE TO THE USE OF AIR, SEA AND LAND FORCES TO MITIGATE ITS BLUNDERBUSS EFFECT. THIS WAS AGREED.

9. THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3. LOZINSKIY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS STILL WANTED A GRADUATED APPROACH TO THE USE OF FORCE TO GET THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE DOWN, TO AVOID ENDANGERING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, AND TO MAINTAIN UNANIMITY OF THE COUNCIL. FORCE COULD BE USED TO STOP AND SEARCH TO VERIFY THEIR CARGOES AND THEIR DESTINATIONS, BUT THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSED DISABLING SHIPS TRYING TO BREACH SANCTIONS. ONCE A CARGO AND ITS DESTINATION HAD BEEN VERIFIED, POLITICAL MEASURES SHOULD BE

USED. PICKERING SAID IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES TO ALLOW A VESSEL TO PROCEED ON ITS WAY ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS BREAKING SANCTIONS. ANYTHING LESS WOULD AMOUNT TO BARGAINING OVER HOSTAGES. PICKERING STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT CALLING FOR A BLOCKADE AS SUCH: THIS WOULD BE AN ACT OF WAR. I THEN SUGGESTED ALTERNATE LANGUAGE IN SQUARE BRACKETS TO PINPOINT BUT LIMIT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US.

10. WE MOVED ON TO THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. LOZINSKIY WANTED TO USE LANGUAGE AKIN TO THAT IN PARA 5 OF OUR ORIGINAL DRAFT (YOUR TELNO 458). PICKERING SAID THIS PRESENTED THE UNITED STATES WITH A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM. FOR PRACTICAL REASONS COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FORCES MUST TAKE PLACE IN THE AREA. MANY COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SENT SHIPS WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. LOZINSKIY AND I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THERE WAS ROOM FOR SOME COORDINATION THROUGH THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. AGAIN I SUGGESTED LANGUAGE IN SQUARE BRACKETS TO PINPOINT BUT LIMIT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US.

11. THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AS IT EMERGED FROM OUR MEETING, WITH POINTS OF DIFFERENCE IN BRACKETS, IS IN MIFT. THE CHINESE DID NOT OF COURSE PARTICIPATE IN THE DRAFTING AND COULD WELL HAVE VIEWS OF THEIR OWN, BUT BY AND LARGE LI FOLLOWED LOZINSKIY. THE REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE ARE IMPORTANT:

- OPERATIVE PARA 2 RELATES TO THE POINT AT WHICH FORCES WOULD BE USED. WE SHOULD AIM TO SECURE 'AND' RATHER THAN 'IN ORDER'.

- OPERATIVE PARA 4 RELATES TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. PICKERING AND LOZINSKIY BOTH THOUGHT THAT MY SUGGESTION OF 'AS APPROPRIATE' MIGHT HELP, ALBEIT IT WENT TOO FAR FOR ONE AND NOT FAR ENOUGH FOR THE OTHER. BOTH RESERVED THEIR POSITIONS. WE CHALLENGED LOZINSKIY TO LET US KNOW EXACTLY HOW HE THOUGHT THAT THE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE MIGHT BE USED. HE WILL ADVISE ON THIS POINT TOMORROW. IN THE MEANTIME I SUGGEST WE GO FOR 'AS APPROPRIATE'.

12. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I MADE A POLITICAL PLEA TO THE CHINESE. I SAID THAT WE MUCH RESPECTED THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. BUT WHEN ALL WAS SAID AND DONE WE FACED A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE: BETWEEN THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON UNILATERAL ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER TO ENFORCE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SCR 661: AND THE RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES ATTENDANT ON PUTTING TOGETHER A FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, THEREBY

CREATING A NEW UN INSTRUMENT TO ENFORCE THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HAD NO DOUBT OF OUR RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51. AT THE SAME TIME WE WANTED TO GO FOR THE PRIZE OF A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMON ACTION. THE FIRST COURSE WAS EASIER THAN THE SECOND. BUT THE SECOND IF IT COULD BE SECURED WOULD BE A PRIZE INDEED.

13. LI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS AT STAKE. HE WOULD REPORT MY REMARKS, WHICH HAD THE ASSENT OF ALL OTHERS, TO HIS GOVERNMENT. BUT HE COULD SAY NOW THAT IF THERE WERE SERIOUS BREACHES OF SANCTIONS AND THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ENFORCEMENT, CHINA WOULD LOOK AT THE QUESTION AGAIN WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

14. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FIVE WOULD NOW URGENTLY CONSULT THEIR CAPITALS ON THE NEW DRAFT. THEY WILL MEET AGAIN AT 1430Z ON 21 AUGUST.

COMMENT

15. THIS WAS A SATISFACTORY MEETING. WE TOOK THINGS AS FAR AS WE COULD. THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY ACTION NOW DEPEND ON THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE. AFTER THE MEETING PICKERING TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE APPEALING FOR TOP LEVEL ACTION IN MOSCOW IN THE NEXT 12 HOURS TO BRING ROUND THE RUSSIANS. HE HOPED THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH THE CHINESE (TELECON WITH TOMKYS). ON LEAVING THE MEETING LI TOLD ME AND PICKERING SEPARATELY THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD BE USING WHAT MEANS WE COULD WITH HIS PEOPLE IN PEKING.

16. IF THE CHINESE DO NOT BUDGE, WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE EMERGENCY ACTION IN THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO PRODUCE A JUDGMENT THAT SANCTIONS WERE BEING BREACHED, AND THUS BRING THE CHINESE ON BOARD. BUT THIS WOULD RISK OPENING DEBATE AMONG THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE FIVE WERE TOGETHER, AND SHOULD I THINK BE AVOIDED IF POSSIBLE.

16. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TEXT IN MIFT DESKBY 211330Z.

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FLASH

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT EMERGED FROM THE MEETING OF THE FIVE ON 20 AUGUST:

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990) AND DEMANDING THEIR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION:

HAVING DECIDED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

DETERMINED TO BRING THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ TO AN END AND TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT:

DEPLORING THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE STEMMING FROM THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND DETERMINED TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH LOSSES:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), AND 664 (1990) AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

1. RECOMMENDS, IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS, THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 661 (1990) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

2. AUTHORIZES WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT ALL MEMBERS STATES WHICH ARE

DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA TO USE SUCH MINIMUM FORCE AS MAY BE NECESSARY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO VERIFY THE CARGOES AND DESTINATIONS OF ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MERCHANT SHIPPING (AND) (~~IN ORDER~~) TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990).

3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE STATES REFERRED TO IN PARA. 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SHORE AND BUNKERING FACILITIES.

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION USING (AS APPROPRIATE) THE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE WHICH SHOULD SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR TO THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 661.

5. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

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MIPT : IRAQ/KUWAIT : NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMPROMISE DRAFT DRAWN UP BY POLITICAL
COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE ON 19 AUGUST:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990)
AND 664 (1990) AND DEMANDING THEIR FULL AND IMMEDIATE
IMPLEMENTATION:

HAVING DECIDED TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER
VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

DETERMINED TO BRING THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ TO AN END
AND TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT WITHOUT FUTHER LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH
RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662 AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE CONDUCT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

(1. RECOMMENDS, IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS,
THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CHARTER, INCLUDING USE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS, OF SUCH AIR, SEA AND LAND FORCES,
AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THESE RESOLUTIONS:)

---FORMULA 1---

(2. CALL ON ALL MEMBERS STATES WHO HAVE DEPLOYED OR WHO WILL BE
DEPLOYING NAVAL FORCES TO THE AREA TO ENSURE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEASURES LAID

DOWN IN ITS RESOLUTION 661 (1990):

3. AUTHORIZES, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT THE NAVAL FORCES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (2) OF THIS RESOLUTION TO USE SUCH MINIMUM FORCE AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT ANY BREACH OF THE SAID MEASURES:)

---FORMULA 2---

(CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES WHO HAVE DEPLOYED OR WHO WILL BE DEPLOYING NAVAL FORCES TO THE AREA TO USE THEM UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEASURES LAID DOWN IN ITS RESOLUTION 661 THROUGH VERIFICATION OF THE CARGOES AND DESTINATION OF ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MERCHANT SHIPPING:)

4. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE STATES REFERRED TO IN PARA 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SHORE AND BUNKERING FACILITIES:

5. FURTHER REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO USE THE MECHANISMS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR TO THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 661 AS APPROPRIATE:

6. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

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
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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 17</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3077</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Embargo Surveillance</i> <i>Centre</i> <i>TUNISIA - Restricted Annex</i> <i>20 August 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24/12/2016</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3077</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Potential Breaches of Sanctions</i> <i>Embargo Surveillance Centre: 06:00 hrs</i> <i>20 August 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24/12/2016</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1990

MESSAGE TO PRINCE BANDAR OF SAUDI ARABIA: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to Prince Bandar, in reply to his message of 13 August (reported in Washington telno. 1915). I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of the Prime Minister's reply to be sent by telegram to Washington as soon as possible, and for the enclosed signed original to follow by bag.

Caroline Slocock

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 August 1990

Your Royal Highness,

I have now had the opportunity to consider the message which you passed to me through our Embassy in Washington on 13 August about the Rules of Engagement for British Tornado aircraft in Saudi Arabia. I have looked into this carefully and am glad to reassure you that there are no inconsistencies between our Rules and those applied by the Americans. In particular, it is not the case that we will require visual contact between our aircraft and a hostile one before permitting an engagement.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Signature of Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Handwritten initials

Aug

SUBJECT CC MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 August 1990

Dear Simon,

The Prime Minister held a meeting today with the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Attorney General and the Minister for Defence Procurement, Mr Alan Clark. Sir Percy Craddock and Mr Len Appleyard were also present. This note records the main action points only.

Having spoken to the Attorney General last night, the Prime Minister said that she was content with the Rules of Engagement for the ARMILLA Patrol and for the RAF contained in the two letters of 18 August to Dominic Morris. However in the course of the discussion, she asked for clarification on when and what degree of force might be used to stop ships breaking sanctions. It was crucial that our ships should have authority to stop ships by force. In particular she wanted to know how oil tankers could be stopped without bridging the oil tanks; and what progressive steps might be taken to stop ships. A further consideration was the safety of crew members; she thought that under the Geneva Convention they should be given warning if there was danger of sinking the ship. She asked for this issue to be resolved today and I think the Prime Minister would find it helpful to have full account on how the Rules of Engagement will operate in practice as soon as possible.

The Prime Minister asked that urgent consideration should be given to the situation faced by Jordan in coping with the stream of refugees from Iraq. Jordan was not well placed to cope with this additional burden and, to help, the UK might provide airlines or other transport for the refugees.

The Prime Minister asked Sir Percy and Mr Appleyard to draft a message for her to send at lunchtime to President Bush. As far as discussions in the UN were concerned, it was agreed that it was vital to stress the importance of finding a way to enforce the sanctions effectively. It would be helpful if the Foreign Secretary would see the Chinese Ambassador to put across the case for the UN Resolution.

The Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Procurement were asked to consider what forces should be sent to the other Arab States in the light of Mr Clark's recent mission. Once this was settled, Mr King said that he would speak to Mr Cheney to let him know in broad terms what was proposed.

The Foreign Secretary said that he would be sending over later today a paper on psychological warfare. The key points to get across were that Saddam Hussein was a loser. He had squandered the lives of 100,000 of his own people in an eight year war and had now given in totally to the Iranians. He was an enemy of the Palestinians - who wanted a small Arab State but no small Arab States would be safe from Iraq.

The Prime Minister said how greatly she appreciated Mr Waldegrave's work over recent weeks. But the regular Cabinet Committee of officials which had been chaired by him should now be chaired at Cabinet Ministerial level, since the key Ministers had now returned from leave. As the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence would be at the meeting of the WEU on Tuesday 21 August, she would chair that meeting herself and take the regular press conference on ²¹12 August afterwards.

After the meeting the Prime Minister decided that she would like a further briefing meeting tomorrow at 10 o'clock with Ministers and we will be in touch to set up the meeting.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb and Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) Sir Percy Craddock and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Gass & co.

Caroline

CAROLINE SLOCOCK

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office