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PREM 19/3079

Confidential filing

Situation in the Middle East

Conflict between Iraq / Kuwait / Saudi Arabia

UK policy towards the conflict

MIDDLE EAST

Pt 1 : May '79

Pt 26 : 30 Aug '90

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
31.8.90							
<p>PREM 19/3079</p>							

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PART 26 ends:-

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PART 27 begins:-

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AMANDA PONSONBY

The Prime Minister told President Bush this morning that she would see US Treasury Secretary Brady on Tuesday next week, to discuss assistance to countries affected by sanctions. Could you please liaise with the Embassy to find a time on Tuesday. He will require 30-45 minutes. We may have to bump something else.

CHARLES POWELL

31 AUGUST 1990

K



The President

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T203C/90

subject cc MAISTER
cc OPS

Ankara, 31 August 1990

Dear Mrs Prime Minister, Dear Friend

It was a pleasure talking to you on the phone on the developments regarding the latest Gulf crisis. I noted with great satisfaction that our views are parallel.

Turkey, like the United Kingdom, was, as you know, one of the first to take immediate action following the adoption of UN Security Council resolution on economic sanctions against Iraq. As a neighbouring country and conscious of her pivotal role in the effectiveness of the embargo, Turkey shut down the two Iraqi oil pipelines, stopped her trade with Iraq and sealed off her borders and ports to transshipment of goods to that country. Thus, we have demonstrated, beyond any doubt, our firm solidarity with our allies and friends in the West.

I know, Mrs. Prime Minister, that you are also fully aware of the considerable burden which these measures have imposed on the Turkish economy. We appreciate your support for international assistance to compensate partially our losses, as well as that of some other countries in the region.

Turkey's economic predicament is not limited alone to losing trade with Iraq and Kuwait or the rising oil bill or to lost tourism revenues. The effects of the Gulf crisis will be far-reaching and we fear they will compromise the Turkish economy which has been performing so well since the introduction of free market policies in the 1980's. Therefore, Turkey must seek the ways and means to mitigate the effects of such adverse developments. One such area is trade. Of Turkey's international trade, 65 percent is directed to Western countries, with the balance being almost always against her. However, our aim has less to do with the balance in trade than the volume itself. As I have often pointed out, we want more trade than aid.

The Right Honourable
Margaret Thatcher MP.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
LONDON


. / . .

Therefore, Mrs. Prime Minister, we should together encourage greater trade between Turkey and the West in general and the EC in particular. The best and most effective step perhaps is to increase Turkey's textiles quotas to the EC by 35 % and remove the non-trade barriers. Such a stride would certainly confirm the political will on both sides of enhancing Turkey-EC relations which is also foreseen in the Cooperation Programme submitted by the Commission to the EC Council for approval.

I am confident that I can rely on your invaluable support on the foregoing. I also take the liberty of enclosing herewith a note on Turkey-EC textile trade, which in my opinion, may contribute to your consideration of the matter.

To express our expectations I have also sent letters to the leaders of our common West European Allies.

With kind regards.




Turgut ÖZAL

TURKISH TEXTILE AND APPAREL EXPORTS TO THE E.C.

(MILLION US DOLLARS)

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u> <u>Estimation</u>	<u>1991</u> <u>Projection (*)</u>
Total Textile and Apparel Exports	1205.6	1897.4	2291.0	2437.7	3000.0	4050.0
Exports of Restrained (Quota) Categories	773.5	1229.5	1495.3	1552.5	1940.0	2619.0
Exports of Unrestrained Categories	432.1	667.9	795.7	885.2	1060.0	1431.0

(*): If 35 % quota increase realized.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

FILE VLB
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SUBJECT as above

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1990

Dear Richard,

Gulf Crisis:

Prime Minister's Telephone Conversation with President Bush

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister again this morning for a further talk about the Gulf crisis. They spoke for some 25 minutes.

This letter contains highly sensitive material and should be seen only by those with a strict need to know.

The President said that, despite press criticism, he was back in Kennebunkport for the Labor Day weekend. The Prime Minister told the President that she would be seeing Governor Sununu later in the day. The President commented that Sununu's visit to Moscow had been very successful. He had held interesting talks with Shevardnadze and with Yeltsin.

Turning to the Gulf situation, the President said that he believed that sanctions were beginning to have an effect in Iraq. He had just been speaking on the telephone to King Fahd, who had told him of reports that people in Iraq were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the results of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. He had heard similar reports from President Ozal. He hoped they were not just whistling to keep their spirits up. It was clear that there was still a significant number of breaches in the sanctions, and we needed to pursue each and every one of these. He was particularly disappointed with the conduct of Tunisia and Libya. The President continued that, if sanctions did not work in a reasonable time, he and the Prime Minister would have to review their options. He wanted to emphasise that, despite speculation in the press, he had not changed his view on the objective of US policy. It was to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Some people were talking of compromises or half measures, such as holding elections in Kuwait or a referendum. This was wide of the mark. There was only one task and that was to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed completely with this. The task was to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and sanctions were the chosen means. We should follow up any reports of breaches of sanctions assiduously. We should never rule out the military option: but in practice it would be some time before

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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we would need to contemplate that. She was constantly being asked how much time we would give for sanctions to work, but had refused to state any particular deadline.

The President said that he had been asked whether the presence of the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait would deter the United States from military action. He had replied that the United States could not have its policy dictated because Saddam Hussein had grabbed men, women and children as hostages. He feared his comment must have been disturbing to the hostage families, but he felt very strongly on the point. We might have to respond militarily to some provocation. It had been very important to leave Saddam Hussein in no doubt that the United States would not be deterred from action if necessary by the presence of the hostages. The Prime Minister said that she agreed with this too. We must not fall into the negotiations trap. The only issue was to secure implementation of the UN resolutions. The President said that he had talked to the UN Secretary General shortly before his departure and thought he understood this point. The Prime Minister said she was fairly sure that he did, although there was some evidence that his staff were implying that release of the women and children would make it easier to arrange some sort of deal.

The Prime Minister said there was some evidence that a laden Iraqi tanker (the Hittin) was likely to move down the Gulf soon. We must take action to stop it. She thought naval people on the spot were in agreement on this. The President agreed there must be no equivocation. He did not know about the tanker in question, but would immediately contact Secretary Cheney.

The President said that he was glad the Prime Minister was seeing King Hussein. He had appeared a trapped man when he had come to Kennebunkport. He seemed totally to fail to grasp the enormity of what Saddam Hussein had done. He had telephoned a few days ago with what he described as the "good news" that Saddam Hussein was about to release the women and children. The President had replied that this was the very least Saddam Hussein could do. The King had gone on to ask the President to "cool it" and reciprocate for Saddam Hussein's humanitarian gesture. The President had replied that he could hardly be expected to show good will just because someone undid something he should never have done in the first place. Generally he was dismayed by the King's hand-wringing approach. The Egyptians, the Saudis and the Gulf rulers were very upset with him. The Prime Minister said that she proposed to tell King Hussein that Saddam Hussein was a loser and he ought to distance himself from him as soon as possible. He had done nothing but harm to the Arab cause. She would also make clear that we were not interested in compromises, only implementation of the UN resolution. She would speak very frankly to him.

The President said that he had made some proposals the previous day on burden sharing and assistance to countries like Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. He would be sending Secretary Baker and Secretary Brady on a tour of various countries. He would be very grateful if the Prime Minister would receive Brady early next week. He would be making a similar request to President

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
SECRET AND PERSONAL

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Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Kaifu. The purpose was to try to work out a co-ordinated approach towards assistance for the countries affected by sanctions, as well as to help meet the heavy costs of the military operation. Britain had of course already responded. But it would be very useful presentationally if Secretary Brady could explain directly to the Prime Minister how the Americans proposed to proceed. They did not want it to look like a hat-in-hand operation. The President added that the Prime Minister's speech in Finland had been very much appreciated in the United States. The Prime Minister said she would of course be very pleased to see Mr. Brady. She thought that, so far as possible, the President should separate the two aspects of this exercise. The most urgent was the question of aid for the countries who had been badly hit by sanctions. Sharing the costs of the military operation was something which needed to be discussed discreetly behind the scenes so as to avoid a row particularly within the NATO alliance. The President said he had reason to believe that Saudi Arabia, the exiled government of Kuwait and the UAE were all prepared to make substantial contributions (he did not specify to which objective). The Kuwaitis now had access to their funds abroad.

The President said that the aspect which continued to trouble him most of all was the prospect of a lingering status quo, if sanctions did not work and the Iraqis avoided any provocation. He did not yet see how matters could be brought to a conclusion in that situation. He would want to stay very close to the Prime Minister on the subject. The Prime Minister said that it was indeed something which she and the President should discuss. She would be in New York at the end of September and they might meet then. The President said that was a must. General Scowcroft and I should discuss the details. It would be a very good time for an extremely private talk.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Your sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T203B/90
Subject CC MASTER
CC OPS



ccpc
②

Prime Minister

CCM
11/9.

Union Buildings
Pretoria

We must
thank him
not

31 August 1990

The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister


The South African Government has noted with grave concern the detention of citizens of the United Kingdom and other nations by Iraq. This repugnant step calls for the strongest condemnation of all civilised states. Please be assured of the full support of myself and my Government in your efforts to secure the release and ensure the safety of your citizens and the citizens of other countries.

In this time of crisis I am acutely conscious of the gravity of the decisions facing you and your Government. Our thoughts and prayers are with you at this time.

Yours sincerely

F W DE KLERK
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Union Buildings
Pretoria



CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO

OF

INFO IMMEDIATE: UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, EC POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE: TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, MOSCOW, TOKYO

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH JIM BAKER: IRAQ/KUWAIT
SUMMARY

1. Baker pleased with Japanese response on burden-sharing. Thinks some transatlantic debate on this issue inevitable. Displeased with German efforts. Baker agrees with Secretary of State on need not to lose sight of Arab/Israel problem. Meeting with Levy still scheduled for 6 September. Baker describes debate within the Administration on whether to extend American objectives over Iraq/Kuwait.

DETAIL

2. The Secretary of State telephoned Baker this afternoon. The following were the main points.

BURDEN-SHARING

3. Baker said that the US was embarking on an effort to generate support for what it was doing. US officials would be travelling around for this purpose. He had talked twice to Nakayama and the President had spoken to Kaifu. The \$1 billion

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initial contribution to the multinational effort was welcome. He thought their figure for help to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan would also be credible.

4. Baker said our Embassy in Washington had expressed concern lest the burden-sharing operation reopen another transatlantic debate. But that debate was inevitable. The UK had, as ever, been the most forward of the allies. Baker was not sure that the FRG had given the support they could have done. They had their constitutional problems but we had helped them over German unification. They had even more at stake in terms of oil supplies etc than the United States. The US might therefore be coming to the European Community and to individuals for support. The Secretary of State said the more the United States could approach individual EC states the better. Anything done on a Community basis cost us and the French more for budgetary reasons.

JORDAN

5. Baker said there was some improvement in the Jordanian position on sanctions but not in Jordan's overall political approach. The Jordanians were in a difficult spot and the King was much better than any alternative. The United States was actively working to get assistance for him, eg from the Japanese.

ARAB/ISRAEL

6. The Secretary of State said that during his visit to the Gulf he would wish to say publicly that we had not forgotten the Arab/Israel problem. Saddam Hussein had set back the Palestinian cause but we would have to come back to it. Baker said he was quite comfortable with that approach. He would be seeing Levy on 6 September. But the PLO needed to do some soul-searching. The PLO had cut themselves off from their main financial backers by their attitude. The Secretary of State said that Saddam Hussein had kicked the Palestinians in the

teeth and the PLO had jumped the wrong way. The PLO ~~are~~^{were} now clearly divided. Baker said Arafat had made a terrible miscalculation.

US GOALS

7. Baker said that he had been having some internal discussion about what US goals should be. It was fashionable at the moment to point out that, even if Saddam Hussein withdrew from Kuwait, he would still have CW, BW and potentially a nuclear capacity. Was it safe to allow that? He himself thought that we had to be very careful before going any further in delineating our goals.

8. The Secretary of State said that Baker and the President had mustered a grand coalition including the better Arabs, Europe and the Russians. To discuss other objectives would mean losing many members of the coalition as well as the support of public opinion. There was a lot at stake. He assumed that no decisions were imminent. Baker confirmed that the Secretary of State's understanding was correct. But there was nonetheless a great deal of pressure on the President to expand his horizons. He himself thought it would be a terrible mistake to do so. The Secretary of State said we were very much entwined with the Americans politically and on the ground. The closer we were to American thinking, the happier we would be. Baker said that was why he was sharing these thoughts with the Secretary of State. The President had great respect for the Prime Minister's views (implying that he would wish to discuss this with her at some point). The Secretary of State reiterated our reservations about any change of strategy.

MEETING IN MOSCOW

9. The Secretary of State and Baker agreed to set aside an hour in Moscow for a bilateral discussion. We will pursue this directly with Baker's office.

HURD

Security
of the whole
area

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT

NNNN



House of Lords

The Prime Minister

31st August, 1990

R/9

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to ask if M. Mohamed Charfi, Secretary of State and an Envoy of President Ben Ali of Tunisia, could have the opportunity of meeting you next week to discuss the Gulf Situation.

M. Charfi is in London from Sunday and I understand bears a message for you from the President.

I would be most grateful, Prime Minister, if you could spare the time to meet the Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Earl Alexander of Tunis
Patron, the British-Tunisian Society

c.: HE The Tunisian Ambassador

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FM BAGHDAD

TO PRIORITY MODUK

TELNO U/N

OF 311050Z AUGUST 90

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INFO PRIORITY HQSTC, ACTOR

SIC ACA/I9M/UBP

FOR DI(ROW)A2 CRISIS CELL FROM DA. INFO DI(IND)(MS) AND FCO MED.

SOVIET INFORMATION ON AL ABBAS SSM AND IRAQI CW RELEASE

1. SOVIET DA (PLEASE PROTECT) PASSED FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHEN ASKED ABOUT IRAQI SSM AND CW CAPABILITIES=

A. AL ABBAS. SOVIET WAS QUITE ADAMANT THAT AL ABBAS (EXTENDED RANGE SCUD B) WAS IN OPERATIONAL SERVICE. HE AGREED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN TESTED TO ITS FULL CLAIMED RANGE OF 850 KMS BUT BELIEVED THAT IT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TEST FIRED FROM A LAUNCH SITE NEAR MOSUL TO A TARGET AREA NEAR THE SAUDI BORDER. HE BELIEVED THAT THIS TEST HAD PRODUCED A CEP OF 3 KM.

B. CW RELEASE. SOVIET SAID THAT CURRENT IRAQI ORDERS ON CW RELEASE WERE THAT AUTHORITY TO DELIVER CW ON TARGETS OUTSIDE IRAQI TERRITORY LAY WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT IN THE EVENT OF A GROUND FORCES' INCURSION INTO IRAQI TERRITORY AUTHORITY TO USE CW AGAINST INVADING FORCES WOULD BE DELEGATED TO DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS.

2. COMMENT

A. AL ABBAS.

Q) SOVIET'S CLAIM CONNECTS WITH UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF A UI MISSILE TEST LAUNCH FROM N IRAQ IN NOV 89 QUES (RECORDS FORMERLY HELD HERE DESTROYED). THE TEST SITE CONCERNED MAY WELL HAVE BEEN TALL AFAR (3623N 4227E), IN WHICH CASE THE RANGE ATTAINABLE TO THE AREA OF SAUDI BORDER IN SPARSELY POPULATED SW IRAQ COULD HAVE BEEN APPROX 600 KMS.

2) SOVIET'S INFORMATION IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH DETAILED INFORMATION

PAGE 1
SECRET

ON ORDER OF BATTLE OF IRAQI MISSILE TROOPS , INCLUDING AN AL ABBAS EQUIPPED BRIGADE, PROVIDED BY THE FORMER GDR AMA HERE (PLEASE PROTECT).

3) SOVIET DID NOT DESPITE PRODDING COME CLEAN AND SAY WHETHER HE BELIEVED AL ABBAS TO BE CAPABLE OF CARRYING A CW WARHEAD. FORMER GDR AMA CLAIMD THAT NO IRAQI MISSILES, INCLUDING THE SHORT RANGE FROG 7, WERE CW CAPABLE.

B. CW RELEASE.

1) DISINFORMATION REMAINS A POSSIBILITY HOWEVER THE RETENTION OF INITIAL RELEASE FOR A CW STRIKE ON FOREIGN TERRITORY BY THE PRESIDENT IS NO SURPRISE AND DELEGATION OF DEFENSIVE USE TO DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS, PRESUMABLY IN EXTREMIS, IS ALSO CREDIBLE GIVEN THE LIMITED DELIVERY MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OCCUPIED KUWAIT WAS CONSIDERED AS IRAQI TERRITORY FOR THIS PURPOSE: IN OTHER RESPECTS IT CLEARLY IS. DELEGATION FOR DEFENSIVE/RETALIATORY USE RECALLS SADDAM'S COMMENT TO A VISITING US DELEGATION ON 12 APRIL TO THE EFFECT THAT AIRBASE AND MISSILE UNIT COMMANDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN ORDERS TO CARRY OUT RETALIATORY CW STRIKES AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON IRAQ, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. THE COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI 7 CORPS (AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY FAO PENINSULA) RECENTLY TOLD VISITING US OFFICERS THAT IN THE GULF WAR INITIAL CW RELEASE FOR EACH OPERATION HAD NORMALLY BEEN RETAINED BY THE PRESIDENT BUT THAT IN THE CASE OF THE FAO 'LIBERATION ' BATTLE (APR 88) AUTHORITY HAD BEEN DELEGATED TO THE TWO CORPS COMMANDERS INVOLVED (BUT ,HE CLAIMED, NOT EXERCISED).

WALKER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

28

MAIN

28

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
NO DISTRIBUTION
MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
MR TOMKYS
MR FAIRWEATHER



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1990

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister

CB 31/8

Call on the Prime Minister by the Crown Prince of Kuwait

The Prime Minister has agreed to a call by His Highness Sheikh Sa'ad al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, at 5.00pm on Monday 3 September.

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August there have been a number of messages to and from, and meetings with, the Kuwaitis. The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister on 16 August and the Minister subsequently met the Secretary of State for talks. The Kuwaiti Royal Family in exile is based at Taif in Saudi Arabia. We have appointed a liaison officer at our Consulate-General in Jedda to maintain regular contact with the Kuwaiti authorities. The Foreign Secretary is due to meet the Amir on 4 September during his Gulf tour.

The Crown Prince will be looking for reassurance of the UK's commitment to securing the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. We have just received a letter dated 28 August from the Crown Prince to the Prime Minister (copy enclosed). The letter is general in tone. The Prime Minister may like to thank the Crown Prince for it. She may wish to share Shaikh Sa'ad's scepticism about peace initiatives which depart from SCR 660. The Prime Minister will wish to emphasise the two main objectives of our policy. First, to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the return of the legitimate Government. Second, to ensure that the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq under SCR 661 are implemented fully and effectively.

The Kuwaitis seem to want an early military solution to the crisis. The Prime Minister could point out that the international forces in the region, including the UK contingent, are there primarily to defend the states of the Gulf from further Iraqi aggression and to enforce the sanctions. We believe that economic sanctions can work if they are implemented conscientiously and the international commitment to them is maintained. This is our aim. We must give them time to work. But we do not rule out other options if they do not.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister could encourage Kuwait's own efforts to combat Iraq's aggression. This can take several forms. First, it is important that the Government in exile should be seen to be active and maintain its high profile. It has done well so far. The Kuwaitis should be encouraged to continue. The Kuwaitis' propaganda effort could be strengthened further. They are presently broadcasting from Saudi Arabia and Cairo. Substantial Kuwaiti financing of their own and others' efforts could be of real benefit. It would be helpful if the Crown Prince could say something about resistance within Kuwait. Is there anything we can do to help?

The Kuwaitis might also use their financial strength to assist those taking Kuwait's part and those who will suffer as a direct result of imposing sanctions. The most obvious candidates are Turkey and Jordan. Assistance to Turkey would be well received. But the Kuwaitis have been deeply disillusioned by King Hussein's attitude since the Iraqi invasion. They need to be coaxed towards providing help for Jordan if the Jordanians fully implement sanctions. The Prime Minister may wish to give an account of her talks on 31 August with King Hussain.

The Crown Prince might raise the issue of Kuwaiti assets in the UK. Following the freeze on Kuwaiti assets in the UK, they have complained about a variety of problems over official and private Kuwaiti funds here. The Foreign Minister mentioned them to the Foreign Secretary on 16 August. The Bank of England has resolved the initial problems and the system now appears to be running smoothly. The Bank is helping the Kuwaitis as far as possible. The Kuwaiti Embassy has contact names and numbers both at the Bank and the Foreign Office should specific difficulties arise.

/ I enclose a personality note on the Crown Prince.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON SW7

سفارة دولة الكويت
لندن

28th August, 1990.

Your Excellency,

I would like to convey to you our sincere gratitude for your Government's just and courageous stand condemning the treacherous Iraqi invasion of Kuwait insisting on immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from all Kuwaiti territories and supporting the legitimate government of Kuwait represented by His Highness The Amir of The State of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber AlAhmed Al-Sabah.

The people of Kuwait highly value and will always remember your firm support to our just cause as well as the practical measures taken by your Government in this regard.

We earnestly hope that the efforts made by your Government in co-operation with other nations will continue and escalate towards the full implementation of Security Council Resolutions number: 660, 661, 662, 664, and 665.

I am sure that you are fully-aware of the reality of certain solutions and initiatives that are being floated outside the frame-work and objective of the Security Council of the above mentioned Resolution. They are nothing but Iraqi-inspired plays aiming to gain time, circumvent Security Resolutions and weaken the determination of the International Community. We do hope that your beneficial efforts will also include persuading those who promote such solutions and initiatives to join the

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON S.W.7

سفارة دولة الكويت
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.../2

International Community in backing the cause of right and justice and implementing Security Council Resolutions.

Last but not least we share your grave concern over the fate of British and other hostages, who are now suffering harassment by the Iraqi regime. We pray for their safe deliverance.

With warmest personal regards and highest consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely Yours,

Saad AlAbdullah AlSalem Al-Sabah,
Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister.

49. H H SHAIKH SA'AD AL ABDULLAH AL SALIM AL SABAH, KCMG

Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

Born 1928. A son of the late Amir Abdullah. Educated in Kuwait. Police Department 1945-53. Hendon Police College 1953-54. Deputy Head of Town Police 1954-59. Deputy President of Police and Public Security Department 1959-61. President of Police and Public Security Department 1961-62. Minister of Interior 1962-4. Minister of Interior and Defence 1964-78. Nominated Crown Prince by the Amir on 31 January 1978, and as Prime Minister on 8 February. Shaikh Saad's relations with the National Assembly were bedevilled by members' criticisms of his Government which only just stopped short of attacking him personally. He attended Assembly sessions only rarely and is believed to have pressed for its dissolution.


Dignified and hard-working, but said to be indecisive. Does not have the power and authority which his office should command. But seems to be consulted by the "strong-men" - The Amir and Shaikh Sabah.

He commands more affection amongst ordinary Kuwaitis than the austere Jabir al Ahmad but not the same respect. Said to have lost some popularity through being too closely identified with calls for the closure of the National Assembly in 1986.

Friendly to Britain. Keeps a house in London and likes to spend time there. Had successful eye operations in the UK in 1979 and 1985 and a gall bladder removed at the end of 1985. Seems to suffer frequent, unrelated health problems and is often thought to have some kind of glandular disease. Accepted invitation to pay official visit to UK in March 1990.

A strict Muslim as is his wife Latifa, who has business interests of her own and was rumoured to have had a considerable stake in the Manakh stock market at the time of its collapse in 1982. One son and five daughters.

Speaks adequate English.





CVZ

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~0233~~ 071 270 0360

CONFIDENTIAL

B.0522

31 August 1990

Dear Mr B,

GULF CRISIS: CO-ORDINATION OF INFORMATION ON WESTERN HOSTAGES

Earlier this week the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf under the Foreign Secretary's chairmanship agreed that it would be useful to keep a comprehensive record of the whereabouts of all the British hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, including those who have been moved by the Iraqis to sites with some military or economic significance. This is important for consular reasons, but there are other aspects which are of interest, for instance what the choice of sites tells us about Iraqi priorities.

2. I understand that you have very kindly said that the consular team in the Emergency Unit is prepared to take on this task. I appreciate that the Unit is already following closely the question of where all UK nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, whether detained or not, may be. I gather that the Unit will now put on disc all that we know about the whereabouts of British nationals, and provide up-to-date print-outs (with maps attached) about twice a week: (the first report being issued by close of play on Monday 3 September). Members of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf will wish to be aware of these arrangements.

3. I should be grateful if the recipients of this letter would arrange for it to be circulated to all staff who are dealing with Iraq. The contact point at the Emergency Unit will be Fred Winter - telephone no. 270 3572. Any new information about the whereabouts of British nationals in Iraq and Kuwait should be passed to him.

*Yours ever,
L*

L V Appleyard

J R Young Esq
Emergency Unit
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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'C'
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A C D S Macrae Esq

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Rich Minister
C1000
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MO 6/17/15J

386 August 1990

Dear Richard,

CALL ON GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF

The Defence Secretary called on General H Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command at the joint headquarters in Riyadh on 30th August. Air Vice Marshal Wilson, Air Commander of British Forces Arabian Peninsula was also present.

This letter contains sensitive material and circulation should be strictly limited.

General Schwarzkopf arrived in Saudi Arabia only last weekend. He has command of all naval, ground, maritime and air force units in the Gulf and Northern Indian ocean. The Defence Secretary found him a large, sensible and likeable commander. General Schwarzkopf was pleased with the US build-up and thought he would shortly be able to announce that the defensive shield was in place. He had been considering replacing the 82nd Airborne Division with more heavily-equipped troops but decided against, lest he suggest that the build-up was flagging. His air and naval components now matched the Iraqis but he was greatly inferior in land forces.

The Defence Secretary set out the UK's thinking with which General Schwarzkopf seemed to agree. He was concerned about an overly "gung-ho" attitude from some people in Washington and the Gulf area, who were inclined to simplify the military situation. He gave a shrewd assessment of Iraqi capability noting their huge manpower as the greatest strength and the over-centralised command of a dictator as a significant weakness. He did not disguise the difficulties and risks of military operations by the US. The Iraqis had some effective combat troops and capable surface-to-air missiles. The US had been doing some detailed studies on previous Iraqi use of chemical weapons. Any major operation would involve substantial casualties.

Richard Gozney Esq
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary



General Schwarzkopf noted that matters would never be the same in the area again. For example, having resisted pre-positioning of equipment for many years, the Saudis were now anxious for the US to establish large stocks.

Asked about command arrangements, General Schwarzkopf spoke initially of the "joint command" (referring to the US/Saudi Military Committee - though in practice this is dominated by the US). The Defence Secretary reminded him that there were other joint command questions; at which the General recovered himself and acknowledged UK interests. He accepted that the UK staff in Riyadh should be involved in the planning process and undertook to keep in touch with AVM Wilson. There is a growing presumption that, if operations began, Arab/Muslim forces will be commanded by the Saudis (the Syrians for example have refused to serve under Egyptians or the US); and the Western elements would come under US command. [This has not, of course, been agreed by the UK and we are addressing the issues currently. The Defence Secretary has asked the Chief of the Defence Staff to keep in close touch with General Colin Powell; they will be meeting on Tuesday 4th September].

Amongst other points discussed were how quickly to turn troops over. This had not been addressed initially but General Schwarzkopf had now put options to Washington (implying a longer time horizon than before). The Defence Secretary said that he was already considering similar proposals from the UK commanders. Another interesting side-light was the purchase of cold weather uniforms for the Marines, more suited to night operations as the cooler weather comes on. As for ROEs (on which General Schwarzkopf seemed entirely sensible), he currently has to refer to Washington when a ship interception has reached the stage of 3 shots having been fired across the bow.

The Saudis are sensitive about conduct and dress of female members of US forces. The US press have abused the greatly increased access granted by the Saudis, especially the New York Times. Poses of senators and congressmen descend on the Headquarters for briefing and then seek publicity in the field (with an eye to the Autumn elections). There are already signs of second thoughts. Senator Nunn had pressed General Schwarzkopf about where the costs of the operation would fall and said that his committee would be enquiring into it. No clear arrangements had yet been made with the Saudis on cost-sharing.

The Saudis are intensely sensitive about the joint command arrangements and UK/US contacts which might exclude them (the Ambassador had a struggle to reassure them about this meeting and had to undertake that it would not be made public). General Schwarzkopf said that the US would make no announcement. It is important that knowledge of it remains very limited.

C



A copy of this letter goes to Charles Powell (No. 10) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office). The Defence Secretary would of course be content for HM Ambassadors in Washington and Riyadh to see it.

Wm. Webb, J. Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

FILE 5AM



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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T203/90

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 August 1990

SUBJECT CC MASTER
ORS

Dear Poul

Thank you for your letter of 27 August informing me of your Government's decision to deploy a Danish corvette to the Gulf to assist in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq.

We discussed this when we met in Helsinki, and I warmly welcomed this further evidence of the Danish commitment to ensuring the effective implementation of UN Resolutions on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. I hope that we can continue to build upon the close co-operation which exists between us on this matter both bilaterally and in other fora, particularly the European Community and the United Nations.

I should also like to express my thanks for the work of the Danish Embassy in Kuwait, which is proving such a valuable source of information on Western missions there.

*Yours
Rayans*

His Excellency Mr Poul Schlüter

□



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1990

TUNISIAN EMISSARY

Thank you for your letter of 31 August enquiring whether the Prime Minister could see an Emissary from the Tunisian President on Monday, 3 September. I am afraid this simply is not possible. The Prime Minister is out at Farnborough virtually the whole day. And we have already gone to great lengths to squeeze in the Crown Prince of Kuwait. There is nothing more we can do. Perhaps the Prime Minister could write to the President in the wake of the Emissary's visit.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

K



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1990

Dear Charles,

Letter from the Amir of Qatar

Thank you for your letter of 20 August enclosing one to the Prime Minister from the Amir of Qatar in response to her message of 9 August.

I enclose a short draft reply. The Foreign Secretary will be meeting the Amir during his present tour of the Gulf.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Draft Reply From: Prime Minister


To: HH Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani
The Amir of Qatar

Thank you for your letter of 16 August in reply to my earlier letter to you of 9 August, about the invasion of Kuwait

I was grateful for your kind agreement to make facilities available at Doha should this prove necessary, and for your instructions that British nationals wishing to depart from Qatar should be given every help. These measures are further welcome evidence of Qatar's commitment to the international effort to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait.

I know that ~~Douglas Hurd~~, the Foreign Secretary, will have spoken to you about our ~~current thinking~~^{latest thoughts} on the crisis. The situation is changing daily. I look forward to hearing from him about the outcome of your talks. His visit is evidence of the great importance we attach to the regular dialogue which has been established between us. I hope that we shall remain in close touch.

ca.



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THE COSTS OF THE GULF OPERATION

SUMMARY

1. TELEPHONE CALL FROM BUSH TO KOHL. GERMANS NOW CONSIDERING HOW THEY CAN HELP FURTHER. SUPPORTIVE STATEMENT BY SPOKESMAN OF CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY.

DETAIL

2. BUSH IS REPORTED BY THE GERMAN PRESS TO HAVE TELEPHONED KOHL LATE ON 30 AUGUST. KOHL'S PRESS SPOKESMAN HAS SINCE ANNOUNCED THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAS ASKED ALL RELEVANT GERMAN MINISTRIES TO EXAMINE WHAT "MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL HELP" THE GERMANS CAN PUT AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE GULF OPERATION. HE ADDED THAT NO FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE OR SUMS NAMED DURING THE BUSH/KOHL CONVERSATION. THE GERMAN PRESS HOWEVER CARRY REPORTS FROM AMERICAN SOURCES THAT THE GERMANS HAVE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE 600 MILLION DOLLARS TO A COMMON FUND PLUS 40 MILLION DOLLARS A MONTH AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE COSTS OF THE MILITARY OPERATION. BAKER IS SAID TO BE EXPECTED IN BONN ON 5 OR 6 SEPTEMBER.

3. THE DUPLY CHAIRMAN OF THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, HORNHUES, TODAY ISSUED A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO BUSH'S PROPOSAL, MAKING THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

(A) SHORTSIGHTED, HASTY ACTIONS WOULD MERELY ENDANGER THE PRESENT UNSTABLE PEACE IN THE REGION. ONLY AN EFFECTIVE AND, IF NECESSARY, LONG TERM BLOCKADE COULD MAKE A SUCCESS OF THE POLICY OF SANCTIONS ORDAINED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

(B) SUCH A BLOCKADE COULD NOT BE HAD FOR FREE. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE GULF HAD ITS COST. IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO ALLOW THIS COST TO BE BORNE ONLY BY THOSE WHO THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF THEIR FORCES WERE STANDING IN THE FRONT LINE AGAINST THE IRAQI

DIKTATOR. THE COSTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO BE SPREAD MORE WIDELY.

(C) GERMAN INTEREST WERE AT STAKE IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTING THE UN RESOLUTIONS. RESPONSIBILITY COULD NOT SIMPLY BE LEFT TO OTHERS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAD SAID THAT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS IT COULD NOT MAKE A MILITARY CONTRIBUTION IN THE GULF. BUT THE ALLIES HAD A RIGHT TO EXPECT GERMAN SOLIDARITY AND A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE. SUCH A CONTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALSO BE OPEN TO AMERICAN REQUESTS FOR HELP WITH AIR AND SEA FREIGHT LIFT.

(D) IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING GERMAN CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE ALLIES CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS.

4. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO BRIEF US ON KOHL'S VIEWS EARLY NEXT WEEK.

MALLABY

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IRAW/KUWAIT: CONVERSATION WITH GORBACHEV'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER.

SUMMARY

1. ASSURANCE'S FROM GORBACHEV'S ADVISER THAT THE SOVIET PRESIDENT INTENDS TO STAND VERY FIRM, AND THAT WE SHOULD DISREGARD ANY CONTRADICTIONARY INDICATIONS FROM SOVIET GENERALS.

DETAIL

2. IN THE COURSE OF OTHER BUSINESS, THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL SECTION DISCUSSED IRAQ/KUWAIT WITH GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, CHERNYAYEV, ON 31 AUGUST.

3. CHERNYAYEV RECALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV, AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET PRESIDENT HAD DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF HIS TIME TO THE CRISIS, BOTH DURING HIS STAY IN THE CRIMEA AND SUBSEQUENTLY, DESPITE OTHER PRESSING PREOCCUPATIONS. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAD PLAYED A UNIQUE ROLE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS, WHICH GAVE SOME GROUNDS FOR HOPE. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET POLICY WERE TO EXPLOIT ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR ACTION AT THE UN, TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID ESCALATION INTO WAR, AND TO ACTIVATE THE ARABS. GORBACHEV HAD PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE LATTER POINT IN HIS MEETING WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE CRISIS COULD TAKE ON MUCH WIDER DIMENSIONS IF WE PAID INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO ARAB PROBLEMS - HENCE THEIR FEELING THAT WE SHOULD SHOW THE ARABS THAT WE WERE WORKING TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. CHERNYAYEV NOTED WITH RELIEF THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD UP TO NOW KEPT QUIET AND SHOWN RESTRAINT.

4. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT A WEEK AGO HE HAD FELT THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE. HE WAS NOW A LITTLE MORE HOPEFUL THAT A COMBINATION OF SANCTIONS, POLITICAL PRESSURE AND DIPLOMACY MIGHT DO THE TRICK. HE SPOKE IN VERY HARSH TERMS ABOUT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHAVIOUR AND

DESCRIBED HIM AS A DANGEROUS AND UNPREDICTABLE MAN WHO MIGHT WELL HAVE CONTINUED HIS OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIA HAD HE NOT BEEN DETERRED. HE WAS VERY FIRM THAT THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE WHATEVER OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN MADE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE YET THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET ARABISTS (INCLUDING ACADEMICS AND JOURNALISTS) WHOM HE HAD CONSULTED LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS CAPABLE OF COMING TO HIS SENSES AND OF TAKING PRAGMATIC DECISIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT THE MESSAGE GOT THROUGH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE HAD NO SUPPORT INTERNATIONALLY. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT HE HAD NOT MET SADDAM HUSSEIN. GORBACHEV HAD DONE SO BUT DID NOT KNOW HIM WELL.

5. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION GIVEN TO THEM BY THE AMERICANS ABOUT REASONS FOR THE US MILITARY DEPLOYMENT. THIS DID NOT WORRY GORBACHEV, SO LONG AS ITS PURPOSE WAS DEFENSIVE. HE SPOKE DISMISSIVELY OF 'OLD THINKERS' WITHIN THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT WHO HAD REACTED AGAINST THIS AMERICAN INTRUSION INTO THE MIDDLE EAST AND CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION'S SOUTHERN FLANK. THIS WAS 'SECOND WORLD WAR THINKING'. HE WAS EQUALLY DISMISSIVE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET MILITARY (EG BY GENERAL LOBOV ON 30 AUGUST - REPORTED SEPARATELY) WHICH HAD ENCOURAGED SPECULATION IN THE WEST ABOUT A RIFT BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN/WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS. ONE COULD NOT STOP THE GENERALS FROM TALKING, BUT THEY DID NOT MAKE THE POLICY.

6. CHERNYAYEV SPOKE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE ON THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE. WHILE THERE MIGHT BE SOME 'CONTRABAND' ACROSS THE IRAN/IRAQ FRONTIER, HE EXPECTED IRAN TO RESPECT SANCTIONS, AND TO CONTINUE TO OPPOSE IRAQ'S ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. THE IRANIANS DEFINITELY WOULD NOT WISH TO ACQUIESCE IN THE PRINCIPLE OF CHANGING FRONTIERS BY FORCE.

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9 BUCKINGHAM GATE

LONDON SW1E 6JP

071-828 1884

The Rt Hon Tom King MP
Secretary of State for Defence

Richard Hunt
CDS 511 P

31 August 1990

Dear Tom:

You sought my views this morning on whether we have the legal powers to arrest and detain ships which are in breach of sanctions, if this proves to be necessary in order for RN ships to enforce resolution 661.

The position that you are envisaging is I believe that a vessel laden with cargo from an Iraqi port is passing through the Gulf and, on being stopped, refuses either to return, divert or anchor. I am also assuming that, rather than attempting to secure the vessel on the high seas, you will wish to take the arrested ship into territorial waters or port of a coastal State, with the agreement of that State and in conformity with their law.

Under international law the position is clear. If the arrest of a ship is necessary to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661 and constitutes the use of the minimum force necessary, then that action is legitimate.

An issue would arise under domestic law if the owner or charterer of the vessel brought a civil action in our courts against the Crown claiming damages for detention of the vessel, interference with goods, or some such matter. In the circumstances here envisaged, in which we are acting in conformity with international law, I am satisfied that the Crown would have a good defence to any such action by claiming act of State.

There are of course numerous practical problems which I can foresee, and which you would have to think about, such as where the ship is to be detained, whether a boarding party would have

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to remain on it, and whether measures are to be taken to ensure that the vessel and cargo do not deteriorate. But these are all questions for you. I shall be happy to give further advice on their legal implications in due course. You will also recall that our existing rules of engagement do not permit assault boarding parties.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and to Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

James Watson,
Patrick

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the department for Enterprise

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The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

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Date PE4DAK

Prime Minister
CDP
31/8

31 August 1990

Dear Charles

SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ: INSURANCE

You wrote to Simon Gass on 26 August about the report in Washington telegram no. 2031 of continuing UK provision of insurance for Iraqi vessels. On the limited information in the telegram we cannot tell whether the reports (if correct) amount to a breach of sanctions.

The Security Council Resolution does not call upon States to prevent provision of services to Iraq and Kuwait companies as such but does call upon them to prevent activities by their nationals which promote or are calculated to promote exports from Iraq and Kuwait or the sale or supply of any commodities or products to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait. Accordingly the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1990 does not prohibit the provision of services to Iraqi and Kuwaiti companies in all circumstances; broadly it prohibits any person from, on or after 9 August, doing any act calculated to promote exports from Iraq and Kuwait or the supply or delivery of goods to persons in Iraq or Kuwait or for the purpose of any business carried on or operated from Iraq or Kuwait. Whether an agreement to provide insurance would contravene the Order would depend on the facts of the particular case, but hull or cargo insurance relating to exports from Iraq or Kuwait or supply of goods to Iraq or Kuwait

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or Iraqi or Kuwaiti controlled companies would, prima facie, be prohibited.

The FCO is asking the British Embassy in Washington to find out if the Americans will give us sufficient information to pin down the transactions, establish whether they are in breach of sanctions, and if so to proceed to stop them. We will report the outcome.

Copies go to Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) Simon Gass (FCO), Simon Webb (MoD) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

mt

Martin Sklar

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Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15J

COP
31/PPRIME MINISTERENFORCEMENT OF UN EMBARGO

I have been giving further thought with the Attorney General to the practical problems that may arise in enforcing the UN embargo, especially in the light of the possibility that an Iraqi tanker, the Hittin, may shortly attempt to leave the Gulf with a cargo of oil.

2. Our basic intention, as set out in the amplifying instructions circulated last week, is to order an outbound sanctions breaker not to proceed (ie effectively to return to Iraq) and an inbound vessel to divert to a destination other than Iraq or Kuwait. If a vessel refused to comply we are entitled to use the minimum force necessary to ensure the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and our ships have appropriate ROE for that purpose.

3. In general, it should not be necessary to seize or arrest vessels in order to enforce the embargo and we would prefer to avoid the practical and legal problems that such action might involve. In some circumstances, it may, however, be necessary to detain a vessel temporarily, eg if it is necessary to conduct a thorough search, if the vessel has been damaged as a result of naval action, or if its crew refused to continue to sail it. We must also consider what we would do if a vessel which has been intercepted and turned back were subsequently to try again.



4. I do not believe that we should permit the Iraqis to play a game of "cat and mouse" with the ships enforcing the embargo. I have discussed this problem with the Attorney General, and we are agreed that if a ship were to attempt to evade the embargo on a second occasion, we could justify its detention, if necessary by force, as action necessary to secure the implementation of the UN Resolutions. I therefore intend to amend the instructions to our ships that when they turn back a sanctions breaking vessel they should also give a clear warning that if it is discovered making a further attempt to evade the embargo it will be liable to be detained.

5. If we operate off Fujairah we would have a choice between directing a vessel into the tanker park in UAE territorial waters (if local agreement is forthcoming) or to a nearby anchorage in international waters (where the Soviet UDALOY warship is anchored). Although there would be some practical problems in ensuring that it was appropriately guarded and immobilised, these can be surmounted.

6. We are developing specific contingency plans for dealing with the Hittin if it does attempt to break the embargo. Our objective, which I discussed with Dick Cheney this afternoon, would be to mount a joint interception with the US and, if possible, the French as well.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Attorney General, and to Sir Robin Butler and Sir Percy Cradock.

(T K)

Ministry of Defence

31st August 1990

Approved by the Defence Secretary
and signed in his absence.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10/6a

31 August 1990

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Ria Amir

Jean Charles

A good & interesting paper.

cop 31/8.

Future Regime of Iraq

The Foreign Secretary thought that the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Energy Secretary might like to see the enclosed paper:

"Iraq: Who Could Replace Saddam Hussein?"

which has been produced by FCO officials.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and John Neilson (Dept of Energy).

Yours ever,
Richard Gozney
(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

IRAQ : WHO COULD REPLACE SADDAM HUSSEIN? 6

1. In order to assess the prospects for a successor regime in Iraq we need to understand existing power structures.

Who is Saddam Hussein?

2. He is a Sunni Arab from the Euphrates village of Tikrit in central Iraq. He is not a military officer, but a civilian Ba'thist whose early life was spent in revolutionary politics. He was wounded in the late 1950s in an attempt to assassinate the (communist-backed) military President al Qassem. He went into exile in Cairo with other young Ba'thists and returned to Iraq after the first Ba'thist coup in 1963. He became a teacher and party worker, moving up the ranks, using the Ba'th security apparatus.

3. Saddam became vice-President - but de facto strongman - after the second Ba'thist revolution in 1968. He replaced President al Bakr in a bloodless coup in 1979 (although he shortly afterwards executed several potential Ba'thist rivals). He has been President for eleven years - and for the great majority of them the country has been at war. His power base has been the Ba'th Party and its security and intelligence wing, the Mukhabarat (once run by his half brother). Into these he has introduced fellow Tikriti "clansmen" in sensitive positions. The army has never been a real powerbase for him, and his relations with it have been subject to strain. During the Gulf war he conducted brutal purges of senior officers and rotated them constantly. He was heavily criticised especially in the early stages for ill-informed meddling in military operations.

Iraqi Ba'th Party

4. The Iraqi Ba'th Party has a history of conspiracy, brutality and internal strife. It started as an underground civilian movement in the late 1940s. It was banned under the monarchy. When it first seized power for a few months in 1963 its leadership was mainly

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Shi'a Arab. But by the 1968 revolution Saddam had established Sunni Arab dominance. It remains a highly disciplined party of some 50,000 full members only (it's Syrian counterpart has been much more diluted). Membership is only attained after a prolonged series of intermediate steps and a candidate must undergo full time ideological training and be sponsored by existing full members.

5. Again unlike its Syrian counterpart, it remains primarily a civilian party : no senior field officer of the Iraqi army has recently served on the Revolutionary Command Council (some members have honourific military ranks). Iraqi Ba'thist leaders and Saddam himself only took to wearing military fatigues when the Iraq/Iran war started. It is organised on a secret cell basis (five to a cell), and constitutes an effective and widespread network of informers throughout Iraqi society. It has its own internal security structures. One of the difficulties for commentators is that one can not be entirely sure that the visible political leadership of the Party is the real or the only centre of power.

6. The effect of recent constitutional changes in Iraq has been to strengthen the personal nature of Saddam's rule at the expense above all of the Party. The Revolutionary Command Council is to be abolished and the Ba'th Regional Command replaced. This may imply recognition that Ba'thism is out of date.

Iraqi Military

7. In the fifties and sixties the Iraqi army was used to extirpate the Ba'th. The revolutionary stream in the army was more Nasserist, and the once powerful - but now suppressed - Iraqi Communist Party was also traditionally strong in the officer corps and supported the 1958 military revolution of al Qassem. It is unlikely that the ICP has much residual influence in the armed forces. The contemporary Iraqi army is officered mainly by Arab Sunnis. Tikritis hold several sensitive commands. The senior officer corps is impressive and in a few cases British trained. Most of the footsoldiers are Shi'a. We must assume that the Ba'th party has established tight

political control in the Army. There is a heavy programme of Ba'thist indoctrination, and Party commissars in all units. But Saddam's capricious and merciless treatment of the officer class, together with his propensity to interfere, remain a potential source of grievance.

Tikritis

8. The Tikritis are not all relations of Saddam. Nor are they a tribe. The word merely denotes regional origin. The rise of the Tikritis resulted largely from a movement of young Tikriti men into the lower and middle ranks of the Army in the fifties, as their traditional local industry died. There are rifts among the Tikritis, but they share common interests with Saddam. They are all Arab Sunnis, many are officers, and many senior Ba'thists. They are all riding on Saddam's coat tails. This could cut both ways: they may think they will stand or fall with him, and could have their stilettos out. Within the wider Tikriti "clan" there is an inner circle of Saddam's own direct relations.

Iraqi Shi'a

9. The Iraqi Arab Shi'a comprise just over 50% of the population. They are concentrated from Baghdad southwards. (It is worth noting that the Arab Sunnis are only about 25% - the others being Kurdish Sunnis and Christians). Under the Ba'th Iraq has become in many respects a genuinely secular Arab nationalist society. Khomeini never succeeded in fomenting Shi'a revolt in Iraq. Since 1982 the regime has paid assiduous attention to Shi'a traditions and spent vast sums on Shi'a shrines, but the Shi'a are generally economically underprivileged. There are Shi'a members of the Revolutionary Council and the Ba'th Party Regional Command, but they have no formal sectarian political representation.

10. The main focus of organised Shi'a opposition has been the al Da'wa (Call) Party. It has been ruthlessly suppressed. Membership carries the death penalty. Its leader, Imam Bakr Sadr, was executed

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in 1980. The party probably still exists underground in Iraq, and is believed to have been responsible for a number of bomb attacks and four assassination attempts. It certainly also exists outside the country. It is not strong enough to pose a direct threat to the security of the regime. During the Gulf war Iran sponsored another Shi'a group - the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Republic of Iraq (SAIRI) under the al Hakim family. The Iraqis have persecuted the family and killed one member in Sudan in 1988. The Islamic opposition is currently meeting in Tehran.

11. There is no strong tradition of Sunni fundamentalism in Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood has not been a major factor in the Iraqi political equation.

Iraq's Kurds

12. The heyday of Kurdish opposition to the Baghdad Ba'th regime was in the late sixties and seventies under Mustapha Barzani. He received support from the CIA, and the Shah. The 1975 Algiers agreement with Iran (over the Shatt) put an end to the major Kurdish insurrection; the Shah committed himself in a secret clause to withdraw his support.

13. During the Gulf war Kurdish insurgents with Iranian support were a constant thorn in Baghdad's flesh. But no more than that. Despite official unification in 1986, the Kurdish opposition is riven with internecine rivalries, and a strong mercenary tradition enables Baghdad to buy groups off, divide and rule. There is no strong evidence that the use of chemical weapons at Halabja has led the factions to bury the hatchet. Saddam has shown himself ready to use mass deportation and genocidal tactics. Attempts at reconciliation with Baghdad by some Kurdish leaders have come to nothing.

Nature of Political Life in Iraq

14. Saddam exercises total autocratic control in Iraq through the

mechanisms of power described above. He has carefully cultivated a formidable cult of personality. It is a mistake to underestimate his appeal to the majority of the Iraqi populace, who are not Baghdad sophisticates but often illiterate, rural poor. He has brought significant improvements to their lives : electricity, TV, health care, clean water. They admire him as a strong leader and have not experienced much better in the past. They are politically passive, and being unused to democracy may hardly stop to consider whether they actually like Saddam. There is no alternative leader visible in the wings. No other member of the Ba'th leadership can touch him for force of personality, decisive brutality or personal charisma. Anyone suspected of incipient disloyalty is killed. Senior army commanders are kept in rotation and seldom allowed to develop a public persona. Saddam has recently built up an independent Palace security system (Amn al Khas) as a rival to the Party and state security apparatus. This makes his personal security tighter than ever.

15. There is no identifiable organised political opposition whatsoever in Iraq and no public political life. The old political classes have been exterminated, cowed or forced into exile. It is important to recognise the extent of this political vacuum when considering alternatives to the present dispensation. It is not as if Saddam were holding down the lid on a seething cauldron of organised internal opposition. The most potent threats to him probably lie within the existing political and security establishments.

Possible Successor Regimes

16. It is not a foregone conclusion that Saddam will fall. He could (a) get away with his occupation of Kuwait if the international community weakens; or (b) be forced to leave or decide to leave and still survive in power in Iraq - so pervasive is his control of the country. If he does fall the nature of a successor regime emerging from within Iraq would depend on the circumstances. The following are some of the most likely scenarios (roughly in

order of likelihood).

(a) Military Coup to Preempt Conflict with the US

Army or Airforce officers may try to eliminate Saddam to preempt defeat by the West. Several groups have been arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup since 1988. Any coup would be very difficult to achieve given the extraordinarily tight personal security around Saddam. Within the Army the crack Republican Guards Corps is his personal praetorian guard. If they cooperated Saddam might be assassinated. Otherwise it would be a question of turning the tanks and aircraft on Baghdad, which would lead to bloody conflict with loyalist army and security units, and possibly civil war if Saddam remained alive. A military coup would have a greater chance of success if carried out with the support of elements of the Ba'th party. In which case, an emerging military leader would probably try to harness existing political and security structures so as to minimise opposition. It is doubtful that any other Arab country (eg Egypt) would be able to intervene to support him in destroying the Ba'thist system.

(b) Ba'th Party Led Coup (Palace Coup)

Party leaders could decide to remove Saddam in order to allow them to leave Kuwait. A Party coup is often considered the most likely way to topple Saddam. But previous efforts have come to nothing. If the rest of the party leadership were to agree that Saddam must go, they could probably remove him (by execution). But which would dare to be the first to whisper the idea? If successful, such a coup would throw up a similar regime, probably with a more collective leadership under a figure from the present leadership. It would be able to withdraw from Kuwait. Fadhl al Barak, Saddam's security adviser, was arrested on suspicion of plotting such a coup in March.

(c) Coup by the Tikritis

If they think they will fall with Saddam the Tikritis could try to preserve their position by removing him themselves and installing a successor from their ranks. This is a real possibility. The chances of an armed member of the Tikriti inner circle getting close to Saddam must be greater than most. The upshot would be likely to be a regime similar in style to the present.

(d) Military or Party Coup after a decision by Saddam to leave Kuwait

If Saddam decided to pull out of Kuwait his domestic powerbase and image as strongman would be seriously weakened (which is why it is unlikely). This would create ideal circumstances for his enemies in the army and/or Party to mount a coup. But Saddam would be alert to this and could be expected to move first, starting with a purge pour encourager les autres. If such a coup were successful the successor regime would be much as in (a) or (b) above.

(e) Assassination (Wild Card)

There are many people in Iraq with a grievance against Saddam : Kurds, families of political prisoners, families of Gulf war victims. There have been many attempts on Saddam's life. His security precautions are extraordinary. Not even top members of the Ba'th leadership are allowed to carry loaded weapons in his presence. If he were assassinated by such a wild card, again the most likely outcome would be a regime similar to the present. Such a regime would probably be able to withdraw from Kuwait. But it might also want to cash in on Saddam's apotheosis.

- (f) Saddam removed (or killed) in a military defeat by multinational forces

There would be an upsurge of popular nationalist and anti-Western sentiment in Iraq, probably including violence against Western interests. Possibly an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalist sentiment too. The situation would not be easy to control. Provided the Americans did not follow through with occupation of Baghdad, the Ba'th Party (in the absence of a viable alternative) could capitalise on this. A Ba'th/military junta would probably emerge with heavy anti-Western rhetoric and headed by a senior figure from the present regime such as Hussain Kamil (Industry Minister). Insecurity in Iraq would lead the new regime to maintain and tighten its grip. The security apparatus would see its vested interest in maintaining the nearest thing to the status quo. Iraq would, of course, be out of Kuwait, but militarily exhausted and unable to project power.

- (g) Saddam steps down voluntarily to offer a way out

Very unlikely. If he did this it would be stage managed. Saddam would arrange a succession and would continue to be the real power in Iraq. He might quite soon re-emerge as top dog.

17. It is difficult, therefore, to envisage a successor regime radically different in nature from the present emerging within Iraq, although there are a number of scenarios in which such a successor regime could withdraw from Kuwait. There is no prospect of a Western style democratic regime emerging internally in the short term: there is simply no democratic infrastructure or tradition, and very powerful anti-democratic forces. (In 1989 people said much the same of Eastern Europe. But the environment is different. Iraq is not close to successful, economically powerful examples of democratic government, and has a different history).

18. There are pro-democracy Iraqi opposition groups in exile. There is a large Iraqi exile community in London and similar groups are at present meeting in Damascus to form a common front. But they are very closely monitored by the regime and Party representatives here, and organisation is difficult. There is no identifiable figure (like Khomeini) waiting to return. A Western backed attempt to introduce liberal democracy would be doomed to failure, especially on the back of military action against Saddam Hussein. The rump of the present regime would have ample resources to disrupt it. The Islamic opposition in theory favour establishment of some form of Islamic democracy.


19. If a successor regime similar to the present one did emerge it might not last long. It would take time for any successor to forge a personal power similar to Saddam's even in the face of perceived external threat. The ideology of the Ba'th Party is a sclerotic anachronism and might not survive the shock of a change of leadership. But the Iraqis have no other on the stocks. The alternative is likely to be a military dictatorship (at best moving towards the current Egyptian model or pseudo democracy) or a populist, nationalist government with Islamic tendencies - or both.

20. The other alternative is that Iraq will disintegrate into its regions - Mosul, Baghdad, Basra (the three Ottoman provinces). In that case we would need to consider further international or Arab intervention to restore central control. However much we may dislike the modern history of Iraq, we would find it very difficult to support the idea of the disappearance of a nation state (cf Kuwait) or schismatic movements within it (cf Eastern Europe). The internal collapse of Iraq would create a dangerous vacuum inviting Iranian, Syrian and possible Turkish adventurism. It would create great instability. But we should not overstate the risk of such collapse : Iraq showed great national cohesion in the Gulf war, and Baghdad has a long history as the centre of power in a strong Arab unit.

Policies of a new regime K


21. Any successor regime inheriting the aftermath of the Kuwaiti invasion will have severe external/internal difficulties. There will be a lot of fences to be mended in the Arab world and more widely. Inside Iraq the Kurds and other oppositionists will seize the opportunity to step up destabilisation. The economic problems will be very acute (and Iraq can hardly expect enthusiastic support from elsewhere in the Arab world, although she may be able to extort more Danegeld). The problem of employing demobilised forces will be further exacerbated by the return to Iraq of large numbers of prisoners of war from Iran, whose political reliability will be suspect. This will be partially alleviated by the mass exodus of Egyptians, but the average Iraqi does not take easily to the sort of menial work he considers appropriate to an Egyptian.

22. It would not be easy for a new leader to disarm or to relax political controls. The reaction in such a crisis is likely to be the opposite. A new regime will feel weak and reluctant to give hope to internal or external enemies. Whatever the mess left by Saddam, Iraq will remain the regional Arab power at the top of the Gulf : demographically strong, potentially rich, and assertive by nature. Its regional policies are unlikely in the political climate described above to change greatly. Ominously for the Gulf states, Saddam Hussein does seem to have tapped a genuine raw nerve of resentment in the "angry northern republics" at the lotus eating rulers of the Gulf.



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A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	REM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	3079	
Extract details: minute and attachment from Craddock to Buell dated 31 August 1940 - SP01109		
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M. M.

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

31 August 1990

Jean Charfi,

Tunisian Emissary


The Tunisian President is sending a special emissary to Paris and London to explain his position on the Gulf crisis. The emissary (the Minister for Higher Education, M. Charfi) is due to see President Mitterand tomorrow, 1 September. The Tunisian Ambassador has asked if the Prime Minister would see him on Monday 3 September.

Mr Waldegrave believes that a call on the Prime Minister, if it were possible, would serve our interests. The Tunisians have condemned the Iraqi invasion, recognized the legitimate government of Kuwait and have agreed to comply with UN sanctions. However, President Ben Ali has questioned the legality of foreign intervention, claimed that the West is pursuing self interest instead of principle and has failed to give the Arab League his strong support.

A message from the Prime Minister to M. Charfi, for the Tunisian President, would remind the latter that there can be no compromise or fudge. It would help to move President Ben Ali towards stronger support for the enforcement of UN sanctions. Such a message would reinforce powerfully the concern which we, other EC governments and the Americans have already registered with the Tunisian government.

If the Prime Minister is unable to see M. Charfi, Mr Waldegrave will see him instead.

Yours ever,


(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

UPDATE

NOTES FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE

CS

~~SOVIET POLICY IN THE CURRENT GULF CRISIS - UPDATE~~

1. There have as yet been no developments in the situation which have caused me to amend in any substantial way my analysis for the Political Committee of 24 August 1990.
2. The USSR did indeed support the UN vote to enforce sanctions but has taken care to distance itself from any immediate military action on the part of the allies. My thoughts on the pros and cons of the argument for the USSR providing military support for action to enforce Saddam Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait are as follows:
3. Pro:
 - (a) Joint action, even in nominal strength with Western (especially European) forces would strengthen immeasurably Western support for Gorbachev and his policies. This support could be converted into tangible economic aid from Europe, the USA and Japan.
 - (b) In event of allied success, Soviet influence (and military presence) in the region would be legitimately assured.
 - (c) The Soviet General Staff might welcome the opportunity to demonstrate the value of their forces to the national interest.
4. Con:
 - (a) Provision of forces in support of an allied operation might strengthen the hand of the General Staff in its domestic position vis à vis Gorbachev.
 - (b) Allied failure would cause the USSR to lose influence in the Arab world, and being identified with Western nations would deprive the USSR of its claim to distinct - and more sympathetic - status in Arab eyes.
 - (c) The Soviet General Staff does not have the confidence in the tactical efficiency and reliability of their troops that their Western counterparts do, and would fear adverse comparison with US forces.
 - (d) Operations in close proximity to Western forces could reveal Soviet operating procedures (especially in such areas as electronic weapons) that the Soviet military would rather keep secret.

UPDATE

-2-

(e) The Soviet population and the nascent political opposition in the new parliament would be unhappy to support the use of Soviet forces abroad both for fear of being drawn into another Afghanistan situation, and from a strong and widespread reaction on the part of intellectuals and radicals to the State's use of military force as being too reminiscent of 'the bad old way of doing business'.

5. Above all, if Gorbachev thinks that to commit his country to military support of allied action against Saddam Hussein would make that military action more likely, then it would in his perception probably be against his national interest to do so in the short term. As we noted on 24 August, Gorbachev for many reasons does not wish to see a long and difficult war in the Middle East, and he particularly does not wish to become involved in any such war if he can possibly avoid it.
6. Gorbachev's attitude to war and the use of armed force is still undoubtedly firmly shaped by the logical and commonsense Marxist-Leninist approach; viz:
 - War is a tool of policy only to be resorted to as a last option and only if victory can be assured without excessive cost.
 - Victory can best be assured by surprise, a high tempo of operations and a swift and successful end to hostilities.
 - War puts societies under a great strain and societies and institutions lacking resilience and stability will crack under the stress. The strains of WWI when it was not 'all over by Christmas' brought the old Russian society to breaking point and precipitated the Revolution of 1917.

Given the very unstable and fragile nature of Soviet society today, the very last thing Gorbachev wants is to see it engaged in an uncertain and protracted military adventure over which he would have little control.

7. Soviet reluctance to become involved in fighting in the Middle East would also be a reflection of their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Western position. The West has some undoubted military strengths - technology plus trained and determined soldiers, with good morale especially. However, the Soviet General Staff has a very poor opinion of Western capacity to orchestrate theatre strategic combined arms operations. Saddam Hussein has a

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UPDATE

-3-

large and experienced army run on Soviet lines. It is true that a bold allied air operation, coupled with other measures, might well be sufficient to topple Saddam Hussein and thereby force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. However, Soviet military thinking will be firmly of the opinion that a half-hearted or belated operation will only serve to reinforce Saddam Hussein's position and would therefore result in a major land/air conflict. Then by Soviet military calculations the Western allies do not have either the command and control system, the operational concepts nor the combined arms force necessary to achieve a quick victory. The war might become a long and bloody trial of strength if surprise and overwhelming force were not used decisively from the outset.

8. If Gorbachev assesses that there is even a slight chance that the West does not have the stomach for a quick war nor the muscle for a long conflict (and he cannot fail to be aware that the pressures on Western leaders to avoid military conflict of any kind will continue to mount), then he is bound to wish to try not just to avoid involvement in war but to try to prevent it happening at all.
9. In such event, Gorbachev might conclude that his best role would be as a mediator, using the extensive Soviet influence in Iraq to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait on condition that a new government not hostile to Iraq would be brought to power. Although a compromise, this would leave Saddam Hussein in a very powerful position in his claim to lead the Arab world - and, incidentally, with a considerable degree of influence over the price of oil.
10. It should be borne in mind that any rise in oil price would be in the Soviet short-term economic interest although it would greatly hinder economic recovery in Eastern European countries.
11. The major disadvantage of such a course of action for the West (and in the long term for the USSR too), would be that Saddam Hussein is likely to remain a problem and, on his past track record to become an even greater problem for stability in the region in the future. However, at the moment Gorbachev is so concerned with short-term crises in the USSR that these are certain to take priority in his policy considerations.

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UPDATE

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UPDATE

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UPDATE

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UPDATE

-3-

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-3-

UPDATE

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1990

The Prime Minister has agreed to see the
Kuwaiti Crown Prince and I have pencilled in
a meeting for 1700 on Monday 3 September.

MRS AMANDA PONSONBY

Stephen Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

L.)



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister ~~Secretary~~

Not much news overnight. I
attach a telegram about Brady's
mission.

On women & children, the Iraqi
fighter should leave today but probably
not before 1500 our time. It will
stop off in Amman & Paris, getting
here during the night. There should be
139 ^{British} women & children on board. The
arrangements for meeting them are as
you ordered yesterday.

The tanker Hittin appears still to



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

be anchored 1.5 miles from where it
loaded (but this formation is 12 hours
old).

C.D.P.

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OF 312300Z AUGUST 90
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INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, ESC LONDON, HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENGLAND, ODA

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/CHANCELLOR, WICKS, ALLAN, AND
MOUNTFIELD (TREASURY), WARE AND ILES (BANK OF ENGLAND)
LANKASTER (ODA)

MY TELNO 2088

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BURDENSARING

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH US TREASURY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF
TREASURY SECRETARY BRADY AND SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER ON TOUR
TO EUROPE, ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST TO DISCUSS BURDENSARING. US
LOOKING FOR OFFSET FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURE (NOT FROM UK) AS
WELL AS CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM FRONT LINE
STATES. ASSESS TOTAL ECONOMIC NEEDS FOR THE REST OF 1990 AT
DOLLARS 2-1/2 TO 3-1/2 BILLION, RISING TO DOLLARS 6 TO 7-1/2
BILLION FOR 1991.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER (ECONOMIC) CALLED ON TREASURY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY DALLARA TO DISCUSS THE US INITIATIVE ON
BURDENSARING.

3. BRADY, ACCOMPANIED BY MULFORD AND EAGLEBURGER WILL
VISIT PARIS, LONDON, TOKYO AND KOREA. SECRETARY OF STATE
BAKER, ACCOMPANIED BY DALLARA AND OTHERS, WILL GO ON A SEPARATE
TOUR TAKING IN BONN, BRUSSELS, ROME, TAIWAN, AND RIYADH. BRADY
WILL BE IN LONDON ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 5.

4. THE US WILL BE SEEKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFSET THE
MILITARY COST OF THE GULF OPERATION, AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTIONS

FOR SHORT-TERM EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE US DEFINE THE LATTER AS EGYPT, TURKEY, AND JORDAN. THEY WOULD NOT EXPECT UK CONTRIBUTION TO THE MILITARY OFFSET, BUT WOULD EXPECT SOMETHING TOWARDS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE UK WOULD NOT BE A PRIMARY CONTRIBUTOR).

5. THE US ASSESS THE SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC NEEDS AS FOLLOWS, IF OIL PRICES STAY AT DOLLARS 25 A BARREL:

	IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS	
	1990	1991
TURKEY	1.36	2.73
EGYPT	0.89	2.07
JORDAN	0.55	1.46
TOTAL	2.80	6.26

(DETAILED FIGURES FAXED TO MOUNTFIELD, TREASURY)

6. FOR 1990, THE US BELIEVE THE 1990 AID SHOULD BE QUICK AND UNCONDITIONAL, PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF GRANTS (OR VERY SOFT LOANS). THE AID WOULD BE DONATED BILATERALLY FROM DONORS DIRECT TO RECIPIENTS.

7. FOR 1991, THE US WOULD BE LOOKING FOR SOME CONDITIONALITY, BUT THE FORM WOULD VARY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AND MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT SHORT OF A FULL IMF PROGRAM. TURKEY, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT HAVE A COLUMBIA-STYLE IMF ENDORSEMENT FOLLOWING A RIGOROUS ARTICLE IV-TYPE EXAMINATION. OTHERS MIGHT HAVE A 'SHADOW' FUND PROGRAM.

8. DALLARA SAID AN OPTION FOR THE 1991 AID--BUT PROBABLY NOT THE IMMEDIATE AID--WOULD BE TO CREATE A COMMON FUND TO WHICH DONORS COULD CONTRIBUTE, AND WHICH WOULD CHANNEL INCOME TO THE RECIPIENTS. THIS FUND MIGHT BE ADMINSTRERED BY ONE OF

A NUMBER OF ORGANISATIONS: BIS, IMF, OR AN AD HOC GROUP OF G10 PLUS SAUDI ARABIA. (DALLARA FAVOURED THE LAST, SAYING HE THOUGHT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE HAPPY WITH IT: ABOVE ALL HE WISHED TO AVOID A COMMISSION DOMINATED G24 GROUP. AS TO POSSIBLE ROLE OF IMF, MANAGING DIRECTOR IS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH G7 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON SEPTEMBER 4). DALLARA THOUGHT A COMMON FUND WOULD HELP ENSURE CONSISTENCY OF CONDITIONALITY, PROVIDE PROPER ACCOUNTING AND MIGHT BE OF POLITICAL HELP TO SOME COUNTRIES WHO WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE DIRECT AID TO THE THREE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

9. DALLARA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WERE ALSO HIT--INCLUDING PHILIPPINES, INDIA, AND EASTERN EUROPE. HE THOUGHT SOME GESTURE IN THEIR DIRECTION WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE MADE, PERHAPS THROUGH A NEW OR EXPANDED IMF FACILITY.

10. MINISTER (ECONOMIC) STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING A COMMON ANALYSIS OF THE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. HE EMPHASISED THAT GIVEN OUR MILITARY CONTRIBUTION THE UK WOULD NOT EXPECT TO BE IN THE FRONT RANK OF FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS. HE ALSO POINTED TO THE NEED TO AVOID FORCING THE IMF TO LOWER ITS STANDARDS, AND TO RING-FENCE ANY CONCESSIONS TO THE BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES, TO AVOID SETTING PRECEDENTS THAT OTHERS WOULD SEEK TO EXPLOIT. DALLARA EMPHASISED THAT BRADY WOULD BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING FROM THE UK.

11. TWO OTHER DETAILED MATTERS:

- (A) DALLARA CONFIRMED US HAD RECENTLY DISBURSED DOLLARS 150 MILLION OF GRANTS TO EGYPT OUT OF DOLLARS 1 BILLION THAT HAD BEEN APPROVED BUT HELD UP PENDING EGYPT MEETING IMF CONDITIONS. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE ALSO SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING FORGIVING SOME OR ALL OF DOLLARS 7 BILLION MLLITARY DEBTS, BUT WERE HOPING FOR FRENCH TO TAKE PARALLEL ACTION.
- (B) SINCE BRADY WILL BE SEEING CHIEF SECRETARY NOT CHANCELLOR HE IS UNLIKELY TO SEEK TO RAISE OTHER G7 ISSUES. BUT MULFORD WILL WANT TO DISCUSS IBRD LOANS TO CHINA WITH WICKS.

PERETZ

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MOD UK FOR SEC(O)(C) MR HATFIELD.
MY TELNO 2114 AND TELECON HATFIELD (MOD)/TEBBIT: ENFORCEMENT OF
EMBARGO IN TERRITORIAL SEAS

1. IN VIEW OF ONE CONCERN TO ENSURE THAT OUR ROES ARE HARMONISED WITH THE AMERICANS (EG WITH AN EYE TO TRIPARTITE OPERATIONS) WE HAVE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH CLARKE (POL-MIL BUREAU STATE) THE STATEMENT BY THE REGIONAL DESK (PARA 6 OF TUR) THAT DIVERSION OR TOWING OF SUSPECT VESSELS INTO PORT WOULD BE CONTEMPLATED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, EG IF A VESSEL HAD BEEN DISABLED.
2. CLARKE CONFIRMED THAT NORMAL PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR SUSPECT VESSELS TO BE TURNED BACK OR DIVERTED AWAY FROM THE BLOCKADED AREA. A PERSISTENT OFFENDER MIGHT NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO PORT, BUT THIS OPTION WAS ENVISAGED ESSENTIALLY AS A SAFETY MEASURE, FOR CASES WHERE PREVIOUS DISABLEMENT HAD BEEN NECESSARY AND THE VESSEL COULD NOT BE LEFT AT SEA.

WOOD

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

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31 August 1990

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ACT 2000

Dear Stefan,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with King Hussein followed by a working lunch. The King was accompanied by the Jordanian Prime Minister, by Field Marshal bin Shaker and by Abu Adnan Odeh.

This letter contains sensitive material and should be seen only by those with a strict need to know.

Summary

The meeting certainly did not follow the normal pattern of the Prime Minister's encounters with the King. The King's opening statement lasted some 40 minutes and was rather a ramble, dredging up every resentment and dislike he has accumulated over the years

There was no particular theme to it other than to show the King himself in the best possible light (in which he was not very successful). It ended with the customary declaration that the time might have come for him to go and he would rather do that than betray his principles. The Prime Minister then threw the book at him with considerable vehemence for much the same length of time, which among other things impelled the King to started smoking heavily (which I took to be a sign of nerves). The discussion over lunch was more amiable and the King ended by saying that he hoped he and the Prime Minister were still friends. The Prime Minister agreed that they were. The Prime Minister's overall impression from the discussion was that the King is trying to get back on side with his real friends. This may be a bit charitable, but let's hope it is so.

Detail

The King launched off by saying he was sorry that the Gulf crisis had created a situation of tension and misunderstanding between him and the Prime Minister. He had very much valued their friendship over many years. It was a pity they had not been in touch earlier (this is rather obscure: we offered him a meeting at the time of his visit to Washington). We should all have been more alert to recognise the signs of impending crisis.

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They had been there at the time of the Baghdad summit. Iraq had been put in a situation where it was unable to meet the basic needs of its people or pay its debts. Indeed it was being brought to its knees. Saddam Hussein had constantly pressed Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others about the over-selling of oil, thus depressing the price. Kuwait kept finding excuses not to abide by agreements. There were many other factors too. Iraq needed to secure a waterway to the Gulf and protect its flank. There was a long historical background to the dispute with Kuwait. There was the question of Kuwait's loan to Iraq which should have been written off. Moreover Iraq also had unselfish motives: it wanted to narrow the gap between the haves and have nots in the Arab world by establishing an oil fund which would assist the less well off.

The King continued that he had urged Kuwait to take some of these complaints seriously. He had also raised with them their repeated failure to make the promised payments to Jordan. The Crown Prince had actually suggested that Jordan's problems were Jordan's own fault, stemming from extravagance.

He had introduced much greater freedom of democracy in Jordan and the country was the better for it. The Gulf rulers would not be able to resist this tide for long, and we were probably due for further unpleasant surprises. All these factors lay behind the crisis, and he had begun to fear during his own visit to Baghdad that the result could be open confrontation if the Kuwaitis refused to negotiate seriously about Iraq's demands.

The King continued that once the invasion had taken place he had tried everything to secure an Arab solution. Indeed he had been on the verge of securing Iraq's agreement to withdrawal, and even the return of the ruling family, but the Arab League meeting had cut across all that. Moreover, the Saudis had deceived him about their intention to invite foreign forces. He was inclined to wonder whether this had not been a deliberate plot by the Saudis and the Americans. He did not believe there had been a real threat to Saudi Arabia from Iraq. Even many Saudis denied it. But now the dangerous step of introducing foreign forces had been taken, and the consequences were difficult to forecast. Since the birth of Islam, there had never been foreign troops in the country which controlled the Holy Places (what about Jerusalem? Ed.) This had changed the whole situation in the Arab world. Tension was continuing to mount, with constant rumours of impending air strikes. If anyone lost their nerve, there would be a real disaster. There were other factors at work, too. Israel was acquiring one million new citizens from the Soviet Union and lacked the space to accommodate them. The struggle for control of oil was becoming very feverish. And in the face of all this the Arabs were divided. He felt particularly badly about Egypt. Jordan and Iraq had brought Egypt back into the Arab fold: now Egypt had turned on them.

The King said he now had to decide where to go from here. His aim was to secure Iraq's withdrawal from some or all of the territory of Kuwait and begin a process of de-escalation. One element in such a plan would be self-determination for the people of Kuwait.

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Jordan had suffered a great deal, with heavy debts and huge financial burdens. It was just not right that so much wealth should be concentrated in the hands of a few. Jordan had waited 24 years for Security Council Resolution 242 to be implemented without anyone coming to their assistance. Now the country was in a state of siege. The Port of Aqaba was virtually closed, insurance rates were high and even close friends like Britain had withheld defence equipment which had been promised. There was a massive refugee problem, with 150,000 new refugees in Jordan at any one moment, and as many as 2 million likely to arrive, all without Jordan receiving any help from the rest of the world. There had been 400,000 Jordanians in Kuwait who had lost everything and were now returning home. They too would have to be looked after. It was all a bit much. He would never be a burden to his country. But equally he would never compromise his principles. He would stay as long as he was wanted and would try and get a solution. But he was perfectly ready to go. He wondered whether the world would have reacted like this if Jordan had been occupied by Israel.

The Prime Minister said she was frankly amazed by the King's account. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was one of the most blatant cases of aggression which she had ever seen. Just because you envied your neighbour's house or his wealth you could not march in and take it. That was contrary to every known law, indeed it was an invitation to anarchy. There could be no legitimate reason for Iraq's invasion and no justification for it. She could not imagine how anyone could portray Iraq as the victim in these circumstances. Iraq was the country which had used chemical weapons, not just in war but against its own people. It was not a poor country: indeed it was rich in resources. Its problems arose because Saddam Hussein had plunged it into an unnecessary war, resulting in untold privation and 100,000 young men dead, all for nothing. Iraq was a country governed by fear and dictatorship. All its problems could be traced directly to Saddam Hussein. He could have developed his country peacefully: instead he chose to impoverish it by war.

The Prime Minister continued that Iraq's territorial dispute with Kuwait was irrelevant. They were both independent states and members of the United Nations. If ever one country invaded another and tried to take it by force, that had to be stopped, otherwise no one would be safe. All the facts pointed to Saddam Hussein having intended to move on to invade Saudi Arabia, probably in league with Yemen. It was the most clear and blatant act of aggression and the UN Security Council had responded appropriately. It did not matter what country it was: it was the principle. We could not have the UN flouted. That was why we had moved forces to defend neighbouring states and had secured sanctions against Iraq. World opinion had never been so united. The King had talked about the dangers of foreign forces in the area. He should remember that the only reason they were there was Saddam Hussein. Now he was mistreating foreign embassies and holding foreign nationals hostage. That was no way for any self-respecting Arab leader or Moslem to behave. Saddam Hussein was no more than an international brigand.

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The Prime Minister continued that the more the king wanted a peaceful solution, the greater the incentive for him to support and implement sanctions. We could not rule out the use of force, but we wanted to avoid it and that meant making sanctions work. That applied to Jordan too. She recognised that countries like Jordan would suffer from imposing sanctions and we were ready to cooperate in a major international effort to provide compensating assistance. But there could be no exceptions or waivers. Sanctions had to be applied wholeheartedly and over the whole range of products including food. It was not we who were depriving the Iraqis of food. It was Saddam Hussein.

The Prime Minister continued that the King should recognise that Saddam Hussein was a loser. He was going to be beaten and the King should distance himself from him. The whole world community was against him, and the United States and others had to put their reputation on the line. He was going to be compelled to withdraw from Iraq, preferably by sanctions but other measures might have to be considered. Apart from anything else he had done immense damage to the Palestinian cause, undermining the credibility of the Arab cause. She recognised the need for fresh efforts to make progress on the Arab/Israel question. But this was unlikely to happen while Saddam Hussein stayed in Kuwait. There was no compromise or partial solution to Iraq's invasion: there was only one thing to be done, and that was for Saddam Hussein to withdraw. It did not matter whether he was an Arab, an African, an Indian or an Eskimo: it was the principle that mattered. He must be stopped and he would be, preferably by peaceful means.

The Prime Minister said she recognised the particular difficulties faced by Jordan, not least on the question of refugees. She thought that the European Community and the United Kingdom had both given aid for this, but we would be prepared to consider more if a case was made. We would also work hard for Jordan to get compensation for the effects of sanctions, provided they were applied rigorously. Meanwhile she hoped that the King would recognise Saddam Hussein for what he was: a man who hid behind the skirts of women and children, and who had done nothing but damage to the Arab case. It was no time for proposals designed to let Saddam Hussein keep part of his ill-gotten conquest. The King should not try to negotiate, but concentrate on full implementation of the Security Council Resolutions. More generally she thought the King had taken a fundamental wrong turn when he had decided to pull out of the West Bank. She would like to see him become a principal player in the Arab world again. That would be the best basis on which to resume progress on the Palestinian problem.

A number of points were covered during the subsequent discussion over lunch. The Prime Minister raised the question of breaches of sanctions by the Central Bank of Jordan. The Jordanian Prime Minister said that the only payments were those due to Jordan in repayment of debt. The King asserted that Jordan was applying sanctions. It had been necessary to allow some prior contracts to be completed, particularly for sugar and rice. Jordan was continuing to receive oil from Iraq in payment of debt. But this was entirely above-board. The problem would

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become easier when Saudi Arabia resumed supply of oil at the rate of 1 billion barrels per month from early September.

The King emphasised that Jordan was not so remote from the international consensus as the Prime Minister implied. Jordanian aircraft were still detained in Kuwait. The Jordanian Embassy was still open and treated in the same way as other Western embassies. The Jordanians had sent their Ambassador back as a gesture of solidarity.

The Prime Minister asked whether the King could really believe anything he was told by Saddam Hussein. The King said that Saddam Hussein had never lied to him, although there were things which he had not told him. The Prime Minister asked whether the King believed that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait. The King said he thought withdrawal was possible, provided it was part of a process during which sanctions were also gradually lifted. He was trying to put together a group of Arab heads of government to visit Saddam Hussein and persuade him of this.

The King said that he was well aware of the stories that he himself was in league with Iraq and Yemen to carve up Saudi Arabia and re-create the Kingdom of the Hejaz. They were perfectly ludicrous. He urged the Prime Minister to believe that there was often another side to the various reports which she heard about Iraq. There was a tendency to blame Saddam Hussein for everything. He had recently met King Hassan, who had been astounded when told some of the true facts of the situation.

The King raised the question of the revocation of export licences for the export of arms to Jordan. This was sad coming from a country he had always thought of as a friend. The Prime Minister said we had evidence that some sensitive equipment destined for Jordan had gone to Iraq. This was a very serious matter. But she was ready to accept the King's personal assurance that none of the items of equipment for which licences had been suspended would reach Iraq. The King said he could give a solemn assurance that nothing purchased by Jordan would ever go anywhere else.

As lunch ended, the King said that he hoped he and the Prime Minister could go back to having the same relations as before. He wanted to be a friend and to continue their very close relationship. The Prime Minister did not respond directly, but the King returned almost pleadingly to ask for an assurance that she still regarded him as a friend. The Prime Minister said this would always be so.

We subsequently told the press that the Prime Minister and the King had been quite far apart in their assessment of the causes of the present difficult situation, and the way to resolve it. But they were agreed on three essential points: the need for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait: rigorous implementation of sanctions: and renewed determination to resolve the Palestinian problem. Britain's relations with Jordan remained good.

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I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence)
Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office) and to Gordon Barrass (Assessments
Staff).

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*file in
ack*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1990

Dear Richard,

EVACUATION OF BRITISH NATIONALS FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ

Stephen Wall wrote to me on 30 August about the contingency arrangements being made for the evacuation of British nationals from Kuwait and Iraq. The Prime Minister has approved these, and in particular the decision not to seek an undertaking to repay before British nationals are embarked on evacuation flights. She equally agrees that we should make clear to other governments, Government departments in this country and companies that we shall seek reimbursement from them after the event. If there is a financial shortfall of the order indicated in Stephen Wall's letter, the Prime Minister suggests this is discussed between the Foreign Secretary and the Chief Secretary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence, Transport, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MY TELNO 1136 AND YOUR TELNO 500: SANCTIONS COMMITTEE: JORDAN AND
ARTICLE 50

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS WANT TO DELAY APPROVAL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON
JORDAN.

DETAIL

2. THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TELEPHONED ME THIS AFTERNOON
ABOUT JORDAN'S APPLICATION FOR HELP UNDER ARTICLE 50. PICKERING
SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD JUST TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD DOUBTS
ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF THE JORDANIAN CASE. THEY WERE SENDING A
MISSION TO AMMAN IN THE NEXT 2 OR 3 DAYS TO PROBE THE JORDANIAN
POSITION. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SEE PROGRESS
MADE IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE OR SECURITY COUNCIL ON A RESOLUTION
SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO HELP JORDAN. PICKERING CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD
SPOKEN TO THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR.

3. LATER WE HEARD THAT PICKERING HAD JUST TOLD THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE THAT THE U S SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THE
TREASURY WERE TO VISIT JORDAN, EGYPT, TURKEY AND PERHAPS OTHER
COUNTRIES TO DISCUSS A LARGE PACKAGE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND TO
PERSUADE OTHER PARTNERS AND DONORS TO CONTRIBUTE. NO DOUBT MORE
DETAILS OF THIS VISIT WILL EMERGE OVERNIGHT: BUT ON THE FACE OF IT
THE AMERICAN MOVE SHOULD REDUCE PRESSURE IN THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
EARLY ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS. WE WILL TAKE STOCK
AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING AND TELEPHONE IF NECESSARY BEFORE THE
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MEETS AT 311500Z.

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cc DPA
MATTER

6 (A-C) ^a

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

cc Press Office
Sir PC
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LOD
CO

31 August 1990

L. J. H.

See

The Gulf Crisis: Ministerial Meeting

The Prime Minister held a meeting this morning with the Defence Secretary, Energy Secretary, Attorney-General and Minister of State FCO (Mr. Waldegrave) to consider the latest developments in the Gulf crisis. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock were also present.

The following were the main points covered.

Recall of Parliament

The Opposition had proposed that the Foreign Secretary and the Shadow Foreign Secretary should wind up on the first day: the Minister of State (Mr. Waldegrave) and Mr. George Robertson should open on the second day: and that the Defence Secretary and the Shadow Defence Secretary should wind up. This was not acceptable. If the Opposition insisted on wind-ups on the first day, Mr. Waldegrave would do that: the Defence Secretary would open on the second day: and the Foreign Secretary would wind up.

The Prime Minister said that she would need a detailed day-by-day chronology of all diplomatic and military developments since the Iraqi invasion, as background to her speech.

Defence Secretary's Visit to the Gulf

The Defence Secretary reported on his visit to the Gulf. There was widespread gratitude for the prompt UK response. A number of the Arab rulers were unrealistically gung-ho about an immediate attack on Iraq. The US Commander of CENTCOM (CINC-CENT) was much more prudent about the scale and difficulty of the operation which would be necessary if the military option became necessary, making clear that he could not be ready before the end of October at the earliest.

British forces in the Gulf were well-established. The conditions at Thumrait (in Oman) posed major difficulties for ground support for the Jaguars and it would probably be necessary to move them to Bahrain, with occasional staging through Qatar. The Prime Minister said that the ground element of our forces in Bahrain should be equipped with Scorpion rather than Land Rovers. This would greatly strengthen the presentational impact.

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There were difficulties over an increasing number of official and political visitors to the area - especially American: and over the joint command structure for Saudi, US and other forces in the area, of which we had obtained details surreptitiously. This took the UK for granted, and we would need to ensure that our position was properly reflected. There was also very limited access for media to bases in Oman, which would lead to increasing complaints (although the Sultan had to be the best judge of what could be allowed.)

Gulf Naval Conference

It had been made clear to the Americans that we could not accept a conference convened by the US and the French alone. The arrangements were being changed to take account of our position and requirements. We should press for "bottom-up" arrangements.

UN Secretary-General's Meeting with Tariq Aziz

There were some grounds for concern about what the Secretary-General might say to Tariq Aziz.

Evacuation of British Women and Children

An Iraqi Airways flight with 137 British women and children would probably leave Baghdad today and would take back Iraqi citizens from here. Reception arrangements were in hand, and DSS staff would be present to help those without adequate funds. There would also be arrangements for medical facilities. It was for consideration whether access to the families by the press should be restricted (so that only those who wanted to speak to the press had to do so). The Minister of State should be on hand to meet them, with a Minister from DSS if possible as well. If BLT families were involved, an MOD Minister might also go. We should not seek undertakings-to-repay in advance from those being evacuated.

It was noted that British Airways were arguing that we ought not to allow an Iraqi aircraft here while a British Airways aircraft was detained in Kuwait. This could not be allowed to prevent immediate evacuation by whatever means were available. But we should continue to press the Iraqis to release the BA aircraft. We should be even-handed between British Airways and Virgin in making arrangements for evacuation. We were currently advising Mr. Branson not to send an aircraft to Baghdad on spec.

US Burden-Sharing Initiative

Officials were reported to be working on a response to the US initiative. We needed a calculus which took account of the military contributions made by individual governments.

Embassies in Kuwait

It was noted that the position was broadly unchanged.

C

SECRET

- 3 -

Expulsion of Iraqis

Action would be suspended until British wives and children had been evacuated.

Counter-propaganda

Concern was expressed at the readiness of the Western media to pick up the Iraqi feeds and take interviews with Saddam Hussein uncritically.

The Minister of State FCO would contact Mr. Gyngell to discuss the handling of the campaign. The Prime Minister agreed to consider an interview with CNN.

The most damaging themes to Saddam were his exploitation of women and children, and his mistreatment of guests: the fact that he had split the Arab world and shattered hopes of progress on the Palestinian issue: and that he was a loser.

The Energy Secretary will discuss with the Defence Secretary some of the feedback about media access to British forces in the area.

Themes to emphasise for press briefing in this country included the West's dependence on oil: the economic effects of the current crisis: and the basic issue of principle involved in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We should also try to pre-empt likely themes of Iraq's propaganda.

Assistance to Qatar

The Defence Secretary's proposals to provide NBC kit and anti-terrorist training and occasional deployment of Jaguar to Qatar were approved and will be conveyed to the Foreign Secretary.

Tanker Interception

It was noted that action might need to be taken in the next day or so to intercept and turn back the Iraqi tanker Hittin.

Sanctions-busting

Continued evidence of sanctions-busting reported in the JIC daily sitrep was a major source of concern. We should pursue individual cases, and should use our own powers where necessary (eg to freeze accounts in this country).

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) John Neilson (Department of Energy), Dominic Asquith (FCO), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

MSugers

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq., *RG*
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

CHARLES

Simon Sherrington from the Iraq/Kuwait Emergency Unit rang to forewarn us of a possible difficulty over flights to collect our hostages.

As you know, Richard Branson was ready last night to send a Virgin Atlantic flight to Baghdad. The aircraft was to leave London at 2 a.m. this morning. No contract has been agreed with the Department of Transport, but Branson was asking the Government to pay the cost of insurance. Ministers had not given their approval to that.


However it seems that as part of the hostage release package, Saddam Hussein has insisted that 134 British citizens granted exit visas should fly home on an Iraqi airline - no doubt another ploy to win international acclaim. Branson's 'plane would therefore be redundant. The FCO put this to him last night and managed to persuade him to hang back. The FCO aren't totally clear when this Iraqi flight will depart, but it's thought some time this morning.

Added to this, comes British Airways who are near to signing a contract with the Department of Transport, also to fly hostages home. However they are beginning to feel the Government are showing a certain favouritism towards Virgin, which isn't true say the FCO - it's just the way Richard Branson does business by giving the impression that he's the golden boy. Colin Marshall, again in a call to the Emergency Unit, had implied that if the Virgin flight had been allowed to leave, British Airways would pull out of the whole shooting match. And there was a veiled threat of Lord King raising the matter with the Prime Minister.

In the end, there was nothing to be done as the Virgin flight didn't leave the UK. But if the Iraqis do allow a British 'plane in it may rear its ugly head once again.

Incidentally, FCO tell me that in processing clearance for the


Virgin flight three countries refused permission to flight over their air space: FRG, Turkey and Yugoslavia. They allege it violates UNSCR 661, which the FCO say is rubbish.



DEREK

21 August 1990

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3079</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute on from Appleyard to Powell undated</i> <i>(taken 31 August 1990)</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>22/2/18</i> <i>M. Wain</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER

GULF CRISIS: MEETING OF MINISTERS

You have your regular meeting of Ministers on the Gulf Crisis this morning. Mr. Waldegrave will represent the Foreign Secretary. The main issues are as follows.

You might first ask the Defence Secretary to give a first-hand account of his visit to the Gulf.

DIPLOMATIC

- Your Speech. Press reaction is generally good except for Guardian and Mirror.
- UN Secretary-General. His talks with Tariq Aziz in Amman have been postponed until today. He appears to be intending to take a satisfactorily firm line on implementation of UN resolutions.
- King Hussein. You will be seeing him at lunch-time. You may want to say a word to the meeting about your approach. The Americans are intending to send some form of mission (not clear whether it is Baker or Brady) to Jordan to discuss aid: but are looking for better evidence of Jordan's compliance with sanctions first.
- Burden-Sharing. The President has gone public on burden-sharing. His proposals cover both contributions to the cost of American military operations and aid to countries like Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. We need to get together a position and officials are meeting on this. The President is proposing to telephone you before your meeting with King Hussein this morning.
- Evacuation of British Women and Children. There is a lot of muddle and uncertainty on the Iraqi side. They seem to want to let out those in Iraq first, and there is a prospect of

some 130/140 returning from Baghdad today by Iraqi aircraft. The position over those - the greater number - in Kuwait is unclear. The Iraqis seem to want them to go to Baghdad first. We are arguing that our Embassy must be allowed to deal with them. You have seen the papers in your box about chartering of aircraft, and will want to confirm that you approve the arrangements. There is quite a lot of posturing by Richard Branson, which is fuelling a row between Virgin and British Airways. There is no point in either of them going until we know that there are passengers ready and able to leave.

- Action against Iraqi Citizens. We have suspended action until we have the British women and children out.
- Counter-Propaganda. You saw a report on progress with this in your box. Mr. Waldegrave can report, also on the question of recruiting suitable people.
- Sanctions-Breaking. You will want to assure yourself that evidence of sanctions-breaking or evasion is being followed up. Latest reports (on BBC) suggest that food is reaching Iraq from both Cyprus and Lebanon. See also attached note on Yemen.

MILITARY

- Tanker Interceptions. There is clear evidence that an Iraqi tanker, the Hittin, is loading in Iraq and could move off at any time. It could encounter American and British warships as early as this evening. There are plans for a joint interception. An Iraqi ship has also left Sri Lanka with tea, and could come within interception range by Monday.
- Gulf Naval Conference. The Americans are planning a conference in Bahrain on 9/10 September to discuss coordination and command and control. They have suggested that the lead be taken by the US and France (as Chairman of WEU), relegating us to a lower place. We can't have this. You will want to raise with the President.

- Interdiction of Air Routes. You will want to ask about progress with work on discouraging countries from allowing over-flights for aircraft going to Iraq; and possible interdiction of flights suspected of breaking sanctions.
- ✓ - Military Assistance to Qatar. You will want to enquire about progress with identifying suitable military help to Qatar. The Foreign Secretary is there today.

Finally, you might mention the arrangements for the recall of Parliament. Material for your speech has been commissioned and I have recruited Mr. Tomkys.

C.D.T

CHARLES POWELL
31 August 1990

a:\foreign\gulf



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The main over-
night Telegrams.

The White House
were on to me
late last night: and
we agreed that
the President will

Telephone you at
11:45 today.

CDP 31/8.

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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 310700Z FCO

TELNO 2103

OF 310108Z AUGUST 90

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, RIYADH, ABU DHABI

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

MY TELNOS 2077 AND 2088 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT:

BURDENSARING

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES AN ACTION PLAN TO COMPENSATE THOSE MOST AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS AND HIGHER OIL PRICES, AND TO SHARE THE COST OF THIS AND OF THE GULF OPERATION. EMISSARIES WILL VISIT THE GULF, EUROPE AND ASIA.

2. JORDAN MENTIONED AS A PROPOSED RECIPIENT OF AID, BUT ADMINISTRATION WILL REQUIRE FULL COMPLIANCE ON SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

3. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY (30 AUGUST), PRESIDENT BUSH SAID THAT THE EFFORT TO REVERSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQI AGGRESSION HAD BEEN TRULY INTERNATIONAL. 22 COUNTRIES HAD PROVIDED FORCES TO DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA OR MARITIME FORCES TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS, OTHERS HAD PROVIDED FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND STILL OTHERS WERE PAYING A HEAVY ECONOMIC PRICE FOR COMPLYING WITH UN SANCTIONS. QUOTE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE CONSIDERABLE BURDEN OF THE EFFORT IS SHARED BY THOSE BEING DEFENDED AND THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM THE FREE FLOW OF OIL UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT THE US WAS MORE THAN WILLING TO BEAR ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE BURDEN BUT EXPECTED OTHERS TO BEAR THEIR FAIR SHARE.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAD ANNOUNCED WILLINGNESS TO HELP. TO ENSURE THAT THE EFFORT BE COORDINATED AND THAT ALL AFFECTED COUNTRIES PARTICIPATED, HE HAD DIRECTED AN INTERAGENCY EFFORT TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY. THE APPROACH, WHICH HE HAD APPROVED ON 29 AUGUST, CALLED FOR SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THOSE BEARING A GREAT PART OF THE BURDEN OF SANCTIONS AND HIGHER OIL PRICES, IN PARTICULAR TURKEY AND EGYPT. THE PLAN ALSO TARGETTED OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JORDAN AND EASTERN EUROPE, FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE. QUOTE THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO SEEK BURDENSARING FOR PART OF OUR OWN EFFORT UNQUOTE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE US WOULD BE ASKING OTHER GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING

JAPAN, KOREA, FRG, SAUDI ARABIA, THE EMIRATES, FREE KUWAIT AND OTHERS TO CONTRIBUTE FINANCIAL OR ENERGY RESOURCES TO COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED.

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT SECRETARY BAKER AND TREASURY SECRETARY BRADY WOULD LEAD HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATIONS TO THE GULF, EUROPE AND ASIA, ADDING THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES IN ADVANCE TO SPELL OUT US OBJECTIVES.

JORDAN

6. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY NSC THAT FINAL DECISIONS ON JORDAN HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN. THIS WILL HAPPEN IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. THE ADMINISTRATION SEE JORDAN AS BEING IN A SPECIAL CATEGORY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF ITS PARTICULAR EXPOSURE AND THE ASSOCIATED CONCERNS ABOUT JORDAN'S STABILITY, AND PARTLY BECAUSE IT REMAINS A NON-COMPLIANT PARTNER IN SANCTIONS. NSC CONTACTS TELL US THAT NEITHER THE BAKER NOR THE BRADY DELEGATIONS WILL VISIT JORDAN. BUT THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT AN EMISSARY WILL GO TO JORDAN WITHOUT PUBLICITY TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARED TO PUT TOGETHER A FINANCIAL AND SECURITY PACKAGE FOR JORDAN, BUT THAT JORDANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH UN SANCTIONS IS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. ASKED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT REPORTS OF GOODS REACHING IRAQ THROUGH JORDAN, THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE I DO KNOW THAT KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME, LOOKING ME RIGHT IN THE EYE, THAT THEY WERE GOING TO COMPLY WITH THE SANCTIONS. BUT I'VE SEEN REPORTS THAT INDICATE THERE'S SOME LEAKAGE THERE UNQUOTE.

7. WE HAVE ASKED FOR A FULL BRIEFING ON THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION PLAN AND WILL REPORT FURTHER. NSC TELL US (AS ALREADY REPORTED BY 'PHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT) THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE TELEPHONING THE PRIME MINISTER ON 31 AUGUST AT 1130Z TO TALK ABOUT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND MAY RAISE THIS ISSUE.

WOOD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE 36

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)

CONFIDENTIAL

141451
MDADAN 2335

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2102
OF 310105Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, RIYADH, ACTOR, ESC LONDON, MODUK

SIC I9M

MODUK FOR JOC

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT
SUMMARY

1. STATE BRIEF EMBASSIES ON THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF IRAQI
OFFER TO ALLOW DEPENDENTS TO LEAVE IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. STATE DEPARTMENT CALLED ANOTHER MEETING OF EMBASSY
REPRESENTATIVES TODAY (30 AUGUST) TO DISCUSS DETENTION OF
FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

3. MACK (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEA) SAID THAT IRAQI
AUTHORITIES WERE CONTINUING TO ROUND UP US CITIZENS RESIDENT
IN KUWAIT (17 IN THE LAST FIVE DAYS) AND ALSO IN IRAQ, WHICH
HE SAID WAS A NEW DEVELOPMENT. HE MENTIONED THAT ONE AMERICAN
WORKING IN AN IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFFICE HAD BEEN DETAINED.

4. ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OFFER TO ALLOW WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO
LEAVE IRAQ, MACK SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY GRADUALLY BECOMING
CLEAR WHAT WAS INVOLVED. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HERE TOLD HIM
TODAY THAT ALL WOMEN AND CHILDREN WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXIT
PERMITS, BUT THAT EACH PERSON WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT TO THE
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR RESIDENCY DEPARTMENT A LETTER, IN
ARABIC AND NOTARISED, STATING THAT THEY WISHED TO LEAVE AND A
SECOND LETTER FROM THE FISCAL AUTHORITIES STATING THAT THEY
OWED NO TAXES.

5. MACK SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
KUWAIT. IT APPEARED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL
TO BAGHDAD TO CARRY OUT THESE FORMALITIES, WHICH WOULD
PROBABLY TAKE SEVERAL DAYS AND WOULD PRESENT THEM WITH
SERIOUS PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. MACK SAID THAT THE IRAQI
AUTHORITIES APPEARED UNPREPARED FOR THE OFFER TO RELEASE
DEPENDENTS AND WERE STRUGGLING TO DEVISE PROCEDURES. THE US
HAD THEREFORE PUT FORWARD THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY ESTABLISH
A RESIDENCY DEPARTMENT IN KUWAIT TO PROCESS LOCAL

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

APPLICATIONS. IF THIS WERE ACCEPTED, FOREIGN DEPENDENTS COULD LEAVE BY AIR FROM KUWAIT OR BASRA. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS MIGHT LAY ON CHARTERS TO GET KUWAIT RESIDENTS TO BAGHDAD (THOUGH THIS WAS CLEARLY LESS SATISFACTORY).

6. MACK ADDED THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE ALREADY HOLDING EXIT PERMITS COULD LEAVE AS SOON AS THERE WAS TRANSPORT AVAILABLE. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE SUGGESTIONS THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS MIGHT PROVIDE CHARTER FLIGHTS. HE SAW NO PROBLEM WITH THIS, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE, SO LONG AS THE AIRCRAFT WERE NOT THEN USED TO TRANSPORT GOODS BACK TO IRAQ. HE ADDED THAT THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM THAT IRAQ WOULD PERMIT FOREIGN AIRCRAFT TO COLLECT FOREIGN NATIONALS, AND THAT THE RUMOUR CIRCULATING TODAY THAT AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BRING MEDICAL ITEMS AND FOOD TO IRAQ WAS ENTIRELY FALSE.

7. FINALLY, MACK SAID THAT, AS OF TODAY, STATE UNDERSTOOD THERE TO BE 30 FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT STILL MANNED. THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE DANISH EMBASSY IN KUWAIT HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO DURING THE NIGHT OF 29 AUGUST AND THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD RECOMMENDED THAT HE SHOULD CLOSE UP AND LEAVE.

WOOD

YYYY

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MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE

SANITISED MATERIAL AT 0600Z ON 31 AUGUST

Cm

Unclassified/
Cleared for use in UN and Elsewhere

LIBYA

We believe that the Iraqi super tanker ALMUSTANSIRIYAH with a sanctions-busting cargo of crude oil, arrived recently in the Libyan port of Benghazi.

CUBA

We believe that the Iraqi super tanker AMURIYAH arrived last week in the Cuban port of Matanzas to discharge a cargo of oil to reprovision. We understand that it is planned to change the tanker from the Iraqi to the Cuban flag.

YEMEN

We are concerned at continuing signs that Yemen remains an area of potential weakness in enforcement of the embargo.

The oil storage and refinery facilities at Aden appear to be particularly attractive to Iraqi tankers. As has been widely reported there are currently six Iraqi tankers in and off Aden, of which some are believed to be laden. At least one, the AIN ZALAH, is known to have discharged oil since the passing of SCR 661.

Iraqi tankers at Aden:

Buzurgan	Al Qadisiyah
Baba Gurgur	Khamaqin
Ain Zalah	Al Fao

Furthermore, there is growing evidence of Iraqi attempts to pick up cargo from the port of Hodeida. At least two Iraqi general cargo boats are there at present, one of which has been seen to be loading. There appears to be some prospect of Iraq running a shuttle service; goods could be delivered to Hodeida by other flags, and picked up from there by Iraqi ships.

Iraqi ships at Hodeida

Babylon	Al Wasitti
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BRAZIL

We have learnt of a deal between the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organisation and Petrobras of Brazil for the supply of 5,000 tons of aluminium.

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Cleared for Bilateral Use

UAE

We have learnt that the Iraqi tanker KHANAQIN has been instructed to load from the Jebel Ali terminal. We trust that if such a request is made to you it will be refused as likely to lead to a breach of SCR 661.

CHINA

We understand that Iraq is still hopeful of receiving a cargo currently aboard the JIACHENG. We believe this cargo was shipped by the China Metallurgical Corporation. We trust that it will be off-loaded where it can be kept from the Iraqis.

BELGIUM

We have good information that a Belgian firm, the Advanced Technology Company, has contacted Iraq offering help with embargo evasion.

PORTUGAL

We believe that a Portuguese company, Corfi-Organizacoes Industrias Texteis Manuel Oliveira Violas SA of Espinao is seeking to supply fibres.

SUBJECT cc
MASSTEK
OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T202c/90

051113

COMMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 300800Z RIYADH
TELNO 530
OF 300600Z AUB 90
AND TO DESKBY 300800Z JEDDA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

KUWAIT/IRAQ: NAVAL INTERCEPTION

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS WRITTEN TO WRITE TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT NOTIFYING HIM OFFICIALLY OF OUR NEW DISPOSITIONS IN THE GULF, AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF CEMENTING OUR LEGAL POSITION. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE AMIR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: BEGINS

YOU WILL, I AM SURE, BE AWARE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PROMPT RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OF YOUR TERRITORY AFTER THE UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY IRAQ. FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT OF YOUR HIGHNESS' MESSAGE OF 13 AUGUST, THERE HAVE BEEN CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND BETWEEN MY GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE REGION AND ELSEWHERE. I AM PLEASED NOW TO BE ABLE TO INFORM YOUR HIGHNESS THAT, AS FROM 0600 HOURS 21 AUGUST, THE ROYAL NAVAL UNITS IN THE GULF HAVE BEEN OPERATING UNDER FRESH INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGREED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS YOUR HIGHNESS REQUESTED, AND TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 665 AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.

MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TELL YOUR HIGHNESS OF BRITAIN'S ADMIRATION FOR THE FORTITUDE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT IN RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI AGGRESSION. YOUR HIGHNESS MAY REST ASSURED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM IS ACTING RESOLUTELY TO HELP BRING THE ILLEGAL IRAQI OCCUPATION TO A SPEEDY END AND TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT OVER KUWAITI TERRITORY, AS REQUESTED BY YOUR HIGHNESS AND AS REQUIRED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.
ENDS

HURD

YYYY

MAIN 223
IRAQ/KUWAIT 210
LIMITED 6
MED 7
[..ADD GEOGRAPHICAL/]
[..FUNCTIONAL AS NECESSARY]
ADDITIONAL 43
IRAQ/KUWAIT 43
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)
[...MAFF TO BE ADDED IF]

Charles of r

EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE CENTRE

E 100

30/8

SANITISED MATERIAL
AT 0600Z ON 30 AUGUSTConfidential/
Cleared for Bilateral UseNETHERLANDS

We believe that a Netherlands company, National Foods of Holland, has been actively seeking contracts for export of canned meat and cooking oil to Iraq.

We understand they hope to ship some tinned meat via Antwerp port or Brussels airport and cooking oil via Rotterdam port or Amsterdam airport. They also hope to deliver tinned meat currently stocked in Egypt.

We hope the appropriate action will be taken.

SWITZERLAND

We understand that Al Janoub Trading Contracting Establishment of Geneva have received a substantial order for goods including metalware and machine parts, to be shipped to Iraq via Aqaba.

ROMANIA

We have learned that Iraq has placed a large order with a company called ELECTRONUM for metalware to be shipped to Iraq via Aqaba. We trust that this order will not be accepted, in compliance with SCR 661.

ZCZC
HPRAN 1782 PTMIAN 2769
CONFIDENTIAL
OO HELSI
FM FCOLN TO HELSI
300828Z AUG
GRS 1077

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI
TELNO 292
OF 300828Z AUGUST 90

FOR PS/NO 10.
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE
WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON
TELNO 2088
OF 291600Z AUG 90
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, RIYADH,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, ESC LONDON

SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
IRAQ/KUWAIT : BURDENSARING

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION BEGINNING TO LOOK AT COSTS WITH A TWIN FOCUS: COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THOSE BEARING THE BRUNT OF SANCTIONS, AND THE NEED TO COUNTER LATENT CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTION THAT EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE SHOULD SHOULDER MORE OF THE BURDEN OF DESERT SHIELD., IDEAS LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED NEXT WEEK. WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE SUBJECT WITH EAGLEBURGER BEFOREHAND IN VIEW OF THE POTENTIALLY DIVISIVE EFFECT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. CONTACTS IN STATE DEPARTMENT (CLARKE AND DOBBINS) HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS ENGAGED IN A MAJOR EFFORT TO DEVISE WHAT THEY CALL A COHERENT STRATEGY TO IDENTIFY THE COSTS OF THE GULF CRISIS AND SHARE OUT THE BURDENS MORE EQUALLY AMONG THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. KNOWN COLLOQUIALLY HERE AS THE HAVES AND HAVE NOTS STUDY, THE WORK IS PROCEEDING RAPIDLY UNDER THE PERSONAL DIRECTION OF EAGLEBURGER AND IS EXPECTED TO BE PRESENTED TO WESTERN ALLIES WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK.

3. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE APPROACH THAT IS BEING TAKEN DIVIDES COUNTRIES INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

(A) THOSE MAKING THE GREATEST ECONOMIC SACRIFICE AND NEEDING EMERGENCY HELP: EGYPT, JORDAN, TURKEY.

(B) THOSE HIT LESS SEVERELY BUT WHOM QUOTE WE UNQUOTE WILL NEED TO CARE ABOUT: PHILIPPINES, EASTERN EUROPE.

(C) THOSE IN A POSITION TO HELP: OIL RICH ARABS, JAPAN, NORTH AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT IS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SEEKING NOT ONLY TO ORCHESTRATE COMPENSATION FROM THE HAVES TO HAVE NOTS BY EG GETTING SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT TO BAIL OUT TURKEY OR JORDAN WITH DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE STUDY IS AXED ON THE FAMILIAR PRINCIPLE THAT WITHIN THE HAVES, A DISPROPORTIONATELY HEAVY LOAD IS FALLING ON THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH THE COST OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD BE CONTRIBUTING MUCH MORE IN ORDER TO SHARE OUT THE BURDEN MORE EVENLY.

4. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, A NUMBER OF KEY STRUCTURAL DETAILS OF THE STUDY HAVE YET TO BE SETTLED: HOW THE AMERICANS INTEND TO DEFINE THE BASELINE FOR CALCULATING COST AND CONTRIBUTIONS, WHAT MECHANISMS THEY HAVE IN MIND FOR ARRANGING COMPENSATION AND EQUALISING BURDENS, HOW TO DEVISE ACCOUNTING ARRANGEMENTS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER A REASONABLE DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. AS DOBBINS SAID TO US, IT IS GOING TO BE MESSY. BUT WE CAN EXPECT THE INTERNAL DEBATE ON THIS TO GRAVITATE AROUND A NUMBER OF HIGHLY POLITICAL LINKED THEMES:

(A) THE IMMENSE COST OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD ITSELF. ON 23 AUGUST, THE PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID THAT ESTIMATES WERE BEING REVISED UPWARDS BY 100 PERCENT TO REFLECT THE IMPACT OF CALLING UP RESERVISTS PLUS INCREASED FUEL PRICES, AND THAT BY SEPTEMBER 30 THE BILL WOULD AMOUNT TO DLRS 2.5 BN (DLRS 1.13 ARMY, DLRS 0.494 BN NAVY, DLRS 0.556 BN AIRFORCE, DLRS 0.02 BN FOR DEFENCE AGENCIES AND DLRS 0.3 BN FOR INCREASED FUEL ELEMENT.

(AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, SOME OF THIS IS ALREADY BEING SHARED BY SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND UAE, THROUGH PROVISION OF FACILITIES ON THE GROUND.) SINCE NO-ONE EXPECTS THE COMMITMENT TO END WITHIN A MONTH, THE FINAL COST WILL OF COURSE BE MUCH GREATER.

(B) CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT WHO PAYS. SO FAR THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ABLE TO FUND THE OPERATION BY INVOKING THE FEED AND FORAGE ACT OF 1861, ENABLING THE PRESIDENT TO INCUR OBLIGATIONS IN EXCESS OF CURRENT FY93 APPROPRIATIONS, IE TO SPEND NOW AND SEND CONGRESS THE BILL LATER. BUT WHEN CONGRESS RETURNS IN SEPTEMBER THERE WILL BE DETAILED SCRUTINY AS TO HOW MUCH CAN BE ABSORBED FROM WITHIN THE EXISTING BUDGET BY EFFECTING SAVINGS ELSEWHERE: HOW MUCH SHOULD BE FUNDED BY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION: AND HOW MUCH SHOULD BE BORNE BY OTHERS: AND

(C) PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY ALLIES. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS ARE EXPECTED ULTIMATELY TO PICK UP MUCH OF THE BILL FOR DESERT SHIELD, THE ADMINISTRATION IS BEGINNING TO STEEL ITSELF AGAINST THE INEVITABLE CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS TO KNOW WHAT THE EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE ARE DOING. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ALLIES COULD BE DOING MORE IS ALREADY BEING ASKED BY SENATOR NUNN AND OTHERS CURRENTLY TOURING THE GULF AND WILL BE REPEATED BY THE FULL CHORUS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP WHEN IT VISITS THE AREA NEXT WEEK. MUCH OF THE RATIONALE FOR THE HAVES AND HAVE NOT EXERCISE IS TO GET AHEAD OF THESE NEO-BURDENSARING PRESSURES IN THE HOPE OF MANAGING THEM EFFECTIVELY ONCE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES BEGIN IN EARNEST AFTER 5 SEPTEMBER.

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5. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT OVER THE WAY IN WHICH IT CARRIES THIS FORWARD. THEY WILL HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE VISIT OF A JAPANESE DELEGATION HERE THIS WEEK WHICH RESULTED, WE UNDERSTAND, IN A COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT (HOUSING, AIR CONDITIONING, MEDICAL SUPPLIES ETC). THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PRAY IN AID THE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL OPERATION (ALREADY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN IS TALKING OF A QUOTE 22 NATION EFFORT UNQUOTE AND ADVISING AGAINST ANY SINGLING OUT OF THE UNITED STATES). THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE NO CRITICISM OF OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH BY VIRTUE OF EXISTING MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS - AS CLARKE HAS MADE CLEAR TO US. BUT OTHER EUROPEANS, NOTABLY THE GERMANS, ARE ALREADY THE SUBJECT OF STRONG CRITICISM IN WHAT IS A REMARKABLY SWIFT TURN AROUND FROM ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO, WHEN BONN WAS CENTRE-STAGE. AND AT THE VERY LEAST, THE AMERICANS WILL BE LOOKING FOR A VIGOROUS AND VISIBLE RESPONSE FROM THE COMMUNITY AND, PERHAPS, NATO. (THE REQUEST FOR SEA/AIR LIFT CAPABILITY REPORTED IN UKDEL TELNO 417 IS RELEVANT.)

6. HOWEVER JUSTIFIED THIS EXERCISE MIGHT BE, AND HOWEVER STRONG THE DOMESTIC NEED TO CARRY IT THROUGH, THERE IS A RISK, JUDGING BY PREVIOUS BURDENSARING EPISODES IN THE ALLIANCE, THAT IT COULD BECOME A CONSIDERABLE IRRITANT AMONG THE NATIONS INVOLVED AT A TIME WHEN THE MAINTENANCE OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY OVER BOTH SANCTIONS AND GENERAL POLICY IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE IN MANAGING THE GULF CRISIS. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS I PROPOSE TO SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH EAGLEBURGER TO EXPLORE AMERICAN INTENTIONS FURTHER. BEFORE I DO SO I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING AND ANY COMMENTS THAT YOU WOULD WISH ME TO MAKE TO HIM.

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OF 333841Z AUGUST 93

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FOR PS/NO 13

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 2393 OF 29 AUG 93

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, RIYADH, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY E S C LONDON, ACTOR

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION

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SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT BRIEFS CONGRESS ON IRAQ CRISIS, PRESENTING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN FAMILIAR TERMS. CONGRESS OFFERS BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT BUT RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COST AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES.

DETAIL

2. ON 28 AUGUST PRESIDENT BUSH ADDRESSED ABOUT 153 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE GULF CRISIS. HE SAID THAT US OBJECTIVES WERE THE IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT, THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, SECURITY AND DLRS TABILITY OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD. HE OUTLINED ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. HE NOTED THAT UN SANCTIONS WERE WORKING REMARKABLY WELL, EVEN ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. HE UNDERLINED THE MULTILATERAL NATURE OF THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE INVASION. QUOTE THIS IS NOT, AS SADDAM HUSSEIN CLAIMS, THE UNITED STATES AGAINST IRAQ. IT IS TRULY IRAQ AGAINST A MAJORITY IN THE ARAB WORLD, IRAQ AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE US INTENTION WAS TO PERSUADE IRAQ THAT IT COULD NOT BENEFIT FROM ITS ILLEGAL OCCUPATION, THAT IT WOULD PAY A STIFF PRICE BY TRYING TO HOLD ON, AND AN EVEN STIFFER PRICE BY WIDENING THE CONFLICT. QUOTE AND, OF COURSE, WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS WITHOUT FURTHER VIOLENCE UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT THE US SUPPORTED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND OTHER LEADERS WORKING TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF UNSCR 663. HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT US AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS HELD HOSTAGE BY IRAQ. QUOTE AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WHEN IT COMES TO THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN CITIZENS HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, I WILL HOLD BAGHDAD RESPONSIBLE UNQUOTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT THEN HELD A CLOSED QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS LASTING ABOUT AN HOUR. THERE WAS GENERAL APPROVAL FROM THOSE PRESENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER MITCHELL (D-MAINE) SAID AFTERWARDS QUOTE THE ONE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT COMES FROM TODAY'S MEETING WAS THAT THE US CONGRESS, AND I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, ARE UNITED IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS UNQUOTE. HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER GEPHARDT (D-MO) SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS. BUT, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, MITCHELL MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN A BLANK CHEQUE: QUOTE APPROVAL OF PAST ACTIONS IS NOT BLANKET APPROVAL OF ALL FUTURE ACTIONS UNQUOTE.

5. A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE COST OF THE US MILITARY BUILD UP, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US BUDGET DEFICIT AND THE OVERALL US DEFENCE PROGRAMME. GEPHARDT SAID THE GULF CRISIS HAD MADE A BUDGET AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE MORE URGENT. HOUSE SPEAKER FOLEY (D-WASH) SAID THAT US ALLIES AND ARAB STATES SHOULD BE SHOULDERING MORE OF THE BURDEN. SENATOR LEAHY (D-VT) SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IMPOSE A SPECIFIC NEW TASK TO FINANCE THE OPERATION AND QUOTE DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT WE ARE IN THERE FOR THE LONG RUN UNQUOTE.

6. A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN EXPRESSED UNEASE AT THE DECISIONS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAILED TO SECURE IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. WHEN PRESSED ABOUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, BUSH SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT SPECULATE ABOUT HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE OVERTHROW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, BUSH SAID THAT HE FELT IT WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA TO TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT SUCH AN OPTION. HOWEVER SENATOR LUGAR (R-IND) SAID AFTER THE MEETING THAT FORCING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT: THE US COULD NOT WALK AWAY FROM A SITUATION IN WHICH IRAQ POSSESSED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WAS SEEKING NUCLEAR ONES. QUOTE SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS TO BE DEALT WITH UNQUOTE.

7. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT APPARENTLY PRESSED TO EXPAND UPON HIS STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS EARLIER THIS WEEK, BUSH PLAYED DOWN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CHANCES OF PROGRESS. QUOTE SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS BEEN SO RESISTANT TO COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT I DO NOT YET SEE FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS IN THE NSC, THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO PERES DE CUELLAR LAST NIGHT. THERE WAS APPARENTLY LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IN THE CONVERSATION, GIVEN THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE HAD ALREADY BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED AND AGREED IN NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT WISHED PERES DE CUELLAR GOOD LUCK IN HIS MEETINGS: THE LATTER REITERATED THAT HE WOULD BE TOUGH WITH THE IRAQIS ON THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.
COMMENT

8. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED AS WHOLEHEARTED AN ENDORSEMENT FROM THE CONGRESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S ACTION SO FAR AS HE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR. BUT THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION ALSO REVEALED CLEAR WORRIES OVER WHERE THE US COMMITMENT OF FORCES MIGHT LEAD AND AT WHAT COST.

HURD

PTMIAN 2771

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL London SWIA 2AH

30 August 1990

Dear Charles,

Strike Minister
Cranking up, but
no way get of
judging results.

Iraq/Kuwait: Counter Propaganda

Simon Gass's letter of 24 August indicated how we proposed to tackle this campaign and undertook to send regular sitreps on Fridays. This is the first.

Our campaign is directed principally at Muslims in the Arab world and elsewhere, but also at the third world more generally, to enlist and consolidate support for the aims of securing Iraqi withdrawal and restoring legitimate government in Kuwait. Posts have been asked to report on trends in Arab and other Muslim opinion. In the UK, we are in touch with various strands of Arab thinking, including Iraqi opposition groups (Umma, Dawa and the PUK), Palestinian groups, the Egyptian Embassy, and members of the BBC Arabic Service. The Egyptian Embassy in particular have welcomed the opportunity to work with us.

On the basis of soundings so far, we believe we should continue to focus attention on the cause of the crisis and Saddam Hussein's personal responsibility for it. His aggressive action in taking over and trying to extinguish a neighbouring state is being put in the context of his personal history as a destructive loser and a failure who has made major miscalculations before - notably over the Iran/Iraq war. We are also drawing attention to his long history of brutality.

At the same time we are taking steps to counter the view being put about in some Arab circles that the crisis is an Arab affair which the Arabs themselves must resolve; the presence of Western troops will only provoke Saddam Hussein to greater intransigence and exacerbate the crisis, causing long term damage in the Arab world. In response to this, we are deploying the arguments that it is Saddam Hussein who is weakening and dividing the Arab world (cf page 2 of your letter of 28 August recording the ministerial meeting on Iran/Iraq), and gravely damaging the Palestinian cause. We are emphasising that the western military presence in the Gulf is in response to requests from Arab states, as part of a multinational effort to which the Arab states themselves are deeply committed. Our purpose is solely to help defend those states and their citizens and to ensure that United Nations' sanctions work. Western forces will withdraw as soon as the crisis is over.



/ A checklist of the more detailed themes we propose to cover is enclosed. It is regularly reviewed and updated. These themes are being used selectively for different audiences.

We believe that television is a particularly effective medium for our overt information effort. Mr Waldegrave gave a TV interview to the COI on 23 August directed to Arab audiences. He stressed that our forces were in the Gulf at Arab request and as part of a multinational effort. The interview was offered with Arabic and English soundtracks to Arab TV stations. It was shown prominently in Oman, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain. The Deputy Director of the MFA in Abu Dhabi commented to our Embassy on 25 August that the interview had been uncompromising and direct, and was welcome in the country. World Television News, CNN and a number of foreign television companies also asked for the interview; we do not yet know to what extent they made use of it.

The Foreign Secretary gave an interview to CNN on 29 August as a curtain-raiser to his Gulf visit. He has also given an interview to the COI designed for Gulf audiences, which will be distributed on cassette for local TV channels during his visit. CNN is a very effective channel reaching senior people in the Arab world (though it does not reach the masses). It is also seen in other third world countries.

News Department are giving regular briefings to the BBC World Service, including representatives of the Arabic Service. Posts in the area have been asked to monitor the tone of Arabic Service broadcasts. Any negative reports will be taken up with the BBC.

The Arab press is subject to government control in many countries, in some cases restricting the scope for placing our material. Nevertheless, some posts report making good use of the material we are sending them. This includes texts of ministerial speeches, press conferences and interviews, together with news stories based on our key themes. We have also begun to send selected material in Arabic and French (for the Maghreb) by fax direct to the more important press agencies in the Arab world. We are also producing more detailed background briefing for posts to use with press and other contacts. The first note, highlighting Saddam Hussein's record as a loser and a failure, will issue this week. Material is also being made available to our posts in other countries for use with the media and others.

London-based foreign correspondents, particularly from Arab countries, are an important target. Mr Waldegrave briefed Arab journalists on 24 August and the Foreign Secretary gave a similar briefing on 29 August.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

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In addition, the Foreign Secretary and Mr Waldegrave are following up the ideas discussed at the meeting on 28 August for outside experts who could advise on counter-propaganda for Western audiences. Mr Waldegrave will be in touch with Bruce Gyngell (at present in Australia); and a list of experts in public relations who could give advice is being drawn up.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence, Energy, and Trade and Industry, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street .

SECRET AND PERSONAL

THEMES

SADDAM HUSSEIN

- A. The sole cause of the problem is Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait.
- B. Saddam Hussein a loser and a failure. Major miscalculations in: attacking Iran (eight year's suffering for his people and then he threw away his winnings), attacking Kuwait, interning foreigners.
- C. Saddam's brutality. Gassed his own people. Iraq a police State where dissent means death.
- (Note. The Hitler analogy is unsuitable for Arabs, inflating Saddam's importance. He (and his military prowess) need cutting down to size).
- D. The first Arab in history to shelter behind women and children; imprisoning people who came to the Middle East to work for Arab interests; turning on his guests. (Note: the extreme shamefulness of Iraqi behaviour in Arab terms.) Weakness also shown [use depending on developments] by backing down over using force to clear embassies in Kuwait, and by ordering tanker captains to allow their ships to be stopped and searched.
- E. Iraq too is a major oil producer but where have revenues gone? Into a lost war and a failed economy. Saddam Hussein has not used Iraq's wealth to benefit its people, but to build an aggressive military machine which has oppressed Iraqis, attacked neighbours, and bankrupted the country. His debts.
- F. Saddam does not appear in public. His speeches are read by an official. He is afraid even of his own people, but manages to appear on TV with defenceless foreign hostages.
- G. A liar. Said explicitly he had no intention of invading Kuwait, so how could anybody believe his further protestations that he did not intend to continue his conquests, or place any trust in his so-called initiatives?
- H. International subversion. Saddam sponsored terrorism in the 1970s. Baghdad still home to several terrorist organisations. Murder his own dissidents overseas, including in the UK.

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OTHER THEMES

I. We are all now bound by the Security Council resolutions, which are not a matter for negotiation. Iraq has to withdraw from Kuwait and allow the restoration of the legitimate government.

J. British forces are in the Gulf at the request of the States of the area, to defend those States and their citizens, and to ensure that UN sanctions work. We are there as part of a multinational force, including a formidable Arab force. Our forces will withdraw when the crisis is over.

K. The multinational force is not a threat to the holy places of Islam. It is Saddam Hussein who has set up a secular State; he has persecuted and murdered fellow Muslims, in violation of the principles of Islam.

L. UK committed to Middle East peace process, will not let Saddam distract us from this, or undermine our good relations with the Arab world.


M. Freedom and Security are the basic issue. Both have been ruptured by the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Condemnation by UN and Arab League. We are working with Arab and other governments, including the Soviet Union, to preserve independence.

N. Iraq stands condemned by the Security Council for its criminal detention of foreigners and its mistreatment of Arab workers. We hold Saddam Hussein responsible for their safety and demand their immediate release from Kuwait and Iraq.

O. Aggression unanswered invites further aggression. Failure to reverse Saddam's action will leave neighbouring States hostage to his threats and actions.

P. No national, rich or poor, can escape the economic consequences of Saddam's action - higher oil prices, increased inflation, higher interest rates and lower economic growth. The non-oil producing developing countries are most vulnerable.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Item 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3079</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Attached report to letter from Wall to Powell dated 30 August 1990</i>	
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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

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eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>MEM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number) <i>3079</i>	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Craddock to the Prime Minister dated 30 August 1990 with attached note</i>	
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cepc

THE RT HON JOHN WAKEHAM MP



Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE
071 238 3290

The Hon Francis Maude MP
Financial Secretary
HM Treasury
Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG

cepc
2/9

30 August 1990

Dear Francis

IRAQ/KUWAIT - INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

leaf p 24

Thank you for your letter of 23 August. My officials have discussed the oil market situation with yours and Douglas Hurd's.

Now that prices have come down again, earlier speculative fears appear to have weakened and I see no need to stimulate the IEA to take concrete measures such as a drawdown of strategic stocks. Even if prices should go up between now and Friday, unless there is a demonstrable physical reason, I believe we should treat it as a market fluctuation and not spur the IEA to action. There is little the IEA can do to assuage speculative fears; premature action could spur them on.

However there are some circumstances in which it would be wise to go along with collective action by the IEA member countries. One such would be if the OPEC countries credibly made destocking by consuming countries a condition of expanding their own production. Another would be if the US administration considered a drawdown of their strategic reserves was needed, eg to meet gasoline demand. Commercial stocks in the US are low and supplies of that product have been particularly affected by the loss of the sophisticated Kuwait refinery and the comparatively light Iraqi crudes. If, improbably, the US wishes for domestic political purposes to present such a drawdown in a collaborative context then, in the interests of unity, I would wish my officials to have discretion to agree to commit the UK to a measure of common action. Any stock drawdown which they might agree to press upon UK companies would be gradual and would not be such as to reduce stocks below IEA or Community mandatory levels. It

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would, in effect, be a gesture, since the companies are already free to reduce stocks to those levels. I accordingly propose to grant my officials discretion, in such circumstances, to support a collective IEA position within these limits.

I am sending copies of this letter to members of OD.

John Wakeham

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "John Wakeham", written in a cursive style.

JOHN WAKEHAM

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MIDDLE EAST: Emilian pr 26

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

You have a meeting with King Hussein tomorrow followed by a working lunch. He will be accompanied by his Prime Minister (new) and Field Marshal bin Shaker. They have been in North Africa. They are going on to Paris and Bonn.

It will inevitably be a difficult meeting. We have every reason to be fed up with the King. He has openly supported Saddam Hussein: Jordan is deeply implicated in sanctions' evasion and possibly military help to Iraq: and the King is peddling various unsatisfactory compromise proposals, designed to undermine both Arab opposition to Iraq and the UN Security Council resolutions. He has to understand that he cannot go on like this and still rely on our good nature, friendship and support.

On the other hand, we need him almost as much as he needs us. If he goes, Jordan could relapse into chaos and the Israelis could be drawn in, with incalculable consequences. We must encourage him to behave like a white man over Iraq and ensure that he can survive doing so. That means rustling up substantial economic and financial help.

I think the overall tone had best be sorrow rather than anger: try to make him feel a heel. You might put some simple propositions to him:

- Saddam Hussein is a loser. He is doing incalculable damage to Iraq and to the Arab cause. The UN has spoken and the United States, Europe and much of the Arab world have put their reputation on the line: Saddam Hussein is going to be defeated. It cannot be in the King's interests to tie Jordan's fate to him.
- like the King we want to avoid war. That means Saddam Hussein must be defeated by the strict application of sanctions. At the moment Jordan is not operating sanctions whole-heartedly. That makes conflict more likely. We

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cannot start making exceptions or allowing waivers.

- we understand the economic consequences for Jordan. We are ready to support compensating help. But realistically that will require the involvement of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as Europe and the US.
- that help won't be forthcoming so long as Jordan fails to apply sanctions whole-heartedly and tries to promote unsatisfactory compromises. The only solution is that laid down in the UN resolutions. To divert attention from that only prolongs the conflict. Iraq has to comply with the UN resolutions.
- nothing is more topsy-turvy or more damaging to the Palestinian cause which you know is so close to the King's heart than that Jordan (and the PLO) should be supporting the occupation of a neighbouring country. It destroys the credibility of the Arab position at a blow. We recognise the need for fresh efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel problem. But they haven't a hope so long as Iraq's occupation of Kuwait continues.
- it grieves you to be at odds with the King on this, particularly after you have supported him so strongly for so many years. You appeal to him to disentangle himself from this disastrous involvement with Iraq and return to lead the respectable Arab cause - which needs his leadership.

You should be aware of two further problems:

- military exercises. We are due to take part in a major exercise - Purple Victory - in Jordan next May. At present it is inconceivable that we could go ahead with that.
- we are in dispute over the export of arms to Jordan, because we fear they may end up in Iraq (and we know of one case where sensitive equipment has done so). We have consequently off-loaded a consignment of arms for Jordan and

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- 3 -

are holding it in abeyance. If the King raises the matter, you will have to say that the export of arms in Jordan at present does arouse considerable public concern here. Nevertheless we are prepared to reinstate licences for export against his personal assurance that none of the equipment will find its way to Iraq.

You will find in the folder:

- a fuller letter from the FCO.
- the Ambassador's telegram.
- your exchange of messages with the King.
- a note on defence cooperation with Jordan.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
30 August 1990

c:\foreign\hussein (ecl)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

30 August 1990

Dear Charles,

King Hussein

The Prime Minister is giving a working lunch for King Hussein on 31 August. The King is on a tour of North African and European capitals to promote his Gulf "peace initiative". On present plans he will arrive from Madrid and go on to Paris and Bonn after the weekend.

The Prime Minister invited the King to London in her message to him of 20 August. Her earlier message of 7 August expressed dismay at the Jordanian response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The King took offence at the 'tone' and claimed that he had been misunderstood.

The meeting promises to be difficult. The King has made major mistakes during the Gulf crisis. His relations with us and the United States have suffered in consequence. Yet, as Mr Baker and the Foreign Secretary agreed on the telephone this afternoon it is very much in Western interests that the King survives. Any alternative regime would bring with it new and incalculable risks to peace in the region. The Americans are actively working to get economic help for Jordan, eg from Japan.

Our major objectives during this visit are therefore to give the King the firmest warnings about the consequences of his vacillations over the Iraqi invasion and over the implementation of sanctions; and at the same time to bring him back to the West's side by expressing understanding of his predicament and offering help in raising financial compensation for the effects of sanctions.

Amman telno 480 (enclosed), analyses the King's tactics and the political and economic pressures which he is under. It looks as if the King recognises that he cannot continue for much longer to keep his lines open to the West while retaining close links with Iraq. He may be edging towards the effective application of UN sanctions, and the Jordanians have applied to the Security Council for financial relief under Article 50

/of the

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of the Charter. They are asking for annual compensation of almost two billion dollars (twice the estimate contained the paper attached to the Secretary of State's minute of 20 August to the Prime Minister.) But they are still pleading for a temporary waiver to allow them to continue to import oil from Iraq until other sources can be secured. They are also seeking 'clarification' of the requirements of the Security Council Resolution 661 on the export of 'humanitarian' foodstuffs and medicines to Iraq. They have not for the moment closed loop-holes in the embargo. Not much seems to be coming into Aqaba. But the Iraq/Jordan border has remained open for most of the time. There has been evidence of the Central Bank trying to 'launder' Iraqi money and of Jordanian companies fronting for Iraqi importers. The Americans tells us they have evidence of some Jordanian support for Iraq in the military field - intelligence gathering, training on US equipment captured in Kuwait etc.

The main message on sanctions is therefore a tough one.

- We very much share the King's desire to avoid Western military involvement. But if war is to be avoided economic sanctions must be made to work and this entails full Jordanian compliance.
- We cannot agree to a waiver from SCR 661 permitting Jordan to import oil - even temporarily from Iraq. This would open the flood-gates to others seeking specific waivers. But we are ready to support Jordanian efforts to secure alternative supplies eg a request for assistance from the Saudis.
- We are fully conscious of the crippling effect on the Jordanian economy of the implementation of sanctions. We have noted carefully the Jordanian list of requirements submitted to the UN Sanctions Committee. We have already discussed with the US and EC partners ways of promoting prompt financial assistance including lobbying others potential donors including Japan and Kuwait. We have donated £500,000 to the Jordanian Red Crescent to help with refugees.
- But all such assistance must depend on the full implementation of sanctions: This means closed borders, no under-the-counter help to Iraqi companies, no 'laundering' of Iraqi money etc.
- The key to economic assistance on the scale Jordan needs, is Saudi Arabia. Yet King Fahd will be reluctant to pay up since he regards Jordan's policy as pro-Iraqi. How does the King think this can be bridged? Has he plans to meet King Fahd?



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The Prime Minister will also wish to discuss the wider political implications of the Gulf crisis, making it clear that she understands the nature of the King's dilemma. On this she might make the following points:

- Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait has split the Arab world. There are no objections of principle to an "Arab solution" but this must not mean fudge and compromise on the basic issues - the complete and unqualified withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of an independent and legitimate government there.
- Saddam Hussein has done a disservice to the cause of the Palestinians and has nothing to offer them. He has sent a very clear message to Israel and the Western world and it is exactly the wrong one. It is scarcely credible that the PLO and Palestinian leaders in the Occupied Territories have supported his occupation of a neighbouring Arab state and have opposed UN sanctions. But we do understand that once the Iraqis are out of Kuwait the West will be under an obligation to make effective efforts to restore the peace process.

Defence Relations

Defence links have always been close and for the King, a very important part of the bilateral relationship. The Foreign Secretary commissioned a joint FCO/MOD/DTI paper on various aspects including military assistance, joint exercises and arms export. This I enclose, as background information.

The following recommendations have been agreed by the DTI and, at official level, by the MOD.

Military Assistance (Training and Loan Service Personnel)

There is at the moment no reason for curtailing training for the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), whether funded by MOD or FCO, nor for withdrawing the two Loan Service personnel based in Jordan.

Exercises

As the paper indicates four minor British training exercises planned to take place in Jordan have been cancelled. We do not anticipate problems from the Jordanians over this. A bigger issue is that of the major joint exercise, Purple

/Victory

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Victory, planned for next May, in which the King has taken a close personal interest. No final decision has been taken by the MOD. The recommendation is that the Prime Minister should not raise this question. But if the King does, she could say that because of the scale and probable duration of current deployment in the Gulf it is unlikely to be practicable to hold Exercise Purple Victory next May. She could add that this does not reflect on the bilateral relationship. If the King expresses concern the Prime Minister could say that should it prove necessary to cancel the Exercise the MOD might consider a similar exercise at some future date.

Arms Exports

The King is very likely to raise objections to the revocation of export licences for the export of arms to Jordan. The decision on whether to reinstate them is difficult. There is a risk that any equipment exported to Jordan could finish up in Iraqi hands. Reinstatement could provoke public criticism. But any criterion which we might formulate to reduce this risk to insignificant proportions would effectively cut off arms supplies to Jordan. This would exacerbate problems in the bilateral relationship and would be of acute sensitivity to the King personally. He would see it as an indication of mistrust and he would be particularly sensitive now to our creating problems for his armed forces. Such a decision could have the effect of driving him towards the Iraqis. The MOU covering equipment exported under the Jordan Defence Package (JDP) (the bulk of outstanding orders) has a strict end-user clause. Jordan's requirement for this equipment was subject to assessment by the MOD at the time orders were placed. There is no evidence that any equipment supplied under the JDP has finished up in Iraq.

The Foreign Secretary believes that we should now allow the export of the consignment unloaded at Hull (the Jordanians have specifically complained about this). He is generally disposed to support the release of other equipment including that being supplied under the JDP as meeting the criterion of "genuine Jordanian requirement". But he believes that some further reassurance is needed that the weapons will not finish up in Iraq. In this context, Mr Hamilton has expressed concern that some of the consignment held up at Hull would, if diverted to Iraq, be of operational use to the Iraqis, in particular tank ammunition and anti-tank missiles. The DTI have reservations. They consider it premature to reinstate the licence for the shipment offloaded at Hull and doubt that any Jordanian assurance on the end-use of this or other

/consignments

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consignments would enable the Government to explain convincingly why it considers it necessary to release such equipment and run the risk of diversion. The MOD and the DTI are nevertheless content with the recommendation that the Prime Minister take the following line with King Hussein if he presses the point.

The King must realise that the continued export of arms to Jordan arouses considerable public sensitivities in this country. There has been one occasion in recent months (as described to the King by the Foreign Secretary during his visit in May) when sensitive British equipment was diverted to Iraq. Nevertheless, we would be prepared to reinstate those licences originally agreed but now revoked, against his personal assurance that none of the items of equipment would find its way to Iraq.

This line could raise some difficulties of public presentation. It might be necessary to state publicly that export licences had been granted on the basis of personal assurances given by the King.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD), Martin Stanley (DTI) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

[Handwritten signature]
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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ANGLO-JORDANIAN DEFENCE RELATIONS

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

1. General

Defence links with the Jordanians have been traditionally close and well established, aided by personal ties between the Jordanian royal family and the British Armed Forces.

MOD have, however, only a limited defence interest in Jordan. Their activities are mainly in support of wider foreign policy considerations.

2. Military assistance

(a) Training in Britain

The Jordanians look to the UK for training assistance, practically all of which is subsidised. Last year the MOD's Defence Policy Fund subsidised training for the Jordanians - mainly technical courses - worth £492,000 (nearly 10% of the fund) making her the second largest recipient behind Oman. Jordan also receives a similar amount of subsidy under the FCO controlled United Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) (at £500,000 the equal largest country allocation for 1990-91). This includes developmental courses (RCDS, Staff College courses, international security courses, etc).

(b) Loan Service Personnel

There are two loan servicemen based in Jordan; a flying instructor (helicopters) and a fighter control instructor.

3. Exercises

Jordan's terrain and climate and the close ties with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) make it a popular choice for exercises for British forces. A number were planned this year, including four adventurous training expeditions, a visit by four RAF Jaguar aircraft and a small-scale exercise with the JAF, Golden Sands. All

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those have now been cancelled except two of the adventurous training expeditions planned for November and December, which await a decision. The MOD do not expect any adverse Jordanian reaction to the cancellations.

These exercises are small-scale and routine. But Exercise Purple Victory, planned for May next year, is a large-scale multi-million pound joint exercise with the JAF which would have given British forces a valuable opportunity to exercise outside the NATO area. The exercise has had the enthusiastic support of the King. As well as offering excellent training facilities for his own forces it would have demonstrated very tangibly our support for his regime.

Given the new situation there must be considerable doubt on political grounds alone about whether a major exercise in Jordan would be desirable next year. Although it is perhaps too early to assess the balance of political advantage, MOD are now at the point where, if the exercise were to proceed, significant expenditure begins to be incurred. Apart from these considerations it seems unlikely that, given the scale and probable duration of the present deployment in the Gulf, it would be practicable to support a major out-of-area exercise next May. The Defence Secretary will be considering these matters very shortly and it may be possible to make a clear recommendation before Mr Hurd meets the King on 5 September.

4. Arms exports

Most of the current and outstanding defence export contracts are covered by the Jordan Defence Package (JDP). This was negotiated in 1985. It comprised a £270m credit facility for the supply of defence equipment to Jordan, and was followed in June 1987 by an extension for a further £40m. There are over 60 contracts under the JDP covering a wide variety of equipment, including one with International Military Services (IMS) to manage the overall package.

Of the two lines of credit (£310m in total) there is £70m worth of equipment still to be delivered. The main items outstanding are Electronic Warfare (EW) equipments, LAW 80 (a light-weight anti-tank

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weapon), an Air Combat Simulator and Fast Patrol Boats for the Royal Jordanian Coastguard.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the UK and Jordanian Governments to cover the Jordan Defence Package. This MOU includes, at Section 9, a clause as follows:

'The Government of Jordan will not sell or otherwise dispose of the equipment to any third party or allow the equipment to pass out of the Government's absolute control at any time without the prior written approval of the United Kingdom Government.'

This clause is also included in all individual contracts placed under the JDP.

There is also an MOU between the UK Ministry of Defence and the Jordan Armed Forces covering a programme of work outside the JDP for modifications on the Khalid TN37 tank. This work is being undertaken at UK MOD's expense. A consignment of spares/consumables valued at approx £150,000 will be ready for despatch to Jordan in the first week of September 1990.

The Foreign Secretary raised with King Hussein in May evidence of an attempted diversion from Jordan to Iraq of a consignment of explosive booster pellets and an assembly line for the production of artillery fuses to be exported from UK. This was not supplied under the JDP and we have no evidence that any JDP equipment has finished up in Iraq.

Due to its severe economic difficulties there is very little prospect of Jordan purchasing any further major defence equipment in the foreseeable future.

On 17 August the DTI revoked all licences for arms exports to Jordan in order to re-examine them. This followed a decision agreed by DTI and FCO Ministers to suspend temporarily the export of a consignment of arms loaded on board a ship at Hull which comprised:

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- Tank ammunition) A part consignment of equipment already in
- Anti-tank weapons) use by the JAF
- Communications equipment

(The ammunition had already been paid for and shipped to Jordan, but returned for the correction of a defect). The consignment (all supplied under the JDP) was unloaded by Customs. There was press coverage of this.

Companies affected by the revocation of licences - notably Racal and Vospers - have expressed concern about being left with equipment on their hands which has not been paid for and which, as specifically designed for Jordanian requirements, would be difficult or impossible to market elsewhere. It is not clear where the financial cost would fall; but firms may well not be insured for equipment which is not eventually exported from the UK. The total deficit if licences were not re-issued would amount to some £80m.

The Crown Prince of Jordan and the Foreign Minister have both expressed concern to HM Ambassador about the suspension of licences and have asked that they be reinstated. The Crown Prince specified the Hull consignment, a Racal electronic warfare vehicle (in fact exported from UK but off-loaded by a Norwegian ship at Piraeus) and gearbox transmission kits for Khalid tanks. He argued that arms exports were covered by long-standing and bona fide contracts between British firms and Jordan, negotiated through IMS and funded both by direct payments and through ECGD.

RESTRICTED

gpc



*1700 on
Mon
3 Sept*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1990

Dear Charles,

*Amends
Can we do this
en*

Visit to Britain by Kuwaiti Crown Prince

The Kuwaiti Ambassador has informed us that Shaikh Sa'ad al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister, will be visiting London on Monday 3 September, departing the following day. The Crown Prince would like to call on the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary will be visiting the Gulf at the time, but we are hoping to arrange a call on the Crown Prince by Mr Waldegrave.

We recommend that the Prime Minister see the Crown Prince, if her diary permits. We are trying to ensure that the legitimate Kuwaiti authorities maintain a high international profile, and the Crown Prince is a key figure. The Foreign Secretary will be calling on the Amir in Taif.

I should be grateful if you could seek the Prime Minister's agreement.


Yours,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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1000 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10003

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9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

Richard Hunter
30/8

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Department
Downing Street
London SW1

30 August 1990

me

Dear Douglas:

Some very valuable work has been done by your Department's Legal Advisers on the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as regards a possible application for provisional measures arising from Iraq's treatment of our Ambassador, his staff and diplomatic premises in Kuwait. This work was wisely put in hand at a time when the use of force against our Embassy seemed very imminent. The issues have been very helpfully set out in the instructions prepared by your Deputy Legal Adviser, Mr Berman.

In my view, the question whether to initiate proceedings in the International Court of Justice must be considered primarily in the light of our objectives.

These are to secure the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the release of Western hostages, and the continuing stability of other States in the Gulf.

An essential component in our tactical array must be the uncertainty in Saddam's camp as to what use will be made when, where and in what manner, of the formidable military forces still assembling in the Gulf.

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An application to the ICJ for provisional measures against Iraq could only produce (if it were successful) measures which were juridical in character, concerning the interpretation of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As such they would be very unlikely to influence Saddam at all, or the rest of the world to any extent additional to what has already been achieved by the historic Resolutions of the Security Council already in place. Yet our very success (which could by no means be assured, since there are jurisdictional difficulties which would certainly be exploited by Iraq so as to blur the real issue) would carry with it a major disadvantage. The ICJ would be almost certain to attach to its order for provisional measures its standard injunction to all parties in such a case, requiring them to take no action, and to ensure that no action is taken, which may aggravate the tension or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution.

Such an injunction could only give comfort to Saddam. If we indicated that we would comply with it, the range and flexibility of our military options and our consequent ability to induce uncertainty would be drastically curtailed. If we declined, we should for the first time in this affair find ourselves on the wrong side of the legal argument, simultaneously transforming Iraq into a complainant. Resort to the Court is itself likely to lead the ICJ to say that having opted for judicial settlement we ought not to resort to the range of other options open to us, including in certain circumstances the use of force.

We may need to revert, as circumstances develop, to the ICJ option. In present circumstances, however, I anticipate that you will consider the consequences of an application so potentially harmful, and so disproportionate to any presentational advantage that might stem from a successful application, as to render the jurisdictional and other issues on which I am asked to advise of

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academic interest only.

I was asked at the Prime Minister's meeting on 24 August to look into the possibility of an application to the International Court of Justice; I am accordingly copying this letter to the **Prime Minister**, Tom King and to Len Appleyard.


Yours sincerely,

S. L. With

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MY TELNO 480: KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER:
SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. SOME EVIDENCE THAT JORDAN MAY BE TIGHTENING SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. ACCOMPANIED BY MY ASSISTANT DEFENCE ATTACHE, I VISITED THE IRAQI BORDER AT RUWAISHID TODAY. IN THE PROCESS, WE MADE A COUNT OF VEHICLES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. THERE ARE STILL MANY OIL TANKERS COMING FROM IRAQ TO JORDAN BUT IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION WE NOTED SCARCELY ANY IRAQI-BOUND TRAFFIC OTHER THAN PRIVATE CARS.

3. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DRAW ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS FROM ONE DAY'S SAMPLE, BUT THE ABSENCE OF IRAQI-BOUND TRUCKS IS CERTAINLY A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM OUR PREVIOUS COUNTS. THIS MAY INDICATE THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE NOW TIGHTENING UP ON SANCTIONS POLICY.

4. THE FLOW OF TRUCKS CARRYING OIL INTO JORDAN FROM IRAQ REPRESENTS PAYMENT IN KIND OF IRAQI DEBTS TO JORDAN. THE IRAQIS DO NOT, THEREFORE, DERIVE ANY REVENUE FROM THIS TRAFFIC. THE JORDANIANS HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO PUT AN END TO THE IMPORTING OF IRAQI OIL AS SOON AS THEY CAN FIND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES AT COMPARABLE PRICES (WHICH ARE VERY MUCH BELOW THE CURRENT MARKET RATE).

5. EVEN IF SANCTIONS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN HITHERTO, THERE ARE STILL MANY GAPS TO BE CLOSED: AND THE ADVICE ON THE LINE TO TAKE OVER SANCTIONS IN MY TUR STILL STANDS.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO.10.

REEVE

YYYY

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DOHA PLEASE PASS SECRETARY OF STATES'S PARTY.

SUMMARY

1. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE AN UP TO DATE ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN POLICIES AND EXPECTATIONS, AS YOU BEGIN YOUR VISIT TO THE GULF. THESE REMAIN VERY MUCH AS SET OUT TO ME BY KIMMITT ON 23 AUGUST (MY TELEGRAM NO 2028, NOT TO ALL): CONTAINMENT AND BLOCKADE, WITH THE ACCENT PERHAPS INCREASINGLY ON THE LONG HAUL, IRAQI ACTIONS, JORDANIAN INSTABILITY, AND POSSIBLE ISRAELI INTERVENTION ARE THE MAIN WILD CARDS. IT IS TOO SOON TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME, BUT SOME EVENTUAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED.

DETAIL

2. BARRING NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND, US POLICIES NOW APPEAR TO BE SET FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS AND AT LEAST UNTIL THE AMERICAN MILITARY BUILD UP IS COMPLETE. IF ANYTHING, THE PENTAGON HAS BECOME MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONSCIOUS AS THE DAYS GO BY OF THE INHERENT RISKS OF TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ, WHETHER IN KUWAIT OR MORE BROADLY. THE ADMINISTRATION ENJOYS A WIDE DEGREE OF PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ITS POLICIES SO FAR, BUT THE INITIAL OUTRAGE AT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND EARLIER EXPECTATIONS THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE HAVE GIVEN WAY TO A MORE GENERAL BELIEF THAT SANCTIONS OUGHT AT LEAST TO BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO WORK WHILE HUSSEIN REMAINS BOTTLED UP IN IRAQ, AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD JOIN IN MORE VIGOROUSLY WITH THE AMERICANS IN SEEING THAT THEY DO. SCOWCROFT PUT IT SUCCINCTLY TO A JOURNALIST FRIEND RECENTLY: IT WAS PERHAPS ALL RIGHT FOR THE USA TO BE SEEN AS THE WORLD'S PREMIER POLICEMAN, BUT NOT AS ITS NUMBER ONE GUNSLINGER.

PAGE 1
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3. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PREOCCUPATIONS, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ARE TWO FOLD: MAKING SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE AND BUILDING UP INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. THEIR DOMESTIC MACHINERY FOR THE FORMER IS TYPICALLY COMPLEX. WE ARE WORKING TO ESTABLISH PROPER LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH IT. THE AMERICANS, TOO, ARE ACTIVE IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON WEAK POINTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING JORDAN. THEY WOULD WELCOME THE CHANCE OF TURNING BACK AN IRAQI SHIP FOR ITS PUBLIC EFFECT. BUT BY AND LARGE THE NOOSE IS IN PLACE.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE JUST BEGINNING SERIOUSLY TO ADDRESS (MY TELEGRAM NO 2088) THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD PAY, A QUESTION GIVEN ADDED POINT BY THEIR OWN BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC POLICY PROBLEMS. THE GERMANS AND THE JAPANESE ARE LIKELY TO COME UNDER THE MOST PRESSURE AMONG NON-MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE GERMANS ARE PARTICULARLY EXPOSED, BEING SEEN AS DIRECTLY THREATENED, POTENTIALLY WEAK-KNEED, AND RELUCTANT TO PAY FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION. THAT IS PARTLY A REACTION TO THE EXCESSIVE HOPES PLACED IN THEM BECAUSE OF CONCENTRATION ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS EARLIER THIS YEAR, AND IT WOULD BE RASH TO DRAW ANY VERY LONG TERM CONCLUSIONS. MY OWN SCHADENFREUDE IS ALSO TEMPERED BY THE THOUGHT THAT ANY DEVELOPING AMERICAN FEELING THEY ARE FIGHTING OTHERS' BATTLES FOR THEM WHILE THE REST OF THE WORLD PROSPERS AT THEIR EXPENSE CAN RUB OFF ON THE EUROPEANS MORE GENERALLY. AND THE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH OTHERS SHOULD PAY IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE AMERICANS HAVING SO FAR PUT AID TO COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS INTO THE SAME HAMPER AS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN MILITARY DEFENCE EFFORTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE NEED FOR SENSITIVE HANDLING OF THE ISSUE IF NASCENT PROBLEMS ARE NOT TO BECOME MORE ACTUAL IS OF COURSE STILL MORE EVIDENT GIVEN THE RISK OF POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS CONCLUDING THAT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO DUN THEM REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT TO GET THEM TO PAY FOR POLICIES THOSE CONTRIBUTORS CANNOT DETERMINE.

5. NOW THAT THE FIRST ALARM AND EXCITEMENT IS OVER, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ALSO COMING UNDER GREATER PRESSURE TO DEFINE THEIR LONGER TERM PURPOSES, AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THEY ARE ENGAGED IN MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO ROLL THE IRAQIS BACK FROM KUWAIT. THE ANSWER WILL, NATURALLY, DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON HOW THE SITUATION EVOLVES ON THE GROUND. THERE SEEMS COMPARATIVELY LITTLE PUBLIC IMPATIENCE IN THE US SO FAR, OR EXPECTATION OF EARLY RESULTS. THAT MAY OF COURSE CHANGE, NOT LEAST IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS OVER HOSTAGES OR

SADDAM HUSSEIN OFFERS SOME NEW PROVOCATION IN THAT REGARD. ONCE THE US MILITARY BUILD UP IS COMPLETE, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE PRESUMED ABSENCE OF A STILL MORE SUBSTANTIAL ARAB COMPONENT ABLE OVER THE LONGER HAUL TO SUBSTITUTE FOR AT LEAST SOME US FORCES, WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH A SIZEABLE AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT WAS NECESSARY SOLELY FOR DETERRENCE TO BECOME MORE ACTUAL, AND THE ISSUE OF HOW TO REDUCE IT IF IT IS NOT TO BE USED TO LIBERATE KUWAIT OR TOPPLE HUSSEIN TO BECOME TOPICAL. SUCH QUESTIONS COULD HURT THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL STANDING. BUT THE PRESENT ASSUMPTION IS, INCREASINGLY, THAT WE ARE IN FOR A LONG HAUL AND THAT THE POLITICAL WINDOW FOR DIRECT MILITARY ACTION, BARRING FRESH DEVELOPMENTS, IF IT EVER IN PRACTICE EXISTED, HAS NOW CLOSED. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, SO FAR AS I CAN JUDGE, SEEM RECONCILED TO THAT. THEY WOULD LIKE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO GO, BUT THEY ARE NOT NOW YELLING FOR HIS HEAD.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION, TOO, NOW EXPECT A PROLONGED PERIOD WHILE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN INCREASES, WITH THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE RESTORATION OF THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT AS THEIR BASIC OBJECTIVES. WHAT EXACTLY THE LATTER MIGHT MEAN IN PRACTICE IS A SUBJECT FOR DEBATE. WHETHER THE AMERICANS CAN REALISTICALLY ENTERTAIN SOME OF THE WIDER OBJECTIVES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES (DOHA TELEGRAM NO 171, PARAGRAPH 5, FOR EXAMPLE) WILL DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES, AND PERHAPS IN PARTICULAR ON WHETHER THEY CONCLUDE DIRECT INTERVENTION IS MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY POSSIBLE. THEY ARE NOT AT PRESENT WEDDED TO THE IDEA IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO OVERTHROW SADDAM HUSSEIN. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE A USEFUL BUT NOT ENTIRELY BANKABLE ISRAELI ASSURANCE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR, THOUGH I ALSO DETECT A GUT FEAR OF SOME ATTEMPT FROM TEL AVIV TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT SITUATION MILITARILY, POSSIBLY THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY PROVOKED BY IRAQI DEPLOYMENT OR TROUBLE IN JORDAN, A FEAR THEY WILL SEEK TO ALLAY DURING LEVY'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK. THEY DO NOT EXPECT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO MAKE ANY EARLY MOVE, SINCE HE TOO WILL WANT TO SEE WHAT TIME DOES FOR HIM, THOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS IRAQI MISCALCULATION OVER HOSTAGES IS ALWAYS THERE. IN BRIEF, FOR NOW, A WAITING GAME.

WOOD

YYYY

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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



Cherose dr. GPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1990

Dear Charles,

The Gulf Crisis *Alap.*

Thank you for your letter of 28 August enclosing one the Prime Minister has received from the Danish Prime Minister about the despatch of a Danish corvette to the Gulf.

/ I enclose a draft reply which expresses appreciation of the Danish move. It also expresses thanks for the role of the Danish Embassy in Kuwait. The Embassy is one of the very few which still has an international telephone line working, and it is proving to be a valuable source of information on the status of Western diplomatic missions in Kuwait city.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

FROM: Prime Minister

TO: Poul Schlüter
Prime Minister of Denmark
Copenhagen

Sam

Thank you for your letter of 27 August informing me of your Government's decision to deploy a Danish corvette to the Gulf to assist in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq.


I was very pleased to see you in Helsinki

This is further welcome evidence of the Danish commitment to ensuring the effective implementation of UN Resolutions on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. I hope that we can continue to build upon the close cooperation which exists between us on this matter both bilaterally and in other fora, particularly the European Community and the United Nations.

I should also like to express my thanks for the work of the Danish Embassy in Kuwait, which is proving such a valuable source of information on Western missions there.

Sam

Muddle East
sit pt 25





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MR POWELL

Iraq: Foreign Secretary's Meetings

The Foreign Secretary asked me to let you have a note summarising the main points which came out of his meetings on 28-30 August.

Interception of Iraqi Tanker

2. The 155,000 tonnes Iraqi tanker HITTIN, currently in ballast, is likely to be berthing at the Mina terminal off the Iraqi coast today or tomorrow. It would take approximately 1 or 1.5 days for the tanker to load. If the tanker then sets sail down the Gulf for the Aden refinery or another destination it will encounter the Wisconsin group of US naval vessels in the course of the coming weekend, possibly on Saturday. MoD have been tasked to maintain contact with the US authorities, and to co-ordinate a joint interception. HMS Battleaxe (Type 22 frigate) has now moved up the Gulf towards the US fleet.

3. The cargo vessel ZANOUBIA left Colombo with a consignment of tea on 28 August. MoD are co-ordinating a surveillance operation with the US to ensure that we can track it. We estimate that if it sails for the Gulf it will reach Western naval forces by 3 September. If it heads for Aqaba it would probably reach the French Navy off Djibouti on 4 September or the US Saratoga Group in the Red Sea on 7-8 September.

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Return of British Citizens

4. Baghdad telegram 1072 reports the latest move by the Iraqi Government on the return of British dependants. The FCO is currently looking at the legal and practical implications. British Airways and Virgin are still standing by. Mr Waldegrave will want to discuss the Iraqi approach at the Prime Minister's meeting tomorrow.

Action against Iraqi citizens

5. Since the position is still unclear over the return of British citizens from Iraq and Kuwait, action on imposing travel restrictions on Iraqi diplomats and the expulsion of 21 Iraqi non-diplomats has been put on hold.

United Nations

6. Activity at the UN has slackened after the passage of the Security Council Resolution. The Permanent Five are working slowly on a French text about Iraqi maltreatment of Embassies but the timing will depend in part on the Secretary General's discussions in Amman tomorrow. In the Sanctions Committee the Western representatives have been resisting Yemeni and Cuban efforts to exclude food from the embargo.

Gulf Naval Conference

7. The US Government is firming up plans for a Gulf Naval Conference to take place in Bahrain on 9/10 September (Washington telegram 2092). They are proposing that approaches be made to participating nations jointly by the US and the WEU Chairman, France, with formal invitations coming from the Bahrain Government once it was clear that



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people were prepared to come. FCO and MoD have been tasked to consider urgently our response. There is a clear operational requirement for co-ordination in the Gulf between the three main naval forces and the smaller contributing forces now arriving. But we do not want this co-ordination to be subject to the scrutiny of the Military Staff Committee or, more importantly, to be given a lesser place than the French which would be unacceptable. The FCO is proposing that the WEU contribution should be jointly handled by the French and ourselves.

British Deployments

8. The Defence Secretary will report on his visit. He may also want to mention the deployment of half a squadron of Rapier and ground defence units to Bahrain, and HMS Gloucester to the Armilla Patrol. MoD are also preparing a range of options for increasing the British presence in Qatar.

Burden-sharing

9. The US Government is embarking on an exercise (Washington telegram 2088) to consider ways of ensuring fairer burden-sharing both on the costs for nations with forces deployed in the area and on aid to friendly countries suffering losses from the embargo. This fits in with our own ideas about the way in which the German, Japanese, other non-participating Western nations and Arab governments should contribute to the costs of the Western effort in the Gulf and the support of Turkey, Egypt and Japan. An initial response to the US ideas is in preparation. This will be an important exercise, and we want to make sure that it results in practical financial help.



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Counter propaganda

10. Work is in hand within the FCO on improving the counter-propaganda effort. The decisions taken at the Prime Minister's meeting on 28 August are being followed up. Mr Waldegrave can report, and a note is in preparation.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
30 August 1990

SECRET



THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT



FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 44-276 3000

071

S L Gass Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign
& Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

My Ref:

Your Ref:

30 AUG 1990

Dear Simon,

BA AIRCRAFT AT KUWAIT AIRPORT

Thank you for your letter of 28 August about the proposed draft reply for Lord Brabazon to send to Mr Prescott about the British Airways aircraft at Kuwait Airport which was caught up in the Iraqi invasion.

My Secretary of State has now returned to the office and proposes to reply to Mr Prescott himself as attached. As you will see he has amended the last sentence to reflect the fact that clear procedures for notifying airlines of developments affecting use of airspace and airports are now in place.

Unless I hear to the contrary, I will arrange for the letter to be despatched on Monday.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell.

Yours sincerely

Simon Whiteley

S C WHITELEY
Private Secretary



THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT

Draft.



FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 01-276 3000

John Prescott Esq MP
House of Commons
LONDON
SW1A 0AA

My Ref:

Your Ref:

Thank you for your letter of 13 August to the Prime Minister about the British Airways aircraft at Kuwait Airport.

Christopher Chope explained the position when you spoke to him on 11 August. It was apparent to everyone that Iraq was massing troops on the border with Kuwait, but the very widespread assumption was that this was to exercise pressure on Kuwait. We certainly had no prior knowledge or expectation that the invasion would take place, let alone the exact time and precise nature of it. It is not always clear exactly what is happening in the early stages of hostilities. However, on the information at present available we believe that the invasion took place at about, or perhaps a little after, the time when British Airways flight BA 149 landed at Kuwait. It was not therefore feasible to warn British Airways of the invasion before the aircraft landed.

There are both formal and informal channels for notifying airlines of developments affecting use of airspace and airports around the world. Exactly who notifies whom depends on the nature of the information and its source. But clear procedures are in place.

CECIL PARKINSON

FLASH

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FM BAGHDAD
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1072
OF 301246Z AUGUST 90

EVACUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

1. THE ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE MFA CONSULAR DEPARTMENT CALLED ME IN THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THE FOLLOWING. IRAQ HAD DECIDED THAT 132 BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN NOW IN IRAQI INSTALLATIONS AS QUOTE GUESTS UNQUOTE (AND NOT THE SAME PEOPLE AS THOSE NOW IN THE MANSOUR HOTEL-MIPT) SHOULD BE FLOWN FROM BAGHDAD TO LONDON IN AN IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHT - ON TWO CONDITIONS:

(A) THIS EMBASSY SHOULD OBTAIN NOT ONLY PERMISSION FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND IN THE UK BUT ALSO OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES EN ROUTE.

(B) HMG SHOULD AGREE TO ALLOW ALL THE SEATS IN THE AIRCRAFT (NOT JUST 132) TO BE FILLED BY IRAQIS NOW IN THE UK WHO WERE READY TO TRAVEL.

2. THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED WAS EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO GIVE ANY OTHER DETAILS, SUCH AS THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. HE SAID ALL SUCH DETAILS WOULD BE PRODUCED WHEN WE HAD GIVEN HMG'S AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE PROPOSAL IN QUESTION.

3. THE OFFER HAS ELEMENTS OF BLACKMAIL IN THAT THERE IS AN IMPLICATION THAT IF WE DO NOT AGREE TO IT THE DEPARTURE FROM IRAQ OF THE 132 WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN QUESTION WILL AT LEAST BE DELAYED.

4. I ASSUME HOWEVER THAT WE SHALL BE PREPARED TO FALL IN WITH WHAT THE IRAQIS ARE PROPOSING: THE ELEMENT OF BLACKMAIL APART, IT IS IN A SENSE THE OBVERSE OF WHAT WE OURSELVES SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO ARRANGE WITH IRAQI AIRWAYS WHEN EARLIER ON THEY ASKED FOR (AND WERE REFUSED) PERMISSION TO LAY ON FLIGHTS TO HEATHROW TO FLY IRAQIS OUT OF BRITAIN. IT WOULD ALSO OF COURSE GO DOWN VERY BADLY WITH OUR DETAINEES IF THEY LEARNT THAT HMG HAD TURNED DOWN THE OPPORTUNITY OF A FLIGHT THAT WOULD ENSURE THEIR EARLY DEPARTURE FROM IRAQ. I RECOMMEND ACCORDINGLY THAT WE GIVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE IRAQI PROPOSAL.

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NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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30 August 1990

Dear Charles,

John Austin

Control?

Evacuation of British Nationals from Kuwait and Iraq

I am writing to let you know what contingency arrangements we are making for the evacuation of British nationals from Kuwait and Iraq. In addition to practical arrangements, we have been thinking about how the operation should be financed.

We estimate that 2,300 British nationals remain in Kuwait, of whom 197 have been detained by the Iraqis. The total in Iraq is about 700, of whom 222 are detained. In addition, we accept consular responsibility for several hundred (we are trying to obtain a more precise figure) Irish and unrepresented Commonwealth nationals in both countries. On 28 August Saddam Hussain announced that women and children would be allowed to leave Iraq. Approximately half the British communities in both countries come into this category.

We do not yet know what arrangements the Iraqis will allow us to make for the evacuation of women and children. Our Embassy in Baghdad is pressing hard for clarification of Saddam Hussain's statement. The Ambassador has been told by the Foreign Ministry that priority will be given to those in Baghdad; only when they are evacuated will arrangements for the Kuwaiti dependants' evacuation be made. The Iraqis have said that all those who wish to leave will require exit visas, for which they must apply in person. Embassies have been instructed to submit lists of those who wish to leave, a requirement which presents obvious difficulties for the large British community in Kuwait.

The most satisfactory way of evacuating British nationals from both countries would be by air. We have been in discussion with British Airways, who could make more than enough Boeing 747s available at short notice, and with Richard Branson's Virgin Airways, who has one 747 ready to fly as soon as he has clearance. British Airways have told us that their preliminary estimate for a round trip London-Baghdad-London would be £160,000, which includes £100,000+ for insurance

/costs

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costs, plus a further figure to compensate for loss of revenue caused by taking the aircraft out of scheduled service. In the worst case, this latter figure could be as high as £191,000. The exact sum would depend on the route on which the cancellation was made. In addition, British Airways would want a further £53,000 in one-off recompense for the considerable time spent in preparation. Virgin Airways have told us that their cost for a round trip would be £237,000, comprising £100,000 in operating costs, £87,000 compensation for loss of revenue, and £150,000 insurance. But Mr Branson has today said on the telephone that he would be willing to make an aircraft available for a single round trip in return only for the agreement of the FCO to pay insurance costs.

Our normal practice when repatriating British nationals at public expense is to ask them to sign an undertaking to repay before they embark on the journey. The circumstances of this proposed evacuation, however, are unusual. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes though that it would be politically damaging to ask women and children hostages in Baghdad and Kuwait to give such undertakings, especially in the stressful circumstances of their enforced departure.

An alternative would be for HMG to accept the cost in full of the evacuation. This could be very expensive. The first phase, during which four or five round trips may be necessary, could cost over £1 million. The second phase, which may come when eventually the men are released, could be equally expensive. It could furthermore set a precedent for future occasions when British nationals suffer loss as a result of the actions of a foreign government if HMG were to pay evacuation costs in full.

The Foreign Secretary therefore proposes that while we should not seek to make evacuees sign an undertaking to repay, we should make it clear to other governments, to other government departments in Britain, and to major companies with nationals involved that we intend to seek reimbursement from them after the event on a pro rata basis. We will probably state this publicly beforehand. Inevitably, this will not cover all the evacuees nor all the costs of the exercise; there may be a gap of over a million pounds. The Foreign Secretary believes we have to accept this, and will ask the Chief Secretary to meet the necessary sum out of the consolidated fund.

My officials have been discussing with their Treasury colleagues how to cover the risk of the hired aircraft and their passengers. In the light of Treasury advice we are

/asking

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asking the airlines to seek insurance cover. This will add substantially to the hire cost, but is preferable to indemnifying the airlines: the loss of one Boeing 747 alone could cost £100 million, quite apart from compensation for loss of life or injury.

There is, of course, no certainty that the Iraqis will allow foreign airlines to fly either to Kuwait or to Baghdad. We are exploring other possibilities, which include arranging overland convoys to Baghdad and thence either to Jordan or Turkey. In such circumstances it is likely that we should still require charter aircraft to pick up British nationals from either Amman or from Eastern Turkey, and the arguments outlined above would still apply. The cost of road transport across Iraq would make up only a small proportion of the total cost of the operation.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Transport and the Cabinet Secretary.

Yours,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SW1A 2NS
Telephone 071-210 3000

BF
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From the Secretary of State for Social Security

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London
SW1 2AA

Prime Minister

30 August 1990

Re DSS enquiry
re position & will
inform Helpline
com

mt
Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 24 August in which you ask for advice about the treatment of property in relation to claims for Income Support made by people affected by the crisis in the Gulf.

The circumstances that you quote in your letter concern a case where a person (or family) is returning from the Gulf and is unable to take up residence in their 'home', as this has been leased for their anticipated period abroad. The capital value of this accommodation, if taken into account for the purposes of calculating entitlement to Income Support, would almost certainly exclude them. You asked for clarification of the position.

In cases such as that described, the capital value of the property may be disregarded if the person (or family) returning from abroad is able to demonstrate that the property is their normal home. Alternatively, if they are in the process of taking appropriate action to enable them to live there the value of the property can be ignored. Any rent received under the leasing arrangement will, normally, be taken into account as income.

It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that we were unaware that this aspect was proving a problem in the assessment of entitlement to Income Support. However, each case has to be decided on the circumstances of the individual claimant. Our main experience of problems, so far, has been cases where a partner remaining in the Gulf is working for 24 hours or more a week; this excludes entitlement to Income Support. In these cases we are able to consider crisis loan payments from the Social Fund; such payments may be made for personal needs but help with housing costs is excluded.

E.R.

Officials in our Headquarters are in direct daily contact with the Helpline, providing advice and assistance. As I have already said we are not aware either from the Helpline or our own local offices of any particular difficulty being caused where someone is renting out their 'home'. I will, however, ensure our officials are made aware of this correspondence.

Yours sincerely,

Helena Dudley

HELEN DUDLEY
Private Secretary

MIDDLE EAST :

Situation P. 27

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 1072

IRAQ:EVACUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

SUMMARY

1. CONSULAR ACCESS GAINED TO PROVISIONAL TOTAL OF 119 UK NATIONALS AWAITING EVACUATION IN MANSOUR HOTEL. NO INFORMATION AS YET ON IRAQI TRAVEL PLANS.

DETIAL

2. DA AND CONSULAR TEAM, AFTER SOME OBSTRUCTION FROM THE IRAAQI SECURITY AUTHORITIES (DUE TO THE BY NOW FAMILIAR PROBLEM OF LACK OF COMMUNCIATION BETWEEN IRAQI DEPARTMENTS) EVENTUALLY GAINED ACCESS ON PM 30 AUGUSTT TO THE BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN NOW HELD IN THE MANSOUR HOTEL. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE AMERICAN, FRENCH, AUSTRALIAN AND JAPANESE MISSIONS EXPERIENCED SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN MAKING CONTACT WITH THEIR NATIONALS.

3. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN THE HITEL DID NOT HAVE (OR FAILED TOMAKE AVAILABLE) COMPREHENSIVE DETAILS OF UK NATIONALS HELD. NOR DID THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ANY CLEAR IDEA OF IRAQI ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. CONSULAR STAFF ARE STILL CHECKING PERSONAL DETAILS/PASSPORTS HELD BY THE IRAQIS HOWEVER IT APPEARS THAT A PROVISIONAL TOTAL OF 119 UK NATIONALS ARE NOW AT THE MANSOUR HOTEL AWAITING EVACUATION.

4. BLT PARTY. ALL BLT DEPENDENTS ARE CONFIRMED TO BE IN MANSOUR WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING WIVES WHO HAVE ELECTED TO STAY WITH THEIR HUSBANDS:

A. MRS DRING PLUS TWO (NICOLA/LEANNE). HER SON DAVID IS AT THE HOTEL. MRS DRING IS REPORTEDLY ON HUNGER STRIKE (SINE 28 AUG) PENDING GRANT OF CONSULAR ACCESS.

PAGE 1
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B. MRS SOUTHCOTE PLUS ONE (ANITA). MRS SOUTHCOTE IS SUFFERING FROM MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS.

C. MRS GARDINER. CHILDREN SANDRA AND TERRY AT MANSOUR HOTEL.

D. MRS BENSON. CHILDREN LESLY AND STEPHEN AT MANSOUR HOTEL.

E. MRS QUICK.

5. IN ADDITION WO BLEARS IS ALSO AT THE HOTEL AND HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE IRAQIS THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING WITH THE PARTY.

6. MRS HAYENS AND MRS GLEDHILL AND THEIR CHILDREN ARE WITH THE BLT PARTY. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY REACHED THE MANSOUR HOTEL AHEAD OF THE MAIN BLT DEPENDENTS CONVOY ON 17 AUGUST. THE TWO CHILDREN SUFFERING FROM DEHYDRATION HAD NOTT, AS THE IRAQIS HAD PROMISED, BEEN TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL BUT HAD BEEN SEEN BY A DOCTOR AT THE HOTEL. THEY HDA COME TO NO HARM.

OTHERS.

7. FULL DETAILS OF THE 46 OTHER UK NATIONALS AWAITING EVACUATION IN THE MANSOUR WILL FOLLOW ONCE PERSONAL DETIALS HAVE BEEN COLLATED. THEY INCLUDE WOMEN AND CHILDREN AMONG CREW AND PASSENGERS OF BA 149 AND FROM THE MOSLEM PILGRIM PARTY.

WALKER

YYYY

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

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(BY TUBE H29)

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(BY TUBE H29)

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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

EMERGENCY UNIT

at to file

Robert Hayward MP

Box 2



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

2

1
m

Dear Prime Minister,

May I, on behalf of everyone at the Gulf Support Group, thank you very much for visiting us on Friday.

I know that not only those who were present but all those who have given so much of their time to help others in difficulty appreciate you giving your time. All those

involved believe they are doing a
worthwhile job, your comments
& time have confirmed that.

Thank you again very much.

Robert Howard

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SIC I9M

MY TELNO 1063: EVACUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

1. THERE HAVE BEEN SO MANY CHOPS AND CHANGES TODAY IN THE IRAQI PROCEDURES FOR ALLOWING FOREIGN WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY THAT IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP THE DEPARTMENT UP TO DATE OTHER THAN BY A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT. WHAT DOES SEEM TO HAVE EMERGED BEHIND THE DETAIL IS THAT:

(A) THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES SEE THE DESPATCH OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN IRAQ PROPER AS PHASE ONE, WITH THE PROBLEM OF THOSE IN KUWAIT RELEGATED TO A PHASE TWO (PERHAPS BECAUSE I AND OTHERS POINTED OUT THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR POSSIBLY A THOUSAND OR MORE PEOPLE: THEY PROBABLY REALISE THAT IT WOULD BE ADMINISTRATIVELY SIMPLER TO EVACUATE THE PEOPLE FROM KUWAIT BY AIR DIRECT TO THE WEST, BUT FOR POLITICAL REASONS WOULD PREFER THE EVACUATION TO BE VIA BAGHDAD):

9

(B) WITHIN THEIR PHASE ONE THE IRAQIS INTEND TO DEAL AS A FIRST PRIORITY WITH THE DETAINEES. UNDER-SECRETARY HAMDOON SAID AS MUCH TO THE TROIKA LAST NIGHT:

(C) THE ARRANGEMENTS BY WHICH NON-DETAINEES CAN GET EXIT VISAS (WHICH ARRANGEMENTS HAVE CHANGED THREE TIMES IN THE COURSE OF TODAY) MEAN THAT IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE PEOPLE TWO-FOUR DAYS TO GET THEIR VISAS. THERE MAY WELL BE AN ELEMENT OF DELIBERATE INEFFICIENCY HERE IN PURSUIT OF THE POLICY OF GIVING PRIORITY TO DETAINEES.

2. AS THINGS STAND (AND PARTICULARLY GIVEN THAT THE IRAQIS SEEM DETERMINED THAT OUR DETAINEES NOW IN THE MANSOUR HOTEL SHALL LEAVE JAQ IN AN IRAQI AIRWAYS AIRCRAFT - SEPARATE TELEGRAMS), IT LOOKS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN

CHARTER AIRCRAFT TO HELP WITH THE EVACUATION FROM IRAQ
 PROPER. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER, WHERE KUWAIT IS CONCERNED,
 ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE CAN OVERCOME POLITICAL CUSSEDNESS.

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OPERATION GRANBY - GENERAL SITREP TWENTY - AS AT 302359Z AUG 90.

1. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS

PAGE 1

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AS REQUIRED.

2. INTELLIGENCE. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE IRAQI FORCE STRENGTHS OR DISPOSITION WITHIN KUWAIT. AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IN THE SHORT TERM CONTINUES TO BE UNLIKELY.

3. POLITICAL SITUATION. BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS CONTINUE TO PREVENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM LEAVING IRAQ. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IS DUE TO MEET THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN JORDAN. HE HAS EXPLAINED THAT THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UN RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR IRAQ TO LEAVE KUWAIT AND FOR THE DETAINEES TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. 10 MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM AND THEIR FAMILIES WHO WERE MOVED TO THE REGENCY PALACE HOTEL YESTERDAY WERE BUSSED TO BAGHDAD THIS MORNING. ONE SERVICEMAN ALONG WITH HIS CHILD AND PREGNANT WIFE, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING MEDICAL SUPERVISION, HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO REMAIN AT THE HOTEL IN KUWAIT.

4. US OPERATIONS. THE CURRENT PATTERN OF A STEADY BUILD UP OF FORCES, TROOP ORIENTATION AND SECURITY PATROLLING CONTINUES. WITH THE ARRIVAL YESTERDAY OF THE FIRST OF THE 24TH MECHANISED INFANTRY DIVISIONS SEA TAIL US GROUND WEAPON SYSTEMS RECEIVED A CONSIDERABLE BOOST OF SOME 118 M1 ABRAHAM MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE US NAVY CENTRAL COMMAND REPORT 223 CHALLENGES ON MERCHANT SHIPS. THE TOTAL US FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE GULF REGION NOW AMOUNT TO 80,000 MEN AND 2000 WOMEN.

5. ROYAL NAVAL OPERATIONS. BATTLEAXE IS NOW ON PATROL IN THE WESTERN GULF AND WILL ARRIVE IN DOHA TOMORROW TO HOST A VISIT FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ON THE 1 SEP. HMS YORK HAS NOW RESUMED PATROL AFTER COMPLETING HER OLYMPUS ENGINE CHANGE AND NOW HAS SNOOME EMBARKED. JUPITER AND ORANGELEAF ARE IN JEBEL ALI FOR THERE PLANNED 48 HOUR STAND DOWN. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ITINERARIES FOR ALL OTHER RN VESSELS ON PASSAGE TO THE GULF.

6. EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE. SURVEILLANCE NOW EXTENDS TO 18 VESSELS WITH 13 IN PORT AND 5 AT SEA. THERE ARE 7 KUWAITI OWNED AND MANNED VESSELS IN THE GULF AREA 6 IN PORT AND 1 AT SEA.

7. OTHER NAVAL VESSELS. CURRENTLY OPERATING INSIDE THE GULF THERE ARE 9 US, 2 FRENCH, 6 SAUDI AND 5 OMANI VESSELS.

8. NO CHANGE TO ARMY DISPOSITION.

9. RAF OPERATIONS. THE FIRST 6 UPGRADED QUOTE STAGE 1 PLUS UNQUOTE F3S HAVE NOW ARRIVED AT DHAHRAN. THE RETURN FLIGHT OF THE REPLACED AIRCRAFT IS SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW. THE NIMRODS AT SEEB CONTINUE TO FLY 2 SORTIES A DAY. A REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVES AT SEEB TONIGHT TO ALLOW ONE TO RETURN TO THE UK FOR ROUTINE SERVICING.

10. LOGISTICS. THE TORNADO GR1 SQN WEAPON DEPLOYMENT WAS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED DUE TO STORAGE PROBLEMS AT BAHRAIN. IT HAS NOW RECOMMENCED AT A REDUCED RATE. THE REVISED COMPLETION DATE FOR THIS AIRLIFT IS

NOW 4 SEP.
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
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PART 26 begins:-

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