

PREM 19/3081

PART 28

TOP

SECRET

Confidential Filings

Situation in the Middle East

Conflict between Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi Arabia
et al.

UK policy towards the conflict.

MIDDLE EAST

Part 1: Aug 1979

Part 28: Sept 1990

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
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| 8.9.90, → 13.9.90 | | | | | | | |
| <div data-bbox="69 1330 367 1768" data-label="Text"> <p>PART 28 ENDS</p> </div> <div data-bbox="377 1702 1669 2154" data-label="Text"> <p>PREM 19/3081</p> </div> | | | | | | | |

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 860
OF 130500Z SEPTEMBER 90
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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO, PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK,
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

SIC19M

MY TELNO 844: SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO STATES AFFECTED BY EMBARGO AND
TO COSTS OF US FORCES

1. US AMBASSADOR HAS NOW OBTAINED FURTHER DETAILS FROM SAUDI
FINANCE MINISTER WHICH CONFIRM A GREATER DEGREE OF SAUDI
MUNIFICENCE TO CERTAIN FRONT LINE STATES THAN HAD BEEN ASSUMED
WHEN BAKER MADE HIS PITCH HERE FOR REGIONAL AID. ACCORDING TO
ABA AL KHAIL, SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN PAST FEW WEEKS TO EGYPT AND
SYRIA ALONE AMOUNTS TO 2.5 BILLION. THIS IS MADE UP THUS:

- EGYPT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT 1 BILLION
- PROJECT AID 500 MILLION
 - SYRIA BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT 500 MILLION
 - PROJECT AID 500 MILLION.

IN ADDITION THE SAUDIS ARE EVACUATING LARGE NUMBERS OF
EGYPTIAN REFUGEES BY AIR AND CLAIM TO HAVE PAID 150 MILLION TO
EGYPT FOR THEIR RESETTLEMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO FREEMAN THE SAUDIS HAVE NOW AGREED TO SUPPLY
TURKEY'S OIL REQUIREMENTS, NO LONGER AVAILABLE FROM IRAQ, TO THE
END OF 1990 FREE OF CHARGE. (THIS MUST BE THE 'GOOD DEAL' WHICH
SAUD MENTIONED TO YOU IN JEDDAH LAST WEEK.) APPARENTLY BAKER
ALSO OBTAINED ADDITIONAL PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT AND TO
TURKEY FROM THE UAE. THE OFFER TO TURKEY WAS INTENDED TO COVER
HALF THE MARKET COST OF SAUDI OIL BUT AS THIS IS NOW TO BE FREE,
THE UAE MAY WITHDRAW THE SUM. THE AMERICANS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT
EGYPT WAS TO RECEIVE SOME 300 MILLION FROM THE KUWAITIS, TO BE
PAID THROUGH LONDON. BUT FREEMAN COMMENTED THAT IN US EXPERIENCE
SO FAR (INCLUDING THE REQUEST FOR A KUWAITI CONTRIBUTION TO COST
OF US FORCES) GETTING MONEY OUT OF THE KUWAITIS WAS LIKE TRYING
TO EXTRACT IT FROM DUTCHMEN.

3. WE SHALL TRY TO CHECK OUT THIS AID BONANZA WITH OUR CONTACTS
AT THE FINANCE MINISTRY. MEANWHILE AMERICANS TELL US THEY ARE
BEGINNING TO GET BOGGED DOWN WITH DETAIL OF PROCEDURES OF SAUDI

FUNDING OF FUEL, WATER AND IN-COUNTRY TRANSPORT COSTS (BUT NO ACCOMMODATION AND CATERING) OF US FORCES HERE. I HOPE THE AMERICANS CAN BLAZE A PATH FOR OUR EVENTUAL DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. CURIOUSLY AMERICANS SAY THEY HAVE HITHERTO PAID FOR FUEL USED IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE AS IT APPEARS THAT THE RAF HAS NOT BEEN REQUIRED TO DO SO. IT LOOKS AS IF A COMPLEX ACCOUNTING ROAD MAY LIE AHEAD, FOR WHICH SPECIALIST MOD FINANCE STAFF WILL BE NEEDED HERE.

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LOOSE MINUTE

Personal for:

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ADVICE REGARDING DEPLOYMENT OF THE CHALLENGER TANK TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. The Prime Minister today asked for unequivocal assurance that an Armoured Brigade equipped with CHALLENGER tanks represented the most appropriate military contribution for deployment to the Gulf; and specifically that the CHALLENGER tank would perform creditably in terms of its battlefield availability and operational capability by comparison with both Iraqi and Allied tanks.

BATTLEFIELD AVAILABILITY

2. We acknowledge that the reliability record of the CHALLENGER tank is poor, and that this together with a shortage of spares has resulted in BAOR availability figures in the region of 10-20% over the past 2 years. Nevertheless it is our professional judgement that this can be fully offset provided comprehensive logistic support is made available, embracing both supply of spares and the necessary infrastructure. This required level of support can, and will, be provided by concentrating our logistic resources on the armoured brigade to be deployed, and by taking all necessary steps to resource further spares purchases. Inevitably this will require additional financial costs to be met, and impact adversely on the operational capability of BAOR. But on that basis we firmly believe that we can achieve and sustain our target of 80% battlefield availability in the desert conditions prevailing.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

3. Despite well known shortcomings in turret system ergonomics, the CHALLENGER tank will fully match the best of the Iraqi tanks (the Soviet T72/M1) in terms of overall operational capability. Specifically CHALLENGER has a better fire control system, equivalent firepower and protection, and a much superior ability to fight at night and through battlefield obscuration.

4. We are satisfied that our soldiers can responsibly be sent to war in these tanks.

THE RIGHT MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

5. If our ground forces are required to fight in the high intensity and difficult environment of desert warfare the right military answer is to send a balanced and properly supported

b

armoured formation. The armoured brigade group is the smallest such force that would be viable. It can be provided and sustained.



Project Manager
Chieftain/Challenger



Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
Operational Requirements (Land)



Chief of the General Staff



Chief of the Defence Staff

13 Sep 90

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STATEMENT BY VICKERS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ON

13TH SEPTEMBER 1990

If we receive a supply Contract for the improvements agreed between MOD and Vickers on Monday September 10th - and given close co-operation between the Army, the Procurement Executive and Vickers, full logistic support, and proper spares resourcing - Vickers as the Design Authority firmly believe that the improved MK3 Challenger 1 will prove effective in terms of operational capability and availability in desert conditions.

Arrangements are also being made for Vickers Personnel and representatives of key suppliers to be available as technical advisors to the British Army in theatre.

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FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 140800Z FCO
TELNO 2234
OF 140053Z SEPTEMBER 90
AND TO DESKBY 140500Z RIYADH
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA

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MY TELNO 2228: IRAQ/KUWAIT: LEGAL BASIS FOR FURTHER
MILITARY OPERATIONS.

SUMMARY

1. KIMMITT VERY CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE PUT DRAFT
TO KUWAITIS WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION. STATE ARE
NOT OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLE, NOR NECESSARILY TO THE
WORDING. BUT THEY NEED A SHORT TIME TO THINK. THEY HAVE
A POINT.

DETAIL

2. KIMMITT (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS JUST SPOKEN TO ME
STRONGLY AND WITH CONSIDERABLE CONCERN HAVING BEEN
BRIEFED ABOUT OUR APPROACHES RECORDED IN TUR.
3. HE SAID THAT SINCE AUGUST 2 THERE HAD BEEN UK/US
CONSULTATION OVER EVERY MAJOR STEP. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES
WERE VERY DISMAYED THAT WE HAD GONE AHEAD WITH THE
KUWAITIS ON OUR OWN. THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE WISHED TO
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT APPROACH IN ADDITION
TO THE TIMING AND CONTENT. HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT HE WAS
OPPOSED EITHER TO THE PURPOSE OF THE DEMARCHE OR NECESSARILY
TO THE WORDING, BUT THE AMERICANS NEEDED A LITTLE TIME TO
THINK THE MATTER THROUGH.
4. I EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS A PIECE OF CONTINGENCY
PLANNING WITH THE OBJECT OF ENSURING THAT WHEN WE GOT A
REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITIS (IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN) IT WOULD
BE IN THE RIGHT FORM TO JUSTIFY OUR ACTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT DID NOT FOLLOW THAT THE KUWAITIS
WOULD WRITE THE LETTER IMMEDIATELY AND THE DOCUMENT WAS A
DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION.
5. KIMMITT EXPECTED THE KUWAITIS TO BE VERY PASSIVE IN ALL
THIS AND FEARED THAT THEY MIGHT JUST SIGN THE LETTER AS

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PROPOSED. FURTHERMORE ANY PUBLICITY OR LEAK WOULD CREATE THE WRONG IMPRESSION AT THIS STAGE. HE WOULD GET ANY US COMMENTS TO US VERY QUICKLY. MEANWHILE HE GREATLY HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER ACTION.

COMMENT

6. KIMMITT HAS A POINT I THINK, AND FURTHER CONSULTATION WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE, GIVEN THEIR STRONG EARLIER RESERVATIONS (MY TELNO 2152). IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF HMA RIYADH COULD ENSURE THAT WHILE THE IDEAS ARE REGISTERED WITH THE KUWAITIS TO GET THEM THINKING ON THE RIGHT LINES, THEY DO NOT GO FURTHER AT THIS STAGE. PRESUMABLY ANY MAJOR AND VALID AMENDMENTS COULD BE FED IN TO THEM SUBSEQUENTLY.

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SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2232
OF 140001Z SEPTEMBER 90
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MY TELNO 2218: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRANIAN STATEMENT

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION SUGGEST THAT KHAMENEI'S REMARKS MAY BE BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF US IDEAS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION.

DETAIL

2. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED AGAIN TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) ABOUT KHAMENEI'S STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN POSITION APPEARED TO BE BASED ON QUOTE A MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE MEAN BY REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES AND ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE. REFERRING BACK TO SECRETARY BAKER'S TESTIMONY ON THE HILL LAST WEEK (MY TELNO 2145), HE SAID THAT THE US WISHED TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE PEACE AND PROSPERITY BUT ALSO FIT REGIONAL REALITIES. HE SAID THEY HAD NO PARTICULAR MODEL IN MIND, NOR WOULD SUCH ARRANGEMENTS DIMINISH US COMMITMENT TO UN ACTION OR THE ROLE OF THE UN. HE RECALLED THAT US TROOPS WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA AT SAUDI INVITATION QUOTE AND WE WILL LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA WHEN THAT MISSION IS ACCOMPLISHED OR WHENEVER WE MIGHT BE ASKED TO LEAVE BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SPOKESMAN DENIED THAT THIS WAS A RETREAT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO A LASTING US PRESENCE IN THE GULF TO DETER FUTURE AGGRESSION.

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN FURTHER TO STATE (NEA AND COUNTER-TERRORISM). THEY REMAIN OF THE VIEW THAT KHAMENEI'S STATEMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A DIRECT IRANIAN THREAT TO US FORCES IN THE GULF. THEY SEE IT MORE AS A SIGNAL THAT THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP, OR AT LEAST SOME WITHIN IT, ARE CONCERNED AT US INTENTIONS IN THE GULF OVER THE LONGER TERM. THEY ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE IRANIANS, VIA THE SWISS, IN A LOW KEY MANNER.

4. WHILE THEY DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FROM THE IRANIANS, STATE ARE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED THAT KHAMENEI'S WORDS COULD BE TAKEN BY PRO-IRANIAN GROUPS IN THE REGION AS THE GREEN LIGHT TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US FORCES.

5. WE ARE DUE TO TALK TO PLANNING STAFF IN STATE TOMORROW ABOUT THEIR WORK ON POSSIBLE REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES. WE WILL

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PURSUE THE IRANIAN ANGLE.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15J

13K September 1990

Dear Charles,

Pl. file
CRM 14/9

ADDITIONAL FORCES IN GULF

I attach the final version of the letter from Vickers Defence Systems Ltd following the Prime Minister's meeting yesterday.

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2231

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OUR TELNO 1993: IRAQ/KUWAIT: THE US DOMESTIC DIMENSION

SUMMARY

1. US PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRESENT POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS SOLIDIFIED AND IS NOW BASED ON A SOBER APPRECIATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LONG HAUL. CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA ALMOST UNIVERSALLY SUPPORTIVE.
2. CRITICISM OF JAPAN, GERMANY, AND SOMETIMES THE EUROPEANS IN GENERAL, CONCENTRATED ON CONGRESS AND NOT SO FAR REFLECTIVE OF WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ANGER. BUT THAT COULD CHANGE. ONLY EUROPEAN GROUND FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA LIKELY TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CALLS FOR MORE BURDEN-SHARING.
3. PUBLIC OPINION STEADY FOR THE TIME BEING.

DETAIL

4. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, AND ESPECIALLY SINCE THE LABOR DAY HOLIDAY AND THE RETURN OF CONGRESS, US PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS HAS SOLIDIFIED. ABOUT 80 PER CENT OF AMERICAN VOTERS NOW APPROVE OF THE US DEPLOYMENT IN THE GULF: AND THERE ARE SIGNS THAT BLACKS AND WOMEN - TWO GROUPS EARLIER IDENTIFIED AS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE COMMITMENT - ARE INCREASINGLY SUPPORTIVE, BY A SMALLISH MAJORITY IN EACH CASE.

5. THE EARLIER MOOD OF ANXIOUS RALLYING AROUND THE FLAG HAS GIVEN WAY TO A SOBER APPRECIATION OF THE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT: THE PROTECTION OF OIL SUPPLIES (CITED BY 50 PER CENT OF THOSE ASKED IN ONE RECENT POLL WHY THEY THOUGHT US TROOPS WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA): THE RESTORATION OF KUWAITI SOVEREIGNTY (39 PER CENT): THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY RESTORATION OF THE EMIRS: AND THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN (9 PER CENT). THERE IS A WIDESPREAD SENSE THAT, UNLIKE WITH OTHER RECENT OVERSEAS MILITARY ADVENTURES, THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF AMERICA AND THE WEST ARE DIRECTLY ENGAGED ON THIS OCCASION: AND THAT, AS THE REMAINING SUPERPOWER, THE UNITED STATES HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO SAFEGUARD THEM.

6. THE OTHER MAJOR FACTOR IN THE STEADYING OF OPINION HERE IS THAT AMERICANS NOW BELIEVE THAT - BARRING UNPREDICTABLE FOLLY ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PART - THEY ARE IN FOR THE LONG HAUL. FEARS OF IMMINENT WAR, AND HISTORICAL PARALLELS WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, AUGUST 1914, HAVE PROVED TO BE UNFOUNDED: NEARLY 40 PER CENT OF VOTERS POLLED LAST WEEK THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT MILITARY STAND-OFF MIGHT LAST 12 OR MORE MONTHS. AND THE PUNDITS HAVE BEEN CORRESPONDINGLY QUICK TO REPLACE EARLIER WARNINGS ABOUT THE TRADITIONAL IMPATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WITH EVIDENCE OF THEIR PATIENCE - IN ENDURING 14 YEARS OF GROWING CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM, AND IN SUSTAINING LARGE FORCES IN EUROPE AND KOREA FOR DECADES.

7. THE ADMINISTRATION'S TASK IN GENERATING AND MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR CURRENT POLICY HAS BEEN HELPED BY AN UNUSUALLY UNCRITICAL PRESS, WHICH SEEMS LARGELY TO HAVE SUSPENDED ITS LONGSTANDING DISBELIEF ABOUT BUSH'S PRESIDENTIAL QUALITIES, AND BY A CONGRESS LEFT SCRAMBLING TO PROCLAIM ITS SUPPORT IN THE WHITE HOUSE'S WAKE. THERE HAVE BEEN CRITICISMS, OF COURSE, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN MINOR, AND FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PRESENT CONDUCT OF POLICY. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION HAS HARDLY BEEN MENTIONED ON CAPITOL HILL, ALTHOUGH JUST RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN TALK - WITH WHITE HOUSE CONNIVANCE - OF A JOINT RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE DEPLOYMENT.

8. THE ONE SERIOUSLY DISCORDANT NOTE IN THIS OTHERWISE HARMONIOUS PICTURE HAS BEEN THE RELISH WITH WHICH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF BOTH PARTIES, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE FACING CLOSE

RACES ON 6 NOVEMBER, HAVE CRITICISED THE JAPANESE AND GERMANS, AND SOMETIMES THE EUROPEANS IN GENERAL, FOR NOT DOING ENOUGH TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES IN THE GULF. BURDEN-SHARING IS MENTIONED, WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ANGER, BY ALMOST EVERYONE ON CAPITOL HILL AS THEIR MAIN CURRENT CONCERN ABOUT THE CRISIS. BUT, SO FAR AT LEAST, THE STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE SEEM TO BE CONCENTRATED, AND PERHAPS MANUFACTURED, ON CAPITOL HILL, AND THERE IS NO REAL EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ANGER TOWARDS JAPAN, GERMANY OR THE EUROPEANS IN GENERAL. THAT COULD, HOWEVER, CHANGE AS THE ELECTIONS APPROACH, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RETURN NEXT MONTH TO THEIR DISTRICTS.

9. THE BEST ALLY OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP IN RESISTING SOME OF THE WILDER GESTURES - FOR EXAMPLE, TO FORCE JAPAN TO MEET THE FULL COST OF US FORCES DEPLOYED THERE - IS THE IMMINENT END OF THE SESSION: BUT THEY WILL BE HELPED BY WHATEVER MORE THE JAPANESE AND GERMANS ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE, IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND, MORE IMPORTANT, PRACTICAL HELP ON THE GROUND.

10. BRITAIN HAS SO FAR BEEN LARGELY EXEMPT FROM ALL BUT GENERALISED CRITICISM OF THIS KIND, AND HMG'S AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUPPORT HAS OFTEN BE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL PRAISE. NEVERTHELESS, ONLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF EUROPEAN GROUND FORCES ALONGSIDE US TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON A GROWING MOOD IN CONGRESS THAT ALL THE ALLIES SHOULD BE DOING MORE.

11. ONE MINOR DIVERSION HAS BEEN THE SPLIT IN CONSERVATIVE RANKS BETWEEN THE HAWKS (WHO FAVOUR AN EARLY STRIKE AGAINST IRAQ) AND THE ISOLATIONISTS (WHO DO NOT BELIEVE HIGHER OIL PRICES AND SAVING THE KUWAITI EMIRATE JUSTIFY INTERVENTION). BUT, DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE PRESS, THE DEBATE REMAINS CONFINED TO A HANDFUL OF LEADING RIGHT-WING COMMENTATORS, AND CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO THE DEPLOYMENT HAS FOUND NO REAL ECHO IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, ON THE LEFT OR IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE (CERTAIN POCKETS OF ISOLATIONISM APART).

12. FOR THE ADMINISTRATION THEREFORE, THE MESSAGE FROM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS SO FAR, SO GOOD. MOST COMMENTATORS HERE BELIEVE THAT - WILD CARDS SUCH AS IRAQI ACTION AGAINST HOSTAGES APART - THE COMBINATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL CAUTION, THE LOGISTICAL REALITIES IN ARABIA AND THE TIME

NEEDED FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK MEANS THAT THE PRESENT COURSE - AND LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT - ARE LIKELY TO BE MAINTAINED AT LEAST UNTIL THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS ON 6 NOVEMBER, AND PROBABLY UNTIL THE TURN OF THE YEAR. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, AND BEYOND THE PRESENT POLICY OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND PRUDENT MILITARY PRECAUTIONS, PREDICTION MUST BE UNCERTAIN. EVEN IF MANY AMERICANS SUSPECT THAT WAR COULD EVENTUALLY BECOME UNAVOIDABLE, FEW ARE YET RECONCILED TO WHAT THEY NOW HOPE IS A RELATIVELY FAR-OFF PROSPECT. US PUBLIC OPINION WILL DOUBTLESS EVOLVE UNDER THE PRESSURE OF EVENTS. BUT IF, FOR WHATEVER REASON THE PRESIDENT DECIDED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THAT HE HAD NO REAL OPTION BUT TO TAKE THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ, THE US PUBLIC WOULD WANT TO RALLY ROUND HIM. BUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY WOULD FEEL ABLE TO DO SO WOULD DEPEND CRUCIALLY ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE NEW FACTORS WHICH HAD COME INTO PLAY.

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SIC

BAKER'S CALL ON GORBACHEV, 13 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. BROADLY POSITIVE SOVIET REACTION TO THE IDEA OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO EMBARGO AIR ROUTES TO IRAQ; BUT MORE CAUTIOUS RESPONSE ON APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS TO VIOLATORS OF THE EXISTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

2. BAKER REHEARSES LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON US GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

DETAIL

3. AT THE END OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT, JAMES BAKER SPENT 2 HOURS WITH GORBACHEV. THE FIRST HOUR WAS A MASS MEETING INCLUDING SECRETARY MOSBACHER AND BUSINESSMEN. THE SECOND HOUR WAS A RESTRICTED SESSION WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE. DENIS ROSS (STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS SENT US A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE LATTER CONVERSATION VIA THE US EMBASSY. IT COVERED THE FOLLOWING GE SUBJECTS (BAR A LIGHT TOUCH OF ARMS CONTROL, IN WHICH BAKER SAID THAT RAPID POLITICAL DECISIONS WOULD BE NEEDED IF CFE AND START AGREEMENTS WERE TO BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE DESIRED PERIOD).

THE GULF

4. BAKER SOUGHT SOVIET REACTIONS TO 2 NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:

A) TO TIGHTEN EXISTING SANCTIONS BY PLACING AN EMBARGO ON AIR TRAFFIC, THUS BLOCKING LOOPHOLES FROM COUNTRIES SUCH AS LIBYA.

B) TO PUNISH COUNTRIES BREAKING SANCTIONS, BY APPLYING SANCTIONS TO THEM.

5. THE AMERICANS REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE, AND ESPECIALLY SHEVARDNADZE, HAD REACTED IN GENERALLY POSITIVE TERMS ON THE AIR EMBARGO RESOLUTION. THEY HAD BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS ON THE SECOND PROPOSAL, TAKING THE LINE THAT THE FIRST RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT BEFORE IT MADE SENSE TO START THINKING OF THE SECOND.

6. BAKER HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT USE THEIR HUGE CAPACITY IN AIR AND SEA TRANSPORT TO HELP TO TRANSPORT FORCES INTO THE ZONE EG FROM SYRIA, AND REFUGEES OUT OF IT. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOT APPEARED AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS IDEA.

7. GORBACHEV HAD COMMENTED THAT THE HELSINI SUMMIT HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE BUILDING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER. HE HAD AGREED VERY STRONGLY WITH BAKER'S COMMENT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS A THREAT TO THIS NEW ORDER.

SOVIET ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM

8. GORBACHEV HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT SOME OF THE INITIAL EUPHORIA IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS WAS DISSIPATING, AND THAT REPUBLICAN LEADERS WERE BEGINNING TO REFLECT MORE SOBERLY ON THEIR OPTIONS. HE HAD SAID CLEARLY THAT HE HAD NOW OPTED FOR A RADICAL ECONOMIC PROGRAMME (ESSENTIALLY THE QUOTE SHATALIN UNQUOTE PLAN) BUT THAT HE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL STRUGGLE WHICH WAS UNDER WAY. FOR POLITICAL REASONS IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GIVE THE REPUBLICS AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PLAN.

US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

9. GORBACHEV HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE AMERICAN LOANS AND NEAR-TERM ECONOMIC HELP. IN REPLY, BAKER HAD SPOKEN WITH SYMPATHY, BUT HAD SPELLED OUT THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE US GOVERNMENT. THESE INCLUDED NOT ONLY JACKSON/VANICK, BUT ALSO THE STEVENSON AND BYRD AMENDMENTS, AND THE JOHNSON DEBT ACT (RELATING TO THE DEBTS OF THE KERENSKY GOVERNMENT). THE JACKSON/VANICK WAIVER WHICH WOULD UNBLOCK THESE CONSTRAINTS DEPENDED ON PASSAGE OF THE NEW SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW. GORBACHEV HAD REPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED THE LAW TO BE ADOPTED SOON. HE HAD NOT BEEN MORE PRECISE.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
 EMERGENCY UNIT
 RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



Statement by Vickers following meeting with
the Prime Minister on Thursday 13 Sept '90

Challenger 1 is not a Vickers design tank

If we receive a supply contract for the
improvements agreed between the MOD and Vickers
on 10 Sept '90 and given:

- Close cooperation between the Army, the
Procurement Executive and Vickers
- Full logistic support
- Proper spares resourcing

then we as the Design Authority firmly
believe that the improved Mk 3 Challenger 1
main battle tank will prove effective in
terms of operational capability and availability
in desert conditions

Arrangements are being made for
Vickers personnel and representatives of key
suppliers to be available as technical
advisors to the British Army in theatre.

Gerald Boxall

13 Sept '90

HO(A-C)

PRIME MINISTER

OD MEETING: THE GULF

You have an OD meeting tomorrow to discuss three aspects of the Gulf crisis:

- additional British forces for the Gulf
- burden-sharing
- effect of sanctions on British companies

You will find papers on all three in the folder, together with a full Cabinet Office brief.

Additional British Forces

You are very familiar with this. You do not need to read the paper, which is virtually identical to the Defence Secretary's earlier minute.

You have concluded that sending an armoured brigade is the inevitable option and will want to steer the Committee towards that conclusion. But you will also want to emphasise that you have cross-examined defence chiefs and Vickers very thoroughly about problems with Challenger and in particular its poor reliability. There are undoubted risks in sending it. But CDS and the Army chiefs have assured you that, with proper spares' support, they hope to achieve 80 per cent availability. There is an agreed record of the meeting (in folder) and they have let you have their formal written and signed advice. This should be available early tomorrow and can be circulated to the meeting.

Assuming there is agreement, there are three subsidiary questions:

- (a) command and control. We shall need to work out very precise arrangements with the Americans and Saudis, which must be agreed by the time the armoured brigade becomes operational.

B

- (b) burden-sharing. We should seek offset for local costs on the same basis as the Americans. We might also ask the Germans (and/or Japanese and Kuwaitis) to help with the cost of shipping.
- (c) announcement. You are to speak to the President at 1230. The Saudis have been alerted, and you may need to send a rapid message to King Fahd. The Defence Secretary should give a press conference in the early afternoon. I don't think you need send messages to Kohl and Mitterrand.

Burden-Sharing

You read the paper yesterday, and it has today been agreed by all departments at Ministerial level. There is no need for detailed discussion. In essence we support the US case for military burden-sharing, but will not be seeking anything on a similar scale (except for local offsets). We also agree on a major aid effort for Egypt, Turkey and Jordan in the form of a Mutual Support Fund (but we should not forget the case for trade concessions).

The complication is the EC. The Commission have proposed a total of £2b. aid through to end-1991, split 50/50 between the EC budget and national contributions. That would cost us £90 million. The matter will come up at the Foreign Affairs Council on Monday, and the FCO want discretion to agree up to \$150 million (£80 million) for total UK bilateral and EC budget contribution. This seems pretty high - and more than the US were asking (\$100m.). It would be unfair for us to pay that much when our military contribution is so much greater than the others. You might hold them down to \$100 million.

This calendar year

Effects of sanctions on British Companies

The burden of the Trade and Industry Secretary's paper is that only a handful of British companies will be seriously affected. Most probably have ECGD cover. It would not be right to pay compensation to 'foolish virgins' who didn't insure. But the DTI will give maximum help to companies who have lost business with

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- 3 -

finding other markets and will use their schemes of assistance to exporters.

C.P.P.

Charles Powell

13 September 1990

c: OD (MJ)

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(2)



10 DOWNING STREET

(AHSS (90) 28)

12.9.90

Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]

You will want

to see this note

by the Trade &

Industry Secretary on

the effects on

British companies

of loss of business
in Iraq & Kuwait.

CA/13/9

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MEETING REVIEW
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

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From the Private Secretary

13 September 1990

Prime Minister

This is my record
of this afternoon's discussion

CDP 13/9.

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

The Prime Minister had a discussion this afternoon with the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of the General Staff about the advisability of sending an Armoured Brigade equipped with Challenger I tanks to join the multi-national force in the Gulf. The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff for Operational Requirements (Land Systems), Major General Blacker, the Project Manager, Chieftain and Challenger Tanks, Mr. S.R. Jackson and the Chairman and Chief Executive of Vickers Defence Systems Ltd., Mr. G. Boxall were also present.

The Prime Minister said that the Challenger I tank did not enjoy a good reputation. On a recent day, chosen at random, their availability in BAOR had been only 17 per cent. There were problems with the gun turret and the fire control system. There had also been difficulties with the engine during desert trials in Saudi Arabia some years ago. The Defence Secretary's minute reported that various modifications would be necessary before the tank could be successfully deployed in the Gulf. It had also been suggested that the Armoured Brigade had scarcely been able to exercise as a formation because of training constraints in Germany. Ministers had to make a difficult judgment against this background whether it was reasonable to send an Armoured Brigade to join the multi-national force. Put in the simplest terms, she did not want our equipment to let our armed forces down. Nor'did she want to put our young soldiers in a vulnerable position when that could be avoided. We also had to think more widely of the reputation of our forces and of our industry if the Challenger tank were to fail. She therefore wanted to be reassured about certain aspects of its performance, and above all that it could achieve much higher levels of reliability and availability.

The Chief of the General Staff said that the question was: could we send our forces to war in the Challenger tank? His answer was that we could. The tanks which would be sent to Saudi Arabia would be the latest versions. Given proper support, they could deliver and sustain a high degree of battlefield reliability. Our troops would be better protected than would the US marines with their M60 tanks. And the Challenger would match other Allied tanks in terms of performance against the Soviet/Iraqi T72s. They had the additional advantage of being

SECRET AND PERSONAL

able to operate at night, which the Iraqis were unable to do.

Major General Blacker said that the Challenger I was not what the army would wish. But availability ratios exaggerated the scale of the problem with it. The average figure for immediate availability in July in BAOR had been 22 per cent. But for availability within 24 hours, the figure rose to 43 per cent. Many of the faults which affected the availability figures were minor and related to what was necessary to comply with German road traffic regulations rather than for going into battle. The intention would be to send only the most recent versions to Saudi Arabia. The crucial factor would be adequate spares support. It would be essential to have Challenger properly supported by a full range of spares and proper logistic back-up. In Germany, the army was trying to support seven Challenger regiments with spares sufficient for only four regiments. In the Gulf, an attempt would be made to reverse that ratio. He was confident that Challenger could be kept running in battle provided there were sufficient spares. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, General Blacker agreed that the availability of the Abrams M1A and of the German Leopard was much higher. The Challenger was fundamentally unreliable. But that was a problem which could be circumvented if it was adequately supported. The Defence Secretary added that the soldiers who would man the tanks had confidence that it would perform, provided it had proper spares support. The Prime Minister commented that the problem of shortage of spares did not reflect well on the management of the MOD or of the Army, especially when one recalled the vast sums of money wasted on projects like AWACs and the EH101.

The Prime Minister reverted to the problems with Challenger's fire control system. The Chief of the General Staff said that the turret was ergonomically a mess. Challenger could not match the speed of fire of the Abrams or the Leopard and was a second or two slower in engaging its target. This was why it had been withdrawn from the NATO Firing Competition. The Defence Secretary said that, even so, it ranked above the T72 in this respect. General Blacker added that the Challenger would have the best night-firing capability of any tank in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister asked about Challenger's ability to operate in the desert. Mr. Boxall said that the earlier trials in Saudi Arabia had been encouraging in most respects. For example, the tank tracks had lasted for over 3,000 kilometres, while the Abrams had lost tracks. Challenger had demonstrated its ability to engage targets at night, whereas the Americans have declined even to try night-firing. The Prime Minister asked about engine problems. Mr. Jackson said that a great deal of work had subsequently been done to overcome three major faults in the engine system. There would still be problems with engine breathing in desert conditions, and new filters and seals would be required to cope with this. The Prime Minister enquired when these would be ready. Mr. Boxall said that it would take about two weeks, but the parts could be fitted while the tanks were in transit. Alternative sources of reply were being established, and the key companies for providing back-up had agreed to send representatives to the Gulf. The Prime Minister said that it would be vital to galvanize suppliers to provide maximum support.

We had to equal the levels of performance at the time of the Falklands conflict.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was the case that the Armoured Brigade had scarcely exercised as a formation. General Blacker acknowledged that there had indeed been a diminution in the level of major exercises in Germany.



The Prime Minister said that she kept coming back to the question of reliability which was crucial. What level of availability on the front line in Saudi Arabia could the MOD guarantee? The Chief of General Staff said that the target would be 80 per cent. The Prime Minister asked whether that would in practice be achieved. The Chief of the General Staff said that, with adequate back-up, the army expected and planned to achieve the 80 per cent target. The Prime Minister commented that it would be prudent to send a number of spare tanks in addition to the two regiments envisaged. It was very important that all necessary equipment should be provided, including helicopters if these were found necessary.

The Prime Minister concluded that she would like to receive the formal recommendations and advice of those attending the meeting in written form and signed, so that she could make it available to members of OD at their meeting the following day.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PRM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3081</u> (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: <p style="text-align: center;"><i>MacRae to Powell 13/9/90 and attachment</i></p> |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION | |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 |  8/12/16 |
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
CABINET OFFICE

MEETINGS ON THE GULF

You discussed with the Prime Minister your minute of 12 September to Mr Powell. She was content that the wider Cabinet Office Group should meet less often than daily if events permit it; and that you or Mr Appleyard should chair the Group if a senior minister is not available, particularly on those days when OD(G) is also meeting.

ANDREW TURNBULL
13 September 1990

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1990

Thank you very much for your kind letter received this morning. What a coincidence that I chose yesterday to telephone you! The Prime Minister was immensely grateful for your helpful advice which she greatly appreciated. It was particularly valuable in helping her to frame questions for the experts today. The decision will be announced tomorrow, but I have little doubt about which way it will go.



CHARLES POWELL



General Sir Martin Farndale KCB

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| Extract details: <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Crack to Powell 13/9/90</i> <i>Kuwaiti Terrorist Threat</i></p> |  |
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| Extract details: <i>Crack to Powell 13/9/90</i> <i>Iraq Military Spares</i> |  |
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36
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

LPA September 1990

CM 14/9.

Dear Charles,

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

As requested in your record of the Prime Minister's meeting this afternoon, I attach the advice the Defence Secretary has received from the Senior Officers and Official present, with which he agrees. The substance of a separate draft letter from Vickers Defence Systems Limited is enclosed which would back up the statements about logistic support; the Company's final version will be delivered as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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Gulf

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1990

GULF CRISIS

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Bush, with further briefing of his meeting in Helsinki with President Gorbachev. I should be grateful if it could be given very limited distribution.

The Prime Minister is intending to speak to the President tomorrow following the meeting of OD.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Charles Powell

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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c. For/webb

10 DOWNING STREET . . .

LONDON SW1A 2AA

bc PC

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1990

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

I enclose a record of this afternoon's discussion which should be treated as a draft. I should be grateful if you would show it to those present at the meeting who are at liberty to suggest any amendments which they think would improve its accuracy so far as their individual contributions to the discussion are concerned. It would be helpful to have this tonight or first thing tomorrow morning.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1990

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

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We had to equal the levels of performance at the time of the Falklands conflict.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was the case that the Armoured Brigade had scarcely exercised as a formation. General Blacker acknowledged that there had indeed been a diminution in the level of major exercises in Germany.

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The Prime Minister concluded that she would like to receive the formal recommendations and advice of those attending the meeting in written form and signed, so that she could make it available to members of OD at their meeting the following day.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

cc Backup
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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robin Butler

OD Meeting: Friday 14 September

Item 1: Options for UK Ground Deployments to Saudi Arabia

Purpose of Meeting

The objective, as you know, is to agree on the type and mix of ground force reinforcement to Saudi Arabia in addition to the substantial British naval and air forces already allocated. OD(G) had a preliminary discussion on 11 September. No decision was taken on ground forces, but it was agreed that we should send an additional 8 Tornado GR1s, 4 Tornado GR1As and 6 Tornado F3s. You had a meeting this afternoon with MoD experts to consider Challenger reliability.

Handling

2. It would be helpful if you were to begin by reminding those less familiar with the Gulf issues of the background to our initial deployment of air and naval forces. You might then outline the case for deployments of ground forces in support of the major US contribution and in response to US and Saudi requests. You might make clear that this is one of those decisive moments where Britain's international reputation and dependability as an ally are engaged. Ministers are being presented with a difficult decision which has to be faced.

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3. You might then invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his memorandum and to explain the reasons behind his recommendations. It would be helpful if he could:

- summarise the advantages and disadvantages of the two principal options;
- remind colleagues of the implications of deploying ground forces (the likelihood of serious casualties);
- outline command and control arrangements;
- brief on the timing of deployment.

4. You might then invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to give the Chiefs of Staff professional view of the proposed deployment. He should confirm his full confidence in the operational capability of both options. In particular, he should confirm he is happy that Challenger is sufficiently reliable to operate at full capability and in those circumstances for British troops to be sent out as proposed.

5. You might then invite Mr Waldegrave to summarise the foreign policy implications and contacts on the subject with the US and Saudi Arabian Governments. (The Saudis are being consulted on a contingency basis so that an announcement can make clear that we are responding to a Saudi request.)

6. You might then ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to remind colleagues of the economic costs of failing to stand up to Saddam, and the Energy Secretary to deal with oil supply implications.

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7. The key issue will be Challenger reliability which you will have fully explored this afternoon. If there are remaining doubts, you will no doubt wish to explore them fully. You may want to check on the operational reliability and capabilities of the artillery brigade option.

8. You might then turn the discussion to the relative operational contribution of the two options to existing forces on the ground. It seems clear that the Americans would greatly prefer an armoured brigade. The Private Secretary letter from the Defence Secretary of 12 September describes Air Vice Marshal Wilson's discussion with General Schwarzkopf in Riyadh. It would be useful to be clear about the proposed command and control arrangements and the extent to which, under each option, we would have to rely on US and other forces in battle. You will want to be sure that there is no risk of being let down by others at a critical moment in the battle. The additional deployments would put us well above the French in terms of total commitment, and the arrangements should reflect this.

9. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff should also confirm that, since we face a long haul, the long term operational capability of an armoured brigade can be guaranteed. They should also be given an assurance that the departure of the armoured brigade from our forces in West Germany will not create an unacceptable gap in NATO.

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10. Finally, you may wish to discuss public handling. If the Saudis have now confirmed that they are happy with reinforced deployments, the Defence Secretary is planning to hold a press conference. You will also wish to inform the US and Saudi Governments of the detailed decision as quickly as possible, perhaps by personal messages to President Bush and King Fahd. You might also consider sending a similar message to President Mitterrand. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should consider how best to maximise the impact of this deployment in order to extract additional deployments from other countries and to strengthen our position on burdensharing. The Defence Secretary has in mind to request the West German Government to help finance the transport to the Gulf.

Item 2: The Gulf Crisis - Burdensharing

11. The objective of the discussion is to secure approval of the essential elements of the Government's policy on burdensharing at the present stage of the exercise. The paper comprises three parts. First, an overview paper by the Cabinet Office bringing together the analysis and conclusions from the more detailed papers below. The second paper, Annex A, looks in detail at the scale of military and other contributions which countries are making in the Gulf and considers how the costs of these contributions might be shared. The third paper, Annex B, tackles in detail how we should handle providing economic assistance to countries directly affected by the crisis.

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12. The papers were taken and approved in the Ad Hoc Group meeting today, which was chaired by the Defence Secretary and at which the Chief Secretary, the Trade and Industry Secretary and Mr Waldegrave were present. There is also a separate paper by the Trade and Industry Secretary on the Industrial Effects of the Gulf Crisis. You may want to leave that to the end of the discussion.

US Government approach

13. You know from your meeting with Mr Brady that we were the first government to be approached by the Americans for this exercise, in recognition of our generous military contribution and the political support which we will give to the initiative. Senator Brady told Ministers on 5 September that the US military operations in the Gulf would cost US \$6bn. to the end of 1990, over and above calculated running costs. He calculated that compensation for the three countries most directly affected (Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) would cost \$3.5bn. to the end of 1990 and a further \$7bn. in 1991. He indicated that the US had looked for a short term contribution from the UK of \$100m. to assist these countries, including the UK share of any EC effort but, not surprisingly, was not looking for any contribution from us to military forces over and above what we were ourselves already doing. Since then we have been pressing the US Administration to give us more detail on the financial calculations underlying their approach. So far they have not been able to do so. The figures which they have quoted seem to us, and to the French, to be on the high side. An immediate objective is to obtain a clearer picture from the US Government.

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Handling

14. The policy recommendations are contained in paragraph 16 of the main paper. You may like to invite the Secretary of the Cabinet to introduce the paper briefly. You might then ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Trade and Industry Secretary, Mr Waldegrave and the Energy Secretary for their comments.

15. In discussion, you may like to explore the main conclusions from the burdensharing paper. On the military effort, the paper argues that the US effort should be strongly supported on the basis that the US has contributed more than its fair share militarily. Our own effort has been second only to the US. We should refrain from blatant attempts to benefit from a compensation scheme for military costs, though we should not rule out receiving some assistance from e.g. Kuwait, Japan or Germany where this can be agreed mutually. More importantly, we should press for the maximum level of local offsets, if possible on the same terms as the US and certainly on at least equal terms with the French. The paper suggests that we should be prepared to lobby in support of the US effort in the major capitals.

16. On the assistance side of the exercise, the paper argues that we should also strongly support US efforts to secure fair burdensharing. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey qualify as front line states for such assistance, provided in Jordan's case that it makes a better effort to observe the UN embargo. We should focus international effort on providing rapid short term assistance to these countries. Countries outside the area which have been damaged by the crisis should be dealt with by a combination of bilateral

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help, debt relief and IMF programmes. The paper proposes that a Mutual Support Fund should be set up to handle the exercise with administrative and analytical support from the IMF and other international financial institutions. G7 and G10 countries should co-operate to provide impetus and strategic guidance.

17. On the EC side, Mr Waldegrave can bring Ministers up-to-date with preparations for the Foreign Affairs Council on Monday. The EC Commission has proposed an EC aid contribution through 1991 of 1650 MECU (£2 bn.), as part of a global total of \$9 bn. The 1650 MECU would be divided 50/50 between EC budget and national contributions, giving a UK share of about £90m. This does not remotely reflect our military effort, and lets off the Germans and other richer Europeans far too lightly. The Foreign Secretary will come under pressure to agree. The FCO currently propose that he should have discretion to name a total sum (of the order of \$150m.) for the total UK bilateral and EC budget contribution. This is higher than the US proposal. You may wish to probe Mr Waldegrave and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on whether this is necessary.

No

Industrial effects of the Gulf crisis

18. You may like to invite the Trade and Industry Secretary to introduce his paper. The main conclusions are that only a handful of companies are likely to go out of business as a result of lost orders to Iraq and Kuwait. Some companies will have cash flow problems, and others will have difficulty sustaining their staff trapped in Iraq. The overall effect on unemployment is likely to peak at 10,000 lost jobs after a year. No reliable figures are yet

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available on likely ECGD losses. Apart from normal ECGD insurance payments, no compensation would be paid to companies. The DTI will help companies to adjust their business to take up opportunities elsewhere within the Middle East. Regional offices and overseas posts will be asked to give priority to this task. DTI are also exploring other ways of using their existing schemes of assistance to exporters.

19. You may wish to confirm that Ministers are content with this broad approach. You may also want to explore the question of whether losses suffered by British companies can be offset against the contribution which we might make to the burdensharing exercise. There is a logical case for so doing. But there is a danger that the French and Germans would use this to argue that they should be let off much bigger contributions because their trading losses would be higher. Mr Waldegrave may wish to comment on this.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
13 September 1990

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PRIME MINISTER

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

General Farndale rang me back again this morning to say that he had reflected overnight on his advice and believed it was right. He suggested there were three crucial questions which those concerned should answer:

- have the problems with the fire control system been rectified?
- has the propellant pressure problem with the gun been resolved?
- has the performance of the engine in desert conditions been put right? (It was apparently problems with the engine in desert conditions which led to Challenger's failure to pass its trials in Saudi Arabia some years ago.)

CDN

CHARLES POWELL

13 September 1990

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON


September 13, 1990

② 011317.

Dear Prime Minister:

The President has asked that I pass to you the attached message concerning the Helsinki Summit. No original letter will follow.



Sincerely,


Henry E. Catto
Ambassador

Attachment:
SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London

A The National Archives

| | |
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TO : *Mr Powell*

DATE : *13-9-90*

NUMBER OF PAGES FOLLOWING : *2*

PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS : YES / NO

COPY ALSO SENT BY POST : YES / NO



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Dorset House

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London SE1 9PS

071-865 4350 (GTN 3913)

Fax Number 071-928 7835

FROM: DAVID LAYTON

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1990

PAYMASTER GENERAL

DETENTION OF GOODS DESTINED FOR IRAQ AT LONDON HEATHROW AIRPORT :
13 SEPTEMBER 1990

1. The hand luggage of an Iraqi national, Mr Kais Yousif Zako, was intercepted this morning when he was checking in for the 10.15 hours Royal Jordanian Airlines flight to Amman. It was found to contain two binders and some loose papers consisting of technical diagrams for wiring and plumbing systems in a construction project.
2. Mr Zako co-operated with Customs staff and informed them that he had intended taking the documents to Iraq. The project involved was the Al Sijood Project, a palace being built for Saddam Hussain. Mr Zako claimed to be taking the documents to Iraq on behalf of Thorn Security Ltd who were reluctant to use a UK national.

cc Mr A Allan
Mr Mountfield
Ms Rutter

Internal

CPS
Mrs Strachan
Mr Jefferson Smith
- Mr Russell (O/R)
Mr Craggs
Mr Twedde
Mr Bugge (Collector LAP)
Mr Walton
Mr Fisher.

3. Mr Zako's baggage was found on examination by Customs to contain nothing in contravention of the Iraq and Kuwait sanctions. Customs action was restricted to detention of the technical documents. Mr Zako was permitted to join the flight which left Heathrow at approximately 10.45 hours.

4. At no time did Mr Zako complain about his treatment nor at the detention of the documents. Customs investigators are considering what further action to take concerning Thorn Security Ltd.



DAVID LAYTON

Enquiries should be directed to the Press Office of Customs and Excise.

Line To Take

This was a routine detention of technical documents that are subject to the embargo against Iraq. Customs and Excise are making further enquiries in the normal way.

Note It is not thought the press know of this seizure.

31

Ref. A090/2130

MR POWELL

c Mr Appleyard

Advice to British Citizens in Kuwait

I should like to offer one comment on the paper circulated to OD(G).

2. I have some unease about the Government's positively advising British citizens in Kuwait that they should remain where they are but should not resist arrest (paragraph 15 d). My worry is that, if the Government positively advises UK nationals to remain where they are in Kuwait and some of them subsequently get killed, the Government would be blamed retrospectively for this advice and perhaps even actions would be brought against it. My preference therefore would be to take the actions at 15 a, b, c and e - ie take action to keep them informed and help them but leave the final decision to them without offering positive advice to stay where they are.

3. I have discussed this point with Mr Appleyard but other Departments involved in preparing the paper thought that the Government should give advice in the form of paragraph 15 d and it has therefore been left in for Ministerial consideration tomorrow.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

13 September 1990

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PRIME MINISTER

GULF CRISIS: MINISTERIAL MEETING

You have your usual meeting of Ministers on the Gulf crisis tomorrow morning, before OD.

In addition to the normal review of developments, on which I will do you a note in the morning, there are three specific items of business which need to be discussed.

Additional British Forces for the Gulf

This is covered in briefing in the OD folder. You will want to make sure that your colleagues in the smaller group are prepared to go along with sending an armoured brigade, before you go to OD. The Attorney will be hard to convince. You will need to deploy the written advice which you will receive from those who attended this afternoon's meeting.

Advice to British Citizens in Kuwait

You will want to read the attached Cabinet Office note. It concludes that clandestine assistance is not practical and that contacts with the Kuwait Resistance could endanger the lives of British citizens. The prospects of negotiating a safe passage out of Iraq and Kuwait through someone like Prince Sadruddin are not good, but should be tried. Meanwhile the best we can do is keep our people briefed on developments over the BBC World Service, and advise them to remain where they are but not to resist arrest (although the final choice must rest with them).

Assistance for the families of hostages in Iraq and Kuwait

Again there is a Cabinet Office note. The arrangements for handling hostage families are going quite well, but there are three recommendations for further action:

- a. to establish a Ministerial Sub-group with particular responsibilities for the families of hostages;

b

- b. to set up a Gulf Families Support Centre, to be co-located with the FCO Emergency Unit, to provide families with information (on a freephone) and help dependants cope with problems on social security, etc.
- c. put out an information pamphlet to all dependants of hostages.

These seem sensible recommendations.

C. D. P

C. D. POWELL

13 September 1990

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MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOODSTUFFS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION AGREED BY THE FIVE
PERMANENT MEMBERS ON 13 SEPTEMBER.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

A. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 661 (1990), PARAGRAPHS 3(C) AND 4 OF
WHICH APPLY, EXCEPT IN HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES, TO FOODSTUFFS:

B. RECOGNISING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ARISE IN WHICH IT WILL BE
NECESSARY FOR FOODSTUFFS TO BE SUPPLIED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT IN ORDER TO RELIEVE HUMAN SUFFERING:

C. NOTING THAT IN THIS RESPECT THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THAT RESOLUTION HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM
SEVERAL MEMBER STATES:

D. EMPHASISING THAT IT IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALONE OR ACTING
THROUGH THE COMMITTEE, TO DETERMINE WHETHER HUMANITARIAN
CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ARISEN:

E. DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT IRAQ HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 (1990) IN RESPECT
OF THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS, AND
REAFFIRMING THAT IRAQ RETAINS FULL RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW INCLUDING, WHERE APPLICABLE,
THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION:

F. ACTING UNDER CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. DECIDES THAT IN ORDER FOR THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DETERMINATION WHETHER OR NOT FOR THE PURPOSES OF PARAGRAPH 3(C) AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 661 (1990) HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ARISEN, THE COMMITTEE SHALL KEEP THE SITUATION REGARDING FOODSTUFFS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW:

2. EXPECTS IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 (1990) IN RESPECT OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS AND REAFFIRMS THAT IRAQ REMAINS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW INCLUDING, WHERE APPLICABLE, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION:

3. REQUESTS, FOR THE PURPOSES OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION, THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SEEK URGENTLY, AND ON A CONTINUING BASIS, INFORMATION FROM RELEVANT UN AND OTHER RECOGNISED HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND ALL OTHER SOURCES ON THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, SUCH INFORMATION TO BE COMMUNICATED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE COMMITTEE REGULARLY:

4. REQUESTS FURTHER THAT IN SEEKING AND SUPPLYING SUCH INFORMATION PARTICULAR ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO SUCH CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO MIGHT SUFFER SPECIALLY, SUCH AS CHILDREN UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE, EXPECTANT MOTHERS, AND MATERNITY CASES:

5. DECIDES THAT IF THE COMMITTEE, AFTER RECEIVING THE REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DETERMINES THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ARISEN IN WHICH THERE IS AN URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEED TO SUPPLY FOODSTUFFS TO IRAQ OR KUWAIT IN ORDER TO RELIEVE HUMAN SUFFERING, IT WILL REPORT PROMPTLY TO THE COUNCIL ITS DECISION AS TO HOW SUCH NEED SHOULD BE MET:

6. DIRECTS THE COMMITTEE THAT IN FORMULATING ITS DECISIONS IT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT FOODSTUFFS SHOULD BE PROVIDED THROUGH RECOGNISED HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND DISTRIBUTED BY THEM OR UNDER THEIR SUPERVISION IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY REACH THE INTENDED BENEFICIARIES:

7. RECALLS THAT RESOLUTION 661 (1990) DOES NOT APPLY TO SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES, BUT IN THIS CONNECTION RECOMMENDS THAT MEDICAL SUPPLIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED UNDER THE STRICT SUPERVISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EXPORTING STATE OR BY

RECOGNISED HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES.

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MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

OUR TELECON WITH UND AND YOUR TELNO 1623 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL):
APPOINTMENT OF RELIEF CO-ORDINATOR

1. THE FULL TEXT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ANNOUNCEMENT REPROTEC
IN TELECON U/R IS AS FOLLOWS:

'THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RELATING TO THE CRISIS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEMS OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THIS DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN GIVEN THE MULTI-FACETED NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE CHALLENGE AND THE NEED TO CONTAIN HUMAN SUFFERING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN WILL FOLLOW THE ENTIRE ISSUE PERSONALLY ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CRISIS, UNPRO, TOGETHER WITH UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNRWA AND UNDP, AS WELL AS THE ICRC, THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION AND A NUMBER OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION ALONG THE BORDERS OF THE COUNTRIES NEIGHBOURING IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE IN PLACE WILL CONTINUE AND THE EFFORTS INTENSIFIED.

IN ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO HIM TODAY, SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN WILL CONTINUE TO SERVE AS CO-ORDINATOR FOR THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN.'

2. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE SECRETARIAT HERE THAT SADRUDDIN IS STILL IN GENEVA, WHERE HE IS BASED, THEY ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR HIM TO VISIT NEW YORK. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO INSTRUCT UKMIS GENEVA TO DELIVER ANY MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

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MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 1237: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOODSTUFFS

SUMMARY

1. SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET ON 13 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER DRAFT RESOLUTION ON FOODSTUFFS PUT FORWARD BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS. RESOLUTION LIKELY TO BE PASSED, BARRING UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS. NON-ALIGNED TEXT ON EMERGENCY AID TO ASIAN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT THEN TO BE ADOPTED AS A STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE.

DETAIL

2. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MET AS PLANNED AT 1430Z ON 12 SEPTEMBER. THE (FINNISH) CHAIRMAN (RASI) SAID THE COMMITTEE WAS CLEARLY DEADLOCKED ON THE QUESTION OF FOODSTUFFS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE (SOVIET) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR 1500Z ON 13 SEPTEMBER.

3. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE THEN MET TO CONSIDER TACTICS. THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 1225 WAS REDRAFTED IN THE FORM OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND A NUMBER OF MINOR AMENDMENTS WERE MADE. (TEXT IN MIFT) THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCORPORATING THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT ON EMERGENCY AID TO ASIAN NATIONALS INTO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GET THE FIVE'S DRAFT RESOLUTION PROVIDING AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE COULD MEET IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS TO APPROVE THE DESPATCH OF THE INDIAN SHIP IN A DECISION BASED ON THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT.

4. I STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BRIEF THE

NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON THE FIVE'S DRAFT, THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT ALL OF THEM, OTHER THAN CUBA AND YEMEN, WOULD EVENTUALLY COME ON BOARD. BUT WE MUST KEEP THEM ABREAST OF OUR THINKING AND CONSULT THEM. IT WAS AGREED THAT BLANC (FRANCE) WOULD BRIEF THE AMBASSADORS OF CANADA, FINLAND AND ROMANIA, WHILE PICKERING, LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AND I WOULD BRIEF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. (THE CHINESE DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE.) THE FRENCH HAD NO DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR BRIEFING: THE CANADIANS, FINNS AND ROMANIANS EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE FIVE'S DRAFT AND FOR THE PROPOSAL THAT THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

5. THE BRIEFING OF THE NON-ALIGNED PROVED TO BE A VALUABLE EXERCISE. PICKERING INTRODUCED THE FIVE'S DRAFT, EXPLAINING THAT THE INTENTION WAS TO ADOPT IT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 13 SEPTEMBER. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE COULD THEN TAKE A DECISION ON THE DISPATCH OF THE INDIAN SHIP IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IT SHOULD BE THE COMMITTEE WHICH DEALT WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS, REFERING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS AND WHEN NECESSARY.

6. I EXPLAINED THAT THE FIVE'S EARLIER DRAFT HAD BEEN TURNED INTO A RESOLUTION. WE SHOULD TRY TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE GENERAL AND PARTICULAR. THE PARTICULAR WAS THE POINT PUT BY INDIA, THE PHILLIPINES AND SRI LANKA. WE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO TAKE A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SET IT IN A BROADER FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF FOODSTUFFS.

7. I SAID THE FIVE'S DRAFT WAS BASED ON A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES:

(A) AN ASSESSMENT OF HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS HAD TO BE PROVIDED TO THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL THROUGH A RECOGNISED CHANNEL, NAMELY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SPECIALISED AGENCIES.

(B) AID SHOULD THEN BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO ENSURE THAT IT WENT TO THE PEOPLE IN NEED.

(C) IN THE CASE OF THE ASIAN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT A GENUINE NEED EXISTED.

8. LOZINSKIY ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH WHAT PICKERING AND I HAD SAID.

SCR 661 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED STRICTLY. THIS WAS A HARSH BUT PEACEFUL WAY OF PROCEEDING. A PROCEDURE WAS NEEDED TO DEAL WITH HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY EXISTED.

9. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) AND ALARCON (CUBA) RAISED THEIR WELL-ESTABLISHED OBJECTIONS TO THE FIVE'S PROPOSALS. THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT THE DRAFT AND MIGHT WELL HAVE TO OPPOSE IT. ALARCON ASKED WHY PARAGRAPH 7 ENVISAGED THE GOVERNMENTS OF STATES EXPORTING MEDICAL SUPPLIES, OR THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, WHICH WERE NOT COVERED BY SANCTIONS. I EXPLAINED THAT THE INTENTION WAS TO PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION OF SUPPLIES BEFORE THEY WERE EXPORTED EG TO ENSURE THAT CHEMICALS THAT COULD BE USED FOR WEAPONS WERE NOT INCLUDED. THE WORD 'PROVIDED' MIGHT BE REPLACED BY 'EXPORTED' TO MAKE THE POINT CLEARER.

10. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THAT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE HAD SPENT TOO LONG ON THE ISSUE. HE COULD ACCEPT THE FRAMEWORK IN THE FIVES DRAFT. A SPECIAL CASE WOULD BE MADE FOR THE INDIAN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE APPEALS MADE BY THE PHILIPPINES AND SRI LANKA MUST ALSO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. CLEARLY EVACUATION OF THE ASIANS WOULD BE THE BEST SOLUTION. HE WONDERED IF THIS THOUGHT COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT. HE WOULD RAISE THIS IN THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS. HIS SUGGESTION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED BY PENALOSA (COLOMBIA) AND NZAJI (ZAIRE). PICKERING SAID THAT HE ALSO SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A REFERENCE TO EVACUATION.

11. PENALOSA SAID THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD TURNED THE THIRD STATE NATIONALS INTO A SPECIAL CATEGORY IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ BY DENYING THEM FOODSTUFFS. WHEN THE COUNCIL ADOPTED SCR 661 IT HAD KNOWN THAT HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS COULD ARISE. BUT THE COUNCIL PREFERRED FOOD SHORTAGES TO PEOPLE DYING FROM BULLETS. HE WAS FRUSTRATED THAT THE INDIAN REQUEST WAS BEING USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON COUNCIL MEMBERS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR THE FIVE'S FRAMEWORK RESOLUTION. THIS LEFT A BITTER TASTE IN HIS MOUTH. IT WAS UNSATISFACTORY THAT IT WOULD TAKE A MONTH OR MORE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT: IN ANY CASE HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE DID NOT HAVE STAFF IN PLACE TO CARRY OUT THE TASK. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT AS WELL AS INDIA THE PHILLIPINES, SRI LANKA AND YUGOSLAVIA HAD ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO SEND FOOD FOR THEIR WORKERS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. ALL THESE CASES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS AN EMERGENCY.

12. NZAJI SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE FIVE'S TEXT WITH A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS AND SAW NO PROBLEM WITH IT AS LONG AS A DECISION WAS TAKEN TO ALLOW THE INDIAN SHIP TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY SUPPLES ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS. TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN DELAYED FOR TOO LONG. THE COUNCIL HAD GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS PREVIOUS DECISIONS AND THERE WAS A NEED TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. WHEN THE COUNCIL HAD PASSED ITS EARLIER RESOLUTIONS, IT WAS KNOWN THAT IT WOULD AFFECT PEOPLES AND NATIONS. A FRAMEWORK WAS CLEARLY NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE LARGE NUMBER OF URGENT REQUESTS NOW COMING IN. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONCE A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE FIVE'S DRAFT RESOLUTION, A DECISION WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN ON THE REQUESTS BY INDIA AND OTHERS. THE NON-ALIGNED SHOULD MEET ONCE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE HAD LEFT AND TRY TO REACH A COMMON POSITION.

13. THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONTINUED MEETING AFTER WE HAD LEFT. THE CUBANS SUBSEQUENTLY CIRCULATED A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT) SETTING OUT THEIR VIEWS AND THOSE OF THE YEMENIS. IF THEY INSIST ON PUTTING IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 13 SEPTEMBER, IT IS LIKELY TO RECIEVE SHORT SHRIFT.

COMMENT

14. BARRING UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT ONLY CUBA, YEMEN, AND JUST POSSIBLY COLOMBIA WILL NOT VOTE FOR THE FIVE'S DRAFT RESOLUTION WHEN IT COMES TO THE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 13 SEPTEMBER. THE NON ALIGNED TEXT ON THE DESPATCH OF THE INDIAN SHIP CAN THEN BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (OR IF THE NON-ALIGNED INSIST, AS A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL). AFTER THEIR DISCUSSION WITH THE FIVE, THE NON-ALIGNED MAY WELL ADD A SECTION ON THE NEED FOR THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS TO BE EVACUATED FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ. THIS SHOULD PRESENT US WITH NO DIFFICULTIES.

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YOUR TELNO 267: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER'S SECOND MESSAGE DELIVERED AND APPEARS TO BE WELL RECEIVED. NO CLEAR RESPONSE OVER SANCTIONS. ADDRESS TO THE NATION THIS EVENING.

DETAIL

2. I SAW KING HUSSEIN AT 1430Z TODAY (12 AUGUST) AND HANDED HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HAVING READ IT CAREFULLY, THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE RECEIVED IT BEFORE SENDING A REPLY TO MRS THATCHER'S FIRST MESSAGE (UNUSUALLY, HE HAD A PIECE OF PAPER IN FRONT OF HIM WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN HIS INTENDED REPLY: IN WHICH CASE, HE CHOSE NOT TO HAND IT OVER). HE LOOKED RELIEVED. I VOLUNTEERED THAT I KNEW THAT MRS THATCHER WAS CONCERNED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.
3. I SAID THAT WE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS: BUT THERE MIGHT BE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP JORDAN TO SUSTAIN THEIR IMPACT EG IN THE FINANCIAL FIELD, THROUGH ADVICE FROM OUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS WAS A POINT ON WHICH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAD ALREADY SOUGHT OUR ASSISTANCE. THE KING REFLECTED FOR A MOMENT AND SAID THAT THE WHOLE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS WAS BEING LOOKED AT URGENTLY. SINCE HE MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT, I SUGGESTED THAT HE OR THE CROWN PRINCE SHOULD LET US KNOW IF HE THOUGHT WE COULD BE OF HELP. HE NODDED.
4. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING FURTHER THE KING MIGHT WISH TO PASS ON TO MRS THATCHER AT THIS STAGE. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD BRIEFED BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON, DRAWING ON HIS EXPERIENCE OF PREVIOUS CRISES IN THE REGION AND ADVISING THEM WHAT, IN HIS OPINION, NEEDED TO BE DONE. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE NOW QUOTE WELL MOTIVATED UNQUOTE.

THIS EVENING HE WOULD BE ADDRESSING THE NATION, SUMMING UP WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE PARLIAMENT. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

COMMENT

5. THE AUDIENCE LASTED NO MORE THAN 5 MINUTES. IT WAS, I AM SURE, HELPFUL TO HAVE TRANSMITTED THIS FURTHER MESSAGE, WHICH HAS PROBABLY HEADED OFF A RETURN SALVO AND THUS HELPED TO REMOVE SOME OF THE STRAIN WHICH HAS BEEN APPARENT OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FAR FROM RELAXED. THE KING HAS MADE NO SECRET IN PUBLIC OF HIS OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION (DRAWING PARALLELS WITH SUEZ) AND HAS STATED THAT HE WILL ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO AN ARAB FORCE IF ALL FOREIGN FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN.

6. AS TO SANCTIONS, THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT OF JORDAN'S INTENTION TO APPLY THEM, THOUGH THE KING MAY HAVE MORE TO SAY THIS EVENING. WE AND THE AMERICANS WILL NO DOUBT NEED TO WORK HARD TO KEEP THE JORDANIANS UP TO THE MARK, THOUGH I HOPE WE SHALL ALSO BE ABLE TO GIVE SUBSTANCE IN SOME FORM TO OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

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YOUR TELNO 500 TO ROME: IRAQ/KUWAIT: IRANIAN STATEMENT

SUMMARY

1. STATE SCEPTICAL ABOUT AN IRAN/IRAQ OIL DEAL, AND INCLINED TO BLAY DOWN THE KHAMENEI STATEMENT.

DETAIL

2. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED ABOUT THE KHAMENEI STATEMENT AND REPORTS OF IRAN/IRAQ OIL-FOR-FOOD DEAL. HE REPLIED: QUOTE IRAN HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT IT'S A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IS OBLIGATED TO CARRY OUT THE UN SANCTIONS. IT HAS SAID IT WOULD DO SO. AND, IN THE ABSENSE OF EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL DO SO. UNQUOTE

3. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THEY HAVE YET TO SEE THE FULL TEXT OF KHAMENEI'S STATEMENT, AND ARE RESERVING FINAL JUDGEMENT. BUT THEY ARE AT PRESENT NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED. THEY NOTE THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO A MAJOR US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THEIR IMPRESSION IS THAT, WHILE EXPRESSED IN HARSH TERMS, KHAMENEI'S MESSAGE FALLS SHORT OF A DIRECT CALL FOR ATTACKS ON US FORCES IN THE GULF. THEY HAVE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO SEEK CLARIFICATION.

4. ON THE TEHRAN TIMES ARTICLE, STATE COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD ONE REPORT THAT IRANIAN AND IRAQI OIL MINISTERS HAD MET ON 9 SEPTEMBER (DURING TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO TEHRAN) AND HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBLE IRANIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN MARKETING THEIR CRUDE. BUT STATE DOUBT WHETHER IRAN IS SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING SUCH A FLAGRANT BREACH OF THE EMBARGO. THEY THINK THAT IT COULD BE JUST TALK DESIGNED TO STRING THE IRAQIS ALONG. ALTERNATIVELY, IT COULD HAVE BEEN PITCHED TOWARDS THE WEST, IN THE HOPE OF SOME WESTERN CONCESSIONS. THE FACT THAT THE STORY

APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN TIMES LENDS CREDENCE TO THIS EXPLANATION.

5. STATE CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY TRANSHIPMENT OF IRAQI OIL TO IRAN HAD OCCURRED TO DATE.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: DISCUSSION AT FOREIGN MINISTERS' DINNER

SUMMARY

1. DUMAS AND SHEVARDNADZE THINK SANCTIONS WILL HAVE THEIR EFFECT ON IRAQ IN TWO MONTHS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BAKER AND GENSCHER LESS SANGUINE.

DETAIL

2. AT A DINNER GIVEN BY SHEVARDNADZE FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS THIS EVENING, BAKER ASKED HIS COLLEAGUES HOW LONG THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE FOR SANCTIONS TO DEAL WITH IRAQ.. DUMAS, BACKED BY SHEVARDNADZE, SAID TWO MONTHS. THE IRAQIS WERE PRETTY VULNERABLE. IF THE SANCTIONS WERE PROPERLY APPLIED, TWO MONTHS SHOULD DO IT.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, GENSCHER AND BAKER WERE A GOOD DEAL LESS SANGUINE. BAKER DID, HOWEVER, THINK THAT THE SANCTIONS WERE FAIRLY TIGHT. OIL WAS NOT GETTING OUT AND IRAQ WOULD RUN OUT OF MONEY FAIRLY SOON,. THERE MUST BE NO COMPROMISE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

4. GENSCHER MADE A ROBUST INTERVENTION SAYING THAT SANCTIONS MUST BE TIGHTENED AND WE SHOULD NOT SHRINK FROM FURTHER MEASURES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLIES BEING AIR-LIFTED AND WITH FOOD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT CUBA AND YEMEN WERE DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. IT MUST BE FOR THE COMMITTEE OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECIDE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH FOOD SHOULD BE SUPPLIED TO IRAQ. DELIVERIES SHOULD THEN BE BY AN IMPARTIAL AGENCY TO THOSE IN NEED. THIS SEEMED TO BE GENERALLY AGREED BY THE OTHERS. CERTAINLY, SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT DISSENT.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED SHEVARDNADZE ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE CLEARLY OPPOSED TO FORCE. THEY WERE WATCHING VERY CLOSELY THE ATTITUDE OF THE NON-ALLIGNED.

DUMAS SAID THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WERE BEING ROBUST AND DRAGGING CHINA
ALONG BEHIND. BAKER COMMENTED THAT SMALL, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAD
MOST TO LOSE FROM AN IRAQI VICTORY.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE STATEMENT FROM AYATOLLAH
KHAMENEI WHICH BAKER HAD NOT SEEN. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT
THE IRANIANS WOULD REMAIN PRETTY STALWART AGAINST THE IRAQI
AGGRESSION. DUMAS SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD RELAX ITS
POLICY BECAUSE THE IRANIANS WERE SO IMPORTANT.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: CHENEY AND POWELL BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC)

SUMMARY

1. CHENEY AND POWELL TESTIFY BEFORE THE SASC. NO
SURPRISES, AND LITTLE HARD INFORMATION. CLEAR SENATORIAL SENSE
OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST JAPAN/GERMANY. BUT UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR
DOD HANDLING SO FAR.

DETAIL

2. ON 11 SEPTEMBER, CHENEY AND POWELL TESTIFIED IN FRONT OF
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC) ON IRAQ/KUWAIT
(TRANSCRIPT BY BAG TO EMERGENCY UNIT). ALTHOUGH SENATORS
PRESSED THEM ON ALL OF THE PERTINENT (AND SO FAR UNANSWERED)
QUESTIONS BOTH CHENEY AND POWELL GAVE LITTLE AWAY. CONSEQUENTLY
THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS THAT EVENING (MY TELNO 2205)
GARNERED ALL OF THE HEADLINES ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

3. THE SENATORIAL PREOCCUPATIONS WERE MUCH AS EXPECTED. NUNN
IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING SUSTAINABILITY AND
ROTATION, WAYS OF INCREASING ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE GROUND
(PARTICULARLY HEAVY ARMOUR), BURDEN-SHARING AND FINANCING,
CO-ORDINATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DEFICIENCIES SO FAR
HIGHLIGHTED BY THE OPERATION (NOTABLY SEALIFT AND LIGHT MOBILE
FIREPOWER). COHEN AND MCCAIN LED THE ASSAULT ON THE GERMANS
AND JAPANESE, WITH THE FORMER CHARACTERISING THE GERMAN
CONTRIBUTION AS QUOTE LITTLE MORE THAN POCKET CHANGE UNQUOTE
AND THE LATTER CALLING FOR DOLLARS 8BN FROM THE JAPANESE.
WARNER PROBED ON BURDEN-SHARING AND FINANCING MORE GENERALLY
AND KENNEDY SPOTLIGHTED THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. OTHER SENATORS
PUSHED THEIR PARTICULAR HOBBY HORSES (INCLUDING SR-71, B-2, SDI
AND DOMESTIC BASE CLOSURES). BUT THE GENERAL TONE WAS
SUPPORTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. CHENEY AND POWELL DID THEIR BEST TO AVOID GETTING INTO
DETAIL. BUT THEY DID SHED SOME LIGHT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES:

- I) CHENEY CONFIRMED EARLIER PRESS REPORTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEEK AN ADDITIONAL DOLLARS 15BN IN FY 91 FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. HE ESTIMATED THAT UP TO 50 PERCENT MIGHT BE OFFSET BY ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS. AS FOR THE CURRENT FINANCIAL YEAR (FY90), OMB WOULD SHORTLY BE SUBMITTING A SUPPLEMENTARY REQUEST FOR UNDER DOLLARS 2BN:
- II) POWELL SAID THAT THE US PRESENCE HAD GROWN FROM 10,000 (ON SHIPS) IN THE EARLY DAYS TO MORE THAN 100,000 NOW (ALTHOUGH HE REFUSED TO BREAK THIS DOWN BETWEEN THOSE IN SAUDIA ARABIA AND THOSE STILL ABOARD SHIPS). THE US HAD AIRLIFTED 65,000 TONS OF MATERIEL AND SEALIFTED 180,000 TONS AND 55 SHIPS WERE EITHER UNLOADING OR ENROUTE:
- III) NEITHER POWELL NOR CHENEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A TIME LIMIT FOR DEPLOYMENTS, WITH CHENEY SAYING THAT THE BUILD-UP WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE US HAD SUFFICIENT FORCES QUOTE TO DEAL WITH ANY CONTINGENCY UNQUOTE. ON ROTATION, CHENEY SAID THAT SIX MONTHS WAS THE NORM FOR TEMPORARY DUTY, BUT WOULDN'T COMMIT HIMSELF TO A FIGURE FOR THIS OPERATION. ROTATION WOULD, HOWEVER, PROBABLY INCLUDE US FORCES IN EUROPE (AND WOULD VARY FROM SERVICE TO SERVICE). RESERVISTS CALLED UP FOR 90 DAYS MIGHT WELL HAVE THAT CALL-UP EXTENDED (ON PRACTICAL AND COST GROUNDS):
- IV) CHENEY REFUSED TO RISE TO THE BAIT ON SOVIET ADVISERS, SAYING THAT THEY WERE NOT OPERATING WITH UNITS, AND CHARACTERISING THE RUSSIAN PERFORMANCE AS QUOTE ADMIRABLE UNQUOTE. NOR WOULD HE ADMIT TO BEING CONSTRAINED BY THE PRESENCE OF SUCH ADVISERS IN IRAQ IN THE EVENT OF OFFENSIVE ACTION:
- V) ON AIR INTERDICTION, CHENEY SAID THAT HE HAD QUOTE NO AUTHORITY OR REQUEST OR DIRECTION TO DO ANYTHING UNQUOTE,
- VI) THE COMMAND CHAIN RAN FROM THE PRESIDENT DOWN TO SCHWARZKOPF. THIS CHAIN WAS QUOTE SENSITIVE TO SAUDI SOVEREIGNTY UNQUOTE AND CHENEY WAS EMPHATIC IN AFFIRMING THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED FROM SAUDI TERRITORY WITHOUT QUOTE A LOT OF CONSULTATION WITH THEM IN ADVANCE UNQUOTE:

- VII) CHENEY SAID THAT THE OFFENSIVE THREAT FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN REMAINED, THE FIRST QUOTE DANGER POINT UNQUOTE HAD BEEN IN THE FIRST WEEK. THE SECOND COULD ARISE WHEN SANCTIONS BEGAN TO BITE: HUSSEIN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO QUOTE LASH OUT UNQUOTE:
- VIII) NEITHER CHENEY NOR POWELL COULD OFFER MORE THAN PLATITUDES ON REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. BUT CHENEY DID SAY THAT THE OPERATION MIGHT INVOLVE QUOTE A MORE LASTING KIND OF COMMITMENT THAN HE'D EXPECTED UNQUOTE:
- IX) CHENEY DOWNPLAYED THE PROSPECT OF SURGICAL STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ. QUOTE THE NOTION THAT WE'RE GOING TO SIMPLY WIPE OUT IRAQ IN A MATTER OF A COUPLE OF DAYS WITH AIR POWER I THINK IS SIMPLY MISTAKEN UNQUOTE:
- X) BURDENSARING WAS A KEY ELEMENT. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT AMERICAS FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD UNDERSTOOD THE STRONG FEELING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THAT SCORE.

5. AS IN THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, THERE WAS NO INDICATION AS TO HOW LONG THE US FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE, HOW LONG THE EMBARGO WOULD TAKE TO WORK, OR HOW LIKELY HOSTILITIES WERE. MEANWHILE THE CHENEY AND POWELL TESTIMONIES CAME ON THE SAME DAY AS THE HOUSE BEGAN ITS FLOOR DEBATE ON THE FY91 DEFENCE AUTHORISATIONS BILL. DISCUSSION OF IRAQ/KUWAIT IN THIS FIRST DAY OF THE HOUSE PROCEEDINGS WAS DOMINATED BY CRITICISMS OF JAPAN AND GERMANY, WITH REP DINGELL (D-MICH), CHAIRMAN OF THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE PROMISING THE INTRODUCTION OF A BILL LEVYING A 20 PERCENT IMPORT DUTY ON GOODS FROM NATIONS QUOTE NOT PAYING THEIR FAIR SHARE. BUT AS IN THE SENATE, THE MOOD IN THE HOUSE WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS IN THE GULF CRISIS, WITH THE ONLY DISCORDANT NOTE BEING STRUCK BY REP JOE KENNEDY (D-MASS) WHO (CHARACTERISTICALLY) ASKED WHETHER US TROOPS SHOULD BE QUOTE MERCENARIES FOR FEUDAL GOVERNMENTS UNQUOTE.

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(BY TUBE H29)
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(BY TUBE H29)
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(BY TUBE H29)
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~~SIR P CRADOCK,~~
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MOSCOW FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE
IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS
SUMMARY

1. A CONFIDENT AND DETERMINED ADDRESS WHICH MAKES CLEAR THE UNITED STATES' DETERMINATION TO DO WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO REVERSE IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS THIS EVENING (11 SEPTEMBER) ON THE IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS (TEXT FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT, FCO).
3. HE REPEATED THE FOUR US OBJECTIVES - IRAQ'S COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THE STABILITY OF THE GULF AND THE PROTECTION OF US CITIZENS ABROAD. HE SAID THAT THESE OBJECTIVES WERE ENDORSED BY THE UN AND SHARED BY MOST COUNTRIES. HE PRAISED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SAYING THAT, BY IMPOSING MANDATORY SANCTIONS AND AUTHORISING THE USE OF ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, IT HAD BACKED UP WORDS WITH ACTION. HIS SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAD SHOWN THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHARED THE RESOLVE TO COUNTER IRAQ'S THREAT TO PEACE. HE ADDED A FIFTH (AND NEW) OBJECTIVE, THE CREATION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA. HE SAID THAT THE GULF CRISIS OFFERED A RARE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARDS AN HISTORIC PERIOD OF COOPERATION. QUOTE HOW WE MANAGE THIS CRISIS COULD SHAPE THE FUTURE FOR GENERATIONS TO COME UNQUOTE.
4. HE SAID THAT AMERICA AND THE WORLD MUST DEFEND COMMON VITAL INTERESTS, SUPPORT THE RULE OF LAW AND STAND UP TO AGGRESSION. QUOTE AND WE WILL UNQUOTE. IN PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS, AMERICA WOULD NOT BE INTIMIDATED. HE REFERRED ALSO TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT RISK, SAYING THAT THE US WOULD NOT PERMIT THE WORLD'S OIL RESERVES TO BE DOMINATED BY QUOTE ONE SO RUTHLESS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT NO-ONE SHOULD DOUBT US CREDIBILITY,

RELIABILITY OR STAYING POWER.

5. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO IRAQ'S DETENTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, SAYING THAT IT WAS A MOCKERY TO CALL THEM GUESTS: QUOTE THEY ARE HOSTAGES AND THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS IT UNQUOTE. HE QUOTED THE PRIME MINISTER (WHOM HE REFERRED TO AS QUOTE OUR DEPENDABLE ALLY UNQUOTE - A PERSONAL ADDITION TO HIS WRITTEN TEXT) ON NOT BARGAINING OVER HOSTAGES. QUOTE OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THE HOSTAGES AND TO THEIR FAMILIES. BUT OUR POLICY CANNOT CHANGE, AND IT WILL NOT CHANGE UNQUOTE.

6. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO RAISE THE BURDEN-SHARING. HE SAID THAT, WHILE THE US WAS PREPARED TO DO MORE THAN ITS SHARE, QUOTE WE INSIST THAT OTHERS DO THEIR SHARE AS WELL UNQUOTE. HE DESCRIBED THE RESPONSE OF MOST FRIENDS AND ALLIES AS GOOD. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE HEARTENING RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS SUPERB COOPERATION FROM THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES IN MAKING UP LOST IRAQI AND KUWAITI SUPPLIES, BUT HE ALSO CALLED FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION AND DIVERSIFICATION. QUOTE OUR FAILURE TO DO THESE THINGS HAS MADE US MORE DEPENDANT ON FOREIGN OIL THAN EVER BEFORE.

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT PREDICT HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT: SANCTIONS WOULD TAKE TIME. ALL OPTIONS WOULD BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW AND IRAQI AGGRESSION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT US INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF PRE-DATED IRAQ'S INVASION AND WOULD SURVIVE IT. THERE WOULD BE A LASTING ROLE FOR THE US IN THE GULF - DETERRING AGGRESSION, ASSISTING FRIENDS IN SELF-DEFENCE, AND CURBING PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES. HE REPEATED THAT THE US HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE - ONLY WITH ITS DICTATOR AND HIS AGGRESSION. QUOTE IRAQ WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ANNEX KUWAIT. AND THAT'S NOT A THREAT, ITS NOT A BOAST, THAT'S JUST THE WAY ITS GOING TO BE UNQUOTE.

8. THE PRESIDENT THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT AMERICA'S ABILITY TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY AS A GREAT POWER ABROAD DEPENDED ULTIMATELY ON ITS DOMESTIC PERFORMANCE. HE SAID THAT THE GULF CRISIS HAD SHOWN THAT THE US WAS MORE ECONOMICALLY VULNERABLE THAN IT SHOULD EVER BE, AND CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ADDRESS THE BUDGET DEFICIT. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED CONGRESS TO ENACT (A) GROWTH-ORIENTED TAX MEASURES (TO INCLUDE A CAPITAL GAINS TAX CUT), (B) A PRUDENT MULTI-YEAR DEFENCE PROGRAMME, (C) MEASURES TO INCREASE DOMESTIC ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION SO AS TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL AND (D) A FIVE YEAR PROGRAMME TO REDUCE PROJECTED DEBTS AND DEFICITS BY US DOLLARS 500 BILLION NOT LATER THAN 28 SEPTEMBER. HE ADDED THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT

DEFICIT REDUCTION REQUIRED NEW REVENUE MEASURES, THEY SHOULD NOT THREATEN ECONOMIC GROWTH OR LEAD TO QUOTE PUNISHING INCOME TAX RATES UNQUOTE.

9. IN HIS RESPONSE FOR THE DEMOCRATS, REPRESENTATIVE GEPHARDT BROADLY ENDORSED THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION ON THE GULF CRISIS. QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED FOR OUR SUPPORT. HE HAS IT UNQUOTE. HE GAVE MORE EMPHASIS TO BURDEN-SHARING, SINGLING OUT JAPAN AND GERMANY AS POWERFUL AND PROSPEROUS ALLIES WHO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DEFEND THEIR OWN VITAL INTERESTS IN THE GULF. IN COMMENTING ON THE BUDGET DEFICIT, HE SAID THAT WORKING FAMILIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO SHOULDER THE BURDEN. HE ALSO CALLED FOR A DEFENCE POLICY WHICH WAS MORE RELEVANT AND RESPONSIVE. THE US MUST BE ABLE TO AFFORD WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS THOSE REQUIRED FOR DESERT SHIELD BUT DID NOT REQUIRE COSTLY SYSTEMS (STAR WARS, B-2 BOMBER, MX MISSILES) DESIGNED TO WIN THE COLD WAR.

COMMENT

10. THIS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE AND CONFIDENT PERFORMANCE BY THE PRESIDENT. HIS SPEECH BROKE LITTLE NEW GROUND (AN EXCEPTION WAS HIS HINTS ABOUT INITIATIVES ON ENERGY POLICY). BUT IT CAN HAVE LEFT IRAQ IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' DETERMINATION NOT TO ALLOW THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT TO STAND. IF THERE WAS ANY COMFORT HERE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN IT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD TO DWELL ON THE BUDGET PROBLEMS AND HIS ASSERTION THAT THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS A GREAT POWER ABROAD DEPENDED ON THE STATE OF ITS ECONOMY. BUT THIS WOULD BE TO CLUTCH AT STRAWS. THE PASSAGE ON THE BUDGET DID NOT DILUTE THE PRESIDENT'S CENTRAL MESSAGE.

11. THERE WAS NO THREATENING OR BLUSTER IN THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH BUT A QUIET DETERMINATION TO DO WHATEVER MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO REVERSE IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR HIS REFUSAL TO BOW TO BLACKMAIL OVER THE HOSTAGES WAS CLEARLY HEARTFELT. THE UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE FROM CONGRESS - EVIDENT IN THE STANDING OVATION ACCORDED TO THE PRESIDENT ON HIS ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, AND IN THE WARM APPLAUSE WHICH FREQUENTLY PUNCTUATED HIS ADDRESS - WAS THAT CONGRESS AND, BY EXTENSION, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FULLY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES.

ACLAND

YYYY

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Sir Brian Unwin KCB
Chairman

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The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

12 September 1990

Jens Peters,

IRAQ/KUWAIT SANCTIONS: ENFORCEMENT AND CO-ORDINATION

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 4 September to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this subject. May I say that from a Customs operational point of view we welcome the arrangements proposed and will certainly co-operate to the fullest extent possible.

2. I think we are now represented on the relevant interdepartmental committees and we have already established bilateral lines of communication with other departments for urgent exchanges of information. Given our role at the "sharp end" in the control of imports and exports and the investigation and prosecution of offences, it is obviously critical that we should receive the earliest possible intelligence and be consulted quickly wherever there is any reasonable suspicion of a breach of sanctions. It will then, of course, be for the Commissioners to determine the application of the appropriate Customs law.

3. I should add that implementation of UNSCR 661 is presenting some problems but we have found the paper attached to your letter a helpful initial guide to policy. Difficulties persist over control of mail but we shall be pursuing this further with the Departments concerned.

4. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.



Brian Unwin
BRIAN UNWIN

*CDP
12/9*

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1990

Her Charles

Iraq/Kuwait: Tunisian Proposals

The Tunisians, like other ambivalent Arabs, are touting proposals for an "Arab solution" to the Iraq/Kuwait crisis. A special envoy from President Ben Ali came to London on 10 September to canvass support for Tunisian ideas, which are set out in the enclosed message from the President to the Prime Minister. These are unacceptable in various respects. We think it would be right to hit them firmly on the head before they obtain a spurious credibility.

I enclose a draft reply to President Ben Ali.

*Jews ever,
S L Gass*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

HE Mr Zine El Abidine Ben Ali

10/9/17

Draft Letter From: The Prime Minister

To: The Tunisian Prime Minister

I have received the letter which your special envoy, Mr Ben Yahya, delivered to Mr William Waldegrave, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, on 10 September.

in Britain
I must tell you ^{of} of the considerable disappointment felt here at the Tunisian Government's equivocal response to the unjustified, illegal and brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In our view there is only one proposal that can bring peace and that is for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from the territory of the independent Arab country which it has overrun by force and purported to annex. The legitimate Ruling Family of Kuwait, ^{which must be} once it has been restored to power in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions, will be able to decide what arrangements it wishes to make for the conduct of government and whether it wishes to negotiate fresh bilateral understandings with Iraq. But it is quite unacceptable to suggest that Iraq should obtain the reward of a change of system in Kuwait as the result of its aggression, ^{or} or ^{very surprised with a} ^{member of the United Nations}

At a time when great efforts have been made to ^{thicken} up relations between the United Kingdom and Tunisia, and between the European Community and the Arab Maghreb Union, I must express my concern to ~~Your Excellency~~ that Tunisia should be canvassing proposals which qualify Resolutions adopted by the Security Council and by the majority of the Arab League. To ^{put forward} advance ~~peace~~ proposals before Iraq has implemented those Resolutions can only encourage Iraq to ^{continue to} flout the decisions of the international community.

*member of the United Nations
should make such a suggestion*

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Handwritten: 27(A-B) (2) Simon

Handwritten: You may like to see this. CAB

12 September 1990 12/9

Handwritten: M/S

Dear Simon.

GULF CRISIS: ISRAEL

I had a talk this morning with Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, mostly about the situation in the Gulf. What he had to say was fairly predictable. The Israeli Government was deliberately lying low and avoiding statements or actions which might be seen as provocative. They thought that the United States had acted well so far and they admired the Prime Minister's strong stand. But there was some unease that we were allowing ourselves to be drawn by Saddam Hussain into a waiting game and would fail to take decisive action which the Israeli Government believed would be required, if the present situation was to be brought to a conclusion on satisfactory terms. They did not believe that sanctions would work, and sooner or later we would have to use force to remove Iraq from Kuwait. He very much doubted whether the Arab contingent would actually fight Iraq, so the United States and Britain would have to bear the brunt. Israel had no wish to be drawn into the conflict. But the likelihood that Saddam Hussain would contrive to bring Israel in must be considered quite high. The Israelis had established their "red line" over any Iraqi move into Jordan. That was meant seriously. Their credibility would disappear if they failed to respond to an Israeli intrusion into Jordan. That said, Israel did not at all relish the thought of Jordan's involvement, since it would inevitably lead to the demise of the Hashemites and their replacement either by an Iraqi or Syrian dominated regime or by the PLO. Netanyahu expatiated on the difficulties for Israel of involvement in military action against Iraq: they would have to control Jordanian air space and guard their flank against attack from Syria. All that said, he personally found it hard to envisage a military solution without Israel being involved.

Netanyhau also expressed concern about attempts to link the Iraq/Kuwait situation with the Arab/Israel problem. Israel did not and would not accept any parallel. The PLO's support for Iraq had put them right beyond the pale so far as Israel was concerned, and there was even less prospect than before of Israel being willing to negotiate with the PLO in any shape or form. But he accepted that it would be necessary to have some movement on Arab/Israel matters if we were to keep together the great coalition which had been formed against Iraq.

3

Netanyahu raised one particular problem concerning the EC/Israel meeting on 17 September. The EC was imposing a form of sanctions against Israel in the form of withholding scientific cooperation. This was surely completely inappropriate in the present situation and the blockage should be lifted at the forthcoming meeting. The Germans were ready to be helpful and he hoped that the United Kingdom would be so too. It was not enough to argue that the suspension of cooperation was an autonomous decision by the Commission: the Commission would respond to a clear directive from Ministers.

Yours in care,
Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FILE

c: Foreign (Morocco) (dt)

10 DOWNING STREET . . .

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 September 1990

GULF CRISIS: MOROCCO

In some despair how to give substance to my Moroccan friend General Kadiri's determination to have a dialogue about the Gulf crisis, I asked him for an account of the meeting Maghreb Foreign Ministers on 2 September. I enclose a copy of the note which he has sent me, for anything which it may add to our knowledge.

CHARLES D POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

EMM

Cher M. Powell ;

Suite à l'entretien que vous avez eu avec mon représentant à Londres M. Allam, je vous communique les grandes lignes et les points importants débattus lors de la réunion extraordinaire des ministres des affaires étrangères de l'union du Maghreb Arabe qui s'est tenue le 2 septembre 1990 à la demande du président Chadli Benjdid, président en exercice de l'U.M.A.

Cette réunion a fait une évaluation de la situation dans le golfe et a retenu les principes susceptibles de permettre une éventuelle contribution maghrébine à la solution de la crise.

Il s'en est dégagé une identité de vue quant aux causes et dimensions du conflit, et il a été permis d'envisager les voies et moyens pour le résoudre.

En général la commission penche vers une solution arabe qui sauvegarderait les droits et intérêts des parties en cause et garantirait la paix et la sécurité des états de la région.

Elle estime que ce cheminement est toujours possible et envisageable.

Après mûre discussion, la commission a envisagé un certain nombre de principes qui peuvent être résumés de la manière suivante.

1- Avant tout il doit être tenu compte du respect de la légalité et du droit international.

2- Bannissement du recours à la force pour régler les différends entre états.

En conséquence, toute initiative devrait déboucher sur :

1- Le retrait des forces irakiennes du Koweït en même temps que la levée des sanctions et de l'embargo.

.../...

2- Le retablissement de la souverainete et de la legalite avec substitution d' une force arabe aux forces irakiennes au Koweit sous l' autorite des Nations Unies.

3- Le retrait des forces etrangeres des pays du golfe et leur remplacement par des forces Arabo-Islamiques .

4- Recherche d' une solution globale au differend Irako-Koweitien (frontieres- dettes ...).

Cependant et simultanement à la reunion des ministres des affaires etrangeres à Alger, le gouvernement Tunisien a entrepris pour meme objet une initiative unilaterale aupres des Grandes Puissances et du Roi Fahd Ibn Abdelaziz .

Laquelle initiative tunisienne ne saurait avoir de lien avec le point de vue adopte par les 5 ministres des affaires etrangeres . Il appert des lors que l' unanimité est loin d' etre effective au Maghreb.

LE GENERAL ABDELHAK EL KADIRI

EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP
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SPEECH BY SIR CHRISTOPHER PROUT, CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROPEAN
DEMOCRATIC GROUP STRASBOURG - WEDNESDAY 12TH SEPTEMBER

President Saddam Hussein, in the space of a few days at the beginning of August, succeeded in annexing a law abiding nation, removing the human rights of thousands of resident foreigners, breaking the Vienna Convention on diplomatic protection, threatening to use chemical weapons in breach of the laws of wars, menacing the stability of the world economy by his manifest intention to invade Saudi Arabia and expropriate her oil resources - I doubt if any leader in history has broken so many rules of international law in such a short period of time - that is the measure of the man.

Had President Bush not despatched American forces to Saudi Arabia the moment Saddam began to mass armour on Kuwait's southern border, 60 per cent of the world's known oil reserves would now be under Iraqi control. Prompt and courageous action by the United States have protected a vital "out of area" European Community interest which - let's be frank - we were simply not organised to protect on our own. Not for the first time, Europe owes the United States an immense debt.

Fortunately our chances of restoring stability to the Arabian peninsular are immeasurably greater than they would have been 12 months ago - because of the momentous events that have unfolded on our own continent. Security Council Resolutions condemning Iraq, imposing an immediate economic and arms embargo and, soon after, granting the powers to enforce them would have all been unthinkable in August 1989. Thus the changes in Europe are bringing the world community much closer together.

It is now the duty of the international Community to make certain that Saddam Hussein fails in every single one of his objectives. It will only succeed in doing so by peaceful means, if it has the political will to make the United Nations blockade effective enough to confront Saddam Hussein and his friends, with the certainty of failure. Any talk of negotiation would deal a fatal blow to the blockade and the objectives it is designed to achieve.

But the role of the international Community must not end with the success of the blockade and the consequent departure of Hussein. We must then turn our attention to the circumstances that gave rise to this appalling situation - the indiscriminate trade in arms, the production of chemical weapons, the huge disparities in the distribution of wealth in the Middle East and its racial tensions - and seek genuine and lasting solutions. We will also have to face up to the fact, whether we like it or not, that the oil-rich but sparsely populated peninsular states simply do not have the manpower to defend themselves against a determined aggressor. If Europe is to play its full part in these vital matters, we must take immediate steps to build a strong and more durable structure of cooperation between the West and the Arab world.

The reaction of the Community's Institutions to all this, within the limits of their own powers, has been exemplary. Without hesitation, they have condemned the invasion of Kuwait, called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces, imposed a trade embargo on Iraq, enacted the necessary legislation for implementing United Nations sanctions, provided emergency aid for refugees, and, most recently, proposed a substantial package of aid to help offset the immense costs to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan of imposing sanctions. The Commission, the Council, and the Foreign Ministers in political co-operation deserve our congratulations.

But the Member States of the Community ought to have been able to do much more. We lack the mechanisms of coordination which would have enabled us to play a part in protecting our out-of-area security interests, commensurate with our economic power. This time, the United States did our work for us. We were lucky. But we may not always be so lucky. This is a matter to which NATO, the WEU and the IGC must now turn their attention with urgency.

12.9.90.

CCPE (1)

OP

Prime Minister

Center with these changes - which would not affect the group which you chair?
CDD 12/9

Ref.A090/2124

MR POWELL

Meetings on the Gulf

The structure of meetings on the Gulf - very restricted high-level meeting under the Prime Minister's chairmanship and a wider group of departments meeting daily to follow up action - have been working well. We have tried to make the Cabinet Office meetings brisk and business-like, concentrating on sharing information, allocating action and chasing progress.

2. The Prime Minister asked that the wider Cabinet Office group should meet daily under a senior Minister. Now that we may be entering the long haul, I doubt whether the Cabinet Office group need meet every day - three times a week may be sufficient. Would you ask the Prime Minister whether she is prepared to give discretion -

(a) for the group to meet less often than daily if events allow that;

(b) for me or Mr Appleyard to chair the group if a senior Minister is not available, particularly on those days when OD(G) is also meeting.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

12 September 1990

26(A-3)

PRIME MINISTER

ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE GULF

I attach the Defence Secretary's note fleshing out the two options for additional ground forces which we discussed yesterday. They are:

- a full armoured brigade.
- an artillery brigade plus a reconnaissance regiment.

He clearly inclines towards the former, although is not sold on it. Alan Clark also favours an armoured brigade plus helicopters. He intends to ask AVM Wilson to discuss both options with General Schwarzkopf today. The reaction is fairly predictable: offered a choice between what he has asked for and what he has not asked for, the General is likely to go for the former.

Meanwhile some-one has told the press that tanks are the most likely option (although the serious papers say the decision has yet to be taken). That makes it harder not to send them, since it would look like backing down. You have had Archie Hamilton's views and seen the Attorney General's minute: both of them very dubious about the advisability of sending tanks.

How do we stop the decision being effectively pre-empted? Not easy, but there are a number of points:

- my guess is that OD would go for the more cautious option (and the Chancellor will have the financial consequences much in mind) if it can be kept open until then.
- I can try to get a statement from Scowcroft that, whatever the military preference, the Americans would be happy with

whatever we decide to send. This could be used publicly.

- you could see the Chief of Staff (but this will leak and look like a major crisis or disagreement).
- you can insist on a formal written recommendation from the Chief of Staff with assurances about Challenger's operational availability, as well as similar written assurances from the company.
- we can get some counter-briefing of the press done on the advantages of the artillery brigade option.

One point which comes out of the Defence Secretary's minute is that neither option would be operationally ready until 20 November at earliest.

All that said, if we are just thinking about the political impact - both domestically and internationally - there is no doubt that tanks play very well. But if it came to a conflict and the Challenger did not perform, the down-side risk would be very much greater than with artillery: at least loss of reputation, at worst needless loss of life.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

12 September 1990

c:\foreign\forces (kk)



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I don't think
you ever had the
time to read
the Defence Secretary's
minute attached to
my note.

mb

CAD

12/9.

(2)



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

AHSS(90)27 12.9.

Burden - sharing

You may like to
see the paper on
burden-sharing agreed
by officials. It seems
very sensible. We
have to put a
capstone on Germany
and Japan. C.A.P. 12/9

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15J
 MO 26/4/2/1J

12/1k September 1990

Dear Charles

CHALLENGER 1 TANK

The team the Defence Secretary plans to bring to the Prime Minister's meeting on Challenger 1 reliability at 3.00pm on Thursday 13th September is:

Chief of the Defence Staff

Chief of the General Staff

Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff for Operational Requirements (Land Systems) - Major General A S J Blacker

Project Manager, Chieftain and Challenger Tanks - Mr S R Jackson (Assistant Director, Engineering).

The Vickers Defence Systems Ltd will be represented by Mr G Boxall, Chairman and Chief Executive (who will be travelling down from their Leeds plant).

The Prime Minister might find it helpful to have the attached list of the main areas which the Defence Secretary addressed during his own review yesterday.

*✓
 in green
 S Webb*

(S WEBB)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

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REVIEW OF CHALLENGER 1

Overall Availability in Germany

Key Areas for Reliability -

- MUFF Couplings
- Laser Sight
- Thermal Optics Sight
- Other Turret Systems

Modifications for a Saudi Arabian deployment -

- Air Cleaners
- Flexible Hoses for Oil Cooler
- Batteries
- Generator
- Coolant
- NBC Charcoal

Other Issues -

- Trials in Saudi Arabia 1985 and 1987
- Ammunition Containers
- Automatic Track Tensioning
- Air Conditioning
- Auxiliary Power Units
- VDS Initiatives

Support -

- Contractor Support
- Spares Levels
- Replacements for sensitive equipments

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25(A-9)

PRIME MINISTER

ADDITIONAL BRITISH FORCES FOR THE GULF

You are meeting a group of senior officers tomorrow, with a representative of Vickers, to probe them on the reliability of the Challenger tank, before we reach a decision whether to send an Armoured Brigade to the Gulf. A list of those attending is attached. In addition, to CDS (Craig) and CGS (Chapple), it includes a very senior tank officer, the Challenger Project Manager from the Procurement Executive and the Managing Director of Vickers. The Defence Secretary insists on being present, but I have urged him to stick to a non-speaking role. This is your show.

As part of the preparations for the meeting, I have spoken to Sir Nigel Bagnall and Sir Martin Farndale. You may find it helpful to have a summary of their views.

Sir Nigel Bagnall was, as ever, rather laconic. Challenger was a very robust tank. Problems with it had arisen only because the Government had been too parsimonious to buy and hold enough spares. Provided there were adequate spares and logistic back-up, it would perform very well in the Gulf and the Government would not be risking anything by sending it. There had been problems with the fire control system, but he thought these were largely now resolved. Mechanically it was a good tank, and he regarded the allegations about its overall lack of reliability as alarmist. He thought sending an Armoured Brigade was now the best course, although equally he was certain you had been right not to rush into a commitment of ground troops. Lightly armoured forces would be no good at all. Nor was he much in favour of an Artillery Brigade: an Armoured Brigade would have its own artillery and would be a much more flexible and effective force. He reiterated his main point: the key was to have an adequate supply of spares.

Sir Martin Farndale was more reflective. Armour in the desert was very different from armour in Europe. He had extensive experience of both. The key was to have a balanced force, ie tanks, armoured infantry, artillery, an engineer squadron and some helicopters. That pointed to a full Armoured Brigade rather than a smaller force. Air superiority was vital in the desert, but it seemed that we and the Americans could now probably rely on that. Armoured infantry was also essential: tanks were defenceless at night in the desert: and that was the time they had to be re-supplied and serviced. The biggest problems in the desert were logistic. In Europe you could always cobble something together and live off the land, but in the desert it was different. The logistics had to be superbly organised, with adequate spares and back-up.

Sir Martin recognised that Challenger did not have a very good reputation for reliability but made the same point as Sir Nigel Bagnall: the problems stemmed basically from a shortage of spares. There had never been enough money to buy the full range of equipment needed. But provided priority was given to the needs of the Challenger tanks sent to Saudi Arabia at the expense of those in Europe, this problem could be overcome. The fire control system was not as modern as that in the Abrams M1A or the Leopard: but actually it was just as effective, although a second or two slower than more modern systems. He would much rather go to war in a Challenger than a Leopard in the desert, indeed he thought the Challenger was as good as the M1A in practice. All that said, he recognised that a worst case of poor reliability and difficulties with the gun turret could occur, causing grave damage to our reputation and endangering lives. But on balance he thought the risk could be taken.

I asked about the alternative option of an Artillery Brigade with an armoured reconnaissance regiment. He thought this was a perfectly reasonable alternative, and in some ways easier to operate because of commonality of equipment with the Americans. But there was no doubt that it was a less high profile contribution and he assumed the Americans would be much keener to have tanks.

Sir Martin wanted you to know that he had been thinking over these issues very carefully during the last few days and had been intending to write with his views. What he had given me was not just a snap judgment.

In the light of this, it seems to me your aim tomorrow should be to do some destruction testing on the MOD and the company, to see how well they stand up to your scepticism about Challenger. The main areas to cover are:

Reliability

You will want to extract from them actual operational availability figures for Challenger in Germany.

You will want to press them on the subject of spares and their availability, and whether they can be sure of having sufficient spares to keep a high proportion of the tanks operational in Saudi Arabia.

Modifications

You will want to probe them on the modifications which are said to be necessary. What exactly do they involve? Have they been tried before? How crucial is their effect on the tanks' performance? Will they cause delay, or give rise to new problems?

Fire Control System

This has frequently been identified as Challenger's weak point.

Is it really a match for the latest Soviet tanks which it will be up against? Why has it had to withdraw from NaTO firing competitions in the past? Is it sufficiently accurate when the tank is on the move?

Operational Experience

Anecdotal evidence from Germany suggests that the Armoured Brigade has scarcely exercised as a formation, indeed

d

training has been very limited because of financial limitations and difficulties caused by the Germans. Do we really believe that they can bring performance up to scratch in a short time and operate as a unit? What sort of training will be necessary? (Remember what happened when the Welsh Guards were taken straight from public duties in London to the Falklands and were unable to complete their march to Port Stanley.)

Command and Control

How do they envisage the tank forces fitting in with American forces? What role do they expect to be given? Do they really believe that our units are sufficiently experienced and practised to undertake this role in the desert? Or are we needlessly putting lives at risk?

At the end you will want to say that this is a very serious decision which affects the lives of our soldiers, our reputation as a serious military power and the standing of Vickers as a company. You will require them all to indicate to you that they advise without any serious reservations that the Government can safely take the decision to send Challenger, and that we have the skills, the resources, the spares and the experience for it to operate reliably and effectively in the desert.

C.P.P.

CHARLES POWELL

12 September 1990

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24

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Sir Robin Butler

**DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER**

I have shown the revised draft message from the Amir of Kuwait attached to your minute of 11 September to the Prime Minister. She is content with it and agrees that the FCO should now discuss the draft with the Kuwaitis.

I am copying this minute to Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department) and Simon Gass (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)
12 September 1990

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23(A-E)

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: MEETING OF MINISTERS

You have a meeting of Ministers this morning to consider the latest developments over the Gulf. Mr Waldegrave will represent the Foreign Secretary (who is in Tokyo, and en route for Moscow).

The main issues for discussion are on the defence side. You will want to leave adequate time for them.

The items which you will want to cover are:

DIPLOMATIC

- 2 plus 4
- Helsinki Summit. This went as well as could be expected, although the Russians are still reluctant to admit the existence of a military option: and are not very helpful on withdrawal of their military advisers. The Foreign Secretary might be encouraged to pursue this latter point with Shevardnadze in Moscow.

The general European response in NATO to Jim Baker's briefing was strong on words and short on deeds. They all shy away from even contemplating a military option.

- Sanctions on foodstuffs. The Permanent Five members of the UN Sanctions Committee have agreed a satisfactory working paper. Indians
- Request from the Amir. The Attorney has circulated a draft request from the Amir to cover the use of force if necessary to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait. If acceptable to colleagues, the next step is to discuss it with the Americans.
- Aid to countries implementing sanctions. We need to tell the Americans in due course how much we are prepared to

9

contribute.

- Refugees. Mrs Chalker travels out to Jordan today, taking relief supplies. She will make recommendations for further help on her return. It seems from press reports that the situation is beginning to improve. Meanwhile we are urging the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative and urging the UN itself to mount an appeal for funds, focusing particularly on countries which are not contributing much in other ways.
- Hostages. Conditions for British citizens still in Kuwait, many of them in hiding, are becoming increasingly difficult. We shall need to consider what advice to give them i.e. whether they should now give themselves up (never a very palatable piece of advice to give). It depends in part what advice other EC countries and the US intend to give.
- Measures against Iraqis in the UK. The Foreign Office and Home Office have been tasked to make recommendations for Friday's meeting on possible measures against the Iraqi Embassy and other Iraqis in the UK. Particular attention will need to be given to the timing of such measures.

DEFENCE

- The main issue is the sending of additional British forces to the Gulf. You have separate papers on this. The Defence Secretary has now steeled himself to a recommendation (attached): extra Harrier, plus ground forces somewhere between an armoured recce regiment (of 1,000) and an armoured brigade (of 7,500-10,000). He joins the Foreign Secretary in urging that the decision be taken to full OD or Cabinet. We must decide this week or we shall look hesitant - indeed there are signs that we are losing our strong standing with American opinion for our prompt and rigorous initial response.
- You might also discuss interdiction of aircraft thought to be breaking sanctions. The first step would be for

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- 3 -

countries concerned to deny them permission for overflights.

The next meeting is set for Friday 14 September.

C.A.P.

Charles Powell

11 September 1990

c: Gulf (MJ)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000

DIRECT DIALING 01-218

11th September

Dear Charles,

FORCE OPTIONS FOR THE GULF

The Prime Minister might find the attached guide helpful, after reading the Defence Secretary's remarks at this evening.

Yours sincerely

Jim Goss

C. D. Pouch Esq.


OP GRANBY - ARMOURED BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT
MAIN EQUIPMENTS

1. CHALLENGER. Main equipment of Armoured Regiment.



Main Battle Tank with Chobham Armour.
57 tanks in Armoured Regiments.
Crew of 4.
120mm rifled gun, firing APFSDS
(armour piercing) ammunition to 2000
metres, HESH (high explosive) to 1500
metres. Carries 52 rounds main armament.
Thermal Imager night gun sight - range 3500m(+).
NBC protected.
Fuel range - 225 Kms.

2. WARRIOR. Main equipment of Armoured Infantry Battalion.



Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle.
Excellent protection and manoevrability;
can keep pace with CHALLENGER MBT.
45 WARRIOR per battalion, at rate of one
per section.
Armed with 30mm Rarden Cannon and 7.62mm
Chain Gun.
Carries 10 men with their equipment.
II (Image Intensifier) night sight - range 1000m.
NBC protected.
Fuel range - 240 Kms.

3. SCIMITAR. Main equipment of Armoured Recce Regiment.



Light tracked recce vehicle.
48 SCIMITAR per regiment.
Armed with 30mm Rarden Cannon
(range 1500 metres)(165 rounds)
and 7.62mm GPMG.
II (Image Intensifier) night sight
(range 1200 metres).
Crew of 3.

4. STRIKER. Subsidiary equipment of Armoured Recce Regiment.



SWINGFIRE anti-tank guided missile
launcher vehicle on SCIMITAR chassis.
16 STRIKER per regiment.
Role to provide overwatch cover for
recce patrols.
Range 4000 m, carries 10 missiles.
Crew of 3.
TI (Thermal Imaging) night sight
(range 4000m).

5. M109. Main equipment of Armoured Brigade s Artillery Regiment.



Self-propelled 155mm artillery gun.
24 guns per regiment, in 3 batteries
of 8 guns.
Range 18,000m.
90 rounds per gun at 1st line.

6. JAVELIN. Air Defence weapon integral to Armoured Brigade.




Hand-held Close Air Defence weapon.
for point defence of key assets.
SACLOS guidance (semi-automatic
command to line-of-sight).
Improved version of BLOWPIPE which
was used in Falklands campaign.
Designed to destroy head-on attacking
aircraft before weapon release.
Range 4500 - 5500m, maximum effective
height 2000m.
12 JAVELIN in a troop, each mounted
in a SPARTAN (based on SCIMITAR
chassis).

7. Engineer Equipment.

A Close Support Squadron RE will provide troops, one each in intimate support of each battle group, each consisting of:

2 x AVRE, 2 x CET, one field troop.



AVRE

Turretless Chieftain chassis with
"roof-rack" for carrying fascines
capable of filling up to 8 metre gap.



CET

Lightly armoured earthmoving equipment.
Capable of swimming.

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22(A-4) *cc/c*

MO 6/17/15D

PRIME MINISTER

OPTIONS FOR GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENTS TO SAUDI ARABIA

I agreed to report this evening on the two options that we discussed this morning, of either an enhanced armoured brigade, or an artillery brigade with a reconnaissance regiment as well. The composition of the two options is described in more detail in Annexes A and B.

Armoured Brigade

2. We know that the US in-theatre commander, Gen Schwarzkopf, regards the tank imbalance between allied and Iraqi forces (likely to be 1:3 even by December) as his major military concern and would particularly value the deployment of a UK armoured unit. An armoured brigade (some 6000-7500 men in total) with 114 Challenger tanks, a battalion of infantry with Warrior armoured fighting vehicles, an artillery regiment and an armoured reconnaissance squadron would provide an all round capability and make a significant contribution towards alleviating the shortage of allied tanks.

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3. The Challenger would be a good match for the very best of the Iraqi tanks (the T72M1). It has had reliability problems but these are mainly with sophisticated turret systems (which are desirable rather than essential). The Army is confident that as long as an above average level of logistic support is provided it will be able to maintain a proper level of operational availability. This would be at the expense of the readiness of our Challenger force in Germany.

4. The outline package therefore includes an extra element of support to ensure that the brigade would be fully sustainable. It might be possible to reduce the third line element (ie the most rearward element along the line of communication). This would depend on the degree to which we could draw upon support from US forces in theatre - this is one of the factors which would need to be established by a very early in-theatre reconnaissance. Although a number of modifications would be required for desert conditions, Challenger was developed from a tank designed specifically to operate in such conditions and the modifications are relatively minor and could be carried out either in transit or on arrival in theatre.

5. I have spoken twice to Sir Colin Chandler today, and asked his Managing Director Mr Boxall to call on me in London. They have not disguised the risks associated with deploying Challenger but believe that - with the modifications envisaged - it will show up well. Vickers have offered to provide free a team of 10 in the Gulf, supplemented by the main turret systems contractors - Barr and Stroud and Marconi.

6. The light armoured vehicles of the reconnaissance squadron (Scorpion family - with an excellent record and used in a number of Middle East countries) and the Warrior vehicles of the armoured infantry battalion (successfully trialled in desert conditions)



would provide an effective additional fighting element and the brigade would also include half the guns of the independent artillery brigade option. Challenger, Warrior and, to a slightly lesser degree, Scorpion/Scimitar all provide collective NBC protection for those inside.

Artillery brigade and reconnaissance regiment

7. A fully self-supporting artillery brigade (48 guns, again approx 6000-7500 men) would also provide a substantial improvement in capability responding to a clear military imbalance (about 2:1 in Iraq's favour at the beginning of November). The brigade would deploy with a fully sufficient stock of ammunition for sustained operations, but this would amount to about two thirds of the immediately available national ammunition of this type. The brigade would have a clear defensive role but would equally be able to provide support for offensive operations if required. In the absence of other UK ground troops, it would need to be integrated into a larger US formation (it has interoperable equipment). A reconnaissance regiment of light armoured vehicles equipped with vehicles of the Scorpion family would provide a further capability in which the British Army has particular expertise (although the US forces are already well provided in this area).

Command and Control

8. Both an artillery brigade and the armoured brigade would need to be closely integrated with US forces. We would, of course, retain the right of decision over whether our forces should be committed to any US operation but, once we had taken such a decision, we would need to assign them to US operational control, although the degree of operational integration would be greater in the case of artillery. This parallels the arrangements for our forces committed to NATO.



Deployment

9. In each case the overall time from a decision to the formation (drawn largely from BAOR) being available for operations in theatre would be about 8-9 weeks. This includes the time necessary to prepare for departure (including acquiring ships from trade), to deploy to the Gulf and to move forward and come to operational readiness. In both cases a very early in-theatre reconnaissance would be absolutely essential to refine the detailed requirements of the option selected and, in particular, to establish the extent of third line support required (for example the degree to which we could rely on existing arrangements for water distribution or casualty evacuation). It would also be essential to set in hand immediately procurement of items required for desert operations.

Costs

10. Until deployment details are clearer it is not possible to identify the additional costs likely to arise, but a very broad estimate of the initial transportation costs alone (around £15M in each case) makes it clear that these would be substantial (and, of course, recovery costs would be similar). Other additional costs are bound to arise for the procurement or modification of equipment to suit the particular conditions of the deployment. I must repeat my warning to OD(G) that the likely magnitude of these additional costs will certainly involve a call on the Reserve.

Conclusion

11. I have spoken to Alan Clark who is away for a couple of days. He believes we must send an integrated force (which an armoured brigade provides) but also consider adding some Lynx helicopters with anti-tank missiles. Previously we assumed that the US would provide helicopters, but I would look specifically at this issue and



consider further whether this should be added after the recce party has returned.

12. Both options would provide a strong political signal and both would respond to a military imbalance but it is clear that, from a military point of view, the US would prefer an armoured brigade. We believe that we could achieve sufficient battle availability of Challenger tanks with proper spares provision and support. Either could be sustained for an extended period (although the artillery option would make greater demands on the immediately available ammunition stocks). The armoured brigade would provide a much more effective and flexible overall fighting force, with a large number of its armoured fighting vehicles and its own artillery regiment in addition to its main battle tanks and, because of its more supporting role, the independent artillery brigade might also be seen as a less direct commitment.

13. I now plan to put the options to General Schwarzkopf tomorrow - making clear the advantages and risks in each. After hearing his comments, I will then circulate a full paper for discussion at OD(G) and OD on Friday.

Ministry of Defence

11H September 1990

T K

(Approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence).

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THE ARMOURED BRIGADE

1. Task Organization. An armoured brigade consisting of an armoured reconnaissance squadron, 2 Challenger regiments, and an armoured infantry battalion together with artillery, engineer and integral first line logistic support numbers some 5150 men.
2. Logistic Support. Further third line, or line of communication, logistic support required to sustain the brigade between the rear maintenance area and the brigade positions numbers a further 2300 men. This will be dependent on a detailed in theatre reconnaissance to determine the degree of allied and host nation support. The numbers required could vary up or down as a result.
3. US Support. This brigade will be dependent on the US formation into which it will be integrated for additional combat support such as area Air Defence (normally provided by Rapier), general support artillery, reconnaissance and anti tank aviation support.
4. Capability. The armoured brigade provides a flexible and hard hitting all arms group capable of both defensive and offensive operations. It is well suited to manoeuvre operations in the open desert. It is sustainable in the long term through roulement.
5. Movement. Movement of the brigade to the Gulf by sea will take in the order of 30-40 days which includes the time required to collect together the STUFT, move to the port and load the shipping. Necessary preparations will have to have been completed beforehand. Any equipments needed for operations in desert conditions not obtained before departure, will have to be flown out to marry up with the brigade in theatre. On arrival in the Gulf the formation will need to unload, move forward up the line of communication, shake out, acclimatize for operations and conduct the necessary battle procedures, before it is ready for operations.
6. Summary of Main Equipments and Manpower.

| | | | |
|-------------|-----|-------------------|-------------|
| MBT | 114 | | |
| Warrior | 70 | | |
| Scorpion | 16 | | |
| Scimitar | 20 | | |
| Striker | 4 | | |
| Milan | 24 | | |
| Mortar 81mm | 8 | | |
| M109 | 24 | | |
| Javelin | 36 | | |
| | | <u>Manpower</u> | |
| | | F Echelon | 3500 |
| | | Immediate log sp | 1650 |
| | | | <u>5150</u> |
| | | Third Line log sp | <u>2300</u> |
| | | TOTAL | 7450 |

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ARTILLERY BRIGADE WITH RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS

1. Task Organisation. An artillery brigade with reconnaissance troops is an ad hoc grouping that is unusual in that it combines 2 separate functions and is not a balanced grouping. The artillery brigade contains two field regiments (M109) together with the necessary engineer and immediate logistic support; this numbers some 4380 men. The reconnaissance element is provided by an armoured reconnaissance regiment with first and second line logistic support, strength 910 men. The total is 5290. This force would need to be integrated with a US formation.

2. Logistic Support. Although logistic support is included in the task organization there will be a need for third line support, either provided by the UK or from US resources. This L of C support would require additional manpower of about 2250. The exact amount of support required will depend on the results of a detailed in-theatre reconnaissance and the amount of allied or host nation support that can be provided.

3. US Support. This force would be dependent upon the US formation with which it is integrated for additional area air defence (normally provided by Rapier), meteorological data and any helicopter lift.

4. Capability. This force would almost certainly be split to different tasks, with the guns being used in one place and the reconnaissance troops being used in another. The M109 regiments would provide an enhancement in an area where there is an imbalance of forces. They would have to be completely integrated with the host US formation. The reconnaissance regiment would provide extra capability and might be used in a wide variety of tasks, but this is an area in which there are already sufficient US assets.

5. Movement. Movement of the force to the Gulf would take some 30-40 days which includes the time to collect the STUFT, the move to the port and loading as well as the 19-20 days sailing time. On arrival further time will be needed to unload, deploy to the area of operations, acclimatise and conduct the necessary battle procedure.

6. Summary of Main Equipments and Manpower.

| <u>Equipment</u> | | <u>Manpower</u> | |
|------------------|----|-----------------|-------------|
| Scimitar | 48 | F Ech | 2560 |
| Striker | 16 | Immed log sp | 2730 |
| M109 | 48 | | <u>5290</u> |
| Javelin | 36 | 3rd line log sp | 2250 |
| | | | <u>7540</u> |

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21(A-B)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15S

11/15 September 1990

MP

Prime Minister

Dear Charles.

You will want to note that we shall have to talk to the Saudis tomorrow about the command & control arrangements for a British

FORCE DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF

I am writing to record the outcome of the consultation with the US about options for further force deployment to the Gulf. As we discussed yesterday evening this was undertaken by Air Vice Marshal Wilson with General Schwarzkopf in Riyadh. *British Contingent, whatever is composition.*

AVM Wilson put to Gen Schwarzkopf the two options. At the Defence Secretary's specific direction he made clear the advantages and disadvantages of each, emphasising in particular questions that have existed about the reliability of the Challenger tank. *is composition.*

AVM Wilson reports that Gen Schwarzkopf was delighted at the prospect of UK ground forces and very grateful for being consulted. General Schwarzkopf was clear that he would prefer the armoured brigade. The Artillery brigade/recce regiment option would not fit into his overall force plan (his staff would be giving us more details so that we can understand his reasoning in more depth). General Schwarzkopf said that he understood that the Challengers might have problems about reliability and sustainability but would still very much like to have them. If the British Government could make them available he would deploy them with MARCENT (the US marine component) situated on the Eastern side of Saudi Arabia based on the sea port of Dhahran. This might allow us to reduce our logistic tail because sea access would be easier and we could draw on the US Marines infrastructure (CDS sees no difficulty with such an arrangement). *12/9.*

General Schwarzkopf saw a potential difficulty with the Saudis about command and control. They saw Prince Khalid as primus inter pares with him - a source of some recent difficulty. The Saudis would instinctively be opposed to UK forces being placed under sole

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street



American control. General Schwarzkopf said that they might be persuaded but we would have to approach this skilfully. He would discuss the problem with General Powell. One approach would be for General Powell to speak to Prince Bandar in the first instance, who could then try to sell the idea to his father. The Defence Secretary might then write direct to Prince Sultan to confirm. It was essential that we should go through this process before any public announcement was made on command and control.

AVM Wilson also mentioned to General Schwarzkopf our likely plans for Tornados. These were warmly welcomed and General Schwarzkopf said he would direct his staff to be helpful about accommodating them. His first reaction would be to deploy the second squadron in the west of Saudi Arabia leaving the first Tornado squadron at Bahrain (all these issues together with the question of trying to bring forward the Jaguar squadron from Thumrait would be looked at further).

AVM Wilson emphasised to General Schwarzkopf that at this stage, he was merely taking soundings at a military-to-military level, but these overtures will be reported to General Powell who is visiting General Schwarzkopf tomorrow. We are now, with the Foreign Office, drawing up plans for consultation with the Saudis. If Ministers wish to make an announcement on Friday afternoon, then we shall have to initiate this soon (ie ahead of the formal OD discussion). The Defence Secretary believes this could now be done on a contingent basis, subject to final decisions on whether, and if so which, ground forces to send.

In another interesting aside which he asked to be carefully protected, General Schwarzkopf said the French had made a direct approach to the Saudis about deploying ground forces to the Red Sea coast. Gen Schwarzkopf commented that this was no use to him at all particularly as they would be under independent command. He said he was having considerable difficulty persuading the Saudis to put their own forces in front line position. They could not, or would not, accept that the best way to put pressure on Saddam Hussein was to convince him we were prepared to fight if necessary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign Office), and to Sir Robin Butler. In view of its sensitivity the subject should be treated in the strictest confidence, though my Secretary of State would of course be happy for our Ambassadors in Riyadh and Washington to be put in the picture on a personal basis.

*Yours sincerely,
John Webb*

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 September 1990

Dear Charles,

CDP (11/9)

Yemen/Saudi Border

Your letter of 7 September asked whether Prince Bandar could be given a target date for the papers the Saudis are seeking on the Yemen/Saudi border.

Unfortunately, the Iraq/Kuwait crisis means that all our Middle East research staff have been drafted to man the Emergency Unit. In addition, Patrick Bannerman, our leading expert on border issues, died in July. So although work has started, the crisis has brought it to a temporary halt.

Our ability to resume this task will depend in large part on the progress of the Kuwait crisis. As soon as an officer can be released the Saudi request will be at the top of his agenda. Given the need to compile as complete a set of documents as possible, the task could take a month or so from the time it is resumed.

We realise that this will be a disappointing response from Prince Bandar's viewpoint but we hope he will recognise that the Kuwait crisis has placed major demands on our resources which were not foreseeable when we originally agreed to the Saudi request.

S L Gass
[Signature]

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Jp 01120

MR POWELL

cc Sir Robin Butler
Mr Wall, FCO
Mr Webb, MOD

Resupply of our Kuwait Embassy

At the Prime Minister's meeting last week I was asked to investigate the possibility of resupplying our Embassy in Kuwait by Special Operations.

2. I have discussed with the relevant Departments and Agencies. The situation in the Kuwait Embassy is that there are four British diplomats headed by the Ambassador. The Embassy in which they live and work is surrounded by 10-12 ft high walls with barbed wire on top. Streets run alongside the walls. Two at least are well lit. Outside, the Embassy is under the surveillance of guards. Kuwait City itself is dense with Iraqi infantry. The occupants reckon they have supplies to last for 50 days (about the end of October with reduced communications activity). After that they will need water, food and fuel.

3. The German Embassy say they will try to hold on as long as possible. They cannot put a figure to this. Utilities to their offices in Kuwait are cut off but their generator has enough fuel for occasional use. The Ambassador's Residence, where all the staff are now living, still has mains power and water. The French have no immediate plans to withdraw their diplomats from Kuwait. Utilities to the French Embassy are cut but they have enough food and water for 2-3 weeks. The State Department estimates that the US Embassy has sufficient supplies for at least one month.

4. We looked at the possibility of resupply of our Embassy by means of a military operation. This has been

carefully examined in the Ministry of Defence and the military view is that the hazards in relation to benefits would be excessive. Kuwait and its approaches are heavily defended. There are mines on the beaches and plentiful air defence. The sea approaches are patrolled by Iraqi fast patrol boats. We have no available submarine and a sea approach would involve bringing in a destroyer or frigate dangerously close to the shore. A parachute drop is impracticable: it would have to be from a considerable height and into a very small landing area. Helicopters would be particularly vulnerable and, although it might be possible for a helicopter to make a one-way journey, landing but not leaving, this would merely add to the number of prisoners and people to be fed and would expose the helicopter crew to probably fatal reprisals by the Iraqis.

5. We have taken soundings on the prospects of using the local population with the help of the Kuwaiti Resistance to drop small quantities of supplies over the walls at night.

**THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT**

The initial reaction was that resupply of the Embassy in this way would be very difficult and dangerous. The Kuwaitis will, however, examine it further.

6. I understand the FCO has a submission in hand intended to clarify policy over EC Embassies staying on in Kuwait. This will examine the benefit/cost equation of staying on beyond the next two weeks.

ke
PERCY CRADOCK

11 September 1990

Secret and Personal

16.



Prime Minister

Prime Minister

The Attorney wanted me to give you this, but not tell the other party.



I have served in tanks and have kept up my interest in armoured warfare, and I have no personal interest in whether Challenger is sent to the Gulf.

He thinks sending Challenger up against the Iraqis would be suicidal. COP 11/9.

I think your instinctive reservations are right. The function of the tank on the battlefield is to knock out the enemy's tanks: it is no more than a mobile gun platform. I suggest you should ask for a report on Challenger's sighting and fire control capacity, and for another on the extent to which Challenger regiments in Germany have been able in the past year to exercise, in armoured formations at all, under pressure of financial constraints and German environmental constraints. You will I think find that exercising has been drastically cut back. Contrast Iraqi recent experience in the use of ammunition, in desert conditions.

Artillery will have been better able to train: it delivers a front-line punch: and it is less dependant on infantry protection at night, being further to the rear.

PM 11/9/90

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|--|---|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3081</i> (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
| Extract details: <i>Turnball to Craddock 11/9/90</i> |  |
| CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION | |
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| MISSING (TNA USE ONLY) | |
| DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY) | |



W.S.

THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828 1386

Sir Robin Butler KCB, CVO
The Secretary of the Cabinet
and Head of the Home Civil Service,
Cabinet Office,
70 Whitehall,
London,
SW1.

COP 12/9.

11 September 1990

Dear Sir Robin,

The Attorney General has seen the revised version of the draft message attached to your letter to Juliet Wheldon of 11 September. He is quite content with the text, which indeed is very similar to his own redraft.

will cop?

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Chief of the Defence Staff and to Sir Percy Cradock.

Yours

date *W.S.*

E. S. WILMSHURST

17(A-B) CCPC ①
Prime Minister

Ref.A090/2109

MR POWELL

Yours
Center with
this address?
CBP 11/9.

Draft Message from the Amir of Kuwait to the Prime Minister

--- I attach a revision of the draft message considered by OD(G) this morning. This has been cleared with the Attorney General.

2. You will have seen from telegram No.143 from Jeddah that the Kuwaitis are themselves envisaging a letter from the Amir to the US, UK and other allies asking for military action. Subject to the Prime Minister's agreement therefore, it would be timely for the FCO to discuss this draft with the Kuwaitis and then with the Americans, as envisaged by OD(G) this morning.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

11 September 1990

Not scanned (not working!)

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

B

I wish to express the renewed gratitude of my Government and the people of Kuwait for the firm and clear measures taken by the Government of the United Kingdom described in Your Excellency's message of 29 August. These measures and those taken by other friendly nations at the request of the Government of Kuwait to deal with the Iraqi aggression have not produced the desired result. Instead, Iraq continues to defy the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, which calls for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of our lawful authority, and continues in unlawful occupation of our territory. Accordingly I hereby confirm the request already made orally to you by representatives of my Government that, in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Government of the United Kingdom take such further military steps as are necessary to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate Government.

Requests in similar terms are being addressed to the Governments of.....

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177013
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1222

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OF 110330Z SEPTEMBER 90
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TOKYO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

en

UKMIS TELNO 1205: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS TO RE-INTRODUCE IN THE FIVE THEIR IDEAS FOR A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, SWEEPING UP CURRENT OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND TIGHTENING THE SCREW AGAINST IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. AT THE END OF DISCUSSION AMONG AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE ON 10 SEPTEMBER ON THE SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS TO IRAQ (AND MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ACTION ON FOODSTUFFS AND JORDAN SHOULD BE OUT OF THE WAY FIRST) THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOW TURNED DOWN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT. (COMMENT: WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS TO THIS EFFECT, BUT HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THEM.) THE TIME HAD THEREFORE COME TO REVIVE THE IDEA OF A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THIS COULD SWEEP UP ALL THE ISSUES OUTSTANDING BEFORE THE COUNCIL - THE POSITION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT, THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, THE IRAQI REJECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL FOR A VISIT TO KUWAIT, LOOTING BY IRAQI SOLDIERS AND THE RECENT KUWAITI COMPLAINTS ABOUT EXECUTIONS AND MASS ARRESTS (KUWAITI LETTER ALREADY FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT).

3. PICKERING ADDED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE LOOKING AGAIN AT EARLIER U S DRAFTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A RESOLUTION WOULD INCLUDE RESTRICTIONS ON IRAQI DIPLOMATS, APPEALS TO UN SUBORDINATE BODIES TO COMPLY FULLY WITH SANCTIONS, CALLS ON GOVERNMENTS TO IMPOUND IRAQI SHIPS IN THIRD COUNTRY PORTS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EMBARGO ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY AIR TO IRAQ.

4. PICKERING SAID HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A TEXT READY FOR CIRCULATION AMONG THE FIVE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 11 SEPTEMBER. HE RESISTED PRESSURE TO CIRCULATE IT EARLIER, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS SEEKING TO IRON OUT WITH WASHINGTON CERTAIN POINTS WHICH COULD CAUSE PARTNERS DIFFICULTIES.

HANNAY

YYYY

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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 September 1990

I have tried to telephone you about fixing a time when you could come to see the Prime Minister but I understand you may be away for a few days.

Since Mrs. Thatcher herself will be away next week and we then enter a particularly difficult period running up to the Party Conference, she wondered whether you could wait until the House returns in mid-October? Perhaps you could give me or Peter Morrison a ring in early October to arrange a slot in the Prime Minister's diary.

MRS. AMANDA PONSONBY

Robert Hayward, Esq., M.P.

df

A: Hayward

cc PHM.

cu

GENERAL SIR MARTIN FARNDALE, KCB

Worthing (0903) 771125

13-9
Sea Barn Manor
Kingston Gorse
East Preston
Sussex BN16 1SB

Dear Charles,

11 Sep 1990.

It was very nice to meet the Prime Minister, Mr Thatcher and yourself on the Shorts Stand at the Farnborough Air Show last week.

I will simply say that, at this testing time, I stand ready to help in any way I can. I have served with Armours in the deserts of Egypt and the Sinai and for some years along the Saudi Arabian border with the old South Arabian Protectorate in the 1960s. I have commanded armours at brigade, division, corps and Army Group level and am well aware of the problems our force will face.

Yours sincerely

Martin Farndale

dti

the department for Enterprise

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uk
②

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Prime Minister

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

It sounds as though we shall need to galvanize

the EC - there is no reason why we should be more forthcoming than others.

CBP 12/9
HAP

Direct line 071-215 5623

Our ref PE9087

Your ref

Date 11 September 1990

Dear Charles,

My Secretary of State has seen your letter of 24 August reporting the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with President Ozal of Turkey and the President's letter of 4 September in which he repeats his request for a 30-35% increase in the EC restraint levels for imports of Turkish textiles.

It was helpful that the Prime Minister pointed to the sensitivity of textiles for the UK. Turkey is the Community's largest supplier of textiles products but maintains considerable barriers to EC textile exports, in breach of its obligations under the Association Agreement. Parliament and the UK industry have voiced strong concern about this. Increases of the order proposed would therefore attract considerable criticism and it is anyway very doubtful that there would be sufficient support from other Member States for increases of the size proposed by President Ozal.

Nonetheless, the request gives us a chance to speed up the liberalisation of the textiles and clothing voluntary restraints on Turkey which distort our market and are increasingly difficult to justify as we work towards a phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangements within the Uruguay Round.

My Secretary of State considers, therefore, that we should respond sympathetically to the Turkish request and be ready to contemplate an increase in the restraint levels, though certainly not as much as President Ozal has suggested. Given Turkey's own

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barriers we should look to her in return, but without making it a condition, to improve conditions of trade and access to her market. My Secretary of State also feels that it would lessen the inevitable criticism from our domestic industry if we were acting as part of an EC response to the Turkish plight. In initial discussion on 5 September with textile officials the Commission (supported by Italy and France) was not inclined to make any proposals on trade concessions but will anyway be having discussions with the Turks later this month on the Community's existing restrictions. It looks as if nothing will be forthcoming from the Commission at least for the September Foreign Affairs Council but we shall keep in close touch with them and Member States.

Given their very tough textiles import restrictions, it would be appropriate if the US were also to allow some increases to Turkey. The US did agree to some modest increases in May which they say it might be risky to reopen, given the highly protectionist Textiles Bill pending in Congress, though they will consider if the May arrangements can be applied more flexibly so as to allow some further uplift. When it becomes clearer what is emerging from the Community there should be further contact with the Americans to hear what they are doing.

You will doubtless be asking FCO to co-ordinate a draft reply to President Ozal's letter. Our advice on textiles will reflect the position in the second and fourth paragraphs above.

Hanns
Rosalind Cole

ROSALIND COLE
Private Secretary

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SECRET

etc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16

*CNP
149.*

11 September 1990

Dear Sonia,

MILITARY OPTIONS : REQUEST FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

I have no further comment on the draft message from the Amir of Kuwait circulated under cover of your letter of this morning. I would like, however, to draw attention in this context to the telegram from Mr Blackley in Jedda (telno 143 of 11 September) reporting on the Shadow Foreign Secretary's meetings with Kuwaiti Ministers which contains the news that the Kuwaitis are already proposing to send messages to those with forces in Saudi Arabia on similar lines to those we have discussed. As the initiative has now been taken by the Kuwaitis, it is therefore very much in our interests to present our own text to them as soon as possible as the suggested basis of any letter the Amir may issue.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Energy, the Chief of the Defence Staff and to Sir Percy Craddock.

Yours sincerely

Dominic Asquith

The Hon Dominic Asquith
Private Secretary to
The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

Ms Sonia Phippard
Private Secretary
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, COLOMBO, MANILA, DHAKA,
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INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA

MODEV TELNO 25 TO ANKARA: IRAQ/KUWAIT: INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
FOR MIGRATION

SUMMARY

1. IOM PLEASED BY RESPONSE SO FAR TO THEIR APPEAL FOR FUNDS TO
TRANSPORT EVACUEES FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

DETAIL

2. IOM DIRECTOR GENERAL, PURCELL, TOLD US LATE YESTERDAY, 10
SEPTEMBER, THAT IOM HAD BEEN ABLE SO FAR TO CHARTER SOME 43,000
SEATS FOR USE OVER THE COMING DAYS TO HELP AIRLIFT EVACUEES FROM
IRAQ/KUWAIT TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. HE SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO
OUR #2M CONTRIBUTION, BOTH JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAD EACH
CONTRIBUTED DOLLARS 12M. SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS HAD ALSO BEEN
FORTHCOMING FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, DENMARK AND CANADA. THE IOM
HAD THEREFORE MET THEIR INITIAL TARGET OF DOLLARS 23.5M.

3. PURCELL ALSO TOLD US THAT THE PROBLEMS ON THE IRAQ/IRAN BORDER
WERE INCREASING. THE IOM'S DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, JENNY, WAS
PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO IRAN TO HELP ASSESS REQUIREMENTS. JENNY HOPED,
HOWEVER, TO BE IN AMMAN ON THURSDAY 13 SEPTEMBER, WHEN HE LOOKED
FORWARD TO MEETING MRS CHALKER (AMMAN TELNO 28 TO ODA).

MORLAND

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MR ~~GOULDEN~~ TAIT
MR JAY
MR SLATER
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PAGE 2
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SECRET AND PERSONAL

DEDIP

FROM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1697

15(A-9)

OF S112203Z SEPTEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), MODUK (PERSONAL FOR PS/MR KING)

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 1696

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BAKER: GULF

1. BAKER SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING AT HELSINKI. THE JOINT STATEMENT WAS A GOOD ONE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION HAD BEEN GREAT AND MUCH APPRECIATED. THE STATEMENT HAD CONTAINED STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ AND WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL MEASURES. IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESS, BAKER WAS SAYING THAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD MEAN EXTRA SANCTIONS, EG SANCTIONS AGAINST SANCTIONS-BUSTERS OR MEASURES TO PREVENT TRADE BY AIR. HE WAS ALSO SAYING THAT THE STATEMENT DID NOT EXCLUDE FORCE. IT COULD COVER ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI, PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SEEMED TO BE EMPHATIC ABOUT PULLING AMERICAN TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOW DID THAT SQUARE WITH BAKER'S REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR A LONGER TERM PRESENCE? BAKER, TO WHOM THE POINT APPEARED TO BE A NEW ONE, SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS TALKING ABOUT GETTING TROOPS OUT AS QUICKLY AS WAS FEASIBLE BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WHILE THE THREAT LASTED. IF THE THREAT DIMINISHED, CERTAINLY SOME OF THE TROOPS COULD COME OUT. THE US WANTED TO SEE REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION IN THE LEAD AND WITH PARTICIPATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES (BY IMPLICATION OTHER THAN THE US).
3. BAKER SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN THE HELSINKI STATEMENT. THE AMERICANS HAD RESISTED USE OF THOSE BUZZ WORDS. THERE MUST BE NO LINKAGE. WE DID NOT WANT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO LEAVE KUWAIT TRUMPETING IT ABOARD THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE. HENCE THE LANGUAGE EVENTUALLY AGREED. BAKER NOTED THAT DE MICHELIS HAD SAID THAT THE COMMUNITY WOULD NEGOTIATE A STATEMENT ON IRAQ WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE SHOULD WATCH OUT FOR THE SOVIET UNION RETURNING TO THE CHARGE.
4. BAKER SAID THE UNITED STATES DID NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WITH THE COALITION OF ARAB STATES THAT HAD BEEN PUT TOGETHER, THERE MIGHT BE BETTER PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR WORKING WITH ISRAEL ONCE SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS OUT OF KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THIS STILL LEFT THE PROBLEM OF FINDING PALESTINIANS TO TALK TO. BAKER SAID THAT IF SYRIA, EGYPT AND THE GULF STATES WERE WORKING TOGETHER, THEY WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF FINDING A DIALOGUE PARTNER OR PARTNERS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN THE PROBLEM BEFORE: THE EXISTENCE OF THE COALITION COULD PUT USEFUL PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS. THE COALITION MIGHT ALSO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PALESTINIANS. BAKER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE LGULF ARABS WERE FED UP WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BAKER SAID THAT MUBARAK HAD PUBLICLY DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARAFAT ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PALESTINIANS ON THE OTHER.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRINCE & SULTAN'S STATEMENT ON AN ATTACK ON SADDAM HUSSEIN NOT BEING LAUNCHED FROM SAUDI TERRITORY. BAKER, LIKE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, HAD FOUND SAUDI ATTITUDES VERY DIFFERENT IN PRIVATE. THE SAUDIS, SAID BAKER, HAD BEEN WILLING TO HOLD THE AMERICANS' COATS FOR THE LAST 4 WEEKS. THEY WERE VERY EAGER FOR ACTION AND DID NOT WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WHEN KING FAHD TALKED ABOUT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WHAT HE WANTED WAS A RESOLUTION TO LIBERATE KUWAIT UNDER ARTICLE 42. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN ASKING FOR THAT SINCE THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST WHEN THE AMERICANS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE CHANCES OF SECURING SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE BETWEEN SLIM AND NONE. BUT THE SAUDIS' FIRST CHOICE REMAINED ARTICLE 42, WITH ARTICLE 51 AS SECOND CHOICE. IF THERE WERE PROVOCATION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, THEN THE SAUDIS THOUGHT THAT THE RESPONSE SHOULD NOT BE A MEASURED ONE. THEY WOULD WANT HIM HIT HARD. THEY DID NOT WANT HIM TO SURVIVE.

6. BAKER SPOKE WITH APPRECIATION OF THE DOLLARS TWELVE BILLION WHICH THE SAUDIS HAD PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE TO US COSTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE YEAR. BAKER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS REALLY APPRECIATED WHAT BRITAIN HAD DONE AND THE FURTHER WE WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER. THE QUESTION OF GROUND FORCES WOULD BECOME AN ISSUE WITH CONGRESS. PUBLIC SUPPORT, WHICH HAD BEEN GREATER THAN THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HOPED, COULD BE MAINTAINED IF:

- 1) THE NATO ALLIES COULD PROVIDE GROUND FORCES:
- 2) THERE COULD BE MORE OF A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE FRG IN TERMS OF FINANCE, SEA LIFT CAPABILITY AND TANK TRANSPORT (THE LATTER BEING PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO GET IN THE EGYPTIAN CONTINGENTS):
- 3) A BETTER PERFORMANCE BY JAPAN.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD CERTAINLY DO MORE OURSELVES AND THE EXACT METHOD WAS BEING URGENTLY DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS MEETINGS IN JAPAN AND HOW HE HAD URGED THE JAPANESE TO DO MORE UNDER THE THREE HEADINGS: HELP FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES, HELP FOR THE EVACUEES AND HELP FOR THE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF SANCTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD NOT BEEN PERSUADED BY MUCH OF WHAT KAIFU HAD SAID BUT KAIFU WOULD BE GOING TO THE AREA IN OCTOBER AND HE THOUGHT THE JAPANESE WOULD OFFER MORE UNDER THE THREE HEADINGS. HE DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD SEND SHIPS. THE BEST APPROACH WAS NOT TO SHOUT AT THE JAPANESE, SINCE THAT PRODUCED ANTI BODIES, BUT TO KEEP UP PERSISTENT PRESSURE. HIS OWN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT KAIFU WAS A DOVE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS HELPFUL AND THAT SOME OF THE PARTY BIG-WIGS MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ZOELLICK SAID THAT HASHIMOTO WAS THE REAL STUMBLING BLOCK. SINCE HE WAS PART OF THE TAKESHITA FACTION, IT MIGHT BE WORTH HAVING A GO AT TAKESHITA. BAKER SAID THAT HE MIGHT GET THE PRESIDENT TO WEIGH IN. IF THE JAPANESE DID NOT DO MORE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD GET UNSHIRTED HELL IN CONGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE WELL AWARE THAT THEIR STANDING IN THE UNITED STATES DEPENDED ON THEIR CONTRIBUTION IN THIS CRISIS. THAT WOULD HELP ERODE HASHIMOTO'S POSITION.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE VERY CONTENT WITH THE COOPERATION WE HAD WITH THE AMERICANS IN THE GULF. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT WE WERE PRIVY TO AMERICAN THINKING. BAKER SAID THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS PRIVY TO EVERYTHING HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT. HIS MIND WAS NOW TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF NON PROLIFERATION IN RESPECT OF IRAQ. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE REMOVED FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT A WAR, THEN THERE NEEDED TO BE A MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT A CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO TO PREVENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WAR MACHINE FROM REVIVING. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO PROTECT THE GULF. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE ENOUGH FORCES ON THE GROUND TO MOVE INTO KUWAIT. IT WOULD BE ABOUT SIX WEEKS BEFORE THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE INTO KUWAIT. AT THAT STAGE, CAREFUL STOCK SHOULD BE TAKEN OF WHETHER TO TAKE ACTION. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ONE. ONE POINT BAKER HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FROM THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS THAT AKROMEYEV HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS WERE GOOD AND THAT THERE WOULD BE MAJOR CASUALTIES IN ANY CONFRONTATION. THE IRAQIS WERE SOVIET TRAINED. THE AMERICANS DISCOUNTED THAT VIEW TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THE IRAQIS TO BE THAT GOOD BUT THEY DID AGREE WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT, IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT, THERE WOULD BE MAJOR CASUALTIES. WHEN WE GOT TO THE POINT OF DECISION ON THE NEXT STEP, WE SHOULD NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION BUT WE SHOULD NOT GO DOWN THAT ROUTE UNLESS WE WERE CERTAIN FROM PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS THAT WE HAD THE SUPPORT FROM THE FIVE. GIVEN THE WAY THINGS HAD GONE SO FAR, HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION WAS UNATTAINABLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED ON THE ADVANTAGES OF AN ARTICLE 42 RESOLUTION SUBJECT TO THE PROVISOS BAKER HAD MENTIONED. WE MUST NOT ALLOW OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION TO BE CURTAILED HOWEVER. BAKER AGREED. ARTICLE 42 ALSO RAISED THE PROBLEM OF A UN COMMAND, WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR.

9. LATER IN THE MEETING, WHEN BAKER LEARNED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TO HAVE DINNER WITH GENSCHER, HE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO URGE ON HIM THE NEED FOR STRONG GERMAN SUPPORT IN THIS FIRST CRISIS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA. THE GERMANS HAD COME UP WITH A SEA AND AIR-LIFT CAPACITY BUT SAID THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION DEBARRED A CONTRIBUTION. KOHL WAS STRONG ON THIS ISSUE BUT GENSCHER WAS WEAK AND NEGATIVE. WE SHOULD LET GENSCHER KNOW THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED HIM ON UNIFICATION. THIS ISSUE WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE REST OF THE ALLIES AND SHOULD BE TO THE GERMANS AS WELL. ZOELLICK COMMENTED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE TO FACE UP TO MORE OF THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE. WHAT BETTER PLACE TO START THAN THIS ONE, WHERE THERE WAS SUCH A STRONG INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS?

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD SUCH A FERTILE AND INGENIOUS MIND THAT HE (AND DE MICHELIS) MIGHT WELL START TO LOOK FOR SOME GERMAN/EUROPEAN WAY OF SETTLING THIS ISSUE WHICH FELL SHORT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. WE WOULD HAVE TO BE VIGILANT.

11. BAKER DESCRIBED HIS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN ALEXANDRIA. MUBARAK BELIEVED THAT THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL HAD BEEN GEARED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLANS TO INVADE KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD LOBBIED MUBARAK HARD TO JOIN. MUBARAK THOUGHT IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD NOT HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLANS. KING HUSSEIN HAD SENT MUBARAK DOLLARS FIFTY MILLION FOR THE POOR PEOPLE OF EGYPT. MUBARAK HAD EXPRESSED ANAZEMENT. WHAT WAS THIS FOR, GIVEN THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE POOR PEOPLE IN IRAQ THAN IN EGYPT? SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD, BEFORE THE INVASION, ALSO SENT 3 ROLLS ROYCES, ONE TO MUBARAK, ONE TO KING HUSSEIN AND ONE TO PRESIDENT SALEH OF YEMEN. ONLY MUBARAK HAD SENT HIS BACK.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN IN JORDAN. THE KING WAS UNDOUBTEDLY SHAKEN BUT WAS STILL EQUIVOCATING. BAKER SAID THAT JORDAN WAS SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS ON SANCTIONS AND WAS BEGINNING TO MAKE BETTER EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THEM. BAKER, DURING HIS OWN VISIT TO THE GULF, HAD NOT THOUGHT IT POLITIC TO MENTION JORDAN'S PLIGHT TO THE KUWAITIS, SAUDIS OR THE UAE BUT JORDAN WAS ON THE JAPANESE AND COMMUNITY LIST AS A COUNTRY TO BE HELPED. BAKER AGREED WITH US THAT ANY FORESEEABLE ALTERNATIVE TO KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE WORSE. OTHER ARAB LEADERS BAKER HAD SPOKEN TO HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT GIVING KING HUSSEIN AN AMBIGUOUS MESSAGE.

13

THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, KASIH WAS FED UP WITH THE WAY JORDANIAN POLICY WAS BEING CONDUCTED. BAKER WAS NOT SO SURE. HE THOUGHT HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN MOST IN FAVOUR OF JORDANIAN LINKS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. BEN SHAKER HAD BEEN MUCH MORE CRITICAL AT AN EARLY STAGE.

14. BAKER SAID THAT AFTER MOSCOW HE WOULD BE GOING TO SYRIA, ITALY AND GERMANY. DE MICHELIS HAD SAID THAT ITALY WOULD LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SOME AIR SUPPORT.

BRAITHWAITE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1229

OF 112125Z SEPTEMBER 90
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INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI RIYADH, AMMAN, ANKARA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 538: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

1. ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN TUR, URGING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A HIGH-PROFILE AND EXPERENCED PERSON WHO COULD COORDINATE THE RELIEF EFFORT ON THE BORDERS OF IRAQ.
2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE HAD IT IN MIND TO APOINT JUST SUCH A PERSON. HE HAD MADE HIS CHOICE AND THIS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY. HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT AN EXPERIENCED AND HIGH LEVEL COORDINATOR SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE. HE COULD ASSURE ME ALSO THAT PLANS WERE GOING AHEAD VERY QUICKLY FOR A MAJOR COORDINATED RELIEF EFFORT WHICH COULD BE SET IN MOTION AS SOON AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOOK UP HIS APPOINTMENT.
3. THIS TELEGRAM CONSTITUTES THE TRIGGER REFERRED TO IN PARA 4 OF TUR FOR ACTION IN NEW DELHI, CAIRO, BELGRADE, ISLAMABAD, COLOMBO, MANILA AND UKMIS GENEVA.

HANNAY

YYYY

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MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 1222 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. WHEN I PRESENTED MY LETTER OF APPOINTMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 11 SEPTEMBER I SAID THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO HIM HER GOOD WISHES, AND IN PARTICULAR HER ADMIRATION OF HIS FIRM HANDLING OF TARIQ AZIZ AT HIS RECENT MEETING IN AMMAN.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION. HIS TALK WITH TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT. THE MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS HAD CONTAINED NO FLEXIBILITY. HE HAD OFFERED TO PURSUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS AFTER TARIQ AZIZ HAD RETURNED TO BAGHDAD FOR FRESH INSTRUCTIONS: THIS COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE EITHER IN AMMAN OR IN GENEVA AFTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ENGAGEMENTS IN PARIS. BUT TARIQ AZIZ HAD DECLINED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD WARNED HIM THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO TELL THE WORLD THAT HE WAS COMING AWAY FROM THEIR DISCUSSIONS EMPTY HANDED.
3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE WAS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSITION OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, IN PARTICULAR THE LARGE ASIAN COMMUNITIES WHO DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE ACCESS TO FOODSTUFFS. HE HAD NOW RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE THAT HE SHOULD SEND A TEAM TO DRAW UP A REPORT ON THE FOOD SITUATION. BUT AT PRESENT HE HAD NO-ONE IN BAGHDAD WHO COULD PERFORM THAT TASK. IT WOULD REQUIRE A SIZEABLE MISSION WITH THE RIGHT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE IRAQIS WOULD REACT. THEY HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE CURRENTLY IN BAGHDAD (ANNAN) SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT TO MAKE AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS THERE. CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, IN PARTICULAR OVER KUWAIT, OF COURSE HAD A PARTICULAR POLITICAL

SENSITIVITY. FOR THAT REASON HE WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BACKING FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL: HE WOULD ASK FOR THAT IN HIS REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WHICH WAS AT PRESENT BEING DRAFTED.

4. I SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ABOUT THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, AND WERE WORKING URGENTLY IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM. BUT THE CENTRAL ISSUE SHOULD NEVER BE OVERLOOKED. IRAQ HAD THE FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEEDING FOREIGN NATIONALS ON ITS TERRITORY. IT WAS MAKING CYNICAL USE OF THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY TO EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE REST OF THE WORLD. WHILE FOOD SHOULD OF COURSE BE PROVIDED IN HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS RIGHT THAT CLEAR GUIDELINES SHOULD BE DRAWN UP TO CONTROL ITS DISTRIBUTION AND ENSURE THAT IT REACHED THOSE WHO WERE IN NEED.

5. ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES SEE MIFT.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15D

11th September 1990

Eric Rintin
COP 12/9

Dear Charles

I am writing to let you know of the Defence Secretary's plans to deploy three Royal Navy ATTACKER class patrol craft to the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).

The deployment will be made, on a temporary basis, in the light of the increased terrorist threat to the SBAs from pro-Iraqi/Libyan terrorist groups, which has arisen as a result of the Gulf crisis. The SBAs have good defences to landward already, but the ability of the garrison to carry out sea patrols of the lengthy SBA coastline is limited. The ATTACKERS, which will be manned by RN crews and armed with machine guns, will provide a 24 hour sea patrol capability and act as a useful deterrent while the threat remains high. We are discussing with HM Customs and Excise whether additional Customs Officers could be deployed to SBAs so as to allow increased routine searching of vessels (for which only they and police have legal powers).

The vessels to be deployed are currently serving with University Royal Naval Units. There will be no significant penalties arising from their withdrawal from these duties, and they will return to the Universities when they are no longer required in Cyprus. The additional cost for a six month deployment is estimated at about £250K.

We are considering how to make this public, perhaps grouping up with announcements on further deployments to the Gulf area itself.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO), John Gieve (HM Treasury), Colin Neilson (Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Attorney-General's Office), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Eric Rintin
Eric Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Gulf Crisis

I attach the main

overnight Telegrams —

principally to record

of Jim Baker's

debriefing of NATO on

the Helsinki Summit.

Our European allies do

not come out too well.

C.B.P.: 11/9

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 1209c



PRESIDENT
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
DHAKA

10 September, 1990.

MS

Excellency,

I have the honour to convey to you and through you to the Government and the people of your great country, our sincere thanks for the prompt assistance that your Government extended to Bangladesh through the International Organization for Migration. This organization is rendering commendable service by repatriating thousands of Bangladeshis who left Kuwait and took shelter in Jordan. Your valuable contribution has made this operation of colossal magnitude possible.

While expressing our deep appreciation for this humanitarian gesture we recall with gratitude the valuable assistance that we received from the United Kingdom during the devastating floods of 1987 and 1988. We are confident that your great country will continue to maintain this friendly interest in Bangladesh.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

(HUSSAIN MUHAMMAD ERSHAD)

Her Excellency
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
LONDON.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T209A/90

DELIVERED 10 SEP 90

SUBJECT CC OPS
MASTER

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Your Excellency,

The painful events and the increasing tension which are prevailing in the Gulf region and their exceptionally grave implications on the regional and international levels are for us a source of preoccupation and of deep concern.

The recent developments to which we pay a particular attention have led us to make continuous efforts in order to defuse the crisis and contain its impact with the aim to preserve peace and security in the world and consolidate international detente.

Taking into account all these considerations I felt I had to have consultations with Your Excellency on the appropriate means to initiate urgent actions to that end.

Therefore I have appointed Mr. Habib BEN YAHIA, Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as a Special Envoy to Your Excellency to reiterate our deep esteem and highest consideration. Mr. BEN YAHIA will also convey to Your Excellency our assessment of this grave crisis and will be very interested to know your views over the measures that could be taken for a peaceful and urgent settlement of this conflict.

Indeed we have to eliminate all risks of a military confrontation which would have disastrous effects on the Gulf region and would seriously threaten peace and security in the world.

In this respect I should like to submit to your Excellency some ideas and suggestions as our contribution to the common thinking effort to find a way out from this hard situation.

I would like to express the hope that Your Excellency will favorably consider these proposals and give them your precious support.

With my highest consideration.

ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI

President of the Tunisian Republic

Her Excellency
Mrs. Margaret THATCHER
Prime Minister of the United-Kingdom

**Tunisian proposals for a settlement
to the Gulf crisis.**

In conformity with the international legality and without siding with any party to the conflict,

Anxious to avoid further divisions within Arab ranks and to preserve peace and security in the region,

Convinced that it is necessary to reach a peaceful solution to this issue,

Tunisia is proposing a number of preliminary ideas as a starting point for negotiations and as a step towards settling the dispute in such a way that the rights of the conflicting parties are preserved and peace and security and stability are insured in the whole Gulf region.

While filing this draft, Tunisia considers that this is a sound basis which could be further enriched and a starting point which could be further developed by additional proposals or necessary amendments, in order to conceive a final peace plan to be submitted to the Security Council for consideration and approval.

1- The announcement by Irak that it will liberate western citizens detained on its soil and that it is determined to withdraw from Kuwait as provided by this plan, will be timed with the announcement, before the Security Council, by those countries which have sent their military forces to the Middle-East, of their pledge not to launch any attack against Irak.

2- Then the withdrawal of Iraki forces from Kuwait will start with their replacement by Arab forces to be agreed upon and placed under the Security Council responsibility

3- The Security Council will decide to hold the embargo measures against Irak and to cancel them at the end of withdrawal operations.

4- Free legislative elections will be held in Kuwait under the sponsorship of the United Nations and the supervision of Arab Forces with the aim of bringing about a Representative Assembly with full powers.

5- The Representative Assembly will decide :

- whether to accept or oppose union with Irak.
- on the Ruling Family status.

6- The Representative Assembly will appoint a Government that will define border lines and will compensate Irak for losses incurred by oil drillings in a disputed oil field and will cancel Iraki debts due to Kuwait.

7- The Arab States as a whole commit themselves to ensure safety and security to the Gulf States .

8- Withdrawal of the foreign military forces from the region.

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SIC I9M

PART ONE OF FOUR PARTS

TOKYO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 10 SEPTEMBER: GULF
CRISIS: BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

SUMMIT

1. BAKER STRESSED NEED FOR NATO TO MEET OUT OF AREA THREAT. CALLS FOR MORE LIFT ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY TO EGYPT. THANKS UK AND FRANCE FOR LAND BASED FORCES, CALLS ON OTHERS TO PROVIDE GROUND FORCES. CALLS RUSSIANS 'RELIABLE PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION' AND SAYS THAT U S AND SOVIET UNION ARE UNITED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW. SETS OUT FURTHER MEASURES FOR NATO ALLIES TO CONSIDER. WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR GENERAL U S POSITION, THOUGH SOME ALLIES STRESS NEED TO ACT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UN. RECOMMENDATION THAT UK CONSIDER U S PROPOSALS SYMPATHETICALLY.

DETAIL

2. WOERNER (SECRETARY GENERAL) THANKED BAKER FOR THE EARLY BRIEFING ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. HE RECALLED THE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS IN NATO SINCE THE LAST MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 10 AUGUST. HE URGED CONTINUED CONSULTATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF FULL SOLIDARITY.

3. BAKER (US) SAID THAT THE NAC WAS MEETING TO REAFFIRM ITS SOLIDARITY AND TO REASSERT ITS OBJECTIVE OF UNDOING THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. THE CRISIS WAS A POLITICAL TEST OF HOW THE POST-COLD WAR ORDER WOULD WORK. WE SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLIDIFY THE GROUND RULES OF THE NEW ORDER AND TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS IN NATO AND THE WEU WOULD BE A MEASURE OF HOW WELL WESTERN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS COULD ADAPT TO TODAY'S DANGERS AND TOMORROW'S THREATS. NATO MUST BE ABLE TO MEET

THREATS LIKE THAT POSED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO THREATENED THE NEW WORLD ORDER, OUR 'COURAGEOUS ALLY' TURKEY AND THE HEALTH OF THE WORLD ECONOMY. WE COULD NOT PERMIT A DICTATOR TO OBTAIN A DEATH GRIP ON THE ECONOMIC LIFELINE OF THE WORLD.

4. BAKER RECALLED THE TRIPS TO EUROPE, ASIA AND THE GULF BY BRADY AND HIMSELF TO PROMOTE 'RESPONSIBILITY SHARING'. THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED THEM TO MOBILISE, COORDINATE AND SUSTAIN THE UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL COALITION, AND TO ADDRESS THE VITAL NEEDS OF STATES WHICH WERE PAYING THE PRICE FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION AND ENFORCING UN SANCTIONS. WE MUST STAND WITH THOSE WHO WERE BEING VICTIMISED BY AN INTERNATIONAL PREDATOR, DEFEND THE WORLD ECONOMY AND DEFEND OUR OWN CITIZENS WHO WERE BEING USED AS HUMAN SHIELDS. IN THE GULF, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAD MADE GENEROUS PLEDGES OF AROUND USD 12 BILLION WHICH WOULD COVER MUCH OF THE U S'S INCREMENTAL DEFENCE COSTS AS WELL AS SUPPORTING THE EGYPTIAN AND TURKISH ECONOMIES, AMONG OTHERS. DESPITE GREAT COSTS, MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE HAD MOBILISED AGAINST SADDAM. EGYPT WAS SENDING TWO GROUND DIVISIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, BUT IT NEEDED LIFT CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED BY EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES, TO TRANSPORT THESE FORCES AND TO BRING HOME EGYPTIAN REFUGEES. BAKER HOPED THAT THE USD 7 BILLION DEBT WHICH THE U S WAS FORGIVING EGYPT WOULD BUILD MOMENTUM FOR STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THAT COUNTRY.

5. BAKER THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FOR THE FORCES COMMITTED TO THE GULF. THE U S WAS PROUD TO STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THEM. ALLIES' EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD BE CRITICAL. HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE NATIONS WHICH WERE PROVIDING NAVAL FORCES. HE URGED OTHER NATIONS TO CONSIDER ON A BILATERAL BASIS THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUND FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA, EVEN IF THEIR PRESENCE WOULD ONLY BE SYMBOLIC. THIS WOULD HAVE A GREAT EFFECT IN BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE U S. THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DELIGHTED AND SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY THE STRENGTH AND VITALITY OF PUBLIC SUPPORT SO FAR IN THE U S: MANY REMEMBERED WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST WHEN WE HAD FAILED TO STAND UP TO AGGRESSION.

6. TURNING TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, BAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD FOCUS ON DISCUSSION OF THE GULF, ALTHOUGH BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD ALSO TALKED ABOUT START, CFE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, CSCE, AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. BAKER SAID THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY RELIABLE PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. GORBACHEV HAD SHOWN THAT HE WOULD BACK WITH DEEDS HIS

PLEDGES TO RESPECT UNIVERSAL HUMAN VALUES. IN HELSINKI GORBACHEV HAD REASSERTED HIS COMMITMENT TO UNDOING IRAQI AGGRESSION. THERE HAD BEEN NO DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT NOTHING SHORT OF THE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR U S/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE CLEAR. THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THEM WAS 'SURGING AHEAD' OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE NATO LONDON DECLARATION HAD BEEN ONE SUCH SURGE. SO HAD THE 2+4 TALKS. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE COLD WAR, WERE BEING DISSOLVED. OLD ANIMOSITIES WERE BEING BURIED IN THE SANDS OF ARABIA, AND THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE UNITING IN THE FACE OF AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW.

[?] || 7. BAKER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT TIME COULD BE ON THE SIDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE U S VIEW AT THE OUTSET, BUT THEY NOW BELIEVED THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. EFFORTS MUST BE UNSTINTING. WE MUST NOT SHIRK THE TASK OF CLOSING DOWN SADDAM'S EFFORTS TO FUEL AND FEED THE INSTRUMENTS OF HIS AGGRESSION. THERE MUST BE NO CHEATING OF THE EMBARGO. ||

8. BAKER THEN SET OUT A LIST OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR NATO, THE WEU AND INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS WHICH WOULD HELP SUPPORT UN SCRS. THE US REQUESTED THAT:

(A) NATO'S SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (SCEPC), SHOULD MEET, PERHAPS WITH THE WEU, TO COORDINATE SEALIFT AND TRANSPORT. LIFT CAPABILITY WAS VITAL TO THE MOVEMENT OF HEAVY ARMoured FORCES AND OF REFUGEES.

(B) NAVOCFORMED'S OPERATIONS SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO SUPPORT ALLIES THERE.

(C) AWACS COVERAGE IN THE SOUTH EASTERN REGION, BASED ON DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY, SHOULD BE EXTENDED.

(D) ALLIES SHOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE TURKISH ECONOMIC DISLOCATION. THIS SHOULD BE PART OF THE EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN TURKEY AND EUROPE.

(E) ALLIES SHOULD HELP IN STRENGTHENING TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO FACE SPECIFIC IRAQI THREATS.

(F) ALLIES SHOULD HELP EGYPT BILATERALLY, OUTSIDE THE NATO FRAMEWORK, WITH LIFT CAPABILITY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO MOVE EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND OVERLAND.

(G) ALLIES SHOULD PROVIDE AIR AND SEA LIFT TO EVACUATE REFUGEES FROM JORDAN.

(H) ALLIES SHOULD EXTEND FURTHER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES WHOSE ECONOMIES WERE BEING DAMAGED BY SANCTIONS AND OIL PRICE RISES. BAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO DELORS AND THE TROIKA. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WAS A DELICATE ENTERPRISE WHICH WAS NOW IN JEOPARDY. THE LOSS OF OIL DELIVERIES FROM BOTH THE GULF AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS HAVING A SERIOUS IMPACT.

(I) ALL ALLIES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR NATIONALS AND COMPANIES WITH UN SCRS.

9. BAKER SAID THAT IF THESE STEPS FAILED TO UNDO SADDAM'S AGGRESSION, IT WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND REESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE GULF. THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED IN THE HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT. ALL OPTIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND NONE COULD BE RULED OUT.

10. NATIONS WOULD STILL NEED TO STAND TOGETHER, EVEN IF SADDAM WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT BUT RETAINED HIS EXCESSIVELY LARGE ARMY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD DIRECTED BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE TO CONSIDER WAYS OF SETTING UP REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND STABILITY AFTER THE KUWAIT CRISIS. ALLIES, PARTICULARLY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NEEDED TO CONSIDER VERY INTRUSIVE, INTERNATIONALLY-SANCTIONED MEASURES TO PREVENT AGGRESSION. ALMOST NONE OF US WAS INNOCENT OF CONTRIBUTING IN SOME WAY TO THE IRAQI WAR MACHINE: INTRUSIVE MEASURES WOULD BE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE INSIPIENT IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND THEIR CW, BW AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES.

11. BAKER CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE U S THE BOTTOM LINE WAS SIMPLE: AGGRESSION COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IF WE WERE SUCCESSFULLY TO CONFRONT THE FIRST POST COLD WAR CRISIS. WE COULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES WE HAD MADE BEFORE. SADDAM MUST BE MADE INCAPABLE OF FUTURE AGGRESSION.

12. DUMAS (FRANCE) SAID THAT SINCE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 10 AUGUST THE CONVICTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQI AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT HAD STRENGTHENED. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO REACT WITH VIGOUR AGAINST THIS CRIME. THE WORK OF THE TWELVE IN ROME ON 7 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN VERY ENCOURAGING. HE PROCEEDED TO GIVE A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE WEU. THERE HAD BEEN CONSULTATION WITH WEU MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THIS HAD LED TO THE BAHRAIN NAVAL CONFERENCE, ATTENDED BY MORE THAN 20 NATIONS, INCLUDING THE U S, THE WEU AND ARAB STATES. PRIOR COORDINATION WITHIN THE WEU HAD DEMONSTRATED THE WILL TO COOPERATE AND HAD SETTLED PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD REQUIRE INTELLIGENT COORDINATION. THIS WOULD CONTINUE IN THE WEU AND MORE WIDELY.

13. IN RESPONSE TO BAKER'S REQUESTS, DUMAS SAID THAT HE IMAGINED THAT THE WORK OF THE WEU AND SCEPC COULD TAKE PLACE 'WITHIN THIS CONTEXT AND IN THIS SPIRIT'. FRANCE'S POSITION OBEYED CERTAIN IMPERATIVES, BUT THESE HAD NOT HINDERED THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. RECALLING MITTERRAND'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PARIS ON 6 SEPTEMBER, DUMAS SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT THERE WERE IN ACCORD WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. FRANCE WAS INTENT ON ENSURING THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS FOUND. THE ONLY MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS THROUGH THE COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO. IF THERE WERE ANY INADEQUACIES IN THE UNSCRS THEY SHOULD BE RECTIFIED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF ACTIONS IN THE GULF CHANGED IN NATURE OR WE WISHED TO LEAVE THE LEGAL COURSE DEFINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEN WE MUST REFER BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

14. DUMAS CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) SIGNAL FROM IRAQ THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD PREVAIL: THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON WHY IT MUST PREVAIL.

15. DE MICHELIS (ITALY) REPORTED ON THE EC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ROME ON 7 SEPTEMBER. THIS HAD BEEN A CLEAR POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE FEELINGS OF THE TWELVE. THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISION HAD BEEN TO ACT JOINTLY AND IN CONTACT WITH OTHER ALLIES TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO. THE TWELVE WERE ALSO READY TO CONSIDER MORE BINDING RULES FOR THE EMBARGO, EG EXTENDING IT TO AIR AND GROUND TRANSPORT. STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD BE IMPORTANT POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, TO WEAKEN SADDAM'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WITHIN IRAQ.

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DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE 38

IRAQ/KUWAIT
 PS
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 PS/PUS
 MR TOMKYS
 MR GORE-BOOTH
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 MR JAY
 MR SLATER
 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
 HD/MED
 HD/NENAD
 HD/NAD
 HD/SED
 HD/UND
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/NPDD
 HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
 SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE DIO
 (BY TUBE H29)
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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INFO DESKBY 102200Z TOKYO
INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, HELSINKI, ABU DHABI
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

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PART TWO OF FOUR PARTS

16. DE MICHELIS SAID THE TWELVE WERE ANSWERING POSITIVELY BUSH'S CALL FOR TRUE BURDENSARING. THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT COSTS FOR ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES HIT BY THE CRISIS, AND THE TWELVE HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL AID TO EGYPT, JORDAN AND TURKEY. ABOUT USD 10 BILLION WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE NEXT YEAR. THE TWELVE WERE STUDYING POSSIBLE JOINT EFFORTS BY THE GCC, EC AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO SHARE THE COSTS.

17. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE TWELVE WERE NOT CONFINING THEIR AID TO THREE COUNTRIES. AT THEIR MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 17 SEPTEMBER THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERING THE POSITION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD APPLIED TO THE UN FOR AID UNDER ARTICLE 50. THEY WERE ALSO PROPOSING THAT THE G24 SHOULD CONSIDER THE SITUATION OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

18. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE TWELVE WOULD RELAUNCH THEIR COOPERATION WITH ARAB COUNTRIES, WHILE GIVING A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THERE WAS NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE KUWAIT CRISIS AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN AND MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEMS. THE EC HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO ORGANISE A MINISTERIAL MEETING BETWEEN THE TWELVE AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, MINUS IRAQ. ONE AIM WAS TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE MINORITY OF STATES WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE WHICH WAS TAKING AN AMBIGUOUS POSITION VIS A VIS IRAQ. ITALY WAS ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

19. DE MICHELIS AGREED WITH DUMAS THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF SADDAM MUST BE STRENGTHENED. IN FUTURE, PERHAPS THERE SHOULD ALSO BE COMMUNICATIONS ISOLATION. THE MILITARY OPTIONS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. WE SHOULD NOT LOSE THE CONNECTION WITH THE LEGAL

FRAMEWORK OF THE UN, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR NEW RULES TO SUPPORT OUR AIMS.

20. IN THE MEDIUM TERM THERE MIGHT BE A NEED TO CREATE A NEW MECHANISM TO AVOID SUCH CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOURED A HELSINKI TYPE MODEL FOR THE REGION. A SET OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES WAS NEEDED TO DEFUSE CRISES. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE READY TO WORK WITH THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS. DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE IMPORTANT.

21. DE MICHELIS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ITALY WOULD STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF GIVING A POSITIVE ANSWER TO BAKER'S REQUESTS. THERE SHOULD BE NO POLITICAL DIFFICULTY. THEY WERE LEGITIMATE AND IMPORTANT SUGGESTIONS FOR SUPPORTING COMMON AIMS.

22. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SAID THAT A NON-MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WAS DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE. THE QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE WHAT TO DO IF THE EMBARGO FAILED, BUT WHAT TO DO TO ENSURE THAT IT PREVAILED. THERE MUST BE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE AND NO 'FISSURES'. THERE MUST BE CLOSE CONTACT WITH VULNERABLE COUNTRIES LIKE JORDAN. THERE MUST BE PATIENT, UNRELENTING PRESSURE. THERE MUST BE COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS. AND THERE MUST BE CONSTANT CONSULTATION AND ALLIED UNITY.

23. THERE HAD TO BE A FAIR SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS. THIS WAS A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH LAY ON THE WHOLE WORLD. SPAIN HAD SUPPORTED U S DEPLOYMENTS, HAD MADE A NAVAL CONTRIBUTION, WAS GIVING AID TO REFUGEES IN JORDAN AND WAS CONTRIBUTING TO EC FINANCIAL AID. THE AMOUNT AND SCOPE OF THIS EFFORT WAS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM SPANISH TRADITION. SPAIN WOULD CONTINUE TO RENDER SUPPORT WITHIN ITS POSSIBILITIES.

24. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ SAID THAT WE MUST PREVENT SADDAM BECOMING A HERO OF THE ARABS AND A FOCUS FOR OPPOSITION TO THE WEST. WHILE THERE WAS NO LEGAL LINK WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, A SOLUTION TO THAT HAD ALSO TO BE FOUND. A MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE WAS NEEDED.

25. HE CONCLUDED THAT A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO THE CRISIS WAS IMPORTANT: IF CURRENT STEPS FAILED TO END IT, SPAIN WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL ONES, CONSISTENT WITH THE UN CHARTER. EFFORTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN MUST CONTINUE. WE MUST AVAIL

OURSELVES OF THE CURRENT CONSENSUS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THAT THE UN WAS OPERATIVE, NOT DECLARATORY.

26. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT IN HELSINKI UNDERLINED THE NEED TO BUILD UP SECURITY STRUCTURES IN THE GULF REGION. THIS FITTED IN WITH EC EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON SECURITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HUSSEIN GOT NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ANY SIDE THAT THE 'PEACE COALITION' WAS WEAKENING. GENSCHER HAD MET YESTERDAY THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM HE HAD ENCOURAGED TO PRESS FOR SUPPORT OF UN SANCITONS AT A FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED TROIKA IN BELGRADE. THE MEETING SHOULD SEND AN INFLUENTIAL, PARALLEL SIGNAL TO THAT FROM HELSINKI. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INDIAN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. GERMANY AGREED THAT ALLIES SHOULD SHARE JOINTLY BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. TO THIS END, GERMANY HAD OPENED ITS AIRSPACE, WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE AIR AND SEALIFT CAPACITIES AND WOULD PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID SPECIFICALLY TO EGYPT BUT ALSO TO TURKEY AND JORDAN. AFTER UNIFICATION, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES.

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DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE 38

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR SLATER
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED

HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD

CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
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INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, HELSINKI, ABU DHABI
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, RIYADH, PEKING,
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PART 3 OF 4 PARTS

27. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSION WAS AGAINST AN ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRY. ALL THE ACTIONS TAKEN WERE TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF THAT COUNTRY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS AGGRESSION MUST REST SOLELY WITH BAGHDAD. GERMANY SUPPORTED THE FIRM AND UNITED STANCE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WAS PREPARED TO SHOULDER ITS SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WOULD WORK ESPECIALLY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL/EASTERN EUROPE.

28. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE EMBARGO MUST BE A SUCCESS IF THE CRISIS WAS TO BE RESOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE NETHERLANDS WAS PLAYING ITS PART. TWO FRIGATES HAD BEEN DESPATCHED, BILATERAL AID WOULD BE GIVEN TO JORDAN AND THE NETHERLANDS WOULD TAKE PART IN EC AID PROGRAMMES FOR EGYPT, TURKEY AND JORDAN. IN ADDITION, 50 THOUSAND ITEMS OF NBC PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WERE BEING SENT TO COUNTRIES MOST DIRECTLY THREATENED.

29. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS IMPORTANT IN THE LONG AS WELL AS THE SHORT TERM. WHILE ALL EMPHASIS MUST BE ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION, THIS MUST BE UNDEPINNED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION. IT WOULD ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON HUSSEIN IF HE KNEW THAT INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MIGHT EXTEND TO MILITARY COORDINATION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. IF SO, IT WOULD ELIMINATE ANY HOPE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST IRAQ WOULD SPLIT IF IT CAME TO MILITARY ACTION.

30. FROM A PR ASPECT, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO PARTNERS OUTSIDE EUROPE THAT HUSSEIN WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS. HE HAD

DEEPENED THE ARAB DIVIDE, HE HAD MADE MORE DIFFICULT ANY SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, AND THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE CRISIS WERE HIS FAULT.

31. VAND DEN BROEK THOUGHT IT ODD THAT THE PRESS AT HELSINKI HAD NOT ASKED ABOUT THE HOSTAGES IN IRAQ. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THEM IN THE PUBLIC EYE.

32. PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL) SAID THAT A SOLUTION (PREFERABLY PEACEFUL, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE OTHERS) MUST BE FOUND.

33. EYSKENS (BELGIUM) SAID THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESTIGE AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN. FAILURE WOULD CONSIGN IT TO THE FATE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. U S DIPLOMACY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE APPROVAL OF UN RESOLUTION 665, BUT THIS MUST BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIRLIFT. BELGIUM WELCOMED THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND IN PARTICULAR THE EFFORTS OF THE WEU WHICH CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE BENEFITS OF EUROPEAN COORDINATION. FOR THE EMBARGO TO WORK IT MUST BE WATERTIGHT, EVEN THOUGH THIS MEANT SOME COUNTRIES WOULD SUFFER. FOR THE FUTURE, HE SUPPORTED BAKER'S CALL FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN PARTICULAR THE WEST SHOULD ENCOURAGE AID FROM THE RICHER TO THE POORER ARAB NATIONS AS WELL AS AID TO ALLEVIATE THE ECONOMIC BURDEN ON EASTERN EUROPE. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST BE PREPARED TO CARRY THE GLOBE 'LIKE ATLAS'. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN ECONOMIES. BELGIUM HAD CONTRIBUTED THREE SHIPS, PLANES FOR USE BY EGYPT TO EVACUATE REFUGEES AND 20 THOUSAND TONNES OF WHEAT TO EGYPT.

34. BONDEVIK (NORWAY) SAW IN THE SUMMIT A CLEAR MESSAGE TO IRAQ THAT AGGRESSION WOULD NOT PAY. THE ROLE OF THE UN IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS WAS ESSENTIAL AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. THIS WAS A CLEAR TEST OF HOW THE WORLD AFTER THE COLD WAR WOULD WORK. SANCTIONS WERE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY ACTION, AND AIR SANCTIONS MERITED CLOSE ATTENTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NORWAY WAS TAKING CONCRETE STEPS WITH THE PROVISION OF NAVAL UNITS IN THE NATO AREA TO COMPENSATE FOR UNITS SENT BY OTHERS TO THE GULF, AS WELL AS THE DESPATCH OF NBC EQUIPMENT, A NAVAL SUPPLY SHIP AND HUMANITARIAN AID INCLUDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT. NORWAY WOULD ALSO PROVIDE NAVAL TRANSPORT FOR EQUIPMENT. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE U S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL HELP AND WOULD REPLY IN DETAIL AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PARLIAMENT.

35. SAMARAS (GREECE) POINTED OUT THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE GREEK ECONOMY OF THE GULF CRISIS. GREECE HAD LOST A SUBSTANTIAL ORDER OF

OIL FROM IRAQ, BOUGHT AT A HIGHLY PREFERENTIAL PRICE, AS WELL AS HAVING TO WRITE OFF IRAQI DEBTS AND TO FACE THE CANCELLATION OF ORDERS FROM IRAQ. A FRIGATE WAS ON THE WAY TO THE GULF REGION, AND THREE VESSELS OF GREEK OWNERSHIP HAD BEEN OFFERED TO PROVIDE SEALIFT CAPABILITY. GREECE HAD MADE ITS AIR AND PORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE FROM THE OUTSET.

36. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK) WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE LACK OF MEDIA INTEREST IN THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. DENMARK WAS, LIKE THE OTHER ALLIES, READY TO SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. A CORVETTE WOULD BE SENT TO THE GULF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DENMARK WAS PREPARED TO OFFER SEA TRANSPORT FOR EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI TROOPS, SOME SEALIFT CAPACITY FROM THE EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND IF NECESSARY WOULD EQUIP A HOSPITAL SHIP. THE UN SHOULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN COORDINATING ANY FUTURE STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN. HE AGREED THAT AID SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT COUNTRIES HARDEST HIT. DENMARK HAD COMMITTED AN IMMEDIATE USD 5 MILLION TO THIS END.

37. POOS (LUXEMBOURG) AGREED THAT PATIENCE AND FIRMNESS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED. NATO WAS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. EVERYONE PREFERRED A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT THIS DEPENDED ON THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. LUXEMBOURG WOULD MAKE 'AN ADEQUATE' FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE EC AND WEU, AND WOULD CONSIDER UNILATERAL AID PACKAGES TO EGYPT, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. POOS SUGGESTED A MIDDLE EASTERN EQUIVALENT OF THE CSCE IN THE MEDIUM TERM TO GIVE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN ARAB WORLD THE BENEFITS EUROPE HAD REAPED FROM CSCE.

38. MR GAREL-JONES (UK) PAID TRIBUTE TO THE U S ROLE AND AGREED THAT HUSSEIN MUST NOT SUCCEED. THE UN RESOLUTION MUST BE UPHELD IN FULL. THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON WESTERN ECONOMIES OF UNCERTAIN OIL SUPPLIES, BUT ALSO TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE SEEN TO SUCCEED. ALL COUNTRIES MUST SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION. THE UK WAS GIVING ACTIVE CONSIDERATION TO PROVIDING GROUND FORCES IN ADDITION TO ITS ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENT TO THE GULF.

39. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT SANCTIONS SUCCEEDED, BUT IF THESE WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE THE OPTION TO USE OTHER MEANS MUST REMAIN AND MUST NOT (NOT) BE DEPENDENT ON FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE WEST TO DEPRIVE ITSELF OF THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

EXPLICITLY STATED IN RESOLUTION 661. MR GAREL-JONES AGREED WITH GENSCHER THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD BE HARD HIT BY THE SANCTIONS. HE HOPED THAT WEALTHY EUROPEAN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WOULD PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN RESPONSIBILITY SHARING.

40. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS A SYMBOL OF THE NEW WORLD, FULL OF OPPORTUNITIES. THE COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WORLD SHOULD NOT FAIL THE FIRST TEST OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA.

41. HANNIBALSSON (ICELAND) AGREED THAT ALL COUNTRIES WERE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SHARE THE COSTS. ICELAND WOULD DO ITS BIT AND WAS CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS. WHILST THE IMMEDIATE AIMS WERE NOW CLEAR AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE ALLIANCE MUST RECOGNISE THAT IN THE LONGER TERM IT COULD NOT EXCLUDE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

42. BOZER (TURKEY) WAS CONVINCED THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST HUSSEIN AT THIS STAGE. HE THANKED THE ALLIES FOR THEIR SOLIDARITY AND AFFIRMED THAT, DESPITE THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS AS WELL AS THE SECURITY RISK THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD ENDURE, THE TURKISH ATTITUDE WOULD REMAIN FIRM. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY BAKER'S PROPOSALS.

43. SMITH (CANADIAN PERMREP) SAID THE HE AGREED WITH BAKER ON NEW REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES AND ON INTRUSIVE MEASURES. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE CAREFUL EXAMINATION TO THE OTHER U S PROPOSALS. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THOSE COUNTRIES FACING THE PRINCIPAL RISKS AND COSTS: THIS INCLUDED EASTERN EUROPE. CANADA NOW HAD THREE SHIPS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN ROUTE FOR THE GULF.

44. BAKER MADE A FURTHER INTERVENTION IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM PORTUGAL, DENMARK AND BELGIUM. HE BELIEVED THAT THE EMBARGO WAS WORKING, THAT NO GOODS WERE BEING EXPORTED FROM IRAQ, THAT ALL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING IRAQ HAD BEEN FORECLOSED WORLDWIDE AND THAT THERE WAS A GOOD RESPECT FOR THE EMBARGO ON IMPORTS. SOME LEAKAGE OF FOOD WAS GETTING THROUGH BY AIR, AND BY LAND FROM JORDAN. THE REFERENCE IN THE HELSINKI STATEMENT TO FOODSTUFFS WAS BECAUSE OF CONFUSION OVER WHETHER FOOD WAS INDEED EMBARGOED. THE U S VIEW WAS THAT ALL FOOD IMPORTS WERE UNDER EMBARGO AT THIS STAGE. IRAQ WAS NOT YET AT A POINT WHERE HUMANITARIAN AID WAS APPROPRIATE. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF FOODSTUFFS WAS NOT A MATTER OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION. GOVERNMENTS WISHING TO

PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID SHOULD DO SO IN A HUMANITARIAN WAY. THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WAS WORKING TO DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT EXEMPTIONS THERE MIGHT BE TO THE SANCTIONS.

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PART 4 OF 4 PARTS

45. BAKER UNDERLINED THE DESIRABILITY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE MAJORITY OF ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE U S ACTIONS. THOSE COUNTRIES OF 'INTERESTS' OPPOSING WERE YEMEN, THE PLO, TUNISIA (IN ABSENTIA) AND JORDAN. JORDAN WAS A SPECIAL CASE. KING HUSSEIN HAD MANY PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN MAKING BUT AT THIS STAGE THE U S SAW 'NO ALTERNATIVE TO KING HUSSEIN'. THE U S WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO ENHANCE THE ARAB COMPONENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE. THAT WAS WHY HEAVY LIFT CAPACITY WAS NEEDED, ESPECIALLY TO TRANSPORT TANKS. SYRIA WAS BEING SUPPORTIVE AND SENDING ADDITIONAL HELP, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES (ACCORDING TO MUBARAK) WAS GROWING. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR HAD FALLEN ON DEAF EARS.

46. THE ISSUE OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS WAS THE ONLY ONE ON WHICH THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THE RUSSIANS WERE REDUCING NUMBERS GRADUALLY, IN ORDER, BAKER BELIEVED, NOT TO PUT SOVIET CITIZENS AT RISK. ALTHOUGH NUMBERS OF UNIFORMED ADVISERS HAD DECLINED FROM 193 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS TO 150, THIS WAS NOT A TRUE REFLECTION OF THE PICTURE. AT THE OUTSET, OVER 8000 (MOSTLY NON-UNIFORMED) SOVIET ADVISERS HAD BEEN IN IRAQ, OF WHOM AROUND 1000 WERE INVOLVED IN SOME MILITARY ACTIVITY.

47. AS FOR THE FUTURE, ALL MUST BE DILIGENT IN ENFORCING SANCTIONS. THE U S DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER POLITICAL MOVES, BILATERALLY, UNILATERALLY OR WITHIN THE UN AUSPICES. OPTIONS MUST BE KEPT OPEN. ONE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE THE IMPOSITION OF AN AIR BLOCKADE. ANOTHER WOULD BE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES NOT OBSERVING THE SANCTIONS

AGAINST IRAQ.

48. AS FOR THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQI ATTEMPTS AT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN, THE U S UNDERSTOOD THAT IRAN INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. BAKER AGREED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST NOT PROFIT FROM HIS AGRRESSION AND MUST NOT, EVEN IN DEFEAT, BE SEEN AS AN ARAB HERO. THE LINKING OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT TO THIS CRISIS WOULD BE A SAD MISTAKE. FINALLY, BAKER APPRECIATED THE COMMENTS OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN RESPONSE TO HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST AND PROPOSALS, AND LOOKED FORWARD TO RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENTS IN DUE COURSE.

49. SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT MINISTERS WERE UNANIMOUS IN WELCOMING THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, WHICH HAD STRENGTHENED THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. THE COUNCIL HAD REAFFIRMED ITS DETERMINATION TO SEE THE CRISIS THROUGH AND WOULD NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SANCTIONS. THE ALLIANCE PREFERRED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT RECOGNISED THAT THIS COULD ONLY WORK IF SANCTIONS WERE WATERTIGHT. ALL AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES (WOERNER SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THIS PHRASE BE USED TO AVOID ANY CONFUSION WITH THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF BURDENSARING, AND ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD STUDY FAVOURABLY THE U S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER COOPERATION.

50. WOERNER ASKED FOR THE COUNCIL'S AGREEMENT TO THE THREE PRINCIPAL REQUESTS FROM THE U S AFFECTING THE WORK OF SCEPC, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NAVOCFORMED, AND AWACS. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID THAT NOT ALL THESE ISSUES AFFECTED FRANCE. ON SCEPC, ROBIN SAID THAT HIS MINISTER HAD ONLY AGREED TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL: IT WAS PREMATURE TO MAKE ANY FIRM DECISION ON THIS.

COMMENT

51. BAKER TOLD MR GAREL-JONES PRIVATELY THAT HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF, IN PARTICULAR, THE JAPANESE ON 'RESPONSIBILITY SHARING'. HE WARMLY ENDORSED THE MINISTER'S COMMENT THAT THE WEALTHIER EUROPEAN NNA STATES SHOULD BE ASKED TO DO MORE BUT ADDED THAT THE U S HAD NOT YET GOT ROUND TO RAISING THE QUESTION WITH THEM: HE WOULD HOWEVER BE APPROACHING BONN AGAIN. BAKER ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A GROUND FORCE PRESENSE, EVEN IF ONLY SYMBOLIC, FROM EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE KNEW THAT WE WERE WILLING: THE DUTCH, THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO CONSIDER IT.

RECOMMENDATION

52. INVIEW OF THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE U S TO NATO'S ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF CRISIS AND THE POTENTIAL LONGERN TERM ADVANTAGES TO THE ALLIANCE OF ITS READINESS TO ADDRESS OUT-OF-AREA QUESTIONS, SIR M ALEXANDER RECOMMENDS THAT SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE THREE U S REQUESTS FOR COLLECTIVE NATO ACTIONS. NATO'S EXTENSION OF THE NAVOCFORMED DEPLOYMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, USE OF THE NATO AWACS FORCE COULD BE PRESENTED AS ACTIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH TURKEY. THE U S ENVISAGE THAT THE AWACS FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE BASED IN TURKEY BUT THE INTENSITY OF ITS OPERATIONS WILL BE INCREASED AND IT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF RATHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION. SCEPC, WHICH IS PURELY AN ADVISORY BODY, COULD PROVIDE USEFUL PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE ON LOGISTIC QUESTIONS.

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. WHILE I WAS WITH ISSA KUWARI HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 3 SEPTEMBER THE AMIR TELEPHONED THROUGH TO ASK ME TO PASS ON TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS CONGRATULATIONS AND ADMIRATION FOR HER SPEECH ON THE GULF CRISIS DURING THE COMMONS DEBATE. HE HAD GIVEN PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SPEECH TO BE SHOWN IN FULL ON QATARI TELEVISION.

BOYCE

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TOKYO: FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD: 5/6 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. CHIEF OF THE ROYAL COURT CLAIMS THAT KING HUSSEIN URGED SADDAM TO WITHDRAW AND TO HAND OVER WESTERN HOSTAGES. KING LIKELY TO CONTINUE WITH HIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON THE CHIEF OF THE ROYAL COURT TODAY (10 SEPTEMBER) TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE KING'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD.

3. ZAID BIN SHAKER SAID THAT THE KING HAD SPOKEN VERY FRANKLY TO SADDAM. HIS MESSAGE HAD BEEN THAT IRAQ SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT: THERE WAS NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER. IF IT CAME TO A WAR, IRAQ WOULD BE DEFEATED EVEN IF IT INFLICTED MUCH DAMAGE ON THE AMERICANS IN THE PROCESS. SADDAM WOULD DO BETTER TO WITHDRAW NOW AND SEEK TO CAPITULATE ON THE GOOD OFFICES OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS NOT THEN ATTACKED BY WESTERN FORCES. BIN SHAKER EMPHASISED THAT SADDAM REMAINED VERY PREOCCUPIED BY THIS LATTER POSSIBILITY.

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, BIN SHAKER SAID THAT SADDAM AND HIS SENIOR ADVISERS (TO WHOM THE JORDANIAN ENTOURAGE HAD SPOKEN SEPARATELY) HAD TAKEN THIS ADVICE CALMLY AND PROMISED TO REFLECT ON IT. THE KING'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IRREVOCABLE ABOUT THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. HOWEVER, HE (BIN SHAKER) HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE TONE OF THE LETTER WHICH SADDAM HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SENT TO BUSH AND GORBACHEV AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT.

5. BIN SHAKER ALSO REPORTED THAT THE KING HAD TACKLED SADDAM FIRMLY OVER WESTERN HOSTAGES. THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE THOUGH IT HAD CONFIRMED BIN SHAKER'S OWN VIEW THAT SADDAM HAD NOT THE FAINTEST UNDERSTANDING OF WESTERN ATTITUDES AND SENSITIVITIES, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EPISODE OF STEWART AND THE CORNFLAKES.

6. I ASKED WHAT THE KING WAS LIKELY TO DO NEXT. BIN SHAKER REPLIED THAT HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY WANT TO CONTINUE WITH EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. I REMINDED BIN SHAKER THAT YOU HAD TRANSMITTED TO THE KING THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE GULF STATES THAT THE KING'S MEDIATION EFFORTS WERE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE SINCE THEY TENDED TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM. WE BELIEVED THAT TIME WAS NEEDED TO ALLOW THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES TO BUILD UP ON SADDAM. ONLY THEN WAS HE LIKELY TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY A CHANGE OF COURSE. BIN SHAKER SAID THAT THE KING HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN ENCOURAGED AT EVERY PORT OF CALL ON HIS RECENT AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN TRIP, QUOTE EXCEPT LONDON UNQUOTE, TO CONTINUE WITH HIS EFFORTS.

7. BIN SHAKER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY DISMAYED BY THE HOSTILITY SHOWN TO JORDAN, AND KING HUSSEIN, IN THE BRITISH MEDIA. HOW COULD THEIR POSITION POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN SO MISUNDERSTOOD? I SAID MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THE DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE IN THE FIRST 72 HOURS WHEN THERE HAD BEEN NO STRONG SIGNAL FROM AMMAN OF DETERMINATION TO OPPOSE THE IRAQI INVASION. HOWEVER, THIS WAS NOW WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS OF JORDAN'S POSITION. BIN SHAKER SAID THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE FULLY APPLIED. THE IRAQIS HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CHALLENGE THIS: NOR WOULD JORDAN ENTERTAIN ANY REQUEST FROM THEM TO EVADE SANCTIONS. THE KING HAD BEEN UPSET THAT ANYONE SHOULD BELIEVE THAT JORDAN WOULD NOT HONOUR ITS COMMITMENTS AS A UN MEMBER.

8. BIN SHAKER ALSO RAISED THE SEARCHING OF RJ AIRCRAFT AT HEATHROW (MY TELNO 531 REFERS). HE COMPLAINED THAT THE SEARCHING OF PASSENGERS WAS NOT ONLY UNDIGNIFIED BUT UNNECESSARY. JORDAN HAD MADE ITS COMMITMENT TO SANCTIONS CLEAR AND WOULD ABIDE BY IT. I EXPLAINED THAT, HAVING RECEIVED EARLIER REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE MFA, WE HAD ALREADY REPORTED JORDANIAN VIEWS TO YOU.

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MY TELNO 840 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF SECRETARY BAKER

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS INSIST THAT ASSISTANCE ALREADY BEING GIVEN BY THEM EQUALS, AND POSSIBLY EXCEEDS, THAT REQUESTED BY BAKER. TALK OF 1.5 BILLION DOLLARS FOR EGYPT, AND 1 BILLION FOR SYRIA THIS YEAR. THEY URGE AMERICANS NOT TO PRESS IDEAS ON LONG TERM REGIONAL SECURITY IN PUBLIC AT THIS STAGE. KING FAHD RAISES IDEA OF A DECLARATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE PERMANENT FIVE ON UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE UN CHARTER.

DETAIL

2. MY TUR GAVE INITIAL ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANCE SAUDIS HAD AGREED, FOLLOWING BAKER'S VISIT, TO PROVIDE TO OFFSET THE COSTS OF THE US MILITARY EFFORT. DCM IN US EMBASSY (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS NOW GIVEN US RATHER MORE INFORMATION ON THIS, AND ON ONE OR TWO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DISCUSSION DURING BAKER'S VISIT:

I) DUNFORD SAID BAKER HAD SOUGHT SAUDI AID TO A VALUE OF UP TO 2 BILLION DOLLARS TO THE END OF THE PRESENT CALENDAR YEAR TO OFFSET US MILITARY COSTS (TOTAL US EXTRA - IE PRESUMABLY IN-COUNTRY - COSTS FROM THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD TO THE END OF THE YEAR WOULD BE 6 BILLION DOLLARS). THEREAFTER AMERICANS ESTIMATED EXTRA COSTS WOULD BE 1 BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH. THEY WERE LOOKING TO THE SAUDIS TO PROVIDE 30 PER CENT OF THIS. SAUDIS HAD RESPONDED THAT THEIR OWN COSTS WERE HIGH, AS A

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RESULT OF THE MOBILISATION OF THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES: NEED TO HELP KUWAITI REFUGEES: AND CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER REGIONAL STATES. DUNFORD CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD NONETHELESS AGREED TO PAY FUEL, IN-COUNTRY TRANSPORT AND WATER COSTS. DUNFORD SAID US APPROACH HAD NOT BEEN VERY ARTFUL. FUEL ALONE ACCOUNTED FOR ALMOST 30 PER CENT OF EXTRA COSTS, SO THE SAUDIS COULD ARGUE THAT THEY HAD FULLY MET US REQUEST.

II) DUNFORD SAID THAT BAKER HAD PRESSED FOR ASSISTANCE TO 'FRONT LINE' AND 'SECOND TIER' REGIONAL STATES AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS. IN THE FIRST GROUP US INCLUDED JORDAN, TURKEY AND EGYPT, THE SAUDIS ON THE OTHER HAND RECIPROCATED BY IDENTIFYING SYRIA, TURKEY AND EGYPT AS THE PRIORITY 'FRONT LINE' STATES AND LEBANON, SOMALIA AND DJIBOUTI AS 'SECOND TIER' COUNTRIES MERITING ASSISTANCE. BAKER HAD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS SAW A NEED FOR A TOTAL OF 7.5 BILLION DOLLARS AID FOR 'FRONT LINE' AND 'SECOND TIER' STATES TO THE END OF 1990, AND 10.5 - 13.5 BILLION DOLLARS IN 1991. THEY LOOKED TO THE SAUDIS TO PROVIDE 2 - 2.5 BILLION OF THE 7.5 BILLION NEEDED THIS YEAR (AND PRESUMABLY, THOUGH DUNFORD DID NOT SAY SO, A SIMILAR PROPORTION IN 1991). THE SAUDIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE GIVING 1 BILLION DOLLARS TO SYRIA THIS YEAR AND 1.5 BILLION TO EGYPT. THIS ALONE MET THE AMERICANS TARGET. ADDITIONALLY THEY HAD PROMISED TO MEET TURKISH AND MOROCCAN OIL NEEDS UP TO THE END OF THE YEAR. DUNFORD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD STRESSED THAT OTHERS OUGHT TO BE PAYING MORE TO MEET THE OVERALL COST OF THE CRISIS AND HAD PARTICULARLY MENTIONED GERMANY AND JAPAN.

III) DUNFORD SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF LONGER TERM REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD COME UP WITH PRINCE SAUD, WHO HAD SAID THAT PREMATURE PUBLIC DISCUSSION COULD FUEL ARAB ANXIETIES THAT THE WEST MIGHT BE ABOUT TO FOIST A REVIVED CENTO ON THE MIDDLE EAST. DISCUSSION OF THE IDEA ALSO CARRIED WITH IT THE IMPLICATION THAT SADDAM WAS LIKELY TO SURVIVE. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT NOW WOULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN ISSUE AT HAND. BAKER AGREED, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS RIGHT THAT THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE SUBJECT..

IV) DUNFORD SAID THAT, WITH BAKER, THE KING HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE PERMANENT FIVE OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE MIGHT ISSUE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42 WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY IF IRAQ CONTINUED TO DISREGARD UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. LATER, WITH CONGRESSMEN, THE KING HAD TAKEN A NOTABLY TOUGH LINE ON SADDAM'S INTRANSIGENCE, THE NEED TO TIGHTEN THE

EMBARGO AND THE EXISTENCE OF A MILITARY OPTION IF SADDAM FAILED TO BUDGE.

COMMENT

3. WITH MR KAUFMAN ON 9 SEPTEMBER PRINCE SAUD SHOWED MORE INTEREST IN LONGER TERM SECURITY ISSUES. THE LINE HE TOOK WITH BAKER ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IS NOT HOWEVER INCONSISTENT WITH HIS REMARKS TO MR KAUFMAN ON THE SUBSTANCE. THE FIGURES THE SAUDIS GAVE BAKER FOR THEIR AID TO SYRIA AND EGYPT ARE HIGHER THAN ANYTHING WE HAVE SEEN SO FAR, THOUGH NOT TOTALLY IMPLAUSIBLE GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN STAND TO THE SAUDIS - PARTICULARLY IF THEY INCLUDE LOGISTIC AND OTHER COSTS OF 50,000 PLUS TROOPS FROM THOSE COUNTRIES NOW BEING TALKED OF IN PRESS (WE WILL EXPLORE FURTHER ON THIS). THE AMERICANS MAY HAVE OPENED WITH A LOWER BID FOR BOTH MILITARY AND REGIONAL AID THAN THE MARKET MIGHT HAVE BORNE. BUT A PATTERN HAS NOW BEEN SET.

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REPLY BY THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING
MINISTER OF STATE FCO MR W. WALDEGRAVE'S REMARKS CONCERNING *Hancock extract attached*
ISRAEL AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT DURING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
SPECIAL SESSION ON THE KUWAIT CRISIS. (6 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1990)

ONE CAN UNDERSTAND THE FRUSTRATION OF THOSE WHO HAVE EMBARKED ON THE VERY UNHELPFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL POLICY OF ENGAGING THEMSELVES IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AND OF ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE IT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AGAIN AND AGAIN, THE TRUE AND UNCHANGED AGGRESSIVE AND TERRORIST NATURE OF THIS ORGANISATION IS EXPOSED. IT BECOMES AMPLY APPARENT THAT THE PLO AND ITS LEADER YASSER ARAFAT ARE ONLY CAPABLE OF DESTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH RUN COUNTER THE ENDEAVORS FOR PEACE AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT.

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

RATHER THAN SUSPEND THIS DIALOGUE AND ADJUST POLICIES TO REALITY, AS OTHERS DID, THERE IS A CONINUOUS EFFORT TO IGNORE PLO BEHAVIOUR. THE PLO FAILED TO CONDEMN THE ATTEMPT OF A TERRORIST RAID BY ABU AL ABAS PLO FACTION ON ISRAEL'S SHORE AND JOINED THE UNHOLY TRINITY WITH IRAQ AND LIBYA ON OBJECTING TO THE ARAB LEAGUE CALL TO BRING AN END TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT,

MOREOVER ONE CAN ONLY REGRET THE EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THE UNEXPLAINABLE BY A DISTORTED PRESENTATION OF ISRAEL POSTURE AND SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND OF THE TRUE CAUSES FOR THIS INTER ARAB CRISIS. TO INSINUATE THAT THE ARAB WORLD DIFFICULTIES EMANATE FROM ISRAEL PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT IS TO TRY AND IGNORE THE TRUE CAUSES - THE OLD INTER ARAB RIVALRIES, THE CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND THE LACK OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. THESE HAVE MANIFESTED THEMSELVES NOT JUST IN THE CURRENT OCCUPATION BY IRAQ OF A SISTER ARAB COUNTRY BUT ALSO IN THE PAST IN THE IRAQ-IRAN EIGHT YEARS LONG WAR, THE LIBYAN INVASION OF CHAD OR NASSER'S INVASION OF YEMEN WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ISRAEL.

[Mr. George Robertson]

Many hon. Members on both sides of the House have drawn attention to the way in which the world has now concentrated its concern on the part of the world affected by the invasion. That concern will not end; it will not go away, however the matter is resolved—even after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. The message of our debate today has been clear enough: we stay tough, we stay cool, we stay united. Because for as long as Saddam Hussein threatens his neighbours, he threatens us all.

9.35 pm

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. William Waldegrave): Today the House has spoken for our nation as only the House can speak. The hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) spoke well in winding up the debate for the Opposition, and we have heard some other outstanding speeches, led by the magnificent speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Let me also pay tribute to the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition, and to the fine speeches of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), my right hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) and, of course, to the splendid speech of the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Sir B. Braine).

The whole House is united on certain objectives. Aggression cannot be allowed to pay. A pirate state with a strong army cannot be allowed simply to loot resources that it may need because it has got itself into debt. Above all, once engaged as they are now engaged, the international forces of law represented by the United Nations cannot be allowed to be defeated. If that were to happen, anarchy would be loosed on the world.

Some have said, "Why the excitement? There have been other invasions and other territorial disputes." They should remember this: never before, since the foundation of the United Nations, has one member state attempted to obliterate another. That is the difference between this and many other crimes and problems of the past.

The strategy formed by the United Nations and the allies of the legitimate Government of Kuwait is also clear and, I believe, has received the almost unanimous backing of the House. The first weapon to be tried was the economic embargo; second came the rapid movement of forces from an amazing variety of nations to defend the other vulnerable states. I was pleased that the hon. Member for Hamilton's speech did not contain that strain of anti-Americanism which, I thought, spoilt one or two speeches made by his hon. Friends. He paid tribute to the extraordinary effort which the United States has made, and which only the United States could have made. We have contributed; but 20 other nations, from literally every other continent of the globe—from Australasia, from Asia and, of course, from the middle east, including the majority of the Arab League—are there as well.

Then comes the next stage. Who knows? We cannot rule out anything, as long as it is firmly based in international law. In the absolute unity that the nations have shown and that the House has shown today, we are all agreed that we should give no comfort whatever to Saddam Hussein.

There have been some dissentient voices. After listening to the speech of my former neighbour, now the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), I asked myself whether I would feel more secure in my arguments if he was agreeing with me, and came to the conclusion that I would not.

Mr. Kinnock: Join the club.

Mr. Waldegrave: I cannot refrain from repeating the Leader of the Opposition's sotto voce remark—"Welcome to the club".

Let us pause for a moment—as did the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) in a useful intervention—to consider Saddam Hussein's strategy. It is pretty clear. He will try to divert us from his central act of aggression: he has been doing so with the inhumane and intolerable treatment of the hostages. He will find other strategies of this kind. He will encourage other people, some of them well meaning, to look for half-baked solutions, conferences, intermediary stages and means to divide those United Nations resolutions by two. We must be alert to that strategy. The hon. Member for Walsall, North did not fall for that strategy—nor, in a fine speech, as I have already said, did the right hon. Member for Devonport and my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker). The hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) did fall for it in his speech—understated, as is his wont.

Mr. Faulds: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Waldegrave: No. The hon. Gentleman would try to divert us, but he would not succeed. I cannot give way to interventions; I have little time.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) said, rightly, that Saddam Hussein likes to liken himself to Nebuchadnezzar and spoke of the hanging gardens. May I direct the attention of Saddam Hussein, who may not be familiar with this verse, to the book of Daniel, chapter five, verse 21, after the deposition, which is referred to in verse 20;

"And he was driven from the sons of men; and his heart was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses; they fed him with grass like oxen."

I must concentrate a little on one section of the Leader of the Opposition's speech, not necessarily because I disagree with it but because I am not sure that I understood it. Several hon. Members have said that clarity of speech is important here. There is no disagreement with the legal position as set out by the Leader of the Opposition. We totally share it. However, there are three international grounds for military action: first, article 51, after a request from Kuwait; secondly, a response to an attack—what after today we may call the Yeovil rules; thirdly, an explicit United Nations mandate. Any of those three would do. The Leader of the Opposition's legal analysis was entirely justified. Where we departed from him—perhaps we did, perhaps we did not—was when he and the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang) seemed to predict a scenario ahead of time that cannot be predicted. We do not know which of those grounds would be the best to use to bring about the objective that all of us share: to avoid the defeat of international order.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh, East sketched one scenario where there was total unity for military action. That might be one scenario, but let us not predict in advance. We cannot rule out any action, so long as it is

based—as it would be based, as the Leader of the Opposition made clear—on article 51 after a request from Kuwait. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in his interesting speech—the former beachmaster at Salerno and at Anzio, even more dangerous—speaking with the authority of having been under fire, made the same point. Just for a moment I thought that he was going to say that we must go back for another resolution under any circumstances, but he did not. He said that we must get as much support as we can. That must be the objective of British, American and Arab League majority diplomacy. However, what we must not do is to take the further fatal step of predicting now that in every circumstance we must go back for a new resolution. That would be most unwise.

Ms. Short: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Waldegrave: The hon. Member for Hamilton did not give way. [*Interruption.*] He was not asked to give way, but I shall give way to the hon. Lady.

Ms. Short: The Minister said earlier that it would be a mistake to allow Saddam Hussein to stand on the moral high ground. He must know that the real danger is that many people in the Arab world believe that the west is deeply hypocritical because of its different evaluation of the situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the situation in Kuwait. Does he not agree that the west could be accused of bias, that it needs to stand firm on international law and that it would be a disaster, unless there were further aggression, if there were to be any offensive military action without a United Nations resolution and without the agreement of the whole of the Arab world?

Mr. Waldegrave: I have just explained why the opposite would be a disaster—a far more profound disaster that might endanger the whole operation and put the basis of international order at risk: that is, if we were to try now to play the game of prediction as to what exactly the circumstances would be in which sanctions were presumably being judged by the wider community not to be working and we went for further action. We cannot judge that now. I shall return to the other issues in the middle east. That is vital. The hon. Lady has made a point with which I have more sympathy to which I shall return in a moment.

Let us not forget that the refugees are Saddam Hussein's refugees. It is a most attractive capacity of the western democracies to take all burdens upon themselves and usually to blame themselves for everything. We are already talking as if in some way we are responsible for those refugees. We are not: Saddam Hussein caused those children to die in the desert by driving out Palestinians, Egyptians, Indians and Philipinos who were working and supporting their families back home with remittances.

We must act and we must, above all, help the nations from which those people come to get them home. We do not want to institutionalise this crisis. We do not want another lot of Gaza camps with permanent refugees in the area. We want to help them get home. That is why the money that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced today is going not to the non-governmental organisations in the ordinary way of a famine crisis but to a specific organisation designed to deal with this situation

—the International Organisation for Migration, which was set up in 1951 to deal with displaced people. We have given it that money to help those migrants get home.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said, an airlift may be needed. We may have to help the poor countries from which many of the refugees come to finance that airlift, and we will do so. Several hon. Members said that we must help and we will do so.

Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North): I do not dissent from the proposition that the refugees are Saddam's refugees. While there must be a massive airlift to get them home, they must remain alive to be taken home. We have a desperate responsibility to do that for the refugees now and to sustain them.

Mr. Waldegrave: We already are. The Overseas Development Administration has joined many others in the world in providing immediate aid, which is arriving. The refugees are trying to get home. That is what they want and it is the best way of preventing the tragedy from continuing indefinitely. We have given that money to the International Organisation for Migration as well as to the immediate humanitarian organisations—the Red Crescent, Red Cross, Oxfam and so on—to support them in the meantime.

That brings me, naturally, to a subject of some interest to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to every taxpayer in this country—burden sharing; who is going to pay. After the titanic contribution of the United States, we have made perhaps the second largest contribution in terms of military aid. The French have also provided major military support, but it is legitimate to look to countries that have not provided very much on the military side, and that point was made by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney. It is legitimate to say to them, "The world is under pressure: what will you do to help?" I shall go at some intolerable hour tomorrow morning to Rome, fortified by the support of the Leader of the Opposition, to address in tactful style, I hope, with some of our colleagues the idea that, although no frigates are available, some money could be supplied.

I must pay tribute to the Japanese, who have already talked in large sums. This is perhaps the first international crisis in which the Japanese, who are talking in terms of \$1 billion, have started to put big money on the line. The fact that the Japanese, for the first time, are saying, "We share the responsibility with the rest of the world for seeing this matter through" seems a very important step forward. Others, we hope, will follow. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made that point very clearly in her speech.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) and other hon. Members referred to the underlying tensions in the middle east, which it is not unfair to say have contributed to regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein. It is easy to try to shift the blame from individuals and say that they are created by the conditions, and we must not fall for that, but it is noticeable that regimes in the middle east, with the great exception of Egypt, have become more radical since the Arab-Israeli wars and the further defeats and humiliations, as they were seen in so many parts of the Arab world, of Arab people. I am not saying that those wars were caused by the Israelis, but the conflict, and injustices to the Palestinians that have emerged out of it have contributed to the situation.

[Mr. Waldegrave]

Three or four months ago, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary came back from the middle east and rightly described the whole region as a tinder box. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, the Leader of the Opposition, and the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, in a powerful speech, all made that point. The hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) rightly pointed out that two wrongs cannot make a right, so although that situation has not been corrected, it does not undermine the rightness of the action that we are taking in regard to Saddam Hussein.

The hon. Member for Warley, East made his point in his inimitable style but many others made it slightly more moderately and carried the House with them more. One factor that has emerged today is an extraordinary unity across the parties on the issue of the injustices done to the Palestinian people.

Mr. Faulds: The right hon. Member has referred to me twice, and I am grateful to him for giving way. If he disagrees so much with the burden of my speech, would he care to make his own comments on the implications for the situation in the Gulf of the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States?

Mr. Waldegrave: The interesting point about it is that it has no implications. What strikes me is what a small part Israel is playing in any of these events. That may lead certain people in the United States Congress to learn a lesson. Some people think of their relationship with Israel in terms of a strategic alliance, but they should realise that it is not particularly useful if it cannot be used in a crisis like this. In such a situation, the United States is bound to want invitations from the Arab nations, and to seek allies in the wider Arab world. The dog that has not barked in the night is interesting. Israel has kept out of this because, as has been said, were it to be involved, the result would be consequences and instabilities that would be difficult to handle.

With the support of the House, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary asked me to establish contacts with the PLO leadership after it had made the Geneva declaration and its London declaration about its new strategy in relation to a peace process. Therefore, along with many others, I was saddened by the way in which the PLO missed a wonderful opportunity, which it should have judged right. Palestine is a small country, resting on international law and suppressed by a stronger neighbour, and if the Palestinians had stood by that international law, they could have pointed out to the international community that they had supported this principle when it cost them a great deal and now they should be helped. Their already just case would then have been unanswerable in all the forums and Parliaments of the world. Many in the Palestinian movement are beginning to understand that, and are shifting their position. We understand the pressures on that disparate movement, but many hon. Members have, like myself and many of my Palestinian friends, have been disappointed by the position taken initially by the leadership of the PLO. We hope to see that position revised. I was glad to see that the Opposition did not pursue that line.

The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) made an interesting speech the other day. He

did not, in a Saddam Hussein way, want to link the issues together, but he called for a conference to look at all the wider issues at the same time. Mr. Shevardnadze made a slightly similar speech.

Mr. Kinnoek: My right hon. Friend said it first.

Mr. Waldegrave: I think that the right hon. Member for Gorton came first.

Who knows what the correct conference structures will be? I beg the right hon. Gentleman—and I think that he shares this view—to agree that we should not be trying to introduce grand conferences and complicated issues before we have settled the issue of the sovereignty of Kuwait.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton) indicated assent.

Mr. Waldegrave: I am gratified to see the right hon. Gentleman nodding. Resolution 660, in relation to Kuwait and to Iraq, refers to negotiations when people have returned to their own countries. That is fine. We could then negotiate about any underlying problems that may have contributed to the conflict in the first place. The same is true in relation to the far more complex and deeper issues of the Palestinians in relation to Israel. That must come afterwards and those who seek to drag across the trail the idea of grand conferences at this stage are contributing to what I call the Saddam Hussein strategy of trying to take our eye off the central issue of his aggression, off the central issue of obedience to international law and off the central issue of absolute concurrence with the Security Council resolutions. None of those points can be divided by two, and none is up for negotiation now. It is only when those resolutions are obeyed that other issues can be addressed.

We hope—and I believe that this will be so—that the middle east will never be quite the same again and that the whole world, even those countries that were not concerned and that have not been interested in the problems, will now focus on the underlying causes of conflict, of dissent and of danger in the middle east. If we can bring back, as I am sure that we shall, the Palestinian leadership into a position of diplomacy and of commitment to diplomacy, there will be progress. I hope and pray that that will be so.

Mr. Nellist: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the central issue is not what he has just described? It is not about democracy. There was precious little of that in Kuwait even before the invasion. The central issue is cheap oil. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree with a former United States Assistant Defence Secretary? He said that it boils down to the great powers defending their interests and that if Kuwait grew carrots, we would not give a damn.

Mr. Waldegrave: The central issue of of obedience to international law. The hon. Member for Coventry, South-East (Mr. Nellist) will find flip remarks from former politicians round the world. If Saddam Hussein and the current leadership of Iraq are allowed to win against the painfully assembled forces of international legality, the world faces anarchy. All that Saddam Hussein has to do is to withdraw. That is a clear issue.

These events will define the nature of the world that will succeed the world in which I was brought up and in which I now live—the world of the cold war. This is a defining event. We cannot allow the forces of international law to

be faced down and we cannot allow the United Nations in its first rebirth, to be defeated. Ernie Bevin must be proud of what is happening now at the United Nations. This is what the founding fathers meant it to do. If the first time that we have this unity, with the Security Council working as it is supposed to work and with the military staff committee for the first time in its history meeting with a substantive agenda, we allow them to be defeated, the world will face unparalleled anarchy. That cannot happen.

Aggression must not be allowed to pay. We must not let the message get out that the old stalemate of the cold war was the only way to keep peace. We hear backward-looking people—funny old Russian generals with rows of medals—say, "Those were the days."

Mr. Canavan: And others.

Mr. Waldegrave: Doubtless there are equivalents elsewhere. They say, "Let us go back to the safe old days of the cold war." If that is the message, what a depressing message it will be. Without the cold war, there is far more

room for flexibility, for danger, for shifts, for movements and for changing alliances, so we need the structure of international co-operation and of international law.

There is no question about on which side of the argument the House and the Government come down. Our hearts are out there with our hostages, but their safety and the safety of innumerable innocent people round the world depend on the strength of the House and its equivalents in the other nations of the alliance which is supporting international law. If anarchy is loosed upon the world, not only their lives will be at risk but innumerable unpredictable other people's lives will be at risk for ever.

Some people doubt the staying power of democracy. I do not. Democracies are slow to anger but, once angered, they go on right to the end of the road. The message has gone from the House today that this British democracy is ready to play its part in that process. I do not doubt that the House and the British people will see it through.

It being Ten o'clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Resolution this day.

Adjourned accordingly till tomorrow.

Original of
De Klerk's
letter → CDF.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1990

I enclose a copy of a letter to the
Prime Minister from President De Klerk, and
would be grateful for a draft reply.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CG



Union Buildings
Pretoria

31 August 1990

The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister

The South African Government has noted with grave concern the detention of citizens of the United Kingdom and other nations by Iraq. This repugnant step calls for the strongest condemnation of all civilised states. Please be assured of the full support of myself and my Government in your efforts to secure the release and ensure the safety of your citizens and the citizens of other countries.

In this time of crisis I am acutely conscious of the gravity of the decisions facing you and your Government. Our thoughts and prayers are with you at this time.

Yours sincerely

F W DE KLERK
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

*CSP
- 109.*

10 September 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

I should be grateful if the enclosed letter from State President de Klerk could be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER



HM Treasury

A C S ALLAN
Under Secretary



Parliament Street
London SW1P 3AG
Telephone 01 2704430

L Appleyard Esq
Cabinet Office
Whitehall
London SW1

10 September 1990

Dear Len,

AHGG: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Two points came up at this morning's meeting of AHGG in relation to financial sanctions, which I said I would investigate and report back to the Group.

The first concerned payments from blocked accounts to Iraqi students in the UK, where paragraph 6(v) of AHGG(90)20 suggested that "it would be possible to put in place much stricter monitoring to ensure that the amounts requested are required and that they are being put to the purpose for which they have been approved". All such payments already require Bank of England authorisation, and this is restricted to reasonable living expenses. Authorisation would not be given for larger sums unless there were a clear evidence of need. Restrictions on Iraqi nationals are already applied much more strictly than those on Kuwaiti nationals. We and the Bank of England do not see scope for a tougher regime without the risk of creating genuine hardship. This could affect those opposed to the current Iraqi regime as well as those who support it, and could open up the possibility of retaliation against the funds of British nationals in Iraq. We also see considerable practical difficulties in policing such a regime, even if it were thought desirable.



3. The second point raised concerned instructions from Iraq to amend letters of credit. I discover that this is being discussed in David Gowan's sub-group on the movement of funds, and that DTI and the Bank of England have been asked to investigate what action can be taken under the UN Sanctions Order to stop this. I understand this is to be discussed at the sub-group tomorrow, and David Gowan could perhaps report back to AHGG on Wednesday.

4. I am copying this to AHGG.

Yours
Alec

A C S ALLAN

A The National Archives

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CONFIDENTIAL



WOP²
Prime Minister

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

To be aware

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1990

CDP
10/9

Dear Simon,

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THE GULF: SAUDI REACTIONS TO BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT

I should perhaps record that Prince Bandar contacted me in quite a state yesterday, after watching the Bush/Gorbachev press conference on Sky television. He was very alarmed at the constant harping on a peaceful solution, and the lack of clear acknowledgment of the military option. This would go down very badly in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries and be seen as a sign of weakness. He wondered whether the President would be passing through London on his way back and could provide some reassurance to the Prime Minister that the military option had not been ruled out.

I sent Prince Bandar - who was in London - the text of the joint statement and drew attention to the reference to 'additional' steps. He was somewhat mollified by this. He asked whether we could give him an account of any briefing which the President gave the Prime Minister. I said we would consider this: it would have to be through Antony Acland in Washington. When General Scowcroft telephoned me later in the evening from Air Force One, I told him about Bandar's concern, and suggested that he might contact him direct to set his mind at rest.

Prince Bandar has decided to travel to Washington today, so as to be there when the President addresses Congress tomorrow. He has therefore withdrawn his request to see the Prime Minister (who does not get back to London until tonight).

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours faithfully,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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071-828 1884

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE

LONDON SW1E 6JP

Prime Minister

Content?

*CDI
15/9.*

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

10 September 1990

Dear Douglas:

GULF CRISIS: REQUEST FROM THE AMIR

record attached

At the meeting of OD(G) on 5 September it was noted that the request for assistance which the Amir of Kuwait has made to us does not embrace the use of force beyond that necessary to enforce economic sanctions, and that a further request would be needed. Your Departmental Legal Advisers have been in touch with my office about the drafting of such a request.

I attach the text of a request which I suggest can form the basis of our discussions with the US and other partners and, subject to those discussions, can be submitted to the Amir. The text is of course drafted on the assumption that a request is obtained as soon as possible. A different draft would be necessary if we were to obtain the further request only if and when the occasion for further use of force arose.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Wakeham, William Waldegrave and Sir Robin Butler.

John King

Na Wick

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I wish to express the renewed gratitude of my Government and the people of Kuwait for the firm and clear measures taken by the Government of the United Kingdom described in Your Excellency's message of 29 August. These measures and those taken by other friendly nations at the request of the Government of Kuwait to deal with the Iraqi aggression have not produced the desired result. Instead, Iraq continues to defy the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, which call for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of our lawful authority, and continues in unlawful occupation of our territory. Accordingly in the event that further and measured military force is necessary to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait/I formally request, in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter, that the Government of Kuwait, to take such further military steps as are necessary to achieve that end.

??

Requests in similar terms are being addressed to the Governments of.....

g the UK proceed, in consultation with the Government

SECRET

dated version

*With the Compliments of
the Attorney-General*

*The Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers
Attorney General's Chambers
9 Buckingham Gate
London SW1E 6JP*

071-828 1884

SECRET

11

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I wish to express the renewed gratitude of my Government and the people of Kuwait for the firm and clear measures taken by the Government of the United Kingdom described in Your Excellency's message of 29 August. These measures and those taken by other friendly nations at the request of the Government of Kuwait to deal with the Iraqi aggression have not produced the desired result. Instead, Iraq continues to defy the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, which call for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of our lawful authority, and continues in unlawful occupation of our territory. | Accordingly in the event that further and measured] military force is necessary to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait I formally request, | in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter, | that the Government of the United Kingdom proceed, in consultation with the Government of Kuwait, to take such further military steps as are necessary to achieve that end. |

Requests in similar terms are being addressed to the Governments of.....

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10(A-0)

PRIME MINISTER

ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THE GULF

The Defence Secretary proposes to let you have a list of options for sending additional forces to the Gulf, which I will attach to this minute when it arrives. He does not want to make a recommendation yet, but would prefer a first round of discussion at tomorrow's meeting of Ministers.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary has also let you have his views from Tokyo. He now favours sending a carrier group plus between 5,000/10,000 ground forces - while arguing that the latter would need the endorsement of a full OD or Cabinet.

The only new factor is that Secretary Baker asked the European members of NATO to contribute ground forces, when he briefed them this morning on the outcome of the Helsinki meeting.

Although the Defence Secretary has not made up his mind, I am told (in confidence) that his tentative conclusions are:

- naval force. He is against sending any further ships. The Americans and Saudis are not asking for more: and the other Europeans are contributing only ships.

- air force. He is inclined to agree to the Americans' request for additional Tornado aircraft in the recce. version.

- ground forces. He is undecided about what best to send. There are three choices:

i) an armoured force. This is what the Americans want, so prima facie there is a good case for sending it. But there are doubts about the reliability of our tanks. Shifting an armoured brigade is quite a major

B

exercise (they take their own workshops and so on).
The manpower commitment would be about 7,500.

ii) Artillery. This could fill a gap: and there is the advantage of commonality with both the Americans and Saudis (which means you can swap ammunition). But it might look a bit as though we were ducking out of sending front-line fighting troops. The manpower commitment would be about 5,000.

iii) an Armoured Recce. Force in light tanks (Scorpion). A smaller commitment than an armoured brigade, indeed might fall below the credibility ceiling; but avoids some of the risks inherent in an armoured brigade. The manpower commitment would be 3000.

Challenger ①

You could of course combine (ii) and (iii). The Defence Secretary does not favour infantry or commandos.

C.P.P.

CHARLES POWELL

F 3

10 September 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\gulf.dca

750 tanks



a(A-I)

MO 6/17/15S

Seen by PM

EM 11/9

PRIME MINISTER

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

I have been considering with the Chiefs of Staff the best further contribution which we might make to the multi-national forces in the Gulf. A range of broad military options is summarised in the attached note for discussion at our meeting tomorrow.

2. There is strong US and Saudi pressure for the UK to supply ground forces, and I have been considering what would best meet the military requirement but at the same time be fully consistent with our declared defensive aim.

Air Forces

3. I believe that the most sensible air contribution we could offer would be a mixed squadron of 8 Tornado GR1s and 4 GR1As. These would complement the GR1 ground attack aircraft already stationed in Bahrain and the GR1A would provide a welcome improvement in the night reconnaissance capability of the allied forces in theatre. They could be in theatre in about 7 days, although we have some further work to do on basing arrangements.

SECRET



Ground Forces

4. We know that the US in-theatre commander, Gen Schwarzkopf, regards the tank imbalance between allied and Iraqi forces (likely to be 1:3 even by December) as his major military concern and would particularly value the deployment of a UK armoured unit. The options would be to send an armoured brigade (7,500-10,000 men) or an enhanced armoured brigade (12,000-14,000 men). Both would have 114 Challenger tanks but the enhanced brigade would include a second battalion of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and a second artillery regiment. Although an enhanced brigade would be more powerful, especially for offensive operations in the open desert, a basic brigade would be easier to sustain and still make a significant contribution towards alleviating the shortage of allied tanks. Unlike the enhanced brigade which could operate as an entirely independent unit, a brigade would need to be integrated with a US formation from which it would receive some combat and logistic support. Although we have undoubtedly had reliability problems with our Challenger tanks, the Army are confident that the battle availability of this relatively limited number of tanks could be satisfactorily maintained.

5. An alternative which would also provide a substantial improvement in capability responding to a clear military imbalance (about 2:1 in Iraq's favour at the beginning of November) would be a fully self-supporting artillery brigade (48 guns, approx 5000 men). This would have a clear defensive role but would equally be able to provide support for offensive operations if required. In the absence of other UK ground troops, it would need to be integrated into a larger US formation (it has interoperable equipment). The size of an artillery contribution could be varied downwards (ultimately to a single artillery regiment) by reducing either its number of guns or its integral logistic support.



6. The other main ground option of an armoured reconnaissance regiment would provide evidence of our political commitment in support of ground operations but would be of less military value in current circumstances.

7. I would not recommend either airmobile or airborne forces, as too lightly armed for this situation.

Naval Forces

8. Similarly, in present circumstances, there is no clear role for the special capabilities of an amphibious force. While a carrier group would provide a strengthening of our naval contribution and some potentially useful additional capabilities, given the strength of allied naval forces already deployed this does not seem a pressing requirement.

Command

9. Both the artillery brigade and the armoured brigade would need to be closely integrated with US forces. We would, of course, retain the right of decision over whether our forces should be committed to any US operation but, once we had taken such a decision, we would need to assign them to US operational control. This parallels the arrangements for our forces committed to NATO. A ground force contribution of this size should also ensure that we have full access to US operational planning.

Costs

10. It is not been possible to identify until deployment details are clearer the additional costs likely to arise, but a very broad estimate of the initial transportation costs alone of each option given in the paper makes it clear that in most cases these would be



quite substantial (and, of course, recovery costs would be similar). Other additional costs are bound to arise for the procurement or modification of equipment to suit the particular conditions of the deployment. The likely magnitude of these costs will certainly involve a call on the Reserve.

Conclusion

11. I am happy with the Tornado GR1/LA proposals which we can action quickly. The ground forces are clearly more difficult, and I personally feel that the best answer in terms of numbers would be rather more than the Recce Regt (of 1000) and rather less than the Armoured Brigade of 7500 to 10,000, but that it should include tanks as this is precisely what they want. I am therefore urgently examining how this alternative might be achieved.

12. There is a major logistical challenge in the armoured options with the much greater manpower involved on which we shall need close consultation with both the US and Saudi Arabia and we shall also need to conduct detailed reconnaissance as soon as possible.

13. It is obvious that whichever choice is made, this would represent a quite different scale of involvement in the Gulf situation with a much higher risk profile than at present. Ground forces will be much less flexible and mobile than the aircraft and ships that we have there at present, and I appreciate the suggestion that their deployment should be finally approved in a wider group of colleagues whether OD or Cabinet.



14. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(G) and the Chief Secretary, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence
10th September 1990



(T.K)

Approved by the Defence Secretary and initialled in his absence.



OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

GROUND FORCES

1. The balance of ground forces is likely to remain in favour of the Iraqis even at the beginning of December. Thus any UK ground force contribution would be welcome militarily - and the US have also made it clear that they would value the commitment of UK ground forces politically. The ground force packages which have been considered are summarised below in order of size:

- a. Armoured Recce Regiment. (1000 men) An armoured reconnaissance regiment (with 48 Scorpions) would provide a good recce capability, but the US already has sufficient capability in theatre. An armoured reconnaissance regiment could be complemented by an attack helicopter regiment if desired. Logistic assistance from US forces would be required. Deployment time about 20 days, including sea tail. Initial transportation cost c. £6.25M.
- b. Artillery Regiment. (800 men) There is a serious artillery imbalance, and an artillery regiment (18xM 109) could help redress the balance. The guns and ammunition are fully interoperable with American artillery and thus maintenance and resupply would be relatively easy, relying on US facilities (see also option d). Deployment time 30-35 days. Initial transport cost c. £3M.
- c. 24 Air Mobile Brigade. (4500-7000 men) 24 Bde can be organised either as an air mobile brigade (primarily a defensive formation - infantry heavy with a good anti-tank



capability) or as an air mechanised brigade, relying principally on attack helicopters. In the latter role it provides a highly mobile and flexible anti-armour force with a reasonable offensive capability; however there could be difficulties in ensuring sufficient Chinook availability in desert conditions. The deployment of 24 Bde would provide a useful military capability, although the US already has a very good capability of this type. Initial deployment 12-13 days but sea tail would take 27-31 days. Initial transportation cost c. £10.5M.

d. Artillery Brigade. (c5000 men) A fully self sufficient artillery brigade of 48 M107 guns would provide a contribution towards improving the artillery imbalance (2:1 in Iraqi favour at beginning of November). This option could be adjusted downwards either by reducing the number of guns or by reducing the degree of integral logistic support and increasing reliance on US support. Deployment time would be about 38 days. Initial transportation cost c. £15M.

e. Armoured Bde. (7500-10000 men) Although not as powerful as an enhanced armoured brigade (option f), an armoured brigade with 114 tanks would be easier to sustain and would make a significant contribution towards alleviating CINCENTCOM's shortage of tanks. It would need to be integrated with a US formation and receive some combat and logistic support from them. Deployment would take 30-35 days. Initial transportation cost c. £1 5M.

f. Enhanced Armoured Bde. (12000-14000 men) An enhanced armoured brigade would have the same number of tanks but provide a formation best suited to offensive operations in the open desert; it would also be a major contribution to



meeting CINCENTCOM's principal military concern about the disparity in tank strengths. As an independent brigade it would have full combat support; a good level of availability could be achieved provided sufficient logistic support were available. It would take 30-40 days to deploy. Initial transportation cost c. £24M.

RAF

2. Tornado GR1/GR1A. (12 aircraft) A mixed squadron would complement the existing GR1 deployment in Bahrain. The Tornado GR1A is primarily an all weather day/night recce aircraft but retains the offensive capability of the GR1. Although its recce facilities are not yet fully developed, its present night capability would provide a valuable addition to the recce capability already in theatre. The squadron could be operational in theatre in 7 days, although the basing arrangements require further study. The further GR1 aircraft would also enhance the all weather and night capability of the existing force which the American Commander in theatre would welcome. Initial transportation cost c. £4.5M.

RN

3. Amphibious. One Commando Group (1500-2500 men) with LPD, CVS (in LPH role) 3 LSLs and RFA support could be in theatre in 24-28 days. There is no specific role for its specialised capability at present (and America has large marine forces in theatre). A Commando Group would nevertheless be a sign of military commitment to ground forces operations without immediate deployment ashore (although such a force could only be maintained at sea for a limited period). A full Commando Brigade of 7000 men would represent a larger contribution, but would require an additional 5 LSLs and 8-12 ships taken up from



trade. Initial transportation cost c. £6-12M.

4. CVSG Group. (5 ships) A CVSG group would consist of a carrier, 2 escorts and 2 RFAs: it would be in theatre in about 28 days. Although there are already large US (and other) naval and air forces in the Gulf area, a carrier would provide a highly flexible range of national capabilities which could be useful in responding to various contingencies. These capabilities include major command and control and surveillance facilities, which could be useful in co-ordinating multi-national naval activity or if a maritime evacuation of civilians were required. Its AAW capability would also offer extra insurance against attacks on naval forces. However, the Chiefs of Staff would not wish to maintain this commitment for more than one 6 month deployment.

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

I have been considering with the Chiefs of Staff the best further contribution which we might make to the multi-national forces in the Gulf. A range of broad military options summarised in the attached note for discussion at our meeting tomorrow.

2. All these are entirely feasible, but it is important that our further contribution should be seen as a substantial one including a ground element, helping to meet a clear military requirement but at the same time fully consistent with our declared defensive aim. Against these criteria, I believe that some options appear rather stronger than others.

Air Forces

3. I believe that the most sensible air contribution we could offer would be a mixed squadron of 8 GR1s and 4 GR1As. These would complement the GR1 ground attack aircraft already stationed in Bahrain and the GR1A would provide a welcome improvement in the night reconnaissance capability of the allied forces in theatre. These could be in theatre in about 7 days, although we have some further work to do on basing arrangements.

Ground Forces

4. We know that the US in-theatre commander, Gen Schwarzkopf, regards the tank imbalance between allied and Iraqi forces (likely to be 1:3 even by December) as his major military concern and would particularly value the deployment of a UK armoured unit. The options would be to send an armoured brigade (7,500-10,000 men) or an enhanced armoured brigade (12,000-14,000 men). Both would have 114 Challenger tanks but the full brigade would include a second battalion of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery regiment. Although a full brigade would be more powerful, especially for offensive operations in the open desert, a light brigade would be easier to sustain and still make a significant contribution towards alleviating the shortage of allied tanks. Unlike the full brigade which could operate as an entirely independent unit, a light brigade would need to be partially integrated with a US formation from which it would receive some combat and logistic support. Although we have undoubtedly had reliability problems with our Challenger tanks, we believe that the logistic support which would be provided would allow us to maintain a fully adequate level of battle availability. U

5. An alternative which would also provide a substantial improvement in capability responding to a clear military imbalance (about 2:1 in Iraq's favour at the beginning of November) would be a fully self-supporting artillery brigade (48 guns, approx 5000 men). This would have a clear defensive role but would equally be able to provide support for offensive operations if required. In the absence of other UK ground troops, it would of necessity operate in support of US forces and need to be integrated with a larger US formation.

6. The size of an artillery contribution could be varied downwards (ultimately to a single artillery regiment - option 6) by reducing

either its number of guns or its integral logistic support. The other ground options of an armoured reconnaissance regiment or 24 Air Mobile Brigade would provide evidence of our political commitment in support of ground operations but would be of limited military value in current circumstances.

Naval Forces

7. Similarly, in present circumstances, there is no clear role for the special capabilities of an amphibious force. While a CVSG group would provide a strengthening of our naval contribution and some potentially useful additional capabilities, given the strength of allied naval forces already deployed this does not seem a pressing requirement.

8. Both the artillery brigade and the armoured brigade would need to be closely integrated with US forces. We would, of course, retain the right of decision over whether our forces should be committed to any US operation but, once we had taken such a decision, we would need to assign them to US operational control. This parallels the arrangements for our forces committed to NATO. A ground force contribution of this size should also ensure that we have full access to US operational planning.

Costs

9. It has not been possible to identify in the time available clearly the additional costs likely to arise but a very broad estimate of the initial transportation costs alone of each option given in the paper makes it clear that in most cases these would be quite substantial (and, of course, recovery costs would be similar). Other additional costs are bound to arise for the procurement or modification of equipment to suit the particular conditions of the deployment. It would not be possible to absorb costs of this

magnitude within the already hard pressed defence budget.

Consultation

10. It would, of course, be necessary to consult both the US and Saudi Arabia about anything we propose and to conduct detailed reconnaissance as soon as possible.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(K) and the Cabinet Secretary.

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULFGROUND FORCES

1. The balance of ground forces is likely to remain in favour of the Iraqis even at the beginning of December. Thus any UK ground force contribution would be welcome militarily - and the US have also made it clear that they would value the commitment of UK ground forces politically. The ground force packages which have been considered are summarised below in order of size:

- a. Armoured Recce Regiment. (580 men) An armoured reconnaissance regiment (with 48 Scorpions) would provide a good recce capability, but the US already has sufficient capability in theatre. An armoured reconnaissance regiment could be complemented by an attack helicopter regiment if desired. Logistic assistance from US forces would be required. Deployment time about 20 days, including sea tail. Initial transportation cost c. £6.25M.
- b. Artillery Regiment. (800 men) There is a serious artillery imbalance, and an artillery regiment (18xM 109) could help redress the balance. The guns and ammunition are fully interoperable with American artillery and thus, maintenance and resupply would be relatively easy, relying on US facilities (see also option d). Deployment time 30-35 days. Initial transport cost c. £3M.
- c. 24 Air Mobile Brigade. (4500-7000 men) 24 Bde can be organised either as an air mobile brigade (primarily a defensive formation - infantry heavy with a good anti-tank

capability) or as an air mechanised brigade, relying principally on attack helicopters. In the latter role it provides a highly mobile and flexible anti-armour force with a reasonable offensive capability; however there could be difficulties in ensuring sufficient Chinook availability in desert conditions. The deployment of 24 Bde would provide a useful military capability, although the US already has a very good capability of this type. Initial deployment 12-13 days but sea tail would take 27-31 days. Initial transportation cost c. £10.5M.

d. Artillery Brigade. (c5000 men) A fully self sufficient artillery brigade of 48 M107 guns would provide a contribution towards improving the artillery imbalance (2:1 in Iraqi favour at beginning of November). This option could be adjusted downwards either by reducing the number of guns or by reducing the degree of integral logistic support and increasing reliance on US support. Deployment time would be about 38 days. Initial transportation cost c. £9M.

e. Armoured Bde. (7500-10000 men) Although not as powerful as an enhanced armoured brigade (option f), an armoured brigade with 114 tanks would be easier to sustain and would make a significant contribution towards alleviating CINCENTCOM's shortage of tanks. It would need to be integrated with a US formation and receive some combat and logistic support from them. Deployment would take 30-35 days. Initial transportation cost c. £1 5M.

f. Enhanced Armoured Bde. (12000-14000 men) An enhanced armoured brigade would have the same number of tanks but provide a formation best suited to offensive operations in the open desert; it would also be a major contribution to

meeting CINCENTCOM's principal military concern about the disparity in tank strengths. As an independent brigade it would have full combat support; a good level of availability could be achieved provided sufficient logistic support were available. It would take 30-40 days to deploy. Initial transportation cost c. £24M.

RAF

2. Tornado GR1/GR1A. (12 aircraft) A mixed squadron would complement the existing GR1 deployment in Bahrain. The Tornado GR1A is primarily an all weather day/night recce aircraft but retains the offensive capability of the GR1. Although its recce facilities are not yet fully developed, its present night capability would provide a valuable addition to the recce capability already in theatre. the squadron could be operational in theatre in 7 days, although the basing arrangements require further study. The further GR1 aircraft would also enhance the all weather and night capability of the existing force which the American Commander in theatre would welcome. Initial transportation cost c. £4.5M.

** fine its
radar
doesn't
work!*

RN

3. Amphibious. One Commando Group (1500-2500 men) with LPD, CVS (in LPH role) 3 LSLs and RFA support could be in theatre in 24-28 days. There is no specific role for its specialised capability at present (and America has large marine forces in theatre). A Commando Group would nevertheless be a sign of military commitment to ground forces operations without immediate deployment ashore (although such a force could only be maintained at sea for a limited period). A full Commando Brigade of 7000 men would represent a larger contribution, but would require an additional 5 LSLs and 8-12 ships taken up from

trade. Initial transportation cost c. £6-12M.

4. CVSG Group. (5 ships) A CVSG group would consist of a carrier, 2 escorts and 2 RFAs: it would be in theatre in about 28 days. Although there are already large US (and other) naval and air forces in the Gulf area, a carrier would provide a highly flexible range of national capabilities which could be useful in responding to various contingencies. These capabilities include major command and control and surveillance facilities, which could be useful in co-ordinating multi-national naval activity or if a maritime evacuation of civilians were required. Its AAW capability would also offer extra insurance against attacks on naval forces. However, the Chiefs of Staff would not wish to maintain this commitment for more than one 6 month deployment.

PS/NO 10

SECRET AND PERSONAL
DEDIP

FM TOKYO
TO DESKBY 100900Z FCO
TELNO 772
OF 100200Z SEPTEMBER 90

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/NO 10 FROM PS/FCO

GULF: FUTURE FORCE LEVELS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MINUTE FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO
THE PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

1. WHILE I AM AWAY, YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING WHETHER TO MAKE
A FURTHER FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR
ME TO JUDGE WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE OPERATIONALLY WITHOUT
KNOWING MORE OF THE SERVICE SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT AND OF US THINKING.
BUT FROM THE POLITICAL/FOREIGN POLICY SIDE, I CANNOT SEE
GREAT ADVANTAGE IN PUTTING IN MORE AIRCRAFT. I DOUBT IF THIS WOULD
GIVE US AN EXTRA DIVIDEND IN TERMS OF THE AMERICAN VIEW OF OUR
COMMITMENT OR INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN.

2 I THINK THERE IS A CASE FOR SOME NAVAL REINFORCEMENT. OUR
SHIPS ARE VULNERABLE TO EXOCET ATTACK AND IN THE EVENT OF
HOSTILITIES THEY MIGHT NEED THE EXTRA PROTECTION OF A CARRIER GROUP.
I WOULD THEREFORE FAVOUR THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A GROUP, IF IT IS
THOUGHT OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY, THOUGH I REALISE THERE WOULD
BE A LIMIT ON HOW LONG SUCH A GROUP COULD BE DEPLOYED.

3. THE AMERICANS - AND THE SAUDIS - HAVE ASKED US TO PUT IN GROUND FORCES. I THINK THERE IS A GOOD CASE FOR DOING SO, EITHER REPLACING AMERICANS BY ROULEMENT, OR SEPARATELY. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE SAUDI ATTITUDE AND PRESIDENT BUSH'S OWN INSTINCTS MAY MEAN THAT THE SITUATION CONTINUES AS IT IS NOW FOR QUITE SOME TIME. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN IS TO BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW, WE HAVE TO KEEP BUILDING UP THE PRESSURE SO THAT HE FEELS THE SCREW TIGHTENING, CANNOT RELY ON SANCTIONS BEING OUR ONLY OPTION AND IS MADE INCREASINGLY AWARE THAT, IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT, HE WILL NOT WIN. WE HAVE RIGHTLY GOT A LOT OF CREDIT FOR THE SPEED OF OUR RESPONSE BUT AS WE BUILD UP THE PRESSURES ON SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND AS WE FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMBAT, THEN I DO NOT THINK THAT OUR PRESENT FORCE LEVELS OR THE ADDITION OF A CARRIER GROUP WOULD BE ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE REGARDED BY ALL AS A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTOR WHO SHOULD BE CLOSELY INVOLVED AT ANY STAGE. WE SHOULD PUT TROOPS IN ON THE GROUND. PRECISELY WHAT FORM THAT TAKES MUST BE A QUESTION OF WHAT FITS BEST WITH THE AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT AND WHAT WE CAN DO MOST EFFECTIVELY. BUT AN ARMoured BRIGADE WOULD BE A SENSIBLE COMMITMENT, PROVIDED WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT OUR EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY TANKS WILL WORK EFFICIENTLY. THE NUMBERS SHOULD AGAIN BE A MATTER OF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. BUT MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND COULD STRIKE PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME AS EXCESSIVE. LESS THAN 5,000 WOULD LOOK LIKE TOKENISM

4. DEPLOYING TROOPS ON THE GROUND WOULD CREATE A NEW DIMENSION TO OUR RESPONSE. IF THAT IS THE RECOMMENDED DECISION, I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR IT TO BE ENDORSED BY A WIDER GROUP OF MINISTERS, EITHER OD OR CABINET. IN MY ABSENCE, I WOULD BE CONTENT FOR THIS MINUTE TO GO TO OTHER MINISTERS IF YOU WISH.

5. WE ARE LIKELY TO COME UNDER PRESSURE ON COSTS. ANY FRESH BUILD-UP WILL COINCIDE WITH A NECESSARILY HARSH PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ROUND. STRINGENCY ON SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS WILL BE CONTRASTED WITH THE MILLIONS SPENT IN THE GULF, ONCE THE OPPOSITION HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL FORM. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DEFEND A POSITION WHERE US MILITARY COSTS ARE TO A SIZEABLE EXTENT CARRIED BY THE SAUDIS, JAPANESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS, WHILE OURS ARE NOT. NO-ONE CAN ACCUSE US OF GOING THERE IN A MERCENARY SPIRIT AND I HOPE WE COULD INSERT OUR MILITARY COSTS INTO THE BURDEN-SHARING EXERCISE. WITHOUT MAKING A REQUEST AT THIS STAGE, I WILL PROBE THE JAPANESE IN THIS AREA TODAY.

6. IF WE TAKE A DECISION TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES, THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN ANNOUNCING IT UNILATERALLY. BUT THERE WOULD ALSO BE ADVANTAGE IN LETTING THE FRENCH, AS THE OTHER MAJOR EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTOR, KNOW WHAT WE WERE DOING. WE DO NOT WANT TO START A COMPETITIVE AUCTION BETWEEN US AND IT IS IN OUR LONGER TERM INTEREST TO WORK WITH THEM WHEN WE CAN. WHEN A DECISION IS TAKEN, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD PHONE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND VERY SHORTLY BEFORE IT IS ANNOUNCED. YOU MIGHT CONSIDER TELLING ANDREOTTI ON THE SAME BASIS. YOU HAVE DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH HIM BEFORE. AS PRESIDENCY HE WILL BE CHAIRING THE MEETINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WHERE THESE MATTERS ARE BOUND TO COME UP, AND THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. WE SHOULD ALSO TELL KING FAHD.

7. I AM COPYING THIS MINUTE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.

ENDS

PERSONAL

EAM

File

be: KC

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ

I had a talk last night with Professor Bernard Lewis, the orientalist. I retain four points which you might find of interest:

- the need to be clear and explicit when dealing with Saddam Hussein. It was no good using diplomatic language or nuances: he did not operate in that way. One had to be direct, even brutal. You were doing far better than other world leaders in this respect. He went on to suggest that Saddam has misread the signals from the West in the period immediately before the invasion: the decision of the US Congress to continue agricultural credits: the fulsome British response to the release of Mrs Parrish. Saddam would have assumed that the West knew what he was up to over Kuwait, and would not have felt he was being warned off;
- if it came to a military option, we should bear in mind that a number of countries had territorial claims against Iraq. There were the Kurds: the Iranians would want frontier rectifications: the Syrians would want something: and the Turks had a claim to Mosul and the surrounding area. Indeed, he was inclined to wonder whether this was not one of the motives behind the strong Turkish support for action against Iraq. One result of a conflict could be the dismemberment of Iraq itself;
- speculating about possible successors to Saddam Hussein, he strongly discounted the theory in some newspapers that the Iranians would engineer the emergence of a militant Shia successor. Although the Shia were a majority in Iraq, the country had been run by a Sunni ascendancy since the 10th century, and this was very unlikely to change;

PERSONAL

PERSONAL

- 2 -

- in our counter-propaganda, we should make more of the way in which Saddam Hussein's conduct over the hostages offended both Arab customs of hospitality and Arab conventions over hostage-taking (which were extremely detailed and complex).

CHARLES POWELL

10 September 1990

eam a:\foreign\iraq

PERSONAL

See by PM 9/9

PRIME MINISTER

I now attach the text of the joint statement. It is actually slightly better than I thought. I would draw your attention particularly to the third and fourth paragraphs from the end. They clearly hold out the possibility of "additional" steps if a peaceful means of resolving the crisis do not succeed.

I should mention that Prince Bandar called me this afternoon in a bit of gloom about the Press Conference because he was worried that it ruled out the use of force. I was able to quote the text to him and he is more encouraged. He passed on King Fahd's best wishes.

PP Pamela Mann
C.D. POWELL
9.9.90.

TEXT OF BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT STATEMENT

Here is the full text of a joint statement issued at the end of a one day Superpower summit on Sunday in Helsinki.

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement.

"We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbours.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

Today we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate Government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions.

At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognise that U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 permits,

in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances.

The United Nations and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists.

However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the U.N. Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability.

It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue those broader objectives at the proper time.

PRIME MINISTER

HELSENKI SUMMIT

I watched the joint press conference between President Bush and Mr. Gorbachev. They have agreed a statement. It was not read out on television but we are trying to obtain a copy and will fax it to Balmoral when received.

They clearly both regarded the meeting as successful and issued a strong signal of their joint determination to see the Security Council Resolutions implemented. But they skirted round the question of possible use of force: and it was fairly clear that Gorbachev is not ready to subscribe to this. Gorbachev said that Soviet military advisers in Iraq were being reduced all the time but did not give a commitment to remove them all immediately. He also made clear that the Soviet Union was not at present intending to send forces to the area. There was some reference to economic assistance to the Soviet Union during which President Bush seemed to me to have taken a more forthcoming line towards the possibility of such assistance than in the past.

The atmosphere of the press conference was obviously good and I would propose to tell Bernard to say that you welcome the agreement reached between the President and Mr. Gorbachev and the strong signal of their joint determination to see the Security Council Resolutions implemented.

Janet Main

JP
C. D. POWELL

9 September 1990

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TELNO 840
OF 091530Z SEPTEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

SIC AAA/I9M

SAUDI FINANCING OF US MILITARY EFFORT

SUMMARY

1. FIRST INDICATIONS ARE THAT SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE COSTS OF US FORCES HERE, AGREED DURING BAKER'S LATEST VISIT, WILL AMOUNT TO RELATIVELY LITTLE.

DETAIL

2. YOUR TELNO 573 ASKED FOR MORE OF THE DETAILS OF ASSISTANCE WHICH THE SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE COST OF THE US MILITARY EFFORT.

3. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY HERE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY BAKER WITH KING FAHD AND THROUGH HIM PRINCE SULTAN AND ABALKHAIL (FINANCE MINISTER), DETAILED NEGOTIATION HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO KHALID BIN SULTAN WHO WILL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS AGREED DURING BAKER'S VISIT THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD MEET US COSTS INCURRED IN KINGDOM FOR FUEL UPLIFT: OTHER IN-COUNTRY TRANSPORT, AND WATER. THE SAUDIS WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE PAYING FOR FOOD OR ACCOMMODATION. IN TERMS OF OVERALL COST THEREFORE THE SAUDI SUBVENTION IS LIKELY TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL. CURRENTLY, THE EMBASSY HERE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ITEM, FUEL, IS COSTING APPROXIMATELY 5 MILLION PER DAY. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT YET REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS WHICH WILL BE USED TO ATTRIBUTE FUEL COSTS. ARE COSTS TO BE CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF SAUDI PUMP PRICES, THE COST TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, OR US FUEL PRICES? AT PRESENT THEY DO NOT KNOW. THEY HAVE ALSO TO RESOLVE TREATMENT OF SHIPPING, NOT LEAST BECAUSE LARGE ELEMENTS OF US NAVAL FORCES ARE OPERATING WELL OUTSIDE THE SAUDI AREA. PRESUMABLY THIS COULD BE RESOLVED IF THE SAUDIS PAID FOR ANY BUNKERING UNDERTAKEN IN SAUDI PORTS, BUT AGAIN THIS IS STILL TO BE PLAYED FOR.

4. A FURTHER DILEMMA FACING THE AMERICANS WILL BE THE QUESTION

OF RETROSPECTIVE PAYMENTS FOR COSTS INCURRED PRIOR TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN BAKER AND KING FAHD. WHILE THE SAUDIS ARE AMENABLE TO PAYING COSTS ON THIS BASIS FROM THE OUTSET OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE DOMESTIC LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MANAGING SUCH PAYMENTS.

5. IT LOOKS THEREFORE AS THOUGH THE SAUDIS WILL BE PAYING PERHAPS BETWEEN 150 MILLION TO 250 MILLION PER MONTH OUT OF A LOCAL MONTHLY COST ESTIMATED AT 500 MILLION. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTLY PRESENTATIONAL. IN CONVERSATION WITH DHM YESTERDAY, MANSOURI (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING THE TERMS OF JAPANESE ASSISTANCE WITH THE MILITARY BUILD UP) LAID MORE STRESS ON THE SAUDI CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL STATES AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS, ESPECIALLY EGYPT, AND SAUDI EXPENDITURE TO SUSTAIN THE GROWING ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONTINGENTS HERE, THAN ON HELP WITH US COSTS.

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PRIME MINISTER

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C.M.

MESSAGE FROM C.D. POWELL

Just to say that Brent Scowcroft telephoned me from Air Force I to say that President Bush wanted you to know that he was well satisfied with the joint declaration with the Soviet Union. Indeed it was better than he had expected. Gorbachev had been reluctant to a commitment to support the use of force, saying that the consequences would be unpredictable. He had also been very confident that the sanctions would work. But he had very carefully not ruled out the use of force. The overall view was a very strong signal from the U.S. and Soviet Union that ought to be sobering for Saddam Hussein.

 Samel Ham
C.D. POWELL

9.9.90

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 September 1990

GULF CRISIS

General Scowcroft telephoned me from Air Force One this evening on the way back to Washington. The President had been well satisfied with the meeting with Gorbachev and particularly with the joint statement. The latter had been better than he had expected and ought to have a sobering effect on Saddam Hussein. Gorbachev had been reluctant to contemplate use of force, on the grounds that the consequences were so unpredictable. He had expressed himself certain that sanctions would be effective. Equally, he had been careful not to rule out force. The President had thought the main thing was to get a clear signal of joint US/Soviet determination.

Scowcroft said that Gorbachev had been less helpful about Soviet military experts, saying only that the numbers would continue to fall. But he had declined to take any special measures to reduce them.

I said that we had put out a statement from No 10 welcoming the outcome of the meeting and the joint statement, and I was sure the Prime Minister would want to convey her congratulations on it to the President.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Resident Clerk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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09-1622 SUMMIT-TEXT

TEXT OF BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT STATEMENT

HELSINKI, Sept 9, Reuter - Here is the full text of a joint statement issued at the end of a one-day superpower summit on Sunday in Helsinki.

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbours.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990, and our support for United Nations Security Council resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

Today, we once again call upon the government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions.

At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognise that U.N. Security Council resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances.

The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists.

However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the U.N. charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability.

It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time."

(End Text)

REUTER GS NJP

CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 September 1990

You wrote to me yesterday with some proposals for handling the refugee crisis in Jordan (and Turkey), as increasing numbers of people flee Iraq. I have now been able to obtain the Prime Minister's views.

In brief, she is content for Sir David Hannay to suggest to the UN Secretary General, when he presents his credentials tomorrow, that he should appoint a Special Representative to handle the refugee crisis, and that he should be someone of international standing. Beyond that, the Prime Minister takes the view that it is for the United Nations itself to head a fund-raising drive for financial assistance for the refugees: and she has reservations about constant recourse to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for finance. She takes the view that they are already being asked to provide substantial funds for the American military presence and for aid to countries affected by implementation of sanctions. She does not think it reasonable to expect them also to take the lead in finance for the refugees. She thinks it better for the UN to turn to countries like Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Austria, who are not playing any significant military role in the Gulf, for this sort of assistance. It follows that the Prime Minister is not willing to send messages on the lines proposed in your letter to King Fahd and the Ruler of Kuwait.

From our point of view, the Prime Minister thinks the next step should be for Mrs Chalker to pay her visit to the area and report further. We can decide what further contribution we ought to make in the light of that.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Eamonn Taylor (Overseas Development Administration) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

The Hon Dominic Asquith
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Unofficial Translation

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Royal Embassy of
Saudi Arabia
London



سَفَارَةُ الْمَلِكِ فَهْدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الْعَزِيزِ
رَبِّ الْمَدِينَةِ
بَعْدَ

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister.

SUBJECT CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T2098/90

Cordial Greetings:

I have received Your Excellency's letter following the discussion which took place between us, during which you referred to the question of the protective equipment against chemical weapons for the Saudi Armed Forces.

I greatly appreciate the directive which was issued to British Aerospace plc. to secure this equipment urgently.

I also appreciate your valuable response in these circumstances when we, together with all the peace-loving peoples, aspire to repel the aggression and its consequences, that led to tensions and to the violation of humanitarian values, norms and principles, which mankind share in their protection and defence.

May I conclude by wishing you, Prime Minister, good health and happiness, as well as continuous prosperity and well-being for the friendly British people.

Please accept my warm greetings and highest consideration.

Your friend,

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,
King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Jeddah: 20 Safar 1411H
Corresponding to 9th September 1990



دولة السيدة ماجريت تاتشر

رئيس وزراء المملكة المتحدة

تحية طيبة وبعد،

فقد تلقيت رسالة دولتكم اثر المحادثة التي تمت بيننا
وأشرت فيها الى موضوع المعدات الوقائية للقوات المسلحة السعودية
ضد الاسلحة الكيماوية. واني لأقدر كثيرا التوجيه الذي صدر للشركة
البريطانية للطيران والفضاء لتأمين هذه المعدات على نحو عاجل.

كما أقدر كثيرا تجاوبكم الكريم في هذه الظروف التي نتطلع
فيها جميعا مع كل الشعوب المحبة للسلام الى صد العدوان وما أدى
اليه من توتر وانتهاك للقيم والاعراف والمبادئ الانسانية التي
يشارك الانسان في المحافظة عليها والدفاع عنها.

وفي الختام اتمنى لدولتكم دوام الصحة والسعادة وللشعب
البريطاني الصديق وافر الرخاء والرفاه الدائمين.

وتقبلو تحياتي وتقديري،،،

صديق قلم

خادم الحرمين الشريفين

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

جده في ٢٠/صفر ١٤١١هـ
الموافق ١٩/سبتمبر ١٩٩٠م.

MILITARY MACHINE. IN SPITE OF THE INEVITABLE

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
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Sir Anthony Acland's
assessment of
American intentions,
on his return
to Washington. He
predicts a long haul.

cc PS
PS/AS,
P/MS, Waddis
Mr Tomkins,
Mr Gribble,
Mr Gove-Robell
PS/AS 10
Chief of Mission Staff
my phone call office
R/K

SIC AAA/19M
MODUK EXCLUSIVE FOR DUTY OFFICER JOC
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO PRIVATE SECRETARY

EDP
1079.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. SINCE MY RETURN LAST TUESDAY, I HAVE BEEN ASSESSING WITH THE POLITICAL AND INFORMATION SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY AND WITH THE DEFENCE STAFF THE GENERAL MOOD HERE. I HAVE SEEN GENERAL POWELL, KIMMITT, SECRETARY CHENEY AND GATES, AND HAVE SPOKEN TO SCOWCROFT ON THE TELEPHONE. YOU MAY LIKE A REPORT BEFORE YOU SEE BAKER. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO ME ARE NOT QUOTED BACK TO OTHERS AND PARTICULARLY NOT TO AMERICAN CONTACTS.
2. THE SHORT TERM IS CLEAR. THE ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO THE EMBARGO POLICY AND TO MAKING ECONOMIC MEASURES AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. WITH SOME INEVITABLE EXCEPTIONS, THE COUNTRY, CONGRESS AND MEDIA CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CURRENT POLICY. THE MOOD IS NOT BELLICOSE. THE PRESIDENT HAS SUPPORT BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN SEEN TO BE FIRM YET MEASURED, AND TO HAVE SECURED UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL BACKING. THERE IS IN ANY CASE NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE EMBARGO AND A DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN SAUDI ARABIA UNTIL THE MILITARY BUILD UP IS COMPLETE. THIS IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED. THERE IS OF COURSE THE WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT THE IMPRESSIVE COALITION RANGED AGAINST

SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL SOMEHOW BE EFFECTIVE AND THAT HE WILL EITHER BE REMOVED FROM POWER BY FORCES INSIDE IRAQ OR THAT HIS NERVE WILL CRACK. I DO NOT FIND MUCH REAL BELIEF, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS LIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM AT LEAST, OR THAT SANCTIONS WILL BE RAPIDLY EFFECTIVE. 3

3. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT A WHOLE RANGE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS GOING ON IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPTIONS FOR ACTION DURING THIS PERIOD, SHOULD THERE BE A SERIOUS INCIDENT OR PROVOCATION. IT IS, I THINK, RECOGNISED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A RESPONSE, BUT THAT IT WOULD NEED TO BE FINELY JUDGED SO AS TO BE FULLY ADEQUATE WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME BRINGING ABOUT A GENERAL CONFLICT BEFORE THE AMERICANS WERE READY FOR ONE. THIS PLANNING IS BEING VERY TIGHTLY HELD INDEED, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHALL BE CUT INTO

IT HERE. THE BEST LINE WILL BE THROUGH AVM WILSON TO GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF. OUR INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IS RECOGNISED - AND WITH GRATITUDE - AND I DOUBT WHETHER AN AMERICAN REACTION TO A MAJOR INCIDENT (UNLESS IN IMMEDIATE SELF DEFENCE) WOULD BE SO SWIFT AS TO PRECLUDE CONSULTATION WITH US. THE INTENTION WOULD BE TO DISCUSS OPTIONS BRISKLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE PARTICULAR INCIDENT. BUT THERE IS NO HARM IN REPEATING THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION. AS I HAVE SAID TO CONTACTS HERE, AN INCIDENT COULD INVOLVE US FROM THE BEGINNING.

4. THE LONGER TERM IS BOTH MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IN SUBSTANCE AND MUCH HARDER TO PREDICT. ITS STARTING POINT IS WHEN THE BUILD UP OF FORCES IS ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE MILITARY OPTION. I DO NOT EXPECT THIS POINT TO BE REACHED UNTIL LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO GET HEAVY ARMOUR IN PLACE. IT IS ALSO FOR QUESTION WHETHER THE CURRENTLY PLANNED LEVELS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE TAKING THE OFFENSIVE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A RISKY OPTION. THERE IS NO DISPOSITION TO UNDERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF IRAQI FORCES NOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK TO DISLODGE THEM. FROM THE MOMENT OF MILITARY SUFFICIENCY, THE INITIATIVE REVERTS TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO HIM BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. IF THE BUILD-UP IS COMPLETE BY, SAY, EARLY NOVEMBER, THE PRESIDENT CAN STILL ARGUE THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE TROOPS ARE THERE, SANCTIONS MUST BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO WORK. THIS WOULD ENABLE HIM TO GET THROUGH THE 6 NOVEMBER MID-TERM ELECTIONS WITHOUT THE VAST UNCERTAINTIES OF MILITARY ACTION. BUT AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF SANCTIONS, THE MILITARY OPTION MAY COME INTO PLAY. IN THAT EVENT, THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE A SHORT, SHARP AND SUCCESSFUL ATTACK WHICH WOULD FORCE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND DESTROY SADDAM

C

HUSSEIN'S MILITARY MACHINE. IN SPITE OF THE INEVITABLE CASUALTIES, THAT WOULD BE APPLAUDED, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE A GUARANTEED CERTAINTY. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT BETS IN ITS FAVOUR ARE INCREASINGLY HEDGED. A LONG, DRAWN-OUT, MESSY CAMPAIGN, WITH VERY HEAVY CASUALTIES, WOULD BRING DOWN MUCH CRITICISM ON THE PRESIDENT, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE MILITARY AND WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR PUBLIC OPINION TO ACCEPT. THE ALTERNATIVE, IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK, OF SEEING SADDAM HUSSEIN REMAINING ENTRENCHED IN KUWAIT, WITH PERHAPS THE MALE HOSTAGES STILL HELD, AND WITH HIS MILITARY (INCLUDING NBC) POTENTIAL INTACT FOR THE FUTURE WOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, GENERATE GREAT PRESSURE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION QUOTE TO DO SOMETHING UNQUOTE. THE DESPATCH OF SUCH A MASSIVE FORCE TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE EXPENDITURE OF SO MUCH MONEY (AT A CRITICAL TIME FOR THE ECONOMY) WILL PROVOKE FROM A NUMBER OF QUARTERS THE DEM
ND FOR A
RESULT.

5. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CONGRESS AND MEDIA HAVE THE PATIENCE FOR A LONG AND SUSTAINED EFFORT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNATTRACTIVENESS OF THE ALTERNATIVE. BAKER SEEMED - IN HIS TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS - TO BE PREPARING OPINION FOR THE LONGER HAUL. THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BURDEN-SHARING OVER THE LONGER TERM ALSO POINTS IN THIS DIRECTON. GENERAL POWELL SAID TO ME THAT THE PATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE SOLD SHORT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE MILITARY OPTION WOULD INVOLVE MANY BODY BAGS RETURNING TO THE USA. HE ADDED THAT AMERICA HAD NOT IN FACT WEARIED OF MAINTAINING DEFENSIVE FORCES IN EUROPE AND KOREA, AND HE EMPHASISED VERY STRONGLY THAT THE ONLY TASK LAID ON HIM BY THE PRESIDENT WAS A DEFENSIVE ONE. CHENEY ECHOED THAT HE HIMSELF WAS NOT AS CONCERNED AS SOME ABOUT THE RESOLVE OF THE COUNTRY FOR A LONG HAUL.

6. ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH HAS NOT, I THINK, YET BEEN ADDRESSED IS THE SHEER DIFFICULTY OF PLANNING WITH SOME DEGREE OF CONFIDENTIALITY - LET ALONE CONDUCTING - AN OFFENSIVE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE COORDINATED WITH A MOTLEY ASSORTMENT OF ARAB ALLIES AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF SAUDI ARABIA - THE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY FROM WHICH AN OFFENSIVE WOULD PRINCIPALLY BE LAUNCHED. SUCH PLANNING COULD PRODUCE IMMEDIATE STRAINS WITHIN THE COALITION, TO PUT IT AT ITS LOWEST.

7. MY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION FROM THIS IS THAT UNLESS SADDAM

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HUSSEIN DOES SOMETHING VERY STUPID WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESIDENT IN ORDERING A MILITARY OFFENSIVE, WE SHALL SEE THE PERIOD OF TRYING TO MAKE SANCTIONS WORK EXTENDED RATHER THAN CURTAILED WITH INCREASING TALK OF DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGION. PUBLICLY ALL OPTIONS WILL BE KEPT OPEN, SO AS TO GIVE NO COMFORT TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT CONTINUED FAILURE TO EVICT THE IRAQIS FROM KUWAIT MAY PROGRESSIVELY DAMAGE THE PRESIDENT'S REPUTATION FOR BEING ABLE TO HANDLE MAJOR CRISES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IS WHETHER, HAVING TRANSPORTED THIS VAST FORCE TO THE REGION, THE PRESIDENT (A) USES THEM (B) LEAVES THEM THERE, OR (C) BRINGS AT LEAST SOME OF THEM HOME (TO SAVE COSTS). THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES TO EVERY OPTION, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS YET DECIDED WHICH IT THINKS THE LEAST BAD. NOR DO I THINK IT HAS YET TAKEN A FIRM VIEW ON WHETHER WESTERN OBJECTIVES WILL HAVE BEEN SECURED IF SADDAM HUSSEIN IS SOMEHOW FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, BUT LEFT IN BAGHDAD WITH HIS MILITARY CAPABILITIES LARGELY INTACT. MY JUDGEMENT AT PRESENT IS THAT WHILE SUCH A SCENARIO WOULD LEAVE THE ADMINISTRATION PROFOUNDLY UNEASY, THEY WOULD CONSIDER THAT IT FULFILLED THE LETTER OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE LIVED WITH, BUT THAT REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD THEN BECOME THE MORE IMPORTANT.

8. ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES, HOWEVER, THE FACT SEEMS TO BE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS, NOT SURPRISINGLY, NOT YET MADE UP ITS MIND - AND IN THE ABSENCE OF IRAQI PROVOCATION, IT HAS NO NEED TO DO SO FOR PERHAPS SEVERAL MONTHS YET.

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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOODSTUFFS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT AGREED AD REFERENDUM BY AMBASSADORS OF THE THE FIVE TODAY AND FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ON MONDAY 10 SEPTEMBER.

BEGINS:

THE COMMITTEE CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS IN HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES TO IRAQ AND KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3(C) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 (1990). IT IS RECOGNISED BY THE COMMITTEE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ARISE IN WHICH IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR FOODSTUFFS TO BE SUPPLIED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT IN ORDER TO RELIEVE HUMAN SUFFERING AND IN THIS RESPECT THE COMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM SEVERAL MEMBER STATES. IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THAT RESOLUTION 661 (1990) MUST BE STRICTLY IMPLEMENTED BUT WITHOUT CREATING CONDITIONS OF STARVATION FOR ANYONE IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

IN ORDER TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 661 (1990) HAVE ARISEN, THE COMMITTEE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR MORE FACTUAL INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION REGARDING FOODSTUFFS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEEK FROM RELEVANT HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND UN SPECIALISED AGENCIES AND OTHER SOURCES INFORMATION FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE COMMITTEE EXPECTS THAT THE INFORMATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE RAPIDLY.

IT IS THE HOPE OF THE COMMITTEE THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO IDENTIFYING SUCH CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO MIGHT SUFFER SPECIALLY, SUCH CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO MIGHT SUFFER SPECIALLY, SUCH AS YOUNGER CHILDREN AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE COMMITTEE EXPECTS IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ITS

OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 664 (1990) IN RESPECT OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS AND REAFFIRMS THAT IRAQ RETAINS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR WELFARE AND SAFETY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

IF THE COMMITTEE, AFTER RECEIVING SUCH INFORMATION, CONSIDERS THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ARISEN IN WHICH THERE IS AN URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEED TO SUPPLY FOODSTUFFS TO IRAQ OR KUWAIT IN ORDER TO RELIEVE HUMAN SUFFERING, PARTICULARLY OF YOUNGER CHILDREN, IT WILL PROMPTLY MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL AS TO HOW SUCH NEED SHOULD BE MET.

IN FORMULATING SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS THE COMMITTEE WILL BEAR IN MIND THAT FOODSTUFFS SHOULD BE PROVIDED THROUGH HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED BY THEM OR UNDER THEIR SUPERVISION IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THESE FOODSTUFFS REACH THE INTENDED BENEFICIARIES.

THE COMMITTEE RECALLS THAT SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE EMBARGO.

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OF 080315Z SEPTEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY BELGRADE, NEW DELHI, ALGIERS, ESC LONDON

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New*

YOUR TELNO 160 TO BELGRADE (NOT TO ALL) AND NEW DELHI TELNO 1215:
IRAQ/KUWAIT: NON-ALIGNED MEETING

1. THE YUGOSLAV DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD RICHARDSON YESTERDAY THAT PLANS FOR A MEETING IN BELGRADE NEXT WEEK, AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, OF THE FULL NON-ALIGNED BUREAU (SOME 16-18 STRONG) HAD BEEN CANCELLED: AND THAT INSTEAD A RESTRICTED MEETING WOULD BE HELD ON 11 SEPTEMBER, AGAIN IN BELGRADE, OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF YUGOSLAVIA, INDIA AND ALGERIA. THE AIM WAS TO CONCERT POSITIONS WITH A VIEW TO A POSSIBLE NON-ALIGNED INITIATIVE ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. KOTEVSKI SPECULATED THAT THIS INITIATIVE MIGHT INCLUDE CALLS ON IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT: ON THE UN OR ARAB LEAGUE TO PROVIDE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR KUWAIT AFTER IRAQ HAD WITHDRAWN: AND ON OTHER FOREIGN FORCES IN THE REGION (IE THE AMERICANS) TO WITHDRAW LIKEWISE.

2. RICHARDSON WARNED KOTEVSKI THAT THE NON-ALIGNED SHOULD THINK CAREFULLY BEFORE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS SENSITIVITY. THE GULF STATES HAD UNDERGONE THE OCCUPATION AND ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT: THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO RELY ON EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ FOR THEIR FUTURE SECURITY: AND THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THEY NEEDED SOME CONTINUING FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE AREA FOR A WHILE TO COME. THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO DECIDE ON WHAT SUPPORT THEY REQUIRED FOR THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENCE.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS (2)

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

MR SLATER

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/NAD

HD/SED

HD/UND (2)

HD/CONSULAR D

HD/NEWS D

HD/NPDD

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HD/AMD

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HD/EC0(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

CABINET OFFICE DIO

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)

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MY TELNO 1199: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOODSTUFFS

SUMMARY

1. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE AGREE STATEMENT ON FOODSTUFFS AD REFERENDUM. INTEND TO SEEK AGREEMENT OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE MORNING OF 10 SEPTEMBER, FOLLOWED IF ALL GOES WELL BY FORMAL ADOPTION IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE THAT AFTERNOON. A VERY HEPLFUL DEVELOPMENT.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET ON THE MORNING OF 7 SEPTEMBER, AT THE SOVIET REQUEST, TO DISCUSS ISSUES ARISING FROM THE WORK OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. RICHARDSON REPRESENTED ME.

3. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID HE WAS CONCERNED BY THE PERCEPTION THAT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WAS BOGGED DOWN AND DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE OF FOODSTUFFS. RAPID AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED, BEGINNING WITH THE FIVE. SOVIET IDEAS WERE NOT FULLY DEVELOPED, BUT THE ISSUE MIGHT BEST BE TACKLED UNDER DIFFERENT HEADINGS:

(A) ON FOOD FOR CHILDREN SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE TOO STRICT. PERHAPS SUCH COMMODITIES AS MILK, BABY FOOD AND VITAMINS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM SANCTIONS:

(B) FOOD FOR IRAQI ADULTS MIGHT BEST BE TACKLED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BODY IN THE UN SECRETARIAT TO ASSESS THE CURRENT FOOD SITUATION IN IRAQ. RESTRICTIONS ON FOOD SHOULD BE APPLIED STRICTLY AT THE OUTSET. LATER ON IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO EASE THESE RESTRICTIONS IF IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS THE SUPPLY SITUATION WAS BECOMING SERIOUS:

(C) THE QUESTION OF FOOD FOR FOREIGNERS WHO, VOLUNTARILY OR INVOLUNTARILY, REMAINED IN IRAQ WAS A SPECIAL CASE. A CLEARER PICTURE WAS NEEDED. CERTAIN COUNTRIES WANTED TO FEED THEIR OWN NATIONALS. HE HAD NO FIXED IDEAS, BUT PERHAPS THE UNITED NATIONS COULD SET UP SOME MECHANISM FOR THIS IN IRAQ. IT WAS IMPORTANT

HOWEVER THAT SUCH FOOD SHOULD NOT BE DIVERTED TO THE OPEN MARKET.

4. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE AGREED THAT PRINCIPLES NEEDED TO BE ESTABLISHED. HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ALREADY OPERATING ON THE BASIS THAT SCR 661 PROHIBITED THE SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD DETERMINED THAT HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES APPLIED. THERE WAS NO FOOD EMERGENCY IN IRAQ AT PRESENT. NO STATE SHOULD ACT UNILATERALLY: DEROGATIONS FROM SANCTIONS WERE A MATTER FOR THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF THESE BODIES DETERMINED THAT HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES DID APPLY, THEN FOOD SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND DELIVERED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS.

4. PICKERING POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ALREADY BEEN ASKED BY THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO COLLECT INFORMATION. HE COULD BE ASKED BY ITS CHAIRMAN TO MAKE HIS FIRST PRIORITY THE NEEDS OF INFANTS: IF THERE WERE SHORTAGES THEN HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES COULD SUPPLY THEM, WHICH WOULD ALSO MINIMISE EVASION. THE QUESTIONS OF IRAQI ADULTS AND FOREIGNERS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT TOGETHER. AT LEAST INITIALLY IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO FEED FOREIGNERS. BUT IF THERE WERE SPECIAL NEEDS WHICH COULD NOT BE MET IN THAT WAY, THEN HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS SHOULD AGAIN HANDLE THE MATTER TO AVOID DIVERSION. PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT AN EARLIER UK PAPER (WHICH HAD NOT IN FACT BEEN CIRCULATED OUTSIDE THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE) MIGHT FORM THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FIVE, AND THEN FOR A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SETTING OUT AGREED PRINCIPLES.

5. RICHARDSON SAID HE AGREED THAT THE FIVE AND THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MUST ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY. WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT ON FOODSTUFFS THE COMMITTEE RISKED PARALYSIS. PRINCIPLES WERE IMPORTANT. SANCTIONS WERE MEANT TO HURT. UP TO NOW THERE HAD BEEN NO RELIABLE INFORMATION ON THE FOOD SITUATION IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE IRAQIS CLAIMED THEY HAD FOOD FOR SOME MONTHS: AND THEY HAD ALSO SAID THEY WOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO SOLDIERS. THE QUESTION HAD NOW BEEN PUT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND HE COULD BE ASKED TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN. WE ENVISAGED THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES WOULD SEEK INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION: A REVIEW MECHANISM WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO CONSIDER IT: A CLEAR TRIGGER WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR ACTION ON THE BASIS OF HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES: AND A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH WOULD AVOID DIVERSION. WE WOULD LIKE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK TO GOVERN THE FUTURE HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE.

6. YU (CHINA) SAID HE SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMAGE OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. BUT CHINA ALSO HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE DELAY IN PERMITTING FOOD SHIPMENTS WHICH MIGHT ARISE NOW THAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS HAD BEEN ASKED AS A PRELIMINARY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE FOOD SITUATION. UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOOD FOR CHILDREN SHOULD BE ALLOWED THROUGH. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE THAT IRAQI PEOPLE SHOULD NOT STARVE. BLANC (FRANCE) AGREED WITH OTHER SPEAKERS THAT RAPID ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. IT WAS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES AND OF THE SANCTION COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN THIS RESPECT.

7. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT EXPERTS WOULD MEET ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 SEPTEMBER TO WORK ON POINTS FOR INCLUSION IN A STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. THIS WOULD REAFFIRM THAT SCR 661 EXCLUDED MEDICINES FROM ITS EFFECT (A POINT ON WHICH THERE WAS IMPORTANT PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING). THE QUESTION OF FOOD FOR CHILDREN WOULD BE TACKLED (VORONTSOV REPEATED THAT SUCH SUPPLIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED THROUGH: RICHARDSON REITERATED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE ASKED TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO CHILDREN'S PROBLEMS, AND THE COMMITTEE COULD THEN TAKE RAPID DECISIONS IF NECESSARY.) THE STATEMENT WOULD ALSO ASK THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO COOPERATE IN GIVING THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE FOOD SITUATION IN IRAQ, AND TOUCH ON THE CREATION OF A REVIEW MECHANISM. AMBASSADORS WOULD MEET AGAIN LATER IN THE DAY TO REVIEW THE WORK OF THEIR EXPERTS.

8. AT THEIR MEETING THE EXPERTS AGREED UPON THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TO THE PRESS AND CONVEYED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ONLY UNRESOLVED QUESTION WAS WHETHER TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THIRD STATE NATIONALS. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) ARGUED REPEATEDLY THAT THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN WORKERS, SUCH AS THE YUGOSLAVS, HAD TO BE RECOGNISED. WE POINTED OUT THAT A STILL GREATER PROBLEM WAS THE LARGE NUMBER OF ASIAN WORKERS WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN EVACUATED. RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEEDING THEM RESTED WITH THE IRAQIS: FOR OTHER STATES TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THEM WOULD ONLY EASE THE PRESSURE ON IRAQ'S OWN SUPPLIES.

9. WHEN AMBASSADORS RECONVENED VORONTSOV SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED AN URGENT JOINT COMMUNICATION FROM THE AMBASSADORS OF INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES, AND A SIMILAR LETTER FROM THE SRI LANKAN AMBASSADOR, BOTH ABOUT THEIR NATIONALS (SOME 300,000 IN ALL) STILL IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. TEXTS OF BOTH LETTERS FAXED TO UND. THEY CALL

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FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO RUSH FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THEIR NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO END THE CURRENT ACUTE FOOD SHORTAGES AND PREVENT EVENTUAL STARVATION. THE INDIAN/FILIPINO LETTER REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PERMISSION FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ARRANGE A SHIPMENT OF FOOD FOR THEIR COMMUNITIES: THE SRI LANKAN LETTER MERELY SPEAKS OF THAT COUNTRY'S 'LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES'.

10. VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS HAD CLAIMED THAT THE SITUATION WAS IF ANYTHING WORSE. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS WERE PREPARED TO LET THEIR NATIONALS GO, THEY HAD SAID THERE WAS NO FOOD AVAILABLE AND THE FIRST (SRI LANKAN) DEATH BY STARVATION HAD ALREADY OCCURRED. VORONTSOV ADDED THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS HAD ASKED TO ADDRESS THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ON 10 SEPTEMBER. ON PICKERING'S PROPOSAL, IT WAS AGREED TO SUGGEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT ANNAN, STILL IN BAGHDAD, SHOULD TAKE UP URGENTLY THE PLIGHT OF THESE FOREIGN NATIONALS.

11. THE AMBASSADORS THEN AGREED THE DRAFT STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT). IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSION, RICHARDSON PROPOSED THE ADDITION OF A FIRM SENTENCE ON IRAQ'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THIRD STATE NATIONALS. THIS WAS AGREED.

12. THE FIVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 101330Z, TO DISCUSS ANY LAST MINUTE POINTS ARISING FROM THEIR INSTRUCTIONS. ASSUMING AGREEMENT, SOME OR ALL OF THEM WOULD THEN PLAN TO BRIEF THE CANADIAN AND ROMANIAN AMBASSADORS AND FINNISH CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE TOGETHER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE AMBASSADORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS. THE FIVE AGREED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE OPEN TO AMENDMENTS (THOUGH IN PRACTICE ONLY TO MINOR CHANGES.) IF ALL WENT WELL ON THE MORNING OF 10 SEPTEMBER, THE FIVE WOULD THEN SEEK THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE TEXT THAT AFTERNOON. WHILE ACTION IN THE COUNCIL ITSELF WAS NOT RULED OUT, IT WAS HOPED THAT THE THREAT OF GOING TO THE COUNCIL MIGHT PERSUADE COUNTRIES LIKE CUBA AND YEMEN TO ACCEPT THE TEXT AT THE COMMITTEE STAGE.

13. SEE MY 2 IFTS.

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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
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PRIME MINISTER

This is a slightly breathless initiative from Mr Waldegrave, but I am sure he is right that a considerable disaster could be in the making.

As with most fund-raising exercises, we end up always approaching the same donors: and I doubt the Saudis or Kuwaitis will see the refugees from Iraq and Kuwait as their responsibility.

Yes I think it is right to ask the UN Secretary-General to appoint a single person to take responsibility for organising relief and the airlift: but then we should leave it to him to drum up support and financial contributions. Anything else should wait at least until after Lynda Chalker returns and reports.

Agree?

CP

CHARLES POWELL

8 September 1990

Germany
Sweden
Switzerland
Italy
Agreed

all the countries that are not days reach now. We can't expect the Saudis & Kuwait to do everything i.e. pass up for weeks for serious danger and refugees.

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1990

Dear Charles,

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OF REFUGEES FROM IRAQ

In your letter of 5 September, ^{to Richard Gwynne} you expressed the Prime Minister's wish to see more emergency relief for Jordan and for a prompt and positive follow up to Richard Branson's suggestion for practical help i.e. tents and blankets to the refugees stranded there. *copy attached*

Your letter crossed with ^{the Private Secretary's} mine the same day about the announcement made by the Prime Minister in the Emergency Debate yesterday of a £2 million contribution to UNDRO and to the International Organisation for Migration who are organising the evacuation of the refugees. As for tents and blankets, the ODAS have already made available £500,000 to the Jordanian Red Crescent through the ICRC to spend on whatever was most urgently required, as well as £100,000 worth of blankets and medical supplies which was taken to Amman by Richard Branson in his plane on 5 September. We have also contributed almost £3m through the European Community.

But given the increasingly desperate situation of the 100,000 refugees on the Jordanian border and the likelihood that the international agencies are not able to cope in the short term, we have been considering with the Aid Wing what more we can do both nationally and by energising the international community before more refugees start dying. The strong public support for the measures so far taken against Iraq could start to erode rapidly both at home and overseas if the international community does not simultaneously address the problem of the refugees urgently. As a first step, the Secretary of State has asked Mrs Chalker to fly to Jordan as soon as possible next week (probably on Tuesday) to see how our assistance is being used and what more can be done to crank up the international relief effort.

/Internationally



Internationally, there needs to be a single individual (such as Sadruddin Khan) in a visible presence on the media, who can give an impetus and who is demonstrably in charge of coordinating all humanitarian assistance. And a major international air and sea evacuation must be set in hand urgently.

The UN Secretary General activated UNDRO (UN Disaster Relief Organisation) as a coordinating centre on 28 August, rather than appoint a Special Representative as we had urged. This has not (as we feared) proved effective. If the Prime Minister agrees, when Sir David Hannay presents his credentials to the UNSG in New York on 10 September, he could be instructed to express Mrs Thatcher's profound concern about the situation of the refugees and urge Senor Perez De Cuellar to appoint a Special Representative who could work with UNDRO, the appropriate agencies within the UN system and without (the ICRC and the International Organisation for Migration) and all those countries and relief organisations in the international community who wish to help.

A major air (and sea) evacuation would need massive funding and a coordinated effort by the international agencies who are experts i.e. the IOM, the IRCRC, the UN and its agencies including ICAO (the intergovernmental body dealing with air transport, including overflights and special routings) and IATA (on which the airlines are represented). In order to generate the necessary support and publicity, we might consider the following:

- a) An urgent appeal at the highest level to King Fahd and the Amir of Kuwait to ask them to make available the necessary funds to finance a major airlift. They are likely to find it easier to respond to an appeal for humanitarian assistance than for aid to Jordan, with whose monarch they are pretty disenchanted. The Saudis should also be asked if they could provide personnel and technical help i.e. temporary accommodation and equipment such as water trucks to help the refugees immediately. They have considerable experience from the Haj in dealing with large influxes of people. The Japanese could also be tapped as could the Germans.
- b) One or more British airlines to announce publicly their willingness to make a plane or planes available immediately to the IOM. Mr Branson is in regular touch with the ODA and might well respond enthusiastically. British airlines to seek to mobilise their colleagues in IATA to support a once for all emergency exercise. (On the basis of Arab funding, the airlines might be willing to respond).
- c) An approach to the Jordanian authorities to ask them to arrange a round-the-clock airlift not only from Amman airport, but also possibly from other nearby military airports. This could be coupled with an offer of trained personnel (e.g. air traffic controllers and other airport technicians) to help. If the CAA are not able to help, we might need to turn to the military.



d) an approach to the countries whose nationals are principally affected (e.g. Egypt, Phillipines, India, Bangladesh) and to encourage them to offer planes and ships as part of an international evacuation;

e) in slower time, a major effort to evacuate the rump of the foreign workers who have been unable to leave Kuwait, possibly by seas.

f) Also in slower time, an offer of a British hospital ship.

These are very ambitious ideas which will need further fleshing out, but there is catastrophe in the making. If refugees start dying in large numbers, public opinion will tend to blame the West for not doing enough rather than recall Iraqi responsibility for destabilising and ruining entire communities. The main responsibility for coordinating the international response must be with the UN. A distinctively British gesture would help keep international solidarity against Iraq and have considerable propoganda advantages. It would also undercut Saddam Hussain's attempted blackmail of such countries as India and the Phillipines by using their trapped communities as a means of securing food imports against the UN embargo. At all stages we should make clear that their disastrous situation is directly attributable to Saddam Hussain's inhumane acts. Although we look to have the main financial costs borne by the Gulf States and Japan, there could be financial implications, but we will seek to ensure that some of the EC money is designated for the airlift.

If the Prime Minister agrees, messages will be prepared to King Fahd and the Amir of Kuwait and to Prime Minister Kaifu, together with instructions to Sir David Hannay.

I am copying this letter to Sara Gillett, John Gieve, Simon Webb the PS to the Secretary of State for Transport.

*Yours sincerely
Dominic Asquith*

Dominic Asquith
PS/Mr Waldegrave

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

LOCATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WERE TRAPPED IN IRAQ/KUWAIT AS AT 7 SEPTEMBER

| COUNTRY | TOTAL IN IRAQ/KUWAIT ON 2 AUGUST | IN JORDAN | NO MAN'S LAND OR ON WAY TO JORDAN | IN OR ON WAY TO TURKEY | IN OR ON WAY TO SAUDI ARABIA | IN OR ON WAY TO IRAN | REPATRIATED | STILL IN IRAQ/KUWAIT |
|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|
| Bangladesh | 85,000 | 12,000+ | 12-15,000 | 15,000 | 6,000 | | 1,200 | 35-40,000 |
| India | 180,000 | 3-5,000 | 15,000+ | | | 100,000 | 14,000 | 120,000 |
| Pakistan | 110,000 | 3,000 | 10,000+ | 18,000 | 10-12,000 | | 20,000 | 50,000 |
| Sri Lanka | 150,000 | 3,000 | 1,000+ | | 1,500 | | | 95,000 |
| Thailand | 10,000 | 1,500 | - | | | | | |
| Philippines | 50,000 | 2,200 | 3-10,000 | | | | | |
| Egypt | 1,700,000 | ? | ? | - | - | | 5,000 | 40,000 |
| Yemen | | 7,000 | | | | | 100,000 | 1,300,000 |
| Others | 140,000 | | | | | | 13,000 | |
| TOTAL: | 2,400,000 | 45,000 | 60-80,000 | 40-50,000 | 18,000+ | 10-100,000 | 190,000+ | 1,800,000-2,000,000 |

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INFO IMMEDIATE EL, ME, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, NATO, NEW YORK, ANKARA

EXTRAORDINARY EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING: ROME, 7 SEPTEMBER:
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN, TURKEY AND EGYPT
SUMMARY

1. De Michelis and Delors try to bounce through an immediate decision on 750 mecu of financial support for Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. Seen off by Mr Waldegrave despite scant support from EC colleagues. The report for ECOFIN Ministers now says only that this is a Commission proposal. But it will get considerable support from most other member states and the Commission still hope for a final decision at the FAC on 17 September.

DETAIL

2. In his opening statement, De Michelis referred to the US initiative on Burdensharing. His initial personal reaction had been that it was unthinkable that European countries could offer financial contributions to the US military effort. But support for the Gulf countries in applying the embargo and economic support for Jordan, Egypt and Turkey was different. Failure to

support

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EU

support these countries might lead to their not participating in the fight against Iraq. The Twelve need to take an imaginative political decision and act soon.

3. Delors referred to the Matutes document on financial support for Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. The EC had already been providing emergency aid amounting to 6 million ecu but these funds were now depleted. Other countries than the three mentioned were also badly hit by the crisis: Eastern Europe would suffer from the oil price rise as would Africa. But their problem could be examined in the G24 and Lome contexts: there was no such mechanism for Mediterranean or Arab states.

4. Delors continued that the three countries concerned had been affected not just by the oil price rise but by the loss of trade and remittances. Jordan had lost 30 per cent of her GDP, Egypt 6 per cent and Turkey 4.5 per cent. So their needs were immediate and desperate and decisions had to be taken now. There would have to be a combination of EC and bilateral help in grant and/or loan form. Obviously apart from the EC there were other potential donors such as Japan and Saudi Arabia.

5. Matutes then introduced the Commission document. He noted that the main burden of help should fall on Saudia Arabia and the UAE who were securing an extra 30 billion dollars a year in oil revenue. They could therefore be asked to cover some two-thirds of the dollars 9 billion identified in the Commission document as necessary support for Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. OECD countries should take on the remaining third, excluding the US because of their military contribution. The Community and the member states should move quickly and be ready to help generously. The help should be as concessionary as possible: grants, and loans which could if necessary later be converted to grants.

6. During the first round of interventions, all Ministers expressed general support in principle for balance of payments support for the three countries. Samaras (Greece), however,

refused

refused to lift the Greek reservation on the new EC/Turkey agreement - a position for which he was criticised by several EC Ministers. No one committed themselves to the figures mentioned by Matutes.

7. Mr Waldegrave said that, though other countries were affected, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt were the three priority targets. They could be helped in many ways. For example, existing EC disbursements to Egypt and Jordan were delayed because of their failure to identify suitable projects. They could be encouraged to do better. But he hoped the message would go out from the meeting that Europe was ready to take on its fair share of the burden. Countries could contribute in different ways. Some were making a military contribution. Others, in one case for constitutional reasons, did not. But they could contribute financially. The additional burden on those who contributed militarily had to be recognised. There were three elements: bilateral military help, bilateral economic aid and EC aid. The right balance had to be struck so that no-one bore a disproportionate burden. While the UK was ready in principle to consider support of the kind proposed, the figures would need to be looked at carefully and all elements taken into account.

8. De Michelis then attempted, during his summing up, to bounce an agreement out of colleagues. He claimed, as the last of a list of points on which consensus had been reached, that there had been quote political agreement unquote that the Community countries, collectively and individually, would contribute the major portion of the three billion dollars balance of payments support that remained when the Gulf states had taken on two-thirds of the burden. He noted that bilateral contributions would have to take account of the military contribution that some states had made. He suggested that he write to Carli as Chairman of ECOFIN to inform him of this political decision and ask that finance ministers work out the details.

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9. Mr Waldegrave said that he could not agree to any precise commitments at this stage about balance of payments support. The UK agreed to the principle but figures would need careful consideration. De Michelis argued that ECOFIN had to be given some orientation on the overall sum. Otherwise they would not agree anything.
10. Fernando-Ordonez queried the figures. Delors said that the Commission calculation called for dollars 9 billion by the end of 1991. If the Gulf took on two-thirds, the OECD countries should take on the rest. He thought that between one and a half and two billion dollars should come from the EC countries. If half of this was bilateral, the remaining half would be community money, amounting to around 7.50 million ecu, of which two thirds might be in grant form. If a decision in principle could be taken today, finance Ministers could consider how this extra money could be found and the Foreign Affairs Council on 17 September could take a formal decision.
11. Dumas and Genscher then announced that they could accept the Commission proposal, upon which De Michelis closed the meeting. Mr Waldegrave immediately had a private word with De Michelis and persuaded him to agree that in the Presidency letter to Finance Ministers for this weekend's meeting he would not specify that there had been a consensus on a particular sum of money: it was a Commission proposal. De Michelis also agreed that it would be left clear that the final decision would be taken by Foreign Ministers on 17 September. Greenstock subsequently saw a draft of the Presidency letter, which mentioned the 750 mecu sum in fairly categorical terms, but managed to have the draft altered to indicate this was still a Commission proposal. He did not see the final version signed by De Michelis. It is probable that all other Community countries will have accepted that 750 mecu will be the target figure for balance of payments assistance up end-1991.

COMMENT

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 0800Z

COMMENT

12. The attempt by the Presidency, with Commission support, to go beyond the sense of the discussion to bounce through agreement on a high figure was unfortunate, if not unexpected. Mr Waldegrave made clear that this was unacceptable, cut across current US efforts to coordinate international assistance, was based on unproven assumptions and took no account of national contributions, either military or financial. The Presidency was therefore prevented from summing up that there was agreement. The letter which De Michelis is sending to the President of ECOFIN will refer to the 3 texts agreed at the meeting (see ~~some other~~ MIFTs) and to support for a Community financial package, EC aid and national contributions: it will then invite ECOFIN to report to the FAC on the technical feasibility of such a proposal. Spain, Denmark and to a lesser extent, Holland indicated to the Presidency that they could not agree precise figures. Delors said that this provision would be consistent with the financial prospectus for 1988/92 agreed by the European Council in February 1988. When pressed Matutes could not clarify, but Delors' Cabinet told us that they assumed a revision of the prospectives would be necessary and that Delors' reference was probably to the monies available between the prospectives total and the own resources available in each year.

13. -- See MIFTs --

HURD

YYYY

MAIN

IRAQ/KUWAIT

NNNN

7(A-c)

PRIME MINISTER

GULF CRISIS

Barring surprises, we face three main issues next week in the Gulf.

US/Soviet meeting in Helsinki

We shall know the outcome of the US/Soviet meeting in Helsinki by Monday. It ought to be something we can welcome, although I doubt the Russians are willing to go so far as to send forces to the Gulf, as suggested in some of today's papers. The best we can probably hope for is a re-affirmation of the objectives of the Security Council Resolutions and a joint determination to see them implemented, and perhaps an undertaking to withdraw Soviet advisers from Iraq.

Air Blockade

There is growing support for an air blockade of Iraq. I think I am right in saying that the US, France and Italy have all spoken out publicly in favour: and there was support for it at yesterday's meeting of EC Ministers. We have been rather reticent by comparison. There are two problems, one temporary the other more lasting. The temporary one is that we don't want Iraq to interrupt the evacuation flights for women and children. That means waiting until we are sure all those who want to leave have got out. The more permanent difficulty is that an air blockade would need to be implemented by countries whose airspace borders on Iraq, not all of whom are reliable (eg Jordan and Iran). An air blockade which was declared but patently ineffective might be worse than no blockade at all. But I don't think we should give up easily. I would like to see us take a lead in discussing both an air and a land blockade in the Security Council. We need constantly to be seen to be tightening the screw on Iraq.

Despatch of additional British forces

Tom King is considering over the weekend the composition of the additional British forces which we have already said publicly we shall despatch to the Gulf. I understand that he has been given a list of options, some of which could be combined. They probably include:

- additional Tornado, particularly the reconnaissance version. The US Commander has apparently identified a gap in his order of battle which these would fill;
- additional ground attack Tornado. From the point of view of the profile of our contribution these are valuable, because they would certainly be in the first wave of any military action;
- an aircraft carrier with Harrier aboard. I still find it hard to see the relevance of this. The United States already have four carriers in the area (and the French one): they cannot enter the Gulf because they become too much of a target: and aircraft are more effective from land bases. My understanding is that only the Navy and Alan Clark support this option;
- elements of 5 Brigade (essentially Paras). The problem is these are not very relevant to the kind of battle likely to be fought. Against the sort of entrenched defence positions which Iraq has established in Kuwait you need armour rather than light troops. The American Commander is apparently thinking of sending his own air-borne forces back to the States;
- an armoured brigade with tanks. This is what the Americans want, but you have (rightly) reservations about putting our tanks in the desert, given their very poor availability record;

C

- a light armour force. This would make quite a lot of sense;
- Gurkhas. They would scare the Iraqis, but there might be a slight impression of exposing 'mercenaries' to danger rather than wholly British forces;
- specialised forces such as signallers, field hospitals, etc. They would be useful but ancillary, and make rather little political impact.

The list may not be exhaustive, but it is what I have been able to glean from MOD sources.

More widely, there is likely to be an argument over whether to send ground forces at all. The Foreign Office are opposed to this: their reasoning is that ours would be the only Western forces on the ground alongside the Americans and therefore potentially exposed in the Arab world. There is also some opposition in the MOD, based more on the view that the command and control arrangements for a British ground contingent would be horrendous. (There are already difficulties enough with so many different national contingents.)

You may like to reflect on this over the next day or so. I have told MOD that you will expect at least a preliminary statement of the options from Tom King at next Tuesday's meeting. My own view is that we should not shrink from sending ground forces, despite the difficulties. They are what the Americans and Saudis want, and if we are going to show solidarity, we may as well do so whole-heartedly. We might go for a combination of, say, 2,000/3,000 ground forces (probably light armour) and an additional squadron of Tornado. That would give us a very respectable contribution indeed. If you wanted to send more, you could then put in Gurkhas, provided there were also some British forces on the ground as well.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

8 September 1990



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

7 September 1990

Dear Charles,

MS

Eric Rennie
0887/4

Iraq/Kuwait Emergency: Use of 0898 System

In her opening speech in the House of Commons debate on 6 September, Mr Ronnie Campbell MP asked the Prime Minister whether we could make available free of charge the recorded telephone advice which under the present arrangement members of the public must pay to hear.

At present, general advice is offered on an 0898 number, for which callers are charged over the normal rate. This recording includes the further numbers to call if callers wish to discuss individual cases. We were aware of possible criticism when we decided to introduce the 0898 system. We introduced this system because it was the only way to meet the very large demand for information which we expected. The alternative recorded message system which British Telecom could offer us - the Freephone system, which is free of charge to callers - would have been unable to cope with the anticipated volume of calls. The Freephone system also has the disadvantage that the message cannot be up-dated at short notice.

We have looked carefully at the idea of introducing a Freephone system now. It would still not meet our requirements. While the present volume of calls would be within its capacity, any dramatic development could cause overload and this would certainly lead to public dissatisfaction.

Although there was some initial criticism of our use of the 0898 system, we have since had few complaints. The signs are that the public have accepted that no profit will be retained by the FCO, and that the system was introduced because there was no other way of meeting public demand.

Since the beginning of the Emergency the FCO Emergency Unit has operated a 24-hour personal service (rather than recorded service) to answer individual calls from the public, and almost all families of people still held in Kuwait are in regular contact with this Unit at



no cost to themselves beyond British Telecom's standard telephone charges.

Since the beginning of the emergency the 0898 number has earned a total of £7,297 for the FCO. These receipts are payable to the consolidated fund but we are subsidising private helplines and charities to the extent of any "profits" made and AMT have agreed to increase our vote by a Supplementary Estimate to offset this. So far, we have agreed to pay £4,000 per quarter to Property Holdings of the Department of the Environment as rent for the offices of the Gulf Helpline Support Group; revenue from the 0898 number in excess of £4,000 per quarter will be given to charities in this country who are helping over the Gulf crisis.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

Worth a quick glance. The point about a shortage of refining capacity (at 'X') is important.

7 September 1990

BHP 719

ER POTTER

Mr Guise thought that the Prime Minister would be interested in the attached note on oil prices prepared by John Wybrew (now of Shell, late of the Policy Unit).


Howell Harris Hughes

HOWELL HARRIS HUGHES

THE GULF CRISIS, OIL MARKETS & PETROL PRICES

Talk of an impending oil supply crisis is ill-founded unless war breaks out. The open, market-based international oil industry is adjusting relatively smoothly to the loss of oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait. Left to work, oil markets will prevent a manageable problem becoming a supply crisis - another "oil shock".

Even at today's nervously high levels, oil prices in real terms are not exceptional by historic standards.



World Oil Supply and Demand

Provided that the Gulf crisis is confined to the suspension of oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait, world oil supplies over the coming winter will be tight but by no means precarious.

The current loss of oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait - 4.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) - can be made up by a combination of:

- boosted oil production, of some 3 mb/d, notably from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria and Venezuela;
- the reduction of oil demand induced by increased oil prices - upwards of 0.5 mb/d if oil prices stay up;
- the re-entry of high-cost marginal oil producers in the US who, given a buoyant price outlook and time to mobilise, could contribute perhaps 0.5 mb/d of extra oil.

Shell's analysis (attached) of the balance of world oil supply and demand - excluding the Eastern Bloc - foresees fourth quarter 1990 (QIV 1990) demand of 53.6 mb/d being balanced by drawing down the industry's commercial stocks by 1.6 mb/d; and likewise by 1.1 mb/d in QI 1991 to balance the peak winter demand of 54.1 mb/d. Thereafter, the summer of 1991 should provide breathing space for an adequate rebuilding of stocks.

Such a run-down of the industry's commercial oil stocks over the northern winter is normal and, because of OPEC's over-production earlier this year, the industry was generously stocked at the start of the Gulf crisis. Bear in mind that the free world oil industry began the year 1989 with commercial oil stocks equivalent to 67.4 days of forward demand. On Shell's analysis, the equivalent stock position at the beginning of 1991 will be 67.6 days of forward demand, indicating that the fundamentals of oil supply and demand are not of themselves cause for alarm - and arguably not such as to justify the early release of strategic stocks.

This analysis assumes that Saudi Arabia's key oil installations will not be damaged by military action. Particularly crucial is the Ras Tanura oil terminal in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. It exports some 4 mb/d, the loss of which in current circumstances would certainly trigger an oil supply crisis. No oil installation in the Gulf needs to be defended more carefully.

X) Since the Iraqi invasion, international prices of oil products have risen proportionately higher than those for crude oil, indicating that the world's refining capacity is if anything a greater source of concern than oil production capacity. Even before the invasion, the world's refineries were more heavily loaded than they have been for over a decade - and facing growing difficulties in meeting the more demanding product quality requirements of a "greening" world.

The loss of Kuwait's sophisticated 600,000 b/d export refinery, coupled with the dedication of a 200,000 b/d Saudi export refinery to support for the military build-up in Saudi Arabia, has put a particular strain on oil products markets east of Suez. Throughout the world the tightness of refining capacity will be accentuated by the fact that most of the incremental crude oil replacing exports from Iraq and Kuwait is heavy and therefore needs more complex refining processes to meet the market requirement for light oil products - petrol, diesel and aviation fuels; prices for these products will be under particular pressure.

Market Sentiment

The fundamental picture of a tight but not precarious balance between future oil supplies and demand is not reflected in today's nervous market sentiment and correspondingly high price levels. The fear of short term military action further disrupting oil supplies from the Gulf encourages the temporary husbanding of stocks and the taking of trading positions in anticipation of a rising market.

What then is the outlook for oil prices? Shell's view is that crude oil prices are unlikely to fall below \$25 a barrel while there is a threat of Iraqi military action disrupting oil supplies from the Gulf. Conversely, the immediate nervousness which has driven oil markets to their current heights should diminish before long. The effect of any military action will depend on the damage to oil installations and the consequent disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf.

Looking beyond the crisis, few in Shell foresee structural changes leading to sustained high oil prices much above \$20 a barrel.

UK Petrol Prices - Market Structure and Pricing Principles


The vigorously competitive petrol market in the UK has responded in a restrained and orderly way to the current situation.

The recent exhaustive enquiry into petrol wholesaling by the MMC concluded that the market structure and pricing policies of the UK oil industry are sound, fair and work to the advantage of consumers by facilitating competition between a variety of players.

In particular it noted that the use of international (Rotterdam) spot prices as the benchmark for determining the wholesale price of petrol ensures competition on equal terms between the integrated oil companies and the 60 or so independent wholesalers in the market. Also, the separate special taxation of oil production means that up to 80% of the increased value of North Sea production from any oil price rise goes to the Government.

On the popular criticism that the oil companies are quick to put up prices and slow to reduce them, the MMC noted that the big oil companies who lead petrol pricing in the UK tend to exercise restraint in a rising oil market for fear of antagonising consumers and losing market share. In consequence, they delay price increases and, when one moves, the others follow sharply. This was seen as evidence of competition, not collusion.

Such restraint has certainly been the case during the period since the Iraqi invasion.



Like the UK, other Western European countries use the Rotterdam spot price of petrol as the benchmark for determining the wholesale price of petrol. In consequence, the pump price of petrol has moved up by much the same percentage amount across Western Europe. In percentage terms, the increase in Italy has been moderated by the particularly high level of taxation there.

**COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN PUMP PRICE
MOVEMENTS INCLUDING TAXES
26TH JUNE TO 31 AUGUST**



John Wylmer

INDUSTRY SUPPLY/DEMAND AND STOCK PROFILE
WORLD OUTSIDE EAST BLOC
(MILLION B/D)

| | 1989 | 1990 | | | | 1991 | | | | | |
|--------------------|------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | YEAR | I | II | III | IV | YEAR | I | II | III | IV | YEAR |
| DEMAND | 51.5 | 53.0 | 50.9 | 51.7 | 53.6 | 52.3 | 54.1 | 51.6 | 52.3 | 54.5 | 53.1 |
| SUPPLY | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OPEC - CRUDE | 21.7 | 23.5 | 23.2 | 21.4 | 21.8 | 22.5 | 22.7 | 22.9 | 23.5 | 23.8 | 23.2 |
| NGLS | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| NON-OPEC | 25.8 | 26.3 | 26.0 | 25.7 | 26.4 | 26.1 | 26.6 | 26.4 | 26.5 | 26.3 | 26.5 |
| EAST BLOC | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| STOCKDRAFT/(BUILD) | -0.3 | -0.5 | -2.3 | 0.4 | 1.6 | -0.2 | 1.1 | -1.8 | -2.0 | 0.4 | -0.6 |
| TOTAL SUPPLY | 51.5 | 53.0 | 50.9 | 51.7 | 53.6 | 52.3 | 54.1 | 51.6 | 52.3 | 54.5 | 53.1 |
| OPENING STOCKS | 4.74 | JAN90 4.85 | APR90 4.90 | JUL90 5.11 | OCT90 5.07 | | JAN91 4.92 | APR91 4.82 | JUL91 4.98 | OCT91 5.16 | JAN92 5.12 |
| BILLION BBL | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OF WHICH STRATEGIC | 1.21 | 1.24 | 1.26 | 1.25 | 1.26 | | 1.26 | 1.26 | 1.26 | 1.26 | 1.26 |
| DAYS OF SUPPLY | 90.6 | 91.6 | 96.2 | 98.9 | 94.6 | | 90.9 | 93.4 | 95.3 | 94.7 | 92.8 |
| OF WHICH | | | | | | | | | | | |
| COMMERCIAL | 67.4 | 68.1 | 71.6 | 74.6 | 71.1 | | 67.6 | 69.0 | 71.2 | 71.6 | 70.0 |



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Tim Austin

7 September 1990

Dea Charles,

A lot of this
doesn't seem like
counter-propaganda

to me. My
background.

IRAQ/KUWAIT: COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

My letter of 30 August contained the first of our regular Friday sitreps. This is the second.

The objectives of our overseas propaganda operations are to:

- maintain and spread more widely through Arab, non-Arab Muslim and other third world countries the arguments:
 - for the need to maintain international pressure through effective sanctions for full implementation of Security Council Resolutions;
 - against Arab/compromise solutions;
 - justifying presence of Western forces in the Gulf;
- continue to show that Saddam Hussein is a loser, a liar who cannot win, and through evidence from Kuwaitis, ex-hostages and other eyewitnesses, that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is destroying the country and more widely creating a major international refugee problem;
- maintain morale among British hostages;

The main instruments we are using are:

- set of 'themes' papers (enclosed at Annex I) to be regularly updated, distributed to posts overseas, Private Offices and press officers in London to provide core material;
- further guidance telegram based on these 'themes';
- interviews by Ministers with international radio and television (in particular CNN and BBC World Service);
- wide dissemination of material from the Parliamentary debate, particularly that on key overseas 'themes';
- placing in the press in target areas articles signed by



Ministers and articles commissioned through the COI;

- placing on TV stations in target areas specially prepared TV material, (the first two items will be a selection of highlights from the Parliamentary debate, with Arabic soundtrack, and a documentary based on interviews in Arabic with Kuwaiti refugees, designed to stress the damage done to ordinary people);
- increasing our supply of daily news feeds and other material from the COI radio service to stations in target areas (new daily feeds in English have been accepted in Bahrain and Qatar);
- additional BBC World Service output;
 - Arabic Service; this was extended from 9 to 10½ hours a day from 2 August: we are discussing a further extension with the BBC, additional programme material and extra frequencies to avoid jamming;
 - World Service (English); live coverage of Parliamentary debate on additional frequencies;


THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

- World Service (English) new 15-minute programme broadcast twice daily starting on 7 September for British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait, with messages from relatives.

In addition, Mr Waldegrave has talked to Bruce Gynge, Alastair Burnet, Peter Gummer and John Banks about how to handle public relations. Arrangements have been made for all four to be in regular contact with FCO Ministers and officials.

The Foreign Secretary discussed the campaign during his visit to the Gulf and we shall be sending material to Gulf governments and seeking their ideas. The Gulf rulers all see the need. Their experience of dealing with the Western media is limited but growing fast. They will be able to help us identify the right themes for Arab audiences. The Kuwaiti government are waking up to the propaganda war and their Planning Minister, who is shrewd and articulate, is in close touch with our Embassy in Saudi Arabia.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), Martin Stanley (DTI), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

 (J S Wall)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

BACKGROUND

1. Kuwait: history and status
2. UN Security Council Resolutions
3. Sanctions: implementation

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

4. Forces in the Gulf
5. Saddam Hussein
6. An International Solution
7. Hostages in Kuwait and Iraq
8. Foreign Embassies in Kuwait

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London

6 September 1990

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

KUWAIT: HISTORY AND STATUS

- Kuwait independent longer than Iraq. Al Sabah in continuous control since early 18th century.
- Came under Ottoman suzerainty, but not sovereignty.
- Ottoman Empire dissolved after First World War, and the disposition of its dependent territories was decided by international treaties.
- Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and international frontiers recognised by both international community and by successive Iraqi Governments, both formally and by the conduct of bilateral relations.

CHRONOLOGY

- Early eighteenth century, Kuwait established on land adjacent to, but not part of, Ottoman Empire.
- 1871: more than one hundred years later, Sheikh Abdullah Al Sabah (1866-1892) accepted title of qaimmaqam (district officer) of the qaza (district) of Kuwait in return for an Ottoman pledge that Kuwait would retain administrative autonomy.
- 1899: fear that the pledge would not be honoured resulted in an Exclusive Agreement with Britain binding the Ruler of Kuwait not to cede any of his territory without Britain's prior sanction.
- July 1913: Britain and Ottoman Empire signed Convention recognising Kuwait as autonomous and accepting that the ruler should have full administrative authority and control over tribes in surrounding areas (defined by a green line on an attached map). Convention not ratified because of First World War.
- 1914: Britain recognised Kuwait as an independent state under British protection. After First World War, Turkey renounced all rights and titles to subordinate territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
- 1921: Kingdom of Iraq created from former vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Anglo-Iraqi relationship established under League of Nations supervision, and given effect by Treaty signed in 1922.
- 1932: British responsibility under the Treaty terminated.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

- 1923: Britain recognised green line of 1913 Convention as boundary between Kuwait and Iraq.
- 1932: Exchange of letters between Sheikh Ahmad Al Sabah (1921-50) for Kuwait and Prime Minister Nuri al Said for Iraq accepted definition of Kuwait-Iraq boundary similar to 1913 green line.
- 1958: Iraqi monarchy overthrown.
- 19 June 1961: Exchange of notes between Britain and Kuwait terminating 1899 Exclusive Agreement but confirming Britain's readiness to assist Kuwait if requested. British troops sent to Kuwait after renewed Iraqi claims, but subsequently replaced by an Arab League Security Force. (British troops withdrew on 19 October 1961, Arab League forces remained until 1963).
- October 1963: Signature by Iraq of an agreed minute recognising Kuwait's sovereignty and independence within the frontiers defined in 1932 exchange of letters.

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- Between 2-25 August, UN Security Council adopted five mandatory resolutions concerning the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. Of the 15 Security Council members only Yemen and Cuba abstained on SCR 661 and 665. Resolution 660 was adopted by 14 votes with none against or abstaining (Yemen was absent). SCR 662 and 664 were adopted unanimously.

Resolution 660 (1990) - adopted 2 August

- condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" all its forces to their positions on 1 August 1990.

Resolution 661 (1990) - adopted 6 August

- called for (1) the import of "all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait" and (2) the sale or supply to Iraq or Kuwait of any commodities or products except "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs" to be strictly prevented by all States, including non-members of the United Nations.
- established a committee of the Security Council to examine reports by the Secretary General on the implementation of the Resolution and to seek information on action taken by States to implement it.
- nothing in the Resolution should prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait whose assets should be protected.

Resolution 662 (1990) - adopted 9 August

- decided that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was null and void.
- called upon all States to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.

Resolution 664 (1990) - adopted 19 August

- recalled the obligations of Iraq under international law in regard to third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq permitted the immediate departure of such nationals from Kuwait and Iraq, granted immediate and continuing consular access and took no action to jeopardise their safety, security or health.
- demanded that Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.

9

Resolution 665 (1990) - adopted 25 August

- called upon those states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and deploying maritime forces to the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council" to halt inward and outward shipping to verify cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the provisions in Resolution 661.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

UN SANCTIONS

- On 6 August 1990 Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution (SCR) 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq. 13 votes for the Resolution; Yemen and Cuba abstained.
- SCR 661 prohibits the import of Iraqi or Kuwaiti products and the sale or supply or transshipment of goods to Iraq or Kuwait (other than medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs. Nature of these items and circumstances in which their supply would be admissible still to be defined.) SCR 661 also forbids the transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait.
- SCR 661 is binding upon all members of the United Nations.
- Vital that international community presents a united front on implementation of sanctions. Without this they cannot and will not work.
- 25 August, Security Council adopted SCR 665 (13 votes, 2 abstentions - Yemen and Cuba) authorising naval support of sanctions using "measures commensurate to the specific circumstances" to inspect cargoes and ensure strict implementation of SCR 661.
- Security Council has established UN Sanctions Committee to monitor compliance with SCR 661. Nearly 100 countries have recorded positive responses to the UN. One or two still considering what domestic measures to take. Many can comply easily since they have no history of trade with Iraq.
- Evidence that some countries are breaking sanctions.
- Sanctions Committee currently considering applications from Jordan, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, India, Tunisia and Lebanon, under Article 50 of the UN Charter, connected with the special domestic economic problems which the full implementation of the sanctions will bring.
- To date sanctions have been largely effective in depriving Iraq of oil revenues and of access to Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets.

UK IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS

- Necessary orders to bring sanctions into effect quickly put into place (8 August):
 - o Export of Goods (Control) Order - prohibits exports without a licence
 - o Amendment to the Open General Import Licence - prohibition on imports

- o Iraq and Kuwait United Nations Sanctions Order - prohibits (except when licensed) activities in connection with the export of goods from Iraq and Kuwait. The Order applies to activities of UK nationals and companies abroad as well as within the UK.

5

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force present in the Gulf in response to request from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Following SCR 665, the naval forces present are now enabled under Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances" to enforce trade embargo.
- Purpose of deployments is entirely defensive
- Forces of over 20 nations, including several Arab ones, are deployed or are to be deployed on land, sea and air.
- The international force will remain in the area so long as the host countries believe it has a job to do.
- The international force is not deployed in the Holy Places - Mecca and Medina: it is well over 1,000 kms away from them.

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

- Total UK forces committed are 4,000. These include:
 - one destroyer, two frigates, already in Gulf, three mine clearance vessels and one destroyer on way. Support ships in attendance.
 - one squadron Tornado air defence aircraft, one squadron Tornado strike aircraft, one squadron Jaguar aircraft (ground support). Backed up by VC10 tanker aircraft and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.
- Our response was speedy; and the greatest need for deterrence was at the start.
- Gulf crisis has shown need for NATO members to reassess their readiness to undertake collective, defensive action outside NATO area.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

SADDAM HUSSEIN

- The sole cause of the problem is Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait.
- Saddam Hussein a loser and a failure. Major miscalculations in: attacking Iran (eight years' suffering for his people: 100,000 Iraqi soldiers killed) and then throwing away winnings; attacking Kuwait; interning foreigners.
- Saddam's brutality. Gassed his own people. Introduction of "political reforms" in 1989 a cynical gesture with no substance. Iraq a police state where dissent means death. (Note: the Hitler analogy is unsuitable for Arabs, inflating Saddam's importance. He (and his military prowess) need cutting down to size).
- The first Arab in history to shelter behind women and children; imprisoning people who came to the Middle East to work for Arab interests; turning on his guests. Shameful behaviour in Arab world.
- Iraq too is a major oil producer (highest reserves in Middle East after Saudi Arabia) but revenues have gone into a lost war and a failed economy. Saddam Hussein has not used Iraq's wealth to benefit its people, but to build an aggressive military machine which has oppressed Iraqis, attacked neighbours, and bankrupted the country. Foreign debt of 880 billion dollars.
- Saddam does not appear in public. His speeches are read by an official. He is afraid even of his own people, but manages to appear on TV with defenceless foreign hostages.
- A liar. Said explicitly he had no intention of invading Kuwait, protestations that he did not intend to continue his conquests, or place any trust in his so-called initiatives not credible.
- International subversion. Saddam sponsored terrorism in the 1970s. Baghdad still home to several terrorist organisations. Murders his own dissidents overseas, including in the UK.

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION

- Iraq powerful heavily armed nation, attacked, invaded and now claims to have annexed Kuwait. Attempt by one nation to wipe another clean off map unprecedented in recent times. Iraqi claims to Kuwait without legal basis.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else unconditional withdrawal of Iraq and restoration of legitimate government of Kuwait in accordance with Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 660, 661 and 662.
- Arab solution tried before, during and after invasion: not successful. Can be no compromise on SCR resolutions: anything short of their requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for the sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Saddam Hussein is a liar. His initiatives and promises cannot be trusted. For example he said explicitly that he had no intention of invading Kuwait.
- The world has chosen through the UN comprehensive economic sanctions, collectively and effectively implemented with full UN authority for their enforcement.
- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperative Council, Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions. Many Arab and Muslim countries have already shown great steadfastness and courage in implementing sanctions.
- In all 95 members of the UN have informed the UN that they are taking steps to implement sanctions. (Of those taking no action many have negligible trade with Iraq.)
- Saddam Hussein consequently faces united action from the World Community. His quarrel is with the world as a whole, not as he claims with the US and Britain.
- Iraq a basically wealthy country - not a "have not". Major oil producer. Economy failed because of fruitless war against Iran and diversion of wealth to build up military machine which oppresses Iraqis and threatens neighbours.
- The UN is proving its worth. Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Iraq economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: financial reserves badly depleted by war with Iran.

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- Western military deployments provide a defensive deterrent to further aggression. An extreme sense of danger caused the Gulf states to seek help. Western forces are part of an international effort including several Arab countries and others.
- Full UN authority (SCR 665) has been given for enforcement of sanctions by force if necessary.
- Recognise Jordan's acute difficulties in implementing sanctions: ready to help if Jordan commits itself to full support of sanctions. But Jordanian interests do not lie in reinforcing Saddam Hussein's disregard for sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- PLO made serious mistake in failing to condemn this aggression: they above all have interest in upholding territorial integrity and opposing illegal annexation. Ambivalent PLO response has set back prospects for peaceful settlement of Palestine problem.
- Issue effects confidence of all small states in face of unchallenged annexation.
- Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel fundamentally different. 1967 war followed period of intense Arab hostility towards Israel; 1973 war began with Arab attack on Israel. Arabs only recognised Israel's right to exist, and then implicitly, in 1982. The PLO did not accept SCR 242 until 1988. Since then we have repeatedly stressed that it is for Israel to match moves for settlement made on Arab side.
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait and legitimate government restored arrangements involving UN will be necessary to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries in the region.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

HOSTAGES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ

- Universal condemnation of Iraqi government decision to use foreign nationals as hostages, to deport them from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait to Iraq, and to place some at strategic sites as a human shield against a possible attack.
- The release of women and children does not mitigate the fact that no hostages of either sex should have been taken.
- These actions flout long-established standards of international law.
- SCR 664 (adopted unanimously on 18 August) demands that Iraq allow foreign nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait. This is most welcome.

CURRENT SITUATION

- Ambassador and staff unable to leave Embassy premises in Kuwait to assist in evacuation effort, but warden system established by Embassy operating well.
- Evacuation of 306 British women and children from Kuwait to Baghdad completed successfully on 4 September.

LEGAL POSITION

- Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949 (The Civilian Convention) applies to situation in Kuwait. Both Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the Convention.
- This Convention applies to those who find themselves, in the case of a conflict or an occupation, in hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals. These are "protected persons".
- Most important provisions are:
 - o right to humane treatment and protection from violence
 - o protected persons may not be used to render areas immune from military operations
 - o protection from reprisals
 - o taking of hostages prohibited
 - o right to leave the territory (restrictions on security grounds must not be exercised in arbitrary manner)
 - o individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power are prohibited, regardless of motive

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- The killing of hostages, whatever the motive, and the use of civilians to provide a shield against military operations are contrary to customary international law, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention individuals are held personally responsible for such crimes. Reference Prime Minister's reply on TV-AM's "Frost on Sunday" programme, 2 September:

"... If anything happened to those hostages, then sooner or later, when any hostilities were over, we could do what we did at Nurenberg and prosecute the requisite people for their totally uncivilised and brutal behaviour."

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

Chronology

- 8 August 1990: Iraqi government announced the "unification" of Iraq and Kuwait, ie Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
- 9 August: UN Security Council adopted unanimously SCR 662, declaring Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as null and void.
- SCR 662 also calls upon all States not to recognise annexation and to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of annexation (paragraph 2).
- 9 August: Iraqi announcement that diplomatic missions in Kuwait must close and move their activities to Baghdad by 24 August.
- 24 August: Iraqi order to close embassies defied by all members of European Community, USA, Canada, Japan and others (nearly 30 countries), in accordance with paragraph 2 of SCR 662.
- Despite severe harrassment, we shall maintain collective stand against Iraq's violation of international law for as long as physically possible.

LEGAL POSITION



- The privileges and immunities of diplomatic mission staff and their premises are regulated by the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.
- 153 States are parties to the Vienna Convention. Iraq is one of them.
- Preamble to the Convention declares that

"... the purpose of such privileges and immunities [accorded to all categories of diplomatic mission staff] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions ..."
- Immunities provided for in the Convention include:
 - personal inviolability and freedom from arrest and detention (Articles 29 and 37);
 - immunity from criminal (and most civil) jurisdiction (Articles 31 and 37);
 - the inviolability of the premises of the mission including the head of mission's residence and of the residences of members of the staff (Articles 22, 30 and 37);

- the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, wherever they may be (Article 24);
- the right of free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes (Article 27(1));
- the exemption from all personal services, from all public service of any kind and from military obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions and billeting (Articles 35 and 37).

The Convention also confirms that persons enjoying privileges and immunities under the Convention must, even in the case of armed conflict, be granted facilities in order to enable them to leave the State in which they are based at the earliest possible moment (Article 44).

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GULF CRISIS: US/ISRAELI CONTACTS

SUMMARY

1. ISRAELIS ASSURE ADMINISTRATION THAT THEY WILL MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE, BUT SEEK INCREASED US ASSISTANCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND ARMS SUPPLIES. INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL/IRAQ RED LINES.

DETAIL

2. KURTZER BRIEFED US TODAY (7 SEPTEMBER) ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL OVER IRAQ AND THE GULF CRISIS. HE SAID THAT THE DETAILS WERE BEING CLOSELY HELD WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ASKED THAT THEY BE SIMILARLY TREATED BY US.

3. KURTZER SAID THAT, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT, THE ISRAELIS HAD - FOR OBVIOUS REASONS - SOUGHT TO OPEN A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. THE INITIAL ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE WAS TO KEEP THEM AT ARM'S LENGTH. THEY URGED THE ISRAELIS TO LIE LOW - NOT TO FLY RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, NOT TO MOBILISE OR GIVE ANY OTHER PRETEXT FOR IRAQI ACTION - BUT REFUSED ALL SUGGESTIONS FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS. AFTER TWO WEEKS, AND WITH ISRAELI NERVOUSNESS STILL HIGH, BAKER AND CHENEY DECIDED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO ENGAGE THE ISRAELIS QUIETLY. THEIR MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD JEOPARDISE THE GULF OPERATION, BUT THEY ALSO WANTED TO BRIEF THEM ON THE PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND HEAR THE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS. IT WAS DECIDED TO INVITE THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTRY, DAVID IVRY, TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS LAST WEEK. THE CHOICE OF IVRY WAS PARTLY TO KEEP THE CONSULTATION BELOW THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND PARTLY TO MAKE IT CREDIBLE TO PASS OFF HIS PRESENCE - SHOULD IT BECOME KNOWN - AS A ROUTINE CONSULTATION ON US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

4. KURTZER SAID THAT THE MEETINGS HAD GONE WELL. IVRY HAD ASSURED THE ADMINISTRATION THAT ISRAEL UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS

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IN HER INTEREST TO LIE LOW AND LET THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DEAL WITH IRAQ. (INDEED, IVRY HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT FORCE SO THAT THE WESTERN/ARAB CONSENSUS COULD BE MAINTAINED - KURTZER WAS NOT SURE HOW FAR THIS VIEW WAS SHARED WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.)

5. BUT IVRY SAID THAT ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON US WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN ASSUAGING ISRAELI ANXIETIES. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED FOR INCREASED INTELLIGENCE SHARING (TO MAKE UP FOR THE LACK OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS), AND PRESENTED A SHOPPING LIST OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ON THE FORMER, THE ADMINISTRATION SAID THEY WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO. KURTZER SAID THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO SPEED UP DELIVERY OR PROVIDE BETTER QUALITY MATERIAL. ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE READY TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS, IN UPGRADING ISRAEL'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON PROVISION OF THE PATRIOT MISSILE SYSTEM. KURTZER SAID THAT, DESPITE LEVY'S PUBLIC STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK THAT THE US HAD AGREED TO SUPPLY PATRIOT, NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THERE WERE PROBLEMS: IT WAS EXPENSIVE, NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AND NOT YET RELEASED TO NATO. KURTZER SAID OFFICIALS WERE PUTTING TOGETHER A PACKAGE COVERING INTELLIGENCE AND DEFENCE EQUIPMENT FOR BAKER'S ATTENTION ON HIS RETURN.

6. KURTZER SAID THAT DISCUSSION WITH IVRY OF ISRAELI QUOTE RED LINES UNQUOTE HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. THE ISRAELIS HAD PRESENTED THEIR THREE MAJOR CONCERNS: ACTIVITY AT MISSILE SITES IN WESTERN IRAQ, IRAQI TROOP MOVEMENTS TOWARDS OR INTO JORDAN, ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILISE THE HASHEMITE REGIME. IVRY SAID THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD GOT THE MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED FOR THE STABILITY OF HIS KINGDOM. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ARGUED THAT PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN THE CASE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO JORDAN. ANY SERIOUS BUILD-UP WOULD TAKE TIME, AND TO REACT TO AN IRAQI FEINT WOULD BE PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS. ON MISSILE ACTIVITY, KURTZER SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT, EVEN HERE, ISRAELI RED LIINES WERE MORE PINK THAN RED, GIVEN THEIR PERCEIVED SELF INTEREST IN STAYING OUT OF THINGS.

7. KURTZER SAID THAT IVRY WAS TOLD THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION. IVRY GAVE NO COMMITMENT, BUT REQUESTED THAT ISRAEL BE TOLD BEFORE THE US TOOK ANY MILITARY ACTION IN THE GULF. AGAIN, NO COMMITMENT WAS GIVEN BUT KURTZER THOUGHT THAT, SHOULD IT COME

TO MILITARY ACTION, THE US PROBABLY WOULD INFORM ISRAEL, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO MIS-IDENTIFICATION.

8. KURTZER SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ELUSIVE ON THEIR RED LINES, THE EARLIER PARTS OF THE DISCUSSION HAD CONVINCED THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT NOT GETTING INVOLVED AND HAD NOT FELT THE NEED TO PRESS THEM. HE ADDED THAT THE LEVY VISIT (MY TELNO 2162) HAD NOT TAKEN THE DISCUSSION ANY FURTHER. ARENS WAS THE NEXT VISITOR (DUE AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK ON A PRIVATE VISIT). ALTHOUGH HE WAS LIKELY TO ASK FOR OFFICIAL CALLS KURTZER DOUBTED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SAY MORE BY THEN.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT : MITTERRAND PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND FIRM ON HOSTAGES AND IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. SAYS THAT FRENCH WILL ONLY ENGAGE MILITARY ON THE CONTEXT OF A UN MANDATE. MAKES CLEAR MILITARY DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY HIM PERSONALLY.

DETAIL

2. MITTERRAND CALLED A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE ELYSEE YESTERDAY EVENING. IT WAS DEVOTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO IRAQ/KUWAIT. HE MADE A SHORT OPENING STATEMENT WITHOUT NOTES AND THEN TOOK QUESTIONS. IT LASTED IN ALL ABOUT ONE HOUR. THE MAIN POINTS WERE THE FOLLOWING :

(A) FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS. MITTERRAND SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD INTERVENE IN THE EVENT OF ANY FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD SUPPORT US MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ HE SAID 'I CANNOT ANSWER THAT HYPOTHESIS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANTICIPATED. I HAVE NOT BEEN INFORMED, AND I WILL ONLY COMMIT FRANCE TO WHAT I AM AWARE OF. BUT I WILL SAY STRAIGHT AWAY THAT I WILL ONLY COMMIT FRANCE TO CARRY OUT THE RULES OF THE UN ... FOR THE MOMENT FRANCE HAS NOT RECEIVED A MANDATE'. IF A NEW SITUATION AROSE, HIS REPLY MIGHT CHANGE. FOR INSTANCE A SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED INTERVENTION OF WHICH FRANCE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM A CHAIN REACTION STARTING FROM THE INTERCEPTION OF A SHIP ON THE CONTEXT OF THE EMBARGO WHICH MIGHT PROVOKE A SERIES OF MILITARY CONFLICTS BLOSSOMING INTO GENERAL WAR. HE IMPLIED THAT BECAUSE OF ITS ORIGIN THIS WOULD IN HIS VIEW COME UNDER THE UN MANDATE. 'FRANCE WILL CARRY OUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISIONS. SHE WILL FULFIL MANDATE BUT HAS NO INTENTION OF EXCEEDING THAT MANDATE'

(B) THE LOGIC OF WAR. HE SAID 'WE ARE STILL UNFORTUNATELY IN A LOGIC OF WAR. AND WE WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO GET OUT OF IT, WHILE RESPECTING (INTERNATIONAL) LAW'. HE ADDED 'IT WOULD NOT SERVE (INTERNATIONAL) LAW TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE ON THE WRONG ROAD'

(C) HOSTAGES. FRANCE WOULD NOT ABANDON THEM, BUT WOULD NOT GIVE WAY TO PRESSURE. THEY WERE 'THE VICTIMS OF AN ACT OF BARBARISM'.

(D) FRANCE WAS MAKING THE SECOND LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE MILITARY FORCES IN THE GULF AFTER THE UNITED STATES 'CLEARLY IN FRONT OF ANY OTHER'. HE MENTIONED ABOUT 6-7,000 MEN DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION.

(E) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS 'COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXECUTION OF UN RESOLUTIONS. IT COULD ONLY MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION AFTER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED'.

(F) STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO. HE SAID THAT COUNTRIES WISHING TO CARRY OUT THE WISHES OF THE UN WERE PREVENTING OVERFLIGHTS OF THEIR TERRITORY. HE SAID THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING A UN RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT, AND THAT THE FRENCH HAD SPOKEN TO OTHERS 'PARTICULARLY THE UK' WHO DID NOT HAVE RESERVATIONS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ABOUT HOW IT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

(G) INTERNAL POLITICS. THERE WAS ONLY ONE MILITARY POLICY FOR FRANCE. CHEVENEMENT AGREED WITH THIS. 'DECISIONS OF A MILITARY ORDER ARE MINE. BUT OF COURSE I DO NOT ACT ON MY OWN WITHOUT CONSULTING AND HAVING THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

(H) BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE DRAFT BUDGET WOULD BE 'CORRECTED' BY 10-12 BN FRANCS, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE RISE IN OIL PRICES.

(I) AID TO THIRD COUNTRIES. HE SAID 'THIS HAS TO BE DONE' BUT ONLY COMMITTED HIMSELF SPECIFICALLY TO POLAND (THE SUBJECT OF THE QUESTION).

COMMENT

3. SINCE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE ADVANCE IN WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAYS OVER THE LONG INTERVIEW BY DUMAS ON 4 SEPTEMBER, WHY DID THE PRESIDENT GIVE THIS FURTHER PRESS CONFERENCE? I THINK THERE WERE TWO REASONS. THE FIRST AND MORE IMPORTANT IS THAT THE NEEDS TO CONTINUE TO ASSERT HIS PERSONAL AUTHORITY OVER POLICY IN THE GULF CRISIS, IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING STORIES ABOUT THE DOUBTS OF THE FACTION IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LED BY CHEVENEMENT. MITTERRAND'S FORMULATION OF ACTING WITHIN A U N MANDATE PROBABLY REFLECTS A DESIRE TO REASSURE THE PUBLIC AND HOLD TOGETHER THE

ELEMENTS OF THE PS AND GOVERNMENT. THE STATEMENT WAS HOWEVER FULL OF AMBIGUITIES ON THIS POINT, AND MY OWN READING IS THAT MITTERRAND IS NOT (NOT) CLOSING THE DOOR TO ENGAGING FRANCE MILITARILY IF THIS - WITHOUT A NEW MANDATE - IS EVENTUALLY THE ONLY WAY OF GETTING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT. THE SECOND REASON FOR MITTERRAND'S APPEARANCE WAS I BELIEVE TO GET HIMSELF INTO THE HEADLINES BEFORE THE BUSH/GORBACHEV MEETING (HE HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO TELEPHONE BOTH BEFOREHAND) IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT FRANCE IS PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE. THIS TOGETHER WITH THE SLIGHTLY EXAGGERATED ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF FRANCE'S COMMITMENT OF MEN UNDER ARMS ALSO RESPONDS TO A BASICALLY INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICAL REQUIREMENT, AS THE PRESIDENT SEES IT, NOT LEAST TO MAKE UP FOR THE GROUND LOST IN ORIGINAL FRENCH HESITATIONS. THE POLLS SHOW THAT THE FRENCH PUBLIC APPROVE OF MITTERRAND'S HIGHLY VISIBLE DIRECTION OF FRANCE'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS. HIS APPROVAL RATING HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY TO 61 PER CENT, UP 7 POINTS OVER JULY.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: CALL ON BELONOGOV

1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN DEPUTY MINISTER BELONOGOV AND HANDED OVER A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IN RECEIVING THE MESSAGE, BELONOGOV TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO THE USE OF COLLECTIVE MEANS TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS WITHIN THE PERMANENT FIVE AND VOLUNTEERED TO GIVE ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT MEETING EARLY NEXT WEEK.

VISIT OF TARAQ AZIZ

2. BELONOGOV SAID WE WOULD SHORTLY BE GIVEN FULLER DETAILS OF THE CALL BY AZIZ ON GORBACHEV. BUT BELONOGOV ADDED THAT FRANKLY THEY HAD FOUND THE MEETING TO BE UNSATISFACTORY AND UNPRODUCTIVE. THE CALL HAD BEEN AT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REQUEST BUT AZIZ HAD BROUGHT NO NEW PROPOSALS OR ANY MESSAGES WITH HIM. BELONOGOV WENT ON TO EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING A DIALOGUE WITH THE VARIOUS ARAB STATES AND GIVEN THE DIFFERENT CONTACTS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

3. I TOOK ACTION AS INSTRUCTED (FCO TELNO 1168). BELONOGOV POINTED OUT THAT CONSULTATION SO FAR HAD TAKEN PLACE WITHIN A WORKING GROUP AND NOT WITHIN THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE MSC. THE MSC WAS THE RIGHT PLACE FOR MILITARY ADVISERS. THE RUSSIANS REMAINED READY TO SEE THE MSC REACTIVATED ON THIS BASIS. THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE WORKING GROUP WAS THE RIGHT PLACE TO DISCUSS SANCTIONS. THAT WOULD CUT ACROSS THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR SANCTIONS, AND WOULD CREATE A BAD PRECEDENT. MEANWHILE IT WAS TOO SOON TO BE GETTING DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WORKING GROUP: IT HAD ONLY JUST STARTED ITS ACTIVITIES, AND THE RUSSIANS WERE FULLY PREPARED TO SEE THESE EXPAND. I REITERATED THAT A FULLER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WOULD BE A GOOD FIRST STEP.

MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE

4. I RAISED THE SUGGESTION PUT FORWARD BY SHEVARDNADZE IN HIS SPEECH AT THE ASIA-PACIFIC CONFERENCE (MOSCOW TELNO 1673) FOR A CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. DID SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW SAW SUCH A CONFERENCE AS FIRMLY LINKED TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE GULF CRISIS? BELONOGOV REPLIED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOT YET RETURNED TO MOSCOW AND SO HE COULD NOT COMMENT AUTHORITATIVELY. BUT BELONOGOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT, AS WE KNEW, THE SOVIET UNION HAD LONG ADVOCATED THE HOLDING OF A MIDDLE-EAST CONFERENCE. THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE GULF HAD ONLY ADDED URGENCY TO THEIR PROPOSAL. THE ARAB WORLD HAD BEEN THROWN INTO CONFUSION BY THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE PROPAGANDA COMING FROM BAGHDAD, HAD OPENED UP THE RISK OF A SERIOUS ARAB SPLIT. THE PROSPECT OF A CONFERENCE WOULD GIVE THE ARABS SOMETHING TO LOOK FORWARD TO AND HEAD OFF THIS DANGER. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT CALLING A CONFERENCE TO BE CONVENED IN THE NEXT 2 OR 3 WEEKS: MUCH WORK STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE BY THE PERMANENT FIVE BEFORE ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN. BUT IF THE PROCESS WAS STARTED IT WOULD FORM A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PRESENT CRISIS. THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH HAD SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE IN THE PAST. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN OPPOSED. NO DOUBT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WOULD SHOW IF THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO MOVE.

SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS

5. I ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS IN IRAQ. BELONOGOV DESCRIBED SOME REPORTS IN THE ENGLISH PRESS AND IN PARTICULAR IN A RECENT SUNDAY TIMES AS BEING UNFRIENDLY, EVEN PROVOCATIVE. THEY HAD INFLATED THE ISSUE OUT OF ALL PROPORTION. THE ADVISERS NUMBERED LESS THAN A HUNDRED. THEY WERE TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS WHO HAD NO INVOLVEMENT AT ALL IN CURRENT IRAQI MILITARY ACTION: TARAQ AZIZ HAD CONFIRMED AS MUCH AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. CONDITIONS IN IRAQ WERE CHANGING ALL THE TIME AND SO THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE MATTERS UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW. THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SOME INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOVIET MILITARY SPECIALISTS. BELONOGOV DID NOT EXPAND. HE IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT CONFIRM, THAT THE ADVISERS WOULD - OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL - REMAIN UNTIL THE END OF THEIR CONTRACTS.

PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN GULF

6. I ASKED BELONOGOV ABOUT THE WORRIES EXPRESSED IN SOME SOVIET CIRCLES ABOUT THE GROWING PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN THE GULF. BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NO TROUBLE WITH THE FACT THAT THE SAUDIS HAD INVITED US FORCES TO PROTECT THEM: THAT WAS WITHIN THE RIGHTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN ASSURED BY

BOTH THE US AND THE SAUDIS THAT AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN THE GULF ON TEMPORARY BASIS ONLY. AS LONG AS THAT REMAINED TRUE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS CONTENT, THOUGH THERE WAS INDEED UNEASINESS IN THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ELSEWHERE (BELONOGOV AGAIN CAREFULLY STEERED CLEAR OF AN EXPLICIT MENTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY).

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AMMAN TELNO 499: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON HIS MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN AMMAN. PROPOSAL THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT TO CONTACT THE EMBASSIES AND LOOK INTO THE SITUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS THERE.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 6 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID THAT ON HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN HE WAS BRIEFED BY HIS REPRESENTATIVES (DAYAL AND ANNAN), WHO HAD BEEN IN BAGHDAD THE PREVIOUS WEEK TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE IRAQIS ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. HE HAD NOW ASKED ANNAN TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HIS MEETINGS WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 31 AUGUST AND 1 SEPTEMBER HAD INCLUDED PRIVATE SESSIONS AND MEETINGS OF FULL DELEGATIONS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE HAD COME AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE BUT WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FIVE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION FROM ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DAYAL AND ANNAN. WHILE HE WAS AWARE OF THE NEED FOR AN ARAB SOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD HIMSELF LONG URGED A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THERE COULD BE NO PROGRESS ON THE OVERALL PROBLEM UNTIL THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS ON ITS WAY TO A SOLUTION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE FELT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO SET OUT WHAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL.

4. TARIQ AZIZ HAD EXPRESSED THE RESPECT OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT

WHEREAS THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN SEVEN YEARS TO ADOPT A CHAPTER VII RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ, IT HAD TAKEN ONLY A MATTER OF HOURS TO PASS SCR 660. THE IRAQIS AS ONE OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED. THIS REPRESENTED A DOUBLE STANDARD. THERE WERE OTHER CONFLICTS IN THE REGION WHERE BLOOD HAD BEEN SHED, TERRITORIES SEIZED AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IGNORED BUT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL. HENCE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE OF 12 AUGUST SUGGESTING THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF OCCUPATION IN THE REGION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON A SIMILAR BASIS.

5. TARIQ AZIZ HAD GIVEN A CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT LEADING TO THE EVENTS OF 2 AUGUST, CENTRED ON THE DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT OVER THE OIL MARKET. IRAQ HAD ALWAYS BEEN READY FOR AN ARAB SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. KING HUSSEIN HAD VISITED BAGHDAD ON 3 AUGUST AND AN ARAB MINI-SUMMIT HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR 4/5 AUGUST, BUT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAD CHANGED THEIR MINDS ABOUT ATTENDANCE AT THE LAST MINUTE. ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN LOST AT THE ARAB SUMMIT OF 10 AUGUST, WHEN INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION HAD BEEN PAID TO IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT IT HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING SAUDI ARABIA. IRAQ ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUING INITIATIVE OF KING HUSSEIN: A FORMULA TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS HAD NOT YET MATERIALIZED, BUT THE CRISIS ITSELF WAS LESS THAN A MONTH OLD.

6. TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO ASSURE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IRAQ WAS NOT PLAYING FOR TIME. HE SAID THAT EVEN IF THE DOOR WAS NOT FULLY OPEN, IT WAS NOT CLOSED. IRAQ WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO AVOID WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT IT HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN AGGRESSION BY PLACING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS WHERE THEY WERE BEING WELL TREATED. WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAD NOW BEEN FREED AND THOSE 'GUESTS' REMAINING WOULD NOT BE HARMED.

7. ON THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT, TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THAT POLITICALLY IRAQ COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY CONTINUE AS 'AMBASSADORIAL' MISSIONS. BUT THOSE WHO AGREED TO CLOSE THEIR EMBASSIES WOULD BE ALLOWED TO KEEP TWO OR THREE STAFF IN KUWAIT TO LOOK AFTER THEIR NATIONALS AND THEIR PROPERTY.

8. TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE SEVERE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN IRAQ IF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE CUT OFF. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS LETTER OF 13 AUGUST, CIRCULATED AS A UN DOCUMENT (S/21503) IN WHICH HE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR IRAQ TO EXPORT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OIL TO PAY FOR FOOD AND MEDICINES. TARIQ AZIZ HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE THREE POINTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

(A) IRAQ WOULD NOT ESCALATE MILITARY HOSTILITIES. THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD DEPLOYED FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA SAID THAT THEY HAD DONE SO TO PREVENT AN ATTACK ON THAT COUNTRY. IF BOTH SIDES MAINTAINED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE THERE WOULD BE NO WAR.

(B) THERE MUST BE AN ARAB SOLUTION. THIS WAS IN THE MAKING AND ONCE READY WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

(C) THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF IRAQ SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. PARAGRAPH 4 OF SCR 661 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN A HUMANITARIAN WAY. IRAQ NEEDED TO SELL OIL TO BUY FOOD AND MEDICINE.

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

10. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE PARAGRAPH OF SCR 660 WHICH CALLED ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD ASKED TARIQ AZIZ WHETHER AN ARAB SOLUTION WOULD BE FEASIBLE GIVEN ARAB DIFFERENCES. THERE WERE ALSO WIDER INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS TO THE CRISIS: THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED, THE PLIGHT OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND THE BUILD UP OF FORCES. WHILE HE HAD WELCOMED THE DECISION TO LET WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND SOME MEN LEAVE IRAQ AND KUWAIT, THE RESTRICTIONS ON ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS SHOULD BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY. THE UNITED NATIONS BELIEVED THAT FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT SHOULD REMAIN OPEN. HE HAD TOLD TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE WOULD BE INFORMING THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE DISCUSSIONS: HE REGRETTED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE A POSITIVE REPORT. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO STAY LONGER IN AMMAN AND MEET HIM LATER IN THE WEEK IF THIS WOULD HELP. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE.

11. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NOT EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS IN A MATTER OF HOURS. BUT

HE HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO START A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS LEADING TO THE BEGINNING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 660. THIS HAD NOT COME TO FRUITION. TARIQ AZIZ HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THE TALKS A FAILURE AND HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE TOO WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER TALKS IF THIS COULD BE USEFUL.

12. ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS EFFORTS. MOST EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HIS TALKS HAD NOT PROVIDED AT LEAST AN OPENING FOR A SOLUTION. BUT THEY THOUGHT HIS EFFORTS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE.

13. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) THANKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS REPORT AND COMMENDED THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH TARIQ AZIZ. HE NOTED THAT ANNAN WAS STILL IN BAGHDAD. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD ARRANGE FOR ANNAN TO VISIT KUWAIT TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSIES THERE AND TO ENQUIRE INTO THE CONDITIONS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN LINE WITH SCR 664. HE MIGHT THEN REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

14. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD GONE TO AMMAN AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE, HE HAD PERFORMED EXACTLY AS THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE WISHED. SOMETIMES DISAPPOINTMENT WAS A NECESSARY PART OF PROGRESS. BUT SANCTIONS SEEMED TO BE WORKING: IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT LIKE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I SUPPORTED THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION THAT ANNAN SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT. WE WERE ALL HORRIFIED BY THE INFORMATION THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HAD PROVIDED ON IRAQI BEHAVIOUR THERE. WE SHOULD APPLAUD THE COURAGE OF THOSE HOLDING OUT IN THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

15. BLANC (FRANCE), RAZALI (MALAYSIA), FORTIER (CANADA), PENALOSA (COLOMBIA) AND TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) ALL SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD SEND ANNAN TO KUWAIT.

16. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THANKED COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO ASK ANNAN TO GO TO KUWAIT AS LONG AS THIS HAD THE CLEAR SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL. AS SECRETARY-GENERAL HE DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE VIOLATING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. BUT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR. HE WOULD CONTACT THE (SOVIET) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AFTER EXPLAINING THE OBJECTIVES OF ANNAN'S MISSION TO THE KUWAITIS.

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BAGHDAD TELNO 1178: IRAQ/KUWAIT: ICRC

SUMMARY

1. IRAQ REFUSES ICRC ACCESS TO KUWAIT AND TO FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. THE ICRC TOLD US THIS MORNING, 7 SEPTEMBER, THAT THE ICRC PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RETURN TO BAGHDAD ON 7 SEPTEMBER FOR A FURTHER ROUND WITH TARIQ AZIZ, FOLLOWING HIS SHORT VISIT TO TEHRAN. THE IRAQIS HAD INDICATED THAT FURTHER TALKS WITH THE ICRC WOULD BE WITHOUT PURPOSE.

3. SOMMARUGA IS DUE TO BRIEF LOCAL AMBASSADORS IN GENEVA THIS AFTERNOON. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER THEREAFTER.

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(BY TUBE H29)

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: HIGH LEVEL U S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. U S TEAM GIVES POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING: EMPHASISES THE NEED FOR NATO SOLIDARITY, EQUITABLE BURDEN-SHARING, AND READINESS FOR A LONG HAUL.

DETAIL

2. THE COUNCIL WAS BRIEFED TODAY ON THE GULF CRISIS BY A U S OFFICIAL TEAM LED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POL/MIL AFFAIRS CLARKE.
3. OPENING THE MEETING, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THE CRISIS WAS A TEST OF THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THREATS TO OUR COMMON SECURITY. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR COHESION AND RESOLVE.
4. CLARKE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THE RESPONSE OF NATO, AS WELL AS OF ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, TO THE CRISIS. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE WAS A FACT. THE ALLIANCE FACED A CLASSIC OUT OF AREA CHALLENGE.
5. THE ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS WAS MORE THAN JUST AN ATTACK BY ONE THIRD WORLD STATE ON ANOTHER: IT WAS A MILITARY ANNEXATION, AND ATTEMPT BY A DICTATOR TO TAKE CONTROL OF 20 PERCENT OF WORLD OIL RESERVES. SADDAM WANTED MORE, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE U S AND OTHERS' REACTION COULD HAVE TAKEN MORE. THE U S HAD TOLD KING FAHD THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD COME IF REQUESTED, WITH GREAT STRENGTH AND SPEED: THEY WOULD ALSO LEAVE WHEN REQUESTED. THE CURRENT DEPLOYMENT WAS THE LARGEST U S OPERATION OF ITS TYPE IN HISTORY IN SUCH A SHORT TIME. THE BUILD UP HAD INVOLVED ONLY MINOR WITHDRAWALS FROM THE EUROPEAN THEATRE: THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DEFENCE BUILD UP OF THE 1980S, WHOSE WISDOM WAS NOW APPARENT.

6. CLARKE SAID THAT, IN RESPONSE TO THIS OUT OF AREA CHALLENGE, WHICH ALSO THREATENED THE BORDER OF AN ALLY, NATO OR ITS MEMBERS SHOULD:

- CONTINUE SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL GLOBAL STRATEGY EMBODIED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS.
- SEND FORCES TO THE REGION (CLARKE SINGLED OUT THE UK, FRANCE AND TURKEY FOR MENTION).
- PARTICIPATE IN MARITIME INTERDICTION (CLARKE REFERRED TO THE BAHRAIN CONFERENCE: NATO COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES WOULD FACILITATE CO-OPERATION).
- MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO STATES SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF THE SANCTIONS (ESPECIALLY TURKEY, EGYPT, JORDAN).
- CONTRIBUTE THE LOGISITC SUPPORT NEEDED BY THOSE STATES SENDING FORCES. CLARKE STRESSED THE URGENT U S NEED FOR AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AND FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE.

7. O'DONNELL (STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THAT AT THE END OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IN JULY 1988 SADDAM BELIEVED HE HAD SAVED THE WORLD FROM KHOMEINI AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. YET HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED LITTLE GRATITUDE AND NO REWARD FOR THIS ACHIEVEMENT. IRAQ'S FINANCIAL POSITION HAD SUBSEQUENTLY DETERIORATED.

8. THE U S ASSESSED THAT SADDAM HAD NOW PROBABLY ACHIEVED ALL THAT HE WANTED TO ACHIEVE BY MILITARY ACTION AND WAS HENCE SEEKING A PEACE PLAN THAT WOULD LEGITIMISE WHAT HE HAD OBTAINED BY FORCE. HIS TERMS FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT WERE, HOWEVER, UNACCEPTABLE, SINCE HE HOPED THAT BY PLAYING A WAITING GAME WESTERN RESOLVE WOULD EVAPORATE. HE WOULD WISH TO RETAIN CONTROL OF ALL OR MOST OF KUWAIT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT HIS RECENT DIVISION OF KUWAIT INTO TWO PROVINCES MIGHT INDICATE A READINESS TO CEDE ONE OF THEM. IT WAS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST SHOULD REMAIN UNITED. THE U S BELIEVED THERE WAS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD SUCCEED, GIVEN IRAQ'S HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS AND OIL EXPORTS.

9. FOLLOWING DETAILED BRIEFING ON U S AND ALLIES' MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS TO THE REGION, GLASPIE (U S AMBASSADOR TO BAGHDAD) PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION IN IRAQ. THE ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT WAS UNIVERSALLY POPULAR IN IRAQ AND SADDAM HOPED THAT IN TIME HIS APPEALS TO THE ARAB WORLD WOULD WEAKEN ARAB OPPOSITION. HIS ACTIVITIES TO THIS END HAD SO FAR BEEN TOTALLY UNSUCCESSFUL. INDEED, WHILE THE PRO-SAUDI COALITION WAS GROWING STRONGER, THE MINORITY PRO-IRAQI FACTION WAS BECOMING WEAKER AND LIBYA WAS NOW WAVERING IN ITS SUPPORT. THE DIFFICULTY FOR WOULD-BE ARAB MEDIATORS WAS THE LACK OF ANY FLEXIBILITY SHOWED BY SADDAM. THE U S BELIEVED THAT SADDAM

WAS CAPABLE OF TACTICAL RETREAT, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS RECENT CONCESSIONS TO IRAN AND THE OBJECTIVE OF MILITARY-BACKED SANCTIONS WAS TO OBLIGE HIM TO SHOW THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY.

10. IN DISCUSSION, FULCI (ITALY) SAID THAT ROME TOO ASSESSED THAT LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ WAS WEAKENING. A LIBYAN EMISSARY RECEIVED IN ROME THE DAY BEFORE HAD SAID THAT TRIPOLI CONDEMNED THE INVASION, TREATMENT OF EMBASSIES AND FOREIGN NATIONALS AND CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID THAT NATO WAS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSULTATION OF THE KIND EVIDENCED BY TODAY'S WELCOME MEETING. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO REAFFIRM THE ALLIANCE'S SOLIDARITY WITH TURKEY. THE CRISIS WAS, HOWEVER, NOT IRAQ VERSUS NATO BUT IRAQ VERSUS THE REST OF THE WORLD. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY ACTION ON NATO'S PART THAT MIGHT GIVE A CONTRARY IMPRESSION.

11. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS FROM FULCI, JACOBVITS (NL) AND ROBIN, CLARKE EXPLAINED THAT U S THINKING ON WHAT REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE MIGHT BE REQUIRED ONCE THE CONFLICT HAD BEEN RESOLVED WAS STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT IRAQI POWER IN THE GULF NEEDED TO BE BALANCED. THIS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ACHIEVED BY IRAN BUT IRANIAN FORCES HAD BEEN LARGELY DESTROYED IN THE WAR. SOME RESIDUAL U S PRESENCE IN THE LONGER TERM MIGHT BE NECESSARY. IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE NBC THREAT POSED BY IRAQ. THE LATTER WAS A GLOBAL PROBLEM FOR WHICH GLOBAL SOLUTIONS WOULD BE SOUGHT BUT THERE WAS ALSO A PARTICULAR REGIONAL THREAT POSED BY IRAQ'S POSSESSION OF SUCH WEAPONS. IT WAS NOW TOO LATE TO STOP IRAQ FROM ACQUIRING AN INDEPENDENT CW CAPABILITY BUT THEIR ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY - WHICH THE U S ASSESSED WOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE MID TO LATE 90S - WAS DEPENDENT ON CLANDESTINE PROCUREMENT ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. AS REGARDS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SIZE OF THE U S MILITARY BUILD-UP, WHILE THE U S NOW HAD AIR SUPERIORITY, THEIR GROUND FORCES WERE STILL SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THOSE OF IRAQ. THE U S REQUIRED FORCES IN THE THEATRE OF A SUFFICIENT SIZE TO ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THEIR ALLIES IN THE REGION AND TO DELIVER A MASSIVE RETALIATORY STRIKE SHOULD IRAQ LASH OUT OR DO SOMETHING TO THE HOSTAGES REQUIRING A RESPONSE. AMBASSADOR GLASPIE SAID THAT THERE WAS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE TO IRAQ IN ACQUIRING KUWAIT SINCE IT GAVE THEM THE ACCESS TO A WARM WATER PORT WHICH THEY HAD FAILED TO ACQUIRE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.

12. BOURLOYANNIS-TSANGARIDIS (GREECE) ASKED ABOUT SOVIET ATTITUDES. UNSAL (TURKEY) PRAISED U S LEADERSHIP. IT WAS TIME TO FOCUS ON THE BURDEN-SHARING ISSUE. TURKEY HAD DONE MORE THAN HER FAIR SHARE. THE

CRISIS COULD BE A SPRINGBOARD FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE: BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE ESSENTIAL TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GULF STATES. HE QUESTIONED THE REACTION OF THE IRAQI MAN IN THE STREET TO THE EFFECTIVE SURRENDER TO IRAN. UNSAL ASKED ABOUT BAKER'S IDEAS ON NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

13. KRISTVIK (NORWAY) SAID IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS. NORWAY WAS MAKING A NAVAL CONTRIBUTION AND HELPING REFUGEES WITH GRANTS AND TRANSPORT. HE ASKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. CAJAL (SPAIN) ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT IRAQ'S CLAIM TO KUWAIT WAS HISTORICALLY BASED: HOW THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED THE U S BUILD UP: AND WHETHER THE U S HAD THE CAPACITY TO REMAIN IN THE AREA LONG ENOUGH FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK.

14. FOR THE UK, I EMPHASISED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE THREAT TO STABILITY, THE WORLD ECONOMY, AND TO SMALL STATES EVERYWHERE. ALL ALLIES SHARED THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. I STRESSED THE GREAT DEBT OWED TO THE U S FOR ITS SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE ACTION. THE WEAPON CHOSEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS SANCTIONS. THEY NEEDED TIME TO WORK: MEANWHILE WE SHOULD SHOW RESOLVE AND UNITY. BUT SANCTIONS NEEDED TO BE BACKED BY A MAJOR MILITARY DETERRENCE PRESENCE. THEY WERE MORE LIKELY TO WORK IF WE WERE SEEN TO HAVE THE OPTION OF RESORTING TO MEANS OTHER THAN SANCTIONS. I NOTED THE SUBSTANTIAL UK CONTRIBUTION TO ALL OF CLARKE'S FIVE HEADINGS.

[He's seen we light!!] 15. ON THE ROLE OF NATO, I SAID THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT EXPECT THE U S IN FUTURE TO BEAR ALONE THE BURDEN OF ENSURING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. ALL ALLIES MUST SHARE THIS TASK. WE MUST MAKE FULL POLITICAL USE OF THE NAC TO CONSULT ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE WIDER WORLD, AS WE WERE DOING TODAY. WE WOULD NEED IN FUTURE FORCES CAPABLE BOTH OF PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND OF RESPONDING TO RESPONSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES FURTHER AFIELD. AS PRESENT COOPERATION IN THE WEU SUGGESTED, THE CRISIS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A REASSESSMENT OF THE READINESS OF ALLIANCE COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE COLLECTIVE DEFENSIVE ACTION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. IT WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO PRE-JUDGE THIS QUESTION - BUT CURRENT EVENTS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE QUESTION WAS THERE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE TACKLED. IN CONCLUSION I ASKED HOW VULNERABLE THE IRAQI REGIME WAS TO THE FOOD WEAPON: IT MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO PROLONG A FOOD EMBARGO ONCE THE MEDIA STARTED SHOWING PICTURES OF 'STARVING' IRAQIS. I ALSO ASKED HOW MUCH SUBSTANCE THERE WAS IN THE ASSERTION THAT SYMPATHETIC ARAB

REGIMES RISKED BECOMING INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, TO THE CHARGE THAT THEY WERE WESTERN PUPPETS.

16. BACHMANN (FRG) SAID SOLIDARITY MUST BE MAINTAINED AND UN DECISIONS UPHELD. HE WELCOMED CONSULTATIONS AT NATO. HE AGREED THAT IRAQ WAS PLAYING FOR TIME, BUT BELIEVED THAT SANCTIONS WOULD WORK. FARIA (PORTUGAL) ASKED WHETHER AN HONOURABLE WAY OUT COULD BE ENVISAGED, WHICH WOULD PRESERVE THE ESSENTIALS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE RISK OF TERRORISM, AND TO THE PREDICAMENT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN. GUNNLAUGSSON (ICELAND) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ACTIVELY STUDYING HOW TO HELP. HE ASKED WHETHER THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SADDAM WOULD MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE.

17. IN REPLY, GLASBIE REFERRED TO THE COMPLEX HISTORY OF THE KUWAIT/IRAQ BORDER SINCE 1923. THE U S HAD NEVER TAKEN A POSITION ON THIS. BUT KUWAIT HAD BEEN SOVEREIGN FOR NEARLY 30 YEARS. AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT WAS A MATTER FOR THE ARABS TO NEGOTIATE AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT SOVEREIGNTY. WHILE THE U S WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON THE UN RESOLUTIONS, IT WAS OPEN TO DIPLOMATIC CONTACT, WHICH TOOK PLACE DAILY. ANY SUCCESSION TO SADDAM WAS A MATTER OF SPECULATION, BUT THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT SOME FORM OF COLLEGIAL RULE BY THE REST OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP (WHO THEMSELVES REPRESENTED MINORITIES) WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION. KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN HAD UNDER-ESTIMATED INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE INVASION, AND NOW REALISED THAT HE HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN REMAINING CLOSE TO SADDAM (THE PLO APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION).

18. O'DONNELL SAID THAT IN TERMS OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION, SADDAM HAD CHOSEN HIS ENEMIES WELL. THE SHEIKHS WERE NOT POPULAR IN THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST. BUT SADDAM'S POPULARITY WAS BASED ON HIS IMAGE AS A STRONG MAN AND WINNER. IF HE WERE PERCEIVED TO WIN THE PRESENT CONFLICT, HE WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH IN FUTURE. O'DONNELL SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ WAS 80 PERCENT DEPENDENT ON IMPORTED FOOD, IT HAD STOCKS SUFFICIENT FOR 3-6 MONTHS. AMBASSADOR GLASBIE SAID THE ATTITUDE OF EGYPT WAS CRUCIAL: THIS IN TURN WAS AFFECTED BY THE VIEWS OF RETURNING EGYPTIAN GUEST-WORKERS WHO WERE UNIFORMLY ANTI-IRAQI.

19. CLARKE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NO LONGER A MONOLITH: ELEMENTS OF OPINION OPPOSED THE VIEW OF GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE THAT IRAQ WAS AN OUTLAW NATION. THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET SPARE PARTS WOULD IN TIME SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE IRAQI FORCES. CLARKE SAID THAT THE U S COULD STAY IN THE AREA FOR A VERY LONG TIME IF NEEDED. IF

SANCTIONS WERE VIOLATED, THE U S WOULD CONSIDER OTHER ALTERNATIVES 'COLLECTIVELY'. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS OVER-WHELMINGLY SUPPORTIVE, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CRACKS APPEARING OVER THE QUESTION OF BURDEN-SHARING. KUWAIT, UAE, SAUDI ARABIA AND JAPAN HAD ALL MADE SUBSTANTIAL PAYMENTS. SOME EUROPEANS WERE DOING A GREAT DEAL, OTHERS WERE STILL CONSIDERING THEIR POSITION. EUROPEAN FUNDING WOULD HELP, AS WOULD THE SIGHT OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS EMBARKING IN EUROPEAN SHIPS. IN CONCLUSION CLARKE SAID THAT FURTHER INTENSIVE CONSULTATION WOULD BOTH BE USEFUL AND NECESSARY. (HE SUBSEQUENTLY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR AND AGREEMENT WITH THE LINE I HAD TAKEN EARLIER).

ALEXANDER

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OTHER EMBASSIES

1. AS I BELIEVE YOU KNOW, THE NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH AMBASSADORS LEAVE ON 8 SEPTEMBER AND THE DANE THE NEXT DAY. THE EGYPTIAN IS ALSO EXPECTED TO GO ON 9 SEPTEMBER.

2. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE YUGOSLAV AND THE CZECH EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THIS WILL LEAVE 16 OF US: 8A C. US. CANADA. SWITZERLAND. AUSTRIA. SYRIA. BAHRAIN. ROMANIA AND POLAND. THE SWISS AND THE AUSTRIAN ARE EXPECTED TO GO SOON. AND THE POSITION OF THE POLE. WHO WAS ACCREDITED HERE BUT RESIDENT IN BAGHDAD BEFORE 8 AUGUST, IS UNCLEAR.

WESTON

YYYY

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, European Political Cooperation

EXTRAORDINARY EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING , ROME, 7 SEPT

SUMMARY

1. THE MEETING CENTRED ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TURKEY, JORDAN AND EGYPT, ON WHICH THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY AND COMMISSION TRIED JOINTLY (BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO BOUNCE THROUGH AN IMMEDIATE DECISION ON NEW MONEY. A SEPARATE REPORT ON THIS DISCUSSION WILL ISSUE FROM THE FCO. MINISTERS ALSO COVERED A PROPOSAL TO RELAUNCH THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE, A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT EC/SOVIET DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS, MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE UN EMBARGO ON IRAQ, AND THE PLIGHT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. A BROADLY SATISFACTORY OUTCOME ON EACH. DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS BELOW. THE THREE DECLARATIONS ISSUED TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING ARE IN MY SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH IFTS.

DETAIL

2. APART FROM AID TO JORDAN, TURKEY AND EGYPT (TELEGRAM TO ISSUE FROM FCO, DRAFT FAXED TO GREENSTOCK, C/O FCO EMERGENCY UNIT) DE MICHELIS PROPOSED FOUR OTHER SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION:

- THE NEED TO RELAUNCH THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE:
- A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT EC/SOVIET DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS:
- THE POSSIBILITIES FOR STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ:
- THE PLIGHT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND EC EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE

3. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT MINISTERS SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO RELAUNCH THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD GAINED CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT IN ARAB COUNTRIES. MANY PEOPLE HAD CONTRASTED THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO HIM WITH A SUPPOSED LACK OF URGENCY IN TACKLING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT EUROPE SHOULD SIGNAL TO THE ARABS, BY RELAUNCHING THE DIALOGUE, THAT THEIR

COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION TO OTHER ARAB ISSUES SUCH AS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS UNDIMINISHED. HE WAS CIRCULATING A DRAFT STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT.

4. VAN DEN BROEK QUESTIONED THIS. THE EC SHOULD AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION OF LINKING THE GULF CRISIS TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. OTHERWISE WE WOULD PLAY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GAME. CERTAINLY, THERE WAS SCOPE FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE EC'S APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE: BUT THERE COULD BE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. WOULD IRAQ PARTICIPATE AND IF THEY DID, WOULD OTHERS? AND WOULD THE MEETING LOOK AT ARAB/ISRAEL OR THE GULF/CRISIS?

5. GENSCHER SAID HE SYMPATHISED WITH SOME OF VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS AT LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. ARAB PUBLIC OPINION HAD TO BE PERSUADED THAT IT WAS IRAQ, BY HER INVASION OF KUWAIT, WHO HAD SET BACK THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. IRAQI AGGRESSION, NOT THE WESTERN RESPONSE, WAS TO BLAME. FERNANDO ORDONEZ SAID THAT A STATEMENT ABOUT THE EC'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WAS ESSENTIAL AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE EC SHOULD ALSO MOVE AHEAD WITH ITS NEW MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES. KLIBI HAD TOLD HIM JUST BEFORE HE RESIGNED THAT THE ARABS NEEDED EUROPE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

6. MR WALDEGRAVE SAID THAT HE TOO SYMPATHISED WITH VAN DEN BROEK. THE IDEA NEEDED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE ARAB LEAGUE WAS DIVIDED, AND WE SHOULD NOT DEEPEN THEIR DIVISIONS. THE EC SHOULD OF COURSE REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. BUT WE SHOULD NOT BE SEDUCED BY THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL ARAB PROBLEMS - ARAB/ISRAEL, LEBANON, IRAQ/KUWAIT ETC.

7. POOS (LUXEMBOURG), AND CONNER (IRELAND) AGREED THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL AND IRAQ/KUWAIT PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT BE LINKED. CONNER ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT A NEW EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE COULD BE A FORUM FOR GETTING ACROSS THE MESSAGE THAT THE GULF CRISIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM CREATED BY THE WEST. DUMAS THOUGHT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE STIMULATED. THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULTIES, BUT THE POTENTIAL REWARDS EXCEEDED THESE.

8. THERE WAS SOME DEBATE ABOUT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT ON EC-ARAB RELATION THAT DE MICHELIS HAD CIRCULATED, WITH THE DUTCH ARGUING THAT IT SUGGESTED A LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND ARAB/ISRAEL. IT WAS THEREFORE REDRAFTED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS OVER LUNCH AND AGREED BY MINISTERS IN THE FORM THAT IT APPEARS IN

THIRD IPT.

EC/SOVIET DECLARATION

9. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED, AS A FURTHER SIGN OF SOLIDARITY, A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE GULF CRISIS TO BE DISCUSSED AND ISSUED DURING THE EC/SOVIET MEETING IN THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA. HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL BUT HAD IN PRINCIPLE WELCOMED THE IDEA.
10. VAN DEN BROEK WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA - IT COULD SET A PRECEDENT. WOULD THERE BE EC/US DECLARATION? IF NOT, WOULD THE EC APPEAR CLOSER TO THE SOVIET POSITION THAN THE AMERICANS? HE WOULD PREFER TO SEE A US/SOVIET/EC DECLARATION INCLUDING ALSO CHINA. THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE REAL SOLIDARITY.
11. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THE EC RESPONSE SHOULD DEPEND IN PART ON EVENTS AT THE NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT. IF THEY AGREED ON SOME JOINT ACTION OR DECLARATION, THEN IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE EC TO DO SO ALSO WITH THE RUSSIANS. SAMARAS (GREECE) SAID HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO AN EC/SOVIET DECLARATION.
12. MR WALDEGRAVE SAID HE DID NOT FEEL STRONGLY ON THIS POINT. THE PROBLEM WITH VAN DEN BROEK'S PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT WAS REINVENTING THE UN. THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN ANY DECLARATION WOULD BE THAT IT DID NOT EXPOSE ANY LIGHT BETWEEN EC AND US VIEWS. THIS MEANT TREATING WARILY ANY IDEAS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.
13. THE PORTUGUESE AND IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SUPPORTED A JOINT DECLARATION. DUMAS AGREED, BUT SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO HINT OF SUPPORT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
14. DE MICHELIS, SUMMING UP, SAID THAT, THOUGH AS THE DUTCH HAD IDENTIFIED, THERE WERE PROBLEMS, BUT HE DID NOT THINK HE COULD GO BACK TO THE RUSSIANS WITH A STRAIGHT REFUSAL. IN THE NEW CLIMATE, THIS WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD. THERE WOULD BE MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT DECLARATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE MATTER BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE FAC ON 17 SEPTEMBER.

STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO

15. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ WAS THE ONLY

ALTERNATIVE TO THE MILITARY OPTION, WHICH WAS DANGEROUS AND FULL OF UNKNOWN. EC MINISTERS SHOULD CONSIDER HOW THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED. HE PERSONALLY FAVOURED EXTENDING IT TO AIR TRAFFIC.

16. ALL SPEAKERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR MAINTAINING AND IF POSSIBLE, STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO. EYSKENS (BELGIAN) SUGGESTED THAT THE TWELVE ACT IN CONCERT TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. GENSCHER SAID HE SUPPORTED AN AIR BLOCKADE. ELLEMAN-JENSEN SAID THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN A WAY IN WHICH ENCOURAGED RESPECT FOR THE UN. MR WALDEGRAVE AGREED THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND THAT AN AIR BLOCKADE BE CONSIDERED. HE NOTED THAT THIS MIGHT WELL AFFECT RELATIONS WITH SOME MAGHREB COUNTRIES, WHO WERE KNOWN TO BE ALLOWING FLIGHTS TO IRAQ.

17. DE MICHELIS SUMMED UP THAT THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE EMBARGO WAS THE PRIORITY INSTRUMENT FOR BRINGING ABOUT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. THE TWELVE WOULD MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. FOOD AND MEDICINES WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION WITH UN RESOLUTION 661.

EC CITIZENS IN KUWAIT

18. THIS WAS DISCUSSED OVER LUNCH. THE DISCUSSION WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY BY GREENSTOCK, DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR. THE DECLARATION IN SECOND IFT WAS AGREED.

EGERTON

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BUSH/GORBACHEV MEETING: HELSINKI, 9 SEPTEMBER: CFE
SUMMARY

1. RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN WOOLSEY AND GRINEVSKY IN VIENNA HAVE HARDENED ATTITUDES HERE. US CFE PRIORITIES IN HELSINKI LIKELY TO BE MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT, WITH FIRM US LINE EXPECTED. BUT SCOWCROFT DOWNBEAT ON PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS.

DETAIL

2. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (OUR TELNO 2100), THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN WOOLSEY AND GRINEVSKY IN VIENNA AT THE END OF AUGUST HAD GIVEN RISE TO SOME CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ERECTING NEW OBSTACLES AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR OF THE CFE NEGOTIATION. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THOSE EXCHANGES, IT WAS AGREED THAT BARTHOLOMEW AND KARPOV WOULD MEET IN MOSCOW FROM 8-10 SEPTEMBER FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE KEY OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN THE START AND CFE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAS LED TO A CHANGE OF PLAN, AND BARTHOLOMEW, TOGETHER WITH WOLFOWITZ (OSD), WILL NOW BE ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT (PLUS SCOWCROFT AND BAKER) ON HIS TRIP TO HELSINKI.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING IS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON CFE (OR START). SCOWCROFT TOLD ME ON 6 SEPTEMBER THAT THERE HAD BEEN INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON ANY OF THE KEY ISSUES AT CFE SINCE THE JUNE SUMMIT FOR THERE TO BE ANY REAL PROSPECT OF A BREAKTHROUGH IN HELSINKI. HIS EXPECTATION WAS THAT THE END RESULT WOULD BE A MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO EXHORT THEIR RESPECTIVE BUREAUCRACIES TO DO BETTER.

4. THAT SAID, WE UNDERSTAND FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR CONTACTS IN THE NSC, STATE AND OSD THAT THE PRESIDENT IS BEING BRIEFED ON A NUMBER OF CFE ISSUES. THESE INCLUDE, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:

1) AIRCRAFT: THE ADMINISTRATION HAS JUST CONCLUDED YET ANOTHER INTERNAL REVIEW OF ITS POLICY ON AIRCRAFT AT CFE. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME AMERICANS (MAINLY IN VIENNA) WHO HAVE BEEN DISINCLINED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON AIRCRAFT (UKDEL

PAGE 1
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VIENNA TELNO 255 REFERS), THE WASHINGTON REVIEW APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE US BOTTOM LINE SHOULD BE QUOTE COVERAGE IN SOME FORM UNQUOTE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE US WILL BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY REALISTIC MIX OF CEILINGS AND NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS WHICH ENSURED COMPLETE COVERAGE OF SOVIET AIR ASSETS IN THE ATTU ZONE. USAF ARE PUSHING FOR THE CEILINGS TO BE MUCH LOWER THAN THOSE RECENTLY PUT FORWARD BY GRINEVSKY. BUT COVERAGE, RATHER THAN THE NUMBERS GAME, IS BECOMING THE WATCHWORD HERE:

- II) MANPOWER: AS WE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL TO WOOLSEY OF A CEILING OF 80,000 ON US TROOPS IN THE ATTU ZONE CAME AS A RUDE SHOCK TO THE AMERICANS, GIVEN THE APPARENT AGREEMENT IN IRKUTSK TO DROP THE OTTAWA PERSONNEL CEILINGS. THIS LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL, CLEARLY BUILDING ON US PRESS SPECULATION AS TO THE EVENTUAL SIZE OF A US PRESENCE IN EUROPE POST-GERMAN UNIFICATION, WILL BE GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT BY THE PRESIDENT IN HELSINKI:
- III) SUFFICIENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE PREVIOUSLY SHOWN SIGNS OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON SUFFICIENCY THAN WE (OR THE FRENCH) WOULD WISH. WE KNOW THAT WOOLSEY HAS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH ENCOURAGE HIM TO SEEK VARIATIONS OF THE ACV, ARTILLERY AND TANK PERCENTAGES AROUND A MEAN OF 33 PER CENT, WITH ACVS AROUND 35 PER CENT AND TANKS NEARER 30 PER CENT. BUT HE ALSO HAS DISCRETION TO GO TO 35 PER CENT ACROSS THE BOARD. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT HELSINKI IS UNLIKELY TO SEE FLEXIBILITY FROM THE PRESIDENT ON SUFFICIENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS PREPARED TO GIVE THE CURRENT INTERNAL WARSAW PACT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE MORE TIME TO MATURE:
- IV) ZONES/VERIFICATION/DESTRUCTION: THE PRESIDENT IS BEING BRIEFED ON THESE ISSUES, BUT THE CHANCES OF IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION ARE THOUGHT LIMITED. ON ZONES HE IS BEING TOLD TO HANG TOUGH, AS HE IS ON THE LATEST SOVIET APPROACH ON QUOTE OBJECTS UNQUOTE OF VERIFICATION. ON DESTRUCTION WE UNDERSTAND HE IS BEING BRIEFED TO QUERY THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS (WHICH BY SOME PENTAGON COUNTS, WOULD ONLY RESULT IN THE DESTRUCTION OF 4000 SOVIET MBTS UNDER A CFE AGREEMENT).

ACLAND

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THE PRIME MINISTER

7 September 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T208/90

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 29 August, sent through the High Commissioner in Nauru, about developments in the Middle East.

I am grateful for your thoughtful message and much appreciate your support at this time.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Staiti

His Excellency Mr. Bernard Dowiyogo

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the department for Enterprise

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The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

SECRET

Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
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Enquiries
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Direct line
Our ref 071-215 5623
Your ref PE9053
Date

7 September 1990

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Dear Douglas

I thought you would wish to be aware that in the interests of security and sanctions enforcement, and for obvious humanitarian reasons, my officials have agreed with BT International and Mercury Communications that telecommunications lines should be maintained with Iraq and Kuwait and that where interference problems arise, these links should be re-routed as they would in normal circumstances.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Peter

SECRET



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FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1990

Dear Mr. Stanley,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

I enclose an excerpt dealing with the question of revocation of export licences for the export of arms to Jordan from the record of the Prime Minister's conversation with King Hussein on 31 August.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Gieve (HM Treasury).

Yours faithfully,

(C. D. POWELL)

Martin Stanley, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2164

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OF 070044Z SEPTEMBER 90
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**IRAQ/KUWAIT: BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT
SUMMARY**

1. SUMMIT FOCUS WILL BE ON THE GULF, AND ON POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE USE OF FORCE. AGENDA WILL ALSO INCLUDE OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, EUROPE, AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY.
- DETAIL
2. WE HAVE OBTAINED FROM CONTACTS IN STATE AND NSC AN ACCOUNT OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN HELSINKI ON 9 SEPTEMBER.
3. THE MEETING WILL BE DIVIDED INTO THREE SESSIONS: IN THE MORNING DISCUSSION WILL BE ON THE GULF AND OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES: THERE WILL BE A WORKING LUNCH TO DISCUSS EUROPE (CSCE, CFE AND GERMANY): AND, IN THE AFTERNOON THERE WILL BE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, AND OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES.
4. THE FOCUS WILL BE ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE US PURPOSE IS LARGELY SYMBOLIC: TO SHOW TO IRAQ THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER OVER THE CRISIS. THE AIM WILL BE TO BRIEF GORBACHEV ON US THINKING, IN THE HOPE OF ENSURING HIS CONTINUED SUPPORT. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SATISFACTION HERE AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WORKED FOR, AND HAS SUBSEQUENTLY STOOD BY, THE UN CONSENSUS AGAINST IRAQ. (THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS IN IRAQ HAS NOT SPOILT THE PICTURE, GIVEN THE US ASSESSMENT THAT THESE ARE NOT MATERIALLY AFFECTING IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND HAVE PROBABLY NOT BEEN RECALLED ONLY BECAUSE MOSCOW FEARS THAT THEY, TOO, MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES HELD LIKE THE WESTERN HOSTAGES.) BUT THERE IS SOME CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE EQUIVOCATION IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE AND MOSCOW'S APPARENT INSISTENCE THAT EVEN IF FORCE SHOULD EVENTUALLY BE NECESSARY IT SHOULD ONLY BE EXERCISED UNDER A UN UMBRELLA. THE AMERICANS FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH FORCE MIGHT HAVE TO BE USED WITHOUT UN COVER.
5. ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRIME OBJECTIVES THEREFORE WILL BE TO MAKE CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT - WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION

REMAIN COMMITTED TO MAKING SANCTIONS WORK - THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO USE FORCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT IN THE EVENT THAT SANCTIONS PROVE INEFFECTIVE. HE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US ARE NOT SEEKING TO PROVOKE IRAQ INTO HOSTILITIES: THAT THEY WANT TO SEE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION: BUT THAT AN EVENTUAL RESORT TO FORCE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

6. OUR CONTACTS HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT BUSH WILL WANT TO PRESS GORBACHEV ON INTELLIGENCE-SHARING (EG ABOUT SOVIET EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO IRAQ) AND ON OTHER WAYS IN WHICH MOSCOW COULD DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THE US EFFORT. ONE IDEA IS THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HELP EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH THEIR OIL SUPPLIES. ANOTHER IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PROVIDE SHIPS TO TRANSPORT, SAY, SYRIAN FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA OR EVEN US SUPPLIES TO THE REGION. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET SHIPPING FIRMS HAVE BID FOR SOME OF THE PENTAGON CONTRACTS TO SHIP EQUIPMENT FROM THE US TO SAUDI ARABIA.)

7. ON BILATERAL ISSUES BUSH WILL FOCUS ON SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. STATE HAVE TOLD US THAT HE WILL EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY ADOPTION OF THE EMIGRATION LAW, AND OF A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION ON CLAIMS (OUR TELNO 1528), IF MOSCOW IS TO REMOVE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. THEY WILL ALSO BE PRESSING THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE DECISIONS ON THE INVESTMENT AND TAX TREATIES CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. ACCORDING TO STATE, BUSH WILL REAFFIRM HIS INTENTION TO MOVE TO NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. FOR CFE ISSUES SEE MIFT.

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39

IRAQ/KUWAIT
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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
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MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER

MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SOVIET
HD/EED
HD/SED
HD/UND(L)
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

7 September 1990

Dear Charles,

Gulf Crisis: US Burden-Sharing Initiative

Thank you for your letter of 5 September, in which you asked for advice on what the Prime Minister might say about a UK contribution to assistance for Egypt, Turkey and Jordan when she telephones the President on Friday afternoon.

Although Mr Brady did not mention a figure in his conversation with the Prime Minister on 5 September, he told Mr Waldegrave and Mr Lamont that the Americans felt that the UK might be able to contribute \$100 million to the first phase (ie for the remainder of 1990).

The Foreign Secretary believes, and hopes that the Chancellor will agree, that the Prime Minister should reaffirm our willingness to play our part and say that we are prepared to make a contribution for 1990, provided that others pay their share. To help us complete our assessment we should be grateful if the Americans could let us have as much analytical background as possible to the calculations they have made (Mr Brady's team, unexpectedly, had no working papers to share with us) and if they would keep us closely in touch with reactions in other capitals to Mr Baker's and Mr Brady's presentation.

The Prime Minister might go on to say that the European Community is likely to discuss some Commission proposals for assistance during the ECOFIN meeting on 8 September. As the Americans know, our strong preference is for the European effort to be made primarily by way of bilateral national contributions rather than through the EC budget. Member states pay fixed shares of EC expenditure. The bilateral route would enable those not contributing militarily to do more. This is important if the FRG are to be encouraged to pull their weight. We

/will

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will be taking an active part in Community consultations this weekend about how to proceed. Our own contribution will be either through the Community budget or a separate bilateral contribution or a mixture of both, depending on the outcome of those consultations.

We agree with Mr Brady that resources need to be made available quickly. Some coordination will be essential, and we hope the Americans will take an early initiative to that effect.

Within HMG, we will need to be clear, if we are making this commitment to the Americans, how the UK contribution is to be funded. As the Foreign Secretary has already made clear, he sees no way of finding resources for this from within his existing allocations.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CCPC

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

7 September 1990

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Dear Charles,

GULF CRISIS: US BURDEN-SHARING INITIATIVE

Stephen Wall has written ^{*with COP?*} today about the question of a UK contribution for assistance to Egypt, Turkey and Jordan.

The Chancellor very much agrees with the relatively cautious line suggested in paragraph 3 of Stephen's letter. In particular, he feels that it would be premature to commit ourselves to a particular number at this stage: when Brady talked to the Chief Secretary, he only indicated a tentative figure of \$100 million, and we have no idea how this was assessed. Nor are we satisfied that the American estimate of the total support operation in 1990 (\$3.5 billion) is well founded. We understand that France has also been asked for \$100 million and shares out doubts about the basis of the american calculations.

The Chancellor also notes the Foreign Secretary's view that some or all of the cost should fall on the Reserve. He accepts, of course, the importance of making a contribution. But he hopes that the Foreign Secretary can re-examine the other calls on the aid programme in the light of this new priority to see what off-setting savings he can offer. He would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary and the Chief Secretary could pursue this issue. That discussion need not prevent the Prime Minister indicating now to Mr Bush our willingness to make a contribution, of an unspecified size.



The Chancellor will meanwhile take a very cautious line at ECOFIN on Saturday, on the understanding that Mr Waldegrave takes a similarly cautious attitude at the special meeting of Foreign Ministers today.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Tancred Tarkowski

T TARKOWSKI
Private Secretary

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TELNO 2162

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ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
SUMMARY

1. BAKER AND LEVY DISCUSS GULF CRISIS IN GENERAL TERMS AND ARAB/ISRAEL IN DETAIL. LEVY SAYS ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO PURSUE SHAMIR INITIATIVE BUT NO INDICATION OF WAY AHEAD.
DETAIL
2. SECRETARY BAKER HELD HIS TWICE-POSTPONED MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY YESTERDAY (5 SEPTEMBER). LEVY ALSO HAD A BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THIS MORNING. WE ASKED KURTZER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEA, STATE) FOR A BRIEFING.
3. KURTZER SAID THAT THE MEETINGS PLUS LUNCH LASTED THREE AND A HALF HOURS. THE FIRST HOUR WAS A ONE-ON-ONE MEETING (PLUS INTERPRETER). BAKER HAD SCHEDULED THIS AS A QUOTE GETTING TO KNOW YOU SESSION UNQUOTE, BUT HAD ALSO USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE BROAD ISSUES IN THE GULF CRISIS. LEVY TOLD BAKER THAT ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO AVOID COMPLICATING US POLICY BY MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE. (LEVY SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY AFTER THE MEETING.) BAKER INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS AWARE OF ISRAELI MILITARY NEEDS AND WOULD BE AS RESPONSIVE AS THEY COULD. BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STILL FACED SEVERE BUDGETARY PROBLEMS, AND HAD RECENTLY AGREED TO SUPPLY URGENTLY AN ARMS PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA. BOTH THESE FACTORS WOULD LIMIT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO RESPOND. BAKER ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED NO OPPOSITION TO THE SAUDI SALES FROM ISRAEL'S FRIENDS ON THE HILL. LEVY MADE NO FORMAL REQUEST FOR FORGIVENESS OF ISRAELI MILITARY DEBT, BUT HE DID MENTION THE NEED FOR COMPARABLE TREATMENT OF CAMP DAVID PARTNERS. BAKER WAS NON-COMMITTAL.
4. OVER LUNCH, THE US SIDE RAISED CONCERNS OVER THE EXTENT OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY CONNECTIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND ETHIOPIA. ON THE FORMER, THEY SOUGHT ASSURANCE THAT PREVIOUS ISRAELI COMMITMENTS TO INITIATE NO NEW CONTRACTS WERE BEING ADHERED TO. LEVY SAID THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN NO DECISIONS ON THIS

BUT AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE QUESTION. ON ETHIOPIA, HE CLAIMED THAT ISRAEL WAS PROVIDING NO LETHAL ASSISTANCE TO MENGISTU.

5. THE AFTERNOON SESSION WAS DEVOTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND RELATED ISSUES. LEVY SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE THE DOLLARS 400 MILLION IN HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES. BAKER MADE CLEAR THAT, BECAUSE OF THE FUNGIBILITY OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE INCENTIVES AND SUBSIDIES FOR IMMIGRANTS TO SETTLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN THE STANDARD ASSURANCES. LEVY SHOWED LITTLE FLEXIBILITY, MERELY REPEATING THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DIRECT IMMIGRANTS TO THE WEST BANK OR GAZA AND THAT NO US GOVERNMENT FUNDS WOULD BE USED EAST OF THE GREEN LINE. HE RULED OUT ANY AFFIRMATIVE STATEMENTS BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AGAINST SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. BAKER LEFT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO REFLECT ON WHAT THEY MIGHT OFFER.

6. BAKER SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF REQUIRED THAT ARAB/ISRAEL BE KEPT FRONT AND CENTRE. THERE HAD TO BE A CREDIBLE PEACE PROCESS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE ARAB WORLD THAT THERE WAS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE VIOLENT APPROACH ADVOCATED BY

SADDAM HUSSEIN. BAKER SAID THE ADMINISTRATION HAD WORKED HARD TO SATISFY ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT TRIED TO FORCE ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE PLO, BUT PLO ACQUIESCENCE IN ANY PEACE PROCESS WAS NECESSARY. BAKER SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR AN INDICATION THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WERE STILL INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE SHAMIR INITIATIVE.

7. LEVY SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID WANT TO SEE THE INITIATIVE GO FORWARD, BUT SAID THAT THE US SHOULD NOT BE REWARDING THE PLO, WHO HAD SHOWN THEIR TRUE COLOURS THROUGH INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM AND SUPPORT FOR SADDAM. HE CAUTIONED BAKER TO REMEMBER WHAT HAD BROUGHT THE COALITION GOVERNMENT DOWN. IF THE US PRESSED ISRAEL AGAIN TO AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF DEPORTEES AND DUAL ADDRESSEES THEY WOULD GET THE SAME RESULT. BAKER RESPONDED THAT THE TWO SIDES NEEDED TO PUT CREATIVE ENERGY INTO REACHING THE SAME RESULT BY SOME OTHER MEANS. LEVY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO LOOK AT THIS BUT AVOIDED OFFERING ANY CONCESSIONS.

8. KURTZER SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE MEETING, BAKER HAD INTENDED TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT ON US POLICY ON THE PEACE PROCESS (UNSCR 242, TERRITORY FOR PEACE, ETC). IN THE EVENT, THE MEETING OVER-RAN. BAKER DID, HOWEVER, MAKE A PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE NEED TO PURSUE A CREDIBLE PEACE PROCESS.

THIS COMPLEMENTED HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT TO CONGRESS (OUR TELNO 2146).

COMMENT

9. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT BAKER AND STATE DEPARTMENT WERE BROADLY CONTENT WITH THIS FIRST ENCOUNTER. THE NEED TO WORK THROUGH AN INTERPRETER ON THE INTRICACIES OF THE PEACE PROCESS CLEARLY CAUSED SOME PROBLEMS. KURTZER COMMENTED THAT AT CERTAIN POINTS THEY WERE UNSURE WHETHER LEVY WAS BEING OBDURATE OR SIMPLY FAILING TO GRASP THE NUANCES UNDER DISCUSSION.

10. ON SUBSTANCE, KURTZER AGREED THAT PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS DID NOT LOOK GOOD DESPITE LEVY'S CLAIMED COMMITMENT TO PURSUING THE SHAMIR INITIATIVE, THE MEETING PRODUCED THE EXPECTED DEADLOCK ON DEPORTEES AND DUAL ADDRESSEES.

THE ADMINISTRATION WILL LOOK FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION, BUT THERE SEEMS NO REASON TO EXPECT A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELIS. NEVERTHELESS, BAKER IS PREPARED TO GIVE IT A LITTLE MORE TIME. KURTZER EXPECTED THE NEXT DISCUSSION TO BE DURING THE BAKER/LEVY MEETING AT UNGA.

ACLAND

YYYY

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MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
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RESIDENT CLERK

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PAGE 3
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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

1. Overnight Telegrams
attached

2. Excellent press coverage
of your speech

3. The Resident will
telephone at 12:30 —
I am preparing a
short agenda.

4. Last night's flight
brought in some 300

women + children.

Next one due
Saturday / Sunday
night.

5. UN Sec-General reported

absolutely no progress
in his talks with



Tariq ALIL.

6. UN functions

Committee still stuck on
foodstuffs.

C.D.P.
7/9

A The National Archives

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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES <p style="text-align: center;">PRM 19</p> PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number) | Date and sign |
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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State
Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON SW1H 0ET

September 1990

*Dear Peter***IRAQ AND KUWAIT SANCTIONS: INSURANCE**

I am replying to your letter of 6 September in the Chancellor's absence abroad.

Your letter proposes that a change should be made to the permissions issued by the Bank of England under the Treasury Direction. This would prohibit payments into blocked Iraqi and Kuwaiti accounts in the UK, in respect of claims made under insurance contracts issued in the London market where the insured is Kuwaiti or Iraqi, except with your agreement. I agree that payments under some of these contracts could be highly embarrassing, especially when we already have the legal power necessary to stop them, and when members of the ABI and Lloyd's have told you that they would welcome use of this power. I therefore agree that we should move ahead quickly on this.

Our officials have been in touch. It has been agreed that, as this is essentially an insurance matter, the DTI should issue a press notice announcing the prohibition to the insurance market and the public at large, and directing requests for (exceptional) permissions to the DTI. For its part, the Bank of England has agreed to issue Supplements to its Notices issued so far under the Kuwaiti and Iraqi Treasury Directions, to bring its guidance into line with your notice. DTI, Treasury and Bank of England officials will need to cross-clear the final texts of the relevant notices.

I take it that primary legislation permanently to cancel payments under some of the contracts remains a possibility, and note that you await a response from the insurance market to your suggestion that you might request them to cancel existing contracts with Iraqis, and to refrain from negotiating new business.

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A copy of this letter goes to the recipients of yours and to the Governor of the Bank of England.

Yours Ever

John

JOHN MAPLES

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1990

YEMEN/SAUDI BORDER

Prince Bandar is passing through London early next week. I shall see him, and it is likely the Prime Minister will too. He has been pressing me for the papers which the Saudis are seeking on the Yemen/Saudi border. Can I give him any comfort, such as a target date?

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PART 27 **ends:-**

Arta Kunderi Jambaku (T207/90)
6.9.90

PART 28. **begins:-**
