

Part 31

CAB ONE

TOP SECRET

Confidential Filing

Situation in the Middle East
Conflict between Iraq / Kuwait /
Saudi Arabia et al
UK Policy towards the conflict

MIDDLE EAST

Part 1: May 1979

Part 31: 9 October 1990

CAB ONE

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
15.10.90							
19.10.90							
21.10.90							
Part ends							

PREM 19/3084

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a meeting of Ministers tomorrow morning to discuss developments in the Gulf. Mr. Waldegrave will represent the Foreign Secretary.

The following are points which you will wish to cover.

DIPLOMATIC

- Mr. Heath's Mission. This will inevitably be the main news. It is clear that he was secured the release of some hostages, but we do not - at the time of writing - know how many (though there are reports that most of the 53 on his list will be allowed to go). Saddam Hussain appears to have given no indication of willingness to withdraw. We are this evening taking the line that we welcome the release of any British citizens, and are pleased for their families; but they should never have been taken hostage in the first place. The meeting will wish to consider whether this is adequate or needs elaboration.

- situation at the UN. The next draft resolution on Iraq/Kuwait (dealing with compensation and accountability) has now been agreed by the five Permanent Members and will be further discussed early this week. Unfortunately it is getting entangled with discussion on the Palestinian issue. It is agreed there will be a meeting of the five Permanent Members at Vice-Chief of Defence staff level once the resolution is through.

Our attempt to deal with the Secretary-General's decision to abandon his mission to Israel by means of a Presidential statement has run into trouble, with the non-aligned seeking a resolution. There will be further discussion in New York on Monday.

Meanwhile there is no reply as yet to your message to Mr. Shamir:
the Israeli Cabinet meets today, so we may get some response
tomorrow.

- Embassies in Kuwait. Your message to the President persuaded the Americans not to insist on inserting an additional clause in the resolution on compensation. But General Scowcroft has indicated that they remain very concerned about how to handle closure of their Embassy and look to us for some alternative suggestions What can we suggest?
- Mr. Primakov's visit. You will wish to give your impressions of this. My note is in the folder.
- Aid for Jordan etc. The Foreign Secretary will raise the need for early disbursement of aid for Jordan, Egypt and Turkey at tomorrow's Foreign Affairs Council.
- Article ⁵¹~~56~~ letter. You told the President that you intended to agree a text with the Amir and then leave it on one side until needed. The President raised no objection.
- UN Secretary-General's good offices. President Bush has indicated that the US might encourage the UN Secretary-General to use his good offices to try to find a political solution for a period of 30-45 days. You tried to discourage this on the grounds that diplomacy has been given a chance already. But it seems inherently likely that Secretary Baker will want to pursue it.
- Advice for British Communities at risk from hostilities in the Gulf. The FCO and MOD were charged with further work on this. I doubt it will be ready by tomorrow. But I have put a copy of the paper in the folder in case.
- Arab opinion. There are worrying indications in the intelligence that opinion in countries like Saudi Arabia is beginning to weaken. The Saudi Government are likely to

press increasingly for early military action.

MILITARY

- 7 Armoured Brigade's tanks have started to arrive, with good publicity.
- interceptions. There are reports on BBC tonight that an American war ship fired across the bows of an Iraqi tanker: but no further news.
- UK/US consultations. CDS will see General Colin Powell this week. Sir Percy Cradock is in Washington on Monday and Tuesday and will see a number of intelligence contacts as well as General Scowcroft.

OIL

- Oil prices fell significantly last week.

C. D. POWELL

21 October 1990

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MY TELNO 1903: MR HEATH'S PRESS CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

1. MR HEATH SAYS THAT HE RECEIVED AN ASSURANCE FROM SADDAM THAT A NUMBER OF DETAINEES WOULD BE RELEASED. NO INDICATIONS OF A CHANGE IN SADDAM'S POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

DETAIL

2. THE BRITISH MEDIA WILL NO DOUBT REPORT EXHAUSTIVELY THE PRESS CONFERENCE MR HEATH GAVE THIS AFTERNOON AFTER HIS MEETING WITH SADDAM. 2 SEC WAS PRESENT AND THE FOLLOWING ARE WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS.

3. MR HEATH SAID THAT HE HAD MET SADDAM FOR THREE HOURS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT. MR HEATH SAID HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION NOT ONLY OF BRITONS BUT ALSO CERTAIN OTHER NATIONALS TRAPPED IN IRAQ. HE HAD HANDED OVER ALL HIS LISTS OF DETAINEES AND ADDED THAT DISCUSSIONS WERE CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE TO DECIDE WHO MIGHT BE RELEASED. MR HEATH GAVE NO INDICATION OF NUMBERS INVOLVED NOR COULD HE GIVE DETAILS OF EITHER THE NAMES OR THE CATEGORIES UNDER CONSIDERATION, HOWEVER, HE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE UK ON THE MORNING OF 23 OCTOBER AND HAD RECEIVED AN ASSURANCE FROM SADDAM THAT SOME DETAINEES WOULD TRAVEL WITH HIM .

4. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS MR HEATH SAID THAT SADDAM HAD ASKED FOR NOTHING IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. MR HEATH SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN GROUPS OF QUOTE GUESTS UNQUOTE WHO OUGHT TO RETURN TO THE UK AND THAT THEIR CONTINUED DETENTION CREATED ILL FEELING AMONGST THE BRITISH PUBLIC. SADDAM HAD BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO THIS ARGUMENT AND HAD INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE FURTHER GESTURES IN THE FUTURE.

5. MR HEATH SAID THAT IN THEIR DISCUSSION ON A SOLUTION TO THE GULF

CRISIS, SADDAM HAD DISPLACED VERY DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. HE RECOGNISED THAT MR HEATH HELD NO POLITICAL OFFICE AND REPRESENTED NOONE BUT HIMSELF. SADDAM HAD EXPLAINED HIS POSITION ON THE GULF CRISIS AND HAD CLEARLY INDICATED THAT HE RECOGNISED THE DANGERS OF WAR AND THE DISASTROUS EFFECT THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE ON THE REGION AND ON THE WORLD ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING ANY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. SADDAM HAD INDICATED NO CHANGES IN HIS POSITION BUT HAD PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A STABLE ORDER IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE. HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH ARAB STATES WHAT THIS ORDER SHOULD BE AND HAD RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN BRINGING ABOUT A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ ISRAEL DISPUTE. SADDAM HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY LINKED THIS WITH THE CRISIS IN THE GULF.

6. FOR HIS PART, MR HEATH SAID THAT HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, A POSITION ALSO ADOPTED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. HE HAD ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 660. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, MR HEATH ADMITTED HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN KUWAIT WITH SADDAM, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD DONE SO THE PREVIOUS EVENING DURING HIS MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ. IN CONCLUSION, MR HEATH SAID THAT HE HOPED NOW THAT HE HAD ACHIEVED EVERYTHING HE HAD SET OUT TO DO DURING HIS VISIT: HE DID NOT ENVISAGE A FURTHER MEETING WITH SADDAM.

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OUR TELECON HMA/GORE-BOOTH OF 18 OCTOBER: PROPOSED MEETING WITH
KING FAHD: PRESENT SAUDI THINKING

SUMMARY

1. KING FAHD TO DISCUSS TIMING FACTORS WITH US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF. ASSISTANT DEFENCE MINISTERS GIVES A RATIONALE FOR GROWING SAUDI IMPATIENCE. RISK OF DIMINISHING APPETITE FOR A FIGHT, AND CONCERN THAT TIME TURNING AGAINST ALLIANCE.

DETAIL

2. KING FAHD'S SECRETARY HAS NOW CONFIRMED THE KING WOULD LIKE TO SEE US AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF IN NEXT FEW DAYS TO GIVE US PRESENT THINKING OF HIMSELF AND HIS SENIOR BROTHERS ON OUTLOOK AND TIMING FACTORS. MOHAMED SULIMAN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT PRINCE SULTAN'S GROWING CONCERN AT EROSION EFFECT OF LETTING PRESENT MILITARY STAND OFF DRAG ON WAS SHARED BY KING FAHD (SEE ACCOUNT OF MY TALK ON 14 OCTOBER WITH SULTAN IN MY TELS NOS 1039 AND 1040). SULIMAN STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT (NOT) YET SAUDI POLICY TO GO FOR AN ULTIMATUM OR SET A FIRM TIME LIMIT BEFORE ADOPTION OF MILITARY OPTION. BUT THESE IDEAS WERE BEING EXPLORED. I AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT WE HAD A CLEAR IDEA OF THE KING'S OWN THINKING. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN PREPARING FOR THE VISIT THE DEFENCE SECRETARY MIGHT MAKE AT SULTAN'S INVITATION IN 3 WEEKS TIME.

3. WE KNOW FROM SULTAN THAT FOR THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP THE FUSE IS SHORTENING. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY PRINCE FAHD ABUDLLAH (ASSISTANT DEFENCE MINISTER) WHO DINED WITH HDES AND MYSELF IN JEDDA ON 17 OCTOBER. FAHD ABDULLAH, ONE OF THE MORE THOUGHTFUL OF THOSE HANDLING MILITARY POLICY, STRESSED THE FOLLOWING

CONSIDERATIONS AS MILITATING AGAINST WAITING MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS LONGER:

- A) US AND BRITISH TROOPS COULD NOT BE KEPT KEYED UP INDEFINITELY, ESPECIALLY IN THE HARD SAUDI ENVIRONMENT (HE DISCOUNTED THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION AS NON PLAYERS):
- B) THE SAME WENT FOR SAUDI FORCES IN THE FRONT LINE, AND THE OTHER ARAB TROOPS. FAHD MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL, AT LEAST PRESENTATIONALLY, FOR SAUDI, KUWAITI AND OTHER ISLAMIC FORCES TO BE SEEN IN THE VANGUARD OF ANY LAND FORCES ENGAGEMENT, DESPITE THE LOSSES THEY MIGHT TAKE. THAT WAS WHY THE SAUDIS ETC NOW FORMED THE INFANTRY SCREEN IN FRONT OF THE AMERICANS (AND OURSELVES) IN THE NE BORDER SECTION. IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO ENGINEER OR PROVOKE A CASUS BELLI.
- C) SADDAM HAD TO BE TOPPLED, OR AT LEAST NEUTRALISED AND HIS ARSENAL DISMANTLED. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS COULD PLAY TO HIS ADVANTAGE AS THE ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL FRONT UNWOUND. FAHD ARGUED IT WOULD ALSO PRESENT MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR PROTECTING KUWAIT. MILITARY ACTION WAS MOST LIKELY TO ENSURE THE KNOCK WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE SADDAM'S OVERTHROW. SADDAM MIGHT NOW TRY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WOULD ALSO ERODE INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE.
- D) THE CONFLICT WOULD BE BRIEF. LOW MORALE AMONG IRAQI TROOPS, ESPECIALLY IN KUWAIT: VULNERABILITY TO AIR ATTACK INSIDE IRAQ (WHICH HE SAW AS ESSENTIAL) ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY POINTS: AND RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT THE RGC BACK INTO KUWAIT WOULD COMBINE TO PRODUCE A QUICK KILL. (FAHD ABDULLAH SOUNDED OVER SANGUINE HERE, AS I SUSPECT THE KING AND SULTAN MAY BE)
- E) IT WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS NECESSARY TO HAVE FORMAL UNSC AUTHORITY FOR AN OFFENSIVE (IE NO BLUE FLAG). IT SHOULD AT LEAST BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ACQUIESCENCE AMONG ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS, (THIS MARKS A SHIFT FROM THE PREFERENCE FOR ARTICLE 42 ACTION WHICH FAHD ABDULLAH PUT TO ME 6 WEEKS AGO, AND WHICH WE HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM KING FAHD).
- F) SANCTIONS WERE NOT GOING TO PRODUCE RESULTS SOON ENOUGH TO OFFSET THE PRESSURES ON ALLIED RESOLVE.
- G) COMMITMENT WITHIN THE ARAB COMMUNITY COULD BE INCREASINGLY SAPPED BY EVENTS ON PALESTINIAN FRONT. FAHD ABDULLAH DID NOT

HOWEVER APPEAR TO SEE THIS AS A PROBLEM FOR SAUDI MORALE (THOUGH OTHERS HERE DO, BY PROVOKING ANTIPATHY TOWARDS THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES HERE, AND BY EXTENSION TO OURSELVES AND OTHER NON-MUSLIMS). INDEED, HE WENT SO FAR AS TO INDICATE THAT ISRAELI INTERVENTION COULD EVEN BE AN ASSET TO SAUDI ARABIA: ISRAELI CONTROL OF NORTHERN JORDAN, WITH THE SOUTHERN TRIBES THROWING IN THEIR LOT WITH SAUDI ARABIA, COULD BE PREFERABLE TO A PALESTINIAN JORDAN OF WHICH KING HUSSEIN HAD NOW LOST CONTROL (PRINCE TURKI AL FAISAL HAS ALSO COME OUT WITH THIS LINE: SUPERFICIAL YET REFLECTING GROWING FRUSTRATION OVER KING HUSSEIN).

4. THESE ARGUMENTS, SHARED NO DOUBT BY THE LEADING AL SAUD, HELP TO EXPLAIN THE FRESH SENSE OF IMPATIENCE HERE. I HAVE A FEELING THAT ON THIS ISSUE THE AL SAUD AND THEIR CLOSE ADVISERS MAY NOT BE FULLY IN STEP WITH WIDER PUBLIC SENTIMENT, WHERE WE ARE DETECTING A LOSS OF STOMACH FOR A FIGHT, WITH SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE COSTS AND TALK OF NEGOTIATION. BUT PERHAPS THE LEADERSHIP SENSE THIS MOOD TOO, WHICH ADDS TO THEIR SENSE OF URGENCY.

5. THE QUESTION OF A TIME LIMIT, WHETHER EXPLICIT OR, BETTER, PRIVATELY AGREED, IS NOW IN THE FRONT OF SAUDI THINKING. IN THEIR IMPATIENCE UNSC ASPECTS MAY BE STARTING TO BE DISCOUNTED. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO MOVE IN CONCERT WITH THE AMERICANS IN THESE NEXT STAGES, AND FOR THE KING TO PERCEIVE THIS. WE MUST ALSO KEEP THE SAUDIS IN THE PICTURE OVER OUR NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS. WHILE FAHD ABDULLAH DID NOT SUGGEST ANY SPECIFIC TIME LIMITS, SOME OF HIS ARGUMENTS DO HAVE A LOCAL VALIDITY.

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FCO TELNO 717 AND TELCON PLUMBLY/YOUNG, EMERGENCY UNIT:
EASTERN PROVINCE: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. THE FOLLOWING WAS DRAFTED BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR (FOR WHICH I AM MOST GRATEFUL). IT HAS BEEN AMENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT TEL. I WOULD STILL BE GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY SIGHT OF THE NEW ADVICE WE ARE CONSIDERING GIVING BRITISH CITIZENS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE, ONCE YOU HAVE A FORM OF WORDS, AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT. BUT AT THE RISK OF REITERATING THE OBVIOUS, A NUMBER OF POINTS SEEM TO ME IMPORTANT:

A) WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SENSATIONALIST COMMENT ON THE PART OF THE LARGE BRITISH PRESS CORPS HERE, NOR CAUSE FEAR AMONG OUR COMMUNITY THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR ADVICE AMOUNTS TO A REITERATION OF THAT GIVEN FOR THE EP SINCE THE OUTSET AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REACTION TO HEIGHTENED DANGER. WE HAVE ALREADY TRIED TO THIN DOWN DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIALS IN THE EP:

B) THIS IS NOT (NOT) A SITUATION FOR USE OF THE BBC WORLD SERVICE. WE CAN GET MESSAGE OUT THROUGH COMPANIES AND WARDENS, AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 5 OF TUR (GIVEN LOCAL WEEKEND, AND NEED TO FOREWARN SAUDIS, THE TIME TO SET UP MEETINGS - ASSUMING ACTION IS APPROVED - WILL PROBABLY BE AROUND 30/31 OCT):

C) WE MUST GIVE ADVANCE WARNING AND EXPLANATION TO SAUDIS, PROBABLY VIA MFA: ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO THEY CALLED IN AMBASSADORS AND ASKED THAT WE DROP NEGATIVE ADVICE TO TRAVELLERS AND RESIDENTS ON GROUNDS THAT IMMEDIATE DANGER WAS PAST: THEY WILL RIGHTLY FEAR IMPACT OF A FRESH WARNING TO THIN OUT ON VITAL SERVICES, OIL INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE, AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY THAT ACTION BY US COULD START EXODUS BY SAUDI POPULATION IN EP WHO ARE ALREADY ON TENTERHOOKS:

D) ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN WORDING BETWEEN CONSULAR ADVICE GIVEN BY OURSELVES AND OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES, GENERAL IMPRESSION IN FOREIGN COMMUNITIES IS THAT WE ARE NOW PRETTY MUCH AT ONE (INCLUDING THE MOST IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF NUMBERS, OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS) IE WE DISCOURAGE DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIALS IN EP, BUT ADVISE OTHERS IN KINGDOM TO CARRY ON AS NORMAL. US ADVICE IS A SHADE OPAQUE, AND HAS CAUSED THEM PROBLEMS WITH PUZZLED CITIZENS. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN STANDARDISE WITH AMERICANS AND EC IT INCREASES CREDIBILITY OF ADVICE WITH COMMUNITY AND HELPS PRESENTATIONALLY WITH SAUDIS. IN THIS CONTEXT I WELCOME PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER CLOSE DISCUSSION IN TWELVE, AND ALSO IN PARTICULAR CLOSE CONTACT WITH AMERICANS (WHO HAVE PROMISED TO KEEP US IN PICTURE ON ANY MOVES IN RELATION

TO THEIR OWN CITIZENS):

B

EP NOTWITHSTANDING MINISTRY OF INFORMATION PRESSURES, THERE ARE STILL UPWARDS OF THIRTY UK JOURNALISTS AND TV CREW IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE AND TIME LIES HEAVY ON THEIR HANDS. THEY WILL SUBJECT ANY CHANGE TO INTENSE SCRUTINY, IN PARTICULAR ATTEMPTING TO ANALYSE IMPLICATIONS VIS A VIS ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI THREAT/POSSIBILITY OF ALLIED ATTACK.

2. WITHOUT KNOWING PRECISELY LANGUAGE PROPOSED FOR NEW ADVICE, OUR ABILITY TO ADVISE ON PRESENTATION IS LIMITED. FROM LOCAL POINT OF VIEW I HOPE WE CAN INCLUDE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A) WE ARE REAFFIRMING EARLIER ADVICE ON DEPENDENTS, SINCE THERE HAS BEEN SOME DRIFT BACK TO EP THOUGH TENSION HAS NOT DIMINISHED. WE HAVE ALREADY SOUGHT TO THIN OUT COMMUNITY IN EP:

B) OUR ADVICE IS IN LINE WITH AMERICANS/OTHERS (EC):

C) ACTION TAKEN IS A SENSIBLE PRECAUTION: IT DOES NOT REFLECT NEW INFORMATION SUGGESTING IMMINENT IRAQI ATTACK, NOR DOES IT IMPLY ALLIES ARE ABOUT TO START HOSTILITIES.

3. IN LINE WITH DISCRETION GIVEN, TWO DS FAMILIES HAVE RETURNED TO EP FOR MORALE (AND EFFICIENCY: ONE OF WIVES IS KEY MEMBER OF LE CONSULAR STAFF) REASONS. I AM VERY RELUCTANT TO GO BACK ON THIS. BUT CREDIBILITY OF ANY THINNING OUT MESSAGE WOULD BE WEAKENED IF LLOYD FAMILY IN PARTICULAR STAYED, SINCE THEY HAVE SMALL CHILDREN.

4. LINE ON RIYADH (YOUR PARA 8) IS ACCEPTED BUT EVEN IF WE CHANGE ADVICE ON DEPENDENTS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE LARGE COMMUNITY IN EP. I AM GLAD THAT NEW THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO CW, TO EVACUATION OPTIONS IN EVENT THAT WE HAVE A WARNING OF HOSTILITIES, AND TO ADVICE TO BE GIVEN IN EVENT OF OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITHOUT WARNING. I DO NOT (NOT) THINK WE HERE ARE REALLY IN A POSITION TO ADVISE FURTHER AS BETWEEN THE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES - DRIVING WEST, OR STAYING PUT INDOORS. THIS COULD AMOUNT TO A ONE SHOT AFFAIR, IN WHICH CASE LATTER MIGHT BE BETTER (AND ROADS COULD ANYWAY BE CLOSED OR CLOGGED WITH REFUGEES). BUT WE REALLY NEED EXPERT GUIDANCE, INCLUDING FROM MOD.

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MR GOULDEN 1

MR GORE-BOOTH 1

MR BROOMFIELD 1

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HD/UND 1

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Subject cc RASTEN

20 October 1990

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. YEVGENY PRIMAKOV.

The Prime Minister had a talk at Chequers this afternoon, lasting some one and three quarter hours, with Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, who came as a Special Emissary from President Gorbachev to discuss the Gulf crisis. Mr. Primakov was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Markariam (Adviser), and Mr. Shilov (Interpreter).

Mr. Primakov said that he had been instructed by President Gorbachev to brief the Prime Minister fully on his meetings in Baghdad. By way of background, he had known Saddam Hussain and Tariq Aziz for some twenty years and was able to speak frankly to them. The immediate purpose of his visit was to try to resolve the issue of Soviet citizens in Iraq. But he had also, of course, devoted a great deal of time to Kuwait. He had remained entirely loyal to the position set out in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. He had insisted on Iraq's total and complete withdrawal from Kuwait and a return to the pre-2 August position. He had explained to Saddam Hussain that the Kuwait crisis was a laboratory for testing the new world order; and no country would let Iraq get away with its aggression.

Primakov continued that it was obvious that Saddam Hussain was afraid of a military strike against Iraq and wanted to avoid it. But paradoxically he was not prepared to withdraw because of the military threat. One had to take account of his mentality. He had developed a sort of messianic self-esteem, and seemed to believe that almost supernatural powers were vested in him. But he was not crazy. Primakov had left Saddam Hussain in no doubt that military confrontation was inevitable if he did not withdraw, and it would be very different from the war with Iran. Then he had enjoyed superiority: this time his opponents would. Then he had some international support: this time he would have none (although we should not underestimate the support he did actually have among the Arab masses).

Primakov said it was clear that Saddam Hussain's advisers were too afraid of him to give him the true picture. He seemed to have a sort of Masada complex like the Israelis. He was

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convinced that the Americans and the Israelis had been out to get rid of him even before 2 August, because they thought Iraq was getting too powerful. He had even presented Primakov with a tape alleged to be of a telephone conversation between King Fahd and the Amir of Qatar discussing plans for his assassination. He was convinced that the Americans and Israelis were out to finish him whether he withdrew from Kuwait or not. Primakov's impression was that Saddam Hussain would not leave under the barrel of a gun. His room for manoeuvre had narrowed drastically when he gave up all the fruits of the war with Iran. He did not seem to fear death, but talked calmly of devastating several countries when the conflict came. The truth was he could do a lot of harm. Primakov concluded that, faced with the dilemma of withdraw or be attacked, Saddam Hussain would not withdraw.

Primakov continued that he had tried to find out whether there was anything which might induce Saddam Hussain to withdraw. Had his 12 August speech saying he would withdraw in return for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem been serious? It had been very difficult to get any sort of clear picture. But he had come away with the impression that, if we could establish some "flexible linkage" with the Arab-Israeli problem, this might help Saddam Hussain save face. There could be no question, of course, of a direct linkage. But there might just be some scope for manoeuvre here. It was significant that Tariq Aziz had told him privately that he was very unhappy with the trend of Iraqi policy, and was clearly ready to work for a solution.

Primakov said that the conclusion he drew was that we should continue to keep the military threat hanging over Saddam Hussain's head. There must be no backing down on this. We should also continue with sanctions, indeed strengthen them. But it was necessary to add a political ingredient: not something which Saddam Hussain could present as a gain, but a gesture which would allow him to withdraw, while enabling each side to give its own interpretation of the circumstances of withdrawal. In effect we would be putting Saddam Hussain in a position to say he was withdrawing in the interest of the Arab nation. Thereafter, and only thereafter, the international community could propose the start of a process of settling the Arab-Israeli problem. He acknowledged that there was a very thin line here. We could not offer a package deal. But President Bush had said that resolution of the Gulf conflict should be an impulse towards resolution of other conflicts, and it was on this that he was trying to build.

The Prime Minister said it was perfectly absurd of Saddam Hussain to suggest that he had been under threat or under pressure. He had started two wars, caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, attacked his fellow Muslims, used chemical weapons on his own people, developed biological weapons, sought to obtain nuclear weapons, and wasted Iraq's oil wealth on attempted conquest. He was the last person to have anything to complain about. He was a dictator pure and simple. He was only popular with the Arab masses because he had built up a big army in order eventually to attack Israel. The first task was to know your enemy: not to listen to what he said, but to look at what he had done.

The Prime Minister continued that it would be absolutely wrong to make deals with a man like that. There was no room at all to negotiate with him. The only thing which would persuade him to leave Kuwait was the total and indisputable knowledge that he would lose. Even if he did withdraw without a conflict, we would still have to deal with the problem of his chemical and biological weapons, and incipient nuclear capability. That would mean keeping on sanctions and building a regional security system to isolate him. But there should be no doubt that, if necessary, we would use the military option. The choice was Saddam Husain's: he could avoid it by withdrawing immediately. The Prime Minister added that we all had a duty to return with renewed strength to try to resolve the Arab-Israel problem. But that duty existed independent of Saddam Hussain's invasion of Kuwait: indeed Iraq's action had set it back.


Mr. Primakov said he agreed with much of what the Prime Minister said. The question was how to get Saddam Hussain to withdraw without paying an exorbitant price. The Prime Minister said that we should pay no price at all. Mr. Primakov assumed the Prime Minister agreed it would be better to avoid military action if possible. He had talked to Prince Bandar in Washington, who had told him that the Saudis appreciated Soviet pressure on Saddam Hussain to withdraw without a war. The Prime Minister said with emphasis that it was not for us to save Saddam Hussain's face. Mr. Primakov said that, if we decided that the military option was the only way to get him out of Kuwait, that was that. But surely it was worth trying to see if there was something which could be discussed. He was not proposing we should give Saddam Hussain anything. It was just a question of manoeuvring. What did the Prime Minister think the next step might be? The Prime Minister said she saw no need for us to initiate any action, only to continue to tighten the noose. Ambassador Zamyatin intervened to say that the Soviet mission had been to find out how to persuade Saddam Hussain to withdraw. The Prime Minister said that her point was clearly not getting across. We must not appease Saddam Hussain. We must not pay a price. And we must not offer him blandishments. He must withdraw or military action would follow. Mr. Primakov agreed that we must not award him anything: he was only suggesting that we try some political skills. If we failed, we would at least be able to show that we had tried. The Prime Minister said that we had tried for 11 weeks. Either he heeded us or we would use the military option. Mr. Primakov asked how much time Saddam Hussain had before the military option was used. The Prime Minister said the element of surprise would be crucial. What mattered was to leave Saddam Hussain in no doubt that he faced total military defeat unless he withdrew very soon. We should not do or say anything which implied there was a third way.

We subsequently had some discussion of the political situation in the Soviet Union. Mr. Primakov described it as indeed very serious and predicted a hard winter. But he was completely confident that Mr. Gorbachev would get through: he was a very strong man. He seemed about to repeat President Gorbachev's request for a soft loan, but the Prime Minister saw it coming and did not give him an opportunity to get the words

out.

Incidentally, Chequers is clearly regarded as a place of pilgrimage for Mr. Gorbachev's admirers, following his visit in 1984. Mr. Primakov looked round reverently and commented: "this is where it all began".

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TELNO 1841 (NOT TO ALL): PRIMAKOV'S TOUR: MEETING WITH THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

SUMMARY

1. Primakov repeats his suggestions for a face-saving gesture to Saddam Hussain, though in a somewhat watered-down form. Stresses the Russians are not backsliding but want to avoid a war. I tell him it is not on.

DETAIL

2. The Soviet Embassy arranged for Primakov, Gorbachev's Special Envoy on the Gulf, to pass through London en route to Moscow after his talks in Washington, Paris and Rome. He had an hour's discussion with me on 20 October and will be calling on the Prime Minister at Chequers later in the day.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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IMMEDIATE

21 3. Primakov began by emphasising that there had been no retreat
3 from the Soviet position on the Gulf crisis. Saddam Hussain must
4 withdraw from Kuwait. The status quo ante 2 August must be
5 restored. Any speculation that the Russians were engaging in
6 talks behind the backs of their partners was false. But it was
7 clear to him as a result of his talks in Baghdad that Saddam
8 Hussain would be prepared to face a war (which he knew he could
9 win) rather than withdraw from Kuwait under the barrel of a
10 gun. He had a fortress mentality (a quote Massada complex
11 quote) and claimed that the West and the Gulf states had been
12 working for ways to bring him down well before the invasion. He
13 had argued that Iraqi military and public opinion would not allow
14 him to withdraw empty-handed. In Primakov's view, if a peaceful
15 solution to the crisis were to be found, it would be necessary to
16 give him some way of saving face, particularly as sanctions
17 seemed unlikely of themselves to have the desired effect.
18

19 4. Primakov said the Russians appreciated that Saddam could
20 not be rewarded for his aggression. They quite appreciated
21 Western concern that any face-saving measures might be construed
22 as such a reward. But one way forward might be to flesh out the
23 correlation (not direct linkage) between a solution to the Gulf
24 crisis and the problems of the Middle East generally. He
25 suggested that some way should be found to tell Saddam in private
26 and in advance that after he had withdrawn unconditionally,
27 started negotiations with the legitimate government of Kuwait,
28 and released all foreign hostages, discussions would start on
29 other Middle East issues. The discussions could be set in hand
30 by means of a call by the US, EC and the Soviet Union shortly
31 after the withdrawal for an international conference.
32

33 5. Primakov argued that in the meantime sanctions and the
34 threat of military action should be maintained, and perhaps

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Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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IMMEDIATE

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2 intensified. But Arab support for Saddam was on the increase and
3 time was not on the side of the Allies. The offer of a
4 face-saving gesture would not be without risk but there could be
5 benefits too. If it succeeded we would be able to beat Saddam at
6 his own game by arguing that a solution to the Palestinian
7 problem depended on withdrawal and continuing good behaviour from
8 Iraqis. Saddam could not be allowed to consolidate his
9 position. A mechanism would have to be established which would
10 allow him to be kept under control if he survived as a political
11 figure.

12

13 6. I said that the pressures currently being applied on Saddam
14 fell into three categories: diplomatic isolation, sanctions, and
15 the knowledge in Saddam's mind that unless he withdrew peacefully
16 force should be used against him. We could not be sure they
17 would work but it was important that all these elements,
18 particularly the latter, should be maintained. Saddam would need
19 some ammunition to use with his own people and it was most
20 unlikely that any face-saving gesture could be kept private. It
21 would be unsafe - and very much resented by the Arab members of
22 the coalition against him - to give him any grounds to argue that
23 the invasion had been a success, if not for Iraq itself then, in
24 saving the Palestinians. I questioned Primakov's assertion that
25 Arab support for the alliance was on the wane.

26

27 7. Primakov said these problems should be manageable. The
28 Allies could argue that the Iraqi withdrawal was a success for
29 sanctions and the deployment of the multi-national force. There
30 was a growing tendency in the Arab world to see Saddam as the
31 leader who had had the courage to throw down the gauntlet to the
32 super powers. His support would be strengthened if hostilities
33 took place. He did not think a quick victory was possible: the
34 difficulties would be compounded if Western troops remained in

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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IMMEDIATE

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 2 Saudi Arabia until the Hajj. If Turkey and Israel became
 3 involved, Arab support for Saddam would grow more quickly. If a
 4 decision had already been taken on military action, there was no
 5 sense in talking about additional measures. But if not, there
 6 was room for further action while the military build-up
 7 continued. He acknowledged ~~however~~ that my arguments had
 8 validity and repeated the Soviet Union's interest in preventing a
 9 deterioration of the crisis. But he stressed that time was not on
 10 our side. Attitudes towards Saddam were changing and even in
 11 Europe were far from united (this may have been a result of the
 12 less robust line that may have been taken with him by the
 13 Italians and the French).
 14

15 8. News Department are telling the press that Primakov took the
 16 opportunity to give an account of his meeting with Saddam Hussain
 17 and his talks in Rome, Paris and Washington and reaffirmed the
 18 Soviet commitment to the implementation of Security Resolutions
 19 on the Gulf. They are refusing to be drawn further pending the
 20 outcome of his meeting with the Prime Minister.
 21

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MY TELNO 2157 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : NEW REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION DO NOT ENVISAGE ANY SINGLE SECURITY STRUCTURE, BUT RATHER A WEB OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON THE STATES OF THE REGION AND INVOLVING OUTSIDE POWERS. THEY EXPECT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, AS WELL AS MILITARY, CONCERNS TO BE ADDRESSED, AND RECOGNISE THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELI DIMENSION.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING THE FALSE START OF BAKER'S SUGGESTION, IN HIS CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF 4 SEPTEMBER, THAT THERE MIGHT BE A NEW REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE ANALOGOUS TO NATO (MY TELNO 2145), POLICY PLANNING STAFF IN STATE DEPARTMENT WERE ASKED TO LOOK AT POSSIBLE POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GULF REGION. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ROSS (DIRECTOR POLICY PLANNING) AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS ABOUT THIS.

3. STATE ADMIT THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO GO INTO DETAIL, BUT HAVE REACHED SOME BROAD TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS. FIRSTLY, THEY THINK THAT POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE BASED AROUND THE STATES OF THE REGION AND CANNOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE. BUT, SECONDLY, THEY BELIEVE THAT OUTSIDE POWERS HAVE INTERESTS TO DEFEND AND A CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS, AND WOULD THUS NEED TO BE PLAYERS. THIRDLY THEY DO NOT THINK THAT ANY SINGLE ORGANISING CONCEPT WILL DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH THE PROBLEMS LIKELY TO BE FACED, OR THE RANGE OF COUNTRIES WITH A LEGITIMATE INTEREST. WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND IS A QUOTE BUILDING BLOCK APPROACH UNQUOTE, IN WHICH A WEB OF COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIPS, PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS ARE STRENGTHENED OR CREATED. FOURTHLY, THEY ENVISAGE THESE BUILDING BLOCKS AS ADDRESSING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

ASPIRATIONS AS WELL AS THE MILITARY DIMENSION.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GONE MUCH BEYOND THESE BROAD PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE CLEARLY WRESTLING WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THROWN UP BY THESE PRINCIPLES. ROSS TOLD THE MINISTER ON 17 OCTOBER THAT, IN HIS VIEW, WE HAD TO RECOGNISE THAT SOME OF THE REGIMES IN THE REGION WERE ANACHRONISTIC. THEY HAD TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF BROADENING THEIR POLITICAL BASES. THE KUWAITIS WERE SHOWING THE WAY IN THIS REGARD. EQUALLY, ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, ROSS THOUGHT THAT A MORE SYSTEMATIC WAY HAD TO BE FOUND FOR THE QUOTE HAVES UNQUOTE OF THE REGION TO FUND THE QUOTE HAVE NOTS UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE AREA AS A WHOLE. ROSS ALSO FELT THAT ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO REDUCE REGIONAL TENSIONS WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELI COMPLICATION. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A ROLE FOR CBMS IN THIS CONTEXT. HE RECONGISED THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT ARAB PARTICIPANTS SAW ISRAEL, JUST AS MUCH AS IRAQ, AS A SOURCE OF HOSTILITY. THIS WAS AN ADDED REASON FOR PROGRESS OVER THE ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUE.

5. AS REGARDS THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF, THE ADMINISTRATION ENVISAGE A STAGED WITHDRAWAL GIVING TIME FOR REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BE PUT IN PLACE. THEY WOULD OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT BY SADDAM HUSSEIN TO LINK IRAQI AND US WITHDRAWALS. THEY CLEARLY EXPECT ALMOST ALL US GROUND TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PENINSULA, BUT ARE WORKING ON IDEAS FOR MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THEY WOULD EXPECT TO MAINTAIN THEIR NAVAL PRESENCE WHICH, AS BAKER AND OTHERS HAVE POINTED OUT, HAS BEEN A FIXTURE SINCE 1949. THEY ALSO SEEM TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF SIGNIFICANT PRE-POSITIONING, AND BELIEVE THAT THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITH VERY FEW US PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND, PERHAPS BY MAKING MORE USE OF DIEGO GARCIA. ROSS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AN AIR PRESENCE IN THE REGION, PERHAPS ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS THUS AVOIDING THE NEED FOR AN OVERT STATIONING COMMITMENT.

6. THERE CONTINUES TO BE SOME PUBLIC INTEREST IN POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE TO WITHDRAW WITH HIS MILITARY CAPABILITY INTACT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS DURING HIS TESTIMONY ON THE HILL THIS WEEK, SECRETARY BAKER SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE AN

INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ COVERING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AS WELL AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. MORE GENERALLY, HE SAID THAT REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE PRIMARILY THE CONCERN OF COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. BUT IF THOSE COUNTRIES CONCLUDED THAT ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION WAS REQUIRED, THEN THE US OUGHT AT LEAST TO BE WILLING TO CONSIDER PROVIDING IT.

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If there is no agenda in Moscow do not meeting - it is better not to have one. That is what we said at our Thursday meeting.

SIC
MY TELNO 1665: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT: MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE THAT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) MEMBERS SHOULD MEET AT HIGH LEVEL. DISCUSSION ON PARTICIPATION, TIMING AND PROCEDURE.

DETAIL

2. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET ON 19 OCTOBER, PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE COULD NOW CONFIRM HIS GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THE PASSING OF THE NEXT SECURITY RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

3. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING. PICKERING SAID THE U S REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE LT. GEN. CAIRNS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID THE FRENCH PARTICIPANT WAS LIKELY TO BE THE DEPUTY TO THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF (WE UNDERSTAND HE IS ADMIRAL COATANEA). LI (CHINA) CONFIRMED THAT HIS COUNTRY'S REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE THE MAJOR-GENERAL WHO HEADS CHINA'S DELEGATION TO THE MSC. I SAID I BELIEVED OUR REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE AROUND VCDS LEVEL.

4. ON THE TIMING OF THE MEETING, LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) CONFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S THINKING THAT THE MEETING WOULD COME A FEW DAYS AFTER THE PASSING OF THE NEXT SECURITY RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. THIS POINTED TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT WEEK, ALL BEING WELL. (COMMENT: GIVEN THE COUNCIL'S CONTINUING PREOCCUPATION WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THIS TIMING COULD SLIP.) THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE KEPT SMALL (PERHAPS TWO MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AND THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AS NOTE-TAKER). BLANC AND LI EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHES, AND PICKERING

AGREED: WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF THE IMPACT ON IRAQ WOULD BE THE NAMES AND TITLES OF THOSE ATTENDING.

5. IT WAS AGREED THAT POLITICAL COUNSELLORS WOULD MEET TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. THEIR FIRST TASK WOULD BE TO DRAFT THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH WOULD BE MADE IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING. THEY SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE FORMAT AND SCOPE OF THE MEETING, WHICH MIGHT BE DESCRIBED ON A SEPARATE, CONFIDENTIAL PIECE OF PAPER OR TAKE THE FORM OF A SIMPLE AGENDA. THEY WOULD ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT REPORT SHOULD GO FROM THE MEETING. PICKERING ARGUED THAT IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE MEETING TO REPORT IN SOME WAY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE REPORT NEED NOT BE AN ELABORATE ONE. HE WAS OPEN-MINDED ON WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SCR 665. LI INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR CHINA IF THERE WAS NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE MEETING AND THE PROVISIONS OF THAT RESOLUTION.

COMMENT

6. THE MEETING OF COUNSELLORS IS PROVISIONALLY FIXED FOR 221400Z. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS COVERING THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS:

(A) THE IDENTITY OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MEETING AND THE TIMING OF THEIR AVAILABILITY:

(B) THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MEETING (AN INITIAL U S DRAFT IS BEING FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT) AND THE PAPER/AGENDA OUTLINING THE SCOPE OF THE MEETING:

(C) THE SCOPE AND FORM OF ANY REPORT/COMMUNIQUE FROM THE MEETING. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A SIMPLE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WOULD BE COMMUNICATED BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE UNDER A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL).

(D) THE OTHER PRACTICAL QUESTIONS LISTED ABOVE (ATTENDANCE, UNIFORMS ETC).

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SECTION ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 1680 (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED ON SUBSTANCE, BUT GROWING PRESSURE FOR A RESOLUTION. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFS COUNCIL MEMBERS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HIS DECISION NOT TO SEND HIS MISSION. DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY SOME NON-ALIGNED. FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 22 OCTOBER. AMERICANS HOPE ISRAELIS WILL REVISE THEIR APPROACH FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING ON 21 OCTOBER.

2. EARLY ON 19 OCTOBER, AS FORESHADOWED IN TUR, I SHOWED TO MY U S COLLEAGUE OUR DRAFT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL. I HAD REMOVED FROM THE DRAFT FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT THE REFERENCE TO THE EVENTS AT RAFAH REFUGEE CAMP, WHICH WERE CLEARLY CAUSING LESS CONCERN AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS THAN WE HAD ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. PICKERING SAID HE WAS HAPPY FOR ME TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFT AT THE MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE CALLED FOR LATER IN THE MORNING. AT THAT MEETING PICKERING SUGGESTED A SLIGHT TONING-DOWN OF THE LANGUAGE. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) ACCEPTED MY GENERAL APPROACH. LI (CHINA) DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF, WHILE BLANC (FRANCE) SUGGESTED THAT A COUNCIL RESOLUTION MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE. IN THE MEANTIME THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE MEETING. THEIR CO-ORDINATOR (RAZALI OF MALAYSIA) CAME TO TELL ME THAT THEY BELIEVED A COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS NECESSARY. I URGED HIM TO SETTLE FOR A STATEMENT, AND OUTLINED THE POINTS WHICH I BELIEVED IT SHOULD COVER.

3. IN THE AFTERNOON MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO HEAR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ON 13 OCTOBER HE HAD MET THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR

PAGE 1
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AND ENQUIRED ABOUT THE FACILITIES THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BEIN HAD SAID ISRAEL REJECTED SCR 672: THE FOLLOWING DAY HE HAD GIVEN HIM THE TEXT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECISION.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ASKED HIM FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE STATEMENT THAT 'ISRAEL WOULD NOT RECEIVE' THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DELEGATION. DID THIS DECISION IMPLY THAT THE DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OR THAT THEY WERE BARRED FROM ENTRY TO ISRAEL? BEIN HAD UNDERTAKEN TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION, WHICH HE EVENTUALLY PROVIDED ON 18 OCTOBER. HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE OVER THE REQUEST IN SCR 672 FOR A REPORT BY THE END OF OCTOBER. ISRAEL'S OWN COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY WOULD SOON CONCLUDE ITS WORK. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN BE PREPARED TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE REPORT AND DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, THE UN MISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELI COMMISSION'S REPORT WOULD BE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE NEEDED TO GATHER FIRST-HAND INFORMATION FROM ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. BEIN HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION WAS UNCHANGED: HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH THE MISSION TO COME.

6. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDED THAT SCR 672 HAD BEEN THE PRODUCT OF PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A CONSENSUS. HIS DECISION TO SEND A MISSION HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL. HE CONTINUED TO BE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE PLIGHT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THEIR NEED FOR SAFETY AND PROTECTION, WHICH HAD AGAIN BEEN ILLUSTRATED BY THE LATEST INCIDENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP. THESE INCIDENTS ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. HE WAS PREPARED TO REPORT FURTHER IF THE COUNCIL WISHED.

7. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT FURTHER, IN LINE WITH SCR 672. A MISSION WAS VERY IMPORTANT: IT WAS THE PRIMARY REASON THE UNITED STATES HAD SUPPORTED SCR 672. A REPORT WITHOUT A MISSION WOULD BE INCOMPLETE. PICKERING WELCOMED ISRAEL'S DECISION TO COMPLETE ITS OWN REPORT QUICKLY AND GET IT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO ITS BEST THROUGH ITS CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO FACILITATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION.

8. RAZALI (MALAYSIA), SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE ISRAELI DECISION, WHICH HE SAID BELITTLED THE COUNCIL. ISRAEL MUST NOT BE ABOVE THE STRICTURES APPLIED TO OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL: OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE ACCUSATIONS OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. HE WELCOMED THE ASSURANCE OF THE UNITED STATES THAT IT HAD WORKED HARD TO GET ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE MISSION. THE COUNCIL MUST NOW INSIST THAT ISRAEL ALLOW THE MISSION TO GO.

9. FORTIER (CANADA), LI (CHINA), LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AND BLANC (FRANCE) STRONGLY CRITICISED THE ISRAELI POSITION. IT WAS VITAL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN SCR 672. FORTIER SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS TO GET THEM TO RECONSIDER. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION EITHER THROUGH A STATEMENT OR A RESOLUTION.

10. SPEAKING AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, I SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE FOUR ELEMENTS ON WHICH ALL MEMBERS WERE AGREED:

(A) THAT WE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR DISPLEASURE AT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND ITS STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE MISSION:

(B) THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER. WE MUST FIRMLY ASK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER:

(C) THIS SHOULD NOT DELAY OR UNDERMINE THE COUNCIL'S REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A REPORT IN THE TERMS I HAD DESCRIBED ON 12 OCTOBER:

(D) ONCE THE REPORT HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IT WOULD BE GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION.

11. SINCE THE MALAYSIANS HAD REQUESTED A BREAK FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, I SAID I WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE LANGUAGE ON THE FOUR POINTS I HAD SUMMARIZED, WITHOUT PREJUDGING IN WHAT FORMAT IT WOULD BE USED BY THE COUNCIL. I THEN SUSPENDED THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND DISTRIBUTED OUR PROPOSED TEXT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (COPIES FAXED TO NENAD, UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT). WITH EQUAL ALACRITY THE NON-ALIGNED (WHO HAD SOMEHOW PROCURED THE TEXT AT AN EARLIER POINT IN THE DAY) CIRCULATED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LANGUAGE IN THE FORM OF A COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THERE FOLLOWED SOME THREE HOURS OF INTENSIVE INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT RAPIDLY

BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS. PICKERING TOLD ME (AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS) THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT ALLOW HIM TO ACCEPT EITHER A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OR A COUNCIL RESOLUTION (ALTHOUGH IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE NON-ALIGNED FULLY BELIEVED HIM): BETTER TO WAIT OVER THE WEEKEND AND SEE WHETHER THE APPEALS BY THE U S ADMINISTRATION AND OTHERS TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD ANY EFFECT. FOR THEIR PART THE NON-ALIGNED, WITH THE HELP OF THE PLO, WERE TOUGHENING UP THEIR TEXT.

HANNAY

YYYY

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PRIME MINISTER

WRITTEN INTERVIEW WITH AL-HAYAT NEWSPAPER:
11.15 AM WEDNESDAY 19 OCTOBER 1990

You have agreed to give a written interview to the daily Arabic language newspaper "Al-Hayat". "Al-Hayat" is published simultaneously in France and Egypt as well as at its headquarters in London. It moved here from Beirut two years ago, and now has a large circulation, particularly in Saudi Arabia, but also in the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East.

I attach questions from the newspaper together with draft answers provided by the Foreign Office. "Al-Hayat's" Editor-in-Chief, Mr Jihad Khazen, will call on you on Wednesday 24 October for an extended photocall of about 10 minutes or so.

Content with the attached answers and with a photocall on Wednesday?

Peter Bean

PETER BEAN
Press Office

19 October 1990

Q.1 : Did the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait come as a complete surprise to you, or had your Government considered it was a possibility should the talks between Kuwait and Iraq fail?

I think it came as a complete surprise to everyone. Discussions between Iraq & Kuwait were in progress & due to not continue. Saddam Hussein had given an assurance to President Mubarak & to King Fahd that there was no question of invasion of Kuwait. History has many examples of perfidy & deceit. This was high among them - a day's war with Jordan. Hussein says can be trusted.

A.1 : ~~We had hoped that Iraq's differences with Kuwait would be settled peacefully and through negotiation. That is what the UN Charter calls for. We were, of course, shocked at Iraq's flagrant violation of international law, particularly following the explicit assurances that Saddam Hussein had given to President Mubarak and King Fahd on the eve of the invasion. Iraq's duplicity takes one's breath away.~~

explicit & categorical

Q.2 : Do you consider that the UK now has an adequate military presence in the Gulf to meet any contingencies, or are you considering plans to boost it further? If so, what types of forces you think are still needed there? Are you now satisfied with the contribution, whether military or financial, of Europe, Japan, and Arab countries to the military build-up?

We have sent substantial naval & air forces to the Gulf & our Armoured Brigade - its support units - are now arriving. I think the response of the Arab nations - in particular Egypt - has been outstanding. To Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia

A.2 : ~~British Force levels in the Gulf are kept under review; we currently consider them adequate. The international response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait has been tremendous. As the Saudi Foreign Minister said in his address to the UN General Assembly, over 26 Arab, Islamic and other friendly states, from every continent of the globe, have come to their support to counter Iraqi aggression.~~

had to United Nations

Saudi Arabia's

Q.3 : Have the mechanics of the chain of command in the Gulf now been fully worked out as a result of the visit of the Defence Secretary Tom King to Washington, and do you accept the placing of British and other forces there under supreme US command?

A.3 : The Command arrangements agreed provide for British Forces to remain under ultimate ^{British command} UK Command. However they may be placed under the tactical control of a US Commander for specific actions where this makes military sense. Equally some US units may be assigned to ^{British} UK tactical control. Both US and UK forces, of course, are under the strategic guidance of ~~the~~ Saudi Arabians.

Q.4 : Given the fact that economic sanctions have never worked in the past, do you really expect them to work this time?

A.4 : Iraq is particularly vulnerable to sanctions: its economy is based almost totally on the export of oil and is heavily dependent on imports. Thanks to the full support which the international community have given to the enforcement of sanctions, all oil outlets have been effectively blockaded, and the import of goods have been cut to a trickle. That will give sanctions the best possible chance of achieving their objective: to get Iraq out of Kuwait. But we do not rule out the military option

Q.5 : President Bush has stated repeatedly that should sanctions not work, then other options must be considered. In fact, there can be only one other option: war. Do you feel that war is avoidable?

A.5 : There can be no compromise on these fundamental principles. Nobody wants armed conflict, but Iraq's aggression cannot be allowed to stand. We are determined to do everything necessary to ensure Kuwait's freedom. But the military option remains available.

Q.6 : Should Britain, along with the US and other allies, feel that war is the only remaining option, would you go back to the UN Security Council for authorisation to dislodge the Iraqis by force?

(points set out in the UN Security Council resolutions.)
Soldier Hussein must not gain anything as a result of his aggression. He must get out of Kuwait, pay compensation for the appalling damage which he has done - and the world must see that he is never in a position to do something similar again. If we believe we are relying on achieving that through sanctions, we have been wrong.
will work. But if not, the military option is the best build up of forces continues. We must be ready for any contingency.

A.6 : Britain has acted throughout the Gulf crisis in accordance with international law, and we shall continue to do so. Security Council Resolution 661, which called for comprehensive economic sanctions, expressly affirms the right of individual or collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Q.7 : Do you see any possibility in the future of negotiations with Iraq over its claims against Kuwait, and what would be the preconditions and framework of such talks?

What is there no legitimate claim? You don't neglect
A.7 : ~~Iraq invaded an independent state, a member of the UN and the Arab League. It must face the consequences of its actions. The final outcome of this crisis must include Iraq making good the damage it has done. Once Iraq has withdrawn unconditionally from Kuwait and legitimacy has been restored, Iraq and Kuwait will be in a position to resolve their differences peacefully.~~
*Some one who made borders into another country
e kills so many people: you get him out.
We had here had many border marks of diplomatic effort at the United Nations to persuade Iraq to withdraw at least of Iraq's son air Iraq is willing to do so.*

Q.8 : Jordan and the PLO have come out in support of Iraq, while at the same time supporting the independence of Kuwait. Do you feel they have lost international support for adopting such a stand? Have you been surprised by the position of King Hussein, given his life-long moderate policies?

No answer to your first question in your
A.8 : ~~The will of the international community has been clearly expressed in successive UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Attempts by Jordan, the PLO and others to broker a compromise solution to the problem, which would reward Iraq for its aggression, are a misjudgement. There can be no compromise solutions which dilute the position of the international community as reflected in by the Security Council resolutions and endorsed by the Arab League. I recognise that King Hussein is in a difficult position. But I believe that he has now realised the need for firm sanctions enforcement. I welcome this: Jordan is an old friend and has long been a force for moderation and stability in the region.~~
sanctions are now being imposed by Jordan and we are pressing for the early disbursement of the economic assistance which Egypt needs.

The PLO in particular has been severely damaged in its credibility by supporting the force of an independent state while at the same time expecting support for its efforts to have return of the occupied territories.

sanctions are now being imposed by Jordan and we are pressing for the early disbursement of the economic assistance which Egypt needs.

Q.9 : Do you accept as at least partially true the criticism in some quarters that your tough statements against President Saddam Hussein have endangered the lives of British, and perhaps other, hostages in Iraq?

A.9 : It is Iraq which is using human beings as pawns in this present crisis. Saddam Hussein ^{has} is breaching ^{and} every accepted ^{standard} norm of international behaviour, by holding foreign nationals against their will. This is totally unacceptable. The Iraqi Government should allow ^{all the hostages} these people to leave as soon as possible. I understand ^{very well} the concern of many people who have relatives and friends trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. We ^{shall} will continue to do everything we can to secure their release, but there can be no deals with hostage-takers, whether they are terrorists or governments.

A
Let alone
the Arab
tradition
of hospitality,

Q.10: British companies dealing with Iraq and Kuwait have lost hundreds of millions of pounds in lost contracts in both countries. Are there government plans to compensate and otherwise help them?

A.10: These are mandatory United Nations sanctions, not a unilateral move by the British Government. I have ~~the utmost sympathy~~ ^{sympathy} with those who have suffered losses. But many companies are insured against such unforeseen events with our Export Credit Guarantees Department and have paid premiums accordingly. It would be unfair to them to treat insured and uninsured companies equally. ^{as in exactly the same way.}

Q.11: There has been mention by some US officials of the need for long-term security arrangements in the Gulf to avoid the type of scenario we are now witnessing. What shape do you think such arrangements might take, and what might Britain's role be? What is the likely impact of the current crisis on Britain's future defence planning, particularly at a time when its defence spending is under review as a result of the changes in Europe?

There will certainly, in my view, need to be regional security arrangements once Iraq is out of Kuwait.
A.11: It is too early to say what the long term results of this present crisis will be. Our prime concern is to restore Kuwait's independence and freedom. But there is clearly a need for a security structure in the region which will ensure a more peaceful future for all. It is primarily for the countries of the region to decide what shape such a structure should take. *As a country that has had a long association with the Gulf, we shall listen carefully to what they have to say.* *to take a full part in discussions*

The United Nations, Arab League, GCC would all need to be involved.

Q.12: There has been much speculation that the US administration's plans for a \$20 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia threaten Britain's own position as an arms supplier to the Kingdom, and in particular the future of the Al Yamamah programme, including the planned sale of 48 more Tornado planes. What is your own perception of the situation?

A.12: I would not wish to go into any detail on the question of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. But we do have a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia and there can be no doubt that the Al Yamamah Programme has been a great success. Both governments remain firmly committed to the Programme and I believe it will continue to make an important contribution to the security of the region for many years to come.

Q.13: There have been hints by British officials that a restoration of relations with Syria is imminent. Is this the case, and what preconditions would the Syrians have to meet?

A.13: I welcome Syria's decision to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression. *membership is relevant.* I know that the Americans and Irish have acknowledged Syria's helpful rôle in securing the release of their hostages in Lebanon. So have we. We broke ^{off} relations with Syria in 1986 because we had clear evidence of their involvement in an attempt to place a bomb on an airliner at Heathrow airport. We have to overcome such problems before we can resume relations. I trust we can do so

We also acknowledge the helpful rôle which Syria has played in obtaining release of hostages in Lebanon.

~~before too long.~~

I urge President Asad to demonstrate his rejection of terrorism and to use his influence to persuade those who are holding British hostages to release them.

Q.14: Following the release of Brian Keenan, and the recent meeting of the British Ambassador in Beirut with Sheikh Fadlallah, will Britain from now on be taking a more active role in trying to secure the release of its hostages in Lebanon?

A.14: Britain has always taken an active role in working for the release of British hostages in Lebanon. We have followed up every lead both in Lebanon and elsewhere and used every contact that we thought might bring results. We have also raised the plight of the hostages in every major international forum. Our vigorous efforts will continue. ~~But we have it in our hands - but we have it in our hands - but we have it in our hands.~~ ~~As is well known, Iran played a helpful role in the releases of Brian Keenan and two American hostages earlier this year. Iran has undertaken publicly to use her humanitarian influence to achieve the release of the remaining hostages in Lebanon. Following the resumption of diplomatic relations, we will continue to urge them to live up to this undertaking.~~

hope very much that these efforts will lead to results.

Never
a day
goes
by
without
our
thoughts
going
to
the
families

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



The Right Honourable
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

19th October 1990

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the recently concluded Kuwaiti People's Conference as well as in my own behalf, I would like to extend to you, the members of your Cabinet, the Parliament, and all of the people of your country our most sincere appreciation for your assistance against the treacherous aggression waged on our country and our people by the head of the Iraqi regime Saddam Hussein.

As you may know, more than 1000 representatives from all segments of Kuwaiti society recently completed a three-day People's Conference in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Conference, which has demonstrated the renewed vitality of our constitutional democracy, and witnessed the power of our democracy in process, unanimously pledged support to four essential objectives :

1. The liberation of our country through whatever means possible, and the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from all Kuwaiti territory.
2. Restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait under the leadership of our Emir, Sheikh Jaber AlAhmed AlSabah.
3. The release of all foreign hostages.
4. Iraqi compensation for all damages, public and private.

On these issues, our resolve is unyielding, our commitment steadfast.

Cont'd.....

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- 2 -

Throughout the conference, we heard statements from men, women and children forced to flee our country. Their tales of unprecedented torture and brutality bring shame on the head of the Iraqi regime Saddam Hussein. We have heard testimony about children killed before their parents' eyes, and the murder of premature babies torn from lifegiving incubators. This has served to strengthen our resolve to rid our country of this modern barbarian dictator. The World will never forget the atrocities committed by Saddam and his evil regime against our people and citizens of other countries resident in Kuwait.

Your support to our just cause is highly valued, and your country's noble actions will always be remembered. The participation of units of your armed forces in this multinational effort to halt the savage aggressor is historic. Your commitment to ending tyranny and torture is truly noble.

The Kuwaiti people will never forget the help we have received from you and all of the British people.

With warmest regards and highest consideration.

with my best wishes

Chairman, Kuwaiti People's Conference

Saad AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah
Crown Prince and Prime Minister



سعادة السيدة مارغريت شاتشر
رئيسة مجلس الوزراء بالمملكة المتحدة

تحية طيبة وبعد ،

فأود باسمي وباسم أعضاء المؤتمر الشعبي الكويتي الذي أختتم أعماله مؤخرا أن أعرب لكم ولأعضاء حكومتكم والبرلمان والشعب البريطاني كله عن أخلص تقديرنا لمساعدتكم لنا ضد العدوان الغادر الذي قام به رئيس النظام العراقي صدام حسين ضد بلدنا وشعبنا .

وكما تعلمون فإن حوالي ألف ممثلين لكافة قطاعات الشعب الكويتي قد اختتموا مؤخرا المؤتمر الشعبي الكويتي الذي استمر ثلاثة أيام في جده بالمملكة العربية السعودية .

ان المؤتمر الذي أبرز الحيوية المتجددة لديمقراطيتنا الدستورية ، وجسد القدرة العملية لديمقراطيتنا قد التزم بالاجماع بمساندة الأهداف الأساسية الأربعة التالية :

- ١ - تحرير وطننا بكافة الوسائل الممكنة والانسحاب غير المشروط للقوات العراقية من جميع الأراضي الكويتية .
- ٢ - عودة حكومة الكويت الشرعية بقيادة أميرنا صاحب السمو الشيخ جابر الأحمد الصباح .
- ٣ - اطلاق سراح جميع الرهائن الأجانب .
- ٤ - التعويضات العراقية عن جميع الأضرار العامة والخاصة .

ان عزمنا بالنسبة لهذه القضايا لا يتزعزع والتزامنا بها ثابت . وقد استمعنا خلال المؤتمر الى أقوال رجال ونساء وأطفال أجبروا على الخروج من بلدنا ، وقد ذكروا قصصا عن التعذيب والفظائع الوحشية التي لم يسبق لها مثيل والتي تصب كلها الخزي والعار على رئيس النظام العراقي صدام حسين . كما استمعنا الى شهادات عن اغتيال الأطفال على مرأى من والديهم ، وقتل الأطفال الخدج نتيجة وقف أجهزة الحضانة الطبية التي كانت تبقيهم على قيد الحياة .

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



ولكن هذا كله قد أكد عزمنا على تخليص وطننا من هذا الديكتاتور
الوحشي الحديث . ان العالم لن ينسى أبدا الفظائع التي اقترفها صدام
حسين ونظام حكمه الشرير ضد أبناء شعبنا ورعايا الدول الاخرى المقيمين في
بلدنا .

ان مساندتكم لقضيتنا العادلة محل التقدير العظيم ، وان أعمال بلادكم
النبيلة ستظل مذكورة دائما . وان مشاركة وحدات من قواتكم المسلحة في هذا
الجهد المتعدد الجنسيات لوقف العدوان الهمجي أمر تاريخي ، وان التزامكم
بوضع حد للظلم والتعذيب أمر نبيل حقا . وان الشعب الكويتي لن ينسى
أبدا العون الذي لقيناه منكم ومن الشعب البريطاني كافة .

مع أطيب التحيات وأسمى التقدير

ح. طيب محياني

رئيس المؤتمر الشعبي الكويتي

سعد عبدالله السالم الصباح

ولي العهد ورئيس مجلس الوزراء

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CORRECTED VERSION

MY TELNO. 2520: PRIMAKOV VISIT
SUMMARY

1. PRIMAKOV GOT A STRONGLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT ON 19 OCTOBER TO SUGGESTIONS FOR A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN.

DETAIL

2. HAASS (NSC) HAS TOLD US THAT PRIMAKOV SPENT AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 19 OCTOBER, HAVING EARLIER SEEN BOTH SCOWCROFT AND BAKER. HIS PRESENTATION WAS OPAQUE BUT ESSENTIALLY PESSIMISTIC IN THAT HE BELIEVED TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THE COALITION ARRAYED AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. PRIMAKOV MADE IT PLAIN HE WAS EXTREMELY OPPOSED TO GOING TO WAR WITH IRAQ.

3. PRIMAKOV SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED THE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED IN ANY WAY. DESPITE THIS, AND PRIMAKOV'S EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT OF SANCTIONS AND THE MILITARY BUILD UP AS ESSENTIAL PRESSURES ON THE IRAQIS, HE NONETHELESS ALSO ARGUED THAT SOME WAY OF SAVING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FACE HAD TO BE FOUND. WHEN THE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND QUITE WHAT PRIMAKOV WAS TRYING TO GET AT THE LATTER MADE IT PLAINER THAT HE THOUGHT SOME WAY OUT COULD BE FOUND BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO SADDAM HUSSEIN IN PRIVATE AND IN ADVANCE THAT, IN RETURN FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, HE COULD BE SURE HE WOULD GET AT LEAST SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE AT A LATER STAGE. PRIMAKOV DID NOT IMPLY THAT ANY SUCH INDUCEMENTS WOULD BE IN THE SPECIFIC KUWAIT CONTEXT, WHERE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAD TO BE FULFILLED. SOMETHING MIGHT HOWEVER BE DONE WITH REGARD TO PALESTINE. THE IRAQIS MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE GIVEN FIRMLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT FOLLOWING THEIR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL THERE WOULD BE A US/SOVIET STATEMENT ON AN ACTIVE EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, PERHAPS THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE.

4. PRIMAKOV ALSO URGED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD IN ANY CASE RESTART THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AS A MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE EVIDENTLY FEARED THE IRAQIS WERE WINNING THE ARGUMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD, HENCE THE URGENCY OF ACTION TO WEAN THE PLO AWAY FROM BAGHDAD. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSED US/SOVIET STATEMENT. IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE TO ALLOW THE HOSTAGES TO LEAVE. SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE, TOO, OVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER TROOPS IN THE GULF REGION. PRIMAKOV SUGGESTED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD FOSTER THE KUWAIT/IRAQ RELATIONSHIP AFTER THE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE ESSENTIAL POINT WAS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPETUS TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE AREA.

5. PRIMAKOV HAD IMPLIED THAT HE MIGHT GO BACK TO IRAQ. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT BUT THAT THE MESSAGE HE SHOULD CONVEY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS THAT THERE WAS NO FLEXIBILITY IN THE US POSITION.

6. WOOD ASKED HAASS WHETHER THE AMERICANS BELIEVED PRIMAKOV WAS ACTING AT GORBACHEV'S REQUEST AND WITH HIS AUTHORITY. HAASS SAID THAT PRIMAKOV HAD IMPLIED GORBACHEV HAD ASKED HIM TO SHARE HIS OBSERVATIONS ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO BAGHDAD WITH THE AMERICANS BUT THAT PRIMAKOV HAD NOT MADE IT CLEAR HOW FAR HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY OR THE DEGREE TO WHICH WHAT HE SAID REPRESENTED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION. WHAT PRIMAKOV HAD SAID HOWEVER WAS SO MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH EVERYTHING ELSE THE AMERICANS HAD HEARD FROM MOSCOW THAT THEY CONCLUDED HE WAS DOING LITTLE MORE THAN ADVANCE PERSONAL IDEAS. WOOD TOLD HAASS IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION HE HAD NO DOUBT PRIMAKOV WOULD RECEIVE A SIMILARLY DUSTY ANSWER FROM US.

7. WOOD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO ROSS (STATE), WHO HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED WE MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER TAKING REINFORCING ACTION WITH GORBACHEV ONCE WE HAD SPOKEN TO PRIMAKOV. HE ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING ACTION WITH GORBACHEV THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO ROSS, THEY ARE. ROSS WANTED TO ADD THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS OWN TALKS WITH PRIMAKOV, HE HAD NO DOUBT OF PRIMAKOV'S GOOD WILL. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO BE WITH THE AMERICANS WHATEVER THEY DECIDED AND THAT THERE WAS INDEED NO TURNING BACK FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

HIS INTENTION HAD BEEN TO PUT FORWARD IDEAS WHICH MIGHT, IN PRIMAKOV'S VIEW, AVOID THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION HE SO MUCH DREADED. THE FACT WAS HOWEVER THAT OFFERING ANY REWARD, HOWEVER

QUALIFIED AND HOWEVER DISTANCED FROM AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, WOULD ONLY ADD TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STATURE AND MAKE TH OTHER STATES OF THE REGION THEREFORE VULNERABLE. THE RESULT WOULD BE IN THE END TO LEAD ANYWAY TO A MILITARY CONFRONTATION, VERY PROBABLY ON A WIDER SCALE THAN ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS.

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MY TELNO 1681: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AS DRAFTED BY THE FIVE. TEXT CIRCULATED TO OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET ON THE MORNING OF 19 OCTOBER PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCEPT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PREPARED BY THE FIVE. HE PROPOSED ONE MINOR AMENDMENT: THE FRENCH INTRODUCED A FEW FURTHER SMALL CHANGES. ALL WERE ACCEPTED (TEXT TO FOLLOW BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND UND).

3. IT WAS AGREED THAT OUR CO-ORDINATOR WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION TO BE CIRCULATED IMMEDIATELY TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AS A WORKING PAPER 'BROADLY ACCEPTED BY THE FIVE' (THE FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE CHINESE TO PRESERVE THEIR OWN POSITION). PICKERING WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE FIVE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THEIR PLANS TO BRIEF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON THE TEXT, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARRANGED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 19 OCTOBER. BUT I SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD BEWARE OF CREATING ANY LINK BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES, EVEN BY JUXTAPOSITION. I WAS SUPPORTED BY LOZINKSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AND LI (CHINA). PICKERING RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THIS, ALTHOUGH HE KEPT OPEN THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE BRIEFING MEETINGS MIGHT BE HELD ONCE THE COUNCIL HAD CONCLUDED ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT PURSUE THE EARLIER AMERICAN IDEA OF IMMEDIATELY TABLING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION 'IN BLUE' (PARA 7 OF TUR): THIS COULD BE SEEN BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUCIL AS A CONFRONTATIONAL GESTURE. IT WOULD BE BETER TO BRIEF THEM FULLY BEFORE A TEXT WAS TABLED.

HANNAY

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
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ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS REFLECTING ON POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, CONCENTRATING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES.

DETAIL

2. ROSS (STATE) LAID OUT CURRENT US THINKING ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM TO THE MINISTER ON 17 OCTOBER. HE SPOKE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO AVOID A US VETO OF A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE OTS. HE ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS URGENT TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO ERODE PALESTINIAN ADHERENCE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT WE HAD TO GET BEYOND PRESENT DIFFICULTIES BEFORE CONCRETE ACTION. HE DID NOT MEAN BY THAT THAT WE HAD TO WAIT UNTIL SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD LEFT KUWAIT, ONLY THAT IN THE PRESENT EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL FOLLOWING TEMPLE MOUNT WE WOULD GET NOWHERE IF WE TRIED TO PUSH MATTERS FORWARD TODAY. THE POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE GREATER IN A FORTNIGHT OR SO.

3. THE AMERICANS, ROSS SAID, WOULD WANT TO FOLLOW UP BOTH AN EFFORT TO REVIVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A DIRECT ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE AND TO INDUCE MOVEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. THE PALESTINIANS HAD TO BE SHOWN THERE WAS A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THAT THE IRAQIS COULD NOT DELIVER FOR THEM. THERE WERE ALREADY SPLITS WITHIN THE PLO AND A FERMENT IN THE OTS WHICH COULD IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES BE CHANNLED TOWARDS SUPPORT FOR A BETTER DIALOGUE. ROSS BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE SOME THINKING THE AMERICANS COULD WORK WITH INCLUDING ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. BAKER HAD SPOKEN OF CBMS IN EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA AROUSING ENTHUSIASM, POLITE INTEREST AND NO REAL RESPONSE RESPECTIVELY. ASSAD PROBABLY WANTED TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN. BAKER HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT OF THE ANTI SADDAM HUSSEIN COALITION OPENED UP NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL FRONT. ROSS COMMENTED THAT PROGRESS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL WAS IMPORTANT NOT JUST IN THE

CONTEXT OF TRYING TO REVIVE A ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, BUT ALSO FOR FUTURE POSSIBILITIES OF A REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE, ON WHICH I AM SENDING A SEPARATE TELEGRAM. THE FACT WAS THAT THE WEST COULD NOT SAY TO FRIENDLY ARABS THEY ACKNOWLEDGED ONE THREAT TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REFUSING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REALITY OF TENSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE WEST'S ARAB FRIENDS.

4. ROSS SAID THAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ADAPTED FROM EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE PROVIDED THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AS WELL AS REASSURANCE ON THE SECURITY FRONT. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES MORE AMBITIOUS IDEAS MIGHT BECOME PRACTICABLE OVER TIME. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HOWEVER THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY PLO ALIGNMENT TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WHICH IT HAD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PEACENIKS TO ARGUE AGAINST THE ALLEGATION THAT THE PLO'S REAL AIM WAS THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. WE COULD HOWEVER BY NO MEANS LEAVE THINGS IN ABEYANCE WHILE WE DEALT WITH THE GULF. HE THOUGHT THERE WERE OPENINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH MIGHT BE EXPLOITED AT THE RIGHT TIME. FOR ALL THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH SHAMIR, THE AMERICANS HAD TO FIGURE OUT A NEW WAY TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. SOME OF THE FUSS ABOUT THE USE OF US FUNDS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET REFUGEES WAS FALSE. WHEN IT CAME DOWN TO IT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO MONEY TO PROVIDE FOR INCENTIVES FOR SOVIET SETTLERS GOING BEYOND THE GREEN LINE. ALL THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN ASKING FOR WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE SUCH SETTLEMENT. THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE BACK TO THE AMERICANS IN ANOTHER SIX MONTHS FOR MORE MONEY. BAKER HAD SAID HE WOULD JUDGE THEM BY WHAT THEY DID AT THAT STAGE, NOT BY WHAT THEY SAID. ROSS BEMOANED THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD BLINKERS ON WHICH MADE IT HARD FOR ISRAEL TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR REAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING DEALING WITH SOVIET IMMIGRATION AND, ABOVE ALL, IRAQ.

COMMENT

5. ALTHOUGH WHAT ROSS HAD TO SAY WAS NOT VERY SPECIFIC WE CAN PERHAPS TAKE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE FURTHER ACTION ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM INCLUDING AN EVENTUAL RETURN TO THE IDEA OF AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. THEY HAVE BY THEIR STANDARDS BEEN TOUGH ON THE ISRAELIS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY ARE INEVITABLY CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTY OF PERSUADING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO MAKE ANY MOVES TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS. BUT, EQUALLY, THEY ARE ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGERS OF DOING NOTHING AND ARE DISPOSED TO SEE WHETHER SOME MOVEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE

ARAB STATES. I SEE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LOWER RATINGS IN THE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS OR THE IMMINENCE OF THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS WILL AFFECT THIS STAND. TWO OF ROSS'S IDEAS WERE REFLECTED IN POINTS MADE TO YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO ISRAEL FROM 15 - 18 OCTOBER (TEL AVIV TELNO. 380 PARAS. 6, LAST SENTENCE AND PARA. 8 REFER).

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 October 1990

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Charles,

THE GULF CRISIS: VISIT BY MR PRIMAKOV

I understand that Mr Gorbachev's Special Envoy on the Gulf, Academician Evgeni Primakov, is due to call on the Prime Minister at Chequers at 1600 tomorrow, 20 October. You might find it useful to have a note of the background against which his visit is taking place.

As you know, Primakov visited Baghdad earlier this month and saw Saddam Hussain on 5 October. The Russians have told us that the purpose of his visit was to resolve the problem of the return of Soviet Specialists in Iraq over which there had been "practically open resistance from the Iraqi authorities". After apparently "heated arguments" with Saddam Hussain agreement was reached that 1,500 could leave within a month.

According to the Russians, Primakov's other aim was to clarify "with pressure if necessary" the possibility of a significant shift in Saddam Hussain's position, especially on withdrawal from Kuwait. He had called on Saddam to display a sense of reality and stressed that neither the Soviet Union in particular or the world community in general would ever accept the annexation of Kuwait. Although Saddam had countered with the usual arguments and pretexts justifying the annexation, Primakov had felt that some new nuances were beginning to emerge. His overall conclusion was that the International Community's rejection of the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and the introduction of sanctions was causing Saddam to sober up, slowly but visibly.

Primakov is coming to London after discussions in Rome, Paris and Washington. We understand that in Rome and Paris he argued that a face-saving solution should be offered to Saddam. This should include guarantees of Iraqi security and a possible deal whereby Iraqi troops would withdraw from

/Kuwait

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Kuwait if the West would agree an international conference on the Middle East should be convened shortly afterwards. But he admitted to the French that he had no guarantee that Saddam Hussain would deliver even if these conditions were met. He also took the opportunity to make clear the Soviet distaste for military action in the Gulf and the Soviet Union's firm resolve to stand behind the UN Security Council Resolutions on the crisis. He told the Italians that the initiative on Arab Israel should take place independently of but prior to Iraqi withdrawal but did not float the idea of such an advance gesture with the French.

The Americans told us before Primakov's arrival in Washington on the evening of 18 October that they would take a tough line on the compromise solution they expected him to have in his pocket. We have not yet had a read-out on his talks with the Administration (which took place earlier today) but have asked the Embassy in Washington to let us have a report first thing tomorrow morning. We shall arrange to get this to you well before the Prime Minister's meeting.

We have conveyed to the Russians our own concern about Primakov's tour (which, incidentally, is shared by moderate Arabs such as the Egyptians). Speaking on Ministerial instructions, David Gore-Booth summoned the Soviet Minister in London on 19 October. He said that we would not accept any compromise solution; Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and completely. We had therefore been concerned to read reports that Primakov was pedalling something short of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. During the ensuing discussion Galitsin more or less admitted that Primakov's mission might have the tactical purpose of demonstrating to the old thinkers in the Soviet establishment (who we know are less than happy with the line Mr Gorbachev has taken on the Gulf) that there was no opening for a compromise solution.

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From the Private Secretary

19 October 1990

GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this morning to follow up on the Prime Minister's conversation with the President yesterday evening about embassies in Kuwait. The President had been grateful for the Prime Minister's subsequent message and Scowcroft thought he would accept the advice in it. But the basic problem remained unsolved. The American embassy in Kuwait could only survive another two weeks or so. What would happen then? Was it just to close down and the occupants be taken away to Baghdad as hostages? Surely there must be a way to withdraw the embassy with dignity, such as taking them out by helicopter. I asked whether the Americans could not follow our example of greatly reducing the numbers of people in the embassy, so that they could retain a presence in Kuwait for a lot longer. Scowcroft said that most of those in the embassy were not diplomats, so he doubted whether this would work. The President was very reluctant to see American citizens marched off into captivity. The matter did not have to be settled in the next few days. But time was getting short. If I had any further ideas about how the Americans could withdraw their embassy without seeming to surrender and lose face, he would be grateful to know. We agreed to discuss it again next week.

Scowcroft then said that he had heard our man in New York was proposing a further Security Council Resolution on the killing of Palestinians in Jerusalem. I said this was rubbish. David Hannay had been approached by the UN Secretary General, who had decided to abandon his attempt to send a mission to Israel. David Hannay had done his best to dissuade him from this course, but the Secretary General was adamant and had demanded a meeting of the Security Council so that he could report. In the circumstances, there had been no alternative but to call an informal session. My understanding was that David Hannay hoped to be able to come out of it with a presidential statement in reasonably moderate language. This might at least tide us over until the date when the Secretary General had been due to report formally. We could not exclude the possibility that others would table an unhelpful Resolution but we would try to dissuade them.

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My understanding was that David Hannay had discussed this at length with Pickering and they were agreed on the right tactics.

This was evidently all news to Brent Scowcroft who commented plaintively that Pickering never seemed to tell Washington anything. He added that he assumed it was now less likely that we would get a Resolution on compensation.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Telephone (202) 462-1340

BY FAX

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 October 1990

Dear Charles,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEW YORK TIMES

1. You asked about reference in the New York Times to a claim by King Hussein that the Prime Minister had said that US troops were on their way to Saudi Arabia before they had been requested formally.
2. I attach an article by Judith Miller, printed in the New York Times on 16 October, based on an interview with King Hussein. In it she writes that the King had said that "The United States decision to send forces to the Saudi desert was taken before the Riyadh Government formally requested them and, he said, seemed ultimately intended not to defend Saudi Arabia but to destroy President Hussein."
3. She goes on to say: "Furthermore, the King said, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had told him, during a meeting at her country residence, that the United States troops were 'half way to Saudi Arabia' before they were formally requested. The King said he had confirmed this later through what he described as his own sources."
4. As far as we can find, this has not been picked up elsewhere in the US media. It certainly has not been picked up in a big way.
5. I attach a short piece from Cairo printed in the New York Times on 18 October about an Al Ahram article on the question of whether King Hussein did or did not know about the Iraqi invasion before it happened.

Yours ever
Francis

Francis Cornish

cc: Minister

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NEW YORK TIMES - 16 OCTOBER 1990

King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

AMMAN, Jordan, Oct. 15 -- He is chain-smoking again, and says it is impossible to sleep more than four hours a night. To relieve the pressure, he has taken to riding around his palace on a BMW motorcycle. While his eyes can sparkle at times, he looks at other times as if he is carrying the cares of 200 million Arabs on his shoulders.

Since the Persian Gulf crisis began, King Hussein of Jordan has traveled more than 50,000 miles and met with 15 leaders to avert a war that he warns would be catastrophic not only for his country, but also for this region and the West.

"With or without war, nothing will return to what it was," the King says. "This will be an area of turmoil unless people face up to the need to create new dreams and new realities."

Missed Opportunities

Now, after 10 weeks, he says that war may be imminent, despite statements in Washington indicating that there are still months of waiting to see if the economic sanctions against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq will work.

If war comes, the Jordanian King says, it will be partly because of a failure by President Bush and



Paul Cookley

King Hussein of Jordan said war might be imminent.

other Western leaders to respond in time to signals from the Iraqi leader, soon after the Kuwait invasion, that he was ready to withdraw from most of the occupied territory.

The 54-year-old King, now in his 38th year on the throne, says that he believes a peaceful end to the Kuwait dispute is possible, but only

if there is a greater willingness to compromise by the United States and its Arab allies, and what he called "an end to the current embargo on dialogue."

"A dialogue across the airwaves is not constructive," he said. If diplomacy fails, he said, his conversations with Saddam Hussein have

Continued on Page A18, Column 1

Jordanian Talks of Chan- And Trust Betrayed in K

Continued From Page A1

convinced him that the Iraqis would fight.

"If it's a question of humiliation and surrender, it won't work," the King said. "Capitulation is unacceptable."

Back at Nadwa, his yellow granite palace in downtown Amman, the King continues his diplomatic campaign with King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, sending letters and messages back and forth between Baghdad and other Arab capitals, planning his next moves.

In a series of interviews over the weekend, he spoke at length about his efforts to prevent and later to contain the Persian Gulf crisis, the first time he has given a full public accounting of his actions.

He disclosed that on Aug. 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he had been given 48 hours by President Bush to secure a commitment from President Hussein to withdraw his troops. He said that President Hussein had promised to begin pulling out troops if the Arab League did not condemn him, something it did do, which he said, led to the collapse of his early efforts.

The King's mood, often frustrated and angry, was lightened by occasional bursts of humor as he mused about happier times, or watched the latest news on CNN. At one point, his spirits darkening, he spoke of thoughts of resigning from a job that many regard among the most dangerous in the Middle East, thoughts he said he has since put firmly out of his mind.

A Favored Land Now Out of Favor

Jordan was once regarded by the United States and other Western countries as the most dependable of the Arab nations. Now, King Hussein showed his distress at the way he and his country have been criticized since the start of the crisis by the United States and its allies. They have deplored what they regard as his hedging on condemning the Iraqi invasion, a stand that the harshest critics say comes close to condoning Baghdad's action.

What made his isolation particularly stressful, he says, is that he and President Bush are friends of long standing. And he went out of his way not to assail the United States. He was more critical of his former Arab allies.

Of all Arab leaders, King Hussein said, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has disappointed him the most. The King said he had helped bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, after its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but that the move seemed not to have assuaged Egyptian anger at having been excluded in the first place. At a Cairo summit meeting in August, the King said he had the feeling that Mr.

take military action.

The King repeatedly emphasized that Jordan has supported all the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kuwait. He has, however, opposed the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, something he said was neither anti-Western nor pro-Iraqi.

"I am pro-peace," he declared. "I have backed nobody except my conscience and the interests of all in peace and security in this region."

Nevertheless, in the interviews, he praised Mr. Hussein as "a friend and a new phenomenon in Arab politics."

When he was asked if he believed that President Hussein, his namesake but no relation, was justified in having invaded part or all of Kuwait, he seemed momentarily uncomfortable.

"I honestly can't tell, but given the leadership of Saddam Hussein, I know it was not easy," he replied. "I can't justify or condone, but the reason must have been pretty substantial to have had it happen. Both sides, I fear, gradually succumbed to a conspiracy theory about the other."

Quashing Rumors Of Lust for Land

The King seemed especially eager to rebut a conspiracy theory that has gained wide credence in Arab circles since the invasion, that Iraq, Jordan and Yemen had been eyeing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for themselves, and had been planning for months before the invasion to divide up the oil-producing area among themselves.

According to these accounts, Iraq would have taken Kuwait, securing its long-sought free access to the Persian Gulf; Yemen would get part of disputed Saudi territory, and King Hussein, who is revered as a 33d-generation descendant of the prophet Mohammed, would be restored to his family's traditional role as custodian of Islam's most sacred sites in Saudi Arabia.

He said Jordan wanted nothing but peace, and had not been forewarned about the Iraqi invasion.

The King argued, however, that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could have been prevented through astute Arab diplomacy, and that American forces would not have been needed if the Arabs had enough time to resolve the problem themselves.

And, he said, the United States' decision to send forces to the Saudi desert was taken before the Riyadh Government formally requested them and, he said, seemed ultimately intended not to defend Saudi Arabia but to destroy President Hussein.

According to the King's account, he received an agreement from President Bush, in a telephone conversation within hours of the Iraqi invasion, that he would be given 48 hours to secure a commitment from Mr. Hussein to withdraw his troops. The King said the commitment was given while he was meeting in Alexandria, Egypt, with Mr. Mubarak.

The King said he told the American and Egyptian leaders that he had talked to President Hussein by phone

(3)

Chances Missed in Kuwait Crisis

Mr. Mubarak that the Iraqi leader had also warned that he "would not respond positively to threats or intimidation."

Conciliatory Words From Iraqi Quoted

The Arab League foreign ministers were meeting in Cairo, and the King said, Saddam Hussein suspected that the ministers might call for foreign involvement. "Let us not scratch each other's eyes out," the King quoted the Iraqi leader as saying. "If things go that way, we may say Kuwait is part of Iraq and annex it."

Early the next morning, Aug. 3, the King flew to Baghdad, where he found President Hussein "fine and more relaxed than on my previous visit" six days earlier. The Iraqi leader, he said, reiterated that he was willing to withdraw from most of Kuwait — exactly to where he did not say — and to discuss other grievances at a meeting of heads of government in Jidda on Sunday, provided the Arab League did not condemn him or call for foreign intervention.

The King returned to Amman later that day, confident that agreement was possible, but he said he was unable to get either King Fahd or President Mubarak on the phone. While still waiting to convey the results of the Baghdad meeting, he said, he learned that Egypt had just condemned Iraq's invasion, and that the Arab League was preparing to take similar action that night.

King Hussein said he still did not understand why his initiative was undermined. But the condemnations dashed hopes of an early peaceful resolution to the crisis, he said, adding "Suddenly, it was all torn apart."

From the King's version of the crisis, an extraordinary picture emerged of the world of Arab politics — a milieu of secrets and conspiracies; of lies and treachery; of humiliations for him and other, poorer Arabs; of duplicity, revenge and broken promises, and of dashed hopes that, he said, had brought him to consider resignation.

"When you look beyond this," he asked, "what is there for us? I'm proud of what I've done in Jordan, but the region itself is sitting on a time bomb. So before the crisis, I was thinking of quitting. I won't quit in the middle of this. But I'll never be a burden to my country."

When Baghdad Decided to Strike

Ranging back and forth through his experiences in recent weeks, the King shed fresh light on other aspects of the crisis.

Among other things, he said, after the invasion Mr. Hussein had told him that he had decided only late in July that military action was necessary. The King said the Iraqi leader had told him that he had decided to seize all of Kuwait, instead of the part of the territory long in dispute, because he expected the United States to defend the sheikdom with force, and he believed he would be in a stronger position militarily and politically if he could eventually withdraw to a point

that left Iraq with the disputed territory only.

The King said Saddam Hussein also told him that he never intended to invade Saudi Arabia, a threat that was originally cited by the United States in sending troops there.

Furthermore, the King said, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had told him, during a meeting at her country residence, that the United States troops were "halfway to Saudi Arabia" before they were formally requested. The King said he had confirmed this later through what he described as his own sources.

The King, of this small country, flanked on three sides by Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia, seemed most agitated when expressing the view that the invasion could have been prevented.

On at least five occasions since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, he said, he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Kuwait directly or through Gulf intermediaries to resolve the financial and territorial disputes with Baghdad that he said triggered the invasion. Saddam Hussein also made repeated, unsuccessful attempts, he said.

He said he first became concerned about an escalation of the dispute five months ago, at the end of May, at an Arab summit meeting in Baghdad. "We had a closed meeting and he was very frank," the King said. President Hussein warned that his oil-rich, oil-ridden country was being strangled by economic warfare waged by "brothers" among Arab leaders, and that these leaders seemed indifferent

to the fact that Iraq had protected them and their people with "the blood of Iraqis" during the just-concluded war with Iran.

Saddam Hussein had already tried to resolve the border issue during the Iran-Iraq war, the King said. Kuwait and Iraq had formed several different levels of joint commissions to resolve it, but with no success.

A Volatile Mixture: Oil and Outrage

The King's "second jolt" came when he learned that Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, had sent a scathing public memorandum to the Arab League on July 15 accusing Kuwait of violating its oil-production quotas and of stealing Iraqi oil from the Rumaila field, which the two countries shared. Terrible consequences might result, Mr. Aziz warned.

In retrospect, neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia seemed to have trusted him, the King said. But he added that relations with Kuwait had never been easy. An assistant to the King described his visits to Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Emir, for discussions of financial matters, as a "tin-cup exercise" and said that they had become increasingly humiliating.

By 1988, the gulf states had stopped making payments that had continued for 10 years under a 1978 pledge to support Arab countries threatened by Israel. Some had not made full payments. Jordan had a \$6 billion deficit. After 1988, the payments abruptly ended. "They were putting the squeeze on us and I realized we were going to have severe internal problems," the King said.

In the spring of 1989, as he had feared, severe food rioting erupted in Jordan. Kuwait ultimately paid Jordan a modest sum, for which the King said he was grateful.

He said his final effort to warn Kuwait about the potential consequences of its deteriorating relationship with Iraq came late in July. On July 29, he visited Mr. Hussein in Baghdad.

"They were bitter," the King recalled, speaking of the Iraqis. They recalled with fury, for example, that after Iranian-backed terrorists had tried to assassinate the Emir, "Iraq had blasted Iran with everything they had — ground to ground missiles, the works." Iran had retaliated, causing 1,500 civilian casualties, but Kuwait

would not write off its debt, or end the border dispute, or stop stealing oil." (4)

"I realized then that the situation was really very serious," the King said. "I knew they were hurting badly. The atmosphere was tense. The troops were on the border."

On July 30, the King visited the Emir in Kuwait and expressed hope that a special meeting in Jidda between Kuwait and Iraq, scheduled to open the next day, would succeed. And he warned that the meeting was critical.

"I pleaded with them," he said. "They were warm and cordial — usually so. But there was no commitment, just hopes that it would not fail."

A View of Doom In Soldiers' Eyes

Before boarding his plane, he said he had a premonition. "I looked at some Kuwaiti soldiers on the tarmac. I suddenly had a deep sense of sadness. Sometimes, leaders' failures can cost these young people's lives."

On the plane back to Jordan, the King said his aides told him that they, too, had failed to detect true concern in their meetings with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. "They said their Constitution does not permit us to give up an inch of territory. We won't give in. If they attack us, we would call the Americans." The Kuwaitis' only concern, the King said he was told, seemed to be that relying on American military backing would be "embarrassing" because of American support for Israel.

He said he had learned of the invasion at 6 A.M. on Aug. 2, when King Fahd telephoned him and urged him to call Saddam Hussein and ask the Iraqi leader to withdraw to the disputed territory. "It's all Kuwait's fault," King Hussein said, quoting King Fahd. "They would be this adamant. They've brought this about."

The King spoke to King Fahd rarely after that. On Aug. 6, the Saudi ruler invited "friendly forces" to assist in his country's defense. The next day, he sent an envoy to assure King Hussein that relations between Riyadh and Baghdad were fine, that there was no evidence of a hostile Iraqi buildup on the border, and that despite American assertions, there was no truth to reports that Iraq planned to invade Saudi Arabia. Later that night, the presence of U.S. forces in the Saudi desert was announced.

New York Times 18 10 1990

Cairo's Major Daily Calls Jordan's King A Party to Invasion

By ALAN COWELL

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Oct. 17 — Egypt's most prominent newspaper assailed King Hussein of Jordan today as a co-conspirator with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the invasion of Kuwait.

The paper, Al Ahram, said King Hussein had acknowledged in an interview with The New York Times that he had known of the planned invasion several days before it happened on Aug. 2, but had been promised by the Iraqi leader that Baghdad's forces would pull out of Kuwait if the Arab League did not condemn him. Al Ahram's version of the interview was at odds with the Times article based on the interview, published on Tuesday, in which the King said he learned of the invasion only at 6 A.M. on Aug. 2.

Egypt is prominent among Arab countries opposing the invasion and has sent troops to support the American-dominated military buildup in the Persian Gulf region. Jordan opposed the dispatch of Arab forces and has been accused in the West of adopting an ambiguous stance.

The relationship between the erstwhile allies, once grouped with Iraq and Yemen in the now-defunct Arab Cooperation Council, has worsened in recent days with Egyptian assertions that Jordan plans to expel as many as 70,000 undocumented Egyptians working there.

The editorial today has added strains because it is certain to be taken in Jordan as officially inspired.

"King Hussein's statements make it quite clear that Saddam decided to invade in July," Al Ahram's editorial said.

The newspaper also accused President Hussein of lying about what he had told President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt before the invasion. The Egyptian leader has said he received assurances that Iraq would not invade as long as there was hope of negotiating an outcome to Iraqi-Kuwaiti differences.



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BY FAX

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 October 1990

Dear Charles,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEW YORK TIMES

1. You asked about reference in the New York Times to a claim by King Hussein that the Prime Minister had said that US troops were on their way to Saudi Arabia before they had been requested formally.

2. I attach an article by Judith Miller, printed in the New York Times on 16 October, based on an interview with King Hussein. In it she writes that the King had said that "The United States decision to send forces to the Saudi desert was taken before the Riyadh Government formally requested them and, he said, seemed ultimately intended not to defend Saudi Arabia but to destroy President Hussein."

3. She goes on to say: "Furthermore, the King said, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had told him, during a meeting at her country residence, that the United States troops were 'half way to Saudi Arabia' before they were formally requested. The King said he had confirmed this later through what he described as his own sources."

4. As far as we can find, this has not been picked up elsewhere in the US media. It certainly has not been picked up in a big way.

5. I attach a short piece from Cairo printed in the New York Times on 18 October about an Al Ahram article on the question of whether King Hussein did or did not know about the Iraqi invasion before it happened.

Francis Cornish
Francis Cornish

cc: Minister

NEW YORK TIMES - 16 OCTOBER 1990

King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

AMMAN, Jordan, Oct. 15 -- He is chain-smoking again, and says it is impossible to sleep more than four hours a night. To relieve the pressure, he has taken to riding around his palace on a BMW motorcycle. While his eyes can sparkle at times, he looks at other times as if he is carrying the cares of 200 million Arabs on his shoulders.

Since the Persian Gulf crisis began, King Hussein of Jordan has traveled more than 50,000 miles and met with 15 leaders to avert a war that he warns would be catastrophic not only for his country, but also for this region and the West.

"With or without war, nothing will return to what it was," the King says. "This will be an area of turmoil unless people face up to the need to create new dreams and new realities."

Missed Opportunities

Now, after 10 weeks, he says that war may be imminent, despite statements in Washington indicating that there are still months of waiting to see if the economic sanctions against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq will work.

If war comes, the Jordanian King says, it will be partly because of a failure by President Bush and



Paul Casella

King Hussein of Jordan said war might be imminent.

other Western leaders to respond in time to signals from the Iraqi leader, soon after the Kuwait invasion, that he was ready to withdraw from most of the occupied territory.

The 54-year-old King, now in his 38th year on the throne, says that he believes a peaceful end to the Kuwait dispute is possible, but only

if there is a greater willingness to compromise by the United States and its Arab allies, and what he called "an end to the current embargo on dialogue."

"A dialogue across the airwaves is not constructive," he said. If diplomacy fails, he said, his conversations with Saddam Hussein have

Continued on Page A18, Column 1

Jordanian Talks of Chan And Trust Betrayed in K

Continued From Page A1

convinced him that the Iraqis would fight.

"If it's a question of humiliation and surrender, it won't work," the King said. "Capitulation is unacceptable."

Back at Nadwa, his yellow granite palace in downtown Amman, the King continues his diplomatic campaign with King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, sending letters and messages back and forth between Baghdad and other Arab capitals, planning his next moves.

In a series of interviews over the weekend, he spoke at length about his efforts to prevent and later to contain the Persian Gulf crisis, the first time he has given a full public accounting of his actions.

He disclosed that on Aug. 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he had been given 48 hours by President Bush to secure a commitment from President Hussein to withdraw his troops. He said that President Hussein had promised to begin pulling out troops if the Arab League did not condemn him, something it did do, which he said, led to the collapse of his early efforts.

The King's mood, often frustrated and angry, was lightened by occasional bursts of humor as he mused about happier times, or watched the latest news on CNN. At one point, his spirits darkening, he spoke of thoughts of resigning from a job that many regard among the most dangerous in the Middle East, thoughts he said he has since put firmly out of his mind.

A Favored Land Now Out of Favor

Jordan was once regarded by the United States and other Western countries as the most dependable of the Arab nations. Now, King Hussein showed his distress at the way he and his country have been criticized since the start of the crisis by the United States and its allies. They have deplored what they regard as his hedging on condemning the Iraqi invasion, a stand that the harshest critics say comes close to condoning Baghdad's action.

What made his isolation particularly stressful, he says, is that he and President Bush are friends of long standing. And he went out of his way not to assail the United States. He was more critical of his former Arab allies.

Of all Arab leaders, King Hussein said, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has disappointed him the most. The King said he had helped bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, after its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but that the move seemed not to have assuaged Egyptian anger at having been excluded in the first place. At a Cairo summit meeting in August, the King said he had the feeling that the

take military action.

The King repeatedly emphasized that Jordan has supported all the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kuwait. He has, however, opposed the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, something he said was neither anti-Western nor pro-Iraqi.

"I am pro-peace," he declared. "I have backed nobody except my conscience and the interests of all in peace and security in this region."

Nevertheless, in the interviews, he praised Mr. Hussein as "a friend and a new phenomenon in Arab politics."

When he was asked if he believed that President Hussein, his namesake but no relation, was justified in having invaded part or all of Kuwait, he seemed momentarily uncomfortable.

"I honestly can't tell, but given the leadership of Saddam Hussein, I know it was not easy," he replied. "I can't justify or condone, but the reason must have been pretty substantial to have had it happen. Both sides, I fear, gradually succumbed to a conspiracy theory about the other."

Quashing Rumors Of Lust for Land

The King seemed especially eager to rebut a conspiracy theory that has gained wide credence in Arab circles since the invasion, that Iraq, Jordan and Yemen had been eyeing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for themselves, and had been planning for months before the invasion to divide up the oil-producing area among themselves.

According to these accounts, Iraq would have taken Kuwait, securing its long-sought free access to the Persian Gulf; Yemen would get part of disputed Saudi territory, and King Hussein, who is revered as a 33d-generation descendant of the prophet Mohammed, would be restored to his family's traditional role as custodian of Islam's most sacred sites in Saudi Arabia.

He said Jordan wanted nothing but peace, and had not been forewarned about the Iraqi invasion.

The King argued, however, that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could have been prevented through astute Arab diplomacy, and that American forces would not have been needed if the Arabs had enough time to resolve the problem themselves.

And, he said, the United States' decision to send forces to the Saudi desert was taken before the Riyadh Government formally requested them and, he said, seemed ultimately intended not to defend Saudi Arabia but to destroy President Hussein.

According to the King's account, he received an agreement from President Bush, in a telephone conversation within hours of the Iraqi invasion, that he would be given 48 hours to secure a commitment from Mr. Hussein to withdraw his troops. The King said the commitment was given while he was meeting in Alexandria, Egypt, with Mr. Mubarak.

The King said he told the American and Egyptian leaders that he had

2

Chances Missed in Kuwait Crisis

Mr. Mubarak that the Iraqi leader had also warned that he "would not respond positively to threats or intimidation."

Conciliatory Words From Iraqi Quoted

The Arab League foreign ministers were meeting in Cairo, and the King said, Saddam Hussein suspected that the ministers might call for foreign involvement. "Let us not scratch each other's eyes out," the King quoted the Iraqi leader as saying. "If things go that way, we may say Kuwait is part of Iraq and annex it."

Early the next morning, Aug. 3, the King flew to Baghdad, where he found President Hussein "fine and more relaxed than on my previous visit" six days earlier. The Iraqi leader, he said, reiterated that he was willing to withdraw from most of Kuwait — exactly to where he did not say — and to discuss other grievances at a meeting of heads of government in Jidda on Sunday, provided the Arab League did not condemn him or call for foreign intervention.

The King returned to Amman later that day, confident that agreement was possible, but he said he was unable to get either King Fahd or President Mubarak on the phone. While still waiting to convey the results of the Baghdad meeting, he said, he learned that Egypt had just condemned Iraq's invasion, and that the Arab League was preparing to take similar action that night.

King Hussein said he still did not understand why his initiative was undermined. But the condemnations dashed hopes of an early peaceful resolution to the crisis, he said, adding "Suddenly, it was all torn apart."

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

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MY TELNO 2480 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT: THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION REMAIN UNCOMPROMISING OVER THE NEED FOR FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. BUT NO SUGGESTION THAT
THIS REQUIRES AN EARLY DECISION ON THE MILITARY OPTION IN THE
ABSENCE OF A PROVOCATION. NO PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR EARLY ACTION.
CONGRESS ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THEY ARE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY DECISION
TO USE FORCE.

DETAIL

2. OUR CONTACTS WITH POLICY MAKERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OVER
THE LAST WEEK HAVE REVEALED NO MAJOR SHIFTS SINCE TUR. THE
EMPHASIS REMAINS ON THE LONG HAUL, ON THE NEED TO MAKE SANCTIONS
WORK AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF QUICKLY RETURNING THE
INTERNATIONAL FOCUS FROM JERUSALEM TO KUWAIT.

3. SECRETARY BAKER, IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THIS WEEK, HAS
EMPHASISED THE NEED TO TIGHTEN THE SCREW ON SADDAM HUSSEIN
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. HE HAS
UNDERLINED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION THAT SADDAM
HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO PROFIT FROM HIS AGGRESSION,
RULING OUT ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE
PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY OF THE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS CURRENTLY
BEING BANDIED ABOUT. HE HAS ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
MILITARY BUILD UP IN UNDERPINNING THE MESSAGE TO SADDAM, BUT
HAS NOT SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY ACTION IS IMMINENT OR
INEVITABLE. RATHER, HE HAS STRESSED THE CONTINUING NEED FOR
PATIENCE AS THE GRIP OF SANCTIONS TIGHTENS.

4. OUR CONTACTS ACCEPT THAT, ONCE THE MILITARY BUILD UP IS
COMPLETE (AROUND MID-NOVEMBER), WE WILL ENTER A PERIOD IN
WHICH DECISIONS MAY HAVE TO BE MADE. BUT WITH THE COMPLEXITY
AND RISKS OF MILITARY ACTION BECOMING EVER CLEARER, THERE
SEEMS TO BE NO INCLINATION TO RUSH THIS PROCESS. THE ONLY
SUGGESTION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE PREPARING THE
GROUND FOR POSSIBLE EARLY ACTION HAVE BEEN THE CONTINUING

REFERENCES TO THE QUOTE RAPE OF KUWAIT UNQUOTE (BAKER) AND IRAQI WAR CRIMES (THE PRESIDENT). BUT OUR JUDGEMENT IS THAT THESE WERE PRIMARILY INTENDED TO SHIFT PUBLIC ATTENTION AWAY FROM EVENTS IN JERUSALEM AND BACK TO THE GULF CRISIS. WE ARE NOT YET SEEING ANYTHING IN THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS WHICH CLEARLY SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE BEGINNING TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR WAR, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT THEY WOULD RESPOND FIRMLY TO A PROVOCATION.

5. WITH THE EMPHASIS ON THE LONG HAUL, THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE TO STRESS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING TOGETHER THE INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE. THE EVENTS IN JERUSALEM, AND THE SUBSEQUENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, HAVE BEEN THE GREATEST TEST TO ITS COHESION SO FAR. THE AVOIDANCE OF A US VETO HAS LIMITED THE DAMAGE. BUT THE ISSUE HAS NOT GONE AWAY, AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS HARM REMAINS.

6. DOMESTIC OPINION ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY SHOWS SOME EVOLUTION SINCE OUR TUR. WRANGLING OVER THE BUDGET CONTINUES TO TAKE THE HEADLINES. OPINION POLLS SHOW A MARKED DECLINE IN THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL RATING, WITH A PARALLEL DECLINE IN PUBLIC APPROVAL FOR HIS HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS (DOWN SOME 15 POINTS TO JUST OVER 60 PER CENT). BUT THIS SHIFT IS NOT NECESSARILY PERMANENT. IT MAY MAKE FOR CONTINUED CAUTION IN HANDLING THE GULF CRISIS BUT THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF IT LEADING TO ANY FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISAL OF US STRATEGY.

7. CONGRESS, MEANWHILE, HAS STILL NOT SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY, WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT, SO FAR AS THE HILL IS CONCERNED, HAVE CARTE BLANCHE. THE CONGRESS CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT THE PRESIDENT REQUIRES ITS AUTHORITY TO INITIATE MILITARY ACTION, AND IS SEEKING TO PUT IN PLACE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENABLE CONGRESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY ADMINISTRATION DECISION TO TAKE ACTION DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECESS FOR THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS (THE RECESS IS DUE TO BEGIN ON 27 OCTOBER). THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE RESPONDED WITH PROMISES OF CONSULTATION BUT NO MORE AND WITH REFERENCES TO OPERATIONAL SECURITY. THESE EXCHANGES, IN OUR VIEW, REFLECT LONGSTANDING DIVISION OVER THE VALIDITY OF THE WAR POWERS ACT, RATHER THAN ANY PRESENT SENSE IN CONGRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT TAKE THE COUNTRY PRECIPITOUSLY INTO A WAR.

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Following for General Scowcroft from Charles Powell.

Dear Brent,

As Antony Acland will have told you, Percy Cradock is planning to be in Washington next week at the Prime Minister's suggestion and is looking forward to his meeting with you on 23 October. It will inevitably centre on the Gulf. He will not want to get into sensitive areas of military strategy and planning, but would welcome a good exchange of views on the crisis in its various aspects and the options open to us (and to the Iraqis) in the coming months. He will of course treat the substance of the discussions with the greatest discretion and will report only to the Prime Minister.

Warm regards,

CHARLES

CDP 19/x

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T O P S E C R E T

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL.

DEAR BRENT,

AS ANTONY ACLAND WILL HAVE TOLD YOU, PERCY CRADOCK IS PLANNING TO BE IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION AND IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH YOU ON 23 OCTOBER. IT WILL INEVITABLE CENTRE ON THE GULF. HE WILL NOT WANT TO GET INTO SENSITIVE AREAS OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND PLANNING, BUT WOULD WELCOME A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CRISIS IN ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS AND THE OPTIONS OPEN TO US (AND TO THE IRAQIS) IN THE COMING MONTHS. HE WILL OF COURSE TREAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREATEST DISCRETION AND WILL REPORT ONLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

WARM REGARDS,

CHARLES

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ATHENS PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
MY TELNO 1664: IRAQ/KUWAIT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. NO PROGRESS. AMERICANS STILL DO NOT HAVE CLEARANCE. COUNCIL WILL REVERT TO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON 19 OCTOBER.

DETAIL

2. NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON 18 OCTOBER ON THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AGREED BETWEEN MISSIONS OF THE FIVE. THE AMERICANS REMAINED UNABLE TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE OF THE TEXT FROM WASHINGTON.

3. NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MET ON THE AFTERNOON OF 18 OCTOBER AND DISCUSSED A 'PIRATE' COPY OF THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS (WE ARE NOT SURE WHICH VERSION). THE YEMENIS AND CUBANS GRUMBLED THAT IT LACKED FOCUS AND THAT THE TWO PARAGRAPHS DRAWN FROM THEIR 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' DRAFT HAD DISTORTED THEIR INTENTIONS. THEY ALSO ARGUED THAT SINCE THE FIVE WERE STILL WORKING ON THEIR TEXT, THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT THESE PARAGRAPHS WOULD SURVIVE. THEY THEREFORE URGED THE AFRICANS TO JOIN THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN SPONSORING THE 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' DRAFT.

4. ACCORDING TO OUR ETHIOPIAN COLLEAGUES, THE AFRICANS RESISTED. THE ETHIOPIANS SAID THAT THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE INVITED TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO PUT FORWARD SUCH A RESOLUTION AT THIS STAGE, AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE ASKED WHETHER HE SAW ANY SCOPE FOR AN EARLY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. THE ETHIOPIANS AND IVORIANS BROADLY WELCOMED THE IDEAS IN THE TEXT OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND SAID HOW HELPFUL IT WAS THAT THEY HAD TAKEN NON-ALIGNED CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.

5. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CUBANS HAD EARLIER TOLD A NUMBER OF ARAB DELEGATIONS THEY WERE GOING TO PUSH HARD FOR THE 'PEACE OFFENSIVE'

PAGE 1
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DRAFT. THEY TOLD THE NON-ALIGNED THAT THIS DRAFT SHOULD HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PROPOSALS BY THE FIVE WHEN THE COUNCIL VOTED. THE CUBANS AND YEMENIS HINTED THAT THE TEXT OF THE FIVE WOULD REQUIRE MUCH DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION: OUR ETHIOPIAN CONTACTS SPECULATED THAT THIS AMOUNTED TO AN ATTEMPT TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF IT UNTIL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ITEM RETURNED TO THE COUNCIL.

6. WHEN THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SUBSEQUENTLY SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO URGE HIM TO DESPATCH HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THEY ALSO ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' DRAFT. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTEDLY SAID THAT IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WISHED HIM TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES IN THE WAY PROPOSED, THIS WOULD GIVE HIM NO DIFFICULTIES.

COMMENT

7. THE POSITION HAS NOW BEEN RADICALLY CHANGED BY THE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TOWARDS THE END OF THE DAY - FIRST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION NOT TO SEND HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO REPORT ACORDINGLY TO THE COUNCIL, AND SECOND THE REPORTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE GAZA STRIP (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM). THESE MAKE THE FUTURE OF OUR NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION HIGHLY PROBLEM-ATICAL. MY U S COLLEGE TOLD ME AT THE END OF THE DAY THAT HE BELIEVED WASHINGTON HAD 'ALMOST DECIDED' TO AUTHORISE HIM TO ACCEPT THE TEXT OF THE FIVE AS IT STOOD. IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES HIS INCLINATION WOULD BE TO LEAVE THE DRAFT ON THE TABLE 'IN BLUE' (IE AS A DRAFT FORMALLY TABLED BUT STILL SUBJECT TO CHANGE) UNTIL WE COULD ASSESS ITS PROSPECTS.

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ie. following your talk.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1990

Richard

088 18/10

Aca Charles,

Gulf Crisis: Burden-sharing

/ You may be interested to see the enclosed table that we have prepared to compare the costs of the crisis that we are bearing (military, resettlement of refugees and economic assistance to countries affected by the imposition of sanctions against Iraq, taken together) with the costs being borne by others. This shows clearly that, leaving aside the Gulf States whose territory is actually being defended, our share of the overall costs is second only to that of the US and ahead of that of France, Germany, Japan and Canada. The other countries fall well short, with the notable exception of Korea, whose response ought to shame a considerable number of much wealthier countries.

The table incorporates contributions from member states towards the EC Budget packages for economic assistance and refugees. The breakdown of these contributions is shown on a separate page.

Most of the military figures are not in the public domain and there is even sensitivity about some aid pledges (particularly some made by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). The figures are, therefore, subject to amendment and should be read as our best estimates. We will update the table from time to time.

On Monday 22 October, there is a meeting in Washington of the Technical Group that feeds into the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (FCG), set up by the US. This Technical Group meeting will review the position on commitments by donors, ready for the next meeting of the FCG in early November. In the light of that review, we will wish to take stock of the difficulties facing the countries most directly affected by the imposition of sanctions (ie Jordan, Egypt and Turkey) and whether the amounts of assistance being committed and actually paid out are adequate to meet those needs.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MoD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

John
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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BURDEN-SHARING	Military (US\$m)	Economic (US\$m)	Refugees (US\$m)	TOTAL (US\$m)	GDP (US\$bn)	% of GDP (%)
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THOSE PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY EFFORT

USA	36,000	—	10.0	36,010	5,166	0.70
UK	1,805	113	22.5	1,941	831	0.23
France	1,676	224	17.7	1,918	948	0.20
Canada	622	50	18.0	690	546	0.13
Italy	205	245	10.6	461	864	0.05
Spain	103	55	9.0	167	376	0.04
Australia	85	—	0.8	86	283	0.03
Netherlands	17	54	4.6	76	225	0.03
Denmark	10	32	6.2	48	105	0.05
Belgium	12	26	4.9	43	151	0.03
Norway	3	—	20.0	23	93	0.02
Greece	N.A.	9	0.9	10	54	0.02
Portugal	N.A.	8	0.7	9	37	0.02

GULF STATES

Saudi Arabia	3,000	3,500	155.0	6,655	87	7.65
Kuwait	2,500	2,500	—	5,000	26	19.23
UAE	1,000	1,000	—	2,000	24	8.33

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BURDEN-SHARING	Military (US\$m)	Economic (US\$m)	Refugees (US\$m)	TOTAL (US\$m)	GDP (US\$bn)	% of GDP (%)
THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY EFFORT						
Japan	2,000	1,978	22.0	4,000	2,812	0.14
FRG	1,083	1,013	26.6	2,123	1,200	0.18
Korea	120	100	—	220	150	0.15
Austria	—	91	1.0	92	127	0.07
Switzerland	—	75	5.4	80	174	0.05
Sweden	—	20	16.9	37	190	0.02
Taiwan	—	30	—	30	—	—
Ireland	—	4	1.3	5	33	0.02
Iceland	—	—	2.4	2	5	0.05
Finland	—	—	2.2	2	115	0.00
New Zealand	—	—	1.6	2	41	0.00

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BURDEN-SHARING: EC COUNTRIES

	Economic (US\$m)	Refugees (US\$m)	% of EC contribution	
			Economic	Refugees
FRG	185	19.3	27.79	25.03
France	124	14.2	18.70	18.45
UK	113	17.2	16.99	22.34
Italy	95	10.6	14.34	13.71
Spain	46	4.3	6.96	5.58
Netherlands	39	4.6	5.82	6.01
Belgium	26	3.0	3.98	3.91
Denmark	12	1.5	1.80	1.89
Greece	9	0.9	1.38	1.22
Portugal	8	0.7	1.21	0.89
Ireland	6	0.6	0.86	0.83
Luxembourg	1	0.1	0.16	0.15
TOTAL	665	77.0	100.00	100.00

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NOTES TO THE TABLES

- The £/\$ exchange rate used is 1.90.
- The figures for military contributions are drawn from MOD information. Where figures are available only for costs to the end of 1990, they have been doubled to give an estimate of annualised costs. (This is in line with the procedure we have used for UK).
- The EC budget contributions for refugees (58 MECU, \$77 million) and economic assistance (500 MECU, \$665 million) have been broken down on a separate page to show the additional contributions by member states resulting from additions to the EC budget. These additional contributions are included in the members' figures in the main table.
- The EC member states have also agreed in principle to provide 1 BECU (\$1.3 billion) in national contributions. The bilateral contributions already announced by Germany, France and Italy already amount to over \$1 billion.
- 1989 GDP figures for OECD countries are drawn from OECD's "Main Economic Indicators (March 1990 edition)". For the Gulf countries GNP figures for 1988 are drawn from the World Bank Atlas.
- The US has offered to write off \$7 billion of Egypt's military debt. This will have little immediate cash flow benefit. Qatar has offered to write off \$200m of debt owed by a range of countries.
- In addition to the 16 countries listed in the table, the following 13 countries are also participating in the military effort: Afghanistan; Argentina; Bangladesh; Bahrain; Czechoslovakia; Egypt; Morocco; Oman; Pakistan; Poland; Qatar; Senegal; Syria.
- The following countries also have offered or are considering offering military assistance: Hungary; Lesotho; Niger; Nigeria.

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NOTES TO THE TABLES (CONTINUED)

- Information on the concessionality of economic assistance contributions is as follows:

EC	\$665m	largely grants
France	\$100m	probably loans
Canada	\$50m	n/a
Italy	\$150m	probably loans
Netherlands	\$15m	n/a
Denmark	\$20m*	n/a
Saudi Arabia	\$3,500m	apparently grants
Kuwait	\$2,500m	n/a
UAE	\$1,000m	n/a
Japan	\$1,978m	\$600m loan at 1% interest; \$30m grants; \$1348m less concessional loans
FRG	\$828m	\$350m grants; \$478m probably loans
Korea	\$100m	\$40m loans \$60m in kind
Austria	\$91m	n/a
Switzerland	\$75m*	n/a
Sweden	\$20m*	n/a
Taiwan	\$30m	n/a

* To be confirmed

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER

1. GOOD ATMOSPHERE BUT PREDICTABLE DIFFERENCES. NO APPARENT GIVE ON ISRAELI POSITION TO REJECT SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION. INSISTENCE THAT SHAMIR PLAN IS THE WAY FORWARD ON ARAB/ISRAEL AND THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD PRESS PALESTINIANS TO ACCEPT IT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MET THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER FOR AN HOUR THIS MORNING. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL AND BRITAIN HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY MIDDLE EAST WITH A SECURE AND CONFIDENT ISRAEL. THE BIGGEST THREAT TO THIS WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE PRIORITY MUST BE TO GET HIM OUT OF KUWAIT. EITHER BY PEACEFUL MEANS OR BY FORCE. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD WISELY KEPT A LOW PROFILE IN THE GULF CRISIS, ALTHOUGH MR LEVY HAD LEFT US IN NO DOUBT ABOUT ISRAEL'S ANXIETIES. WE NEED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE REGION - FOR EXAMPLE, IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT AND RETAINED HIS MILITARY POWER WE WOULD NEED TO THINK HOW THE CONSEQUENT DANGER COULD BE CONTAINED AND REDUCED. ON THAT BRITAIN AND ISRAEL HAD AN IDENTICAL INTEREST. OUR DIFFERENCES AROSE BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS PORTRAYING HIMSELF AS THE ONLY PERSON WHO REMEMBERED THE PALESTINIANS. THIS WAS NOT SO. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF WE ALLOWED IT TO APPEAR THAT OTHERS HAD FORGOTTEN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. NEITHER WE NOR PRESIDENT BUSH WERE SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INITIATIVE NOW. THAT COULD ONLY HAPPEN ONCE IRAQ HAD WITHDRAWN FROM KUWAIT. AFTER THAT, THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A FRESH EFFORT. WE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION. THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM COULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS, WITH WHOM ISRAEL WAS STILL FORMALLY AT A STATE OF WAR. WE HOPED THAT IN THE

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NEW SITUATION WHICH WOULD ARISE AFTER THE GULF CRISIS THERE WOULD BE ROOM FOR NEW THINKING. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NEED TO THINK AGAIN, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE PLO HAD MADE A GRAVE ERROR IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE ALSO HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE FRESH THINKING BY ISRAEL.

4. SHAMIR AGREED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON DANGER TO THE MIDDLE EAST FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE SITUATION THAT HE HAD CREATED WAS UNTENABLE. IT WAS A PROBLEM FOR ALL THE CIVILISED WORLD. BUT THERE WAS A SPECIAL ASPECT RELATED TO ISRAEL. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DECIDED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE A TARGET - HE HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT IF THERE WERE MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ISRAEL WOULD BE A MAIN TARGET OF IRAQ'S MISSILES. SADDAM HUSSEIN CLAIMED THAT ISRAEL WAS AN ACTIVE PARTNER IN THE COALITION AGAINST IRAQ, ALTHOUGH SHAMIR DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WAS SIMPLY SAYING THIS OR WHETHER HE BELIEVED IT. PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PEOPLE TOLD HIM WHAT HE WANTED TO HEAR. BUT THERE WAS A REAL DANGER TO ISRAEL. THE GOVERNMENT HAD ISSUED CW PROTECTION TO ITS CITIZENS.

5. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN. IT WAS IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO SEE THAT JORDAN REMAINED STABLE. JORDAN WAS THE BUFFER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAQ. SO FAR JORDAN HAD DONE ITS BEST TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO CONFRONTATION ON THE ISRAEL/JORDAN BORDER, AND THAT NEITHER TERRORISTS NOR WEAPONS WERE INFILTRATED INTO ISRAEL. THERE WAS A TACIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL. BUT ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE HAPPENING ON JORDAN'S EASTERN BORDER. THE NEWSPAPER HAD TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, BUT THIS WAS QUITE WRONG. NEVERTHELESS IS IRAQ ATTACKED ISRAEL OR MOVED INTO JORDAN, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND AND THAT WOULD NEED COORDINATION WITH OTHERS. THIS WAS A DELICATE PROBLEM.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TRIED TO KEEP CLOSE TO THE JORDANIANS AND HE HAD ONLY RECENTLY TALKED TO KING HUSSEIN AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN. JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WERE VERY BAD - BOTH MUBARAK AND KING FAHD FELT INSULTED AND DECEIVED AND WERE RELUCTANT TO HELP KING HUSSEIN. THE JORDANIANS WERE TRYING TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS AND KING HUSSEIN HAD FOR THE MOMENT STOPPED HIS POLICY OF MEDIATION. BUT EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WERE NOT READY TO MEND THEIR FENCES WITH THE KING. THIS CREATED A DANGEROUS SITUATION - KING HUSSEIN WAS BETTER THAN ANYONE WHO MIGHT TAKE HIS PLACE. SHAMIR AGREED. THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTY OF THE KING'S POSITION, BUT THE SITUATION WAS DANGEROUS.

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HE HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD KNOW EXACTLY WHEN THE IRAQIS ENTERED JORDAN: THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THERE WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE COORDINATION. BUT KING HUSSEIN KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THAT ISRAEL HAD NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTION AGAINST JORDAN.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD READ SHAMIR'S STATEMENT TO THE KNESSET ABOUT SCR 672. HE HOPED THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND OF ENABLING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION TO COME TO ISRAEL. LEVY HAD RIGHTLY SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD A TRADITION OF RECEIVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVES, EVEN UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WERE ANXIOUS THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN WHAT THEY WERE AFTER - A SERIES OF SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES WHICH DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. SHAMIR SAID THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ISRAEL COULD NOT ACT DIFFERENTLY. THAT JERUSALEM WAS PART OF ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGN TERRITORY WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. THERE WAS A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THIS AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE CITY STATUS. SHAMIR HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE SECRETARY GENERAL, BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ISRAEL HAD ALREADY INSTITUTED AN INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION, WHOSE REPORT SHOULD BE READY NEXT WEEK. IT WOULD BE PUBLIC AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD READ IT. HE SAW NO NEED FOR ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION. ISRAEL REGRETTED THE LOSS OF LIFE, ESPECIALLY IN JERUSALEM GIVEN THE EFFORTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE TO AVOID ANYTHING OF THIS SORT. SINCE 1967 JERUSLEM HAD BEEN PEACEFUL. IT HAD BEEN AN OPEN CITY WITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR ALL. THIS WAS IN CONTRAST TO PRE 1967 WHEN EAST JERUSALEM HAD EFFECTIVELY BEEN CLOSED. SHAMIR UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW OVER JERUSALEM'S STATUS BUT SOME OF THE WORDING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION HAD BEEN INSULTING. FOR EXAMPLE, TO REFER TO THE INCIDENT AT QUOTE HARAM AL SHARIS UNQUOTE, BUT NOT TO MENTION TEMPLE MOUNT OR THE WESTERN WALL, INFLAMED ISRAELI EMOTIONS. TO ACCEPT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE TO ACCEPT ARAB TERRORISM.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE VERY STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE. BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE SURELY SKILFUL ENOUGH TO FEEL THEY COULD RECEIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP - THEN THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER AND ANOTHER. THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION THAT THE DEATHS FOLLOWED AN ATTACK WITH ROCKS AND STONES ON JEWISH WORSHIPPERS. AS REGARDS THE DANGER OF DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM

SADDAM HUSSEIN, MANY ARABS REALISED THAT THE GULF CRISIS WAS A FAR GREATER DANGER IN THAT IT REPRESENTED A PHYSICAL THREAT TO THEM.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD STUDIED THE SHAMIR PLAN. BUT WHAT REALISTICALLY WERE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS WHO WERE NOT CONNECTED WITH THE PLO? COULD ISRAEL IDENTIFY PALESTINIANS WITH WHOM IT COULD DO BUSINESS, OR WAS THE PRESENT SITUATION GOING TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY? SHAMIR REPLIED THAT SOME PEOPLE ACCUSED HIM OF WANTING TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. THIS WAS NOT SO. (THE SECRETARY OF STATE INTERJECTED THAT IF SHAMIR DID NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO HE WAS NEVERTHELESS PRETTY GOOD AT DOING SO). SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTED PEACE. JEWS WERE NOW ARRIVING IN ISRAEL IN GREAT NUMBERS AND IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE SORT OF ISRAEL THEY WANTED ISRAEL NEEDED PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS. PALESTINIAN TERRORISM WAS A PROBLEM WHICH ISRAEL COULD HANDLE. IT WAS NOT A DANGER TO THE COUNTRY'S EXISTENCE. ANY DANGER OF WAR WOULD COME FROM COUNTRIES, NOT TERRORISTS: THE MAIN TEST OF PEACE WOULD BE WHETHER RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB COUNTRIES COULD BE IMPROVED. ISRAEL WAS STILL FORMALLY AT A STATE OF WAR WITH HER NEIGHBOURS. A SETTLEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS THEREFORE DEPENDED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS. ARAB GOVERNMENTS MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO URGE THE PALESTINIANS TO COME TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. BUT IT WAS NOT POPULAR DOMESTICALLY FOR ARABS TO TALK ABOUT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. EVEN MUBARAK FOUND THAT IT SERVED HIS INTERESTS TO SAY THAT HE SUPPORTED THE PLO EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT LIKE THEM. THE SAME WAS TRUE OF ASAD AND KING HUSSEIN.

10. SHAMIR ACCEPTED THAT HIS PLAN WAS NOT EASY TO IMPLEMENT. BUT IT WAS BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD AND SERVED AS A GOOD FRAMEWORK BECAUSE IT DID NOT REQUIRE THE ARABS TO TALK ABOUT A PERMANENT SOLUTION. IT ONLY PROPOSED THE WAY TO PROCEED TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE PLAN WOULD WORK IN TWO STAGES: FIRST THERE WOULD BE TALKS LEADING TO AUTONOMY AND ONLY THEN WOULD THERE BE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT A PERMANENT SOLUTION. THE PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS PROCESS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT PEACE: THEIR REAL ASPIRATION WAS TO DESTROY ISRAEL. PLO SUPPORT FOR IRAQ FOR FURTHER PROOF OF THIS THE PLO SAW SADDAM HUSSEIN AS THE MAN WHO WOULD PUT AN END TO ISRAEL. BUT MANY PALESTINIANS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD GET NOTHING FROM ISRAEL BY VIOLENCE, BUT THEY COULD GET A LOT THROUGH NEGOTIATION. HE ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT GOOD NEGOTIATORS.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SHAMIR PLAN WAS

BASED ON CAMP DAVID, THE FACT WAS THAT THIS PART OF CAMP DAVID HAD NOT WORKED. THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO PRESS ON THE PALESTINIANS A PROCESS WHICH BEGAN FROM WHAT THEY REGARDED AS THE WRONG END - WHAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO GRANT THE PALESTINIANS RATHER THAN THE SELF DETERMINATION WHICH THEY, AND WE, THOUGHT THE PALESTINIANS MUST HAVE. WE NEEDED TO FIND A WAY TO RECONCILE ISRAEL'S NEED FOR SECURITY WITH THE NEED OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR SELF DETERMINATION. HOWEVER UNSATISFACTORY THE PLO WERE, THEY STILL HAD SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT.

12. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD DEVIATE FROM THE CAMP DAVID PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD RESULTED FROM COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES. RUBINSTEIN (CABINET SECRETARY) INTERJECTED THAT THE PALESTINIANS NEVER MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MISS AN OPPORTUNITY. THIS WAS A HISTORIC PATTERN GOING BACK TO THE 1920S. IT WAS OPEN TO THE PALESHMNIANS TO SAY THAT THEY SHAMIR PLAN WAS NOT IDEAL BUT THAT THEY COULD BUILD ON IT. INSTEAD THEY WERE MISSING ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY BY EMPHASISING WHAT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED RATHER THAN WHAT WAS FEASIBLE. THE INTIFADA WAS CONTINUING, BUT HALF OF ITS ENERGY WAS DEVOTED TO INTERNAL BATTLES. BRITAIN SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THE PALESTINIANS TO ACCEPT THE SHAMIR PLAN.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE INTIFADA HAD CREATED BITTERNESS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH WOULD BE HARD TO ERADICATE. BUT IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW IT COULD END. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WOULD COME TO AN END. IN 1936-39 THERE HAD BEEN AN INTIFADA, BUT IT HAD PETERED OUT WITHOUT A RESULT. THE PRESENT INTIFADA WOULD BE OVERCOME. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCING THE PALESTINIANS TO TRY THE ISRAELI PLAN. THERE WAS EVEN SOME OPPOSITION TO THE SHAMIR PLAN IN THE ISRAELI CABINET. BUT IF THE PLAN WAS ACCEPTED THEY COULD LEAVE AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY MIGHT BE FORMED. BUT THE FIRST STEP WAS FOR THE EUROPEANS TO CONVINCING THE PALESTINIANS.

MIERS

YYYY

ADVANCE

12/16

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS(2)
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~
MR GORE-BOOTH
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TEMPORARILY RETAINED S. Gray 7/1/2017

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 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/NO 10, PS, PS/MR WALDERGRAVE, PS/PUS

EGYPT, ISRAL AND GREECE, 12 -19 OCTOBER

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MINUTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:



EGYPT

THE ISRAELIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT EGYPT'S STABILITY, BUT I FOUND NO
 CORROBORATION. I SAW MUBARAK ON THE DAY OF THE FUNERAL OF THE
 SPEAKER, WHO HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED IN MID-MORNING OUTSIDE A HOTEL
 IN CENTRAL CAIRO. BUT HE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ANXIETY, AND WAS HIS
 USUAL BREEZY SELF. HE PRESENTS HIS VIEWS WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY
 AND THEY ARE SOME TIMES WRONG (BEFORE OVER SADDAM HUSSEIN, NOW
 OVER QADAFI). BUT I WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF HE WAVERED IN HIS
 STANCE AGAINST IRAQ NOW. NATIONALIST FEELING IN EGYPT IS
 (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) EGYPTIAN, NOT ARAB. MUBARAK HAS REAL
 PROBLEMS WITH MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM, BUT THEY GO BACK WELL
 BEFORE SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO WITH HIS NON-RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND IS NOT
 WELL PLACED TO EXPLOIT THEM. THE ECONOMY IS IN A BAD WAY, WITH
 MANY CANCELLED TOURIST BOOKINGS AND REVENUE FROM THE CANAL AND
 GULF REMITTANCES WELL DOWN.

ISRAEL

I AM AFRAID I LANDED IN THE MUD THERE AND AM SORRY IF THIS CAUSED
 YOU DIFFICULTY. THE TACTIC OF SPEAKING OUT IN ADVANCE (SO THAT I
 DID NOT HAVE TO SPOIL THE VISIT BY SPELLING OUT OUR CRITICISM OF
 THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN PUBLIC WHILE THERE) WORKED IN THE SENSE
 THAT, WITHOUT SKIMPING THE ISSUES, I HAD FRIENDLY AND
 SERVICEABLE TALKS WITH SHAMIR, ARENS AND LEVY, AND COULD NOW GO
 BACK TO ANY OF THEM DIRECT AND INFORMALLY AT SOME MOMENT OF
 CRISIS. THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL. BUT JERUSALEM IS SO TENSE IN THE
 AFTERMATH OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT KILLINGS THAT THE PALESINIAN
 NOTABLES WERE KNOCKED OFF BALANCE BY A MISQUOTATION AND THAT PART
 OF THE EXERCISE, NECESSARY FOR BALANCE, WENT WRONG. (I GATHER
 THERE WAS THE SAME CLIFFHANGER DURING OUR VISIT FOUR YEARS AGO,
 BUT IN THE END THEY CAME TO SEE YOU BUT BOYCOTTED ME.) LEVY, THE
 FOREIGN MINISTER, IS A VAIN,

BUT NOT UNFRIENDLY. I
 FOUND SHAMIR MORE IMPRESSIVE THAN I EXPECTED - QUIETLY

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3084</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Extract Craddock to Powell 19/10/90</i>	
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+ PS S&S Defence

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INFO DESKBY 181030Z WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK NWYTXGNXJUENNTGF
FCO PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/MR WALDEGRAVE, PS/PUS, MR
GORE BOOTH, MR SLATER HEADS OF UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT GULF
CRISIS, SECURITY NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FURTHER MESSAGE FROM BAKER TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE,
BEGINS

DEAR DOUGLAS,
I APPRECIATE YOUR RAPID REPLY TO MY TUESDAY LETTER. WE WELCOME
YOUR IDEA OF SIMPLIFYING AND MARRYING OUR TWO TEXTS -- AND
INDEED THE TEXT CONSIDERED TUESDAY AFTERNOON BY THE FIVE DOES A
FINE JOB IN THAT RESPECT.

IN DISCUSSING THIS DRAFT WITH THE PRESIDENT, HE STRESSED TO ME
THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE
AS A NEW PARAGRAPH FOUR IN THAT TEXT,

"DECIDES THAT, FAILING COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3, STATES WHOSE
NATIONALS ARE BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY IRAQ'S ILLEGAL ACTIONS
ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PROVIDE NECESSARY
FOOD, WATER AND OTHER BASIC NECESSITIES TO THEIR NATIONALS, OR TO
EVACUATE THOSE NATIONALS WHO WISH TO LEAVE."

AS YOU KNOW THE PLIGHT OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS GROWS DAILY
MORE SERIOUS. ALTHOUGH WE KNOW YOUR EMBASSY CAN HOLD OUT UNTIL
YEARS'S END, THE SITUATION OF OUR EMBASSY IS MORE TENUOUS. WE
BELIEVE THAT WE MUST BE SEEN TO HAVE EXPLORED EVERY POSSIBLE
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE RELIEF SUPPLIES OR EVACUATE THESE
INDIVIDUALS.

IT WOULD BE OF THE HIGHEST SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE WERE IRAQ TO TURN
DOWN A UNITED STATES REQUEST TO SEND A SHIP TO KUWAIT UNDER THIS
AUTHORITY. AS YOU KNOW, OTHER COUNTRIES, LIKE INDIA, HAVE
ALREADY BEEN PERMITTED TO RESUPPLY AND EVACUATE THEIR NATIONALS.
THUS, WERE IRAQ TO TURN BACK OUR EFFORT, IT WOULD UNDERSCORE YET
AGAIN TO DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
DUPLICITY AND MALEVOLENCE.

/THE

THE PRESIDENT IS CONVINCED THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT RESOLUTION AND THE RIGHT TIME TO MOVE FORWARD WITH AN INITIATIVE ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE. WE HAVE NOT WANTED TO BROACH THIS IN NEW YORK OR LONDON UNTIL I HAD THE CHANCE TO CONTACT YOU DIRECTLY -- TO

ASSURE YOU KNOW THIS COMES WITH THE PRESIDENT'S AND MY PERSONAL INTEREST.

ONCE AGAIN TIME ZONES HAVE INTERFERED WITH MY REACHING YOU BY PHONE, BUT I WOULD WELCOME TALKING WITH YOU THURSDAY IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR SUPPORT.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

JIM

ENDS

4. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO.10

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UKMIS NEW YORK FOR HM AMBASSADORS
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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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FCO FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/MR WALDEGRAVE, PS/PUS, BROOMFIELD,
GORE-BOOTH, SLATER, HEADS OF UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT

ATHENS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

WASHINGTON PERSONAL FOR HM AMBASSADOR

AIRBORNE TELNOS 003 AND 004 : IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. THE U S MODUS OPERANDI IN NEW YORK IS CERTAINLY NOT DESIGNED TO GET THE BEST RESULTS EITHER FROM THE FIVE OR FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. HAVING SPENT THE WHOLE OF 17 OCTOBER LABORIOUSLY STITCHING TOGETHER AMONGST THE FIVE A NEW DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED MORE SUBSTANCE THAN THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES ORIGINALLY WANTED BUT WHICH HAD A REAL PROSPECT OF GETTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL SWITCHED FIRMLY, SWIFTLY BUT REASONABLY UNCONTENTIOUSLY BACK FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON TO IRAQ/KUWAIT, THEY NOW SEEM ALL SET TO ROLL IN A NEW ELEMENT WHICH WILL, IN MY ESTIMATION, PREVENT ANY OF THESE OBJECTIVES BEING ACHIEVED.

2. THE TROUBLE WITH THE NEW TEXT IS THAT IT NOT ONLY HAS MORE THAN A WHIFF OF A LEAD-IN TO MILITARY ACTION BUT THAT ITS NET IS CAST FAR WIDER THEN THE U S (OR OUR) EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. IT IS IN FACT DRAFTED SO AS TO APPEAR TO OFFER SCOPE ALSO FOR UNILATERAL ACTION SHOULD THE IRAQIS REFUSE TO RELEASE OUR NATIONALS HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAQ. IT IS CLEARLY UNWORKABLE WITHOUT EITHER IRAQI COOPERATION OR MILITARY ACTION.

3. GIVEN THE WIDE-RANGING IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW TEXT I WOULD SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF THE EARLIER SCENARIO, APPROVAL OF A NEW RESOLUTION BY THIS WEEKEND THUS KEEPING WELL CLEAR OF THE INEVITABLE REPRISÉ NEXT WEEK ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BEING ACHIEVED. THE CONTRARY IS ALL TOO LIKELY.

4. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE COULD MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TODAY TO

PAGE 1
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PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO KEEP THIS ELEMENT UP THEIR SLEEVE FOR THE
ROUND AFTER THIS ONE OR LATER.

HANNAY

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DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE 2

PS/NO 10



PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY

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PAGE 2
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FM ATHENS

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 637

OF 181600Z OCTOBER 90

INFO DESKBY 181715Z WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR HM AMBASSADORS
FCO FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/MR WALDEGRAVE, PS/PUS,
BROOMFIELD, GORE-BOOTH, SLATER, HEADS OF UND AND EMERGENCY
UNIT

GULF CRISIS: NEXT STEPS AT UN

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO BAKER ON THE TELEPHONE FROM ATHENS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE NEW US PROPOSAL WORRIED HIM A LOT. IT WOULD SURELY DRIVE A COACH AND HORSES THROUGH ALL WE HAD SAID ABOUT FOOD. IF IT WAS PASSED (ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT COULD BE PASSED) THE SRI LANKANS, RUSSIANS, VIETNAMESE AND PLO WERE ALL LINING UP TO SEND FOOD SHIPS. IT WOULD BE AN END TO THE FOOD EMBARGO.
2. BAKER SAID THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF BACKGROUND THAT HE COULD NOT TALK ABOUT ON THE TELEPHONE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE THE CASE. GIVEN THAT THE NEW DRAFT RAN COUNTER TO OUR POSITION ON FOOD, IT WOULD LOOK ODD AND PEOPLE MIGHT LOOK FOR ANOTHER MOTIVE. HE KNEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD A REAL PROBLEM WITH THEIR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ALSO WORRIED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT AGREE TO TALK ABOUT IT AND DRAG US INTO PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS.
3. BAKER SUGGESTED TWO ALTERNATIVES TO MEET THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONCERNS. EITHER WE COULD NARROW THE PASSAGE TO COVER ONLY KUWAIT OR TO COVER ONLY EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. BUT HE SAW THAT THE LATTER WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH INCENTIVE FOR THE NON-ALIGNED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE FORMER OPTION WOULD STILL BE CONTRARY TO OUR LINE ON THE FOOD EMBARGO. HE AGREED HOWEVER THAT WE SHOULD PRESS AHEAD WITH A RESOLUTION QUICKLY. HIS TALKS IN JERUSALEM HAD SHOWN LITTLE GIVE IN THE ISRAELI REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION SO IT WAS IMPORTANT QUICKLY TO SECURE A FURTHER RESOLUTION ON THE OULF. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD NOT MAKE SOMETHING OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH OUR DELEGATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TALKING ABOUT.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER AGREED THAT IN THE MEANTIME OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK SHOULD CARRY THE ARGUMENT FORWARD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WONDERED WHETHER SOMETHING TO MEET US CONCERNS ON ITS EMBASSY MIGHT BE SLIPPED INTO A RESOLUTION COVERING A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WITH BAKER THAT HE WOULD TALK TO HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM ATHENS TOMORROW NIGHT.

MIERS



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1990

Dear Stephen

THE GULF

I attach in an envelope to be opened only by the Secretary of State:

- a record of the Prime Minister's talk with Secretary Cheney.
- a message which the Prime Minister sent to President Bush earlier today about the Gulf.
- the President's reply.
- the record of the subsequent telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and the President.
- a further message which the Prime Minister sent the President after consulting the Defence Secretary, Mr. Waldegrave and CDS.

I should be grateful if you could ask the Foreign Secretary to treat them as for his own information only, and to return them to me in the envelope provided.

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



Copy no. 2 of 3 copies

File 29
No '2c'

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

THE GULF

I attach:

- a message which the Prime Minister sent to President Bush today about the Gulf.
- the President's reply.
- the record of the subsequent telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and the President.
- a further message which the Prime Minister sent the President after consulting the Defence Secretary, Mr. Waldegrave and CDS.

I should be grateful if you could return them to me once you have read them.

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

18 October 1990

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

TO BE OPENED ONLY BY

C. D. POWELL

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Shown to ^{12(a-}
Defence Secretary
and CDS on
2 October, on the
Prime Minister's
instructions.

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF CRISIS: THE MILITARY OPTION

The Prime Minister and President Bush had a very private talk in New York this evening about the military option in the current Gulf crisis. General Scowcroft and I were present throughout. Secretary Baker was with us for part of the time.

CDS
2/x

The Prime Minister said that she was struck by certain similarities in the decision-making on military issues between the Gulf crisis and the Falklands conflict. You tended to assume that you had more time at your disposal than was actually the case. In practice, there had only been a very brief 'window' for launching the military operation to recover the Falklands. The same might be true in the Gulf. We had a relatively limited period during which the temperature was suitable for military operations, probably from November through to March/April. We had to squeeze into that period both time for sanctions to work and time for a resort to the military option if they did not. If the window was missed, we would probably have to wait until next autumn for another chance: and in practice that probably meant never. So in a sense you had to fit the politics to the military requirement. Above all, you had to keep in mind that our forces were being asked to risk their lives: you had to be ready to let them take action at the time which was best for them.

As for justification for military action, that existed already. Saddam Hussain was in effect at war with Kuwait, even though he did not have an opponent. Every day brought new information on atrocities there. No further pretext was needed. The Prime Minister added that she was against going to the United Nations to secure backing for the military option. We already had all the legal entitlement which we needed. The UN would only try to put constraints on it, which could put our forces at risk. We had no right to subject them to that.

TOP SECRET

Much of this clearly struck the President as new. The US military had not mentioned such time constraints to him. Nor had he got a date in mind for military action: all planning was a contingency basis. His thoughts continued to focus on an Iraqi provocation, as the most likely cause of conflict, with a massive American response. He was worried in particular by the extent to which Iraq was dabbling with terrorism. The US had warned Saddam Hussain that this would meet with a severe reaction. More generally, he thought military liaison between the US and the UK was going very well. The Prime Minister would be familiar with the details of US military planning, although the plans were subject to alteration in the light of the changing deployment of Iraqi forces. The Prime Minister said her point was that the military option might be realistic only for a relatively short period. It was no good saying that sanctions must be given time to work, if the consequence was to take us past the military window of opportunities. The President said that he saw the force of this, but was surprised that the Pentagon had not mentioned it.

The President asked how the Prime Minister assessed public opinion in the UK on the Gulf. The Prime Minister said she was confident we could hold public opinion, which saw Saddam Hussain as a dictator, even in the event of military action.

The President said that Secretary Baker thought the United States should go back to the United Nations for another resolution to endorse use of force. He himself was not persuaded. The Prime Minister repeated it would be a mistake, especially to try for a resolution under Article 42. The UN would insist on defining the amount of force which was 'necessary' to recover Kuwait. We had all the authority we needed under Article 51 and a letter from the Amir, and should not risk argument and delay. The worst outcome would be to seek such a resolution and fail to get it.

The Prime Minister repeated that we should not let the opportunity to use the military option go by, or be so eroded that we could not use it effectively. The whole reputation of

the US and the UK was on the line. She was increasingly convinced that Saddam Hussain would not withdraw as a result of sanctions. Indeed our assessment was that sanctions would have little effect on Iraqi decisions over the next few months. We could not afford to come out of the present situation without having done the job effectively, by one means or the other. Her concern was that Saddam Hussain would try to provoke us before we were ready.

The President said that the US was already in a position to respond to any provocation by implementing Phase 1-3 of its overall strategy, that is to use its overwhelming air power to 'decapitate' the Iraqi command structure by destroying its communications and strategic assets. But they were not yet ready to follow up with land forces. The Prime Minister said she saw some danger in this: if we went right through Phases 1-3 before we were ready to implement Phase 4 and 5, we would be vulnerable to an Iraqi counter-attack. The President doubted this was a great danger. If there was an Iraqi provocation tomorrow, the US would respond with devastating punishment from the air. It would go into Iraq and hit a lot of targets there: 'all the stuff Dugan got fired for'. The US would control the air and Iraq's options would be limited: they had no experience of mounting ground operations without air superiority. This was as far as US thinking had gone. They had not yet thought out use of the military option except as a response to Iraqi provocation. The Prime Minister said she still had doubts whether it was wise to use Phases 1-3 without being ready to go on to Phases 4 and 5. Phases 1-3 on their own were unlikely to recover Kuwait. Moreover, there would be strong international pressure 'for a 'limited and proportionate' response to an Iraqi provocation, rather than going the whole way. We ought to work out some options which were more limited than Phases 1-3 in their entirety.

The President said he remained very worried about the response of the Arab world if Iraq were to attack Israel. He thought this remained a real possibility, although some of the speculation about it was being fuelled by the Israelis

themselves. Arab support for action against Iraq was likely to fall away rapidly if Saddam Hussaian played the Israel card. The Prime Minister noted that the Israelis had been restrained so far. She suspected from what Crown Prince Hassan had said to her that they were in close touch with the Jordanians. She thought they would not move unless compelled to do so.

The Prime Minister asked what we would do in the event of an Iraqi attack with CW or BW. The President said that world opinion would eat Saddam Hussain for lunch if ~~he~~ he resorted to this. The Prime Minister doubted whether Saddam Hussain would be deterred by world opinion. Did the US itself have CW in the area to act as a deterrent? The President said that use or threatened use of CW would only put the US in the wrong with world opinion. It would be better to launch an all-out conventional attack and wipe Saddam Hussain off the face of the earth. He was not twenty feet tall. There was intelligence that Iraq's CW and BW capability were not very effective, although the US did not really know. Moreover, there were some signs that Saddam Hussain was beginning to realise the full enormity of what he had unleashed. The President added that he did not think stories, like the one attributed to a defence source in the British Sunday papers about the possible use of nuclear weapons, were at all helpful.

The Prime Minister asked whether the President was confident of US ability to destroy Iraq's nuclear facilities.

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Wayland
12 January 2017

The Prime Minister cautioned the President against believing that everything would work out precisely as planned on the military front. It hardly ever did. Talk of getting Iraq out of Kuwait in three weeks was unrealistic: it would probably take much longer and there would be heavy casualties. You would not liberate Kuwait by air strikes alone.

The President said that the main point which he retained from the discussion with the Prime Minister was that the US had initially defined its objectives too narrowly by limiting them to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate government. He was now convinced 'this guy is going to have to go' if the problem was ever to be resolved. The status quo ante was not good enough. The Prime Minister agreed with this. The President said that General Scowcroft should keep in close touch with me about the issues which he and the Prime Minister had discussed.

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

30 September 1990

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE UNITED STATES
DEFENCE SECRETARY, 15 OCTOBER

The Prime Minister had an hour's talk this afternoon with Secretary Cheney. The Defence Secretary was also present. The talk was concerned entirely with the military situation in the Gulf.

Secretary Cheney said that the matters which he was proposing to discuss with the Prime Minister were held within a very small circle indeed in Washington, consisting of the President, himself, Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft and General Colin Powell. He would be grateful if they could be restricted to a similarly small circle on the British side. The Prime Minister confirmed that this was also our practice.

The Prime Minister said she would like to set out her views about the military option in the Gulf. First, she found no difficulty in setting the objective. She did not believe that Saddam Hussain would withdraw from Kuwait. We would have to eject him, and that would mean destroying targets in Iraq. This would be essential in order to protect our own forces. If Saddam Hussain were against expectations to withdraw, we must demand reparations, the dismantling of his CW and BW capability and an end to his military nuclear programme. We had to insist on these conditions, otherwise we should all be sitting here in President Bush's second term discussing how to achieve what we ought to do now.

Secondly, there could be no question of the US forces returning to the United States without achieving the aim of removing Saddam Hussain from Kuwait and enforcing the conditions which she had listed. If they failed in this, the United States would have no standing left in the world.

Third, the US and the UK must be clear between themselves about the dates for implementing the military option. As she had told President Bush, we had to decide what dates would suit us

militarily, and then work backwards from there to deal with the politics. The period from mid-November to mid-February looked the most suitable from the point of view of climatic conditions. That meant we could not allow another three months or so for sanctions to work, otherwise we would run up against the return of the hot weather. We must decide on the moment that would be most advantageous from our own point of view.

Fourth, she saw no difficulty at all in devising a reasonable justification for military action. Every day Saddam Hussain was in Kuwait was a fresh crime. We did not have to wait for him to undertake some further provocation: we should move when we were ready.

Fifth, she saw no need to go back to the United Nations for authority to use force. We had all the powers we needed under Article 51. Moreover, a return to the United Nations would reveal our intentions, giving Saddam Hussain warning and therefore putting our forces in danger.

Sixth, she was very worried about Iraq's CW and BW capability. She believed that Saddam Hussain would use them, and we had to decide what our response would be. If we wished to deter a CW attack by threatening to retaliate in like manner, we must have CW weapons available. Above all, it was vital to work out in advance exactly how we would respond to the use of such weapons by Iraq.

Lastly, we must work out and agree arrangements for handling the press. The press had been one of the main factors which prevented the United States from winning the war in Vietnam: their interest was exclusively in criticism and exposure. They must at all times be kept behind the action rather than up with it, so that they could only report on what had actually happened, not leak plans.

Secretary Cheney said he would try to deal with most of these points. They had been discussed in the very small circle which he had mentioned. But not all of them had yet been resolved. It was crucial to maintain secrecy, particularly in

the event the decision was made to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iraq. As the Prime Minister would know, the Americans had devised a four phase plan, with the first three phases involving an air campaign and the fourth envisaging action by ground forces. There would be no sanctuaries from the air campaign: the Americans would strike at a very wide range of targets in Iraq, including the Iraqi Air Force, the air defence system, the SCUDs and other ballistic missiles, Iraqis CW and BW capacity, its nuclear research centres, command and control facilities, telecommunications and logistic capabilities. This would all be in phase one. In phase two they would attack other military targets in Iraq. Phase three would comprise air action against Iraqi targets in Kuwait, in particular their armoured units. Throughout all three phases, the Americans would hold back enough aircraft - some 200 in all - to defend against any attempt by Iraq to move southwards. The United States Force Commander would need 72 hours notice to launch this action. He believed the intention to move could be kept secret during this period (the Prime Minister was sceptical). Phases one and two would last some six or seven days, but phase three could last considerably longer.

Secretary Cheney continued that phase four was much more problematic. In the best case it would not be necessary: the first three phases might so undermine Iraqi morale that they simply packed up. But clearly the United States could not count on this and would have to be prepared to send in ground forces. This would be a very much more difficult operation. The Iraqi forces in Kuwait were well dug in: they had constructed substantial defences against amphibious attack: they had a tactical reserve in the northern part of Kuwait and a strategic reserve in southern Iraq. In all there were some 400,000 forces, protected by anti-tank ditches and other obstacles. The roads in Kuwait had been improved to provide greater mobility. The Americans simply did not know to what extent they could degrade these defences by air attack. In a way, it would be easier if Iraqi forces went on the offensive, because their forces would then be more vulnerable. General Powell's advice, at this stage at least, was that a ground campaign might not work. That was why it was necessary to

continue to build up the numbers of American forces.

Secretary Cheney continued that the Americans had little confidence in the capability of other units of the multinational force except those of the United Kingdom. For example, the French had logistical support for only two or three days of action. The Egyptians no logistical support at all. The Syrians were still not present and it might be two months before they arrived. The Americans therefore had to make their calculations on the basis of their own forces and British forces alone.

Secretary Cheney continued that no final decision had been taken on how to respond to an Iraqi CW attack. The President had a particular aversion to chemical weapons. The US military commanders were not keen on them, because American forces had no experience of using them and many of the weapons themselves were outmoded. Their inclination, therefore, was to rely on massive conventional response to a CW attack. They were confident that they could eliminate most of Iraq's CW capability during the initial air strikes.

Secretary Cheney asked whether the Prime Minister could contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in a Gulf conflict. The Prime Minister said she would be most reluctant to consider this, indeed she would rule it out, although nuclear weapons were always there as the ultimate deterrent. Her main concern was to deter the Iraqis from using CW, since it would have a very demoralising effect on our forces and on their families. Personally, she believed it would be justified for the United States to use CW against Iraq armoured formations in Kuwait if the Iraqis themselves used it first. Secretary Cheney repeated that the Americans were relatively less concerned about the CW threat to their forces in Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis had no experience of using CW strategically, only as a tactical battlefield weapon. The American military were confident of their ability to prevent Iraqi attempts to use air-delivered CW against them. The key was to pre-empt their use.

The Prime Minister commented that she found the prospect of

Possible use
of CW +
nuclear
weapons by
UK / US

Iraqi use of BW even more fearsome than CW. Secretary Cheney agreed that we had little information about Iraqi capabilities in this area. But the risk that they might use such weapons against soft targets must be there.

The Prime Minister asked about American targetting policy. Did they envisage the bombing of cities and civilian targets? Secretary Cheney said there was no intention to attack cities as such, although there were military targets within Baghdad and Basra which they would strike. They did not exclude attacking targets which could effect the civilian population like dams and power stations.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Americans expected Turkey to attack Iraq from the north west as part of a coordinated strike. Secretary Cheney said he was unaware of any inclination on the part of the Turks to do this. The Prime Minister pointed out that they appeared to have territorial ambitions in northern Iraq.

The Prime Minister said she thought it was unrealistic to expect military action to last only three weeks or so: it was bound to be longer. Secretary Cheney asked how the Prime Minister would react to the idea of a campaign which involved implementing the first three phases of the American plan, then pausing for a month or two. The Prime Minister said it would be a mistake to give Saddam Hussain time to recover and regroup, and possibly counter-attack. Secretary Cheney said that the Americans were confident they could defend Saudi Arabia during such a pause, they already had enough forces to guarantee that. The plan he had mentioned would enable the Americans to inflict massive damage on Iraq, and give the Iraqis the opportunity to withdraw from Kuwait without a land battle. The Prime Minister remained sceptical whether this would work. At the least, it would be necessary to keep up air attacks during the so called pause. Her instinct was that it was unwise to go ahead with the first three phases until we were ready to go in on the ground as well if necessary.

Secretary Cheney asked what the Prime Minister thought would

happen to the international coalition against Iraq in the course of a conflict. Would it hold together? The Prime Minister said that we would have to work hard to keep it together, stressing all the time that the conflict could end immediately if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. We had to think not only of our own position but that of our friends like President Mubarak, who had committed themselves to securing Iraqi withdrawal. The key was to succeed: Arabs would always support success.

Secretary Cheney asked whether the Prime Minister was concerned at the prospect that King Hussein might be toppled. The Prime Minister said she sometimes wondered these days whether an alternative would be much worse. But any upset in Jordan might draw in Israel. On reflection, she reached the conclusion that it was better to have no change.


The Prime Minister remarked that we must not make it look as if we were being more assiduous about solving the Arab/Israel problem because of Saddam Hussain. Secretary Cheney agreed, but commented that he expected there to be more violent incidents in the Occupied Territories.

The Prime Minister said it was important that Britain and the United States should agree on ROE for use in a war. The Defence Secretary said it was also vital to establish a clear procedure for keeping each other informed about the timing of a decision to resort to military action. The necessary steps must be sorted out in advance so that all concerned knew what had been agreed. He and Secretary Cheney were agreed on the importance of this. The Prime Minister added that it was also important to work closely together on targetting policy, given that our forces would be so closely enmeshed with those of the United States.


As Secretary Cheney left, the Prime Minister observed there must be no retreat now: we had to win.

C.D.P.
C. D. POWELL, 15 October 1990

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3084</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telex 181135Z Powell to Scowcroft dated 18 October 1990 (Message from PM to President Bush). (2 copies - 1 typed version, 1 teletyped)</i>	
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NOTE FOR THE RECORD**PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 18 OCTOBER**

The Prime Minister and President Bush spoke on the secure telephone for some 40 minutes this evening about the situation in the Gulf.

The President said that he had been most grateful for the Prime Minister's message earlier in the day which set out the issues very clearly. He shared many of her concerns and was growing increasingly restless about the lack of progress in getting Iraq out of Kuwait. He agreed that the key calculation was whether we had the luxury of giving sanctions time to work. They had not had the dramatic effect for which we had hoped. He was also worried about the mingling in of the Palestinian problem. This could adversely affect the cohesion of the coalition against Iraq. He was trying to get Shamir to show some flexibility over admitting the UN Secretary-General's mission to Israel, but so far without success. The result was that US/Israel relations were as bad as they had been for some time. But one had to admit that, in terms of the Gulf crisis, the Israelis had been reasonably cooperative.

The Prime Minister said that she had been grateful for the President's prompt reply to her message. She thought time was on Saddam Hussein's side: he would use it to try to weaken our resolve. She shared the President's concern about the events in Jerusalem and his dismay that Shamir would not receive the Secretary General's mission. Shamir was putting himself in the wrong, which was always a mistake. Moreover, he owed the President something because of the way the United States had responded to the situation in the Gulf. He should repay this by being helpful over the mission.

The Prime Minister continued that she was uneasy with the proposal in the President's message to invite the UN Secretary-General to use his good offices with Iraq for a period of 30-45 days. We did not have to worry about giving diplomacy a

TOP SECRET

chance: diplomacy had already been tried for eleven weeks without success. If the Secretary-General got involved in negotiations, our resolve would be undermined little by little. The other Arab Governments would come to believe that Saddam Hussein would get his way and they would weaken. Those countries who had sent troops would be left looking foolish, unable to get Saddam Hussein out. President Bush said that he understood those concerns. The only point of action by the Secretary-General would be to demonstrate that we were prepared to go the extra mile in search of peace. We would not be able to give the Secretary-General any flexibility: he would only use his good offices to secure implementation of the Security Council resolutions. The Prime Minister said that her doubts remained.

The President continued that the more urgent matter was the resolution currently before the Security Council on compensation. The United States had suggested adding a clause on the right to reproviseion nationals in Iraq and Kuwait or extract them if need be. He viewed this as something which could lead to the use of force. His particular concern was with the American Embassy in Kuwait, where there were 8 diplomats and 19 non-diplomats. The moment was arriving when a decision would have to be made between closing the Embassy and seeing the occupants slink off to Baghdad with their tails between their legs: or action either to re-supply them or to bring them out. The second option could be extended to the British and other Embassies remaining in Kuwait. He thought the American people would support him in refusing to sit by and watch those in the Embassy marched off to Baghdad. This would amount to humiliation of American citizens. He could not just turn them over to a brutal dictator. By demanding the right to reproviseion them or take them out, either Saddam Hussein could be forced to climb down or there would be a casus belli for military action.

The Prime Minister said she had some instinctive objections to this proposal. What about the American and British citizens who were not in the Embassies but elsewhere in Kuwait? Did the President envisage trying to extract them? Or would action be

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limited to the people in the Embassy? Moreover, did the proposal apply only to Kuwait or to Embassies in Baghdad? In our own case, our Ambassador was determined to stay in Kuwait for as long as possible and would not think it right to abandon other British citizens. The Embassy was able to remain in contact with some of them, and receive and pass on information. She did not think our public opinion would readily accept action which saved diplomats but left others to their fate. Moreover she wondered whether action to extract Embassy staff from Kuwait was really practical. Presumably there would have to be some sort of safe conduct.

The President said that there was nothing much to be done about the Baghdad situation. But in Kuwait there was the possibility of action. The logic of the Prime Minister's position was that we should think in terms of reprovisioning the Embassies so that they could stay, rather than extracting the occupants. But the American Embassy was not actually able to do anything to help Americans there. If Iraq refused to accept a mission to extract them, authorised by the United Nations, there would be justification for the use of force. Alternatively, if the Americans announced that they were coming in with helicopters or a ship, with the authority of the UN behind them, to take the occupants of the Embassy out, and the Iraqis then shot down a helicopter or otherwise interfered with the operation, there would be a clear casus belli. It could be the provocation which led to implementation of Phases 1 to 3. He still found it difficult to see how we could initiate military action without a provocation.

The Prime Minister repeated that all her instincts were against the idea of saving diplomats and abandoning others: and reprovisioning would drive a coach and horses through food sanctions. We did not need any further justification for military action beyond what Iraq had already done in Kuwait. The only reason we had not so far invoked the military option was that we were not quite ready for it. Our own forces would not be on the ground and acclimatised for another 3/4 weeks. We should not delay too long: equally we should not move too soon. But she would reflect further on the President's ideas.

TOP SECRET

She understood his wish for a trigger point for military action.

The President said that the Americans were ready for Phases 1 to 3. We should not make Saddam Hussein twenty-five feet tall. He had little idea of the power of the air strike which would hit him. Public support might begin to erode if we did not act fairly soon. He was increasingly worried about the brutalities and destruction in Kuwait. He would like to see the US and Britain standing together on this issue. It was a chance to do something and save at least some people. But the United States could act alone and not involve Britain if that was what we preferred.

The Prime Minister said the President's instinct that there was not much time was absolutely right. We could not wait until everything was in perfect order. But we were not ready yet: and it would be a great mistake to start on something which we could not finish. We would lose the vital element of surprise. She was still not convinced that this issue was the best means to make the transition to the military option. The President said that early decisions were needed on whether to go ahead with adding the clause to the resolution currently before the Security Council. The Prime Minister said she would reflect for a few hours and let the President have her considered views. The President agreed that they should continue to discuss the options.


The Prime Minister added that the Amir of Kuwait would be visiting London next week. We now had the text of a letter asking us to use force to recover Kuwait, with which we were generally satisfied. She proposed to proceed to final agreement on the text with the Amir, but to ask him to delay signature until the letter was needed. The President raised no objection.

C.D.P.
C. D. POWELL

18 October 1990

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A The National Archives

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MR POWELL

The Gulf: Visit to Washington

— As agreed, I attach a draft message to Scowcroft.

2. Perhaps I could have a copy when it is sent.

PERCY CRADOCK

18 October 1990

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Following to General Scowcroft from
Charles Powell.


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

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM CHARLES POWELL TO GENERAL SCOWCROET

Dear Brew:

As Antony Acland will have told you, Percy Cradock is planning to be in Washington next week at the Prime Minister's suggestion and is looking forward to his meeting with you on 23 October. It will inevitably centre on the Gulf. He will not want to get into sensitive areas of military strategy and planning, but would welcome a good exchange of views on the crisis in its various aspects and the options open to us (and to the Iraqis) in the coming months. He will of course treat the substance of the discussions with the greatest discretion and will report only to the Prime Minister.

Warm regards
Charles

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CC QS
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

18th October 1990

010 18th

Dear Charles

PAY AND ALLOWANCES IN THE GULF

I enclose a copy of the draft written answer which my Secretary of State intends to make today in response to a question from David Martin MP seeking a statement on the pay and allowances of Servicemen deployed to the Gulf. The content of the answer has been agreed with Treasury officials and the text is currently being cleared with them and officials of the Departments of the Environment and Social Security. The text has yet to be approved by Secretary of State.*

I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's office), John Neilson (Energy), Stuart Lord (Social Security), Roger Bright (Environment), Jeremy Haywood (Treasury) and Murdo McLean (Chief Whip), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Jane R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

has now been approved.

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

PAY AND ALLOWANCES

DRAFT ANSWER

X The basic pay of Service personnel remains the same wherever they are stationed and includes an X-factor, currently 10.5% for men and 9.5% for women, which recognises the disadvantages of Service life, including the liability to serve in difficult and dangerous conditions. Entitlement to allowances and liability to charges varies according to individual circumstances.

2. The effect of this for those deploying to the Gulf is that the great majority of Service personnel will in fact receive more in their pay packets. However, there are some for whom the changes would result in a possible loss. I have therefore decided that there should be an abatement to part of the charges paid by married personnel from Germany and from other overseas locations while they are serving in the Gulf. This will benefit most of those otherwise adversely affected. In addition, I have instructed that arrangements be made to recompense any individual who would still otherwise experience a net reduction in pay and allowances.

3. These measures are intended to fulfil my assurance that no one would suffer financially as a result of service in the Gulf.

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. A CORDIAL AND DETAILED EXCHANGE ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION, THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CALLED ON DEFENCE MINISTER ARENS IN TEL AVIV FOR AN HOUR ON 18 OCTOBER.

SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. ARENS SAID THAT THE IDF HAD TWO MAIN TASKS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA:

(A) TO PREVENT BLOODSHED AMONGST JEWS AND ARABS ALIKE. THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY PROTECTED JEWS LIVES RECENTLY. THERE HAD FOR EXAMPLE BEEN NO SERIOUS VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELI CARS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE FOUR MONTHS BEFORE THE KILLINGS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT HAD SEEN NO KILLING OF GAZANS BY THE IDF AND ONLY TWO OR THREE KILLINGS IN THE WEST BANK. THE IDF HAD BEEN UNDER FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID CASUALTIES. ARENS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE INFLECTION OF CASUALTIES DETERRED VIOLENCE. THE IDF HAD HAD LESS SUCCESS IN PREVENTING PALESTINIANS KILLING EACH OTHER - THERE WERE 20 TO 30 SUCH MURDERS PER MONTH AND OVER A HUNDRED ATTEMPTED.

(B) TO CREATE THE RIGHT ENVIRONMENT FOR ELECTIONS AS PRESCRIBED IN THE SHAMIR PEACE PLAN, FOR REPRESENTATIVES WHO WOULD BECOME NEGOTIATING PARTNERS THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT YET CONDUCIVE TO THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS FREE FROM INTIMIDATION. IT WAS STILL HARD TO FIND ANY PALESTINIANS WHO WOULD AGREE TO BECOME CANDIDATES UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORISED BY THE PLO.

4. LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS IN GAZA WERE INTOLERABLE - TO THE EXTENT THAT THE OCCUPANTS PUT LITTLE VALUE ON LIFE - THEIR OWN, THEIR CHILDREN'S OR THEIR ENEMIES'. THE GULF CRISIS HAD PRODUCED A WAVE OF INSTABILITY. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE, ALTHOUGH NOT UNIVERSAL, SUPPORT

FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN (MAYOR FREIJ HAD BEEN BRAVE ENOUGH TO STAND OUT ON THIS AND TO CONDEMN PARTICULAR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST JEWS). THIS COULD ONLY BE EXPLAINED BY FACTORS DEEP IN ARAB CULTURE, ZENOPHOBIA AND FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF DEMOCRACY. THE KILLINGS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT HAD PROVOKED RAGE. THE SECURITY FORCES WERE ON A HIGH STATE OF ALERT AGAINST ACTS OF REVENGE AGAINST JEWS. THEY WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RESTORE CALM. MOST CURFEWS HAD ALREADY BEEN RAISED. PALESTINIANS WERE BEGINNING TO RETURN TO WORK. BUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO FURTHER VIOLENCE.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER PERIODICAL OUTBURST OF VIOLENCE WERE NOT INEVITABLE IF ISRAEL DID NOT MAKE REALISTIC MOVES TO DEAL WITH THE FRUSTRATIONS RESULTING FROM SUPPRESSED NATIONHOOD. ARENS ARGUED THAT THE DEATHS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT WERE CAUSED NOT BY SUPPRESSED NATIONHOOD BUT BY MOSLEM EXTREMISM. THE ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE WAS VERY FAR REACHING. THERE WAS NO OTHER REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE. THE PALESTINIANS AS EVER WERE MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY. BUT ISRAELI EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THEM WERE NOT HOPELESS EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE LESS GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAN THREE WEEKS AGO.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THE BREAK-UP OF TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE OTS AND THE POSSIBLY DECLINING INFLUENCE OF THE PLO WERE NOT MAKING THE SITUATION MORE FRAGMENTED AND DIFFICULT. ARENS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PLO WAS LESS MONOLITHIC THAN BEFORE BUT IT WAS STILL ABLE TO TERRORISE OTHER GROUPS. THE INTIFADA HAD DEMONSTRATED THE DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE LOCAL POPULATION, WHO SUFFERED GREAT HARDSHIP, AND THE PLO LEADERSHIP LIVING IN COMFORT IN TUNIS. PERHAPS THE INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT, ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN DID NOT ENCOURAGE CONFIDENCE IN THIS RESPECT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN RECONCILING TWO METHODS OF SELECTING REPRESENTATIVES - FROM THE BOTTOM UP, OR THE TOP DOWN.

7. ARENS SAID THAT GAS MASKS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO ISRAELI ARABS AND THE ARAB POPULATION OF EAST JERUSALEM. THEY WOULD IN FUTURE BE ISSUED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IT WAS INTERESTING TO SEE THAT PALESTINIANS WERE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OVER THIS.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REHEARSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR ISRAEL'S RECEIVING THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION. MR BAKER AND HE HAD PLANNED TO RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN BY A SUCCESSION OF RESOLUTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID THIS BEING SIDETRACKED BY A SERIES OF POINTLESS RESOLUTIONS ON

ARAB/ISRAEL. THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAD LAST WEEK BEEN MANOEUVRING FOR A U.S. VETO. HE DID NOT GET IT. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL WAS OFFENDED BY THE LANGUAGE IN THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (THE OTHER SIDE THOUGHT IT TOO LENIENT) BUT IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE MOVES AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS SOME DIPLOMATIC FOOTWORK. ARENS SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA IN THE ALLIANCE. BUT ISRAEL COULD NOT AGREE THAT IT SHOULD ALWAYS PAY THE PRICE. ISRAEL WAS ALREADY UNDER CONSIDERABLE DISADVANTAGE BECAUSE OF THE GULF CRISIS. IT HAD COST HALF A BILLION SHEKELS TO KEEP THE IDF IN A STATE OF ALERT. THE TOURIST TRADE HAD BEEN BADLY DAMAGED. 20 BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA. THIS COULD AT SOME FUTURE DATE BE USED TO THREATEN ISRAEL. THE SAUDI AIRFORCE WOULD BE ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE WORLD. ON ALL SIDES THE THREAT TO ISRAEL HAD INCREASED. ASSAD WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST NOW BUT HE WAS NOT THAT DIFFERENT FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE SYRIANS TOO HAD MISSILES WITH CW WARHEADS. THEY HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY OF EXPANDING THEIR INFLUENCE IN LEBANON. THE DRAFTING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MIGHT BE JUSTIFIABLE BY EXPEDIENCE BUT IT WAS ISRAEL THAT WAS BEING EXPLOITED. HE COMPLAINED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED BY ANYBODY ON THE TEXT. BAKER AND CHENEY WERE VISITING ARAB COUNTRIES BUT NOT ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALONE HAD COME TO JERUSALEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THESE ARGUMENTS. ISRAEL HAD HANDLED THE PROBLEMS IMPOSED BY THE GULF CRISIS WITH GREAT CARE, IT SUFFERED FROM THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH IT SHARED THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE IT WAS EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING. WERE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT ISRAEL COULD BE LEFT IN A NEW DANGEROUS SITUATION. WE WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CAREFULLY WITH ISRAEL AT THAT STAGE.

JORDAN

9. ARENS SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS RIDING A TIGER. HE COULD DISAPPEAR ANY DAY. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ON THE SITUATION WAS GOOD BUT NOBODY COULD PREDICT WHEN THE KING MIGHT BE ASSASSINATED OR WHEN HE MIGHT DECIDE TO CALL IT A DAY. ISRAEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQI TROOPS ENTERING JORDAN HAD GOT ACROSS TO BOTH IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS (IT HAD PERHAPS HELPED HUSSEIN'S BALANCING ACT). A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN WOULD NOT BE IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE KING AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN. THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT JORDAN WAS NOW GRAPPLING RESOLUTELY WITH THE PROBLEMS OF IMPOSING SANCTIONS. THE KING HAD, FOR THE MOMENT, HALTED THE QUEST FOR A 'DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION' WHICH HAD MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE INFURIATED EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. IT WOULD

BE NECESSARY TO HELP HUSSEIN BEFORE HIS POSITION COLLAPSED.

IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITY

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED FOR ISRAEL'S ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. ARENS SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD BEFORE THE CRISIS ASSESSED THAT THE IDF COULD HANDLE AN ATTACK BY AN ALLIANCE CONSISTING OF IRAQ, JORDAN, SYRIA AND SOME SAUDI FORCES. IT WOULD NOT BE EASY. 3-5,000 DEATHS WOULD BE INSUFFERABLE FOR ISRAEL. BUT IT FOLLOWED THAT ALLIED FORCES WHICH HAD SUPERIOR AIR POWER TO THAT OF ISRAEL AND MORE TROOPS THAN ISRAEL'S STANDING ARMY SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE A WAR AGAINST IRAQ ON ITS OWN. BUT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE A VICTORY IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH EARLY SUPERIORITY IN THE AIR AND ELIMINATE IRAQI SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS. BUT THERE WOULD THEREAFTER STILL BE A HARD SLOG AHEAD ON THE GROUND. ISRAEL HAD TO ASSUME THAT ONCE HOSTILITIES HAD BROKEN OUT BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE ALLIANCE, IRAQ WOULD ATTACK ISRAEL WITH MISSILES.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WITHDRAW ONCE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WAS MILITARY DEFEAT. ARENS SAID THAT IF THE OUTCOME ALLOWED SADDAM HUSSEIN TO PRESERVE HIS IMAGE AMONGST THE ARABS A NEW AND DANGEIOUS SITUATION WOULD BE CREATED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A QUITE UNACCEPTABLE OUTCOME, IT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS THE LOSER, BUT HE WARNED THAT SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE STILL TEMPTED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A COMPROMISE.

12. ARENS SAID THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, ISRAEL WOULD STILL BE FACED WITH DICTATORIAL REGIMES WITH LARGE ARMIES. DEMOCRACY MIGHT BE SEEPING INTO THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT VERY SLOWLY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT FIRST STEPS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, EG. IN JORDAN AND ALGERIA, COULD BE DANGEROUS IN THEMSELVES.

13. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP ARENS RAISED, IN LOW KEY THE BRITISH ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST ISRAEL. THE IDF DID NOT NEED BRITISH ARMS BUT ISRAEL WAS ENTITLED TO OBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGUMENT. BUT THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN IMPOSED AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RELAX IT AS LONG AS AN IDF PRESENCE REMAINED THERE.

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ATHENS PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

ROME TELNO 860: IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRIMAKOV'S TOUR

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION WILL TAKE A TOUGH LINE ON THE COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH THEY EXPECT PRIMAKOV TO BRING TO WASHINGTON. DETAIL
2. ROSS (DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING, STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD THE MINISTER ON 17 OCTOBER THAT PRIMAKOV WAS DUE IN WASHINGTON ON THE EVENING OF 18 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED PRIMAKOV TO BRING A POSSIBLE PACKAGE FOR A COMPROMISED SOLUTION. SECRETARY BAKER WOULD QUOTE BEAT DOWN HARD UNQUOTE ON ANY SUCH PACKAGE. HE ARGUED THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD IN ANY WAY BE HELD IN THE END TO HAVE ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS AGAINST THE ODDS HE WOULD ACQUIRE MYTHICAL STATUS IN ARAB EYES. (ROSS DREW AN ANALOGY WITH NASSER AND SUEZ.) IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE LIKELY TO LOOK TO SADDAM AS PROVIDING THE ANSWER TO THEIR PROBLEMS, THUS UNDERCUTTING EFFORTS TO PURSUE AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE EFFECTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF OVER TIME WOULD BE HARMFUL, AND COULD EVEN ENSURE THAT A WIDER WAR WOULD IN THE END BECOME INEVITABLE.
3. ROSS CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE FORCING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE BECAUSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE ALSO HAD TO WATCH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS IN ISRAEL, LEST WE TEMPT THEM TO PREEMPTIVE ACTION. THIS ASSESSMENT LAY BEHIND THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO REJECT ANY IDEAS PRIMAKOV MIGHT BE BRINGING FOR A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT. ROSS STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW FOR A FACT THAT THIS WOULD BE THE SOVIET MESSAGE, THOUGH IT SEEMED A REASONABLE GUESS. (COMMENT: HE WAS PRESUMABLY WORKING OFF THE REPORT FROM THE US EMBASSY IN ROME, RELAYED IN TUR). ROSS ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT HIS ASSESSMENT THAT GORBACHEV HIMSELF WISHED TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE BUT, RATHER, WAS CONTENT FOR PRIMAKOV TO SEE WHETHER SUCH IDEAS WOULD RUN.
4. ROSS SAID THAT BAKER HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE

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ON 16 OCTOBER THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE SEARCH FOR PARTIAL SOLUTIONS. HE WOULD UNDERLINE THIS IN HIS TESTIMONY ON THE HILL THIS WEEK.

5. BAKER DULY DID THIS. HE TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON 17 OCTOBER THAT:

QUOTE. THE PROSPECTS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS WILL BE SHATTERED IF HE (SADDAM HUSSEIN) PREVAILS. SO, IT IS TIME TO CLEAR THE AIR ONCE AND FOR ALL ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SADDAM'S AGGRESSION IN KUWAIT AND THE OTHER CONFLICTS AND PROBLEMS IN THE REGION.

I WILL PUT IT TO YOU SIMPLY: DOES ANYONE SERIOUSLY THINK THAT IF THIS AGGRESSION SUCCEEDS, PROSPECTS WILL BE BETTER FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS? CAN ANYONE SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT IF IRAQ WINS THIS CONTEST WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IT WILL BE EASIER TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE REGION? OF COURSE NOT. UNQUOTE.

6. WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO GET A READ-OUT OF THE BAKER/PRIMAKOV MEETING FROM STATE DEPARTMENT TOMORROW.

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ATHENS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNOS 1655-6 AND YOUR TELNOS 104-5 TO JERUSALEM: IRAQ/KUWAIT:
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT IN THE FIVE ON TEXT OF DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION. AIM TO INTRODUCE IT TO OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS ON 17
OCTOBER AND TO HAVE RESOLUTION PASSED BY END OF WEEK. BUT FINAL U S
GO-AHEAD STILL AWAITED.

DETAIL

2. BY THE AFTERNOON OF 17 OCTOBER COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE HAD
REDRAFTED, AND AMBASSADORS HAD APPROVED, THE PROPOSED SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THE AMERICANS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET FINAL
CLEARANCE FROM WASHINGTON: OTHER MISSIONS ARE READY TO GO AHEAD.

3. THE DISCUSSIONS TOOK AS THEIR STARTING POINT THE TEXT FAXED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OVERNIGHT. NOT ONLY THE AMERICANS BUT ALSO THE OTHER
THREE FELT THAT OUR MATERIAL ON COMPENSATION SHOULD BE MADE LESS
DETAILED AND LESS PROMINENT. THE PASSAGE ON IRAQI TREATMENT OF
KUWAITIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE
RESOLUTION, FOLLOWED BY THE PARAGRAPHS ON THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
AND DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT, AND THEN BY
SIMPLIFIED LANGUAGE ON COMPENSATION. THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE WERE
ANXIOUS THAT THE DRAFT SHOULD TAKE IN MORE LANGUAGE FROM THE
CUBAN/YEMENI 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' DRAFT. WE HAVE DONE THIS, WHILE
MAKING THE POINTS IN INNOCUOUS LANGUAGE. SEVERAL OTHER SMALL
DRAFTING CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE (TEXT FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT, UND
AND ATHENS).

4. IT WAS TENTATIVELY AGREED BY AMBASSADORS THAT THE TEXT WOULD BE
CIRCULATED BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY TO ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS AS AN
INFORMAL WORKING PAPER. LI (CHINA) SAID THAT IN ORDER TO PROTECT
CHINA'S POSITION THE PAPER SHOULD NOT GO OUT AS A DRAFT OF THE FIVE:
AFTER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE MERELY DESCRIBED AS

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'BROADLY ACCEPTED BY THE FIVE'. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TO INTRODUCE THE DRAFT IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED AND NON-NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON THE MORNING OF 18 OCTOBER. (AS USUAL CHINA WILL NOT TAKE PART IN THIS BRIEFING EXERCISE: I SHALL BE REPRESENTED BY RICHARDSON, IN ORDER TO PROTECT MY OWN POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL).

5. ALL THESE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN PUT ON HOLD AS THE AMERICANS HAVE STILL BEEN UNABLE TO GET CLEARANCE OF THE DRAFT FROM WASHINGTON. OUR CONTACTS IN THE U S MISSION DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE HOLD-UP. THEY HAVE TOLD US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT SECRETARY BAKER IS NOT UNHAPPY WITH THE TEXT AS IT HAS EMERGED, BUT HAS ONE FURTHER IDEA ABOUT IT, ON WHICH HE MIGHT SEND A FURTHER MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. PROVIDED THAT THIS ADDITIONAL LOOP DOES NOT CAUSE SIGNIFICANT DELAY, IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE ON TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE AFTERNOON OF 18 OCTOBER. MY AIM IS TO HAVE THE RESOLUTION PASSED ON 19 OCTOBER.

6. SEE MIFT FOR DISCUSSION ON THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC).

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ATHENS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 823: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT: MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION IN THE FIVE ON SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) MEMBERS SHOULD MEET AT HIGH LEVEL. AMERICANS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS: OTHER FOUR GENERALLY IN FAVOUR. MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE AROUND MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, AT LEVEL BELOW CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF.

DETAIL

2. HAVING REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL (MIPT), AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE TURNED TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THE PASSING OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A HIGH LEVEL MEETING OF MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC). PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT HE STILL AWAITED INSTRUCTIONS.

3. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO OBJECTION OF PRINCIPLE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. BUT THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIVE RATHER THAN AS A FORMAL SESSION OF THE MSC. WHERE THE LEVEL WAS CONCERNED, FRANCE COULD ACCEPT A MEETING AT THE LEVEL OF CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF OR AT A LOWER LEVEL.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN TUR. WE COULD SUPPORT THE SOVIET IDEA SO LONG AS THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A FORMAL RE-ACTIVATION OF THE MSC, BUT TOOK PLACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS, I.E. AS A MEETING OF THE FIVE CHAIRED BY OUR CURRENT CO-ORDINATOR. WE HAD NO STRONG VIEWS ON THE WEARING OF UNIFORM RATHER THAN MUFTI, OR ON THE LEVEL OF THE MEETING: BUT WE THOUGHT THIS COULD PROBABLY BEST BE AT A LEVEL BELOW CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEETING SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE WORK DONE SO FAR IN AD HOC INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MSC MEMBERS.

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5. LI (CHINA) AGREED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF OUR CO-ORDINATOR. CHINA WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE MAJOR-GENERAL WHO WAS THE LEADER OF ITS DELEGATION TO THE MSC.

6. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT DELEGATIONS TO THE MEETING SHOULD BE KEPT SMALL. I SUGGESTED THAT OUR POLITICAL COUNSELLORS SHOULD DRAFT A FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED WHEN THE MEETING WAS ANNOUNCED, AND ANOTHER PIECE FOR INTERNAL USE SETTING OUT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTENT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE MEETING. THESE MIGHT RELATE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS WAS AGREED. ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE IMPRECISE.


7. WHERE THE TIMING OF THE MEETING AND ITS ANNOUNCEMENT WERE CONCERNED, IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD AWAIT THE PASSING OF THE NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BEFORE ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTIONS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A DOUBLE SHOCK FOR THE IRAQIS, WHILE AVOIDING ANY UNHELPFUL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION. IF THE RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED BY THE END OF THE WEEK, OUR ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT BE MADE ON 22 OCTOBER AND THE MEETING HELD AROUND THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE MEETING WAS A HIGHER LEVEL CONTINUATION OF THE SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT HAD ALREADY BEGUN IN THIS FORMAT.

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
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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

1. Re overnight
Telegrams.
2. Re Foreign
deputy is in a
fair amount of trouble.
3. Re President will
telephone you at
6.30 this evening.
CJP 15/X.

26(a-b)

TOP SECRET

MR POWELL

17 October 1990

THE GULF: VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Your minute of 17 October.

I understand the difficulty, but I am afraid this agenda would raise problems for me. I do not want to get into military planning and strategy, on which I am in any case not competent. I do not want to ask Scowcroft when the US plans to attack Iraq, which he would not tell me even if he knew. But the main value of the visit, as envisaged when I spoke with the Prime Minister on 8 October, was as a means of encouraging the Americans to think through their options more clearly. This is essential if the whole operation is not to go wrong. In order to do this I have got to be able to cover the issue in broad terms. I have got to be able to make the basic points that sanctions will probably not do the trick in the time we have at our disposal; that time is probably not on our side; that we need to be able to use the relatively narrow timeslot available; and that the consequences of not doing so would be very serious for the West. I would also want to listen to any counteravailing thoughts on his side that this argument elicits. Failure to make these points if only in a general way would hamstring discussion and would be strange and positively misleading coming from the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser, who must be expected to reflect her views.

By the same token, I can hardly avoid asking how Scowcroft sees the likelihood of Iraqi provocations, since US policy seems heavily reliant on that dangerous assumption, and giving my own view. In my discussions elsewhere in Washington, eg with the CIA or State Department in discussing Iraqi intentions, this issue is bound to come up.

To take the headings in your proposed agenda, I fear that the intelligence aspects of the conflict and strategic deception are not in Scowcroft's area of primary interest. I can pursue these elsewhere. I also fear that the long-term arrangements in the Gulf

b

TOP SECRET

and the future of the Arab/Israel dispute lie too far in the future at present to engage much of his attention. To pass the agenda in its present form would encourage him to keep quiet on matters on which we are greatly interested and would deny me the opportunity of even reporting his views on them, as distinct from raising them myself.

As regards security, I fully understand the need to reassure Scowcroft and should be prepared to give whatever undertaking is needed, eg that I shall report only to the Prime Minister and, if necessary, am prepared to see him without anyone else on our side present.

To sum up, I do not think I shall in practice entrench on the Prime Minister's or Defence Secretary's domain, but some latitude has to be given to permit an intelligent discussion and to set out the main framework of our case. Otherwise we fail to grasp the opportunity and could leave a misleading impression.

I should welcome a chance to have a word with the Prime Minister on this.



PERCY CRADOCK

2



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the
passage about
which you asked.

CAD

17/x

Adonis.

Fm Reuters tapes

C.C. PS
PS/ Mr Waldey
W. G. M. R. B. R.
News Dept. have
faxed to Jerusalem

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16-0650 GULF-HUSSEIN

KING HUSSEIN SAYS SADDAM AGREED TO QUIT KUWAIT

NEW YORK, Oct 16, Reuter - Jordan's King Hussein said in an interview published on Tuesday that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had agreed in August to withdraw from Kuwait if the Arab League did not criticise him, but the group's condemnation ended the deal.

In what the New York Times called Hussein's first full public accounting of his attempts to prevent and then contain the Gulf crisis, he revealed that on August 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. President George Bush gave him 48 hours to secure a commitment from Saddam to withdraw his troops.

The king said Saddam promised to begin pulling out if the Arab League did not condemn him. But it did, and the efforts collapsed, Hussein said.

Hussein quoted Saddam as saying shortly after the invasion "Within a week we'll be gone", but also that the Iraqis would not respond positively to threats or intimidation".

The king said he still did not understand why his initiative was undermined. Suddenly, it was all torn apart," he said.

Hussein, 54, said if war broke out it would be in part because Bush and other Western leaders failed to respond in time to signals from Saddam that he was ready to withdraw from most of the occupied territory.

Hussein also revealed that Saddam told him late in July he had decided to seize all of Kuwait instead of just territory in dispute, because he expected the United States to respond militarily. He thought he would be in a stronger position if he could withdraw only far enough to leave Iraq with the disputed territory.

The king told the New York Times he believed a peaceful end to the Gulf crisis was still possible if the United States and its Arab allies were willing to compromise.

But Hussein said his conversations with Saddam had convinced him that the Iraqis would fight if diplomacy failed and that a war would be catastrophic for the entire region and for the West.

In a report covering a series of interviews conducted over the weekend, the New York Times said Hussein called for an end to the current embargo on dialogue. A dialogue across the airwaves is not constructive".

Most Arab states, but not Jordan, have deplored Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and called for withdrawal. But the king pointed out that Jordan has supported all United Nations resolutions on Kuwait.

Jordan has opposed the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, a position Hussein characterised as neither anti-Western nor pro-Iraqi, but pro-peace".

Of all Arab leaders, Hussein said President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had disappointed him the most. At a meeting in August, Hussein said he thought Mubarak was trying to pay back Iraq for having led the campaign against Egypt" following Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel.

Asked if he thought Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was justifiable, the king said I honestly can't tell...I can't justify or condone, but the reason must have been pretty substantial to have had it happen."

The newspaper said the king seemed most agitated when expressing the view that the invasion of Kuwait could have been prevented. He said he had tried at least five times since 1988 to persuade Kuwait to resolve its territorial disputes with Iraq.

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PRIME MINISTERTELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

Speaking to Brent Scowcroft today, he thought the President would probably want to telephone you either tomorrow evening or Friday evening.

You talked of sending him a message in advance to set out the sort of points you would want to cover. I have tried my hand at this and attach a draft.

The Foreign Office have also had a go and produced some speaking notes which I attach. But I do not think they are quite what you want.

We may need to get a message off by lunchtime tomorrow, so it would be very helpful to have any comments early tomorrow if you have the time.

e.d.p.

CHARLES POWELL

17 October 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\bush.dca



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

17 October 1990

Dem Clarke,

CD

The Prime Minister's telephone conversation with
President Bush

We agreed that I should send you some points which the Prime Minister could draw on in speaking to President Bush - or which could otherwise be incorporated in a message.

- / I enclose a note. On past form, I doubt if President Bush will be bang up-to-date on the latest moves in the Security Council. Some of the American objections to the draft which we (and their UN representative) had agreed seem to be based on a misunderstanding that we were talking about
/ reparations rather than compensation. I enclose a copy of the message which Secretary Baker sent to the Foreign Secretary last night and of the reply which we have recommended. The points for the Prime Minister on this issue may be overtaken by events later today.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

James
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH
SPEAKING NOTE

- International coalition holding up well. However, Arab support will weaken if there are more outrages in Jerusalem or elsewhere in the Occupied Territories, and the Israelis continue to refuse to play ball with the UN Secretary General. Sanctions unlikely to produce decisive result in short term: Saddam apparently settling down for a long game. How long can we continue to maintain military effort? Do we have any windows for action which might close?

Letter - agree? - Need to switch focus of attention back to Saddam Hussein and his appalling treatment of Kuwait and foreign nationals. Your last speech helped to do that. Must keep up the propaganda effort. Amir coming to Europe later this month (will see him on 23 October).

- Hope we can have common approach on next step Resolution in UN. We want a Resolution which increases pressure on Saddam Hussein and will command wide-ranging support. We are very happy for the Resolution to cover the plight of foreign nationals and diplomatic missions but believe we have a better chance of support if we include compensation (not reparations) in the draft. Non-aligned members of the Council, who have suffered badly at Iraqi hands, are likely to favour this. Hope we can agree on an approach which combines both the question of compensation and the humanitarian elements in your approach. Need to keep the Security Council engaged on Iraq if we are to secure broad international support for military option, should this

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prove necessary.

- UN Resolution authorising or approving use of force could, if drafted exactly as we want, give broader legal cover than Article 51 and might help to keep members of coalition including France on board. But:
 - could we keep discussion in New York private?
 - how could we ensure the right result? Risk of either protracted negotiation ending in failure to agree or having to veto a Resolution which would constrain our freedom of action. For example, a deadline for withdrawal could play into Saddam's hands: he would only have to shift his position a little to have SC members arguing that the deadline should be put back.
 - UN discussion would give those who want to spin things out an opportunity to cause difficulties. More talk of "Arab solutions". More danger of linkage with Palestinians.

- Suggest therefore that we should be very careful about UN option unless we are certain that it will work. That would mean genuinely private soundings. Must make sure we do nothing for the time being which would take us inexorably down UN (Article 42) track. Might pull it off immediately after Iraqi military or terrorist provocation (eg Iraqi-inspired terrorist attack on aircraft). But Saddam cleverly avoiding direct provocation at present.

- If it comes to military action, need to keep in mind impact on public and world opinion. Obviously essential we should be able to justify the actions of our Armed Forces. Essential to try to hold together as much as possible of the coalition, especially if hostilities drag on. Essential to continue to keep Israel out of the action. But above all essential to succeed.

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- Need to think through strategic objectives. Voluntary withdrawal now by Saddam would spare us a war with possibly major allied casualties, but would make it difficult for us to curb further growth in his military power. On the other hand, a devastated Iraq could land us with rehabilitating a country over which we have little control, and itself undermine regional stability. Winning the peace would be even harder if the Israelis hold out against Arab/Israel negotiations after Saddam has been beaten.

- Need to take stock by mid-November on options open to us. Would like to compare notes with a view to deciding strategy then. Must clearly maintain closest possible co-ordination.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification
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Caveat

Precedence

IMMEDIATE

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ZCZC

1 ZCZC

2 CONFIDENTIAL

CAVEAT

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4 FM FCO

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5 TO FLASH JERUSALEM

TELNO

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7 OF OCTOBER 90

AND TO

8 AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

9 INFO DESKBY WASHINGTON

10 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

11 JERUSALEM: FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECURITY ONLY

12 MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT UN: REPLY TO SECRETARY BAKER

13

14 Following is proposed draft reply (comment in MIFT):

15

16 Begins

17 Dear Jim,

18

19 Thank you for your message. I agree with you that our first
20 priority must be swiftly and visibly to reestablish consensus in
21 the Council against Saddam Hussein. For this reason, our two
22 Missions have been working on a Resolution that would represent
23 an incremental increase in pressure against Saddam Hussein and
24 which could command wide ranging support.

25

26 It is precisely in order to secure such support that we
27 propose the inclusion of compensation and restitution. The
28 nationals of Third World countries have suffered badly at Iraqi
29 hands. They have a legitimate interest in some form of redress.

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Caterword Our

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File number

Dept

Drafted by (Block capitals)

Telephone no

ADDITIONAL

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Date/time

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17/10

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Prepared by

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Our soundings among the Non Aligned suggest a resolution on compensation will be attractive.

I do, however, share your reservations about the question of reparations. This evokes unfortunate echoes of the two world wars and would be indeed be difficult and contentious to achieve in the Council. Perhaps the language proposed in New York is too far reaching (for instance as regards placing frozen Iraqi assets in trust). We are happy to look again at the text in the interests of finding simple language on the principle of compensation and restitution that will help Non Aligned and even Eastern Europeans cope with their own domestic pressures.

We have, of course, covered the plight of foreign nationals and diplomatic missions already in resolutions SCR 664 and SCR 667. I wonder if a Resolution concentrating only on humanitarian aspects and with the reprovisioning of Embassies as its centre piece will not be seen as addressing the concerns only of those two Permanent members who still have Embassies in Kuwait? (There is a question mark over the French) An approach which combines both the question of compensation and the humanitarian elements in your approach will probably be easier to sell to the Non Aligned, and indeed the New York text usefully incorporates the key idea on the reprovisioning of the Embassies.

?
The joint US/US approach has proved to be a powerful alliance within the Five and in the Security Council so far. I suggest that we ask our two Permanent Representatives to see if they can now marry the New York and Washington approaches in a new text that covers both reprovisioning and compensation, but modifies the latter so that it is both simpler and less far reaching in scope.

TOP SECRET

18/10 23(a-b)

~~SIR PERCY CRADOCK~~

Disarmed
CDD 107-1.

THE GULF: VISIT TO WASHINGTON

The Prime Minister is content with your plans to visit Washington, and she believes a visit will be timely and useful.

The Americans have put very strict constraints on knowledge of some aspects of their military planning and political intentions. The Prime Minister has given a personal undertaking to observe those limits. She thinks therefore that you should not yourself raise certain subjects in discussion with General Scowcroft.

For the sake of clarity, the subjects which you can safely raise are:

- intelligence aspects of the Gulf conflict.
- Iraqi CW and BW capability.
- Iraqi nuclear programme.
- the risk of Israeli involvement.
- tactics at the UN.
- strategic deception.
- long-term security arrangements in the Gulf.
- future handling of Arab-Israel issues.

But she would wish to reserve for her own discussions with the President (and for the Defence Secretary/CDS on the military

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

b

side) the following subjects:

- the conditions under which we might invoke the military option.
- the timing of such action.
- military planning and strategy.

She has suggested that I should put this agenda to General Scowcroft. Would you be content with that?

CDP

C. D. POWELL

17 October 1990

C:\pc

TOP SECRET

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FM ROME

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 86D

OF 171735Z OCTOBER 90

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JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: VISIT OF PRIMAKOV TO ROME, 16 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. SOVIETS REPORTEDLY LINK IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO A UN INITIATIVE ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ITALO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR 'SPECIAL PRESSURES' ON SADDAM TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF FOREIGN HOSTAGES.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV'S SPECIAL ENVOY, PRIMAKOV, VISITED ROME ON 16 OCTOBER ON HIS WAY TO PARIS AND WASHINGTON. HE HAD AN HOUR OF RESTRICTED TALKS WITH ANDREOTTI AND DINNER WITH DE MICHELIS. NEITHER ANDREOTTI'S OFFICE NOR THE RELEVANT MFA DESK OFFICER (CHERUBINI) WERE ABLE TO BRIEF US ON THE VISIT, CLAIMING THAT DETAILS HAD NOT YET FILTERED DOWN TO THEM. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS THEREFORE BASED ON PRESS ACCOUNTS AND A BRIEFING FROM THE US EMBASSY (WHO DECLINED TO GIVE THEIR SOURCE).

3. THE AMERICANS SAY THAT PRIMAKOV HAD THREE MESSAGES FOR THE ITALIANS:

- (I) THE SOVIET DISTASTE FOR MILITARY ACTION IN THE GULF
- (II) THE SOVIET UNION'S FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BEHIND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
- (III) SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A UN INITIATIVE ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 'INDEPENDENT OF BUT PRIOR TO' IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, PRIMAKOV TOLD ANDREOTTI THAT THE

SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO BE OPTIMISTIC THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS WAS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HIS IMPRESSION FROM HIS OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH SADDAM WAS THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE, BUT ONLY IF ITS ENEMIES REFRAINED FROM ULTIMATUMS AND THREATS OF MILITARY ACTION. THERE WAS REPORTEDLY NO MENTION OF SOVIET PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO AGREE TO A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

5. THERE WAS ALSO A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM, WITH ANDREOTTI AND DE MICHELIS REPORTEDLY AGREEING THAT 'SPECIAL PRESSURES' SHOULD BE PUT ON SADDAM TO RELEASE FOREIGNERS. ANDREOTTI REVEALED THAT THE ITALIAN DELEGATION TO THE IPU CONFERENCE IN URUGUAY HAD ALREADY LOBBIED IRAQI PARLIAMENTARIANS ON THIS POINT. HE ALSO TOLD PRIMAKOV THAT LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER AL-BISHARI, ON A RECENT VISIT TO ROME FOR A WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING (MY TELNO 854), HAD ASSURED THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT QADHAFI HAD INTERVENED WITH SADDAM ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN HOSTAGES.

6. IN A BRIEF AND UNILLUMINATING PRESS CONFERENCE ON 16 OCTOBER, PRIMAKOV TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT HE WAS VISITING ROME NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITALY'S ROLE AS EC PRESIDENCY, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE 'PERSONAL POSITION' OF ANDREOTTI ON THE GULF CRISIS. (COMMENT: THIS WAS PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO ANDREOTTI'S WELL-KNOWN PREDILECTION FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.)

EGERTON

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2. IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

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PS/PUS

MR GORE-BOOTH

~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

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MR JAY
~~MR SLATER~~
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AUS (C) MODUK
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2. MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

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PAGE 3
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JERUSALEM/ATHENS PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

JERUSALEM TELNOS 239, 245 AND 247: UNSG'S MISSION TO JERUSALEM

1. ROSS (DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING, STATE DEPARTMENT) COMMENTED TO THE MINISTER ON 17 OCTOBER THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS AWKWARD: THE EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL WAS VERY DIFFICULT. IT WAS TO SOME EXTENT ENCOURAGING THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THEY WOULD BE GIVING A COPY OF THEIR OWN ENQUIRY REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. THE ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET THE AIME MISSION INTO ISRAEL. IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT TALK TO THEM THEY WOULD BE THE ONES TO SUFFER. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO RECOGNISE THAT DECLARING THAT A UN MISSION WOULD NOT BE WELCOME WAS DIFFERENT FROM SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE REFUSED ENTRY. WE SHOULD BE URGING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GO AHEAD IF HE POSSIBLY COULD.
2. ROSS NOTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REAL PROBLEMS IF THE ISRAELIS DENIED THE AIME MISSION ENTRY. IN THAT CASE THE PLO AND THE NAM WOULD COME FORWARD WITH ANOTHER RESOLUTION. THE PLO WANTED TO FORCE A US VETO. THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO AVOID THIS IF THEY COULD, BUT IF THERE WERE SERIOUS TALK OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL THEY WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO VETO. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING FREEDOM FOR MANOEUVRE.
3. KURTZER (DAS/NEA, STATE) CONFIRMED TO US SEPARATELY THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM SHAMIR (UKMIS TELNO 1648 REFERS). HE SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS CAST IN VERY MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS THE RESPONSES GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN JERUSALEM. IT STRESSED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF JERUSALEM AND THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF UNSR 672. THERE WAS NO HINT OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. KURTZER SAID THAT A REPLY HAD BEEN DRAFTED, WHICH EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF STRONG ISRAELI FEELINGS ON THE ISSUE, BUT SOUGHT TO FOCUS ISRAELI MINDS ON THE UNWELCOME CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION.

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

KURTZER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO IS AWAY FROM WASHINGTON,
WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SEE THE DRAFT UNTIL TOMORROW.

ACLAND

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RESIDENT CLERK

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The Security Council,

A. Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990),

B. Reiterating its demand for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and of the authority of its legitimate government,

C. Condemning the actions by Iraq in flagrant violation of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law to deport Kuwaiti nationals, to take third state nationals hostage, to murder, mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third state nationals, to destroy Kuwaiti demographic records, to settle foreigners in Kuwait, to confiscate hospital supplies and equipment and to carry out the unlawful and wanton destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait as part of a general policy aimed at the destruction of a nation,

D. Reaffirming the expression of grave alarm in its resolutions 662, 664, 667 and 670 over the situation of nationals of third states in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such States,

.../...

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E. Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General and his special representative concerning the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

F. Condemning these flagrant violations of international law, and reaffirming the responsibility of Iraq in respect of grave breaches of the fourth Geneva convention, and of individuals who commit or order the commission of such grave breaches,

G. Mindful of the economic cost to states, and in particular developing countries, of carrying out their obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Council,

H. Deeply concerned at the loss and suffering caused to individuals,

I. Alarmed by the perils to international peace and security caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and affirming the Council's continued commitment to seek, in accordance with relevant resolutions, a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Gulf region caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and to the restoration of peace, stability and security,

J. Recalling also the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-general have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the United Nations Charter,

.../...

FROM: FRANCE ONU

TO: ROYALME-LNI

OCT 17, 1990 5:06PM P.04

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K. Acting under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter :

1. Demands that Iraq immediately cease and desist from deporting Kuwaiti nationals, taking third state nationals hostage, murdering, mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third state nationals, destroying Kuwaiti demographic records, settling foreigners in Kuwait, confiscating hospital supplies and equipment and carrying out unlawful and wanton destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait,
2. Invites States to collate information from any source of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention and to make this available to the Council,
3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its international obligations to third state nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council,
4. Reaffirms further its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of as many third state nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, as wish to leave,
5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate provision of food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well being of nationals of third states, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states,

.../...

4.

6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and security of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and Iraq, rescind its order for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and for the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and take no action to hinder the performance of the functions of such missions in Kuwait and Iraq, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests,

7. Requests the Secretary-general and his special representative to use their good offices to achieve the objectives of the three previous paragraphs and in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third state nationals,

8. Affirms the liability of Iraq to make full restitution or compensation for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

9. Invites states to collect all relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, with a view to such arrangements for the discharge by Iraq of its liability to make restitution or compensation as may be established,

10. Decides that, should Iraq not comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, the Council will take further enforcement measures under the Charter,

.../...

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5.

11. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to make his good offices available for reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Gulf region on the basis of resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and reestablishing peace, security and stability, and calls on all States to pursue their efforts to this end,

12. Requests the Secretary-general to continue to report to the Security Council on the results of his efforts,

13. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until the aggression has been suppressed and peace restored.

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FROM JERUSALEM
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 244
OF 170910Z OCTOBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKIN

You can't say
① sanctions must be strictly applied only
② we want an exception for our networks
in the same bank.
Everyone will come in with
exceptions for them and

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 1655 AND 1656 : GULF CRISIS :
MESSAGE FROM BAKER TO SECRETARY OF STATE

whenever and by
Food would get
through to the
Iraqis. me

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
HAS RECEIVED IN JERUSALEM FROM BAKER:

BEGINS

DEAR DOUGLAS,
I HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO REACH YOU BY TELEPHONE TO DISCUSS THE
NEXT RESOLUTION ON THE GULF CRISIS. UNFORTUNATELY OUR SCHEDULES
AND OUR TIME ZONES DONT MESH.

I BELIEVE THAT, WITH THE TEMPLE MOUNT RESOLUTION BEHIND US, WE
NEED TO SHOW SADDAM HUSSEIN QUICKLY THAT THE COUNCILS SOLIDARITY
HAS NOT BEEN MARRED BY THE DEBATE OVER THE TEMPLE MOUNT RESOLUTION.
I KNOW THAT THE UK HAS PUT FORWARD A DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT INCLUDES
WAR REPARATIONS AS WELL AS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. I AGREE THAT
A REPARATIONS RESOLUTION WILL BE DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, I DISAGREE
OVER TIMING.

I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE GO WITH A CLEAN HUMANITARIAN
RESOLUTION THAT WILL GET QUICK SUPPORT, SO THAT WE CAN GET THE
FOCUS OFF OF ISRAEL AND BACK ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT. I AM PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND THOSE IN THE
FEW DIPLOMATIC MISSION WHICH HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WITHSTANDING THE
IRAQI SIEGE. THE SITUATION AT OUR EMBASSY IS VERY PRECARIOUS.

IN ADDITION, I WORRY THAT A WAR REPARATIONS RESOLUTION WILL BE
MORE CONTENTIOUS, WILL INVOLVE LOTS OF DEBATE, AND WILL TAKE MORE
TIME TO ACHIEVE IN THE COUNCIL. MOREOVER, A RESOLUTION WITH
HUMANITARIAN AND REPARATIONS MIXES THE MESSAGE. WHEN WE LAST
TALKED, WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD STEADILY RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE,
TIMING OUR MOVES VERY CAREFULLY: I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL
AGREE WITH ME THAT WE SHOULD PRESS THROUGH QUICKLY NOW A RESOLUTION

!3

THAT FOCUSES ON THE RAPE OF KUWAIT AND THE REPROVISIONING ISSUE. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO MOVE THE FOCUS BACK TO IRAQ/KUWAIT, HOPEFULLY WITH A MINIMUM OF DEBATE. AFTER ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, I WOULD WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR A REPARATIONS RESOLUTION --PROBABLY AS SOON AS NEXT WEEK. FOLLOWING THESE RESOLUTIONS, THAT IS RESUPPLY AND REPARATIONS, I WOULD HOPE WE CAN CONSIDER A RESOLUTION ON WAR CRIMES.

IF YOU AGREE WITH THE APPROACH IVE OUTLINED, I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE YOUR UN MISSION THE GREEN LIGHT TO JOIN WITH OURS IN PURSUING THE RESUPPLY RESOLUTION TOM PICKERING TABLED TUESDAY IN THE FIVE. OTHERWISE, ID BE GLAD TO TALK BY PHONE, BUT WILL BE WITH THE CONGRESS UNTIL MID AFTERNOON WASHINGTON TIME.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY YOURS,
JIM

ENDS

2. THE SECTETARY OF STATE WOULD LIKE EARLY ADVICE ON THIS- PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT REPLY, BUT WHICH HE COUYLD USE A SPEAKING NOTE IF HE DECIDES TO TELEPHONE BAKER.

CALLAN

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

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US/UK NEW YORK TEXT OF 16110.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

A. REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 661 (1990), 667 (1990) AND 670 (1990),

B. ALARMED AT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY IRAQ IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO DEPORT KUWAITI NATIONALS, TO TAKE HOSTAGES, MURDER, MISTREAT AND OPPRESS KUWAITI AND THIRD COUNTRY, TO DESTROY KUWAITI DEMOGRAPHIC RECORDS, TO SETTLE FOREIGNERS IN KUWAIT, TO CONFISCATE HOSPITAL FOOD AND EQUIPMENT AND TO CARRY OUT THE UNLAWFUL AND WANTON DESTRUCTION AND SEIZURE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN KUWAIT AS PART OF A GENERAL POLICY AIMED AT THE DESTRUCTION OF A NATION,

C. CONDEMNING SUCH FLAGRANT BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND REAFFIRMING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQ FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, AND OF INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMIT OR ORDER THE COMMISSION OF GRAVE BREACHES,

D. DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE LOSS AND SUFFERING CAUSED TO INDIVIDUALS,

E. MINDFUL OF THE ECONOMIC COST TO STATES, AND IN PARTICULAR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OF CARRYING OUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER RESOLUTION 601,

F. REAFFIRMING THE EXPRESSION OF GRAVE ALARM IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 662, 664, 667 AND 670 OVER THE SITUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS OF SUCH STATES,

G. AFFIRMING ITS CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,

H. DESIRING TO AVOID ANY FURTHER RESORT TO FORCE CONTRARY TO THE CHARTER,

I. ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:

--1. AFFIRMS THE LIABILITY OF IRAQ TO MAKE FULL RESTITUTION OR COMPENSATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL ACTS OR OMISSIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ OR THE IRAQI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES IN KUWAIT SINCE THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THAT STATE BY IRAQ ON 2 AUGUST 1990, INCLUDING LOSS, DAMAGE, MALTREATMENT, INJURY WHETHER TO PERSON OR PROPERTY, WHICH HAS BEEN OR MAY HEREAFTER BE SUFFERED BY OTHER STATES, THEIR NATIONALS OR CORPORATIONS AS A RESULT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, OF SUCH ACTS OR OMISSIONS,

--2. DECIDES THAT SUCH RESTITUTION OR COMPENSATION SHALL FORM PART OF ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT;

--3. REAFFIRMS THOSE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 661 WHICH FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION REQUIRE STATES TO FREEZE ALL OVERSEAS ASSETS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ;

--4. DECIDES FURTHER THAT ALL SUCH FROZEN ASSETS SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST FOR ALL CLAIMANTS, WHATEVER THEIR NATIONALITY, PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISCHARGE BY IRAQ OF ITS LIABILITY TO MAKE FULL RESTITUTION OR COMPENSATION;

--5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COLLATE INFORMATION FROM ANY SOURCE OF ALLEGED GRAVE BREACHES OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, AND TO THOSE ENDS TO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS.

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II

--6. AFFIRMS THAT THIRD STATES ARE AUTHORIZED TO EVACUATE AS MANY THIRD STATE NATIONALS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL, AS WISH TO DEPART FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ, UTILIZING SUCH MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION MAY BE NECESSARY,

--7. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ PROVIDE THE IMMEDIATE PROVISION OF FOOD, WATER AND BASIC SERVICES NECESSARY TO THE PROTECTION AND WELL BEING OF SUCH THIRD STATE NATIONALS INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS OF SUCH COUNTRIES,

--8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO USE THE GOOD OFFICE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO PREVIOUS PARAGRAPHS AND IN PARTICULAR TO FACILITATE THE EVACUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS,

--

III

--9. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ACTION BY IRAQ OF DEPORTING KUWAITI NATIONALS, TAKING HOSTAGES, MURDERING, MISTREATING AND OPPRESSING KUWAITI AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS, DESTROYING KUWAITI DEMOGRAPHIC RECORDS, SETTLING FOREIGNERS IN KUWAIT, CONFISCATING HOSPITAL FOOD AND EQUIPMENT AND THE UNLAWFUL AND WANTON DESTRUCTION AND SEIZURE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PROPERTY IN KUWAIT,

--10. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST FROM ALL SUCH ACTIVITY;

16-1990 15:35 FROM UKMIS NY

TO

FCO UND P.03

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IV

--11. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MAKE HIS GOOD OFFICES AVAILABLE FOR RESTORING PEACE IN THE AREA ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660(1990), 662(1990) AND 664(1990) AND ENHANCING THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION;

--12. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE RESULTS OF HIS EFFORTS;

--

V

--13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY AND PERMANENTLY SEIZED OF THE MATTER UNTIL THE AGGRESSION HAS BEEN SUPPRESSED AND PEACE RESTORED.

STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ACTION BY CHAO OF ALPHONSE WANG
TAKING HOSTAGE, MURDERING, MUTILATING OR ABUSING
WANG #1/2774

10.18.90

02:10 PM

*U. S. MISSION TO U. N. P02

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a PS - PS/ Mr Wale
Mr Gore-Burke
Mr Berman
Mr Yung
Mr Marshall
Mr Timm
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WASHINGTON DRAFT OF 16/10

US Draft

10/16 1200

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669 and 670,

Reaffirming the expression of grave alarm in its resolutions 662, 664, 667 and 670 over the situation of third state nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states,

Recalling the consultations between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq in Amman, Jordan between August and , 1990, concerning the safety and well being of third state nationals,

Recalling further the designation by the Secretary-General of Prince Sadrudin Aga Khan as his special representative to assist third state nationals affected by the occupation of Kuwait,

Alarmed at the actions taken by Iraq in flagrant violation of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law to deport Kuwaiti nationals, to take hostages, murder, mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and foreign nationals, to destroy Kuwaiti demographic records, to settle foreigners in Kuwait, to confiscate hospital food stocks and in general to effect the seizure of public and private property in Kuwait as part of a policy aimed at the destruction of a nation,

Condemning such flagrant breaches of international law, and reaffirming the responsibility of Iraq for grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva convention, and of individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches,

Aware of the heavy burdens that resolutions 661 (1990) and 670 (1990) place on all states and determined to give early consideration to such further measures by states and by the United Nations as may be necessary to effect early compliance by Iraq with decisions of the council and to maintain international peace and security, in particular including measures to provide for compensation to those injured by Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

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Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:

1. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its international obligations to third state nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council,

2. Further Reaffirms its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of third state nationals, including personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states,

3. Confirms that third states are authorized to evacuate as many third state nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, as wish to depart from Kuwait and Iraq, utilizing such means of transportation may be necessary, and requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to use their good offices to facilitate the evacuation of third state nationals in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolutions,

4. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and Iraq, must rescind its order for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and its demand that Iraq not hinder the performance of the functions of such missions in Kuwait and Iraq, including access to their nationals and the protection of their persons and interests,

5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate provision of food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well being of such third state nationals including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such countries, and requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on an urgent basis to use their good offices to achieve these objectives,

6. Decides that, should Iraq not comply with the provisions of this resolution, the Council will take further enforcement measures under the Charter, including, inter alia, measures to limit and restrict Iraqi diplomatic and consular presence and activities in member states,

7. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to make his good offices available for restoring peace in the area on the basis of Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990) and enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf region;

8. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council as soon as possible on steps taken to implement this resolution.

SECRET



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2/9-5

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

CABINET OFFICE

GULF BUSINESS NOTE

The Prime Minister has considered the Gulf Business Note in your minute of 16 October to me. She wants to draw a distinction between issues which can go to OD(G) and those which she would wish to be handled on an even more restricted basis, because of undertakings concerning secrecy which she has given to the President. The upshot is as follows:

- the paper on Iraqi use of CW and BW can be considered at OD(G). But she thinks its usefulness limited because - inevitably - it does not take account of the discussions which she and the Defence Secretary had with Secretary Cheney. She will not want further discussion with US officials at this stage.
- She would not want the papers proposed in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 of your minute to come to OD(G). She will discuss the handling of these issues privately with the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary.
- The paper on operational philosophy should be for her, the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary only. That on US military objectives and priorities is not necessary in the light of the discussions which she and the Defence Secretary have had with Secretary Cheney, and CDS with General Powell. Equally, she does not think a paper on a wider range of allied objectives is appropriate at present. The full military presentation should be limited to her, the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary.
- The paper on media handling should come forward to OD(G) in due course.
- The FCO should work on papers on Arab/Israel and a regional security structure to come forward to OD(E) or OD when ready.

SECRET

- She does not think elaborate papers are necessary on subjects which are regularly reviewed in OD(G). The Foreign Secretary will no doubt prepare short notes for the group on policy at the UN and on timing and modalities for withdrawal of British and American Embassies in Kuwait. A note on burden-sharing will presumably involve the Treasury who should be represented at discussion of it.

D

CHARLES POWELL

17 OCTOBER 1990

M. J. J.

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JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT: COMMENT

1. IT IS INFURIATING THAT, JUST WHEN WE HAD CONVINCED THE NEW YORK AMERICANS THAT OUR APPROACH OF INCLUDING IN THE NEXT RESOLUTION MATERIAL ON COMPENSATION AND ON INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY WAS PREFERABLE TO THEIR LARGELY CONTENT-FREE DRAFT, THEY HAD THE GROUND CUT FROM UNDER THEIR FEET BY YET ANOTHER PREMATURE BAKER PRESS STATEMENT WHICH COMMITTED THEM TO THE LATTER APPROACH.
2. PICKERING CLEARLY PREFERS OUR APPROACH TO THE INSTRUCTIONS HE IS GETTING FROM WASHINGTON AND IS DOING HIS LEVEL BEST TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTION OF FUSING THE TEXTS I.E. OF SMUGGLING MOST OF OURS INTO THEIRS. FIRST REACTIONS FROM THE FRENCH HERE INDICATED A PREFERENCE FOR OUR APPROACH. NEITHER THE RUSSIANS NOR THE CHINESE SHOWED THEIR HAND: BUT I HAVE SOME HOPE THE FORMER WILL COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE TOO AND, IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE CHINESE HELD OUT ON THEIR OWN.
3. ALL THIS REMAINS TO FIGHT FOR ON 17 OCTOBER. IF THERE IS ANY OVERNIGHT CONTACT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER (ON THIS OR OTHER MIDDLE EAST TOPICS) I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR OUR APPROACH AND THUS TO KEEP IT ALIVE. I ASSUME HOWEVER THAT, IF OPINION AMONG THE FIVE SWINGS FIRMLY AGAINST US TOMORROW, RATHER THAN DELAY TABLING A RESOLUTION AT ALL AND THUS RISK A COINCIDENCE IN TIMING WITH THE NEXT ROUND ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WE SHOULD CONCEDE THE OMISSION FROM THIS RESOLUTION OF THE MATERIAL ON COMPENSATION AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY SO LONG AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WILL BE TAKEN UP THE NEXT TIME ROUND.
4. A TRICKIER ISSUE TO HANDLE IS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE AT CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF LEVEL. THE PROPOSAL, WHICH HAS BEEN IN THE OFFING FOR SOME TIME, IS CAREFULLY CRAFTED TO AVOID THE MOST OBVIOUS PITFALLS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CERTAIN TO

ELICIT A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM SOME OR ALL OF THE OTHER FOUR. IT IS NOT CONNECTED WITH ANY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THEREFORE SKIRTS ROUND THE ARTICLE 42 VERSUS ARTICLE 51 CONTROVERSY. IT IS NOT PROPOSED AS A MEETING OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE AS SUCH. MOREOVER VORONTSOV HAS CAREFULLY LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO A MEETING AT A LEVEL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THAT OF CDS AND THAT OF THE PRESENT MSC MEMBERSHIP. THE ATTRACTIONS IN TERMS OF THE PUBLIC MESSAGE THAT WILL GO TO THE IRAQIS ARE CLEAR: THE POTENTIALLY AWKWARD IMPLICATIONS OF TURNING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL DOWN WILL ALSO NEED TO BE WEIGHED.

5. IT IS NOT EASY TO PREDICT HOW OTHERS WILL REACT. PICKERING EXPECTS MUCH SUCKING OF TEETH IN WASHINGTON AND FOR THEM PERHAPS TO GO FOR A MEETING BELOW CDS LEVEL. THE CHINESE SHOWED DISTINCT SIGNS OF ALARM. THE FRENCH KEPT THEIR COUNSEL. AND I GAVE NO HINT OF OUR REACTION.

6. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 171230Z.

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JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

YOUR TELNO 818: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS AND IN THE FIVE ON THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION. CONTINUING UK/U S DIFFERENCES OVER ITS SCOPE: DISCUSSION TO RESUME ON 17 OCTOBER. RUSSIANS PROPOSE MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE FIVE.

DETAIL

2. AS FORESHADOWED IN MY TELNO 1636, ON THE MORNING OF 16 OCTOBER I MET MY U S COLLEAGUE TO TAKE FORWARD DISCUSSION ON THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THREE TEXTS WERE CIRCULATED AT THE MEETING:

- A) OUR DRAFT FOCUSING ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
- B) A SHORT DRAFT PREPARED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WITH THE MUCH NARROWER SCOPE PICKERING HAD OUTLINED TO ME ON 15 OCTOBER (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 1636):
- C) A MUCH LONGER DRAFT, PREPARED IN THE U S MISSION AND COVERING ALL OF THE OTHER TOPICS EARLIER DISCUSSED BETWEEN OUR TWO MISSIONS.

PICKERING SAID THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON HE HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THE AIM WAS TO PRODUCE SOMETHING LYING IN BETWEEN THE PARAMETERS REPRESENTED BY THE TWO U S DRAFTS.

3. PICKERING SAID HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE SOMETHING ON COMPENSATION IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH IT COULD STILL GET THROUGH QUICKLY. BUT WASHINGTON HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT REFERENCES TO PLACING IRAQI ASSETS IN TRUST. HE ENVISAGED THAT THE FINAL DRAFT MIGHT INCLUDE SOMETHING ON HOSTAGES, LANGUAGE PICKING UP THE CUBAN/YEMENI 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' AND

SOMETHING ON THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND WATER TO THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: BUT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WANT TO GO THE FULL DISTANCE EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH US AND INCLUDE PROVISIONS ON IMPOUNDING TRUCKS OR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION UNDER ARTICLE 53. PICKERING WONDERED WHETHER PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR DRAFT (PROVIDING THAT FROZEN ASSETS SHOULD BE HELD IN TRUST) WAS NECESSARY.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD TRAILED THE IDEAS IN THE SHORTER U S DRAFT WITH LONDON. YOU HAD BEEN UNDERWHELMED: ESSENTIALLY IT WENT OVER OLD GROUND. WE REMAINED ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF COVERING COMPENSATION AND INCLUDING SOMETHING BRIEF ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. IF WE AIMED FOR NO MORE THAN WAS IN THE SHORT U S DRAFT IT WOULD LOOK AS IF WE WERE PANICKING. OUR IDEAS ON COMPENSATION COULD PROBABLY RUN WITHOUT PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR DRAFT, IF THE AMERICANS FELT THIS WOULD HELP. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE INSTEAD TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGISTER OF CLAIMS.

5. IT WAS QUICKLY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DRAW UP A SINGLE DRAFT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL OUR MATERIAL ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOME OF THE IDEAS FROM THE LONGER U S RESOLUTION (COPY ALREADY FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT). THIS WOULD THEN BE PUT FORWARD JOINTLY AT A MEETING OF THE FIVE LATER IN THE DAY. THIS PLAN HAD TO BE ABORTED, HOWEVER, WHEN WE DISCOVERED THAT BAKER HAD GONE ON RECORD IN WASHINGTON TO FORESHADOW A UN RESOLUTION OF MORE LIMITED SCOPE, DEALING ONLY WITH SUCH HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS THE RE-SUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. PICKERING TOLD ME THAT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PUT FORWARD YET ANOTHER DRAFT, PREPARED IN WASHINGTON, WHICH WAS ON MUCH MORE RESTRICTED LINES. AT HIS SUGGESTION I AGREED THAT I WOULD PUT FORWARD THE FULLER UK/U S DRAFT AS MY OWN.

6. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET IN THE AFTERNOON PICKERING INTRODUCED HIS DRAFT, SAYING THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY WITH IT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I CIRCULATED MY ALTERNATIVE TEXT. I SAID THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ANXIOUS FOR SOME TIME TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION. THE IRAQIS WERE INFLECTING MASSIVE DAMAGE ON KUWAIT, AND ON THE INTERESTS THERE OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND THEIR NATIONALS. THE PROVISIONS OUTLINED IN OUR DRAFT WERE NOT CONTENTIOUS OR PUNITIVE, BUT SIMPLY COMMON SENSE. NOT ONLY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BUT ALSO OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ATTRACTED BY THIS APPROACH: AFTER ALL THEY WERE THE ONES WHO WOULD BENEFIT. ON THE OTHER HAND WE FELT THAT THE U S DRAFT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH CONTENT: IT REPEATED POSITIONS RATHER THAN RATCHETING UP THE PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS.

7. THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE RIVAL TEXTS. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) DID NOT GO BEYOND A FEW COMMENTS ON DETAILS. YU (CHINA) AND BLANC (FRANCE) SAID THEY WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS: BUT THE FRENCH TOLD US AFTER THE MEETING THAT THEY EXPECTED PARIS TO FAVOUR OUR APPROACH.

8. VORONTSOV THEN WENT ON TO OUTLINE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A ROUGH IDEA DESIGNED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS. IN PARALLEL WITH THE PASSING OF THE NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (WHICHEVER ONE IT WAS) THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE FIVE SHOULD MEET IN THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS. THIS WOULD BE A THREAT TO IRAQ, EVEN IF NOTHING VERY SUBSTANTIAL CAME OUT OF THE DISCUSSION. AT LEAST THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. THEY MIGHT MEET FOR A DAY OR SO AND THEN GO BACK TO THEIR CAPITALS.

9. UNDER CLOSE QUESTIONING FROM THE OTHER FOUR VORONTSOV EXPANDED ON HIS IDEA. HE SAID HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANYTHING TOO FORMAL OR RIGID IN TERMS OF FORMAT. IT WOULD BE PRESENTATIONALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MEET IN UNIFORM RATHER THAN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THIS COULD BE SEEN AS A BEGINNING OF THE MSC'S ACTIVITY, BUT IT NEED NOT BE DESCRIBED AS SUCH. IF THE MEETING TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MSC, AS A CONTINUATION OF THE INFORMAL AD HOC DISCUSSION OF MSC MEMBERS ALREADY UNDERWAY, THIS WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE. HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE ANY REFERENCE TO THE MEETING IN THE COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

10. PICKERING NOTED THAT THE PREFERENCE OF HIS AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN TO CONDUCT SUCH EXCHANGES WITHIN THE FIVE RATHER THAN IN THE FORMAL SETTING OF THE MSC. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE RUSSIANS COULD VIEW THIS ASPECT FLEXIBLY. SINCE CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE BUSY PEOPLE, PERHAPS THEIR DEPUTIES COULD TAKE PART INSTEAD. VORONTSOV SEEMED OPEN TO THESE IDEAS, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE SUCH A MEETING PARTICULARLY WELL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WOULD GIVE THE DISCUSSIONS A WIDER SCOPE THAN THEY HAD HAD HITHERTO.

11. IT WAS AGREED THAT ON THIS POINT TOO WE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT. FOR THE RESOLUTION YET ANOTHER DRAFT WOULD BE PRODUCED AFTER THE MEETING, WHICH WOULD BE A CONFLATION OF THE SHORT U S TEXT AND THE LONGER UK TEXT, WITH UNAGREED PORTIONS IN SQUARE BRACKETS (TEXT FAXED TO UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT). COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE WOULD MEET AT 171300Z TO CONTINUE WORK ON THE TEXT. AMBASSADORS

WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION AT 171400Z TO REVIEW THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE SOVIET IDEA OF A MEETING OF MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

12. SEE MIFT FOR MY COMMENTS.

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SECRET

19

(A-D)

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet tomorrow to discuss the situation in the Gulf. Mr. Waldegrave will represent the Foreign Secretary.

The main issues you will want to cover are the following.

DIPLOMATIC

- Foreign Secretary's Visit You could ask William Waldegrave to report. You will find some of the telegrams in your box. The Foreign Secretary is intending to make a Statement on his return.

- Activity at the UN We are at odds with the Americans on the next UN resolution. We have prepared a draft which covers compensation/reparations and individual responsibility for war crimes. It seemed originally to have support from Pickering, the French and the Russians. But Secretary Baker thinks this too difficult to obtain now, although he is ready to join us in launching it next week. Meanwhile he considers it important to demonstrate that the unity of the Security Council on Iraq/Kuwait remains intact, despite the Jerusalem killings. He prefers to go for a quick resolution focussing on humanitarian issues in Kuwait, reprovisioning of Embassies and the right of diplomats and hostages to leave. We have gone back to the Americans pointing out that a compensation resolution has many attractions for third world countries: and that delaying until next week could get us entangled with a renewed Arab/Israel debate. Efforts to convince the Americans continue: we should know the outcome by tomorrow. The texts are in the folder.

In a separate development, the Russians have proposed a special meeting of the Military Staff Committee at Chief

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B

of Staff level, to intimidate the Iraqis. We are holding this up to the light, to see what the catch is.

- Diplomatic activity Primakov is in orbit, and will be briefing the President on his mission to Baghdad. It is significant that he is also visiting capitals of those who have expressed interest in negotiations, e.g. Rome and Paris, but not London. It is not clear what the Russians are up to. More generally, signals are piling up that Saddam Hussein would be prepared to withdraw if there are a few 'adjustments'. The Americans seem publicly firm against this,

*Temporarily
Retained
J. Gray
7/1/2017*

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

- Embassies in Kuwait The Americans seem to be manoeuvring in preparation for shutting down their Embassy in Kuwait. They want a deal whereby we all close the Embassies in return for Iraqi agreement to allow diplomats to leave Iraq.
- Sanctions No new developments. You are going to visit the Embargo Surveillance Centre in the Department of Transport.
- Mr. Heath's Mission Mr. Waldegrave should report on whether we have any fresh information about his plans.
- Your talk with the President You might go through the main headings which you intend to raise with the President. I am working on a separate note on this.
- Advice for British Communities at risk from hostilities in the Gulf There is a Cabinet Office note in the folder which recommends that we advise British communities in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Jordan to thin down dependants and non-essential staff, and to lay in supplies. This would not apply to the

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Central Province of Saudi Arabia or to Israel for now. We would emphasise that the advice was purely precautionary. You will want to secure OD(G)'s agreement.

MILITARY

- 7 Armoured Brigade Defence Secretary will want to report on progress with deployment.
- Response to Iraqi use of CW and BW In the light of your reaction, I have instructed the Cabinet Office not to circulate their note. If you think it necessary to say something, I suggest the following:
 - you and Defence Secretary discussed this subject with Cheney.
 - the Americans are averse to using CW, or threatening use of it, to deter the Iraqis.
 - they doubt the Iraqis would try to use CW as a strategic weapon: it is more likely on the battlefield.
 - they intend to try to eliminate the bulk of Iraq's CW capability and the means of delivering it by a pre-emptive strike.
 - they are firmly committed to a conventional response if the Iraqis do use CW.
 - there should be no speculation about possible use of nuclear weapons.

FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

- You might say that the Foreign Secretary should bring forward notes next week on next steps at the UN and on handling of Embassies in Kuwait. In the longer term, FCO should work on a paper on ways to make progress in the

SECRET - 4 -

D

Arab/Israel dispute after Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Together with MOD, they should also prepare a paper on a
future security system in the Gulf. You will talk
separately to the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary
next week about any further papers which may be needed,
in the light of your talk with the President.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

17 October 1990

C:\ministers

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TOP SECRET

Handwritten signature

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

18 (a-b)

THE GULF: VISIT TO WASHINGTON

The Prime Minister is content with your plans to visit Washington, and she believes a visit will be timely and useful.

The Americans have put very strict constraints on knowledge of some aspects of their military planning and political intentions. The Prime Minister has given a personal undertaking to observe those limits. She thinks therefore that you should not yourself raise certain subjects in discussion with General Scowcroft.

For the sake of clarity, the subjects which you can safely raise are:

- intelligence aspects of the Gulf conflict.
- Iraqi CW and BW capability.
- Iraqi nuclear programme.
- the risk of Israeli involvement.
- tactics at the UN.
- strategic deception.
- long-term security arrangements in the Gulf.
- future handling of Arab-Israel issues.

But she would wish to reserve for her own discussions with the President (and for the Defence Secretary/CDS on the military

TOP SECRET

side) the following subjects:

- the conditions under which we might invoke the military option.
- the timing of such action.
- military planning and strategy.

She has suggested that I should put this agenda to General Scowcroft. Would you be content with that?

C. D. POWELL

17 October 1990

C:\pc

PRIME MINISTER

GULF BUSINESS NOTE

I attach a rather elaborate Gulf Business Note from Robin Butler. In essence it lists a lot of papers which he wants to have prepared and put to OD(G) over the next few weeks. They are:

- i) ways of deterring Saddam Hussein from using CW/BW. This is already written and is attached. The paper illustrates the difficulties which we face at present because of the need for secrecy: it takes no account of your and the Defence Secretary's discussion with Secretary Cheney at which these issues were fully considered, or of the American plan to strike pre-emptively at Iraq's CW facilities.
- ii) US military objectives and priorities. This cannot fully and accurately be written without considerably expanding the circle of those who are in the picture.
- iii) The implications of a wider range of allied objectives, including destruction of Iraq's NBC facilities and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
- iv) A full presentation by MoD on the military scenario for hostilities against Iraq.
- v) Presentation of UK policy.
- vi) A regional security structure for the Gulf post-Iraqi withdrawal.
- vii) Prospects for an Arab/Israel settlement.
- viii) Media handling in a conflict.
- ix) UK strategy in the United Nations.
- x) Timing and modalities of withdrawal of British and American Embassies.

xi) Burden-sharing.

X xii) Strategic deception.

This is a formidable agenda, and it raises some questions:

- NO
- do you want all these subjects dealt with in papers which will inevitably involve quite a number of officials, and a wider circle of Ministers? This applies particularly to (ii), (iii) and (xii). They could be omitted for the time being, and handled on a more restrictive basis. (iv) might be handled by MoD alone. *should be kept to very few people.*
 - Some of the subjects are short-term and operational. We do not need elaborate papers. They can come up to OD(G) on the basis of notes by the Ministers responsible, in the ordinary way. This would apply to (viii), (ix), (x) and (xi).
 - Some are wider-ranging, longer-term issues which are good subjects for deeper study, with papers to come to OD(G) or even OD in due course, but not necessarily in the next few weeks. That applies to (vi) and (vii).

You have a private meeting with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries early next week to talk through some of the most sensitive matters. I suggest you discuss the procedure *and for* handling of such subjects with them. Meanwhile content:

- to allow the attached paper on response to Iraq's use of CW/BW to be circulated to OD(G) for discussion on Thursday?
- for me to minute out on the other issues as proposed above?

C.D.P.
CHARLES POWELL
16 OCTOBER 1990

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TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

16a - f
Seen by PM
Comment in
16 October 1990
rely.
CBA/7K.

THE GULF: VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Following our talk on 8 October I have arranged to visit Washington on 22 and 23 October and have been offered a "substantial discussion" with Scowcroft on 23 October. At this juncture it will be essential to make maximum use of this opportunity to explore US top-level planning and encourage them to think through their options. The signs are still of lack of clarity and determination. [Is this really so?]

The broad questions that suggest themselves are not dissimilar from those in my minute to you of 27 September attached. There are a host of subsidiary matters but there is no need to burden you with those. The nub of the matter remains the short time available; the need to use it fully (which means decisions, though not necessarily action, now); and the question of how to manage the transition to major hostilities. Under this last head the key issue is whether to seek first a further UN resolution on the use of force. Baker's wish to have this extra cover will no doubt be strengthened by the current lower standing of the Administration with US popular opinion as a result of the budget crisis. On the other side, the arguments against such a course, familiar to us both, remain as cogent as ever.

Much of this ground will no doubt be covered in your telephone talk with the President later this week and I shall of course be guided by that. If you have further suggestions you will no doubt let me know.

If we are to derive maximum benefit from the visit it will be important that Scowcroft speaks freely and in confidence. It would encourage that and assist the visit greatly if you could convey, whether directly or through Charles, your interest in it.


PERCY CRADOCK

PRIME MINISTER

27 September 1990

QUESTIONS FOR MR BUSH

You will want to exploit the opportunities in your private talk with the President to explore US thinking, and we hope planning, on the Gulf.

The questions fall under several heads.

A. US response to incidents

My guess would be that Saddam Hussein will continue to lie low and avoid provocations while seeking to break-up the coalition against him. But we cannot be sure. We need to know how the US would be likely to respond to incidents involving Iraqis, eg Iraqi attacks on allied vessels following interception of Iraqi shipping or some other deliberately provocative Iraqi move, eg attacks on oil rigs. We must also allow for terrorist incidents associated with Iraq. Presumably the US are thinking of a limited proportionate response such as would be unlikely to trigger full scale hostilities before we are ready. The possibility of escalation occurring nonetheless has, however, to be borne in mind and an incident late in the day, say in November, might prove providential. Are there any situations in the present early phase which the US would consider required an all-out response, eg maltreatment of hostages, readying of missiles with CW, threats to use BW? An imminent missile threat to Israel, or an attack on Israel?

B. Preparations for full-scale hostilities

We need to know more of US thinking on deployment of the allied force, command and control, and arrangements for consultation with foreign, particularly Arab elements, so as to ensure unified operations while preserving security. A number of these questions would probably best fall to military discussion, eg CDS with General Powell, but you will need to make some reference to this area of uncertainty and emphasise the need for speed. Our impression is that

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

there is a great deal to be done to establish full coordination in a heterogeneous allied force.

C. Transition to major hostilities

This is the nub of the matter. Our assessment is that sanctions, though biting, are unlikely to produce the changes in Iraq we require within a period we would find sustainable. There will be a relatively brief spell between October/November and March when we shall be ready and still united and when weather conditions will be at their least bad. We assume the President is considering recourse to the military option in this period. Does he have any idea of timing?

On the mechanics of transition, although the Russians are now more amenable and speak of military force under a UN command, we assume that there is no intention to approach the UN before action. Obvious disadvantages. Mr Baker has nonetheless been touching on this possibility in discussions in New York this week with the Foreign Secretary. This does not rule out further Security Council resolutions to ratchet up pressure on Saddam, but recourse to Article 42 could complicate use of Article 51.

Presumably the intention is to invoke Article 51 plus a further letter from the Amir and cite the failure of sanctions to date to bring Saddam to compliance.

Does the Administration think it may need some additional casus belli, eg maltreatment of hostages? There were some signs of this during Robin Butler's visit. There is obvious danger in this course. We have all the justification we need already.

Presumably the US plan a very short notice notification to allies and friends, including the Russians of the decision to move, plus a suitable statement in the United Nations soon after fighting begins.

On the form of the assault, you will have seen an outline of likely planning in the JIC paper, Allied Military Options, ie an

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

intense air bombardment intended to destroy the Iraqi airforce and missiles plus communications and a left hook into Kuwait separating it from Iraq. We hope the President can reveal something of this planning. Has he any assessment of the time likely to be required for the recovery of Kuwait? Has thought been given to means of reducing bloodshed in retaking Kuwait City if the Iraqi troops dug in there maintain their defence? What military problems most worry the President?

On the air bombardment, we shall need full consultation over targets if we are to be involved. There may be legal questions on the range of targets, eg infrastructure, which we shall need to consider.

Do the Americans have plans to attempt the rescue of any Western hostages in Kuwait? Do they have plans to deter Saddam from harming hostages/diplomats in Iraq?

Have the Administration thought of how they would respond to likely Iraqi use of CW and BW? They will obviously wish to keep this vague, with the suggestion of readiness in certain contingencies to use chemical or nuclear weapons in response, but our guess would be that they will want to confine themselves to conventional responses. Do they take seriously the possibility that the Iraqis as a last desperate measure may seek to use BW in foreign capitals?

D. Israel

Saddam would like to transform this into an Arab/Israel conflict. The Israel factor can intrude at a number of stages in the game. Saddam may seek to provoke or may actually attack Israel before major hostilities, or once such hostilities have broken out.

Presumably a minor attack could be borne by Israel without a military response, as the Israelis themselves have indicated. Generally the US would wish to act for Israel in order to keep them out, eg destroying Iraqi western missile bases, and generally the Israelis would like to see the dirty work done for them. But presumably there would be circumstances in which the Israelis would

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

act for themselves, eg in face of a major attack, or if they saw the end-game developing unsatisfactorily, with Saddam escaping too lightly. Do the Americans agree with the above analysis? Are there circumstances in which they would acquiesce in, or even welcome, Israeli military intervention?

E. The end game

We have to allow for the possibility that Saddam, though badly battered and compelled to withdraw from Kuwait, may still survive. Have the Americans plans to deal with this eventuality and to compel the dismantling or destruction of Iraqi nuclear/CW/BW capabilities? Presumably the initial air assault will be broad enough to embrace much of this, but we must assume some facilities will survive. Are there circumstances in which the US would envisage continuing hostilities after the recovery of Kuwait? Have they any thoughts on a tolerable successor regime in Baghdad?

F. Long term security arrangements

We shall need to ensure the defence of Kuwait after its recovery. We shall also probably need to ensure the defence of Saudi Arabia. This would best be done by Arab forces, though with clear guarantees by Western allies. How much further geographically should the long term security arrangements extend? Role for Iran or Turkey? There will be a unique opportunity to tackle other major Middle East issues, both economic and military/political. There will at the same time be reluctance by the Americans to move on into these deeper waters and a tendency to confine long term security arrangements to the immediate Kuwait/Iraq issue. There is danger in this and in any piecemeal approach, namely that we shall tackle only the easier bit, miss a great opportunity and leave much of the Middle East discontented and unstable as well as heavily armed.

G. Iraqi nuclear capacity

There is one question which needs asking and can probably only be answered by the President or Scowcroft, namely is the American

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assessment still that the Iraqis are some four to five years away from acquiring a nuclear weapon.⁷

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temporarily retained
R.S.
16/11/16

Conclusion

The above is intended as a quarry rather than a precise brief. I fancy you will find the President still very cautious, partly because of the nature of the subject, partly he will not have thought it all through or reached conclusions as yet. What will be essential therefore is to establish channels for further privileged information and to ensure that we shall remain closely informed as his thinking develops. It would also be valuable to provide for more detail discussion at military level, ie CDS/General Powell.

K

PERCY CRADOCK

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5a-d
Prime Minister
Com/1/x.

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Ref.AO90/2414

MR POWELL

The fewer the people
who know the better. We have

Gulf Business Note had experience of
Secret papers leaking. mt

This note, which has been prepared in consultation with FCO and MoD, summarises the work in preparation on Gulf issues and proposes the agenda for the work of OD(G) in the four weeks between now and the completion of military preparations, if the Prime Minister agrees.

Iraqi Use of CW/BW

2. The Cabinet Office has prepared the attached paper, cleared with FCO, MoD and Assessments Staff, which, if the Prime Minister agrees, could be considered at OD(G) on Thursday, on ways of detering Saddam Hussain from using CW/BW and responses if, despite our warnings, the Iraqis went ahead with a CW/BW attack in the Gulf.

British and American Military Objectives

3. The MoD is working on a paper on Operation Granby: Operational Philosophy. The paper essentially covers targeting policy, based principally on the Security Council Resolutions and the means necessary to secure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and deter further Iraqi aggression.

4. If the Prime Minister wishes, two further papers could be prepared. First, an MoD/FCO assessment of US military objectives and priorities. The paper could be produced after the visit of the Joint Commander to the Gulf theatre next week.

For MoD & PM only.

No

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No /

5. Second, an MoD/FCO paper on the implications of a wider range of allied objectives, to include the destruction of Iraq's NBC facilities and production capacity and the overthrow of Saddam.

Military Planning

No /

6. OD(G) might find it helpful to have a full military presentation by MoD on the basic scenarios for hostilities against Iraq, should these be necessary, possibly against the background of the proposed paper on US military objectives and priorities.

7. This discussion would enable Ministers to look at the presentation of UK policy in the light of the projected timescale and rates of attrition. Ministers could also consider what further background briefing might be needed for MPs, the Opposition and the press. The Cabinet Office could be tasked to prepare a note on these aspects.

Diplomatic objectives post-Saddam Hussain

8. The FCO is preparing a paper on the political and diplomatic endgame including the requirement for a regional security structure and a rigorous NPT regime which would maintain stability and peace in the Gulf after Saddam Hussain has been dislodged.

9. The Prime Minister may wish to ask the FCO to prepare a further paper on how in practice the search for an Arab/Israel settlement can be taken forward after Iraq has been removed from Kuwait. The US attitude would of course be crucial, and it is open to debate how strongly the UK should press.

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Media Handling

10. MoD is finalising a paper on media handling in a period of heightened tension or conflict in consultation with Number 10 Press Office, FCO, COI and the Cabinet Office. The paper will cover US and UK arrangements for controlling media access to the battlefield, for preventing the media from giving away allied military deployments and plans (e.g. an allied first strike by air), and for ensuring that the media are given facilities in the aftermath of action and not ahead or in parallel with them. It will cover media handling in London and in-theatre, including the role of Ministers in defining the Government's line and dealing with the press.

Other papers which could be considered in OD(G)

- Too vague*
- i. Officials will be submitting on the next steps of the UK strategy in the United Nations in the light of earlier discussions and will be reporting further on compensation/personal responsibility. *We have already been told that this would not go through d-present.*
- ii. The FCO is preparing a note on the timing and modalities of the withdrawal of the British and American Embassies in Kuwait, taking account of the logistic situation in the Embassies, the timing of hostilities, the advice to the British community and the likely conduct of Iraqi troops during a conflict.
- iii. The Cabinet Office, in consultation with the Treasury and FCO, will prepare a note to bring OD(G) up to date on the burdensharing exercise, which is currently being concluded under US chairmanship, after the next round of meetings.

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Conclusion

No 12. I should be glad to know whether the Prime Minister is content with this programme of work; and, immediately, whether she is content for the paper on Iraqi use of CW/BW to be circulated for consideration at OD(G) this Thursday. If the programme of work is approved, I will propose a timetable for finalisation of the papers and Ministerial discussions.


R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

Cabinet Office
16 October 1990

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PRIME MINISTER

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THE GULF

Option (ii) MF

Percy Cradock is planning to go to Washington next week. He will see his usual intelligence community contacts. He has also arranged a meeting with General Scowcroft for a 'substantive' discussion.

We have a potential problem here. Percy is not fully informed on your talks with the President or with Secretary Cheney, and is not among the very restricted number of people who are informed of American thinking at the highest level (they number only Defence Secretary, CDS, me and the Foreign Secretary - in part). The Americans have enjoined us to preserve the strictest security.

You have discussed the most sensitive issues with Secretary Cheney, and will be talking to the President at the end of the week. This may make it ^{UN} necessary for Percy to go into these with Brent Scowcroft.

The alternatives seem to me:

- i) to brief Percy fully on all the issues and authorise him to discuss them in Washington. I would need to warn Brent Scowcroft that we were doing this and seek his agreement;
- ii) to ask Percy to restrict himself to intelligence aspects: the issue of whether to go back to the UN for authority for military action: future strategy at the UN: the risks of Israeli involvement: assessment of the Iraqi nuclear programme: strategic deception: long-term security arrangements for the Gulf: possible initiative on Arab/Israel in the wake of Iraqi withdrawal. But he would be instructed NOT to deal with military planning, military strategy and

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Page 2 of 2 Pages

the transition to the military option, which would be reserved for you and the President and CDS/General Powell. Again I would warn General Scowcroft in advance which subjects could and could not be raised (bearing in mind that Percy is bound to be accompanied by someone from the Embassy).

I think the second option would still give him a very full agenda.

Prefer (i) or (ii)?

e.d.p.

C.D. POWELL

16 October 1990

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~~Amended~~ CAP
Cd. you please
find a place
? Emp 1700

Thurs
1st Nov (1)

PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Mrs. Ponsonby

confirmed
with Transport

GULF CRISIS: EMBARGO SURVEILLANCE UNIT

AP
18/10

The Embargo Surveillance Unit is an inter-Departmental group which is tracing and then following up every piece of evidence of sanctions breaches. It is not very glamorous, but absolutely essential, work. They do it from the Department of Transport although they do not report directly to the Transport Secretary.

Cecil Parkinson has asked me whether you would be able to find 20 minutes to visit them at some point to encourage them in their work. This would be a nice gesture if you could squeeze it into your programme in the next week or so.

Agree?

Yes

CDP

C. D. POWELL

16 October 1990

tmw a:\embargo

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 686

OF 160935Z OCTOBER 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL IBRD/IMF WASHINGTON

TEL AVIV: FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 680 (NOT TO ALL):

JORDAN : UN SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. CROWN PRINCE REPLIES HELPFULLY, IF SOMEWHAT TESTILY, TO YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT. EVIDENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN JORDANIAN PERFORMANCE, PARTICULARLY ON LORRY TRAFFIC, BUT ALSO ON AIR EMBARGO. PROPOSAL FOR UN-SPONSORED MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS.

DETAIL

2. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE CROWN PRINCE'S REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION, WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO ME ON THE EVENING OF 15 OCTOBER. THE MESSAGE ENCLOSED A LETTER FROM THE FINANCE MINISTER ADDRESSED TO THE UNSG'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE CURRENTLY VISITING AMMAN TO DISCUSS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, TO WHICH IN TURN IS ATTACHED AN UP-DATED VERSION OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OUTLINING ITS MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS. THESE DOCUMENTS FOLLOW BY TODAY'S BAG TO FCO AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

3. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE CONCLUSION OF PRINCE HASSAN'S MESSAGE REFLECTS THE TESTINESS WITH WHICH HE INITIALLY RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE, AS REPORTED IN MY TUR. THE CONTENT, HOWEVER, IS GENERALLY POSITIVE, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT RECENT EVIDENCE OF INCREASED TRUCK TRAFFIC GOING FROM JORDAN TO IRAQ. THE FINANCE MINISTER'S LETTER GOES INTO THIS MATTER IN MORE DETAIL, CONVEYING THE RESULTS OF JARDANEH'S PERSONAL

INSPECTION OF THE BORDER AND CUSTOMS ARRANGEMENTS, AND HIS CONCLUSION THAT VIRTUALLY ALL TRUCKS GOING INTO IRAQ ARE IN FACT EMPTY, HAVING BEEN INSPECTED AND SEALED BY JORDANIAN CUSTOMS.

4. WE HAVE MEANWHILE HAD CONTACTS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (AS RECOMMENDED BY PRINCE HASSAN) AND WITH THE US AND FRENCH EMBASSIES. A COPY OF A MINUTE RECORDING THESE CONTACTS ALSO FOLLOWS BY BAG. THE MAIN CONCLUSION TO REPORT IS THAT THE AMERICANS AT LEAST ARE NOW SATISFIED WITH BOTH THE GOOD INTENTIONS AND THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES, AT ALL LEVELS, IN ENFORCING SANCTIONS PROPERLY. THEY HAVE EXAMINED THE CUSTOMS ARRANGEMENTS IN AMMAN FOR SEALING BOTH THE CLOSED REFRIGERATED TRUCKS AND THE OPEN TARPAULIN-COVERED ONES: AND INDEED NOW REPORT THAT MOST OF THE LATTER ARE HAVING TARPAULINS REMOVED AT THE BORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE EMPTY. THEIR REINSTATED MONITORING POST AT THE BORDER REPORTS A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE FLOW OF TRUCKS INTO IRAQ AS FROM 13 OCTOBER (IE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED LEVELS OVER THOSE REPORTED IN MY TELNO 683). THEY HAVE ALSO MONITORED COMPLIANCE WITH THE AIR EMBARGO INSTITUTED BY RESOLUTION 670: FROM THIS, THEIR MAIN CONCLUSION IS THAT VOLUMES OF CARGO GOING ON SCHEDULED IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHTS TO BAGHDAD ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PERSONAL BAGGAGE OF THE NUMBERS OF PASSENGERS TRAVELLING ON THOSE FLIGHTS. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF JORDANIAN GOOD INTENTIONS CAME ON 15 OCTOBER IN THE FORM OF A DECISION NOT TO ALLOW THE LATEST CONVOY OF CHARITABLY-DONATED FOOD SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ TO LEAVE AMMAN, PENDING CLEARANCE OF THE CONSIGNMENT WITH THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (WHICH WE ASSUME IS IN PRACTICE UNLIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING).

5. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR OWN LATEST ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FIRST-HAND COVERAGE OF THE CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE BORDER HAS BEEN THWARTED BY A LAST-MINUTE REFUSAL OF PERMISSION BY THE PRIME MINISTER. APPARENTLY HIS STATED REASON FOR THE REFUSAL WAS THAT JORDAN IS ABOUT TO ARRANGE FOR MONITORING OF SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT BY THE UN ITSELF (AS MENTIONED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE CROWN PRINCE'S MESSAGE): AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL EMBASSIES TO COVER THIS ARE THEREFORE NO LONGER REQUIRED. THE IDEA OF UN MONITORING WAS RAISED BY THE US EMBASSY: THE LATTER CLAIM THAT THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS REPLIED THAT JORDAN WOULD AGREE TO A UN-SPONSORED MONITORING PRESENCE PROVIDED SIMILAR REQUESTS HAD BEEN MADE OF OTHER COUNTRIES BORDERING IRAQ - IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY RESPONSES OBTAINED FROM THOSE COUNTRIES. WE SHALL BE PURSUING THIS IN CONSULTATION

WITH THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS: THE IDEAL OBJECTIVE FROM OUR VIEWPOINT WOULD BE A UN FLAG COVERING MONITORING ACTIVITIES SHARED BETWEEN EMBASSIES OF COUNTRIES CONCERNED. THIS WOULD BOTH SAVE ON CURRENT MANPOWER COMMITMENTS AS WELL, WE HOPE AS PROVIDING RELIABLE COVERAGE.

COMMENT

6. I HOPE THAT THE LATEST EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN OUR AND US REPORTS, TOGETHER WITH THE LATEST JORDANIAN ASSURANCES, WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW US TO ACCEPT THAT JORDAN IS NOW COMPLYING WITH ITS SANCTIONS OBLIGATIONS. INDEED, I NOTE YOU HAVE ALREADY INDICATED YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS (IN YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE ON 14 OCTOBER IN CAIRO - RETRACT 005). THE US REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE SIMILARLY DURING THE LAST MEETING OF THE FINANCIAL COORDINATION GROUP IN WASHINGTON (UKDEL WASHINGTON TELNO 365 TO YOU, PARA 5). UNJUSTIFIED THOUGH THE ELEMENT OF IRRITABILITY IN THE JORDANIAN REACTION MAY BE, IT SEEMS TO HAVE PROVIDED A STIMULUS FOR ACTION. AT THE SAME TIME, I CAN SEE SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR WISH FOR BETTER COORDINATION AMONGST THE COUNTRIES MOST KEEN TO SECURE THEIR COMPLIANCE EG THROUGH SETTING UP UN RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS. WE LEARNT RECENTLY THAT THE LIST OF ALLEGED BREACHES WHICH I GAVE THE KING ON 23 SEPTEMBER WAS IDENTICAL TO ONE GIVEN TO THE JORDANIANS BY THE AMERICAN EMBASSY: WE HAVE AGAIN BEEN PROMISED A WRITTEN REPLY IN BOTH CASES. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT PERIODIC INSTRUCTIONS TO PURSUE SPECIFIC CASES OF ALLEGED SANCTIONS BUSTING.

7. I HOPE IT MAY NOW BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE SWIFTLY IN SETTING UP SATISFACTORY MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UN (I BELIEVE M RIPERT WILL PROBABLY ADD HIS VOICE TO THIS RECOMMENDATION). MEANWHILE, WE INTEND TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS TO ENSURE THAT OUR PRESENT COVERAGE IS MAINTAIN. AS ALREADY INDICATED (MY TELNO 685) THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE NOW, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IS NOT TO GIVE THE JORDANIANS GROUNDS FOR SUSPICION THAT DELAYS IN PRODUCING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THEM ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED, IN CASE THIS UNDERMINES THEIR NEW-FOUND RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS OBSERVANCE IN THE FACE OF THE INEVITABLE POLITICAL PRESSURES.

8. SEE MIFT.

REEVE

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MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ISRAEL:
PLENARY SESSION: GULF CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT SITUATION. ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT RISKS OF GROWING ARAB SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN IN ANY LONG HAUL SCENARIO. FOCUS ON PROBLEM OF CONTAINING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS MILITARY ARSENAL SHOULD THEY SURVIVE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS. WORRIES ABOUT JORDAN.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, LEVY CONCENTRATED ON THE GULF CRISIS. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S THREAT HAD BEEN AGAINST ISRAEL ONLY, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE STOOD ALONE. BUT ITS LOW PROFILE POLICY NOW MADE IT EASIER FOR OTHERS TO ALIGN THEMSELVES AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS ARSENAL SURVIVED, ISRAEL WOULD ONCE AGAIN FACE HIM ALONE. FOR OTHERS, THE CONFLICT WAS A QUESTION OF INTERESTS SEMI COLON FOR ISRAEL IT WAS A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH. ISRAEL HOPED THAT THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE UK WOULD REMAIN OPEN. ISRAEL'S VIEWS WERE IMPORTANT AS THE 'GEO-POLITICAL METEOROLOGICAL STATION FOR THE REGION.'

3. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID OUR SHARED INTEREST IN AN ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE NOW AND IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. HE UNDERSTOOD THE RISKS INVOLVED IN ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE POLICY. BUT IT WAS A WISE POLICY AND HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. THERE WERE THREE PRESSURES ON SADDAM HUSSEIN SEMI COLON DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION (UNCOMFORTABLE FOR HIM BUT NOT DECISIVE) SEMI COLON SANCTIONS (HAVING AN EFFECT, BUT INVOLVING A LONG HAUL) SEMI COLON AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IF HE DID NOT GO IN PEACE HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT. THIS FINAL POINT WAS PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT.

4. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD SUDDENLY WITHDRAW FROM AT LEAST PART OF KUWAIT. BUT THIS WOULD BE NO GOOD: THERE WAS NO

QUESTION OF HIS KEEPING AN ISLAND OR TWO. ISRAEL WOULD NEED TO BE INVOLVED IN CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO REDUCE AND CONTAIN THE DANGERS IF THE OUTCOME LEFT IRAQ'S DANGEROUS POTENTIAL IN PLACE. ACCOUNTS OF CHENEY'S VISIT TO LONDON ON 15 OCTOBER SUGGESTED A U.S. EMPHASIS ON THE LONG HAUL AND AGAINST IMMINENT USE OF THE MILITARY OPTION. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS SURE WE COULD NOT ABDICATE FROM THE MILITARY OPTION.

5. LEVY ARGUED THAT ANY LONG HAUL SOLUTION CONTAINED RISKS. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON SAUDI SOIL WAS ITSELF A POTENTIAL RALLYING POINT FOR ANTI-WESTERN ARAB FORCES. ISRAEL WAS NOT GOADING ANYONE TO USE FORCE AND WAS NOT TAKING ANY INITIATIVES. BUT IF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF 'MEDICATION' DID NOT WORK THE TIME WOULD COME WHEN BOTH DOCTOR AND PATIENT WOULD REALISE THAT OTHER OPTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TRIED.

6. LEVY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT MEMBERS OF THE COALITION SHOULD REALISE THAT ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE POLICY AND THE UNPRECEDENTED NATURE OF THE THREAT CARRIED VERY GREAT RISKS FOR HER. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD REALISE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO HURT ISRAEL WOULD PROMPT A SEVERE REACTION.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE CRISIS DID NOT CALL FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO LEAVE POWER OR BE DISARMED, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION WIDENING OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS WAY.

8. DISCUSSING PUBLIC OPINION IN ARAB COUNTRIES, LEVY PAINTED A GLOOMY PICTURE OF THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS FUELLING A GROWTH IN PAN-ARAB SENTIMENT OF THE NASSER VARIETY MERGED WITH FUNDAMENTALIST FEELINGS. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD IRONICALLY BECOME THE STANDARD BEARER OF KHOMEINISM. THE FERMENT OF ARAB FEELING WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN, IN A POSITION OF WEAKNESS, HAD DECIDED HE HAD TO GO ALONG WITH THIS SENTIMENT. HE WAS IN A SIMILAR POSITION TO THE SHAH OF IRAN IN HIS FINAL YEARS. LEVY SUGGESTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN AT LEAST AWARE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLAN TO INVADe KUWAIT, AND HAD LAID THE GROUNDWORK BY THE DIVERSIONARY TACTIC OF SOUNDING FALSE WARNINGS ABOUT ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS. DESPITE INSTANCES OF IRAQI/JORDANIAN MILITARY COOPERATION. ISRAEL WANTED CONTINUED STABILITY IN JORDAN AND HAD CONVEYED THIS MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN VIA DE MICHELIS. ISRAEL WAS NOT DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN AT EVEN THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SINCE TO DO SO COULD BE SEEN AS CREATING A CLIMATE OF EXPECTATION. BUT THE SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING IN A DANGEROUS DIRECTION. SYRIA, IRAQ, THE PLO AND

IRAN ALL HAD A INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENED IN JORDAN, AS DID ISRAEL.

9. IN EGYPT, ALTHOUGH MUBARAK WAS IN CONTROL, THERE WERE UNDERCURRENTS OF POSSIBLE UNREST WHICH COULD PROVIDE CATALYSTS FOR INSTABILITY (MUSLIM BROTHERS, NASSERITES, TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS, REFUGEES FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT). ISRAEL NEEDED TO WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY. PEACE WITH EGYPT WAS PRECIOUS TO ISRAEL.

10. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN SURVIVED THE PRESENT CRISIS WITH THE GROWING SUPPORT OF ARAB PEOPLES, THEN STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND BAHRAIN WOULD 'YIELD TO HIM THEMSELVES' SEEING HIM NOT AS AN INVADER BUT AS A TAX COLLECTOR. THEY WOULD PAY FOR THEIR SURVIVAL.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO CONTACTS AT ALL LEVELS WITH THE JORDANIANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. WHETHER OR NOT KING HUSSEIN KNEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE, HE HAD RAPIDLY BECOME THE APOLOGIST FOR THE IRAQI LEADER'S ACTIONS. IN OUR VIEW. JORDAN WAS NOW MAKING AN EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS. BUT THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS WERE NOT CONVINCED. KING HUSSEIN HAD TO WORK OUT HIS OWN SALVATION SEMI COLON THERE WAS LITTLE BRITAIN OR ISRAEL COULD DO TO HELP. LEVY SAID THAT ISRAEL TOO HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN ENSURING KING HUSSEIN'S SURVIVAL.

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16 October 1990

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Map p 30.

Gulf: ROE

Simon Webb wrote to you of 4 October enclosing a set of draft "dormant" Rules of Engagement for British forces in the Gulf, for use if a limited conflict developed. If the Attorney agrees, Mr Waldegrave, in the Foreign Secretary's absence, is content that these ROE should be issue in their "dormant" form. He agrees that certain Rules, as specified by the MOD, should not in any event be implemented without specific ministerial authority.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (Dept. of Energy), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Attorney General's Office) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER

GULF BUSINESS NOTE

I attach a rather elaborate Gulf Business Note from Robin Butler. In essence it lists a lot of papers which he wants to have prepared and put to OD(G) over the next few weeks. They are:

- i) ways of deterring Saddam Hussein from using CW/BW. This is already written and is attached. The paper illustrates the difficulties which we face at present because of the need for secrecy: it takes no account of your and the Defence Secretary's discussion with Secretary Cheney at which these issues were fully considered, or of the American plan to strike pre-emptively at Iraq's CW facilities.
- ii) US military objectives and priorities. This cannot fully and accurately be written without considerably expanding the circle of those who are in the picture.
- iii) The implications of a wider range of allied objectives, including destruction of Iraq's NBC facilities and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
- iv) A full presentation by MoD on the military scenario for hostilities against Iraq.
- v) Presentation of UK policy.
- vi) A regional security structure for the Gulf post-Iraqi withdrawal.
- vii) Prospects for an Arab/Israel settlement.
- viii) Media handling in a conflict.
- ix) UK strategy in the United Nations.
- x) Timing and modalities of withdrawal of British and American Embassies.

b

- xi) Burden-sharing.
- xii) Strategic deception.

This is a formidable agenda, and it raises some questions:

- do you want all these subjects dealt with in papers which will inevitably involve quite a number of officials, and a wider circle of Ministers? This applies particularly to (ii), (iii) and (xii). They could be omitted for the time being, and handled on a more restrictive basis. (iv) might be handled by MoD alone.
- Some of the subjects are short-term and operational. We do not need elaborate papers. They can come up to OD(G) on the basis of notes by the Ministers responsible, in the ordinary way. This would apply to (viii), (ix), (x) and (xi).
- Some are wider-ranging, longer-term issues which are good subjects for deeper study, with papers to come to OD(G) or even OD in due course, but not necessarily in the next few weeks. That applies to (vi) and (vii).

You have a private meeting with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries early next week to talk through some of the most sensitive matters. I suggest you discuss the procedure and handling of such subjects with them. Meanwhile content:

- to allow the attached paper on response to Iraq's use of CW/BW to be circulated to OD(G) for discussion on Thursday?
- for me to minute out on the other issues as proposed above?

CHARLES POWELL
16 OCTOBER 1990

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MY TELNO 1635: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SUMMARY

1. INCONCLUSIVE MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND ISRAELI AMBASSADOR. SECRETARY-GENERAL TO WRITE TO ME AS PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DULY CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 OCTOBER. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATER TOLD ME THAT BEIN HAD SIMPLY HANDED OVER THE TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET ON 14 OCTOBER. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE STATEMENT IN PARA 4 OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT QUOTE ISRAEL WILL NOT RECEIVE THE DELEGATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNQUOTE: DID THIS MEAN THAT THE MISSION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED INTO ISRAEL, OR MERELY THAT IT WOULD NOT BE OFFICIALLY RECEIVED? BEIN SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE THIS CLARIFICATION AND UNDERTOOK TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR URGED HIM TO GET THESE OVERNIGHT.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME HE WAS NOT TOO DISCOURAGED BY THIS REACTION: THERE WAS STILL ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE HAD ALREADY LEARNT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PLANNED TO SEND ME A LETTER AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EXPLAINING WHERE MATTERS STOOD. I SAID TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT I HOPED THAT THE HOTHEADS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE OVER-HASTY IN BRINGING UP THE ISRAELI NON-COOPERATION THERE. THIS WOULD DO NOTHING TO ASSIST OUR OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION PROPERLY RECEIVED IN ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. WE AGREED THAT TO LESSEN THIS RISK HIS LETTER TO ME WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WERE STILL BEING PURSUED.

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UKMIS TELNO 1635: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
SUMMARY

1. BAKER SENDS MESSAGE TO LEVY, URGING THAT ISRAEL COOPERATE WITH THE AIME MISSION. NO CLEAR RESPONSE AS YET, BUT STATE BELIEVE ISRAELIS STILL CONSIDERING WHETHER TO ADMIT THE DELEGATION. HOPE WE WILL PRESS LEVY HARD ON 16 OCTOBER.

DETAIL

2. WE SPOKE ON 15 OCTOBER TO COVEY AND KURTZER (NEA) AND WOLF (INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS) AT STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOLLOWING SC RESOLUTION 672.

3. SECRETARY BAKER SENT A MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY, WHICH WAS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR BROWN ON 14 OCTOBER. EXCERPTS FROM THIS MESSAGE HAVE APPARENTLY NOW APPEARED IN THE ISRAELI PRESS. IN RESPONSE, STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE MADE PUBLIC THAT BAKER'S MESSAGE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE ADMINISTRATION VOTED FOR UNSCR 672 BECAUSE THEY FELT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO DEAL WITH VIOLENCE AND A RIOT WITHOUT THERE BEING 21 DEAD AND 150 WOUNDED.

(B) ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE AS RECENTLY AS JUNE OF THIS YEAR, AND THEREFORE THIS MISSION WOULD NOT SET A PRECEDENT.

(C) THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN OVER ISRAEL'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE LED THEM TO SUPPORT UNSC ACTION, REGARDLESS OF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF.

(D) THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS ISSUE CONCLUDED AND HOPED THAT ISRAEL WILL FIND A WAY TO WORK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE.

COVEY TOLD US THAT BAKER HAD MADE CLEAR TO LEVY THAT THE ISRAELI CLAIM THAT THE US HAD ONLY VOTED FOR 672 SO AS TO KEEP TOGETHER THE ARAB COALITION IN THE GULF WAS WRONG. HE URGED ISRAEL NOT TO LET SADDAM HUSSEIN OFF THE HOOK BY SWITCHING WORLD ATTENTION AWAY FROM HIS ACT OF AGGRESSION.

PAGE 1
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4. ROSS (DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING) WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH RUBENSTEIN (ISRAELI CABINET SECRETARY) 15 OCTOBER. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS CLEARLY IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO LET THE AIME MISSION TAKE PLACE. IF ISRAEL BLOCKED IT, THEN THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURE FOR FURTHER, EARLY DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ROSS SAID THAT THE OUTCOME LAST FRIDAY COULD BE SEEN AS A DEFEAT FOR THE PLO, IN THE SENSE THAT THEY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE TOUGHER RESOLUTION WHICH THEY WERE SEEKING. ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE NOW WOULD MERELY GIVE THEM ANOTHER CHANCE. RUBENSTEIN DID NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY, BUT NEITHER DID HE DISMISS THESE ARGUMENTS OUT OF HAND.

5. STATE'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MAY BE RETHINKING THEIR APPROACH TO THE AIME MISSION. EARLIER TODAY, STATE HAD BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI PERM. REP. TO THE UNITED NATIONS (BEIN) WOULD INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING THEIR MEETING THAT AIME'S DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO LAND. IN THE EVENT HE HAD SIMPLY DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE CABINET RESOLUTION (TEL AVIV TELNO 369) AND AGREED TO SEEK CLARIFICATIONS REQUESTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BEIN ALSO APPARENTLY MADE SOME NOT UNHELPFUL PUBLIC COMMENTS FOLLOWING THE MEETING. BUT STATE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC. COVEY SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE BEING EXCEPTIONALLY BLOODY MINDED.

COMMENT

6. STATE THINK THAT, WHILE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO STICK TO THE CABINET DECISION NOT TO RECEIVE THE AIME DELEGATION, THEY MAY YET DECIDE NOT TO IMPEDE THEM. THE NEXT 24 HOURS WILL BE CRITICAL. STATE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD STRONGLY URGE LEVY TO SEE SENSE WHEN THEY MEET ON 16 OCTOBER. THE ADMINISTRATION TELL US THAT - FOR THEIR PART - THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANYTHING MORE THEY CAN USEFULLY DO.

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15 October 1990

*See Charts,**CD 15/x.***IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

This is the seventh of our weekly sitreps.

We have continued to address target audiences in the Middle East and other Muslim countries. Key themes remain the illegality of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the international isolation of Saddam Hussein, the certainty that he will lose and the requirement for full withdrawal and restoration of the Al Sabah. Material pointing up the distinction between Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel has been reinforced.

The Government of Kuwait in Taif have told us that they will pursue contacts with British suppliers of mobile broadcasting equipment.

At the meeting of the UK/Saudi Joint Cultural Committee on 5 October we pressed the Saudis to improve the presentation of their case to the international media.

FCO officials will attend a meeting to be arranged soon by the Home Office with leaders of the British Muslim community, to explain the Government's approach to the Gulf crisis, stress Saddam Hussein's poor record on Islam and convey to the community that their concerns are taken seriously.

Briefing Material

- a) The sixth edition of the FCO briefing notes was issued on 11 October. A copy is enclosed.
- b) Background Briefing Notes will appear next week on Iraq's isolation in the United Nations, and Saddam Hussein's claims to Kuwaiti territory.
- c) A Guidance about the resumption of relations with Iran was issued on 9 October.
- d) Briefing material issued for distribution by our posts has included the Foreign Secretary's interview on BBC



SECRET AND PERSONAL

b

Radio 'World at One' about the killings in Jerusalem.

Written Press

- a) The Foreign Secretary gave an interview to the leading Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram, linked to his visit to Egypt, and on his return will speak to a selected group of Arab and Islamic journalists.
- b) Regular briefings have continued for the Arab Correspondents group in London, countering Iraqi propaganda themes.

Television

- a) An interview with the Kuwaiti Planning Minister, commenting on conditions in Kuwait, was filmed on 8 October. We are considering using this as part of a compilation to include the Emir's speech in New York and further video material from Kuwait, including amateur footage obtained from refugees. Our previous compilations have been broadcast in the Gulf and widely distributed elsewhere to the media and other opinion formers in cassette form.
- b) Local and international television channels will give the Foreign Secretary's visit to Egypt and Israel wide coverage among our target audiences.

Radio

Radio is at present the only effective way to reach ordinary citizens in Iraq and Kuwait. We continue to place material about the Government's policy with radio stations in the Gulf area (including Radio Qatar, which is audible in Iraq and Kuwait) and more widely in other target areas.

- a) An edited version of our recording of an interview in London with the Kuwaiti Planning Minister was accepted by Radio Qatar and by Radio Monte Carlo's Arabic Service, which has a large audience in North Africa and the Gulf.
- b) A recent survey shows that regular audiences for the BBC World Service in both English and Arabic have more than doubled in size in the UAE, Cairo and Alexandria since the beginning of the crisis, reaching about 50% of the adult Arab population. The Head of the BBC Arabic

BU8ABR

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

c

Service will visit Saudi Arabia in the week of 13 October and Cairo the following week to follow up Saudi criticism of the service and to improve coverage. A senior correspondent will visit Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE for the same purpose.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), Martin Stanley (DTI), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Jan,
Stephen Wall


(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Saddam Hussein - an isolated loser
4. Forces in the Gulf
5. Iraq/Kuwait and the Palestinians
6. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - on Kuwaiti and wider Arab and Muslim interests
7. International assistance to Jordan and other countries affected by sanctions
8. Iraq's treatment of foreign hostages and Embassies
9. What happens if sanctions do not work

BACKGROUND

Annex 1: Kuwait: history and status: illegality of Iraqi action

Annex 2: UN Security Council Resolutions

Annex 3: Sanctions

(Revision)

11 October 1990

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

1. KEY POINTS

- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
 - Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
 - Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
 - Saddam Hussein cannot win: a record of failure. Kuwait a miscalculation like Iran where 8 years war, 100,000 Iraqis killed and a \$80 bn deficit have left Iraq with no gains.
 - The international pressures are just now in place: they will take time to build: they must be as formidable and complete as possible.
 - If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
 - Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force; they will leave when asked to do so.
 - Iraq's action against Kuwait has damaged Palestinian interests by diverting international and particularly US attention from Arab/Israel.
 - PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.
 - Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
 - "Far from helping the Palestinian cause, Iraq is now the main obstacle in the search for a settlement" (Secretary of State interview on "World at One", BBC radio, 10 October).
 - Once present crisis over, a solution must be found to Arab/Israel.
-
- Gulf crisis caused by Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cannot be linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 9 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.
- Incident underlines need for progress towards a settlement of underlying dispute.
- Urgent consultation continuing in Security Council. Working to produce early agreement on Resolution which can be accepted by all parties.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that it is null and void. Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state

SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.
- Saddam Hussein's hostages have not fought against him. He has deliberately exposed them to danger (transport to sites). Shamed into freeing women and children but still deprives sick and elderly of freedom. Denied food to Asian workers in Kuwait.

IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRS

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Arab solution tried before, during and after invasion: not successful. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.

EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 80 billion before invasion of Kuwait).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.

FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs."
- But reports from Iraq indicate that while some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at Bakeries) Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock.
- Iraqi occupation stripped hospitals in Kuwait of medical supplies: where have these gone ?
- Iraqi Government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Attempted blackmail of their governments (no evacuation ships accepted without food) cynical. But some 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility.
- Iraq has rejected an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.
- Iraq has similarly refused permission for the visit of the UN Secretary General's representatives to find out whether there is a humanitarian need for emergency food shipments and to check on the condition of Kuwaitis, diplomats and foreign nationals.

IRAQI TREATMENT OF BRITISH MUSLIMS

- The Iraqi authorities have refused to provide assistance to British Muslim pilgrims (to Shi'a shrines in Najjaf and Kerbala) whom the Iraqis have prevented from returning to Britain and who now have no means of support.

- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers.

WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them - over 1,000 kms.

PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "Palestine is the issue on which successive Arab demagogues have pumped themselves up. Saddam Hussein is no exception ... I do not think that new initiatives over Palestine can take place until Saddam Hussein has been driven out of Kuwait ... This is unfinished business to which we must return as soon as the aggressor has withdrawn or been expelled. Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).
- British government shocked by violence in Jerusalem on 9 October.
- With EC partners have issued statement deploring "use of excessive force by Israeli occupying forces ...".
- UN Security Council debating urgently text of a Resolution agreeable to all parties. Five Permanent Members ready to endorse text condemning Israeli violence.

- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Saddam Hussein has killed his own colleagues in government; he has used guns and gas on the Kurds.
- Iraq did not contribute to the Arab forces which faced Israel in 1973 (heaviest fighting was done by the Egyptians, Syrians and Moroccans).
- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Since outbreak of Iran/Iraq war virtually no Iraqi contribution to the Palestinian cause.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam resumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- HMG have since then repeatedly stressed that it is for Israel to match moves for settlement made on Arab side. We welcome Palestinian willingness to go forward on basis of Baker plan. But so far Israeli government has not matched that willingness.
- For Palestinians to throw in their lot with Saddam Hussein plays into hands of Israeli opponents of withdrawal and international settlement, alienates moderates in Israel with whom Arabs/Palestinians will have to talk.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)
- Prince Saud, Saudi Foreign Minister, told the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 2 October that "for the sake of Palestine, Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait and adhere to international legitimacy".

MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September, and expressed:

- o strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It was inadmissible that Muslims should commit acts of aggression against each other;
- o a call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government;
- o a call to the Iraqi government to abide by international law in respect of persons, property and foreign Embassies in Kuwait;
- o Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. When Iraq withdrew and the threat to the Kingdom receded, the foreign forces must be withdrawn;
- o a call for the establishment of a permanent Islamic force within the framework of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to deal with future crises between Islamic countries. Young people in Islamic countries should receive military training to enable them to participate in the defence of Islam;
- o a call to governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.

THE FUTURE

- If and when the Saudis, the Bahrainis, any others, ask us to leave, we will leave. "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait as it must and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.
- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

3. SADDAM HUSSEIN - AN ISOLATED LOSER

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq, now virtually isolated in the Arab community of nations.
- Saddam Hussein has a brutal record: at 22 he took part in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate General Qasim.
- He has gassed his own people. He runs a police state where dissent means death. Iraqi opposition sources report the arrest in mid-September of scores of middle-ranking officers plotting against the regime.
- Afraid of his own people: never appears in public. Mr Tariq Aziz said on Cable News Network that Saddam Hussein "is spending all his time with his people and is one of the most popular leaders in the world". But coverage of his visit to Kuwait on 3 October was first media indication of his whereabouts since 8 August. Iraqi TV film of visit showed a deserted city.
- Iraqi Communist Party newspaper, Tariq al-Shaab, has called for immediate, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and release of all foreign nationals from Kuwait and Iraq.
- International subversion. Sponsored terrorism in the 1970s. Baghdad still home to several terrorist organisations. Murders Iraqi dissidents overseas.
- Saddam Hussein's hostages have not fought against him. He has deliberately exposed them to danger (transport to sites). Shamed into freeing women and children but still deprives sick and elderly of freedom. Denied food to Asian workers in Kuwait.
- "Saddam Hussein is beginning to understand that it is him against the world" (President Bush to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 1 October).
- Saddam's isolation ever more evident. Voting in the Security Council has reflected an unprecedented level of international consensus against his actions. Iraq's aggression and hostage-taking has alienated almost every nation in the world.
- Saddam Hussein's words cannot be trusted:
 - (a) "An Arab country does not have the right to occupy another Arab country ... God forbid, if Iraq should deviate from the right path, we would want Arabs to send their arms to put things right" (speech to Arab lawyers, 28 November 1988);
 - (b) Escalation of war aims from:

- i cancellation of Iraqi debt to Kuwait and surrender of islands
 - via ii response to invitation from a rebel government in Kuwait
 - and iii acting in pursuit of the Arabs dispute with Israel
 - to iv acting for the poor and unendowed against the rich, selfish feudal states of the Arabian peninsula
- Resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union after half a century will further isolate Iraq, which until the invasion of Kuwait, was one of Moscow's main Arab allies.
 - Bush/Gorbachev Helsinki Summit confirmed Iraq's isolation "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger States can devour their smaller neighbours".
 - Arab League called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and approved decision that Arab countries could send troops to defend Saudi Arabia against any Iraqi attack. Egypt, Syria and Morocco responded speedily.
 - Support of all oil producing states (with exception of Iraq) for UN measures gives lie to allegations that USA and others motivated only by desire for cheap oil.
 - World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September with strong condemnation of the Iraqi invasion and endorsement of the deployment of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia.
 - Foreign Ministers of Organisation of the Islamic Conference, at meeting in New York on 1 October, strongly condemned invasion of Kuwait, declared its annexation null and void, and demanded that Iraq abide by the SC Resolutions. During session, the Secretary General of the Conference, Hamid Algabed, called Iraq's act "a challenge and affront to Islam, and a waste of Islamic resources".
 - Farouk al-Shara, Syrian Foreign Minister, told the UNGA in New York on 2 October that "Syria was bound by the Charter of the Arab League and the Joint Arab Defence Pact to help any Arab country which fell victim to aggression".
 - Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Ministers have met to co-ordinate the position of their two countries, and have again stressed need for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
 - Olympic Council of Asia barred Iraq from taking part in the Asian Games in Peking. Asian Federations of wrestling, fencing, athletics, table tennis, volley ball and hand ball suspended Iraqi membership.

- Iran has condemned the invasion of Kuwait and confirmed that it will abide by the UN sanctions. President Rafsanjani has said Iran would strongly oppose any territorial concession to the Iraqis in occupied Kuwait, however minimal, as an inducement to its withdrawal. Iran has confirmed it will abide by the UN sanctions: "if, like us, every country applied without fail the embargo ... Iraq would be obliged to give way and withdraw from Kuwait" (President Rafsanjani in interview with Le Monde, 9 October).
- NATO and EC countries have condemned the Iraqi invasion and are providing military and/or financial support to States affected by Iraqi aggression. Iraqi diplomats have been expelled by EC countries and the freedom of movement of remaining diplomats has been restricted.
- Growing food shortage has forced Iraq to appropriate agricultural land not being cultivated and to issue ration books limiting each person to a monthly ration of 6 kg flour, 1.5 kg rice, 100 gms tea, 500 gms cooking oil, 250 gms beans and pulses, 3 tins baby milk, 1 small packet of detergent and 1 cake of soap.
- "The Charter of the UN, our document, was held in complete contempt. And it is for those reasons that an extraordinary, unique coalition of the international community has formed against the aggressor" (Mr Hurd at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 26 September).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

4. FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force present in the Gulf in response to request from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Forces of over 25 nations, including several Arab ones, are deployed or are to be deployed on land, sea and air.
- Purpose of deployment is entirely defensive.
- Following SCR 665, the naval forces present are now enabled under Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances" to enforce trade embargo.
- The international force will remain in the area so long as the host countries believe it has a job to do. President Bush (press conference at Helsinki Summit) said "The sooner our forces were out of the region, the better. I have no intention of keeping them there a day longer than necessary". Exactly the British government's view.
- British forces initially committed to Gulf undertaking are 5,000, on sea and in the air. Our response speedy, when need for defence at its greatest. In addition an armoured brigade totalling some 10,000 troops and including some 120 tanks and a further squadron of Tornado aircraft is now on the way to Saudi Arabia.
- Operating costs to HMG are about £2 mn a day; deployment and additional costs are some £700 mn. Some support (free fuel) already being provided by host nations.
- France is despatching a brigade (4,000 troops) equipped with helicopters, tanks and anti-aircraft missiles plus 30 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Canada is sending 18 more fighter aircraft. Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands have also sent warships and aircraft.
- Largest military costs being incurred by US. Administration is examining ways in which other nations might help to share the burden. Japan has pledged \$2 bn towards financing international force.
- Genuine international operation: military contributions arriving from every continent. Arab states making a major contribution include Egypt, Syria and Morocco as well as troops from all the countries of the Gulf Co-Operation Council. Pakistan is sending 5,000 troops and Senegal, Niger and Bangladesh are following suit. Argentina has now decided to despatch a combined force and Czechoslovakia and Poland will participate.

- Latest Gallup Poll (Daily Telegraph, 10 October) shows public support for UK (and US) policy in Gulf unwavering after 2½ months.
- Most people questioned in survey prepared to support use of force if blockade proves unsuccessful, but 60% preferred blockade to use of force.
- Holy Places of Saudi Arabia: international forces are deployed along Persian Gulf. Holy Places of Mecca and Medina are in Hejaz, region lying along coast of Red Sea. International forces closest to them are over 900 km away. Areas around Medina and Mecca are no-go areas for non-Muslims, and Saudis enforce this position strictly.
- Muslim and Arab forces (part of international force) are helping to defend Saudi Arabia against threat posed by only occupying force in Arabian Peninsula - Iraqi troops that have invaded Kuwait.
- Mecca Conference of Muslim World League on 12 September concluded Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance in accordance with Islamic law.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

5. IRAQ/KUWAIT AND THE PALESTINIANS

- No direct linkage between Arab/Israel and Iraq/Kuwait. But "we must not lose sight of other fundamental issues in the region, above all the need for a just solution to the Palestinian problem. Unfortunately the Palestinians' support for Iraq's action in seizing the territory of another State has grievously damaged their cause, but nevertheless these events must not stop us from trying to find a solution to this long-standing issue. Peace and security will not come to the region until it is solved" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- Recent bloody incidents in Jerusalem deeply shocking. Underline need for progress towards settlement of underlying dispute.
- Britain determined, once the present crisis is over, to bring Israel's occupation of Arab territory to an end in order to allow the Palestinians to exercise their right of self-determination.
- Saddam's invasion of Kuwait has deprived the Palestinians of one of their most generous financial supporters (a Palestinian economist has pointed out that the loss of Kuwaiti aid alone could cost the Occupied Territories 10% of their GNP this year). This situation lays bare the lie of Saddam Hussein that the government and people of Kuwait have hoarded their oil wealth and been uncaring of poorer Arab countries. Kuwaiti assistance has been given extensively to many countries and on generous terms.
- Invasion has deprived most of the 350,000 Palestinians working in Kuwait of their livelihood, and the possibility of supporting their relatives in Jordan, the Lebanon and the West Bank. (Another Palestinian economist has estimated that the returning Palestinians could push the unemployment rate in the Occupied Territories up to 35%.)
- Invasion has done grave damage to the Palestinian cause and strengthened the case of those Israelis who claim that the Arabs cannot be trusted to live in peace with Israel. PLO has got itself into the position of supporting one occupation in order to end another.
- Saddam's continued occupation of Kuwait, and deprivation of the Kuwaiti right to self-determination, can only help those Israelis who call for the continuation of the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan and the southern part of Lebanon, and deny the Palestinians their right to self-determination.
- Reject linkage of solutions to Gulf crisis and Arab/Israel. This would allow Saddam Hussein to claim that his aggression against Kuwait had achieved something for Palestinians. And it

would greatly complicate search for solution to both problems. Will redouble our efforts to resolve Palestinian problem when Iraqis have left Kuwait.

- "There must eventually be direct dialogue between Israel and representative Palestinians - the prospects for an international conference are bound to be limited unless and until the two principal parties are talking to each other about the real issues. Once Iraq is out of Kuwait, I hope there will be opportunities for fresh thinking" (Mr Hurd to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association in London, 4 October).
- "Saddam Hussein claims to be promoting the Palestinian cause. In fact his cause is power, not people power but personal power. He has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Mr Hurd to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association in London on 4 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

6. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew. Invasion has resulted in collapse of public order.
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence papers, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- Amnesty International reported on 3 October that Iraqi forces have executed and tortured scores of people in Kuwait, and hundreds more were being detained. Repressive measures include killing in streets and in presence of victims' families, summary executions, random mass arrests, destruction of homes.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein erected around the city.
- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.
- Iraqis have now organised formal requisitioning system, so that goods from Kuwait continue to flow to markets in Iraq.
- But Iraqi News Agency reported that Saddam Hussein, on 3 October, walked about in the streets of Kuwait city "familiarising himself with its landmarks which were resplendent, reflecting pride in the city's return to the homeland".
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (\$1.6 bn in gold and foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Deterioration on oil installations will mean a significant potential loss in revenues in the longer term.
- Saddam Hussein's treatment of foreign workers inhumane and barbarous. He has treated Asian workers without any human dignity, and is now using their circumstances to attempt to blackmail governments into breaching the embargo.

- Iraq is responsible for the flood of refugees, mainly Asian who have fled from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and Iraq. Iraq has created climate of fear and uncertainty, from which migrant workers wish to escape. They are prompted by:
 - o Shortage of food, water and other necessities.
 - o Shortage of funds in most cases, their jobs have disappeared; their savings been lost or devalued as result of the phasing out of Kuwaiti dinar. They have been robbed of many of their possessions by Iraqi officials and troops.
 - o Fear of looting, rape of women, both of which have been reported as widespread.
 - o Fear of being used as shields at sites of military importance.
 - o Fear of use of chemical weapons.
- Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was unique in post-World War II history. Not only had Iraq overrun a sovereign independent member state of the UN and attempted to annex it by force, it had also tried to erase the name and existence of Kuwait from the world political map and destroy its political, economic and social structures. "Rape, destruction, terror and torture were the Iraqi rule of the day in Kuwait".
- Iraq is doing little to help thousands of people blocked at its borders. But it has rejected offer from International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, have however, been helpful.
- Similarly Iraq has refused permission for visit of UN to find out whether there is an humanitarian need for emergency food shipments, and to check on condition of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Kuwait (including diplomats).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

7. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS

- World community intensifying efforts to ease twin problems of
 - (a) countries adversely affected by sanctions;
 - (b) humanitarian assistance to refugees.
 - Britain is playing its part.
 - Britain is co-operating in international efforts to co-ordinate international assistance to countries hard hit by sanctions and the crisis on their doorstep. "While we must all contribute, it is only fitting that a special effort be made by those who, for one reason or another, are not contributing to the multi-national force in the Gulf" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
 - Britain has contributed £10 mn in humanitarian relief for refugees in Jordan, and sent tents, blankets and medical supplies. Britain is also joining EC partners in providing a further £21 mn in addition to the original EC aid of £14.3 mn to the Governments of Jordan, Egypt and Turkey to help them cope with the flood of refugees.
 - The international airlift has significantly reduced the number of refugees in Jordan and is coping with the current outflow from Iraq. A British Airways Tristar is flying refugees from Amman to South Asia. But an outbreak of hostilities could displace a further million refugees.
 - Iraq has refused to accept the UN Secretary-General's appointment of Sadruddin Aga Khan as his personal representative for humanitarian assistance relating to the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, in particular the problems of third country nationals.
-
- Only fitting that richer countries not contributing to the multinational force should make a special financial effort. Japan and Germany have pledged substantial amounts (US \$4bn and US \$2.2 bn) and Koreans contributing US \$220 mn. Contributions could go to countries directly affected by sanctions (Egypt, Turkey and Jordan) if political problems about contributions to military costs. For example, half of Japanese pledge designated for economic aid to "front-line" states, while half for support of multinational force, channelled through GCC.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

8. IRAQI TREATMENT OF FOREIGN HOSTAGES AND EMBASSIES

Iraq has violated international law by:

- (a) using foreign nationals as hostages, deporting them from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait to Iraq and placing some at strategic sites as a human shield against possible attack; and
- (b) attempting to close foreign Embassies accredited to Kuwait, following its illegal annexation of Kuwait.

A. LEGAL POSITION ON FOREIGN HOSTAGES

- Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949 (The Civilian Convention) applies to situation in Kuwait. Both Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the Convention.
- This Convention applies to those who find themselves, in the case of a conflict or an occupation, in hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals. These are "protected persons".
- Most important provisions are:
 - o right to humane treatment and protection from violence
 - o protected persons may not be used to render areas immune from military operations
 - o protection from reprisals
 - o taking of hostages prohibited
 - o right to leave the territory (restrictions on security grounds must not be exercised in arbitrary manner)
 - o individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power are prohibited, regardless of motive
- The killing of hostages, whatever the motive, and the use of civilians to provide a shield against military operations are contrary to customary international law, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention individuals are held personally responsible for such crimes.

B. LEGAL POSITION ON FOREIGN EMBASSIES

- The privileges and immunities of diplomatic mission staff and their premises are regulated by the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

- 153 States are parties to the Vienna Convention. Iraq is one of them.
- Preamble to the Convention declares that
"... the purpose of such privileges and immunities [accorded to all categories of diplomatic mission staff] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions ..."
- Immunities provided for in the Convention include:
 - personal inviolability and freedom from arrest and detention (Articles 29 and 37);
 - immunity from criminal (and most civil) jurisdiction (Articles 31 and 37);
 - the inviolability of the premises of the mission including the head of mission's residence and of the residences of members of the staff (Articles 22, 30 and 37);
 - the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, wherever they may be (Article 24);
 - the right of free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes (Article 27(1));
 - the exemption from all personal services, from all public service of any kind and from military obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions and billeting (Articles 35 and 37).

The Convention also confirms that persons enjoying privileges and immunities under the Convention must, even in the case of armed conflict, be granted facilities in order to enable them to leave the State in which they are based at the earliest possible moment (Article 44).

-
- SCR 662, adopted 9 August, declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void, and calls upon all States not to recognise annexation and to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of annexation. Nearly 30 countries defied Iraq's orders to close their Embassies in Kuwait.
 - SCR 667 adopted 16 September, condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait and demanded that Iraq take no action to hinder diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and Baghdad, including access to their nationals and the protection of their personal interests.

- Iraqi troops have broken into and ransacked several Embassies in Kuwait, and taken away those non-diplomats who were there. They have surrounded the Embassies with tanks, and cut off their water, electricity and telephones. Diplomats are imprisoned inside these Embassies totally, unable to carry out consular or any other responsibilities and denied free movement in the city.
- Nearly 300 Britons are now being held by the Iraqis at a number of key installations. About 700 British people are left in Kuwait out of the 4,000 who were there when the Iraqis invaded on 2 August.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

9. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- Sanctions can work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Hope to achieve objective peacefully, but use of force cannot be ruled out. "We are not precluded by reason of the SCR from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law - I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- Bush/Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "If Iraq does not meet these non-negotiable conditions (immediate withdrawal of forces from Kuwait, restoration of the Kuwaiti government and release of foreign hostages), then its isolation will not end. We are prepared to take additional steps if sanctions and the quest for a political solution do not work" (President Bush in San Francisco on 19 September).
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power "to suppress acts of aggression. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "This broad alliance, this concert of nations, has to reverse the aggression, restore legitimacy to Kuwait and secure the release of the foreign nationals being held hostage" (Mr Hurd to the UNSC on 25 September).
- "The military option exists and can be used ... we are being made to face the possibility of war by Saddam Hussein's refusal to roll back this annexation of an independent country" (Mr Hurd to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association in London on 4 October).
- "I know we have to be ready for any contingency, and we shall be ... that man must leave Kuwait, the legitimate government must be restored, and he must pay for the damage and harm he has done in Kuwait and elsewhere ... there is no more room for negotiation now" (Mrs Thatcher in New York on 1 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

ANNEX 1. KUWAIT: HISTORY AND STATUS

- Kuwait independent longer than Iraq. Al Sabah in continuous control since early 18th century.
- Came under Ottoman suzerainty, but not sovereignty.
- Ottoman Empire dissolved after First World War. The disposition of its dependent territories was decided by international treaties under which Turkey abandoned any rights to areas outside its frontiers.
- Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and international frontiers recognised both by international community and by successive Iraqi Governments formally and through the conduct of bilateral relations.

CHRONOLOGY

- Early eighteenth century, Kuwait established on land adjacent to, but not part of, Ottoman Empire.
- 1871: more than one hundred years later, Sheikh Abdullah Al Sabah (1866-1892) accepted title of qaimmaqam (district officer) of the qaza (district) of Kuwait in return for an Ottoman pledge that Kuwait would retain administrative autonomy.
- 1899: fear that the pledge would not be honoured resulted in an Exclusive Agreement with Britain binding the Ruler of Kuwait not to cede any of his territory without Britain's prior sanction.
- July 1913: Britain and Ottoman Empire signed Convention recognising Kuwait as autonomous and accepting that the ruler should have full administrative authority and control over tribes in surrounding areas (defined by a green line on an attached map). Convention not ratified because of First World War.
- 1914: Britain recognised Kuwait as an independent state under British protection. After First World War, Turkey renounced all rights and titles to subordinate territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
- 1921: Kingdom of Iraq created from former vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Anglo-Iraqi relationship established under League of Nations supervision, and given effect by Treaty signed in 1922.
- 1932: British responsibility under the Treaty terminated.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

- 1923: Britain recognised green line of 1913 Convention as boundary between Kuwait and Iraq.
- 1932: Exchange of letters between Sheikh Ahmad Al Sabah (1921-50) for Kuwait and Prime Minister Nuri al Said for Iraq accepted definition of Kuwait-Iraq boundary similar to 1913 green line.
- 1958: Iraqi monarchy overthrown.
- 19 June 1961: Exchange of notes between Britain and Kuwait terminating 1899 Exclusive Agreement but confirming Britain's readiness to assist Kuwait if requested. British troops sent to Kuwait after renewed Iraqi claims, but subsequently replaced by an Arab League Security Force. (British troops withdrew on 19 October 1961, Arab League forces remained until 1963).
- October 1963: Signature by Iraq of an agreed minute recognising Kuwait's sovereignty and independence within the frontiers defined in 1932 exchange of letters.
- The Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 September that the Iraqi aggression was a premeditated scheme to occupy and seize Kuwait, "based on false pretexts and untenable claims, despite the existence of several internationally recognised Treaties and agreements between the two countries".

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

ANNEX 2. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- The UN Security Council has adopted eight mandatory resolutions concerning the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. Of the 15 Security Council members only Yemen and Cuba abstained on SCR 661 and 665. Resolution 660 was adopted by 14 votes with none against or abstaining (Yemen was absent). SCR 662, 664 and 667 were adopted unanimously. Cuba was the only SC member to vote against SCR 670 and Cuba and Yemen both voted against SCR 666.

Resolution 660 (1990) - adopted 2 August

- condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" all its forces to their positions on 1 August 1990.

Resolution 661 (1990) - adopted 6 August

- called for (1) the import of "all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait" and (2) the sale or supply to Iraq or Kuwait of any commodities or products except "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs" to be strictly prevented by all States, including non-members of the United Nations.
- established a committee of the Security Council to examine reports by the Secretary General on the implementation of the Resolution and to seek information on action taken by States to implement it.
- nothing in the Resolution should prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait whose assets should be protected.

Resolution 662 (1990) - adopted 9 August

- decided that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was null and void.
- called upon all States to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.

Resolution 664 (1990) - adopted 19 August

- recalled the obligations of Iraq under international law in regard to third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq permitted the immediate departure of such nationals from Kuwait and Iraq, granted immediate and continuing consular access and took no action to jeopardise their safety, security or health.

- demanded that Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.

Resolution 665 (1990) - adopted 25 August

- called upon those states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and deploying maritime forces to the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council" to halt inward and outward shipping to verify cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the provisions in Resolution 661.

Resolution 666 (1990) - adopted 13 September

- expected Iraq to comply with its obligations under SCR 664 (1990) in respect of third state nationals.
- requested the Secretary General to seek urgently information on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, with particular attention to eg children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly.
- requested the Secretary General, in the event of a decision to supply foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait in humanitarian circumstances, the use his good offices to facilitate their delivery and distribution.

Resolution 667 (1990) - adopted 16 September

- condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and Baghdad, including access to their nationals and the protection of their personal interests.
- decided to consult urgently in order to take further concrete measures under Chapter 7 of the Charter.

Resolution 670 (1990) - adopted 25 September

- orders nations to close airspace and landing strips to planes flying to and from Iraq and Kuwait unless they submit to cargo inspection - exceptions will only be made for food supplies in humanitarian circumstances and medical flights subject to UN authorisation.
- calls on all states to detain any Iraqi-registered ships which enter their ports in violation of sanctions.
- reminds governments of their obligations to freeze Iraqi assets and protect those of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

ANNEX 3. UN SANCTIONS

- On 6 August 1990 Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution (SCR) 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq. 13 votes for the Resolution; Yemen and Cuba abstained.
- SCR 661 prohibits the import of Iraqi or Kuwaiti products and the sale or supply or transshipment of goods to Iraq or Kuwait (other than medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs. Nature of these items and circumstances in which their supply would be admissible still to be defined.) SCR 661 also forbids the transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait.
- SCR 661 is binding upon all members of the United Nations.
- Vital that international community presents a united front on implementation of sanctions and takes action to ensure they are rigorously applied. Without this they cannot and will not work.
- 25 August, Security Council adopted SCR 665 (13 votes, 2 abstentions - Yemen and Cuba) authorising naval support of sanctions using "measures commensurate to the specific circumstances" to inspect cargoes and ensure strict implementation of SCR 661.
- Security Council has established UN Sanctions Committee to monitor compliance with SCR 661. Nearly 100 countries have recorded positive responses to the UN. One or two still considering what domestic measures to take. Many can comply easily since they have no history of trade with Iraq.
- The 25 September vote on SCR 670 (air embargo) particularly significant as most countries represented at Foreign Minister level: "another brick in the international wall being built around this aggressor" (Mr Hurd to the UNSC on 25 September).
- Evidence that some countries are breaking sanctions.
- Sanctions Committee currently considering applications from Jordan, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, India, Tunisia and Lebanon, under Article 50 of the UN Charter, connected with the special domestic economic problems which the full implementation of the sanctions will bring.
- To date sanctions have been largely effective in depriving Iraq of oil revenues and of access to Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets.

- "The energy-consuming world has a great interest in the uninterrupted flow of oil as we, the producers, have. Our interests are identical, a fact that Iraq should have recognised" (Yousuf Shirawi, Bahraini Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs in The Times, 20 September).

UK IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS

- Necessary orders to bring sanctions into effect quickly put into place (8 August):
 - o Export of Goods (Control) Order - prohibits exports without a licence
 - o Amendment to the Open General Import Licence - prohibition on imports
 - o Iraq and Kuwait United Nations Sanctions Order - prohibits (except when licensed) activities in connection with the export of goods from Iraq and Kuwait. The Order applies to activities of UK nationals and companies abroad as well as within the UK.
- No valid comparison with UK policy on sanctions against South Africa. Whereas with South Africa our policy has been to encourage internal reform without causing economic ruin and political chaos, our aim with Iraq is so to weaken the economy that a military retreat from Kuwait is unavoidable.

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YOUR TELNO. 978 TO BAGHDAD: CONVEYING MESSAGES TO
SADDAM HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. US AGREEMENT WITH OUR DIAGNOSIS. EFFECT OF SANCTIONS SO FAR LIMITED. SEVERAL CHANNELS TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. PRIMAKOV ACHIEVED LITTLE. DOUBTS AS TO VALUE OF A MEETING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY ON 12 OCTOBER FOR AN ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN THINKING.

3. KELLY SAID THE US AND OUR OWN ANALYSES OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MAKE UP WERE VERY CLOSE. THERE COULD IN PARTICULAR BE NO QUESTION AS TO THE NEED AND THE DIFFICULTY FOR US TO GET THROUGH TO HIM THE DETERMINATION AND UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION RANGED AGAINST HIM, AND OF THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION TO EXPEL THE IRAQIS FROM KUWAIT IF NECESSARY. BUT IT WAS ONE THING TO AGREE ON THE OBJECTIVE AND ANOTHER TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO REALISE IT. IF HE WERE A RATIONAL MAN HE WOULD REALISE ALREADY HOW MUCH SANCTIONS WERE HURTING HIS COUNTRY. THE LOSS OF REVENUE WAS ENORMOUS. THE DIRECT EFFECT MIGHT BE LIMITED AS YET, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ACCOUNTS OF PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING SPARE PARTS. BUT THE CUMULATIVE RESULTS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. THE TROUBLE WAS OF COURSE THAT, SO FAR AT LEAST, HUSSEIN DID NOT SEEM DISPOSED TO BE RATIONAL.

4. KELLY REMARKED THAT THERE WERE PLENTY OF CHANNELS OPEN TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE MENTIONED THE TUNISIANS, ALGERIANS, ROMANIANS, PERHAPS THE SWEDES, AND THE YEMENIS. HE DID NOT THINK THE FRENCH HAD CURRENT CONTACTS. WOOD COMMENTED THIS WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING AS WELL. THE JORDANIANS, TOO, SAID KELLY SEEMED TO HAVE BACKED OFF REALISING THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WERE BEING HARMED AND THAT THEY WERE GETTING NOWHERE. BUT HE HAD LITTLE DOUBT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE CHARGE IF THERE WERE ANY HOPE OF PROGRESS. AND

THE RUSSIANS HAD HAD GOOD LINKS. BUT PRIMAKOV HAD GOT NOWHERE. INSTEAD, THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE THREATENING TO PUT THE RUSSIANS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE WEST. NONETHELESS HIS CENTRAL POINT REMAINED VALID, THAT EFFECTIVE LINES FOR COMMUNICATION REMAINED OPEN IF AND WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR DIALOGUE.

5. KELLY SAID THAT, DEPENDING ON THE REACTIONS OF OTHERS TO WHOM WE HAD BEEN TALKING, IT WOULD SEEM PREMATURE TO CALL A SPECIAL MEETING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN LONDON TO CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER. HE THOUGHT WE NEEDED SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE THAN WE AT PRESENT HAD TO WORK WITH. MEANWHILE THE BUILD UP OF PRESSURE FROM THE UN, SANCTIONS, AS WELL AS THE MILITARY BUILD UP TOLD THEIR OWN STORY WHICH HUSSEIN COULD NOT ENTIRELY IGNORE. WOOD SAID THAT HE EXPECTED WE WOULD WANT TO REFLECT ON REACTIONS TO OUR INITIAL SOUNDINGS. WE MIGHT WANT TO RAISE THE QUESTION AGAIN ONCE THE SITUATION HAD MATURED FURTHER AND WE WERE IN A POSITION TO MAKE MORE CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE TIMING, LEVEL AND AGENDA OF ANY POSSIBLE MEETING.

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Prime Minister

IRAQ/KUWAIT

I have seen in JIC(90)(IA)68 the latest Cabinet Office assessment of the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabian oil installations.

It was clear from my recent discussions with the Saudi Oil Ministry and Aramco that the Saudis would have flexibility, if need arose, to export their own oil through the Iraqi IPSA line which crosses Arabia to Al Mu'ajjiz near Yanbu on the Red Sea. They would need to make some short connections between the IPSA line and their own pipeline to Yanbu. This holds out some extra insurance against damage to terminals in the Gulf or the Saudi Red Sea pipeline. It may be worth the JIC Assessments Staff considering how useful the Iraqi IPSA pipeline might be in the event of a disruption to Saudi oil supplies.

I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence and to Sir Robin Butler.

Secretary of State for Energy

15 October 1990

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: DISCUSSION WITH SAUDI DEFENCE MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. SIGNATURE OF STATUS OF FORCES MOU. PRINCE SULTAN WELCOMES CBFME. ENLIGHTENING DISCUSSION OF HOW HE SEES NEXT STEPS, WITH STRONG PREFERENCE FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT BEFORE MID DECEMBER. AGREEMENT THAT PRESSURE SHOULD NOT BE LET UP ON IRAQ UNTIL IT PRESENTS NO MILITARY THREAT OR CHEMICAL ARSENAL. SUGGESTION OF CONTACT WITH PRIME MINISTER OR MR KING.

DETAIL

2. I TOOK GEN DE LA BILLIERE TO CALL ON PRINCE SULTAN IN JEDDA ON 14 OCTOBER. AVM WILSON WAS PRESENT AS WAS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MANSOURI. THE MEETING PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SULTAN AND MYSELF TO SIGN THE MOU ON STATUS OF BRITISH FORCES IN KINGDOM (SIGNED TEXT BEING FORWARDED TO FCO BY BAG).

3. SULTAN MADE CBFME VERY WELCOME, AND APPEARED WELL BRIEFED ON HIS PREVIOUS ARABIAN EXPERIENCE. SULTAN LOOKED FORWARD TO 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE'S ARRIVAL BY EARLY NOVEMBER AND NOTED CBFME'S POINT THAT A PUMA CASEVAC UNIT WOULD ALSO COME TO JUBAIL. SULTAN ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF IRAQI FORCES IN SUDAN AND YEMEN, AND WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT CDI WAS IN RIYADH THAT DAY TO BRIEF THE SAUDI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE. THE YEMENIS WOULD NOT TRY ANY MILITARY ACTION. CBFME THANKED SULTAN FOR HAVING AGREED OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. SULTAN NOTED APPROVINGLY OUR

OPERATIONAL ASSOCIATION WITH US ARMoured UNITS.

4. WE SOUGHT TO DRAW SULTAN OUT ON HOW HE SAW SADDAM'S NEXT MOVES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL. THIS STIMULATED AN ANIMATED DISCUSSION IN WHICH SULTAN GAVE US A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE KIND OF SCENARIO THAT HE (AND WE CAN BE SURE THE KING AND OTHER SENIOR AL SAUD) NOW HAVE IN MIND, THAN WE HAVE SECURED HITHERTO. SULTAN THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT SADDAM WOULD TRY A SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL, OR EVEN GO FOR A QUICK ATTACK. HE DID NOTHING BY STAGES. HE HAD JUST HEARD (ON CNN) THAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD PROPOSED IN AMMAN A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. WE AGREED THIS DID NOT WASH. SULTAN ACCUSED KING HUSSEIN OF HAVING MISLED GCC AMBASSADORS LAST WEEK BY NOT DISCLOSING THAT SADDAM HAD REPLIED TO THE LATEST REQUEST FROM KING HASSAN, CHADLI BENDJEDID, AND KING HUSSEIN FOR A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL BY A FLAT NEGATIVE. KING HUSSEIN CONTINUED TO COVER UP FOR SADDAM, WHO IN HIS TURN HAD MADE PLAY WITH MITTERAND'S APPROACH.

5. SULTAN WENT ON TO MAKE IT CLEAR WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO HANG ABOUT FOR MUCH LONGER. OUR ARMOUR WOULD SOON BE IN POSITION. THEN THERE WERE THE US MID-TERM ELECTIONS IN EARLY NOVEMBER. THEREAFTER HE SUGGESTED AN INTERVAL OF NO MORE THAN A MONTH TO GIVE SANCTIONS AND OTHER PRESSURES MORE TIME TO TAKE EFFECT. BUT HE FORSAW THE NEED TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE BEFORE MID DECEMBER. MILITARY ACTION HAD TO BE ENGAGED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR HOLIDAYS (CHRISTMAS AND ALL THAT) BECAME A DISTRACTION. MOREOVER WESTERN TROOPS MORALE WOULD SUFFER IF THEY HAD TO GO ON SITTING IN THE DESERT INTO JANUARY - ALL RIGHT FOR SAUDIS BUT NOT FOR EUROPEANS. GENERAL PRINCE KHALID WAS VISITING GULF STATES THIS WEEK FOR MILITARY DISCUSSIONS. WE HAD TO KEEP THESE FACTORS IN MIND, AND NOT LET TIME SLIP BY. IRAQ WAS STEADILY COLONISING KUWAIT WITH IRAQIS AND PALESTINIANS - IRANIANS MIGHT BE NEXT.

6. I PROBED SULTAN ON HOW HE SAW THE RESPONSE TO AN ATTEMPT BY SADDAM TO TURN THE TABLES BY SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL: THE PRESSURE ON HIM WOULD HAVE TO BE KEPT UP BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SO LONG AS HE CONTINUED TO PRESENT A THREAT. SULTAN STRONGLY ENDORSED THIS, STATING THAT WE MUST NOT ONLY SEE WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, BUT GO BEYOND THIS TO ENSURE SADDAM'S ARSENAL, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS CHEMICAL ARMOURY, WAS DISMANTLED. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF HIS BEING LET OFF. SADDAM WAS ONE MAN AGAINST THE WORLD, AND WE MUST GO ON TRYING TO GET THIS ACROSS TO HIM. HE ASKED HOW PRIMAKOV HAD GOT ON IN BAGHDAD, AND I DREW ON SOVIET ACCOUNTS TO US OF THIS FRUITLESS

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ERRAND. SULTAN SPELT OUT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DIVEST HERSELF OF HER CHEMICAL WEAPONRY UNLESS SHE WAS SURE THE ARABS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO USE THEM. SO ONCE WITHDRAWAL WAS ACHIEVED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO ENSURE, THROUGH THE UN, THAT IRAQ NO LONGER HAD THIS CAPACITY. ONLY THEN COULD PROGRESS BE MADE OVER PALESTINE.

7. SULTAN WENT ON TO SPEAK WITH WARM APPRECIATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS ON IRAQ. SHE WAS CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. HE HAD READ HER BOURNEMOUTH SPEECH WITH INTEREST. OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY CLOSE OVER THIS CRISIS. SULTAN SAID POINTEDLY THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER OR MR KING IN SAUDI ARABIA OR LONDON BEFORE LONG.

8. SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT ON THIS USEFUL DISCUSSION.

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TEL AVIV PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY *ms*

MY TELNO 1634 : OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. WHEN I SAW MY U S COLLEAGUE AT A DINNER IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAMBODIA TALKS ON 14 OCTOBER HE SAID HE WAS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A MORE CO-OPERATIVE ATTITUDE TO AIME'S MISSION. HE WAS IN PARTICULAR PRESSING THE OPTION (MY TELNO 1633) WHEREBY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MIGHT ALLOW THE MISSION IN TO MEET NON-OFFICIALS AND, ONCE THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY HAD REPORTED, GIVE AIME ACCESS TO THE REPORT AND ITS AUTHORS. PICKERING BELIEVED THERE WAS MUCH HIGH LEVEL TOING AND FROING IN TRAIN BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV. THE ISRAELI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS DUE TO CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 15 OCTOBER AT 1930Z.

2. IN THE MEANTIME PICKERING AND I AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO PLAY THE ISSUE LONG IN TERMS OF ANY SECURITY COUNCIL REACTION TO THE OBSTRUCTIVE ISRAELI ATTITUDE. I SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO ANY URGING FOR COUNCIL ACTION I WOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:

(A) THE MISSION WAS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RATHER THAN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THEREFORE IT WAS A MATTER TO BE HANDLED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:

(B) NOTHING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SAID OR DID COULD ALTER THE OBLIGATION ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRODUCE A REPORT BY 24 OCTOBER, AND THIS HE WOULD NO DOUBT DO. IF, BECAUSE AIME WAS NOT GIVEN ACCESS TO ISRAELI OFFICIALS, HIS EVENTUAL REPORT WAS CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELIS TO BE ONE-SIDED THEY HAD NO-ONE TO BLAME BUT THEMSELVES:

(C) THERE WAS NO CASE FOR FURTHER INVOLVEMENT BY THE SECURITY

COUNCIL UNTIL AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT.

I HAVE NOT YET IN FACT HAD TO DEPLOY THIS LINE, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY APPROACHES FROM MY COUNCIL COLLEAGUES.

3. BOLTON OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE DINNER, HAS TAKEN ON BOARD MY SUGGESTION THAT HIGH LEVEL U S/UK CONTACTS WILL NO DOUBT BE DESIRABLE IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO TEL AVIV.

HANNAY

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

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MY TELNO 1571: NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. I DISCUSSED THE NEXT STEPS WITH THE U S AMBASSADOR TO THE UN ON 15 OCTOBER. IT TRANSPIRED THAT IN ALL THE ACTIVITY LAST WEEK OVER JERUSALEM, THE U S MISSION HAD SUCCEEDED IN LOSING THE DRAFT WE HAD TRANSMITTED TO THEM ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND HAD FAILED TO TRANSMIT TO US THE DRAFT WHICH THEY HAD PREPARED ON ALL THE OTHER ASPECTS (MY TUR SETS OUT THE AGREED DIVISION OF LABOUR). WE ARE NOW ENSURING THAT THE TEXTS ARE PROPERLY EXCHANGED (THE U S TEXT WILL BE FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT).

2. PICKERING WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE, LIKE ME, HAD NOW COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT AS FAR REACHING AN APPROACH AS THIS TO THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION WOULD BE UNWISE IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WAS LIKELY TO BE DOOMED TO FAILURE. HE WAS THEREFORE FOCUSSED ON A RATHER NARROWER SCOPE WHICH WOULD COVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ONLY:

- (I) A RENEWED EFFORT TO PRESS THE IRAQIS TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES THEY WERE HOLDING AND TO LET ANY OTHER FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ WHO WISHED TO DEPART DO SO.
- (II) A REFERENCE TO ACCESS TO THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.
- (III) SOMETHING ON THE LOOTING OF KUWAIT (BUT, BY IMPLICATION, LESS FAR REACHING THAN OUR COMPENSATION PROVISIONS).
- (IV) AN ELEMENT IN THE RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO HOLD OFF THE CUBA/YEMENI 'PEACE OFFENSIVE'.

A step back

3. PICKERING ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN WAS NOW PRESSING FOR EARLY CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE FIVE ON THE NEXT STEP RESOLUTION.

4. WE THEREFORE AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE UK/US SHOULD REACH BROAD AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE REST OF THE FIVE BY CLOSE OF PLAY ON 16 OCTOBER. WE ARE AIMING FOR A BILATERAL MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 16 OCTOBER. AT FIRST SIGHT IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE AMERICANS MAY BE JETTISONING RATHER TOO MUCH OF THE CONTENT WHICH WE HAD EARLIER ENVISAGED MIGHT GO INTO THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION. WHILE IT SEEMS TO ME ONLY COMMON SENSE TO GO FOR

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SOMETHING LESS AMBITIOUS, (MY TELNO 1634 SETS OUT THE REASONING FOR THIS) A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES SKETCHED OUT BY PICKERING WOULD BE ALMOST DEVOID OF TEETH. IT COULD BE WORTH GOING, AT LEAST IN INITIAL CONSULTATION AMONG THE FIVE, FOR SOMETHING WHICH CONTAINS THE DETAIL OF OUR IDEAS ON COMPENSATION/PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY EVEN IF THE OVERALL FOCUS IS RATHER NARROWER THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENVISAGED. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR REACTIONS DESKBY 161300Z.

HANNAY

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
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

cc Ro

SERIAL No. T229/90 10 DOWNING STREET

subject cc Master
cc OPS

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 October 1990

Your Majesty,

I am grateful to Your Majesty for your letter of 20 September, together with the memorandum setting out Jordan's view of the Gulf crisis.

It is important that we should stay in close touch on this issue. I think that we both have a clear understanding of each other's views.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Nasir al-Khateeb

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal, G.C.B.

de



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

To overnight

Telegrams.

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VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ TO AMMAN: 13 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN BRIEFS ME ON LATEST VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ. NO SIGN OF ANY SIGNIFICANT IRAQI SHIFT.

DETAIL

2. THE KING SUMMONED ME AGAIN TODAY (14 OCTOBER). TOGETHER WITH THE US AMBASSADOR. HE SUBSEQUENTLY INVITED US TO LUNCH AT WHICH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE KING'S MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO BRIEF US ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH TARIQ AZIZ. WE ALSO HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF SANCTIONS WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY.

3. TARIQ AZIZ BROUGHT NO WRITTEN MESSAGE BUT HAD BEEN BRIEFED ORALLY BY SADDAM. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO BRING THE KING UP-TO-DATE ON RECENT IRAQI EXCHANGES WITH EG THE RUSSIANS, AND TO PASS ON LATEST IRAQI VIEWS OF THE CRISIS.

4. SADDAM WAS INSISTENT THAT HE HAD NEVER THREATENED SAUDI ARABIA, NOR WOULD HE DO SO IN THE FUTURE. IRAQ'S INVASION SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND HER PRESENT ATTITUDE AGAINST THE EVENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE INVASION, PARTICULARLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN FORCES. IRAQ WAS ACTIVELY WORKING TO RESOLVE THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CRISIS AND REMAINED STRONGLY INTERESTED IN A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM. (THE KING INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF MR HEATH'S VISIT AND THAT THE RESULTS WERE LIKELY TO BE POSITIVE.)

5. ACCORDING TO TARIQ AZIZ, THERE HAD BEEN SOME VERY STRAIGHT TALKING ON BOTH SIDES DURING THE VISIT OF PRIMAKOV. THE IRAQIS

PAGE 1
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HAD FELT REASSURED THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND DID NOT WISH TO SEE THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAQ.

6. SADDAM HAD EMPHASISED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM SHOULD BE TACKLED AND RESOLVED. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE VIEWED MITTERRAND'S UN SPEECH VERY POSITIVELY. THE US AND THE UK HAD SHOT DOWN HIS PROPOSAL OF 12 AUGUST WITHOUT EVEN CONSIDERING IT. THE KING COMMENTED THAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD REFERRED TO THIS AS A MAXIMALIST IRAQI POSITION. WHY, ASKED TARIQ, HAD THERE BEEN NO COUNTER-PROPOSAL? WHY NO GIVE AND TAKE? IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AS A WHOLE. SADDAM HAD MADE CLEAR TO PRIMKOV THAT ANY PROPOSALS ON THE THEME OF REGIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE LOOKED AT VERY SERIOUSLY BY IRAQ.

7. TARIQ HAD ARGUED THAT IRAQ HAD NOT INVADED KUWAIT FOR ITS OIL BUT BECAUSE IRAQ FELT THAT IT HAD NO OTHER OPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS NEED FOR GREATER ACCESS TO THE SEA. THE BRITISH HAD HELPED TO RESOLVE MANY SIMILAR PROBLEMS EG THE GULF ISLANDS, THE BURAIMI DISPUTE. THE IRAQIS FOUND IT SURPRISING THAT THEY ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO ENTER INTO ANY DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE.

8. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED TARIQ WHETHER SADDAM HAD ANY SPECIFIC POSITION OVER WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE READY TO DISCUSS ALL ISSUES BUT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO STATE ANY POSITION UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOWED READINESS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LATTER WANTED TO FORCE A WAR, IRAQ WAS PREPARED FOR THAT EVEN THOUGH THE COST WOULD BE VERY HIGH.

9. WE ASKED WHETHER TARIQ AZIZ'S PRESENTATION OFFERED ANYTHING MORE THAN HAD BEEN CONTAINED IN THE LETTER WHICH SADDAM HAD SENT THE KING FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS IN RABAT. THE KING SAID THAT HE FELT HE DETECTED MORE INTEREST IN NEGOTIATION. ON THE NATURE OF THE IRAQ LINKAGE WITH THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, THE KING SAID THAT SADDAM WAS NOT SEEKING SIMULTANEOUS ACTION ON THE TWO ISSUES. WHAT HE APPEARED TO WANT WAS SOME GUARANTEE THAT IF THE KUWAIT ISSUE WERE RESOLVED, OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, SHOULD BE TACKLED.

10. I REMARKED THAT IN TERMS OF OUR OBJECTIVES UNDER SCR 660, SADDAM HUSSAIN'S MESSAGE DID NOT APPEAR TO OFFER ANYTHING. THE KING SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD TWO MAIN CONCERNS: THE FIRST

WAS TO SECURE SOME LINKAGE TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE: THE SECOND WAS TO SECURE SOME GUARANTEE THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF IT WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT. ON THE LATTER POINT, HARRISON SAID THAT, IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN INSUPERABLE PROBLEM. THE LINKAGE TO ARAB/ISRAEL WAS, HOWEVER, UNACCEPTABLE. THE CROWN PRINCE REFERRED TO MRS THATCHER'S STATED VIEW THAT SADDAM SHOULD GET NOTHING OUT OF HIS INVASION. DID THIS MEAN THAT ANY ASSURANCES ABOUT ATTACKS ON IRAQ ITSELF IF IRAQ WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT WERE ALSO RULED OUT? I SAID THAT MY OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REMARK WAS THAT IT RELATED SOLELY TO SADDAM'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

COMMENT

11. FROM THE KING'S ACCOUNT OF THIS EXCHANGE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETECT ANY SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN SADDAM'S POSITION. IT MAY BE TRUE, AS THE CROWN PRINCE AT ONE POINT ARGUED, THAT THE ARRIVAL OF TARIQ AZIZ WITH THE MESSAGE IS IN ITSELF AN INDICATION OF AN INTEREST BY SADDAM IN WITHDRAWAL. BUT EQUALLY, IT COULD BE PART OF AN IRAQI STRATEGY TO PROLONG THE PRESENT PHASE IN THE HOPE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS WILL BEGIN TO CRUMBLE. IN ANY EVENT, THE KING GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE HAD ANY FURTHER INITIATIVE IN MIND. HE SPOKE SEPARATELY TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. NO DOUBT THE IRAQIS ARE HOPING THAT THEY MIGHT TEMPT THE FRENCH INTO TAKING SOME INITIATIVE, THOUGH THE KING HIMSELF SEEMS WELL AWARE THAT THE FRENCH POSITION DOES NOT DIFFER IN SUBSTANCE FROM OURS.

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PAGE 3
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7 PM

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1990

Dear Simon,

GULF: ROE

Thank you for your letter of 4 October enclosing draft 'dormant' Rules of Engagement for British forces in the Gulf, for use if a limited conflict develops. I note that the Attorney General has confirmed that he is content with these. I have shown them to the Prime Minister, who is equally satisfied. She also agrees that authority to implement essential elements in them should, in extremis, be delegated to the British Force Commander Middle East, provided retrospective Ministerial authority is sought as soon as possible afterwards.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR CHRISTOPHER CURWEN
CABINET OFFICE

REACTIONS TO GULF POSTINGS

The Prime Minister was grateful to see the letter from the Commanding Officer of The Queen's Royal Irish Hussars, attached to your minute to me of 12 October.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
14 October 1990

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1990

See Steele.

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: SECURITY
COUNCIL DEBATE

The Prime Minister has followed the telegrams about the Security Council Debate on the Occupied Territories, leading up to the adoption of SCR 672. She has commented that it is a very good piece of work.

Your man,

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CAIRO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT : OCCUPIED TERRITORIES : SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. EVENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 OCTOBER LEADING UP TO THE ADOPTION OF SCR 672 ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

DETAIL

2. I HAD PLANNED TO BEGIN THE MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER BY INTRODUCING OUR REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION IN TURN TO THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP, THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BEFORE MOVING TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. IN THE EVENT THE NON-ALIGNED WENT INTO A PROLONGED CAUCUS, AND IT WAS ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY THAT I COULD EVEN GET IN TO THEM TO PRESENT MY NEW TEXT. CLEARLY THE ATMOSPHERE WITHIN THE GROUP WAS ALREADY BAD: I WAS HEARD IN SILENCE, NO QUESTIONS WERE ASKED, AND MEMBERS AVOIDED MY EYE.

3. THE NON-ALIGNED CO-ORDINATOR (RAZALI OF MALAYSIA) PRIVATELY TOLD ME THAT THE THREE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE CLEARLY PREPARED TO VOTE FOR MY TEXT. BUT AT THAT STAGE IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHETHER ALL THE SPONSORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WOULD REFRAIN FROM PUTTING IT TO THE VOTE, OR WHETHER THE AFRICANS WOULD SUPPORT A PROCEDURAL MOTION GIVING MY OWN DRAFT PRECEDENCE. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN THE GROUP OVER THE AMENDMENTS TO BE SOUGHT ON MY TEXT.

4. WHILE THE NON-ALIGNED CONTINUED TO AGONISE I INTRODUCED MY DRAFT TO THE NON-ALIGNED AND TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE. THE CANADIANS, FINNS AND ROMANIANS WERE ALL VERY SUPPORTIVE, AND WISHED ME WELL. BUT NEITHER THEY NOR I WERE CERTAIN AT THAT STAGE THAT A

DEAL COULD BE ACHIEVED, GIVEN THE TENSION AND DISSENSION BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED.

5. WITH THE FIVE, THEREFORE, I SPENT SOME TIME DISCUSSING THE FALL-BACK SCENARIO WHERE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD SEND HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF HIS OWN ACCORD AND THE COUNCIL WOULD PASS ONLY A BRIEF, DECLARATORY RESOLUTION ON THE EVENTS OF 8 OCTOBER. BUT DURING THE AFTERNOON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF GREW INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT A MISSION WHICH DID NOT HAVE THE COUNCIL'S BACKING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SPOKE DIRECTLY TO BAKER TO SEEK HIS ASSURANCE THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE ISRAELIS WOULD RECEIVE THE MISSION: AND WAS TOLD THAT NO SUCH ASSURANCE COULD BE GIVEN. IN THE EVENT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT ARISE. AT THE REGULAR UN PRESS BRIEFING ON 12 OCTOBER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION TO SEND THE MISSION WAS BRIEFLY MENTIONED, AND THE DETAILS WILL BE ANNOUNCED ON 13 OCTOBER. IT WILL NOT AFTER ALL BE LED BY SPIERS, AS THE AMERICANS INSISTED THAT HIS U S NATIONALITY WOULD COMPOUND THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. INSTEAD THE LEADER WILL BE AIME, WHOM THE SECRETARIAT BELIEVE IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO TURN DOWN.

6. WHEN THE NON-ALIGNED EMERGED FROM THEIR FOUR-HOUR CONCLAVE I WAS PRESENTED WITH A FURTHER VERSION OF MY TEXT, REVISED IN A NUMBER OF UNHELPFUL WAYS. THE NON-ALIGNED VERSION WOULD HAVE REAFFIRMED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION TO ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 'INCLUDING JERUSALEM' (A NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE AMERICANS): CONDEMNED ONLY THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES: AND EXPANDED THE ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REFER MUCH MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION.

7. NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONTINUED INTO THE EVENING. GRADUALLY POSITIONS WERE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER. THE NON-ALIGNED MODERATED THEIR POSITION ON A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS, IN THE PROCESS AT LAST PARTING COMPANY WITH THE PLO. SIMILAR CONCESSIONS WERE MADE BY MY U S COLLEAGUE (WHO DELAYED REFERRING THE TEXT BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR HIS INSTRUCTIONS UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT).

8. IN THE TEXT THAT FINALLY EMERGED THE REFERENCE TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION WAS TONED DOWN TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE AMERICANS, WHO AGREED AS THE PRICE THAT I SHOULD MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT AS PRESIDENT CONFIRMING THE COUNCIL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT JERUSALEM WAS INCLUDED. THE CONDEMNATION OF

VIOLENCE WAS REFORMULATED SO THAT IT COULD BE READ AS ACKNOWLEDGING IMPLICITLY THAT THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BLOODSHED ON 8 OCTOBER. THE REFERENCE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION IN THE RESOLUTION WAS A LITTLE EXPANDED: AND THAT IN THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SIGNIFICANTLY ELABORATED TO REFER TO THE SUBMISSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON "WAYS AND MEANS FOR ENSURING THE SAFETY AND PROTECTION" OF PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MY U S COLLEAGUE COULD ACCEPT THAT LATTER POINT ONLY ON THE BASIS THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED AND THAT WASHINGTON NEED NOT KNOW ABOUT THE CONTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE SHOULD MATCH THE EXPANDED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PURPORTING TO REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID, BY MAKING A REVISED STATEMENT OF HIS OWN: BUT LIKE THE SEASONED TROUPER HE IS HE DID WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF HIM.

9. ONE FLATTERING SIDE-LIGHT. THE PALESTINIANS INSISTED AT A LATE STAGE THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE RESOLUTION TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON HIS MISSION "BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER 1990" BE CLARIFIED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO READ "BY 24 OCTOBER 1990". THEY EXPLAINED THAT THEY WANTED THE REPORT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL UNDER THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY, GIVEN OUR SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, RATHER THAN UNDER THE U S PRESIDENCY IN THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER.

10. FINALLY IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE IN THE EVENING. AS A FURTHER GESTURE OF REASSURANCE TO THE ARABS THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT IN THE VIEW OF HIS AUTHORITIES THE PHRASE "ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967" INCLUDED JERUSALEM. THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS CONFIRMED THAT MY RESOLUTION COULD NOW BE FORMALLY PUT TO THE VOTE. DESPITE DARK RUMOURS OF CUBAN OR POSSIBLY YEMENI SKULLDUGGERY NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO SEEK A VOTE ON THE EARLIER NON-ALIGNED DRAFT. BY THE TIME THE FORMAL SESSION BEGAN AND THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT WE HAD GATHERED THE CO-SPONSORSHIP OF CANADA, COTE D'IVOIRE, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ZAIRE, A VERY SATISFACTORY SPREAD OF COUNTRIES.

11. FOR A DETAILED REPORT ON THE FORMAL SESSION, SEE MIFT

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GULF CRISIS: AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONS ME AND US AMBASSADOR. AFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO SANCTIONS. TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT AMMAN LATER TODAY.

DETAIL

2. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE KING TODAY (13 OCTOBER). UNUSUALLY, HE HAD ALSO SUMMONED MY US COLLEAGUE AND WE WERE INVITED TO SEE HIM TOGETHER. THE MAIN POINTS ARISING FROM A DISCUSSION LASTING WELL OVER AN HOUR WERE:

I) SANCTIONS. THIS SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE AUDIENCE. THE KING SAID THAT HE WISHED TO ASSURE US THAT JORDAN WAS DETERMINED TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVELY. THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULTIES, FOR EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT EXTENSIVE JORDANIAN TERRITORY LAY BEYOND THE JORDANIAN CUSTOMS POST AT RUWEISHED. THIS MEANT THAT SOME SUPPLIES FOR THOSE LIVING BEYOND THE POST, FOR EXAMPLE AT THE GAS FIELD AT RISHA, WERE BEING ALLOWED THROUGH. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO BRING ANY FUTURE ENQUIRIES ON SPECIFIC SANCTIONS ISSUES TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WHERE THEY WOULD BE DEALT WITH AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE.

II) HE TOLD US THAT TARIQ AZIZ WOULD BE VISITING AMMAN LATER TODAY. HE DID NOT KNOW THE PURPOSE. HARRISON SUGGESTED THAT IF AZIZ WERE BRINGING SOME FRESH PROPOSAL, THE KING MIGHT WISH TO ASK HARRISON TO CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT BEFORE GIVING ANY FORMAL RESPONSE. THIS MIGHT AVOID DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WHICH WASHINGTON

WOULD NOT REGARD AS HELPFUL. THE KING MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT UNDERTOOK TO INFORM US BOTH ABOUT THE RESULTS OF AZIZ'S VISIT. HE ALSO REFERRED TO IRAQI INTEREST IN MITTERRAND'S UN STATEMENT. I MENTIONED THAT THE FRENCH HAD ASSURED US THAT THEIR POSITION DID NOT DIFFER ESSENTIALLY FROM OURS.

III) THE KING TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT HOW UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL WAS TO BE ACHIEVED. HE COULD NOT SEE ANY PROSPECT OF THIS UNLESS SADDAM HAD SOME ASSURANCES EG OVER ACCESS TO THE SEA. HE FLOATED THE IDEA OF AN ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE 'DISPUTED AREAS' ONCE IRAQ HAD WITHDRAWN. BOTH HARRISON AND I SAID THAT IF THE PURPOSE OF THIS WAS TO FUDGE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE DISPUTED AREAS, WE DID NOT SEE IT AS A STARTER. IN ANY CASE, WE SAW NO SIGN OF IRAQI INTEREST IN WITHDRAWAL.

IV) THE KING EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT SEEKING TO ESTABLISH LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN AND GULF ISSUES. HOWEVER, HE HOPED THAT THE FORMER WOULD BE TACKLED WITH THE SAME VIGOUR WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD SHOWN OVER THE GULF ONCE THAT CRISIS WAS SOLVED.

V) I ENQUIRED ABOUT RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. THIS PROVOKED A LENGTHY STATEMENT ON THE INIQUITIES OF HOSNI MUBARAK THOUGH THE KING MENTIONED (AS BIN SHAKER HAD EARLIER TOLD ME) THAT OSAMA AL BAZ MIGHT BE VISITING JORDAN SHORTLY. AS TO THE OTHER ARAB STATES, HE DID NOT FEEL THAT HE HAD MUCH IN COMMON WITH THEM ANY MORE. HAVING MOVED HIMSELF IN THE DIRECTION OF DEMOCRACY, HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WAS UP TO HIM TO APOLOGISE TO THEM (HE SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST WHEN HARRISON FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE SAUDIS TO RE-OPEN TAPLINE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT JORDAN WOULD PAY ITS OUTSTANDING DEBT OF DOLLARS 40 MILLION LATER). DESPITE THE APPALLING DIFFICULTIES HE FACED, HE FELT AT ONE WITH HIS PEOPLE, WHICH WAS A GREAT COMFORT. HIS OVERRIDING AIM WAS TO AVOID A WAR WHICH WOULD DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT HE HAD SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE. IF THERE WERE ANY AMBITION BEYOND THAT, IT WOULD BE TO SEE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM SETTLED. THAT MIGHT BE THE ONE GOOD THING TO EMERGE FROM THE GULF CRISIS.

COMMENT

3. THE KING SEEMED READY TO TALK AT EVEN GREATER LENGTH. WITH HIS INCREASING ISOLATION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITIES TO TRAVEL, HE SEEMS TO FEEL THE NEED FOR SUCH EXCHANGES. HE TOLD ME RECENTLY THAT ONE LESSON HE HAD LEARNT FROM THE CRISIS WAS THE NEED TO SET ASIDE TIME TO THINK. HIS MOOD SEEMED RELAXED AND RATHER MORE BUOYANT THAN IN RECENT WEEKS.

4. I WILL TRY TO GET AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT. I SHALL ALSO PURSUE OUR OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON SANCTIONS BREACHES WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1990

Dear Resident Club,

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION: KILLINGS IN JERUSALEM

You may find it helpful to have a brief summary of exchanges last night between No.10 and the White House and No. 10 and UKMIS New York, about the Security Council Resolution on the killings in Jerusalem.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Gore-Booth) let me know around 2300 that matters seemed to be coming to a head in the Security Council. Sir David Hannay's judgment was that the British compromise resolution had a good chance of securing sufficient votes. The Americans still had difficulties with it on certain points, in particular the failure to condemn the Palestinians, well as the Israelis, and the nature of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council (whether there should be "conclusions" or "recommendations"). It was possible that the President might try to get in touch with the Prime Minister to discuss these difficulties.

You subsequently informed us at around 2330 that the White House were asking whether the Prime Minister could speak to the President. I briefed the Prime Minister on the lines of the preceding paragraph. The President then spoke to the Prime Minister at about midnight. The President said that he had spoken the previous day to President Mitterrand and had persuaded him to change the French position and fall in to line behind the British draft. The Americans hoped the British draft would now be pressed to a vote, but the Non-Aligned countries were stalling and insisting on priority for their resolution. He hoped that our Permanent Representative would use Presidency powers to push the British compromise resolution forward procedurally despite this. He wanted to avoid a situation where the United States had to veto the Non-Aligned draft resolution: or where the issue was allowed to drag on in the Security Council, so that it became inextricably involved with the Iraq/Kuwait problem.

The Prime Minister said she was rather puzzled by the President's account. We believed that our resolution had the necessary support and we were trying to bring matters to a head. The main obstacle seemed to be reservations still held by the United States. The points of difficulty which the Americans seemed to have did not appear to be of sufficient substance to

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
make it worthwhile holding matters up. She agreed that the worst thing would be for the United States to have to veto a Non-Aligned resolution. She suggested that the President might like to have the position checked with the US delegation in New York. The President seemed rather flustered by this and said he would indeed speak to Secretary Baker. He had been given the impression that we were reluctant to push our resolution through. The Prime Minister said this was not at all the case: we were very willing to do it but understood the Americans still had some difficulty with our text. She wanted to be absolutely sure that the President was now telling her that the Americans could accept the British compromise resolution and that we should try to clinch matters as rapidly as possible. The President said he thought this was the position but he would check.

Since Sir David Hannay was chairing an informal meeting of the Security Council, I spoke to Mr. Hum in New York. He confirmed the position was as the Prime Minister had described it. He undertook to make sure that the American Permanent Representative was aware of the President's exchange with the Prime Minister.

I then spoke to General Scowcroft at around 0045, and informed him of the position. He seemed totally unaware that the Americans had any difficulties with the British text. I said that we would do all we could to use the procedural advantage of the Presidency to get the British resolution adopted as soon as possible. General Scowcroft said we could assume this was so unless he rang me back within a short time.

Sir David Hannay then telephoned me at around 0145 at the conclusion of the informal session of the Security Council, to say that he had informed his American colleague of the President's conversation with the Prime Minister. Pickering was now confident that the United States would drop its objections to the British compromise text. There was now every prospect that it would indeed go through, probably by consensus. This seems to have been the case.

I think this illustrates once again that the White House are often quite a long way behind the game. I suspect that the "British text" to which they were referring was that of a day or so ago without the changes which subsequently had to be introduced. But all's well that ends well.



(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1990

Mr Resident Clerk,

GULF CRISIS

At the conclusion of his talk with the Prime Minister in the middle of last night about discussions in the Security Council on the killings in Jerusalem, the President said that he would like a fuller talk with the Prime Minister next week on the situation in the Gulf. He was worried about a number of developments, including the assassination of the speaker of the Egyptian Assembly. He had also looked into some of the points which the Prime Minister had raised with him in New York, for instance about weather conditions in the Gulf and the 'window' for military operations; General Scowcroft had sent No.10 some material on this. He would like to review the situation with the Prime Minister.

We will make arrangements for a talk, probably towards the middle of the week.


I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the paper
which Brent Scowcroft
sent me, & to which
the Reader referred in
speaking to you &
the Deputies. It was
~~not~~ in your box, but
I think you may
have missed it. In practice
it confirms what

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

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a regular meeting of Ministers on Monday to review the latest developments in the Gulf. Mr. Waldegrave will represent the Foreign Secretary who is on a visit to Egypt and Israel.

The principal issues to cover are as follows.

DIPLOMATIC

- action at the UN. The Security Council has been taken up with discussions of Jerusalem killings, and no progress has been made with a resolution on compensation and other issues. Nor has there been any further discussion with the Americans of resort to the United Nations for a resolution authorising the use of force. But there is no evidence that Secretary Baker has changed his mind on this. It will remain a problem.
- Sanctions. There is still no evidence that sanctions are having any real effect on Iraqi decisions. Meanwhile the paper in the folder gives evidence of extensive sanctions-breaking activity by a group of countries. This is becoming a serious problem. Despite our strong representations, Jordan's compliance with sanctions appears to have deteriorated with a substantial increase in lorry traffic. You will want to ensure that any aid is suspended until their performance improves. Meanwhile, a paper is in preparation on options for action against countries which break sanctions.
- Hostages. Mr. Heath's visit to Iraq has been postponed. It seems likely that, when he does go, the Iraqis may agree to release some of the sick and elderly hostages. The Government's public line on his visit will require careful handling.

- Embassies in Kuwait. The Americans continue to hanker after coordinated closure of Embassies in Kuwait in return for safe conduct for diplomats and others living in diplomatic missions. We are discouraging this.

- Diplomatic Activity. The briefing given by the Russians on Primakov's visit to Baghdad underlines how remote Saddam Hussain is from reality and how lacking in understanding of his isolation. Although the Russians say they are more hopeful of a peaceful resolution, there seems remarkably little evidence to sustain this view. He appears almost fatalistic in his acceptance that force will be used.

There has not been much Arab diplomatic activity in the past week. The main question has been how far the events in Jerusalem have distracted attention from Kuwait and will undermine the solidarity of the coalition against Iraq.

- US Policy. Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the past week has been the impression of dithering in Washington over the budget, the decline in the President's standing and the seeming paralysis of policy in the Gulf: in particular there has been no follow up to your discussion with the President. This is not a reassuring basis on which to enter what may be the most difficult and dangerous phase of the Gulf conflict.

The Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary are worrying about what they feel is lack of clarity about US (and our) strategic objectives in the Gulf: the extent to which we believe they will necessitate massive military action against Iraq: and the implications for targetting policy (i.e. do we go for dams and oil fields or try to avoid destruction of economic targets: we shan't get reparations if we destroy Iraq's main source of income). They are also concerned at American reluctance to discuss some of these issues with us.

There may be a case for a message from you to the President this week, following up your talk with him.

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Camp ready.

MILITARY

- 7 Armoured Brigade. The Defence Secretary should report on progress with deploying 7 Armoured Brigade.
- Iraqi tankers. There are indications that an empty Iraqi tanker with a reinforced crew may run the gauntlet up the Gulf during the week-end.
- Arrangements for the Media in the event of a conflict. You might ask for a report on the meeting held on this in the Cabinet Office on Friday.
- Meeting with Secretary Cheney. Both you and the Defence Secretary will be seeing Secretary Cheney in the course of Monday. You may like a separate word with the Defence Secretary and CDS about this at the end of the meeting.

OIL

- Oil prices. Oil prices remain stubbornly high, not because there are any supply shortages but because of fears of a conflict.

C.D.P

CHARLES POWELL
12 October 1990

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PRIME MINISTER

The Iraqis have now said that a visit by Mr. Heath at the weekend would not be convenient and are asking him to postpone it for a while.

C. D. POWELL

12 October 1990

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

SUMMARY

1. ANECDOTAL ACCOUNT BY MUBARAK OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO INVASION OF KUWAIT. DESCRIBES KING HUSSEIN AS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAT'S PAW. MUST KEEP SANCTIONS TIGHT. BUT IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION THE IRAQIS WILL RUN AWAY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD AN HOUR LONG MEETING WITH MUBARAK, WHO WAS ON LIVELY, IF ANECDOTAL, FORM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SPEAKER OF THE EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENT.

3. MUBARAK GAVE A VERY LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS OF EGYPT/IRAQ/JORDAN RELATIONS LEADING TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD USED KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AGAINST EGYPT. EGYPT HAD ALWAYS BEEN CAUTIOUS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH IRAQ, AND THIS HAD BEEN PROVED RIGHT. AS FAR BACK AS 1988 KING HUSSEIN, AT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHEST, HAD TRIED TO INVEIGLE EGYPT INTO A UNITED EGYPT/JORDAN/IRAQ MILITARY FORCE WHICH COULD BE USED FOR INTERVENTION IN THE GULF IF THAT PROVED NECESSARY. MUBARAK HAD WARNED THAT THIS WOULD WORRY SYRIA. HE HAD ALSO ASKED KING HUSSEIN WHETHER THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES HAD AGREED. KING HUSSEIN HAD CLAIMED THAT ALL THE GULF COUNTRIES HAD BEEN CONSULTED AND WERE CONTENT - BUT THIS WAS COMPLETELY UNTRUE. ALL THIS HAD BEEN PLANNED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD ONE DAY BE ABLE TO ANNEX KUWAIT. EGYPT HAD REFUSED TO HAVE ANY PART OF THIS AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

4. IRAQ AND JORDAN HAD TRIED AGAIN TO ENMESH EGYPT THROUGH THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL. BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TRIED TO GET EGYPT TO SIGN AGREEMENTS FOR TRILATERAL MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES, BUT MUBARAK HAD ABSOLUTELY REFUSED. HE HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN THAT EGYPT WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SUCH

PAGE 1
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ARRANGEMENTS. EVEN ON THIS, KING HUSSEIN HAD LIED - SAYING THAT KING FAHD, WHO HE HAD SEEN JUST BEFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, WOULD BE CONTENT WITH AN EGYPT/IRAQ/JORDAN MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. BUT IN FACT KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID NOTHING TO KING FAHD, WHO WAS VERY UPSET BY THIS DECEPTION.

5. THE LEAD-IN TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD ALSO BEEN AN EXERCISE IN IRAQI DECEIT. WHEN MUBARAK WAS IN BAGHDAD ON 24 JULY SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HIS TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE DESIGNED ONLY TO FRIGHTEN THE KUWAITIS AND THAT IRAQ WAS NOW WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. ALL THIS WAS QUOTE A BIG FAT LIE UNQUOTE. MUBARAK HAD THEN GONE TO KUWAIT, AND HAD TOLD THE KUWAITIS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE IRAQIS BUT THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT ATTACK. BUT THE KUWAITIS HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO GIVE IRAQ MONEY - THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN US DOLLARS 14 BILLION IN SUPPORT AND IRAQ HAD HAD A FREE RUN OF KUWAITI FACILITIES DURING THE IRAQ/IRAQ WAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ASKED FOR A FURTHER US DOLLARS 10 BILLION BUT ONCE KUWAIT STARTED TO PAY IT WOULD NEVER STOP.

6. ONCE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD TAKEN PLACE, KING HUSSEIN IMMEDIATELY CAME SCUTTLING TO CAIRO. HE HAD IMplored MUBARAK NOT TO ISSUE A STATEMENT CONDEMNING SADDAM HUSSEIN - TIME WAS NEEDED TO REACH A SOLUTION. MUBARAK AGREED TO POSTPONE BY 24 HOURS A STATEMENT CONDEMNING IRAQ, AND THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD HAD FOLLOWED HIS LEAD. HE HAD TOLD KING HUSSEIN TO GO TO BAGHDAD AND TO TELL SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT MUBARAK WOULD CALL A LIMITED ARAB SUMMIT IN JEDDA TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM - BUT ONLY IF SADDAM SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.

7. KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED MUBARAK FROM BAGHDAD TO SAY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED THE SUMMIT TO PROCEED. MUBARAK ENQUIRED IF KING HUSSEIN HAD RAISED THE TWO CONDITIONS? HE HAD NOT. MUBARAK SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE CONDITIONS FOR A SUMMIT HAD NOT BEEN MET. PUBLIC OPINION IN EGYPT WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO REMAIN SILENT ANY LONGER, AND MUBARAK HAD THEREFORE ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING IRAQ. THE GCC, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE OIC HAD AGAIN FOLLOWED HIS LEAD AND DONE THE SAME.

8. SINCE THEN KING HUSSEIN HAD PUBLICLY INSULTED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THIS WAS SAD BECAUSE KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN A FRIEND. QUEEN NOOR HAD SNUBBED MUBARAK'S WIFE. KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO SPREAD LIES ABOUT EGYPT, CLAIMING THAT KING HASSAN HAD TOLD HIM

THAT EGYPT WAS UNDERMINING JORDAN, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. BUT THIS TOO WAS A LIE AND MUBARAK DID NOT LIKE LIES.

9. HAVING RESISTED KING HUSSEIN'S BLANDISHMENTS, MUBARAK HAD NEXT BEEN SUBJECTED TO IRAQI EFFORTS TO BRIBE HIM. PRESIDENT SALEH HAD COME TO CAIRO TO WHISPER IN HIS EAR. HOW MUCH DID EGYPT OWE KUWAIT IN DEBT? SALEH SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD CANCEL IT. MUBARAK HAD TOLD SALEH THAT EVERYONE KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF EGYPT EVER REPAYING THESE DEBTS TO KUWAIT. SALEH HAD THEN SAID THAT SADDAM HAD TAKEN US DOLLAR 100 MILLION FROM KUWAIT - WOULD US DOLLARS 20 BILLION BE ENOUGH TO GET EGYPT ON SIDE? GIVE ME THE MONEY AND THEN I WILL TELL YOU SAID MUBARAK.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHAT HOPE THERE WAS FOR JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS WERE MAKING SOME EFFORTS TO MAKE SANCTIONS WORK. BUT THERE WERE LOOPHOLES. THE JORDANIANS WERE FRIGHTENED BY THEIR OWN DOMESTIC OPINION - FOR EXAMPLE BY THEIR NEWSPAPERS, SOME OF WHICH WERE FINANCED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. ALL SAID MUBARAK WOULD HAVE HELPED KING HUSSEIN BUT KING HUSSEIN HAD NOT WANTED ANY HELP. IN HIS OPINION, KING HUSSEIN HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE INVASION OF KUWAIT IN ADVANCE, AND HAD BEEN PROMISED HELP BY SADDAM HUSSEIN.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF, IN THE END, WE WOULD HAVE TO FORCE SADDAM OUT OF KUWAIT. MUBARAK SAID THAT SADDAM WAS IN A TIGHT CORNER. HE HAD BEEN FIGHTING FOR EIGHT YEARS AND HAD SPENT ALL IRAQ'S RESERVES - THE NATIONAL DEBT WAS ABOUT US DOLLARS 60-70 BILLION. HAVING SOLD OUT ON IRAN, HIS PEOPLE WOULD KILL HIM IF HE WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED IF MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT SADDAM MIGHT MAKE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. MUBARAK DID NOT KNOW - BUT AGREED THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETE. WE MUST KEEP SANCTIONS TIGHT. IF SADDAM HAD NOT WITHDRAWN IN 4 TO 6 MONTHS THE POSITION WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT. IF IT CAME TO WAR THE IRAQIS WOULD RUN AWAY. THEIR ARMY WAS VERY POOR AND THE LARGE AIRFORCE WAS BADLY LED - IF MUBARAK HAD SUCH AN AIRFORCE HE COULD HAVE WON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN A MONTH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHO THEN WOULD TAKE OVER FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. MUBARAK SAID THAT WITH IRAQ YOU COULD NEVER TELL. SADDAM GOT Madder EVERY DAY - HE NOW GAVE HIMSELF 99 NAMES IE THE SAME AS ALLAH. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN FELL HE WOULD PROBABLY JUST BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER MADMAN, BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD BE A NEW MADMAN.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW THE VIOLENCE IN JERUSALEM WOULD AFFECT THE ARAB WORLD. MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT NOW THE SECURITY

COUNCIL HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION IT WOULD ALL BLOW OVER. THE BRITISH HAD PLAYED A VERY POSITIVE ROLE. THE KEY WAS TO AVOID LINKAGE BETWEEN ARAB/ISRAEL AND THE GULF. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL WITH ARAB OPINION IF THERE COULD BE SOME MOVEMENT SEPARATE FROM THE GULF. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD WON PROPAGANDA POINTS BY HIS RHETORIC ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT ARAFAT. MUBARAK SAID THAT WE HAD TO KEEP TRYING WITH HIM. IT WAS A PITY THAT HE HAD TAKEN IRAQ'S PART, BUT WE HAD TO WORK ON HIM. AT LEAST WITH ARAFAT ONE KNEW THAT WHAT HE SAID ONE DAY HE WOULD DENY THE NEXT.

13. MUBARAK DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS MUCH CAUSE FOR WORRY ABOUT THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA WAS A NICE MAN BUT OF NO SUBSTANCE. BEN BELLA HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS. AS FOR THE TUNISIANS, THEY HAD WANTED TO TAKE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, BUT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN TOUGH WITH THEM.

14. ON QADAFI, MUBARAK SAID THAT HE WAS A VERY SIMPLE MAN. HE WAS NOT WELL INFORMED AND HE NEEDED REGULAR CONTACT TO KEEP HIM IN TOUCH WITH REALITY. IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT HE HAD SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN THE GULF. AS FOR THE YEMENIS, THEY WERE A BIT BETTER THAN THEY HAD BEEN, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF SAUDI ARM TWISTING.

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VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, 15 OCTOBER:
IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. DESPITE THEIR FRUSTRATIONS THE AMERICANS SEEM BOUND TO TRY TO MAKE SANCTIONS WORK AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS, UNTIL THEIR BUILD UP IS COMPLETE. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO FACE DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR EARLY ACTION AND THE DOMESTIC TEMPER IS FATALISTIC RATHER THAN BELLICOSE. TROUBLE IN JERUSALEM HAS SHIFTED THE PLATES SOMEWHAT. THE AMERICANS WILL WISH TO PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR POLICIES. THE TALK IS STILL MOSTLY OF THE NEED FOR PATIENCE. BUT THERE ARE CROSS CURRENTS WHICH MAKE LONGER TERM PREDICTION CHANCY.

DETAIL

2. MR KING WILL FIND AT HIS TALKS WITH CHENEY ON 15 OCTOBER THAT THE AMERICANS ARE FACING VERY MUCH THE SAME DILEMMAS AS AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY ON 20 SEPTEMBER EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS THE SYSTEMATIC IRAQI DISMANTLING OF KUWAIT HAS INCREASED THE AMERICAN SENSE OF FRUSTRATION. THE PRESIDENT SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 OCTOBER THAT HIS PATIENCE WAS WEARING QUOTE VERY THIN ON THAT ACCOUNT UNQUOTE.

3. FOR ALL THEIR FEARS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN KUWAIT ITSELF AND THE EVIDENCE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE THE AMERICANS SEEM NONETHELESS BOUND TO TRY TO MAKE SANCTIONS WORK FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT MAY NOT NOW BE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER AT THE EARLIEST BEFORE THE US BUILD UP REACHES AN ADEQUATE LEVEL FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO BE GIVEN TO EXERCISING THE MILITARY OPTION. SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES OVER LOGISTICS WHICH HAVE ARISEN RAISE QUESTIONS AS TO THE TIME OVER WHICH INTENSIVE US OPERATIONS COULD EVEN THEN BE SUSTAINED.

4. IN THE ABSENCE OF FRESH TROUBLES OR FURTHER IRAQI

PROVOCATIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS AT PRESENT UNLIKELY TO COME UNDER DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN THE MEANTIME TO TAKE EARLY ACTION AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAS BEEN DONE TO PREPARE THE US PUBLIC FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A US OFFENSIVE. THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ARE PREOCCUPIED BY BUDGETARY PROBLEMS (MY TELSNOs. 2452 AND 2473). IT IS NOT YET ENTIRELY CLEAR HOW MUCH LONG TERM DAMAGE BUSH'S HESITATIONS OVER THE BUDGET WILL HAVE DONE HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY, THOUGH THE EFFECT CAN ONLY BE HARMFUL. THERE IS A RISK OF A READ ACROSS TO HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ON THE GULF. BUT I WOULD NOT FOR NOW WANT TO PUT IT HIGHER THAN THAT. SUPPORT FOR HIS POLICIES TOWARDS IRAQ REMAINS WIDESPREAD. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD NO DOUBT BACK HIM IN TAKING EVENTUAL MILITARY ACTION IF THAT TURNED OUT TO BE BOTH EFFECTIVE AND COMPARATIVELY CHEAP IN US LIVES, AND IF GOOD PROXIMATE COST COULD BE SHOWN. BUT THE PRESENT MOOD IS FATALISTIC RATHER THAN BELLICOSE. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S APPETITE FOR A LONGER AND MORE BLOODY CONFLICT IS AT BEST QUESTIONABLE.

5. NOR DO THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS APPEAR TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE REPUBLICANS SEEM UNLIKELY SIGNIFICANTLY TO INCREASE THEIR STRENGTH ON 6 NOVEMBER. THEY MAY EVEN LOSE GROUND. AN ATTEMPT TO WRAP THEMSELVES IN THE FLAG THROUGH DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE A VERY RISKY GAMBLE IN ELECTORAL TERMS. MY OVERALL CONCLUSION IS THAT BUSH'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION WILL PROBABLY NOT THEREFORE BE STRONGER AFTER 6 NOVEMBER, AS HE COMES TO FACE MORE CLEARLY THE CHOICE BETWEEN TAKING DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AND PERSISTING WITH THE EFFORT TO SQUEEZE SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT OF KUWAIT THROUGH SANCTIONS.

6. THE AMERICANS ARE OF COURSE CONCERNED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS CONTINUING TO CREATE FACTS, ESPECIALLY IN KUWAIT, DESPITE THE PRESSURES ON HIM AND WHILE THE MILITARY OPTION APPARENTLY REMAINS CLOSED TO THEM. THEIR EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT SANCTIONS ARE HAVING SOME EFFECT. THEY BELIEVE SADDAM HUSSEIN OUGHT TO BE COUNTING THE COST. BUT THEY SEE NO REASON TO THINK HE MAY BE ABOUT TO CHANGE HIS POLICIES, AND TAKE FOR EXAMPLE PRIMAKOV'S HEAVILY QUALIFIED GLIMMERS OF HOPE WITH A LARGE PINCH OF SALT.

7. THE LATEST TROUBLE IN JERUSALEM HAS ALSO SHIFTED THE PLATES SOMEWHAT, AROUSING CONCERN AT THE TOP OF THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR PRINCIPAL ARAB PARTNERS. IT REMAINS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEY SHOULD SUSTAIN THEIR ALLIANCE WITH THE SAUDIS, EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS, NOT JUST FOR ITS OBVIOUS POLITICAL VALUE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE, IF IT CAME TO A

CONFLICT, THE ARAB MILITARY CONTRIBUTION COULD WELL MAKE A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE ON THE GROUND. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NEVERTHELESS TO WATCH THEIR DOMESTIC BACKS IN CASE THEIR NEW LINKS TO THE ARAB WORLD PUT TOO MUCH STRAIN ON THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP. THEY SEEM NO NEARER TO SEEING HOW TO APPROACH AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT ONCE THE KUWAIT CRISIS IS UNDER CONTROL, HOWEVER MUCH THEY AGREE THAT IS NOW EVEN MORE DESIRABLE THAN EVER.

8. THE AMERICANS HAVE DONE WELL IN THE UNITED NATIONS SO FAR. THERE MAY BE RISKS TO THEM IN THE ARGUMENT THAT UN ACTION ON ISRAEL SHOULD BE PURSUED AS VIGOROUSLY AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, BUT THEIR PRESENT ASSESSMENT IS THESE CAN BE CONTAINED - PROVIDED AT LEAST THEY ARE NOT FORCED INTO A VETO IN THE CURRENT DRAFTING EXERCISE. WHEN IT COMES TO DECIDING ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, HOWEVER, THEY WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT SOME OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IS DEPENDENT ON THE WAY THEY HAVE CHANNLED THEIR EFFORTS THROUGH THE UN. THE AMERICANS ARE, IN BRIEF, BOUND TO A DEGREE BY THEIR SUCCESS IN BUILDING UP AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN, SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF WHICH COULD BE LIABLE TO FALL AWAY IF IT CAME TO MILITARY ACTION.

9. THE AMERICANS WILL ALSO NEED SOON TO DECIDE, IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO INITIATE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, WHOM THEY SHOULD CONSULT IN ADVANCE AND FOR HOW LONG BEFOREHAND. THIS, AND A CONTINUING DEBATE OVER WHETHER OR NOT FORCE WILL IN THE AND HAVE TO BE USED, LIES BEHIND THE QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER UN COVER SHOULD BE SOUGHT BY WASHINGTON. ON THE ONE HAND THEIR CHANCES OF A QUICK MILITARY SUCCESS WOULD BE INCREASED IF THEY COULD ACHIEVE SURPRISE. EVEN SECURING CONTINGENT UN COVER, IF FEASIBLE, WOULD JEOPARDISE THAT. UNILATERAL ACTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD RISK COMPROMISING THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT THEY NOW ENJOY, AND THEIR CHANCES OF ACHIEVING A STABLE OUTCOME FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT COULD ALSO BE MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO THE US PUBLIC THAN ACTION SANCTIONED BY THE UN, ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A FRESH IRAQI CHALLENGE AND/OR A CONCERTED EFFORT TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY THE NECESSITY OF MILITARY ACTION BEFOREHAND.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE WILL, IN DISCUSSING CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH CHENEY, BE ABLE TO GET A SENSE OF HOW THE AMERICANS NOW ASSESS THE POSSIBLE COSTS OF MILITARY ACTION. PART AT LEAST OF THE QUESTION MARKS OVER THE TIME BY WHICH US FORCES WOULD BE READY FOR ACTION CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THEIR HUGE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS. ESTIMATES FOR US CASUALTIES IF IT

CAME TO WAR SEEM TO BE HIGHER NOW THAN THEY WERE SOME WEEKS AGO. THE MILITARY OPTION IS NO LESS LOGICAL THAN BEFORE, BUT THERE IS AN INCREASINGLY SOBER AWARENESS OF THE ATTENDANT RISKS. THE NATURAL CONCLUSION IS THAT US ACTION IS UNLIKELY AT ANY RATE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND QUITE POSSIBLY FOR LONGER. THE TALK IS STILL MOSTLY OF THE NEED FOR TIME FOR PRESENT POLICIES TO WORK. BUT EVEN THE SHORT-TERM BET MUST BE HEDGED AND THERE ARE CROSS CURRENTS WHICH MAKE LONGER TERM PREDICTION CHANCY AT BEST.

ACLAND

YYYY

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38

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RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



Prime Minister

Jf01742

MR. POWELL

MS

13/x.

REACTIONS TO GULF POSTINGS

- 1. The Prime Minister might be interested to see the attached letter from the Commanding Officer of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars, describing the Regiment's reactions to their posting to the Gulf.
- 2. The Queen's Irish Hussars are an amalgam of the 4th and 8th Hussars. The former was, of course, Churchill's old Regiment, in which as Honorary Colonel he continued to take a close interest when I served briefly with them.
- 3. Their enthusiasm for active involvement in the present crisis was to be expected. Their reactions as described in the CO's letter are nonetheless heartening.

ChC

CHRISTOPHER CURWEN

12 OCTOBER 1990

FROM: LIEUTENANT COLONEL A G DENARO



THE QUEEN'S ROYAL IRISH HUSSARS
BRITISH FORCES POST OFFICE 38
FALLINGBOSTEL MIL EXT 203
HOME 01049-5162-5327

DO/AGD

22nd September 1990

Dear Irish Hussar,

I had planned to write to you all having returned from my recce to Saudi Arabia, but that has now been delayed and I may not have time to do it afterwards: this is therefore just a short note to bring you up to date on the Regiment and our preparations and plans for deployment on Op Granby as part of 7th Armoured Brigade.

The Corps Commander visited us on the 2nd of August whilst we were training on Soltau. It was 30 degrees heat and the dust was horrendous as those of you who know Soltau can imagine. It was the day Iraq invaded Kuwait and I jokingly said that the conditions we were experiencing on Soltau made us ideally suited for deployment to the Gulf....

It was not however until the day that the Secretary of State for Defence announced that he was planning to send 100 tanks and 5000 men to the Gulf that we really started to believe that the Regiment had a chance of going. The confirmation that 7 Brigade was to go, came on Friday the 14th. I returned from the Divisional Commander's O Group at 1700 hrs and spoke to the whole Regiment. The Guidon was marched on accompanied by the Pipe Major and the band played: for those of us on parade, it was a day we will always remember. From that moment to this, we have been working almost a 24 hour day.

You will know the Brigade orbat from the various newspaper accounts. It is great for us to be under command of Brigadier Patrick Cordingley of the Skins, and to be along side our friends, the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards. As we have gone up to 'war establishment', I have been able to invite reinforcements from other regiments, principally 17/21 Lancers and the Skins. There would not have been room for any of those if I have been able to take all the volunteers from Regimental officers and other ranks who are at ERE. Sadly I couldn't. That said, we have been able to pull back a good number; even Tim Bidie, who left us 7 years ago, has somehow managed to sign on as a TA officer attached QRIH, and is coming with us. I attach a list of officers.

You can imagine the kind of preparations that are going on; they are no different to those many of you have made in the past. You can also imagine what an incredible feeling there is in the Regiment at the moment; an eagerness, a pride and an awareness of the responsibility we carry. Over all, the support in every single facet from across the Divison, the Corps and the Army has been almost overwhelming. One of the most practical offers of help came from the QDG who are going to look after most of our 22 polo ponies throughout the winter!

There is a goodwill, with a barely concealed envy, from everyone who is not coming. This has been particularly heartening in respect of the families who we are leaving behind. A very good system for caring for them has been established and will be up and running before we go.

We deploy in about a fortnight by ship and air, the details of which are yet undisclosed.

I would like to thank all of you who have written, signalled or telephoned your support; I have had Colonel George's '400' points for Desert Warfare typed out and distributed to all tank commanders - they are invaluable.

All of us in the Regiment are mindful of the heritage that we bear and are determined that the great name of the Regiment will continue to be heard and read about throughout this next chapter in our history.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur Harris

Pristine virtutis memores

Mente et manu

APPOINTMENT

1. CO - LT COL ARTHUR DENARO
 2. 2IC - MAJ RICHARD THORNELY
 3. ADJT - CAPT ANDREW CUTHBERT
 4. OPS - CAPT ROBERT HUTTON
 5. RSO - CAPT ROBIN MURRAY BROWN
 6. IO - CAPT TOM BECKETT
 7. BDE LO - CAPT BOBBY NOONE
 8. FLANK LO - CAPT TIM BIDIE
 9. WKPR - CAPT RICHARD PALEY
 10. WKPR - CAPT NICK MARSHALLSAY 1RTR
 11. WKPR - CAPT PADDY ACHESON
 12. WKPR - CAPT PIERS HANKINSON 17/21 L

A SQN

13. SQN LDR - MAJ HUGH PIERSON
 14. 2IC - CAPT STEVE McCLUSKEY
 15. BC - CAPT PETER McFARLANE 5 INNIS DG
 16. TP LDR - LT DAVID MADDEN
 17. TP LDR - LT MICHAEL HARTWELL
 18. TP LDR - SSGT WRIGHT
 19. TP LDR - LT NICK COTTON 17/21 L
 20. LO - CT CHARLES MALET

B SQN

21. SQN LDR - MAJ DAVID SWANN
 22. 2IC - CAPT JOHNNY ORMEROD
 23. BC - LT TONY HOOD 5 INNIS DG
 24. TP LDR - LT SIMON REDMAN
 25. TP LDR - LT JAMES RAINBIRD
 26. TP LDR - SSGT STEVENSON
 27. TP LDR - LT TIM BUXTON 17/21 L
 28. LO - CT DARA SUGRUE

C SQN

29. SQN LDR - MAJ NIGEL BEER
 30. 2IC - CAPT CHARLES ALEXANDER
 31. BC - LT DAVID YOUNG 5 INNIS DG
 32. TP LDR - SSGT HAYDEN
 33. TP LDR - LT ANDREW BOTT
 34. TP LDR - CT RUPERT JOCELYN-THOMAS
 35. TP LDR - LT WILL WYATT 17/21 L
 36. LO - CT HENRY CAMILLERI

D SQN

37. SQN LDR - MAJ TOBY MADDISON
 38. 2IC - CAPT PHILIP NAPIER RRW
 39. BC - CAPT IVAN RUTHERFORD
 40. TP LDR - LT CHRISTOPHER MILLETT
 41. TP LDR - SSGT SMITH
 42. TP LDR - LT ALEXANDER CORMACK
 43. TP LDR - CAPT TIM PURBRICK 17/21 L
 44. LO - CT DAVID WEBB

HQ SQN

45. SQN LDR - MAJ MARCUS PILLEAU
 46. 2IC/MIO - CAPT ARTHUR CURRIE
 47. QM - CAPT PHIL NUNN
 48. QM(T) - CAPT TIMMY TIMMONS
 49. PWR - CAPT MICK BADDELEY
 50. M - CAPT JOH SYDENHAM
 51. RECCE TP LDR - CAPT ALASDAIR MURDOCH

LAD

52. EME - CAPT PAUL ARMSTRONG
 53. EMELET - 2LT HARVEY GORDON-SAWYER

RAP TP LDR - CT SIMON BOREHAM
 2ND RHQ TANK - CT JAMES MOSELEY

12 October 1990

16.15 hrs

REVISED DRAFTThe Security Council,Recalling its resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980),

Reaffirming that a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must be based on its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) through an active negotiating process which takes into account the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, as well as the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people,

Reaffirming further that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

Taking into consideration the statement of the Secretary-General relative to the purpose of the mission he is sending to the region and conveyed to the Council by the President on 12 October 1990:

1. Expressed alarm at the violence which took place on 8 October at the Al Haram Al Shريف and other Holy Places of Jerusalem resulting in over twenty Palestinian deaths and to the injury of more than one hundred and fifty people, including Palestinian civilians and innocent worshippers,

-2-

2. Condemns especially the acts of violence committed by the Israeli security forces resulting in injuries and loss of human life,

3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention,

4. Reaffirms, in connection with the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region, which the Council welcomes, that he submit a report to it before the end of October 1990 containing his conclusions and that he use as appropriate all of the resources of the United Nations in the region in carrying out the mission.

DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

In the informal consultations of members of the Council which led up to the adoption of this resolution, the Secretary-General explained that the purpose of the mission which he would be sending to the region would be to look into the circumstances surrounding the recent tragic events in Jerusalem and other similar developments in the occupied territories, and to submit by 26 October a report and recommendations to the Council on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian and civilians under Israeli occupation. He recalled, however, that under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the principal responsibility for ensuring the protection of the Palestinians rested with the occupying power, namely Israel.

12 October 1990

16.15 hrs

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Occupied Territories
(UKMIS New York Telus 1615)

copy to:

Mr Fairweather

Mr Gore-Smith

Mr Young: EU

11 October 1990

PS / Mr Waldgrave

20.00 hrs

AS

REVISED DRAFT

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980),

Reaffirming that a just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must be based on its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) through an active negotiating process which takes into account the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, as well as the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people,

Recalling also the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) providing for the protection of civilian population and property in occupied territories,

Alarmed by the violence which took place on 8 October at the Al Haram Al Shareef and other Holy Places of Jerusalem which led to over twenty Palestinian deaths and to the injury of more than one hundred and fifty people, including Palestinian civilians and innocent worshippers, and in this regard especially condemning the acts of violence committed by the Israeli security forces and deploring the resulting injuries and loss of human life,

Taking note of the statement of the Secretary-General as conveyed to the Council by the President of the Council on 12 October 1990;

1. Calls upon Israel, the occupying power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention;

2. Requests, in connection with the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region, which the Council welcomes, that he submit a report to it before the end of October 1990 containing his conclusions and that he use as appropriate all of the resources of the United Nations in the region in carrying out the mission.

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

11th October 1990

can 11/12

Dear Tim,

MPS' VISITS TO THE GULF


will request if required

Thank you for your letter of 28th September responding to Simon Webb's earlier proposals on a visit by Parliamentarians to the Gulf.

We are now quite keen to move matters forward. We continue to plan on the basis of a group of about ten people; the composition would be decided in the light of views coming from each House but, broadly speaking, we would envisage inviting representatives of the Select Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs (probably the Chairman and one member in each case) and the Opposition spokesmen on Defence. As far as the Lords is concerned, I understand that the Lord Privy Seal's office would recommend the inclusion of a representative of each Party and one cross-bencher - but it would be helpful to have confirmation of this.

I would be grateful if Murdo Maclean and Gillian Kirton would let me know as soon as the idea has been fed into the usual channels; we will then get on with the business of issuing formal invitations.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No. 10), Richard Gozney (Foreign Office), John Neilson (Energy), Martin Stanley, (DTI), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office); and also to Gillian Kirton in the Lord Privy Seal's Office and Douglas Slater in the Chief Whip (Lords') Office.

Yours ever 

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS) (MISS)
Private Secretary

Tim Sutton Esq
PS/Lord President's Office

RESTRICTED

me h

PRIME MINISTER

Charles has rung to say that we have reports that Mr. Heath has been offered a meeting with Saddam Hussein on Sunday or Monday and is likely to go out this weekend. The line we shall be taking is that he does so as a private individual and as such does not require the endorsement of HMG.

AT


ANDREW TURNBULL

11 October 1990

SECRET

Seen by COB 10/10

3



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
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9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828

10 October 1990

Simon Webb Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON S W 1

Dear Sir

DORMANT ROE

Har

The Attorney General has seen your letter to Charles Powell of 4 October, attaching two sets of draft dormant Rules of Engagement. The Attorney is content with the Rules as they are drafted.


I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Richard Gozney, John Neilson and to Sonia Phippard.

Yours truly

E S Wilmshurst

E S WILMSHURST

SECRET



MIDDLE EAST
at Pt 30

PRIME MINISTER

GULF: ROE

The MOD have drawn up the attached 'dormant' Rules of Engagement for use if a limited conflict develops in the Gulf. Their proposal is:

to allow a limited military response to a deliberate Iraqi attack.

to allow our ships and aircraft in certain circumstances to attack Iraqi units before they have committed a hostile act e.g. if they are demonstrating hostile intent or pose a threat.

The ROE have been vetted by the Attorney who is satisfied.

In general the ROE require authority from Defence Ministers before being implemented. But in certain circumstances, that authority would be delegated to the British Force Commander (e.g. in the event of communications difficulties or great urgency), who would seek retrospective authority as rapidly as possible.

Separate ROE for a general conflict are being drafted.

Are you content with the ROE as drafted? Yes

Or are there points which you would like to talk through in one of the regular meetings of Ministers?

More specifically, are you content to delegate authority for implementing them in extremis to the British Force Commander?

C.P.

CHARLES POWELL

10 October 1990

c:\foreign\ROE (ecl)

Yes

06
ccpg.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



London SW1A 2AH

10 October 1990

Dear Charles,

Jordan and the Gulf Crisis

/ I enclose a letter from King Hussein of Jordan to the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary and Her Majesty The Queen have been sent identical letters - so, no doubt, have other prominent figures in the West.

The Foreign Secretary will reply briefly to the letter sent to him; we have also forwarded a draft acknowledgement which might be sent by The Queen. Although there is no absolute need for the Prime Minister to reply to King Hussein's letter, she may wish to acknowledge it. I
/ enclose a draft.

Jawoero
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO: His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal GCMG
Amman

GCB

I am grateful to Your Majesty for your letter of 20 September, together with the memorandum setting out Jordan's view of the Gulf crisis.

It is important that we should stay in close touch on this issue. I think that we both have a clear understanding of each other's views.

CDM



PRIME MINISTER

②
Prime Minister
ms
19/9

VISIT TO THE GULF: 29 SEPTEMBER - 2 OCTOBER

I visited Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia between 29 September and 2 October while returning from a programme of export related engagements in Australia and the Far East. The visit proved a timely opportunity to hear latest assessments of the situation, to discuss the oil market with key OPEC producers and to meet a number of our own people who are helping to keep the oil flowing and the military supplied. I was also able to speak to our Ambassador in Kuwait and send through him a message of support to British residents in the occupied territory.

There was everywhere the keenest appreciation of the firm stand HMG and you personally have taken since the outset, reinforced by the subsequent deployment of the armed forces and by the contribution British expatriates are making towards the common effort (in contrast to others such as the Japanese and the Dutch who have pulled out). It was clear that initial reactions of dismay in the area had turned by stages into a settled resolve. Neither Shaikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi nor those of King Fahd's immediate family with whom I spoke expected Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without force being used. But all accepted that time should be allowed and were focussed also on how Iraq would emerge from the conflict and the extent of its future ability to pose threats. There was some suggestion that Iraq had prepared the ground well in advance with the few allies it had succeeded in securing and that Saddam's ultimate target was Israel. It was said that Yemen and the Sudan were now distancing themselves from Iraq. Particular animus was reserved among the rulers for King Hussein who was thought to have played an ill judged hand in an admittedly difficult situation and who has stung the Saudis by his remarks about foreign troops. The crisis so far has generated a fund of goodwill towards Britain and, in the Gulf States, has revived memories of our past links: hence Sheikh Zayed's overtures in the direction of a defence pact.



The oil ministers and executives to whom I spoke all shared the analysis that supply and demand were now broadly in balance and that prices reflected possible future, not present, problems. I expressed appreciation for the considerable contributions that have been made by Saudi Arabia (some 2 million barrels a day expected to rise to 2.5 by the end of the year and 3 next year) and Abu Dhabi (some 0.5 million barrels a day) towards balancing the market. Dr Oteiba in Abu Dhabi was enlightening about the pre-August negotiations in OPEC. In Saudi Arabia there was some suspicion, which our information does not support and which I attempted to dispel, that the companies were further building stocks and so contributing to higher prices. The Saudi Oil Minister, Hisham Nazer, put to me a request, which he has also been pursuing with the US, for limited access to stocks to help cover any short term disruption of overstretched Saudi production. I explained that the UK holds no Government stocks but we have asked BP and Shell if they can provide any help of this kind. If they can I will bring forward proposals in OD(G).

Now that the defensive shield is in place, a greater sense of normality is returning to the area. The Energy Industries Council Trade Mission to Dhahran, which had been part of my original programme, was the first visit of its kind since the invasion and the participants reported brisk business geared to the production, refining and other requirements of the new situation. I spoke to employees at the important and exposed Petromin/Shell refinery at Al Jubail which is producing jet fuel for the air force. Morale there is high and evacuation plans were well laid if need be. I welcomed also opportunities which

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arose to meet Air Vice Marshal Wilson and some of his officers and men who have established good working relations with the Saudis and US forces. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have put considerable resources into rehousing Kuwaiti refugees and providing schooling and medical care. I expressed our appreciation for all their efforts on this and other fronts.

I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a stylized, cursive script.

Secretary of State for Energy

10 October 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/PUS

FROM: R F Cooper
Policy Planning Staff

DATE: 10 October 1990

cc: PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
Mr Weston
Mr Broomfield
Mr Fairweather
Mr Anderson,
Legal Advisers
Mr Gore-Booth
Mr Goulden
Mr Tait
Mr Slater
Mr Young,
Emergency Unit
Mr Fuller, NENAD
Mr Smith, NPDD
Ms Evans, UND
Mr Lyne, Soviet Dept
Mr Beel, RAD
Ms Manning, MOSCOW
Chancery:
WASHINGTON
PARIS
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ANGLO-SOVIET PLANNING TALKS: THE GULF

1. At the Anglo-Soviet planning talks on 8 October Tarasenko was particularly outspoken on the Gulf. Although he may be ahead of thinking in the Soviet MFA, he is Shevardnadze's closest adviser and their views are probably similar. He had just returned from Shevardnadze's meetings with Baker in New York and his own separate meetings with Ross.

2. The following were his main points on the more immediate issues:

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a) Saddam Hussein must not come out of the crisis a hero, like Nasser. The worst possible scenario would be one in which Saddam withdrew from Kuwait but remained in power with his arsenal untouched.

b) We needed a complete settlement to the crisis, not just Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. We should demand certain things from Saddam before we would withdraw from the region, including a regional security structure, renunciation of CW and nuclear weapons etc. Sanctions should not be relaxed until these conditions had been met and satisfactory compensation had been agreed.

c) The military option was a real possibility. International forces could not stay in the region indefinitely. It was hard to imagine that by next spring nothing would have happened. Shevarnadze was afraid that Saddam Hussein would strike out at Israel as an act of desperation.

d) The Soviet Government was ready to participate militarily in action taken under Article 42, including the provision of ground forces. This would however require the consent of the Supreme Soviet and there might be problems there. Deputies would object to military action outside the Soviet Union but they might be able to sell it in the context of a Soviet contribution to UN forces more generally. Even if the Soviet Union did not participate the West should go ahead under Article 42. We should begin informal consultations amongst the UNSC5 soon. Consultations should be kept informal so that, if agreement proved impossible, the prospects for action under Article 51 should not be badly damaged. He believed the Chinese might abstain but would not vote against it. They feared isolation. We should look for an enabling resolution that gave no hint on the timing of an attack. The Soviet Union would not object in principle to action under Article 51 (though they would not be able to welcome it in public).

e) He envisaged national contingents acting under national command. Soviet forces could not come under US command. Some practical coordination arrangements in the region would have to be worked out on the spot. The UN Military Staff Committee would exercise political coordination functions but would not directly command forces.

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f) He expected Saddam to let Soviet hostages out gradually. The Soviet expatriates in Iraq were claiming that they had been abandoned by the government, but when it had been possible for them to leave they had refused to do so. There was considerable support for Iraq in Soviet military and the military-industrial circles. The government would be criticised in the Supreme Soviet for its failure to look after its people.

3. On the longer term issues, his main points were:

a) We should create a regional security structure. US ground forces could not remain in the region indefinitely. It might take 3 to 5 years to create such a structure.

b) A key element in the new security structure should be the renunciation of CW, BW and nuclear weapons and limits on armed forces (possibly based on a sufficiency rule). There should be a strict verification regime allowing access to any site in Iraq. There might be differentiated zones in the region with tighter verification in the centre and less rigorous measures at the periphery. Verification could be undertaken by neutral parties or by the UNSC5. All countries in the region should participate. The Israelis should see it as in their interests to go along with it.

c) As part of an overall package there would have to be progress on Arab/Israel. The Russians were no longer pushing for an international conference. They favoured a flexible approach beginning with practical confidence building measures on the ground. Without progress on substance a Conference would solve nothing: trying to get it organised would create new problems and would distract attention from the real issues.

d) The Americans had told them that they had decided to push the Israelis towards acceptance of CSBMs. They would start a dialogue with Israel as soon as they had concrete ideas, and had asked the Russians if they had any proposals. The PLO had made a terrible mistake and would pay for it.

e) He believed the crisis would have long term consequences for Iraq and for the region. The existing party and military structures would collapse. If Saddam Hussein was toppled new people would appear. This did

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not mean Iraq would become a democracy in one step. It would probably pass through a number of mixed regimes but the changes would be in the direction of democracy; we should encourage this. Likewise, while the Russians supported the reinstatement of the Al Sabah in Kuwait he doubted they had a long term future.

4. Tarasenko's comments on other issues are covered in a separate minute.

R Cooper.

R F Cooper



SECRET AND PERSONAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

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FROM THE AMBASSADOR

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

10 October 1990

Dear Charles,

THE GULF: CONTACTS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE

1. As the time draws nearer to the US review of their options in mid-November, and to the point at which it may become more feasible for the Americans to exercise the military option, I would like to be clear on how the Embassy can be most helpful in ensuring that Ministers generally, and the Prime Minister in particular, are kept fully abreast of White House thinking.

2. Your link with Brent Scowcroft is clearly a crucial one for the direct and rapid conveyance of highly sensitive information. I am perfectly happy with that, and the purpose of this letter is not to seek information about those matters best kept strictly between the President and the Prime Minister, and Brent Scowcroft and yourself.

3. I would, however, like to be clear in my own mind about what you need or expect of the Embassy in this regard. There is both a particular and a wider aspect here. The particular one is that we clearly need to ensure that the Prime Minister is fully briefed about any imminent US military action, and that this briefing happens sufficiently in advance to allow her a real opportunity to comment. British aircraft will be part of the strike force and, if tasked against targets inside Iraq, there is a clear risk of civilian casualties and the deaths or execution of British hostages. Britain will also be most closely associated with the overall US action, and our ground forces will take casualties. Brent Scowcroft and you may well already have agreed on a procedure to ensure that both consultation and

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warning take place well before any military action initiated by the US and its friends. Or it may all come in from Peter de la Billiere. If not, there are suggestions that I would put forward.

4. The second, wider, aspect relates to our need to talk through thoroughly with the Americans all the available options. The received wisdom in Washington is that, unless there is some Iraqi provocation, the Administration will conduct a major review of where we have all got to in mid-November, and at that point the President will have to focus very seriously on the sort of questions set out in para 6 of my telno 2244 (copy enclosed). Britain is the country seen by the Americans to be closest to all of this, and we are clearly going to be the country most closely involved with them in any military action. It is therefore very important that British views are firmly fed into the American review, and the options very thoroughly discussed and argued through. This could be done either direct between the Prime Minister and the President, or by Foreign Ministers, or by intermediaries or by my being given detailed instructions to speak to Scowcroft or even the President.

5. Whatever the channel, my main concern, and the purpose of this letter, is to ensure that there are adequate arrangements for this consultation to take place. We here have no wish to waste our interlocutors' time, or cross wires, but at the same time it is obviously important that the right questions should be asked, and that I should be in the best possible position to keep the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary fully informed on the basis of regular and broadly-based talks with the Americans. I do not need, for that purpose, to cite, directly or indirectly, your exchanges with the White House. But, to the extent consistent with operational security, I need to have a clear picture both of the ground already covered and of the way your minds are turning. I do not wish to seem importunate, but you would rightly think me remiss if I did not satisfy myself that you have all the information that you need and that the mechanics for full consultation are in place, as we move towards what may be a very difficult period of decision.

Yours ever
Antony

Antony Acland

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

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INFO PRIORITY DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ADEN, JEDDAH, AMMAN, CAIRO, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV
INFO PRIORITY, ACTOR, ESC LONDON

SIC I9M

VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE: IRAQ/KUWAIT
SUMMARY

1. US POLICIES TO COME UNDER REVIEW IN NOVEMBER. PRESENT STRESS ON THE LONGER HAUL. QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDE THE EFFICACY OF SANCTIONS, THE PERSISTENCE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THE POSSIBLE MILITARY OPTIONS AND THEIR COST, AND WHAT THE LONGER-TERM RESULTS WOULD BE OF A CONTINUED SQUEEZE OR THE USE OF FORCE. BALANCE IN NOVEMBER PROBABLY AGAINST THE IMMEDIATE USE OF FORCE. PREDICTION FURTHER AHEAD HAZARDOUS.

DETAIL

2. IT IS VERY GOOD NEWS THAT MR KING WILL BE HERE FOR TALKS WITH CHENEY AND OTHERS ON 20/21 SEPTEMBER. THERE WILL BE A FURTHER CHANCE TO EXPLORE US THINKING IN DEPTH WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER MEETS THE PRESIDENT ON 30 SEPTEMBER. WE ARE WELL PLACED THEREFORE TO GET A FULL AND ACCURATE SENSE OF CURRENT AMERICAN THINKING FOLLOWING THE 14 SEPTEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FURTHER BRITISH CONTRIBUTION, WHICH HAS BEEN VERY WARMLY WELCOMED AND HAS RECEIVED GOOD PUBLICITY. OUR NEED TO BE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN US THINKING AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING WILL ALSO HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY OUR HAVING SO MANY MORE MEN ON THE PROSPECTIVE FRONT LINE.

3. SUBJECT TO ANYTHING THAT THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF MAY LEARN WHEN HE SEES GENERAL POWELL ON 15 SEPTEMBER, I WOULD EXPECT CHENEY TO CONFIRM ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT, UNTIL THE AMERICAN MILITARY BUILD-UP IS COMPLETED AROUND THE END OF OCTOBER, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A MAJOR IRAQI PROVOCATION, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE WITH THE EFFORT TO IMPOSE AND, WHERE NECESSARY, TIGHTEN SANCTIONS WHILE MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING A DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN SAUDI ARABIA. IF WE HAVE THE TIMING OF THE US BUILD-UP RIGHT, THAT IN TURN MAKES IT UNLIKELY ON PRESENT FORM THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN A POSITION TO CONSIDER DIRECT MILITARY ACTION BEFORE THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS ON 6 NOVEMBER. THE PRESENT PUBLIC MOOD (MY TELNO. 2231) IS SUPPORTIVE OF FIRM BUT MEASURED POLICIES. NEITHER THE US PUBLIC NOR THE CONGRESS ARE CLAMOURING FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION.

(AW/CHY)

//(4. AFTER.....)

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4. AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR HOWEVER (ALWAYS ASSUMING NO MAJOR CHANGES ON THE GROUND WHETHER PROVOKED BY IRAQ, ISRAEL OR THROUGH EVENTS IN JORDAN), THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO DECIDE BETWEEN TWO BROAD POLICY OPTIONS - THE LONGER HAUL AND USING FORCE. DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION. GIVEN THE PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS IT IS STILL SOMEWHAT ACADEMIC. I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAS YET MADE UP HIS MIND WHICH WAY TO GO. THE PRESENT PUBLIC STRESS IS ON THE LONG HAUL, COUPLED WITH REMINDERS THAT THE MILITARY OPTION MIGHT STILL HAVE TO BE EXERCISED IF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOUR STATED OBJECTIVES ARE NOT OTHERWISE ATTAINABLE. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO ENDORSE THE WIDER OBJECTIVES OF REMOVING SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER AND CURTAILING LONGER TERM IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESSED ON THEM BY SOME COMMENTATORS AND, APPARENTLY, BY SOME OF THE ARABS. IF THE PRESIDENT DID DECIDE, PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY, THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO EXTEND US OBJECTIVES IN THIS WAY, THE BALANCE OF DECISION WOULD THEREBY BE WEIGHTED TOWARDS USING MILITARY FORCE. I DO NOT THINK HOWEVER THAT THINGS ARE FOR THE MOMENT MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION.

5. IN THIS SORT OF SITUATION PREDICTIONS ARE HAZARDOUS. MY CURRENT EXPECTATION HOWEVER IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL RETAIN SUFFICIENT DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME AFTER THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS TO ALLOW HIM TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS WHICH WILL GOVERN HIS EVENTUAL CHOICE, WITHOUT COMING UNDER UNDUE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE IN HIS POLICY REVIEW. THIS MIGHT TAKE MUCH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN PUBLIC SPECULATION CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BUILD UP. IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF I SET OUT THE SORTS OF QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN DEPTH SO THAT MR KING WILL HAVE THEM AT THE BACK OF HIS MIND WHEN TALKING TO CHENEY AND OTHERS ON 20 AND 21 SEPTEMBER, AND TO SKETCH OUT SOME TENTATIVE ANSWERS.

6. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER:

(A) WHAT EFFECTS ARE THE SANCTIONS HAVING AND HOW LONG THEY MAY TAKE TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES?

NO ANSWER IN NOVEMBER IS LIKELY TO BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN APPROXIMATE. UNLESS THERE HAVE BEEN SERIOUS AND LASTING BREACHES HOWEVER I DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR TO SAY THAT SANCTIONS ARE NOT GOING TO WORK.

(B) HOW LONG WILL THE PRESENT SUPPORTIVE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS PERSIST?

THE MAIN VARIABLE HERE MAY BE THE HOSTAGES. PUBLIC ANGER HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT MODERATED BY THE RELEASE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. BUT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S PATIENCE WILL BE STRAINED IF THERE IS NO FURTHER PROGRESS. FEELINGS WOULD INEVITABLY BE INFLAMED BY ANY MALTREATMENT OF THE REMAINING PRISONERS. AT PRESENT HOWEVER THE EXPECTATION IS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS IN FOR A LONG HAUL. I DO NOT THINK THAT ANYONE SERIOUSLY EXPECTS THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF TROOPS CAN BE HOME FOR CHRISTMAS OR THE NEW YEAR.

(C) HOW LONG WILL THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS HOLD TOGETHER?

THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT REST ON THE SOLID GROUND OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AS THE WEEKS PASS HOWEVER THERE IS BOUND TO BE INCREASING DEBATE OVER THE LONGER TERM AIMS OF US DEPLOYMENT. THE AMERICANS WILL BE LOOKING TO THEIR PARTNERS FOR CONCRETE SUPPORT, NOT JUST POLITICAL ACQUIESCENCE. US PERCEPTIONS OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE COMMITMENT IN PARTICULAR WILL INFLUENCE THEIR ASSESSMENT. PRESENT SPECULATION ABOUT POSSIBLE STRUCTURES TO PROTECT A REGIONAL BALANCE ONCE THE PRESENT CRISIS IS RESOLVED IMPLY A POLICY OF LONG TERM CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ RATHER THAN A VIOLENT RESOLUTION OF PRESENT PROBLEMS.

//(D) IF.....)

(D) IF MILITARY ACTION WERE TO BE TAKEN, WHAT FORM OUGHT IT TO TAKE? THIS MUST LASTLY BE A MATTER FOR MILITARY ADVICE BUT OBVIOUSLY THE OPTIONS WOULD RANGE FROM SELECTIVE STRIKES EITHER IN RETALIATION FOR IRAQI ACTIONS OR TO UNDERScore US DETERMINATION, THROUGH AN EFFORT TO LIBERATE KUWAIT AND HOLD THE LINE AT THE IRAQ/KUWAIT FRONTIER, TO THE DESTRUCTION OF HUSSEIN'S REGIME AND IRAQI MILITARY POTENTIAL. BUT ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO GO VERY FAR UP THE LADDER TO MAKE IT APPARENT THAT THE MOST SENSIBLE MILITARY OPTION WOULD BE TO GO ALL OUT FOR A DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE IRAQIS. THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI MILITARY POWER IN THE WIDER THEATRE. THIS SORT OF LOGIC WOULD BE REINFORCED BY WHAT THE AMERICANS NOW SEE AS THE MAJOR LESSON OF VIETNAM, THAT GRADUATED INCREMENTS OF FORCE ARE INEFFECTIVE AS COMPARED TO MASSIVE INTERVENTION FROM THE BEGINNING.

(E) IF FORCE WERE EMPLOYED, WHAT WOULD BE THE COST IN MONEY AND LIVES AND HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? THIS MUST BE THE IMPORTANT UNKNOWN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STRUGGLE COULD BE LONG AND BLOODY MUST WEIGH ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION.

(F) WHAT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WOULD THERE BE FOR MILITARY ACTION? IDEALLY THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE UN BACKING FOR DIRECT ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, THOUGH THEY RECOGNISE THAT UN ENDORSEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 42 IS IMPROBABLE AND THAT THE MOST THEY COULD REASONABLY HOPE FOR IS A WIDE DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL ACQUIESCENCE IN OFFENSIVE ACTION. THEY WOULD IN ANY CASE NEED A RESPECTABLE DEGREE OF ARAB SUPPORT, IF ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF ESTABLISHING A MORE STABLE POSITION AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. WHAT MEASURE OF SUPPORT THEY MIGHT GET WOULD CLEARLY DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME AND, IN PARTICULAR, WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD BEEN A NEW PROVOCATION FROM BAGHDAD. FRUSTRATION ALONE, PARTICULARLY IN THE RELATIVELY SHORT RUN, MIGHT NOT BE EASILY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONALLY AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR TAKING THE OFFENSIVE. AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH SEES THE GULF CRISIS AS A TEST-CASE FOR US-LED INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF POST-COLD-WAR CRISES WILL NOT LIGHTLY PROCEED IF DOING SO WOULD SACRIFICE SOVIET AND UN SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE ARE ALREADY THOSE IN THE AREA WHO WOULD LIKE A QUICK AND TOTAL MILITARY SOLUTION, AND THE FACT OF A MAJOR MILITARY BUILD UP CREATES ITS OWN MOMENTUM AND EXPECTATIONS.

(G) IF THE AMERICANS TOOK THE OFFENSIVE, HOW WOULD THEY STABILISE THE SITUATION IN IRAQ ONCE IT WAS OVER? THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO RECKON WITH THE PROBABILITY THAT DIRECT ACTION AGAINST IRAQ WOULD CREATE VERY CONSIDERABLE TURBULENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A QUICK AND RELATIVELY EASY VICTORY. EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE HARD TO SEE IN ADVANCE WHAT SORT OF SUCCESSOR REGIME MIGHT BE INSTALLED IN BAGHDAD OR HOW THE AMERICANS COULD SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCE THEIR MILITARY COMMITMENT OVER THE LONG HAUL.

//(7. THESE.....)

7. THESE QUESTIONS WILL OF COURSE BE CONTINUING ONES AND THERE IS A CERTAIN ARTIFICIALITY IN CONDUCTING A REVIEW IN NOVEMBER RATHER THAN DECEMBER OR JANUARY, BUT THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE AFTER THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS IS LIKELY TO DEMAND IT. THE END OF THE YEAR ALSO HAS A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE.

I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF IT WERE DECIDED TO MAINTAIN PRESENT POLICIES UNTIL THAT TIME, THOUGH THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN NOVEMBER TO GO FOR MILITARY ACTION EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR IF SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS TELEGRAM IS TO SET OUT SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED IN DEPTH IN ORDER TO HELP TO ENSURE THAT WE REMAIN SECURELY ON THE INSIDE TRACK IN DETERMINING THE WAY IN WHICH US POLICIES EVOLVE.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1990
M

Dear Charles:

As you may know when the Prime Minister and the President met recently in New York, they agreed to convey to President Mitterrand their acute concern about the lack of unequivocal French support for our position toward Iraq. I wanted you to be aware that the President has in fact communicated his concern. (S)

More specifically, President Bush has told President Mitterrand that we must avoid any daylight among us with regard to the need for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal in accordance with Resolution 660. Further, the President underscored the perils of any weakening of our position regarding the restoration of the Government of Kuwait. While we would naturally be pleased by further democratic reform once the legitimate government has returned, the recent French position on this aspect is a departure from the Security Council Resolution 661 and a recipe for encouraging Saddam Hussein's further intransigence. (S)

We are grateful for your continued strong position, which is an important factor in the unity of purpose and power confronting Saddam Hussein. (U)

Sincerely,

Brent
Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Charles D. Powell
Private Secretary for the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL No. T227B/90 10 DOWNING STREET

SUBJECT cc MAJESTY
cc OPS LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 October 1990

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter of 15 September. I agree that the unanimity shown by the international community in condemning Iraq's aggression and enforcing sanctions is very welcome. Pakistan's firm stance, and its commitment of troops to the multinational force have been of great value.

Iraq's action has caused serious economic damage to many countries, including Pakistan, through the increased cost of oil, the loss of trade and of remittances, and the need to reabsorb large numbers of refugees. The long-term remedy lies in the restoration of peace and stability in the Gulf area. The priority must therefore be to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the reinstatement of the legitimate Government.

We realise that a number of countries, including Pakistan, will need assistance in dealing with the immediate economic impact of the crisis, and we have been discussing with the World Bank and other donors how this assistance might be provided. Inevitably, it will be necessary to look to those donors which are not contributing to the military operations to take the lead in providing such additional assistance as may be required. Britain is, of course, already providing substantial aid to Pakistan: we expect our bilateral aid to total about £30 million this year.

PM/EM

A major part of the immediate impact on Pakistan, as on other countries, is due to the increase in oil prices. The analysis carried out by the IMF and IBRD shows that the best way of dealing with this is through domestic economic measures. While the oil price shock undoubtedly increases the difficulty of economic adjustment, it also makes such adjustment even more essential. We are therefore urging all affected countries as a first step to reassess their economic policies and financing needs in consultation with the IMF and the World Bank, and to explore the possibility of obtaining additional resources from the International Financial Institutions in support of appropriate adjustment programmes.

I realise also that the repatriation and reintegration of large number of refugees is an additional burden for Pakistan. Britain has responded quickly to provide emergency assistance. So far, our contribution to the costs of repatriating refugees from the Gulf (of whom many are from Pakistan), including our share of European Community assistance, amounts to over £10 million.

Yours sincerely

Rajaram Malhotra

His Excellency Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan



Re
AM

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 October 1990

PAKISTAN

I enclose the Prime Minister's reply to the recent letter from the President of Pakistan. It is amended in some respects from the draft which you sent me. Provided the department are content, I should be grateful if it could be despatched for delivery as soon as possible.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mem

file

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FM BAGHDAD
TO PRIORITY FCO
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MY TELNO 1450: EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS - INDUSTRIAL DECLINE

SUMMARY

1. SERIOUS PROBLEMS EXPECTED IN THE IRAQI INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AFFECT SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIALS, SPARE PARTS AND FOREIGN EXPERTISE.

DETAIL

2. AT THE OECD COMMERCIAL OFFICERS' MEETING ON 19 SEPTEMBER REPORTED IN TUR, IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT A DETERIORATION IN THE STATE OF IRAQ'S INDUSTRY CAUSED BY SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN IRAQ'S POLICY TOWARDS KUWAIT IN THE SHORT TERM. WE CONTINUE TO HOLD THIS VIEW, ALTHOUGH (LARGELY ANECDOTAL) REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT THE DECLINE OF IRAQ'S INDUSTRY SUGGEST THAT SANCTIONS ARE CAUSING INCREASING DAMAGE.

3. ACCORDING TO A REPORT COMPILED FOR THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY BY EXPATRIATE AUSTRALIANS PREVIOUSLY WORKING FOR THE AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD (AWB) IN BASRA AND DRAWING ON THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER EXPATRIATE ENGINEERS, THE ALREADY POORLY MAINTAINED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WILL FACE ACUTE DIFFICULTIES IN THE FOLLOWING THREE AREAS: (A) WATER - IRAQ'S NATURAL WATER RESOURCES CONTAIN CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF DISSOLVED MINERALS. THIS MEANS THAT ALL WATER FOR INDUSTRIAL USE MUST BE PROCESSED TO AVOID HEAVY ARTERIO-SCLEROSIS. THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHEMICALS REQUIRED FOR THIS ARE BOTH IN SHORT SUPPLY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HOW LONG IT WILL BE BEFORE THESE SHORTAGES CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS: MANY PLANTS HAVE THEIR OWN PROCESSING UNITS. HOWEVER, EVERY INDUSTRIAL PROCESS REQUIRING TREATED WATER AS WELL AS THOSE INSTALLATIONS THAT ARE STEM

OR WATER-COOLED (IN PRACTICE THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE IN IRAQ) WILL BE VULNERABLE.

(B) SPARE PARTS - SPARE PARTS SUCH AS SOLENOIDS, PIPES, WELDING MATERIAL AND FUSES ARE ALREADY IN SHORT SUPPLY. REPORTS OF ATTEMPTS BY IRAQIS TO REPAIR EG BROKEN HEAVY-DUTY FUSING SUGGEST THAT THE USUAL HABIT OF REPLACING RATHER THAN REPAIRING IS BEING ABANDONED. BUT THE EXPERTISE TO DO THIS SAFELY AND SUCCESSFULLY IS NOT GENERALLY AVAILABLE. ONE CATEGORY OF SPARE PARTS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS BALL-BEARINGS, WHICH ARE CRUCIAL FOR THE MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. IRAQ HAS ONLY A VERY LIMITED CAPACITY TO PRODUCE THESE, AND THE SHORTAGES ARE ALREADY BECOMING APPARENT. THE BREWERY AT MAISAN NEAR BASRA FOR EXAMPLE IS REPORTEDLY 'ONE BEARING AWAY FROM DISASTER' EXCLAM (IT IS FUNCTIONING - JUST - AT ONE THIRD CAPACITY.)

(C) MANPOWER/MANAGEMENT - THE DEPARTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS FOR THE ARMY HAS LEFT MANY INSTALLATIONS SERIOUSLY SHORT OF LABOUR, SOME OF WHICH IS SKILLED AND CANNOT BE REPLACED LOCALLY. IN ADDITION WHAT LOCAL EXPERTISE EXISTS IS NOW INCREASINGLY BEING EMPLOYED IN THE ARMY.

4. THE AUSTRALIANS CONCLUDED THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE THREE FACTORS WOULD BE TO ACCELERATE INDUSTRIAL DECLINE. THE BEGINNINGS OF THIS ARE ALREADY VISIBOE. THE LACK OF ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF WATER FOR COOLING, FOR EXAMPLE, PLACES AN EXTRA STRAIN ON MACHINE LUBRICANTS, A PROBLEM NORMALLY OVERCOME BY ADDING 'EXTENDERS'. BOTH LUBRICANTS AND EXTENDERS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. '(MOTOR OIL, FOR INSTANCE, IS NOW RATIONED.)

5. ACCORDING TO A BRITISH ENGINEER WORKING ON THE NORTHERN OIL FIELDS NEAR KIRKUK THE PROBLEM OF SPARE PARTS IS POTENTIALLY ACUTE IN THE REFINING SECTOR. MANY PARTS NEED REPLACING AS FREQUENTLY AS EVERY TWO WEEKS, AND PROJECTS DO NOT CARRY LARGE STOCKS. MOST OF THE PARTS CANNOT BE MANUFACTURED LOCALLY AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF

FOR EXAMPLE, NON-SPECIALISED PIPING, THOSE LOOTED FROM KUWAIT ARE NOT GENERALLY COMPATIBLE. A JAPANESE BUSINESSMAN WORKING IN THE OILSECTOR REPORTED THAT THERE WERE ALREADY PROBLEMS AT THE BEIJI REFINERY WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT PRODUCTION.

6. PROBLEMS ARE BEING EXPERIENCED ELSEWHERE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY. THE BRITISH ENGINEER REPORTED THAT THE NORTHERN FIELDS HAD BEEN CLOSED AND THAT EXPATRIATES HAD BEEN ORDERED TO MOTH-BALL PUMPING STATIONS. THE ENGINEER ADDED THAT THIS MOTH-BALLING REQUIRED SKILLED MAINTENANCE, WITHOUT WHICH THERE COULD BE CONSIDERABLE

LONG-TERM DAMAGE. THE SOUTHERN FIELDS MAY SUFFER FROM THE LARGE SCALE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS JUST NEGOTIATED BY ACADEMICIAN PRIMAKOV (MY TELNO 1706).

7 POWER GENERATION IS A RELATIVELY WELL PROTECTED SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY, AND THEREFORE LESS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MAJOR OVERHAULS OF THE TWO MAIN POWER STATIONS FOR BASRA AND BAGHDAD WERE COMPLETED IN JULY AND THESE STATIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE FUNCTIONING FOR ANOTHER 12 MONTHS. A MAJOR ACCIDENT OR BREAKDOWN HOWEVER COULD NOT BE HANDLED WITHOUT IMPORTED SPARE PARTS, AND THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SHORTAGES OF REFINED OIL COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS. AN INDICATION OF CONCERNS OVER ENERGY WAS PROVIDED BY A REPORT IN ATH-THAWRA ON 8 OCTOBER WHICH STATED THAT A SEMINAR HAD BEEN HELD AT THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING THE PREVIOUS DAY TO DISCUSS ENERGY CONSERVATION.

WALKER

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IRAQI REPRISALS

1. FOLLOWING THE CAR BOMB OUTSIDE THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL
(FORMERLY THE HILTON) HOTEL TWO DAYS AGO, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A
QUOTE USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE UNQUOTE THAT 20 KUWAITI MEN STOPPED
AT THE SAUDI BORDER HAVE BEEN BROUGHT BACK TO KUWAIT CITY AND
SHOT.

BURTON

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MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
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PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
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SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK

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JORDAN : SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. FRANK EXCHANGE WITH THE CROWN PRINCE ABOUT SANCTIONS BREACHES AND ABOUT JORDANIAN POLICY.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON THE CROWN PRINCE ON 9 OCTOBER. HE BEGAN WITH THE SUBJECT OF SANCTIONS WHICH THE US AMBASSADOR HAD RAISED WITH HIM IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO OUR MEETING. HARRISON HAD PASSED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE US EMBASSY (WHICH THEY HAVE ALSO PASSED TO US AND WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY) INDICATING AN INCREASE IN HEAVY GOODS VEHICLES FROM JORDAN TO IRAQ. HASSAN COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD BE FOLLOWING THIS UP URGENTLY. IF TRUE, IT WAS ENTIRELY CONTRARY TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND TO THE CLEAR DECISION TAKEN BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO APPLY SANCTIONS FULLY.

3. I SAID THAT TWO WEEKS AGO I HAD DELIVERED TO THE KING ON INSTRUCTIONS A LIST OF POSSIBLE SANCTIONS BREACHES. SO FAR, I HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY. AT THAT AUDIENCE, I HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE A CENTRAL POINT OF REFERENCE TO WHICH I COULD BRING ANY FURTHER ENQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE BREACHES OF SANCTIONS. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT THE RIGHT RECIPIENT FOR SUCH MESSAGES WAS THE FINANCE MINISTER. I SAID THAT I HAD RAISED THE SAME POINT WITH JARDANEH ONLY YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 657) BUT HAD BEEN REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THE LACK OF RESPONSE TO OUR APPROACHES ABOUT SANCTIONS BREACHES COULD HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE PROCESS OF AGREEING EC AID TO JORDAN. IF ALL OUR ENQUIRIES WERE SEEN TO FALL INTO A BOTTOMLESS PIT, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN COOPERATING.

4. THE CROWN PRINCE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THIS APPROACH. HE SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED ON A NEED FOR A CENTRAL REFERENCE POINT FOR SANCTIONS ENQUIRIES. HE HIMSELF HAD SUGGESTED IT PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK AND HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN PUT IN HAND. HE THEN TELEPHONED THE CHIEF OF THE ROYAL COURT AND ASKED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE APPROACHED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY WITH A VIEW TO GETTING A REFERENCE POINT SET UP.

5. WE WENT ON TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S PRESENT POSITION IN THE GULF CRISIS. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN MAKING CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS ABOUT JORDANIAN POLICY. THESE WERE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE APPLIED: THAT, DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR SADDAM, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SOMEHOW CONTROL PUBLIC OPINION: AND THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO KEEP RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN GOOD REPAIR. HOWEVER, EVIDENCE OF A SURGE OF SANCTIONS BREACHES, COUPLED WITH AN INCREASINGLY STRIDENT ANTI-WESTERN AND, MORE RECENTLY, ANTI-GULF ARAB TONE IN THE MEDIA INEVITABLY CAUSED ME TO WONDER WHETHER A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF COURSE WAS IN TRAIN. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT I COULD BE REASSURED THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY NOT THE CASE. THE ARTICLE WHICH HE HAD SENT TO THE INDEPENDENT (PUBLISHED ON 6 OCTOBER AND REPEATED IN TODAY'S JORDAN TIMES) SET OUT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION VERY CLEARLY. HE WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO TILT TO BAGHDAD. HE AGREED ENTIRELY THAT MOVING IN SADDAM'S DIRECTION WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED.

COMMENT

6. HASSAN WAS CLEARLY ALARMED AT THE EVIDENCE OF INCREASED SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT BOTH ON POTENTIAL DONORS AND AROUND THE ARAB WORLD. I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO TAKE URGENT REMEDIAL ACTION. AS FAR AS OVERALL JORDANIAN POLICY IS CONCERNED, HASSAN IS ALIVE TO THE DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE KING'S RELUCTANCE TO CONDEMN THE INVASION OUTRIGHT AND BY HIS CONTINUAL HANKERING AFTER A COMPROMISE SOLUTION. THE KING'S RELUCTANCE TO SAY MUCH IN PUBLIC ABOUT SANCTIONS (IN CONTRAST TO THE LEADERSHIP HE SHOWS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS) ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO AN IMPRESSION OF HALF-HEARTEDNESS AND PROBABLY INCREASES THE TEMPTATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL JORDANIANS TO EVADE SANCTIONS IF THEY CAN.

REEVE

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