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MT

Part 32

CAB 1

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Situation in the Middle East
Conflict between Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi
Arabia et al
UK Policy towards the conflict

MIDDLE EAST

Part 1 Mar 1979

Part 32: 22 Oct 1990

CAB ONE

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25-10-90							
2-11-90							
4-11-90							
Part ends							
PREM 19/3085							

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Date

1. COP to PM 22.10.90
2. Mod Paper taken at mtg
of PM, FCS and S/S/MS 23.10.90
3. COP to Mod (Webb) 23.10.90
(mtg record) - to COP for
PM's box 1.11.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

We need to address some major issues in advance of any military operations against Iraq.

A. Strategic Objectives

2. Military operations must be guided by agreed strategic objectives. Our primary objective at present is to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. We will also want to secure the release of all British/foreign hostages.
3. If these objectives cannot be achieved by means of the trade embargo and other economic measures, the military option then arises. Military action to free Kuwait would inevitably involve action against targets in Iraq which support their military activities in Kuwait or their operations against Allied forces. The impact on Iraq itself would, however, be a side effect of the main objective and would depend in part on how soon Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.
4. But should our strategic objectives be extended to include:
 - a. the downfall of the current Iraqi leadership;
 - b. the elimination of Iraq's capability (or potential) with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and with long-range missiles?
5. The wider our objectives, the greater the care that will be required to ensure that the means chosen are justifiable within

the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. We will also need to keep in mind the impact of military operations on British and world opinion. We must be able to justify any military action undertaken by our forces.

6. Additional objectives might be:

- a. the development of a long term security structure in the region involving minimum Western participation;
- b. (so far as possible without inhibiting the chances of military success) the preservation of Iraq's civil infrastructure in order to minimise the post-war burden on other nations;
- c. the avoidance of Israel's involvement in any hostilities.

B. Co-ordination with Allies

7. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations against Iraq. Nevertheless it is very desirable that as many countries as possible are involved and are agreed on the strategic objectives. However, it may be optimistic to assume that all those Allies who have deployed troops will be willing to take part in offensive action, especially if this goes beyond ejecting Iraq from Kuwait or is not taken under UN sponsorship. It is important that we should not be at odds with our allies on the legal basis for any action. Given the sensitivity of the subject it may be unrealistic to expect the United States to be willing to share their thinking on specific military operations very widely. A minimum requirement for us is to agree objectives and co-ordinate planning with the United States; the support of the Saudis is also essential to us.

8. Particular issues to be discussed with the Americans are
 - a. strategic objectives (as above);
 - b. operational planning and the role and tasks to be assigned to UK forces. This will provide the basis for approving the commitment of UK forces to operations, where appropriate under US operational control. It might best be done in theatre;
 - c. the scale of operations, their likely duration and potential losses;
 - d. how to get the maximum participation of other forces with the minimum loss of effectiveness and operational security. The military operational planning Committee under Prince Khalid may help in this, though the bulk of the detailed arrangements will fall to General Schwarzkopf in accordance with directives issued by the Committee;
 - e. how is joint decision with the Saudis to be implemented (to which both the US and we are committed)? What about Bahrain, and possibly Qatar, UAE and Oman?

C. Guidance to Military Commanders

9. Tactical military planning to meet the strategic objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Their military operations must avoid putting at risk British and international support: in this the length of hostilities and the scale of the losses incurred will be very important. These considerations and international law suggest that operations should conform to the following criteria:

- a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

- b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;
 - c. targets which do not provide direct or indirect support to military operations should be avoided;
 - d. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible;
 - e. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;
 - f. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to achieving the strategic objective. It may be possible to meet this concern over hostages by alternative methods of attack.
 - g. forces under command ^{may} ~~should not~~ be used for the evacuation of British nationals if this would ^{not} detract from the success of operations ^{to dislodge} against Iraq. ^{from Kuwait}
 - h. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.
10. If our objectives extend beyond ejecting Iraq from Kuwait we shall need to decide if the following targets should be attacked:
- a. Military research establishments and production facilities.

- b. Civilian targets with military connections (e.g. oil refineries, power stations, transport systems)
- c. Government command centres.
- d. Targets in or near Baghdad.

D. Conclusion

11. On all these issues we need to agree policy with the Americans and have regard also to the position of the Saudis. The best way to do this, if it could be achieved, would be to have a joint political directive. This would then provide the framework within which tactical planning could proceed in theatre.

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PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

You have a meeting tomorrow afternoon with Foreign and Defence Secretaries alone, to discuss the situation in the Gulf. The Foreign Secretary requested it, principally I think to talk about our strategic objectives. But it is also an opportunity to talk through some of the more sensitive issues such as the timing of military action and our attitude towards further diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation (e.g. the United States' plan to involve the UN Secretary General). It might also be useful to talk about business management. Some issues have to be kept in a very tight circle: but we have to be sure that this does not lead to failures in planning and preparation for military action.

Strategic Objectives

You do not see any difficulty with our objectives:

- / - Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait;
- the legitimate government to be restored;
- *to secure freedom for the hostages;*
- compensation to be paid;
- ~~those responsible for~~
- those responsible for atrocities to be accountable for them;
- Iraq's NBC capability to be eliminated or tightly constrained;
- maintenance of the widest possible alliance of Arab governments against Iraq;
- *avoidance of Israeli involvement.*
- a future regional security structure to be established.

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We do not avowedly aim to bring down Saddam Hussein: but we assume that an outcome of the crisis - whether peaceful or military - should be his disappearance (the President speaks of wiping him off the face of the earth).

If the military option is used, we envisage massive destruction of military and strategic targets in Iraq by air action, but not invasion of Iraq's territory by ground forces (although one does not know what, for instance, the Turks might do).

CDS is very keen to have a written directive setting out our strategic objectives, as the basis on which they can agree on targeting policy with the Americans. If tomorrow's meeting can agree the objectives suggested above, I will do a draft directive for you.

Timing of Military Action

This is not entirely in our hands. In a conversation with the Foreign Secretary some weeks ago, you spoke of giving sanctions three or four months to work, i.e. roughly until the end of the year. Since then a number of factors point towards a rather earlier resort to the military option:

- a clearer understanding of the climatic 'window';
- lack of clear indication that sanctions are working, or are likely to work, before the 'climatic window' closes again.
- Saddam Hussein's evident determination to avoid giving a specific provocation for military action;
- a feeling that opinion in Arab countries may weaken unless there is fairly early military action. The downside of the large American military presence is clearly being felt, particularly in Saudi Arabia;
- the risk of further Israeli/Palestinian incidents which could further destabilise Arab opinion;

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- concern about American (and European) opinion over the long haul;
- the danger that, if we delay too long, the Israelis may force our hand.

These factors would all point to initiating military action sometime in the period late November - mid December.

Against this, there are factors which will be cited to justify delay:

- there are some signs that sanctions are biting and should be given longer;
- the Americans continue to be attached to seeking authority from the UN for military action;
- the argument that we need to give diplomacy another chance, e.g. the US proposal to give the UN Secretary General 30/45 days to use his good offices;
- the growing number of governments (Soviet, French, other European) who are espousing the need for diplomatic efforts/negotiations;
- the American decision to send additional Abrahams MIAI tanks from Germany, which could presumably take 4-6 weeks;
- reports that some senior American military figures are talking of 12 months or more before hostilities.

The questions you will wish to address tomorrow are:

- do we wish to push the Americans towards relatively early resort to the military option?

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- if so, how do we most effectively do that? Given that they are making by far the biggest military effort and will take the largest number of casualties, the decision to resort to military action will be an American one: we have to lead them to see early action as the best decision from their point of view.

Attitude towards Diplomatic Efforts

Publicly we have taken a robust line to the effect that diplomacy has had a chance for 11 weeks: and that there is no need for others to pay any price for Iraqi withdrawal. We do not need to save Saddam Hussein's face or offer any blandishments.

Against this, there is mounting pressure from many sources for more diplomacy/negotiations. This includes:

- President Mitterrand's UN speech;
- Primakov's mission;
- continued efforts by several Arab governments: Jordan, Yemen, PLO;
- Mr. Heath's visit and his statement that not enough is being done on the diplomatic front;
- the President's message to you suggesting that the UN Secretary General be given more time to use his good offices;
- the reference in UNSCR 660 to settling differences between Iraq and Kuwait by negotiation (although that does not include territorial disputes).

We cannot ignore these efforts but have to decide what is the best way to handle them, without becoming isolated as the only country 'opposed to negotiations'.

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Our priority is to avoid any sort of negotiation since it would inevitably - given the inherent spinelessness of many other countries - lead to concessions. The key is the United States and keeping President Bush firmly opposed to negotiation.

But we ought, on a contingency basis, to think what would be the least bad form of diplomatic activity if the Americans weaken:

- a good offices mission by the UN Secretary General, constrained by the terms of Security Council resolutions? I doubt that he would be so constrained: his staff would urge him to insist on some flexibility;
- an independent initiative on Arab/Israel, with no ostensible link to Iraq/Kuwait? It is hard to see what form this could take: but perhaps a discussion among the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council to demonstrate their continuing deep concern with the Palestinian problem.

The more one struggles to find something, the clearer it becomes there is no negotiation which does not give Saddam Hussein something.

Handling

The regular co-ordination meetings - your once or twice-weekly meeting of Ministers and the 11 o'clock meeting - work well and the great majority of issues can be settled there.

Where problems may arise is in the need to handle on a very restricted basis information about US military intentions and timing of possible action. This is shared with only a tiny circle of Defence Secretary, CDS and Foreign Secretary. I am not sure how real the problem is: in part, we have a lot of discontented Whitehall knights who feel they ought to be informed. I think we shall have to take decisions on how much

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information to disseminate on an ad hoc basis. When there is something of clear operational significance, I will seek your authority to pass it on to those directly concerned (in most cases CDS and the military side).

One further aspect is the position of Antony Acland who is getting a bit restless at being 'left out'. It seems to me that his task and that of the Embassy is to go gathering the best information they can on American thinking, the state of Congressional and public opinion, intentions at the UN and so on: but not to be directly involved in the most secret operational discussions and plans, which will be done directly between London and Washington.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell
22 October 1990

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FILE

KW

ccFCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 October 1990

Your Highness

Thank you for your letter of 19 October. I read with great interest and admiration the conclusions of the Kuwait People's Conference, the success of which I congratulate Your Highness and the Kuwaiti people. For our part, we remain fully committed to achieving the objectives reaffirmed at the Conference, namely the unconditional and complete withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of her legitimate government.

I share your outrage at the reports of the behaviour of the Iraqi occupying forces and send my deep sympathy to the families of victims of Saddam Hussain's inhuman actions. Those responsible for the devastation of Kuwait and her way of life must be made to pay, and the recent Security Council Resolution provides for this.

The tyranny and ruthlessness of the Iraqi regime is in sharp contrast to the commitment of the legitimate Government of Kuwait to the principles of consultation, democracy and popular participation under the 1962 Constitution which is confirmed in the declaration of the Kuwaiti People's National Conference.

We must maintain the unprecedented degree of international solidarity against Saddam Hussain, and to convince him of the determination of the world community that he withdraw from Kuwait. As part of that effort public opinion must be focussed on the plight of the Kuwaiti people, the wanton destruction of Kuwait itself, and the urgent need to reverse Saddam Hussain's

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brutal aggression. We shall be happy to do everything we can to support Kuwaiti efforts to ensure that international opinion does not lose sight of these issues.



With all best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Nayana Shakti

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah Al Salim al Sabah

A The National Archives

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MY TELNO 2617: IRAQ/KUWAIT: STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND
BAKER
SUMMARY

1. BUSH AND BAKER TAKE UNCOMPROMISING PUBLIC LINE ON THE NEED FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. PRESS INTERPRET REMARKS AS EMPHASISING THE MILITARY OPTION. SEEN ALSO AS PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MAJOR INCREASES IN US GROUND FORCES IN THE GULF.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER BOTH ADDRESSED THE GULF CRISIS IN PUBLIC REMARKS MADE IN CALIFORNIA YESTERDAY (29 OCTOBER).

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE WAS AS DETERMINED AS EVER THAT IRAQI AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT STAND. HE THOUGHT THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, COUPLED WITH WORLDWIDE SOLIDARITY, SHOULD CONVINCCE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, BUT THERE COULD BE NO PRE-CONDITIONS. HE DISMISSED ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE PRIMAKOV MISSION MIGHT COME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. HE DESCRIBED THE SIEGE OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT AS UNCONSCIONABLE AND INHUMANE. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD USE FORCE WITHOUT CONSULTING CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HISTORY WAS REplete WITH EXAMPLES OF THE PRESIDENT HAVING TO TAKE ACTION. QUOTE I'VE DONE THIS IN THE PAST AND CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE NO HESITANCY AT ALL UNQUOTE.

4. SECRETARY BAKER, ADDRESSING THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL IN LOS ANGELES, SIMILARLY GAVE PROMINENCE TO THE MILITARY OPTION. HE SAID THAT US MILITARY OBJECTIVES WERE TO DETER AN IRAQI ATTACK IN SAUDI ARABIA, TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES, AND TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS. BUT MILITARY FORCES WERE ALSO THERE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE AND DECISIVE MILITARY RESPONSE SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT IT. QUOTE SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST REALISE THAT THERE IS A LIMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S PATIENCE. HE MUST ALSO REALISE THAT SHOULD HE USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, THERE WILL BE THE MOST SEVERE

CONSEQUENCES UNQUOTE. BAKER WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WHILE THE US WOULD STRONGLY PREFER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, ALL OPTIONS WERE BEING CONSIDERED. QUOTE WE WILL NOT RULE OUT A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE IF IRAQ CONTINUES TO OCCUPY KUWAIT UNQUOTE.

5. A TOUGHENING OF RHETORIC WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN BAKER'S REMARKS ABOUT IRAQI BEHAVIOUR IN KUWAIT, QUOTE A STORY OF BARBARISM IN ITS MOST CRUDE AND EVIL FORM: THE RAPE OF KUWAIT UNQUOTE, TOGETHER WITH HORROR STORIES ABOUT TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS AND USE OF US CITIZENS AS HUMAN SHIELDS WHICH WAS QUOTE SIMPLY UNCONSCIONABLE UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

6. ALTHOUGH THE REMARKS MAY IN PART BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOMESTIC ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS AND AN ATTEMPT TO REFOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE BUDGET DEBACLE, COMMENTATORS HAVE ALSO INTERPRETED THIS AS A PREPARATION FOR DECISIONS ON INCREASED US FORCE LEVELS IN THE GULF. NO ANNOUNCEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE (AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE WHITE HOUSE IS STILL CONSIDERING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM GENERAL POWELL AFTER HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE GULF) BUT THE PRESS ARE NOW TAKING IT FOR GRANTED THAT UP TO 100,000 EXTRA TROOPS WILL BE DISPATCHED. INDEED, CHENEY HAS NOW GONE ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT QUOTE THERE IS NO UPPER LIMIT UNQUOTE.

7. IF FORCE AUGMENTATION IS AGREED TO A SIGNIFICANT CALL UP OF ADDITIONAL RESERVISTS WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED SINCE THESE WOULD PROVIDE THE BULK OF THE COMBAT SUPPORT FOR THE EXTRA DIVISIONS - A FURTHER REASON WHY THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER WOULD WISH TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION CAREFULLY.

ACLAND

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

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(BY TUBE H29)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

31A (a-h).

Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15D

This draft Directive has been amended, on the basis of 31st October 1990 instructions which I issued after your meeting with the Defence Secretary.

Have suggested further amendments

Dear Charles, Foreign Secretary last week. Agree it may now be finished?

IRAQ/KUWAIT

attached CDD 1/Ki.

See proposed amendments mb

Thank you for your letter of 23rd October following the Prime Minister's talk with the Defence and Foreign Secretaries. (A list of those who have seen it here is attached).

As you asked we have worked up the earlier note to reflect the discussion. A revised version is attached. If the Prime Minister is content we suggest this is used as a basis for discussions with the United States at the key contacts:

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| PM/yourself | President/Scowcroft |
| Foreign Secretary | Secretary of State |
| Defence Secretary | Defense Secretary |
| CDS | Chairman of Joint Chiefs |
| Joint Commanders | CINCCENT (Schwarzkopf) |

We have some worries that US thinking in these areas is not as advanced as we would like because of other preoccupations. The UK discussions have allowed the Defence Secretary to give political guidance on planning to our commanders, but it is plain that their counterparts do not yet have it.

The developed note is now quite close to the kind of directive that is given to military commanders. It could then form a basis for a joint directive if we find common ground in our discussions with the US. With this mind the Defence Secretary is minded to send a copy of the note to Secretary Cheney; and you might like to send one to the White House.

A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Sir Robin Butler. I suggest its circulation is limited to the same group as your letter of 23rd October.

*Yours sincerely
Steve Webb*

(S WEBB)

ANNEX

MOD OFFICIALS WHO SAW LETTER FROM C D POWELL OF 23RD OCTOBER

Defence Secretary and his Private Secretary
CDS
Joint Commander - Air Chief Marshal Sir P Hine
Assistant Under Secretary(Commitments) - Mr N Bevan

IRAQ/KUWAIT

UK POSITION PAPER

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Our strategic objectives are as follows:

a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

b. To secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq.

c. To secure the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait.

d. To bring to account those responsible for atrocities.

by committee from heads of the Geneva Convention

e. To eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical and long range missile capability.

f. To establish a long term regional security structure that involves minimum Western participation.

- g. To avoid any Israeli involvement in the crisis.

It would not be a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); we should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

2. The strategy currently selected to achieve the most immediate of these objectives is to secure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of non-compliance.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

3. If Iraq fails to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions within a reasonable timeframe, the military option will come into play. In that event our military objectives are seen as:

- a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait;
- b. To rescue or secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq;
- c. To destroy Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capability/potential and her long range missile capability;

4. No avoidable constraints should be placed on the conduct of military operations, if the duration of hostilities and associated casualties are to be minimised. Nevertheless, the means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be justifiable within the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Moreover the impact of military operations on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion will need to be kept in mind.

5. Air operations against targets in Iraq will be an essential element in military operations but we should avoid a 'scorched earth' policy. (not least because it will be important to seek to preserve Iraq's civil infrastructure in order to minimise the post-war burden on other nations.)

delete

6. Land operations in Iraq should be limited to those necessary to liberate Kuwait or to rescue hostages. [There should be no intention to occupy any part of Iraqi territory.]

we may have to in order to protect No Kuwait

GUIDANCE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

7. Tactical military planning to meet these objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Planning should conform to the following criteria

- a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be

relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;

c. targets for attack may include facilities which provide direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait (e.g. military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems, Government command centres);

d. civil targets which have no military connections (e.g. desalination plants) should not be attacked;

e. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible; e.g. by selecting the appropriate method of attack or giving prior warning;

f. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;

g. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations. ^{Where} ~~It may be~~ possible to

~~meet this~~ ^{concern} ^{should be met} by alternative methods of attack.

h. forces under command may be used for the protection and evacuation of hostages if this would not unreasonably detract from the success of operations against Iraq.

Some in these forces must be allocated to deal with the hostage and refugee problems.

i. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.

CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIES

8. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations. Co-operation with them and with the Saudis is fundamental and the role and tasks of UK forces in relation to both of them will need to be determined and agreed at political level. It will be important for the French and other principal Arab forces to be involved in any operation and to be brought into co-ordination and planning. The requirement for "joint decision" will entail consultation at the highest level with the Saudis.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE UNITED STATES

9. a. Strategic objectives
- b. Military objectives

- c. The role and tasks of UK forces
- d. The scale of operations, their timing, likely duration and potential losses
- e. Targetting constraints
- f. Co-ordination of planning and operations, with particular reference to the Saudis and the French.
- g. Arrangements for securing "joint decision"
- h. Joint political directive to act as framework for tactical military planning.

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X is Scandalous

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Scandalous, so soon after the European

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Small declaration. I got the FCO no problem in strong QMS in Rome last night.

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BONN TELNO 1383: HOSTAGES HELD BY IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. BRANDT WILL CALL ON THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 31 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS.

DETAIL

2. AT A MEETING OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWELVE ON 31 OCTOBER, THE GERMAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ANNOUNCED THAT BRANDT WOULD CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT AFTERNOON, TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS. HE WAS DOING SO AS A PRIVATE PERSON, NOT AT THE REQUEST OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. AT MY PROMPTING, THE GERMAN UNDERTOOK TO DRAW TO BRANDT'S ATTENTION SCR 674, AND IN PARTICULAR THE REFERENCE TO THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THIS REGARD CONTAINED IN PARA 7 OF THE RESOLUTION.

CAF 1/x

3. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE COULD NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS OF BRANDT'S INITIATIVE. WHEN I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PRIVATELY AT LUNCH HE WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN MORE OF THE BACKGROUND: HE SAID HE WAS MUCH TROUBLED BY WHAT WAS PLANNED. HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED THIS MORNING SEPARATELY FIRST BY GENSCHER AND THEN BY ANDREOTTI WHO TRIED TO SELL HIM THE IDEA THAT BRANDT SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD AS THE LEADER OF A EUROPEAN TROIKA REPRESENTING THE THREE MAIN (SIC) EUROPEAN POLITICAL GROUPINGS (THE OTHERS TO ACCOMPANY HIM BEING COLOMBO (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT) AND DE CLERCQ (LIBERAL)). GENSCHER AND ANDREOTTI HAD SAID THAT THEY HOPED PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD GIVE THE TROIKA A UNITED NATIONS LABEL AND COVER FOR THEIR TRIP TO BAGHDAD.

K

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD RESPONDED VERY COOLLY. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT HE ALREADY HAD HIS OWN EMISSARY FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, SADRUDDIN. MOREOVER HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE VISITING FOREIGNERS IF THEY CAME UNDER BILATERAL NATIONAL COLOURS AND NOT UNDER UN AUSPICES. THAT HAD BEEN THE EXPERIENCE SO FAR. HE HAD THEREFORE GIVEN THEM NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY WHEN HE SAW BRANDT LATER

TODAY.

5. I SAID THIS WAS ALL VERY DISTURBING. WE WERE OF COURSE A PARTY TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. BUT I DOUBTED VERY MUCH WHETHER WE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT ANY AMBITIOUS FOLLOW-UP IDEAS SUCH AS HE HAD DESCRIBED. I COULD NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD APPROVE OF THEM. TO SEND A MISSION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WHICH PURPORTED TO REPRESENT THE MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPINGS IN EUROPE WAS EXACTLY THE THING TO AVOID. SO I HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH WAS BEING MADE TO HIM IN ANY SENSE IN THE NAME OF THE TWELVE.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR THANKED ME FOR THIS CLARIFICATION AND SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE A GROUP OF THAT SORT AND WOULD TURN IT VERY MUCH TO HIS OWN BENEFIT. WHEN HE SAW BRANDT LATER THIS AFTERNOON HE INTENDED TO WISH HIM GOOD LUCK BUT NOT TO GIVE HIM ANY UN LABEL FOR THE PURPOSES OF HIS JOURNEY.

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MIDDLE EAST ISSUES: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

1. I TALKED OVER NEXT STEPS AT THE UN ON THE VARIOUS MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. PICKERING AS USUAL SPOKE VERY FRANKLY AND HIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

GULF CRISIS

2. PICKERING SAID THAT WASHINGTON WERE THIRSTING FOR A WHOLE SERIES OF SINGLE ISSUE RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF, STARTING WITH THE IDEAS WE HAD ORIGINALLY SURFACED FOR USING THE FROZEN IRAQI ASSETS TO PAY COMPENSATION TO COUNTRIES, COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS DAMAGED IN THE CONFLICT. FOR REASONS WHICH HE FOUND HARD TO UNDERSTAND, GIVEN THE SUCCESS IN BOTH PRACTICAL AND PRESNETATIONAL TERMS OF THE LAST TWO MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS (SCR 670 AND SCR 674) THEY NOW SEEMED DETERMINED TO SEPARATE OUT INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AND TO PROCESS THEM SEPARATELY.

3. I SAID WE COULD HARDLY ARGUE STRONGLY AGAINST A RESOLUTION TO SET THE FROZEN ASSETS TOWARDS COMPENSATION SINCE WE HAD ALREADY PROPOSED THIS OURSELVES BUT I THOUGHT WE WOULD BE A BIT WORRIED ABOUT THE RISK OF A LINKAGE WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IF ONE WAS THINKING NOW IN TERMS OF MORE THAN ONE RESOLUTION GOING THROUGH DURING THE NEXT MONTH. WE HAD SPENT THE WHOLE OF OCTOBER SUCCESSFULLY, BUT WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY, AVOIDING CROSS-LINKAGES AND HAD FINALLY GOT SCR 674 DECIDED WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY A PRICE FOR IT. WE COULD WELL BE CONFRONTED WITH WORSE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO LINKAGE IN NOVEMBER.

4. PICKERING SAID HE VERY MUCH AGREED. HE WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE WASHINGTON, AND BELIEVED HE WOULD SUCCEED, THAT THEY WOULD DO BETTER WITH A MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTION AND THAT THEY SHOULD DO NO MORE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO THAN CONSULT OVER IT WITH US AND THE REST OF THE FIVE. THEY SHOULD NOT LAUNCH ANY RESOLUTION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE UNTIL A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, CLEAR OF LINKAGES, WAS VISIBLE.

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

5. PICKERING SEEMED TO HAVE NO CLEARER IDEA THAN WE HAVE OF THE PROBABLE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT DUE OUT BY THE END OF THE MONTH. HE SAID THE AMERICANS WERE PRESSING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DELAY THE REPORT AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE CREDENTIALS DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 1 NOVEMBER. THEREAFTER THE BEST PICKERING COULD THINK OF WAS A SERIES OF DILATORY DEVICES SUCH AS PERSUADING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HIS REPORT WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ONE WITH MORE TO FOLLOW OR MAKING A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO GET AMIE INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. PICKERING SAID THEY ALSO HAD SOME HOPE OF MAKING USE OF THE ISRAELI REPORT ON THE 8 OCTOBER SHOOTINGS. ALTHOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN AS CRITICAL OF THE ISRAELI SECURITY AUTHORITIES AS ONE MIGHT HAVE HOPED, IT DID CONTAIN MATERIAL WHICH COULD BE PUT TO SOME USE WHEN IT CAME TO PRESSING THE ISRAELIS FROM THE OUTSIDE. BUT PICKERING ADMITTED THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS FURTHER U S/ISRAELI CONTACTS AND ALSO AN ATTEMPT BY THE MAIN JEWISH ORGANISATIONS IN THE U S TO PLEAD WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE UN'S ACTIVITIES HAD BOTH COME UP AGAINST A COMPLETE STONE WALL.

6. I SAID I WAS SURE WE WOULD COOPERATE IN ANY INGENIOUS IDEAS THE AMERICANS MIGHT SURFACE FOR PLAYING THESE ISSUES LONG UNLESS THE DEVICES WERE SO BLATANTLY DILATORY AS TO BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. I SUGGESTED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMING HIMSELF TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PRESENT HIS REPORT. THAT OCCASION IN ITSELF WOULD TRIGGER OFF MASSIVE PRESSURE FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION. IT WOULD SURELY BE BETTER FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRODUCE A WRITTEN REPORT WHICH IT COULD BE ARGUED WOULD REQUIRE EXAMINATION IN CAPITALS FOR A REW DAYS. PICKERING AGREED THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND SIAD HE WOULD PRESS IT ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHOM HE WAS GOING TO SEE LATER TODAY.

7. I SHALL BE SEEING PICKERING FOR MY SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY HANDOVER AT 2030Z ON 31 OCTOBER. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY POINTS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES (OR ON ANY OTHERS FOR THAT MATTER) WHICH YOU WOULD WISH ME TO RAISE WITH HIM THEN.

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cc: [handwritten initials]



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1990

Dear Charles,

Letter from Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 24 October, ^{AOP} enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from Shaikh Sa'ad in his capacity as Chairman of the Kuwaiti People's Conference.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that the Prime Minister should reply to Shaikh Sa'ad, despite her recent meeting with the Amir. The Kuwaiti Minister of Planning, Al Mutawa, told us on 25 October, that Shaikh Sa'ad had gone out on a limb at the Taif Conference to encourage the Al Sabah along the democratic track to which he was committed but about which others were still hesitant. There is little doubt that Shaikh Sa'ad's insistence on restoring the 1962 Constitution was largely responsible for rallying the Kuwaiti opposition at Taif and ensuring a united outcome. Al Mutawa, who is emerging as a key spokesman for the Kuwaiti Government, also told us of his difficulties in persuading the Amir and Sheikh Sa'ad actively to project a positive image of Kuwait and its cause in the foreign media.

Al Mutawa asked us to send a political signal which would encourage the Al Sabah to stick to agreements made at Taif on future democratic development and to adopt a higher media profile. Both are important ingredients in maintaining the cohesion of the anti-Saddam alliance. A reply from the Prime Minister would undoubtedly have an impact and strengthen Shaikh Sa'ad's hand: Al Mutawa told us that Britain was seen by the Kuwaitis as "a driving force in the international coalition".

/ The enclosed draft reply is in terms which would permit publication.

[Handwritten signature]
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO: HH Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah Al Salim al Sabah
Crown Prince and Prime Minister
State of Kuwait

Thank you for your letter of 19 October. I read with great interest and admiration the conclusions of the Kuwait People's Conference, on whose success I congratulate your Highness and the Kuwaiti people. For our part, we remain fully committed to achieving the objectives reaffirmed at the Conference, namely the unconditional and complete withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of her legitimate government.

I share your outrage at the reports, which we continue to receive, of the behaviour of the Iraqi occupying forces. I wish to express my deep sympathy to the families of victims of Saddam Hussein's inhuman actions. Those responsible for the devastation of Kuwait and her way of life must be made to pay.

The tyranny and ruthlessness of the Iraqi regime stands in sharp contrast to the commitment of the legitimate Government of Kuwait to the principles of consultation, democracy and popular participation under the 1962 Constitution confirmed in the declaration of the Kuwaiti People's National Conference. The clear expression by the Kuwaiti people and government of their united support for democratic values will be a potent reminder to international public opinion of the justice of the cause to which we are committed.

It is vital to maintain the unprecedented degree of international solidarity against Saddam Hussein, and to convince him of the determination of the world community that he withdraw from Kuwait. As part of that effort public opinion must be focussed on the plight of the Kuwaiti people, the wanton destruction of Kuwait itself, and the urgent need to reverse Saddam Hussein's brutal aggression. We shall be happy to do what we can to support Kuwaiti efforts to ensure that international opinion does not lose sight of these issues.

en

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MR POWELL

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The Gulf

The Prime Minister may wish to see
the attached telegram from our Defence
Attaché in Washington on US military
planning. It accords broadly with the
picture I was given last week.

ms
H.

PERCY CRADOCK

30 October 1990

SECRET

WHENCE THE POSSIBLE NEED TO GOOK TO ENCOI LOWEALONE

VBE

REFERRED TO

MR GOULDEN

F.D.A.

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EXCLUSIVE FOR MODUK FOR CDS AND DCDS(C). FCO FOR GOULDEN (AUS).
UKMIS NEW YORK FOR MR CLIFF. FROM DA
SUBJECT: KUWAIT

1. SUMMARY. REAPPRAISAL OF MULTINATIONAL OPTIONS IN KUWAIT. TIMINGS NOW POINT TO LIMITED IDEAL PERIOD 5 DEC - 14 JAN FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. SAUDIS TO OPEN US PR CAMPAIGN. ARAB MULTINATIONAL FORCE NATIONS MAY HAVE US COMMITMENT FOR OFFENSIVE WHOSE AIMS MUST INCLUDE REMOVAL OF IRAQI THREAT TO REGION. INFLUENTIAL JCS OFFICERS NOW CONSIDER UN INVOLVEMENT OR LONG HAUL NO CONFLICT CONTAINMENT OPTIONS.
2. ON RETURN TO CAPITAL I HAVE HAD SERIES OF CALLS ON FORMAL (DIRECTORS JCS J3 AND VICE DIRECTOR J5) AND INFORMAL CONTACTS TO ASSESS AND READVICE CURRENT US OPTLONS. BOTH CONTACTS POINT TO STIFFENING SAUDI POSITION TO AVOID THE NIGHTMARE OF IRAQ SIMPLY COMPLYING WITH UN SCR 661. JCS STRESSED NO CHANGE TO DETERRENT/DEFENCE MISSION, PREOCCUPATION WITH EXTENDED TOURS OF DUTY/ROTATION, AND SOBER REALITY OF MILITARY TASK IF GIVEN EITHER OFFENSIVE MISSION.

3. SAUDI. MY INFORMAL BUT RELIABLE CONTACTS ARE SURE THAT SAUDI, EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN COMMITMENTS WERE CONDITIONAL UPON US AGREEMENT AT KENNEBUNKPORT THAT MISSION WAS TO RESTORE SECURITY OF REGION BY REMOVING MAIN IRAQI THREAT AND RESTORATION OF KUWAIT SOVEREIGNTY. US TROOP LEVELS UP TO THAT POINT WERE CAPPED BY SAUDIS BUT THERE WAS NOW NO CAPPING. GIVEN CONTINUING AND PRESENT ISRAELI (TEMPLE MOUNT UN SCR 672) DIFFICULTY, IT WAS ALLEGED THAT PRINCE BANDAR WAS ORCHESTRATING MAJOR US PR CAMPAIGN LINKED TO SAUDI FAVOURED NATIONAL STATUS FOR US DEFENCE SALES. THIS WOULD CHIME WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL AND BUDGET PRESSURES DRAW DOWN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMME. SAUDIS WOULD PREFER OPERATIONS OVER BY RAMADAN AND MAJORITY OF WESTERN FORCES OUT OF SAUDI OR AT LEAST RELOCATED TO KUWAIT BY HAJ. JCS CONFIRM THAT SAUDIS HAVE NOT IMPOSED THIS AS A CONSTRAINT AND JCS VIEW JAN AS OPTIMUM TIME. IF OPS OVERRAN INTO HAJ, SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE BLAMED FOR CANCELLATION, NOT THE ALLIES. JCS VIEW THIS THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PSYOP MILEAGE IN THIS. BY LATE JAN DUST STORMS AND PROXIMITY TO RAMADAN REDUCE OFFENSIVE WINDOW AND SAUDI PREFER ASSAULT IN PERIOD END NOV - MID JAN WITH DECEMBER AS BEING OPTIMUM FOR BOTH LAND AND AIR OPS. BANDAR WAS REPORTED AS PRIVATELY HAVING APPROACHED UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HEALTH SERVICE FACILITY FOR FOUR MILLION ANTHRAX VACCINE DOSES.

4. US BUILD UP. J3 TOLD ME THAT BY 5 DEC US WOULD HAVE COMPLETED PLANNED BUILD UP TO 250,000 WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF 30 DAYS INTENSE RATE. CURRENTLY JCS JUDGE THAT THEIR (AND OTHER) FORCES ARE TOO WEAK AT PRESENT FOR A SHORT BLITZKREIG CAMPAIGN WHICH RAISES PROBABILITY OF EXTENDED SLOG WITH HIGHER CASUALTY RATIO. AIR CAMPAIGN LIKELY TO TAKE 6-8 DAYS. DIRECTOR J3 STILL CONFIDENT OF WINNING GIVEN ADDITIONAL TIME FOR BUILD-UP. HE STATED THAT 416 X MIAI 120MM TANKS WERE BEING MOVED FROM GERMANY. HE STRESSED THAT THESE WOULD REPLACE PRESENT M60 AND M1 105MM TANKS AT FRONT LINE (COMMENT - THIS WILL SURELY RAISE TRAINING CONVERSION AS WELL AS LOGISTIC PROBLEMS) AND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO LINKAGE AT PRESENT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF REINFORCEMENT FROM EUROPE. HOWEVER WE KNOW THAT THE DECISION ON ROTATION WILL BE TAKEN AT MONTH END AND THAT THE JCS/ARMY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO LIFT 82 AB DIV (COMPLETE) OUT AT FIRST ROTATION NOW LIKELY TO BE AT 179 DAY POINT. HE ALSO ADDED THAT FOR THE US TO BE CONFIDENT OF VICTORY, A FURTHER TWO HEAVY DIVISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED (REPLACING BOTH 82ND AB AND 101 AASLT DIVS). THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT ONLY REMAINING DIVS IN US ARE QUOTE BOBTAILS UNQUOTE (2 X REG BDES, 1 X RES BDE). HENCE THE POSSIBLE NEED TO LOOK TO EUCOM FOR FUTURE ROTATION/REINFORCEMENT. THIS BRINGS WITH IT COMPLICATIONS FOR

CFF. USAF ARE ALREADY TRICKLING ROTATION OF CREWS WITHOUT
DEF AUTHORITY AND USN HAS SUSTAINING 6 MONTH NAVAL OP TOUR
POLICY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT JCS REGARD TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT AS OP
LIABILITY BUT FACE PRESSURES FROM CONGRESS TO CALL OUT OP
RESERVES. d



5. LONG HAUL OPTIONS. VDIR J5 GAVE ME FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO
HOW THIS DIRECTORATE (SUPPORTED HE SAID BY CJCS) SAW
MULTINATIONAL OPS. THEY NOW BELIEVE UN MANDATE ONLY REALISTIC
OPTION IF OFFENSIVE ACTION REQUIRED AND WERE SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENSURE THAT THINKING ON QUOTE CO-EXECUTIVE UN
THEATRE AGENCY UNQUOTE WOULD BE SHARED SAUDI/US COMD (WITH
CINCENT REALLY DIRECTING OPS) BACKED BY LOCAL POLITICAL AND
MILITARY MULTINATIONAL COMMITTEES. DIRECTOR JCS EARLIER HAD
CONFIRMED THIS POSITION STRESSING NO MSC STRATEGIC DIRECTION
ROLE BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEATRE EXECUTIVE AGENCY. JCS
THINK SOVIET POSITION INHIBITED BY WLSH TO AVOID COMMITMENTS OF
TROOPS (AFGHANISTAN MEMORIES) BUT INCREASING AFFECTED BY
STRIDENCY OF CRITICISM FROM RELATIVES OF HOSTAGES, THEREFORE
ENGAGEMENT OF MSC PROFILE COULD BE AN IMPORTANT SOVIET
MILESTONE. IF PRESSED BY NEED TO KEEP SOVIETS ON LINE UP TO AN
ARTICLE 42 UN SCR, JCS WOULD ACCEPT ADVISORY SIDELINE ROLE TO
SECURITY COUNCIL.



6. NON-CONFLICT CONTAINMENT OPTION. J5 WERE NOW PREPARING
LONG HAUL NO-CONFLICT ASSESSMENTS. PREDICT SANCTIONS (IN CERTAIN
AREAS (TYRES AND AIRCRAFT LUBRICANTS WERE CITED) ALREADY
DISABLING IRAQ BUT IF TIGHT SANCTIONS SUSTAINED THIS COULD
CONSIDERABLY REDUCE OP EFFECTIVENESS AND PERMIT REDUCTION OF
WESTERN FORCES. WHEN PRESSED ABOUT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT
THEY INFERRED THIS MAY HAVE TO AWAIT COUP. PROSPECT OF STARVING
CHILDREN OR HOSTAGES COULD BE AVERTED BY RELEASE OF HUMANITARIAN
AID.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3085</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Cradock to Powell 30/10/90 and attachments</i>	
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3085 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

1. Key objectives this week are:

- to continue to highlight the brutality and illegality of the Iraqi occupation;
- to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein faces a powerful, united and effective military force against which he cannot win;
- to highlight evidence of sanctions beginning to bite;
- to counter views that a compromise solution is attainable or desirable;
- to counter Iraqi attempts to portray the alliance against Iraq as weakening.

2. Briefing Material

In the week beginning 22 October we circulated:

- a) a new edition of the FCO briefing notes (attached);
- b) background notes on (i) atrocities in Kuwait, and (ii) the Security Council Resolutions and Iraq's isolation at the United Nations;
- c) next week we shall issue notes on (i) the international force, and (ii) effectiveness of sanctions and falling morale among Iraqi troops.

3. Written Press

We are considering further interviews by the Foreign Secretary with Arab and Muslim journalists and with CMN. Briefings for Arab and Islamic journalists in London and the supply of material to the press in target countries remain priorities.

4. Television

- a) We distributed a video on 27 October with further evidence of Iraqi brutality and destruction in occupied Kuwait, coupled with coverage of Kuwaiti and British public diplomacy (the Amir of Kuwait's call on the Prime Minister, Mr Waldegrave's photo-call with demonstrators

outside Parliament, statements by the Foreign Secretary and the Kuwait Finance Minister, Kuwaiti evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 24 October).

- b) Our earlier video (Atrocities in Kuwait) was shown on a number of Gulf television stations; it has been circulated in cassette form by Middle East posts. It was also used by television stations in Australia, Germany, Japan, Mexico and Spain.

5. Radio

Further COI produced material, has been placed with Radio Monte Carlo and with Gulf Radio stations.

We have established that the Kuwaitis have been given access to both Saudi and Egyptian radio stations. We continue to gather and pass to the Kuwaitis information on mobile medium wave and FM broadcasting stations including sources of supply and delivery times.

The Head of the BBC Arabic Services has visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A senior correspondent is visiting Bahrain, UAE and Qatar. We continue regularly to brief the Head of the Arabic Service on HMG's policies.

The two Kuwaiti organisations in London (Association for Free Kuwait and Campaign for Free Kuwait) are improving their public presentation and consulting us closely. But there is still a lack of drive and cohesion in the efforts of the Kuwait Government. We are following up the Foreign Secretary's advice to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to take on a public relations company.

Home Office and FCO Officials briefed Muslim community leaders (including the three man group that recently visited Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) on 25 September prior to a meeting of the community on 28 October to consider the situation in the Gulf. British Muslims remain very susceptible to arguments for a compromise solution; they are concerned that hostilities will divide their loyalties to Britain and the wider Muslim community.

We have arranged to hold talks at official level with State Department and USIA representatives in London on 12 November. The agenda will cover objectives of UK and US overt positive information campaigns in Iraq/Kuwait, themes and means used.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
29 October 1990

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
4. What happens if sanctions do not work
5. Reference papers

(Revision)

26 October 1990

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

1. KEY POINTS

- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
- Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
- "You don't negotiate with someone who marches into another country, devastates it, killing whoever stands in the way. You get him out, make him pay, and see that he is never in a position to do these things again" (Prime Minister, Bournemouth, 12 October).
- Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
- Iraq flouts international law by not allowing all foreign nationals to leave Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Where hostages have been released, this has clearly been a great relief for their families. But there should be no hostages; and Saddam Hussein is not displaying humanitarian traits by letting some categories leave.
- Armoury of international pressures in place: they are formidable, and will grow to become even more comprehensive.
- If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
- Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force. They will leave when asked to do so.
- Gallup poll (18 October) in five EC countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) showed most people supported US stance in Gulf. 85% of Britons supported use of military force to free Kuwait or to free hostages, against average for five countries of 70-75%. The latest Newsweek poll in the US shows 61% approval rate for Administration's handling of situation.
- Shootings in Jerusalem on 8 October refocussed world attention on Arab/Israel. But, contrary to Iraqi claims, no linkage between solutions on Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel.
- International consensus on Iraq/Kuwait unshaken by events in Jerusalem.
- "Our Arab partners feel anxiety, feel anger ... but they are not deflected from the task of reversing the aggression against their Kuwaiti brothers" (Mr Hurd, speaking to the Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).

- PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.
- Iraqi action against Kuwait damaged Palestinian interests by diverting world attention from Arab/Israel.
- Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 8 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.
- A solution must be found to Arab/Israel. SCR 672 demonstrates international resolve to tackle Arab/Israel problem; reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously 24 October).
- "The policy of the British government is clear ... that is, self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to live in peace behind secure borders" (Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, 24 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that its annexation of Kuwait is null and void. Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion. 84th Conference of Interparliamentary Union (in Uruguay) endorsed universal condemnation of Iraqi action and supported UNSC Resolutions.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state
- "I remind the Iraqis once again that at all levels of authority, military or civilian, they are personally responsible under the Geneva Convention for illegal acts committed as occupiers of Kuwait" (Foreign Secretary speaking in House of Commons, 24 October).

SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.
- Saddam Hussein's hostages have not fought against him. He has deliberately exposed them to danger (transport to sites). Shamed into freeing women and children but still deprives sick and elderly of freedom. Denied food to Asian workers in Kuwait.

IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRs (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670)

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for the sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.

- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.
- Statement by Heads of State and government of six Asian Muslim States (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives and Pakistan) issued on 16 October in Dhaka, called upon President Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait in compliance with relevant SCRs.

EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 80 billion before invasion of Kuwait).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Acceptance of Iraqi offer of oil at \$21 per barrel would infringe SCR 661. World oil markets are finding a level nearer OPEC limit: dropped \$10 in as many days (21 October, \$26.8).

FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs". Iraqi statements speak of women and children suffering for want of supplies. But contradicted by
- Reports from Iraq which indicate that while some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at bakeries) Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock. Markets being stocked from pillaged Kuwait.
- Iraqi Government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Many have left, but 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility.
- Iraq has rejected offers from both the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.

- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers, plucking out of beard of religious leader before his murder.

WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them - over 1,000 kms.

PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "I do not think that new initiatives over Palestine can take place until Saddam Hussein has been driven out of Kuwait ... This is unfinished business to which we must return as soon as the aggressor has withdrawn or been expelled. Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).
- British government shocked by violence in Jerusalem on 8 October.
- With EC partners have issued statement deploring "use of excessive force by Israeli occupying forces ...".
- UN SCR 672 demonstrates international condemnation of excessive force by Israeli police, and authorises Secretary General to send mission to Israel to investigate incident and developments in occupied territories.

- Reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously), deploring Israeli government's decision not to accept the Secretary General's mission and asking them to reconsider. Resolution repeats request for report.
- "I hope the government of Israel may yet agree to accept the UN Secretary General's mission to investigate those killings. To do otherwise will risk diverting the Security Council from its main task - getting Iraq out of Kuwait - and will give Saddam Hussein a cause which he will exploit ruthlessly" (Foreign Secretary's statement in House of Commons, 24 October).
- "There is only one man who, in his warped way, might have taken satisfaction from the events in Jerusalem, and that is President Saddam Hussein ... He sees the plight of the Palestinians as ... a weapon which he can pick up and let fall at whim ... The aggression against Kuwait is now the main obstacle to sensible diplomacy ... over the Arab-Israel dispute" (Mr Hurd to Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).
- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Saddam Hussein has killed his own colleagues in government; he has used guns and gas on the Kurds.
- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam assumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- For Palestinians to throw in their lot with Saddam Hussein plays into hands of Israeli opponents of withdrawal and international settlement, alienates moderates in Israel with whom Arabs/Palestinians will have to talk.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)

MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September, and

expressed strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government. Agreed Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. Conference called on governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.

THE FUTURE

- "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).

- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, as it must, and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.

- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).

- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jeddah from 13-16 October united Salah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and representatives of opposition groups in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait with the prospect of a more representative system of government.

- "... There's no question but coming out of this crisis there will have to be some new security arrangements in the Gulf ... anything that is worked out will have to be based upon the wishes and desires of the countries in the area" (Mr James Baker, interview on BBC Radio 4 "Today" programme, 15 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

3. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew and a regime of terror under Saddam's cousin, Ali Majid. Invasion has resulted in collapse of public order.
- Basic foodstuffs in short supply. Long queues for bread, no eggs, no fresh fruit, very little meat; all at exorbitant prices.
- Amnesty testified to US Congressional Human Rights caucus (10 October). After summarising organisation's concerns about Iraq's human rights record prior to invasion, gave further account of repression in Kuwait. People being tortured by Iraqi military and intelligence personnel said to include Iraqi Shia Muslims with suspected links with opposition group al-Dawa Al Islamiyya (membership of this group is capital offence in Iraq). Many individual cases of torture, abuse, summary execution cited. Victims include boys as young as 13. Reported group executions including shooting at peaceful protest group of about 35 women and young people in early August.
- Testimony by Kuwaiti refugees to House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (24 October) reinforces this evidence (eg doctors forced to take blood from small children for transfusions for Iraqi soldiers).
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence plates, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- No work, no schools, restrictions on cash withdrawals by Kuwaitis (of their debased currency), shortage of medicines, make leaving an attractive alternative to difficult survival in Kuwait.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein erected around the city. Most schools have closed and commercial activity has virtually ceased.
- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.
- But Iraqi News Agency reported that Saddam Hussein, on 3 October, walked about in the streets of Kuwait city "familiarising himself with its landmarks which were resplendent, reflecting pride in the city's return to the homeland".

- Kuwaiti Oil Minister has said Iraqis have mined oil installations and refineries.
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty, which can also follow failure to declare possession of a fax or photocopier.
- All Arabs and foreigners in Kuwait who fail to report to the Residence Department by 5 November will be liable to legal proceedings and residence permission will be terminated.
- 15,000 Kuwaitis rounded up by Iraqis and imprisoned in Iraq.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (\$1.6 bn in gold and foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Saddam Hussein's treatment of foreign workers inhumane and barbarous. He has treated Asian workers without any human dignity, and is now using their circumstances to attempt to blackmail governments into breaching the embargo.
- Iraq has encouraged the emigration of young, elderly and female Kuwaitis. Their homes and positions have reportedly been given to Iraqis and Palestinians. Of 700,000 Kuwaitis in the Emirate at the time of the August invasion, only 300,000 are thought to be left.
- Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was unique in post-World War II history. Not only had Iraq overrun a sovereign independent member state of the UN and attempted to annex it by force, it had also tried to erase the name and existence of Kuwait from the world political map and destroy its political, economic and social structures. "Rape, destruction, terror and torture were the Iraqi rule of the day in Kuwait".
- Iraq has rejected offers both by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, continue to be helpful.
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united the Sabhh family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and the opposition in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait.

- "We will rebuild Kuwait on the firm foundation of our national unity and the legitimate system of government which we have chosen and are content to be ruled by, strengthening consultation and democracy and popular participation in the light of our 1962 Constitution" (Conference Final Statement).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

4. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- Hope to achieve objective peacefully, but use of force cannot be ruled out. "We are not precluded by reason of the SCR from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law - I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- Poll shows Britons favour use of force. Latest Gallup poll published on 18 October repeats that public support for UK (and US) policy in the Gulf unwavering after 2½ months. 86% of Britons said they would back force to free Kuwait and liberate the hostages if sanctions failed.
- "We are tightening the screw of peaceful pressures but we cannot shirk our part in the alternative course if that course finally becomes necessary" (Foreign Secretary's statement in House of Commons, 24 October).
- Bush-Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression as acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power 'to suppress acts of aggression'. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "Can anyone seriously believe that if Iraq wins this contest with the international community, it will be easier to eliminate chemical weapons or biological weapons or nuclear weapons in the region? Of course not" (Mr James Baker to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 October).
- "I know we have to be ready for any contingency, and we shall be ... that man must leave Kuwait, the legitimate government must be restored, and he must pay for the damage and harm he has done in Kuwait and elsewhere ... there is no more room for negotiation now" (Mrs Thatcher in New York on 1 October).
- "Saddam Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait. He does not have a choice ... the only choice is whether to leave of his own free will or to leave at the point of a gun" (Mr Hurd to Egypt's Diplomatic Club in Cairo on 14 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

5. REFERENCE PAPERS

Verbatims

- VS 42/90 Prime Minister's speech to House of Commons, 6 September
- VS 43/90 Foreign Secretary's speech to House of Commons, 7 September
- VS 48/90 Passage in Foreign Secretary's speech to UNGA, New York, 26 September
- VS 50/90 "Palestine: the other Middle East problem": speech by Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October
- VS 54/90 Statement by Foreign Secretary in House of Commons, 24 October

Guidance

- No 47/90
50/90
52/90
61/90

Retracts

Extensive daily coverage of Ministerial statements, spokesman etc. Following are some recent key pieces:

- Foreign Secretary's various briefings, interviews in New York, 25 September
- "Options available": transcript of Foreign Secretary's discussion with Arab journalists, New York, 27 September
- Statement and press conference by Defence Secretary, 1 October
- Transcript of interviews given by Foreign Secretary in New York to BBC Radio and IRN, 2 October
- Extracts from debate on Middle East in House of Commons, 24 October.

Survey of Current Affairs

August 1990, p.277: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

The Gulf Crisis: Briefing Notes

- Saddam Hussein's record
- International reactions to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Kuwait: consequences of the Iraqi invasion
- Iraqi claims to Kuwait
- The Rape of Kuwait

Video Material

- Kuwait refugees
- Inside Kuwait
- Kuwait: the atrocities
- Kuwait: destruction of a society

See also Mr George Walden's article in Daily Telegraph of 24 October, attached. (NOTE: we do not have second rights for this article.)

Keeping clarity of vision in a war of perceptions

It was to be expected that enthusiasm for war against Saddam would waver, though it is surprising it has happened so soon.
GEORGE WALDEN
argues that we must not revise our view of reality

SUDDENLY, in the Gulf, everything appears the opposite to what it had seemed. The threat of war has all but evaporated as the air is filled with winning words like "negotiation", "concession", "settlement" and, sweetest of all, "peace". As the ground shifts beneath us, the landscape moves with it; issues that were once starkly clear become troublingly hazy.

The "unconditional" withdrawal of Iraq demanded by the Security Council prevents Saddam Hussein from imposing his own terms for getting out of Kuwait, but does not — it now seems — preclude some of the international community from suggesting them to him. Suddenly, too, Saddam is no longer a taker, but a munificent deliverer of hostages. The problem in the Middle East is presented not as Kuwait, but as Israel. Pictures are available of Israeli repression, but not of the daily rape of Kuwait, which thereby becomes a non-happening. Oil prices, which soared when Saddam made his armed grab for more, subside in relief with the news that he may be allowed to keep some of his liquid booty after all.

What is really surprising is that anyone should be astounded by all this. It was always predicted that American popular enthusiasm for military action would waver; that there would be a proliferation of peace plans from foreseeable sources; that the Iraqis would seek to divert attention to the West Bank; and that Saddam would take every opportunity to play catchy tunes on the fiddle of public opinion. Yet everyone seems thrown into confusion when all these developments actually unfold.

From the start, we knew that the staying power of the Western democracies and of the Arab coalition would come under pressure with time. Perhaps the only remarkable thing is that the timescale in question has proved so short, and that the strains are showing sooner than expected. This is a good moment to go back to essentials.

The objections to any territorial concessions to Iraq are as strong as ever. It is not just a matter of saving Saddam's face by tossing him a couple of islands which no one has heard of before. Bubiyan and Warbah would give the Iraqis a strategic advantage in the Gulf greater than the possession of Shatt al-Arab, which they spent so many years and lives in trying to wrest from the Iranians. Already there are understandable indications from Iran that it, for one, would be strongly opposed to such a deal.

It is being suggested that the ceding to Baghdad of the Rumaila oilfield, which the Iraqis alleged to be one of the origins of the dispute with Kuwait, would be a trifling price for peace. This notion does not stand up to scrutiny. Quite apart from the obvious objections of principle, control of this substantial oilfield would be a significant financial reward for the aggressor, the proceeds of which would no doubt go towards rebuilding and modernising Saddam's army for its next act of aggression.

The Saudi defence minister, Prince Sultan, has hinted at territorial concessions. Little weight should be attached to his remarks. Like their Western counterparts, Arab politicians have personalities, and have been known to say things that do not accord with their governments' policies. Prince Sultan has done this before. There is no reason to suspect that King Fahd is in any way weakening.

None of this is to deny that there is uncertainty about the Americans' readiness to resort to armed action in the Middle East. But, then, we always knew that there would be such uncertainty, which would be enhanced by chance events on the domestic American scene, such as the deadlock over the budget — a rather large happening at an inconvenient moment. Attempts by members of the Washington Administration to reassert American readiness to consider adopting the military option were bound to risk a backfire among Arab opinion.

Thus, when the US Defence Secretary, Mr Cheney, recently said that American forces were ready to stay in Saudi Arabia for years if necessary, what was intended as reassurance caused a bubble of alarm at the prospect of a permanent US military presence on Saudi soil. Equally predictable were the strains of military inaction on the Arab alliance. It was always unrealistic to suppose that the Americans could somehow go in, "take out" the Iraqis, and retire in short order. The issue was never as simple as that, if only because of the time needed for the American military build-up. Yet, after scarcely three months, some people affect surprise that it is all taking so long.

MOST predictable of all was that some Arab countries and interests would seek to obscure the vital distinction laid down by Washington and London, between a new look at the Arab-Israeli problem following an Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and the simultaneous examination of these very distinct issues. As on the possible ceding to Iraq of islands or oil, there are attempts to suggest that these are not matters of substance, but merely timing. Perhaps the only unforeseen element was that the Israelis would play into Saddam's hands quite as spectacularly as they appear to have done, by their handling of Palestinian disorders.

There should be least surprise of all about Moscow's diplomatic excursions. We always knew that Mr Gorbachev's solidarity with the United States in the Security Council would be resented by some of his military men.

One of the penalties of the emergence of some sort of democracy in Moscow is that disagreement about how far to go in backing the West in the Gulf has openly surfaced in the Supreme Soviet. The high-profile travels of Mr Primakov, Mr Gorbachev's adviser, armed with various peace plans, are not so much proof that the Soviet president is preparing to ditch his new American allies, as evidence that, for self-evident domestic reasons, Mr Gorbachev has to be seen to be doing whatever he can to head off armed conflict.

With so many kites swirling around in the sky, it is worth keeping an eye on what is happening on the ground. The Americans and the British are steadily moving towards completion of their build-up. The Syrians continue to reinforce their contingent. Mubarak's Egypt remains firm, despite domestic pressures.

On the United Nations front, economic sanctions are holding far better than anyone expected. Diplomatically, the French are showing more solidarity (or if you like, less cynicism) than some feared. M. Mitterrand once again has firmly declined Saddam's typically subtle offer to exchange French hostages for French neutrality.

All this said, there is no room for complacency about the outcome in the Gulf. The old paradox remains: the aims of the allies will only be achieved peacefully if the threat of force remains real. The trouble today is that the option of armed action is thought in some circles to be slipping from the American Administration's hands. Increasingly, we are engaged in a war of perceptions. Once we all start revising our view of reality with every news bulletin, Saddam has won.

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SIC
YOUR TELNO 868: AD HOC MEETING OF MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC): 29
OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. CONSULTATIONS OF MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) MEMBERS. LENGTHY SOVIET STATEMENT, CALLING AGAIN FOR REACTIVATION OF MSC AND STUDY OF MEANS OF AVOIDING ACCIDENTIAL HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON DEPLOYMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO. SHARED ASSESSMENT THAT SANCTIONS ARE SLOWLY BEGINNING TO TAKE EFFECT.

DETAIL

2. MEMBERS OF THE MSC DULY MET FOR CONSULTATIONS FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS ON THE AFTERNOON OF 29 OCTOBER. OPENING THE MEETING, BLANC (FRANCE) REFERRED TO THE CO-OPERATION AND SOLIDARITY OF THE FIVE IN FACING THE GULF CRISIS. THE NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED EARLIER IN THE DAY DEMANDED THAT IRAQ COMPLY OR FACE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER. THE PRESENT MEETING, WHICH TOOK PLACE BY FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE ON THE SAME DAY, CLEARLY SIGNALLED THE DETERMINATION OF THE FIVE TO WORK TOGETHER UNTIL IRAQ BACKED DOWN.

3. ADMIRAL COATANEA (FRENCH DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF) THEN PROPOSED THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD COVER THREE ITEMS:

- (A) THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES THERE.
- (B) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAVAL AND AIR EMBARGO:
- (C) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMBARGO AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ'S CAPABILITIES.

VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID HIS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE WOULD PREFER TO BEGIN WITH A MORE GENERAL STATEMENT.

SOVIET STATEMENT

4. COLONEL-GENERAL OMELICHEV (FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF) SAID HE WISHED TO UNDERLINE THE SPECIAL QUALITY OF THE MEETING. THE FACT THAT IT TOOK PLACE AT SUCH A HIGH LEVEL DEMONSTRATED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND A SHARED DETERMINATION TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. THE MEETING SHOULD BE A POWERFUL SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE MUST OBSERVE IN FULL THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON KUWAIT. THE GULF CRISIS HAD EXTENDED BEYOND ITS REGIONAL BOUNDARIES, AND DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AFFECTED THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE IRAQ ECONOMY HAD BEGUN TO FEEL THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS, SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS ADOPTING A WAIT-AND-SEE POLICY, WHILE AVOIDING GIVING ANY PRETEXT FOR THE LAUNCHING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. HE WAS HOPING FOR AN INCREASE IN PRO-ISLAMIC SENTIMENTS. IRAQ'S INTRANSIGENCE INCREASED THE RISK OF AN ARMED CLASH. IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE BLOCKADE WITH THE HELP OF IRAN HAD NOT YET BROUGHT RESULTS.

5. OMELICHEV SAID THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WAS AN EXPLOSIVE ONE CARRYING THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFLICT. THE POSSIBILITY COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT IRAQ WOULD DELIVER A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE, USING MISSILES OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AGAINST OIL INSTALLATIONS, THE FORCES IN THE AREA OR EVEN ISRAEL. AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES MIGHT RESULT FROM IRAQI PROVOCATION, OR MIGHT EVEN BE ACCIDENTAL. AGGRESSION HAD BEEN LOCALISED AND THE FORCES IN THE REGION WERE NOW SUFFICIENT FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENCE. BUT THE MILITARY BUILD-UP AND THE INCREASE IN TENSION COULD LEAD TO FULL-SCALE CONFLICT. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS A GROUP OF MILITARY EXPERTS SHOULD BE SET UP UNDER THE MSC TO CONSIDER HOW TO AVERT ANY SUCH INCIDENT. FROM THE BEGINNING THE SOVIET UNION HAD LAID THE EMPHASIS ON COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS BY NON-MILITARY MEANS. MILITARY AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION WITH IRAQ HAD BEEN SUSPENDED, MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING DELIVERED TO IRAQ HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND SOVIET SPECIALISTS WERE RETURNING HOME AS THEIR CONTRACTS CAME TO AN END.

6. OMELICHEV SAID THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ACTIVATION OF THE MSC COULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AGAINST IRAQ. THIS HAD LONG BEEN A SOVIET WISH. THE MSC HAD NEVER EVEN CONSIDERED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLACING ARMED FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT RECENT EVENTS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE MSC THE COUNCIL COULD NOT CARRY OUT THE FUNCTIONS ENVISAGED BY THE CHARTER. THE MSC SHOULD NOW CONSIDER MECHANISMS TO CO-ORDINATE EFFECTIVE

MEASURES AGAINST IRAQ: HOW TO PREVENT THE USE OF FORCE OR RESORT TO CONFLICT IN THE GULF: AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT OPTIONS OPEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IF THE CRISIS DID LEAD TO LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD BE AFFECTED. THE WAR WOULD BE A LONG ONE. EVEN CONVENTIONAL WAR WOULD LEAD TO NUMEROUS LOSSES AND CREATE ECONOMIC PRESSURES: IT WAS UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC. THEREFORE ALL PEACEFUL MEANS SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS WITHOUT USE OF ARMED FORCE. THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD ONLY BE THE VERY LAST RESORT.

SITUATION IN THE GULF

7. AFTER THIS STATEMENT, WHICH DID NOT GIVE RISE TO COMMENT, DISCUSSION TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES. AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHAIRMAN, MAJOR GENERAL BECKETT (UNITED KINGDOM) GAVE DETAILS OF OUR LAND AND AIR DISPOSITIONS, AS OUTLINED IN PARA 3 OF TUR. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CARNS (DIRECTOR OF THE U S JOINT STAFF) RECALLED THAT U S FORCES WERE IN THE REGION TO DETER FUTURE IRAQI AGGRESSION, TO DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA AND TO ENFORCE UN RESOLUTIONS. HE ESTIMATED THAT IRAQ NOW HAD MORE THAN 400,000 TROOPS, 3,500 TANKS AND 2,500 ARMoured VEHICLES IN KUWAIT. IT WAS SEEKING TO ELIMINATE KUWAIT'S SENSE OF IDENTITY. THE UNITED STATES WAS HEARTENED BY THE SUPPORT IT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED NATIONS AND FROM MANY COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING FORCES OR SUPPORT.

8. COATANEA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQI FORCES WERE IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, THEY COULD ADOPT AN OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE VERY QUICKLY. THE CALM IN THE REGION WAS PRECARIOUS. IRAQ HAD NO OBJECTIVE INTERESTS IN UNLEASHING HOSTILITIES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ITS ARMED FORCES OR ITS DEFENCE POTENTIAL BUT IF HE WAS THREATENED BY POPULAR UNREST, OR IN THE HOPE OF BRINGING ABOUT ARAB SOLIDARITY, SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT ATTACK THE ALLIED TROOPS. COATANEA THEN DESCRIBED FRENCH DEPLOYMENTS IN THE REGION.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO

9. ASKED TO SPEAK FIRST, BECKETT SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAS 4 TO 7 OF TUR. CARNS AND COATANEA THEN GAVE THEIR OWN STATISTICS RELATING TO NAVAL ENFORCEMENT. (THESE WILL ALREADY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU). COATANEA ADDED THAT FRANCE SHARED OUR CONCERNS ON UNUSUAL AIR ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR FLIGHTS FROM SUDAN TO JORDAN.

EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO

10. BECKETT SPOKE AS IN PARA 8 OF TUR (BUT DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE REPORTED REVERSAL OF THE IMPOSITION OF PETROL RATIONING). CARNS

SAID HE AGREED THAT SANCTIONS WERE NOT YET HAVING A CLEAR EFFECT. SIGNS OF STRAIN IN IRAQ WERE ONLY GRADUALLY APPEARING. BUT SANCTIONS ALSO HAD THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT. IRAQ SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT THE PRESSURES UPON IT WERE STATIC. ALTHOUGH OMELICHEV HAD SAID SUFFICIENT FORCES WERE IN THE AREA FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, IT WOULD KEEP UP THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE IF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES SENT TROOPS. FOR EXAMPLE, SYRIA WAS READY TO DEPLOY ITS FORCES AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD OFFERED TO PAY FOR THE AIRLIFT. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD ASSIST SYRIA IN THIS WAY. AND SINCE SYRIA USED SOVIET EQUIPMENT, PERHAPS THE RUSSIANS COULD PROVIDE LOGISTICAL AND SPARES SUPPORT.

11. OMELICHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION WAS VERY LIMITED AND THEREFORE COULD NOT PLAY A LARGE PART IN SURVEILLANCE. IT HAD THE LIMITED TASK OF SAFEGUARDING THE NAVIGATION OF SOVIET VESSELS. BUT HE AGREED THAT SANCTIONS WERE BEGINNING TO BRING RESULTS EVEN THOUGH THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS UNCLEAR. ON THE U S SUGGESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA, IT WAS UP TO SYRIA TO DECIDE HOW HER TROOPS SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED. SINCE THE SOVIET POSITION WAS NOT TO SEND ANY MILITARY CONTINGENT TO THE AREA THE PROPOSAL WAS 'A BIT AHEAD OF TIME'. IT WAS UP TO SYRIA TO DISPOSE OF THE MILITARY SPARES WHICH WERE DELIVERED FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

12. COATANEA SAID HE SHARED THE GENERAL ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECT OF THE EMBARGO. THE MOST VULNERABLE PART OF THE IRAQI ARMED SERVICES WAS THE AIR FORCE, IN PARTICULAR THE NAVIGATION AND WEAPON SYSTEMS OF THE MOST MODERN AIRCRAFT. MECHANISED AND ARMED ELEMENTS OF THE IRAQI FORCES WERE LESS AFFECTED, AS WERE AIR DEFENCE OR MISSILE SYSTEMS. IRAQ WOULD THUS RETAIN CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL EVEN IF ITS AIRPOWER WAS DIMINISHED. WHERE THE EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY WAS CONCERNED, THE EMBARGO WAS HAVING A CLEAR IMPACT ON THE OIL SECTOR AND CERTAIN SHORTAGES (EG OF TYRES AND BEARINGS) COULD SOON APPEAR. THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE ANY REAL FOOD SHORTAGES BEFORE EARLY 1991. BUT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-ESTIMATED. PRICE RISES AND THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES COULD CAUSE POPULAR DISCONTENT. THERE MIGHT BE A GROWING REALISATION THAT IRAQ'S DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL AND ITS PLACE IN THE REGION WERE BEING UNDERMINED. THE EMBARGO STRATEGY WAS THUS BEGINNING TO HAVE EFFECT. BUT IT WAS INEVITABLY A LONG-TERM ONE WHICH NEEDED PATIENCE.

13. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION DU (CHINA) ASKED TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH CHINA HAD NO FORCES IN THE GULF IT WAS MUCH CONCERNED BY THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL AND

MILITARY SITUATION THERE. THE MAJOR QUESTION WAS HOW TO DEFUSE THE CRISIS IN A JUST AND PEACEFUL MANNER. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT STOOD FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THERE SHOULD BE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. CHINA WAS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE. CHINA SUPPORTED THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE EFFORTS OF THE ARAB AND GULF STATES TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. SO LONG AS THERE WAS STILL A RAY OF HOPE, EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD NOT SLACKEN. PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHARED A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SHOULD CO-OPERATE MORE CLOSELY TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

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MIPT : IRAQ/KUWAIT : SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION : COMMENT

1. DESPITE LAST MINUTE ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS OVER YEMEN'S ATTITUDE, THE RESOLUTION HAS NOW BEEN ADOPTED AS TABLED BEFORE THE WEEKEND AND WITH A MAJORITY AS LARGE AS THAT ACHIEVED ON SOME OF THE OTHER GULF RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. (SOME OF THE EARLY ONES WERE ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND THE YEMENIS VOTED FOR THE AIR EMBARGO RESOLUTION OF 25 SEPTEMBER AFTER MUCH ARM TWISTING, BUT YEMENI AND CUBAN ABSTENTION IS PAR FOR THE COURSE AND REPRESENTS NO WEAKENING IN THE OVERALL WEIGHT OF THE CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.)
2. THE YEMENIS BEHAVED WITH A PUSILLANIMITY REMARKABLE EVEN FOR THEM: BUT THEY SHOULD HAVE INFLICTED MORE DAMAGE ON THEMSELVES THAN ON ANYONE ELSE AS A RESULT OF THEIR LAST MINUTE DECISION TO ABSTAIN ON A MODIFIED TEXT WHICH THE U S ONLY CONCEDED TO THEM ON THE EXPLICIT INDICATION THAT YEMEN ACCEPTED IT AND WOULD VOTE FOR IT. THE BITTERNESS AROUSED BY THIS ACT OF BAD FAITH SPREAD A GOOD DEAL WIDER THAN THE U S DELEGATION SINCE SUCH BEHAVIOUR STRIKES AT THE ROOT OF THE WAY BUSINESS IS TRANSACTED BETWEEN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP ARE DEEPLY EMBARRASSED AND IRRITATED. ALL THIS SHOULD STAND THE U S AND OURSELVES IN GOOD TACTICAL STEAD WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE OF PALESTINE AGAIN.
3. AS TO THE RESOLUTION ITSELF, THE LAST MINUTE DELAY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SOVIET UNION SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE ACTUALLY STRENGTHENED ITS POLITICAL EFFECT. ADOPTION THE DAY AFTER THE FAILURE OF PRIMAKOV'S EFFORTS IN BAGHDAD HAS SWITCHED ATTENTION FIRMLY ONTO THE TOUGH MESSAGE OF THE FIRST ELEVEN PARAGRAPHS. THE MUCH CONTESTED QUOTE PEACE PARAGRAPHS UNQUOTE NOW LOOK PRETTY SICK IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIMAKOV FIASCO.

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SECTION ONE OF TWO

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. AT THE LAST MOMENT YEMENIS DECIDE TO ABSTAIN INSTEAD OF VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION. SHARP EXCHANGES IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN KUWAITI AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES. AMERICANS UNDERLINE THAT THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEIR CITIZENS.

DETAIL

2. ON THE MORNING OF 29 OCTOBER AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) TOLD PICKERING (UNITED STATES) THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD RECONSIDERED THEIR POSITION OVER THE WEEKEND AND HAD NOW INSTRUCTED HIM TO ABSTAIN ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. PICKERING REPORTED TO WASHINGTON AND RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE SHOULD REVERT TO THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 12. AL-ASHTAL AGREED TO TRY AND GET HIS AUTHORITIES TO THINK AGAIN. THE NON-ALIGNED CO-ORDINATOR, RAZALI (MALAYSIA) AND I, AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, POINTED OUT TO AL-ASHTAL THAT IF HIS AUTHORITIES BACKED OUT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON 27 OCTOBER, IT WOULD MAKE FUTURE NEGOTIATION IN THE COUNCIL VERY DIFFICULT.

3. AL-ASHTAL REPORTED BACK SHORTLY AFTERWARDS THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE STILL DETERMINED TO ABSTAIN. PICKERING MANAGED TO PERSUADE THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO RE-OPEN THE TEXT AND THAT THE U S EMBASSY IN SANAA SHOULD MAKE ONE LAST EFFORT WITH THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT. THE START OF THE FORMAL COUNCIL DEBATE, SCHEDULED FOR 1600Z, WAS DELAYED WHILE AL-ASHTAL MADE A FINAL CONTACT WITH SANA'A, BUT THE YEMENIS REFUSED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

4. THE DEBATE RESUMED WITH A LONG STATEMENT BY AL-ANBARI (IRAQ). HE SAID THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED EIGHT RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS,

BUT HAD NOT DEEMED IT APPROPRIATE TO CONSULT IRAQ ON ANY OF THEM. THIS MEANT THE COUNCIL WAS IGNORING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER. THE RESOLUTIONS AMOUNTED TO A DEMAND FOR CAPITULATION BY IRAQ: THEY WERE NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THEY SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT WAR WAS THE ONLY OPTION. THE UNITED STATES HAD AMASSED ITS TROOPS BEFORE ANY STATE IN THE REGION HAD ASKED IT TO DO SO. THE U S/BRITISH NAVAL BLOCKADE HAD BEGUN BEFORE SCR 661 WAS PASSED.

5. AL-ANBARI SAID THAT SINCE 2 AUGUST KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND OTHER PARTIES TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ISSUED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE ON 12 AUGUST. BUT THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN NO NOTICE. IRAQ HAD HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD DRAW UP PROPOSALS TO SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION IN A HOMOGENOUS MANNER. THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED 168 RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND 44 ON LEBANON: THE UNITED STATES HAD EXERCISED ITS VETO 91 TIMES. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WANTED TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS WHILE PUTTING THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES INTO THE BACKGROUND. THEY ARGUED THAT LINKAGE WAS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT THEY WERE THEMSELVES CREATING A LINK BETWEEN THE POSTPONEMENT OF A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND THE SOLVING OF THE GULF CRISIS. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE NOW INSISTING ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF IRAQ. ON 28 OCTOBER THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID THAT THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ MUST GO ON UNTIL ALL ITS CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. SHE HAD OBVIOUSLY DECIDED TAHT IRAQ HAD OBTAINED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ACQUIRED BY ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL WAS APPLYING DUAL STANDARDS IN THE REGION.

6. TURNING TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AL-ANBARI SAID THAT PART A HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PART B BY THE NON-ALIGNED. IRAQ WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TWO SEPARATE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS SO THAT EACH STATE COULD MAKE PLAIN ITS AGGRESSIVE OR PEACEFUL LONG-TERM INTENTIONS. WHILE IRAQ WELCOMED THE APPEAL FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN PART B, IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO LIMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE RESOLUTION IMPLIED THAT HIS GOOD OFFICES COULD ONLY BEAR FRUIT IF IRAQ CAPITULATED. THE RESOLUTION COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ, WHEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE SUFFERING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BLOCKADE. THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE THE TRUE HOSTAGES IN THIS SITUATION. THE COUNCIL WAS NOT COMPETENT TO RULE ON COMPENSATION ARISING FROM A CONFLICT. THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO RECOMMEND WAYS FOR THE FORMER

COLONIAL POWERS TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THEIR FORMER COLONIES.

7. ABULHASAN (KUWAIT) SAID IRAQ HAD VIOLATED EVERY LETTER OF THE CHARTER AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT INVADED KUWAIT. IRAQ COULD NOT TALK ABOUT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DECEIVED ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL LEADERS BY HOLDING ONLY ONE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH KUWAIT HOURS BEFORE HIS FORCES INVADED THE COUNTRY. PRIMAKOV'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD HAD LED TO THE VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEING PUT OFF. BUT IRAQ WAS ONLY TRYING TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE AGAINST IT AND PRIMAKOV HAD COME AWAY EMPTY-HANDED. AL-ANBARI HAD NOT MENTIONED KUWAIT ONCE DURING HIS SPEECH.

8. IN A STATEMENT BEFORE THE VOTE TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) SAID IRAQ HAD REJECTED THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARAB LEAGUE TO SOLVE THE CRISIS BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE COUNCIL HAD SHOWN ITS FLEXIBILITY BY DEFERRING THE VOTE ON 27 OCTOBER, BUT PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY IRAQI INTRANSIGENCE.

9. VOTING THEN TOOK PLACE AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AS SCR 674 BY 13 VOTES TO NONE WITH TWO ABSTENTIONS (YEMEN AND CUBA).

10. IN A STATEMENT AFTER THE VOTE AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE RESOLUTION DID NOT GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FULL FREEDOM TO TAKE INITIATIVES INDEPENDENTLY. THE RESOLUTION INCLUDED OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON STATES WHICH WISHED TO MAKE EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THOSE WHO WISHED TO DESTROY THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF IRAQ WERE WORKING TO SUPPORT THE EXPANSIONIST POLICIES OF ISRAEL. THESE STATES WANTED TO MAKE THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE REGION PERMANENT. YEMEN HAD LOST DOLLARS 1.4 BILLION BY IMPLEMENTING SCR 661 AND MORE THAN ONE MILLION YEMENIS HAD LEFT NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND LOST ALL THEIR PROPERTY. YEMEN WAS A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

11. ALARCON (CUBA) MADE SARCASTIC REFERENCE TO THE WAY THE COUNCIL HAD JUGGLED WITH NUMERALS, LETTERS AND ASTERISKS IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE RESOLUTION. WHILE ALL THIS HAD BEEN GOING ON THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO SEND ANOTHER 100,000 SOLDIERS TO THE REGION. THE STATES DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES IN THE REGION HAD STILL NOT PRODUCED THE FIRST REPORT CALLED FOR UNDER PARAGRAPH 4 OF SCR 665. THE RESOLUTION ITSELF MADE THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MORE DIFFICULT AND THE COUNCIL HAD NO POWER TO DECIDE ON QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN

DILATORY ABOUT DEALING WITH ARTICLE 50 APPLICATIONS WHERE IT DID HAVE OBLIGATIONS. THE VIOLATION OF KUWAITI HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN BUT CUBA OBJECTED TO THE ''IMPERIAL AIR'' WITH WHICH OTHERS USED THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

12. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION REPRESENTED A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO CLOSE THE DOOR ON DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 12. SOME WOULD HAVE LIKED THIS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT THE COUNCIL HAD GREAT FAITH IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IRAQ SHOULD START WORKING WITH THE EXISTING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT MUST SEND THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

13. ANET (COTE D'IVOIRE) CONGRATULATED ME ON RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE. THE TEXT ADOPTED SHOWED THE COHESION OF THE COUNCIL IN DEMANDING IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT : SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 674 ADOPTED ON 29 OCTOBER:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) AND 670 (1990)

STRESSING THE URGENT NEED FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT, FOR THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND OF THE AUTHORITY OF ITS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT,

CONDEMNING THE ACTIONS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AND OCCUPYING FORCES TO TAKE THIRD STATE NATIONALS HOSTAGE AND TO MISTREAT AND OPPRESS KUWAITI AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS, AND THE OTHER ACTIONS REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL SUCH AS THE DESTRUCTION OF KUWAITI DEMOGRAPHIC RECORDS, FORCED DEPARTURE TO KUWAITIS, AND RELOCATION OF POPULATION IN KUWAIT AND THE UNLAWFUL DESTRUCTION AND SEIZURE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN KUWAIT INCLUDING HOSPITAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, IN VIOLATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

EXPRESSING GRAVE ALARM OVER THE SITUATION OF NATIONALS OF THIRD STATES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS OF SUCH STATES,

REAFFIRMING THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIES TO KUWAIT AND THAT AS A HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY TO THE CONVENTION IRAQ IS BOUND TO

COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL ITS TERMS AND IN PARTICULAR IS LIABLE UNDER THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE GRAVE BREACHES COMMITTED BY IT, AS ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMIT OR ORDER THE COMMISSION OF GRAVE BREACHES,

RECALLING THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT,

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE ECONOMIC COST, AND AT THE LOSS AND SUFFERING CAUSED TO INDIVIDUALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ AS A RESULT OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ,

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

REAFFIRMING THE GOAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF MAINTAINING AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY BY SEEKING TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS,

RECALLING ALSO THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL HAVE PLAYED IN THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

ALARMED BY THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, DIRECTLY THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND SEEKING TO AVOID ANY FURTHER WORSENING OF THE SITUATION,

CALLING UPON IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990),

REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY MAXIMUM USE OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MEANS,

A

1. DEMANDS THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AND OCCUPYING FORCES IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST FROM TAKING THIRD STATE NATIONALS HOSTAGE, AND MISTREATING AND OPPRESSING KUWAITI AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS, AND FROM ANY OTHER ACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL AND DESCRIBED ABOVE, VIOLATING THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR

RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:

2. INVITES STATES TO COLLATE SUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION IN THEIR POSSESSION OR SUBMITTED TO THEM ON THE GRAVE BREACHES BY IRAQ AS PER PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AND TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL:
3. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS, UNDER THE CHARTER, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND COUSULAR RELATIONS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL:
4. REAFFIRMS FURTHER ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ PERMIT AND FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ OF THOSE THIRD STATE NATIONALS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL, WHO WISH TO LEAVE:
5. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO FOOD, WATER AND BASIC SERVICES NECCASSARY TO THE PROTECTION AND WELL BEING OF KUWAITI NATIONALS AND OF NATIONALS OF THIRD STATES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT:
6. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY PROTECT THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL AND PREMISES IN KUWAIT AND IN IRAQ, TAKE NO ACTION TO HINDER THESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR NATIONALS AND THE PROTECTION OF THEIR PERSON AND INTERESTS AND RESCIND ITS ORDERS FOR THE CLOSURE OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMMUNITY OF THEIR PERSONNEL:
7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES CONCERNING THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, TO SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF PARAGRAPHS 4, 5 AND 6 AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISION OF FOOD, WATER AND BASIC SERVICES TO KUWAITI NATIONALS AND TO THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE EVACUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS:
8. REMINDS IRAQ THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IT IS LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS, DAMAGE OR INJURY ARISING IN REGARD TO KUWAIT AND THIRD STATES,

AND THEIR NATIONALS AND CORPORATIONS, AS A RESULT OF THE INVASION AND ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ:

9. INVITES STATES TO COLLECT RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR CLAIMS, AND THOSE OF THEIR NATIONALS AND CORPORATIONS, FOR RESTITUTION OR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION BY IRAQ WITH A VIEW TO SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW:

10. REQUIRES THAT IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS, FAILING WHICH THE COUNCIL WILL NEED TO TAKE FURTHER MEASURES UNDER THE CHARTER:

11. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY AND PERMANENTLY SEIZED OF THE MATTER UNTIL KUWAIT HAS REGAINED ITS INDEPENDANCE AND PEACE HAS BEEN RESTORED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

B

12. REPOSES ITS TRUST IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE AVAILABLE HIS GOOD OFFICES AND, AS HE CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE, TO PURSUE THEM AND UNDERTAKE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN ORDER TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990), AND CALLS ON ALL STATES, BOTH THOSE IN THE REGION AND OTHERS, TO PURSUE ON THIS BASIS THEIR EFFORTS TO THIS END, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND RESTORE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY:

13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE RESULTS OF HIS GOOD OFFICES AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

ENDS

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

38

ADVANCE~~38~~ 36

IRAQ/KUWAIT
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010
IN CONFIDENCE

cc PK
②



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 October 1990

Dear Charles,

Handwritten mark

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials CD 30/12

Call on the Foreign Secretary by Mr Gerald Kaufman

Mr Gerald Kaufman called this afternoon on the Foreign Secretary at the suggestion of the Foreign Secretary. They spoke on a Privy Counsellor basis.

The Foreign Secretary gave Mr Kaufman an account of various aspects of the Gulf crisis, although without telling him anything that he did not know already. Mr Kaufman said that he believed the Labour leadership should be able to keep the party reasonably supportive of the Government's line. He thought that the 35 votes against the Government during the parliamentary debate in September were about five short of the total of those in the Labour Party who strongly disagreed with the Government's policy. At the Labour Party Conference he had tried to keep open the possibility of the military option, without the party becoming committed to any particular sort of United Nations cover. He and Mr Kinnock would like to keep the Labour Party on board in the event of the military option materialising, but that would depend to a certain extent on the level of support at the United Nations. This need not necessarily be a resolution, but Mr Kaufman implied that some sort of UN support would be necessary.

The Foreign Secretary also explained to Mr Kaufman where we stood on hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, and what we were doing to help the families. Mr Kaufman listened without comment.



I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office) and to Murdo Maclean (Government Chief Whip's Office).

*Yours,
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

IN CONFIDENCE

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3085 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Telex Riyadh to FCO 29/10/90	
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TEMPORARILY RETAINED	 13/12/16
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27a-b

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: GULF

You have a regular meeting of Ministers tomorrow to consider developments in the Gulf. The main subjects which you will want to cover are:

DIPLOMATIC

Activity at the United Nations

3 weeks

The Resolution dealing with compensation should go through tonight, after the vote was postponed at the Soviet's request. There are no immediate plans for further resolutions, although the Americans are continuing to show interest in returning to the UN for authority to use force.

European Council

The European Council in Rome agreed very satisfactory statements on the Gulf and on hostages. There may be questions in Parliament about whether the latter statement should be seen as a criticism of Mr. Heath.

Soviet activities

We do not yet have an account of Mr. Primakov's meetings in Baghdad, although the impression given to the media is that he did not get anywhere. But following his meeting in Paris with President Mitterrand, President Gorbachev said unhelpfully that a military solution must be avoided and the right way forward was for a conference of Arab countries to discuss the problem. The Russians are clearly still unreliable on this whole subject.

Meeting with Prince Bandar

You might mention your meeting today with Prince Bandar. His main concern was to encourage you to press the Americans not to

delay any longer before deciding on the military option. He mentioned 5-15 December as the period when action ought to be initiated.

Sanctions

There continues to be a steady stream of reports of breaches of sanctions. The Yugoslavs are among the worst offenders. There are also reports of aircraft from a number of countries, notably Sudan and Belgium, who file flight plans for Jordan, then change them to Iraq while in mid-flight.

The Iraqis have cancelled petrol rationing. It is not clear whether this is just a piece of bravado to show that sanctions are not working, or means that they have overcome problems they faced with the supply of additives for the refining process.

Hostages

The French hostages were due to return to France today. The suspicion remains that the French have struck some sort of deal: the aircraft bringing them is returning with medical and other supplies.

The Defence Secretary met the wives of members of the British Liaison Team in Kuwait and did not have a very easy time.

Burden-sharing

Chancellor Kohl told you in Rome that he would be replying positively to your letter about sharing the costs of our military deployment, and that the details should subsequently be discussed between Teltschik and me.

Secretary Baker's visit

Secretary Baker is to visit Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf from 3 November and will then be in Europe from 6 to 8 November. He wants to come here early on 7 November but we are

saying this is impossible and he must make it 8 November (you have the Debate on the Address on 7 November).

President Mitterrand's views

President Mitterrand took a robust line in discussion with you in Rome saying that France was prepared to use military force and that he expected this to be necessary during the autumn/winter.

MILITARY

Military Staff Committee

The Military Staff Committee was due to meet this afternoon in New York. We should have an account by the time of your meeting.

American deployments

*Reports - don't take
up further discussion*

General Scowcroft told me at the end of last week that the Americans were thinking of sending two more divisions. The necessary tanks were already on the way. He expected the additional forces to be in place by early December (rather than the late January which CDS had reported at the last meeting).

7 Armoured Brigade

7 Armoured Brigade was due to complete its arrival in Saudi Arabia today and will now need a period of about two weeks to become acclimatised and work up. You will want to satisfy yourself that work is in hand to identify possible replacements if they are needed.

CDS?

C. D. POWELL

29 October 1990

a:\foreign\gulf (kk)

MR GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PARIS: 29 OCTOBER

Mr Gorbachev himself has said that international solidarity is vital and that Iraq should not be given grounds to hope that there will be any weakening of the international community's resolve.

*Further SC
resolutions
today*

The international community is clear that the aim must be the full and unconditional implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. Saddam Hussain must not be allowed to gain from his aggression. This means:-

- Unconditional and complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- The restoration of the legitimate government.
- The release of all the hostages.

We hope that the pressure of sanctions will persuade Saddam Hussain to comply, but it would be wrong to rule out other options, including military action.

[If necessary]

Not clear what inter-Arab mechanism Mr Gorbachev was talking about. The Arab League failed in its efforts to find a solution as have several Arab leaders.

Saudi Arabia has been in the vanguard of those opposing the Iraqi invasion. Not clear what initiative Mr Gorbachev hopes they will take. The Saudis have told us that Prince Sultan's remarks last week were not intended to imply that they would accept a partial withdrawal: their position remains firm. GCC has vowed no concessions or solutions outside UN Security Council Resolutions.

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary saw Mr Primakov last week. No sign then that his talks in Iraq had resulted in any progress. Important that Saddam Hussain should not be given an opportunity to drive wedges within the alliance. We note that President Mitterrand did not endorse Gorbachev's call for an inter-Arab meeting.

Secret talks?

CC2AAG *David Keen would be referring to.*

[Unattributable]

It is worth noting that ad hoc consultations of the Military Staff Committee are taking place today in New York at Soviet suggestion.



SUBJECT CC MASTER

25a-b

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1990

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

Prince Bandar came to see the Prime Minister this morning on his way back to Saudi Arabia from Washington. The clear if unstated purpose of his call was to encourage the Prime Minister to put pressure on the Americans to take military action against Iraq soon. That apart, he had relatively little to say, although I am writing separately about two or three matters.

Prince Bandar started with some highly critical remarks about the French (fairly obviously designed to curry favour with the Prime Minister in the wake of the European Council in Rome). The French forces in Saudi Arabia were pretty much of a rag-bag, mainly Cambodians and wanted criminals. The French were very macho as long as there was no risk of their actually having to fight. But they refused to allow their forces to be counted into General Schwarzkopf's military planning, and were engaged in moving them further back from the front line. King Fahd was very unhappy with the French posture on Iraq/Kuwait, and was convinced that they had done a deal to secure the release of their hostages in Iraq.

Prince Bandar was no less disparaging of Mr. Primakov's peace mission to Baghdad. Thankfully it seemed to have come to nothing. Primakov was about to visit Saudi Arabia. He (Bandar) had met him in Washington and had not at all liked the cut of his jib. His basic argument was absurd. If you could secure a settlement of the whole Arab/Israel problem by invading Kuwait, Saudi Arabia would be in there tomorrow. But he would be inclined to think that Gorbachev had gone along with Primakov's mission simply to show that the Russians had tried everything to avert hostilities, if they did eventually break out.


Prince Bandar said that Secretary Baker would be visiting Saudi Arabia on 3 November. He understood he would pass through London on his way back. He hoped the Prime Minister would take the opportunity to see him and try to stiffen him. He was still hankering after a further UN resolution to authorise the use of force and was responsible for the continued hesitation in American policy. The purpose must now be to get the President to set a firm date for military action. The Saudis favoured the period 5-15 December. The Prime Minister said we shared reservations about a return to the United Nations. Experience

over the resolution on compensation showed just how much delay this could involve. There was only a limited window during which military action could be undertaken and she had urged the President not to miss that. She thought the point was well understood. But the Americans were very anxious to have everything in place before they made a move, and further forces and tanks were on their way from Germany. Prince Bandar said it was very important that this message should be clearly understood in Washington and he hoped the Prime Minister would reinforce it. All the indications were that Saddam Hussain still thought that hostilities would not break out. America's liberals were convincing him that a peace movement was growing apace in the United States, that the President had been seriously weakened by the budget dispute and that the French were working for a negotiated solution. We had to counter this.

Prince Bandar said that the second Egyptian division was due to start arriving today and that the Syrians were also finally about to move. The only cloud on the horizon was a fear among the Arab governments ranged against Iraq that the United States would back away from military action. The Prime Minister said it would be wrong to question American resolve. She was sure the President understood exactly what was at stake.

There was also a brief exchange on the role of the press should hostilities break out, with the Prime Minister counselling extreme caution. They must not be allowed to file reports until after action had taken place, otherwise there was the risk they would leak our plans. Prince Bandar said that the Saudis could help contrive this, for example by suspending the availability of facilities such as satellite communications. The Prime Minister said they would simply slip over to Bahrain. Prince Bandar said that perhaps we would have to jam the Western media as well as Iraqi broadcasts.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

Your sincerely,


CHARLES POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE



SUBJECT CE MAST6A

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1990

Der Steph.

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BBC

When Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia saw the Prime Minister this morning, he complained about the BBC Arabic Service's broadcasts to the Gulf about the Iraq/Kuwait crisis. Many people in the area listened to the BBC and it was shocking that the content of some of the broadcasts was hard to distinguish from Radio Baghdad. The BBC Arabic Service seemed to be contaminated by Palestinians and Sudanese. At the least it ought to take a neutral line rather than a positively hostile one. He hoped the Prime Minister would have some enquiries made. The Prime Minister said that she would ask the Foreign Secretary to let her have a report.

CHARLES POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



File

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 October, 1990.

De Stephen.

THE GULF: MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV

The Prime Minister has agreed to sign a message to President Gorbachev about Mr. Primakov's mission to the Middle East. I enclose the version which she has signed, and should be grateful if it could be delivered as soon as possible. You might also ask the Embassy in Washington to give General Scowcroft a copy at my request.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

file
to

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T238/90

SUBJECT α MASTER
OPS

27 October, 1990.

Dear Mr. President

I was glad to have the opportunity to talk to Mr. Primakov on 20 October. His account of what he learned in Baghdad was valuable, but disturbing. Saddam Hussein's attitude gives me little confidence that he understands the realities of the situation.

According to Mr. Primakov, Saddam Hussein is trying to portray himself as under threat, and needing some face saver in order to withdraw. Mr. Primakov said that he was left with the impression that some "flexible linkage" with the Arab Israeli problem might secure Iraqi agreement to withdraw. This cannot be: Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to bargain over withdrawal. The international community has demanded complete withdrawal through a mandatory Security Council Resolution. It is not a matter for negotiation. Saddam Hussein must not benefit from his aggression, otherwise we shall encourage his political ambitions, and he will remain a threat to the rest of the region. He must be allowed no choice but unconditional withdrawal.

Talk of face savers or negotiated settlements will simply encourage him to hang on, in the illusion that time is on his side. Such talk also gives encouragement to those who seek to undermine the unity of the international community. I made these points to Mr. Primakov.

We have all admired the strong position which the Soviet Union has adopted towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Your

41

role has been crucial in maintaining the unanimity of the Five Permanent Members and of the Security Council as a whole. It is of the utmost importance that the international consensus ranged against Saddam Hussein remains united and steadfast. We have seen only this week how the Iraqis are trying to exploit the hostage issue to drive wedges between European countries. We intend to resist this firmly.

I hope you will feel able to use your channels of communication to Saddam Hussein to continue to convey the simple message that the world will not let him win, and that no compromise is available on the Security Council requirements. I hope in particular that Mr. Primakov will do so when he returns to Baghdad. I believe Saddam Hussein may listen to a message from Moscow.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. M.S. Gorbachev



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1990

J S Wall LVO
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

See Stephen.

THE GULF: BURDEN-SHARING

The Prime Minister had a brief word with Chancellor Kohl before the start of the European Council this evening. Chancellor Kohl said that he would shortly be replying to the Prime Minister's letter about burden-sharing. The tone of the reply would be positive, although it would be cast in rather general terms. He proposed that details should subsequently be sorted out between me and Herr Teltschik. He thought the Prime Minister would be well satisfied. The Prime Minister said that she was extremely grateful for this and looked forward to receiving the letter.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (Treasury) and Sir Robin Butler (Cabinet Office).

*Your man,
C D Powell*

C D Powell

24a-5

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

Prince Bandar is coming to see you on Monday morning at his own request. You last saw him in New York with Prince Saud.

You will want to hear what he has to say about Prince Sultan's comments on the scope for negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. It seems that he was mis-reported by the Press: but some unease nonetheless lingers that the Saudis might be up to something. This is reinforced by Saddam Hussein's comment to Mr. Heath (which you should not of course repeat) that Iraq was in direct contact with Saudi Arabia. Clearly you will not want to give Prince Bandar the impression that we have any lack of confidence in them. So I suggest you tackle the subject obliquely by referring to your displeasure at Primakov's activities, and by making your point that you are not prepared to order British soldiers to fight to recover anything less than the whole of Kuwait.

You should also have something to report to him from the discussions in Rome, with luck a good robust statement. You will not want to conceal from him some worries as to whether all the Europeans are as robust as we are. You might also get his assessment of whether the Arab coalition against Iraq can continue to hold together for the next two or three months. How can we all discourage them from pursuing unsatisfactory compromise solutions?

You will no doubt want to touch on Jordan. The breakdown between Saudi Arabia and Jordan seems irreversible. But we think King Hussein is now doing his best to apply sanctions: and we continue to assess that any alternative to him would be worse.

Prince Bandar, for his part, may encourage you to take another initiative to restore relations with Syria. He has already been on to me about this, arguing that Syrian participation in the Arab coalition against Iraq is of absolute crucial importance,

and we should do everything possible to maintain it. He is likely to offer his own good offices to help. You might take the line that you understand the strategic arguments for getting back on terms with Syria: but our attempt to do so was rebuffed, and we regard the ball as in the Syrian court. We would be prepared to receive a Syrian representative here at an appropriately high level if Bandar could organise this - although it would be best to pre-cook the outcome of a visit, so there would be no question of disappointed hopes.

The FCO want you to raise the question of British journalists in Saudi Arabia. I doubt you will have much appetite for this: but it does appear that, largely for bureaucratic reasons, our journalists are being given less favourable treatment than those from the United States and France. You might simply ask Prince Bandar to see if there is anything which he can do to ease the situation.

Finally, I should report that the Chairman and Chief Executive of Westland Helicopters came to see me the other day. They reckon they have excellent export opportunities for Saudi Arabia and the UAE for Black Hawk, and that this has the support of Prince Bandar. But nothing is happening because BAe control the flow of funding for project Al Yamamah, and ensure that the money goes in the first instance to Tornado, Hawk and other BAe interests. A clear signal from you that we would welcome an early decision by the Saudis to acquire Black Hawk from Westland, and to make the necessary funds available (particularly now that oil revenues are so much up), might help unblock the road for Westland.

C.D.P.
CHARLES D. POWELL

26 OCTOBER 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\Bandar.MRM



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SWIA 2AH

26 October 1990

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Prince Bandar

Prince Bandar will call on the Prime Minister at his request at 1115 on Monday 29 October. I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister on 1 October, which Prince Bandar attended. The central issue for the meeting is likely to be a review of recent signs of wobbling in the coalition against Iraq, and of how best to counter Iraqi wedge-driving tactics.

There has been a disturbing resurgence of mediatory activity. Primakov has visited Cairo and plans to travel to Damascus, Amman and Baghdad again in the course of a further tour of the region. Egyptian officials have described Primakov as appearing subdued by his reception in London: he told the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow that the Prime Minister had spoken more forcefully even than the Americans. But the signs are that he is continuing to explore the scope to find a face-saver for Saddam Hussain.

In a separate development the Algerian Foreign Minister is to visit Cairo and Riyadh on 25-8 October amidst speculation that he will sound out Egypt and Saudi Arabia on a possible mediation effort by the President of Algeria. The sense of wobble has not been helped by the reports that the Saudi Defence Minister had indicated the possibility of territorial concessions to Iraq after a withdrawal from Kuwait. Despite the rapid denial (repeated by Prince Bandar to US Secretary of State Baker on 23 October) a lingering impression has been created that there has been some debate within the house of Saud about the possibility of making concessions to Iraq.

Amongst Western members of the coalition, strains have begun to appear over how to respond to Iraqi wedge-driving over release of hostages of different nationalities. Some EC Partners (Germany, Denmark) are under pressure to send envoys to negotiate the release of their nationals and the matter is likely to be discussed at the informal European Council over the weekend. Mr Heath's mission to secure the release of sick and elderly British hostages has doubtless increased the

/domestic

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domestic pressure on these governments, although German officials have indicated that Chancellor Kohl has sought to defer a similar visit by Willy Brandt at least for the time being. Sweden's action in sending a government envoy, which has reportedly ended in agreement to release five of the ninety Swedish hostages, has been criticised, notably by the Danes. France has made clear that the release of all French detainees was a unilateral Iraqi decision and is considered by the French government as no more than a step towards the liberation of all hostages which will in no sense affect the French approach to the crisis. Two Greek opposition PASOK party politicians have gone to Baghdad to seek the release of Greek hostages.

Against this background the Prime Minister may wish to tell Prince Bandar of the firm line taken with Primakov in London and to be taken at the informal European Council this weekend. Noting the prompt refutation of the misreporting of Prince Sultan's comments, she might seek his advice about what practical steps might be taken to stiffen resistance to the proponents of partial solutions and to ensure that there is no sliding away from the firm provisions of the Security Council Resolutions.

In particular, the Prime Minister might seek Prince Bandar's reading of the mood among Arab states. The Saudis were instrumental in securing the 11:10 decision of the Arab League not to criticise the United States at the Foreign Ministers' meeting following the Temple Mount shootings. But this issue is set to further complicate efforts to keep the focus at the United Nations on Iraq/Kuwait. We have made clear our commitment to renew efforts to resolve the Palestinian question after the crisis is resolved. What can the Saudis and their friends in the Arab world do to keep the focus on the need to deal with Saddam Hussain? Can they keep a majority in the Arab League and amongst the Arab group in New York? What are the prospects for successfully discouraging President Chadli of Algeria from pursuing compromise solutions, as King Hassan has been?

The breakdown in relations between Saudi Arabia and Jordan looks irredeemable. The Prime Minister might nevertheless wish to affirm to Prince Bandar that we believe Jordan is now making genuine efforts to implement sanctions, and that Jordan should be a priority for economic assistance. We remain convinced that any alternative to King Hussein would be disastrous - not least for Saudi Arabia.

The Prime Minister might ask Prince Bandar for his assessment of Saudi relations with Yemen and of Yemeni performance on sanctions breaking. Public criticism of each other by the two countries appears to be growing. What is the objective of Saudi policy towards Yemen?

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Prince Bandar may revert to the question of restoring relations with Syria, raised by Prince Saud with the Prime Minister on 1 October, and repeat his offer of Saudi assistance. If he does, the Prime Minister might say that we should like to have normal relations with Syria, but need to resolve the substantive problems of Syrian involvement in terrorism. Following recent unsatisfactory contacts, the ball is in the Syrian court.

It would be helpful if the Prime Minister raised the recent restrictions placed by the Saudi authorities on visas for British journalists covering Operation Granby. A number of journalists already in Saudi Arabia have been asked to leave, just as the Seventh Armoured Brigade started to arrive. Representations by the Embassy in Riyadh and with the Saudi Ambassador here have succeeded in getting a ruling from the King that there should be no overall reduction (but no increase either) in the 42 strong British press corps. But problems remain over the implementation of the rules by the Ministry of Information, who are insisting on rotation of journalists within the ceilings set by the King, and with the Saudi Embassy in London which is slower and less flexible on this question than the Embassies in Paris and Washington. The situation is set out in Riyadh telno 1080 (copy attached).

Our aim is to ensure that British journalists are able to renew their visas, or else to be replaced by colleagues as their editors wish. Saudi sensitivities mean that all decisions on media access are taken at very senior levels. The Ambassador in Riyadh has recommended that the issue be raised with Prince Bandar, whose own Embassy in Washington is apparently able to deliver a smoother operation for American journalists.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), who is providing separate briefing on defence equipment sales.

Simon Webb
S L Gass
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

*Mr. Elton 3/10
Date 1 Oct 4/x
3/10*

*Mr. Young, EU (23)
12660
cc PS
PS / Mr. Hildegarde
PS/PUS
Mr. Fairweather
Mr. Gore - South
Mr. Fuller, WENAD.*

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Dear Jeffrey,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a meeting in New York this afternoon with the Saudi Foreign Minister. Prince Saud was accompanied by Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington.

The Gulf

Prince Saud complimented the Prime Minister on her interviews on early morning television and the severity with which she had ruled out negotiations. This was exactly the right line to take. President Mitterrand's speech at the UN had been a hornet's nest, although he now seemed to be backing away from it. Luckily the Iraqis, instead of trying to exploit the speech, had jumped all over it. But Mitterrand was not the only one: he had himself seen Signor Andreotti earlier in the day and found him casting around for some negotiated solution. The truth was only military strength and the prospect of a confrontation would get Saddam Hussain out of Kuwait. The Prime Minister said she was doubtful whether he would leave even then. Prince Saud said that he might do so, if he was isolated and if we had enough force and the will to use it. Saddam Hussain was gambling that the Western countries would not be prepared to make sacrifices to recover Kuwait. Prince Saud commented that it was a positive development to have Russians aboard. Although they might not openly approve the use of force, at least they would not try to prevent it. The Prime Minister commented that they needed the West too much for that.

The Prime Minister said there was still not enough effective counter-propaganda against Iraq. She had discussed this with the Amir of Kuwait and understood that the Iraqis were jamming foreign broadcasts to both Kuwait and Iraq. Prince Bandar said the thing was to broadcast on Iraqi frequencies with a more powerful transmitter and drown them out.

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Prince Saud continued that the picture in the Arab world was improving. The countries standing with Saudi Arabia were sending more forces. The Syrians were ready to send another division, as were the Egyptians. There had been a positive response, too, from several West African countries. He had talked to the Iranians in New York and was reasonably confident they would not exploit Islamic emotions over the presence of foreign troops.

Relations with Syria

Prince Saud said that he had a plea to make to the Prime Minister and that was to ask the United Kingdom should restore relations with Syria. The Syrians had done extraordinary service to the Saudi cause in the Gulf and were playing a vital role with the Iranians. It would be very helpful if Britain could get back into contact with them. The Prime Minister intimated that we had taken some discreet steps in that direction, but the response had been very disappointing. Prince Bandar said that it would be better to have told the Saudis first and they could have arranged things. Prince Saud urged that we should not give up but should make a further attempt, allowing the Saudis to prepare the ground for this. The Prime Minister said that she would discuss this with the Foreign Secretary.

Al Yamamah Project

Prince Saud said that King Fahd had instructed him to tell the Prime Minister formally that newspaper speculation that the defence contracts which Saudi Arabia was placing with the United States would be at the expense of Al Yamamah were absolutely not true. If anything, Saudi Arabia was likely to ask for more equipment under Al Yamamah. We should give no credence to the stories.

British forces in the Gulf

The Prime Minister gave an account of the additional forces we were sending to the Gulf. Prince Bandar asked when they would be ready for action. The Prime Minister said they should be in place and operational by the first half of November. Prince Bandar said that we ought to be ready for military action against Iraq as soon as possible thereafter. Prince Saud commented while adding that the Iranians were passing on very useful information about the chemical weapons used by the Iraqis.

Jordan

Prince Saud asked whether the Prime Minister had been in contact with the Jordanians. The Prime Minister said she had seen Crown Prince Hassan but had not found him very helpful. She thought the Jordanians were now genuinely trying to apply sanctions. She was not sure that King Hussein had been fully apprised of some of the earlier breaches. Prince Saud said that the King was still acting as an apologist for Saddam Hussain. What the Saudis found hardest to forgive was the way he was consorting with Palestinian extremists and giving them credibility. The Prime Minister said it would nonetheless be

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very unfortunate if we were to lose King Hussein. Prince Saud said that Saudi Arabia would be ready to help him if he got back on to the right track. Prince Bandar commented that King Hussein had pulled off a remarkable feat of alienating the four countries of the world which were most important to Jordan: the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Prince Saud concluded that, overall, the situation in the Arab world was turning and getting better.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), John Gieve (H.M. Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,
Chris Jones

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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EVENING STANDARD, DAILY MIRROR) WISH TO SEND THE SAME JOURNALISTS BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE COVERING THE STORY: OTHERS WANT TO CHANGE.

7. DH WILL SPEAK TO AL FARSI AS SOON AS HE IS BACK AND WE WILL TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE EXACT ARRANGEMENTS. ONCE THESE ARE AGREED IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO PUSH SAUDI AMBASSADOR ONCE AGAIN, OR FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE SAUDI EMBASSY IS AU FAIT WITH PROCEDURES.

8. SINCE DICTATING ABOVE I HAVE HEARD THAT PRINCE BANDAR MAY BE IN LONDON NEXT WEEK. IT WOULD BE WORTH RAISING THIS WITH HIM, AND MIGHT INDEED BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF LACK OF CONCERN IF WE DO NOT, GIVEN THE LEVEL AT WHICH WE HAVE LOBBIED HERE.

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OUR TELNO 1070: UK JOURNALISTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY

1. LETTER SENT TO MINISTER OF INFORMATION. ASSURANCE FROM THE KING THAT BRITISH PRESS CORPS SHOULD NOT DECREASE IN NUMBERS. WE WILL TRY TO DISCUSS DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WITH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. JOURNALISTS WHOSE VISAS EXPIRE WELL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE REPLACED, OR RETURN TO THE UK AND APPLY FOR NEW VISAS THERE. MATTER MERITS FURTHER HIGH LEVEL ACTION IN LONDON.

DETAIL

2. ON 22 OCTOBER, AS I HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY TO OUR EARLIER DEMARCHES, I WROTE TO THE INFORMATION MINISTER IN JEDDA, REITERATING UK MINISTERS' CONCERN THAT BRITISH PRESS PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS TO BE DIMINISHED, AND INDICATING THE LIKELY EFFECT OF THIS ON UK PUBLIC OPINION. WHILE IN JEDDAH SUBSEQUENTLY I WAS ABLE TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH MOHAMMED SULIMAN, THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY. SULIMAN LATER CALLED ME TO SAY HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH THE KING WHO HAD RULED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF BRITISH JOURNALISTS HERE (CURRENTLY 42), BUT THAT EQUALLY NO INCREASE WAS POSSIBLE EITHER. A SYSTEM OF ROTATION WAS NECESSARY AND THIS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. I ARGUED THAT ROTATION MADE NO PARTICULAR SENSE. SULIMAN WAS NOT TO BE MOVED (I SUSPECT THE SAUDIS ARE CONCERNED THAT JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN HERE A WHILE WILL LOSE INTEREST IN THE FRONT AND BEGIN TO WRITE ABOUT MORE SENSITIVE ISSUES).

3. I SPOKE TO JAMJOOM, ASSISTANT DEPUTY INFORMATION MINISTER, FOLLOWING THIS. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BUT INDICATED THAT VISAS WERE STILL BEING HELD UP BY HIS SUPERIORS. HE BELIEVED THE BEST WAY FORWARD WAS TO SPEAK TO FOUAD AL FARSI, DEPUTY INFORMATION MINISTER (WHO IS IN LONDON UNTIL 27 OCTOBER), ABOUT MODALITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE KING'S RULING. I SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED SULIMAN TO HELP US UNBLOCK VISAS: HE SAID HE WOULD FOLLOW UP.

4. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN AGAIN TO PRINCE KHALID BIN SAUD AT THE MFA WHO AGREED TO PUT PRINCE SAUD AL FAISAL IN THE PICTURE.

COMMENT

5. THE KING'S RULING IS USEFUL IN THAT IT ALLOWS FOR AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF UK PRESSMEN IN THE KINGDOM, SUFFICIENT FOR ALL THE MAJOR PAPERS, TV CHANNELS ETC TO BE REPRESENTED. BUT WE NEED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS INVOLVING BOTH THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THINGS MAY BE MESSY UNTIL DIRECTIVES ARE ISSUED AND THE DILATORY EMBASSY IN LONDON UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO ISSUE VISAS EXPEDITIOUSLY.

6. THE KING'S DECISION MEANS THAT JOURNALISTS HERE WITH EXPIRED VISAS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO RETURN TO LONDON TO MAKE WAY FOR REPLACEMENTS OR GET A NEW VISA THEMSELVES (WE BELIEVE THE LATTER WILL BE POSSIBLE, BUT HAVE NO FIRM PROMISE). WE ARE CURRENTLY ADVISING JOURNALISTS ON THESE LINES WHILE ADDING THAT THE PICTURE SHOULD BE CLEARER IN A FEW DAYS. A GROUP (INCLUDING DAILY MAIL,

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(ROME FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

MY TELNO 2546: IRAQ/KUWAIT:
SUMMARY

1. NO MAJOR CHANGE IN PUBLIC MOOD SINCE TUR BUT CLEAR INDICATIONS OF AN IMMINENT INCREASE IN CURRENT PLANNED LEVELS OF US GROUND FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. DECISION LIKELY TO RAISE PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS WHILE FURTHER DEFERRING ANY DECISION ON USE OF MILITARY OPTION. ADMINISTRATION REMAIN CONCERNED TO KEEP INTERNATIONAL COALITION TOGETHER.

DETAIL

2. INCREASING PUBLIC SPECULATION AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL US TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO THE GULF HAS BEEN GIVEN A FURTHER BOOST THROUGH A TV INTERVIEW WITH CHENEY ON 25 OCTOBER IN WHICH HE DID NOT REJECT A SUGGESTION THAT 100,000 MORE MIGHT BE NEEDED. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED NO UPPER LIMIT HAD BEEN SET FOR GROUND FORCES. THERE MAY BE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF US INTENTIONS SHORTLY, FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM AN INSPECTION TOUR OF THE AREA.

3. IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT FOR SOME TIME NOW THAT WHILE THE AIR BUILDUP WAS COMPLETE, US PLANS FOR THEIR GROUND FORCES WERE STILL EVOLVING, AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT AIR POWER ALONE COULD BRING VICTORY IF IT CAME IN THE END TO AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQ. THE TWO LIGHT DIVISIONS CURRENTLY IN THEATRE AT LEAST WILL BE REPLACED WITH HEAVY ARMoured DIVISIONS ON ROULEMENT. THIS WILL INVOLVE SOME DIVERSION FROM GERMANY. THERE MAY WELL BE FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS IN DUE COURSE: OUR CONTACTS HERE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY OPEN IN EXPRESSING THEIR UNEASE ABOUT THE AMERICAN ABILITY TO EXERCISE THE MILITARY OPTION WITH THE FORCE LEVELS SO FAR CONTEMPLATED.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AT THE PENTAGON TOLD US EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT, DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY, AIR POWER ALONE COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON TO WIN THE CAMPAIGN. SINCE AUGUST THE IRAQIS HAD CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENED AND SKILFULLY DEVELOPED THEIR DEFENCES IN KUWAIT. A COSTLY GROUND BATTLE SEEMED INEVITABLE AND DIA, AT LEAST, WONDERED WHETHER SUFFICIENT FORCES WERE IN PLACE.

4. IF THE ADMINISTRATION CONFIRM THAT THERE IS NOW TO BE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER US BUILDUP, ABOVE THE 220,000 LEVEL THAT THEY HAVE APPARENTLY ENVISAGED UP TO NOW, THERE ARE TWO IMMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN. FIRST, THAT NO US LED OFFENSIVE IS LIKELY UNTIL THE HIGHER LEVEL CAN BE REACHED, PRESUMABLY TOWARDS THE END OF THE YEAR AT THE EARLIEST, AND SECOND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S OPTIONS WILL BE NARROWED BECAUSE OF THE WAY PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS ARE LIKELY TO DEVELOP. BUT I SHOULD NOT WANT TO GO BEYOND THAT FOR THE MOMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION'S DILEMMA IN DECIDING WHAT TO DO IF THERE IS NO REAL SIGN OF A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE IRAQI POSITION OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WILL GET NO EASIER WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME.

5. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR SHIFTS IN PUBLIC MOOD ON THE GULF CRISIS SINCE MY TUR. THERE WERE SMALL ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO AND OTHER CITIES OVER THE WEEKEND OF 20-21 OCTOBER. THEY WERE GIVEN SIGNIFICANT COVERAGE IN THE MEDIA AND THE WIDER AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THEM. BUT THEY WERE SMALL IN NUMBER AND RELATIVELY ISOLATED. AT THIS STAGE AT LEAST THEY DO NOT SUGGEST A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION. SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICIES, ALTHOUGH LESS THAN IT WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, REMAINS PRETTY STEADY, EVEN THOUGH POLLS SUGGEST THAT MOST BELIEVE THE CRISIS WILL END IN WAR. MEANWHILE, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE NOW AGREED A GENERAL FORMULA PROVIDING FOR CONTINUED CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS DURING THE RECESS AND ITS RECALL IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.

6. OVER THE LAST WEEK, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE STARTED TO REACT TO EARLIER CRITICISMS THAT THEY WERE LOSING THEIR WAY ON POLICY TOWARDS THE CRISIS. PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE TRIP TO THE GULF BY THE PRESIDENT, AND TO EUROPE AND THE GULF BY BAKER, IS NOT YET COMPLETE. IF AND WHEN THEY OCCUR IT WILL NOT JUST BE IN THE INTERESTS OF KEEPING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TOGETHER BUT ALSO TO CONVEY A SENSE OF PURPOSE TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF EMPHASIS ON THE LONG HAUL AND RELIANCE ON SANCTIONS (TUR) ALSO SEEMED TO SOME TO HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED BY REMARKS BY WEBSTER (DIRECTOR, CIA) ON 25 OCTOBER TO THE EFFECT THAT SANCTIONS WERE

HAVING LITTLE EFFECT AND THAT THE GULF COULD NOT BE SECURE AS LONG AS SADDAM RETAINED POWER AND MAINTAINED HIS PRESENT ARSENAL. THE PRESS HAVE NOTED THESE REMARKS AS SOME OF THE BLUNTEST BY ANY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. THEY ARE ALSO THE FIRST PUBLIC OFFICIAL REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO GET RID OF SADDAM AND HIS WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT HOWEVER IN FIRMLY REPEATING HIS OBJECTIVES IN VERMONT ON 23 OCTOBER DID NOT GO BEYOND THE AIMS SET OUT BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

7. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT IS AT STAKE HAVE PERHAPS BEEN FURTHER AFFECTED BY INCREASING PRESS COMMENT ON THE STRENGTHENING OF IRAQI FORCES AND DISPOSITIONS IN THE AREA AND MUDDIED BY SPECULATION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL PREEMPTIVE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. PRINCE SULTAN'S SUGGESTION OF A COMPROMISE DEAL WAS THEREFORE DOUBLY UNWELCOME TO THE ADMINISTRATION (PRIMAKOV'S EARLIER VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF THE GROWING TEMPTATION AMONG SOME TO MAKE COMPROMISES WITH SADDAM.) SULTAN'S STATEMENT CAME DURING PRESIDENT BUSH'S CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN SWING THROUGH VERMONT AND HIS REFERENCES THERE TO SADDAM AS QUOTE HITLER REVISITED UNQUOTE SHOULD PROBABLY BE SEEN AS UNDERLINING THE PRESIDENT'S OWN STEADFASTNESS OF PURPOSE IN THE FACE OF APPARENT SAUDI UNCERTAINTY.

8. AS THE EXTENDED MILITARY BUILD-UP CONTINUES, ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE CRISIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AFFECTED BY THEIR ATTEMPTS, IN THE UN AND BEYOND IT, TO RE-DIRECT ATTENTION TOWARDS IRAQ AND AWAY FROM ARAB/ISRAEL. THE REQUIRED BALANCING ACT WILL BE DIFFICULT.

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MY TELNO 1365: IRAQ/KUWAIT: GERMAN ASSISTANCE TO BRITISH FORCES
DEPLOYED TO THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE BRITISH REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE DATING FROM 24 SEPTEMBER. THE SUBMISSION TO KOHL BROADLY SUPPORTS OUR REQUESTS AND WOULD TOTAL SOME DM 100 MILLION IN VALUE. COST HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE HURDLE. THE GERMANS HAVE ALREADY GIVEN CONSIDERABLE AND VALUABLE PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE BEYOND THE ITEMS REQUESTED FORMALLY. A LINE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL THIS WEEKEND.

DETAIL

2. AS BACKGROUND, ON 24 SEPTEMBER I TOOK ACTION WITH THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND FEDERAL CHANCELLERY TO SEEK GERMAN HELP WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF 7 ARMoured BRIGADE TO THE GULF (MY TELNO 1232). AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF THE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED WAS HANDED TO THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (FMOD) ON 25 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 1240). THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A MORE SPECIFIC LIST OF EQUIPMENTS ON 15 OCTOBER (MOD SIGNAL 141656Z OCTOBER).

3. ALTHOUGH INITIALLY FMOD THOUGHT STOLTENBERG WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A QUICK RESPONSE, IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. COINCIDENCE WITH THE PERIOD SURROUNDING GERMAN UNIFICATION WAS UNLUCKY. THE SIZE OF THE GERMAN AID PACKAGE FOR EGYPT, JORDAN AND TURKEY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE US, ANNOUNCED ON 17 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 1195): REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (INCLUDING FRANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA): AND GROWING CONCERN OVER THE COST OF UNIFICATION HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED FURTHER TO COMPLICATING AND DELAYING THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

4. OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT THE FMOD AND

THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE GIVEN BROAD SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH REQUEST, WITH ANY OPPOSITION COMING FROM THE FINANCE MINISTRY. CONTACTS IN FMOD INFORM US THAT ONE TYPE OF REQUESTED EQUIPMENT (THE SKORPION MINELAYER) HAS BEEN EXCLUDED. THE MAJORITY OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTS, HOWEVER, AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF 7 ARMoured BRIGADE WITHIN GERMANY, RECEIVED INTER-MINISTERIAL IN A SUBMISSION TO THE CHANCELLERY ON 19 OCTOBER. THE TOTAL VALUE OF THE SUPPORT FORESEEN IN THE SUBMISSION WAS SOME DM 100 MILLION.

5. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH TELTSCHIK ON 24 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 1360) HE CONFIRMED THAT THE BASIC APPROACH IN THE SUBMISSION WAS POSITIVE BUT HE WAS UNABLE TO ANTICIPATE KOHL'S DECISION ON INDIVIDUAL POINTS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS THE COST OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF HELP. THE VALUE OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE US WAS ANNOUNCED AS DM 1.6 BILLION. AGAINST THAT A FIGURE FOR US OF DM 100 MILLION IS MODEST, BUT THE RATIO OF 16:1 MAY BE CONSIDERED TO REFLECT THE RELATIVE US/UK STRENGTHS IN THE GULF.

6. ALTHOUGH MOST UNHELPFUL ABOUT LOW FLYING, THE FMOD HAS ALREADY PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRAINING FOR 7 ARMoured BRIGADE AND FOR RAF(G) CREWS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF, BY SURRENDERING GERMAN RANGE AND TRAINING AREA BOOKINGS AND LIFTING TRAINING RESTRICTIONS. HELP WAS READILY PROVIDED FOR THE MOVE OF 7 ARMoured BRIGADE'S VEHICLES AND AMMUNITION AND CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY SHOWN OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF SAFETY REGULATIONS. IN ANTICIPATION OF KOHL'S APPROVAL OF PROVISION TO US OF ELEVEN FUCHS NBC RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, SOLDIERS OF 7 ARMoured BRIGADE AND THE RAF REGIMENT ARE BEING TRAINED TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE VEHICLES. AGREEMENT WAS READILY GIVEN TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF LIVEOAK SATCOM TERMINALS PURCHASED WITH GERMAN FUNDS. OTHER IMPORTANT, BUT SENSITIVE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN THE PROVISION OF EX EAST GERMAN T-72 TANKS AND BMP ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS, SUCH AS IRAQ POSSESSES, FOR 7 ARMoured BRIGADE TO EXAMINE AND TO OBSERVE OPERATING TACTICALLY. MIG 29S ARE ALSO BEING MADE AVAILABLE FOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT BY THE RAF, AS ARE GROUND TO AIR RADAR JAMMING SYSTEMS OF THE TYPE HELD BY IRAQ. OUR REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON OTHER TYPES OF EAST AND WEST GERMAN EQUIPMENT HELD BY IRAQ ARE BEING GIVEN TIMELY AND POSITIVE RESPONSES.

7. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR NOW HAS THE SUBMISSION ON OUR REQUESTS. HE MAY BE IN A POSITION, WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES HIM THIS WEEKEND, TO INDICATE THE GENERAL NATURE OF GERMAN DECISIONS. IF KOHL CONFIRMS THAT GERMAN HELP WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL, THE PRIME MINISTER, I SUGGEST, SHOULD THANK HIM AND ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL

ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 October 1990

GULF CRISIS

I spoke to General Scowcroft late this morning to follow-up a couple of points which were made at this morning's meeting of OD(G).

This letter contains highly sensitive material and should be seen only by a very limited number of people.

Primakov Mission

I said that the Prime Minister was disturbed to see Primakov continuing his unhelpful attempts to launch peace negotiations with a further visit to the area. She was considering a message to President Gorbachev, to try to get Primakov called to order. She wondered whether the President had anything similar in mind.

General Scowcroft said the President had already sent a message to Gorbachev, very shortly after Primakov's talks in Washington, in order to be sure that Gorbachev got an unvarnished account of them. When the Americans learned that Primakov was going to Cairo, the President had telephoned Mubarak on an open line and given him an equally unvarnished account - which the Russians will undoubtedly have picked up - of what he had told Primakov. Scowcroft thought that the President would be enthusiastic about the idea that the Prime Minister should also send a message to Gorbachev.

I said there seemed some evidence of a difference of view on this issue between Primakov and Shevardnadze. Scowcroft said the Americans shared this assessment. The Soviet Ambassador in Washington had taken Bob Gates aside and told him that the rivalry between Primakov and Shevardnadze was a domestic political problem. The Ambassador had advised the Americans to put their money on Shevardnadze. This underlined the utility of a message to Gorbachev.

Additional American Forces for Saudi Arabia

I told Scowcroft that we had heard that the Americans were considering sending an additional 100,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. It would clearly be a major operation. We wondered how long that

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would take. Might it bring them up against the closing of the 'climatic window' for military action towards the end of February? Scowcroft said the President had not actually taken a decision on this yet, although he was likely to come down in favour of sending additional forces. The Americans would probably send two divisions, mostly from Europe. Cheney estimated that they could reach Saudi Arabia within 28 days: 'the ships are already moving'. The aim was to have the additional forces in place by early December. I said that we had heard estimates which stretched rather beyond this. Scowcroft laughed and said that the military were getting a bit nervous about forecasts, after getting the amount of time needed to move the first units badly wrong. But Cheney had been categorical that two extra divisions could be in Saudi Arabia within 28 days of a decision to move. I asked whether shipping was likely to be a problem. Scowcroft did not know of any problem for the Americans, but said that shipping was still needed for a second Egyptian Division.

Secretary Baker

Scowcroft said that Secretary Baker would probably visit the area in about a week's time and hoped to come through London. The Americans were in the process of refining their thinking and Baker would be in a position to put some more concrete proposals to the Prime Minister.

GATT

I said that the Prime Minister had received the President's message on the GATT negotiations and would do her best to get some progress at the European Council. The main problem was Helmut Kohl. Scowcroft said that he was getting seriously worried about an irreparable breakdown of the GATT negotiations. They would wait and see how we got on at the weekend. But thereafter, the President might have to call in some chips from Helmut Kohl.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1748

OF 261400Z OCTOBER 90

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MY TELNO 1683 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION AMONG THE FIVE AND WITH CO-SPONSOR OF 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' DRAFT. PROLONGED FILIBUSTER BY CUBA AND YEMEN IN WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS THE TWO TEXTS.

DETAIL

2. ON THE MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE BRIEFED THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THEIR PROPOSED NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS BLANC (FRANCE) BRIEFED THE THREE NON-NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS: THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION BRIEFED THE NON-ALIGNED (RICHARDSON TOOK MY PLACE IN VIEW OF MY POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL): AND THE CHINESE DID NOT TAKE PART.

3. LATER IN THE MORNING AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET TO COMPARE NOTES. BLANC REPORTED THAT THE NON-NON-ALIGNED HAD REACTED FAVOURABLY TO THE TEXT. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) REPORTED THAT THE FOUR CO-SPONSORS OF THE 'PEACE OFFENSIVE' RESOLUTION (CUBA, YEMEN, MALAYSIA AND COLOMBIA) REMAINED VERY ATTACHED TO THEIR OWN TEXT. THERE HAD BEEN RESISTANCE AMONG THE FOUR TO MOVING TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL LATER IN THE DAY: BUT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO SO PROVIDED THAT THE TWO DRAFT TEXTS WERE BOTH DISCUSSED. PICKERING JUDGED THAT THEIR RESOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECIEVE THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTES. BUT THAT WAS NONETHELESS AN EVENTUALITY TO BE AVOIDED. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GET A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE WEEKEND. TO DO THIS HE WAS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE FORM IF THE TWO RESOLUTIONS COULD BE MERGED: FOR EXAMPLE THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS COULD BE DEMARCATED BY THE USE OF ROMAN NUMERALS. I SAID THAT MY AUTHORITIES TOO WISHED US TO PROCEED RAPIDLY.

4. IT WAS AGREED AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD

BE FOR ME AS PRESIDENT TO HOLD AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD BRING TOGETHER THE MAIN PROPONENTS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE FIVE (PICKERING AND VORONTSOV) AND THOSE OF THE DRAFT OF THE FOUR NON-ALIGNED (THE CO-SPONSORS, NOW JOINED BY ZAIRE). THEREAFTER A BRIEF SESSION OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE HELD TO TAKE STOCK OF THE POSITION REACHED.

5. WHEN THE GROUP DISCUSSION WAS HELD LATER IN THE DAY THE NON-ALIGNED PRODUCED A REVISED DRAFT OF THEIR RESOLUTION, CONSIDERABLY TONED DOWN IN COMPARISON WITH ITS PREDECESSOR. AL-ASHTAL EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE QUITE CLOSE. HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE TWO DRAFTS TO BE PRESENTED TOGETHER AND PASSED SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE WAS ECHOED BY PENALOSA (COLOMBIA). PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT WAYS SHOULD BE SOUGHT OF INTEGRATING THE TWO TEXTS. WE WOULD BE SENDING AN UNFORTUNATE SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN IF ONE TEXT DEALT WITH ''PEACE'' AND THE OTHER WITH FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST IRAQ. IN EFFECT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD CHOOSE WHICH SIGNAL TO HEED. I SUPPORTED HIM.

6. AL-ASHTAL QUESTIONED WHETHER SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD MISTAKE THE SENSE OF THE COUNCIL, GIVEN THAT IT HAD ALREADY PASSED NINE RESOLUTIONS ON KUWAIT. HE HOPED OTHERS WOULD NOT INSIST ON INTEGRATION: BUT YEMEN WAS READY TO VOTE ON BOTH TEXTS AT THE SAME TIME, IF IT WAS POSSIBLE BY ONE VOTE ON TWO RESOLUTIONS. THIS SHOULD BE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD VOTE UNANIMOUSLY ON BOTH.

7. BAGBENI (ZAIRE) SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHAT PORTION IN THE TWO TEXTS COULD BE COMBINED, AND WHERE DUPLICATION COULD BE REMOVED. THEN THE TWO MIGHT BE PUT TOGETHER WHILE KEEPING THE ELEMENTS SEPARATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT COUNSELLORS WOULD WORK ON THAT BASIS LATER IN THE EVENING. THEY WOULD WORK THROUGH EACH TEXT IN TURN, ELIMINATING OVERLAP AND PREPARING FOR THE TWO TO BE JOINED.

8. I SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED ON THIS BASIS TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL. TORNUDD (FINLAND) AND FORTIER (CANADA) SPOKE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF AMALGAMATING THE TWO TEXTS.

9. FOLLOWING THIS MEETING COUNSELLORS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE, YEMEN, MALAYSIA, CUBA AND ZAIRE MET UNDER UK CHAIRMANSHIP TO WORK ON THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT AND THE TEXT OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WITH A VIEW TO THEIR AMALGAMATION ON 26 OCTOBER. THE OPTIMISM EVIDENT AT THE EARLIER MEETINGS WAS QUICKLY DISSIPATED AS THE YEMENIS AND CUBANS ENGAGED IN A PROLONGED FILIBUSTER. THEY

HAGGLED OVER PROCEDURE AND OVER MAJOR AND MINOR ASPECTS OF BOTH TEXTS. THE MALAYSIANS ALSO HAD CONSIDERABLE AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSE, SOME DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL AND SOME NOT. AS A RESULT THE MEETING WENT ON FOR TEN HOURS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND ENDED AT 0615 LOCAL ON 26 OCTOBER. THE END RESULT WAS TWO TEXTS RIDDLED WITH PASSAGES IN SQUARE BRACKETS. THEY ARE BEING FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND UND. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE AND OF THE NON-ALIGNED SPONSORS OF THE ''PEACE OFFENSIVE'' DRAFT WILL WILL MEET LATER ON 26 OCTOBER TO DECIDE HOW TO TAKE MATTERS FORWARD.

HANNAY

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MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
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From the Private Secretary

CDP
(2)
R. Amin
CDS
25/x

26 October 1990

See Hople.

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MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

You will see from the minutes that there was some discussion at OD(G) this morning of the State Department's request that we should raise the level of attendance at the Military Staff Committee's meeting on 29 October. OD(G) decided, however, to maintain our decision to send Major General Beckett, Head of British Defence Staff, Washington.

I should report that I was telephoned this morning by the French Ambassador to say that the French Government were sending their equivalent of VCDS and would appeal to us to send someone of similar rank as a gesture of solidarity. I explained that we had never been very keen on the concept of the meeting and were determined to avoid any implication that the Military Staff Committee had a role in relation to British (or other) forces in the Gulf. This militated against sending someone from London. Ministers had considered the matter again this morning in response to an inquiry from the Americans, but had decided to maintain our decision. I would, of course, report these representations, but could not hold out any hope of change.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1990

efc

end 2/10/90

Dear Charles,

The Gulf: Economic Assistance to Turkey, Jordan and Egypt

I enclose the top copy of Mr Delors' reply to the Prime Minister's letter to him of 10 October. Michael Jay sent Patricia Parkin a copy of the reply, together with a contingency press line, on 24 October.

The terms of the press reporting have been neutral, and it appears that Mr Delors intended the letter to be conciliatory. The Foreign Secretary suggests that we have little to gain by continuing the correspondence. We have made the point to the Commission in letters from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor that decisions involving major expenditure can only be taken after proper procedures have been followed. Mr Delors' letter implicitly accepts this.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

COMMISSION
OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

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The President

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 10 October about financial assistance for the countries most immediately affected by the Gulf Crisis (Turkey, Egypt and Jordan).

I attach a full list of all the meetings which prepared this decision. This shows that despite the urgency of the situation and the pressures from our international partners for action, the process was long, thorough and correct. However, it was also complex, as it involved both Political Cooperation and the standard Community procedures.

At the moment a decision of this kind has to involve both these sets of procedures, and it is precisely because the resulting complexity can result in a lack of transparency that I consider that the second Intergovernmental conference should result in uniting the two.

Sincerely yours.



Jacques DELORS

The Rt Hon
Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP, FRS
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Financial aid for countries particularly affected by the
Gulf crisis

21 August

Meeting of Ministers on Political Cooperation in Paris. Positive welcome for the Commission's intention to make financial proposals in favour of countries particularly affected by the Gulf crisis. From 31 August the Commission launched consultations with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Department of Treasury.

5 September

The Commission presented a working document "The Community and the Gulf crisis". We indicated the three potential beneficiary countries (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) without setting out in detail the amount of the aid nor the division between the beneficiaries.

6 September

Meeting of COREPER. No delegation contested the necessity for some financial assistance to the countries which were particularly affected by the crisis.

7 September

Extraordinary meeting of Ministers for Political Cooperation at Rome on the basis of the working document of the Commission. The Ministers declared

"The Community and its Member States have taken a decision on the principle of extending such short-term financial assistance to these three countries. This assistance will take place in the framework of concerted action with other industrialised countries as well as with the countries of the region. The General Affairs Council will take appropriate decisions at its forthcoming meeting on the basis of Commission proposals and the results of consultations with third countries".

8 September

The Ministers of Economy and Finance at their informal meeting in Rome were informed of the situation and the position taken by their colleagues in Political Cooperation.

12 September

Meeting of COREPER. First discussion on the Commission's communication which set out the amount of the international financial assistance, the division of the charge between the contributing countries (2/3 for the Gulf countries exporting petrol, 1/3 for OECD countries, of which 2/3

would be for the Community and its Member States) and the procedures for coordination. It also set out some of the working details of the proposed Community contribution (1.5 billion ECUS, of which 750 million ECUS would be on the Community budget and 750 million ECUS in the form of voluntary national contributions, taking account in particular of the military expenses undertaken by certain Member States) and the budgetary implications.

13 September

Meeting of COREPER for further discussion.

17 September

Meeting of the Council (General Affairs). Declaration confirming the willingness to provide short term assistance in favour of countries particularly affected by the crisis.

20 September

Meeting of COREPER. Discussion on the proposed regulation presented by the Commission concerning the implementation of the financial assistance. Question submitted to Foreign Affairs Ministers in the margin of the United Nations meeting in New York.

26 September

Meeting of COREPER. New exchange of views on the Commission's proposal with a view to the political decision.

1 October

Political decision by Ministers of Foreign Affairs at New York foreseeing a financial assistance of 500 million ECUS, mainly in the form of gifts and to be imputed to the budget. 1 billion ECUS to be paid by Member States in the form of voluntary contributions.

3 October

Meeting of COREPER. An amended proposal was dealt with at this session, taking account of the changes made by the Foreign Affairs Ministers in New York. There was a Greek reserve on the division of the aid between the three beneficiary countries and a British reserve on Article 2 relating to the figure of 500 million ECUS "mainly in the form of aid and for the rest in the form of loans to be attributed to the 1991 budget". This British reserve was lifted at the COREPER meeting on 4 October.

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PART ONE OF TWO

MIPT: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS: GULF

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON SHORT AND LONG TERM AIMS, INCLUDING NEED TO LIMIT IRAQI MILITARY THREAT AFTER CRISIS. US ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION FOR ANY MILITARY ACTION. FRANCE AND GERMANY INSIST FURTHER UN COVER FOR MILITARY ACTION LEGALLY AND POLITICALLY NECESSARY. US DISCUSSING IDEAS ON REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS WITH STATES IN REGION. FRANCE URGES RAPID PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARAB/ISRAEL. US WARNS OF NEED FOR CAUTION OVER ANY EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EAST. AGREEMENT THAT PARTIAL IRAQI PEACEFUL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AND WOULD POSE TRICKY PROBLEMS FOR WEST.

DETAIL

SHORT TERM

2. INTRODUCING DISCUSSION WESTON SAID HE ASSUMED ALL WERE AGREED THAT OUR SHORT TERM AIMS WERE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND AVOIDANCE OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT. DUFOURCQ (FRANCE) AGREED. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SHAIKH JABER THAT OUR AIMS WERE TO ENSURE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KUWAIT. SEITZ (US) AGREED BUT ADDED ONE MORE OBJECTIVE, THE NEED TO LIMIT THE IRAQI THREAT IN THE LONG TERM. WE SHOULD GIVE GREATER PUBLIC EMPHASIS TO THE IRAQI DISMANTLEMENT OF KUWAIT.

3. KASTRUP (GERMANY) SAID HUGE GAINS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE CRISIS IN TERMS OF COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UN. WE SHOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO PRESERVE THESE GAINS. GERMANY HAD REFUSED TO SELL ANY ARMS TO THE REGION DURING THE CRISIS, AND HAD TURNED DOWN A SAUDI REQUEST FOR EQUIPMENT. DUFOURCQ ASKED WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF PRINCE SULTAN'S COMMENTS, THE SAUDIS WERE FIRM. SEITZ SAID HE BELIEVED THEY WERE. SULTAN HAD NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT THE KUWAITIS SHOULD SEEK A COMPROMISE WITH IRAQ. AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ WOULD NOT REMOVE THE IRAQI THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

MILITARY ACTION

4. SEITZ SAID THERE WAS NO PREDISPOSITION IN WASHINGTON TO USE FORCE. THE US WAS NOT THINKING OF TAKING MILITARY ACTION WITHIN ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAME. THE MILITARY BUILD UP WOULD BE COMPLETE BY MID-NOVEMBER. BUT THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT ANY DECISIONS ON MILITARY ACTION. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE ALREADY EXISTED IN THE VIEW OF THE US. TO RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT THE US WOULD NOT NEED TO SEEK AUTHORISATION FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE MIGHT BE IMPORTANT POLITICALLY AS A WAY OF MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. THEY HAD TAKEN NO DECISIONS ON WHAT FORM THIS INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION MIGHT TAKE, BUT HE COULD IMAGINE PRIOR ENDORSEMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN A UN FLAG OR A UN COMMAND. DUFOURCQ SAID THAT IN THE FRENCH VIEW A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL

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RESOLUTION

SECRET / *DEDIR*

RESOLUTION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND LEGAL REASONS BEFORE FORCE WAS USED. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE ARTICLE 51 COVER WAS SUFFICIENT. POLITICALLY WE MUST DO EVERYTHING TO PRESERVE THE COHESION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FIVE. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SEEK SUCH A RESOLUTION NOW. FIRST WE SHOULD SEE IF THE EMBARJO WORKED. KASTRUP SAID THERE WAS NO FORMAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THIS, BUT HE TENDED PERSONALLY TO AGREE WITH THE FRENCH.

LONGER TERM

5. WESTON SAID THAT THE LONG-TERM AIMS IN THE REGION WERE TO REMOVE PERENNIAL THREATS TO STABILITY THERE AND TO ENSURE RELIABLE ACCESS TO OIL. IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CRISIS PERIOD OUR AIM MUST BE TO WIN THE PEACE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A VIABLE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN THE GULF WHICH IN DUE COURSE SHOULD BE REINFORCED AND EXTENDED BY MEANS OF A SERIOUS EFFORT TO SOLVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. MUCH WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW THE CRISIS ENDED. WE COULD FORESEE THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:

? ? ?
A) A FULL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT WAR: THIS WOULD LEAVE THE IRAQI MILITARY POTENTIAL INTACT. THE WEST COULD NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES UNTIL ALL THE HOSTAGES HAD BEEN RELEASED AND A SATISFACTORY SECURITY STRUCTURE WAS IN PLACE. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ON OIL AND BORDERS, A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT TOGETHER WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, A SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS, AND POSSIBLY A UN OR ARAB LEAGUE PEACE KEEPING FORCE BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. BUT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. IN THE MEANTIME WE WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON IRAQ, VIA AS MANY SANCTIONS AS POSSIBLE ESPECIALLY ON NBC, ARMS AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT VIABLE DETERRENT LEVELS.

B) A PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL IN WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HUNG ON TO THE RUMAILIA OIL FIELD AND THE ISLANDS: IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON FULL WITHDRAWAL AND MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AND THE MULTILATERAL FORCE AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL. IT WAS LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SPLIT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. BUT IF ACTION WERE NOT TAKEN TO REMOVE THE IRAQIS, IF NECESSARY BY FORCE, THE WEST WOULD HAVE SUFFERED A DEFEAT.

C) FULL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AS A RESULT OF A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. THIS WOULD PROBABLY REMOVE THE IRAQI THREAT BUT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULT LEGAL QUESTIONS. WOULD WE HAVE COVER TO PURSUE THE WAR AFTER THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT? WOULD WE NEED TO SHOW UN AUTHORITY HAD NOT BEEN EXCEEDED IF WESTERN FORCES WERE TO STAY ON IN THE REGION AT SAUDI OR KUWAITI INVITATION? WAS THERE A DANGER OF PROVIDING A FOCUS FOR ANTI-WESTERN FEELING IN THE ARAB WORLD, ESPECIALLY IF ISRAEL HAD JOINED IN?

IN ANY SCENARIO WE WOULD NEED TO ENSURE VERIFIABLE NBC DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. WE WOULD ALSO NEED TO WORK IN THE LONGER TERM FOR A LASTING SECURITY STRUCTURE BOTH IN THE GULF AND BEYOND. THIS WOULD NOT BE ATTAINABLE WITHOUT ADDRESSING PROBLEMS SUCH AS ARAB/ISRAEL, THE COLAN AND SOUTH LEBANON.

6. SEITZ BROADLY AGREED. THE OTHER SCENARIO WAS INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME. THIS WAS UNLIKELY BUT WOULD REPRESENT A GOOD OUTCOME. HIGH STAKES WERE INVOLVED IN HOW THE CRISIS WAS RESOLVED. THESE INCLUDED IMPLICATIONS FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN, THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. THE CRISIS GAVE A NEW URGENCY TO DEALING WITH NON-PROLIFERATION ON A REGIONAL AND A GLOBAL BASIS.

SECRET / *DEDIR*

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THE / *[signature]*

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THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE EXISTING REGIONAL COALITION (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA) BEYOND THE CURRENT CRISIS. BUT WE WOULD NEED TO ESTABLISH A REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND TO BEGIN A RE-INVIGORATED ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS. WE COULD CONSIDER CSBMS BASED ON EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE. THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THESE IDEAS WITH GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION AND THE INITIAL RESPONSE WAS FAVOURABLE.

7. DUFOURCQ SAID THERE WOULD BE LONG-TERM RESULTS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY FROM THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. THESE INCLUDED A DIVISION BETWEEN MODERATES AND RADICALS IN THE ARAB WORLD, POSSIBLE SAUDI/YEMENI CONFRONTATION, GREATER DEMOCRATISATION, PARTICULARLY IN KUWAIT AND EVEN IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE YOUNG PEOPLE WERE PLAYING MORE OF A ROLE, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE REGION IN WHICH THE PARTS PLAYED BY TURKEY, IRAN, SYRIA AND YEMEN WOULD ALL BE IMPORTANT.

ARAB/ISRAEL

8. KASTRUP SAID THE GERMANS WERE OPPOSED TO LINKAGE, BUT ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION. COULD THE US RESUME ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO? SEITZ SAID THE UN RESOLUTION HAD SENT A TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS AT SOME DOMESTIC POLITICAL COST IN THE US. THEY WERE TRYING TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO COMPLY, BUT IF THEY FAILED THE ISSUE WOULD COME BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CUT ACROSS THE FOCUS ON IRAQ. THE US COULD NOT RESUME CONTACTS WITH THE PLO IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. DUFOURCQ AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO LINKAGE. BUT WE NEEDED TO SETTLE THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE URGENTLY BEFORE THE ARABS EXPLODED WITH FRUSTRATION. WE SHOULD BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WESTON ASKED HOW THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD APPROACH THIS IN ANY STATEMENT MADE FROM ROME. WAS THERE SCOPE FOR DEVELOPING THE THEMES THAT THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR MODERATION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE COMPLETION OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS? SEITZ AGREED THERE WAS A NEW URGENCY, AND A NEED TO BE BLUNT WITH THE ISRAELIS. BUT THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS REMAINED. ARAFAT WAS LESS OF AN INTERLOCUTOR VALABLE. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT IF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CALLED OUTRIGHT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A SUCCESS FOR BAGHDAD. OF COURSE SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED THE HIGH GROUND ON ARAB/ISRAEL. THE US DID NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ISRAEL MIGHT ALSO BE PREPARED TO MOVE. PRIVATELY THE US WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT LINKAGE. BUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS RISKED BEING INTERPRETED AS SUCCESS FOR IRAQ. DUFOURCQ ASKED IF THE AMERICANS HAD ANYTHING NEW TO PROPOSE. SEITZ SAID THEY HAD IDEAS BUT HE COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THEM AT THE MOMENT. HE LATER EXPLAINED PRIVATELY THAT THE ISSUE WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE POLITICALLY PRIOR TO THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS.

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LIMITED

HS/PLANNERS

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/SEC POL D

HA/NEPAD

HA/WED

HA/WAD

AS

AS/Mr Waldegrave

AS/AUS

Mr Weston

Mr Broomfield

Mr Fairweather

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PART TWO OF TWO

MIPT: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS: GULF

PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

9. REVERTING TO HIS EARLIER REMARKS WESTON SAID PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS IN MANY WAYS THE LEAST UNLIKELY AND MOST DIFFICULT SCENARIO. WE MIGHT FIND THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHERS PRESSING US FOR A FACE SAVING COMPROMISE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. SEITZ AGREED. WE MIGHT ALSO FACE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD GET THE SOVIET UNION HOOKED ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE COULD USE GORBACHEV'S VISITS TO EUROPE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO PRESS THIS POINT. DUFOURCQ SAID FRANCE WOULD INSIST ON COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. KASTRUP SAID GERMANY WOULD INSIST ON A LEGAL SOLUTION. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION WOULD REACT TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. WESTON CONCLUDED AND ALL AGREED THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULT CHOICES. WE MUST INSIST ON FULL WITHDRAWAL AND MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE UNTIL THIS HAPPENED.

HOSTAGES

10. KASTRUP SAID SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION, (EG BY THE RELEASE OF FRENCH HOSTAGES). LEADERS OF ALL PARTIES WERE MEETING WITH KOHL IN BONN TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND BRANDT TO BAGHDAD. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT SEE HIM GOING. DUFOURCQ SAID THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN PARIS INSISTED THAT A FRENCH OFFICIAL SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD TO RECEIVE THE FRENCH HOSTAGES. ROCARD WAS MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF ALL PARTIES IN PARIS TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT. THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

JORDANIAN PEACE PLAN

11. DUFOURCQ REPORTED THAT PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN HAD FORWARDED A NINE-POINT PEACE PLAN TO THE FRENCH LAST WEEK. THIS ENVISAGED: WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES, THE RETURN OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND A DATE FOR ELECTIONS, INSERTION OF AN ARAB OR UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN KUWAIT, A GUARANTEE TO IRAQ OF ACCESS TO THE SEA AND THE RUMAILIA OIL FIELDS, A DECLARATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT AN AGGRESSION WOULD BE LAUNCHED AGAINST IRAQ, RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES INCLUDING ARAB/ISRAEL, AGREEMENT BY ALL OIL PRODUCERS TO ENSURE SUPPLY AND THE INDEXING OF PRICES. THE FRENCH DID NOT INTEND TO RESPOND.

ASSISTANCE TO AFFECTED STATES

12. SEITZ SAID THE US ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT THE AFFECTED STATES RECEIVED CONCRETE ASSISTANCE IN 1990. JORDAN DESERVED PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GULF STATES. THE AMERICANS ESTIMATED THAT THE EFFECT ON TURKEY WOULD BE IN THE ORDER OF 1 1/2 BILLION DOLLARS IN 1990 AND 5 BILLION

SECRET / *SECRET*

(1)

DOLLARS /

SECRET / Sec 12

DOLLARS IN 1991. THE US WAS CONSIDERING OFFERING A NEW QUOTA ON TEXTILES. THEY HOPED THE COMMUNITY COULD RESPOND WITH THE FOURTH FINANCIAL PROTOCOL, POLITICAL DIALOGUE, CUSTOMS UNION AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION. THE AMERICANS HAD SPOKEN TO THE GREEKS. WESTON SAID THE SUBJECT WAS UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMUNITY. KASTRUP SAID GERMANY WOULD BE PROVIDING TURKEY WITH A 2 MILLION DM MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME.

ARAB MILITARY PROFILE

13. SEITZ SAID ONE SYRIAN ARMoured DIVISION WAS STILL IN SYRIA BECAUSE OF LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN MOVING IT. THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED THE ITALIANS TO HELP AND HE HOPED THEY WOULD REPLY POSITIVELY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THEM TO SAUDI ARABIA QUICKLY.

YYYY

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HS/SEC ACD

HS/NEAD

MA/WED

HS/NAD

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PS/Mr. Waldegrave

AS/AUS

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Mr. Broomfield

Mr. Fairweather

Mr. Goulden

Mr. Greenstock

Mr. Beauish

Mr. Gore-Booth

Mr. Jay

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Mr. Appleby - Cabinet Office.

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(2)

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TELNO 1844

OF 250820Z OCTOBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA, MOSCOW

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, LONDON, 24 OCTOBER

1. POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE UK, US, FRANCE AND GERMANY MET IN LONDON ON 24 OCTOBER. WESTON WAS IN THE CHAIR. MY 6 IFTS - NOT TO ALL - REPORT DISCUSSION OF:

- (A) GULF
- (B) FUTURE OF NATO
- (C) SOVIET UNION
- (D) EASTERN EUROPE
- (E) CSCE
- (F) EC/US

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2. POLITICAL DIRECTORS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN PARIS ON 4 DECEMBER.

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MAIN
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HEADS OF:
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MR BROOMFIELD
MR BAYNE
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BEAMISH
MR TAIT
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GREENSTOCK
ADDITIONAL
PS/NO 10.
MR APPLEYARD, CABINET OFFICE

SECRET / *DESIA*

19a-d

Jp 01173

MR POWELL

We shall have to read - this view at every opportunity. It is the right one. The could put our forces at 256X.

The Gulf: US Views on UN Authority for Military Action

The Prime Minister may wish to see these two telegrams, which supplement my minute to her of 24 October. Kimmitt was called away suddenly from our meeting to attend Baker, who had to receive Prince Bandar.

2. The argument in telegram 2589 is a predictable one and it is natural that the State Department should deploy it. There was a general feeling during my visit that of course a further resolution authorising force would be ideal, provided always we could get it quickly and in the form we wanted. But the problem lies in the proviso. Nor do I find convincing the assurance that an approach would only be made to the UN if it was clear that it would succeed. There are two snags. First, although our private consultations might lead us to believe everything was sewn up, matters could change rapidly once the resolution was revealed to a wider audience. Secondly, there could be no guarantee that private consultations would not leak, giving the Iraqis the warning they want. I made these points elsewhere in my rounds.

3. The idea that we might seek in November additional authority for military action at some unspecified time in the future is also similar to ideas I heard from Wolfowitz. I do not find the argument that operational security would be preserved thereby entirely persuasive. It is true Saddam might not know the precise time of the allied attack; but he would have been put on notice that one was much more likely, if not inevitable. He would therefore be prompted to take pre-emptive moves whether military or diplomatic and plenty of time to mount them.

25 October 1990

PERCY CRADOCK

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DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2589

OF 242355Z OCTOBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, CABINET OFFICER

FCO PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/PUS AND SIR PERCY CRADOCK,
CABINET OFFICE

NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

UKMIS NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

THE GULF: AUTHORITY FOR THE MILITARY OPTION

1. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO KIMMITT ALONE ON 24 OCTOBER
ABOUT THE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY IN THE UN, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER APPROACH TO AUTHORISE MILITARY ACTION.

2. KIMMITT REPEATED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED THAT ARTICLE 51 GAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION THEY DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION THROUGH. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE IMPORTANT INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE AWARE. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE OVER MILITARY ACTION (POSSIBLY THROUGH A FORMAL VOTE) IF CONGRESS COULD BE ASKED TO ACT IN SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, RATHER THAN RISK A DIFFICULT DISCUSSION ON WHERE AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTING US FORCES TO ACTION LAY UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT. BAKER HAD ALREADY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME WITH CONGRESS ON THIS ISSUE.

3. KIMMITT ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE RUN OF NOT VERY HELPFUL SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTS FOLLOWING THE UNITED STATES IN NOVEMBER, AND WITH INDIA, ZIMBABWE AND AUSTRIA COMING ON THE COUNCIL IN THE NEW YEAR, SOME THOUGHT WAS NOW BEING GIVEN TO OBTAINING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACTION, DURING THE US PRESIDENCY. THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF THIS WAS THAT OPERATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE PRESERVED. TO ACT AT THE LAST MINUTE COULD GIVE THE GAME AWAY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF KIMMITT'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED AND IF THIS COULD BE TREATED AS FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY UNTIL US REPRESENTATIVES RAISE THIS WITH US IN A MORE DEFINITE WAY.

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GRS 128

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE

TELNO MISC 377

OF 242359Z OCTOBER 90

PERSONAL FOR SIR PERCY CRADOCK FROM AMBASSADOR


THE GULF

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 2589 TO FCO. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE WAS VERY SORRY THAT HE HAD HAD TO LEAVE THE MEETING WITH YOU SO ABRUPTLY. HE HAD MUCH ENJOYED THE EXCHANGE, AND WOULD HAVE LIKED IT TO CONTINUE. HE HAD PARTICULARLY WANTED TO TELL YOU OF THE CONSIDERATION IN MY TUR. IT WAS NOT OF COURSE OVER-RIDING, BUT WAS SOMETHING WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. HE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT AN APPROACH SHOULD ONLY BE MADE IN THE UNITED NATIONS IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WOULD SUCCEED. IF NOT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON ARTICLE 51 AND MANAGE THE CONGRESSIONAL ASPECT AS BEST THEY COULD.

ACLAND

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The National Archives

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SIC

AD HOC CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY STAFF
COMMITTEE (MSC)

SUMMARY

1. US EXPRESS QUOTE DISAPPOINTMENT UNQUOTE THAT UK WILL NOT BE SENDING SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE FROM LONDON FOR AD HOC MSC MEETING ON 29 OCTOBER.

DETAIL

2. TELECON SALVESON/POCOCK REFERS. JOHN WOLF (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BUREAU, STATE) TOLD US ON 24 OCTOBER THAT KIMMITT AND QUOTE THE SEVENTH FLOOR UNQUOTE WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE UK DECISION ON THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT THE FORTHCOMING MSC MEETING. WHILE HE AGAIN FORMALLY CONFIRMED THE ASSURANCES ON THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE MEETING ALREADY CONVEYED BY PICKERING TO UKMIS NEW YORK (PARA 7 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1729), HE SAID THAT THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION WAS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF POLITICAL SYMBOLISM. THE US SAW QUOTE POLITICAL UTILITY UNQUOTE IN HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATION FROM CAPITALS. THEY WANTED TO PROMOTE A COMMON PERCEPTION THROUGHOUT THE UN THAT THIS WAS MORE THAN A QUESTION OF THE US FLEXING THEIR MUSCLES.

3. WITHOUT SAYING SO IN TERMS, WOLF MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE US HOPED WE WOULD RECONSIDER OUR POSITION AND PERMIT APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION FROM LONDON. WE HAVE TOLD STATE THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A CHANGE OF VIEW ON THIS.

ACLAND

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PAGE 1
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 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 MR JAY
 MR SLATER
 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
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 HD/UND
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/NPDD
 HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
 SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE DIO
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 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
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SECRET

17a-c

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have one of the regular Meetings of Ministers to consider latest developments in the Gulf. The main points you will want to consider are:

DIPLOMATIC

Activity at the United Nations

Now that the Palestinian resolution has gone through, the way should be clear to return to the further resolution dealing with Iraq/Kuwait and in particular the question of compensation. It is very important not to interrupt further the steadily mounting pressure on Iraq.

At the same time, it is clear that the Americans remain determined to obtain authority from the United Nations for the use of force. They are now arguing in addition that this will be essential in order to obtain Congressional backing. The signs are that they might try to secure a resolution during their Presidency of the Security Council in November. They argue this will be done on a contingency basis, so that it does not give a signal to Saddam Hussein that military action is imminent. The arguments against recourse to the UN for authority to use force are no less strong than they were. But it seems increasingly unlikely that the Americans will allow us to deter them. We ought to be giving some thought to the least damaging form of such a resolution.

Article 51 letter

You handed over to the Amir of Kuwait the draft of the letter agreed with the Americans. The Amir undertook to consider it and let you have any comments, but not to sign it for the time being.

SECRET

Negotiations

Primakov is back in the Middle East, first in Cairo but going on to Amman and Baghdad. He is evidently continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution.

American views and opinion

You might like to ask Sir Percy Cradock to report his findings from his visit to Washington both on the intelligence front and in terms of American intentions.

Advice to British communities at risk from hostilities in the Gulf

You will want the Foreign Secretary to report on the meeting of Consular Directors of the Twelve (which I think has taken place) and the conclusions to be drawn.

Saudi views

Prince Sultan's press conference was unfortunate, despite subsequent efforts by the Saudis to pull back. Prince Bandar is coming to see you on Monday at his own request. You might ask for views on what you should say to him.

Meeting with President Mitterrand

You want to see President Mitterrand on Saturday and the Gulf is likely to be one of the main subjects discussed. Indications from M. Attali are that Mitterrand expects use of force to be necessary, and is robust in his determination to work closely with us and the Americans. However, he seems determined there should be some specific United Nations backing for the use of force. Are there particular points which you need to make to him?

Iraqi intentions

There have been one or two indicators that Iraq may be

considering withdrawal from a part of Kuwait. You will want to ensure that work is in hand to consider the political and military response we should make in such an eventuality. Would the Kuwaiti Government immediately return to Kuwait? Or would it wait until Iraqi forces had left the whole of the country? Would our own forces move forward? Or would this be too risky without forward air cover? There are quite a number of questions to be addressed here.

Sanctions

There continues to be substantial evidence of breaches or intended breaches of sanctions against Iraq. Reports of Jordanian activity reflect a very uneven pattern: some days virtually no movement at all, others substantial movement of traffic. But both we and the Americans seem to be of one mind that sanctions are unlikely to work within an acceptable timeframe.

MILITARY

CDS's meeting with General Colin Powell

You may like to ask CDS to say something about his meeting with General Powell - bearing in mind that some of what he has to say may not be suitable for this larger group.

Iraqi missiles

You will want to enquire what view was reached on the evidence from satellite imagery that the Iraqis were deploying missiles to their launchers in Western Iraq (it was not clear whether this was with or without warheads). Was this a deliberate provocation towards the Israelis?

C.D.P.
CHARLES POWELL

25 October 1990

c:\meeting (tempest)



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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Overnight Telegrams

on the way.

plus a very

helpful Times leader

on this week-end's

unnecessary European

Council.

CDP
25A

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INFO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA

MY TWO IPTS : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL : COMMENT

1. THE SECOND AND UNNECESSARY ACT OF THIS DRAMA HAS NOW BEEN BROUGHT TO A REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE UNANIMITY OF THE COUNCIL, SO LABORIOUSLY ACHIEVED AFTER THE JERUSALEM KILLINGS (SCR 672), HAS BEEN SUSTAINED, AND THE RISK OF A U S VETO OR ABSTENTION AVOIDED EVEN THOUGH THE CRITICISMS BY THE JEWISH LOBBY IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN VOCAL AND EVENTS ON THE GROUND HAVE SLIGHTLY BLURRED THE CLEAR BLACK AND WHITE PICTURE PRESENTED BY THE ORIGINAL EVENT. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAVE CONTINUED TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THEIR CRITICS AND TO CAUSE DESPAIR TO THEIR FEW REMAINING FRIENDS BY REFUSING ANY COOPERATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION, EVEN COOPERATION SHORT OF ACTUALLY RECEIVING THE MISSION THEMSELVES.
2. WE COULD ALL HAVE DONE WITHOUT THIS SECOND ACT WHICH WAS ONLY PRECIPITATED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION VERY FORMALLY TO THROW IN THE TOWEL ON HIS MISSION AND REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL. IN RETROSPECT, I SUSPECT HE MUST REALISE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF HE HAD NOT DONE SO AND HAD SIMPLY SUBMITTED HIS REPORT AT THE END OF THE MONTH AND RECORDED IN IT HIS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO SEND A MISSION TO THE REGION. BUT THAT IS NOW WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE.
3. ACT THREE WILL BE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT WHICH IS NOW IN GESTATION AND WHICH IS ALMOST CERTAINLY GOING TO HAVE TO BE WRITTEN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A VISIT TO THE REGION. IT CAN HARDLY BE LESS FAR REACHING THAN THE 1988 GOULDING REPORT ON THE SAME SUBJECT, WHOSE CONCLUSIONS RAPIDLY FOUND THEIR WAY INTO THE 'TOO DIFFICULT' TRAY. IT MAY GO FURTHER. AND IT WILL ARRIVE ON THE COUNCIL TABLE AT A TIME WHEN EVENTS ON THE GROUND AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION ARE IN AN EXCEPTIONALLY SENSITIVE STATE.
4. ACT FOUR WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DELAY FOR VERY LONG AND IT WILL BE PLAYED UNDER A U S PRESIDENCY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NO-ONE

HERE WOULD OFFER MUCH MONEY ON AVOIDING A U S VETO AT THAT STAGE.

5. ALL THIS IS BAD NEWS FOR US AND OTHERS WHO ARE TRYING TO KEEP THE UNITED NATIONS' EYE FIRMLY ON THE BALL OF THE GULF CRISIS. IT CERTAINLY IS NOT REALISTIC TO SUPPOSE ANY MORE THAT WE CAN RAPIDLY GET THE ISSUE OF PALESTINE ONTO THE BACK BURNER. WE ARE IN FOR A LENGTHY DAMAGE LIMITATION EXERCISE ON THAT FRONT. BUT WE SHOULD STILL BE ABLE TO GET GULF RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THE COUNCIL, ALBEIT PROBABLY WITH SMALLER MAJORITIES THAN IN THE PAST. THAT WILL BE PUT TO THE TEST LATER THIS WEEK. FORTUNATELY MOST OF THE MEASURE NEEDED TO COUNTER IRAQI ACTION AND TO MAINTAIN A TOUGH SANCTIONS REGIME ARE ON THE STATUTE BOOK ALREADY.

HANNAY

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MIPT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 673 ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 24 OCTOBER.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 672 (1990),

HAVING BEEN BRIEFED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 19 OCTOBER 1990,

EXPRESSING ALARM AT THE REJECTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 672 (1990) BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AND ITS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RELATIVE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE MISSION HE IS SENDING TO THE REGION AND CONVEYED TO THE COUNCIL BY THE PRESIDENT ON 12 OCTOBER 1990,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,

1. DEPLORES THE REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RECEIVE THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE REGION:

2. URGES THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION AND INSISTS THAT IT COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 672 (1990) AND TO

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PERMIT THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROCEED IN KEEPING WITH ITS PURPOSE:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL THE REPORT REQUESTED IN RESOLUTION 672 (1990):

4. AFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION TO GIVE FULL AND EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE REPORT.

ENDS

HANNAY

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
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PAGE 2
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P. P. P.
OBD
26/11

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

PS/Mr Waldegrave

Secretary of State's meeting with Mr Heath: Iraq

The Secretary of State saw Mr Heath alone this afternoon. Mr Heath first described his dinner with King Hussein of Jordan. It was clear nothing new had emerged. The King had complained about how misunderstood/broke the Jordanians were. The Crown Prince had bemoaned the fact that Jordan's GDP was down by 55%.

In Iraq, Mr Heath had found Saddam Hussein very calm, well informed and lucid, as was Tariq Aziz. There were two further groups of hostages for whom Mr Heath had some hopes. One was a group of 80 nurses. Saddam Hussein had said that they would be allowed out if they were replaced. Mr Heath had pointed out that this was unrealistic and hoped that he might have made some impression. Saddam Hussein had said that those involved in building his guest house could go when the work was finished. Saddam Hussein had claimed that they were Irish but Mr Heath had pointed out that they were from Northern Ireland, and thus British.

Mr Heath said it was clear from what Saddam Hussein had said that he was convinced that Britain and the United States wanted a war. He was convinced of this from our talk of reparations and war trials. Saddam Hussein had said that, since he had no nuclear weapons, he would have to rely on CW in the event of war. Equally, he had to make use of hostages, though this was regrettable because of the Arab tradition of hospitality.

There had been a lot from Saddam Hussein about the history of Kuwait and a rebuttal of the charge that he had deceived Mubarak and King Fahd in July. Saddam Hussein had thought that all the help he had received from the Gulf Arabs during the war with Iran had been a gift. But the Gulf Arabs had then asked for it back. The British were supposed to be so moral. Why were we impressed by the Al Sabah who spent most of their time with prostitutes?

Saddam Hussein had said that he was in direct touch with the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, though he had asked Mr Heath not to talk about the second.

Mr Heath had drawn the conclusion that the best way forward was an Arab-type negotiation which would allow Saddam Hussein to withdraw with some concessions. Mr Heath had told Saddam Hussein that his hostage policy would not in fact

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
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shield installations from attack.

Mr Heath told the Secretary of State that his use of the words "grisly and repulsive" in the House would have exactly the wrong effect in Iraq. Mr Heath was critical of the trend of our policy.

Mr Heath did not raise the case of Ian Richter.

25 October 1990


for (J S Wall)

cc: PS/PUS
Mr Fairweather

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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MY TELNO 1731: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. RESOLUTION DEPLORING ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO RECEIVE MISSION OF SECRETARY-GENERAL PASSED UNANIMOUSLY. SOME SPEAKERS FLEX THEIR MUSCLES IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE DEBATES ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SOME THINLY VIELED CRITICISM OF MYSELF AS PRESIDENT FOR ALLEGEDLY DELAYING A VOTE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COUNCIL UNANIMITY.

DETAIL

2. NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PICKERING (UNITED STATES) CONDUCTED WITH AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) AND RAZALI (MALAYSIA) ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 OCTOBER EVENTUALLY RESULTED IN A COMPROMISE TEXT OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FOR WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE ABLE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. AFTER COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD MET BRIEFLY IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, A FORMAL MEETING WAS HELD.

3. THIS BEGAN WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BEIN (ISRAEL) ACCUSED THE COUNCIL OF HAVING BEEN DIVERTED FROM THE REAL ISSUE OF IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE PLO HAD SERVED SADDAM HUSSEIN WELL BY STEALING THE SHOW. HE QUOTED AN (UNNAMED) ARAB AMBASSADOR AS HAVING SAID THE PLO HAD CAUSED THE INCIDENT OF 8 AUGUST TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM KUWAIT. BEIN SAID IT WAS ARAFAT WHO HAD GIVEN SADDAM HUSSEIN THE IDEA THAT HE SHOULD THREATEN ISRAEL. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD EVEN ACCUSED KUWAIT OF COMPLICITY IN A ZIONIST PLOT BEFORE INVADING IT. THE VIOLENCE ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT HAD BEEN THE LAST THING THAT ISRAEL HAD WANTED. THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES WERE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS PLO CHEERLEADERS. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS NOW FITTED INTO A SET PATTERN. IF AN ISRAELI WAS LYNCHED THE COUNCIL DID NOT MENTION IT. IF ISRAEL MENTIONED IT THE COUNCIL BLAMED ISRAEL. FOR THE PLO THE MESSAGE OF SCR 672 WAS THAT CRIME PAID. FATAH WAS NOW ENCOURAGING ITS ACTIVISTS TO ARM THEMSELVES WITH WEAPONS AND TO SLASH JEWS WITH

KNIVES. HENCE THE RECENT WAVE OF STABBINGS INCLUDING ONE ATTACK FOR WHICH THE PLO FORCE 17 CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. ISRAEL REGRETTED THE CONTENT AND TONE OF SCR 672, AND THE IDEA OF A MISSION TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS WHEN ISRAEL HAD ALREADY BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE COUNCIL.

4. BEIN SAID THE ISRAELI COMMISSION SET UP TO LOOK INTO THE EVENTS OF 8 OCTOBER WOULD REPORT SOON. ISRAEL WOULD ASSIST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PREPARE HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. LIKE ALL SOVEREIGN STATES ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY IN THE TERRITORY IT CONTROLLED, ESPECIALLY IN ITS CAPITAL JERUSALEM. BEIN ACCUSED THE COUNCIL OF IGNORING RECENT SYRIAN ATROCITIES IN LEBANON IN WHICH INNOCENT PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE CHAMOUN FAMILY, HAD BEEN MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD AND NUNS HAD BEEN RAPED. HE CONCLUDED BY CLAIMING THAT THERE WAS NO PARALLEL BETWEEN SCRS 242 AND 660. THE FORMER DID NOT SPECIFY FROM WHICH TERRITORIES ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW OR SPEAK OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE, AND ISRAEL WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACTION UNTIL THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT ENDING THE ARABS' STATE OF BELLIGERENCY.

5. AL-KIDWA (PALESTINE) SAID THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN CALLED TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC ISSUE: THE ISRAELI REJECTION OF SCR 672 AND OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION. HE COULD NOT HELP BUT OBSERVE THE EXTREME DELAY IN THE COUNCIL'S HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE. IT HAD BEEN REMARKABLY SLOW IN COMPARISON WITH ITS PROMPT HANDLING OF OTHER ISSUES. THERE HAD BEEN SCHEMES TO STOP THE COUNCIL FROM FULFILLING ITS DUTIES. THESE CONTRADICTED THE CUSTOMS AND NORMS OF THE COUNCIL AND WERE PROOF THAT THE CLAIM OF A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN THE COUNCIL WAS A FALLACY. HE WAS PAINED TO NOTE THE STATEMENTS OF SOME PERSONS OF GREAT PROMINENCE IN THE COUNCIL ADVISING ISRAEL HOW TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION WHILE NOT ABIDING BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS INTENDED TO BE A REFERENCE TO ALLEGED REMARKS YOU MADE IN ISRAEL).

6. AL-KIDWA SAID HE NEVERTHELESS RECOGNISED THAT IF THE COUNCIL WAS TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE PATTERN OF VOTES BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN THE COUNCIL MUST CHANGE TO ONE OF UNANIMITY. THE PLO WAS READY TO FOLLOW A PRACTICAL COURSE TO HELP BRING THIS ABOUT. HE REFERRED TO HIS STATEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON 12 OCTOBER (PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 1624) IN WHICH HE HAD SAID THE ISRAELIS WOULD IGNORE SCR 672 AND THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO MEET AGAIN TO DEAL WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE HAD BEEN PROVED RIGHT. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS A FIRST STEP ON THE WAY TO THE COUNCIL SHOWING THAT IT WAS

SERIOUS IN DEALING WITH THE REBELLION AGAINST IT BY ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL SHOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL OF ITS INTENTION TO ENFORCE ITS RESOLUTIONS AND MAKE THEM LEGALLY BINDING, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE USE OF CHAPTER VII. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT TRY TO SHUFFLE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ONTO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN WHOM HE NEVERTHELESS STRESSED THE PLO HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE. WHEN THE COUNCIL CAME TO EXAMINE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIANS IT WOULD BE NO GOOD IF IT SIMPLY REITERATED THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIED. CONCRETE MEASURES SHOULD BE ADOPTED, SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS OR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

7. SALAH (DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SUDAN) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED ISRAEL FOR THE MASSACRE OF 8 OCTOBER. IT WAS AMAZING THAT ISRAEL CLAIMED THAT ITS SECURITY FORCES HAD FIRED AT UNARMED CIVILIANS IN SELF DEFENCE. THIS INCIDENT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE GULF CRISIS OR THE MURDER OF CHAMOUN. THE ISRAELIS SPOKE AS IF CRIMES COMMITTED ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD JUSTIFIED THEIR OWN CRIMES. SUDAN CALLED FOR SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE UNDER THE PLO. THE COUNCIL SHOULD APPLY SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII AGAINST ISRAEL. (THE (SOUTHERN) SUDANESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (LAGU) TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD CHOSEN NOT TO DELIVER THE STATEMENT HIMSELF BECAUSE HIS SYMPATHIES WERE WITH THE QUOTE OTHER SIDE UNQUOTE.)

8. FATTAL (SYRIA) THEN EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO BEIN'S COMMENTS ON SYRIAN ACTIONS IN LEBANON. HE SAID ISRAEL HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN A CHAIN OF MASSACRES. IT HAD COMMITTED WHAT AMOUNTED TO WAR CRIMES LIKE THOSE OF THE NAZIS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. IF ISRAEL WANTED TO HELP LEBANON IT SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE SOUTH SO THAT THE COUNTRY COULD REGAIN ITS SOVEREIGNTY. SYRIA WAS DOING ITS BEST TO HELP LEBANON RECOVER ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN A FRATERNAL WAY. ISRAEL HAD ACCUSED SYRIAN SOLDIERS OF VIOLATING RELIGIOUS PLACES. SYRIA RESPECTED ADHERENTS OF ALL RELIGIONS IN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY THE MARONITE CHRISTIANS. SYRIA HAD LOST MANY SOLDIERS IN THE FIGHT TO END THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON AND PROTECT IT AGAINST PARTITION. ISRAEL'S REAL FEAR WAS THAT PRESIDENT HRAOUI WOULD BEGIN TO EXERCISE POWER IN LEBANON AND DRIVE THE OCCUPIERS OUT OF THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY.

9. THE COUNCIL THEN MOVED TO FORMAL STATEMENTS BEFORE THE VOTE. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID ISRAEL HAD REJECTED SCR 672 EVEN THOUGH IT TOOK ACCOUNT OF ISRAEL'S SENSITIVITY ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY

HAVING THE MISSION SENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOW ADOPT UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH THOSE WHO DID NOT COMPLY WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS. WHAT WOULD IT DO ABOUT THE ILLEGAL ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS? SHOULD ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII NOT BE MENTIONED? THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT WOULD NOT BE AN END IN ITSELF. HE EXPECTED THE COUNCIL TO RE-OPEN THE FILE ON THE CORE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SOONER OR LATER. THERE WAS NO PEACE PROCESS IN TRAIN AT PRESENT AND THE UNITED STATES HAD CUT OFF CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS WERE DEALING WITH ALL THE OTHER EXPLOSIVE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND THE ARABS HAD A RIGHT TO EXPECT THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SERIOUSLY.

10. NZENGEYA (ZAIRE) SAID HIS DELEGATION DEPLORED THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THERE HAD BEEN A DELAY IN MOVING TO THE DRAFT NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL BECAUSE OF TIME WASTING ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A RESOLUTION OR A STATEMENT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT A RESOLUTION WAS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE ATTEMPT BY ISRAEL TO PLACE ITSELF ABOVE THE LAW. IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE UNANIMITY OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO IT TAKING ACTION.

11. PENALOSA (COLOMBIA) CONDEMNED ISRAEL'S ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND ITS REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. ALARCON (CUBA) SAID IT WAS IRONIC THAT THE COUNCIL HAD FINALLY MET TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 672 ON 24 OCTOBER, THE DAY ON WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BEEN DUE TO PRODUCE HIS REPORT. ON 19 OCTOBER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPLAINED TO THE COUNCIL WHY HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEND HIS MISSION. IN THE INTERVENING FIVE DAYS MEMBERS HAD HAD NEW AND BROADER EXPERIENCES IN THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING A DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF UNANIMITY.

12. THE COUNCIL THEN MOVED TO THE VOTE AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY AS SCR 673. TEXT IS IN MIFT. FOR COMMENT SEE MY SECOND IFT.

HANNAY

YYYY

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FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1360

OF 241714Z OCTOBER 90

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. TELTSCHIK EXPLAINS KOHL'S THINKING ON HOSTAGES AND WHY KOHL OPPOSED A MISSION BY BRANDT TO IRAQ. KOHL TO PROPOSE DISCUSSION AT INFORMAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL. HE HAS STILL TO CONSIDER OUR REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT TO OUR GULF DEPLOYMENT. COST MAY BE A KEY FACTOR. RECOMMENDATION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER PURSUE WITH KOHL THIS WEEKEND.

DETAIL

2. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT KOHL WAS MOST CONCERNED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD SUCCEED IN HIS OBVIOUS TACTIC OF TRYING TO DIVIDE THE WEST BY SELECTIVE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THAT THE RELEASE OF ALL THEIR HOSTAGES HAD BEEN AGREED WITHOUT CONCESSION. BUT COULD THIS BE TRUE? TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD CLAIMED, IN MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN BONN, THAT MR HEATH'S TRIP TO IRAQ HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN AGREEMENT WITH HMG. TELTSCHIK HAD THEREFORE BEEN GRATEFUL FOR POWELL'S ASSURANCE BY TELEPHONE THAT MR HEATH HAD ACTED ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT KOHL WAS DEAD AGAINST BRANDT UNDERTAKING A MISSION TO IRAQ FOR ANOTHER REASON AS WELL - NAMELY THAT THE SPD WOULD TRY TO MAKE USE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF ANY SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY BRANDT.

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT KOHL WOULD TODAY PROPOSE TO THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY THAT THE SUBJECT OF HOSTAGES AND THE GULF BE DISCUSSED AT THE INFORMAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL THIS WEEKEND. KOHL WAS WONDERING WHETHER THE TWELVE COULD UNDERTAKE A JOINT INITIATIVE CALLING FOR ALL HOSTAGES, NOT ONLY THOSE FROM COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, TO BE RELEASED IN LINE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE PRESIDENCY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY SEND AN ENVOY TO IRAQ TO CALL FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES.

4. I ASKED TELTSCHIK ABOUT THE POSITION ON OUR REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT

IN RELATION TO OUR DEPLOYMENT IN THE GULF. HE SAID THAT OUR REQUESTS HAD BEEN PROCESSED BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN BONN, WHOSE PROPOSALS WOULD NOW BE SUBMITTED TO KOHL. A MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD PROBABLY BE NEEDED BUT DECISION SHOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE BASIC APPROACH IN THE SUBMISSION WAS POSITIVE BUT THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO ANTICIPATE KOHL'S DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL POINTS. HE INDICATED THAT THE KEY QUESTION, WITH GERMANY FACING NEW EXPENDITURE ON MANY FRONTS, WOULD BE THE COST OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF HELP FOR US.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD MENTION THIS TO KOHL IN THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

MALLABY

YYYY

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NNNN



FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1990

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister of Kuwait, in his capacity as Chairman of the Kuwaiti People's Conference. I am not sure that any reply is necessary, in the light of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Amir, but would be grateful for advice.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

kw



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cc16
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Rich Smith

FCS/90/189

CDP

24/11

mt

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Rolls Royce: Engines for an Argentine Frigate

1. President Menem recently announced that Argentina would make a contribution to the multinational force in the Gulf. The Prime Minister wrote to President Menem on 25 September to tell him that we were grateful for this action.

at Flap A Pt 29

2. An element of the Argentines' modest contribution is the provision of a Meko Class frigate, the Almarante Brown. I understand that your officials have been asked by Rolls Royce whether they can approve the sale of spare parts for it. The frigate is powered by Rolls Royce Olympus gas turbines which are covered by the ban HMG has imposed on the sale of military-related equipment to Argentina since the Falklands Conflict. We understand from Rolls Royce that the spares are for maintenance purposes and will not improve the performance of the frigate.

3. Both your department and mine have always taken great care to ensure that the embargo is not breached. Otherwise we would leave ourselves open to the charge of double standards from friendly countries, principally the

/US

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US and the Western Europeans, whom we ask not to sell significant military equipment to Argentina. However, a refusal to Rolls Royce over the sale of equipment for this particular ship could make it impossible for the Argentines to contribute to the Gulf effort and would look petty. I therefore think that on this occasion Rolls Royce's request be treated as a special case and that an export licence for the spares be granted. We shall ensure that the licence covers spares for this frigate only.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other OD colleagues and Sir Robin Butler.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 October 1990



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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2589

OF 242355Z OCTOBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, CABINET OFFICER

M. Jila

CDP
from JSW
25/10

FCO PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/PUS AND SIR PERCY CRADOCK,
CABINET OFFICE

NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

UKMIS NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

THE GULF: AUTHORITY FOR THE MILITARY OPTION

1. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO KIMMITT ALONE ON 24 OCTOBER ABOUT THE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY IN THE UN, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER APPROACH TO AUTHORISE MILITARY ACTION.
2. KIMMITT REPEATED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED THAT ARTICLE 51 GAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION THEY DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION THROUGH. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE IMPORTANT INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE AWARE. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE OVER MILITARY ACTION (POSSIBLY THROUGH A FORMAL VOTE) IF CONGRESS COULD BE ASKED TO ACT IN SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, RATHER THAN RISK A DIFFICULT DISCUSSION ON WHERE AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTING US FORCES TO ACTION LAY UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT. BAKER HAD ALREADY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME WITH CONGRESS ON THIS ISSUE.
3. KIMMITT ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE RUN OF NOT VERY HELPFUL SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTS FOLLOWING THE UNITED STATES IN NOVEMBER, AND WITH INDIA, ZIMBABWE AND AUSTRIA COMING ON THE COUNCIL IN THE NEW YEAR, SOME THOUGHT WAS NOW BEING GIVEN TO OBTAINING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACTION, DURING THE US PRESIDENCY. THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF THIS WAS THAT OPERATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE PRESERVED. TO ACT AT THE LAST MINUTE COULD GIVE THE GAME AWAY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.
4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF KIMMITT'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED AND IF THIS COULD BE TREATED AS FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY UNTIL US REPRESENTATIVES RAISE THIS WITH US IN A MORE DEFINITE WAY.

ACLAND

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Sir P. Cradock.

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
We envisage a
30-minute visit. Mr.
Parkinson will meet you,
& accompany you round.

CAP
31/X.

1. I was delighted to hear that you plan to visit the Embargo Surveillance Centre on 1 November.

2. The Centre has been operating successfully since it was set up on 17 August in accommodation under Marsham Street normally reserved for a number of NATO civil wartime agencies. It is operated on an inter-departmental basis drawing staff from my Department, the FCO, MOD (both Royal Navy and Defence Intelligence Staff) and GCHQ.

3. Using overt and covert sources, it has two main roles. The Centre produces daily sitreps and background material on sanctions busting and sanitises material for use by Posts abroad either bilaterally with other governments or in the UN. The naval cell within the Centre gives 48 hours advance warning to WEU forces of all shipping entering the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf and Red Sea and alerts them to suspect vessels.

4. The Centre operates under the general direction of Mr David Rowlands, an Under Secretary in my Department. The naval cell is commanded by Captain Jeremy Howard and the senior officials from the FCO and the MOD are respectively Mr John Hughes and Mr Martin Holmes.

C.P.

CECIL PARKINSON

24 October 1990

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1730

OF 240145Z OCTOBER 90

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MY TELNO 1711 : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS ADOPT MY IDEA OF A LAST ATTEMPT TO GET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE INTO ISRAEL. THEY GAIN BREATHING SPACE UNTIL 24 OCTOBER.

DETAIL

2. ON THE MORNING OF 23 OCTOBER MY U S COLLEAGUE (PICKERING) TOLD ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE UP THE IDEA I HAD PUT TO HIM AND TO MAKE A LAST EFFORT WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GO TO ISRAEL. BUT FOR THIS BREATHING SPACE OF ABOUT 24 HOURS WAS NEEDED.

3. IN ORDER TO HELP SECURE THIS, WHILE CREATING AN IMPRESSION OF MOVEMENT, I THEN CIRCULATED TO ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS THE REVISED TEXT OF MY PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, TOUGHENED UP SLIGHTLY IN THE WAY OUTLINED IN PARA 8 OF MY TELNO 1695. (TEXT FAXED TO NENAD, UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT.) I ASKED FOR AN INDICATION FROM EACH COUNCIL MEMBER WHETHER THE LANGUAGE COVERED THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO BE MADE IN ANY POSITION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESPECTING THE STRONG PREFERENCE OF SOME MEMBERS FOR THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION.

4. HOWEVER WHILE I WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE ON ANOTHER ISSUE LATER IN THE MORNING I LEARNT THAT I HAD BEEN SENT A FORMAL LETTER, IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, FROM THE FOUR CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION REQUESTING A FORMAL MEETING ON 23 OCTOBER IN WHICH THE DRAFT WOULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE. ALL THE OTHER FOUR, INCLUDING PICKERING, AGREED THAT I HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUMMON INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR LATE THE SAME DAY WITH A VIEW TO PROCEEDING TO A FORMAL MEETING AND VOTE.

5. IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS APPROACHED THE MALAYSIANS AND YEMENIS WITH A PRESSING REQUEST THAT THEY HOLD OFF ACTION ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR 24 HOURS. THEY SAID THEY WERE PLANNING TO MAKE A FINAL EFFORT TO SECURE ADMISSION TO ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. TO THIS END BUSH WOULD BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO SHAMIR, BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE 24 HOURS TO SEE WHETHER THIS HAD EFFECT. AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD THE AMERICANS WOULD LIFT THEIR OBJECTIONS TO A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. AFTER CONSULTING TO PLO, THE YEMENIS AGREED TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL. AFTER SOME HESITATION THE MALAYSIANS ALSO AGREED.

7. COUNCIL MEMBERS MET FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 2130Z. PICKERING SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF CONTACTS MADE SINCE THE LAST INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, HE HAD ADVISED HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WAS INTEREST IN SEEING ANOTHER EFFORT OVER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION. HIS GOVERNMENT NOW SUGGESTED HOLDING OFF A VOTE UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF 24 OCTOBER TO PERMIT CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS TO BE PURSUED. THIS WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO DELAY AND HE HOPED THE U S REQUEST WOULD BE TREATED SERIOUSLY.

8. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF PICKERING'S INTERVENTION AND THE IMPORTANT CONTACTS THE U S GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESOLUTION, THEY HAD AGREED TO DELAY THEIR REQUEST FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL UNTIL 24 OCTOBER.

9. IT WAS AGREED THAT I WOULD CONVENE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 1915Z ON 24 OCTOBER TO BE FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL MEETING AT 2000Z. THE CO-SPONSORS INSISTED THAT A PRECISE TIME SHOULD BE FIXED AND PUBLISHED IN ADVANCE IN THE UN JOURNAL.

COMMENT

10. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS MOST AMICABLE, AND THE AMERICANS HAVE WON THEIR BREATHING SPACE. BUT UNLESS THE AMERICANS CAN PULL OFF A COUP WITH SHAMIR, THERE SEEMS NO WAY IN WHICH THEY CAN AVOID A VOTE ON 24 OCTOBER.

HANNAY

YYYY

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MY TELNO 1730: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. NEGATIVE ISRAELI REACTION TO LATEST US APPROACH OVER SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION. AMERICANS INSTRUCTED TO SEEK AMENDMENTS TO NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION, TO ENABLE THEM TO VOTE IN FAVOUR.

DETAIL

2. THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TELEPHONED EARLY ON 24 OCTOBER TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT YET SEEN ANY TELEGRAMS OUT OF TEL AVIV, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE LATEST US APPROACH HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. THE AMERICANS WERE NOW THEREFORE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A RESOLUTION WOULD COME TO A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATER IN THE DAY.

3. PICKERING SAID THAT, IN THAT PERSPECTIVE, HE HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SOME CHANGES TO THE TEXT TABLED BY THE FOUR NON-ALIGNED (TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION AS THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT IS BEING SENT BY FAX TO THE DEPARTMENT). BROADLY SPEAKING THE MAIN CHANGES THEY WERE SEEKING WOULD BE TO REMOVE THE PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 25: TO DELETE THE REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT READ OUT TO THE COUNCIL AT THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 672 ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THAT RESOLUTION: AND TO CHANGE SOME OF THE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE MISSION TO BRING IT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE NOTE WHICH I NEGOTIATED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (MY TELNO 1712 A TEXT OF COURSE NOT KNOWN TO ANYONE EXCEPT THE AMERICANS) SO THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT ASKED TO RECEIVE THE MISSION BUT TO PERMIT IT TO GO AND TO SEE ALL THOSE WHO WISHED TO SEE IT. PICKERING SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING THE MALAYSIAN AND YEMENI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES VERY SHORTLY TO TRY TO PRE-NEGOTIATE THESE CHANGES.

4. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION PICKERING SAID THAT IT WAS NOT IMPLICIT

IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS THAT, IF THESE CHANGES COULD BE MADE, THE AMERICANS WOULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION. SHOULD HOWEVER THERE BE DIFFICULTY OVER THE CHANGES HE WOULD BE DUCKING ANY QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THAT WOULD IMPLY A U S ABSTENTION OR EVEN A VETO.

5. PICKERING MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT SEEK ANY INTERVENTION BY US AS PRESIDENCY IN ADVANCE OF THIS AFTERNOON'S CONSULTATION OF THE WHOLE AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. I CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT THE CHANGES HE WOULD BE SEEKING COVERED ALL THE POINTS ON WHICH WE WISHED TO SEE THE RESOLUTION CHANGED. PICKERING SAID THAT THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS WHOM HE HAD ALSO BRIEFED. HE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE CHINESE TOO.

HANNAY

YYYY

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
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MODUK FOR DI(ROW)A2

RIOT AT SITE

1. JAMES THOMSON, ONE OF THE DETAINEES WHO LEFT WITH MR HEATH ON 23 OCTOBER, TOLD US THAT DURING HIS DETENTION HE HAD BEEN KEPT AT THREE DIFFERENT SITES: A NUCLEAR INSTALLATION, A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLANT AND A HEAVY MUNITIONS FACTORY (WE THINK THIS MAY HAVE BEEN LATIFIYA). CONDITIONS AT THE MUNITIONS PLANT HAD BEEN BAD. AFTER THE IRAQIS HAD FAILED TO RESPOND ABOUT THE STANDARD OF FOOD, WHICH APPARENTLY AMOUNTED TO NO MORE THAN RICE, BREAD AND WATER, THE DETAINEES (15 IN TOTAL) HAD GONE ON THE RAMPAGE, TEARING DOWN FENCING, SMASHING WINDOWS AND WRITING ANTI-SADDAM SLOGANS ON WALLS. THE IRAQIS HAD RESPONDED BY SEPARATING THEM AND MOVING THEM TO DIFFERENT SITES. THE RINGLEADER, A FRENCHMAN IDENTIFIED AS JEAN-JACQUES, WAS PUT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

2. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD COMPLAINTS ABOUT FOOD AT INSTALLATIONS IN IRAQ (AS OPPOSED TO KUWAIT). WE HAVE OF COURSE NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE INCIDENT BY THE IRAQIS BUT FROM THOMSON'S ACCOUNT IT APPEARS THAT ONLY THE FRENCHMAN WAS PUNISHED IN ANY WAY.

3. I SHALL BE RAISING THE QUESTION OF DETAINEES' CONDITIONS WITH THE MFA, AND SHALL SITE WHAT HAPPENED AT THE MUNITIONS PLANT.

WALKER

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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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MY TELNO 1921 AND PARIS TELNO 1275: FOREIGN NATIONALS IN IRAQ

1. AT ITS EMERGENCY MEETING YESTERDAY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED PRESIDENT SADDAM'S PROPOSAL THAT ALL FRENCH NATIONALS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IRAQ IF THEY SO WISHED.
2. ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM ASSEMBLY MEMBERS ON THE MOTIVES THAT HAD PROMPTED SADDAM TO PUT FORWARD HIS PROPOSAL, FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NOTICED SOME CHANGE IN THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO THE GULF CRISIS, BOTH ON THE OFFICIAL AND THE PUBLIC LEVELS. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS OVERTLY AND IMPLICITLY EXERTING EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. HE ADDED: '' WE HAVE HEARD CONFIRMATION THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ''. TARIQ AZIZ ALSO SAID: '' WE CANNOT SAY THAT THE FRENCH STAND IS IDENTICAL WITH IRAQ'S , BUT IT IS GETTING CLEARER AND MOVING TOWARDS PEACE''. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ALSO HAD A DIFFERENT VIEW FROM THAT OF THE REMAINDER OF THE WEST TOWARDS THE PALESTINE ISSUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT GOOD INTENTIONS HAD BEEN DETECTED IN PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
3. REVIEWING IRAQI/FRENCH RELATIONS, TARIQ AZIZ RECALLED THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN APPRECIATIVE OF THE FRENCH STAND TOWARDS IRAQ'S NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES IN 1972, AND THAT THE FRENCH HAD HELPED IRAQ TO BOOST ITS DEFENCE CAPABILITIES DURING THE GULF WAR: IRAQ/FRENCH TIES DURING THE WAR HAD BEEN ''THE BEST OF RELATIONS''.

COMMENT

4. AS THE BBC WORLD SERVICE COMMENTED THIS MORNING, THIS IS A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF ATTEMPTED WEDGE-DRIVING.

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5. FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED TO ATTEND THE MEETING AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WERE QUITE SURPRISED TO DISCOVER THAT THERE WAS SOME SEMBLANCE OF DEBATE ON THE ISSUE. FOR INSTANCE FRANCE WAS CRITICISED FOR EXPELLING IRAQI STUDENTS AND IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON DIPLOMATS. OF COURSE, HOWEVER, NOBODY WAS PREPARED TO OPPOSE THE PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATION.

6. THE FRENCH CHARGE WAS CALLED TO THE MFA AT 2030 YESTERDAY TO BE INFORMED OFFICIALLY OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DECISION, AND HOPES TO CALL AT THE MFA AGAIN TODAY TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF THE EVACUATION OF THE FRENCH NATIONALS.

WALKER

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October 1990

Dear Charles,

The Gulf

The Foreign Secretary has read your letter of 23 October to Simon Webb recording yesterday's meeting. He thought your account was admirable but he has a comment on the paragraph on the timing of military action.

The Foreign Secretary's own view, which he sought to express at the meeting, was that we would need to find some way of solving the US problem, ie their political difficulty in engaging in hostilities from a cold start. The Americans had put forward various possibilities, on which we had blown cold. The Foreign Secretary did not think that we should exclude further action in the UN Security Council on the lines of the Opinion put forward by the Solicitor General, ie this need not necessarily be under Article 42. Failing that, the Foreign Secretary put forward the idea of a secret message from President Bush to Saddam Hussein to the effect that if he did not withdraw from Kuwait he would be hit but that, if he completely fulfilled the terms of the UN Security Council Resolutions, he would not be hit. The point was made that this could lose us the important advantage of surprise. The Foreign Secretary continues to believe, however, that some such message will be needed and that further work on this is required.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sir Robin Butler.



Jans

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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24 October 1990

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Dear Aunts,

CM

Statement on the Middle East

I enclose a draft of the Foreign Secretary's Statement to the House this afternoon. This is in final form except for one or two statistics, which the MOD are kindly providing.

I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office), Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Jans,
Stephe Wall

(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD
CBE MP: 24 OCTOBER 1990

With permission, Mr Speaker, I shall make a Statement about developments in the Middle East since the Emergency Debate on 6 and 7 September.

Then, the House endorsed the Government's policy, which is that of the entire international community. Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait and the legitimate government must be restored. Iraq must release our hostages.

Since the House met, at the United Nations we have applied growing pressure to Iraq. Negotiations are now under way in New York for a further resolution, to hold Iraq liable to pay compensation for the damage resulting from its actions, including the maltreatment of foreign nationals and property.

Sanctions have been enforced, in particular by the effective blockade by allied ships now operating in the area. 104 ships from [x] countries are on constant patrol. The Royal Navy have challenged over 1,000 vessels and have taken part in 9 boarding operations. The House will wish to pay tribute to the courage and professionalism of the Royal Navy.

The United Nations will continue to tighten the screw of sanctions. We cannot relax our determination to ensure Saddam Hussein's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Since the House met, there have been many more examples of his tyranny. All the evidence suggests that, far from being under strict orders to behave with discipline in Kuwait, Iraq's soldiers have been allowed complete licence. The House will be aware that many Kuwaitis who have been able to escape their occupied country have testified to wanton destruction of property and to cruel and inhuman treatment of Kuwaiti citizens, including several murders carried out in front of wives and children, rape and torture. I remind the Iraqis once again that at all levels of authority, military or civilian, they are personally responsible under the Geneva Convention for illegal acts committed as occupiers in Kuwait.

In these circumstances, one of our first concerns has been the welfare of the eight hundred British people still in Iraq, and of the remaining substantial British community in Kuwait. In Kuwait, our Embassy, one of the last to stay open, is down to the Ambassador and one colleague. They will remain as long as they have food and water and as long as they can continue, through the warden system, to help Britons in Kuwait.

We welcome the release of British nationals in response to the humanitarian appeal by my rt hon Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup. But this carefully calculated gesture by Saddam Hussein is not enough. All of our nationals - all foreign nationals - should be allowed to leave Iraq. I admire the courage of those detained or in hiding in Iraq and Kuwait and of their families here. Our Embassies have helped organise the evacuation of over 900 women and children and we are doing what we can to ensure that those who remain in Iraq have the money and comforts they need.

The situation is particularly agonising for families here at home. We are working in the closest cooperation with the Gulf Support Group to provide as much help and information as we can. We cannot work miracles. But my staff and that of the Embassy in Baghdad are working round the clock on these problems. Where complaints have been made, we are investigating them urgently. Where there is room for improvement, we are making those improvements as quickly as we can.

We should not forget that the plight of our hostages is caused by Saddam Hussein. It is he who is playing a cat and mouse game with them. He must be in no doubt that the British Government and this Parliament cannot be blackmailed.

The United States and Britain moved fast immediately after the invasion of Kuwait to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries from the threat of attack. Since then, a unique coalition of forces has been established in the Gulf consisting of [x] men from [y] countries. My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced on 14 September the deployment of the 7th Armoured Brigade (the Desert Rats) and of more Tornado aircraft. This will bring the total number of British forces committed to the Gulf to some 16,000. They have the support and gratitude of this House and of the countries of the region.

Saddam Hussein will seek to cling on to the country which he has acquired by force or to negotiate his way out so that he can claim some gain from his aggression. He has tried to sow disunity among the coalition ranged against him, with a variety of bogus peace plans, delaying tactics and smokescreens. One of these is his attempt to present himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause. In fact, the Palestinian cause has been set back by Iraq's aggression and the credibility of the PLO has been damaged by their ambivalent response to it.

Some have suggested that Saddam Hussein should be persuaded to withdraw from Kuwait in exchange for an international conference on the Middle East. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Gulf and the government of Kuwait have all firmly rejected that suggestion. There can be no reward for aggression. Iraq's withdrawal must be complete and unconditional. But Members of this House and the British Government have long argued the urgent need to find a lasting settlement in the Middle East. Once Iraq is out of Kuwait, we must return to this issue. The policy of the British Government is clear and is the one I re-stated during my recent visit, that is self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to live in peace behind secure borders.

The killing of 21 Palestinians on the Dome of the Rock or Temple Mount on 8 October and the subsequent murder of Israelis underlines the tragedy of the Arab/Israel dispute. The cycle of violence is repeating itself. I hope the government of Israel may yet agree to accept the UN Secretary General's mission to investigate those killings. To do otherwise will risk diverting the Security Council from its main task - getting Iraq out of Kuwait - and will give Saddam Hussein a cause which he will exploit ruthlessly.

Mr Speaker, our aim remains Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. At a meeting of the Kuwaiti ruling family and their people in Jeddah earlier this month, there was an impressive display of the loyalty of all Kuwaitis and of the unity which the crisis has produced. The Kuwaitis have announced their intention to implement in full the 1962 democratic constitution when the legitimate government is restored. Many will welcome that decision, which was taken freely by Kuwaitis. In the meantime, the pressures on Saddam Hussein remain diplomatic isolation, the economic blockade and the threat of forcible expulsion from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's choice is simple: retreat or defeat. The Government, and doubtless this House, strongly hope that the restoration of Kuwait will be achieved without further bloodshed. But the daily destruction of Kuwait and the murder of its people continue. We are tightening the screw of peaceful pressures but we will not shirk from our part in the alternative course if that course finally becomes necessary.

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cc MASTER.

23 October 1990

THE GULF

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary this evening about some of the major issues which need to be addressed in advance of any military operations against Iraq. The discussion took place on the basis of the note which the Defence Secretary produced at the meeting (of which the Foreign Secretary and I also hold copies). The note should now be further worked up to take account of points made in the discussion, as recorded in this letter. Meanwhile, the note and my letter can serve as guidance for CDS' meetings with General Colin Powell over the next two days.

This letter contains highly secret and sensitive material. It should be seen in the MOD only by the Secretary of State, CDS, yourself and two other named officials: in the FCO only by the Foreign Secretary and his Private Secretary: and in the Cabinet Office only by Sir Robin Butler. I will show a copy to Sir Percy Cradock.

Strategic Objectives

Before seeing the Defence Secretary's note, the Prime Minister defined our strategic objectives in the following terms:

- Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait;
- the legitimate government to be restored;
- release of the hostages;
- compensation to be paid by Iraq;
- those responsible for atrocities to be accountable for them;

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- Iraq's NBC capability to be eliminated (in the event of hostilities) or dismantled (in the event of peaceful withdrawal)
- maintenance of the widest possible alliance of Arab governments against Iraq;
- avoidance of Israeli involvement;
- establishment of a regional security structure to constrain Iraq in future.

It was noted that these objectives broadly paralleled those in paragraphs 2 to 6 of the Defence Secretary's note. It would not be a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership, although that would be a desirable side-effect of our actions. We should aim for a situation where Saddam Hussein had to face his people as a beaten leader.

It was clear that military action to free Kuwait would involve striking targets in Iraq: we should be prepared to attack Iraq to the degree necessary to secure complete withdrawal from Kuwait and to destroy weapons which could be used against us now or in the future. Once military action was undertaken, therefore, we should aim to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capability as completely as possible.

More widely, it should not be our policy to use "scorched earth" tactics. But further work needed to be done on defining precise targets. While purely civilian targets should be avoided, it was for consideration whether power stations and dams should be regarded as legitimate targets. There was a consensus that desalination plants should be avoided.

It was agreed that our ground forces might have to enter southern Iraq in order to attack Iraqi forces involved in holding Kuwait. They might also need to enter Iraq in hot pursuit of Iraqi forces. But there was no intention that our forces should occupy any part of Iraqi territory.

It was noted that we needed to refine our planning for two further situations:

- where Iraq withdrew completely from Kuwait. We would then have to consider how to constrain or dismantle Iraq's NBC capability. This would involve at the least the continuation of sanctions and no doubt other measures. We would want to maintain the widest possible alliance against Iraq.
- where Iraq withdrew from most of Kuwait, but continued to occupy a part of it. In these circumstances we would have to develop new military plans for ejecting Iraq from the remainder. It was noted that little work had yet been done on the implications of this.

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Co-ordination with Allies

The vital importance of keeping the French and the principal Arab forces with us, so that military action did not become a purely US/UK operation was emphasised. This would mean that we must find a way to involve them in co-ordination and planning. Without this there would be a very considerable risk of confusion. This was a priority issue for discussion with the Americans, together with the other points identified in paragraph 8 of the Defence Secretary's note. We had a major interest in avoiding being a party to a shambles.

Guidance to military commanders

Further work was needed - as recorded above - in relation to the choice of targets mentioned in paragraph 9(c). In relation to 9(d), it was noted that many military targets were in civilian areas. This raised the question whether some sort of warning should be given, at least in phases 2 and 3, to minimise civilian casualties.

The position of hostages, dealt with in 9(f), would be of intense public interest. It was recognised that the prospects of being able to exfiltrate them immediately before or during military operations were negligible. Consideration should be given to alternative methods of attack against legitimate targets where this might save hostage lives. But it was recognised that we could not allow ourselves to be deflected from our overall strategic objectives by the presence of hostages; and that there was broad bipartisan understanding for this in Parliament.

Treatment of Embassies

A point not covered in the Defence Secretary's note was what action, if any, we envisaged in relation to our Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi Embassy in London. It was unlikely to be practical to secure the withdrawal of our Embassy before a conflict. Depending on their treatment, we would need to have ready options for dealing with the Iraqi Embassy here.

Timing of Military Action

It was agreed that we should seek to lead the Americans towards acceptance that we could not not afford indefinite delay and that military action would in all likelihood have to be initiated before the end of the year. It was recognised that the US Administration found great difficulty in the idea of hostilities from a 'cold start'. This continued to incline them towards seeking prior authorisation for the use of force from the United Nations. We would have to continue to try to wean them from this, relying instead on Article 51.

Briefing of other Ministers

It was agreed that, as the possibility of military action drew closer, a slightly wider circle of senior Ministers would need to be brought into the discussions. The Prime Minister

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

said that she would take steps to brief the Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Transport Secretary and perhaps others. A full Cabinet would be needed before a final decision to initiate hostilities.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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TO: Mr Powell

JHW 24/10
7

FROM: David Lidington

DATE: 23 October 1990

Mr Whittingdale
No 10

IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. As I expect you know, Peter Gummer and his senior colleagues from Shandwicks have been giving us some informal (and of course unpaid) advice on the media and domestic political handling of the crisis.

2. Last Thursday, Mr Charles Jones, Managing Director of Shandwicks' US businesses, came with Mr Gummer to the Foreign Office. Mr Waldegrave has asked me to send you a copy of my note recording Mr Jones's comment on the state of US public opinion. This is enclosed and I should be grateful if you could pass a copy on to Charles Powell and any others in No 10 who have an interest.





David Lidington
Special Adviser

7. Mr Jones said that back in August the American public had supported Bush because of the international nature of the response to the Iraqi invasion and, most importantly, because of oil. The key thought then in American minds was "we are never going to put up with a situation where we have to queue for gas again". But public attention span was short. The issue was losing its emotional appeal and it was therefore harder for Bush to find public support. The troop deployments in the Gulf region were giving people in the States the impression that Saddam had been contained and most Americans would not know where to find Kuwait on a map let alone feel strongly about its liberation. However, public attention could easily be aroused again if the right emotional focus were forthcoming. Mr Jones' best guess was that Bush, as an old CIA hand, could ask Webster to find him a pretext for military action on a given date. The high moral tone struck by Bush in recent speeches, especially his references to the atrocities being carried out by the Iraqis in Kuwait, were another sign that the President was now seeking to engage public opinion on a more emotional level. The key unknown factor in this equation was Israel. The American public felt very strongly about Israel and would certainly, in Mr Jones' view, support wholeheartedly a war designed to defend Israel against Iraq. Americans might even tolerate the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq if Israel had been attacked using chemical weapons. The problem for Bush, if it did come to war, was less casualties than duration. Mr Jones said his own view was that the American public would tolerate 25,000 US servicemen killed provided that the war was fought in what they believed to be a just cause, and that it was won fairly quickly. He thought that six months was the maximum period of time in which Bush could count on public support for a continuing military war. Mr Jones promised to keep in touch with me from time to time with his thoughts on US public opinion.



David Lidington
Special Adviser

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3085</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

1. Key objectives this week are:

- to continue to demonstrate the brutality of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, as new accounts of atrocities emerge;
- to emphasise that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait one way or another: the use of force remains a real option; and
- to counter linkage with the Arab-Israel dispute.

2. The Iraqis are now trying to divert international attention from these themes to the plight of their Western hostages. The Amir of Kuwait's visit on 23 October is a useful peg for us to offer the overseas media material on our own themes.

3. We are maintaining close contact with the Association for Free Kuwait (AFK) and the Campaign for Free Kuwait in London. These organisations are becoming more effective at public relations and have been helpful in providing speakers and film for our television output. Mr Waldegrave will take part in an AFK photo-call outside the House of Commons on 25 October, to underline Government and Parliamentary support for the Kuwaiti cause.

4. The Kuwait Government have not yet taken up our offer of advice about mobile broadcasting equipment probably because of the limited range of such equipment. Probably this is because the Kuwaitis have been given time on a Saudi transmitter and offered time by the Egyptians.

5. Feedback on our information campaign in the region has been positive; the local media in the UAE and Egypt, among others, have made wide use of our output, commented favourably on it, and suggested further material which we shall provide.

6. Briefing Material

In the week beginning 15 October we circulated:

- a) a new edition of the FCO briefing notes :
- b) a background brief refuting Iraq's claims to Kuwait:
- c) texts of the Foreign Secretary's speeches and interviews during his visit to the Middle East for distribution by posts overseas.

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7. Television

a) The third programme in our series about the occupation of Kuwait was distributed last week. It concentrates on atrocities, taking account of the Amnesty International report, and incorporates recent amateur footage of destruction inside Kuwait made by an Iraqi refugee who also gives his eye-witness account of the murder by Iraqi soldiers of a Jordanian trying to protect his family. The whole series is being shown on the main evening news in Egypt and has been widely used elsewhere. We shall add to the series as new material becomes available.

b) We are suggesting to British TV companies that Panorama or World in Action might consider making a programme based on material from the series.

8. Radio

a) We have made a study of broadcasting and listening patterns in the Gulf area; this will help ensure as far as possible that our message reaches target audiences, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, as the situation develops.

b) In response to a request for further material by Radio Monte Carlo, a popular Arabic language station in the Gulf, we have supplied a piece about the looting of art treasures and the destruction of cultural life in Kuwait by the Iraqis. More will follow.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
23 October 1990

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
4. What happens if sanctions do not work
5. Chronology of main events
6. Reference papers

NOTE: Papers 3-5, 7 and 8, and Annexes 1-3 from the last edition of these notes are not being reissued until there have been significant developments which make changes to them necessary. Posts should retain papers from the edition of 11 October for reference purposes until amended versions are issued.

(Revision)

18 October 1990

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

1. KEY POINTS

- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
- Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
- "You don't negotiate with someone who marches into another country, devastates it, killing whoever stands in the way. You get him out, make him pay, and see that he is never in a position to do these things again" (Prime Minister, Bournemouth, 12 October).
- Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
- Saddam Hussein cannot win: a record of failure. Invasion of Kuwait a miscalculation like 8 years war with Iran, which left Iraq with 100,000 dead and 250,000 wounded, a \$80 bn deficit and ultimately no gains at all.
- Armoury of international pressures in place: they are formidable, and will grow to become even more comprehensive.
- If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
- Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force; they will leave when asked to do so.
- Iraq's action against Kuwait damaged Palestinian interests by diverting international and particularly US attention from Arab/Israel.
- Shootings in Jerusalem on 8 October refocussed world attention on Arab/Israel. But, contrary to Iraqi claims, no linkage between Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel.
- International consensus on Iraq/Kuwait unshaken by events in Jerusalem.
- "Our Arab partners feel anxiety, feel anger ... but they are not deflected from the task of reversing the aggression against their Kuwaiti brothers" (Mr Hurd, speaking to the Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).
- PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.

- Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
- Once present crisis over, a solution must be found to Arab/Israel. SCR 672 demonstrates international resolve to tackle Arab/Israel problem.
- "The aggression against Kuwait is now the main obstacle to sensible diplomacy ... over the Arab/Israel dispute" (Mr Hurd, speaking to Egyptian Diplomatic Club in Cairo, 14 October).
- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 8 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that its annexation of Kuwait is null and void. Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state

SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.
- Saddam Hussein's hostages have not fought against him. He has deliberately exposed them to danger (transport to sites). Shamed into freeing women and children but still deprives sick and elderly of freedom. Denied food to Asian workers in Kuwait.

IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRs (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670)

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Arab solution tried before, during and after invasion: not successful. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.

EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 80 billion before invasion of Kuwait).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.

FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs."
- But reports from Iraq indicate that while some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at bakeries) Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock. Markets being stocked from pillaged Kuwait.
- Iraqi Government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Attempted blackmail of their governments (no evacuation ships accepted without food) cynical. But some 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility.
- Iraq has rejected an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.
- Iraq has similarly refused permission for the visit of the UN Secretary General's representatives to find out whether there is a humanitarian need for emergency food shipments and to check on the condition of Kuwaitis, diplomats and foreign nationals.
- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers.

WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them - over 1,000 kms.

PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "I do not think that new initiatives over Palestine can take place until Saddam Hussein has been driven out of Kuwait ... This is unfinished business to which we must return as soon as the aggressor has withdrawn or been expelled. Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).
- British government shocked by violence in Jerusalem on 9 October.
- With EC partners have issued statement deploring "use of excessive force by Israeli occupying forces ...".
- UN SCR 672 demonstrates international condemnation of excessive force by Israeli police, and authorises Secretary General to send mission to Israel to investigate incident and developments in occupied territories.
- "There is only one man who, in his warped way, might have taken satisfaction from the events in Jerusalem, and that is President Saddam Hussein ... He sees the plight of the Palestinians as ... a weapon which he can pick and let fall at whim ... The aggression against Kuwait is now the main obstacle to sensible diplomacy ... over the Arab-Israel dispute" (Mr Hurd to Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).
- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Saddam Hussein has killed his own colleagues in government; he has used guns and gas on the Kurds.

- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam assumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- For Palestinians to throw in their lot with Saddam Hussein plays into hands of Israeli opponents of withdrawal and international settlement, alienates moderates in Israel with whom Arabs/Palestinians will have to talk.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)

MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September, and expressed:
 - o strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It was inadmissible that Muslims should commit acts of aggression against each other;
 - o a call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government;
 - o a call to the Iraqi government to abide by international law in respect of persons, property and foreign Embassies in Kuwait;
 - o Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. When Iraq withdrew and the threat to the Kingdom receded, the foreign forces must be withdrawn;
 - o a call for the establishment of a permanent Islamic force within the framework of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to deal with future crises between Islamic countries. Young people in Islamic countries should receive military training to enable them to participate in the defence of Islam;

- o a call to governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.

THE FUTURE

- If and when the Saudis, the Bahrainis, any others, ask us to leave, we will leave. "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait as it must and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.
- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and representatives of opposition groups in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait with the prospect of a more representative system of government.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

3. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew. Invasion has resulted in collapse of public order.
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence plates, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- Amnesty International reported on 3 October that Iraqi forces have executed and tortured scores of people in Kuwait, and hundreds more were being detained. Repressive measures include killing in streets and in presence of victims' families, summary executions, random mass arrests, destruction of homes.
- Amnesty testified to US Congressional Human Rights caucus (10 October). After summarising organisation's concerns about Iraq's human rights record prior to invasion, gave further account of repression in Kuwait. People being tortured by Iraqi military and intelligence personnel said to include Iraqi Shia muslims with suspected links with opposition group al-Dawa Al Islamiyya (membership of this group is capital offence in Iraq). Many individual cases of torture, abuse, summary execution cited. Victims include boys as young as 13. Reported group executions including shooting at peaceful protest group of about 35 women and young people in early August.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein erected around the city.
- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.
- Kuwaiti Oil Minister has said Iraqis have mined oil installations and refineries.
- Iraqis have now organised formal requisitioning system, so that goods from Kuwait continue to flow to markets in Iraq.
- But Iraqi News Agency reported that Saddam Hussein, on 3 October, walked about in the streets of Kuwait city "familiarising himself with its landmarks which were resplendent, reflecting pride in the city's return to the homeland".
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty.

- Kuwaiti resistance scaled down due to Iraqi reprisals, but Kuwait airport temporarily closed to civilian traffic following rocket attack on Iraqi aircraft.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (\$1.6 bn in gold and foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Saddam Hussein's treatment of foreign workers inhumane and barbarous. He has treated Asian workers without any human dignity, and is now using their circumstances to attempt to blackmail governments into breaching the embargo.
- Iraq has encouraged the emigration of Kuwaitis, whose homes and positions have reportedly been given to Iraqis and Palestinians. Of 700,000 Kuwaitis in the Emirate at the time of the August invasion, only 300,000 are thought to be left.
- Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was unique in post-World War II history. Not only had Iraq overrun a sovereign independent member state of the UN and attempted to annex it by force, it had also tried to erase the name and existence of Kuwait from the world political map and destroy its political, economic and social structures. "Rape, destruction, terror and torture were the Iraqi rule of the day in Kuwait".
- Iraq is doing little to help thousands of people blocked at its borders. But it has rejected offer from International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, have however, been helpful.
- Similarly Iraq has refused permission for visit of UN to find out whether there is an humanitarian need for emergency food shipments, and to check on condition of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Kuwait (including diplomats).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jeddah from 13-16 October united the Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and the opposition in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait, with the prospect of a more representative system of government.
- Crown Prince Saad said that the leadership would respond to the hopes and aspirations of the people to follow liberation, including a major role for women.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

4. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- Sanctions can work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Hope to achieve objective peacefully, but use of force cannot be ruled out. "We are not precluded by reason of the SCR from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law - I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- "If there is some kind of provocation against US forces or our friends in the area, there is no question but that the President has all the authority he needs to defend our forces and defend our interests" (Mr Cheney on "Newsmaker Saturday" on 6 October).
- Bush-Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "If Iraq does not meet these non-negotiable conditions (immediate withdrawal of forces from Kuwait, restoration of the Kuwaiti government and release of foreign hostages), then its isolation will not end. We are prepared to take additional steps if sanctions and the quest for a political solution do not work" (President Bush in San Francisco on 19 September).
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power "to suppress acts of aggression. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "Saddam Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait. He does not have a choice ... the only choice is whether to leave of his own free will or to leave at the point of a gun" (Mr Hurd to Egypt's Diplomatic Club in Cairo on 14 October).
- "I know we have to be ready for any contingency, and we shall be ... that man must leave Kuwait, the legitimate government must be restored, and he must pay for the damage and harm he has done in Kuwait and elsewhere ... there is no more room for negotiation now" (Mrs Thatcher in New York on 1 October).
- "The growing certainty there should be in his (Saddam Hussein's) own mind that he is going to have to go, one way or the other, and what we will have to do is take stock whether those pressures are actually going to do the job or whether the military option should be pursued" (Mr Hurd on Breakfast TV on 11 October).

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

5. CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS

- 17-18 Jul Saddam Hussein accuses Kuwait and other Gulf states of deliberately depressing the price of oil and of going against OPEC quota arrangements; demands Kuwait compensate Iraq for \$2,400 million of oil allegedly stolen from the disputed Rumaila oilfield.
- 24 Jul Iraq sends 30,000 heavily armed troops to the Kuwait border.
- 27 Jul OPEC settle on \$21 a barrel target price.
- 31 Jul Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations meet for talks in Saudi Arabia.
- 1 Aug Iraq walks out of talks.
- 2 Aug Iraqi troops invade Kuwait: claims that it intervened in Kuwait in response to a request from "democratic government of Kuwait" which had overthrown the Al Sabah family
- 2 Aug "Provisional Free Kuwait Government" issues communique dismissing the Emir and dissolving the National Council; the Emir of Kuwait flees to Saudi Arabia.
- 2 Aug United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts Security Council Resolution (SCR) 660 condemning Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- 3 Aug Arab League Foreign Ministers condemn Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by majority vote.
- 4 Aug Islamic Conference Organisation condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- 6 Aug UNSC adopts SCR 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq (13:0:2, Yemen and Cuba abstaining).
- 7 Aug "Provisional Free Kuwait Government" proclaims Kuwait a republic; decrees parity between Kuwaiti and Iraqi dinars, implying devaluation of Kuwaiti dinar to one-twelfth of its former value.
- 7 Aug US deploys troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia.
- 8 Aug Iraq announces "unification" of Iraq and Kuwait (ie annexation of Kuwait).
- 9 Aug Kuwaiti-drafted SCR 662 unanimously adopted - declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as null and void.

- 9 Aug Secretary of State for Defence gives details of British forces to be deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region.
- 9 Aug Iraqis announce that diplomatic missions in Kuwait must close and move their activities to Baghdad by 24 August.
- 10 Aug Emergency Arab Summit meets in Cairo: tough resolution calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, military assistance for Saudi Arabia and sanctions against Iraq; Iraq, Libya and PLO vote against, Algeria and Yemen abstain, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania enter reservations.
- 12 Aug Saddam Hussein announces "peace initiative" (Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdraws from the Occupied Territories and if Israel and Syria withdraw from Lebanon).
- 14 Aug Saddam Hussein offers to accept Iranian terms for a comprehensive settlement of Iraq's conflict with Iran; proposes withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Iranian territory starting 17 August, full exchange of POWs and resolution of the dispute over sovereignty over Shatt Al-Arab waterway on basis proposed by Iran.
- 18 Aug SCR 664 unanimously adopted, condemning Iraqi actions against the foreign communities in Kuwait and Iraq.
- 25 Aug UNSC adopts SCR 665 on the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq (13:0:2, Yemen and Cuba abstain).
- 28 Aug Iraqi authorities declare that Kuwait has been made the nineteenth province of Iraq, with Kuwait city renamed Kadhima; northern Kuwait incorporated in Basra liwa.
- 30 Aug President Bush announces plan for "burden sharing".
- 4-5 Sept US Secretary Baker calls for new regional security structure in Gulf to contain aggressors and recognises need for progress on Arab/Israel dispute.
- 12 Sept UN Secretary General appoints Sadruddin Aga Khan his "personal representative for humanitarian assistance" (relief co-ordinator).
- 13 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 666 on food supplies to Iraq and Kuwait under strict international control and supervision (13:2:0, Cuba and Yemen vote against).
- 14 Sept UK decides to send 7th Armoured Brigade to Saudi Arabia and additional RAF units (18 Tornado aircraft) to Gulf.

- 14 Sept Iraqi troops enter French Ambassador's residence in Kuwait. Had earlier entered Dutch Ambassador's residence (12/9) and Canadian Embassy (13/9). EC statement and demarche.
- 16 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 667 condemning Iraqi intrusions into Embassies in Kuwait.
- 17 Sept UK orders expulsion of Iraqi Military Attaché and staff and deportation of 23 other Iraqis.
- 19 Sept Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan abandons UN aid mission after Iraq refuses him entry.
- 21 Sept Iraq orders the expulsion of some 40 diplomatic staff from Baghdad, including Military Attachés of the EC, US and Egypt.
- 23 Sept Iraqis threaten action against Middle East oilfields and Israel if sanctions stifle Iraq.
- 23 Sept Iraqi authorities withdraw the Kuwaiti dinar from circulation.
- 24 Sept President Mitterrand addresses UN General Assembly, puts forward four-stage peace plan.
- 25 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 670 imposing air embargo on Iraq.
- 25 Sept Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze addresses UNGA: indicates that the Soviet Union will back the use of force if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait, proposes formation of a "rapid response force" under the Security Council.
- 26 Sept Foreign Secretary addresses UNGA, mentions idea of a new regional security system in the Gulf after Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- 1 Oct President Bush addresses UNGA, talks of opportunity to settle Arab/Israel dispute as well as for Iraq and Kuwait to settle differences.
- 1 Oct EC Foreign Ministers agree in New York on financial assistance to countries most affected by crisis.
- 3 Oct Saddam Hussein visits occupied Kuwait.
- 4 Oct Foreign Secretary, speaking to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association in London, says no hope of progress on Palestinian issue until Saddam Hussein is driven out of Kuwait, but it must be tackled as soon as Gulf crisis is resolved.
- 7 Oct Some 21 Palestinians are shot by Israeli security forces in Jerusalem.

8 Oct

Saddam Hussein, in statement about Palestinian deaths, warns that Iraq has missiles capable of striking targets well within Israel "when the time of reckoning comes".

13-17
Oct

Foreign Secretary visits Cairo and Tel Aviv/Jerusalem.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

6. REFERENCE PAPERS

Verbatims

- VS 41/90 Extracts from transcript of Prime Minister's interview to "Frost on Sunday" programme, TV-AM, 2 September
- VS 42/90 Prime Minister's speech to House of Commons, 6 September
- VS 43/90 Foreign Secretary's speech to House of Commons, 7 September
- VS 48/90 Passage in Foreign Secretary's speech to UNGA, New York, 26 September
- VS 50/90 "Palestine: the other Middle East problem": speech by Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October

Guidance

- No 47/90
50/90
52/90
61/90

Retracts

Extensive daily coverage of Ministerial statements, spokesman etc. Following are some recent key pieces:

- Foreign Secretary's various briefings, interviews in New York, 25 September
- "Options available": transcript of Foreign Secretary's discussion with Arab journalists, New York, 27 September
- Statement and press conference by Defence Secretary, 1 October
- Transcript of interviews given by Foreign Secretary in New York to BBC Radio and IRN, 2 October

Survey of Current Affairs

August 1990, p.277: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

The Gulf Crisis: Briefing Notes

- Saddam Hussein's record
- International reactions to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Kuwait: consequences of the Iraqi invasion
- Iraqi claims to Kuwait

Video Material

- Kuwait refugees
- Inside Kuwait
- Kuwait: the atrocities

89

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MR POWELL, NO 10

cc. Sir Robin Butler

IRAQI MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

1. The MOD tell us that they have just been telephoned by the DIA in Washington to say they have for the first time identified (presumably from their latest satellite pass) a SCUD-type missile deployed on a fixed launcher at a site in western Iraq (ie facing Israel). There are several command and control vehicles nearby. That is all DIA know at present.

2. The missile is believed to be one of the longer-range SCUD derivatives, the *Al-Abbas*, which is thought to have a range of some 600 Kms carrying a 200-lb warhead (see map).

3. It seems unlikely that the Iraqis would want to fire a single missile at Israel: in any case, if they had intended to, Iraq would surely have already done so at once. Possible explanations include:

- this is *not* a singleton: the imagery has simply not picked up other deployments yet;
- it is a tactic to provoke an Israeli pre-emptive strike;
- it is a training practice-run.

4. We do not yet know whether the Americans have told the Israelis (see our paper of 6 September on the risk of an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Iraqi missiles), but we expect that they will have done so.

Christopher MacRae

A C D S MacRAE

23 October 1990


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- | Missile Complex | |
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| 1 | Zawr Hawran |
| 2 | Wadi Amij |
| 3 | Qasr Amij West |
| 4 | Qasr Amij East |
| 5 | Shuayb Al Awaj |
| 6 | Wadi Al Jabariyah |
| 7 | Wadi Ar Ratqa |
| 8 | Wadi Hawran |
| 9 | H2 Airfield |
| Other Facilities | |
| 10 | Poss SSM Storage Facility |
| 11 | SSM Support Facility |
| 12 | SSM Equipment Prod. Facility |
| 13 | H3 Airfield |



13

34°

32°

48°



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1990

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the Japanese Prime Minister about the situation in the Gulf. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SA

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 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING

MY TELNO 1683: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION

1. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET TO DISCUSS OTHER BUSINESS ON 22 OCTOBER, THERE WAS A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF OUR NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. NO-ONE QUESTIONED MY SUGGESTION THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE WE WOULD HAVE TO FIND WAYS OF DEALING IN PARALLEL WITH THE GULF CRISIS AND THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: BOTH WOULD FIGURE CONTINUOUSLY ON THE COUNCIL'S AGENDA.

2. IT WAS AGREED TENTATIVELY THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD ON 23 OCTOBER, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WITH OUR BRIEFINGS FOR THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE OTHER THREE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THERE WAS SOME EXPECTATION OF THIS AMONG OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS. WE WOULD TAKE A FINAL DECISION WHEN WE COULD SEE HOW MATTERS STOOD ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT WAS NOTED THAT SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN HAD ASKED FOR TWO REFERENCES TO HIMSELF TO BE DROPPED FROM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD MAKE STILL MORE REMOTE HIS CHANCES OF BEING ADMITTED TO IRAQ. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS.

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MY TELNO 1690 : NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT : MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) MEMBERS. INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 848 CARRIED OUT.

DETAIL

2. POLITICAL COUNSELLORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET ON THE MORNING OF 22 OCTOBER TO PURSUE DISCUSSION ON THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF MSC MEMBERS. WE WERE UNABLE TO SECURE A POSTPONEMENT OF THE MEETING PENDING RECEIPT OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS, AS OTHER PARTICIPANTS INSISTED ON GOING AHEAD. ACCORDINGLY WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE COULD ONLY LISTEN AND REPORT. WE EMPHASISED THAT THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION WERE REGARDED IN LONDON AS BEING OF GREAT SENSITIVITY, AND THAT WE FULLY RESERVED OUR POSITION.

TIMING OF THE MEETING

3. IT WAS NOTED THAT EVENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE WEEKEND MADE IT STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE COMPLETED ACTION ON THE NEXT STEPS RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. THIS MEANT THAT THE TIMING OF THE MEETING OF MSC MEMBERS REMAINED UNCERTAIN: IT MIGHT TAKE PLACE AT THE END OF THE WEEK AT THE EARLIEST, BUT MORE PROBABLY IT WOULD SLIP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER. THE CHINESE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE VERY UNHAPPY IF THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF HOLDING THE MEETING OVER TO THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, WHEN THEY WOULD BECOME CO-ORDINATORS OF THE FIVE AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO CHAIR THE MEETING.

PARTICIPATION

4. THE FRENCH CONFIRMED THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE ADMIRAL

COATANEA, WHOM THEY DESCRIBED AS NO 5 IN THE MILITARY HIERARCHY. THE RUSSIANS STILL COULD SUPPLY NO NAME, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE A DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF.

AGENDA

5. OUR FRENCH CO-ORDINATOR CIRCULATED THE DRAFT OF A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING. (THIS WAS A LITTLE CHANGED FROM THE U S DRAFT FAXED TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT BEFORE THE WEEKEND.) SOME FURTHER AMENDMENTS WERE PROPOSED BY THE OTHER THREE. THE RUSSIANS ATTEMPTED TO HAVE THE MEETING IDENTIFIED WITH THE 'APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS OF THE MSC' REFERRED TO IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 OF SCR 665, BUT DID NOT PRESS THE POINT. THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE ANXIOUS TO STRESS THE INFORMAL NATURE OF THE MEETING. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE ANTICIPATED SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION, WHICH THEY WISHED TO SEE MORE DIRECTLY FOCUSED ON THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IT WAS AGREED TO SUBMIT THE REVISED TEXT TO AMBASSADORS AND CAPITALS AND TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS (TEXT IN MIFT). THE CHINESE SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT THE TEXT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AS A DESCRIPTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE MEETING FOR INTERNAL USE, BUT THAT THEIR INSTINCT WAS TO KEEP ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SHORTER AND LESS SPECIFIC.

COMMUNIQUE

6. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH MIGHT BE PRODUCED AFTER THE MEETING. THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THIS NEED GO NO FURTHER THAN THE TERMS OF THE EARLIER PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE FRENCH AND RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THAT A LITTLE MORE WAS NECESSARY, IF ONLY TO INDICATE IN GENERAL TERMS WHAT AREAS THE DISCUSSION HAD COVERED. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FIVE WOULD NEED TO AGREE IN ADVANCE ON THE LINE TO TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE MOST OBVIOUS FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS (FOR EXAMPLE TO STRESS THAT THE MEETING DID NOT REPRESENT ANY FORMAL REACTIVATION OF THE MSC).

OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

7. THE AMERICANS RECALLED SUGGESTIONS AT THE EARLIER DISCUSSION AMONG AMBASSADORS (MY TUR) THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO TWO MILITARY AND TWO CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES: AND THAT MILITARY PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT WEAR UNIFORM: AND THEY ADDED A SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL PRESS BRIEFING OR OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDIA COVERAGE. THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION, BUT OTHER PARTICIPANTS DID NOT SEEM DISPOSED TO QUESTION ANY OF THESE POINTS.

MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE

8. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 848 I ASKED FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE TO BE ARRANGED. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE SEEKING CERTAIN ASSURANCES IN RELATION TO THE PROPOSED MEETING: THAT IT WOULD NOT DISCUSS COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS: IT WOULD NOT SEEK TO CONSTRAIN ANY FUTURE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE GULF, FOR EXAMPLE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER: AND THAT NOTHING ON THE AGENDA COULD LEAD INTO SUCH AREAS. THE MEETING SHOULD BE CONFINED TO ACTIVITIES IN PURSUIT OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME SET OUT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE COULD GIVE ME ON A PERSONAL BASIS THE ASSURANCES I SOUGHT, BUT WOULD SEEK CONFIRMATION FROM WASHINGTON. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) AND LI (CHINA) SAID THEY HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN GIVING THESE ASSURANCES. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. I SAID THAT SUBJECT TO RECEIVING FORMAL ASSURANCES FROM ALL FOUR THE UK REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETING WOULD BE THE DEFENCE ATTACHE FROM WASHINGTON.

9. I THEN TURNED TO THE PROPOSED PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT IN MIFT. OBJECTIVE 3 IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD GO OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MEETING AS WE SAW THEM. LI AGREED. HE SAID THE CHINESE APPROACH TO ALL THESE CONSULTATIONS WAS CONDITIONAL ON TWO POINTS: THEY WERE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MSC MEMBERS AND WOULD REMAIN IN THAT FORMAT, AND THE MEETINGS SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. LI THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

'THE OBJECTIVES OF THEIR MEETING WOULD BE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON:

1. THE SITUATION IN THE GULF REGION:

2. THEIR ACTIVITIES IN ENFORCING THE SANCTIONS REGIME SET OUT IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 661, 665 AND 670.'

(OBJECTIVE 3 WOULD BE DELETED.)

LI ADDED THE REQUEST THAT THE TITLE OF THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO READ 'INFORMAL MEETING'

10. THERE WAS NO FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, ALTHOUGH VORONTSOV AND BLANC EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE INFORMATION I HAD GIVEN THE MEETING. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A COMMUNIQUE AFTER THE MEETING: ITS IMPACT WOULD BE GREATER IF NOTHING AT ALL WAS SAID. ON TIMING, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE NEXT IRAQ/KUWAIT

RESOLUTION MADE IT DESIRABLE TO TREAT THE MSC MEETING AS A SEPARATE EXERCISE: IT MIGHT BE HELD ON THE AFTERNOON OF 29 OCTOBER, WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE ON THE MORNING OF THE SAME DAY.

11. WE AGREED THAT THESE NEW POINTS SHOULD BE PUT TO CAPITALS OVERNIGHT. WE SHALL MEET AGAIN AT 231530Z. GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 231430Z.

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Rina Rina

AM

24/x

22nd October, 1990

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I visited five Middle Eastern countries, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Oman from October 2 through 9 and I would like to share with you some of the impressions I gained during my visit. During my tour, I also met with Taha Yassin Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq in Jordan, at his request.

At the countries I visited, I spelled out Japan's basic position toward a just and peaceful solution of the Gulf Crisis. Through complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, all the leaders of these countries emphasized that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by force was absolutely unacceptable and expressed their hope that the crisis be resolved peacefully. In order to achieve that end, most of them were of the opinion that the international community should not compromise with Iraq and should be united in continuing the pressure on Iraq, centering around the economic sanctions and, if necessary, such pressures should be strengthened through further decisions at the Security Council.

King Hussein of Jordan, while taking the position that he would abide by the internationally accepted principles, stated that, in realistic terms, negotiation with Iraq was inevitable for a peaceful solution of the crisis, thus disclosing his difficult position under internal and external pressures. I informed him that such a solution should be in accordance with the resolutions adopted at the Security Council, and urged that his country participate in international efforts including the economic sanctions.

In my talk with Deputy Premier Ramadhan of Iraq, I conveyed our position that Iraq should comply with the demands of the international community, expressed in the Security Council Resolutions, beginning with Resolution 660, and that that was the prerequisite for the solution of the current crisis. He indicated no conciliatory attitude at all, and throughout the discussion, the basic positions of the two sides remained as they were when the talk started.

In Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, I expressed in concrete terms Japan's intention to provide emergency financial support to them to alleviate the economic difficulties arising from their observance of the economic sanctions. The support includes the emergency aid of 600 million dollars out of 2 billion dollars we already announced, and the implementation of some of the aid programs or projects which we had been discussing with them. All the countries expressed their appreciation for such assistance and their hope that the international community including Japan would continue to support them in light of the seriousness of their economic difficulties.



All the countries I visited welcomed my visit, made at this time of difficulty when they were confronted with the crisis in the Gulf, as an expression of Japan's interest in the Middle East and its political will to support the restoration of peace in the region.

I will continue to take an active part in the international efforts to seek a just and peaceful solution of the Gulf Crisis, keeping in mind what I observed during my visit to the Middle East. I would like to emphasize the importance I attach to the exchange of views and political dialogue among the industrialized democracies on this matter, and I would like to maintain a close contact with you.

Yours sincerely,

Toshiki Kaifu
Prime Minister of Japan

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP
Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1 2AA

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SIC I9M

SITUATION IN KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. FOOD SHORTAGES, ABSENCE OF COMMERCIAL LIFE, POOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION - KUWAIT A DYING CITY. ARMY MORALE LOW. NON-IRAQI POPULATION EVACUATING.

DETAIL

2. WE DEBRIEFED MOUSALLEM (LE II KUWAIT, PLEASE PROTECT) ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN KUWAIT AS OF 20 OCTOBER. HE WAS BASING HIS COMMENTS ON CONVERSATIONS WITH IRAQIS (CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS) AND RESIDENTS OF KUWAIT.

FOOD

3. THERE ARE SERIOUS BREAD SHORTAGES, WITH LONG OVERNIGHT QUEUES OUTSIDE BAKERIES IN YARMOUK, KAIFAN AND SALMIYA. PURCHASES ARE LIMITED TO TEN LOAVES PER PERSON THOUGH THERE IS NO ORGANISED RATIONING (EG COUPONS). LARGE AMOUNTS OF FOOD, PARTICULARLY FLOUR, HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR THE ARMY AND THE POLICE. THERE ARE NO EGGS, NO FRESH FRUIT AND VERY LITTLE MEAT (250 IRAQI DINARS FOR 15 KILOGRAMMES OF LOW-QUALITY BEEF). SOME MILK IS AVAILABLE BUT IT IS NO LONGER OPERATING. THE DAIRY HERD IS DYING AND DEAD COWS ARE BEING LEFT TO ROT IN THE FARMS IN SULEIBIYA.

4. FOOD IS THOUGHT TO BE GENERALLY AVAILABLE BUT IT IS EXPENSIVE, HARD TO FIND AND OFTEN, IN THE CASE OF PERISHABLES OR FROZEN FOOD, PAST ITS EXPIRY DATE. THERE HAVE BEEN PRICE RISES OF UP TO 400 PER CENT FOR EG TINNED TUNA OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS. MANY PEOPLE SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME FORAGING FOR FOOD. THE PRICE THEY PAY WHEN THEY FIND THE FOOD IS, FOR MANY, CRIPPLING.

UTILITIES

5. THE WATER AND POWER SUPPLY ARE BEING MAINTAINED BUT THE QUALITY OF THE WATER IS DECLINING. RUBBISH IS NOT BEING COLLECTED AND IS ACCUMULATING IN STREETS. THIS IS NOW BECOMING A MAJOR HAZARD.

6. THE VAST MAJORITY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS ARE CLOSE AND NO MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE CHILDREN ARE ATTENDING. MANY OF THE SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE ARMY AS BARRACKS OR HQ'S. THE ABSENCE OF SCHOOLS IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN MANY PEOPLE'S DECISION TO LEAVE.

7. THE COMMERCIAL LIFE OF THE CITY HAS ALMOST CEASED. BANKS ARE OPEN BUT NO DEPOSITS ARE BEING MADE. NO BUSINESSMEN ARE FUNCTIONING SINCE PRIVATE ENTERPRISES AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY HAVE CEASED. BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND NON-PROFESSIONAL LABOUR IS NOW DEPARTING. DESPITE THE RELATIVELY GOOD TREATMENT GIVEN BY IRAQIS TO THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY, THE MAJORITY, WHO WERE IN KUWAIT TO MAKE MONEY, ARE NOW RETURNING TO JORDAN HAVING DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO FUTURE FOR THEM IN AN OCCUPIED KUWAIT. THE ONLY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IS THE SELLING BY STREET VENDORS OF VEGETABLES BROUGHT FROM IRAQ. THE ONLY PEOPLE WORKING ARE BLACK MARKETEERS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. THE LATTER HOWEVER HAVE NOT BEEN PAID YET FOR SEPTEMBER .

MILITARY PRESENCE

8. THERE ARE HEAVILY DUG-IN POSITIONS ALONG THE SEAFRONT IN SALMIYAH AND BNEID AL-GHAAR. THERE ARE MANY ROAD BLOCKS AND SOLDIERS IN THE CITY CHECKING VEHICLES AND HOUSES. THERE ARE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ON THE TALL BUILDINGS ALONG THE SEAFRONT (GULF ROAD). IN AHMADI THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS AND THE STREETS ARE FULL OF SOLDIERS.

IRAQI MILITARY : MORALE

9. THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN KUWAIT, THE ATMOSPHERE OF DECAY, THE UNCERTAINTY OF BOTH WHY THE IRAQI ARMY IS THERE AND WHAT IT MAY BE ASKED TO FACE, AND A GENUINE WAR-WEARINESS HAVE CONSPIRED TO UNDERMINE THE GENERAL MORALE OF BOTH CONSCRIPTS AND REGULAR TROOPS. IN ADDITION TO THIS, SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGES AMONG THE TROOPS (ONE MEAL OF RICE AND BREAD A DAY) AND COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES MAKE KUWAIT AN UNPOPULAR POSTING. MANY SOLDIERS EXPRESSED WAR-WEARINESS, FRUSTRATION THAT THE ACQUISITION OF KUWAIT HAD BROUGHT SIMPLY MORE MISERY, AND THEIR GENUINE HOPE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE

AN ATTACK FROM THE AMERICANS. AGAINST THIS THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO FIGHT AND THEY WERE, IN MOUSALLEM'S EYES, MORE AFRAID OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT'S OFFICERS AND THE BA'TH PARTY THAN THEY WERE OF THE ENEMY. THEY ARE ALL HUNGRY .

LOOTING

10. SOLDIERS ARE APPARENTLY FORBIDDEN TO LOOT AND THIS ORDER IS BEING GENERALLY OBEYED. HOWEVER, SOLDIERS ARE BRINGING THEIR RELATIVES FROM IRAQ TO DO THE LOOTING FOR THEM EXCLAM ALTHOUGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOT KUWAIT WAS WELCOMED INITIALLY, THE NOVELTY HAS WORN OFF AND IN ANY EVENT THE RICHEST PICKINGS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. PRIVATE HOUSES AND APARTMENTS ARE NOW THE TARGETS AND MANY HOUSES ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN LOOTED ARE SMASHED. MOUSALLEM BELIEVED THAT OFFICIAL LOOTING WAS DONE BY PLAIN-CLOTHES OFFCIERS WHO CLEARED OUT A BLOCK OF FLATS OR AN AREA ONCE THE ARMY HAD SEALED OFF THE ROADS AROUND IT.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

11. MOUSALLEM DESCRIBED KUWAIT AS A QUOTE GHABA UNQUOTE (JUNGLE) IN WHICH THERE WAS NO RULE OF LAW AND ORDER AND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO FIND ANY FIGURE OF CLEAR AUTHORITY. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WAS CHAOTIC AND INEFFICIENT IN THE EXTREME. PEOPLE WERE ONLY ABLE TO RECEIVE IRAQI TELEVISION AND IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE MAJORITY WHO DID NOT HAVE SHORT-WAVE SETS TO LISTEN TO THE BBC OR SAUDI RADIO. THAT SAID, NOBODY BELIEVED THE IRAQI NEWS, AND EFFORTS WERE MADE WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO MONITOR THE BBC ON MEDIUM WAVE.

12. THERE IS A WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE OCCUPATION WILL NOT CONTINUE AND THAT THE IRAQIS WILL WITHDRAW TO THE NEW FENCE ALONG MUTLARIDGE. MOUSALLEM ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS LARGELY WISHFUL THINKING AND THAT THE EVIDENCE OF ENTRENCHMENT GAVE NO INDICATION OF AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW. HOWEVER, THE SHABBINESS OF THE PLACE AND THE RELUCTANCE OF THE SOLDIERS TO SERVE THERE HAD LED MANY TO BELIEVE THAT KUWAIT WOULD IN THE LAST RESORT BE HANDED BACK TO AVOID WAR.

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EMBASSY OF JAPAN
LONDON

22nd October, 1990

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by Mr. Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan, to forward a message to you.

I have much pleasure in attaching the message herewith.

Yours sincerely,



Kazuo Chiba

Ambassador

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP
Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1 2AA

Subject cc Master
Ops

(T E X T)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 7234/90

22nd October, 1990

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I visited five Middle Eastern countries, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Oman from October 2 through 9 and I would like to share with you some of the impressions I gained during my visit. During my tour, I also met with Taha Yassin Ramadhan, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq in Jordan, at his request.

At the countries I visited, I spelled out Japan's basic position toward a just and peaceful solution of the Gulf Crisis. Through complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, all the leaders of these countries emphasized that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by force was absolutely unacceptable and expressed their hope that the crisis be resolved peacefully. In order to achieve that end, most of them were of the opinion that the international community should not compromise with Iraq and should be united in continuing the pressure on Iraq, centering around the economic sanctions and, if necessary, such pressures should be strengthened through further decisions at the Security Council.

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In Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, I expressed in concrete terms Japan's intention to provide emergency financial support to them to alleviate the economic difficulties arising from their observance of the economic sanctions. The support includes the emergency aid of 600 million dollars out of 2 billion dollars we already announced, and the implementation of some of the aid programs or projects which we had been discussing with them. All the countries expressed their appreciation for such assistance and their hope that the international community including Japan would continue to support them in light of the seriousness of their economic difficulties.

All the countries I visited welcomed my visit, made at this time of difficulty when they were confronted with the crisis in the Gulf, as an expression of Japan's interest in the Middle East and its political will to support the restoration of peace in the region.

I will continue to take an active part in the international efforts to seek a just and peaceful solution of the Gulf Crisis, keeping in mind what I observed during my visit to the Middle East. I would like to emphasize the importance I attach to the exchange of views and political dialogue among the industrialized democracies on this matter, and I would like to maintain a close contact with you.

Yours sincerely,

Toshiki Kaifu
Prime Minister of Japan

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP
Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1 2AA

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MFM

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1990

Dear Stephen,

GULF: HOSTAGES

Herr Teltschik telephoned me from Bonn this morning to ask whether Mr. Heath had gone to Baghdad with approval, tacit or otherwise, of the British Government. There was now growing pressure for a similar mission from Germany by former Chancellor Willy Brandt. The German Government was under great pressure to give its approval to such a mission but was reluctant to do so. If there was any indication that Mr. Heath had gone to Baghdad by agreement with the British Government, the German Government's position would be made more difficult.

I said that Mr. Heath's decision to go had been entirely his and the Government had not endorsed it. He had been extended the courtesies normally given to any senior British politician travelling abroad. Herr Teltschik was relieved to hear this.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

You may,



CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FOLLOWING FOR CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF FROM JICREP
FCO FOR J R YOUNG ESQ, EMERGENCY UNIT

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS
SUMMARY

1. CIA BELIEVE THAT IF IRAQ HAS DIVERTED ITS SAFEGUARDED FUEL, IT
COULD POSSIBLY PRODUCE A CRUDE NUCLEAR DEVICE BY THE END OF THIS
YEAR. SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE CW/BW THREAT.

DETAIL

NUCLEAR

2. ON NUCLEAR, CIA ADMITTED THAT UNTIL RECENTLY THEIR ASSESSMENT
HAD BEEN THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR DEVICE
UNTIL THE MID TO LATE 1990S AND, EVEN THEN, ONLY WITH FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE. BUT OTHER SCENARIOS WERE POSSIBLE. IF THE IRAQIS
WERE TO DIVERT THE SAFEGUARDED FUEL FROM THE CIVILIAN FACILITIES,
THERE MIGHT BE ENOUGH MATERIAL FOR THEM TO PRODUCE A SINGLE GUN
DEVICE, USING ABOUT 36KGS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. THIS WOULD
BE A CRUDE AND CLUMSY TOO LARGE FOR DELIVERY EXCEPT BY LARGE
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. BUT IT COULD CONCEIVABLY BE USED AS A TERROR
WEAPON - DELIVERED BY BOAT, BARGE OR TRUCK.

3. ALTERNATIVELY THE IRAQIS COULD DIVERT THE SAFEGUARDED FUEL
AND BUILD ONE TO FOUR IMPLOSION DEVICES OF ONE KILOTON OR LESS.
THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED ENGINEERING. SUCH A
WEAPON COULD BE DELIVERED BY AIRCRAFT.

4. IN BOTH INSTANCES, IT WOULD TAKE THE IRAQIS - ON THE MOST
FAVOURABLE (AND THEREFORE NOT NECESSARILY ACCURATE) ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT THEIR CAPABILITIES. - BETWEEN SIX MONTHS AND A YEAR AFTER
DIVERTING THE SAFEGUARDED FUEL TO DEVELOP A DEVICE. THE FUEL HAD
MOST RECENTLY BEEN INSPECTED BY THE IAEA IN APRIL. IF THE IRAQIS
HAD DIVERTED FUEL IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER (AND THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS), THE EARLIEST THEY MIGHT PRODUCE A
DEVICE MIGHT BE THE END OF THIS YEAR. SUCH A TIMETABLE ASSUMED A
FLAWLESS PERFORMANCE FROM DIVERSION OF THE FUEL AND THROUGHOUT
THE ENGINEERING PROCESS. THE PROCESS WAS COMPLEX AND MISTAKES
WERE ONLY TOO EASY. ANY MISTAKES WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY LENGTHEN
THE PERIOD IN WHICH A DEVICE COULD BE PRODUCED.

5. EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON WHETHER THE SAFEGUARDED FUEL HAD BEEN
DIVERTED OR NOT. THE NEXT IAEA INSPECTION IS DUE IN NOVEMBER.
CIA SAID THAT THE IAEA WERE SHOWING SOME RELUCTANCE TO
CARRY OUT THAT INSPECTION: IN CIA'S VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL.
IF THE IAEA COULD CONFIRM THAT THE SAFEGUARDED FUEL
WAS STILL IN PLACE THERE WOULD BE NO CAUSE FOR IMMEDIATE
CONCERN. MEANWHILE, THE RISK HAD TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY (SEE
COMMENT BELOW).

BW

6. ON BW, CIA CONFIRMED THAT THE THREAT WAS BEING TAKEN
SERIOUSLY AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS IN WASHINGTON.
ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAD NOT USED BW BEFORE, IT CLEARLY HAD BW AGENTS:
AND THE US HAD NO ADEQUATE DETECTION SYSTEMS. THERE WAS NO

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INTELLIGENCE/

INTELLIGENCE THAT IRAQ HAD WEAPONISED BW, BUT IT HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE. IRAQ WOULD NOT HAVE TO HAVE USED MUCH BW TO CREATE WIDESPREAD PANIC.

7. AS TO MISSILE DELIVERY, IRAQ HAD THE CAPABILITY AND THE MISSILES, AS WELL AS THE WARHEADS. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAD PRODUCED BW WARHEADS FOR THEIR MISSILES, BUT AGAIN NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE. BUT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS HAD AIRBURST CAPABILITIES.

8. WE ASKED ABOUT THE BW THREAT OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF OPERATIONS, INCLUDING TO WESTERN CAPITALS. CIA SAID THAT THE THREAT WAS REAL. BUT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN IRAQI THREATS TO QUOTE TAKE THE WAR TO YOUR CITIES UNQUOTE, THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE AND NO INTELLIGENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT CONSIDER THE USE OF BW AGAINST, POPULATION CENTRES. CIA'S VIEW WAS THAT IRAQ WOULD TEND TO REGARD BW MUCH MORE AS A WEAPON OF LAST RESORT, IF ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN ITS USE AND COULD NOT BE CERTAIN OF ITS IMPACT. BUT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE WARNING IF THE IRAQIS WERE TO USE BW. WITH THE LACK OF ADEQUATE DETECTION SYSTEMS, IF BW WERE USED AGAINST, EG, SAUDI OIL FIELDS, IT WOULD CAUSE MAJOR DISRUPTION AND WIDESPREAD CASUALTIES. ONE UNCERTAINTY WAS HOW PERVASIVE BW MIGHT BE. DESERT CONDITIONS (WITH HIGHER ULTRAVIOLET LEVELS) MIGHT DISSIPATE ANTHRAX MORE QUICKLY THAN PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN OTHER CLIMATES MIGHT SUGGEST.

9. WE ASKED ABOUT ANY DEPLOYMENT OF BW IN THE FIELD. CIA HAD NO INTELLIGENCE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOTED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ATYPICAL BUNKERS IN KUWAIT. THESE WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE AT SALMAN PAK WHERE MUCH OF IRAQI R AND D ON BW TOOK PLACE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THESE BUNKERS WERE USED TO STORE BW AGENTS.

CW

10. MOST IRAQI CW WAS UNITARY AND THEREFORE HAD A SHORT SHELF LIFE. IRAQ HAD A BINARY CAPABILITY BUT MUCH SMALLER STOCKS. UNLIKE WITH BW, IRAQ HAD NUMEROUS DELIVERY OPTIONS AND CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE.

11. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE WARNING TIME OF IRAQI USE OF CW. DIVISIONS WITH CW WEAPONS HAD ALREADY BEEN MOVED UP: DECONTAMINATION UNITS WERE IN PLACE. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE NO MOVEMENT INDICATORS.

12. WARNING WOULD BE EQUALLY SHORT IF IRAQ USED CW MISSILES. THERE WAS AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM IN THAT MUCH OF THE MISSILE INFRASTRUCTURE HAD BEEN DISPERSED SINCE AUGUST. ONE HAD TO ASSUME THAT THE CW CAPABLE MISSILES WERE BOTH HIDDEN AND WITHIN RANGE OF TARGETS IN SAUDI ARABIA. CIA WERE TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR TECHNICAL COVERAGE SO AS TO IDENTIFY THE MOBILE LAUNCHERS (THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IN FINDING THE FIXED SITE). BUT AS YET THEY HAD HAD LITTLE SUCCESS AND DID NOT EXPECT ANY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

13. CIA WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER IRAQ WOULD USE CW IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ANY HOSTILITIES. THEY HAD SHOWN NO COMPUNCTION OVER ITS USE IN IRAN, BUT THEN THEY HAD NOT FACED AN OPPONENT WHO COULD RETALIATE IN KIND. WE ASKED WHETHER THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ISSUING THREATENING WARNINGS TO IRAQ AGAINST THE USE OF CW. STAN MOSKOWITZ CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD. NEVERTHELESS, CIA THOUGHT THAT IF IRAQ WAS ABOUT TO BE PUSHED OUT OF KUWAIT, CW WOULD BE USED.

COMMENT

14. WE HAVE REPORTED (BUCHANAN'S LETTER OF 17 OCTOBER TO YAGHMOURIAN, NPDD, FCO) US CONCERN THAT THE NEXT IAEA INSPECTION TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED. YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER BRIEFING ROLAND SMITH, THE HEAD OF NPDD, ABOUT THE ABOVE CIA ASSESSMENT WITH THE VIEW TO A POSSIBLE UK APPROACH TO THE IAEA TO STIFFEN THEIR RESOLVE.

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FOLLOWING FOR CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF FROM JICREP
FCO FOR J R YOUNG ESQ, EMERGENCY UNIT

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
SUMMARY

1. CIA DOUBTFUL WHETHER SANCTIONS CAN WORK IN ANY TIMESCALE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES. SADDAM CONFIDENT OF HIS INTERNAL POSITION. CIA CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUED RELIABILITY OF SOME OF THE ARABS IN THE ANTI-SADDAM COALITION IF DECISIVE ACTION IS DELAYED BEYOND NEXT SPRING. BELIEVE THAT SADDAM WILL CONTINUE TO SIT TIGHT AND AVOID PROVOKING THE ALLIES. BUT IF HE THINKS WAR IMMINENT, HE WILL TAKE PREEMPTIVE ACTION - MILITARY OR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL.

DETAIL

2. ON THE MILITARY, CIA'S ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE ARE 27 IRAQI DIVISIONS IN THEATRE. THEIR DEPLOYMENT INDICATES THAT THE IRAQIS ARE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT THE THREAT FROM THE ALLIED FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. TO MEET THAT, IRAQ HAD TAKEN 20 DIVISIONS FROM ITS BORDER WITH IRAN. IRAQ HAD NOT REINFORCED ITS BORDER WITH TURKEY, AND ONLY SENT TWO ADDITIONAL ARMoured REGIMENTS TO THE SYRIAN BORDER. MEANWHILE IN BAGHDAD THERE WERE ONLY TWO REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS OF SOME 20,000 MEN - CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT SADDAM WAS LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT INTERNAL UNREST.

3. ON SANCTIONS, CIA HAD SEEN SOME EVIDENCE OF IMPACT IN THE MILITARY SECTOR. MOTOR OIL WAS SHORT (BUT THIS COULD BE A DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM). SO WERE TYRES. BUT CIA'S ASSUMPTION REMAINED THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD RETAIN THEIR FIGHTING STRENGTH IN THE SOUTH FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS, IF ONLY BY CANIBALISING OTHER UNITS. AND ONE HAD TO ASSUME THAT OTHER KEY SUPPLIES, EG REFINED PRODUCTS, HAD BEEN STOCKPILED IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES.

4. MORE GENERALLY, SANCTIONS WERE HURTING THE IRAQIS. OIL EXPORTS HAD BEEN STOPPED, AS HAD MOST IMPORTS. IRAQ HAD NO ACCESS TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE, AND HAD GOT AWAY WITH LITTLE CASH (PERHAPS ONLY A BILLION) FROM KUWAIT. RATIONING HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE FOOD SECTOR, AND PETROL AND OIL WOULD BE RATIONED THIS WEEK. THERE WERE SHORTAGES OF CHEMICALS AND FILTERS FOR WATER PURIFICATION, OF BALL BEARINGS, OF LUBRICATING OILS, AND OF BATTERIES. BUT ONE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE IMPACT OF ALL THIS. IRAQ HAD SHOWN DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN THAT IT COULD PUT UP WITH SUFFERING. OVER EIGHT YEARS, SOME 2.3 PER CENT OF ITS POPULATION HAD BEEN CASUALTIES, WITHOUT SERIOUS INTERNAL UNREST.

5. CIA'S OVERALL CONCLUSION ON SANCTIONS - AND WE PRESSED THEM HARD ON THIS - WAS THAT THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE THE REQUIRED CHANGES IN IRAQI POLICY IN A TIMESCALE WHICH THE ALLIED COALITION COULD SUSTAIN. THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH FOOD. THERE MIGHT BE THE ODD, SUDDEN BREAKDOWN IN INDUSTRY, BUT THERE WAS NO GOLDEN PART WITHOUT WHICH IRAQI INDUSTRY WOULD COLLAPSE. IN ANY CASE, KEY SPARES WOULD BE SMUGGLED IN THROUGH IRAN. (AT THE

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HEIGHT OF THE WAR THE SMUGGLING TRADE HAD CONTUNUED.)

6. MEANWHILE, SADDAM DID NOT SEEM UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS. CIA HAD A LIST OF INDICATORS TO SHOW WHETHER SADDAM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SITUATION (SEE MY THIRD IFT). SO FAR - OTHER THAN HAVING CUT DOWN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES - THERE WAS LITTLE TO INDICATE SUCH CONCERN. THE CIA'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE REGIME WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD COPE WITH THE HARDSHIPS LIKELY TO BE CAUSED BY SANCTIONS.

7. IF SADDAM DID, HOWEVER, CONCLUDE THAT SANCTIONS WERE HURTING AND THAT HE HAD TO COMPROMISE, CIA THOUGHT HIS MOST LIKELY MOVE WOULD BE TO PULL BACK TO THE NEW INTERNAL BORDER BETWEEN KUWAIT AND BASRA PROVINCES. AS YET, THERE WERE NO SIGNS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE FORTIFYING THIS LINE, WHICH WOULD BE A KEY INDICATOR. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY CONTINUED TO STRENGTHEN THE SOUTHERN BORDER WITH SAUDI. CIA'S VIEW THEREFORE WAS THAT SADDAM THOUGHT HE COULD OUTLAST THE WESTERN COALITION AND THAT HE STILL HAD DIPLOMATIC/HOSTAGE OPTIONS. HE MIGHT ALSO BE COUNTING ON FUTURE UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (EG TEMPLE MOUNT) PLAYING IN HIS FAVOUR, AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS (SEE MIFT). MEANWHILE, HE WOULD SIT TIGHT AND AVOID PROVOCATIONS.

8. AS TO THE MOOD OF THE ARAB COALITION PARTNERS, CIA THOUGHT THE SAUDIS, THE GCC, EGYPT AND SYRIA REMAINED FULLY RESOLVED - AT REGIME LEVEL - TO SEE A DECISIVE OUTCOME, WITH THE STRONG PREFERENCE FOR MILITARY ACTION. BUT THERE APPEARED TO BE GAPS BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THEIR CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. THAT SAID, THE WAVE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SADDAM IN THE ARAB WORLD SEEMED TO HAVE PEAKED. THE PRO-SADDAM SENTIMENT NO LONGER HAD ITS EARLIER FOCUS OR IMMEDIACY. THE NORTH AFRICANS AND THE PLO SEEMED TO BE RECONSIDERING WHETHER THEY WERE BACKING A LOSER. IN JORDAN, THERE WERE SIGNS THAT SECULAR PARTIES HAD BEEN GALVANISED TO REACT TO THE POPULAR MOOD, AND SOME HOPE THAT THE PENDULUM MIGHT SWING BACK FROM THE RADICALS. IN EGYPT, POPULAR OPINION REMAINED FIRM, DESPITE THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SPEAKER.

9. WE ASKED HOW LONG WE COULD EXPECT THE ANTI-SADDAM OPPOSITION TO REMAIN STRONG AT REGIME LEVEL. CIA SAID THAT IN SAUDI THE REGIME REGARDED THE CRISIS AS A LIFE AND DEATH ISSUE: THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF COMPROMISE. OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES MIGHT CHANGE, BUT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE THE LAST TO DO SO. THE TOP RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE NERVOUS BUT SUPPORTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN LOWER DOWN IN THE CLERICAL HIERARCHY BUT THE REGIME COULD KEEP IT IN CHECK. MORE GENERALLY, THE EXPULSION OF JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN WORKERS AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY EGYPTIANS WOULD HELP. THAT SAID, THE IRAQIS WERE CLEARLY TRYING TO INFILTRATE SAUDI AND THERE MUST BE A GOOD CHANCE OF A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT - PERHAPS DURING NEXT YEAR'S HAJ. THAT COULD EFFECT THE PUBLIC MOOD. AS TO THE CONTINUED RESOLVE OF THE OTHER ARAB PARTNERS, IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO PREDICT MUCH BEYOND NEXT SPRING: THE ARABS TENDED TO PROMISE CONTINUED FIRMNESS OF RESOLVE IN TWO MONTH INCREMENTS ONLY.

10. WE ASKED HOW A POSSIBLE IRAQI PREEMPTIVE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT THE ARAB COALITION. CIA THOUGHT THAT THE SAUDIS AND THE GULF STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT: THE KUWAITIS CERTAINLY WOULD NOT. BUT SUCH A MOVE WOULD PUT THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE - PARTICULARLY IF THERE WERE MORE TROUBLE OVER THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. STAN MOSKOWITZ COMMENTED THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD PLAY IN THE US: IT WOULD BE HARD TO JUSTIFY A WAR ON THE BASIS OF TWO ISLANDS AND THE OIL FIELDS.

11. WE ASKED HOW SADDAM WAS LIKELY TO REACT IF HE FELT AN ATTACK INEVITABLE OR IMMINENT. CIA SAID THAT HE PROBABLY ALREADY THOUGHT WAR INEVITABLE: THE KEY WAS WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT IMMINENT. IF HE DID, CIA THOUGHT HE WOULD LOOK FOR A LOW RISK WAY OF DISRUPTING SUCH AN ATTACK - SHORT OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OR A MAJOR PREEMPTIVE ATTACK OF HIS OWN AGAINST THE US OR ISRAEL. CIA THOUGHT A MOVE INTO JORDAN A POSSIBILITY, PERHAPS ON THE TRUMPED-UP PRETEXT OF PREEMPTING AN ISRAELI MOVE THERE. THIS

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would/

WOULD SHIFT THE FOCUS AWAY FROM IRAQ/US TO ARAB/ISRAEL. ADMITTEDLY THERE WAS A RISK OF ISRAELI RETALIATION. BUT THAT RISK WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE CERTAINTY OF US RETALIATION IN THE EVENT OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE TO THE SOUTH. MOREOVER, ISRAELI RED LINES HAD GOT PROGRESSIVELY PINKER.

12. BUT A PREEMPTIVE MOVE BY SADDAM NEED NOT BE MILITARY. HE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE BY PARTIALLY WITHDRAWING FROM KUWAIT. EITHER WAY, HE WOULD NOT SIT BACK AND LET THE ALLIES TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

13. WE ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL COULD BE KEPT OUT OF ANY CONFLICT. CIA THOUGHT THAT, IF WAR BEGAN, IRAQ WOULD ATTACK ISRAEL. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE ALLIED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT HIM FROM DOING SO. SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD CONVINCE SADDAM THAT THE US WERE OUT TO KILL HIM - A LA DUGGAN. HE WOULD BRING DOWN THE TEMPLE WITH HIM.

14. FINALLY, WE DISCUSSED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY INTERMEDIARIES WHO COULD GET THROUGH TO SADDAM THE HOPELESSNESS OF HIS POSITION. HIS OWN ADVISERS CLEARLY DID NOT DARE SPEAK OUT. WE QUICKLY AGREED THAT THERE WERE NO ARAB INTERMEDIARIES, CERTAINLY NOT KING HUSSEIN. PRIMAKOV HAD APPARENTLY SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR THE FACTS OF LIFE BUT HAD PROBABLY PULLED HIS PUNCHES. IN ANY CASE, BY SHOWING THEIR CONCERN TO AVOID WAR, THE SOVIETS HAD WEAKENED THEIR HAND AS INTERMEDIARIES. SADDAM, HOWEVER, STILL SEEMED TO PUT STORE BY THE FRENCH. BUT THE PROBLEM WAS LESS A LACK OF INTERMEDIARIES MORE THAT SADDAM MIGHT NOT SURVIVE A CLIMB DOWN. HE HAD SOLD OUT HIS MEAGRE GAINS FROM EIGHT YEARS WAR WITH IRAN ON THE PRETEXT OF KUWAIT. HE WOULD HAVE LITTLE TO JUSTIFY A FORCED PULL-OUT FROM KUWAIT. MORE IMPORTANT, IF HE PULLED OUT BOTH HE AND HIS ARMY COULD LIVE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY. JUDGE WEBSTER WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS REALLY THE DESIRED OUTCOME.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
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cc Peter Bean

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH
AL-HAYAT NEWSPAPER

You sent us some draft answers for the Prime Minister's written interview with the Al-Hayat newspaper. I enclose a revised version on which I should be grateful for comments by the end of today.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

- Q1 Did the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait come as a complete surprise to you, or had your Government considered it was a possibility should the talks between Kuwait and Iraq fail?
- A1 I think it came as a complete surprise to everyone. Discussions between Iraq and Kuwait were in progress and due to continue. Saddam Hussain had given explicit and categorical assurances to President Mubarak and to King Fahd that there was no question of invasion of Kuwait. History has many examples of perfidy and deceit. This ranks high among them and shows that nothing Saddam Hussain says can be trusted.
- Q2 Do you consider that the UK now has an adequate military presence in the Gulf to meet any contingencies, or are you considering plans to boost it further? If so, what types of forces do you think are still needed there? Are you now satisfied with the contribution, whether military or financial, of Europe, Japan, and Arab countries to the military build-up?
- A2 We have sent substantial naval and air forces to the Gulf and our Armoured Brigade - the Desert Rats- are now arriving. I think the response of the Arab nations - in particular Egypt - has been outstanding. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia told the United Nations General Assembly that over 26 Arab, Islamic and other friendly states, from every continent of the globe, have come to Saudi Arabia's support to counter Iraqi aggression.
- Q3 Have the mechanics of the chain of command in the Gulf now been fully worked out as a result of the visit of the Defence Secretary Tom King to Washington, and do you accept the placing of British and other forces there under supreme US command?
- A3 The Command arrangements agreed provide for British Forces to remain under ultimate British command.

However they may be placed under the tactical control of a US Commander for specific actions where this makes military sense. Equally some US units may be assigned to British tactical control. Both US and UK forces, of course, are under the strategic guidance of Saudi Arabia.

Q4 Given the fact that economic sanctions have never worked in the past, do you really expect them to work this time?

A4 Iraq is particularly vulnerable to sanctions: its economy is based almost totally on the export of oil and is heavily dependent on imports. Thanks to the full support which the international community have given to the enforcement of sanctions, all oil outlets have been effectively blockaded, and the import of goods have been cut to a trickle. That will give sanctions the best possible chance of achieving their objective: to get Iraq out of Kuwait. But we do not rule out the military option.

Q5 President Bush has stated repeatedly that should sanctions not work, then other options must be considered. In fact, there can be only one other option: war. Do you feel that war is avoidable?

A5 There can be no compromise on the fundamental points set out in the UN Security Council resolutions. Saddam Hussain must not gain anything as a result of his aggression. He must get out of Kuwait, pay compensation for the appalling damage which he has done - and the world must see that he is never in a position to do something similar again. We are trying to achieve that through sanctions. We hope they will work. But if not, the military option is there and the build up of forces continues. We must be ready for any contingency.

Q6 Should Britain, along with the US and other allies,

feel that war is the only remaining solution, would you go back to the UN Security Council for authorisation to dislodge the Iraqis by force?

A6 Britain has acted throughout the Gulf crisis in accordance with international law, and we shall continue to do so. Security Council Resolution 661, which called for comprehensive economic sanctions, expressly affirms the right of individual or collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Q7 Do you see any possibility in the future of negotiations with Iraq over its claims against Kuwait, and what would be the preconditions and framework of such talks?

A7 What is there to negotiate about? You don't negotiate with someone who marches into another country and kills so many people: you get him out. We have had nearly three months of diplomatic efforts at the United Nations to persuade Iraq to withdraw but without any sign that Iraq is willing to do so.

Q8 Jordan and the PLO have come out in support of Iraq, while at the same time supporting the independence of Kuwait. Do you feel they have lost international support for adopting such a stand. Have you been surprised by the position of King Hussein, given his life-long moderate policies?

A8 The answer to your first question is yes. There can be no compromise solutions which dilute the position of the international community as reflected in the Security Council resolutions and endorsed by the Arab League. The PLO in particular has severely damaged its credibility by supporting the annexation by force of an independent state and a member of the United Nations, while at the same time expecting support for its

efforts to secure return of the Occupied Territories.

I recognise that King Hussein is in a difficult position. But sanctions are now being enforced by Jordan and we are pressing for the early disbursement of the economic assistance which Jordan - and Egypt - needs. Jordan is an old friend and has long been a force for moderation and stability in the region.

Q9 Do you accept as at least partially true the criticism in some quarters that your tough statements against President Saddam Hussain have endangered the lives of British, and perhaps other, hostages in Iraq?

A9 It is Iraq which is using human beings as pawns in this present crisis. Saddam Hussain has breached every accepted standard of international behaviour, let alone the Arab tradition of hospitality, by holding foreign nationals against their will. Iraq should allow all the hostages to leave as soon as possible. I understand very well the concern of many people who have relatives and friends trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. We shall continue to do everything we can to secure their release. But there can be no deals with hostage-takers, whether they are terrorists or governments.

Q10 British companies dealing with Iraq and Kuwait have lost hundreds of millions of pounds of lost contracts in both countries. Are there government plans to compensate and otherwise help them?

A10 These are mandatory United Nations sanctions, not a unilateral move by the British Government. I sympathise with those who have suffered losses. But many companies are insured against such unforeseen events with our Export Credit Guarantee Department and have paid premiums accordingly. It would be unfair to them to treat insured and uninsured companies in exactly the same way.

Q11 There has been mention by some US officials of the need for long-term security arrangements in the Gulf to avoid the type of scenario we are now witnessing. What shape do you think such arrangements might take, and what might Britain's role be? What is the likely impact of the current crisis on Britain's future defence planning, particularly at a time when its defence spending is under review as a result of the changes in Europe?

A11 There will certainly, in my view, need to be regional security arrangements once Iraq is out of Kuwait. It is primarily for the countries of the region to decide what shape these should take. The United Nations, the Arab League and the GCC would all need to be involved. As a country which has had a long association with the Gulf, we would be ready to take a full part in discussions.

Q12 There has been much speculation that the US administrations's plans for a \$20 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia threaten Britain's own position as an arms supplier to the Kingdom, and in particular the future of the Al Yamamah programme, including the planned sale of 48 more Tornado planes. What is your own perception of the situation.

A12 The Al Yamamah Programme has been a great success. Both governments remain firmly committed to the programme and I believe it will continue to make an important contribution to the security of the region for many years to come.

Q13 There have been hints by British officials that a restoration of relations with Syria is imminent. Is this the case, and what preconditions would the Syrians have to meet?

A13 Syria's decision to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression is welcome. We also

acknowledge the helpful role which Syria has played in obtaining the release of hostages in Lebanon. We broke off diplomatic relations with Syria in 1986 because we had clear evidence of their involvement in an attempt to place a bomb on an airliner at Heathrow airport. We have to overcome such problems before we can resume relations.

Q14 Following the release of Brian Keenan, and the recent meeting of the British Ambassador in Beirut with Sheikh Fadlallah, will Britain from now on be taking a more active role in trying to secure the release of its hostages in Lebanon?

A14 We have always been active in seeking the release of British hostages in Lebanon. Never a day goes by without our thinking of them, and of their families. We have followed up every lead both in Lebanon and elsewhere and used every contact that we thought might bring results. We have also raised the plight of the hostages in every major international forum. But it is our consistent policy not to bargain with hostage-takers. Iran has undertaken publicly to use her humanitarian influence to achieve the release of the remaining hostages in Lebanon. I hope very much that these efforts will lead to results.

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MY TELNO 1687: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. EXCHANGES WITH THE AMERICANS, YEMENIS AND PLO ON SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

DETAIL

2. IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE WEEKEND I CONCLUDED THAT I SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO RESUME CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A STATEMENT/RESOLUTION ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL. I ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH MY U S COLLEAGUE, BUT OTHERWISE AWAITED DEVELOPMENTS. BEFORE LONG I WAS TELEPHONED BY THE YEMENI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE: AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE ACTING PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE PLO ASKED TO CALL ON ME AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
3. PICKERING TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NO HINT OF ANY GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE POSITION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION. THE PREFERRED OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION, FROM THE ISRAELIS' POINT OF VIEW, WOULD BE A RESOLUTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD VETO: THIS WAS HOWEVER UNLIKELY TO ARISE. THE SECOND PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. PICKERING CONFIRMED TO ME LATER IN THE MORNING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO WORK FOR AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: BUT HE NO DOUBT RECOGNISED THAT THE PREFERENCE AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS MIGHT WELL BE FOR A RESOLUTION ON WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE.
4. WHEN THE YEMENI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE TO ME I URGED HIM TO CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY THE SUPPORT OF ALL 15 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AS OPPOSED TO A RESOLUTION SUPPORTED BY 14 MEMBERS. I SAID MY TASK AS PRESIDENT

WOULD BE TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY WAY AT ALL OF PUTTING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COUNCIL'S POSITION, ON WHICH THERE WAS ESSENTIALLY AGREEMENT, IN A FORM TO WHICH EVERYONE COULD AGREE. AT PRESENT THIS COULD ONLY MEAN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. AL-ASHTAL DID NOT REJECT THE IDEA. BUT HE FORMALLY ASKED ME TO HOLD RESUMED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE AFTERNOON.

5. WHEN THE ACTING PLO OBSERVER (AL-KIDWA) SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON ME HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION ON THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, FOR THREE REASONS:

(A) TO SHOW THE COUNCIL CONSIDERED THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS IMPORTANT AS OTHER ISSUES:

(B) BECAUSE A DELAY WOULD RENDER THE DRAFT MEANINGLESS, ESPECIALLY IF THE DEADLINE IN SCR 672 FOR THE SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT WAS PASSED:

(C) BECAUSE THE WORSENING SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REQUIRED CLEAR ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

6. I SAID I AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ACTION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I THEN TOOK THE SAME LINE AS I HAD WITH AL-ASHTAL. I SUGGESTED THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL BECAUSE THAT WOULD COUNT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL: THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE ONLY TOO PLEASED IF THEY COULD DETACH THE AMERICANS AND GET THEM TO ABSTAIN ON A RESOLUTION.

7. AL-KIDWA AGREED THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE CLOSE. BUT HE INSISTED THAT A RESOLUTION WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ONLY REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION BUT ALSO FORMALLY REJECTED SCR 672 AS A WHOLE. THIS REQUIRED A CLEAR AND STRONG MESSAGE FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD ALREADY SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY OVER THE TEXT AND WERE OPEN TO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDMENTS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FROM AL-ASHTAL I HAVE ARRANGED FOR RESUMED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AT 222000Z. THESE WILL BE PRECEDED BY A DISCUSSION WHICH I WILL HAVE WITH PICKERING AND AL-ASHTAL, DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH WHAT COMMON GROUND THERE IS BETWEEN THEM. I HAVE PREPARED A REVISED TEXT OF MY PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, TOUGHENED UP SLIGHTLY TO MEET THE

PLO POINT ABOUT THE ISRAELI REJECTION OF SCR 672. PICKERING IS
CONTENT FOR ME TO USE THIS AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

HANNAY

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From the Private Secretary

22 October 1990

THE GULF

Brent Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon, with Jim Baker sitting in his office, to say that the Americans remained very unhappy about the way things were going at the United Nations. They did not think it had been necessary for the Security Council to discuss the Palestinian issue on Friday: at the least, David Hannay could have held off discussion over the weekend, to give them more time to bring the Israelis along, while keeping the focus on the Gulf resolution. I said that, as I had told him on Friday, our perspective was that there had been no alternative to early discussion of the Secretary-General's decision to abandon his Mission. I was certain that David Hannay would not have done this unless he really saw no other way. Moreover, my understanding was that he had moved in very close consultation with Pickering.

Brent Scowcroft said, rather testily, that this was not how Pickering saw it. We were making the Americans lives unnecessarily difficult for them. They were working very hard on Shamir to make some helpful gesture over the Secretary-General's mission. I said that they were not the only ones: the Prime Minister had sent a personal message to Shamir. Brent Scowcroft welcomed this and said he thought we could actually, between us, make some ground with the Israelis. But David Hannay must take a firmer line in resisting pressure for premature discussion of the Palestinian issue. It seemed there was now no hope of getting back to the Gulf resolution until the matter of the Secretary-General's Mission had been resolved. I cautioned against trying to second-guess the person in the chair at the Security Council.

This may well not be fair to David Hannay. But I should report that Scowcroft was distinctly and unusually irritated, and was being audibly egged on by Jim Baker in the background.

Rich Hunter
CLON
22/10
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I suggest that you give this letter very limited distribution only.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



Robin Butler

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1990

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THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

I gave lunch today for M. Attali who is still acting as President Mitterrand's adviser, although spending a certain amount of time on his EBRD job. He thought that the Gulf was one of the main issues which President Mitterrand would wish to discuss with the Prime Minister on Saturday. He claimed that Mitterrand was convinced that there would be no resolution of the crisis without resort to the military option and was ready for this. I asked what view he had on the timing. Attali said that Mitterrand thought sanctions must be given some time longer to work. When I asked how long "some time" was, Attali hazarded two months. He added that the French would insist on going back to the United Nations for a resolution authorising use of military force, but saw no great difficulty in obtaining this. I asked how we got over the problem of giving Saddam Hussein warning of our intentions by seeking a UN Resolution. Attali's answer was that such a warning would actually be useful: it might finally bring home to Saddam Hussein that a military conflict was inevitable. Attali explained that it was impossible, in terms of French politics, to put French forces under American control, but in practice they would co-ordinate very closely indeed with American and British forces. He described the degree of co-ordination on the ground in Saudi Arabia as excellent.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ARMILLA: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the prime purpose of the ARMILLA patrol was to provide reassurance and, if necessary, protection to British shipping in the Gulf. The ARMILLA patrol has also had the secondary but nonetheless important role of demonstrating our commitment to and support of our friends in the Gulf. The invasion of Kuwait gives this task continuing and added significance. In addition, the ARMILLA patrol is now required to contribute to the multinational effort to monitor the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed under SCR 661 and, if necessary, enforce these sanctions, as requested by the legitimate government of Kuwait.

Aim

2. This paper proposes a revised concept of operations to cover four tasks:

- (1) Reassurance and protection of British shipping in the Gulf;
- (2) Participation in the monitoring of sanctions imposed under UN SCR 661;
- (3) Action, if necessary, to assist in the enforcement of UN sanctions;
- (4) Demonstration of our continued commitment to our friends in the Gulf.

Protection and reassurance of British Shipping

3. This task will require:

- a. maintaining a presence in possible threat areas to

provide reassurance to entitled ships

b. occasional boarding of entitled ships to proffer advice on damage control and to pass any relevant current threat information

c. accompanying or escorting entitled merchant ships through possible threat areas to their destinations.

4. The present level of Iraqi threat in relation to the substantial naval and air forces already deployed to the Gulf does not appear sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of naval accompaniment of merchant shipping; but we must be able to do so quickly if it should become necessary.

5. At present British merchant shipping in the Gulf is adhering to FCO advice not to venture north of 26° 20 N but it is likely that strong commercial and political pressures will emerge rapidly for shipping to proceed further north to the Saudi ports of Al Jabiul and Ras Taura and also to the Iranian terminal at Kharg. For this reason, we believe that the ARMILLA operating area should be extended to 27° 30N to provide reassurance to British shipping proceeding to Saudi ports.

MONITORING AND ENFORCING SANCTIONS

6. The key ingredients for enforcing the UN sanctions at sea are:

(1) Good intelligence on all merchant shipping movements to identify potential blockade runners;

(2) Complete surveillance of the Strait of Hormuz (and, if necessary, choke points for other outlets);

(3) Interception and diversion of suspect vessels.

7. This paper sets out the contribution which UK forces are already making in each area to the multi-national effort to enforce sanctions and how we believe that this can be further developed and, in particular, coordinated with the US (and possibly French and other nations deploying maritime forces to the Gulf region).

Intelligence

8. An analysis of the requirements and an outline possible system for gathering intelligence on merchant ships has been carried out by the Naval Staff. The RN is already collating intelligence from a number of readily available sources on a national basis and some discussion has already taken place with the USN about how this can be further developed on a multi-national basis. The subject will also form part of discussions with the French on 14 August.

9. The intelligence picture already available provides a good basis for identifying potential blockade runners but this would undoubtedly be improved by access to information from other national (particularly US) sources. At the same time, it is important that UK information should be passed (in suitable form) to warships of other nations which are cooperating in implementing sanctions. In addition, the more comprehensive (and multi-national) the evidence against a particular ship, the easier it will be to justify any enforcement action that may be taken. For all these reasons, we believe that it is essential to establish an international focal point for the collation and dissemination of information on merchant ship movements.

10. A number of possible candidate organisations worldwide for this role have been identified. We believe, however, that the UK is well fitted to assume this role because of the wide variety of national information sources available and the existing close links between the RN and merchant shipping

organisations. In addition, if the UK were to assume this role, it would help to prevent the impression developing that maritime operations were being dominated by the US. We believe that the US themselves would welcome an offer to undertake this role.

Surveillance

11. The immediate and most important requirement is to prevent sanctions breaking in the Gulf itself although there may yet be a requirement for some naval enforcement action in the Red Sea, perhaps in relation to Aqaba (if required this might best be conducted by the French and/or USN). The RN, USN and French navies already have sufficient warships (and aircraft) in the area to provide complete surveillance of merchant shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Detailed discussions on coordination have already taken place with the USN and discussions with the French are to take place on August 14.

12. It is envisaged that 2 of the 3 DD/FF deployed to the Gulf will normally be at sea and available for patrolling and surveillance tasks, supplemented by the 3 Nimrod MPA deployed to Seeb. It is proposed that the ARMILLA ships and the Nimrod aircraft should carry out surveillance extending to the Iranian Advisory Zone (outside territorial waters). The RN already carries out occasional transits of the IAZ but before expanding this role it is intended to inform the Iranians privately of our plans and secure their tacit acceptance. Subject to the agreement of the Gulf States concerned, it is also proposed that RN operations should extend to territorial waters on the western side of the Gulf.

13. It is apparent that the USN has more than sufficient forces available to provide a surveillance/interdiction line at the Strait of Hormuz itself (we understand that they intend to intercept vessels outside the Strait). For this reason it seems that the most useful contribution that the RN could make is to provide preliminary surveillance inside the Gulf and feed

intelligence to the US ships at the Strait (in essence a scouting role). Equally, the ARMILLA ships would be able to continue to monitor the movements of inward bound ships once they had passed the US ships at Hormuz, as well as internal movements in the southern Gulf. We are also considering further the possibility of monitoring coastal traffic by small vessels within the Gulf, although the amount of sanctions breaking by this means is unlikely to be significant. This would also permit ARMILLA to continue its role in support of British shipping within the present force level. From our discussions with the US we know that they would very much welcome the RN in this role, both because it is a sensible division of labour and to demonstrate that naval operations inside the Gulf are not a purely US preserve (and the the US are doubtful whether navies other than the RN will be willing to operate inside the Strait of Hormuz). They would also particularly value our extension of surveillance to the IAZ, as USN activity there is likely to be strictly limited.

Enforcement - US intentions

14. The US are describing their operation as 'interdiction' to avoid the specific legal connotations of a blockade. for this reason they do not intend to seize contraband vessels but to prevent ships inbound to Iraq from entering the Gulf and to prevent outbound ships from leaving. This is effectively a 'quarantine' operation.

15. The general guidelines to which the US are operating are that all commodities inbound to Iraq or Kuwait (other than medical items) should be interdicted. If a vessel refuses to turn away or submit to necessary inspections, measures short of force will be used initially but, if necessary, proportionate force will be used.

Interdiction by RN

16. This US approach is broadly similar lines to that outlined in the MOD paper on the enforcement of a maritime blockade and the draft ROE for a blockade approved in principle by OD(G) on 9 August, subject to confirmation of appropriate legal authority on the basis of a request from the legitimate Government of Kuwait. Such a request has now been received by both the US and the UK. Although this provides the legal basis for enforcement action, this would be further strengthened if the agreement of major flag states were obtained for UK warships to stop, board and inspect their vessels, if this is necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the UN sanctions. Although this would be a useful strengthening of the legal and presentational position, a fully effective interdiction operation can be mounted almost immediately on the basis of the ROE agreed in principle by OD(G). The detailed ROE changes required being prepared for submission to MOD Ministers tomorrow.

Reassurance to Gulf States

17. If we are to continue to provide reassurance to our friends in the Gulf it is important that, in addition to ARMILLA's contribution to the enforcement of sanctions, RN ships maintain a visible presence around the Gulf. It is therefore intended that the DD/FF not actually on patrol should be stood down to a port in the Gulf area where, in addition to carrying out maintenance and replenishment, it will provide such a presence.

Cooperation with other navies

18. The proposals outlined have been produced on the basis of close consultation with the USN and Flag Officer Second Flotilla (Rear Admiral Abbott) is en route to the Gulf to develop detailed plans for operational cooperation in theatre. Following an initial contact between CDS and his French counterpart, discussions are due to take place with the French navy tomorrow (14 August). The Dutch Defence Minister telephoned Min(DP) this morning to say that his Government had

decided to despatch 2 frigates to the Gulf and to say that he hoped that it would be possible to develop cooperation between European navies contributing to the multinational force. It was agreed that this could be followed up at the political level at next week's meeting of the WEU but that in the meantime UK and Dutch staffs should talk urgently about the practical cooperation between the two navies.

Summary

19. In addition to its existing tasks of reassurance to British shipping and demonstration of our support for friendly Gulf States, the ARMILLA patrol is now required to contribute to the monitoring and enforcement of UN sanctions. After discussions with the US, it appears that the most effective RN contribution, at least initially, would be to provide two ships to patrol inside the Gulf working in cooperation with the USN vessels stationed outside the Strait of Hormuz. This arrangement could begin to operate within the two days, subject to finalisation of practical details with the USN on the spot. If enforcement action is to be fully effective ROE permitting the use of force, if necessary, will be required. Appropriate ROE will be submitted shortly. To further strengthen the legal basis for enforcement action and for presentational reasons it would be helpful to secure the agreement of major flag states that the RN may, if necessary, stop board and search any of their vessels suspected of sanction breaking.

20. This approach would also allow the ARMILLA patrol to maintain its existing roles in support of British shipping and the Gulf states. The current Iraqi threat is not judged sufficient to warrant the reintroduction of accompaniment of merchant shipping, although once shipping resumes use of the Saudi ports of Al Jubail and Ras Tanura it will be necessary to extend the ARMILLA operating area slightly further north to 27° 30'N. With 3 DD/FF deployed to the area, a sustainable patrol level is 2 DD/FF on operations in the Persian Gulf which 1 DD/FF

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stood down to the Gulf of Oman or a Gulf port a 24 hours notice,
carrying out maintenance or showing a diplomatic presence.

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