



● PART 33 ends:-

Riyadh Tel no 1187 17.11.90

PART 34 begins:-

CDP to CCo 18.11.90

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM RIYADH  
TO DESKBY 171300Z FCO  
TELNO 1187  
OF 171243Z NOVEMBER 90  
INFO DESKBY 171300Z MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, HQBFME, JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 817 (NOT TO ALL) AND MODUK U/N TEL OF 14 NOVEMBER:  
GULF CRISIS: CELEBRATION OF CHRISTMAS BY BRITISH FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

*temporarily returned*  
*Ry*  
*12/12/16*

2. IN PRACTICE WE AND HQBFME ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT OUR FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE ABLE TO CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS IN ENJOYABLE AND TRADITIONAL FASHION, TO THE EXTENT THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS PERMIT. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY AGREED WITH HQBFME A POLICY STATEMENT ON CHRISTMAS CELEBRATIONS WHICH GIVES A WIDE MEASURE OF LATITUDE, AND WHICH THE HQ BELIEVES MEETS SERVICEMANS CONCERNS, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR OPERATIONAL PRESENCE HERE. OUR GUIDELINES PROVIDE FOR:

A) WORSHIP AWAY FROM LOCALS:

B) THE DISCREET IMPORTATION OF CHRISTMAS TREES, BOTH NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL, BY THE RAF. (THE RELIGIOUS POLICE HERE REGARD THESE TREES, HOWEVER MISGUIDEDLY, AS A RELIGIOUS SYMBOL AND TRY EACH YEAR TO IMPEDE COMMERCIAL IMPORTATION, THOUGH SOME DO SLIP

THROUGH THE NET).

C) THE DISPLAY OF CHRISTMAS TREES AWAY FROM LOCAL PUBLIC VIEW, IE IN MILITARY CAMPS, LOCATIONS AND HOUSING TOGETHER WITH CHRISTMAS DECORATIONS:

D) THE PLAYING OF MUSIC:

E) FATHER CHRISTMAS ACTIVITIES, AGAIN IN UK CONTROLLED AREAS WHERE LOCAL NATIONALS DO NOT HAVE ACCESS, AND OF COURSE CHRISTMAS DINNER:

F) IN ADDITION THE CSE ARE PUTTING TOGETHER VISITS BY ENTERTAINERS FROM BRITAIN.

3. I BELIEVE THAT THIS RANGE OF ENTERTAINMENT, WHILE CARRYING SOME RISK OF MISCHIEVOUS EXPLOITATION BY UK PRESS, OR OF OCCASIONAL BUT CONTAINABLE LOCAL OFFENCE TO THE ISLAMIC PURITANS WHO FORM THE CORE OF SAUDI SOCIETY, IS NONETHELESS IN LINE WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH PRINCE KHALID, AS WELL AS WITH THE LINE IT IS PROPOSED OUR MINISTERS SHOULD BE BRIEFED TO TAKE AT HOME, IE THAT OUR FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS WHILE AVOIDING GIVING OFFENCE TO THE SAUDIS. I HAVE ASKED HOWEVER THAT THE PRESS, AND PARTICULARLY CAMERAMEN, SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THESE FESTIVITIES AND CELEBRATIONS. IN SHORT OUR FORCES FESTIVITIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO RUN CLOSER TO MR PICKWICK'S IDEA OF CHRISTMAS THAN THAT OF SCROOGE, AND ATTEMPTS BY CERTAIN SENSATIONALIST NEWSPAPERS TO PAINT A BLEAK PICTURE WILL I HOPE BE CONTAINED.

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Raj  
12/12/16

- A) INEVITABLY PRODUCE SENSATIONALIST PRESS COPY:
- B) PROVIDE SERVICEMEN WITH A REAL TEMPTATION TO TRY TO SELL ALCOHOL ON THE BLACK MARKET (WHERE PRICES ARE ASTRONOMICAL). IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT BY NO MEANS ALL OUR TROOPS ARE ISOLATED IN THE DESERT, THERE IS A LARGE HEADQUARTERS IN RIYADH AND THE RAF ARE BASED IN DHAHRAN AND IN TABUK AS WELL AS 7TH ARMoured DIVISION NEAR THE ECHELONS IN JUBAIL.
- C) BY NO MEANS LEAST, IT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE STRICT NO ALCOHOL RULE APPLIED BY THE AMERICANS, WITH WHOM OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE WIDELY CO-LOCATED, INCLUDING IN THE DESERT. I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN COMMAND WOULD BE SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED IF WE WERE TO GET OUT OF LINE, PARTICULARLY AS THEY NOW HAVE TACTICAL CONTROL OF 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE.
5. IT IS NOT ONLY OUR IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONS (AL YAMAMA ET AL) WHICH WOULD BE JEOPARDISED HERE. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (MOST RECENTLY IN HOLLIS' TELELETTER OF 15 NOVEMBER) THE PRESENCE OF US AND OTHER NON-ISLAMIC FORCES HERE IS, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, STARTING TO AROUSE HOSTILITIES AMONG THE ISLAMIC MILITANTS, WHO FORM A LARGE ELEMENT IN SAUDI SOCIETY TODAY. THEY REPRESENT A FEATURE IN SAUDI POLITICAL LIFE OF WHICH THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP ARE WARY AND WITH WHICH THE AL SAUD FIND THEMSELVES OBLIGED TO COMPROMISE. THE AL SAUD'S PROBLEMS ON THIS FRONT ARE CURRENTLY INCREASING, AND THE POINT HAS BEEN MADE TO ME THAT THE UNITY OF PURPOSE VIS A VIS IRAQ WHICH SAUDI SOCIETY HAS SO FAR MANIFESTED, (AND WHICH WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN SEEING FRAGMENT) IS GOING TO COME UNDER STRAIN IF FOREIGN FORCES ARE SEEN TO BE TAKING UNDUE LIBERTIES WITH SAUDI TRADITIONS AND LAWS.
6. ON THE PLUS SIDE HERE, IN ORDER TO HELP OVER THIS PROBLEM, ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR BRITISH FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA TO HAVE R AND R SPELLS. WE ARE LOOKING AT SINAI RESORTS AS WELL, WHERE ALCOHOL IS AVAILABLE. I BELIEVE THIS OFFERS THE RIGHT WAY TO ALLOW THEM SOME ESCAPE FROM THE STRINGENCIES OF SAUDI ARABIA. GIVEN ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT WE WILL DROP THE IDEA OF TRYING TO PROVIDE OUR FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES THIS CHRISTMAS. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE. IF OPPORTUNITY PERMITS I SHALL TRY TO HAVE A WORD WITH PRINCE SAUD, AND ALSO WITH PRINCE FAHD ABDULLAH, THE

SYMPATHETIC AND SENSIBLE ASSISTANT DEFENCE MINISTER, TO LET THE KNOW HOW WE PROPOSE TO PLAY THINGS.

7. IF THE ABOVE IS AGREED, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD FIRMLY TRY TO NAIL THIS STORY AND TELL THE PRESS NOW IN LONDON THAT THEY AND THEIR INFORMANTS HAVE THE WRONG END OF THE STICK. SUBJECT TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TROOPS BEGIN UNDERLINING WILL CEASE UNDERLINING CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS PROPERLY. DISCRETION WILL BE OBSERVED IN ORDER TO AVOID OFFENDING SAUDI SENSITIVITIES BUT THIS WILL NOT PREVENT CELEBRATION. THE PRESS MAY OF COURSE SEEK TO DRAW US INTO SPECIFICS. I WOULD COUNSEL AGAINST THIS, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE RISK OF PROVOKING A SAUDI RESPONSE. THE LINE THAT BEING MORE SPECIFIC WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE VERY DISCRETION NECESSARY FOR THE CELEBRATION TO GO AHEAD PROPERLY, MIGHT HELP DEFENSIVELY.

8. I UNDERSTAND THAT GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE, TO WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN, IS SENDING HIS OWN CAUTIONARY SIGNAL ON THIS SUBJECT.

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MR APLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
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CABINET OFFICE DIO  
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HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
MR WICKS HMT  
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PRIME MINISTER

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Prinf Minister 2  
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OPERATION GRANBY: POLICY ON REPATRIATION OF THE DEAD

I believe that OD(G) colleagues would wish to be aware of the policy it is proposed to adopt in the event of hostilities towards the bodies of any Servicemen killed in the Gulf. I have endorsed the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff that our policy should be local temporary burial coupled with repatriation of bodies, wherever practical, once fighting had ceased. This policy would be announced in advance of hostilities only if we are pressed and, otherwise, when casualties arise.

2. Our traditional policy has been that of local temporary burial of Servicemen killed in action overseas, with a view to their later reburial near the battlefield on which they fell. In the case of those killed at sea, the senior officer present has decided whether to land the body or bury at sea. This policy was reconsidered by OD(SA) shortly after the 1982 Falklands Conflict, primarily as a result of pressure from the public and next of kin. It was decided then that the bodies of those temporarily buried in the Falkland Islands should be either repatriated or given permanent burial at San Carlos, according to the wishes of the next of kin. In the event, 65 out of 81 Servicemen killed on land were repatriated. We have, however, concluded that it would not be tenable in current circumstances to wait until the end of hostilities before deciding whether repatriation would be offered.

3. Advice from the FCO is that permanent Christian war graves in Saudi Arabia would be unacceptable to the Saudi authorities, although it is possible that they might review their attitude if large numbers of Western servicemen were to die in support of their country. But permanent burials in Saudi Arabia could also subject

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next of kin to unnecessary hardship since future visits to war graves could not be guaranteed in the long term. Bodies (including, possibly those who fell in Saudi Arabia) could be buried in other Gulf states. Our objective would remain to offer, in accordance with tradition, burial at least close to the field of battle but we have to recognise that the Gulf States (particularly Kuwait) would also be unattractive sites for many next of kin. It is therefore likely that we will be asked to repatriate at least a proportion of those killed. For reasons of equity, if repatriation is to be made available it should be offered to all next of kin, subject to practicality, regardless of where the Serviceman was killed.

4. We have, however concluded that we should not adopt a policy of repatriating of bodies during hostilities. Such a policy could prove impossible, or have to be suspended, because of the logistic and operational pressures of a campaign, leading to a major criticism of the MOD, perhaps especially if some Servicemen were repatriated immediately and others were not. The arrival of bodies in the UK while fighting was still underway could also have a serious impact on public opinion and support for the campaign at home (as occurred in the US during the war in Vietnam).

5. For those who are killed or die of their injuries at sea, however, the decision on whether bodies should be transferred ashore for later repatriation or buried at sea would continue to rest with the afloat commander in the light of operational circumstances.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to members of OD(G) and to the Cabinet Secretary.

*TK*

Ministry of Defence

T K

*16th* November 1990

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See JIC  
Foster Kuwait  
jobs of legitimisation and  
502 + legitimisation  
not



Prime Minister

This agrees agreed  
your view that we  
can legitimately make  
destruction of the Iraqi  
war-machine a military

PRIME MINISTER

At the meeting of OD(G) on 15 November there was discussion of the United Kingdom's strategic objectives, and in particular of the question whether they should include destruction of Iraq's military capability to attack Kuwait again. At the end of the meeting, you asked me to submit advice to you.

Objective  
within  
the  
terms  
of Article  
51  
CDD  
16/11

If we are operating in the Gulf under the cover of a Security Council Resolution authorising the use of force, our military objectives will be governed by the terms of that Resolution. In case, however, we find ourselves operating under Article 51 of the UN Charter we must recall what we are authorised to do under international law.

As I have advised before, our military response in the collective defence of Kuwait under Article 51 must be necessary in order to repel the invasion and proportionate to that aim. The drawing up of those of our military objectives which are to be secured by force must keep within these international law criteria. Short of a military appreciation which shows that the whole might of the Iraqi military effort is directed or threatened to be directed towards maintaining the subjugation and occupation of Kuwait, we could not be entitled to have as a military objective the destruction of the whole of the Iraqi war machine. To term it a "strategic" objective, if we are to attempt to fulfil it by military effort, will not avoid the problem.

Sub Secretary  
has said  
he will  
leave Kuwait

We are of course perfectly entitled to acknowledge that it would be highly satisfactory if at the end of the conflict Iraq were to be left with no means of re-invading Kuwait. We shall of course be comforted if whatever we are entitled to do



under international law results in that effect. But it should not appear as more than a desirable consequence of our legitimate military objectives. If after Iraq's expulsion the appreciation reveals an imminent continuing threat, our military objectives should be drawn up in the light of that threat and by reference to the same criteria of international law.

I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

A. M.

16 November 1990



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
 Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

16th November 1990

Mr P Hine  
 Admiral  
 CDS 16th

Dear Charles,

THE GULF: STRATEGIC AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Following the OD(G) discussion yesterday, the Defence Secretary spoke to Secretary Cheney to chase up a response to his letter of 7th November with the UK position paper on Iraq/Kuwait. Mr Cheney said that they were now ready to have discussions with us about ideas in the paper which they had found helpful though they did not agree with all of it. He emphasised the meeting should be kept to a very small circle.

Subsequently we have been making arrangements with Mr Cheney's office. The conclusion was that the meeting should be on an "Defense-led inter-agency" basis. The teams are likely to be:

US

Wolfowitz  
 (Deputy Secretary for Defense)

Admiral Jeremiah  
 (4 Star Vice Chairman of the  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Kimmit  
 (State Department)

Haas  
 (National Security Council)

UK

Air Chief Marshal Sir P Hine  
 (4 Star Joint Commander)

Broomfield  
 (Foreign & Commonwealth Office)

Bevan  
 AUS (Commitments), MOD

The meeting is being arranged for Monday or Tuesday of next week, to allow a report ahead of the OD(G) meeting.

C D Powell Esq  
 No 10 Downing Street



The Agenda for the meeting was set by the Defence Secretary's letter to Mr Cheney of 7th November. The aim of the team is to work towards a joint political directive on the lines approved by UK Ministers. While I do not think it would be sensible for the UK team to be over constrained, the discussions will clearly have to be ad referendum to Ministers.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely  
John Webb.*

(S WEBB)  
Private Secretary



*He [unclear] 47*  
*ea*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

16 November 1990

*See [unclear]*

POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE GULF

Thank you for your letter of 15 November setting out the possible programme for a visit by the Prime Minister to the Gulf. This has now been greatly complicated by the indications that the Italians are once again trying to shift the dates of the European Council. Until that is resolved, I do not think we can take matters much further forward, although I do not see why we should once again have to accept a change to the European Council dates.

As to the structure of the visit to the Gulf, the Prime Minister would certainly want to call on King Fahd wherever he is at the time before seeing the Amir of Kuwait.

Perhaps we can have a further word when the matter of the European Council dates is settled.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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C. D. P.  
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TELECON SHEINWALD/DARROCH: PROGRAMME FOR THE DECEMBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. SPATAFORA, THE HEAD OF THE MFA PRESIDENCY SECRETARIAT, TOLD US TODAY THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE DANISH PROBLEMS WITH THE EARLIER PROPOSED, HE WAS WORKING ON THE FOLLOWING REVISED SCENARIO FOR THE DECEMBER COUNCIL:

FRIDAY 14 DECEMBER

EARLY MORNING	PARTICIPANTS ARRIVE
11.00 - 13.00	FIRST WORKING SESSION
13.15 APPROX.	LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, COSSIGA, AT THE PALAZZO QUIRINALE
15.30 - 19.30	SECOND WORKING SESSION
20.00	WORKING DINNER, HOSTED BY ANDREOTTI AT PALAZZO CHIGI

SATURDAY 15 DECEMBER

09.00 - 11.00	FINAL WORKING SESSION
11.00 - 11.45	OPENING OF POLITICAL UNION IGC
11.45 - 12.30	OPENING OF EMU IGC
12.30 ONWARDS	PRESS CONFERENCES, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPART

PAGE 1  
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AFTERNOON

FIRST WORKING SESSION OF EMU IGC

2. SPATAFORA STRESSED THAT ALL TIMINGS WERE APPROXIMATE AND THAT THE NEW SCENARIO HAD YET TO BE CLEARED WITH MINISTERS. HE WAS HOPING TO SUBMIT IT TO ANDREOTTI OVER THE WEEKEND. WE WILL SPEAK TO HIM AGAIN EARLY NEXT WEEK TO CHECK DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO SHEINWALD, ECD (I).

EGERTON

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MR D A HADLEY CABINET OFFICE

MR B BENDER CABINET OFFICE  
MS MANDERSON-JONES  
(CABINET OFFICE)  
MR N L WICKS HMT  
MR H P EVANS HMT  
MR R ALLEN HMT  
MR M. MERCER HMT  
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YOUR TELNO 1984: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON RAPE OF KUWAIT  
SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE WITH OUR IDEAS. THEY HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED KUWAITIS AND WILL DO SO AGAIN URGENTLY. THEIR AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT DUE THERE ON 18 NOVEMBER. READY FOR FURTHER APPROACH WITH US. AMERICANS THINK MATERIAL IS AVAILABLE FOR A CONVINCING PRESENTATION BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT KUWAITIS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET ACT TOGETHER IN TIME.

DETAIL

2. WE DISCUSSED TUR AT A MEETING IN STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY (16 NOVEMBER). GNEHM (US AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO KUWAIT), WOLF (IO, STATE) AND RUGH (DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST BUREAU, USIA) WERE PRESENT. WE HAD GIVEN STATE IN ADVANCE DETAILS OF YOUR THINKING SO THAT THEY COULD GET THEIR IDEAS TOGETHER.

3. GNEHM SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH THE KUWAITIS THE MOUNTING OF A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. KIMMITT SPOKE ON 14 NOVEMBER TO THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HERE, WHO WELCOMED THE IDEA AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD GNEHM THAT THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, MOHAMMED ABDUL HASSAN, HAD BEEN TASKED WITH CO-ORDINATING IT.

4. GNEHM SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE KUWAITIS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DEPTH OF PLANNING REQUIRED TO PUT TOGETHER A GOOD PRESENTATION, AND WONDERED WHETHER THEY COULD GET ORGANISED IN ONLY A WEEK. AT LEAST, WITH THE HELP OF HILL AND KNOWLTON (A WASHINGTON-BASED PR FIRM) THE KUWAITIS HAD PUT TOGETHER A PRESENTATION ON THE DESPOILATION OF KUWAIT FOR THE HOUSE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON 2 NOVEMBER (AND WERE WORKING ON ANOTHER ONE FOR EARLY DECEMBER). ALSO, DURING SECRETARY BAKER'S RECENT VISIT TO TAIF, THE KUWAITIS HAD FIELDED EYE-WITNESSES WHO GAVE

PAGE 1  
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GRAPHIC AND MOVING ACCOUNTS OF IRAQI ATROCITIES. SO THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO BUILD ON.

5. STATE GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE ELEMENTS IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF TUR. THEY SAW THE MOST URGENT TASK AS PERSUADING THE KUWAITIS TO ENGAGE A SINGLE PR FIRM. THEY SAID THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE PRESENTLY USING THREE FIRMS: IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SINGLE FOCUS IN PREPARING THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESENTATION. IN THE SAME CONTEXT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO RIDE THE KUWAITIS OFF HAVING THEIR UN AMBASSADOR AS THEIR FOCUS FOR CO-ORDINATION. ALL WORK WOULD BEST BE FOCUSED IN WASHINGTON. STATE THEREFORE FAVOURED ENCOURAGING THE KUWAITIS TO USE THE WASHINGTON FIRM, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THEIR EXPERIENCE, AND PARTLY BECAUSE USIA COULD THEN BE INSTRUCTED BY STATE TO SUPPORT (AND MONITOR) HILL AND KNOWLTON'S EFFORTS. (STATE REMARKED THAT THEIR MISSION IN NEW YORK HAD JUST BEEN APPROACHED BY OURS ON TUR: AGAIN IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE A SINGLE CHANNEL BETWEEN US TO AVOID CONFUSION.)

6. GIVEN THE ELEMENTS ALREADY AVAILABLE, AND UNLIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES, STATE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A CHANCE OF ARRANGING A GOOD PRESENTATION IN TIME FOR 26 NOVEMBER. IN DISCUSSION, A NUMBER OF DETAILED POINTS AROSE:

- WOULD SECURITY COUNCIL RULES OF PROCEDURE PERMIT LIVE 5 APPEARANCES BY KUWAITI EYE-WITNESSES? WE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BUT, IF NOT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE VIDEOTAPED.
- WHAT VISUAL MATERIAL WAS AVAILABLE? THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THERE WAS IN FACT VERY LITTLE GOOD POST-INVASION FOOTAGE. THEY REMARKED THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE VIEW AT THE UK/US INFORMATION TALKS ON 12 NOVEMBER.
- FORMAT? THE OBVIOUS FORMAT SEEMED TO BE TO HAVE A SCRIPTED PRESENTATION INTERSPERSED WITH FILM/VIDEO CLIPS AND PERSONAL TESTIMONY.
- WHO SHOULD BE THE MAIN PRESENTER? GNEHM AGREED WITH BLACKLEY (JEDDA TELNO 256) THAT THE AMIR WOULD NOT BE TOUGH ENOUGH. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT MUTAWA, WHILE GOOD, WAS TOO LOW IN THE PECKING ORDER, WHICH WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS ON THE KUWAITI SIDE. HE THOUGHT THE CROWN-PRINCE OR SHAIKH SABAH WOULD BE BETTER, THOUGH NEITHER WAS IDEAL.

7. GNEHM SAID THAT HE WOULD TELEPHONE MUTAWA IN TAIF TOMORROW (17 NOVEMBER) TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE. GNEHM HIMSELF WOULD BE FLYING TO SAUDI ARABIA ON SUNDAY. HE WOULD CONSULT WITH BLACKLEY ON ARRIVAL WITH A VIEW TO A JOINT DEMARCHE. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE EARLY NEXT WEEK (NO LATER THAN TUESDAY) WHETHER THE KUWAITIS WERE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PRODUCE

AN ADEQUATE PRESENTATION. IF NOT, WE MIGHT HAVE TO RECOMMEND CANCELLATION RATHER THAN RISK A FIASCO. WOLF, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT SECRETARY BAKER REMAINED VERY KEEN ON A DEBATE FROM 26 NOVEMBER ONWARDS. WE AGREED THAT WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT WE PROVIDED THE KUWAITIS WITH SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE SO THAT THE JOB WAS WELL DONE.

8. WE AGREED THAT, ONCE GNEHM AND BLACKLEY HAD APPROACHED THE KUWAITIS ON SUNDAY, WE WOULD NEED TO LOBBY OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE - NOTABLY THOSE WHOSE GUEST-WORKERS HAD SUFFERED SINCE IRAQ'S INVASION. ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN VERY EARLY NEXT WEEK. TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO ASSEMBLE THIRD COUNTRY WITNESSES ETC AND GET THEM TO NEW YORK. WE AGREED IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE WENT IN IN SUPPORT OF THE KUWAITIS IN GCC AND OTHER FRIENDLY ARAB CAPITALS. THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH BLACKLEY AND GNEHM COULD DISCUSS WITH THE KUWAITIS.

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PRIME MINISTERI agree  
with all the

conclusions of the reasoning

War Aims

At OD(G) this morning you asked whether the war aims we have passed to the Americans were worded so as to cover the objective of ensuring not only the recovery of Kuwait but also its future security (by ensuring that Iraq is not left in a position to try again). CDS expressed concern about the implications of including this as a purely military objective.

2. Our aims as stated do not specifically include this point. Our military objectives are (a) unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; (b) the rescue of hostages; and (c) the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological capability and her long-range missile capability. We do not go on to stipulate the destruction of Iraq's military machine; we hope that this may be achieved as a byproduct of successful prosecution of the stated aims. Equally, we do not say we seek the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; but we hope that this too will be a happy consequence. On land operations, we say that these should be limited to liberation of Kuwait and rescue of hostages and that there is no intention to occupy any part of Iraq.

3. CDS is content that the aims we have put to the Americans are a good basis for discussion with them and for establishing their own thinking. He is, however, concerned that, if we include the destruction of the Iraqi military machine as obligatory rather than an extra, this could require further forces and delay and a new concept of operations, involving additional air attacks and, conceivably, substantial land operations deep inside Iraq.

There is also the question whether we would have the legal cover to pursue operations of this kind.

4. Given the time constraints, we do not want to hold up American agreement of our war aims until we have settled this issue; but before we get down to any more detailed discussion with them, we need to have cleared our own minds.

### Legal Aspects

5. The problem will be affected by the precise legal cover we get from <sup>the</sup> our Security Council. If we act under Article 51 and invoke self-defence, we have to use force proportionate to the attainment of our objective, ie the recovery of Kuwait. It may be argued that this would exclude wider attacks on targets inside Iraq. I disagree. Since the whole power of the Iraqi state is used to hold down Kuwait, we would be entitled to destroy that power as a means of recovery of Kuwait. In addition, there would be the need to prevent or respond to Iraqi counter-attacks.

6. If we go for a further resolution on the use of force as the Americans want, our military powers would be defined by the terms of the resolution. But in practice we would insist that it gave us at least as much scope as Article 51. During the battle for Kuwait, therefore, there would be nothing to choose as regards legal cover between action under Article 51 and action under a further Security Council resolution.

7. Where a difference could emerge would be after the Kuwait battle had stopped. If Saddam had accepted defeat and withdrawn it would be harder to justify continued attacks on Iraq under Article 51, even though he might retain a good part of his military machine intact. True, we could argue, as you did this morning, that recovery of Kuwait should be widely defined so as to extend to ensuring

its future security. But we must recognise that this would be likely to prove a controversial argument. If, however, we were acting under a suitably worded Security Council resolution, eg one authorising measures to restore international peace and security, we would have better legal cover for continuing attacks on Iraqi mainland targets after the surrender of Kuwait.

8. I see this, therefore, as an argument in favour of a further resolution on the use of force (always provided, and it is a very large proviso, we can get the right resolution). But in practice the legalities may matter less than the politico/military circumstances at the time. We must assume that after the recovery of Kuwait international pressures to bring the fighting to an end would become intense. Whatever our precise legal position, we might find it hard to continue bombing or, *a fortiori*, to carry out land operations deep inside Iraq, except for the rescue of our hostages. In practice, we might well find we would have to rest content with having inflicted heavy damage on Iraqi NBC facilities and many of their military installations. But total destruction from the air, even of the NBC facilities, might prove beyond the Allies.

#### Military Aspects

9. The military arguments support this. Our forces and plans are, or soon will be, adequate for the attainment of the three stated military objectives. To go for the fourth (destruction of the Iraqi military machine) could require vastly increased forces and probably plans for land operations deep inside Iraq, perhaps as far as Baghdad and perhaps involving occupation of part of the country. We ourselves could not, of course, do that, and I am fairly sure that the Americans would not contemplate it. It would go far beyond our present stated aims. The best we can do is, by heavily reinforcing the initial air attacks, give

ourselves the best chance of attaining a good part of the fourth objective before the fighting is brought to an end.

#### Long-term Security Arrangements

10. If we cannot be sure of fully attaining the fourth objective by military means, we shall have to fall back on suitable post-war security arrangements. These may include the continuing presence in Kuwait of an Arab force, supported by suitable Western guarantees. We could not contemplate the retention of militarily adequate Western forces in Saudi Arabia/Kuwait on a long-term basis. The full dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and payment of compensation would probably require a long-term sanctions régime. You have already seen outline FCO papers on this subject. They bring out the manifold difficulties; nevertheless something of this kind is likely to be an essential feature of the end-game.

#### Conclusions

11. The above suggests:

- ✓ a. that we include among our strategic objectives the destruction of the Iraqi military machine;
- ✓ b. that to achieve this we seek the widest possible powers under any further resolution on the use of force;
- ✓ c. we ensure that as much as possible in the way of destruction is achieved by the initial air attacks;
- ✓ d. we recognise that we should not seek to involve ourselves in land operations deep inside Iraq, except possibly to rescue hostages;

e

e. that full attainment of this objective would probably have to be left to non-military means, ie long-term security arrangements.

We should be guided by the above in discussion with the Americans.

12. CDS agrees with the above.



PERCY CRADOCK

15 November 1990



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46(a-c) *ceb*

PM/90/085

PRIME MINISTER

*Prime Minister*

*His all seems sensible.*

*CB 16/11/90*

GULF CRISIS: EXTRACTION OF BRITISH HOSTAGES AND  
DETAINEES IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES

*att.*

1. As I mentioned at OD(G) on 15 November, what we do about British hostages in Kuwait and Iraq is politically and practically a key element in the Gulf crisis. There are an estimated 516 British citizens in hiding in Kuwait, and 57 held at Iraqi "strategic sites". In Iraq itself there are an estimated 426 British citizens, plus 298 held at strategic sites. Public opinion is bound to remain very sensitive on this. There have already been complaints from relatives that the Government is taking no active steps to get them out. Most people will expect that we should somehow ensure their safety in advance of any hostilities initiated by the Allied side.

2. In practice, it is clear that it will not be possible to do anything to extricate the hostages in advance of hostilities. Any attempt might itself precipitate armed conflict. It will be correspondingly important to minimise danger to the hostages by ensuring that our targeting of Iraqi installations takes full account of all the information we have on their whereabouts, without compromising our military operations. Our military planning needs to take account of the scope for hostage rescue and to make the best possible arrangements for looking after the hostages once they are liberated. These questions are under

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discussion at official level between the MOD and the FCO.

### Kuwait

3. In Kuwait we will have to rely on the Americans (who have roughly the same number of hostages in Kuwait as we do) for the liberation and initial handling of our citizens. We cannot expect 7th Armoured Brigade to take on the numbers involved, or even to be in the right place to do so. We are working on the assumption that British and other citizens liberated by Allied forces will be brought by a military evacuation chain as far as Al Jubail (7th Armoured Brigade's supply port in Saudi Arabia), and that the military casualty evacuation (Casevac) system will take on to hospital those who are injured. We envisage that HMA Riyadh and his staff, suitably reinforced, might take on the further evacuation of the uninjured from Al Jubail, and we are consulting him on the best way to achieve this. We may well have to ask for MOD assistance for a sea or airlift, though I recognise that MOD resources will already be stretched.

### Iraq

4. In Iraq, there are two main scenarios we may face:
- If Saddam Hussein is toppled from power at a fairly early stage, we may well be able to secure the peaceful and speedy release of our citizens. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and/or the Red Cross may be useful in helping to do so;
  - If Saddam remains in power after withdrawing from Kuwait, and there are reprisals against the hostages or he refuses to release them, we will have to consider



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further military options or (in the latter case)  
continued sanctions.

5. There is much at stake here. We need very soon to begin a detailed dialogue with the Americans. They share our interest in that they also have large numbers of hostages at risk, and of course in military terms they are in the lead. We need to ensure that we pool all available information on the hostages and detainees, and coordinate our planning both in relation to targeting and to rescuing the hostages.

6. I understand that a hostage cell has been established at the JHQ High Wycombe, and this should make an important contribution on all these aspects. The FCO Emergency Unit will work in close liaison with the cell, and in the event of hostilities the FCO will contribute an official to it.

7. It will be essential from now on to keep the eventual release of the hostages very high among our objectives, and to ensure that the Americans do the same.

8. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

DH.

DOUGLAS HURD

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
15 November 1990

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1990

*[Handwritten initials]*

**THE GULF: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Following discussion in OD(G) this morning about the Americans' failure so far to respond to our paper on strategic objectives, I spoke again to General Scowcroft. I explained that Ministers saw some urgency in obtaining American endorsement of our paper, or comments on it, and proceeding from there to joint planning. The Defence Secretary had just returned from a visit to the Gulf and would be putting forward proposals for reinforcement of the British military presence. His colleagues were generally well disposed but felt we needed the assurance that the United Kingdom and the United States were at one about the strategic objectives for our forces, and how they would be implemented.

General Scowcroft said that he had finally been able to discuss our paper with Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney yesterday. There were a few points on which the American definition of their objectives was not at one with ours, although he did not think that the differences were irreconcilable. He was drafting a reply to my message which he would try to get to me tomorrow. This would set out the differences, together with some ideas on how to deal with them.

I said this would be very welcome. I expected the Prime Minister to raise the matter with the President in Paris on Monday. General Scowcroft said he would ensure the President was briefed.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2792

OF 152335Z NOVEMBER 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, MOSCOW, PEKING, BAGHDAD, ACTOR

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MY TELNO. 2742: IRAQ/KUWAIT  
SUMMARY

1. NO DECISION YET ON EXERCISING THE MILITARY OPTION. MILITARY BUILD UP TO BE COMPLETED BY EARLY 1991. NOT HOWEVER SUSTAINABLE OVER THE LONGER TERM. AMERICANS ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO SECURING FURTHER UN COVER. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS A PROBLEM IN PERSUADING PUBLIC AND, MORE ESPECIALLY, CONGRESSIONAL OPINION THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO GO OVER TO THE OFFENSIVE. THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RELY ON CONSENSUS WHEN HE DECIDES WHICH ROUTE TO TAKE, PROBABLY SOME TIME IN JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE SEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, SCOWCROFT, KIMMITT, WOLFOWITZ AT THE PENTAGON AND TALKED TO PELL (CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE) ON THE TELEPHONE OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS TO GET A READING OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT POSITION FOLLOWING BAKER'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 9 NOVEMBER OF MAJOR NEW US DEPLOYMENTS TO THE GULF. AS I REPORTED IN MY TUR, EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN AROUSED. BUT SCOWCROFT TOLD ME ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN FURTHER DECISIONS ABOUT THE MILITARY OPTION MIGHT BE TAKEN. THERE WAS AS YET NO DEFINITE GAME PLAN. AS I SEE IT, HOWEVER, THREE FACTORS WILL FIGURE HEAVILY IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION-MAKING. EACH IS NOW A FOCUS OF ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITY.

3. FIRST, MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE RENEWED MILITARY BUILD-UP OUGHT TO BE COMPLETED BY ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY. POWELL TOLD ME ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT LOGISTICS. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE 70 PER CENT OF US FORCES OVERSEAS FOR A LONG PERIOD. THE MORALE OF THOSE ORIGINALLY SENT OUT IN AUGUST, AND EXPECTING TO BE ROTATED FAIRLY SOON, WOULD FALL DRAMATICALLY AND CREATE A SERIOUS PROBLEM IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE HAVING TO STAY FOR A FURTHER LONG PERIOD. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT A PRESENT CONCERN. INDEED, THE MORALE OF THOSE IN THEATRE HAD

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IMPROVED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS, BECAUSE THOSE THERE ALREADY THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING WOULD HAPPEN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER BEFORE TOO LONG. THE CLEAR INFERENCE FROM WHAT POWELL SAID WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD IN JANUARY/FEBRUARY EITHER HAVE TO USE THE FORCES HE WOULD BY THEN HAVE IN THE AREA, OR SETTLE IN FOR THE LONGER HAUL AND BRING SOME OF THEM HOME ON ROTATION.

4. SECOND, UN COVER. THE AMERICANS EVIDENTLY ATTACH PERHAPS INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO SECURING THIS, AS WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT KIMMITT SAID TO ME ON 14 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO. 2873 NOT TO ALL). BAKER'S INTENTION TO MEET A FURTHER GROUP OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS POINTS IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

5. THIRD, DOMESTIC SUPPORT. FURTHER UN COVER WOULD, IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW, ALSO HELP IN THE CRITICAL AREA OF CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION. ALTHOUGH THE LOGIC BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER US TROOP DEPLOYMENTS WAS CLEAR ENOUGH VIEWED FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE, THE FACT THAT HE CHANGED FROM SPEAKING OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE TO USING THE WORD QUOTE OFFENSIVE UNQUOTE EXPLICITLY MADE IT SEEM TO MUCH OF THE PUBLIC, AND PARTICULARLY TO CONGRESS, THAT SOME FORM OF RUBICON HAD BEEN CROSSED. THIS MIGHT SEEM ILLOGICAL, GIVEN THE IRAQI BUILD-UP AND THE LONG-ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVE, ENDORSED BY THE UN, OF GETTING THE IRAQIS OUT OF KUWAIT. MOREOVER, IT WOULD PROBABLY ALWAYS HAVE BEEN THE CASE THAT ONLY ONCE THE INITIAL BUILD-UP WAS COMPLETE, WOULD SERIOUS DEBATE START ON THE RESPECTIVE MERITS OF STICKING TO THE LONG HAUL OR TRYING FOR EARLIER AND DECISIVE MILITARY ACTION. THE FACT REMAINS HOWEVER THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT SHARPLY FOCUSED THE ISSUE. IT IS WIDELY RECOGNISED THAT DELAYING THE ROTATION, WHICH HAD EARLIER CONFIDENTLY BEEN EXPECTED, MEANS THAT THE LEVELS TO BE ACHIEVED EARLY NEXT YEAR ARE NOT SUSTAINABLE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME READ-ACROSS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE BUDGET CRISIS, WHICH DAMAGED HIS PUBLIC REPUTATION FOR MEASURED JUDGEMENTS. HENCE THE PUBLIC PRESSURES RECORDED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN MY TELNO. 2767.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND ARE STARTING TO TACKLE IT. THE EFFORT, HOWEVER, HAS YET TO BE COORDINATED EFFECTIVELY OR TO PAY SIGNIFICANT DIVIDENDS. THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS FROM THE GULF ON 22 NOVEMBER WILL BE IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD. SENATOR PELL TOLD ME ON 14 NOVEMBER, AFTER A TWO HOUR PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING OF THE SENATE LEADERSHIP, THAT THERE WAS BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION TO DATE, BUT THAT THE CLEAR MESSAGE WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SLOW DOWN. THE DECISION

TO CANCEL ROTATION HAD COME IN FOR PARTICULARLY HEAVY CRITICISM (AND HAS SINCE BEEN SHADED BY CHENEY). PELL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD FIND THE PRESIDENT BACKING AWAY FROM THIS DECISION. CRITICISM WAS ALSO FOCUSSED ON THE INCREASINGLY DOMINANT US ROLE IN THE GULF IN TERMS OF TROOPS COMMITTED. THE PRESIDENT NEEDED TO PRESENT THE ISSUE TO THE US PUBLIC IN SIMPLER TERMS AND TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS CHANGING HIS OBJECTIVES.

7. MUCH OF THE PRESSURE FOR THE EARLY RETURN OF CONGRESS TO DEBATE THE USE OF FORCE HAS NOW EASED, MAINLY BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS NOT RIPE FOR JUDGEMENT. SOME AT LEAST IN THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP WILL NOT WANT TO GIVE THE ADMINISTRATION A BLANK CHEQUE TOO FAR IN ADVANCE. THE SENATE HEARINGS DUE LATER THIS MONTH WILL MARK AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS. IF A SUITABLE RESOLUTION CAN BE PASSED IN THE UN AND BE SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED IN SOME WAY BY THE CONGRESS, THAT WILL EASE THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. CONGRESS IS DUE TO RECONVENE FOR A BRIEF FORMAL MEETING IN EARLY JANUARY, BUT WILL NOT DO SO SUBSTANTIVELY UNTIL LATE IN THE MONTH. THIS COULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE THE MILITARY OPTION BEFORE THEN, UNLESS HE IS ABLE TO WIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT THROUGH INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE MEANTIME. AS THINGS STAND, THE MILITARY BUILD-UP OUGHT TO BE COMPLETED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE NEW CONGRESS BEGINS ITS FIRST SESSION, LEAVING SOME FEW WEEKS BEFORE WHAT WE HAVE SO FAR SEEN AS THE QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE IN THE GULF BEGINS TO CLOSE.

8. MY OVERALL CONCLUSION IS THAT IT WILL NOT BE UNTIL TOWARDS THE END OF THE YEAR OR, QUITE POSSIBLY, UNTIL SOME TIME IN EARLY JANUARY, BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATION MAKES ANY VERY CLEAR DECISION AS TO WHETHER IT WILL ORDER AN OFFENSIVE OR REVERT TO DEFENCE, DETERRENCE AND THE LONG SANCTIONS HAUL. THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CONGRESS WILL INFLUENCE HIS CHOICE, THOUGH THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY LIMIT HIS OPTIONS. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE MAJORITY JUDGEMENT IN CONGRESS AND AMONG THE PUBLIC AT THE TIME AS TO HOW SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL MILITARY OPERATIONS MIGHT BE. THE PROSPECT OF THOUSANDS OF US BODIES RETURNING HOME BECAUSE OF KUWAIT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR MANY IN THIS COUNTRY TO ACCEPT, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF A GENERAL SENSE THAT TRULY VITAL US INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE. THE PRESIDENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL HAVE TO REALISE SOONER OR LATER THAT HE CANNOT MAKE THE JUDGEMENT AS BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. HE WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE BEST ASSESSMENT HE CAN OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS AND THEN DECIDE WHICH WAY TO

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GO, KNOWING THAT IF HE DOES NOT TAKE THE OFFENSIVE EARLY NEXT YEAR, THE NEXT CAMPAIGNING SEASON MIGHT NOT THEN BE UNTIL THE FOLLOWING AUTUMN.

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MY TELNO 1966 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2783: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

## SUMMARY

1. PICKERING OUTLINES AMERICAN THINKING ON PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE AND TIMING FOR THE NEXT STEPS. ACTION IN NEW YORK ON HOLD WHILE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS AND IN CAPITALS WITH THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS GET UNDER WAY.

## DETAIL

2. THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE GAVE ME BREAKFAST ON 15 NOVEMBER AND DEBRIEFED ME THOROUGHLY ON HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN THE MORNING OF 14 NOVEMBER. I HAD NOT AT THAT STAGE SEEN THE ACCOUNT OF SIR A. ACLAND'S CONVERSATION WITH KIMMITT IN WASHINGTON TUR.) PICKERING UNDERLINED THAT ALL THIS PRE-DATED THE TALKS WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER HAD WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS LATER THAT DAY BUT HE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR VIEWS HAD CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THOSE MEETINGS.

3. PICKERING SAID THAT, BROADLY SPEAKING, A LOT OF PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND MANY OF THE POINTS HE AND I HAD SUGGESTED (MY TELNOS 1940 AND 1941) HAD NOW BEEN TAKEN ON BOARD. MORE SPECIFICALLY:

I) IT HAD FIRMLY REGISTERED AND BEEN AGREED THAT THE SELLING OF BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE MILITARY OPTION AND A TEXT MUST BE DONE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND IN CAPITALS. THAT IMPLIED HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH AND THE RUSSIANS THIS WEEKEND AND POSSIBLE FOLLOW UP THEREAFTER IN THEIR CAPITALS AND A SEPARATE EMISSARY TO PEKING. IN ADDITION BAKER WOULD BE MEETING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ETHIOPIA, IVORY COAST AND ZAIRE IN GENEVA AND WAS PLANNING A VISIT TO BOGOTA (ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT BE A LITTLE BIT TOO LATE FOR THE CURRENT OPERATION).

II) THE DRAFT WE HAD PASSED THEM HAD BEEN MUCH WELCOMED AND FITTED MORE OR LESS EXACTLY THEIR OWN THINKING. IT WOULD, WITH VERY FEW CHANGES, FORM THE BASIS FOR CONSULTATION. THE ONE POINT THAT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN WASHINGTON AS NEEDING SOME CHANGE WAS THE



REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION OF THE KUWAITI REGIME WHICH, TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FRENCH SUSCEPTIBILITIES, MIGHT NEED TO BE HANDLED LESS DIRECTLY EG BY A CROSS-REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE EARLIER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

III) IT WAS AGREED THAT 'PEACE' LANGUAGE SHOULD NOT BE PROFFERED AT THIS STAGE.

IV) IT WAS AGREED THAT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DATE IN THE FUTURE AFTER WHICH THE MILITARY OPTION COULD BE AVAILABLE SHOULD ALSO NOT BE PURSUED AT THIS STAGE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT COME BACK INTO PLAY IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

V) ON TIMING, THE IDEA HE AND I HAD DISCUSSED FOR STARTING THE KUWAITI DESPOLIATION SHOW DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 26 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED AT THE END OF THAT WEEK OR EARLY THE NEXT BY THE DEBATE ON THE MILITARY OPTION RESOLUTION WAS BROADLY ACCEPTED, BUT WAS REGARDED AS THE FASTEST TRACK PRACTICABLE. DEPENDING ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE THE TIMETABLE MIGHT HAVE TO BE SLOWED DOWN A LITTLE. IT WAS THE FIRM VIEW IN WASHINGTON THAT THE KUWAIT DESPOLIATION SHOW SHOULD NOT BE LAUNCHED ON A TIMESCALE WHICH LEFT ANY RISK OF IT BECOMING DECOUPLED FROM THE MILITARY OPTION RESOLUTION DEBATE. THE SWITCH OF SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCIES FROM THE U S TO YEMEN WAS REGARDED AS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE AND NOT A DETERMINING FACTOR.

4. I ASKED PICKERING WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION HE WAS NOW INSTRUCTED TO TAKE IN NEW YORK AND WHAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED TO DO TO TEE UP THE KUWAIT DESPOLIATION SHOW. PICKERING SAID THAT, SO FAR AS NEW YORK WAS CONCERNED, HE WAS FIRMLY ON HOLD WHILE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS AND CAPITALS WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE GOT UNDER WAY. THE US AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT WAS ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH THE KUWAITIS AND WITH THOSE PARTS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAD BEEN DEALING WITH PUBLICITY MATERIAL ON DESPOLIATION. HE IMAGINED THE ISSUE WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA NEXT WEEK. WASHINGTON HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO RUN THE SMALL KUWAITI DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE END OF THIS WEEK AS A SEPARATE EXERCISE AND A KIND OF PRECURSOR TO THE MAIN DESPOLIATION SHOW OR WHETHER TO FOLD IT INTO THAT LARGER OPERATION. (THIS RESOLUTION SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT UNDER CLIFF'S LETTER OF 14 NOVEMBER TO MS EVANS, WOULD ENTRUST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A COPY OF THE REGISTER RECORDING THE CITIZENS OF KUWAIT ON 1 AUGUST 1990).

5. I PASSED ON TO PICKERING THE ADVICE GIVEN BY SIR E FERGUSSON (PARIS TELNO 1377) ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A SEPARATE AND FREE-STANDING U S APPROACH AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO THE FRENCH THIS WEEKEND IN PARIS. PICKERING SAID THIS SOUNDED VERY GOOD SENSE TO HIM

AND HE WOULD FEED THAT INTO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

HANNAY

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1990

I enclose a copy of a letter from Chancellor Kohl to the Prime Minister about German assistance with our forces in the Gulf. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H.M. Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SM

Courtesy Translation

Bonn, 13 November 1990

Letter  
from  
Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the  
Federal Republic of Germany  
to  
Her Excellency The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,  
dear Margaret,

Despite a high degree of enduring consensus on the part of the member states of the United Nations Security Council and the international community, we have not yet succeeded in obtaining the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait or in forcing Iraq to meet its international responsibilities. A further visible strengthening of international solidarity, as agreed by the WEU Council of Ministers on 21 August 1990, is thus of decisive importance if we are to attain our objective - to end the aggression and its consequences by peaceful means, if possible.

I am therefore pleased to comply with your request, transmitted to me by your Ambassador on 24 September, to support your country's involvement in coping with the crisis.

In order to increase the operational readiness of the British forces in the Gulf, the Federal Republic will provide military

equipment worth a total of approximately 60 million Marks. This support is in line with the wishes expressed by the British side and includes in particular the "Fuchs" NBC detection vehicle.

In addition, the German side will, as far as possible, provide military air transport capacity within the NATO area to ease the provision of supplies for the British forces.

I suggest that our defence ministers discuss the relevant details.

Yours sincerely,  
(sgd) Helmut Kohl



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

15 November 1990

Content with  
this outline?

- No - I think the  
initial visit  
to Saudi Arabia should  
NOT be a prelude for

Dear Charles

CAB 15/11

Possible visit by the Prime Minister to the Gulf

In your letter of 9 November you asked us to consider a possible programme for a visit by the Prime Minister to the Gulf from 14-17 December.

We agree that the priorities for the visit should be Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt. Time constraints would make it impossible to fit in a visit to Oman; though it might just be possible to include a stopover in the UAE (on which see below).

In Saudi Arabia we would hope that, in addition to meetings with King Fahd and the Amir of Kuwait and visits to our own forces, the Prime Minister would be able to fit in a meeting with General Schwarzkopf, the US Commander. This could take place perhaps during a visit to HBQFME in Riyadh. We assume that she would want to spend the best part of a day with British forces in and around Dhahran and to visit a RN ship in the Gulf, from where it would be possible to helicopter on to Bahrain. The programme there would include a call on the Ruler (or, if he is still convalescing in the United States, the Crown Prince) and visits to RAF units at Muharrag. A stopover in Cairo (which need last no more than 5-6 hours) could be fitted in on the return trip. Apart from Saudi Arabia, Egypt is the key Arab member of the coalition against Saddam Hussain; HM Ambassador Cairo recently made a strong recommendation in an entirely separate context that the Prime Minister should find time for a brief visit if she were in the area.

A programme on these lines would look something like this:

Friday 14 December

Late afternoon/early evening

Depart Rome at the conclusion of the European Council (assuming the date does not change)

Saturday 15 December

Early morning Arrive Jedda  
 am Call on the Amir of Kuwait  
 Lunchtime Fly to Riyadh  
 pm Visit HQBFCME. Calls on General  
 Schwarzkopf and General de la  
 Billiere.  
 Early evening Audience with King Fahd\*  
 Overnight Riyadh

\*This part of the programme would have to be rejigged if the King is in Jedda

Sunday 16 December

Early morning Depart Riyadh for Dhahran  
 am Visit British Forces in and around  
 Dhahran  
 ?Call on Governor of Eastern Province,  
 Prince Mohammed bin Fahd  
 Mid-afternoon Helicopter to RN ship in the Gulf  
 Early evening Helicopter on to Bahrain.  
 Overnight Bahrain.

Monday 17 December

am Call on the Ruler (or Crown Prince) of  
 Bahrain  
 Visit RAF units at Muharraq  
 Early afternoon Depart for Cairo  
 Late afternoon Arrive Cairo  
 Meeting with President Mubarak  
 Late evening Depart for London  
 Midnight (approx) Arrive London



It would be necessary to discuss the main elements of this programme with the governments concerned - and particularly the Saudi leadership - albeit on a highly restricted basis at a fairly early stage. It is possible the Saudis would be hesitant about any suggestion that the Prime Minister's first major meeting in the Kingdom should be with the Kuwaitis. But this need not be an insurmountable problem, and matters would be eased considerably if King Fahd were in Jedda at the time. In any event the programme allows for a certain degree of flexibility in splitting the Prime Minister's time between Jedda and Riyadh.

It might be possible to fit in a short visit to Abu Dhabi en route from Bahrain to Cairo. But the UAE has already received considerable attention from British Ministers this year, and our initial view is that a visit would probably over-strain the programme. In any event a meeting in the early afternoon might not appeal to Shaikh Zayed who traditionally prefers to receive visitors in the evening. The same arguments apply to Oman, which would only be possible if Bahrain were dropped. That would seem illogical given the greater RAF presence now at Muharraq than at Thumrait/Seeb.

The above reflects preliminary discussions with the MOD.

*Yours,*  
*Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

DSG  
CCFO  
PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T252190

SUBJECT CC MASTER  
CC OPS

15 November 1990

Dear Mr President,

I was grateful for your letter of 6 November setting out your views on the Gulf crisis. It was helpful to have these assurances of the firmness and consistency of your policy in resisting the Iraqi aggression and to know that you recognise the need to keep up the military pressure on Saddam Hussein.

Since you wrote I have had a useful talk with Jim Baker, who had just come from seeing you in Moscow. I look forward to discussing all this with you when we are both in Paris next week for the CSCE Summit.

Yours sincerely  
Narasimhaiah

His Excellency Mr. M. S. Gorbachev

DER BOTSCHAFTER  
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

London, 15 November 1990

RM

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit the message of Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany dated 13 November 1990. The original letter will follow.

Courtesy translation is attached.

I am, dear Prime Minister,  
Yours sincerely  
Hermann von Richthofen

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and  
First Lord of the Treasury  
L o n d o n

SECRET AND PERSONAL



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bc P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1990

**THE GULF: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Following discussion in OD(G) this morning about the Americans' failure so far to respond to our paper on strategic objectives, I spoke again to General Scowcroft. I explained that Ministers saw some urgency in obtaining American endorsement of our paper, or comments on it, and proceeding from there to joint planning. The Defence Secretary had just returned from a visit to the Gulf and would be putting forward proposals for reinforcement of the British military presence. His colleagues were generally well disposed but felt we needed the assurance that the United Kingdom and the United States were at one about the strategic objectives for our forces, and how they would be implemented.

General Scowcroft said that he had finally been able to discuss our paper with Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney yesterday. There were a few points on which the American definition of their objectives was not at one with ours, although he did not think that the differences were irreconcilable. He was drafting a reply to my message which he would try to get to me tomorrow. This would set out the differences, together with some ideas on how to deal with them.

I said this would be very welcome. I expected the Prime Minister to raise the matter with the President in Paris on Monday. General Scowcroft said he would ensure the President was briefed.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAKER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 7-9 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. BAKER FINDS GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME, AND READY (RELUCTANTLY) TO CONTEMPLATE RESORT TO FORCE. GORBACHAEV UNDERLINED HIS COMMITMENT TO US/SOVIET COOPERATION, AND TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL UNSCR'S. POSSIBILITY THAT BUSH MAY GO TO PARIS WITH FIRM PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE ACTION.

DETAIL

2. THE US MINISTER-COUNSELLOR, COLLINS, HAS BRIEFED US ON BAKER'S DISCUSSIONS HERE LAST WEEK WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE ON THE GULF. WE ARE REPORTING HIS ACCOUNT IN CASE IT ADDS TO THE INFORMATION ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU. (COLLINS STRESSED THAT HE WAS ONLY PARTIALLY BRIEFED HIMSELF).

3. BAKER HAD THIRTEEN HOURS OF TALKS, TWO OF WHICH WERE WITH GORBACHEV. THE MAIN POINTS THAT EMERGED WERE:

(A) THE RUSSIANS WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE OUTCOME OF PRIMAKOV'S DISCUSSIONS. SADDAM WAS ADAMANT THAT HE WOULD NOT COMPLY WITH THE UNSCR'S. SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF A PEACEFUL OUTCOME:

(B) BAKER EXPLORED POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS AT THE UN, BUT WITHOUT TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. HE HAD NOT WANTED TO TRY TO EXTRACT ANY COMMITMENTS BEFORE HIS SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON AND PARIS, AND BEFORE REPORTING BACK TO THE PRESIDENT:

(C) GORBACHEV HAD EMPHASISED THREE POINTS:

(I) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD WORKED TOGETHER FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS AND WOULD WORK TOGETHER UNTIL ITS END:

(II) LIKE THE US, THE SOVIET UNION WAS UNSHAKEABLE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE

PAGE 1  
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**Secret**

RELEVANT UNSCR'S. THERE COULD BE NO PARTIAL SOLUTIONS:  
(III) THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE A NEGOTIATED ONE, BUT OTHER  
POSSIBILITIES HAD TO BE EXPLORED.

4. BAKER HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO  
COMTEMPLATE THE MILITARY OPTION (ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY), AND MIGHT EVEN  
BE COMING ROUND TO THE VIEW THAT A CONVINCING THREAT TO USE FORCE WAS  
THE LAST GCHANCE OF PERSUADING SADDAM TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. COLLINS SAID THAT BAKER SAW HIS TOUR AS PREPARATION FOR BUSH'S  
BILATERALS AT THE CSCE SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT MIGHT THEN WANT  
TO PUT FIRM PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER ACTION TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
OF THE OTHER PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS.

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: VISIT OF DEFENCE SECRETARY, 13 - 14 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. A BUSY AND PRODUCTIVE TWO DAYS IN SAUDI ARABIA, MEETING KING FAHD, PRINCE SULTAN, PRINCE SAUD, PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF GID) THE GOVERNOR OF TABUK AND US AND SAUDI C-IN-C'S. SAUDI READINESS TO FACE MILITARY ACTION EVIDENT, PREFERABLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF A DEADLINE. WELCOME FOR REINFORCEMENT. DOUBT THAT SADDAM WILL BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW. CONFIDENT THAT EGYPTIANS AND ALSO SYRIANS WOULD DO THEIR MILITARY BIT, AND THAT CHINESE (RECENTLY HERE) HAVE NO TIME FOR SADDAM. NO QUESTION OF ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. ANGER OVER YEMEN AND SUDAN, BUT KING FAHD INSISTENT KING HUSSEIN MUST SURVIVE, JUST POSSIBLE A DOOR OPENING HERE.

2. SEVERAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. ENCOURAGING NEW DEFENCE SALES IN PROSPECT OUTSIDE AL YAMAMAH. IMPRESSIVE CROSS DESERT TRAINING EXERCISE BY 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE. NIGHT VISIT TO GRI TORNADO AT TABUK. GOOD MEDIA COVERAGE.

DETAIL

3. MR KING'S VISIT COMING JUST AFTER THAT OF BAKER, GAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TIMELY DISCUSSIONS ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. KING FAHD AND PRINCE SULTAN PUT THEMSELVES OUT TO WELCOME THE DEFENCE SECRETARY.. BOTH PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

PARTICIPATED IN TALKS (AND PRINCE SAUD HAD A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MYSELF AND YOUNG (MED)). A COHORT OF AL SAUD WERE BIDDEN TO PRINCE SULTAN'S LUNCH IN MR KING'S HONOUR IN JEDDAH. DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY. MR KING ALSO HELD TALKS ON MILITARY OUTLOOK WITH GEN SCHWARZKOPF AND WITH GEN PRINCE KHALID IN RIYADH AND VISITED HQBFME. HE SAW 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE NEAR JUBAIL ON A RIGOROUS CROSS DESERT EXERCISE INVOLVING OBSTACLE CLEARING, WHERE HE ALSO GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE, TO EMPHASISE WE MEANT WHAT WE WERE SAYING ABOUT A MILITARY OPTION IF SADDAM DID NOT SOON WITHDRAW. THE BASE AREA AT JUBAIL AND THE GRI TORNADO SQUADRON AT TABUK WERE VISITED. THESE VISITS GAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO FRONT-LINE SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN ABOUT THE TASK THEY MIGHT SOON FACE.

4. THE MAIN MESSAGES TO COME ACROSS WERE CLEAR:

A) REAFFIRMATION OF OUR MUTUAL RESOLVE TO FACE UP TO HOSTILITIES IF NEED BE. SADDAM SEEN AS LIKELY TO PLAY FOR TIME RATHER THAN WITHDRAW. MR KING SUGGESTED SANCTIONS MIGHT BE STARTING TO TAKE EFFECT ON IRAQI PUBLIC.

B) AN ASSURANCE FROM SAUD THAT BOTH EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD JOIN IN HOSTILITIES.

C) A STRONG SAUDI PREFERENCE FOR UNSC ENDORSEMENT OF THE MILITARY OPTION, WITH A DEADLINE, AND SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. MR KING SUGGESTED WE NEED NOT BE TOO SPECIFIC ON A TIME LIMIT.

D) A WELCOME FOR US REINFORCEMENT AND FOR A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION, DESPITE THE TIME THIS COULD TAKE TO ASSEMBLE. RAMADAN'S ONSET WOULD COMPLICATE HOSTILITIES.

E) AN ENCOURAGING READ OUT ON THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECOND VISIT HERE THIS WEEK, WITH NO SIGN OF CHINESE INTEREST IN SAVING SADDAM'S FACE. QIAN EVIDENTLY SPELT OUT TO AN UNEASY SADDAM THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF HANGING ON IN KUWAIT (US AMBASSADOR, A CHINA HAND, HAS SAME ACCOUNT OF QIAN'S TOUGH TALK IN BAGHDAD FROM OUR CHINESE COLLEAGUE).

F) UNDIMINISHED ANGER OVER YEMEN AND ARAFAT, BUT INSISTENCE THAT KING HUSSEIN MUST NOT FALL. CONTACT SO FAR WITH KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN INDIRECT AND UNPROMISING, BUT SAUDI INTEREST (EXPRESSED BY PRINCE TURKI) IN OMANI EFFORTS TO SET UP A DIRECT JORDANIAN APPROACH.

G) REJECTION OF ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT (NOW CONFIRMED PUBLICLY BY SAUD).

H) NO SIGN OF CONCERN THAT SADDAM MIGHT PROVOKE ISRAEL. BUT KING FAHD WARNED THAT YEMEN OR JORDAN MIGHT TRY TO ATTACH SAUDI ARABIA IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ (PERHAPS WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN ASSESSMENT, AND STEP UP THE MESSAGE IN JORDAN THAT SADDAM IS BOUND TO LOSE).

I) EMPHASIS ON NEED TO DISMANTLE IRAQ CBW CAPABILITY EITHER DURING HOSTILITIES OR POST WITHDRAWAL.

J) RELUCTANCE TO RELEASE SAUDI COMMAND OF KUWAITI UNITS AND REFUSAL TO BRIGADE KUWAITI CHIEFTAINS WITH 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE.

K) ON THE MILITARY SIDE IT WAS IMPRESSIVE TO SEE 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE SO QUICK OFF THE TRAINING AND FIRING MARK (AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS). MR KING OBTAINED SAUDI CLEARANCE FOR A CONTRIBUTION TO OUR IN COUNTRY COSTS ON SAME BASIS AS AMERICANS: A BRITISH FORCES BROADCASTING WAVELENGTH: AND AGREEMENT TO FRESH FIRING RANGE FACILITIES.

L) PRINCE TURKI TOLD ME HE LIKE THE MEDIA MATERIAL WE HAD SHOWN HIM AIMED AGAINST IRAQI MORALE. WE HAD TO FIND WAYS TO GET ITS IMPACT OVER TO THE MILITARY IN IRAQ WHO HELD THE KEY TO CHANGE. BUT NO CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE IRAQI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WAS YET PERCEPTIBLE.

MUNRO

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MR POWELL

cc Sir Percy Cradock  
Mr Appleyard

CA 15/11

The Iraqi Long-Range Gun Project

The remand hearings of the two men charged in connection with the Iraqi gun case, Mr Peter Mitchell, the Managing Director of Walter Somers Limited, and Dr Christopher Cowley of the Space Research Corporation, will be held by Sheffield Magistrates tomorrow sometime between 2.30 pm and 4 pm. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise have decided this afternoon, on the advice of Counsel and after consultation with the Attorney General, to drop all charges against the two men.

2. A summary of what will be said to the Court is attached (Annex A). The essential points are that there is insufficient evidence to give a realistic prospect of success in securing a conviction of Mr Mitchell by a jury (with the consequence that the charges against Dr Cowley are also dropped), but that the Commissioners are making clear their view that the seized items are indeed components of guns, and condemnation proceedings in respect of the steel tubes seized at Teesport in April will continue. Ministers are entitled to refer to the Commissioners' view in answering any criticisms in Parliament.

3. The timing of tomorrow's Court appearance is awkward in relation to Prime Minister's Questions. We do not know at what precise time the representative of the Commissioners will make his statement to the Court; it is possible that other cases will

be heard first. Immediately he does so the case will cease to be sub judice. However, the defendants' representatives will be aware of the Commissioners' intention beforehand, and it is possible that word of this will reach Westminster. (Indeed, there has already been a leak in the Sunday Correspondent - copy attached at Annex B.) Customs and Excise will make arrangements to let you know as soon as their representative has made his statement. Thereafter, the Prime Minister will be free to answer any questions on the subject. A suggested line to take is attached at Annex C. I have included a defensive point about Mr Paul Ashwell, the lorry driver detained in Greece when transporting another steel tube for the gun. An ex gratia payment of £35,000 has been made to Mr Ashwell. His MP, Mr Michael Morris, who took up his case, is aware of this.

4. Attached at Annexes D and E are question and answer briefs for, respectively, Treasury Ministers and the Customs and Excise press office, for use after the statement in Court. It would be inappropriate for other Departments to comment on the decision to drop charges or the reasons for it; any questions along these lines must be referred to Customs and Excise. There are however other aspects of the Iraqi gun case which concern other Departments. Should the ending of sub judice restrictions stimulate PQs about the case (of which there were a great many between April and June), I propose that the basis of allocation to Departments should be as shown at Annex F. Press enquiries should be handled on the same basis. It is of course essential that the responses of all Departments should be consistent, and the Cabinet Office will continue to co-ordinate answers to all PQs.

5. The Cabinet Office have led a study by Departments and Agencies of the lessons of the Iraqi gun episode, and their report will be circulated to OD. Looking further ahead, the

Trade and Industry Select Committee may confirm their intention to proceed with their own investigation after the sub judice restraints have been removed.

6. I understand the Chancellor of the Exchequer is being briefed to report the decision to drop charges to Cabinet at tomorrow's meeting.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord President, the Defence Secretary, the Trade and Industry Secretary and the Attorney General.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

14 November 1990

# CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Cowley is charged with one offence contrary to section 68 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 and one offence contrary to section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Mr Mitchell is charged with one offence contrary to section 68 of the same Act. The offences contain allegations relating to the exportation of prohibited goods, being items forming parts of large guns, to Iraq.

As a result of the seizure in April this year at Teesport docks in Middlesbrough of eight pipes destined for Iraq, customs enquiries have continued. Customs are satisfied that these pipes and other items were parts of large guns destined for Iraq. However, the evidence in support of any offences against the defendant Mitchell is not sufficient to give a realistic prospect of a successful conviction before a jury and proceedings are being withdrawn against him. It would be inappropriate to continue against the only remaining defendant, Dr Cowley, and it has therefore been decided to withdraw the prosecution against him.

Sunday Correspondent

Sunday 11 November 1990

Page 2

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## Supergun men freed

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**By Christopher Elliott**

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ALL charges relating to the Iraqi supergun affair may be dropped. Eighteen people were interviewed by Customs Investigators following the seizure of the barrel of a 40-metre cannon on a Teesside dockyard in April. Twelve were formally arrested and bailed.

Officially, inquiries by Customs officers are continuing, but all have been released apart from two men whose charges may be "compounded", a technical device used by Customs in VAT cases.

Such action would be unusual, but legally feasible. It would also avoid government embarrassment over the role of some Whitehall departments in the 18 months before the gun parts were seized.

Dr Christopher Cowley, a British scientist, has been charged with illegally exporting equipment with intent to evade export controls. Mr Peter Mitchell, 42, the managing director of Walter Somers, an engineering firm in Halesowen, West Midlands, has also been charged with illegally exporting equipment.

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Not be used until notified that the hearing  
on 15 November has taken place

IRAQI GUN: Q & A BRIEF FOR TREASURY MINISTERS

1. Why has the case been dropped?

This was a decision taken by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise in the exercise of their statutory function as an independent law enforcement body. The Commissioners' reasons for asking for the charges to be withdrawn were explained by their legal representative to Sheffield Magistrates' Court on 15 November.

2. What were the Commissioners' reasons for dropping the case?

The reasons were explained to Sheffield Magistrates' Court on 15 November by the legal representative of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. I have nothing to add. I have arranged for a copy of what was said to the Court to be placed in the Library.

3. Has pressure been put on Customs to drop the case?

No. The conduct of investigations of possible criminal offences and any decisions to make arrests or lay criminal charges are the sole responsibility of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. These matters have been handled by them alone at all times in the present case.

4. Were Ministers consulted before Customs took their decision?

Decisions on whether or not to prosecute offences under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 are a matter for the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

## CONTINGENCY BRIEF

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on 15 November has taken place

5. Did Customs consult the Attorney General?

As is well known it is not the practice to disclose whether the Law Officers have been consulted.

6. What is the role of Commissioners in a case like this?

Under the provisions of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 decisions on whether or not to prosecute offences are a matter for the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

7. Whom did Customs consult before taking their decision?

This is a matter for the Commissioners. The decision not to prosecute rests entirely with the Commissioners.

8. What will happen to the parts of the gun already seized by Customs?

Customs are in no doubt that the items they have seized are parts of guns. Because the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Manufacturing has challenged the seizure, the Commissioners are a party to High Court proceedings for condemnation of the seized items - in effect a civil case to determine whether the goods were properly seized.

9. Will others be charged?

I understand the Commissioners do not envisage conducting any further enquiries.

10. Have Customs made a compounded settlement with the defendants?

No. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise have asked for the charges to be withdrawn.



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CONTINGENCY BRIEF

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11. Any effect on other cases involving exports to Iraq?

Any other cases will be a matter for the Commissioners to consider.

[If pressed. Matrix Churchill? - or any other case being investigated by Customs and Excise.

I cannot comment. This is a matter for the Commissioners.]

12. Will compensation/costs be paid to Mr Mitchell, Dr Cowley and others?

Costs. The matter of costs is for the Courts to decide.

Compensation I understand the Commissioners see no grounds for paying compensation.

13. Did the companies seek export licences for the gun?

This is a matter for my rt. hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

14. Is this not a serious blow to sanctions against Iraq?

No. Customs deserve highest praise for preventing the export to Iraq of some highly lethal weaponry.

15. Did Government turn a "blind eye" to the exports?

Government committed to rigorous enforcement of export prohibitions and restrictions. Matters of export licensing are the responsibility of my rt. hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

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CONTINGENCY BRIEF

Annex E

Not to be used until notified that the hearing on 15 November has taken place

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS BRIEF - MEDIA ENQUIRIES

1. Are Customs dropping the big gun case?

(To be used if question asked before Court hearing on 15 November 1990.)

There is a hearing at Sheffield Magistrates' Court in the afternoon of 15 November. You must await the outcome. (If pressed). The Commissioners of Customs and Excise will, if necessary, make a statement in the light of that hearing.

2. Why is the case against Mr Mitchell and Dr Cowley not being prosecuted?

After taking advice from Senior Treasury Counsel the Commissioners of Customs and Excise have decided not to pursue the case against Mr Mitchell on the basis of advice received about the prospect of success were the prosecution to continue. The Commissioners decided that it would be inappropriate to institute proceedings against Dr Cowley alone.

[If pressed. Why inappropriate to prosecute Dr Cowley?

Not the practice to discuss the detailed reasons why the prosecution has been dropped.]

~~3. Are Customs taking action against Sheffield Forgemasters or Walter Somers? Are Customs taking action against any of those previously arrested/questioned?~~

The Commissioners do not intend instituting any other criminal proceedings arising from their investigations in this case.

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CONTINGENCY BRIEF

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4. Is the investigation closed?

Commissioners do not envisage conducting any further enquiries.

5. Which other Government Departments did Customs consult before reaching their decision not to prosecute?

None. The decision not to prosecute rests entirely with the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

6. Was the decision not to prosecute taken at Ministerial level?

No. The alleged offences were under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Decisions on whether or not to prosecute under that Act lie with the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

7. Were Ministers consulted?

Decisions on whether or not to prosecute offences under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 are a matter for the Commissioners of Customs and Excise.

8. Did Customs consult the Attorney General before deciding to prosecute?

As is well known it is not the practice to disclose whether or not the Law Officers have been consulted..

9. The decision not to prosecute was taken to avoid making Government "mistakes" public?

No.

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CONTINGENCY BRIEF

Not to be used until notified that the hearing on 15 November has taken place

10. What about the seized pipes/gun?

Customs are in no doubt that the items they have seized were parts of guns. Because the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Manufacturing has challenged the seizure, the Commissioners are a party to High Court proceedings for condemnation of the seized items - in effect a civil case to determine whether the goods were properly seized.

11. Is it normal practice to arrest and charge people but not to prosecute them?

The withdrawal of a case before committal proceedings is a perfectly proper procedure.

12. Unnecessary to arrest and charge people at all?

Customs are satisfied that they had adequate grounds for arresting and charging Mr Mitchell and Dr Cowley. That is a different issue from whether or not there was, after investigation, adequate evidence to support proceedings with a reasonable prospect of success.

13. Why has it taken so long to decide not to prosecute?

This is a very complex case. There has been a long investigation with a considerable volume of evidence to be considered.

14. Have Customs made a compounded settlement with the defendants?

No. Customs have asked for the charges to be withdrawn.

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Not to be used until notified that the hearing on 15 November has taken place

15. Does this decision not to prosecute affect other cases in hand?

No. Customs will investigate and decide upon each case on its own merits.

16. Does the withdrawal of the case mean that compensation and costs will be paid to the defendant?

The matter of costs is for the court to decide. [If pressed about compensation: The Commissioners see no grounds for paying compensation.]

17. Does withdrawal of the case mean that Parliament/Select Committees, etc can enquire into the case?

Since the case is no longer sub judice, they would be free to do so. But that is a matter for them to decide.

18. Is this not a serious blow to sanctions against Iraq?

Not at all. Customs deserve the highest praise for preventing the export to Iraq of a major piece of weaponry.

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ANNEX F

FUTURE ALLOCATION OF PQs RELATING TO THE IRAQI GUN

Treasury Ministers (Customs and Excise)

Questions related to the dropping of charges.

Questions relating to the material (including written material) seized or confiscated at Teesport, in industrial premises, in Greece or in Turkey.

DTI

Questions relating to decisions on whether or not an export order is subject to licence under the strategic exports control legislation.

MOD

Questions relating to assessments of military use or potential.

Questions relating to military and related activities in Iraq.

FCO

Questions relating to relations with the Government of Iraq, or to the actions of the British Embassy in Baghdad.

Questions relating to compensation for Mr Paul Ashwell.

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YOUR TELNO. 925 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAQ/KUWAIT:  
NEXT STEPS AT THE UN: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. I TOLD KIMMITT WHEN I SAW HIM ON 14 NOVEMBER THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO HELP THE AMERICANS TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY HAD TO CAST A VETO ON ARAB/ISRAEL (PARAGRAPH 11 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). HE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY I COULD NOT GIVE ANY ABSOLUTE UNDERTAKING. WE HAD LIMITED INFLUENCE. BUT WE OF COURSE SAW THE DANGERS.
2. KIMMITT SAID THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD HELP THEM IF OTHERS BELIEVED THE AMERICANS MIGHT NOT STAND ALONE IN VETOING UNSUITABLE RESOLUTIONS. THEY WANTED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE CRITICS OF THEIR POLICIES WERE IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY COULD ONLY WIN BECAUSE THEY WOULD EITHER GET A PROPAGANDIST RESOLUTION OR PROVOKE AN AMERICAN VETO. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD INDICATIONS THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FACT THAT THEIR DISTASTE FOR THE IDEA OF A POSSIBLE UN FORCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS SHARED BY OTHERS HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN PUTTING OFF THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE PUSHED FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL.
3. BOLTON, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, SAID THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT THE AIME MISSION (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 1965). HE WAS PRETTY CONFIDENT THE ISRAELIS WOULD COME ROUND. THEY OUGHT TO BE PERSUADED THAT IT WOULD NOT PLAY INTO THE PLO AGENDA IF THE FOCUS COULD BE CHANGED IN THIS WAY. IF AIME COULD GO SOMETIME FAIRLY SOON, THAT WOULD PROVIDE A PERIOD IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM ITS CONCENTRATION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT BY ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEMS (IT SEEMS NOW THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDEED ACCEPTED THE AIME MISSION).

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YOUR TELNO. 936 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAQ/KUWAIT:  
 NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

## SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE ACTION PREFERABLY TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE END OF NOVEMBER AND THAT IT IS BETTER TO LOBBY IN CAPITALS THAN IN NEW YORK. THEY WILL CONFIRM LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. BAKER WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE RESOLUTION WITH YOU ON 18 NOVEMBER.

## DETAIL

2. I SAW KIMMITT ON 14 NOVEMBER TO GO THROUGH THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO. 925 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS. I STRESSED THE URGENCY AND THE NEED TO GET THE KUWAITIS AND THE OTHER GULF COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION SOON. THE MATERIAL WHICH THEY PRODUCED HAD TO BE DRAMATIC IF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE AREA WAS NOT TO OVERSHADOW ITS IMPACT. A DEBATE SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER, AND LEAD IN TO THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION. I EXPLAINED WHY WE WERE OPPOSED TO INCLUDING A DEADLINE. I SUGGESTED WE SHOULD CONSULT OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN CAPITALS RATHER THAN IN NEW YORK. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO APPROACH THE FRENCH (PARIS TELNO. 1377 TO YOU) AS THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO PRECOOKING BETWEEN OURSELVES AND WASHINGTON. I CONCLUDED MY INITIAL REMARKS BY REMINDING KIMMITT THAT WE ALREADY HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51: THERE COULD BE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN REMINDING OTHERS WHO MIGHT WANT TO AMEND A LEAN RESOLUTION OF THE FACT THAT WE COULD ALWAYS GO BACK TO IT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1966, PARA. 7).

3. KIMMITT SAID HE AGREED WITH WHAT I HAD SAID. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE, EXPRESSED IN SPARE LANGUAGE, TO BE ADOPTED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. THE PRESIDENT WAS REFLECTING UPON WHAT BAKER HAD TOLD HIM AND FOLLOWING HIS CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE HOWEVER TO ANNOUNCE SHORTLY THAT BAKER WOULD BE MEETING IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ZAIRE, COTE D'IVOIRE AND ETHIOPIA ON 17 NOVEMBER AND ON THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH HIS ROMANIAN AND

FINNISH COUNTERPARTS. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT HE WOULD HAVE CONSULTED ALL BUT FOUR OF THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 18 NOVEMBER. HE HOPED TO MEET YOU AS WELL AS DUMAS AND SHEVARDNADZE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION. THE CSCE MEETING PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE PROSPECTS FOR APPROVING A RESOLUTION BY THE END OF THE MONTH. THERE WAS STILL SOME QUESTION MARK OVER THE CHINESE ATTITUDE WHICH HAD TO BE RESOLVED. ACTION OUGHT ALSO TO BE TAKEN WITH THE NON-ALIGNED. HE AGREED IT WAS BETTER TO LOBBY IN CAPITALS THAN NEW YORK. THE AMERICAN DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING THIS ACTION WAS SUCH AS TO ALLOW A DEBATE TO BEGIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 NOVEMBER.

4. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE AGREED IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION FOLLOWING A DEBATE ON KUWAIT INITIATED BY THE KUWAITIS. THE AMERICANS HAD NO FIXED IDEAS AS TO HOW SUCH A DEBATE SHOULD BE SET UP, THOUGH IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN STAGE MANAGED BY THEM OR BY US. THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO BE TOLD TO GET THE BEST ADVICE THEY COULD. HE HAD NOT YET THOUGHT THROUGH A WESTERN DIVISION OF LABOUR ON SETTING MATTERS IN TRAIN. SUCH A DEBATE COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL IMPACT AS WELL AS INFLUENCING THE COUNCIL ITSELF, AND CONGRESS HERE.
5. KIMMITT SAID HE ALSO AGREED THAT, ON REFLECTION, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE A DEADLINE OUT OF ANY RESOLUTION. HE WAS UNSURE HOWEVER WHAT THE SOVIET OR CHINESE POSITION ON THIS MIGHT BE. HE RECALLED THE POINT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS DURING BAKER'S LONDON VISIT THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO OFFER A CLEAR TARGET FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN OR FOR THOSE WITH QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE PROPOSALS TO PEDDLE. HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY SANGUINE AS TO THE CHANCES OF AVOIDING LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD ARGUE FOR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AND/OR SANCTIONS TO BE GIVEN A FURTHER CHANCE. THOUGH IT WAS OF COURSE BEST TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE, WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER WAYS FOR SUCH PRESSURES TO BE CONTAINED. THE AMERICANS WERE IN GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WE HAD PUT TO THEM, BUT THEY HAD SOME MINOR POINTS ON THE PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BETTER NOT TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THE SUBSTANCE EACH OF THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS: THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT, FOR EXAMPLE, STRUCK NO VERY RESPONSIVE CHORD IN FRANCE OR EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES WHEREAS THE NEED TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW MIGHT PROVE A MORE PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT. BUT THESE WERE MINOR POINTS: THE MAIN THING WAS TO GO FOR A TIGHT RESOLUTION.
6. KIMMITT SAID WE HAD TO CONVEY A POWERFUL SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT MEANT AVOIDING OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS OR ANY SUGGESTION THAT PARTIAL SOLUTIONS WERE POSSIBLE. BAKER WOULD

WANT TO TALK OVER A TEXT WITH YOU ON 18 NOVEMBER. HE WOULD THEN WANT TO SPEAK TO THE FRENCH (HE SAID HE TOOK MY POINT THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO THINK SOMETHING HAD BEEN PRECOOKED WITH LONDON FIRST) AND THEN THE RUSSIANS AND THEN THE CHINESE.

7. I REPEATED THAT WE HAD TO BUILD IN TIME FOR THE KUWAITIS TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LET WORD GET OUT ABOUT A RESOLUTION BEFORE A DEBATE ABOUT KUWAIT HAD BEEN SET UP. KIMMITT SAID PICKERING HAD ALREADY SET ASIDE THE THREE DAYS LEADING UP TO A POSSIBLE VOTE ON 29 NOVEMBER FOR THIS EXERCISE. HE WAS TRYING TO KEEP 30 NOVEMBER CLEAR, PARTLY FOR REASONS OF FLEXIBILITY AND PARTLY BECAUSE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS TO BE CLEARED. HE AGREED THAT THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ENERGISED THIS WEEK. THE AMERICANS WOULD GET BACK TO US WITH IDEAS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. HE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR LATER THAT DAY, 14 NOVEMBER. THE US AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO KUWAIT, GNEHM, MIGHT BE THE MAN TO MASTERMIND THE APPROACH TO THE KUWAITIS ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT WE MIGHT BE AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS IN OUR THINKING. HE WANTED US TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER. I REPEATED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT THE PROPOSED DEBATE IN NEW YORK SHOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN AT KUWAITI INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD CONSIDER FOR EXAMPLE WHETHER OR NOT THE AMIR HIMSELF SHOULD ATTEND.

8. THE MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED UP WITH BOLTON, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT AT MY CONVERSATION WITH KIMMITT. BOLTON SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL WHICH HAD TO BE GOT RIGHT IN A SHORT TIME. HE SENSED THAT MINISTERS WANTED TO PUT A PACKAGE TOGETHER THEMSELVES. THERE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL FIRST. HE WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO LONDON AND PARIS IN ADVANCE OF THE CSCE MEETING IF NECESSARY. WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO TREAD A COMPLEX AND TREACHEROUS PATH. THE YEMENIS, WHEN THEY TOOK OVER THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FRUSTRATE THINGS EVEN IF THE PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION SLIPPED INTO DECEMBER, PROVIDED WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET AGREEMENT IN THE MAIN CAPITALS AND TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT MOMENTUM. WE MIGHT HAVE A GREATER PROBLEM HOWEVER IF THERE APPEARED TO BE A POSSIBILITY OF A RESOLUTION NOT BELNG PUT TO THE VOTE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER. WOOD SAID WE SHARED THIS ASSESSMENT, HENCE OUR DESIRE TO GET THINGS THROUGH BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE RISKS IN BOLTON GOING FIRST TO LONDON, IF WE WERE TO PREVENT THE FRENCH FROM SEEING A DRAFT TEXT AS A UK/US AFFAIR RATHER THAN SOMETHING ON WHICH THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO WORK FROM THE BEGINNING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE WENT TO PARIS

FIRST HE MIGHT FIND WE WERE NOT MAKING THE INITIAL PRESENTATION AT A SENIOR ENOUGH LEVEL.

9. BOLTON SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS THE AMERICANS HAD DECIDED WHO WOULD BE THE COORDINATOR FOR ACTION WITH THE KUWAITIS AND THE GULF STATES ON THEIR SIDE. WOOD STRESSED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE KUWAITIS AT LEAST TO HAVE ASKED FOR A DEBATE BEFORE THE NEWS LEAKED THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING A RESOLUTION. BOLTON AGREED IT WAS DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE TWO QUESTIONS SEPARATE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE ON 14 NOVEMBER THAT BAKER WOULD BE SEEING THE AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD ENABLE ALL TOO MANY PEOPLE TO PUT 2 PLUS 2 TOGETHER. IT MIGHT BE AS WELL TO SUGGEST TO THE KUWAITIS THAT THEY SHOULD ASK FOR A DEBATE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. HE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT HAD BEEN THE AMERICANS OR OURSELVES WHO HAD PRECOOKED A KUWAITI INITIATIVE. THE TROUBLE WAS HOWEVER THE KUWAITIS WERE REMARKABLY PASSIVE. HE FEARED, TOO, THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA EFFORT MIGHT IN PRACTICE BE THIN GRUEL. THEY HAD NOT DONE VERY WELL AT TAIF. SINCE THEN BOLTON'S OFFICE HAVE CALLED BACK WITH THE NEWS THAT THE BBC AMONG OTHERS HAVE PUT OUT THE STORY THAT PICKERING HAS HAD ORDERS TO PRODUCE A RESOLUTION BY THE END OF THE MONTH AND THAT THERE MAY BE A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE SAYING THAT NO SUCH ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

10. BOLTON CONFIRMED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD EARLIER BEEN CONSIDERING WAS NOW VERY MUCH ON ICE.

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## IRAQ/KUWAIT: EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

1. I ASKED KIMMITT ON 14 NOVEMBER WHETHER HE HAD ANY UP TO DATE INFORMATION ON THE POSITION OF THE US EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. OUR OWN COULD STAY THE COURSE UNTIL ROUND ABOUT THE END OF THE YEAR. WE WANTED HOWEVER TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AS THE SITUATION EVOLVED.
2. KIMMITT SAID THE AMERICANS WERE DOWN TO TUNA FISH AND THAT THEY COULD GO INTO DECEMBER BUT NOT TO THE END OF THAT MONTH. THE AMERICANS HAD CONSIDERED REDUCING THE NUMBER OF THEIR DIPLOMATS, WHICH CURRENTLY STOOD AT 8. THE TROUBLE WAS HOWEVER THAT THEY COULD NOT BY DOING THAT GIVE ANY HELP TO THE 19 NON-DIPLOMATS IN THE COMPOUND. THEY HAD TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTURE OF SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS WOULD AFFECT THE MORALE OF THE NON-DIPLOMATS LEFT BEHIND. HIS TENTATIVE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THOSE IN THE COMPOUND WOULD HAVE TO STAY OR GO SO FAR AS POSSIBLE TOGETHER.
3. KIMMITT SAID THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER MOUNTING A RELIEF COLUMN. THE AMERICANS STILL LOOKED TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, THOUGH WITHOUT MUCH HOPE, TO DO SOMETHING. THE TROUBLE WITH A RELIEF EFFORT BY THE AMERICANS WOULD BE THAT IT MIGHT PROVOKE AN IRAQI REACTION WHICH COULD ESCALATE AT A TIME WHEN THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ONE. BUT OF COURSE THE AMERICANS DID NOT AT ALL LOOK FORWARD TO THE CLOSURE OF THEIR EMBASSY.
4. SCOWCROFT TOLD ME ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT A RANGE OF OPTIONS WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION, INCLUDING A PEACEFUL MISSION FOR REPROVISIONING, PERHAPS WITH UN OR RED CROSS MARKING. BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT ABSOLUTELY NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE, LIKE KIMMITT, PROMISED TO TELL US HOW AMERICAN THINKING DEVELOPED.

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SUMMARY

1. BAKER CLAIMS BROAD DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR ADMINISTRATION'S GULF POLICY, BUT NOTES NEED TO SEND A CONSISTENT AND UNIFORM SIGNAL. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS RULE OUT SPECIAL SESSION AT PRESENT, GIVEN PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCE THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO USE FORCE.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH MET CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TODAY (14 NOVEMBER) TO DISCUSS ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON THE GULF. AT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE, SECRETARY BAKER SAID THAT THERE WAS STILL SUBSTANTIAL AND BROAD SUPPORT, BOTH AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE CONGRESS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF. HE ACKNOWLEDGED VARYING VIEWS ON TACTICS, BUT SAID THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE MUST BE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND NO ACCEPTANCE OF PARTIAL SOLUTIONS. HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS QUOTE GENERAL AGREEMENT UNQUOTE BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF CONGRESS TO DEBATE GULF POLICY. ASKED WHETHER THE DEBATE WHICH HAD OPENED UP IN THE LAST FEW DAYS UNDERMINED THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION, BAKER SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEMOCRATIC DEBATE IN THE COUNTRY ON SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. QUOTE BUT .... WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO TRY AND SEND A CONSISTENT AND UNIFORM SIGNAL UNQUOTE HE ADDED THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAD AGREED AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID SENDING MIXED SIGNALS.

3. ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES, BAKER SAID THAT, SINCE THE OPTION OF FORCE COULD NOT BE RULED OUT, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LAY AN APPROPRIATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FOUNDATION FOR THAT OPTION. QUOTE THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THIS IS A COURSE OR AN OPTION THAT HAS BEEN CHOSEN UNQUOTE. WHEN ASKED

ABOUT SENATOR MITCHELL'S VIEW THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS COMPELLED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION BEFORE LAUNCHING A MILITARY OFFENSIVE, BAKER ARGUED THAT THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS COULD CALL FOR A VERY PROMPT AND SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE (WHICH WOULD NOT PERMIT TIME TO CONSULT CONGRESS). PRESSED FURTHER, HE SAID THAT THERE REMAINED A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OVER THE WARPOWERS ACT, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

4. ASKED WHETHER SANCTIONS WERE WORKING, BAKER SAID THAT THEY WERE, BUT QUOTE THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT (SADDAM HUSSEIN) IS READY TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT, WHICH IS WHAT THE SANCTIONS WERE TO ACHIEVE UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHETHER THEY WOULD ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. BAKER DID NOT COMMENT ON A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO AUTHORISE THE USE OF FORCE, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE POSITION WOULD BE CLEARER IN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS, AND THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ZAIRE, COTE D'IVOIRE AND ETHIOPIA, WHO WERE CURRENTLY SERVING ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. SENIOR DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN EMERGING FROM THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED THE LONG, WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION. THEY NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCE THAT THE DECISION TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE GULF DID NOT AMOUNT TO A DECISION TO USE FORCE. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY SAW NO NEED FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF CONGRESS AT PRESENT, BUT IMPLIED, MORE OR LESS EXPLICITLY, THAT THEY WOULD BE LOOKING FOR MORE THAN JUST CONSULTATION IF THERE WAS A CHANGE IN POLICY.

COMMENT

6. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND BAKER'S SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE CAN BE SEEN AS FIRST STEPS IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO REGAIN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INITIATIVE (OUR TUR). IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY WILL HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS, THE GULF

You have one of your regular Meeting of Ministers on the Gulf before Cabinet tomorrow morning. There are three big issues to discuss.

- Tom King's visit to Saudi Arabia and whether we should send additional forces;
- a further UN Resolution on use of force;
- and preparation for your meeting with President Bush in Paris on Monday morning.

I think we may have to leave some of the smaller issues on one side in order to concentrate on these three.

① Defence Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia

The Defence Secretary will wish to report on his visit to Saudi Arabia. You will find in the folder an account of his meeting with Prince Sultan, which went well. The Saudis would be happy for us to send additional forces. They are also ordering more defence equipment from us, including Blackhawk helicopters.

Ford  
Walt  
Trumpet  
A... ..

② Additional British forces

Secretary Baker made a formal request to you for additional British forces and suggested we might like to increase our armoured brigade to a full division (which would mean sending two further brigades). He also mentioned the possibility of minesweepers. You have told the Americans that we are ready in principle to consider additional forces, but have made no commitment on the size and nature of them. At the same time, the Chief of the Naval Staff has been lobbying you (and others) to send an aircraft carrier to the Gulf.

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I do not know precisely what the Defence Secretary will recommend, but my information is that he is likely to suggest sending one additional armoured brigade to which the Americans would add a third, thus constituting a division which would be under British command.

Even one additional brigade is a substantial extra commitment in terms of men (about 7,500), equipment (another 120 Challenger tanks) and money. (I cannot give a precise figure, but it would be substantial.) Equally, you may think that, given the massive increase in American forces, we can hardly do less than an additional brigade. But we have to be aware of the risks. We shall be even more heavily committed, and the disproportion between our contribution and that of others would be more striking. Casualties could be higher. Saddam Hussain might be even more inclined to victimise British hostages. By sending another 120 tanks we would be denuding BAOR: and inevitably the tanks would be less reliable than the first 120, because the available spares would have to be spread more thinly.

You will want to satisfy yourself that there is no sensible alternative, eg an Artillery brigade or some Commandos. You will also want to get a clear answer from the military as to exactly how long they envisage it would take, from a signal to start, to get an additional brigade deployed in Saudi Arabia.

⊖ I have heard 70 days mentioned which seems quite a lot. We do not want our late arrival to become an excuse for the Americans to postpone military action.

⊖ I think the case for additional naval assets is not a strong one. In particular, I have not found any serious defence commentator who thinks that an aircraft carrier would be a sensible addition to our forces. The Americans are using theirs as floating airfields: we do not need that. An aircraft carrier would be expensive and vulnerable: and we have had no high level request from the Americans to send one, although I am sure the American Navy would like it.

Shocked when I got British  
D501 assets from U.S.  
Mick Helms  
Milly

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U.S. Defence  
coll'ons

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You will also need to think about the form of a decision to send additional forces. We need to take the decision as early as possible and you will want to give the President a provisional reply on Monday. But equally, the decision should be discussed in a wider circle than OD(G), with the Treasury present. Either you could have a special OD next week: or you could have an OD(G) with the Chancellor present followed by full Cabinet next Thursday.

#### Further UN Resolution

You have seen the exchanges with New York on this. The Americans are still being very slow in producing a draft and deciding how to get the Five Permanent Members aboard for it. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and there are only two weeks of their Security Council Presidency left. You will need to discuss the issue with President Bush. You will also want to satisfy yourself that our plans for a son et lumiere for the Security Council on Iraq's atrocities in Kuwait is moving ahead, and will be a thoroughly professional job.

#### Meeting with President Bush

You are to have a breakfast meeting with President Bush in Paris. The key points you will want to cover are:

- you will need to give him some idea of the response we are likely to make to his request for additional forces;
- you will want to urge him to rapid action on the UN front;
- you will want to secure his endorsement of, or comments on, the strategic objectives which we have sent to the Americans. Only when we are formally agreed on the objectives can we commit our forces to American command, and start on joint operational planning. It is still far from clear that the Americans have any similar document themselves;
- you will want to press him to agree that, once the strategic objectives are endorsed by both sides, we should send some people across to Washington for two or three

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days of talks on military planning, so that we can sort out precisely what our role would be. Thereafter, the details can be left to the force Commanders on the spot.

If there is time, another point you might cover is:

- Advice to British and American communities in the region. You raised that with Secretary Baker and it was agreed there would be further contacts between the Foreign Office and State Department. Again, time is running out and we need to reach agreement rapidly.

C.D.P?

C. D. POWELL

14 November 1990

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 November 1990

*Dear Stephen*

GULF CRISIS:  
UK OBJECTIVES FOLLOWING TOTAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 13 November setting out our principal objectives in the wake of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The Prime Minister would take the view that all those listed in your letter are important and we cannot discard any of them, although we shall have to settle priorities. She agrees with the Foreign Secretary's judgement that settlement of other Middle Eastern issues, including Arab/Israel, will have to have lower priority since the prospects of progress are not at all bright.

*Yours sincerely,*

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MY TELNO 2742: IRAQ/KUWAIT

## SUMMARY

1. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S GULF POLICY. ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED TO COMBAT EROSION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND WILL NEED TO WORK HARD TO REGAIN INITIATIVE.

## DETAIL

2. SINCE TUR, A COMBINATION OF OUTSPOKEN CONGRESSIONAL REACTIONS TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE GULF AND AN APPARENT EROSION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ADMINISTRATION POLICY HAS INCREASED THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON PRESIDENT BUSH. SENIOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE MADE INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECT TO BE FULLY CONSULTED AND THEIR APPROVAL SOUGHT BY THE WHITE HOUSE IN ADVANCE OF ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION BY US FORCES. SENATOR NUNN (D-GEORGIA) HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE MOVING TOO QUICKLY TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE. SENATOR MOYNIHAN (D-NEW YORK) HAS ACCUSED THE ADMINISTRATION OF MOVING TOWARDS WAR WITHOUT EITHER ALLOWING ENOUGH TIME FOR SANCTIONS TO BITE OR PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF US INTENTIONS. EVEN SENATOR LUGAR, A SENIOR REPUBLICAN ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRESIDENT CALL CONGRESS BACK INTO SESSION TO DEBATE A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST IRAQ, ALTHOUGH BOTH MITCHELL AND ASPIN HAVE RULED OUT RECALLING CONGRESS FOR THE MOMENT.

3. CRITICISM EXTENDS BEYOND CONGRESS. THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS HAVE URGED THE US TO PRESS IRAQ FOR A NON-VIOLENT SOLUTION: FAILING THAT, TO WAGE ONLY QUOTE LIMITED WAR UNQUOTE, SPARING CIVILIANS. THE MEDIA HAVE ALSO COMMENTED ON THE GROWTH OF AN UNUSUAL COALITION OF LEFT AND RIGHT, UNSEEN SINCE THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AND UNITED ONLY IN QUESTIONING THE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICY.

WHILE SUCH A GROUPING - SOCIALISTS AND LIBERALS, ARDENT CONSERVATIVES, RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS - IS INHERENTLY UNSTABLE, WITH BOTH THEIR FOCUS AND IMPACT UNPREDICTABLE OVER THE LONGER TERM, IT PROVIDES FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE SURRENDERED THE INITIATIVE IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF POLICY.

4. SO FAR THERE IS LITTLE OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO US MILITARY ACTION. WHILE MANY REMAIN UNDECIDED ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER US INTERESTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY AT RISK IN THE GULF TO WARRANT HEAVY LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES TO DEFEND THEM, THE CONCERN AT THIS STAGE IS RATHER MORE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR TO BE MOVING TOWARDS WAR WITHOUT A THOROUGH TESTING EITHER OF CONGRESSIONAL OR PUBLIC OPINION. RESTON, THE VETERAN COLUMNIST SAYS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 13 NOVEMBER THAT HE IS HEARING QUOTE A LOT OF PEOPLE HOPING THE PRESIDENT WILL THINK BEFORE HE JUMPS. TO SAY MY PRESIDENT RIGHT OR WRONG IN THE PRESENT CRISIS IS A LITTLE LIKE SAYING MY DRIVER, DRUNK OR SOBER, AND NOT MANY PASSENGERS LIKE TO GO THAT FAR UNQUOTE. MEANWHILE, PUBLIC OPINION APPEARS TO BE UNDECIDED. THE LATEST POLL (13 NOVEMBER) SHOWS 51 PER CENT APPROVAL FOR BUSH'S HANDLING OF THE CRISIS, SHARPLY DOWN FROM THE 82 PER CENT APPROVAL RATING IN AUGUST.

5. THE DEBATE CONTINUES TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN DIMENSION (PARA 5 OF TUR) AND THE POLITICAL COVER THAT AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION WOULD PROVIDE. WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION REMAIN CLEAR THAT ARTICLE 51 PROVIDES ALL NECESSARY LEGAL COVER, THEY SEE THE POTENTIAL FOR A UN RESOLUTION - ASSUMING IT IS ACHIEVED WITHOUT MAJOR DIVISIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL - IN STEADYING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THESE CONGRESSIONAL, PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND ARE CONCERNED BY THE SLIDE IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT. THEY RECOGNISE THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD TO REGAIN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INITIATIVE. IN A DIRECT RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID ON 12 NOVEMBER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD FOLLOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH CONGRESS EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. HOW FAR BUSH TAKES THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WILL HOWEVER NO DOUBT PARTLY DEPEND ON HIS CALCULATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH CONSULTATION WOULD HELP OR HINDER HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION.



7. THE WHITE HOUSE IS ALSO ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF CLARIFYING AND ARTICULATING ADMINISTRATION OBJECTIVES. THE PRESIDENT'S THANKSGIVING SPEECH TO THE NATION FROM THE GULF WILL BE IMPORTANT. NSC SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT IT WILL BE LESS A QUESTION OF SAYING SOMETHING NEW THAN OF PUTTING US OBJECTIVES IN TERMS WHICH PUBLIC OPINION CAN UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT. THAT SAID, WE ARE TOLD THAT ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS WILL PROBABLY BE PLACED ON TWO OBJECTIVES THAT HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN EXPLICITLY STATED:

- Point, when you have made for the beginning.*
- I) THAT IT IS VITAL TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS TO PREVENT A DICTATOR LIKE SADDAM FROM CONTROLLING THE FREE WORLD'S ECONOMIC LIFELINE:
  - II) THAT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IS UNACCEPTABLE, IN TERMS OF IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES BEING LEFT UNCONSTRAINED.

MEANWHILE, IN A SPEECH IN ALABAMA ON 12 NOVEMBER, GENERAL POWELL (CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS) CAREFULLY EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GULF, AND REFERRED TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS THE FIRST STATEMENT OF THE THEMES IN (I) AND (II) ABOVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL NEED TO AMPLIFY AND PROMOTE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1966

OF 140320Z NOVEMBER 90

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## ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 936: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

### SUMMARY

1. INSTRUCTIONS CARRIED OUT WITH U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. CONTINUED SHARED PREFERENCE FOR ACTION IN CAPITALS OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS TO EXPLAIN MOVE TO MILITARY OPTION AND SECURE AGREEMENT ON TEXT OF RESOLUTION. I EMPHASISE DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD WITHOUT DELAY.

### IRAQ/KUWAIT

2. I DULY CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOVEMBER.

3. PICKERING, WHO HAD BEEN DOWN IN WASHINGTON DURING THE MORNING, WAS STILL NONE THE WISER ABOUT THE FOLLOW-UP TO BAKER'S TOUR. BAKER AND KIMMITT HAD BOTH GONE OFF TO BERMUDA FOR A MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAD ONLY CARRIED OUT A VERY CURSORY DE-BRIEF SO FAR. PICKERING DID NOT KNOW WHETHER BAKER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD YET DISCUSSED THE NEXT STEPS. PICKERING WAS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW FOR ANOTHER DISCUSSION, AMONG OTHERS WITH KIMMITT, FROM WHICH HE HOPED TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF U S INTENTIONS.

4. I EXPLAINED TO PICKERING WHY WE DID NOT THINK IT WAS WISE TO BUILD A 'PEACE' ELEMENT INTO THE RESOLUTION. WE MIGHT WELL NEED TO CONCEDE SOMETHING IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT WAS BETTER TO HOLD IT BACK RATHER THAN TO PROFFER IT AT THE BEGINNING. PICKERING TENDED TO AGREE AND SAID THAT HE WAS IN ANY CASE HAVING DIFFICULTY DRAFTING ANYTHING ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS ELEMENT.

5. I ALSO EXPLAINED OUR DISLIKE OF THE SETTING OF ANY FUTURE TIME LIMIT EITHER FOR THE ENDING OF PEACE PROCESSES OR FOR THE SANCTIONING OF THE MILITARY OPTION. PICKERING TOOK NOTE.

6. WE DISCUSSED AGAIN THE SUBSEQUENT HANDLING OF ANY UK/U S TEXT OF A RESOLUTION AGREED BETWEEN US THIS WEEK. WE BOTH REMAIN FIRMLY OF

THE VIEW THAT THE INITIAL JOB OF SELLING A MOVE TO THE MILITARY OPTION AND GETTING AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE TEXT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WILL HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THEIR CAPITALS. GOOD THOUGH THE SOVIET AND CHINESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE (THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID OF THE FRENCH), WE BOTH BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL SIMPLY NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE AS MAJOR AN ISSUE AS THIS WITHOUT THE DETAILED INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR CAPITALS, AND THAT THE LATTER WILL BE NEGATIVE UNLESS THE PRINCIPLE AND THE TEXT HAVE BEEN SQUARED WITH THEM AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. WE ARE NEITHER OF US AT ALL TAKEN WITH THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF THE FOUR (WITHOUT THE CHINESE). IT WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BOTH SO FAR AS THE PRESENT ISSUE IS CONCERNED AND EVEN MORE FOR THE FUTURE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT FIVE.

7. I URGED ON PICKERING AGAIN, AS I HAD DONE YESTERDAY, THE NEED WHEN APPROACHING THE OTHER THREE OF THE PERMANENT FIVE IN THEIR CAPITALS TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH LINE ABOUT OUR RELUCTANCE TO MOVE AWAY FROM AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE ONLY EVEN CONTEMPLATING SUCH A MOVE AS A RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY LEGAL REQUIREMENT. WE SHOULD WARN THEM THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO LOAD UP THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION WITH UNACCEPTABLE PARAPHERNALIA WOULD DRIVE US (UK/U S) STRAIGHT BACK TO AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH. PICKERING SAID HE VERY MUCH AGREED WITH THIS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE THREE OTHER PERMANENT FIVE MEMBERS WERE KEEN TO SHIFT THE UK/U S AWAY FROM ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT IT WOULD PRESENT THEM INsofar AS THE POSITION THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE UP THEREAFTER. IT WAS THEREFORE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO HOLD OVER THEIR HEADS THAT WE WOULD REVERT TO AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH IF THEY INSERTED UNATTRACTIVE FEATURES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

8. I UNDERLINED OUR DESIRE TO MOVE ON THE NEXT STEPS WITHOUT DELAY. PICKERING AGREED TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON AND TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH ME IN THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 14 NOVEMBER.

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FROM AMBASSADOR IN JEDDAH

SIC 19M/A2P

DEFENCE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: MEETING WITH SAUDI  
DEFENCE MINISTER

## SUMMARY

1. PRINCE SULTAN FOCUSED ON NEED FOR EARLY UN RESOLUTION GIVING SADDAM DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT: SAYS SAUDIS WOULD WELCOME DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL UK TROOPS TO KINGDOM. POSITIVE DISCUSSION ON DEFENCE SALES. BOTH PRINCE SULTAN AND PRINCE SAUD SAY SYRIA AND EGYPT STAUNCH, GIVE POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECOND VISIT.

## DETAIL

2. PRINCE SULTAN RECEIVED MR KING IN JEDDAH THIS AFTERNOON, AND GAVE A LUNCH IN HIS HONOUR WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SEVERAL SENIOR AL SAUD. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRINCE SAUD, WAS PRESENT BRIEFLY AT THE TALKS AS WAS PRINCE TURKI AL FAISAL (GID). I HAD A SEPARATE TALK WITH SAUD IN THE MARGINS ACCOMPANIED BY YOUNG (FCO EMERGENCY UNIT)

3. PRINCE SULTAN WAS ANIMATED AND IN GOOD FORM. HIS MAIN MESSAGE WAS THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION OF NO WAR, NO PEACE MUST NOT LAST MUCH LONGER. TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY WERE BEARING HEAVY COSTS. KUWAIT WAS BEING SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED. THERE WAS THE RISK THAT ISRAEL OR IRAQ MIGHT START SOMETHING. PRINCE SULTAN SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DEFEAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE DID NOT EXPECT ACTION TODAY OR TOMORROW, BUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD SET A DEADLINE BY WHICH SADDAM SHOULD BE REQUIRED EITHER TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY OR FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. SULTAN'S CLEAR PREFERENCE WAS FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES AND HE

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RETURNED TO THE POINT REPEATEDLY, THOUGH HE ALSO SPOKE OF A RESOLUTION DELEGATING TO THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE OR SIMPLY AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE.

4. MR KING SAID THAT OUR VIEWS WERE CLOSE. WE WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS TO ENSURE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THAT IF HE DID NOT LEAVE KUWAIT HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT. THE CLOCK HAD STARTED WITH THE DECISION ON US REINFORCEMENTS. THERE WAS A WINDOW, AND IT WOULD CLOSE WITH THE ONSET OF RAMADAN AND THE HOT WEATHER. WE WERE AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A RESOLUTION IF WE CAN GET A SUITABLY WORDED ONE (PREFERABLY BEFORE THE YEMENI PRESIDENCY) AND WORK HAD BEGUN BEHIND THE SCENES: BUT WE WERE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE, WHICH MIGHT PROVOKE A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. (PRINCE SAUD ALSO URGED PROGRESS HERE AND THOUGHT A DEBATE ON DESPOLIATION OF KUWAIT A GOOD LEAD-IN).

5. PRINCE SULTAN WAS SCATHING ABOUT MISREPRESENTATION BY THE WESTERN PRESS DURING THE CRISIS. BAD REPORTING COULD SHAKE THE RESOLVE OF GOVERNMENTS, AND EVEN THE SOLDIER AT THE FRONT. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CONSTANCY. MR KING UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR COOPERATION IN PROPAGANDA, AND GIVING GREATER PUBLICITY TO ATROCITIES IN KUWAIT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED OUR COOPERATION WITH PRINCE TURKI ON THIS FRONT. (PRINCE TURKI TOLD ME AT LUNCH THAT OUR MATERIAL ON THIS WAS EXCELLENT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO GET IT THROUGH TO IRAQ.) ASKED BY MR KING WHETHER HE THOUGHT SADDAM WOULD EVENTUALLY WITHDRAW, PRINCE SULTAN SAID THE MAN WAS UNPREDICTABLE. IF HE DID, IT WOULD ONLY BE UNDER SHARP INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE. THE IRAQI PUBLIC GENERALLY TOOK THE VIEW THAT KUWAIT WAS A PART OF IRAQ: THEY NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT FACE TO FACE WITH THE COST OF SADDAM'S POLICIES. PRINCE SULTAN DID NOT THINK THAT SADDAM WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDULY SHAKEN BY THE LOSS OF HIS CHIEF OF STAFF: THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS WAS IMMATERIAL TO HIM. WE HAD TO GET TO A WIDER SWATHE OF HIS ARMY.

6. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, PRINCE SULTAN SAID THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA WERE FIRM, BUT NEEDED EXTERNAL SUPPORT. SYRIA IN PARTICULAR NEEDED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE EUROPEANS, INCLUDING OURSELVES. HE ASCRIBED KING HASSAN'S CALL FOR EARLY ARAB SUMMIT TO THE PRESSURES TO WHICH THE KING WAS SUBJECT (PRINCE TURKI TOLD ME HASSAN WANTED TO BE COCK OF THE MAGHREB ROOST), BUT NOTED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE KING HAD STILL STRESSED THAT A SUMMIT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. PRINCE SULTAN STRESSED THAT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN ONE ARAB SUMMIT AND THERE

COULD ONLY BE ANOTHER IF SADDAM HUSSEIN AGREED TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT. PRINCE SULTAN SPOKE STRONGLY OF THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RESOLUTIONS IN FULL, AND DISMISSED SADDAM'S ATTEMPTS AT LINKING THE KUWAITI, LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS. HE SPOKE DISMISSIVELY OF JORDAN, YEMEN, TUNISIA, SUDAN AND THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP, ALL OF WHOM WOULD EXPLOIT A SUMMIT AND WERE CURRENTLY ENCOURAGING VOLUNTEERS TO GO TO IRAQ.

7. PRINCE SAUD TOLD ME SEPARATELY THAT THE PACIFIC PUBLIC LINE TAKEN AFTER THE TRIPARTITE MEETING IN DAMASCUS LAST WEEKEND HAD DERIVED FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH SECRETARY BAKER. HE HAD ASKED THAT, WHILE THE COALITION HAD TO PREPARE ALL POSSIBLE OPTIONS, IT SHOULD BE SEEN TO CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. BUT THIS IMPLIED NO DILUTION OF THE POLICIES OF SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA OR EGYPT TOWARDS THE CRISIS. SAUD PERSONALLY HAD NO DOUBTS THAT SYRIA WOULD BE FIGHTING ALONGSIDE THE ALLIES IF AND WHEN THE TIME CAME.

8. SAUD TOLD ME THAT THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD VISITED THE KINGDOM A SECOND TIME BECAUSE HE HAD NOT SEEN KING FAHD ON THE FIRST OCCASION. ACCORDING TO QIAN QICHEN, SADDAM HAD HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY. HE HAD REITERATED HIS 12 AUGUST PROPOSALS. SADDAM HAD ARGUED THAT SINCE THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE CRITICISING HIS RECENT AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, HE COULD CONCEDE NOTHING ON KUWAIT. QIAN QICHEN HAD DESCRIBED SADDAM AS A RATIONAL MADMAN. THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD STRESSED THAT HE HAD BEEN CARRYING NO MESSAGE AND NO PROPOSALS TO BAGHDAD. HE HAD WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT MISJUDGE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. ACCORDING TO SAUD, THERE HAD BEEN NO SHIFT IN THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S POSITION BETWEEN HIS TWO VISITS TO THE KINGDOM (SEE MIFT FOR KING FAHD'S ACCOUNT).

9. ON POSSIBLE RECOURSE TO THE UN, QIAN QICHEN HAD REPEATED THE CHINESE DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. SAUD HAD SAID THAT THAT WAS EVERYONE'S HOPE, BUT THAT MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE NEEDED IF SADDAM REFUSED TO WITHDRAW. WHEN HE HAD ASKED FOR CHINESE SUPPORT AT THE UN, QICHEN HAD SAID 'I UNDERSTAND'. HE HAD NOT ARGUED AGAINST MILITARY ACTION.

10. ON MILITARY MATTERS, MR KING SAID THE UK MIGHT ASK TO SEND MORE TROOPS: PRINCE SULTAN SAID THEY WOULD OF COURSE BE WELCOME, THOUGH THE KEY WAS QUALITY RATHER THAN QUANTITY. BFCME STRESSED

THE NEED FOR JOINT PLANNING FOR THE MILITARY OPTION: TIME WAS SHORT. PRINCE SULTAN SAID PRINCE KHALID WAS TALKING TO SCHWARZKOPF, AND SUGGESTED THAT OTHER COMMANDERS MIGHT BE INCLUDED. MR KING SAID 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE WERE NOW READY FOR OPERATION AND INVITED PRINCE SULTAN TO VISIT THEM: THE PRINCE SAID HE HOPED TO DO SO, AND LATER SAID THAT HE WOULD DO SO IN TWO WEEKS TIME. MR KING EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED SOON ON HOST COUNTRY SUPPORT COVERING FUEL, WATER, FOOD, ACCOMMODATION AND TRANSPORT, ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE US: PRINCE SULTAN CONFIRMED HE WANTED IT AGREED. HE AGREED MR KING'S REQUEST THAT A WAVELENGTH BE ALLOCATED FOR UK FORCES BROADCASTING ON A TRIAL BASIS AND TOLD HIS STAFF TO FIX IT. HE SUGGESTED THAT STAFF STUDY OUR IDEA THAT KUWAITI CHIEFTAIN TANKS BE CO-LOCATED ALONGSIDE THE 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE IN ORDER TO ENABLE UK REME TO MAINTAIN THEM, AS THE KUWAITIS HAD REQUESTED, BUT NOTED THAT THE KUWAITI UNITS CONCERNED WERE CURRENTLY POSITIONED FAR FROM 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE. (CBFME WILL PURSUE WITH KHALID).

11. IN A FRUITFUL DISCUSSION OF EQUIPMENT SALES REPORTED IN DETAIL SEPARATELY MR KING MENTIONED THE ALARM AIR LAUNCHED MISSILE, AND SUGGESTED AN EARLY START ON BLACKHAWK HELICOPTERS WITHIN YAMAMA II. PRINCE SULTAN SAID THAT THIS SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM, AND WAS FOR DISCUSSION WITH HDES. HE PRODUCED A LIST OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT FOR EARLY DELIVERY TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR DEFENCE FORCE. HE CONFIRMED THAT THIS NEW EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE OUTSIDE AL YAMAMA FUNDS.

TUNNELL

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

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MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST  
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(CABINET OFFICE VIA TUBE H29)  
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE

(VIA TUBE H29)  
MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE  
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## IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

## 1. Key objectives remain:

- to highlight the brutality and illegality of the Iraqi occupation;
- to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein faces a powerful, united and effective military force against which he cannot win;
- to emphasise international agreement on Security Council Resolutions;
- to counter views that a compromise solution is attainable or desirable;
- to counter attempts to portray the alliance against Iraq as weakening.

2. The Defence Secretary's visit to the Gulf will provide an opportunity to press the Saudis to improve their information performance and give better access to the media, including access to the Iraqi deserters they hold; these could be of considerable propaganda value.

3. Briefing Material

In the week beginning 5 November we circulated a new edition of the FCO briefing notes.

Next week we shall issue new Background Notes on the effectiveness of sanctions and on the ill-treatment of Western hostages.

#### 4. Written Press

We have proposed to the Ministry of Defence that on his return from the Gulf the Defence Secretary should give an interview to a selected group of Arab and Islamic journalists. Among the material distributed in our Verbatim series was the Foreign Secretary's interview on BBC "Breakfast News" of 6 November.

#### 5. Television

We are preparing a fifth video about atrocities in Kuwait, with fresh eyewitness accounts. The previous four videos and the accompanying Background Notes have been widely seen in our target countries

#### 6. Radio

Extra Arabic<sup>-speaking</sup> staff have been recruited to increase the supply of translated Ministerial speeches and interviews to Radio Monte Carlo, which has a large audience in the Gulf including Iraq and Kuwait. We continue to give weekly briefings to the BBC Arabic Service and to monitor the output of the Service from within the FCO. There have been no further complaints about its output over the last week.

#### 7. Liaison with the USA

We are meeting members of the State Department and USIA in London on 12 November to compare notes on our information campaigns and look at the prospects for better UK/US co-ordination of the message to Iraq, other Middle Eastern audiences and wider Muslim opinion.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

12 November 1990

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
4. What happens if sanctions do not work
5. Reference papers

(Revision)

9 November 1990

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 1. KEY POINTS

- "Our aim remains the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate government; and the release of hostages in Kuwait and Iraq. The peaceful means to these ends are also well known: isolation, economic sanctions, and the certainty that the option of armed intervention exists and can be used." (Foreign Secretary, Chatham House, 31 October.)
- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
- Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. There can be no negotiations with Iraq until these conditions have been fulfilled. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
- If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
- Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
- Iraqi efforts to split coalition against it unsuccessful.
- Armoury of international pressures in place: they are formidable, and will grow to become even more comprehensive.
- Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force made up of contingents from some 30 countries. They will leave when asked to do so.
- Iraq flouts international law by not allowing all foreign nationals to leave Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Where hostages have been released, this has clearly been a great relief for their families. But there should be no hostages. SCR 674 condemned Iraqi actions and demanded that third country nationals (including diplomatic and consular personnel) be allowed to leave Iraq and Kuwait if they wished.
- Shootings in Jerusalem on 8 October refocussed world attention on Arab/Israel. But, contrary to Iraqi claims, no linkage between solutions on Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel.
- International consensus on Iraq/Kuwait unshaken by events in Jerusalem.
- PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.

- Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait have all made clear that they see no scope for Primakov proposals for an Arab solution.
- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 8 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.
- A solution must be found to Arab/Israel. SCR 672 demonstrates international resolve to tackle Arab/Israel problem; reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously 24 October).
- "The policy of the British government is clear ... that is, self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to live in peace behind secure borders" (Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, 24 October).
- "My government will work with the utmost determination, together with our allies and the whole international community, for the unconditional implementation of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council which require the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, and the restoration of the independence and legitimate government of Kuwait."

(HM The Queen's speech on the Opening of Parliament,  
7 November)

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

## ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that its annexation of Kuwait is null and void.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state
- "I remind the Iraqis once again that at all levels of authority, military or civilian, they are personally responsible under the Geneva Convention for illegal acts committed as occupiers of Kuwait" (Foreign Secretary speaking in House of Commons, 24 October).
- SCR 674 (adopted 13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining, 29 October) reaffirms international condemnation of Iraqi actions and reminds Iraq that it is liable under international law for loss, damage and injury arising from illegal occupation of Kuwait.

## SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.

## IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRs (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, 674)

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Commitment of these states reaffirmed - eg recent statement by King Fahd; reinforcement of Syrian military component; clear response from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait to Primakov proposals for an Arab solution.

- Meeting GCC Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, 28/29 October, reiterated condemnation of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait as breach of international and Islamic law, and expressed full support for UNSCRs.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for the sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion.
- Amir of Kuwait, in televised address to his people to mark the third month of the occupation of his country, said that he was certain there was no way to bring the occupation to an end other than by the complete and definitive application of SCRs and the Resolutions of the Arab Summit and Islamic Conference.
- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.
- Countries supporting sanctions and worst hit by Gulf crisis will receive \$13 bn in emergency aid, pledged by Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group (representing 24 of the world's richest nations) at meeting in Rome on 5 November. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey will be principle recipients.
- Statement by Heads of State and government of six Asian Muslim States (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives and Pakistan) issued on 16 October in Dhaka, called upon President Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait in compliance with relevant SCRs.
- EC meeting in Rome, 27/28 October, denounced Iraq's unscrupulous use of hostages, agreed to discourage any further national or private missions to Baghdad, and said efforts to divide Community would be in vain. Twelve agreed (5 November) that UN Secretary General should be asked to continue efforts to send special representative to Iraq.
- 84th Conference of Interparliamentary Union (in Uruguay) endorsed universal condemnation of Iraqi action and supported UNSC Resolutions.
- ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) has condemned Iraq's looting of Kuwait International Airport since the invasion, and has demanded return of foreign aircraft seized in Kuwait. Resolution endorsed by IATA (International Air Transport Association) at Annual General meeting in Geneva on 29 October. IATA also called for release of passengers and crew of foreign aircraft.



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#### EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 100 billion).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.

#### FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs". Iraqi statements speak of women and children suffering for want of supplies. But contradicted by
- Reports from Iraq indicate some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at bakeries). But Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock, with markets provisioned from pillaged Kuwait. Profiteering on looted goods rampant.
- Iraqi government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Many have left, but 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility. SCR 674 underlines Iraqi obligations to third country nationals as well as to Kuwaitis.
- Iraq has rejected offers from both the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.

#### WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them. Saudi government strictly controls access to region around Holy Places, and only Muslims are admitted.

#### PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).
- UN SCR 672 demonstrated international condemnation of excessive force by Israeli police, and authorised Secretary General to send mission to Israel to investigate incident and developments in occupied territories.
- Reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously), deploring Israeli government's decision not to accept the Secretary General's mission and asking them to reconsider. Resolution repeats request for report.
- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam assumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international conference based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the

usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)

#### MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League in Mecca (12 September) expressed strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government. Agreed Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. Conference called on governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.
- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers, plucking out of beard of religious leader before his murder.
- Ayatollah Khoi, Shia leader in Iraq (and regarded as chief authority for all Shia on Arab side of Gulf, including Iraqi Shia), has issued fatwah (religious decree) condemning Iraqi plundering of Kuwait.
- Abdulaziz Ibu Adullah Al-Sheikh, member of Saudi Committee of Senior Islamic Scholars, has asked "Those who justify Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, will they accept annexation of their countries by other forces?"
- Tanzanian press reported (1 November) that Iraqi Embassy in Dar es Salaam had been registering young Tanzanian muslims for military service. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Iraqi Embassy had been told their actions were illegal.

#### THE FUTURE

- "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for, but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, as it must, and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.
- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and

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representatives of opposition groups in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait with the prospect of a more representative system of government.

- Amir in TV broadcast to Kuwaitis, after three months' exile, said building of new Kuwait would require all citizens to work together. Heroic role played by Kuwaiti women alongside the men holding out in Kuwait would never be forgotten.

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 3. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew, with regime of terror under Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Majid. Collapse of public order.
- Systematic looting of what remains of public and private property continues unchecked. Systematic nature indicates deliberate plan to dismantle infrastructure of state of Kuwait, and to impose rapid demographic change.
- Iraqi Information Minister, Latif Jassim, said (4 November): "The world should forget a place called the Emirate of Kuwait ever existed".
- Basic foodstuffs in short supply. Long queues for bread, no eggs, no fresh fruit, very little meat; all at exorbitant prices.
- No work, no schools, restrictions on cash withdrawals by Kuwaitis (of their debased currency), shortage of medicines, make leaving an attractive alternative to difficult survival in Kuwait.
- Iraq has encouraged the emigration of young, elderly and female Kuwaitis. Their homes and positions have reportedly been given to Iraqis and Palestinians. Following survey of all residential property, unoccupied houses/flats being reallocated and their contents "disposed of". Of 700,000 Kuwaitis in the Emirate at the time of the August invasion, only 300,000 are thought to be left.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (£1.8 bn in gold and £5.5 mn in foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Iraq busily appropriating Kuwaiti assets. According to Iraqi government Kuwait Airlines "no longer exists", and all its assets have gone to Iraqi Airways.
- A new pipeline has been installed between Kuwait and Basra, and it is reported that oil from Kuwait is being pumped along it. Otherwise Kuwait crude production down to 10% of normal; refineries have been shut and many installations mined.
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence plates, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein

erected around the city. Most schools have closed and commercial activity has virtually ceased.

- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.
- Reports of atrocities committed by Iraqi forces in Kuwait multiply.
- Amnesty testified to US Congressional Human Rights caucus (10 October). After summarising organisation's concerns about Iraq's human rights record prior to invasion, gave further account of repression in Kuwait. People being tortured by Iraqi military and intelligence personnel said to include Iraqi Shia muslims with suspected links with opposition group al-Dawa Al Islamiyya (membership of this group is capital offence in Iraq). Many individual cases of torture, abuse, summary execution cited. Victims include boys as young as 13. Reported group executions including shooting at peaceful protest group of about 35 women and young people in early August.
- Testimony by Kuwaiti refugees to House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (24 October) reinforces this evidence (eg doctors forced to take blood from small children for transfusions for Iraqi soldiers).
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty, which can also follow failure to declare possession of a fax or photocopier.
- All Arabs and foreigners in Kuwait who fail to report to the Residence Department by 5 November will be liable to legal proceedings and residence permission will be terminated.
- 15,000 Kuwaitis rounded up by Iraqis and imprisoned in Iraq.
- Iraq has rejected offers both by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, continue to be helpful.
- SCR 674 (29 October) condemns actions of Iraqi authorities to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third State nationals, in violation of the Geneva Convention and International Law. It invites states to collect substantiated information on grave breaches of 4th Geneva Convention and make them available to Council.

- Resolution also invites states to collect information regarding claims for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq.
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united the Sabhh family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and the opposition in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait.
- "We will rebuild Kuwait on the firm foundation of our national unity and the legitimate system of government which we have chosen and are content to be ruled by, strengthening consultation and democracy and popular participation in the light of our 1962 Constitution" (Conference Final Statement).

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 4. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- "The only way the crisis can be settled peacefully would be for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait" (Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ozal, 1 November).
- "We are tightening the screw of peaceful pressures but we cannot shirk our part in the alternative course if that course finally becomes necessary" (Foreign Secretary's statement in House of Commons, 24 October).
- Poll shows Britons favour use of force. Latest Gallup poll published on 18 October repeats that public support for UK (and US) policy in the Gulf unwavering after 2½ months. 86% of Britons said they would back force to free Kuwait and liberate the hostages if sanctions failed.
- Bush-Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power 'to suppress acts of aggression'. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "The greatest prospect for peace lies in this paradox ... the certainty which we have to create in his [Saddam Hussein's] mind that, if he does not go in peace he will be removed by force" (Foreign Secretary speaking at Canning House, October 30).
- "It is not acceptable or safe for the West, the Arab world, or the United Nations to walk away from the problem, leaving the aggressor in possession of any part of Kuwait or any compensation or his aggression. It is not acceptable or safe, and it will not happen." (Foreign Secretary, speaking in House of Commons, 8 November.)



## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 5. REFERENCE PAPERS

Verbatims

- VS 50/90 "Palestine: the other Middle East problem": speech by Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October
- VS 54/90 Statement by Foreign Secretary in House of Commons, 24 October
- VS 56/90 Foreign Secretary's speech at Canning House, 30 October (extract)
- VS 57/90 Foreign Secretary's speech at Chatham House, 31 October (extract)

Guidance

- No 47/90  
50/90  
52/90  
61/90

Retracts

Extensive daily coverage of Ministerial statements, spokesman etc. Following are some recent key pieces:

- Transcript of interviews given by Foreign Secretary in New York to BBC Radio and IRN, 2 October
- Extracts from debate on Middle East in House of Commons, 24 October
- Declaration on the Gulf crisis and Middle East, by Twelve (27/28 October)

Survey of Current Affairs

August 1990, p.277: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

The Gulf Crisis: Briefing Notes

- Saddam Hussein's record
- International reactions to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Kuwait: consequences of the Iraqi invasion
- Iraqi claims to Kuwait
- The Rape of Kuwait
- The Multinational Force

Video Material

- Kuwait refugees
- Inside Kuwait
- Kuwait: the atrocities
- Kuwait: destruction of a society



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1990

Dear Charles,

Soviet views on the Gulf

In your letter of 7 November recording your discussion with the Soviet Ambassador about Mr Gorbachev's message to the Prime Minister on the Gulf, you held open the possibility of a reply after Mrs Thatcher's meeting with Secretary Baker on 9 November. No reply seems necessary, but if the Prime Minister wants to send a further message, I enclose a short draft, which has been approved by the Foreign Secretary. It is designed primarily as the lead-in to a discussion of the Gulf with Mr Gorbachev in the margins of the CSCE meeting in Paris next week.

Yours,  
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

From: Prime Minister

To: Mr Gorbachev

I was grateful for your letter of 6 November setting out your views on the Gulf crisis. It was helpful to have these assurances of the firmness and consistency of your policy in resisting the Iraqi aggression and to know that you recognise the need to keep up the military pressure on Saddam Hussein.

Since you wrote I have had a useful talk with Jim Baker, who had just come from seeing you in Moscow. I look forward to discussing all this with you when we are both in Paris next week for the CSCE Summit.

*To iml*  
*an*  
*an*  
*a: / gorbachev. d dg*

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T250A/90**

subject cc MASTER  
cc OPS

Courtesy Translation

Bonn, 13 November 1990

Letter

from

Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the  
Federal Republic of Germany

to

Her Excellency The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister,  
dear Margaret,

Despite a high degree of enduring consensus on the part of the member states of the United Nations Security Council and the international community, we have not yet succeeded in obtaining the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait or in forcing Iraq to meet its international responsibilities. A further visible strengthening of international solidarity, as agreed by the WEU Council of Ministers on 21 August 1990, is thus of decisive importance if we are to attain our objective - to end the aggression and its consequences by peaceful means, if possible.

I am therefore pleased to comply with your request, transmitted to me by your Ambassador on 24 September, to support your country's involvement in coping with the crisis.

In order to increase the operational readiness of the British forces in the Gulf, the Federal Republic will provide military

equipment worth a total of approximately 60 million Marks. This support is in line with the wishes expressed by the British side and includes in particular the "Fuchs" NBC detection vehicle.

In addition, the German side will, as far as possible, provide military air transport capacity within the NATO area to ease the provision of supplies for the British forces.

I suggest that our defence ministers discuss the relevant details.

Yours sincerely,  
(sgd) Helmut Kohl

13. November 1990

Schreiben  
von  
Herrn Helmut Kohl  
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  
an  
Ihre Exzellenz  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher  
Premierminister des Vereinigten Königreichs  
Großbritannien und Nordirland

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister,  
liebe Margaret,

trotz eines hohen und fortdauernden Konsenses unter den Mitgliedern des VN-Sicherheitsrates und der internationalen Gemeinschaft ist es bisher nicht gelungen, den Irak zum unverzüglichen, vollständigen und bedingungslosen Rückzug seiner Streitkräfte aus Kuwait und zur Einhaltung seiner internationalen Verpflichtungen zu bewegen.

Der weiteren sichtbaren Stärkung der internationalen Solidarität, wie sie vom Ministerrat der WEU am 21. August 1990 beschlossen wurde, kommt daher für unser Ziel, die Aggression und ihre Folgen möglichst friedlich zu beenden, entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Der von Ihrem Botschafter am 24. September 1990 übermittelten Bitte, das Engagement Ihres Landes bei der Bewältigung der Krise zu unterstützen, komme ich daher gerne entgegen.

Zur Erhöhung der Einsatzbereitschaft der in den Golf entsandten britischen Truppen wird die Bundesrepublik Deutschland militärische Ausrüstung im Gesamtwert von ca. 60 Mio DM zur

Verfügung stellen. Diese Unterstützungsleistungen orientieren sich an den von britischer Seite vorgebrachten Wünschen und beinhalten vor allem das ABC-Spürfahrzeug "Fuchs".

Darüber hinaus wird von deutscher Seite im Rahmen des möglichen militärische Lufttransportkapazität innerhalb des NATO-Vertragsgebietes bereitgestellt werden, um die Versorgung der britischen Truppen zu erleichtern.

Ich schlage vor, daß die Verteidigungsminister unserer Länder die erforderlichen Einzelheiten besprechen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Helmut Kohl

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND  
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 13. November 1990

original? PR33

Ihrer Exzellenz  
Frau Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Premierminister des  
Vereinigten Königreichs

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister, liebe Margret,

trotz eines hohen und fortdauernden Konsenses unter den Mitgliedern des VN-Sicherheitsrates und der internationalen Gemeinschaft ist es bisher nicht gelungen, den Irak zum unverzüglichen, vollständigen und bedingungslosen Rückzug seiner Streitkräfte aus Kuwait und zur Einhaltung seiner internationalen Verpflichtungen zu bewegen. Der weiteren sichtbaren Stärkung der internationalen Solidarität, wie sie vom Ministerrat der WEU am 21. August 1990 beschlossen wurde, kommt daher für unser Ziel, die Aggression und ihre Folgen möglichst friedlich zu beenden, entscheidende Bedeutung zu.

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
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Ich schlage vor, daß die Verteidigungsminister unserer Länder die erforderlichen Einzelheiten besprechen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Wilton". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "W" and a long, horizontal tail.



*Meeting Record  
cc MASTER.*

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bc PC*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*30.*

*From the Private Secretary*

13 November 1990

*Dear Stephen.*

THE GULF

The Foreign Secretary suggested to the Prime Minister this afternoon that it would be very important, as the likelihood of war in the Gulf grew, to maintain the high degree of national unity which the Government had so far achieved. This would include such steps as a Prime Ministerial broadcast, meetings with church leaders, briefing the Leader of the Opposition, with the basic purpose of preparing people for the eventuality of war. While agreeing with the objective, the Prime Minister was inclined to think that many of these steps could not actually be taken until after a formal decision to resort to the military option had been taken, and therefore at the very last minute. But she agreed it would be useful if the Foreign Secretary were to draw together some of the steps he thought would be necessary in this situation. They might then discuss them with close colleagues.

*Yours sincerely,  
C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



*We must not discard any objectives. We <sup>still</sup> have to obtain them*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*29/2a - UCP*

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London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1990

*all 'though I understand the need for prisoners - not*

*Time Review*

*Dear Charles*

*I am not sure we can pick a choice between these objectives. We want to leave them all.*

Gulf crisis: UK objectives following total Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait

*CDP 13/XI*

The Foreign Secretary has been looking in the context of Jim Baker's visit at our longer term objectives. He sees a danger that, as the crisis develops, we may find that our leverage to obtain all our objectives is reduced and we shall have to concentrate on those objectives which are of the first importance for our national interests.

Our first priority after Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government must be the release of any remaining hostages. A voluntary Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would probably prevent the MOD from mounting operations to rescue the hostages. If withdrawal took place after a land battle in Kuwait, we would probably still be faced with a prospect of several hundred hostages being held in Iraq by Saddam Hussein or another hostile Iraqi leader. Saddam Hussein may well be tempted to trade the release of the hostages against the lifting of the sanctions which we shall want for other reasons to maintain - see below. Public opinion might shift towards the view that we should do whatever was necessary to get the hostages home. We will let you have some thoughts on how we would deal with this potentially difficult issue.

Our second priority should be controlling Iraq's offensive and particularly NBC capacity, which otherwise will constitute a continuing threat to regional and international security. The military option may provide the opportunity to destroy Iraq's capabilities, though we should beware of assuming that their destruction is a foregone conclusion: NBC plants are targets which it will be difficult and potentially costly to take out.

In the event of voluntary withdrawal, we will need to maintain maximum pressure on Iraq through the Security Council to accept the immediate dismantling of her weapons of mass destruction through the continuation of the general embargo under Security Council Resolution 661 or, since it may not be practical to retain this much beyond Iraq's withdrawal, more probably through a new resolution imposing a more selective embargo.

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Controlling Iraq's offensive capacity is of course connected with the objective of establishing a regional security system. The requirement in SCR 660 that Iraq and Kuwait begin intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences provides a peg, and it is helpful that some of the non-aligned are talking in New York of the need for international arrangements under UN supervision for arms and armed forces reduction in the region. But the problems are considerable. The Kuwaitis and others may argue with some justice that, without a Western presence on the ground, a security system would be worthless since Arab participation could not be relied on. But the financial and political problems of a long-term Western presence on the ground could be formidable: a sea and air presence would be more manageable.

The Foreign Secretary regards the settlement of other Middle Eastern issues, including Arab/Israel, as a lower priority, not because it is less desirable but because he is sceptical about the possibility of achievement. But clearly in public statements we must continue to state our readiness to address these issues when the crisis is over. In his minute of 8 November to the Prime Minister the Foreign Secretary suggested how we might proceed, though Mr Baker showed himself reluctant last week.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 674 dealt with the Iraqi obligation to pay compensation to Kuwait for losses resulting from the illegal invasion and occupation. The same resolution envisages nationals and corporations of other countries also being compensated. We have given the Iraqis formal notice that we reserve all our rights. We have to recognise however that Iraq was hugely indebted before the crisis, perhaps to the tune of \$80-100 billion (compare with oil earnings in 1989 of about \$15 billion) and the chances of the international community getting anything are not great. The Foreign Secretary is convinced that it would not be in our interest to inflict penal reparations on Iraq comparable to those imposed on Germany after the First World War. To do so would guarantee a legacy of bitterness which would work against longer term security in the region. Compensation for Kuwait might be a different matter. We are looking at the possibility of hypothecating a percentage of Iraq's oil revenue post-crisis for the reconstruction of Kuwait.

Finally, there is the question of the individual responsibility of Iraqis and possible war crimes trials. UNSCRs 670 and 674 reaffirm that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that Iraq is bound to comply with its terms. We are looking at the practicality of bringing individual Iraqis to book. Much would depend on the circumstances. We do not want to make specific proposals

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which would consolidate Army and Party support for Saddam Hussein. We are working up a further resolution on individual responsibility and war crimes which will avoid echoes of Nuremburg.

*Yours,*  
*Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*This contains  
most of our  
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YOUR TELNO 925 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON OUR FUTURE TACTICS. PICKERING SUGGESTS ON PERSONAL BASIS POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF "PEACE" ELEMENTS AND A DEADLINE IN DRAFT RESOLUTION: DEMARCHES AT HIGH LEVEL IN CAPITALS OF OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS: AND A TIMETABLE FOR ACTION OVER NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 12 NOVEMBER AND, AS INSTRUCTED, EXPLAINED OUR THINKING ON THE TACTICS FOR THE NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT AT THE UNITED NATIONS, BASED ON THE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGY YOU HAD REACHED WITH BAKER. I SET OUT OUR IDEAS FOR THE MOUNTING OF A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, INVOLVING VIDEO AND PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL, IN WHICH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE GCC MIGHT PARTICIPATE. I ALSO EXPLAINED HOW THIS MIGHT RUN STRAIGHT INTO VOTING ON AN ENABLING RESOLUTION FOR MILITARY ACTION, AND ASKED PICKERING FOR HIS PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE CONTENT AND TIMING OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. I GAVE PICKERING THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT IN YOUR TELNO 926.

3. PICKERING, GIVING HIS PERSONAL REACTION AND MAKING IT CLEAR HE HAD HAD NO READ-OUT FROM THE BAKER TOUR, LET ALONE ANY INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED, SAID OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION LOOKED GOOD. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO STATE THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY ACTION, BUT SUBJECT TO THAT SAW OUR TEXT AS A GOOD WAY OF SECURING THE MAXIMUM LATITUDE. BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER TO MAKE IT EASIER TO DIGEST THERE SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED SOME IDEAS FROM THE "PEACE" DRAFTS CURRENTLY BEING CIRCULATED. WE WOULD ANYWAY HAVE THE PEACE LANGUAGE PUSHED AT US: IT WOULD THEREFORE BE BETTER TO HAVE SOME ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS INCLUDED FROM THE OUTSET. WE MIGHT LOOK TO SEE WHAT PRINCIPLES (FOR EXAMPLE REGIONAL SECURITY) MIGHT BE BROUGHT IN WITHOUT CAUSING ANY DAMAGE. THERE MIGHT BE A REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD APPLY TO ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL: THIS WOULD NOT REALLY GIVE THE IRAQI'S ANYTHING.

*33*

4. PICKERING ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED SOME TACTICAL USE MIGHT ALSO BE MADE, IN THAT CONTEXT, OF THE INCLUSION OF A DEADLINE. THIS COULD BE PUT IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WAS NOT A DEADLINE AFTER WHICH MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN, BUT A DEADLINE BEYOND WHICH ALL PEACE EFFORTS WOULD LAPSE. THE COMBINATION OF THE PEACE ELEMENTS AND SUCH A DEADLINE WOULD BE A POWERFUL ONE, AND COULD HELP MAKE THE DRAFT BROADLY ACCEPTABLE WITHIN THE COUNCIL. THE RESOLUTION MIGHT THUS NEED TO BE IN BIPARTITE FORM, WITH THE PEACE ELEMENTS IN PART (A) TOGETHER WITH A DATE AND THE ELEMENTS FROM OUR DRAFT IN PART (B).

5. ON THE TIMING AND HANDLING OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE TO GO IN WITH THE TEXT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN PARIS, MOSCOW AND PEKING. USE COULD BE MADE OF CONTACTS WITH MITTERRAND AND GORBACHEV AT THE CSCE SUMMIT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE DRAFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FULLY ENDORSED IN CAPITALS. NEGOTIATIONS CONFINED TO NEW YORK COULD ALL TOO EASILY BE BLOWN OFF COURSE AS A RESULT OF LOCAL PRESSURE. IN A SUBSEQUENT PHASE THE TEXT WOULD NEED TO BE SOLD TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CUBA AND YEMEN WHO WERE PROBABLY BEYOND REDEMPTION): THIS TOO SHOULD BE DONE IN CAPITALS.

6. PICKERING DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ENDING OF THE U S PRESIDENCY AT THE END OF NOVEMBER NEED BE A DETERMINING FACTOR WHERE THE TIMING OF THE EXERCISE WAS CONCERNED. IT MIGHT BE OF SOME BENEFIT TO BE IN THE CHAIR IN ORDER TO LAUNCH THE COUNCIL DEBATE. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DIFFICULT TO HAVE A RESOLUTION PASSED UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF YEMEN IN THE MONTH OF DECEMBER: THE YEMENI MIGHT BE ABLE TO INTRODUCE A DAY OR TWO'S DELAY BUT HIS POSITION WOULD IF ANYTHING HAMPER HIM FROM INTRODUCING UNHELPFUL AMENDMENTS. ONE MAJOR TIMING QUESTION WAS HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR A REALLY CONVINCING KUWAITI INPUT INTO THE DEBATE. ANOTHER WAS THE STATE OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. WE BOTH AGREED THAT, SINCE IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID THE TWO EXERCISES BEING UNCOUPLED THE SECOND TIMING POINT WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THE FIRST.

7. WE AGREED THAT THE ULTIMATE TIME LIMIT, IN TERMS OF COUNCIL ACTION, WAS THE END OF DECEMBER. THE CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL AND THE PARTICIPATION OF FIVE NEW MEMBERS WOULD ADD A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY THEREAFTER. THE CHANGE IN COMPOSITION WAS LIKELY TO WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE.

8. WE CONCLUDED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSBLE TO HAVE THE COUNCIL DEBATE

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READY TO RUN AT THE EARLIEST IN THE LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER, AFTER THE LONG THANKSGIVING WEEKEND. PICKERING SAID HE COULD IF NECESSARY DRAG OUT PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL SO THAT THE DEBATE WAS SPREAD OVER AN ENTIRE WEEK. TOWARDS THE END OF THE WEEK THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD BE TABLED, HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN DISCUSSED IN CAPITALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IDEAS OUTLINED ABOVE. THIS TIMETABLE WOULD STILL ALLOW FOR SOME SLIPPAGE.

9. WE AGREED FINALLY THAT WE SHOULD REPORT BACK TO CAPITALS ON OUR DISCUSSION AND COMPARE NOTES AGAIN ON 13 NOVEMBER IN THE LIGHT OF REACTIONS. THE U S MISSION WOULD DRAFT OVERNIGHT THE LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN A 'PEACE' SECTION OF A BIPARTITE RESOLUTION. WE WOULD DRAW UP A POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR THE TIMING AND HANDLING OF ACTION ON THE RESOLUTION, ON THE BASIS OF THE IDEAS WE HAD DISCUSSED. OUR DRAFT OF THIS PAPER IS BEING SENT BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND UND. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT, AND FOR YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 131500Z.

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MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

COMMENT

1. THERE IS CLEARLY MERIT IN THE PROCEDURE WHEREBY A DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IRAQ DESPOLIATION OF KUWAIT SHOULD BE THE LEAD IN TO A COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE. I AM VERY SCEPTICAL INCIDENTALLY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF OUR BEING ABLE TO KEEP THE LATTER FIRMLY UNDER WRAPS WHILE WE PROCEED OPENLY WITH THE PREPARATION OF THE FORMER. MOST PEOPLE HERE WILL INSTANTLY SPOT THAT THE MEDIA SHOW IS A CURTAIN-RAISER FOR SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS.
2. WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE CARE TO ENSURE THAT THE TWO ELEMENTS REMAIN COUPLED. THIS MUST MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THE TIMING OF OUR PREPARATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND ITS PRESENTATION TO OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS MUST BE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE THE TIMETABLE FOR THE DEBATE, RATHER THAN VICE VERSA. WE MUST AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO AN UNREALISTICALLY FAST TIMETABLE, GEARED TO OUR READINESS TO STAGE THE DEBATE, WHICH THEN PREVENTS US FROM SECURING THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME WHEN IT COMES TO A VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION. THIS MEANS ENSURING THAT NO FINAL GO-AHEAD TO THE KUWAITI/GCC MEDIA SHOW IS GIVEN UNTIL WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE ARE GETTING THE KEY PERMANENT MEMBER DUCKS IN A ROW FOR ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION.
3. LIKE PICKERING, I PERSONALLY SOMEWHAT REGRET THAT THE IDEA OF A DEADLINE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STRATEGY AGREED WITH BAKER. I RECOGNISE THAT IT HAS DISADVANTAGES. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THE BEST WAY TO RECONCILE THE INEVITABLE PRESSURES TO "GIVE PEACE A LAST CHANCE" WHILE NOT ALLOWING ENFORCEMENT ACTION TO BE INDEFINITELY DELAYED. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO SECURE COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH PERMITS MILITARY ACTION TO BE TAKEN FROM THE DAY OF ITS ADOPTION.
4. I BELIEVE THAT PICKERING'S IDEAS ON THE TIMING AND HANDLING OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MAKE A LOT OF SENSE. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO SELL OUR DRAFT IN CAPITALS, BEGINNING WITH THE CAPITALS OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS. WE NEED THE FIRM BASIS FOR ACTION

PROVIDED BY THEIR AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION (OR IN THE CASE OF THE CHINESE, AT LEAST READINESS TO ABSTAIN) BEFORE WE CAN MOVE ON TO ACTION WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND WE NEED THEIR COMMITMENT ON A TEXT IF WE ARE SUCCESSFULLY TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR UNACCEPTABLE CHANGES BY THE NON-ALIGNED. ON TIMING, THE SCENARIO WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH PICKERING WOULD PERMIT A COUPLE OF WEEKS SLIPPAGE, WITHOUT BRINGING RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE TOO UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO THE END OF THE YEAR. BUT WE SHALL OF COURSE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE ABILITY OF THE YEMENI PRESIDENT TO DELAY MATTERS A LITTLE AND THE PROBLEM OF HOLIDAYS TOWARDS THE END OF DECEMBER.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS STRICTLY SPEAKING NONE OF MY BUSINESS HERE, SINCE NONE OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED ARE CURRENTLY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I IMAGINE WE AND THE FRENCH (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE U S) WILL BE GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO BRING IN THE EPC 12, OR AT LEAST THE WEU FORCE CONTRIBUTORS. SINCE MUCH OF THE NEXT STEP PROCESS IS GOING TO BE UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE GLARE OF PUBLICITY ANYWAY, THERE IS A RISK THAT, IF WE LEAVE THE EUROPEANS TOO LATE, THEIR REACTION WILL BE UNNECESSARILY NEGATIVE. THIS RATHER POINTS TOWARDS CONSULTING THEM IN THE SAME TIME FRAM AS THE NON-NON-ALIGNED AND THE MAJORITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

HANNAY

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 12 NOVEMBER:  
EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOLLOW-UP: IRAQ/KUWAIT HOSTAGES

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON DEMARCHE TO RANGE OF COUNTRIES, STARTING WITH AMU OVER LUNCH, TO PRESS IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF MISSION BY UNSG REPRESENTATIVE. DEMARCHE TO INCLUDE (AT UK SUGGESTION) REFERENCE BACK TO EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT AND TO NO NEGOTIATIONS ON HOSTAGES. TEXT OF AGREED STATEMENT IN MIFT. POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE GERMAN PROPOSAL FOR TIGHTENING EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ BY HELPING TO PLUG LEAKS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. DELORS CALLED FOR UNBLOCKING PROCEDURAL DEADLOCK BETWEEN EP AND COUNCIL, TO ENABLE EARLY FLOW OF AGREED EC AID TO FRONTLINE STATES.

DETAIL

2. DE MICHELIS (PRESIDENCY) NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAD APPROVED A TEXT BY THE TWELVE ON HOSTAGES IN IRAQ/KUWAIT, AND A DEMARCHE TO A WIDE RANGE OF COUNTRIES URGING PRESSURE ON IRAQ TO ACCEPT A MISSION BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. POLITICAL DIRECTORS HAD ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE TWELVE SHOULD STICK FIRMLY TO THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (SCRS), AND SHOULD MAINTAIN BOTH THE ISOLATION OF IRAQ AND PRESSURE ON IT TO OBSERVE THE RESOLUTIONS. THE TERMS OF THE DEMARCHE COMPRISED: THE REPEATED CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ'S BEHAVIOUR, THE FREEING OF ALL HOSTAGES ACCORDING TO THE SC RESOLUTIONS, SUPPORT FOR THE UN ROLE AND INSISTENCE THAT IRAQ ACCEPT THE PROPOSED MISSION, AND A REFERENCE TO THE CONDEMNATION UNDER ISLAMIC LAW OF HOSTAGE-TAKING. DE MICHELIS PROPOSED THAT, AS PART OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOLLOW-UP, MINISTERS SHOULD NOW ENDORSE THESE CONCLUSIONS AND HE SHOULD SO INFORM THE PRESS AFTER THE COUNCIL.

3. GENSCHER (GERMANY) AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH BUT URGED THAT A FURTHER POINT SHOULD BE EXAMINED. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ WERE

KNOWN NOT TO BE LEAK PROOF AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DO ITS BEST TO PLUG THE HOLES. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE DOING THEIR BEST, IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS WERE INCAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING THE NECESSARY CONTROLS. THE COMMUNITY SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO HELP THEM TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE VIA A NEW SCR WHICH WOULD PROMOTE SUCH ASSISTANCE TO TIGHTEN UP BORDER CONTROLS. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT SITUATION. A PEACEFUL SOLUTION MUST REMAIN THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE, AND THE BETTER SANCTIONS WORKED, THE MORE LIKELY SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE. IT WAS THEREFORE IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THE COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE PROPOSALS FOR A NEW SCR.

4. MR GAREL-JONES SAID THAT THE STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE SHOULD ALSO EMPHASISE THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND SHOULD REFER BACK TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT OF 28 OCTOBER. GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL DESERVED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THE DEMARCHE BEING PURSUED AT ONCE. DUMAS (FRANCE) AGREED WITH GENSCHER ON THE NEED TO TIGHTEN UP THE EMBARGO. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE GIVEN SUPPORT ON HOSTAGES, AND COMMUNITY LANGUAGE SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED. THE PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED, WITHOUT EXCLUDING FURTHER SCRS.

5. DE MICHELIS NOTED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT HAD ALREADY COVERED THESE POINTS. AS THE UK HAD PROPOSED, THE NEW STATEMENT SHOULD REFER TO NO NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEED FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THESE POINTS WERE ALREADY EC POLICY. AS FOR THE GENSCHER PROPOSAL, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD EXAMINE THIS ON 14 NOVEMBER. THE EC AID ALREADY PROMISED TO SOME OF THE NEIGHBOURS, (EG JORDAN) SHOULD PROVIDE LEVERAGE.

6. GENSCHER ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT LOOKING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS, BUT FOR HELP TO THEM (MANPOWER, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE AVAILABLE ANY RESOURCES THAT COULD HELP TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, UNDERSTAND THE UK POINTS, WHICH HAD BEEN SUBSUMED IN THE ROME STATEMENT. THEY DID NOT NEED RE-EMPHASIS. GENSCHER ALSO NOTED THAT BRANDT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL DURING HIS RECENT MISSION TO SPEAK IN FAVOUR OF THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES. HE HAD STUCK FIRMLY TO THE TERMS OF THE SCRS AND EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENTS. BRANDT HAD LIVED UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS GENSCHER HAD HAD AT THE TIME OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

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7. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) REPORTED THAT ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM LAST WEEK THAT HE WAS CONVINCED IRAQ WOULD FREE THE HOSTAGES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ HAD EMPHASISED THAT IF SOME (ESPECIALLY UK AND US) HOSTAGES WERE NOT FREED, THIS WOULD CREATE EVEN GREATER PROBLEMS AND EXACERBATE THE PROSPECT OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. HE THEREFORE ENDORSED THE PROPOSED DEMARCHE. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT DATA TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IRAQ WAS STILL IMPORTING GOODS ACROSS CERTAIN LAND ROUTES, AND THAT THERE WERE MAJOR GAPS IN THE EMBARGO. HE SUPPORTED THE GERMAN PROPOSAL.
8. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK) ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD MEAN UN FORCES TO ENSURE THE EMBARGO WAS IMPLEMENTED. GENSCHER DENIED THIS, INDICATING THAT HE ENVISAGED ONLY TECHNICAL HELP AND MANPOWER. BUT ELLEMANN-JENSEN SAW A UN PRESENCE AS THE NEXT NATURAL STEP. IT WAS CRUCIAL TO REPEAT THE ROME STATEMENT SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF THE COMMUNITY TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS IN THE REGION. PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING FOR THE HOSTAGES WAS BUILDING UP IN EUROPE AND THE COMPETITION BETWEEN EC POLITICIANS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF SOME HAD HAD AN UNFORTUNATE EFFECT. THIS COULD ONLY BE RESISTED BY GOVERNMENTS DEMONSTRATING THEIR SOLIDARITY AND BY REPEATING THE ROME STATEMENTS. IT WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE IF ONLY UK AND US HOSTAGES WERE LEFT, AND THIS SITUATION MUST BE PREVENTED BY ANY MEANS.
9. MR GAREL-JONES WARMLY WELCOMED THIS STATEMENT, WITH EVERY WORD OF WHICH HE AGREED. HE ALSO WAS ATTRACTED TO THE GENSCHER PROPOSAL ON STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO.
10. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) ENDORSED THE ELLEMANN-JENSEN LINE, AND SUPPORTED THE UK PROPOSAL THAT CERTAIN POINTS BE ADDED TO THE NEW STATEMENT FOR USE IN THE DEMARCHE. HE HAD INTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT IN ROME TO MEAN THAT ALL MISSIONS TO IRAQ SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED. HE ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT GENSCHER HAD INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT MISSIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED, BUT NOT BY EUROPEAN CITIZENS. AS FOR STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO, IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE TO HAVE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. THE SCRS WERE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS TO STRENGTHEN CONTROLS, AND DESPITE THE EVIDENT PROBLEMS AN UN OBSERVER FORCE MIGHT BE NEEDED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE.
11. COLLINS (IRELAND) SUGGESTED THAT THE GENSCHER PROPOSAL SHOULD BE EXAMINED, WHILE NOTING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRS

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WAS A MATTER FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. COMMUNITY AID SHOULD ONLY BE PROVIDED TO COUNTRIES WHERE THE COMMUNITY COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT SANCTIONS WERE BEING OBSERVED. RECENT VISITS TO IRAQ HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL IN TERMS OF PRESSURE FROM EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. IRELAND HAD OVER 250 HOSTAGES (MORE THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER STATE EXCEPT THE UK). GENSCHER ADDED THAT HE AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS, EITHER BY GOVERNMENTS OR INDIVIDUALS. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR, AND BRANDT HAD NOT NEGOTIATED.

12. EYSKENS (BELGIUM) AGREED THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WERE UNDER PRESSURE ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS SHOULD NOT BE DISAPPROVED, PROVIDED THEY WERE REALLY HUMANITARIAN. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO GET PAYMENT FOR HIS HOSTAGES, THIS SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. THAT SAID, UNOFFICIAL VISITS CAUSED PROBLEMS EVEN IF GOVERNMENTS OPPOSED THEM. THE TWELVE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ONLY RELEVANT POLITICAL ATTITUDE WAS THAT OF THE COMMUNITY AND THAT EXPRESSED IN THE SCRS. ANYTHING ELSE WAS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF EUROPEAN VIEWS.

13. SUMMING UP, DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE PROPOSED DEMARCHE WOULD BE PURSUED, AND WOULD INCLUDE THE POINTS PROPOSED BY THE UK. POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD FINALISE THE TEXT NOW AND ON 14 NOVEMBER CONSIDER THE GENSCHER PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO, EITHER VIA UN MEANS OR DIRECTLY BY COMMUNITY ACTION. HE CONTINUED THAT THE TWELVE REAFFIRMED THE POSITION THEY HAD EXPRESSED IN ROME, AND THAT HE FELT THIS VERY CLEAR ATTITUDE WAS INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE. THE BEST WAY TO GET THE HOSTAGES HOME WAS TO STICK FIRMLY TO THAT POSITION. THESE POINTS WOULD BE MADE TO THE AMU MINISTERS OVER LUNCH.

14. RETURNING TO EC AID TO FRONTLINE STATES, DELORS REFERRED TO A LETTER HE HAD SENT ON 9 NOVEMBER TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (BY FAX TO FCO, ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY BAG). THIS HAD URGED THAT ALL STEPS BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DISBURSEMENT OF EC ASSISTANCE, AND THAT BILATERAL CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT COMMUNITY FUNDING WOULD COME FROM THE 1991 BUDGET. DELORS CONTINUED THAT AT PRESENT, BECAUSE OF THE QUOTE INCOMPREHENSIBLE BATTLE UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL, THERE WAS NO HOPE OF COMMUNITY FUNDING BEING DISBURSED BEFORE FEBRUARY 1991. THIS WAS DAMAGING THE COMMUNITY'S CREDIBILITY. HE HOPED THAT PROCEDURES COULD BE SIMPLIFIED SO THAT AID COULD FLOW BY THE END OF THE YEAR. DE MICHELIS AGREED

PAGE 4  
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AND PROPOSED THAT COREPER RE-EXAMINE THE PROBLEM LATER IN THE WEEK.

15. SEE MIFT.

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MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)  
MR WICKS HMT  
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NNNN

CF  
I have copies  
of this.  
JP 12/11



D  
c/c

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

12 November 1990

THE GULF

The Prime Minister has had a letter out of the blue from a young British officer in the Gulf. It is a nice letter, one she is very pleased to have. It is generally very complimentary about the manner in which British forces have been deployed and the arrangements made for them, as well as about the morale of the forces themselves. I will be writing back to him with a simple acknowledgement.

The Prime Minister thinks the Defence Secretary may want to know that the letter mentions one or two problems which have occurred, all perfectly predictable. The author writes that: "Water has been a problem - never enough - but as the logistics have improved so has the supply of water and fuel." He goes on to say that vehicles have performed better than expected but: "one thing has become very clear. We must have all the spares we need as and when we need them. The distances we cover out here are so much longer than in Germany and if a vehicle cannot motor, it has a far more limiting effect than it would have had before." He has expressed some concern about the effect of the intense heat on the gun kit of Challenger tanks but says that no specific problems have been identified yet.



The only thing which might be interpreted as a 'moan' is the suggestion that our forces are desperately short of any world news. This may be inevitable. The Prime Minister thinks that, if there is anything which could be done, we should consider how to keep our forces informed of developments.

(C. D. POWELL)

Miss Jane Binstead,  
Ministry of Defence.



**A** The National Archives

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

12th November 1990

Dear Stephen,  
with CSP?

CO 13/11/90

The Defence Secretary was grateful for a sight of the FCO paper on constraining Iraq's Nuclear, CBW and Missile capability, which you sent to Number 10 on 8th November. He believes it provides a useful contribution to consideration of a difficult issue of major concern.

As the recommendations recognise, work is already underway in the MOD on the wider implications of any military attack on NBC facilities, which may require some amendment to the paper. Mr King, would, therefore, wish to return to this subject as MOD's studies advance.

A copy of this letter goes to Charles Powell.

Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTead)  
APS/S of S

S Wall Esq  
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

SECRET  
FROM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 121800Z FCO  
TELNO 2754  
OF 121711Z NOVEMBER 90  
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## IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAKER'S DISCUSSION IN PARIS.

KIMMITT TOLD THE MINISTER ON 12 NOVEMBER THAT BAKER'S TALKS IN PARIS HAD GONE QUOTE EXCEPTIONALLY WELL UNQUOTE. THE FRENCH REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY STICKING TOGETHER, AND WITHIN THAT, FOR THE FIVE IN PARTICULAR TO ACT IN CONCERT, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE COHESION OF THE WESTERN THREE. THE FRENCH, SAID KIMMITT, WOULD BACK WHATEVER COULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE THREE, AND HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT APPROPRIATE ACTION COULD BE AGREED BETWEEN LONDON, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

2. KIMMITT APOLOGISED FOR SPEAKING QUOTE SOMEWHAT ELLIPTICALLY UNQUOTE AT THIS STAGE, BUT BAKER HAD YET TO MAKE HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM HIS TRIP AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING WHAT HE HAD LEARNED DURING HIS TALKS IN LONDON. BUT BAKER WAS CONFIDENT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING COMMON GROUND AMONG THE WESTERN THREE. BAKER HAD RAISED THE SAME KIND OF OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS AS HE HAD WITH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER. THE FRENCH HAD TAKEN THESE ON BOARD BUT ELICITED NO IMMEDIATE REACTION, AND CERTAINLY NO IMMEDIATELY NEGATIVE REACTION.

## COMMENT

3. WOOD WAS UNABLE TO PROBE FURTHER, WE HAVING HAD NO ACCOUNT AS YET OF BAKER'S TALKS IN LONDON

ACLAND

YYYY


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Handwritten notes: "H", "cpc", "BF (1)", and "26" in red ink.

10 DOWNING STREET  
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*From the Private Secretary*

12 November 1990

**GULF CRISIS: POLITICAL PRELIMINARIES  
TO MILITARY ACTION**

Thank you for your letter of 10 November covering the text of a draft UN Security Council Resolution authorising the use of force. I have shown this to the Prime Minister who would be content for us to use it as a basis for discussion with the Americans in Washington and New York.

Vertical stamp: "SECRET" repeated multiple times.

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

---

A young Captain in the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars has written to you direct from Saudi Arabia about the experience of deployment there. It is generally an upbeat and cheerful letter. Water has been a problem, but supplies are now improving. Vehicles have performed better than expected. But he adds: "One thing has become very clear. We must have all the spares we need as and when we need them". He also mentions that the temperature in the gun turrets reaches 36°C and "the gun kit heats up worryingly".

More generally, he says "We are still desperately short of world news and have no idea what is likely to happen", and adds that "the US Army make us look like poor relatives at times" (although they have treated us terribly well).

I do not propose to send the letter to MOD since it might get him in trouble: but will raise the points with them without revealing the source.

C.P.

CHARLES POWELL

11 November 1990

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SIC AAA/I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT, DISCUSSION WITH CROWN PRINCE

SUMMARY

1. CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH APPEARS TO SHARE KING FAHD'S RESOLUTE APPROACH TO GETTING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT, FOLLOWED BY REMOVAL OF IRAQ'S CBW CAPABILITY. WELCOME FOR UK'S STRONG AND CONSISTENT POSITION AND FOR THE WAY BRITISH TROOPS HAVE MOVED QUICKLY INTO TRAINING HERE. PRINCE ABDULLAH DOUBTS SADDAM WILL WITHDRAW UNDER PRESSURE AND ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, SEES CONFLICT AS PROBABLE. STRESSES DISTINCTION BETWEEN SADDAM'S REGIME AND IRAQI PEOPLE. GLAD TO RECEIVE UK PARLIAMENTARY PARTY NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. I TOOK GEN DE LA BILLIERE TO CALL ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH IN RIYADH TODAY. CROWN PRINCE SPOKE WARMLY OF OUR CONSISTENT POSITION OVER KUWAIT AND OF THE LEAD THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED TO GIVE. HE DUCKED AN INVITATION TO VISIT 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE BUT SHOWED INTEREST IN THE DETAIL OF THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE. HE HAD ADMIRERD THE PERFORMANCE OF 7TH ARMoured BDE. CHALLENGERS IN A FIRING ON THE MOVE DEMONSTRATION SHOWN ON SAUDI TV THIS WEEK. THE BRIGADE HAD A STRONG REPUTATION AND ITS JERBOA WAS AN APT INSIGNIA FOR DESERT WARFARE.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE OUTLOOK PRINCE ABDULLAH DOUBTED SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WITHDRAW UNDER PRESSURE. TO DO SO WOULD LOSE HIM WHAT WAS LEFT OF HIS REPUTATION IN IRAQ AND THE PEOPLE WOULD TURN ON HIM. HE WAS LIKELY TO TRY TO STICK IT OUT IN KUWAIT. PRINCE ABDULLAH CITED A PROVERB ABOUT THE NEED TO EQUIP ONESELF FOR FIGHTING A LION IF ONE WAS TO BE SURE OF BEATING A JACKAL. BFCME EXPLAINED THAT THIS JUSTIFIED FURTHER ALLIED REINFORCEMENT AND ABDULLAH TOOK THE POINT. HE SUSPECTED HOWEVER THAT IF SADDAM

WERE TO BECOME CONVINCED THAT HE WOULD BE ATTACKED BY A SUPERIOR FORCE, HE MIGHT THEN UNDERTAKE A LIGHTNING WITHDRAWAL. IN THIS EVENT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FOLLOW THROUGH AND ENSURE THAT HIS CAPACITY TO MAKE WAR WITH CHEMICAL AND OTHER WEAPONS WAS REMOVED. I POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE AS ONE ON THIS POINT. PRINCE ABDULLAH COMMENTED THAT OTHER DANGEROUS ARMOURIES OF WEAPONS IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL COULD NOT NOW BE TACKLED UNTIL IRAQ'S HAD BEEN DISMANTLED. BUT HE EXPECTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH.

3. PRINCE ABDULLAH CONCLUDED A CONFLICT THUS LOOKED PROBABLE, AND THE WINDOW OF TIME WAS NOT WITHOUT LIMIT. HE INDICATED HOWEVER THAT HE SAW THIS COURSE AS REGRETTABLE, AND HE HOPED FERVENTLY THAT IN THE INTERVAL REMAINING TO US SOMEONE IN IRAQ WOULD DO AWAY WITH SADDAM. THE REGIME WOULD THEN TOPPLE. HE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE, BUT WITH THEIR LEADER WHO HAD TO BE DONE AWAY WITH.

4. THE CROWN PRINCE WELCOMED THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS OUR JOINT APPROACH TO THE CRISIS. OUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WAS SHOWING TRUE FORM. HE RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO MY REQUEST THAT HE RECEIVE LORD PYM'S PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION NEXT WEEK.

COMMENT

5. THIS WAS A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A READ-OUT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH'S POSITION. HE HAS NOT SHOWN HIMSELF OVER THE PARAPET OF LATE AND IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT HE HAS BEEN LUKEWARM OVER THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS AND OF THE PROSPECT OF HOSTILITIES. HE HAS IN THE PAST BEEN THE SENIOR PRINCE TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND SADDAM (WITH WHOM HE INTERCEDED AT THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S REQUEST LAST MARCH OVER BAZOFT). BUT THE GENERAL AND I FOUND PLENTY OF SIGNS OF RESOLVE TO SEE THIS ONE THROUGH AND TO HAVE SADDAM'S THREAT REMOVED, ALBEIT WITH A TINGE OF RELUCTANCE TO CONTEMPLATE A FIGHT. THE CROWN PRINCE CLEARLY APPRECIATED THE PRESENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF BRITISH TROOPS AND GAVE BFCME A PARTICULARLY WARM WELCOME. HE ALSO COMMENDED THE VERY CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE WAY THIS WAS BEING TURNED TO ACCOUNT IN THE CRISIS, WITH THE HELP OF OUR MILITARY MISSION. A BRIGADE OF THE GUARD HAD DISTINGUISHED ITSELF BY MOBILISING TO THE FRONT IN FOUR HOURS WHEN THE IRAQI THREAT APPEARED (THIS WAS PARTLY DUE TO PRODDING FROM BRIGADIER COCKING). THE CROWN PRINCE USED VIVID PROVERBIAL IDIOM TO ILLUSTRATE THE NEED TO BE SURE OF DEALING WITH THE JACKAL. HE APPRECIATED THE FCO VIDEOS IN ARABIC OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE CRISIS AND OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN KUWAIT WHICH I LEFT WITH HIM.

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
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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

11 November 1990

**THE PERMANENT FIVE AND ARAB/ISRAEL**

The Prime Minister has read with interest the Foreign Secretary's minute of 8 November proposing that the Permanent Five should issue a declaration stating formally that once Saddam Hussain is out of Kuwait, they will address the Arab/Israel problem. She applauds the intention but is concerned that the fact of issuing such a statement at the time of the next Security Council Resolution on Iraq/Kuwait will inevitably make the two issues appear to be linked. This risk might be diminished if the last sentence of the draft declaration were amended to say, "The Five will resume their efforts towards promoting such negotiations ...".

The Prime Minister has also underlined the danger of building up expectations on Arab/Israel, given that we are most unlikely to get anywhere with Mr Shamir.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET

25(A-B) (1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

10 November 1990

C D Powell Esq,  
No 10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

This is a lot better than the resolution about Jim Baker was proposing. Agree but we should discuss it privately with the Americans? CDH

Dear Mr Powell,

**GULF CRISIS: POLITICAL PRELIMINARIES TO MILITARY ACTION**

Following discussions with Mr Baker on 9 November, the Foreign Secretary asked that urgent work should be put in hand on the text of a draft UN Secretary Council Resolution authorising the use of force.

The Foreign Secretary, who has approved the enclosed draft prepared by our Legal Advisers, does not think it would be right to include wording authorising the use of force after a given date if Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait, as Mr Baker suggested. The draft therefore contains no date and is indeed just about as simple and straightforward as can be described. It will not be possible in his view to avoid a reporting provision as contained in para 3.

If the Prime Minister is content Sir D Hannay will be authorised to discuss at once with the Americans in New York. There is much to be said for basing Anglo-American discussion on a British draft if we can.

Yours sincerely,  
Dennis Keefe

Resident Clerk  
for Private Secretary

The Security Council

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660 (1990) and related resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that Member States shall take such action, in cooperation with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other States of the Gulf, as is necessary to procure the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of the authority of its legitimate Government, and to restore international peace and security in the area.
2. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this Resolution.
3. Requests the States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Resolution.

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INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ESC LONDON  
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, MODUK

SIC I9M  
MY TELNO. 2689 AND MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT  
SUMMARY

1. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR US REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE GULF WILL AROUSE EXPECTATIONS. BUT NO DECISION YET ON THE EVENTUAL USE OF FORCE. ADMINISTRATION'S NEED TO NURTURE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT PLAYS INTO THE DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEEK FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL COVER. BAKER WILL WANT TO EXPLORE THE OPTIONS IN LONDON.

DETAIL

2. BAKER'S VISIT TO LONDON COMES TOWARDS THE END OF A ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MAJOR ARAB ALLIES AND THE FOUR OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, DESIGNED TO ROUND OUT THE CURRENT AMERICAN PROCESS OF STOCKTAKING ON THEIR GULF POLICIES, AND LEADING UP TO A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA (FOR THANKSGIVING WITH US TROOPS ON 22 NOVEMBER). HIS TALKS IN LONDON WILL ACQUIRE ADDED IMPORTANCE FOLLOWING THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION, WHICH HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED, TO REINFORCE US FORCES IN THE GULF BY SOME 150,000 TROOPS. ALTHOUGH NO FIRM DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THE EVENTUAL USE OF FORCE, THE TIDE SEEMS TO BE MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION. A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE NEW FORCES, TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS, WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO COME FROM GERMANY. THE MECHANICS OF ROTATION COULD BE EXPLOITED TO PRODUCE AN UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF TROOPS EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE AMERICANS WILL NO DOUBT HOPE THAT OTHERS OF THEIR ALLIES WILL FOLLOW THEIR LEAD.

3. THERE WILL STILL HOWEVER BE TIME FOR HESITATION BETWEEN NOW AND EARLY TO MID-JANUARY, WHEN THE LATEST BUILD UP OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. IF THE AMERICANS ARE EVENTUALLY TO USE FORCE, THEY WILL NEED:

(A) TO RETAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT OVER THE TIME BETWEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS FURTHER INCREASE AND ITS COMPLETION. THIS WILL APPLY TO THE CONGRESS, WHICH WILL NOT WISH TO BE

BLIND-SIDED, AS MUCH AS TO THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL. PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL LAST WEEK (MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE) WERE TOUGH BUT AMBIVALENT. BUSH HAS BEEN UNDER MEDIA CRITICISM FOR APPARENT UNCERTAINTY OVER BOTH TACTICS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE GULF. WHILE RECOGNISING THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE PRESIDENT FACES IN TRYING SIMULTANEOUSLY TO ADDRESS MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES, INFLUENTIAL COMMENTATORS HAVE NOTED THAT QUOTE INCOHERENCE IS THE THEME OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY UNQUOTE AND CALLED FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO PROVIDE AN ARTICULATE AND REASONED EXPLANATION OF US OBJECTIVES. THE ADMINISTRATION FACE AN IMPORTANT TASK IN PUTTING A PERSUASIVE CASE TO THE PUBLIC IF THEY ARE TO RETAIN MAJORITY DOMESTIC SUPPORT AND THE INITIATIVE WITH CONGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE YEAR. THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOW ANNOUNCED A FURTHER INCREASE IN TROOP LEVELS SHOULD HELP TO GIVE A LEAD. THE POLLS SHOW THAT THE PUBLIC IS STILL WILLING TO TRUST THE ADMINISTRATION, EVEN THOUGH A LARGE MAJORITY BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS HEADED FOR WAR. BUT THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED TO YOU BY SENATOR BENTSEN ABOUT THE FRAYING OF PUBLIC SUPPORT (YOUR TELNO. 1925, NOT TO ALL) SHOULD NONETHELESS NOT BE DISMISSED, AND TODAY'S PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE WAS NOT ALTOGETHER REASSURING IN THIS REGARD.

(B) THE ADMINISTRATION WILL OF COURSE ALSO NEED TO RETAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. VERY LITTLE AUTHORITATIVE HAS BEEN SAID HERE ABOUT BAKER'S TRIP, AND HE HIMSELF IS OF COURSE BEST PLACED TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF HIS FINDINGS. BUT THE GENERAL IMPRESSION, CONFIRMED BY WHAT WE HAVE HEARD AND LEARNED SO FAR, IS THAT WHILE THE AMERICANS BY NO MEANS HAVE A TOTALLY FREE HAND, THEY HAVE GAINED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE, INCLUDING FOR THE EVENTUAL USE OF THE MILITARY OPTION.

(C) BOTH THESE FACTORS PLAY INTO THE DECISION THE AMERICANS MUST SOON TAKE ON WHETHER AND HOW TO GO BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO SEEK FURTHER COVER FOR THE USE OF FORCE.

4. BAKER HAS UP TO NOW ARGUED THAT EXPLICIT UN COVER WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY HELP THE ADMINISTRATION DOMESTICALLY. WHILE SUCH COVER IS PROBABLY NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL, I BELIEVE HIS ASSESSMENT TO BE CORRECT. GIVEN THAT THIS FURTHER INCREASE IN US FORCES IN THE GULF WILL ENTAIL THE WIDER CALL UP OF RESERVISTS, SOME FOR POTENTIAL COMBAT DUTIES, THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC POSITION, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY WITH THE CONGRESS, WOULD BE EASED IF HE WERE ABLE TO POINT TO EXPLICIT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE IN THE END. A US OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED QUOTE IN COLD BLOOD UNQUOTE, WITHOUT FURTHER INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT, COULD WELL EXCITE CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC CRITICISM. BUSH WILL NEED

TO SHOW THAT HE INTENDS OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS TO EXHAUST THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY. IT IS OF COURSE OPEN TO SADDAM HUSSEIN TO FEED ON THIS BY IMPLYING OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS THAT HE IS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. SOME OPINION FORMERS HERE BELIEVE THAT A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR BAGHDAD IS NECESSARY AND THAT INSISTENCE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND NOTHING ELSE IS TOO HARD-NOSED.

5. BAKER WILL BE ABLE TO TELL YOU HOW IMPORTANT HE BELIEVES A UN RESOLUTION MAY BE IN KEEPING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TOGETHER. THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY ACCOUNTS OF HIS TALKS SO FAR IS THAT HE ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO GETTING FURTHER COVER. IF THAT IS CORRECT, HE WILL BE REFLECTING AN ADMINISTRATION PREFERENCE OF LONG STANDING. BUT A GREAT DEAL WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON BAKER'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GET A PROPER RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL OVER THE NEXT THREE WEEKS.

6. ONCE BAKER RETURNS, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE VIRTUALLY COMPELLED SOON TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS AGAIN IN TIME FOR ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL TERM RUNS OUT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. BOTH MILITARY REINFORCEMENT AND A RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR FURTHER ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 42 OR 53 WILL HEIGHTEN US AND INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF MILITARY ACTION EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO NURTURE HIS SUPPORT IN THE MEANTIME: HE CANNOT RISK FINDING HIMSELF BY JANUARY IN THE DANGEROUS POSITION OF HAVING ESTABLISHED A MOMENTUM TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE WHILE ALLOWING DOUBTS AS TO ITS WISDOM AND EFFICACY TO GROW. ON PRESENT FORM SADDAM HUSSEIN IS UNLIKELY TO HELP HIM AT THE RIGHT TIME BY OFFERING A CLEAR, FRESH CASUS BELLI. SUCH A PROVOCATION WOULD OF COURSE RAPIDLY CLEAR THE US PUBLIC MIND OF HESITATION.

7. YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH BAKER ON 9 NOVEMBER WILL BE IMPORTANT IN HELPING HIM TO MAKE UP HIS MIND HOW BEST TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT. YOU WILL NO DOUBT ALSO WISH TO EXPLORE WITH HIM HOW WILLING OTHERS, INCLUDING THE TURKS AND SYRIANS, MAY BE TO HELP IN REDUCING US/UK EXPOSURE BY ADDING FURTHER TO THE COALITION OF FORCES. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT THIS WEEK RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF HOSTAGES OR THE RESUPPLY OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT, BUT THESE TWO ISSUES, AS WELL, WILL BE VERY MUCH ON BAKER'S MIND (MY TELNO. 2705).

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SIC I9M  
IRAQ/KUWAIT: US DEPLOYMENTS

SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES INCREASE IN US FORCES COMMITTED TO THE GULF. THE STATED PURPOSE IS TO ENSURE COALITION HAS ADEQUATE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPTION. CHENEY GIVES DETAILS OF NEW GROUND FORCES AND NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS, WHICH APPEAR TO AMOUNT TO AN ADDITIONAL 150,000 PERSONNEL.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY (8 NOVEMBER) THAT, FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH KING FAHD AND OTHER ALLIES, HE HAD DECIDED TO INCREASE US FORCES COMMITTED TO DESERT SHIELD QUOTE TO ENSURE THAT THE COALITION HAS AN ADEQUATE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPTION SHOULD THAT BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOALS UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT, TO THIS END, THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF BOTH ADDITIONAL ALLIED FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS AND APPROPRIATE UN ACTIONS.
3. ASKED IF THE NEW DEPLOYMENTS MEANT THAT THE US WAS GOING TO WAR, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS DOING WHAT HE FELT WAS NECESSARY TO FULFILL US OBJECTIVES, ADDING THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IF THIS MOVEMENT OF FORCE CONVINCED SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW, SO MUCH THE BETTER.
4. DEFENCE SECRETARY CHENEY GAVE DETAILS OF THE NEW DEPLOYMENTS. IN SUMMARY, HE ANNOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT OF A FURTHER FOUR-AND-A-THIRD DIVISIONS (MAKING A TOTAL OF EIGHT-AND-TWO-THIRDS DIVISIONS), 3 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS (MAKING A TOTAL OF 6), AND ONE BATTLESHIP CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS (MAKING A TOTAL OF 2). HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE DETAILS OF FURTHER AIRFORCE DEPLOYMENTS, BUT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE LIKELY TO FOLLOW. IN ADDITION TO THE GROUND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS (ALL REGULAR TROOPS), CHENEY ANNOUNCED THE CALL UP OF COMBAT UNITS (3 BRIGADES) OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TO BE PUT



THROUGH OPERATIONAL-READINESS TRAINING - WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF. (FULL DETAILS IN BDS SIGNAL SIC ACA/I9M OF 082300Z, COPIED TO FCO EMERGENCY UNIT).

5. CHENEY NOTED THAT THE MISSION OF US FORCES REMAINED TO DETER FURTHER AGGRESSION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, TO DEFEND, SHOULD DETERENCE FAIL AND TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS. QUOTE BUT THE ADDITIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY THAT'S NOW BEING ADDED CLEARLY WILL GIVE US THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD THAT BE REQUIRED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD UNQUOTE.

6. CHENEY REFUSED TO PUT A FIGURE ON THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS, BUT INITIAL ESTIMATES ARE OF A TOTAL INCREASE OF 150,000 OR MORE. SIMILARLY, HE WOULD NOT GIVE A DATE FOR DEPLOYMENT, BUT AGREED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE NEW YEAR.

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 091030Z FCO

TELNO 2128

OF 091018Z NOVEMBER 90

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MOSCOW TELNO 2124 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT: VISIT OF BAKER TO MOSCOW

## SUMMARY

1. SHEVARDNADZE ADMITS THAT FORCE IS NOT TO BE RULED OUT, BUT ANY DECISION TO USE IT WOULD NEED TO BE MADE WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK

## DETAIL

2. JAMES BAKER ARRIVED IN MOSCOW LATE AFTERNOON ON 7 NOVEMBER AND SPENT THE REST OF THE FOLLOWING DAY IN TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE PLUS A SEPARATE CALL ON GORBACHEV BEFORE DEPARTING EARLY THIS MORNING FOR LONDON. IN PARALLEL WITH THE BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS, THERE WERE ALSO WORKING GROUP SESSIONS TO DISCUSS THE FINE PRINT OF THE START AND CFE AGREEMENTS. SINCE THE TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE WERE FOR THE MOST PART HELD ONE ON ONE, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GIVE US ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPLEMENT THE SOVIET MEDIA'S BLAND REPORTING OF THE CONSULTATIONS.

3. ACCORDING TO PRAVDA MOST OF THEIR TALKS CENTRED, AS EXPECTED, ON THE GULF CRISIS/MIDDLE EAST ALTHOUGH THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF START, CFE, AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND OTHER REGIONAL PROBLEMS. DURING A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE HELD LATER THAT EVENING, SHEVARDNADZE CONFIRMED THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE UNITED IN THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF AND IN THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT NEVERTHELESS THE POSSIBILITY OF USING FORCE 'COULD NOT BE FULLY RULED OUT'. BUT ANY DECISION TO DO SO WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR HIS PART, BAKER RENEWED CALLS ON IRAQ TO IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND CATEGORICALLY RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY PARTIAL SOLUTIONS.

## CALL ON GORBACHEV

4. BAKER'S VISIT WHICH CAME ON THE EVE OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO GERMANY MEANT THAT THERE WAS DOUBT UP TO THE LAST THAT GORBACHEV WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND THE TIME TO SEE HIM. IN THE EVENT, BAKER DID CALL ON THE SOVIET PRESIDENT FOR TALKS LASTING 2 HOURS TO DISCUSS THE GULF CRISIS. THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING REFERS TO THE

TWO SIDES' AGREEMENT FOR THE NEED FOR CONTINUING UNANIMITY AMONG ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GORBACHEV IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT 'NO ONE SHOULD COUNT ON CRACKS TO APPEAR IN THE ALLIANCE' AND PRAISING AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT OTHER COUNTRIES ON THEIR APPROACH TO THE GULF CRISIS. THERE WAS ALSO A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS, DURING WHICH GORBACHEV IS REPORTED TO HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINE, ORDER AND STABILITY TO BE SHOWN IF THE NEXT STAGES OF TRANSFER TO A MARKET ECONOMY AND OF AGREEING A UNION TREATY WERE TO BE ACHIEVED.

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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2747

OF 092200Z NOVEMBER 90

YOUR TELNO 1944: IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSSIBLE BW THREAT

1. WE TOOK ACTION ON 9 NOVEMBER WITH THE COUNTER TERRORISM OFFICE AT STATE. THEY WERE AWARE OF THIS LETTER. THEY AGREED THE PROPOSED PRESS LINE IN YOUR PARA 4. THEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ASSESSED THE LETTER AND CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A HOAX.

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From the Private Secretary

9 November 1990

Dear Stephen,

**POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE GULF**

The Prime Minister is contemplating paying a brief visit to the Gulf in the period immediately before Christmas. But she does not want this to be known outside a very small circle at present.

I should therefore be grateful if this letter could be handled by a very restricted number of people indeed.

The purposes of going would be to pay a Christmas visit to British forces in the area and to hold talks with the principal Heads of Government. In order of priority, they would be King Fahd, President Mubarak, the Amir of Kuwait and the rulers of Oman, Bahrain and the UAE. But time constraints may make it impossible to undertake all these.


The Prime Minister envisages flying to the area immediately after the conclusion of the Rome European Council on Friday 14 December. She would need to be back in London late on Monday 17 December, giving her in effect three days. We would have to work on her Statment for the European Council while in the Middle East: and would look to you to let us have material for supplementaries.

It would be very helpful if FCO and MOD could draw up a draft feasible programme within these time constraints, but they should not consult posts in the area or our military commanders at this stage. The Prime Minister would want to have adequate time to meet members of our forces, both on the ground in Saudi Arabia as well as those stationed elsewhere in the Gulf. The visits to some of the smaller states such as Bahrain and the UAE would have to be very brief indeed, possibly a matter of only an hour or so. We may have to omit Oman altogether on this occasion.

Once we have an idea of what is feasible, we will consider approaching posts. But I repeat the Prime Minister is extremely concerned that knowledge of this possible visit and the timing of it should be very tightly held indeed.

B

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,  


CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



PM/90/084

PRIME MINISTER

4/2  
②

Prime Minister

CS

9/2

ms

Economic effects of the Gulf crisis on our main  
Aid recipients

- / 1. I thought you might wish to see a paper which Lynda Chalker did for me on the economic impact of the Gulf crisis on our main aid recipients. The conclusions are pretty bleak for a number of economies.
2. We are not in the business of compensating for higher oil prices. We are urging these countries to make further domestic adjustments, including tight fiscal and monetary policies, and ensuring that the higher price of oil is passed on to the consumer.
3. It has been one of our key policies to support economic reform. It would be a severe setback if the progress made in recent years in a number of countries was to be jeopardised by the higher cost of oil imports. But the truth is that many of these countries have little further scope to absorb external shocks such as this. If adjustment is to be sustained, they will need some further help.
4. We are encouraging them to look to the international financial institutions, but once they have done this they in turn will look to us, not just for further bilateral assistance but for substantial multilateral aid spending which will result in an earlier drawdown of our own multilateral aid contribution to which we are already



committed. As I said again in Cabinet yesterday, we now have reduced capacity to respond.

5. I am copying this minute and its enclosure to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Cabinet Secretary.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
9 November 1990



## ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE GULF CRISIS ON OUR MAIN AID RECIPIENTS

### Effects on Aid Recipients

1. The attached tables and country notes are based on an assumption of an average oil price of \$28.70 in 1991, up from \$16.30 pre-crisis (ie. the World Bank's assumptions). The tables also include estimates of other direct effects where relevant:- loss of remittances, cost of resettling refugees, lost exports. We have not included more speculative second round effects, such as the impact of higher oil prices on interest rates or on global economic growth and hence the demand for their exports. The figures show effects in a full year (1991) compared with 1989; effects in 1990 are therefore no more than half the full-year effect.
2. The analysis is limited to main UK aid recipients. The front-line states (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey) are therefore omitted, as are some other countries likely to be severely affected (Sudan, Somalia) which are not main aid recipients. Most of our main recipients are unlikely to suffer damage comparable to that experienced by the front-line states, apart from Guyana.
3. Summarising the effects on those aid recipients who lose, the damage in 1991 is estimated to be equivalent to 1.4% of GDP, 10% of imports, and 13.7% of exports. All countries face significant costs (apart from the net oil exporters Nigeria and Indonesia), but countries likely to suffer most damage, taking account of their current situation, are, in Africa, Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Mozambique; in Asia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan; and most of the open and oil import-dependent Caribbean economies, particularly Jamaica and Guyana. In absolute terms, the \$700m costs to African economies are dwarfed by the \$5b losses incurred by Asian and Oceans recipients, though the relative effects are at least as serious as those incurred by the large, populous South Asian economies.

4. For African and Caribbean recipients, effects are largely confined to the oil price increase. Some Asian countries are also significantly hit by loss of remittances and lost export markets.

5. The effects of losses on this scale will depend upon the reserves available to absorb the foreign exchange loss. Unemployment will result from returning workers and import compression; in some cases structural adjustment programmes will be affected and debt arrears will accumulate; income growth will be depressed almost everywhere and inflationary pressures increased.

#### Aid and Other Financial Flows

6. Other than the front-line states, we are aware of no significant aid offers to individual countries other than unconfirmed reports of a Japanese offer of \$500m for Pakistan, and US assistance of \$8m for Uganda. Several donors, including ODA in the case of Uganda, have offered to switch existing balance of payments support to provision of petroleum imports, but this does not represent additional money.

7. The lesson of previous oil shocks is that countries should take early measures to adjust their economies to higher oil prices. Aid therefore needs to be attached to sound structural adjustment programmes approved by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund. The oil shock will increase financing requirements for structural adjustment, but any additional aid must satisfy normal conditionality if it is not to be wasted.

8. The EC are considering ECU150mn (£105m) for badly affected countries other than the front-line states, but this is not yet agreed. The World Bank will try to assist by accelerating disbursements and expanding lending, within the constraints of credit worthiness. They have also indicated a desire to explore the possibility of additional contributions to the IDA: ODA would be unable to contribute, but this may be a good way to mobilise

contributions from countries unable to offer significant military support. The IMF are also looking at ways to increase access to their Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility, though they too will be constrained by creditworthiness problems.

9. The World Bank is exercising a lead role in co-ordinating support for adjustment packages. The Special Programme of Assistance for low-income debt distressed African Countries (SPA) provides an existing and well-functioning mechanism for mobilising quick-disbursing assistance and for considering absolute and relative needs within low income African countries. The Bank envisage suggesting reallocation of aid within Africa to countries seriously affected, and see particular scope for such reallocation by the EC and the African Development Fund. They acknowledge that early international agreement to rescheduling under the more concessional Trinidad terms proposed by the Chancellor would be especially helpful to the low-income debt distressed countries. However, for the 21 active SPA countries the Bank are experiencing difficulty in obtaining pledges sufficient to fill a financing gap calculated on the basis of an oil price of \$21. The more pessimistic assumptions reflected in the attached table would add \$600m to the gap in 1991 alone.

#### Oil Stocks and Supplies

10. Physical supply problems are not a general problem for our recipients, other than those for whom the ability to contract for oil imports is constrained by foreign exchange shortages. Oil stocks are dangerously low in some countries (e.g. Sierra Leone 6 days) and others may elect to cut back on use (e.g. Ugandan electricity generation), but these generally reflect balance of payments difficulties as much as supply disruption resulting from the crisis.

11. Available data on oil stocks and supply sources are given in the attached country notes, but they are not comprehensive.

(10)

Differences with August assessment

12. The main difference with our August assessment is that the scenario now used most often by the World Bank ("short-term uncertainty") assumes an average oil price in 1991 which is higher than that we assumed in August (\$28.7 per barrel compared with \$25). All such assumptions are subject to considerable uncertainty, however, and the worst Bank scenario (ie. oil prices increasing beyond present prices) would result in much greater damage to the world economy and developing countries. Even the most likely scenario, combined with more comprehensive data on lost remittances and exports, yields a more gloomy forecast for main aid recipients than in August, however.

Economic and Social Division  
16 October 1990

## EFFECTS OF THE GULF CRISIS: 1991 (16/10/90)

COUNTRY	1 OIL PRICE EFFECT Price \$28.70 bbl \$mn	2 LOST REMITTANCES \$mn	3 OTHER EFFECTS \$mn	4 \$mn	5 TOTAL % GDP	6 EFFECTS % IMPS	7 % EXPS
AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST							
Gambia	6	0	0	6	2.6%	6.8%	3.8%
Ghana	100	0	0	100	2.0%	7.2%	11.2%
Kenya	195	0	0	195	2.4%	7.8%	21.2%
Malawi	34	0	0	34	2.1%	6.3%	10.9%
Mozambique	36	0	0	36	2.8%	4.2%	19.1%
Sierra Leone	19	0	0	19	1.8%	11.2%	14.3%
Tanzania	99	0	0	99	3.5%	7.2%	19.0%
Uganda	41	0	0	41	0.9%	5.4%	18.4%
Zambia	58	0	0	58	1.2%	5.7%	3.9%
Zimbabwe	114	0	0	114	1.9%	8.4%	6.3%
TOTAL AFRICA ABOVE	701	0	0	701	2.0%	7.0%	10.5%
ASIA AND OCEANS							
Bangladesh	280	100	18	398	2.0%	10.8%	25.5%
India	2160	389	295	2844	1.0%	9.8%	13.4%
Nepal	44	0	0	44	1.4%	6.9%	22.0%
Pakistan	900	170	50	1120	2.8%	12.9%	14.4%
Sri Lanka	220	35	65	320	4.6%	12.4%	16.9%
Guyana	60	0	0	60	20.9%	21.6%	25.5%
Jamaica	210	0	0	210	5.4%	11.0%	10.7%
TOTAL A&O ABOVE	3874	694	428	4996	1.4%	10.7%	14.3%
GRAND TOTAL ABOVE	4575	694	428	5697	1.4%	10.0%	13.7%
Nigeria	-6749	0	0	-6749	-22.8%	-101.6%	-66.7%
Indonesia	-1693	0	0	-1693	-1.9%	-9.0%	-7.7%

SOURCES: IBRD: Briefing Note on Potential World Bank Assistance to Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis (13/9/90), Scenario II

IBRD: The impact of the Gulf Crisis on sub-Saharan Africa (9/10/90)

IBRD: Tables supplied by Economic Advisory Staff, 15/10/90

ODA and IMF sources used where IBRD figures unavailable

NOTE: Imports figures for Gambia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Nepal are derived from IMF sources and may be incompatible with IBRD exports statistics.

## COUNTRY NOTES

### AFRICA

#### GAMBIA

1. The Gambian economy has grown at 4-5% a year, following the adoption of a structural adjustment programme in 1985.
2. The incremental costs in 1991 of an oil price rise to \$28.70 are estimated at 2.6% of GDP and 6.8% of imports. These might be met from a reduction in planned reserve accumulation if compensatory finance was not forthcoming - though this would mean reserves would remain at undesirably low levels. The impact on economic recovery is not expected to be substantial unless higher air fares lead to a marked decline in tourism.

#### GHANA

1. The Ghanaian economy has been recently growing at 5 to 6% a year, as a result of undertaking structural and financial reforms supported by substantial external assistance.
2. The incremental costs of the oil price rise are estimated at 2% of GDP and 7.2% of imports in 1991. These are likely to be met by rephasing a planned build-up in foreign exchange reserves, by an increase in borrowing, and by some import reduction. The latter is not expected to undermine the reform programme and continued economic recovery, though this could occur if second round effects led to a sharp drop in cocoa prices.

#### KENYA

Kenya is currently expected to achieve a 5-5.5% annual GDP growth, assuming real import growth of 2.4% a year. Gross official reserves were projected to rise from 2.6 to 3.0 months cover. The oil price

rise, which would represent 2.4% of GDP and 7.8% of imports in 1991, is likely to postpone the reserves build up and cut import growth by over half. GDP growth may fall below 5% but should remain in excess of population growth unless second round effects reduce demand for Kenyan exports.

#### **MALAWI**

Malawi was projected to have a relatively strong macro economic position for the early 1990's with GDP growth rising to 4.5% a year, falling debt service, further strengthening of external reserves and a reduction in adjustment financing needs. An increase in price to \$29 a barrel in 1991 is estimated to cost 6.3% of imports and 2.1% of GDP. Malawi may be able to maintain its growth targets by modifying the objectives for reserves build-up and seeking a maintenance of donor flows rather than a contraction. The good tobacco harvest expected in 1990 may provide a temporary cushion.

#### **MOZAMBIQUE**

Mozambique's import needs are almost wholly met by concessional flows. The current programme envisages continued modest recovery with GDP growing 5% a year on the basis of further increases in assistance. Oil expenditure accounts for 25% of foreign exchange earnings and a rise in price to \$29 per barrel in 1991 would increase this to 44%, at a cost of 2.8% of GDP and 4.2% of imports. Without compensating increases in aid, this is likely to lead to a fall in non-oil imports which could constrain recovery in those parts of the country accessible to Government. It may also delay introduction of the next stages of foreign exchange liberalisation. The USSR has traditionally provided oil imports largely on a barter basis but this will cease at the end of this year.

## **NIGERIA**

Nigeria probably exceeds its OPEC oil quota and may be producing to capacity (1.7 million barrels a day). An average price of \$29 per barrel in 1991 will close next year's external financing gap and increase export earnings on a full-year's basis by over \$6.7 billion above the 1989 level. This represents a potential increase in GDP of 22.8% and in import capacity by over 100%. The Government is likely to use any windfall gain to add to reserves, loosen constraints on public expenditure a little, and perhaps to discreetly buy back some international debt. In the longer term, the rise in the price of oil could make it easier for the Nigerians to undertake structural change by easing the hardship of those affected.

## **SIERRA LEONE**

Sierre Leone recently agreed to a policy reform package aimed at settling debt arrears and merging its parallel economies. An oil price rise representing 1.8% of GDP and 11.2% of imports in 1991 will test the political commitment to carry through reforms and place considerable pressure upon the limited foreign exchange reserves (0.7 months of imports). Any relaxation of reforms or suspension of payment of arrears will jeopardise any future agreement on IMF funded support. In early October less than a week of oil stocks remained, though a shipment was expected soon, financed by mortgaging future mineral exports. Iran is considering provision of compensatory finance.

## **TANZANIA**

GDP growth of 4.5% a year is envisaged in the current Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, assuming 2.3% real annual import growth. Oil imports represent a significant proportion of GDP (6%). As foreign exchange reserves are already very low (less than 1 month



cover), the burden of the higher oil price, which would represent 3.5% of GDP and 7.2% of imports in 1991, will have to be borne by a reduction in imports and a deferrment in repayments of external arrears (\$43 million outstanding at end 1989). If absorbed solely by the former, GDP growth could fall to the lowest levels since the mid-1980's (i.e. below population growth).

#### **UGANDA**

Uganda's oil needs are modest for a country of its size yet high in proportion to its external trade. Its foreign exchange reserves are negligible. The increase in the oil price is likely to represent 0.9% of GDP and 5.4% of imports in 1991. In the absence of increased donor financing, arrears repayment could be postponed further or even reversed and/or import volume frozen at current levels to compensate. The latter is likely to bring GDP growth down from the 5% target to below a level needed to maintain per capita incomes. However, USAID is reported to have offered \$8 million of compensatory assistance. There are reports of short-term physical supply problems, with import volumes cut to 60% of previous levels and restricted operating hours of power stations, though this represents lack of foreign exchange to meet higher prices rather than supply disruption caused by the Gulf crisis. The Government have moved fast to adjust domestic energy prices, passing through the full effects to consumers and eliminating previous fuel price subsidies.

#### **ZAMBIA**

1. Net oil imports accounted for 7% of exports and 2% of GDP in 1989. An increase in the average price of oil to \$29 per barrel in 1991 would add \$58 million to the oil import bill, accounting for an extra 5.7 of imports and 1.2% of GDP. Although the main source of Zambia's non-household energy supply is hydro-electricity (70%), the situation is exacerbated by heavy dependence on oil by the country's major foreign exchange earner, the copper industry.

2. The economic reform programme is being reasonably well adhered to, but programmed growth is low (0.9%) and it is doubtful whether further belt-tightening is politically feasible. (The oil price increases have been passed through thus far.) The probable response would be further request for debt rescheduling and some slippage in achieving programme benchmarks.

3. Zambia had been obtaining its oil supplies from Kuwait, but has been able to find alternative supplies and has now concluded a long-term deal with Iran.

#### **ZIMBABWE**

A sustained increase in the oil price to \$29 per barrel in 1991 would add \$114 million to the import bill (amounting to 8.4% of imports and 1.9% of GDP). Zimbabwe has a relatively strong external position, resulting from cautious debt management. The debt service ratio has been falling and the current account deficit is not much above 1% of GDP. Reform policy is proceeding laconically but it is doubtful if GOZ will seek to economize much on oil. The likely response is to accommodate the oil price rise by increased borrowing.

#### **ASIA**

##### **BANGLADESH**

1. Oil products in 1989/90 account for 8% of total imports and 1.2% of GDP. An increase to \$28.7 per barrel would add an estimated \$280 million to imports or cost 1.4% of GDP. Including remittances and other direct costs raises this to 2% of GDP or 10.8% of imports.

2. Bangladesh is a producer of natural gas, which provides around 80% of the electricity generating energy. This explains the reduced dependency of Bangladesh on imported oil as compared to most other countries in the region.

3. There were an estimated 70,000 Bangladeshi's working in Iraq and Kuwait and loss of remittances could total \$100 million. Most of the cost of repatriation itself is likely to be met by the international community, however, and the World Bank estimates that these costs may be as little as \$5 million to Bangladesh.

4. Recent performance on economic management has been poor, so donors may not be sympathetic to pleas for additional resources for Bangladesh unless it makes strenuous efforts to adjust to this new problem.

5. Bangladesh oil imports were not sourced in Iraq or Kuwait (in 1988) and Kuwait and Iraq are only minor export markets (about \$13 million of goods per annum)

## **INDIA**

1. India has a relatively closed economy so oil imports account for only 1.5% of GDP; but at 16.1% they form a very significant proportion of imports. At 28.7 dollars a barrel the economy will incur losses equivalent to 1% of GDP or 9.8% of imports.

2. India produces domestically around two-thirds of its crude petroleum consumption. India is also a major coal producer which provides most energy for power generation. This explains the low dependency on imported oil compared to GDP.

3. India aims to maintain stocks of about 5 weeks consumption. Prior to the crisis India obtained about 45% of its oil from Kuwait and Iraq including that supplied by the USSR under trade agreements with India.

4. There are about 200,000 Indian nationals working in Kuwait and Iraq and gross remittances from them total \$389 million in a full year. The full effect of the loss of these remittances may not be felt immediately since there is some evidence that migrants in other countries are reacting to the crisis by increasing their remittances.

5. The Indian Government expects to spend about \$30 million in repatriating its nationals.

6. India exports about \$180 million of goods to Iraq and Kuwait per year and was this year expecting a payment from Iraq as part of a deferred payment agreement.

7. No compensatory aid packages have been announced so far.

8. The increased deficit is likely to discourage the politically insecure government from its tentative programme of economic liberalisation. With a fairly high debt service ratio (29.9%) and limited international reserves (2.2 months of total imports) the government has limited room for manoeuvre.

#### **NEPAL**

1. Oil imports accounted in 1988/89 for 8.5% of total imports and 1.8% of GDP. An increase in the oil price to \$28.7 would add \$44 million to imports, costing 1.4% of GDP or 6.9% of imports.

2. Petroleum accounts for around two-thirds of commercial energy and there is no domestic petroleum production at present. However, the vast majority of Nepal's energy supply is traditional (mainly fuel wood). This probably explains the relatively small dependence on imported oil.

3. Nepal orders the petroleum through Singapore for delivery via India and aims to hold 3 months consumption in stock.
4. There are only thought to be 1,000 or so Nepalese working in the Gulf and so the impact of the crisis on either remittances or exports is likely to be negligible
5. Nepal has made 2 mercy flights carrying 200 passengers from the Gulf and is hoping that the International Red Cross will bear the cost.
6. With Nepal's access to concessional finance, low utilisation of oil products and healthy international reserves, she is relatively well placed to cope with the current price increases.

#### **PAKISTAN**

1. Oil accounts for 41% of Pakistan's energy (1988/89) and a further 35% is supplied by gas. In 1988/89 domestic oil accounted for only 18.2% of consumption, making the country heavily dependent on imports. Oil imports accounted for 12.3% of total imports and 2.2% of GDP in 1988/89.
2. At \$28.7 a barrel Pakistan will face an additional oil import bill of \$900 million, equivalent to 2.8% of GDP or 12.9% of imports. The size of oil stocks are not known. Before the crisis Pakistan imported most of its oil from Kuwait, but we understand that this has now been replaced by Saudi Arabian supply.
3. There were about 100,000 Pakistanis working in Kuwait and Iraq, remitting \$170 million per year which will now be lost. In addition the Pakistan Government has estimated that it will cost them \$70 million to repatriate their nationals, although their assumptions seem excessive and \$20 million is likely to be nearer the true cost.

4. Pakistan will lose exports valued at about \$30 million a year to Kuwait and Iraq.
5. There is an unconfirmed report that the Japanese Government is considering offering Pakistan \$500 million of emergency assistance.
6. Pakistan has already failed to meet the performance targets on the structural adjustment programme before the Gulf crisis broke. With foreign exchange reserves equivalent to only 2 weeks of imports, the additional burden imposed by the crisis has markedly weakened the country's economic position.

#### **SRI LANKA**

1. All oil is imported, but oil imports accounted in 1988 for 6.5% of total imports. An increase in oil prices to \$28.7 would add a further 3% of GDP to the oil import bill, increasing total imports by \$220 million. Including lost remittances and exports, total losses equal 4.6% of GDP or 12.4% of imports.
2. Sri Lanka is well endowed with hydro electric energy which provides 92.8% of electricity generating energy (in 1988). Without this the level of dependency on oil imports would be much higher. They normally store 2 months of consumption and have in the past procured very little from Iraq or Kuwait.
3. There are estimated to be 100,000 Sri Lankans working in Iraq and Kuwait but the Government puts remittance value at only \$35 million, which seems surprisingly low but may reflect effects of internal disorder in Sri Lanka leading workers to hold savings offshore. It is unclear what proportion of the costs of repatriation will have to be borne by Sri Lanka but it could be in the region of \$20 million.
4. Exports to Iraq and Kuwait are about \$45 million per year, mostly tea. So far the non-availability of these markets does not seem to have affected sales or prices.

5. No compensatory aid packages have been offered for assistance with the costs of repatriation.

6. Sri Lanka has made surprisingly good progress in meeting the second year performance targets under its IMF adjustment programme, but there is still much to be achieved particularly in bringing inflation under control. Higher oil prices will make the paths of continued adjustment more onerous.

### **INDONESIA**

1. Indonesia stands to gain revenue equal to 9% of 1989 imports, equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, as a result of an increase in oil prices to \$28.70 per barrel. This is due to gains on the oil current account surplus of \$1.7 billion in 1991 alone. In addition there will be further gains from liquid Natural Gas exports.

2. The overall gain to the economy is limited by the fact that net oil exports are equivalent in 1989/90 to only 10% of total exports. This low dependency on oil exports results from a successful diversification of exports into non-oil products. Nevertheless the gain from increased oil revenues are significant, and will further boost an already healthy economy.

### **CARIBBEAN**

#### **GUYANA**

1. Guyana is extraordinarily dependent on oil imports, these accounting for a third of total imports in 1989 and nearly a quarter of official GDP. An increase in oil prices to \$28.7 per barrel would cost Guyana an additional \$60 million a year, 21.6% of total imports or 20.9% of GDP. These figures may overstate the position because GDP and imports may be under-valued.

2. Guyana has only 2 weeks supply of oil. Venezuela is the normal supplier of oil products, although in recent years aid donors (including the ODA), have been providing aid in the form of oil as support to the adjustment programme. The President of Venezuela is reported to have offered longer credit terms in response to the crisis, but details are not yet available.

3. Guyana is not expected to face any other additional costs as a result of the crisis.

4. The financial situation is desperate, with a projected 1989 debt service ratio of 77.5% of exports (World Bank PFP) and minimal international reserves. Bridging finance has recently been put in place by donors in order to underwrite a new IMF programme. The viability of this programme was already highly questionable and it is now extremely likely to run into difficulties requiring extensive additional resources from donors.

#### **JAMAICA**

1. Jamaica is highly dependent on imported oil which accounts for around 90% of energy use. Fuel imports accounted for 15.1% of total imports and 7.3% of GDP in 1989/90. An increase to \$28.7 per barrel for oil would add \$210 million to the import bill and cost 5.4% of GDP or 11% of imports.

2. There are expected to be no other adverse effects of the Gulf crisis on the Jamaican economy.

3. Jamaica has about 3 weeks of stocks and normally procures from Venezuela and Mexico.

4. The weak balance of payments position has made Jamaica vulnerable to the previous oil shocks. The IMF programme was recently suspended because Jamaica failed to meet external balance



targets. This increase in oil prices will make renegotiation of the programme considerably more difficult.

5. The only new aid package agreed so far is a relaxation of the San Jose accord to provide a slightly greater deferred payment facility on oil import payments which should save £20 million in 1991.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

23(A-E)  
CJP  
12/10/90

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER:

9 NOVEMBER 1990

NOTE OF THAT PART OF THE MEETING ATTENDED BY AMBASSADOR  
CATTO AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

Hostages

1. In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr Baker confirmed that the hostage issue was beginning to run quite hard in the United States. It was coming back to public consciousness and families were starting to organise. The Secretary of State gave the numbers of our hostages in Kuwait and Iraq. In the event of hostilities, we would need to show awareness of the hostages and of our concern not to expose them to needless risk. Our targets would still have to be targets but we did know where the hostages were. Mr Baker said he thought that was right. There would be collateral damage.

Command and Control

2. Mr Baker said he had agreed with the Saudis that, in the event of military operations, joint command would continue. However, the Commander of the US forces would have the final operational authority for planning and conducting all military operations. That would obviously have consequences which we would need to think about and which Mr Baker would mention to the Prime Minister.

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Embassies in Kuwait

3. Mr Baker said the American Embassy in Kuwait could make it to mid-December at the latest. The people there had been very courageous. They had dug a well. They were, however, running out of food. There were private citizens as well as diplomats there. The military were confident that a rescue operation was not possible ("we do not have a workable non-permissive evacuation plan"). That would be to kick off a wider-ranging conflict. The US Government had thought about sending the Iraqis a message saying that they were sending in a Red Cross helicopter and requiring the Iraqis to let it in. Congress had already taken the view, however, that to take such a step, when others had already closed their Embassies and allowed the inmates to go to Baghdad, would not in their view be a justifiable pretext for a wider conflict.

4. The Secretary of State confirmed that our Embassy in Kuwait were operating on a similar time constraint. We did not want to pull our people out while they were still in touch with the British community. We thought it was in order for our people to make a dignified exit to Baghdad but he recognised that the Americans were in a different situation. Mr Baker said that the Americans still had secure communications. They would run out at about the same time as the food (presumably because of fuel running out). The President was still keen to get Americans out through a "non-permissive" operation or by using the route of a re-supply operation. But Mr Baker reiterated that Congress was against what it called phoney provocation.

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Views of Arab countries

5. Mr Baker said he had found Turkey and Egypt entirely robust, though keen to get the political cover of a UN resolution before military action, if possible. The Syrians remained committed - but out of animosity to Saddam Hussein. The Gulf states were ready for action but had no capacity to fight, with the possible exception of their air forces. The Saudis were keen to pay the Americans to do their dirty work. The Saudis would be happy to go with only Article 51 cover. The US military were not comfortable with the idea of a ground campaign in the absence of further reinforcements.

6. The Secretary of State asked whether the Americans were thinking of the end of January. Mr Baker said that they would go for a resolution in the UN of a general kind, eg saying that military action would be justified unless the Iraqis were out by 1 January. If we got the resolution, then politically we would be constrained from using Article 51. If we concluded that we could not get a resolution, then the Article 51 route would still be open but the military were reluctant to go for anything other than an air attack before 1 February, though they would look at action in January.

7. Mr Baker asked that we take a close look at the non-aligned and see which members we could influence, putting the biggest chit we had on the table. The Secretary of State said that we could certainly look at Malaysia. <sup>(and possibly others)</sup> Mr Baker said that President Mubarak had also indicated that he would use his influence with the Malaysians.

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we wanted thereafter. The Secretary of State said we would do our best but it would be difficult.

Jordan

12. Mr Baker did not seem to think that the leak of goods into Iraq from Jordan was on a large scale. He agreed with the Secretary of State about the seriousness of the Jordanian economic situation. He had not even tried to persuade the Saudis to change their view on Jordan though he had tried to persuade the Saudis to do something about Yemen. The Yemenis would be the next in the chair in the Security Council and it really was possible to win them back. The problem was that the Saudis were flexing their muscles and feeling that they could use the American presence to solve all their border disputes.

Syria

13. The Secretary of State described our recent efforts to get alongside the Syrians and the abortive mission by Sir James Craig (whom he did not name). We were now waiting to see how the Saudis got on in their approaches to the Syrians on our behalf. The Syrians must show some effort if they wanted an improvement in our relations.

14. Mr Baker said that the US too had been disappointed. He had visited Syria. The President had spoken on the telephone to President Assad on a number of occasions. Assad's rhetoric on terrorism was good but the Americans had had no satisfactory response on PA103. In order to get debt relief for Egypt and the arms package for Saudi Arabia, the Administration had had to agree to the supply of additional arms to Israel. The Syrians were now

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blasting the Americans for that in their media. Everywhere he had been in the Gulf, the rulers had leant on Mr Baker on Syria, urging him to pay more attention to Syria and to take them off the terrorism list etc. Mr Baker did not think the Syrians would leave the coalition. He also thought that they would fight. They and the Egyptians would be the only ones who would.

German attitudes

15. The Secretary of State described recent German behaviour over the Brandt mission. There was some evidence which suggested that the Germans had not really taken on board the realistic possibility of war. Mr Baker implied that Chancellor Kohl had a realistic view. The President talked to him on the phone often enough. But Herr Genscher might be in a different world and he recognised the need to pay some attention to him.

9 Novmeber 1990

(J S Wall)



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 November 1990

REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:  
CALL BY PRINCE SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN

Thank you for your letter of 8 November about the visit of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Much as I think she would like to see him, the Prime Minister's diary is full to bursting and she simply cannot fit it in at this stage. If he cannot come later, in December or January, I am afraid she will not be able to see him on this occasion.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

KW

c/foreign/khan

KW

Message 002

SUGGESTED.

COPIES TO MR FAULWEATHER

W/E.U.

H/D/UND

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GRS 1700

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WASHINGTON AND RIYADH PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

YOUR TELNO 911; IRAQ/KUWAIT; RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

SUMMARY

1. COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON MILITARY ACTION COULD NOT REMAIN SECRET FOR LONG. BUT THIS NEED NOT BE A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW. THERE MAY BE A NEED TO CONCEDE A LIMITED PERIOD FOR EFFORTS TO BRING SADDAM HUSSEIN BACK FROM THE BRINK. VIEWS OF THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

DETAIL

2. WHERE THE SECRECY OF ACTION IN THE FIVE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PREPARE FOR THE MILITARY OPTION IS CONCERNED, I THINK THE KEY LIES IN YOUR STATEMENT IN PARA 2(D) OF TUR THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ITSELF WOULD NOT NEED TO PROVIDE ANY PRECISE CLUES ON THE TIMING OF MILITARY ACTION.

3. IN PRACTICE I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK COULD REMAIN SECRET FOR LONG. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP INITIAL CONTACTS IN CAPITALS OF THE FIVE (OR AT LEAST THEIR PURPOSE) SECRET DESPITE THE INTENSE PRESS INTEREST IN ALL HIGH-LEVEL COMINGS AND GOINGS. THE SAME MIGHT BE TRUE OF THE INITIAL PHASE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS IN NEW YORK, AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH THE FRENCH. BUT PAST EXPERIENCE IN THE DRAFTING OF IRAQ/KUWAIT RESOLUTIONS SUGGESTS THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BECOME RATHER POROUS WHEN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE WERE BROUGHT IN, LET ALONE THEREAFTER.

4. OUR PAST PRACTICE - AND ONE WHICH HAS WORKED WELL OVER PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS - HAS BEEN FOR MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TO BRIEF OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS INFORMALLY ON THE BASIS OF A TEXT, BEFORE THERE IS COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL PROPER. THEREAFTER THE KEY PHASE OF CONSIDERATION AMONG ALL 15 MEMBERS WOULD BE IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, WHICH, ALTHOUGH THEY TAKE PLACE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, ARE KNOWN IN DETAIL TO THE MEDIA AND TO NON-MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WE WOULD SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN THEREAFTER EMPLOYING THE PROCEDURE OF A CLOSED MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF. BY THE TIME AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO GO AHEAD TO A VOTE THE WHOLE MATTER WOULD IN PRACTICE ALREADY BE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. WE WOULD PRESUMABLY WANT THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION TO BE A PUBLIC ACT, AND STATEMENTS MADE ON THAT OCCASION WOULD BE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION.

5. BUT, AS I INDICATE ABOVE, I WOULD QUESTION WHETHER THE INCREASING TRANSPARENCY OF THE PROCESS WAS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW. ANY DECISION TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN ADVANCE OF MILITARY ACTION WOULD NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST. BUT, PROVIDED THAT THE RESOLUTION, AS I IMAGINE WE WOULD WISH, GAVE A GENERAL AND NON-SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION WHICH DID NOT TIE THE HANDS OF THE STATES WHICH WOULD INITIATE THE USE OF FORCE, THEN GOVERNMENTS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD STILL HAVE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE THE MOMENT AT WHICH TO ACT.



6. I THINK IT VERY PROBABLE, GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF FEELING HERE THAT 'PEACE MUST BE GIVEN A LAST CHANCE', THAT THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE FOR THE SETTING OF A FURTHER LIMITED PERIOD BEFORE MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE AUTHORISED TO PERMIT INTENSIVE EFFORTS AIMED AT BRINGING SADDAM HUSSEIN BACK FROM THE BRINK. FOR REASONS OF UN TACTICS WE MIGHT HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO PERMIT SOMETHING ON THESE LINES, ALWAYS ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ACTION SHOULD NOT DETRACT IN ANY WAY FROM THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL. THE SAFEST COURSE COULD BE TO AUTHORISE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE ONE LAST ATTEMPT, ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BACK DOWN.

7. WHEN CONSIDERING THE FEASIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH, THE SOVIET AND CHINESE POSITIONS WOULD BE CRUCIAL, NOT JUST TO THE QUESTION OF THE NEED TO AVOID VETOES BUT ALSO TO THE TASK OF GETTING NINE POSITIVE VOTES. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF FIVE POSITIVE VOTES FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO WHICH THE THREE NON-NON-ALIGNED AND THE THREE AFRICANS COULD PROBABLY BE ADDED WE WOULD BE HOME AND DRY. OF THE FOUR THAT WOULD REMAIN, I WOULD NOT DESPAIR OF BRINGING MALAYSIA AND COLOMBIA TO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, GIVEN THE RELATIVELY ROBUST STATEMENTS MALAYSIAN MINISTERS HAVE MADE ABOUT MILITARY ACTION AS A LAST RESORT AND THE PRESSURE THE AMERICANS CAN BRING TO BEAR ON COLOMBIA. YEMEN AND CUBA WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN A LOST CAUSE. BUT THE MATHEMATICS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE SHAKY IF EITHER THE RUSSIANS OR THE CHINESE COULD NOT BE BROUGHT FULLY ON BOARD, I.E. ABSTAINED. IF BOTH DID SO, THE POSSIBILITY OF NINE POSITIVE VOTES WOULD REMAIN THEORETICALLY ON THE CARDS BUT I WOULD NOT COUNT ON IT.

8. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS (PARA 3 OF TUR) TO SPEAK TO PICKERING ON A PERSONAL BASIS. I STRESSED THAT OUR OWN PREFERENCE FOR RELYING ON ARTICLE 51 WAS UNCHANGED AND I WAS SEEKING NOT THE VIEW OF THE U S ADMINISTRATION, BUT PICKERING'S OWN VIEW AS U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

9. PICKERING SAID THAT IN ORDER TO SELL A RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF FORCE TO OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WE WERE LIKELY TO HAVE TO ACCEPT SOME LIMITATIONS ON OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION. THERE WOULD BE PRESSURES FOR MEASURES LIKE A LIMITED EG SIX MONTH PERIOD WHEN ACTION WAS AUTHORISED, A NON-AMERICAN COMMANDER FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND NO OPERATIONS NORTH OF KUWAIT. BUT THE NEED NOT TO ACCEPT SUCH LIMITATIONS DID NOT MEAN THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST THE UN ROUTE (HE HAD JUST HEARD THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT ANY MOVE TO THE USE OF FORCE MUST TAKE THE UN ROUTE). IN HIS VIEW A SINE QUA NON WOULD BE THE SUPPORT OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS WITHOUT THE SORT OF LIMITING CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. IT WAS VITAL TO HAVE A POSITIVE RUSSIAN VOTE. THIS MIGHT MEAN WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE A SOMEWHAT GREATER ROLE TO THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC), WITHOUT HOWEVER LETTING IT GET INTO THE COMMAND AND CONTROL AREA WHICH WOULD GIVE US THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES. IN OTHER WORDS THE MSC'S ROLE SHOULD BE ONE OF ADVICE NOT CONTROL. IF THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR HE DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD WIN A VOTE. WE MIGHT JUST GET AWAY WITH IT IF THE CHINESE INDICATED WILLINGNESS NOT TO BLOCK A RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THEN ABSTAINED AT THE LAST MINUTE.

At last!  
10. PICKERING SAID THAT IF WE TOOK THE UN ROUTE BUT FAILED TO GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH, THIS WOULD RISK PREJUDICING OUR POSITION UNDER ARTICLE 51. SENATOR MOYNIHAN HAD MADE THIS POINT TO HIM A FEW HOURS BEFORE. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT NOT TO RUSH INTO THINGS. PICKERING AGREED WITH ME THAT IF WE WENT DOWN THE UN ROUTE WE WOULD NEED TO MAKE IT CLEAR AT EACH STAGE THAT THIS WAS A POLITICALLY DESIRABLE MOVE IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION; IT WAS NOT A LEGAL NECESSITY. IT MIGHT JUST BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE A PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 51 IN ANY ARTICLE 42 DRAFT RESOLUTION OR TO REFER TO FURTHER STEPS, THEREBY INDICATING THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT ITSELF THE ONLY ROAD.

11. PICKERING THOUGHT THAT TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENGAGE IN AN EXERCISE TO GIVE PEACE A LAST CHANCE. BUT A FIXED DATE ULTIMATUM WAS UNWISE. BY TAKING THE UN ROUTE WE WERE LOSING THE ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE AND BY ISSUING THE ULTIMATUM WE WOULD RISK ALSO LOSING THE ELEMENT OF TACTICAL SURPRISE. PICKERING WONDERED ABOUT ADAPTING THE PEACE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY COLOMBIA, MALAYSIA, YEMEN AND CUBA AND ADDING TO IT AN AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE, PERHAPS WITHOUT A DEADLINE. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO A STRENGTHENING OF WHAT THE SAUDIS WERE ALREADY PROPOSING. BUT THIS WOULD NOT OVERCOME ONE ARGUMENT THAT WOULD INEVITABLY BE DEPLOYED WHEN THE MOMENT FOR ACTION CAME: NAMELY THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A FEW MORE WEEKS TO WORK. WE ALSO HAD TO BE WARY OF SAYING TOO FIRMLY THAT SANCTIONS WERE WORKING BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE EVERYONE THE EXCUSE TO PUT OFF MILITARY ACTION.

12. PICKERING MULLED OVER WHETHER ONE WAY OF GETTING ROUND THE DEADLINE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO GET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE THE COUNCIL'S LAST PEACE OFFER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. IF HE REJECTED IT, THE COUNCIL WOULD TAKE ACTION. THE TROUBLE WITH THIS WAS THAT IT MADE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE TRIGGER FOR WAR AND HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY RESIST BEING CAST IN THIS ROLE. ALSO SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD STRING THINGS ALONG BY GIVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SOME POSITIVE SIGNS AND GETTING INTO A NEGOTIATION. INDEED, THIS WOULD BE A DANGER IN ANY SCENARIO INVOLVING A FINAL PEACE OFFER. SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD SAY HE ACCEPTED SOME ELEMENTS IN SUCH AN OFFER BUT NOT OTHERS AND PLAY FOR TIME.

13. PICKERING SAID HE DID NOT ATTACH THE SAME SIGNIFICANCE AS WASHINGTON DID TO TAKING ACTION DURING THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY IN NOVEMBER. IF ACTION CAME DURING THE YEMENI PRESIDENCY IN DECEMBER, YEMEN COULD DO NO MORE THAN DELAY THINGS BY A COUPLE OF DAYS. PICKERING WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE READY FOR MILITARY ACTION IN ANY CASE IN NOVEMBER AND PERHAPS NOT EVEN IN DECEMBER. PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WERE SAYING THAT THE U S FORCES WOULD NOT ALL BE IN THE REGION UNTIL MID-JANUARY. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT IT WOULD BE A TACTICAL ERROR TO LEAVE A LONG GAP BETWEEN A FINAL PEACE OFFER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE POINT WHERE ACTION WAS TAKEN. THIS WOULD ONLY GIVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEOPLE TO ARGUE THAT THINGS HAD CHANGED IN THE MEANTIME.

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MY TELNO 1137: IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAKER'S VISIT

## SUMMARY

1. BAKER'S DISCUSSIONS HERE ON FUTURE UNSC ACTION WENT FURTHER THAN US EMBASSY INITIAL ACCOUNT TO US SUGGESTED. BAKER APPARENTLY AGREED A ROUTE MAP WITH KING FAHD INVOLVING A UNSC RESOLUTION THIS MONTH, WHICH WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO MILITARY ACTION IF WITHDRAWAL HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE BY BEGINNING OF JANUARY. LATEST US SCENARIO SEES MILITARY ACTION INITIATED DURING JANUARY, COMPLETED BY END FEBRUARY, BEFORE RAMADAN ISLAMIC FACTORS START TO OBTRUDE IN MARCH.

## DETAIL

2. I HAD A WORD TODAY WITH US AMBASSADOR ON HIS RETURN TO RIYADH TO PURSUE FURTHER HOW BAKER HAD HANDLED DISCUSSION WITH SAUDIS OVER COORDINATION OF UNSC ACTIVITY IN WEEKS AHEAD WITH THE MILITARY OPTION. I EXPLAINED THIS BACKGROUND WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR MY MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD LATER TODAY. FREEMAN SAID THAT BAKER HAD TAKEN KING FAHD THROUGH A STAGE BY STAGE SCENARIO. FREEMAN EXPECTED BAKER WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS IN LONDON TOMORROW. THIS US ROUTE MAP TOWARDS THE MILITARY OPTION SEEKS TO HARMONISE THE RATCHETING UP OF UNSC ACTION, INCLUDING AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SECURITY COUNCIL AGREEMENT TO SETTING A TIME LIMIT AFTER WHICH MILITARY ACTION COULD GO AHEAD, WITH AN OUTLINE PLAN FOR AN OFFENSIVE TO BEGIN AROUND MID-JANUARY THIS SHOULD BE COMPLETED DURING FEBRUARY BEFORE THE MOOD AND RESOLVE ON THE PART OF SAUDI ARABIA AND HER ISLAMIC PARTNERS BECAME SUBJECTED TO NEGATIVE PRESSURES WITH THE ONSET OF RAMADAN IN MARCH. WHEN I REMARKED ON THE DOWNSIDE ASPECTS OF IN EFFECT AN ULTIMATUM SETTING A SECURITY COUNCIL TIME LIMIT FOR DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES SO FAR IN ADVANCE, FREEMAN SAID THE AMERICANS

ACKNOWLEDGED THIS COULD PROVOKE SADDAM TO RECKLESS ACTION, BUT THEY REGARDED IT AS ESSENTIAL TO GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE YEMENI PRESIDENCY IN DECEMBER. ALSO THE UNHELPFUL ZIMBABWE WOULD JOIN UNSC IN JANUARY. THERE WERE RISKS IN WAITING UNTIL JANUARY AS THEY ALSO NEEDED TO HAVE A RESOLUTION TO HAND BEFORE CONGRESS REASSEMBLED ON 20 JANUARY, LEST THE LATTER TRY TO UN-PICK THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY. A RISK MIGHT THEREFORE HAVE TO BE TAKEN OVER SETTING A TIME LIMIT. BAKER BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE COULD NOW CONTEMPLATE RESORT TO FORCE IN JANUARY.

3. FREEMAN SAID THAT US THINKING ABOUT THE FORM A RESOLUTION MIGHT TAKE WAS AS YET TENTATIVE. HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO BRING ARTICLE 42 TO BEAR, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE SAUDIS HAD SHOWN A PREFERENCE FOR THIS. (THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT PRINCE SAUD INDICATED TO ME LAST WEEK ABOUT SAUDI READINESS TO ACQUIESCE IN ARTICLE 51 ACTION). THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL NEED TO INVOKE ARTICLE 42, BUT THEY SAW THIS AS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE IF IT COULD BE MANAGED. FREEMAN THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WOULD GO FOR A RESOLUTION IN PERMISSIVE TERMS WHICH NEED NOT TIE THE PROCESS SPECIFICALLY TO ARTICLE 42. (I SHALL TRY TO EXPLORE THE SAUDI POSITION HERE FURTHER WITH SAUD TODAY). FREEMAN CONFIRMED THAT IN THE LIKELY EVENT OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION STOPPING SHORT OF INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 42, THE AMERICANS SAW OUR PROPOSAL FOR A FURTHER LETTER OF REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT COMING INTO PLAY AT SOME STAGE DOWN THE ROAD.

4. AS FOR THE PROCESS BEYOND A NOVEMBER RESOLUTION BAKER HAD FOUND KING FAHD ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD TO A MILITARY OFFENSIVE, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT FURTHER MILITARY REINFORCEMENT, INVOLVING SOME WEEKS DELAY, WAS NEEDED. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD PLAY THEIR MILITARY PART, THOUGH IN WHAT WAY DOES NOT YET SEEM CLEAR. THE KING HAD STRESSED THAT ACTION MUST BE OVER BEFORE THE ONSET OF RAMADAN IN MID-MARCH. ACCORDINGLY THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY ACTION, IN THE EVENT OF IRAQ'S FAILURE TO WITHDRAW, WOULD HAVE TO START DURING JANUARY (PRESUMABLY BEFORE CONGRESS RECONVENES) TO BE COMPLETED IN THE COURSE OF FEBRUARY. PLANNING WOULD NOW GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS.

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FOR BERMAN, LEGAL ADVISERS  
IRAQ/KUWAIT: LEGAL ISSUES

## SUMMARY

1. NO MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH THE AMERICANS ON CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES.

## DETAIL

2. SIR ARTHUR WATTS CALLED ON WILLIAMSON (STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER), MATHESON (DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER) AND RASHKOW (ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER) THIS AFTERNOON (7 NOVEMBER). THEY DISCUSSED THE LEGAL BASIS FOR MILITARY ACTION, WAR CRIMES AND REPARATIONS.
3. ON MILITARY ACTION, WILLIAMSON SAID HE WAS COMFORTABLE RELYING ON ARTICLE 51 AS A LEGAL BASIS. HE WAS PREPARED TO INTERPRET IT EXTENSIVELY. WILLIAMSON AND HIS COLLEAGUES THOUGHT THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COULD GIVE BETTER LEGAL COVER FOR EXTENDED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ, BUT WERE WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF SEEKING SUCH A RESOLUTION AND ONLY GETTING ONE ON RESTRICTED TERMS. THEY CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 WOULD ENCOURAGE WAVERERS NOT TO OPPOSE A BROADLY-WORDED RESOLUTION, IF THAT COURSE WERE EVENTUALLY CHOSEN.
4. ON WAR CRIMES, WATTS DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (FOR WHICH PUNISHMENT PROCEDURES EXISTED) AND NUREMBERG-TYPE WAR CRIMES (FOR WHICH THEY DID NOT). HE SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE DANGERS IN RESOLUTION WORDING WHICH POINTED TOO CLEARLY TO A NUREMBERG-TYPE OUTCOME WITHOUT HAVING A MUCH CLEARER IDEA THAN AT PRESENT OF HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED. WILLIAMSON NOTED THAT THE NUREMBERG REFERENCE SERVED THE POLITICAL PURPOSE OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BACK DOWN. ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH MANY OF THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, THEY SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED A PROVISIONAL VIEW THAT THE RIGHT COURSE WOULD BE FOR A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL TO BE SET UP BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF THAT WERE DONE, THEY SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT OTHER MATTERS WOULD SOMEHOW FALL INTO PLACE. WILLIAMSON ASKED IF WE COULD KEEP HIM INFORMED OF ANY ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE

TO COLLECT EVIDENCE OF WAR CRIMES.

5. ON REPARATIONS, THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF THE INTENDED SCOPE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS NON-FINANCIAL PROPERTY (EG, SHIPS, BUILDINGS), OF PARA 19 OF THE MOST RECENT US DRAFT RESOLUTION. WILLIAMSON AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT SEE THIS AS ADDING VERY MUCH TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING RESOLUTIONS, BUT AS MAINLY CLARIFICATORY. THEY DID NOT SEE THE PROPOSED REQUIREMENT TO TAKE CONTROL OF IRAQI PROPERTY AS LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS PRACTICAL OR LEGAL PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNISED THAT IT MIGHT DO SO AT THE MARGINS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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8 November 1990

*[Handwritten mark]*

*Prime Minister*

*A useful paper*

Constraining Iraq's Nuclear, CBW and  
Missile Capability

*CBW  
F/A*

I enclose a paper, prepared in the FCO, about Iraq's nuclear, CBW and missile capability. The paper may need further work but the Foreign Secretary thought the Prime Minister would wish to see it before Mr Baker's visit tomorrow.

I am copying this letter and paper to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*[Handwritten signature]*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A



## CONSTRAINING IRAQ'S NUCLEAR, CBW AND MISSILE CAPABILITY

## INTRODUCTION

1. It is agreed that any lasting settlement of the Gulf crisis will have to include more effective ways of constraining Iraqi NBC and missile capabilities. Otherwise they will constitute a continuing threat to regional and international security. Much will depend on how the crisis is resolved: the military option may provide the opportunity to destroy Iraq's capabilities but this might in itself have only a temporary effect.

2. The existing constraints on Iraq are:

(a) her membership of the NPT and of the 1925 Geneva CW Protocol (note 1). She has signed but not ratified the 1972 BW Convention;

(b) existing restrictions by suppliers through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the MTCR, the Zangger Committee and SNET.

3. These constraints have proved inadequate - because of the subterfuges of the Iraqi procurement network, and the failure of some supplier countries to operate stringent controls.

4. Iraq has used CW in war. The main CW production and storage facility is at Samarra, 100 km from Baghdad. There are also three production facilities at Habbaniyah.

/5.

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Note 1: The 1925 Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war; but in common with many other countries, Iraq has reserved the right to retaliate in kind against other parties, and to use these weapons against non-parties

5. Iraq has not used BW in war, but is believed to possess them, though it is not certain that she has a delivery capability. One BW research and production facility has been identified at Salman Pak, but there may be others.

6. In the nuclear field, Iraq may not yet have violated the letter of her NPT obligations, but she has embarked on a clandestine programme aimed at acquiring a weapons capability. Most estimates suggest that she could not have nuclear weapons for at least five years, but it is possible that she would now be able to proceed without further outside help to the production at least of crude nuclear devices. The principal nuclear facility is the Baghdad nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha, which includes the Osirak reactor bombed by the Israelis in 1981. There is a suspect uranium recovery plant at Al Qaim, and a possible enrichment plant at Saad 4-6 South.

7. Iraq has successfully modified Soviet supplied missiles and is well on the way to establishing an indigenous missile production capability.

#### MILITARY ACTION

8. Military action could largely remove the existing production capabilities and main storage sites. It could thus eliminate much of the threat to Allied forces and reduce the regional threat from Iraq in the immediate post-war period. But:

(a) Military action would not necessarily be successful. Iraq has at least 12 manufacturing/assembly facilities around the country: the sites are well protected. In the case of BW, only one site is known but others may exist;

(b) Iraqi CW and missile forces are mobile and many have now been dispersed. A pre-emptive strike might thus provoke retaliation;

(c) Military action might kill large numbers of civilians (especially hostages) near the installations. There might be widespread and/or persistent environmental contamination. The CW plant at Samarra, with a total estimated stockpile of 10,000 tonnes, is only 100 km from Baghdad, and the wind might, following an attack, carry large quantities of CW that far. The BW plant at Salman Pak is near the tomb of the Muslim Saint Salman. An attack could release lethal concentrations of anthrax spore for up to 100 km, and make the area uninhabitable for a long period.

9. Such contamination is not inevitable. In practice CBW agents would probably be largely destroyed by fire following bombing. The nuclear facilities are comparatively small and there seems to be little serious risk of widespread contamination.

10. Even the complete destruction of all facilities would not remove the threat for good (just as Israel's bombing of the Osirak reactor in 1981 did not remove the nuclear threat permanently). The scientists and engineers would remain, and could rebuild an indigenous NBC capability in time.

#### AN IMPOSED SOLUTION

11. If Iraqi withdrawal is achieved peacefully, we will need to maximise pressure on her to accept the immediate dismantling of her weapons of mass destruction. Short of occupying her territory, we should have to rely on:

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(a) Iraq's need for international help to rebuild her economy. The solidarity of Western creditors would be crucial here;

(b) action in the UN Security Council. Continuation of the general embargo under SCR 661 will not be practicable much beyond Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, assuming that the full requirements of the Security Council have been met. We should have to seek a new Resolution. This would exploit international revulsion against Iraqi behaviour in Kuwait and (if appropriate) her use of CBW in hostilities. It would need to embargo the following:

- (i) all arms and munitions;
- (ii) all components and precursors which could contribute to an NBC facility;
- (iii) technical or other services which might assist development of such facilities; and
- (iv) the granting of credits to these ends.

(c) If such an embargo is unobtainable, the US and UK may need to block Iraqi oil exports unilaterally, until our post-crisis aims are realised. Much would depend on Saudi and Turkish support and on the attitude of other major players, especially Egypt, France and the Soviet Union. This strategy might not be sustainable for long if Iraq had left Kuwait peacefully.

#### A LONGER-TERM SOLUTION

12. Any long term solution should ideally include the following constraints:

- (a) dismantling of existing facilities or diversion to peaceful uses, with adequate verification;

(b) if Iraq wished to continue with a civil nuclear programme of any kind, a reaffirmation of Iraq's commitments under the NPT, combined with a rigorous inspection regime, going well beyond what the IAEA would normally require, including the permanent stationing of inspectors;

(c) renunciation by Iraq of CBW, ratification of the BW Convention, and access for inspectors on an "anytime, anywhere" basis;

(d) complete or partial renunciation of ballistic missiles, again with adequate inspection provisions;

(e) continuing or increased restrictions by supplier states on export to Iraq of items which might be of significance for NBC weapons or a missile programme.

13. Of these, restrictions by supplier states are the easiest to put in place, since they do not depend on Iraqi cooperation. However, it will be difficult over time to maintain support by all potential suppliers unless equally tight constraints are applied to the region as a whole. In any case, seeing what Iraq has already achieved, supplier restrictions alone will not constrain her forever.

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#### A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK

14. Regardless of whether Iraqi withdrawal is achieved peacefully or not, a comprehensive solution to the problem of constraining Iraq will be necessary, and will need to make full use of possible multilateral agreements. These might include the following, none of which would be quickly realised, and some of which are not to the liking of the UK:

(a) a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. Already notionally accepted by all Middle East states. But not

achievable as regards Israel in the foreseeable future, and probably not before a comprehensive solution to the Arab/Israel conflict;

(b) a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, an idea put forward by President Mubarak. (The UK has been unenthusiastic because of the linkage between nuclear and chemical weapons. Again, Israel would be the key);

(c) intensified efforts for a worldwide CW Convention (likely to be a US target for 1991 or 92);

(d) Iraqi ratification of the BW Convention.

#### CONCLUSION

15. In the interests of regional stability we need, following a settlement, to constrain Iraq's NBC capabilities. In the event of hostilities, military action might destroy the existing facilities (though there are problems), but by itself even this would not constrain Iraq indefinitely. In the immediate aftermath of hostilities, or of a peaceful withdrawal, we should seek to impose a regime specific to Iraq, and should maintain stringent supplier restrictions. In the longer term, we should aim at constraining Iraq within a wider Middle East or global framework.

#### IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

- Intensive studies should continue of the feasibility of eliminating Iraq's NBC and missile capabilities through military action, taking into account the likely extent of collateral damage, contamination and civilian casualties.

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- There should be further discreet discussion with the IAEA regarding the safeguarding of Iraq's nuclear facilities.
- More detailed studies should be undertaken of the likely inspection effort required, under UN auspices or otherwise, to verify a unilateral renunciation or partial renunciation by Iraq of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles.
- Work should be undertaken on the form of a Council Resolution, to be sought in the immediate aftermath of hostilities.
- There should be further discussion of these issues with the United States, in the WEU and with creditor and supplier countries, especially with a view to imposing necessary constraints on Iraq after the crisis.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
8 November 1990



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Prime Minister

PM/90/082

PRIME MINISTER

The sentiment is admirable.  
But it is very hard to  
avoid implying a linkage  
in practice, as the last sentence

THE PERMANENT FIVE AND ARAB/ISRAEL

of the Foreign Secretary, proposed

1. One of our principal concerns in handling the Gulf crisis is to keep the Arab/Israel card out of the hands of Saddam Hussein. His efforts to grab it, however spurious, have been successful to him in propaganda terms and damaging to us. This damage is compounded by the absence of any Arab/Israel peace process and untoward developments in the Occupied Territories.

statement shows. Perhaps it would be better to say: "will

2. There is wide agreement in the multinational coalition that Arab/Israel cannot sensibly be addressed until after Iraq has left Kuwait. There is also wide agreement that Saddam Hussein cannot be rewarded on this issue, but equally that it cannot be neglected. The need to capture the Arab/Israel issue for ourselves without creating a linkage with Kuwait has exercised us greatly. That is why we have been taking the line that the Arab/Israel dispute is unfinished business and that new efforts to resolve it will be required once Iraq has withdrawn.

resume their best efforts. Agree? OK B/Ki

3. President Bush made this point in his speech to the UN General Assembly at the beginning of October (and there were earlier echoes of it in his joint communique with President Gorbachev in Helsinki). You and I have been making the point with our various Arab and Israeli interlocutors. I think there would be advantage in the

but the fact of the

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London it to the present situation. However we have little hope of getting anywhere with Shamir





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Permanent Five stating rather formally that once Saddam Hussein is out of Kuwait they will address Arab/Israel. I plan to canvass this possibility as a personal idea with Secretary Baker on 9 November - although without committing you or the Government. The Americans have been resistant to date, but the Israeli performance over the Temple Mount shootings has come as a shock and they are more than ever conscious of the danger to the solidarity of the Gulf coalition posed by Arab/Israel. The activities of Primakov and others have unsettled the coalition. A declaration of this sort is calculated to settle nerves and give us back the diplomatic initiative.

4. The timing of any such declaration (which could alternatively take the form of a US/EC Declaration, though I think this would be less good) would be for consideration. My guess is that we might want it to issue around the same time as the next Resolution in the Security Council. This would have the advantage of fending off the 'peaceniks' in the Security Council who are trying to run with damaging draft Resolutions that do imply linkage between Kuwait and Palestine.

5. I enclose a draft of what I have in mind.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
8 November 1990

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Draft declaration of the Five to be made before the resolution of the Gulf crisis

"The Five Permanent members of the Security Council, have consulted about the Arab/Israel issue. They are concerned by the continuing inter-communal violence. They all agree that lasting stability in the region requires a solution of the Palestinian problem which meets the legitimate concerns and rights of all states in the region and of the Palestinians. They believe that a solution should be based on SCRs 242 and 338. They do not believe that a lasting solution can be imposed. It requires negotiation by the parties concerned, including, if they are agreed on it, the convening of an international conference at an appropriate moment. The Five do not believe it realistic to expect progress towards negotiations before the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. ~~But~~ when this is complete the Five will ~~direct~~ their best efforts towards promoting such negotiations".

50

ccp



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1990

Charles  
we can't  
fit any  
more in.  
can we  
leave the  
Foreign see  
to deal  
with him.  
AP 9/11

Dear Charles,

~~Amman~~  
He will not  
to see him  
if possible.  
an

Refugee Crisis in the Middle East:  
Call by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan is visiting London in the last four or five days of November. He would like to call on the Prime Minister. He is the UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Humanitarian Assistance relating to the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, in particular the problems of Third country nationals. He has been concerned with the evacuation of developing country nationals from Iraq and Kuwait, but now that a repatriation programme is well under-way he should be able to concentrate more on the plight of Western hostages. The Iraqis have refused him a visa so far.

The Foreign Secretary has already agreed to see Prince Sadruddin, so it is not essential that the Prime Minister should also do so. Nevertheless, a call would be an opportunity to underline our support for Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan and the UN Secretary-General's approach to the hostage issue.

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

dti

the department for Enterprise

*cell*

The Hon. Tim Sainsbury, MP  
Minister for Trade

Norman Lamont Esq MP  
Chief Secretary  
HM Treasury  
Parliament Street  
London  
SW1P 3AG

Department of  
Trade and Industry

Room 835  
1-19 Victoria Street  
London SW1H 0ET

Telephone 071-215 5144  
Fax 071-215 4294

Direct line 071-215 5144  
Our ref W010  
Your ref  
Date 8 November 1990

*CDP  
a/k*

*Dear Norman*

IRAQ: PREMIUM REFUNDS

Issue

I am writing to propose guidelines for handling applications for refunds of ECGD premium from exporters with contracts with Iraqi buyers which have been frustrated by UN Sanctions. To date, ECGD has received about 50 applications; potentially there could be 145 contracts affected.

Background

2. These contracts were being financed under ECGD-Guaranteed Lines of Credit. The result of contract frustration has been that the full amount of finance originally approved for the contract has not been drawn by the exporter. Exporters are arguing that because they have not received the full benefit for which they have paid premium, ie the finance approved for the contract, they are entitled to a premium refund in relation to the undrawn balance. Some have pressed for refunds pro-rata to undrawn finance.

3. The sums involved are substantial - an average 11% of the Contract Value - which in turn reflects the high risks which ECGD were taking on. The total undrawn balance on all contracts is about £155m. If we refunded premium pro-rata, we would be paying out £17m.



Recycled Paper

Norman Lamont Esq MP

November 1990

ECGD's Current Refund Policy

4. Once ECGD has committed itself to a risk, the exporter is not legally entitled to any refund. Refunds are, however, considered on an ex-gratia basis. The maximum refund normally permitted is 75% which is payable only if a contract is frustrated before any finance is drawn from the ECGD-Guaranteed loan. The 25% retention is to cover ECGD's commitment to take on the risk in the first place, and to cover administration costs. If the contract is frustrated after work has begun, a further element of the premium is retained to reflect the risks which have been run by ECGD in relation to completed work.

5. However, it is implicit in this policy that ECGD does not face a potential loss. In other words, refund questions have in the past tended to arise when the contract has been terminated amicably as a result of agreement between exporter and buyer. In the case of Iraq, however, ECGD will have to meet substantial claims under its guarantees to banks in respect of the finance which has already been drawn under its Iraqi credit facilities, with very poor recovery prospects. This would suggest a tighter stance on refunds. Against that, it is ECGD who is withdrawing from the arrangement with exporters which would make it very difficult to defend not making some refunds of premium in respect of finance which exporters will not be able to draw - notwithstanding ECGD's potential losses. In short, ECGD's current refund policy was not designed with Iraq in mind.

Proposals

6. I have asked ECGD to review their policy on premium refunds taking into account the Iraqi experience, and this will be pursued in due course with your officials. But we need to settle our Iraq policy now - we cannot wait for the review. My proposals are intended to strike a balance between ECGD, who face substantial potential losses on their Iraq commitments, and exporters who will also have lost money as a result of their contracts being frustrated. They also reflect our general intention not to pay compensation to exporters except through legitimate claims payments under ECGD's Guarantees. Accordingly, I would divide contracts into three categories:

Norman Lamont Esq MP

November 1990

- (1) Those where no drawings had been made on the loan. Here, ECGD has not assumed any risk on the contract in question. I would propose that we refund 85% of the premium paid. The 15% retention is designed to cover administration costs and ECGD's commitment to risk. A lower retention percentage than under current policy (25%) is justified because ECGD's premium rate on Iraq is twice the overall average for project business.
- (2) Contracts where loan drawings are less than the premium paid. On these contracts, I propose that we should refund 85% of the difference between the premium paid and the drawings made from the loan. Although, strictly speaking, ECGD would be within its rights not to make any refund because of the losses which it faces on the drawings already made, I think we need to temper this strict stance - the exporter could always offer to repay all of the loan monies which he had drawn, which would then put him broadly in the same category as the exporter who has drawn no money at all.
- (3) Contracts where loan drawings exceed premium paid. On these contracts, I would propose not to pay any refunds at all. Some exporters in this category, however, may be able to obtain some compensation if they have taken out ECGD's contract frustration cover. In principle, ECGD premium in respect of both guaranteed loan finance and the contract frustration cover itself could be considered to be a cost incurred in connection with the contract and thus be eligible for a claims payment. One of the strongest reasons for not paying ex-gratia refunds for exporters in this category is that this would be to compensate exporters who have not been sufficiently prudent to take out contract frustration cover. This, in turn, would weaken our general line on compensation as I have set out above.

7. The cost of this package would be about £9.7m. If we were to refund premium at a rate of 75% rather than 85%, this would reduce by £1.1m. Further, if we were to restrict

Norman Lamont Esq MP

November 1990


refunds only to contracts where no drawings had been made, this would save a further £4.6m. I would not, however, favour cutting back the package in this way because I believe it would be widely regarded as unfair, and difficult to defend on grounds of either logic or equity.

#### Conclusions

8. Although I believe this package to be a fair balance between the exporter and the taxpayer, I am afraid that many exporters will not see it that way, particularly if they have not taken out ECGD contract frustration insurance. A number of them are feeling very aggrieved about the losses which they face on contracts which have been frustrated by Sanctions, and you will know of the pressure upon Government to compensate companies who are suffering these problems. I do not see as a legitimate role for ECGD to try to compensate all exporters for the losses they have incurred as a result of Sanctions unless they are justified by the terms of the Guarantee and a balanced policy on ex-gratia refunds, but it makes it all the more important for our policy on refunds to be seen to be both fair and balanced to both taxpayer and exporter.

9. I would be grateful for your early agreement to my proposals. I am starting to receive quite a volume of correspondence from MPs and exporters, and I would like to settle our policy stance soon so that ECGD can start to refund money to exporters.

10. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.



TIM SAINSBURY

*CE/C*  
*(2)*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1990

*M*

*Prime Minister*

*Dear Charles,*

*A fairly lame reply:*

Iraq/Kuwait: BBC World Service

*a case of falsehood being half way round the world.*

You wrote to me on 29 October about the complaint made by Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia to the Prime Minister over the BBC Arabic Service's broadcasts to the Gulf. You will since have seen Riyadh telegram number 1107 reporting the Saudi King's concern at BBC World Service reporting on Saudi/Yemen relations.

Since the Gulf crisis began officials from Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have made a number of complaints about the BBC Arabic Service. Like Prince Bandar's remarks to the Prime Minister, they allege pro-Iraqi bias, particularly in the number of interviews with Iraqi and pro-Iraqi sources, lack of challenge to the Iraqi viewpoint and inadequate coverage of Gulf States and particularly Saudi positions. Most of the complaints have contained too little chapter and verse to identify specific items: the concern has been more about the overall tone, reinforced by Arabic Service use of a number of senior and long established Palestinian presenters.

*with truth in still looking for its shoes. Open 6/11.*

FCO Ministers and senior officials have brought these complaints to the attention of the BBC Chairman and the Managing Director of the World Service. The Secretary to the Cabinet has spoken to the Director-General.

The World Service have investigated the specific complaints which have been made and have arranged for an independent Arab academic (the Deputy Director of Farnham Castle) to monitor output. The Head of the Arabic Service has been through the complaints in detail with FCO officials; he has also visited Saudi Arabia twice and Egypt once since the crisis began to hear criticism at first hand. We have recently arranged for a senior member of the FCO Language Centre to monitor Arabic Service output.

The World Service have confirmed that they have taken measures to ensure that John Birt's "Producers' Guidelines on Impartiality" are fully observed by the Arabic Service. The World Service have repeatedly





3 reminded us of their editorial independence and concern to retain credibility with Arab audiences. We have drawn their attention to the FCO/BBC Agreed Objectives for the World Service which include: "a credible, unbiased, reliable, accurate, balanced and independent service of news ..... a balanced British view of developments and of world events taking into account British Government policy".

Our conclusion so far is that the Arabic Service:

- needs to reinforce its collection of news from Saudi Arabia through the appointment of a better or additional stringer;
- has probably given more prominence than was warranted to the Iraqi position, at least in the early days of the crisis;
- has had difficulty throughout the crisis in obtaining quick and authoritative comment from the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia (we have repeatedly urged the Saudi and Kuwaiti authorities to be more forthcoming);

We continue to make the first two points forcibly to the BBC at senior levels.

*Yours,  
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES AND SAUDI ARABIA/YEMEN

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS SAY KING UPSET ABOUT BBC REPORTING FROM SANAA, CLAIM MAJOR SAUDI STATEMENT OF 29 OCTOBER ON SAUDI-YEMENI RELATIONS IGNORED. THEY AGAIN CRITICISE LOCAL BBC ARABIC SERVICE STRINGER. TO SOME EXTENT SAUDIS HAVE THEMSELVES TO BLAME IF REPORTING IS ONE-SIDED, BUT ARABIC SERVICE DO NEED A BETTER LOCAL CORRESPONDENT.

DETAIL

2. DEPUTY INFORMATION MINISTER RANG DHM LAST NIGHT TO SAY THAT THE KING WAS UPSET AT BBC REPORTING FROM YEMEN. FARSI APPEARED TO BE REFERRING TO WORLD SERVICE REPORT, PRESUMABLY TRANSLATED AND ALSO CARRIED ON ARABIC SERVICE, EARLY ON 30 OCTOBER ON EXODUS OF YEMENIS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THERE WAS A FURTHER BUT SIMILAR REPORT, THIS TIME ON ECONOMIC ASPECTS, THIS MORNING ON THE WORLD SERVICE NEWS. FARSI SAID THAT BBC HAD RELAYED THE YEMENI POINT OF VIEW, BUT HAD PAID NO ATTENTION TO A MAJOR STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT ON 29 OCTOBER (THE SAUDI STATEMENT IN QUESTION RESPONDED TO RENEWED CRITICISM BY ALI ABDULLAH SALIH OF SAUDI ARABIA'S REQUEST FOR FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND PRAISE BY HIM FOR SADDAM. THE STATEMENT REJECTED CLAIMS BY ALI ABDULLAH SALIH THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD SOUGHT OVER THE YEARS TO UNDERMINE YEMENI STABILITY, AND POINTED TO SAUDI ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN. IT SAID THAT THOSE NOW LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA DID SO OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL, AND WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE ALL OF THEIR POSSESSIONS WITH THEM. IT DESCRIBED ALI ABDULLAH SALIH'S CLAIMS TO A LEADERSHIP ROLE WITHIN THE UN AND ARAB LEAGUE AS LAUGHABLE).

3. FARSI SAID THAT THE BBC'S LOCAL PALESTINIAN STRINGER SHOULD HAVE PICKED UP THE SAUDI STATEMENT. FULLER REFERENCE TO IT MIGHT HAVE INFUSED SOME BALANCE INTO THE BBC REPORT. HE RECALLED

INFORMATION MINISTER SHAIR'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH THE HEAD OF THE BBC ARABIC SERVICE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE BBC WOULD LOOK FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE LOCAL CORRESPONDENT HERE.

4. PLUMBLY SAID HE WOULD CONVEY COMPLAINT TO LONDON. THE BBC EXTERNAL SERVICE'S TASK WAS NOT MADE EASIER BY THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON ACCESS TO THE KINGDOM, OR THE DIFFICULTIES THEY ENCOUNTERED IN FINDING SOMEBODY TO PUT OVER THE SAUDI VIEW. HE PRESSED FOR EARLY ISSUE OF A VISA TO MASON OF THE WORLD SERVICE, WHO HAD BEEN KEPT WAITING FOR A LONG PERIOD. FARSI TOOK THE POINT AND UNDERTOOK TO HELP. ON THE LOCAL STRINGER, PLUMBLY SAID THAT 29/30 OCTOBER HAD BEEN BUSY DAYS FOR NEWS HERE, WITH THE GCC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND THE ARRIVAL OF PRIMAKOV. THE BBC WERE UNLIKELY TO ACT ON A NEW STRINGER BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL PRESSURE, BUT HE (PLUMBLY) THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIRING AN ADDITIONAL ONE.

## COMMENT

5. SAUDI/YEMENI RELATIONS SEEM TO HAVE HIT A NEW LOW, WITH RESUMPTION OF THE MEDIA WAR AT AN EVEN SHARPER LEVEL THAN BEFORE. BBC REPORTING FROM YEMEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS INEVITABLY SENSITIVE, FARSI'S CRITICISMS CAN BE FAIRLY EASILY REFUTED SEMI COLON SAUDI TARDINESS IN GRANTING A VISA FOR MASON IS PERHAPS SUFFICIENT RESPONSE. I DO NOT THINK WE NEED SAY MORE UNLESS THE SAUDIS RETURN TO THE CHARGE. NONETHELESS IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE BBC GET THEIR FACTS RIGHT (IT IS NOT OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SAUDI AUTHORITIES WISH TO REDUCE THE YEMENI POPULATION TO 'A HANDFUL' AS ONE OF THE BBC REPORTS IN QUESTION SUGGESTED).

6. FARSI'S CRITICISMS OF THE BBC ARABIC SERVICE LOCAL STRINGER HERE ARE NEARER THE MARK. THE STRINGER IN QUESTION, NIMR, IS HOPELESS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING HIM, OR ADDING A SECOND STRINGER HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN US AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (PLUMBLY'S TELELETTER OF 24 OCTOBER TO MUIR REFERS).

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VISIT OF SECRETARY BAKER TO TURKEY 

## SUMMARY

1. BAKER AND OZAL AGREE THERE CAN BE NO PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS AND STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. BAKER DECLARES US INTENT TO GO FOR A FURTHER UNSCR. HE TAKES FAVOURABLE LINE ON INCREASED US TEXTILE QUOTAS. CYPRUS AND CFE ALSO DISCUSSED.

## DETAIL

2. US SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER VISITED TURKEY ON 6/7 NOVEMBER. HE SAW PRESIDENT OZAL (FOR 2 HOURS), FOREIGN MINISTER ALPTEMOCIN (FOR 1 HOUR) AND PRIME MINISTER AKBULUT (FOR 30 MINUTES).
3. SPEAKING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW, BAKER SAID THAT HE AND TURKISH LEADERS HAD DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INSISTING THAT THERE COULD BE NO PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS. (A TURKISH GOVERNMENT SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT RECENT AND ONGOING VISITS BY FORMER PRIME MINISTERS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES ONLY GAVE A FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THE COALITION WAS IN DISARRAY). BAKER NOTED THAT WE WOULD ALL PREFER TO SEE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION, BUT IT WAS THE VIEW OF PRESIDENT BUSH THAT WE COULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. THE TURKISH PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT OZAL AND BAKER HAD BEEN IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS FULLY AND THERE IS SPECULATION THAT OZAL MAY BE TAKING A MESSAGE ON SANCTIONS TO IRAN, WHICH HE VISITS FROM 10 NOVEMBER.
4. WE HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON BAKER'S VISIT BY AUSTRIAN (US EMBASSY) AND OGUT (HEAD OF NORTH AMERICAN DEPT, MFA). FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS:

(A) GULF: OGUT, (WHO WAS PRESENT FOR THE MEETINGS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER, BUT ADMITTED TO BEING UNSIGHTED ON THE MEETING WITH OZAL) SAID THAT BAKER HAD TOLD THE TURKS OF THE AMERICANS' DESIRE FOR A FURTHER UNSCR, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS DETERMINED TO PURSUE EFFORTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. HE HAD ALREADY FLOATED THIS WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN CAIRO AND THE LATTER HAD INDICATED THAT PEKING WOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. BAKER HAD STRESSED THAT THE US PREFERENCE WAS STILL FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT SAID THAT THEY WERE 'GROWING MORE AND MORE PESSIMISTIC' AS TO WHETHER A CONCLUSIVE RESULT COULD BE OBTAINED BY THESE MEANS. HE HAD REITERATED THE US VIEW THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST BE FULLY IN LINE WITH PREVIOUS UNSCRS AND THAT SADDAM SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH ANY GAIN. THE TURKISH SIDE HAD AGREED THAT A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE, BUT HAD INDICATED THEIR VIEW THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO AND ACCOMPANYING POLITICAL PRESSURES REMAINED THE BEST WAY FORWARD. OGUT SAID THAT BAKER HAD NOT SPELT OUT THE PRECISE DETAILS OF A FURTHER UNSCR: BUT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IT WOULD NOT AIM TO SET UP A FORCE UNDER UN COMMAND, NOR THAT IT WOULD EVEN AUTHORISE THE USE OF FORCE. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE HAD BEEN NO TALK OF PASSING A MESSAGE TO IRAN ON SANCTIONS, NOR HAD BAKER EXPRESSED ANY DISSATISFACTION ABOUT IRANIAN ADHERENCE. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF US BASES IN TURKEY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.

AUSTRIAN (WHO BASED HIS BRIEFING ON AN ACCOUNT BY HIS AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS PRESENT FOR ALL MEETINGS) CONFIRMED THE GIST OF THE ABOVE. HE SAID THAT THE AIM OF THE PLANNED UNSCR WAS TO BRING ALL PREVIOUSLY AGREED SOLUTIONS UNDER ONE UMBRELLA: IT WOULD BE WORDED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SANCTION THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT SANCTIONS MUST BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO WORK, BUT THAT OTHER OPTIONS MUST NOT BE RULED OUT. THE TURKS HAD, HE CLAIMED, TACITLY AGREED THAT THE CURRENT BUILD UP OF FORCES IN THE GULF WAS NECESSARY TO SHOW SADDAM THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY OPTION.

(B) HELP FOR TURKEY: BOTH OGUT AND AUSTRIAN SAID THAT BAKER HAD STRESSED THAT THE US WAS DOING ITS UTMOST TO ACHIEVE HELP FOR THE FRONT LINE STATES. HE HAD INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD RESPOND FAVOURABLY TO THE TURKISH REQUEST FOR AN INCREASE IN TEXTILE QUOTAS. OGUT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION OF FREE SAUDI OIL. BUT BAKER HAD ASSURED PRIME MINISTER AKBULUT THAT THEY WERE PUTTING PRESSURE ON EVERYONE (ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS) TO DELIVER ON THEIR

## UNDERTAKINGS.

(C) CFE: ALPTEMOCIN HAD TRIED TO RAISE CFE, BUT BAKER HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY EXPERTS OWING TO LACK OF TIME. EXPERTS HAD DULY MET AND THE TURKS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS ON PARAMILITARY FORCES AND THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT. OGUT SAID THAT BAKER HAD PROMISED THAT THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN HE SAW SHEVARDNADZE.

(D) CYPRUS: DISCUSSION HAD BEEN VERY BRIEF. OGUT REPORTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD EXPLAINED THAT THEIR PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO KEEP THE PROCESS MOVING. LEDSKY'S EFFORTS WERE TO BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT AND WERE NOT INTENDED TO RUN COUNTER TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. THE TURKS HAD NOT COMMENTED IN DETAIL ON LEDSKY'S IDEAS BUT HAD CONFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE UNSG'S EFFORTS.

## COMMENT:

5. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE ON THE BASIS OF THESE RATHER SKETCHY ACCOUNTS WHETHER ANY IMPORTANT NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN. PROBABLY NOT. BUT THE ATMOSPHERICS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GOOD AND THE AMERICANS WERE IMPRESSED BY THE FACT THAT ALL THREE OF BAKER'S INTERLOCUTORS SPOKE WITH THE SAME VOICE. CLEARLY US/TURKEY RELATIONS ARE STILL IN A GOOD STATE OF REPAIR AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF ANY BACKSLIDING ON THE TURKISH PART.

DAUNT

YYYY

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FOLLOWING EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL,  
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

"Dear Brent,

We have been doing some work here, in a very restricted circle, on some guidelines for our military commanders in the Gulf. Apart from anything else it has proved a useful mind-clearing exercise. I am sending you on a strictly personal basis the note which we have drawn up, in case it is useful in the context of any similar work which you are doing. I believe Tom King is also sending a copy to Dick Cheney. But can I please emphasise the great sensitivity of the document: it has been seen by only a handful of people here.

I would be interested in any comments you may have on it, in due course, so that we can finalise our work ~~on it~~. In particular it would be interesting to know if your own guidance to US military commanders is broadly similar.

Warm regards,

Charles"

2. Following is text of UK paper.

[please transmit]  
A-B attached

8 November 1990



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THE INDEPENDENT

WEDNESDAY

7 NOVEMBER 1990

## The view from inside Kuwait

*From a British citizen in Kuwait*

Sir, I am a British citizen and a warden for the Embassy who has been living and working in Kuwait. My wife and son are still here, and we are still living in the same place. There has, however, been a marked deterioration in living conditions and the morale of those living here.

Our lives are spent in an endless attempt to avoid detection by the Iraqis. My family recently had a close escape when Iraqi civilians broke into the ground floor of our villa in an attempt to steal possessions belonging to our (absentee) Kuwaiti landlord. On this occasion, we were able to phone our Kuwaiti neighbours who came round and prevented the Iraqis from looting.

Food supplies are very low. Until recently we had been able to conserve stocks, as the Kuwaiti resistance were able to provide us with as much food as we consumed. This practice altered after food stores in Kuwait were looted by the Iraqi military. Some people have less than two weeks supply of provisions with little hope of getting more. It would be ironic for Westerners to have to turn themselves in to the Iraqis, in order not to starve, after spending months trying to avoid capture.

Our morale is extremely low and we are beginning to feel forgotten by all but our families and friends. However, this does not represent any victory for the Iraqi regime, whom we have learned to detest and whose downfall we would welcome. Even so, we are aware that as Westerners we are not treated as badly by the Iraqis as other nationalities.

The treatment of the Kuwaitis by the Iraqis is atrocious and breaks all international laws and conventions. Electrocuting, burnings, beatings and the use of chemicals are all part of the Iraqi interrogation techniques. Executions of Kuwaiti civilians occur every day. The Iraqis often take Kuwaitis back to their homes for execution, and before killing them fire shots in the air in order to attract the attention of people living nearby. In this manner, the Iraqis ensure that the executions are witnessed by friends and families of the victims.

The people that are killed are not criminals. By profession they are doctors, scientists, students, teachers, businessmen - an ordinary cross-section of the population distinguished only by their bravery in staying on in their country and refusing to accept its annexation by the Iraqis.

They are being killed in order to reduce the morale of other Kuwaitis who have remained and

who refuse to accept the Iraqi occupation of their country. The Kuwaitis that remain are in despair. Their country has been destroyed, their food supplies are inadequate; their children have no schools and their old people no medical facilities.

The outside world calls for a "peaceful" or "diplomatic" solution to the crisis. Everyone in Kuwait disagrees and believes a "military" solution is required. Peaceful and diplomatic efforts, to date, have resulted in hundreds of Kuwaitis being tortured and killed in some of the most horrible ways possible. Many others will be killed before this is resolved. Other nationalities, including British, are dying because of the lack of access to medical facilities and the stress brought on by the Iraqi occupation.

If the Iraqis do not withdraw voluntarily from Kuwait, military action will have to be taken eventually. The only tangible results of the peaceful and diplomatic efforts will have been the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of Kuwaitis and some non-Kuwaitis.

The outside world should realise that there is no way out of this crisis for the Iraqi regime and it is just playing for time. Every visit by every politician, diplomat or envoy, prolongs the agony of those of us under Iraqi occupation. How many more "final" diplomatic initiatives do there have to be before the rest of the world realises there is no pattern, logic or possible compromise in the Iraqi position? They are doomed.

If it were Westerners, rather than Kuwaitis, who were being tortured and executed, then almost certainly the allies would have taken military action by now. What sort of perverse logic can explain the massive EC outcry against the invasion of the French Ambassador's house by Iraqis, yet the complete and utter silence from the outside world that greeted the Amnesty report on Kuwait?

The blame for this crisis rests squarely on Saddam Hussein's regime, and nothing short of its total removal will bring about a satisfactory conclusion. However, the Western world has compounded this tragedy by its failure to act quickly and decisively. Every day that passes brings more deaths, more hardship and more suffering. It does not bring the Iraqi regime any nearer its end. That will have to be brought about by military action.

Yours faithfully,  
JOHN SMITH

Kuwait  
9 October

*The writer is using a pseudonym.*

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\* POTENTIAL SOVIET INFLUENCES ON IRAQI ARMY OPERATIONS \*  
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From: Chris Donnelly  
Special Adviser for Central  
and Eastern European Affairs

07 November 1990



Comment:

The Gulf crisis makes the attached paper by Colonel David Glantz, US Army, of particular relevance. Anyone interested in receiving a copy of some of the translations referred to by Colonel Glantz can obtain them from this office.

## POTENTIAL SOVIET INFLUENCES ON IRAQI ARMY OPERATIONS

Assessments of the Iraqi Army must address three questions: how is the army organized, how has it been trained to operate, and how will it actually operate in wartime.

The basic organization of Iraqi forces reflects both older Western European models from colonial times and newer influences of Soviet force structuring. Basic army organization accords with traditional European models used by Arab (and Israeli) forces throughout the Middle East, namely a corps, division, brigade, battalion structure. Soviet-type specialized units have been integrated into this structure (air assault, SCUD missile, etc). Foreign military officers attending Soviet military schools and academies receive instruction based on Soviet concepts applied to non-Soviet force structure models. As a consequence, a blending of approaches is sometimes evident in Soviet-trained foreign armies that have had other models to draw upon. As demonstrated by Egyptian and Syrian examples in earlier Middle Eastern wars, Soviet combat methods will be employed by these forces, although wide variations in approach and execution are likely as well.

Recent Iraqi combat methods are derived from Soviet experiences passed on by Soviet training manuals, regulations, and advisers. Known examples of Iraqi operations in the Iran-Iraq War in part seem to reflect that training base and combat methodology. Consequently Iraqi offensive or defensive operations will generally accord with Soviet concepts, in particular regarding techniques applicable to waging desert warfare.

Experiences of Soviet-trained and equipped armies in other Middle Eastern Wars (1973 for example) indicate that Arab nations will not always conform to the dictates of Soviet combat methodology, either due to existing local conditions, the unique experiences of the army involved, or sheer ineptitude. In 1973 Egyptian operations to cross the Suez Canal developed along Soviet lines. Thereafter, however, for political or other reasons, the Egyptians deviated from the Soviet model. More specifically, Soviet assessments of Egyptian plans and the initial execution of the Suez Canal crossing gave the Egyptians high marks in many areas (maskirovka, surprise, fire planning, engineer support, etc.). In regard to subsequent actions, however, a 1987 Soviet assessment indicated, "The indecisiveness and slowness of the Egyptian Command were combined with the laxity of the troops and staffs. The flanks, particularly of the armies, were poorly covered and reconnaissance was virtually idle" (VIZH, Oct 87).

Likewise, the Syrians in their attack on the Golan Heights ignored the advice of Soviet regulations and launched their armored brigades, unsupported by infantry and artillery, into the

teeth of Israeli defenses. More recently, Iraqi forces clearly employed Soviet tactics when reducing Iranian bridgeheads near Basra (employing carefully tailored shock groups supported by massive firepower to erode the bridgehead bit by bit). They did not, however, employ deep armored thrusts in their initial advance into Iran (per Soviet advice), although this was probably for good reason (see below).

The following is a short summary of Soviet principles for desert warfare -- principles to which Iraqi officers have been exposed and will, with variations, seek to translate into effective combat actions.

a. General:

(1) Desert combat is of a fragmented [ochagovyy], non-linear nature. Operations develop rapidly along multiple axes across a broad expanse of territory. Most combat assumes the nature of a meeting engagement. Prepared defenses of a linear, contiguous nature are easily penetrated and, hence, wasteful of precious resources. Both offensive and defensive formations are instead arrayed in depth and formed on the basis of population centers, water supply points, strong points, or tailored offensive shock groups and enveloping detachments.

(2) Adequate logistics and open lines of communications are essential for achieving success in desert operations. Water and fuel are strategic resources without which neither offensive nor defensive success can be achieved.

b. Strategic Operations:

(1) Strategic offensives seek to destroy major enemy force groupings and/or seize key political, economic, and military objectives whose possession will satisfy basic war aims of the state. Offensives must develop rapidly and achieve their objectives within a relatively short period (7-10 days). Strategic surprise is essential. Logistics is the chief limiting factor on the depth (range) and duration of operations.

(2) Offensives develop along several axes and involve extensive maneuvers (normally envelopment, deep cutting thrusts and outflanking movements). Attacking forces must achieve and maintain air superiority over their operating forces and supply lines throughout the duration of combat actions (which probably prevented deep Iraqi thrusts into Iran). Similarly, air defense coverage of advancing forces must be extensive. Creation and maintenance of a system of water supply points and fuel distribution to the final objective is essential.

(3) Strategic reconnaissance of enemy forces is critical to plan the advance route, launch attacks from the march, and

prepare to repel rapidly developing enemy counterstrokes. The size of the strategic shock force, in particular its armor and IFV strength, must be sufficient to absorb natural equipment attrition likely during the advance.

(4) Strategic defenses in desert regions cover principal population centers, economic objectives, water sources, and key communications routes and centers. Defenses are particularly strong around population centers, where all-round fortified positions are organized as anchors for the strategic defense. In open desert terrain defenses are strong point in nature and deeply echeloned. Strong points organized for all-round defense and small, tailored, mobile ambush units and subunits cover major enemy attack axes in an extended security zone. Subsequent defense lines, also organized in strong point configuration, deploy up to 50 kilometers to the rear. Small, mobile subunits, artillery fires and aviation strikes cover gaps between strong points, and stronger mobile tactical and operational reserves form in the tactical and operational depths to launch counterstrokes and counterattacks against penetrating enemy forces. Maximum effort is made to strike against enemy supply lines, in particular the fuel and water supply system.

c. Operational and Tactical Combat.

(1) Operational and tactical actions on the Soviet model are mobile and rapidly developing. Offensive forces advance along specific key axes of advance while paying particular attention to reconnaissance, air defense, and flank security. Force echelonment is shallow, but logistical support is deeply echeloned along the entire route of advance. Most movement is in pre-combat (column) formation. Force size and the amount of logistical and other support is tailored to secure objectives at specific depths within distinctly limited periods (3-5 days operational, 1-3 days tactical). Special attention is paid to water and fuel resupply, since consumption rates in the desert exceed those elsewhere (e.g., up to 2.5 times as much fuel as normal).

(2) Forces rely on extensive maneuver, long-range aviation and artillery strikes, and combat actions by tailored enveloping detachments and air assaults to strike key enemy forces and installations in the flanks and rear. Depths of force missions are greater than in normal combat because of the greater dispersal of enemy defenses and the necessity of avoiding undue strain on logistics. Reconnaissance is particularly important in open desert terrain to plan and conduct one's own attack, avoid costly engagement of enemy strong points, and protect against enemy counterattacks. Maintenance of tanks, all combat and support wheeled vehicles, and helicopters is difficult and critical.

(3) Among the many offensive considerations are the following:

- openness of terrain and deception [maskirovka] difficulties
- difficulties in land navigation and target designation
- poor terrain trafficability (sand dunes, wet or dry salt marshes and rocky desert)
- complexity of water resupply
- larger than normal contamination zones (if chemical or nuclear weapons have been employed)

(4) Operational and tactical defenses in desert regions are erected over a wider expanse than normal and are organized in deeply echeloned strong point fashion. Where population centers exist, defenses are erected in normal configuration, but with reserves deployed at a greater depth. Such defenses are all-round in nature: aviation strikes, long-range artillery, and specially detailed mobile forces cover secondary sectors between population centers. Reconnaissance and observation cover the intervals between defended positions.

(5) Water reconnaissance is organized to assist in water supply to all forces. Water and fuel supply and distribution points must be well protected, and water and fuel reserves are created in all subunits, units, and for individual vehicles and tanks. Rear service units and installations are located on main axes close to water sources.

SASO is translating more detailed operational and tactical information from Soviet sources concerning the following topics: general desert tactics; motorized rifle battalion desert tactics; artillery battalions in desert operations; reconnaissance under desert conditions; march and meeting engagements in the desert; engineer support of desert operations. This information will be provided under separate cover when translations have been completed.

DAVID M. GLANTZ  
COL, FA  
Acting Director, SASO





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November 1990

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Mr Primakov's mission

Mr Yevgeni Primakov, Mr Gorbachev's special emissary on the Gulf, whom the Prime Minister met on 20 October, undertook a second tour of the Middle East from 24-30 October. In addition to Iraq (where he spent two and a half hours with Saddam Hussain) he visited Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Apart from his talks with King Fahd in Riyadh, Primakov had a meeting with the Amir of Kuwait in Taif. We have received accounts of his discussions from the Saudis and Egyptians and direct from the Russians both in Moscow and London.

We now know that Primakov put to Saddam Hussain a proposal that envisaged the convening of an Arab summit to approve a six point plan to resolve the crisis. The elements of the proposal, which are intended to be more or less sequential, are as follows:

- (i) complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate government;
- (ii) subsequent withdrawal of multinational forces within an agreed timeframe;
- (iii) lifting of international sanctions;
- (iv) start of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait;
- (v) a public commitment by the permanent members of the Security Council to an early settlement of Middle East issues (ie Palestine);
- (vi) discussion of regional security arrangements.

These proposals are cleverly designed to appeal to weaker Arab - and Western - members of the coalition against Saddam. They include the main elements of the Security Council resolutions on the Gulf crisis (though there is no reference to hostages, compensation and war crimes) and could thus be said to meet the international community's stated objectives for a resolution of the crisis. But the proposals would still allow Saddam Hussain the possibility of gaining something from his aggression.

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The details of Soviet proposals are not yet widely known. Although Primakov claimed to have won the support of the Egyptians and Syrians in putting them forward, the Saudis and Egyptians have reacted strongly against them, pointing out that the divisions in the Arab world rule out a Summit. It is by no means clear that the Primakov plan would be acceptable to the Iraqis, who are continuing to consolidate their hold on Kuwait, although they have been quick to use his visit for wedge driving purposes. The French (whom Mr Gorbachev will have briefed in Paris on 29 October, and where he told the press that military action was unacceptable) may also see attractions in Primakov's ideas despite President Mitterrand's comments to the Prime Minister at their meeting on 27 October. If they became public we would have to argue that the Iraqis' actions since 2 August have turned the crisis into much more than a bilateral dispute: Saddam Hussain's behaviour has been such that he cannot be allowed to benefit in any way from his invasion of Kuwait and the international community cannot afford to let such a thing happen again. What is required before any package can be concocted is Iraqi withdrawal.

The Russians have told us that they believe that under pressure of circumstances Saddam Hussain is coming slowly to realise that Iraqi troops will have to leave Kuwait. But they do not think (nor do we) that he has given up trying to play for time. They have not given us a clear picture of how they believe we should go about exerting additional pressure on Saddam to withdraw. It seems likely that, as our Ambassador in Moscow has reported, the Russians are in a bind. They want to avoid a war with Iraq while maintaining the cohesion of the Permanent Five and demonstrating their support for the United Nations. They want to maintain a distinctive policy in the Middle East and do not want to see Saddam's downfall. They also have to worry about their own Muslim minorities; and it is clear that there would be considerable opposition from ordinary Russians to Soviet involvement in a war in the Gulf. But if forced to choose Mr Gorbachev is likely to come down in favour of preserving Soviet relations with the West. The tenor of all Soviet reporting to us has been reassuring about their intentions. Primakov told our Ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet Union had no intention of breaking ranks with the United States over the crisis. Primakov asked that this message should be conveyed personally to the Prime Minister and assured Sir Rodric Braithwaite that the Russians were not ruling out military action as a last resort.

*Yours,*  
*Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

JK November 1990

*Dear Charles,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

*map*

The Defence Secretary has seen Stephen Wall's letter of 5th November about the draft position on Iraq/Kuwait. He was generally content with the amendments proposed, except for two points.

Mr King accepted the comment on paragraph 7(h) but thought that the revised wording went too far. It would mean that military commanders - who are required to interpret their orders strictly - would have to allocate sufficient troops to deal with what might be several thousands of hostages and refugees. This could significantly impair their ability to conduct military operations which would be intended to regain control of Kuwait (so that we could then help the hostages and refugees). The Defence Secretary would prefer the wording on the lines of:

"Although the first priority is to ensure the success of military operations, planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist hostages (and other refugees)".

The Defence Secretary agrees that paragraph 9 could be omitted from the paper (although he may include these points in his covering letter to Mr Cheney). He would prefer paragraph 8 on co-ordination with Allies to remain since it includes important messages about trying to get military value from the French and Arab forces (difficult as that might be).

I am enclosing a clean copy of the paper reflecting these changes.

A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Tom Raftery*  
*Jim Webb*  
(S WEBB)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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IRAQ/KUWAITUK POSITION PAPERSTRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Our strategic objectives are as follows:
  - a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
  - b. To secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq.
  - c. To secure the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait.
  - d. To bring to account those responsible for atrocities, by committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
  - e. To eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical and long range missile capability.
  - f. To establish a long term regional security structure that involves minimum Western participation.

- g. To avoid any Israeli involvement in the crisis.

It would not be a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); we should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

2. The strategy currently selected to achieve the most immediate of these objectives is to secure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of non-compliance.

#### MILITARY OBJECTIVES

3. If Iraq fails to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions within a reasonable timeframe, the military option will come into play. In that event our military objectives are seen as:

- a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait;
- b. To rescue or secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq;
- c. To destroy Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capability/potential and her long range missile capability;

4. No avoidable constraints should be placed on the conduct of military operations, if the duration of hostilities and associated casualties are to be minimised. Nevertheless, the means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be justifiable within the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Moreover the impact of military operations on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion will need to be kept in mind.

5. Air operations against targets in Iraq will be an essential element in military operations but we should avoid a 'scorched earth' policy.

6. Land operations in Iraq should be limited to those necessary to liberate Kuwait or to rescue hostages. There should be no intention to occupy any part of Iraqi territory.

#### GUIDANCE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

7. Tactical military planning to meet these objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Planning should conform to the following criteria

- a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

- b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;
- c. targets for attack may include facilities which provide direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait (e.g. military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems, Government command centres);
- d. civil targets which have no military connections (e.g. desalination plants) should not be attacked;
- e. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible; e.g. by selecting the appropriate method of attack or giving prior warning;
- f. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;
- g. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations. Where possible these concerns should be met by alternative methods of attack.

h. Although the first priority is to ensure the success of military operations, planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist hostages (and other refugees).

i. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.


#### CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIES

8. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations. Co-operation with them and with the Saudis is fundamental and the role and tasks of UK forces in relation to both of them will need to be determined and agreed at political level. It will be important for the French and other principal Arab forces to be involved in any operation and to be brought into co-ordination and planning. The requirement for "joint decision" will entail consultation at the highest level with the Saudis.

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**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PLem 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3086</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSTIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

1. We continue to concentrate on clear exposition of a limited number of themes, in particular focussing attention on events in Kuwait. Key objectives remain:

- to highlight the brutality and illegality of the Iraqi occupation;
- to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein faces a powerful, united and effective military force against which he cannot win;
- to emphasise international agreement on Security Council Resolutions;
- to highlight the evidence of sanctions beginning to bite;
- to counter views that a compromise solution is attainable or desirable;
- to counter attempts to portray the alliance against Iraq as weakening.

2. Briefing Material

In the week beginning 29 October we circulated:

- a) a new edition of the FCO briefing notes;
- b) a background note on the international force;

Next week we shall issue a background note on diplomatic activity which has taken place to try to resolve the crisis, designed to show that the international community remains solid.

A note on the western hostages is in preparation to counter Iraqi claims that they are well treated and remind our target audiences that the holding of hostages contravenes international law, the Security Council resolutions and Arab traditions of hospitality.

3. Written Press

Briefings, where possible by Ministers, for Arab and Islamic journalists in London and the supply of material to the press in target countries remain priorities.

4. Television

Television interviews with Ministers, designed to project our main themes to Arab and other Islamic audiences, remain a priority. Feedback has shown that such interviews will be most effective with target Arab and Muslim audiences if they lay stress on atrocities in Kuwait and on the illegality of Iraqi action.

A short film about Free Kuwait Day (organised by the Campaign for Free Kuwait on 2 November) will be included in the November edition of the FCO magazine programme UK Today, which is seen in 90 countries.

5. Radio

Iraqi attempts to jam the BBC Arabic Service and Voice of America ceased at the beginning of October and have not been resumed. The FCO Emergency Unit continues to give briefings to the BBC Arabic Service. We have again emphasised to the BBC the need to reinforce their newsgathering in Saudi Arabia. The Embassy in Riyadh are pressing the Saudi authorities to issue a visa to the BBC Cairo correspondent.

6. Assessment of Usage

Our video material has been shown extensively on television in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. Items have been shown in Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Uganda, Australia, Germany, Japan, Mexico and Spain. Material has also been distributed through foreign television correspondents in London and international television news agencies such as Visnews. It is impossible to assess precisely how widely this has been shown but interest by television stations suggests that the material has reached many audiences. Media and political contacts in many countries, especially Turkey, India, Pakistan and Egypt, have confirmed that they have found our cassettes a valuable source of information.

7. Radio Qatar and Radio Monte Carlo, both of which broadcast in Arabic to Iraq and Kuwait, have broadcast the radio material we have supplied. We shall now increase the supply of items, particularly translations of Ministers' statements.

8. An article by the Foreign Secretary was widely reproduced in the written press in Arab and other Islamic countries. Other written material has been widely welcomed for background use by media and political contacts in our target countries.

9. We are reminding British correspondents in Iraq of the need regularly to draw attention in their reports to Iraqi reporting restrictions. We are continuing to supply material on conditions in Kuwait to the British media.

10. A meeting at official level with MOD and others on 1 November reviewed information themes and the means of putting them over internationally. The meeting noted that major government statements reached wide overseas audiences. It agreed that pressure must be maintained on the Saudis to give better access to the international media and to step up their positive information to other Islamic countries; and that there is scope for more liaison with the Americans on propaganda themes and objectives; the FCO will report back to the group on a meeting with US officials to be held on 12 November.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
5 November 1990

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
4. What happens if sanctions do not work
5. Reference papers

Annex: United Nations Security Council Resolutions

(Revision)

2 November 1990

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 1. KEY POINTS

- "Our aim remains the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate government; and the release of hostages in Kuwait and Iraq. The peaceful means to these ends are also well known: isolation, economic sanctions, and the certainty that the option of armed intervention exists and can be used." (Foreign Secretary, Chatham House, 31 October.)
- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
- Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
- If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
- "We are clear about the legal justification [for military option]. The amount of pillage, suffering and killing going on in Kuwait is really a very substantial justification.  
  
"But no decision has been taken by the US or anybody else because everybody is very anxious to let the peaceful pressures do their work if they are going to." (Foreign Secretary's interview with Daily Telegraph, 11 November).
- Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
- Iraqi efforts to split coalition against it unsuccessful. President Gorbachev, during visit to Paris (28/29 October), while calling for new diplomatic efforts to find peaceful solution to crisis said "We cannot allow and should never give grounds for Iraq, the regime of Saddam Hussein, to be able to think or hope that there will ever be any disharmony or weakening of decisions". Both he and President Mitterand emphasised commitment to ending of crisis according to terms of UNSCRs.
- Armoury of international pressures in place: they are formidable, and will grow to become even more comprehensive.
- Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force made up of contingents from some 30 countries. They will leave when asked to do so.
- Iraq flouts international law by not allowing all foreign nationals to leave Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Where hostages have been released, this has clearly been a great relief for their families. But there should be no hostages. SCR 674 again expressed demand of international community that Iraq should cease this practice.

- Gallup poll (18 October) in five EC countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) showed most people supported US stance in Gulf. 85% of Britons supported use of military force to free Kuwait or to free hostages, against average for five countries of 70-75%. The latest Newsweek poll in the US shows 61% approval rate for Administration's handling of situation.
- Shootings in Jerusalem on 8 October refocussed world attention on Arab/Israel. But, contrary to Iraqi claims, no linkage between solutions on Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel.
- International consensus on Iraq/Kuwait unshaken by events in Jerusalem.
- PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.
- Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 8 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.
- A solution must be found to Arab/Israel. SCR 672 demonstrates international resolve to tackle Arab/Israel problem; reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously 24 October).
- "The policy of the British government is clear ... that is, self-determination for the Palestinian people and the right of Israel to live in peace behind secure borders" (Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, 24 October).

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

## ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that its annexation of Kuwait is null and void.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state
- "I remind the Iraqis once again that at all levels of authority, military or civilian, they are personally responsible under the Geneva Convention for illegal acts committed as occupiers of Kuwait" (Foreign Secretary speaking in House of Commons, 24 October).
- SCR 674 (adopted 13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining, 29 October) reaffirms international condemnation of Iraqi actions and reminds Iraq that it is liable under international law for loss, damage and injury arising from illegal occupation of Kuwait.

## SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.

## IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRs (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, 674)

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Meeting GCC Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, 28/29 October, reiterated condemnation of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait as breach of international and Islamic law, and expressed full support for UNSCRs.



- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for the sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion.
- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.
- Statement by Heads of State and government of six Asian Muslim States (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives and Pakistan) issued on 16 October in Dhaka, called upon President Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait in compliance with relevant SCRs.
- EC meeting in Rome, 27/28 October, denounced Iraq's unscrupulous use of hostages, agreed to discourage any further national or private missions to Baghdad, and said efforts to divide Community would be in vain.
- 84th Conference of Interparliamentary Union (in Uruguay) endorsed universal condemnation of Iraqi action and supported UNSC Resolutions.
- ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) has condemned Iraq's looting of Kuwait International Airport since the invasion, and has demanded return of foreign aircraft seized in Kuwait. Resolution endorsed by IATA (International Air Transport Association) at Annual General meeting in Geneva on 29 October. IATA also called for release of passengers and crew of foreign aircraft.

#### EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 100 billion).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Acceptance of Iraqi offer of oil at \$21 per barrel would infringe SCR 661.

#### FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs". Iraqi statements speak of women and children suffering for want of supplies. But contradicted by

- Reports from Iraq which indicate that while some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at bakeries) Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock. Markets being stocked from pillaged Kuwait.
- Iraqi Government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Many have left, but 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility. SCR 674 underlines Iraqi obligations to third country nationals as well as to Kuwaitis.
- Iraq has rejected offers from both the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.

#### WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them - over 1,000 kms.

#### PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it"

(Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).

- UN SCR 672 demonstrated international condemnation of excessive force by Israeli police, and authorised Secretary General to send mission to Israel to investigate incident and developments in occupied territories.
- Reinforced by SCR 673 (adopted unanimously), deploring Israeli government's decision not to accept the Secretary General's mission and asking them to reconsider. Resolution repeats request for report.
- "I hope the government of Israel may yet agree to accept the UN Secretary General's mission to investigate those killings. To do otherwise will risk diverting the Security Council from its main task - getting Iraq out of Kuwait - and will give Saddam Hussein a cause which he will exploit ruthlessly" (Foreign Secretary's statement in House of Commons, 24 October).
- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam assumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international conference based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)

#### MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September, and expressed strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government. Agreed Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. Conference called on governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.

- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers, plucking out of beard of religious leader before his murder.
- Abdulaziz Ibu Adullah Al-Sheikh, member of Saudi Committee of Senior Islamic Scholars, has asked "Those who justify Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, will they accept annexation of their countries by other forces?"
- Dr Omer Saleh Al-Samahi, President of the Federation of Islamic Societies in New Zealand, voiced support of muslims in New Zealand for measures taken by Saudi Arabia, which came within the framework of the teaching of Koran: the Kingdom has legal and Islamic right to seek help from friendly and brotherly nations.

#### THE FUTURE

- "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, as it must, and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.
- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and representatives of opposition groups in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait with the prospect of a more representative system of government.

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 3. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew, with regime of terror under Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Majid. Collapse of public order.
- Systematic looting of what remains of public and private property continues unchecked. Systematic nature indicates deliberate plan to dismantle infrastructure of state of Kuwait, and to impose rapid demographic change. (Senior Iraqi official reported (26 October) as saying: "the situation in Kuwait is now being corrected and is getting back to normal. This false state is returning to being a normal city.")
- Basic foodstuffs in short supply. Long queues for bread, no eggs, no fresh fruit, very little meat; all at exorbitant prices.
- No work, no schools, restrictions on cash withdrawals by Kuwaitis (of their debased currency), shortage of medicines, make leaving an attractive alternative to difficult survival in Kuwait.
- Iraq has encouraged the emigration of young, elderly and female Kuwaitis. Their homes and positions have reportedly been given to Iraqis and Palestinians. Of 700,000 Kuwaitis in the Emirate at the time of the August invasion, only 300,000 are thought to be left.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (\$1.6 bn in gold and foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Iraq busily appropriating Kuwaiti assets. According to Iraqi government Kuwait Airlines "no longer exists", and all its assets have gone to Iraqi Airways.
- A new pipeline has been installed between Kuwait and Basra, and it is reported that oil from Kuwait is being pumped along it. Otherwise Kuwait crude production down to 10% of normal; refineries have been shut and many installations mined.
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence plates, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein erected around the city. Most schools have closed and commercial activity has virtually ceased.
- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by

sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.

- Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was unique in post-World War II history. Not only had Iraq overrun a sovereign independent member state of the UN and attempted to annex it by force, it had also tried to erase the name and existence of Kuwait from the world political map and destroy its political, economic and social structures. "Rape, destruction, terror and torture were the Iraqi rule of the day in Kuwait".
- But Iraqi News Agency reported that Saddam Hussein, on 3 October, walked about in the streets of Kuwait city "familiarising himself with its landmarks which were resplendent, reflecting pride in the city's return to the homeland".
- Reports of atrocities committed by Iraqi forces in Kuwait multiply.
- Amnesty testified to US Congressional Human Rights caucus (10 October). After summarising organisation's concerns about Iraq's human rights record prior to invasion, gave further account of repression in Kuwait. People being tortured by Iraqi military and intelligence personnel said to include Iraqi Shia muslims with suspected links with opposition group al-Dawa Al Islamiyya (membership of this group is capital offence in Iraq). Many individual cases of torture, abuse, summary execution cited. Victims include boys as young as 13. Reported group executions including shooting at peaceful protest group of about 35 women and young people in early August.
- Testimony by Kuwaiti refugees to House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (24 October) reinforces this evidence (eg doctors forced to take blood from small children for transfusions for Iraqi soldiers).
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty, which can also follow failure to declare possession of a fax or photocopier.
- All Arabs and foreigners in Kuwait who fail to report to the Residence Department by 5 November will be liable to legal proceedings and residence permission will be terminated.
- 15,000 Kuwaitis rounded up by Iraqis and imprisoned in Iraq.
- Iraq has rejected offers both by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, continue to be helpful.

- SCR 674 (29 October) condemns actions of Iraqi authorities to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third State nationals, in violation of the Geneva Convention and International Law. It invites states to collect substantiated information on grave breaches of 4th Geneva Convention and make them available to Council.
- Resolution also invites states to collect information regarding claims for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq.
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united the Sabhh family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and the opposition in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait.
- "We will rebuild Kuwait on the firm foundation of our national unity and the legitimate system of government which we have chosen and are content to be ruled by, strenghtening consultation and democracy and popular particiaption in the light of our 1962 Constitution" (Conference Final Statement).

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 4. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- Hope to achieve objective peacefully, but use of force cannot be ruled out. "We are not precluded by reason of the SCR from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law - I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- Poll shows Britons favour use of force. Latest Gallup poll published on 18 October repeats that public support for UK (and US) policy in the Gulf unwavering after 2½ months. 86% of Britons said they would back force to free Kuwait and liberate the hostages if sanctions failed.
- "We are tightening the screw of peaceful pressures but we cannot shirk our part in the alternative course if that course finally becomes necessary" (Foreign Secretary's statement in House of Commons, 24 October).
- Bush-Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power 'to suppress acts of aggression'. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "Can anyone seriously believe that if Iraq wins this contest with the international community, it will be easier to eliminate chemical weapons or biological weapons or nuclear weapons in the region? Of course not" (Mr James Baker to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 October).
- "The greatest prospect for peace lies in this paradox ... the certainty which we have to create in his [Saddam Hussein's] mind that, if he does not go in peace he will be removed by force." (Foreign Secretary speaking at Canning House, October 30.)



## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

### 5. REFERENCE PAPERS

#### Verbatims

- VS 42/90 Prime Minister's speech to House of Commons, 6 September
- VS 43/90 Foreign Secretary's speech to House of Commons, 7 September
- VS 48/90 Passage in Foreign Secretary's speech to UNGA, New York, 26 September
- VS 50/90 "Palestine: the other Middle East problem": speech by Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October
- VS 54/90 Statement by Foreign Secretary in House of Commons, 24 October
- VS 56/90 Foreign Secretary's speech at Canning House, 30 October
- VS 57/90 Foreign Secretary's speech at Chatham House, 31 October

#### Guidance

- No 47/90  
50/90  
52/90  
61/90

#### Retracts

Extensive daily coverage of Ministerial statements, spokesman etc. Following are some recent key pieces:

- "Options available": transcript of Foreign Secretary's discussion with Arab journalists, New York, 27 September
- Transcript of interviews given by Foreign Secretary in New York to BBC Radio and IRN, 2 October
- Extracts from debate on Middle East in House of Commons, 24 October
- Evidence of Foreign Affairs Select Committee

#### Survey of Current Affairs

August 1990, p.277: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

#### The Gulf Crisis: Briefing Notes

- Saddam Hussein's record
- International reactions to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Kuwait: consequences of the Iraqi invasion
- Iraqi claims to Kuwait
- The Rape of Kuwait

#### Video Material

- Kuwait refugees
- Inside Kuwait
- Kuwait: the atrocities
- Kuwait: destruction of a society

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## ANNEX UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- The UN Security Council has adopted eight mandatory resolutions concerning the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. Of the 15 Security Council members only Yemen and Cuba abstained on SCR 661 and 665. Resolution 660 was adopted by 14 votes with none against or abstaining (Yemen was absent). SCR 662, 664 and 667 were adopted unanimously. Cuba was the only SC member to vote against SCR 670 and Cuba and Yemen both voted against SCR 666.

Resolution 660 (1990) - adopted 2 August

- condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" all its forces to their positions on 1 August 1990.

Resolution 661 (1990) - adopted 6 August

- called for (1) the import of "all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait" and (2) the sale or supply to Iraq or Kuwait of any commodities or products except "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs" to be strictly prevented by all States, including non-members of the United Nations.
- established a committee of the Security Council to examine reports by the Secretary General on the implementation of the Resolution and to seek information on action taken by States to implement it.
- nothing in the Resolution should prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait whose assets should be protected.

Resolution 662 (1990) - adopted 9 August

- decided that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was null and void.
- called upon all States to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.

Resolution 664 (1990) - adopted 19 August

- recalled the obligations of Iraq under international law in regard to third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq permitted the immediate departure of such nationals from Kuwait and Iraq, granted immediate and continuing consular access and took no action to jeopardise their safety, security or health.

- demanded that Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.

Resolution 665 (1990) - adopted 25 August

- called upon those states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and deploying maritime forces to the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council" to halt inward and outward shipping to verify cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the provisions in Resolution 661.

Resolution 666 (1990) - adopted 13 September

- expected Iraq to comply with its obligations under SCR 664 (1990) in respect of third state nationals.
- requested the Secretary General to seek urgently information on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, with particular attention to eg children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly.
- requested the Secretary General, in the event of a decision to supply foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait in humanitarian circumstances, the use his good offices to facilitate their delivery and distribution.

Resolution 667 (1990) - adopted 16 September

- condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and Baghdad, including access to their nationals and the protection of their personal interests.
- decided to consult urgently in order to take further concrete measures under Chapter 7 of the Charter.

Resolution 670 (1990) - adopted 25 September

- orders nations to close airspace and landing strips to planes flying to and from Iraq and Kuwait unless they submit to cargo inspection - exceptions will only be made for food supplies in humanitarian circumstances and medical flights subject to UN authorisation.
- calls on all states to detain any Iraqi-registered ships which enter their ports in violation of sanctions.
- reminds governments of their obligations to freeze Iraqi assets and protect those of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

Resolution 674 (1990) - adopted 29 October

- condemned Iraqi mistreatment of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, and the taking of hostages.

- reminded Iraq of its obligations under, eg the 4th Geneva Convention.
- demanded that Iraq facilitate the work of diplomatic and Consular missions in Kuwait and Iraq and allow third country nationals (including diplomatic and Consular personnel) to leave if they wish.
- reminded Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States as a result of its illegal occupation.
- invited states to collect relevant substantiated information about Iraqi breaches of international law, including 4th Geneva Convention.
- invited states to collect relevant information regarding claims for restitution or compensation from Iraq.



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You should be aware.

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FCS/90/199

CHIEF SECRETARY

Chemical Warfare Equipment for Civilians in the Gulf

1. FCO and Ministry of Defence officials have agreed a paper for OD(G) on the question of providing chemical warfare equipment to civilians in the Gulf. I enclose a copy (Treasury officials earlier said, and commented on, a final draft). On present plans OD(G) are likely to discuss this on 8 November.
2. Paragraphs 11-13 of the paper, together with Annex E, highlight the public expenditure implications of this issue, and the question of whether civilians in the Gulf should be charged for protective equipment supplied by HMG. MOD and FCO officials have recommended that the cost (ranging up to a maximum of £2 million or so, subject to decisions on recoveries, on which the paper sets out the options) should be met from the Reserve.
3. Since the Treasury is not represented on OD(G), you will no doubt want to consider the implications of this. It would be helpful to have your views before the meeting on 8 November if possible.

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4. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, other members of OD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*DH*

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 November 1990

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GULF CRISIS: ADVICE AND PROTECTION FOR CIVILIANS AT RISK FROM  
CHEMICAL WARFARE

Introduction

1. This paper is a response to the request by OD(G) on 18 October for consideration of pre-positioning equipment to protect British civilians in the Gulf against chemical warfare (CW). It has been prepared jointly by the FCO and MOD. Conclusions and recommendations are at para 18.

The Threat

2. JIC(90)(IA)69 assessed the threat from CW to civilians in the Gulf. While it is more likely that civilians could become casualties of conventional weapons than CW, it is possible in the latter case to improve substantially the chances of civilians surviving an attack by the distribution of protective equipment, in conjunction with training and advice on precautionary measures. The JIC assessment is that without such equipment and advice, there could be extensive civilian casualties in those places where military targets are located close to population centres. It is also possible that Iraq could attack population centres by choice.

Protective Measures

3. The main threat to civilians is assessed to be from vapour hazards rather than contact hazards (details at Annex A). For most agents, protection from CW vapour hazards can be achieved by the use of a respirator. Protection from a contact hazard requires using a full NBC suit (boots, jacket and hood, gloves) in addition to the respirator. The issue of full NBC equipment to civilians would not offer significant practical advantages over issue of respirators because:

- there is a distinctly lower risk to civilians from contact hazards; respirators are therefore appropriate to the level of threat;
- NBC equipment requires an extended period of training to be used effectively, as suits must be donned very quickly.

Furthermore, suits would be both more difficult to fit, are much more expensive than respirators (para 7) and the practical and administrative difficulties of supplying fitting and training many thousands of civilians at short notice would be unmanageable in current circumstances.

4. The Saudi Government has announced its intention to distribute respirators only; Israel is currently doing so. The US so far has announced no plans to provide protective equipment for civilians (para 16). Among EC members, France and Denmark have no plans at present to provide any kit; Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Italy have plans to provide kit (unspecified); Ireland has acquired suits but has not prepositioned; and Germany has prepositioned suits for its 250 citizens in the Eastern Province. We believe that the provision of respirators is the most practicable means of providing protection against CW agents for the British communities as a whole. For those at special risk, for example, those working on airfields or, perhaps, oil fields, Embassies should encourage employers to provide full NBC protection; a number have already done so. The protection given by respirators would be enhanced by provision of a leaflet setting out advice to civilians on the lines of Annex B. The FCO have consulted posts (Riyadh, Bahrain and Doha) who take the view that there would be no presentational problems if the UK were to distribute respirators only rather than full NBC equipment.



British Communities at Risk

5. JIC(90)(IA)69 suggested that Bahrain, Qatar, and the Eastern and Central Provinces of Saudi Arabia could be at risk from Iraqi CW. Consultations with posts over the past week show that there are currently some 23,000 British nationals in these areas, including some 3,000 children. Of this total, posts estimate that perhaps 14,000 adults and over six hundred children would remain after issue of Phase II advice to the effect that non-essential staff and dependants should leave. Full figures are at Annex C. The Embassy in Tel Aviv have commented that while the British community in Israel might also be regarded as at risk, the Israeli authorities have already made available respirators to both Israeli and foreign nationals.

6. We must also consider what provision should be made for non-British nationals for whom the UK has consular responsibility: Annex D shows that these number some 2,200 and might number some 1,660 after Phase II advice. Our initial view is that HMG should provide CW protection for these citizens and agreement should be sought for costs to be recovered from the governments concerned if they are issued.

Cost and Availability of Equipment

7. The MOD has sufficient stock available to equip 26,000 people with full NBC kit, including respirator, or with respirator only. There is a limited supply of small sizes but it is not yet clear whether this will be a problem. The equipment, which is to military specifications, would need to be replaced: the cost to MOD is around £150 per full kit, or around £47.50 per respirator. Neither full kits nor respirators are available from stock for children or babies, although MOD would be prepared to consider acting as the procurement agency if it were decided to purchase supplies. On the basis of an initial survey, it is estimated that

children's respirators would take up to a month to supply and would cost in the region of £50 each. MOD stocks would have the advantage that they would be supplied on a sale or return basis.

#### Transport

8. The military transport fleet is already fully stretched moving high priority military stores. Civil charter has been necessary for some non-Gulf tasks. Civil charter would be one possibility for the movement of respirators, but if Ministers wished prepositioning to be done discreetly, military aircraft would be preferable. Initial estimates are that transport to the Gulf of those respirators already available could be achieved in about 7 days if Ministers deemed the task to have sufficiently high priority to use military aircraft.

#### Timing and Scale of Provision

9. The timing and scale of provision are closely inter-related. Ideally, we would issue 'Phase II' advice to dependants and inessential staff to leave and would follow this by distributing respirators to the much smaller number who remained. Unfortunately, we cannot be certain that we will be able to issue clear 'Phase II' advice in sufficient time for this sequential procedure. Host governments may be resistant to our issuing such advice. There may be political and strategic difficulties about such a move. Furthermore, we cannot be sure how effective such advice would be unless it was pegged to some clear deterioration in the situation. Nor can we rule out the possibility of a surprise attack by the Iraqis. We believe, therefore, that we should preposition a sufficient number of respirators to cope with most of the existing British community rather than risk a situation in which there might be insufficient available.

10. While there is a case for distributing the equipment straightaway, we recommend that this be the subject of a separate decision. It will be important to ensure that sufficient supplies are available for adults before distribution begins. Supplies for children will inevitably take longer. (The Embassies in Riyadh, Bahrain and Qatar take the view that some children, eg of dual nationals, are likely to stay whatever warnings are issued.) The decision would be better taken in the light of the political and military situation at that time (including the views of host countries and allies). We therefore propose to commence prepositioning as soon as possible and report back to Ministers in, say two weeks. It is relevant that the Israelis are so far the only country to have distributed, as opposed to prepositioned, protective equipment.

#### Cost and Funding

11. Most British civilians in Saudi Arabia could easily afford the price of a respirator, or indeed a full NBC suit. It could be argued, however, that HMG could be criticised if they sought to charge civilians for CW protection kit which could make the difference between life and death. Certainly it would be difficult to withhold respirators from those who could not or would not pay. There could also be a conflict between the practicalities of collecting money for respirators and the need to distribute equipment at extremely short notice. The Israelis have provided respirators free of charge. We understand that the FRG intends to provide full NBC equipment free; but that the Saudis intend to charge individuals and that some EC countries intend to charge companies for respirators.

12. The MOD will require reimbursement for the cost of providing respirators. If Ministers decide to charge the full recovery price for respirators, including the cost of transport (details at Annex E), civilians would have to pay about £85 per adult (figures for

children and babies are not yet available). Total costs of prepositioning, which might range from £840,000 for 10,000 respirators suitable for adults to £2.1 million for 25,000, would be a charge to the FCO, which has no funds available in the current financial year and would have to seek to recover as much as possible from users. Prepositioning of respirators for children and babies (for which prices are not yet available), and local distribution, would add to these costs. Experience of the Gulf crisis to date has, however, shown recovery of costs of this kind to be very difficult. A number of companies have already themselves made arrangements to provide their employees with CW protection and we might advise others that the cost should properly be borne by them. The position of those working for local companies or with no employer (notably dependants) may impose limitations on this approach but it is proposed that our initial line is that we should arrange protection but ask employers who benefit to pay where they can.

13. Whether or not recipients are charged, it will be necessary to decide how to allocate prepositioning costs which could be in excess of £2.1 million; and the cost of local distribution, if and when this is agreed. It is recommended that the cost be charged to the FCO vote and met by a transfer from the Reserve in the current year.

#### Marking of Military Equipment for Civilians

14. To prevent civilians being mistaken for combatants, and for security reasons in case equipment subsequently falls into hostile hands (eg those of terrorists), Ministerial guidelines for the sale of NBC equipment to civilians require that it be clearly distinguishable. During the present crisis, this has been achieved by the painting of "UN Blue" spots on military respirators and the inclusion of blue flashes on military suits sold to civilians, including UK nationals and FCO core staff. Unless Ministers were prepared to waive this security requirement, any kit supplied by HMG

would need to be so marked.

15. Marking in the UK prior to despatch would ensure the job was done properly. It would, however, involve time-consuming unpacking and repacking. Marking in theatre would, if it were to be properly controlled, present a significant problem for limited Embassy staff. It would, however, mean that kit could be prepositioned and, if not issued or damaged, returned to MOD stocks. We recommend that, if respirators have to be distributed in an emergency, no marking should be required; but that if issue takes place over a period, all equipment should be so marked.

#### US Views

16. The US have 20,000 civilians in Saudi Arabia (including some 15,000 in Central and Eastern Provinces) and a further 1,200 in Bahrain and Qatar. At present, they say that they are not contemplating the distribution of CW protection equipment, taking the view that only full NBC kit will offer 100% protection, and that provision is impractical because of the need for training, the numbers involved and the risk of creating panic. The American position need not determine our own: the decision of the Saudis, Germans and others to preposition equipment provides cover for ourselves to do likewise, and the Americans are quite capable of changing their minds at short notice (and, with their far greater resources, they are able to provide equipment extremely quickly). We should, nevertheless, inform the US of any decision to preposition and advise them before we distribute.

#### Press Line

17. If the news that we are prepositioning respirators should leak, we would propose to take the following line (as suggested by the Embassy in Riyadh):

"Importation is a precautionary measure. Respirators will be

held against the possibility of a deterioration in the situation. If such deterioration occurred, we would evacuate non-essential persons and dependents. The respirators would be for those who need to stay."

We would explain the reasons for issuing respirators only on the lines of paras 3 and 4 above.

#### Conclusions and Recommendations

18. Ministers are invited to agree:

- a. that we should distribute respirators but not NBC suits to UK civilians (para 4);
- b. that MOD and FCO should now set in train at once the prepositioning of sufficient respirators for all British citizens, including children, currently in risk areas and that MOD respirators should be supplied on a sale or return basis (paras 7 and 10);
- c. that respirators be transported by military aircraft (para 8);
- d. that respirators should also be made available to other citizens for whom the UK has consular responsibility, and the costs should be reclaimed from the governments concerned (para 6 );
- e. that distribution to civilians should not begin without further Ministerial authorisation, except in case of emergency (para 10);
- f. that costs of respirators be met by local employers or, to the extent that they will not take on this responsibility, from the Reserve;

- g. that kit prepared for civilians should not be marked before despatch to risk areas but should be marked on distribution unless they are issued in an emergency (para 15);
- h. that we inform the US and host governments immediately of our decision to preposition and that we advise them before distribution. EC partners should also be kept informed of our decisions.
- i. the press line at para 17.

ANNEX A: THE CW HAZARD TO CIVILIANS

The CW agents available to the Iraqis include persistent and non-persistent agents. The former represent a contact hazard, perhaps lasting some hours after an attack (depending on the agent used, the temperature and wind speed). The effects of CW agents will be more persistent at night. During the day, agents will evaporate more quickly and this will reduce the time for which there is a hazard. For this reason, it is likely that an attack will occur at night when most civilians will be indoors and unlikely to become contaminated with droplets of liquid agent. Even in the daytime, most civilians would be expected to have received warning and be under cover during the period of an attack. The main threat to civilians is therefore assessed to be from chemical agent vapours from non-persistent agents or evaporating from persistent agents.



ANNEX B: ADVICE TO CIVILIANS USING RESPIRATORS

1. Civilians would need respirators to be fitted (four sizes are available) and briefing on how they are to be worn. MOD advise that it would be possible to produce a leaflet covering the essentials. The effectiveness of protective measures can be much enhanced by provision of general advice to civilians on the following lines:

- don protective kit on warning of an attack and continue to wear after an attack for period, as advised;
- stay at home or under cover during periods when it is advised a chemical attack may take place, and assume [since CW detection devices are not suitable for use by untrained civilians] that any bomb, shell or missile attack could involve chemical warheads;
- close windows and doors;
- seal cracks;
- turn off extractor fans and externally vented air conditioners;
- do not eat or drink unless from containers unsealed immediately prior to consumption;
- turn on the BBC World Service and stay inside until further notice. Civilians would have no precise way of knowing when a contaminated area was again safe, but could be given guidance on the maximum duration of the likely agents within broad ambient temperature bands.

Such advice could also be broadcast on the BBC World Service.

ANNEX C: BRITISH CIVILIANS IN RISK AREAS

BEFORE PHASE II ADVICE

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Babies</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bahrain	1,750	1,800	1,050	125	4,725
Qatar	1,350	900	580	40	2,870
Eastern P.	6,500	800	650	50	8,000
Central P.	4,000	2,000	1,000	100	7,100
<u>Total</u>	13,600	5,500	3,280	315	22,695

AFTER PHASE II ADVICE

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Babies</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bahrain	1,550	1,300	550	25	3,425
Qatar	1,150	350	100	10	1,610
Eastern P.	4,500 <sup>1</sup>	400	200	20	5,120 <sup>1</sup>
Central P.	3,000	1,000	300	50	4,350
<u>Total</u>	10,200 <sup>1</sup>	3,050	1,150	105	14,505 <sup>1</sup>

Notes

1 Includes 3,500 British Aerospace and Aramco personnel whose companies are making their own arrangements for CW protection, and for whom further assistance from HMG is not needed.

2 Figures comprise registered British nationals and estimates of British visitors and non-registered British nationals. Figures for children and babies are very approximate.

ANNEX D: OTHER CIVILIANS FOR WHOM HMG HAS CONSULAR  
RESPONSIBILITY

BEFORE PHASE II ADVICE

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Babies</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bahrain	523	435	204	-	1,162
Qatar	215	140	35	10	400
Eastern P.	- <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-	-
Central P.	521	48	-	-	569
<u>Total</u>	1,259	623	239	10	2,131

AFTER PHASE II ADVICE

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Babies</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bahrain	475	200	50	-	725
Qatar	175	80	20	5	280
Eastern P.	- <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-	-
Central P.	400	30	-	-	430
<u>Total</u>	1,050	310	70	5	1,435

Notes

- 1 Separate figures not available for Eastern Province.
- 2 Figures for Bahrain comprise some 75% EC nationals, for whom provision may be made by other EC governments.

ANNEX E; COST OF PROVIDING RESPIRATORS TO BRITISH CITIZENS IN  
THE GULF

Residual Population	Cost of Masks (£) <sup>1</sup>	Distribution Costs (£) <sup>2</sup>	Total Cost (£) <sup>3</sup>
10,000	475,000 (420,000)	364,400 (168,500)	839,400 (588,500)
20,000	950,000 (840,000)	728,000 (337,000)	1,678,000 (1,177,000)
25,000	1,187,500 (1,050,000)	911,000 (421,250)	2,098,500 (1,471,250)

Notes

1 First figures assume full price of £47.50 per respirator. Bracketed figures assume MOD "no loss" price of £42.00.

2 First figures assume transport to the Gulf by Mark 1 Hercules at full price. Bracketed figure assumes "no loss" charge rate.

3 Table makes no allowance for local distribution or marking costs, or for provision of respirators to children or babies.

CONFIDENTIAL file

ech

c/foreign/wall



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 November 1990

THE GULF: SOVIET VIEWS

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Gorbachev which I received this morning, about the situation in the Gulf. It is a reply to a message which the Prime Minister sent to Mr. Gorbachev while he was in Madrid. The Soviet Ambassador is coming in to see her this evening to discuss it. I should be grateful for advice in due course on whether it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a further reply.

You will see that the message ends by saying that Mr. Gorbachev hopes to meet the Prime Minister in "the nearest future". Obviously the sooner we hear anything about dates the better. No doubt Sir Rodric Braithwaite is keeping in close touch with President Gorbachev's office.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1990

SOVIET VIEWS ON THE GULF

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me this afternoon to talk about Mr. Gorbachev's message to the Prime Minister on the Gulf, a copy of which I sent you earlier today. He did not seem to me to have much new to say, but was at pains to stress that the Soviet Union was not trying to reduce the pressure on Saddam Hussain and accepted it might become necessary to use force. He drew attention in particular to the paragraph towards the end of the message in which Gorbachev reiterates that there is no linkage between the crisis in the Gulf and other conflicts in the Region. He asked how I thought the Prime Minister would react to the idea in the message for a "more energetic use of the Arab factor". I said I did not think this was particularly helpful. The whole affair had passed out of the Arab orbit and was now firmly seized by the UN Security Council. It would be too easy for Saddam Hussain to dominate and divide the Arabs on their own. The main reason why the Americans and others had gone into Saudi Arabia was to defend the country and the Gulf States against an over-mighty Iraq. This point apart, I thought the Prime Minister would find the message fairly reassuring. I thought she would reply, but only after she had seen Secretary Baker on Friday.

The Soviet Ambassador drew attention to the last paragraph about an early meeting between the Prime Minister and Gorbachev. He knew that Gorbachev was giving personal consideration to this, but was much criticised for travelling too much abroad. He hoped to have a specific proposition to put to us soon.

At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador referred briefly to the forthcoming visit of President Landsbergis and asked whether the Embassy could have a debriefing after the event. I said I would see what could be arranged.

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

19(A-B)

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet tomorrow to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf. We had to cancel last Monday's meeting. The main points to cover are set out below.

DIPLOMATIC

Activity at the United Nations

You mentioned to President Bush the idea of a presentation to the Security Council on Iraqi brutality in Kuwait. He was enthusiastic. We should now be pursuing this vigorously.

The new development is an attempt by the Non-Aligned to table an unsatisfactory Resolution on the prospects for a peaceful solution and on post-withdrawal arrangements. We are trying to get this pushed away into the future.

The Security Council is likely to return to the Palestinian question this week.

Hostages

A number of hostage missions are in progress or about to start: Herr Brandt, the former Danish Prime Minister, the former New Zealand Prime Minister and the Belgian Red Cross. But we managed to scotch attempts to get EC or UN backing for Brandt's mission.

Meeting with King Hussein

You might give a quick account of your meeting with King Hussein. His main pre-occupation was with the economic and political situation in Jordan, which he painted in very gloomy terms. He did not attempt to sell you any particular peace initiative. His subsequent speech to the World Climate Conference was rather disgraceful.

Message from Mr Gorbachev

You will see in your box that Mr Gorbachev has sent you a message in reply to your's about the situation in the Gulf. It is a reasonably robust statement of the Soviet position and to that extent reassuring.

SECRET

Secretary Baker's Visit

Secretary Baker's visits seem to have been quite successful so far. He is reported to have agreed command and control arrangements with the Saudis. There are also suggestions that the Chinese Foreign Minister told him that China would not block a UN Resolution authorising force against Iraq. Secretary Baker will be seeing you on Friday.

Sanctions

Evidence of malfeasance still abounds. There are now intelligence reports that substantial numbers of trucks are still crossing from Jordan to Iraq through the desert.

Embassies in Kuwait

The President clearly remains deeply preoccupied about the US Embassy in Kuwait, and said that Secretary Baker would wish to discuss this with you.

Meanwhile, officials have prepared a paper (in the folder) about the position of the British and American Embassies. They recommend we should question that the Americans reprovise their Embassy: should avoid a joint withdrawal: and should review the position of our own Embassy in mid-November.

MILITARY

US Forces

The President confirmed to you today that the US would be sending additional forces to the Gulf. He did not demur when you said we must be ready to initiate military action by early January at latest. You offered help with transport for US forces: and said that we would see what reserves we could make available in Germany, to be moved to the Gulf if necessary.

[NOT ALL THOSE PRESENT WILL BE AWARE OF THE FULL DETAILS OF YOUR TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND MY TALK WITH SCOWCROFT]



C.D.P.  
Charles Powell

7 November 1990

c: Ministers (MJ)



A further paper has now been added to the agenda on Advice & Protection for Civilians at Risk from Chemical Warfare (in folder). The recommendation is that 26000 respirators should be pre-positioned for British citizens at risk in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia & certain Gulf countries, but not issued without further Ministerial authorization. It is not thought necessary to provide full CW protective clothing, since the main danger to civilians is from vapour not contact. The Saudis & Israelis are similarly providing respirators only.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PRem 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3086</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Crabock to Powell 6/11/90          and attachment</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	 <i>12/12/16</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

SUBJECT cc matter

Unofficial translation

2

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher  
Prime-Minister of Great Britain  
London

*Prime Minister*

PRIME MINISTER'S

*Message from President*

6 November 1990

PERSONAL MESSAGE

*Gorbachev*

*C. D. 7/ki*

SERIAL No. T.245.190

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I have studied carefully the letter you sent me concerning your views on the Kuwaiti crisis. This crisis, of course, was the subject of special concern during the meetings in the capitals of Spain and France.

I also write to you taking into account the trip to the Middle East of my special envoy Mr. Eugeni Primakov.

From the very outset it should be said that there can be no doubt whatsoever in the firmness and consistency of our policy of the Iraqi aggression. In Baghdad and in other capitals, both our confidential and public, position has been in strict accordance with the Security Council resolutions. I have stated publicly and I am prepared to repeat to you the following: the aggression should be reversed, and the aggressor himself cannot count on a reward. The Security Council resolutions should be implemented.

At the Paris press-conference I emphasised: "We cannot accept, should not give any ground for Iraq, President Hussein's regime, to aspire and hope for any split among those, who oppose the aggression". There should be not a single crack, not a single chink. And it has to be said, my talks with President Mitterand have shown that our French partners are also firm in their support for the strict implementation of the sanctions collectively adopted within the UN framework.

Another vital element of our collective policy confirmed by the Security Council consists of a specific commitment to a political solution, since a new war in the Middle East would have catastrophic consequences. For the sake of a peaceful settlement, let us, if necessary, increase the political, demonstrably military, economic and moral pressure on the aggressor.

Mr. E. Primakov shared with you his impressions of his first trip to Baghdad. Recently, he saw Saddam Hussein again and, as a result, formed impression that, under the sanctions' pressure, the Iraqi's, it seems, are beginning to wonder just how far the matters had gone. In a straight forward and forceful manner we described to the Iraqi leadership the actual situation which they had brought onto themselves. We bluntly told to S. Hussein that a military strike could be inevitable if the Iraqi troops did not withdraw from Kuwait. So far Iraq has not introduced any significant changes to its position yet, however, certain shifts in it are visibly emerging. I am quite confident in the following: as long as there remains one chance in a thousand to avoid a bloody conflagrations in the Persian Gulf, contacts with S. Hussain should be sustained. The moment the guns start to talk will mean not only the death of thousands and thousands of people - it will also place under a threat emerging new world order. This option - weather we like it or not- would become though a horrible, but still "rewarding" a prize at the expence of the rest of humankind. We believe that such an outcome of the Kuwait-crisis, in so far as the interests of the international community are concerned, is unacceptable. It was precisely the term - "unacceptable" - that was used in Paris. Unfortunately, the British media interpreted this term "inadmissible", "out of the question". The Russian meaning of this term is "highly undersirable".

At my press-conference in Paris I specifically stressed the need for a more energetic use of the Arab factor. For, as yet the Arabs have played the role of spectators, shifting the burden of responsibility for the settlement of the crisis onto the Security Council and primarily its permanent members. The Arab leaders should as well be involved in the international efforts. Let them ponder and make their own suggestions. It seems to me, that it might be less difficult for S. Hussain to retreat provided that the provisions of the Security Council resolutions, without one single concession of substance, could also be presented as some kind of an Arab and Islamic initiative.

There is in our diplomatic efforts (as in yours, naturally) another priority i.e. the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the President of the USSR, I simply must do everything possible to prevent casualties. After meeting my representative, S.Hussain is aware of the significance of the problem. I do not harbour any follow hopes but the agreement of the Iraqi leadership to a phased departure of Soviet specialist as well as the softening of Baghdad's attitude regarding the hostages from some other countries allows me to hope that certain realism is gaining ground in Baghdad. The tactics of the international community manifesting its rejection of hostage taking, is bringing about certain results. We should not allow pressure on this issue to deminish.

While resolving an immediate task of repulsing Hussein in his illegitimate claims on Kuwait there is apparently, a need to consider the future of the region as a whole. Such tasks as curbing the arms race in the Middle East, introducing the confidence-building measures and establishing the regional security measures are becoming ever more topical. All that, I repeat, merits a serious discussion and dialogue.

I do, however, share the opinion that at the moment, it is not appropriate - due to tactical considerations - to put an emphasis on a linkage between the crisis in the Persian Gulf and other conflicts in this region.

These are the considerations which I would like to put forward in regards your letter.

I hope to meet you in the nearest future. We shall have an opportunity to discuss this problem, - among others, - in more detail. 11

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

Внимательно ознакомился с Вашим письмом, в котором Вы излагаете соображения в связи с кувейтским кризисом. Он, разумеется, был предметом особого внимания в ходе встреч в столицах Испании и Франции.

Пишу Вам с учетом также поездки моего специального представителя Е.М.Примакова по странам Ближнего Востока.

Следует сказать с самого начала — не должно быть ни малейшего сомнения в последовательности и твердости нашей линии в отношении противодействия иракской агрессии. В Багдаде и других столицах, конфиденциально и открыто, мы выступаем строго с позиций резолюций Совета Безопасности. Я говорил публично, повторю и Вам: агрессия должна быть повернута вспять, а сам агрессор не может рассчитывать на вознаграждение. Решения Совета Безопасности должны быть выполнены.

На пресс-конференции в Париже я подчеркнул: "Мы не можем допустить, не должны дать никакого повода Ираку, режиму президента С.Хусейна думать и надеяться на какой-то разлад между теми, кто противостоит агрессии". Здесь не должно быть ни единого разлома, ни одной щелочки. И, надо сказать, разговор с президентом Миттераном показал, что наши французские партнеры также твердо стоят за строгое выполнение санкций, коллективно выработанных и принятых в рамках ООН.

Другой важнейший элемент нашей коллективной линии, одобренной Советом Безопасности, состоит в приверженности именно политическому решению, ибо новая война на Ближнем Востоке имела бы ужасные последствия. И ради мирного урегулирования будем, если понадобится, наращивать политический, военно-демонстрационный, экономический и моральный нажим на агрессора.

Е.М.Примаков делился с Вами по итогам своей первой поездки в Багдад. Недавно он вновь встречался с С.Хусейном, и у него создалось впечатление, что под давлением санкций в Багдаде вроде бы начали задумываться, куда зашло дело. Мы откровенно и

жестко раскрыли перед иракскими руководителями реальную ситуацию, в которую они поставили себя своими поступками. Хусейну было прямо сказано, что может оказаться неизбежным военный удар, если иракские войска не будут выведены из Кувейта. Пока Ирак не внес сколько-нибудь значимых коррективов в свою позицию, но определенные подвижки в ней тем не менее явно вызревают. Убежден: если существует хотя бы один шанс из тысячи предотвратить кровавую вспышку в Персидском заливе, контакты с Хусейном прерывать не стоит. Если заговорят пушки, то это будет означать не только гибель тысяч и тысяч людей - под ударом окажутся и начавшие набирать темп процессы становления нового мирового порядка. И этот вариант - вне зависимости от нашей на то воли - стал бы пусть страшным, но "вознаграждением" агрессору за счет всего остального человечества. В наших глазах такой исход кувейтского кризиса с точки зрения интересов международного сообщества неприемлем. Именно это слово - "неприемлем" - я употребил в Париже, к сожалению, британские газеты его трактовали как "недопустим", "исключен" и т.п. Русское значение этого термина - "крайне нежелателен".

На пресс-конференции в Париже я особо остановился на необходимости более энергичного задействования арабского фактора. Ведь пока арабы выступают больше в роли зрителей, перекладывая ответственность за решение кризиса на Совет Безопасности, и в первую очередь его постоянных членов. Надо и арабских лидеров подключать к международным усилиям, пусть они думают и дают свои предложения. Наверное, С.Хусейну было бы легче отступить, если бы положения резолюций Совета Безопасности - без единого отступления по существу были бы также поданы и как какая-то арабо-мусульманская инициатива.

Есть в наших мирных дипломатических усилиях (так же, впрочем, как и в Ваших) и другой приоритетный момент - жизнь наших граждан, находящихся в Ираке. Как президент СССР я просто обязан сделать все, чтобы среди них не было жертв. После встреч с моим представителем Хусейн знает, что значит для нас эта проблема. Не хочу обольщаться, на согласие иракского руководства на постепенный отъезд советских специалистов, смягчение позиции

Багдада в отношении заложников из некоторых других стран вселяют надежду, что некоторое чувство реализма все же пробивает себе дорогу в Багдаде. Демонстрируемое мировым сообществом неприятие варварской тактики захвата заложников приносит определенные результаты. Нажим и по этому направлению ослаблять нельзя.

Решая непосредственную задачу отпора Хусейну в его незаконных притязаниях на Кувейт, видимо, есть необходимость подумать и о будущем этого региона в целом. Такие цели, как обуздание гонки вооружений на Ближнем Востоке, введение мер доверия, создание структур региональной безопасности, становятся как никогда актуальными. Все это, повторяю, заслуживает серьезного соразмышления и диалога.

При этом я разделяю ту точку зрения, что сейчас по тактическим соображениям нецелесообразно делать акцент на взаимосвязи кризиса в Персидском заливе с другими конфликтными ситуациями этого региона.

Таковы те соображения, которые я хотел изложить в связи с Вашим письмом.

Надеюсь на встречу с Вами в ближайшее время, у нас будет возможность обсудить также и эту проблему более подробно.

С уважением,

М.Горбачев

г. Лондон

6 ноября 1990 года



PRIME MINISTER

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MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a meeting of Ministers tomorrow afternoon to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf. The main points to cover are set out below.

DIPLOMATIC

Activity at the UN

You mentioned to President Bush the idea of a presentation to the Security Council on Iraqi brutalities in Kuwait. He was enthusiastic. We should now pursue this vigorously.

The Americans for their part clearly envisage further resolutions in the course of their Presidency of the Security Council, probably of a portmanteau type.

The Security Council is likely to return to the Palestinian question this week.

Hostages

The latest Iraqi statements about releasing foreign hostages in return for guarantees from certain countries that Iraq would not be attacked, are not very specific.

Sanctions

You visited the Embargo Surveillance Unit On Thursday.

A JIC assessment shows Iraq has enough oil to keep its military machine going for some months.

Meeting with King Hussein

You are seeing King Hussein in Geneva on Tuesday. The recommendation is that you should go easy on him this time, in view of improved Jordanian performance on sanctions. You will want to say that we are urging other countries to disburse aid for Jordan quickly.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME

TO DESKBY 060230Z FCO

TELNO 945

OF 060100Z NOVEMBER 90

INFO DESKBY 060230Z UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE POSTS, ANKARA, TOKYO, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, ACTOR

ADVANCE COPY

SPECIAL EPC MINISTERIAL: HOSTAGE POLICY

## SUMMARY

1. GERMAN ATTEMPT TO SWING A PROPOSAL ON THE TWELVE TO APPROACH IRAQ THROUGH ALGERIA, TUNISIA, AND JORDAN TO RELEASE HOSTAGES. BLOCKED BY UK, WITH SCANT SUPPORT. PRESIDENCY CONCLUDES THAT ACTION WITH THE UN SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY. PRESIDENCY DEMARCHE AT UN TO TAKE PLACE ON 6 NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED BY MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND FURTHER MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION ON 12 NOVEMBER.

## DETAIL

2. DE MICHELIS SAID HE HAD CONVENED THE MEETING AT DUTCH, BELGIAN AND GERMAN REQUEST. BUT HE HIMSELF ALSO THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS TO IRAQ IN THE LAST FEW DAYS: JOERGENSEN, THE FORMER DANISH P.M., BRANDT, DE CLERQ WITH A BELGIAN RED CROSS DELEGATION, THREE IRISH PARLIAMENTARIANS, NAKASONE, THE FORMER JAPANESE P.M. AND A GROUP OF ITALIAN GREEN PARTY MPS. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE TWELVE EXCHANGED OPINIONS PRIOR TO THE REGULAR FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON HOW TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND TO PRESS FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES.

3. VAN DEN BROEK RECALLED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ROME EUROPEAN COUNCIL: NO GOVERNMENT MISSIONS AND PRIVATE MISSIONS TO BE DISCOURAGED. SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO WEDGE-DRIVE. EVERYONE WANTED THEIR HOSTAGES RELEASED: BUT SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS PUT PRESSURE ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE NATIONAL INITIATIVES. HE HIMSELF HAD TO MEET THE FAMILIES OF HOSTAGES TOO. DELEGATIONS LED BY PROMINENT POLITICIANS HAD CERTAINLY BEEN IN THE MINDS OF THOSE DRAFTING THE ROME CONCLUSIONS. HE DID NOT DOUBT THE HONOURABLE INTENTIONS OF THOSE SUCH AS BRANDT: BUT THEIR MISSIONS WOULD BE ABUSED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES. SO HE HOPED

THE MEETING WOULD REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENTS AGREED IN ROME, AND PERHAPS RENEW THE APPEAL TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE HOSTAGES: ONLY HE COULD ACT ON BEHALF OF ALL. BUT IF SADDAM WAS ALLOWED TO DAMAGE WESTERN UNITY THROUGH EXPLOITING PRIVATE MISSIONS, THE END RESULT WOULD BE TO BRING THE MILITARY OPTION CLOSER.

4. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THERE WERE TWO MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION: WHAT COULD BE DONE FOR THE HOSTAGES, AND WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. ON THE FORMER, THE ROME SUMMIT HAD AGREED TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HE HAD SINCE SPOKEN TWICE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR, WHO HAD SAID THAT SADDAM HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE UN REPRESENTATIVE. THE TWELVE NOW HAD TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES. HE HAD NO OPINION TO OFFER ON VISITS BY SPECIAL MISSIONS FROM OTHER STATES. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT ALL COMPLIED WITH EC DECLARATIONS. THE HOSTAGES WERE NOT A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. ON THIS POINT, BRANDT WAS CLEAR: HE WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE, JUST REQUEST THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES INCLUDING, OF COURSE, AMERICANS.

5. GENSCHER CONTINUED THAT HE HAD A NEW PROPOSAL. HE THOUGHT THE ITALIANS AS PRESIDENCY, OR THE TROIKA, SHOULD ASK THREE ARAB STATES WHO HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ BUT SUPPORTED THE WESTERN POSITION TO INTERVENE WITH SADDAM ON BEHALF OF THE HOSTAGES: NAMELY JORDAN, TUNISIA AND ALGERIA. THIS WOULD SHOW WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT GOVERNMENTS WERE STILL WORKING ON BEHALF OF THE HOSTAGES. AS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, HE SUGGESTED THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEET BEFORE THE NEXT FAC TO CONSIDER OPTIONS.

6. MOLLER (DENMARK) ALSO RECALLED THE TEXT OF THE ROME CONCLUSIONS. THE DANISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT (NOT) ENCOURAGED JOERGENSEN TO GO: INDEED HE WAS STILL STUCK IN AMMAN, WITHOUT A VISA. ON THE GERMAN PROPOSALS, HE SUPPORTED AN EARLY MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS. THE OTHER IDEA, CONCERNING A MISSION TO THREE ARAB STATES, MERITED FURTHER STUDY, AND COULD ALSO BE EXAMINED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS. BUT THE COMMITMENTS REACHED IN ROME SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

7. MR GAREL-JONES ENDORSED VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS USING THE HOSTAGES TO UNDERMINE WESTERN UNITY. THE ROME CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN GOOD: THE EC SHOULD HOLD TO THEM. OTHERWISE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EC WOULD BE UNDERMINED: SADDAM'S DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION WOULD BE COMPROMISED: AND THE IRAQIS WOULD BE HANDED A MAJOR PROPOGANDA COUP. THERE HAD BEEN NO LESS THAN TEN UNSC

RESOLUTIONS, REPRESENTING CUMULATIVELY A POWERFUL RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S AGGRESSION. THE PROBLEM WITH THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT OUTFLANKED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS: THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH HIM. THIS WAS THE FIRST REAL TEST FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REMAINED FIRM, RESOLUTE AND UNITED.

8. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) AGREED THAT THE ROME CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD. BUT HE SAW MERIT IN AN EARLY MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS TO DISCUSS OPTIONS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND FURTHER WAYS OF HELPING THE HOSTAGES.

9. PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL) ENDORSED VAN DEN BROEK'S STATEMENT BUT ALSO THOUGHT THAT GENSCHER'S IDEAS SHOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY. THIS MIGHT BE THE LAST CHANCE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

10. DE BEAUCE (FRANCE) SAID THAT THE RELEASE OF FRENCH HOSTAGES HAD NOT ALTERED FRENCH PERCEPTIONS. THE PROBLEM CONCERNED ALL HOSTAGES. HE AGREED WITH VAN DEN BROEK'S SUGGESTION THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL BE ASKED TO TRY AGAIN. IF HE FAILED, THE GERMAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

11. COLLINS (IRELAND) SAID THAT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE MEETING WAS PROOF THAT SADDAM WAS SUCCEEDING IN DESTABILIZING THE COALITION. HE WAS DISTURBED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. IN LINE WITH THE ROME CONCLUSIONS, HE HAD DISCOURAGED IRISH MPS FROM UNDERTAKING MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD. BUT VISITS SUCH AS THOSE BY BRANDT, CHEYSSON AND HEATH MADE THIS LINE HARD TO EXPLAIN TO THE FAMILIES OF HOSTAGES. THE EC HAD TO STICK TOGETHER AND DO SOMETHING: HENCE HE WELCOMED GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL.

12. GOEBBELS (LUXEMBOURG) STRESSED THAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE PRIVATE MISSIONS. THE EC SHOULD WORK THROUGH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND ASK HIM TO TRY AGAIN TO SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY. PAPOULIAS (GREECE) REAFFIRMED THE ROME CONCLUSIONS AND WELCOMED BOTH THE DUTCH AND THE GERMAN PROPOSALS. ROELANTS (BELGIUM) CLAIMED THAT BELGIUM MPS HAD BEEN DISCOURAGED FROM VISITING IRAQ. DE CLERQ WAS NOT GOING. POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD DISCUSS THE GERMAN PROPOSALS.

13. DE MICHELIS ATTEMPTED TO DRAW FOUR CONCLUSIONS, FOR PRESIDENCY USE ORALLY AFTER THE MEETING:

- THE OBJECTIVE WAS THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES. ATTEMPTS TO

DRIVE NATIONAL DEALS ON HOSTAGES BROUGHT THE MILITARY OPTION CLOSER

- ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ROME CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED. PRIVATE MISSIONS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED: THE HOSTAGES WERE NOT A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION

- THE TWELVE AGREED TO ASK THE PRESIDENCY TO PRESS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO IRAQ

- POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD CONVENE SOON TO CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND TO EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW INITIATIVES ON HOSTAGES, INCLUDING THE GERMAN PROPOSAL - WHICH SOME HAD WELCOMED, BUT OTHERS HAD DOUBTS ABOUT.

14. GENSCHER REITERATED THAT BRANDT WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON HOSTAGES ('THE NON-NEGOTIABLE'). HE WAS OTHERWISE CONTENT WITH THE CONCLUSIONS. VAN DEN BROEK WARNED AGAINST SUGGESTING THAT SOME MISSIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT 'NEGOTIATE', WHILE OTHERS WERE NOT. A BETTER VARIATION OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WOULD BE TO ASK THE THREE ARAB COUNTRIES TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO MEET THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE.

15. MR GAREL-JONES SAID THAT IT WAS ALL VERY WELL TO REITERATE OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TWELVE DECLARATION. BUT WHAT WAS BEING PROPOSED WAS THAT WE SEND SUCH A MISSION OURSELVES. THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE IN DANGER OF BEING A LAUGHING STOCK. FURTHERMORE, ALGERIA, TUNISIA AND JORDAN HAD ADOPTED AN EQUIVOCAL ATTITUDE TO THE CRISIS. HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE GERMAN PROPOSALS WHICH NOT ONLY SEEMED TO SHORT-CIRCUIT THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WOULD HAND A PROPOGANDA COUP TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE PROPOSED THAT A DEMARCHE BE MADE TO THE UN BUT THAT NO ACTION BE TAKEN ON THE GENSCHER PROPOSAL UNTIL THE PRESIDENCY HAD REPORTED BACK ON HIS EFFORTS AT THE UN.

16. MOLLER SUGGESTED THAT GERMAN IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO THE PRESS. GENSCHER DISSENTED: HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHATEVER ANYBODY ELSE MIGHT DO HE CERTAINLY INTENDED TO MENTION THEM TO HIS PRESS. HE WAS NOT PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH ALGERIA ETC. WITH IRAQ, ONLY PRESSURE. MR GAREL-JONES SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENCY PRESENTED THE MEETING AS AGREEING TO THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THESE THREE COUNTRIES, THE UK WOULD HAVE TO SAY PUBLICLY THAT IT DISAGREED.

17. DE MICHELIS DREW DISCUSSIONS TO A CONCLUSION BY SUGGESTING THAT

HE SAY TO THE PRESS THAT, IN ADDITION TO A PRESIDENCY DEMARCHE AT THE UN, THERE WOULD BE CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS (UNSPECIFIED) TO GET THEM TO PRESS SADDAM TO ACCEPT A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERALS' SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

## COMMENT

18. WE WERE NOT FACED WITH A GERMAN/ITALIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI ON EC COVER FOR THE BRANDT MISSION. NEVERTHELESS GENSCHER WAS IMPATIENTLY DETERMINED TO BE SEEN FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON A GERMAN INITIATIVE MOVING FORWARD EC DIPLOMATIC ACTION ON THE HOSTAGES. MR GAREL-JONES WITH DUTCH AND SOME DANISH SUPPORT MADE CLEAR THAT WE REGARDED ANY QUASI-DIPLOMATIC OVERTURE TO IRAQ WITH GRAVE DISQUIET. DE MICHELIS, SUMMING UP, CONCENTRATED SATISFACTORILY ON GIVING PRIORITY TO SUPPORT FOR UN ACTIVITY. MR GAREL-JONES SPOKE WITH HIM AFTER THE MEETING TO CONFIRM THAT HE WOULD BRIEF THE PRESS IN THIS SENSE. THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A CLEAR DANGER THAT GENSCHER, AND PERHAPS SOME OTHERS, WILL LEAK REPORTS OF THE PROPOSALS FOR INVOLVING ALGERIA AND OTHERS.

EGERTON

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06 NOV 1990 02:12

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17

PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ/KUWAIT

You will recall that you approved, with some minor amendments, the revised draft Directive for our Military Commanders in the Gulf. The Foreign Secretary has now, rather belatedly, come forward with three further proposed amendments, in the enclosure to the attached letter. All three seem sensible points. Agree that the Directive should be amended to take account of them?

CDP

Yes

CHARLES POWELL

6 November 1990

c\tempest\dd

TOP SECRET

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CCPC

MO 6/17/15/1D

FOREIGN SECRETARY

*ah*

ROLLS ROYCE: ENGINES FOR AN ARGENTINE DESTROYER

Thank you for your letter of 24th October <sup>Play</sup> about the supply of Rolls Royce marine gas turbine engine spares for the Meko 360 Class destroyer, the Amirante Brown (which Rolls Royce referred to as a frigate), that Argentina has committed to the multinational force in the Gulf.

2. Despite the welcome progress made in the last year or so in normalising our relations with Argentina, there is a continuing military threat to the Falkland Islands. We have, therefore, as you point out, taken great care to ensure that the embargo is not breached and made considerable efforts to dissuade friendly countries from supplying military equipment to Argentina. Nevertheless, on balance, I believe that the potential embarrassment of refusing these spares and perhaps thereby limiting the Argentine's ability to participate to the full in the multinational force in the Gulf, outweighs any possible military penalties in agreeing their supply. I therefore agree that an export licence for the Rolls Royce spares should be granted.

3. The Amirante Brown also contains several other items of British origin, as does the Meko 140 frigate, Spiro, (no R.R. engines) which the Argentine is also deploying to the Gulf. Other essential spares may therefore be required. In the circumstances, and strictly limited to these ships' commitment to the multinational force in the Gulf, I believe we can accept the supply of any other essential

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spares for this specific deployment to maintain rather than enhance their capability. We can rely on our officials to draw to our attention any items which they feel go beyond this narrow dispensation.

4. It will also be important I think for you to ensure that the US and Germans (who built the vessels) understand the basis of our approach. Presumably this can be done at official level through our Embassies.

5. I am copying this minute to the **Prime Minister**, other OD colleagues and Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature, possibly "UK", written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and appears to be a set of initials or a name.

5+4 November 1990

(T K)

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PM/90/078

PRIME MINISTER

*I see no reason  
to give any*

*explicit assurance.*

*We would tie our hands  
and limit our freedom  
Kuwait*

*R. Marsh*

*(b(A-c))*

*CB*

*b/xi*

*free war cor.*

1. I have read with interest the record of your talk over the weekend with the President, and Charles Powell's with Brent Scowcroft.

2. We have not yet found a way of helping the US over the difficulty which they clearly see in starting a military operation from cold. I doubt if it is enough to argue that the difficulty ought not to exist. My worry is that, if no way through the difficulty is found, military action will be repeatedly postponed, with the consequences which you rightly fear. We would be left with the prospect of a long haul, with no certainty of success and the military option effectively discredited, and that would do us all immense harm.

3. The disadvantages of trying for a fresh Security Council resolution authorising member states to use force were set out in Charles Powell's talks with Scowcroft. But, as you know, I do not think we should absolutely rule this out. It would need to be done this month, under the US Presidency, and separated from the start of a military operation so that military surprise was not in practice lost. The difficulty is how to prepare it effectively with the Russian, Chinese and non-aligned without exposing ourselves to humiliation. We obviously must not get into a position where the Security Council refuses such a resolution or hedges it about with restrictions. The operation would be tricky and dangerous but not in my view impossible. Nor in this



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form need it constrain the scope of military action (see the Solicitor General's Opinion).

4. An alternative would be some form of ultimatum. If someone carrying the personal authority of the President could go privately to Baghdad, he could tell Saddam Hussein face to face (without dates) that if he did not fully comply with the Security Council Resolutions he would be attacked, and that if he did fully comply he would not be attacked. This last assurance has not, so far as I know, been explicitly given, but it is implicit in the President's and your refusal to extend the objectives laid down by the Security Council. (We would then move into the new chapter which you have recently been sketching of dealing with his NBC capabilities over time via sanctions and the retention of forces.) If Saddam Hussein rejected this ultimatum despite the assurance mentioned above, then the President would be on strong ground with Congress and US opinion if he published the exchange at the same time as he ordered the military option. He could show that he had been up to the wire in search of peace.

[It is in your speech]

5. A further, though probably less effective, alternative would be a solemn public warning by President Bush to the same effect.

6. These ideas seem to me worth considering if we come to the conclusion that, without something on these lines, American opinion was building a cage around their President's freedom to act.

7. Four United States' Senators called on me today. The three Democrats said the President would have no support for military action in their states. Senator

SECRET



SECRET

Lloyd Bentsen said that Texas would support a military action for 30 days.

8. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
5 November 1990

SECRET

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FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

15

*From the Private Secretary*

5 November 1990

*Dear Sophie,*

KUWAIT

The Prime Minister has read the Foreign Secretary's minute of 5 November about the transition to the military option in the Gulf. This will of course be one of the main issues for discussion at her meeting with Secretary Baker. Her only comment at this stage is that she sees no reason to give Saddam Hussein an explicit assurance that he would not be attacked. It would tie our hands and limit future options.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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14

File

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 November 1990

*Dear Sir,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Stephen Wall wrote to you on 5 November proposing three further amendments to the draft Directive for our military commanders in the Gulf. I am confident the Prime Minister would accept these. I hope you can now let me have a revised version as quickly as possible so that I can send it to General Scowcroft (less paragraphs 8 and 9).

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,*

Charles Powell

Simon Webb Esq  
Ministry of Defence

TOP SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

5 November 1990

13 (A-B)

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait

The Foreign Secretary has seen the position paper circulated under cover of Simon Webb's letter of 31 October to you and noted the procedures suggested for using it in discussion with key US contacts.

I enclose as an annex three proposed amendments to the position paper.

As far as the destruction of Iraqi NBC capability is concerned the Foreign Secretary is aware that the environmental effects and possible civilian casualties resulting from an attack on these targets is under study in the MOD. The results of this analysis will need to be considered when political clearance to engage these targets is given to the military commanders.

On handling, the Foreign Secretary thinks that there would be advantage in getting our views to the Americans as soon as possible so that they take them into account in preparing for President Bush's mid-November review. If the Prime Minister is content he suggests that you might send the paper less paragraphs 8 and 9 to Scowcroft. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would reinforce the message with Mr Baker in their talks with him next week. An alternative would be to send them after Baker's visit, but that has now moved back to 9 November.

There are of course a number of political points we will wish to raise with the Americans in addition to those in paragraph 9 of the letter. For example we will need to discuss the handling of any move from the sanctions to the military option (including the Amir's letter), and how we deal with the political, military and economic results of hostilities and the way they are conducted, ie their impact on strategic objective (f). The Foreign Secretary is, however, content for them not to feature on a list of points which are essentially those affecting our military operations in the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*James Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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UK POSITION PAPER

1. Paragraph 1(d) add "by committing grave breaches of the Geneva conventions".

Comment. This reflects the wording of Security Council resolutions 670 and 674.

2. Paragraph 7(g) last sentence to read - "Where possible these concerns should be met by alternative methods of attack."

Comment. Strengthens an important political and presentational point.

3. Paragraph 7(h) add an additional sentence - "Some in theatre forces must be allocated to deal with the hostage and refugee problems."

Comment. Clearly front line troops should not be distracted from their main military task. But we need to persuade the Americans that planning and resources should be committed to dealing with our hostages/detainees and the enormous numbers of refugees that are likely to result from hostilities.



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 November 1990

*Dear Prime Minister*

Thank you for writing to me following your recent tour of the Middle East. I agree that it is now more important than ever that we should stay in close touch and have the benefit of each other's thinking on this vital issue.

I welcome your firmness in pointing out to the Iraqis that a solution to the present crisis can only be achieved by their full implementation of the relevant Security Council Resolutions: and, in resisting Iraq's attempts to divide the countries opposed to it by offering preferential treatment to some hostages.

We are all grateful for the major contribution which Japan has made to the costs of countering Saddam Hussein's aggression. Assistance to the front-line states which are suffering as a result of sanctions is becoming urgent. I have in mind Egypt, Turkey and particularly Jordan. I believe Jordan's performance in complying with sanctions has improved recently and there is no doubt that its economic problems are real and pressing. Although the European Community is providing help, most will come only from the 1991 budget. Anything Japan could do to get help to them now, preferably on a grant basis, would be of great value.

*Warm regards.*

*Yours sincerely*

*Narasimhaiah*

His Excellency Mr. Toshiki Kaifu, K.B.E.

*ops*

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MIPT AND YOUNG'S TELELETTER OF 27 OCTOBER: OMAN/JORDAN/SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY

1. OMANIS PRESSURE KING HUSSEIN TO MEND FENCES WITH THE SAUDIS. KING HUSSEIN AMENABLE. OMANIS PROPOSE TV INTERVIEW FOR KING HUSSEIN TO SHOW A CHANGE OF HEART. OMANI EMISSARY LIKELY TO PUT THIS TO SAUDIS SHORTLY FOR AGREEMENT. KING NOT ENGAGED IN ANY NEW PEACE INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. DURING MY CALL LAST NIGHT ON MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS I WAS ABOUT TO RAISE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT (MY TELNO 507), WHEN YUSUF ALAWI SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO PASS ON A MESSAGE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS HERE LAST WEEK BETWEEN SHE SULTAN AND KING HUSSEIN. HE WAS PARTICULARLY KEEN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED BEFORE SHE MEETS KING HUSSEIN IN GENEVA.

3. ALAWI SAID THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT HERE WAS TO HELP KING HUSSEIN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS. THE LATTER FELT DEEPLY WOUNDED BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCED THEM TO FORGIVE AND FORGET BECAUSE OF THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION WAS VERY WEAK: HE WAS BROKE AND THE ECONOMY WAS LIKELY TO COLLAPSE IN 3-4 MONTHS. IN SHORT, HE WAS FINISHED.

4. ALAWI CONTINUED THAT THE KING'S POSITION WAS LIKE THAT OF THE SHAH IN HIS LAST DAYS. HE WAS THREATENED BY THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. IF THEY GAINED CONTROL OF PARLIAMENT, THEY WOULD WITHHOLD CONFIDENCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE GOVERNMENT FELL, THEY WOULD CONTROL THE WHOLE COUNTRY. THEY WOULD MOVE CLOSER TO IRAQ AND THE IRAQIS COULD USE THEM AS THEIR 'ISRAEL CARD'. IF THE IRAQIS PLAYED THIS CARD AND ISRAEL INTERVENED, THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE IN A DILEMMA FACING SIMULTANEOUSLY THE TWO PROBLEMS OF KUWAIT AND ARAB/ISRAEL.

5. ALAWI SAID THAT IN THEIR TALKS HERE THE OMANIS HAD INSISTED THAT THE KING'S PRESENT WAY WAS NOT RIGHT AND THAT THE DAMAGE WITH HIS NATURAL ALLIES (THE MONARCHIES) HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THERE WERE TWO ELEMENTS TO BE ADDRESSED: THE KING'S OBJECTION TO THE PRESENCE OF THE

MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND THE JORDANIAN MEDIA'S ATTACKS ON THE SAUDIS. THE OMANIS EXPLORED WITH THE KING THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS CHANGING HIS STANCE, NOT MUCH BECAUSE HE WAS ALREADY FIRMLY AGAINST THE INVASION, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT CONDEMNED IT, AND FOR THE RETURN OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE. PERHAPS HE COULD MAKE A NEW STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WAS NOT AGAINST THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES OR THE SAUDIS?

6. ALAWI SAID THE KING HAD SAID HE WAS READY TO DO WHATEVER THE OMANIS SUGGESTED. THEY PROPOSED THEY SHOULD SEND A TV TEAM TO INTERVIEW THE KING WHEN HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR HIS POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH MATTERS AS HIS NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNING ON THE INVASION AND HIS AFFINITY WITH THE GULF STATES. THE KING SAID HE WAS NOT IRAQ'S PARTNER BUT PEOPLE HAD ASSUMED THIS BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH IRAQ OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS. ALAWI ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE A QUID PRO QUO FOR SUCH A GESTURE FROM THE KING. IF THE SULTAN AGREED (ALAWI WOULD SPEAK TO HIM TODAY), AN EMISSARY WOULD BE SENT TO KING FAHD PROPOSING THIS PUBLIC RE-STATEMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION AND, IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SAUDIS SHOULD PROVIDE JORDAN WITH OIL, ALLOW JORDANIAN EXPORTS OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES TO RESUME, AND GIVE WHATEVER OTHER ASSISTANCE THEY FELT POSSIBLE. ALAWI UNDERLINED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD NOT YET BEEN APPROACHED AND THAT WE WERE THE FIRST TO HEAR OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, ALAWI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HOPED THAT IF KING HUSSEIN MADE THIS STEP, IT WOULD CAUSE THE ALLIANCE OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, YEMEN, SUDAN AND TUNISIA, TO CRACK.

8. I WARMLY ENDORSED THESE EFFORTS BY THE OMANIS TO BRING JORDAN BACK INTO THE FOLD AND AGREED JORDAN'S POSITION WAS CRUCIAL TO EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. I THEN ASKED WHETHER THE KING WAS ENGAGED IN ANY NEW SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. WE HAD NOTED TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO AMMAN IMMEDIATELY ON THE KING'S RETURN AND BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TO MEET PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. ALAWI SMILED AND SAID THIS WAS A BLIND. THE IRAQIS WERE JUST TRYING TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THEY WERE CLOSE TO THE KING. IT MEANT NOTHING.

9. PL SEE MIFT.

CLARK

YYYY

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SUMMARY

1. OMANI MINISTER REVEALS THAT RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY SAUDIS AND OTHERS. OMAN HAS PROVIDED A LOAN TOO.

DETAIL

2. DURING MY CALL ON THE OMANI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAST NIGHT, I BEGAN TO PROBE ALAWI ON PRIMAKOV'S TOUR (MOSCOW TEL 2073 TO YOU) AND ITS APPARENT FAILURE, WHEN HE CUT ME SHORT BY SAYING THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD CAUSE NO MORE PROBLEMS: THEY HAD BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS FROM THE GULF. THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN 4 BN US DOLLARS REPAYABLE OVER 30 YEARS WITH NO INTEREST AND A GRACE PERIOD OF 10 YEARS. OF COURSE, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED TO KEEP IN WITH THE IRAQIS, BECAUSE THEY HAD INVESTED HEAVILY IN THE COUNTRY AND STILL HAD MANY "HOSTAGES" THERE. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE PEACE INITIATIVES.

3. I ASKED WHETHER OMAN HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THIS GENEROUS LOAN. ALAWI SAID OMAN HAD INDEED PRE-EMPTED IT BY OFFERING THE RUSSIANS A 200M US DOLLAR SOFT LOAN OVER 15 YEARS.

COMMENT

4. THE LATTER ADMISSION IS THE FIRST CONFIRMATION OF INFORMATION SEEN ON OTHER CHANNELS THAT SUCH A LOAN WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION. IT WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY FIRMED UP DURING QAIS ZAWAWI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 4-6 OCTOBER.

5. PL SEE MIFT.

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FCO TELNO 239: VISIT OF MR MICHAEL HESELTINE

SUMMARY

1. USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO UPDATE ON SENIOR JORDANIANS' VIEWS. NO NEW ELEMENTS IN JORDAN'S POSITION ON THE GULF. NO BREAKTHROUGH WITH SAUDIS. GLOOMY ASSESSMENTS OF JORDAN'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT FOREIGN AID.

DETAIL

2. THE RT HON MICHAEL HESELTINE MP, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS HESELTINE, PAID A SHORT PRIVATE VISIT TO JORDAN ON 3-4 NOVEMBER. MR HESELTINE HAD AN AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN, ATTENDED BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, WITH WHOM HE SUBSEQUENTLY HAD A LONGER SESSION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS AND WHO SUBSEQUENTLY ENTERTAINED HIM AND MRS HESELTINE TO LUNCH. HE ALSO CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. KING HUSSEIN OUTLINED JORDAN'S PART IN THE GULF CRISIS IN BY NOW FAMILIAR TERMS. HE REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT INITIALLY INTENDED TO OCCUPY THE WHOLE OF KUWAIT, BUT THAT THEY HAD DECIDED TO DO SO IN ORDER TO OBTAIN GREATER NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. HE GAVE LITTLE AWAY ABOUT EITHER HIS OWN RECENT VISIT TO MUSCAT (MUSCAT TELNO 507) OR THE VISIT TO AMMAN ON 3 NOVEMBER OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY). HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS SOON CONCERNING QUOTE AN ARAB SOLUTION UNQUOTE TO THE GULF CRISIS, IN WHICH HE IMPLIED THE SAUDIS WOULD PLAY A PART.

4. THE KING SPOKE SCATHINGLY ABOUT CURRENT SAUDI POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN, IN WHICH HE CLEARLY DETECTED NO SIGN OF MOVEMENT. HE STRONGLY CRITICISED PRESIDENT MUBARAK FOR STIRRING UP CONSPIRACY STORIES ABOUT IRAQI/JORDANIAN TERRITORIAL INTENTIONS AND THEREBY POISONING SAUDI MINDS AGAINST JORDAN. MEANWHILE, HE

STRESSED THAT VERY LITTLE TIME REMAINED BEFORE THE SITUATION IN JORDAN BECAME CRITICAL, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND BECAUSE OF THE VOLATILITY OF INTERNAL OPINION. PARLIAMENT WAS DUE TO RESUME IN SOME TWO WEEKS' TIME, PROBABLY UNDER A NEW SPEAKER FROM THE ISLAMIST FACTION, AND THEREAFTER THE VOICE OF THE EXTREMISTS WOULD BECOME EVER MORE INFLUENTIAL. HE WAS LIKELY TO COME UNDER RENEWED PRESSURE TO GIVE KEY GOVERNMENT JOBS, SUCH AS THE EDUCATION MINISTRY, TO ISLAMISTS. REFERRING TO EARLIER STATEMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS ABDICATING, THE KING INDICATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT HIS ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO PRESIDE OVER AN INCREASINGLY RADICALISED JORDAN.

5. DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, THE KING STRESSED THAT JORDAN DID NOT ENVISAGE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON THE LATTER PRIOR TO AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HOWEVER, SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM ACCORDING TO THE SAME SET OF STANDARDS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO MOVE. HE SHARED MR HESELTINE'S DOUBTS ABOUT CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT: BUT AFFIRMED THAT THIS MUST NEVERTHELESS REMAIN A PRIORITY INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVE.

6. THE CROWN PRINCE AND HIS ECONOMIC ADVISERS TOOK MR HESELTINE THROUGH FIGURES, EG FROM THE RIPERT REPORT, DEMONSTRATING THE SCALE AND URGENCY OF JORDAN'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT AS A RESULT OF THE GULF CRISIS. PRINCE HASSAN CONTRASTED UNFAVOURABLY THE SLOWNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE OVER AID TO JORDAN COMPARED WITH THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE US AND OTHERS HAD INCREASED THEIR SUBSIDIES TO ISRAEL TO PAY FOR ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT AND ITS AGGRESSIVE SETTLEMENT POLICY.

7. PRINCE HASSAN RECOGNISED THAT BRITAIN AND THE US HAD NOW ACCEPTED JORDAN'S SINCERITY ABOUT THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS, AND WERE ACTING ON THIS BY APPEALING TO THEIR PARTNERS TO SPEED UP DISBURSEMENTS OF AID ALREADY PLEDGED. BUT PROGRESS WAS STILL PAINFULLY SLOW (ALTHOUGH ONE OF HIS ADVISERS REPORTED THAT A FIRST INSTALMENT OF DM 45 MILLION ON THE GERMAN PLEDGE HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED). THE IMF WERE NOW BACK IN TOWN, BUT WERE BEHAVING AS IF THE CRISIS HAD NEVER HAPPENED, BY INSISTING ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FULL RANGE OF AUSTERITY MEASURES AGREED BEFORE THE CRISIS, INCLUDING EG HEFTY PETROL PRICE RISES. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION THIS WOULD LITERALLY SET THE STREETS ABLAZE.



8. THE CROWN PRINCE ALSO REFERRED TO DELAYS IN SECURING REIMBURSEMENT OF THE DOLLARS 55 MILLION WHICH THE GOVERNMENT ESTIMATED IT HAD SPENT ON EVACUEE REPATRIATION. THIS MUST BE TREATED AS A SEPARATE ISSUE FROM THAT OF AID TO JORDAN ITSELF.

9. PRINCE HASSAN REFERRED TO THE LARGE WINDFALL PROFITS BEING MADE BY OIL EXPORTERS AS A RESULT OF INCREASED OIL PRICES. THESE HE CLAIMED WERE ACCRUING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF SOME DOLLARS 200 BILLION, OF WHICH HALF WAS GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA. SURELY AT LEAST A MODEST PORTION OF THESE GAINS COULD BE DIVERTED TO HELP JORDAN AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES HIT BY SANCTIONS AND THE GULF CRISIS?

10. ON THE CRISIS ITSELF, PRINCE HASSAN CLAIMED TO HAVE TRIED TO SECURE MORE LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE OF THE INIQUITIES OF IRAQI BEHAVIOUR IN KUWAIT: HE SAID HE HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE REPORTS OF ATROCITIES (WE HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING HIS OFFICE WITH EG COI FILMS ON THE SUBJECT). IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO ACHIEVE MORE BALANCED COVERAGE WHEN JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS ALIKE WERE SO BITTER ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND PARTICULARLY RECENT EVENTS, IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. JORDAN'S REAL FEAR WAS THE ENORMOUS DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES ALREADY RESULTING AND LIKELY TO RESULT FROM BOTH THE GULF CRISIS AND THE SITUATION IN THE TERRITORIES. OFFICIAL FIGURES SHOWED 180,000 JORDANIANS AS HAVING ALREADY RETURNED TO JORDAN FROM THE GULF: AND OF THE 90,000 PALESTINIAN WORKERS WHO HE CLAIMED HAD NOW BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THEIR JOBS IN ISRAEL PROPER A LARGE NUMBER WOULD BE DRIVEN ACROSS INTO JORDAN BY SHEER ECONOMIC PRESSURES. PRINCE HASSAN DID HOWEVER ACKNOWLEDGE (AND SAID HE HAD MENTIONED PUBLICLY) THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ALLOWED SOME 40,000 PALESTINIANS RETURNING FROM THE GULF TO ENTER AND SETTLE IN THE WEST BANK: BUT THESE WOULD ADD FURTHER TO THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES THERE AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF LARGE SCALE MIGRATIONS INTO JORDAN.

11. THE FOREIGN MINISTER CLAIMED TO HAVE HAD A FRANK DISCUSSION WITH TAREQ AZIZ ON 3 NOVEMBER. THE LATTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THREATS OF MILITARY ACTION WERE NOT THE WAY TO INFLUENCE IRAQI ATTITUDES. QASEM CLAIMED TO HAVE TOLD THE IRAQI IN TURN THAT EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE UN COALITION EG BY PROPOSING TRADE-OFFS AGAINST HOSTAGE RELEASES WOULD GET NOWHERE: AND TO HAVE REITERATED JORDAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT TAREQ AZIZ HAD BROUGHT ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW PROPOSALS OR CONCESSIONS.

12. ON ECONOMIC AID AND SANCTIONS, QASEM SAID THAT MUCH DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE INITIAL BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT JORDAN'S WORD ABOUT SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RECENT US PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE NOW SATISFIED. HE SHOWED LITTLE APPRECIATION OF BRITISH AND US EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO SPEED UP FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. JORDANIANS LOOKED TO COUNTRIES LIKE BRITAIN, WITH THEIR LONG HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP, TO MAKE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS.

13. IN A BRIEF MEETING WITH BRITISH AND LOCAL JOURNALISTS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL, MR HESELTINE OUTLINED HMG'S POSITION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT, WHICH HE FULLY SUPPORTED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE STRENGTH OF JORDAN'S CASE FOR PROMPT AND ADEQUATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: AND THAT BRITAIN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN THE CONTINUED STABILITY OF JORDAN.

## COMMENT

14. THE VISIT PROVIDED A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR AN UPDATE ON THE VIEWS OF THE SENIOR JORDANIAN HIERARCHY. ALTHOUGH THE NOTE WAS PREDOMINANTLY PESSIMISTIC, MR HESELTINE WAS RECEIVED WARMLY (THE KING DELAYED HIS DEPARTURE FOR PARIS IN ORDER TO RECEIVE HIM). I BELIEVE THIS SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE WHICH SENIOR JORDANIANS STILL ATTACH TO THE BRITISH CONNECTION, FOR ALL OUR CURRENT DISAGREEMENTS ON SOME ASPECTS OF POLICY.

15. FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS REQUIRED.

HOGGER

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

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF MINISTERS: THE GULF

You have a meeting of Ministers tomorrow afternoon to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf. The main points to cover are set out below.

DIPLOMATIC

Activity at the UN

You mentioned to President Bush the idea of a presentation to the Security Council on Iraqi brutalities in Kuwait. He was enthusiastic. We should now pursue this vigorously.

The Americans for their part clearly envisage further resolutions in the course of their Presidency of the Security Council, probably of a portmanteau type.

The Security Council is likely to return to the Palestinian question this week.

Hostages

The latest Iraqi statements about releasing foreign hostages in return for guarantees from certain countries that Iraq would not be attacked, are not very specific.

Sanctions

You visited the Embargo Surveillance Unit On Thursday.

A JIC assessment shows Iraq has enough oil to keep its military machine going for some months.

Meeting with King Hussein

You are seeing King Hussein in Geneva on Tuesday. The recommendation is that you should go easy on him this time, in view of improved Jordanian performance on sanctions. You will want to say that we are urging other countries to disburse aid for Jordan quickly.

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Embassies in Kuwait

The President clearly remains deeply preoccupied about the US embassy in Kuwait, and said that Secretary Baker would wish to discuss this with you.

Meanwhile, officials have prepared a paper (in the folder) about the position of the British and American Embassies. They recommend we should question that the Americans re-provision their Embassy: should avoid a joint withdrawal: and should review the position of our own Embassy in mid-November.

MILITARY

US Forces

The President confirmed to you today that the US would be sending additional forces to the Gulf. He did not demur when you said we must be ready to initiate military action by early January at latest. You offered help with transport for US forces: and said that we would see what reserves we could make available in Germany, to be moved to the Gulf if necessary.

[NOT ALL THOSE PRESENT WILL BE AWARE OF THE FULL DETAILS OF YOUR TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND MY TALK WITH SCOWCROFT].

C. D. POWELL

4 November 1990

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*From the Private Secretary*

4 November 1990

*See table.*

THE GULF

I enclose:

- a note of a talk which I had with General Scowcroft on 3 November;
- a note of a talk between the Prime Minister and President Bush today

about the situation in the Gulf. Both are extremely sensitive. No copies should be made and they should be seen only by the very small circle of those authorised to see these papers.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Sir Robin Butler and Sir Percy Cradock.

*Yours sincerely,*

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MY TELNO 2102 : HOSTAGE POLICY

SUMMARY

1. SADDAM SAYS CERTAIN EUROPEAN WORKERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IRAQ. SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY STATES THAT ALL HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED IF CERTAIN COUNTRIES DECLARE THAT THEY ARE AGAINST WAR. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AGREES THAT BULGARIANS BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE IRAQ ON TERMINATION OF THEIR CONTRACTS.

DETAIL

2. THERE WERE TWO INDICATIONS ON 3 NOVEMBER THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE CONSIDERING CHANGES IN THEIR POLICY TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. FIRST, AT A RECEPTION FOR THOSE ATTENDING THE NINTH ANNUAL GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF IRAQI WORKERS, A DELEGATION FROM THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ARAB WORKERS APPEALED TO THE PRESIDENT TO ALLOW A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN WORKERS CURRENTLY IN IRAQ THE RIGHT TO LEAVE. SADDAM AGREED, EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD TAKEN THIS DECISION IN APPRECIATION OF THE 'MILITANT ROLE OF ARAB WORKERS' TOWARDS PAN-ARAB QUESTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF 'NATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN LIBERATION'.

3. SECOND, THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SA'DI MEHDI SALEH, ADDRESSING THE OPENING OF THE ASSEMBLY'S AUTUMN SESSION, SAID THAT THE REASON WHY FOREIGNERS WERE PREVENTED FROM TRAVELLING WAS TO PUT OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OF THEUS ADMINISTRATION AND ITS ALLIES AND TO ALLOW PUBLIC OPINION TO DECIDE ON A PEACEFUL APPROACH TO THE CRISIS. SALEH WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SAME GOALS COULD NOW BE ACHIEVED BY ALLOWING FOREIGNERS THE FREEDOM TO LEAVE IRAQ, PROVIDED THAT A NUMBER OF STATES DECLARED THEMSELVES AGAINST WAR AND THE

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THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION AS A MEAN TO SOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN THE REGION, AT THE FOREFRONT OF WHICH WAS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. SALEH SAID THAT FOREIGNERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL IF ALL FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVELY, OR ANY TWO OUT OF FRANCE, PRC, SOVIET UNION, GERMANY AND JAPAN, AGREED TO DECLARE THEY WERE AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ AND WERE COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL AND JUST METHODS OF SOLVING ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION.

4. THE LOCAL PRESS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT AT ITS SESSION ON 3 NOVEMBER THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AGREED TO ALLOW ALL BULGARIAN NATIONALS TO LEAVE IRAQ ON TERMINATION OF THEIR CONTRACTS (MY TELNO 2003 - NOT TO ALL).

COMMENT

5. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO GUIDANCE ON WHICH WORKERS FROM WHICH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SADDAM INTENDS TO ALLOW TO LEAVE, AND CAN ONLY WAIT FOR HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO BE INTERPRETED. IT MAY BE THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COUNTRIES (EG EAST EUROPEAN) ALL OF WHOSE WORKERS ARE NOW GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO DEPART. OR IT COULD RATHER BE THAT IT IS CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WORKER THAT ARE GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO DEPART (CF THOSE WORKING ON THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WHO WE HOPE WILL SHORTLY BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE AT THE END OF THEIR CONTRACTS).

6. THE STATEMENTS OF SADDAM AND SALEH ARE FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THEIR HOSTAGE POLICY AND ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS OF LIMITING ITS SCOPE WITHOUT LOSING FACE. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, WE MUST TAKE IT AS CERTAIN, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CALL PAID BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWELVE ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 1 NOVEMBER (TUR), THAT THE AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE TO DETAIN A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF AT LEAST AMERICAN AND BRITISH HOSTAGES TO MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR WESTERN MILITARY PLANNERS TO ASSUME THAT THERE ARE FOREIGNERS AT ALL OF IRAQ'S MAJOR MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS.

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

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From our man  
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FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT  
FROM HMA KUWAIT

YOUR TELNO 585: HAUTE CUISINE

1. REGRETTABLY THERE IS LITTLE QUOTE HAUTE UNQUOTE ABOUT MY CUISINE, AT LEAST IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE ONE MEAL A DAY, CONSISTING OF RICE AND PASTA ALTERNATELY. WE STILL HAVE QUITE A LOT OF TINS OF TUNA AND A FEW OF FRANKFURTERS, PLUS A LOT OF SPICES, MOSTLY TAKEN FROM THE SERVANTS' QUARTERS. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE VERY SHORT OF ONIONS, THOUGH WE DO HAVE GARLIC, AND HAVE ONLY A FEW TINS OF TOMATOES AND TOMATO PASTE. WE HAVE A LITTLE POWDERED MILK LEFT AND QUOTE GRAM UNQUOTE POWDER MADE FROM CHICK PEAS, I THINK, SO I CAN MAKE WHITE SAUCES. WE HAVE USED UP ALL OUR ORDINARY FLOUR, WHICH MEANS I CAN NO LONGER MAKE BREAD, AS I DID IN THE EARLY DAYS.
2. CURRIED TUNA AND TUNA LASAGNA ARE BOTH POPULAR, SO IS CRAB IN CHEESE SAUCE, WITH FLAKED ALMONDS(?). CURRIED FRANKFURTER IS RATHER LESS SO, THOUGH QUOTE SAUSAGE CHASSEUR UNQUOTE IS ACCEPTED.
3. THE CUCUMBERS AND WATERMELONS WILL BE THE FIRST FRESH FOOD WE HAVE HAD FOR TWO MONTHS. I SUSPECT WE SHALL EAT THE CUCUMBERS AS THEY ARE, WITH SALT, OR WITH AN OIL AND VINEGAR DRESSING.
4. I AM SORRY I CANNOT SEND A MORE IMAGINATIVE REPLY.

BURTON

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YOUR TELNO 891: BRANDT MISSION TO IRAQ

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL RESISTS FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE HIM TO GIVE A UN LABEL TO A VISIT BY PROMINENT EUROPEANS TO BAGHDAD.

## DETAIL

2. THERE HAS CONTINUED TO BE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSED ACTIVITY HERE DIRECTED UNSUCCESSFULLY AT PERSUADING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GIVE SOME KIND OF UN COVER TO THE VISIT TO BAGHDAD BY BRANDT AND SUCH OTHER EUROPEAN WORTHIES AS MIGHT GO WITH HIM. THE MAIN EVENTS THAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER FROM CONTACTS WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CHEF DE CABINET ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- (I) A DUTCH APPROACH: VAN DEN BROEK, UNDER GREAT DOMESTIC PRESSURE ONCE THE NEWS OF THE BRANDT VISIT HAD BROKEN IN NEW YORK, TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 1 NOVEMBER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONTINUED TO FEND HIM OFF, AS HE HAD DONE GENSCHER AND ANDREOTTI THE DAY BEFORE (MY TELNO 1793).
- (II) A FURTHER GERMAN APPROACH: GENSCHER SPOKE AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 2 NOVEMBER TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND AT THE VERY LEAST TO GIVE THE BRANDT MISSION A PUBLIC BLESSING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD CONTINUED TO RESIST AND GENSCHER HAD FINALLY GIVEN UP.
- (III) A FURTHER ITALIAN APPROACH: THE ITALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WAS SENT IN ON INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATE THIS AFTERNOON TO INSIST THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECONSIDER HIS NEGATIVE REACTION TO ANDREOTTI'S APPROACH. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE TRAXLER AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH GENSCHER AND SAID THIS WAS REALLY ALL WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE NOW. THERE WAS NO POINT IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT GOING ON PRESSING HIM. HE REVEALED THAT HE HAD IN FACT TALKED TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR ON 1 NOVEMBER TO FIND OUT WHAT THE IRAQI REACTION WOULD BE TO BRANDT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPANIONS, COMING WITH A UN LABEL. AL-ANBARI HAD REPLIED WITH THE GREATEST CLARITY THAT:

- (A) THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERED IN IRAQ TO BE AN EXTENSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AS SUCH HOSTILE.
- (B) ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOSTAGES AND TO THIRD COUNTRY WORKERS IN IRAQ HAD TO BE HANDLED ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND NOT A MULTILATERAL ONE. HENCE IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE ICRC ~~BUT~~ THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH NATIONAL RED CROSS OR RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES.
- (C) BRANDT AS AN INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE VERY WELCOME IN IRAQ. IF HE WERE GIVEN A UN LABEL HE WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED OR RECEIVED.

3. TRAXLER SAID HE WOULD BE REPORTING ALL THIS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ASSUMED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THIS VERY CLEAR POSITION, THEY WOULD NOT PERSIST ANY FURTHER. BUT FEELINGS IN ROME WERE EXTREMELY BRUISED, WITH MUCH IRRITATION DIRECTED PARTICULARLY TOWARDS THE GERMANS. THE ITALIAN PREDICAMENT WAS ACUTE NOW, SINCE BRANDT WOULD BE GOING ON A PURELY BILATERAL BASIS, AND COULD THEREFORE BE EXPECTED ONLY TO GET OUT GERMAN HOSTAGES. HE BELIEVED COLOMBO WOULD NOT BE GOING.

4. I GAVE BOTH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH VAN DEN BROEK AND THE LINE YOU WOULD TAKE IN ANY FURTHER CONVERSATION YOU MIGHT HAVE WITH DE MICHELIS. WE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT ANY GROUP OF THIS SORT, WITH OR WITHOUT A UN LABEL, WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF ISOLATING AND BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SADDAM HUSSEIN AND WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS. WE COULD CERTAINLY NOT AGREE TO ANY SUCH APPROACH TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEING PRESENTED TO HIM AS AN EC APPROACH. TRAXLER SAID HE TOOK THE LAST POINT. HE LATER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN HE SAW HIM (PARA 2(III) ABOVE) THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON A NATIONAL BASIS AND NOT ON BEHALF OF THE TWELVE.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CHEF DE CABINET SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CHANGING HIS MIND. HE DID NOT INTEND TO ANOINT ANYONE IN THIS GROUP. THE WHOLE MANOEUVRE HAD BEEN A DISCREDITABLE ONE WHICH MADE NO SENSE AT ALL. IT BEGAN AS A RATHER SHADY MANOEUVRE TO BRING THE VISIT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL BUT, GIVEN THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TOWARDS A UN LABEL, IT HAD SEEMED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR MORE AND MORE AS IF HE WERE BEING MANIPULATED TO BRING ABOUT THE ABORTING OF THE BRANDT MISSION. I ASKED DAYAL TO ENSURE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF ALL THIS TOING AND FROING. WE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO

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GET SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN INTO IRAQ. HE SAID OUR POSITION WAS  
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SUMMARY

1. RECENT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SEND CONFUSING SIGNALS TO THE US PUBLIC. HAVING STARTED THE WEEK BY TRYING TO CLARIFY HIS POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF, THE PRESIDENT ENDS IT ON THE DEFENSIVE, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS IN THE PRESS THAT HE IS FLOUNDERING.

DETAIL

2. THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE GULF HAVE SPREAD CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN THE PAST WEEK. UNDER HEADLINES LIKE QUOTE US RAISES THE PRESSURES AND THE RISKS UNQUOTE, THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE A NUMBER OF TOUGH STATEMENTS. BUT THE THRUST HAS NOT BEEN CONSISTENT.

3. FOLLOWING A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WERE INCREASINGLY ALLEGED BY THE PRESS TO HAVE LOST THEIR WAY ON THEIR GULF POLICY, THE PRESIDENT STEPPED IN WITH TOUGH LANGUAGE ON 29 OCTOBER (TUR) WHICH THE PRESS WIDELY INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE. ON 31 OCTOBER, THE PRESIDENT INTENSIFIED THE WAR OF WORDS. HE SAID IN VIRGINIA THAT US DIPLOMATS IN KUWAIT WERE BEING STARVED BY A BRUTAL DICTATOR:

QUOTE DO YOU THINK I'M CONCERNED ABOUT IT? YOU'RE DARN RIGHT I AM. AND WHAT AM I GOING TO DO ABOUT IT? LET'S JUST WAIT AND SEE. BECAUSE I HAVE HAD IT WITH THAT KIND OF TREATMENT OF AMERICANS AND I KNOW OTHERS FEEL THAT WAY UNQUOTE.

ON THE SAME DAY, HOWEVER, SUNUNU DECLARED ON A MORNING TALK SHOW THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS COMMITTED TO QUOTE MAKING SURE HE DOES EVERYTHING ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT TO AVOID HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE. THE MEDIA QUICKLY PORTRAYED THIS AS A REPLAY OF THE BUDGET DEBATE, WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY IN DIFFERENT VOICES. AN UNIDENTIFIED SENIOR

OFFICIAL WAS QUOTED AS SAYING QUOTE IT'S THE BUDGET MESS ALL OVER AGAIN: FLIP-FLOPS, A MESSAGE OUT OF CONTROL AND NOBODY IN CHARGE UNQUOTE. A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL IS REPORTED AS ADMITTING TO QUOTE ZIGZAGGING, BECAUSE SOMETIMES IT'S LESS A MATTER OF A GAME PLAN AND MORE A MATTER OF THE PRESIDENT'S MOODS UNQUOTE.

4. ON 1 NOVEMBER, THE PRESIDENT INSISTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN QUOTE EXTRAORDINARILY CONSISTENT ON KEY POINTS REGARDING SUBSTANCE UNQUOTE. HE ADDED QUOTE I'M NOT TRYING TO SOUND THE TOCSIN OF WAR UNQUOTE. BUT HE HAS CONTINUED TO POINT OUT HIS CONCERN OVER HOSTAGES AND HIS IMPATIENCE WITH IRAQ: QUOTE THE SAND IS RUNNING THROUGH THE GLASS UNQUOTE. DESPITE THIS, HE HAS SUGGESTED THAT HE IS NOT SENDING MIXED SIGNALS BUT CHANGING HIS EMPHASIS INTENTIONALLY, OFFERING ALTERNATELY MORE OF A CARROT AND MORE OF A STICK.

5. THE RESULT SO FAR HAS BEEN CONFUSION. THE WASHINGTON TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST RAN COMPETING HEADLINES ON 2 NOVEMBER. THE TIMES SAID QUOTE BUSH PREPARES THE COUNTRY FOR WAR UNQUOTE, WHILE THE POST SAID QUOTE BUSH DENIES PREPARING US FOR WAR UNQUOTE. IN ITS LEADING EDITORIAL, THE NEW YORK TIMES COMMENTED THAT IN WARNING IRAQ THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ATTACK WHILE IN THE NEXT BREATH TELLING CONGRESS THAT US TROOPS WERE IN NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF WAR, BUSH WAS QUOTE FLOUNDERING. HE CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS AND STILL SEND A CREDIBLE MESSAGE UNQUOTE. THIS SORT OF SHARP CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICY IS QUITE NEW.

COMMENT

6. THE PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM IS THAT HE HAS TO BALANCE A NUMBER OF COMPETING AIMS: HE WANTS TO REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THE GULF AFTER THE BUDGET AND TEMPLE MOUNT DIVERSIONS: HE WANTS TO KEEP SADDAM GUESSING: AND HE WANTS TO AVOID ALARMING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THE RESULT IS THAT HE RISKS FALLING BETWEEN A NUMBER OF STOOLS, WITH NONE OF HIS RESPECTIVE AUDIENCES RECEIVING OR UNDERSTANDING THE MESSAGE HE IS TRYING TO TRANSMIT. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES AT THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ON 6 NOVEMBER. AFTER HIS MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON 29 OCTOBER, THE DEMOCRATS CLAIMED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SHARP LANGUAGE WAS MOTIVATED BY ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE HAS DENIED THIS. BUT WITH LITTLE POSITIVE TO POINT TO ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE AND IN THE WAKE OF THE DAMAGING BUDGET DEBATE, THERE IS A STRONG TEMPTATION TO FOCUS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. TOUGH RHETORIC PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR PRESIDENTIAL AND TO HIGHLIGHT TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN STRENGTHS.

7. THE PRESIDENT CANNOT HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE IMMEDIATE REACTIONS. WHERE HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY, HE IS ACCUSED OF

EQUIVOCATION. WHERE HE HAS TAKEN A TOUGH LINE, HIS MOTIVES AND TIMING ARE WIDELY SUSPECT. WITH THE PRESIDENT SEEMING TO PLAY BOTH HIS PEACE AND WAR CARDS AT ONCE, IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO CORRECT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF DRIFT, CONFUSION AND INDECISION.

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## THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon on the secure line to prepare for your talk with the President tomorrow, and give an indication of the subjects which the President will raise. The President will telephone you at Chequers at 1400 hours.

General Scowcroft said the President had been talking at length with General Powell, Jim Baker and himself about the possibilities in the Gulf. General Powell had recommended to the President that more US military capability was needed to guarantee Iraq's defeat. This was based on a fresh estimate of the Iraqis' own military posture. General Powell had recommended three more armoured divisions: two from Germany and one from the United States. He was also suggesting that the British forces might be rounded up to one division (my impression is this would mean about another 4-5,000 men). The President shared General Powell's view that the only forces which could be relied on were the United States and British. General Scowcroft added that the President had not reached a final decision on additional numbers but would probably agree to General Powell's request. The forces themselves would be in place and ready for action not later than 15 January.

General Scowcroft continued that Secretary Baker's first task on his forthcoming visit to the area would be to secure King Fahd's approval for the increased forces. Besides that, he would sound out various heads of government to assess whether they were really willing to face up to the possibility of conflict. He would also take very secret soundings about the prospects of securing a further United Nations Resolution which would tell Saddam Hussain that he had x days or weeks to withdraw from Kuwait, otherwise the members of the multinational force would be free to take any necessary steps to enforce earlier Security Council resolutions. It was important that news of these soundings should not leak out: it would be damaging if it became

known that Baker had tried and failed to obtain support for this idea.

General Scowcroft continued that the big question was the timing of military action. There was not absolute unanimity of views in Washington on this. Everyone was agreed that the military option should be used not later than 1 February if Saddam Hussain had failed to withdraw by then. But Cheney and Scowcroft himself were arguing for any time from early December. They believed that we had to be prepared to move at whatever was the best time militarily, psychologically and diplomatically from our point of view. It was common ground that we had to be able to say that sanctions had been given a reasonable chance. Jim Baker argued that you had to give as long a period as possible for this, because the longer the time you gave Saddam Hussain, the better people would recognise that military action was justified. Scowcroft himself was inclined to the view that Saddam Hussain would have had plenty of time by the beginning of December.

I said it was helpful to have this forewarning of what was on the President's mind. I thought the point which would concern you most was that the decision to send three extra divisions risked delaying the military option too long. We would be getting close to the end of the climatic 'window'. General Scowcroft said that the first two divisions, which would come from Germany, could be in the area by early December. It was only the third division, which would come from the United States, which would take until mid-January. He could conceive that military action could start in December while the third division was still in the process of arriving. He himself favoured that.

I asked whether the President was likely to revert with you to the question of the American Embassy in Kuwait. General Scowcroft did not think that the President would make it a big issue with you. Your message had made your position clear. But there was no doubt the matter was still on his mind: the Americans faced a deadline which we did not have.

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I said I was sure you would continue to argue against a further UN Resolution to authorise the use of force. General Scowcroft made clear this would not worry him. Even Jim Baker, who was the most optimistic, rated the prospects of securing the agreement of the Security Council to such a Resolution as no more than 25 per cent. I said that this only underlined your point that it was better not to try and fail. General Scowcroft said this was the point of the very secret and informal soundings which Secretary Baker would be undertaking: if they were negative, the Americans would not go ahead in New York.

I said that we had noticed that American rhetoric had become noticeably stronger over the last week or two. General Scowcroft said that, in his own view, it had tightened up too much. The President had got a little out of hand. It was important to escalate the rhetoric at a pace that could be sustained over the period until military action became feasible.

Reverting to the UN Resolution, General Scowcroft said the President would argue that going the UN route got you the maximum world unity behind you, if it succeeded. The President was very concerned about the difficulties of going to war from cold: he saw a need to generate some excuse to go. I said you took the view that everything Saddam Hussain had done in Kuwait was more than enough excuse. I added that I thought you might suggest to the President our idea of a presentation to the Security Council about the brutalities in Kuwait. This would need to be very professional. General Scowcroft said it was a capital idea. It was a constant problem to keep the Iraq's brutalities before the public mind.

I said that you remained concerned about the Soviet activities in the area, particularly Primakov's mission. General Scowcroft said that the Americans continued to believe that there was a tug-of-war going on between Primakov and Shevardnadze. Jim Baker would now be going to Moscow as well, because Shevardnadze had said that the situation was too difficult for him to get away to Geneva for a meeting. The advantage was that Baker would see Gorbachev.

D

I said that I thought you would probably mention the GATT problem to the President. You had fought hard at the Rome European Council but the French and Germans had been very obstructive. General Scowcroft said that the President would speak very strongly to Chancellor Kohl on this when they met, assessing that there was a better chance of moving the Germans than the French. But he would probably agree not to go too hard publicly before the German elections on 2 December. I said that would not leave much time for negotiation: the President ought to be leaning on the French and Germans now. General Scowcroft said that he remained very worried indeed about the GATT issue which could cause a major political problem for the President.

It was clear that part of General Scowcroft's purpose in telephoning me was to indicate where he thought it would be useful for you to impress your views once more on the President, in particular on the question of further recourse to the United Nations and an earlier start for military action. I made clear that I did not think you would be in a position to give a straight answer tomorrow to a request for additional British forces. Scowcroft said this would not matter: the President just wanted to register the point.

C. D. P.

C. D. POWELL

3 November 1990

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I said it was helpful to have this forewarning of what was on the President's mind. I thought the point which would concern you most was that the decision to send three extra divisions risked delaying the military option too long. We would be getting close to the end of the climatic 'window'. General Scowcroft said that the first two divisions, which would come from Germany, could be in the area by early December. It was only the third division, which would come from the United States, which would take until mid-January. He could conceive that military action could start in December while the third division was still in the process of arriving. He himself favoured that.

I asked whether the President was likely to revert with you to the question of the American Embassy in Kuwait. General Scowcroft did not think that the President would make it a big issue with you. Your message had made your position clear. But there was no doubt the matter was still on his mind: the Americans faced a deadline which we did not have.

I said I was sure you would continue to argue against a further UN Resolution to authorise the use of force. General Scowcroft made clear this would not worry him. Even Jim Baker, who was the most optimistic, rated the prospects of securing the agreement of the Security Council to such a Resolution as no more than 25 per cent. I said that this only underlined your point that it was better not to try and fail. General Scowcroft said this was the point of the very secret and informal soundings which Secretary Baker would be undertaking: if they were negative, the Americans would not go ahead in New York.

I said that we had noticed that American rhetoric had become noticeably stronger over the last week or two. General Scowcroft said that, in his own view, it had tightened up too much. The President had got a little out of hand. It was important to escalate the rhetoric at a pace that could be sustained over the period until military action became feasible.

Reverting to the UN Resolution, General Scowcroft said the President would argue that going the UN route got you the maximum world unity behind you, if it succeeded. The President was very concerned about the difficulties of going to war from cold: he saw a need to generate some excuse to go. I said you took the view that everything Saddam Hussain had done in Kuwait was more than enough excuse. I added that I thought you might suggest to the President our idea of a presentation to the Security Council about the brutalities in Kuwait. This would need to be very professional. General Scowcroft said it was a capital idea. It was a constant problem to keep the Iraq's brutalities before the public mind.

I said that you remained concerned about the Soviet activities in the area, particularly Primakov's mission. General Scowcroft said that the Americans continued to believe that there was a tug-of-war going on between Primakov and Shevardnadze. Jim Baker would now be going to Moscow as well, because Shevardnadze had said that the situation was too difficult for him to get away to Geneva for a meeting. The advantage was that Baker would see Gorbachev.

I said that I thought you would probably mention the GATT problem to the President. You had fought hard at the Rome European Council but the French and Germans had been very obstructive. General Scowcroft said that the President would speak very strongly to Chancellor Kohl on this when they met, assessing that there was a better chance of moving the Germans than the French. But he would probably agree not to go too hard publicly before the German elections on 2 December. I said that would not leave much time for negotiation: the President ought to be leaning on the French and Germans now. General Scowcroft said that he remained very worried indeed about the GATT issue which could cause a major political problem for the President.

It was clear that part of General Scowcroft's purpose in telephoning me was to indicate where he thought it would be useful for you to impress your views once more on the President, in particular on the question of further recourse to the United Nations and an earlier start for military action. I made clear that I did not think you would be in a position to give a straight answer tomorrow to a request for additional British forces. Scowcroft said this would not matter: the President just wanted to register the point.

C. D. P.

C. D. POWELL

3 November 1990

c:\ts (slh)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

2 November 1990

*Dear Charles,*

*W*

Prime Minister's Meeting with King Hussein,  
Geneva, 6 November

The Prime Minister has agreed to see King Hussein in the margin of the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva on 6 November. You will have seen the Foreign Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 1 November. — *into 48?*

*attached* The Prime Minister's last meeting with the King on 31 August left him in no doubt that our perception of the Gulf Crisis differed profoundly from his and that we were disappointed at Jordan's response. Since then Jordan's sanctions performance has greatly improved, as the Prime Minister acknowledged at OD(G) on 18 October. — *minutes attached*

The Prime Minister might take this opportunity to welcome Jordan's achievement and to encourage the King to continue in this direction. We believe that Jordan's future lies firmly with the international majority and that its application of sanctions is an acknowledgement of this. The Prime Minister may wish to welcome Jordan's request for a UN monitoring presence on its border with Iraq to observe Jordan's sanctions performance. The Prime Minister might say that Jordan's continuing application of sanctions will be the key to the availability of urgent international financial assistance. If the King asks what further help the UK can provide, The Prime Minister might say that we will keep pressure on those countries able to contribute to do so quickly. We have already argued the case for early release of assistance with a number of potential contributors. The UK is already making a major contribution to the international force in the Gulf and a considerable contribution to economic support for Jordan via the EC. We look to those who are not sending forces to lighten Jordan's financial burden.

The King may ask the Prime Minister about the supply of defence equipment to Jordan from the UK. In her last message to him, on 21 September, the Prime Minister said that the

*attached*

/Government

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Government were authorising the resumption of arms exports to Jordan, following the King's personal assurance to the Prime Minister on 31 August that they would not go elsewhere. But deliveries are proving difficult because of the controls being operated by US Navy vessels in the approaches to Aqaba. Despite intervention in Washington, a vessel carrying spares for the transmission system of the Khalid tank was twice refused access but was successful at the third attempt. The problem was that this particular vessel carried other commercial cargo, some of it loaded at a European port, for which the documentation had proved inadequate. Another vessel carrying a larger amount of military equipment for Jordan is due to leave Hull around 6 November for Aqaba. Again we are taking action with the Americans.

In her message of 21 September the Prime Minister told the King that given the presence of the 7th Armoured Brigade in the Gulf we needed to be sure that anti-tank missiles exported to Jordan were indeed in service with the Jordanian armed forces. The Jordanians have proposed inspection arrangements which go a fair way towards meeting our concerns (although no arrangements can be foolproof). But the Trade and Industry Secretary still has misgivings about exporting the missiles. Ministers are corresponding in order to resolve this. If the King does raise arms supplies, the Prime Minister may wish to tell him of the efforts being made to get them to Jordan.

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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TOP SECRET

38(A-C)

Copy No 1 of 1 Copy  
Page No 1 of 3 Pages

6(a-c)

PRIME MINISTER

TALK WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

The President is likely to telephone you later today for a round-up on the situation in the Gulf.

You might like to start by congratulating him on settling the Budget and ask him about the progress with the Congressional Election Campaign (elections are on Tuesday). You ought also to mention the resignation of Sir Geoffrey Howe, which has been reported quite prominently in the American papers.

You might go on to welcome the excellent personal relationship between Tom King and Secretary Cheney. They are keeping in close touch and you are pleased with the decision that our military planners should join the American planners and work together.

You might then welcome Jim Baker's forthcoming visit, and say that you look forward to a very full discussion with him. You would also hope that you and the President could meet during the CSCE Summit in Paris.

You might go on to deplore Soviet activities in the Gulf and Primakov's attempts to find a negotiated solution. This risks spreading confusion and undermining the resolve of some of the Arab Governments (you have seen a disturbing report of the views of the Saudi Interior Minister). You sent a strongly-worded message to Gorbachev urging him to desist: a copy was sent to General Scowcroft.

You might also mention the visit of Brandt and others to Iraq to discuss hostages. This was a nasty surprise coming so soon after the Europeans agreed not to encourage any further emissaries.

TOP SECRET

That might lead on to the main point which you want to make, which is about US reinforcements. You have seen a number of reports that the Americans will be sending extra forces and General Scowcroft has confirmed this to me. (You should not mention the account given by Secretary Cheney to Tom King.)

While you welcome this, you are a little concerned about the implications for timing. How long will it take to deploy the additional forces? Does it not risk bringing us up against

① the closing of the window for military operations in March, in which case we might lose the military option altogether?

② Can we really hold Arab and other international opinion together for that long? Or will we not have to contend with spurious

③ peace proposals and more trouble with the Palestinians? You recognise the need to have sufficient forces in place to guarantee that the military option is successful. But too much delay might become self-defeating. You will want to add that we are ready to help in any way we can, for instance by assisting with transport or by providing more forces within the limits of our resources.

④ *State of our relations in Kuwait*

If the President himself does not raise it, you might ask how

⑤ his thinking has developed on the American Embassy in Kuwait.

We have taken a decision to keep ours there for another month and then review the position. You understand his frustration, but you are anxious that attempts to undertake a relief operation, as has been suggested in the press, might come unstuck and be a propaganda victory for Saddam Hussein. If the purpose was just to demonstrate the Iraqis' refusal to abide by Security Council resolutions that would be fine. But if such an operation were pushed to the point of a military confrontation, it would be very high risk: and would anyway surely be premature, if there were not yet enough forces in place to exercise the military option.

You might add that our respective delegations in New York are in close touch about the way ahead at the United Nations. One

⑥ suggestion we have is to mount a full presentation for the Security Council of the brutalities which are taking place in Kuwait.

Copy no. 1 of 1

Page no. 3 of 3

This would have to be conducted by the Kuwaitis themselves and we would want to be sure it was a thoroughly professional job.

①

Finally on a unrelated matter, you might say that you very much regret the failure so far to get the European Community to table an offer on agriculture for the GATT negotiations. A further attempt will be made next week but you are not very optimistic. The problem lies entirely with the French and the Germans.

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

2 November 1990

you will see a note <sup>about</sup> ~~by~~ a brave Brit. in hiding in Kuwait attached: you might mention it to the President.

Also see daily sitrep.

C.D.P.  
2/xi

Covering TOP SECRET  
SECRET AND PERSONAL



36  
A: IRAQ  
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LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4  
2 November 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 31 October enclosing a revised draft of the directive for our military commanders in the Gulf. I have shown this to the Prime Minister who is content with it, subject to one further amendment which is to omit the second half of paragraph 5 (beginning "not least ..."). The Prime Minister would be happy for the Defence Secretary to send a copy to Secretary Cheney, provided that we can be sure that it will be held as tightly on the American side as it has been on ours. I shall also send a copy to General Scowcroft on the same conditions. (Perhaps you could let me have a clean copy, taking account of the Prime Minister's amendment.)

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler, with circulation to be limited to the same people who saw my letter of 23 October.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November 1990

*Dear Charles,*

*at flap.*  
Thank you for your letter of 23 October enclosing a copy of a message the Prime Minister has received from the Japanese Prime Minister about his recent visit to the Middle East. I enclose a draft reply. If the Prime Minister is content, we will telegraph the text to Tokyo for onward transmission, making clear that there will be no signed original.

Despite domestic concerns about Japanese involvement in the Gulf and some initial hesitations because of this, the Japanese Government's response to the crisis so far has been fairly good. Japan is heavily dependent on oil imports from the region and the Government has used this as a justification for its forthcoming attitude.

There is no reason to doubt that Mr Kaifu took a robust line during his visit to the Middle East. This is evidently the Iraqi perception: Japanese nationals, along with Americans, British and Germans, are amongst those who have been detained on strategic sites. They have not benefited from Iraq's recent attempts to drive wedges between the allies - indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the Japanese Government has rebuffed Iraqi approaches. But the pressures are building up and this no doubt explains the proposed visit Nakasone to Iraq. The draft reply aims to reinforce the Japanese government in their firm stance.

Japan's financial response has been good. At \$4 billion Japan is contributing more in absolute terms to the burden-sharing operation than any country except the United States, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. At 0.14% of GDP, Japan's contribution is less than that of the USA, UK, France, Germany and Korea, but is nonetheless respectable. The 50-50 split between military and economic costs is also satisfactory and stands in notable contrast to the tendency of most contributors to emphasise the latter. The draft reply accordingly acknowledges Japan's performance in this area and places

/the



the emphasis on the special urgency of Jordan's case, the need for quick disbursement and for grants rather than loans.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*  
*L. Gass*

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

HE

FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: Mr Toshiki Kaifu, KBE  
Prime Minister of Japan  
Tokyo

Thank you for writing to me following your recent tour of the Middle East. I agree that it is now more important than ever that we should stay in close touch and have the benefit of each other's thinking on this vital issue.

I welcome your firmness in pointing out to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister that a solution to the present crisis can only be achieved by <sup>full</sup> Iraqi implementation of the relevant Security Council Resolutions: I believe this is a message which King Hussein of Jordan has now accepted.

*and, in revising Iraq's attempts to divide the countries opposed to it by*

The Iraqis have attempted to drive wedges between members of the coalition which stands against it, most notably by offering preferential treatment to some hostages. Iraq's detention of foreign nationals is a flagrant breach of international law and we must stand firm in our condemnation. I welcome the fact that you and your Government have supported this position. The European Council at its meeting in Rome last week reiterated the Twelve's determination to remain united on this question and highlighted the dangers of separate negotiations with Iraq on the return of the hostages.

*where we are all grateful for the work Japan has made*

Japan has made a major contribution to the costs of countering Saddam Hussein's aggression. Assistance to those countries in the region which are suffering as a result of sanctions is becoming urgent. I am thinking of Egypt, Turkey and particularly Jordan. I believe Jordan's performance in complying with sanctions has improved recently and there is no doubt that its economic problems are real and pressing. Assistance from the European Community's budget will become available in 1991, but anything Japan could do now, preferably on a grant basis, would be of great value.

*mainly help, more will come only from the 1991 budget.*

*oper help to tom*

*en*





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Re over-night

Telegram.

CDD <sup>ms</sup>

2/xi

SECRET

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/NO 10, PS/PUS  
SIR PERCY CRADOCK CABINET OFFICE

THE GULF: BAKER'S TOUR

1. AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN ROME, KIMMITT IS NOW JOINING BAKER'S TOUR. I SAW HIM ALONE THIS AFTERNOON.
2. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER'S ITINERARY IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. BUT ON PRESENT PLANNING HE IS FLYING TO BAHRAIN TO SEE THE AILING RULER AND TO THANK HIM FOR HIS STAUNCHNESS AS AN ALLY OVER SOME 40 YEARS: TO TAIF TO SEE THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO GAUGE HIS MOOD AND TO FIRM UP SOME FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS: TO RIYADH FOR IMPORTANT TALKS WITH THE KING ABOUT HOW THE SAUDIS SEE THE NEXT STEPS AND ALSO TO OBTAIN A LARGER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION AND TO GET THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN ATTITUDES: TO CAIRO FOR SIMILAR TALKS (BUT WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPONENT REVERSED, IN THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE AGREED TO FORGIVE THE EGYPTIAN DEBT), AND ALSO TO SEE THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WILL BE IN THE REGION AND TO SOUND HIM OUT GENTLY ABOUT ATTITUDES TO MILITARY ACTION: TO TURKEY TO SUGGEST PROVISION OF TURKISH MILITARY FORCES TO THE COALITION: TO PARIS TO TRY TO ASCERTAIN WHAT FRENCH THINKING REALLY IS: TO LONDON FOR FRANK DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT MAY BE NECESSARY IN COMING WEEKS IN TERMS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATION (THE FORMER RELATING TO POSSIBLE MOVES AT THE UN): AND FINALLY TO GENEVA TO SEE SHEVARDNADZE. THE EXACT ROUTE MAY CHANGE. BUT THIS WILL ENABLE BAKER TO SEE ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE OTHER MAIN PARTICIPANTS. KIMMITT SAID THAT, IN MANY WAYS, BAKER WOULD HAVE LIKED TO START IN LONDON. BUT THE TIMETABLE DID NOT MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.
3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS FROM ME, KIMMITT INDICATED THAT BAKER'S MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO GET THE VIEWS OF THE COALITION PARTNERS IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE DECISIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW HOW FIRM THEY WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE IF ECONOMIC MEASURES FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT. IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL IN SAUDI ARABIA TO HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING ABOUT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. BAKER WAS NOT GOING TO THE AREA BECAUSE THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT THE COALITION WAS BREAKING DOWN (AS SOME COMMENTATORS WERE SUGGESTING). THERE WAS ADMITTEDLY SOME PROBLEM OVER THE SYRIANS, WHO SEEMED TO THINK THAT THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ENOUGH RECOGNITION FOR THEIR SUPPORT. OTHERWISE THE COALITION BOTH ON THE GROUND AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS HOLDING UP VERY WELL. BAKER WOULD ALSO BE TESTING WHETHER ANY OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FORCES. HE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE EGYPTIANS TO GET THEIR SECOND DIVISION IN QUICKLY.

4. I ASKED ABOUT ALL THE SPECULATION THAT CHENEY AND POWELL WERE ASKING THE PRESIDENT FOR A FURTHER 100,000 TROOPS TO IMPROVE THE RATIO FOR THE LAND BATTLE. KIMMITT ADMITTED THAT, IN MILITARY TERMS, THE RATIO OF FORCES LOOKED UNSATISFACTORY AND INADEQUATE FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. BUT HE SEEMED PRETTY CLEAR THAT NO DECISION TO INCREASE FORCE LEVELS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN, AND INDEED SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE DECIDED UNTIL AFTER BAKER'S REPORT ON WHAT THE COALITION WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE AND WHAT IT SEEMED TO WANT IN TERMS OF ACTION FOR THE FUTURE. I SAID THAT IF A DECISION WERE PUT OFF UNTIL MID-NOVEMBER AND IF IT WERE AGREED THAT A FURTHER 100,000 TROOPS WERE REQUIRED, THAT WOULD SEEM TO DELAY THE EXERCISE OF THE MILITARY OPTION UNTIL MID-JANUARY AT THE EARLIEST. I ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE MORE TROOPS THAT WERE PUT IN, THE MORE LIKELY IT WAS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE USED, UNLESS SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE TO CRACK. KIMMITT SAID THAT, IF HE DID NOT CRACK, HE WOULD HAVE TO BE CRACKED. IF MEMBERS OF THE COALITION AGREED TO HIGHER FORCE LEVELS IN THEATRE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLICIT THAT THEY ALSO ACCEPTED THE INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FORCES COULD BE BROUGHT IN REASONABLY QUICKLY FROM EUROPE. BUT HE AGREED THAT THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE OPENING FROM MID-JANUARY. B  
5.

5. I ASKED ABOUT THE AMERICANS HELD PARTICULARLY IN KUWAIT. I HAD NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S HARsher RHETORIC FOLLOWING THE LATEST UN RESOLUTION. DID KIMMITT EXPECT MILITARY ACTION TO BE TAKEN TO FREE THEM? KIMMITT SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE DID NOT. THE US WOULD NOT WANT TO TRIGGER A SITUATION THAT COULD LEAD TO FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES BEFORE THEY WERE READY FOR THESE. BUT THE SUBJECT WAS BEING WRESTLED WITH.

6. I ASKED ABOUT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TIME FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. BUT HE KNEW THAT BAKER WOULD HAVE THE PROBLEM IN MIND FOR HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINKAGE. BUT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT FORGOTTEN.

COMMENT

7. I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT BAKER WILL WANT TO REPORT VERY FRANKLY IN LONDON ON THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION, AND TO DISCUSS WHAT THE NEXT POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS SHOULD BE. BAKER'S AND KIMMITT'S INCLINATION WOULD BE TO TRY TO GET FURTHER AUTHORITY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ONLY (REPEAT ONLY) IF AN APPROACH WOULD CLEARLY SUCCEED. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, LISTEN VERY CAREFULLY TO OUR VIEWS AND TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT. BAKER WILL NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MILITARY PLANNING. BUT HE MAY BRING UP BOTH COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FUTURE LEVEL OF FORCES. I THINK THAT HE COULD WELL ASK US FOR A FURTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTION.

8. NEEDLESS TO SAY, KIMMITT'S FRANK COMMENTS SHOULD BE VERY CLOSELY HELD.

ACLAND

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

## SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES, US URGING UNSG TO MOVE QUICKLY ON HUMANITARIAN ELEMENTS OF SCR 674. US ALSO SWINGING AWAY FROM PRESSING A SEQUENCE OF SINGLE ISSUE RESOLUTIONS TOWARDS 2 OR 3 MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS.

## DETAIL

2. THE MINISTER CALLED ON WOLF (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IO), IN BOLTON'S ABSENCE IN NEW YORK, ON 2 NOVEMBER. WOLF SAID THAT DURING HIS CURRENT CAMPAIGN SWEEP, THE PRESIDENT HAD FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF NATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION OF US CITIZENS IN KUWAIT. BOLTON HAD THEREFORE BEEN URGENTLY DESPACHED TO PRESS THE UNSG TO MOVE QUICKLY IN HIS EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT PARA 7 OF SCR 674, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE EVACUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS AND THE REPROVISIONING OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. THERE MIGHT BE POSSIBILITIES HERE FOR BRINGING THE ICRC INTO PLAY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT TODAY NOTING THAT THE IRAQIS COULD ASSIST REPROVISIONING BY TURNING ON WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND PROVIDING FOOD, CLOTHES AND CLEAN SHELTER TO THIRD STATE NATIONALS. IF THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO THIS THEMSELVES THEY SHOULD PERMIT EXTERNAL REPROVISIONING.

3. STATE WERE NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. BUT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING US SERIOUSNESS ON THIS ISSUE AND TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE OF IMPLEMENTATION. STATE FEARED THAT WITHOUT REPROVISIONING THE US EMBASSY MIGHT BE FORCED TO CLOSE BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. THIS WOULD BE QUOTE A SYMBOLIC VICTORY FOR SADDAM AND A POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR US UNQUOTE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER QUOTE BUT WE COULD SURVIVE THE HUMILIATION UNQUOTE.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER GULF RESOLUTIONS DURING THE US PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, WOLF SAID THAT THEIR TACTICS HAD EVOLVED (AND INDICATED THAT THINKING CHANGED ALMOST DAY TO DAY). INSTEAD OF THE GAMEPLAN OF A SERIES OF SINGLE-ISSUE RESOLUTIONS (MY TELNO 2654), THE US WERE NOW CONSIDERING A COUPLE OF MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS:

I - COMPENSATION/REPARATIONS PLUS WAR CRIMES: THIS WAS A NEW LINKAGE. THE US WERE AWARE OF UK CONCERN ABOUT THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ON COMPENSATION/REPARATIONS, BUT LEGAL ADVISERS WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS ON 5 NOVEMBER. ON WAR CRIMES, WOLF SAID THAT THE US WERE NOT SEEKING TO ESTABLISH NUREMBURG-TYPE INSTITUTIONS. INSTEAD, THEY WISHED TO LAY OUT QUOTE CATEGORIES OF MORAL OBLIGATION UNQUOTE. FAILURE BY IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THESE WOULD RESULT IN INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION. THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAKE PEOPLE CLOSE TO SADDAM REALISE THAT THEY WERE IN QUOTE PERSONAL PERIL UNQUOTE.

BUT THE PRECISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. IF IT ENDED IN WAR, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SENIOR IRAQIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE SERIOUS.

II - MEASURES AGAINST SANCTIONS VIOLATORS: TO THIS IDEA WOULD NOW BE ADDED A CUT OFF OF SERVICES AND (A NEW ELEMENT) A PROVISION IN THE RESOLUTION TO ENSURE THE CONTINUING APPLICABILITY OF SCR 661 EVEN AFTER A POSSIBLE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. THE IDEA HERE WAS TO ENSURE THAT SANCTIONS COULD NOT BE LIFTED AUTOMATICALLY ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, BUT WOULD REQUIRE THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE REFERENCE IN PARA 12 OF SCR 674 TO THE NEED TO RESTORE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF, BY EXTENDING THE PARAMETERS OF SCR 660, ALREADY PROVIDED A BASIS FOR US THINKING ON THIS ISSUE, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE CONTINUING APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS MORE EXPLICIT.

5. WOLF SAID THAT IF A FURTHER RESOLUTION WAS NEEDED, IT WAS LIKELY TO BE QUOTE MORE MILITARISTIC UNQUOTE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT EMERGED FROM BAKER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE GULF. IF AS A RESULT OF THIS THE US THOUGHT THAT FURTHER UNCOVER WAS NEEDED (UNDER ARTICLE 42 OR 53), THEN THE BEST WINDOW WAS LIKELY TO BE DURING THE US PRESIDENCY.

6. ON ARAB/ISRAEL, WOLF SAID THAT THE US WERE THINKING CAREFULLY ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. THERE WAS ONE PARTICULAR POINT ON WHICH THEY WOULD WELCOME UK SUPPORT. IF IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, THE US THOUGHT STRONGLY THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE IN NEW YORK. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE DEBATE IN GENEVA, AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE OF NEW YORK. MORE THOUGHT WOULD BE NEEDED ON THIS.

7. WOLF STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO SIR D HANNEY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON OTHER MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICANS DURING THEIR PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL.

ACLAND

YYYY

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PRIMAKOV

## SUMMARY

1. I CALLED ON PRIMAKOV THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON SADDAM IMPLEMENTING ALL SCR'S. BUT THEY WOULD NOT GO BEYOND THAT IE THERE WOULD BE NO SUPPORT FOR ACTION TO TOPPLE SADDAM INSIDE IRAQ. AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, THERE MUST BE A POLITICAL/MILITARY PACKAGE FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND PARALLEL ACTION ON ARAB/ISRAEL. SADDAM NEEDED TO SAVE 'FACE'. CONTRARY TO WHAT FALIN TOLD ME, PRIMAKOV WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SECURING THE RELEASE OF SOVIET HOSTAGES. HE WARNED AGAINST EXPECTING DOMESTIC PRESSURE, OR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, TO SECURE IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT OR SADDAM'S DOWNFALL. I WARNED AGAINST PUTTING STRAINS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS OR UNDERMINING THE MILITARY OPTION. PRIMAKOV WAS INSISTENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BREAK RANKS IT WAS NOT IN THE RUSSIAN INTEREST TO RISK FALLING OUT WITH ITS WESTERN PARTNERS. HE ASKED THAT THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE CONVEYED PERSONALLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

## DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON PRIMAKOV THIS AFTERNOON. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO IRAQ, AND ON SOVIET POLICY ON THE GULF:

- (A) WE MUST ALL INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO GO BEYOND THEM. NOR SHOULD WE HINT THAT WE CONTEMPLATED DOING SO, SINCE THIS MERELY MADE SADDAM MORE INTRANSIGENT. IN OTHER WORDS, SADDAM MUST WITHDRAW, FROM KUWAIT UNCONDITIONALLY, BUT WE SHOULD NOT THEN TRY TO BRING ABOUT HIS POLITICAL DOWNFALL IN IRAQ.
- (B) AFTER SADDAM HAD WITHDRAWN, WE SHOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER A PACKAGE DEAL ON THE GULF/MIDDLE EAST REGION. IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS WOULD NEED GUARANTEES, AND KUWAIT WOULD NEED FRIENDLY ARAB FORCES TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY IN PLACE OF THE CURRENT

- MULTINATIONAL FORCE. SADDAM TOO WOULD NEED GUARANTEES THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. THIS PACKAGE SHOULD BE BROKERED BY THE ARABS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ACTIVATE THEM IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
- SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT SEPARATELY, NEGOTIATIONS MUST BEGIN ON ARAB/ISRAEL. PRIMEKOV DID NOT SUGGEST HOW THIS PROCESS WAS TO BE INITIATED, OR BY WHOM.
- (C) THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO INTENTION OF BREAKING RANKS WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER THE CRISIS. THE SOVIET UNION'S FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS DICTATED STAYING CLOSELY IN STEP.
- (D) HE HAD TOLD SADDAM THAT HOLDING FOREIGN HOSTAGES WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. GIVEN HIS LONG PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH SADDAM, WHOM HE HAS KNOWN TWENTY YEARS, HE HOPED THIS MIGHT HAVE REGISTERED. HE HAD DEMANDED THE RELEASE NOT JUST OF RUSSIAN HOSTAGES, BUT OF ALL OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS TOO. SADDAM HAD AGREED THAT ALL SOVIET PERSONNEL COULD LEAVE AS THEIR CONTRACT EXPIRED. PRIMAKOV BELIEVED THAT SOME 2,500 OR HALF THE SOVIET TOTAL OF AROUND 5,000 PERSONNEL WOULD BE OUT BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. SADDAM HAD ALLOWED SOME 30 SOVIET MILITARY SPECIALISTS TO LEAVE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, WHEN THEIR CONTRACTS HAD EXPIRED. NO SOVIET CITIZENS HAD BEEN MOVED TO AREAS THAT ARE POTENTIAL MILITARY TARGETS. (THIS CONTRADICTS FALIN'S CLAIM TO ME THIS MORNING MY TELNO 2078).
- (E) THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF POPULAR DISAFFECTION WITH SADDAM IN IRAQ. HIS GRIP WAS TOO TIGHT. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES TO UNDERMINE HIM.
- (F) SANCTIONS WERE ONLY WORKING VERY SLOWLY, AND WERE PRETTY LEAKY.
- (G) HAVING GIVEN UP THE GAINS SECURED AT VERY GREAT COST IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, SADDAM WAS NOW DOUBLY DETERMINED NOT TO BE FORCED OUT OF KUWAIT EMPTY HANDED. THIS WAS WHY SOME SORT OF FACE-SAVING PACKAGE MUST BE CONSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW ON IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. WE MUST WORK WITH THE GRAIN OF SADDAM'S PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP. HE WAS NOT A EUROPEAN.
- (H) THE ARABS, EG THE SAUDIS, WERE VERY 'GUNGHO' WHEN THEY WERE TALKING TO WESTERN INTERLOCUTORS. THEY WERE MUCH LESS KEEN



ON A MILITARY SOLUTION WHEN TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES.

- (I) PRIMAKOV WAS EVASIVE ABOUT WHAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DO IN THE EVENT OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. HE SAID (CORRECTLY) THAT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY THE SUPREME SOVIET. HE COULD NOT SPECULATE ON THE OUTCOME. (IN FACT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE STRONG OPPOSITION TO SOVIET PARTICIPATION.)
- (J) PRIMAKOV DETECTED A CHANGE IN SADDAM'S ATTITUDE COMPARED WITH HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE SPECIFIC BUT SADDAM SEEMED LESS CONFIDENT THAT HE HAD BEEN, AND LESS FULL OF RINGING CLAIMS ABOUT IRAQ'S AGE-OLD RIGHT TO KUWAIT.

3. AS I HAD DONE WITH FALIN, I STRESSED TO PRIMAKOV THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CONSENSUS. I ALSO WARNED AGAINST ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE MILITARY OPTION MIGHT NOT BE EXERCISED IF NECESSARY. THIS COULD ONLY GIVE SADDAM COMFORT. WE HAD BEEN PERTURBED, IN THIS REGARD, BY GORBACHEV'S REMARKS IN PARIS THAT THE MILITARY OPTION WAS UNACCEPTABLE. PRIMAKOV INSISTED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED. HE COULD NOT IMMEDIATELY LAY HIS HAND ON THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S REMARKS, BUT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT RULING OUT THE MILITARY OPTION AS A LAST RESORT. HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM.

#### COMMENT

4. TWO MESSAGES CAME THROUGH PARTICULARLY CLEARLY AT THIS ENCOUNTER. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WANT SADDAM OUT OF KUWAIT AND WANT TO SEE ALL THE SCR'S IMPLEMENTED IN THE PROCESS: BUT THEY DO NOT WANT TO GO BEYOND THIS. THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR ANY IDEA THAT THE COALITION SHOULD GO ON TO TOPPLE SADDAM INTERNALLY.

5. THE SECOND MESSAGE WAS THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THE RUSSIANS BREAKING WITH THE CONSENSUS. PRIMAKOV WAS MOST INSISTENT ON THIS SCORE, REPEATEDLY TOLD ME THAT 'WE SHOULD NOT WORRY', AND ASKED ME TO ENSURE THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS BROUGHT TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER (TO WHOM HE SENT HIS WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS).

6. IT IS CLEAR THEREFORE (AS I ARGUED IN MY TELNO 2073) THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT CONTEMPLATING BREAKING RANKS: BUT IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY WILL LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED IN THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION (AT PRESENT THEIR FAVOURED ROUTE IS 'ACTIVATING THE ARABS'). WHEN I ASKED PRIMAKOV WHAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DO NEXT, HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN. HE DID HOWEVER, AGREE TO KEEP IN TOUCH AND

DISCUSS FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

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RIYADH TELNO 1110: SYRIAN POSITION

SUMMARY

1. US AWARE OF ASSAD'S VIEWS BUT UNWILLING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA UNTIL DAMASCUS SEVERS LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

DETAIL

2. WE ASKED STATE FOR THEIR REACTION TO THE SYRIAN POSITION REPORTED IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF TUR. STATE'S SYRIA DESK CONFIRMED THE LINE TAKEN BY BUSBY ON 25 OCTOBER (OUR TELNO 2595). SYRIA WAS DOING THE RIGHT THING OVER THE GULF AND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WAS A USEFUL SYMBOLIC COMMITMENT. BUT THEIR ACTIONS HAD BEEN DICTATED BY SYRIAN SELF-INTEREST. IRAQ WAS A TRADITIONAL RIVAL. SYRIA HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN ADEQUATELY REWARDED FOR ITS DEPLOYMENTS IN FINANCIAL AND OTHER TERMS.

3. ASSAD'S MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO CURRY FAVOUR WITH THE WEST. THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF AFFORDING HIM THE RESPECTABILITY HE CRAVED UNTIL DAMASCUS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT HAD SEVERED ITS LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THIS INCLUDED THE EXPULSION OF TERRORIST GROUPS - PFLP(GC), ISLAMIC JIHAD, ABU NIDAL - AND GREATER SYRIAN COOPERATION OVER PAN AM 103. WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA - FOR WHICH THERE WAS AS YET NO EVIDENCE - THE US WOULD REMAIN VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA. THEY WERE UNABLE IN LAW AND UNWILLING IN ETHNICS TO DO OTHERWISE.

4. STATE SAID THAT AFTER BAKER'S MEETINGS WITH ASSAD AND THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND HIS FURTHER MESSAGE ABOUT TERRORISM (TUR), DAMASCUS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE US POSITION. THE SYRIANS HAD NOT YET REPLIED TO BAKER'S MESSAGE. UNTIL THEY WERE SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRUCTIVE, ASSAD'S VIEWS AND SYRIAN PRESS COMMENT - WHICH WAS PARTLY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION ANYWAY - WOULD NOT INFLUENCE THE US POSITION. THE SAUDIS AMONG OTHERS

WERE AWARE OF THIS.

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MY TELNO 1802: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT EXPLAINS WHY HE DID NOT SEND A MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. TWO SUGGESTIONS: A MEETING OF PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMPARTIAL PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MANDATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS ISSUED ON 1 NOVEMBER (DOCUMENT S/21919 DATED 31 OCTOBER: COPIES FAXED TO NENAD AND UND).

3. THE FIRST PART OF THE REPORT IS FACTUAL. IT DESCRIBES SCR 672 AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION TO SEND A MISSION TO THE REGION, AND THE ISRAELI REJECTION OF BOTH. THE REPORT GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF SCR 673, AFTER WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SENT AN ORAL MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT URGING IT TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION.

4. A LETTER SENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 31 OCTOBER BY THE NEW ISRAELI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS REPRODUCED IN THE REPORT. HE REITERATES THAT JERUSALEM IS THE SOVEREIGN CAPITAL OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NO ROLE. THIS IS DESCRIBED AS A LONG-STANDING ISRAELI POLICY: IN 1971 ISRAEL DECLINED TO RECEIVE THE ENVOYS AND THE MISSION TO JERUSALEM MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF SCR 298. THE LETTER ALSO CONVEYS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE FULL TEXT IN HEBREW OF THE ZAMIR REPORT ON THE INCIDENTS IN JERUSALEM, TOGETHER WITH A SUMMARY IN ENGLISH. THE LATTER WILL BE ISSUED SHORTLY AS AN ADDENDUM TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CLASHES OF 8 OCTOBER IN JERUSALEM. IT REFERS ONLY TO THE REPORTS OF AN ISRAELI AND A

PALSTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION (B'TSELEM AND AL-HAQ) WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AS ADDENDA TO THE REPORT.

6. THE REPORT THEN MAKES A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE GOULDING REPORT OF JANUARY 1988 AND TO SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ISSUED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT ALSO DESCRIBES THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES IN GENEVA AND NEW YORK IN LATE MAY AND THE VETOING THEN OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED A SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND RECOMMENDED WAYS AND MEANS OF ENSURING THE SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOTES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS TO WHICH HE REFERS ALL REAFFIRM THE APPLICABILITY TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. HE QUOTES ARTICLE 27 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ENTITLEMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION TO SAFETY AND PROTECTION, ARTICLE 29 ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OCCUPYING POWER, AND ARTICLE 1 WHICH STATES THAT THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE CONVENTION IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. HE EXPLAINS THAT ISRAEL, ITSELF A HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY, DOES NOT ACCEPT THE DE JURE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, ALTHOUGH SINCE 1967 IT HAS DECIDED TO ACT IN DE FACTO ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONVENTION'S HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS. BUT THIS HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ICRC, THE 'GUARDIAN' OF THE CONVENTIONS, OR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

8. THE REPORT ENDS WITH A NUMBER OF 'OBSERVATIONS' BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE STATES THAT HE HAS BEEN GUIDED BY TWO MAIN CONSIDERATIONS: FIRST THAT THE EVENTS OF 8 OCTOBER WERE ONLY THE MOST RECENT OF MANY GRAVE INCIDENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND SECOND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES ENTRUSTED TO HIM UNDER SCRS 672 AND 673 SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF EARLIER EFFORTS HE HAD MADE. HE RECALLS THAT THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION OF THE GOULDING REPORT WAS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE DE JURE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO CORRECT ITS PRACTISES. IN LINE WITH THE GOULDING REPORT THE NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF OF UNRWA IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM 15 IN 1987 TO 51 AND THE SIZE OF THE ICRC DELEGATION FROM 15 TO 45. BUT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT THEIR DISTRUST OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES IS SO DEEP THAT ONLY AN IMPARTIAL PRESENCE, PROPERLY MANDATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A CREDIBLE SENSE OF PROTECTION. MANY ASKED WHY UNTSO SHOULD NOT BE ASSIGNED TO MONITOR THE SITUATION

IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

9. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REFERS TO THE AIME MISSION OF EARLY JULY. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT HE WOULD PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO COMPLY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. IF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES FELT THAT FURTHER MEASURES- SUCH AS THE DESIGNATION OF A PROTECTING POWER - WERE REQUIRED, IT WAS A MATTER FOR THEM. HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO SEND A MISSION TO THE AREA AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP THE DISCUSSIONS BEGUN IN THE SUMMER. AT THAT TIME THE ISRAELIS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING NEW MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN THE SUBSEQUENT MONTHS THERE WAS A DECREASE IN THE MILITARY PRESENCE AND IN THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. BUT THE EVENTS OF 8 OCTOBER SPARKED OFF A NEW SPATE OF VIOLENCE.

10 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATES THAT THE NUMEROUS APPEALS TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO ABIDE BY THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE. FOR ANY MEASURE OF PROTECTION TO BE ENSURED, CO-OPERATION OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IS ESSENTIAL. GIVEN THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES FOR ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE CONVENTION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT WISH TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE MEASURES THEY MIGHT TAKE. PALESTINIAN APPEALS FOR AN IMPARTIAL PRESENCE, PROPERLY MANDATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, WERE A MATTER FOR DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

11. THE REPORT CLOSES WITH A CALL FOR AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL TO SECURE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS AND ENABLE THEM TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER.

12. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT AND MY SECOND IFT FOR AN ACCOUNT OF FIRST REACTIONS TO THE REPORT.

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MIPT : OCCUPIED TERRITORIES : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT : FIRST REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. INITIAL REACTIONS TO SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT.

DETAIL

2. MOST DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK ARE STILL DIGESTING THE CONTENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. THE SUGGESTION THAT THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION MIGHT MEET TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE MEASURES HAS AROUSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST. THE ARABS SEE THIS AS HAVING OVERTONES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND OBVIOUSLY RELISH THE PROSPECT OF SUCH A LARGE GATHERING LAMBASTING ISRAEL. MEMBERS OF THE SAUDI MISSION HAVE COMMENTED TO US THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD CARRY ENORMOUS MORAL AUTHORITY EVEN WITH THE ISRAELIS. ARAB LEGAL EXPERTS ARE ALREADY LOOKING INTO HOW SUCH A MEETING COULD BE ORGANISED AND HOW IT WOULD TAKE ANY DECISIONS. THEY HAVE POINTED OUT THAT IF IT WERE TO PROCEED BY CONSENSUS AND THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESENT THEY COULD BLOCK IT. THE ARABS ARE, HOWEVER, WARY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL USING THIS IDEA TO DUMP THE PROBLEM INTO THE LAPS OF THE ICRC IN GENEVA (AS GUARDIANS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION) OR OF THE SWISS GOVERNMENT (AS DEPOSITARIES) FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD. MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US AND TO THE ARABS THAT THIS IS NOT THEIR INTENTION. THEY HAVE STRESSED THAT SINCE ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION IS EFFECTIVE IS IN A SENSE COMMON TO BOTH BODIES.

3. THE DEPUTY PLO OBSERVER COMMENTED TO US THAT THE REPORT WAS QUITE A GOOD PEICE OF WORK. THERE WERE A FEW POINTS ABOUT WHICH HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY, BUT HE THOUGHT THE REPORT AS A WHOLE WAS SOMETHING WITH WHICH THE PLO AND THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES COULD WORK.

4. THE ARABS ARE NOT AT PRESENT FOCUSSING ON THE SUGGESTION THAT

THERE SHOULD BE AN IMPARTIAL PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PROPERLY MANDATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS AND A NUMBER OF THE MODERATE ARABS REMAIN INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF UN OMBUDSMAN IN THE TERRITORIES (AN IDEA DRAWN FROM THE GOULDING REPORT) MOST OF THE ARABS ACCEPT THAT AT PRESENT THERE IS NO REALISTIC PROSPECT OF A NEW UN PRESENCE BEING ADMITTED TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY POINT OUT THAT EVEN BLANCHARD, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, HAS NOT BEEN ADMITTED FOR A YEAR AND THAT THE REJECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECENT MISSION BACKED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR ANYONE ELSE GOING.

5. MEMBERS OF THE U S MISSION HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY SEE SOME ATTRACTION IN THE IDEA OF A MEETING OF ALL THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION BECAUSE THIS WOULD TAKE THE ISSUE OUT OF NEW YORK AND AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A WHILE. THE COUNCIL COULD THEN CONCENTRATE ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY THINK IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD TURN UP TO SUCH A MEETING. THEY ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN IMPARTIAL PRESENCE MANDATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THEIR VIEW EVEN AN EXPANSION OF UNRWA'S MANDATE WAS LIKELY TO PRESENT INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES IN WASHINGTON. WE MENTIONED TO THEM THE IDEA OF A UN OMBUDSMAN WHO WOULD WORK WITH RATHER THAN AGAINST THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS SEEMED TO STRIKE THEM AS A NEW THOUGHT, WHICH THEY DID NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND.

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A brave man

Mr Gore-Booth

#### CONDITIONS IN KUWAIT

1. This evening the Emergency Unit received a telephone call from Mr Ron Sargeant, a British citizen in hiding in Kuwait. Mr Sargeant asked for Mr Young by name and was directed to me in his absence. He said he was calling on a telephone (presumably a satellite link) lent to him by the Kuwaiti resistance and had earlier been in touch with his wife (from whom he is separated). On 20 October we had received a fax from Mr Sargeant containing much useful information about conditions in Kuwait and had attempted to get a message of thanks back to him through the Embassy. We have also been in touch

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with Sir John Stanley MP, of whom Mr Sargeant is a constituent.

2. Mr Sargeant was clearly under a great deal of strain and broke down twice during the conversation. He said that conditions for those in hiding in Kuwait had deteriorated markedly in recent weeks; they were now much worse off than those in the Embassy. The house where he was hiding had recently been searched for a second time by the Iraqis. He and his colleagues had only been saved by the presence of mind of the Kuwaiti who was hiding them who had had to stand with a gun at his head for 20 minutes while soldiers looted his TV, stereo and video equipment. Mr Sargeant thought that many Kuwaitis were reaching the end of their tether. They were beginning to despair of ever regaining their country and might soon become reluctant to shelter British citizens in the courageous way they had done up to now.

3. Mr Sargeant said that the British community could not last for much longer. He was lucky to be in touch with a number of others: those hiding on their own were in a far worse position. It was only a matter of time before everyone would have to give themselves up, thus adding another 1350 detainees (his figure) to those already held by the Iraqis. Drawing on Mr Lennox-Boyd's Gulf Link interview (which Mr Sargeant had heard) I said that a decision on whether to give up was a personal one and would have to be taken in the light of individual circumstances. Mr Sargeant said this was all very well. But the community was frightened of what the Iraqis would do to anyone who gave themselves up. Four Western bodies had recently been found under a pile of rubbish in Kuwait City: he had heard (but could not confirm) that one of them was an American. He wanted to appeal to the Prime Minister to send the troops in very soon; as far as the British community was concerned that was the only way out of the crisis. He repeated this several times; I said I would pass the message on.

4. Mr Sargeant added that he was in close touch with the Kuwaiti resistance which, despite media reports to the contrary, remained very active. He could assure me - as members of his group had assured the Americans - that they were in a position to control Kuwait City should an attack be mounted. He could guarantee that

there would be no street fighting should the multinational force move in. The resistance possessed ground-to-air missiles and were in a position to deny the Iraqis the use of Kuwait Airport.

5. This was the first direct contact that the Emergency Unit has had with anyone in hiding in Kuwait for some time. It confirms what Mr Weston and Colonel Duncan have reported about the strain under which the British community is currently existing. Mr Sargeant said he had further useful information to pass on and (though I do not think we can necessarily take all that he said at face value) we managed to arrange successfully for him to speak to the MOD later in the evening. I offered to transmit any further messages to his family but he said that, having spoken to his wife and children, he had done all that was necessary.

S.G.E.

S G Eldon

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PRIME MINISTER

The Gulf: US Military Planning

If you are talking to the President in the next few days, I imagine you will want to say something about the implications of any American decision to send substantial reinforcements to the Gulf and the effect this is likely to have on the timing of any military operation.

2. It seems that the American military are recommending that another US corps should be despatched, that this will take two-and-a-half months, and that it will mean that the earliest date for launching any offensive would be 1 February. We cannot of course be sure that this recommendation has been accepted by the President. Nor can we be sure that we have the full picture of American planning: for example, the latest report hardly squares with what Scowcroft told Charles Powell last Friday. It may be that the President has taken into account all the factors and is insisting on an earlier date for American readiness.

3. But we cannot make this assumption. If the report is correct, and if it is acted on, the implications are serious. We must assume that there will be a certain slippage: 1 February could well become mid or even late February in actuality. As we know, and as the Americans recognise, there is a limited window of opportunity from November to March. After that the climate deteriorates; Ramadan supervenes; and a number of adverse factors begin to operate with increasing strength against us. Among them are the likelihood of a growing intolerance among Arab host countries for the presence of large Western forces; the probability that we shall have further trouble with the Palestinians; more spurious peace proposals; the boost to

Saddam Hussein from the apparent inaction of Western forces; and a likely weakening in Western public opinion. We have also to reckon with the fact that, while we may be improving the correlation of forces in our favour, we are by the same token giving the Iraqis more time to perfect their defences. A further timing factor to be taken into account is the Haj in June.

4. The Americans appeared to be alive to all these factors when I was in Washington last week and accepted the thrust of our analysis that we should not miss the November to March opening. The impact of a decision to reinforce along the lines above, however, could mean that on grounds of military prudence the President was taking a decision which endangered our chances of carrying out the operation at all.

5. You will want, I am sure, to stress our readiness to help in any way we can, whether by providing more forces within the limits of our resources or by assisting with transport, so as to speed up the US reinforcement. But in the midst of this packaging will have to lie the hard warning in paragraph 4 above.

6. There is another US theme which you may wish to touch on. It seems from our latest telegram from Washington that the President may be contemplating some action by special forces to rescue those currently in the US Embassy compound in Kuwait. I hope you will feel able to counsel against this. It has all the makings of a Carter-style failure and humiliation.

7. There is the related idea to which the President returns from time to time, that action should be taken, no doubt under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 674, to reprovision the US Embassy. If he is to embark on this course he should be clear beforehand what his objective is. If it is simply to demonstrate once again

Iraqi disregard for Security Council Resolutions and tot up another black mark against Saddam, all well and good. If, on the other hand, it is intended as the necessary provocation for action, we are into a very different game, and one which hardly accords with the information in paragraph 2 above that they are insisting upon heavy reinforcement before operations can be launched.

8. I am, as I am sure you are, highly suspicious of the "engineered provocation" line of thinking. The only sensible course, as I see it, is to carry out the necessary military preparations and act without warning as soon as we are ready, always on the understanding that that readiness is not postponed until a time when the whole coalition is likely to be unravelling.

  
PERCY CRADOCK

1 November 1990



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OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP EIGHTY THREE - 012359Z NOV 90  
ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS  
REQUIRED.

1. INTELLIGENCE. IRAQI DISPOSITIONS IN KUWAIT SHOW EVIDENCE OF REPOSITIONING AND ROTATION, ESPECIALLY THE HEAVY UNITS. ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IN NEAR TERM ASSESSED UNLIKELY. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE LONG AWAITED DEPLOYMENT OF A SYRIAN ARMD UNIT TO THE GULF MAY BE UNDERWAY.
2. POLITICAL. PRESSURE WAS TIGHTENED WITH STATEMENTS IN THE US AND UK. PRESIDENT BUSH SAID YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD QUOTE HAD IT UNQUOTE WITH IRAQ AND ITS VIOLENCE TOWARDS US CITIZENS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. IN LONDON MR HURD ADMITTED THAT SANCTIONS MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO GET SADDAM QUOTE THAT CRUEL AND BLINKERED MAN UNQUOTE, OUT OF KUWAIT. HMG IRAQS OFFER TO ALLOW RELATIVES OF QUOTE ITS GUESTS UNQUOTE TO VISIT THEM AT CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR AS EXPLOITATION.
3. NAVY OPERATIONS. LITTLE CHANGE. GLOUCESTER IS ON PATROL IN THE GULF. LONDON IS IN BAHRAIN. CARDIFF SAILED FROM JEBEL ALI TODAY TO TAKE OVER PATROL FROM BRAZEN WHICH IS IN SHARJAH. ATHERSTONE, CATTISTOCK AND HERALD ARE CONTINUING THEIR OPERATIONS OFF ABU DHABI WITH THE USN.
4. ARMY OPERATIONS. ALL 140 MBTS IN THEATRE AND MODIFICATIONS NOW COMPLETE. 7 ARMD BDES 24 X M109 155MM SP GUNS HAVE ALSO ARRIVED AS HAVE ALL 36 JAVELINS. THE MAJORITY OF WARRIOR AND CVR(T) ARE ALSO COMPLETE IN THEATRE. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN, USING LOCAL RESOURCES AND MANUFACTURERS ADVICE, TO SOLVE THE MECHANICAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING SOME OF THE WARRIOR AND DROPS FLEET. INITIAL REPORTS ARE ENCOURAGING. THE FIRST TRAINING COURSE FOR DRIVERS AND OPERATORS OF THE FUCHS NBC RECCE VEHICLE HAS BEEN COMPLETED IN GERMANY.
5. RAF OPERATIONS. DISPOSTIONS UNCHANGED. REPORTS INDICATE THAT DAMAGE TO STORES ON MV AETOS FOLLOWING STORM IN BISCAY ARE 11 LAND-ROVERS AND 4 TRAILERS WRITTEN OFF AND 7 VEHICLES PLUS 5 TRAILERS IN NEED OF REPAIR. SHIP ARRIVES GIBRALTAR 2 NOV FOR FORMAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. FIRST US C5 AIRLIFT OF PUMAS WAS DELAYED UNTIL MID-DAY TODAY.
6. LOGISTICS. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. AS PART OF THE CASUALTY

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RECEPTION PLAN INTO THE UK, UKLF HAS IDENTIFIED A REQUIREMENT FOR 36 COACHES AND 12 AMBULANCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UKCICC JOINT MEDICAL SUPPORT PLAN. VEHICLES HAVE BEEN EARMARKED SO THAT RELEASE MAY BE ACTIONED ONCE THE PLAN IS PROMULGATED.

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SIC 19M/A2P

FROM AMBASSADOR IN JEDDA.

IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRIMAKOV TOUR: DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE SAUD.

## SUMMARY

1. I SAW PRINCE SAUD FOR OVER AN HOUR IN JEDDA TODAY. HE GAVE A FULL RUN DOWN ON PRIMAKOV'S VISIT AND ON SUBSEQUENT SAUDI ACTION TO REGULARISE STAND WITH EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PARTNERS ON 31 OCTOBER. SAUDIS HAD FOUND PRIMAKOV'S PROPOSALS VERY UNHELPFUL. KING FAHD HAD TOLD HIM SO AND HAD HANDLED HIM QUITE ROUGHLY TO TRY TO GET IT ACROSS THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE NO TRUCK WITH PACKAGE DEALS AND THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS NO LONGER A STARTER. SAUDI INTEREST IN NEXT STEPS AT THE UNSC.

## DETAIL

2. PRIMAKOV HAD TOLD THEM HE HAD FOUND A MUCH MORE REALISTIC SADDAM ON HIS SECOND VISIT. SANCTIONS WERE STARTING TO BITE AND SADDAM WAS STARTING TO FACE THE LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION. FOR THE SOVIET UNION IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO AVOID A MILITARY OUTCOME. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGION WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. IN THE LAST RESORT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT STAND AGAINST A MILITARY SOLUTION. BUT FIRST IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE IF A WAY OUT, CONSISTENT WITH SCR'S COULD NOT BE FOUND: THIS POINTED TO AN ARAB SOLUTION. (SAUD COMMENTED THAT PRIMAKOV TENDED TO DRAMATISE THE WAR OPTION MORE HEAVILY IN PUBLIC THAN IN PRIVATE). ACCORDINGLY PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BE TOLD BY ASSAD IN DAMASCUS LAST WEEK THAT ASSAD WOULD GO ALONG WITH A FRESH ARAB SUMMIT. PRIMAKOV HAD CLAIMED IN JEDDA THAT ASSAD HAD SPOKEN OF A STAGED SERIES OF UNDERTAKINGS TO IRAQ, AND THAT WHEN THESE HAD BEEN PUT TO SADDAM IN BAGHDAD, HE HAD SHOWN INTEREST, AND ASKED FOR CERTAIN GUARANTEES OF NON AGGRESSION AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL.

3. PRIMARKOV HAD THEN PUT TO THE SAUDIS, WITH HE CLAIMED SYRIAN

AND EGYPTIAN AS WELL AS IRAQI SUPPORT, A PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL ARAB SUMMIT AT WHICH PROPOSALS WOULD BE AGREED INVOLVING SEQUENTIAL ELEMENTS IN A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON WHICH ASSURANCES WOULD BE GIVEN AT THE OUTSET:-

- A) TOTAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.
- B) SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL BY PREVIOUSLY AGREED STAGES OF M.N.F.
- C) LIFTING OF SANCTIONS
- D) A START TO IRAQI-KUWAITI NEGOTIATIONS ON DISPUTES
- E) A PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY PERMANENT FIVE TO AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST ISSUES (I.E. PALESTINE)
- F) DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

4. THE KING'S REACTION HAD BEEN SHARP, AND INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A) THE ARAB COMMUNITY HAD ALREADY TRIED IN ITS 10 AUGUST SUMMIT TO FIND AN ARAB SOLUTION AND HAD FAILED. FOUR POINTS WERE ON THE TABLE AND IRAQ HAD REJECTED THEM. IF AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE IT WOULD ALREADY HAVE HAPPENED. IT WAS DANGEROUS TO REOPEN THE ARAB DEBATE. THIS WOULD HEIGHTEN THE DIVISIONS, AND CUT ACROSS THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE UNSC ACTIVITY. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE HEART TO SADDAM THAT HE COULD GET AWAY WITH SOMETHING.
- B) IF AS PRIMAKOV CLAIMED, PRESSURES WERE NOW STARTING TO TELL ON SADDAM THEN WHY ON EARTH RELAX THEM THROUGH TALK OF A FACE-SAVING DEVICE? HE WAS BEING INCONSISTENT.
- C) SADDAM HAD NO RIGHT TO ASK FOR GUARANTEES FROM THE ALLIES. RATHER VICE VERSA SADDAM WAS THE THREAT AND NO ONE ELSE. ALSO HIS NBC WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY HAD TO BE DEALT WITH.
- D) AS SAUDI ARABIA SAW IT, IT WAS FOR THE PERMANENT FIVE TO LEAD OVER A SOLUTION (KING FAHD MADE THIS POINT TO YOU IN SEPTEMBER). IT WAS AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, NOT JUST AN ARAB ONE.
- E) WERE PRIMAKOV'S PROPOSALS CLEARLY ENDORSED BY SADDAM? HAD THEY ORIGINATED IN SYRIA? OR HAD HE CONCOCTED THEM? UNDER PRESSURE PRIMAKOV HAD CONCEDED THAT HE HAD PUT THE PACKAGE TOGETHER HIMSELF, BASED ON HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ASSAD'S AND SADDAM'S SUGGESTIONS.
- F) WHY THEN HAD GORBACHEV GONE PUBLIC AS HE HAD IN PARIS, AND TAKEN SAUDI ARABIA'S NAME IN VAIN WHEN PRIMAKOV HAD NOT YET REACHED JEDDA?. PRIMAKOV HAD ADMITTED TO TELEPHONING GORBACHEV IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT FROM BAHDAD TO TELL HIM OF THE PACKAGE HE HAD PUT TOGETHER. HE HAD REACTED PREMATURELY. IT WAS SADDAM WHO HAD SUGGESTED SAUDI ARABIA IN A MEDIATING ROLE AS THE QUOTE ONLY

COUNTRY HE TRUSTED UNQUOTE. THIS THE KING DISMISSED AS A PLOY TO SOW DISSENSION.

5. KING FAHD HAD LEFT PRIMAKOV WITH NO REASON TO BELIEVE HIS IDEAS WOULD RUN AND HAD REPRIMANDED HIM FOR BRINGING WHAT WERE NO MORE THAN IMPRESSIONS DRESSED UP AS A PACKAGE. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE NO PART OF IT. SAUD SAID HE HAD FINALLY PRESSED PRIMAKOV AGAIN ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD, IF PRESSURE FAILED, GO ALONG WITH MILITARY ACTION. PRIMAKOV HAD CONFIRMED THIS WAS SO. HAVING THUS DISMISSED PRIMAKOV, THE SAUDIS HAD QUICKLY SOUGHT TO CHECK WITH SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS JUST WHAT THEY HAD SAID TO PRIMAKOV. HENCE YESTERDAY'S GATHERING IN JEDDA. ABDUL MAGUID HAD CLAIMED TOTAL SOLIDARITY WITH SAUDI REACTION. SHARA'A HAD CLAIMED PRIMAKOV HAD DISTORTED ASSAD'S POINT ABOUT A SUMMIT. ASSAD HAD OFFERED THE IDEA WITHOUT ANY LINKAGE TO A PACKAGE, BUT AS A FRESH FORM OF MORAL PRESSURE ON SADDAM. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO SYRIAN INTEREST IN A DEAL. INDEED SYRIAN REINFORCEMENTS WERE NOW EN ROUTE TO SAUDI ARABIA. KING FAHD HAD WARNED SHARA'A THAT EVEN SUCH HINTS, IN THE HANDS OF THE RUSSIANS WHO SEEMED SO DESPERATE TO AVOID A CONFLICT, GAVE SADDAM AND OTHERS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE POSITION WAS NEGOTIABLE. SAUD INSISTED TO ME THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGN OF SYRIAN HESITATION YESTERDAY OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFLICT. THE SAUDIS HAD THEREFORE AGREED WITH A JOINT APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS SPELLING OUT THEIR REJECTION OF PRIMAKOV'S PACKAGE. THIS WOULD NOW GO AHEAD, MAKING THE POINT THAT SUCH BROKING ONLY IMPEDED PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME.

6. WE AGREED WE SHOULD ALL MAXIMISE OUR EFFORTS TO STIFFEN THE SOVIETS. I EXPLAINED WE WERE DOING OUR BIT. ASKED HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SOVIET ANXIETY OVER A CONFLICT AND THEIR FAILURE TO SEE IT IN THE MORE CONTAINABLE PERSPECTIVE WHICH SAUD CLAIMED WE AND THE SAUDIS SHARED, I POINTED TO SOVIET REFLEXES, TO THEIR SENSITIVITY OVER HOSTAGES AND TO BLANKS STILL ON THEIR SCREEN IN ASSESSING MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. TO THIS SAUD ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS FEARED A WAR WOULD SAP WESTERN ECONOMIC RESOURCES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE TO HELP THE SOVIET UNION. I NOTED PRIMAKOV'S ASSURANCE THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY MILITARY ACTION MIGHT HAVE TO BE CONTEMPLATED. SAUD SAID HE HAD WARNED PRIMAKOV THAT THE WINDOW FOR WAITING FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK WAS SHORTENING. PRIMAKOV HAD CLAIMED THAT SANCTIONS WOULD TAKE 6 MONTHS AT LEAST TO SHOW EFFECT, AND EVEN THEN THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE IRAQ'S GOVERNMENT.

7. SAUD ASKED TO KEEP IN TOUCH OVER HOW WE SAW NEXT STEPS AT THE

U.N. I WENT OVER ELEMENTS IN SCR 674. HE APPROVED OF KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE WITH FURTHER UNSC ACTION. I STRESSED THE EMPHASIS LAID IN SCR 674 ON TREATMENT OF HOSTAGES, AND ASKED, IN A LEADING QUESTION, IF SAUDI ARABIA STILL HAD CITIZENS IN THAT CATEGORY. SAUD SAID HE BELIEVED SO. IF WE WERE TO MAKE A KEY ISSUE OF HOSTAGES AT SOME STAGE WITH IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA COULD TAKE HER PLACE ALONGSIDE. HE SAW THE RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 51 HERE.

## COMMENT

8. FROM SAUD'S DESCRIPTION, PRIMAKOV'S IDEAS WERE RUN RAGGED AND PLAINLY REJECTED HERE. THE KING HAS ALSO MOVED QUICKLY TO PREVENT EROSION OF THE MAIN ARAB FRONT. BUT SAUD EVIDENTLY SUSPECTS THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT GIVE UP EASILY, EVEN IF THEY DO ACCEPT THAT A MILITARY OUTCOME MAY HAVE TO BE. THE SAUDIS NOW SEE PRIMAKOV AS DECEITFUL. WE CAN I BELIEVE TAKE SATISFACTION FROM THE ROBUST REACTION OF KING FAHD.

9. IT IS IMPORTANT WE KEEP UP OUR MINISTERIAL CONTACT WITH THE KING OVER THE COMING WEEKS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF MUTUAL ASSURANCE. MR TOM KING'S VISIT WILL BE TIMELY. I ASKED SAUD IF HE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO SEE THE DEFENCE SECRETARY IN JEDDA. HE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE OUTLOOK AND OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES. I HOPE MR KING WILL BE CONTENT, (HE SAW SAUD ON HIS VISIT TO RIYADH LAST MARCH). COULD I ALSO HAVE A BRIEF TO FOLLOW UP WITH SAUD OUR CURRENT THINKING ON LINES OF FUTURE UNSC ACTION, DESIGNED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE AND DISCOURAGE ATTRITION.

10. SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM (FROM RIYADH) ON SAUD'S COMMENTS ON UK/SYRIAN RELATIONS.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
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*From the Private Secretary*

1 November 1990

*See Steple,*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discussed one or two points about the Gulf at their bilateral this evening. They agreed that our Ambassador in Kuwait should remain for the time being and we should look at the position again in about three weeks' time.

The Foreign Secretary mentioned the Archbishop of Canterbury's intention to send representatives to try to visit the hostages in Iraq. The Prime Minister said she thought the Foreign Secretary ought tactfully to discourage this and suggest it would be better to use the ICRC.

In discussion of next steps in the Security Council, the Foreign Secretary mentioned the idea of a presentation of exactly what is happening in Kuwait. The Prime Minister thought this a good idea.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,*

C.D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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*df*

Mr. Powell, No 10



*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

This is the English translation  
of the German press release on the  
Brandt crisis.

*[Handwritten signature]*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH



Bonn, 1 November 1990

Press release

At its extraordinary meeting in Rome on 27/28 October the European Council issued a declaration requesting the United Nations Security Council to continue its efforts to obtain the immediate exit of all hostages in Iraq and suggesting to the UN Secretary-General that he send a special representative to Iraq for this purpose.

In a conversation on 31 October with Mr Giulio Andreotti, President of the European Council, Chancellor Helmut Kohl requested that he propose the following three European figures to the UN Secretary-General for such a humanitarian mission for the sake of all foreign citizens detained and abducted in Iraq and Kuwait:

- Mr Willy Brandt, formerly Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and now Chairman of the Socialist International,
- Mr Emilio Colombo, formerly Italian Prime Minister and now Chairman of the European Union of Christian Democrats,
- Mr Willy de Clercq, formerly Belgian Finance Minister and EC Commissioner and now Chairman of the European Liberal Democrats.

In a telephone conversation with UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher supported this proposal by Prime Minister Andreotti on behalf of Chancellor Kohl.

Contrary to reports circulated, a trip by Mr Willy Brandt without a mandate from the United Nations was not discussed in the telephone conversation between the UN Secretary-General and Foreign Minister Genscher, nor could it have been in view of the subject-matter.

On 31 October Chancellor Kohl phoned Mr Brandt, who is currently in the United States, to inform him of this initiative and asked him to make himself available for such a humanitarian mission as special representative of the UN Secretary-General. Foreign Minister Genscher informed Mr Brandt of his conversation with the UN Secretary-General. Mr Brandt told Chancellor Kohl that he was willing to take part in such a mission and also let the UN Secretary-General know this.

However, Mr Perez de Cuellar did not take up this proposal, stating that he had already named a personal representative in the past.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was informed early today by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr Hans Otto Brautigam, of the decision by Mr Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Socialist International, to travel to Baghdad even without a mandate from the UN Secretary-General or from the Federal Government, either on his own or together with the two other European figures.

The further line of action will be discussed in the next few days by the relevant persons in the European party organizations.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany abides by the European Council's resolution that isolated actions should be avoided. It considers a mission by leading European figures on their own responsibility to be the most suitable means in the current situation of bringing home to the Iraqi leadership the international community's demand for the immediate release of the hostages of all nationalities.

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MY TELNO 1793: HOSTAGES HELD BY IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. BRANDT'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. NO UN COVER FOR HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. BRANDT DULY CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LATER ON 31 OCTOBER. A CONTACT IN THE GERMAN MISSION HAS TOLD US THAT BRANDT INFORMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD NEXT WEEK. HE TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ADVISED HIM TO GO: BUT THAT HE HAD FELT THAT HE SHOULD MAKE AVAILABLE HIS SERVICES AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE GULF CIRSIS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD WISHED HIM WELL. BUT BOTH FELT THAT IT WOULD BE MORE OF AN OBSTACLE THAN AN ADVANTAGE IF BRANDT WAS SEEN TO GO WITH A MANDATE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS: INDEED THERE WAS SOME DOUBT WHETHER IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD BE WELCOME IN BAGHDAD.

3. BRANDT SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A SHORT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS. TEXT IN MIFT.

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(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
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MY TELNO 2617: IRAQ/KUWAIT  
SUMMARY

1. NO DECISIONS YET ON POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO THE GULF. ANY DECISION WILL HAVE TO BALANCE A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT FACTORS. MEANWHILE THE ADMINISTRATION'S TOUGH RHETORIC CONTINUES.

## DETAIL

2. SINCE CHENEY'S TV INTERVIEW ON 25 OCTOBER (MY TUR), SPECULATION HAS MOUNTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DECIDED TO SEND UP TO 100,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE GULF. OUR CONTACTS IN THE PENTAGON TELL US THAT GENERAL POWELL (CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS) HAS MADE A RECOMMENDATION FOR AN INCREASE OF UP TO 150,000, FOLLOWING THE FORMER'S RETURN FROM A VISIT TO THE GULF LAST WEEK. THE LOGIC REMAINS THAT - WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF THE IRAQI DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN KUWAIT AND GROWING SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE WISDOM OF RELYING SOLELY ON AIR POWER TO REDUCE THEM - THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF US GROUND FORCES IS INADEQUATE TO GUARANTEE A SUCCESSFUL LIBERATION OF KUWAIT.

3. DESPITE THIS SPECULATION, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE MADE NO ANNOUNCEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID ON 30 OCTOBER THAT FORCE LEVELS WERE IN QUOTE STEADILY INCREASING MODE UNQUOTE. (THERE MAY NOW BE AS MANY AS 250,000 ALREADY IN THEATRE). IT MAY BE THAT BY DELAYING FORMAL CONFIRMATION (OR DENIAL) OF THE SPECULATION, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE HOPING TO INCREASE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON SADDAM TO WITHDRAW. MORE LIKELY, THE PRESIDENT HAS SIMPLY NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND ALTHOUGH HE DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH HIS SENIOR ADVISERS ON 30 OCT.

4. IN REACHING ANY DECISION, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO BALANCE A NUMBER OF KEY FACTORS. THESE INCLUDE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR:  
(A) THE TIMING OF ANY MILITARY ACTION: CURRENT TROOP DEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOW BE VIRTUALLY COMPLETE, GIVING THE PRESIDENT A THEORETICAL, IF RISKY, MILITARY OPTION SOON. IF THE ADMINISTRATION CONFIRMS THAT AN ADDITIONAL 100,000 OR MORE

- TROOPS WILL BE DEPLOYED, THE TIME NEEDED TO MOVE THEM TO THE GULF WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY PUT BACK POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION (IN THE ABSENCE OF PROVOCATION) UNTIL AT LEAST MID JANUARY:
- (B) SUSTAINABILITY: IF THE AMERICANS DECIDE THAT THEY NEED A TOTAL FORCE LEVEL OF OVER 300,000 TROOPS, THEY WILL HAVE TO IMPLEMENT SIGNIFICANT DIVERSIONS FROM GERMANY, AS WELL AS CALL UP ADDITIONAL RESERVISTS IN THE US (TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COMBAT SUPPORT). GIVEN THE MASSIVE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES IN SUSTAINING EVEN THE EXISTING TROOP LEVELS, ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS WOULD INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, AS SOON AS THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS WERE IN PLACE:
  - (C) NON-MILITARY OPTIONS: SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT EXISTING US FORCES ARE INADEQUATE TO DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA OR DETER IRAQI AGGRESSION, THE DESPATCH OF ADDITIONAL FORCES WILL BE SEEN AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF PREPARATION FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. TOGETHER WITH (B) ABOVE, THE EFFECT WILL BE TO NARROW SIGNIFICANTLY THE PRESIDENT'S OPTIONS. THE PRESSURE ON HIM TO ACT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO RESIST ONCE THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS ARE IN PLACE.
  - (D) PUBLIC OPINION: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICIES HAS ALREADY SLIPPED ( MY TUR) AND MAY DO SO FURTHER IF MORE TROOPS ARE DEPLOYED OR A FURTHER CALL-UP OF THE RESERVE IMPLEMENTED. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO FULL DEPLOYMENT WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL MANAGEMENT AND MUCH ATTENTION.
  - (E) CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT: CONGRESS HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT HAS NOT GIVEN THE ADMINISTRATION A BLANK CHEQUE. ITS CONCERN ABOUT POLICY SURFACED AGAIN AT A MEETING BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT ON 30 OCTOBER. A MAJOR NEW DEPLOYMENT WILL ADD TO THE STRAIN:
  - (F) THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION: A DECISION TO DEPLOY MORE TROOPS WILL BE WIDELY SEEN AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS WAR. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ALREADY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD THE ALLIED COALITION TOGETHER, IN THE FACE OF CONSTANT PRESSURE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION (THE LATEST EXAMPLES BEING PRIMAKOV'S SECOND VISIT TO THE REGION AND KING HUSSEIN'S RENEWED ACTIVITIES). IF MORE TROOPS ARE SENT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE TO EXPECT FURTHER PROBLEMS, PERHAPS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND FRANCE IN PARTICULAR.
5. WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH HOT AND COLD PERIODS BEFORE. THE

ADMINISTRATION HAS A DIFFICULT TACTICAL HAND TO PLAY IN NOT ALARMING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION UNDULY ON THE ONE HAND, WHILE RATCHETTING UP THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN ON THE OTHER. THE PRESIDENT HAS HAD THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEM RECENTLY OF REFOCUSING ATTENTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT AFTER IT HAD BEEN DIVERTED BY THE BUDGET DEBATE. THE NUMBERS OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS BEING SUGGESTED MAY NOT IN PRACTICE PROVE AS LARGE AS THEY SEEM IN THE NEWSPAPERS, GIVEN THE EFFECT OF ROULEMENT. BUT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER HAVE TOUGHENED THEIR RHETORIC IN THE LAST FEW DAYS HAS HELPED TO HEIGHTEN EXPECTATIONS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TAKE FURTHER ACTION, IF ONLY IN THE SENSE THAT IF THEY DO NOT, THAT WILL BE WIDELY SEEN AS EVIDENCE THAT THE MILITARY OPINION MAY NOT AFTER ALL NOW BE PRACTICABLE. CONCERN ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF US HOSTAGES HAS ALSO RETURNED TO CENTRE STAGE, FOLLOWING A SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT ON 31 OCTOBER. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN A WILD CARD, THE EMOTIONAL EFFECT OF WHICH ON AMERICAN INTENTIONS COULD PROVE POWERFUL.

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