CAB ONE

TOP SECRET

UKEA CODEWORD

MT

NEW FILE COVER

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Aid Programme to Mozambique

UK/Mozambique Relations

Internal Situation

MOZAMBIQUE

PT1:
August 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~4.11.86~~		~~2.5.86~~					
~~6.11.86.~~		2.1.90					
~~17.11.86~~							
~~8.12.86~~		PT1					
~~18.12.86~~		ENDS					
~~22.12.86~~							
~~31.7.87.~~							
~~4.8.87.~~							
~~12.V.V7~~							
~~1.9.V7~~							
~~22.9.87.~~							
~~25.1.88~~							
~~23.2.88~~							
~~26.2.88~~							
~~16.3.88~~							
~~4.4.88~~							
~~3.5.88~~ (DA)							
~~11.5.88~~							
~~12.5.88~~							
~~5.8.88~~							
~~6.9.88~~							
~~10/11/89~~. Parab							
~~1.4.89~~							
~~28.4.89~~							

PREM 19/3091

PART 1 ends:-

Mozambique Constitution Jan 90

PART 2 begins:-

PRES CHISSANO TO PM. 6.12.90

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(86) 36th meeting, item 3	06/11/1986
CC(86) 34th meeting, item 3	

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 12/12/2016

PREM Records Team

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference: Diplomatic Report No 139/81

Description: Mozambique: Annual Review for 1980

Date: 4 February 1981

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed _____ Date 12/12/2016

PREM Records Team

R 26/3

Central Office of Information

COI

Mr Powell, [redacted] seen by CDP. 23/3

With compliments

His Excellency Mr Francisco Madeira, Ambassador and Diplomatic Advisor to His Excellency The President of Mozambique asked me to forward the 'Draft Amended Constitution' to you.

Please may I ask you to forward the enclosed photograph to the Prime Minister's Office. Thank you.

Tony Hampson

Hercules Road
London SE1 7DU

Telephone 01-217 3000
Direct line 01-217 2317

Telex 915444

DRAFT AMENDED CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

January 1990

DRAFT AMENDED CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

January 1990

INTRODUCTION

At a rally in Maputo on 9 January 1990, President Joaquim Chissano unveiled a new draft constitution for Mozambique.

Discussions on a thorough-going amendment of the Constitution have been under way since 1986. A commission established by the country's parliament, the People's Assembly, drew up an amended Constitution which was submitted for discussion in 1988.

However, the discussion was suspended in order to provide time for the debate leading up to the Frelimo Party's Fifth Congress, held in July 1989.

In September, the draft consitution was withdrawn in order to be rewritten in the light of the Congress decisions. The People's Assembly gave this task to the Frelimo Party.

The draft now presented by Frelimo is qualitatively different. It specifies the rights, freedoms and duties of Mozambican citizens in a much more detailed way, and makes significant alterations in the system of political power, notably by separating Party and State, and introducing universal suffrage through secret ballot for the election of the head of state.

The draft Constitution is now being submitted to a nation-wide debate, and if approved will result in significant changes. It will finally be voted into law by the People's Assembly at a session later this year.

DRAFT AMENDED CONSTITUTION

PREAMBLE

At zero hours on 25 June 1975, the Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) solemnly proclaimed the total and complete independence of Mozambique and its Constitution as the People's Republic of Mozambique.

This was the culmination of a centuries-long process of resistance to colonial rule and of the unforgettable victory of the armed national liberation struggle which brought together all the patriotic sectors of Mozambican society in the same ideals of freedom and justice.

The Constitution then proclaimed attributed a determinant role to FRELIMO, the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people. Under its leadership the uplifting process of the exercise of democracy was then begun, and power increasingly rests on the expression of the people's will.

The state that we have created makes it possible, for the first time in their history, for the Mozambican people to exercise political power at a national level, to organise and direct economic and social life, and to deepen democracy.

The way in which state institutions have functioned and the democratic practice of citizens impose new definitions and developments.

After 15 years of independence, the Mozambican people, using their inalienable right to sovereignty, determined to consolidate the nation's unity and to respect the dignity of Mozambicans, adopts and proclaims this Constitution which shall be the basic law for all political and social organisation in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The fundamental freedoms and rights enshrined in the Constitution are gains of the Mozambican people in their struggle to build a society of social justice, where the equality of citizens and the imperatives of the law are the pillars of democracy.

We, the Mozambican people, determined to deepen the arrangement of political life in our country, within a spirit of responsibility and pluralism of opinion, are decided to organise society in such a way that the will of the citizens may be the greatest value of our sovereignty.

Part 1

Basic Principles

Article 1

The People's Republic of Mozambique is an independent, sovereign, unitary, democratic state of social justice.

Article 2

Sovereignty resides in the people.

The powers of the state emanate from the people. The Mozambican people shall exercise political power through periodic universal suffrage to choose their representatives, through referenda, and through the permanent democratic participation of citizens in public life.

Social organisations, as associations of citizens linked through common interests. shall play an important role in the promotion of democracy, and in the participation of citizens in public life.

Article 3

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall uphold the values of the heroic struggle and centuries of resistance by the Mozambican people against foreign rule. It shall retain as a

national heritage the decisive role played by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in the victory over colonialism and in the winning of national independence.

This experience shall inspire the state in the building of the Mozambican nation, in strengthening national unity, and in promoting the democratic participation of citizens.

Article 4

The fundamental aims of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be:

(a) The defence of independence and sovereignty;

(b) The consolidation of national unity;

(c) The defence and promotion of human rights and of the equality of citizens before the law;

(d) The building of a society of social justice, and the achievement of material and spiritual well-being for its citizens;

(e) The strengthening of democracy, of freedom and of social and individual stability;

(f) The development of the economy, and scientific and technological progress;

(g) The affirmation of Mozambican identity, and of those traditional cultural and social values that are freely and democratically accepted;

(h) The establishment and development of relations of friendship and cooperation with other peoples and states.

Article 5

Mozambican citizens shall be those persons born within the national territory, those whose mother or father are Mozambican, and naturalised citizens.

Limitations on the principles mentioned above as well as other forms of acquiring or forfeiting nationality may be stipulated by law.

Article 6

In the People's Republic of Mozambique, Portuguese shall be the official language.

The state shall uphold national languages and promote their development and increasing use as spoken languages and as a medium of education.

Article 7

The territory of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be indivisible and inalienable. It shall comprise the entire land surface, territorial waters and air space demarcated by the nation's frontiers.

The extension, limits and legal order of Mozambique's territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone, the contiguous zone, and seabed rights shall be fixed by law.

Article 8

The territory of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be divided into provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities.

Urban zones shall be classified as cities and towns.

The definition of the characteristics of territorial levels, the establishment of new levels, as well as the power to decide on the organisation of territory shall be fixed by law.

Article 9

The state's defence and security policy shall seek to preserve the country's sovereignty and integrity, and to guarantee the security of citizens against any armed aggression.

In the tradition of the FPLM (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique), which they are continuing, the Mozambican Armed Forces shall act in close liaison with the people.

The oath taken by members of the armed forces shall establish their duty to respect the constitution.

Citizens shall be encouraged to participate in the country's defence by involving themselves in organs for people's self--defence.

Article 10

Natural resources located in the subsoil, in national waters, in territorial waters, on the continental shelf, and in the exclusive economic zone shall be property vested in the state.

The public state domain shall also consist of:

(a) the maritime zone;

(b) the airspace;

(c) assets belonging to the cultural heritage;

(d) nature protection zones;

(e) national railway lines;

(f) the roads;

(g) the ports and airports;

(h) telecommunication facilities;

(i) national energy and water undertakings;

(j) other property classified as such by law.

The state shall determine how they may be used and exploited, safeguarding national interests.

Article 11

The state shall promote knowledge, surveys and evaluation of natural resources, guaranteeing the ecological balance and the conservation and preservation of the environment.

Article 12

All property in land shall originally vest in the state, and may be transferred to individual persons or collective entities, taking into account its social purpose.

The transfer of property and the granting of titles to land shall be regulated by law, benefitting direct users and producers. The law shall avoid the use of property rights to produce situations of economic domination or privilege to the detriment of the majority of citizens.

Article 13

State economic policy shall be directed towards laying the fundamental bases for development, improving the living conditions of the people, and using natural riches appropriately and for the benefit of the people.

Article 14

The state shall guarantee that economic activities are in conformity with the public interest.

The state shall promote the planning and development of the national economy, acting directly or stimulating activities that contribute to resolving the basic problems of the people and to reducing social and regional inequalities.

State investment should play a catalysing role in promoting development.

Article 15

The state shall guarantee control over those economic sectors that are decisive for the nation's economic sovereignty, and for the independence of its political power.

Article 16

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall take agriculture as the basis for the growing satisfaction of the people's needs.

In the framework of rural development, the state shall stimulate the production of the peasant farming sector and shall encourage individual peasants and labourers to organise themselves into cooperative forms of production.

Article 17

The state shall recognise the contribution made by small scale production to the national economy, and shall support its development as a way of making good use of the capacities and creativity of the people.

Article 18

The right to private property shall be recognised and guaranteed in terms of the law.

Private property may not be used to the detriment of the interests specified under constitution or law.

Article 19

Foreign capital shall operate in the framework of the state's economic policy.

Article 20

Taxes may be imposed or altered only by law. They shall be fixed according to criteria of social justice, and taking into account the taxpayers' ability to pay.

Article 21

Labour shall merit respect and protection, and it shall be the driving force of development.

The state shall insist upon a just distribution of the proceeds of labour.

Article 22

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall promote an educational strategy that aims to wipe out illiteracy and to ensure that citizens may master science and technology.

The state shall organise the education of citizens through a national educational system.

Schooling given by collective and other entities shall operate within the limits established by law and shall be subject to state supervision.

Article 23

The state shall promote the development of the national culture and identity, and shall guarantee free expression of the traditions and values of Mozambican society.

The state shall make Mozambican culture known internationally, and shall take action so that the Mozambican people may benefit from the cultural achievements of other peoples.

Article 24

Medical and health care for citizens shall be organised through a national health system which shall benefit the entire Mozambican people.

To achieve the goals outlined by the national health system, the law shall establish the way in which medical and health care is exercised.

The state shall promote the participation of citizens and institutions in efforts to raise the level of public health.

Article 25

The state shall guide and promote physical training and sport as forms of educating and instructing citizens.

Article 26

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall recognise and hold in high esteem the sacrifices made by those who gave their lives to the national liberation struggle, and to the defence of the country's sovereignty and of the revolution.

The state shall guarantee special protection to the orphan children and to other dependents of persons who died in carrying out missions, as well as to those who suffered physical handicap during the national liberation struggle, and in defence of the country's sovereignty and of the revolution.

Article 27

The family shall be the basic unit of society. The family shall develop and consolidate patriotic values in new generations.

The state shall protect marriage as the institution that ensures the objectives of the family may be carried out.

In the context of developing social relations resting on respect for human dignity, the state shall solemnly guarantee the principle that marriage is based on the free consent of husband and wife.

Article 28

Motherhood shall merit respect and protection.

The family shall be responsible for the harmonious development of children.

The state and the family shall ensure an all-round education for children, bringing them up in the values of national unity, love for the motherland, equality and social solidarity.

Children may not be discriminated against on grounds of their birth, nor may they be subjected to ill-treatment.

Article 29

The state shall promote and support the emancipation of women, and shall stimulate the growing role of women in society.

The state shall recognise and hold in high esteem the participation of Mozambican women in the national liberation struggle and in all spheres of society.

Article 30

The state shall encourage and promote initiatives carried out by young people, as the worthy continuation of revolutionary traditions, in consolidating national unity, and in the reconstruction and defence of the country.

Young people played a decisive role in the national liberation struggle, and there shall fall upon them a fundamental responsibility in the building of a new society.

Article 31

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall be a lay state. State and religious institutions shall be separate.

All acts of religious institutions shall conform with the laws of the state.

The state shall appreciate the activities of religious denominations, seeking to promote a climate of understanding and social tolerance, and the strengthening of national unity.

Religious denominations shall have the right to pursue freely their religious aims, and to hold and acquire property for realising these objectives.

Article 32

The People's Republic of Mozambique, as a non-aligned country, shall establish relations of friendship and cooperation with other states on the basis of principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality, non-interference in internal matters, and reciprocity of benefits.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall accept, observe and apply the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity.

Article 33

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall fight for the unity of African peoples and states on the basis of their freedom, dignity and right to economic and social progress.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall seek to strengthen relations with countries committed to the consolidation of their national independence and in recovering the use and control of their natural resources for their respective peoples.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall associate itself with all states struggling for the establishment of a just and equitable economic order in international relations.

Article 34

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall support and be in solidarity with the struggles of people for their national liberation.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall grant the right of asylum to foreigners persecuted because of their fight for peace, democracy, national and social liberation, or for the defence of human rights.

Article 35

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall develop relations of friendship and cooperation with political and social forces throughout the world on the basis of the defence of national interests, progress and peace.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall hold in high esteem the relations with states, peoples and organisations forged during the struggle for independence.

Article 36

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall pursue a policy of peace, and shall only resort to force in the case of legitimate defence.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall defend the principle of the general and universal disarmament of all states.

The People's Republic of Mozambique shall advocate the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a nuclear-free zone of peace.

PART 2

Rights, duties, freedoms and guarantees

Chapter 1

Rights and duties of citizens

Article 37

All citizens of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy the same rights and shall be subject to the same duties regardless of colour, race, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, educational level, social position, the status of their parents, occupation or profession.

Article 38

All citizens shall have the right to life. All shall have the right to physical integrity, and may not be subjected to torture or any other cruel or inhuman treatment.

All citizens shall have the right to have their honour, good name, and reputation respected, as well as the right to defend their public image, and to shelter their private life.

Article 39

Men and women shall be equal before the law in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life.

Article 40

All acts intended to undermine national unity, to disturb social harmony, or to create divisions or situations of privilege or discrimination based of colour, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, educational level, social possession, the status of one's parents, occupation or profession, shall be punished according to law.

Article 41

All citizens shall have the right and duty to participate in the process of broadening and consolidating democracy at all levels of state and society.

Citizens older than 18 years shall have the right to vote and to be elected, with the exception of those legally deprived of this right.

The right to vote shall be personal and shall constitute a civic duty.

Article 42

All citizens shall enjoy freedom of expression, of assembly and of association.

The exercise of the above rights shall be regulated by law and may only be limited if public order, or individual rights, freedoms and guarantees are endangered, or if the use of force is implied or proposed.

Article 43

Social organisations shall have the right to pursue their aims, to create institutions designed to achieve their specific objectives, and to hold property for carrying out their activities.

Article 44

All citizens shall have the right of recourse to the courts against any act violating their rights as recognised by the constitution and the law.

Article 45

All citizens shall have the right to address petitions, complaints and reminders to any authority requiring the reinstatement of rights that have been violated.

All citizens shall have the right not to comply with orders that are illegal, or which infringe upon their rights.

Article 46

All citizens may contest administrative acts that violate their rights as established under the constitution and other laws.

Article 47

All citizens shall have the duty to respect the constitutional order.

Acts contrary to the constitutional order shall be subject to sanctions according to law.

Article 48

It shall be the duty and the honour of all citizens to participate in the defence of the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, in continuation of the heroic traditions of the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique.

All citizens shall have the duty to render military service according to terms fixed by law.

Article 49

The state shall be liable for damage caused by illegal acts of its agents, committed in discharging their functions, without

prejudice to the right to obtain redress from those agents according to law.

Article 50

All citizens shall have the freedom to practise or not to practise a religion.

Article 51

The state shall recognise and guarantee the right to property.

Expropriation may only take place on grounds of public need, usefulness or interest, as defined by law, and there shall be just compensation.

Article 52

The state shall recognise and guarantee, within the limits of law, the right of inheritance.

Article 53

Work shall be the right and duty of all citizens regardless of sex.

All citizens shall have the right to a free choice of occupation or profession.

Forced labour shall be outlawed, with the exception of work done within the context of penal law.

Article 54

All persons in paid employment shall have, in terms of the law, the right to just payment, to rest and to holidays.

They shall have the right to protection, safety and hygiene at work.

They may only be dismissed in such cases and within such limits as established by law.

Article 55

All persons in paid employment shall have the right to join and to participate in trade union organisations.

The exercise of trade union rights shall be guaranteed and regulated by law.

The right to strike shall be regulated by law.

Article 56

All citizens shall have the right to freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation.

The state shall protect the rights inherent to intellectual property, including copyright.

Article 57

In the People's Republic of Mozambique, education shall constitute a right and duty of all citizens.

The state shall promote greater and equal access for all citizens to the enjoyment of this right.

Article 58

All citizens shall have the right to medical and health care, in terms of the law, and shall have the duty to promote and preserve healthy conditions.

Article 59

The state shall promote and encourage the establishment of conditions for implementing the right of citizens to assistence in the case of incapacity or old age.

Chapter 2

Guarantees of rights and freedoms

Article 60

Individual rights and freedoms shall be guaranteed by the state and must be exercised within the framework of the constitution and the laws.

Article 61

In the People's Republic of Mozambique no-one may be arrested and put on trial except in terms of the law.

Persons charged with an offence shall enjoy the presumption of innocence until final judgement has been passed.

Article 62

No-one may be sentenced for an act that was not considered a crime at the moment it was committed.

Any criminal law may be applied retroactively only in favour of the suspected person.

Article 63

The state shall guarantee the access of citizens to the courts. It shall guarantee to persons charged with an offence the right to defence, and the right to legal aid and counsel.

The state shall take precautions that justice may not be denied for lack of resources.

Article 64

The home and the privacy of correspondence of citizens, as well as other forms of private communication, shall be inviolable, except in such cases as specifically stipulated by law.

Article 65

All citizens shall be free to travel inside the country and to go abroad, except those legally deprived of this right.

Article 66

Preventive imprisonment shall only be allowed in cases provided for by a law, which shall limit the duration of such imprisonment.

Citizens in preventive imprisonment must be brought to court within the period fixed by law. Only judicial authorities shall have the power to decide on the validity and continuation of imprisonment.

Article 67

In case of illegal imprisonment or detention, resulting from abuse of power, citizens shall have the right to demand the remedy of habeas corpus.

The request for habeas corpus shall be put before a court: the proceedings shall be fixed by law.

Article 68

Extradition may only take place by court decision.

Extradition for political motives shall not be authorised.

No Mozambican citizens may be expelled or extradited from the national territory.

Article 69

Individual freedoms and guarantees may only be suspended or limited temporarily in the event of the declaration of a state of war, a state of siege or a state of emergency.

A state of siege or a state of emergency may not exceed six months.

The law shall define rules for a state of war, a state of siege and a state of emergency, and shall establish those judicial guarantees protecting the rights of citizens that are to be safeguarded.

Part 3

Organs of state

Chapter 1

General Principles

Article 70

Representative organs shall be chosen through elections in which all citizens shall have the right to participate

The electoral process shall be regulated by law.

The electoral law shall stipulate the apportionment of electoral constituencies, and shall ensure that a plurality of candidates may run for office.

Article 71

The organs of sovereignty are the President of the Republic, the People's Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Courts.

Article 72

Central organs of the state are the organs of sovereignty, governmental organs as a whole, and such central insitutionsas are responsiblefor guaranteeing the precedence of national interests and the realisation of a unitary policy of the state.

(e) Dissolve the People's Assembly according to the terms established in the constitution;

(f) Appoint the President and Deputy President of the Supreme People's Court, and the President of the Administrative Court;

(g) Appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Attorney-General and Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic;

(h) Grant pardons and commute sentences;

(i) Confer, in the terms of the law, titles, awards and distinctions.

Article 80

In his function of directing government activity, the President of the Republic shall have power to:

(a) Convene and chair sessions of the Council of Ministers;

(b) Appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Prime Minister;

(c) Establish ministries and ministry-like commissions;

(d) Appoint, exonerate and dismiss:

- Ministers and Deputy Ministers
- Provincial Governors
- University Rectors;
- the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mozambique;
- Secretaries of State.

Governmental policies shall be formulated by the Council of Ministers at sessions chaired by the President of the Republic.

Article 81

In the sphere of national defence and public order, the President of the Republic shall have power to:

(a) Declare a state of war and its termination, a state of siege or a state of emergency;

(b) Sign peace treaties;

(c) Decree general or partial mobilisation;

(d) Appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the various wings of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, and other officers as defined by law.

Article 82

In the sphere of international relations, the President of the Republic shall have power to:

(a) Guide foreign policy;

(b) Sign international treaties

(c) Appoint, exonerate and dismiss the ambassadors and diplomatic envoys of the People's Republic of Mozambique;

(d) Receive letters of credentials from ambassadors and diplomatic envoys of other countries.

Article 83

The President of the Republic shall promulgate the laws amd order their publication in the *Boletim da Republica.*

The President of the Republic may, by order with reasons adduced, send a bill back to the People's Assembly for re-examination.

Should the bill, under re-examination, be approved by a two-thirds majority, the President of the Republic must promulgate the law and order its publication.

Article 84

On assuming office, the President of the Republic shall take the following oath: "I do swear by my honour that I will dedicate

all my efforts to the defence, promotion and consolidation of national unity and of the achievements of the revolution, to the well-being of the Mozambican people, to ensure respect for the constitution, and see that justice is done for all citizens".

The President of the Republic shall assume office in a public ceremony before the elected members of the People's Assembly and representatives of the organs of sovereignty, and witnessed by the President of the Supreme People's Court.

Article 85

The President of the Republic shall decide who will be his substitute in case of short-term absence or other impediment, and who will represent him in carrying out specific activities. If the period of impediment exceeds 45 days, the President of the People's Assembly shall act as interim substitute.

Article 86

In the event of the death, resignation or permanent incapacity of the President of the Republic, his functions shall be assumed on an interim basis by the President of the People's Assembly.

The President of the People's Assembly shall assume office as Acting President of the Republic before representatives of the organs of sovereignty, and the ceremony shall be witnessed by the President of the Supreme People's Court.

The election of a new President of the Republic must take place within 45 days. The Acting President of the Republic shall be excluded from running as a candidate.

The new President of the Republic shall hold office until the next ordinary elections have been completed.

Article 87

The permanent incapacity of the President of the Republic must be proven by a medical council as defined by law.

The declaration of incapacity shall be received by the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly.

Article 88

During the period in which the office of the President of the Republic is vacant, the Constitution may not be altered.

The Acting President of the Republic shall guarantee the functioning of the organs of state and all other institutions, but may not exercise the powers referred to in Article 79 (b), (c), (d) and (e), in Article 80 (d), andin Article 82 (c).

Article 89

Statutory acts of the President of the Republic shall take the form of presidential decrees, and other decisions in the framework of the President's constitutional powers shall be issued in the form of presidential orders, and both shall be published in the *Boletim da Republica.*

Article 90

The President of the Republic shall enjoy immunity from civil and criminal proceedings with respect to actions taken in discharge of his functions.

The President of the Republic shall not have to answer to the courts, during the term of his office, for actions taken outside the discharge of his functions.

Chapter 3

The People's Assembly

Section 1

People's Assembly

Article 91

The People's Assembly is the highest legislative organ in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The People's Assembly shall be elected by direct universal suffrage, and personal secret ballot.

Through laws and through guidelines of a general character, the People's Assembly shall determine the rules governing the activities of the state and economic and social life.

The composition of the People's Assembly shall be established by law.

The deputies to the People's Assembly shall be elected for five year terms of office.

Article 92

The People's Assembly shall have power to legislate on basic questions of the country's domestic and foreign policy.

In particular, the People's Assembly shall have power to:

(a) Evaluate whether the legislative and regulative acts of state organs are unconstitutional or illegal;

(b) Delimit the frontiers of the People's Republic of Mozambique;

(c) Take up questions of territorial division;

(d) Adopt the electoral law and the rules for referenda;

(e) Propose the holding of referenda on questions of national interest;

(f) Ratify the legislative acts of the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly;

(g) Sanction the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency;

(h) Ratify the appointment of the President and Deputy President of the Supreme People's Court and the President of the Administrative Court;

(i) Debate progress reports from the Council of Ministers;

(j) Debate the state plan and budget, and the respective reports on their implementation;

(k) Lay down the basis for tax policy;

(l) Ratify and terminate international treaties;

(m) Grant amnesties and pardons;

(n) Elect the President and the members of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly;

(o) Adopt the standing orders of the People's Assembly and the Statute for Deputies;

(p) Set up commissions of the People's Assembly, and regulate their activities.

Article 93

At the beginning of each legislative period, the People's Assembly shall evaluate the programme of the government, presented by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister may present a revised programme that takes the conclusions of the debate into account.

Should the People's Assembly, after debate, reject the government's programme, the President of the Republic may dissolve the Assembly and call new general elections.

Article 94

Bills may be introduced in the People's Assembly by:

(a) the President of the Republic;

(b) the commissions of the People's Assembly;

(c) the deputies;

(d) the Council of Ministers.

Article 95

The People's Assembly shall elect from among its members the President of the People's Assembly.

The Head of State shall convene and chair the session during which the President of the People's Assembly is elected.

The President of the People's Assembly shall be sworn into office by the Head of State.

The President of the People's Assembly shall be answerable to the People's Assembly.

Article 96

The People's Assembly shall meet in ordinary session twice a year, and in extraordinary session whenever this may be required by the President of the Republic, by the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly, or by at least one third of the deputies to the People's Assembly.

Article 97

The People's Assembly may only enter into debate assuming that more than half its members are present.

The decisions of the People's Assembly shall require a majority of votes of the members present.

Article 98

The legislative acts of the People's Assembly shall take the form of laws, and its other decisions shall take the form of resolutions. Both shall be published in the *Boletim da Republica.*

Article 99

No deputy to the People's Assembly may be arrested, unless apprehended in committing a criminal offence (flagrante delicto). No deputy may be brought to trial without the consent of the Assembly or of its standing commission.

Deputies to the People's Assembly shall be tried only by the Supreme People's Court.

Article 100

Deputies to the People's Assembly may not be sued, detained or put on trial for opinions voiced or votes cast in exercising their function as deputies. This does not apply to civil or criminal responsibility for defamation or slander.

Article 101

Any deputy to the People's Assembly may resign.

The disqualification and resignation of deputies to the People's Assembly shall be regulated by law.

Article 102

The People's Assembly shall be convened and chaired by the President of the People's Assembly. In case of absence or impe- diment, his functions shall be exercised by members of the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly as stipulated by the standing orders of the Assembly.

Article 103

The President of the People's Assembly shall:

(a) See to it that decisions of the People's Assembly are implemented;

(b) Sign bills adopted by the People's Assembly, and submit them to the President of the Republic for promulgation;

(c) Sign and order the publication of resolutions of the People's Assembly;

(d) Represent the People's Assembly domestically and internationally.

Section 2

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly

Article 104

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall be composed of the President of the People's Assembly and by deputies elected by the Assembly from among its members.

The composition of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall be established by law.

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall be convened and chaired by the President of the People's Assembly.

Article 105

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall have power to:

(a) Adopt bills and resolutions in the periods between sessions of the People's Assembly;

(b) Give its opinion before a state of war is declared;

(c) Sanction the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency should it prove impossible to convene the People's Assembly;

(d) Authorise the President of the Republic to leave the country on state visits;

(e) Coordinate the activities of the commissions of the People's Assembly;

(f) Guide the relations between the People's Assembly and assemblies and equivalent institutions in other countries;

(g) Prepare and organise sessions of the People's Assembly.

Article 106

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly may not legislate on:

(a) the definition of nationality;

(b) the delimitation of the national territory;

(c) the electoral law;

(d) the rules for referenda;

(e) judicial organisation and the status of judicial officers;

(f) the rules for a state of war, state of siege or state of emergency;

(g) the imposition of taxes;

(h) the designation of the national currency;

(i) the rules concerning expropriations for public use.

The legislative acts of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall be ratified by the People's Assembly in the session following their adoption.

Article 107

The legislative acts of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly shall take the form of laws, and its other decisions shall take the form of resolutions. Both shall be published in the *Boletim da Republica.*

Chapter 4

Council of Ministers

Article 108

The Council of Ministers is the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

In discharging its functions, the Council of Ministers shall observe the decisions of the President of the Republic and the opinions of the People's Assembly.

Article 109

The Council of Ministers shall be convened and chaired by the Prime Minister, to whom this power is delegated by the President of the Republic.

The composition of the Council of Ministers shall be fixed by law.

Article 110

The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the President of the Republic and to the People's Assembly for the conduct of domestic and foreign policy and shall give account to them of its activities as stipulated by law.

Article 111

The Council of Ministers shall take care of the administration of the country, shall guarantee its territorial integrity, shall supervise its armed forces, shall oversee public order, security

and stability of citizens, shall promote economic development, shall implement the state's social activity, shall develop and consolidate legality, and shall implement the country's foreign policy.

The defence of public and constitutional order shall be guaranteed through appropriate organs functioning under government control.

Article 112

In particular, the Council of Ministers shall have power to:

(a) Guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens;

(b) Ensure public order and social discipline;

(c) Draft bills to be submitted to the People's Assembly, and proposals for decisions to be submitted to the President of the Republic;

(d) Guarantee the defence and consolidation of the public domain, and of state property;

(e) Direct and coordinate the activities of the ministries, and of other organs subordinate to the Council of Ministers;

(f) Analyse the experience of local executive organs, and regulate their organisation and functioning;

(g) Draft the state plan and budget and implement them after they have been approved by the People's Assembly;

(h) Promote and regulate economic activity and the activity of the social sectors;

(i) Ensure the correct functioning and the development of state-owned institutions and companies and their expansion in accordance with the needs of the economy;

(j) Promote the development of cooperatives, and support for peasant family production;

(k) Guarantee the conditions for the exercise of private initiative;

(l) Direct labour and social security policy;

(m) Direct the state-run social sectors, particularly education and health;

(n) Define and promote housing policy;

(o) Prepare the signing of international treaties, and sign, ratify, agree to and terminate international agreements.

Article 113

Notwithstanding other authorisations conferred upon him by the President of the Republic or by law, the Prime Minister shall assist and advise the President of the Republic in the leadership of the government.

In particular, the Prime Minister shall have power to:

(a) Assist the President of the Republic in drawing up the programme of the government;

(b) Advise the President of the Republic on establishing ministries and ministry-like commissions, and on appointing members of the government and other heads of governmental units;

(c) Draw up the government's plan of work and present it to the President of the Republic;

(d) Guarantee that members of the government implement decisions taken by state bodies;

(e) Convene and chair the meetings of the Council of Ministers dealing with the implementation of defined policies and other decisions;

(f) Coordinate and control the activities of the Ministries and other governmental institutions;

(g) Sign decrees and resolutions from the Council of Ministers;

(h) Supervise the technical and administrative functioning of the Council of Ministers.

Article 114

In his relations with the People's Assembly, the Prime Minister shall have power to:

(a) Present to the People's Assembly the government's programme, and the draft plan and budget;

(b) Present government reports;

(c) Outline the government's positions and its activity to the People's Assembly.

In the exercise of these functions, the Prime Minister shall be assisted by members of the Council of Ministers whom he shall designate.

Article 115

The members of the Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the President of the Republic and to the Prime Minister for implementing the decisions of the Council of Ministers within their jurisdiction.

Article 116

Regulatory acts of the Council of Ministers shall take the form of decrees. Other decisions of the Council of Ministers shall take the form of resolutions.

The decrees and resolutions shall be signed by the Prime Minister and published in the *Boletim da Republica.*

Chapter 5

The Courts

Article 117

It shall be the function of the courts to guarantee and strengthen the rule of law as an instrument of legal stability, to guarantee respect for the laws and other legal rules as social practice, to safeguard the rights and freedoms of citizens as well as the vested interests of the various organs and entities having legal capacity.

The courts shall educate citizens in the voluntary and conscious observance of laws, thus establishing a just and harmonious social community.

Article 118

In the People's Republic of Mozambique, the power to administer justice shall be exercised through the Supreme People's Court and other courts as established by law.

The courts shall punish violations of legality and shall adjudicate disputes in accordance with what is established in law.

The Supreme People's Court shall be the highest judicial body, and shall have jurisdiction throughout the national territory.

The Supreme People's Court shall guarantee the uniform application of the law, at the service of the interests of the Mozambican people.

Article 119

The Supreme People's Court shall function:

(a) in sections, as a trial court and an appeal court;

(b) in plenary session, as an appeal court, and as a court of single instance (from which there is no appeal), in cases expressly envisaged in the law.

Article 120

The Supreme People's Court shall be composed of professional judges and elected judges.

The professional judges shall hold a degree in law, shall be proposed by the Supreme Council of the Legal Profession, and shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.

The number of professional judges, their status, and term of office shall be defined by law.

The People's Assembly shall elect judges to the Supreme People's Court.

Mozambican citizens aged over 40 may be elected as judges to the Supreme People's Court, but other criteria shall be fixed by law.

Article 121

In court hearings, matters of law shall always be decided by the professional judges.

The elected judges shall only take part in hearings in the trial court.

Article 122

The law shall regulate the jurisdiction, composition, organisation and functioning of the Supreme Council of the Legal Profession, and of the judicial courts at all levels.

Article 123

In the exercise of their duties, judges shall be independent, and shall owe obedience only to the law.

Judges may be held responsible in civil, criminal and disciplinary proceedings for acts committed in the exercise of their duties only in cases specifically provided for by law.

The removal of a professional judge from the bench may only take place under legally established terms.

Article 124

The Administrative Court shall control the legality of administrative acts, and shall watch over the legality of public expenditure.

The law shall regulate the jurisdiction, organisation, composition and functioning of the Administrative Court.

Article 125

In particular, the Administrative Court shall:

(a) Adjudicate acts whose object is controversies emerging from administrative juridical relations;

(b) Rule on appeals against decisions of state bodies, and their agents;

(c) Audit the state's accounts;

(d) Exercise other jurisdictions that may be attributed by law.

Article 126

Apart from the Supreme People's Court, the Administrative Court and the judicial courts, there shall exist the following categories of courts:

(a) Courts-martial;

(b) Customs Courts;

(c) Fiscal Courts.

The law shall regulate the jurisdiction, organisation, composition and functioning of these courts.

Article 127

The establishment of courts exclusively designed to try certain categories of crime, apart from those courts provided for in the Constitution, shall not be permitted.

Chapter 6

The Attorney-General's Office

Article 128

The Attorney-General's Office shall supervise and control legality, shall promote compliance with the law, and shall participate in defending the law of the land.

The Attorney-General's Office shall be headed by the Attorney-General of the Republic. In case of absence or impediment, his substitute shall be the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic.

The Attorney-General shall be responsible to the President of the Republic, and shall provide annual reports to the People's Assembly.

The law shall determine the structure, composition and functio- ning of the Attorney-General's Office.

Article 129

The Public Proscutor's Office shall constitute a hierarchically organised magistracy, subordinate to the Attorney--General of the Republic.

In the exercise of their duties, the magistrates and agents of the Public Prosecutor's Office shall be subject to criteria of legality, objectivity, restraint, and exclusively bound by the directives and orders as provided for by law.

Article 130

The Public Prosecutor's Office shall represent the state in the courts, shall control the legality and the duration of detentions, shall draw up prosecution cases, shall execute criminal sentences, and shall ensure the legal defence of minors, and of persons not present in court, or unable to defend themselves.

Chapter 7

Local state organs

Article 131

Local state organs shall have the function to organise the participation of citizens in solving problems of their communities and in promoting local development.

The strengthening of local organs shall serve to deepen democracy and shall contribute to national integration and unity.

Local state organs shall have the power to decide on all matters within their territorial jurisdiction, provided this does not infringe on the powers of other organs.

Local organs shall be constituted at the various territorial levels and shall be structured according to law.

Article 132

Local organs shall have assemblies with deputies elected by the citizens who live in a particular territorial area, and executives designated by the assemblies.

The executives shall be subordinate to the assemblies.

Article 133

The deputies shall periodically give an account of their activity to their electorate and to the assemblies.

The disqualification and resignation of deputies shall be regulated by law.

Article 134

The assemblies shall take decisions that are binding in the sphere of their jurisdiction, they shall set up commissions necessary for carrying out their duties, and they shall hold individual deputies responsible for discharging specific functions.

State organs and institutions must provide necessary information and collaborate with the local organs to ensure the fulfilment of their tasks.

Article 135

The legal form of acts of the local organs shall be established by law.

Chapter 8

Incompatibilities

Article 136

No person may hold at the same time more than one of the following positions: President of the Republic, President of the People's Assembly, Prime Minister, member of the government, President of the Supreme People's Court, Deputy President of the Supreme People's Court, Judge of the Supreme People's Court, President of the Administrative Court, Attorney-General of the Republic, Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, Provincial Governor, Secretary of State.

Part 4

Symbols and capital of the Republic

Article 137

The symbols of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be the flag, the emblem and the anthem.

Article 138

The national flag shall be based on the flag of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the vanguard which united the Mozambican people for the struggle against colonialism, led the armed national liberation struggle, proclaimed the country's inde- pendence, and founded the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The national flag shall have five colours: red, green, black, gold and white.

The significance of the colours shall be as follows:

red - the centuries of resistance to colonialism, the armed national liberation struggle, and the revolution;

green - the riches of the Mozambican soil;

black - the African continent;

gold - the riches of the subsoil;

white - the justice of the struggle of the Mozambican people, and peace.

From top to bottom there shall be green, black and gold stripes, separated by strips of white. On the left there shall be a red triangle in the centre of which there shall be a gold star. Above this there shall be a crossed hoe and gun superimposed upon a book.

The gold star shall symbolise the internationalist spirit of the Mozambican people.

The book, hoe and gun shall enshrine the slogan "Study, Produce, Combat".

Article 139

The emblem of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall contain as its central elements a book, a gun and a hoe, placed above a map of Mozambique, and representing, respectively, education, defence and vigilance, and the peasantry and agricultural production.

Below the map the ocean shall be represented.

In the centre shall be the rising sun, symbol of the revolution and of the new life under construction.

Enclosing all this shall be a toothed wheel, symbolising the working class and industry.

Surrounding the toothed wheel there shall be, to the right and left respectively, an ear of maize and a piece of sugar cane, sybolising agricultural wealth.

At the top and in the centre, a red star shall symbolise the internationalist spirit of the Mozambican revolution.

At the bottom, there shall be a red strip with the inscription "People's Republic of Mozambique".

Article 140

The capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique shall be the city of Maputo.

Part 5

Amending the Constitution

Article 141

Initiatives to amend the Constitution may be proposed by the President of the Republic or by at least one third of the deputies to the People's Assembly

Proposed amendments must be submitted to the People's Assembly 90 days before the opening of debate.

Article 142

If a proposed amendment implies fundamental changes in the rights of citizens or in the organisation of public powers, the proposal, after adoption by the People's Assembly, shall be submitted to public debate and to a referendum.

In other cases, amendments to the constitution shall be adopted by a two thirds majority of the deputies of the People's Assembly.

Article 143

All citizens entitled to vote shall have the right to participate in the referendum.

The amendment shall be considered approved if more than half of the votes cast are in its favour.

The results of the referendum and the approved constitutional text shall be adopted by the People's Assembly in the form of a constitutional law, and their publication in the *Boletim da Republica* shall be ordered by the President of the Republic.

Article 144

The constitution may only be amended at least five years after the preceding constitutional amendment.

Part 6

Concluding and transitional provisions

Article 145

The Constitution shall take precedence over all other laws.

Article 146

Insofar as they are not contrary to the constitution, previous laws shall remain in force until modified or repealed.

Article 147

The stipulations in Article 77 regarding the election of the President of the Republic shall come into force upon the holding of the third general elections.

The President of the Frelimo Party shall be President of the Republic of Mozambique until the third general elections.

Article 148

The deputies to the People's Assembly shall retain their seats until general elections are held pursuant to this constitution.

Article 149

The limit on terms of office prescribed in Article 91 shall come into force as from the first elections held under this constitution.

Article 150

This constitution shall come into force on (date)

**Published by the INFORMATION DEPARTMENT,
FRELIMO PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

**Rua Pereira do Lago, MAPUTO,
People's Republic of Mozambique**

card w PM's Box

R4/1

EMBAIXADA DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE

EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Your reference: Our reference:2/Emb/UK/90 London, 2nd Jan 1990

The Embassy of the People's Republic of Mozambique presents its compliments to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request the transmission of the attached envelopes to the following dignatories:

- Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I
- The Right honourable Mrs. Margareth Thatcher, Prime Minister
- The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe, Deputy Prime Minister

The above mentioned envelopes were received from the Presidency of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of Mozambique avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

TO:

Protocol Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London, SW1A 2AH

011 [redacted]

COMMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
FM HARARE
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 435
OF 311355Z JULY 89
INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO. NAIROBI. PRETORIA. LUSAKA

MOZAMBIQUE/ZIMBABWE

SUMMARY

1. MUGABE CONFIRMS THAT AT CHISSANO'S REQUEST HE AND PRESIDENT MOI ARE CONSIDERING A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE. MUGABE AND MOE TO MEET SOON TO COMPARE NOTES BEFORE CONTACTING RENAMO. EVENTUAL AIM IS FOR DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN REMAMO AND MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT

DETAIL

2. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 JULY PRESIDENT MUGABE OUTLINED DEVELOPMENTS ON THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE. MUGABE CONFIRMED THAT CHISSANO HAD ASKED HIM DURING THEIR BEIRA MEETING ON 9 JULY. AND MOI DURING HIS 21 JULY VISIT TO MAPUTO. TO WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A BASIS ON WHICH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RENAMO COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. BOTH HAD AGREED.

3. MUGABE SAID THAT HE AND MOI HAD DISCUSSED THEIR ROLE DURING THE OAU SUMMIT IN ADDIS ABABA. THEY HAD AGREED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD PRODUCE A SET OF DRAFT PARAMETERS WITHIN WHICH THEY WOULD HOPE TO OPERATE. THEY WOULD THEN MEET QUOTE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS UNQUOTE TO COMPARE AND CONSOLIDATE NOTES BEFORE CONTACTING RENAMO. MUGABE DID NOT REVEAL ANY OF HIS OWN PLANS.

4. MUGABE SAID HE HOPED FOR AS MUCH COOPERATION AS POSSIBLE FROM RENAMO. IN CONCLUSION. MUGABE SAID IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT THERE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN RENAMO AND THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT SINCE THOSE TWO PARTIES MUST IN THE END NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THEM.

COMMENT

5. LITTLE NEW. BUT MUGABE SEEMED EXCITED BY HIS ROLE AS PEACEMAKER. HIS READINESS TO TAKE THEM ON NOW. AND IF NECESSARY TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH RENAMO CONTRASTS WITH HIS LARGLEY DATED RHETORIC ON SOUTH AFRICA.

THORPE

YYYY
MAIN 134
.MOZAMBIQUE 1
LIMITED 6
CAFD 9

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 335
OF 102000Z JUNE 89
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, MOSCOW, LISBON, NAIROBI, WASHINGTON

LUXEMBOURG FOR FAIRWEATHER

TALK WITH US AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS

1. ON 8 JUNE AT A FAREWELL LUNCH A TROIS I RECOUNTED TO MELISSA WELLS AND NIKOLAI DYBENKO MY IMPRESSIONS OF CHISSANO DURING MY FAREWELL CALL THE DAY BEFORE (MY TELNO 327). BOTH SAID THEY HAD RECENTLY SEEN HIM AND THAT HE HAD SEEMED ALERT AND IN GOOD HEALTH. HOWEVER BOTH AGREED THAT HE WAS IN NEED OF SUPPORT. MY US COLLEAGUE SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT CHISSANO SHOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT HE WAS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH RENAMO BEFORE THE FIFTH FRELIMO PARTY CONGRESS. DYBENKO SAID WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD SHOW SOME TANGIBLE SUCCESS BY THE CONGRESS. I COMMENTED THAT THE LATTER SEEMED MORE PLAUSIBLE. I COULD NOT SEE THAT REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CONGRESS WOULD BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT REPORTS OF PEACE DISCUSSIONS UNLESS THEY HAD BROUGHT SOME RESULTS. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS WOULD NOT A MORE REASONABLE OBJECTIVE FOR CHISSANO TO BE SIMPLY AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE IDEA THAT ALL MOZAMBICANS COULD PARTICIPATE IN VARIOUS FIELDS (POINT 11 OF THE NON-PAPER)?

2. DYBENKO SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT PIK BOTHA WAS UP TO NO GOOD. HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE IN A DAY OR TWO WHICH SHOWED CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH RECENT SUPPORT FOR RENAMO. MRS WELLS REFERRED TO THE REJECTION BY BOTHA OF MR BAKER'S SUGGESTION AT THE ROME MEETING THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS CONTINUING ITS SUPPORT. (BOTHA HAD ALREADY DISMISSED THE LIST OF SA OPERATIONS ASSISTING RENAMO WHEN USTINOV HANDED IT OVER IN CAPE TOWN.) DYBENKO AT THIS POINT MENTIONED THE HELP WHICH HE ALLEGED WAS GIVEN TO RENAMO BY THE WEST GERMANS.

3. THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT

THE FIFTH CONGRESS WOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY POLITBUREAU MEMBERS BEING DISMISSED, BUT HE EXPECTED THE ADDITION OF TWO OR THREE 'CANDIDATE MEMBERS' - MOCUMBI, ARUN AND CARRILHO WERE THE FRONT RUNNERS.

COMMENT

4. THIS WAS A REMARKABLY WARM AND FRANK MEETING. DYBENKO MADE MUCH OF THE FACT THAT PORTUGUESE AND OTHERS BELIEVED THAT THE US HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR FRELIMO TO TALK TO RENAMO.

ALLAN

FCO PLEASE PASS PUSD
YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 238

MAIN 218

.SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
CAFD
EAD
WAD
UND
NAD
ECD (I)
SOVIET
MR FAIRWEATHER
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL 20

SOUTHERN AFRICA

NNNN

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL DATED 2 MAY 1989	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	DKB 12/12/2016.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

ZCZC
LNCYAN 6627 HGHPAN 9902
CONFIDENTIAL
PP CAOFF
FM HARAR TO MODAD
261230Z APR
GRS 493

CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE
TO PRIORITY MODUK
TELNO U/N
OF 261230Z APRIL 89
AND TO PRIORITY FCO
INFO PRIORITY CABINET OFFICE,MAPUTO

SIC ABA/Z7A/W61

FROM BMATT ZIMBABWE

FROM COMD. MOD FOR DMAO,FCO FOR CAFD AND DEF DEPT, CABINET OFFICE FOR NO.10

MAPUTO FOR DA.

ONE. VISITED MAPUTO 24/25 APR. VISIT STARTED BADLY WITH PROGRAMMED VISIT BY SELF AND HMA TO MTT TRAINED TROOPS AT MAGUDE CANCELLED AFTER 2 HOURS OF PROCRASTINATION. EVENTUALLY TRANSPIRED THAT ONLY ONE HELICOPTER IN MAPUTO SERVICEABLE BUT IT HAD FAILED TO RETURN FROM MORNING MISSION. CAUSE OF UNSERVICEABILITY IS LACK OF BATTERIES, SUPPLY OF WHICH SOVIETS HAVE FAILED TO MAINTAIN. PRESIDENT WELL AWARE OF PROBLEM: STATED THAT HELICOPTER FLEET TOO OLD AND DELAPIDATED BUT COST OF NEW FLEET,HIP OR PUMA,PROHIBITIVE.

TWO. SECOND DAY MUCH BETTER. I HAD USEFUL SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CHISSANO AND LT GEN HAMA THAI, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

THREE. WITH PRESIDENT EMPHASISED, AS INSTRUCTED, THAT FINANCIAL APPROVAL FOR EXPANSION STILL AWAITED FROM FCO. PRESIDENT DID NOT TAKE UP THE POINT, CLEARLY EXPECTING APPROVAL TO BE MERE FORMALITY AND THAT FIRST EXPANDED COURSE WOULD START ON 4 SEP.

FOUR. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT ALL NECESSARY INTERPRETERS WOULD BE FOUND AND THAT 20 WOULD START TRAINING IN MAPUTO ON 2 MAY. HAMA THAI LATER CONFIRMED THIS AND ALSO AGREED TO MAKE UP PRESENT SHORTFALL OF 2 AT NYANGA IMMEDIATELY.

FIVE. I SUGGESTED THAT FIRST EXPANDED COURSE SHOULD BE FOR 60 OFFICERS. PRESIDENT AND HAMA THAI AGREED. BOTH ALSO CONFIRMED THAT ADDITIONAL RECRUITS AVAILABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT COURSES.

SIX. STATE OF WEAPONS DISCUSSED. HAMA THAI LATER AGREED TO PROVIDE AN ARMOURER AND SPARE PARTS FOR NYANGA. PERSONAL WEAPON CONCEPT ACCEPTED BUT PRACTICABILITY ANOTHER MATTER.

SEVEN. HAMA THAI AGREED THAT REFURBISHMENT OF 1ST COMPANY SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MAPUTO IN MAY/JUN. I INTEND TO SEND QM MTT TO ASSIST DA. HE ALSO AGREED THAT COMPANIES SHOULD RETRAIN IN NYANGA. I SUSPECT THAT THIS MIGHT PROVE TOO DIFFICULT FOR MOZAMBICANS AS ALTERNATIVE A SMALL TEAM FROM NYANGA OC CAPT, RSM AND SGT COULD CARRY OUT USEFUL DEBRIEF AND LIMITED RETRAINING OF COMPANY IN MAPUTO OVER 2 WEEK PERIOD. COMMENTS PLEASE.

EIGHT. ARMY COS BRIEFED ON VISIT OF DCDS(C). GUARANTEED THAT VISIT TO MAGUDE WOULD BE ARRANGED. AM SLIGHTLY WARY OF SUCH GUARANTEES, HAVING BEEN DITCHED TWICE, BUT HOPE IT WILL GO AHEAD EXCLAM.

NINE. IN CONCLUSION PRESIDENT FRIENDLY AND POSTIVE. OBVIOUSLY KEEN TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM OF NYANGA VISIT. HAMA THAI MOST IMPRESSIVE OF SENIOR OFFICERS AND RELATIONSHIP WAS WARM. I HAVE INVITED HIM TO THE PASS OUT PARADE AT NYANGA IN JUN AND WILL HOST HIM IN HARARE EN ROUTE. HE ACCEPTED WITH ALACITY BUT WE MAY NEED TO ASSIST WITH AIR PASSAGE. MAPUTO WILL PURSUE THE IDEA.

TEN. I DO NOT INTEND TO RETURN TO MOZAMBIQUE BEFORE JUNE VISIT WITH DSDS(C), UNLESS PROBLEMS ARISE. AT PRESENT ALL SEEMS TO BE ON SCHEDULE FOR 4 SEP, PROVIDING AGREEMENT FOR REBUILD AND MTT TRANSPORT NOT DELAYED. WILL BRIEF DMAO FULLY WHEN HE VISITS NEXT WEEK.

MELHUISH

YYYY

HGHPAN 9902

NNNN

1216282

CONFIDENTIAL
DO FCOLN
FM MAPUT TO FCOLN
110935Z APR
GRS 623

File

CDN.

CONFIDENTIAL AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 12/4
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 210
OF 110935Z APRIL 89
INFO PRIORITY CAPETOWN. HARARE
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

MOZAMBICAN ATTITUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY DR MOCUMBI. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. TO SEE HIM AT 1730 HRS ON SUNDAY 9 APRIL. MY US COLLEAGUE SAW HIM AT 1700 HRS AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 1800 HRS.

2. MOCUMBI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT. WHO WAS GOING ON PROVINCIAL TOUR THE NEXT DAY. WANTED HMG TO HAVE SOME FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE MOZAMBICANS' ATTITUDE TO DIALOGUE. SPEAKING WITH A PAPER (TEXT IN MIFT) IN FRONT OF HIM. HE SAID THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR PLACING THE INSTRUMENTS OF DESTRUCTION ON THE SAME LEVEL AS THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS THE GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING FOR DIALOGUE TO BRING AN END TO SUFFERING. ASSUMING THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE WAS NOT THREATENED. THE MOZAMBICAN APPROACH COULD PUT AND END TO TERRORISM AND ESTABLISH A MECHANISM TO ENABLE EX-RENAMO TO LEAD A NORMAL LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PROGRESS ON NEW LAWS ON LAND. EDUCATION AND HEALTH AND WAS NOW WORKING ON LEGISLATION CONCERNING RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES. IT WAS MOZAMBICAN PRACTICE TO CONSULT ANYONE LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY LEGISLATION - THIS WAS DEMOCRATIC. MOCUMBI SAID THAT DIALOGUE WOULD HELP TO EXPLAIN THAT ALL PEOPLE WOULD BE GUARANTEED HUMAN AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS. PROVIDED THEY DID NOT USE THESE AGAINST NATIONAL UNITY. ETC. POLITICAL CHANGES SHOULD OCCUR THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

3. THE MINISTER THEN HANDED TO ME THE DOCUMENT. WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE NON PAPER UNQUOTE. MOCUMBI SAID HE WAS GIVING IT TO THE UK. US AND USSR AND A COLLEAGUE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. I ASKED WHETHER IT WAS ENDORSED BY THE POLITBUREAU AND WHAT ACTION HE EXPECTED US TO TAKE. MOCUMBI DUCKED THE QUESTION OF ITS ORIGINS BUT SAID IT WAS PREPARED ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND THAT THE PURPOSE OF HANDING IT OVER WAS TO LET US KNOW WHAT THE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT SO THAT THOSE WHO WERE FIGHTING AGAINST IT WOULD ALSO KNOW AND THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAD CITIZENS WORKING AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS. IN THE CASE OF THE UK. OUR STAND WAS WELL KNOWN BUT IT WAS CONSIDERED RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD KNOW THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE. MOCUMBI EMPHATICALLY SAID HE WAS NOT ASKING HMG TO MAKE CONTACTS WITH RENAMO.

COMMENT

4. THE PAPER BREAKS LITTLE NEW GROUND AND CONTAINS NO HARD DETAILS OF THE MECHANISM BY WHICH RENAMO COULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. IT SIMPLY RESTATES WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD FOR SOME TIMM. NAMELY THAT FORMER RENAMO FIGHTERS COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY PROVIDED THEY RENOUNCED VIOLENCE. THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING THE PAPER NOW IS THEREFORE SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IT WAS HOPED THAT IT WOULD ANSWER SOME OF THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE UK. US AND OTHERS AS TO WHAT THE MOZAMBICANS HAD IN MIND WHEN CONSIDERING DIALOGUE. IT MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO GIVE THE CHURCHMEN SOME IDEAS TO PASS ON DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS. ATLHOUGH WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS.

5. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS. BOTH OF WHOM ARE ALSO MYSTIFIED. THE US WERE TOLD NO ACTION BY THEM VIS-A-VIS RENAMO WAS EXPECTED AND THE POINT ABOUT USING INFLUENCE ON THEIR CITIZENS WAS ALSO NOT MENTIONED. BOTH US AND SOVIET MISSIONS ARE PASSING THE DOCUMENT BACK TO CAPITALS (THE SOVIETS IN PARTICULAR CLAIM NOT TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF A QUOTE NON PAPER UNQUOTE).

6. DESPITE THE ABOVE, I BELIEVE THE FACT THAT THIS MATTER HAS NOW BEEN DISCUSSED WITH US BY DR MOCUMBI MEANS THAT WE CAN IN FUTURE PRESS THE MOZAMBICANS TO KEEP US BETTER INFORMED ON THEIR PLANS FOR DIALOGUE. WE WILL BE PROBING FURTHER, EG WITH MADEIRA, THE PRESIDENT'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER.

ALLAN

YYYY

135057
MDHIAN 0121

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 205
OF 100840Z APRIL 89
INFO PRIORITY CAPETOWN, HARARE, LILONGWE, MODUK

SIC ACA/Z7A

MY TELNO 202 (NOT TO ALL): EXPANSION OF TRAINING AT NYANGA: VISIT OF COMMANDER BMATT

1. BRIGADIER TOYNE-SEWELL VISITED MAPUTO FROM 4-7 APRIL. HE WAS ABLE TO CARRY FORWARD THE DECISION TAKEN AT NYANGA ON 29 MARCH THAT THE NUMBER OF MOZAMBICANS TRAINING AT NYANGA SHOULD BE DOUBLED. THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT FROM 2 SEPTEMBER THERE SHOULD BE TWO COMPANIES/COURSES UNDER TRAINING IN PARALLEL (BUT STAGGERED). MEANWHILE CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO AN AD HOC INCREASE IN TRAINING BEFORE THAT DATE.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HAD BEEN PROMISED THAT THE BRIGADIER WOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT, CHISSANO'S ATTENDANCE AT THE LUANDA FLS PREVENTED THIS. TOYNE-SEWELL HOWEVER WAS ABLE TO HAVE GOOD TALKS WITH GENERAL DAI, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY, AND GENERAL MUNHEPE, DIRECTOR OF TRAINING. HE ALSO MET AT MY HOUSE FRANCISCO MADEIRA, THE PRESIDENT'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, AND PANGUENE, MOZAMBICAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. (THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL HAMA THAI, WAS IN THE NORTH). A VISIT TO THE BRITISH-TRAINED UNITS ON THE LIMPOPO LINE WAS UNFORTUNATELY CANCELLED AT THE LAST MINUTE (WE WERE PREPARING TO BOARD THE HELICOPTER) ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE WERE ACTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERWAY.

3. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT COMMANDER BMATT IS ABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AND VISIT THE UNITS ON HIS NEXT VISIT, WHICH IT IS HOPED WILL TAKE PLACE ON 24-25 APRIL. I HAVE PRESSED THIS ON DR MOCUMBI, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. CHISSANO HIMSELF IS ABOUT TO GO UP COUNTRY ON A PROVINCIAL TOUR SO IT MAY TAKE A LITTLE WHILE TO GET CONFIRMATION.

4. THE MOZAMBICANS APPRECIATE THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERES IN PRESSING FORWARD WITH THE EXPANDED TRAINING AND HAVE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WILL NOT BE PROBLEMS WITH PROVISION OF PERSONNEL TO BE

135057
MDHIAN [redacted]121

TRAINED AND SUBSEQUENTLY LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE FIELD. WE WILL HAVE TO KEEP THEM UP TO THE MARK. CHARLES POWELL, NO 10, HAS ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

ALLAN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 43

MAIN 39

LIMITED	PS
CAFD	PS/MRS CHALKER
DEFENCE	MR TOMKYS
SAFD	PS/PUS
FINANCE	MR FAIRWEATHER

ADDITIONAL 4

NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

061417Z

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 197
OF 051225Z APRIL 89
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE CAPETOWN, HARARE

MOZAMBICAN INFORMATION EFFORT IN THE US

1. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER MET PRESIDENT CHISSANO AT NYANGA ON 29 MARCH SHE COUNSELLED HIM TO MOUNT A MAJOR INFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES TO BRING HOME THE TRUE NATURE OF RENAMO AS WELL AS THE POLICIES OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. CHISSANO EXPLAINED TO HER THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A MOZAMBIQUE NETWORK, MAINLY SUPPORTED BY CHURCH ORGANISATIONS.

2. THE MOZAMBIQUE NETWORK IS, I UNDERSTAND, IN THE HANDS OF PREXY NESBITT, A BLACK AMERICAN WHO WORKED WITH FRELIMO IN TANZANIA. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE NETWORK IS LIKELY TO BE PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED AND MAY WELL NOT BE TOO EFFECTIVE.

3. CHISSANO CLEARLY AGREED WITH MRS THATCHER'S ADVICE. AS HE TOLD HER, HE IS DESPATCHING MARCELINO DOS SANTOS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, AND HIS WIFE PAMELA TO THE US FOR A THREE-WEEK TOUR. ALTHOUGH AT FIRST SIGHT IT MAY SEEM PECULIAR TO SEND SUCH AN UNRECONSTRUCTURED MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WHITE (EX?) SACP WIFE TO AMERICA, THIS IS PROBABLY A SHREWD MOVE. DOS SANTOS IS AN ELOQUENT OPERATOR (I DO NOT KNOW HOW HE WILL COME OVER ON TV) AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF RENAMO BRUTALITIES (THE RECENT MURDER OF THREE ITALIAN MISSIONARIES WAS PARTICULARLY SENSELESS). MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, MELISSA WELLS, HAS BEEN ADVISING SCHOOLING DOS SANTOS ON THE SORT OF RECEPTION HE CAN EXPECT. HE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON 10, 11 AND 12 TO UNDERTAKE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS. HE HOPES TO MAKE CONTACTS ON THE HILL AND TO ADDRESS THE METHODISTS AS WELL AS MEETING STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. ALTHOUGH NOT AN OFFICIAL VISIT, THE LATTER WILL, ACCORDING TO MS WELLS, BE GIVING DISCREET SUPPORT.

4. IT IS CLEARLY IN ALL OUR INTERESTS THAT THE MOZAMBICANS SHOULD EXPRESS THE TRUE NATURE OF RENAMO TO THE US PUBLIC. MRS THATCHER'S FORTHRIGHT CONDEMNATION OF THEIR TERRORISM HAS BEEN GREATLY APPLAUDED HERE.

ALLAN

YYYY
ADVANCE 4
PS/MRS CHALKER 1
MR TOMKYS 1
MR FAIRWEATHER 1
HD/CAFD 1

MAIN	87
LIMITED	6
CAFD	9
SAFD	8
NAD	4
NEWS	9
INFO DEPT	11
PUSD	26
PLANNERS	3
PS	7
PS/MRS CHALKER	1
PS/PUS	1
MR TOMKYS	1
MR FAIRWEATHER	1

[BAMFORD]

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL DATED 23 MARCH 1989	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	12/12/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

Q43751
MDHIAN 2308

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LILONGWE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 274
OF 060555Z SEPTEMBER 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, PRETORIA
INFO ROUTINE HARARE, LUSAKA

PRESIDENT BOTHA'S VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE AND MALAWI
MY TELNO 273

SUMMARY

1. SOUTH AFRICANS EXPECT PRESIDENT BOTHA TO VISIT CHISSANO AT CABORA BASSA ON 12 SEPTEMBER. VISIT TO MALAWI ON 10 SEPTEMBER PROPOSED, BUT MALAWIAN AGREEMENT AWAITED.

DETAIL

2. SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME (IN CONFIDENCE, PLEASE PROTECT) ON 5 SEPTEMBER THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA WOULD VISIT CHISSANO AT CABORA BASSA ON 12 SEPTEMBER. BOTHA MIGHT CALL ON BANDA IN BLANTYRE FIRST, ON 10 SEPTEMBER. PRESIDENT BOTHA WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA, DEFENCE MINISTER MALAN AND DIRECTOR GENERALS FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE.

3. AMBASSADOR SAID PURPOSE OF VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE WAS TO PROVE COOPERATION WITH MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT, DISCUSS HOW TO CONTROL RENAMO, AND OFFER PROJECTS. SOUTH AFRICANS HOPE THIS WILL HELP CONVINCE MOZAMBICANS THAT THEY ARE GIVING NO OFFICIAL SUPPORT FOR RENAMO AND DISCOURAGING ANY UNOFFICIAL SUPPORT. THEY SEE THIS AS PART OF A LONG PROCESS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE.

4. ORIGINAL PLANS WERE FOR VISIT TO CABORA BASSA ON 9 SEPTEMBER AND TO BLANTYRE ON 10 SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER CHISSANO ASKED ON 2 OR 3 SEPTEMBER FOR POSTPONEMENT OF BOTHA'S VISIT TO CABORA BASSA BY A FEW DAYS. THIS THREW SOUTH AFRICANS INTO CONFUSION AS BANDA HAD INSISTED THAT HE WOULD NOT SEE BOTHA UNTIL AFTER BOTHA HAD SEEN CHISSANO, AND SAID HE WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AFTER 10 SEPTEMBER UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH.

5. ON 5 SEPTEMBER SOUTH AFRICAN DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

VISITED MAPUTO AND AGREED 12 SEPTEMBER FOR CABORA BASSA MEETING. SOUTH AFRICANS ARE NOW TRYING TO PERSUADE MALAWIANS TO LET BOTHA COME HERE FIRST. I UNDERSTAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN VISIT HERE ARE BEING HANDLED BY MAMA KADZAMIRA AND THAT JOHN TEMBO HAS A KEY ROLE AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE MALAWI-MOZAMBIQUE JOINT COMMISSION. I HOPE TO SEE TEMBO ON 8 SEPTEMBER.

6. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HOPE BOTHA'S VISIT HERE WILL LEAD TO A FURTHER TRILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL MEETING IN MALAWI (SOUTH AFRICA, MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE AND POSSIBLY LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND). MALAWIANS ARE SUSPICIOUS.

7. SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR CLAIMED THAT RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA ARE IMPROVING: PRESIDENT BOTHA AND KAUNDA ARE IN CORRESPONDENCE. RELATIONS WITH MUGABE ARE UNCHANGED. SOUTH AFRICANS EXPECT (OR ARE HOPING) THAT MUGABE WILL BECOME ISOLATED AMONG LEADERS OF FRONT LINE STATES AND THINK THE OTHER LEADERS MIGHT WELCOME THIS. THEY SEE CHISSANO AND MOZAMBIQUE AS CENTRAL TO THEIR POLICY OF SEEKING AGREEMENT WITH OTHERS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND MALAWI AS A POSSIBLE FOCUS FOR A NEW SOUTHERN AFRICA GROUPING WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SOUTH AFRICA.

OSBORNE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 42

MAIN 42

LIMITED
CAFD
SAFD
NEWS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR FAIRWEATHER

NNNN

R6/E

5 August 1988

MOZAMBIQUE

For technical reasons, the enclosed item, **MOZAMBIQUE: LIGHT ON FORGOTTEN WAR**, was not included in the second (July 1988) issue of **WORLD BRIEFING**. As it is of special interest to certain readers, we are distributing it separately, from the office of **ANALYSIS**.

PAS

MOZAMBIQUE: LIGHT ON FORGOTTEN WAR

Further light on the murder of Evo Fernandes (see last month's WORLD BRIEFING) and on the largely misreported civil war in Mozambique has reached us from our Lisbon associate, who has access to special sources on Southern Africa.

Mozambique occupies a unique position among Third World countries where anti-Communist resistance movements have been waging successful guerrilla wars against Soviet-backed regimes. For 12 years now, RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) guerrillas have been fighting the Marxist one party Government, FREELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), with increasing success.

The war in Mozambique has, as a result of a media black-out, become a forgotten war. When, in the last few months, this ban was lifted, a misleading and one-sided picture emerged. RENAMO was presented as no more than gangs of war lords and thugs whose exclusive activity lay in terrorising, robbing, kidnapping and slaughtering peasants and the civilian population.

THE WEST'S "SPECIAL APPROACH"

The question is: ifthe RENAMO rebels are mere criminals and terrorists, how has it been possible, without external support, for them to gain and sustain the increasing support and strength that is now widespread over the country, considering the massive military aid provided by a Zimbabwean Expeditionary Corps of 15,000, , contingents of Malawian and Tanzanian troops (8,000) and approximately 1,000 East European and Cuban military advisers?

One of the reasons for the development of this view is the strong pro-FRELIMO bias shown by the US State Department, a view which we have reasons to believe is not shared by US Intelligence and Military communities. For example, situation reports from the US Ambassador in Maputo, (Mrs Melissa Wells, a liberal whose appointment was strongly contested by Senator Jesse Helms) and the Military Attache have been very different. Also, reports about Mozambique recently published in the US, French and British press refer to State Department reports based on interviews with "refugees" in Government controlled areas.

This US approach to the situation in Mozambique - very different from the Angolan case - may have arisen from its consideration that Mozambique was exclusively a preserve of the State Department. The Angolan policy was formed by the late William J. Casey when he was director of the CIA and the State Department were responsible for the follow up. Other Western powers have assumed a similar stance: Great Britain and Spain have provided military training for hundreds of FRELIMO troops; Italy, France, Portugal and Sweden have supplied economic and diplomatic help.

So, Mozambique, a Marxist State, has become one of the main recipients of Western economic aid due to the disastrous internal situation and official assurances coming from the FRELIMO leadership that the regime will change its allegiance from the Eastern Bloc to the West. So far, nothing has happened to confirm this and the West is engaging in an up-to-date form of N.E.P. (New Economic Policy).

THE MURDER OF EVO FERNANDES

Evo Fernandes, 44, a Mozambiquan Indian lawyer, educated in Portugal, carrying a Portuguese passport, was considered by the rank and file of Mozambique to be the most able and reliable RENAMO cadre outside Mozambique. Former General-Secretary of the organisation and No.2 to President General Afonso Dlakhama, Fernandes retired voluntarily to a low-profile official post when his position weakened. However, at the beginning of the year, he appeared to regain Dlakhama's favour. They had met at RENAMO headquarters in the Gorangoza mountains inside Mozambique.

According to a Portuguese expert on Mozambique, Frnandes was a key member of RENAMO for the following reasons:
1 He enjoyed the confidence and respect of the guerrilla leader, Dlakhama;
2 He enjoyed the confidence and contact with those people inside the SADF (South African Defense Force) sympathetic to the cause and who have in the past supported RENAMO.
3 As a brilliant and able politician he had easy access to some European Conservative circles and intelligence establishments.

So, he was an important and irreplaceable element and therefore a perfect target for FRELIMO's secret police, the SCNASP, an East-German/ Cuban trained service.

Fernandes was well aware of RENAMO's main obstacle, it's bad public image. They had been depicted as a gang of armed bandits (Le Monde called them "les Khmers Noirs"), devoid of political purpose,, a mere "puppet" of the SADF "dirty operations" department. He was also aware that, without a political structure outside the country which could provide accurate information, this image was unavoidable.

The precarious external political network was undermined by internal struggle, dissent and latterly suspicion, emanating from the American group led by Schaff, of manipulation by the Zimbabwean CIO (Central Intelligence Office). All these problems increased after the RENAMO representative in Portugal, Paulo Oliveira, a white journalist, defected to FRELIMO after being involved in criminal fraud charges in Lisbon.

Against this chaotic background, Fernandes met Dlakhama in January and April and prepared a counter-offensive to create a political structure; to launch a media campaign (inviting foreign journalists to visit RENAMO's liberated areas); and to clean up the movement's representatioin in Europe and the USA.

Unable to counter RENAMO in military terms (foreign military support has, so far, had limited success) and facing the threat of a political alternative, it is understandable that FRELIMO hard-liners considered the "elimination" of Fernandez. This mission was probably assigned to Department D-13, the section of SNASP whose function is the repression of the so-called "bandits" (RENAMO partisans).

Inform AFRICA, a reputable monthly intelligence digest based in Lisbon, reports: "According to police and the Portuguese Intelligence services, SNASP - Maputo's East German-trained political police - was actively

involved in the affair". Enquiries made by our Portuguese correspondent to officials of the Portuguese Military Intelligence (DINFO) and Civilian Intelligence (SIS) confirm the following:

a) Evo Fernandes returned from Southern Africa with detailed instructions and power to clean up RENAMO's political structure in Europe and the USA, and to prepare a visit to Germany by Afonso Dlakhama.
b) Sunday, 17 April. Fernandes dined with Alexandre Chagas. Chagas is a devious character who has lived in Mozambique for a long time, both before and after independence (1975). It is known he was involved with SNASP and on their payroll. He arrived in Portugal on March 1 and travelled to Maputo again before the kidnapping. He also sent his daughter to Maputo a few days before 17 April.
c) Fernandes suspected Chagas' SNASP links. Chagas talked to Fernandes and convinced him that high-ranking FRELIMO officials, passing through Lisbon, wished to meet him secretly for peace talks. He mentioned General Bonifacio Gruveta, a FRELIMO military commander who was said to favour national reconciliation.
d) After dinner with Chagas in Cascais, a seaside town close to Lisbon, Fernandes disappeared. His body was found on April 21 with six bullets and signs of torture.
e) Chagas and other minor accomplices left the country on April 18, travelling via Spain to Morocco, where they were detained some days later by Moroccan police at the request of INTERPOL. They had air tickets to Maputo via Algiers.
f) The planned coup suggest a split operation. Chagas and two Portuguese "agents", Joaquim Messias (detained in Morocco) and Manuel Pinto da Costa (later captured in Paris) kidnapped Fernandes and delivered him to other SNASP agents, whohad probably entered Portugal on false passports. He was held in captivity and interrogated. They killed him and disappeared.
g) Marxist disinformation tried to put the blame for the murder on RENAMO factions, the South Africans and even the Americans. The facts, already known, pointed to FRELIMO and SNASP.
h) The Portuguese government is seriously embarrassed as its official line has been to present Maputo's FRELIMO authorities as reliable and civilized people. Confronted with the facts, their relations with Maputo remain cool, and they have not, so far, acted officially.
i) Public opinion is outraged, demanding to know what is delaying the extradition of Chagas from Morocco. Previous criminal cases involving Marxist African diplomatic activities (Angola, Guine-Bissau) remain unresolved.

The disappearance of Fernandes was a serious setback for RENAMO and prejudiced its chances of improving its political structure and public image but it did not achieve its military objective. On the contrary, our sources confirm RENAMO's continuing strength at operational level and increased difficulties encountered by the 30,000 strong FRELIMO regulars and their foreign allies (15,000 Zimbabwean and 8,000 Tanzanian troops) in controlling the 25,000 armed RENAMO insurgents.

The financial situation is disastrous: a GNP of 3 billion, exports of US$100 million, a foreign debt of US$3.2 billion. A third of the budget, US$770 million, is for military expenditure.

There is a growing food shortage and massive migration of the population to neighbouring countries - 250,000 to the RSA and 600,000 to Malawi.

Maputo, the capital, is under siege to guerrillas operating on its outskirts. The only regular line of communication, operating under Zimbabwean protection, is the Beira-Umtali corridor.

There is dissent within the FRELIMO military who are said to favour a settlement with RENAMO. On July 8, President Joaquim Chissano retired 82 military officers, amongst whom were Marcelion dos Santos and Armando Guebuza, both top FRELIMO men. Other leading men such as Oscar Monteiro, Sergio Vieira and Bonifacio Guveta, were removed from active service but retained political powers and rank.

The South African military personnel are sceptical about FRELIMO's ability to control the rebels and protect the power lines from Cabora-Bassa. A permanent presence of ANC members in Mozambique has been noted.

Experts believe that only an internal political settlement between FRELIMO "nationalists" and RENAMO can bring about an end to the war.

File SRW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 May 1988

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to President Chissano of Mozambique which will need to be delivered today in Mabuto. I should be grateful if you could have the text telegraphed to our Embassy.

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SRW

DAS

FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 May 1988

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T71/88

Dear Mr. President,

I have read with great attention our Ambassador's account of his meeting with you on 9 May. I am glad that the British Government were able to help in arranging last week's quadripartite talks in London on Angola and Namibia. We are taking a close interest in the process and had good talks with all the participants.

The success of this initial meeting is encouraging. It is now most important to maintain the momentum. We stand ready to help in whatever way we can to move the process forward. I have encouraged President Botha to build on the good start which seems to have been made, and I am very glad to hear that you are doing likewise.

Meanwhile, we have continued to emphasise to the South African Government the need to work for better relations with its neighbours and to refrain from all acts of cross-border violence. I welcome the steps you have been taking to establish closer contact with President Botha and am encouraged, as I am sure you are, by the recent signs of a willingness on the part of the South African Government to reciprocate. I wish you well in these endeavours.

SVL

I am most grateful to you for keeping me informed of your thinking, and for the very positive role which you yourself are playing in these matters.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Joaquim Alberto Chissano

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May 1988

COPIED TO ANGOLA: UNSit PT2

Dear Charles,

Message from the Prime Minister to President Chissano

Maputo telegram number 266 suggests that President Chissano would welcome a response from the Prime Minister to his thoughts on Angola. I understand the Prime Minister may be willing to send him an encouraging message before he leaves on 13 May for a tour of Asia.

The Foreign Secretary agrees that such a response would be useful. Apart from addressing the question of the Angola/Namibia talks, it would also provide an opportunity to encourage Chissano in his current efforts, which President Botha seems to be reciprocating, to mend fences with Pretoria. In recent correspondence they have agreed to make a renewed effort to revive the Nkomati process and both have indicated a willingness to meet. I attach a draft message.

copy filed in ANGOLA: Internal situation PT2

The Foreign Secretary is also considering whether to recommend a message from the Prime Minister to President Dos Santos in response to the President's letter of 30 April. I shall be in touch again about this as soon as we have been able to clarify the position regarding the proposed meeting on Angola this week in Brazzaville between the South Africans and Angolans.

Yours ever,

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

11. V.
PM88

DSR 11C
(Revised 5/87)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....

In Confidence

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

To: President Joaquim Chissano

DS2AHR

I have read with great attention ~~interest~~ our Ambassador's account of his meeting with you on 9 May.

I am glad that the British Government were able to help in arranging last week's quadripartite talks in London on Angola and Namibia. We are taking a close interest in the process and had good talks with all the participants.

~~I am heartened by~~ The success of this initial meeting in encouraging ~~Clearly~~ it is now most important to maintain the momentum. We stand ready to help in whatever way we can to move the process forward. I have encouraged President Botha to build on the good start which seems to have been made, and I am very glad to hear that you are doing likewise.

Meanwhile we have continued to emphasise to the South African Government the need to work for better relations with its neighbours and to refrain from all acts of cross-border violence.

/I

I welcome the steps you have been taking to establish closer contact with President Botha and am encouraged, as I am sure you are, by the recent signs of a willingness on the part of the South African Government to reciprocate. I wish you well in these endeavours.

I am most grateful to you for keeping me informed of your thinking, and for any positive role which you may be playing in these matters.

177133
MDHIAN 8817

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO DESKBY 101000Z FCO
TELNO 266
OF 100810Z MAY 88
INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, LUANDA, HARARE, HAVANA

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON 9 MAY: ANGOLA

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT CHISSANO DESCRIBES HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH STATE PRESIDENT BOTHA ON ANGOLA. HE IS KEEN TO SEE FURTHER PROGRESS AND FEELS NEED FOR SUPPORT FROM HMG.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT CHISSANO SUMMONED ME AT LUNCHTIME ON 9 MAY. HE SAID HE WANTED TO FOLLOW UP WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE HEAD OF CHANCERY (OUR TELNO 247 - NOT TO ALL). HIS INITIATIVE ON ANGOLA HAD BEEN TAKEN BY HIMSELF EG WHEN HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ANGOLAN TEAM SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY HMG HE DID THIS WITHOUT CONSULTING DOS SANTOS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD HIM WHAT HE HAD DONE.

3. CHISSANO BELIEVED THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE AS IT IS, THEN CHISSANO AND OTHERS WOULD GET TO WORK. THE MOMENT WAS PROPITIOUS AND HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET ON WITH THE TALKS (PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 136 TO LUANDA). HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASTRO SHOWED HE WELCOMED THE PROCESS AND WAS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT US ATTITUDES. THE ANGOLANS FELT THEY WERE STRONG ENOUGH TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO P W BOTHA BEFORE THE LONDON TALKS. CHISSANO SUMMARISED IT AS FOLLOWS:
HE REAFFIRMED READINESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO CREATION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE BELIEVED THAT THE TALKS COULD LEAD TO BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA FAVOURABLE TO THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS IN THE REGION. ALL PARTIES (IE CUBANS, ANGOLANS AND US) WANTED MOVEMENT. HE ASKED BOTHA FOR UNDERSTANDING AND TO INSTRUCT THE SA DELEGATION TO NEGOTIATE WITH MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY. CHISSANO PUT HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL FOR MAJOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO OBTAIN A GLOBAL SATISFACTORY SOLUTION.

5. PRESIDENT THEN READ EXCERPTS FROM BOTHA'S REPLY BUT CAUTIONED THAT THIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE PROTECTED, QUOTE HE GETS ANNOYED IF THIRD PARTIES QUOTE HIS WORDS, UNQUOTE. PW APPARENTLY SAID HE HIGHLY APPRECIATED CHISSANO'S INITIATIVES AND SAID THE LATTER HAD QUICKLY CREATED A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THE SOLUTION OF EXISTING CONFLICTS. HE SAID HE WOULD IN DUE COURSE REPLY IN DETAIL TO HIS MESSAGES (IN THE PLURAL - CHISSANO TAKES THIS TO REFER TO THOSE ON ANGOLA AND SAM 7: SEE SEPARATE TEL).

6. PRESIDENT CHISSANO SAID THAT INFORMATION HE HAD RECEIVED FROM SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT HIS INITIATIVES HAD PROVIDED NEW CONDITIONS FOR SOLUTION OF EXISTING PROBLEMS AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE WHOLE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY: THE SADF WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE LONDON TALKS. THERE WAS A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR PROGRESS ON CAHORA BASSA.

7. CHISSANO SAID HE BELIEVED THAT PACE OF CTW COULD BE INCREASED AFTER WITHDRAWAL TO 13TH PARALLEL. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE US SHOULD ''RELAX'' THEIR SUPPORT FOR SAVIMBI. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ABOUT MPLA/SAVIMBI RELATIONS, HE BELIEVED THIS COULD BE SORTED OUT ONCE IT WAS REALISED THAT SA WAS NOT GOING QUOTE T AGRESS OR HELP SAVIMBI UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

8. CHISSANO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING TO ME BECAUSE HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER COULD EXERCISE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS SURE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD TAKE ADVICE FROM MRS THATCHER (AND WERE NOT HAPPY WITH THE US). THE OTHER PARTIES ALSO HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE PRIME MINISTER. THE TIMING OF OUR MEETING MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF CHARLES FREEMAN, US DEPUTY ASSISTANT S OF S (HERMAN COHEN IS ALSO HERE).

9. I TOLD CHISSANO THAT YOU HAD SEEN THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON TWO OCCASIONS (FCO TELNO 136 TO LUANDA). HE WAS GRATEFUL. HE CLEARLY WANTS US TO TAKE ON A SUPPORTIVE ROLE AND SAID RATHER PLAINTIVELY THAT THERE WAS STILL TIME TO HAVE SOME RESPONSE FROM MRS THATCHER BEFORE HE LEFT FOR HIS FIFTEEN DAY TOUR OF ASIA ON 13 MAY.

ALLAN

We had better send a reply from yr.

YYYY

ECPC (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 May 1988

Prime Minister

I have not attached the report which is very bulky. But it is indeed damning. CDP 3/5

Dear Charles

Gersony Report

I enclose a copy of a report recently produced by Robert Gersony, an independent consultant commissioned by the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programmes, to conduct an assessment into the causes underlying the massive movements of Mozambican refugees. He has a respected track record of similar studies in the past in other parts of the world. Gersony's report, which is based on painstaking research among refugees inside and outside Mozambique, is a damning indictment of the activities of RENAMO. It paints an appalling picture of premeditated brutality on a large scale.

We know that President Reagan and Mr Shultz were fully briefed before the report was released last week by the State Department to the press. The report seems likely to have an important impact on attitudes towards RENAMO both in the US, where it has received widespread press coverage, and here.

Gersony's assessment shows that the most important cause of refugee flows, famine and deaths is RENAMO's systematic and extreme brutality towards the civilian population in Mozambique. According to the evidence he has collected, the overwhelming majority of Mozambicans who have fled to neighbouring countries did so because of the current conflict. 95% of those leaving the country for this reason cite RENAMO's action and behaviour as the principal cause; only 3% mention FRELIMO. Gersony found that while the severity of RENAMO's treatment of civilians varies in different areas, there is a pattern of coercion of civilians in order to obtain food, shelter, labour, military intelligence, and reinforcements. There is clear evidence that those who resist are summarily punished.

Those areas in which RENAMO exercises control appear to be run as captive labour camps. Civilians are compelled to act as porters on forced marches and those who cannot keep up are routinely beaten or executed. In

areas outside RENAMO control, guerrillas destroy villages, whether or not they are defended, and indiscriminately kill women, children and elders as they try to escape. This appears to be routine policy. Gersony could detect no evidence of any RENAMO effort to win the loyalty of the civilian population or even to explain their aims to the civilians controlled by them or to those captured by them.

Gersony's report is remarkable for the consistency of the accounts of RENAMO behaviour by those interviewed in widespread locations and from all parts of Mozambique. It seems clear that atrocities are carried out as part of a deliberate and disciplined policy. The report concludes that, at a conservative estimate, 100,000 people may have been killed by RENAMO in Mozambique during the last 2-3 years.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique

Report Submitted to:

Ambassador Jonathan Moore
Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs

Dr. Chester A. Crocker
Assistant Secretary of African Affairs

Robert Gersony
Consultant to
Bureau for Refugee Programs
Department of State
April 1988

Introduction

In December 1987, the author was engaged by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs to undertake an assessment of designated Mozambican refugee matters. The Bureau's Director, Ambassador Jonathan Moore, decided to have the assessment conducted as a result of the Bureau's perception of a mounting refugee crisis in Southern Africa.

The Bureau had witnessed an increase of 300% in the number of Mozambican refugees in southern Africa over the past year. The Bureau currently estimates that the total number of such refugees is about 870,000. Malawi, for example, has 450,000 - 500,000 refugees -- up from 70,000 just fifteen months ago. Its southern Nsanje District, which has a Malawian population of about 150,000, now provides sanctuary for about 175,000 Mozambican refugees. (In proportion to national population, 500,000 refugees in Malawi would be the equivalent of 17 million refugees in the United States). Reports from the field continue to indicate that 20,000 - 30,000 Mozambican refugees per month - up to 1,000 each day -- enter Malawi. Many of these refugees arrive in poor health, severely malnourished, without belongings and often naked. In Swaziland, there were about 8,500 Mozambican refugees at the beginning of 1988; that number has already doubled and, according to one informed estimate, could quadruple by mid-year. Increased flows into Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa combine with Malawi

and Swaziland arrivals to suggest that there will be more than one million such refugees by year's end.

Complementing this exodus is a high rate of population displacement within Mozambique. According to the Bureau for Refugee Programs' World Refugee Report to the United States Congress in 1987, more than one million Mozambicans are internally displaced.

The author was engaged by the Bureau for Refugee Programs to shed additional light on such issues as the causes of these refugee flows; the likelihood of continued migrations; refugee protection and assistance; and the possibility of refugee repatriation.

To do this, the author conducted a field visit of nearly three months to forty-two different locations in five countries -- Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Tanzania. In 25 refugee camps, separated by as many as 1,500 miles, he spoke at length and individually with nearly 200 randomly selected refugees. Forty-three percent of them had arrived at these camps during the period of the assessment, some within hours of the interviews conducted for this study. They came from 48 different districts of Mozambique, including northern, central and southern provinces. Some came from areas of predominant FRELIMO Government control, others from areas of RENAMO prevalence. At many of the 25 refugee sites and in seventeen other locations visited, independent national and international religious and relief assistance workers were also

interviewed and added valuable complementary information.

This report attempts to recapitulate the complex body of information which was gathered from refugee and other accounts. In order to convey this information, the collective accounts have been divided into nominal categories. The report is divided into three sections:

-- Assessment Procedures

-- Conflict Dynamics

-- Summary of Findings

Assessment Procedures

Geographical Scope

The Mozambique refugee assessment was conducted during a period of approximately eleven weeks between January and March 1988 in 42 locations in five southern African countries: Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Tanzania. Roughly 25 sanctuary sites for refugees and displaced persons (10 sites in six of ten provinces in Mozambique; 15 in the neighboring countries) were visited. In addition, the five national capitals and twelve administrative centers in which hospitals and relief operations are based were visited.

Source of Findings

The principal source of the assessment's findings was 196 individual interviews with refugees and displaced persons who provided eyewitness accounts of the incidents and patterns of conduct in the conflict which led to their migration. In addition, the author met with roughly fifty priests, ministers and religious leaders and national and international relief workers with independent first-hand experience in assisting the refugees. They provided background information and an opportunity to check aspects of the information provided by the refugees. In the national and regional capitals, the author

met with host Government, United States Embassy and other diplomatic officials.

Refugee Interviews

In each of the 25 locations in five countries, the author as randomly as possible personally selected or directed the selection for interviews of the refugees and displaced persons (hereinafter "refugees"), without reference to the type of conflict problems they might have experienced in Mozambique. He also attempted to select refugees who had arrived as recently as possible and who came from as wide a geographical distribution as possible.

The interviews were conducted in the language which the refugee identified as his/her native language, through translators whom the author selected. In the three countries which accounted for about 75% of the interviews, the author was able to select, from among the agricultural development staff of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions, an individual who was a native speaker of one of the principal languages spoken by the refugees. This individual assisted in translation of the interviews in all of the sites in his country. In most other cases, local workers selected by the author who are associated with health clinics, religious and relief organizations or local relief committees assisted in translation on an ad hoc basis. The average length of each

interview was one hour. The more detailed interviews took as long as two hours to complete. The interviews were conducted in a private place, out of hearing and usually out of sight of those not participating in the interview. In Mozambique, those present in each interview were the refugee, the translator(s) and the author. In some of the other countries, a local official was also present. Sometimes the refugee's spouse and children, especially for those who had just arrived at the sanctuary sites within minutes or a few hours of the interview, were also present.

Refugee Interview Sites

Mozambique	Malawi	Zimbabwe	South Africa	Tanzania
Ressano Garcia	Chang'ambica	Tongogara	Huntington	Namabanga
Caia (2 subsites)	Chiomeangame	Mazoe Bridge	Mangwene	Likuyu-Mbowa
Casa Banana	Mtendere	Nyamgombe	Steenbok	
Espungabera	Kapesi			
A Luta Continua	Biriwiri			
Moatize (2 subsites)	Makokwe			
Benga				
Estima (2 subsites)				
Cuamba				

Refugee Arrival Dates

In order to obtain the most current data, preference in selection of refugees to be interviewed was given to those who had arrived recently. Nearly 90% of those interviewed had arrived at the refugee site during 1987 and 1988. About 50% of these were January-March 1988 arrivals. The 10% who arrived before 1987 also provided useful information, but more than one third of these had migrated earlier because of drought or in order to seek employment in the more prosperous neighboring country; thus, the data for 1987 and 1988 arrivals is the most useful.

Districts of Origin

In order to obtain a wide geographical representation among the refugees, preference in selection was given to those from different home districts and, as appropriate, from different villages within such districts. The 196 refugees interviewed reported that they came from villages in 48 different districts of Mozambique. These districts were widely distributed in Mozambique, with each province in the country represented to varying degrees. The refugees described their home districts and areas of origin as follows:

Angonia
Barue
Buzi
Cabora Bassa
Caia
Changara
Chemba
Chibabava
Chicualacuala
Chimoio
Chinde
Chiringoma
Chiuta
Chokwe
Funyaloro
Gorongosa
Guro
Lago
Lichinga
Macanga
Machaze
Magude
Majune
Mandimba
Manica
Maputo
Maringue
Marromeu
Marrupa
Massinga
Matola
Maua
Mavago/Mataca
Mecula
Milanje
Moamba
Moatize
Mopeia
Mossurize
Muembe
Mutarara
Namarroi
Nampula
Pemba
Sanga
Tete
Vilanculos
Zumbo

Home Language

The refugees described themselves as native speakers of nineteen different Mozambican languages:

Barwe
Chichewa
Chicunda
Chidenda
Chitavara
Chitswa
Gorongosa
Lomwe
Makua
Ndao
Nyanja
Nyungwe
Portugese
Sena
Shangani
Shona
Swahili
Xinhanja
Yao

Occupation

The majority (65%) of the refugees interviewed described themselves as farmers. Almost all were residents of small villages and hamlets. The occupational breakdown of the respondents is as follows:

Farmers	65%
Farm workers Farm worker Tractor driver Blacksmith Herder	4%
Small Trades/Jobs Waiter Clerk Secretary Merchant Shoemaker Shop worker House painter Fish seller Road worker Carpenter Security guard Tailor Car mechanic Driver Coop employee	9%
Teachers	5%
Students	5%
Health workers	2%
Housewives	2%
Children	2%
Former soldiers	2%
House servants	1%
Miners	1%
Other	2%

Previous Mobility Affecting Migration

Of the 55 Mozambicans interviewed in displaced persons sites inside Mozambique, 40% had never traveled outside the

country. About 45% had visited one of the potential asylum countries neighboring Mozambique earlier in their lives.

Of the refugees interviewed outside Mozambique, 45% reported that they had at least once before visited the country in which they are currently in asylum. But 50% reported that when they migrated from Mozambique to the interview site, it was their first trip outside the borders of Mozambique.

Refugee Accounts

The refugees often provided detailed eyewitness and other credible accounts, spontaneous responses to follow-up questions, and simple diagrams drawn in the dirt to illustrate. The majority of the respondents had no formal education or literary skills, but they described effectively what they had seen and what had happened to them. A few refugees appeared afraid to provide any information. But the great majority appeared to speak forthrightly and with confidence about what had happened to them.

The refugee reports tended to be consistent throughout the 25 interview sites in five countries, with origins of the refugees, as well as their sanctuary sites, separated, in some cases, by as much as 1,500 miles. In addition, a number of the reports tended to corroborate each other, with refugees inside Mozambique describing the same events in the same places as had been described by refugees in camps outside Mozambique.

Certain additional specific opportunities for cross-corroboration arose. In one asylum country, several refugees described a series of incidents within Mozambique in considerable detail. When the author visited Mozambique, he was able to visit that area and to verify the information they had provided. The major difference between their description of what had occurred and that provided by survivors who had remained in Mozambique, and separately by local officials, was that the refugees had given a lower estimate of the number of persons who had been killed or wounded. Refugees provided sufficient detail so that accounts by several refugees -- sometimes in different countries -- could be readily identified and thus not "double-counted" in the quantitative analysis.

Distinguishing between the Parties

Serious complaints about the conduct of both sides to the conflict were received, although, as the report will describe, the number of complaints about one party exceeded by a considerable proportion the complaints against the other. Complaints against each side tended to contain the same level of detail and authority and to be conveyed with the same level of conviction. There were no complaints against the Government soldiers from refugees inside Mozambique. All of the complaints against these came from refugees outside Mozambique. This may reflect a natural hesitation of refugees

in the Government controlled areas to express criticism of the soldiers under whose protection they live. This constraint may have affected the 28% of the sample interviewed in Mozambique. But criticism against the Government soldiers received from the refugees in the four neighboring countries representing 72% of the sample, was also very low. These included two countries considered either hostile to the FRELIMO regime or until recently, considered more neutral in the conflict. In short, it is believed that this factor is unlikely to have significantly affected the findings of the assessment. Soundings among the independent religious and relief assistance sources tended to reinforce this conclusion.

The refugees spoke authoritatively about their ability to distinguish between combatants of the two sides in the conflict. Many of them were questioned closely about the basis for their assertions and explained their views effectively. They pointed to personal familiarity with the individuals comprising the Government forces, who were often stationed in or near their villages; to the heavy casualties often suffered by the Government side in the attacks by insurgent forces on villages. In some areas, some refugees described marked differences between the two sides in physical appearance, including hair length and style, and face and body adornment. Routine patterns of conduct and other data provided by refugees tend to confirm their assertions. Refugees were also asked whether free-lance bandits, as opposed to elements of the two

principal parties to the conflict, perpetrated the acts they witnessed; their responses were emphatically negative. When in doubt about the identity of assailants, they seemed prepared to say so.

Moreover, one fifth of the refugees interviewed said that they had involuntarily resided for many months -- sometimes for years -- in areas where insurgent influence prevails. They had often been used by RENAMO as porters to carry materials over long distances within these areas, providing extensive exposure to this group. Thus, a significant proportion of the refugees possessed not only the ability to distinguish between the two sides, but also a first-hand knowledge of the operating procedures of both forces.

The majority of the refugees lacked two skills which limited the precision of their data. Most could not count accurately above the number ten. One of the results of this limitation was that the number of deaths appeared to be underestimated. Beyond the number ten, these refugees could only describe "many", and could not assign a corresponding number to the concept except to say that it exceeded ten. The second limitation was an inability to identify the month and year of an incident. Such identification had to be established approximately by working back through seasonal agricultural thresholds which were more familiar to the refugees, such as the advent of rain, planting, harvest, etc. It is believed that neither limitation materially affects the conclusions of

the assessment. In quantifying casualty reports the term "many" was almost always assigned a maximum value of ten.

In summary, the author would assign a high level of credibility to the refugee accounts.

Conflict Dynamics:

The 1987 - 1988 Arrivals

Nearly 90% of the refugees interviewed had arrived at the refuge site where the interview was conducted during 1987 and 1988 -- about half within the three-month period January - March 1988. The information they provided concerning conflict dynamics in Mozambique was thus fairly current. Over 90% of these 1987 - 1988 arrivals said that they fled their home areas because of the conflict, and, specifically, because of abusive conduct by the parties to the conflict. About 5% of this sample said they had migrated because of drought, 2% to seek employment and 2% for other reasons. The pre-1987 arrivals represented only about 10% of the sample, and one-third of these said that they had migrated during earlier periods because of drought, in search of employment, or for other reasons not directly related to conflict violence. In order to provide conclusions which are current, and to avoid undue emphasis on the drought/economic migrants of earlier years, data presented in the following sections will be for the 1987 - 1988 arrivals unless otherwise specified.

Parties to the Conflict

Each of the more than 90% of the refugees who fled from their homes because of conflict attributed their flight to one party or the other, or to both parties to the conflict. The clearest way to summarize the experiences of these nearly 200 refugees as well as other information collected in the assessment, is to describe the conduct of the war as the refugees themselves have experienced it, separately for each side: for RENAMO, the insurgent forces; and for FRELIMO, the defending Government forces. The proportion of attention devoted in the report to each of the two respective groups reflects the proportion contained in the accounts which the refugees themselves provided.

RENAMO's Conduct of the War

Refugee reports suggest three typical types of RENAMO operations. Within Mozambique, no geographical area will fit perfectly into the nominal description provided for each. But this appears to be the best way to disaggregate three perceived types of behavior in order to explain them. The three types of areas refugees described are:

(1) Tax areas

(2) Control areas

(3) Destruction areas

(1) Tax Areas

Tax areas tend to be rural areas in which the population resides in extremely dispersed patterns. Each family lives on the land it is farming, or in small extended family hamlets. RENAMO combatants move freely through such areas and routinely (weekly or monthly) visit the farmers. They demand a contribution of prepared and/or dry food (food grain or flour), chickens and goats, perhaps some clothes, a radio or other possession. They demand at will a young girl or married woman for sex.

To the degree that it is necessary to transport the resources which are extracted, the local people are obliged to serve as porters (RENAMO appears to have virtually no mechanized transport anywhere in Mozambique). But their trips tend to be of short duration (counted in hours, rather than days). As a general rule the porters are permitted to return to their homes when their service is completed. The journeys are short and not as harsh as those conducted in the other types of areas; reports of beatings of porters tend to be exceptions. If the family refuses to submit to these demands, they are likely to be severely beaten with heavy sticks or gun butts. It appears from refugee reports that local people are not permitted to flee the area. But the burdens placed upon them are more moderate than those placed on the population of other areas. RENAMO's policy appears to be to maintain a level

of taxation and abuse insufficient to motivate the population to risk the security dangers, economic perils, and social disruption represented by escape.

Murder of a civilian by RENAMO in such areas is the exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless, RENAMO combatants are reported to target individuals possessing resources whose origin, in the minds of these combatants, links them to Government forces. The possession of new clothes, a radio, any type of army-issue apparel such as a belt or cap -- perhaps even a bag of salt -- may be enough to trigger torture or death. But such incidents appear to be sporadic.

This sort of administration does not appear very different from the conduct of many guerrilla organizations. What is somewhat unusual, however, is the reported absence of effort to explain to "the people" the purpose of the insurgency, to provide positive services -- security, administration, schooling, health care -- to the local farmers. The relationship between RENAMO and the population appears to revolve solely around the extraction of resources, strictly by force, without explanation, with no tolerance for refusal, and without reciprocation.

(2) Control Areas

About one fifth of the refugees interviewed reported that they had lived in areas under the prevalent control of RENAMO

combatants. Some of these refugees had resided there for many months; others for many years. A significant number provided detailed descriptions of the manner in which these areas are administered.

According to the refugee reports, there are two principal types of civilian populations who reside in these areas: indigenous local populations, who were referred to in Portuguese as naturales; and a population which was abducted from other areas and involuntarily marched into the control areas. According to the refugees, both of these populations are captive, detained against their will, and prohibited from attempting to depart.

Each of the control areas described by the refugees appeared to have a somewhat different system of organization. For purposes of explaining the general thrust of their reports, a control area tends to be nominally divided into three sub-categories,

A. Combatant bases
B. Field areas
C. Dependent areas

A. Combatant Bases

Combatant bases were described to be of two types: those reserved principally for permanent, resident combatants; and those reserved principally for combatants who are passing through an area or who are, for whatever reason, temporarily

stationed there. Both areas are managed in roughly the same fashion. They are served by a staff of exclusively male captives who provide food, water, cleaning and other support services. Women are provided on-demand from other sectors of the control areas.

Refugees who resided in "control" areas, as well as other refugees who had contact with RENAMO, said that its combatants represented indigenous language groups from all major regions of Mozambique. When they commented on recruitment in their own home villages, forced recruitment was said to be the principal method through which these men had been impressed into service. Two refugees provided detailed accounts of their own escapes from apparent forced recruitment roundups. One said that his group, awaiting disposition, had been locked in a guarded house without food and water for such a long time that four of the men had starved to death. A few refugees said that they witnessed either the recruitment of young (age ten and over) children or were themselves the victims of indiscriminate shootings or beatings by such young RENAMO combatants.

B. Field Areas

Second are permanent agricultural lands, significant expanses of RENAMO farms or plantations. The workers on these farms are captives who toil at a regular schedule, usually long hours during a six-day week. They do not benefit from the production of these fields. Their work is closely supervised,

and physical punishment, in the form of beatings, is used to motivate those who take unauthorized rest or who refuse to continue. The worker population of these areas is reported to be principally older children of both sexes and adult males and females. In addition to its production tasks, this age group is also used as porters. Unlike porters in the tax areas, the marches undertaken by these porters tend to be of longer duration -- sometimes a week or more roundtrip. While for some the portering is occasional, it appears that many of the porters perform this as a full-time service, making continuous rounds of arduous trips.

The refugees report that these trips usually begin at dawn and continue until evening -- perhaps 6AM-8PM. More recent arrivals report that, increasingly, the porters are not permitted food on these trips, and are allowed to drink water only when they pass streams. Some report that they are not often permitted to drink because it is during these rests that some make their escape. The loads are heavy, the pace quick. The porters carry food toward the larger bases; meat from some wildlife areas back to the bases in their home "control areas". They also carry weapons, ammunition, and the personal supplies and equipment of military units as they are shifted over long distances between provinces. None of the roughly 20% of the refugee sample who themselves served as porters said they made trips to the sea. When they reached the destination bases -- wherever these may be located -- the porters deposit

their loads outside. According to those who have served as porters, RENAMO combatants then pick the materials up and take them into the bases.

Those who have served as porters reported uniformly that discipline on these forced marches is extremely harsh. Those who cannot keep up, who rest without authorization, drop their burdens, or refuse to continue, are routinely beaten very severely, sometimes until they are dead. Over half of those who served as porters said they were eyewitnesses to cases of porters beaten to death or executed for the reasons described above.

When the captives are not being used as porters -- and the amount of such time varies, depending on whether they are full- or part-time porters -- they are usually returned to RENAMO-controlled fields. Some areas which are not organized into large RENAMO-controlled fields, permit the captives to have their own land, but extract a great proportion of the harvest, allowing only a small amount to be retained for family survival.

Another function of the young girls and adult women is to provide sex to the combatants. From refugee reports it appears that these women are required to submit to sexual demands, in effect to be raped, on a frequent, sustained basis. The rape may occur in field area residences. According to those who have served as porters, women are frequently raped along the transport routes. Women are also dispatched from the field

areas to combatant bases on demand. One of the frequent refugee complaints (verified by medical relief workers in some of the refugee camps) is the level of infection with venereal disease which this practice proliferates. Severe beating is inflicted on young girls and women who resist sexual demands. Such punishment may also be inflicted on the husband or fatherof the female who resists. Such punishment reportedly can include execution in some circumstances.

C. Dependent Areas

The third type of sub-category within the control areas is dependent areas, populated by the elderly, who cannot serve in other more taxing functions, and young children. It appears, according to the refugees' reports, that the elderly women are responsible for the care of the young children, while the elderly men are responsible for collecting thatch and building houses for the combatants. (In some areas, it is reported that elderly men and women are also used as field workers and porters. Some of the more brutal accounts of beating and killing of porters who could not continue involved the elderly as victims). Although specialization of function by age and sex is sometimes reported, only some of the control areas are reported to split families and oblige the members to live near their respective locus of service function.

Survival of Captives in Control Areas

The captive population is reportedly not materially remunerated, nor are in-kind resources from their productive effort provided to them. Instead, in their spare time, the field workers are permitted to grow food for themselves. Formost, their "spare time" consists of one day per week, because during the other six days, they labor in the fields from early morning until dark, and the full-time porters have particularly disruptive schedules.

When people work on the alternative system -- the highly-taxed individual production system -- it appears that drought has the effect of increasing the levy. In areas where food is extremely short (and these are not insignificant), the captive labor, on its own initiative, gathers wild mushrooms, leaves and berries -- natural survival foods. Some refugees reported that even these have been confiscated by the RENAMO administration. At times, captives are dispatched into the bush by RENAMO combatants or police to gather these survival foods. Several of those interviewed had made their escape during these unsupervised forays.

Those who served as porters reported that increasingly they were not permitted to eat during the trips. They alleged that some people died because they were denied food. The RENAMO guards and police who oversee these transport columns eat regularly and, some say, carry canteens. Some porters suggested that they were deprived of food and water in order to

keep them too weak to attempt escape.

What appears clear is that however inadequate the food supply, most of the food produced is appropriated for theRENAMO organization and its combatants. When food is short, these always eat first. The refugees' allegations of food deprivation appear to explain the wasted physical condition of the men, women and children arriving by the thousands in asylum countries naked and severely malnourished.

Control Area Security and Surveillance

Given the unusually high rate of resource and energy extraction from the captives in the control area, it is curious that more have not fled and that those who have fled tend to arrive in such pitiful physical condition. The explanation, according to the refugees who have resided in these areas and later escaped, lies in an effective security and surveillance system which has been established by RENAMO.

The heart of the system are the RENAMO police, called majuba or mujiba. According to the refugees, these fall into two categories: (a) Former tax collectors and petty officials, some called regulos, associated with the previous Portuguese colonial administration, who were replaced by the FRELIMO government after independence from Portugal, and a small number of previous FRELIMO members who became disaffected; and (b) Captives identified by RENAMO and obliged

to serve in this role. These captives may be motivated on the one hand by punishment should they either refuse the role or fail to effectively implement it, and on the other with some degree of preferential treatment. In general, the refugees indicate that these police tend to be armed with cutting instruments (machetes, knives, bayonets, axes) rather than with firearms.

The police are deployed in two ways. Some are stationed along the geographical perimeters of the control areas. These perimeters tend to be marked by physical features such as rivers and mountains, or by a circle of combatant bases, which lend themselves to police patrolling. A second set of police reside in the captive areas and supervise the fields, the residence areas, and movements of the captives between points within the control area.

Attempted escape from a control area is often treated as capital crime. One man reported that because he attempted to escape, he was put in a RENAMO jail. But the majority of those who resided in a control area report that they personally witnessed severe punishment or death inflicted on captives apprehended while attempting to escape. When individuals make successful escapes, wives and children left behind may be executed in retribution. Refugees report that, in general, the RENAMO executioners use these punishments for demonstration value to discourage others from escape. Thus, executions of captured escapees are reported to be conducted in front of

all the captives from a given area gathered together in a central place. One refugee reported that during a portering job he was led to small clearing and shown the decomposed bodies of many men, women and children. He was told by RENAMO combatants that this was a place where those apprehended while attempting to escape were taken and executed. The refugees almost uniformly reported that these demonstrations and their own contextual understanding of RENAMO's methods had a chilling effect on those considering escape.

It appears from the refugees' reports that not until death becomes a real possibility in their minds do the captives consider risking the dangerous escape attempt. But they explain that there are a number of additional constraints which encumber such actions. First, both naturales and abducted captives find that if they have families with them, escape is more difficult. They state that a larger group is more likely to be apprehended; on-the-spot execution is, in their minds, a likely outcome. Second, captives who are natives of other areas, and were abducted to control areas, were unfamiliar with the new terrain, uncertain of bush routes they had to follow to avoid detection.

Finally, several refugees reported that an increasing constraint on escape is that a part of the captive population is too starved, too weak, too old, or too sick to undertake flight. Some parents may send their children who are sufficiently grown and still healthy enough to make the

journey, perhaps with an adult natural as a guide. Almost invariably, the escapees travel only by night, surviving on wild fruits and leaves, walking through the bush, never on the roads. (In one recent incident however, captives said they were ordered by RENAMO combatants to leave one control area and their houses were burned).

RENAMO appears to have little difficulty in replacing individuals who have been killed, who have died of starvation, who are too weak to produce or who have escaped. The principal source of new captives appears to be abductees taken in "destruction operations" described later. But RENAMO occasionally appears to abduct individuals from "tax areas".

What distinguishes "control" areas from "tax" areas is the higher degree of extraction of energy/labor/food production from the population. The refugees describe this rate of extraction as unbearable, and the wasted physical condition of escapees who reach safety provides physical evidence to buttress this assertion. As in "tax" areas, this extraction appears to be the only type of relationship between RENAMO and these captives. There were virtually no reports of provision by RENAMO of protection, remuneration, in-kind assistance, administration (except for security and surveillance), social services, or material or other type of perceived reciprocity. There is almost no reported effort to explain the purpose of the insurgents' efforts, the nature of its goals, or to enlist the loyalty -- or even neutrality -- of

the population. The only reciprocity the captives appear to receive or to expect is the opportunity to remain alive.

A few refugees who lived in control areas reported that their villages had schools for their children. One of these refugees stated that his children were taught to inform the RENAMO police if they spotted strangers walking in their area and were also taught to read and write. Beginning with ages 10 and 11, however, he reported that the children are used for other purposes: some are old enough to work in the fields; others are recruited to become RENAMO soldiers. One refugee reported that there was a school and that attendance for the children was obligatory. But he added that the main school activities were working in the fields and building houses and latrines. (One refugee reported that he was originally captured by three RENAMO soldiers, whom he described as being 10 - 12 years old and particularly vicious.) One of two refugees who lived in an area which had a school also reported that there was a health clinic there as well, although it contained no medicines.

(3) Destruction Areas.

Areas which are not designated as "tax" or "control" areas may fall into a third category, which may be described as areas targeted for destruction. Such areas often include "villages" of 40 or more families residing in a small hamlet -- although these also include villages of several hundred families. Villages designated as "settlements," especially those developed by the Mozambican Government for refugees who have returned from neighboring countries, appear in some cases to be priority targets. Entire geographical areas may be subject to the "destruction" zone designation; or sometimes only the larger villages within such areas may be targeted for destruction. Refugees from various areas of Mozambique reported consistent patterns and methods of attack, with similar consequences. Not all villages in Mozambique have been subject to such attack. But from the geographical diversity of the refugees reporting, it appears that significant areas have been the object of this type of activity, which seems to be aimed principally at the destruction of these population centers.

The destruction program may proceed through up to three nominal stages. First, some villages which are the targets of a destruction effort appear to become the subject of careful, advance intelligence collection. Intelligence is reported to

be gathered through visits by RENAMO combatants to local farmers in their fields -- or through the abduction of one or two villagers, who are subjected to a debriefing and sometimes reported not to return to the village. The questions pertain to the deployment, if any, of Government soldiers and/or militia in the village; the nature of their arms; the identity of civilian officials of the Government -- the identity of the village Chairman, Secretary, and other prominent citizens and the location of their homes; the identity of individuals owning valuable possessions -- new clothes, a radio, etc; and the habits of the population.

Second, depending on the area, a "political" visit by RENAMO combatants may follow (although in some cases this second stage is combined with the attack stage). During this stage, RENAMO combatants may proceed directly to the homes of Government officials -- such as the village Chairman and Secretary -- apprehend them, and in some instances, their wives, children and perhaps other relatives who may be found in the home. Refugees report that such persons are usually executed, sometimes after the village is called together to witness the incident. One refugee reported that a group of officials, their wives and children were burned alive in their homes after the husband had been immobilized with an ax wound, as the villagers were forced to look on. In some cases during this stage, RENAMO combatants instruct the people to disperse from their village to their individual fields, "tax areas". They may also be advised to go to "control areas."

The third stage for villages and areas designated for destruction is the actual military attack. Such attacks were generally said to occur in the early morning hours, just before or after dawn. In some cases it appeared that the attack group moved from village to village in a selected area conducting the same operation in each. The attacks seemed to be organized and executed in the same manner, whether or not the village was defended by Government soldiers or militia. (As a general rule, civilians possess no firearms.) Thus, if there are no Government soldiers or militia, the attack is conducted against unarmed civilians. In most of the small villages, a handful of Government soldiers or militia were reported to be present. According to the refugees, they would often be rapidly overwhelmed by the more numerous attacking force and either be killed or forced to flee soon after the attack began. Larger villages sometimes have larger defending forces, and in these there is a longer, and sometimes successful, resistance.

The attack stage was sometimes reported to begin with what appeared to the inhabitants to be the indiscriminate firing of automatic weapons by a substantial force of attacking RENAMO combatants. This force usually has the element of surprise, as the attack begins during the very early morning hours. In some villages, the firing is sometimes reported to be directed into the houses of the civilian population, at inhabitants who attempt to flee and at the handful of Government soldiers or militia, if any, who return the fire. Reportedly the

Government soldiers aim their defensive fire at the attackers, while the RENAMO forces shoot indiscriminately into the village. In some cases refugees perceived that the attacking force had divided into three detachments: one conducts the military attack; another enters houses and removes valuables, mainly clothing, radios, food, pots and other possessions; a third moves through the looted houses with pieces of burning thatch setting fire to the houses in the village. There were several reports that schools and health clinics are typical targets for destruction. The destruction of the village as a viable entity appears to be the main objective of such attacks.

This type of attack causes several types of civilian casualties. As is normal in guerrilla warfare, some civilians are killed in crossfire between the two opposing forces, although this tends in the view of the refugees to account for only a minority of the deaths. A larger number of civilians in these attacks and other contexts were reported to be victims of purposeful shooting deaths and executions, of axing, knifing, bayoneting, burning to death, forced drowning and asphyxiation, and other forms of murder where no meaningful resistance or defense is present. Eyewitness accounts indicate that when civilians are killed in these indiscriminate attacks, whether against defended or undefended villages, children, often together with mothers and elderly people, are also killed.

Varying numbers of civilian victims in each attack were reported to be rounded up and abducted, apparently to "control"

areas. During the initial abductions, they are sometimes simultaneously used as porters to carry away goods confiscated in the attacks on their own villages. From refugee reports, treatment of these porters seems to be consistent with that of the regular porters described in the preceding section on "control areas."

Deaths were also reported in instances when RENAMO combatants, in the absence of resistance or defense, were reported to chase the villagers toward natural barriers, such as rivers, or otherwise use the physical surroundings to cause their deaths by drowning or asphyxiation.

The survivors of attacks who do not die, who are not severely wounded, and who are not abducted, appear to face three destinations: some flee to their fields, including the "tax areas"; some flee to Government-controlled towns, typically district capitals; and some flee to neighboring countries. Refugees residing in areas apparently marked for "destruction" were asked repeatedly why they did not, upon learning of initial abductions, and particularly after the (second stage) "political" visit, flee their their villages. Many responded that they did not realize, at each of the early stages, what fate awaited the village; and said they had been reluctant to leave their home villages until there was absolutely no other choice. Some of the villages had been subjected to several RENAMO "third stage" attacks before the final successful attack which drove the villagers from their

homes. In each of the earlier attacks, people were killed. But it sometimes appeared that until someone in their immediate family was killed or their home and property destroyed, they were most reluctant to abandon homes and land, with which they seemed to identify very closely. Moreover, some expressed fear of the danger of a journey to safety and uncertainty about what alternative destination area was, in fact, safe from attack. Economic survival was another factor mentioned by the refugees -- how would they eat, where would they get food, if they left their villages?

In both "tax" and "destruction" areas, a small number of cases were reported of "targeted retribution" against small children. These involved, for example, the mutilation and subsequent killing of young children in retaliation against parents who fled a RENAMO visit or attack against their homes. Most civilians took their children with them when they fled, and the child retribution cases appeared to affect mainly the small number of families who could not find a child at the moment of flight; events evolve rapidly in such instances. Mutilation by RENAMO combatants or police of adults -- the severing with a knife of mainly ears, but also lips, noses and limbs -- was reported by a small fraction of refugees.

Summary of RENAMO Conduct

While the foregoing description does not encompass every type

of RENAMO operation in Mozambique, it characterizes in nominal categories both the general types of conduct and the relationship with the respective civilian populations which the great majority of the refugees reported. The purpose of the division of these accounts into three nominal types of areas (tax, control, destruction) is to convey complex reports in a more understandable form. No area conforms strictly to only one pattern.

Quantification of RENAMO Conduct

This section seeks to complement the preceding descriptions by providing approximate quantitative orders of magnitude of RENAMO practices reported by the refugees.

The great majority of the total of 196 interviewed refugees whose migration was caused by conflict violence cited RENAMO actions as the reason for their flight. Roughly 40% reported personally witnessing the murder of civilians principally by RENAMO combatants and RENAMO police in the absence of resistance or defense. The 169 refugees who arrived at their current locations in 1987/1988 reported roughly 600 such murders. The refugees provided eyewitness or other credible accounts about these killings which included shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, forced drownings, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks.

The shootings listed above do not include about 200 persons killed in crossfire between RENAMO and FRELIMO Government

soldiers, which this report attributes to neither side in the conflict. The approximately 600 murders attributed to RENAMO by the 1987/1988 arrivals represented about 94% of such murders reported by these refugees (of the remainder, about 3% were attributed to FRELIMO and about 3% were attributed to "unknown" parties). An additional ten persons drowned in the Zambezi River by accident while escaping from RENAMO pursuit, and are not counted among the roughly 600.

About fifty of the 600 reported RENAMO murders were reported to be young children. Of these, about thirty fell into the category of murder for retribution, as described in the preceding section, and included the children of FRELIMO civilian village officials killed in the second stage of the campaign against the "destruction" areas.

The results in the other abuse categories were similar. Nearly 40% of the refugees had direct knowledge of the imposition by RENAMO of forced portering on the civilian population; about 20% had themselves served as porters. Over 70% of those who had served as porters witnessed severe beatings of porters who could not keep up, who stumbled, or who dropped their loads. About 60% of those who served as porters reported that they eyewitnessed or had credible reports of captive porters who were beaten to death or executed along the route for the same reasons. Four of the refugees who had served as porters described incidents in which they themselves were severely beaten. No portering complaints against FRELIMO Government soldiers were received.

Over 15% of the refugees reported patterns of systematic rape of civilian women by RENAMO combatants. One rape complaint against Government soldiers was reported. About one-third of those reporting house burnings saw their own houses burned. No complaints of house burning were reported against Government soldiers.

Nearly 40% of the refugees complained about abduction of civilians, a pattern most typical of the nominal "destruction areas." Of these, over a quarter had themselves been victims of abduction. 94% of these identified RENAMO combatants as the abductors; the remainder were split between Government soldiers and unknown parties.

Looting and forced contribution of resources was reported by nearly 60% of the refugees. Of these, some 45% reported that beatings were used when necessary to extract resources. 93% of the looters were identified as RENAMO combatants, 6% as Government soldiers, 1% as by unknown parties.

Mutilations, reported by 5% of the refugees, were all attributed to RENAMO combatants.

Some 21% of the refugees provided eyewitness accounts of life in "control" areas based on personal residence there as captives. About 60% of the refugees said they witnessed or had credible knowledge of the severe punishment or execution of captives who had been caught by RENAMO attempting to escape from "control" areas and other activity areas.

For the 1987/1988 arrivals, discounting non-conflict migrants, 91% of the refugees' reports were categorized by the

author as "very negative" toward RENAMO; 5% as "negative"; 1% as positive. Three percent offered no report and no complaints.

FRELIMO Conduct of the War

Complaints by 1987/1988 refugees about Government (FRELIMO) combatant conduct were both serious and quite different from the reports about RENAMO conduct. In general, refugees described the principal role of the FRELIMO soldiers as defending their villages against the RENAMO attackers. Many of the refugees reported that in attacks on small villages which may have had from two to ten FRELIMO soldiers and militia defending them, the Government soldiers were quickly overwhelmed by a far larger insurgent force. In some cases, refugees said that FRELIMO soldiers fired their weapons and attempted resistance just long enough to give civilians an opportunity to flee.

Accounts of serious abuses in individual incidents attributed to Government soldiers were reported in credible detail. However, they were small in number by comparison to complaints concerning RENAMO and did not appear to represent systematic problems of discipline or command and control. As complaints were relatively few, the 1987/1988 data can be summarized as follows: as compared with the 94% of murders attributed to RENAMO, about 3% (roughly 20) were ascribed to FRELIMO (3% were attributed to "unknown" parties). No reports of forced drowning, axed/knifed/bayoneted, burned alive, beaten

to death, forced asphyxiation, or random shootings were attributed to FRELIMO soldiers by this sample. As compared with 96% of child murders attributed to RENAMO, only 4% were ascribed to FRELIMO. No complaints of forced porterage or burning of houses were ascribed to FRELIMO. The 169 arrivals during the 1987/1988 period attributed one complaint of rape to a FRELIMO soldier. Three cases of abduction by FRELIMO soldiers (4%, versus 96% for RENAMO) were reported. Six cases of looting or forced contributions (6% versus 94% for RENAMO) were reported. There was also one complaint that FRELIMO Government soldiers had destroyed a farmer's crop, and one complaint of a man who had been arrested because in earlier years he had resisted a FRELIMO Government order to move into a central village. No reports of mutilation were attributed to FRELIMO soldiers.

In general, informed sources within Mozambique reported that the human rights conduct of FRELIMO Government soldiers has been on a marked positive course since 1986, while RENAMO conduct appears to have worsened.

In summary, after discounting the non-conflict related migrants for the entire sample, refugee reports on FRELIMO and RENAMO are characterized by the author as follows:

	Positive	Very Negative	Somewhat Negative	No Complaint
FRELIMO	11%	7%	10%	72%
RENAMO	1%	91%	5%	3%

Thus, the combined "negatives" concerning RENAMO were 96%, versus 17% for FRELIMO. Combined positive plus "no complaints" concerning FRELIMO were 83% versus 4% for RENAMO.

Pre-1987 Report Differences

The pre-1987 arrival sample was too small to provide a useful basis for comparison with the 1987/1988 arrivals. Because of the limited sample size and because a larger proportion -- about one-third -- had migrated because of conditions not related to the conflict, it must be treated with some reserve. The attribution of human rights abuses to RENAMO versus FRELIMO among this group, is roughly the same as for1987/1988 arrivals. The proportion of non-murder abuses (rape, looting, forced porterage, mutilation etc.) attributed to RENAMO is slightly higher. Of the witnessed murders, however, 68% were attributed to RENAMO, 32% to FRELIMO, none to "unknown". The proportions arising out of these particular numbers should be given only relative weight because of the limited size of the sample (particularly after non-conflict migrants are deducted) and the consequent possibility that the dimensions of a single incident could disproportionately affect the overall results.

Summary of Findings

From 48 districts in northern, central and southern Mozambique, in 25 refugee camps in five countries separated by as many as 1,500 miles, nearly 200 Mozambican refugee accounts of their experiences are strikingly similar. If that sample is reasonably representative, their accounts, corroborated in large measure by independent experience of some religious and relief assistance workers, compel certain unavoidable findings.

First, the level of violence reported to be conducted by RENAMO against the civilian population of rural Mozambique is extraordinarily high. Roughly 170 refugees, each representing one family, who arrived in 1987/1988, collectively reported about 600 murders by RENAMO of unarmed civilians, in the absence of resistance or defense. (If the population estimates reported in the introduction to this report are correct, there are roughly 200,000 - 250,000 refugee and displaced families in Mozambique and in the neighboring countries, the majority of whom are conflict victims.) If the refugee reports are generally accurate and the sample reasonably representative, it is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by RENAMO in this manner.

The same 170 refugees report many hundreds of cases of systematic forced portering, beatings, rape, looting, burning of villages, abductions and mutilations. These patterns of

systematic abuse represent many hundreds, if not thousands, of individual instances reported by this small sample. Conservative projections based on this data would yield extremely high levels of abuse.

That the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants.

Second, the relationship between RENAMO and the civilian population, according to the refugee accounts, revolves almost exclusively around a harsh extraction of labor and food. If these reports are accurate, it appears that the only reciprocity provided by RENAMO for the efforts of the civilians is the possibility of remaining alive. There are virtually no reports of attempts to win the loyalty -- or even the neutrality -- of the villagers. The refugees report virtually no effort by RENAMO to explain to the civilians the purpose of the insurgency, its proposed program or its aspirations. If there is a significant sector of the population which is sympathetic to this organization, it was not reflected in the refugee accounts.

Third, there were serious complaints about abuses by some FRELIMO Government soldiers. But in both the murder and non-murder categories, only three to four percent of the complaints were attributed to FRELIMO soldiers. They tended to

be isolated reports, often from areas of the country most remote from Maputo. It appeared that there is a sustained trend toward improvement overall.

Fourth, the refugees and most independent sources rejected the assertion that much of the violence in Mozambique is attributable to neither FRELIMO or RENAMO but instead to armed bandits affiliated with neither side. It appears from this field research that violence by "freelance bandits" does not account for more than occasional, isolated instances of the high level of reported violence.

CP
27/4

BRITISH AID TO MOZAMBIQUE

Gross bilateral civil aid (including emergency relief)

1985	1986	1987
£8.366m	£7.424m	£22.798m

UK share of multilateral aid to Mozambique (OECD figures)

1985

£5.8m (approximately 10% of total multilateral aid)

1986 and 1987 figures have not yet been computed.

UK Commitments to Mozambique (as opposed to actual expenditure)

1985	1986	1987
£10.6m	£11.1m	£27.4m

JH1

BRITISH GROSS BILATERAL AID TO SADCC STATES 1980-87 (£000)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	TOTAL 1980-1987
ANGOLA	12	93	55	71	146	164	317	261	858
BOTSWANA	11,546	10,199	7,570	13,289	15,975	8,775	12,805	11,874	80,159
LESOTHO	4,607	6,364	4,251	4,695	5,233	2,382	3,784	3,918	31,316
MALAWI	16,543	15,999	16,984	14,620	12,959	13,825	15,019	24,882	105,949
MOZAMBIQUE	4,629	5,379	1,924	1,805	4,182	8,366	7,424	22,798	33,709
SWAZILAND	6,472	4,144	6,366	5,665	5,626	3,376	7,722	3,458	39,371
TANZANIA	32,119	30,040	27,328	30,384	30,230	17,967	12,715	24,137	180,783
ZAMBIA	20,696	24,119	14,237	15,485	32,901	25,579	35,366	26,173	168,383
ZIMBABWE	36,405	50,048	21,464	19,453	15,062	23,636	12,242	12,240	178,310
TOTAL	133,029	146,385	100,179	105,467	122,314	104,070	107,394	129,741	948,579

PRIABE

PS/NO.10

2 copies passed to you at request of CAFD.

2519[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL
DD FCOLN
FM MAPUT TO FCOLN
240930Z MAR
GRS 1251

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO (AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 25/3)
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 168
OF 240930Z MARCH 88
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, HARARE, LUSAKA, LISBON
INFO PRIORITY LILONGWE, DAR ES SALAAM

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHISSANO: 23 MARCH 1988

SUMMARY

1. LETTERS FROM PRIME MINISTER AND PRINCESS ROYAL HANDED OVER. PRESIDENT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION. CLAIMS THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND TO IMPROVE CONVOYS AND THAT THERE ARE INCREASING NUMBERS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AMNESTY. I REGISTERED OUR CONCERN ABOUT STATE OF THE MAF. PRESIDENT PREPARED TO HAVE MEETING WITH P W BOTHA. TALKS WITH RENAMO ''NOT NECESSARY''.

DETAIL

2. I HAD NEARLY 3/4 OF AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT CHISSANO YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (23 MARCH). I HANDED OVER LETTERS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL. CHISSANO WAS SAD TO LEARN THAT MRS THATCHER DID NOT ENVISAGE VISITING MOZAMBIQUE THIS YEAR, BUT SAID THAT SHE WOULD BE VERY WELCOME WHENEVER SHE DECIDED TO VISIT SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE PRINCESS ROYAL'S MESSAGE, IN PARTICULAR ITS REFERENCES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FROM EMERGENCY TO DEVELOPMENTAL AID, AND ALSO HER PRAISE FOR MOZAMBIQUE'S WORK IN SUPPORT OF SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND.

SECURITY SITUATION

3. I QUESTIONED THE PRESIDENT ON THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THINGS WERE IMPROVING. REPORTS REACHING HIM, INCLUDING THOSE FROM INHAMBANE, GAZA, MANICA AND ZAMBEZIA SHOWED THAT THE SITUATION WAS BETTER. HE HAD BEEN INTERESTED TO NOTE THAT A NUMBER OF FOREIGN COMPANIES WERE NOW ASKING TO SET UP (OR COME BACK) TO OPERATE IN THE PROVINCES. THE POSITION IN NIASSA, NAMPULA AND MAPUTO PROVINCES WAS NOT GOOD, BUT HE HOPED THAT PROGRESS WOULD SOON BE MADE. IN THIS CONNECTION I REFERRED TO HIS REMARKS DURING THE PRINCESS ROYAL'S VISIT (MY TELNO 110) ABOUT SECURITY OF CONVOYS: I SAID I HAD BEEN DISMAYED TO HEAR THE NEXT DAY OF AN ATTACK ON THE RESANO GARCIA TRAIN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE SERIOUSNESS OF SUCH INCIDENTS, BUT SAID THAT WITHIN A MONTH HE HOPED THAT THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE IN PLACE WHICH WOULD ALLOW NOT ONLY THE INTRODUCTION OF CONVOYS ON THE NORTH/SOUTH ROAD TO INHAMBANE, BUT ALSO ACTION ON THE RESANO GARCIA AND NAMAACHA ROADS. CONSIDERATION WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE GIVEN TO GUARDING TRAINS ON THE RESANO GARCIA LINE (HE CLAIMED THAT PLANS FOR THE LIMPOPO LINE

WERE ALREADY MADE). AS PART OF THE IMPROVING SECURITY SITUATION HE CLAIMED THAT THE AMNESTY ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEGINNING TO HAVE REAL EFFECTS: RENAMO PERSONNEL WERE COMING OVER IN INCREASING NUMBERS. HE WAS USING VARIOUS MEANS, INCLUDING RELIGIOUS CHANNELS, TO SEND MESSAGES TO THE ''BANDITS'' TO SAY THAT THEY SHOULD STOP AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WELCOME TO RETURN TO ORDINARY LIFE. THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME HAD CREATED EXTENSIVE ECHOES WHICH WERE BEING PICKED UP BY RENAMO FROM THE US AND THE FRG. HE POINTED TO OLIVEIRA'S ARRIVAL IN MAPUTO. IN TALKING OF THE SECURITY SITUATION, HE EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS MORE AND MORE EVIDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIVITY. IN PARTICULAR HE REFERRED TO AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS (INCLUDING THOSE BRINING SOUTH AFRICAN AND FRENCH JOURNALISTS TO GORONGOSA).

4. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT, ALTHOUGH WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION WOULD BE WELCOME TO YOU, WE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED TO HAVE VERY DISTURBING EVIDENCE OF THE DEFECTS OF THE MOZAMBICAN ARMED FORCES. FOR INSTANCE, THE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE LIMPOPO LINE HAD STILL NOT TAKEN PLACE. (THIS SURPRISED THE PRESIDENT, WHO EXCLAIMED THAT PERHAPS THAT WAS WHY PRESIDENT MUGABE WANTED TO SEE HIM TOMORROW - HE IS TRAVELLING TO LUSAKA FOR THE FRONT LINE STATES MEETING.) WE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT, WHEN THE FIRST NYANGA TRAINED COMPANY HAD BEEN VISITED NEAR MAGUDE, THE COMPANY COMMANDER WAS ABSENT SEEKING FOOD FOR HIS MEN. CHISSANO SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH LOGISTICS. HE HAD APPOINTED COL MANGUEIRA, AS SECRETARY OF STATE, TO OVERSEE THIS, AND HE BELIEVED THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD SOON BE MADE TO IMPROVE FOOD SUPPLY. THIS IN PART DEPENDED UPON THE EFFICIENCY OF CONVOYS, AND ALSO ON THE TRAINING OF LOGISTICS OFFICERS AT HEADQUARTERS AND IN THE PROVINCES (HE EXPRESSED SOME HOPE THAT SUCH OFFICERS WOULD EMERGE FROM TRAINING WITH THE PORTUGUESE). OF COURSE IT WAS TERRIBLE THAT PEOPLE LIKE THE COMPANY COMMANDER DID NOT EVEN HAVE TRANSPORT. HE HAD HANDED TO GENERAL OBSANGO A LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES COULD USEFULLY GIVE TO THE MOZAMBICAN ARMED FORCES. HE HOWEVER AGREED WITH MY VIEWS THAT EQUIPMENT ALONE WOULD COME TO NOTHING: WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CONSIDERABLY IMPROVED ORGANISATION AND CONSCIENTIOUS PROFESSIONAL COMMANDERS IN THE MAF.

MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE REAL KEY TO PEACE WAS SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT, IN THE ATMOSPHERE POST THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS AT CAHORA BASSA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY WOULD TAKE PART IN LIAISON COMMITTEE MEETINGS. HE KNEW THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT WANTED TO SEE HIM. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO THIS BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO DO SO WITHOUT SOME POSITIVE SIGNS OR HE WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM FROM HIS PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. THESE WOULD INCLUDE MEETING OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE CAHORA BASSA, ACTION ON MAPUTO PORT AND ON THE RESAND GARCIA RAILWAY. THE MOZAMBICANS WERE RECEIVING INCREASING EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND OTHER PARTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. HE BECIEVED THAT WHEN PIK BOTHA WAS ANGRY WITH HIM FOR DENOUNCING SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT (OF RENAMO) THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HIS OWN MILITARY WERE UP TO.

6. ON CAHORA BASSA ITSELF, THE MOZAMBICANS HAD SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD EVENTUALLY SIGN. (I TOLD

THE PRESIDENT THAT WE WERE SUPPORTIVE AND WISHED TO SEE PROGRESS.)

NPT

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GET AHEAD WITH SIGNATURE OF THE NPT. HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

HAMILTON

8. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

TALKS WITH RENAMO

9. AS IWAS LEAVING I PRESSED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS VIEWS ON WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF HIS OPENING TALKS WITH RENAMO. HE SAID THAT SUCH TALKS WERE ''NOT NECESSARY''. IT WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT NOW THAN WHEN HE HAD EXPLAINED THE POSITION TO MRS THATCHER IN MAY 1987, IE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHO TO TALK TO. THERE WERE OPEN DIVISIONS WITHIN RENAMO AND THERE WAS NOW TALK OF THE TWO RENAMO LEADERS KILLED IN MALAWI HAVING BEEN DONE IN BY THEIR OWN PEOPLE. (HE HAD FOUND IT STRANGE AT THE TIME TO HAVE A MESSAGE FROM THE MALAWI GOVERNMENT, SAYING QUOTE WE DID NOT DO IT UNQUOTE.) OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUPPORT ANY MOVES TO CONTACT THE BANDITS TO DISCOURAGE THEM FROM CONTINUING THE FIGHT. THIS MESSAGE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SENT THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, BUT IT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE NEGOTIATIONS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ALL THIS WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN GETTING ON GOOD TERMS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

COMMENT

10. THE PRESIDENT WAS RELAXED, OPEN AND EXTREMELY FRIENDLY. (THE RETIRING FRG AMBASSADOR WAS KEPT WAITING WHILE WE TALKED.) I FEAR THAT CHISSANO IS TAKING ON TRUST WHAT HE IS TOLD BY THE MILITARY. WHILE I DISSENT FROM APOLYPTIC VIEWS ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION APPARENTLY CURRENT IN CERTAIN FRONT LINE CIRCLES AND I ACCEPT WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID ABOUT THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION, I REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE SHAMBOLIC STATE OF THE MAF. CHISSANO SEEMS TOO OPTIMISTIC IN THINKING THIS WILL BE EASY TO RECTIFY. I FOUND A NEW NOTE OF URGENCY AND INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S OPTIMISM IN THIS FIELD IS ALSO MISPLACED I CANNOT JUDGE FROM HERE.

ALLAN

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3591 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL DATED 16 MARCH 1988	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	~~DKD~~ 12/12/2016.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T23/88

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

MJ
cc FCO
PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 February 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I am most grateful for your kind letter of 16 February, which Dr. Mocumbi handed to Sir Geoffrey Howe when he saw him on 19 February, and for renewing your invitation for me to visit Mozambique.

As I am sure you will understand, my programme for the coming year is already extremely full; but I shall certainly bear your invitation in mind when considering my longer term plans.

I extend my best wishes to you for the success of the challenging economic programme you have introduced.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Joaquim Alberto Chissano

OA

010

CONFIDENTIAL

CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 February 1988

Dear Charles,

When Dr Mocumbi, the Mozambican Foreign Minister, called on the Secretary of State on 19 February he handed over the enclosed letter from President Chissano to the Prime Minister inviting her to visit Mozambique. I attach a draft reply cast in politely non-committal terms.

Clearly the Prime Minister is not likely to want to take up this invitation in the near future, nor to make a decision at this stage about a visit at a later date. Nor is President Chissano pressing hard for her to do so. However a visit in due course to Mozambique could be valuable given its strategic position in Southern Africa and our high profile civil and military assistance to it. Mozambique has received a good deal of attention from our EC partners recently, notably in the form of visits by Chancellor Kohl and the French Foreign Minister.

Yours ever

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

CAR

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO: Copies to:

His Excellency Joaquim Alberto Chissano
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique

SUBJECT:

I am most grateful for your kind letter of 16 February, which Dr Mocumbi handed to Sir Geoffrey Howe when he saw him on 19 February, and for renewing your invitation for me to visit Mozambique.

As I am sure you will understand, my programme for the coming year is already extremely full; but I shall certainly bear your invitation in mind when considering my longer term plans.

I extend my best wishes to you for the success of the ~~courageous~~ challenging economic programme you have introduced.

CR.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T19a/88

Maputo, 16 February 1988

UNNOFICIEL TRANSLATION

On the occasion of the holding of the Wilton Park Conference on Southern Africa which will take place in London from 16th to 18th February, 1988, the Honourable Dr. **Pascoal Mocumbi**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mozambique will be in the United Kingdom to attend the Wilton Park Conference as a guest of honour. Thus, he will avail himself of this opportunity to convey to you, Honourable Prime-Minister, my warmest and friendly greetings and wishes of a good health.

The honourable Dr. **Pascoal Mocumbi** who is also a member of the People's Assembly will take this opportunity to express our satisfaction for the positive development of relations of cooperation

Right Honourable
MARGARETH THATCHER
The Prime-Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northen Ireland
L O N D O N

between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the United Kingdom.

It is with immense gratitude that I recall the kind cordiality and friendship that you showed to me in the course of the visit we realized last year to your lovely country.

Thus, I would like to formally renew the invitation we extended to you, Right Honourable, so as to visit our country and we would also like to assure you how satisfied would we be on welcoming you with the customary and friendly hospitality of the Mozambique people.

You may visit us during the present or next year, as it best suits you. Meanwhile, allow us to suggest that, on deciding to honour us with your visit still on the course of this year the best time would be before May or after August.

Concerning the prevailing situation in Southern Africa, particulary in the People's Republic of

Mozambique, I request to you, Right Honourable Prime-Minister, to believe in the message my Minister for Foreign Affairs will convey to you, espcially in my wishes of prosperity to the British Government and People who are under your wise leadership, and we cherish hopes for a long happy life and sucess in your undertakings.

JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique

República Popular de Moçambique
Presidência da República
O Presidente

Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 1988

Estimada Primeiro Ministra,

No âmbito da realização da Conferência de Wilton Park sobre África Austral a ter lugar em Londres de 16 a 18.2.88, encontra-se na Grã-Bretanha, o Dr. **Pascoal Mocumbi,** Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros da República Popular de Moçambique, para participar na Wilton Park como convidado de honra, e assim aproveitará o ensejo para transmitir a Vossa Excelência as minhas mais calorosas saudações de amizade e votos de boa saúde.

Sua Excelência
MARGARETH THATCHER
Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido
da Grã-Bretanha
L O N D R E S

O Dr. **Pascoal Mocumbi** que é também Deputado a Assembleia Popular irá aproveitar esta oportunidade para manifestar a nossa satisfação pelo desenvolvimento positivo das relações de cooperação entre a República Popular de Moçambique e a Grã-Bretanha.

É com grande gratidão que recordo a amável cordialidade e amizade que me dispensou, assim como a comitiva que me acompanhava, durante a visita que efectuámos ao vosso belo País no ano passado.

Assim gostaria de renovar formalmente o convite que fizemos a Vossa Excelência para visitar o nosso País, e gostaríamos de assegurar-Lhe, Senhora Primeiro-Ministro, a quão enorme satisfação teriamos em acolhê-La com a habitual hospitalidade amiga do povo moçambicano.

Poderá visitar-nos no corrente ano ou no próximo, como melhor convier a Vossa Excelência. Permita-nos, no entanto, sugerir que, a decidir honrar-nos com esta visita ainda este ano, o melhor período

seria antes de Maio ou depois de Agosto.

Quanto à situação prevalecente na África Austral e na República Popular de Moçambique em particular, peço que Vossa Excelência dê crédito a tudo quanto o meu Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros Vos transmitir em meu nome, particularmente os meus sinceros votos de prosperidade para o Governo e Povo Britânicos de que Vossa Excelência é a digna dirigente a quem desejamos longa vida cheia de felicidade e sucessos nos seus empreendimentos.

Alta Consideração.

Esperando vê-la em breve,

JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO
Presidente da República Popular de Moçambique

22 IL
1988

002747
MDLIAN 4746

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 36
OF 251220Z JANUARY 88
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, HARARE, BONN

VISIT OF DR FRANZ JOSEF STRAUS

SUMMARY

1. STRAUSS HAD OVER FOUR HOURS WITH CHISSANO. SOME GERMAN ASSISTANCE PROMISED FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRIC TRANSMISSIONS (WHICH ALSO AFFECT SOUTH AFRICA). UNCLEAR EXACTLY WHAT STRAUS IS UP TO IN CONNECTION WITH RENAMO AND SOUTH AFRICANS BUT GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND MOZAMBICAN/SOUTH AFRICAN MEETING MAY BE ON CARDS.

DETAIL

2. THE CSU LEADER VISITED MAPUTO ON 21 AND 22 JANUARY IN THE COURSE OF A SOUTHERN AFRICAN TOUR. ON 21 JANUARY HE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH JACINTO VELOSO, MINISTER OF COOPERATION, AND ALBERTO CHIPANDE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE. PRESIDENT CHISSANO ESPECIALLY BROKE OFF HIS HOLIDAYS UP COUNTRY TO GIVE HIM A DINNER AND ON 22 JANUARY THEIR TALKS WENT ON FOR (AN UNSCHEDULED) FOUR HOURS.

3. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE STRAUSS CHARACTERISED HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AS EXTREMELY OPEN, FRANK AND SINCERE. HE SAID THEY AGREED ON 80 PER CENT OF THE MATTERS DISCUSSED - THE REST COULD BE SOLVED IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID GERMANY WAS INTERESTED IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PORTS AND RAILWAYS AND TO THE CAHORA BASSA TRANSMISSION LINE. ON THE LATTER HE IMPLIED TO JOURNALISTS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE INTERESTED IN HELPING BUT NOT WITH TROOPS. AS TO THE ENDING OF RENAMO ACTIVITIES, HE CRYPTICALLY SAID THAT SOME MEDIATION HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY HIM BUT HAD NOT BEEN FINISHED.

4. THE VISIT WAS APPARENTLY UNDERTAKEN WITH THE BLESSING OF CHANCELLOR KOHL, WHO VISITED HERE IN NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 598). AS IT TURNED OUT STRAUSS HAD A MUCH LONGER TALK WITH CHISSANO THAN KOHL. THE FRG EMBASSY HERE HAD LITTLE TO ADD. THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ACTED AS INTERPRETER BUT HE AND OTHER OFFICIALS WERE EXCLUDED DURING A DISCUSSION ON SECURITY MATTERS (WHEN THE TWO LEADERS USED

ENGLISH). DR SCHOLZ SAID THAT STRAUSS AND THE REST OF THE PARTY WERE SINCERELY IMPRESSED BY CHISSANO (BY CONTRAST THE MEETING WITH CHIPANDE WAS A DISASTER, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE SPOKE ENTIRELY IN CLICHES AND SLOGANS).

5. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT STRAUSS SAID ABOUT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. I GET THE IMPRESSION THAT A SUMMIT MEETING (BOTHA/CHISSANO) WAS NOT RULED OUT, BUT THAT A MEETING AT SENIOR MINISTERIAL LEVEL IS AT THIS STAGE MORE LIKELY. THE PROMISE OF GERMAN AID WAS CONCENTRATED BY STRAUSS ON THOSE AREAS IN WHICH IT WOULD UNDERPIN COOPERATION BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA.

ALLAN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 117

MAIN 113

LIMITED
CAFD
WED
OADS
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
NAD
ECDS
SOVIET
NEWS
INFO
PS/MRS CHALKER
SIR J FRETWELL
MR RATFORD
MR MUNRO
MR FAIRWEATHER

ADDITIONAL 4

ASSESSMENT STAFF, CAB OFF
NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1987

Prime Minister
Well done!
CDP
22/9

Dear Charles,

President Chissano's visit to the United States

In my letter of 1 September I said that we would keep in touch with developments over a possible visit by President Chissano to the United States. The Americans have now told us that President Chissano will meet President Reagan in Washington on 5 October. Chissano will also see Vice President Bush, Mr Shultz and Mr Carlucci. Meanwhile, President Chissano has asked our Ambassador in Maputo to convey to Mrs Thatcher his decision not to travel to Cuba and Nicaragua before or after his visit to the US and to express his appreciation for her efforts on his behalf.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique : Intr SA
Aug 79.
[illegible] Cab 1.



cc PC
(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 September 1987

Prime Minister

CDP
1/11

Dear Charles,

Your letter of 12 August confirmed that the Prime Minister was content for our Chargé in Washington to speak personally to Shultz to inform him that President Chissano had been persuaded not to travel to Cuba and Nicaragua and that the way seemed clear for President Reagan to issue him an invitation to meet at the White House during the period of the UNGA. Unfortunately Shultz was absent from Washington. Following clearance from Mr Bearpark, the message was passed through Acting Secretary John Whitehead.

// As you will see from the two attached telegrams, although some opposition in the form of Defence Secretary Weinberger remains, the initial response has been encouraging. We shall keep in touch with developments.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street



2829

CONFIDENTIAL

0134
MDHIAN 06

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1827
OF 272350Z AUGUST 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

WASHINGTON TELNO 1775 : MOZAMBIQUE : CHISSANO'S VISITS
1. UNOFFICIAL INDICATIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL SEE CHISSANO IN OCTOBER.
DETAIL
2. CABELLY (CROCKER'S AIDE) TOLD US IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE ON 27 AUGUST THAT HE WAS LEAVING THAT EVENING FOR SOUTHEN AFRICA (MAPUTO, LILONGWE AND (BRIEFLY) SOUTH AFRICA). HE EXPECTED TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS A) TO CONVEY TO CHISSANO AN INVITATION FROM REAGAN TO COME TO THE WHITE HOUSE IS EARLY OCTOBER AND B) TO SOUND OUT BOTH RENAMO AND THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES ABOUT RECENT RUMOURS ABOUT POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION MOVES.
2. CABELLY SAID THAT A REAGAN/CHISSANO MEETING WOULD BE DISTINCT FROM THE PROPOSED REAGAN/FLS EVENT ON 8 OCTOBER. IT WAS ENVISAGED AS A WORKING, AS OPPOSED TO OFFICIAL, VISIT. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION, CABELLY DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE INVITATION AND THE RECONCILIATION ISSUE : THE LATTER HAD ARISEN PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF HINTS SUPPOSEDLY GIVEN TO THE REPUBLICAN TASK FORCE IN MAPUTO (MAPUTO TELNO 407).
3. CABELLY MADE NO REFERENCE TO OUR EARLIER APPROACH TO WHITEHEAD (FROM WHOM WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING AS YET). DISCREET DOUBLE-CHECKING WITH LANPHER (DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS), HAS ELICITED THE COMMENT THAT THE SIGNS FOR AN OCTOBER VISIT TO THE WHITE HOUSE WERE LOOKING GOOD, BUT THAT FINAL CONFIRMATION WAS STILL AWAITED.
4. A DETAILED SEPARATE DISCUSSION ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE POLICY WHICH WOODLEY HAS HAD TODAY WITH ARMITAGE'S DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA AT THE
PENTAGON SUGGESTED NOT THE SLIGHTEST AWARENESS IN DOD OF ANY INVITATION : THE DISCUSSION DID, HOWEVER, CONFIRM THAT SUCH AN INVITATION WOULD NOT BE WELCOMED BY WEINBERGER AND, IN PARTICULAR, IKLE, AND THAT THERE REMAINS A STRONG BODY OF PENTAGON OPINION IN FAVOUR OF SOME US RELATIONSHIP WITH RENAMO IN THE INTERESTS OF PROMOTING RECONCILIATION.

ACLAND

26

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 306

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1775
OF 172301Z AUGUST 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO



TOP COPY
D DIST ?

ON

23

FCO TELNOS 1326 AND 1333: PROPOSED VISIT OF PRESIDENT CHISSANO TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA

SUMMARY

1 WHITEHEAD GRATEFUL FOR PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVENTION. BUT ADMINISTRATION SENSITIVITY OVER MOZAMBIQUE UNDIMINISHED.

DETAIL

2 I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO WHITEHEAD ON 17 AUGUST.

3 WHITEHEAD, WHO WAS EVIDENTLY WELL-AWARE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S DIFFICULTIES OVER MOZAMBIQUE, SAID THAT HE WAS IMMENSELY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S EFFORTS. HE UNDERTOOK TO ENSURE THAT MY ACCOUNT OF HER INTERVENTION, AND OUR HOPE THAT AN INVITATION TO CHISSANO WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, WAS TRANSMITTED URGENTLY AND IN CONFIDENCE TO SHULTZ IN CALIFORNIA. SHULTZ WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS: WHITEHEAD WOULD KEEP US BRIEFED.

4 WHITEHEAD COMMENTED THAT THE PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OVER MOZAMBIQUE REMAINED ACUTE. THE RIGHT-WING'S LATEST SUSPICIONS OF A POSSIBLE WHITE HOUSE SELL-OUT OF THE CONTRAS COULD ONLY INCREASE THE TEMPTATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE SOME GESTURE IN THEIR DIRECTION OVER MOZAMBIQUE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S ENCOURAGEMENT WAS A GREAT HELP IN KEEPING THE POLICY - AND THE PRESIDENT - ON TRACK. BUT FOR IT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY WOULD NOW QUOTE BE HANGING BY A THREAD UNQUOTE.

5 WHITEHEAD SAID THAT, GIVEN THE BACKGROUND, THE IDEA OF A REAGAN/CHISSANO MEETING WAS BOUND TO BE CONTROVERSIAL. AND BY LATE SEPTEMBER, WITH THE CONTRA AID DEADLINE FAST APPROACHING, THE PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT FROM THE RIGHT-WING RISKED BEING ALL THE GREATER.

6 I STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID LEAKS. WHITEHEAD FULLY AGREED, AND CONFIRMED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVENTION WOULD BE VERY TIGHTLY HELD WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. IT WOULD BE FOR SHULTZ TO DECIDE WHETHER OTHERS (BY IMPLICATION, SUCH AS CROCKER) SHOULD BE PUT IN THE PICTURE.

CROWE

YYYY

ORWBAN 3701

LIMITED
C AF D
S AF D
NAD
PUSD
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR REEVE

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 August 1987

PROPOSED VISIT OF PRESIDENT CHISSANO TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA

Thank you for your letter of 11 August. The Prime Minister has confirmed that she is content for our Chargé in Washington to speak personally to Mr Shultz as described, but has stressed that the confidentiality of the personal approach must be strictly honoured.

P A BEARPARK

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 August 1987

Yes - the confidentially of the personal approach must be strictly maintained

Prime Minister

Content for our Chargé to speak to Mr Shultz as proposed?

PSB 11/8

Dear Andy,

Proposed Visit of President Chissano to Cuba and Nicaragua

On the Prime Minister's instructions our Ambassador in Maputo has twice conveyed orally to President Chissano her view that he should not go ahead with planned visits to Cuba and Nicaragua, or at least should agree to postpone them so that they do not coincide with his proposed visit to Washington.

As you will see from Maputo telegram number 401 President Chissano now seems to have accepted that his visits should be postponed. He has however made clear the importance he attaches to a meeting with President Reagan in Washington and is clearly working on the assumption that this will be possible.

At present the Americans are still under the impression that Chissano is intent on visiting Cuba and Nicaragua. We believe it would be useful if we could explain to them that this is no longer the case, in order to pave the way for an invitation to President Chissano to visit Washington (which seems unlikely to be forthcoming if we let matters take their course). We owe Mr Shultz a reply to his approach following the Prime Minister's visit to Washington (Washington telegram number 1553). The Prime Minister may also consider that it would be helpful for President Reagan and his most senior advisers to be aware of the effort she has made and of its impact on President Chissano.

I discussed this briefly with Charles Powell last week before he went on leave (and before we had a response from President Chissano). He was concerned that any leak from Washington would seriously undermine the results of our efforts; but he accepted that it would be difficult not to let Mr Shultz at least know of the Prime Minister's efforts to dissuade President Chissano and their effect.

/Now

CONFIDENTIAL

Now that we have a helpful reply from President Chissano, *believe we we should now inform the Americans. The risk of an unhelpful leak could be minimised by instructing our Charge in Washington, Mr Crowe, to speak personally to Mr Shultz to convey the news of the Prime Minister's successful intervention. He would be instructed to stress to Mr Shultz the importance of protecting the confidentiality of the Prime Minister's exchange with President Chissano because of the difficulties any leak would cause. At the same time he would say that the way now seems clear for an invitation to President Chissano to visit Washington at the time of the United Nations General Assembly.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be content for us to proceed on this basis.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

PM87

NEW FILE

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 401
OF 100740Z AUGUST 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 357: PROPOSED VISIT OF CHISSANO TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA.

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT CHISSANO INDICATES THAT ON ASSUMPTION HE WILL SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN HE ACCEPTS THAT VISITS SHOULD BE POSTPONED. NICARAGUANS UNDERSTANDING BUT MATTER NOT YET BROACHED WITH CUBANS. PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN UNDERSTOOD.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT CHISSANO RETURNED FROM HIS VISITS TO ADDIS ABABA, SOFIA, MOSCOW ND LAGOS ON SATURDAY 8 AUGUST AND LEFT AT 0600HRS ON MONDAY 10 AUGUST FOR BOTSWANA. HE SAW ME (ALONE) AT 2030HRS ON 9 AUGUST FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF TUR AND IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION, WHICH AS INSTRUCTED CONCENTRATED ON THE ISSUE OF THE VISITS TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA, USED MATERIAL FROM PARAS 2 AND 3.

3. PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO ASSURE THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HER CONCERN. HE HAD DECIDED THAT IF HE SAW PRESIDENT REAGAN HE COULD NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO CUBA OR NICARAGUA. HOWEVER, THIS NEEDED VERY CAREFUL HANDLING. HE HAD ALREADY MADE CONTACT WITH NICARAGUANS (HE DID NOT SAY WHEN). THEY HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND A POSTPONEMENT (AND AS CHISSANO OBSERVED, THE PARK HE WAS TO INAUGURATE WOULD STILL BE THERE). THE CUBANS PRESENTED MORE OF A PROBLEM. HE HAD NO INTERLOCUTORS READY TO HAND WITH WHOM TO DISCUSS SUCH A SENSITIVE MATTER (THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR, EVEN IF HA WERE IN MAPUTO, WHICH HE IS NOT AT PRESENT, WAS NOT THE SORT OF MAN HE COULD DO BUSINESS WITH). THE CUBANS WERE GIVING MUCH HELP TO MOZAMBOQUE. THEY DID NOT DICTATE NOR ASK MOZAMBIQUE TO DO IMPOSSIBLE THINGS. THEIR AID WAS SIGNIFICANT, THOUGH HE EMPHASISED IT WAS NOT MILITARY: DOCTORS, TEACHERS, TRADE, FISHERIES AND SUGAR EXPORTS ALL PROVIDED FREE IN MOZAMBIQUE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION GIVEN TO LARGE NUMBERS OF MOZAMBICAN CHILDREN IN CUBA. HE HAD HAD TO POSTPONE A VISIT TO CUBA BEFORE AND HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THIS TIME HE WOULD COME. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO FIXED DATES AND HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND A WAY OF PUTTING TO THEM THAT A POSTPONEMENT WAS NECESSARY. BUT THIS WAS DIFFICULT. HE DID NOT ACCEPT AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION WHICH I SUGGESTED, THAT HE NEEDED TO RETURN TO MOZAMBIQUE TO DEAL WITH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PREOCCUPATIONS. NO, HE SAID HE WOULD COME OUT AND SAY TO THE CUBANS IT WAS BECAUSE OF NEED TO ENCOURAGE POSITIVE TRENDS IN THE CONGRESSVADVANTAGEOUS TO MOZAMBIQUE (HE IMPLIED AT ONE STAGE IN THE DISCUSSION THAT HE WAS TEMPTED TO SAY TO THE CUBANS THAT IT WAS ON MRS THATCHER'S ADVICE.)

Good

Confidential

4

4. CHISSANO SAID THAT EVEN IF, AS HE NOW INTENDED, (AND THE POLITBURO APPARENTLY ACCEPT) HE DID NOT GO STRAIGHT TO CUBA, HE WOULD STILL HAVE TO GO THERE SOME TIME THIS YEAR. NEXT YEAR HE HAD OTHER COMMITMENTS. HE WAS GENUINELY WORRIED ABOUT COST (ALTHOUGH HE PUT POINT IN TUR ABOUT COST COMPARATIVE TO WORST CASE). HE NOW HAD TO TRAVEL TO SWEDEN THEN BACK TO MOZAMBIQUE (HE SEEMS TO THINK THE PROPOSED VISITS TO NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM AND OTHER SCANDANAVIANS WILL PROVE IMPOSSIBLE BEFORE RETURNING TO FRANCE AND THE US THEN BACK TO MOZAMBIQUE BEFORE CUBA. NEXT YEAR BRAZIL, CHINA AND BACK AGAIN TO THE US (PRESUMABLY FOR UNGA)).

5. CHISSANO HOWEVER SAID HE KNEW THE IMPORTANCE OF MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN. REFERRING TO A THREE HOUR DISCUSSION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH A VISITING DELEGATION OF REPUBLICAN ADVISERS(FURTHER DETAILS TO FOLLOW) HE SAID THAT THEY SHOULD NOT TRY TO IMPOSE ON HIM NEGOTIATIONSMO (WITH RENAMO). HE WOULD TELL PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT US ENERGIES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO PERSUADING RENAMO TO DESIST FROM VIOLENCE AND TO ENCOURAGE ITS MEMBERS TO COME BACK AND WORK FOR THE COUNTRY. IF THESE RETURNEES THEN RAISED THEIR VOICES IN CRITICISM OF ANYTHING FRELIMO WAS DOING WRONG THEY WOULD BE AT LIBERTY TO DO SO. INDEED IN THE US HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE ALL SHADES OF MOZAMBICAN OPINION (ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED THIS WOULD NOT COVER PEOPLE WHO CALLED THEMSELVES ''RENAMO REPRESENTATIVES'').

6. PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO ASSURE THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SPIRIT IN WHICH HER ADVICE WAS GIVEN AND HE WOULD FIND A WAY TO MEET IT. IN A SLIGHTLY OBSCURE ASIDE HE SAID THAT HE WOULD UNDERSTAND HER REGRET FOR WHAT HE DID BUT HE HOPED HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO USE THE WORD DISAPPOINTED. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE RELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS AT LEAST INTENT ON AVOIDING THE MAJOR PITFALL OF SEEKING TO TRAVEL TO THE US AND CUBA AND NICARAGUA ON THE SAME TRIP.

COMMENT

7. PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH TIRED, WAS RELAXED, FORTHCOMING AND REASONABLE. HE HOWEVER OBVIOUSLY FINDS THIS WHOLE EPISOSE AS POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING WITH THE CUBANS AND SAID JOKINGLY THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH THEM WOULD BE SOLVED IF REAGAN NOW OFFERED TO SEE HIM. BUT HE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS NOT PUTTING FORWARD A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AS A BARGAINING PLOY. AS HE HIMSELF SAID HE WAS CONVINCED OF THE IMPORTANCE OFA MEETING WITH REAGAN AND BRINGING THE US ON SIDE. HIS FRIENDLINESS TO ME UNDERLINED HIS REGARD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WHO HE SEES AS A GENUINE FRIEND.

ALLAN

DELNBN 0026

LIMITED
CAFD
SAFD
MCAD
NAD
PUSD
PS
PS/CHAIKER

PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR BEENE

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1553
OF 022249Z JULY 87
INFO ROUTINE MAPUTO

SUPPORT FOR CHISSANO

1 THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ BOTH MENTIONED MOZAMBIQUE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SUBSEQUENTLY MRS THATCHER INCLUDED THE SUBJECT IN HER PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE LEADERSHIP HAVING SOMETHING OF AN ARGUMENT WITH SENATOR HELMS ABOUT THE MERITS OF THE CASE.

2 SHULTZ WAS DELIGHTED THAT SHE HAD EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE REASONS FOR HER SUPPORT FIRST FOR MACHEL AND NOW FOR CHISSANO. SHULTZ TOLD ME SEPARATELY THAT HE HAD SEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT CHISSANO MIGHT BE PAYING VISITS TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA. IF HE WERE TO DO THIS ANY HOPE OF GETTING CONGRESSIONAL OR POPULAR SUPPORT HERE WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD GET A MESSAGE TO HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT IF HE WANTED THE US ADMINISTRATION TO DO MORE TO HELP HIM HE MUST BE SENSITIVE ABOUT AMERICAN PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THEIR QUOTE BACK YARD UNQUOTE AND NOT (NOT) PAY VISITS TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA WHICH WOULD BE WIDELY REPORTED IN THE UNITED STATES TO HIS DISADVANTAGE.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 3085

MOZAMBIQUE

LIMITED

COPIES TO:

CAFD
OAD'S
SED
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
CONSULAR D
PUSD
NEWS D
INFO D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF
SECURITY D
NAD

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR REEVE
MISS PESTELL
MR J CAINES (ODA)
MR HUDSON (ODA)
CABINET OFFICE

DI ROW MOD
SEC(O)(C) MOD
DMAO/MOD
DCTS ROW MOD
HD/CSAD ODA
MR JP ROBERTS,
ECONOMIC SERVICE ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL DATED 4 AUGUST 1987	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	DJC 12/12/2016.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

fcie DTSALG

CC PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 August 1987

MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 30 July covering the telegrams reporting the call by our Ambassador in Maputo on President Chissano.

The Prime Minister would like a further oral message conveyed to President Chissano, either directly or through a close colleague or assistant, to the effect that she is disappointed with his decision to go ahead with the visits to Cuba and Nicaragua. She fears that this puts at risk all the work which she has done on his behalf in Washington, and it cannot but affect to some degree her view of his longer term intentions. Even at this late stage, she would urge him to think over his decision again and postpone the visits so that at least they do not coincide with his visit to Washington.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT CHISANNO

You will want to see the attached letter and telegrams which record the delivery of your message to President Chisanno about his proposed visits to Cuba and Nicaragua, and his reaction. He seems to have weighed your advice very carefully, but concluded that he now has no real option but to go ahead with the visits.

This is disappointing, although there clearly would be genuine difficulties for him in cancelling the visits. It is more for the Americans than for us to demonstrate displeasure. But you might wish to send back a further oral message to the effect that you are disappointed with his decision which puts at risk all the work you have done on his behalf in Washington, and that you would urge him even now to think over his decision again and postpone the visits so that at least they do not coincide with his trip to Washington.

Agree? Yes MT

I will also after my news of his longer term intentions. MT

CDP?

CDP

31 July, 1987.

JD3BBI

CONFIDENTIAL

cc/pc

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1987

Dear Charles,

Mozambique

As requested in your letter of 20 July, our Ambassador in Maputo called on President Chissano on 26 July to convey the Prime Minister's concern at his proposed visits to Cuba and Nicaragua. I enclose his reporting telegrams.

Given Chissano's background and the pressures on him, it is not entirely surprising that he should feel that he cannot back out of visits which have already been set up. The Foreign Secretary considers that we have now done all we can to bring home to Chissano the difficulties these visits will cause in the US. He clearly understands the reasons for our concern, though he probably under-estimates the strength of his opponents in Washington. The Foreign Secretary concludes that we shall need to do what we can to explain the pressures on Chissano to the US Administration, and continue to emphasise to them the need to give him the West's active support if we are to make further progress in drawing him away from the Soviet bloc. At the same time we shall need to go on bringing home to Chissano the implications of this kind of behaviour.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Prime Minister

CDP
20/7

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 July 1987

MOZAMBIQUE

The question of Mozambique was raised on several of the Prime Minister's meetings in Washington, and she had a particularly lively exchange with Senators, in particular with Senator Helms. In the course of this the Prime Minister vigorously defended President Chissano's efforts to deal with Mozambique's problems in a sensible and pragmatic way, and argued the case for the United States to support him. At one point in the discussion with the Senators, it was suggested to the Prime Minister that President Chissano was likely to visit Cuba and Nicaragua quite shortly. The Prime Minister considers that this would very largely negate all the efforts which she has made on President Chissano's behalf and would wish him to be aware of this.

I should be grateful therefore if you could arrange for our Ambassador in Maputo to convey an oral message to President Chissano. Drawing on the paragraph above, the message should say that the Prime Minister stood up stoutly for President Chissano during her visit to Washington both in her talks with leading members of the Administration and with Congress and urged that the United States should follow our example in giving him support. She believes that her efforts may have some effect. However, she was informed - and we have no independent confirmation of this - that the President was proposing to visit Cuba and Nicaragua at some point fairly soon. She takes the view that such visits would undermine any positive effect from her own efforts on President Chissano's behalf; and that if he is indeed considering such visits, he would be well advised at the least to postpone them until the matter of future United States policy towards Mozambique has been resolved. The Ambassador should emphasise that this is the Prime Minister's own personal advice to President Chissano and does not reflect any suggestion or proposal from the United States. She does, however, feel strongly about the matter.

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mozambique

You may like to look at the passages which I have underlined.

CDP

22/12

SUMMARY

1. Joaquim Alberto Chissano elected President of Mozambique on 3 November 1986, is a founder member of Frelimo who took a leading part in its development. As Prime Minister in the transitional government 1974-75 he earned widespread respect. Subsequently as Foreign Minister recognised as an accomplished diplomatist. Style and temperament different from Machel's: an intellectual measured in his approach. (paras 1 - 3).

2. The transition after Machel's death on 19 October 1986 was resolved speedily. Although Marcelino dos Santos, Guebuza, Chipande and Machungo were thought to be in the running Chissano had the support of the Politburo. Endorsement by the Central Committee indication of his popularity. (paras 4 - 5).

3. He inherits a country torn by war with an inadequate army, /a with/menacing neighbour and an economy in ruins. But he is pledged to pragmatic solutions. He will move cautiously to reform the army. On South Africa he has affirmed his adherence to Nkomati and can be expected to make moves to a dialogue. But Pretoria holds the cards. He is pledged to IMF/IBRD prescriptions and will require international help. (paras 6 - 7).

4. Mozambique (and Chissano) can help British interests. Action to give assistance now could bring returns. (para 8).

5. Renamo offers no alternative. Chissano's election sets him painful tasks but he deserves our support. (para 9).

BRITISH EMBASSY
MAPUTO

010/1

26 November 1986

Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC MP
LONDON

Sir

JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO: PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, NOVEMBER 1986

1. Joaquim Alberto Chissano was elected President of the People's Republic of Mozambique (and of Frelimo) on 3 November 1986 by the Frelimo Party Central Committee meeting in extraordinary session. As President of the Republic he also automatically became Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He was sworn in on 6 November, 1986.

Chissano's background

2. Chissano who is a Shangaan, as was Machel, was born in Malehice, Chibuto District, Gaza Province in Southern Mozambique on 22 October 1939. His father was a methodist minister. He attended primary school in Xai Xai, the provincial capital and later, the Lycee in Lourenco Marques, as Maputo was then called. He helped to found the (non-racial) Mozambican Students Union. In 1960, he went to Portugal to study medicine (he was among the first black Mozambicans to do so). However, his involvement in the nationalist movement there led him to leave Portugal for France in 1961, where he enrolled at Potiers University and again became active in pursuit of Mozambican

/independence

independence. He participated in the founding of Frelimo in 1962 and finally abandoned his studies to become Secretary to the first Frelimo President, Eduardo Mondlane. He later added the function of Secretary for Defence and Security to his responsibilities. He has been a member of the Party Central Committee since 1963. He was a member of the Executive Committee, forerunner of the Politburo in the early days of Frelimo. During the independence struggle he married a Makonde from Mueda District, the birth place of the Minister of Defence General Chipande and a centre of resistance to the Portuguese. This gave him a personal link with this important Northern tribe (they formed the backbone of Frelimo's guerrilla forces and remain strong in the army). During the internal crisis in Frelimo in 1968/69, Chissano played an important part in support of Machel and dos Santos in the ousting of Uria Simango and others who favoured a black nationalist but less ideologically oriented policy. After Mondlane's death in February 1969, he was the third member of the leadership troika with Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos.

3. Chissano participated in the negotiations with the Portuguese in Lusaka in 1974 which led to the signature of the Lusaka Agreements on 7 September 1974, providingfor the establishment of a transitional government and independence for Mozambique. He presided as Prime Minister of the transitional government over six Mozambican and four Portuguese Ministers until Mozambique achieved full independence on 25 June 1975. His sensitive handling of difficult social and security problems earned him respect both from Portuguese and Mozambicans. Chissano stage managed Machel's assumption of office as first President of the Republic and stepped into the background to become Foreign Minister. However his talents could not be hidden and in the course of his extensive travels he was recognised as an adroit diplomatist (and capable linguist: he speaks extremely good English and French). His style and temperament are fundamentally

/different

different from Machel. Samora derived immense satisfaction from his public appearances. He projected his personality and indulged his vanity to the full, deploying his skills as an orator, singing and even dancing (after the early puritanism of Frelimo was relaxed). In contrast, Chissano appears less at ease before the public. There is none of the flamboyant dialogue with the crowd favoured by Machel and none of Machel's instant policy making. Instead, Chissano is more measured, cautious even, in his approach. He is given to reflection and is at his best when speaking a deux or in small groups. Those who knew Machel will miss the vibrant excitement of a session with him: Chissano is an intellectual who on first acquaintance can seem cold. But he has a personality which should not be underestimated. People who have dealt with Chissano have a profound respect for his intelligence and political sagacity.

Transition and Election

4. The brief period after Machel's death on 19 October, during which the Politburo, led by Marcelino dos Santos, exercised the functions of the President, was marked by an apparent unity and closing of ranks within Frelimo. The issue of the succession was resolved speedily and without outward sign of factionalism. Although the leadership maintained absolute discretion about who would succeed Machel, inevitably there was much speculation. Chissano was favourite. His two closest rivals were thought to be Marcelino dos Santos and Armando Guebuza, though dos Santos' chances of success were always in question because of his mixed origin and ill health. Outside candidates were Alberto Chipande (Defence) and Mario Machungo (Prime Minister). It is now being suggested that the Politburo agreed during its first meeting that Chissano should succeed Machel thus preempting divisive and ultimately damaging manoeuvring by rival contenders. That there was some manoeuvring by Guebuza (or his supporters) during

/the

the early days post Machel seems beyond doubt. But it was short-lived in the face of generalised support for Chissano as being the best all round candidate.

5. As far as we know, after the emergency session immediately following Machel's death the Politburo did not formally meet again until 30 October to prepare for the Extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee necessary to elect the new President. By then, Chissano's position as likely successor had become virtually unassailable. There remained a hint of uncertainty, however, for during the last twelve months of Machel's Presidency, the institutions - notably the People's Assembly and the Central /also Committee itself, but/less august bodies such as the OJM (the Mozambique Youth Movement) - had become restless at the drift into further economic and military disaster. There had been frank criticism of the leadership from the floor on several occasions. No-one could be asbolutely certain that the Central Committee membership would accept the Politburo's choice or find itself faced by a last ditch attempt by one of Chissano's rivals. It is an indication of Chissano's popularity that nothing of the kind emerged. Chissano was put forward as the Politburo's only candidate. He was nominated by Chipande and, in accordance with Frelimo's electorial conventions, a speech in support (fulsome in its praise for Chissano's qualities) was made by Sergio Vieira (Security). The choice of proposer and seconder was significant for it put the full weight of the army and security apparatus behind Chissano. When Marcelino dos Santos announced the result of the election on national radio from the Central Committee meeting, there was manifest popular satisfaction mingled with relief. The transition was remarkable for the dignity and efficiency with which Frelimo conducted business in the aftermath of Machel's death.

His Inheritance

6. Chissano's inheritance could scarcely be worse. War -

/or

or at least widespread insurgency - compounded by perceived dangers from South Africa and an economy in ruins.

a) The War. Although, as seen from Maputo, the country was held together in a remarkable way, the situation in October 1986 was worrying with the Renamo capture of a number of small Mozambican towns surrounding the Malawi border and the Government forces tenuous grip over Zambezia. Blame inevitably attached to senior commanders but it was also clear that under every heading the Mozambican Army was a shambles. No real transition had been made from a guerrilla to regular army. Officers were inadequate to the task, soldiers were pressganged by an arbitrary recruitment system, logistic support inadequate (there are frequent reports of units having no equipment, food or pay) and intelligence non-existent.

b) South Africa. When Machel died relations were in a particularly bad state. The South Africans were held to have established bases in Malawi for Renamo and to have encouraged them to infiltrate into Tete and Zambezia. Rumours abounded of South African Defence Force (SADF) special forces personnel being involved. Pressure was exerted daily by Pretoria: the announcement of the ending of recruitment of Mozambican workers and accusation of Mozambican support for the ANC led to expectations of an imminent punitive raid.

c) The Economy. All indications were of continuing decline. Agricultural and industrial production were down on previous years (one estimate I have seen suggested that at independence only 13% of arable land was under cultivation but in 1985 this had declined to 5%). Although there were some signs of rain there were shortages of grain because of the population seeking to escape the war. The Government's deficit was increasing with requirement for new investment against declining revenue.

/His Task

His Task

7. These problems had all been identified by Machel and the country had been promised remedies. They had not materialised. Chissano is pledged to continue the search and to adhere to the pragmatic path which his predecessor had been seeking to follow. I believe he will make a good stab at the task but solutions to fundamental problems will not come easily.

a) Reorganising the army will require considerable tact. The older officer corps are part of the Frelimo leadership many of whom were brothers in arms, and will be reluctant to be bypassed. Although they are unlikely to oppose Chissano to whom they have sworn loyalty the process will be slow. Even more difficult will be reorganisation of logistics. Chissano is conscious that the Soviet Union has led the army up a blind alley: training them for the wrong war, with the wrong equipment and with little sympathy for the problems of the ordinary soldier. While he realised he cannot dispense with Russian support in materiel, he like Machel, wants training from the West. Above all, he would like training from the United Kingdom which is seen to have an outstanding track record and to have profoundly, and beneficially, affected the forces in surrounding Commonwealth countries.

b) Machel had planned to send his adviser, Aquino de Braganca, in an attempt to restart dialogue with South Africa, but he, like so many others dedicated to peace, was killed in the plane crash with his President. Chissano on taking office has affirmed that he stands by the Nkomati Accord (even though as Foreign Minister he tactically distanced himself from negotiatins with the South Africans). For him there will be none of the almost atavistic pleasure Machel had from parleying with the Boers. But he is a realist and he genuinely wants peace with his dominant neighbour. He has emphasised to recent foreign visitors that

/progress

progress in relations with South Africa can only be achieved through negotiations. Some moves to a new dialogue can therefore be expected in due course; meanwhile Chissano will also try to reduce any scope for South African accusations of Mozambican support for ANC military operations. But at the end of the day it is the balance of forces in Pretoria which will be crucial. The Department of Foreign Affairs, as I witnessed on a recent visit to Pretoria, assert that they have no interest in a weak and destabilised Mozambique. Their message is that they will abate the polemics and quietly forget the draconian repatriation of Mozambican workers. But will they be allowed to do so? The Mozambicans fear, I believe with some justification although this is not my parish, that the South African military are not subject to normal political control. Action through Renamo surrogates and punitive SADF forays cannot be ruled out whatever emollient actions are taken by the Mozambicans.

c) Chissano when he chaired the first meeting of the Council of Ministers of his Presidency on 14 November 1986 called for unity and determination in pursuit of economic and social development. He is known to favour private enterprise (he spoke out at the 14th Session of the People's Assembly in December 1985 and his speech on 6 November 1986 contained a reaffirmation of support for private investors) and to support Prime Minister Machungo in his efforts to tackle the country's economic problems. He has made it clear that he wishes to see agreement concluded with IMF/IBRD. The consequences of adhering to their prescriptions will raise awkward social problems. But Chissano and his team - it is thought that he will reshuffle his Ministers before the New Year - seem determined to grasp this nettle.
But they will require continued support from the international community: Chissano has gone out of his way in his early presidential pronouncements to acknowledge the help already received from Western industrialised nations.

/Should

Should Britain Care?

8. At first sight Mozambique might seem remote from British concerns. But that would be to ignore the long association of Britain with Mozambique through the links which have always existed between Mozambique and its Anglophone neighbours. Moreover, Portugal's own slowness to industrialise and her predilection for things British reinforced human, commercial and industrial links with Britain. Frelimo's headlong pursuit of Marxist/Leninist principles in the early years of independence led to loosening of these contacts. However, Machel's position as an African leader and his role in Zimbabwean independence evoked development of a different but nonetheless important relationship. If there is any tendency to question continuation of UK support for this impoverished African state technically adhering to a Marxist Leninist constitution, I suggest that cool analysis of British interests will reveal good reasons for helping. Chissano although adroit at using "socialist" language has a good track record as a pragmatist. He desperately needs help in his effort to distance Mozambique from the Soviet Union and to establish it as genuinely non-aligned. He is known to favour progress by negotiation on Southern African problems: he opposes imposition by his country of sanctions and is likely to speak up against those who seek to exploit this issue in FLS and NAM circles. Assistance to Mozambique has a spin off in our relations with the FLS and other African countries who have accepted that this must receive priority attention. And Mozambique genuinely requires developmental assistance. These are crucial times for Mozambique. Action now even on a modest scale by Britain and the West could bring welcome returns.

9. Renamo, as I have reported on a number of occasions show no signs of offering an alternative and Frelimo displays no disposition to negotiate with them. Until recently, there

/was

was little evidence that it had the ability, or the will, to administer territory. Lately, Renamo has sought strenuously to cultivate a more substantial image abroad, particularly in the United States. In some parts of Zambezia, they have attempted to substitute a rudimentary local administration of its own. But its main characteristic remains its weak organisation and lack of popular support. Its barbarity and the self seeking of individual bands has done little to win over the people. We are left therefore with Frelimo. Unappetising as some of its characteristics may be, I believe it has in the transition after Machel's death shown itself in a good light. Chissano has the potential to be a notable leader. His election sets him the painful tasks of rehabilitating his own country and working for peaceful relations with South Africa. No miracles can be expected but he deserves support.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to HM Representatives in Pretoria, Mbabane, Maseru, Luanda, Gaborone, Harare, Lusaka, Lilongwe, Dar es Salaam and Washington.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully

James Allan.

J N ALLAN


22 MAY
PM86

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 637
OF 181500Z DECEMBER 86
INFO IMMEDIATE LILONGWE, LUSAKA
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, HARARE, PRETORIA, GABORONE

MOZAMBIQUE: ARMACOSTS VISIT.

SUMMARY

1. ARMACOST VISITED MAPUTO FROM 16 TO 18 DECEMBER. ACCORDING TO US AMBASSADOR HE ACHIEVED HIS OBJECTIVES. MOZAMBICANS ASSURED HIM THEY WOULD NOT OFFER RUSSIANS BASES AND THAT THEY WANTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. ARMACOST IMPRESSED BY PRIVATE ENTREPENEURS AND MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENTS DETERMINATION TO GRAPPLE WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

DETAIL

2. ARMACOST VISITED MAPUTO FROM 16 TO 18 DECEMBER. HE WAS MET AT AIRPORT BY MINISTER OF COOPERATION VELOSO AND HAD TALKS WITH A SERIES OF MINISTERS INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTERS OF FINANCE, AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE. HE HAD A LONG MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON 17 DECEMBER.

3. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT THE VISIT WAS A GREAT SUCCESS. HE SAYS THAT THE US HAD A NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES: THEY WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR CHISSANO'S GOVERMENT AND TO DISSIPATE ANY BELIEF THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED RENAMO SEMI COLON THEY WISHED TO ESTABLISH THAT MOZAMBIQUE WOULD NOT OFFER BASES TO THE SOVIETS AND WOULD SEEK TO BE GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED SEMI COLON THEY WISHED TO SHOW THEMSELVES AS CRITICAL OF SAG POLICIES BUT NEVERTHELESS SUPPORTIVE OF NEGOTIATIONS SEMI COLON THEY WANTED TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE ANC. IN ALL THESE THEY HAD POSITIVE RESPONSES. THE MOZAMBICANS WERE COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT US SUPPORT AND ASSURED ARMACOST THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE OFFERING MILITARY FACILITIES TO THE RUSSIANS. THE MOZAMBICANS WERE COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT US SANCTIONS POLICY AND SHOWED THEMSELVES AS ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE TO SEEK CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. ON THIS LATTER THEY WANTED SUPPORT FROM THE US. MOZAMBICANS WELCOMED US TALKS WITH ANC.

4. ARMACOST WAS IMPRESSED BY THE PRIVATE BUSINESSMEN HE MET (INCLUDING BP AND LONRHO) AND MAGID OSMAN GAVE HIM A COMPETENT PRSEENTATION ON THE ECONOMY WHICH CONVINCED THE US SIDE OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE MOZAMBICANS TO KNUCKLE DOWN TO IMF/WORLD BANK ORTHODOXY.

5. CHISSANO TOLD ARMACOST THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OFFERS OF MILITARY HELP FROM THE UK, ITALIANS, FRENCH, SPANISH AND AUSTRALIANS. HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL EXCEPT TO PRAISE BRITISH EFFORTS ALTHOUGH HE CONFESSED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE MOZAMBICANS TO PROVIDE MEN OF THE RIGHT CALIBRE FOR NYANGA. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THOUGHT ARMACOST MIGHT AFTER HIS VISIT FEEL THAT A FURTHER ATTEMPT SHOULD BE

CONFIDENTIAL

/MADE

MADE TO SEE WHETHER US COULD SUPPLY SOME NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT. CHISSANO GAVE NO SIGN THAT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION WITH RENAMO EVEN THOUGH ARMACOST (DELICATELY) GAVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY SOMETHING IF HE HAD WISHED. CHISSANO DID SAY THAT TALKS WITH THE MALAWIANS WERE GOING WELL.

6. CONCLUSION. FROM DE VOS' ACCOUNT THIS WAS A USEFUL VISIT: THE INTEREST SHOWN BY MOST SENIOR US OFFICIAL TO VISIT MOZAMBIQUE SINCE INDEPENDENCE WILL HAVE INCREASED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THOSE ROUND HIM WHO WANT TO PURSUE A TRULY NON-ALIGNED COURSE.

7. CABALLY MADE TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH H OF C BUT IN THE EVENT HAD TO CRY OFF MEETING WITH GUY BECAUSE OF VOLUME OF WORK.

ALLAN

YYYY

MHPOAN 1973

MOZAMBIQUE

LIMITED

CAFD
OAD'S
SED
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
CONSULAR D
PUSD
NEWS D
INFO D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF
SECURITY D

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)
MR HUDSON (ODA)
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

D14/MOD
SEC(O)(C) MOD
DMAO/MOD
D(ROW) MOD
HD/CSAD ODA
MR JP ROBERTS ,
ECONOMIC SERVICE ODA

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS448
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reg
Please copy to Related dept and No10

FM MAPUTO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 606
OF 080300Z DECEMBER 86
INFO IMMEDIATE HARARE
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, LUSAKA, LILONGWE, WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, KINSHASA, LUANDA

605 - 051000

NT

YOUR TELNO 545: MOZAMBIQUE: MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON 5 DECEMBER. HE HAD WITH HIM LUIS BERNARDO HONWANA, VICE MINISTER IN THE PRESIDENCY AND I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY DA.

2. IN REPLY TO MY OPENING COURTESIES THE PRESIDENT ASKED THAT HIS GOOD WISHES BE PASSED TO THE QUEEN, THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESSENT WITH THE LATE PRESIDENT ON A NUMBER OF HIS VISITS TO BRITAIN BUT RECALLED THAT IT WAS HE AS FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD FIRST MET MRS THATCHER. HE HAD ONLY BEEN SCHEDULED TO HAVE A TWENTY MINUTE MEETING BUT IT HAD GONE ON FOR OVER FORTY AND IT WAS A RESULT OF HIS REPORT ON THIS MEETING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT CLOSE RAPPORT BETWEEN PRESIDENT MACHEL AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DEVELOPED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WISHED THE COOPERATION BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND BRITAIN TO CONTINUE AND GROW. DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSION ON MILITARY MATTERS IS IN MIPT.

MIPT ?

3. AT END OF OUR TALK PRESIDENT CONFESSED THAT HE WAS VERY BUSY AND HAD MANY THINGS TO ATTEND TO NOT ONLY IN GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO IN THE PARTY. HE WOULD HAVE TO GET ROUND TO APPOINTING A FOREIGN MINISTER. IF EVENTS HAD NOT TURNED OUT AS THEY HAD HE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY CONTENT TO CONTINUE HIMSELF AS FOREIGN MINISTER FOR FIVE YEARS AND THEN RETIRE TO HIS FARM ''TO CULTIVATE POTATOES''.

4. THE PRESIDENT WAS EXTREMELY FRIENDLY. AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED, HIS STYLE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM MACHEL'S. HE SPOKE CALMLY AND MODESTLY BUT SHOWED THAT HE HAD STUDIED THE PAPERS IN DETAIL AND KNEW OF ALL PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IT IS CLEAR THAT LIKE MACHEL HE WILL TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT.

ALLAN

MOZAMBIQUE

LIMITED

C AF D
OADs
SED
SOVIET D
CONS D
PUSD
NEWS D
INFO D
R D
PLANNING STAFF
SECURITY D

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
SIR C TICKELL(ODA)
MR HUDSON(ODA)
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:-
DI4/MOD
HD/CSAD ODA
MR J P ROBERTS
ECONOMIC SERVICE ODA
SEC(O)(C) } MOD
DMAO } MOD
D(ROW) } MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL INC ATTACHMENTS DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1986	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	~~DJE~~ 12/12/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SUBJECT
cc Ops
Master.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 197C/86

(57)

UNCLASSIFIED

74493 - 1

JCM 014/2

10 NOV 1986

OCMIAN 4493
UNCLASSIFIED
DD 051800Z MAPUT
FM FCOLN TO MAPUT
051600Z NOV
GRS 180

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO DESKBY MAPUTO 051800Z
TELNO 448
OF 051600Z NOVEMBER 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, LILONGWE, LUSAKA, LUANDA, KINSHASA
INFO PRIORITY HARARE

(47)

YOUR TELNO 522: ELECTION OF CHISSANO

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGES TO CHISSANO:

A) FROM THE QUEEN

QUOTE
ON YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, I SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT OF YOUR COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE.
UNQUOTE

B) FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

QUOTE
I SEND YOU GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES ON YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.
UNQUOTE

C) FROM ME

QUOTE
ON BEHALF OF ALL THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS AND WARMEST GREETINGS ON YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AT THIS MOST DIFFICULT TIME IN MOZAMBIQUE'S HISTORY.

UNCLASSIFIED

74493 - 1

I RECALL OUR LATEST MEETINGS WITH GREAT PLEASURE AND WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR YOUR COUNTRY.
UNQUOTE

HOWE

OCMIAN 4493

NNNN

MOZAMBIQUE

LIMITED

C AF D
OADs
SED
SOVIET D
CONS D
PUSD
NEWS D
INFO D
R D
PLANNING STAFF
SECURITY D

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
SIR C TICKELL(ODA)
MR HUDSON(ODA)
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:-
DI4/MOD
HD/CSAD ODA
MR J P ROBERTS
ECONOMIC SERVICE ODA

file

OA
copy

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1986

Thank you for your letter of 4 November recommending that the Prime Minister should send a message to Sr. Chissano, the new President of Mozambique.

The Prime Minister would, I am sure, wish to send a message but perhaps a rather less fulsome one than you propose. I suggest:

> "I send you greetings and best wishes on your election as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique."

BF // I should be grateful if a message in these terms could be despatched.

(Charles Powell)

R. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1986

Dear Charles

On 3 November, Sr Chissano, the Foreign Minister, was elected President of Frelimo and thereby, under the Constitution, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The Prime Minister may wish to send the following message :

"I should like to send you my greetings on your election as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, in succession to the late President Machel. Please accept my best wishes as you assume this great responsibility. I look forward to continuing the close relationship between our two Governments which has developed in recent years."

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

PS We are also recommending messages from The Queen and the Foreign Secretary.



SRJALP

RESTRICTED

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: PRESIDENT MACHEL'S DEATH

I should record that the Attorney-General informed me last night that a retired Lord Justice of Appeal, Sir Edward Eveleigh had been approached by the South African authorities and asked to join a three-man Court of Enquiry into the aircraft crash in which President Machel was killed. At least one of the other judges would be a non-South African national, probably German. Sir Edward wanted to know whether there was any government objection to his accepting. After consulting the Prime Minister, I told the Attorney-General that the Prime Minister saw no objection, indeed would be quite pleased if Sir Edward were to accept, although would not want to press him to do so.

I understand that Sir Edward is likely to accept.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Discussed with PM and spoken to AG. PM has no objection, indeed would be quite pleased, but would not want to press him CDP.

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: INQUIRY INTO AIR CRASH

The Attorney-General has been in touch to say that a former Lord Justice of Appeal, Sir Edward Eveleigh, had been invited to join a three-man Court of Inquiry into the plane crash in which Machel died. He has to reply by early tomorrow.

The Attorney wants to know whether you would either

a) object; or

b) wish to urge Sir Edward to do it.

I said that I thought you would certainly not object, but would equally not wish to press Sir Edward, leaving it to his judgement.

Agree?

CDP

C.D. POWELL
26 October 1986

BM2AWU

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL INC ATTACHMENTS DATED 24 OCTOBER 1986	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	DXD 12/12/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

GRS 958

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PRETORIA
TO DD 201800Z FCO LONDON
TELNO 390
OF 201630Z OCT 86
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO,LUSAKA,HARARE,MBABANE,MASERU,GABERONE,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN,PARIS,LILONGWE,LAGOS
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 388 : MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA.

SUMMARY.

1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO CONVINCE INTERNATIONAL OPINION THAT THE AIRCRAFT CRASH WAS NOT OF THEIR CAUSING. PRESIDENT MACHEL'S DEATH WILL NEVERTHELESS HAVE FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE. IN THIS TELEGRAM I EXAMINE THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE BEHIND THE RECENT DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS AND MAY GOVERN SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES.

2. THERE ARE MANY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION, ESPECIALLY AROUND PRIME MINISTER BOTHA, WHO HAVE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE NKOMATI ACCORD THROUGH ALL THE UPS AND DOWNS SINCE ITS SIGNATURE. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BEFORE THE CRASH BOTH P W BOTHA AND PIK BOTHA REAFFIRMED THAT NKOMATI WAS STILL ALIVE THOUGH REQUIRING RESUSCITATION.VAN HEERDEN'S COMMENTS TO THE U S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES (MY TEL UNDER REF) REFLECTED THE CONSISTENT DFA PUBLIC LINE THAT MACHEL WAS THE BEST PRESIDENT THEY COULD GET AND THAT RENAMO WOULD NOT BE A CREDIBLE SUBSTITUTE FOR FRELIMO IN GOVERNMENT. THE MAIN ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF NKOMATI HAS BEEN THAT IT OFFERS THE MOST PROMISING ROUTE TO ATTAIN THE TOP SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERN IN THE REGION , NAMELY TO PREVENT OR REDUCE ANC TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE LONGER TERM, THE NKOMATI SCHOOL HELD OUT THE HOPE OF EVENTUAL INTERNAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN FRELIMO AND RENAMO , ELUSIVE THOUGH THIS HAD COME TO APPEAR.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND MANY, ESPECIALLY WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT , HAVE ALWAYS VIEWED NKOMATI WITH SCEPTICISM. FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

/THEM

THEM DESTABILISATION WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO NEUTRALIZE MOZAMBIQUE AND TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON ZIMBABWE AND ZAMBIA THROUGH THEIR EASTERN TRANSIT LINKS, WHILE THE ANC COULD BE RESTRAINED BY SOUTH AFRICAN DIRECT MILITARY ACTION. CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH RENAMO WAS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR THIS STRATEGY. THE HANDS OF THIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN STRENGTHENED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. PRESIDENT MACHEL PROVED UNABLE (AND PERHAPS UNWILLING) TO CURB THE ANC TO THE EXTENT EXPECTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THE COMMONWEALTH SANCTIONS PACKAGE GAVE ADDITIONAL URGENCY TO DEMONSTRATING SOUTH AFRICA'S HOLD OVER ZIMBABWE AND ZAMBIA'S TRANSIT LINKS. NOW THAT THE EC AND US CONGRESS HAD TEMPORARILY DONE THEIR WORST OVER SANCTIONS, THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS ON WESTERN OPINION NEEDED TO BE GIVEN LESS WEIGHT. AT THE SAME TIME A TOUGH LINE TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE APPEARED CONSISTENT WITH A HARD STANCE ON EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ISSUES GENERALLY, AS WELL AS POPULAR WITH DOMESTIC OPINION WORRIED BY BLACK VIOLENCE. MOREOVER, THE MAIN PROPONENTS OF THIS LINE IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAVE IN RECENT MONTHS INCREASED THEIR INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME CONVINCED THAT MACHEL WAS LIKELY TO FALL WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS WHATEVER SOUTH AFRICA DID, AND THAT THERE WAS THEREFORE LESS AND LESS TO GAIN FROM NKOMATI.

RECENT DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS.

4. THESE VARIOUS FACTORS SEEM TO HAVE DECIDED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TWO WEEKS AGO TO ADOPT A TOUGHER STANCE AGAINST MACHEL, THE FINAL STRAW BEING THE ANC CAR BOMB WHICH INJURED A NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS ON 6 OCTOBER. A HEAVY PROPAGANDA BARRAGE ACCUSED THE MOZAMBIQUE AUTHORITIES OF COMPLICITY WITH ANC TERRORISTS, THREATENED RETRIBUTION AND EMPHASISED RENAMO'S SUCCESS AND MACHEL'S FRAGILITY. THE MAIN AIM WAS CLEARLY TO FRIGHTEN MACHEL AND THE ANC INTO STOPPING TERRORIST ATTACKS FROM MOZAMBIQUE . BUT THERE WAS ALSO AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE FOR THE FLS AND WEST ABOUT RETALIATION AGAINST SANCTIONS. THE CHOICE OF MEASURES AGAINST MOZAMBICAN WORKERS AND THE SUBSEQUENT FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION SUGGESTS THAT MACHEL WAS TO BE ALLOWED A FURTHER CHANCE BEFORE RECOURSE TO DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION. BUT THE WAY HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR AN ATTACK AT ANY TIME. COVERT HELP TO RENAMO MAY WELL HAVE BEEN RESUMED SOME TIME BEFOREHAND.

DEATH OF PRESIDENT MACHEL.

5. IT STRAINS BELIEF THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE SEEN MACHEL'S DELIBERATE REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE AS BEING TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. THE IMMEDIATE SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE TO LIE LOW UNTIL CONTROVERSY OVER THE AIRCRAFT CRASH DIES DOWN. THERE MAY BE VOICES URGING DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION TO ASSIST RENAMO. BUT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE UNLIKELY TO RUN THE RISK THIS WOULD ENTAIL OF BEING SUCKED INTO AN INTENSIFIED CIVIL WAR. NOR DO THEY SEEM LIKELY TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE EMERGENCE OF A SUCCESSOR FROM WITHIN FRELIMO RANKS. INDEED OPINION MAY BE DIVIDED OVER WHAT WOULD BE THE FAVOURABLE OUTCOME. THE NKOMATI SCHOOL NO DOUBT HOPE FOR SOMEONE IN THE MOULD OF MACHEL WHO MIGHT BE READY TO LIMIT ANC ACTIVITIES. THE PROPONENTS OF DESTABILISATION MAY WELCOME THE EMERGENCE OF A HARD-LINER AGAINST WHOM THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD TAKE THE GLOVES OFF AND ALLOW THEMSELVES A FREE REIN TO TRY AND DEAL WITH THE ANC BY S. AFRICAN MILITARY ACTION. HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES WILL RECOGNISE THERE IS COMPARATIVELY LITTLE SOUTH AFRICA CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE CHOICE.

6. LONGER TERM POLICIES WILL DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE. INSOFAR AS NKOMATI STILL ENJOYS SOME VESTIGAL STANDING IN SOUTH AFRICAN EYES, THE DEATH OF MACHEL WILL PUT IT STILL FURTHER IN QUESTION. SUPPORT FOR THE ACCORD HERE HAS BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE BELIEF OF P W BOTHA AND OTHER MINISTERS THAT MACHEL WAS A LEADER WITH WHOM THEY COULD DO BUSINESS. WHILE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO WRITE OFF THE NKOMATI PROCESS, THE CHANCES OF ITS SURVIVAL MUST NOW BE REMOTE.

MOBERLY.

YYYY

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

POHPAN 9189

LIMITED

CAFD PS
SAFD PS/MRS CHALKER
PUSD PS/PUS
NEWS D. MR FERGUSSON
INFO D. MR REEVE
RESEARCH D.
PROTOCOL D.
PLANNING STAFF

COPIES TO:
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST.
ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE

OCMIAN 0429
RESTRICTED
DD 202330Z JAKAR
OO PRETO
OO LUSAK
OO HARAR
OO LILON
OO KINSH
FM FCOLN TO MAPUT
201830Z OCT
GRS 232

RESTRICTED
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 210730Z MAPUTO
TELNO 387
OF 201830Z OCTOBER 86
INFO DESKBY 202330Z JAKARTA (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO DESKBY 210900Z STRASBOURG (FOR PS/MRS CHALKER)
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, LUSAKA, LUANDA, HARARE, LILONGWE,
INFO IMMEDIATE KINSHASHA, WASHINGTON

DEATH OF PRESIDENT MACHEL
1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 20 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SR MACHUNGO ASAP:
'I WAS DEEPLY DISTRESSED AND SADDENED TO HEAR THE NEWS OF THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL. THE PEOPLE OF MOZAMBIQUE HAVE LOST A GREAT LEADER WHO NOT ONLY BROUGHT THEM TO INDEPENDENCE BUT STROVE TO BRING PEACE TO YOUR COUNTRY AND TO THE WHOLE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION. I RECALL IN PARTICULAR THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION HE MADE DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE WHICH LED TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE. I ALSO MOURN HIM AS A PERSONAL FRIEND, WHOM I HELD IN THE HIGHEST RESPECT. ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT I ASK YOU TO CONVEY TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF MOZAMBIQUE OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY AND GREAT SENSE OF LOSS, AND OUR CONDOLENCES TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE LOST RELATIONS AND FRIENDS.'
2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

OCMIAN 0429

X

FCO (PALACE)
CAFD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 October 1986

DEATH OF PRESIDENT MACHEL

Thank you for your letter of 20 October enclosing a draft message of condolence from the Prime Minister to Senor Machungo on the death of President Machel.

The Prime Minister has signed a slightly amended version which I enclose. I should be grateful if the text could be sent by telegram as soon as possible. We propose to let the press have a copy once we know the message has been delivered.

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ECL

CAFLO

CC PRESS

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 October 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

I was deeply distressed and saddened to hear the news of the death of President Samora Machel. The people of Mozambique have lost a great leader who not only brought them to independence but strove to bring peace to your country and to the whole Southern African region. I recall in particular the outstanding contribution he made during the Lancaster House Conference which led to the independence of Zimbabwe. I also mourn him as a personal friend, whom I held in the highest respect. On behalf of the British Government I ask you to convey to the Government and people of Mozambique our deepest sympathy and great sense of loss, and our condolences to all those who have lost relations and friends.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Sr. Mario de Graca Machungo

SFW

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1986

Dear Charles,

Death of President Machel

The Prime Minister may wish to send the following message of sympathy to Sr Machungo. (He was appointed Prime Minister of Mozambique in July this year, when the office was created to relieve some of the burden on President Machel.)

"I was deeply distressed to hear the news of the death of President Machel. The people of Mozambique have lost a leader who not only brought them to independence but strove unceasingly to bring peace to their country and to the whole Southern African region. I recall in particular the invaluable contribution he made during the Lancaster House Conference which led to the independence of Zimbabwe, and of course the Nkomati Accord. On behalf of the British Government I ask you to convey to the Government and people of Mozambique our deepest sympathy and great sense of loss, and our condolences to all those who have lost relations and friends."

I am also writing to Buckingham Palace submitting the following draft message from The Queen to Mr Marcellino Dos Santos, who ranked second in the Frelimo Politburo after Machel. Under the Constitution the Central Committee assumes collective leadership of the country in the event of the President's death.

"I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of President Machel. The people of Mozambique have suffered a tragic and irreparable loss. Please convey my condolences to the families of all who are bereaved as a result of the crash."

/We

We are recommending to Sir Geoffrey Howe that he should send a message of condolence to the Mozambican Foreign Minister (who it is now thought was not on board the aircraft). This will be in his European Presidency as well as national capacity. He and Lady Howe may also send a personal message to Sra Machel.

I will let you know as soon as possible the arrangements we propose for representation at the funeral.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street


20. X.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister
CDP
20/X.

Jp.0230

Mr Powell

c: Sir Robert Armstrong

Death of President Machel

It was confirmed this morning that President Machel of Mozambique was killed when his Tu-134 jet crashed in South Africa last night. We believe that the Mozambican Defence and Transport Ministers were also killed, and also the President's Security Adviser, Fernando Honwana. Aircraft and crew were Soviet. Machel was returning from Zambia where he had attended a quadrilateral summit with Presidents Kaunda, Mobutu and dos Santos. The site of the crash, in Transvaal Province near the South African-Swaziland-Mozambique borders, suggests the plane was some way off the expected course from Zimbabwe to Maputo.

2. Of the two dead Ministers, Chipande (Defence) was regarded as a hardliner; Santos (Transport) was more pragmatic. Machel himself was the lynchpin in the Frelimo Government. The immediate prospect is a struggle between the various factions to determine the succession.

3. We have no intelligence as yet, but shall be commenting later in the week.

PERCY CRADOCK

20 October 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

PS
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/PUS
Mr Fergusson
Mr Reeve
CAFD
SAFD
PUSD
News D
Protocol D
Planning Staff

PS/Mr Davis
Mrs. Skeff
Cabinet Office

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED
FM MAPUTO
TO DESKBY 200815Z FCO
TELNO 471
OF 200730Z OCTOBER 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
INFO IMMEDIATE HARARE, LUSAKA, LILONGWE, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO IMMEDIATE, MBABANE, MASERU, GABORONE, WASHINGTON, LISBON

OUR TELNO 470: CRASH OF PRESIDENT MACHEL'S AIRCRAFT

1. POLITBURO MEMBER, MARCELINO DOS SANTOS, READ A COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE CRASH OVER MOZAMBIQUE RADIO AT 0845, 20 OCTOBER 86. APPROX TEXT FOLLOWS IN MIFT. THERE IS AS YET NO CONFIRMATION THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL WAS AMONG THE SURVIVORS.

2. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S DELEGATION. FOREIGN MINISTER, JOAQUIM CHISSANO, IS IN THE USA. PRIME MINISTER MARIO MACHUNGO, IS IN MAPUTO. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ALCANTARA SANTOS (MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS), COL FERNANDO HONWANA AND PROFESSOR AQUINO DE BRAGANCA WERE ON THE AIRCRAFT AND ARE PRESUMED AMONGST THOSE WHO DIED.

3. I ASSUME LUIS BERNARDO HONWANA, VICE MINISTER AND DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL CABINET, WILL RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO MAPUTO (MY TELNO VISIT 20).

4. WHEN CONFIRMATION OF MACHEL'S DEATH IS RECEIVED, THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE RECOMMENDING CONDOLENCE MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF TO COUNTERPARTS HERE. IN VIEW OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S INTERNATIONAL STANDING AND KNOWN RESPECT FOR HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, I RECOMMEND THAT A MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO BE SENT FROM HER MAJESTY. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER MRS MACHEL ACCOMPANIED THE PRESIDENT.

GUY

YYYY
DESKBY SHOULD READ 200830. APOLOGIES.

33A

CONFIDENTIAL

69287 - 1

36
35

OCMIAN 9287
CONFIDENTIAL
OO PRETO
OO HARAR
PP LUSAK
PP LILON
PP DAESS
PP GABOR
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
141530Z OCT
GRS 508

JSS 02017

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 1783
OF 141530Z OCTOBER 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, MAPUTO, HARARE
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LILONGWE, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, MASERU, MBABANE, GABORONE.

22

PRETORIA TELNO 366 AND MAPUTO TELNO 452 (NOT TO ALL) :
MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA

1. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MAY SHORTLY LAUNCH A MILITARY RAID AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. THE REPORTS IN TURS ARE SUPPORTED BY MATERIAL FROM OTHER SOURCES (OF WHICH THE AMERICANS WILL BE AWARE) WHICH SUGGESTS THAT SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A RAID ONCE POLITICAL APPROVAL IS GIVEN.
2. THE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS, BOTH IN THE REGION AND INTERNATIONALLY, OF A SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK AT THIS JUNCTURE ARE OBVIOUS. IT WOULD ADD TO THE GROWING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE STATES AND WOULD LEAD TO RENEWED

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE (E.G. IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL) FOR FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

3. IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE US AND FRG TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO DISSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS FROM LAUNCHING SUCH AN ATTACK. IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE INCLINED TO LISTEN. BUT IF WE, THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS MADE SEPARATE BUT CONCERTED HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHES IN PRETORIA EMPHASISING THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD VIEW MILITARY ACTION IT MIGHT JUST GIVE THEM PAUSE FOR THOUGHT. THE SAG WILL BE CONSCIOUS THAT AN EC BAN ON COAL IMPORTS RESTS ON A GERMAN VETO, AND THAT A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA WILL SHORTLY BE COMING FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO RAISE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNIQUE OF 11 OCTOBER (MAPUTO TUR) AS WELL AS THE INDICATIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS. WE WOULD EMPHASISE THE VERY SERIOUS VIEW WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALWAYS TAKEN OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY RAIDS AGAINSTS ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE 19 MAY RAIDS. WE WOULD STRESS THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT MACHEL TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE WEST AND THE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THIS OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACTION. WE WOULD SAY THAT WE BELIEVE SUCH ACTION WOULD BE A HEAVY BLOW TO PRESIDENT MACHEL AND THE NKOMATI ACCORD AND WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE PRESSURE ON WESTERN COUNTRIES LIKE THE UK, FRG AND THE US TO TAKE SOME CONCRETE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE RAID WOULD BE INTENSE AND COULD ONLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A FURTHER TWIST TO THE SANCTIONS SPIRAL. FINALLY WE WOULD URGE THE SAG TO WORK THROUGH THE CONSULTATION MACHINERY OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD TO RESOLVE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH MOZAMBIQUE.

5. GRATEFUL FOR WASHINGTON AND BONN'S RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. FOR PRETORIA: WE SHALL LET YOU HAVE FINAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS RESPONSE BUT OUR PRESENT THINKING IS THAT YOU SHOULD SEEK A CALL ON PIK BOTHA TO DELIVER THE DEMARCHE.

Howe

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

S AF D
C AF D
UND
ECD (E)
NEWS D
INFO D
LEGAL ADVS
PLANNING STAFF
CONSULAR DEPT
SCD
PUSD
DEFENCE DEPT
ECON ADVISERS
CCD
ERD
WAD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)
CABINET OFFICE
MR RATFORD
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER

COPIES TO:
ASSESSMENT STAFF
CABINET OFFICE
MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE

D SEC(O) (C) /5/8 MOD

MRS CASE TREASURY

Confidential

Fill

GA (42) 4
cc PC

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1986

MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 15 October proposing that we should seek the support of the United States and the FRG for a high level approach to the South African Government to dissuade them from carrying out a military raid on Mozambique. I am confident that the Prime Minister would approve the proposed action and I agree that the draft telegram enclosed with your letter should be despatched. But I should be grateful if you would consult me again in the unlikely event that the Americans and Germans decline to join us in making an approach, in which case I would want to seek the Prime Minister's views.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 October 1986

Prime Minister
Agree this proposal for a concerted approach by us, the Americans & the Germans to try to dissuade the South Africans from launching an attack on Mozambique?
CDP

Dear Charles,

Mozambique/South Africa

We are unable at present to consult the Foreign Secretary, but FCO Ministers are seriously concerned by recent indications that the South Africans may be about to carry out a military raid on Mozambique.

Relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply during the past month. Last week the SAG announced its intention to end the employment of Mozambican workers in South Africa. The South Africans allege that the ANC has stepped up its activity from Mozambique, while the Mozambicans have accused the SAG of increased support for Renamo. Following a landmine incident near the Mozambique border on 6 October which wounded several South African soldiers, the South African Minister of Defence issued a clear threat to Mozambique.

We know from secret sources that the South Africans have laid the basis for military raids into Mozambique and that they could go ahead at any time, given political approval. SADF attacks were planned on Beira and Maputo in September, but cancelled at a week's notice for political reasons. Meanwhile, our Embassy at Pretoria have reported that the South African military are feeding the local press an increasingly ominous line. They have also been seeking to talk up to the prospects for Renamo, claiming that it could force President Machel to accept a coalition government in the short/medium term.

The Mozambican Government for its part issued a communique on 11 October saying that it had information that the SADF were preparing an attack on Maputo using the air force and commandos, and claiming that men and equipment had already been infiltrated into Mozambique by the South Africans for attacks against the Beira corridor and other targets.

/The

SECRET

SECRET

The serious repercussions, both in the region and internationally, of a South African military raid at this juncture are obvious. It would be a heavy blow to President Machel and to the future of the Nkomati Accord and would increase the likelihood of confrontation between South Africa and the Front Line States. It would serve to undermine President Machel's increasingly pro-Western (and pro-British) stance. It would also give renewed impetus to the sanctions bandwagon both in the Twelve and at the United Nations.

It is clearly in our interests to do what we can to dissuade the South Africans from launching such an attack. In their present mood they are not going to be inclined to listen. But if we, the Americans and Germans made separate but concerted high level demarches in Pretoria, emphasising the seriousness with which we would view military action, it might just given them pause for thought (for one thing, the SAG will be conscious that an EC ban on coal imports rests on a German veto). We would argue to the South Africans that they should resort instead to the machinery for consultation with the Mozambicans provided for in the Nkomati Accord.

/ I enclose a draft telegram and instructions to our posts in Washington and Bonn which FCO Ministers would like to despatch as soon as possible, provided that the Prime Minister is content. (We do not think that it is worth seeking to associate the French or the rest of the Twelve with the demarche, since they cut no ice in Pretoria and could only complicate matters.)

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF 141530Z OCTOBER 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, MAPUTO, HARARE
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LILONGWE, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, MASERU, MBABANE, GABORONE.

PRETORIA TELNO 366 AND MAPUTO TELNO 452 (NOT TO ALL) :
MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICA

1. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MAY SHORTLY LAUNCH A MILITARY RAID AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. THE REPORTS IN TURS ARE SUPPORTED BY MATERIAL FROM OTHER SOURCES (OF WHICH THE AMERICANS WILL BE AWARE) WHICH SUGGESTS THAT SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A RAID ONCE POLITICAL APPROVAL IS GIVEN.

2. THE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS, BOTH IN THE REGION AND INTERNATIONALLY, OF A SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK AT THIS JUNCTURE ARE OBVIOUS. IT WOULD ADD TO THE GROWING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE STATES AND WOULD LEAD TO RENEWED INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE (E.G. IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL) FOR FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

3. IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE US AND FRG TO

///
//
/

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: DO	
File number	Dept: SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals): C T W HUMFREY	Telephone no: 233 4954
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

<<<<

<<<<

DO WHAT WE CAN TO DISSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS FROM LAUNCHING SUCH AN ATTACK. IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE INCLINED TO LISTEN. BUT IF WE, THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS MADE SEPARATE BUT CONCERTED HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHES IN PRETORIA EMPHASISING THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD VIEW MILITARY ACTION IT MIGHT JUST GIVE THEM PAUSE FOR THOUGHT. THE SAG WILL BE CONSCIOUS THAT AN EC BAN ON COAL IMPORTS RESTS ON A GERMAN VETO, AND THAT A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA WILL SHORTLY BE COMING FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO RAISE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT'S COMMUNIQUE OF 11 OCTOBER (MAPUTO TUR) AS WELL AS THE INDICATIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS. WE WOULD EMPHASISE THE VERY SERIOUS VIEW WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALWAYS TAKEN OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY RAIDS AGAINSTS ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE 19 MAY RAIDS. WE WOULD STRESS THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT MACHEL TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE WEST AND THE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THIS OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACTION. WE WOULD SAY THAT WE BELIEVE SUCH ACTION WOULD BE A HEAVY BLOW TO PRESIDENT MACHEL AND THE NKOMATI ACCORD AND WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE PRESSURE ON WESTERN COUNTRIES LIKE THE UK, FRG AND THE US TO TAKE SOME CONCRETE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE RAID WOULD BE INTENSE AND COULD ONLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A FURTHER TWIST TO THE SANCTIONS SPIRAL. FINALLY WE WOULD URGE THE SAG TO WORK THROUGH THE CONSULTATION MACHINERY OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD TO RESOLVE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH MOZAMBIQUE.

5. GRATEFUL FOR WASHINGTON AND BONN'S RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

/// 6. FOR PRETORIA: WE SHALL LET YOU HAVE FINAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THE
// LIGHT OF THIS RESPONSE BUT OUR PRESENT THINKING IS THAT YOU
/ SHOULD SEEK A CALL ON PIK BOTHA TO DELIVER THE DEMARCHE.

For distribution order see Page Catchword:

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

<<<<

1 <<<<
2 HOWE
3
4
5 YYYY
6 MAIN
7 DISTRIBUTION LIMITED
8 SOUTH AFRICA
9
10 NNNN
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
/// 31
// 32
/ 33
34

For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656


15 X 86

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: CR BUDD TO CO POWELL DATED 9 MAY 1986	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	~~DKG~~ 12/12/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3091 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: PERCY CRADOCK TO MR POWELL DATED 27 MARCH 1986	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	DMG 12/12/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

RESTRICTED

File

DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 August 1985

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 14 August. The Prime Minister has agreed to the despatch of the draft telegram which you enclosed with your letter.

Mark Addison

S. G. Eldon, Esq.,
Minister of State's Office,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

cy

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 August 1985

Dear Mark

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

Tim Flesher's letter of 7 August to Peter Ricketts enclosed a copy of President Kaunda's letter dated 5 July to the Prime Minister.

President Kaunda's motive in writing the letter is presumably partly to make up for his refusal to give President Machel any Zambian military help. Nevertheless his letter is a further indication of the useful political return from our own military aid offer, not only with the Mozambican Government but also with its neighbouring Front Line States.

As Tim suggested, the letter does not call for a formal reply, but it would be useful if our High Commissioner in Lusaka could convey the Prime Minister's appreciation of it, not least because of President Kaunda's influential role over Southern African questions. We have asked our High Commissioner in Lusaka to tell President Kaunda's Special Assistant that the letter will be seen by the Prime Minister on her return from leave.

I enclose a draft telegram to Lusaka. There is no need to bother the Prime Minister with this before her return from leave but once she is back I should be grateful if you could let us know if she can agree to its despatch.

Yours ever

Stephen Eldon

S G Eldon
Private Secretary to
Baroness Young

M J Addison Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		RESTRICTED	ROUTINE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 141700Z AUGUST 85
PRE/ADD	7	TO ROUTINE LUSAKA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO ROUTINE MAPUTO HARARE PRETORIA WASHINGTON
	10	INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA KINSHASA LILONGWE
	11	MY TELNO 348: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE
	12	1. Please inform State House by whichever channel you consider
	13	best that the Prime Minister much appreciated the President's
	14	letter of 5 July, and warmly reciprocates his good wishes. She,
	15	too, looks forward to seeing him again at CHOGM in Nassau.
	16	2. You may add that we are now working on implementation of our
	17	offer with the Mozambicans, and that there was naturally some
	18	discussion of it during Chissano's successful visit to London
	19	(21-26 July).
	20	
	21	YOUNG
///	22	NNNN
//	23	
/	24	
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept CAfD	Distribution Limited J R Johnson CAfD OADs Defence Dept CCD PS PS/Mr Rifkind Mr Fergusson
Drafted by (Block capitals) J R JOHNSON		cc: No 10 Downing St SEC (O) (C), MOD
Telephone number 233-4691		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 August 1985

The Prime Minister has received the attached letter from the President of Zambia about the question of assistance for Mozambique. The letter, at first sight, does not seem to require a reply but I should be grateful for your advice and any draft reply which is necessary.

(Timothy Flesher)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July, 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of Mozambican Foreign Minister, Sr Chissano 21-26 July

Sr Chissano had a useful session of talks with the Foreign Secretary on 25 July during which he handed over the enclosed message from President Machel to the Prime Minister. As you will see it is a positive response to the offer of military assistance made in the Prime Minister's message of 21 June. It does not call for any acknowledgement.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Michael McCulloch (ODA).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T139A/85

NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Prime Minister
Rashid your letter from President Machel
CDP 29/7.

Maputo, 20th July, 1985

cc master ops.

It is with great pleasure that I am sendig you this message through my Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who is well-know to you.

I still have vivid memories of our meetings, where we had a useful exchange of points of view on the general framework of cooperation to be developed between our two countries.

After our meeting in Moscow, I was pleased to receive your message, about the British Government's readiness to cooperate with the People's Republic of Mozambique on military matters.

President Julius Nyerere has also briefed us on the talks he held with Your Excellency when he was last in London, and emphesized the positive results you were able to achieve. Likewise, Prime-Minister Robert Mugabe has informed us of the steps with a view to implementing the military cooperation, having equally manifested his wholehearted agreement.

Since then, the military authorities of our two countries have been in touch with one another in order to work out the

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE KINGDOM OF GREAT-BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDON

details. I have personally been following closely these contacts, which have been highly productive.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our high esteem for the British Government's rapid and eficient response to our request regarding military cooperation. Apart from revealing the high level of mutual understanding reached by our two Governments, it constitutes a source of encouragement for other Western countries to understand the situation to which Mozambique is being subjected.

This gesture also demonstrates the British Government's growing committment in the difficult and complex process of the search for peace in Southern Africa.

My Government is certain that this step taken by the British Government will increasingly strengthen the bonds of the current cooperation between the People's Republic of Mozambique and Great Britain.

Minister Chissano will convey to you, Madam, our position on the latest developments in our region, where the South African regime has not shown any positive signs which might demonstrate its genuine interest in the peace process of Southern Africa. We continue, however, to work with the South

African authotities, with a view to implementing the principles enshrined in the Nkomati Accord.

Please accept, Your Excellency, our sincere assurances of renewed friendship and our best wishes.

Highest Consideration.

SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Marshal of the Republic
President of the Council of Ministers
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

Maputo, 20 de Julho de 1985

Senhora Primeira Ministra;

Com viva satisfação tenho o prazer de Lhe enviar esta mensagem através do meu Ministro dos Negóci os Estrangeiros, Sr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano , que bem conhece.

Guardo bem a memória dos encontros que temos man tido, os quais têm permitido uma útil troca de

Sua Excelência
MARGARETH THATCHER
Primeiro Ministro do Reino da Grã-Bretanha e
Irlanda do Norte
Londres

I. N. 1698-983

pontos de vista e onde tem sido delineado o quadro da cooperação entre os nossos dois países.

Depois do nosso encontro em Moscovo, tive o grato prazer de receber a sua mensagem informando-nos da disponibilidade do Governo britânico em cooperar , no âmbito militar, com a República Popular de Moçambique.

O Presidente Julius Nyerere informou-nos também das conversações que manteve com Vossa Excelência em Londres e das conclusões positivas que foram atingidas. O Primeiro Ministro Robert Mugabe igualmente nos informou das diligências feitas com vista à materialização da cooperação militar entre os nossos países e manifestou a sua plena concordância.

Desde então, tem havido contactos entre as autoridades militares dos nossos dois países para acerto de pormenores. Tenho acompanhado de perto estes contactos que têm sido altamente produtivos.

Gostaria de aproveitar esta ocasião para testemunhar o nosso alto apreço pela disponibilidade pronta e eficiente como o Governo britânico respondeu ao nosso apelo à cooperação militar. Para além de revelar o nível alto de entendimento atingido entre os nossos dois Governos, este gesto constitui um elemento encorajador para a compreensão por parte de outros países ocidentais, da situação que Moçambique é vítima.

Este gesto traduz igualmente o empenho crescente do Governo britânico no difícil e complexo processo na busca da paz na África Austral.

O meu Governo está seguro que este passo dado pelo Governo britânico vai repercutir-se num fortalecimento maior dos elos de cooperação já existentes entre a República Popular de Moçambique e a Grã-Bretanha.

O Ministro Chissano transmitir-Lhe-á o nosso ponto de vista sobre os últimos desenvolvimentos da situação na África Austral onde o regime sul africano não tem mostrado sinais positivos que permi-

tam concluir estar interessado num genuíno processo de paz nesta zona do Continente. Continuamos, contudo, a trabalhar com as autoridades sul africanas com vista a implementar os princípios inscritos no Acordo de Nkomati.

Queira finalmente Vossa Excelência aceitar os nossos protestos de sincera amizade, renovando os votos de boa saúde.

Alta Consideração.

SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Marechal da República
Presidente do Conselho de Ministros
Presidente da República Popular de
Moçambique.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T131A/85

State House
Lusaka, Republic of Zambia

cc Ops
Master

5th July, 1985.

My Dear Prime Minister,

Your High Commissioner has briefed me that on the request of both President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe, your country is considering offering military assistance to Mozambique.

In this connection, I thought I should write to express support for your action. I do this because I know that Mozambique is in dire need of this kind of support. Having been born at the height of the Rhodesian problems, Mozambique was not able to settle down to retrain properly her guerrilla army and turn it into an efficient regular Force, to deal with the kind of problems that the Army is now facing.

Mozambique also needs other kinds of assistance, especially economic assistance. Like all of us in this region, Mozambique is facing a serious shortage of food.

All of us in the Frontline States wish we could do something to help Mozambique. But we do not have the capability to do so. Our own economies are weak and our military Forces no better than that of Mozambique and in any case, we do not produce our own weapons. So

/...

Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

we look at Mozambique helplessly. It is, therefore, pleasing that more able friends of Mozambique and of the Frontline States as a whole, friends such as your country, are able to come forward to offer valuable assistance. I want you to know that we in Zambia appreciate this very much.

Let me end by wishing you good health and warm regards. I look forward to seeing you in Nassau, Bahamas in October this year.

Yours sincerely,

Kenneth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 284
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 221200Z
FM HARARE 220930Z JUN 85
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 22 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO (DESKBY 221300Z)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN,
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LILONGWE, LUANDA,
MOSCOW, BONN, ROME.

YOUR TELNO 225 AND 226 : MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

MR

1. PRIME MINISTER MUGABE SAW ME THIS MORNING BETWEEN ELECTIONEERING VISITS TO MATABELELAND AND GWERU. AFTER READING MRS THATCHERS MESSAGE, HE AGREED THOROUGHLY, PROMISED HIS FULL SUPPORT AND ASKED ME TO PASS ON HIS AND, HE WAS SURE, PRESIDENT MACHEL'S THANKS.

2. I WILL REPORT MORE FULLY ON MONDAY. HE HAD OBVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THIS WITH MACHEL AND NYERERE AT THEIR RECENT HARARE MEETING AND HAD IDEAS ON HOW TRAINING MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT.

3. EXPLAINED THAT HM AMBASSADOR MAPUTO WOULD NOW BE PASSING A MESSAGE TO MACHEL. MUGABE WAS PLEASED WITH THIS TIMING AS HE IS GOING TO MAPUTO FOR TUESDAY'S INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS OUR OFFER WITH MACHEL THEN.

MELHUISH

LIMITED
CAFD
DEFD
SAFD
FIN D
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
MR MACINNES

COPIES TO:
ASSESS STAFF CAB OFF
SEC(O)(C) MOD
PS/NO 10 D ST

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS
FILE COPY

SUBJECT
CCOPS
Mastel

CONFIDENTIAL

27008 - 1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T118/85

RR DAR ES SALAAM
RR LILONGWE
RR MOSCOW
RR ROME
GRS 347
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 211230Z
FM FCO 211200Z JUNE 85
TO IMMEDIATE HARARE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 226 OF 21 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE, MOSCOW, BONN, ROME
INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE
MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE

1. SINCE I MET PRESIDENT MACHEL IN MOSCOW ON 13 MARCH, I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING HOW WE CAN BEST HELP HIM RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY IN MOZAMBIQUE. I KNOW THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU TOO, AND THAT ZIMBABWE IS ALREADY MAKING A CONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTION. I WAS VERY GLAD TO LEARN THAT YOU HAD SUGGESTED TO BRIGADIER HODGES THAT THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY TRAINING TEAM SHOULD ASSIST IN TRAINING THE MOZAMBICAN ARMED FORCES (MAF), BECAUSE OUR OWN THINKING WAS MOVING IN JUST THAT DIRECTION.

I AM THEREFORE WRITING TO PRESIDENT MACHEL TO OFFER, PROVIDED YOU AGREE, COURSES UNDER BMATT INSTRUCTORS FOR THE MAF AT THE BATTALION BATTLE SCHOOL (BBS) AT INYANGA. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS FOR GROUPS OF ABOUT 30 OFFICERS AND NCOS FROM THE MAF TO BE TRAINED AT THE BBS ON 6 TO 8 WEEK COURSES. WE ENVISAGE THIS TRAINING BEING CONDUCTED IN A SEPARATE 'MOZAMBIQUE WING', SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ZNA TRAINING AT THE BBS: AND WE WOULD ASSIGN EXTRA STAFF SPECIFICALLY FOR THE MOZAMBIQUE TASK. WE ENVISAGE

THE PROGRAMME STARTING EARLY NEXT YEAR, AND RUNNING FOR ONE YEAR. TO HELP OUR LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES WE WOULD INVITE THE MOZAMBICANS TO SECOND TO THE STAFF A FEW OF THEIR ENGLISH-SPEAKING OFFICERS.

WE SHALL OF COURSE BEAR THE FULL COST OF PROVIDING THE ADDITIONAL BRITISH INSTRUCTORS, AND WE WOULD ALSO ENVISAGE MEETING THE INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS OF EXTENDING THE FACILITIES AT INYANGA TO RECEIVE THE MOZAMBICANS, BY PROVIDING TENTS, BEDDING, ETC. THEREAFTER WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO LOOK TO THE BBS FOR THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT: AND I HOPE THAT YOU WOULD FEEL ABLE TO MEET THE LOCAL COSTS OF THE TRAINING IN THE WAY YOU DO FOR YOUR OWN ARMY. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WILL ENABLE OUR CONTRIBUTION TO GO FURTHER.

WITH MY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

FCO (PALACE)

CAFD

COPIES TO

SEC (O / C) MOD

ASSESSMENTS STAFF, CAB OFF

PS/NO 10 D ST

SUBJECT
cc OPS
Master

cc PF

(124)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 118 AA /85

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

27006 - 1



RR DAR ES SALAAM
RR LILONGWE
RR MOSCOW
RR ROME
GRS 591
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 211200Z
FM FCO 211130Z JUNE 85
TO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 171 OF 21 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE HARARE, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE, MOSCOW, BONN, ROME
INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE
MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT

SINCE WE MET IN MOSCOW ON 13 MARCH, I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING HOW BEST WE COULD HELP YOU TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY TO YOUR COUNTRY AND THUS OPEN THE WAY FOR THE PEOPLE OF MOZAMBIQUE TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD. AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE HAVE STRESSED TO A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS THE NEED TO PREVENT ARMS AND MONEY REACHING RENAMO, AND WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, I ALSO APPRECIATE THE NEED OF THE MOZAMBICAN ARMED FORCES FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND I HAVE BEEN EXAMINING HOW WE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE.

SINCE OUR MEETING I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR REQUIREMENTS WITH OUR AMBASSADOR, AND WITH COLONEL ANDERSON DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE. IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS, I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN MOST USEFULLY HELP IN TWO WAYS. FIRST, I SHOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT YOU SEND SOME OF YOUR ARMY PERSONNEL FOR TRAINING UNDER BRITISH INSTRUCTORS IN ZIMBABWE. YOU WILL, I AM SURE, BE AWARE THAT THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY TRAINING TEAM (BMATT) ARE WORKING WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY AT THE ZIMBABWEAN BATTALION BATTLE

SCHOOL AT INYANGA.

WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS THAT WE MIGHT ATTACH EXTRA INSTRUCTORS TO OUR TEAM THERE, TO RUN A SPECIAL 'MOZAMBIQUE WING' AT WHICH GROUPS OF OFFICERS OR NCOS DRAWN FROM THE MOZAMBICAN ARMY COULD UNDERGO SHORT TRAINING COURSES IN AN ENVIRONMENT SIMILAR TO THAT OF MOZAMBIQUE. THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD TAKE TIME TO FINALISE (AND WE WOULD NATURALLY WISH TO DISCUSS THEM IN DETAIL WITH YOUR PEOPLE, TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE BEST SUITED TO YOUR NEEDS) BUT WE ENVISAGE BEING ABLE TO START SUCH TRAINING EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE PROGRAMME WOULD BE FOR ONE YEAR, DURING WHICH TIME WE HOPE WE WOLLD BE ABLE TO IMPART USEFUL SKILLS TO SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND NCOS.

ONE OF THE PRACTICAL OBSTACLES WILL BE LANGUAGE. WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO TRAIN OUR INSTRUCTORS IN PORTUGUESE, BUT IT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY USEFUL IF YOU WERE ABLE TO SECOND TO THE TEAM A FEW ENGLISH-SPEAKING MOZAMBICAN OFFICERS - PERHAPS THOSE CURRENTLY TRAINING AT SANDHURST AND AT THE ZIMBABWE STAFF COLLEGE.

SUCH A SCHEME WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. I AM THEREFORE WRITING TO PRIME MINISTER MUGABE TOO, IN ORDER TO SEEK HIS APPROVAL.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY AWARE THAT YOUR NEEDS ARE FOR EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS TRAINING. THIS IS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED. NEVERTHELESS I AM GLAD TO BE ABLE TO OFFER TO SUPPLY SOME EQUIPMENT FOR YOUR ARMED FORCES TO THE VALUE OF ABOUT POUNDS 200,000 WE HAVE IN MIND EITHER RACAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR UNIFORMS: WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR WHICH YOU WOULD FIND MOST USEFUL.

AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE HAVE AGAIN OFFERED YOUR GOVERNMENT TWO PLACES NEXT YEAR AT THE ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, SANDHURST. I WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE TWO STUDENTS WHO ARE NOW HERE HAVE SETTLED IN WELL.

I SHOULD LIKE TO OFFER YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE PEOPLE OF MOZAMBIQUE MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY

OF MOZAMBIQUE'S INDEPENDENCE. I HAVE SEEN WITH SYMPATHY AND ADMIRATION THE WAY MOZAMBIQUE HAS RESPONDED TO THE FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE FACED IT. I ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY OF THE CONTINUING SUPPORT OF MY GOVERNMENT FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE AND PROSPERITY WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE.

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION

FCO (PALACE)

CAFD

COPIES TO

SEC (O / C) MOD

CABINET OFFICE ASSESSMENTS STAFF

PS/NO 10 D ST

CONFIDENTIAL

MJ 2AQD

cc P.C

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1985

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 19 June enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to President Machel and Mr Mugabe about our offer of military assistance to Mozambique

The Prime Minister has approved both messages and I should be grateful if they could be despatched. (On a small point, the Prime Minister does not like referring to other Heads of Government by Christian name in messages. Thus, in the message to President Machel the reference should be to "Prime Minister Mugabe" rather than to "Robert Mugabe".)

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ccPC (1)

Prime Minister
You wanted to put our offer of assistance to Mozambique in the form of a message to President Machel. Agree attached message (and that to Mr Mugabe as well)?

Yes

CDP 19/6

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 June 1985

Dear Charles,

Military Assistance for Mozambique

Thank you for your letter of 5 June.

As requested, I enclose a draft telegram containing the text of a message from the Prime Minister to President Machel, and another containing HM Ambassador's instructions. As you will see, the draft message to President Machel places our offer of military assistance in the context of the Nkomati Accord; it also reminds him of our diplomatic lobbying against Renamo, for which he has expressed appreciation.

Since our proposal to establish a Mozambican wing of BMATT in Zimbabwe requires the agreement of the Zimbabwe Government, the Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister would send a message to Mr Mugabe too. We can be confident that our proposals will be welcome to him since he himself suggested that we should help Mozambique in this way when Commander BMATT called on him on 5 June. It is unfortunate that the Zimbabweans should have announced the dates of their General Election (27 June and 1/2 July) just as our plans matured, but it is not necessary to delay putting them forward for that reason. I therefore enclose two similar draft telegrams to our High Commissioner in Harare.

When the two Governments concerned have given their agreement to our ideas, we shall inform our Allies and encourage them to make similar contributions.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

L Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Relations.

Mozambique: Aug 79

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

TC

CAVEAT

FM

TO

TELNO

OF

AND TO

INFO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX

FM (post) FCO

TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELNO/TELELETTER

OF (Time of origin) ..... Z (Month) ..... (Year) .....

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND TO SAVING

INFO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE HARARE, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE, MOSCOW, BONN, ROME

INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE

Distribution:–

FCO (PALACE)
CAfD
EAD
WAD
SAfD
DEFENCE DEPT
FINANCE DEPT
SED
PUSD
SOVIET DEPT

cc: SEC(O)(C), MOD
Cabinet Office (Assessments Staff)
PS/No 10

OF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MACHEL

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT

Since we met in Moscow on 13 March, I have been considering how best we could help you to restore peace and security to your country and thus open the way for the people of Mozambique to enjoy the benefits of the Nkomati Accord. As you will know, we have stressed to a number of Governments the need to prevent arms and money reaching Renamo, and we are continuing our efforts in this regard. However, I also appreciate the need of the Mozambican Armed Forces for military assistance, and I have been examining how we might contribute.

Since our meeting, I know that you have discussed your requirements with our Ambassador, and with Colonel Anderson during his recent visit to Mozambique. In the light of those conversations, I believe that we can most usefully help

Catchword: in two

File number	Department	Drafted by : (block capitals)	Telephone no.
JCM 061/1	CAfD	D I LEWTY	233 5485

in two ways. First, I should like to suggest that you send some of your Army personnel for training under British instructors in Zimbabwe. You will, I am sure, be aware that the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) are working with the Zimbabwean Army at the Zimbabwean Battalion Battle School at Inyanga.

What we have in mind is that we might attach extra instructors to our team there, to run a special "Mozambique wing" at which groups of officers or NCOs drawn from the Mozambican Army could undergo short training courses in an environment similar to that of Mozambique. The practical arrangements would take time to finalise (and we would naturally wish to discuss them in detail with your people, to ensure that they were best suited to your needs); but we envisage being able to start such training early next year. The programme would be for one year, during which time we hope we would be able to impart useful skills to a significant number of officers and NCOs.

One of the practical obstacles will be [redacted] language. [redacted] We shall do what we can to train our instructors in Portuguese; but it would be enormously useful if you were able to second to the team a few English-speaking Mozambican officers - perhaps those currently training at Sandhurst and at the Zimbabwe Staff College. [redacted]

[redacted]

/N.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

Such a scheme will of course require the agreement of the Government of Zimbabwe. I am therefore writing to Prime Minister ~~Robert~~ Mugabe too, in order to seek his approval.

I have also been very aware that your needs are for equipment as well as training. This is not an area in which it is customary for the British Government to become involved. Nevertheless I am glad to be able to offer to supply some equipment for your Armed Forces to the value of about £200,000. We have in mind either Racal Communications equipment or uniforms: we should be glad to hear which you would find most useful.

As you will know, we have again offered your Government two places next year at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. I was very pleased to hear that the two students who are now here have settled in well.

I should like to offer Your Excellency and the people of Mozambique my congratulations on the 10th Anniversary of Mozambique's Independence. I have seen with sympathy and admiration the way Mozambique has responded to the formidable problems which have faced it. I assure Your Excellency of the continuing support of my Government for your efforts to secure peace and prosperity within Mozambique.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

TC

CAVEAT

FM

TO

TELNO

OF

AND TO

INFO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ..CONFIDENTIAL.....

PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX .....

FM (post) ..FCO.....

TO (precedence/post) .....IMMEDIATE HARARE.....

TELNO/TELELETTER .....

OF (Time of origin) .....Z (Month).....(Year).....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND TO SAVING .....

INFO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE, MOSCOW, BONN, ROME

INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE

Distribution:–

FCO (PALACE)
CAFD
EAD
WAD
SAFD
DEFENCE DEPT
FINANCE DEPT
SED
PUSD
SOVIET DEPT

cc: SEC(O)(C), MOD
Cabinet Office (Assessments Staff)
PS/No 10

TO MR. MUGABE

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE

Since I met President Machel in Moscow on 13 March, I have been considering how we can best help him restore peace and security in Mozambique. I know that this is a matter of great concern to you too, and that Zimbabwe is already making a considerable contribution. I was ~~therefore~~ very glad to learn that you had suggested to Brigadier Hodges that the British Military Advisory Training Team should assist in training the Mozambican Armed Forces (MAF), because our own thinking was moving in just that direction.

I am therefore writing to President Machel to offer, provided you agree, courses under BMATT instructors for the MAF at the Battalion Battle School (BBS) at Inyanga. What we have in mind is for groups of about 30 officers and NCOs from the MAF to be trained at the BBS on 6 to 8 week

Catchword: courses.

File number	Department	Drafted by : (block capitals)	Telephone no.
JCM 061/1	CAFD	D I LEWTY	233 5485

courses. We envisage this training being conducted in a separate "Mozambique wing", so as not to interfere with ZNA training at the BBS; and we would assign extra staff specifically for the Mozambique task. We envisage the programme starting early next year, and running for one year. To help our language difficulties we would invite the Mozambicans to second to the staff a few of their English-speaking officers; and we might also, subject to your views, ask the Portuguese Government to assist too. We shall of course bear the full cost of providing the additional British instructors, and we would also envisage meeting the initial capital costs of extending the facilities at Inyanga to receive the Mozambicans, by providing tents, bedding, etc. Thereafter we would of course have to look to the BBS for the necessary administrative support; and I hope that you would feel able to meet the local costs of the training in the way you do for your own Army. I am sure you will understand that this will enable our contribution to go further.

With my warm personal regards

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence

TC — SECURITY CLASSIFICATION .....

CAVEAT — PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX .....

FM — FM (post) .....

TO — TO (precedence/post) .....

TELNO — TELNO/TELELETTER .....

OF — OF (Time of origin) .....Z (Month).....(Year).....

AND TO — AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND TO SAVING .....

INFO — INFO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

INFO SAVING .....

Distribution:—

Catchword:

File number	Department	Drafted by : (block capitals)	Telephone no.

XY42 (Rev. 1983)

courses. We envisage this training being conducted in a separate "Mozambique wing", so as not to interfere with ZNA training at the BBS; and we would assign extra staff specifically for the Mozambique task. We envisage the programme starting early next year, and running for one year. To help our language difficulties we would invite the Mozambicans to second to the staff a few of their English-speaking officers.

We shall of course bear the full cost of providing the additional British instructors, and we would also envisage meeting the initial capital costs of extending the facilities at Inyanga to receive the Mozambicans, by providing tents, bedding, etc. Thereafter we would of course have to look to the BBS for the necessary administrative support; and I hope that you would feel able to meet the local costs of the training in the way you do for your own Army. I am sure you will understand that this will enable our contribution to go further.

With my warm personal regards.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

TC

CAVEAT

FM

TO

TELNO

OF

AND TO

INFO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX

FM (post) FCO

TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

TELNO/TELELETTER

OF (Time of origin) Z (Month) (Year)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND TO SAVING

INFO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE HARARE, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE MOSCOW, BONN, ROME

INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE

Distribution:–

FCO (PALACE) [E]
CAfD
EAD
WAD
SAfD
Defence Dept
Finance Dept
SED
PUSD
Soviet Dept

cc: SEC(O)(C), MOD
Cabinet Office (Assessments Staff)
PS/No 10

YOUR TELNO 201: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE

1. MIFT contains text of message from the Prime Minister to President Machel. As a matter of courtesy we consider the Prime Minister's message to Mugabe should be delivered first, and oral confirmation received that he has no objection to the offer being made to Machel. Thereafter please deliver the message as soon as possible.

2. We hope that Machel will accept our offer as a serious and significant response to his requests for assistance. We are confident that in the light of Commander BMATT's discussions with Mugabe on 5 June that the Zimbabweans will welcome it too (though you should stress to Machel that we must of course await Mr Mugabe's formal agreement). The package as a whole is worth over £0.5 million, the training accounting for £0.3 million

Catchword: and

File number	Department	Drafted by : (block capitals)	Telephone no.
JCM 061/1	CAfD	D I LEWTY	233 5485

and the (once-off) gift of military equipment the remainder.

3. The message describes our proposals in broad outline. We envisage putting groups of 30 or so officers and/or NCOs, drawn from across the Mozambican Army, through courses lasting perhaps 6-8 weeks. You should emphasise that the success of such a scheme would depend on Mozambican commitment to make the management effort involved in producing the trainees on time. The courses will essentially be low-level tactical training. Accommodation will be tented. On equipment, two hundred thousand pounds will cover some two or three dozen Racal radio sets, or about five thousand uniforms. We should be grateful if you would discuss with Machel which he would prefer. Delivery times will probably be several months.

4. Once both governments have agreed in principle to the establishment of a Mozambique wing at BMATT, MOD envisage a further reconnaissance visit by appropriate expert(s) to Mozambique to define more exactly with the Mozambicans the best arrangements and most useful content for the training. We will be in touch about this in due course.

5. You should also say that for financial reasons we have not been able to respond to Mozambique's request for military Land Rovers but hope that once the ODA-funded project for the rehabilitation of civil Land Rovers gets under way, his Government's overall shortage of such vehicles will be eased.

/6.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

6. HMA Lisbon has suggested that we invite the Portuguese to provide one or two officers to help BMATT with the language problem. Would you expect the Mozambicans to welcome this?

7. We would like you to give publicity to the last paragraph of the Prime Minister's message in connection with the 10th Anniversary celebrations on 24/25 June. If Harare is not able to give you clearance to deliver the full message before then, you may deliver the last paragraph separately.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

TC

CAVEAT

FM

TO

TELNO

OF

AND TO

INFO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ..... CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVACY MARKING/RESTRICTIVE PREFIX .....

FM (post) ..... FCO

TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE HARARE

TELNO/TELELETTER .....

OF (Time of origin) ..... Z (Month) ..... (Year) .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND TO SAVING .....

INFO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LISBON, CAPE TOWN, ROUTINE PARIS, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, LILONGWE, MOSCOW, BONN, ROME

INFO SAVING KINSHASA, MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE

Distribution:–

FCO (PALACE)
CAFD
EAD
WAD
SAFD [E]
DEFENCE DEPT
FINANCE DEPT
SED
PUSD
SOVIET DEPT

cc: SEC(O)(CO, MOD
Cabinet Office (Assessments Staff)
PS/No 10

MY TELS NOS AND TO MAPUTO: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE

1. In the light of Commander BMATT's discussion with Mugabe on 5 June (his ACA/A26/27A/W61 - not repeated) we can be confident that the proposals in my TURs will be welcome to the Zimbabweans. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Prime Minister to Mugabe. Please deliver it as soon as possible. Mugabe will no doubt send a formal reply in due course, but we hope you will be able to obtain immediate oral confirmation that he would have no objection to an offer being made as set out in the proposed message from the Prime Minister to Machel.

2. Once we have the agreement of both leaders we can begin detailed planning, and will be in touch with you in due course. We would meanwhile welcome your comments on a proposal by HMA Lisbon that we should invite the Portuguese

Catchword: to provide

File number	Department	Drafted by : (block capitals)	Telephone no.
JCM 061/1	CAFD	D I Lewty	233 5485

to provide one or two officers to help BMATT with the language problem. Would the Zimbabweans be likely to agree?

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Printed in the UK for HMSO Dd 8422057 2/84 (28592)

009/1282

cc PC

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

L V Appleyard Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AH

NBIM
CDO 11/6.

11 June 1985

Dear Len,

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

The Chief Secretary has seen your letter of 4 June setting out the Foreign Secretary's proposals for assistance to President Machel. He has also seen Charles Powell's letter of 5 June and notes that the Prime Minister is content for the Foreign Secretary to proceed.

He notes that the financial provision of £550,000 is to be funded from within the Foreign Secretary's existing provision and is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Jeremy Wright (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Paul Lyles

R J BROADBENT
Private Secretary

MOZAMBIQUE: Relations: Aug 79

FLE

CONFIDENTIAL

DCA (53)

bcPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 June 1985

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

Thank you for your letter of 4 June describing the various forms of military assistance which we are able to offer to Mozambique.

The Prime Minister is grateful for the effort which has been made on this and agrees that the package is a satisfactory one. She would like to inform President Machel of it in a personal message. I should be grateful for an appropriate draft.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(Charles Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Content with this package?
If so, we might put it in a message from you to President Rachel.

4 June 1985

Dear Charles,

CDP 4/6

Military Assistance to Mozambique

In your letter of 21 March, you asked us to consider whether there is any help we could give to President Machel in the military field, either through further training for members of his armed forces or the supply of military equipment. You will have since seen the Private Secretary's (MOD) letters of 9 April and 13 May.

We are most grateful to the Ministry of Defence for the trouble they have taken in studying the possibilities, and we fully support their proposal for the establishment of a "Mozambican wing" at the BMATT-run training camp at Nyanga in Zimbabwe. At a moderate cost this scheme would provide a highly visible political gesture, much welcome to both President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe, and make a modest contribution to Mozambique's military needs. On the assumption that the Zimbabweans will cover the local costs, we estimate that the cost for HMG would come to just over £300,000, and this can be met from the FCO's UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS).

We have in addition consulted further with MOD about Mozambique's priority equipment needs. Unfortunately we do not have the financial resources to respond positively to all the requests put to us by Machel. We suggest that we should provide either Racal communications equipment or uniforms. Both are badly needed and are items for which Machel has pressed us for some time. We would propose to find £250,000 on a one-off basis from FCO Unallocated Provisions for this year. We would also provide a number of medical kits.

We do not have the financial resources to provide the military Land Rovers which Machel has requested. However, the ODA are doing their best to bring into operation as soon as possible a project for rehabilitating civil Land Rovers. Under ODA rules this could not be used for military purposes. But the increased availability of rehabilitated Land Rovers will ease the Government's overall requirement for these vehicles.

/In

In addition, we have already offered two further places in next year's Sandhurst course (costs will be met from UKMTAS) and the Mozambicans have accepted this in principle. The present two students are said to be doing well.

The Foreign Secretary considers that a package on the above lines would provide President Machel with the expression of political support he needs at this present difficult period when the security advantages of the Nkomati Accord have still to be attained. It would also make a small contribution to meeting his most pressing military needs. We would of course work in close collaboration with the US and Portugal, who are likely to assist on similar lines. A military aid package of our own would also enable us to increase pressure on other Western governments to play their part.

Please let us know if the Prime Minister would be content for us to proceed on these lines.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Wright (MOD), Margaret O'Mara (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Mozambique: Int Sit Aug 79

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 131814Z MAY 85
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 13 MAY
AND TO SAVING WASHINGTON, CAPE TOWN.

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 16/5

YOUR TELNO 125 OF 3 MAY: CALL ON PRESIDENT MACHEL.

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT MACHEL AGAIN REPUDIATES ANY POSSIBILITY THAT MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT MIGHT SUSPECT BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF GIVING RENAMO SUPPORT. PROMISED DETAIL HANDED OVER ALLEGED RENAMO LINKS OF ONE PORTUGUESE RESIDENT IN JERSEY, AND OF AN AUSTRALIAN RESIDENT IN KENT WITH FORMER MALAWI CONNECTIONS. WARM THANKS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF MOZAMBIQUE, IN PARTICULAR WITH THE AMERICANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS, PIK BOTHA HAVING TOLD HIM LAST WEEK OF SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS OWN APPRECIATION OF OUR RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THEM ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE. STRONG PLEA FOR SUPPLY OF MILITARY UNIFORMS.

(can we help? NO)

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT MACHEL RESUMED THIS EVENING CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 186 OF 2 MAY. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED ON RENAMOS ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH OFFICIAL HELP. HE SAID THE DELAY IN NO WAY INDICATED SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES THEN GIVEN ME OF THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT DISMISSING ANY BRITISH OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH RENAMO. THE PRIME MINISTER AND ALL CONCERNED IN BRITAIN HAD ALWAYS SHOWN GREAT SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY FOR MOZAMBIQUE. NOR DID THEY BELIEVE THAT BRITISH INDIVIDUALS WERE IMPLICATED. THEY HAD NEVERTHELESS SUSPICION TO DRAW TO OUR ATTENTION AGAINST TWO INDIVIDUALS USING BRITAIN AS A BASE FOR ACTIVITIES AGAINST FRELIMO:-

A) ANTONIO FELIZARDO (PORTUGUESE) OF INDICO INTERNATIONAL LTD, STHELIER, JERSEY AND

B) DAVID WRIGHT (AUSTRALIAN), DIRECTOR, CROP SERVICES (AGENCIES) LTD, WROTHAM PLACE, SEVENOAKS, FORMER COLLEAGUE OF FELIZARDO IN MALAWI.

FELIZARDO IS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN INCIDENT INVOLVING SUSPECTED BOMB ON MOZAMBIQUE AIRLINES FLIGHT LEAVING LISBON IN MARCH. FULL DETAILS ARE CONTAINED IN THE DOSSIER HE GAVE ME (TRANSLATION FOLLOWS IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM).

3. I ASKED MACHEL HOW LAST WEEKS MEETING HERE WITH PIK BOTHA AND MALAN WENT. HE SAID THEY WERE VERY PLEASED. ALTHOUGH NO FIRM DECISIONS WERE REACHED, IT HAD MAINTAINED THE MOMENTUM OF THE 16 MARCH MEETING WHICH HAD PUT RELATIONS ON A BETTER FOOTING. PIK BOTHA HAD TOLD HIM ALSO ABOUT PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT EXCHANGES WITH PRESIDENT BOTHA AND I COULD REPORT THAT PIK BOTHA HAD SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WEREAPPRECIATIVE OF OUR EFFORTS TOO. OUR DIPLOMACY HAD HELPED MOZAMBIQUE'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. IT HAD ALSO BEEN EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT THECURRENT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL. HE KNEW ALSO THAT WE HAD BEEN HELPFUL WITH THE AMERICANS IN BRINGING THEM TO UNDERSTAND MOZAMBIQUE BETTER. OUR INTERVENTIONS WITH MALAWI HAD ALSO BORNE

CONFIDENTIAL

FRUIT.

FRUIT. HE WAS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE LIAISON AND WELCOME OFFERED HONWANA, HIS SPECIAL SECURITY ADVISER AND DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANT IN LONDON LAST MONTH.

4. REVIEWING THE MOMENTUM OF OUR CONTACTS, I MENTIONED ALSO OUR INVITATION TO CHISSANO TO VISIT BRITAIN AFTER THE OAU CONFERENCE. HE WELCOMED THIS SAYING HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF SENDING CHISSANO TO WESTERN EUROPE SOON TO RALLY DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND MATERIAL HELP. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE READY TO DO WHAT THEY CAN, BUT PIK BOTHA HAD EXPLAINED FRANKLY THE LIMITS TO THEIR RESOURCES AND THEIR OWN HOPE THAT WESTERN EUROPE WOULD CONTRIBUTE MORE. UNIFORMS WERE THE MOST URGENT NEED. RENAMO WERE FACING INCREASING DIFFICULTIES THERE WAS NO POSSOBILITY AT ALL OF THEIR BEING ANYTHING BUT A MINOR NUISANCE AT NEXT MONTHS 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. BUT AS WE KNEW, THE ORDINARY SOLDIER NEEDED THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF BETTER LOGISTICS AND CONDITIONS TO FINISH THEM OFF. HE URGED ME TO REPORT AGAIN THE REQUEST FOR HELP FOR THE UNIFORMS. THEY DID NOT NEED ARMS.

COMMENT

5. MACHEL WAS VERY RELAXED. HE SEEMS TO HAVE GOT OVER THE TENSIONS OF A FEW MONTHS AGO, WITH A REVIVED SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS DIPLOMACY WORKING OUT TO RENAMOS DISADVANTAGE. HE FEELS THEY ARE ON THE DECLINE. BUT THEY HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVE AROUND MAPUTO IN RECENT WEEKS WITH SOME RESUPPLY AND THERE MUST, AS ALWAYS, BE SOME DOUBT WHETHER HE IS BEING CORRECTLY INFORMED ABOUT THEIR CAPABILITIES. HIS TRUST IN THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAS RISEN, BUT RESULTS TO SHOW THE PEOPLE ARE SLOW TO APPEAR. HE WILL WISH TO GIVE THE LATTER SOME ENCOURAGEMENT AT THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS ON 25 JUNE BEING PLANNED AS A MAJOR CELEBRATION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING

VINES

LIMITED

CAFD
SAFD
PUSD
DEFD
RESD
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
MR BUIST

COPIES TO:

PS/NO 10 D ST
MR LEGGE. SEC(O)(C) MOD
COL P WILLIAMS, MOD
MR BRIGHT, ASSESS STAFF CAB OFFICE.

SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/1

9th April 1985

Await FCS reply

CDP – to see. Yr will presumably wish to await FCO response before putting to PM. CDP 3/4

MEA 10/4

Dear Colin

File in In-tray.

MOZAMBIQUE

Charles Powell's letter of 21st March asked for your recommendations on what further military help it might be possible to give President Machel. The Defence Secretary has now had an opportunity to consider this question.

The scale of the problem is, of course, enormous. The Mozambique Armed Forces (MAF) are badly equipped and supplied, badly trained and led, and demoralised; moreover they do not have the sort of numerical superiority over Renamo which would offer any prospect of their controlling the security situation in the foreseeable future. Even if significant progress were made on choking off aid for Renamo it would still require a massive infusion of outside assistance to put the MAF within reach of a military victory, and even then this could not be guaranteed. We should therefore be clear that even assistance on the scale of what the Americans hope to provide, though useful at the margin and of obvious political value, will almost certainly make very little appreciable difference to the position on the ground.

As you will know our present assistance to Mozambique is very slight, consisting of two Mozambican officer cadets training at Sandhurst, (funded by UKMTAS) and help over arrangements for two further officers to attend BMATT-run courses in Zimbabwe. This modest level of help reflects the low priority we have hitherto attached to the claims of Mozambique, as a former Portuguese colony, in competition with those of other black African countries with whom we have much closer links. A further inhibiting factor has been the very strong Eastern bloc influences in the country (as evidenced by the continuing presence of over 1700 Soviet and allied advisers), which rules out Mozambican attendance at our more sensitive

C Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

training courses. Nonetheless, if more UKMTAS funding were available (Mozambique is not eligible for subventions from MOD's Defence Policy Fund, since there is no direct defence policy interest in the country), it would certainly be possible to enhance our effort in this area. Similarly, I imagine that the Zimbabweans would not be averse to increasing the numbers of Mozambicans training there. In both cases language problems would provide a major constraint on the number of candidates suitable for training; and its practical impact would in the short to medium term be negligible. But it could have value as a political gesture. The Defence Secretary has therefore directed that our Defence Adviser in Harare - we have no defence attache resident in Mozambique - should visit Maputo in the near future to investigate at first hand the possibilities for expanding our training effort.

In-country training, on the lines of the training teams we provide in Zimbabwe and Uganda, would present further problems. Mozambique is effectively in a state of civil war; any team we put in would either be put at very considerable risk (much greater than that in Uganda, for example) or have to constrain its activities to a point where it would be virtually useless. The language problem, again, would cause great difficulties; and the presence of so many Eastern bloc advisers would arouse security concerns. However I understand that the ODA have been trying for some time to set up a Land Rover refurbishment plant in Mozambique and that over £1M may be available for this purpose; if we can offer any help in this project (for example in the area of training) we would be willing to see what we could do.

As for military equipment, you will be aware that Treasury rules prevent us from gifting from stock any equipment, other than what is surplus to our own Forces' requirements. We shall review what might be available; but experience suggests that surplus kit is seldom in condition to be much use to the recipient, and can involve both parties in extensive disputes over spares, repair and maintenance. A more practical alternative would be to offer new equipment. But such a move would, of course, run counter to the policy of successive governments not to establish a military aid budget. There would certainly be no MOD funds available for this purpose. A certain amount could no doubt be done if new FCO/ODA money could be made available, albeit at the expense of other aid recipients. Belize provides a precedent for a decision by OD Ministers to make new money available for a special equipment package. We are not at all sure that Mozambique should rate such exceptional treatment; but if a sufficiently strong foreign policy case can be made, then this would be one way forward. MOD does not hold stocks for such contingencies but we are ready to help with the assembly of a suitable package (for example including combat clothing and boots) should the money for it be found.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Margaret O'Mara (Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Simon Lowe

(S H LOWE)

Mozambique: Rels Aug 79



SUBJECT
a Master Set

CONFIDENTIAL

file RAMAIT
CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March, 1985

Dear Colin,

MOZAMBIQUE

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief word about the situation in Mozambique this morning following their discussion with President Machel in Moscow and with President Nyerere in London. The Prime Minister thought it would be appropriate for her to send a message to President Botha in constructive terms, reporting that she had seen both Machel and Nyerere, and knew how worried they were about the continuing activities of Renamo. The message would express appreciation for the steps already taken by the South Africans against those providing help for Renamo, but go on to urge them to do everything possible to stop any further help getting through. The message would also express our support for President Machel and the need to help consolidate his position.

The Prime Minister wants us to consider whether there is any help we can give to President Machel in the military field either through further training for members of his armed forces or the supply of military equipment. I should be grateful to have recommendations on this point as soon as possible, co-ordinated with the Ministry of Defence.

I am copying this letter Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(C D Powell)

C Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Soviet Union; PM's attendance at funeral May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 March 1985

Dear Len,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Machel of Mozambique, while in Moscow for President Chernenko's funeral.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject "master"

RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE ON 13 MARCH 1985 AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW

Present:

Prime Minister	President Machel
Foreign Secretary	Advisers
Mr. C.D. Powell	
Mr. L.V. Appleyard	

The Prime Minister began by asking President Machel for his assessment of the present internal situation in Mozambique. President Machel said that since the last time they met in New Delhi the situation had deteriorated in Mozambique. This was due to interference both from South Africa and from Portugal, and even from Malawi, where the security and police forces were involved. There was no doubt that South Africa was failing to implement the Nkomati Agreement.

The Prime Minister asked whether this was due to activities by the South African Government or by individuals. President Machel said that it was hard to make a distinction between the two. The Government had overall responsibility for the activities of all the citizens on its soil. The Mozambique Government had just finished an important meeting to assess the situation. The meeting had concluded that South Africa had not abandoned its intention of forcing the Mozambique Government to negotiate direct with Renamo. He was not suggesting that the South African Prime Minister was involved, but it was obvious that individual members of the Government and the Army, including Cabinet members, were implicated. Their ultimate aim was to force the Mozambique Government to share power with Renamo. The Prime Minister asked whether the Mozambique Government was asking us to

contact the South African Government. President Machel said that he was.

At this point the Prime Minister had to leave for another meeting (President Machel having apologised for arriving very late). The discussion continued with the Foreign Secretary.

President Machel repeated that South Africa was still harbouring and supporting Renamo. The leaders of Renamo were exclusively Portuguese, so that South Africa was fundamentally supporting the interests of Portugal. The Mozambique Government had no intention of re-negotiating its independence after 10 years. The Foreign Secretary said that whenever we raised this issue with the South African or Portuguese Governments, they assured us that they were trying to put a stop to these activities, which were carried out by individuals. Had President Machel any firmer evidence of Government involvement?

President Machel repeated his earlier accusations that members of the South African Government and Army were involved, but not the South African Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary said it was widely believed that Renamo had a large stock of weapons and equipment before the Nkomati Agreement was signed. He wondered whether they were not using up their old stock. President Machel replied that this showed that when South Africa signed the Nkomati Agreement they were preparing to violate it in advance. Besides, Renamo were still getting support from South Africa. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the Cabora Bassa Dam contributed to the Mozambique and South African economies as well as to Portuguese investors. It was in the interests of none of the Governments for it to be damaged. President Machel simply repeated that he had evidence that the South Africans were well aware of who was involved in South Africa. The Foreign Secretary asked what steps had been made to integrate former members of Renamo in Mozambique society. President Machel said that 3,000 prisoners had been integrated, but there was no question of integrating the Portuguese leaders of Renamo.

The other members of Renamo were simply instruments of the Portuguese leadership. There were of course some British and German individuals involved as well. But of course neither Government was implicated. Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Mali, the Comoros and Malawi were all involved in one way or another, some as staging posts.

President Machel concluded by saying that the First anniversary of Nkomati would shortly take place. He could see no practical achievements which the Agreement had brought. But Mozambique was now getting more support from the African countries and far more support from socialist countries - more than during their war of liberation. The Foreign Secretary asked again whether President Machel wanted us to talk to the South Africans. President Machel assented.

CDP.

14 March 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MASTER SET

ECLAIAN

bcPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE AT THE ASHOK HOTEL, NEW DELHI, AT 2000 HOURS ON 3 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister paid a brief courtesy call on President Machel at the Ashok Hotel in New Delhi on the evening of 3 November.

President Machel greeted the Prime Minister warmly as a good friend and expressed his horror and revulsion at the terrorist bomb attack on her in Brighton. He was very pleased with economic cooperation between Britain and Mozambique. He referred to continuing rebel activity in Mozambique, and claimed that this was sustained from Portugal, not by the Portuguese Government but by former colonists. He hoped that the Prime Minister would help to deter such support.

President Machel described at considerable length his visit to Malawi during which he had spent many hours in conversation with Dr Banda. There were serious problems in Malawi of banditry and corruption which were preventing the movement of goods in and out of Malawi with serious consequences for the latter's economy. He urged the Prime Minister to help Dr Banda to overcome these. Malawi and Mozambique would cooperate over the development of a new road and railway outlet for Malawi to the sea.

Finally, President Machel urged the Prime Minister to encourage British firms to participate in the restoration of the Beira/Zimbabwe railway. This was a most important project.

The Prime Minister said that she would look into the points raised by President Machel.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am sending copies of this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Michael McCulloch (ODA), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GRS 1400

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PRETORIA 050600Z OCT 1984

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO. 479 OF 5TH OCT 1984

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, HARARE, LISBON.

INFO ROUTINE LUANDA, MBABANE, MASERU, GABORONE, UKMIS NEW YORK.

Summary and para. 10

MY TEL NO 470 : MOZAMBIQUE SECURITY

SUMMARY

1. PIK BOTHA TELLS AMBASSADORS THAT HE HAD GREAT DIFFICLUTIES IN NEGOTIATING YESTERDAY'S DECLARATION AND THAT HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS AHEAD. SOUTH AFRICA IS CONCENTRATING ON SUCRUING A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND CIVILIAN RECONSTRUCTION WORK. .

DETAIL

2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PIK BOTHA, BRIEFED THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THE DECLARATION WHICH HE MADE YESTERDAY ON MOZAMBIQUE SECURITY.

3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THEY HAD ALL WORKED VERY HARD TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT. NO FEWER THAN 26 DIFFERENT DRAFTS OF VARIOUS KINDS HAD BEEN EXAMINED. SOUTH AFRICA AND RENAMO WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE SEEN A SIGNED DECLARATION, PACT OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE PUT RENAMO ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THEM. SOUTH AFRICA APPRECIATED THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION VIS A VIS A REBEL MOVEMENT. THE PAINFUL REALITY WAS HOWEVER THAT THE RENAMO WAS A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH.

4. THERE HAD BEEN SOME 30 HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS SPREADING OVER SIX DAYS. THEY HAD ALMOST BROKEN DOWN ON FRIDAY EVENING. HE (PIK BOTHA) HAD HAD TO THREATEN RENAMO THAT IF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS WERE KILLLED OR INJURED BECAUSE OF RENAMO ACTION, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS. RENAMO HAD BECOME VERY EMOTIONAL: THEY HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN ULTIMATUM BUT GIVING A STATEMENT OF FACT ABOUT WHAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD DO. SO A LAST EFFORT WAS MADE AND BY LATE FRIDAY EVENING THEY WERE BACK ON TRACK. VELOSO HAD RETURNED TO MAPUTO AND DHALAKAMA TO THE BUSH TO TALK TO HIS COMMANDERS. DURING THE WEEKEND, A MESSAGE HAD COME FROM MAPUTO SUGGESTING CERTAIN CHANGES. WHEN THEY REASSEMBLED ON MONDAY THERE WAS MUCH TO RENEGOTIATE. BY TUESDAY EVENING THE FOUR POINTS HAD BEEN AGREED. THE PROBLEM ON WEDNESDAY WAS HOW TO PRESENT THEM. MOZAMBIQUE SUGGESTED A PRESS STATEMENT BY PIK BOTHA WHICH COULD BE AFFIRMED IN MAPUTO AND ALSO BY RENAMO. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT NO-ONE WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS AND THEY WOULD BE BACK TO SQUARE ONE. THEY DISCUSSED SIGNATURE OF A DOCUMENT, BUT THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MOZAMBIQUE. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A SIMULTANEOUS AFFIRMATION IN PRETORIA BY RENAMO AND THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT OF PIK BOTHA'S DECLARATION. ALTOGETHER SOME

NINE ALTERNATIVES WERE DISCUSSED. THE FINAL DECISION WAS ''AS BINDING AS ANYTHING ELSE''. THEY HAD ALL AGREED TO STAND TOGETHER WITH THE MOZAMBIQUE DELEGATION IN THE PLACE OF HONOUR ON P W BOTHA'S RIGHT-HAND SIDE.

5. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COMMISSION TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION. RENAMO REGARDED SOUTH AFRICA AS THE CONVENER. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT SAW SOUTH AFRICA AS THE CHAIRMAN. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SAW THEMSELVES AS PARTICIPANTS. THE DELEGATIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, RENAMO AND THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIST OF SEVEN MEMBERS EACH. THERE WOULD ALSO BE AD HOC COMMITTEES, WHICH COULD INCLUDE MEMBERS WHO WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPAL DELEGATIONS. DECISION OF THE COMMISSION WOULD BE BINDING ON THE PARTICIPANTS. MR LOUIS NEL, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, WOULD BE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION. SOUTH AFRICA WOULD PROVIDE SECRETARIAL SERVICES. RESOLUTIONS ONLY WOULD BE NOTED IN THE AGREED MINUTES, NOT THE DISCUSSION. THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE SECRET AND ANY PUBLICITY ABOUT PROCEEDINGS WOULD ONLY BE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THREE PARTICIPANTS. MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD IN DIFFERENT VENUES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE: FOR THE TIME BEING, THESE WOULD BE HELD IN PRETORIA. RESOLUTIONS OF AD HOC COMMITTEES WOULD NOT BE BINDING, BUT WOULD BE PUT TO THE COMMISSION FOR RATIFICATION. THE NEXT MEETING OF THE COMMISSION WOULD TAKE PLACE SOON IN PRETORIA AND WAS EXPECTED TO LAST 1-2 DAYS. THE CHAIRMAN/CONVENER HAD THE RIGHT OF BILATERAL DISCUSSION.

6. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE COMMISSION. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUSPICIONS ON BOTH SIDES. RENAMO WAS CONVINCED THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S EFFORTS WERE DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE MOVEMENT. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT STRONLGY SUSPECTED THAT RENAMO WAS OUT TO CREATE PROPAGANDA AND HUMILIATE THE MOZAMBIQUE AUTHORITIES. THERE HAD BEEN GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATING THE FIRST TWO PRINCIPLES. SOUTH AFRICA WAS SURPRISED BUT GRATIFIED THAT THE OTHER TWO PARTICIPANTS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE SOUTH AFRICAN WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A ROLE.

7. SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NONETHELESS BE DELIGHTED IF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WOULD CARE TO TAKE THIS OVER. SOUTH AFRICA RECOGNISED THAT THEY MUST RECKON WITH SEVERE EMOTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. BUT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC DEBATE WHILE MEETINGS OF THE COMMISSION CONTINUED. HE HOPED THAT AS PEOPLE GOT TO KNOW EACH OTHER BETTER, THE COMMISSION'S WORK WOULD ACHIEVE RESULTS. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT HAD CEASED CALLING RENAMO ''BANDITS AND CRIMINALS''.

8. THE THREE MAIN TASKS OF THE COMMISION WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A DATE FOR A CEASEFIRE, TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE COUNTRY AND TO DEFINE THE SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE. SOUTH AFRICA HAD FELT THAT IT WAS NOT SUCH A GOOD THING TO SET A DATE FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE DECLARATION. THIS WOULD LEAVE THE TWO PARTIES FREEDOM TO SHOOT UNTIL THE DATE OF

/THE.

THE CEASEFIRE. THERE COULD BE NO COOLING DOWN OF EMOTIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET AN EFFECTIVE DATE AND THIS COULD BE BEST ARRANGED BY THE COMMISSION.

9. HE APPEALED TO AMBASSADORS FOR SUPPORT. HE HOPED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE THE COURTESY TO SHUT UP IN THE UN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS EXTREMELY UNHAPPY ABOUT RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE UN FORUM. THE WESTS SELECTIVE INDIGNATION WAS IMMORAL. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR MACHEL TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WHEN HE WAS FIGHTING ON TWO FRONTS. HE APPEALED FOR MOZAMBIQUE TO BE KEPT OUT OF THE UN FORUM AND AWAY FROM THE SUPERPOWERS.

10. PIK BOTHA EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE FAVOURABLE RESPONSE OF THE US, BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE DECLARATION. HE ASKED THAT HIS THANKS BE PASSED ON TO THE THREE GOVERNMENTS.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE TWO CONTESTING PARTIES WERE SO FAR APART, WITH RENAMO WISHING TO CHANGE ''THE NATURE OF THE STATE'', THAT HE AT ONE STAGE DOUBTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SUCCEED. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION WAS THAT PEACE SHOULD COME FIRST THROUGH A CEASEFIRE. CONDITIONS WERE SO BAD ON THE GROUND IN MOZAMBIQUE THAT THE PARTIES COULD NOT AFFORD TO TALK ABOUT IDEOLOGY. THEY HAD HOWEVER TOUCHED ON THE POLITICAL ASPECT. MOZAMBIQUE HAD POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR AND SUGGESTED THAT RENAMO MIGHT AND COULD PARTICIPATE. BUT SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE WIDER EVENTS IN ANY DETAIL. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS TO FOCUS ON THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, MAINLY THE CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND RECONSTRUCTION WORK. THE SADF COULD HELP BOTH IN MONITORING THE CEASE-FIRE AND IN THE PROVISION OF DOCTORS, DENTISTS AND AGRICULTURALISTS. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE PUT ASIDE FOR THE PRESENT. RENAMO LEADERS MIGHT BE APPOINTED AS VILLAGE LEADERS AND IN QUASI ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS. RENAMO SUPPORTERS MIGHT ENJOY ASPECTS OF A MARKET ECONOMY AS REGARDS LAND AND CATTLE.

12. AS A RESULT OF THE CEASEFIRE, IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED WOULD STAY IN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORIES UNDER THEIR CONTROL. THE PROPOSAL WAS THAT A JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE AND TO EXAMINE COMPLAINTS FROM EITHER SIDE. THE JMC WOULD HOWEVER NOT BE A COURT OF LAW BUT COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT PERFECTION. THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF RENAMO STRONGHOLDS IN THE NORTH WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO REACH. THE AIM WAS TO SEE WHETHER A LINE SOUTH OF THE LIMPOPO UP TO CAHORA BASSA COULD BE MADE SAFE IN THE FIRST STAGE. GENERALLY HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE THREE PARTIES.

13 COMMENT: A REMARKABLY FRAGILE AGREEMENT. BECAUSE EVERYONE EXPECTS IT TO COLLAPSE, IT MIGHT JUST WORK.

TONKIN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECDs
SOVIET D
EED
MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA
MR. FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER.

CRS200

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM PRETORIA 040930Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 470 OF 4 OCTOBER 84

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE MBABANE

MY TELNO 467: MOZAMBIQUE

SUMMARY

1. THE RENAMO LEADER CONFIRMED YESTERDAY THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CEASEFIRE WITH THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN AGREED BUT THAT A DATE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE TRUCE HAVE YET TO BE DECIDED.

DETAIL

2. EVO FERNANDES, LEADER OF THE RENAMO DELEGATION IN PRETORIA, SPOKE TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL IN PRETORIA YESTERDAY (3 OCTOBER). HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) RENAMO HAD AGREED TO SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND DISCUSS PEACE CONDITIONS. BUT, FOR THE MOMENT, THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE AND RENAMO MIGHT EVEN HAVE TO ESCALATE ITS ACTIONS:

(II) RENAMO REJECTED A CLAIM BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER (PIK BOTHA) TO CORRESPONDENTS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS WOULD BE USED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. RENAMO WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN MOZAMBIQUE TERRITORY.

(III) RENAMO HAD RECOGNISED SAMORA MACHEL AS PRESIDENT OF MOZAMBIQUE BUT THIS WAS RECOGNITION OF THE CURRENT FACT AND DID NOT MEAN THAT RENAMO WOULD SUPPORT HIM IN THE FUTURE. THE MOVEMENT HAD MADE NO PROMISES TO KEEP HIM IN POWER. /(IV).

TIONS OF DIFFICULTIES AND EVEN A THREATENED BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS.

3. IT SEEMS FROM WHAT WE WERE TOLD BY KILLEN ON 1 OCTOBER THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD HOPED THAT CONCESSIONS BY RENAMO WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GET THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT TO AGREE TO A PROCESS THAT WOULD ENABLE A CEASEFIRE TO BE IMPLEMENTED.

4. PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT APPARENTLY REPPESENTS THE BEST THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE. IT IS DESCRIBED AS A DECLARATION MADE WITH THE APPROVAL OF BOTH SIDES IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND INCORPORATES PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD SEEM TO REPRESENT A CONCESSION BY RENAMO. NOTHING IS SAID, OR EVEN HINTED AT ABOUT ANY FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE FOR RENAMO'S LEADERS.

5. THE COMMISSION WILL BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY IN PRETORIA. DETAILS OF ITS COMPOSITION ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. WE ASSUME IT TO BE A JOINT MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT-RENAMO COMMISSION, BUT DO NOT YET KNOW WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY SOUTH AFRICAN REPPESENTATION.

6. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT YET PROVIDED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS. NO QUESTIONS WERE ALLOWED WHEN THE TWO STATEMENTS WERE MADE, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT PIK BOTHA WILL GIVE A FULLER PRESS CONFERENCE LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW. A RELIABLE SOURCE HASE HOWEVER LEARNT FROM PIK BOTHA THAT THE SAG HAVE OFFERED TO PLAY A ROLE BY ALLOWING THE SADF TO ASSIST IN MONITORING A CEASEFIRE AND GENERAL MALAN HAS BEEN INVITED TO CONSIDER WHAT OTHER CIVILIAN ORIENTED LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE SADF MIGHT PROVIDE.

TONKIN

NNNN

GRS 300
UNCLASSIFIED
FM PRETORIA 031458Z OCT 1984
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO. 463 OF 3RD OCT 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE MBABANE

MIPT : MOZAMBIQUE

1. TEXT OF THE STATE PRESIDENTS STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT A CESSATION OF ARMED ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN ASSENTED TO BY THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT AND RENAMO, AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION MADE THIS MORNING.

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DAY FOR MOZAMBIQUE AND INDEED FOR THE WHOLE OF SOTHERN AFRICA. WHEN FUTURE HISTORIANS LOOK BACK AT THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1984 WILL SURELY STAND OUT AS A MILESTONE IN THE PROGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TOWARDS PEACE AND STABILITY.

NOW IS THE TIME FOR MEN AND WOMEN OF GOODWILL TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE SPIRIT OF THIS DECLARATION AND THE ACCORD OF NKOMATI. THE PATH THAT LIES AHEAD WILL BE ROCKY AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGER. AT TIMES THE GOING WILL BE DIFFICULT. THERE WILL BE MAY OBSTACLES ALONG THAT PATH - SOME PLACED THERE MALICIOUSLY BY THOSE WHO DO NOT, FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH REASONS, WANT THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TO REACH THEIR DESTINATION. BUT THROUGH DETERMINED EFFORT AND INSPIRED LEADERSHIP, TEMPORARY SETBACKS WILL BE OVERCOME. WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES MIGHT BE, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MUST BE WORTH THE GREATEST EFFORT BY ALL CONCERNED.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT STANDS READY AT ALL TIMES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THIS IMPORTANT EVEN IS A SIGNAL TO THE WORLD THAT WE HERE TODAY ARE SERIOUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN OUR REGION AND TO DO SO NOW. IT IS AN INDICATION TO THOSE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE REGION WHO DO NOT WANT TO SEE SOUTHER AFRICA PROSPER THAT WILL FORGE AHEAD DESPITE THEIR EFFORTS TO THWART US.

PEACE IN SOUTHER AFRICA IS IMPORTANT TO US ALL. LET US MOVE FORWARD WITH CONFIDENCE AND LET US MAKE THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION, AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.
ENDS
TONKIN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECDs
SOVIET D
EED
MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

GRS 275
UNCLASSIFIED
FM PRETORIA 031450Z OCT 1984
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO. 462 OF 3RD OCT 1984
INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, WASHINGTON.
INFO ROUTINE MBABANE

MIPT : MOZAMBIQUE

1. TEXT OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

BECAUSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, I, AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, APPROACHED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE TO SEE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE. I WAS ASSURED THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT RECIPROCATED MY SENTIMENTS. I THEN APPROACHED THE MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE (RENAMO), WHICH ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE.

SINCE I HAVE CONDUCTED NEGOTIATIONS, ON THE ONE HAND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ON THE OTHER WITH RENAMOQN IN ORDER TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE WHICH COMPRISED THE FOLLOWING:

1. SAMORA MOISES MACHEL IS ACKNOWLEDGED AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.

2. ARMED ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE FROM WHATEVER QUARTER OR SOURCE MUST STOP.

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER PLAYING A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECLARATION.

4. A COMMISSION WILL BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY TO WORK TOWARDS AN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECLARATION.

WE HAVE HERE TODAY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND OF THE MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE. THIS DECLARATION IS MADE WITH THEIR APPROVAL AND THEIR PRESENCE HERE SIGNIFIES THEIR ASSENT THERETO.

/THE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AGREES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMEMTATION OF THIS DECLARATION AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION.

ENDS

TONKIN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD

WED
ECDs
SOVIET D
EED
MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October 1984

SOUTH AFRICA/MOZAMBIQUE

I enclose a copy of some material sent to me this evening by the South African Embassy.

(C.D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

3 October 1984

Mr Charles Powell
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Mr Powell,

I enclose a copy of a communication which we have just received from Pretoria in which agreement on the cessation of armed activity in Mocambique is reported. The telex also contains the text of a statement by the South African State President, Mr P.W. Botha, as well as the content of a declaration and remarks by our Foreign Minister.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Leo Evans

L.H. EVANS
MINISTER

INCOMING TELEGRAM

MEDIATE/PRIORITE COPY NO OF

2. TELNRA104

3. 19841003/1345

4. PRETORIA

5. IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON: RELAY PRIORITE TO YOUR MISSIONS IN USA AND OTTAWA.

LONDON: RELAY PRIORITE TO THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, BERNE, ROME AND MADRID

BONN

PARIS

LISSABON

PRIORITE: TO ALL OTHER MISSIONS NOT LISTED ABOVE

EN CLAIR

ROUTE 253

1. ON THE OCCASION OF A DECLARATION ON A CESSATION OF ARMED ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE SOUTH AFRIIICAN STATE PRESIDENT MR PW BOTHA SAID:
'I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT A CESSATION OF ARMED ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN ASSENTED TO BY THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT AND RENAMO, AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMNTATION OF THE DECLARATION MADE THIS MORNING.

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DAY FOR MOZAMBIQUE AND INDEED FOR THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. WHEN FUTURE HISTORIANS LOOK BACK AT THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1984 WILL SURELY STAND OUT AS A MILESTONE IN THE PROGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TOWARDS PEACE AND STABILITY.

2/...

NOW IS THE TIME FOR MEN AND WOMEN OF GOODWILL TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE SPIRIT OF THIS DECLARATION AND THE ACCORD OF NKOMATI. THE PATH THAT LIES AHEAD WILL BE ROCKY AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGER. AT TIMES THE GOING WILL BE DIFFICULT. THERE WILL BE MANY OBSTACLES ALONG THAT PATH - SOME PLACED THERE MALICIOUSLY BY THOSE WHO DO NOT, FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH REASONS, WANT THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TO REACH THEIR DESTINATION. BUT THROUGH DETERMINED EFFORT AND INSPIRED LEADERSHIP, TEMPORARY SETBACKS WILL BE OVERCOME. WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES MIGHT BE, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MUST BE WORTH THE GREATEST EFFORT BY ALL CONCERNED.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT STANDS READY AT ALL TIMES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THIS IMPORTANT EVENT IS A SIGNAL TO THE WORLD THAT WE HERE TODAY ARE SERIOUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN OUR REGION AND TO DO SO NOW. IT IS AN INDICATION TO THOSE WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE REGION WHO DO NOT WANT TO SEE SOUTHERN AFRICA PROSPER THAT WE WILL FORGE AHEAD DESPITE THEIR EFFORTS TO THWART US.

PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IS IMPORTANT TO US ALL. LET US MOVE FORWARD WITH CONFIDENCE AND LET US MAKE THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION, AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.

I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS AND I WISH TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO ALL THOSE WHO LABOURED SO LONG TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.
MAY GOD' S BLESSINGS ACCOMPANY ALL OF US IN OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS GREAT CHALLENGE. '

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION READ BY MIN RF BOTHA IN THE PRESENCE OF DELEGATIONS REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE (RENAMO) AT THE UNION BUILDINGS TODAY:

3/...

'BECAUSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT' S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, I, AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA , APPROACHED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND INFORMED THAT GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA' S DESIRE TO SEE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE. I WAS ASSURED THAT THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT RECIPROCATED MY SENTIMENTS. I THEN APPROACHED THE MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE (RENAMO) WHICH ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE.

SINCE THEN I HAVE CONDUCTED NEGOTIATIONS, ON THE ONE HAND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ON THE OTHER WITH RENAMO, IN ORDER TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE WHICH COMPRISED THE FOLLOWING:

1. SAMORA MOISES MACHEL IS ACKNOWLEDGED AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.

2. ARMED ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE FROM WHATEVER QUARTER OR SOURCE MUST STOP.

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER PLAYING A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECLARATION.

4. A COMMISSION WILL BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY TO WORK TOWARDS AN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECLARATION.

WE HAVE HERE TODAY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND OF THE MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE. THIS DECLARATION IS MADE WITH THEIR APPROVAL AND THEIR PRESENCE HERE SIGNIFIES THEIR ASSENT THERETO.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AGREES TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE

4/...

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECLARATION AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION. '

REMARKS BY MR RF BOTHA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ON THE OCCASION OF THE DECLARATION OF 3 OCTOBER 1984.

THOSE OF US WHO HAVE WORKED ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT EFFORT DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS KNOW HOW OFTEN WE WERE CONFRONTED WITH ALMOST INSURMOUNTABLE AND INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES. IT WAS DIFFICULT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE TWO ELEMENTS WHICH BECAME DEEPLY ESTABLISHED IN OUR MINDS - ON THE ONE HAND WE WERE AWARE OF THE BENEFITS THAT MUST FLOW FROM A SUCCESSFUL PROCEDURE FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE REGION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: ON THE OTHER HAND WE WERE AWARE WHAT MISERY AND SUFFERING FAILURE WOULD HAVE BROUGHT.
WE REMAIN AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE CAN FOLLOW THIS PROCESS THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY THERE WILL BE NO LOSERS - ONLY WINNERS.

ENDS.

/Rlg

-- 3 OCT 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 September 1984

Mozambique: Message to President Machel

You wrote on 13 September to ask whether the Prime Minister would agree that Mr. Rifkind should deliver an oral message to President Machel during his forthcoming visit to Mozambique. The Prime Minister is content for Mr. Rifkind to speak on the lines suggested in the last paragraph of your letter.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister ①
Agree that Mr.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Rifkind can convey an oral message as proposed?
CDP
13/9.

13 September, 1984

Dear Charles,

Mozambique: Message to President Machel

The Foreign Secretary has agreed that Mr Rifkind should pay a visit to Mozambique from 19-22 September, the first by a British Minister since the visit by President Machel to this country and the subsequent Nkomati Accord. You recently suggested that while the Prime Minister would probably not wish to send a letter to President Machel, she might welcome the opportunity to maintain the excellent relations she established with him last year through an oral message. Certainly this would add greatly to the significance of the visit. It would also enable the Prime Minister to assure President Machel of our continuing support for the Nkomati Accord, and would be particularly appropriate since President Machel has just sent a warm oral message of greeting to the Prime Minister through Sr Veloso, his Minister for Economic Affairs, who called on the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. Veloso stressed that Machel is most grateful for the Prime Minister's continuing help and support.

We have in mind that Mr Rifkind might speak as follows: "The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for the kind message you sent through Sr Veloso and to tell you that she warmly reciprocates your greetings. She wants you to know that she has been much impressed by the strong determination and perseverance with which you have worked to make the Nkomati Accord a success, and well remembers what you told her about your aspirations during your visit last October. She fully supports your efforts and would like to help where we can. She asks you to discuss your problems frankly with me and looks forward to hearing your views on the prospects for Mozambique and for the whole Southern African region".

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR710
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 291445Z AUG 84
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 29 AUGUST
INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, LISBON, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING FLS LILONGWE.

MY TELNO 304 OF 24 AUGUST
MOZAMBIQUE: RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND RENAMO.

1. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT MACHEL DISMISSES THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY NEGOTIATION WITH RENAMO WHICH INVOLVES THEIR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT OR THEIR PORTUGUESE LEADERSHIP REGAINING THEIR COLONIAL POSITIONS AND ASSETS.

2. DETAIL. JUST RETURNED FROM EASTERN EUROPE, PRESIDENT MACHEL ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONTACT I HAD EARLIER HAD WITH VELOSO ABOUT ACTION TAKEN IN PRETORIA IN RESPONSE TO MACHEL'S CONCERN THAT RENAMO MIGHT STILL BE RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA. VELOSO WAS PRESENT. MACHEL SAID THAT VELOSO'S VISIT HAD GONE WELL. HE WAS SATISFIED WITH SOUTH AFRICAN ASSURANCES. HE CONTINUED TO TRUST PIETER BOTHA. THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT'S AIM WAS ALWAYS PEACE, BUT THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT RENAMO HAD BEEN CREATED OUTSIDE MOZAMBIQUE, A SETTLEMENT REQUIRED OUTSIDE ACTION TOO. THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT HERE WITH RENAMO WHICH INVOLVED A RETURN TO COLONIALISM WITH THE PORTUGUESE LEADERSHIP IN RENAMO TAKING POSTS HERE, OR OBTAINING CONCESSIONS IN THE ECONOMY. POWERSHARING OR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION. IT WAS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS (HE ALSO INCLUDED THE AMERICANS BUT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A SLIP) TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY FINDING THE LEADERSHIP JOBS AND BY ABSORBING IN THE MINES AND AGRICULTURE THOSE RANK AND FILE WHO WERE NOT IN MOZAMBIQUE OR WHO WOULD NOT SURRENDER WITHIN THE COUNTRY BECAUSE THEIR CRIMES HAD BEEN TOO GREAT MOZAMBIQUE WOULD LOOK AFTER THOSE WHO GAVE THEMSELVES UP TO MOZAMBICAN FORCES UNDER AMNESTY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IN PARTICULAR THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND WESTERN EUROPE, AS MOZAMBIQUE DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO START PROJECTS PURELY TO ABSORB RENAMO.

4. MACHEL ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING EXSPANSIVELY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF BRITAIN PLAYING A KEY PART IN MOZAMBIQUE'S AND THE REGIONAL RECONSTRUCTION ESPECIALLY IN PORTS AND RAILWAYS. HE LOOKED TOWARDS OUR EXTENDING THE LIMPOPO LINE PROJECT RIGHT THROUGH TO BOTSWANA AND URGED THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAND ROVER REHABILITATION PROJECT THROUGHOUT MOZAMBIQUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5.

5. COMMENT. WHILE MACHEL DID NOT DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME EXPLORATORY CONTACTS WITH RENAMO CONTINUING WITH SOME SOUTH AFRICAN HELP (PRETORIA TELNO 262 OF 18 AUGUST), I FOUND NO READINESS TO GIVE GROUND IN HIS POSITION OVER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEADERSHIP, WHICH HE REGARDS AS ENTIRELY PORTUGUESE. HIS LANGUAGE ABOUT NOT RETURNING TO COLONIALISM WAS DIRECT AND SHARPLY POINTED. HE WILL ALSO LOOK TO THE PORTUGUESE TO FIND JOBS FOR THE LEADERS WHERE THE SOUTH AFRICANS CAN NOT HELP. THE US AMBASSADOR IS MORE CONFIDENT THAN I THAT THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT WILL COMPROMISE ON ALL THIS WITH FACE SAVING FORMULAS AND IT IS I SUPPOSE POSSIBLE THAT THE MOZAMBICANS ARE TALKING TOUGH FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES BEFORE SOARES' VISIT THIS WEEKEND. TO GET THE PORTUGUESE TO URGE RENAMO MORE REALISTIC AND LOWER THEIR TERMS. RENAMOS ACTIVITIES ARE PREJUDICIAL TO PORTUGUESE HOPES OF WINNING BACK INFLUENCE HERE. BUT VELOSO HAD EARLIER DENIED TO ME THE VALIDITY OF MOST TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HE SAID HE WAS DENYING ALMOST DAILY TO ENQUIRERS FROM PORTUGAL.

6. VELOSO HAS ALSO SURPRISED AND WORRIED THE US AMBASSADOR BY COMMENTING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE ''REALLY MAD'' ABOUT BEING TACKLED BY CROCKER OVER THESE LATEST MOZAMBICAN ALLEGATIONS. NEITHER MACHEL NOR VELOSO HAS SAID ANYTHING SIMILAR TO ME.

7. WE ARE, I THINK, NO FURTHER TOWARDS NEGOTIATION THAN THE MOZAMBICANS AGREEING TO CONSIDER TALKS ABOUT TALKS IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WILL BUY TIME NOT ONLY TO HELP THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND PORTUGUESE LEAN ON RENAMO'S LEADERSHIP TO GIVE UP THEIR DEMANDS FOR POWER SHARING BUT ALSO FOR THE CONFIDENCE OF RENAMO'S RANK AND FILE WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN RESUPPLY TO BE ERODED. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING.

VINES [No para 3.]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECDs
SOVIET D
EED
MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

file

085

bc: Sir P. Cradock.

21 May 1984

UK ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 17 May in which you describe the aid which we are at present giving to Mozambique and your thoughts on future aid.

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CRPC

(2)

Prime Minister.

You asked what we were doing to meet President Machel's aid needs.

A.J.C. 15/5.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 May 1984

Dear John,

UK Assistance to Mozambique

In your letter of 3 May you asked for our comments on whether it would be possible to help meet President Machel's need for economic aid, in particular food, drugs and technical assistance.

The Foreign Secretary fully agrees that we should do our best to help President Machel to show his followers that the Nkomati Accord is bringing economic returns. The ODA and diplomatic wings are working out how best to respond.

As you know, we put together a package of aid, both bilaterally and under SADCC auspices, for President Machel's visit last October. This is already being implemented. Since the visit we have offered and delivered further disaster relief. The attached annex sets out details, and shows what we are doing in the specific fields you mentioned. The security situation in Mozambique has been a constraint on executing aid projects and "delivering aid" generally, but we hope this will in due course improve. Administrative delays and weakness on the Mozambican side have also held things up.

We are now considering what more we can offer. This is mainly being done in the context of the aid framework process. It is still at an early stage, but if present proposals are agreed we would be able to announce a new aid pledge of £6.5m for 1985/6. Our total level of aid for that year would be roughly twice as high as that during the special effort immediately following the Lancaster House Agreement. In our view most of this should be in the form of programme aid, but the proposals would also allow a steadily rising technical cooperation element. The fact that our regional Development Division will shortly take over responsibility for our aid in Mozambique should enable us to keep a close eye on how our aid is spent.

In addition ODA are considering urgently what more can be done in short-term disaster relief, including food and drugs. Disaster relief already pledged in the last few months

/totals

totals some £1m. There is a local distribution problem, but provided that can be overcome, ODA intend to make a further offer.

All this would add up to a sizeable expansion in our aid which we could announce during the current year. We are encouraging our Western partners to be similarly forthcoming and prospects are reasonably good.

I might add that we are also demonstrating our interest and support in other ways. The Prime Minister will no doubt discuss the follow-up to the Nkomati Accord when she meets Mr Botha on 2 June. I have written separately to suggest that the Prime Minister might send President Machel a message before the visit to explain its background. We hope that Mr Rifkind will pay an official visit to Maputo later in the year. We intend to support Mozambique's application to join IMF and IBRD as well as the successor to Lome II, and be as positive as we can over debt rescheduling. The prospects for private investments are likely to hang fire until the internal situation improves, but interest should pick up if, as planned, Mozambique introduces an investment code. Lord Jellicoe discussed the possibilities with President Machel when he paid a short visit to Mozambique in March.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Mozambique Aug. '79

Relatorio



c. 9C

ANNEX : AID TO MOZAMBIQUE

1. The level of aid to Mozambique in the last few years has run at about £3m p.a. including food aid: the figure for 1983/4 was £3,072,000. During Machel's visit in October 1983, we granted Retrospective Terms Adjustment on £22.5m of aid loans made since 1978.

2. UK projects in Mozambique (Technical Assistance)

a) Pemba Power Station

A total of £2.8 capital aid and £300,000 technical cooperation is providing for an extension to Pemba Power Station.

b) Landrover Reconditioning Project

£1.2m has been allocated to provide Landrover personnel, equipment and spares, and to train Mozambicans in the reconditioning of Landrovers.

c) Leyland Buses: ATP Project

A grant of £1m for a maintenance and training programme for 200 buses supplied by Leyland. (Suspended at the moment because of the suspension of ECGD cover).

d) UK training

35 Mozambican students came to the UK under a Technical Cooperation Training Programme (increased from £100,000 to £218,000 for 1983/4.

/e)

e) £10.1m project due to start shortly under Southern African Development Cooperation Conference auspices to upgrade Limpopo Valley railway line.

f) £750,000 projects (to be supervised by a 6-man British team) to improve container facilities in Maputo port.

3. Food aid and emergency relief

11.5 thousand tonnes of maize given during Machel's visit for drought victims. Emergency relief for victims of both drought and floods in southern Mozambique included fortified food-powers, tinned meat and seeds for replanting - worth over £400,000.
We sent tools for seed planting, 4 Leyland handmaster vehicles, and 2 Landrovers. To help contain flooding, we sent 2 Motorfloat engines, spares for the Maputo water-supply system, spares for Lister pumping engines, culverts, and a bridge to replace one damaged in the stroms. Total cost of emergency relief since October 1983 has been over one million pounds.

4. Drugs

Medicines sent for drought victims (£19,700 worth); water-pumping tablets to combat effects of flooding. Disaster Unit in ODA are about to send medical supplies to the Vilanculos region, part of a batch (worth £100,000) to be sent over the next 3 months.

AID TO MOZAMBIQUE 1980-87 (1) (4)

	1980/1	1981/2	1982/3	1983/4	1984/5	1985/6	1986/7
Bilateral	4.6	5.4	1.7 (2)	1.5 (2)	3.0	6.5 (4)	2.0 (3)(4)
SADCC					3.9	3.9	1.9
Total	4.6	5.4	1.7	1.5	6.9	10.4	3.9

Notes:

(1) Excluding ATP

(2) Low levels in 1982/3 and 1983/4 followed disbursement problems.

(3) Figures for 1986/7 do not include programme aid, which is allocated in the preceding year.

(4) Figures for 1985/6 and beyond do not include food aid and disaster relief.

CADAAT

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 May, 1984.

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 16 April.

Mrs. Thatcher well understands the anxiety that you continue to feel about your husband, Mr. Hamilton, and has asked me to assure you that we are following his case carefully. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discussed it with President Machel during his visit to Britain in October 1983. Our Embassy, who have been active since the beginning of the case, have raised with the Mozambican Government a number of aspects of the trial and sentence in the hope that an act of clemency might be made. The Embassy also continue to do their best to ensure that Mr. Hamilton is properly treated, and to make his imprisonment as comfortable as possible.

As you know, they visit him regularly, normally once a fortnight. Visits were suspended recently for some weeks because of an outbreak of cholera in the prison. But the Vice-Consul was able to visit again on 6 April, and found Mr. Hamilton in good health and reasonable spirits. The next visit was due to take place recently.

A.J. COLES

Mrs. Mize Rocha

CONFIDENTIAL

PPS.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1984

Dear John,

Mr Dion Hamilton

Thank you for your letter of 19 April, with which you enclosed one dated 16 April from Mrs Mize Rocha to the Prime Minister. I attach a draft reply which is drafted on the assumption that Mrs Rocha may make it public. If she did so it should not make further difficulties for her husband with the Mozambican authorities.

Mrs Mize Rocha is the Portuguese common-law wife of Mr Dion Hamilton, a British citizen sentenced in February 1983 to twenty years imprisonment in Mozambique on charges of illegal possession of weapons (which he admitted) and of involvement with Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance) (which he denied). (Mr Hamilton's estranged wife lives in South Africa but he still acknowledges her as his next of kin.) I enclose copies of Mrs Rocha's letter of 4 April 1983 to the Prime Minister, and of Miss Solesby's reply of 28 April.

We have made a number of representations to the Mozambicans since Mr Hamilton's arrest. The Prime Minister raised the case with President Machel during his visit to London in October 1983. But there is so far no sign that he is ready to exercise clemency. The Nkomati Accord with South Africa of 16 March has not been received uncritically within the Mozambican party cadres. President Machel will so far as possible be reluctant to take further actions unpalatable to them - which Mr Hamilton's release would be - until they have become more reconciled to it, and some of its hoped-for benefits have begun to materialise.

In the meantime our Embassy in Maputo will continue to visit him regularly. By local standards the conditions of his imprisonment are relatively comfortable.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PS/Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mrs Mize Rocha
Praceta Projectado à
Rua D. Maria II Lote 2
2º. Esqdº
2735 - CACEM PORTUGAL

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT: The Prime Minister has asked me to

Thank you for your letter of 16 April ~~addressed to the Prime Minister. I have been asked to reply~~.

Mrs. Hatcher

I well understands the anxiety that you continue to feel about your husband, Mr Hamilton, and has asked me to ~~can~~ assure you that we are following his case carefully. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discussed it with President Machel during his visit to Britain in October 1983. Our Embassy, who have been active since the beginning of the case, have raised with the Mozambican Government a number of aspects of the trial and sentence in the hope that an act of clemency might be made. ~~Our~~ The Embassy also continue to do their best to ensure that Mr Hamilton is properly treated and to make his imprisonment as comfortable as possible.

As you know, ~~the Embassy in Maputo~~ they visit him regularly, normally once a fortnight. ~~Although~~ Visits were suspended recently for some weeks because of an outbreak of cholera in the prison. But the Vice-Consul was able to visit again on 6 April and found Mr Hamilton

/in

in good health and reasonable spirits. The next visit was due to take place ~~on 2 May~~ [illegible].

5.
5

File. (8)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

JCM 384/1

29 APR 1983

Mrs M Hamilton
Box 854
Blantyre
Malawi

Your reference

Our reference JCM 384/1

Date 28 April 1983

Dear Mrs Hamilton,

(75a)

Thank you for your letter of 4 April to the Prime Minister, to which I have been asked to reply.

We are grateful for the full account of your husband's arrest and trial, and the detailed information which you have given in regard to the charges made against Mr Hamilton. This is useful.

We fully understand the deep anxiety you feel about Mr Hamilton. We have taken a close interest in his case and our Embassy have been active throughout. Our Ambassador in Maputo has done his best to ensure that Mr Hamilton is properly treated and that he is granted regular consular access. The Embassy have pressed, we understand with some success, for him to receive a regular supply of food, medicine and clean clothes and for letters to be forwarded to him. We hope that any existing problems with regard to mail can be solved in the near future. The Embassy have also raised with the Mozambican Government a number of aspects of the trial and sentence. We understand that your husband may appeal for clemency to the President and we will give whatever assistance we can to him in this.

I can assure you that we will continue to follow Mr Hamilton's case carefully. I do hope that some progress may be made in the near future. In the meantime our High Commission in Blantyre will continue to keep you informed of any new developments.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Solesby

T A H Solesby (Miss)
Head of Central African
Department

Summary of letter to the Prime Minister from Mrs F D Hamilton, dated 4.4.83, forwarded by BHC Blantyre - see also covering papers.

/Mrs Hamilton is Portuguese and has been married to Mr Hamilton since 1976. The children referred to are presumably of a previous marriage of his (aged 11, 12, 15 and 18) and are apparently is South Africa. Mr Hamilton is - or was - engaged in a transport firm "Manica Freight Services", with operations involving several Southern African countries./

Mrs Hamilton wishes to present the facts of the case to the Prime Minister, has not previously had an opportunity of doing so, has only recently left Mozambique (expelled). In September 1982 the family returned to Beira from holiday in Europe and immediately heard from local staff that Mr Hamilton was being kept under observation and that he was to be detained by the Security Police, that all his property was to be confiscated, that he was to be declared PNG and expelled. Through a contact, he received a verbal assurance from the Minister Resident that the rumours were unfounded.

On 9.12.82 fuel tanks in Beira were blown up by saboteurs, thought to be insurgents. On the same day Mr H went to the airport to fly by private aircraft to Johannesburg for his daughter's birthday and for business meetings. The flight had been planned for some time and was authorised. While Mr H was at the airport, accompanied by his wife, it was announced that because of the sabotage all aircraft movements in and out of the country were prohibited. After taking advice, Mr H wrote to the Minister Resident, explaining his business commitmer and asking for permission to fly.

On 11.12.82, having had no reply, Mr and Mrs H went to call on the Minister Resident. WHile they were waiting in their car Mr H was taken away, ostensibly "for five minutes", and did not return; Mrs H was later taken to Security HQ without explanation. That evening she was taken home by Security Police while the house was searched, then spent the night in custody and witnessed a further search the next day. Police took away foreign currency, including $ 595 in Zimbabwe dollars, and travel cheques. Mrs H was then allowed to remain at home.

Mrs H had no news of her husband until 14.12.82, when she received a telephone message from the Security Police, asking her to take clothing for him but without saying where he was. The house was watched, all callers checked and

many were afterwards questioned. When Miss Ann Grant (1st Secretary, Maputo) travelled to Beira to see Mr H she was accompanied by security men.

On 13.1.83 Mrs H was arrested as an "accomplice" and kept in solitary confinement for 35 days, after which she appeared before a Military Tribunal and was expelled from Mozambique.

On 2.2.83 foreign detainees, including Mr H, were put on public display, barefoot, handcuffed etc, as part of an anti-foreigner campaign.

On 11.2.83 Mrs H was one of 8 people tried by a Military Tribunal, accused of taking part in the attack on the fuel tanks. The only Defending Officer was a lietenant in the Security Police who was supposed to represent all eight but only met them very briefly half an hour before the hearing. The proceedings, held in camera, were a farce. The offences with which Mr H was charged were:

(1) Complicity in the sabotaging of the fuel tanks
Untrue; he had been away from 29/11 to 6/12 and knew nothing.

(2) Being a close friend of the engineer Jardim etc.
Untrue; a nodding acquaintance only. J had never been to the H's house.

(3) Being godparents of Dr Evo Fernandes, a Resistance leader.
Untrue; Mr and Mrs H are not his godparents and are not in touch with him or his family.

(4) Giving interviews to British journalists and the BBC
Untrue; Mr H has never given such interviews.

5) Being in touch with insurgents and bein g in possession of transmitting and receiving apparatus etc.
Untrue; the only radio equipment in the house was a portable set for the aircraft and(?) a set on loan from the Beira Aero Club for teaching student pilots.
/No item 6 in the original but "10" appears twice. The numbering of items 6 - 10 has been adjusted in this summary/.

(6) Having Resistance emblems and flags in the house.
Untrue; the only flag in the house was a Scottish flag - a holiday souvenir.

(7) Being in possession of military uniform
Untrue; Mr H had two pairs of old military style trousers, last worn on hunting trips in 1965-66 and kept in a trunk.

(8) Keeping 1000 litres of petrol hidden in the hangar
This was an emergency reserve for the firm's transport fleet, obtained with petrol coupons not used on current operations - standard practice for firms in Mozambique.

(9) Buying a house for the firm with foreign currency.
The purchase was arranged by the directors of the firm in Johannesburg. The letter found in the safe was addressed to the house-owner and signed by two of the directors (not Mr H); it promised that funds from Johannesburg would be deposited in an account in Lisbon, ie no funds were to leave Mozambique. In any case Mr H took no part in the transaction.

(10) Weapons, including shells‡, found in the house
The Security Police alleged that "war material" was found. What they actually found was :
- 5 ancient shotguns, rusty and wrapped in newspaper dating from 1960, part of a collection of antiques and left at the house by an acquintance now dead. These had been seen and ignored by Security forces on three previous occasions.
- 3 small revolvers and 1 rather larger, all unused, as confirmed by the Security men. These had been left in a cupboard in a spare room for over 15 years and had been forgotten.
- 3 shell-cases ‡, empty, which had been in the house for at least 10 years.

---

‡ Translator's Note; the word "granadas" may refer to shells or grenades. It seems likely that the articles in question were empty shell-cases, sometimes kept as ornaments or curios.

Mr H, though innocent of all the alleged offences, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. All the family's property was confiscated, in particular:

1 aircraft, Cessna 206, valued at		£50,000
1 motor-boat	" "	5,000
1 motor-car	" "	3,000
3 parachutes	" "	3,000
1 aircraft hangar		20,000
1 house and land	" "	4,000
		£85,000

/letter reads "£86,000"/

Also confiscated were household appliances, clothing, etc. Mrs H was allowed to bring with her only 20 kg of clothing.

Mrs H appeals to the British Government, which has granted development loans to Mozambique, to use its influence in this case. She appeals to Mrs Thatcher as a wife and mother: she and the children do not even receive letters from Mr H.

The B/E staff visiting Mr H in Beira are not shown the bad conditions in which he is detained: a very hot cell, with mattresses on the floor and no furniture, with rainwater coming in, mosquitoes, etc. The prisoners are kept shut up day and night, are not even allowed out for exercise (only for a bath) and are not allowed newspapers or radio.

In the past Mr H rendered a great deal of assistance to B/E staff with transport, hospitality etc. Now that he has been unjustly imprisoned, will the British Government help him? His wife appeals to the PM to use her influence.

MAY 1984

Subject
c. PORTUGAL:
PM's visit
2/84

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE
da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1984

Mozambique

In my letter of 17 April describing the discussion which took place at the Prime Minister's private lunch in Lisbon that day with the Prime Minister of Portugal, I recorded Dr. Soares' view that President Machel was in dire need of outside help, particularly food, drugs and technical assistance.

The Prime Minister asked me yesterday whether it would be possible for us to help meet Machel's needs. I should be grateful for your early comments.

B17

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CST

3/5 JL

Mrs D. HAMILTON

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1984

Reminded FCO today 4/5. saying back coming this pm. 4/5
Chased this a.m. 8/5
On the way 8/5

PORTUGAL: MR. DION HAMILTON

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the wife of the above, who has been detained in Mozambique. I should be grateful if you could let me have an early draft reply for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister.

JC

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1984

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 16 April. This is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

Mrs. D. Hamilton

(re: Mize Rocha)

Reference .....

RESTRICTED TIM

Mr Coles ✓ & will handle from London
17.4.

DION HAMILTON

Attached is a letter to the Prime Minister from Mize da Rocha, Dion Hamilton's common law wife, who lives in Lisbon.

17 April 1984 P W HARE

CODE
18-78
SS 11/78

Cacém, 16th April, 84

Mr
A. J. Abbott
H. M. Consul
British Embassy
Lisboa

Dear Sir

I hereby enclose a letter for her Excellency Mrs. M. Thatcher, which I wish if could handed to her while she is in Portugal.

Yours Sincerely

Hof C

Please see the attached letter from Mrs da Rocha to the Prime Minister concerning Brian Hamilton in Maputo Prison. Would it be appropriate to pass it on to the P.M.'s Private Secretary?

17/4

Mizé Rocha
Praceta Projectada à
Rua D.Maria II Lote 2
2º. Esqdº
2735 - CACÉM PORTUGAL

16th April, 1984

To Your Excellency
The Prime Minister of
the UNITED KINGDOM
c/o British Embassy
LISBON

Excellency,

I am the portuguese wife of Mr. Dion Hamilton, who is a British citiz en, and I were living in Mozambieque when he has detained in December 11th 1982.

He was accused of being colaborator of the rebel movement Mozambique National Resistence but no evidence was brought by the Mozambican Authorities. He firmly denied any linke with the guerrila fighters.

Nevertheless he was submited to martial trial without any defendent and any fair possibility for defense. Before the trial and after the trial, many times at night time, he was interrogated by the secret police, the well known SNASP. Our home in Beira was searched eleven times. I also was detained and expelled from Mozambique.

.../2

There are no doubts that the case was a no sense one and the trial a comedy according the laws and legal principles in any civilized country. However he was convicted and received twenty years of imprisionment penalty.

I can't accept that such a process can be accepted by the Bristish Government and therefore that British Citizens are defenseless in People's Rep. of Mozambique.

When Britain supports economically this country and still gives them new finacial help I ask myself what kind of British interest of the justice to my husban was not yet protected in exchange of British help.

As you known at the momento Maputo hasn't got any water or electricity, so the food shortage problem is even worse. I'do like if your Excellency could intercede with the Mozambique Government so that my husband can get the authorization to receive food from outside, which the company Manica Freight Services and I will provide.

Excellency

I still believe in my husband's idea that her Majesty's government will never forget a British citizen laying in a prison by any other reason than the Mozambican authorities' need of a "scapegoat" for their security failures. But after 16 months of ilegal imprisionment I start getting doubts.

Yours faithfully

Teresa Rocha

(57)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T41A184/84 RESTRICTED

P.C.
TOP COPY
10/7.

6179 - 1

cc to Subject: filed on South Africa Pt 3 Relations.

GRS 173
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 151030Z MAR 84
TO FLASH CAPE TOWN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 136 OF 15 MARCH
AND TO FLASH MAPUTO
ROUTINE ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, PRETORIA, DAKAR, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, HARARE, KINSHASA, LAGOS, LILONGWE, LUANDA, LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE, NAIROBI, JOHANNESBURG
NKOMATI ACCORD: MIPT AND FCO TELNO 92 TO MAPUTO
TEXT OF MESSAGE BEGINS: (53) (55)
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNATURE OF A SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE (MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA), I SHOULD LIKE TO SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS. THIS IS A STEP OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE SECURITY BOTH OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE (MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA) AND OF THE WHOLE REGION. IT IS AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO ALL WHO BELIEVE IN THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS BASED ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING MUTUAL BENEFIT TO THE PEOPLE OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN THEIR SEARCH FOR PEACE, PROPERITY AND HARMONY. I CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE STATESMANSHIP AND WISDOM YOU HAVE SHOWN.
ENDS.

HOWE

JCM 020/R

19 MAR 1984

NNNN
DISTRIBUTION
LIMITED
CAFD
SAFD
OAD'S
NEWS D
RESEARCH D
PUSD
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE

COPIES TO
PS/MR RAISON ODA
MR BUIST ODA
MR CAHILL

RESTRICTED

(55)

TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

6178 - 1

ZZ MAPUTO
GRS 173
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 151100Z MAR 84
TO FLASH MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 92 OF 15 MARCH
INTO ROUTINE ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, CAPE TOWN, DAKAR, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, HARARE, KINSHASA, LAGOS, LILONGWE, LUANDA, LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE, NAIROBI, JOHANNESBURG
NKOMATI ACCORD

(55)

1. FCO TELNO 136 TO CAPETOWN CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MACHEL. A MESSAGE IN IDENTICAL TERMS IS BEING SENT TO MR P W BOTHA.

2. PLEASE CONVEY THE MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BEFORE OR AT SIGNATURE, AND IF PRACTICABLE IN PERSON TO PRESIDENT MACHEL. IN HANDING IT OVER YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS INSTRUCTED YOU TO EXPRESS HER ADMIRATION FOR THIS COURAGEOUS AND STATEMANLIKE STEP. SHE RECALLS HER DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL DURING HIS VISIT ABOUT HIS NEED AND HOPE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT. HMG HAVE BEEN PLAYING THEIR PART, AS HAVE A NUMBER OF WESTERN AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS, TO ENCOURAGE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. SHE IS DELIGHTED THAT THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. IT IS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT FOR PRESIDENT MACHEL AND FOR MOZAMBIQUE

HOWE

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION
LTD
CAFD
SAFD
OAD'S
NEWS D
RESEARCH D
PUSD
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE

COPIES TO
PS/MR RAISON ODA
MR BUIST ODA
MR CAHILL ODA

JCH 020/2
19 MAR 1984

RESTRICTED

cc P.E. to

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 March, 1984.

South Africa/Mozambique: Nkomati Accord

Thank you for your letter of 14 March.

As I told Peter Ricketts earlier this morning, the Prime Minister has approved the congratulatory messages from herself to President Machel and Prime Minister Botha. I should be grateful if you could arrange for their despatch.

BF

A.J. COLLEY

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CT.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Prime Minister.

Agree message to President Machel and Prime Minister Botha?

A.J.C. 15/3.

Yes MT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 March 1984

Dear John,

South Africa/Mozambique: Nkomati Accord

A pact of non-aggression (to be known as the Nkomati Accord) will be signed by President Machel and Prime Minister P W Botha on 16 March. The main thrust will be that neither of the two countries will serve as a base for acts of aggression or violence against the other and that both countries undertake not to use the territory of a third state for this purpose.

This is an important development in reducing tension between South Africa and its black neighbours. It is a process which we and our Western allies have strongly encouraged. The Maputo official press recognise that President Machel's visit to Europe played a crucially important part in bringing about the agreement. If the Accord works, the West now has an opportunity progressively to lessen the influence which the Soviet Union has enjoyed as a result of Mozambique's dependence on Soviet bloc military assistance in the face of a perceived South African threat.

Both the South African and Mozambican Governments are turning the signature into a grand diplomatic occasion. There are bound to be messages from numbers of Heads of Governments. Our Ambassador in Cape Town has recommended that the Prime Minister should send a message of congratulation to both leaders. Given the importance of the agreement and the active part which HMG have played in bringing it about, Sir Goeffrey Howe agrees that this would be appropriate. As the text is likely to be published, it would be appropriate for identical messages to go to both Governments. I enclose a draft, together with draft telegrams of instructions to our Ambassador's in Cape Town and Maputo.

Yours ever

Robert Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSP 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Prime Minister P W Botha

and President Machel

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

On the occasion of the signature of a security agreement between the Governments of South Africa and Mozambique [Mozambique and South Africa], I should like to send you my warm congratulations. This is a step of great importance for the security both of South Africa and Mozambique [Mozambique and South Africa] and of the whole region. It is an encouragement to all who believe in the peaceful solution of problems based on the non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. I hope that this agreement will bring mutual benefit to the people of both countries in their search for peace, prosperity and harmony. I congratulate you on the statesmanship and wisdom you have shown.

MT.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

S3842(22455)DD.0532199 300M 8/79 GWB LTD.GP.870

XY 42

File No. .....

Department CAfD

Drafted by MISS T A H SOLESBY
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn. 233 4176

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification
RESTRICTED
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY to be inserted Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) .....
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) .....RESTRICTED.....

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....

(Deskby) to be inserted Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) MAPUTO (post) Tel. No. .....of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) ROUTINE ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, CAPE TOWN, DAKAR, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, HARARE, KINSHASA, LAGOS, LILONGWE, LUANDA, LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE, NAIROBI

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:–

Copies to:–

[TEXT]

NKOMATI ACCORD

1. MIFT contains a message from the Prime Minister to President Machel. A message in identical terms is being sent to Mr P W Botha.

2. Please convey the message as soon as possible, preferably before or at signature and if practicable in person to President Machel. In handing it over you should say that the Prime Minister has instructed you to express her admiration for this courageous and statesmanlike step. She recalls her discussions with President Machel during his visit about his need and hope for such an agreement. HMG have been playing their part, as have a number of Western and African Governments, to encourage a successful outcome. She is delighted that this has been accomplished. It is a great achievement for President Machel and for Mozambique.

53842 (21688) DD.0532043 100M 9/78 GWB LTD. GP.870

XY 42

File No. .....

Department SAfD

Drafted by (Block Capitals) N J THORPE

Tel. Extn. 233 4954

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Security Classification: RESTRICTED

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

DESKBY to be inserted Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Codeword) .....

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....

(Deskby) To be inserted Z

TO IMMEDIATE (precedence) CAPE TOWN (post) Tel. No. ..... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

.....

.....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) ROUTINE MAPUTO, PRIORITY PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG

.....

.....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

NKOMATI ACCORD: MESSAGE TO P W BOTHA

1. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Prime Minister to P W Botha congratulating him on the conclusion of the accord with Mozambique. Please arrange to deliver this personally to P W Botha as soon as practicable, preferably before the accord is signed, or at the signing. If you are unable to deliver it to P W Botha, or if to do so would mean delaying until next week, you should deliver it to the next appropriate individual (presumably Pik Botha).

2. In handing the message over you should say that the Prime Minister has asked you to emphasise how much she appreciates the importance of the accord, both for South Africa and Mozambique, and for the peace and security of

the region as a whole: and to express personally her admiration for the statesmanship and foresight shown by the South African Prime Minister in seeking this agreement. You should add that the accord has, of course, the support of the United Kingdom and that we publicly welcome it.

3. The Prime Minister is sending an identical message to President Machel, with similar instructions about delivery.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RM

FILE

CC FCO

CC MASTER
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 February 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 27/84

Dear M. President,

I learned with great pleasure of your decision to release Mr. Frederick Collins. I know this act of clemency for humanitarian reasons will be much appreciated in Britain.

May I say also how distressed I was to hear of the severe flooding in your country. I send you and those affected all my sympathy.

I look forward to our next meeting and to continuing friendly and fruitful relations between our two countries.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Samora Moises Machel GCMG

HE

010

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 February 1984

Type letter pl.

A.J.C. 8/2.

Dear John,

Mozambique: Release of Mr F Collins

You will be glad to know that, following a message from Sir Geoffrey Howe to the Mozambican Foreign Minister, President Machel has ordered the release of Mr Frederick Collins, a British citizen who had been held under house arrest since June 1983 on suspicion of offences against security. Mr and Mrs Collins are now in Zimbabwe.

As the decision was very much a personal one by President Machel and must owe a good deal to his successful visit to this country last October, it would seem appropriate for a short message of thanks to be sent by the Prime Minister. This would be much appreciated by President Machel. It would also provide the opportunity to encourage him to persevere with the resumption of talks with South Africa. I attach a draft letter.

Sir Geoffrey Howe will also be writing to thank the Mozambican Foreign Minister. If you agree, we shall arrange to telegraph the texts for delivery in advance of the originals.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: His Excellency President
Samora Machel GCMG
People's Republic of Mozambique

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I learned with great pleasure of your decision to release Mr Frederick Collins. I know this act of clemency for humanitarian reasons will be much appreciated in Britain.

May I say also how distressed I was to hear of the severe flooding in your country? I send you and those affected all my sympathy.

I look forward to our next meeting and to continuing friendly and fruitful relations between our two countries.

With all good wishes.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

RR CAPE TOWN
RR PRETORIA
RR HARARE
RR MBABANE
CONFIDENTIAL
GRS 512
FM MAPUTO 062000Z JAN 84
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 6 JANUARY
INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, HARARE, MBABANE, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND LISBON.

GREAT BRITAIN : MOZAMBIQUE.

1. I PAID MY FINAL CALL ON PRESIDENT MACHEL THIS EVENING. THE CALL WHICH LASTED AN UNPRECEDENTED TWO HOURS WAS MOSTLY TAKEN UP BY A PREDICTABLE MONOLOGUE (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) TOUR D'HORIZON ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

2. ITEMS OF INTEREST WERE AS FOLLOWS : HE PRESENTED ME WITH A MEDAL (NOT REPEAT NOT A DECORATION) AND TOLD ME, TRUTHFULLY, THAT THIS WAS ONLY THE FOURTH TIME THAT SUCH A PRESENTATION HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT I WAS THE FIRST NON-COMMUNIST AMBASSADOR TO RECEIVE ONE.

3. HE SPONTANEOUSLY DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS IN MBABANE ON 20 DECEMBER. HIS ACCOUNT WAS REMARKABLY COMPATIBLE WITH THAT GIVEN IN PRETORIA TELEGRAM NUMBER 535. WHAT STRUCK ME FORCIBLY WAS THE VERY OPTIMISTIC AND POSITIVE INTERPRETATION THAT MACHEL GAVE TO THE TALKS. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT A BOTHA/MACHEL SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE SAID WITHOUT ANY PROMPTING ON MY PART THAT MOZAMBIQUE WAS COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON THE R S A AND THAT IT WAS VITALLY NECESSARY FOR MOZAMBIQUE TO ESTABLISH A QUOTE LIVE AND LET LIVE UNQUOTE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE R S A , QUOTE THE AFRIKAANERS ARE AFRICANS. SOONER OR LATER WE MUST LEARN TO LIVE WITH THEM AND THEY WILL LEARN TO LIVE WITH US UNQUOTE.

4. WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS OF MAPUTO PORT. HE ASKED ME WHY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE NOT USING THE PORT , WHEN IT WAS SO OBVIOUSLY MORE COSTLY TO SEND THE EXPORT PRODUCE OF THE TRANSVAAL

VIA

VIA DURBAN OR RICHARDS BAY. I SAID THAT AS A FRIEND OF MOZAMBIQUE I WOULD SPEAK FRANKLY. MAPUTO WAS NOTORIOUSLY THE LEAST EFFICIENT PORT ON THE EAST AFRICAN SEABOARD, I HAD NO DOUBT AT ALL THAT IF THE EFFICIENCY WERE IMPROVED THE TRANSVAAL EXPORTERS WOULD MUCH PREFER TO USE MAPUTO AND TO AVOID THE COST OF TRANSPORTING PRODUCE TO THE NATAL PORTS. AFTER A LONG AND DIFFUSE DISCUSSION (WHICH INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR A BRITISH MANAGEMENT TEAM TO RUN MAPUTO PORT) HE SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THE ONLY SENSIBLE SOLUTION WAS TO ASK THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO HELP TO RUN MAPUTO PORT.

5. MACHEL DILATED AT LENGTH ON HIS HOPES FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM BRITAIN IN MOVES TO REACH NON-VIOLENT SOLUTIONS FOR THE UNSTABLE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. I DESCRIBED THE LIMITED POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO US TO INFLUENCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND DETAILED THE CONDEMNATIONS THAT YOU HAVE ISSUED ON SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND AGAIN DETAILED H M G'S INVARIABLE CONDEMNATION OF CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY CONTENT WITH THE ATTITUDE OF H M G PARTICULARLY BECAUSE BRITAIN WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAD A COMPLETE AND PROFOUND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

6. ALL IN ALL THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MACHEL HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY TOUCHED BY HIS RECEPTION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NOW REGARDS US AS HIS BEST FRIENDS IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD. I ONLY HOPE THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN THIS POSITION.

F C O PLEASE PASS TO ALL.

STEWART

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECD
SOV D
EED
MR SQUIRE
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 413
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 131500Z DEC 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 416 OF 13 DECEMBER 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
AND PRETORIA

MOZAMBIQUE - US RELATIONS

1. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT MACHEL ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON DECEMBER 10 TO DISCUSS SWEDISH AID. THE TALK EVENTUALLY RANGED MUCH WIDER AND COVERED THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE.

2. MACHEL REFERRED TO THE COMING VISIT OF A US DELEGATION LED BY FRANK WISNER (MY LETTER OF 9 DECEMBER TO MISS SOLESBY, NOT TO WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK) AND MACHEL ASKED IF THE SWEDES COULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS TO PERSUADE THEM TO ADOPT A MORE FRIENDLY LINE WITH MOZAMBIQUE. MACHEL SAID THAT THE MENACE FROM THE SOUTH-AFRICAN BACKED NRM WAS NOW BECOMING SO SERIOUS THAT HE FELT HIS ONLY HOPE WAS FOR THE US TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO STOP THEIR DIRECTION AND SUPPORT OF THE NRM.

3. MACHEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE RUSSIANS, EAST GERMANS AND BULGARIANS TO AFFORD BETTER PROTECTION FOR THEIR TECHNICAL COOPERATION PERSONNEL HERE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION. HE THEN REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME ON 19 AUGUST (MY TEL NO 252) AND SAID QUOTE AS I TOLD THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN AUGUST I WILL NEVER ALLOW COMBAT TROOPS FROM EASTERN EUROPE OR CUBA TO OPERATE IN MY COUNTRY. THIS COULD ONLY HAPPEN IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS ACTUALLY INVADED US. UNQUOTE.

4. HE THEN SAID THAT MOZAMBIQUE WAS IN DESPERATE NEED OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE REALISED THAT SWEDEN COULD NOT HELP WITH THE PROVISION OF ARMAMENTS OR SOLDIERS BUT PLEADED THAT SWEDEN SHOULD MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR STRENGTHENING THE MOZAMBICAN ARMED FORCES.
STEWART

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD
S AF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECD
ES & SD
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 360A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 231440Z FEB 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TEL NO 67 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, MAPUTO

Mozambique

RUSSIAN NAVAL PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

1. THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF RUSSIAN WARSHIPS, INCLUDING A SVERDLOV CLASS CRUISER, IN MOZAMBIQUE PORTS HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN SOUTH AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS. ACCORDING TO THESE SAME REPORTS THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN MAPUTO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT IF ANY COUNTRY ATTACKED ONE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FRIENDS HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REGARD IT AS AN ATTACK ON ITSELF AND WOULD QUOTE REACT ADEQUATELY UNQUOTE. HE APPARENTLY ADDED THAT OTHER WARSHIPS WOULD VISIT THESE PORTS (MAPUTO AND BEIRA) IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA TOLD ME AT LUNCH TODAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TOOK THESE REPORTS VERY SERIOUSLY: THEY WERE, HE SAID, CAUSING HIM DIFFICULTY. I TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS BECOMING EXCITED ABOUT THEM. PIK THEN SAID: QUOTE PLEASE UNDERSTAND, IF WE HAVE NO CHOICE, WE HAVE NO CHOICE UNQUOTE. AT THAT TANTALISING POINT WE HAD TO BREAK OFF OUR CONVERSATION, BUT I WAS ABLE TO HAVE A FEW WORDS AS WELL WITH BRAND FOURIE, WHO WAS AT THE SAME LUNCH. IN HIS USUAL WAY HE TOOK IT ALL MORE CALMLY AND AGREED WHEN I SAID THAT THIS WAS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME THAT RUSSIAN WARSHIPS HAD VISITED MOZAMBIQUE. I ADDED FOR GOOD MEASURE THAT SOME PEOPLE MIGHT SAY - INDEED HAD SAID - THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BROUGHT THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT ON THEMSELVES BY THEIR RAID ON MATOLA. FOURIE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE TWO THINGS WERE REALLY CONNECTED SINCE THE VISIT OF THE WARSHIPS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN LAID ON AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE.

3. IF THE NEW MEN IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY CHESTER CROCKER, WERE PROPERLY IN BUSINESS THIS IS JUST THE SORT OF THING THEY OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THEORY THEY SHOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN ANYONE ELSE TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO KEEP THEIR COOL AND NOT DO ANYTHING SILLY: IN PRACTICE THEY MAY NOT BE READY TO SAY EVEN THAT TO THEM.

4. ANOTHER ITEM FOR THE WASHINGTON AGENDA?

LEAHY

STANDARD
C AF D
OADS
EESD
NAD
DEF D
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

THIS TELEGRAM
... SENT
ADDRESSED

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

VLB

Mozambique

29 January 1981

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you very much for the generous gifts you sent her following your meeting. Mrs. Thatcher is delighted with all of them and has asked me to send you her very best wishes and sincere thanks.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

His Excellency Senor Joaquim Alberto Chissano

Joaquim Alberto Chissano

MINISTRO DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS
DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE

MAPUTO

CONFIDENTIAL

HS

File

CS.

Mozambique

Subject

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 January 1981

cc. Master set.

Call by the Foreign Minister of Mozambique

As you know the Foreign Minister of Mozambique, Sr. Chissano, called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by Sr. Khan, Sr. Murarguy and Miss Taela. Mr. Luce was also present.

The Prime Minister asked Sr. Chissano to convey her greetings to President Machel. She asked him also to convey her gratitude to the President for Mozambique's help during the negotiations about the future of Rhodesia. Sr. Chissano said that President Machel also sent his greetings. He had been asked to say that President Machel, having received the British Government's invitation to visit this country, would be happy to do so. He would now await a more formal invitation. Sr. Chissano said that, as an additional earnest of their wish for good relations with Britain, his Government had agreed to accept the accreditation of a British military attache who would be based in Salisbury.

In the course of a brief discussion about economic relations, Sr. Chissano said that his Government sought much increased co-operation between the two countries and on a long time scale. He hoped that the United Kingdom would consider offering facilities favouring such co-operation. His Government were thinking of a fifteen to twenty-five year time scale. The Prime Minister commented that this was very extended. It sounded as though private rather than public finance would be needed. Sr. Chissano confirmed that his Government would welcome private capital. They understood that people wanted to know their profits would be secure and that capital growth as well as income would be available. The Mozambique authorities envisaged that their country would have a mixed economy. The constitution allowed for this.

On Namibia Sr. Chissano said that his Government had been disappointed by the outcome of the Geneva conference. They would continue to pursue a negotiated settlement and remained ready to support a UN initiative. But they would make no concessions on the issue of SWAPO's status as the representative of the Namibian people nor would they accept any changes in the UN resolution. They would not abandon their support of SWAPO at the present stage. The only weapon the Africans had to exert pressure on the South Africans was the armed struggle. Once, however, it had been agreed to implement the UN plan, the Front Line States would tell Mr. Nujoma that he was on his own - just as they had done with Mr. Mugabe.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed that the failure in Geneva had been a great disappointment. The British Government's view was that it was not for outside Governments to choose a Government for the Namibian people. We wanted to see the ballot replace the bullet. It was vital that the ballot should be held without intimidation. Namibia was in some respects a more difficult problem than Zimbabwe. But she was confident that a solution would be found and in a reasonable time. Violence would only result in the loss of innocent lives and in the creation of more animosity. The next step for Namibia had to be the right one. No-one wanted another failure. Sr. Chissano made it clear that he understood the Prime Minister's point of view but that his opinion was different. He welcomed her optimism but believed that the only consequence of relaxing pressure would be delay. The sole means of pressure open to the Africans was the armed struggle. They had no other means of making their voice heard.

As regards the situation in South Africa itself, Sr. Chissano said that Mozambique would continue to resist apartheid. South Africa would never convince the Africans that their system had anything positive to offer. However although spasmodic violence would continue he did not foresee an armed struggle in the immediate future.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit by Mozambican Foreign Minister

The Mozambican Foreign Minister, Sr Chissano, will be visiting Britain from 25-29 January. He will be paying a courtesy call on the Prime Minister at 11.30 am on Tuesday 27 January. He has been invited in order to maintain the improvement in Anglo-Mozambican relations generated by the Rhodesian settlement.

Namibia is likely to be uppermost in Sr Chissano's mind since the breakdown of the Geneva Conference (PIM). As Chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee he has this week called for sanctions against South Africa (although sanctions would have a disastrous effect on the Mozambican economy). The brief suggests a general statement of disappointment about the PIM and a short defensive line on sanctions. Lord Carrington will go over the ground in greater detail when he meets Sr Chissano.

The Foreign Minister's delegation will include the Director for Europe and America in the MFA, Sr Khan, and the Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Sr Murargy (there is no Mozambican Ambassador resident in London). We would suggest that both should be invited to attend the call: you may find it useful if Mr Luce also does so.

// / I attach a brief for a call accordingly, together with a personality note and a copy of Sr Chissano's programme.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Edward Chaplin (Lord President's office).

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

23 JAN 1981



CALL BY MOZAMBICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE PRIME MINISTER: TUESDAY 27 JANUARY

POINTS TO MAKE

Bilateral Relations

1. Grateful for President Machel's helpful role during Lancaster House talks. We attach importance to maintaining good relations with Mozambique.
2. Pleased to be able to assist in Mozambique's development through our aid programme, including the recently announced pledge of food aid (worth £800,000).
3. We support objectives of South African Development Coordination Conference in seeking greater regional economic cooperation, and hope to be able to assist in SADCC projects.
4. We wish to increase our bilateral trade. ECGD have made £55 million credit cover available and the British Overseas Trade Board sent a successful mission to Mozambique in October.

Namibia

5. Last November, I urged the South African Foreign Minister to seize the current opportunity for a settlement. I am very disappointed at the failure of Geneva meeting.
6. We shall continue to work with other members of the Western Five for a peaceful solution. Hope to maintain co-operation with Front Line States. Together with the new US administration, will see whether negotiations could be resumed with a chance of success. Need for a pause for reflection.

Sanctions

7. [Defensive] Acknowledge African impatience. Before going along with pressures to take the matter to the Security Council hope Front Line States will consider carefully whether sanctions would help bring about our common objective of

/independence

independence for Namibia. More likely that sanctions would shut off all chance of resumed negotiations.

7. [If pressed] Our views on sanctions are well known. We do not believe they would contribute towards a settlement. They would damage us (and other countries in Southern Africa) very considerably.

Visit by President Machel [If raised]

8. We would welcome an official visit to Britain by President Machel. In view of other important visits already scheduled for this year, unlikely that we could suggest a suitable date for President Machel before 1982.

CALL BY MOZAMBICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE PRIME MINISTER: TUESDAY 27 JANUARY

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Following the Rhodesian settlement the Mozambicans indicated that they would welcome closer economic links with Britain. They are clearly disillusioned with economic assistance from the Soviet Union, although they continue to maintain close political and military ties with them.

2. Our wish to respond is based upon the desire to encourage this disillusionment and to wean them away from total dependence upon the Russians. We also wish to influence Mozambican attitudes towards general Southern African issues. Sr Chissano, the Foreign Minister, ranks third in the Mozambican Government and is a key figure in policy decisions.

Namibia and Sanctions

3. The Mozambicans are not so influential amongst the Front Line States on Namibia as they were on Rhodesia. But Namibia will be uppermost in their minds in the wake of the failure of the PIM and Chissano is the current chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee which is an important influence on African strategy in the UN. After the meeting of this Committee in Arusha on 19 January, Chissano made a strong demand for sanctions against South Africa.

4. We cannot disguise South African responsibility for failure in Geneva nor offer hope of an early change in the South African position, given the range of their objections to current arrangements for the UN plan and their fear of a SWAPO victory. However, we are not in a position to offer Sr Chissano any concrete suggestions about the way forward. The best we can do is to urge the Front Line States to pause for reflection at least until we see where the new US Administration is heading.

Relations with Britain

Aid

5. Britain has pledged £22.5 million of aid to Mozambique since 1976, about a third of which remains unspent. It will be announced during Sr Chissano's visit that we are to give Mozambique 7,000 tonnes of grain through the European Community Food Aid programme, worth approximately £800,000.

6. An important meeting of nine Southern African states, known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) met in Maputo last November. Their aim is to create greater economic cooperation among its members. Mr Neil Marten represented Britain.

Trade

7. Despite its current economic problems, the long term outlook for Mozambique is promising. It has considerable natural resources to develop - minerals (copper, gold and probably uranium), energy (coal, gas, possibly oil). We therefore hope to increase our trade with Mozambique, and a British overseas Trade Board mission visited Mozambique in October. ECGD agreed last July to support £30 million of Medium Term Credit and at least £25 million of Short Term business.

Visit by President Machel

8. During his visit to Maputo Mr Luce told Sr Chissano that we would welcome a visit by President Machel at some future date. The Mozambicans may anticipate a visit within the next few months. However, there are a number of similar visits in the pipeline and we do not foresee a visit by President Machel taking place before 1982.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
22 January 1981.

CHISSANO, JOAQUIM ALBERTO

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Permanent Political Committee and the Central Committee, and Party Secretary for Foreign Relations.

Born in Chibuto District of Gaza on 22 October 1939. Son of a Methodist Minister. Shangaan tribe. Went to Primary School in Xai-Xai and High School in Lourenco Marques. Left Mozambique as a student for Portugal in 1960 to study medicine. Left Portugal for political reasons for France in 1961. Studied Law in USA. Founder of the National Union of Mozambican Students. Member of FRELIMO since its foundation in 1962. Member of the Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO since 1963. Formerly FRELIMO Secretary for Security and Defence, and for several years in the 1970s in charge of FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Prime Minister in Transitional Government.

Earned a reputation for good administration during the Transitional Government. Urbane, and intelligent. Pragmatic, but probably a devout Marxist-Leninist too. Popular in the country; but, probably because of occasional rumours that he might replace Machel, takes care to remain in background publicly and, when they meet foreign delegations, to defer to Machel, with whom he probably gets on very well: he does not seem to have ambitions to be President.

Married with three children. Speaks very good English and French. His wife is a trained midwife.

PROGRAMME FOR VISIT BY THE MOZAMBICAN FOREIGN MINISTER
SENHOR JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO

SUNDAY 25 JANUARY 1981

2110 Arrive Heathrow, flight No. BA 064 from Dar-es-Salaam. Met by the Secretary of State's Special Representative.

MONDAY 26 JANUARY

1030 Programme discussion at Hyde Park Hotel.

1130 Arrive at FCO for discussions with the Secretary of State.

1245 for 1 pm Lunch hosted by the Secretary of State at 1 Carlton Gardens.

1515 Call on Mr Marten, Minister for Overseas Development.

1630 Call on Governor of Bank of England

PM Attend theatre accompanied by Mr Luce.

TUESDAY 27 JANUARY

0845 Call on Sir Derek Ezra, Chairman of the National Coal Board.

0930 Call on Mr Hamish Gray, Minister of State, Department of Energy.

1030

1130 Call on Prime Minister

1230 for 1245 Lunch hosted by Lord Jellicoe, Chairman of Tate and Lyle and President of London Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

1445 Attend Question Time at House of Commons.

1615 Call on Lord Soames at House of Lords.

1730 Address Southern African Development Coordination Conference Liaison Committee at Chatham House.

WEDNESDAY 28 JANUARY

Visit Port of Liverpool.

THURSDAY 29 JANUARY

0955 Depart Manchester Airport by BA 920 to Brussels.

Mozambique

Top Copy
on Peru visit of Dr. Elias. Dec 80

MFJ

cc Mozambique
Int Sit

22 December 1980

Prime Minister of Peru

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 18 December. She would be prepared to offer Dr. Elias lunch on Monday 26 January preceded by an hour's talks. I fear however that if this engagement is confirmed, we shall have to switch the time at present pencilled in for the Mozambique Foreign Minister. Perhaps we could have a word about this.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

Mozambique.

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS500
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 261140Z JUNE 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 289 OF 26 JUNE
INFO SALISBURY CAPE TOWN

UK/MOZAMBIQUE

1. I PAID MY FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT MACHEL TODAY. HE EXPRESSED GENUINE SORROW AT MY PREMATURE DEPARTURE AND REFERRED IN EMBARRASSINGLY GENEROUS TERMS TO MY WORK AND OUR MANY PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ZIMBABWE. THE SOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM WAS OF TRANSCENDING IMPORTANCE NOT ONLY FOR THE REGION BUT ALSO FOR ITS MUCH WIDER IMPLICATIONS. HE WANTED ONCE AGAIN TO PAY TRIBUTE TO BRITISH STATESMANSHIP. I RETURNED THE COMPLIMENT SAYING THAT BOTH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE ACKNOWLEDGED HIS OWN CONTRIBUTION.

2. WITH THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM HAPPILY SOLVED MOZAMBIQUE NEEDED THE HELP AND COOPERATION OF THE UK, ESPECIALLY IN THE REHABILITATION OF ITS PORTS, RAILWAYS, ROADS, THE SUGAR AND COAL INDUSTRIES. MOZAMBIQUE HAD RECEIVED LITTLE HELP FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO COMPENSATE IT FOR THE LOSSES IT INCURRED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA (HERE I SLIPPED IN A REMINDER OF OUR £20M WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED) NOT TO MENTION THE DEVASTATION CAUSED BY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. HE ASSENTED VIGOROUSLY WHEN I SAID THAT I PRESUMED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO ACTION BY A RHODESIAN REGIME IN REBELLION AGAINST THE BRITISH CROWN. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, BRITAIN HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP WITH MOZAMBIQUE'S DEVELOPMENT. HE HAD NEVER USED THIS PHRASE BEFORE, EITHER IN PUBLIC OR IN PRIVATE BUT HE FELT THAT HE SHOULD SAY THIS TO ME NOW. MOZAMBIQUE WAS A POTENTIALLY RICH COUNTRY. IT NEEDED BRITISH EXPERTISE, MACHINERY AND TECHNOLOGY. WE SHOULD LOOK ON MOZAMBIQUE AS A COUNTRY VERY CLOSELY LINKED WITH THE FORMER BRITISH DEPENDENCIES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

3. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE WERE INDEED ANXIOUS TO PLAY A PART IN MOZAMBIQUE'S DEVELOPMENT. OURS WAS NOT A STATE RUN ECONOMY AND WE COULD NOT DICTATE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HOWEVER, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INITIATIVES BY LORD SOAMES, WE HAD PROMOTED ACTIVE INTEREST AMONG MANY BRITISH FIRMS SOME 16 OF WHICH WERE NOW IN CONTACT WITH SEVERAL STATE CONCERNS COVERING THE AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT MENTIONED BY THE PRESIDENT. AN ECGD OFFICIAL WAS COMING ON 29 JUNE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF THE BANK IS TO VISIT LONDON NEXT MONTH. I HOPED THAT THESE CONTACTS WOULD PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4

4. THE PRESIDENT AGREED AND HOPED THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE MORE RAPID MOVEMENT. MEANTIME HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD FOLLOW UP THEIR EXCHANGES OVER ZIMBABWE BY MEETING IN PERSON. ''PERHAPS MRS THATCHER COULD VISIT MOZAMBIQUE AND I COULD VISIT BRITAIN'' SAID THE PRESIDENT LIGHTHEARTEDLY - BUT I AM SURE HE MEANT IT. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THESE SENTIMENTS.

5. THE PRESIDENT WAS RELAXED AND EXTREMELY FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT THE 45 MINUTE AUDIENCE. HE WAS MORE THAN USUALLY FLUENT AND ELOQUENT AND HIS BRIEF REFERENCE TO OUR ''MORAL'' OBLIGATION TO HELP WAS MADE WITHOUT THE INTENSITY WHICH IS OFTEN A FEATURE OF HIS DELIVERY.

6. HE DID NOT RAISE NAMIBIA: AND, KNOWING THAT MY US COLLEAGUE WHO HAD JUST PRECEDED ME WOULD DO SO, NEITHER DID I.

7. I SHALL REVERT TO THE SUBJECT OF UK/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS IN MY VALEDICTORY.

PAPADOPOULOS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPTL DISTN
CAFD
OADS
ODA
CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

[~~RHODESIA POLICY~~: ADVANCE COPIES]

26 Mozambique

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
Sir L Allinson
~~MR ASPIN~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT ~~(2)~~

ADVANCE COPY

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/UND
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/ERD
HD/NEWS DEPT
~~HD/WAD~~
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 2514107
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 177 OF 25 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY

Read in full.

LORD SOAMES' VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE

1. LORD SOAMES HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL AND ANOTHER WITH CHISSANO AND OFFICIALS. THE WARMTH WITH WHICH HE WAS WELCOMED WAS UNMISTAKEABLE FROM THE START. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED GENUINELY DELIGHTED TO MEET HIM AND TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO HIM PERSONALLY THE SENTIMENTS WHICH HE HAD ALREADY CONVEYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER, MORECVER HE WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE PUBLICLY THE WARMTH OF THE WELCOME AND OF HIS SENTIMENTS TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN. UNBEKNOWN TO US A SIZEABLE GROUP OF VISITING FOREIGN PRESS, AS WELL AS LOCAL JOURNALISTS, HAD BEEN ASSEMBLED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. AFTER THE TALKS THE PRESIDENT LED LORD SOAMES TRIUMPHANTLY TO THE ASSEMBLED CAMERAS.

2. IT CLEARLY EMERGED FROM THE TALKS THEMSELVES THAT MOZAMBIQUE EXPECTS GREAT BENEFITS FROM ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE. THE PRESIDENT CLEARLY HOPES FOR AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG, AS WELL AS PEACEFUL AND STABLE, ZIMBABWE AND FEELS THAT MUGABE HAS BEEN SPEAKING AND ACTING ALONG THE RIGHT LINES. HE EMPHATICALLY AGREED WITH LORD SOAMES THAT MUGABE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RESIST ANY PRESSURE FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT OTHER POLICIES. HE EXPECTS THE MOST IMMEDIATE BENEFITS FOR MOZAMBIQUE TO FLOW FROM A RESUMPTION OF RAIL, ROAD AND AIR TRAFFIC ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE PORT OF BEIRA.

[illegible] THE PRESIDENT TOLD THE PRESS THAT

MOZAMBIQUE TO FLOW FROM A RESUMPTION OF RAIL, ROAD AND AIR TRAFFIC ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE PORT OF BEIRA.

3. ON ANGLO/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE FOUNDATIONS FOR GOOD UK/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS HAD EXISTED FOR SOME TIME AND THAT THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO BUILD THE EDIFICE ITSELF. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION MACHEL SAID, WITHOUT HESTITATION, QUOTE WE DO NOT WANT AID-WE WANT COOPERATION UNQUOTE - A REPLY HEADLINED IN TODAYS NOTICIAS WHICH DEVOTES MOST OF ITS FRONT PAGE TO LORD SOAMES' VISIT. INDEED, AID AS SUCH WAS ONLY BRIEFLY MENTIONED AT THE MEETINGS, THE MOZAMBICANS CONCENTRATING ON THEIR DESIRE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN UK AND MOZAMBIQUE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE , MINERAL RESOURCES, INDUSTRY (QUOTE WE DO NOT WANT TO BE FOR EVER MERE SUPPLIERS OF RAW MATERIALS UNQUOTE) AND, AS A MORE IMMEDIATE TASK, THE REHABILITATION OF RAIL AND ROAD COMMUNICATIONS WITH RHODESIA AND OF BEIRA PORT. THE LATTER WOULD ALSO BENEFIT ZIMBABWE AND INDEED COUNTRIES BEYOND.

4. THE MOZAMBICANS SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO A SUGGESTION BY LORD SOAMES THAT THE EEC MIGHT HELP WITH COMMUNICATIONS GIVEN THE INTERESTS OF NEIGHBOURING LOME COUNTRIES. HE URGED THEM TO DISCUSS MEMBERSHIP THEMSELVES WITH M.CHEYSSON WHO WILL VISIT MAPUTO EARLY IN APRIL. THEY ALSO READILY ACCEPTED THAT UNDER OUR SYSTEM FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH AND OBTAINED FROM PRIVATE FIRMS IN BRITAIN. THESE WOULD EXPECT A SOUND DEAL AND A FAIR RETURN FOR THEIR INVESTMENT. CHISSANO READILY ASSENTED: MOZAMBIQUE HAD ALREADY MADE DEALS WITH OTHER WESTERN FIRMS (I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT A US DOLLAR 200M ELECTRIFICATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATED WITH A FRANCE/ITALIAN CONSORTIUM): AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER GOOD TERMS AND CONSIDER JOINT VENTURES.

5. THE MOZAMBICANS HALF EXPECTED US TO INDICATE AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN WHICH QUOTE BRITAIN UNQUOTE WOULD BE INTERESTED. HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT WE WOULD REQUIRE DETAILS BEFORE WE USED THE GOVERNMENT MACHINERY TO BRING TO THE NOTICE OF BRITISH FIRMS OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THEY PROMISED TO LET ME HAVE SUCH DETAILS: WE AGREED THAT, ONCE WE HAD THEM WE WOULD CONVEY THEM TO LIKELY FIRMS AND ENCOURAGE AN OUTWARD MISSION. WE ALSO AGREED THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR A MOZAMBICAN MISSION TO GO TO THE UK.

6. ALL IN ALL THIS WAS A MOST SUCCESSFUL VISIT. POLITICALLY IT HAS DONE NOTHING BUT GOOD FOR MACHEL TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN HIS SPECIAL REGARD FOR BRITAIN: AND TO BE SEEN TO WANT CLOSER RELATIONS WITH US AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. LORD SOAMES WAS HARDLY PRESSED ON AID THOUGH HE DID HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND THE MOZAMBICANS THAT WE HAVE PROVIDED A NOT INCONSIDERABLE AMOUNT. ON TRADE AND AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION THE MOZAMBICANS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS NOT A PROVIDER OF FINANCE BUT AS A CHANNEL FOR INFORMING AND ENCOURAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

ROLE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS NOT A PROVIDER OF FINANCE BUT AS A CHANNEL FOR INFORMING AND ENCOURAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE QUESTION OF ECGD COVER WAS NOT RAISED. THIS WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO SECURE MAJOR BUSINESS FOR BRITISH FIRMS. I SHALL RETURN TO THE SUBJECT WHEN, AS I HOPE, WE GET MORE DETAILS FOR THE MOZAMBICANS ABOUT THEIR DEVELOPMENT PLANS.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT AT 2516Ø9Z JYB
RECD AT 2516Ø9ZDW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM SALISBURY 251730Z MAR 80

TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1161 OF 25 MARCH 1980
INFO ROUTINE MAPUTO

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.
MOZAMBIQUE
1. ON MACHEL'S INVITATION, I HAVE JUST SPENT 24 HOURS IN MAPUTO. AS EXPECTED, I WAS RECEIVED IN VERY FRIENDLY MANNER. THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE REPORTING ON THE MEETINGS I HAD WITH MACHEL AND CHISSANO, AND WILL BE MAKING CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND MOZAMBIQUE. I THINK IT WORTH MAKING THE IMMEDIATE POINT, HOWEVER, THAT WE (OR RATHER THE WEST) DO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP WITH MOZAMBIQUE THAT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STRATEGIC POLITICO PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.
2. BUT THAT RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BEBUILT ON FINE WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPAIHY. IF WE TAKE WHAT I WAS TOLD BY BOTH MINISTERS AT FACE VALUE, THEY ARE GENUINELY LOOKING FOR COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE RESOURCES OF CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL, ESPECIALLY MINERAL, AGRICULTURAL, FISHING AND TOURISM. I OF COURSE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THEIR HOPES MAY BE JUSTIFIED. NOR DO I KNOW HOW STARRY EYED AND UNRELATED TO REALITY THEIR PRESENT PLANNING (SUCH AS IT IS) MAY BE. THE AMBASSADOR WILL REPORT. BUT IT DOES AT LEAST SEEM POSSIBLE THAT, IF THEY ARE SENSIBLE ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH AN ADEQUATE FINANCIAL REGIME FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS, THERE WILL BE SOME PROFIT TO BE MADE FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. TO THIS END, AND TO THE POLITICAL END, THE WEST MUST SHOW THEMSELVES WILLING TO AT LEAST DISCUSS WAYS AND MEANS IN WHICH WE CAN COOPERATE IN THE DEVLOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, IF WE WERE TO PLAY OUR PART BY DISCUSSING THEIR PLANS WITH THEM AND ENCOURAGING POTENTIAL INVESTORS: TOGETHER WITH SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERHAPS IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION (? ENGLISH TEACHING), IT NEED NOT LEAD US INTO A COSTLY AID PROGRAMME.
3. FRENCH, ITALIAN, GERMAN AND US BUSINESSMEN HAVE BEEN AT WORK FOR A WHILE ALREADY AND COME TO SOME USEFUL ARRANGEMENTS.

FCO PASS MAPUTO

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

SOAMES

FILES
C AFR D
OAD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR MARTEN ODA
PS/PUS
SIR D MACLENNAN
MR DAY
SIR C ALLISON

COPIES TO:
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
PS/SOFS FOR TRADE
PS/CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
DOT (CRED DN)
MR FOGERTY } ODA
MR LYNCH }

CONFIDENTIAL

Mozambique.

RESTRICTED

GPS 360
RESTRICTED
FM MAPUTO 191045Z MARCH 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 166 OF 19 MARCH
INFO SALISBURY
INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN

INTERNAL SITUATION

1. IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS ''POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL OFFENSIVE'' PRESIDENT MACHEL YESTERDAY ADDRESSED A SPECIALLY CONVENED RALLY IN MAPUTO TO WHICH THE ENTIRE DIPLOMATIC CORP WAS ALSO BIDDEN. HIS FOUR AND A HALF HOUR SPEECH FELL ROUGHLY IN 4 PARTS. FIRST HE RECALLED THE EVILS OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A VERY LONG AND DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE GROSS DEFICIENCIES, MALADMINISTRATION, INCOMPETENCE, NEGLECT, DISHONESTY AND ''SABOTAGE'' WHICH HE DISCOVERED DURING HIS VISITS TO MANY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, STATE CONCERNS, FACTORIES, PORTS, AIRPORTS ETC SINCE HE LAUNCHED THE ''OFFENSIVE'' EARLIER THIS YEAR. NEXT THE PRESIDENT ACCUSED THE ''INTERNAL ENEMY'', FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE ENEMY, DIRECTED AND ABETTED FROM OUTSIDE (HE MENTIONED ONLY THE FORMER RHODESIAN ''RACIST REGIME''), HAD INFILTRATED AND UNDERMINED EVERY SECTOR OF THE GOVERNMENT MACHINERY TRYING TO CREATE CHAOS AND DISCREDIT THE PARTY AND SOCIALISM.

2. THE REST OF HIS SPEECH DESCRIBED REMEDIAL MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, IN WHAT HE CALLED A ''DECLARATION OF WAR ON THE INTERNAL ENEMY'':

(1) IRON DISCIPLINE TO FIND OUT AND PUNISH THE SABOTEURS.
(2) RATIONING TO BE INTRODUCED IN MAPUTO, BEIRA AND NAMPULA.
(3) SABOTEURS AND UNEMPLOYED TO BE MOVED OUT OF MAPUTO FOR PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURAL WORK IN A SURROUNDING ''GREEN ZONE''.
(4) THE PEOPLE'S SHOPS TO BE CLOSED, TURNED INTO COOPERATIVES OR RETURNED TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE.
(5) FIRMS TO OPERATE PROFITABLY, GOVERNMENT SERVANTS PRODUCTIVELY: PRICES TO BE RAISED TO ECONOMIC LEVELS.
(6) SOME SMALL BUSINESSES TO BE RETURNED FROM STATE TO PRIVATE HANDS.

/3.

RESTRICTED

3. MACHEL'S REVELATIONS ABOUT THE APPALLING DEFICIENCIES IN VIRTUALLY EVERY GOVERNMENT-RUN ENTERPRISE CAME AS NO SURPRISE: BUT HIS DIAGNOSIS IS RATHER LESS CONVINCING. ONE HARDLY EXPECTED HIM TO BLAME THE SYSTEM: BUT HE REALLY WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO DEFEND SOCIALISM. NONE OF THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED WILL PRODUCE EARLY IMPROVEMENTS. INSTEAD OF ANY ADMISSION OF MISTAKES BY THE LEADERSHIP, ''REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE'' IS TO BE USED ON SCAPE-GOATS. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON SOME, REPLACEMENTS WILL BE HARD TO FIND AND IT IS BOUND TO SCARE HONEST, SINCERE BUT INEXPERIENCED YOUNG MANAGERS TO THE POINT OF GIVING UP, THUS PROBABLY MAKING WAY FOR EVEN MORE INCOMPETENT SYCOPHANTS AND PARTY BOOT-LICKERS.

PAPADOPOULOS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

DEPARTMENTAL DIST:
CAFD
OADS
ECON.D
FRD
TRED
CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

HS

c. Market set

Rhodesia Situation Pt 16.

La Mozambique.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1980

Dear Robin,

Call by Mr. Cabaco

As you know, President Machel's envoy, Mr. Cabaco, called on the Prime Minister earlier today. He was accompanied by Mr. Honwana and his Private Secretary, Mr. Come. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Luce were also present.

Mr. Cabaco said that he had been sent by President Machel to convey the President's congratulations on the happy outcome in Rhodesia. Mozambique, like the entire international community, was enthusiastic about the outcome. The other countries of the region were already feeling the benefits of peace. South Africa would have to tackle the problem of finding a solution to its problems in a shorter term than had previously seemed likely. However the most immediate problem was Namibia. In the spirit of the close co-operation between Britain and Mozambique in recent months, talks had already begun between the two countries about Namibia.

Mr. Cabaco said that in President Machel's view, Britain had achieved new status in Africa. Britain and Africa had been reconciled. British colonialism no longer existed. Throughout the Rhodesian negotiations, Britain and Mozambique had been allies. Their tactical objectives had on occasions differed but the goal had always been the same. President Machel had greatly appreciated the frankness with which HMG had communicated with him. The two countries should now aim to continue as allies in consolidating what had been built so far. President Machel hoped that a British delegation would come to Mozambique soon to discuss the economic consolidation of Zimbabwe and of the region and the strengthening of bilateral links between Britain and Mozambique.

The Prime Minister said that the success in Rhodesia would not have been possible without President Machel's help. Help offered quickly when asked for and in time of need was the help most appreciated. HMG were delighted with the outcome in Rhodesia. Zimbabwe would start as an independent nation with the goodwill and confidence of the world as a whole. This was a wonderful start. The country was rich in resources and had a great future. Britain would continue to take a major interest in the region. We had historic ties with it. It would be essential to try to bring South Africa along. The other countries in the region should try to encourage the South African Government when they took

RESTRICTED

/ positive

positive action such as a reduction in discrimination. It was essential that all the countries in the area should work together for the good of the region.

As regards President Machel's invitation, the Prime Minister said that she was pleased to have been asked to help. It seemed to her an excellent idea for a team to go out to Mozambique. She suggested, however, that it might be wise to wait until it was a little clearer what was happening in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister concluded the discussion by asking Mr. Cabaco to carry her best wishes to President Machel.

I enclose a copy of the text of the letter left with the Prime Minister by Mr. Cabaco.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 March 1980

Dear Michael,

Cabaco
Honwana.

Call on the Prime Minister by
President Machel's Envoy:
Monday 10 March

President Machel's envoy is to call on the Prime Minister on Monday 10 March at 12.45 pm. Sr Cabaco, who is Minister of Transport and Communications, will be accompanied by Sr Honwana, Presidential adviser on Foreign Affairs, and his Private Secretary Sr Come. Lord Carrington, who will be seeing Sr Cabaco beforehand proposes to accompany him to the meeting with the Prime Minister. Thereafter, Mr Luce will be giving a small lunch at Lancaster House for Sr Cabaco and Sr Honwana.

/ I enclose a brief, with personality notes.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing St
London

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MACHEL'S ENVOY: 10 MARCH 1980

POINTS TO MAKE

RHODESIA

1. Grateful for President Machel's help both during the Lancaster House conference and during the interim period. Please convey thanks to President Machel.

2. Mr Mugabe faces an extremely delicate task. His early statements on the need for reconciliation have been admirable. He should adopt policies which will secure the widest possible support in the country.

3. President Machel has clearly given Mr Mugabe much good advice. Hope that he will urge on him need for continued moderation, and to create conditions in which Whites will wish to stay.

4. Sorry it was not possible for Governor to meet President Machel. But grateful for Mr Honwana's useful work in Salisbury (as head of Liaison Office).

5. Rhodesia's relations with South Africa will need to be handled with particular care. The economic and trade link is vital to Rhodesia's economy.

ANGLO-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS

6. Look forward to maintaining friendly relations with Mozambique and increasing trade between our two countries. Hope there can be further Ministerial visits in each direction.

7. [If question of British aid is raised]. Glad that Britain was able to give substantial food aid in January. All overseas aid programmes now under review, but naturally ready to consider specific proposals by Mozambique Government.

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT MACHEL'S ENVOY: 10 MARCH 1980

RHODESIA

1. President Machel is sending a special envoy to London to convey his personal 'thanks and congratulations' to the Prime Minister for her handling of the Rhodesia issue. The envoy is Senhor Cabaço, Minister of Transport and Communications and Mozambique's observer at the Lancaster House Conference. He will be accompanied by Senhor Fernando Honwana, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the President, who also attended the Lancaster House Conference and was Mozambique's Liaison Officer in Salisbury in the pre-election period. Personality notes are attached.

2. President Machel has been surprisingly helpful during the Lancaster House Conference and the transitional period. He made it clear to Mr Mugabe on several occasions that he wanted an end to the guerilla war which was wreaking havoc with Mozambique's economy. Apart from damage caused by Rhodesian raids on roads and communications, Mozambique bore the burden of 150,000 refugees.

ANGLO/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS

3. Mozambique is a one party state. Partly as a result of the help it received during the war against the Portuguese, Mozambique has close links with the Soviet Union. But Machel is not a Soviet puppet; he is quite prepared to take an independent line where Mozambique's interests differ from those of the Soviet Union, as in the case of Rhodesia and trade links with South Africa.

4. We have had normal diplomatic relations with Mozambique since it became independent in 1975. Our present Ambassador, Mr Papadopoulos, has established a close relationship with President Machel and his Ministers since his arrival in Maputo last October.

5. British trade with Mozambique has been limited because of the country's poverty and its policy of nationalisation. But President Machel has recently expressed an interest in increasing economic links with the West, and trade prospects are improving. Several British companies, including British Leyland and British Midland Airways, have interests in Mozambique.

AID

6. Four loans totalling £22.5m were made to Mozambique in the period 1976-78. All this money has been allocated but not completely spent.

.../In

AID....cont'd

In January this year, in response to a request from President Machel, we agreed to give food aid comprising 15,000 tons of cereals worth about £2m.

Central African Department
7 March 1980

CABAÇO, JOSE LUIS OLIVEIRA (pronounced CABASSO)

Minister of Transport and Communications, Mozambique.

Born in Lourenco Marques (Maputo) in 1942. White. Studied at Coimbra University Law Faculty, Portugal, 1959-61. Studied Sociology in Italy 1966-71. Worked as a journalist and as a public relations officer in Lourenco Marques. Joined the nationalist party FRELIMO in 1974, and became Minister of Information in the Transitional Government 1975 and later Minister of Transport. Appointed to the FRELIMO Central Committee February 1977.

A vigorous and effective Minister; his Ministry is concerned with a number of British aid projects. Attended the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, September-October 1979, as an official Mozambique observer. Speaks reasonable English.

HONWANA, FERNANDO

Special Assistant to the President of Mozambique.

Born 1950. Attended secondary school in Swaziland, then read politics at University of York 1971-74. Has excellent command of English. Appointed Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs to President Machel in 1975 and invariably accompanies him on overseas visits. Works closely with him on Rhodesia; attended Lancaster House Conference from start to finish. Headed Mozambique Liaison Office in Salisbury January-March 1980.

SUBJECT.

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

cc. Master

Maputo, 7th of March, 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 50A/80

I wish to reiterate our congratulations for the happy outcome of the process in Zimbabwe.

We admire and applaud the personal courage you have often shown.

We are convinced that History will record that you have achieved in a few months what successive British Governments were unable to do in 15 Years.

I am sending you, madam, Mr. José Luís Cabaço, Minister of Transport and Communications of my Government, to transmit our feelings personally.

The Right Honourable
MARGARET THATCHER
Prime Minister
LONDON

I would be grateful if you received him and accepted what he transmits on my behalf.

Highest Consideration

SAMORA MOISES MACHEL
President of People's Republic of
Moçambique

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

Maputo, aos 7 de Março de 1980.

Minha Senhora e amiga,

Quero por este meio reiterar as nossas felicitações pela feliz conclusão do processo do Zimbabwe.

A coragem pessoal que Vossa Excelência por várias vezes demonstrou conquistou a nossa admiração e o nosso aplauso.

É nossa convicção que a História registará que Vossa Excelência logrou em poucos meses aquilo que sucessivos governos britânicos, ao longo de 15 anos, não conseguiram realizar.

Para transmitir de viva voz estes nossos sentimentos, envio a Vossa Excelência o Senhor José Luís Cabaço, Ministro dos Transportes e Comunicações do meu Governo.

Sua Excelência
MARGARET TATCHER
Primeiro Ministro do Governo Britânico
Londres

Agraceço que o receba e lhe dê crédito no que em meu nome lhe vai transmitir.

Alta Consideração.

SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL

Presidente da República Popular de Moçambique

IMMEDIATE

NO DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPY

No 10 Downing St.

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL
FROM SALISBURY 071621Z MAR 80

Cabaco
Honwana.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 991 OF 7 MARCH 1980

Read in full.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING URGENTLY TO NUMBER 10.

PERSONAL FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM GOVERNOR:

I AM SO GLAD THAT YOU ARE SEEING MR CABACO, THE EMISSARY FROM MACHEL. I DO NOT KNOW IF YOU ARE AWARE HOW MUCH OF A GOOD INFLUENCE MACHEL HAS BEEN ON MUGABE. HE IS WELL AWARE OF THE MISTAKES HE HIMSELF HAS MADE BY FOLLOWING AN ABSURDLY RADICAL POLICY IN MOZAMBIQUEHAND HAS DONE ALL HE CAN TO PERSUADE MUGABE NOT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES. HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE THE MAN WITH THE GREATEST INFLUENCE OVER MUGABE IN TIME TO COME, AND STRANGE AS IT MAY SEEM HE WILL, I BELIEVE, BE AN INFLUENCE FOR MODERATION. I HOPE YOU WILL BEAR THIS IN MIND WHEN YOU RECEIVE CABACO.

2. CABACO IS BEING ACCOMPANIED TO LONDON BY A HIGHLY INTELLIGENT YOUNG MAN CALLED FERNANDO HONWANA, WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO MACHEL AND HAS BEEN HIS REPRESENTATIVE HERE IN SALISBURY FOR SOME TIME. HE I SUSPECT WILL CONTINUE TO BE MACHEL'S LIAISON WITH MUGABE AND WILL ALSO, I BELIEVE, BE A SOBERING INFLUENCE. IF HONWANA COMES WITH CABACO (WHICH I HOPE HE WILL) IT WOULD BE GOOD IF YOU COULD TELL HIM HOW MUCH WE AND I IN PARTICULAR HAVE VALUED OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SPARE TIME ENOUGH FOR THEM, AND THAT THEY MAY BE ENTERTAINED AND PATTED BY SENIOR FCO MINISTER.

SOAMES

NNNN

[RHODESIAN POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 34

Mozambique

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GPS 570
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 041055Z JAN 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NO 011 OF 4 JANUARY 1980
INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON

MIPT : UK/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS

1. YOU WILL KNOW FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING, COOPERATION HAS BEEN A RECURRING THEME OF MACHEL'S AT OUR MEETINGS STARTING WITH OUR TALK AT MY CREDENTIALS CEREMONY (MY TEL NO 315 OF 12 OCTOBER), AND THAT I HAVE BEEN GETTING THE SAME SORT OF MESSAGE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES, NOTABLY FROM THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS ALSO BEEN GETTING THE SAME MESSAGE, MOST RECENTLY DURING HIS TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AFTER MY MEETING YESTERDAY (WHEN MACHEL ACKNOWLEDGED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LATEST MESSAGE URGING CONTINUED HELP OVER RHODESIA).

2. THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY WHICH HE HEADS PROPOUND A MARXIST IDEOLOGY, MACHEL SEEMS DETERMINED TO AVOID BECOMING ANOTHER SOVIET SATELLITE. THE ASSISTANCE WHICH MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND CUBA - IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AND VARIOUS FORMS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION - HAS BROUGHT LITTLE VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT TO THE ECONOMY. I BELIEVE THAT MACHEL, IF HE CAN POSSIBLY AVOID IT, WOULD NOT PAY THE PRICE FOR MORE MEANINGFUL

VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT TO THE ECONOMY. I BELIEVE THAT MACHEL, IF HE CAN POSSIBLY AVOID IT, WOULD NOT PAY THE PRICE FOR MORE MEANINGFUL SOVIET AID. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED HERE THAT HE TURNED DOWN A SOVIET REQUEST FOR FACILITIES AT THE DEEP WATER PORT OF NACALA: AND I HAVE IT FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES, INCLUDING THE WELL-INFORMED CHINESE AMBASSADOR, THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO MAPUTO IN LATE NOVEMBER THE SOVIET VICE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE TRIED SOME BLACKMAIL BY SEEKING PAYMENT FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN FOREIGN CURRENCY WHICH HE KNEW THE MOZAMBICANS DO NOT HAVE. THE MOZAMBICANS APPARENTLY WERE NOT AMENABLE TO SUCH PRESSURES.

3. MACHEL IS PRAGMATIC ENOUGH TO MAKE NO APOLOGIES FOR TRADING WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THAT HE HAS SO FAR RETAINED CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET BLOC IS IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH COMES IN FROM SOUTH AFRICA. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE STRONGLY PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD NOT MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STEER MOZAMBIQUE TOWARDS SUBSERVIENCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, THE LESSON OF AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT HAVE BEEN LOST ON MACHEL AND I JUDGE THE MOMENT RIPE FOR THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY US AND THE US, TO RESPOND TO THE MOZAMBICANS' OVERTURES. I SUGGEST THAT WE DO SO IN THREE WAYS: FIRST, WE SHOULD OFFER FOOD AID, IN RESPONSE TO THEIR APPEAL OF LAST NOVEMBER (MY TEL NO 392 OF 13 NOVEMBER 1979). WE WERE IN ANY CASE CONTEMPLATING SUCH AID. IF ONLY THROUGH THEIR PERFORMANCE SO FAR OVER RHODESIA THE MOZAMBICANS HAVE SURELY EARNED IT. SECOND, WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER WITH THE MOZAMBICANS A NEW TRANCHE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (IN RESPONSE TO MACHEL'S APPEAL CONVEYED IN MY TEL NO 511 OF 24 DECEMBER 1979) FOR THE REHABILITATION OF PORTS, RAILWAYS AND ROADS WHERE BRITISH INDUSTRY WOULD HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY - AND WOULD OF COURSE DIRECTLY BENEFIT RHODESIA (TEL NO MODEV 88 OF 8 AUGUST 1979 REFERS). AND THIRD, ENCOURAGE BRITISH BUSINESSMEN TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT MOZAMBIQUE AND THE MOZAMBICANS TO OFFER ATTRACTIVE TERMS TO POTENTIAL INVESTORS.

4. IT HAS BEEN DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED THAT MACHEL'S SUPPORT WAS CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. WE MUST TAKE HIM AT HIS WORD WHEN HE ASSERTS THAT HE HAS NO ULTERIOR MOTIVES IN RHODESIA AND THAT HE WILL BE HAPPY TO WORK WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THE ELECTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT BY COOPERATING WITH THE MOZAMBICANS WE WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO RETAIN THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION AND TO RESIST ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO INFILTRATE RHODESIA THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE. I THEREFORE FEEL THAT SOME RESPONSE FROM US, EVEN IF NO COMMITTAL AT THIS STAGE, IS URGENTLY NEEDED.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 31

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
MR FIFOOT LEGAL ADVISER RM K164

GPS 470
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MAPUTO 040700Z JANUARY 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 4 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY PRETORIA WASHINGTON

UK/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS

1. PRESIDENT MACHEL SENT FOR ME YEFTERDAY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS KEEPING HIMSELF INFORMED OF OUR LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS AND WAS ANXIOUS THAT THEY SHOULD WORK WELL TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. HE HAD ISSUED ORDERS FOR WALCOT TO BE ISSUED WITH A SPECIAL PASS TO ENABLE HIM TO SEE MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY INCLUDING REFUGEE CAMPS. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE TO HIS TEAM IN SALISBURY. IT WAS A STRONG TEAM BECAUSE HE ATTACHED MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THEIR TASK. HE ALSO HOPED THAT WE WOULD ISSUE VISAS SOON TO ALVES GOMES AND THE 2 OTHER MOZAMBICAN JOURNALISTS (TELS EGDING WITH MY TELNO 17) AS HE WAS ANXIOUS FOR HIS PEOP TO HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS OF EVENTS IN RHODESIA. HE SAID THAT GOMES'S REPORTING OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN FACTUAL, NON-SENSATIONAL AND HELPFUL (I DID NOT DISSENT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN ONE OR TWO LAPSES).

2. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT HIS MAIN REASON FOR WISHING TO SEE ME

2. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT HIS MAIN REASON FOR WISHING TO SEE ME WAS TO ASK ME TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS ADMIRATION AND APPRECIATION FOR HER HANDLING OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM. SHE HAD SHOWN POLITICAL COURAGE AND DETERMINATION COUPLED WITH ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO SECURE AGREEMENT FOR FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, WITHOUT VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION, LEADING TO A TRULY INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WHICH WOULD NO DOUBT ELECT TO STAY IN THE COMMONWEALTH. MOZAMBIQUE WISHED TO COOPERATE WITH US, NOT ONLY OVER CURRENT PROBLEMS SUCH AS MILITARY LIAISON AND REFUGEES, BUT ALSO BY MAKING AVAILABLE HER PORTS, RAILWAYS, ROADS ETC. HE AGAIN THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER LAST MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 187) AND FOR THE HELP AND COURTESIES SHOWN TO HIS REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON - HE WAS TOUCHED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD HERSELF HAVE TAKEN THE TROUBLE TO SPEAK TO HONWANA - AND SENT SEASONAL GREETINGS.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE HIS MESSAGE AND HIS ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED GOODWILL AND COOPERATION. A START WAS BEING MADE ODAY WITH TALKS IN SALISBURY ON COMMUNICATIONS AND IN LONDON ON RHODESIAN REFUGEES. (HE ASSENTED EMPHATICALLY WHEN I SAID, IN PARENTHESIS, THAT WE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO AN ORDERLY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN NUMBERS WHICH WOULD NOT OVERTAX THE CAREFUL PREPARATIONS BEIFG MADE IN RHODESIA). WHILE WE WERE HAPPY TO HAVE SET IN MOTION THESE CONTACTS, IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO POINT OUR THAT IN HIS SHORT ADMINISTRATION THE GOVERNOR'S MOST PRESSING PRIORITIES WERE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT WOULD FLOW FROM THEM. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD: BUT HE ALSO ENVISAGED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UK ITSELF AND MOZAMBIQUE. HIS OFFICIALS WOULD BE GIVING ME SOME IDEAS NEXT WEEK.

4. AS IN ALL MY PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM MACHEL WAS WARM, FRIENDLY AND EARNEST. HE AVOIDED AWKWARD SUBJECTS AND I BELIEVE THAT HE DELIBERATELY LEFT HIS CONCERN OVER THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA FOR THE US AMBASSADOR WHOM HE SAW A LITTLE LATER.

5. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

vb Mozambique

21 September 1979

Assistance for Mozambique

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 20 September on this subject. She has commented on the apparent inconsistency, at least in policy terms, of paragraphs 2 and 5.

M O'D B

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(2)

Interesting - but
please 2 or 4
just quick comments.
!

M.T.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 September 1979

Prime Minister

Dear Michael,

Assistance for Mozambique

In your letter of 3 September, you said that the Prime Minister had asked why we were sending any aid to Mozambique next year.

The aid which we shall be giving to Mozambique next year was promised in four legally binding agreements concluded in 1976, 1977 and 1978. If we intended to stop this aid, we should have either to denounce the agreements unilaterally or refuse to implement them.

When he was consulted earlier this year about the Mozambique programme, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took the view that it would not be wise to take any positive steps to cut off aid to Mozambique while we were engaged in consultations about Rhodesia. In view of the continued importance of Mozambique in the search for a settlement (as well as of the potential commercial benefits that have been generated by our programme) Lord Carrington would consider it inadvisable immediately to cut off our programme for Mozambique. But administrative delay and other means will be used to reduce the rate of expenditure as much as possible.

Very little of the programme involves direct transfers of cash - the transfers are overwhelmingly of goods and of services of UK origin.

The previous government allocated 15,000 tonnes of food to Mozambique (which is suffering from a drought) as part of the "national actions" programme which member countries of the EEC undertake annually. On taking office Ministers agreed to let the proposed allocations stand: however, the food aid has not yet been consigned to Mozambique, and may be reviewed by Lord Carrington in the light of developments over Rhodesia (we would obviously wish to be sure that the aid was not being used to supply ZANU guerrillas based in Mozambique).

No new pledge of bilateral capital assistance for Mozambique has been made since 3 May.

Yours sincerely,

Ray Pringle

PP. (R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

20 SEP 1979

CONFIDENTIAL TMW

BF 10-9-79

3 September 1979

Aid to Mozambique

The Prime Minister has seen Stephen Wall's letter to Bryan Cartledge of 29 August on this subject. She has noted the figures for actual expenditure on aid to Mozambique, and that it will be lower next year than this. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister has asked why we are sending any aid to Mozambique next year.

MO'DBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

You asked for this information. JSW 30/8

29 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

Meeting Between the Prime Minister and President Zia of Bangladesh

Clive Whitmore's letter of 2 August to George Walden recorded a reference by the Prime Minister to the aid programme to Mozambique.

We sent you on 24 July a note about the aid programme in Mozambique, which set out the extent of commitments and expenditure under the aid pledged to Mozambique over the last three years. I enclose a further copy for ease of reference. You may, for your background information, wish to be aware that this note shows that £22.5m is the total of capital aid pledged since 1976: it is not the annual level of aid expenditure on Mozambique. Actual expenditure on Mozambique in the current financial year is in fact expected to be £5.1m; and next year we estimate that it will be £4.8m.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Why are we spending any next year?

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

AID TO MOZAMBIQUE

1. Summary

	£m
Programme Loan 1976	5
Programme Loan 1977	5
Project Loan 1977	10
Programme Loan 1978	2.5
	£22.5m

2. Details

i) Programme Loan 1976: (£5m). £4.8m already spent. All orders have been placed and most goods and equipment have arrived in Mozambique. These include trucks, landrovers, bus chassis, vehicle and aircraft spares, textile machinery and electrical equipment.

ii) Programme Loan 1977: (£5m). Fully allocated in loan agreement, though orders for only £0.5m actually placed. No equipment has arrived yet. Loan includes sugar machinery, telecommunications equipment and vehicles.

iii) Project Loan 1977: (£10m). £6m committed to roads project and £1.9m committed to power project. Expenditure to date £2.9m. Roads will be built in Gaza and Cabo Delgado provinces with British consultants financed under technical cooperation. Plant and equipment all ordered, and consultants due to arrive this summer. Power station project is at Quelimane: equipment has been ordered, some is on site and British engineers have started installation.

iv) Programme Loan 1978: (£2.5m). Fully allocated. Orders for £1.4m have been placed and paid, but remainder not yet finally ordered. Loan includes aeronautical telecommunications equipment.

3. Present expenditure position (latest estimates in £m)

	Spent	Unspent but allocated	Unallocated
1976 Loan (£5m)	4.8	0.2	-
1977 Loan (£5m)	-	5	-
1977 Loan (£10m)	2.9	5	2.1
1978 Loan (£2.5m)	1.4	1.1	-
Totals (£22.5m)	£9.1	£11.3	£2.1

/4.

4. In addition to these capital aid commitments, we are committed to technical cooperation activities amounting to approximately £3m. The largest element in this is the roads consultancy (which cannot be terminated without incurring a substantial cancellation charge).

5. These figures exclude food aid. We have a "national action" commitment to provide 15000 tonnes (which if provided in the form of wheat would cost about £1.6m) but this has not yet been implemented.

Central and Southern Africa Department
Overseas Development Administration

24 July 1979.

30 AUG 1979

Original on Commonwealth, July 79 GHGM - Bilateral Mtgs.

cc TSY CO

JS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

2 August 1979

Dear George.

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT ZIA OF BANGLADESH

When President Zia of Bangladesh, who was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and the Bangladeshi High Commissioner in London, entertained the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to breakfast today in his villa in Mulungushi Village, Lusaka, the discussion concentrated almost wholly on British aid to Bangladesh.

The President said that Bangladesh had a major problem in trying to feed itself. The World Bank had recently reported that the Bangladeshi agricultural programme should be four times its present size. Food imports were at a high level, nothwithstanding successful efforts in recent years to increase food production. This year food imports would be even higher than usual because his country was suffering from an unprecedented drought. They also had difficulties in the field of energy, though in the long term this should not be a problem. Bangladesh had enormous reserves of coal and its reserves of natural gas were estimated to be the eleventh largest in the world. No oil had yet been discovered but a number of oil firms, including BP, were showing an interest once more in exploration. In the immediate future, however, Bangladesh was very dependent, in both the industrial and agricultural fields, on foreign aid. He understood the reasons why the United Kingdom was contemplating making reductions in the aid which it gave to his country and he wondered whether it might ease our difficulties if our assistance took the form of long-term loans.

The Bangladeshi High Commissioner then gave some examples of the activities of British firms in Bangladesh. A company known as Imeg, which was being backed by a consortium of American, Swiss, German and British banks, was negotiating for a contract to explore a natural gas field, convert the gas into LNG and then export it. Bangladesh's natural gas potential was huge: there were proven reserves of 9,000 billion cubic feet. There were extensive opportunities for British firms to exploit. The President added that the Americans had described Bangladesh as "floating on a sea of gas".

The High Commissioner continued that following a conversation with the British Secretary of State for Employment, his Government were now in touch with British firms about the development of the fishing potential of the Bay of Bengal. The United Kingdom was also one of the biggest participants in a consortium that was constructing a large petro-chemical plant for the production of fertilisers. This was a typical aid project and its successful completion would have considerable

/ benefits

benefits at a number of levels of the economy right down to individual peasant farmers. The scheme was now approaching its final phase, but unfortunately, as part of its plans for reducing its aid programme, the United Kingdom was now threatening to cut back its contribution, even though the orders for the equipment which was needed to finish the plant had already been placed. In 1978/79 Britain had disbursed aid worth £40 million to Bangladesh. The comparable figure for 1979/80 was estimated to be £66 million. Britain was now proposing to limit expenditure in 1979/80 to the 1978/79 level. Much of current expenditure was required to finance projects which had been started as long ago as 1972 and which, like the petro-chemical plant, were now well advanced. Similarly, there were technical assistance programmes which were already being implemented but which now appeared to be jeopardised by the proposed cuts in the British aid programme. Bangladesh had planned to send 320 students to the United Kingdom in the present year. Of these, some 90 were either already in the United Kingdom or were virtually on their way when the order to freeze the programme came. The rest had been preparing to leave for Britain but had now been told to stand down. This sudden turn of events had inevitably had political repercussions in his country. The possibility of reductions in British aid had come as a severe shock to the system in Bangladesh. The sums of money involved were a drop in the ocean for Britain, but for Bangladesh they were substantial. If necessary, Britain should give Bangladesh special treatment. Bangladesh had been receiving aid for only eight years, whereas India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had been enjoying British assistance for over thirty years. It was unjust - and he used this word advisedly even though he recognised that it was a strong term - for Britain to treat his country in exactly the same way as others when cuts in aid had to be made. Bangladesh had given 1½ million lives for democracy, and it should therefore be protected. Britain had a special relevance in this situation. Moreover, Britain not only gained the direct and immediate benefits of the exports tied to its aid for Bangladesh, but the future leaders of the country who were being educated in the United Kingdom would be encouraged to look to Britain to help meet Bangladesh's needs in the long term.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that President Zia and the High Commissioner had made a very eloquent case against any reduction in Britain's aid to Bangladesh. Unfortunately, many other countries could make exactly the same case. It had to be borne in mind that Britain was already giving aid only to deserving countries. If we said that we could no longer afford to maintain our aid programme at its planned level, this was bound to seem unjust to countries like Bangladesh. But the British Government faced major economic problems. It had inherited from its predecessor public expenditure programmes which the country could no longer afford and which therefore had to be reduced. It would be impossible to convince the British public that the United Kingdom's aid programme should be left untouched, when other public expenditure programmes such as the education service, housing and the road programme were being reduced.

The Prime Minister said that the cut in the aid programme was in fact very small. She had come to listen to what President Zia had to say, and she recognised that there were longstanding projects which were coming to maturity this year and next. She understood the difficulties that would arise if these programmes were denied adequate finance in their final stages. The British Government would review their aid programme to Bangladesh project by project before deciding on any changes as a result of the need to cut public expenditure. If the problem of Rhodesia could be solved, it would no longer be necessary to give aid to Mozambique, which was running at £22 million in the present year.

/ After she had

After she had left President Zia's villa, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to arrange for a review of our aid programme to Bangladesh to be carried out on the lines she had described to the President. She also said that we should look closely for savings in our aid programmes which were not tied to British exports. It was a pity that we could not make more use of the European Community's food surpluses for countries like Bangladesh which were having very real difficulties in feeding their populations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had instituted a study to see how to make the best use of the available money in the aid programme. There was at present some disagreement about what our approach should be. There were those on the one hand who argued that we should concentrate our aid on Commonwealth countries, for to do otherwise implied that the Commonwealth meant nothing. On the other hand, there were others who felt that we should concentrate our aid on projects that brought the best return for British firms. A possible way forward was to tie aid to British industry but, in the process, to do as much as possible for Commonwealth countries.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could let her know, in due course, what conclusions he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had come to as a result of their review of the aid programme.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tony Battishill (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Clive.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.


Grey Scale #13
C
Y
M
A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19