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SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

NATO Ministerial Meetings

S 3005

NATO

May 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
18-5-90 ~~1.6.90~~ Part ends							

PREM 19/3100

HMSO Dd8953031 6/88 C60 GP2265 CCN13412 (3932)

PART 1 ends:-

FCO to JR 30.5.90

~~Scottish office to CDP 18.5.90~~

PART 2 begins:-

CDP to FCO 1.6.90

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(80) 27th meeting, item 2	03/07/1980
CC(80) 45th meeting, item 2	18/12/1980
CC(81) 18th meeting, item 2	07/05/1981
CC(83) 11th meeting, item 2	24/03/1983
CC(84) 14th meeting, item 2	05/04/1984
CC(85) 37th meeting, item 2	19/12/1985

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 30/11/2016

PREM Records Team

NATO documents removed from

The NATO documents which were enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

Document Reference and Title	Date
Document DPC/D(83)11(Final) Defence Planning Committee Ministerial Guidance 1983	8 June 1983

Signed:

Date: 30 November 2016

Cabinet Office
London

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 May 1990

Miss Janice Richards
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Miss Richards,

TURNBERRY NAC: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, 7 JUNE

1. As promised, I attach a note on the Turnberry Hotel and its management as background for the after-lunch meeting with hotel staff at which the Prime Minister will unveil a plaque inaugurating the new Conference Centre. (Mock-up of plaque also enclosed.) This part of the programme will take place in a private room (the Arran Room (North)) adjacent to the hotel restaurant and should not last more than five minutes.

2. You will wish to bear in mind that a suite has been set aside for the Prime Minister and her party on the first floor of the hotel (Rooms 156-160) should they require to use it before returning to the helicopter.

3. I also enclose a copy of the revised programme for the visit, together with a floor plan indicating the parts of the hotel through which the Prime Minister will pass.

4. If bad weather rules out a landing on the hotel lawn, cars from PSA Scotland's Government Car Pool will be used to take the party from either Prestwick or the Turnberry Golf Course landing strip to the hotel (Courtyard Entrance). The cars would be escorted by Strathclyde Police and would have been previously "sanitised" by them.

POWABS

5. Should you wish you contact us directly about any of the above, I should be grateful if you would note that, as of 31 May, the Turnberry Unit will be moving to the Turnberry Hotel, where we will be available on 0655-31167/8 or through the hotel switchboard (0655-31000).

Yours sincerely,
Michael Robinson

MICHAEL ROBINSON
Turnberry Unit
Security Policy Dept

cc: C D Powell Esq, No 10 Downing Street
R T Gozney Esq, Private Office
S J Gomersall Esq, Sec Pol Dept

POWABS

BACKGROUND NOTE FOR MEETING WITH TURNBERRY HOTEL MANAGEMENT AND STAFF/INAUGURATION OF NEW CONFERENCE FACILITIES: ARRAN ROOM (NORTH), THURSDAY 7 JUNE 1990

HISTORY

Situated on the Firth of Clyde opposite Ailsa Craig and the Isle of Arran, Turnberry was part of the nearby Culzean Estate until the Marquis of Ailsa gifted the land to the Glasgow and South Western Railway at the beginning of the century. When the Turnberry Hotel and Golf Courses were opened in 1906 they were the first purpose-built hotel and golf course complex in the world.

The two golf courses were further developed under the direction of London-Midland-Scottish Hotels, and in 1926 were named Ailsa and Arran Courses. It was not, however, until after the Second World War when the Ailsa course was redesigned that it achieved championship status. Since then it has seen many major championships played over the links, notably the British Open Golf Championships in 1977 and 1986.

OWNERSHIP

The hotel was bought in 1983 by the Sea Containers/ Venice-Simplon-Orient Express Group (James Sherwood) as part of the privatisation of British Transport Hotels. In 1987, Sea Containers sold the hotel premises to the Japanese golf management consortium, Nitto Kogyo. The agreement gave the Japanese company commercial rights to the "Turnberry" name worldwide while Sea Containers continued to manage and market the hotel as part of its small international chain of prestige hotels. Since acquiring the hotel, Nitto Kogyo has invested £7 million out of a £25 million refurbishment programme, one part of which has been the construction of the new "Turnberry Suite" conference facilities, which has been brought ahead by two years in order to accommodate the current NAC meeting.

MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

Before being invited to unveil the plaque inaugurating the new conference facilities, the Prime Minister will be introduced to a small cross-section of the hotel's management and staff by its General Manager, Mr Christopher Rouse. Those involved in the presentation from the hotel will be as follows:

POWABQ

Christopher Rouse: General Manager of Turnberry Hotel since 1978; previously General Manager of the Old Course Hotel, St Andrews, Welcombe Hotel, Stratford-on-Avon, and Deputy General Manager at Gleneagles Hotel.

David Pease: Executive Assistant Manager; has worked at Turnberry Hotel since 1983 and is the hotel's co-ordinator for all arrangements for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting.

Stewart Cameron: Executive Chef since 1979; he is a "Master Chef of Great Britain" and was previously Executive Chef at the Central Hotel, Glasgow.

Luigi Alzetta: Restaurant Manager; he comes from the Venice area and has been at Turnberry for 32 years.

Alison Crawford: Head Housekeeper; from Argyllshire, she worked in a number of British Transport Hotels before joining Turnberry in 1975.

Keith Allison: Director of Worldwide Sales and Marketing for the hotel since 1987, he was responsible for the initial discussions over the selection of Turnberry as the NAC venue.

Mikiasu Kayanuma: Resident representative of Nitto Kogyo at Turnberry since 1988 and responsible for the future development of the hotel, including planning for the new conference suite.

UNVEILING CEREMONY

There will be no formal speeches. However, the Prime Minister may wish to acknowledge the effort which the hotel has made to complete its conference centre in time for the NAC Ministerial meeting and the contribution this has made to expanding the choice of conference venues for international meetings of this sort in Scotland. (The plaque will be temporarily mounted in the Arran Room and will be relocated at the entrance to the new conference facilities once the NAC Ministerial meeting has ended.)

POWABQ

ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH AT TURNBERRY: 7 JUNE 1990

1240	Arrive Prestwick; met by the Rt Hon George Younger MP
1300	Arrive by helicopter on Turnberry Hotel lawn (accompanied by Mr Thatcher, Mr Younger, Mr Powell, Mr Ingham, Mr Turnbull + 3); met by Foreign Secretary and Secretary-General of NATO, followed by Meeting and group photograph with Secretary-General and Foreign Ministers on Turnberry Hotel terrace (Arran Room, if wet), followed by Pre-lunch drinks in Arran Room lounge (Press and television coverage of arrival and meeting on terrace)
1315	Lunch hosted by the Prime Minister in the Turnberry Hotel restaurant, followed by a speech (about 20 minutes) to which the Secretary-General will say a few words in reply (Television coverage)
Approx 1435	Prime Minister leaves Turnberry Hotel restaurant to meet hotel management and staff in Arran Room (North) and unveil plaque inaugurating new Conference Centre. Accompanied by Foreign Secretary and rest of party. (Private: Hotel photographer only)
1440	Leave Arran Room(North) via doorway to hotel terrace for helipad on front lawn. Chief Constable of Strathclyde (Mr Andrew Sloane) and senior RMP/MOD police officers at conference site present at helipad for Prime Minister's departure
1445	Prime Minister and party leave Turnberry by helicopter
1500	Arrive Prestwick

POWABQ



GROUND FLOOR PLAN – TURNBERRY HOTEL
DELEGATION/INTL. STAFF OFFICES AND MEETING ROOMS

THE TURNBERRY SUITE

opened by

THE RT.HON. MARGARET THATCHER F.R.S.,M.P.

on the occasion of

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING

7th June 1990

THE TURNBERRY SUITE

opened by

MARGARET THATCHER

on the occasion of

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING

7th June 1990

CHARLES

Janie

Ken

TURNBERRY

The architects concerned need a decision on the inscription on the plaque. Can we agree:

THE TURNBERRY SUITE
WAS OPENED BY THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, FRS, MP,
ON THE OCCASION OF
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING
ON 7 JUNE 1990

I said I would try to go back to Mr. Robinson in the Foreign Office tomorrow morning if possible as the Architects are starting to feel a little uneasy about the time they have.

JR
24 5 90

270 3471

10 DOWNING STREET

Chancellor

Pl. see attached.

Preference is for Option 2, but that's also the most expensive.

Content?

Leader

24/5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 210 6374

Miss L Bainsfair
Duty Clerk
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

21 May 1990
Date

Told Bettes - Menu 2.
(Agreed - CDP)
24/5

Dear Lesley:

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION: STOPOVER IN TURNBERRY

1. I have arranged for a lunch to be provided at Prestwick Airport on Thursday 7 June for those members of the Prime Minister's party not going into Turnberry.

2. I have asked for a buffet lunch and enclose a selection of menus. Would you like to let me know your preferences please.

Yours sincerely

Beth

B Davis (Miss)
Protocol Department

cc: Miss S Phillips
Turnberry Unit

CLASSIC

MENU 1

£7.50 PER HEAD

PATÉ WITH MELBA TOAST

* * * *

GOUJONS OF PLAICE

OR

ROAST AYRSHIRE CHICKEN & BACON

* * * *

CHEFS VEGETABLES

AND

FRENCH FRIES

* * * *

LATTICE APPLE PIE

WITH ICE CREAM

* * * *

COFFEE OR TEA

MENU 2

£8.50 PER HEAD

SMOKED SALMON CORNETS

SIDE SALAD GARNISH

* * * *

COLD ROAST SILVERSIDE OF BEEF

HONEY ROAST HAM

CHICKEN DRUMSTICKS

* * * *

SELECTION OF 3 SEASONAL SALADS

BAKED POTATOES

* * * *

BLACK FOREST GATEAUX & CREAM

* * * *

COFFEE OR TEA

MENU 3

£7.00 PER HEAD

CHEF'S SOUP OF THE DAY

* * * *

HONEY ROAST HAM

COLD ROAST PORK

CHICKEN DRUMSTICKS

* * * *

SELECTION OF 2 SEASONAL SALADS

BAKED POTATOES

* * * *

LEMON SORBET

* * * *

COFFEE OR TEA

ST. ANDREW'S HOUSE
EDINBURGH EH1 3DG

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

18 May 1990

Dear Charles

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: TURNBERRY

The Secretary of State has seen Mr Forsyth's letter of 17 May to you about the invitation list for the Prime Minister's lunch on 7 June.

Mr Rifkind is happy to agree with the majority of Mr Forsyth's suggestions. However he would wish to reinstate Mrs Susan Baird and Robert Calderwood (since the local authorities have been extremely helpful with respect to the organisational arrangements for the Conference) and he would not wish Mr Steven Samson of the Scottish Sun to receive an invitation.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney.

Yours

J D GALLAGHER
Private Secretary

EML138P9

NATO: Ministerial Mtg May 79.

C:\WPDOCS\FOREIGN\
TURNBERRY.DCA

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 May 1990

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, TURNBERRY: 7-8 JUNE

Thank you for your letter of 18 May about the practical arrangements for the Prime Minister's attendance at the North Atlantic Council lunch on Thursday 7 June.

I am content with the proposals in your letter. I am sure the Prime Minister will be delighted to be met by Mr. Younger. I hope we can find space in the helicopter to accommodate him. The arrival arrangements at Turnberry are also in order. I agree that it would be best if the Secretary General were to respond only very briefly to the Prime Minister's speech. I think it right to avoid toasts. I believe the Prime Minister would be happy to unveil the commemorative plaque after lunch and immediately before her departure. I agree that the press party should be bussed to and from Turnberry (I assume this will not result in any delay to the Prime Minister's departure). We would indeed want unrestricted press coverage of the Prime Minister's arrival and greeting by the Secretary General and Foreign Ministers, as well as of her speech.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, we need to reach a view on whether the Prime Minister should use an autocue for her speech. Harvey Thomas is willing to instal one if the room and the speaking arrangements would make it appropriate. He will need to speak to Michael Robinson - and possibly make a flying visit to Turnberry - to establish this. I should be grateful if you could arrange for him to contact Mr. Robinson.

I would be very happy to have a word with Michael Robinson next week. You might ask him to give me a ring.

CHARLES POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

cc PS
PS/Ider

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1990

Dear Charles,

North Atlantic Council, Turnberry: 7-8 June

Thank you for your letter of 20 April with comments on the arrangements for the Prime Minister's attendance at the NAC lunch on Thursday, 7 June. I now enclose a draft programme.

Meeting at Prestwick

Mr George Younger, as the MP for the Prestwick constituency, has offered to meet the Prime Minister at the airport. Since he will also be involved in the Prime Minister's lunch, he would then need to travel with the party by helicopter to Turnberry.

Arrival arrangements at Turnberry

Arrival at the helipad in front of the hotel assumes good weather. The wet weather plan would either involved a road journey by police car or a helicopter landing on the airstrip alongside the golf course. In either case, we envisage a photo session, followed by drinks with the Secretary General and Foreign Ministers, before moving to the dining room where the remaining guests would already be seated.

Speech

NATO have asked whether it would be a good idea for the Secretary General to respond to the Prime Minister's speech. We intend to suggest that he confine himself to thanking the Prime Minister for visiting Turnberry and giving the lunch and wishing her "bon voyage". Would the Prime Minister want toasts?

Proposed commemorative plaque

You will see that we have allowed time at the end of the lunch for the unveiling of a plaque inaugurating the Hotel's new conference centre. The Hotel management has recently asked whether the Prime Minister would be prepared to do this during her visit. The Hotel - which is owned by a Japanese golfing consortium but managed by its former owners, the Sea Containers/ Vienna Orient Express Group - has brought forward by two years the construction of its conference centre in order to accommodate the NAC. The Hotel has also been one of the most dependable elements in the Turnberry exercise and its management team have given us, the Police and others involved in its

/planning

RESTRICTED

planning their fullest cooperation. We and the Scottish Office therefore endorse the proposal. At the same time, any unveiling ceremony would need to be separate from the official visit. We have, therefore, suggested that the unveiling ceremony might take place in a private room adjacent to the restaurant immediately prior to the Prime Minister's departure for Prestwick. I should be grateful for your views.

Press

The Prime Minister's speech will be made available to the networks through a direct radio and TV feed from the restaurant to the media centre. As requested in your letter of 20 April, we have made arrangements for the Kiev press party to be bused to and from Turnberry under police escort. We assume that you would want unrestricted press coverage of the Prime Minister's arrival at Turnberry and greeting by the Secretary General and Foreign Ministers on the hotel terrace.

Michael Robinson, the Head of our Turnberry Unit, might now discuss some of the details with the Garden Rooms and No 10 Press Office – and perhaps with Joe.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT PROGRAMME FOR PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH AT TURNBERRY, 7 JUNE

12.40	Arrive Prestwick: met by the Rt Hon George Younger MP
13.00	Arrive by helicopter on Turnberry Hotel lawn: met by Foreign Secretary and Secretary General of NATO
	Group photograph followed by drinks with Secretary General and Foreign Ministers on Turnberry Hotel terrace (or in Arran room if wet)
13.15	Lunch in Turnberry Hotel restaurant, followed by speech
Approx 14.30	Lunch ends. [Prime Minister bids farewell to guests on departure]
14.35	Presentation of Hotel staff and unveiling of plaque inaugurating new conference centre, Arran room. Accompanied by Foreign Secretary
14.45	Depart Turnberry Hotel by helicopter
15.05	Arrive Prestwick

TU2ACI

From THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH

SCOTTISH OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AU

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Confined to Mr Gozney letter as Nld. made item changes. CP.

17 May 1990

Dear Charles

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: TURNBERRY

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 15 May 1990 to Richard Gozney in which you asked me to cast an eye over the invitation list for the Prime Minister's lunch on 7 June.

I would like to suggest that in the local dignitaries/authorities section Mrs Susan Baird, Mr Steven Hamilton and Mr Robert Calderwood be dropped unless there is any pressing protocol reason for the invitations standing.

I turn now to the press invitees and would see merit in extending invitations to Mr Ken Cargill, Head of News, Current Affairs & Sport, (BBC TV Scotland), Mr Alistair Gracie, Head of News, Grampian TV in place of Mr William Brown, Chairman, Scottish TV, who I believe is due to retire imminently. Mr Neil Fraser and Ms M S Sheena Macdonald might also be dropped. I feel that it would be useful to invite Mr Steven Samson, Editor, The Scottish Sun, Mr Bill Anderson, Editor, Sunday Post, Mr Ian Stewart, Editor, Dundee Courier and Mr David Hunter, Editor, Scottish Sunday Express.

It might also be appropriate to extend invitations to Allan Stewart MP and Ian Lang MP.

These suggestions will obviously need to be reconciled with those of Malcolm, whose views are also sought. I have arranged for this letter to be copied to Richard Gozney and hope that my opinions are helpful.

Yours ever

Michael

MICHAEL B FORSYTH

AMP137P4

NATO: Ministerial Mtgs
5/79

fle Kho
a Sir PC
Sue Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 May 1990

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: TURNBERRY

Thank you for your letter of 14 May covering a draft guest list for the Prime Minister's lunch for delegates to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting on 7 June. The Prime Minister is in general content with the list but would like the Secretary of State for Scotland and Mr. Forsyth to cast an eye over it personally and let her have any recommendations before invitations are issued. I should be grateful if you could arrange this. I assume that you will discuss the format of invitations with Sue Goodchild.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CC/SG (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

14 May 1990

This looks a reasonable list for what will be an important occasion. But I propose to show it to Mr. Rifkind & Mr. Forsyth for any suggestions they may have.

Dear Charles,

North Atlantic Council: Turnberry, 7 - 8 June 1990

I attach a draft guest list for the Prime Minister's lunch for delegates to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at Turnberry on 7 June 1990.

Subject to that, content? CDP 14/5

In line with your advice, we have spread the net beyond those directly involved in the Conference to include senior representatives of the media, MPs and others with an interest in defence, military and foreign affairs, all without spouses. Approximately half of the proposed non-conference guests are from Scotland. The Secretary of State for Scotland's dinner at Turnberry the previous evening will be for Ministers and senior delegates only. There is therefore no overlap as regards local guests. The advice of both the Scottish Office and the Ministry of Defence has been sought in compiling the list.

The Turnberry can accommodate a maximum of 200. Of the suggested guests, some 68 are Ministers and senior delegates who can be expected to accept. London-based Ambassadors have not been included since they play no part in the meeting, although if any were to attend as a member of a delegation (e.g. the US Ambassador), we would need to add them to the list.

Yes pr

It is worth remembering that Turnberry is not easily accessible, and accommodation in the immediate area will be virtually unobtainable. (Those guests listed in sections g-q will also constitute the UK guest list for the Opening Ceremony at 10.00 a.m. the same day.)

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

NAC, TURNBERRY: LUNCH HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER, 7 JUNE

Suggested Guest List:

a. Prime Minister's Party

HOST: The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Mr Thatcher
Mr Charles Powell
Mr Bernard Ingram 4

b. NATO Secretary General

Dr Manfred Woerner 1

c. NATO Foreign Ministers

Mr Mark Eyskens	Belgium	
Mr Joe Clark	Canada	
Mr Uffe Ellemann-Jensen	Denmark	
Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher	FRG	
M Roland Dumas	France	
Mr Antonis Samaras	Greece	
Mr John Hannibalsson	Iceland	
Sg Gianni de Michelis	Italy	
M Jacques Poos	Luxembourg	
Mr Hans van den Broek	Netherlands	
Mr Kjell Bondevik	Norway	
Sr Joao de Deus Pinheiro	Portugal	
Sr Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez	Spain	
Mr Ali Bozer	Turkey	
Mr Douglas Hurd	UK	
Mr James Baker III	USA	16

d. NATO Ambassadors

Mr P Thuysbaert	Belgium
Mr Gordon Smith	Canada
Mr Ole Bierring	Denmark
Dr Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz	FRG

M Gabriel Robin	France	
Mr Ioannis Bourloyannis-Tsangaridis	Greece	
Mr Einar Benediktsson	Iceland	
Mr Sverrir Gunnlaugsson	Perm-Rep-des Iceland	
Sg Francesco Fulci	Italy	
M Guy de Muyser	Luxembourg	
Mr A P R Jacobovits de Szeged	Netherlands	
Mr Bjorn Kristvik	Norway	
Sr Jose Faria	Portugal	
Sr Maximo Cajal	Spain	
Mr Unal Unsal	Turkey	
Sir Michael Alexander	UK	
Mr William H Taft IV	USA	17

e. Political Directors

Mr Jan Hollants van Loocke	Belgium	
Mr Jeremy Kinsman	Canada	
Mr Benny Kimberg	Denmark	
Mr Dieter Kastrup	FRG	
M Bertrand Dufourcq	France	
Mr Antoine Exarchos	Greece	
Mr Sveinn Bjorsson	Iceland	
Sg Enzo Perlot	Italy	
M Jean-Jacques Kasel	Luxembourg	
Mr A P Van Walsum	Netherlands	
Mr Ole Peter Kolby	Norway	
Sr Jose Shearman Macedo	Portugal	
Sr Fernando Perpina	Spain	
Mr Husseyin Celem	Turkey	
Mr John Weston	UK	
Mr Robert Kimmitt	USA	16

f. NATO International Staff

General M Eide	Chairman of Military Committee
Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis	Deputy Secretary General
Mr James Cunningham	Director of the Private Office
Ambassador Henning Wegener	Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs Committee

Mr Michael Legge	Assistant Secretary General, Defence Planning and Policy Division	
Mr Robert Pearson	Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs Division	
Mr W A Young	Director of Information	
Mr C Prebensen	Executive Secretary	
Mr Mark Mulvey	Director, NATO Office of Security	
Mr R Stafford	Head of Press Services	
Mr Roland Wegener	Deputy Director of the Private Office	
Mr Jan Peter Dijkstra	Deputy Director of the Private Office	
Mr A Synadinos	Deputy Executive Secretary	
Mr Y Karaozbek	Assistant Director (Media)	14

g. Ministers

FCO

The Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP (Minister of State) 1

Ministry of Defence

The Rt Hon Tom King MP 1

h. MPs (local)

Rt Hon George Younger MP
Mr George Foulkes MP (+ Labour Foreign Affairs Spokesman) 2

i. MPs (National)

Foreign Affairs Spokesmen:

Rt Hon Gerald Kaufman MP)
Mr George Robertson MP) Labour Party
Mr Donald Anderson MP)

Rt Hon Sir David Steel KBE MP (Foreign and Defence)	) Liberal Democratic Party	
Sir Russell Johnston MP (EC)	)	
Rt Hon David Owen MP	) Social Democratic Party	6

Foreign Affairs Committee

Rt Hon David Howell MP	
Rt Hon Peter Shore MP	2

Defence Committee

Michael Mates MP	
Bruce George MP	2

UK Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly

Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith MP	Delegation leader	
Mr Menzies Campbell MP	SDLP Defence spokesman	
Mr John Cartwright MP	SDP HCDC member	
Mr Patrick Duffy MP	President of NAA until mid-May 1990 + former MOD junior minister	4

Ministry of Defence

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir David Carig GCB OBE DSC, Chief of the Defence Staff	
Sir Michael Quinlan KCB, Permanent Under Secretary of State	
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald GCB ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord	
General Sir John Chapple, GCB CBE ADC(GEN), Chief of the General Staff	
Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding GCB ADC, Chief of the Air Staff	
Mr Richard Mottram, Deputy Under Secretary of State (Policy)	6

j. Local Dignitaries/authorities

Col Bryce Muir Knox MC TD	HM Lord Lieutenant of Ayr and Arran Martnaham Lodge, By Ayr, KA6 6ES
Mr Andrew Sloan QPM BA	Chief Constable Strathclyde Police Police HQ 173 Pitt Street Glasgow G2 4JS
Mrs Susan Baird	The Rt Hon the Lord Provost of the City of Glasgow City Chambers Glasgow G2 1DU
Convener James Jennings	Strathclyde Regional Council Strathclyde House 20 India Street Glasgow G2 4PF
Provost Daniel MacNeill	Kyle and Carrick District Council Burns House Burns Statue Square Ayr
Mr Steven F Hamilton JP BL DPA DMS	Town Clerk and Chief Executive The City of Glasgow District Council City Chambers Glasgow G2 1DU
Mr Robert Calderwood LLB CBIM	Chief Executive The City of Glasgow District Council City Chambers Glasgow G2 1DU

Mr Ian R D Smillie BL	Chief Executive Kyle and Carrick District Council Burns House Burns Statue Square Ayr	
Mr Edward Friel	Chief Executive, Greater Glasgow Tourist Board	
Sir David Nickson DL	Chairman, Scottish Development Agency Abbey Brewery 111 Holyrood Road Edinburgh	10

k. Local residents with an interest in Foreign Affairs

The Lord Home	Former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary	1

l. Senior Scottish Military

Lt General Sir John MacMillan KBE	General Office Commanding, Scotland Governor Edinburgh Castle Edinburgh EH1 2YT	
Vice Admiral Sir Michael Livesay KCB	Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland Maritime Headquarters Pitreavie Dunfermline Fife KY11 5QE	

Air Vice Marshal J Morris CBE	Air Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland Pitreavie Castle Dunfermline Fife KY11 5QE	
Commander Ian Thorpe	HMS Gannet Greensite Prestwick Airport Monkton Ayrshire KA9 2RZ	4

m. Former NATO Personnel in UK

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington	Former Secretary General	1

n. Academics in the defence/military studies field (local)

Professor Bill Wallace	Director, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow
Mr Stephen White	Senior Lecturer, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow
Professor John Erikson	Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh
Professor Paul Wilkinson	Dept of International Relations, University of Aberdeen Regent Walk Aberdeen AB9 1FX
Mr D Greenwood	Director, Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen

Dr D Gates	Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen	
Dr C Archer	Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen	
Dr Trevor Salmon	Coordinator of International Relations, University of St Andrews	
Dr David Scrivener	Aberdeen University (former member of FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit)	9

o. Academics in the defence/military studies field (national)

Professor L Martin	Vice Chancellor, University of Newcastle	
Mr Michael Clarke	Dept of Politics, University of Newcastle, (Director-des of Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London)	
Professor Lawrence Freedman	Dept of War Studies, Kings College, London	3

p. Press (local)

Mr Magnus Linklater	Editor, Scotsman	
Mr Arnold Kemp	Editor, Glasgow Herald	
Mr Patrick Chalmers	Controller, BBC Scotland	
Mr William Brown CBE	Chairman, Scottish TV	

Mr George McKechnie	Editor, Evening Times 195 Albion Street Glasgow G1 1QP (also Chairman of the Scottish Daily Newspaper Society's Editor's Committee)
Endell Laird	Editor-in-Chief Daily Record and Sunday Mail Anderston Quay Glasgow G3 8DB
Mr Andrew Jaspan	Editor, Scotland on Sunday North Bridge Edinburgh
Mr Harry Roulston	Editor, Press and Journal Lang Stracht Mastrick Aberdeen AB9 8AF
Mr James Gordon, CBE	Managing Director Radio Clyde Clydebank Business Park Clydebank Glasgow G81 2RZ
Mr Neil Fraser	Head of BBC Radio Scotland Queen Margaret Drive Glasgow G12 8DG
Mr Colin Mackay	Political Editor Scottish Television Cowcaddens Glasgow G2 3PR
Sheena MacDonald	Freelance Current Affairs Presenter Scottish Television Cowcaddens Glasgow G2 3PR

q. Representatives of UK organisations with an interest in NATO

Gen Sir Hugh Beach	Council for Arms Control, London
Mr Kenneth Aldred	Secretary General, Peace Through NATO, London
Major General Chris Popham CB	Director, British Atlantic Committee, London
The Viscount Trenchard	Chairman, Foundation of Defence Studies, London
Lord Lewis	Robinson College, Cambridge. UK member of NATO Science Committee
Professor W Mitchell	Chairman, Science and Engineering Research Council, Swindon. Member of NATO Science Committee
Dr Wim van Eekelen	Secretary General, WEU, London
Sir John Killick	President, British Atlantic Committee, London Former UKRep NATO
Mr Francois Heisbourg	Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London
Sir Clive Rose	Chairman, Royal United Services Institute, London Former UKRep NATO

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Total = 142

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PRESS RELEASE M-NPG-1(90)24

For Immediate Release
10th May, 1990

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in Ministerial session at Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, on the 9th and 10th of May, 1990. Iceland attended as an observer.

2. Our discussions have taken place against the background of dramatic and profound political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe since Defence Ministers last met in November 1989. We warmly welcome the processes of reform which are underway and the efforts to establish democratic values and institutions in these countries. We fully endorse the process of German unification and note that a unified Germany in the Alliance will provide a cornerstone of stability in overcoming the division in Europe. These developments, coupled with the changes also taking place in the Soviet Union, bring us closer to the Alliance's long-held vision of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe: a Europe characterized by co-operation, trust and peaceful competition. We are now presented with welcome opportunities to achieve our objective of a continent where the threat of conflict is removed and where military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence.

3. From the inception of NATO, Western democratic values have provided the basis for the strength and unity of an Alliance which has preserved peace in Europe and which has played a major role in laying the foundations for the fundamental changes now taking place. We are ready to build upon the achievements of the past 40 years, to seize the opportunities created by a new and changing Europe, to take on new challenges and to define the objectives NATO will pursue. We are optimistic about the future. At the same time, the period of transition

which Europe has now entered entails uncertainty and potential instability. Even with the successful conclusion of the current arms control negotiations and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will retain very substantial nuclear and conventional military capabilities. These factors must be taken into account as we address our long-term security requirements in the light of the current positive developments.

4. In our discussions we noted that NATO is and will remain a principal source of stability in Europe. Our fundamental objective, which is to prevent war of any kind, remains valid, as do the principles governing our security as set out in the Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament. For the foreseeable future, the deterrence of war will continue to require the maintenance of strategic nuclear forces and widespread Alliance participation in an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces in Europe.

5. We have discussed a broad range of nuclear-related issues in the light of the profound changes underway and their implications for the future nuclear planning and force posture of the Alliance. We noted that, as in the past, the size and structure of Alliance nuclear forces will evolve in response to changing international circumstances and security requirements. The reduction of forces to the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements remains a fundamental element in our goal of fostering peace and stability. In this regard, we recalled that the number of Alliance nuclear weapons in Europe has already been unilaterally reduced by more than one third during the past decade. Given the political and military changes now taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, together with the prospect of early signature and implementation of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, we agreed that there is a diminishing need for nuclear systems of the shortest range. Accordingly, we welcomed President Bush's decision to terminate the Follow-On To LANCE (FOTL) programme and to cancel any further modernization of United States nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe. This demonstrates once again the ability of the Alliance to take the initiative in a rapidly changing situation.

6. We have reviewed the work programmes which we set in hand at our last NPG Ministerial meeting. While the principal elements of NATO's nuclear policy remain valid, we will continue to adapt it and will reassess the future qualitative and quantitative requirements for NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces. In this context, and also bearing in mind the continuing

need for widespread Alliance participation, we noted that sub-strategic nuclear systems offering both flexibility and longer range will assume relatively greater importance. We therefore directed that our examination of the implications for NATO's nuclear forces of a CFE agreement be intensified, taking into account the changed politico-military environment. This comprehensive review of the roles, missions, desired characteristics and composition of NATO's future nuclear force posture will provide guidance for the NATO Military Authorities in their further work on future nuclear requirements.

7. We were also briefed on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Defence and Space Talks and Nuclear Testing Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. We expressed our full support for United States efforts in these negotiations. We reaffirmed that arms control remains an integral part of Alliance security policy. We welcomed the prospect of early negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missile systems and emphasized the importance of close consultation within the Alliance on the development of objectives for these negotiations. More generally, we looked forward to the successful conclusion of arms control agreements (both nuclear and conventional) which will enable us to achieve a balance of forces at much lower levels of armaments. Noting the recent disclosures of previously undetected INF-class missiles in Eastern Europe, we underlined the central importance of rigorous verification regimes for monitoring full compliance with arms control agreements.

8. While we welcomed the changes underway in Central and Eastern Europe, we noted that modernization and restructuring of Soviet nuclear forces has continued and that the Soviet Union still has numerical superiority in short-range nuclear missile forces. With these considerations in mind, we repeated our call upon the Soviet Union to carry out substantial reductions in these systems.

9. As we look to the future, we aim for a co-ordinated, unified Alliance effort to build on the welcome political changes taking place in Europe, and are ready to respond positively to continuing political and military developments. Our discussions have concerned primarily the implications of these developments for nuclear aspects of our security. At our Defence Planning Committee meeting in two weeks we will focus our discussions on their implications for our strategy, overall Alliance defence planning, and our conventional force posture.

10. The Autumn 1990 NPG Ministerial meeting will be held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.



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JD.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 April 1990

Dear Stuart,

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TURNBERRY: 7-8 JUNE

Thank you for your letter of 20 April about the practical arrangements for the Prime Minister's attendance at the NAC lunch on Thursday, 7 June.

Transport

Those who would need to travel by helicopter from Prestwick are the Prime Minister, Mr. Thatcher (if he joins the delegation), myself, Bernard Ingham, a Garden Room Girl, and a Detective. I have consulted Bernard Ingham about the Press - he feels we should make arrangements to take them to Turnberry by coach.

Arrival Arrangements

I am sure the Prime Minister would be happy to join the traditional "family portrait" of Cabinet Ministers if that would be appropriate.

Accommodation

The arrangements described sound admirable. I do not think we shall have any special requirements for such a short stay. The secure fax will be more than enough.

Prime Minister's Lunch

I am sure the Prime Minister would indeed wish the guest list to have a Scottish flavour.

I will ask the Duty Clerks to liaise directly with the Turnberry Unit.

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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20 April 1990

Dear Charles,

NAC Turnberry, 7-8 June 1990

Since we last corresponded in January about the Prime Minister's attendance at lunch on Thursday 7 June a number of administrative points have arisen on which we would be grateful for guidance.

Transport

As you asked in your letter of 23 January to Richard Gozney, a helicopter will be provided for the journey to Heathrow. An RAF Puma has also been provisionally booked for the transfer from Prestwick to Turnberry and back. It would be helpful, however, to know the numbers in your party in case a smaller helicopter, which could land closer to the hotel, would be adequate. Should we also assume that the Kiev press party will wish to travel to Turnberry, in which case we will need to arrange transport and accreditation for them?

Arrival arrangements

On present plans the Prime Minister's arrival will coincide with the traditional "family portrait" of NATO Foreign Ministers with the Secretary General on the hotel terrace. Would the Prime Minister wish to join the group for a further photo opportunity before receiving her guests?

Accommodation

A room with bathroom attached to the UK delegation suite on the first floor of the hotel has been set aside for the Prime Minister's use. (The hotel hairdresser could attend then if required.) There is also a sitting room which could be used as the Private Office for the duration of the Prime Minister's stay. It would be helpful to know whether any members of your party will be travelling to Turnberry in advance and whether you have any special office equipment and secure communications needs. We shall have secure fax which could serve both your office and ours.

Prime Minister's lunch

This is tentatively scheduled to begin at 1.15 in the Turnberry restaurant and will be for approximately 200 guests, without spouses. The guest list will need to be coordinated with that for the Secretary of State for Scotland's dinner and with the list of UK invitees to the Opening Ceremony on the

morning of 7 June. We hope to get a draft to you shortly. In addition to including Ministers and senior delegates, we assume the Prime Minister would wish the guest list to have a Scottish flavour.

Press coverage

A media centre is being built in the Conference hotel grounds though the press will not have access to the hotel. Facilities will, however, be in place for a direct feed of sound and pictures of conference events such as the Prime Minister's speech to the media centre.

Finally, as you may be aware, a Turnberry Unit has now been set up here of which I enclose details. Perhaps the Duty Clerks going to Moscow could liaise direct with the Unit over detailed administrative points.

Yours

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
TURNBERRY UNIT
K258

Head of Unit	Michael Robinson 270 3471
Liaison with NATO and Government Departments, Accommodation/Transport	Mike Shingler 270 3127/3474
Security	Robbie Jupe 270 3472
Media	Maggie Cleaver 270 3474
Protocol/Social	Sandra Phillips 270 3473

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NATO

Nato Min Mtgs

May 79

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SECRET
FM WINDHOEK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 193
OF 211530Z MARCH 90

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNO 147: TURNBERRY NAC

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR QUICK REPLY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO BAKER:

BEGINS

WE HAD A WORD LAST NIGHT ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE TURNBERRY NAC. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MOVE. THERE ARE SERIOUS PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE THE TURNBERRY HOTEL COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR USE BEFORE 5 JUNE. EVEN THEN THE MEETING COULD NOT BE MOVED FORWARD TO 5-6 JUNE BECAUSE THOSE DATES WOULD COINCIDE WITH THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE CSCE MEETING IN COPENHAGEN AND WE WOULD ANTAGONISE THE DANES AND THOSE OF THE NON-NATO MEMBERS OF THE CSCE WHO PLAN TO GO TO THE OPENING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

SO THE ONLY POSSIBLE ATLERNATIVE WOULD BE TO MOVE FROM 7-8 JUNE TO 6-7 JUNE. IF THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT BUDGE, THEN WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE WILLING TO TRY FOR THOSE REVISED DATES BUT I OF COURSE HAVE NO IDEA HOW THEY WOULD SUIT OTHERS AND I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING IF THE MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE AT ALL. IT IS GOING TO BE PRETTY CRUCIAL IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE SHAPE OF NATO AND, IF IT WERE CANCELLED, OR OVERSHADOWED, I AM AFRAID THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT COULD BE QUITE SUBSTANTIAL.

COULD I ASK YOU TO HAVE IN MIND ONE OTHER FACTOR? MARGARET THATCHER IS DUE TO FLY TO MOSCOW ON THE EVENING OF 7 JUNE FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENTT GORBACHEV ON 8 JUNE, AND A VISIT TO KIEV ON 9 JUNE WHERE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS DUE TO JOIN HER. THOSE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS AND WE ARE VERY KEEN TO STICK TO THEM.

ENDS

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO WESTON, GOULDEN, LEVER (SEC POL DEPT). HEMANS

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WALLIS

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MR P J WESTON

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SECRET
FM WINDHOEK
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 188
OF 210630Z MAR 90

TURNBERRY NAC

1. THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, JIM BAKER, ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE LAST NIGHT WHETHER IT WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THE TURNBERRY DATES WERE CHANGED. THE TURNBERRY NAC COINCIDED WITH THE DATES FOR WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE PRESSING FOR THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE DATES OF THE MEETING. BAKER SAID HE REALISED THAT. THERE WAS ALSO GOING TO BE A STATE VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. THE AMERICANS HAD PUT ALTERNATIVE DATES TO THE RUSSIANS BUT HE DID NOT HOLD OUT ANY GREAT HOPE OF THEM ACCEPTING.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY SEE BAKER AGAIN AT 1100Z TODAY. GRATEFUL IF ONE OF YOU COULD LET ME HAVE A QUICK REACTION BY TELEPHONE BY 1030Z ON WINDHOEK 36182.

4. IF THE SUMMIT DATES DO COINCIDE WITH THE NAC, THIS COULD PRESUMABLY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION ALTHOUGH I DO NOT HAVE DETAILS OF EXACTLY WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV ARE DUE TO MEET. BUT IF THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE PROBLEMS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD OBVIOUSLY FLAG THESE UP WITH BAKER.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO WESTON, GOULDEN, LEVER (SEC POL DEPT), HEMANS (SOVIET DEPT), PS, PS/PUS AND PS/NO 10.

WALLIS

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MR GOYULDEN
MR LEVER, SEC POL D
MR HEMANS, SOVIET D

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C. North

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1990

Dear Richard.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL, TURNBERRY: 7-8 JUNE 1990

Thank you for your letter of 23 January setting out the timetable for the Prime Minister's attendance at the North Atlantic Council lunch at Turnberry on 7 June and subsequent journey on to Moscow. I am content with this. But since it is a Thursday and we shall be very pressed for time, we shall need a helicopter out of Heathrow. I should be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made.

I am not yet sure whether Mr Thatcher will be coming to the Soviet Union. Even if he does so, and decides to attend the lunch at Turnberry I would see no need to invite other spouses.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January 1990

Dear Charles

North Atlantic Council Ministerial, Turnberry: 7-8 June 1990

Thank you for your letter of 11 January. You subsequently agreed on the telephone that as the most senior British person present, the Prime Minister will act as the host for the lunch at Turnberry on 7 June. If it followed past practice, the lunch would take place from about 1.00 pm until 2.45/3.00 pm. This would suggest a programme as follows:

Depart Heathrow 11.30 am
Arrive Prestwick 12.40 pm; drive to Turnberry
Arrive Turnberry 1.00 pm
Depart Turnberry 3.00 pm; drive to Prestwick
Depart Prestwick 3.30 pm
Arrive Moscow 10.15 pm (local time).

I should be grateful to know whether we can plan on this basis.

A number of spouses of both Foreign Ministers and senior delegates usually attend Spring NAC Ministerials. Our current plan is that they would leave Turnberry immediately after the morning opening ceremony on 7 June for a day long cultural programme in Western Scotland. However, if Mr Thatcher were to accompany the Prime Minister to the Soviet Union, would he wish to be at the lunch and would the Prime Minister wish to invite spouses to the luncheon? On balance we would recommend against this. I should be grateful if you could let me know the Prime Minister's wishes.

Yours ever

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

NATO : Ministerial Meeting, May 79.



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File
c: NACM(MJ)
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 January 1990

Dear Stephen,

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING: TURNBERRY

Thank you for your letter of 9 January about the Prime Minister's attendance at the North Atlantic Council meeting at Turnberry in June.

I have discussed this with the Prime Minister and she has agreed to attend the lunch at Turnberry on 7 June and speak, before flying direct from Prestwick to Kiev. It will mean holding Cabinet early that morning and missing Questions. Since it is a particularly busy time of year, we shall need to get to work on a speech very early. That means letting me have the first outline by the Easter recess please.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Jim Gallagher (Scottish Office).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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(1)

PRIME MINISTER

NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING/VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

NATO Foreign Ministers will meet as the North Atlantic Council in Scotland in early June. Some months ago you promised to attend a lunch or dinner during the meeting and speak. The choices were either dinner on Wednesday 6 June at Culzean Castle (which can seat only 40); or lunch on Thursday 7 June at Turnberry (which can seat 200). The strong preference was for the latter. ✓ MT

Since then, the dates for your visit to the Soviet Union have firmed up and you now have to leave for Kiev on the late afternoon of Thursday 7 June to start your programme early the next morning.

The question is whether you still try to go ahead with your lunch with NATO Foreign Ministers and other senior officials at Turnberry on 7 June.

In theory it would be possible to have Cabinet early that day: then fly up to Scotland for a slightly late lunch: then fly on that afternoon to Kiev from Prestwick Airport (only 16 miles from Turnberry). That would, of course, mean missing Questions.

There is much merit in your meeting and addressing NATO Ministers immediately before going to the Soviet Union on an important visit. I imagine that your absence in such circumstances would be understood by the House. There is no risk that you will miss another Questions in that immediate period. On the other hand, a lunch and speech would burden you even more at what is a very busy time. I attach the relevant page of the long-term diary.

Agree to do the lunch at Turnberry and then go on to Kiev?
OR
Prefer to abandon the idea of lunch with NATO Ministers?

CDP

C. D. POWELL
10 January 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\kiev

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COPY NO: _____

Wednesday 6 June	
0930	Premier of New South Wales CDP
1730	Foreign Secretary + CDP
1830	AUDIENCE
Thursday 7 June - Sunday 10 June	
	SOVIET UNION
Tuesday 12 June	
1830	AUDIENCE
Wednesday 13 June	
1730	Foreign Secretary + CDP
Thursday 14 June	
	Dinner for Mr. Ramphal at No.10
Friday 15 June	
0930	Sir Robin Butler + AT
	DEPART NO.10 FOR FINCHLEY
Saturday 16 June	
	TROOPING THE COLOUR
Wednesday 20 June	
	REGIONAL TOUR
1730	Foreign Secretary + CDP
Friday 22 June	
0930	Sir Robin Butler + AT
Saturday 23 June	
	WOMENS CONFERENCE
Sunday 24 June - Tuesday 26 June	
	EUROPEAN COUNCIL, DUBLIN
Thursday 28 June	
?	STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Friday 29 June	
0930	Sir Robin Butler + AT
Monday 2 July	
	FINCHLEY WESTMINSTER FORUM DINNER
Tuesday 3 July	
1830	AUDIENCE
Wednesday 4 July	
1730	Foreign Secretary + CDP
Friday 6 July - Saturday 7 July	
	WELSH CONFERENCE IN LLANDUDNO?

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1990

Dear Charles,

North Atlantic Council Ministerial: Turnberry, 7-8 June 1990

In your letter of 14 November, you said that the Prime Minister would like to host a dinner for NATO Foreign Ministers when they meet in Scotland for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial on 7 June and would be prepared to make a speech. This will not now be possible as the Prime Minsiter will be flying to Kiev that day.

There are two possible options which would enable the Prime Minister to host a meal for participants, and to make a speech: dinner on 6 June, or lunch on 7 June. If the Prime Minister were able to host the lunch, she could fly on to Kiev from Prestwick Airport, which is 16 miles from Turnberry. Giving lunch on 7 June would mean that the Prime Minister would miss Questions. A lunch on 7 June would need to be at Turnberry, as the meeting goes on there throughout the day. A dinner on 6 June could either be at Turnberry or Culzean Castle. But Culzean Castle could only seat 40, whereas Turnberry can seat 200 and offers a high standard of catering.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Jim Gallagher (Scottish Office).

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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SIC EMA/EME MODUK FOR SEC(NATO/UK)(P)

MY TELNOS 419-425: NAC MINISTERIAL: 14-15 DECEMBER: COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. A SUCCESSFUL MEETING WHICH PRODUCED A SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNIQUE, CONSENSUS ON A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES AND ONE NEWSWORTHY - POSSIBLY PORTENTOUS - DECISION VIZ AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE RECEIVED HERE AT NATO EARLY NEXT WEEK. TOO EARLY TO ASSERT THAT THE MEMBERSHIP AS A WHOLE IS COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE ALLIANCE'S FUTURE ROLE. BUT SOME OF THE KEY PLAYERS HAVE VIEWS.

DETAIL

2. THE NAC MINISTERIAL WAS, AS YOU CONFIRMED WHEN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS, A SUCCESS. IT BROUGHT TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION A BUSY THREE WEEK PERIOD WHICH HAS ALSO INCLUDED MEETINGS OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND OF DEFENCE MINISTERS. THE ALLIANCE HAS REACHED THE END OF A REMARKABLE YEAR (INCLUDING AN EARLIER SUMMIT) IN BETTER ORDER THEN MANY MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE AND PACE OF THE EVENTS TO WHICH MEMBER STATES HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO REACT.

3. ON THE EVE OF THE NAC THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED (MY TELNO 423). IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT COULD READILY BE FOUND. IN THE EVENT:

(A) THE GREEKS AND TURKS SHOWED JUST ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE POSSIBLE YESTERDAY THE TABLING IN VIENNA BY THE 16 OF A DRAFT CFE TREATY TEXT. IT WAS RECOGNISED BY ALL THAT TO HAVE TABLED WITHOUT CONSENSUS WOULD HAVE BEEN A VERY UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENT. THE TURKS SEEMED TO ME TO HAVE SLIGHTLY THE WORSE OF THE ARGUMENT:

(B) COMPROMISES ALL ROUND ENABLED A POSITION PAPER FOR THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE ON OPEN SKIES TO BE PUBLISHED AS AN ANNEX TO THE

COMMUNIQUE. AGAIN THE TURKS WERE THE LAST TO GIVE WAY AND WERE DISTINCTLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THEY HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO REACT TO YESTERDAY'S NEGOTIATION:

(C) A HOLDING FORMULA WAS FOUND ON THE PUTATIVE 1990 CFE/CSCE SUMMIT. THIS WILL ALLOW THE ISSUE TO BE CONSIDERED IN A MORE MEASURED WAY EARLY NEXT YEAR. MY OWN IMPRESSION IS THAT THE AMERICANS, WHO WERE THE MAIN ADVOCATES OF CAUTION (PERHAPS THE STATE DEPARTMENT RATHER THAN THE WHITE HOUSE), RECOGNISED THAT IT WILL BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE EXPANSION OF A CFE SUMMIT INTO A MEETING AT 35. BUT BAKER WANTS TO EXTRACT A PRICE FROM THE OTHER SIDE FOR ALLOWING THE LATTER MEETING TO TAKE PLACE:

(D) NO-ONE WANTED TO BE SEEN TO PREVENT A MEETING (ABOUT WHICH SOME HARBOUR DOUBTS) BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND WORNER NEXT WEEK. THE ENCOUNTER WILL PLAINLY BE A MAJOR MEDIA EVENT. IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE ANOTHER OF THOSE MILESTONES WHICH WE HAVE BEEN PASSING SO REGULARLY OF LATE. AS THE QUESTIONS TO YOU FROM JOURNALISTS MADE CLEAR, IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO PREVENT THE MEETING BEING INTERPRETED AS AN INITIAL CONTACT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. (THE SOVIET REQUEST PRESUMABLY PRESAGES AN ATTEMPT BY THE RUSSIANS TO ESTABLISH THE TWO ALLIANCES, LIKE THE FOUR POWERS, AS GUARANTORS OF STABILITY IN EUROPE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. IN SO FAR AS WE FAIL TO REBUT THIS ARGUMENT, WE WILL BE ACCEPTING A DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ORGANISATIONS.) WORNER IS WELL AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITIES AND RISKS IMPLICIT IN THE EVENT.

4. BEYOND ITS SUCCESS IN CLEARING THESE ISSUES OUT OF THE WAY, THE NAC WAS THE OCCASION FOR A SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN RESTRICTED SESSION (MY TELS 419 AND 421) - THE INTERVENTIONS OF DUMAS, GENSCHER AND BAKER ARE WORTH ATTENTION - AND THE ISSUE OF A WIDE RANGING COMMUNIQUE (MY TEL 424). THE LATTER DOCUMENT CONFIRMED, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT, THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE IN PRESERVING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY AND IN PURSUING ARMS CONTROL. BUT IT ALSO LOOKED TO THE FUTURE, RECOGNISING THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DEVELOP ITS POLITICAL ROLE AND TO BEGIN TO DEFINE ITS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE - IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CSCE SHOULD ALL FIGURE PROMINENTLY.

5. HOWEVER THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE WAS HARDLY JOINED IN THE LAST TWO DAYS. TO JUDGE FROM EG THE DEBATES ON THE COMMUNIQUE, MOST MEMBER GOVERNMENTS ARE STILL AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SWEEP OF EVENTS. THERE IS LITTLE SIGN OF A COHERENT APPROACH TO THE ISSUES - PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF THE EUROPEANS.

BUT SOME STRANDS IN THE APPROACHING DEBATE ARE CLEAR ENOUGH.

6. THE AMERICANS HAVE A POLICY - IT EMERGED PLAINLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S INTERVENTION LAST WEEK AND IN BAKER'S REMARKS YESTERDAY. THEY ARE PRESUMING A SUBSTANTIAL RUN DOWN IN THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE BOTH FOR DOMESTIC REASONS AND IN RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT. THEY WISH TO BE SEEN TO ENCOURAGE INTERGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE BOTH BECAUSE IT IS DESIRABLE IN ITSELF AND BECAUSE IT PROVIDES AN ACCEPTABLE SETTING FOR A U S DRAW DOWN. THEY WISH, HOWEVER, TO RETAIN A POSITION OF INFLUENCE IN EUROPE. THEY WILL THEREFORE TRY TO KEEP 'SIGNIFICANT' MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AND TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY REDUCTION IN THE ALLIANCE'S MILITARY ROLE BY ENHANCING ITS POLITICAL (AND EVEN ECONOMIC) ROLE AS WELL AS BY BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY. FOR THE SAME REASONS THEY WILL PUSH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND SEEK TO FORMALISE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

7. THE FRENCH HAVE MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THIS - AS WAS EVIDENT IN DUMAS' INTERVENTION. THEY GIVE PRIORITY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THEY ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE ALLIANCE TAKING ON FUNCTIONS OUTSIDE ITS TRADITIONAL AREA OF RESPONSBILITY. THEY WANT 'EUROPE' TO HAVE A SECURITY ROLE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT: HENCE THE REFERENCE TO 'EUROPE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE' AND THE ARGUMENT THAT 'IN REINFORCING EUROPE ONE REINFORCES THE ALLIANCE'. DESPITE DUMAS' BRAVE WORDS ABOUT FRANCE'S DEFENCE POLICY, CURRENT EVENTS ARE IF ANYTHING RENDERING FRANCE'S TRADITIONAL DILEMMA MORE RATHER THAN LESS ACUTE.

8. AS REGARDS THE GERMAN QUESTION, IT WAS ON THE WHOLE AVOIDED DURING THE FORMAL SESSIONS. GENSCHER KEPT, FOR HIM, A LOW PROFILE. BUT IT WAS HARD NOT TO SENSE IN HIS MAIN INTERVENTION AND IN THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMUNIQUE, AS IN KOHL'S TEN POINTS, AN INSTINCTIVE, PERHAPS ALMOST UNCONSCIOUS, DOWN PLAYING OF THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS WOULD NO DOUBT BE VIGOROUSLY DENIED IN BONN BUT THAT IS HOW IT APPEARS. IT WAS EVIDENT EG IN REMARKS HE MADE TO ME AT LUNCH YESTERDAY WHEN I WAS SAT NEXT TO HIM, THAT GENSCHER'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO SLOW THE PACE OF EVENTS IN THE GDR, TO MAKE POSSIBLE A GRADUAL GROWING TOGETHER OF THE TWO STATES WHILE MINIMISING THE CONSITUTIONAL ISSUES, AND THUS TO AVOID THE CHOICES IMPLICIT IN THE PRESENT COURSE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT HE THOUGHT THIS AMBITION REALISTIC.

9. BEHIND ALL THIS, AND EVIDENT THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS, HAS BEEN THE AWARENESS OF THE GROWING

UNCERTAINTIES AND POTENTIAL DANGERS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS REASON THE NEWS OF SAKHAROV'S DEATH LAST NIGHT HAD AN EVEN GREATER IMPACT HERE THIS MORNING THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE. YOUR COLLEAGUES WERE NO DOUBT ASKING THEMSELVES WHICH WOULD TURN OUT TO BE THE MORE ACCURATE SYMBOL FOR THE FUTURE: THE SUDDEN DISAPPEARANCE OF THE GREAT SOVIET DISSIDENT AND REFORMER OR THE FIRST VISIT TO NATO BY A SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER.

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II

IMPLEMENTING OUR APPROACH

17. WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING THE APPROACH SET OUT BY ALLIANCE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT BOTH THEIR MAY 29TH-30TH AND DECEMBER 4TH MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS WE HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING LINES OF ACTION WHICH ARE PART OF A CONTINUING PROCESS:

18. WE ASPIRE TO ACHIEVE THE FULL PROMISE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. LOOKING TO THE CSCE MEETINGS SCHEDULED OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, WE ARE DETERMINED TO MAKE FULL USE OF THEM AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND GREATER CO-OPERATION AND TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. THE CSCE PROCESS IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS WILL BEAR FRUIT ONLY IF IMPLEMENTED IN LETTER AND SPIRIT BY ALL OF THE SIGNATORY COUNTRIES, WITHOUT EXCEPTION. THUS, WE ARE AGREED ON A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON FULL RESPECT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS WITHIN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND SUBSEQUENT COMMITMENTS.

WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO BUILD UPON THE CSCE PROCESS. IT HAS ALREADY BROUGHT ENCOURAGING RESULTS IN THE FIELDS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SECURITY SEMICOLON HUMAN RIGHTS SEMICOLON ECONOMICS SEMICOLON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. WE WILL PURSUE NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN ALL OF ITS FIELDS. IN PARTICULAR, AT THE UPCOMING COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION WE WILL EXPLORE WAYS TO EXPAND CSCE UNDERTAKINGS TO INCLUDE THE EXPLICIT RIGHT TO ELECTIONS THAT ARE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC. WE WILL SEEK TO ENERGIZE THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CSCE TO FOCUS ON THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITION TO MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE BONN CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD.

THE ALLIES WILL BE CONSIDERING IN THE PERIOD AHEAD THE USEFULNESS AND POSSIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF A CSCE MEETING AT A POLITICAL LEVEL PRIOR TO THE HELSINKI FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN 1992. A SUCCESSFUL MEETING WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION AND CLARITY AS TO ITS INTENDED PURPOSE AND GOALS.

19. FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL BE NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE BASIS FOR IMPROVED EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CONSISTENT WITH OUR BROAD SECURITY CONCERNS, WE INTEND TO ENCOURAGE EXPANDING ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, IN A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH, COMMENSURATE WITH THE PROGRESS OF THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS AND AS A MEANS OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING THESE POSITIVE CHANGES. SUCH RELATIONS - BASED ON COMMERCIALLY SOUND TERMS, MUTUAL INTEREST AND RECIPROCITY - WILL PAVE THE WAY TO AN INCREASED INTEGRATION OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, WHICH WE SUPPORT. AN IMPORTANT TASK OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WILL BE TO EXPLORE MEANS TO EXPAND WESTERN EXPERIENCE AND KNOW-HOW TO EASTERN COUNTRIES, BY ESTABLISHING CO-OPERATIVE AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES AND EXCHANGES IN TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL FIELDS. IN THIS REGARD, WE SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF RATIONALISING EXISTING EXPORT CONTROLS THROUGH A CO-ORDINATED APPROACH THAT ALLOWS GREATER SUPPORT FOR REFORM IN THE EAST AND FOR WESTERN INVESTMENT IN THOSE COUNRIES WHILE PROTECTING OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

WE FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE 24 COUNTRIES CO-ORDINATED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AND HUNGARY AND WILL CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO THE URGENT NEEDS OF THESE COUNTRIES. WE WELCOME THE DECEMBER 13TH DECLARATION OF THE MINISTERS OF THE GROUP OF 24, IN WHICH WE, IN CONCERT WITH OUR PARTNERS, HAVE RENEWED OUR COMMITMENT TO ASSISTANCE FOR THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLISH AND HUNGARIAN ECONOMIES AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND IN PARTICULAR THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, AS WELL AS YUGOSLAVIA, AT THE TIME THEY PUT INTO PLACE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

20. RECENT EVENTS HAVE CREATED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ALLIES TO ACHIEVE THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE ALLIANCE'S COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE MAY SUMMIT MEETING. THIS STRESSED THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL AS A VITAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF OUR SECURITY POLICY, AND ONE WHICH IS EMBEDDED IN OUR BROADER POLITICAL AGENDA. WE WELCOME RECENT

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO ACCELERATE A RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

THIS IS IN PARTICULAR TRUE FOR THE TWO DISTINCT NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THUS, THE PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) IN VIENNA STRENGTHENS OUR BELIEF THAT AN AGREEMENT CAN BE SIGNED IN 1990 THAT WOULD REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. WE WILL INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS WITHIN OUR HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE (HLTF) TO ACHIEVE THIS AGREEMENT AND WILL INSTRUCT OUR DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA ACCORDINGLY. ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND THE PROMPT COMPLETION THEREAFTER OF THE AGREED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, WILL BE ACCOMPANIED AND SUPPORTED BY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. BEARING IN MIND THAT VERIFICATION IS A NATIONAL REPONSIBILITY, WE WILL CONSIDER HOW THE ALLIES CAN BEST ORGANISE THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS TASK.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE CFE AGREEMENT WILL BRING US A DRAMATIC STEP FURTHER TOWARDS OUR GOAL OF PROVIDING SECURITY FOR ALL AT GREATLY REDUCED LEVELS OF FORCES. BUILDING UPON THIS CRUCIAL AGREEMENT WE WILL LOOK BEYOND IT TO DISCUSS AMONG THE ALLIES FURTHER STEPS IN ARMS CONTROL AS WE HAVE AFFIRMED IN OUR COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL ALSO WORK TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN THE CSBM NEGOTIATIONS, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF ENCOURAGING OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THEREBY REINFORCING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. RECOGNISING THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON MILITARY MATTERS, WE WELCOME THE SEMINAR ON MILITARY DOCTRINE TO BE HELD IN VIENNA IN JANUARY 1990 IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSBM NEGOTIATIONS.

OUR GOALS OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY WILL BE FURTHER ENHANCED BY AN AGREEMENT ON AN OPEN SKIES REGIME, DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE RECIPROCAL OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND TO ALLOW THE OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND INSTALLATIONS ON THEIR TERRITORIES. TODAY WE HAVE AGREED ON A COMMON POSITION FOR THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN FEBRUARY 1990. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH ARE SET OUT IN AN ANNEX TO THIS COMMUNIQUE.

WE WELCOME THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCELERATE THE START PROCESS TO RESOLVE ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO CONCLUDE A TREATY BY THE JUNE 1990 U S/SOVIET

SUMMIT.

SINCE THE IMPETUS GIVEN BY THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, NEW ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS THE CANBERRA CONFERENCE, HAVE OCCURRED. WE VIEW THESE EVENTS AND THE RECENT PROPOSALS BY PRESIDENT BUSH AIMING AT THE ACCELERATED DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.

21. WE WILL SEEK TO STIMULATE THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST BY FOSTERING GREATER AWARENESS OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS AND THROUGH EDUCATIONAL INTERCHANGE AND LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGES WITH NEWLY VITALISED LEGISLATURES IN REFORMING EASTERN COUNTRIES. IN THIS SPIRIT, AND IN KEEPING WITH THE DECLARATION OF MAY 1989, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THE NATO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FELLOWSHIPS, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO PROMOTE THE STUDY OF OUR DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES BY INDIVIDUALS FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST.

22. WE ARE AWARE THAT FOR OUR FELLOW CITIZENS SECURITY IS MORE THAN JUST THE PREVENTION OF WAR AND MUST BE SEEN IN A BROADER PERSPECTIVE. OUR CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WILL ALLOW US TO WORK TOGETHER AND WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN A NUMBER OF FORA TO DEVISE COMMON RESPONSES TO NEW THREATS. AS PART OF OUR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS WE ARE ENGAGING IN CO-OPERATIVE ENDEAVOURS, INCLUDING WITH COUNTRIES OF THE EAST, IN SUCH AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST AS THE SPREAD OF DESTABILISING MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES, THE FIGHT AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE RESULTS OF THE SOFIA CSCE CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, WHICH REPRESENTS A USEFUL STEP TOWARDS THE COMPREHENSIVE AND CONTINUED ATTENTION THAT ALL STATES MUST DEVOTE TO THIS SERIOUS PROBLEM OF COMMON CONCERN.

23. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WILL NECESSITATE INTENSIFICATION OF OUR PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, POLITICAL COORDINATION. THIS WILL DEMAND OPTIMUM USE OF THE PROCEDURES OF THE ALLIANCE. THE LATTER CONSTITUTES THE ONLY FORUM FOR PERMANENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC PARTNERS BASED ON AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF SECURITY. CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION TAKEN AT THE MAY 1989 SUMMIT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION RECOMMENDATIONS TO THIS EFFECT. AS A RESULT, WE ARE DETERMINED TO

FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR CONSULTATION PROCESS.

24. THE SPRING 1990 MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSION WILL BE HELD IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN JUNE.

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NAC MINISTERIAL 14-15 DECEMBER: COMMUNIQUE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE

FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS, WE HAVE MET FOR AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ACCELERATING POLITICAL CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE THAT IS EVIDENCE OF A PROFOUND TRANSFORMATION UNDERWAY IN THE NATURE OF POST-WAR EUROPE. WE STAND AT THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA IN WHICH THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES WHICH ARE AT THE HEART OF OUR ALLIANCE AND PART OF THE EUROPEAN HERITAGE ARE INCREASINGLY SHARED THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. OUR TASK IS TO HELP ADVANCE AND CONSOLIDATE THAT WELCOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS GREATER FREEDOM WITHIN CONDITIONS OF PEACE AND STRENGTHENED STABILITY. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WAYS TO SEIZE NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO BRING OUR VISION OF AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE OF THE FUTURE TO REALITY.

[Good language]

I

A PERIOD OF HISTORIC CHANGE

1. SINCE OUR MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MAY, THERE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY DRAMATIC ADVANCES TOWARDS GREATER DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM IN MOST EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THROUGH THE LONG DREAMT-OF OPENING OF BORDERS, THE FREE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST HAS ACCELERATED. THERE HAS BEEN WIDENING RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR REFORM TOWARDS MORE MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIES AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE.

2. THESE CHANGES TESTIFY TO THE INDOMITABLE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. THEY CONFIRM OUR LONG-HELD CONVICTION THAT

THE ASPIRATIONS COMMON TO ALL PEOPLE TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS WILL ULTIMATELY PREVAIL IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

3. POSITIVE CHANGE AMONGST SOVIET ALLIES IN EUROPE HAS BEEN GIVEN IMPETUS AND UNPRECEDENTED MARGIN FOR ACTION BY THE REFORMS THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE DOMESTIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES AND IN A REORIENTATION OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY THAT BREAKS WITH THE PAST IN A NUMBER OF FUNDAMENTAL RESPECTS. AS THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO TRANSLATE SUCH POLICIES INTO CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE ACTION, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EAST AND THE WEST WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE.

4. THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN EXPANDING CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND CO-OPERATIVE ACTION INTO A BROADER RANGE OF FIELDS. CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES, INCLUDING IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN, HAVE MULTIPLIED. THERE IS PROGRESS AND HOPE IN THE ONGOING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. OUR COUNTRIES HAVE RECENTLY INTENSIFIED HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE EAST. IN THIS REGARD, WE HAVE ESPECIALLY WELCOMED THE MEETINGS OF PRESIDENTS BUSH AND MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND PRIME MINISTERS THATCHER, ANDREOTTI AND MULRONEY WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, AND WE HAVE NOTED THE BILATERAL DECLARATIONS ISSUED.

5. WE ARE AWARE THAT THE CURRENT PROCESSES OF CHANGE UNDERWAY ARE STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE AND THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED MUST BE CONSOLIDATED. MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN. THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS HAVE YET TO BE FULLY INSTITUTIONALISED. IN MANY INSTANCES, BASIC RIGHTS ARE STILL DENIED AND THE PACE TOWARDS GENUINE DEMOCRACY IS UNEVEN. FURTHERMORE, WE CANNOT IGNORE THE MILITARY REALITIES THAT OUR ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO FACE AND WHICH LIE AT THE HEART OF EUROPE'S SECURITY PROBLEMS. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER VARIOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AFFECTING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OVERALL PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE

6. WE HAVE CALLED FOR THESE FAR-RANGING CHANGES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF OUR ALLIANCE. WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT A JUST AND LASTING ORDER OF PEACE IN EUROPE, BASED ON FULL RESPECT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS, AND ON THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES FROM THREATS OF AGGRESSION OR INTIMIDATION. BUILDING UPON OUR DUAL APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS CONTAINED IN THE HARMEL REPORT,

THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION OF THIS PAST MAY REAFFIRMED OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE FREEDOMS. AT THE MEETING OF THE ALLIANCE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN BRUSSELS ON 4TH DECEMBER, WE AGREED TO INTENSIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CONCERTED APPROACH.

7. WE WANT THE REFORMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE TO SUCCEED PEACEFULLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY. WE ARE DETERMINED TO FACILITATE AND PROMOTE THEM WITHOUT SEEKING ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE. WE WILL SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECT ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AS WE EXPECT ALL OTHER SIGNATORIES TO DO. WE DO NOT SEEK TO IMPAIR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ANY STATE.

8. WE ARE AWARE THAT EACH COUNTRY WITHIN EUROPE IS UNIQUE AND THAT THIS DIVERSITY MUST BE RESPECTED AND ALLOWED TO EXPRESS ITSELF. AS REGARDS EASTERN EUROPE, IT IS UP TO EACH COUNTRY THERE TO SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS THROUGH REFORMS FROM WITHIN. BUT WE THINK WE ALSO CAN PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE BOTH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR ALLIANCE AND IN OUR RESPECTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION EFFORTS.

9. WE ARE WITNESSING RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM IN THE GDR AND THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. THE RESTORATION OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WAS A PARTICULARLY MOVING EVENT. THE WALL, WHICH HAS DIVIDED BERLIN FOR NEARLY THREE DECADES, HAS BEEN BREACHED.

FRESH OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THEREBY OF GERMANY AND IN PARTICULAR OF BERLIN. THIS NEW SITUATION OPENS THE WAY TO INCREASINGLY CLOSE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

Strasbourg language

WE SEEK THE STRENGTHENING OF THE STATE OF PEACE IN EUROPE IN WHICH THE GERMAN PEOPLE WILL REGAIN ITS UNITY THROUGH FREE SELF-DETERMINATION. THIS PROCESS SHOULD TAKE PLACE PEACEFULLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY, IN FULL RESPECT OF THE RELEVANT AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES AND OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES DEFINED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN A CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE AND EAST-WEST CO-OPERATION. IT ALSO HAS TO BE PLACED IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE

10. THESE EVENTS CHALLENGE US TO LOOK AT OUR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES AS ALLIES. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SERVES AS THE ESSENTIAL BASIS FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR PEOPLES. BY KEEPING THE PEACE FOR THE PAST

FOUR DECADES IT HAS ENABLED OUR PEOPLES TO PROSPER IN FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES TO SERVE AS AN INSPIRATION FOR OTHER SOCIETIES. IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY, THE ALLIANCE REMAINS A RELIABLE GUARANTOR OF PEACE. IT WILL PROVIDE AN INDISPENSABLE FOUNDATION OF STABILITY, SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION FOR THE EUROPE OF THE FUTURE.

11. TO THAT END, SOLIDARITY AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES OF NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ESSENTIAL. OUR ALLIANCE IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES AND ITS GOAL IS THAT OF WAR PREVENTION. FOR THE FORESEEBLE FUTURE, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, BASED UPON BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. WE SHALL ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THESE FORCES, WHILE MAINTAINING THEM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE PRESENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE WILL REMAIN VITAL.

12. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE IN THE PURSUIT OF TIMELY AND ORDERLY PROGRESS OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE FULL AND PROMPT ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, ADOPTED IN MAY 1989.

13. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIANCE WILL INCREASINGLY BE CALLED UPON TO CARRY OUT ITS POLITICAL FUNCTION. RECALLING THE ORIGINS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE BUILT UPON COMMON FUNDAMENTAL VALUES, OUR LEADERS AFFIRMED AT THE MAY 1989 SUMMIT THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST REINTENSIFY ITS OWN EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE. IN DOING SO, IT MUST TAKE UP NEW CHALLENGES. OUR TASK THEREFORE IS TO USE ACTIVELY AND CREATIVELY THE POTENTIAL OF OUR ALLIANCE IN THE PURSUIT OF POLITICAL CHANGE WITHIN STABILITY. OUR POLITICAL APPROACH IN SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE CHANGE MUST BE MULTIFACETED AND DYNAMIC, SEEKING TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL PLURALISM, FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION, AND CO-OPERATIVE ACTION IN DEALING WITH COMMON PROBLEMS.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

14. OUR ALLIANCE WILL MAKE AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE EMERGENCE OF A EUROPE NO LONGER DIVIDED. THIS MOST CHALLENGING OF OUR COMMON TASKS TRANSCENDS THE RESOURCES OF EITHER WESTERN EUROPE OR NORTH AMERICA ALONE. FOR THAT REASON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS

UNIQUE IN BRINGING TOGETHER ALL OUR DEMOCRACIES IN JOINT EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF OUR SECURITY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR BROAD CO-OPERATION AMONG OURSELVES.

15. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE WE RECOGNISE THE OUTLINES OF THE POLITICAL ARCHTECTURE OF A EUROPE MADE WHOLE AND FREE, IN THE EMERGENCE AND SHAPING OF WHICH WE ARE DETERMINED TO PLAY A FULL PART. WE WILL FURTHER WORK TO STRENGTHEN WESTERN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES. THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL BE CENTRAL TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, AND ITS INSTITUTIONS ARE ALREADY PLAYING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ENCOURAGING THE FORCES OF REFORM FORWARD IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THIS INTEGRATION PROCESS MUST REMAIN A POINT OF REFERENCE AND ATTRACTION FOR THESE FORCES. THIS REPRESENTS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT THAT GOES HAND-IN-HAND WITH THE CONTINUED CLOSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, THE COHESION OF WHICH REMAINS A CRITICAL STABILISING FACTOR. WE VALUE THE ROLE OF EFTA IN THIS EMERGING FRAMEWORK. WE ALSO RECOGNISE THE GROWING ROLE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN THE LARGER EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE.

16. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) IS DESTINED TO ACQUIRE A GROWING AND CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO OFFER BOTH AN AGREED SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING PEACE, GREATER CO-OPERATION AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND A MEANS OF GIVING THESE PRINCIPLES PRACTICAL SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT.

ALEXANDER

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PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR P J WESTON
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 16

NATO

NNNN

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

cc Sonia Phippard
To be aware. I see no problems. AT 15/12

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Andrew Turnbull Esq CBE
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

15 December 1989

Dear Mr Turnbull

APPROACH FROM DAVID WALKER OF "THE TIMES"

David Walker, the public adminstration correspondent of "The Times", has approached my Secretary of State in connection with an article which he wishes to write seeking to discuss aspects of the release of Cabinet papers under the 30 years rule. The article proposes to refer to papers from the time when my Secretary of State's father was a Minister (I understand that at the time he was Minister of Housing and Local Government) and Mr Walker's aim is to discuss what papers available in the public domain 30 years on might reveal about the nature and character of the Government in question. I believe Mr Walker is also seeking views from Mr David Heathcoat-Amory and from Lord Hailsham.

Mr Brooke had considered the possibility that Walker may seek views on how the present Government might be viewed in 30 years time but, having spoken to Walker on a similar basis some 2 years ago feels that this is unlikely to present difficulties. My Secretary of State therefore proposes to accede to Mr Walker's request.

Yours sincerely

Stephen Pope

STEPHEN POPE

Mr Lever, Sec Pol Dept

Secretary of State's call on the Secretary General of NATO: 14 December 1989

The Secretary of State called on Dr Woerner this morning, accompanied by Sir Michael Alexander.

Dr Woerner asked for the Secretary of State's reaction to Secretary Baker's Berlin speech, particularly the passage on the future development of the Alliance. The Secretary of State said this must be on the right lines. We were keen not to lose sight of security as the core of the Alliance but to sustain that we would need a more active political role to persuade public opinion of the Alliance's continued validity. NATO was a natural vehicle to discuss a wide range of issues. There would be occasional overlap with European political cooperation but there was no need for disputes.

Dr Woerner said that the line he had taken at his press conference the previous day was that the two organisations were complementary. The membership of both was to a large extent common. We needed therefore not a new institution but simply good exchanges of information. There was French resistance to that which he did not understand. The Secretary of State said we should try to wear down that resistance. Dr Woerner agreed. He had spoken to the Italians as the next NATO member to hold the EC Presidency. They had undertaken to brief NATO intensively on EC developments. The French were somehow afraid that NATO would regard itself as a superior organisation, treating the EC as an annex. This was simply not true. The whole issue could be handled in a pragmatic, elegant way.

The Secretary General then turned to particular problems facing the meeting of the NAC. I shall not record in detail the discussion of whether or not to table the Alliance draft of the treaty in the absence of Greek agreement since this has been overtaken by events. But it is worth recording that Dr Woerner was very strongly in favour of maintaining consensus. He believed that the Alliance should put pressure on the Greeks but it would be very dangerous to abandon the principle of consensus. Later in the conversation, Dr Woerner said that when he had first come to NATO he had been very impatient with the slowness of decision-taking but he now appreciated the need for painstaking consultation. Consensus was the major element which distinguished NATO from the Warsaw Pact, and was a significant source of its strength.

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The Secretary of State and Dr Woerner also discussed the possible meeting between Mr Shevardnadze and Dr Woerner. They agreed that public opinion would not understand if we refused such a meeting. Dr Woerner should receive Mr Shevardnadze as Soviet Foreign Minister, but not as a representative of the Warsaw Pact. Mr Shevardnadze should not have a meeting with the Council (Dr Woerner pointed out that this was never done, even for friendly countries like Japan and Australia). If Dr Woerner chose to invite Permanent Representatives in for a drink with Mr Shevardnadze, that would be all right.

Dr Woerner said that, if Shevardnadze invited him to visit Moscow, he would say that he must discuss that with the member countries of NATO. The Secretary of State agreed that that was the right approach.

The German Question

Dr Woerner said that the Germans needed their allies at present but there were risks in the situation. It was very important that the German Government should not see the Allies as an obstacle to reunification.

The Secretary of State said this issue had been discussed rather frankly by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers after dinner on the first day of the Strasbourg European Council. Doubts about the German approach had been voiced by Messrs Andreotti and Lubbers - as well as by the Prime Minister. Out of that discussion had come the very good Strasbourg Conclusions on German reunification. We needed similar language at this meeting. The Secretary of State and Dr Woerner agreed that the key to successful handling of this issue lay in the behaviour of people in the GDR. Dr Woerner said that Mr Gorbachev was trying to keep some hold on a fast-moving situation, which was why he had suggested a 4-power meeting and why he wanted contacts with NATO. The Soviet Union needed the continuing existence of NATO as a anchor of stability.

Dr Woerner said that he constantly told the Germans that it was important for their interests to keep the Allies with them. Germany should maintain and reinforce its commitment to Western institutions. Chancellor Kohn knew perfectly well that the issue of Germany's external borders was effectively settled. There was no disagreement of substance with Genscher on that, but Kohl declined to say it publicly for internal political reasons. Dr Woerner also found it necessary to tell the Allies that, if they tried to block Germany's path to reunification, they would lose the Germans as allies.

The Secretary of State agreed that the process should not be blocked. The real question was one of pace. We would prefer a slow pace but we were not masters of the situation. Dr Woerner agreed. Sir Michael Alexander drew attention to the fact that the Germans were not approving references in the NAC Communique

/to

to strengthening the Alliance. Dr Woerner said he did not know the reasons for the German attitude or why Kohl had made no reference to NATO in the 10 points. The Secretary of State said it would be dangerous if the suggestion emerged that Germany was cooling towards NATO. Dr Woerner said that if he saw that danger he would speak personally to Chancellor Kohl about it.

CSCE Summit

Dr Woerner said that when he had talked to President Bush at the NATO Summit the previous week, President Bush had been somewhat against the idea of the Helsinki Summit being brought forward. The US attitude had changed since then. The French seemed committed to the idea. He himself was a bit concerned about it. The Secretary of State said we must not drift or be dragged. Mr Baker's ideas on the development of the CSCE were ambitious and needed further work. A Helsinki Summit without preparaton might be all right for Gorbachev but would not be all right for us. We needed to work to clear objectives. Dr Woerner said he shared the Secretary of State's analysis. Others would insist on the signing of the CFE agreement being extended to allow the participation of the Twelve. That would turn the CFE Summit into a sort of Summit of the 35, and might prepare the way for the full Helsinki II Summit.

14 December 1989

(J S Wall)

cc: PS
PS/Mr Waldegrave
PS/PUS
Sir J Fretwell
Mr Weston
Mr Goulden
Mr Ratford
Mr Burns, News Dept
WED
Planners
Mr Lidington
Mr Fraser

Mr Powell, No 10
Sir M Alexander, UKDEL NATO

15.12.
PM 89

MJ

cc NOML

cc AP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1989

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING: JUNE 1990

Thank you for your letter of 7 November about the Spring Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1990 and the Prime Minister's possible participation. I have discussed this with her and she would be prepared to host a dinner on 7 June at Culzean Castle. She would like it to be a large dinner and would be prepared to make a speech.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Jim Gallagher (Scottish Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 7 - 8 JUNE 1990

The UK plans to host next year's meeting of the NATO Spring Ministerial meeting; and to do so in Ayrshire because no suitable venue is available in London. The main body of the conference will be on Thursday 7 June and the FCO would like to know whether and how you might participate in the meeting.

The option favoured by the Foreign Secretary (and the only viable one in diary terms) is for you to host a dinner on the Thursday evening. This would be at the conference venue, the Turnberry Hotel, or at the nearby Culzean Castle (said to be the most beautiful castle in Scotland). FCO say that this could either be on a large scale - as usually happens on the evening of the Council - or limited to Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General; and that you could use the dinner as an occasion for a speech. Further details are attached.

It would be possible to combine your visit with a mid-summer tour in Scotland. You will of course be visiting Glasgow on 9 March; and we had planned for you to tour in Scotland on 6 - 7 September before your Balmoral weekend. Friday 8 June is now pencilled in your diary for a trip to Lancashire, which would include the opening of Heysham Power Station. But you could cancel these plans (Heysham is at present the only firm commitment) and carry out a Lancashire tour on your way to Scotland in September instead. You would of course have to hold a shorter tour in Scotland then. This could be a convenient way of getting out of the Heysham opening, if you so wished.

Do you agree to hosting a dinner on 7 June? Do you have any preferences for the location and size of the dinner?

Would you want to combine the occasion with a tour in Scotland on 8 June? Do you agree to postponing the Lancashire tour to 6 September, but to cancelling all plans for opening Heysham?

Caroline Slocock
13 November 1989

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

7 November 1989

Dear Charles,

North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, June 1990

The UK had offered to host the North Atlantic Council Spring Ministerial this year, until it was replaced by the NATO Summit. Following suggestions from NATO we have now offered to receive next spring's meeting instead; but because no adequate venue was available in London at the relatively short notice, we have proposed to Allies instead a meeting based on the Turnberry Hotel in Ayrshire. This has now been agreed, and will take place on 7 and 8 June. The purpose of this letter is to ask whether the Prime Minister would wish to become involved in the meeting.

The shape of the meeting is normally on the following lines:

7 June

mid-morning	Opening ceremony (public; not necessarily at the Conference Centre)
late-morning	Meeting starts
	Lunch
afternoon	Meeting continues
evening	Dinner

8 June

morning	Meeting concludes

The opening ceremony lasts about three-quarters of an hour and consists primarily of speeches by Dr Woerner, the President d'Honneur of the meeting (likely to be the Norwegian Foreign Minister) and a representative of the host nation. Our current hope, not yet confirmed with NATO Headquarters, is to mount the opening ceremony at the British Aerospace works at Prestwick: we want the programme to feature somewhere a reminder of Britain's technological base. The meeting itself will take place at the Turnberry Hotel; the two meals probably either there or at Culzean Castle nearby, depending on numbers.

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It is too soon to know what issues may dominate the meeting's agenda. If we have been able to keep to the timetable for the CFE negotiations set by the NATO Summit, we may be in the middle of their endgame. We can expect Soviet and Eastern European issues to be prominent. It will be the last NAC ministerial meeting before the German elections.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will be willing to play a part in the meeting. Ideally, she might agree both to address the Council and to give the Foreign Ministers and Dr Woerner a private lunch or dinner, perhaps at Culzean Castle. This would enable her both to demonstrate publicly our continuing commitment to the Alliance, and to the need for adequate defences as the basis for our relationship with Eastern Europe; and to discuss privately with the Ministers how we can assure that NATO retains the public support necessary to pursue its policies.

The timetabling would, however, be less than ideal. Since 7 June will be a Thursday, the Prime Minister would presumably wish to be in London for Prime Minister's Questions in the House. On this basis, there would be three possiblities:

i) the Prime Minister could address the Council during the Opening Ceremony leaving Prestwick for London at about 1200 hrs;

ii) we could delay the opening ceremony until 1100 hrs, to permit the Prime Minister both to address the Council and offer an early lunch at Culzean (about 12 miles away), with the Council starting only in the afternoon. It should then just be possible, though inconvenient, for the Prime Minister, flying via Prestwick, to conclude lunch by 1320 hrs and be back in London by just after 1500 hrs, provided that a helicopter can be made available for transport between Northolt and Chelsea Barracks;

iii) alternatively, the Prime Minister could offer dinner and use that as an occasion for her speech. This could be arranged on a large scale, as usually happens on the evening of the Council, or limited to Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that, if in principle she agrees, the Prime Minister should adopt option (iii).

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Jim Gallacher (Scottish Office).

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary)

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1989

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 5 June about work in NATO on the new Ministerial Guidance, which is due to be adopted at the Defence Planning Committee on 8/9 June. She agrees that we should continue to press for a reference to 3 per cent "as a general guide" but be ready to fall back on "significant real increases" if necessary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to Sir Robin Butler.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC ①

Rie Minister

Agree that we should continue to press for 3% annual increases in defence spending as a "general guide" for NATO countries? It would show determination to keep up NATO strength

CRD 5/6

MO 13/1/12L

PRIME MINISTER

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

1. You will wish to be aware of where matters stand on the biennial work in NATO on the new Ministerial Guidance (MG 89) which is due to be adopted by Ministers at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 8th/9th June. The Guidance will provide the basic political directive for the Alliance's defence planning activities over the period 1991/96. Agreement has yet to be reached on the key area of resource guidance.

2. The draft MG 89 has two general themes. First, it recognises the continuing importance of burdensharing and reflects the approach in last December's DPC report on 'Enhancing Alliance Collective Responsibility'. In particular, it notes that all countries should maintain, and if possible strengthen, the capabilities and commitments of their forward deployed forces in Europe. Second, the Guidance addresses the improvement in East-West relations. It welcomes the better atmosphere but emphasises that hopes for the future must not be allowed to obscure present realities and potential dangers. Considerable importance is attached, therefore, and rightly so, to an effective public presentation of the NATO case in an effort to overcome increasing reluctance within Western public opinion to accept existing levels of defence expenditure. Allies are also called upon to avoid making any changes in their force structures which might undercut NATO's position in arms control negotiations.

3. The section on "Resource Guidance" thus takes on a key importance this year. Since 1977, Alliance defence planning has been based on resource guidance involving a commitment by nations to aim at annual real increases in defence expenditure in the region of 3%. The 1987 Guidance, in addition to confirming the 3% formula as a general guide, placed the emphasis on improving value for money from resources; it also called on those nations spending a smaller proportion of their GDP on defence than the NATO median to take on a fairer share of the burden by increasing the percentage of their GDP dedicated to defence. The new guidance will maintain an emphasis on value for money and contain similar language to that of MG 87 on the defence share of GDP. The draft calls on those nations whose spending is below the current NATO median of 3% of GDP to aim to increase that percentage over time. Although this formula is acceptable, it is less demanding of those below the median than we wanted and argued for; the US take a similar view.

4. The issue on which nations remain divided is whether the passage on annual real growth should continue to refer to increases of 3% as a general guide, or instead refer more generally to 'significant real increases'. The latter is the clear preference of a substantial minority, led by the Dutch and Norwegians, both of whom have a respectable record on real increases. They feel strongly that the more general formula will be seen to be more realistic and, in presentational terms, appear more responsive to developments in East-West relations over the last six months or so.

5. There are strong arguments, however, for retaining the reference to 3% "as a general guide". First, despite the prospects for negotiated reductions in conventional forces in the medium term, particularly following President Bush's new CFE initiative, the Ministerial Guidance as a whole makes it clear that existing

deficiencies in conventional defence capability cannot be redressed without real increases of about this order. Second, the investigations into burdensharing have once again confirmed the need for those allies who do not make a fair contribution to be encouraged to do so; if sights are to be lowered in MG 89, contributions are likely to be reduced still further. Third, NATO needs to avoid giving the impression of being more influenced by Soviet words than Soviet actions and of anticipating success in what will be tight and difficult negotiations. In sum, abandoning 3% at this stage would risk sending the wrong political signal, both within the Alliance and externally, and cast doubt on the Alliance's commitment to its own winning formula of strong defence as the necessary basis for political dialogue and co-operation. Our Permanent Representative has, with my approval, firmly supported its retention during preliminary discussions. The Americans, for their own reasons, have also made a strong stand against dropping the 3% formula.

6. The Defence Planning Committee met at Permanent Representative level at the end of last week to take stock in the light of the Summit. They addressed the outstanding issues on the resource guidance, in particular, but were again unable to reach agreement. The United States position remained firmly in favour of 3%. Ministers will, therefore, need to address and to resolve the issue at the actual Ministerial meeting.

7. If we are to capitalise on the achievements of last week's Summit meeting, it will be important to agree on a positive declaration of resource policy within MG 89. In the current climate I believe that neither we nor the US should readily take the pressure off nations whose resolve is less firm than ours; and that we should continue to press for a reference to 3% "as a general guide". However, if in the interests of achieving

agreement, the US is prepared to fall back to the more general reference to "significant real increases", and are satisfied that that would meet Congressional concerns on burdensharing I would intend to do likewise.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson, and to Sir Robin Butler.

GH.

Ministry of Defence

5 June 1989

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PART ONE OF TWO

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MIPT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, 8 DECEMBER: COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTS FRANKLY ON THE LIMITED PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN DRAFTING THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, SETS OUT THE ISSUES ON WHICH GUIDANCE FROM MINISTERS IS NEEDED, AND CALLS FOR INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CAPITALS AND AT NATO HQ. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO COMPLETE THE WORK FOR THE NEXT NATO SUMMIT OR MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHICHEVER IS FIRST. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PUBLISH THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT IN A FORM TO BE DECIDED LATER.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REFERRED TO HIS WRITTEN REPORT AND SAID HE WOULD NOW BE CANDID. THE MANDATE FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT DATED FROM JUNE 1987. SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. BUT THERE WAS NOT AGREEMENT ON A TEXT, EVEN SETTING ASIDE KEY DISPUTED ISSUES: AND THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN UNABLE EVEN TO AGREE ITS OWN REPORT TO MINISTERS, DESPITE INTENSIVE EFFORT. PROGRESS HAD BEEN SLOW BECAUSE CERTAIN BASIC QUESTIONS HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED, SUCH AS FOR EXAMPLE:

- HOW THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEFINE ITS PRECISE TASK
- HOW THE 16 SHOULD TREAT ELEMENTS AGREED ONLY BY 15
- HOW TO ACHIEVE THE RIGHT MIX OF CONFIDENCE AND CAUTION
- THE PUBLIC OPINION ANGLE
- HOW TO COMMUNICATE THE RESULTS OF THE WORK.

BUT, THE TWO KEY ISSUES WERE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE POLICY: AND THE QUESTION OF SNF MISSILES (MODERNISATION AND THE ARMS CONTROL DIMENSION). THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP HAD REPORTED:

SACEUR'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS STUDY WOULD BE AVAILABLE NEXT YEAR. THE BUILDING BLOCKS WOULD THUS BE IN PLACE. BUT IF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WERE TO BE CONCLUDED BY SPRING 1989, INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WOULD BE NEEDED BETWEEN CAPITALS AND AT NATO HQ. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NEED APROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS FROM MINISTERS. CONCLUDING, WOERNER SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION WAS EXPECTING RESULTS.

3. ELLEMAN-JENSEN (DENMARK) AGREED ON THE NEED FOR PROGRESS. THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT APPEAR DIVIDED. THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE APPROVED NEXT SPRING, PERHAPS AT THE POSSIBLE SUMMIT. BUT A MORE VISIONARY APPROACH WAS NEEDED. NOT MUCH HAD BEEN SAID ABOUT HOW FUTURE CHANGE COULD AFFECT ALLIANCE INTERESTS. THE PRESENT DRAFT WAS STATIC AND DEFENSIVE. THE FINAL PRODUCT MUST BE SHARED WITH THE PUBLIC. THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD LACK OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THAT PART OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY WHICH RELATED TO NUCLEAR BASED DETERRENCE. THIS PROBLEM MUST BE ADDRESSED LEST IT ERODE SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE. IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO ESTABLISH A SMALL GROUP OF EXPERTS ON PUBLIC COMMUNICATION (INCLUDING POLLING SPECIALISTS) TO ADVISE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT.

4. ELLEMAN-JENSEN IDENTIFIED A DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS GORBACHEV. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE DESIRABLE TO CONSIDER ESTABLISHING A GROUP OF QUOTE WISE MEN UNQUOTE WHO, ON THE HARMEL BASIS, COULD FORMULATE A QUOTE CONVINCING ALLIANCE OVERVIEW UNQUOTE FOR THE NEW ERA OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SUCH A GROUP SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE COMPLETED FIRST. NO DECISONS ON HIS PROPOSAL WERE NEEDED AT THIS STAGE: HE COULD ELABORATE LATER.

5. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT ALLIANCE STRATEGY. THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WAS A MAJOR POLITICAL EXERCISE WHICH COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FAIL. BUT THERE WERE STILL REAL DIFFICULTIES. MINISTERS SHOULD AGREE THAT THE DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION WAS A SPRING 1989 SUMMIT, AND SET OUT GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION.

6. VAN DEN BREOEK (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE POINT OF NO RETURN HAD BEEN PASSED. A COMPLETION DATE SHOULD THUS BE SET: PERHAPS JUNE 1989. AN INTERIM MINISTERIAL MEETING BEFORE THEN WAS CONCEIVABLE, TO GIVE ADDED IMPETUS. HE REGRETTED THE FACT THAT MINISTERS WERE NOT DISCUSSING DETAILS: HE WAS PREPARED TO DO SO IN RESPECT OF SNF. MINISTERS SHOULD GIVE CLEAR GUDIANCE TO THEIR OFFICIALS.

7. ANDREOTTI (ITALY) SAID THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WAS A QUOTE BASIC REFLECTION UNQUOTE OF THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH TO THE EAST AND ARMS CONTROL. DIVERGENCIES WERE TO BE EXPECTED. ARMS CONTROL WAS AN ON GOING PROCESS. THERE WAS A NEED, NOT FOR IMMUTABLE CRITERIA, BUT FOR A FRAMEWORK OF REFERENCE WHICH COULD GUIDE FUTURE STEPS TOWARDS LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS: A STRATEGY FOR ARMS CONTROL WITHIN A SECURITY CONCEPT. NO EARLY RESULTS IN ARMS CONTROL WERE NEEDED, BUT THE POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE SOUNDED OUT, AND THE THREAT EVALUATED. THE CONCEPT SHOULD LEAD TO A HARMONISATION OF POSITIONS ON SNF.

8. SHULTZ (US) SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FINISH THE TALKS, SINCE THE PRODUCT WAS NEEDED TO GUIDE BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS. ITS ACHIEVEMENT WAS AN EDUCATIONAL PROCESS. A SUMMIT WOULD GIVE A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO INVOLVE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: BUT FOREIGN MINISTERS MUST PREPARE THE DOCUMENT. THE PROCESS WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THE PRODUCT. HE SYMPATHISED WITH THE DANISH SUGGESTION, UNLESS EXISTING NATO BODIES COULD DO THE WORK. PRESIDENT-ELECT BUSH'S TEAM WAS THINKING ABOUT PROCEDURES. FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S ENCOUNTER, A MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WAS NOT NOW SO URGENT. THE FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE TO CONSULT THE ALLIES.

9. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS SAFEGUARDING ITS SECURITY THROUGH A STRATEGY OF DEFENSIVE DETERRENCE. ARMS CONTROL WAS AN ELEMENT IN THIS: SECURITY THE OBJECTIVE. WHILE SOVIET/WP DEVELOPMENTS COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CONCEPT, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO PREDICT THE FUTURE. THE CONCEPT MUST BE BASED ON PRESENT REALITY, AND ESTABLISH A WAY OF THINKING.

10. ON THE OPERATIONAL ASPECT, SHULTZ SAID THAT ALL AGREED THAT FORCES SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO DATE. MODERNISATION WAS ALREADY TAKING PLACE. BUT IN RESPECT OF A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE, ENGINEERING NEEDED TO START, AND MUST BE AUTHORISED. FUNDING WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1990, WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD SUBMIT TO CONGRESS IN A FEW WEEKS. THE FISCAL YEAR WOULD START ON 1 OCTOBER, WHEN THE FUNDS SHOULD BE APPROPRIATED. THE US ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO TELL CONGRESS THAT NATO HAD AGREED WHAT IT WANTED, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. OTHERWISE THE MONEY WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING.

11. SMITH (CANADA) SPOKE OF HIGH PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. A DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE SET FOR THE NEXT NATO MEETING, WHETHER OR NOT THIS WERE A SUMMIT/ THE CONCEPT SHOULD FOCUS ON KEY ARMS CONTROL/DISARMAMENT ISSUES, AND NOT BE OVER-LOADED WITH SECONDARY ISSUES SUCH AS THE COURSE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND

REAFFIRMATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO COMMUNICATE THE CONCEPT TO PUBLIC OPINION IN SOME WAY. GUIDANCE WOULD BE NEEDED ON PUBLICATION. THE EWG BURDEN-SHARING REPORT MIGHT BE A MODEL. THE TONE SHOULD BE ANALYTICAL AND NOT DECLARATORY.

12. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THE DECLARATION ON THE CST WAS A GOOD ACHIEVEMENT - THE RESULT OF CONSISTENT HARD WORK. THE SAME METHOD WOULD BRING SUCCESS FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PRESS ON TOWARDS ITS GOAL. ALL SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE NEXT SUMMIT. ITS IMPORTANCE MERITED ADOPTION AT A SUMMIT: THE DATE FOR THIS SHOULD BE DECIDED. IF SUCH A MEETING TOOK PLACE, A FURTHER MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHETHER BEFORE OR AFTER, WOULD NOT BE NEEDED. NOBODY AT THE MADRID NAC HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE COMPELTED BY THE END OF 1988. QUOTE REMARKABLE UNQUOTE WORK HAD BEEN DONE. HE SUPPORTED THE DANISH VIEW THAT THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE MORE VISIONARY. HARMEL HAD BEEN FORWARD-LOOKING: THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SHOULD ALSO CONTAIN NEW IDEAS. BUT IT SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE. GENSCHER WARNED AGAINST PREPARING ONE PAPER FOR THE PUBLIC AND ANOTHER TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. A POLICY MUST BE DEFENSIBLE IN PUBLIC. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY: THE ONE WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE OTHER.

13. FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT SEEK TO DEFINE A POSITION ON SNF UNTIL THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT HAD BEEN COMPLETED. IN ITS WORK THE COUNCIL SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WAS A POLITICAL CONCEPT. NUCLEAR ARMS WERE FOR DETERRENCE, NOT WAR FIGHTING. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EVOLUTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH WOULD AFFECT DECISIONS IN OTHER FIELDS.

14. YOU SAID THERE WAS A NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC DOCUMENT. MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE WAS PART OF THE EXERCISE. IT WAS FOR DISCUSSION WHICH PARTS OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED. ON THE SUBSTANCE, THE ALLIES SHOULD BEWARE OF GIVING THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT A LIFE OF ITS OWN. IT SHOULD SERVE TO HELP THE ALLIES TAKE DECISIONS AND MOVE ON, NOT TO FOSSILIZE DECISION MAKING. A LOT OF TIME HAD ALREADY PASSED AND THERE WAS A NEED FOR URGENCY. THE FINAL REPORT SHOULD BE READY BY THE NEXT NAC MINISTERIAL IN JUNE 1989, OR PREFERABLY BEFORE.

15. YOU NOTED GENSCHER'S COMMENTS THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE DIVERTED FROM OUR GOALS. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST AVOID SEEKING TO SCORE SO MANY GOALS AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE ENDED UP SCORING NONE AT

ALL. ARMS CONTROL AND DECISIONS TO KEEP OUR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT UP TO DATE WERE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. BUT THOSE PRESSING FOR AN AGREED SNF ARMS CONTROL POSITION SHOULD NOTE THAT THERE WERE STILL FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BEFORE IT COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT THEY WERE ANY ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES IN THIS AREA WHICH WOULD NOT UNDERMINE OUR OWN SECURITY. OTHER DECISIONS SHOULD NOT BE HELD BACK BY THIS. DEFENCE PLANNING HAD TO TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF TODAY'S REALITIES. DECISIONS WERE NECESSARY SOON, NOT LEAST FOR THE US BUDGETARY REASONS SET OUT BY SHULTZ. THE ALLIES SHOULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF WORK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SO AS TO COMPETE IT QUICKLY AND ALLOW THE ALLIANCE TO GET BACK TO DAY TO DAY DECISION MAKING.

16. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES SHARED OTHERS' PREOCCUPATIONS AT THE SLOWNESS OF WORK. FRANCE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH FIXING A COMPLETION DATE. BUT IN SO DOING CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS HAD TO BE BORN IN MIND. ONE WAS THE UNCERTAINTY OVER THE AUDIENCE FOR WHICH THE CONCEPT WAS BEING PREPARED. TRYING TO WRITE FOR OUR PUBLICS AND GOVERNMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WAS AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WORK ON THE BASIS THAT THIS WAS A REPORT FOR MINISTERS, AND CONSIDER THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT AFTER ITS COMPLETION. A MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WAS THE LINGERING DOUBT ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE EXERCISE. FOR SOME (FRANCE INCLUDED) IT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES TO SERVE AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE. FOR OTHERS IT WAS AN EXERCISE TO MAKE CONCRETE DECISIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. FRANCE UNDERSTOOD THE INTEREST OF OTHER ALLIES IN SNF AND MODERNISATION BUT FRANCE TOOK NO PART IN THESE DECISIONS AND WOULD NOT BE FORCED TO EMBRACE THEM. CONTINUED FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE WOULD DEPEND ON MAINTENANCE OF THE FORMER INTERPRETATION OF ITS TASKS.

17. POOS (LUXEMBOURG) SAID THAT WOERNER'S ORAL REPORT SHOWED THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE TASK STILL AHEAD. HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDEA OF A COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN. THE COUNCIL SHOULD AIM FOR A COMPLETE REPORT BY THE JUNE NAC. THIS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. ANY DELAY IN COMPLETION OF THE REPORT BEYOND JUNE WOULD OVERSTRETCH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

18. HANNIBALSSON (ICELAND) COMMENTED THAT THE DISCUSSION HAD BROUGHT OUT THE GROWING NEED FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO THE EXERCISE. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TRY TO CONCLUDE WORK BY THE JUNE NAC. IN FUTURE WORK IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND PAST COMMITMENTS AND STATEMENTS BY

THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EROSION OF ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAPABILITY.

19. STOLTENBERG (NORWAY) SAID THE EXERCISE SHOULD CONCLUDE BY THE NEXT NATO SUMMIT. BUT IT WOULD BE A CONTRADICTION TO HAVE A MODERNISATION DECISION IN THIS CONTEXT: THIS WOULD OVERSHADOW QUOTE ALL THE GOOD THINGS UNQUOTE IN THE CONCEPT. HE STRESSED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT READY TO TAKE UNPOPULAR DECISIONS BUT ASKED WHETHER, GIVEN US BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, THERE WAS REALLY A NEED FOR A DECISION NOW.

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You will want to see Shultz' comments in para. 6 onwards. CM

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PART ONE OF TWO
SIC EME

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, 8 DECEMBER: MORNING SESSION

SUMMARY
1. SHULTZ REVIEWS GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AND HIS OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. GENERAL RECOGNITION BY MINISTERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPEECH. SHULTZ COMMENTS THAT ON THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE WE ARE GETTING CLOSE TO THE POINT WHERE QUOTE WE MIGHT FIND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION UNQUOTE. CST/CSCE COMPROMISE ENDORSED BY SHULTZ AND DUMAS. WIDESPREAD DESIRE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE VIENNA MEETING. CST STATEMENT APPROVED AND ISSUED.

DETAIL
2. OPENING THE PLENARY, THE PRESIDENT D'HONNEUR (VAN DEN BROEK, NETHERLANDS) SAID THE MEETING WAS TAKING PLACE AT AN IMPORTANT JUNCTURE. AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD RECENTLY TOLD THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, THE PRESENT SITUATION OFFERED MORE OPPORTUNITIES THAN RISKS: ALLIANCE VALUES WERE ADVANCING IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REALISED THAT PERESTROIKA NEEDED OPENNESS, DEBATE AND DEMOCRATISATION. GORBACHEV'S QUOTE EXTRAORDINARY AND MEANINGFUL ADDRESS TO THE UN UNQUOTE OPENED PROSPECTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE A MORE COMFORTABLE PARTNER. NATO SHOULD BE READY TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING EAST/WEST RELATIONS, USING HARMEL AS A GUIDE. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF QUOTE MORE SIGNIFICANT UNQUOTE DETENTE WITHOUT THE EUPHORIA OF THE 1970S. YOU HAD CORRECTLY SAID QUOTE DO NOT CHANGE A WINNING FORMULA UNQUOTE. THERE WERE PROSPECTS FOR QUOTE CIVILIAN DETENTE UNQUOTE COVERING TRADE, THE ENVIRONMENT, CULTURE, ETC. A COHERENT ALLIANCE POLICY WAS ESSENTIAL, ESPECIALLY IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND CST. BUT IT REMAINED TRUE THAT THE

ALLIANCE WOULD NEED AN ADEQUATE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHHICH SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO DATE. THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE REMAINED VITAL: AND AN INCREASINGLY UNITED EUROPE WAS VITAL TO US SECURITY. THE BURDEN-SHARING REPORT WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE UNITY. IN THANKING SHULTZ FOR HIS CONTRIBUTION, VAN DEN BROEK EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. AS MONNET HAD SAID, EUROPE AND THE US SHARED THE SAME CIVILISATION. THE ALLIANCE, A QUOTE HOUSE OF DEMOCRACY UNQUOTE, WAS IN GOOD SHAPE ON THE THRESHOLD OF ITS 40TH ANNIVERSARY.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THE ANNIVERSARY WOULD TAKE PLACE IN AN HISTORIC PERIOD OF TRANSITION, WITH A MORE COMPLEX POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. MANY OF THE CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE HAD LONG BEEN SOUGHT BY NATO. EVEN THE CHANGES IN THE WARSAW PACT WERE A RESULT OF NATO'S SUCCESS. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES, BUT NOT FORGET PAST WISDOM. THE HARMEL DOCTRINE HAD WORKED, AND SHOULD BE A GUIDE FOR THE FUTURE. WOERNER EXPRESSED THE HOPE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY REMAINED EXCESSIVE: GORBACHEV'S UN SPEECH WAS AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT, WHICH THE ALLIANCE SHOULD WELCOME: BUT THE DETAILS NEEDED EXAMINATION. HIS DECISIONS WOULD REDUCE, BUT NOT ELIMINATE, WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY. THEY WERE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: NATO SHOULD NOW LOOK FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. IF THE RUSSIANS NOW REALISED THAT THEIR CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY WAS A THREAT TO STABILITY, THIS WAS ENCOURAGING. BUT THE CST WAS STILL CRUCIAL. THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE URGED TO RESPOND TO NATO'S DATA INITIATIVE.

RESTRICTED SESSION

4. OPENING THE RESTRICTED SESSION, WOERNER SUGGESTED THREE MAIN TOPICS: EAST/WEST RELATIONS, HLTF WORK (INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION AND APPROVAL OF THE CONVENTIONAL STATEMENT) AND THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. HE ASSUMED THAT THE REPORTS REVIEWING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE NOTED WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE.

5. DUMAS (FRANCE) (SPEAKING FIRST BEFORE LEAVING TO JOIN PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IN PRAGUE) SAID IT COULD NO LONGER BE DENIED THAT CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE HAD MODIFIED THE EAST/WEST CLIMATE: THE WEST MUST SEIZE THE OPPPORTUNITY TIO REINFORCE PEACE. GORBACHEV'S UN SPEECH STRENGTHENED THIS IMPRESSION. A KEY AREA TO EXPLOIT WAS THAT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. AFTER THE INF TREATY, THE ALLIANCE COULD BE MORE AMBITIOUS ON EVERY FRONT (NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, CONVENTIONAL). ON THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION, DUMAS

CALLED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN START AND RESPECT FOR THE ABM TREATY. ON CW HE SAID THAT A COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE BAN LEADING TO EQUAL SECURITY MUST BE THE AIM: THE PARIS CONFERENCE SHOULD GIVE AN IMPETUS TO WORK IN GENEVA. ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL THE AIM SHOULD BE A POSITION WHERE NEITHER ALLIANCE COULD LAUNCH A SURPRISE ATTACK., HE HOPED THAT NATO'S NEGOTIATING POSITION COULD BE AGREED. BUT ARMS CONTROL EXISTED NOT IN ISOLATION, BUT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GENERAL POLICY. THIS APPLIED ESPECIALLY TO THE CONVENTIONAL TALKS. EAST/WEST RELATIONS COULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE MILITARY DIMENSION, BUT NEEDED A BROADER CONTEXT. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE FOREVER A BLOC TO BLOC CONFRONTATION: THE VISION OF EUROPE MUST BE KEPT OPEN. HENCE FRANCE'S INSISTENCE THAT CST TAKE PLACE IN A CSCE FRAMEWORK. HE WAS GLAD THAT A SATIFACTORY COMPROMISE HAD BEEN FOUND ON THIS ISSUE.

6. SHULTZ (US), AFTER COMMENDING BOTH PLENARY ST TEMENTS BRIEFED ON HIS MEETINGS YESTERDAY WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND ON GORBACHEV'S SPEECH. AT A MEETING BEFORE THE LATTER, SHEVARDNADZE HAD PREVIEWED THE SPEECH AND DISCUSSED THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE: SOUTHERN AFRICA: NUCLEAR TESTING: CAMBODIA AND BRIEFLY, KOREA. ON THE VIENNA MEETING, SHEVARDNADZE GAVE FURTHER ASSURANCES OF SOVIET WISHES FOR PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (REFLECTED IN GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE IN HIS SPEECH TO CHANGES IN THE CRIMINAL CODE, OTHER LAWS, AND THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO CHANGE THE STATE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE). THE US WOULD SEEK FURTHER DETAILS IN MOSCOW ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS REGARDING LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO CHECK SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THE REFUSENIK PROBLEM (ABOUT 150 OUTSTANDING CASES) WOULD BE SOLVED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THERE WERE 21 OUTSTANDING CASES OF DIVIDED FAMILIES, ALTHOUGH SOME HAD BEEN RESOLVED: AND SOME DUAL NATIONALITY CASES. GORBACHEV HAD DENIED THAT THERE WERE STIL POLITICAL PRISONERS: THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THERE MIGHT STILL BE AS MANY AS 150 CASES, THOUGH THESE MIGHT BE LIGITIMATE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON DEFINITION. A MECHANISM WAS NEEDED TO ANALYSE THESE CASES. SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED WILLING TO AGREE TO THIS. QUOTE GIGANTIC PROGRESS UNQUOTE HAD BEEN MADE IN HUMAN RIGHTS. QUOTE WE ARE GETTING CLOSE TO THE POINT WERE WE MIGHT FIND A SATISFACTORY SITUATION. THE PROCESS WAS PROMISING BUT NOT YET COMPLETED. HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL GREATLY INTERESTED IN A MOSCOW CONFERENCE, DESPITE THEIR PROTESTATIONS.

7. ON THE CST MANDATE, SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE 23/35 RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN SETTLED. THE GEROGRAPHICAL PROBLEM (TURKEY) REMAINED TO BE SOLVED, BUT THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. ON OTHER CSCE ASPECTS, THERE WERE STILL PROBLEMS

OVER ADDITIONAL CONFERENCES. IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO MEET IN PRAGUE: ALTHOUGH QUOTE WE SHOULD GET INTO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE AND A CONFERENCE MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA. SHEVARDNADZE HAD CALLED FOR CLOSURE AROUND CHRISTMAS: IF THIS WERE TO BE ACHIEVED THERE WAS MUCH ROUTINE WORK. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SUGGESTED A CLOSING SESSION ON 6 JANUARY. IT WAS THUS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE QUOTE GET ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER UNQUOTE.

8. TURNING TO REGIONAL ISSUES, SHULTZ SAID THAT A SOLUTION ABOUT THE ANGOLA/NAMIBIA PROBLEM SEEMED QUOTE ABVOUT TO FALL INTO PLACE UNQUOTE. HE HOPED THE CONFERENCE WOULD RECONVENE IN BRAZZAVILLE THIS WEEKEND, WITH A SUBESEQUENT SIGNING CEREMONY IN NEW YORK. THE SOLUTION WOULD INVOLVE HEAVILY FRONT-END-LOADED CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS: THE NEED WOULD THEN BE FOR PRESSURE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA. THE RUSSIANS HAD WORKED CO-OPERATIVELY SINCE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, AND PUT PRESSURE ON CUBA AND ANGOLA.

9. ON AFGHANISTAN, SHULTZ BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WOULD COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL BY 15 FEBRUARY. THE SOVIET/MUJAHIDIN DIRECT TALKS, THE FIRST OF THEIR KIND, HAD REACHED NO AGREEMENT BUT WERE POSITIVE. THE MAJAHIDIN WERE READY NOT TO ATTACK DEPARTING SOVIET FORCES, OR THE AIRFIELDS BEING USED. THE RUSSIANS WANTED AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE QUOTE PUPPET UNQUOTE REGIME. THE MUJAHIDIN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE QUOTE GOOD MUSLIMS UNQUOTE IN LOWER LEVELS OF THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT, WHO MIGHT HAVE A ROLE. THE MIJAHIDIN CAUTION WAS UNDERSTANDABLE: OF A PRE-WAR AFGHANISTAN POPULATION OF 15 MILLION, 5.5 MILLION WERE REFUGEES OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, 2 MILLION WERE INTERNAL REFGUEES, AND 1.5 MILLION HAD BEEN KILLED.

10. ON SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THE RECENT TALKS WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD GONE WELL: A VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA WAS CERTAIN, TIMING DEPENDING ON THE CREATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA. CHINA WAS LIKELY TO CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE KHMER ROUGE. THE CHINESE ACCEPTED THAT THOSE CLOSE TO POL POT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. A SINO/SOVIET SUMMIT IN BEING WAS LIKELY: THIS WOULD NOT THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS.

11. SHULTZ SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF CENTRAL AMERICA, AND VERY LITTLE ON KOREA. GORVBACHEV HAD UNDERTAKEN TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THIS. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, SHULTZ SAID THAT WORK ON THE PNET WAS COMPLETED, AND WAS NOW FOCUSSED ON THE TTBT. THIS WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED BY

JANUARY 20 BUT A BRACKETED JOINT TEXTG, FOR FINAL AGREEMENT IN 1989, MIGHT BE READY.

12. ON THE REAGAN/BUSH/GORBACHEV MEETING, SHULTZ SAID THAT GORBACHEV DESCRIBED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERESTROIKA AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED TO DEVELOP HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN SENSE IF PERESTROIKA WERE TO SUCCEED. SHULTZ WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REACHED THIS CONLUSION ON THEIR OWN. HE SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE DISCUSSION WAS VERY CORDIAL, RELAXED AND WIDE-RANGING, WITH NO NEGOTIATION AS SUCH. GORBACHEV HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE ARMENIA/AZERBHAIJAN CONFLICTS WERE NOT FUNDAMENTALLY ETHNIC IN ORIGIN, BUT RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS, AND TO HOSTILITY TOWARDS THIS IN CERTAIN QUARTERS. ON THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, GORBACHEV ADMITTED USING THE WORD QUOTE DISMANTLE UNQUOTE BUT HAD ADDED THAT THE FACILITY WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. SHULTZ BELIEVED THE PROBLEM WAS MANAGEABLE. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THERE WAS MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD BE NEEDED: SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT 1989 SHOULD BE A QUOTE BANNER YEAR UNQUOTE IN THIS CONTEXT.

13. ON GORBACHEV'S FORCE REDUCTION ANNOUNCEMENT, SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT THE DECISION WAS A UNILATERAL SOVIET ONE: NOT NEGOITIATED NOR MADE UNDER PRESSURE. THEY WISHED TO REDUCE THE IMPRESSION OF AN OFFENSIVE CONFIGURATION OF FORCES. HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS: THESE NEEDED MILITARY ANALYSIS. BUT GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS A SIGNIFICANT STEP, WHICH BY RECOGNISING ASYMMETRY, RESPONDED TO THE NATO POSITION. BUT IT DID NOT REMOVE THE ASYMMETRY. THERE REMAINED MUCH TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. ACCORDINGLY, WHILE NATO SHOULD WELCOME THESE STEPS, THERE WAS NO NEED TO CHANGE THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH. FIRMNESS PAID. THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE A QUOTE DOWN-PAYMENT UNQUOTE.

14. SHULTZ SAID NATO NEEDED AN AGREED CST POSITION, AND FOR THE TALKS TO GET STARTED. BUT DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS TOOK PLACE AT THE MADRID NAC IN JUNE, WAS CENTRAL TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS. IF THE ATMOSPHERICS IN EASTERN EUROPE REMAINED POSITIVE THE PROMISED SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WOULD HAPPEN. IF THINGS TURNED SOUR THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS. IT WAS THUS VITAL FOR THE ALLIANCE TO CONTINUE TO STUDY EASTERN EUROPE.

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MODUK FOR SEC (NATO/UK)(P) AND DACU

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: MINISTERIAL MEETING, MADRID: COMMUNIQUE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT AGREED BY MINISTERS ON 10 JUNE:

BEGINS
1. AT THEIR MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 2 AND 3 MARCH 1988, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ALLIANCE REAFFIRMED ITS GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND STRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE WORKING FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR COMMON IDEALS AND GOALS. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT AT OUR MEETING IN MADRID WE REVIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE US, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RECENT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

2. GUIDED BY OUR DESIRE FOR A MORE PEACEFUL AND SECURE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WE HAVE CONTINUED SINCE THE ALLIANCE SUMMIT TO CONSIDER THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF ISSUES CONCERNING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SECURITY, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND THE EXISTING MILITARY FORCE RELATIONSHIP. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND WE DISCUSSED:

- THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AND PROSPECTS FOR EASTERN EUROPE,

- THE NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AND BALANCED OUTCOME OF THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA, AT AN EARLY DATE, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS, AND MANDATES FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES:

- OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO SHARE EQUITABLY THE RISKS, BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AS WELL AS THE BENEFITS, OF OUR COMMON ENDEAVOUR, AND THE NEED TO RENEW OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN, UNDER

EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES, A FAIR PARTNERSHIP, MINDFUL OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. WE WELCOME THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, BOTH FOR THEIR SUBSTANCE AND AS A PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE WELCOME THE UNPRECEDENTED PROMINENCE ACCORDED TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SUMMIT, AND HOPE THAT A MORE FORTHCOMING SOVIET ATTITUDE WILL ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE CSCE CONCLUDED DOCUMENT. WE SUPPORT THE PROGRESS RECORDED TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON A 50% REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND STRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS OBJECTIVE IN SEEKING SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. WE WELCOME THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INF TREATY AS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN OUR SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLARATIONS OF OUR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

4. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION HAS CONTINUED ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AS CALLED FOR IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED IN REYKJAVIK IN JUNE 1987. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED ON THE PROGRESS OF THIS WORK AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING A WRITTEN REPORT AT OUR NEXT MEETING IN DECEMBER.

5. WE WELCOME THE BEGINNING OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM AFGHANISTAN AFTER OVER EIGHT YEARS OF OCCUPATION. WE HOPE THAT THE GENEVA ACCORDS MARK THE START OF A PROCESS WHICH WILL ENABLE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ENABLE THEIR COUNTRY TO RECOVER ITS FULL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE.

6. THE MAINTENANCE OF CALM AND STABILITY IN AND AROUND BERLIN AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONDITIONS THERE, AS ENVISAGED IN THE CURRENT BERLIN INITIATIVE, REMAIN KEY ELEMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AS THE EC'S EUROPEAN CITY OF CULTURE FOR 1988, BERLIN IS AGAIN DEMONSTRATING ITS VITALITY AND ATTRACTIVENESS.

7. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ON THE OCCASION OF OUR FIRST MEETING IN MADRID. WE TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME AGAIN SPAIN'S MEMBERSHIP AS YET ANOTHER CONFIRMATION OF THE VITALITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WE ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROCESS UNDER WAY IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS MADE BY SPAIN FOR DEFINING A SIGNIFICANT SPANISH MILITARY

CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENCE.

8. ON COMPLETION OF HIS TERM OF OFFICE, WE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE DEPARTING SECRETARY GENERAL, LORD CARRINGTON, FOR HIS OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. WE EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR HIS SERVICES TO THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THEREFORE TO PEACE AND FREEDOM.

ENDS.

GORDON LENNOX

YYYY

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Prime Minister
Consistent with the briefing which the President gave you — which was rather good.
CDP
11/12

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

1. THE MEETING BEGAN IN RESTRICTED SESSION. POOS (PRESIDENT OF HONOUR) PAID TRIBUTE TO HARMEL, THE RECIPIENT OF THIS YEAR'S ATLANTIC PRICE AND CONGRATULATED SHULTZ AND HIS TEAM ON THE INF TREATY. CARRINGTON THEN RECALLED THAT IT WAS 8 YEARS LESS ONE DAY SINCE THE 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION. HE SUGGESTED 3 CONCERNS FOR THE ALLIANCE FOLLOWING THE INF TREATY: ITS RATIFICATION: THE FUTURE PATH OF ARMS CONTROL AND IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD: AND THE PROBLEMS OF SUCCESS IN TERMS OF PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. THE NEED FOR FULL RESPECT OF THE FIRST HARMEL PRINCIPLE (MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY) WAS GREATER THAN EVER.

2. SHULTZ THEN GAVE AN EXTENSIVE DE-BRIEFING ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. HE DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ITS BUSINESSLIKE NATURE. '3 DAYS OF DRINKING FROM A FIRE HOSE' WITH HARDLY ANY SMALL TALK. PROCEDURALLY IT HAD FOLLOWED THE PATTERN OF HIS OWN PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, IE MEETINGS OF A SMALL GROUP OF PRINCIPALS SUPPORTED BY 2 WORKING GROUPS, ONE ON ARMS CONTROL, ONE ON BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES. THERE HAD BEEN 5 FULL WORKING SESSION.

HUMAN RIGHTS

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD LAUNCHED FROM THE BEGINNING INTO AN INTENSE DISCUSSION. THIS HAD INVOLVED NAMES, LISTS AND THE SOVIET UNION'S LAWS AND PRACTICES. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT HOWEVER GONE INTO DETAIL IN PUBLIC ABOUT ALL THE POINTS OR NAMES RAISED. GORBACHEV HAD CLEARLY APPRECIATED THIS. IN GENERAL HE HAD SHOWN HIMSELF WILLING TO DISCUSS ALMOST ANYHTING, PROVIDED THAT DISCUSSION WAS NOT ON A TEACHER/STUDENT BASIS. PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE NUMBER OF DIVIDED SPOUSES/BLOCKED MARRIAGES IN WHICH THE U S HAD AN INTEREST HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM AROUND 30 TO 3 OR 4. BUT THERE WAS CLEARLY A SOVIET BOTTOM LINE. ANYONE WHO HAD EVER SERVED IN THE KGB WOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE. AND THE GENERAL OBSESSION WITH

STATE SECRECY REMAINED. THE AMERICANS WERE ALERT TO ENSURE THAT GOOD PROCEDURES FOR DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS. BUT THE INCLUSION OF A SENTENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN A MILESTONE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

4. AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ HAD DOMINATED. THERE HAD BEEN 8 HOURS OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION OF THE MOST DIRECT AND REALISTIC KIND THE AMERICANS HAD EVER HAD WITH THE RUSSIANS. ON AFGHANISTAN, EVERYTHING WAS AGREED EXCEPT FOR SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED STILL TO BE HUNG UP ON THEIR INSISTENCE ON PRIOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE U S SIDE HAD EMPHASISED THE ABSURDITY ON THIS WHEN A THIRD OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION WAS NOT EVEN IN THE COUNTRY. THE RUSSIANS HAD SEEMED TO ACCEPT IN THE END THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS NOT AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS. AND IN SHULTZ'S VIEW THIS MEANT THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOW EFFECTIVELY DELINKED FROM SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. HE PERSONALLY HOPED FOR SUCH A WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF 1988. BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PROMISED ANYTHING.

5. ON IRAN/IRAQ THE AMERICANS HAD EMPHASISED THAT IRAN WAS NOW PLAYING GAMES WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAD URGED THAT WORK SHOULD START ON THE DRAFTING OF A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THAT THIS FACT SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY. THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTINUED TO PUSH THE IDEA OF A UN FORCE 'AN IDEA WITHOUT A CONCEPT'.

ARMS CONTROL : START

6. FOLLOWING THE CEREMONY OF THE INF SIGNATURE THE 2 SIDES HAD GONE STRAIGHT TO WORK. ON START A LOT OF PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT WAS NOW IN SIGHT. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS CERTAIN, OR EVEN PROBABLE, BUT IT WAS NOW CLEARLY WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY. FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT AT REYKJAVIK ON A 6000 WARHEAD CEILING, A 1600 DELIVERY VEHICLE CEILING AND A BOMBER COUNTING RULE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A HEAVY MISSILE LIMIT OF 1540 WARHEADS AND 154 LAUNCHERS, AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN WASHINGTON ON A NUMBER OF OTHER POINTS. IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED THAT THE 50 PERCENT CUT IN THROW-WEIGHT ESTABLISHED BY THE HEAVY MISSILE LIMIT WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED SUBSEQUENTLY TO CREEP BACK UP. AND, OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE AMERICANS, THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT ON A CEILING ON BALLISTIC MISSILES OF 4900 WARHEADS. AS REGARDS MOBILE MISSILES, THE US HAD AGREED THAT THEY COULD BE RETAINED IF SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE FOUND AND DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS. SIMILARLY, ON SLCMS, THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED TO FIND A WAY TO LIMIT

THEM OUTSIDE THE THRESHOLD OF 6000 WARHEASDS PROVIDED THAT A WORKABLE VERIFICATION REGIME WAS FOUND. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO HAVE SOME IDEAS FOR TECHNICAL FIXES IN THIS RESPECT. VERIFICATION REMAINED A KEY PROBLEM FOR THE AMERICANS, AND U S NAVAL EXPERTS WERE SCEPTICAL WHETHER AN EFFECTIVE REGIME WAS FEASIBLE. WITHOUT SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION THE U S PREFERENCE WOULD REMAIN FOR HANDLING THE ISSUE THROUGH UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS.

7. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN PROGRESS ON COUNTING RULES. NONE OF THE ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. BUT THERE WERE NOW AGREED EXPLICIT COUNTING RULES FOR 15 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SYSTEM.

8. AS REGARDS VERIFICATION THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE REGIME WOULD INCLUDE 8 POINTS. 5 OF THESE HAD FEATURED IN THE INF TREATY, NAMELY DATA EXCHANGE ON PRODUCTION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING, STORAGE, AND DEPLOYMENT: BASELINE INSPECTION: ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION: CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF CERTAIN PRODUCTION FACILITIES: AND SHORT NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF DECLARED LOCATIONS. IN ADDITION HOWEVER THERE WOULD BE 3 NOVEL FEATURES: THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT, SUBJECT TO AGREED PROCEDURES, SHORT NOTICE INSPECTIONS AT SUSPECT SITES: A BAN ON TELEMMETRY ENCRYPTION: AND AN ARRANGEMENT FOR ENHANCED OBSERVATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WHEREBY AT SHORT NOTICE CERTAIN FACILITIES WOULD HAVE TO BE OPENED UP.

SDI/AMB TREATY

9. THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTINUED TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SDI PROGRAMME AND HAD ARGUED THAT IT WAS A WASTE OF MONEY. THE AMERICANS IN RETURN HAD POINTED TO THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN EFFORTS. BUT IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED THAT ON THE ISSUE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THE PROGRAMME, THE 2 SIDES SHOULD AGREE TO DISAGREE. AGREED LANGUAGE HAD BEEN PRODUCED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED SATISFIED THEIR REQUIREMENTS, IN PARTICULAR THE REFERENCES TO THE 2 SIDES BEING ABLE TO CONDUCT THEIR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND THE TESTING AS REQUIRED, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF NON WITHDRAWAL. THE U S HAD PROPOSED 7 YEARS LASTING UP TO 1994, THE RUSSIANS 10. BUT THE DIFFERENCE ON THE NUMBER OF YEARS WOULD NOT 'UPSET THE APPLE CART'. FROM THE U S POINT OF VIEW THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THE RECOGNITION BY THE RUSSIANS THAT FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF UP TO 3 YEARS INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT, IF NOT AGREED OTHERWISE EACH SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO PURSUE ITS COURSE OF ACTION.

10. TAKEN TOGETHER, WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED ON START AND ON SDI/ABMT

WAS A MAJOR FORWARD STEP. THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO GET A START TREATY COMPLETED BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. BUT, AS THEY HAD DONE OVER INF THEY WOULD KEEP THEIR COOL UNTIL THE END.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

11. SHULTZ REFERRED ONLY BRIEFLY TO THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO NUCLEAR TESTING AND TO THE SEARCH FOR WAYS OF NARROWING THE PROBLEMS ON VERIFICATION. ON CW THE RUSSIANS HAD PUSHED HARD. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW BEST TO PROCEED. THE VERIFICATION REGIME OF ANY CW TREATY WOULD BE TENUOUS AND 'WE MAY NOT FEEL SO GOOD ABOUT IT'. THE TREATY WOULD REQUIRE HIGHLY INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION AND IT WOULD HAVE TO BE GLOBAL. AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE RUSSIANS HAD DISCUSSED ASSYMETRIES FREELY AND HAD REFERRED TO U S AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THIS CONTEXT. THEY WERE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO PUSH AHEAD IN THIS FIELD. THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED WITH THE NEED FOR PROGRESS. THEY HAD HOWEVER EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH THEY COULD DEAL BILATERALLY WITH THE RUSSIANS AND THAT DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA WERE LINKED TO PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

12. SHULTZ REFERRED TO REMARKS HE HAD MADE AT HIS LUNCH FOR THE GORBACHEVS. HIS CONCLUSIONS WERE THAT THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION NEEDED TO RECOGNISE THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO COEXIST AND CONTINUE TO DIFFER. THEY SHOULD AVOID BOTH HOSTILITY AND EUPHORIA AND SHOULD SPEAK WITH CLARITY AND CANDOUR ABOUT THEIR DIFFERENCES. HE HAD QUOTED THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ORDER TO STRESS THAT PREOCCUPATION WITH THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT AN AMERICAN IDIOSYNCRASY. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT, WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST, TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE. THE WORLD WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT IN 5 TO 10 YEARS TIME. OPENNESS TO IDEAS, INFORMATION AND CONTACT WERE THE KEY.

11. SHULTZ'S FINAL MESSAGE WAS THAT 'SOMETHING DIFFERENT IS GOING ON'. THE CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS PROFOUND. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE 'GOING TO ROLL OVER AND BE NICE TO US'. ALLIED STRENGTH AND COHESION WOULD REMAIN VITIAL. BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH WERE THERE.

ALEXANDER

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
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CDP

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-270 3000

20 May 1987

J F Howe Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence

CDP 20/5

Dear John,

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

cc flap

The Chancellor has seen your letter of 18 May to Charles Powell and its attachment.

The Chancellor endorses your Secretary of State's view that the new resource guidance is generally helpful to the UK and thinks it a considerable improvement on the 1985 version. He is therefore content that it should be adopted at the DPC meeting on 26 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell, Tony Galsworthy (FCO) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Cathy Ryding

CATHY RYDING
Assistant Private Secretary

Nato: Ministerial Mtgs 5/79



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CQ PC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 13/1L

18th May 1987

Dear Charles.

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The Defence Secretary wrote to the Prime Minister on 8th January, outlining our proposed approach to the resource aspects of the new NATO Ministerial Guidance (MG 87), for the period 1989-94. Subsequently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked that the guidance should concentrate on existing levels of defence spending and the need for improved contributions from those nations whose present contribution is well below their ability to pay.

I enclose for your information the resource guidance which has been drafted after prolonged discussion within NATO. As we intended, there is considerable emphasis on the need to obtain optimal value for money through improved co-operation and greater competition in equipment procurement. While the 3% formula is confirmed as a general guide, it is qualified by a proposal that nations spending a smaller proportion of their GDP on defence than the NATO median should take on a fairer share of the burden. In practice, this formulation applies particularly to Italy, Canada, Denmark, Spain and Luxembourg. There is also a more general reference to the need to take present and past national performance into account.

Mr Younger considers that the new resource guidance is generally helpful to the UK and should be endorsed. The next step is for MG 87 to be considered by NATO Permanent Representatives on 19th May, before it is taken by Ministers at the DPC meeting on 26th May. It is also planned that the resource guidance should be published as an annex to the DPC communique as it was in 1985. On the basis of the attached text, Mr Younger sees no reason to object to this.

I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Galsworthy (FCO), Alex Allan (Treasury) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
John Howe.

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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ANNEX A

DRC/WP(87)1(3rd Revise)

Resource Guidance

12. Against the background of existing Warsaw Pact strengths and force improvements and of the need to sustain and, where required, to accelerate the CDI effort, nations must provide the resources necessary to implement the agreed strategy at a politically acceptable degree of risk. All Allied countries should bear and be seen to bear a fair share of the common defence burden. The ultimate yardstick by which Alliance and national efforts must be measured is the overall ability to perform the tasks required to support NATO's deterrence and defence objectives. The following guidance is to be read in that light:

(a) Every effort must be made to obtain optimal value from the resources made available. Vigorous efforts must be made to improve co-operation and rationalisation within the Alliance, especially in the field of armaments collaboration, and to obtain better value for money on a national basis, including greater competition in equipment procurement.

(b) Notwithstanding the success of nations in improving output from existing expenditure it will be necessary to ensure that the allocation of resources to defence is commensurate with the tasks facing the Alliance. For many nations this would mean achieving increases in real

expenditure above currently planned levels and for some these increases would need to be the greater because of the severity of the deficiencies in their defence capability.

(c) In this respect the 3% formula should be confirmed as a general guide, based on real increases in defence expenditures in the region of 3% a year. This resource guidance formula must always be viewed as one amongst several instruments to guide defence efforts within the Alliance. Those nations which have not met this guidance in the past should make every effort to do so in the future. Regarding the share of national resources devoted to defence, nations that spend a smaller proportion of their gross domestic product on defence than the NATO median should over time assume a more equitable share of the collective defence burden by increasing the percentage of their GDP dedicated to defence. In applying this and the general guide, account should be taken of the considerations above, as well as the specific considerations applying to individual nations. Such considerations should take as their starting point the quantity and quality of each nation's past and present defence effort including the share of national resources devoted to defence, the identification of

the most critical deficiencies in each nation's force contribution and the necessary improvement measures, in short, performance. Nations should achieve, to the extent possible and as soon as possible, necessary force improvements even if they are additional to those contemplated at the resource level called for by the formula.

NATO — Ministerial Mtgs 5179

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ RAMT ~~WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS~~

PS
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

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MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

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T.I.K

MODUK FOR PS/S OF S, DUS(P), DACU
SIC CAA/EME

NPG MEETING, 14-15 MAY.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE.

BEGINS:

THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION AT THE INVITATION OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IN STAVANGER, NORWAY ON 14TH AND 15TH MAY, 1987. WE DISCUSSED A WIDE VARIETY OF SECURITY MATTERS, INCLUDING THE STATUS OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES, CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DUAL-TRACK AND 1983 MONTEBELLO DECISIONS, THE WORK OF SEVERAL STUDY GROUPS AND FUTURE NPG WORK PROGRAMMES.

2. DETERRENCE OF ANY AGGRESSION CONTINUES TO BE THE CENTRAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIANCE. TO THAT END, IN THIS THE YEAR OF THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADOPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, WE NOTED THAT THIS STRATEGY HAS STOOD THE TEST OF TIME AND REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL AND SOUND BASIS FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY OF ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS. WHILE IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE WILL MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE NUCLEAR FORCES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THAT STRATEGY. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE NOTED

SECURITY OF ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS. WHILE IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE WILL MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE NUCLEAR FORCES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THAT STRATEGY. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE NOTED WITH CONCERN THE EXISTING IMBALANCES BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL FORCES AS WELL AS THE UNABATED EXPANSION OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE BOARD.

3. EFFORTS TO SECURE EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY FORCES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, ARE AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF OUR SECURITY POLICY IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. IT IS IN OUR SECURITY INTERESTS THAT AGREEMENTS ENSURE DETAILED, SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDING FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SEMICLN WE REJECT GENERALIZED UNDERTAKINGS ON VERIFICATION AS AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR SOUND AGREEMENTS.

4. DURING OUR CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ON INF ARMS CONTROL, WE WELCOMED THE IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR A LONGER-RANGE INF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ENCOMPASSING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES. WE REAFFIRMED THAT APPROPRIATE GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS ARE INDISPENSABLE. WE STRESSED THE REQUIREMENT TO ELIMINATE ALL UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES AND CALLED UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO DROP ITS DEMAND TO RETAIN A PORTION OF ITS SS-20 FORCE. A GLOBAL ZERO OUTCOME, A LONG-STANDING NATO OBJECTIVE, WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT, AND GREATLY FACILITATE VERIFICATION.

5. WE ACCEPTED WITH PLEASURE THE INVITATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO HOLD OUR NEXT NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MINISTERIAL MEETING IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE AUTUMN OF 1987.

6. GREECE EXPRESSED ITS VIEWS IN A STATEMENT INCLUDED IN THE MINUTES.

PIKE

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RR COPEN
RR LISBO
RR LUXEM

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 February 1987

Dear John,

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1987

Your Secretary of State minuted the Prime Minister on 8 January about the new Ministerial guidance which NATO will shortly be drafting for the period 1989/94. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary have subsequently commented. The Prime Minister, I am sure, would very much agree with the points made by the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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DS

ccPC

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PM/87/005

PRIME MINISTER

NATO Ministerial Guidance 1987

1. I have seen George Younger's minute to you of 8 January.

2. Like the Chancellor I am generally content with his approach, but hope that we can modify the NATO Ministerial Guidance so that it applies more clearly to those nations whose defence contribution to the Alliance has been and remains inadequate and which are well able to contribute more.

3. I am copying this minute to George Younger, Nigel Lawson and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
2 February 1987

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

NATO: ministerial mtgs May 79.

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cc/pc

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

BF Await FCO comments
CDP
16/1

PRIME MINISTER

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1987

I have seen George Younger's minute to you of 8 January.

I am generally content with his approach, which reflects a balance of considerations. However, I think we should make a determined effort to focus the guidance less on future rates of growth and more on existing levels of defence spending. As you are aware our defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP is second only to the US among the major NATO allies, and much higher than Germany, France or Italy. We have absolutely no reason to be apologetic about our NATO contribution; and the small real terms decline projected in our defence budget over the next few years will go only a small way, if any, to mitigating the existing imbalance. That imbalance is of long standing, but has worsened since 1979, with UK defence spending rising considerably faster than that of our European allies.

I therefore hope that we can argue strongly to modify sub-paragraph d) so that it clearly applies to those nations whose present contribution is well below their ability to pay.

I am copying this minute to George Younger, Geoffrey Howe and Sir Robert Armstrong.

N.L.

N.L.
15 January 1987

NATO: Ministerial mtgs

May 79

MO 13/1E

PRIME MINISTER

NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1987

Over the next few months, NATO will be drafting new Ministerial Guidance (MG 87) for the period 1989-94. This will be put to Ministers for endorsement at the DPC meeting next May and will then form the basic political guidance for the Alliance over the new planning period.

2. A key element of the new document will be the resource guidance. A copy of the relevant section of the existing guidance (MG 85) is attached. You will wish to know how I propose to proceed in negotiating new guidance for MG 87.

3. Given the fact that our defence budget is set to decline somewhat in real terms over the period to 1989/90, I believe we should aim to tone down further the input aspects of the guidance for MG 87. In particular, I consider that we should aim to develop the guidance to take more account of the quality and quantity of each nation's existing contribution; the need to identify and rectify critical deficiencies; and the importance of greater efficiency, coupled with enhanced competition, in improving defence

output. This might enable us to dispense with - or at least to modify - sub-paragraph d. But this cannot be guaranteed and our negotiations will need to take account of other considerations.

4. In seeking such changes it will be important to avoid giving any impression of a weakening commitment to defence on the part of the European allies in general or of the UK in particular. I therefore consider that a general reaffirmation of the 3% formula is likely to be unavoidable. Whilst this would leave us in a slightly uncomfortable position, given our plans to reduce slightly our defence budget in real terms over the next few years, our Allies recognise that we will continue to make a very substantial and wide-ranging contribution to the Alliance. To move away from the 3% could only increase Congressional concern about burdensharing; would risk significant and potentially lasting damage to transatlantic defence relations; and might allow those of our European allies who currently contribute less than their fair share to rest on their oars. This would run counter to both our own interests and those of the Alliance generally. The Secretary General expressed very clear concerns at the recent DPC Ministerial meeting about this risk and about the prospects for collective security in the 1990s if the weaker brethren continue to avoid providing the resources necessary to provide an equitable and effective defence contribution, and which economically they can readily afford to do. We can expect, therefore, his continued support for the 3% formula.

5. Copies of this minute go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

G.G.

Ministry of Defence

8th January 1987

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ANNEX A

RESOURCE GUIDANCE : MC 85

Resource guidance must always be viewed as one amongst several instruments to guide the defence efforts within the Alliance. No formula can provide more than planning guidance; the ultimate yardstick is the overall ability to perform the tasks required to support NATO's overall deterrence and defence objectives.

a. There is a political and military need to improve NATO's conventional defence capabilities in relation to those of the Warsaw Pact in order to narrow the gap and reduce dependence on the early recourse to nuclear weapons.

b. To achieve this every effort must be made to obtain optimal value from scarce resources.

c. To this end vigorous efforts must be made to improve cooperation and coordination within the Alliance, and as part of these efforts a study should be undertaken whether specific improvements could best be brought about by common funding.

d. Notwithstanding the above efforts to improve the output from existing expenditures it will be necessary to increase the allocation of resources to defence in real terms with most nations achieving rates of real increase higher than those in the past.

e. Determined efforts should be made as a matter of urgency to devise an agreed and accepted methodology for measuring output performance with a view toward developing a variety of key performance indicators allowing supplementary resource guidance to be set in those terms.

f. The 3% formula is confirmed as a general guide. Those nations which have not met it in the past should make every effort to do so in the future. In applying this general guide, account should be taken of the considerations above as well as the specific considerations applying to individual countries based on analysis of all factors relevant to the respective national defence efforts. These considerations should take as their starting point the quantity and quality of each nation's past and present defence effort, the identification of the most critical deficiencies in each nation's force contribution and the necessary improvement measures, in short, performance. Nations should achieve, to the extent possible and as soon as possible, necessary force improvements even if they are additional to those contemplated at the resource level called for by the formula.

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SECTION ONE OF THREE
M I P T: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 11 DECEMBER:
RESTRICTED SESSION: ITEM II: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

SUMMARY

1. A REVIEW BY SHULTZ OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN WASHINGTON AND OF THE COURSE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS SINCE REYKJAVIK LED TO A USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT ON THE PRIORITIES AND THE WAY AHEAD.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ BEGAN WITH A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN WASHINGTON OVER THE IRANIAN QUESTION. FIRST, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD DETERMINED THAT WHATEVER INFORMATION THERE WAS SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC OR, IF IT WAS CLASSIFIED, GIVEN TO CONGRESS. NOTHING WOULD BE COVERED UP. A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAD BEEN ASKED TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER FUNDS HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY DIVERTED. AN ENQUIRY WAS BEING CONDUCTED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER IT HAD BEEN WISE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO INCLUDE THE SALE OF ARMS IN EFFORTS TO TRY TO PROMOTE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN. AS THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR, MISTAKES HAD BEEN MADE AND THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME ILLEGAL ACTS HAD BEEN COMMITTED.

3. THE MAIN POINT WAS THE PRESIDENT HAD ACTED QUICKLY AND OPENLY. HE WAS SEEKING TO PUT A RING ROUND THE IRANIAN QUESTION SO THAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD GET ON WITH THE IMPORTANT ISSUES ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA. NO-ONE COULD DOUBT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS STILL IN BUSINESS.

4. TURNING TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE CENTRE-PIECE OF US SECURITY POLICY WAS THE ALLIANCE WITH EUROPE. THIS INVOLVED THREE CLEAR OBLIGATIONS:

I. TO MAINTAIN A SURVIVABLE STRATEGIC FORCE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE SOVIET UNION SEMICLN

II. TO MAINTAIN A MILITARILY CREDIBLE US FORCE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE SEMICLN

III. TO BE PART OF A FUNCTIONING ALLIANCE STRUCTURE INVOLVING CONSULTATIONS, CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND EXERCISES.

THE ESSENCE OF THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT MILITARY BUT POLITICAL: THE MAINTENANCE OF A CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF SHARED POLITICAL VALUES. SHULTZ HOPED THAT IN MAKING THIS STATEMENT HE WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE FEELING WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE DEVELOPED IN EUROPE THAT THE WORLD WHICH HAD EXISTED BEFORE REYKJAVIK HAD DISAPPEARED. THIS WAS NOT

SO. NOTHING HAD CHANGED EXCEPT THAT IF WE COULD CAPTURE SOME OF THE THINGS THAT WERE ON THE TABLE AT REYKJAVIK, WE COULD MAKE THE ALLIANCE STILL STRONGER.

5. IF, HOWEVER, WE WERE TO DETER WAR SUCCESSFULLY AND FACE THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, WE HAD TO THINK IN GLOBAL TERMS. THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY WAS NOT SIMPLY POSED IN EUROPE. THERE WAS A SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, IN CAMBODIA, AND ELSEWHERE. WE HAD TO THINK WHAT LAY BEHIND RECENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THIS WAS NOT A NEW PROBLEM BUT WE MUST NOT OVERLOOK IT.

6. THE QUESTION NOW WAS WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM REYKJAVIK. BROADLY, THE SITUATION HAD GREATLY IMPROVED BY COMPARISON WITH TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS GENEVA MEETING WITH GROMYKO, THE NST HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS, AND THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL PROBLEMS. THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE HAD GREATLY HELPED THE AMERICANS TO CONDUCT THIS RELATIONSHIP AND MAKE HEADWAY IN IT.

7. AT REYKJAVIK ITSELF, A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT STEPS FORWARD HAD BEEN REGISTERED. ON INF, IT WAS NOW AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT OF 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE, NONE OF WHICH WOULD BE BASED IN OR TARGETTED ON EUROPE. MAJOR PROBLEMS STILL REMAINED TO BE SOLVED, PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION, DURATION, AND THE LINK WITH SRINF. HE NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DROPPED THE REQUIREMENT FOR INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES ALTOGETHER. ON START, THE RUSSIANS HAD RETURNED AT REYKJAVIK TO THE OBJECTIVE OF A 50 PERCENT CUT. NITZE AND AKHROMEYEEV HAD NEGOTIATED A SHORT STATEMENT WHICH REGISTERED THIS AGREEMENT INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF WARHEADS AS THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT AND ACCOUNTING RULES FOR BOMBERS. THERE WERE STILL MAJOR DIFFERENCES OVER SUB-LIMITS AND AGAIN ON VERIFICATION. BUT THIS AGREEMENT REPRESENTED TREMENDOUS PROGRESS.

8. THERE HAD BEE LESS OF A FIRST APPROXIMATION ON SPACE/DEFENCE. BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT REYKJAVIK THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTEMPLATE NOT WITHDRAWING FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A PERIOD OF 10 YEARS. THIS WAS SOMETHING TO WORK WITH. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT YET ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD. NOR WAS THERE ANY UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE KIND OF REDUCTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE ACHIEVED DURING THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD OR WHAT ACTIVITY COULD BE PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY. ALL THIS REQUIRED A GREAT DEAL OF FURTHER WORK.

9. THE PROBLEM WHICH THE EUROPEANS HAD FACED POST-REYKJAVIK WAS THAT THE PROSPECT OF DEEP CUTS, AND ZERO INF HAD BECOME A REALITY AND HAD CAUSED MANY IN EUROPE TO DRAW IN THEIR BREATH. THEY FOUND THAT THEY LIKED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER ALL. BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SERIOUS. MOST EUROPEANS EVIDENTLY SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF ZERO DEPLOYMENT OF INF AND 50 PERCENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE PROBLEM AROSE ABOUT THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ICBMS BY THE END OF THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD. SHULTZ THOUGHT THERE WERE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS BUT THE EUROPEANS COULD BE ASSURED THAT THE RUSSIANS REJECTED IT ABSOLUTELY. IN RETURN THEY HAD PROPOSED THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WAS EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

10. THE QUESTION NOW WAS THAT IF THE TEN YEAR PERIOD WAS AGREED,

HOW COULD WE REACH INTO THE SECOND FIVE YEARS SO AS TO BE ABLE TO BRING OFF THE INITIAL STAGE. MORE THOUGHT WAS NEEDED ABOUT THIS. THE PROGRESS MADE AT REYKJAVIK HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF STABILITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. IT WAS PREMATURE TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS. AS IN OTHER FIELDS, VERIFICATION WOULD BE A MAJOR HURDLE. BUT THE FACT WAS CLEAR THAT IN A LESS NUCLEAR WORLD, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS NEEDED ATTENTION. MOREOVER ACCOUNT HAD TO BE TAKEN OF THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST BE EXPECTED TO CHEAT. AN INSURANCE POLICY WOULD BE NEEDED.

11. GENSCHER (FRG) DECLARED HIS SATISFACTION BOTH WITH THE HLTF DECLARATION AND WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY SHULTZ (US). THE LATTER'S EMPHASIS ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE US GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE A COMMON POLICY WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS WAS MOST WELCOME. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE US COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE, TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN EUROPE AND TO CONSULTATION IN GENERAL. THE VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE WAS AN ESSENTIAL PRE-CONDITION FOR IMPROVED EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT, AT WHICH AN AGREED ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOME HAD BEEN REACHED, HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION SUBSEQUENTLY. THE TASK OF THE PRESENT MEETING SHOULD ALSO BE TO GIVE A SIGNAL OF UNITY AND TO STRESS THAT THE CORE OF NATO STRATEGY WAS THE PREVENTION OF WAR OF ANY KIND - WHETHER CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR.

12. ON THE INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS IN THE REYKJAVIK PROGRAMME, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT A GLOBAL CEILING ON LRINF WAS INDISPENSIBLE. THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN REYKJAVIK AT A LEVEL OF 100/100 ON EACH SIDE. THE EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AS A RESULT OF THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS HAD NOT BEEN EASY TO DEFEND DOMESTICALLY. THE ALLIANCE'S SUCCESS IN DOING SO HAD IMPRESSED THE OTHER SIDE. THE ALLIANCE MUST NOT SPEAK WITH TWO TONGUES ON THE ZERO ZERO SOLUTION FOR LRINF IN EUROPE. IT HAD BEEN IN THE LOGIC OF THE TWO-TRACK DECISION FROM THE OUTSET. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO THIS POSITION WENT BEYOND THE QUESTION OF DEFENCE CAPABILITY: IT AFFECTED THE MOTIVATION OF THE UNIFORMED SOLDIERS AND THE SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC FOR OUR DEFENCE EFFORT. GERMAN PPUBLIC OPINION HAD ONLY ACCEPTED THE STATIONING OF CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES BECAUSE THE POSSIBILITY OF A ZERO ZERO SOLUTION EXISTED. MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THIS OPTION WOULD DAMAGE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE. THE FRG INTENDED TO ADHERE TO THE ZERO ZERO OBJECTIVE: THAT OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ACCOUNT HAD TO BE TAKEN OF SRINF IN ORDER TO AVOID CREATING A NEW GREY AREA. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPRECIATED THE US POSITION. A COMMITMENT TO SUBSEQUENT TALKS DID NOT AMOUNT TO A NEW LINKAGE. WE SHOULD BE AIMING FOR A CEILING ON LOWER LEVELS, NOT A FREEZE.

13. ON START, GENSCHER WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 PERCENT CUTS. VERIFICATION WOULD, AS WITH INF, BE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE ADHERED TO THE TERMS OF SALT II. BUT THEY HAD NOT FORGOTTEN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT IN MAY, NOR THE FACT THAT THE PROSPECT OF 50 PERCENT CUTS CHANGED THE SITUATION. ON SDI THE FACT THAT THE CONCEPTS OF THE TWO SIDES

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ON LABORATORY TESTING SEEMED TO BE COMING CLOSER WAS WELCOME. IT WAS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME NEW PROPOSALS FOR THIS PERIOD.

14. THE HLTF DECLARATION WAS AN IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT TO THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL POLITICAL AIMS. THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WAS BEING MADE MORE IMPORTANT BY PROGRESS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING NEW LINKAGES BUT OF SEEING THE TOTAL PICTURE. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON THE CW NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE WAY TO AVOID CREATING NEW INSTABILITIES WAS TO HAVE EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE THREAT. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION PICTURE UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE. MEMBERS WOULD BE FACED REPEATEDLY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD WITH THE NEED FOR DECISIONS. A CLEAR SIGNAL HAD TO BE SENT DEMONSTRATING THE ALLIANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SEEK CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

SECTION TWO OF THREE

M I P T: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 11 DECEMBER: RESTRICTED SESSION: ITEM II: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

15. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING HAD OPENED UP PERSPECTIVES THAT QUOTE TOOK THE BREATH AWAY UNQUOTE. IT WAS PERHAPS A GOOD THING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PAUSE TO ENABLE THE ALLIANCE TO GET ITS BREATH BACK AGAIN. THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS HAD CAUGHT THE IMAGINATION OF THE PUBLIC. EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN HIGH: FRUSTRATION MIGHT BE GREAT IF NO AGREEMENTS RESULTED. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AVOID BEING MESMERISED BY THE NST NEGOTIATIONS. THERE MUST BE READINESS TO SEEK PROGRESS ELSEWHERE IF THERE WAS DEADLOCK IN GENEVA. THERE MUST BE READINESS TO TAKE SMALL STEPS AND TO PRESERVE AGREEMENTS THAT ALREADY EXISTED, SUCH AS SALT II AND THE ABM TREATY. A TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENT TO RE-ESTABLISH US COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II WOULD BE VERY WELCOME. MORE GENERALLY WE OUGHT TO SEEK TO DE-DRAMATISE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AND TO REINJECT AN ELEMENT OF ROUTINE REGULARITY. THE PUBLIC MUST BE GIVEN A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS - WHICH COVERED MORE THAN MERE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTING. THERE WAS A CASE FOR A STUDY OF THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS WITH A VIEW TO SYNCHRONISING EFFORTS IN VARIOUS FIELDS AND ESTABLISHING AN OVERALL CO-ORDINATED STRATEGY. THE COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION SHOULD FOCUS ON THIS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD: ONE SUBJECT THEY MIGHT LOOK AT WAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

16. ANDREOTTI (ITALY) WELCOMED THE EMPHASIS PLACED BY SHULTZ (US) ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUITY AFTER REYKJAVIK. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT APPROVED THE OUTCOME AT REYKJAVIK BUT RECOGNISED THAT IMPORTANT POINTS HAD BEEN RAISED THERE. THERE WAS A RISING PUBLIC REACTION, ACCENTUATED BY CHERNOBYL, AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WISH TO SEE NUCLEAR ARSENALS DESTROYED WAS IN LINE WITH THE HOPES OF WESTERN ELECTORATES. THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR GLOBALISATION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PREVENT PROGRESS ON THE COMPONENT PARTS OF

THE PACKAGE. HE DID NOT SEE SDI AS A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. MORE BROADLY THERE WAS A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDE IN THE SEARCH FOR MEANS OF REDUCING EXPENDITURE ON MILITARY WEAPONS - BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. RECENT EVENTS HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. THERE WAS A PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FIELDS: REDUCTIONS MUST BE ACHIEVED IN BOTH.

17. RAIMOND (FRANCEC) SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES AS REVEALED IN THE PERIOD SINCE REYKJAVIK. MOSCOW'S REACTION TO THE US BREAKOUT FROM SALT II HAD BEEN VERY MODERATE. THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO CLEARLY KEEPING OPEN THEIR OPTIONS ON LINKAGE AND ON WHETHER TO PURSUE THE POSSIBILITIES OPENED UP BY REYKJAVIK OR TO RETURN TO THE APPROACH THEY HAD BEEN FOLLOWING EARLIER IN THE YEAR. THEY WERE LIKELY TO TRY TO KEEP THESE OPTIONS OPEN FOR SOME TIME LONGER IN ORDER TO SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOPED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THIS AREA BETWEEN THE CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

18. WESTERN OBJECTIVES SHOULD INCLUDE PURSUIT OF THE PROSPECT OF A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THIS WAS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY AND MOMENTUM MUST BE MAINTAINED. IN PRINCIPLE IT OUGHT NOT TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AS REGARDS LRINF IT WAS CLEAR THAT THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR OVERNIGHT. WE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A TIME-SPAN WITHIN WHICH THEY COULD BE DISMANTLED WITHOUT RISK. ANXIETY ABOUT THE SRINF WAS JUSTIFIED. THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET POSITION VIS-A-VIS THAT OF THE WEST WAS CLEAR. THERE WAS A RISK THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS PROBLEM MIGHT REAWAKEN THE THIRD FORCE ISSUE. IN ANY CASE THIS ISSUE WAS BOUND TO COME UP WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE CENTURY - ON WHICH GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY NOT YET READY TO COMMIT HIMSELF - BEGAN. ALL THIS ACCENTUATED THE PROBLEMS OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE.

19. THE IMPORTANT UNDERLYING ISSUE RAISED BY REYKJAVIK WAS THAT OF THE US NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE. IT WAS NOT SIMPLY A QUESTION OF THE COUPLING OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. THE NEGOTIATIONS E.G. ON SRINF RISKED ENTERING A GREY AREA. IF WE REJECTED A FREEZE AND SOUGHT CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS THERE WAS A RISK OF LAUNCHING A PROCESS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF US NUCLEAR FORCES FROM EUROPE. THERE WAS A NEW SOVIET TEAM IN MOSCOW FULL OF IMAGINATION AND WELL CAPABLE OF EXPLOITING THESE POSSIBILITIES. THERE WERE ALSO OF COURSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEM WE WOULD HAVE TO BE VIGILANT AND FIRM.

20. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THANKED SHULTZ FOR SPEAKING WITH SUCH CANDOUR ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON. IT HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING TO HEAR SHULTZ REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE CONTINUITY OF PURPOSE OF THE ALLIANCE. WE ALL NEEDED TO RECOGNISE OUR JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS STRENGTH DESPITE POLITICAL TURBULENCES WHICH AFFLICTED ALL DEMOCRACIES. THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION WAS UNDIMINISHED. SHULTZ HAD BEEN RIGHT TO EMPHASISE THAT WE FACED A GLOBAL PROBLEM. THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT EACH HALF OF THE ALLIANCE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER. THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING TO THEIR OWN SECURITY AND IN DOING SO WERE CREATING

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RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST. THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT TURNING AWAY FROM REYKJAVIK. IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT THINK THAT THE NEXT TWO YEARS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WERE LOST.

21. THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA RATHER THAN THE SECOND FIVE YEARS. HE FOR HIS PART WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT HOW SERIOUS THE RUSSIANS REALLY WERE ABOUT THE LONGER TERM OBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATION TO WHICH THEY HAD SUBSCRIBED. FIRST, WE SHOULD PRESS THEM TO CONCLUDE AN INF AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO GO BACK ON THE ZERO ZERO OPTION WHICH WE HAD ALL ACCEPTED BUT DUE ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE PROBLEM OF SRINF. IT WOULD ALSO BE VITAL TO MAKE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT VERIFICATION MUST BE TACKLED. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DAMAGING IF WE WERE THOUGHT TO BE BRINGING THAT UP AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT.

22. THE SECOND PRIORITY WAS THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN 5 YEARS, IF THAT WAS THE DESIGNATED TIMETABLE. THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR LINKING IT TO ANYTHING ELSE. HE AGREED WITH ANDREOTTI THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT TOO MANY FORMAL LINKAGES. IT WAS PROBABLY NECESSARY TO ACCEPT SOME LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF REDUCTIONS BEYOND THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD AND WHAT KIND OF RESEARCH INTO STRATEGIC DEFENCE WAS PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. OTHER LINKAGES WERE NOT LEGITIMATE. THIRD THERE WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WARNED AGAINST THINKING THAT THIS WAS GOING TO BE EASY. A GREAT DEAL OF PATIENCE WOULD BE NEEDED IF AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION WAS TO BE REACHED. FINALLY, WE MUST APPROACH CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS WITH CONFIDENCE. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE IDEA THAT THE EUROPEANS WERE FRIGHTENED OF AGREEMENT ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE MUST ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUED TO SEE DETERRENCE AS NECESSARY.

SECTION THREE OF THREE

M I P T: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 11 DECEMBER: RESTRICTED SESSION: ITEM 11: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

23. IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

I. FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ (SPAIN)

SPAIN ACCEPTED THE US GOALS BUT AGREED THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT IN THE EAST/WEST BALANCE. A NEW HORIZON HAD BEEN OPENED UP BEYOND NUCLEAR DEFENCE. THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGE FACING THE ALLIANCE.

II. HALEFOGLU (TURKEY)

ALLIANCE CONSULTATION HAD BEEN A KEY ELEMENT IN THE VALUABLE CONCLUSION REACHED AT STOCKHOLM. THERE WERE NOW SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ABLE TO THINK NEW THOUGHTS. FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY HAD PROPOSED THE APPLICATION OF THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT TO THE CAUCASUS. BUT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT YET READY EVEN TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF SRINF IN ASIA. TURKEY WOULD NEED HELP FROM ALLIES TO MODERNISE ITS FORCES SINCE IT FACED A THREAT NOT ONLY FROM THE WARSAW PACT BUT ALSO FROM THE INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

III. MATHIESON (ICELAND)

THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE AN ULTIMATE AIM BUT FOR THE TIME BEING WE HAD TO RELY ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. HE ENDORSED THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES.

IV. FRYDENLUND (NORWAY)

WE MIGHT COME TO SEE REYKJAVIK AS A WATERSHED. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PLAYING UP TO THIS BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO MONOPOLISE THE BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ZERO ZERO OPTION AND THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION HAD BOTH BEEN WESTERN PROPOSALS. WE HAD TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE RUSSIANS TO MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IT WAS EASIER TO GET POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR INCREASES IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE WHEN PEOPLE FELT THAT OTHER AVENUES THAN THE ARMS RACE WERE BEING PURSUED.

V. POOS (LUXEMBOURG)

AN INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION HAD TAKEN PLACE AT REYKJAVIK WHICH HAD PRODUCED REMARKABLE PROGRESS. IF WE DID NOT WANT TO LOSE THE SUPPORT OF OUR PUBLICS WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF BLOCKING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AS SOON AS CONCRETE PROPOSALS WERE ON THE TABLE. THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING AT LUXEMBOURG HAD BROUGHT OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. HE URGED THE UNITED STATES TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM AND SALT II TREATIES. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WAS A GAUGE OF THEIR GOOD FAITH.

VI. PERES DE MIRANDA (PORTUGAL)

SHULTZ'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WAS WELCOME. REYKJAVIK HAD MADE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER.

VII. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS)

A NUMBER OF POINTS SEEMED TO COMMAND CONSENSUS, IN PARTICULAR THE PROSPECT OF AN INF ZERO ZERO AGREEMENT AND 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PERIOD IT MIGHT NOT BE WISE TO ASSUME THE SOVIET GVT WAS BLUFFING. IT WAS ALSO VITAL TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND DEPLOYMENTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE HISTORY OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOWED HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. AS TO THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD, THE NETHERLANDS WOULD BE AGAINST DROPPING IT ALTOGETHER. SOME EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED. IF BOTH SIDES WERE READY TO COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY BEFORE THE END OF TEN YEARS, THIS ALREADY REPRESENTED REINFORCEMENT OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH WE HAD ALL BEEN WORKING FOR. WE SHOULD LOOK HARD AT WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED. FINALLY, VAN DEN BROEK EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. SHULTZ HAD MADE SOME IMPORTANT COMMITMENTS TODAY. FOR THE SAKE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE WE NEEDED TO COUNTER SCEPTICISM ABOUT US CREDIBILITY.

VIII. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM)

THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH WAS RIGHT. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD BEEN CHANGED RADICALLY AT REYKJAVIK. HE SUPPORTED THE OBJECTIVES OF A ZERO ZERO AGREEMENT ON INF AND 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE IN FAVOUR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. BUT FOR THE PRESENT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT EUROPE STILL NEEDED US NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY.

IX. CLARK (CANADA)

REYKJAVIK HAD CREATED NEW EXPECTATIONS. A SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WAS NOW IN FULL SWING. THE RUSSIANS COULD MOVE MORE QUICKLY THAN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. THERE WAS NO COMPARABLE WESTERN CAMPAIGN IN FAVOUR OF US PROPOSALS. THE US DECISION TO BREAK OUT OF THE SALT III CONSTRAINTS HAD COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM. WE HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONCERTING OUR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. IF THIS PROBLEM WAS TO BE TACKLED, WE NEEDED A CLEAR SENSE OF WHERE WE WERE ALL GOING IN A LESS NUCLEAR WORLD. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE WINNING THE PROPAGANDA WAR AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO UNLESS THE ALLIES GOT THEIR ACT TOGETHER. ONE EXPERIMENT WORTH TRYING MIGHT BE TO HOLD A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING WITHOUT OFFICIALS.

24. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, RESPONDING TO CLARK'S FINAL PROPOSAL, AGREED THAT REAL DISCUSSION WAS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE IN THE NORMAL CONDITIONS OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE THOUGHT THAT CLARK'S SUGGESTION MIGHT HAVE SOME MERIT, PROVIDED MINISTERS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REACH DECISIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF ADVISERS. GOING ON TO SUBSTANCE, THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOOK UP THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S QUESTIONING OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS A SUPERPOWER SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS MILITARY AND NUCLEAR MIGHT. MOREOVER IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD THEY FACED AS BIG A PROBLE WITH CHINA AS THE EUROPEANS DID WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO ABANDON THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

25. A LIVELY DISCUSSION FOLLOWED, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING STEP BY STEP AND AVOIDING BEING DISTRACTED BY VISIONS. THIS PROVOKED SHULTZ INTO A LENGTHY AND WIDE-RANGING DISCOURSE ON THE NEED FOR INTERPLAY BETWEEN VISIONS AND PRACTICAL STEPS. HE THOUGHT THE PRESENT RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP WERE VERY SMART AND HAD LEARNED SOME LESSONS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING CHERNOBYL, ABOUT THE NEED FOR FREER CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION AND THE LIMITATIONS OF A COMPARTMENTALISED SYSTEM. HE RETURNED, AT THE END, TO THE MAIN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AT REYKJAVIK. THE IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS TO KEEP GOING DOWN THE PRESENT TRACK - MODERNISATION, MAINTENANCE OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY, DEPLOYMENTS

Confidential ION

Confidential

ON SCHEDULE, MAINTENANCE OF COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT READINESS FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WHEN OPPORTUNITY OFFERED. HE HAD FOUD THE WHOLE DISCUSSION MOST VALUABLE AND APPRECIATED BOTH THE SUPPORTIVE REMARKS AND THE HEALTHY SCEPTICISM WHICH HAD BEEN DISPLAYED. THE PROBLEMS WERE HARD TO SOLVE BUT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP TRYING.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1292

NNNN

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED

SOVIET D.
DEFENCE D.
RESEARCH DEPT.
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
SAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
NEWS DEPT.
INFO DEPT.
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL DEPT.
ESSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
CHIEF CLERK
MR GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER
MR RENWICK

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

Repetition to REYKJAVIK.
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 May, 1985

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The Prime Minister has considered the further minute of 17 May from the Defence Secretary. She notes that Mr. Heseltine will take any suitable opportunity that arises at the Ministerial to soften the guidance. She looks forward to learning the result.

I am coying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury).

(C.D. Powell)

R. Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

I fear that the Chancellor's minute (attached) gives you no support. I have asked his Private Office to go back to him. The reply is that, although we would be better off without the NATO Ministerial Guidance, he thinks it's manageable and shares the Defence Secretary's assessment that the Americans will not move.

Agree to leave it that Defence Secretary does his best to obtain changes but, if he fails, you will if necessary make clear in the House that we are not committed to 3%?

C.D.P.

Yes mr

(CHARLES POWELL)

21 May 1985

CC PC

PM/85/51

PRIME MINISTER

NATO Defence Meetings: Ministerial Guidance w/m CDP

1. I have seen the Defence Secretary's minutes of 10 and 17 May and your comments recorded in your Private Secretary's letters of 13 and 15 May.

2. I recognise the attractiveness of the changes you would like to see in the text. But there are a number of other very significant factors to be taken into account.

3. These include the need on the one hand to safeguard our position and on the other to encourage those who have failed to meet targets in the past to do better. In my view, the existing text meets these two objectives satisfactorily. But my main concern is the danger of starting a major row in the Alliance (a point underlined by Sir John Graham) if the Defence Secretary were to try to reopen the debate on 22/23 May. The Americans would have preferred much stronger language than that in the existing text, which they have been brought to accept with some difficulty. There is a risk that they will feel free to revert to their original preference if the argument is reopened. We also need to bear in mind that, though the prospects of a further Nunn amendment this year may have receded, the European allies are likely to have to live with the problem of congressional pressure in the longer term. The Congress will be looking at the resources section of the Ministerial Guidance for evidence of European intentions, and we should be careful not to give them an extra stick with which to beat us.

/ 4.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
20 May 1985

NATO May 1979

Ministerial Mtgs



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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

20 May 1985

Richard Mottram Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence

Dear Richard

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The Chancellor has seen Charles Powell's letter to you of 15 May and the earlier correspondence on this subject. He has also seen your Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 17 May and in the circumstances is content with the line Mr Heseltine proposes to take.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell and to Len Appleyard (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Rachel Lomax

MRS R LOMAX
Principal Private Secretary

21 MAY 1985



I spoke to the Chancellor - he is NOT happy about it - MS

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

He's clearly being bolshie about this, & has nobbled the Chancellor & the Foreign Secretary in advance. I don't think there's much to be gained by going on.

CDP
17/5.

(1)

Prime Minister

The Defence Secretary is clearly both to seek any changes, but provides in paragraph 7 a line which you could use if it was alleged that our policies were inconsistent with the NATO guidance. None of your colleagues has intervened.

MO 13/5/26/1

Agree to let it rest, but speak up in the House on the lines you warned him, if necessary?

CJP 17/5

PRIME MINISTER

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

I have seen your Private Secretary's letter of 15th May recording the outcome of our discussion about the draft Ministerial resource guidance. It may be helpful if I set out the background more fully and explain how I intend to proceed.

2. Resource guidance forms a central part of the biennial Ministerial Guidance for NATO planning purposes. Like the rest of the Guidance the resources section is advisory: it represents an aim and not a binding commitment. Resource guidance is inevitably a sensitive subject for all nations, not just for the United Kingdom. There is always a difficult balance to be struck between exhortations to those who spend less of their national wealth on defence than us to do more and to take a more equitable share of the common defence burden, and the need for guidance which acknowledges that resources are only one yardstick for measuring relative defence effort. Other factors, such as past performance, and the size and breadth of each nation's force contribution, have to be weighed in the balance.

3. The problems that we have to face over the 1985 resource guidance are not, therefore, new. Indeed, when we considered the 1983 guidance you and the Chief Secretary stressed that we should press for greater emphasis on efficient use of Alliance resources and were unhappy, as indeed was I, with the phrase "notwithstanding economic and financial constraints". You judged, however, that in

the circumstances which then prevailed the priority was to avoid a damaging public row. The 1983 Guidance was, therefore, much stronger. It runs until 1990 but has not caused us undue pressure or difficulty in explaining our defence expenditure decisions.

4. As I explained in my minute of 10th May, we have succeeded this year in negotiating draft guidance which is much softer than the 1983 version. It deals with the concerns we felt then; and which have been reinforced subsequently by our decision not to proceed with 3% real increases after 1985/86. As general guidance to all nations, it also encourages others to do better; as burden-sharing is as much an intra-European as a transatlantic problem, this is helpful to us. I would not suggest it is the form of words I would choose if I had a free hand; but I do not. It had to be negotiated in the face of strong American and German opposition.

5. In particular, the American Administration has been, and remains, most concerned that the softer wording will make it more difficult to keep the weak performers up to the mark and to encourage them to make the necessary resources available for conventional defence improvements. The present wording represents a compromise which they are prepared to live with; and in which they acknowledge our position. Having given ground once in order to reach an accommodation with us, they are likely to react very badly if we re-open the argument. Their attitude will not be changed by the Senate Budget resolution for FY 86. US performance in NATO is measured in outlays, and the zero real increase in budget authority would still allow a real increase in that year, perhaps as high as 5 or 6%. Moreover, the Senate resolution also recommends 3% real increases in FY 87 and FY 88. It is also relevant that the US Administration line, in connection with their recent report to Congress on burden-sharing, is that the 3% goal should remain as a minimum benchmark for annual real growth in defence spending.

6. If a suitable opportunity arises at the Ministerial, I will certainly seek to soften the guidance still further on the lines

you suggest. I would be very loth, however, to take the initiative to re-open the debate, because our reasons for doing so would certainly not be well-received or readily understood. We could expect no support from the Americans who would certainly consider that the suggested changes to sub-paragraph (d) would provide too much of an excuse for the weaker brethren to do even less - which we have a common interest in avoiding. The Germans would also oppose us. The amendment to sub-paragraph (f) could, I suggest, work to our disadvantage as it would remove the qualification that the 3% formula is only a general and not an absolute "guide", while leaving the implication further down the sub-paragraph that 3% is a general "rule". In sum, my judgement is that for Britain to re-open the debate at this stage could provoke a very major and damaging row, which would be bound to become public and which could redound to our disadvantage in Parliament and internationally.

7. You asked about the public line, if in the event, we had to accept the formula as drafted. I would continue to take the line, in Parliament and elsewhere, that the guidance is advisory not mandatory, that taken as a whole it recognises that what matters is output and performance, that our record on the factors cited in sub-paragraph (f) of the guidance stands second to none save for the US, and that the approach described in paragraphs 503 onwards of the 1985 Defence White Paper will enable us to maintain our defence capabilities in future.

8. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
17th May 1985

Note: Ministerial meetings May 1979

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SRWAAD

File

10 DOWNING STREET

15 May 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Richard,

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

I wrote to you on 13 May to convey the Prime Minister's views on the draft Ministerial guidance. She and the Defence Secretary discussed it further this evening.

The Prime Minister said that she did not see how Britain could honestly subscribe to the text as it stood. If challenged in Parliament, she would have to say that we were not bound by it. This would be damaging. Moreover in the light of recent Congressional decisions, it was hard to see how the US Administration could put its name to the draft.

The Defence Secretary accepted that the United Kingdom would not be bound by the 3 percent growth figure. But the wording was carefully chosen to make clear that those who had failed to meet targets in the past were now bound to do more. He had fought hard to secure wording which would convey this. There were risks in re-opening the discussion: the Americans might press for a firmer commitment.

In further discussion the Prime Minsiter indicated that the points which gave her most difficulty were:

(i) "necessary" in sub-paragraph (d). "Advisable" would be better.

(ii) "most" in sub-paragraph (d). "Some" would be better.

(iii) the first sentence of sub-paragraph (f). It would better be deleted and the sub-paragraph read: "Those nations which have not met the 3% formula in the past ...".

The Defence Secretary undertook to make a further attempt to amend the text, while warning that the proposed changes might well be unnegotiable. If so, a precise form of words to spell out the Government's position in Parliament and elsewhere would be needed. He would provide this.

CONFIDENTIAL

SRW

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I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Mottram Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

NATO: Ministerial Meetings 5/79.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Re Defence

Secretary wishes to discuss this very briefly with you tomorrow.

CDP

14/5

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1985

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 10 May covering an extract from the NATO draft Ministerial Guidance for 1985 on resources.

The Prime Minister finds sections (d) and (f) too explicit to be compatible with our own decision not to continue with 3 per cent real growth after 1985/86. She notes in addition that the situation has changed since this draft was prepared, in that the United States Senate has voted to freeze US defence spending. This should be taken into account in further work on the guidelines. For instance alternative wording might be found for (d) on the lines: "it will be advisable to increase the allocation .."

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C D POWELL

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

MO 13/5/26/1

PRIME MINISTER

NATO DEFENCE MEETINGS: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

The NATO Defence Planning Committee will be meeting in Ministerial session on 22nd/23rd May to address resource guidance and the follow up to the Conventional Defence Improvements exercise launched at the December meeting. It will consider the "Ministerial Guidance" which is produced every other year to set the framework for national and NATO force planning. This year's Guidance focuses on the planning period from 1987 to 1992, with broader guidance for the longer term.

2. The Guidance as a whole is still under discussion at working level in Brussels. But the section on resources and the NATO 3% aim is the most difficult issue and I have therefore taken a close personal interest in it at the drafting stage before it is put collectively to Defence Ministers. The Treasury and FCO have been fully involved. The aim has been to secure general agreement to guidance which is compatible with our own decision not to continue with 3% real growth after 1985/86, but which does not also let off the hook those countries which have not been pulling their weight. We have had to have in mind American concerns that the resource guidance should encourage increased defence spending and fairer burden sharing, and avoid any backlash in Congress against inadequate European effort.

3. I attach the proposed wording, which has been negotiated with considerable difficulty with our Allies. There is a very welcome recognition in it of the importance of better use of resources, of the need to improve output and of past and present defence effort.

The 3% formula is confirmed as "a general guide", but set in this much wider context. We have succeeded in deleting the much tougher wording which appeared in both the 1981 and 1983 Guidance, and which read: "notwithstanding economic and financial constraints, the standing Alliance commitment to the 3% formula guidance is confirmed."

4. I am satisfied that the attached wording adequately protects our position on defence spending after 1985/86. It is, I judge, the best formula that we are likely to be able to agree with the Americans, who would have preferred a much stronger reaffirmation of 3%. Subject to your views, and those of our colleagues, I propose, therefore, to accept this formula at the Ministerial meeting.

5. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
10th May 1985

EXTRACT FROM DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1985

Resource Guidance

Resource Guidance must always be viewed as one amongst several instruments to guide the defence efforts within the Alliance. No formula can provide more than planning guidance; the ultimate yardstick is the overall ability to perform the tasks required to support NATO's overall deterrence and defence objectives.

a. There is a political and military need to improve NATO's conventional defence capabilities in relation to those of the Warsaw Pact in order to narrow the gap and reduce dependence on the early recourse to nuclear weapons.

b. To achieve this every effort must be made to obtain optimal value from scarce resources.

c. To this end vigorous efforts must be made to improve cooperation and coordination within the Alliance, and as part of these efforts a study should be undertaken whether specific improvements could best be brought about by common funding.

d. Notwithstanding the above efforts to improve the output from existing expenditure it will be advisable necessary to increase the allocation of resources to defence in real terms with some most nations achieving rates of real increase higher than those in the past.

e. Determined efforts should be made as a matter of urgency to devise an agreed and accepted methology for measuring output performance with a view toward developing a variety of key performance indicators allowing supplementary resource guidance to be set in those terms.

f. The 3% formula should be confirmed as a general guide. Those nations which have not met it in the past should make every effort to do so in the future. In applying this general rule, account should be taken of the considerations above as well as the specific considerations applying to individual countries based on analysis

of all factors relevant to the respective national defence efforts. These considerations should take as their starting point the quantity and quality of each nation's past and present defence effort, the identification of the most critical deficiencies in each nation's force contribution and the necessary improvement measures, in short, performance. Nations should achieve, to the extent possible and as soon as possible, necessary force improvements even if they are additional to those contemplated at the resource level called for by the formula.

D/DS12/42/13/7

PS/Secretary of State
PS/Minister(AF)
PS/Minister(DP)
PS/USofS(AF)
PS/USofS(DP)
PS/PUS
PS/2nd PUS

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AUS(AS)
Head of DS20
No. 10 - Mr Coles
FCO (Defence Dept)
HM Treasury - Mr Wilson
Home Office

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ACDS(P)
ACDS(P&L)
ACDS(C)
AUS(D Staff)
Head of DS1
Head of GF3
DCPR

A. & C. 12/7
L.a.

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1983

1. I attach (for those in the left-hand column only) a copy of the 1983 Ministerial Guidance, approved by NATO Defence Ministers at the Ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee held on 1/2 June 1983.

2. The Ministerial Guidance, produced every two years, is an important policy directive to NATO Military Authorities and to nations. It provides the political, economic, military and technological framework for all Alliance planning for a forward period of six years. The 1983 Guidance covers the period 1984-1990.

5 July 1983

D T WILSON
DS12
MB7363 2837MB

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 10 DECEMBER

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M I P T: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING: COMMUNIQUE

1. FOLLOWING ARE OTHER SECTIONS OF COMMUNIQUE (SPANISH RESERVATION ON WHOLE COMMUNIQUE):

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN BRUSSELS ON 9TH AND 10TH DECEMBER 1982 AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BASED ON THE IDEALS AND VALUES OF DEMOCRACY, HAS THROUGH ITS STRENGTH AND COHESION SUCCEEDED IN PRESERVING PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FREE AND EQUAL MEMBERS OF THIS PARTNERSHIP. ON THIS SOLID FOUNDATION, THE HEADS OF

OF THIS PARTNERSHIP. ON THIS SOLID FOUNDATION, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED AT THEIR MEETING IN BONN ON 10TH JUNE 1982 THE ALLIANCE'S POLICY OF A STRONG DEFENCE AND OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, THEY SET FORTH THEIR PROGRAMME FOR PEACE IN FREEDOM, EMPHASISING THEIR RESOLVE TO DEVELOP SUBSTANTIAL AND BALANCED EAST-WEST RELATIONS AIMED AT GENUINE DETENTE BASED ON THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS 2. AND 3. SECTIONS ON SOVIET UNION AND POLAND CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS

4. IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND DESPITE REPEATED CALLS FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES, THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES ITS MILITARY OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE FACE OF DETERMINED RESISTANCE BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THE ALLIES CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE SUFFERINGS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND ALLOW THE RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND OF OVER 3 MILLION REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO EXILE. THIS SOLUTION MUST BE BASED ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES AND RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD THEREBY BE ENABLED TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO RETURN TO A POSITION OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT.

5. IN UNREMITTING PURSUIT OF ITS MILITARY BUILD-UP, WHICH HAS LONG PASSED THE LEVEL REQUIRED FOR DEFENCE, THE SOVIET UNION IS INCREASING ITS SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND EXPANDING ITS NAVAL POWER. IT IS SIMULTANEOUSLY STRENGTHENING ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. AS STATED IN THEIR BONN DECLARATION, THE ALLIES ARE LEFT NO CHOICE BUT TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY DETERRENT ADEQUATE TO MEET THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS IN A CHANGING SITUATION. IT THEREFORE REMAINS ESSENTIAL FOR THE ALLIES TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA BY MEANS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES ADEQUATE TO DETER AGGRESSION AND INTIMIDATION. TO THAT END THEY AGREE TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS GREATER CO-OPERATION IN ARMAMENTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND TO CONTINUE ACTION IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA RESTRICTING WARSAW PACT ACCESS TO WESTERN MILITARILY-RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES.

THE PRESENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN FORCES ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO EUROPE ARE ESSENTIAL TO ALLIED SECURITY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT ARE THE MAINTENANCE

[illegible] NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO EUROPE ARE ESSENTIAL TO ALLIED SECURITY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT ARE THE MAINTENANCE AND CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF THE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

6. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TOGETHER WITH DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF ALLIANCE SECURITY POLICY AND IMPORTANT MEANS OF PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PEACE.

FIRMLY COMMITTED TO PROGRESS OVER ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, THE ALLIES HAVE INITIATED A COMPREHENSIVE SERIES OF PROPOSAL FOR MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS, WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A BALANCE OF FORCES AT LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVELS. THEY SEEK FROM THE SOVIET UNION A CONSTRUCTIVE AND SERIOUS APPROACH IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START), THE ALLIES FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES EMPHASIZING THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTRIBUTE IN A CONCRETE WAY TO SPEEDY PROGRESS IN THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS 8. INF CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS

9. THE ALLIES WELCOMED THE RECENT PROPOSAL BY PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR NEW CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION INTENDED TO ENHANCE STABILITY.

10. THE ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS IN VIENNA ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE DRAFT TREATY TEXT PRESENTED BY WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAS GIVEN NEW MOMENTUM TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WESTERN INITIATIVE IS AIMED AT ACHIEVING REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES, LEADING TO PARITY IN COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CALL UPON THE EAST TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THE NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DATA FOR CURRENT WARSAW PACT FORCE LEVELS AND TO AGREE TO EFFECTIVE ASSOCIATED MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.

11. THE ALLIES ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EFFORTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE [illegible]

11. THE ALLIES ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EFFORTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO SECURE IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, WIDER AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ON DEFENCE SPENDING AND OTHER MEASURES LIKELY TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND THUS BUILD CONFIDENCE.

12. THE ALLIES ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT STRONG EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS (1 GREECE HAS EXPRESSED ITS VIEWS ON THIS SENTENCE, WHICH WERE RECORDED IN THE RECORD OF THE MEETING.).

THEY STRESS THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMEMENT TOWARDS A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, WITH APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS 13. CSCE CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS

14. ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE WEST IS ESSENTIAL BOTH FOR ALLIED DEFENCE EFFORTS AND FOR SOCIAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS. THE ALLIES REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION BILATERALLY AND IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA TOWARDS THIS END, INCLUDING PROGRAMMES IN KEEPING WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WHICH ARE INTENDED TO BENEFIT THE ECONOMIES OF THE LESS FAVOURED PARTNERS.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS 15. EAST/WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS

16. THE STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 3RD SPETEMBER 1971 AND THE MAINTENANCE OF AN UNDISTURBED SITUATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN REMAIN ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE ALLIES WELCOME THE EFFORTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY OF THE CITY IN PARTICULAR BY ENSURING LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS.

RECALLING THEIR ROME STATEMENT OF 5TH MAY 1981, THE ALLIES EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE IN EUROPE AND WILL BRING DIRECT BENEFITS FOR BERLIN AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE IN BOTH STATES.

17. PEACEFUL PROGRESS WORLD-WIDE IS A GOAL TO WHICH THE ALLIES REMAIN COMMITTED. THEY CONSIDER THAT GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT - AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY - CONTRIBUTES TO THIS GOAL, AS DOES THE AID WHICH THE ALLIES GIVE BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR READINESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ON A BASIS OF EQUAL PARTNERSHIP. THE ALLIES CALL UPON ALL STATES TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST UNDER-DEVELOPMENT AND TO REFRAIN FROM EXPLOITING THOSE NATIONS' ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS FOR POLITICAL GAINS.

THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT CERTAIN EVENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA MAY AFFECT THEIR COMMON INTERESTS AS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. ALLIED CONSULTATION ON SUCH EVENTS WILL BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION OF THOSE COMMON INTERESTS. THOSE ALLIES IN A POSITION TO DO SO MAY RESPOND TO REQUESTS BY SOVEREIGN NATIONS WHOSE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE ARE THREATENED. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE TO ENSURE THAT SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY REMAINS IN THE TREATY AREA TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE.

18. THE ALLIES AGAIN STRONGLY CONDEMN THE CRIME OF TERRORISM, WHICH IS A MENACE TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF NORMAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY APPEAL TO ALL GOVERNMENTS TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASED CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS TO STAMP OUT THIS SCOURGE.

19. THE ALLIANCE'S EFFICIENCY IN PURSUING ITS POLICIES DEPENDS UPON CONTINUED COHESION AND SOLIDARITY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NATURAL DIVERSITY OF ITS SOVEREIGN MEMBER STATES. RECOGNIZING IN THIS CONNECTION THE VALUE OF THEIR INFORMAL MEETING IN CANADA, MINISTERS AGREED THAT SIMILAR MEETINGS COULD USEFULLY BE HELD IN FUTURE.

20. THE SPRING 1983 MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSION WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON 9TH-10TH JUNE.

NOTE: THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SPAIN HAS INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S PURPOSE REGARDING THE ALLIANCE AND RESERVED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE.

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME MADRID BMG BERLIN UKMIS NEW YORK

GRAHAM

GR 1000

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKDEL NATO 101300Z DEC 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 10 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK COPENHAGEN WARSAW PRIORITY MOSCOW
ANKARA ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO
OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK ROME WASHINGTON MADRID UKREP BRUSSELS
UKDEL MADRID ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA UKDEL OECD
PRAGUE SOFIA BUCHAREST BUDAPEST BELGRADE EAST BERLIN DUBLIN

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING: COMMUNIQUE (EAST/WEST RELATIONS)
1. FOLLOWING ARE SECTIONS OF COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND INF (SPANISH RESERVATION ON WHOLE COMMUNIQUE):

THE ALLIES WILL MAINTAIN A FIRM, REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THEY DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND TO EXTEND AREAS OF CO-OPERATION TO THEIR MUTUAL BENEFIT.

THE ALLIES LOOK TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOR TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IT SHARES THEIR READINESS TO ACT IN THIS SPIRIT. THEY EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO HONOUR ITS OBLIGATIONS AND TO SHOW RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER STATES. IN FACE OF THE CONTINUING AND MASSIVE SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP, THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE ALLIES REMAIN AND MUST BE RECOGNIZED. BUT THE ALLIES ARE OPEN TO ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE, WILL WELCOME ANY POSITIVE MOVE TO REDUCE TENSION, AND DESIRE, IF SOVIET ATTITUDES ALLOW, TO CO-OPERATE IN RE-BUILDING INTERNATIONAL TRUST.

THE VIOLATIONS IN POLAND OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, IN PARTICULAR BY THE BANNING AND DISSOLUTION OF TRADE UNIONS INCLUDING SOLIDARITY, CONTINUE TO CAUSE THE GRAVEST CONCERN.

THE ALLIES CALL UPON THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. RECALLING THEIR DECLARATION OF 11TH JANUARY 1982 (FOOTNOTE: THE GREEK DELEGATION RECALLED ITS POSITION ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS DECLARATION.), THE CRITERIA OF WHICH ARE FAR FROM BEING FULFILLED, THE ALLIES HAVE NOTED THE RECENT RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF DETAINEES AND CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RELAXATION OF MILITARY RULE. THEY EMPHASIZE THAT IN THIS REGARD THE ACTIONS OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WILL BE JUDGED BY THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECTS. THE ALLIES CONSIDER THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH POLAND DEPENDS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT GIVES EFFECT TO ITS DECLARED INTENTION TO ESTABLISH CIVIL RIGHTS AND TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS

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OF REFORM. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS TO HAVE TRADE UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE SHOULD NOT BE DENIED TO THE POLISH PEOPLE. THE DIALOGUE WITH ALL SECTIONS OF POLISH SOCIETY MUST BE RESUMED. THE ALLIES CALL ON ALL COUNTRIES TO RESPECT POLAND'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS OWN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES.

THE ALLIES UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH PARTS OF THE DECISION OF 12TH DECEMBER 1979 WHICH PROVIDED FOR A LIMITED MODERNIZATION OF UNITED STATES INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) COMBINED WITH A PARALLEL OFFER OF NEGOTIATIONS ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET WEAPONS OF THIS KIND. THIS DECISION, WHICH WAS PROMPTED, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILES, LED TO THE CURRENT INF TALKS IN GENEVA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.

THE ALLIES FULLY SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY THROUGH THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL EXISTING AND PLANNED SOVIET AND UNITED STATES LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES. THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL WAS DEVELOPED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AMONG THE MEMBER COUNTRIES CONCERNED. THE MINISTERS OF THESE COUNTRIES WELCOMED THE CONTINUING UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WITH THESE ALLIES ANY SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSAL.

MINISTERS REITERATED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS, INF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BEGIN ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE AT THE END OF 1983.

(FOOTNOTE: ON THE FIRST AND THIRD SUBPARAGRAPHS THE GREEK DELEGATION RESERVED ITS POSITION)

AT THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING THE ALLIES HAVE DEPLORED INFRINGEMENTS OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. THEY NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT THE SITUATION IN POLAND REMAINED A SOURCE OF CONCERN. THE ALLIES ARE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A SUBSTANTIAL AND BALANCED CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND THEY REGARD THE DRAFT SUBMITTED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN DECEMBER 1981 AS A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAVE INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS TO BRING IT UP-TO-DATE WITH REALITIES IN EUROPE AND TO CALL FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE TRADE UNIONS AND THE FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION. TO FACILITATE A POSITIVE OUTCOME IN MADRID, THE ALLIES URGE THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES TO ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

AS PART OF A SUBSTANTIAL AND BALANCED CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THE ALLIES REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF A PRECISE MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE IN A FIRST PHASE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BINDING AND VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. THEY WILL ALSO STRIVE TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

/THE

THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE WITH THE EAST ON COMMERCIALLY SOUND TERMS CONTRIBUTES TO CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY AGREE THAT BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE MUST ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR BROAD SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH INCLUDE THE AVOIDANCE OF CONTRIBUTING TO SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH. STUDIES ARE UNDERWAY OR WILL SOON BE UNDERTAKEN ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND MINISTERS WILL CONSIDER THESE ISSUES AGAIN ON THE BASIS OF THESE STUDIES AT THEIR NEXT MEETING (1 GREECE RECALLED ITS POSITION ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PARAGRAPH.).

2. REMAINDER OF COMMUNIQUE IS IN MIFT (SAVING TO SOME)

GRAHAM

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

NATO SUMMIT

LIMITED
DEF.D
PLANNING STAFF
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ACDD
INFO.D
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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR WRIGHT
SIR J BULLARD
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

GR 1900
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKDEL NATO 021345Z DEC 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 453 OF 2 DECEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS12 AND CPR)
INFO IMMEDIATE COI (FOR MR SKINNER) PRIORITY WASHINGTON BONN ROME ANKARA THE HAGUE OTTAWA OSLO COPENHAGEN BRUSSELS LISBON ATHENS PARIS
INFO SAVING LUXEMBOURG REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA

DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE - 1/2 DECEMBER.
MINISTERS TODAY AGREED THE FOLLOWING FINAL COMMUNIQUE:
BEGINS

THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN BRUSSELS ON 1ST AND 2ND DECEMBER, 1982. MINISTERS RECALLED THE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE IN FREEDOM DECLARED BY THEIR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN BONN IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR. THIS PROGRAMME RESTS EQUALLY ON THE IMPERATIVES OF MAINTAINING STRONG DETERRENCE THROUGH DEFENCE MODERNIZATION AND THE NEED TO ACHIEVE, THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATION, AGREEMENTS ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE BONN SUMMIT EMPHASIZED THE ALLIED COMMITMENT TO THE PREVENTION OF WAR, TO THE PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY AND TO BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE. THE ALLIES EXPRESSED THEIR COLLECTIVE DETERMINATION BOTH TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE MILITARY STRENGTH AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY AND TO SEEK MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHENEVER SOVIET BEHAVIOUR MAKES THIS POSSIBLE.

2. ON THE PREVIOUS DAY MINISTERS PARTICIPATING IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP REVIEWED A WIDE RANGE OF NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND NOTED WITH CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO IMPROVE THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES FROM STRATEGIC TO SHORT-RANGE. MINISTERS TURNED THEIR ATTENTION IN THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING TO A REVIEW OF NATO'S DEFENCE PROGRAMME AS A WHOLE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINUING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE GROWING APPLICATION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES.

3. MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES CONTINUE TO ACCELERATE AND INCLUDE THE ADDITION OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT, SURFACE SHIPS, SUBMARINES, A FULL RANGE OF ARMOURED VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY AND OTHER SYSTEMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, AND RECOGNIZING PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR STRONG CONVENTIONAL FORCES, MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF THE 1982 ANNUAL DEFENCE REVIEW, ADOPTED THE NATO FORCE PLAN FOR 1983-1987, AND AGREED TO PROVIDE RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. MINISTERS NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY NATIONS IN 1982, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE, INCLUDING THE PURSUIT OF MEASURES ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED BY THE LONG-TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME.

4. AS A FURTHER IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO DETERRENCE, MINISTERS APPROVED A PLAN FOR THE RAPID REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE AS NECESSARY IN A CRISIS. THE IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND AUGMENT ALLIED FORCES IN THE FORWARD AREAS, IMPLICIT IN THIS PLAN, EXTENDS THE RANGE OF OPTIONS OPEN TO THE ALLIANCE.

5. IN REVIEWING THE STATUS OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE 1980S, MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR STRONG CONVICTION THAT, OVER AND ABOVE THE IMPORTANCE OF REINFORCEMENTS, THE CONTINUING AND UNDIMINISHED PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE IS ESSENTIAL TO NATO'S DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND SERVES THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THESE FORCES PLAY A UNIQUE AND ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE INTEGRATED DEFENCE POSTURE AND AS A CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF THE COHESION AND WILL OF THE ALLIANCE. IN LIKE FASHION, THE EFFORTS BY EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THIS COMMON DEMONSTRATION OF COHESION AND WILL. IN THIS CONTEXT, MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THE INTENT EXPRESSED AT THE BONN SUMMIT TO CONTINUE TO GIVE DUE ATTENTION TO FAIR BURDEN-SHARING AND DEVELOPING AREAS OF PRACTICAL CO-OPERATION.

6. IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL COUNTRIES ARE MAKING SACRIFICES TO MEET THEIR DEFENCE COMMITMENTS. HOWEVER, MINISTERS NOTED THE EXTENT TO WHICH GREECE, PORTUGAL AND TURKEY RELY ON ALLIED ASSISTANCE TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ALL. MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITES FOR FURTHER SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE.

7. RECALLING THE IMPORTANT DECLARATION ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUED AT THE BONN SUMMIT, MINISTERS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) TO SEEK SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT. MINISTERS ALSO REITERATED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT OF THE POSITION TAKEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES, AND WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL EXISTING AND PLANNED SOVIET AND UNITED STATES LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES, THUS RESULTING IN THE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY ALSO REITERATED THEIR ADHERENCE TO BOTH TRACKS OF THEIR DECEMBER 1979 DECISION AS THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.(1) RECALLING THE BONN SUMMIT INITIATIVES ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR) AND THE TABLING OF A DRAFT WESTERN TREATYIN VIENNA, MINISTERS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE EAST WOULD RESPOND IN AN EQUALLY SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER.

(1) GREECE RESERVES HER POSITION

8. MINISTERS STRESSED THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN THE SECURITY, STABILITY AND SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA: RESPECT FOR GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT IS IMPORTANT FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THE PURPOSE OF NATO IS TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, MINISTERS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE NATO AREA MIGHT THREATEN THE VITAL INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THEY AGREED TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ON NATO SECURITY, DEFENCE CAPABILITIES, AND THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES, AND RECALLED THE BONN SUMMIT AT WHICH THE NEED TO CONSULT AND TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS ON THE BASIS OF COMMONLY IDENTIFIED OBJECTIVES WAS REAFFIRMED. RECOGNIZING THAT THE POLICIES WHICH NATIONS ADOPT OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA ARE A MATTER FOR NATIONAL DECISION, MINISTERS STATED THAT THOSE COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAVE THE MEANS TO TAKE ACTION OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA TO DETER THREATS TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE WEST, SHOULD DO SO IN TIMELY CONSULTATION WITH THEIR ALLIES, AS DEFINED IN THE BONN SUMMIT DOCUMENTS. MINISTERS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER INDIVIDUAL ALLIED NATIONS, ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL DECISION, WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE BY MAKING AVAILABLE FACILITIES TO ASSIST SUCH DEPLOYMENTS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE IN SUCH AREAS.

MINISTERS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR INCREASED CO-OPERATIVE PLANNING, NOTING THAT THE ALLIANCE AUTHORTIES ARE STUDYING A REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF UNITED STATES PLANS FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE.

9. MINISTERS ENDORSED THE NEED TO SEEK WAYS TO REDRESS ESCALATING DEFENCE COSTS BY MORE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES TO DEFENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. SOME IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE RATIONALIZATION AND BETTER CO-ORDINATION OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING AIMED AT A GREATER HARMONIZATION OF SUCH PLANNING ACTIVITIES AS THOSE INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE, ARMAMENTS AND LOGISTICS. IN THIS CONTEXT MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WHICH THEY ATTACH TO ARMAMENTS CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE AND ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE CONCEPT OF FAMILIES OF WEAPONS.

10. CONSISTENT WITH THE BONN SUMMIT MANDATE, MINISTERS RECEIVED A UNITED STATES PAPER ON TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND THEREBY ENHANCE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. THEY AGREED THAT NATO SHOULD ACTIVELY SEEK WAYS TO EXPLOIT THESE TECHNOLOGIES WITHIN THE CO-OPERATIVE DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS AND ENDORSED THE PURSUIT OF NATO EFFORTS TO LOOK FOR THE ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT APPLICATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

11. SIMILARLY, EFFECTIVE STEPS TO RESTRICT THE TRANSFER OF MILITARILY RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT WILL SERVE TO PRESERVE THE WEST'S TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. IN THIS REGARD, MINISTERS NOTED THE RECENT PROGRESS MADE IN THIS AREA AND URGED CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT OF COMMON EFFORTS TO STEM THE LEAKAGE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO THE EAST.

12. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE GROWING PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE WEST ABOUT HOW BEST TO PRESERVE PEACE WITH FREEDOM OVER THE COMING YEARS. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THESE DEBATES WERE CARRIED FORWARD IN FULL RECOGNITION OF ALL THE FACTS. FUNDAMENTAL TO ANY SUCH DISCUSSION MUST BE A RECOGNITION OF THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE. EQUALLY, IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF ARMAMENTS BY THE WARSAW PACT, THERE MUST BE A RECOGNITION OF THE NEED, IF PEACE IS TO BE PRESERVED, FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN

A STRONG, MODERN AND FLEXIBLE TRIAD OF FORCES. NATO MUST MAINTAIN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT A POTENTIAL AGRESSOR COULD NOT COUNT ON ANY QUICK OR EASY GAIN. IN VIEW, HOWEVER, OF THE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH THE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT, CONVENTIONAL DEFENCES ALONE CANNOT DETER AGGRESSION(1). IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE AVAILABLE INTERMEDIATE- AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AS INDISPENSIBLE PARTS OF THE INTERLOCKING TRIAD OF FORCES (1). A POTENTIAL AGRESSOR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT AN ATTACK ON ANY MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF ESCALATION MAKING THE PRICE OF AGRESSION HIGHER THAN ANY CONCEIVABLE GAIN. THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE THAT HAS BEEN - AND REMAINS - ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

(1) GREECE RESERVES HER POSITION

13. MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THAT CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THIS STRATEGY BACKED UP BY STRONG DEFENCE EFFORTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION, HOLDS THE GREATEST PROMISE OF CREATING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO SUBSTANTIAL, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GENUINE DETENTE.

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FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

GRAHAM

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 150940Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 15 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN PARIS, ATHENS, MADRID, MODUK,
INFO SAVING ALL OTHER NATO POSTS.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING 7 - 11 DECEMBER.

1. THE PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS FOLLOWED THE TRADITIONAL PATTERN, WITH THE EUROGROUP ON MONDAY, DPC ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY AND THE COUNCIL ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY. THE PROCEDURES AND CONTENT OF THE MEETINGS WERE HOWEVER ANYTHING BUT TRADITIONAL.

2. THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK WAS THE SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL OF SPANISH ACCESSION AT A CEREMONY ON 10 DECEMBER BY ALL 15 MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS WAS AN HISTORIC OCCASION. BUT IT WAS ALSO A CLIFF-HANGER. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, PLANNING HAD GONE AHEAD OVER THE PAST YEAR FOR THE STEPS REQUIRED ONCE THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCESS IN MADRID WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AND THE REQUEST TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. ALL GOVERNMENTS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR NATIONAL PROCEDURES BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION THAT ANY DIFFICULTY WAS LIKELY TO ARISE. LAST MINUTE HESTITATIONS BY THE DUTCH AND GREEKS WERE THEREFORE SURPRISING AND UNWELCOME. BOTH IN THE END AGREED TO THE PRESS STATEMENT ON 2 DECEMBER WELCOMING THE SPANISH APPLICATION BUT DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER GREECE WOULD SIGN THE PROTOCOL WERE NOT FINALLY RESOLVED UNTIL 9 DECEMBER, WHEN THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER INFORMED THE DPC THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE AUTHORISED TO DO SO. THE LATTER HOWEVER MADE IT CLEAR THAT RATIFICATION BY THE GREEK PARLIAMENT COULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED, WITH MORE THAN A HINT THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE ALLIANCE RESPONDED IN THE MEANTIME TO GREECE'S OWN DEMANDS. NEVERTHELESS, THE FIRST FORMAL STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN. THIS IN ITSELF IS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT WHICH WILL TO SOME EXTENT GENERATE ITS OWN MOMENTUM.

3. POSITIVE ALSO WAS THE DECLARATION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL WHICH FOLLOWED THE BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL BY NITZE, THE LEADER OF THE U S DELEGATION TO THE GENEVA TALKS (MY TELEGRAMS NOS 469 AND 483). THE DECLARATION FIRMLY EMPHASISED BOTH TRACKS OF THE 1979 DECISION AND THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS OF MAINTAINING THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME. IT REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE ADVANCE ON THE WEAKER FORMULAS WHICH WERE EARLIER ADVOCATED BY THE GREEKS AND THE DUTCH AND PROVIDED TIMELY AND ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION AT GENEVA. THE DECLARATION WAS ISSUED SEPARATELY FROM THE COMMUNIQUE (UNLIKE PREVIOUS PRACTICE) AND A WELCOME ACHIEVEMENT ON THIS OCCASION WAS FRENCH AGREEMENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO ACCEPT IN THE BODY OF THE COMMUNIQUE ITSELF A PASSAGE SUPPORTING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS REFLECTS THE MORE ROBUST AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN COMPARISON WITH ITS PREDECESSOR.

4. ANOTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WAS THE DECISION BY EUROGROUP MINISTERS TO MAKE MORE USE OF THESE MEETINGS IN FUTURE FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF EUREOPEAN DEFENCE (MY TELNO 442). THIS RESULTED FROM AN INITIATIVE BY MR NOTT, WHICH WAS STRONGLY ENDORSED BY APEL AND SUPPORTED BY ALL OTHER MINISTERS PRESENT. THE INITIATIVE RESPONDED TO A FEELING SHARED GENERALLY AMONG THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS THAT THE EUROGROUP HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE IT TENDS TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TECHNICAL SUB-GROUPS AND ARMAMENT COOPERATION RATHER THAN ADDRESSING POLICY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE. PROVIDED THIS INITIATIVE IS FOLLOWED UP VIGOROUSLY, IT SHOULD DO MUCH TO RESTORE THE EUROGROUP TO ITS ORIGINAL ROLE AS A FORUM FOR GIVING EXPRESSION IN AN ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK, TO THE DESIRE FOR CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION.

5. FINALLY, ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE SUPER RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHED THIS FORUM AS A VALUABLE MEANS OF ALLOWING FOREIGN MINISTERS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS FREELY OVER A WIDE RANGE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. UNLIKE THE TWO PREVIOUS SESSIONS, IN DECEMBER 1980 WHICH WAS DEVOTED TO POLAND, AND MAY 1981, CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH INF, THIS TIME MINISTERS NEITHER TRIED NOR NEEDED TO REACH SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS. MOREOVER IT WAS LIMITED IN TIME TO THE MORNING OF 10 DECEMBER AND MOST MINISTERS ESCHEWED THE USE OF PREPARED SPEAKING NOTES. THE SCOPE WAS SET BY HAIG WHO GAVE WHAT WAS IN EFFECT A GLOBAL OVER-VIEW. HIS COLLEAGUES CLEARLY WELCOMED THIS, ALTHOUGH NOT MANY ATTEMPTED TO FOLLOW SUIT. BUT THE GENERAL VIEW WHICH EMERGED WAS THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS IN BETTER SHAPE THAN IT HAD BEEN A YEAR AGO: THIS WAS DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE MATURING OF AMERICAN POLICY ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH OF 18 NOVEMBER.

6. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE OF THE GREEKS RAN LIKE A THREAD THROUGHOUT THE WEEK. THEIR PARTICIPATION WAS DOMINATED BY PAPANDREOU, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. HE WAS REPRESENTED AT THE EUROGROUP BY THE NEWLY ARRIVED YOUNG DEFENCE COUNSELLOR OF THE GREEK DELEGATION, WHO HAD NO AUTHORITY TO VARY THE INFLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD BEEN GIVEN. AS A RESULT THE ISSUE OF THE COMMUNIQUE WAS, EXCEPTIONALLY, DELAYED UNTIL TUESDAY MORNING WHICH WAS THE FIRST TIME PAPANDREOU WAS ABLE TO BE PRESENT. IN THE EVENT THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WERE SOLVED RELATIVELY EASILY ON THIS OCCASION. BUT THIS WAS ONLY A FORETASTE OF THE MAJOR ATTACK ON TURKEY DELIVERED (IN A MANNER OF SWEET REASON) BY PAPANDREOU IN THE DPC, WHICH PROVOKED THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TO REPLY IN KIND (MY TELEGRAM NO 446) AND THE EXTENSIVE BATTLE OVER THE DPC COMMUNIQUE. THE LATTER CENTRED ROUND PAPANDREOU'S DEMAND FOR A PARAGRAPH GIVING GREECE AN ASSURANCE AGAINST TURKEY. IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURK, WHOSE READINESS TO COMPROMISE QUICKLY WON HIM THE SYMPATHY OF THE DPC. AS DISCUSSION CONTINUED INTO THE LATE EVENING IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT PAPANDREOU WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT AND IT WAS THEREFORE WITH LITTLE

SURPRISE THAT THE DPC LEARNED (BY TELEPHONE AS HE DID NOT DEIGN TO ATTEND IN PERSON TO CONVEY HIS DECISION) THAT HE HAD REJECTED THE REASONABLE COMPROMISE WHICH HAD BEEN WORKED OUT BY, AND WAS ACCEPTABLE TO, ALL HIS ALLIES (MY TELEGRAMS NOS 451 TO 453). THUS FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER THERE WAS NO DPC COMMUNIQUE. THIS WAS NOT HOWEVER THE RESULT OF A GREEK VETO, AS PAPANDREOU HAS SUBSEQUENTLY SUGGESTED - THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL REASON WHY THE DPC SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE WITHOUT GREEK PARTICIPATION - BUT BECAUSE ALL THE DEFENCE MINISTERS WERE RELUCTANT TO EXACERBATE FURTHER THE STRAINED RELATIONS WITH GREECE, WHOSE PROBLEMS THEY CONSIDERED WERE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR HANDLING BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

7. COMPARED WITH THE DPC, GREEK BEHAVIOUR IN THE COUNCIL WAS RELATIVELY MILD. THEY RAISED A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WHICH LOOKED LIKE CAUSING SERIOUS TROUBLE. BUT DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THEM IN RESTRICTED SESSION, HARALAMBOPOLOUS PROVED READY TO GO ALONG WITH COMPROMISES SUPPORTED BY HIS ALLIES. CONTENTING HIMSELF IN EACH CASE WITH MAKING A FORMAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW FAR THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS OF GREEK BEHAVIOUR AT THESE MEETINGS WERE INTENDED FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION (SEE FOR EXAMPLE PAPANDREOU'S STATEMENTS IN ATHENS TELEGRAM NO 348 WHICH ARE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE AND TENDENTICUS) OR WHETHER THEY WILL PRESS FOR THEIR DEMANDS TO BE FULLY MET EVEN IF THIS INVOLVES MAJOR DISRUPTION OF THE ALLIANCE.

8. A DISAPPOINTING ASPECT WAS THE FAILURE OF DEFENCE MINISTERS TO ADDRESS COLLECTIVELY THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE DEFENCE ARISING FROM THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS. THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESENTATIONS BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS WAS CLEAR AND REINFORCED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW WHICH MINISTERS HAD BEFORE THEM, NAMELY THAT UNLESS NATIONS DEVOTE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO DEFENCE THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF DETERRENCE AND TO FULFIL THE MILITARY TASKS IT HAS SET ITSELF WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY ERODED. THE UK'S RECORD OF MEETING OUR RESOURCE COMMITMENTS IS A GOOD ONE, BUT ALL NATIONS FACE DIFFICULTIES OF VARYING DEGREES OF SEVERITY ON EITHER THE INPUT OR THE OUTPUT SIDE. NATIONAL PROBLEMS DIFFER BUT FROM THE ALLIANCE POINT OF VIEW THE QUESTION IS LARGELY ONE OF PRIORITIES FOR THE USE OF RESOURCES. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THESE PROBLEMS IN THE CONTENT OF THE NEEDS OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. THE LONGER THIS IS DELAYED THE MORE INTRACTABLE THINGS WILL BECOME. THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS DEBATE WAS MADE BY THE DUTCH DEFENCE MINISTER WHO MADE THE HELPFUL SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A VERY RESTRICTED SESSION IN WHICH MINISTERS WOULD FEEL ABLE TO TALK FREELY ABOUT THEIR PROBLEMS (MY TELEGRAM NO 449). BUT THIS WAS NOT TAKEN UP BY ANY OTHER MINISTER. AT LEAST AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE OVER INFRASTRUCTURE WAS AVOIDED, BUT THE GERMANS REMAIN AS ISOLATED AS BEFORE AND APEL HAS SHOWN NO WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE.

9. ON BALANCE, THIS WAS A USEFUL SERIES OF MEETINGS, DESPITE PAPANDREOU'S ATTEMPTS TO CONVERT IT TO A GREEK BENEFIT. IN VIEW OF THE LATTER, IT WAS PERHAPS FORTUNATE THAT, APART FROM THE SPANISH PROTOCL, NO MAJOR DECISIONS WERE CALLED FOR. BUT I BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE NEXT DPC MINISTERIAL TO ATTEMPT TO FIND SOME WAY OF TACKLING THE GROWING PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES AND RESOURCES FOR THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE PERHAPS FOLLOWING VAN MIERLO'S SUGGESTION. IN THE DPC, AND MORE ESPECIALLY IN THE COUNCIL THE DIFFERNG APPROACHES OF THE ALLIES ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THREATS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA (WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE ONLY REAL CONTROVERSY OVER THE COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE NOT CAUSED BY THE GREEKS) WILL NEED TO BE RECONSIDERED BY CAREFUL AND CONTINUING CONSULTATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID EXACERTBATION OF THIS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF TRANSATLATIC FRICTION. IT IS ALSO PERTINENT TO REMARK, IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND OVER THE WEEKEND, THAT THE COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS MIGHT HAVE FOLLOWED A DIFFERENT COURSE IF THEY HAD TAKEN PLACE THIS WEEK INSTEAD OF LAST.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ANKARA, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME.

ROSE.

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From the Principal Private Secretary

3 August 1981

Dear Brian,

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
MINISTERIAL MEETING, AUTUMN 1981

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your Secretary of State's minute of 23 July 1981 about the arrangements he is making for the meeting of the NATO Planning Group which the United Kingdom will host this autumn.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), David Edmonds (Department of the Environment), Godfrey Robson (Scottish Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Norbury Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

AH

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

Prime Minister.

To note.

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PRIME MINISTER

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
MINISTERIAL MEETING, AUTUMN 1981

It is the United Kingdom's turn, this autumn, to host the next Ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. I believe that you would wish to be aware of the arrangements that have been made.

2. I plan, following consultations with Peter Carrington, George Younger and Michael Heseltine, to hold the meeting at the Gleneagles Hotel, Scotland on 20/21 October. I have chosen Gleneagles for three main reasons. The principal reason is security; with support for the various anti-nuclear groups currently running at a very high level there would be a considerable risk of major demonstrations were the meeting to be held in a city-centre site, with consequent embarrassment to HMG. The choice of a remote site will make such demonstrations both much more difficult to organise and, should they occur, easier to contain well away from the Conference site. In addition because of our Presidency of the EC, conference facilities in London will be heavily stretched this autumn; and it has frequently been the custom to hold NPG meetings away from capitals, the UK being one of the few countries not so far to have followed this practice.

3. A public announcement about the meeting will not be made until shortly before it takes place. When it is made we might be criticised on grounds of cost, but while it may be a little more expensive to hold the conference in Scotland than in London I estimate that it will be only marginally so. Individual national Delegations are responsible for paying their own hotel bills; the cost of entertainment will be the same as in Central London; and holding the whole conference under a single roof will reduce transport and administrative costs. I shall be using

Service facilities and personnel wherever possible. I shall, however, make sure that the press are carefully handled when the time comes so as to minimise any risk of hostile speculation.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Secretary of State for Scotland; and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
23rd July 1981

NATO.
Read in full

GRS 1000
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FM UKDEL NATO 270945Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 314 OF 27 JUNE 1980.
INFO WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ANKARA,
INFO SAVING COPENHAGEN, OSLO, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, MOSCOW,
UKDEL VIENNA, OTTAWA.

ANKARA TELNO 298A: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING.

1. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS FIRST MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING SINCE AFGHANISTAN WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THE ALLIANCE'S FIRMNESS AND COHESION. IT WAS A LOW-KEY MEETING AT WHICH NO MAJOR DECISIONS WERE EXPECTED AND NONE WERE TAKEN. THE OBJECTIVE WAS ACHIEVED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE MEETING ENDED WITH A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH MINISTERS CONDEMNED THE SOVIET ACTION IN ROBUST TERMS, AGREED ON ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DETENTE AND ARMS CONTROL AND REAFFIRMED THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE TNF DECISIONS TAKEN LAST DECEMBER. BUT THE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON TACTICS FOR THE MADRID CONFERENCE, AND ON WESTERN REACTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN, STILL REMAIN UNRESOLVED. AS REGARDS CSCE AND CBMS, THE CRACKS WERE PAPERED OVER IN COMPROMISE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE FINALLY AGREED AFTER MANY HOURS OF DISCUSSION. ON AFGHANISTAN THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, BUT THEIR CONTINUED EXISTENCE WAS MADE CLEAR BY MR MUSKIE'S REMARKS.

2. THE HIGHLIGHTS IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION ON 25 JUNE WERE GENSCHER'S SPLENDIDLY FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT, ESPECIALLY ON TNF AND AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE ALLIANCE ABOUT THE LINE SCHMIDT WOULD TAKE IN MOSCOW: FRANCOIS-PONCET'S LUCID AND CONVINCING EXPOSITION OF THE FRENCH APPROACH TO THE MADRID CONFERENCE AND THE CBM MANDATE, WHICH SHOWED THE EXTENT TO WHICH AFGHANISTAN HAS INJECTED GREATER REALISM INTO FRENCH POLICY ON THESE SUBJECTS SINCE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER 1979: AND YOUR OWN STATEMENT, ESPECIALLY THE PASSAGE ON ARMS CONTROL, WHICH FOUND AN ECHO IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND WILL PROVIDE A VALUABLE LEAD IN TO OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE ALLIANCE TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN POLICY CO-ORDINATION. MACGUIGAN (CANADA), AT HIS FIRST APPEARANCE, DID A USEFUL JOB IN TABULATING THE AREAS OF ALLIANCE AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT AND EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION. BUT HIS EVIDENT HOPES OF STIMULATING DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT WERE STILLBORN. THE ONLY NEW POINT ON CONSULTATION CAME FROM VAN DER KLAAUW (NETHERLANDS) WHO SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BETTER PROMOTED ALLIANCE COHESION IF THE 15 FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD MET BRIEFLY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS SOON AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION, INSTEAD OF WAITING UNTIL THE END OF JUNE. THIS REFLECTS A GENUINE FEELING AMONG THE SMALLER ALLIES OF BEING LEFT OUT AND LINGERING RESENTMENT AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS, IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF AFGHANISTAN, IGNORED THE ALLIANCE.

/3. MUSKIE,

3. MUSKIE, WHO SPOKE LAST AND WAS INTENDED BY LUNS TO QUOTE WIND UP UNQUOTE THE DEBATE, WAS DISAPPOINTING. HE MADE A LENGTHY UNSCRIPTED SPEECH, WITH SEVERAL ALLUSIONS TO HIS LONG YEARS OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, WHICH TOLD THE COUNCIL A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE MOOD OF CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION BUT SUCCEEDED IN SOUNDING PATRONISING AND ADMONITORY TOWARDS HIS ALLIES. ALTHOUGH SOME OF HIS EVIDENT IMPATIENCE WITH THE EUROPEANS MAY HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED, HE GAVE THE UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION OF SEEING THE ALLIANCE IN TERMS OF THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE REST, WITHOUT MUCH UNDERSTANDING OF OF THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE LATTER. AS A RESULT, HIS STATEMENT MADE LITTLE CONTRIBUTION TO HEALING THE ALLIANCE WOUNDS OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS AND MAY EVEN HAVE SERVED TO DEEPEN SOME OF THEM.

4. THE DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE PRODUCED THE EXPECTED DIVERGENCIES OF VIEW ON THE CSCE AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST. NEITHER COULD BE RESOLVED DURING AN ALL NIGHT MEETING OF OFFICIALS AND BOTH THEREFORE CAME TO MINISTERS ON 26 JUNE. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PROBLEM WAS TO RECONCILE THE VIEWS OF THE NINE, AS EXPRESSED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 13 JUNE, AND OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE WAS IN FACT NO WAY OF BRIDGING THE GAP, BUT THE ATTEMPT TO DO SO LED TO A HEATED EXCHANGE BETWEEN MUSKIE AND ARNAUD (DEPUTISING FOR FRANCOIS-PONCET) IN WHICH THE FORMER ACCUSED THE EUROPEANS OF WANTING TO MAKE POLICY WITHOUT CARRYING THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAD TAKEN ON AT CAMPT DAVID. AS REGARDS CSCE, THE AMERICANS WERE UNDER FIRM POLICY DIRECTION FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TO ENSURE THAT ANY REFERENCE TO TABLING A CBM MANDATE AT MADRID WAS SUBJECT TO REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUS, WHEREAS THE FRENCH WERE DETERMINED NOT TO GO BACK ON THE COMMITMENT IN THE DECEMBER 1979 COMMUNIQUE. ALTHOUGH A FORM OF WORDS WAS EVENTUALLY FOUND FOR THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH WAS JUST ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES, THE DISCUSSION DID NOTHING TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRENCH, WHO ARE SUPPORTED BY VIRUTALLY ALL THE EUROPEANS, AND THE AMERICANS. THE FRENCH VIEW WAS WELL PUT BY FRANCOIS-PONCET ON THE PREVIOUS DAY, BUT LUNS, IN THE CHAIR, FAILED TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A DEBATE ON THE SUBJECT. SO APART FROM HAVING IDENTIFIED RATHER MORE CLEARLY THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE, WE ARE NO FURTHER ON.

/5. THE

5. THE MEETING PRODUCED NO FOWARD MOVEMENT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR GREEK REINTEGRATION. IN THEIR BILATERALS WITH YOU, BOTH THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS ASSERTED THEIR ANXIETY TO MAKE PROGRESS, BUT NEITHER SHOWED ANY READINESS TO SEEK THE COMPROMISES WHICH ARE BOUND TO BE NEEDED IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE. THERE WAS A SOUR EXCHANGE ON THE SUBJECT BETWEEN THE TWO MINISTERS DURING THE RESTRICTED SESSION, WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE, AND IT WAS ONLY WITH SOME DIFFICULTY THAT THE TURKS WERE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT AN OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO GREEK REINTEGATION IN PARAGRAPH 1[illegible] OF THE COMMUNQUE.

6. THE TURKS THEMSELVES WERE CLEARLY PLEASED THAT THIS YEAR'S MEETING WAS BEING HELD IN ANKARA AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH OF WELCOME. THEY ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERLINE THEIR ECONOMIC NEEDS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE (PO/80/51) BEYOND STATEMENTS BY THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, WE MUST EXPECT, FOLLOWING THIS VISIT, A RENEWAL OF PRESSURE FOR MORE MILITARY AID TO TURKEY, IN PARALLEL WITH CONTINUING PRESSURE ON US TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PORTUGUESE FRIGATES PROGRAMME. IN VIEW OF OUR DIFFICULTY OVER RESPONDING TO THIS PRESSURE, I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT AS ACTIVELY AS POSSIBLE THE NEW QUOTE SCIENCE FOR STABILITY UNQUOTE PROGRAMME (C-M (80)14) - APPLICABLE TO TURKEY, PORTUGAL AND GREECE - WHICH WAS APPROVED BY MINISTERS ON 26 JUNE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROSE.

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Private Secretary to
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68 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01-233-7113

Duplicate.

NATO

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

18 February 1980

Dear Miles

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY: TEXTS

I enclose a copy of a document we have received from the Overseas Office of the House of Commons. I well imagine you will already have seen it, but if not you may be pleased to have this opportunity to have a look at it and deal with it as necessary.

I am copying this letter to Nick Sanders (No 10), Derek Piper (MOD) and Murdo Maclean (Whips Office).

Yours sincerely

Petra

MISS PETRA LAIDLAW
Private Secretary

Miles Wickstead Esq
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

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TEXTS ADOPTED

BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

AT ITS TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL SESSION,

OTTAWA, 22-27 OCTOBER 1979

International Secretariat

November 1979

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RECOMMENDATION 69

on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (1)

The Assembly,

Recognising that stabilising security at lower military levels by balanced arms control measures on the basis of undiminished security must remain a priority political aim and that it is of prime importance to slow down by political means the quantitative and qualitative arms build-up of the Warsaw Pact in particular;

Considering also the willingness declared by the East to reduce military forces in Central Europe;

RECOMMENDS that the North Atlantic Council:

1. attach more importance to the confidence-building measures by submitting at the Vienna MBFR negotiations a proposal on associated measures enabling the verification of a reductions agreement contributing to the prevention of surprise attacks and thus serving confidence-building as well as the stability of political security in Europe;

2. examine at a high political level within NATO the possibilities available for reaching mutual consent on present troop strengths of both sides' ground forces within the MBFR reduction area.

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(1) Presented by the Military Committee.

RECOMMENDATION 70

on Theatre Nuclear Forces (1)

On this recommendation, an amendment was proposed from the floor of the Assembly by Mr. Klaas G. de Vries (Netherlands). In its operative section it recommended that the North Atlantic Council :

"pursue efforts in SALT III to negotiate satisfactory restrictions on theatre nuclear forces before making any decision on new deployments".

The Assembly, therefore, was being asked to make a clear decision on whether it recommended that deployment of long-range theatre nuclear forces by NATO be postponed until arms control negotiations had been tried or that an immediate decision be taken on new deployments. A country-by-country roll-call vote was taken on the amendment. It was rejected by 88 votes to 4, with 18 abstentions.

The original recommendation was then voted upon by a show of hands, indicating that a large majority was in favour -- 84. 4 were opposed and there were 22 abstentions.

The Assembly,

Convinced of the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and the American commitment to the defence of Europe;

Believing, however, that it is also necessary to seek an agreement for limitations of nuclear weapons which are not included in SALT II so that the arms race is not shifted to Europe;

Concerned about the recent Soviet arms build-up of medium-range nuclear systems, especially through deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber.

Convinced that the Alliance must take effective action to bring about limitation and reduction of these weapons systems;

Convinced that a stable deterrence capability and escalation control is necessary to preserve the security of the Alliance;

Concerned that without arms control measures for medium-range nuclear weapons or modernisation of American theatre nuclear forces in Europe, Alliance deterrence capabilities and escalation control might suffer setbacks in the near future;

./...

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(1) Presented jointly by the Military and Political Committees.

Welcoming Soviet readiness to negotiate about these problems as expressed in the speech of President Brezhnev in East Berlin on 6 October 1979, which, however, is not yet a sufficient basis for negotiations;

RECOMMENDS that Alliance governments and the North Atlantic Council:

1. agree on a programme for theatre nuclear modernisation;

2. implement this programme in a way that concrete results or arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union can be taken into account at any time during the period between the decision on the programme and the earliest possible deployment of new systems in 1983, including the possibility of renouncing the new medium-range nuclear weapons, if and to the degree that the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce its own long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF);

3. provide for LRTNF deployment in several Alliance member countries and not in only one European member country;

4. shape the modernisation programme exclusively towards strengthening deterrence and escalation control, thereby improving the Alliance strategy of flexible response and assuring the stabilisation of the overall nuclear strategic balance without attempting to create a separate nuclear balance in Europe;

5. provide in the SALT III negotiations, so vitally important for European security, a consultation process that includes European participation in the preparation of LRTNF negotiating positions.

RECOMMENDATION 71

on East-West relations (1)

The Assembly,

Convinced that détente is based on mutual interest in reducing the dangers of nuclear war;

Recognising that détente policy, twelve years after the Alliance adopted the Harmel Report, is at a critical juncture;

Persuaded, after close examination of the achievements and setbacks of détente, that the détente process has reduced tensions between East and West and has contributed significantly to an improvement in East-West relations, particularly through arms control negotiations and through the CSCE;

Convinced that new efforts are necessary in order to strengthen and broaden détente, so that a global approach providing more stability and continuity can be worked out;

Noting that détente policy has increased the coherence of the Alliance and that a firm political consensus has emerged to pursue détente as an Alliance policy;

Disturbed by Soviet activities in the Third World and by the effects of the continuing Soviet military growth on the East-West military balance;

Aware that genuine détente can be based only on a stable military balance;

RECOMMENDS that the North Atlantic Council:

1. reaffirm strongly the basic détente policy advocated by the Harmel report and adopted by the Alliance;

2. clarify détente policy by affirming it as both a superpower and European policy, primarily regional and European in scope, and at the same time attempt to adjust its principles to the new military and political realities in Europe and elsewhere;

3. work to deepen, broaden, and make détente global through vigorous activity in the following areas, aimed at persuading the Soviet Union to expand the areas of co-operation:

   - intensified efforts for arms control negotiations, especially concerning conventional forces in Europe (MBFR) and theatre nuclear weapons (SALT III);

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(1) Presented by the Political Committee.

- exploration of the possibilities for increased East-West economic co-operation, especially in regard to trade and regional co-operation concerning energy resources;

- expansion and strengthening of the CSCE in all areas, especially concerning confidence-building measures and the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act;

- support for regional efforts to apply CSCE principles to further co-operation;

- preparation, if the circumstances allow, for a new CSCE summit meeting in the near future, possibly in 1985;

4. take all appropriate steps to ensure the maintenance of the military balance between East and West, without which there can be no genuine détente;

5. regularly consult the Western authorities and collaborate closely with them in their efforts to assist Chinese modernisation programmes, while taking account of national policies toward Asia;

6. encourage member countries to increase regular consultations aimed at supporting, through multilateral arrangements, Third World aspirations for independence and self-determination and aimed at discouraging or checking foreign interventionism;

7. maintain as important for the aims of the Alliance the steady and gradual improvement in relations between member countries and the Soviet bloc and the safeguarding of the security of member countries.

RESOLUTION 86

on a continuing need for joint strategy on economic policy (1)

The Assembly,

Recalling its resolution of last year on a joint Atlantic strategy for economic development (Resolution 76);

Reaffirming the necessity of improving the world economic order and economic assistance among Alliance countries;

Concerned by the repercussions of the persistent fluctuation of the dollar on monetary relations between member countries and the financial conditions governing Western oil supplies;

Mindful of the increased strength of the USSR, the relative improvement in its military capability and its expanding influence outside its own boundaries;

Concerned that member countries should be prepared to spend more money on economic assistance within the Alliance and on mutual defence to counterbalance the USSR;

Aware of the economic and political problems of her Southern Flank countries;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to pursue energetically closer economic and monetary collaboration;

2. to work collectively towards financial, trading and technological assistance for the Southern Flank countries;

3. to consider actively the opportunities for standardisation and inter-operability which could lead both to increased efficiency and to defence economies.

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(1) Presented by the Economic Committee.

RESOLUTION 87

on the right of access to information (1)

The Assembly,

Considering that the rapid evolution of communications and the explosion of computer technology is bringing about a new society in which information plays a dominant rôle and in which the public is entitled to access to the information of its choice;

Recalling that a society which is not well informed cannot be truly democratic and that the public, and its elected representatives, cannot participate properly in the life of the nation unless it is fully informed of government policy and the plans for its implementation;

Noting that the right of consumers and the public to information is legally protected in only a few member countries;

Concerned by a certain degree of public apathy towards politics and the general decline in motivation for the common defence of the member countries of the Alliance;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to safeguard and facilitate public access to information held by public authorities;

2. to encourage public interest in national and international affairs by inviting the authorities to improve public information;

3. to re-examine within the North Atlantic Council the rules governing the release of information on Alliance planning and NATO activities.

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(1) Presented by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information.

RESOLUTION 88

on the project for an exhibition of works of art
from the fifteen member countries (1)

The Assembly,

Convinced of the need to bring home to the public that the Alliance is based on the determination of the member countries to defend a common social and cultural heritage;

Welcoming the proposal by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Education to commemorate the 30 years of existence of the Alliance by organising an exhibition of works of art designed to highlight the common inheritance of member countries;

Considering that the success of the exhibition arranged in conjunction with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation depends on the full participation of all fifteen member countries;

URGES those member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance which have not already done so:

1. to respond positively to the Assembly's invitation to take part in the exhibition;

2. to take the necessary measures to ensure their country's participation in accordance with the conditions proposed by the organisers as a matter of urgency.

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(1) Presented by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information.

RESOLUTION 89

on human rights groups in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union (1)

The Assembly,

Recognising the essential role played by private Helsinki monitoring groups in East and West;

Noting the persecutions to which these groups are subjected in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;

Concerned about the fate of many members of these groups, including some of the founders, who are now in prisons and labour camps in the Soviet Union;

Shocked by the harsh sentences given to the Charter 77 signatories in Prague;

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to request the liberation, before the beginning of the Madrid Conference, of all individuals persecuted or condemned for monitoring the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Act.

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(1) Presented by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information.

RESOLUTION 90

on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1)

The Assembly,

Noting that the importance given to security questions may distort consideration of the different sections of the Helsinki Final Act at the next CSCE meeting in Madrid;

Recalling that the main objective of the Helsinki Conference in 1975 was to improve the climate in Europe by means of dialogue and exchanges between peoples and through the freer circulation of information, ideas and individuals;

Hoping that better results may be obtained by the development of bilateral relations and the improvement of contacts between diplomats of East and West through the CSCE process;

Considering that failure at the Madrid meeting could be fatal for the CSCE and endanger détente;

Recalling its Recommendation 65 adopted at the 24th Annual Session;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to pursue consultations among themselves and with the other participating countries in order to develop a constructive attitude and realistic objectives for the coming meeting;

2. to include parliamentarians in the official delegations to the Second CSCE Review Conference to be held in Madrid;

3. to request at the Madrid Conference a balanced review of all sections of the Final Act and to expose the inadequacy of the progress made by the communist countries in their implementation of the humanitarian provisions;

4. to maintain an atmosphere conducive to dialogue and table new proposals for exchanges in the Basket III area.

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(1) Presented by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information.

RESOLUTION 91

on the SALT II Treaty (1)

ROLL-CALL VOTE

In Favour	: 71
Opposed	: 0
Abstentions	: 38

The Assembly,

Noting that the SALT II Treaty is the culmination of seven years of rigorous and complex negotiation by three United States Administrations, and represents adherence to the obligations of the two superpowers under the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Recognising that the Treaty places numerical restraints on Soviet strategic capabilities, in terms of both launchers and warheads, and enhances Western capabilities to predict and monitor the development and deployment of Soviet strategic forces;

Recognising further that the Treaty permits the United States to pursue all measures necessary to sustain the strength and credibility of the United States strategic deterrent;

Assured that neither the Treaty nor the Protocol will inhibit necessary military and technological co-operation within the Alliance;

Convinced therefore that, in providing the framework for a secure and stable strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Treaty reduces the possibility of nuclear war, contributes to international stability, and thereby promotes the security interests of the member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance;

Recognising the SALT II Treaty as an essential step toward the goal of achieving more substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides during a future SALT III negotiation;

Convinced that a SALT III negotiation provides the most promising forum for nuclear reductions in the European theatre and that progress in such a negotiation would facilitate collateral progress in related negotiations within the MBFR and CSCE frameworks;

Reminded that the twin precepts of the Alliance are defence and détente;

Recognising that the unanimous endorsement of the SALT II Treaty by the leaders of all member states of the Alliance reflects broad-based public support of the SALT process as a central element in the effort to stabilise the East-West military balance and simultaneously to improve East-West relations;

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(1) Presented jointly by the Military and Political Committees.

Concerned, with regard to defence, that failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty would have a seriously disruptive impact on the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance;

Concerned, with regard to détente, that failure to ratify SALT II would result in a deterioration in East-West relations, potentially negating many of such positive aspects of détente as expanded trade, cultural contacts, and reunification of families;

Respecting as an Assembly of Parliamentarians the sovereign right and the responsibilities of the United States Senate to decide on the ratification of SALT II;

URGES the United States Government:

1. to proceed to early ratification of the SALT II Treaty, with due respect to all requirements for credible deterrence, stable nuclear balance and future arms control negotiations;

2. to undertake SALT III negotiations aimed at accomplishing significant reductions in each side's nuclear forces;

3. to consult fully and regularly with the Allies on all aspects of the negotiation, in particular on those pertaining to theatre nuclear forces.

RESOLUTION 92

on the political and military contribution of Portugal (1)

The Assembly,

Noting that NATO, as an alliance of free and equal nations, can only be strengthened insofar as all its members enjoy access to the same responsibilities;

Recognising the political and military importance of Portugal and the outstanding role played by the Portuguese people in building democratic institutions which, though young, are remarkably sound, in spite of extremely unfavourable economic conditions which could well have had an adverse effect;

Convinced of the value of Portugal's contribution in all fields, notably the military one;

COMMENDS, as an important contribution by Portugal to NATO, the existence on Portuguese territory of COMIBERLANT;

RECOGNISES as a further contribution to the Alliance's cohesion the present interim appointment of a Portuguese admiral as commander of COMIBERLANT;

EXPRESSES THE WISH that a Portuguese general officer be appointed commander of COMIBERLANT.

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(1) Presented by the Political Committee.

RESOLUTION 93

on the need for a co-ordinated energy policy (1)

The Assembly,

Recalling the concern felt in Alliance countries in recent years due to both the substantial increase in the price of oil and gas and the more recent shortage in the supply of oil;

Mindful that world fossil energy reserves are not only limited but in many cases are also too precious to be burnt solely as fuel;

Stressing that the developing countries also need a fair share of world energy resources in order to ensure their economic development;

Aware of the importance of avoiding any policy of confrontation with the OPEC countries and of working for lasting economic co-operation between industrialised and Third World countries, whether or not they are oil exporters;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to fulfil, as a first step, their commitments concerning energy conservation agreed within the International Energy Agency and at the Strasbourg and Tokyo Summit meetings;

2. to encourage to a greater degree the development of renewable energy sources and to set up more stringent ceilings on oil consumption;

3. to reduce by stages the policy of subsidising oil imports in order to keep national energy prices below the level of world energy prices;

4. to work with all speed towards a comprehensive co-ordinated Alliance energy policy;

5. to make the public aware of the seriousness of the world energy situation and the economic and political dangers of delaying a solution;

6. to give high priority to developing the extraction of indigenous resources such as coal, gas and oil appropriate to each country;

7. to develop as a matter of urgency commercial methods for the production of liquid hydrocarbons from coal.

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(1) Presented jointly by the Political and Scientific and Technical Committees.

RESOLUTION 94

on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) (1)

The Assembly,

Acknowledging that a credible defence posture remains the major objective of the Alliance;

Stressing nevertheless that democracy within all member countries, as well as the unity and effectiveness of the Alliance may be threatened not only by armed aggression from outside but also by social, technological and economic pressures within individual member countries;

Reminding Alliance governments of the importance of the non-military Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

Convinced of the importance which should increasingly be placed by Alliance member governments on improving the quality of life of their citizens and of protecting them from the worst excesses of environmental pollution;

CONGRATULATES CCMS, on its tenth anniversary, for the excellence and practical value of its pilot studies which have effectively demonstrated the value of international co-operation in the environmental field;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to provide the CCMS with increased resources to enable it to expand its activities;

2. to pay more attention both to the pilot studies themselves and to the various recommendations which accompany them.

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(1) Presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee.

RESOLUTION 95

on scientific co-operation in Alliance countries with respect to low-level radiation research (1)

The Assembly,

Concerned at the possible risks to public health resulting from long-term exposure to low-level radiation;

Anxious to ensure the best possible co-ordination of research efforts undertaken in this field by the Alliance countries;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to support a regular world-wide exchange of information on low-level radiation research in progress;

2. to accelerate research projects under way;

3. to avoid research duplication at national and international level;

4. to analyse the results of this research in order to introduce, if necessary, appropriate legislative or regulatory measures.

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(1) Presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee.

ORDER 22

on the setting up of a working group on Portugal (1)

The Assembly,

Having taken note of the report on the "Economic Situation and Portugal's Economic and Military Aid Requirements", presented by its Economic Committee (W 133 EC (79) 10);

Recalling Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the recommendations of the Committee of Three of 1956 and the declarations of several North Atlantic Councils, all of which stress the need for closer economic collaboration among Alliance members;

Aware of the relationship between the economic development and the social and political stability and of the vital importance of Portugal for the security of the Alliance;

Mindful of the enormous economic gap between Portugal and most other countries of an Alliance which should be built on solidarity;

Supporting the approach taken by NATO, that total help to Portugal must include economic aid, and defence related economic assistance;

Considering more efforts necessary to develop concrete proposals for collective or bilateral help to Portugal;

INSTRUCTS its Secretary General :

to take all appropriate steps in collaboration with the Economic Committee to set up a working group of parliamentarians and experts from national administrations and international organisations which should define concrete conclusions and measures in order to help Portugal in its overall economic and social development.

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(1) Presented by the Economic Committee.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 31 MAY 1979.
INFO PRIORITY ALL NATO POSTS, MODUK.
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN.

Enclosure No 6 in Z

MIPT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING: COMMUNIQUE.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT
BEGINS:

1. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN THE HAGUE ON 30TH AND 31ST MAY, 1979.

2. COMMEMORATING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLIANCE, MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION THE ALLIANCE HAD MADE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AND THEREBY TO THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR COUNTRIES. THEY RENEWED THEIR FAITH IN THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE ALLIANCE, AND PLEDGED THE CONTINUING DEDICATION OF THEIR COUNTRIES TO DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY MINISTERS CONSIDERED A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. MINISTERS RECOGNISED THE CONTINUED URGENCY OF MAKING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE EXPERIENCING SEVERE DIFFICULTIES AND THE NECESSITY OF FINDING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR CONTINUED POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO THIS END. THE MINISTERS ALSO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE ACTION RECENTLY TAKEN IN ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

4. MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT AS THE ALLIANCE ENTERS INTO ITS FOURTH DECADE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ITS MEMBERS BY PURSUING THE COMPLEMENTARY AIMS OF DETERRENCE AND DETENTE THUS CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE AND STABILITY.

/RECALLING THE

RECALLING THE STUDY UNDERTAKEN IN 1978 AS THE BACKGROUND FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, THEY REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THEY NOTED WITH ATTENTION CERTAIN SIGNS IN RECENT STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO MAKE EFFORTS TOWARDS A BETTER SITUATION. AT THE SAME TIME THEY NOTED THE PERSISTENCE OF DISTURBING FACTORS, ABOVE ALL THE CEASELESS GROWTH OF THE MILITARY POWER OF THESE COUNTRIES AND ITS PROJECTION ABROAD. IN THE FACE OF THESE FACTS, MINISTERS UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED STEADFASTNESS AND SOLIDARITY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE COUPLED WITH A SUSTAINED DEFENCE EFFORT. WHILE RECALLING THAT DETENTE IS AN INDIVISIBLE PROCESS, THEY REMAINED COMMITTED TO SEEKING CONCRETE PROGRESS IN EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO STRIVE TOWARDS THIS END, ESPECIALLY IN THE DIALOGUES AND NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY.

5. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. THEY AGREED THAT A BALANCED LIMITATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SECURITY. MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION WITH THE PAST RECORD OF CLOSE AND FULL EXCHANGES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON ISSUES ARISING FROM THESE TALKS AND CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING THESE EXCHANGES. THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY IN DEPTH THE OFFICIAL SALT II TEXT ONCE THE TREATY IS SIGNED.

6. MINISTERS AGAIN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE CONTINUATION AND DEEPENING OF THE CSCE PROCESS AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF DETENTE. IN REVIEWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSTE FINA ACT MINISTERS RE-EMPHASISED THAT PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS. SUCH PROGRESS COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AT THE MADRID MEETING AND CONTRIBUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN SOME SECTORS, THE SITUATION IN OTHERS, NOTABLY THAT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, REMAINED LARGELY UNCHANGED AND HAD, IN SOME INSTANCES IN THE FIELD OF ONFORMATION, DETERIORATED. IN THE LATTER CONTEXT THEY NOTED WITH

SPECIAL CONCERN THE RESTRICTIONS RECENTLY IMPOSED BY SOME STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE ON THE WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS. THEY OBSERVED THAT THE THREE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS ENVISAGED BY THE BELGRADE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A SATISFACTORY ATMOSPHERE. WELCOMING THE FACT THAT THE NEED FOR CAREFUL PREPARATION OF THE MADRID MEETING IS WIDELY RECOGNISED, THEY REITERATED THEIR INTENTION TO CONSULT CLOSELY, BOTH AMONG THE ALLIES AND WITH ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, TO THIS END AND IN ORDER TO STIMULATE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY NOTED WITH INTEREST THE RECENT EAST EUROPEAN STATEMENTS REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, WHICH WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED AT THE BELGRADE MEETING ON THE BASIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT: THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE PROGRESS IN MADRID. THEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A BALANCE AMONG ALL THE SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS.

7. MINISTERS REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE. THEY AGREED THAT THE CONTINUATION, SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING OF A CALM SITUATION IN BERLIN AND ON THE ACCESS ROUTES IS A POSITIVE ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE. THEY EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE MAINTENANCE OF AN UNDISTURBED BERLIN SITUATION CONTINUES TO HAVE FOR DETENTE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

8. MINISTERS OF COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN SPITE OF THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS. THEY RE-EMPHASISED THEIR DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY, PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR PROPOSAL TO CREATE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE AND THE REDUCTION OF THE DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS: A FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT CONCERNING UNITED STATES AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ON THE BASIS PROPOSED BY THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT AND PRACTICAL STEP TOWARDS THIS GOAL. MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE RELEVANCE OF THEIR PROPOSAL FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MORE STABLE

/RELATIONSHIP IN

RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE IS NO LONGER DISPUTED IN PRINCIPLE IN T[illegible] NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE REMAIN UNRESOLVED. THE CENTRAL OPEN QUESTIONS ARE THE CLARIFICATION OF THE DATA BASE - PREREQUISITE TO GENUINE PARITY - AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY. THESE MINISTERS RECALLED THAT, SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING, THE WESTERN SIDE HAS MADE IMPORTANT MOVES ON THESE TWO CENTRAL ISSUES. THEY CALLED ON THE EASTERN SIDE TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE WESTERN MOVES AND TO RESPOND POSITIVELY IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE MOMENTUM IN THE TALKS. THESE MINISTERS UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THEY ATTACH TO ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH WOULD PROMOTE MILITARY STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE AND ENSURE VERIFICATION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION THEY ALSO STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

9. IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES IN THE PURSUIT OF REALISTIC AND VERIFIABLE DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WHICH WILL ENHANCE STABILITY, REDUCE FORCE LEVELS AND PROMOTE SECURITY. MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR HOPE THAT THE CONTINUING PROCESS INITIATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT WOULD STIMULATE SPEEDIER PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN PARTICULAR THEY WELCOMED THE START MADE BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA AND THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION IN NEW YORK. ACTIVE CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES ARE TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE PERMANENT MACHINERY OF THE ALLIANCE. AS ANOTHER ELEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO DEVELOP THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, MINISTERS HAD A FURTHER USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL MADE BY FRANCE IN MAY 1978 TO ALL THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE BUT ALSO TO LIMIT AND REDUCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT EUROPE. THEY DECIDED TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THIS PROPOSAL AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND SECURITY IN THIS CONTINENT.

10. MINISTERS AGAIN VOICED THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY POWER BEYOND LEVELS JUSTIFIED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE GROWING SOVIET THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. WHILE EXPRESSING THEIR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ALL ASPECTS OF DETENTE, MINISTERS,

/RECALLING THE

RECALLING THE DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE LONDON AND WASHINGTON MEETINGS, UNDERLINED THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO DEVOTE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO MODERNISE AND STRENGTHEN ALLIED CAPABILITIES TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE.

11. MINISTERS WELCOMED THE DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS IN THE FIELD OF EQUIPMENT CO-OPERATION DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT A MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THEY NOTED THAT GOOD PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE BOTH IN ESTABLISHING NEW JOINT PROGRAMMES FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS AND IN WORKING OUT ARMAMENTS PLANNING PROCEDURES. THEY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE WAS EVOLVING IN A PRACTICAL WAY TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE BALANCED RELATIONS AMONG THE EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF NEW DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND THE AUGMENTING OF ITS QUANTITY AND QUALITY, BEARING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDISATION AND INTEROPERABILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF THE LESS INDUSTRIAL-ISED COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE BORNE IN MIND.

12. MINISTERS EXAMINED TWO REPORTS RELATING TO CIVIL EMERGENCY MATTERS. THEY TOOK NOTE OF THE ACTION SO FAR TAKEN BY THE MEMBER COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO PROVIDE CIVIL SUPPORT FOR THE RAPID REINFORCEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, WITH A VIEW TO REDRESSING PRESENT SHORTCOMINGS AND ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LEVEL OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

13. WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THE MINISTERS PAID TRIBUTE TO THE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY PRESIDENT CARTER, PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. THEY UNDERLINED THE FACT THAT A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRES THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IN THE ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

14. MINISTERS NOTED THE CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE PURSUED THROUGH JOINT EFFORTS SO THAT POSITIVE AND CONCRETE RESULTS COULD BE ATTAINED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

/15. MINISTERS

15. MINISTERS TOOK NOTE OF THE SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE WHOLE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR PEACE IN THE AREA.

16. MINISTERS RECOGNISED THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE NATO SCIENCE PROGRAMME IN ENCOURAGING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND EXPRESSED THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR IT. THEY WELCOMED IN PARTICULAR THE INTENSIFIED CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN BY THE SCIENCE COMMITTEE TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF REDUCING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DISPARITIES BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES THROUGH CO-OPERATIVE ACTIVITIES.

THE MINISTERS OF THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSED THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE GROWTH IN SOVIET THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES REFERRED TO ABOVE, THEY NOTED THAT THE CONTINUING NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNISE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, ENVISAGING NO INCREASE IN OVERALL RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, HAD RECENTLY BEEN REAFFIRMED. AT THE SAME TIME, IN LINE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL DUAL OBJECTIVES OF DETENTE AND DETERRENCE, THEY EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR A RESPONSE TO THIS CHALLENGE WHICH COMBINES THE COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES OF FORCE IMPROVES AND ARMS CONTROL. IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE, THESE MINISTERS WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE SPECIAL GROUP WAS WORKING EFFECTIVELY IN PARALLEL WITH THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND TOOK NOTE OF THE REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK.
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