

Confidential File

THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA.
and possibility of Namibia
joining the Commonwealth

SOUTH AFRICA

Part 1: May 1979

Part 5 May 1989.

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PREM 19/3173

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T255/90

subject CC MASTER
CC OPS



C. / WOODS / FOREIGN
NUTOMA

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 November 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 5 October and for your kind words about the work of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in Namibia. I am glad that the Team's presence has helped you so much with your policy of national reconciliation. We, for our part, are impressed by the excellent start Namibia has made as an independent State.

When we originally agreed to supply a team to help train the new Namibian Defence Force, it was on the basis that it would aim to complete its task within one year, but that we would review the position towards the end of that time. I understand your reasons for asking for BMATT's help during a second year and am sure BMATT would be able to consolidate what has so far been achieved.

I therefore confirm that the British Government will continue to provide military training assistance during a second year, after which, as you express it, the Defence Force should be able to stand on its own feet. As you pointed out, the task will not require a team as big as the present one. Its precise size will need to be discussed between military experts on both sides.

mem

I was very glad to see you in New York and look forward to meeting you at the Commonwealth Meeting at Harare next year.

Yours sincerely

Nyandhaka
—

His Excellency Mr. Sam Nujoma

cc/jc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1990

Dear Charles,

Military assistance for Namibia *Plan*

On 12 October we forwarded a faxed letter to the Prime Minister from President Nujoma of Namibia asking that military training be provided for a second year. I now enclose a draft reply.

When we agreed to provide military training for Namibia, we did so in the belief that it would be one of the most important contributions to the stability of the new country. So far, despite the difficulties, the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) has been remarkably successful in building a unified defence force from the disparate armed forces of SWAPO and the previous administration. Their efforts have helped win a position of influence with the Namibians which is useful to our interests in South Africa.

In agreeing to President Nujoma's request for training, we made it clear that we were prepared to provide this help with the aim of completing its main task within one year, though we undertook to review the position towards the end of that time. Commander BMATT and the High Commissioner at Windhoek strongly advise that some extension of the Team's presence into a second year is necessary to consolidate what is being achieved and to continue to underpin the stability of the country while it finds its feet. The Foreign Secretary accepts this judgement and believes we should agree to extend BMATT's presence into a second year but at a much reduced level.

Anticipating that we might be asked for continued assistance, we had asked Commander BMATT to consider how consolidation could best be achieved. We had also submitted a bid for funds in the latest PES round. Unfortunately, the bid for extra funds has failed and we shall accordingly have to find the costs of any extension from savings in military training programmes elsewhere. In replying to President Nujoma, we must therefore avoid committing ourselves to any precise level of training. Nujoma himself accepts that the Team will be smaller.

MOD officials have been consulted and are content. I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD).

Jane, Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

From: The Prime Minister

Mr Sam
To: His Excellency President Nujoma
The Republic of Namibia

Thank you for your letter of 5 October and for your kind words about the work of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in Namibia. I am glad that the Team's presence has helped you so much with your policy of national reconciliation. We, for our part, are impressed by the excellent start Namibia has made as an independent State.

When we originally agreed to supply a team to help train the new Namibian Defence Force, it was on the basis that it would aim to complete its task within one year, but that we would review the position towards the end of that time. I understand your reasons for asking for BMATT's help during a second year *and I* am sure BMATT would ~~thus~~ be able to ~~help~~ consolidate what has so far been achieved. // I therefore confirm that the British Government will continue to provide military training assistance during a second year, after which, as you express it, the Defence Force should be able to stand on its own feet. As you pointed out, the task will not require a team as big as the present one. Its precise size will need to be discussed between military experts on both sides.

was very glad to see you in New York e
I am glad that we will continue to help. I look forward to meeting you at the Commonwealth Meeting at Harare next ~~this~~ year.

Can
Y17ABP/1



SOUTH AFRICA!

Sil in Namibia at 5.

discussing between

1990



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-270

CONFIDENTIAL

T01165

17 October 1990

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 304
King Charles Street
London SW1

COO 17/x

Don Simon

OD(90)21: THE NAMIBIA BILL

This is just to record that the only reaction I have seen to OD(90)21 was on the Defence Secretary's behalf saying that he had no comments. The Foreign Secretary said in his paper that in the absence of comments requiring discussion within two weeks from 18 September he would assume that policy approval had been given by OD. The purpose of this letter is to record that that approval has been given. I understand the Bill will go to Legislation Committee shortly.

*Yours sincerely
Bill Reeves*

W D REEVES

Copies to: C D Powell Esq, No 10
Tim Sutton Esq, Lord President's Office
John Gieve Esq, HM Treasury
Simon Webb Esq, MOD
John Neilson Esq, DEN
Miss G Kirton, Lord Privy Seal's Office
Neil Thornton Esq, DTI
Richard Dales Esq, FCO

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1990

EN 12/11

Dear Charles,

Request for Extension of BMATT Assistance
to Namibia Defence Force

I enclose a faxed letter to the Prime Minister which has been received via Windhoek from the President of Namibia, Mr Sam Nujoma. We shall be sending you a draft reply shortly.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WINDHOEK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 405
OF 101000Z OCT 90
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PRETORIA

ADVANCE COPY,

MIPT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NUJOMA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT NUJOMA'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

QUOTE. REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF BMATT ASSISTANCE TO NAMIBIA DEFENCE FORCE

SHORTLY BEFORE OUR INDEPENDENCE YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY AGREED TO PROVIDE A BRITISH MILITARY TRAINING TEAM FOR ONE YEAR.

THE PRESENCE OF THIS TEAM IS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED BY ALL THEIR CONTACTS, INCLUDING OPPOSITION MPS, AND IT HAS MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW, PROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY DISCIPLINED NAMIBIAN DEFENCE FORCE. THIS IS A VITAL ELEMENT IN THE STABILITY OF OUR YOUNG AND FRAGILE DEMOCRACY WHICH IS IMPORTANT IN THE WIDER DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

NAMIBIA WISHES TO BE INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY SUPPORT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, AS WE EXPLAINED TO YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS YEAR, WITHDRAWAL IN MARCH 1991 OF BRITISH MILITARY TRAINING TEAM WOULD BE TOO SOON AS WE WOULD ENCOUNTER MAJOR DIFFICULTIES SHOULD THE WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE IN MARCH 1991.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EARNESTLY REQUEST HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT THROUGH YOU, HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER, TO EXTEND A HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO EXTENDING THE PRESENCE OF THE TRAINING TEAM OF ABOUT HALF OF THE PRESENT LEVEL, FOR A FURTHER ONE YEAR. THEREAFTER, WE HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO STAND ON OUR OWN.

I SINCERELY HOPE THAT OUR REQUEST WILL MEET WITH YOUR FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE.

RICHARDS

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

9

ADVANCE 9

PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR HEMANS

HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/NPDD
PS/NO 10

NNNN



Republic of Namibia

State House
Windhoek

Ref: SH/7/1/22

5 October 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T227A(1)190

SUBJECT CC MASTER
OPS

Your Honourable

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF BMATT ASSISTANCE TO NAMIBIA DEFENCE FORCE;

Shortly before our independence your Foreign Secretary agreed to provide a British Military Training Team for one year.


The presence of this team is very much appreciated by all their contacts, including opposition MPs, and it has made a major contribution to the government policy of national reconciliation, through the development of a new, professional and highly disciplined Namibian Defence Force. This is a vital element in the stability of our young and fragile democracy which is important in the wider development in Southern Africa.

Namibia wishes to be independent of foreign military support, as soon as possible. However, as we explained to your Secretary of State for Defence earlier this year, withdrawal in March 1991 of British Military Training Team would be too soon as we would encounter major difficulties should the withdrawal takes place in March 1991.

In this connection, I would like to earnestly request Her Majesty's Government through you, Honourable Prime Minister, to extend a hand of friendship and give sympathetic consideration to extending the presence of the training team of about half of the present level, for a further one year. Thereafter, we hope we will be able to stand on our own.


I sincerely hope that our request will meet with your favourable consideration.

Sincerely yours



Sam Nujoma
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

The Right Honourable
Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

clc

MO 6/21D

2nd October 1990

ERO 3/a

Dear Richard,

THE NAMIBIA BILL

attached

The Defence Secretary has seen the Foreign Secretary's memorandum of 18th September, circulated as OD(90)21, and has no comments on the content of the proposed legislation.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of OD colleagues and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


Yam ewr Sm

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS)(MISS)
Private Secretary

Richard Gozney Esq
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

RESTRICTED
FM WINDHOEK
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 338
OF 161005Z JUL 90
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, PRETORIA

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST



OUR TELNO 336: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

1. THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARISES MAIN POINTS ARISING FROM MR KING'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND DEFENCE MINISTER.

BMATT AND DEFENCE COOPERATION

2. ALL MR KING'S INTERLOCUTORS MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR A FURTHER YEAR OF BMATT, AT A SOMEWHAT REDUCED LEVEL. BMATT HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB, BUT ONE YEAR WAS NOT ENOUGH TO PRODUCE AN ARMY WHICH FULLY CONFORMED TO THE STANDARDS BMATT HAD SET. THEY HOPED FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE. MR KING REACTED AS REPORTED IN TUR. BRITAIN WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO HELP NAMIBIA, AND IF WE COULD REACT POSITIVELY - BEARING IN MIND OUR OTHER COMMITMENTS AND OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES - WE WOULD. HELP WOULD NEED TO EXTEND TO LOGISTICS AND BUILDING UP THE MOD. KAPOFI (PERMANENT SECRETARY, DEFENCE) SAID THAT KEEPING THE TWO BMATT CIVILIANS IN MOD WOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY. MR KING SUBSEQUENTLY REFERRED TO THIS REQUEST AND HIS RESPONSE TO IT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE AIRPORT ON HIS DEPARTURE. THIS WAS EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN THE NAMIBIAN PRESS.

3. THE PRESIDENT AND MUESHIHANGE ALSO RAISED TRAINING COURSES IN BRITAIN FOR DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL. IT WAS AGREED THAT DETAILED PROPOSALS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE FUNDING.

4. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE LACK OF AIR TRANSPORT TO SUPPORT THE ARMY. HAD DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE LEFT THE UK WITH REDUNDANT AIRCRAFT? MR KING DID NOT ENCOURAGE THIS THOUGHT, BUT WONDERED WHETHER THE US (WHICH RECENTLY GAVE SOME DAKOTAS TO MALAWI) COULD HELP.

5. MR KING UNDERTOOK TO REFLECT ON THE SCOPE FOR UK FORCES TO TRAIN IN NAMIBIA. THE PRESIDENT SAID THEY WOULD BE WELCOME TO USE THE REDUNDANT AIR BASE AT KARIBIB, WHICH HE WAS ALSO KEEN TO SEE BRITISH AEROSPACE USE FOR THE PROPOSED FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL. I REMINDED HIM THAT BRITISH AEROSPACE'S PROPOSAL WAS PART OF A WIDER COMMERCIAL PACKAGE, AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DIRECT WITH THE COMPANY.

ECONOMY

6. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND GEINGOB SPOKE IN TERMS IMPLYING THAT NAMIBIA WAS RESIGNED TO HONOURING THE R 700 M SOUTH AFRICAN DEBT. GEINGOB SAID THAT R 200 M OF THIS WAS A FAIR CHARGE ON NAMIBIA: THE REST COULD LEGITIMATELY BE REPUDIATED AS WAR RELATED, BUT NAMIBIA DID NOT WANT TO ANNOY A POWERFUL NEIGHBOUR. THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY SPOKE OF THE INHERITED BURDEN OF R 700 M OF DEBT.

7. GEINGOB SPOKE WITH SOME BITTERNESS OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM (MOSTLY FROM MUDGE) OF THE BUDGET. MR KING TOLD HIM THAT THAT WAS WHAT HE MUST EXPECT FROM THE OPPOSITION IN A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. GEINGOB BRIGHTENED VISIBLY WHEN TOLD OF THE UNIFORMLY FAVOURABLE WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE BUDGET. (AND HAS SUBSEQUENTLY REFERRED TO THESE IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE).

8. BOTH NUJOMA AND GEINGOB SPOKE DISPARAGINGLY OF THE CUSTOMS UNION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH DID NOT GIVE NAMIBIA A GOOD DEAL. THEY WERE TRYING TO CREATE A CLIMATE WHICH WOULD ATTRACT INVESTMENT FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA. MR KING REMINDED THEM OF THE EXTREMELY COMPETITIVE MARKET FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AS NEW OPPORTUNITIES OPENED UP IN EASTERN EUROPE.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

9. NUJOMA, WHO HAD RETURNED FROM THE OAU SUMMIT ONLY 3 HOURS EARLIER, SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED OF DE KLERK'S GOOD FAITH, AND THAT HE DESERVED SUPPORT. BUT HE MUST MAKE DECISIVE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA QUICKLY, BEFORE THE RIGHT WING GAINED ANY MORE STRENGTH.

10. HE ALSO SPOKE WARMLY OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY HMA PRETORIA AT DIFFICULT MOMENTS DURING NAMIBIA'S TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE.

FISHERIES

11. IN SPEAKING TO BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER, MR KING MENTIONED THE EXPERIENCE BRITAIN HAD GAINED IN WORKING OUT AND ENFORCING AN EFFECTIVE AND LUCRATIVE FISHERIES REGIME FOR THE FALKLANDS, AND RECALLED OUR OFFER TO PLACE THIS EXPERIENCE AT NAMIBIA'S DISPOSAL. REACTIONS WERE FRIENDLY, BUT NON-COMMITTAL AND PROBABLY UNBRIEFED.

RICHARDS

YYYY



275

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 March 1990

I enclose the Prime Minister's message to President Nujoma. She would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary could deliver this during his visit for the independence celebrations.

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h

File: 47

*SUBJECT CE MASTER
FCS
OM*



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 55/90 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 March, 1990.

Dear Mr. President,

I am delighted to send you and the Namibian people my congratulations and very best wishes on the historic achievement of Namibia's independence.

Britain is glad to have played a major part in drawing up and implementing the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence.

We recommend the spirit of co-operation and reconciliation in Namibia and the peaceful, democratic way in which the transition to independence has been achieved. This has laid the foundation for a new beginning and set an example for others. We shall continue to help with both military and civil aid.

I wish independent Namibia every success.

*Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher*

His Excellency President Nujoma

lv



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 March 1990

Ica Charles,

Possible message from the Prime Minister on
Namibia's Independence: 21 March

[REDACTED]

In view of the major part which Britain has played in the successful implementation of the UN Settlement Plan, the Prime Minister may also wish to send a message. I enclose a draft. The Foreign Secretary could deliver it personally.

The Foreign Secretary will announce a pledge of £10 million aid from our Overseas Aid Programme, either at an event on Independence Day, when short speeches may be required, or at a subsequent press conference in Windhoek.

Jans,
Stephe Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Temporarily Retained 16/11/2016 dkj

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

DATED 21 MARCH 1990

I am delighted to send you and the Namibian people my congratulations and very best wishes on the historic achievement of Namibia's independence.

Britain is glad to have played a major part in drawing up and implementing the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence.

We commend the spirit of cooperation and reconciliation in Namibia and the peaceful, democratic way in which the transition to independence has been achieved. This has laid the foundation for a new beginning and set an example for others. We shall continue to help with both military and civil aid.

independence every success
I wish Namibia well for a happy, prosperous and peaceful future.

C.M.

His Excellency President Nujoma

E11AAP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2

9 March 1990

John Austin

Sean Charles,

mt

CD 9/3

Namibia and the Commonwealth

Attached.

Mr Nujoma, President-elect of Namibia, wrote to the Secretary General of the Commonwealth on 2 March formally conveying his Government's wish that Namibia should join the Commonwealth when it attains its independence on 21 March. I enclose a copy of a circular letter of the same date from Mr Ramphal in which he notifies Commonwealth Government of his intention to issue a press release on 12 March in London and Windhoek making public that Namibia will become the 50th Commonwealth member on 21 March.

In the light of the 1975 decision by Commonwealth Heads of Government to welcome independent Namibia into the Commonwealth, which was reaffirmed at Kuala Lumpur in October 1989, Mr Ramphal's announcement is a formality. No response is needed from us. We shall, however, be taking action to ensure that the necessary changes are made to British law.

The British Liaison Office in Windhoek will become a High Commission on 21 March.

Jans,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Circular Letter No. 25/90

2 March, 1990

I enclose a copy of a communication I have received today from Windhoek formally notifying me of the wish of the Government-elect and people of Namibia to join the Commonwealth when Namibia attains its independence on 21 March, 1990. In conveying this wish, President-elect Sam Nujoma has referred to the sentiments of welcome for Namibia's membership already expressed by Commonwealth Heads of Government in the meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1975 and specifically renewed in Kuala Lumpur last October. For convenience, I set out below these confirmations already given by Commonwealth leaders of the welcome that awaits a free Namibia in the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1975,
Kingston, 29 April - 6 May, Final Communique,
para. 24:

'The Meeting looked forward to the time when the Government and people of Namibia might be welcomed into the Commonwealth if that were their wish.'


Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala
Lumpur, 18-24 October, 1989, Final Communique:
Southern Africa: the Way Ahead: the Kuala Lumpur
Statement, para. 17:

'Heads of Government welcomed the implementing of Resolution 435, and looked forward to the holding of free and fair elections leading to the emergence of a genuinely independent Namibia. They reaffirmed their full support for the United Nations Secretary-General, and the UN's efforts to ensure the integrity of the Settlement Plan. Heads of Government looked forward to welcoming a free Namibia into the Commonwealth.'


In all the circumstances, I am sure it is your Government's wish that the Commonwealth should proceed to a prompt affirmation of its welcome of Namibia's wish to become a member of the Commonwealth on independence and that

I should take the necessary steps to bring this about. The essential first step, as customary, is a press release confirming these developments and announcing that, on the basis of consultations with member governments of the Commonwealth and of the wish of its Government-elect, Namibia will become the 50th member of the Commonwealth on its attainment of independence on 21 March, 1990.


I am sure your Government shares a deep sense of satisfaction that Namibia's membership should at last have been brought to fulfilment. In the light of the welcome already extended to Namibia by Commonwealth Heads of Government as recently as last October, I trust I may proceed on the basis that I should issue a release on the lines attached on March 12, simultaneously in London and in Windhoek.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Shridath S. Ramphal". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered on the page.

Shridath S. Ramphal



**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA**



P.O. Box 24338
Windhoek 9000
NAMIBIA
Tel.: (061) 3082017/8/9
Fax: (061) 223937

Ref:


2 March 1990

Your Excellency,

It is with great pleasure that I write to you, on behalf of the Government-elect and people of Namibia, to convey our wish to join the Commonwealth when Namibia attains its independence on 21 March 1990. I and my colleagues are mindful and appreciative of the sentiments expressed by Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Meeting in Kingston in 1975, and renewed in Kuala Lumpur last October, regarding the welcome which awaits a free Namibia in the Commonwealth.

I should be grateful if you could initiate the necessary consultations to enable an announcement to be made in advance of Independence Day.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Sam Nujoma
PRESIDENT-ELECT

His Excellency
Mr Shridath S. Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London, SW1.

Text of Press Release
Embargoed until 1100 hours
on 12 March 1990

Namibia Joins the Commonwealth on Independence

Namibia will join the Commonwealth as the 50th member country on its achievement of independence on 21 March, 1990. This was announced today by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, after consultations carried out at the request of the Government-elect of Namibia and on the basis of the welcome extended in advance to Namibia by Commonwealth leaders as far back as their meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1975 and specifically reaffirmed at their meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October last year. In making the announcement, the Secretary-General said that "the Commonwealth had responded with unanimity and joy to the wish of the democratically elected government of Namibia to join the Commonwealth on independence". "Namibia", said the Secretary-General, "as the Commonwealth's 50th member, will bring further strengths to the Commonwealth both generally and in the special context of the new prospects for the resolution of long-standing problems throughout Southern Africa".



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 March 1990

CCPE

Den Caryl

CCPE 873

**Namibia: Request for Assistance with Military
and Police Training**

Thank you for your letter of 26 February. The Foreign Secretary agrees that we should proceed on the basis set out in your letter. We shall certainly seek to absorb the costs of the military training for Namibia if we can. But as you know, our programme provision is tight. There are likely to be a number of claims on our unallocated provision and against any savings that may arise. If in the event we are unable to absorb the full costs, Mr Hurd will look to the Chief Secretary to accept a claim against the Reserve.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10).

Yours ever

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

Miss Carys Evans
PS/Chief Secretary
HM Treasury

SOUTH AFRICA: NAMIBIA

Pf 5



CONFIDENTIAL

alc



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Robert Peirce Esq
Private Secretary to the
Foreign Secretary
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1

COO
20/2

26 February 1990

Dear Bob

NAMIBIA: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH MILITARY AND POLICE TRAINING

The Chief Secretary has seen a copy of your letter of 5 February to Charles Powell saying that the Foreign Secretary accepts the recommendations of the MOD exploratory mission for assistance with establishing and training a Namibian army, and saying that in consequence he would be seeking £2.928 million additional funds from the 1990-91 Reserve.

2 The Chief Secretary feels that a claim on the 1990-91 Reserve for such an amount would certainly not be justified before the start of the financial year, or even early in the financial year. He has noted that there is a £3 million unallocated provision on the Vote concerned, (Class II, Vote 2), and he understands that officials have discussed deferring any possible claim on the 1990-91 Reserve until some way into that financial year. The Chief Secretary considers that would be a suitable approach, especially since he understands the cost estimate to be between £2.44 million and £2.928 million. This would be on the basis that the FCO seek to offset the extra costs of military training for Namibia in 1990-91 and see what levels of FCO spending are realised during the year, in the hope that offsetting savings will materialise.

3 The Chief Secretary has also noted that the Foreign Secretary proposes that the UK contribution to any police training will be paid from ODA's existing aid programme.

4 I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No. 10), Simon Webb (MOD) and Myles Wickstead (ODA)


Yours
Miss C Evans

MISS C EVANS
Private Secretary

at front

SOUTH AFRICA:

Namibia P.S.



CONFIDENTIAL



Handwritten initials and marks, including 'cc PC' and a signature-like scribble.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1990

**NAMIBIA: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
MILITARY AND POLICE TRAINING**

Thank you for your letter of 5 February covering the report of the Ministry of Defence's recent fact-finding mission to Namibia, with its recommendations on how we should respond to the Namibian request for assistance with military and police training.

The Prime Minister has considered the report and is ready to accept the recommendations. She attaches importance to the aim of completing the main task within twelve months or so. The question of financial provision will have to be negotiated with the Treasury.

The Prime Minister has asked me to say that she is most grateful to the members of the Ministry of Defence who went out to Namibia to produce the report.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Tancred Tarkowski (HM Treasury) and to Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration).

CHARLES POWELL

R N Peirce Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CDF 1



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 February 1990

I do not think you need read the whole report which I have been through. The size of force envisaged by the Namibians is 6,000. The task of BMAIT will undoubtedly be difficult. But the recommendations seem desirable, in particular

Namibia: Request for Assistance with Military and Police Training

Thank you for your letter of 19 December confirming the Prime Minister's agreement to follow up Mr Nujoma's request for British training for the future Namibian army and police force by exploratory missions on the lines suggested in my letter of 18 December.

12-month limit on our help.

I enclose a copy of the report of the MOD's recent fact-finding mission to Namibia from 15-25 January. The Foreign Secretary accepts the recommendations of the report for establishing and training a future Namibian army. The aim will be to complete the task within a time limit of about 12 months, although we may wish to retain the option of keeping a (much smaller) training team in Namibia after 1990-91. The cost will be £2.928 million in 1990/91.

Agree to proceed as proposed?

As indicated in my letter of 18 December, we do not have financial provision for this expenditure and will be seeking additional funds from the 1990-91 Reserve to meet the requirements identified. We want to deploy the training team of up to 55 MOD personnel as soon as possible after independence on 21 March and to have at least some elements in place before then.

CDF 6/2

An ODA fact-finding team is now in Namibia to assess the requirements for police training. Although we expect to provide the bulk of any police training (paid for out of our aid programme), it will be presented as part of a Commonwealth effort, with the Canadians and probably an African country involved. This avoids the appearance of an over-reliance by SWAPO on UK assistance in the security field.

Y

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Tancred Tarkowski (HM Treasury) and to Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours ever

R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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D Cts Staff(R) 71/29

31 Jan 90

REPORT ON MOD ADVISORY VISIT
TO NAMIBIA

1. This report comprises:
 - a. The Report itself, plus;
 - b. Three Annexes, as follows:
 - A. The Armed Forces of Namibia - SWAPO Concept.
 - B. Summary of Discussions - SWAPO/UK Delegation.
 - C. UK Military Assistance - The Requirement.
2. The British Liaison Office, Windhoek, is complimented on the astute management afforded the visit.

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A C MASSEY
Col
D Cts AD(SE)
MB 5307 2939 MB

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REPORT ON MOD ADVISORY VISIT TO NAMIBIA

INTRODUCTION

1. A joint Central Staff/Army Department team visited Namibia over the period 13-26 Jan 90. This was in response to a request from Mr Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader and President-elect, that HMG provide military assistance in the form of training for the country's nascent Armed Forces.
2. During the visit, consultations were held with key personalities, relevant organisations and other interested parties. Personalities included Mr Nujoma himself, the South African Administrator - General, Mr Louis Pienaar, the UN Special Representative, Mr Martti Ahtisaari and Lieutenant General Prem Chand, Commander UNTAG. Officials of SWAPO and UNTAG were also consulted together with representatives of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).
3. Whilst not individually unique in contemporary UK experience of military assistance, prevailing circumstances were identified that in combination render the task distinctly so. The team was aware of some of these factors prior to departure but not all, nor their cumulative effect.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of the mission was to determine how the UK might assist with the setting up and training of Armed Forces that would meet Namibia's Defence needs and be sustainable in resource terms. With a view to making recommendations to HMG, implicit within this objective was an assessment as to whether the task is viable and advisable.
5. Following on from the visit by DCDS(C) in Jun 89 and in anticipation of the request from Mr Nujoma, work was commissioned within MOD as a result of which possible areas within which the UK might assist were identified. These studies envisaged a spectrum of assistance encompassing the higher management of Defence, formation and unit levels. The commitment was broadly estimated at a duration of some 12 months within a budget of £2 million and a requirement for approximately 50 instructors. This overall approach was agreed in principle by the FCO.

THE SITUATION

THE THREAT

6. Two aspects of threat are considered, external and domestic. Externally, the SWAPO psyche demands a recognition of the threat posed by the Republic of South Africa. In substance, this is considered in both political and military terms to be currently low. However, much will depend upon whether or not the new Government chooses to extend support to such organizations as the African National Congress and to what degree. The provision of such facilities as bases for attacks on the Republic would provoke an inevitable military reaction. This arena will be an indicator of the new Namibian Administration's

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pragmatism. Early indications are that they will be realistic. In reality, instability on the border with Angola provides a more credible consideration. The conflict between FAPLA and UNITA means that there is no authoritative security in certain areas on the northern side of the border. This vacuum leaves the potential for instability to spill over into Namibia of which there is already some evidence, albeit low-level. And initially at least, the new Government's capacity to exercise its sovereignty is likely to be limited.

7. Domestically, the change in political regime may produce its own vacuum. Within this, there is potential for an ethnically diverse population with endemic grievances exacerbated by war to become fractious. Economic conditions will have a strong bearing here, in particular, in the capacity or otherwise to soak up men formerly under arms and from opposing sides. Forecasting is difficult although there is some hope within SWAPO political declarations. The early physical evidence of a successful integration within the Armed Forces could prove a significant factor. Although its effectiveness is difficult to determine, provision appears to have been made for the security of the President-elect.

TRANSITION

8. Now approaching the conclusion to its Mandate (1 Apr 90), UNTAG has been successful in supervising the transition to self-rule. On Independence, the Administrator-General, through whom the Republic of South Africa exercises its writ over the Territory, will transfer his responsibilities to the incoming Government which will be led by SWAPO. This date has yet to be determined but 21 Mar appears likely.

9. The overall situation is that which inevitably faces a new Administration in such circumstances, the requirement to make promptly a series of key and inter-connected policy decisions, all within a tightly restricted time-frame. The broad prognosis for the immediate future is cautiously optimistic but factors peculiar to that arena make this particular need especially keen within Defence. Moreover, in terms of effective capacity, the Ministry of Defence is potentially in an adverse situation relative to other elements of the incoming Administration.

DEFENCE

10. Defence matters are currently managed on a partially effective and an administrative basis only under the auspices of a civil Ministry, that of Civic Affairs. The subsidiary mechanism whereby this caretaker function is effected is known as the Department of Defence Administration. Dominated in its previous form and role by a large complement of South African Defence Forces (SADF) personnel, this now residual body is manned by a small cadre of ex-SWATF members. They possess managerial knowledge and military expertise that could prove invaluable should the new regime choose to continue with their employment. Other, potentially useful SWATF personnel have withdrawn with SADF to the Republic. Given appropriate signals, it is understood that some of these may opt to return and make themselves available for employment within the new Defence community. However,

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despite the attractions of their practical and colloquial knowledge, in context with the Nation's future, more conventional military needs, all such SWATF personnel have their limitations. With its own experience restricted to that of running a guerilla campaign, the military leadership of SWAPO has similar limitations and perhaps more so.

11. As things stand, there exists a minimal capacity only for decision-making and the development of policy in the current management of Namibia Defence affairs. Because the infrastructure of other, civilian Ministries is already in-place and operating, there is a pressing need to fill this void in order that Defence is equipped to acquit itself competently in the imminent competition for national resources. Moreover, in contrast with some Ministries, Defence has no revenue upon which to rely. At this stage, its budget comprises merely a sum allocated by the Administrator-General that is sufficient to tide it over the Independence Day celebrations and the period leading up until 31 Mar 90. The Defence allocation for 1990/91 will be drawn up as part of the overall government budget which is due to be constructed jointly between the Administrator-General's staff and SWAPO officials. At this stage it is neither possible to say how large provisions will be nor at what stage funds will start to become available.

12. Its materiel and logistic resources are similarly straitened, comprising solely of 12,000 G3 rifles (75% of which are considered to be in working order), 0.5 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for these rifles and the Defence Estate. The SWAPO military leadership advised that there are considerable stocks of weaponry, ammunition and radios (RACAL was mentioned) at present stored in Angola, also the intention to repatriate these after Independence. UN sources advised them to be in poor condition and, possibly unusable. Disposed towards a counter-insurgency campaign in the North of the country, the Defence Estate is mal-structured for the tasks the new State intends its Armed Forces to fulfil, namely; protection of sovereignty, manifestation of national identity and internal security, the latter in support of the civil power. However, the Estate appears to be in reasonable order and, in context with perceived needs, extensive. In the longer term, there is potential for income via rationalization. Security poses an immediate problem. Bases evacuated by SADF and not occupied by UNTAG have already been vandalized to an extent that they are unusable and repair is unlikely to be an economic proposition. The imminent withdrawal of UNTAG from its bases holds a similar eventuality. Some bases have already been appropriated by other institutions of state.

13. In sum, managerial, fiscal and resource deficiencies hold adverse implications for the support necessary in order to conduct effectively any military assistance package that might be offered. Assuming this is to proceed, these difficulties may demand some flexibility in these areas on the part of UK, in particular, during the early stages. On the plus side, traditionally light African logistic needs and scales, the adequacy and availability of the necessary training installations and a relatively straightforward military requirement may ease these problems.

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confidence, and on a number of occasions. Although not overly significant, the small yet vociferous minority active in local politics and opposed to the formation of armed forces is worthy of mention.

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL

18. The Administrator-General afforded the team a cordial reception. He proffered additional financial support to cover Defence expenses over the Independence Day celebrations and in the period leading up until 31 Mar 90. This offer was conveyed by Head British Liaison Office, Windhoek to SWAPO. Mr Pienaar refused to be drawn on the possible threat to stability post-Independence posed by ex-members of SWATF and former PLAN fighters.

THE PRESIDENT ELECT

19. Mr Nujoma was attentive throughout the presentation given to him as was the Minister of Defence (Designate), Mr Mueshihange, who appeared particularly receptive to the ideas so described. It was on this occasion that the President-elect chose to indicate the SWAPO position in respect of Koevoet and the Bushman units together with a most positive declaration of intent towards the formation of integrated and professional Armed Forces. He agreed subsequent technical talks but specified that any contact with SWATF be arranged via SWAPO. Proposals for the Namibian Armed Forces circulated by the hosts at the meeting are at Annex A. With a strength of approximately 6,000 they are broadly comparable in scale to the original UK concept; they differ in structure, 8 independent battalions as opposed to 3 battalion groups, the latter number being adjusted to 4 during the process of consultation.

20. Commander UNTAG was welcoming and relaxed. Whilst affirming a bilateral UK/SWAPO relationship, he introduced the team to the UN-sponsored Integration Committee chaired by his Deputy (Brigadier Daniel Opande - Kenya) and comprising UNTAG, SWAPO and SWATF representation. The team was largely un-sighted to this committee and certainly the extent to which it was involved in the integration process. The impression gained was that the committee's primary objective was to bring together the previously opposing parties and, subsequently, introduce them to the military assistance donor. However, although it proved useful in these laudable roles, in the advice proffered, some UN members appeared to be acting beyond remit, and for a variety of motives, national even personal being amongst these. Their activities at first complicated the process of developing the direct donor/recipient relationship sought by the team. In the event, these proved manageable and on balance productive in the opportunities afforded to make contacts and an assessment of the in-theatre operational environment. Whilst somewhat diversionary from primary considerations, the tours of Defence establishments arranged by the UN were contributory in both respects. It was considered at the time as being likely to be politically disadvantageous to decline participation.

21. On the occasion of the office call made on him, Mr Ahtisaari was heavily pre-occupied with a diplomatic crisis. This centred on

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allegations of continued South African support for UNITA in Angola, routed via the North-Eastern border and for which there was no apparent substance. They had been engineered by Front Line State diplomatic sources. Mention here is in order to illustrate similar potential relative to the next point made by Mr Ahtisaari. This was to express his concern about the possibility of a security vacuum developing over the final period of the transitional process, a concern endorsed during the farewell call on Lieutenant General Prem Chand and by other, diplomatic sources in Windhoek. Mr Ahtisaari advocated an early UK deployment in order to help fill the void. In doing so, he stated a commitment to UNTAG terminating on schedule its Mandate. He was frank in declaring his wish to avoid its extension and the problems this would encounter in New York. Whilst acknowledgement of this vested interest is relevant, the team judged that the introspection within the diplomatic community in Windhoek is such that there remains a danger that speculation might become perception and, thence, fact. Also, that this could be complicated by other interests, for example, amongst remedies floated for the current and envisaged problems in the future was the presence of police and military monitors provided from amongst the African nations. It is felt that the latter presence could prove an unhelpful complication for any UK military assistance effort. Given the limited time available, there is clearly a fine balance to achieve between the effective preparation of the UK instructors and political imperatives. There remains also the technicality of jurisdiction which rests up until Independence with the Republic of South Africa - some facilities would need to be made available to UK in the interim - although the consensus in-theatre was that this might be resolvable. The view of the advisory team is that pressure for a timely presence might be satisfied by deployment of an advance element approximately 2 weeks prior to Independence and the main body thereon or immediately thereafter.

SWAPO

22. Following on from the presentation to the President-elect, the UK team delivered to SWAPO an agenda for technical talks at official level. This stimulated a series of meetings during which the theme was again that of reconciling views and thereby defining requirements. The talks were conducted frankly and in a harmonious atmosphere. The SWAPO military leadership gave the impression of receptiveness and competence. They did exhibit a distinct sensitivity about propriety in the handling of PR matters.

23. Amongst the points made by the UK delegation was the importance of the new Defence administration's both securing and establishing proprietary rights over its Estate, and without delay. A key, potential area of misunderstanding was clarified. This was that UK would provide free of charge instructional expertise but that the host Government would be expected to pay in-country costs as well as make available the necessary resources. In addressing another delicate area, the team quietly encouraged the SWAPO leadership to make the best use of the remaining expertise within SWATF. The political assessment leading to SWAPO's proposals for the size of the Armed Forces was gently probed. It was acknowledged on their part that this was influenced by 3 principal factors: fiscal constraint, the resource

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will be run in parallel with the formation of units, centred on the 4 battalion groups. A target timescale of 12 months is retained. At formation and unit levels, 3 phases of development have been identified. Achieving the third of these is likely to prove difficult within the 12 month period since it is heavily dependent upon the acquisition of more sophisticated equipment the costs of which may go beyond the means of the new Government. However, although some flexibility may be required, the completion within this period of the first 2 phases should ensure Armed Forces of adequate competence and capability. Pursuit of the third will be a matter for political decision in Whitehall at an appropriate yet timely stage. Initially, military assistance teams will need to be targeted individually at each level in the new infrastructure and thereafter at the developing range of military capabilities as these are acquired. This comprehensive approach will also encourage self-sufficiency and therefore make it easier for UK to disengage.

MINISTRY

28. A small, highly integrated Ministry with joint Service potential is proposed. A CDF and Permanent Secretary will be supported by a joint secretariat. It is intended that the 4 Directorates each be assisted by a UK specialist schooled in the relevant staff disciplines under the overall supervision of a Civil Service Principal; an important individual task will be for him to advise the Permanent Secretary. It is felt appropriate that the directorate concerned with finance and administration be aided by another civil servant of HEO rank, a sentiment specifically endorsed by the hosts.

FORMATION

29. Three phases in the evolution of the Force Headquarters are envisaged, each corresponding to either developments in the capability of the battalion groups and/or the addition of Force units. A single Staff officer of appropriate quality and experience targeted on provision of support and advice for the Force Commander and his immediate staff is thought adequate to fulfil this task. Should additional expertise or technical capacity be required, he will be able to draw on that available in the remainder of the training team.

UNITS

30. Two aspects of the preparation of units are considered, separate yet inter-related. These are: training and increments to capability. Each aspect has 3 phases which in terms of timing do not necessarily correspond.

31. Training. Language remains the driving factor here and dictates the overall approach. This is to circumvent the problem by training English-speaking cadres of leaders, officers and senior ranks for each battalion. On the basis of this training each cadre will then proceed to train under supervision its own battalion. Thereafter, each battalion will be introduced into barracks again under supervision. When the battalion is operating effectively, this latter assistance will be withdrawn. Although yet to be finally confirmed, it is understood that command of English within candidate trainees is

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sufficient at the higher levels to make the concept viable. Commonality of language at lower levels and therefore within units will be a matter for the hosts, albeit with political overtones and subject to advice, this in the context of their declared commitment to integration. It may be possible for the UK training team to conduct some rudimentary English tuition geared to military needs.

32. Capability. The aim is to develop battalion groups capable of operating independently and therefore possessing their own integral Combat and Logistic Support. However, the lack of even such fundamentals as light support weapons means that in the truest sense of the word, units will commence life as "straight" rifle battalions. The second phase will be to equip them with reconnaissance and communications, also some Logistic Support. This should achieve the desired level of adequacy already indicated. Thereafter, it will be a matter of adding selected increments with UK assistance subject to further political decision and the provision of resources.

IMPLEMENTATION

33. Prepared by MAO staff in consultation with the Army Department, details of the military assistance requirement relative to the development of the Armed Forces of Namibia are shown at Annex C. These include organization of the UK team; BMATT Namibia is considered an appropriate and logical title.

34. The reconnaissance scheduled for Feb 90 will be necessary to progress further implementation. Thereafter, the proposed schedule is for the advance element to deploy prior to Independence Day - in order to satisfy political as well as practical considerations - with the main body following either on or in close proximity to Independence. This schedule has been agreed in principle by the Administration designate.

35. It is considered that manning of the team will demand careful consideration. Its personnel will be under close scrutiny and from all quarters. Such qualities as intelligence, leadership, military credibility, good physical condition and bearing are deemed essential together with the capacity to adapt to the demands of handling African troops. At work, they will need to be capable of securing the co-operation of remaining members of the former SWATF leadership. Socially, team members may be compelled to cope with encounters in which antipathy is displayed by some elements of the population. Whilst the imperative for a plan is fully understood, the manning plot will require in-built flexibility in order to allow for what can only at this stage be an estimated rate of progress, also for unforeseen requirements. Specific possibilities in the latter area include advice on the communications aspect of a command and control system and supervision of maintenance programmes for radios and vehicles. Should these arise, it may be that these requirements could be satisfied by the relevant expertise being made available over a relatively short period, perhaps, via a short visit. A specific and vital requirement is to impart quickly a sense of identity and ethos. [Exploitation of the strengths of the Regimental System may assist in this fundamental objective.]

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COSTS

36. The advisory team has made an initial estimate of the cost of providing the assistance, details of which are at Annex C. In summary, based on a team of up to 55 being deployed for 12 months, the direct cost would be £2.44 million, to be met by the FCO. This assumes that the new Namibian Government will provide in-country resources and meet in-country costs. However, because of the circumstances peculiar to the training task, and the large number of uncertainties that exist, it would be prudent to allow a margin of up to 20% to cater for unexpected additional financial demands. This would increase the total cost of the package to about £3.0 million. It may also be necessary to be flexible about time scale and manning. Progress in training will need to be carefully structured by both the UK team and the host Government and appropriate training and/or financial target adjusted. Subject to these caveats an investment on this scale should be sufficient to complete training of the new Namibian Defence Force at least up to the end of the second of the three phases described in Paragraph 27. If it does not prove possible to complete the third phase within financial and/or time constraints, a further political decision will need to be taken as to whether additional assistance could and should be provided.

CONCLUSIONS

37. The most significant threat to the new Nation's sovereignty lies in its northern border regions. There remains some scope for internal unrest. Economic circumstances and a successful integration within the Armed Forces will have a bearing on the latter.

38. The task is unique in contemporary British experience of military assistance and for an amalgam of reasons, as follows:

- a. The absence in-country of a Defence decision-making, policy and resource infrastructure.
- b. The total lack of Logistic support.
- c. No effective commonality in language.
- d. Tensions between groups to be integrated into the Armed Forces.

39. These deficiencies may be ameliorated in part by traditionally modest African needs and the existence of sound Defence installations.

40. The commitment is broadly welcomed in-country.

41. Despite potential difficulties, it is feasible and could accrue political benefit.

42. The requirement is for a comprehensive range of assistance encompassing Ministry, formation and unit levels.

43. It would be prudent to make pertinent Intelligence available to the UK team commander.

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44. Prevailing circumstances dictate some flexibility in the areas of funding and manning. Current assessments indicate a sum of £2.44 million and manning figure of 55.
45. The PR aspect may demand careful handling.
46. Personnel with particular qualities are needed. [The strengths of the Regimental System offer certain advantages].
47. The deployment schedule should be as follows:
 - a. 17 Feb 90 - reconnaissance, this being the earliest practicable date.
 - b. Mar 90 - advance element, some 2 weeks prior to Independence.
 - c. Mar 90 - main body, on Independence (21 Mar 90) or immediately afterwards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

48. HMG should accede to the request made by the President-elect.
49. A comprehensive spectrum of assistance should be offered.
50. Such Regional and Country Intelligence as affects his task should be made available to the commander of the UK team.
51. There should be some flexibility in financial and manning provisions.
52. The handling of PR matters should be sensitive to the perspective and needs of the incumbent Administration.
53. Only personnel with the necessary qualities should be deployed. [Within the manning plot, the strengths of the Regimental System should be exploited.]
54. The proposed deployment schedule should be approved.

A C Massey

A C MASSEY
Col
D Cts AD(SE)
MB 5307 2939 MB

31 Jan 90

Annexes:

- A. The Armed Forces of Namibia - SWAPO Concept.
- B. Summary of Discussions - SWAPO/UK Delegation.
- C. UK Military Assistance - The Requirement.

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ANNEX A TO
D CTS STAFF(R) 71/29
DATED 31 JAN 90

THE ARMED FORCES OF NAMIBIA - SWAPO CONCEPT

This Annex comprises the initial concept(s) for the Armed Forces of Namibia as delivered by SWAPO officials to the UK delegation at the outset to bilateral consultations.

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TRAINING PROPOSALS

A force of 5 850 to 6,000 men is to be trained as a first intake.

COMPOSITION:

Infantry —	8 independent Bns i.e.	4,500 men
Engineer —	1 Bn	300 men
Recce —	1 Bn.	300 men
Communication	1 Bn.	250 men
Logistics	1 Bn.	300 men
Medical	1 Bn.	300 men
Auxiliaries	—	50 men


Geographical Location

North, north-east, central, and southern zones.

The British team may visit the following areas:

- Windhoek and its surroundings
- Oshakati
- Opuwo
- Rundu
- Katima Mulilo
- Karasburg/Keetmanshoop
- Swakopmund
- Luderitz and Oranjemund

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ARMY (REGULAR)



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ANNEX B TO
D CTS STAFF(R) 71/29
DATED 31 JAN 90

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS - SWAPO/UK DELEGATION

This Annex contains the summary of discussions as handed over by the UK delegation at their concluding meeting with SWAPO military representatives on 26 Jan 90.

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Draft letter

To:

Mr Mueshihange

I thought it might be helpful and convenient if I were to set down for the record our understanding of what was agreed between your staff and the UK Technical Advisory Team which visited Namibia between 15 and 26 January.

This is attached, and includes copies of the principal organisational diagrams and charts which the team passed to your staff. I should stress that it is not binding in any sense. It is simply intended to summarise the discussions held between the two sides. If, however, you believe it includes any inaccuracies or omissions, perhaps you could let me know as soon as possible.

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

1. The purpose of this note is to record the major points agreed between representatives of SWAPO and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Technical Advisory Team which visited Namibia between 15 and 26 January 1990. These points form the basis of the recommendation the Advisory Team is making to Her Majesty's Government on how it should respond to Mr Nujoma's letter of 7 December 1989 to the [United Kingdom] Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

2. It is agreed that:

(a) the structure of a future Namibian defence force should be based on:

(i) a small Ministry of Defence, the outline organisation of which is at Annex A and in more detail at Appendix 1.

(ii) a Force Headquarters, the outline organisation of which is at Annex B, with implementation to be carried out in three phases;

(iii) four battalion groups each organised as shown at Annex C, again with implementation to be carried out in three phases.

/(b)


- (b) direction of this force will be exercised in accordance with the chain of command shown at Annex D;
- (c) the new Namibian government may wish in due course to consider expansion of the land element of the defence force and/or the establishment of air and maritime wings;
- (d) any UK assistance will cover training of Ministry of Defence and Force Headquarters staffs as well as battalion troops. The outline pattern of training will be in accordance with the schedule at Annex E;
- (e) the initial commitment for providing training by the United Kingdom should be for a period of 12 months, at which point the two governments will review the position to decide whether further British assistance is necessary or appropriate. It is recognised that the training schedule will have to incorporate a degree of flexibility to deal with unforeseen eventualities;
- (f) in order to support the training, the new Namibian defence force will require a range of equipment and other material. An initial assessment of requirements, prepared by the British Advisory Team is at Annex F. Acquisition of these and any other item

/required

required for the defence force will be the responsibility of the new Namibian government;

(g) Her Majesty's government will meet the direct costs of the personnel deployed to Namibia to carry out training of the Defence Force. The Namibian government will be responsible for providing in-country facilities and support;

(h) training assistance should start as soon as possible after independence. To this end, a further advisory visit by UK experts should take place in mid-February to follow up these broad points of agreement in more detail.

ORGANIZATION - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE


Chief of Defence Force	1 + 1 = 2
Permanent Secretary	1 + 1 = 2
Joint Secretariat	5
Total Personnel	9
MOD Grand Total	= 22 + 24 + 35 + 166 + 9 = 256

Key to abbreviations

AD	Assistant Director
OR	Other Ranks
IT	Information Technology


*Military
+Civilian

*Director of Defence Personnel and Training (1 + 1)




Total personnel = 22

*Director of Defence Policy and Operations (1 + 1)




Total personnel = 24

*Director of Defence Resources (1+1)



Total personnel = 35


+ Director of Finance Administration and Support Services (1+1)



Total personnel = 166


REVISED ORGANISATION - FORCE

PHASE ONE



REVISED ORGANISATION - FORCE

PHASE TWO (INCREMENTS UNDERLINED)




NOTE:

ANY FORCE PHASE THREE INCREMENTS TO BE CONFIRMED ,


REVISED ORGANISATION - FORCE

PHASE THREE (INCREMENTS UNDERLINED)



FORMATION OF BATTALION GROUP IN THREE PHASES


PHASE ONE



STRENGTH : 528 { Lt. Col : 1
 Major : 6
 Capt/Lt. : 15

FORMATION OF BATTALION GROUP IN THREE PHASES


PHASE TWO (NOTE : NEW ELEMENTS/INCREASES UNDERLINED)



STRENGTH : 618 { Lt Col : 1
 Major : 7
 Capt/Lt : 18


FORMATION OF BATTALION GROUP IN THREE PHASES

PHASE THREE (NOTE: NEW ELEMENTS/INCREASES UNDERLINED)



STRENGTH : { Lt. Col 1
 Major 7
672 Capt/Lt : 21

ORGANIZATION - CHAIN OF COMMAND



TRAINING FLOW CHART

Annex E

		FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN 91	FEB	MAR	APR				
BATTALIONS: FORCE: LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN BASIC TRG 1ST BN AFTER BASIC TRG & FORMATION EACH BN INTO BARRACKS & CONTINUES TRG, WITH ASST BASIC TRG 2ND BN LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN BASIC TRG 3RD BN BASIC TRG 4TH BN FORCE TRG: HQ, PAY & RECORDS, HQ LOG BN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TRAINING AND ADVICE	B M A T P R E P I N U T K	BATTALIONS: PHASE 1											PHASE 2		PHASE 3 → TBC					
	FORCE: PHASE 1											PHASE 2					PHASE 3 → TBC			
	LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN											8 - 10 WEEK COURSES		A R M Y E X A M S	1. LLAD					
	BASIC TRG 1ST BN											1. SIGS (80 STUDENTS)			2. ATK					
	AFTER BASIC TRG & FORMATION EACH BN INTO BARRACKS & CONTINUES TRG, WITH ASST											2. RECCE (100 STUDENTS)			3. MOR IF NOT IN PHASE 2					
	BASIC TRG 2ND BN											3. ASSLT PIONEERS/ENGRS (140 STUDENTS)								
	LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN											4. MOR? (100 STUDENTS)								
	BASIC TRG 3RD BN											REMAINDER OF BN'S CONTINUE TRG								
	BASIC TRG 4TH BN											ESTB TRG SCHOOLS		ENGR COY, AIR, SEA						
	FORCE TRG: HQ, PAY & RECORDS, HQ LOG BN											ADVISE CONTINUES TO FORCE HQ/TRG OF FORCE SIGS COY/TRG OF MAINT SUP, MED, TPT COYS.								
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TRAINING AND ADVICE																				

- NOTE:
1. TIMESCALE IS FLEXIBLE.
 2. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENTS: OCT FOR FORCE SIGS COY & LOG BN; DEC FOR BNS.
 3. STUDENT NUMBERS:
 - A. EACH LEADERS' CADRE: MINIMUM 50 x OFFICERS, 150 x SNCO.
 - B. EACH BASIC TRG BN COURSE: LEADERS PLUS 700 RECRUITS. THIS FIGURE WILL ALLOW LATER MANNING OF BATTALION COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND FORCE LOGISTIC BATTALION

Introduction

1. This is a list of practical requirements essential to the training taking place. However, at this stage it is stressed that:

- a. It is a provisional list.
- b. It is purposely not in detail.

2. The list will need to be explored and discussed in detail during the training team's reconnaissance in February. Training locations, student numbers, start dates and outline training programme will need to be confirmed during the reconnaissance because it is on these factors that the detailed list of requirements will depend.

Requirements of the Leaders' Cadre

3. Transport. Troop lift for 200 students, plus drivers.
4. Rations.
5. Accommodation and accommodation stores.
6. Training aids. To cover classrooms, blackboards, plus overhead projectors etc. as available.
7. Stationery and office supplies.
8. Medical Stores.
9. Student clothing & equipment.
10. Ammunition. To include training ammunition and pyrotechnics.

Requirement of BATTALION BASIC TRAINING

11. General. Battalion basic training, which will begin after the first leaders' cadre, will require facilities as listed above for the leaders' cadre, plus transport for a larger number of students (800).

Requirements of the Training Team

12. Accommodation.
 - a. Senior Staff. 3 houses in Windhoek, one each for the Training Team Commander, Chief of Staff and Senior Civil servant (Principal); these men would be settled in Namibia for the full year.
 - b. Rotational instructors. Other members of the training team, who would be unaccompanied & rotated with fresh instructors from home every 6 months, or as required, should be accommodated in suitable accommodation in the area of the training centres selected for the leaders' cadre and battalion basic training.
13. Transport. Small-sized vehicles to the minimum requirement of the training team for their own movement.
14. Food. Catering support.
15. Other facilities. To include some clerical facilities & support appropriate to task.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

GENERAL

1. The progression towards providing military assistance presents a number of unusual and potentially awkward hurdles. Points of contact in the new Government still have no executive authority and indeed will not do so until independence. Nor have they been given any experience in Government by the South African regime. They are being left with the inherent problems of creating a new Army from two disbanded and previously opposing forces, with a misplaced deployment of military bases, virtually no equipment and the inevitable sensitivities and jealousies that lie in the aftermath of a war.

2. While the British Military Advisory and Training Team is being created in far from ideal circumstances, it can also be sure that it is going to be engaged in a challenging and important task. It is moving into the vacuum left by the departing (and very successful) UNTAG mission, yet with none of the advantages that such a UN force brings with it. It is charged with the task of training a multi-lingual force of widely varying experience and expertise and minimal equipment. Its actions will be under close scrutiny. High standards, resilience, sensitivity and self help will to be the order of the day.

PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT

3. Reconnaissance. A reconnaissance by the team commander is essential and it is recommended that he should be accompanied by his COS (or Chief Instructor), and possibly his Quartermaster.

4. Advance Party. Because of uncertainties in the situation it is likely that an advance party will be deployed, probably in early March. However at that stage, before Independence, the future Government will still not be in a position to make decisions or implement their plans, and so the party is likely to be housed in hotels. It should therefore be kept to a minimum, until more permanent accommodation can be allocated, when other key appointments can be called forward.

5. Formation of Team. The team will assemble for briefing and preparatory training at the School of Infantry in early Mar 90.

6. Accommodation

a. It is envisaged that Commander BMATT, COS and the Principal will be accompanied and accommodated in Government housing in Windhoek.

b. The remainder will be unaccompanied and accommodated in some form of mess facility in Windhoek, and in the area chosen for the main training camp.

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

c. In the event of no suitable accommodation being available/released prior to Independence - or indeed after Independence - it may be necessary for additional funds to be made available from FCO to enable the team to live, temporarily, in hotels.

7. Dress and Equipment. Tropical uniform, including combat dress and No 7 dress will be required. Further details will be issued by Team Commander after reconnaissance.

8. Terms and Conditions of Service. Terms and Conditions of Service will be drawn up by DMAO staff for both married accompanied members of the team, and for those on unaccompanied 6/7 month tours. Account should be taken of the short notice given to individuals, particularly for those on accompanied tours.

9. Post. Authority will be required for BMATT to make use of the FCO postal system for letter mail. If this is agreed, the address will be:

Name
c/o FCO(WINDHOEK)
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

10. Medical. Those selected to join the BMATT should be given advice on medical requirements. Once in country, the RAMC Officer/NCO will provide routine medical cover until other arrangements can be made.

11. Communications. It will be necessary to seek FCO authority for the use of Secure Communications, and steps should be taken to ensure that the team is issued with a FAX machine for insecure traffic. It may also be necessary for additional funds to be made available for installation of telephones in houses and messes.

12. Establishment. Details of the proposed team and their tasks, for the first 6 month period as listed at Appendix 1. Projected details for the second to period are shown in outline at Appendix 2.

TRAINING PACKAGE

13. A chart showing the likely timetable for the training package, which was one of the documents handed to SWAPO and which has been provisionally agreed by the Secretary for Defence (Designate), is shown for ease of reference at Appendix 3.

TEAM COSTINGS

14. At Appendices 4 and 5 are the estimated team costs for the first 6 months, and for the subsequent 6 months. These are based on the assumption that after 6 months it will probably be necessary to adjust the composition of the team within the overall ceiling of 55.

15. It will be noted that the overall cost of LSP for the first 12 months is assessed at £2.44m, however some of the posts are rank-ranged and the costs have been worked out using the highest rank.

C-2
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

DMAO 109 (TA/ML)

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

ACTION POINTS

16. Detailed points that require action are listed at Appendix 6.

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
D CTS STAFF(R) 71/29
DATED 31 JAN 90

BMATT ESTABLISHMENT AND TRAINING TASKS

1. Commander BMATT.
 - a. Rank: Brigadier (12 month accompanied tour)
 - b. Tasks:
 - (1) Team Commander.
 - (2) Advise and assist CDF/CGS as requested.
 - (3) Advise and assist Force Commander.

2. COS BMATT.
 - a. Rank: Lt Col (12 month accompanied tour)
 - b. Tasks:
 - (1) COS BMATT.
 - (2) Provision of assistance, training and advice to Policy Directorate of MOD with specific responsibility for assisting in establishing training and advising Policy, Operations and Commitments branch.
 - (3) Coordination of the assistance, advice and training of Force HQ.

3. Catering Adviser.
 - a. Rank: WO1/WO2/SNCO.
 - b. Tasks:
 - (1) Establish and supervise catering arrangements for training team.
 - (2) Coordinate catering support for Leaders Cadre.
 - (3) Establish catering section for each battalion.
 - (4) Provide advice on catering system for Namibian Army.

4. APTC Instructor
 - a. Rank: SNCO

C1-1
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

b. Tasks:

- (1) Fitness training all trainees.
- (2) Introduce a fitness training system into Namibian Army.

5. Weapon Training Warrant Officer

a. Rank: WO/SNCO. SASC

b. Tasks:

- (1) Overall coordination of weapon training instruction.
- (2) Coordination of BMATT small arms instructors.
- (3) Advise Commander BMATT on range safety aspects.
- (4) Introduce small arms qualifications and testing for Namibian Armed Forces.
- (5) Establish weapon training infrastructure for Namibian Armed Forces.

6. RAMC

a. Rank: Capt/Major or SNCO Combat Medical Technical).

b. Tasks:

- (1) Provide immediate medical support during Leaders Cadre and Battalion Basic Training Course.
- (2) Combat medical training during Battalion Basic Training phase.
- (3) Establish medical sections for each battalion.
- (4) Establish system for combat medical support for Namibian Armed Forces.

7. RSM

a. Rank: WOI

b. Tasks:

- (1) RSM for BMATT.
- (2) Inculcate ethos and discipline into Namibian WOs/SNCOs and coordinate establishment of WOs/SNCOs messes if required.
- (3) Coordinate and instruct in WOs/SNCOs messes if required.

C1-2
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

8. Quartermaster/MTO

- a. Rank: Capt/Major
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) QM and MTO for BMATT.
 - (2) QM and MTO training for Namibian Armed Forces.
 - (3) Advice on QM matters.

9. Staff Clerk

- a. Rank: WO2 (RAOC)
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) Supervision of clerical support.
 - (2) Clerical training and advice to the Armed Forces fo Namibia, to include:
 - (a) Advice to MOD and Force HQ on staff clerk matters.
 - (b) Assist SO2 GI Instructor in establishing and training Pay and Records office at Force HQ.
 - (c) Establishing and training battalion orderly rooms during battalions training phase.

10. Pay Warrant Officer

- a. Rank: WO2/SNCO (RAPC)
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) Responsible for BMATT pay.
 - (2) BMATT postal services.
 - (3) The establishment and training of a pay infrasture within units.
 - (4) Assist SO2 G1 Instr in establishing and training Pay and Record office at Force HQ.

11. Force Commander's Adviser.

- a. Rank: Major
- b. Tasks:

C1-3
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

- (1) Advise force commander.
- (2) Assist in establishing Force HQ.

STAFF OFFICER

12. G1

a. Rank: Major

b. Tasks:

(1) Primary.

(a) Coordination of assistance, training and advice to the Management Directorate in the MOD.

(b) To assist in establishing, training and advising the Personnel Branch of the Management Directorate of the MOD.

(c) Be prepared to assist in advising the Finance, Administration and Support Services Directorate of the MOD.

(2) Secondary.

(a) To establish train and advise the G1 Branch and assist and advise DCOS on all G1 matters at Force HQ.

(b) Establish and train pay and records office.

(c) Coord of trg in G1 matters throughout the Force.

13. G2.

a. Rank: Major

b. Tasks:

(1) Primary.

(a) To assist in establishing, training and advising the Intelligence Branch of the Policy Directorate in the MOD.

(2) Secondary.

(a) To establish, train and advise the G2 branch at Force HQ.

(b) Coordination of training in G2 matters through the force.

14. G3

a. Rank: Major

C1-4
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

b. Tasks:

- (1) Train and advise the Policy Directorate in the MOD.
- (2) To establish, train and advise the Individual Training branch of the Management Directorate in the MOD.

15. G4.

a. Rank: Lt Col (7 month tour)

b. Tasks:

- (1) DCOS BMATT
- (2) Coordination of assistance training and advice to the Resources Directorate in the MOD and specific advice to the Procurement Branch in concert with MOD Civil Servant.
- (3) Be prepared to assist and advise the Force HQ DCOS and establish, train and advise G4 Branch.
- (4) Prepare for establishment and training of logistics battalion.
- (5) Coordination of training in G4 matters throughout the Force.

16. Civil Servant: Principal

a. Tasks:

(1) To advise the Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary on:

(a) the functioning of the Defence Ministry as a department of state including the relationship with other government departments, the Council of Ministers, and the National Assembly, and more general legal matters.

(b) the control of acquisition and disposal of equipment, and other material (including land and building) to ensure cost-effectiveness and value for money.

(c) financial matters, including budgeting, monitoring of expenditure and accounts.

(d) the provision and management of Administrative Support Services for the Defence Ministry and other defence establishment.

(e) the organisation necessary to fulfill these functions.

C1-5
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

(2) To co-ordinate the work of the other training personnel associated with the establishment of the Defence Ministry.

17. Civil Servant (HEO)

a. Tasks:

(1) To establish train and advise the Civil Affairs Branch of the Policy Directorate.

(2) To establish train and advise the Defence Estates Branch of the Resource Directorate.

(3) Assistance, Training, and advise the Finance, Administration and Support Services Directorate.

BATTALION TRAINING

18. Chief Instructor.

a. Rank: Lt Col (Teeth Arm)

b. Tasks:

(1) Responsible to Comd BMATT for organisation and conduct of:

(a) Leader's Cadres.

(b) Battalion Basic Training Course.

(2) Responsible to Comd BMATT for monitoring and assisting subsequent battalion development and training.

(3) Responsible to Comd BMATT for conduct of BMATT training at leader, recruit and battalion level.

(4) Responsible to Comd BMATT for training objectives and their fulfilment.

(5) Responsible for coordination of second Leader's Cadre.

(6) Second instructor and senior syndicate DS on officer element of second Leader's Cadre.

(7) Assists on Battalion Basic Training courses 2, 3 and 4.

TRAINING TEAM

19. Training Majors x 2

a. Arm/Service: Infantry

C1-6
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

b. Tasks:

(1) Training Major 1:

- (a) Responsible for first Leader's Cadre.
- (b) Senior instructor and senior syndicate DS of officer element of first Leader's Cadre.
- (c) Responsible for coordination of Battalion Basic Training Courses No 3 and No 4.
- (d) Assist Battalion Training Courses.

(2) Training Major 2:

- (a) Senior instructor and syndicate DS or WO/SNCO/NCO element Leaders Cadre No 1 and 2.
- (b) Responsible for Battalion Basic Training Courses No 1 and 2.

20. Training Captains/Lieutenants x 8.

a. Arm/Service Teeth Arm preferred - Minimum 4 x infantry.

b. Tasks:

- (1) Syndicate DS for Leader's Cadre.
- (2) Officer instructor for Battalion Basic Training Course.
- (3) Requirement for 4 x infantry advisers deployed to formed battalions to assist in subsequent battalion development training.

21. Training WO/SSgt x 24.

a. Arm/Service. Teeth Arm preferred. Minimum 4 x WO must be infantry 1 x SNCO/WO to have MT experience.

b. Tasks.

- (1) WO/SNCO Instructors on Leader's Cadres.
- (2) WO/SNCO instructors on Battalion Basic Training Courses.
- (3) 4 x infantry WO deployed to formed battalions to assist subsequent development and training.
- (3) 1 x WO/SNCO to consist in establishing and training battalion transport platoons for each battalion during Basic Training Course.

22. Additional Support. It may be necessary to call for additional support as follows:

C1-7
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

- a. Armourer SNCO/Cpl.
- b. VM SNCO/Cpl.
- c. Communications Adviser.

C1-8
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

REQUIREMENT FOR INSTRUCTORS FOR SECOND SIX-MONTH

INTRODUCTION

1. This Appendix seeks to ascertain the requirement for instructors for the second of 2 projected six-month periods. The requirement is predicated on the following assumptions:
 - a. Basic battalion training (Phase 1) will not be complete until the period is well under way.
 - b. Phase 2 training (signals, recce, asslt pioneer/engineer and mortars, possibly also Anti Tank and Low Level Air Defence for battalions will follow.
 - c. There will be a continuing requirement to advise Force HQ and MOD.
 - d. Force phase 2 will be covered, to include signals and logistics battalion training.
2. Any change to these assumptions, based either on inadequate progress in students in the first six months, or on projected inability of hosts to obtain equipment pertaining to phase 2, must be decided by 3 months before the second six-month period. Thus the requirement for instructors can be changed in good time.
3. Furthermore, the requirement for instructors and equipments in phase 2 must in any case be assessed and reconfirmed by experts in the relevant fields during the first 6 months. For example, the S02 G4 instructor will need to liaise with, and advise hosts on the shape, size and equipments for the force logistic battalion companies. Only then can the exact requirement for logistic instructors be confirmed. Similarly, an assessment must be made of hosts' signals equipments prior to confirming the need for 3 x Royal Signals instructors for the second six-months period.
4. Training functions for each individual instructor will be drafted in due course.
5. It is likely that only one instructor will need to be extended beyond his initial six month period, to seven months (staff officer G4).

BMATT HEADQUARTERS AND SUPERVISORY TRAINING ELEMENT

6. There will be a continuing need for the following:
 - a. Commander.

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

- b. COS.
- c. Chief instr.
- d. 2 x Training Majors.

BMATT SUPPORT TRAINING STAFF

7. There will be continuing requirement for the following, who will have a role both in support of BMATT and hosts:

- a. Clerk RAOC WO/SNCO.
- b. Pay WO/SNCO.
- c. RMO Capt/Major.
- d. QM/MTO Capt/Major.
- e. SASC WO/SNCO.

8. In addition, the following may or may not be required throughout the whole of the second six-month period:

- a. Caterer WO/SNCO (possibly only to end of bn phase one trg).
- b. PTI SNCO (possibly only to end of bn phase one trg).
- c. WO1/RSM (possibly only to end of bn phase one trg).
- d. Armourer SNCO/Cpl (requirement not yet known).
- e. VM SNCO/Cpl (requirement not yet known).
- f. Communications Adviser (requirement not yet known).

MOD AND FORCE HQ ADVISERS AND TRAINERS

9. For the second six month period, the 4 x G discipline majors reduced to 2:

- a. S02 instructor G2/G3.
- b. S02 instructor G1/G4.

10. Logistics trainers will be required as follows, for the training of force logistics battalion companies:

- a. Major/Capt supply.
- b. Major/Capt maintenance.
- c. Maj/Capt transport.

C2-2
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

RAMC MAJOR/Capt at para 7 above (BMATT support training staff) will be dual-
roled to train the force logistics battalion medical company.

11. In order to train the force signals company, the following will be provi-
sionally required, all from R SIGNALS:

- a. Major/Capt x 1
- b. Capt/WO x 1
- c. WO/SNCO x 1

BATTALION TRAINERS

12. For the second six-month period, battalion trainers will need to be dual
roled. This is because they need to cover the final battalion basic course
(phase 1) as well as the battalion combat support instruction (phase 2).

13. No change to numbers is at present foreseen from the first six-month
period: ie./eg.

- a. 8 x Capt/Lt.
- b. 24 x WO/SNCO/senior Cpl.

14. The following table identifies a range of arms/experience for all 32 per-
sons which should cover all possible instructional skills required while
retaining flexibility. Nonetheless, the table will need confirming in due
course. It is emphasised all instructors must also have a high aptitude for
instructing in the phase one battalion basic training. This phase is primarily
concerned with infantry type skills.

C2-3
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

15.

SER (a)	TASK (b)	OFFICERS (c)	WO/SNCO/SENIOR CPLs (d)
1.	CONTINUITY ASST TO BNS	4 x INF CAPT	4 x INF WO
2.	BN SIGS PL INST (TO INSTR IN CONJUNCTION WITH 3 x R SIGNALS PERS FROM FORCE SIGS COMPANY INSTR TASK AT PARA 11 ABOVE	1 x INF RSO	1 x INF RSI/RSS
3.	BN ASSLT PIONEER/ ENGINEER INSTR	1 x RE CAPT	1 x INF ASSLT PIONEER WO 1 x RE WO/SNCO 2 x INF ASSLT PIONEER SNCO/CPL
4.	BN RECCE PL INSTR	1 x RAC RECCE TP COMD	1 x INF RECCE WO/SNCO (L/ROVER RECCE EXPERIENCE) 2 x RAC RECCE WO/SNCO/CPL
5.	BN MOR PL INSTR	1 x INF MOR OFFR	1 x WO MOR SCH INSTR 8 x WO/SNCO/CPL ABLE TO INSTR MFC/CPO/ ALL BACKGROUND
6.	BN LLAD PL INSTR		1 x RA BLOWPIPE/ JAVELIN WO/SNCO (ALTN 1 x SAS SNCO/CPL STINGER OP, INF BACKGROUND)
7.	BN ATK PL		2 x INF WO/SNCO ATK PL (MAW/MILAN: 1 EACH)
8	TOTAL	6 x INF OFF 1 x RAC OFFR 1 x RE OFFR	20 x INF WO/SNCO/CPL 2 x RAC WO/SNCO/CPL 1 x RE WO/SNCO/CPL 1 x RA WO/SNCO

C2-4
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

DMAO 109 (INS)JA

CONCLUSION

16. Total of all persons listed at this appendix is 55. Of these, the requirement for the VM and the armourer is NYK, and 3 more may perhaps not remain for the whole 6 month period (Caterer, RSM and PTI.)

17. All posts will need to be confirmed by the start of the second half of the first 6 months of the task.

TRAINING FLOW CHART

FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN 91	FEB	MAR	APR				
B M A T P R E P I N U K A D V A V I N P A R T Y C 3-1 L O O S E N	BATTALIONS: PHASE 1										PHASE 2			PHASE 3 → TBC				
	FORCE: PHASE 1					PHASE 2					PHASE 3 → TBC							
	LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN		BASIC TRG 1ST BN		AFTER BASIC TRG & FORMATION EACH BN INTO BARRACKS & CONTINUES TRG, WITH ASST		BASIC TRG 2ND BN		LEADERS CADRE FOR 2 x BN		BASIC TRG 3RD BN		BASIC TRG 4TH BN		8 - 10 WEEK COURSES		A R M Y E X A L L E L M S	1. LLAD 2. ATK 3. MOR IF NOT IN PHASE 2
	FORCE TRG: HQ, PAY & RECORDS, HQ LOG BN										REMAINDER OF BN'S CONTINUE TRG		ESTB TRG SCHOOLS		→ ENGR COY, AIR, SEA			
	MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TRAINING AND ADVICE										ADVICE CONTINUES TO FORCE HQ/TRG OF FORCE SIGS COY/TRG OF MAINT SUP, MED, TPT COYS.							

- NOTE:
1. TIMESCALE IS FLEXIBLE.
 2. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENTS: OCT FOR FORCE SIGS COY & LOG BN; DEC FOR BNS.
 3. STUDENT NUMBERS:
 - A. EACH LEADERS' CADRE: MINIMUM 50 x OFFICERS, 150 x SNCO.
 - B. EACH BASIC TRG BN COURSE: LEADERS PLUS 700 RECRUITS. THIS FIGURE WILL ALLOW LATER MANNING OF BATTALION COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND FORCE LOGISTIC BATTALION

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX C TO
DCTS STAFF(R)7/1/2
DATED 5 / JAN 90

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
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RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX C TO
D CTS STAFF(R)71/29
DATED 31 JAN 90

INITIAL TEAM COSTS BMATT NAMIBIA FIRST 6 MONTHS

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
1	TEAM COMD	BRIGADIER	46306(1)	
2	COS	LT COL	36527(1)	
3	CATERING ADVISER	WO1 WO2 SNCO	21330 19915 18565	
4	APTC INSTRUCTOR	SNCO	18565	
5	WEAPON TRG WO SASC	WO2 SNCO	19915 18565	
6	RAMC NON MEDICAL	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
7	RSM	WO1	21330	
8	QM/MTO	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
9	STAFF CLERK RAOC	WO2	19915	
10	RAPC WO	WO2 SNCO	19915 18565	

C4-1
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
11	FORCE COMD ADVISER	MAJOR	28632	
12	S02/G1	MAJOR	28632	
13	S02/G2	MAJOR	28632	
14	S02/G3	MAJOR	28632	
15	S02/G4	LT-COL	36527	
16	PRINCIPAL CIVIL SERVANT	-	36527	Estimate only
17	HEO CIVIL SERVANT	-	28362	Estimate only
18	CHIEF INSTRUCTOR	LT-COL	<u>BATTALION TRAINING</u> 36253	
19	TRAINING OFFICERS	MAJOR (INF) MAJOR (INF)	28632 28632	
20	TRAINING OFFICERS	MAJOR CAPT x 8	22996 18878	
21	TRAINING WO/SSGT	WO2 SNCO x 24	19915 18565	

C4-2

LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

DMAO 110 (M1)

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
22(3)	ARMOURER VM SIGS	SNCO SNCO SNCO	18565 18565 18565	55695 Not included in Total
23	TOTAL COSTS LESS LOA (2)		1176767	

Note (1) Accompanied 12 months.

(2) LOA is dependent on Duty Free facilities. If no Duty Free facility is available then LOA will range from 72p per day to 54p per day for unaccompanied members of the team and £4.56-£2.37 per day for accompanied members of the team

(3) May not be required.

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C TO
D CTS STAFF(R)71/29
DATED 3 / JAN 90

TEAM COSTS SECOND 6 MONTHS

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
1	TEAM COMD	BRIGADIER	46306 (1)	
2	COS	LT-COL	36527 (1)	
3(3)	CATERING ADVISER	WO1 WO2 SNCO	21330 19915 18565	
4(3)	APTC INSTRUCTOR	SNCO	18565	
5	WEAPON TRG WO SASC	WO2 SNCO	19915 18565	
6	RAMC NON MEDICAL	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
7(3)	RSM	WO1	21330	
8	QM/MTO	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
9	STAFF CLERK RAOC	WO2	19915	
10	RAPC WO	WO2 SNCO	19915 18565	
11	0			
12	0			

C5-1
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

DMAO 110 (COSTS)ALM

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
13	S02/G2/G3	MAJOR	28632	
14	0			
15	S02/G1/G4	LT-COL	36527	
16	PRINCIPAL CIVIL SERVANT	-	36527	
17	HEO CIVIL SERVANT	-	28632	
18	CHIEF INSTRUCTOR	LT-COL	36253	
19	TRAINING OFFICERS	MAJOR INF MAJOR INF	28632 28632	
20	TRAINING OFFICERS	CAPT LT x 8	22996 18878	
21	TRAINING WO/S/SGT	WO2 SNCO x 24	19915 18565	
22(3)	ARMOURER VM SIGS	SNCO SNCO SNCO	18565 18565 18565	5695 not included in total
23	LOGISTIC INSTRUCTOR SUPPLY	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
24	LOGISTIC INSTRUCTOR MAINTENANCE	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	

C5-2
LOCSEN
RESTRICTED UK EYES A

DMAO 110 (COSTS1/AM)

RESTRICTED UK EYES A
LOCSEN

SERIAL (a)	TASK (b)	RANK (c)	COSTS - LOA (d)	REMARKS (e)
25	LOGISTIC INSTRUCTOR TRANSPORT	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
26	FORCE SIGNALS COMPANY	MAJOR CAPT	28632 22996	
27	FORCE SIGNALS COMPANY	CAPT WO2	22996 19915	
28	FORCE SIGNALS COMPANY	WO2 SNCO	19915 18565	
29	TOTAL COSTS LESS LOA(2)		1266866	

Note (1) Accompanied 12 months.

(2) LOA is dependent on Duty Free facilities. If no Duty Free facilities then LOA will range from 72p per day for unaccompanied members of the team. For accompanied members of the team the range of £4.56 per day to £2.37 per day.

(3) May not be required.

ACTION POINTS

- | <u>ACTION POINTS</u> | <u>ACTION</u> |
|--|----------------------------------|
| 1. Selection and posting of personnel. | MO/MAO(LS) |
| 2. Allocation of UIN. | MAO(LS) |
| 3. Authority for use of FCO facilities, incl:
a. Use of FCO Bag Room for letter mail.
b. Use of FCO Communications. | MAO(LS) |
| 4. <u>Medical</u> . Provisional authority to use Namibian Civil Hospital and/or FCO Doctors List. Debrief on BRITCOM experience to members of team. | Team recce
MAO(LS) |
| 5. <u>Terms and Conditions of Service</u> .
a. Establish LSP rate of pay.
b. Arrangements for LOA.
c. Prepare written terms and conditions of service.
d. Establish rules for export/purchase of private vehicles. | MAO(LS) |
| 6. Memorandum of Understanding. | Sec(0)(C) |
| 7. <u>FCO Funding</u> . Obtain provisioned authority from FCO for:
a. FCO Budget for the team.
b. Obtain FCO funding for FAX system.
c. Enhancement of accommodation (estimate £2,000 for house).
d. Instalation of telephones in houses.
e. Possible costs for accommodation for Advance Party, if accommodation is not available prior to Independence. | MAO(A1)
MAO(LS)
Team recce |
| 8. <u>Newspapers</u> . Obtain authority for delivery of the newspapers to BMATT. | MAO(LS) |
| 9. <u>Deployment</u> . Details to follow. | MO1/Team recce |
| 10. <u>Radios</u> . Authority for deployment of sufficient radio equipment to Namibia to provide essential comms for team training tasks. | MO1 |



File 215

CPK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary


19 December 1989

Dear Bob,

**NAMIBIA: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
MILITARY AND POLICE TRAINING**

Thank you for your letter of 18 December about Mr Nujoma's request for British training for the future Namibian army and police. The Prime Minister thinks that we should follow this up, on the lines indicated in your letter (ie by exploratory missions).

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

18 December 1989

Sen Charles

*In the light of SWAPO
behaviour since the elections,
it is right to help.*
*Yes Mr
O'Donoghue*

Namibia: Request for Assistance with Military
and Police Training

At a meeting in Windhoek on 7 December with Sir Robin Renwick and Mr Wallis, the President of SWAPO handed over a letter to the Foreign Secretary (text enclosed) formally seeking British assistance in training the future Namibian army and police. Mr Nujoma also stated SWAPO's intention that Namibia should join the Commonwealth.

Robin Renwick reminded Mr Nujoma of the offer of military training in the joint statement issued by the Prime Minister and Mr Major at CHOGM and said that the MOD would be prepared to send a team to Namibia early in 1990 to assess Namibia's requirements. We are considering separately and sympathetically the request for help with police training, perhaps as participants in a joint programme with an (old) Commonwealth country eg Canada. We are also trying to establish whether other potential donors have been asked to help.

The UN Special Representative (Ahtisaari), the UNTAG Force Commander (Prem Chand), and South African Administrator General all welcome Britain's involvement with the integration of Namibia's Forces after independence. Ahtisaari has said UNTAG proposes to try to make a start, but wants elements of Britain's future training teams to be in place before UNTAG withdraw on or before 1 April 1990.

Plans are in hand to send an MOD exploratory mission to Namibia in mid-January to assess the training requirements. The MOD's preliminary thoughts are that we should plan on providing comprehensive advice and training for the establishment of a force of up to 5,000. This assistance would be for a limited period, initially perhaps one year, with the possibility of extending it if needed. The MOD indicate the cost will be about £2m in 1990/91. We do not have provision for this and shall have to seek additional funds from the 1990-91 Reserve once the requirements have been identified.

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Any Namibian police training would be funded from the aid programme. The resources required would need to be weighed carefully against other priorities. The next step will be for an early fact-finding visit to Namibia to establish the requirements.

Tomson

R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

TELNO 597
OF 070900Z DEC 89
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, LUANDA

SCA 21/1

1578

MY TELNO 599 : POSSIBLE MILITARY TRAINING FOR NAMIBIA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SWAPO PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

BEGINS. I WRITE THIS LETTER AS A FOLLOW-UP TO EARLIER DISCUSSIONS I HAD IN LONDON WITH YOUR PREDECESSOR, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALSO WITH YOUR AMBASSADOR IN SOUTH AFRICA, SIR ROBIN RENWICK, HERE IN WINDHOEK.

I HELD SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS, ON THE SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE WITH YOU, WITH A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE FRONTLINE STATES AND NIGERIA AS MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

NAMIBIA'S FIRST FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS HAVE GIVEN SWAPO, THE MAJORITY PARTY IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, A CLEAR MANDATE TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA.

IN THE MEANTIME, THE NAMIBIAN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ELECTED PARTIES HAVE ALREADY EMBARKED UPON THE CHALLENGING TASK OF DRAFTING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION FOR OUR COUNTRY. AND THE WORK IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT OF PREPARING FOR NAMIBIA'S FUTURE THAT I WOULD LIKE FORMALLY TO REQUEST HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE THE TRAINING OF A NAMIBIAN NATIONAL ARMY AND POLICE BASED ON THE INTEGRATION OF FORCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

TO BEGIN WITH, I WOULD THINK THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD SEND A TECHNICAL TEAM TO WINDHOEK, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TO CONSULT WITH US AND CARRY OUT FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING PROCEDURES AND ESPECIALLY AREAS OF TRAINING.

IT IS MY INTENTION TO SEND AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE A

DECLARATION OF INTENT THAT AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA WILL SEEK, AT AN EARLIEST DATE, THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH. ENDS.

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

WALLIS



7/12

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 December 1989

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter about the Rossing Uranium Mine. She was very glad to hear of the favourable impression which Rossing made on some of its recent visitors and congratulates you on the further safety award. She very much shares your hopes for the future of the operation in Namibia.

CHARLES POWELL

J D Birkin Esq TD

men

RTZ

CHIEF EXECUTIVE

27/12

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

4th December, 1989

Dear Prime Minister,

Rossing Uranium

I thought that in the light of your visit in April to the RTZ managed Rossing Uranium Mine, and the recent successful Namibian elections, which you did so much to promote, you would be interested to know of some of the encouraging comments that have been made recently about Rossing's operations.

During the run-up to the election, Rossing had more than 200 important political and diplomatic visitors, including Mr. Marti Ahtisaari, and a number of representatives from the African 'frontline' states. They were particularly impressed by the social aspects of the mine. It was especially pleasing to read Mr. Nujoma's comments in the Arandis Club visitors' book that

"the delegation of the SWAPO of Namibia is highly impressed by the process and progress of the work done and especially the working relations between management and staff, and above all, health care for the workers". *

It is gratifying to us that the work we have put in over the past twelve years at Rossing is now becoming widely respected, both internally and internationally. This is further evidenced in Rossing having been awarded recently a British Safety Council Sword of Honour for the second year running.

These recognitions of our achievements at Rossing, from widely differing quarters, gives us ever-increasing confidence in the future of our operation in Namibia and indeed in the future of Namibia as a whole.

Yours sincerely,

Derek Birkett

* We are not giving this media coverage.

Duty Clerk,

15/11

No 10



With the compliments of

Asch

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The attached papers may
be of interest to Charles Powell.

Neil Hammond.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

NAMIBIA

- A: Secretary General's remarks to the Security Council,
14 November (includes details of election result on page 4)
- B: Secretary General's Press Statement, 14 November
- C: UN Special Representative's statement certifying the
elections to have been free and fair, 14 November
- D: FCO News Department statement, 13 November

Telegrams

- E: Pretoria Telno 566
- F: UKMIS Telno 1803
- G: UKMIS Telno 1807

REMARKS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435

TUESDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1989

MR. PRESIDENT,

AS YOU KNOW, ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN NAMIBIA FROM 7 TO 11 NOVEMBER 1989 FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF 72 MEMBERS. 701,483 VOTERS WERE REGISTERED IN THE 23 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS OF THE TERRITORY. TEN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE REGISTERED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN, THE ELECTION WAS ORGANIZED AND CONDUCTED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL UNDER THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS' SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

358 POLLING STATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT NAMIBIA FOR THE TAKING OF THE POLL, COMPRISING 215 FIXED LOCATION AND 143 MOBILE POLLING STATIONS. MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS ASSISTED IN THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE ELECTION BY A TOTAL OF 1,700 ELECTORAL SUPERVISORS DRAWN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNTAG, AND FROM 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, 1,023 POLICE MONITORS PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE. UNTAG ELECTORAL PERSONNEL SUPERVISED SOME 2,500 COUNTERPARTS APPOINTED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE POLL. UNTAG ELECTORAL SUPERVISORS WERE TRAINED IN THEIR FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AT FOUR TRAINING CENTRES IN THE TERRITORY OVER A FOUR-DAY PERIOD.

THE ELECTION PROCLAMATION WAS PUBLISHED IN AN EXTRAORDINARY OFFICIAL GAZETTE ON 13 OCTOBER 1989 (NO. AG 49) AFTER IT HAD BEEN FINALIZED BY MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL. ON THE SAME DAY, AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, SETTING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ELECTION, WAS ALSO PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE AS GENERAL NOTICE NO. 142.

THE PROCLAMATION PROVIDED FOR ALL REGISTERED VOTERS IN POSSESSION OF THE NECESSARY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TO CAST ORDINARY BALLOTS, VOTING IN DISTRICTS WHERE THEY HAD REGISTERED. OUT-OF-DISTRICT VOTERS, AS WELL AS CERTAIN OTHER CATEGORIES OF VOTERS LISTED IN THE PROCLAMATION, WERE REQUIRED TO CAST TENDERED BALLOTS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BEFORE THE COUNT. ALL ORDINARY BALLOTS WERE COUNTED AT THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, WHILE TENDERED BALLOTS WERE COUNTED IN WINDHOEK, AFTER VERIFICATION. THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE VOTE WERE DETERMINED BY ADDING THE TOTALS OF ORDINARY AND TENDERED BALLOTS CAST IN FAVOUR OF EACH OF THE TEN POLITICAL PARTIES.

..

AT THE CLOSE OF THE POLL, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES INDICATED THAT OVER 96% OF THE ELECTORATE HAD PARTICIPATED. AFTER THE POLL, AND PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE COUNT, MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ANNOUNCED THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN A FEW MINOR INCIDENTS, HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE PROCESS OF VOTING HAD GONE SMOOTHLY AND THAT IT HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1978).

THE COUNTING OF THE ORDINARY BALLOTS BEGAN ON MONDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1989, AT THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, AND WAS COMPLETED EARLIER TODAY. THE RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED DISTRICT BY DISTRICT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE ELECTION PROCLAMATION. THE COUNTING OF TENDERED BALLOTS, AFTER VERIFICATION, WAS COMPLETED A FEW HOURS AGO AND THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE VOTE HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED TO ME BY MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE TALLY FOR THE ELECTION AND THE CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF SEATS, BASED ON THE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, IS AS FOLLOWS:

(I SHALL READ THE NAME OF EACH OF THE TEN PARTIES, FOLLOWED BY ITS PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE TOTAL VALID VOTE AND THE CONSEQUENT ALLOCATION OF SEATS TO IT IN THE ASSEMBLY. AT THE SAME TIME, I SHALL CIRCULATE PRESENTLY TO MEMBERS A FULL TABLE OF PERTINENT DATA.)

4

- 4 -

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF VOTE</u>	<u>SEATS WON</u>
AKSIE CHRISTELIK NASIONAAL (ACN)	3.537%	3 SEATS
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ACTION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (CDA)	0.372%	NO SEAT
D.T.A. VAN NAMIBIE	<u>29% 28.551%</u>	21 SEATS
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF NAMIBIA (FCN)	1.558%	1 SEAT
NAMIBIA NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NNDP)	0.147%	NO SEAT
NAMIBIA NATIONAL FRONT (NNF)	0.797%	1 SEAT
NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF NAMIBIA (NPF)	1.594%	1 SEAT
SWAPO-DEMOCRATS	0.471%	NO SEAT
SWAPO OF NAMIBIA	57.327%	41 SEATS
UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF NAMIBIA (UDF)	<u>5.646%</u>	<u>4 SEATS</u>
TOTALS	<u>100.00%</u> =====	<u>72 SEATS</u> =====

AT 1.00 P.M. NEW YORK TIME TODAY, MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,
 AFTER FULL SCRUTINY OF THE RELATED PROCEDURES,
 AND AFTER CONTACTING ME,
 CERTIFIED THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NAMIBIA HAD,
 AT EVERY STAGE, BEEN FREE AND FAIR
 AND THAT IT HAD BEEN CONDUCTED TO HIS SATISFACTION.
 HE MADE THIS CERTIFICATION
 IN FULFILLMENT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER PARAGRAPH 6
 OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN SITUATION,
 AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1978).

MR. PRESIDENT,

WITH TODAY'S EVENTS, A MOST SIGNIFICANT PHASE IN THE PROCESS OF BRINGING NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

THE FACT THAT OVER 97 PER CENT OF REGISTERED VOTERS FINALLY TURNED OUT TO CAST THEIR BALLOTS, WAS AN IMPRESSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THEY ATTACHED TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE ELECTIONS PROCEEDED IN A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY MANNER AND THAT THE POLITICAL PARTIES OBSERVED THE CODE OF CONDUCT TO WHICH THEY HAD AGREED DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WAS TESTIMONY TO THE POLITICAL MATURITY OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE; THE FACT THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT ANY MAJOR HINDRANCE, WAS BOTH A TRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND HIS ELECTORAL STAFF, AND, I MIGHT ADD, TO THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF THE UNTAG ELECTORAL OFFICIALS IN SUPERVISING AND CONTROLLING THE ARRANGEMENTS.

THE WAY HAS NOW BEEN OPENED FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN THE PROCESS -- THE DRAWING-UP AND ADOPTION OF A CONSTITUTION BY THE NEWLY-ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THE NAMING BY IT OF A DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENT STATE.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WILL DEMONSTRATE, IN THEIR NEW CAPACITY, THE SAME DEGREE OF PATRIOTISM THAT THEY DISPLAYED DURING THE COURSE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. INDEED, I TRUST THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL DISCHARGE, IN THE LETTER AND IN THE SPIRIT, AND IN GOOD FAITH, THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH FALL ON THEM UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE SETTLEMENT PLAN, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RELATED COMMITMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DAY FOR NAMIBIA AND OTHERS WILL FOLLOW. FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DISCHARGE ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA UNTIL THE TERRITORY ACHIEVES INDEPENDENCE.

I WISH TO THANK COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OVER THE PAST MANY MONTHS THAT HAVE LED TO THE ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA. I ALSO WISH TO PAY TRIBUTE TO MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, MR. AHTISAARI, TO THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE, MR. LEGWAILA, TO THE FORCE COMMANDER, GENERAL PREM CHAND, AND TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF UNTAG FOR THE EXEMPLARY SERVICE THAT THEY ARE PERFORMING IN THE CAUSE OF NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE.

- 7 -

7

I SHALL, MR. PRESIDENT, BE SUBMITTING VERY SHORTLY
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A WRITTEN REPORT ALONG THESE LINES.

I THANK YOU.

* * *

United Nations

Press Release

Department of Public Information • Press Section • New York

SG/SM/4267

NAM/1076

14 November 1989

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RESULTS OF NAMIBIAN ELECTIONS

Following is the text of the statement issued today by Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar on the results of the elections in Namibia:

I was most pleased to learn today from my Special Representative in Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, that the elections for the Constituent Assembly which took place in Namibia last week have been successfully concluded, and that he has certified the electoral process as having been free and fair and the results correct. A most significant phase in the process of bringing independence to Namibia has thus been accomplished, and the way has been opened for the next stage — the drawing up and the adoption of a constitution by the newly elected Constituent Assembly, the naming of a date for independence, and the establishment of a government for the independent state.

The fact that 97 per cent of registered voters turned out to cast their ballots was an impressive demonstration of the importance which they attached to the electoral process; the fact that the elections proceeded in a peaceful and orderly manner and that the political parties observed the agreed code of conduct during the election campaign was testimony to the political maturity of the Namibian people; the fact that the elections were conducted smoothly and without any major hindrance was both a tribute to the effective arrangements made by the South African electoral authorities and the excellent performance of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) electoral officials in supervising and controlling the arrangements.

I am confident that the members of the Constituent Assembly will address themselves to the most crucial task of framing and adopting the constitution for the country with the same degree of enthusiasm and patriotism that they displayed during the course of the electoral process. For Namibia must become a united nation where the inhabitants of all political persuasions will be able to enjoy their inalienable rights without fear or favour. These were the aims and objectives of the United Nations when, forty-three years ago, the issue of Namibia first came before the General Assembly. Eleven years ago, the United Nations plan established the modalities by which those objectives could be obtained. The United Nations will continue to discharge its obligations to the people of Namibia until the Territory achieves independence.

(more)

5487P

For information media — not an official record

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Press Release SG/SM/4367

NAM/1078

14 November 1989

I wish again to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, to the Deputy Representative, Mr. Legwaila, to the Force Commander General Prem Chand and to all the members of UNTAG for the exemplary service they are performing in the cause of Namibia's independence.

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UNTAG

N A M I B I A

Copied by fax to
Mr Morris, S Af D, FCO
Mr Eldon, UK His NY
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PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY MR. MARTTI AHTISAARI,
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NAMIBIA
TUESDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1989, 20.00 HOURS

It is my responsibility, under the United Nations' Settlement Plan, to assess the propriety of the electoral process, which has just been completed, for a Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia.

Earlier this evening, the Administrator-General informed me of the final results of the election. I have considered all aspects of the process, with particular reference to proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results, as required by the Security Council.

Revised final returns show that over 97% of Namibians who were registered to vote took the opportunity to exercise their long-awaited and fundamental democratic right. Only a very small fraction of ballots - 1.4% - had to be rejected as invalid, with the concurrence of UNTAG, and under its scrutiny.

Its youngest democracy has given the whole world a shining lesson in democracy; exemplary as to commitment, restraint and tolerance. Accordingly, in this election, there have been no losers: - the whole people of Namibia have been victorious, united in their dedication to peace, reconciliation and the future. I am sure that Namibians will continue to maintain these admirable qualities during the next days, and I should like to appeal for the maximum restraint and calm at this time.

I have spent many hours at the count here in Windhoek, as has the Administrator-General. The immensely conscientious attention given to each single ballot-paper by a most professional staff, from the United Nations and from Advocate Pienaar's administration, has deeply impressed all who have observed the process of counting and tabulation. My staff throughout the country have reported similar care and accuracy at each stage since the close of voting last Saturday. I wish to express UNTAG's appreciation for the endeavours of all concerned during long, sleepless hours, days and nights. This part of the process has also been a model of proficiency.

A few minutes ago, I informed the Administrator-General, after the establishment of the final results, that I was satisfied with the post-polling procedures that UNTAG has supervised and controlled.

In fulfilment of my responsibility under paragraph 6 of the Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation, and in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, I hereby certify that the electoral process in Namibia has at each stage been free and fair, and that it has been conducted to my satisfaction.

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: MONDAY 13 NOVEMBER 1989

NAMIBIAN ELECTIONS

Spokesman issued the following statement:

"We welcome the announcement by the United Nations Special Representative in Namibia that the elections there last week were free and fair. The result, whatever it is, must be respected by all parties both within Namibia and outside. We will continue to support the work of the United Nations in supervising the peaceful transition to independence next year.

We have made a substantial financial and material contribution to the work of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), including a Royal Signals Unit and fifty election supervisors who have been present at the polling stations."

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 566

OF 141500Z NOVEMBER 89

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, WINDHOEK, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, LAGOS, NAIROBI, HAVANA, MOSCOW

WINDHOEK TELNO 547 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL): NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

1. PIK BOTHA THANKED ME EFFUSIVELY THIS MORNING FOR OUR EFFORTS IN LUANDA WHICH, HE BELIEVED, HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE ANGOLAN DECISION TO PERMIT VERIFICATION PATROLS ON THE ANGOLAN SIDE OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD HELP TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINING 1500 SADF FROM OSHIVelo AND GROOTFONTEIN, AS REQUIRED UNDER THE SETTLEMENT PLAN, ONE WEEK AFTER AHTISAARI CERTIFIES THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.
2. THE SADF WITHDRAWAL IS LINKED UNDER THE SETTLEMENT PLAN TO THE 'CLOSURE OF SWAPO BASES' AND THE SADF WOULD HAVE MADE TROUBLE ABOUT THIS IF THE ANGOLANS HAD NOT AGREED TO THE VERIFICATION PATROLS.
3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE ELECTION RESULTS. IT HAD CORRESPONDED CLOSELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S EXPECTATIONS. THE RESULTS SHOWED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE SWAPO HAVE WON VIRTUALLY ALL THE OWAMBO VOTES, THEY HAVE VERY LIMITED NON-OWAMBO SUPPORT. HE HAD TALKED TO NUJOMA ABOUT THIS AT THEIR RECENT MEETING IN WINDHOEK AND HAD URGED ON HIM THE NEED FOR SWAPO TO REACH ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE NON-SWAPO POLITICAL PARTIES. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A NORTH/SOUTH SPLIT IN NAMIBIA WITH POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE. NUJOMA HAD MADE CONCILIATORY REMARKS ABOUT THIS.
4. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS VERY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THINGS HAD GONE SO FAR. HE EXPECTED AHTISAARI TO CERTIFY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.
5. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 321 ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL TO START CONSULTING THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON KEY ISSUES DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS KEEN TO BRING HOME TO SWAPO AND THE OTHER PARTIES THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONTACT WITH KEY FINANCE AND OTHER OFFICIALS IN WINDHOEK. HE AGREED THAT THE TRANSITION NEEDED TO BE

MANAGED IN A POSITIVE WAY, THOUGH THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WOULD REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RUNNING OF THE TERRITORY. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT HAVE LEGISLATIVE POWERS: ITS ROLE WAS TO DECIDE ON THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. BUT OBVIOUSLY THE INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT IN DUE COURSE WOULD EMERGE FROM IT.

6. IN SUBSEQUENT GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE EC AMBASSADORS, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF WALVIS BAY AND URGED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD CONSIDER TURNING WALVIS BAY INTO A FREE PORT. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO GET AN AGREEMENT WITH AN EVENTUAL SWAPO-LED GOVERNMENT THAT NAMIBIA SHOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF WALVIS BAY. HE WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF DECLARING IT A FREE PORT, DEPENDING ON SWAPO ATTITUDES AND THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT HERE.

7. I SAID THAT, PROVIDED SWAPO HONOURED NAMIBIA'S DEBTS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND PENSIONS FOR FORMER PUBLIC SERVANTS, I HOPED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO PROVIDE BUDGETARY SUPPORT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE WOULD ALSO BE ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION WITH SWAPO AND OTHERS IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO INDEPENDENCE.

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INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LAGOS
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

YOUR TELNO 814: NAMIBIA AND THE FIVE

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS RESPOND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPROACH ON THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN NAMIBIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS, USING THE TALKING POINTS AGREED ON 13 NOVEMBER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR INDICATES HE WILL REVERT IF FURTHER DIFFICULTIES ARISE.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 14 NOVEMBER TO CONVEY THEIR RESPONSE TO THE POINTS HE HAD RAISED WITH THEM LAST MONTH ON THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN NAMIBIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

3. AFTER WATSON (U S) HAD READ OUT THE AGREED TALKING POINTS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKED THE UN LEGAL COUNSEL TO SPEAK. FLEISCHAUER GAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROCLAMATION ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD EVENTUALLY BEEN BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED IN THE PROCLAMATION, WHICH CONTAINED TWO CLAUSES GUARANTEEING THE IMMUNITY OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY FROM INTERFERENCE BY OUTSIDE AUTHORITIES AND THE NAMIBIAN COURTS. THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR CONSULTATION BY THE ASSEMBLY WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL ON THE DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE ALTHOUGH THE PROCLAMATION LAID DOWN THAT THE DATE SHOULD BE FIXED BY THE ASSEMBLY AFTER HEARING PIENAAR'S VIEWS. BUT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD MADE A MINOR CONCESSION TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN AGREEING THAT MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CROSS PARTY LINES. FLEISCHAUER ADDED THAT THE PROCLAMATION AND THE ASSOCIATED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WOULD SHORTLY BE CIRCULATED AS SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS.

4. REVERTING TO THE OTHER POINTS RAISED BY THE FIVE THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL SAID THAT AHTISAARI WAS CONTINUING TO WORK ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL POLICE. HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION TO REVERT TO THE FIVE IF FURTHER DIFFICULTIES AROSE OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER. HE WENT ON TO GIVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, ADDING HE HAD HEARD THAT SWAPO HAD ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT WITH SOME OF THE SMALLER PARTIES AS PART OF THEIR EFFORTS TO MUSTER A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. HE WAS GREATLY RELIEVED THAT THE ELECTIONS HAD PASSED OFF IN SUCH A CIVILISED FASHION: IT WOULD BE UNFAIR NOT TO GIVE CREDIT TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHO HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB OF ORGANISATION.

5. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE CHINESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT AHTISAARI HAD FORMALLY CERTIFIED THE ELECTIONS AS FREE AND FAIR. SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT THAT ANY EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. LI, AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHAT HE COULD DO.

6. WE SUBSEQUENTLY BRIEFED A MEMBER OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S STAFF IN MORE DETAIL ON OUR CONCERNS OVER THE LAST THREE OPTIONS RAISED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 26 OCTOBER, BASING OURSELVES ON OUR ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE TALKING POINTS FOR THE FIVE.

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MY TELNO 1793 (NOT TO ALL): NAMIBIA: ELECTION RESULTS

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFS THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS SATISFACTION TO THE PRESS AND HOLDS OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE FORMAL ACTION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

DETAIL

2. EARLY ON 14 NOVEMBER I SPOKE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASK HOW HE INTENDED TO HANDLE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ELECTION RESULTS. HE SAID HE WOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT (FAXED TO MORRIS, SAFD) SHORTLY AFTER AHTISAARI HAD CERTIFIED THE ELECTIONS AS FREE AND FAIR. SUBSEQUENTLY HE WOULD MAKE AN ORAL REPORT AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH HE WOULD FOLLOW UP IN WRITING. HE HAD NOT AT THAT STAGE FOCUSSED ON HOW THE COUNCIL MIGHT RESPOND. I SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE THE CHINESE, AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, A COPY OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WE HAD PREPARED (PARA 5 OF TUR) ENDORSING AHTISAARI'S JUDGEMENT ON THE ELECTIONS AND URGING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO BEGIN WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. SHORTLY BEFORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH THE FIVE LATER IN THE DAY (MY TELNO 1803, NOT TO ALL) THE CHINESE REPORTED THAT THE NON-ALIGNED HAD NOT YET REALISED THAT AHTISAARI HAD CERTIFIED THE ELECTIONS. THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE ANY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE HE HAD DONE SO. WE DREW THE ATTENTION OF THE CHINESE TO AHTISAARI'S STATEMENT IN WINDHOEK, AND SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT CONFIRM IT WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IN HIS REPLY PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE WOULD WELCOME AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT BY THE COUNCIL, AND THEY UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. AFTER SOME HESITATION THE NON-ALIGNED LET IT BE KNOWN THEY WERE PREPARED FOR THE CHINESE TO BRIEF THE PRESS AFTER THE

CONSULTATIONS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO CONSIDER A MORE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. DURING THE CONSULTATIONS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MADE A STATEMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS (FAXED TO MORRIS (SAFD), WINDHOEK AND PRETORIA), WHICH FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE LINES OF HIS FORMAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 15 NOVEMBER. AFTER SUMMARISING THE ELECTION RESULTS PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT, AFTER CONTACTING HIM, AHTISAARI HAD CERTIFIED THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AS FREE AND FAIR AT 1300 NEW YORK TIME ON 14 NOVEMBER. A MOST SIGNIFICANT PHASE IN THE PROCESS OF BRINGING NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE HAD THUS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE HIGH TURN-OUT WAS AN IMPRESSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE ATTACHED TO THE ELECTIONS: THE WAY IN WHICH BOTH ORDINARY VOTERS AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES HAD CONDUCTED THEMSELVES TESTIFIED TO THEIR POLITICAL MATURITY.

5. AFTER A TRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UNTAG ELECTORAL SUPERVISORS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD DEMONSTRATE, IN THEIR NEW CAPACITY, THE SAME PATRIOTISM THEY HAD DISPLAYED DURING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. HE HOPED ALL CONCERNED WOULD DISCHARGE, IN GOOD FAITH, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SETTLEMENT PLAN AND THE RELATED COMMITMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS. FOR ITS PART THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCHARGE ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA UNTIL THE TERRITORY ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE. HE CONCLUDED BY THANKING MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND WITH A FULLSOME TRIBUTE TO AHTISAARI AND HIS STAFF.

6. ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, RAZALI (MALAYSIA) CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ELECTIONS. ONE PHASE OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN HAD BEEN COMPLETED, AND THE NEXT WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE. SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RETAIN CERTAIN RESIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR UNTAG TO DO AS MUCH IF NOT MORE THAN BEFORE TO BRING THE PROCESS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

7. I WELCOMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REMARKS. THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ELECTIONS MARKED AN IMPORTANT DAY IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AFTER THE CONSULTATIONS, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TELL THE PRESS OF THE COUNCIL'S PLEASURE AT THE OUTCOME AND EXPRESS

ITS THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS SUGGESTION WAS SUPPORTED BY BELONOGOV (SOVIET UNION). RAZALI SAID THE NON-ALIGNED HAD NO OBJECTION: INDEED THE COUNCIL SHOULD FIND AN OPPORTUNITY OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO ISSUE A MORE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT. AFTER PEJIC (YUGOSLAVIA) AND WATSON (U S) HAD SPOKEN ON SIMILAR LINES, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HAD EXPRESSED ITS SATISFACTION AT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ELECTIONS. HE WOULD GO ON TO CONGRATULATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AHTISAARI FOR THEIR EXCELLENT WORK AND INDICATE THAT MORE FORMAL ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN A DAY OR TWO. HE SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO REPORTERS AFTER THE CONSULTATIONS.

COMMENT

8. THIS OUTCOME IS THE BEST WE COULD REASONABLY HAVE HOPED FOR. THE NON-ALIGNED WERE UNWILLING TO BE RUSHED INTO A RESOLUTION OR A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND WILL WANT TO CONSULT THE FRONT-LINE STATES BEFORE TAKING A POSITION. MEANWHILE THE AFRICANS IN NEW YORK HAVE GREETED THE ELECTION RESULT WITH SOMETHING APPROACHING EUPHORIA: EVEN THE ZAMBIAN AND ZIMBABWEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THANKED US FOR THE PART WE PLAYED IN ACHIEVING IT. THEIR PRIORITY NOW IS TO HAVE THE CONSTITUTION ADOPTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND WE COULD BE IN FOR A BUMPY RIDE IF THE WORK OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS DELAYED. WE COULD ALSO FACE DIFFICULTIES OVER OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WHEN HE BRIEFED THE ALL-PARTY GROUP OF MPS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ELECTION RESULTS, THE ZIMBABWEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ARGUED THAT WHATEVER LEGALISTIC QUIBBLES MIGHT BE RAISED, THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WAS FROM NOW ON A SOURCE OF POLITICAL POWER IN NAMIBIA: HE HOPED THE GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA COULD BE IN PLACE BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.

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MY TELNO 546: NAMIBIA: ELECTIONS

SUMMARY

1. SWAPO WINS 41 SEATS IN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO DTA'S 21 THANKS TO A SWEEPING VICTORY IN OVAMBO. AG CONGRATULATES ALL CONCERNED AND MEETS NUJOMA. AHTISAARI DECLARES THE ELECTORAL PROCESS FREE AND FAIR.

DETAIL

2. THE RESULTS FOR OWAMBO AND KAVANGO WERE ANNOUNCED ON 14 NOVEMBER (DETAILS BY FAX TO SAFD AND PRETORIA). IN OWAMBO, SWAPO GAINED A SWEEPING VICTORY, OBTAINING 196,169 (92.31%) OF THE 212,505 ORDINARY VOTES AGAINST DTA'S 9,000 (4.24%). IN KAVANGO, SWAPO ALSO MADE A STRONG SHOWING, WITH 27,256 (51.71%) OF THE 52,709 ORDINARY VOTES CAST, AGAINST DTA'S 22,046 (41.83%).

3. THE OVERALL RESULTS, INCLUDING TENDERED BALLOTS, WERE ANNOUNCED BY THE AG'S OFFICE SPOKESMAN IN WINDHOEK ON THE EVENING OF 14 NOVEMBER (DETAILS BY FAX TO SAFD, PRETORIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK). THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES COUNTED WAS 670,830, FROM WHICH THE QUOTA REQUIRED TO SECURE A SEAT IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WAS CALCULATED AT 9,317. THE VOTES WERE DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS:

SWAPO	384,567	(57.33%)
DTA	191,532	(28.55%)
UDF	37,874	(5.65%)
ACN	23,728	(3.54%)
NPF	10,693	(1.59%)
FCN	10,452	(1.56%)
NNF	5,344	(0.80%)
SWAPO(D)	3,161	(0.47%)

CDA	2,495	(0.37%)
NNDP	984	(0.15%)

THE 72 SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY WILL THUS BE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:
SWAPO 41, DTA 21, UDF 4, ACN 3, NPF 1, FCN 1, NNF 1.

4. AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESULTS, THE AG APPEARED BEFORE THE MEDIA. HE SAID THAT HE SHARED THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S SATISFACTION WITH THE PROCESS. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED, INCLUDING THE MAJORITY PARTY AND HIS OWN POLICE. HE SAID THAT SWAPO NOW HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING THE AFFAIRS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND DIRECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONSTITUTION SUPPORTED BY A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY. HE HOPED FOR SPEEDY PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. HE HAD MET NUJOMA THAT MORNING AND THEY HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH A LIAISON COMMITTEE. HE HOPED FOR GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN SWAPO AND HIS ADMINISTRATION AND BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE NEXT STAGE WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE LAST BUT, IF ALL PARTIES SHOWED RESPONSIBILITY AND MODERATION, THEY COULD SHARE A GREAT FUTURE. AFTER THE CONFERENCE, RICHARD DALES AND I CONGRATULATED THE AG ON HIS ACHIEVEMENT. HE SAID THAT HIS PLEASURE ON THE OCCASION WAS TOUCHED WITH THE SADNESS, WHICH MANY WOULD SHARE, AT THE PASSING OF AN ERA.

5. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, AHTISAARI MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT (COPIES BY FAX TO SAFD, PRETORIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK) THAT HE HAD INFORMED THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL, AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINAL RESULTS, THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE POST-POLLING PROCEDURES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSCR 435, AHTISAARI CERTIFIED THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NAMIBIA AT EACH STAGE HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR, AND CONDUCTED TO HIS SATISFACTION. HE SAID THE WORLD'S YOUNGEST DEMOCRACY HAD GIVEN A SHINING LESSON TO THE WHOLE WORLD, AND SHOWN EXEMPLARY COMMITMENT, RESTRAINT AND TOLERANCE. THERE HAD BEEN NO LOSERS IN THE ELECTION - THE WHOLE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA HAD BEEN VICTORIOUS. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT NAMIBIANS WOULD SHOW CONTINUED DEDICATION TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, AND APPEALED FOR MAXIMUM RESTRAINT AND CALM OVER THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS.

6. AHTISAARI PAID TRIBUTE TO THE STAFF FROM THE UN AND THE AG'S ADMINISTRATION INVOLVED IN THE COUNTING AND TABULATION PROCESS. UNTAG THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAD REPORTED A HIGH DEGREE OF CARE AND ACCURACY AT EACH STAGE OF THE PROCESS SINCE THE CLOSE OF VOTING LAST SATURDAY. AHTISAARI DESCRIBED THE POST-ELECTION PROCESS AS A MODEL OF PROFICIENCY.

7. AHTISAARI AND THE AG WERE GUESTS OF MY US COLLEAGUE AT A DINNER PARTY LATER THAT EVENING GIVEN FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. RICHARD DALES AND I DINED IN THE SAME RESTAURANT AND OVERHEARD THE SPEECHES BY MUSKIE, AHTISAARI AND THE AG, WHICH WERE ALL VARIATIONS ON THE THEME, THE VIRTUES AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRACY. IT WAS A FESTIVE OCCASION.

8. COMMENT IN MIFT. A REPORT ON THE REACTIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE PARTIES ALSO FOLLOWS.

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7 OF 151150Z NOVEMBER 1989
8 AND TO IMMEDIATE BLO WINDHOEK

Prime Minister
content?
COB
Yes no

9
10 TELECON HMA/BERG: NAMIBIA: MESSAGES
11 1. Grateful if you would pass the following messages from the
12 Prime Minister to the UN Special Representative and to the
13 Administrator General. You will wish to coordinate action
14 locally.
15 2. Message from the Prime Minister to the Special
16 Representative. Begins: I warmly congratulate you, General
17 Prem Chand and your staff on the resounding success of the
18 elections which you have supervised. The atmosphere of peace
19 and calm, and the enthusiastic participation by such an
20 extraordinary ^{it} large number of Namibians, is a tribute to your
21 work. I well remember the difficult days at the beginning of
22 the process, when you made a courageous and correct decision
23 which kept the United Nations settlement plan alive.
24 Much, of course, remains to be done. We will continue to be
25 active in support of the United Nations to ensure that all sides
26 keep strictly to the Plan, so that independence can be
27 peacefully achieved. Ends.
28 3. Message from the Prime Minister to the Administrator
29 General. Begins: I warmly congratulate you on the resounding



YYYY	Catchword: success		
MAIN	File number B16ABA	Dept SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals) T MORRIS
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1	<<<<	
2		success of the elections which you and you staff have organised.
3		I am delighted that such large numbers of Namibians exercised
4		their democratic right, and that the election took place in an
5		atmosphere of peace and calm. You and your staff deserve much
6		credit for a remarkably well organised election. Ends.
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MY TELNO 549: **NAMIBIAN ELECTIONS**

MF

SUMMARY

1. **SWAPO WINS A SIMPLE MAJORITY IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. FALLS SHORT OF THE TWO THIRDS MAJORITY NEEDED FOR A CONSTITUTION. OUTSIDE OVAMBO, DTA WIN MORE VOTES THAN SWAPO. SMALLER PARTIES GENERALLY FARE BADLY.**

DETAIL

2. **SWAPO HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR LEADING POSITION AMONGST THE NAMIBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (41 SEATS OUT OF 72 IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY), THANKS TO A LANDSLIDE VICTORY IN THE DENSELY POPULATED OVAMBO DISTRICT, WHERE THEY POLLED 92.3% OF THE 212,505 VOTERS - AN EVEN HIGHER TOTAL THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. OVAMBO SUPPORT (AND THE HIGH OVAMBO TURNOUT) COMPENSATED FOR AN UNIMPRESSIVE SWAPO PERFORMANCE ALMOST EVERYWHERE ELSE. IN AREAS OF TRADITIONAL DTA SUPPORT, NOTABLY HEREROLAND, NAMALAND AND THE KAOKOVELD, SWAPO MADE LITTLE IMPACT. IN CAPRIVI, DESPITE RECENT INDICATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THEY COULD NOT MAKE SUBSTANTIAL INROADS INTO SUPPORT FOR MISHAKE MUYONGO, THE CAPRIVIAN DTA LEADER. SUPPORT WAS RATHER HIGHER IN THE KAVANGO AND IN THE INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIPS (OFTEN DOMINATED BY OVAMBOS), NOTABLY TSUMEB, SWAKOPMUND AND LUDERITZ. OUTSIDE OVAMBO, THE DTA POLLED MORE THAN SWAPO: 156,230 (42.7%) COMPARED TO 135,788 (37.15%). THE FINAL FIGURES DEMONSTRATE HOW MUCH SWAPO REMAINS AN ETHNICALLY BASED PARTY.**

3. **THE DTA (21 SEATS) IS DISAPPOINTED OVER ITS POOR SHOWING IN OVAMBOLAND BUT CAN BE PLEASED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE ELSEWHERE. IT RETAINED ITS TRADITIONAL TRIBAL FOLLOWING ACROSS LARGE (IF UNDERPOPULATED) SWATHES OF NAMIBIA. IN THE CENTRE OF THE COUNTRY, THE HERERO VOTE HELD FIRM, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROLIFERATION OF HERERO-BASED PARTIES AND THE RECENT RUCTIONS WITH CHIEF RIRUAKO.**

THE SOUTH REMAINS DTA TERRITORY. IN OVAMBO, THE DTA WAS ONLY AIMING FOR 20% OF THE VOTE BUT ENDED UP WITH 4.2%. IT DID BETTER IN THE NORTH-EAST AND NORTH-WEST. FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT CAPTURED A MAJORITY OF THE WHITE VOTE AND RELEGATED THE FORMER NATIONAL PARTY TO A RUMP.

4. OF THE SMALLER PARTIES, ONLY THE UDF AND ACN GAINED MORE THAN A SINGLE SEAT (4 AND 3 RESPECTIVELY), THE FIRST FROM ITS ETHNIC BASE AMONG DAMARAS AND COLOURED VOTERS (AND PERHAPS BY PICKING UP DISSIDENT SWAPOS), THE LATTER FROM CONSERVATIVE WHITES. THE UDF ARE THE ONLY PARTY APART FROM THE DTA AND SWAPO TO HAVE A SOLID REGIONAL BASE.

5. NONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES DID WELL. THE FCN (DEPENDENT ON BASTER SUPPORT) SUFFERED FROM THE GOOD SHOWING IN REHOBOTH OF THE DTA AND ONLY PICKED UP 10,452 VOTES (1 SEAT). THE NPF POLLED ONLY 10,693 (1 SEAT) AND ALSO SUFFERED FROM THE POWER OF THE DTA MACHINE, THIS TIME IN HEREROLAND: IT PICKED UP VOTES IN THE NORTH-WEST AND WINDHOEK. THE NNF ONLY REACHED FOUR FIGURES IN WINDHOEK AND SCARCELY THREE FIGURES OVER MOST OF THE COUNTRY. IT WAS LUCKY TO BE ALLOCATED A SEAT. THE CDA, SWAPO(D) AND NNDP FAILED TO GAIN SEATS.

COMMENT

6. TO WIN A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY FOR THEIR CONSTITUTION, SWAPO WILL HAVE TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF EITHER THE UDF AND THE THREE SMALL PARTIES OR THE SUPPORT OF THE DTA: NEITHER MAY BE EASY. IN EFFECT, THE CONSTITUTION WILL HAVE TO REFLECT A COMPROMISE BETWEEN ALL SHADES OF OPINION IN THE ASSEMBLY. IF THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY SHOW SUFFICIENT MATURITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO ACHIEVE SUCH A COMPROMISE, THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION WILL PROVE TO BE GOOD FOR NAMIBIA: BUT THE BARGAINING MAY BE HARD.

7. TO HAVE PRODUCED A RESULT WITH WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN LIVE AND WHICH MANIFESTLY REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA IS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ONE WHICH REFLECTS CREDIT ON ALL CONCERNED. WORRYING FEATURES OF THE RESULT ARE, FIRST, THE CLEAR TRIBAL BASIS OF THE VOTING AND THE NORTH/SOUTH DIVIDE WHICH THIS IMPLIES: THE RESIDUAL CORE OF CONSERVATIVE WHITE OPINION IN THE ACN: AND THE DECIMATION OF THE MODERATE, CENTRE PARTIES, SOME OF WHICH HAD THE MOST ABLE LEADERS AND THE MOST SENSIBLE POLICIES. THE 72 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY ARE NOT THE BEST NAMIBIA HAS TO OFFER AND THE LEVEL OF THE DEBATE THERE MAY NOT MATCH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ORDINARY VOTER IN THIS ELECTION. HOWEVER, THE

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FIRST POST-ELECTION STATEMENTS OF SWAPO (WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY) GIVE GROUNDS FOR SOME OPTIMISM: AND OUR CONTACTS IN DTA TELL US THAT THEY INTEND TO BE A TOUGH BUT RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION.

WALLIS

YYYY

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THE PRIME MINISTER

13 November 1989

Dear Nicholas

Thank you for your letter of 25 October enclosing your Report of your visit to Namibia.

I am pleased that you came away with a positive impression of developments. I hope that the progress that has been made since your return will enable the Special Representative to certify the elections as having been free and fair.

I understand that Ivon Brabazon has replied separately to the specific points in your Report.

Yours ever

Margaret

Nicholas R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.

6



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 November 1989

20-11

Dear Charles

Mr Winterton's Visit to Namibia

Thank you for your letter of 26 October enclosing Nicholas Winterton's letter of 25 October to the Prime Minister about his recent visit to Namibia.

/ Mr Winterton also sent his Report to the Foreign Secretary. Lord Brabazon has replied. A copy of his letter is enclosed.

/ I enclose a short courtesy reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

Yours ever

Bob

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

~~WINTER~~ NAMIBIA

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO Nicholas R Winterton Esq MP
House of Commons
London
SW1A OAA

Thank you for your letter of 25 October enclosing your Report of your visit to Namibia.

I am pleased that you came away with a positive impression of developments. I hope that the progress that has been made since your return will enable the Special Representative to certify the elections as having been free and fair.

I understand that Ivon Brabazon has replied separately to the specific points in your Report.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

9 November 1989

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 25 October to John Major enclosing a copy of the Report of your visit to Namibia. William Waldegrave has Ministerial responsibility for Africa, but I am replying in William's absence overseas. I understand that you had a brief talk about the subject with William last week.

The Report has been read with great interest and we were encouraged that your overall impressions of the progress of the independence process are positive. Your recommendations in section four of the Report have been noted. Perhaps I might deal with these in turn.

On the Constitutional Principles, we have made clear on a number of occasions that we consider the 1982 "Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution" to be an essential part of the UN Plan, and binding on all the parties involved. At a meeting of the Security Council on 31 October our Ambassador at the United Nations reaffirmed this, emphasising that the Security Council should not approve the Namibian Constitution unless it complies with the Principles and is adopted by a two thirds majority of the Assembly. You will also have seen William's reply to Robert Banks' PQ of 26 October. You may also be interested to know that SWAPO publicly stated on 2 November that they would abide by the Constitutional Principles.

The UN Special Representative and the Administrator General are working hard to resolve their few outstanding difficulties over the Constituent Assembly Proclamation. We are optimistic that they will do so.

We share your concern about detainees. We have repeatedly raised with SWAPO the subject of prisoners held by them in camps in Angola. Lynda Chalker made the point in a meeting with Hidipo Hamutenya, SWAPO Information Secretary, in April, and Geoffrey Howe did likewise when he met Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO President on 28 June. As you know, the United Nations conducted a mission in September to search for any remaining detainees which uncovered none. Mr Ahtisaari does not consider this matter closed and we will continue to support his efforts.



You recommend that the British Government assists in the process of reconciliation. We believe that this must be for Namibians themselves. We will be giving every support to the Secretary General in New York, and to Mr Ahtisaari, whose role in monitoring compliance with the United Nations plan will continue.

We share your view that it would be desirable for an independent Namibia to join the Commonwealth. We have made clear on a number of occasions that we would welcome an application from the Government of an independent Namibia.

Turning to your final point about assistance for post independence Namibia, I expect you will have seen the Prime Minister's Kuala Lumpur Statement in which she confirmed our readiness to give financial assistance to an independent Namibian Government, and to provide, if asked, military training. As in all cases we would keep under review our aid commitment in the light of developments on the ground.

John ...
hwa

THE LORD BRABAZON OF TARA

Nicholas R Winterton Esq MP
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA

CIF file

FIVE DAS



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 October 1989

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 25 October enclosing your report on your recent visit to Namibia. I will let you have comments in due course. Meanwhile, I was grateful for your kind words.

Yours

Norfolk

Nicholas R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.

KK

N. WINTERTON MP

(Namibia)

9/11

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 October 1989

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Nicholas Winterton MP about Namibia.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Thursday 9 November.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

[Handwritten signature]

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)



Private office: 01 219 4402
Secretary: 01 219 6434
Assistant 01 219 3585

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

CC 1246

25th October 1989

R26/10

Dear Margaret,

I enclose for your attention a Report which I have compiled following my recent return from a visit to Namibia on which I was accompanied by Richard Alexander, John Bowis, and my wife Ann.

The Report seeks to highlight a number of most important points and I shall be most grateful to receive your comments upon the issues which I raise.

Yours sincerely,
Nicholas

Congratulations on your splendid stand at
the Commonwealth Conference.

M E M O R A N D U M

REPORT ON A VISIT TO NAMIBIA

1-6 OCTOBER 1989

To: Rt Hon John Major MP, Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

William Waldegrave MP, Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Date: 25 October 1989

Background

1. Nicholas Winterton MP, John Bowis MP, Ann Winterton MP and Richard Alexander MP visited Namibia, 1 - 6 October 1989 as guests of the Foundation for Democracy of Namibia, an independent and privately financed Foundation to promote plural democracy in Namibia. Our programme was comprehensive and included meetings with the major political parties, with the Administrator General and his officials, with electoral officers, the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, UNTAG officials, the Head of the British Mission, businessmen the media and Namibian voters. We also travelled to the north to the Caprivi, and to Oshakati, Owamboland.

2. General Impression

Our overall impression of the process leading to Namibian elections for a Constituent Assembly and thereafter full independence was extremely positive. The first phase of the process, registration, has by all accounts been highly successful, due to the professional, competent and unbiased performance of the electoral officers and judicious supervision by UNTAG officials. Indeed the United Nations have made it clear that they were well satisfied with the conduct of this first phase confirmed by Hisham Omayad, Head of UNTAG Electoral Division. Secondly, all the Namibian political parties are exhibiting an enthusiasm and political maturity that bodes well for an independent Namibia. Their campaigning has, in general, been robust but fair and they have developed for the most part an electioneering apparatus geared up for the important challenge ahead. The widespread enthusiasm of the voters is also apparent. If we have a reservation it is that the smaller political parties are starved of funding despite significant support in certain areas.

Political parties have agreed to an electioneering 'Code of Conduct' to minimise the risks of provocation, intimidation and confrontation in the pre-election period which is largely being adhered to.

However, there are a number of issues that are of concern to Namibians in the lead-up to the November 7 elections which should be addressed, in the short-term, to ensure that the threat of a derailment of the process is minimised. The overall process, through to the acceptance of an independence constitution early next year, must be seen to be 'free and fair' with both the spirit and substance of the United Nations independence plan being applied. The key issues we identified were as follows:

3. Key Issues:

3.1 Constitutional Principles (1982)

We understand that the Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia (12 July 1982 S/15287) submitted by the Contact Group to the Secretary General in 1982 and referred to in the Secretary General's report to the Security Council (23 January 1989 S/20412) are an integral part of the UN independence plan. However, it was clear to us that because of the provision that the Constitution may only be adopted by a two thirds majority of the Assembly, certain parties in Namibia are less than enthusiastic about the application of such Principles and would indeed prefer to see them excluded from the overall package.

We believe therefore that it is imperative that the Principles remain part of the UN Settlement Plan, and that any tampering with the principles will seriously undermine the whole process.

Moreover we believe that it is imperative that the necessary legislation establishing the Constituent Assembly makes specific reference to the Principles, either within the Proclamation document itself, or alternatively in an Annex to the Proclamation.

In addition, if any party is subsequently in breach of these provisions there must be sanctions, in place, to ensure that this party is brought back into line.

3.2 Detainees Issue

The issue of the SWAPO detainees, those Namibians detained by SWAPO in their camps in Angola and Zambia over the last few years, accused of being 'South African Spies', is dominating the Namibian election campaign. The return of all detainees is part of the United Nations settlement proposal for Namibia and, whilst we were in Namibia a special UN Mission on Detainees was compiling a report on its visit to Angola and Zambia in September, (subsequently released on 11 October)

During our visit we heard a number of estimates of the number of detainees still held by SWAPO, ranging from 300-1,500. There was outrage, shock and resentment expressed by most Namibians we met at the systematic abuse of human rights meted out by SWAPO's leadership on SWAPO members; many of whom were tortured, many of whom were killed. It has clearly damaged, and will continue to damage, not only SWAPO's reputation but its electoral standing. Equally, it was clear that many of the SWAPO leaders at present in Namibia were either directly or indirectly responsible for these abuses and killings. SWAPO has yet to be brought to account for its actions and despite the fact the UN Mission has now identified 115 detainees as 'dead' and 315 missing - the UN appears no closer to being able to locate these detainees. It is important that the British Government ensures that the United Nations pursues this issue, using its ample resources and good offices, until such time as every detainee has been identified and repatriated and those responsible, in SWAPO, brought to account for their actions.

3.3 Intimidation

There were a number of allegations and counter-allegations of intimidation, especially in the Northern Owambo area. This despite an agreed code of conduct between the competing parties. On the one hand SWAPO believes that Koevoet and 101 Owambo Battalion were operating as agents of the DTA in Owamboland, on the other hand other political parties registered concern at the large numbers of SWAPO's PLAN fighters, just across the border in Angola and 'demobilised' PLAN cadres in Owamboland. However, there is a lack of substantive evidence of widespread intimidation. There have been relatively few violent clashes in Owamboland or elsewhere especially when set against the background of the recent war in northern Namibia. We do not believe that intimidation is at a level to cause concern or on a scale sufficient to undermine the electoral process, although it is an area that requires constant and meticulous monitoring.

3.4 Registration

According to both the South African and UNTAG officials we spoke to, the registration process has been an unqualified success. Overall registration was at 103 per cent and the mobile registration stations ensured that even the most isolated areas were covered. However, SWAPO has articulated a litany of complaints about the registration process. These included the qualifications for registration - the four year continuous residence rule, in particular, and allegations that registration was at a 200 per cent level in border areas implying South African and UNITA interference etc. UNTAG officials however were confused about such

allegations, and found no evidence to support them. They also pointed out that SWAPO had agreed the registration rules and the numbers of South Africans benefiting from the four year rule were insignificant, and considerably less than the 9000 votes required for a Constituent Assembly seat.

SWAPO

3.5 SWAPO's complaints about the registration process reflected the negative mood in the SWAPO camp. Having lost its status as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people' granted by the UN General Assembly in the 1970s, SWAPO is now competing head to head with nine other political parties and now understands that it has a fight on its hands. Few dispute that SWAPO will be the largest party in the Assembly. Equally, few Namibians we met believe that they will achieve the coveted two-thirds majority required to draft the Constitution. SWAPO appears, therefore, to be preparing the ground for such an eventuality. By complaining on the one hand about the registration process and anticipating the unfairness of the result and on the other hand by attempting to circumvent the two thirds provision in the UN settlement plan. In brief, SWAPO is attempting to shift the goal posts at the eleventh hour. If they continue their efforts then the whole process may be threatened.

3.6 South African Government

There is no doubt in our minds that the SAG is genuinely committed to the implementation of the UN settlement plan. Indeed the SAG are even being accused in some political quarters of being too weak and conceding to the United Nations on most important points of contention. We understood from some sources that there are elements within the SAG who are keen that SWAPO achieves a two-thirds majority; that a one party unitary state would subsequently be established and Namibia would then suffer the fate of other African states - headlong economic decline combined with political repression. In other words reinforcing the right-wings 'worst-case' scenario for the RSA, thus strengthening the right's position in South Africa's domestic political environment.

3.7 Post-Election Period

Considerable concern was expressed about the post election period from November 1989 to April 1990. Assuming that no party gains a two-thirds majority then a constitution will have to be agreed on the basis of accommodation and consensus - which appears at present to be signally lacking between the political parties.

There is clearly a role for the Western powers in overseeing this transitional period and in ensuring that the constitutional principles are properly adhered to and applied. The rules, procedures and principles governing the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and the framing of the constitution must be published before the election day in order to define the parameters and sustain overall confidence in the process.

4. We recommend that the British Government

- * Re-states its commitment to the Constitutional Principles of 1982 and confirms that these principles are part and parcel of the overall UN settlement package.
- * Ensures that the Constitutional Principles are made binding on all parties, are included in the relevant Proclamation and that this Proclamation's legal status is valid and that it is promulgated prior to election day (7 November).
- * Ensures that all necessary steps are taken by the United Nations to continue its investigations into the missing detainees to ensure that their status and whereabouts are confirmed, that they are repatriated at the earliest possible opportunity (before election day) and that those individuals responsible for Human Rights abuses are brought to account for their actions.
- * Assists Namibian parties in the post election period to identify and secure consensus and to foment National Reconciliation. In addition to ensure that both the substance and spirit of the agreements within the UN settlement plan are adhered to by all parties and that appropriate sanctions are applied to parties in breach of such agreements.
- * Encourages a newly independent Namibia to join the Commonwealth.
- * Provides development aid and promotes private inward investment conditional on the Namibian Government's commitment to democratic practices and the protection of Human Rights.

25 October 1989

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UKDEL KUALA LUMPUR FOR FAIRWEATHER

MIPT, NAMIBIA AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. AFRICANS LIKELY TO ENGAGE US ON MANY FRONTS ON NAMIBIA IN THE COMING WEEKS. STRONG NERVES NEEDED.

DETAIL

2. SOME OF THE AFRICANS IN NEW YORK ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT SWAPO'S PROSPECTS IN THE NAMIBIAN ELECTIONS. THEY WILL USE THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND POLLING DAY TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE OVER ALLEGATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 435. THEIR AIM IS PRESUMABLY TO MAKE AS STRINGENT AS POSSIBLE THE CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH AHTISAARI MUST CERTIFY THE ELECTIONS AS FREE AND FAIR. THEY WILL ALSO NO DOUBT HAVE IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY WANT TO ACCUSE THE UNITED NATIONS OF BIAS OR INCOMPETENCE, AND BACK OUT OF THE EXERCISE IF THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE NOT TO THEIR LIKING. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE LIKELY TO CENTRE ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS.

SECURITY COUNCIL

3. THE FRONT LINE STATES WILL INSIST ON THE ADOPTION OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BEFORE THE ELECTION, A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO RUN. THEY ARE LESS ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF A DEBATE (THE ZAMBIANS SAY THE KENYAN REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING IS PARTLY A DIVERSIONARY TACTIC DESIGNED TO REMIND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE SUBJECT CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN), AND - THOUGH I WOULD NOT BET ON IT - MIGHT BE CONTENT FOR THE RESOLUTION TO BE ADOPTED AT A MEETING AT WHICH NO STATEMENTS ARE MADE.

4. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL RECOGNISE THAT THE CURRENT DRAFT WILL NOT RUN. THEY HAVE YET TO DECIDE WHETHER TO AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD PRODUCE A NEW TEXT OR TO CIRCULATE A SECOND DRAFT THEMSELVES. BUT IT IS A SAFE BET THAT WHATEVER TEXT EMERGES WILL BE SHORN OF SOME OF THE WORST ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT DRAFT.

5. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS CURRENTLY EXERCISING THE AFRICANS, SUCH AS THE BUSHMAN BATTALIONS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AFFAIRS, SHOULD WITH LUCK HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE JOINT COMMISSION. FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE THE AFRICANS WILL WANT TO INCLUDE AS MUCH MATERIAL AS POSSIBLE ON SOUTH AFRICAN VIOLATIONS OF SCR 435. BUT THE ZAMBIANS AND ZIMBABWEANS - AND, MORE IMPORTANT, THE MODERATE NON-ALIGNED - HAVE TOLD US THAT MANY OF THESE POINTS ARE NEGOTIABLE; THEIR REAL CONCERNS ARE KOEVOET (WHERE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD BE ENCOURAGED ONCE AGAIN TO DISCHARGE ALL EX-KOEVOET ELEMENTS FROM THE POLICE) AND THE PERIOD AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

6. THE HANDLING OF THE PERIOD AFTER THE ELECTIONS IS NOT COVERED IN DETAIL IN THE SETTLEMENT PLAN AND RAISES A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES. BUT THE ZIMBABWEAN AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED TO US ON 19 OCTOBER THAT THE PARAGRAPHS OF THE PRESENT DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WENT TOO FAR. HE SAID HE WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY TO REINFORCE AHTISAARI'S POSITION AND PERHAPS TILT THE BALANCE BETWEEN HIM AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL A LITTLE MORE TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID NOT MENTION THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY EXCEPT TO SAY THAT IT MUST BE LEFT TO GET ON WITH ITS WORK. I WOULD SEE NO HARM IN CONCEDING A PARAGRAPH WHICH ASSERTED AHTISAARI'S CONTINUING ROLE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN WHILE RECOGNISING THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TERRITORY IN PREPARATION FOR INDEPENDENCE.

SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION

7. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOLD ME ON 19 OCTOBER THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION WAS NOW LESS OF A PREOCCUPATION FOR THE AFRICANS. THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE GOING TOO FAR TO SUGGEST THAT THE NON-ALIGNED ARE READY TO DROP THE IDEA. THE RUSSIANS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO THE DESPATCH OF A MISSION BEFORE A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON ITS MANDATE AND COMPOSITION, AND WE CAN PROBABLY RELY ON THEM TO SPIN OUT THE PROCESS FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE TOLD THE AFRICANS THAT WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO A MISSION PROVIDED THE TERMS AND COMPOSITION ARE RIGHT, THIS HAS WON US SOME LIMITED CREDIT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED.

IMPARTIALITY

8. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO TRY TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IN THE AFTERMATH OF JESSE JACKSON'S STATEMENT TO THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (MY TELNO 1553). BUT THE AFRICANS WILL PROBABLY INSIST THAT OTHER PETITIONERS BE ALLOWED TO ADDRESS THE COMMITTEE UNDER THE GENERAL ITEM ON DECOLONISATION, IN PRACTICE THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO TO PREVENT THIS. ON WHAT MAY BE A BRIGHTER NOTE, THE ZAMBIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT INSIST ON A DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR CRISIS BETWEEN NOW AND THE ELECTIONS. IN PRACTICE, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

OTHER GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITEMS

9. THE FRONT LINE STATES HAVE INTRODUCED UNHELPFUL LANGUAGE ON NAMIBIA INTO THE NORMALLY UNCONTROVERSIAL RESOLUTION ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU. THEY ARE LIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES THAT MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

10. AS SEEN FROM NEW YORK, A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF AHTISAARI'S NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PROCLAMATION WOULD HELP GREATLY IN EASING AFRICAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE PERIOD AFTER THE ELECTIONS. WE SHALL ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER (PARA 4 OF MIPT) WHETHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD REAFFIRM THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY BEGINS ITS WORK. THOUGH THE NON-ALIGNED MIGHT BE RESISTANT THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO HOLD OUT AGAINST THIS GIVEN THAT THE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN EXPLICITLY ENDORSED BY THE COUNCIL. IT WOULD BE A USEFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, AS WOULD AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN AHTISAARI AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-

GENERAL (YOUR TELNO 691). BUT ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE THE POLITICAL PARTIES (PARA 6 OF YOUR TUR) TO ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLES COULD BE MORE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY AS SOME HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THEM. A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER THE PRINCIPLES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY COULD BE DAMAGING.

11. CERTAIN OF THE CONCERNS OF THE AFRICANS ARE LEGITIMATE, AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT CAN BE DONE (AND IS BEING DONE) TO MEET THEM. BUT THE FACT THAT THEY ARE CLEARLY LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION OF CRYING FOUL AND WITHDRAWING FROM THE SETTLEMENT EXERCISE MEANS THAT THEY HAVE NO INTEREST IN PROFESSING THEMSELVES SATISFIED. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FURTHER SOUTH AFRICAN CONCESSIONS AND FURTHER EXPOSURE OF THEIR CAUSE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR THEIR PART THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY PRONE TO REACT IN INTEMPERATE AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WAYS. OUR TASK WILL BE TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE DOWN, TO LIMIT EXCESSES ON BOTH SIDES, AND TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION DESPITE ALL PROVOCATION. WE SHALL NEED TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION WITH CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS (THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE FIVE), AND THE FINNS (THE OTHER WESTERN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER). IT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND WE SHALL NEED STRONG NERVES IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

RICHARDSON

YYYY

NFLNAN 8250

NNNN

Kate pl.*This is the report
held by the UN.*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WINDHOEK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 477

OF 120755Z OCTOBER 89

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, LUSAKA

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, HAVANA, HARARE

INFO PRIORITY MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, KUALA LUMPUR

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, HQ UKLF

SWAPO DETAINEES: UN MISSION

SUMMARY

1. AHTISAARI PRESENTS AND MAKES PUBLIC THE MISSION'S REPORT. NO DETAINEES FOUND IN ANY OF THE ALLEGED DETENTION CENTRES OR ELSEWHERE. OF 1,100 INDIVIDUALS REPORTED MISSING OR DETAINED, NEARLY 800 ACCOUNTED FOR. SEARCH FOR THE REMAINDER TO CONTINUE.

DETAIL

2. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PRESENTED THE FINDINGS OF THE UN MISSION ON DETAINEES AT A WELL ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE IN WINDHOEK ON 11 OCTOBER. AMBASSADOR CLARK, WHO HEADED THE MISSION, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

3. IN A PREPARED STATEMENT, AHTISAARI SAID HE WAS MAKING THE REPORT PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (STATEMENT BY FAX TO SAFD, PRETORIA AND UKMIS NEW YORK: REPORT BY BAG TO SAME ADDRESSEES PLUS LUANDA, LUSAKA, UKMIS GENEVA AND WASHINGTON). IN THE REST OF HIS STATEMENT, AHTISAARI DETAILED THE TASKS AND COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION (EXPLAINING HIS DECISION NOT TO INCLUDE EX-DETAINEES ON THE BASIS THAT ALL THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM THEM HAD BEEN OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE MISSION'S DEPARTURE, AND THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING NAMIBIANS HOME WAS THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ALONE): EXPLAINED HOW A SINGLE COMPUTERISED LIST OF OVER 1,100 NAMES WAS DRAWN UP ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO UNTAG: AND SUMMARISED THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE MISSION AS FOLLOWS:

- THERE WERE NO DETAINEES IN ANY OF THE ALLEGED DETENTION CENTRES AND OTHER PLACES VISITED IN ANGOLA AND ZAMBIA
- THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ALLEGED DETAINEES HAD BEEN MOVED FROM

ANY OF THESE LOCATIONS TO ANOTHER PLACE PRIOR TO THE MISSION'S ARRIVAL

- ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED EITHER INTENDED TO RETURN OR ELSE HAD ELECTED OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL NOT TO RETURN AT THIS TIME
- VIRTUALLY ALL NAMIBIANS HAD BEEN REPATRIATED BY UNHCR EXCEPT FOR A SMALL NUMBER STAYING BEHIND TO GUARD COMMUNAL PROPERTY.

4. AHTISAARI SAID THAT THE WHEREABOUTS OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THE 1,100 PLUS PEOPLE REPORTED MISSING OR DETAINED HAD BEEN DETERMINED. THEY COULD PRESENTLY BE ACCOUNTED FOR AS FOLLOWS:

- SOME 110 DUPLICATIONS HAD BEEN REVEALED BY THOROUGH CHECKING
- 484 PEOPLE HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS RELEASED AND/OR REPATRIATED
- 7,21 INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING CURRENT SWAPO OFFICIALS, REPORTEDLY WERE NEVER DETAINED
- 115 PERSONS WERE REPORTED, OR SUSPECTED TO BE, DEAD
- 52 PERSONS COULD NOT BE TRACED BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION PROVIDED
- 315 PERSONS COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR: THE SEARCH FOR THESE PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE.

5. AHTISAARI CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION OF THE WORK DONE BY THE MISSION, AND GRATITUDE FOR THE COOPERATION OF THE ANGOLAN AND ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENTS. HE ASKED THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE INFORMATION ON THE WHEREABOUTS OR FATE OF THOSE UNACCOUNTED FOR TO COME FORWARD. HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONS UNACCOUNTED FOR WERE 'TRAGIC BY-PRODUCTS' OF PROLONGED WARS - WHILST EXPRESSING OPTIMISM THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS WOULD YIELD FURTHER INFORMATION. HE NOTED THAT ONLY THE PREVIOUS DAY, THE TEAM EXAMINING VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS HAD IDENTIFIED A FURTHER 54 NAMES OF PEOPLE HITHERTO UNACCOUNTED FOR (COMMENT: THIS EXPLAINS THE CHANGES FROM THE FIGURES REPORTED IN MY TELNO 463, NOT TO ALL).

6. THE REPORT ITSELF CONTAINS A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE VISITS, MEETING AND TRACING WORK CARRIED OUT BY THE DELEGATION, AND REFERS TO SOME OF THE CONSTRAINTS FACED BY THE MISSION, BUT DOES NOT OTHERWISE ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO AHTISAARI'S STATEMENT.

7. ASKED ABOUT CONSULTATION WITH SWAPO IN THE COURSE OF THE MISSION'S ACTIVITIES, AMBASSADOR CLARK SAID NATURAL JUSTICE DEMANDED THAT, AS THE ACCUSED PARTY, SWAPO SHOULD BE CONSULTED. BUT SWAPO'S WORD HAD NEVER BEEN TAKEN AS FINAL - INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THEM WAS ALWAYS DOUBLE CHECKED. AHTISAARI SAID SWAPO HAD NOT HAD ACCESS TO THE REPORT PRIOR TO PUBLICATION. SWAPO COULD NOT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE REMAINING 315 PERSONS, IN THE ABSENCE OF INFORMATION AS TO THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS OR FATE.

8. ASKED WHETHER THE UN WOULD PURSUE ITS ENQUIRIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES TO WHICH DETAINEES HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN TRANSFERRED, AHTISAARI SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO ON THE BASIS OF UNSUBSTANTIATED SPECULATION, BUT IF EVIDENCE WERE FORTHCOMING, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW IT UP AS NECESSARY. HE REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT NAMIBIAN CHILDREN IN EAST GERMANY MIGHT BE HELD THERE AGAINST THEIR WILL (A CLAIM MADE RECENTLY BY THE PARENTS' COMMITTEE). ASKED IF UNTAG WOULD FOLLOW UP ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEES HELD BY PARTIES OTHER THAN SWAPO, AHTISAARI CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE PREVIOUS DAY FROM SWAPO A LIST OF ALLEGED MISSING PERSONS, AND WOULD TAKE THIS UP WITH THE AG - ANY OTHER SUCH REPORTS WOULD SIMILARLY BE PURSUED.

9. ASKED TO DESCRIBE THE LOCATIONS VISITED, CLARK SAID THAT, AS STATED IN THE REPORT, 6 OF THE LOCATIONS, ALL NEAR LUBANGO, APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PRISONS - IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER THE OTHER LOCATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED AS DETENTION CENTRES. SOME OF THE BUILDINGS USED FOR DETENTION PURPOSES WERE CONSTRUCTED ABOVE GROUND WHILE OTHERS WERE HALF OR FULLY SUNKEN BELOW THE GROUND. HE DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO SPECULATING FURTHER ON THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH DETAINEES MIGHT HAVE BEEN HELD. THE MISSION HAD FOUND NO GRAVES - THIS HAD NOT BEEN AMONG ITS TASKS.

10. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THE MISSION'S REPORT WOULD HELP TO RESOLVE THE DETAINEES ISSUE, AHTISAARI SAID HIS TASK WAS TO CONDUCT A SEARCH AND REPORT THE FINDINGS. THIS HE HAD DONE. HE VIGOROUSLY REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT UNTAG'S PERFORMANCE ON THE DETAINEES ISSUE HAD BEEN UNSATISFACTORY.

11. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

WALLIS

SIR ALISTAIR FRAME

6, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE
LONDON, SW1Y 4LD
TELEPHONE: 01-930 2399

S. AFRICA: Namibia

pp
A. J. H.
cm

BY HAND

10th October, 1989

Dear Charles,

Enclosed is a copy of the Minutes of the latest meeting of our internal working party on the future of Rossing post Independence in Namibia.

Dr. Ngavirue, Dr. Bates and Mr. Algar are Rossing representatives, the remainder being RTZ staff, with Sir Hugh Byatt, the former UK Ambassador in Portugal, being a consultant to RTZ.

I hope this is of some use to you.

Yours ever,
Alistair

Charles Powell, Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

ROSSING INDEPENDENCE COMMITTEE/LONDON INDEPENDENCE GROUP

JOINT MEETING

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD ON WEDNESDAY 6TH SEPTEMBER 1989

AT 6 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE

PRESENT:

Mr A E Buxton
Dr Z J Ngavirue
Dr M P Bates
Sir Hugh Byatt
Mr C Algar
Mr D C Bailey
Mr P C F Crowson
Mr J G Hughes
Mr J H Schickler
Mr J H G Senior
Mr S P C Stewart

14 SEP 1989

APOLOGIES:

Mr F S Wigley

A. STATUS REPORTS

1 NAMIBIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

MPB outlined the Namibian political situation. There will probably be 72 seats (figure not finalised) in the Constituent Assembly. 44 parties could be identified, though this would reduce to perhaps 6 major groups:

SWAPO

DTA

UDF (support largely Damara/Rehoboth;
or may merge with above 2 parties)

NNF (mainly Herero)

NAMIBIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

?CDA (Peter Kalangula/Ovambo)

MBJ/ZJN thought that SWAPO would receive about 55 per cent of the votes, DTA 30 per cent and the remaining 15 per cent would be shared between the rest. This was based on detailed analysis of the separate population groups. Political parties have to register, obtain 2,000 signatures, and put up R 10,000 in order to stand at the election. Only 92 per cent of the 677,000 estimated electorate had registered. The Ovambo presence was less in the electorate than in the population because of the high proportion of children; only 1/3 of the registered electorate was in Ovamboland

despite its having over 50 per cent of the population.

Nujoma has still not returned to the country, and would not do so until just before the election but for the need to register (by 16 September) in order to be electable to the Assembly.

He
has
now

The prospect for a relatively peaceful election contest is good. The SWAPO campaign has been based on national reconciliation and the risk of serious disorder following an inconclusive result in November is felt to be slight. There was a small but not negligible chance that SWAPO would get less than 50 per cent of the votes, in which case it was important that UNTAG should stand firm to what they were saying in private, viz. that this election was the fairest they had been involved in.

The Administrator General remains in charge of the country until a new government is formed ie while the Constituent Assembly is in place, however he has to accept any constitution having 2/3 support in the Constituent Assembly, and therefore could not resist the Assembly declaring itself a Legislature, if with a 2/3 majority. Existing legislation stays in place until changed by a new government. Thus there will be no "vacuum" eg in the regulation of nuclear materials.

One area of risk was that the ceasefire in Angola had broken down. If the situation deteriorated seriously the Cubans might respond, which could bring SA back in; this risk was felt to be slight as the Cubans had behaved with restraint in the face of provocation.

A contrast with the Zimbabwe situation, which argued in favour of a peaceful resolution, was the absence of a returning victorious army of liberation. PLAN were coming back but disarmed, and it was felt that there really were no concealed arsenals in place. The military leaders were still out of the country, but their return was not felt to pose a serious threat.

The MUN has been largely ignored by SWAPO who showed little sympathy for the Rossing workforce's grievances on the recent mine visit. 150 Rossing employees had left the MUN because they felt it was too pro SWAPO; despite the overwhelming support for SWAPO, this did not cause problems at Arandis or on the mine.

2. REVIEW OF LIAISON ACTIVITIES

2.1 SWAPO

Rossing have established a remarkably good relationship with the SWAPO leadership who have returned to the country, and indeed appear to have very high standing in all sectors of opinion. A particularly good rapport exists with Theo-Ben Gurirab, but relationships with Hamutenya have also improved considerably since the mine visit. Nujoma has been invited to lunch on September 19 and to bring any colleagues of his choice; it will be interesting to see who turns up. No matters of substance have yet come up in discussions.

2.2 Other National Political Groups

One or another political party is represented at each lunch and all significant groups have now been invited. There is also a representative from at least one other company. All ministers and deputy ministers of the Transitional Government have visited Rossing at some time.

2.3 Other Namibians

Relations with UNTAG have improved since Ahtissaari visited the mine. Bequira (previously UNTAG representative i/c resettlement, now coordinating aid agencies) has suggested that the Rossing Foundation acts as a vehicle for aid coordination. The priorities for directing aid are to cover the revenue gap left by SA, education, and health and food supplies in the North. A meeting has taken place.

The UN Council for Namibia appears to have been sidelined, though an acting replacement to Carlsson (killed in the Lockerbie crash) has been appointed.

2.4 OTHER

34 senior diplomats have visited the mine since April. The only main sector not reached is the group identified with SWAPO when it was in exile eg the World Council of Churches, and church groups overseas.

2.5 Sanctions

An immediate lifting of sanctions is not likely; SWAPO's statement of support did not make much impression in Washington. Further discussions are to take place with Gurirab; if these are positive we will ask the other political parties to add their weight. The move should anyway improve the chances of lifting sanctions post November when Gurirab has promised to move a resolution in the Constituent Assembly to that

U.S. Congress

effect. Diane Harmon has proposed a letter from a suitable congressman to his fellow Senators and Representatives. A likely objection will be that Namibia will be used by SA as a back door to avoid sanctions against itself; CAA is preparing a paper to show that this is unlikely/avoidable.

2.6 Utilities

The two major targets were Sweden and West Germany. On the advice of the Swedish National Nuclear Authority, an approach would be deferred until after the November elections. However we will then need to be in a position to move quickly as the opportunity arises. (Z J Ngavirue's visit to Sweden from 7 September 1989 would therefore be limited to long standing contacts.)

All the West German utilities had been invited for October/November; the only 3 responses so far received were all negative.

3 ROSSING WORKFORCE

Grades 1-10 were overwhelmingly Namibians, were all pro independence and were mainly pro SWAPO. There was no evidence of unrealistic expectations; the union may be more aggressive in negotiations but not as much as expected.

The supervisory grades were the only group who were apprehensive. Many are South Africans and are showing signs of nervousness about personal security, educational standards, and loss of their privileges and the strength and assertiveness of the workforce. Turnover had doubled to about 13 per cent but was still manageable.

Management levels were much happier than in April when there was considerable unease. Turnover has increased though prospective independence is only one of the reasons (others including the weak rand and good jobs available elsewhere). This group, and their wives, were being kept informed of developments by SBK.

1 GENERAL

The prime objective of all this activity was preparation for negotiations with the eventual government. When the RIC and LIG were set up at the beginning of 1989, it was thought a new government would be in place early in 1990. It is now likely in say April 1990, with negotiations being under way not much before June 1990. This leaves us with a hiatus after the political landscape starts to emerge in November. Hitherto we had been very careful not to start negotiating. It was necessary, but increasingly difficult, to maintain this stance until the new government was formally in office.

Phase one of the overall process could therefore be said to have ended. Phase two was beginning and would last until the new government was settled in. Well before this the likely shape and attitudes of the new government would emerge and we could formulate our line in advance of actually beginning negotiations. This could be a very useful time of preparation for us. Phase three would be the negotiations proper.

2 SPECIFIC ACTIONS

2.1 Fact Papers

An analysis of the proposed application of each of the fact/discussion papers was tabled by the RIC (attached). The LIG would review the proposals at its next meeting, and revert to the RIC.

LIG

Even those papers categorised 'B' (briefing material) would be rewritten or at least reviewed, as they would be going to a new readership, viz. Rossing management in general. Those papers intended for external circulation in one form or another would also have to be reviewed.

CAA

2.2 Future Activities of RIC/LIG

ACTION

An analysis of the RIC sub-committee structure was also tabled (attached). The 'international' and 'political' sub-committees were the only ones not to have met. It was agreed that (as envisaged when the RIC and LIG were originally set up in January 1989), the RIC would make the running from now on. Individual sub-committees would draw, as required, on expertise either in the London office, or accessible through the London office (eg specialised advisors, diplomatic help). The LIG would act as clearing house for such requests, and initiate contact between the sub-committee and the specialist with subsequent working contact being direct. The LIG should continue to meet according to a predefined schedule, say fortnightly, rather than ad hoc.

JHS

The LIG has a particular role in safeguarding the shareholders' interests and monitoring the few points at which it is not identical to that of Rossing (eg double tax relief considerations in fiscal arrangements).

2.3 Priorities/Timetable

These will be defined by the sub-committees/LIG.

NIC/LIG

An early priority will be the model, since this would allow alternative tax structures etc to be tested and compared. Points to be covered fall into three groups, (a) those which were bound to change as a result of independence, eg the regulatory regime for mining in general and nuclear matters in particular, (b) those where we would hope to defend the status quo (c) those where we could see scope for advantageous change of the status quo. An aim in the last category would be a move towards the Botswana pattern (as reported by the Botswana Ambassador) where the government's participation through tax and equity aims at equality and therefore the tax take was limited to 45 per cent (NB all the mining projects in Botswana began after independence).

2.4 Involvement of Other Advisors

ACTION

It would be desirable to secure the services of Roland Brown as economic/fiscal advisor; however it was thought to be unlikely that he would agree to act for us. Discreet approaches would be made.

PCFC

A lobbyist in the United States, and a tax advisor, would not be appointed at this stage.

The LIG were asked to draw up a list of advisors we could suggest to the new government, and a list (for our own use) of those we would prefer them to avoid, with particular reference to the risk that a State Minerals Marketing Corporation might be set up.

JHGS/PCFC

It was pointed out that whatever we might think about the Zimbabwe MMC it was generally regarded as a success; it was still operating and there had been no spectacular disasters. The government will certainly (and reasonably) want to appoint an independent advisor for uranium and diamonds; we should encourage them to limit themselves to this rather than getting into the business on their own account. (The Zimbabwe government had confined itself to appointing an advisor for emerald marketing.)

Having spent considerable time in Angola, the SWAPO hierarchy were unlikely to look to that country as a model. They were more likely to look at Zimbabwe, India, ?West Africa, ?Botswana.

C. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

Rossini Chairon

- 1 Z J N reported that SWAPO had indicated they wanted to consult him, and Martin Shipanga, on a particular topic as yet undisclosed.

D. NEXT PLENARY SESSION

December 1989

JHS/flg/15 ix 89

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file Vb
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ccw PC

From the Private Secretary

11 September 1989

NAMIBIA: PROPOSED COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

Thank you for your letter of 8 September about the proposal that the United Kingdom should participate in a group of seven observers whom the Commonwealth Secretariat wish to send to Namibia to assess conditions in the run-up to the November elections. The Prime Minister has considered this very carefully and has concluded that it would be a mistake for us to take part. She notes that we have deliberately held ourselves aloof from the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa, and the new group is simply a brain child of that Committee. She does not believe that there is any likelihood that the group would produce a satisfactory report, even with a British representative: and British participation would make it more difficult for us subsequently to criticise the report at CHOGM. Moreover, the elections in Namibia are the responsibility of the United Nations, not the Commonwealth, and she does not want us to take part in a Commonwealth exercise likely to be critical - at least implicitly - of the performance of the United Nations Representative in Namibia. I should add that the Prime Minister also resents the attempt by the Commonwealth Secretariat to suggest who the British representative of such a group should be.

For all these reasons, the Prime Minister is firm in her view that we should NOT participate.

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SW2AZN

PRIME MINISTER

NAMIBIA

The Commonwealth are - rather interferingly - planning to send a group of observers to Namibia in late September or early October to look at the preparations for the elections and report to CHOGM. The idea stems from the Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa, in which we refused to participate. The purpose is pretty transparent: to prepare the ground for pointing an accusing finger at the South Africans if SWAPO don't win the election. Unfortunately the idea has been welcomed by Perez de Cuellar.

Ramphal is keen for the UK to participate. He is prepared to exclude the Front Line States, so that the observers would be Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, Gambia, Malaysia, UK.

No - we have never taken part in this group and it would be a great mistake to start now. This is a trick to neutralise our effectiveness.

The Foreign Secretary narrowly favours taking part on the grounds that there will be a group anyway and we have some chance of influencing it to produce a satisfactory report if we take part (I presume that we would nominate some one like Sir John Leahy).

But one could as well argue that:

- expecting a satisfactory report from a group like this is a triumph of hope over experience;

✓ - events have proved the wisdom of our decision not to take part in the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' group. We should stick to our guns;

- anyway the Namibia elections are a UN matter not a Commonwealth one.

There is not a great deal in it either way. I am inclined to think that even with a UK representative, a group with the composition proposed by Ramphal is bound to produce an

unsatisfactory report: we would therefore be better off keeping a free hand to criticise the report at CHOGM, which means we would not participate.

Agree to participate?

OR

Prefer to keep our distance?

NOT participate -

This is a group in which we deliberately do not take part. not

C.D.P?

(C. D. POWELL)

11 September 1989

ow

cepc

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



CONFIDENTIAL

8 September 1989

Dear Charles

Namibia: Proposed Commonwealth Observer Group

A tricky situation has arisen over Namibia. The Commonwealth Secretariat are pressing hard for our participation in a group of seven observers which they propose to send to Namibia in late September and early October to assess the conditions on the ground in the run-up to the November elections there. The group would produce a report on the situation for CHOGM. The origin of the idea is the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA), to which we do not belong. The Commonwealth Secretariat are pressing hard for our participation in the group.

The problems with this are clear. An unbalanced report risks prejudging the United Nations' assessment of whether conditions exist for free and fair elections; it could also be unhelpful to our aim of a non-contentious and forward looking debate on Namibia at CHOGM. UK officials have therefore argued strongly against the proposal at a meeting of Commonwealth High Commissioners on 7 September. We received no support from any quarter. The United Nations Secretary General has apparently welcomed the idea.

After the meeting, Mr Ramphal approached the British representative and said he was prepared to make important concessions in order to secure British participation:

- He was prepared to exclude the Front Line States from the group, which might include representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India, Jamaica, the Gambia and Malaysia. By implication he accepted the FLS participation could lead to difficulties with the UN (which the Secretariat did not want to undermine) and to an unbalanced report;
- He was also prepared to limit the Secretariat's involvement.

/The

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The Foreign Secretary thinks there are two options. First we can stand aside and decline to take part on the grounds that the elections are part of the UN Plan and the UN should be responsible for monitoring the run up. The problem with this is that many of the black Africans consider that the UN, in particular Ahtisaari in Windhoek, are in cahoots with the South Africans. They would not be content to leave it all to the UN and a Commonwealth Observers Group would go ahead without us. Its report would almost certainly be unbalanced and unhelpful.

The second option is that, since the group is bound to go ahead anyway and given the UN Secretary General's position, we can participate and use our participation to work for as balanced a report as possible. If we did this we should insist on nominating a UK candidate and also that the mix of the group should be as described to us by Mr Ramphal. We would make these conditions clear to the Commonwealth Secretariat before agreeing to join the group.

On balance the Foreign Secretary is inclined towards the latter option because

- a) whatever we do there will be an observers group,
- b) participation would avoid an otherwise inevitable pre-CHOGM row, and
- c) there is a sporting chance that a group with this composition might produce a satisfactory report.

*Y
Lonsdale*

R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file mem
bc rfc

MA Meeting Record.
Subject filed on South Africa
P/S The situation in Namibia
CC MASTER.

From the Private Secretary

19 July 1989

Dear Stephen,

NAMIBIA

The Foreign Secretary reported to the Prime Minister this evening the suggestion from President Mugabe that we might offer military training for Namibia after independence. The Prime Minister expressed considerable reservations about this, on the grounds that she had no confidence at all in SWAPO.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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with me
15/6
CDE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1989

John Charles

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CIR
CF to keep

Letter from UNITA

Thank you for your letter of 2 June about a letter from Mr Isaias Samakuva of UNITA's office in London.

The Foreign Office have regular contact with UNITA representatives in London, usually at desk level. Senior UNITA members visiting London are sometimes received by Under-Secretaries. Patrick Fairweather saw two of them on 19 May.

UNITA are continually seeking to raise the level of our contact with them and would read significance into any such change. My letter of 2 June about Dr Savimbi's recent letter to the Prime Minister set out the reasons for caution in our dealing with UNITA.

We do not think it would be right for Mr Samakuva to get a reply from you and we propose to send him a short acknowledgement from the department.

Tonsen
Bob

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

Isaias SAMALUVA

16/6



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

not ack'd.

2 June 1989

I attach a copy of a letter from
Mr Isaias Samaluva of UNITA.

I should be grateful for advice
on whether I need or should reply.
Could this reach me please by Friday
16 June.

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth office.

lv

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UNITA'S OFFICE

3 Clifford Street
London W1X 1RA
Tel: 01-439 3045

31st May 1989

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA

Dear Mr Powell

Much has happened, recently, in South Western Africa, and I believe now might be a useful time, bearing in mind your interest in the region, for me to focus on recent events and to give you a brief summary of UNITA's position on these current developments.

1. The Tripartite Agreement (South Africa, Cuba and the MPLA Regime) - 22 December 1988; New York.

This agreement establishes a framework for the independence of Namibia and the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, over a 27 month period (from 1st April), under the supervision of UNAVEM - the United Nations Monitoring Team. UNITA regards this as a considerable accomplishment because, without unrelenting military pressure from UNITA, the Soviets and Cubans would not have been brought to the conference table and indeed would have won complete control of Angola.

It is clearly in the interests of the Angolan people that Cubans withdraw from Angola, and UNITA has made it clear, through our recent offer of a ceasefire and in a series of recent statements that we shall not attack or harry the Cubans or impede their withdrawal unless, of course, our cadres are attacked. In addition, President Savimbi, in a conciliatory gesture, released details, on March 13, of a major peace initiative, which has been recently endorsed by the United States Administration. The timing of this initiative is important because it recognises that the Namibian settlement provides a unique window of opportunity for securing peace in the whole of South Western Africa.

2. President Savimbi's Peace Initiative - 13 March 1989

This eight point peace plan offers significant concessions to the MPLA regime in the hope that they will respond in a constructive and a conciliatory manner. The programme includes:

- A four month moratorium on UNITA military offensives to give the African initiative a chance to work.
 - The establishment of a ten member commission to begin negotiations with the MPLA regime. The negotiating team will not include President Savimbi.
 - A coalition transitional Government, excluding President Savimbi, will act as a caretaking Government until free and fair elections are held at which time President Savimbi reserves the right to put forward his candidacy for National elections; It is for the Angolan people to determine their own leaders.
 - UNITA will not interfere with the reconstruction of the strategic Benguela railway, as long as it is not used for military purposes.
 - UNITA is willing to exchange prisoners with the MPLA regime.
3. On May 16 1989, the Presidents of Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Zaire, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sao Tome and Principe met in Luanda "for an analysis of the situation in Southern Africa in general and Angola and Namibia in particular."

The meeting was projected as a forum to discuss the Angolan civil war and put forward proposals towards its solution.

Unfortunately, the final communique of that meeting indicates that the Luanda Conference did not meet expectations because it simply endorsed the so-called MPLA peace plan, which is to offer clemency, amnesty and harmonisation to UNITA.

UNITA has repeatedly rejected, unequivocally, MPLA offers of exclusive amnesty and clemency to UNITA members and sees these efforts as misguided attempts to split UNITA. This offer fails to take into account the realities of the Angolan conflict - an enduring peace can only be secured following free and fair inclusive national elections.

4. Application by the MPLA Regime to join the IMF

The British Government has recently confirmed that it supports the MPLA regime's application to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF). UNITA strongly objects to this application, and the British Government's support for it, believing that this is a manifestly retrograde step. There can be no question of giving the MPLA regime access to the IMF until such time as the civil war ends and an enduring settlement has been reached within Angola,

after free and fair elections have taken place. Acceptance into the IMF, will afford the MPLA regime ill deserved credibility and will act as a disincentive for it to enter into realistic negotiations with UNITA. Additionally the MPLA will use its IMF membership as a passport to membership of other agencies including, for instance, the Economic Community of Central Africa. It will also act as a severe set back to the prospects of National Reconciliation within the territory. Arguments which suggest otherwise are disingenuous and pay little heed to the signals such an acceptance will give to the MPLA regime and its proxies. They will regard this as a major moral and material victory and will exploit it to the full, using their well-tried propaganda machinery.

5. Human Rights Allegations against UNITA

In March 1989 UNITA and its leader President Dr Jonas Savimbi were the target of an orchestrated campaign of vilification in certain sectors of the international media. Some normally reliable sources including the New York Times and Sunday Telegraph repeated allegations made by United Kingdom based Angolan students that various Angolan citizens, associated with UNITA, including women and children, have been systematically beaten, tortured and executed on the direct orders of President Savimbi. UNITA categorically denied these allegations and responded at the time through a repudiation document, to each specific allegation. (The document is available on request from UNITA offices).

UNITA suspects that this disinformation campaign will continue and is aware that it is being organised and financed by the MPLA regime. Its specific aim is to divide the UNITA movement and isolate our leader. Certain Angolans, either for mercenary reasons or because they are being skillfully manipulated by the MPLA, either have already, or will, be contacting members of the media and Parliament as part of this propaganda offensive.

The MPLA is also intent on deflecting attention away from its own disgraceful Human Rights record, as recorded in Amnesty International's annual reports. In concluding its review of the MPLA's abuses in its 1988 report, Amnesty stated (inter alia) that it 'was concerned about long-term detention without charge or trial and sought information from the Government (MPLA) about the imprisonment of numerous political detainees' Amnesty, not unexpectedly, 'received no reply.' The MPLA also obstructed Amnesty's attempts to investigate the condition of Namibian refugees in Angolan camps following the arrest, by SWAPO, of at least 100 of its own members.

I remain willing to discuss the Human Rights situation in Angola with you and to brief you on the background, should you so wish.

6. The Use of Chemical Weapons against Angolans


UNITA has long been aware of the use of chemical weapons by the MPLA and Cubans against Angolan citizens. Many observers have remained sceptical about such allegations because of the lack of detailed, verified evidence; others have been embarrassed about the possible consequences and implications of such revelations, with particular respect to the Soviet Union's role in the manufacture and supply of chemical weaponry to the MPLA regime. The most recent recorded attack involving use of chemical weapons against UNITA was on 20 April 1989 when a squadron of Cuban-piloted MIG 23's, from Menonjue, attacked women and children in Umpalo in the Bie Province of Angola, resulting in ten casualties, including one ten year old, a four year old and a two year old. Symptoms of the casualties were dysphora, vomiting, fainting and chest pains, all consistent with the use of toxic bombs.

UNITA, aware of the need for detailed, verifiable evidence, have commissioned independent chemical warfare experts to undertake 'on site' research and verification, including analysis of samples. Results of their research including detailed evidence will shortly be made available to the public.

7. British Government Policy

UNITA understands that the Prime Minister is personally committed to the Namibian independence process under UN Security Council Resolution 435, symbolised by her presence in Windhoek on 1 April. We believe therefore that there is a major 'window of opportunity' for the British Government and other western powers to launch a new initiative on Angola whose primary objective will be to establish the framework for free and fair elections in Angola. A failure to exploit this opportunity now, will ensure that Angola remains in a state of civil war for many years to come, with the inevitable detrimental effect this will have on the chances of Namibia enjoying a stable future as a newly independent sovereign state. We therefore support and encourage the British Government's present efforts to resolve the Angolan conflict.

I hope that I have explained in enough detail some of the key issues affecting the Angolan people in the last few months. We would obviously appreciate any advice or assistance you may feel able to give in securing our objectives of National Reconciliation in Angola, followed by free and fair elections. If you require any further information please don't hesitate in contacting me.



Isaias Samakuva
UNITA Representative
United Kingdom

PA

File L03DIF

cc MLB
fco



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 May 1989

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 18 May and for your kind comments about my visit to Namibia. I have also been considering the points raised in our meeting on 16 May.

I agree completely on the need for the provisions of the impartiality package to be fully respected. It is an essential part of the settlement plan. As you will now know, the United Nations Secretary General made public the provisions of the package on 16 May. At the same time he called upon all those involved to abide by the terms of this and all other aspects of the UN plan. We have fully supported his efforts to obtain the agreement of the relevant UN bodies to the package. We have been active in trying to ensure observance of the impartiality package in contacts in New York, with SWAPO, and with the governments of neighbouring African countries.

As you know, we are not members of the Council for Namibia and we have never accepted that it is the legal administering authority for Namibia. Under the terms of the impartiality package the Council (and all other UN bodies) is obliged to cease funding SWAPO or any other political party.

SLH

The Council is also obliged to refrain from engaging in public activities. No enforcing action has been taken by the General Assembly since the Council has indicated that it will voluntarily comply with the impartiality package. We shall hold the Council to this undertaking. When the Council issued an unhelpful public statement on 4 May we immediately made a strong protest to the governments of the Council's leading member countries.

In the meantime, the UN Secretariat have assured us that direct UN funding of SWAPO ceased on 31 March and SWAPO representatives are no longer attending UN meetings. We will continue to watch this.

I very much share your concern about SWAPO-held detainees in Angola. It is quite unacceptable that SWAPO should be holding these detainees in such a fashion and denying access to them by independent observers, such as the International Red Cross. We have made our concerns known directly to SWAPO, most recently when Lynda Chalker met their Secretary for Information, Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya, on 19 April. We have spoken on this matter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

We expect both sides to comply with the provision of the United Nations Plan for the release of political prisoners. The United Nations Special Representative has recently written to Mr. Nujoma on this point. We shall make further representations if his letter does not lead to any progress.

You also mention SWAPO cadres which remain in Namibia. I understand the numbers involved are considerably less than the 500-800 you mention. We welcome the South African decision to restrict its forces to base, to proceed with their reduction in accordance with the United Nations Plan, and to use the UN-monitored police only to conduct searches for SWAPO members and arms caches.

I have expressed my views on a multi-party informal meeting in previous correspondence. As I have said before, we would not oppose such a meeting if there was a general wish to have one. However, my priority at the moment is to ensure that the United Nations Plan is fully and fairly implemented.

Lawson

Parsons

Nicholas R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1989

Dear Charles,

Namibia

Thank you for your letters of 16 and 19 May to Bob Peirce concerning Namibia. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Nicholas Winterton's letter of 18 May. It also covers the concerns which Mr Winterton expressed to the Prime Minister in their meeting on 16 May.

Mr Winterton's concerns about SWAPO-held detainees and the impartiality package are ones which we share. We have already taken action on them and will continue to do so.

The impartiality package was drawn up in 1982 by the Western Contact Group in consultation with the Frontline States, Nigeria, SWAPO and South Africa. It is part of the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence and was explicitly listed as such in the UN Secretary General's report of 23 January this year which was, in turn, approved by United Nations Security Council Resolution 632 on 16 February.

The package consists of a series of informal understandings designed primarily to allay South African fears about an alleged UN bias towards SWAPO. These provide inter alia for the UN to cease funding SWAPO during the transition period, for consideration of Namibia at the General Assembly to be suspended and for the UN Council for Namibia (a pro-SWAPO body established by the General Assembly which claims for itself the status of legal administering authority for Namibia until independence) to refrain from public activities. The text of the impartiality package was made public by the UN Secretary General on 16 May.

These provisions have not been enforced by General Assembly resolutions but both SWAPO and the UN Council have undertaken voluntarily to comply with the impartiality package. We are actively holding them to this pledge. The UN Secretariat have assured us that direct UN funding of SWAPO ceased on 31 March and SWAPO representatives are no longer attending UN meetings. On the one occasion so far when the impartiality package was breached (the UN Council issued a public statement on 4 May) we immediately took action with leading member governments of the UN Council (especially the Front Line States).

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The question of detainees held in SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia is equally a matter of concern. SWAPO admitted in 1986 to holding over 100 detainees whom they claim are South African spies. SWAPO's critics allege that the detainees are victims of tribally-based power struggles within the movement. SWAPO insist that the detainees are being well-treated although their persistent refusal to allow independent observers (such as the ICRC) to verify this suggests otherwise.

As the draft makes clear, we have consistently raised this matter in our contacts with SWAPO. We have also brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The United Nations Plan for Namibian independence includes a provision for both sides to release political prisoners. The United Nations Special Representative, Mr Ahtisaari, has recently written to Mr Nujoma urging compliance with this provision. We plan to take further action with SWAPO and the Angolan Government in support of the United Nations' efforts if Mr Ahtisaari's letter does not lead to progress. We have today seen reports suggesting that some SWAPO prisoners have been released.

We would be happy to provide briefing for the Prime Minister in advance of any further meeting with Mr Winterton and his colleagues on Namibia.

Jans,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister
DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference *New Ref:*
~~Z17AFP~~ *PM/11/10*

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Your Reference
PO8ABQ

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:
Nicholas Winterton Esq MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA

Copies to:

LO3BIF

PO

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

Thank you for your letter of 18 May and for your kind comments about my visit to Namibia. I have also been considering the points raised in our meeting on 16 May.

I agree completely on the need for the provisions of the impartiality package to be fully respected. It is an essential part of the settlement plan. As you will now know, the United Nations Secretary General made public the provisions of the package on 16 May. At the same time he called upon all those involved to abide by the terms of this and all other aspects of the UN Plan. We have fully supported his efforts to obtain the agreement of the relevant UN bodies to the package. We have been active in trying to ensure observance of the impartiality package in contacts in New York, with SWAPO, and with the governments of neighbouring African countries.

Enclosures flag(s)

As you know, we are not members of the Council for

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PRIVACY MARKING

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In Confidence

Namibia and we have never accepted that it is the legal administering authority for Namibia. Under the terms of the impartiality package the Council (and all other UN bodies) is obliged to cease funding SWAPO or any other political party. The Council is also obliged to refrain from engaging in public activities. No enforcing action has been taken by the General Assembly since the Council has indicated that it will voluntarily comply with the impartiality package. We shall hold the Council to this undertaking. When the Council issued an unhelpful public statement on 4 May we immediately made a strong protest to the governments of the Council's leading member countries.

In the meantime the UN Secretariat have assured us that direct UN funding of SWAPO ceased on 31 March and SWAPO representatives are no longer attending UN meetings. We will continue to watch this.

very much
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Commissioner for Refugees.

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You also mention SWAPO cadres which remain in Namibia. I understand the numbers involved are considerably less than the 500-800 you mention. We welcome the South African decision to restrict its forces to base, to proceed with their reduction in accordance with the United Nations Plan, and to use the UN-monitored police only to conduct searches for SWAPO member and arms caches.

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Namibia P75



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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BLO WINDHOEK
INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, HAVANA, MOSCOW, LAGOS
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, LUSAKA, HARARE

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

1. VAN HEERDEN CALLED ME THIS MORNING TO ASK US TO RELAY VERY URGENTLY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIM TO GENERAL NDALU. BEGINS.

NEWS REPORTS HERE THIS MORNING STATE THAT PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HAS WRITTEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS INDICATING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA MIGHT NOT PROCEED ACCORDING TO THE AGREED SCHEDULE BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

THIS NEWS HAS CAUSED SOME CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE JUST MANAGED TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ILLEGAL SWAPO INCURSION OF 1 APRIL 1989. YOU WILL KNOW HOW CLOSE WE CAME TO A COLLAPSE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION BECAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT. I AM AFRAID THAT ANY DELAY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE WILL RESULT IN DELAYS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS A WHOLE. WE ARE DEALING WITH A SET OF AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE INTERLOCKED, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS THE ELEMENT OF TIMING IS CONCERNED. ON OUR SIDE THE FINANCIAL ASPECT IS ALSO A HEAVY BURDEN BUT I MUST POINT OUT THAT THE AGREEMENTS WHICH WE CONCLUDED DO NOT MAKE PROVISION THAT ANY PARTY CAN USE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS A REASON FOR DELAYING IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE FROM YOU AN URGENT CLARIFICATION OF THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. HIGHEST CONSIDERATION ENDS.

2. GRATEFUL IF MR GLAZE COULD TAKE ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ANY DELAY IN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT ALSO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435.

RENWICK

YYYY

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY

TO DESKBY 220830Z FCO

TELNO 325

OF 211425Z MAY 89

AND TO DESKBY 220830Z UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, BLO WINDHOEK, LUNADA, WASHINGTON,

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, HAVANA

INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, NAIROBI, HARARE, LUSAKA

NAMIBIA

1. AURET CALLED IN ON HIS RETURN FROM THE JOINT COMMISSION MEETING AT CAHAMA. HE SAID THAT THE OUTCOME REFLECTED SOME IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE SINCE (A) 2 - 300 SWAPO INSURGENTS REMAINED WITHIN THE TERRITORY (B) SEVERAL ARMS CACHES HAD NOT YET BEEN FOUND (C) THE SOUTH AFRICANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ALL SWAPO IN ANGOLA WERE AS YET IN FIXED LOCATIONS UNDER EFFECTIVE MONITORING NORTH OF THE SIXTEENTH PARALLEL. NEVERTHELESS, THOSE HERE WHO WISHED TO HOLD UP THE PROCESS UNTIL THESE PROBLEMS WERE RESOLVED HAD BEEN OVER-RULED. THE PREVIOUS MEETING AT RUACANA HAD GOT STUCK ON SOUTH AFRICAN INSISTENCE THAT THE OTHER DELEGATIONS SHOULD SUBSCRIBE TO A STATEMENT ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SWAPO STAGED ANOTHER MAJOR CROSS-BORDER INCURSION. THIS POINT WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS BOTH FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS AND BECAUSE, WITH THE REDUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES TO 1500 MEN IN TWO BASES BY 1 JULY, THERE WOULD BE NO ONE TO OPPOSE SUCH A CROSSING UNLESS TROOPS WERE MOVED BACK INTO THE TERRITORY. THE SAG HOPED AND BELIEVED THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN. BUT, AS A RESULT OF SWAPO BEHAVIOUR, NAMIBIA WAS NOW A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HERE AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SWAPO CHEATED ON A MASSIVE SCALE AGAIN. THAT ALSO WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT SWAPO DID NOT TRY AGAIN.

2. AURET SAID THAT, TO ALLOW THE PROCESS TO CONTINUE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD MADE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT AND THE CUBANS AND ANGOLANS HAD ACCEPTED THIS. I SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD BE SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF THIS PASSAGE IN PIK BOTHA'S LETTER. I STRONGLY ADVISED THAT THIS SHOULD BE GIVEN IN CONCILIATORY TERMS. AURET SAID THAT HE WAS DRAFTING A REPLY IN THIS SENSE. INTIMIDATION WAS NOW GOING TO BE THE MAJOR PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE DEALT WITH. BUT THEY WERE REFERRING TO THREATS BY RIGHT WING FARMERS AS WELL AS SWAPO AND OF COURSE THE RESPONSE WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH AHTISAARI. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE PLENTY OF WELL DOCUMENTED CASES OF INTIMIDATION ALSO BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

3. AURET SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOW BE PRESSING AHEAD WITH THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES TO 8,000 MEN BY THE END OF MAY AND 1,500 BY 1 JULY. THE DEMOBILISATION OF SIX SWATF BATTALIONS WOULD START NEXT WEEK. AT CAHAMA THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD SEEN A CUBAN TANK BATTALION WITHDRAWING NORTH. THE CUBANS WERE ON SCHEDULE WITH THEIR WITHDRAWAL AND ALDANA HAD AGAIN PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE JOINT COMMISSION.

4. I ASKED ABOUT THE ABOLITION OF DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION. AURET THOUGHT THE PROBLEMS OVER THIS WERE ON THE WAY TO BEING RESOLVED. PIENAAR HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO SOMEWHAT FURTHER THAN HE HAD AT FIRST INTENDED, WHILE AHTISAARI ACCEPTED THAT ALL THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES COULD NOT SIMPLY BE DISMANTLED. THE TASK DURING THE INTERIM COULD NOT BE TO RE-WRITE THE CONSTITUTION: THAT WOULD BE FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

5. THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD AGREED ON THE RELEASE OF 'POLITICAL' PRISONERS AND THIS WOULD APPLY TO PERSONS CONVICTED UNDER THE TERRORISM ACT. BUT THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT AND EMOTIVE ISSUE IN WINDHOEK AND WOULD HAVE TO BE HANDLED VERY CAREFULLY. THE REMAINING DETAINEES WOULD BE RELEASED AS SOON AS SWAPO RELEASED THEIR PRISONERS IN THE DETENTION CAMPS IN ZAMBIA AND ANGOLA. IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT THE ICRC HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THESE CAMPS. PW BOTHA WAS WRITING TO KAUNDA AND DOS SANTOS ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED.

6. AURET SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE RESIGNED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A DEPUTY TO AHTISAARI. THEY ACCEPTED THAT THE BOTSWANA PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WAS LIKELY TO BE THE BEST CHOICE. BUT THEY REMAINED SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE KIND OF ADVICE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS GETTING FROM HIS STAFF IN NEW YORK, ESPECIALLY FARAH AND DAYAL.

COMMENT

7. THE PROCESS IS NOW MOVING FORWARD AGAIN AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE INDEED BEEN OBLIGED TO MAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. THEY ARE NOT CONTEMPLATING UNILATERAL ACTION AND SHEARER WILL, I HOPE, BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE A REASONABLY CONCILIATORY ORAL INTERPRETATION OF PIK BOTHA'S STATEMENT, BUT IF THAT ISSUE IS PUSHED TOO FAR THEY WILL SIMPLY DIG IN AND MAKE CLEAR THAT IF SWAPO CROSS THE BORDER AGAIN IN LARGE NUMBERS, THAT WILL BE THE END OF THE PROCESS.

RENWICK

YYYY

CFLNBN 0114

NNNN



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1989

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Nicholas Winterton MP, about Namibia, following up his meeting with the Prime Minister earlier this week. You will no doubt wish to take account of it in the draft letter to Mr. Winterton which I have already commissioned.

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

h



Handwritten initials

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1989

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 18 May and its enclosure.

Your letter is receiving attention and I shall ensure that you receive a reply as soon as possible.

CHARLES POWELL

Nicholas R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.

Handwritten initials

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)



Private office: 01 219 4402
Secretary: 01 219 6434
Assistant: 01 219 3585

18th May 1989
NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

19/5 pps

Dear Margaret,

My record e pleal

I would like to thank you very much for meeting Rt. Hon. Julian Amery MP, Sir William Shelton MP, George Gardiner MP and myself on Tuesday in order to discuss the situation in Namibia.

Firstly, can I say that it is our view that your visit to Namibia on 1st April probably saved the whole Independence process from total collapse following the SWAPO incursions on 31st March and 1st April. Your visit clearly revealed your total personal commitment to the 435 process, and this, I believe, places you in a unique position to influence developments in Namibia over the next few months. The unfortunate aspect of the SWAPO incursions is that breaches of the Independence and peace process - both the spirit and the letter - may well be overlooked because the only sanction against those parties who breach the agreement is the threat of one party pulling out of the process, which is now highly unlikely. The cumulative effect of a series of breaches will be that the elections on 1st November will be held in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, intimidation and polarisation, and this does not herald well either for peaceful elections or for stability thereafter.

Whereas the United Nations Secretary General is, I am convinced, doing everything he personally can to ensure the process is genuinely free and fair under United Nations stewardship, others within the organisation are working against him and are intent on continuing to support SWAPO as though nothing has happened, and totally contrary to the impartiality package. For instance, the UN financed radio stations in African countries are still broadcasting SWAPO propoganda. Secondly the UN Council for Namibia, which has always been exclusively a SWAPO agency and believes that it is still empowered to administer Namibia affairs until Independence, will only cease aiding and funding SWAPO following an explicit decision by the UN General Assembly. As we indicated to you during our meeting on Tuesday, the Council has denied that it has anything to do with the impartiality package or any agreements which have been reached since Resolution 435 was originally passed in 1978. It is our view that the continuing activities of the UN Council for Namibia fundamentally undermines the impartiality of the United Nations. The British Government should take steps to ensure that the Council for Namibia receives unambiguous instructions from the United Nations Secretary General to adhere to the impartiality package and to cease its activities. Thirdly, SWAPO

/continued



offices abroad are still benefiting from UN financial aid despite the fact that UNSCR.435 is currently in the process of implementation. In short, neither SWAPO nor various agencies within the UN take the agreements reached since 1978 seriously - this despite the fact that the Contact Group takes an opposite view and, moreover, regards them as essential elements within the overall Settlement Plan ensuring that the UN is seen to be impartial and the process is seen to be free and fair.

On the matter of refugees, SWAPO understands as much as anyone else the damage which will be inflicted on its cause following the return of those of its members, numbering several hundreds, whom it has accused of being South African spies and who it has imprisoned in camps in Angola. It is doing everything it can to obstruct the process of the return of refugees, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Secretary General have thus far shown no ability to control the situation. SWAPO continues to refuse to publish the names of those it detains.

A majority of SWAPO cadres who infiltrated between 31st March and 4th April are undoubtedly still in Namibia. They have gone underground, exchanged combat uniforms for civilian clothes, and cached their arms. It is difficult to know exactly how many cadres are in Namibia, 500 at least, possibly as many as 800, and their presence among the local population is clearly a source of intimidation. As long as they remain, the process of free and fair elections will be undermined. It is important that the UN, working with the South West African police, root out these terrorists and their weapons, which include heavy armaments, and send them back to Angola, otherwise elections in Owamboland in particular cannot be free or fair.

The atmosphere in Namibia, following the SWAPO incursions, is not marked by its sense of national reconciliation, so essential if the process is to work and for there to be some consensus in the post-election period when the Constitution has to be determined. In my view, some form of multi-party informal meeting, under impartial chairmanship, would certainly help to assist the process of national reconciliation, as indeed it would in Angola. In addition, all those Namibians who support the concept of a multi-party democracy, democratic ideals and practices, must be given support, financially and otherwise, and SWAPO must be challenged on its commitment to participative democracy and agreeing principles which must apply concerning a post-election Constituent Assembly and Constitution if stability is to be achieved. You may be interested to know that on a mainly German initiative, but with US support and helped by an American, the Foundation for Democracy is to establish an office in Windhoek. I hope that we will be associated, and support this initiative.

There is no doubt that the outcome of elections in Namibia will affect future developments both in Angola and the Republic of South Africa. The right result will produce peace and stability, the wrong result chaos and bloodshed. It is all the more imperative, therefore, that



you, with other Western leaders, ensure that all the parties involved are pressurised into adhering to the letter of the agreements, and that it is made absolutely clear to all the parties that fundamental breaches of agreements will immediately result in postponement and, should they continue, the Western powers would have to withdraw their support for the Independence process.

I enclose, in confidence, a speech which is to be made by Andreas Shipanga, the President of the SWAPO Democrats, whom I know exceptionally well, and he, in the speech, responds to the address to business given by Sam Nujoma's UN representative at a meeting held at the Hyde Park Hotel three weeks ago. I would refer you particularly to page two of this address, which outlines the Marxist/Leninist system which a SWAPO Government would put in place, and which would quickly bankrupt Namibia, for unlike Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in 1980, there are no Exchange Controls in place to prevent the rapid flight of money.

Once again I express my sincere gratitude for the time which you gave to us on Tuesday afternoon, during what was clearly a very busy day for you.

Cons...
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SWAPO'S ECONOMIC POLICY
AND OTHER DEBACLES
(by Andreas Shipanga,
President of SWAPO-DEMOCRATS)

Mr Sam Nujoma has a remarkable talent for miscalculation. His idiocy in believing that the international community would condone even so blatant a violation of the international accords as was perpetrated by PLAN cadres on March 31 and the first few days of April, cost the lives of at least 350 of our young men, caused great suffering to the people of Ovambo, and almost derailed the UN Independence Plan for Namibia, so carefully crafted over the previous twelve months. As AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL noted on April 14, he succeeded in doing "...what Pretoria's generals could not achieve in over two decades of war; to concentrate the mobile SWAPO guerillas inside Namibia where South Africa's superior firepower could eliminate them."

But shocking though this stupidity was, it was not all that Mr Nujoma managed in April. Invited by BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, a prominent consulting group - before his tragic error of judgement at the end of March - to come to London on April 21, to explain SWAPO's policies to an audience of international investors and businessmen, he made two more remarkable mistakes.

Firstly, he snubbed the British Foreign Secretary, with whom an appointment had been arranged with some difficulty, by not turning up in London. SWAPO put about the excuse, later revealed as a lie, that Mr Nujoma was attending a Joint Military Monitoring Group meeting with the South Africans, the Angolans and the Cubans.

Secondly, he approved a speech, presented by Hage Geingob at the BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL conference, which had his distinguished audience shaking their heads in disbelief. As one experienced businessman told me afterwards:

"One could almost have believed that his worst enemy had written the speech, it was so bad. But he did a lot of harm to Namibia. A lot of people left the room thinking that if these were the sort of fools who would be in government after independence, no-one in his right mind would consider investing."

The investment climate in Europe was remarkably positive just a few weeks earlier. Andrew Matjila, Stolla Botha and I visited London, Paris, Brussels and Strasbourg early in April. Apart from many other politicians and businessmen, we met the European Commissioner for Development, Mr Manuel Marin, British Minister of State Lynda Chalker and the President of the European Parliament, Lord Henry Plumb. Although all the dignitaries we spoke to were shocked by SWAPO's violation of the Independence Plan, they were interested in our views, positive about investment opportunities, enthusiastic about Namibia's accession on independence to the Lome IV Treaty between the ACP and EC states, and committed to providing development aid for infrastructural projects, education, housing and health services.

The policies we advocated - putting Namibia's interests first, and seeking to achieve them in partnership with foreign investors and governments - were, without exception, well received. But Mr Nujoma, not content with squandering the lives of our youth in a stupid attempt to claim, after peace and the guarantee of independence had already been won by others, what he could not succeed in gaining through the "armed struggle", then sent Mr Geingob to London to scare off the Western investors who could help develop Namibia's economy and reduce our dependence on South Africa. If it were not so tragic, one would find it ludicrous.

What did SWAPO's leader suggest to his audience of prominent investors?

-Firstly that SWAPO would "...enumerate from the very beginning areas of the economy reserved for the public sector...areas for partnership between the public and the private sectors and areas left to the private sector."

But he failed to do so anywhere in his speech!

-Secondly to place "...key economic activities which act as a fulcrum upon which the rest of the economy revolves...in state hands."

Hardly the sort of message to encourage foreign private sector investment, even if one leaves aside the fact that the metaphor displays a frightening ignorance of the basic principles of physics!

-Thirdly, "...overall planing of the national economy...with the results subjected to periodic evaluation and control." A prescription reminiscent of the disasterous efforts at "central planing and control" of the economies of the Soviet-bloc states, policies which Mr Gorbachev and most other East-bloc leaders are now abandoning.

-Fourthly, "...a system of accountability of leaders at all levels and in various spheres of national life to the people through their institutions." No economic system, other than one based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, would regard this as an economic tenet!

-Fifthly, "...significant regulation of the private sector, including its investment decisions." This excludes the possibility of a market economy and assumes that the leaders of SWAPO know better than businessmen and bankers how to run these enterprises. Mr Frans Indongo, take note! *

-Sixthly, "...effective worker participation in decision-making at enterprise and other levels." A vague proposition, capable of many different interpretations, some of which, like the German notion of "mitbestimmung", or Japanese "participatory management," many of us would support. Unfortunately, in the context in which it is offered here, it is reminiscent of the precepts of Soviet economic doctrine in the Stalinist era, in which the Party dictated to the workers and through them to the bureaucratic managers.

This is the message which SWAPO's President thought fit to offer to an audience of international investors who had each paid 925 Swiss Francs to attend his talk. Even Mr Gorbachev would have chided him for reactionary and outdated thinking. Most potential Western investors quite naturally dropped all thoughts of Namibian ventures in the event of a SWAPO victory.

But, fortunately, relatively few people abroad or in Namibia think that SWAPO will win. The investors are still talking to the rest of us, as are the diplomats and the UN officials. SWAPO is isolating itself, thanks to the mistakes of Sam Nujoma.

Mr Nujoma's next problem is that of the refugees in Angola and Zambia. Having told the world for years that there were 80 000 refugees - and taken money from the UN and international organizations under the pretext that it was necessary to maintain them - he is now unable to produce even half that number. As we have already seen, economics is not Sam Nujoma's strong point! But even if we concede that, it seems unlikely that the donors who have been paying to maintain alleged refugees, will take kindly to the discovery that Mr Nujoma and his friends have been channelling off this aid for other purposes.

Meanwhile, thousands of refugees who left the SWAPO camps years ago and have been living on their own in the bush, have been identified by the UNHCR and are beginning to return to Namibia. Hundreds more are, however, still trapped in SWAPO prison camps, falsely accused of "spying for South Africa", detained without trial, and tortured. Many more have already been killed.

Fortunately for these poor people and their families - and for the good name of all Namibians - human rights organizations the world over have no intention of abandoning the detainees to the fate SWAPO has prepared for them. The United Nations Plan for Namibia makes provision for the release of all political prisoners and detainees, whether they are held in Namibia, Angola or elsewhere. Comrade Sam, your troubles are just beginning!

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FROM AMBASSADOR

NAMIBIA

1. AURET TELEPHONED ME IN JOHANNESBURG THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION WOULD BE GOING BACK TO THE JOINT COMMISSION MEETING IN ANGOLA ON FRIDAY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MOOD. THE MAIN PROBLEM HAD BEEN TO GET ASSURANCES ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SWAPO WERE TO CROSS THE BORDER AGAIN. THIS WAS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE AS THE SOUTH AFRICANS WENT AHEAD WITH THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE TERRITORY TO 1500 MEN BY 1 JULY.

2. AURET SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE SEEKING SOME ASSURANCES FROM THE OTHER PARTIES IN THE MEETING. THEY WOULD ALSO STATE ON THEIR OWN BEHALF THAT IF A REPETITION OF THE SWAPO INCURSIONS TOOK PLACE, SOUTH AFRICA RESERVED THE RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE THE SITUATION. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BEEN MAKING THE POINT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN COULD NOT WITHSTAND A REPETITION OF SWAPO'S BEHAVIOUR. BUT THE FORMULA THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE GOING TO USE ON THEIR OWN BEHALF WOULD REFER TO QUOTE RESTORING THE SITUATION UNQUOTE AND NOT TO TEARING UP THE PLAN. AURET BELIEVED THAT, ON THIS BASIS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PROCESS TO PROCEED AND THINGS TO MOVE AHEAD FROM THIS WEEKEND. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS, IN THEIR VIEW, HAD MADE A CONSIDERABLE CONCESSION IN NOT MAKING IT DEPENDENT ON THE 2-300 SWAPO THEY ESTIMATED TO BE STILL IN THE TERRITORY LEAVING BEFORE THINGS COULD PROCEED.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS. AS WE HAD MADE CLEAR TO PIK BOTHA, WE HAD GIVEN SOUTH AFRICA STRONG SUPPORT AGAINST THE SWAPO VIOLATIONS. BUT IT REALLY WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES SHOULD NOW BE OVERCOME AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435 SHOULD MOVE FORWARD FROM THIS WEEKEND.

MASSINGHAM

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From the Private Secretary

16 May 1989


Joe Bob,

NAMIBIA

bx // The Prime Minister saw four backbench MPs this afternoon, headed by Mr. Nicholas Winterton M.P., to discuss Namibia. I will not record all the points they made since they are very familiar. But they laid particular stress on the continued UN funding for the Council for Namibia which in turn provided aid for SWAPO. They argued that this was inconsistent with the obligation of impartiality which was part of the 1982 package. The Prime Minister has considerable sympathy for their position. She understands that it may be difficult to suspend the assistance given to SWAPO through this channel. But she thinks that at least we ought to make something of a fuss about it and be seen to do so. It would be helpful if you could let me have a bit more background, together with a draft letter to Mr. Winterton on the point.

Another issue which they raised was the return of refugees and the position of what they described as SWAPO political prisoners. Again, neither the Prime Minister nor I know anything much about this. But they allege there are a number of political prisoners held by SWAPO in Angola who ought to be allowed to return to Namibia as refugees and were concerned that not enough was being done by Western powers to exert pressure on SWAPO and the Angolan government to comply with this. It would be very helpful if you could let me have further briefing on this point and include it in the draft reply to Mr. Winterton.

I should emphasise that on both points, the Prime Minister wants us to be seen to be taking some action.

Yours sincerely

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MY TELNO 621: NAMIBIA

SUMMARY

1. DURING A VISIT TO NEW YORK ON 9 MAY, FREEMAN INDICATES THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO RESTRICT THEIR SECURITY FORCES IN NAMIBIA TO BASE ON 13 MAY COME WHAT MAY. EXPECTS THEN TO KEEP TO THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE LAID DOWN IN SCR 435 EXCEPT FOR A SMALL DELAY IN THE DEMOBILIZATION OF SWATF. REVEALS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN REPORTS OF PLANNED SWAPO INFILTRATION ON 3 MAY WERE CORRECT. CONCERNED THAT THE SECRETARIAT IN NEW YORK IS MAKING AHTISSARI'S JOB UNNECESSARILY DIFFICULT.

DETAIL

2. FREEMAN, THE ACTING U S ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICA, VISITED NEW YORK ON 9 MAY. IN ADDITION TO MEETINGS WITH DAYAL (SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CHEF DE CABINET) AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND ANGOLAN MISSIONS, HE BRIEFED A GROUP OF UNTAG TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND, AT HIS REQUEST, CALLED ON ME SEPARATELY FOR A DISCUSSION ON NAMIBIA.

3. THE DECLARED PURPOSE OF FREEMAN'S VISIT WAS THREE-FOLD: TO MAKE LIFE EASIER FOR AHTISAARI BY ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE CONTROL EXERCISED FROM NEW YORK: TO BRING HOME TO AFRICAN AND OTHER DELEGATIONS THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA: AND TO CALM ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE JOINT COMMISSION. THE FOLLOWING NEW POINTS EMERGED DURING HIS BRIEFING OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS:

A) FREEMAN SAID THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD UNDERTAKEN TO WITHDRAW THEIR SECURITY FORCES TO BASE FROM 13 MAY COME WHAT MAY. THAT MORNING THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED DETAILS OF THEIR PLANS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SADF AND THE DISBANDMENT OF SWATF. THESE SHOWED IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP TO THE TIMETABLE LAID DOWN IN SCR 435 EXCEPT FOR A DELAY OF 8-10 DAYS IN THE DEMOBILIZATION OF SWATF (WHICH WOULD BEGIN ON 13 MAY). FREEMAN ADDED THAT AHTISAARI HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON THE MECHANICS OF THE

ELECTIONS: THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WOULD BE ISSUING A DRAFT PROCLAMATION ON THE REPEAL OF DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION ON 9 MAY. B) FREEMAN SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE OF PLANNED SWAPO INCURSIONS ON 3 MAY (MY TELNO 576) HAD PROVED CORRECT. LATE THAT NIGHT THE ANGOLANS AND CUBANS HAD APPREHENDED ABOUT 250 SWAPO COMBATANTS PROCEEDING TOWARDS THE BORDER AND ESCORTED THEM BACK TO THEIR CAMPS AT GUNPOINT. HE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT THE ANGOLANS AND CUBANS WERE NOW TALKING OF MOVING SWAPO NORTH OF THE 15TH PARALLEL AS THEY NOW CONSIDERED THE CAMPS AT LUBANGO AND CHIVEMBA TOO CLOSE TO THE BORDER.

C) FREEMAN HOPED THE JOINT COMMISSION WOULD PLAY A LESS PROMINENT ROLE ONCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD RETURNED TO BASE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NEXT WEEK'S DISCUSSION AT RUACANA, NO MEETINGS WERE PLANNED UNTIL THE END OF JUNE IN LUANDA. AHTISAARI WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE PART AS AN OBSERVER, BUT THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE WOULD BE A PARTY TO ALL THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS: THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS HAD FOUND THEMSELVES LOCKED OUT OF SOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT MOUNT ETJO AND RUACANA.

4. DURING THE BRIEFING FREEMAN WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO SAY THAT AHTISAARI HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. HE TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH DAYAL, HE WOULD BE SUGGESTING TO AHTISAARI THAT HE SHOULD HAVE HIS OWN MAN IN NEW YORK TO ACT AS AN INTERFACE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TEAM. HE WONDERED WHETHER MR WALLACE MIGHT REINFORCE THIS IDEA (WHICH SEEMS USEFUL) WHEN HE NEXT SEES AHTISAARI IN WINDHOEK.

5. THE AMERICANS MENTIONED THAT DAYAL HAD FLOATED WITH FREEMAN THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON NAMIBIA (MY TUR). FREEMAN ENDORSED THE POINTS I HAD PUT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AGREED THAT A CONSULTATIVE GROUP COULD BE USEFUL IN DISSIPATING AFRICAN PRESSURE IN NEW YORK. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SOME OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AMBASSADORS HERE AND REVEALED THAT LUANDA HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF WITHDRAWING THE ZAMBIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (THOUGH THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT PRESS FOR THIS). THE U S MISSION HAS TOLD US THAT DAYAL ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF APPOINTING A DEPUTY TO AHTISAARI (WHICH THE LATTER IS APPARENTLY RESISTING FIERCELY): AND THAT HE TOLD FREEMAN THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS INCLINED TO VISIT NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA IN MID-LATE JUNE.

6. FREEMAN MADE A POINT OF SAYING HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR OUR

EFFORTS TO KEEP THE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT ON TRACK AND PAID PARTICULAR TRIBUTE TO THE EFFORTS OF SIR ROBIN RENWICK AND MR GLAZE.

TICKELL

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South African Embassy

CDP
5/5

5 May 1989

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No 10, Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Private Secretary

Attached please find a copy of a letter from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr R F Botha, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, for your information.

A copy of the letter has been delivered to the Principal Finance Office of the AUSS Department, Mr W R Tomkys.

Yours sincerely

Jean de Bevoise
AMBASSADOR



South African Embassy

Dear Mr Secretary-General

I am perturbed by the views and allegations you conveyed to Ambassador Shearar on 3 May 1989 and which were reflected in your report to a closed session of the Security Council on 4 May 1989. You have lost sight of the elementary fact that SWAPO, and SWAPO alone, was responsible for the current disruption of the settlement process. As you will recall, SWAPO undertook to you in its letter of 18 March 1989, as did South Africa, to abide by its commitments. SWAPO categorically undertook not to engage in tactical movements, cross-border movements and all acts of violence and intimidation in, or having effect in, Namibia.

Surely as long as all SWAPO forces are not confined to base north of the 16th parallel, and, as long as UNTAG cannot verify this fact, SWAPO remains in breach of its commitments to you and to the Security Council. I do not find a single word in your report of 4 May 1989 mentioning this fact or condemning it.

I am constrained to ask you to inform me whether you agree that :

- (a) SWAPO crossed the border in violation of its commitments;
- (b) SWAPO carried heavy arms and military equipment and cached them in Owambo in violation of its commitments;
- (c) SWAPO should have been confined to base north of the 16th parallel as of 1 April 1989;
- (d) SWAPO's confinement to base as of 1 April 1989 should have been monitored by UNTAG;
- (e) As long as UNTAG cannot verify that all SWAPO forces are confined to base north of the 16th parallel, SWAPO remains in breach of its commitments and must be held responsible for disrupting the implementation of the settlement process.

In my letter to you of 8 April 1989, I indicated that if you and the Security Council were of the opinion that there was

a need to renegotiate UNSCR 435 as well as all the other agreements, my Government was in principle prepared to consider such a proposal. The views you express in your report to the Security Council come close to a proposal to that effect. I would be grateful to learn whether this is indeed what you have in mind.

In your report you refer to the decision taken in Cape Town on 28 April 1989 by the Joint Commission allowing for a two-week verification period after which the restriction to base of South African security forces would again become applicable. This matter was fully discussed by the members of the Commission in Cape Town, and this arrangement was agreed upon in the light of the circumstances prevailing in Namibia and the threat posed by the presence of arms caches which were established by SWAPO during the incursions which started on 31 March 1989. As you are aware your Special Representative was present at this meeting.

You lose sight of the fact that it was the Joint Commission which saved the peace process from collapsing. If it had not been for the Mount Etjo Declaration agreed upon by the members of the Commission on 9 April 1989, the entire peace process would have disintegrated.

However, you are in effect implying that SWAPO should be pardoned for one-sidedly violating its commitments and that my Government as well as the Governments of Angola and Cuba should be blamed for taking action to restore the situation as it should have existed on 1 April 1989. There is a clear tendency on your part and on the part of your Special Representative to ignore the agreements reached between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. Without these agreements UNSCR 435 would not have been implemented.

On the one hand you rely on the provisions of UNSCR 435 in requesting that SWAPO should carry small arms. On the other hand you overlook the fact that SWAPO illegally crossed the border carrying large quantities of automatic arms, RPG-7's and surface-to-air missiles and that SWAPO cached much of this equipment. This attitude on your part is not acceptable to the South African Government.

As I am addressing this communication to you there are still SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia. Further, SWAPO has information which indicates that there are still arms caches in Owambo which must be traced. They have located seven caches since the start of the verification period. On 3 May 1989, I supplied information to you and to your Special Representative to the effect that SWAPO was planning further incursions into Namibia. This information emanated from the same source which supplied correct information on 31 March 1989 as to SWAPO positions in Angola preceding their illegal incursions on 1 April 1989. At that time your Special Representative thought that SWAPO would not engage in such a stupid venture. But unfortunately that is exactly what SWAPO did. If SWAPO has now abandoned such plans I would welcome it. But if not, it is your duty and responsibility to

ensure that SWAPO should be brought to its senses. Has the thought occurred to you that the views and allegations in your latest report to the Security Council may in fact encourage SWAPO to repeat its senseless incursions of 31 March/1 April 1989?

I urge you, Mr Secretary-General, to make it clear to SWAPO that it should comply immediately with its commitments. As soon as this is done and is verified by UNTAG in conjunction with the Administrator-General, the settlement process can continue as it was planned.


Mr Secretary-General, ever since the illegal infiltration of heavily armed SWAPO elements into Namibia in contravention of its commitments, the Joint Commission has taken remedial steps to ensure that the settlement process is not fatally damaged. South Africa has done everything that could be expected of it in terms of the agreements it entered into. We have demonstrated the political will and determination to continue with the settlement process. It is, however, not acceptable that other parties who flagrantly violated their commitments should enjoy the protection of the United Nations, as evidenced by statements and actions which we have witnessed over the past weeks. I earnestly request you not to allow a continuation of this situation.

Please accept, Mr Secretary-General, the assurance of my highest consideration.

R F BOTHA

His Excellency Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General
of the United Nations
NEW YORK

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MIPT: NAMIBIA

SUMMARY

1. GOULDING REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CAPE TOWN AGREEMENT WILL CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE RESUMED IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. ADMITS THAT UNTAG IS NOT YET FUNCTIONING PROPERLY BUT CONFIDENT PREM CHAND'S DEPUTY CAN PUT THINGS RIGHT. CONCERNED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN AHTISAARI AND UN HEADQUARTERS. GRATEFUL FOR THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO UNTAG.

DETAIL

2. GOULDING TOLD TOMKYS ON 2 MAY HE WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE JOINT COMMISSION IN CAPE TOWN WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE RESUMPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BEEN UPSET BY THE DECISION TO ALLOW THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL (WE HAVE HEARD THAT AHTISAARI'S STATEMENT ON 1 MAY - WINDHOEK TELNO 153 - WAS ISSUED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INSTRUCTIONS). BUT THIS WAS A REALITY THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD NOW HAVE TO LIVE WITH.

3. GOULDING SAID UNTAG WAS AT PRESENT IN A MESS. NEITHER THE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN COMPONENT WAS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. PREM CHAND HAD AGED PHYSICALLY SINCE 1 APRIL AND WAS SLOW AND INFLEXIBLE. BUT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF REPLACING HIM AND GOULDING WAS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT HIS KENYAN DEPUTY WOULD SUCCEED IN PUTTING THE UNTAG HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER. THIS MIGHT ENTAIL THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESENT MALAYSIAN CHIEF OF STAFF (WHO DID NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH OF PERSONALITY FOR THE JOB), BUT GOULDING WAS FIGHTING OFF ATTEMPTS BY THE AUSTRALIANS AND CANADIANS TO FOIST MORE STAFF OFFICERS ONTO UNTAG. ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE, UNTAG'S LOGISTIC PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY THE END OF MAY, THOUGH THERE WAS STILL A SHORTAGE OF MINE PROTECTED VEHICLES FOR THE POLICE MONITORS.

4. GOULDING SAID HE HAD REPORTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT,

WHILE THE OPERATION WOULD PROBABLY SUCCEED, UNTAG WAS IN FOR A BUMPY RIDE. BOTH SWAPO AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN FOUL PLAY AND THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE VIOLENT INCIDENTS AND RECRIMINATIONS AGAINST THE UN. TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES CHANGES MIGHT NEED TO BE MADE TO THE TASKS UNDERTAKEN BY THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF UNTAG. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN AHTISAARI'S STAFF IN WINDHOEK AND UN HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK, WHICH WERE AT PRESENT VERY STRAINED. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ESTABLISHED A TASK FORCE ON NAMIBIA WHICH WOULD MEET DAILY UNDER HIS (PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S) CHAIRMANSHIP. GOULDING DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD, AS PREVIOUSLY ANTICIPATED, BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR HANDLING THE SUBJECT AT UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL LEVEL.

5. GOULDING COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISPOSITION ON THE THIRTY EIGHT FLOOR TO HAVE ANOTHER PITCHED BATTLE WITH THE AFRICANS. HE WAS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF A VISIT TO NAMIBIA BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (PARA 3 OF MIPT), WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD RAISE THE TEMPERATURE UNNECESSARILY. HIS MAJOR WORRY WAS THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO RETURN BECAUSE OF INTIMIDATION BY SWAPOL, WHICH WAS IN REALITY MORE OF A PARAMILITARY THAN A POLICE FORCE. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY UNTAG WOULD NEED MORE POLICE MONITORS: HE AND AHTISAARI WERE ALSO CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SOME OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE POLICE. AT PRESENT HE WAS NOT CONVINCED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEPLOY ANY OF THE RESERVE BATTALIONS, THOUGH HE WARNED THAT OTHERS IN THE SECRETARIAT THOUGHT DIFFERENTLY.

6. GOULDING WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT WE HAD GIVEN TO UNTAG AND THE ASSISTANCE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MR WALLIS IN WINDHOEK. COLONEL DONALDSON WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB AND WAS WELL REGARDED BY PREM CHAND. FOR THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US TO DO ANYTHING MORE.

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MY TELNO 562: NAMIBIA

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL TO BRIEF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 4 MAY. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL NOT AT PRESENT DISPOSED TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES, BUT OTHER AFRICANS MAY DO SO, PARTICULARLY IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS BEHAVE BADLY OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. BRIEFING BY GOULDING IN MIFT.

DETAIL

2. OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS I HAVE DISCUSSED NAMIBIA WITH ALMOST ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DURING MY BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AS THIS MONTH'S PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. NONE HAS SHOWN ANY DISPOSITION TO BE DIFFICULT. THERE IS HOWEVER SOME CONCERN, PARTICULARLY FROM THE CANADIANS AND BRAZILIANS, AT THE LACK OF INFORMATION REACHING THE COUNCIL FROM THE SECRETARIAT. I HAVE ARRANGED FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A FURTHER REPORT TO AN INFORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON 4 MAY. I HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A REGULAR CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE SECRETARIAT, FOR EXAMPLE BY ARRANGING A MEETING AT WHICH QUESTIONS WOULD BE ANSWERED BY GOULDING (WHO BRIEFED TOMKYS ON 2 MAY, SEE MIFT), OR BY NOMINATING A MEMBER OF GOULDING'S STAFF AS A CONTACT POINT. BUT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL APPARENTLY PREFERS TO KEEP CONTROL IN HIS OWN HANDS: HE SUGGESTED ONLY THAT GOULDING MIGHT RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO HIMSELF AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

3. THE AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL HAVE BEEN LESS RESTRAINED. ACCORDING TO THE MALAYSIANS, THE ZIMBABWEANS HAVE INCLUDED UNHELPFUL LANGUAGE ON NAMIBIA IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE NON-ALIGNED MINISTERIAL MEETING IN HARARE NEXT WEEK (WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED A COPY TOMORROW). THE ZAMBIAN AND GHANAIAN AMBASSADORS TOLD TOMKYS ON 2 MAY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE DECISION BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ON 2 APRIL. THEY URGED

AHTISAARI TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND PROPOSED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL VISIT NAMIBIA TO RE-ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. THE ZAMBIAN, WHO IS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA, HINTED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THE COUNCIL WOULD NO LONGER CONSIDER ITSELF BOUND BY THE IMPARTIALITY PACKAGE. TOMKYS WARNED THAT THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE MATTERS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND URGED RESTRAINT: ZUZE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ON 3 MAY SERVING NOTICE THAT IT WOULD RESUME ITS PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 WERE NOT RESUMED.

5. FOR THE MOMENT THE AFRICANS ARE UNLIKELY TO GAIN MUCH SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THOUGH THEY MAY ENCOURAGE THE ETHIOPIANS OR ALGERIANS TO PUT AWKWARD QUESTIONS DURING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BRIEFING ON 4 MAY. BUT MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OVER THE NEXT 10 DAYS. UNTAG WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE IT IS ACTIVELY MONITORING THE SADF AND BEING GENERALLY MORE ASSERTIVE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. FURTHER SWAPO CASUALTIES WOULD OF COURSE MAKE THE SITUATION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE.

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MY TELNO 269: NAMIBIA

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2. FREEMAN SAID THAT THE CUBANS CLAIMED THAT THEIR WITQDRAWML WAS AHEAD OF SCHEDULETM THEY SAID THAT 6400 MEN HAD LEFT SO FAR AND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WAS CONTINUING AT 900 A WEEK. ALDANA HAD CONFIRMED THAT A FURTHER CONTINGENT WOULD LEAVE THIS WEEK.
3. FREEMAN SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SO FAR HAD DISCOVERED EIGHT ARMS CACHES IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE KNEW ROUGHLY WHERE A FURTHER SEVEN CACHES WERE LOCATED BUT HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT THERE WERE A FURTHER SIX CACHES BEYOND THAT. AT THE CACHES SO FAR DISCOVERED THEY HAD FOUND ONE SAM 7 MISSILE, LARGE QUANTITIES OF SMALL ARMS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, EXPLOSIVES AND NEW UNIFORMS.
4. ON SWAPO IN ANGOLA, FREEMAN SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE CABELLY'S FIGURE OF 7000 NORTH OF THE SIXTEENTH PARALLEL HAD COME FROM (MY TELNO 270). THE U.S. IN FACT BELIEVED GOULDING'S FIGURES TO BE CORRECT, IE ABOUT 4000 NORTH OF THE SIXTEENTH PARALLEL WITH OTHERS MOVING NORTH. SOME OF THE SWAPO ELEMENTS WHICH HAD CROSSED THE BORDER WERE BEING CONCENTRATED AT CHIBEMBA AND WOULD BE MOVED ON TO LUBANGO. THE CUBANS AND ANGOLANS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FRANK IN THE MARGINS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD BEEN EXPERIENCING WITH SWAPO. THE CUBANS HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT SWAPO HAD BEEN MOVED OUT OF THEIR SOUTHERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERS AT PEU PEU AT GUNPOINT. THE CUBANS HAD ALLOCATED CUBAN OFFICERS TO ESCORT PLAN COMMANDERS WHEREVER THEY WENT. THE CUBANS TALKED OPENLY ABOUT THE ''LEADERSHIP PROBLEM'' IN SWAPO AND WERE EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF NUJOMA.
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
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