

Part 2

Confidential File

Prime Minister's visits to Turkey

TURKEY

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Part 1: Feb 88
Part 2: Feb 90

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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Date 13/8/90

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TURKEY: his visit
Rothstein
Pg 2

C. Powell

PRIME MINISTER

HMS ARGONAUT

When you went to the Gallipoli ceremony, you invited members of the Ship's Company of HMS Argonaut to come to No.10 to present you with a chart of the Dardanelles. We have arranged for two of them to come at 1045 tomorrow morning: Lieutenant Commander Wadham, the Marine Engineer Officer and Petty Officer Green. They will be accompanied by Mrs. Dunn, Senior Mapping and Charting Officer from the Hydrographer's Office. Chief Petty Officer Wellings will attend to take photographs of the event. He was present for the reception with President Bush on board HMS Arrow in Bermuda; and will take the opportunity to present you with a commemorative album.

We are arranging coffee and a tour of No.10 after you have met the group briefly.

Details of those coming are in the folder.

C. D. Powell

mt

C. D. POWELL

28 June 1990

A:\foreign\argonaut (pmm)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Charles
a Pres.

MO 25/3/4D

Henry *25th* June 1990
P. Wadham
u

Dear Margaret,

PRESENTATION OF CHART TO THE PRIME MINISTER BY HMS ARGONAUT

We have spoken about the presentation, by members of the ship's company of HMS ARGONAUT, of a chart of the Dardanelles to the Prime Minister at 1045 on Friday 29th June.

The ship has nominated Lieutenant Commander J Wadham (the Marine Engineer Officer) and Petty Officer(M) A R Green to make the presentation and, provided you are content, would also like Mrs E Dunn (the Senior Mapping and Charting Officer from the Hydrographer's Office responsible for producing the chart) to be included in the presentation party. I will let you have CVs for all three by Wednesday.

Chief Petty Officer(Phot) P A Wellings will also attend to take photographs of the event. He covered the naval side of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Bush in Bermuda and I understand you are already aware that he would like to use this opportunity to present the Prime Minister with a commemorative album of photographs taken on that occasion. Please let me know if this causes you any difficulty.

It would be useful if you could let me know when you would like them to arrive and details of any security arrangements they may need to observe.

Yours sincerely
I M Woodman

(I M WOODMAN)
Private Secretary

Margaret Bell
No 10 Downing Street

*cc Bill
Russ*LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN WADHAM

- Lt Cdr John Wadham joined the Royal Navy as a Junior Marine Engineering Mechanic (Second Class) in 1966. After completing basic training at HMS GANGES, he served in a variety of ships including HMS VICTORIOUS, HMS EAGLE, HMS BLAKE and HMS HERMIONE.

- In 1975, he was selected for Mechanician training and was promoted to Chief Petty Officer after further experience at sea. He was commissioned as Sub-Lieutenant in 1983 and following appointments in HMS JUNO, HMS DOLPHIN and HMS INTREPID, was transferred to the general list and promoted to Lt Commander in 1989. He is currently serving as the Marine Engineering Officer on ARGONAUT.

- Lt Commander Wadham is married with two children and lives in Lee-on-Solent.

PETTY OFFICER ANTHONY GREEN

- Petty Officer (Missileman) Anthony Green joined the Royal Navy in 1976. Following completion of his basic training at HMS RALEIGH, in Cornwall, he served in HMS TIGER, HMS BULWARK, HMS RHYL, HMS KENT and HMS LOWESTOFT.
- He was promoted to Petty Officer in 1986 and is currently serving in HMS ARGONAUT, where he is responsible for weapon instruction and ceremonial training.
- Petty Officer Green is married with two children and lives in Portsmouth.

CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PAUL WELLINGS

- Chief Petty Officer Airman (Phot) Paul Wellings joined the Royal Navy in 1967. After completing basic training at HMS GANGES, he was posted to the Photographic School at HMS FULMAR in Lossiemouth and following further training, served in HMS ARK ROYAL, HMS HYDRA and various shore establishments before being promoted to Petty Officer in 1977.

- He then served in Germany as a Close Observation Instructor and in Northern Ireland as part of the Training and Advisory Team. He was promoted to Chief Petty Officer in 1981 and has since served as Chief in Charge of the Fleet Photographic Unit, the Film and Video Department at Portsmouth, and in the Naval School of Photography in the USA. He joined the MOD Directorate of Public Relations (Navy) in 1989.

- Chief Petty Officer Wellings is married with two children and lives in Portsmouth.

MRS ELIZABETH DUNN

- Mrs Dunn joined the Hydrographic Office in 1974, after completing a degree in Geography at Oxford and a Diploma in Cartography at Swansea.
- She has held several posts within the Hydrographic Office, working in areas responsible for Home Waters Charting, North West European Charting and the Admiralty List of Radio Signals, and was appointed Curator of the Hydrographic Office in 1989.
- Mrs Dunn is married and lives in Ilchester in Somerset.

The Memory of Gallipoli

Veterans from both sides meet to recall a fierce campaign

By **PENBERTHY MELBOURNE**


While Vietnamese and Americans mark the 15th anniversary of the end of a tragic war this week, politicians, diplomats and World War I veterans from several countries will gather on Turkey's windswept Gallipoli Peninsula to honor those who fell in another bloody clash of arms.

As a planeload of veterans of the campaign that began on April 25, 1915, left Sydney for the commemoration last week, Prime Minister Bob Hawke told them, "I am glad to say, and you will be very glad to hear, that the planning for the second landing is a definite improvement over the first." Taking a further swipe at British military bungling in the Dardanelles campaign of 75 years ago—troops were put ashore in the wrong places, in chest-deep water, under steep cliffs, in the teeth of withering Turkish fire—Hawke added, "This time around it is an all-Australian affair."

Well, not exactly. Hawke and John Hewson, the head of the Australian opposition, will lead the Gallipoli pilgrimage in a dawn ceremony at Anzac Cove, the name given to a bare Aegean beach by troops of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps after the landings. But British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, New Zealand Governor-General Sir Paul Reeves and officials and veterans from Turkey, France, Canada, West Germany, India and Pakistan and a number of North African countries will also be there. Turkish President Turgut Ozal will preside over the ceremonies at the Cannakale Martyrs Memorial on the peninsula where, between April 1915 and January 1916, half a million troops of the British and French empires, backed by naval gunfire, sought in vain to dislodge 300,000 Turks entrenched on high ridges.

The Allied objective, proposed by Winston Churchill, then Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, was to secure the passage through the strategic Dardanelles straits by ousting the Turks from the peninsula that dominates it. Had they succeeded, the Allies would have been able to open a third front in Europe, isolating the Ottoman Empire from its allies, Germany and Austria, the so-called Central Powers, and relieving German pressure on Czarist Russia. In the end, the Allies withdrew, with

few of their troops having caught more than a glimpse of the strategic waterway during the battles for the Gallipoli heights. By the time they pulled out in January 1916, an estimated 120,000 men—40,000 Allied and 80,000 Turks—had been killed and 250,000 wounded. The withdrawal, in which scarcely a single soldier was lost, was



Preparing for combat: a crucible of nationhood

the Allies' most successful operation of the entire campaign.

Today the barren, 60-mile-long Gallipoli Peninsula is the site of dozens of war cemeteries. On the ridges, trenchworks, though overgrown, remain visible; in the dust of the ravines, bones and pieces of ordnance can still be found. Gallipoli is, as one recent visitor described it, "perhaps the most naturally preserved major battlefield in the world."

The Turkish victory, under such leaders as Lieut. Colonel Mustafa Kemal, later better known as Atatürk, marked the country's emergence as a modern state; in Britain the careers of Churchill, of Sir Ian Hamilton, the commanding general who was eventually sacked, and of a raft of staff officers were set back for the remainder of the Great War.

Yet the heroic failures of the Australians and New Zealanders at Gallipoli, in what were actually diversionary landings for the benefit of British forces coming ashore at Cape Helles, 13 miles to the south, are etched in memory. Year after year, their effort is marked in both countries by a national holiday, with dawn services in every town and hamlet.

As Hawke pointed out last week, the long casualty lists from Gallipoli raised national consciousness in Australia, then still a British dominion, and increased a sense of bonding on a far-off continent where six small British colonies had uneasily come together in a federation only 14 years earlier. The memories of the few surviving Gallipoli veterans, most now well into their 90s, are not always sharp, but inevitably they talk of the "mateship" that sustained them in the face of sniper and artillery fire, hunger, thirst, lice and disease in the trenches. While the Australians distinguished themselves as hard-bitten fighters, they did not accept British discipline. Coming from a country that thought of itself as egalitarian, they would not salute British officers and addressed their own by their first names. "They were superb to lead, but could not be driven," one Australian officer recalled.

At places like Anzac Cove, Shrapnel Gully, Lone Pine and a ridge called the Nek, the 50,000 Australians who went ashore at Gallipoli suffered 26,000 casualties, including 8,000 dead; of the 18,000 New Zealanders who fought there, 2,700 were killed and more than twice that number wounded. Although Anzac casualties accounted for only a quarter of the Allied dead in the Dardanelles campaign, their 50% casualty rate was two to three times as high as that of the entire Allied force. The reason: they were trapped longer in some of the most rugged and difficult terrain on the peninsula after the main British landings, first at Cape Helles and later at Suvla Bay, had failed to carry offensives forward. Though 46,000 Australians and 13,000 New Zealanders were later to die in France, it is Gallipoli that Australians and New Zealanders remember as their crucible of nationhood.

Said Australian veteran Walter Parker, 95, who is attending this week's ceremony: "We achieved this much: that we were an Australian nation and could make an account of ourselves. This was the only good thing that came out of it. The loss of life was very terrible. I didn't know for many years just how many we had lost."

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

Ans.
8,000
N. 2,700

MEETING RECORD

CONFIDENTIAL

File ARW

Subject cc MASTER



b.c. P.C.
B

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

25 April 1990

From the Private Secretary

See Record.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
OF TURKEY

The Prime Minister had an hour's talk with the President of Turkey immediately after the Gallipoli International Ceremony this morning. President Ozal was accompanied by the Turkish Prime Minister, Ambassador H. Celem (Political Director), Ambassador Kaya Toperi and Mr. Mabi Sensoy. HM Ambassador, Ankara, was also present.

Introduction

The Prime Minister congratulated President Ozal on the ceremony, and his speech which had struck just the right note. President Ozal said that he hoped it would encourage younger people to continue to take an interest in the history of the Gallipoli campaign.

East/West

The Prime Minister said it might be helpful to have a talk about developments in East/West relations. She had recently had a thorough discussion with President Bush in Bermuda. He had been admirably firm on the need to keep NATO as the main forum for the West's defence. He was also determined that a united Germany should be a member of NATO. Both she and the President had detected some hardening of Soviet attitudes in recent weeks. The military seemed to have been growing in influence and new difficulties had cropped up in arms control negotiations. She and the President both agreed that it would be useful to have an early NATO summit, and this might possibly be held in London. She had herself formed some ideas for developing the CSCE as a forum for East/West discussion.

President Ozal said that he had seen the President in January and had urged him to do everything possible to keep American forces in Europe. There were far too many uncertainties for us to be able to release our defences. He expected many new problems to emerge, particularly in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was already beginning to break up. The Russians had been unjustifiably severe in their treatment of the Azerbaijanis. They had treated the Lithuanians rather better,

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but he did not think Gorbachev could afford to let them leave the Soviet Union at this stage. He did not believe the Russian empire should continue in the long term, although equally he found it hard to see how there could be a peaceful transition to something new. Meanwhile the Soviet economy was in even worse shape than three years ago and Gorbachev seemed to be at the point of no return.

The Prime Minister said she was convinced the Lithuanian problem could be resolved by discussion. She did not think it had been well handled on either side. If the Russians continued to escalate their measures against Lithuania, it might be necessary for the United States and Europe to slow down some of our trade dealings with the Soviet Union. President Ozal asked what would happen if, against all the odds, President Gorbachev were to allow the Lithuanians their independence. Would the West help them? His own view was Lithuania was not viable economically. The Prime Minister said that she thought any help would be fairly minimal. We must not encourage the Lithuanians to have exaggerated expectations.

President Ozal asked whether the Prime Minister thought Gorbachev would survive. The Prime Minister said that she thought on balance he would, but only by adopting more hardline policies. Mr. Ozal said that he had some doubts, although this was just a personal feeling. There had been two types of Tsars in Russian history, the cruel and the kind, and the cruel were always more popular. Democracy had no roots in the Soviet Union.

German Reunification

President Ozal asked whether German reunification was giving rise to problems for the European Community. His own fear was that the proposed Monetary Union between the two Germanies would be inflationary. The Prime Minister said there was no doubt that in 10 years' time Germany would be the dominant country in Europe. President Ozal asked whether Germany was nationalistic. The Prime Minister said she frequently found herself in hot water for answering that question. But she thought it important that the rest of us should all stick together.

Turkey and the European Community

President Ozal said that he had first discussed Turkey's aspiration to join the European Community with the Prime Minister on his visit to London three years ago. He did not want to go over that ground on this occasion. He would only say that wider developments in Europe should make it possible for Turkey to achieve Customs Union by 1995. The Prime Minister said the Community could certainly not contemplate any further enlargement until the Single Market had been completed. But we were anxious to see the Fourth Financial Protocol implemented. President Ozal said cheerily that this was peanuts: Customs Union was what he was after. The Prime Minister said she had got the point.

Cyprus

The Prime Minister said that the United Nations Secretary-General had asked her to raise the Cyprus problem with President Ozal. It had been most unfortunate that the recent talks in New York had broken down. But it had quite clearly been Denktash's fault: she had not said this before, but this time there was no doubt about it. The main point she wished to establish was

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whether she and President Ozal still shared the same objective of a single state of Cyprus, which was bizonal and bicomunal. Partition had never solved anything and it would be a great mistake to make it an objective. If the objective remained a single state of Cyprus, then we could get the show on the road again. President Vassiliou offered a much better prospect of a settlement than any other likely President of Cyprus.

President Ozal said that Turkey certainly accepted the objective of a bizonal and bicomunal state with equal political rights. But a federal Cyprus must be very carefully planned. The division was not between two halves of one people but two antagonists. If the constitution of a new Cyprus was not designed well and there was again a confrontation, Greece and Turkey would inevitably come face to face. He could assure the Prime Minister that Turkey was not trying to make partition the end result: he had enough problems in the Aegean without that. But any new arrangements would need understanding if they were to work, and that would take time. Central government should have minimal powers, with as many as possible devolved. He had to deal with the reality of the situation. Recent opinion polls had shown that 80 per cent of people in the Turkish part of Cyprus did not want to become part of a unified state. We also had to recognise that Denktash was a very different man from Vassiliou. The latter was very businesslike, but Denktash emphatically was not. Why did the Prime Minister not talk to Denktash? The Prime Minister said she had no aspiration to be a mediator. What we all had to do was help the United Nations Secretary-General find a solution before the end of his term of office. President Ozal noted that the Prime Minister ought to hear the other side of the story. The Prime Minister said it had clearly not been President Vassiliou's fault the talks had broken down. President Ozal said he agreed with that. But it had not been a very good idea to hold the talks immediately before elections in the northern part of Cyprus. That was the worst possible time to try to bring pressure on Denktash. The Prime Minister concluded that she was pleased that she and President Ozal were still pursuing the same objective. She found that a hopeful sign.

Human Rights

The Prime Minister said she was regularly asked in Parliament about human rights in Turkey. She had always quoted President Ozal's earlier assurances to her that he was doing his best to overcome the problems which existed. President Ozal said there had been tremendous improvements since 1983 although there were still some incidents. These were not the result of any action by the government but of mistakes made by the police and security forces. However, the great bulk of the allegations made by Amnesty International were lies. The Prime Minister might be interested to know a human rights commission was being established in the Turkish parliament. The Prime Minister said she was grateful for these comments, which she would quote.

Midland Bank

The Prime Minister said there was a problem over obtaining authorisation for Midland Bank to operate in Turkey. She found this inexplicable, given that three Turkish banks were operating in London and no British banks in Turkey. President Ozal said that life would be easier if the Bank of England would explain precisely what the problem was. The Prime Minister said she would arrange for the President to receive details of the

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criteria which had to be met under the Banking Act and the interpretation which the Bank of England put upon them. President Ozal concluded by saying: "in any event, I will help you".

Iraq


The Prime Minister thanked President Ozal for Turkey's help in intercepting parts of what we believe to be a super gun destined for Iraq. President Ozal said that he hoped the consignment could be returned to the United Kingdom. But there were some legal difficulties. These could only be resolved if the company itself sent instructions to the haulier to bring the load back. It was agreed that the Ambassador would pursue this with the Turkish authorities.

Commercial relations

The Prime Minister recalled that she had sent President Ozal a message about British Aerospace's bid for Turksat. We had been grateful for the award of the contract for military radios to GEC/Marconi. President Ozal did not respond directly to this but suggested the UK might like to undertake the possibility set for the Dardanelles Crossing. This would be bigger than the Bosphorous Bridge.

The Prime Minister had to leave for the British ceremony at this point.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), Paul Tucker (Bank of England) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. D. Powell', with a horizontal line underneath.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MEETING RECORD

Subject cc RASTER

CONFIDENTIAL



File ARW

see PC
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 April 1990

De Raster

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a talk in Gallipoli this afternoon with the Australian Prime Minister. Mr. Hawke was accompanied by no less than four officials - to his evident annoyance. Since he and the Prime Minister had already sat next to each other at lunch, they had exhausted a good number of topics before their meeting, notably East/West relations, developments in the Pacific and Hong Kong.

Introduction

The Prime Minister expressed condolences for the damage caused by the recent floods in Australia.

Mr. Hawke said how very grateful he and all the Australian people were of our decision to let them have an original copy of the Australia Constitution Act.

Arms Sales

Mr. Hawke said that he would like to raise the question of arms sales in the Asia/Pacific region. He thought that his officials had been rather over-ambitious in some of the proposals which they had put to us. But Australia had a number of genuine concerns about the consequences of selling sophisticated weapons to various countries in the region, particularly Indonesia. The Americans made a practice of consulting the Australians before making any significant sales in the area. To take another example, Australia had at one stage thought of selling its redundant Mirage aircraft to Argentina, but it desisted following representations from us. All he was seeking was some sort of informal understanding that we would inform Australia before making any major arms sales in the region. The Prime Minister asked whether there was really a problem: or was it just a piece of additional bureaucracy? Mr. Hawke admitted that he did not see any real threats to Australia. But there was some unease about Indonesia in the long term. The Prime Minister asked whether the Australians were worried about Japan's military potential. Mr. Hawke denied this. The Prime Minister said that we would not want to lose any sales unnecessarily. She would think about Mr. Hawke's suggestion and let me have an

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answer.

Vietnamese Boat People

The Prime Minister said that the Australians had been marvellously helpful over Vietnamese Boat People and we were grateful. Mr. Hawke said that Australia took more refugees per capita than any other country in the world and was really doing as much as she could.

Uruguay Round

The Prime Minister said that the Uruguay Round was not making as much progress as we would wish. She recognised that the EC was in part to blame for this, although we were putting every effort into securing a reasonable EC position. Mr. Hawke said that we very much appreciated Britain's role. It was very important to complete the negotiations by the end of the year. He hoped we would keep up the pressure on the other Europeans. The Prime Minister said she had recently discussed the prospects with President Bush, and was intending to raise the subject at the informal meeting of EC heads of government on 28 April in Dublin. It would also be a major subject at the Economic Summit.

Political Union

Mr. Hawke asked how the Prime Minister assessed the views of the other EC countries on the French and German proposals on political union. The Prime Minister said she thought they would mostly be in favour, although no one seemed to have a clear idea what political union meant. She found it rather like boxing against a feather mattress.

Cambodia

The Prime Minister said that she had discussed Cambodia with the UN Secretary General recently and he was rather uneasy about the scale of the commitment which the United Nations was expected to undertake. Mr. Hawke said that the main problem blocking progress was the intransigence of the Khmer Rouge. Australia nonetheless intended to continue with its practical work in the hope that progress could be made.

South Africa

The Prime Minister said she hoped Mr. Hawke was well satisfied with the progress made in South Africa. Mr. Hawke said he had welcomed President De Klerk's measures early and publicly, but he was still suspending judgment. The main pillars of apartheid remained in place. Moreover some of De Klerk's recent speeches had been less helpful, in particular his statement that there would never be black majority rule. The Prime Minister said she was much more worried by Mr. Mandela's constant reassertion of the armed struggle, the need to intensify sanctions and the support for nationalisation. Mr. Hawke said the Prime Minister should not take these too seriously: it was clear that De Klerk was not too worried about them. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mandela's place was at home and his first priority should be to stop the violence between the ANC and Inkahtha.

Mr. Hawke said that the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa would meet in May. They would need

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some indication of further movement if there was to be any question of relaxing measures against South Africa.

Antarctica

Mr. Hawke asked whether the Prime Minister's thinking on Antarctica had evolved. There was growing international support for the Australian plan to turn Antarctica into a protected area. The Prime Minister said the proposed Minerals regime was the quickest way to ensuring that Antarctica would not be developed without the agreement of all the countries concerned. Mr. Hawke said he found this argument hard to credit. He hoped the Prime Minister would reconsider her position.

Middle East


Mr. Hawke asked whether President Bush had shown signs of renewed determination to make progress on the Arab/Israel problem. He had heard some reports that the US was toughening its position. Some of Senator Dole's remarks had seemed to point in that direction. The Prime Minister said that she did not think that, in the end, the Americans would ever cut off finance to Israel although President Bush had been taking quite a robust line. Settlement of Soviet Jews in the Occupied Territories was a matter of particular concern. Mr. Hawke said he hoped the Israelis would change their political system: the present political impasse was ridiculous.

Conclusion

The Prime Minister said that, all in all, things were moving pretty much the right way. Mr. Hawke agreed that the world was a much better place than five years ago.

Mr. Hawke said he wanted to thank the Prime Minister again for the marvellous visit he and his Ministerial colleagues had paid to London last year. The Prime Minister said that we must do it again.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).



(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MEETING RECORD

Subject CC MASTER

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File
JRW

cc. PC
B)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 April 1990

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister before the Gallipoli Ceremonies today. Mr. Akbulut was accompanied by two or three officials. HM Ambassador, Ankara was also present.

Introduction

The Prime Minister recalled that she and Mr. Akbulut had met briefly at the last NATO summit. Mr. Akbulut referred to the Prime Minister's successful visit to Turkey some two years previously.

NATO Summit

The Prime Minister said that she had discussed with President Bush the possibility of a NATO Summit in the next few months, possibly in London. Mr. Akbulut agreed that, at a time when Europe's future was being shaped, such a summit could be beneficial. The Prime Minister said the main purpose would be to confirm that a united Germany would be part of NATO and to underline continuing commitment to defence. Mr. Akbulut agreed that NATO must maintain its unity and strength but we were still a long way from achieving a complete relaxation of tension in Europe. NATO would continue to have an important role.

Middle East

The Prime Minister said she understood Mr. Akbulut had recently visited Iran and would shortly be visiting Iraq. We were grateful for the Turkish government's help in intercepting a delivery of parts for the Iraqi super gun. She wondered what impression had been formed of relations between Iran and Iraq.

Mr. Akbulut said he had received a constructive and positive impression of Iranian intentions. They appeared somewhat more flexible in their approach to a peace process, although there was still a deep distrust of Iraq. Turkey had been trying for a long time to help achieve a solution. He was not expecting any sudden breakthrough. But it was clear that Rafsanjani wanted to concentrate on putting the Iranian economy to rights: and as part of this was looking to soften and normalise relations with

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the West. The Prime Minister agreed that things were going in the right direction with Iran, although only slowly.


Bilateral Relations

The Prime Minister said that trade between Britain and Turkey was going well. Mr. Akbulut agreed, adding that Britain was an important investor in Turkey. He thought it was the right time for the two countries to conclude an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. The Ambassador pointed out that the negotiations for this had been stuck at the technical level for some three years. The Prime Minister said that we should tell our respective officials to sort matters out within a fixed timescale. The difficulties would not go away by sitting and staring at them. Mr. Akbulut said that he agreed with this approach.

The Prime Minister said that we had been very grateful when Turkey had bought military radios from GEC/Marconi. We were also hoping they would accept British Aerospace's offer for a Turksat.

The meeting had to break at this point, to enable the two Prime Ministers to attend a Gallipoli International Ceremony.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C. D. Powell', with a large, stylized flourish at the end.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher


Gallipoli, April 25th, 1990

Dear Sir,

Please accept my sincere apologies for bothering you with a request on behalf of my son (Çağrı İcen Arsin, 15, until last year a pupil of the British International School, Oslo) who, having once asked me to take the enclosed snapshot at Madame Tussaud's, has now urged me to try my best to get it autographed by Her Excellency as a souvenir of my escort officer's assignment during the visit to Turkey of the greatest stateswoman of our times on the occasion of the 75th anniversary ceremonies of the British and ANZAC landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

I would remain ever grateful if you were so kind as to submit the afore-mentioned request and photograph to Her Excellency's attention while at the same time communicating to her my and Çağrı's most profound admiration, affection and respects.

Best regards,


Ali Arsin

Private address :

Abidin Daver Sok. 19/6
Çankaya
TR-06550 Ankara
Turkey

Encl. (1) photo

Ali Arsin
Head of Department
at the
Directorate General for the
European Communities

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ankara

SPEECH BY THE GOVERNOR OF ÇANAKKALE

Mr. President,
Mr. Governor General,
Prime Ministers,
Ministers,
Veterans,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are assembled here to commemorate the 75 th anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign, to pay our respects and to express our gratitude to those soldiers who fought gallantly and fell for their countries at a young age as well as those veterans of the Campaign.

I have great pleasure to see that the representatives of the countries that have taken part in one of the fiercest battles of history, have united here with feelings of mutual friendship, respect and affection.

I have further pleasure to express here, also as behalf of the people of this historic and beautiful corner of our country which is protected as a "National Park" as it carries most vivid memories for all of us here and especially for the veterans among us, our deep appreciation to have the opportunity of hosting this meaningful ceremony.

With these sentiments I would like to welcome all our distinguished guests and especially all the veterans who are present here.

SPEECH ON BEHALF OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES

Governor General, Mr. President, Distinguished Guests, Heroes and Veterans, Members of the Armed Forces of Allied and friendly countries. It is my great pleasure to extend to you all a most heartfelt welcome.

Today we live through the pride and happiness of remembering for the first time in such a glorious manner, those who have lost their lives and reached the ranks of martyrdom by fighting heroically to defend the ideals they believed in. The presence among us, in such a friendly and brotherly atmosphere of those of you belonging to nations which at the time were taking part in these wars and which are now all, our friends, even allies, provides a great and particular contribution to the meaning of this day.

When we take a look at the world political conjuncture reigning at that time, we will all recall that, the race of armaments between the blocks and the balance of power which accompanied it at the beginning of the 20th century-enabled Europe to live through a period of "armed peace" for a while. But afterwards confrontations among nations due to economic and other reasons strained their relations and the war of 1914-1918 ended up with changes of a considerable scale on the political map of Europe.

As a result of these developments and changes some empires in Europe ceased to exist and a number of new states have been created. Çanakkale wars which took place within the framework of the 1st World War, affected the destiny of this war and caused it to procrastinate.

The Turkish straits consist of a region which include the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles along with the sea of Marmara. They constitute a link between the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the warm waters, they are a crossing point of sea and land lines of communication and as such, are one of the main arteries of the world's trade and transport roads. Throughout history, the Turkish straits have been an active element affecting continuously the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Balkan region

strategies and policies of many nations and consequently played an important role on the national economies, foreign policies, the military activities and power displays of these nations directed to the region. For the Black Sea countries, the Turkish straits constitute a naval exit, but also a barrier against the external threat to these same countries.

Because they affected the interest of many countries, the Turkish straits for centuries, have continuously carried a strategic importance.

In this context the point which should not be forgotten is the fact that the Turkish straits are the exclusive waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and are in a position to constitute a bridge linking Europe and Asia.

The straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale are, for Turkey, a matter of existence, integrity, sovereignty, and security. Consequently, in the course of the historical evolution the straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale have often become a stage for political rivalries and conflicts. The cost of being the stage, once again, for such conflicts in 1915 during the first World War, was the loss of nearly half a million adult lives. Despite all this, however, in terms of their effects and historical consequences, the Çanakkale Battles have not only changed the fate of the Turkish nation, but also affected the general course of the events in the 20th century and constituted an important turning point in the histories of the participating nations.

The two important consequences of the Çanakkale battles have been their role in the emergence of the New Republic of Turkey, and their contribution to the foundations of the friendship amongst the participant countries.

Distinguished Guests,

In the first instance, Çanakkale Battles constitute the clear proof of the continuation of the Turk's power which was believed to be exhausted. This battle, while proving to the nations of all the world that moral power and patriotism were assets more valuable and more efficient than all sorts of financial power and armed strength, it also constituted the start of the struggle for liberation and independence all around the world.

The great success that the Turkish nation achieved in Çanakkale by restituting the confidence of the nation and by strengthening its moral has played an important role in preparing the psychological atmosphere and in winning the victory in the Turkish independence war.

Another important aspect of the Çanakkale battles for us and for the nations of the world is the emergence of Atatürk, as the great commander and statesman who changed the course of the battle, and who registered his name on the pages of history with this battle.

Although 75 years have passed, the importance and the magnitude of Çanakkale battles have not diminished, on the contrary; they paved the way for scientific studies of the future generations in historical, military, social and political areas.

When building up a friendship, a harsh and difficult struggle is required so as to create a strong relationship. Thus, with this difficult struggle, we were involved in 1915, we succeeded to create the present with the nations we fought.

These feelings of friendship developed between foes determined to kill each other and more particularly their emergence on the battlefield in Gallipoli carries an extraordinary importance. The two parties who, in those days have fought each other in the most gentlemen like manner, had laid the foundations of a strong friendship which would develop later. In this respect the Çanakkale battles present and importance of their own. Scenes like the Turkish officer who while trying to dress his own wound used half of his bandage to dress the wound of the seriously wounded French officer, cooperation between the two sides in digging mass graves, chatting with each other, exchanging cigarettes, badges, and other similar gifts during the lulls, served to form the first foundation of this friendship.

With casualty figures reaching 500 per killometer square, Çanakkale wars are one of those with heaviest losses in the history. However, these battles which have now become legends and taken their distinguished place in the history, have also proved that those nations which possess sons who are determined to shed their blood, to sacrifice their lives when necessary to defend their country, its independence, its freedom and the ideals they believe in; will be entitled to live for the eternity, honourably and in dignity.

The monuments which are here, keeping alive the memories of the heroism of the soldiers who have fought valiantly in a narrow field in Çanakkale, rise today as a symbol of pride and honour. The immortal spirits of 500.000 young men who fought heroically against each other, rest side by side in a deep silence and peace against the breeze of the Aegean sea. I would like to remind once again the words of great Atatürk about the feelings of the Turkish Nation for the soldiers of allied forces who lost their lives in Çanakkale battles.

"Those herdes that shed their blood and lost their lives... you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmeds to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours.... You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well."

With these feelings, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Turkish armed forces, I commemorate with great respect those who lost their lives in these battles wish god's mercy to all martyrs and express my gratitude to war veterans alive.

SPEECH BY H.E. İ. SAFA GİRAY, MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE OF TURKEY

Mr. President,
Mr. Governor General,
Mrs. Prime Minister
Mr. Prime Minister,
Excellencies,
Esteemed Veterans,
Distinguished Guests,

We are gathered here today to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign which has a distinct and important place in the history of our nations.

It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the commemoration ceremonies of this Campaign which was one of the firecest battles of the First World War but at the same time one in which the distinct virtues inherent in mankind were so widely displayed.

It is a true pleasure and honor indeed to have a very high level representation from all countries involved in this battle. But, to have the veterans among ourselves who did the actual fighting, now with friendly and brotherly feelings towards each other gives us reason for special joy and adds to the meaning of this ceremony.

History is the best teacher if we know to make use of it. Comprehension and correct interpretation of the past, illuminates the future. One of the very fundametal qualities that makes a community a Nation is the existence of a sense of history. Nations are glorified as long as they accept their own past in its entirety and pay tribute to those who had contributed to its making, passing this on to the future generations.

These are precisely the reasons why our togetherness here in friendship and solidarity to mark the 75th anniversary of the Battles of Gallipoli is so important.

With these commemorations, we pay tribute and respect to all those fine young men who had sacrificed their lives on this soil for their ideals and their country and to all our veterans. I salute with due respect those who had fallen here and the veterans still alive.

./..

I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to all those, and in particular to the members of the Returned Services League of Australia, Returned Services Association of New Zealand, Royal British Legion of the United Kingdom and the Turkish Veterans Association who have always contributed not only to keep alive the memories of the Battles of Çanakkale but also to nourish and pass on to the future generations the feelings of friendship and mutual respect based on the solid foundations of these memories.

I would like to take this opportunity to make another point. Mustafa Kemal, the distinguished Commander at Çanakkale , formulated the fundamental principle of the Turkish Republic as "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad". We strictly adhere to this principle. To prevent the re-emergence of conditions compelling us to fight other wars, we are also making an effort to modernize our armed forces, thus to have them as a supportive pillar of our peace policy based on deterrence and stability around us. What we really owe to the fallen who lie here is to establish a strong and durable world peace, to maintain it and to make every contribution towards this end. In this connection, I cannot overemphasize my happiness over the fact that, in cooperation with all countries sharing peace and democracy ideals, we are making every effort for the realization of this goal at various fora.

YENİ ZELANDA GENEL VALİSİ TARAFINDAN 25 NİSAN 1990
TARİHİNDE GELİBOLU SAVAŞLARINI ANMA TÖRENİNDE YAPILAN
KONUŞMA

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Turgut Özal,
Milli Savunma Bakanı Sayın Safa Giray, Çanakkale Valisi Sayın
Muzaffer Ecemiş, birçok ülkeden gelen değerli Konuklar,

Konuk Delegasyonların heyet başkanları adına, bu sabah
dinlediğimiz ve hepimizi duygulandıran "hoşgeldiniz"
konuşmalarına cevap vermekten onur duymaktayım.

Bundan 75 yıl önce 19. Türk Tümeninin komuta karargahı
Çanakkale'de bulunuyordu. Komutanları genç bir yarbay olan
Mustafa Kemal'di. Eğer Müttefik kuvvetlerin generalleri onun
askeri sicilini ve özellikle daha üç yıl önceki Balkan Savaşları
sırasında Gelibolu Yarımadasını nasıl parlak bir şekilde
savunduğunu incelemiş olsalardı, ileride karşılaşacakları
güçlükler konusunda daha gerçekçi bir değerlendirmede
bulunabilirlerdi.

Müttefiklerin, Çanakkale Boğazındaki savunmayı arkadan
kırmaya çalışarak İstanbul ve Karadeniz yolunu açmak
istemelerinin kendileri yönünden geçerli stratejik nedenleri
mevcuttu. Sonuç ise, her iki taraf için de maliyeti çok yüksek
olan ümitsiz bir hareket olmuştur. Mustafa Kemal, müttefik
kuvvetleri çıkartma yaptıkları köprü başlarında mahsur tutmayı
başarmıştır.

Bu yarımadanın koylarına çıkartılan müttefik askerlere
gelince, onlar için bu iddialı stratejik plan fazla önem
taşımamaktadır. Onlar için sadece şu iki soru çok önemli idi.
Karşılarındaki Türk hasımlarının ne kadar güçlü ve yenilmez,
kendi silah arkadaşlarının da ne kadar iyi bir asker oldukları.

Her iki sorunun cevabını da kısa zamanda aldılar.
Burada, dikenler, çalılar ve kumlar arasında, sıcağa ve soğuğa
karşı, bıkkınlık ve her gün karşılaşılan mahrumiyetler ölüm ve
yaralanmalar içinde 1915 yılının Gelibolusunu tanıdılar ve bazı
hususlar aydınlığa kavuştu.

Türk askeri güçlü, dayanıklı ve cesaretli idi. Müttefik kuvvetler de aynı meziyetlere sahip bulduklarını gösterdiler. Yeni Zelandalı asker, Avustralyalı silah arkadaşının cesaret ve atılganlığına saygı duydu. Böylece bu topraklarda Anzak ruhu ve efsanesi doğdu. Askerler kendi bekaları için arkadaşlarına güvenmeyi öğrendiler.

Bundan 75 yıl önce buraya geldiğimizde pek tabii ki davet edilmemiştik. Bugün ise Türk Hükümetinin konukları olarak burada toplandık. Daha sonra Atatürk adıyla modern Türkiye'nin kurucusu olan Mustafa Kemal'in aşağıdaki sözlerinden cesaret almış olarak geri geldik.

" Bu memlekette kanlarını döken kahramanlar, burada bir dost vatanın toprağında-sınız. Huzur ve sükun içinde uyuyunuz."

Bugün, hayatlarını kaybedenleri saygı ile anıyoruz ancak onların bize verdikleri dersi de idrak ediyoruz. Eşlerini kaybeden kadınların, dul kalan anaların, babasını hiç tanıyamamış çocukların, sakat kalan erkeklerin insanlık için teşkil ettikleri kaybı dikkate aldığımızda, savaştan beklenebilecek yararların, ödenmiş olan bedeli karşılamayacağını anlıyoruz.

Savaşları şanlı olaylar olarak takdim etmek mümkün değildir. 1914 yılında Yeni Zelanda'daki uzak bir çiftlikte yaşayan bir genç orduya katılmak için 48 saat hiç durmadan at koşturmuştu. Onun için bu bir macera idi. Bugün bu olayın tekrarlanabileceğine inanmıyorum. İnsanlar artık bu konuda çok daha sağlıklı düşünbilmektedirler. Savaş heveslileri büyük karışıklıklar yaratır ve arkalarında çok büyük kayıplar bırakırlar.

Atatürk Cumhurbaşkanı olduğu zaman dış politikasının temeli olarak "Yurtta Sulh,Cihanda Sulh" ilkesini kabul etmişti. Bu sözleri gerçekleştirmek ödevimizdir. Herşeyin ötesinde, bunu, 1915 yılının korku dolu aylarında hangi bayrak altında olursa olsun hizmet eden ve sevdiklerinden uzakta hayatını kaybedenlere borçluyuz.

Bütün konuk heyet başkanları adına, bugün bu kutsal yerde bulunmak imkanını bize sağlayan Türk Hükümetine teşekkür ediyorum. Şimdi, sükut etme ve cesur insanların yapmış oldukları fedakarlıklardan ders alma zamanıdır. Boş yere can vermiş olmamaları için tanrıya dua edelim.

SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY TURGUT ÖZAL PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Excellencies,
Distinguished Veterans,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today we are assembled here to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign and to salute the sacrifice of the gallant soldiers who have fallen in pursuit of their ideals in this beautiful corner of our country.

Seventy five years ago on the morning of April 25, 1915 a combination of allied troops landed on the beaches of Gallipoli.

Regardless of its objective and outcome, the campaign itself was a hard and fierce struggle, but one that was free of dishonourable conduct. All the adversaries proved gallant and determined, earning the respect of each other. For, on this battlefield, soldiers engaged in fierce combat had sent water to their foes whose own water supply had been exhausted, others would leave behind hot cooked food when forced out of their trenches and here, medics gave comfort to the wounded of both sides.

This is why the lesson of the Gallipoli campaign will remain unique forever. The friendship that was built among our nations has stood the passage of time. This is the true story of peace. There is no room in our shrinking world for ill feelings and hate and the Gallipoli Campaign is the best example that nations, if they really desire, are capable of building friendly relations even on foundations of past wars. Therefore, this anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign is not just a time to pay tribute to our dead and to remember the past. It is also a time to look forward and reflect on the virtues of maintaining peace.

On the other hand, the Gallipoli Campaign also deserves to be remembered and carefully studied as it has determined the future of many nations and yielded political results of great magnitude that has changed our world.

Primarily, the Campaign, hindering the flow of Allied support, paved the way for the fall of the Tzarist Russia. Consequently, in less than two and a half years, the first ever communist regime in history was established in Russia. The world-wide effects of this development has reached our day.

The peoples of the countries like Australia and New Zealand have for the first time reached a real sense of national identity at the conclusion of this Campaign.

Finally, the campaign had important and lasting effects also on the Turkish people.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, The founder of the Republic of Turkey first acclaimed nation wide recognition in this Campaign and became a General. We can say that one of the greatest leaders of the 20 th century was born here.

This year is a special one for all of us here. We have come together to consolidate our friendship, to immortalize our dead who have fallen on this land and to remember and better appreciate the respective qualities of all those who were involved in the campaign.

This indeed is a special anniversary, for we have among us a handful of the original landing and defending parties still alive and determined to travel to the spot, to embrace each other with affection and respect in the presence of high level official delegations from their respective countries.

Perhaps ten years hence, no one would remain to come back again to Gallipoli, but they would adorn for ever one of the brighter pages of history. Their bravery and gallantry will remain as exceptional examples for the admired virtues of our race.

On the 75 th anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign we recall in reverence and with gratitude, the memories of those who have given their lives in the service of their respective countries and we solemnly declare that we shall cherish, treasure and pass on this valuable asset and common heritage of ours intact to the generations to come.

I have no doubt that the deep feelings we all share today are best reflected in the following words of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.

" To heroes who have shed their blood on the soil of this country:

" You rest here in the land of a friendly nation. Sleep in peace and tranquility. You lie together side by side with Turkish soldiers in each other's embrace.

" To mothers who have sent their sons to war from distant lands:

" Shed no more tears. Your sons are now in our hearts. Calm and serene, they will sleep in repose and tranquility. In losing their lives on our soil, they have become our sons as well."



GALLIPOLI
1990

THE HELLES MEMORIAL

A service of Commemoration

FORM OF SERVICE

On the Occasion of the Seventy Fifth Anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings 25th April 1915.

In memory of all Ranks who gave their lives in the Gallipoli and Dardanelles Campaign.

The Guard is drawn from the Ships' companies of HMS ARGONAUT and HMS BROADSWORD. Both Ships will be lying off Cape Helles during the ceremony.

The Music for the Service will be provided by the Prince of Wales's Division, Director of Music, Captain S J Smith ARCM psm RRF, by permission of Colonel B J Willing CBE, Divisional Colonel The Prince of Wales's Division.

- 1155 All participants should be assembled at the Helles Memorial
- 1200 The Right Honourable Tom King MP Secretary of State for Defence arrives to a General Salute. (Spectators please stand).
- 1210 The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP Prime Minister arrives to a General Salute. Inspects guard and meets veterans. (Spectators please stand for the General Salute).
- 1215 Service begins.
- 1240 At the end of the Service please remain at the Helles Memorial until the Prime Minister has visited the V Beach Cemetery, returned to her official car and departed for lunch at Kaba Tepe.

The Helles Memorial is both the Memorial to the Gallipoli Campaign and to 20,763 men who fell in that campaign and whose graves are unknown or who were lost or buried at sea in Gallipoli waters. Inscribed on it are the names of all the ships that took part in the campaign and the titles of the army formations and units which served on the Peninsula together with the names of 18,985 sailors, soldiers and marines from the United Kingdom, 248 soldiers from Australia and 1,530 soldiers of the Indian Army.

The monument was designed by the Imperial War Graves Commission's chief architect Sir John Burnet (1857-1938) and was completed in the summer of 1924. It is constructed from rough stone, similar to that used in the walls of Troy, quarried at Ilgardere. The stone was shipped to the present site where it was dressed by stonemasons.

The Cenotaph is 32.9m in height. On each of its four sides large marble tablets list the units which served in the Gallipoli Campaign. At the base, facing the entrance, is the following inscription:

"In honoured memory of the units and ships which fought on Gallipoli or in the Dardanelles, and of those British sailors and soldiers and Australian soldiers who fell in this neighbourhood and have no known graves, 1914-1916."

The names on the panels are arranged in two groups: those who were lost at sea and those who fell on land. Under these are the names of the regiments. The names of the men are categorised by rank and, under each rank, they are listed alphabetically.

ORDER OF SERVICE

conducted by

The Archdeacon of the Aegean and the Danube

The Venerable Geoffrey B Evans

OPENING BIDDING

HYMN

"FOR THE FALLEN"

1. O Lord of Life, whose power sustains
The world unseen no less than this-
One family in Him who reigns,
Triumphant over death, in bliss;
To Thee with thankfulness we pray
For all our valiant deeds to-day
2. As nature's healing through the years
Reclothes the stricken battle-fields;
So mercy gives us joy for tears,
And grief to proud remembrance yields
And mindful hearts are glad to keep
A tryst of love with them that sleep
3. Not names engraved in marble make
The best memorials of the dead,
But burdens shouldered for their sake
And tasks completed in their stead;
A braver faith and stronger prayers,
Devouter worship, nobler cares.
4. O help us in the silence, Lord,
To hear the whispered call of love,
And day by day Thy strength afford
Our work to do, our faith to prove.
So be Thy blessing richly shed
On our communion with our dead.

THE LESSON
REVELATION CH 21 v 1-7

Read by the Prime Minister

HYMN

"O VALIANT HEARTS"

1. O Valiant Hearts, who to your glory came
Through dust of conflict and through battle-flame;
Tranquil you lie, your knightly virtue proved,
Your memory hallow'd in the Land you loved.
2. Proudly you gathered, rank on rank to war,
As who had heard God's message from afar;
All you had hoped for, all you had, you gave
To save mankind, yourselves you scorned to save.
3. Splendid you passed, the great surrender made,
Into the light that never more shall fade;
Deep your contentment in that blest abode,
Who wait the last clear trumpet call of God.

WREATH LAYING

Let us remember those who gave their lives and are
commemorated here

"They shall grow not old as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn;
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them".

Answer: "We will remember them".

"LAST POST"

BY

Buglers of the Prince of Wales's Division
(Followed by two minutes silence)

HYMN

"O VALIANT HEARTS"

4. These were His servants, in His steps they trod
Following through death the martyr'd Son of God;
Victor He rose; Victorious too shall rise
They who have drank His Cup of sacrifice.
5. O risen Lord, O Shepherd of our Dead
Whose Cross has brought them and whose Staff has led
In glorious hope their proud and sorrowing Land
Commits her children to Thy gracious hand.

"REVEILLE"

BY

Buglers of the Prince of Wales's Division

THE PRAYERS

Almighty and Eternal God,
From whose love in Christ we cannot be parted,
either by death or life:
Hear our prayers and thanksgivings
for all whom we remember this day;
Fulfil in them the purpose of thy love;
And bring us all, with them, to Thine eternal joy,
Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

Let us pray for the peace of the world;
for statesmen and rulers that they may have
wisdom to know and courage to do what is
right.....

Most gracious God and Father, in whose will is our
peace, Turn our hearts and the hearts of all men
and women to Thyself, so righteousness may be
established throughout the whole world,
Through Jesus Christ Our Lord. Amen.

ALL God who has made us one with Himself
His Son Jesus Christ calls us to share in
His work of reconciliation.

Lord make us instruments of your peace,
where there is hatred, let us sow love,
where there is injury, pardon;
where there is doubt, faith;
where there is despair, hope;
where there is sadness, joy;
where there is darkness, light.

Grant, O Lord, that we may seek to console,
rather than to be consoled;
to understand,
rather than to be understood;
to love,
rather than to be loved.

For it is in the giving that we receive;
in self-forgetfulness that we find our true selves;
in forgiving
that we are forgiving;
in dying
that we are raised up to life everlasting. Amen.

THE LORD'S PRAYER To be said by all present:

Our Father, which art in heaven, Hallowed by Thy Name.
Thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done, On earth as it is in
Heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us
our trespasses. As we forgive them that trespass against us.
And lead us not into temptation; But deliver us from evil.
For Thine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory.
For ever and ever. Amen.

BLESSING

THE NATIONAL ANTHEM

1. God save our gracious Queen,
Long live our noble Queen,
God save the Queen!
Send her victorious,
Happy and glorious,
Long to reign over us;
God save the Queen!
2. Nor on this land alone-
But be God's mercies known
From shore to shore.
Lord, make the nations see
That men should brothers be
And form one family
The wide world o'er.

ORDER OF WREATH LAYING

Sir Timothy Daunt KCMG, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Turkey
on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen

General Sir Robert Ford GCB CBE, Vice-Chairman, on behalf of
His Royal Highness The Duke of Kent KG GCMG GCVO ADC,
President of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher FRS MP
The Prime Minister

Mr Orhan Aydin, Deputy Governor of Cannakale,
on behalf of The Republic of Turkey

The Right Honorable Tom King MP,
Secretary of State for Defence

Admiral Sir Julian Oswald GCB ADC
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
and
General Sir John Chapple GCB CBE ADC Gen
Chief of the General Staff

Senator Jack Marshall CD, for those of
the Newfoundland Regiment who fell in the Campaign
and
Colonel Pradip Mehta,
Indian Defence Attache in Turkey, for those of
the Indian Regiments who fell in the Campaign

Mr David Knowles,
National Chairman of the Royal British Legion

Mr Ilkay Bilgisin,
Chairman British Chamber of Commerce in Turkey
and
Mr Desmond Whittall, representing
The British Community Council in Istanbul



GALLIPOLI


GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL LECTURE
HOLY TRINITY CHURCH ELTHAM
7th MAY 1987



**ENDS
AND
MEANS**

HRH THE PRINCE PHILIP
DUKE OF EDINBURGH, KG, KT, OM, GBE, PC.

**THE DARDANELLES: THE ATTACK ON THE NARROWS
18 MARCH, 1915**



ENDS AND MEANS

I have to confess that when I accepted the invitation to give this address, I had little detailed knowledge of the campaign. I knew the whereabouts of the Dardanelles, in fact The Queen and I were shown over the battlefield during a State Visit to Turkey. I knew that it was fought with the greatest gallantry on both sides and that the heroism of the Australians and New Zealanders had become a legend among their countrymen. I knew that it ended with a miraculous evacuation, and that it took place in 1915. But that was patently not sufficient, so there was nothing for it but to read it up.

I started my research with "Gallipoli", by Captain Eric Bush RN, for the simple reason that he had sent me a copy when it was published in 1975. Captain Bush was a Midshipman in HMS "Bacchante" which formed a part of the naval force during the campaign. It is a fascinating account, particularly of the naval operations, and made all the more compelling by the fact that he was an eye-witness to many of the dramatic events in that remarkable campaign.

When I had read the book, I thought it might be an idea to look up his list of references with a view to going into it all a bit more deeply. I was somewhat chastened when I counted something like 45 books on the list.

As a first step I thought I would have a look to see what was available at Windsor. To my astonishment, I found no less than five books touching on the subject in the book-case in my own room. They all had King George V's book-plate in them. These were "The World Crisis, 1915" by Winston Churchill, "Lord Fisher" by Admiral Bacon, "The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes", "The History of the Great War" by John Buchan and "The Dardanelles Campaign" by H. W. Nevinston. I must add that I was also greatly assisted by Mr. Martin Gilbert, Sir Winston Churchill's biographer, who by chance stayed at Windsor.

Needless to say, there was no dispute between the authors about the

salient facts. Some gave greater emphasis to certain aspects than others, but the descriptions of the events were substantially the same. There the similarity and the consensus ended. Motives, opinions, views, priorities, strategic concepts, assessments of personalities; in fact in every respect other than the bald facts the authors each painted sharply different pictures.

So it seemed to me that rather than go through yet another account of the astonishing story of the campaign, it might be more interesting to try to trace the influence of the personal views and attitudes of the main actors during the period leading up to the fateful decision to undertake the attack on the Dardanelles forts.

The problem was to know where to begin, because in so many cases, strategic concepts and opinions had already been formed long before the war broke out. Ever since Nelson's day, the Navy abhorred the idea of ships attacking forts, but on the other hand Admiral Duckworth had led a fleet through the Narrows and anchored off Constantinople in 1807, although he only just managed to get out again.

As might be expected, a great deal of thought had been given to the strategic problems that would arise in the event of war breaking out with Germany. There were two principal issues to be considered; the role of the Navy and the employment of the British Expeditionary Force, which meant, to all intents and purposes, the Regular Army.

Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this divergence of views is contained in an account of a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1909. Fisher was the First Sea Lord, and Asquith the Prime Minister.

"During the Morocco crisis the French Government was within an inch of war with Germany, and insisted on 120,000 British troops being sent to the French frontier. The Cabinet agreed. At a meeting of the Defence Committee, where the military plans were set forth by General Nicholson, Fisher remained silent, seated opposite to Mr. Asquith at the end of a long table. The only question put to Fisher was "Whether the Navy could guarantee transport", to which he answered "Yes". Mr. Asquith then asked him if he had anything to say; and he replied that he had nothing to say that anyone present would care to hear."

Mr. Asquith pressed him; then a scene took place. Fisher told the Committee that if 120,000 English were sent to France, the Germans would put everything else aside and make any sacrifice to surround and destroy the British, and that they would succeed. Continental armies being what they are, Fisher expressed the view that the British Army should be absolutely restricted to operations consisting of sudden descents on the coast, the recovery of Heligoland, and the garrisoning of Antwerp.

He pointed out that there was a stretch of ten miles of hard sand on the Pomeranian coast which is only ninety miles from Berlin. Were the British Army to seize and entrench that strip, a million Germans would find occupation; but to dispatch British troops to the front in a Continental war would be an act of suicidal lunacy arising from the distorted view of war

duced by Mr. Haldane's speeches, and childish arrangements for training "ferriers" after war broke out.

Fisher followed this up with an impassioned diatribe against the War Office and all its ways, including conceit, waste of money, and ignorance of war. He claimed that the British Army should be administered as an annex to the Navy and that the present follies should be abandoned.

At this point Mr. Asquith said, "I think we had better adjourn". This was done, but for some months onward the Defence Committee never considered, nor did the soldiers propose, any plan for helping the French by means of an Expeditionary Force to take part in the main land fighting.

Anyone who has read anything about Fisher will recognise his inimitable style. He was recalled as First Sea Lord at the end of 1914 by Churchill, who had then become First Lord. Throughout his second spell in that office, Fisher never really changed his mind and kept coming back to these two points; the landing of a Russian army on Germany's Baltic coast and the occupation of the Belgian coast by the British Army. It is perhaps ironic that the Monitors and the landing-craft, or "Beetles" as they came to be known at the Dardanelles, were designed by Fisher for use in the Baltic or on the Belgian coast.

As far as operations on the Belgian coast were concerned he saw eye to eye with Churchill. In his book, "World Crisis", there is a series of letters on this subject between himself and Sir John French, the British C-in-C in France. He sets out the general scene in the following passage:-

"...in November 1914, Sir John French wished to make an advance in conjunction with the Belgian Army along the sea coast from Nieuport towards Ostende and Zeebruggeit appealed very strongly to Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson (Wilson had succeeded Fisher as First Sea Lord when the latter retired at the end of 1909). The Admiralty War Staff were increasingly apprehensive of the dangers of a hostile submarine base developing at Zeebrugge from which our cross-Channel communications would be continually harassed. I had always wished to see the British Army with its left hand on the sea, nearest to its home, and with its left flank guarded by the Navy. I saw in this the prospect of close and effectual co-operation between Fleet and Army out of which the amphibious operations in which I was a believer might develop."

He then goes on:-

"Neither Lord Kitchener nor the War Council were opposed to these ideas. On the contrary, they united British opinion — professional and political, naval and military, War Office and General Headquarters. General Joffre, however, did not think well of the planThe French Government also on political grounds showed themselves strongly opposed to allowing the British armies to occupy the sea flank, or to acquire a close association with the Belgian forces."

It turned out that this extraordinary attitude of the French was based on their fear that Britain might remain in occupation of Belgium after the war. Similar damaging jealousies between the Allies were to have an important

influence on the Dardanelles project.

A point worth noting from the account of the Fisher "scene" is that Fisher only gave his opinion when pressed by the Prime Minister. You will appreciate its importance when we come to the decision by the War Council to undertake the Naval attack on the Dardanelles.

There are two other major strategic factors to be considered before getting to the origins of the Dardanelles campaign. In the first place it is quite evident that the main theatre of the war was in Europe. Germany could only be defeated by the invasion of her territory. That was generally accepted, but the problem was how to achieve it. Unlike any previous wars, the front lines of the antagonists had become a continuous line of entrenchments from the coast of the North Sea to the Alps.

Out-flanking, in the accepted military understanding of that term, was therefore impossible. This was at least partly the reason that so much futile effort and so many lives were expended in frontal assaults.

While "out-flanking" was not possible in the land battle, it was still possible in the grand strategic sense. Fisher's Baltic project would have had the effect of turning Germany's right flank. Other than the Adriatic coastline of Austria-Hungary, which Lloyd George wished to attack, the nearest thing to a left flank was Turkey, which, after much assiduous wooing by Germany, had thrown in her lot with the Central Powers.

Within the higher Allied councils of war there were two principal factions: those who wished to concentrate everything in the main theatre with a single thrust at the enemy's heartland, and those who wished to turn the enemy's flank, on one side or the other.

This division of opinion was further complicated by the natural desire of the Admiralty to bring the German High Seas Fleet to a decisive action. It was believed by the more aggressive elements that this could only be achieved by some provocative act such as seizing the island of Borkum. On the other hand there were those, such as Jellicoe, the C-in-C Grand Fleet, and later Fisher himself, who held that all the Navy needed to do was to maintain command of the seas by keeping a superior force in home waters to prevent the enemy from doing any mischief outside the North Sea.

The possibility of taking some action in the Near East had been under general consideration since the outbreak of the war. As early as 26th August 1914, the British adviser to the Turkish Navy, Rear Admiral Limpus, suggested a landing between Smyrna and the Dardanelles. However, in the very first days of 1915, three events conspired to concentrate the minds of the members of the War Council on the advantages to be gained by directing a threat at Constantinople. The first was the declaration of war by Turkey.

The second was a paper, dated 28th December 1914, by Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Council, who drew attention to the great benefits to be derived from forcing Turkey out of the war. Russia was getting desperately short of artillery ammunition and rifles for her armies, her economy was under serious pressure owing to the fact that she could not export her wheat

plus and she was also having to fight both the Germans and the Turks at same time.

It was confidently expected that the opening of the Dardanelles and the arrival of an Allied fleet at Constantinople would solve all these problems and, furthermore, it would have the effect of persuading Greece and Bulgaria, the two neutral Balkan states, to join the Allies against the Central Powers. In Hankey's view, if Bulgaria could be induced to join the Allies-by the offer of the Greek province of Thrace - ".....there ought to be no insuperable obstacle to the occupation of Constantinople, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus." It would, in fact, constitute a serious out-flanking movement on the Germans.

The third event was the receipt of a telegram, on New Year's Day, from the Russian C-in-C, The Grand Duke Nicholas, to the effect that he was being sorely pressed and that any demonstration which suggested a threat to Constantinople would be very much appreciated. This appeal was all the more difficult to resist as in August 1914 The Grand Duke had responded to an appeal from the French and British for a Russian offensive to relieve pressure on the Western Front. The Russian offensive had just ended in the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg.

On receiving the Grand Duke's telegram, Kitchener wrote to Churchill:-

"The only place that a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going East would be the Dardanelles...."

On 2nd January, Kitchener sent a telegram to Petrograd assuring The Grand Duke that ".....steps will be taken to make a demonstration against the Turks." However, it so happens that in the previous November, Churchill, with Fisher's approval, had signalled to Admiral Carden, then C in C in the Mediterranean:-

"....without risking the ships demonstration is to be made by bombardment on the earliest suitable day by your armoured ships and the two French battleships against the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles at a range of 14,000 to 12,000 yards."

The bombardment took place on 3 November 1914, the day before Britain's declaration of war on Turkey. Although this demonstration alerted the Turks to the need to strengthen the defences at the entrance to the straits, they did little work on them for some time.

Hankey's paper had an electrifying effect on Fisher. On 3rd January, 1915, he put his thoughts on paper in a letter to Churchill in which he made a number of important points.

"I've been informed by Hankey that War Council assembles next Thursday, and I suppose it will be like a game of ninepins! Everyone will have a plan and one ninepin in falling will knock over its neighbour! I CONSIDER THE ATTACK ON TURKEY HOLDS THE FIELD! - but only if it is IMMEDIATE! However it won't be! Our Aulic Council will adjourn till the following Thursday fortnight! (NB When did we meet last? and what came of it???)

We shall decide on a futile bombardment of the Dardanelles.....

What good resulted from the last bombardment?

Did it move a single Turk from the Caucasus?....

This is the Turkey plan:—

1. Appoint Sir W. Robertson the present Quartermaster-General to command the Expeditionary Force.
2. Immediately replace all Indians and 75,000 seasoned troops from Sir John French's command with Territorials, etc., from England (as you yourself suggested) and embark the Turkish Expeditionary Force ostensibly for the protection of Egypt! WITH ALL POSSIBLE DESPATCH at Marseilles! and land them at Besika Bay direct with previous feints before they arrive with troops now in Egypt against Haifa and Alexandretta, the latter to be a REAL occupation because of its inestimable value as regards the oil fields of the Garden of Eden, with which by rail it is in direct communication, and we shove out the Germans now established in Alexandretta with an immense Turkish concession — the last act of that arch-enemy of England, Marschall von Bieberstein.
3. The Greeks to go for Gallipoli at the same time as we go for Besika, and the Bulgarians for Constantinople, and the Russians, the Serbians and Roumanians for Austria (all this you said yourself)
4. Sturdee forces the Dardanelles at the same time with "Majestic" class and "Canopus" class! God bless him!

But as the great Napoleon said, "CELERITY" — without it — FAILURE!"

The suggestion that the Greeks might go for Gallipoli was vetoed by the Russians, who would not countenance the Greeks anywhere near Constantinople, particularly as the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had already promised the city to the Russians, in the event of the defeat of Turkey.

Churchill replied by letter to this typical piece of Fisher prose in these words:—

"I would not grudge 100,000 men because of the great political effects in the Balkan Peninsula: but Germany is the foe, and it is bad war to seek cheaper victories and easier antagonists."

Many years later Churchill was to have a slightly different recollection of his views. He wrote in "World Crisis":—

"Lord Fisher's third paragraph about the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians and Russians expressed exactly what everybody wanted. It was the obvious supreme objective in this part of the world. The question was, How to procure it?"

This was the root of the matter. It was in connection with this that Lord Fisher's fourth paragraph made its impression on me. Here for the first time was the suggestion of forcing the Dardanelles with the old battleships."

On the same day that he received the letter from Fisher, he sent the following signal to Vice-Admiral Carden:—

"Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable proposition?"

It is assumed older battleships fitted with mine-bumpers would be used,

ceded by colliers or other merchant craft as mine-bumpers and keepers.

Importance of results would justify severe loss.

Let me know your views."

On 4th January there was a further exchange of letters between Churchill and Fisher, in which Fisher commented:—

"The naval advantages of the possession of Constantinople and the getting of wheat from the Black Sea are so overwhelming that I consider Colonel Hankey's plan for Turkish operations vital and imperative and very pressing."

In a further letter to Churchill, on the morning of the meeting of the War Council on 28th January, Fisher again emphasised the importance he attached to military co-operation:

"I make no objections to enter Zeebrugge or Dardanelles if accompanied by military co-operation on such a scale (as to secure) our permanent military occupation of the Dardanelles Forts pari passu with the Naval bombardment."

In view of the fact that Fisher was later to say that he had always been against the Gallipoli project and of the fact that he resigned over the issue, these two letters of his, and Churchill's understanding of them, need some explanation.

I have come to the conclusion that there must have been a serious misunderstanding. As far as the need for the "Turkey operations" was concerned, they were obviously both in complete agreement. However, it also seems obvious that Fisher understood them to include the whole plan as outlined in the four paragraphs of his letter, or that any bombardment would be accompanied by military action on a sufficient scale. It would appear that it was never his intention to suggest a solely naval attempt to force the Dardanelles. Indeed, he had written "We shall decide on a futile bombardment of the Dardanelles."

Furthermore, his plan for the Baltic landings and his advocacy of bringing the British Army to the Belgian coast so that the Army and Navy could operate together, make it reasonably clear that Fisher always envisaged joint operations.

Churchill seems to have missed this point in his eagerness to get on with some sort of offensive action. Judging by his signal to Carden, it looks as if Churchill took Fisher's fourth paragraph out of its context and assumed that Fisher would support the Naval bombardment part of his plan as the only element of the "Turkey operations". If that view is accepted, then the rest of the developing argument between Churchill and Fisher over the Dardanelles issue falls into place.

On 5th January Churchill received the reply from Carden. As Churchill commented "It was remarkable."

"With reference to your telegram of 3rd instant, I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed.

They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships."

Although the message was slightly equivocal, it clearly answered Churchill's question; at any rate it was quite sufficient to encourage him to pursue the idea, and he asked Carden to prepare an outline plan.

Meanwhile the subject of "Turkey operations" was discussed at the War Council meeting on 8th January. The dominating personality on the Council was Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War. It is quite evident that nothing was decided about the higher conduct of the war without his approval, and on this occasion, as Churchill reports:—

"Lord Kitchener expressed an opinion in favour of an attack on the Dardanelles. He told the Council that the Dardanelles appeared to be the most suitable military objective, as an attack there could be made in co-operation with the Fleet. He estimated that 150,000 men would be sufficient for the capture of the Dardanelles, but reserved his opinion until a close study had been made. He offered no troops and made it clear that none were available. His contribution was therefore, and was meant to be, purely theoretic."

Churchill may have thought the contribution was "purely theoretic" but in fact it meant quite clearly that Kitchener had ruled out a combined operation. This was understandable as he was heavily engaged in the formation of the "new armies" which the Army assumed would be used in France. Furthermore, it meant that he did not wish to see the troops currently defending Egypt to be used for any other purpose. It so happens that a Turkish attack on the Suez Canal had, only recently, been repulsed. So it must have been fully evident to Fisher that his "Turkey" plan in its entirety stood no chance of being accepted. This may well have been the beginning of his disillusionment with the Dardanelles plan.

Kitchener evidently considered that his undertaking to The Grand Duke Nicholas would be met by some sort of naval action at the Dardanelles, whether it was a bombardment or an attempt to force the Narrows.

Churchill, in his anxiety to get something started, apparently failed to notice Fisher's growing apprehensions about the way things were developing. As Fisher pointed out later on, he did not feel that he should attempt to veto the project since a bombardment of the forts by the old ships in the Mediterranean could do no harm, provided the action could be broken off if no progress was made and provided it did not draw scarce resources from home waters. He continued to believe that the Dardanelles operation should be concerted with some other military action either at Gallipoli or a descent on Alexandretta.

On 12th January Fisher wrote to Sir William Tyrrell at the Foreign Office:—

"...If the Greeks land 100,000 men on the Gallipoli Peninsula in concert with a British naval attack on the Dardanelles I think we could count on an easy and quick arrival at Constantinople...."

Matters eventually came to a head at a meeting of the Council on the next

the 13th January. Churchill had circulated Carden's plan and the minutes concluded:—

"The Admiralty were studying the question, and believed that a plan could be made for systematically reducing all the forts within a few weeks. Once the forts were reduced the minefields would be cleared, and the Fleet would proceed up to Constantinople and destroy the "Goeben". They would have nothing to fear from field guns or rifles, which would be merely an inconvenience.

Lord Kitchener thought the plan was worth trying. We could leave off the bombardment if it did not prove effective.

That the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."

It was at this meeting that Fisher and Wilson sat silent throughout the proceedings and consequently gave the impression that they approved of the decisions. For this they were subsequently criticised by the Dardanelles Commission. But there is no record of the Prime Minister, or anyone else, having asked for their views.

Unless Fisher had suddenly changed his mind and had come to accept a solely naval operation, he must have assumed that Churchill (who, as First Lord, was a member while they were not), appreciated the importance which they attached to a joint operation. Both assumed that the political reasons for going ahead with the project outweighed their professional reservations. It is tempting to think that the Prime Minister remembered the last time he had asked for Fisher's views and determined not to risk another scene.

The wording of the last paragraph of the minutes — a wording devised by Asquith — is interesting for a number of reasons. Nothing had ever been said, up to this point, about "taking" the Gallipoli Peninsula by a naval expedition, in fact all naval professional opinion was against anything other than a piecemeal destruction of the forts. It seems to have been assumed that, once this had been achieved, the need to occupy the Peninsula, in order to secure the communications of whatever fleet managed to penetrate into the Sea of Marmara, would have become self-evident.

It is difficult to believe that anyone could seriously contemplate sending a fleet into the Sea of Marmara without being certain of getting it out again. Duckworth's exploit may have shown that it was possible to get a fleet through the defended narrows, but it also showed that the fleet only had a very limited time to achieve its objective before it became trapped.

Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who had been charged with the job of evaluating the Carden plan, went no further than to suggest the approval of the bombardment of the outer forts as soon as possible "... as the experience gained would be useful in the subsequent attacks on the Narrows." In his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, he said that he did not consider that an attempt by the Fleet alone to get through the Dardanelles was a "feasible operation", he thought that "it would be a mad thing to do".

In a letter to Jellicoe on 21st January, Fisher again referred to a military operation:—

"I just abominate the Dardanelles operation, unless a great change is made and it is settled to be made a military operation, with 200,000 men in conjunction with the Fleet."

Four days later Fisher sent a Memorandum to Churchill with the following covering note:—

"I have no desire to continue a useless resistance in the War Council to plans I cannot concur in, but I would ask that the enclosed may be printed and circulated to its members before the meeting."

The Memorandum then recapitulates Fisher's views on the employment of the Navy. He emphasises the prime importance of bringing the enemy fleet to action and states that any subsidiary operations, such as the bombardment of the Dardanelles, are only justified if they help to induce the enemy fleet to put to sea. He goes on to say that the first function of the British Army is to assist the fleet in obtaining command of the sea and suggests that this might be accomplished by joint operations against the Turks in the Dardanelles, or an attack on Zeebrugge.

He ends with the words "The English Army is apparently to continue to provide a small sector of the allied front in France, where it no more helps the Navy than if it were in Timbuctoo."

The next meeting of the Council took place on 28th January, after Fisher had made his opposition to the Dardanelles project quite clear to both Churchill and the Prime Minister, but Asquith so strongly supported the Dardanelles plan that he refused to allow Fisher's memorandum to be printed for the War Council.

Asquith was probably strengthened in his resolve to pursue the Dardanelles plan by the arrival of a second appeal from Grand Duke Nicholas, which had just reached the Foreign Office,

Fisher may not have known about this telegram, since when the subject of the Dardanelles came up at the meeting, he remarked that he had not known that it was on the agenda and left the Council table in a huff. Kitchener got up and had a word with him and Fisher reluctantly returned to his seat. The final, apparently unanimous, decision to go ahead with the Dardanelles project was then taken.

A somewhat similar situation arose during the Suez crisis in 1956. The then First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten, made it very clear to the Prime Minister, Mr Eden, and to the First Lord, Lord Hailsham, that he was most unhappy about the use of force under the circumstances and, in effect, asked to be relieved. However, he was told by the First Lord to remain at his post and carry out his instructions, which he then did to the best of his ability.

Following the Council, there was a long meeting between Fisher and Churchill at which Fisher was persuaded to give the plan his support. As he told the Commission, "When I finally decided to go in, I went the whole hog, totus porkus."

This was quite true, until he saw the campaign becoming a drain on naval resources and realised that the longer it went on, the less chance there was of his Baltic project being accepted.

In many ways I feel that Fisher only had himself to blame. To Churchill, with his single-minded determination, it must have seemed that Fisher was always changing his mind. One moment he seemed to be strongly in favour, the next he was counselling caution or was actively opposed.

Fisher was at least consistent in two respects. "CELERITY OR FAILURE" — as he put it, and he never wavered in his insistence on the need for a joint operation. He was proved right in both cases.

The trouble seems to have arisen because while he and Churchill agreed about the ends of the "Turkey operations", they were completely at odds about the means.

The rest of the story followed like some inevitable Greek tragedy. The success of the bombardment of the outer forts suggested that all was going to be alright. Then things started to go seriously wrong. The attack on the inner forts resulted in the loss of several ships to mines.

Out of 16 battleships, 3 had been sunk and 4 disabled. The ships, particularly the mine-sweeping trawlers manned as they were by their peacetime fishermen crews, found the tidal stream and the constant shelling by mobile field batteries not to their liking. German submarines made their appearance and their success forced the major units of the fleet to retire to Mudros and Tenedos. Admiral de Robeck, who had succeeded Carden, became even more reluctant to renew the attack on the inner forts. This was probably the moment to call off the whole operation.

However, it was at this point that Kitchener finally agreed to send a military expedition under Sir Ian Hamilton, but instead of the 130,000 men he originally estimated would be needed, only about 70,000 were available for the landing, and this after some three months warning to the Turks and their German allies.

Then the departure of the regular 29th Division was delayed from the 10th to the 16th March and when it got to Mudros it was decided to send it to Alexandria so that the loading of the transports could be re-organised for a landing. The whole force only assembled at Mudros in the middle of April and the landing eventually took place on the 25th, nearly five months after the first bombardment.

During this long period of vacillation the Turks had not been idle and, but for the outstanding courage and tenacity of the Allied troops, the landing could never have succeeded. All the beaches were covered by artillery and rifle fire, all open ground was wired, and the landing force was always fighting uphill against a well-entrenched enemy.

The situation soon developed into a stalemate, both on the land and at sea, and the continuous drain on naval resources eventually led Fisher to resign rather than countenance sending any more ships and men out to the Dardanelles.

Fisher's resignation led to the formation of a Coalition Government, and to Churchill's removal from the Admiralty. However, the campaign continued and, on 5th July, Kitchener told the War Council that the war would be over "...as soon as the Gallipoli Peninsula was captured..."

A month later, on 6th August, Hamilton made a valiant attempt to break the deadlock with a new landing at Suvla, but that went sadly wrong. The new Territorial Divisions, which were committed to the Suvla landings, lacked battle experience and many of their senior officers were not equal to the task.

Kitchener seems to have started by assuming that the Navy would have no difficulty in forcing the Straits, and when that failed, his decision to send a military force was too late to retrieve the position. The original expeditionary force was too small and subsequent re-inforcements were not adequately trained and arrived too late.

de Robeck, who had led the original assault on the forts before he succeeded Carden, became less and less enthusiastic about attempting another assault on the inner forts, in spite of the persistent urging by his Chief of Staff, Roger Keyes.

Maurice Hankey was sent out to report on the situation and suggested that evacuation should be considered. He was followed by Kitchener himself who quickly appreciated the hopelessness of the situation, but decided to send General Monro to take over from Hamilton. Monro, who came from the war in France and believed that every effort should be concentrated in that area, recommended evacuation.

The ultimate irony was that the evacuation turned out to be the most successful operation of the whole campaign. Every single soldier and virtually every horse, mule and weapon was taken off the Peninsula at the cost of one man slightly wounded.


Estimates vary, but Captain Bush reckons that the total Empire (British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and Newfoundland) casualties for the whole campaign amounted to 205,000 (115,000 killed, wounded or missing and 90,000 evacuated sick); those of the French, 47,000. The official Turkish estimate of their casualties was 251,000, but some Turkish authorities put it as high as 350,000.

John Buchan begins his account of the campaign with these words:—


"The Dardanelles campaign is one of the most pitiful, tragic and glorious episodes in British history."

He concludes his account like this:—

"Had the fashion endured of linking the strife of mankind with the gods, what strange myth would not have sprung from the rescue of the British troops in the teeth of the winter gales and uncertain seas! It would have been rumoured, as at Troy, that Poseidon had done battle for his children."



This lecture
has been printed
by



*The Gallipoli Memorial
Lectures were inaugurated in
1985 in Holy Trinity, Eltham
where there is a Gallipoli
Memorial Chapel and where
from 1917-84 an annual
memorial service was held.
The Lectures are an attempt
to remember those who died
at Gallipoli in a way which
draws lessons for the
contemporary world.*

GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL LECTURE
HOLY TRINITY CHURCH, ELTHAM
24TH APRIL 1985

THE MURDEROUS
RESPONSIBILITY

GENERAL SIR HUGH BEACH GBE KCB MC

This lecture has been published by
BRASSEY'S DEFENCE PUBLISHERS
who announce
the publication today of

GALLIPOLI 1915:
Pens, Pencils and Cameras at War

by

PETER H. LIDDLE

*This book contains 242 hitherto unpublished photographs
of the campaign with an introductory text and
accompanying captions.*

GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL LECTURE

"I strayed about the deck, an hour, tonight
Under a cloudy moonless sky; and peeped
In at the windows, watched my friends at table,
Or playing cards, or standing in the doorway,
Or coming out into the darkness. Still
No one could see me.

I would have thought of them
— Heedless, within a week of battle — in pity,
Pride in their strength and in the weight and
firmness
And link'd beauty of bodies, and pity that
This gay machine of splendour'd soon be broken
Thought little of, pashed, scattered . . .

Only, always,
I could but see them — against the lamplight —
pass
Like coloured shadows, thinner than the filmy
glass,
Slight bubbles, fainter than the wave's faint light,
That broke to phosphorus out in the night
Perishing things and strange ghosts — soon to die
To other ghosts — this one, or that, or I."

That was Rupert Brooke, the first and perhaps the most famous of the Gallipoli expedition to perish — written not long before he died 70 years ago yesterday, in a French hospital ship, off Skyros, of blood-poisoning from an insect bite. "He died at 4.46, with the sun shining all round his cabin, and the cool sea breeze blowing through the door and the shaded windows. No one could have wished a quieter or calmer end in that lovely bay shielded by the mountains and fragrant with sage and thyme."

He was buried that evening in an olive grove above Trebuki Bay. At the grave were Denis Browne (who wrote that description of his death and was to die himself on 4th June), Bernard Freyberg (who won his first D.S.O. at Bulair 48 hours later and went on to win three bars to it — and a V.C.), Charles Lister, Clegg Kelly, Patrick Shaw Stewart, Arthur Asquith, Johnny Dodge. Sir Ian Hamilton felt the loss keenly: "Death grins at my elbow. I cannot get him out of my thoughts. He is fed up with the old and sick — only the flower of the flock will serve him now, for God has started a celestial spring cleaning, and our star is to be scrubbed bright with the blood of our bravest and our best." He was right about the blood, but not about *his* star. Within six months he had been dismissed and was never to command again. Did he guess — that night? "Watchman of the milky way, shepherd of the golden stars, have mercy upon us . . . thy will be done. *En avant* — at all costs — *en avant*."

"Nature was so beautiful" — a young officer of the Lancashire Fusiliers writing of this evening 70 years ago on the cruiser *Euryalus* off Tenedos — "a dead flat calm, an oily sea, a silent beautiful rock-crowned island, with its replica in the bay beneath, no sound or

movement in water or in air, no signs of the prodigious eruption of metal and men which was to greet the dawn." He was in the assault on W beach. But Gallipoli in the late spring *is* beautiful.

"It was a beautiful day." This is Major Mure, with the 29th Division at Helles. "I think it was the most intensely blue of all the vivid blue days I saw at Gallipoli. The air danced and shimmered as if full of infinitely small dust of blue diamonds. Butterflies swam through it; a thousand wild flowers perfumed it. Always there in the radiant days of the brief early summer our eyes saw great patches of bloom except where they beheld only desolation, aridity, death and blood. Achi Baba, ever the most prominent mark in view, loomed like a lump of awkwardness in the near distance, so shapeless that its very ugliness was picturesque. The sun went down in glory and in rainbows of fire as we worked, and the guns a little further inland — the never ceasing guns — belched out a venomous requiem and a reiterated threat.

And so — we buried our dead."

At Anzac, as Colonel Skeen wrote to his wife, "There has been a succession of beautiful days ever since we landed — the sea like glass and the hillsides covered with flowers and trees . . . some of the flowers are really beautiful — a thing just like a white wild rose grows all over the hills and in a field in front of the trenches is a mixture of marguerites and poppies which we must imitate in our next garden." So throughout May, and then the heat increased until by August it was unbearable. "The sea was like glass — melted", Hamilton again, "blue green with a dull red glow on it;

the air seems to have been boiled." The flowers and then the grass withered and vanished. In their place came dust, covering everything, horribly pungent; enormous flies, green and loathsome, and with them the Gallipoli gallop, a highly debilitating form of dysentery. Here is A. P. Herbert — the peninsula seemed to be thick with poets — or at least versifiers:

"This is the fourth of June.
Think not I never dream
The noise of that infernal noon
The stretchers' endless stream
The tales of triumphs won
The night that found them lies
The wounded wailing in the sun
The dead, the dust, the flies.

The flies, oh God, the flies
That soiled the sacred dead
To see them swarm from dead men's eyes
And share the soldiers' bread!
Nor think I now forget
The filth and stench of war
The corpses on the parapet
The maggots in the floor."

A. P. Herbert was at Helles. At Anzac the whole Corps — 20,000 men or more — were crammed into an area that you could cover with the top-joint of your finger in a 1-inch map — a tangle of steep ravines, washaways and cliffs cascading down the west flank of the Peninsula to the Aegean. Ashmed Bartlett, war correspondent, wrote: "The whole scene at Anzac beach reminded one irresistibly of a gigantic ship-

wreck. It looked as if the whole force and all the guns and ammunition had not been landed but had been washed ashore." Orlo Williams, Clerk to the House of Commons turned Chief Cipher Officer, was reminded of "the cave dwellings of a large and prosperous tribe of savages who live on the extremely steep slopes of broken sandy bluffs covered with scrub". As to *why* they were there, more later. Robert Rhodes James, who has walked the course with care, writes: "On the beach there were mounds of stores, men hanging about waiting for orders, casualties awaiting embarkation, pyramids of tinned meat and biscuits which also served as shelter from the shrapnel, trains of mules standing in rows being loaded with water cans or ammunition, fatigue parties laying telephone wires or setting off for the front line with supplies, while above, in the cliffs, hundreds of dugouts were perched crazily like some extraordinary rookery." By night — this is a New Zealander, C. B. Brereton — "the Anzac position looked for all the world like a great foundry, working strenuous overtime, sparks flying everywhere, and when shells were bursting great fiery showers flew in all directions like a heavy blow on red-hot metal. This was accompanied by a clanging and cracking that made the likeness complete."

"So here the Anzacs live" — this is Henry Nevinson — "practising the whole art of war. Amid dust and innumerable flies, from the mouths of little caves cut in the face of the cliffs they look out over miles of sea up to the precipitous peaks of Samothrace and the grey mountains of Imbros. Up and down the steep and narrow paths the Colonials arduously toil, like ants which bear the burdens of their race. . . . Every kind of store and arms has to be dragged or 'jumped' up

these ant-hills of cliffs and deposited at the proper hole or gallery. Food, water, cartridges, shells, building timber, guns, medical stores — up the tracks all must go, and down them the wounded come.

“So the practice of the simple life proceeds, with greater simplicity than any Garden Suburb can boast, and the domestic virtues which constitute the whole art of war are exercised with a fortitude rarely maintained upon the domestic hearth.”

The domestic *virtues* which constitute the whole art of war?

It seems to me — but I am certainly no expert — that there had been translated into the Gallipoli peninsula *all* the domestic *horrors* of trench warfare in Flanders — modulated only by the quite exceptional Asiatic heat of the summer of 1915.

At Helles, though the ground is flatter, the congestion was almost as intense. The whole Corps area was never larger than a postcard — on a scale of 1 inch to a mile!

There is a small ravine on the western side where 10,000 Turks were killed in a week, and piles of skulls are to be found to this day. The Turks never buried their dead. If one attacked, one was lucky to get beyond the first Turkish trench. And then, as one young soldier wrote, “the bottom of the trench was choked with dead bodies, friend and foe, and slippery with their life-blood. Corpses had been built into the parapet, the dead then affording protection to the living. Wherever one looked there was death in some ghastly form, arms and legs and decapitated bodies sprawling around in all manner of horribly grotesque postures. To me that scene was the personification of stark naked horror.” After one attack Corporal Riley, whose letters are in the

Imperial War Museum, wrote: “Some of the 7th Manchester were lying, wounded about 25 yards in front of their trench; and there they lay all day in the hot sun, not daring to move until night, when some of them might be able to crawl slowly and painfully back to our lines. . . . It is impossible to describe how men in the trenches were living. Tall men slouched, thin, round shouldered, bandaged over their septic sores, dirty, unshaven, unwashed. Men were living like swine, or worse than swine. About those crowded trenches there hung the smells of latrines and of the dead. Flies and lice tormented men who had hardly enough strength to scratch or fan the flies off for a few seconds. The August sun scorched us for there was no shade. No photograph could show the misery of those trenches, that Saturday afternoon.”

Back at Anzac, there is a vivid description of the Wellington Battalion, having attacked at dawn, holding off a series of counter-attacks. “By early afternoon the forward trench was so choked with bodies that it had to be abandoned and another scratched immediately behind it. The Wellingtons seemed to rise up, each time, from nowhere and the Turks were hurled back.” When darkness came, reinforcements were moved up. “Sergeant Pilling led a platoon and was appalled by the ranks of dead and wounded, the cries for water. The shattered remnants of the attacking force were withdrawn. Their uniforms were torn and drenched with sweat and blood; they were caked in dust; they could hardly walk; most of them had had no sleep for more than 48 hours; none had had any water since dawn; they spoke in whispers and they trembled violently; some broke down and wept. Of the 760 New Zealanders who had advanced so confidently at first light only

70 were unwounded." Major Allanson, commanding 1/6 Gurkhas, after a brilliant action, needing medical attention, describes the journey back to Anzac Cove; "The nullahs on the way back were horrible, full of dead and dying, Maoris, Australians, Sikhs, Gurkhas and British Soldiers, blood and bloody clothes, the smell of the dead now some two days old. . . . I left that battlefield a changed man; all my ambitions to be a successful soldier have now gone; knowing all I now know, I feel the responsibility, *the murderous responsibility*, that rests on the shoulders of an inefficient soldier, or one who has passed his prime to command."

And this brings me towards the centre of what I want to say. That the Gallipoli campaign was *murderous* is clear beyond all doubt. Total allied casualties were probably about 250,000, of whom nearly 50,000 died. Turkish casualties were probably higher — bringing the total of killed and wounded on both sides to over 1/2 million. The Allies never achieved even their *initial D-day objectives*, though they held on for 8½ months and were never thrown back into the sea. It was a desperately close-fought campaign which ended — you could say — in a tactical draw. You could also say, though it is a backhanded way of looking at things, that if the divisions at Gallipoli had not been fighting there they would have been getting killed or wounded somewhere else — the Baltic, Salonika, Syria, Egypt — or more likely Flanders. You could say that the stakes were high enough to justify the attempt; that instead of the short route to Constantinople via Gallipoli, the Allies were forced to take the long and weary road via Mesopotamia and Palestine. You can speculate upon the effects in Russia if the campaign had succeeded. The Prussian Pasha Kannengiesser (= tub-thumper!),

writing ten years later, said: "The year 1915 had already proved a disastrous year for Russia and now came this shattering blow to their morale. They were finally cut from their Allies. *Without Gallipoli they would probably have had no revolution.*" As Churchill said: "the terrible 'ifs' accumulate". But look at it how you will, for the Allies it was *strategically* a major disaster.

I take it that the value of a lecture of this kind is, at least in part, to keep green the memory of those (on both sides) who suffered, so that their heroism, their humour and their endurance shall not yet be forgotten. It is in that spirit that this Church has a chapel dedicated to the 29th Division (which after the Helles operation went on to fight in France), and 84 regiments of the British Army include Gallipoli on their battle honours. It is in that spirit that I have been trying to evoke some aspects of the human condition.

But to leave it at that would be a terrible cop-out. Because more than any other campaign of which I've read Gallipoli seems to scream with the question "Why?" Nor is there any shortage of suggested answers. The bibliography is enormous, and ever-increasing. Churchill, Fisher, Lloyd George, Asquith, Hamilton, Keyes, Guépratte, Wemyss, von Sanders, and umpteen others have written personal accounts: there are huge collections of papers available, not least Kitchener's, Birdwood's and Hamilton's. (Only Hunter Weston seems not to have contributed; I doubt if writing was his strong suit.) There are the Dardanelles Commission Report and the Official History. There are regimental histories galore. What can one add to all this? With real historians present I have the gravest of misgivings.

But it seems to me quite clear that the key to nearly

everything that went wrong was *cybernetic* — by which I understand myself to mean a failure of the *steering gear*. This seems to me the common thread that runs from top to bottom and is worth illustrating at the various levels: at the level of planning and higher direction; at the level of organization; at the level of execution. Allow me a little time in each area.

The *strategic* ingredients of the decision to go for Gallipoli included: pressure from the Russians, British naval reverses, and disenchantment with the Western Front. The Russians were asking for help as early as the end of 1914. Their autumn campaign in Prussia had disastrously failed with over a million casualties. A Turkish Army had advanced into the Caucasus in December and came close to scoring a huge success — failing only when 30,000 of them literally froze to death. The Grand Duke Nicholas appealed to the British Government for a *demonstration* against the Turks to draw part of their army away from Russia. Secondly, there was disenchantment with the prospect of a war of attrition in France — which was the best that the French and Joffre seemed able to offer. An attack upon Turkey would have the appeal of neutralizing one of Germany's most important allies, opening a sea-route for support of the Russians, and drawing the neutral Balkan countries, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, into the Entente. Meanwhile the Royal Navy was also having a bad war: three cruisers lost to submarines off Holland, *von Spee* dominating the South Atlantic and *Emden* the Indian Ocean, the dreadnought *Audacious* sunk and the Royal Naval Division failing to avert the loss of Antwerp. A success was badly needed *somewhere*. All this led, by the turn of the year, to pressure, mainly by Churchill, for an attempt to "force the Dardanelles".

For at least a month, until mid-February 1915, the Dardanelles operation was seen as purely naval, with at the most two Marine battalions to demolish the fortress artillery. Fisher, throughout this period, regarded the operation as unjustifiable, but could not carry against Churchill's enthusiasm. Then, bit by bit, through February, Kitchener found himself agreeing to the commitment of troops *somewhere* in the Eastern Mediterranean; 29 Division, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the Royal Naval Division; and then a French Division chipped in. Rear Admiral Wemyss was sent off to Lemnos — "without instructions, staff or means, to establish a base 3,000 miles from Britain; 700 from Malta, 575 from Alexandria, whose only asset was the huge but exposed natural harbour of Mudros. There was only one tiny pier, no depot ship or supplies, no accommodation on shore and wholly insufficient water resources." No one, at this stage, even knew what the expeditionary force was *for*. Then, on 19th February, came the first naval bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. Militarily it was quite ineffective, but diplomatically a *succes fou*. The Bulgarians broke off negotiations with the central powers; the Greeks offered three divisions; the Russians spoke of attacking Constantinople from the East; the Italians made friendly noises; and in Constantinople itself there were signs of panic. After this there could be no going back. Kitchener telegraphed to Egypt firmly allocating the Australian and New Zealand Corps — "to occupy any captured forts" and "to give co-operation". But as he then clearly explained: "It would not be a sound military undertaking to attempt landing in force on the Gallipoli peninsula until the naval operations for the reduction of forts have been

successful and the passage has been forced."

So the next phase consisted of the attempt, by purely naval means, to do just that. A fresh bombardment of the outer forts on 25th February met with some success, but once the warships entered the straits difficulties increased. Mobile howitzer batteries opened up and could not be spotted. Some of the ships and crews were less than first class. "Some were green," Admiral Brodie wrote, "mostly with age." Seaplanes from *Ark Royal* were unreliable. A series of Marine landings, at the entrance forts, did well at first, but as they were repeated over a ten-day period resistance grew. Bombardment of the coast artillery seemed to be having little effect. Above all, the minesweepers — small trawlers with civilian crews from the north-east ports of England, which could barely make 3 knots against the Dardanelles current — repeatedly failed to sweep any mines. The combination of searchlights, howitzer shells, and the mines themselves was simply too much for them and from 1st to 13th March, despite almost nightly attempts, they achieved nothing.

Over the same period an attempt by Admiral Hall (Director of Naval Intelligence) to buy the Dardanelles for £4 million also foundered — mainly because the British side could not guarantee to leave Constantinople in Turkish hands! And so, on 18th March, there followed the grand naval assault upon the narrows: 18 battleships, with an armada of cruisers and destroyers, "it looked as though no human power could withstand such an array of might and power". It was the nearest equivalent, in all history, to a naval cavalry charge, and it was a decisive failure. The Turks fired off most of their ammunition, but their guns remained largely intact. The battleships blundered into an uncharted

row of mines, laid only a few nights earlier. The minesweepers, as usual, wavered and fled. Three battleships were sunk and three more crippled. The force withdrew. Although there was much talk of reorganizing and trying again, in fact nothing of the kind *ever* happened.

What *did* happen was a complete change in the complexion of the plans. When Hamilton was first appointed, and then briefed, by Kitchener on 13th March, the military operation was still to be undertaken "only in the event of the Fleet failing to get through after every effort has been exhausted". He hoped to get through without it.

On 22nd March, *after* the naval failure, when Hamilton and de Robeck, the new naval C-in-C first got together, the latter said at once that he could not get through without the help of the troops. The crucial decision was then taken to proceed on the basis of a *joint* operation. London were told and had to make the best of it. It was decided also to send the Army back to Alexandria to reorganize, thus making a postponement till after mid-April inevitable. The extra warning time thus given to the Turks for digging, wiring, laying minefields, camouflage and above all training were — in von Sanders words — indispensable. Hamilton *assumed*, and indeed de Robeck promised, that in the meanwhile a vigorous offensive on the forts, reconnaissance, and sustained and determined sweeping operations would continue. In the event the fleet effectively disappeared. Hamilton *assumed* that the operations eventually to be undertaken by the Army would be in conjunction with another major naval assault on the Dardanelles. In fact de Robeck had decided that the Navy would never again attack the

forts until the Army *had* occupied the Gallipoli peninsula. Nor did they.

Why — and this is the crucial question — did things drift in this way until an operation emerged for which there had been no planning, no training, no intelligence, totally inadequate logistic preparation, and on the major outline of which the naval and land forces commanders-in-chief continued to have totally incompatible conceptions? Partly, I suppose, because nothing of this kind had ever been attempted before. Partly, I suspect, it was due to the inadequacy of the Whitehall planning machinery. The War Council did not meet regularly, nor forward its conclusions to the Cabinet. It kept its proceedings in manuscript, received few departmental memoranda, did not work to an agenda, and met only when the Prime Minister summoned it. So Ministers tended to move off in differing directions. As Sir William Robertson put it: "The Secretary of State for War was aiming for decisive results on the Western Front; the first Lord of the Admiralty was advocating a military expedition to the Dardanelles; the Secretary of State for India was devoting his attention to a campaign in Mesopotamia; the Secretary of State for the Colonies was occupying himself with several small wars in Africa; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was attempting to secure the removal of a large part of the British Army from France to some Eastern Mediterranean theatre."

As was well known, the First Sea Lord (Fisher) saw eye to eye with his boss on almost nothing — particularly on the Dardanelles, while the CIGS (Archibald Murray) saw himself simply as Kitchener's Chief of Staff to give advice and information when asked. Kitchener, quite out of touch with the new General

Staff created by the Haldane Reforms, never asked him! Only Hankey seems to have had any premonition of disaster. As early as 19th March he was attributing the naval fiasco to "inadequate staff preparation" and advocating a technical naval and military committee — the first germ of the Chiefs of Staff. Not long afterwards he put his finger on the fundamental flaw in the whole Gallipoli concept. "Up to the present time", he wrote, "no attempt has been made to estimate what force is required to make sure of success. We have merely said that so many troops are available and they ought to be enough." When he told Churchill that the landings would be "of extraordinary difficulty", Churchill said that he could see no difficulty at all. On 12th April Hankey sent to Asquith a memorandum that concluded: "The military operation appears, therefore, to be to a certain extent a *gamble* upon the supposed shortage of supplies and inferior fighting qualities of the Turkish Armies." He was right. The War Office estimate of casualties for the landing and capture of the whole Peninsula was only about 5000. "At the outset" — this is the finding of the Dardanelles Commission — "all decisions were taken and provisions based on the *assumption* that, if a landing were effected, the advance would be rapid and the resistance slight." But there was little hard evidence in support of this assumption and no lack of warnings: the fighting in the Caucasus, on the Canal, at Basra and at the Dardanelles Forts. But these were disregarded, and in their absence plans and assumptions were allowed to feed on each other, and to spread outwards and downwards via GHQ to the whole force. "I only hope I may be able to nip over and have a look at Troy", wrote Patrick Shaw Stewart. "I don't think this is going to be at all a dangerous

campaign — we shall only have to sit in the Turkish Forts after the Fleet has shelled the unfortunate occupants out of them.”

So in Whitehall there was neither grip nor vision but considerable disarray lit by one, brilliant, strategic idea.

And much of the same was true at the level of the Force Headquarters. There was never one man in overall command — it was Hamilton and de Robeck jointly. There was never a joint headquarters. During the preparation Hamilton was at Alexandria, on *Arcadian* or at Lemnos. Later he set up his headquarters on Imbros. De Robeck was at sea. During the actual landings Hamilton joined him on *Queen Elizabeth*, but this meant his staff being incarcerated in gun turrets and other clanging recesses where they were quite useless. And, which was perhaps much worse, proper use was never made of the administrative staff. Hamilton was obsessed with the virtue of a small headquarters and had an antipathy for administration. The AQ staff were appointed late; then left in Alexandria; then were kept on a separate ship at Mudros and left in no doubt that they were regarded as a tedious encumbrance. Not till Hamilton was superseded were the general and administrative staffs brought together; and it may be that the efficiency and success of the final evacuations owed much to just that fact. Communications were always difficult, and it is tempting at times to ascribe almost the whole cause of the fiasco to the absence of any efficient form of combat net radio. But that was nothing new, and applied to both sides equally — so as an explanation it is not particularly helpful!

Let me tell a few more stories on the theme of cybernetic failure — the first quite literally. It appeals

to me as a boating man — there but for the grace of God! The Anzacs were to land, in 48 rowing boats, towed in by pinnaces and then cast off 50 yards out, spread out over a mile of beach giving easy access to the hinterland. They actually landed, completely intermingled, on a tiny stretch of coast only a few hundred yards wide, about a mile too far north, giving directly on to a steep rise, or almost sheer cliffs. This upset every plan. Not only was the movement inland far slower than it ought to have been, but units became (and remained) inextricably mixed up, and Anzac Cove became instantly, and long remained, an administrative shambles, thus slowing down the build-up perhaps fatally. The bridgehead remained, for the full eight months that it was occupied, the literal cliff-hanger that I earlier described — which it need never have been.

And yet, the sea that night was a dead flat calm; the battleship *Triumph* was anchored — as far as is known correctly — to mark the rendezvous and assess the current; and three more battleships, *London*, *Prince of Wales* and *Queen*, were to lead the “tows” to within a mile of their landing places. What can have gone wrong? The official account is that an unexpected northerly current pushed the tows off course and that Lieutenant Commander Waterlow, leading the right wing, then misidentified a headland in the dark and steered still further to the north. But Commander Dix, on the other flank, says that seeing the right wing coming across (as he knew wrongly) he steered under their stern, thus closing the whole array like a concertina. Why, if Dix knew where they were, did Waterlow not? There is also evidence that the battleships themselves were too far north. The legend is that Turkish

soldiers, seeing a marker buoy the day before, swam out and moved it, but this is quite incredible. One theory is that Rear Admiral Thursby, on *Queen*, made a last minute change of plan, but could not signal to *London*, so Dix did not know. This would explain almost everything. There *had* been a change of landing site, though in the opposite, southerly direction, not long before. Thursby *did* report that the southern tow had landed within a hundred yards of its *assigned* position. But why, if there was a further change of plan on Thursby's part, did this never come out in the subsequent investigations? We shall never know the truth. What is certain is that a navigation error took place, on a coastline that had been closely reconnoitred, not short of distinctive landmarks, clearly visible from 1000 yards out, on an almost perfect night, where there was no enemy opposition whatsoever. One cannot say that if the Anzacs had been correctly landed by the Navy their mission would have succeeded. One can say from that moment their chances of *initial* success were greatly lessened, and that from this mishap the whole expedition never really recovered.

An even odder episode, though probably with less far-reaching consequences, was the operation at Y beach, a landing detached from the rest of those at Helles, about 5000 yards up the west coast. It had been decided upon late on in the planning, by Hamilton himself, to make use of a small beach, and a pathway up the cliff, where there were known to be no Turks. The troops concerned were the KOSB, a company of South Wales Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion of Marines — some 2000 all told. Lieutenant Colonel Koe of the KOSB thought he was in command, but at a conference four days earlier it was discovered that

Lieutenant Colonel Matthews of the Marines was senior. He had been put in command, but Koe was away sick at the time and no one remembered to tell him. He had no orders at all; Matthews was told only to advance "some little distance inland", capture a gun and attract reserves. Later he was to contact the main body and join it for the march north.

The landing was entirely uneventful. Fighting patrols found only four startled Turks. Two companies of the KOSB went inland as far as the deep ravine — barely marked on their maps — where the 10,000 Turks were to die in a week, two months later, and the piles of skulls are still to be seen. On that day it was quite deserted. Koe, still thinking he was in command, appealed to Divisional HQ for information and advice but got no reply. Matthews, with his adjutant, walked across to the village of Krithia — also deserted. He was the last British soldier ever to get there! It was a beautiful day — but the officers began to feel uncomfortable. They all went back to the "camp" which was sprawled along the cliff top. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon they decided to dig in — too late. Before six the Turkish counterattack had started and by nightfall they were in a state of siege. In fact the Turks were always outnumbered, but they pressed their attacks through the night: by dawn Koe was dead, there had been heavy casualties, and many of the men had shot all their ammunition away. Matthews, whose conduct was impeccable, beat off a final attack at the cliff top and the Turks then withdrew out of sight of the warships' guns. Matthews, once it was apparent that the Turks had gone, inspected his position, and to his amazement found much of the force had *gone*, abandoning its equipment. What seems to have happened

is that some men had drifted down to the beach. A young officer asked for help and the Navy promptly re-embarked him. Other officers, seeing this, and thinking that an order had been given, followed suit. By 7 a.m. several hundred men were either back on the warships or waiting on the beach while puzzled and then frantic messages passed to and fro. Matthews by now had had no message of any kind from divisional headquarters for 29 hours and seeing the evacuation proceeding rapidly also assumed that they had ordered it.

At this point Hamilton himself, having failed to persuade Hunter Weston to take any interest in Y beach, ordered some reinforcements to go there, off his own bat, and proceeded to go there himself in *Queen Elizabeth* arriving at half-past nine. What he saw amazed him. "I disliked and mistrusted the look of those aimless dawdlers by the sea. There was no fighting; a rifle shot now and again from the crests where we saw our fellows clearly. The little crowd and the boats on the beach were right under them and no one paid any attention or seemed to be in a hurry. Our naval and military signallers were at sixes and sevens. The *Goliath* wouldn't answer; the *Dublin* said the force was coming off and we could not get into touch with the soldiers at all." Hamilton, by now, had made the same assumption, that the evacuation had been ordered. The whole contingent re-embarked. That afternoon Adrian Keyes was sent ashore to make certain there was no one left behind. The battlefield was utterly deserted!

I will tell one more story of cybernetic breakdown. The time was early August when, in synchrony with new landings at Suvla Bay, there was also to be a wide

flanking attack out of Anzac, moving first north close to the coast and then east up a steep valley — the Aghyl Dere — then south-west to the summit of the central spine of the Peninsula. The left-hand column, to be led by guides, was composed mainly of Indian and Australian troops, the latter under a Brigadier Monash. He was an Australian Jew, an engineer by profession, deeply interested in the art of war, a brilliant officer who did better the higher he went; he was later to become a Corps Commander and be described by Lloyd George as the "most resourceful general in the British Army".

But on the night of the 6th/7th August 1915 resourceful he was not. Things started badly, but not *that* badly. Assembling the units in the ravines at Anzac took far longer than expected. It was pitch dark. A few men panicked and ran back, causing confusion. The guides took a dud short cut where there were snipers. By 2 a.m., instead of approaching the ridge, the soldiers were only just reaching the Aghyl Dere. The moon rose. Casualties were seen "throwing themselves about". The General arrived (Cox) slightly wounded, having lost his column and his headquarters! The brigades pushed on; there were more snipers; at daybreak they were exhausted, still entangled in the foothills, and had not started to move towards the objectives they *should* have reached four hours earlier. The leader of the guides was killed at dawn. Allanson, commanding 3/6 Gurkhas, who had made much the best progress, was then put by Cox under Monash's command and went to report to him. This is what he found.

"A lot of shooting seemed to be going on, and there were some wounded lying about, but what I mostly saw were men hopelessly exhausted, lying around

everywhere, all movement and attempt to advance seemed to have ceased. This is not surprising to me now . . . it had been a most exhausting night march and the sun was terribly powerful. But what upset me most was that Monash himself seemed to have temporarily lost his head, he was running about saying 'I thought I could command men, I thought I could command men', those were his exact words. I went up and told him that my battalion had been placed in reserve at his disposal but he said to me 'What a hopeless mess has been made of this, you are no use to me at all.' I said nothing more but got back to my battalion as soon as I could. . . . I thought that the best thing I could do was to start up the hill on my own. . . . I was anxious to get away from Monash as quickly as I could as I felt thoroughly upset by what I had seen."

In the fighting that followed, Allanson's Gurkhas did brilliantly and in the end got up and over the ridge, though being on their own the position could not be sustained. Allanson was put up for a V.C. and got a D.S.O. Monash's Australians, by contrast, having made an attempt upon the ridge from the north, were shot to bits by well-concealed machine-guns and, for the first time in the campaign, broke and ran. It is hard not to blame him. He was an excellent officer, but in the wrong job and at the wrong time. It must have been at least partly with him in mind that Allanson wrote of "murderous responsibility".

In speaking of *cybernetic* failure, has one said anything at all, apart from importing a word from the new jargon? I think so. Whitehall, as it seems to me, was in the grip of a brilliant strategic idea that was simply too big for it to handle. The techniques of

command and control in joint operation took decades more to develop. What happened more recently in the Falklands leads one to suspect that neither in Whitehall co-ordination nor at Task Force level are we yet anywhere near perfection. Within the Force itself, perhaps the main problem was that the whole machine had been too rapidly expanded. George Lloyd, an M.P. serving in Gallipoli, wrote to his wife at the end of July from GHQ on Imbros:

"the one thing that hits one in the face the whole time is the very small number of men who are efficient. What is the cause of it? Is it our system of education, is it something in the character we are breeding? It is the one thing — *the one thing* — that has struck me over and over again."

I wish I had found that quotation before I finished a recent report on the Army's "system of education". Actually I think that the British Army today is highly efficient, and that an excellent system of education has much to do with it — of which the "character that we are breeding" is a most important ingredient.

Let me finish with one more anecdote — that is in one sense a parable. At Helles, in late June, to assist identification, the men had small metal triangles sewn on their backs. As the bombardment lifted the ground was suddenly filled with thousands of sparkles of glittering metallic light, as though, in Hamilton's words, "someone had quite suddenly thrown a big handful of diamonds on to the landscape". In the attack of 6th August Corps Headquarters told HQ 29 Div that the Turkish front line was definitely captured, as their observation officers could see the metal discs on the

soldiers' backs in the enemy trenches. Their wearers,
however, were all dead.

"Was it hard Achilles"

wrote Patrick Shaw Stewart, who was killed later on the
Western Front,

"So very hard to die?
Thou knowest and I know not —
So much happier I.

I will go back this morning
From Imbros over the sea;
Stand in the trench Achilles,
Flame-capped, and shout for me."

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PRIME MINISTER

GALLIPOLI

I attach some notes, originally intended for a speech about Gallipoli, sent to me by a Mr Peter Liddle of the University of Leeds. It occurs to me that you might like to glance at them as a source for any comments about the campaign which you may be called upon to make to the media during your visit to Gallipoli on Wednesday. There are some evocative phrases.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL
23 April 1990

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DRAFT NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN TURKEY MARKING
THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

We meet today in a mood of melancholy mingled with thanksgiving, and of reverence at the memory of the sacrifices of 75 years ago; a reverence which transcends the rivalries of those days, and bridges the divisions between former enemies. I know that there are many who have drawn comfort from the cemeteries so beautifully tended here.

The very word 'Gallipoli' is often used to denote heroic but pointless endeavour, or even useless sacrifice. It is not my purpose today to indulge in detailed judgements about the military events of 1915. Perhaps now that so many records have been opened up we understand better than we once did how complicated were the circumstances which Ministers and military leaders had to face, and why they were prepared to run such great risks in order to avoid what seemed likely to be an endless slogging match on the Western Front. The idea that so much treasure poured out, so many lives lost, so many acres devastated, would produce no conclusive result in France and Belgium tempted strategists and Ministers to look for a way round.

It seemed the more attractive when by the standards of the Western Front the commitment of men and materials would be relatively small. Of course, everything turned upon success in the Dardanelles being attained without undue delay; after that, so it was reasoned, it would be possible to assist Russia, as the ally of France and Britain, and to undermine Austria-Hungary, the ally of Germany. Russia appealed for help, as well she might. The purpose of the British and Commonwealth military forces dispatched after the failure of the Navy to neutralise the Turkish defence of the mines in the Dardanelles, was to take the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to open Naval passage to the Marmora and thus to the Golden Horn. The allies could place their ships there, they could threaten the bombardment of Constantinople, and thus try to ensure Turkish withdrawal from the war.

Our relations with Turkey have been so friendly for so many years now that I hope I can say all this without giving offence. Much must be excused in the fog of war, with nations fighting for their very life. And when we look at what happened in almost another four years of warfare, the loss of many of the best of their generation in every part of Europe, we should not quickly condemn people who looked for another way of bringing war to an end. No doubt their assumptions were too optimistic; even if the local enterprise succeeded here at the Narrows, rather unlikely allies had to be found in South East Europe, a force would have to be equipped and organised to threaten Austria-Hungary by advancing up the Danube, the Germans, it was hoped, would divert a good deal of strength from the Western Front in order to help Vienna and Budapest; and thus, either Austria-Hungary would be defeated by a combination of military pressure and internal disruption, or Germany would be so weakened that Britain and France could secure victory on the Western Front.

Perhaps we shall best call it an understandable gamble. But we mark and celebrate today a different aspect of affairs, something that even an official historian of one of the participating regiments once called 'the great adventure'. That it certainly was, as an act of strategy and even more in terms of unquenchable human spirit. I pay my particular tribute to the way in which the Turkish Government has maintained the sites hallowed by memories of sacrifice in 1915, and have been moved, as many will be, to read the words which the Turkish authorities have chosen to commemorate amidst the friendships of today the sacrifices of those who fought on opposite sides long ago. I read that on one of the memorials are inscribed the lines:

'Traveller halt! The ground where you walk once witnessed the end of an era. Listen! In this quiet mound there once beat the heart of a nation.' Indeed, we may add - several nations.

So startling have been the advances of applied science in the last generation that we need to make a conscious effort of imagination if we were to understand how great were the uncertainties and novelties of the campaign fought here in 1915. It was a

Combined Operation, not only between British and French and Commonwealth forces, but between new and old arms of warfare. Less than six years had passed since Bleriot had first flown an aircraft over the twenty miles or so of sea which separate France from Britain. At the Dardanelles, not only land-based aircraft but sea planes supported no less than an Armada of vessels large and small making their way to 7 separate beaches; at a little distance from the shingle shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula and on the Asiatic side of the Narrows, at Kum Kale, naval cutters and whalers, which had been towed in by steam picket boats, cast off and were rowed in by their crews to face a resolute Turkish opposition which withstood heavy shelling from the allied ships. At one of those beaches, on the northern side of the Peninsula, a few miles from Cape Helles, Australians and New Zealanders were about to face a task of the most daunting kind. Everyone knows how they faced it, and at what a cost; and there they forged a legend which became a permanent part of their emerging nationhood, the drama of the Anzac beachhead.

Against the Turkish and German forces were arrayed nationalities, tongues, cultures, religions of the most diverse kind: the English, Scots, Welsh and Irish; Australians and New Zealanders; Newfoundlanders; Sikhs, Gurkhas and other troops from India; Palestinians, Moroccans, Algerians, Senegalese, troops from Metropolitan France. To bring such an array of forces together and then to coordinate their action must, we may say, surely have been exceptionally difficult. Perhaps in this particular enterprise launched in the way it was, 'impossible' would not be an inappropriate word. However, the testimony of those who gave their lives as well as those who survived leaves us in no doubt that the endeavour had for them all the marks of a great cause, and the exhilaration which springs from taking part in it. Amongst them were men whose diaries and letters show that they knew how historic was the ground upon which the battle was to be fought; for the scene lay within sight of Troy on the Asiatic shore.

Those eight months of campaigning brought a heavy toll; on the allied side alone, 46,000 died. Even the survivors had to confront

every sort of ordeal from dysentery to flooding and freezing temperatures. Some were convinced and in a sense troubled for the rest of their lives by the belief that success had been but one or two steps away. An awareness of a great adventure frustrated, the sadness of so many fine lives lost, the constant strain of those months upon the peninsula under endless shelling, the pent up tensions associated with the evacuation - all this ensured that those who served at Gallipoli carried with them to the end an undiminished sense of the comradeship forged there, of the pride in having been there and the confidence that every man had done his best.

The conception of the campaign here in the Dardanelles, and the driving force behind its early stages sprang largely from Winston Churchill. Everyone knows that his political career was severely stricken as a result of the failure of his concept to bear early fruit. Looking back years later upon the events of 1915, Churchill said with his characteristic good humour that he had only one consolation in thinking of the series of mischances which in his view had just prevented the allied forces from getting through; and that was that God wished matters to be prolonged so that mankind should be thoroughly sickened of war. He said this only ten years before an even more destructive war broke out in the autumn of 1939; but in our generation, especially after the events of the last twelve months, we may perhaps be moving towards circumstances which render war between such great nations unnecessary and even unthinkable. Our pleasure that the enmities of the First War between Turkey and the western allies did not persist into the Second and that we have now been allied for so long, our earnest hope that the present and future generations may not have to walk through the wilderness of suffering which their grandfathers and great-grandfathers had to traverse, blend today with our respect for all those who stood to their duty in this place 75 years ago.

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Pete H Liddle F.R.Hist.S.

University of Leeds
Liddle Collection

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
GALLIPOLI 1915 - 1990

An exhibition to commemorate the
75th Anniversary of the Gallipoli landings on April 25 1915
and the Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign.
April 25 to May 31, The University of Leeds (Edward Boyle Library)

The University of Leeds is mounting a major and unusual exhibition drawing upon the uniquely comprehensive and fascinating Dardanelles/Gallipoli holdings of the Liddle Collection to document Britain's first large scale, inter-allied 20th century Combined Operation of war. Imaginatively conceived and illustrating the February, March Naval bombardments and shore party demolition work, the assembling of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and then the drama of the April landings at Cape Helles, Kum Kale and North of Gaba Tepe, the exhibition fully takes account of the undersea and air support elements in the campaign. After coverage of the May to July battles, the new landing at Suvla and the struggle for the heights above Anzac, the exhibition depicts the tribulations of dysentery and then of the extreme climatic conditions of November, till, against all the odds, the skilful carrying out of well-laid evacuation plans is successfully effected in December and then in January of the following year. In telling a tale of exceptional interest, a distinctive audio element is an integral part of the lay out of this exhibition, nicely complementing displays which make surprising use of colour.

There will always be debate over the concept, conduct and impact of this campaign but here in Leeds will be seen graphic documentation of "what it was like to be there". The spirit of Gallipoli is quite remarkably captured. Whether the visitors were to be drawn by interest in the campaign itself, the Naval or Air aspects, the service of certain regiments, the exploits of those who were to be awarded the Victoria Cross or the endeavours of unsung individuals who left letter, diary, art, photographic or three-dimensional evidence of their endeavours or whether he were to wish to see the appearance of the landscape today, it is unlikely that he will be disappointed.

If you would like more information on the exhibition (open throughout normal library hours, admission free) or on the Liddle Collection and in particular its association of "Friends" of the Collection, please write to the Hon. Sec. of the Friends: Mrs A. Artymluk, The Liddle Collection, Edward Boyle Library, The University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT. Tel. 0532 935566.



GALLIPOLI 1915 - 1990

THE LESSONS OF GALLIPOLI

BY

ROBERT RHODES JAMES

No single military campaign of modern times has received a literature comparable in scale and quality than the ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Even the British Official biographer, who had been on Sir Ian Hamilton's staff, wrote rhapsodically that "the drama of the Dardanelles campaign, by reason of the beauty of its setting, the grandeur of its theme and the unhappiness of its ending, will always rank amongst the world's classic tragedies!" C.E.W. Bean's superlative Australian history is also a work of literature in its own right. But, as Lord Grey wrote, "nothing so distorted perspective, disturbed impartial judgment, and impaired the sense of strategic values as the operations on Gallipoli", and the same can be said of much of the subsequent writing on the campaign. As John North remarked, with truth, "no battleground so easily lends itself to retrospective sentimentality", and one of the purposes of my history of the campaign, first published in 1965, translated into Turkish and Italian, and in print virtually ever since - in itself a remarkable example of the enduring fascination with Gallipoli - was to describe it very much in the contemporary accounts of the luckless participants, to whom, on both sides, it was sheer hell, with some interludes. My late uncle, badly wounded at Anzac in the August offensive, told me that his most vivid memory of Anzac was spending almost all his time in the latrine, suffering, as was virtually every other man, from virulent dysentery. He saw nothing romantic about it; nor did hardly anyone else who was actually there. And 46,000 Allied soldiers, and literally countless Turks, were killed on two small fronts in nine months.

The assumption of the ^{Western} inter-war writers was that as there would never again be a war on this scale the dominating question was who was to blame for the disaster. Was it Churchill, as Bean, and many others, claimed? Was it Hamilton? Why were so many of the British generals so old and so useless? These, and many other issues, were furiously argued. The confidential British joint Services study, which has never been published, lamely concluded that "it is essential that operations of this nature should be based on a previously well-considered estimate of the sea, land and air forces necessary to obtain the results desired!" It even advised against having a single commander-in-chief for

amphibious operations of this type and scale, blithely ignoring what had been one of the most significant of all the lessons of the Allied command. Curiously enough the best and most detailed analyses were by the Turkish General Staff and ⁱⁿ American Service journals.

The Gallipoli campaign was absolutely unique and unprecedented in modern warfare, a fact that has been often overlooked by Hamilton's critics. If the British had little experience of such operations since the occupation of Egypt in 1882, nor did anyone else. It was the first amphibious operation that involved aircraft, submarines, ^{radio communication} and armoured landing craft, and long, entirely maritime, lines of communication. German and Turkish ^{mines and} torpedoes caused havoc among the Allied naval and civilian fleets. Disease caused even more casualties than bullets or bombs. And Hamilton had less than a month ^{in March or April 1915} to gather his disparate - and, with the exception of the magnificent 29th Division, which was to suffer so grievously - untried troops and to devise his strategy.

The brilliance of that strategy has also tended to be underestimated. There would be a feint attack at Bulair, on the neck of the Peninsula, where Liman Von Sanders ^{whose role} was deliberately down-graded in the Turkish history - had concentrated his principal forces. There would be another, in strength, by the French, at Kum Kale. British submarines would be sent into the Marmara to attack Turkish ships bringing reinforcements and supplies. While the main landings would be by the British at Helles, the untried Anzacs would land further north near Gaba Tepe and sweep across the Peninsula. The naval bombardment to precede the landings at Helles would be of unparalleled fury. A harmless-looking transport ship, the River Clyde, would be a modern Trojan Horse, packed with soldiers. The purpose of this was to confuse the defenders for the first vital forty-eight hours. In this at least it succeeded totally, as Von Sanders candidly admitted.

It also tends to be forgotten that only two of the landings were opposed - at W Beach, where the Turkish resistance, although strong, was swept aside, and V Beach. The latter reverse was the most serious setback on April 25th 1915, and threw the assault in disarray, but by the following day had been made good, albeit at a terrible cost. Although the Anzacs had been thrown back by Kemal's division into a dangerously vulnerable perimeter, they had kept - and were to continue to keep - a disproportionate number of the Turkish forces away from the main front. When the British, now reinforced by the French after the wholly successful operation at Kum Kale, advanced ^{at Helles} on the 27th there was virtual no Turkish resistance left.

But, even ^{by} then, some grim lessons had been learned.

The first had been that no one, from Churchill down, had expected the much despised and often defeated Turkish soldier to put up so ferocious a resistance, Kemal hurling his men fanatically to certain death until the Anzacs broke under the onslaught, the machine-gunners at Sedd-el-Bahr uncowed by the massive naval bombardment. Not only had they inflicted undreamed-of casualties, and had proved that shelling has its limitations on a well dug-in unit and that there are few things more vulnerable than a heavily equipped soldier sitting helplessly in a wood^{ed} boat of struggling shore with water up to his waist, but the psychological damage on the invaders had been immense. "I had no idea, to be frank, that they would be so good", Hamilton later told the Dardanelles Commission of the Turks. Confidently expected ^{ing} a walk-over, the invaders were stunned and demoralised by the reality.

Hamilton's overall strategy, however inspired, was grievously marred by his lack of attention to logistics, and his "Q" staff had been virtually ignored in the planning. It was the collapse of logistics, combined with exhaustion and confusion, that brought the Allied advance at Helles to a halt. By the time that things had been sorted out to some reasonable extent, Von Sanders' army from Bulair had arrived. The element of surprise having been lost, the Helles sector taught the lesson that attacks in open country on trenches in the era of the machine-gun are exercises in suicide.

By making over-optimistic assumptions about the quality of the opposition and the practicalities of the operation, what had seemed to have been a successful, if costly, operation now became a near-disaster. The arrangements for the treatment of the wounded were based on the assumption that hospitals would be established ashore (not that many casualties were expected, in any event). The result was chaos, with much needless suffering and unnecessary deaths. The sight of boats of wounded men being ferried around from ship to ship seeking succour, and the lack of all but the most basic medical facilities on the Peninsula, was another deadly factor in the slump in morale. This particular lesson was never learnt throughout the campaign, especially in the planning for the August campaign. The official account of the British medical record on Gallipoli is perhaps the most chilling single document that emerged from the campaign, although it can be said that the Turks' indifference to this aspect of war was far worse. This was little consolation to their opponents.

The result was trench warfare - on the Allied side without grenades, apart from

the "jam-tin" home made variety - and, as the trenches got ever closer - without artillery. Here, apart from the warships, before they had to flee back to Mudros when the German submarines and a Turkish torpedo boat started sinking them, ammunition and guns were so limited that the ration became only a few shells a day; only the French, with their incomparable "75"s seemed to have sufficient reserves. None of this stopped Hamilton and Hunter-Weston launching a series of set-piece attacks on the Helles front on the Flanders model - and with exactly the same terrible result. The Turk commanders, also, had not learnt the lesson, and their casualties in mad, if heroic, assaults, were horrific. One of the wonders not only of Gallipoli but of the Western Front in the First World War is how high morale remained on both sides, particularly at Anzac, where the conditions were unspeakable, and where, in that amazingly confined space, when disease came it swept through the Anzacs so devastatingly. Again, the medical services were totally at a loss.

The August offensive, the breakout at Anzac, was the result of some brilliant reconnoitring by a New Zealander officer, Major Overton, and another, Corporal Denton, who had found a totally undefended route to the summit of Chunuk Bair, the key to the Anzac position; this discovery led to a detailed, and wholly practical, plan to capture Chunuk Bair by a night march, which was the brainchild of a quiet Scots officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel Skeen. Kemal had also realised the vulnerability of the virtually undefended Chunuk Bair, but was dismissively overruled.

A night march with troops who were, most of them, seriously unwell, in such a mountainous and broken landscape, must well have seemed madness to the German-Turkish high command, but the fact was that it came within an ace of triumph. The New Zealanders actually reached the summit, before being ordered by an exceptionally incompetent senior officer to halt, and General Walker's diversionary assault on Lone Pine was a masterpiece of preparation and ingenuity, and success. The others at Anzac, particularly the tragic slaughter of the Australian Light Horse at The Nek, were totally ineffective and bloody, but the result of local blunders.

The basic cause of the failure of the August Offensive was to make it too ambitious. Hamilton had, in the New Army Divisions, a superfluity of manpower. Anzac had been secretly reinforced until the tiny area was seriously overcrowded, and the fateful decision was taken to land the new and inexperienced divisions on the undefended Suvla Plain, to the north of the Anzac position. But this was regarded as a side[-]show to the

main Anzac thrust. The British Generals responsible for Suvla were hopelessly inadequate, and, again, too old, but their instructions were simply to land their men and occupy the beaches. This, to be fair to them - which few have been - they did. After that, they did nothing, until it was too late.

In a catalogue of ineptitude in military matters, few operations of war can match the Suvla landings. Security had been so relaxed for the original landings that it now became a mania, with the result that senior officers had no idea of what was required of them and their men until hours before they landed. The logistics, particularly water supplies, were bungled again. The men were injected against cholera shortly before embarking. There were no maps, again, of any value. The only asset the New Army had were armoured landing craft, which greatly reduced their casualties against what limited resistance they initially met. After that, it was chaos.

Both at Anzac and at Suvla, Von Sanders again had been totally outwitted by Hamilton but, again, made a fast and fierce response. Every available man was hastened to Chunuk Bair by Kemal, while Von Sanders marched his reserves to Suvla, even at the expense of the Helles front, where another British diversionary attack had ended in total failure, at a heavy cost. It was this speed of assessment of the peril that marked out both Von Sanders and Kemal as far better fighting commanders than Hamilton. The August offensive, that had opened so triumphantly for the British, ended in a stalemate that was to the advantage of the Turks. Hamilton had over-reached himself. The August offensive was too clever by half. If it had been concentrated on the Anzac breakout it would have been a decisive victory, as Kemal realised. His casualties were very heavy, but he drove the British and the Anzacs off Chunuk Bair, and Suvla degenerated into the Helles pattern of miserable trench warfare. It also meant the end of Hamilton's career, and, in effect, the end of the Gallipoli campaign.

There was, however, to be one singular triumph before the curtain fell - the evacuation of Suvla-Anzac and, subsequently, Helles. The new commander, General Monro, a particular target of Churchill's subsequent vituperation, brought together his staff and the Q staff for the first time. Their task at Suvla-Anzac alone was to evacuate some 80,000 men, 5,000 animals, 2,000 vehicles and nearly 200 guns, literally under the eyes of the enemy, as at the end of the August fighting the Turks still commanded all the high ground. To keep the enemy deceived was crucial. Every night flotillas of small boats would creep into Anzac Cove and Suvla; by morning the seas were empty again. Nothing appeared to have changed, regular fire was maintained, and every appearance that the army remained in

strength. This time everyone was kept fully informed, and the detailed time-tables were a model of professional staff work, nothing being left to chance or improvisation. So successful was this subterfuge that, to the end, the Turks thought that the British were preparing a new assault. On the final night, when 20,000 men were evacuated, self-fitting rifles fired regularly, and a huge mine was exploded under The Nek. On the morning of December 20th the Turks discovered with stupefaction that the entire British and Dominion force had vanished, without a single death or serious injury. It was, as a leading German commentator wrote generously at the time, "a hitherto unattained masterpiece"

What was even more remarkable was that the same tactics worked at Helles in January, when over 35,000 men and nearly 4,000 horses and quantities of guns and stores were spirited away without the Turks ever realising what was going on.

* * *

For staff officers in the inter-war period Gallipoli was a treasure-trove of information and experience; when the Second war came, and amphibious operations planning came into its own, this proved invaluable, although, depressingly, not all the lessons had been learnt. One of the key problems was that the British (and American) soldier being a land-animal there is a natural tendency, after making the landing, to relax. A curious inertia prevails, as though the most difficult part of the operation was over. The D-Day planners, with fresh experience in the Mediterranean and the Dieppe disaster, were acutely aware of this, and great emphasis was placed on "pushing forward". But, in spite of total air superiority, the limitations of naval bombardment was demonstrated again, particularly at Omaha, but although the build-up was slow, the logistics side had been thoroughly prepared. Another factor was the psychological one; no one had any illusions that this was going to be a walk-over, or that the Germans were anything but superb soldiers. A close friend of mine who made the landing told me that he and his unit were convinced that "we would all be slaughtered". It was some time before the Allied forces could break through, but it had been a masterpiece of planning and, again of deception, the feints of Hamilton being emulated, and added to with great ingenuity and skill.

The Falklands operation presented logistical problems even greater than those that had faced Hamilton, and the amount of time available to the planners equally limited, but sheer professionalism triumphed. The lessons had been learned.

But, a footnote can be added. During the conflict I was surprised to learn that my

history of the Gallipoli campaign had suddenly sold out, and had to be reprinted. After the Argentine surrender I was invited to lunch at the Admiralty by Michael Heseltine. It was a small gathering, that included Admiral Woodward and Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, two of the stars of the conflict. I was flattered to be in such company, but puzzled, until I found that the reason my Gallipoli had vanished from the shelves was that the Ministry of Defence had bought every copy they could find. Also, when the army had landed, and the characteristic inertia was faithfully repeated, Fieldhouse had sent an urgent message: "Remember Gallipoli ! Get going !"

There can be few such dramatic examples of the importance of studying and writing military history, and, for the professional, the importance of learning from the experience of others. When one looks at D-Day and the Falklands, one sees the reason.

ROBERT RHODES JAMES, POLITICIAN AND HISTORIAN, IS CONSERVATIVE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR CAMBRIDGE.

“Was your soul so much aflame, child?...”



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.....**You have drunk the wine of death”**

A LINE FROM A POEM BY IDRIS SABİH IN MEMORY OF HER BROTHER

Turquoise marks the 75th anniversary of the campaign with a special commemorative feature. DON SCURR introduces a series of articles that provide a vivid portrait of the battle, the terrain and the men who fought

GALLIPOLI



Celebrated by the Turkish Republic as the victory of Çanakkale and by the Allies as the Gallipoli campaign, the conflict lasted for almost 10 months and cost more than 150,000 lives.

Throughout the year 1915 and the early part of 1916 a bitter campaign was fought in the southernmost peninsula of Thrace in western Turkey that today unites the combatants in bonds of friendship. It led to the demise of one great empire, the Ottoman, and prefaced the beginning of the end for another, the British, which thereafter began slowly to fade away over the next 50 years. And although the strategy that created the battle is clear, the reasons for the larger conflict between the Allies and Turkey, of which it formed part, remain obscure.

This year a fellowship of nations representing the opposing sides recalls the 75th anniversary, cherishing a special relationship which was forged in the triumph and tragedy of the battle. In this commemorative feature, *Turquoise* outlines the background to the campaign, describes its progress, provides a portrait of the landscape now and places special emphasis on the recollections of some of the men who took part.

The name Gallipoli resounds with all the conflicting emotions aroused by poignant memories of the First World War: pride,

rage, despair. Typical of the ultimately futile losses caused by that grim struggle, Gallipoli takes its place among the greatest battles of that world war: the Somme, Verdun, Passchendaele, Tannenberg, the Caucasus. These are the names that endure as monuments to the deaths of millions in a conflict which, from our perspective at the end of the 20th century, appears especially monstrous even by the melancholy standards of this sanguinary century.

And yet, to most of the countries taking part in the battles that were fought so savagely on the Gallipoli peninsula, memories of the campaign are mixed. Sadness at the carnage is fused with pride in its heritage — a heritage which for Turks embraces the achievements of Kemal Atatürk that led to the founding of the modern Turkish Republic; for Australians and New Zealanders the awakening of their sense of nationhood; and for British and French a watershed in their histories and an awareness that here, perhaps, was a

starting point in a long and painful process which has led finally to the birth of a new Europe and progress towards an even wider community of nations.

AN EARLY REHEARSAL OF THE DISASTER

At the height of the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century there occurred two portents which were remarkably prophetic for the ill-fated British and French attempt to seize the Dardanelles during the Great War more than a century later. With his eye on further conquests in the East to enlarge the First Empire, Napoleon gazed at a map of the famous straits — the ancient Hellespont linking the Aegean and Marmara seas, scene of the siege of Troy — and remarked: “Who is to have Constantinople? That is always the crux of the problem.”

One year later, in 1809, his enemy, Great Britain, despatched an expedition to capture Walcheren Island to block the River Scheldt in Belgium. The French had been warned by months of publicity about British intentions; medical authorities in Britain who were aware of the disease-ridden conditions in the island in midsummer were ignored; the expedition's commander did not have maps of the enemy's defences; there was scant co-operation between naval and land commanders.

The inevitable happened — British troops, afflicted with disease, ill-supplied

Right: the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, on the grandstand at the Grand Place, Lille, watching the march past of the 47th division (British) on October 24, 1918. In the left foreground is the young Major B. L. Montgomery.

CIGAR-BUTT STRATEGY

and pinned down by alerted defences, made little progress inland. After weeks of vacillation, the Cabinet agreed to their evacuation. Their commander was sacked, the Government nearly fell. In every respect it was to prove an early rehearsal of the disaster at Gallipoli.

In 1915, Britain, now allied with France against Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, sought some way around the stalemate with which their armies were confronted on the entrenched and unshifting battleground of the Western Front in France. Their strategists recalled Napoleon's maxim, but forgot the lessons of Walcheren. It was decided to embark on an uncannily similar — and what was to prove an equally abortive — expedition to capture the Dardanelles. In an attempt to outflank the Germans and find a back door through which they could outmanoeuvre the Kaiser's armies by linking up with the Russians, the Allied plan was designed to avoid the necessity of battering through the German lines in France by costly frontal assault.

It was, of course, a brilliantly imaginative idea, but it demanded a level of urgency, secrecy, detailed planning and inter-service co-operation that was so signally missing in 1809. Clearly, swift and decisive action against unprepared defences might achieve success at minimal cost. Indeed, so basically sound was the concept and so potentially threatening to Germany and its allies that, when the second stage of

Below: (left to right) Vice-Admiral A. Boue de Lapeyrere (French Navy Commander-in-Chief, Med); General Sir Ian Hamilton (allied land commander); Vice-Admiral John M. de Robeck; and General Bailloud, G.O.C. Corps Expeditionaire d'Orient.



“Someone, Churchill or another, looked at a map of Europe; pointed to the spot with the end of his cigar; and said: ‘Let us go there.’”

the invasion was under way in August 1915, the German Admiral von Tirpitz warned: “Heavy fighting has been going on at the Dardanelles. . . the situation is obviously very critical. Should the Dardanelles fall, the World War has been decided against us.” But like Walcheren, the project lacked preparation and vigorous generalship.

The two radicals in the British cabinet, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, dismayed at their generals' enthusiasm for confronting the formidable German defences in France head on, were anxious to discover an easier way. Churchill, in particular, seized on the Dardanelles strategy advocated by the “Easterners”. Many of their schemes were clever in theory but, as historian A.J.P. Taylor has indicated, they were often “cigar butt” strategies. “Someone, Churchill or another, looked at a map of Europe; pointed to a spot with the end of his cigar; and said: ‘Let us go there.’” No detailed maps were consulted, local terrain and conditions were either ignored or unknown.

Britain's sea power, challenged in the eastern Mediterranean when the powerful German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* eluded the British and French fleets to find

safety in Turkish waters at Istanbul, was to be reasserted and used to force the straits.

But now there began a series of miscalculations that was to prove fatal for the Allied expedition and a vindication of the formidable qualities of Turkish generalship and valour. The troops of both sides displayed a consummate bravery and skill which has become part of the traditions of the nations that took part. The courage of Allied soldiers and sailors was matched equally by their Turkish opponents, but the ineptitude of Allied commanders — characterised by the German, General Ludendorff, when he described British soldiers on the Western Front as “lions led by donkeys”, although he himself was guilty of similar mistakes — contrasted with the determination and masterly leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who was to become leader of the new Turkish Republic.

Many nations have a stake in the conflict. On the Allied side, English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Australians, New Zealanders including Maoris, Newfoundlanders, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Palestinians, French, Algerians, Moroccans and Senegalese took part — the most richly varied ethnic mix to fight together during a First World War battle. The whole multi-ethnic blend of Ottoman Turkey, with its German advisers, opposed them. Yet today, all join in paying tribute to the courage of the participants on both sides. This rare spirit of comradeship between former enemies reflects the mutual affection, respect and sympathy felt by the descendants of the fighting men and banishes any trace of enmity. □

Don Scurr is a freelance journalist specialising in military and historical matters. He was founding editor of *Islamic World Defence* magazine.

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
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ANATOMY OF A BATTLE

Distinguished military historian, JOHN KEEGAN, Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature in London, and author of the definitive studies *The Face of Battle* and *The Mask of Command*, describes the battle and its outcome



The return of the anniversary of the Gallipoli (Gelibolu) landings for the 75th time will be widely commemorated in the Anglo-Saxon world and in Turkey itself. The landings on April 25, 1915, are widely remembered by the regiments and the families of those that took part from Britain. In Australia, April 25 has become the greatest day in the national calendar, Anzac Day, when the nation rises before dawn to watch the sunrise and remember all Australian servicemen who died overseas in the two world wars, and in Korea and Vietnam.

It is March 18, the date that marks the repulse of the Allied naval expedition to force the Straits, that is remembered in Turkey. This was the moment when the long tide of defeat was stemmed which had forced back the western frontiers of the Turkish world from Tripoli and Bosnia to within 320 kilometres of Istanbul.

Gallipoli is, of course, a battle, but also the place that gives its name to the events. It is a small town on the peninsula that

bounds the western shore of the Dardanelles, the passage that connects the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Çanakkale Boğazi, or the Dardanelles, is the sea frontier between Europe and Asia and, since the rise of the Greek city states, has always been a waterway of the greatest strategic importance.

Its importance was enormously enhanced at the outbreak of the First World War when, in October 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Turkey entered for a variety of reasons. Russia, who was the Germans' and Austrians' enemy, was also the traditional enemy of the Ottomans, against whom the tsars had fought a series of bitter territorial wars since the 16th century. But Austria was a traditional enemy also, while Britain, and even more so France, were traditional friends. The causes of Turkey's alliance with the Central against the Allied powers were therefore not historical but immediate.

Germany had taken the trouble to make itself the friend of the Young Turks, to provide material aid for their programme of modernising the Ottoman realm — by financing the Berlin to Baghdad railway and providing instructors for the Turkish army. On August 2, Germany had signed a secret alliance with the Ottoman government, sent the cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* through the Mediterranean to join the Turkish fleet and appointed a German naval expert, Admiral Souchon, to command it.

Turkey shortly found itself engaged on four fronts against the Allies: in Mesopotamia, where troops of the British Indian Army landed to take control of the oilfields on November 6, 1914; in the Caucasus against Russia, where the first fighting occurred on November 8; on the Suez Canal, which a Turkish force attacked in February, 1915; and then at Gallipoli.

The British and French decided to make a strategic thrust at Gallipoli in order to fulfil a Russian request to help them by taking pressure off the Caucasus front where the

Turks had achieved an initial success. At the outset, the strategy was to use naval forces only, which it was hoped would attract Turkish army units to the shores of the channel. As it is 25 kilometres (40 miles) long, but in places only one kilometre wide, the British admiralty — which had studied the problem before the war — rightly considered that the chances of pushing a fleet through to Istanbul were slim.

A naval bombardment of the Turkish defences of the Dardanelles was begun on February 16. But on the same day, the British War Cabinet decided that a naval "demonstration" was not enough; troops would be needed after all.

During February and March the Allies had been concentrating five divisions in Egypt for a landing at Gallipoli. They were the Royal Naval Division, the 29th, two Australian and New Zealand divisions (forming a corps called Anzac), and the French First Colonial. But the Turks, now alert to the threat, had also been assembling divisions. By April 25, the day scheduled for the landing, they had six in place, under the command of the German general, Liman von Sanders. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), a Turkish divisional commander, was to prove the most energetic and effective of his subordinates.

The British had decided to land at two points on the Gallipoli peninsula: at the tip, Cape Helles, and further north at a point to become famous as Anzac. But their landing arrangements were woefully inadequate.

On April 25, the landings brought tragedy in some places, missed opportunities at others. At Cape Helles, the troops disembarking from the *River Clyde* were caught in machine-gun crossfire with heavy losses. At three other beaches, codenamed S, X and Y, the troops got ashore with little difficulty but the local commanders decided to dig in rather than

press inland. By the end of the day, therefore, the British were confined to narrow footholds, overlooked by the Turkish defenders, in which they began to suffer heavy casualties.

The Australians and New Zealanders were initially successful at Anzac, until Mustafa Kemal brought up reinforcements and hemmed them in.

General Sir Ian Hamilton, the Allied commander, supervised operations from a headquarters afloat. He had no means of communicating with his landing troops at the crucial moments — military radio had not yet been developed — and failed to exercise firm command in the days that followed. Conditions ashore rapidly became gruelling for the troops.

The Allies, nevertheless, poured in troops. By August there were 13 divisions ashore, 11 British and Anzac, two French. The Turks, however, had reinforced also and had equal numbers on the peninsula, many held in positions from which they could counter-attack if the Allies attempted to land nearer Istanbul.

On August 6, the Allies did attempt a second landing, at Sarı Bayır, codenamed Suvla, and 20 miles nearer Constantinople than Cape Helles. Two divisions, supported by two more a day later, landed, found themselves almost unopposed and then, as

on the first day of the campaign at S, X and Y beaches, failed to push inland. A German officer, surveying Suvla the following day, said that it "looked as if a boy scouts' picnic was in progress".

On August 9, strong Turkish reinforcements commanded by Mustafa Kemal appeared and hemmed in the new landings. Trench warfare set in at heavy cost in casualties and disease to the attackers. The whole campaign had now become a stalemate. The Allies could not advance; the Turks were prevented from pushing the Allies into the sea by shortage of artillery ammunition.

Finally, at the beginning of December, the British Cabinet accepted the inevitable and decided to withdraw the expeditionary force. Anzac and Suvla were successfully evacuated by December 20. Finding a skill they had not shown in attack, the Allied commanders got their men away by deception at almost no cost.

The cost of the fighting had been grievously heavy to both sides. The Allies had also suffered a serious blow to their prestige and the only chance they had of opening an alternative route of supply to the hard-pressed armies of the tsar.

Gallipoli was the making of Mustafa Kemal. Thereafter he became known as one of the most energetic and successful commanders in the Turkish army. It was the unmaking of Winston Churchill, in the First World War at least, who had most vociferously and consistently supported the Dardanelles strategy in the Cabinet.

But Gallipoli was not without its point. It showed Turkey's determination to hold "the Straits" as one of its fundamental national interests and it left a memory of the dauntless courage of both sides. □

John Keegan is the Defence Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*.



Facing page: German postcard of the period (courtesy of Taha Toros). Bottom left: Australians at Anzac, December 1915 (Imperial War Museum) and, below, a Turkish battalion advancing against the enemy (Hulton-Deutsch Collection).



'As dangerous as the bridge to heaven'

PHOTOGRAPHS COURTESY OF IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, LONDON

Accounts by Turkish veterans from **Yaşayan Çanakkaleli Muharıpler**, by Cahit Önder, published by İbrahim Bodu, first edition 1981

Ali Demirel, from Biga

I was in Arburnu in the 27th regiment. The enemy trench was very close. They threw grenades into our trenches and they also threw things like onions. Then we put nets in front of our trenches and after this the grenades did not fall into our trenches. One day we captured a gun with a mirror. I copied it and put two mirrors on our guns. Without raising your head, you could aim with the mirrors.

Later I was a prisoner of war for two years in Egypt. One day a limping British lieutenant shouted: 'Is anyone from the 27th regiment here?' They clearly weren't going to kill me, I said to myself, and stepped forward. The infidel with the walking-stick came limping over to me and shook hands. I was very comfortable thanks to him, God bless him. This infidel had also been wounded at Arburnu, his interpreter told me later.

Mehmet Yavaş, from the village of Göle in Çan

I was born in 1891. I went to the Balkans to fight the Bulgarians and to Russia to fight the Armenians. I also fought in Çanakkale. I dug trenches for six months in Seddülbahir and Soğandere. In Soğandere I was wounded in my back and in my leg. They were bullet wounds and I still have a bullet in my back. My wounds were treated by a doctor under a bush and I went back to the trenches again. I never heard anyone crying for their father, only for their mother.

I came back from the front and found that bandits had kidnapped my wife while I was at Çanakkale. My first wife's name was Medine. Now I am married to Ayşe and we have six children. I have no pension and no medals. Because of the war we saw the world. Can't complain!

"Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives . . . You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country therefore rest in peace . . . Having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well"

Ataturk's message in 1934 to visitors from Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and France.



GALLIPOLI

POSTCARDS COURTESY OF MUNEVER AVASU

From an account by General Sükrü Naili in **Çanakkale Zaferinin Altın Sayfaları**, by A. Banoğlu, 1982

The Kanlıdere was under constant machine-gun fire and 10 to 15 men were killed every day.

One day I went there for an inspection and I had to cross this river. The regimental commander said it was as dangerous as the bridge to heaven. He said: 'First I'll cross it then you.' He ran the 40 paces safely and I followed him. The enemy machine-gun was firing non-stop. When I turned round I saw one soldier carrying two heavy buckets of soup, slowly crossing the river without caring about the firing. I shouted: 'Run, you'll get shot.' He didn't seem to hear me. When he finally reached us I was furious and asked him why he hadn't run. 'If I ran I would have spilt the soup and my friends would have gone hungry. You shouldn't be afraid of the enemy, commander.'

Ali Su, Gelibolu, from Canakkale 1915, by İhsan İlgar.

On the morning of April 24, 1915, we noticed a little buoy in the sea in front of Kabatepe. We thought it was something left by the British as a marker because Kabatepe would have been the most convenient place in the peninsula to land and was close to the heights that dominated the Dardanelles. We asked our commander for permission to move it.

We chose three or four strong swimmers who removed the buoy from the sea. We loaded it on a mule and put it into the sea a mile further north, opposite a steep hill.

And the next day the Anzac troops landed at Arburnu. (According to non-Turkish sources, the fatal landing of the Anzac troops at Arburnu instead of Kabatepe, a mile to the south was caused by strong currents which made the making buoys drift.)

An excerpt from **Birinci Dünya Savaşında Çanakkale Anıları**, 1984

From the memoirs of Sokrat incesu who fought as an Ottoman officer in the Caucasus, Palestine and the Arabian desert, and Çanakkale.

I have one unforgettable memory. It was late in the evening; I wanted to check the situation and went down to the beach. It was very dark and it was impossible to see where I was walking. Suddenly I stepped on something soft and nervously threw myself forward, but there was no movement so I walked on. The next day our major called me and said: 'Tell your soldiers that last night while they were patrolling they stepped on General Liman von Sanders. Make sure that they walk more carefully in future.'

The cease-fire

Near Merkeztepe the trenches were just five metres apart. The soldiers could see each other clearly and started to make jokes. The Anzacs were sympathetic, cheerful people. The Turks were asking: 'Are you English?' 'No, we are not English.' 'Why are you fighting then?' 'The English are our brothers, we have the same language and past.'

They also seemed to like our soldiers. So both sides who had been trying to kill each other soon became friends. The Anzacs gave their buttons as souvenirs and the Turkish soldiers threw things like coins to the other side. The cease-fire commission was trying to stop this but both sides went on chatting. I even noticed one Australian soldier trying to measure one of our tallest soldiers with a tape-measure.

But later on, when the corpses arrived, the Turkish soldiers became silent. The chocolates were thrown back.

THE BATTLE OF BROKEN HILL

Lone Pine, the Nek, Walkers Ridge — all famous and grim encounters between Australian and Turk. But Broken Hill? Harvey Broadbent reports

The Battle of Broken Hill, on New Year's Day 1915, was Australia's first taste of conflict, four months before the Anzac force landed at Gallipoli. But this battle was fought by two men, an ice-cream cart, and a posse of local militia. Yet it was bloody and tragic all the same.

The story starts several years before the outbreak of the war when Mohammed Gool and Mulla Abdullah arrived in Australia. It is unclear why they chose to settle there but it may have been to do with servicing the Afghani camel-train owners who operated in outback Australia. Abdullah set up a butcher's shop and Gool worked as an ice-cream vendor.

Both men suffered the difficulties of being strange easterners in a small Australian mining community. Abdullah, by his own account, had stones thrown at him by local children for wearing a turban. He also fell foul of the city elders who prosecuted him for his helal butchering.

He was still suffering from this mortification when news came in November 1914 that Britain and its allies were at war with the Ottoman Empire. As young Australians marched off, the two men must have felt very far from home.



Excerpt from *A Fortunate Life*, by A. B. Facey

The officers were called to report to the Company Commander. Now excitement ran high. A few minutes later they returned and told us that we were to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey.

Our officer gave us a briefing on the proper instructions for landing. We were told that our ship would move as close as possible into the shore but would keep out of range of the enemy's shelling. He said, "A destroyer will come alongside and you will climb over the side and down the rope onto the deck of the destroyer. Close to the shore you will be met by a small motor boat towing rowing boats. There will be sailors on the rowing boats and they will take you into the beach. Now you are to get ashore as best you can and then line up on the beach and await further instructions."

This was it. We were scared stiff — I know I was — but keyed up and eager to be on our way. We thought we would tear right through the Turks and keep going to Constantinople.

All went well until we were making the change into rowing-boats. Suddenly all hell broke loose: heavy shelling and shrapnel fire commenced. Men were being hit and killed all around me.

When we were cut loose to make our way to the shore was the worst period. I was terribly frightened. The boat touched

Abdullah and Gool packed two rifles, ammunition, a revolver and two daggers on to Gool's wooden ice-cream cart, raised the Turkish crescent and star flag on it and pushed it to a place by the railway line four kilometres outside Broken Hill. A train approached. The engine drivers would only have seen the unexpected sight of Gool's

ground about thirty yards from the shore so we had to jump and wade into the beach. The water in some places was up to my shoulders.

There were many dead already when we got there. Bodies of men who had reached the beach ahead of us were lying all along the beach. The order to line up was forgotten. We ran for our lives over the strip of beach into the scrub and bush. We were stumbling over bodies — running blind.

I am sure there wouldn't have been one of us left if we had obeyed that damn fool order to line up on the beach.

By nightfall our small group had moved into a gully which later became known as Shrapnel Gully. This was one of the hottest spots we had to face. By this time we were short of ammunition and water. It seemed to me that we were only about a quarter of a mile from the beach.

We were a mixed group of troops from different states — Victorians, South Australians, New South Welshmen, Tasmanians and Western Australians. Most of us were young and in battle for the first time.

People often ask what it is like to be in war. Well I can tell you I was scared stiff. You never know when a bullet or worse is going to whack into you. A bullet is red hot when it hits you and burns like mad.

ice-cream cart sprouting the Turkish crescent and star. Still the train came on and as it went past they opened fire.

Within a minute, four citizens of Broken Hill were dead and several more were wounded. The police and local military reserve were called up by telegraph and a battle began in the hills outside the town. Abdullah did not last long, felled by the bullet of a civilian rifleman. Gool was wounded and died on his way to hospital.

Both men left notes to prosperity which were found among the rocks where they made their last defiant stand: Gool's motives were purest patriotism. He did it, he said, "because your people are fighting my country". Abdullah wrote, "One day I got very worried because I was summoned at the court. I asked them to forgive me, but they did not, and I have worried over it and been a very sorry man." And so ended the Battle of Broken Hill. □

Harvey Broadbent is a producer with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

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
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2ND INVASION

Heads of state, the top brass, diplomats, television crews and journalists will all be there. ANDREW FINKEL looks at the preparations for a major media event and (overleaf) puts the sights in perspective

PHOTOGRAPHS: BÜNYAD DİNÇ



Left: Anzac Cove and David Richardson, from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission

Ninety-four-year-old Adil Şahin was only 19 at the time. He was sleeping in his trench the morning of April 25. It was the look-out stationed in the advance trench who woke him. From their vantage point in the cliffs they could make out the shadows of a host of bodies moving through the water on to the beach next to Arburnu. Şahin and his fellows had to retreat four times before they were able to hold the line. The Australians were invading.

Seventy-five years later they are invading again, "only this time," says Colonel Robert Brown, from the embassy in Ankara, "we intend to be better prepared". He and a legion of fellow Australians are planning the remembrance ceremony for the fated Gallipoli campaigns. By their own admission, the event is getting out of hand.

Şahin is only among a handful of veterans still alive in Turkey; in Australia there are about 300 survivors. Of these about 50 are fit and eager enough to make the trip back to Turkey. Through their veterans' organisation, the Return Services League, they decided that this was the last major anniversary of the landing of the Anzac troops which they could celebrate together. The Department of Veterans' Affairs drew up battle plans and the politicians set the ball rolling.

Within a short time the leaders of most of the participant countries, their ministers of defence and chiefs of defence had enlisted for the campaign. Last February, the British attaché in Ankara was churlishly refusing to confirm that Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, would be attending the ceremony, but back at the peninsula, the caretaker of the 15th-century Kilitbahar Castle was already fluffing the cushions for her expected meeting with Turgut Özal, the president of Turkey.

The Australian Prime Minister, will be in Turkey on a state visit and will be accompanied by senior members of his cabinet, the Chief of Defence, bands, guards, battleships and the Leader of the Opposition. With an Australian general

election, the celebrations have acquired a new significance.

Canada and France will be represented at a high level. A flotilla of war ships from all the participating nations (two from France which lost almost 15,000 men in the campaign, more than the Australians to whom Gallipoli means so much). Sir Paul Reeves, the Governor General of New Zealand, will also be part of the dawn landing party at what is now called Anzac Cove, the tiny beach where Antipodean troops first landed — and, of course, where the first casualties occurred, some presumably from Şahin's rifle.

The dawn ceremony is a traditional part of Anzac Day. Normally, says David Richardson of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, it is an informal ceremony. "Can you imagine 5,000 people here?" Richardson, a young horticulturist from Northern Ireland, is responsible for the upkeep of the more than 30 cemeteries and monuments in the area. "I suppose it won't be too bad," he says, with one eye on the fate of his herbaceous borders.

In Australia, the Gallipoli campaigns are famous for the folly of sending the cream of a generation into a badly conceived and executed operation. There is real concern that having survived the first campaign, the veterans (the youngest is 91 and the oldest 103) will weather the second. Advance guards of road engineers, medical personnel, diplomats and television producers have been dispatched to see that the celebrations go without a hitch.

The campaign will be run from a modest hotel in the nearby and normally sleepy town of Eceabat. "I suppose it would be tactful to call it co-ordination centre rather than command HQ," muses the Australian naval commander sent to organise radio communications.

It is March 18 that is most remembered in Turkey as the day that the Allied powers "back door" attack was repulsed and Istanbul protected from invasion. In Australia and New Zealand it is April 25 that is remembered, when young men from the southern continent first lost their lives on foreign soil.

April's battles, however, will be fought not for an inch of turf but for a spare place to stay. All the hotels in the area have been booked long ago.

Şahin, who has spent most of the intervening years in the nearby village of Büyük Anafarta, takes all the excitement in his stride. He has just seen off a visiting Turkish journalist and a few days earlier played host to a BBC film crew. Now it is the turn of the Australian ABC to book a television slot with him on April 25. And media star he is. He claims perfect recall of the events 75 years ago and of a summer spent in the trenches dreading when the wind would change and blow the smell of death in the Turkish direction.

He remembers how one of the *hocas* (holy men) who was with the men in the trenches to give spiritual encouragement spoke of how one day Turks and Australians would be close to one another. "And", says Şahin, "his words came true."

THE ANZAC CONNECTION

A personal reflection by FRANKLIN SCHWARZER, a young American student who joined relatives of Anzac servicemen on a pilgrimage to the battlefields

Churchill's plan to force the straits might have worked if the Turkish minelayer Nusret had not laid 26 mines the night before the attack. On the morning of March 18, what was described by the historian Alan Moorhead as the greatest armada in history sailed into disaster. By the time the battle was over, three battleships had been sunk and many other ships severely damaged. March 18 is as significant in Turkish history as the failure of the Spanish armada is in English history. And it is not surprising that a full-scale mock-up of the famous minelayer is one of the main attractions of Çanakkale's military museum or that the date should be emblazoned across a hillside overlooking the straits.

But anybody expecting the peninsula to be a desolate wasteland will find instead a sense of peace. This was not the case my first evening with the college students from Australia and New Zealand who, like me, had joined Huseyin Uluaslan's Troy/Anzac Tours for the April 25 anniversary tour. They were busy all night drinking beer and jumping in and out of the Dardanelles.

The next day was a very different story and they could not have been a more patriotic, respectful and polite group of people. Some had travelled eight months by yacht just to be there for the commemoration ceremony.

Our tour arrived at Anzac Cove at exactly 4.40am, the same hour the battle had begun so many years ago. A small memorial fire was built and Alan Moorhead's account of the landing was read. After a few minutes we walked down to the Ariburnu Cemetery where a dawn service was held. When the service ended, New Zealand Maoris did a traditional war chant in remembrance of the soldiers who fell at Gallipoli. The sun, just beginning to come up, outlined the promontories known as the Sphinx and Walker's Ridge.

The tour continued to the Beach Cemetery. Buried here is the famous Anzac

GALLIPOLI FACT FILE

Combatants' guide 1990

The main battles in Gallipoli 1990 will be fought not for the gun emplacement over the next ridge but for a spare hotel room. There are certainly none for the casual visitors who will be directed to camp sites (see below). On the morning of April 25, extra ferries will be laid on from Çanakkale to Eceabat and there will be six municipal buses donated to take visitors from Eceabat to the car park at Kabatepe. Combatants lucky enough to get a seat will probably have to make their way on foot after that to Anzac Cove (leave a good half-hour) for the 5.30 dawn ceremony.

At 9.20 there will be an international ceremony at Seddülbahir, the towering Turkish memorial that overlooks Moro Bay. From here, the nationalities will disperse — the English to the nearby Helles memorial

at the south-western tip of the Gallipoli peninsula. The French cemetery is also near Helles.

Others will return to the Anzac cemeteries. The main Australian ceremony will be at Lone Pine where 5,000 of their soldiers are buried or commemorated in a field no larger than a football pitch. The pine in the centre is a direct descendant of the original from which the battlefield takes its name. There are two Australian eucalyptus trees planted at the entrance.

The main New Zealand ceremony will be at the memorial at "Chunuk Bair". This is also a spot of Turkish interest. It is here that the young commander Mustafa Kemal — later Atatürk — ordered his troops not to charge but to die, and where his own life was saved when his pocket watch deflected a piece of shrapnel. These events are recorded in Turkish memorials on the spot.

CAMPING

Camping is popular in Turkey and during June, July and August the sites can get crowded, particularly on national holidays. The choice of sites on the peninsula is neither large nor luxurious, but it is adequate. From November to April all the sites are closed but there is plenty of parking for caravans. There are several sites at the northern end between Keşan and Gelibolu (Gallipoli), but although they have the best facilities they are too far for those who want to spend time on the battlefields.

● **Cennet Camp**, south of Boncuk, is easy to find as it straddles the main road. It is a pleasant site edging on to the Dardanelles but in summer can be a little noisy with passing traffic. It has electricity and essential, if somewhat rudimentary, facilities. You can dine at the restaurant overlooking the beach, watching the ships ply their way through the Dardanelles. The food is Turkish and prices

reasonable.

● At the tip of the peninsula, where the Dardanelles meet the Aegean, there are two camp sites, both attached to motels, at Abide and Seddülbahir. The latter is close to the old fortress with a nice stretch of beach, but is exposed to wind from the south.

● **Kum Camp**, further round the coast between Cape Helles and Anzac Cove, is very pleasant. Take the secondary road that leaves the main coastal road about two kilometres north of Eceabat. The road goes west and is sign-posted "Anzak Köyü" (Anzac Cove), "Gökçeada" or "Kemalyeri". This leads to the distant tree-covered ridge which marks the site of the Anzac battle line. Near the ridge on the right is Kabatepe War Museum. Turn sharp left and follow the coast road for about 10 kilometres (six miles). Kum Camp is on the right at the bottom of a steep hill between the road and the sea.

medic, John Simpson, who bought a donkey to help transport the wounded. Before his death on May 19, 1915, Simpson and his donkey brought back scores of men from some of the worst battle zones.

We then walked to Shrapnel Valley Cemetery. In 1915, the name Shrapnel Valley said it all. Now cherry trees were in full bloom.

There are many cemeteries and memorials for Anzac, British and French troops; there are no grave sites and few memorials for the Ottoman soldiers. The one near Hellas, at the very tip of the peninsula, is dedicated to all those who died at Gallipoli.

Here, two army helicopters appeared on the horizon. They touched down near the memorial and several high-ranking officers of the Turkish, Australian and Canadian armed forces disembarked. While a bugler sounded the Last Post, the officers and visitors lined up and placed wreaths just below the epitaph.

We boarded our buses; this time for Lone Pine cemetery. Strategically, the position at Lone Pine was extremely important. It was taken on April 25, 1915, by the Anzacs only to be recaptured by the Ottomans. On August 6, the First Australian Brigade attacked and, again, after five days of bitter fighting, drove the defenders out of the area. While ceremonies took place, I wandered around the graveyard. As I read the headstones, I was startled to see two belonging to 16-year-olds.

We left Lone Pine and moved on to Conk Bayiri or, as it is known outside Turkey, Chunuk Bair. It was here that Mustafa Kemal won the battle for Turkey. By August 10, 1915, the Anzacs had gained so much ground the opposing trenches on Chunuk Bair were only 25 metres apart. In the early hours of the morning Kemal led a concerted counter attack and within six hours the Allies did not control one important height at Suvla or Anzac Cove. □

prev 19/3/99

Profile of artist Philip O'Reilly by our arts correspondent

A SNAIL WITH A TALE IN ALI BABA'S KILIM SHOP

Things changed when Philip O'Reilly started thinking positively. He had raised a family, was teaching art and was going nowhere. But as he said to a friend who complained he could not afford a holiday: "If you don't go, you won't go." And O'Reilly is determined to go very far indeed.

The man behind his change of heart was Gurdgiev, a Caucasian-born philosopher who influenced many writers and intellectuals in Europe in the 1920s. Gurdgiev wrote a number of books, the most famous of which is *Meetings with Remarkable Men*, a fantastic tale of travels and chance conversations.

A well-intentioned critic once described Gurdgiev as "half baked: a loaf of bread removed from the oven too soon". And taken whole, his philosophy is certainly hard to digest: an esoteric collection of systems gleaned from the thousand and one religious and philosophical traditions feeding off each other in Turkey and the Caucasus.

But for O'Reilly, he offers no end of material for the thinking painter even if O'Reilly is reluctant to be labelled as a Gurdgiev follower.

It is the analytical writings of Aspenski, who was taught by Gurdgiev at Fontainebleau in the 1920s, that O'Reilly likes to think about when he is painting stacks of kilims in Ali Baba's kilim shop in Kuşadası. And it was Gurdgiev's destiny that took him there in the first place. Until a lodger offered to take O'Reilly to Turkey in lieu of rent, he had never realised that Gurdgiev had spent much of his life there, admittedly in the distant northern town of Kars, close to the Soviet border.

A typically Gurdgiev preoccupation is with coincidences of destiny, when objects that should have no connection with each other suddenly appear side by side as if pushed by unseen currents on to the surface of the sea for an instant before sinking and being swept on their own different ways. "I can see all the regions of Turkey represented in one stack of kilims," O'Reilly says. "And when a customer comes in each one is hurled on to the floor to be inspected and then replaced in quite a different order. Sivas is suddenly next to Kayseri, Urfa is below Balıkesir and Hereke has vanished altogether."

O'Reilly is working on a new composition based on sketches he made at Kaleköy near Demre, a haunting bay with a sunken city

on Turkey's Lycian coast. A Lycian tomb built like a house is reflected in the water which itself partly conceals carpets being washed in the sea and a tame giant turtle. What begins as an illustration gradually dissolves into a complex group of patterns with references to different time scales.

Before O'Reilly discovered Turkey he found the same combination of objects that should never have been thrown together in his father-in-law's antique shop. His earliest Turkish connection was with a Victorian puppet of the Grand Vizier in London's puppet museum in Battersea where his wife has worked for the last 10 years. This puppet is full of Gurdgiev imagery. The head opens three times, like a Chinese puzzle, to reveal a smaller and yet smaller head.

And the most consistent Gurdgiev element is the snail. The snail has always been imbued with hidden meaning in the Anatolian psyche. Perhaps the most famous snail is in Istanbul's Church of the Chora (Kariye Camii) where it is making its way across the abyss in the famous fresco of the Resurrection. But it was Gurdgiev's snail that keeps cropping up in O'Reilly's paintings. It represents the way we live on different levels. "A snail moves forward on two dimensions in three-dimensional space".

Born in Leamington Spa on the south coast of England in 1944, O'Reilly has so far made six trips to Turkey, travelling extensively along the coast from Istanbul to Antalya, in the east from Sanliurfa to Doğubeyazıt, and in central Anatolia from Cappadocia to Nemrut Dağ. And his paintings have been shown in four exhibitions in London where he has spent the last 20 years teaching art and where he makes book cover illustrations for the London publisher Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

His preoccupation with the practical details of his art lends it its richness. He always uses pure pigments in his oils and he has always been ready to start afresh with new painting techniques.

In his new kilim paintings, he uses gesso described by Cennini in his 15th-century handbook for artists and dating back as far as the tomb paintings of the Egyptians.

West End galleries in London are wary, O'Reilly says, of artists who show too much variety of style. If Gurdgiev has influenced the way he sees things, it is his fascination with light that brings consistency to his paintings and a breath of fresh air to his work. □



PRIME MINISTER

YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY : 24/25 APRIL 1990

You are to visit Turkey to attend the International and British Commemorative Ceremonies marking the Seventy-Fifth anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings. In addition you are to hold separate bilateral talks with the President and Prime Minister of Turkey and with the Australian Prime Minister.

There will be extensive press coverage of the ceremonies by both the British and international press (at least part of the International ceremony will be transmitted live on Breakfast TV here on Wednesday morning). The Turkish authorities have given an undertaking to monitor and control the Turkish media during your visit to the two cemeteries, but I fear that we may still have some problems.

I attach a programme for the visit: a detailed programme will be available on arrival.

Peter Bean

PETER BEAN
Press Office

23 April 1990

TUESDAY 24 APRIL

- c1535 After Questions, leave for Wellington Barracks.
- 1545 Depart Wellington Barracks by helicopter for London Heathrow Airport.
- 1550 Arrive Heathrow : embark VC10.
- 1555 Depart by air for Istanbul (4 hour flight - Turkey is two hours ahead of BST)
- 2200 Arrive Istanbul. Doors open. (Press leave by rear door.)
- 2202 Ambassador Gukdogdu Can (Turkish Escort Officer) and Sir Timothy Daunt (HM Ambassador) board aircraft up front steps.
- 2205 Ambassadors escort you down aircraft steps and introduce:
- Mr Cahit Bayar, Governor of Istanbul
Lt-General Cengiz Alpa, Garrison Commander Western Istanbul
Mr Nusretin Sozen, Mayor of Istanbul
Mr Ali Arslan, MFA Interpreter
Mr Eray Alpay, Protocol Officer
Mr Michael Collins, HM Consul-General, Istanbul
- Walk across the tarmac to VIP lounge
(NB: No Honour Guard).

PRESS WILL COVER ARRIVAL

- 2207 Enter VIP lounge: drinks served.
- 2212 Depart by car for the Consulate-General.
HM Ambassador to accompany you.
- 2233 Arrive Consulate-General.

Overnight in Consulate-General

WEDNESDAY 25 April

- 0715 Depart Consulate-General for Harbiye Heliport.
- 0725 Arrive Harbiye: embark helicopter
- 0730 Depart by air for Turkish Memorial.

0840 Arrive Turkish Memorial helipad: disembark.

PRESS WILL COVER ARRIVAL

Drive to Turkish Memorial (accompanied by HM Ambassador and Mr Powell)

0845 Arrive Memorial: met by Prime Minister Akbalut :
bilateral talks

PHOTOCALL AT BEGINNING OF TALKS

0915 Talks end. Prime Minister Akbulut will escort you to ceremony site entrance.

0920 Welcoming formalities for Heads of International Delegations.

0930 International ceremony begins.
(See Annex A for details of ceremony)

PRESS WILL COVER THE CEREMONY

1115 International ceremony ends: You are escorted to marquee for your bilateral talks with **President Ozal** (HM Ambassador and Mr Powell to attend).

1200 Bilateral with President Ozal ends.

PHOTOCALL

Depart by car for the British Memorial.

1210 Arrive British Memorial: met by **General Sir R Ford**, Vice-chairman of the Commonwealth War Graves who will introduce some British Gallipoli veterans.

1215 British ceremony begins.
(See Annex B for details of the ceremony)

1240 British Ceremony ends: further opportunity to talk to veterans and Royal British Legion, and look around the Memorial.

PRESS WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF THE CEREMONY

1255 Depart British Memorial by car.

1256 Lay poppy bunch at grave of Turkish hero (Sgt Yahya):
view V beach from clifftop.

SMALL PRESS POOL TO COVER

1259 Depart by car for V beach.

1301 Arrive V beach cemetery: lay poppy cross on Captain
Walford's grave and walk around the cemetery.

DOORSTEP WITH THE PRESS

1320 Depart for Kabatepe by car.

1345 Arrive Kabatepe: met by Defence Minister Giray and escorted
to lunch.

PRESS MAY BE PRESENT FOR A PHOTOCALL

1520 Depart by car for Shrapnel Valley, in company with the
New Zealand Governor General, **Sir Paul Reeves** and
Australian Prime Minister, **Mr Bob Hawke**.

1530 Arrive Shrapnel Valley cemetery: lay a wreath at Memorial.
Later lay a poppy cross at graves of Australian (Major
Quinn) and New Zealand soldiers (Governor General and
Australian Prime Minister to reciprocate).

DOORSTEP WITH AUSTRALIAN PRESS

1555 Depart by car for Anzac Cove.

1556 Slow drive past Anzac Cove: disembark at Turkish memorial
and read the inscription-Ataturk's words of reconciliation.

1600 Arrive Commonwealth War Graves cottage. Bilateral talks
with Australian Prime Minister.

PHOTOCALL ON ARRIVAL

1645 Bilateral talks end: doorstep farewell to Australian
Prime Minister. (Change clothing if desired.)

1655 Depart by car for Kabatepe.

1705 Short bilateral meeting with Mr Hewson, Australian
Opposition Leader.

1720 Talks end. Walk to helipad.

Embark Royal Navy Lynx helicopter (accompanied by
Mr Ingham, Mr Powell)

1725 Depart Kabatepe for HMS Argonaut.

1730 Arrive HMS Argonaut: met by Rear Admiral Abbott, FOF2
(Flag Officer Second Flotilla). Tour ship; present two
Long Service and Good Conduct medals.

SMALL PRESS POOL WILL COVER YOUR TOUR OF THE SHIP

1820 Depart HMS Argonaut by Lynx helicopter.

1825 Arrive Turkish Memorial helipad: disembark.

Turkish farewell formalities: embark VIP helicopter.

1830 Depart for Istanbul airport.

1940 Arrive Istanbul airport: embark VC10.

approx1945 Depart Istanbul for Heathrow.

approx2145 Arrive Heathrow : disembark.

Drive to No 10

approx2215 Arrive No 10.

International Ceremony: Programme

0920 You are received by Turkish Defence Minister **Safa Giray** and then escorted by a ceremonial officer past the Guard of Honour (no inspection) to your seat.

0930 Ceremony begins with introductions.

You will then be invited, along with other Heads of Delegation, to lay a wreath at the Turkish Memorial. (Walk from your seat down a central path to the Memorial, carrying your wreath).

Return to your seat.

One Minute's Silence, followed by playing of national anthems (played in alphabetical order with the Turkish anthem last).

Speeches:

Welcoming speech by **Mr Muzafeer Ecemis**, Governor of Cannakkale Province.

Speech by **Mr Giray**

Speech by Governor-General of New Zealand, **Sir Paul Reeves**

Speech by **President Ozal**.

Parade by Military Bands and Guards of Honour.

1115 Ceremony ends.

PRESS WILL COVER THE CEREMONY

British Ceremony: Programme

1210 You arrive British Memorial, Helles Point. Greeted by **Sir Robert Ford**, Vice-Chairman of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, who will introduce you to **Colonel Gavin Peebles**, Officer-in-Charge of the British Commemorations.

General Ford will escort you to the top of the steps where you will be received by a general salute and inspect the Guard of Honour. Introduced to **Mr David Knowles**, Chairman of the Royal British Legion, who will in turn introduce you to the five British and one Canadian Gallipoli veterans attending the ceremony. You will then be introduced to **The Venerable Geoffrey Evans**, Archdeacon of the Aegean and the Danube (who will conduct the Service of Commemoration), before being shown to your seat by General Ford.

1215 Service of Commemoration begins.

You will read the lesson (from a lectern near the memorial) following the first hymn. Return to your seat.

Wreath-laying will follow the third verse of the hymn "O Valiant Hearts" (Colonel Peebles will indicate when you should leave your seat). Yours will be the third wreath to be laid, following HM Ambassador (on behalf of HM The Queen) and General Ford (on behalf of HRH The Duke of Kent).

1240 Service ends.

PRESS WILL COVER THE SERVICE

CONFIDENTIAL

celo
dc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1990

Prime Minister
CD
23/4.

Jean Charles,

Prime Minister's visit to Turkey: Bilateral Talks

You should be aware of developments on two fronts relevant to the Prime Minister's talks with President Ozal and Prime Minister Akbulut.

Iraq: Long-range Gun

The Turks have detained a lorry which almost certainly contains parts for an Iraqi gun. A Customs and Excise expert is in Istanbul examining the consignment. If suspicions prove correct, the Turks have agreed to return the parts to the UK, provided we make an official request; this is being done.

The Prime Minister may wish to thank President Ozal, and emphasise the importance of the immediate return of any gun parts to Britain. Mr Akbulut is due to visit Iraq on 5 May.

Midland Bank

The Chancellor agrees to send Mr Taner a message expressing concern at his refusal to sign the decree permitting Midland Bank to open a branch in Istanbul. The Ambassador delivered this on 23 April, but Mr Taner remained obdurate. It is evident that the Midland will not get authorisation unless President Ozal intervenes.

Sir Kit McMahon, the Chairman of Midland Bank, had previously decided to withdraw from leading a British Invisibles Export Council Mission to Turkey on 2 May; but has reconsidered and agreed to wait and see how the Turks respond to the Chancellor's and Prime Minister's approaches.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HMT).

James
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM ANKARA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 202
OF 231250Z APRIL 90
INFO PRIORITY ISTANBUL

YOUR TELNO 136: MIDLAND BANK - BIEC SEMINAR

SUMMARY

1. MINISTER TANER CONTINUES TO INSIST ON 'RECIPROCITY': HARPS ON IKTISAT APPLICATION IN LONDON. MENTIONS VISAS.
2. EVIDENT THAT MIDLAND WILL NOT GET AUTHORISATION UNLESS OZAL INTERVENES.

DETAIL

3. ON RECEIPT OF THE CHANCELLOR'S MESSAGE TANER TELEPHONED - IN AGGRESSIVE MOOD. TURKISH LAW REQUIRED RECIPROCITY AND HE HAD LITTLE DISCRETION. NUMEROUS TURKISH BANKS HAD APPLIED FOR BANK STATUS: A FEW HAD LICENCED DEPOSIT TAKER AUTHORITY. THE BANK OF ENGLAND OPERATED A QUEUE, SIMULTANEOUSLY USING CRITERIA OVER WHICH IT WAS SECRETIVE. TANER COULD PROBABLY AUTHORISE BANK STATUS FOR MIDLAND IF THE BANK OF ENGLAND PROVIDED HIM WITH A STATEMENT THAT TURKISH BANKS WHICH MET SPECIFIED CRITERIA WOULD BE SIMILARLY AUTHORISED.
4. TANER SAID THAT HE OBJECTED TO IKTISAT HAVING BEEN TURNED DOWN WITHOUT DETAILED EXPLORATION: OFFERED AN AGENCY PERMIT AND TOLD BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND THAT THINGS WOULD BE REVEIUED AS TIME PASSED. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE RECIPORCITY.
5. TANER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WANTED BANKS LIKE MIDLAND IN TURKEY. HE HAD NO PREJUDICE AGAINST BRITAIN DESPITE VISAS, BRITISH SPRAYING OF AIRCRAFT FROM TURKEY ETC.
6. I MADE NO (NO) PROGRESS IN ARGUING THE TOSS WITH TANER. I ASKED IF ALL THIS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT IKTISAT HAD NOT IMMEDIATELY BEEN GRANTED WHAT IT ASKED FOR: IT ALL TURNED ON THAT? HE SAID 'YES'.

7. THE EXCHANGE REINFORCED MY CONVICTION THAT ONLY ACTION WITH PRESIDENT OZAL HAS ANY HOPE OF SHIFTING THINGS SO LONG AS TANER REMAINS A MINISTER. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO TACKLE OZAL ON 25 APRIL. MEANWHILE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME AHEAD OF THE BIEC SEMINAR DATE (2 MAY) SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY.

DAUNT

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

23 April 1990

Prime Minister
CAF 23/4

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Possible Meeting with
Dr John Hewson, Leader of the Liberal Party of Australia,
Gallipoli, 25 April

In your letter of 10 April you said that the Prime Minister would be willing to have a very brief meeting with Dr Hewson if it could be fitted into the programme. A slot is still being sought, but the timing may have to be decided on the day.

Following the Liberal Party's defeat at the Australian Election on 24 March, the Party's leader, Mr Andrew Peacock, resigned on 2 April. The Shadow Treasurer, Dr John Hewson (an MP since only 1987) was elected by an overwhelming majority.

It will be some time before a considered judgement can be made on the capacity of the opposition coalition to recover from their failure in an election which they should have won. No one doubts the technical competence of Dr Hewson in the field of economic and financial policy, but he has very little experience of other areas of policy and is still comparatively new to the Federal political scene.

Dr Hewson announced his Shadow Cabinet on 11 April. It is generally regarded as being a fresh looking team, with a more business-like structure. The key economic portfolios are held by economic "dries", reflecting Hewson's free market philosophy.

I enclose a personality note.

John Gass
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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HEWSON, DR JOHN (ROBERT) MP

Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the Liberal Party since April 1990.

Born 28 October 1946 in Carlton, NSW. Educated at Kogarah High School, Sydney University (BEC Hons), University of Saskatchewan (MA) and John Hopkins University, USA (MA, PhD).

Formerly a teaching assistant and lecturer in economics, he worked as an economist with the IMF, 1973-74, and the Reserve Bank of Australia, 1975-76. Economic Adviser to the Treasurer, 1976-77 and 1978-81 (when Treasurer was John Howard, qv), later Chief of Staff to Treasurer, 1981-82. Professor of Economics, University of NSW, 1978-87. Head of the School of Economics, University of NSW, 1983-86. Director of the Japanese Economics Management Studies Centre, University of NSW, 1984-87. Executive Director, Macquarie Bank, 1985-87. Director, Baring Securities, 1988. Has been a consultant to the IMF and UN, amongst many others, and has been a member of a number of State and Federal Government inquiries. On the board of a number of institutions. A newspaper columnist, he has been a regular contributor to various financial and economic publications.

Liberal member for the blue ribbon seat of Wentworth (East Sydney) since 1987. Member, Opposition Economic Policy Committee and backbench Treasury and Finance Committee. Shadow Finance Minister 1988-89. Shadow Treasurer 1989-90.


One of the brightest MPs of any persuasion, he stands head and shoulders above many of his Liberal colleagues. An archetypal over-achiever and working-class boy made good. Very ambitious. A touch arrogant and a workaholic.

Category I visitor to the UK in 1989.

Divorced; three children.

Likes golf, tennis, soccer, skiing, jazz, theatre, collecting antiques and classic cars. Owns several cars, including a Ferrari. Has a penchant for monogrammed shirts and French champagne. Owns a businessman's restaurant in Sydney called 'Simpons'.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3199 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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The mad gamble of Gallipoli

Next week is the 75th anniversary of one of the great first world war fiascos. Churchill's plan seemed worth the risks, but, as **Daniel Farson** explains, it ended in carnage, with a hint of Gilbert & Sullivan

I EXPECTED the war graves of Gallipoli to be forlorn, but they are not. Cared for devotedly as usual by our former enemies, in this case the Turks, they are bright with wallflowers and snapdragons between the simple headstones. The Anzac Memorial at Lone Pine is hauntingly beautiful, lined by cypress trees and pines. The poignancy lies with those heart-breaking inscriptions: "Dear is the spot to me where my beloved son rests, my Anzac Hero, Mother." Her son was 19 when he was killed on April 25, 1915 in the first attack by the Australian infantry.

This nearly forgotten campaign, which we are honouring at last, was conducted so crazily that it seems less sombre than the slaughter in Flanders. There was an element of Gilbert & Sullivan which even adds a comic relief. This was the war to be at, with English officers hurrying to pay their train fares to Italy and sail to Alexandria where they hoped to enlist or cadge a lift to the Allied base on the Greek island of Lemnos.

Rupert Brooke was an early casualty, dying from blood-poisoning caused by an insect bite on his way to the Dardanelles, buried in a corner of Scyros, the "fabled island of Achilles", part of the ancient world which made this war so glamorous to his generation of writers and poets.

In Tell England, published in 1922, Ernest Raymond recalled a pep-talk from the colonel, who told his men of Jason and the Argonauts; of Poseidon sitting on Samothrace to watch the fight at Troy; of Xerxes bridging the narrow straits to carry his army into Europe; and Leander swimming to Hero — a feat emulated by Lord Byron on May 3, 1810 when he swam the four miles of the Hellespont to Asia in just over an hour.

"Have eyes to see this idea also," the colonel concluded. "England dominated Gibraltar and Suez, the doors of the Mediterranean; let her complete her constellation by winning from the Turk the lost star of the Dardanelles, the only other entrance to the Great Sea." "This roused the jingo devil in us," wrote Raymond, "and we were a-fidget to be there."

Winston Churchill has been blamed for the failure of Gallipoli, yet his plan had a bold simplicity and the stakes were worth the gamble. We could have opened an ice-free route to the Black Sea; released valuable supplies of Russian wheat for the Allies; removed the threat from Turkey; and started a second offensive against Germany from the Balkans. This would have shortened the war in the Allies' favour, and the Germans understood this. In August 1915, Admiral Von Tirpitz warned that "The capsizing of one little Balkan state may affect totally the whole course of the war. The forcing of the Dardanelles will be a severe blow to us ... we have no trumps left."

At the outbreak of war, Turkey's support lay in the balance. There was a natural inclination to join the winning side and a sympathy for the British who fought with the Turks in the Crimea. The vast hospital at Scutari (now Uskadar) on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, is an army barracks today but still has Florence Nightingale's lamp as a relic of the alliance.

Yet far from consolidating this good will, the British acted with such stupidity that it encouraged Enver Pasha, one of the Young Turks who controlled Constantinople, to turn to Germany instead. Enver had been a military attaché in Berlin, and the German negotiator, General Liman van Sanders, seized every opportunity, assisting Enver to transform the

shambles of the underpaid Turkish army into a well-trained force of 800,000 men.

If proof was needed of British "perfidy," this came when Churchill impounded two Turkish warships which were being built at Tyneside. Churchill had a point — it would have been foolhardy to release the ships, virtually the entire Turkish navy, intended for the seizure of the Lemnos and of possible use against the Allies.

But these had been paid for by a national lottery subscribed in every Turkish village and our action was seen as a calculated insult. The Germans pounced, presenting two of their warships to Turkey, sailing the Goeben and the Breslau up the Dardanelles to moor them in the Golden Horn. This was brilliant diplomacy and Enver Pasha was convinced of German strength. From that moment, the Turkish navy passed into German control.

YET by 1915, with the insurrection of the Young Turks against the Sultan, the situation was so chaotic that even the Germans believed that Turkey might negotiate a separate peace. Enver threatened to dynamite St Sophia and destroy the city should it have to be abandoned; embassies prepared to withdraw.

At this moment the Dardanelles were within the Allies' grasp, with few Turkish soldiers either there or on the Russian border. If the Allies reached Constantinople with a token force of men, while the Russians attacked Erzerum in the east, there was even the chance that the two armies could join up. The Ottoman Empire would be finished, and Turkey neutered for the rest of the war. Obsessed by this grand design, Churchill pressed ahead. Madcap though the venture sounds, decisive action could

have proved effective, but one condition was essential — surprise. The Allies set about it with the clumsiness of a blind dinosaur.

On November 3, 1914, the fleet bombarded the narrows at Chanak (Cannakale) only 1,600 yards wide, and were so successful with two lucky shots that a fortress was destroyed by exploding a magazine. On December 13 a British submarine dived under five rows of mines and sank a warship.

This was a case of being hoist by your own petard; by now the Turks and General Sanders in Constantinople were alerted, further mines were laid, and troops mustered.

As Churchill's flotilla sailed through on March 18, 1915 the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine and sank in two minutes with nearly all her crew; then the Inflexible, then the Irresistible. Seeing the loss of his ships as the ultimate disgrace, the British admiral suffered a form of nervous breakdown and withdrew.

The sinkings were bad luck but bad luck is the worst of enemies. One can only imagine what might have happened if a more audacious man had forged ahead, but he was not forthcoming then, nor in the months ahead when a massive amphibious force assembled in Alexandria and the Turks prepared for a major onslaught on the Peninsula. Now that the army was involved the initiative was lost. The War Office procrastinated in London, reluctant to divert troops from France, a view shared, understandably, by the French themselves. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher, thought it "mightily hazardous" even with military support; Kitch-

ener was so aware of Turkey's importance that he wanted to be the British Ambassador to Constantinople before the war, but he dithered and delayed for crucial weeks until he approved the expeditionary force under the command of Sir Ian Hamilton, a decent, cautious and unlucky man.

Subsequently Kitchener was shaken by a telegram from Hamilton who reported "he no longer believed the Straits could be forced by ships" with the disconcerting comment that "Gallipoli looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your office." Hamilton was uninspired.

THE Gallipoli Campaign which finally took place in April 1915 with the landing at Helles was an important precedent for combined naval and military operations which contained lessons for the second world war and the Falklands, with a similar assembly of "toy steamers" and gigantic liners — the Olympic in 1915; the Canberra more recently.

Before the war stagnated, with each side struggling to advance a distance of yards, and before the troops were disillusioned, the officers relished the element of opera bouffe. Intellectual, almost effete, it is not surprising that they baffled the simpler men from Australia and New Zealand. To a degree uniquely English, they were lackadaisical yet courageous. It seems remarkable that men like the Hon Aubrey Herbert, later a lieutenant-colonel, were allowed to enlist in the first place, for he was so short-sighted he had difficulty walking in a straight line, and so vague that when he arrived in a

startling canary-coloured uniform, Compton Mackenzie congratulated him deviously on such an attractive shade of khaki. "It was made from some stuff my wife got up," Herbert explained. Yet his understanding of the Turks and their language, and his integrity, proved invaluable in arranging a truce between the two sides in order to bury their dead.

Compton Mackenzie was rebuked by a fellow-officer for sleeping in silk pyjamas under a mosquito net. Mackenzie protested that silk was the ideal clothing for such a climate. Writing about the Australian volunteers he admired their "litheness and powerful grace" in words that would be misconstrued today: "Their beauty, for it was really heroic, should have been celebrated in hexameters not headlines. As a child I used to pore for hours over those illustrations of Flaxman for Homer and Virgil which simulated the effect of ancient pottery. There was not one of those glorious young men I saw that day who might not himself have been Ajax or Diomed, Hector or Achilles."

The Anzacs might have asked who were Hector or Achilles to bear comparison? A lieutenant-colonel with a "soft, somewhat ecclesiastical voice" attempted to be friendly as he told three Australians, none of them less than six feet four inches tall, "Have you chaps heard that they've given General Bridges a posthumous KCMG?" "Well that won't do him much good where he is now, will it mate?" came the laconic reply.

The British troops were equally bemused by the sybaritic nature of their officers and the gulf between them. An old veteran I spoke to at Buck's Mills in north Devon remembered little except the horrible food: tins of bully-beef gone rancid, "and those black biscuits, like what the gentry gave their dogs back home."

There is fascinating evidence in the circular war museum in Gallipoli, not so much the guns, nor the macabre glass cases filled with false teeth, but the luxuries sent out from England: a special vermin powder for the trenches prepared by Boots,

and also small stone jars of Rich Preserved Cream from the Wigtownshire Creamery at Stanmer.

One officer described a visit to a friend's dug-out a couple of hours after the landing on Suvla Bay, to be shouted at by a sailor who complained — "Sir! You realise you're throwing your cigar butts on our sticks of gelignite?" Indignantly, the officer recorded — "He was the only surly man I met in the whole campaign."

Perhaps such behaviour was born of the madness of war, though it could have been one way to hold on to your sanity. Unfortunately for the British, the man who led the Turks had a crazy courage of his own. Climbing the heights of Helles, the Allies were so close to victory that Mustafa Kemal told his men: "I do not ask you to fight, I order you to die. While you are dying reinforcements will arrive and we shall save the day."

HIS adversary, Churchill, might have had this in mind when he offered us blood, sweat and tears. The Turks died and Kemal held the ridge. At Suvla Bay the Allies hesitated. Looking down on it today, Suvla looks a perfect landing place with a flat area, a salt lake which had dried in the summer, and the low hills beyond. The Allies landed on August 6 but instead of pushing forward to seize the heights and consolidate their position, the officers, having lost radio contact with Hamilton on Lemnos, gave their men permission to go swimming. When they advanced a couple of days later, Kemal had reached the hills above, and whoever commanded them was in control.

Appropriately, the campaign ended with suitable panache with the glorious triumph of the retreat from Suvla Bay on December 20, 1915. This was achieved overnight with a few bangs as triggers were released by a Heath Robinson system of filling punctured tins with water so it sounded like sporadic gunfire as the troops left in silence. There were no casualties. This was magnificent,

but this was defeat. Churchill was disgraced and retired to the country where he took up painting as a form of solace, and Gallipoli became the unmentionable war, scarcely observed on Armistice Day until this month's belated recognition of the valour involved.

The gamble was lost and the repercussions were immense: Mustafa Kemal became the hero of Turkey and the president of the new republic. Without the diversion of a sea-route through the Dardanelles, pressure built up against the army in Russia ending in the Bolshevik Revolution. Whereas the Tsar would have claimed Constantinople as his reward, Lenin sympathised with the Turkish revolutionaries and Russia failed to secure her access to the Mediterranean. Like so many, it was a war of "might have beens".

At the Anzac Memorial, a pine grown from the seed of the original solitary tree stands there today. Later I swam near Helles below the immense obelisk cut from stone which was shipped from England for the British War Memorial — the Turkish Memorial looks out from the point opposite. In the nine-month campaign, the Commonwealth lost an estimated 36,000 men (Turkish losses were higher) compared to 20,000 lost on the first day of the Battle of the Somme; and 28 VCs were won. Conditions were terrible, with extremes of heat — "enough flies to eat you," according to the veteran from the Devon Yeomanry — and excessive rain — "swimming in trenches up to our boots" — followed by such cold that "any amount of chaps froze to death. And so much shelling you got used to it after you got hardened. It was a queer old war."

Ernest Raymond remembered a lost friend but could not mourn, believing he had found on the Peninsula that life of multiplied sensations which he had always craved in the days when he said "I want to have lived!"

With such gallantry it is tempting to conclude that the whole mad gamble was worthwhile, but that might be the craziest verdict of all.



ÖZAL, TURGUT

President of the Republic.

Born Malatya, 1927.

Graduated Istanbul Technical University, 1950 in Electrical Engineering. 1950-60 worked in the Electrical Works Study Administration under Demirel, with a study period in US in 1952. Later Assistant Professor at Middle East Technical University and Special Technical Adviser to the Prime Ministry. 1967-71 Under Secretary at the State Planning Organisation. 1971-73 Adviser on Special Projects at the World Bank in Washington. 1973-79 established own business and served on boards of various corporations; became Chairman of the Metal Industry's Employers Association. 1979 became Under Secretary to Prime Minister Demirel, and was the architect of the economic stabilisation measures of January 1980.

Kept on by Evren after the September 1980 coup as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy. Gained an international reputation as the master-mind of Turkey's economic recovery, but resigned from the Government in 1982 following a banking collapse.

Established and became Chairman of the right-of-centre Motherland Party (ANAP) which unexpectedly won the November 1983 elections. Began a programme of reforms; opening the economy to market forces in an effort to revitalise and modernise it, and attempting to reorganise the bureaucracy.

In November 1987, ANAP won a second election victory, with 65% of the seats, but only 36% of the vote. Özal's new Administration quickly ran into trouble, notably for failing to bring the overheating economy under control. In the March 1989 local elections, ANAP came third. Despite Opposition claims that ANAP no longer had the right to elect a partisan President; Özal stood, and won, comfortably in the November 1989 Presidential elections.

Since his elevation to the Presidency, Özal has kept a firm hand on the reins of Government. He installed the loyal but ineffectual Akbulut as Prime Minister and dictated the shape of the Cabinet. He has already made it clear that he intends to play an active part in shaping policy, despite a constitutional requirement that the President remain apolitical. This apparent high-handedness coupled with rumours of corruption in his immediate entourage has contributed to a continuing sense of dissatisfaction with, and criticism of, his style in many quarters.

Married his wife Semra in 1954; three children. The eldest (Ahmet) is his unofficial Chief of Staff. His daughter's flamboyant lifestyle in Istanbul is a source of some scandal.

Short, rotund and friendly, he is a good listener and a talker who can hold his audience. Impressive TV performer. Devout Moslem. Underwent a triple bypass heart operation in 1987. His health remains a concern, despite recent weight loss. Official visit to London 1986. Speaks fluent (but flawed) English. Wife speaks adequate English.

AKBULUT, YILDIRIM

Prime Minister.

Born Erzincan 1935. Graduate of Istanbul University Faculty of Law. Freelance Lawyer for many years. Entered Parliament at December 1983 elections as ANAP Deputy for Erzincan. Deputy Speaker of Grand National Assembly 1984. Minister of Interior between 1984-1987. Elected Speaker of Grand National Assembly September 1987.

Although his roots lie on the right, Akbulut has never been identified with any particular faction within ANAP. Acceptable to all sides, his unfailing loyalty to Özal made him a suitable 'compromise' Prime Minister when appointed in November 1989. Unassuming and softly spoken, Akbulut is reasonably popular within the party, but not widely respected. His detractors question his ability: he made little impact as Interior Minister. An intellectual lightweight, he knows little about the key areas of economics and foreign policy. Likely slavishly to follow Özal's instructions. His wife, who is said to be his intellectual superior, is a judge.

Married with three children. Speaks only Turkish.

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: PROSPECTS IN TURKEY

SUMMARY

1. OZAL BLITHELY SELF CONFIDENT DESPITE MAJOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND EXTERNAL UNCERTAINTIES. GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO MUDDLE THROUGH TO MID-1991. MEDIUM TERM PROSPECTS REMAIN GOOD.

DETAIL

2. TURKEY FACES MOUNTING PROBLEMS:

A. GOVERNMENT UNPOPULARITY, PARTY SQUABBLES AS ANAP SLIPS TO THIRD PLACE - WITH AROUND 10% PUPULAR SUPPORT - AND WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

B. INFLATION: ALTHOUGH IT HAS EDGED DOWN FROM 1989'S 70 PER CENT, STILL OVER 60 AND LIVING STANDARDS ERODED.

C. INTERNAL SECURITY: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEFT WING MILITANCY? BUT THE MAIN CONCERN NOW IS THE KURDISH PROBLEM, OVER WHICH NEW MEASURES, INCLUDING SEVERE PRESS CENSORSHIP, ARE UNLIKELY TO PROVE EFFECTIVE.

D. EXTERNAL UNCERTAINTIES: REBUFF BY THE EC, SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM, IRANIAN AND SAUDI ENCOURAGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTALISM, DIFFICULTIES WITH GREECE AND BEING BLAMED OVER CYPRUS, ALL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND E EUROPE WILL AFFECT TURKEY'S POSITION IN NATO AND HER INFLUENCE WITH HER MAIN ALLIES.

E. A POOR IMAGE OVER DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPEATED OWN GOALS AND ANOTHER THREATENED AS KUTLU AND SARGIN ENTER THE THIRD WEEK OF THEIR HUNGER STRIKE (TELELETTER TO HEAD OF SED).

ALTHOUGH OZAL MAY WISH TO DISCUSS (D) ABOVE, HE IS UNLIKELY TO BETRAY MUCH ANXIETY ON ANY OTHER SCORE. HE CONTINUES TO EXUDE SELF-CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY OVER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND A STRONG EXTERNAL ACCOUNT. HE TOLD BUSINESSMEN ON 17 APRIL NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE HE HIMSELF REMAINED FIRMLY IN CHARGE

(EXCLAM).

3. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS PRECARIOUS. MORE SERIOUS TROUBLE IN THE SOUTH EAST, URBAN TERRORISM, A SPURT IN INFLATION, OR SIGNIFICANT LABOUR UNREST, COULD PRECIPITATE A CRISIS. BUT IT IS MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WILL MUDDLE THROUGH UNDER AKBULUT UNTIL AN EARLY ANAP PARTY CONGRESS NEXT JANUARY, PERHAPS A NEW PRIME MINISTER THEREAFTER AND ELECTIONS LATER NEXT YEAR. OZAL MAY NOT BE UNREALISTIC IN HOPING THAT HIS OWN POSITION CAN BE MAINTAINED THEREAFTER, QUITE POSSIBLY WITH A COALITION GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER HAPPENS TO ANAP.

4. SEE MIFT ON COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS.

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: COMMERCIAL

1. BRITISH EXPORTS HAVE PICKED UP WELL IN RECENT MONTHS AND ARE NOW RUNNING AT #40 MILLION PLUS PER MONTH. TURKEY IS PROBABLY AGAIN OUR SECOND MOST IMPORTANT MIDDLE EAST MARKET.

2. FOLLOWING THE SUCCESS WITH HFSSB, LATEST NEWS OVER THE MAIN EARLY PROSPECTS FOR BIG PROJECTS IS:

A. TURKSAT (#70M UK CONTENT) THE BAE BID IS SAID TO BE BEST ON BOTH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL GROUNDS. THE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN BY OZAL. FLETCHER OF GEC-MARCONI, WHO HAS SEEN MINISTERS AND THE PTT THIS WEEK REPORTS STRONG HINTS THAT NONETHELESS A DECISION TO NEGOTIATE A CONTRACT WITH AEROSPACIALE WILL BE ANNOUNCED END APRIL/ EARLY MAY: THE DELAY A COURTESY TO MRS THATCHER

B. EAGLE (#350M) - THE RACAL/MARCONI EAGLE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR THE 35MM OERLIKON GUN IS PROBABLY LEADING BUT FACES STIFF DUTCH COMPETITION, IN SUPPORT OF WHICH POLITICAL PRESSURE IS BUILDING UP (THE DUTCH GIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, UNLIKE THE UK).

C. ANKARA METRO (#45M) - HAWKER SIDDELEY, AS WELL AS ECGD COVER, FOR THIS 'PART BOT' PROJECT. TURKISH DETERMINATION TO PUSH AHEAD WITH IT WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES SEEMS FIRM.

D. RAPIER (WELL INTO THREE FIGURES) - BAE, WHO HAVE SOLD #300M WORTH OF RAPIER TO THE AIR FORCE, HOPE TO GET BACK INTO CONTENTION AFTER INITIAL ELIMINATION FROM THE CONTEST.

E. ZEUS (WELL INTO THREE FIGURES) - TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH LAURAL (US) FOR ECM SUITE FOR THEIR F16'S ARE REPORTEDLY IN DEEP TROUBLE. MARCONI ZEUS IS THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. BUT IT REMAINS A LONGISH SHOT.

F. UNIVERSITY LABORATORY EQUIPMENT (#67M) - ATP (#23M) OFFERED TO SUPPORT TEQUIPMENT BID TO UPGRADE ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE FACULTY

PAGE 1
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LABS. AID OFFER LAPSES END JUNE THIS YEAR.

3. HAVING SENT OZAL A MESSAGE ON (A) I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AT LEAST ENQUIRE ABOUT TURKSAT. GEC-MARCONI INFORMATION MAY BE WRONG. HAVING SEEN DEFENCE MINISTER GIRAY LAST MONTH, MAINLY TO HELP OVER (B), THE PM MAY WISH TO REINFORCE WITH OZAL. THE CASE FOR MENTION OF (C) SEEMS TO ME LESS STRONG, UNLESS ATP AND ECGD COVER HAVE BOTH NOW BECOME AVAILABLE. ON (D) AVAILABILITY OF ECGD COVER HAS NOT EVER BEEN BROACHED. ON (E) PM MIGHT BE ASKED IF PREVIOUS UNDERTAKINGS ON SECURITY RELEASES/CLEARANCE ARE STILL VALID. I GATHER THAT THEY ARE AND HOPE SHE WILL SAY SO IF ASKED. I SEE NO NEED TO PRESS ON (F).

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

You are to have a meeting with Bob Hawke in Gallipoli on Wednesday. We have set aside about 45 minutes for this although timings may slip considerably on the day.

You will want to start by congratulating him once again on his re-election for a fourth term and say how pleased you are that we were able to let Australia have one of our two archive copies of the Australia Constitution Act.

He may bring up the subject of British arms sales in the South East Asia region. The Australians are nervous about a mooted sale of Tornado to Indonesia and have asked us to desist. Indeed they have made proposals for consultation arrangements which would commit us to consult them before making virtually any arms sales in the whole area. We cannot shackle ourselves with such arrangements but are always ready for unofficial contacts and discussion.

You will also want to commiserate over the floods which have caused heavy damage & some loss of life.

It is possible that he will bring up the question of cleaning up the nuclear test site at Maralinga. There is nothing we can say until the Technical Assessment Group have reported in June.

The Australians have a strong interest in the Uruguay Round. You will want to assure him of our good faith and the effort we are making to move the EC.

You will want to underline the importance of steps to sustain confidence in Hong Kong. We would like the Australians to introduce measures on the lines of our own nationality package, but there is little sign so far that they will do so. You should tell him once more that we hope to see Hong Kong participate in Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).

The Australians have been very helpful over Vietnamese boat people, taking a large number from Hong Kong. We hope for their

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- 2 -

continued support when we have to resort to compulsory repatriation again.

Mr Hawke will certainly welcome an exchange on China and Cambodia. You will remember that the UN Secretary General was a bit dubious about the very ambitious role allotted to the UN in Cambodia under the Australian plan.

You may also want to take him through developments over South Africa. The wretched Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa will be meeting in mid-May in Nigeria. You hope the Committee will take a benevolent view of the progress made and recognise it in some practical way.

Antarctica remains a bone of contention between us. The Australians continue to push their "wilderness park" proposal which we cannot accept.

He is much pre-occupied with what is happening in Papua New Guinea where secessionist rebels have taken complete control of the island of Bougainville. It will be helpful to have his assessment, given that we are also major investors there.

If there is any further time, you might give him your analysis of developments in the Soviet Union.

C.D.P

Charles Powell

20 April 1990

c: Hawke (MJ)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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20 April 1990

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Bilateral Meeting with Australian
Prime Minister, Gallipoli, 25 April

The Prime Minister will have a bilateral meeting with Mr Hawke on 25 April when she attends the events to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign.

Our objectives for the meeting are:

- (a) to express our satisfaction that a good momentum is being maintained in our bilateral relations with Australia;
- (b) to reaffirm our commitment to a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round;
- (c) to underline the need for continuing Australian support on Hong Kong and Vietnamese boat people;
- (d) to seek Australian support for London as the site of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
- (e) to have a good exchange of views on current topics of interest in international relations.

Australian Election

Mr Hawke has just been re-elected, for a fourth consecutive term, with a much reduced vote and a reduced majority of 8 seats. His new Government, which includes all the leading members of his previous Cabinet, is capable and experienced but Mr Hawke and his colleagues may no longer have the energy and ideas of former years. The Australian economy remains the main problem with an unsustainably high current account deficit, high inflation, high interest rates and a large, albeit mostly private, external debt.

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Bilateral Relationship

The Prime Minister will wish to say that we continue to attach importance to a strong bilateral relationship with Australia and to mention in this connection that the Lord President, the Home Secretary and the Energy Secretary hope to visit Australia in August and September. Mr Hawke is delighted with our gift to Australia of one of our two archive copies of the Australia Constitution Act about which the Prime Minister wrote to him on 1 April.

British Arms Sales to Australia's General Region

Australian officials have called recently for greater consultation over possible British arms sales to countries in Asia, South Asia and South East Asia. They have shown particular concern about a possible UK sale of the strike version of Tornado to Indonesia in the mid-term future and have asked us not to proceed with such a sale. In the last few days they have also made proposals to us for consultation arrangements which are breathtaking in scope and would be quite unprecedented. It is very difficult to see how we could possibly agree to them.

If Mr Hawke raises the subject the Prime Minister may wish to say that:

- we cannot accept Australia's latest proposals which are for us unprecedented in nature and extreme in scope. We doubt if any country with a major defence export industry would shackle itself with such arrangements;
- but if the Australians lower their sights we would be prepared to discuss the matter at official level to see whether a mutually acceptable solution can be achieved.

Cleaning Up of Nuclear Test Sites At Maralinga

If Mr Hawke raises this subject, the Prime Minister could say that we must await the report by the Technical Assessment Group, due in June this year.

/Uruguay

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Uruguay Round

It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could reassure Mr Hawke of our commitment to trade reform and the successful conclusion of the Round. She could make the following points:

- the Foreign Affairs Council on 5 March reaffirmed the EC's commitment to the Round and its readiness to negotiate on agriculture;
- the UK is in the lead in the EC in urging reform;
- we wish to encourage Australia and the Cairns Group to build on the EC proposals;
- the US will also need to be flexible; they are showing signs of being willing to negotiate on the basis of parts of the EC proposals.

International Support for Hong Kong

The Prime Minister will wish to underline the need for continuing Australian support to help us to maintain confidence in Hong Kong. Mr Hawke is aware that we have asked the Australians to consider introducing measures to encourage people to remain in Hong Kong on the lines of our own nationality package. Our impression is that Australian officials are unlikely to move as far as we would wish but Mr Hawke may be sympathetic. It would be useful if the Prime Minister could sound him out on this.

The Prime Minister will wish to restate our aim to see Hong Kong participate in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) in recognition of the territory's economic and commercial autonomy, its separate membership of GATT, and its economic importance to the region.

Vietnamese Boat People

So far arrivals in Hong Kong are well down on last year and resettlement in third countries plus voluntary return to Vietnam is achieving a steady net outflow. The Prime Minister will wish to express our particular thanks for Australia's high rate of resettlement out of Hong Kong and to seek Australian support for our resuming non-voluntary returns once the backlog of volunteers has cleared, probably this summer.

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China

Australia's severe disappointment at the events of June 1989 reflected the substantial investment it had made in its relations with China. In January it decided to relax its total ban on ministerial visits and consider visits on a case-by-case basis. But other restrictive measures, largely matching those of the Twelve, remain in place. Australia remains concerned about China becoming inward-looking, particularly in relation to its regional role, eg. over Cambodia.

The Prime Minister may wish to make the following points:

- China's political prospects remain uncertain with heavy dependence on Deng Xiaoping, for whom there is no obvious successor;
- we agree about the importance of not isolating China and endorse eg. the resumption of limited World Bank lending;
- our policy and the EC's has also evolved eg. resumption of export credit;
- further normalisation is likely once the anniversaries of last June's events have passed;
- but wholesale abandonment of measures would be premature in the absence of any positive Chinese response to justify this;
- Western solidarity may have helped to moderate Chinese behaviour and should be maintained.

Cambodia

Current diplomatic activity stems from the Australian Foreign Minister's proposal for an enhanced UN role in an interim Cambodian administration, leading to fair and free elections, and from the US suggestion that the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council should work together for peace in Cambodia. The Five

/have

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have made significant progress on several of the aspects of a settlement. They hope to meet again in mid-May and there is a possibility of a meeting with the four Cambodian factions in June. It may not be easy to keep the Russians and Chinese in play. It also remains to be seen whether the Cambodian factions are prepared to accept a peaceful political settlement. The signs were not encouraging at the Informal Meeting on Cambodia in February and seemed to indicate that despite agreement on the principle of UN involvement neither Vietnam/Hun Sen nor the Khmer Rouge were yet anxious to make significant progress towards a settlement.

The Prime Minister will wish to thank Mr Hawke for the constructive Australian contribution and to stress the importance we attach to maintaining the momentum of current diplomatic activity and keeping the USSR and China in play.

UN involvement will be expensive, possibly costing £2 billion in the first year. The Australian Foreign Minister has suggested a Trust Fund to pay for the early stages of the UN operation. We are considering this proposal carefully, although our preliminary view is that initial costs could be met from existing UN funds.

South Africa

The next meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (of which Australia is a member) will take place in Abuja (Nigeria) on 16-17 May. Commonwealth reactions to developments in South Africa will be the principal item. The Prime Minister may therefore wish to draw on the following:

- President De Klerk is irrevocably committed to negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa;
- we are pleased that SAG/ANC "talks about talks" on removing obstacles to negotiations are about to take place (2-4 May). There is an urgent need to show progress and to stem the wave of violence (much of it between black factions);
- Mr Mandela (like De Klerk) is vital to changes of progress. It is still unclear whether he can carry his constituency with him;

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- we believe the role for the international community is to:

(a) apply pressure and encouragement on all sides to get substantive constitutional negotiations started; and

(b) increase aid to the black community to help them prepare for transition to post apartheid society. We are increasing our programme by £10 million, including our CHOGM commitment to provide additional aid rather than contribute to Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

Antarctica

Two special meetings convened by the Antarctic Treaty partners will be held in Santiago in November. One will deal with proposals for comprehensive measures to protect the Antarctic environment, at which the Australians will push their 'Wilderness Park' proposal; the other will deal with the Liability Protocol to be attached to the Convention on the Registration of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). If the subject is raised the Prime Minister could say that we look forward to the Santiago meetings, favour comprehensive measures to protect the Antarctic environment, continue to support CRAMRA and do not wish it to be replaced or damaged. But we do not support the proposal for a 'Wilderness Park' which is an over-ambitious alternative to CRAMRA.

Developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Implications for East/West Relations. Germany and NATO.

Mr Hawke will be interested in the Prime Minister's views on these interrelated topics and in her assessment of the situation.

On Eastern Europe, the Australian government participates in G24 co-ordination and has developed a modest assistance programme on similar lines to UK and EC efforts. It has committed \$5 million for food aid for Poland, contributed \$760,000 to the Poland Stabilisation Fund, and announced a \$3.5 million training programme for Eastern Europe.

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We have lobbied the Australians about the site of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development but they have not yet declared their preference. The Prime Minister will wish to say that we hope we can count on Australian support for London as the site as we have the best case on practical grounds.

Papua New Guinea

The Australians are much preoccupied at the moment by events in Papua New Guinea where secessionist rebels have taken complete control over the island of Bougainville, closed down a huge copper mine owned by an Australian subsidiary of RTZ, and forced the police and army to withdraw to the mainland. The Australians as the major aid donors and PNG's partners in a defence co-operation agreement have a much bigger interest than we do but our investment in PNG is considerable and is increasing. It would be useful to have Mr Hawke's assessment of the situation.

*Yours ever,
S L Gass*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO GALLIPOLI

You will find attached a programme for your visit to Gallipoli on Wednesday next week which you may care to read through. I have also placed in the folder the text of the lesson which you will read at the British Memorial Service: and a more detailed programme for your visit to HMS ARGONAUT, together with notes on the Gallipoli veterans whom you will meet.


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
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20 April 1990

jd c:gallipoli

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3199</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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GALLIPOLI



CCPC
CCDC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 14/25D

20th April 1990

Dear Charles,

GALLIPOLI COMMEMORATIONS

I understand that the FCO are separately providing the majority of the briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Gallipoli next week, but I attach the following additional material which you may find useful:

- The programme for the Prime Minister's visit to HMS ARGONAUT;
- A brief on HMS ARGONAUT and personality notes on its Commanding Officer and FOF 2;
- Personality notes on the five British Gallipoli veterans to whom Prime Minister will be introduced at the British Ceremony.
- The Defence Secretary's programme. (As you know, Winston Churchill MP will be travelling with my Secretary of State).

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO).

Yours sincerely

(I M WOODMAN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

HMS ARGONAUT (F56) - LEANDER CLASS FRIGATE

- Commanding Officer - Captain John Clarke LVO MBE (c.v. at Annex A)

- List of Officers - Annex B

- HMS ARGONAUT was laid down in November 1964 at Hawthorn Leslie Ltd, Heburn-on-Tyne, launched in February 1966 and commissioned in August 1967. She has been refitted twice; once in 1976 when she underwent conversion to an Exocet type Leander, and again in 1983 on her return from the Falklands.

- Since being commissioned, ARGONAUT has served with the ARMILLA patrol, in the Far East, the Mediterranean and Western Atlantic and carried out fishery protection duties, most notably with the Icelandic patrol during the "Cod War" in 1973. In 1982, she was among the second group of ships to be deployed to the Falkland Islands, accompanying the amphibious forces from Ascension Island. She was forced to return to the UK almost immediately, after being hit by a bomb on arrival at San Carlos Bay.

- Prior to this deployment, ARGONAUT was on patrol in the Atlantic. Following her visit to Turkey and attendance at the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign, she will take part in the NATO exercise OPEN GATE.

LEANDER CLASS FRIGATES

- The Leander Class was the largest class of frigates to be built for the Royal Navy since the Second World War, numbering 22 vessels. They were designed to carry out a general purpose role, in addition to their main anti-submarine capabilities.

When first built, they were armed with a triple-barrelled anti-submarine mortar, the Seacat missile system, a twin 4.5 inch gun and a Wasp anti-submarine helicopter.

- Eighteen of this class have been extensively modernised and fitted with the Ikara anti-submarine weapon system, while twelve, including ARGONAUT, are fitted with the Exocet surface-to surface missile system and anti-submarine torpedo tubes which replaced the anti-submarine mortar. Four ships, including ARGONAUT, have also been fitted with towed array sonar. The Wasp helicopter has been replaced by the Lynx multi-purpose helicopter.

- The ships have a complement of between 230 and 270, depending on its size and capabilities. They are 113 metres long, have a beam of either 12.5 or 13.1 metres, a displacement of 2,600 tonnes and are powered by two sets of steam turbines, capable of giving speeds in excess of 30 knots.

PROGRAMME FOR VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO HMS ARGONAUT

25 APRIL 1990

1710 - Depart Kabatepe by LYNX helicopter

1715 - Embark HMS ARGONAUT

Timings as arranged by CO HMS ARGONAUT

- To Commanding Officer's cabin for refreshments etc. as required
- PM presents two Long Service and Good Conduct medals to ARGONAUT ratings
(on Exocet deck or in aft cabin depending on weather)
- PM meets members of ship's company including members of the Guard of Honour
- PM visits Operations Room (control centre for UK military involvement in day's events)
- PM visits bridge - possible steam past by HMS BROADSWORD

(if PM wishes to address the ship's company the opportunity will be available for her to do so)

- To Commanding Officer's cabin for refreshments etc. as required

1755 - To flight deck for LYNX helicopter flight ashore.

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DETAILS OF VETERANS ON ROYAL BRITISH LEGION PILGRIMAGE TO GALLIPOLI

1. ARTHUR BULL

DOB 12.8.95 Age 94

Served in the rank of corporal in B Sqn Royal Gloucestershire Hussars.

Enlisted Birmingham 1914.

Landed at Suvla Bay August 1915.

Suffers from bronchitis, slightly hard of hearing.

Sponsored by the Times.

2. JIMMY PAGE

DOB 15.12.95 Age 94

Enlisted August 1914.

Served in the rank of Bombardier, Royal Field Artillery.

Landed at Suvla Bay August 1915. Hospitalised September 1915.

Returned to take part in the main evacuation January 1916, subsequently served in Salonika 1916/17 and in Egypt until 1919.

Demobbed 1919 to follow career as electrical engineer.

Resident of Star and Garter Home, Richmond.

Slightly hard of hearing, still very active.

Sponsored by ITV.

3. ARTHUR SCUDAMORE, OBE

DOB 10.11.96 Age 93

Served in the rank of private in 2nd/10th Middlesex Regiment from 1914 - 1919. Landed at Suvla Bay 8 August 1915. Of his 1000-strong battalion only 190 were left to be evacuated in January 1916. Subsequently served in Egypt and Palestine.

Post war career in the Civil Service.

Will lay a wreath at the Cape Helles memorial on behalf of the Gallipoli Association.

Fit, lucid.

4. FRED WRAY

DOB 16.5.99 Age 90

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Joined RNVR Naval Division under age in January 1915 (aged 15). Arrived Gallipoli May 1915. Landed at Suvla Bay with the 29th Division in a support role, spent 16th birthday in the line. Hospitalised to Australian hospital with dysentery before being returned to UK for discharge (under age) in 1916. Rejoined in 1917 and served with the army in France.

Holds 1914 Star from the Navy and General Service Medal from the Army.

Subsequent career as a shoemaker until retirement.

Fit, lucid.

5. FRANCIS CHING

DOB 16.12.97 Age 92

Served in the rank of private in the Somerset Light Infantry, the 5th Leinsters and the Army Cycling Corps. (664 bicycles were taken to Gallipoli though few were used in the event on account of the lack of roads.) Landed at Suvla Bay 14 August 1915.

Demobbed after the war to work in mining and water engineering until retirement.


Fit and lucid.

Sponsored by Sky TV.

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The Flag Officer Flotilla Two

Rear Admiral P.C. Abbott



The Flag Officer Flotilla Two assumes tactical command at sea as the RN Commander of National Task Groups formed by CINCFLEET for exercise, operations and transition to war tasks. In particular FOF2 has responsibility delegated to him for close monitoring of the Gulf, Falkland Islands and Caribbean areas, while advising CINCFLEET on plans and operations outside the NATO area. He is normally the RN 'Out of Area Commander' of RN Forces.

Rear Admiral Peter Abbott was educated at Queens' College, Cambridge. He then became an articled clerk to a large firm of city accountants and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the RMFVR: he resigned and joined the Royal Navy in 1964. He has served in all kinds of surface ships and has commanded HM Ships CHAWTON, AMBUSCADE and AJAX. Promoted Commander in 1975 whilst serving on the staff of the Senior Naval Officer West Indies, in Bermuda, he was then promoted Captain in 1980 when he was second in command of the aircraft carrier, HMS BULWARK.

His staff appointments include time in Naval Plans; briefing the Chief of Defence Staff during the Falklands war and MA to DCDS. He commanded the First Frigate Squadron and attended the RCDS. He was the Director of Navy Plans from 1985 until taking up his appointment as FOF2 in 1989.

Rear Admiral Abbott married Susan Grey in 1965 and has three daughters.



ANNEX A

CAPTAIN JOHN CLARKE LVO MBE RN

- Captain John Clarke, the Commanding Officer of HMS ARGONAUT and Captain of the Seventh Frigate Squadron joined the Royal Navy in 1963 from Epsom College.

- Most of his early career was spent in submarines and his first post on promotion to Commander was as Commanding Officer of HMS DREADNOUGHT, the first nuclear propelled submarine. In 1980, he became the Commanding Officer of the Submarine Command course, based in HMS DOLPHIN at Gosport. He then spent two years in the Directorate of Naval Warfare in Whitehall, and was appointed as Executive Officer on HMY BRITTANNIA in 1985.

- On his promotion to Captain in 1986, he became Captain of Submarine Sea Training. He took command of HMS ARGONAUT in January 1989. In July 1990, will return to Whitehall to join the Directorate of Naval Staff Duties as Assitant Director of the division.

- Captain Clarke lives in Somerset and is married with three children.

ANNEX B


HMS ARGONAUT: LIST OF OFFICERS

<u>Job Title</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>
CO	Capt	John Clarke
XO	Lt Cdr	David Lister
SO	Lt Cdr	Robert Scott
WEO	Lt Cdr	Geoffrey Turner
MEO	Lt Cdr	John Wadham
Flight Commander	Lt Cdr	Michael Pamphilon
Ops Off	Lt Cdr	Jeffrey Phillips
Deputy SO	Lt	John Farmery BA
2nd Pilot	Lt	Jeremy Tribe BSc
PWO	Lt	Russell Pegg
Off of the Watch(1)	Lt	Norman Tomsett
Nav Off	Lt	Edward Dewing
Comms Off	Lt	Stephen Kerslake
Flight Observer	Lt	Mark Graham
Off of the Watch(2)	Sub-Lt	David Benwick
Off under training	ASub-Lt	Nicholas Beng
Off under training	ASub-Lt	Michael McGuire
Deputy MEO	WO	Graham Brown
Deputy WEO	WO	John Elston

SEVENTH SQUADRON FRIGATE STAFF

Squadron MEO	Cdr	David Perkins BSc, CEng, MImechE
Squadron WEO	Cdr	Richard Lindley MIElecIE MIBM
Squadron METOC Off	Lt Cdr	Charles Keal BED
Squadron Ops Off	Lt Cdr	Anthony Rix
Deputy Squadron Metoc Off	Lt	Andrew Davison
Squadron Medical Off	Surg Lt	Mark Groom MB ChB

A The National Archives

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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19 April 1990

CD

Jean Chanku,

Prime Minister's Visit to Turkey: Bilateral Talks
with the Turks

During the Prime Minister's visit to Turkey on 25 April, she will have separate bilateral talks with Prime Minister Akbulut (35 minutes) and President Ozal (45 minutes).

Political Situation

After 6 years as Prime Minister, Mr Ozal used his Parliamentary majority to secure election as President last November. His replacement as Prime Minister, Mr Akbulut is a colourless compromise choice from the ruling ANAP party. Although the Constitution requires the President to be apolitical, Ozal frequently intervenes in the day to day running of Government; and real power remains with the President.

The Government is increasingly divided and unpopular. Since the beginning of the year both the Foreign and Finance Ministers have resigned, expressing open dissatisfaction at Akbulut's performance. Ozal's position is somewhat more secure. His term of office is 7 years, though opposition parties have pledged to secure a Constitutional amendment to remove him if they win the next election (due in November 1992, though it may be brought forward).

Political Problems

Two issues preoccupy the government. Inflation remains at over 60% and guerrilla activity by PKK Kurdish separatists has increased substantially. Reaction by the security forces has been uncompromising, leading to

/accusations

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accusations of brutality and to increased alienation of the general population in SE Turkey. Although Armenian terrorists have not been active in Turkey since 1984, some kind of demonstration to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the "Genocide" on 24 April cannot be ruled out.

Objectives

The Turks will want to raise their EC application, and will be looking for reassurance that the changing situation in Eastern Europe does not affect the value we attach to their membership of NATO or input on disarmament questions (on both of which they can nonetheless be difficult customers). We will need to ensure that our views on Cyprus, human rights and the Midland Bank (if the problem remains unresolved by then) are registered, and to explain our position on Iraq.

Bilateral with Prime Minister AKBULUT

Talks with Mr Akbulut will take place at 0845 before the International ceremony. The Prime Minister might like to concentrate on the Middle East, Human Rights, EBRD and commercial issues, (though not Midland Bank on which Ozal is more likely to break the deadlock), leaving other topics for the meeting with President Ozal. Mr Akbulut will speak through an interpreter.

Middle East

Iran (which Mr Akbulut has recently visited):

Turkish assessment of recent Iranian statements calling for the release of all hostages in Lebanon? We hope Turkey will use every opportunity to press for their release.

Iraq.

- recent difficulties with Iraq not of our making.
- We had to react firmly to the unjustified execution of Farzad Bazoft and imprisonment of Mrs Parish. Public feeling in Britain was outraged.

/We are

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- We are also concerned at Iraq's procurement efforts and Saddam Hussain's recent threats to use chemical weapons.
- No evidence that Iraq presently has the capability to produce a nuclear weapon, but this is clearly their intention. We must work together to prevent this happening and to lower tension in the region.

Syria

Relations between the two countries are complicated by Turkish concern about Syrian support for Kurdish insurgents (including training in the Bekaa valley) and Turkey's control of the headwaters of the Euphrates. Do the Turks see any prospect for change in Syria or improvement in its international behaviour?

Human Rights

Despite proposed legislation to improve human rights observance in 1989, little progress has been made; Helsinki Watch reports that restrictions remain on political expression, the press and trade union activities.

- An area of continuing public concern in Britain. What further steps by the Turkish authorities can Turkey's friends in Britain quote when answering critics?

Bilateral with President Ozal: East/West

President Ozal values the Prime Minister's views on world issues and will want an exchange on East/West issues including those discussed with President Bush in Bermuda.

On the German Question the Prime Minister might give an account of the visit by Chancellor Kohl, and stress our determination to keep a united Germany in NATO (and the EC). The Turks were briefed in NATO on the first official-level 2+4 talks on 14 March (but not bilaterally). The Prime Minister might add that:

- We hope to take the 2+4 process forward quickly. We hope Ministers can meet early next month.

/We

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- We favour close consultation in NATO. 2+4 intended to cover issues directly relevant to Four Power rights. Not a substitute for discussions elsewhere.

Soviet Union

The Prime Minister may like to give an account of her view of recent developments in the Soviet Union, including in Lithuania.

Mr Ozal might raise Azerbaijan: the Turks have suggested that the West's reaction to the Soviet use of force in Azerbaijan in January showed a lack of interest in the welfare of Moslem peoples, compared to the reaction to the events in the Baltic States. The Prime Minister could point to the differences between the two situations: in the Transcaucasus the situation was close to civil war, with a violent dispute between Azeris and Armenians. Moves towards independence in the Baltic States have been entirely peaceful.

Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (if raised)

- The new Bulgarian government acted swiftly to restore rights to the Turkish minority (Turkish names, Moslem customs etc) despite some popular discontent.

- We will continue to stress to Bulgarians importance of full respect for human rights. We will also be sending observers to Bulgarian elections in June.

NATO and CFE

On NATO the Prime Minister could mention the importance we attach to:

- Turkey's contribution to NATO

- Germany remaining in the integrated military structure

- the application of Articles V and VI of the NATO Treaty to former GDR territory, as a starting point for discussion of arrangements for defence of the former GDR.

/WEU

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WEU

President Ozal may refer to Turkey's application (put forward last year) to join the WEU. The WEU has responded so far by saying that a Treaty review is being conducted following the accession of Spain and Portugal, and this must be completed before further enlargement. The Prime Minister could use this line in response.

Nuclear weapons in Europe (if raised)

- we accept that the reduced threat which will be posed by the Warsaw Pact, particularly after a CFE agreement, means that a substantial reduction can be achieved in the number of nuclear weapons in Europe.
- But this will need careful handling if we are to ensure the maintenance of an adequate nuclear deterrent which will include TASM.

Cyprus

The intercommunal talks are stalled, following an abortive round in New York in late February. Mr Vassiliou briefed the Prime Minister on 7 March. The subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 649 of 12 March (copy enclosed), reaffirmed the intercommunal basis for the dialogue.

The Turks have publicly supported Mr Denktash's tough line but may privately be unhappy, believing that he went too far in New York. Following her talks with Mr Perez de Cuellar and President Bush (in which Mr Bush said that UK influence in Turkey remained low because of the Armenian Genocide Resolution), the Prime Minister may wish to make the following points:

- Regret lack of progress. Mr Denktash's tough line caused a major difficulty in last round of talks in New York.
- Following the breakdown, we worked hard to achieve a firm and balanced Security Council Resolution, which all parties have accepted. The Resolution's central point is that the talks must remain in the framework of one state, two communities.

/Our

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- Our common objective: a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal state. The way forward is through resumed intercommunal talks after the Turkish Cypriot elections. Urge you to press Mr Denktash to make a constructive contribution. Surely in Turkish interests to look for a settlement: prospects better with Vassiliou than they might be later.

- The two communities must have opportunity to accept or reject agreements their leaders reach. But if Mr Denktash insists on a separate right of self-determination, he will only block achievement of a settlement: a dangerous and destabilising approach.

- The leaders of the two sides must avoid unhelpful actions. Changes in the status of Varosha, for example, still the subject of press speculation, would be very damaging.

Greece

The Prime Minister may also wish to mention the formation of a New Democracy government in Greece under Prime Minister Mitsotakis and express the hope that this will lead to an improvement in relations with Turkey.

EC

President Ozal is likely to press for our support for Turkey's EC Application. The Commission's report in December 1989 on Turkey's application concluded that, in view of Turkey's relatively low level of economic development and the EC consensus that there should be no accession negotiations until 1993 at the earliest, the Community should strengthen its relations with Turkey within the framework of the existing Association Agreement. We endorsed this approach. The Foreign Affairs Council asked the Commission to develop detailed proposals for strengthening existing relations. Greece alone dissented and can be expected to continue to block the Fourth EC Financial Protocol for Turkey - worth £420 million over five years. The Commission are due to report in May.

/The

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The Prime Minister might emphasise that:

- we favour strengthened EC/Turkey links;
- we expect the Commission to produce detailed proposals to develop the Association Agreement;
- we want to see the Fourth Financial Protocol unblocked. Britain has long regarded Turkey as a valued partner, and we have a shared interest in the political and economic development of Turkey.
- we support the EC consensus that no decisions can be taken on enlargement until 1993.

If pressed on what view we might then take on Turkish accession, the Prime Minister might wish to repeat what she told Ozal in April 1988, that "when the time comes for a decision on Turkey's application, the UK will give full weight to the long history of our relations with Turkey and to our many common interests".

Ozal may raise the question of the access of Turkish textiles into the EC. A new Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) was negotiated in December. We have lifted a reserve we placed on it at the time, but continue to register concern at the lack of Turkish response to the Commission's representations on Turkish subsidies and restricted market access. If raised, the Prime Minister might say:

- detailed questions relating to VRAs must be taken up with the Commission in Brussels.
- once Customs Union is achieved between the EC and Turkey, and all subsidies removed, VRAs should no longer be necessary.

Commercial Prospects and ECGD cover

The Prime Minister will wish to express her appreciation that in January Marconi were awarded the £96m contract to supply military radios. British companies are competing for three other notable contracts:

/Racal

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- Racal to supply a £300 million anti-aircraft radar fire control system. (EAGLE).
- Bae to supply a £180m satellite communication project (Turksat);
- As a sub-contractor, Hawker Siddeley to supply equipment worth £50m to the Canadian company UTDC for the Ankara Metro. (ATP has been applied for but not yet agreed).

The Prime Minister gave her support to BAE's bid for Turksat in a New Year's message to President Ozal. As a consequence ECGD have reserved cover. However, the potential demand for new Medium Term cover in Turkey could exceed the cover available. The present market limit is £750m and of this about £160m is available.

In view of the uncertainty about the level of ECGD cover, the Prime Minister should avoid endorsing Eagle or Ankara Metro unless she also points out that ECGD cover is not reserved. Otherwise, President Ozal may assume that HMG is prepared to give these projects full financial backing.

Midland Bank

Midland Bank's plans to open an office in Istanbul next month have been blocked, at the last minute, by the refusal of a senior Economic minister, Gunes Taner, to sign the authorising decree. The ostensible reason is our refusal to give the Turkish bank, Iktisat, full status in London: they have a representation office but have yet to meet the criteria in the UK's 1987 Banking Act. We are recommending that the Chancellor send a message to Mr Taner. But Ozal's personal intervention will probably be needed to resolve the deadlock. The Ambassador has recommended that the Prime Minister raise the issue with him. Sir Kit MacMahon has also asked her to do so.

The key points are:

- Since the German acquisition of part of Standard Chartered, there is no British Bank in Turkey, whilst there are 3 Turkish Banks in London.

/Turning

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- Turning down Midland would send the wrong signals to the international financial community at a time when Turkey is actively encouraging inward foreign investment.
- There is no direct comparison between the Midland and Iktisat cases. Iktisat has to comply with the 1987 Banking Act. So far it has been unable to do so; other Turkish Banks have.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The Turks have said that they favour a consensus candidate for the site of the EBRD. The Prime Minister may wish to register her personal interest in seeing London chosen as the site.

The Prime Minister has met President Ozal on a number of occasions, most recently at the NATO summit in Brussels in May 89. She may have seen Prime Minister Akbulut in the margins of the last NATO summit in Brussels in December 1989. I attach LPRs on both men. A formal visit programme will be handed to the Prime Minister by Sir Timothy Daunt on arrival in Istanbul. He will also be sending a scene setting telegram on 20 April. I shall be writing separately about the Prime Minister's bilateral with Prime Minister Hawke.

The MoD are writing to you separately about the Defence Secretary's programme, the veterans and the Prime Minister's visit to one of the frigates.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb at the MoD.

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/649 (1990)
12 March 1990

RESOLUTION 649 (1990)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2909th meeting,
on 12 March 1990

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990 (S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and on his assessment of the current situation,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,

Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the talks will result in a major step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus problem,

Expressing its regret that, in the more than 25 years since the establishment of UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem,

Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement,

1. Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession;

2. Expresses its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a

federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, toward this end, to assist the two communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions;

5. Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the situation and the current effort;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report due by 31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution.



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CL TURKEY:
PM Visit Ptz

CDP
26/3

22nd March, 1990.

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 20th March requesting The Queen's permission for the Prime Minister to visit Bermuda from 12th to 14th April and Turkey on 24th and 25th April. I have laid this before Her Majesty, who is pleased to give her permission for Mrs. Thatcher's absence from the country on these dates.

Yours ever,

Ken.

(KENNETH SCOTT)

C. D. Powell, Esq.



Cite SFW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 March 1990

Dear Ian.

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GALLIPOLI LANDINGS

Thank you for your letter of 12 March about the arrangements for veterans to attend the 75th Anniversary of the Gallipoli landings. The Prime Minister is most grateful for this.

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL)

Ian Woodman, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

R13/3(2)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 25/3/4D

12th March 1990

*Dear Minister
I have think this
is now satisfactory.*

mt

Dear Charles.

CR 13/3

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GALLIPOLI LANDINGS

Thank you for your further letter on this subject of 24th February.

We have had another look at ways in which we could help the British Legion with the pilgrimage they are arranging to Gallipoli and have decided we can best do this by offering genuine British veterans, members of their immediate family, and any necessary medical support, seats at concessionary rates on a VC10 aircraft that is flying out to Istanbul carrying the Army band that will be participating in the commemorations and which has a small number of spare seats available. We envisage that those flying to Turkey in this way would join up with the Royal British Legion pilgrimage on arrival in Istanbul.

As an aircraft is scheduled to cover this route in any case, the fare for this would be only £44.00 return. We may be able to cover this fare ourselves in the case of individual Gallipoli veterans in positions of financial hardship and we will discuss any such cases with the British Legion.

We do not yet know if this offer will result in more Gallipoli veterans joining the Pilgrimage, but regrettably, given the very small number of such veterans still active after 75 years it is most unlikely even at this reduced cost that more than 3 of the British servicemen who took part in the campaign will be able to attend (I understand one of the four I mentioned in my last letter has since dropped out for medical reasons).

*Yours sincerely
I M Woodman*

(I M WOODMAN)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

I am a fortunate man," said Adil Sahin, "the Lord has been good. He gave me this beautiful place to live my life. In these days we speak of, it was also a beautiful place to die." The village where Adil has lived all the 93 years of his life is Buyuk Anafarta on the Turkish peninsula called Gallipoli. We know it better as Gallipoli.

Seventy-five years ago, the 18-year-old shepherd Adil went with 32 others from his village to man hastily dug trenches along the Sari Bair ridge above his house. Only he and two others returned. Buyuk Anafarta did not suffer alone; the scale of its losses of young men is matched on the village war memorials of New Zealand and Nepal, in the memories of the aged on Australian sheep stations, and in the records of many now-disbanded British regiments.

From Sari Bair's peaks you look down on the golden crescents of a coast of haunting place names: Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay, Gully Beach and Cape Helles. Buried among the trees above the beaches are others: Lone Pine and The Nek, Pink Farm and Twelve Tree Copse. Even now, 75 years on, there are women of a half-dozen nations who cannot hear those names without weeping.

Some of those women will be joining a pilgrimage by people from all around the world to the graves of Gallipoli next month, when the anniversary will be marked by the speeches of statesmen near where 28 Victoria Crosses were won; 216 other men were awarded the Distinguished Service Order, 354 the Military Cross, and 719 the Distinguished Conduct Medal. But no politician will be able to find a sentence which rings true that does not lean with equally heavy emphasis on the heroics and the horror this land has seen.

That horror lives still with Arthur "Johnny" Bull, aged 94, who saw the worst of the fighting with the Royal Gloucester Hussars: "It was a horrible nightmare, suicide. A terrible, terrible time."

Bull was a stretcher-bearer at the infamous Chocolate Hill, which rapidly became thick with bodies. Former Corporal Bull, who now lives in Dyfed, spent his 20th birthday in a trench under fire: "They were shooting at you all time, day and night. All you could hear was guns going pap-pap-pap. We lived on bully beef, biscuits and water. The same water for washing and drinking.

"Wounded? I wish I had been. We all wanted to get wounded, just to get out of there."

In Adil's beautiful place during 1915, in a strip of killing ground never more than 12½ miles by five, the armies of the British Empire, France and Turkey suffered more than 500,000 casualties. More than 120,000 died on this finger of land, many in hand-to-hand fighting: "This is hell, all piled up," one Aussie wrote. No more than a quarter were ever identified; many of the rest simply became part of the very stuff of this glorious, brooding scenery. Very few are left to tell, as Adil

Anzac Cove, Suvla Bay, Gully Beach, Cape Helles . . . the Dardanelles. Next month, as a pilgrimage of politicians, old soldiers and widows heads for the Turkish beaches, a new generation will learn with horror of the futility of Gallipoli — the killing fields of 1915.

Brian James tells the dreadful story



Survivors: Adil Sahin (left) defended the vital Sari Bair ridge; Arthur Bull saw the worst of the fighting with the Royal Gloucester Hussars

can, what it was like. He was on duty at the north end of the bay that would become known as Anzac Cove at 4am on April 25. "My friend shouted 'Someone comes'. I saw big black shapes on the water. Then many shadows on the beach. We had great fear. But we fired. We were called back up into the hills. Still we fired. Of the 11 men in my post five were killed at once."

Adil did not know who they were fighting. "We were told they were English. But England had been our friend. We did not know why they were doing this to us. Then we were told that many came from this land of Australia. That was a great distance. Why had they come here?"

That was a question that was going to be asked, between prayers and curses, countless times in the months after that April morning. Yet the men from the Empire, volunteers all, had arrived singing with confidence in pursuit of a truly Grand Design. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had proposed that the capture of the Gallipoli peninsula would give the Allies free use of the 40-mile stretch of water known as the Dardanelles. This in turn would give access to British fleets to the Sea of Marmara, put Istanbul

beneath their battleship guns, drive Turkey from the war, and open up the Black Sea ports, through which the Allies could supply and encourage Russia, then scarcely holding Germany on the eastern front.

Perhaps even more was played for than Churchill contemplated; historians now speculate whether, had the plan succeeded, the Russian Revolution would ever have taken place.

But the plan was never destined to succeed, because it was attended by so doleful a list of ignorances in its planning, incompetencies in its execution, by failures in the leaders matched only by the heroism of the led, as to make that cool and eminent military historian Dupuy declare: "With the possible exception of the Crimea, the expedition was the most poorly mounted and ineptly controlled operation in modern British military history . . . the fighting men on both sides performed miracles." Of the millions of words written on the campaign most have been greatly more scathing.

The consequences of failure were many. Churchill was sacked from the Cabinet and was seldom trusted by military minds again until his re-emergence in the

Second World War. A previously unknown Turkish divisional commander named Kemal became a national hero and established the fame that led on to his emergence as Kemal Ataturk, the "father" of the modern Turkish republic. And an equally unknown Australian journalist, Keith Murdoch came, wrote what he had seen, and almost single-handedly ended the war.

The verdicts of historians on Gallipoli cannot be dismissed as hindsight. Soldiers of the time, one or two ranks down from the incompetent staff officers wished on the luckless commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton (who left for Turkey at 24 hours' notice with no plan and only a few tourist maps of his target) fumed as delays multiplied and chances of essential surprise vanished.

The consequences were immediate. On March 18 a formidable Allied fleet, including 18 capital ships, sailed into the Straits and began to reduce the out-gunned batteries barring the 40-mile passage. But pointless earlier assaults in November and January had so alerted the Turks that a small minesweeper had strewn charges along the line chosen by the British on their previous raid: now three old battleships were sunk and three more crippled.

This action, celebrated across Turkey every March 18 since as a victory marking the re-birth of a nation in decline since the rout of the Ottoman Empire, cast the die: the British fleet fled, its admiral declaring: "First, let the troops clear the land."

According to the plan they should have been ready to do so. But incompetent staffwork meant that the approaching force was in chaotic order: units were on one ship, their guns on another, ammunition on a third. They had to return to Egypt to be combat-loaded. A month passed: every ship arrival was freely reported in Cairo newspapers; spies were taken daily around the assembly area on the island of Lemnos.

The German "advising" general, Liman von Sanders, given command of the Gallipoli garrison, could scarcely have been better prepared for his enemies. In February, Turkey had 15,000 troops on the peninsula. At 4.30am on April 25, when the first Anzacs tripped ashore, Adil Sahin was one of 88,000 men waiting to receive them. He remembers being chivvied back up the razor-backed ravines above the beaches throughout that first night by the ludicrously courageous charges of men apparently loving their first taste of war.

Next morning, British troops made their own landings on five beaches around Cape Helles on the southern tip of Gallipoli. Some, like the thousands on a converted collier, the River Clyde, stepped off into point-blank fire and were massacred. Others, like the men on "Y" beach, sauntered ashore, looked around the town of Krythia, paused to brew up on the slopes of the height called Achi

Baba and were still awaiting orders when the Turks arrived to chase them off. Britain was to lose 10,000 dead trying in vain to take both Krythia and Achi Baba in the next nine months.

By dawn the Anzacs had taken the first ridge of hillocks. But the land won against withering fire by the end of the first day was all they were to hold for the next three months; trapped in a beachhead, usually within sight of snipers, always in range of artillery, and fighting daily with bayonet and grenades to cling to just a few feet of scrub.

Adil says: "All day just shooting. So many died. But it was our duty. We awoke and began fighting. At night we buried those who died. We knew they would be happy now. There was no horror

for us." The fatalistic courage of these Muslim infantrymen was yet another factor totally underestimated in the planning.

"Often we were without food," Adil says. "One day the government sent hazelnuts and raisins. The trenches of the Australians were only about 15 yards away. We threw them fruit. They threw back cigarettes and biscuits." This is a documented incident; the grudging regard of the combatants for each other is famous.

But more typical was another incident Adil, sharp-minded still at 93, recalls: "One day they waved flags from each side. And we walked out of the trenches to bury the dead." In fact, Turks do not formally bury their dead; what they wanted was to recover the rifles of the 1,000 men shot down

in one insane charge into 948,000 bullets (yes, someone counted). The Australians matched this sacrifice another day when they lost 2,400 men tackling a 300-yard section of front.

Apart from a regular diet of lack of water, lack of ammunition, lack of comprehensible orders, some days brought supreme horror. Like the afternoon of mad bravery when leap-frogging handfuls of Gurkhas, Gloucesters and Welch Fusiliers finally took the key peak of Chunuk Bair. They sent for reinforcements to fresh-landed troops assembled below: "Sorry, my men need a hot meal and tea before coming up," the red-tabbed commander said. After the Turkish counter-attack, no British soldier was left alive on Chunuk. The

Continued overleaf

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THE BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI

DUNCAN STEWART

Continued from previous page
final débâcle came at Suvla Bay, when a fresh August landing to take the Turks from the rear saw 20,000 Empire troops land unopposed to scatter the 1,600 enemy facing them under the Sari Bair ridge. The plan visualized a dash for the heights: instead some units began digging in, others went bathing. Fresh Turkish battalions were strung along the heights when, two days later, the advance began, and was instantly halted.

Effectively, the Gallipoli campaign ended then; except that neither Hamilton and his mulish staff nor Churchill was prepared to concede so. It took the truth about life and death on the peninsular (brought to Britain by the dramatic means outlined on this page) to provoke the one Dardanelles operation that brought credit to British arms: the evacuation.

Hamilton had said it could not be done, not without losses of up to 40,000 of his men. His replacements, Generals Monro then Birdwood, produced a plan of breathtaking audacity. From mid-December, night after night groups of men, six or a dozen at a time, filed down the gullies, silent and not smoking, moving soundlessly across roads and jetties lined with sacking and slid into barges.

On January 9, 1916, the last few, having mined their trenches and rigged Heath-Robinson devices operated by water dripping into cans to trigger abandoned rifles, crept away. The evacuation of 134,000 troops had cost not a single man.

Adil says: "At first we did not believe. Then we went down through the fog, and there was no one. We sat down; what was there to celebrate?"

The 57 Anzac veterans, average age 94, making their way to where Adil waits to greet them ("not as enemies, but comrades of a terrible time") will find the peninsula as empty today as then. Like the 35 sons and daughters of the British dead on the British Legion pilgrimage, like veteran Arthur Bull, Margaret Thatcher, Australia's prime minister and New Zealand's governor-general, like the bands and colour-parties from warships that will again sail the Narrows, they will be heartened by the care given the countless cemeteries.

The Turks have made the peninsular tip a national park, forbidding all development and gimcrack tourism and planting the once-bare hills with millions of trees. But only the imagination-dead can tread the trenches, where once "as the bullets hit blood hung in the air like the droplets of a hairdresser's spray" and not feel that Adil's beautiful land is peopled with a braver presence than those striding regiments of pine.

The journalist who stopped a war

How much influence journalists truly wield can occupy much lunchtime discussion in bars, and at No 10 Downing Street. Few can claim to have written one long piece on an army "murdered by incapacity" and almost single-handedly stopped a war.

Keith Murdoch was aged 29 when he left Australia to run the London cable office of an Australian newspaper group. He was nervous about the assignment (because of his stammer a previous attempt to conquer Fleet Street had not succeeded) and, in any case, he saw the job as second prize, having narrowly failed to gain the one place allocated to Australia in the Press corps accompanying the Gallipoli landings four months before.

He was slightly mollified by having been given the chore by his government, for a fee of £25, of stopping off in Cairo to ask questions about the failure of the Australian forces' postal system and allegations that money sent from home was vanishing on route.

To pursue those inquiries, Murdoch cabled General Sir Ian Hamilton for permission to visit campaign headquarters on Imbros and the Anzac front. This, to Hamilton's later regret, was granted... once Murdoch had signed an undertaking to write nothing that did not pass before the censor.

Murdoch was part-prepared for Anzac Cove after talking on Imbros to Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, an English war correspondent who was scathing about the conduct of the campaign. What he was to observe for himself over four days appalled him. Worse, because of his undertaking to the censor, he could not hope to report the truth to his newspaper in Australia.

It was Ashmead-Bartlett who provided the solution. Would Murdoch, asked the Englishman, agree to carry a sealed letter to Britain's Prime Minister, Asquith? Murdoch, guessing the contents, agreed. The plan misfired when, tipped off by another journalist, Hamilton warned the War Office about the letter and a British Intelligence officer boarded Murdoch's ship at Marseilles to seize his papers.

But Murdoch had been shown a way out: by placing himself under military discipline by signing the undertaking, he had also extended to himself every soldier's right to correspond freely with any MP. On September 21 Murdoch arrived in



The war reporter: Keith Murdoch revealed the awful truth in a letter to the Australian Prime Minister

London, went straight to the Australian group's offices in The Times building and began pecking out an 8,000-word letter to the Australian prime minister, Andrew Fisher, the former miner he had met while a parliamentary reporter.

I am indebted to Desmond Zwar, a journalist friend of many years, for what follows: Ten years ago Zwar persuaded the Australian government to release the Murdoch letter, "classified" since 1915. Murdoch had done his homework. His letter has piercing detail of what had been done badly, what alternatives were never tried. Much of it is almost sentimental in praise of Australian courage and spirit. More is deadly in its criticism of the campaign's leadership.

Excerpts give a flavour. After describing the inept chaos of Suvla, Murdoch continued:

Flies are spreading dysentery, and we must be evacuating 1,000 sick and wounded men every day.

When the autumn rains come and unbury our dead, now lying under a light soil in our trenches, sickness must increase. Even now the stench is sickening. Alas, the good human stuff that there lies buried...

When spring comes we shall have about 60,000 men left. But they will not be an army. They will be a broken force, spent. The spirit

of Suvla is simply deplorable. The men have no confidence in the staff, little in London. Every man knows that the last operations were grossly bungled by the general staff, and that Hamilton has led a series of armies into a series of cul-de-sacs. You would hardly believe the evidence of your own eyes at Suvla. You would refuse to believe that these men were really British soldiers. So badly shaken are they by their miserable defeats, so affected by the lack of water and the monotony of salt beef and rice diet, that they show an atrophy of mind and body that is appalling.

I do not like to dictate this sentence, even for your eyes, but the fact is that after the first day at Suvla orders had to be issued to officers to shoot without mercy any soldiers who lagged behind or loitered in an advance.


For the general staff and, I fear, Hamilton, officers and men have nothing but contempt. They express it fearlessly. That however is not peculiar to Anzac. Sedition is talked round every tin of bully beef on the peninsula, and it is only loyalty that holds the forces together.

Undoubtedly, the essential and first step to restore the morale of the shaken forces is to recall him and his Chief of Staff [General Braithwaite], a man more cordially detested in our forces than Enver Pasha. The continuous and ghastly bungling over the Dardanelles enterprise was to be expected from such a General Staff as the British Army possesses, so far as I have seen it. The conceit and complacency of the red feather men are equalled only by their incapacity.


Along the lines of communications, and especially at Mudros, are countless high officers and conceited young cubs only playing at war. What can you expect of men who have never worked seriously, who have lived for their appearance and for social distinction and self-satisfaction, and who are now called on to conduct a gigantic war? Australians now loathe and detest any Englishman wearing red.

Murdoch finished his letter and went to lunch with Geoffrey Dawson, then editor of The Times, at Simpson's-in-the-Strand. Back at the office, Dawson sent a message: could Murdoch be persuaded to repeat what he had said to a member of the War Cabinet?

In the next few dizzying days the unknown reporter was grilled in



Plan of action: more than 120,000 Allied and Turkish troops died fighting for control of the Dardanelles



Turk's eye view: Anzac Cove (top left) today with its sombre memorial, and beachheads curving to North Cove

turn by Sir Edward Carson, chairman of the Dardanelles Committee; Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions; Lord Kitchener, Secretary for War; and by a bristlingly hostile Winston Churchill.

Asquith, meanwhile, asked to see a copy of the Murdoch letter, and at once ordered it duplicated as a Cabinet paper.

Hamilton, shown the letter, dismissed it as tittle-tattle ("No gentleman would have said it, and no gentleman will believe it," he would later add). But the Cabinet was convinced otherwise. Twenty-four hours later Hamilton was

relieved of his command. Within days, General Monro had arrived to take charge and 48 hours later answered Lord Kitchener's terse cable... "the main issue... staying or leaving?" by recommending evacuation.

Murdoch remained in London for six years, given by his letter an instant entrée to the political establishment and becoming a favourite of the father of modern British journalism, Lord Northcliffe, before returning to Melbourne to begin building a newspaper empire of his own and earn a knighthood, with most

Australians only dimly aware of what he had done.

His son, Rupert, who created an even greater media empire, recalls: "My father remembered what he had seen all his life. Yet he seldom spoke of the part he played."

But Charles Bean, Australia's official war historian and an appalled witness of Gallipoli, wrote: "It is a bit of a shock to find that what the whole system cannot do after months of close attention, a single visitor can do within days... that is make up the mind of the British Government."

④

Line Minister

Embargoed until delivery: 8pm 26 April 1990, London.

FOR WANT OF CRITICS....:

THE TRAGEDY OF GALLIPOLI

ROBERT O'NEILL

Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford

Can many
like to glance
at this, in
particular pages

INTRODUCTION: IN HOMAGE TO THE PARTICIPANTS

Few of the lectures that I have given have meant as much to me as this one. The Gallipoli campaign has been part of my consciousness since the age of five. I learned from witnessing my first ANZAC Day ceremony, in my first year in primary school, some two months after the fall of Singapore, that it commemorated an event in Australian history like no other. In most of the forty-eight years since then I have attended commemorative services and absorbed both the ANZAC legend and the ANZAC facts which have been such dominant aspects of Australia's political and social history in the twentieth century.

9-11 on the
British role in
the battle.
COM
20/2

Nobody who has taken part in one of the hundreds of dawn services that are held in Australia and New Zealand on the 25th of April each year is ever likely to forget their atmosphere of dedication. The faces of those taking part show a keen determination to remember and honour those who, in that same chilly darkness began clambering over the sides of their transports into the small craft waiting to take them into their baptism of fire. The dawn services are a mark of respect for free

men who willingly accepted huge risks in order to thwart what they saw as alien hegemonism, threatening Britain and therefore both Australia and New Zealand. The moral dilemma involved in invading a country remote from the theatre of war, which in the preceding months had done Britain little direct harm other than to defend itself against naval attack, has only recently found acknowledgement.

ANZAC Day services and parades are expressions both of compassion for those who died and pride in the military reputation that they helped to found. The services also have a wider significance in recognizing the birth of a sense of national pride that has kept the 25th of April for seventy-five years the most poignant day of the year for Australians and New Zealanders. The more radical of antipodean nationalists today repudiate the Gallipoli experience as an expression of national worth, seeing it rather as a piece of deplorable imperial subservience and bellicism. But to anyone with a sense for history and an understanding of how times change, Gallipoli will continue to be seen as an important verifier of the claims of Australia and New Zealand to be regarded as significant international actors. It is also a key source of the confidence which is essential if people are to feel that they are an independent nation.

The campaign cost the lives of 7,594 Australians and 2,431 New Zealanders. Another 18,500 Australians and 5,140 New Zealanders were wounded. For young countries of small populations these were terrible sacrifices of the coming generation. Few Australian or

New Zealand families were without cause to grieve at personal loss. It is no wonder that ANZAC Day became such a sacred act of remembrance in both countries.

Of course it is a day to remember not only for Australians and New Zealanders. The regular attendance of the Austrian, German and Turkish ambassadors at the 11 am service at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra showed that they well understood the significance of the 25th of April. After a service in the mid-1970s the newly arrived Austrian Ambassador remarked to me that he found the seating arrangements notable. He had been placed, as was the custom, together with his German and Turkish colleagues, at one side of the seating for the diplomatic corps. He observed with a broad smile of satisfaction: "In the course of a long diplomatic career I have had to attend many war commemoration services but as I looked at the three of us sitting here I thought this one is unique - it commemorates the only occasion on which we won."

And so they did, and for very good reasons, not the least of which were that they fought well and worked effectively together. In a campaign of extreme difficulty for all who took part, the Turkish infantryman distinguished himself not only by his bravery and sense of devotion to his comrades when under enormous pressure, but also by his humanity and evident regard for his enemy. Early fears about Turkish cruelty to prisoners and the wounded, and the use of dum-dum bullets, proved to be largely unfounded. Soon after the landings, Major Guy Dawnay, of General

Sir Ian Hamilton's staff, wrote to his wife:

[The Turks] are treating our wounded splendidly! So believe no other stories you may hear." (1)

The Turkish soldier, or Johnny Turk as his foes called him, was well served by his own leaders including the then Lieutenant Colonel Mustapha Kemal, better known to us as Ataturk, who at 10 am on 25 April personally blocked that very promising Australian foray led by Captain Tulloch which reached 2000 yards inland, across the shoulder of Battleship Hill and within sight of the Straits. That thrust, made in the first six hours of the landing, penetrated twice as far as the deepest advance made on the ANZAC front during the whole subsequent operation. It was to be the first of many that Kemal and his men were to contain.

The Turkish soldier was also fortunate in his German leaders and advisers, a band of some two hundred officers under the doughty Otto Liman von Sanders. By his own admission one of the oldest division commanders in the German Army, von Liman had not been intended for great heights in his own service when he was nominated on 15 June 1913 to lead the new German military mission to Turkey. In many ways he was a curious choice: perhaps it was the oriental flavour of his name which led to his selection. If so, someone had blundered because he was probably of Jewish descent. The "Sanders" part of his name he assumed only with his ennobling, the granting of the right to use the prefix "von"

(1) Dawnay Papers, Imperial War Museum, cited in Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarin and Hatice Hürmüz Basarin, A Turkish View of Gallipoli-Canakkale, Hodja, Melbourne, 1985, p. 73.

before his name. The Kaiser honoured him along with many others on the 25th anniversary of his ascent to the throne, a month after Liman's appointment to Turkey. Liman intended thereby to commemorate his wife, Amalie von Sanders, who had died in 1906. He is properly referred to as General von Liman. It is formally correct to call him, on first use of his name, General Liman von Sanders. The practice of many British historians of referring to him as General von Sanders, as if Liman was his given name, is wrong.

Perhaps in sending him to Constantinople the German General Staff was simply ridding itself of a tiresome senior officer without being too brutal to his self esteem. A younger colleague, General Hans von Seeckt, who served as Chief of Staff in the Turkish General Headquarters in 1917-18, wrote of Liman's selection:

"The choice of the Chief of the Military Mission could scarcely have fallen more unfortunately. Found in Germany unsuitable for the command of an Army Corps, he was supposed to take over the re-building of the whole Turkish Army. One simply could not demonstrate indifference in worse terms: it was an admission that we had not understood the principle that for the representation abroad of a strong nation, only the best would suffice. General von Liman was well enough known in the German Army to deter the best from serving under him. To him went the unsuspecting, the enthusiasts, the adventurers or those who were tempted by higher

pay."(2)

Viewed in the light of Liman's performance in command of the Fifth Turkish Army, the formation defending the Dardanelles in 1915, these seem to be ungenerous comments. He made an early error in thinking that Besika Bay, on the southern shore, was the most likely place for a British landing. The forces he stationed on the peninsula were held too far back to frustrate a landing at its outset, but he wanted to keep them concentrated on the best axes for rapid movement. He was firmly of the opinion that an attempt to invade would be made and stirred up a whirlwind of controversy with War Minister Enver and those of his subordinates who in early 1915 discounted this possibility. Difficult, vain man that Liman undoubtedly was, he met the challenges of the campaign, and faced down his many arm-chair critics in Constantinople and Germany when the enemy pressure was at its most intense.

He had his hour of glory in repelling the great offensive at ANZAC and Suvla in August. Within hours of its launching he had deduced British aims precisely and marshalled his none too numerous forces quickly and at the right places. He ordered counterattacks rapidly and unerringly, going forward himself to observe that to be made at Suvla. Would that his rival, Hamilton, had emulated his action in dismissing the local commander, Feizi

(2) Hans von Seeckt, "Gründe des Zusammenbruchs der Türkei Herbst 1918", Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv file N 247/202c, cited in Jehuda L. Wallach, Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die Preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei 1835-1919, Droste, Düsseldorf, 1976, p. 137.

Pasha, for inactivity. Handing the sector over to Kemal, Liman had the satisfaction of seeing the 6,000 men that he could assemble for this one desperate thrust pour over the ridge of Tekke Tepe and strike the British infantry precisely at their most vulnerable phase, clambering up the steepest part of the slope, exhausted and confused. That success put paid to British hopes for a successful outcome to the campaign.

The great Suvla offensive was brought to nought at dawn on 9 August. Kemal, returning exhausted to the heights of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair late that evening, brought off a superb feat of front line leadership to remove the final threat to his position. Heartening his six remaining battalions that night he organized a counter attack to break the epic British and New Zealand drive for the crest. At 4.30 next morning he led the first assault line into battle, signalling direction with his whip. A few minutes later, when light had strengthened, that last band of Turkish reserves would have been swept off the forward slopes by naval gunfire. The New Zealand machine gunners took terrible toll of them as they advanced silently, with no fire support, holding their own fire until they were on their foes. Their determination and Kemal's leadership carried them through to success. The Turkish hold on the crest was thereafter never to be challenged.

We know the story well from our own side. It is well to think about it from that of the Turks if justice is to be done Kemal and his chief, von Liman. The old German may not have been one

of his country's best officers but he had what it took when the chips were down. It is hard to believe that his qualities were not known to those who selected him for the position. For all his crustiness and obstinacy in dealing with Berlin and his ambassador in Constantinople, Liman served Turkey and Germany well as a senior commander and adviser in time of crisis.

It is also only fair, however, to let the final word rest with Seeckt, who knew him well and showed by his own record that he also had what it took to exercise high command:

It should not be disavowed that in stubborn repulse of the stubborn attack he fulfilled what was required of him, but in holding fast just as stubbornly to preconceived ideas he let the real victory slip through his fingers. His incapacity not only to lead military masses but also to nurture them, and his pathological mistrust of any expert German assistance provided to him let the Turkish Army emerge from the Dardanelles campaign victorious but in ruins. (3)

It was not only the British survivors who were exhausted by the struggle for Gallipoli. We remember the Turks and their Austro-Hungarian and German allies today, the former fighting in defence of their own native soil against the aggression which nobody can tolerate if they value freedom. But thinking of them also reminds us of a great disparity in the historiography of the Gallipoli campaign. There are hundreds of volumes on the British and ANZAC

(3) Seeckt, ibid., cited in Wallach, op. cit. p.191

sides but only a handful covering the Turkish and German experience. With a few rare exceptions such as the memoirs of von Liman and General Kannengiesser, one of his subordinates, or the studies of Professor Ulrich Trumpener, they remain masked by the screen of a foreign language. If there is a task worth doing for those who want to keep alive the memory of this campaign it is surely to find ways of bringing the existing Turkish and German literature on the Gallipoli campaign to the reader of the new global language, English, and of commissioning new historical works by scholars of various nationalities which draw on Turkish and German sources.

Finally and most importantly let me acknowledge the British role in the campaign, and by British I mean United Kingdom as distinct from imperial. It is easy to forget how vast the Britain's role was. The national importance of the Gallipoli campaign to Australians and New Zealanders is such that there one is aware only of a sideshow down at Cape Helles. Perhaps the ANZAC public relations machine has also done its work internationally all too well, so that the world is more aware of the Australian and New Zealand role than of the United Kingdom's own part. If the role of the United Kingdom does not always receive its due share of attention, that of the Royal Navy has even less justice done to it, severely underplayed by comparison with accorded to the forces ashore, to the infantry perched high up on the cliffs and ridges, clinging on desperately despite a fierce enemy, crumbling soil, constant thirst, malnutrition, logistic shortages of all kinds and alternately roasting and freezing temperatures. But it

was initially wholly a naval operation and, apart from occasional withdrawals, the navy sustained and supported the army throughout eight long months.

Also we should remember the part played by the 29th Indian Brigade, particularly the 1st/6th Gurkhas on Chunuk Bair on 8 and 9 August. As an Australian I am delighted that through the auspices of the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture Trust, the United Kingdom is marking and keeping alive the memory of a campaign of rare significance, conceived, mounted and directed from this very city, in whose operations 119,696 men in British and Indian uniforms became casualties, including over 28,000 dead.

One hopes particularly in these days of European integration that there might be some counterpart to these commemorative efforts in France. The French part in the campaign was notable and bloody, if brief. It is understandable, however, that an operation which cost a mere 47,000 casualties, including 10,000 dead, in a war in which France lost 1.3 million in dead alone, will play only a small part in that nation's thinking on war and its impact. It is also appropriate particularly in the wake of recent relaxations in East-West tensions to recall the Russians who fell in the appalling winter campaign against Turkey in the Caucasus and those manning the cruiser Askold, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese war which had daringly outrun the Japanese navy to escape from Port Arthur to Shanghai. They represented the great ally on the Eastern Front which stood to gain so much had the operation been successful.

As General Hans Kannengiesser, who commanded a Turkish division on the peninsula, observed in his study of the campaign:

"Seldom have so many countries of the world, races, and nations sent their representatives to so small a place with the praiseworthy intention of killing one another." (4)

In toto nearly one million men fought in the campaign, and the largest contingent of all was that of the Turks, some 500,000. According to official Turkish figures, 86,000 were killed and 165,000 wounded, but these almost certainly are a severe understatement. Of the Allied half million over 250,000 became casualties, including 46,000 dead. Of the million men who fought at the Dardanelles, about one in seven died and a further one in three were casualties.

When one climbs the ridge of Chunuk Bair and surveys the tiny battlefields on the peninsula it is astounding to realize that so much intense activity was concentrated in such tiny areas. The British area at Helles was some three miles deep and two wide. The ANZAC position was some two miles from north to south and much of it was half a mile or less in depth. One can walk the perimeter in a few hours. It is good to know that yesterday the Turkish government gave the seventy-fifth anniversary of the landings such prominent commemoration, and that ever since 1919,

(4) Cited in John North, Gallipoli the Fading Vision, Faber and Faber, London, 1936, p. 21.

and particularly in recent years, it has been extremely cooperative with those who wish the battlefields to be marked more comprehensibly for visitors from home and abroad.

It is ironic that we should know the campaign by the name Gallipoli, which derives from the Greek for "nice town". As the Turks seem to have been content to adapt that name only slightly, to "Gelibolu", they will doubtless forgive us, even if the Greeks think we choose strange words to describe a peculiarly horrible battlefield. The Turkish name for the campaign as a whole, Canakkale, corresponds to our reference to it as the Dardanelles. The Turks call that same waterway the Straits of Canakkale after the major fortress and administrative centre on the southern shore. To the Turkish defenders, Canakkale was central to their concerns, and this is why Liman worried so much about a landing at Besika Bay. If they held Canakkale they could supply the peninsula and keep the Straits closed. If they lost it, their flank was turned.

The British invaders for their part focused their attention on the northern side because it was there that they imagined their road to Constantinople to begin. It is a moot point as to whether a greater allied effort on the southern side would not have paid decisive dividends. The country was not easy and strong Turkish forces were concentrated in that sector, but they were led with nothing like the skill and ferocity of Kemal, and the initial French gains were impressive. But that possibility is simply one

of the many "ifs" of the campaign.

THE THEME: THE CAMPAIGN'S SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR

I am deeply conscious of the honour of the invitation to give the Gallipoli lecture, here in London, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the landings. Given the nature of my predecessors as Gallipoli lecturers, who include HRH Prince Philip, Mr Edward Heath and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the invitation was both daunting and tempting. I accepted it in the understanding that the Trust knew what it was doing in asking me to speak, jumping down in standing and age, as well as crossing the now quite broad gap of nationality. As a working military historian who teaches the campaign at Oxford and takes an interest in current strategic issues, I am not about to philosophize after making brief mention of the campaign. Rather in this lecture I will give you fifty-five minutes worth on the events of 1915 and some thoughts they raise which are of wider relevance to the conduct of war in general. Rest assured I do not intend either to make this occasion exclusively an ANZAC celebration.

To judge from recent events in Eastern Europe the whole subject of warfare may be heading fast for the dusty archives of history, at least in Europe. One hopes that it might be, but one also remembers that war will continue to afflict many other regions for a long time to come. One also has to remain aware of the possibility that the revolutions of 1989 may prove fragile. In

other words, I do not believe that my subject is yet wholly of historical significance, nor do I teach it as such.

Not only is the mission of the Gallipoli Trust well chosen but so also is the wording of its constitution. The Trustees are charged with the holding of an annual lecture, to keep alive the memories "of those who suffered and perished on both sides" and to see that the lessons of the campaign are not forgotten. That is a splendid mission: there is much worth remembering from the Turkish-German side of the struggle, as well as that of our own. And long before reading the constitution so thoughtfully sent to me by General Lee in January, I had already decided to make my theme a study of aspects of the campaign which reveal problems encountered in most major military operations. As a historian I hesitate to call these "lessons" but as a former soldier I know what the Trustees are aiming at.

INFANTRY COMBAT

I would like to have your attention for several hours to do justice to the task, but as I have less than one at my disposal tonight I shall have to be highly selective. Let me begin at the sharp end. In thinking about its tactical impact one is inclined to wonder whether there is anything special to be said that could not be said about any of the opening campaigns of a major war. Troops on both sides were initially inexperienced and leaders had to learn to handle their responsibilities as they went. Soldiers

had to learn that war is a twenty-four hours a day business, and come to terms with the fact that while on operations there is little real rest and there are no diversions except the boredom of inactivity. Aged and inadequate leaders chosen by the criteria of peacetime service had to be weeded out. They also had to learn prudence on the modern battlefield dominated by the machine gun. Will power, as General Fuller once observed in commenting upon French elan, does not make one bulletproof. All these things were learned smartly in the opening weeks, but they are so sui generis that they have to be learned anew in any war.

On Gallipoli there were the special arts of close-quarter trench warfare to be acquired, with front lines twenty yards apart and less, and the enemy in easy earshot or grenade and message tossing range. Senior commanders thought it a splendid idea for the front line troops to throw messages to the Turks promising good treatment if they surrendered. The troops themselves knew the idea was crazy but they complied. On one occasion, at Quinn's Post, the reply came back squarely:

"You think there are no true Turks left. But there are Turks, and Turks' sons!" (5)

(5) C.E.W.Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. Volume 2, The Story of Anzac, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1944, p.162.

Communication also took place for other purposes. In November at Quinn's the Turks threw over a handsome cigarette case, inscribed in Turkish soldiers' French:

"Take, with pleasure. To our heroic enemy." (6)

But the proximity of the trenches meant that life on both sides went on under constant threat of the bombs which could easily be tossed from one line to another and of the huge mines which patient sappers placed in tunnels beneath the feet of their enemies. Listening and counter-mining were the best defences against the latter. Men soon learned to fall on an incoming bomb with a full sandbag to smother its explosion, except those daredevils who caught and threw them back.

Both sides had to improvise, making devices such as periscopes so that they could fire without exposing heads above the parapet and home-made bombs cased in ration tins to supplement the meagre supply of ordnance coming through from Alexandria or Constantinople. The life of a periscope soon became a matter of seconds as marksmanship improved to a phenomenal level, and the snipers who constantly covered the battlefield had to resort to the use of tiny, protected loopholes in sandbag fortifications built at night. Had mortars been widely available, they could have turned the course of the campaign, but at that point in the war Britain had only a handful of Japanese weapons, whose

(6) Bean, op. cit., photograph facing p.899.

ammunition stock was soon exhausted, and the rather ineffective bomb thrower invented by Mr Garland of the Cairo arsenal.

The Turks throughout the campaign lacked proper mortars. At least they were able to build cover over their trenches for protection, a facility that their enemies were unable through lack of resources to emulate. Had the Turks been well supplied with either mortars or howitzers they could have driven the invaders out of their precarious holds in a short space of time. Such support did not become available, however, until Bulgaria entered the war. The failure of the British August offensives having helped King Ferdinand to see on which side of the bread the butter then lay, he threw his lot in with that of the Germans and Austrians and opened the rail link through to Turkey. The timing of the British evacuation of the peninsula was particularly fortunate from this perspective.

Every war is replete with problems of transition in tactical methods, whose solutions sadly are dearly bought by those unfortunate enough to have to face them for the first time. In the case of the Gallipoli campaign, these problems were severe. Not only did men have to learn to cope with an intensity of automatic fire they had not faced before, the invaders also had to coordinate gunnery support from warships with which they lacked direct communications against targets they could not see. They had to fight on tiny, often steeply sloping and sometimes precipitous battlefields, overlooked by the enemy.

They had to live under appalling conditions of monotonous, vitamin deficient food, primitive sanitation made worse by the crowding of the positions, the stench reinforced by the odour of the corpses decaying in front of their trenches, plagued by dysentery, enteric fever and lice, and rudimentary treatment for the wounded until they could be moved to hospital ships. They received little mail and news, and as a result were prey to rumours sweeping the trenches, particularly to ones which lifted their hopes such as that an Italian army of 100,000 or a Russian of 50,000 was about to land. Perhaps the worst problem of all was that of ever present thirst. What none of the operation's originators ever thought of was that their army would be trapped for months on a desert shore, with its ultimate source of water, the heaviest commodity that men must have in bulk to survive, several hundred miles away in Egypt and Malta. Wells provided some supply but in summer they dried. Men in the high forward posts often received only one water bottle per day, which had to meet all needs. The Turks, by contrast, were well supplied with water from springs and wells, although they had to endure all the other hardships.

THE ART OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

One problem of tactical operations that was not solved at the Dardanelles was that of command and control. You have, I imagine, all seen Peter Weir's splendid film Gallipoli, and its horrifying demonstration of the consequences of a failure to synchronize

watches. A fateful seven minutes elapsed between the cessation of the artillery fire onto the Turkish trenches at 4.23 a.m. on 7 August and the moment when the first line of the 8th Light Horse had to climb the walls of their trenches on the pegs they had hammered in for that purpose and spring out for the desperate fifty yard dash to the Turkish line. The Turks, badly battered by the barrage, had just enough time to recover their wits, take up fire positions, assemble relief personnel, organize their ammunition and take careful aim at the Australian trenches to cut down the assault that was so obviously about to be made. Those seven minutes were sufficient for them to make absolutely certain that a nearly impossible task was absolutely impossible.

This episode is one of those few in which the screen understates reality, for there were not three but four successive charges by the light-horse men in the following forty-five minutes. The last was triggered by a misunderstanding while the local commanders were debating whether or not the operation should be abandoned after the third line had been shot down. Nearly half of those who made up the four waves of attack were killed and another quarter were wounded. As Weir showed and Bean, the Australian war historian, wrote, the last sight anyone had of Private Wilfred Harper was of him " running forward like a schoolboy in a foot-race, with all the speed that he could compass." (7) His elder brother Gresley, a Western Australian barrister, also a private, died in almost the same instant.

(7) C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac, p.618.

Co-ordination of fire support for the infantry was a major problem throughout the campaign. Not much artillery could be landed and it had to be sited near the beaches, hundreds of feet below the front trenches, facing the gunners with formidable crest clearance problems. For telling bombardments, naval gunfire was also needed, but ship to shore communications for target identification and correction of the fall of shot were meagre. The flatness of the trajectories of the naval guns made observation all the more vital when operations were undertaken close to the ridgetops. It is still not certain what caused the disaster which befell Major Allanson and his mixed force of Gurkhas, Warwicks and South Lancashires immediately after they had driven the Turks off the crest of Chunuk Bair on 9 August and could gaze down on the Straits. But it is certain that they were shelled from their own side and as a result had to cease their pursuit of the Turks down the far slope of the hill. The Turks were then able, with a great effort, to counter-attack successfully. Whether the shells came, as Allanson thought, from one of the ships or, as Bean and Rhodes James are inclined to think, from a shore battery, is immaterial to the point that the command and control system was hopelessly inadequate for operations of such complexity. These problems were never really rectified on Gallipoli but they set soldiers thinking about them, both to improve on the existing radio and telephone systems and to design better procedures for the preparation of orders and the control of fire support by forward observers. Thirty years later operations of comparable complexity to the assault on Chunuk Bair were being undertaken in the Mediterranean and the Pacific with

high confidence.

THE TECHNIQUE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Perhaps the most important tactical lessons to come from the Gallipoli campaign were those relating to amphibious warfare. This extremely complex art, often shown to be sadly deficient in earlier British operations such as those at Constantinople itself in 1807 and Walcheren in 1809, can hardly be regarded as having been mastered by Britain and her allies in 1915. The landings were marred by serious errors in navigation. The landing craft themselves were poorly suited for the task, being capable only of loading men, or what a man could lift, over their sides. It was difficult for troops to climb into their landing craft. Ships carrying supplies had to be unloaded into lighters. Piers had to be built before supplies could be brought ashore in any quantity. Command and control techniques were lamentable for coping with the problems of two services, army and navy, working together. There was no real understanding of how to cope with the most vulnerable phase of a landing - the moment when the troops hit the beach and have to be reorganized for the assault inland. The result was chaos and confusion among those who raced across the sand into the cover of scrub or cliffs and death for those who delayed while looking for the others of their section or platoon. The above-mentioned problems of fire-control were a further complication for the landings.

The challenges of offensive amphibious operations were taken up by the United States Marine Corps immediately after the First World War. As early as 1913, Major Ellis had suggested that the future of the Marine Corps would lie not in base defence as in the 1880s and 90s but in the amphibious attack role, seizing Japanese bases across the Pacific in the event of a major US-Japanese war. This idea was taken up with a will and developed by General Lejeune, the Marine Corps Commanding General, in the early 1920s. The defensive Advanced Base Force became the offensive Expeditionary Force. Landing exercises were conducted and years of doctrinal development followed. Until the development of specialized landing craft with bow ramps or doors, the whole enterprise remained essentially one of theory.

By great good fortune this whole process came to fruition in 1941 with the successful testing of the Higgins bow ramp landing craft, the development of a tank lighter derived from the Higgins craft and the production of the first 200 Amtracs, or amphibious tractors, tracked vehicles which could swim to the beach and then drive on inland without pause. It would be interesting to know how closely the US Marine Corps studied and benefitted from the Gallipoli operations. The official history of the Corps has little to say on the subject, but it is difficult to believe that the biggest amphibious operation to that date was not the subject of close analysis by American specialists, and also by the Japanese, who were developing their amphibious capabilities in the 1920s and 30s.

Sadly Britain did little in the inter-war years to build on the experience so dearly bought by her own forces in 1915, but the outbreak of the Second World War transformed that situation. After the evacuation from Dunkirk, Churchill's mind turned to the problems of landing a force to liberate the European continent: his Dardanelles experience stood him in good stead. Combined Operations Command was established in 1940 and Churchill pressed for the development of the ships and landing craft needed to put a huge army back into a strongly defended Europe. There soon followed the development of the Landing Ship Tank, or LST, (some of whose passengers were to claim that these initials stood for large, slow target); the smaller LCT; and the assault and mechanized landing craft. Without amphibious operations the Second World War could not have been won, and without the experience of thousands of British naval and army personnel in the Dardanelles landings, that capacity would not have been raised as swiftly and surely.

PROBLEMS OF THEATRE COMMAND

At the level of theatre command there is much that the Gallipoli campaign can teach, but it is almost entirely of a negative nature. One thing in favour of the British-dominated force command structure was the organic politico-military nature of the Empire from which most of the force came. Apart from the French, many of whom were at the Dardanelles for only a short period, and the Russians, whose direct contribution was marginal, the forces

assembled for the operation, although nationally and geographically diverse, were all British or British-derived. In the light of the French refusal to stay ashore at Kum Kale and consolidate their unexpected success in the first two days of the operation, this composition was clearly fortunate. What other bond could have induced the Australian or New Zealand governments and people to sustain their total commitment to British authority throughout a long campaign in which so much went amiss?

The antipodean contingents had been raised and trained by British officers, and had continued their development during and after the South African war under close British tutelage. They were immature in that they had not yet thrown up a cohort of senior commanders of their own and therefore they were willing to accept British leadership in the field. The Australians had their own division commander but at the level of ANZAC Corps headquarters and higher, the command structure was entirely British. The British authorities had the good sense not to try too hard to break up the Australian and New Zealand national contingents, thereby preserving a sense of identity which helped maintain political support for the imperial war effort in the dominions.

The imperial system was not without its frictions but earlier experience of working together served to lubricate the mechanism and keep it from seizure even in times of great stress. British officers such as Birdwood and Sinclair-MacLagan already had acquired useful knowledge of independent-minded colonial troops and their sometimes touchy political masters during the South

African war and since. The colonials, for their part, had also enjoyed similar opportunities for studying the peculiarities of their British superiors. The putting together of so diverse a force after the age of imperial devolution would have been a much more complex affair. The last conflict in which such an arrangement was used, the Malayan Emergency, is now thirty years behind us. The politics of any such combined operations undertaken in future will make the Dardanelles command structure seem the utmost in simplicity.

It is not relevant to my theme to consider ad hominem issues such as the suitability of particular individuals for the posts they held during the campaign. There is much to be argued on that score about most generals and admirals involved, but much already has been said and written on it and it would be poor use of my time to add to it. What is of particular relevance to my theme are the arrangements, or lack of them, made by the British government for overall theatre command. They reflected the fundamental weakness of the whole British command structure at that time, namely the total separation of the Army from the Royal Navy, each under its own powerful political head, in a system where overall command could be exercised only at Cabinet level. It is difficult to believe that in 1915 the formation of a proper Ministry of Defence was still twenty-five years away. Hence it is not surprising that such a system proved unable to conceive of the need for a joint force command, with one man in charge of all force elements, army and naval, in the theatre of operations.

The result was frequent chaos and confusion, as the Navy withdrew its ships for its own good reasons such as danger of enemy submarine attack, while the ground forces had to live with the consequences. Given General Hamilton's total dependence on the Navy for mobility and communications, this situation was potentially disastrous. At the height of the Suvla crisis in August, when Hamilton finally suspected that things were going badly and his presence was urgently required on the scene, he was held up for six hours because of boiler trouble in the destroyer assigned for his use. A call to Admiral de Robeck, the Fleet commander, or his Chief of Staff, might have yielded another ship immediately, but both services were confined in their habitual straight-jackets and the necessary contact was not made until late in the day. A joint staff could have solved such a problem in a trice.

At the key conference of senior naval officers held on 9 May in Queen Elizabeth to consider resumption of the naval attack on the Straits, not a single soldier was present. Had de Robeck been of a more daring disposition and taken the fleet into the Straits, the army could have been left literally high and dry while their supporting warships were placed at great risk. In the worst case the army could have been virtually marooned on the peninsula. As events turned out, the ensuing crisis of relations between Churchill and Fisher killed the idea of a further naval offensive, but the fate of the army could have been prejudiced without its having had any effective voice in the matter.

When Churchill gave reluctant assent to the navy's call to withdraw the spanking new super-Dreadnought Queen Elizabeth from the theatre for her own protection, Kitchener was simply informed that the army's most powerful source of fire support was departing. He raged at Fisher alleging treachery and Fisher raged back but Queen Elizabeth went. When the German submarine U 21 appeared off the peninsula and sank Triumph on 25 May, de Robeck withdrew all larger ships from the support of the operations ashore. Army morale plummeted and the Turks were jubilant. The departure of the battleships deprived the army of its badly needed long range fire support. The Turkish batteries on the south side of the Straits were then left unmolested and brought their fire to bear more heavily on the troops on Cape Helles.

The only place at which such conflicts of interest between the services could be resolved, the Cabinet, was by this stage in turmoil following the fall of the Liberal government and its replacement by a coalition. Inter-service disputes at the Dardanelles were simply overwhelmed by higher events and those at the front were the principal victims of an appallingly defective system.

The peculiar nature of the First World War enabled Britain to get away with its antiquated military command structure but the lessons of 1915 were not lost on Churchill in 1940. When faced with the overall responsibility for leading the nation in war he did not, like Asquith, sit idly in Cabinet meetings writing letters to a lady love. He took command in a very direct way as

both Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, and he presided over the Chiefs of Staff Committee with great assiduity. It required yet further experience before the theatre command system finally evolved in the later stages of the Second World War, but again the Dardanelles played a useful role in educating Churchill and some of his later military subordinates in the need for proper joint service command arrangements at both chiefs of staff and theatre levels.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR AT CABINET LEVEL

The organization of the British Cabinet for the conduct of war in 1914-15 was so defective that virtually all one can say is "Don't ever do it like that again!" Asquith, although a notable Prime Minister in peace, was most unsuited for the role of supreme national commander in war. He was fortunate in having two strong subordinates to conduct the land and sea operations, but in the face of their strength, particularly that of Churchill, he came close to abdication of control. Small wonder that there were problems of inter-service friction. The Cabinet supporting staff were very inadequate for the task. Hankey did his best to transform his peacetime role as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence into that of Secretary to a War Cabinet, but he lacked skilled assistants and the government had no idea of how to conduct a global war when the stakes were limitless and the nation's resources were at full stretch.

By early November 1914 it was clear that the traditional Cabinet

system was in difficulty in conducting a major war. Churchill's order to bombard the Turkish forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles was given without Cabinet discussion, yet it was a major act of policy which carried consequences rightly called by Hankey "far-reaching and unfortunate".(8) It confirmed rather than challenged German influence in Constantinople, and it put the Turks on notice to improve the defences of the Straits. Kitchener's raising of his new army was a far-sighted move, but he took it on his own responsibility, and soon caused trouble because he was recruiting men vitally necessary to defence production and the war economy.

Then followed the War Council, bringing in Balfour from the opposition and Fisher and General Wolfe Murray as service experts. It had obvious point, if obscure constitutional status, but in four months it expanded from eight to thirteen members, losing cohesion and control. And for the crucial period between 19 March and 14 May, an interval of eight weeks, it did not meet at all, believing that its work was done. But Hankey has made the stunning revelation that:

"After the failure of the naval attack on the Narrows on March 18th the naval and military officers in command at the Dardanelles soon decided that a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula was more likely to succeed. The War Council was not summoned again to consider their recommendations." (9)

(8) Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, Vol 1, p.223.

(9) Hankey, op. cit p.299.

The key decisions regarding the escalation of the attack to the level of a major amphibious operation were taken piecemeal by three men, Churchill, Kitchener and Asquith, who failed properly to examine the real difficulty of what they were attempting and the implications of meeting stout resistance. Hankey could see that matters were being handled badly. His diary entry for 19 March shows his concern:

"Wrote a memo to Prime Minister imploring him to appoint naval and military technical committee to plan out military attack on Dardanelles in great detail so as to avoid repetition of naval fiasco, which is largely due to inadequate staff preparation."(10)

He was barking at the moon. Asquith continued to permit Churchill and Kitchener to enmire themselves, their nation, the Empire and their allies in a swamp which was to claim the lives of 150,000 men, inflict colossal hardship on a further 850,000, expend untold amounts of money and resources, inflict misery on the thousands of families of the men who died and blight the lives of all those who had to tend the physically and psychologically maimed survivors over the next generation.

The political foundations of the operation were so weak that Fisher's resignation in mid-May pulled down the government and compelled Asquith to form a coalition. The War Council was replaced by the Dardanelles Committee, of eleven senior ministers, to whom a twelfth, the dissident Carson, was added in

(10) Hankey, op. cit., p.293.

August. It proved impossible, however, to restrict such a high level body to the conduct of the Dardanelles campaign alone and it evolved, with Hankey's guidance, through the summer of 1915 into a full War Committee, finally taking that name in November. Then with the advent of the Lloyd George government in December 1916 a proper War Cabinet was formed. It had been a long learning period, but much had been learned. Again it was fortunate that Churchill, who had held high office for much of this time, was able to bring the benefit of this experience to the conduct of war twenty-five years later.

I shall dwell no further on the myriad lessons there are to be derived from the Dardanelles for the conduct of war at the highest level. The system available at the outbreak of the war was ludicrously incapable of conducting a total war on a global basis. Unfortunately it took a very long time for men steeped in and dedicated to the Cabinet system of government to find ways of making it an efficient means of directing a national and imperial war effort.

At least since the Dardanelles the need for rigorous staff work and extensive debate has been recognized. As Churchill and some of his successors have shown, the outcome of debate may well be that the prime minister's mind is unchanged. So be it: leaders must be able to lead strongly when their country is in peril. But all leaders who have read anything about the Dardanelles will remember three sanctions that a democratic system can readily

apply to those whose policies yield disaster: loss of office through reconstruction of the government; loss of power to govern; and the long trial by ordeal which commences when a commission of investigation is established. But they are inevitably damaging sanctions to have to apply and a wise leader sees to it that he does not incur that risk too closely.

IN CONCLUSION

Let me close on a more positive note. Churchill was culpable in several ways. He countenanced and played a dominant role in a slipshod decision-making process. He manipulated the words of his subordinates such as the unfortunate Admiral Carden in order to get his way with Asquith and Kitchener. He bulldozed everyone from the Prime Minister and Kitchener through to Carden and de Robeck to ensure that his wishes were translated into action. Yet he did the nation and the Empire a service in hatching a brilliant alternate strategy. I do not mean that it was the right strategy, but it showed that a creative and subtle mind was at work to steer Britain and the Empire through to victory without driving the whole effort into the abattoir of the Western front. Abortive though the Dardanelles offensive proved, it was none the less the right sort of alternative to look for. The ultimate cause of the tragedy that we commemorate tonight was the lack of tough-minded, confident, well-informed people at Cabinet level who could criticize Churchill's ideas as he formed them. For want of critics one of Britain's best strategic minds led the Empire to disaster.

PART 1 ends:-

Fletcher to CSP 4.7.88

PART 2 begins:-

Robert O'Neil Feb 90



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