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Secret

CONFIDENTIAL FILMS

OIL PLATFORM

PIPER ALPHA 1 - EXPLOSIONDISASTERS6 JULY 1988

July 1988

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
14-7-88							
28.9.88 PA							
<del>25.11.88</del>							
12-11-90							
25.3.91							
PIPER 19/3264							

## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Piper Alpha Technical Investigation: Interim Report of 15 September 1988 by Mr J R Petrie of the Department of Energy (a copy is available in The National Archives – reference EG 5/119)

Signed J. Gray Date 31/3/2017

**PREM Records Team**



PMM

cc: Policy Unit

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 March 1991

Dear John

CULLEN REPORT - TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGULATING  
OFFSHORE SAFETY

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 21 March. He is content for your Secretary of State to announce the proposed changes by way of a suitable arranged PQ on 27 March.

A copy of this letter goes to the Private Secretaries to Members of the Cabinet and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Dominic

DOMINIC MORRIS

John Neilson, Esq.,  
Department of Energy.

869



960  
Prime Minister

*Content*

ccps.  
*Prime Minister*  
*Content? - it is a straightforward change of responsibilities.*

**CULLEN REPORT - TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGULATING OFFSHORE SAFETY**

*Dr*

I announced the Government's acceptance of Lord Cullen's recommendations for improving offshore safety to the House when I published his report on the Piper Alpha disaster in November last year. One of his major recommendations was that there should be a single regulatory body to deal with all aspects of offshore safety, which should be part of the Health and safety Executive. It follows that the Health and Safety Commission would be responsible for taking forward Lord Cullen's other recommendations. As I announced last year, Ministerial responsibility for offshore safety in Great Britain should pass to the Secretary of State for Employment.

The necessary detailed arrangements for this transfer, and for the transfer of staff in my Offshore Safety Division and from the Department of Transport to the Health and Safety Executive have now been finalised between interested Departments. The Commission are also content, and a date of 1 April has been agreed for the changes to come into effect. Treasury colleagues have agreed that the financial provision for next year for the Division should be transferred to HSE through the Department of Employment. The necessary additional resources will be available to HSE/C to enable them to undertake the new functions which arise out of the Government's acceptance of Lord Cullen's recommendations.

If you are content, I propose to announce these changes on the 27 March. Michael Howard agrees. A draft of a suitable arranged PQ is enclosed.

I am copying this minute to Cabinet colleagues and Sir Robin Butler.

*John*

Secretary of State for Energy

21 March 1991



TRANSFER TO HSE - ARRANGED PQ

Draft Question

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what progress he has made in implementing the recommendation of the Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster that responsibility for the regulation of offshore safety should be transferred to the Health and Safety Executive.

Draft Answer

I announced on 12 November (O.R. Col 330) the Government's acceptance of all the recommendations for improving offshore safety made by Lord Cullen in his report on the Piper Alpha disaster. These included the establishment of a single regulatory body to deal with offshore safety, which, on balance, he recommended should be part of the Health and Safety Executive. It follows that the Health and Safety Commission will be responsible for taking forward Lord Cullen's other recommendations. I also announced in November that Ministerial responsibility for offshore safety matters in Great Britain would, with the approval of my Rt. Hon Friend the Prime Minister, be transferred to my Rt. Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Employment.

I am pleased to announce that, following the completion of the necessary detailed preparatory work, and with the agreement of the Health and Safety Commission, the staff of the Offshore Safety Division of the Department of Energy, together with certain staff from the Department of Transport, will, with effect from 1 April 1991, be transferred to the HSE. They will form the core of a new Division, which will be considerably strengthened to enable it to continue to enforce the existing regime for the regulation of offshore safety and to carry forward the successful development and implementation of changes recommended by Lord Cullen.

It is clear that a significant increase in the resources available to the HSE will be necessary to enable them to carry out their new responsibilities. Agreement has been reached on this with the HSC, and my Rt Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Employment, who will be assuming Ministerial responsibility from the same date, will be seeking authority for the necessary additional resources by means of a Supplementary Estimate.

From: Frank Dobson, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

12  
67/3

The Rt. Hon. J. Major MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON, SW1

6 March 1991

Dear Mr. Major,

Cullen Report on Piper Alpha

Mr. Dobson has asked me to let you know that he may mention you in tomorrow's debate on Piper Alpha.

Yours sincerely,

*B. Collins*

Barbara Collins  
SECRETARY TO FRANK DOBSON MP



## STATEMENT ON PIPER ALPHA

With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement about the report of the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. My RHF and predecessor, the member for Hertsmere, set up the public inquiry on 13 July 1988 and appointed the Hon. Lord Cullen as its chairman. I am publishing his report today as a Command Paper, and copies are now available from the Vote Office.

I am sure that I speak for the whole House in expressing my deepest sympathy for the relatives and friends of the 167 men who lost their lives in this disaster. Our thoughts are no less with those who survived, but suffered physical or mental injury.

The House will also join me in paying tribute to the many people who gave unstintingly of their courage, skills and kindness in rescuing and aiding the survivors: crewmen of nearby vessels, helicopter crew, medical teams and hospital staff. The Report draws particular attention to the bravery of the crews of the fast rescue craft and of the standby vessel.

Lord Cullen concludes that the initial cause of the disaster was an explosion in Piper Alpha's gas compression module. He identifies the underlying causes as failures of communication, and weaknesses in management control. The initial explosion set in train an escalating series of fires which destroyed the installation. The death toll among those in the accommodation might have been significantly reduced if instructions had been given for personnel to escape from the accommodation by whatever means they could.

The primary responsibility for safety has always been, and will always remain, with the operator. Lord Cullen observes that there were significant flaws in the way safety was managed by Occidental. Senior management were too easily satisfied that safety was being maintained. Workers and management on the platform were not adequately trained and prepared for a major emergency. Whilst the Department of Energy had regularly inspected Piper Alpha, and these inspections had shown up a number of deficiencies, including deficiencies for which Occidental had been successfully prosecuted, Lord Cullen felt that the existing system did not give sufficient emphasis to the auditing of Occidental's management of safety.



The main thrust of the Report is thus to propose a new approach, under which the Operator would retain the primary responsibility for safety, and would be required to prepare a comprehensive safety case. The regulator would be responsible for continuously reviewing the case. Lord Cullen believes that this is the best way to prevent any recurrence of such failings in the future, and the Government accepts his conclusions.

In all, the report makes 106 recommendations, for improvements in the management of safety on offshore installations; design and equipment; planning and provision for emergencies, and for evacuation, escape and rescue; and for strengthening the involvement of the workforce in safety.

The principal recommendation points to a fundamental change in the system for regulation of offshore safety. The new system should be based on requirements for operators of offshore installations to carry out formal and comprehensive safety assessments of their installations. These should be presented to the regulatory body as a Safety Case, covering:

- The adequacy of the company's safety management system;
- The controls on potential major hazards; and
- The provision of temporary safe refuge, and of means for safe evacuation, escape and rescue, on each installation.

New installations should not commence operations until the Safety Case has been accepted by the regulator, and a Safety Case should be submitted in respect of existing installations as urgently as practicable. The report goes on to make recommendations on the content of the Safety Cases - for example that the exposure of personnel to accidental events has been minimised - and on the criteria for acceptance.

As the analysis of the Piper disaster makes clear, it is of the highest importance that there should exist a reliable assurance that the proper principles and measures of safety management are not only adopted, but consistently put into practice. The report therefore recommends that the operator himself should be required to confirm, by comprehensive and regular auditing, that his safety management system is being adhered to. The regulatory body should review and audit this critical activity.



The report makes recommendations for the overhaul of existing regulations on offshore safety, and for their replacement by new regulations which, in the main, should set goals to be achieved rather than prescribe specific measures. It is expected, however, that there will still be a need for some detailed prescriptive regulations.

The House will recall that the present arrangements for regulatory responsibility were instituted following the report in 1980 of an independent committee under Dr J H Burgoyne. Lord Cullen has reviewed the allocation of these responsibilities in the light of the proposed new framework. His recommendation is that there should be a single regulatory body with a clear identity. This would deal with all aspects of offshore safety. On balance, he concludes that it should be located within the Health and Safety Executive. It should employ a specialist inspectorate with adequate resources to discharge its role.

The Government accepts Lord Cullen's conclusions and recommendations. Arrangements have been put in hand to progress the necessary detailed work. I have written to the Chairman of the Health and Safety Commission about the transfer to the Executive of the responsibilities in respect of offshore safety of my Department's Safety Directorate, together with specialist personnel engaged in that work in my Department and the Department of Transport. I have sought the views of the Commission on the proposed creation of the single regulatory body for offshore safety as a discrete division within the Health and Safety Executive. Subject to satisfactory completion of these arrangements, my RHF the Prime Minister has agreed that when they are implemented my responsibilities for offshore safety should be transferred to my RHF the Secretary of State for Employment. The statutory responsibilities of my RHF the Secretary of State for Transport would not be affected.

In a number of areas, the report recommends immediate action by the industry. My Director of Safety has today written to the industry, asking them immediately to undertake the necessary action.

I take this opportunity to thank the professional staff who have aided me in the discharge of my responsibilities for offshore safety. I am confident that the energy and commitment they have displayed will be great assets to the new system.



Finally, I should like to express my thanks to Lord Cullen, his assessors, and the many others who participated in the investigation, for the immense labour and dedication which have gone into their unprecedented and exceptionally difficult task.

The Piper Alpha disaster was the most serious industrial accident in Britain in over 50 years. It was the most serious to have occurred anywhere in the history of offshore development. Its investigation was an altogether exceptional responsibility; and, because so much of the evidence was unrecoverable, it was also one of exceptional difficulty. I believe that Lord Cullen and his team have proved equal to these challenges, and that his far-reaching and comprehensive recommendations will have a lasting influence on the safety of offshore operations hereafter.

The Government's concern throughout has been that the events should be properly probed and the lessons learned as soon as possible. We have already taken important action to improve safety following my Department's technical investigation. This includes new regulations on the provision of emergency shutdown valves, and the election of Safety Committees, and guidance on the priority areas for action by operators following the disaster. The Government is now acting to implement the recommendation for a new regulatory system, and to ensure that the lessons of this terrible event are fully learned and thoroughly put into effect. Until the details of the measures which we will be taking are fully worked out, it is impossible to determine the precise level of resources which will be required. But I can assure the House that offshore safety will not be sacrificed through lack of resources.

The Piper Alpha disaster was an awful event, one which has been felt throughout the nation and around the world. Those of us who have seen it from afar can only offer our most sincere sympathy to those who were there, and to those who lost someone they loved. The measure of our sympathy is the determination, which I am certain is shared by this whole House, that nothing of this kind shall ever happen again.



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 November 1990

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's letter of 10 November and the draft statement responding to Lord Cullen's report on Piper Alpha.

She is content with the proposed statement and approves the proposed transfer of Ministerial responsibilities for offshore safety from the Secretary of State for Energy to the Secretary of State for Employment. She notes however that Lord Cullen found no evidence that the Department of Energy's safety arrangements lack independence or that its actions had been influenced by considerations related to the exploitation of oil. In view of the different arrangements for nuclear safety which there is no proposal to change, it may be difficult to avoid justifying the proposed transfer of the responsibilities for offshore safety on the grounds that it ensures the independence of safety from production considerations. The argument that unlike the nuclear industry and other industries the safety issues here are much more concerned with the safety of the workforce rather than the safety of the public seems a better justification for the transfer of responsibilities to the Employment Secretary.

I am enclosing this letter to Private Secretaries to other Ministers in the Cabinet and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours,  
Barry

BARRY H POTTER

John Hadden Esq  
Department of Energy

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CONFIDENTIAL



Secretary of State  
for Employment

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2. NAM

CCPDT

PRIME MINISTER

THE CULLEN REPORT

I have seen John Wakeham's letter of 8 November seeking agreement to the publication of Lord Cullen's report on the 12th November and to the subsequent transfer of Ministerial responsibility for offshore safety.

I agree that we should welcome the report's recommendations which seem both sensible and practical.

I agree also that the whole thrust and logic of the report argues for a transfer to me of Ministerial responsibility for offshore safety.

The proposed changes will, of course, necessitate a PES transfer to provide me with the resources to fulfil our pledge that offshore safety will not be sacrificed through lack of resources.

I am copying this minute to Cabinet colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

ASME

PP

M H

12 November 1990

(Approved by the Secretary of State  
and signed in his absence)



*Prime Minister*  
*Content for responsibility*  
*for North Sea Safety to go to the*  
*Health and Safety Executive,*  
*under D'Employment minister?*

Ref.A090/2680

MR TURNBULL

AT 9/11

*Yes - and after*  
*draft letter*

*with AT?*

The Secretary of State for Energy's minute of 8 November seeks the Prime Minister's agreement to the statement he proposes to make in the House on 12 November on publication of Lord Cullen's Report on the Piper Alpha disaster.

2. The Energy Secretary proposes to accept Lord Cullen's principal recommendation for a new system of regulation of offshore safety based on the preparation of a detailed safety case for each installation by operators. The new regime would be enforced by a single regulatory body, and Lord Cullen recommends that this should be a discrete division within the Health and Safety Executive. At present, in accordance with the recommendations of the Burgoyne Committee in 1980, regulatory responsibilities, including those under the Health and Safety at Work Act, are exercised by a Safety Directorate within the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department of Energy.

3. The report is critical both of Occidental's management of safety and of the Safety Directorate's record. The Safety Directorate has been undermanned; inspections of the Piper Alpha rig prior to the disaster were superficial and failed to detect shortcomings; their general approach is reactive and relies too much on specific prescriptive measures. The HSC/HSE approach to the control of major industrial hazards focuses more on the effective management of safety by industry; it sets safety objectives with less emphasis on restrictive and inflexible requirements.

4. Lord Cullen reports but does not endorse criticisms of conflict between the Department of Energy's safety and sponsorship roles and makes no recommendation on Ministerial responsibilities. It would be possible therefore to meet Lord Cullen's recommendation by transferring regulatory responsibilities to HSC/HSE acting as agents of the Secretary of State for Energy. However, the Energy and Employment Secretaries both favour a transfer of Ministerial responsibilities for offshore safety from Energy to Employment. This would be timed to coincide with the creation of the new offshore safety unit within HSE, probably in April 1991.

5. Mr Wakeham feels this would remove any lingering doubts of the independence of safety from production considerations, and notes that the safety of the public, as opposed to the workforce, is not an issue in offshore regulations. This approach differs from nuclear safety on which the Secretary of State for Energy retains Ministerial responsibility, although the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate is part of HSE. Similarly the Secretary of State for Transport will continue to be responsible for railway passenger safety after the Railways Inspectorate is transferred to HSE. While nuclear power and railways remain in public ownership the scope for perceived conflict between the Government economic and safety objective may be greater than exists in respect of the private oil and gas industries.

6. Transfer of Ministerial responsibilities will entail some extra work for Employment Ministers, who will in future be accountable for oil-field safety and for the Parliamentary side of re-making regulations. It will further reduce the load on Energy Ministers, who will be comparatively lightly-loaded after electricity privatisation is completed, and who already have a network of contacts with the oil and gas industry which Employment Ministers would need to duplicate.



7. To sum up, while it would be an option to leave Ministerial responsibilities as they are until a more thorough review of the future of the Departments of Energy and Employment following the election, the Prime Minister will wish to give weight to the agreed recommendation of the Secretaries of State, and the argument that there is no public safety issue over and above that of workforce safety in the offshore context. On the assumption that the Prime Minister is content on this basis to agree to the proposal of the two Secretaries of State, I attach a draft Private Secretary reply agreeing to the transfer of responsibilities.

R. R. B.

ROBIN BUTLER

9 November 1990



Cullen.MN

DRAFT FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER TO SEND PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's letter of 8 November and the draft statement responding to Lord Cullen's report on Piper Alpha.

She is content with the proposed statement and approves the associated transfer of Ministerial responsibilities for offshore safety from the Secretary of State for Energy to the Secretary of State for Employment. She notes however that Lord Cullen found no evidence that the Department of Energy's safety directorate lacks independence or that its actions had been affected by considerations related to the exploitation of resources. In view of the different arrangements for nuclear and railway safety which there is no proposal to change, it may be preferable to avoid justifying the proposed transfer of Ministerial responsibilities for offshore safety on the grounds that it ensures the independence of safety from production considerations. The argument that unlike the nuclear industry and railway industries the safety issues here are much more concerned with the safety of the workforce rather than the safety of the public seems a better justification for the transfer of responsibilities to the Employment Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to other members of the Cabinet and to Sir Robin Butler.

B H. P. M.

Prime Minister

Content with Energy Secretary's  
proposed response to the  
Cullen Report (summarised  
in this covering minute)?

BHP

9/11

**THE CULLEN REPORT**

I have received Lord Cullen's Report of the Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. It is an extensive document, which is likely to be the subject of considerable public interest. I propose to publish it, and make a statement setting out the Government's initial response, on 12 November if you and other colleagues are content.

Lord Cullen concludes that the underlying cause of the disaster, in which 167 men died, was failings in the safety management systems of the operator, Occidental. For the future, his principal recommendation is that the existing offshore safety regime should be replaced by a new system of regulation. This would be based on operators preparing a detailed safety case for each installation, to be submitted to the regulator. This would cover, inter alia, the company's safety management system, the identification and control of risks to personnel from potential major hazards, and provision for safe evacuation and escape if needed. The new regime would be enforced by a single regulatory body, which will need to be adequately resourced. On balance, Lord Cullen recommends that this should be a discrete division within the Health and Safety Executive.




I believe that we must accept these recommendations, which represent the major thrust of the Report. In practice, it will mean transferring staff in my Safety Directorate, and from the Department of Transport, to the Health and Safety Executive. I think, and Michael Howard agrees, that it would also be sensible to transfer Ministerial responsibility for offshore safety from Energy to Employment at the same time. There does not seem to be any operational impediment, although further work on the details is needed, and it would remove any lingering doubts some groups may have about the independence of safety from production considerations. Nor is safety of the public, as opposed to the workforce, an issue in this case, as it was, for example in the case of the nuclear industry or the railways.

I propose to write to the Chairman of the HSC about the transfer to HSE, and to say in the statement that I have done so. The statement, a draft of which is enclosed, would also trail the change of Ministerial responsibility, which may be raised in discussion of the Report, although final decisions on that need to await the outcome of the further work referred to above.

2cc  
separate  
minute  
by FERB

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Cabinet colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

8 November 1990



Draft Statement on Piper Alpha

1. With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement about the report of the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. My RHF and predecessor, the member for Hertsmere, set up the public inquiry on 13 July 1988 and appointed the Hon. Lord Cullen as its chairman. I am publishing his report today as a Command Paper, and copies are now available from the Vote Office.

2. I am sure that I speak for the whole House in expressing my deepest sympathy for the relatives and friends of the 167 men who lost their lives in this disaster. And our thoughts are no less with those who survived, but suffered physical or mental injury from the events of that day.

3. The House will also join me in paying tribute to the many people who gave unstintingly of their courage, skills and kindness in rescuing and aiding the survivors: crewmen of nearby vessels, helicopter crew, medical teams and hospital staff. The Report draws particular attention to the bravery of the crews of the fast rescue craft and of the standby vessel.

4. Lord Cullen concludes that the initial cause of the disaster was an explosion in the gas compression module of the Piper Alpha installation. He identifies the underlying causes of this explosion to be the failures of communication, and weaknesses in management control, which deprived the operators of essential information about equipment under maintenance. The initial explosion set in train an escalating series of fires which destroyed the installation. The death toll among those in the

accommodation might have been significantly reduced, if instructions had been given for personnel to escape from the accommodation by whatever means they could.

5. The primary responsibility for safety has always been, and will always remain, with the operator. Lord Cullen observes that there were significant flaws in the way safety was managed by Occidental. Senior management were too easily satisfied that safety was being maintained. Workers and management on the platform were not as properly trained and prepared for a major emergency as they should have been. Whilst the Department of Energy had regularly inspected Piper Alpha, and these inspections had shown up a number of deficiencies, including deficiencies for which Occidental had been successfully prosecuted, Lord Cullen felt that the existing system did not give sufficient emphasis to the auditing of Occidental's management of safety.

6. The main thrust of the Report is thus to propose a new approach, under which the Operator would retain the primary responsibility for safety, and would be required to prepare a comprehensive safety case. The regulator would be responsible for continuously reviewing the case. Lord Cullen believes that this is the best way to prevent any recurrence of such failings in the future, and the Government accepts his conclusions.

7. In all, the report makes 106 recommendations, directed:-

- to improving the management of safety on offshore installations;
- to improving their design and equipment;
- to improving planning and provision for emergencies, and for evacuation, escape and rescue;
- to strengthening the involvement of the workforce in safety ; and
- to strengthening the regulation of safety.



8. The principal recommendation points to a fundamental change in the system for regulation of offshore safety. The new system should be based on requirements for operators of offshore installations to carry out formal and comprehensive safety assessments of their installations. These should be presented to the regulatory body as a Safety Case, covering:

- The adequacy of the company's safety management system;
- The controls on potential major hazards; and
- The provision of temporary safe refuge, and of means for safe evacuation, escape and rescue, on each installation.

New installations should not commence operations on the UK Continental Shelf until the Safety Case has been accepted by the regulator, and a Safety Case should be submitted in respect of existing installations as urgently as practicable. The report goes on to make recommendations on the issues which are to be demonstrated in the Safety Cases - for example that the exposure of personnel to accidental events has been minimised - and on the criteria for acceptance.

9. As the analysis of the Piper disaster makes clear, it is of the highest importance that there should exist a reliable assurance that the proper principles and measures of safety management are not only adopted, but consistently put into practice. The report therefore recommends that the operator himself should be required to confirm, by comprehensive and regular auditing, that his safety management system is being adhered to. The regulatory body should review and audit this critical activity, and by regular inspection verify that the output of the safety management system is satisfactory.

10. The report makes recommendations for the overhaul of existing regulations on offshore safety, and for their replacement by new regulations which, in the main, should have the general character of setting goals to be achieved rather than that of prescribing specific

measures. It is anticipated, however, that there will still be a need for some detailed prescriptive regulations.

11. The House will recall that the present arrangements for regulatory responsibility were instituted following the report in 1980 of an independent committee under Dr J H Burgoyne. Lord Cullen has reviewed the allocation of these responsibilities in the light of the proposed new framework. His recommendation is that there should be a single regulatory body with a clear identity. This would deal with all aspects of offshore safety. On balance, he concludes that it should be located within the Health and Safety Executive. It should employ a specialist inspectorate with adequate resources to discharge its role.

12. The report makes a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the involvement of the workforce in safety matters. It makes further recommendations on more detailed aspects of the management of safety, the control and mitigation of hazards, the control of emergencies and provision for evacuation, escape and rescue.

13. The Government accepts Lord Cullen's conclusions and recommendations. Arrangements have been put in hand to progress the necessary detailed work. I have written to the Chairman of the Health and Safety Commission about the transfer to the Executive of the responsibilities in respect of offshore safety of my Department's Safety Directorate, together with specialist personnel engaged in that work in my Department and the Department of Transport. I have sought the views of the Commission on the proposed creation of the single regulatory body for offshore safety as a discrete division within the Health and Safety Executive. Subject to satisfactory completion of these arrangements, my RHF the Prime Minister has agreed that when they are implemented my responsibilities for offshore safety should be transferred to my RHF the



Secretary of State for Employment. The statutory responsibilities of my RHF the Secretary of State for Transport would not be affected.

14. In a number of areas, the report recommends immediate action by the industry. My Director of Safety has today written to the industry, asking them immediately to undertake any action required to meet these recommendations.

15. I take this opportunity to thank the professional staff who have aided me in the discharge of my responsibilities for offshore safety. I am confident that the energy and commitment they have there displayed will be great assets to the new system.

16. Finally, I should like to express my thanks to Lord Cullen, his assessors, and the many others who participated in the investigation, for the immense labour and dedication which have gone into their unprecedented and exceptionally difficult task. The Piper Alpha disaster was the most serious industrial accident which has happened in Britain in over 50 years. It was the most serious to have occurred anywhere in the history of offshore development. Its investigation was an altogether exceptional responsibility; and, because so much of the evidence was unrecoverable, it was also one of exceptional difficulty. I believe that Lord Cullen and his team have proved equal to these challenges, and that his far-reaching and comprehensive recommendations will have a lasting influence on the safety of offshore operations hereafter.

17. The Government's concern throughout has been that the events should be properly probed and the lessons learned as soon as possible. We have already taken important action to improve safety following my Department's technical investigation. This includes new regulations on the provision of emergency shutdown valves, and the election of Safety Committees, and guidance on the priority areas for action by operators following the disaster. The Government is now acting to implement the recommendation

for a new regulatory system, and to ensure that the lessons of this terrible event are fully learned and thoroughly put into effect. Until the details of the measures which we will be taking are fully worked out, it is impossible to determine the precise level of resources which will be required. But I can assure the House that offshore safety will not be sacrificed through lack of resources.

18. The Piper Alpha disaster was an awful event, one which has been felt throughout the nation and around the world. Those of us who have seen it from afar can only offer our most sincere sympathy to those who were there, and to those who lost someone they loved. The measure of our sympathy is the determination, which I am certain is shared by this whole House, that nothing of this kind shall ever happen again.





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EM

cc PU

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

25 April 1989

**EXPLOSION ON CORMORANT ALPHA**

The Prime Minister was grateful for your Secretary of State's minute of 21 April and has noted the present assessment.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (Treasury) and David Crawley (Scottish Office).

PAUL GRAY

Stephen Haddrill Esq  
Department of Energy

dg

020

Prime Minister

020

Prime Minister<sup>2</sup>  
Amplifier M. Pakina's  
Counsellor & Cabinet  
last week.

EXPLOSION ON CORMORANT ALPHA

I felt it might be helpful if I let you have a note on our latest assessment of the economic effects of the recent incidents in the North Sea.

On Tuesday, during the fitting of an emergency shut down valve on the Cormorant platform a gas leak occurred. Shell notified the Department and evacuated non-essential personnel in accordance with emergency procedures. The leak was repaired but an explosion occurred at 18.20 hours. There was no fire or loss of life or injury. My inspectors are on the platform now investigating the cause of the accident.

Production totalling some 400,000 b/d from the Brent system fields (Brent, Cormorant, Deveron, Dunlin, Eider, Hutton, NW Hutton, Murchison and Thistle) which transport oil via the Cormorant Alpha platform have been shut-in as a consequence. There is some offshore loading by tanker from the Brent B platform and potential for Brent C to export up to 100,000 bbls per day via these facilities. Total production at present shut-in, including the fields affected by earlier problems such as the Piper Alpha accident, is 720,000 b/d or some 31% of the 2.3 mb/d at which production would otherwise have been running.

It is too early to say exactly what impact the production shortfall as a result of Cormorant will have on the balance of payments and on tax revenues since this will depend on how long it takes to repair the damage on that platform. The operators have indicated that it will be several days before they are able to give an assessment of how long these facilities will remain out of production.



My economists have estimated that the gross value of production lost, for each day the system is closed, would be around £4.5 million. The impact of this on the balance of payments will be partially offset, after some time, by £1 million per day of interest, profits and dividend which would have flowed overseas. The net effect could therefore be some £3.5 million per day.

My earlier estimates of the production losses stemming from previous accidents, which I set out in my letter to Nigel Lawson of 13 March, remain unchanged. But with today's higher oil prices the net effect on the balance of payments of these earlier losses is now higher, amounting to some £600 million in 1989, falling to £120 million in 1990. Assuming the problem with Cormorant persists for some weeks the total impact on the balance of payments this year could be up to £800 million, before taking into account the above offsetting invisibles which will take time to come through.

I am copying this minute to Nigel Lawson and Malcolm Rifkind.

C.P.

Secretary of State for Energy

21 April 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

until 2pm 29/9/88



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY  
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH  
MILLBANK LONDON SW1P 4QJ  
01 211 6402

Pr

Prime Minister?

RCC6

28/9

Nigel Wicks Esq CB  
Principal Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

28<sup>th</sup> September 1988

Dear Nigel,

My Secretary of State mentioned to the Prime Minister yesterday that the interim report of the Department's technical investigation into the Piper Alpha disaster would be released tomorrow. I understand that the Prime Minister expressed interest in seeing a copy of the conclusions and main findings. These are enclosed with a copy of the full report. It is strictly confidential until tomorrow at 2 o'clock.

in folder  
attached

Yours ever,  
Stephen.

S HADDRILL  
Principal Private Secretary



## 10.0 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

10.1.1 The most probable cause of the initial explosion is thought to have been a release and ignition of gas (condensate vapour) from a section of pipework in Module C, following an earlier process disturbance. The condensate was probably released from the site of a pressure relief valve (PSV) which had been removed from pipework associated with the isolated condensate injection pump 'A'. It is probable that this pipework was inadvertently pressurised whilst operators were dealing with a plant disturbance. The operators were probably unaware that the PSV had been removed.

10.1.2 Piper Alpha was largely destroyed by the subsequent release and ignition of gas and oil in the pipelines connected to it. The release and ignition of an estimated 80 million standard cubic feet of gas, plus a substantial quantity of oil and condensate, produced and sustained high temperatures over a wide area of the installation causing major structural failures.

10.1.3 It appears that the gas plant operators reacted to the failure of the condensate pump 'B' in the belief that the system would automatically shutdown if the process approached a hazardous condition. The operators appear to have energetically pursued the task of restoring the condensate pumping and would have endeavoured to re-establish the injection condensate system before the entire gas process plant went into a shutdown sequence.

10.1.4 In the Phase 1 process mode operating at the time, insufficient back-up functions existed to trip the system in the event of condensate carry-over, and possible injection of liquids into the reciprocating compressors. Protection against this occurrence was reliant upon a single trip signal generated by a high liquid level in the reciprocating compressor inlet scrubber.

10.1.5 The evidence indicates that the initial explosion was sufficiently powerful to cause substantial damage to the main control room, electrical power generators, power distribution systems and the battery uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems such that all essential and emergency services were disabled almost instantaneously. As a result all external telecommunication systems, internal and general alarm systems failed to function, with the exception of the radio equipment operating on the international emergency frequency (2182kHz). The force of the initial explosion probably caused the rupture of oil process pipework in Module B.

10.1.6 The closure of the pipeline emergency shut down (ESD) valves was designed to be initiated primarily by manual intervention or by the loss of the battery UPS. The emergency shutdown system (PESD) did not provide for closure of the gas pipeline valves.

10.1.7 A major fire developed in Module B shortly after the explosion in Module C, which was probably fed by the contents of the pressurised process vessels and pipework and the bulk diesel storage tanks mounted above Module B and C ceilings.



10.1.8 The fire pumps did not start automatically because they were on manual control. It is likely that the fire pumps were damaged in the initial explosion as they were located in an area in Module D adjacent to the C-D fire wall.

10.1.9 The severity of the accident dramatically increased some 20 minutes after the initial explosion when it is believed that the Tartan gas import pipe-line to Piper Alpha ruptured. During that 20 minute period, the mass evacuation of the accommodation modules was not accomplished via the survival crafts probably due to the total envelopment of the accommodation in dense black smoke and flame. This interim report has not addressed in any detail the reasons why so few persons were able to evacuate the installation, particularly from the accommodation. Further work on this aspect is clearly necessary.

10.1.10 The deployment of helicopters for rescue from the helideck was not possible due to fire and smoke over the landing area.

10.1.11 Two inflatable life rafts were launched but both failed to inflate successfully.

10.1.12 The relatively calm state of the sea enabled most of those who escaped from the installation to be recovered from the water.

10.1.13 A preliminary assessment of emergency capability of the field pipeline depressurisation facilities on MCP 01, Tartan and Claymore indicates that a controlled depressurisation of the pipelines, within a period likely to have significantly reduced the impact of the pipeline releases during the accident, was not possible.

10.1.14 Weaknesses in the work permit and mechanical plant isolation systems have been identified.

10.1.15 The Piper Alpha flare continued to burn strongly with a relatively clean flame for approximately one hour 15 minutes. The hydrocarbon inventory on the installation routed to flare on ESD should have been exhausted in about 15 minutes. This indicates that the flare was being supplied with fuel from an unidentified source.

10.1.16 Production continued on MCP 01, Tartan and Claymore for varying periods after 2200hrs on 6 July. A preliminary assessment indicates that this had little effect on the severity of the events.

10.1.17 Although well fires were observed during the accident there is no evidence to suggest that they were the cause of the accident.

## 10.2 Recovery of Equipment

10.2.1 Recovery of equipment in a reasonable condition from the sea bed would be necessary to confirm, or otherwise, the two theories put forward in this report. However the fall to the sea bed may have caused more damage to equipment than that caused by the explosion and fire before collapse. Recovery may be dangerous since the remaining structure and the pile of debris are unstable. Since the strength of the tangled debris is



uncertain, lifting could be hazardous. Occidental are trying to recover the accommodation modules, which seem to be intact and not tangled with other debris. Their purpose is to recover as many bodies as possible. If this is successful, recovery should also provide information as to how the accommodation modules withstood the fire.

10.2.2 Annex E comprises drawings showing the current disposition of debris.

#### 11.0 FURTHER WORK

11.1 The focus of the work of this investigation to date has been primarily on the gathering of evidence, on the elucidation of events on Piper Alpha and on the immediate causes of the accident. Further work is required in these areas, notably on:-

- i examination of any equipment recovered from the seabed, and of the accommodation modules if successfully recovered;
- ii evaluation of the research work commissioned from the Christien Michelsen Institute, the Fire Research Station, the Health and Safety Executive and Scientific Software-Intercomp;
- iii clarification of all the factors contributing to the large number of casualties.

11.2 There are other areas of inquiry which will be equally relevant to a full understanding of the accident, but which are only partially addressed in this interim report. These include:-

- i design standards and principles used in, or influencing, the design, construction and modification of the installation, particularly as regards the treatment of hazards arising from the handling of pressurised hydrocarbon gases;
- ii location and protection of accommodation;
- iii the systems and disciplines under which operations, maintenance and repair work were conducted;
- iv management monitoring and control, with particular reference to the evaluation of hazards and the maintenance of health and safety.

Such issues will be addressed in the final report of this investigation.

11.3 Among the specific issues to be examined in further work are:

- a) evacuation procedures;
- b) assessment of the quality and monitoring of safe systems of work and in particular the permit to work systems;
- c) hazard and operability studies;

- d) the reasons for extended flaring;
- e) the role and actions of key personnel;
- f) security of communication and alarm systems;
- g) the assessment of fuel consumption rates by fires;
- h) the propagation of blast pressure waves in Module C;
- i) the performance and operation of the pipelines;
- j) the reason for the tripping of the 'B' condensate injection pump;
- k) the performance and location of gas detection equipment;
- l) the effects of liquid ingestion into the reciprocating compressors;
- m) the pressurised protection system for the centrifugal compressor turbine drives;
- n) the reported failure of the methanol injection pump;
- o) the performance of life rafts;
- p) the performance of subsurface safety valves and hydraulic "Christmas Tree" valves.

This list is by no means exhaustive nor is it presented in any particular order.

11.4 The work done in this investigation has naturally flowed into the normal work of the Safety Directorate in maintaining and improving offshore safety. Some action has already been taken which draws on the lessons of the Piper Alpha accident; other issues are under review and further action may follow. These matters are outside the terms of reference of the investigation itself, and are not therefore covered in this document.



FILE. CC PC  
PRIME MINISTER  
PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL No. T29A/88

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT cc MASTER  
OK.

From the Private Secretary

29 July 1988

I should be grateful if you would pass the following message from the Prime Minister to His Excellency Major-General Justim M. Lekhanya:

"I was grateful for your message and kind words of sympathy for the victims of the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed to the bereaved and to the injured, to whom they will bring comfort and solace.

Margaret Thatcher"

His Excellency Dr. J.T. Kolane

KK

Prime Minister

2

This will  
mean move  
to you than  
to me.



28.7.88  
11.00 am

N.C.W 10 DOWNING STREET

28.7

TO: MR WICKS

I answered Amanda's phone and received a call from Sir Hector Laing with regard to the information he gave the PM on Sunday about the coming on-stream of the Brent Alpha oil.

He had told her that the process was being held up by bureaucracy with regard to security, but has since been informed that Brent Alpha will be on-stream as from tomorrow 29th July.

He apologises for misinforming the PM.

Helen

A handwritten signature in blue ink, possibly reading 'Mick'.

Political Office



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. T116Ai/88



cc/c

HIGH COMMISSION OF  
THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS.  
10 COLLINGHAM ROAD, LONDON, SW5 0NR. TEL. 01 373 8581/2/3/4

NOTE NO. 19/88

The High Commission of the Kingdom of Lesotho presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request the latter to forward the following message to its highest destination:

QUOTE

FROM : H.E. MAJOR-GENERAL J.M. LEKHANYA, CHAIRMAN  
OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO.

TO : THE RT. HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME  
MINISTER OF UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

PRIME MINISTER, PLEASE ACCEPT DEEPEST CONDOLENCES FROM HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, THE BASOTHO NATION AND MYSELF ON THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIVES AT THE PIPER ALPHA EXPLOSION IN THE NORTH SEA.

UNQUOTE

The High Commission of the Kingdom of Lesotho avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

LONDON

22ND JULY, 1988



Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

Macdonald House  
1 Grosvenor Square  
London W1X 0AB

July 22, 1988

CDP  
25/7

Dear Mr. Powell,

I refer to my letter of July 8 with the text of the letter from the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher concerning the Piper Alpha disaster. Enclosed is the original letter.

Yours sincerely,

Michael B. Phillips  
Acting High Commissioner

Mr. C.D. Powell  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister (Overseas Affairs)  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA



SUBJECT.  
ce OPS  
MASTER



PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 116/88

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 July 1988

File: DISASTERS:

Piper Alpha Oil  
Platform Explosion  
- 6 Jul 88

Dear Prime Minister,

I was grateful for your kind message of sympathy following the disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Georgi Atanassov

24



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 July 1988

*Dear Dr Hammer*

Thank you very much for your letter of 15 July.

I was grateful to you for coming over so soon after the tragedy, for your ready grasp and understanding of what was required and for the warm humanity and generosity you showed then and since.

*Kind regards,*

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

Dr. Armand Hammer.





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister<sup>4</sup>

To see Dr Hammer's  
letter, attached. He seems  
determined to do the best he  
possibly can in the circumstances.

(5)

DM.

15/7.

I have only - thanking  
him for coming over so  
soon - for his grasp &  
understanding which was required  
And for his warm humanity &  
kindness

CC

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

July 15th, 1988

Prime M

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 12th July.

My people at Occidental in Aberdeen and I were very pleased that you held that most worthwhile meeting with us on July 8th, following the Piper Alpha tragedy.

We are doing everything humanly possible, and will continue to do so, to help those who have suffered.

Yesterday I arranged that the Occidental Consortium would pay the contracting companies the cost incurred by them of payments to any employee unable to be redeployed to other work. The employees concerned will be retained on their standby rate in accordance with their existing contract of employment, subject to a minimum of £140 per week. This agreement will remain in place until December 31st 1988.

With my thanks and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Armand Hammer





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. 1126/88

Dear Mr. President:

I was grateful for your thoughtful message of sympathy about the terrible accident on the North Sea oil platform. I shall certainly pass on your condolences to the bereaved and injured and I know that they will draw comfort from them.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Barber

His Excellency President Hussain Muhammad Ershad.

085



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T112A/88

Superior court  
obs

Dear Prime Minister,

I was grateful to receive your kind message of sympathy about the dreadful accident on the North Sea oil rig. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured and I am sure they will bring comfort to them.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency De heer Wilfried Martens

MS

Seen by COP. 13/7

SUBJECT  
MASTER  
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

2 PALACE GREEN  
LONDON, W8 4QB  
Telephone: 01-937 8050



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 111F/88

שגרירות ישראל

File: DISASTERS: Piper Alpha לתדון  
Oil Platform Explosion - Jul '88.

13th July 1988

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been instructed to transmit to you the following message from Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel:

"The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, FRS, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street, SW1  
England.

Please accept my personal sympathies and those of the Government and people of Israel on the tragic loss of life in the North Sea oil rig accident. We extend our condolences to the bereaved families and good wishes for complete recovery to the survivors.

Sincerely,  
Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister"

Respectfully  
  
Yehuda Avner  
Ambassador of Israel

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, FRS, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street, SW1





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO.

THH/88

Subject: a note  
DS

Dear Kenneth,

It was characteristically thoughtful of you to send such a kind message about the tragic accident on the North Sea oil platform. I will certainly pass on your words of sympathy to the bereaved and injured, and I am sure that they will draw comfort and solace from them.

Yours

Ramsey

His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda

ls



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. *TRID/88*

*Subject* *CC note*  
*OPS*

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I was grateful to receive your kind message of sympathy following the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured.

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

His Excellency Monsieur Constantin Dascalescu

*lv*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. <sup>T111C</sup>~~1000~~/88

Dear Mr. President,

Subject:  
cc most  
OPS

Thank you for your kind message of sympathy for those who have suffered so terribly as a result of the tragic accident on the North Sea oil platform. I am sure your words will help to bring solace to the bereaved and injured. Your praise for the work of the emergency services will be much appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Monsieur François Mitterrand, GCB.

ts





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1113/88

Subject *a note*  
*ds*

*Dear Mr. President,*

It was most kind of you send a message of sympathy following the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform in which so many people perished. I shall ensure that your kind words of sympathy are passed on to the bereaved and injured who will, I am sure, draw comfort from them.

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

His Excellency Mr. Otto Stich

*ls*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T111A /88  
Safail cc north OPS

Dear Mr. President:

It was most thoughtful of you to send a message of sympathy for the victims of the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your kind words of condolence are passed on to the bereaved and injured and I am sure they will draw comfort and solace from them.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

His Excellency General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq

ho

R.S.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T1106/85

COL CKD

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Telegram

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file. Ea

PRIME MINISTER

MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR VICTIMS OF PIPER ALPHA

I mentioned to you that the Lord Chancellor would not be able to represent you, and that I had had a word with Nigel about a possible alternative. He suggested George Younger. I have checked with the Ministry of Defence and Mr. Younger will be in Wales the previous evening and due to return to London by 3 pm that day. If he were asked to represent you I am sure he could change his plans and fly from Wales to Aberdeen to attend the Service.

Nigel's other suggestions were the Foreign Secretary or Lord Whitelaw (if you wanted a personal representation rather than a Governmental representation).

Would you like me to ask Mr. Younger to represent you?

TESSA GAISMAN

12 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER

MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR VICTIMS OF PIPER ALPHA

This is to be held at 2 pm on Wednesday 20th July at St. Nicholas Church, Union Street, Aberdeen.

I attach your programme for the day. If you wanted to go, the timing would be very tight - but you could do it if you left the House at 11.40 following the Tercentenary Address and went by helicopter from Wellington Barracks to Northolt, and then flew up to Dyce; as long as everything went according to plan.

This would mean moving your afternoon engagements and cancelling/postponing the lunch for Industrialists.

You could, alternatively, ask the Lord Chancellor to represent you (and Cecil Parkinson will be going too).

What would you like to do?

*I think the Lord Chancellor -  
if he would kindly represent me  
not*

*less*

TESSA GAISMAN

11 July 1988

c1200 Keep free  
1 5 Dr. Kopelowitz +CDP  
Lunch in flat  
1415 DEPART NO. 10  
FINCHLEY CARNIVAL  
TO CHEQUERS?

Saturday 16 July

1830 KEEP FREE  
1930-2000 KEEP FREE +DT

Sunday 17 July

1230 for KEEP FREE +DT  
1300  
1930 for DINNER FOR LORD JOSEPH +DT 12 CATHERINE PLACE  
2000 Black tie SW1

Monday 18 July

0830 Hair  
1000 Week ahead meeting  
1030 Diary meeting  
1100 Interview with Sunday Express +TP  
1215 Meeting with colleagues  
1300 Followed by lunch  
1500 Treasury seminar +PG  
1630-1730 Keep free +NLW  
1830-2000 Reception for MPs and wives

Tuesday 19 July

0900 Questions briefing team  
0930-1000 William and Mary College delegation +CDP  
1100 OD  
1200 E(EP)  
1300 Lunch and questions briefing  
1515 QUESTIONS  
1545 CRANLEY ONSLOW MP  
1600 KEEP FREE FOR MPs  
1630 YTS Tea  
1730 Sir Peter Lane +JW  
1830 AUDIENCE

Wednesday 20 July

Keep free  
1020 DEPART FOR  
1100 REVOLUTION TERCENTENARY CELEBRATIONS - QUEEN TO  
RECEIVE ADDRESSES WESTMINSTER HALL  
1140 RETURN TO NO.10  
Lunch for Industrialists?  
1430 Lord McAlpine +JW  
1500 Lord Young +PG  
1530 Keep free for NLW  
1630 Foreign Secretary +CDP  
1700 Chancellor of the Exchequer +PG  
1730-1815 Sir Jeffery Stirling +NLW

Thursday 21 July

0830 Hair  
0900 Questions Briefing Team  
0930 E(A)  
1030 Cabinet





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1100/88

Safely cc not  
als

Dear Prime Minister,

It was most thoughtful of you to send a message of sympathy for those afflicted by the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your kind words of sympathy are passed on to the bereaved and injured, to whom they will bring great comfort.

Yours sincerely

Rajiv Gandhi

His Excellency Signor Ciriaco De Mita

Lo



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

NO. T110C/88

Subject cc rest  
of

Dear General Eyadema,

It was kind of you to send a message about the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform in which so many people lost their lives. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

General Eyadema

21



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. <sup>1100</sup> ~~1100~~ / 8

*subject as next  
yrs*

*Dear Mr. President-*

It was most kind of you to send a message of sympathy following the dreadful accident on board the North Sea oil platform in which so many people lost their lives. I shall make sure that your kind words of condolence are passed on to the bereaved and injured who will, I am sure, draw comfort from them.

*Yours sincerely*

*Rajiv Gandhi*

His Excellency Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, G.C.B.





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July, 1988.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1104/88

Y  
Your Highness,

subject cc mail  
yds

I was grateful for your message and kind words of sympathy for the victims of the terrible disaster on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed to the bereaved and to the injured, to whom they will bring comfort and solace.

Y  
Yours sincerely

Rajand Shalita

His Highness Shaikh Saad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah K.C.M.G.

Lo



*File PH2.AAW*

*cc FCO  
to  
P/NO*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 July, 1988.

*Dear Monsieur Delors*

I was very grateful for your message conveying the sympathy of the Commission of the European Communities following the dreadful accident on the North Sea oil platform in which so many people lost their lives. I shall ensure that your words of condolence are passed on to the bereaved and injured.

I was very pleased to learn of the Commission's decision to grant assistance to the families of the victims. I know that this important gesture will be much appreciated.

*Yours sincerely*

*Rafael Sanjaume*

Monsieur Jacques Delors

*L*

OW  
● EMBASSY OF  
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF BULGARIA

Two copies: Mr Dixon, Private Office  
& copy to pa. By Embassy file

EE 19/7

186-188 QUEEN'S GATE  
LONDON SW7 5HL

Tel. 01-584 9400  
01-584 9433

*A*  
This is for EED rather  
than us. 16 transfer.

*B. 18/7.*

Mr. A.H.Ellis,  
Protocol Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London SW1A 2AH.

11 July 1988

Dear Mr. Ellis,

*See 8/7/88.*

Enclosed herewith please find a translation from the Bulgarian of the telegram which Mr. Georgi Atanassov, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria asked us to forward to the Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC,FRS,MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The telegram offers the condolences on behalf of the Bulgarian Government on the disaster stricken the Piper Alpha Oil Platform.

I would be grateful if you could forward the said telegram to Mrs. Thatcher.

Yours sincerely,



Dimitar Zhulev,  
Ambassador of Bulgaria

Encl.:



NNNN



*1217*

11 JUL 1988/1954

ZCZC CLW9115 ZCB096 TLX0636

GBXX BY RMXX 069

BUCURESTI/TLX 69/67 11 2045 PAGE 1/50

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
SERIAL No. *T109R/88*

*Subject CC north  
OS*

ETATPRIORITE

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND NORTHERN IRELAND

LONDON

I HAVE LEARNED WITH PROFOUND SORROW OF THE  
TRAGIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON THE "PIPER ALPHA" OFFSHORE  
PLATFORM. I EXPRESS TO YOU OUR FEELINGS OF COMPASSION AND KINDLY  
REQUEST YOU TO CONVEY OUR CONDOLENCES

COL ETATPRIORITE

TLX0636 MRS. PAGE 2/17

TO THE BEREAVED FAMILIES.

CONSTANTIN DASCALESU

PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

International  
Telegram  
TELECOM  
British  
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For enquiries dial the  
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For enquiries dial the  
number shown in your  
Phone Book  
International



EMBASSY  
OF

THE STATE OF KUWAIT  
46 QUEEN'S GATE  
LONDON S.W.7



سفارة دولة الكويت  
لندن

11th July 1988

Ref : KKB65/88

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to enclose a message  
from our Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad  
AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

G. Al-Rayes

Ghazi Al-Rayes

Ambassador.

The Right Honourable,  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER  
STATE OF KUWAIT

PERSONAL MESSAGE

9 July, 1988

SERIAL No. T109N/88

Subject cc rest  
OPS

Your Excellency

I received with appreciation your kind message on my stop-over in London and I would like to thank you most cordially for your good wishes.

It is regrettable that despite all the efforts towards a settlement to the Iraq-Iran war, including Security Council Resolution 598, the tragic conflict has gone on unabated for almost eight years now. We earnestly hope that the five permanent Members of the Security Council will assume their responsibility and find the means to bring about an early end to this devastating war.

I will be abroad when your Secretary of State for Defence visits Kuwait next week. But I am sure he will have full cooperation and help from his counterpart and other concerned officials in Kuwait. I wish him a successful and fruitful visit. We highly appreciate the United Kingdom's readiness to help us with our defence needs and believe this truly reflects the longstanding close relationship between our two countries.



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- 2 -

We share the deep sadness over the tragic explosion of the North Sea Piper Alpha oil rig and I wish to convey once again, my sincere condolences and heartfelt sympathies to you and, through you, to the families of the victims.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely

Saad Sabah

His Highness Saad AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah King

The Right Honourable,  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
London.



*file ECL*

*cc fco*

*D/G*

*SO*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

*Gentlemen,*

Your kind message of sympathy for the victims of the terrible accident on the North Sea oil rig is much appreciated and I shall ensure that your condolences are received by the bereaved and injured.

*Yours sincerely*

*Nayandzhakova*

The Council of Ministers of the USSR

*LPO/DT*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

*Dear Prime Minister*

Your kind message of sympathy for the victims of the terrible accident on the North Sea oil rig will be very much appreciated and your words of sympathy will be of great comfort to the bereaved and injured.

*Yours sincerely*

*Raymond Walker*

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. *T109 m/88*

*Subject a north  
gas*

His Excellency Senor Don Felipe  
Gonzalez Marquez

*LPO FTS*





*file D39*  
*cc FCO*  
*D/GW*  
*SO*

10 DOWNING STREET

**PRIME MINISTER'S** THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No.** *T 1096/88*

*Subject cc note*  
*OPS*

*Your General Secretary.*

Thank you for your message about the tragic accident on the North Sea oil rig. It was most thoughtful of you to write and your words of sympathy will be a comfort and support to the bereaved and injured.

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

His Excellency Herr Erich Honecker

*LPO/*  
*OTS*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. 11094/88

Subject cc next  
PS

Dear Bob,

It was good of you to write about the terrible disaster  
on the North Sea oil rig and your kind words will help bring  
solace to the bereaved and injured.

Yours

Rogers

The Hon. R.J.L. Hawke, A.C., M.P.

LPO/  
QTS.



file ECU

cc FCO

D1-6A

50

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

SERIAL No. T1096/88

Subject cc o/s  
masb

Dear Deputy Prime Minister,

It was very thoughtful and considerate of you to send such a prompt message about the disaster on the North Sea oil rig. Your words of sympathy are very much appreciated and will help bring solace to the bereaved and the injured.

Yours sincerely

*Raymond Walker*

The Hon. G.W.F. Palmer

LPO DAS



PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T109 Q/88

*Subject  
cc. rail  
OBS*

MESSAGE DE MONSIEUR FRANCOIS MITTERRAND,  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

A

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER

Paris, le 10 juillet 1988

"Madame le Premier Ministre,

Votre pays a été douloureusement frappé par la terrible catastrophe qui a détruit en Mer du Nord la plate-forme pétrolière "Piper Alpha" dans des conditions particulièrement dramatiques.

Je tiens à vous exprimer la profonde sympathie de tous les Français et vous adresse mes condoléances attristées ainsi qu'à toutes les familles qui ont été si cruellement frappées. Je vous prie de transmettre également mes vœux de rétablissement à tous ceux qui souffrent encore cruellement et de dire aux sauveteurs qui luttent toujours pour mettre un terme au sinistre mon admiration pour leur courage et leur ténacité.

.../...

Je voudrais enfin rendre hommage à tous ceux qui mènent une vie quotidienne périlleuse et rude pour permettre à chacun de bénéficier des progrès de la recherche et de la technologie.

Tous les pays de l'Europe sont naturellement solidaires dans cette terrible épreuve comme ils le sont dans les enjeux qu'ils partagent.

signé : François Mitterrand".//.

101000Z

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

COMMENT


PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. 7109P/88

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM ISLAMABAD  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 879  
OF 100852Z JULY 88

*Safat  
cc post  
ops*



FOR SAD  
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ZIA TO PRIME MINISTER

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ZIA TO THE PRIME MINISTER, SENT TO US IN AN MFA NOTE DATED 8 JULY:  
BEGINS: "DEAR MADAM, THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN THE NORTH SEA THAT HAS REPORTEDLY CLAIMED ALMOST TWO HUNDRED PRECIOUS LIVES HAS CAUSED DEEP ANGUISH IN PAKISTAN. ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN, AND ON MY OWN BEHALF, I CONVEY OUR HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS. WE PRAY THAT GOD ALMIGHTY GIVES THEM SOLACE AND COURAGE TO OVERCOME THIS CATASTROPHE.

I ALSO EXTEND TO YOU, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, MY DEEP FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY ON THIS DISASTER. GENERAL (M ZIA-UL-HAQ) PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN." ENDS.

2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE HAS ALREADY APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS.

BARRINGTON

YYYY		
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RC		1
MAIN	14	
MINIMAL		8
SAD		6
[BRADLEY]		



FOR URGENT ATTENTION OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

✓ *faxed 10/1/88.*  
TO BE FAXED TO CHEQUERS

Secretary of State

I attach the draft press notice. I have cleared this with Lord Cullen and Mr Morrison. Could you ring Mike on 0892 37508 when you and the Prime Minister have seen it.

STEPHEN

10 July 1988

# LORD CULLEN TO CHAIR PIPER ALPHA PUBLIC INQUIRY

Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Energy, has appointed The Hon. Lord Cullen to chair the Public Inquiry into the explosion on the Piper Alpha platform.

## BACKGROUND NOTE

The Hon. Lord Cullen, is a Senator of the College of Justice in Scotland. He has held this post since 1986. Born in 1935, he was educated at Dundee High School and St Andrews and Edinburgh Universities and was called to the Scottish Bar in 1963. He was an Advocate-depute between 1978 and 1981 and a Chairman of the Medical Appeal Tribunal from 1977 to 1986.



London, 9th July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Dear Prime Minister,

SERIAL NO.

T 1097 / 88

subject cc not ORI

Wilfried Martens has asked me to convey to you the following message concerning the tragedy on Alpha Piper.

"On behalf of the Belgian government and in my own name I wish to convey to you and to the British people my sincerest feelings of sorrow and grief at the drama that struck the United Kingdom. The Belgian people wish to express the part they take in the appalling loss of the bereaved families who lost someone dear in the catastrophe

(s) W. Martens "

May I add my own feelings which are the more felt that I recently visited a similar oil installation.

Yours sincerely

Jean Paul van Bellinghen  
Ambassador of Belgium

The Right Honourable  
Mrs. M. Thatcher  
Prime Minister





COL OUR SYMPATHY AND PRAYERS

PAGE 3/33 TXR665

OF GRIEF .

WE PRAY THAT THE SURVIVORS WILL RECOVER FULLY AND WE  
PRAY, TOO, THAT THE SOULS OF THE DEPARTED WILL REST IN PEACE.

KENNETH D. KAUNDA

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

COL SOULS OF THE DEPARTED REST IN PEACE

Phone  
International  
Telegram  
International  
Telegram  
British  
TELECOM  
International  
Telegram  
International  
Telegram  
For enquiries dial the  
number shown in your  
Phone Book  
International  
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International  
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Telegram  
International  
Telegram  
For enquiries dial the  
number shown in your  
Phone Book  
International



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

AUSTRALIA HOUSE  
STRAND  
LONDON WC2B 4LA  
01-438 8000

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1095/88

9 July 1988

*Subject cc mast  
opo*

Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AL

*Dear Prime Minister,*

In the absence of the High Commissioner from London,  
I have the honour to forward to you the following message  
from the Hon. R.J.L. Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia.

Text begins:

"My Dear Margaret

I was distressed to learn of the tragic accident on the  
North Sea Oil Rig yesterday and would ask that you convey  
to the families of the victims the condolences of the  
Government and people of Australia.

R.J.L. Hawke  
Prime Minister of Australia"

Text ends.

*yours sincerely  
R.G. Starr*

(R. G. Starr)  
Minister





10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T109 I /88

Dear Mr. President.

Subject cc: info  
of S

Thank you for your kind message of sympathy for the loss of life and injuries suffered in the terrible accident on the North Sea oil platform. I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured.

Yours sincerely

Rajiv Gandhi

His Excellency Mr. Branko Mikulic

LPO 100



file PMM

cc fco  
DIGN

10 DOWNING STREET

SO

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

Dear Ambassador,

It was kind and thoughtful of you to write about the North Sea oil rig disaster, and I shall ensure that your message of sympathy reaches the bereaved families and the injured.

Yours sincerely

*Raymond Hunt*

His Excellency Mr. Yehuda Avner

WFO / DAS



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T109H/88

*I can Brian*

*subject*

*cc most  
of D*

It was thoughtful of you to send such a prompt message about the terrible tragedy on the North Sea Oil Rig. I shall certainly ensure that your condolences are passed on to the families of the victims as well as to those who were injured. Your words will, I am sure, be of comfort to them.

*Yours*

*Raymond*

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, M.P.

*WPO DTS*





10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

*Dear Helmut:*

It is very considerate of you to send such a prompt message of sympathy following the disastrous accident on the North Sea oil platform. Your kind words about the efforts of the rescue teams are also very much appreciated.

I shall ensure that your condolences are passed on to the bereaved and injured and I know they will draw comfort from them.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T1095/88

*Subject cc mettr  
ops*

*Y  
One even  
Rafael*

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl

*WPO 1075*



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T109F/88

Dear Mr. President:

Subject : CC north  
OPS

It was very good of you to send a message of sympathy and condolence following the terrible explosion and fire on board the North Sea oil platform which resulted in the loss of so many lives. I know that your kind and thoughtful words of sympathy will give solace to the bereaved and injured.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Barber

His Excellency Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi

109F/88  
C10



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 11095/88

Subject cc: mast  
ops

Dear Charlie,

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending such a prompt message about the dreadful disaster on the North Sea oil rig. I shall certainly ensure that your kind expression of sympathy reaches the bereaved families and those who were injured.

Yours sincerely

R. May

Mr. Charles Haughey T.D.

LAD LAD



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T1090/88



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

Subject a rest  
OPS

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

Dear Prime Minister,

It was very considerate of you to send such a prompt and sympathetic message following the terrible accident on the North Sea oil platform. I shall certainly ensure that your kind words of sympathy reach the bereaved and injured, and I know that they will draw comfort from them.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Walker

His Excellency Mr. Noboru Takeshita

LPC /  
JTE



*file ECL*

*cc FCO*

*D/Gen*

*SO*

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1988

SERIAL No. ....

*7109C/88*

*subject a ORS  
note*

*Dear Mr. President:*

It was very good of you to send such a prompt and sympathetic message following the terrible accident on the North Sea oil platform. Your words will bring solace and comfort to the bereaved and injured.

*Yours sincerely*

*Nayana Sahita*

Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida CFR

*LPO / DTS*

10 DOWNING ST  
Sw 1

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R 11/7

TABLE 65-3  
continued

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SUBJECT  
ce MASTER  
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 109Ai/88

File: DISASTERS:

An Official Translation from Bulgarian

Piper alpha Oil Platform  
Explosion - Jul 88.

The Rt Hon Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, PC, FRS, MP,  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,  
L o n d o n.

8 July 1988

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

Please allow me on behalf of the Bulgarian Government and on my own behalf to offer you our most sincere condolences on the disaster stricken the Piper Alpha Oil Platform.

Would you please forward our deepest sympathy to the relatives of those who have lost their lives in the disaster.

Georgi Atanassov,  
Prime Minister of the  
People's Republic of Bulgaria

**R**

08 JUL 1988/1129

ZCZC DLM5465 NBE211 JABF5934

GBXX BY CHRX 089

BERN 89/80 08 1210 PAGE 1/50

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T108K/88

Subject cc nost  
oPS

RS 17/88

ETATPRIORITE

SON EXCELLENCE

LA TRES HONORABLE MARGARET THATCHER

PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI DE

GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD

LONDON

URGENT 5702 AU NOM DU CONSEIL FEDERAL SUISSE VIVEMENT EMU PAR  
L'EXPLOSION SURVENUE EN MER DU NORD SUR LA PLATE-FORME PETROLIERE  
"PIPER ALPHA" QUI ENDEUILLE TRAGIQUEMENT VOTRE PAYS JE PRIE

COL 5702

JABF5934 LA TRES HONORABLE MARGARET THATCHER PAGE 2/30

VOTRE EXCELLENCE DE RECEVOIR ET DE BIEN VOULOIR TRANSMETTRE AUX  
FAMILLES DES VICTIMES MES TRES SINCERES CONDOLEANCES ET L'ASSURANCE  
DE MA PROFONDE SYMPATHIE

OTTO STICH

PRESIDENT DE LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE

07 0

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 11085/8

ccp

Italian Embassy,  
14, Three Kings Yard,  
London, W.1.

6540

8th July 1988

Dear Charles,

Please find herewith enclosed the text of a message, a translation of which is also attached, addressed to the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP, by the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Ciriaco De Mita.

Sincerely yours



Livio Muzi-Falconi

Chargé d'Affaires A.I.

Mr. Charles Powell  
Private Secretary to  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London S.W.1



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SIGNOR  
CIRIACO DE MITA TO THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. MARGARET  
THATCHER, MP

T E X T

Deeply shocked by the tragic news of the North Sea disaster, I would like to express my most heartfelt feelings of solidarity together with the expression of the most sincere sorrow. I should be grateful if you would convey the same to the families of the victims.

Signed: Ciriaco De Mita

MESSAGGIO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI ON.LE CIRIACO DE  
MITA AL PRIMO MINISTRO BRITANNICO SIGNORA MARGARET THATCHER

T E S T O

Profondamente colpito dalla tragica notizia della sciagura nel Mare del Nord, La prego accogliere i miei più commossi sentimenti di solidarietà unitamente alle espressioni del più sincero cordoglio, pregandola di farsene cortese interprete presso i familiari delle vittime.

Ciriaco De Mita

ETAT

PRES REPUBL TOGO LOME

A SON EXCELLENCE

MADAME MARGARET TCHATCHER

PREMIER MINISTRE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE

LONDRES


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MADAME LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

11084  
PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T1084/88



*Subject amnesty  
of  
Lomé*

C'EST AVEC INFINIMENT DE PEINE QUE NOUS AVONS APPRIS  
LA NOUVELLE DE L'INCENDIE QUI A DETRUIT LA PLATE-FORME PE-  
TROLIERE PIPER ALPHA EN MER DU NORD FAISANT SEIZE MORTS,  
CENT DIX DISPARUS ET DE NOMBREUX BLESSES.

DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES DOULOUREUSES, JE VOUDRAIS, AU  
NOM DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS, DE SON PARTI D'UNION NATIONALE, LE  
"RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS", AU NOM DE MON GOUVER-  
NEMENT ET EN MON NOM PERSONNEL, VOUS EXPRIMER NOS CONDOLEANCES  
LES PLUS ATTRISTEES AINSI QUE NOS VOEUX DE PROMPTE GUERISON  
AUX BLESSES.

EN VOUS RENOUVELANT L'EXPRESSION DE NOTRE SINCERE  
COMPASSION, JE VOUS PRIE D'AGREER, MADAME LE PREMIER MINISTRE,  
LES ASSURANCES DE NOTRE TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

GENERAL GNASSINGBE EYADEMA  
PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR DU RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE TOGOLAIS  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

TRIS LE 08/07/88 A 10£50

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1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, 2021-2022, 2023-2024, 2025-2026, 2027-2028, 2029-2030, 2031-2032, 2033-2034, 2035-2036, 2037-2038, 2039-2040, 2041-2042, 2043-2044, 2045-2046, 2047-2048, 2049-2050, 2051-2052, 2053-2054, 2055-2056, 2057-2058, 2059-2060, 2061-2062, 2063-2064, 2065-2066, 2067-2068, 2069-2070, 2071-2072, 2073-2074, 2075-2076, 2077-2078, 2079-2080, 2081-2082, 2083-2084, 2085-2086, 2087-2088, 2089-2090, 2091-2092, 2093-2094, 2095-2096, 2097-2098, 2099-2100, 2101-2102, 2103-2104, 2105-2106, 2107-2108, 2109-2110, 2111-2112, 2113-2114, 2115-2116, 2117-2118, 2119-2120, 2121-2122, 2123-2124, 2125-2126, 2127-2128, 2129-2130, 2131-2132, 2133-2134, 2135-2136, 2137-2138, 2139-2140, 2141-2142, 2143-2144, 2145-2146, 2147-2148, 2149-2150, 2151-2152, 2153-2154, 2155-2156, 2157-2158, 2159-2160, 2161-2162, 2163-2164, 2165-2166, 2167-2168, 2169-2170, 2171-2172, 2173-2174, 2175-2176, 2177-2178, 2179-2180, 2181-2182, 2183-2184, 2185-2186, 2187-2188, 2189-2190, 2191-2192, 2193-2194, 2195-2196, 2197-2198, 2199-2200, 2201-2202, 2203-2204, 2205-2206, 2207-2208, 2209-2210, 2211-2212, 2213-2214, 2215-2216, 2217-2218, 2219-2220, 2221-2222, 2223-2224, 2225-2226, 2227-2228, 2229-2230, 2231-2232, 2233-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2239-2240, 2241-2242, 2243-2244, 2245-2246, 2247-2248, 2249-2250, 2251-2252, 2253-2254, 2255-2256, 2257-2258, 2259-2260, 2261-2262, 2263-2264, 2265-2266, 2267-2268, 2269-2270, 2271-2272, 2273-2274, 2275-2276, 2277-2278, 2279-2280, 2281-2282, 2283-2284, 2285-2286, 2287-2288, 2289-2290, 2291-2292, 2293-2294, 2295-2296, 2297-2298, 2299-2300, 2301-2302, 2303-2304, 2305-2306, 2307-2308, 2309-2310, 2311-2312, 2313-2314, 2315-2316, 2317-2318, 2319-2320, 2321-2322, 2323-2324, 2325-2326, 2327-2328, 2329-2330, 2331-2332, 2333-2334, 2335-2336, 2337-2338, 2339-2340, 2341-2342, 2343-2344, 2345-2346, 2347-2348, 2349-2350, 2351-2352, 2353-2354, 2355-2356, 2357-2358, 2359-2360, 2361-2362, 2363-2364, 2365-2366, 2367-2368, 2369-2370, 2371-2372, 2373-2374, 2375-2376, 2377-2378, 2379-2380, 2381-2382, 2383-2384, 2385-2386, 2387-2388, 2389-2390, 2391-2392, 2393-2394, 2395-2396, 2397-2398, 2399-2400, 2401-2402, 2403-2404, 2405-2406, 2407-2408, 2409-2410, 2411-2412, 2413-2414, 2415-2416, 2417-2418, 2419-2420, 2421-2422, 2423-2424, 2425-2426, 2427-2428, 2429-2430, 2431-2432, 2433-2434, 2435-2436, 2437-2438, 2439-2440, 2441-2442, 2443-2444, 2445-2446, 2447-2448, 2449-2450, 2451-2452, 2453-2454, 2455-2456, 2457-2458, 2459-2460, 2461-2462, 2463-2464, 2465-2466, 2467-2468, 2469-2470, 2471-2472, 2473-2474, 2475-2476, 2477-2478, 2479-2480, 2481-2482, 2483-2484, 2485-2486, 2487-2488, 2489-2490, 2491-2492, 2493-2494, 2495-2496, 2497-2498, 2499-2500, 2501-2502, 2503-2504, 2505-2506, 2507-2508, 2509-2510, 2511-2512, 2513-2514, 2515-2516, 2517-2518, 2519-2520, 2521-2522, 2523-2524, 2525-2526, 2527-2528, 2529-2530, 2531-2532, 2533-2534, 2535-2536, 2537-2538, 2539-2540, 2541-2542, 2543-2544, 2545-2546, 2547-2548, 2549-2550, 2551-2552, 2553-2554, 2555-2556, 2557-2558, 2559-2560, 2561-2562, 2563-2564, 2565-2566, 2567-2568, 2569-2570, 2571-2572, 2573-2574, 2575-2576, 2577-2578, 2579-2580, 2581-2582, 2583-2584, 2585-2586, 2587-2588, 2589-2590, 2591-2592, 2593-2594, 2595-2596, 2597-2598, 2599-2600, 2601-2602, 2603-2604, 2605-2606, 2607-2608, 2609-2610, 2611-2612, 2613-2614, 2615-2616, 2617-2618, 2619-2620, 2621-2622, 2623-2624, 2625-2626, 2627-2628, 2629-2630, 2631-2632, 2633-2634, 2635-2636, 2637-2638, 2639-2640, 2641-2642, 2643-2644, 2645-2646, 2647-2648, 2649-2650, 2651-2652, 2653-2654, 2655-2656, 2657-2658, 2659-2660, 2661-2662, 2663-2664, 2665-2666, 2667-2668, 2669-2670, 2671-2672, 2673-2674, 2675-2676, 2677-2678, 2679-2680, 2681-2682, 2683-2684, 2685-2686, 2687-2688, 2689-2690, 2691-2692, 2693-2694, 2695-2696, 2697-2698, 2699-2700, 2701-2702, 2703-2704, 2705-2706, 2707-2708, 2709-2710, 2711-2712, 2713-2714, 2715-2716, 2717-2718, 2719-2720, 2721-2722, 2723-2724, 2725-2726, 2727-2728, 2729-2730, 2731-2732, 2733-2734, 2735-2736, 2737

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**THE**  
**NEW**  
**YORK**

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THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES HAS LEARNED WITH THE GREATEST SORROW OF THE TRAGEDY THAT OCCURRED IN THE NORTH SEA. WE SHARE THE MOURNING OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND THE GRIEF OF THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.

RECEIVED

THE COMMISSION HAS TAKEN A DECISION TODAY TO GRANT EMERGENCY  
AID TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.

THIS AID DEMONSTRATES IN CONCRETE TERMS THE SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE COMMUNITY TOWARDS THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN INJURED AND BEREAVED IN THIS DISASTER.

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Journal of Internal Medicine 255: 103–110

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ETAT

RT. HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1

*R9/7/88*

I HAVE LEARNED WITH DEEP GRIEF OF THE DEATH OF 100 PEOPLE  
AFTER A MASSIVE EXPLOSION SPLIT NORTH SEA OIL RIG ON WEDNESDAY ,  
6TH JULY , 1988 . THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC

COL ETAT 6TH 1988 10 166

PG155 ETAT RT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER PAGE2/35

OF MALAWI SOLEMNLY JOIN ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU, THE GOVERNMENT  
AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES AND  
SYMPATHIES ON THIS TRAGIC OCCASION.

H KAMUZU BANDA

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI

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29/7/88

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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI

cc/c  
To

HER EXCELLENCY  
MRS. MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN  
LONDON

Accept our sincere sympathy in connection with the numerous human losses incurred by an explosion and fire at the oil rig in the North sea.

Please, convey to the families of the victims feelings of deep condolences from the Soviet people and Government.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1988

ЕЕ ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ  
ГОСПОЖЕ МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР  
ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ  
ЛОНДОН

Примите наше искреннее сочувствие в связи с многочисленными человеческими жертвами, вызванными взрывом и пожаром на нефтяной платформе в Северном море.

Передайте, пожалуйста, семьям пострадавших чувства глубокого соболезнования от советского народа и правительства.

СОВЕТ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Москва, Кремль

8 июля 1988 года



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cc/c  
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PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 7089

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MADRID (PALACIO MONCLOA) 08/07

Subject cc master  
OPS

FROM: PRESIDENTE GOBIERNO ESPANOL

TO:

EXCMA. SENORA  
MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIMER MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO DE  
GRAN BRETANA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE  
LONDRES

PROFUNDAMENTE IMPRESIONADO POR TRAGICO ACCIDENTE OCURRIDO EN LA PLATAFORMA PETROLIFERA PIPER ALPHA, QUIERO EXPRESARLE MIS SENTIMIENTOS DE HONDO PESAR QUE RUEGO HAGA LLEGAR A LOS FAMILIARES DE LAS VICTIMAS. AL MISMO TIEMPO LE RUEGO TRASLADAR MIS MEJORES DESEOS DE PRONTO RESTABLECIMIENTO A LOS HERIDOS EN ESTE ACCIDENTE.

FELIPE GONZALEZ MARQUEZ  
PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO ESPANOL

NNNN

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EMBASSY OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL  
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

5 LEXHAM GARDENS,  
LONDON, W8 5JU.  
Tel: 01-370 6105

London, 8 July 1988

Dear Madame Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit the message by the President of the Federal Executive Council of the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Branko Mikulic addressed to you on the occasion of the North Sea Oil Platform disaster.

May I take this opportunity, dear Madame Prime Minister, to extend to you also my own sincere sympathies.

Please accept, Madame Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration and profound respect.



Mitko Calovski  
Ambassador

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United  
Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland  
London.

PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL  
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE  
ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCIALIST  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade, 8 July 1988

We were much distressed to hear the news of the tragic explosion  
in the North Sea Oil Platform taking a heavy toll of human life.

May I extend to you personally and to Her Majesty's Government,  
on behalf of the Federal Executive Council and myself, our  
sincere sympathy.

Please convey to the bereaved families the expressions of our  
profound condolence.

(Sgd) Branko Mikulic

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United  
Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland  
London.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T08P/88

*Sajal CC mast  
as*



Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

London

July 8, 1988

Mr. C. D. Powell  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister (Overseas Affairs)  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T108E/88

*Subject as above*  
*DS*

Dear Mr. Powell,

...

I have been asked to transmit to you the attached text of a letter from the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney on the Piper Alpha disaster. The original will be forwarded upon receipt.

Yours sincerely,

Michael B. Phillips  
Acting High Commissioner

"Dear Margaret,

News of last night's tragic explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha oil rig in the North Sea in which, I understand, 160 people are missing and feared dead came as a shock to all of us.

I extend to you and the families of those who perished my personal condolences as well as those of all Canadians. We share your sorrow with this disaster and our prayers and sincere sympathy go out to the loved ones of those on the Piper Alpha whose lives were lost.

Yours sincerely,

Brian Mulroney"

080  
DER BOTSCHAFTER  
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar

ccR  
London, 8 July 1988

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed telegramme  
from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is also attached.

I am, dear Prime Minister,

*Yours sincerely*



The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Her Majesty's Prime Minister  
and First Lord of the Treasury  
L o n d o n



T e l e g r a m m

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister,  
liebe Margaret,

Zu dem schweren Explosionsunglück auf der Ölbohrinsel "Piper Alpha" spreche ich Ihnen mein tiefempfundenes Beileid aus. Ich hoffe sehr, dass es dem Einsatz der Rettungsmannschaften gelingen wird, möglichst viele Menschenleben zu retten.

Mein besonderes Mitgefühl gilt den Opfern dieses Unglücks und ihren Familienangehörigen.

Ihr  
Helmut Kohl

Courtesy translation

T e l e g r a m m e

Prime Minister,  
dear Margaret,

I am deeply grieved by the news of the terrible explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform and hope very much that through the tremendous efforts of the rescue teams many lives will still be saved.

My profound sympathy goes out to the relatives of those who have lost their lives and to those injured.

Helmut Kohl

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 11280/88

*Subj*

*cc north  
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TELEPHONE: 01-499 8951  
TELEX: AMS: TANZANREP LONDON  
TEL: 262504



cc/c  
HIGH COMMISSION OF THE  
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

43, HERTFORD STREET  
LONDON, W1Y 8DB

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

TZL/D.30/112

8th July, 1988

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON S.W. 1

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 7108C/88

subject cc master  
OBS

I have been asked by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi to transmit to you the following message of condolence on the North Sea Disaster:

"YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE RECEIVED WITH GREAT SHOCK THE NEWS OF THE EXPLOSION AT THE PIPER ALPHA OIL PLATFORM IN THE NORTH SEA WHICH HAS CAUSED THE TRAGIC LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED LIVES.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, AND ON MY OWN BEHALF, PLEASE ACCEPT OUR DEEP AND SINCERE CONDOLENCES FOR THIS CALAMITY.

PLEASE CONVEY, YOUR EXCELLENCY, OUR SYMPATHIES TO THE BEREAVED FAMILIES.

ALI HASSAN MWINYI  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA"

  
U.K. Mwambulukutu  
Acting HIGH COMMISSIONER



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1058B/88

EMBASSY OF JAPAN  
LONDON

8th July 1988

H.E. Mr. Noboru Takeshita

subject cc masb  
OB

Dear Prime Minister.

I have been asked by Mr. Noboru Takeshita,  
Prime Minister of Japan, to convey the following  
message to you:

"I was extremely distressed  
to learn of the tragic accident of  
the North Sea oil platform.

On behalf of the Japanese people,  
I wish to express my sincere sympathy  
and condolences to the people of your  
country, especially to those who have  
suffered from the loss of their families."

NOBORU TAKESHITA  
Prime Minister of Japan

Yours sincerely,

Kazuo Chiba  
Kazuo Chiba  
Ambassador

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR NIGERIA



TELEPHONE: 01-839 1244

9 NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE  
LONDON WC2N 5BX

8 July 1988

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. *T-8A/88*

*Subject a master  
OPS*

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have been instructed by my President to transmit the enclosed message of condolence to you over the accident in the North Sea.

May I, Prime Minister, add my humble condolence in doing so.

*With every respect,*

*Yours sincerely,  
George Dove-Edwin*

(G. DOVE-EDWIN)

Enc.

TEXT OF MESSAGE  
FOR THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER

FROM PRESIDENT IBRAHIM BABANGIDA

I HAVE LEARNT OF THE TERRIBLE ACCIDENT ON YOUR NORTH  
SEA OIL PLATFORM, THE PIPER ALPHA, WITH THE LARGE LOSS OF  
LIFE INVOLVED X I ASK YOU IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT  
AND PEOPLE OF NIGERIA TO PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT  
AND PEOPLE, AND THE RELATIONS OF THE DEAD AS WELL AS THE  
SURVIVORS, OUR MOST PROFOUND FEELINGS OF SHARED SORROW X  
ENDS X GREETINGS





## New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House  
Haymarket  
London SW1Y 4TQ  
Telephone 01-930 8422  
Telex 24368

Reference: B65/15

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T1002A/88

8 July 1988

Mr Nigel Wicks,  
Principal Private Secretary,  
Prime Minister's Office,  
10 Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

Subject cc OPS  
masb

Dear Mr Wicks,

In the absence of the High Commissioner in Wales, I have been asked by Wellington to pass on to you the following message from our Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, addressed to the Prime Minister:

"Dear Mrs Thatcher,

"New Zealanders have been shocked to learn of the dreadful accident at the Piper Alpha rig off the coast of Scotland. We join with you in expressing our condolences to the families and friends of those who have suffered in this tragedy. The thoughts of New Zealanders with family ties with England and Scotland are very much with you at this sad time.

Geoffrey Palmer,  
Deputy Prime Minister."

Roger Farrell

Roger Farrell,  
Deputy High Commissioner.

SECRET



FILE 1A-B KATAIE  
Subject cc master

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

8 July 1988

*From the Private Secretary*

When she was at Aberdeen today the Prime Minister and Mr. Rifkind had a private briefing from Dr. Hammer and the Occidental management team on the events surrounding the Piper Alpha disaster.

I should be grateful if you could ensure that this letter is given a very limited circulation and is dealt with on a strict need-to-know basis, being seen only by those who have an operational need to do so.

Dr. Hammer said that a team of experts were coming in from South America to help Occidental in its own inquiry. He was himself getting the designer of the rig in to give him a full briefing on the design. He was very deeply concerned about the disaster and its wider implications. He was announcing immediately that he was matching the Government's £1 million contribution to the appeal fund. Mr. Brading, Chairman of Occidental UK operations said that the explosion appeared to have been caused by an as yet unexplained major failure in the gas terminal module which had led to a gas escape. The most reliable estimate of events from the manager of the Tharos was that the first explosion had occurred at 9.59 pm. That, in Occidental's understanding, had caused the control room to fail, and had knocked out all the backup systems with the exception of the automatic cut off to the well head. The second devastating explosion had occurred at 22.25 followed 10 minutes later by a third explosion.

The Prime Minister commented that she was privately very concerned that an explosion of this nature should simultaneously destroy the nerve centre of the rig and knock out all the backup systems. The reports she had had from survivors suggested that the design of the accommodation quarters was also unsatisfactory. The failure of power and control information between the two explosions may have led to some of those who could have got out not doing so. She fully recognised that these were issues for the full inquiry not for an instant lay-person's reaction, but she wondered what action Occidental were taking to look both at simple commonsense emergency procedures and at the design of rigs. An accident of this kind was clearly larger than had been envisaged when

SECRET



fail safe systems were designed but it was no longer possible to consider the design of these in ignorance of the Piper Alpha disaster.

Dr. Hammer said that Occidental did indeed need to consider redesign for the future. One possibility would be to separate accommodation quarters from the main platform. There also needed to be a strengthening of the design of backup systems to reflect the lessons that would be learned from the disaster. He and the Occidental team were very conscious that Occidental needed to look at steps which could be implemented to increase further the safety record of rigs ahead of the report of the inquiry announced today by your Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to David Crawley (Scottish Office).

(DOMINIC MORRIS)

Stephen Haddrill, Esq.,  
Department of Energy.



*4/5 (Seen on the  
newspapers).*  
PRIME MINISTER

8 July 1988

PIPER ALPHA

In 1985 I was operations manager for BP's Forties Field which has four platforms similar to Piper Alpha. In 1986 and 1987 I was responsible for BP's UK offshore drilling operations.


From my experience with BP and from my contacts with other members of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, I know first hand of the safety and safety training efforts put in by all of the oil companies.

There of course is no such thing as a perfect safety record. However, through the continuing efforts of the oil companies, the services companies and not least by the Department of Energy, the level of attention to safety continues ever onwards and upwards.

From my knowledge of the Department of Energy's ways of working during my three years in Aberdeen, I know that no conflict of interest exists between Safety Directorate and other parts of the Petroleum Engineering Division. I have the highest regard for the members of the Safety Directorate, their efforts and their overall direction.

I attach two articles from today's Times which I believe are worth reading. The trade unions will try to make political capital out of this catastrophe. Their frustration is more from not being able to make much headway in recruiting members offshore, rather than a real concern over lack of safety standards. All platforms have their safety representatives and safety committees. Few of the members however bother joining a union.

I have already been in contact with the Safety Inspectorate  
and will stay in touch throughout the Inquiry.

A handwritten signature in black ink, featuring a large, stylized 'B' that loops around and ends in a long horizontal stroke.

GREG BOURNE



Roger Spiller puts a trade union view of the Piper Alpha tragedy

# Making the oil rigs safer

The tragedy in the Piper oil field on Wednesday demonstrates beyond words the dangers inherent in offshore oil and gas production. Nearly 300 deaths in the UK sector over the past 25 years out of a workforce of around 30,000 make the oil industry the most dangerous in Britain.

The environment is hostile, the product is explosive, the locations are remote, and management is hostile to any "challenge" to its authority. The cramped working area means that simple accidents become serious, a fire or explosion affects not only those at work but those asleep and off duty as well, thus at least doubling casualties.

The inquiry into the disaster should examine all the relevant circumstances, not just the immediate cause. We should by now be used to handling explosive material. The major lesson is of course to keep sources of ignition away from sources of fuel. This is a difficult process and needs active cooperation as well as sensible rules to implement.

While a piece of rotating machinery or an electrical problem may well be the cause of the

initial explosion, the fact that it occurred at all is a reflection of the work that still needs to be done.

The situation today might well be different if more attention had been paid to the evidence of the union representatives on the 1980 Burgoyne Committee into offshore safety. In a note of dissent they drew attention to shortcomings which unfortunately still exist.

Unlike onshore installations, those offshore are not required to have a health and safety committee. It is time they were given equal protection. Unions have found a reluctance on the part of many oil companies to recognize the benefits of co-operation with the trade unions over health and safety issues.

There is no doubting the companies' good intentions concerning health and safety but

their attitude to the unions on this issue weakens their defence. For example, earlier this year Shell was fined at Bow Street magistrates court for the absence of a piece of medical equipment which came to light after an accident. In its defence it said "no one pointed out to us that it was missing."

In agreeing to a ballot on recognition of the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union, Shell excluded health and safety from the issues which could be discussed. Some two years ago the MSF health and safety representatives on the Piper platform walked out of their committee in frustration because they considered that Occidental Petroleum was not prepared to look seriously at the issues they raised.

The union representatives on the Burgoyne committee partic-

ularly drew attention to the possible conflict of interest arising from the Department of Energy having responsibility for both production and safety in an industry which has major significance for the British economy, and where economic performance might take precedence over every other consideration.

They wrote: "through no fault of their own, members of the Petroleum Engineering Division may experience conflicting pressure emanating from the exigencies of production on the one hand and from the requirements of safety on the other. This also takes place in a context wherein the operating companies are under constant pressure for financial reasons to maximize development, production and exploration."

They suggested that responsibility for safety in the offshore

industry should be passed completely to the Health and Safety Executive. Adding that the unique aspects of offshore operations were frequently overstressed, they said that "the vast majority of offshore accidents arise out of circumstances which would be perfectly comprehensible to an ordinary Factory Inspector". This remains as true today as it was in 1980.

The experience of the Health and Safety Executive and its Inspectorate is second to none. It covers almost all health and safety issues onshore, including oil and gas processing plants. The offshore industry continues to fight for its own inspectorate.

If Wednesday's accident had occurred a few months later the multi-support vessel, Tharion, would not have been available to perform its invaluable rescue work. It is not used during the

winter and there are rumours that all these vessels are to be withdrawn as they are no longer considered to be "economic".

First City estimates of the cost of Wednesday's disaster are that the shutdown in production in the five fields surrounding the Piper Alpha platform will decrease output by 14 per cent. This will cost around £80 million a month in lost exports, not to mention the revenue that would have gone to the Exchequer. Clearly money spent on safety is money well spent.

Gradually the oil companies are recognizing the value of well-informed and trained union representatives. What we bitterly resent is the death or injury that has to occur to persuade them of the justice of our case.

Our deepest sympathies go out to the families and friends of those injured or killed. At the same time we demand that the Department of Energy and the oil companies take a responsible position and put the lives of their employees before Britain's balance of payments or the pursuit of profit.

© Times Newspapers, 1988

The author is offshore organizer for MSF.


François Heisbourg

# Europe's own Nato pillar

Today, as in previous decades, the defence of Western Europe and of the United States is difficult to conceive without a substantial physical US conventional and nuclear force in Europe within the framework of a political-strategic alliance. The lessons of

interests are some of these achievements. Although they are not unimportant in themselves, they remain nevertheless modest in the overall picture. The process of regeneration of the Alliance clearly needs speeding up.

Four pragmatic steps, achievable within a relatively brief time



three countries to co-ordinate the timing and content of such reviews. This would be a defence breakthrough and contribute greatly to a real European pillar. In the present economic and political climate, particularly when the US is slashing its military budget, the Europeans cannot be expected to increase

None of these steps is revolutionary. All can be undertaken within a few years, ie, a politically practical schedule. They, and other measures, should however be embarked upon without much further delay if we are to benefit from, rather than be blown adrift by, the winds of change.





1 Pennington Street, London, E1 9XN Telephone: 01-481 4100

## OILMEN AND HEROES

The story of North Sea oil began as an improbably perilous adventure. It reached peaks of highly publicized success. It has recently adopted an apparently routine formula in which the accountant was the bigger star than the roustabout. But as Wednesday night's disaster demonstrates so clearly, the danger never left.

In one night the industry death toll doubled. The extraction of North Sea oil and gas has reclaimed its reputation as the most dangerous way of earning a living, and the ripples will extend far beyond the twisted remains of Piper Alpha.

Once upon a time, the mines used to be the most hazardous means of earning a wage. But the latest figures show that oil rigs are nine times as dangerous as the modern pits. The construction industry has safety problems. The oil rigs are eleven times as dangerous.

The wages paid to the men on the rigs have often generated jealousy. Even the unskilled can bring home £600 a week to spend in their fortnight's holiday every month. But yesterday's closure of Piper Alpha and its associated rigs will cost the country £80 million a month in lost exports, and more than £300 million a year in lost tax revenue. The country is in debt to the men who daily risk their lives in unpleasant conditions to win this national resource from under the sea.

It is also in debt to those whose heroism in the burning seas around the rig saved lives at the cost of their own. Survivors spoke of their horror yesterday at seeing the men who had pulled them from the sea minutes earlier themselves dying in a ball of exploding gas, their bodies silhouetted against the searing flames. This horror must be translated into the sadness and respect of the whole country.

This debt to the men of the oilfields must now include a determination to find out exactly how the Piper Alpha disaster occurred.

It must also reinforce official determination that the most dangerous of occupations should be made as safe as is humanly possible.

The first may be more difficult than the second. The rig is badly damaged. Potential witnesses near the seat of the original explosion are likely to be among the first to have died. But it ought, at least, to be possible to ascertain why it took half an hour before the first may-day call was transmitted.

The inquiries following the disaster should also shed light on whether the union officials who yesterday renewed their calls for a health and safety inspectorate separate from the Department of Energy are justified. Their case, which was expressed in a minority report attached to the 1980 report on offshore safety, is that the closeness of interest of the safety officials in the department and the officials of the oil companies is itself dangerous, although they are not able to point to any instance where this has been specifically threatening.

Union officials also complain that they do not have the same rights over safety as their fellows onshore. They do not, for example, have any statutory union safety representatives or safety committee. There is no official safety training levy. The department is also blamed for keeping to itself the result of safety studies on lifejackets.

These and other charges of putting oil-production above life-preservation are bound to resurge in the coming weeks. They were there in the adventurous beginnings and they will be there till the last barrel is drawn. The general attention to safety in the North Sea is extremely high — amounting in some companies to an obsession. But it is not always enough. On Wednesday night it was not enough. The public inquiry, announced with proper speed by the Government yesterday, must spare no effort to discover what more might have been done to keep disaster at bay.

## TOO MANY WAGES COUNCILS

The Confederation of British Industry is calling for an industry-by-industry review of Britain's 26 statutory wages councils. The least the Government can do is agree to it.

The councils, which set minimum hourly rates for about 2.25 million workers, represent the last vestige of pay controls. Wise men in equal numbers from employers and unions, with a few independent members holding the ring, sit in judgement on the minimum levels of pay in a variety of the lower-paid service industries.

The minimum wages which the councils set range from just under £2 an hour to about £2.33, so they can hardly be said to be forcing powerless employers to pay their workforces to live a life of Riley. Nor do the employers claim,

workers, buying out existing work practices or recognizing regional differences can become unacceptably expensive.

Much depends on how the councils interpret their brief. Their statutory obligation since the 1986 reform is to set pay levels on the basis of the likely employment effects and establish minima on the basis of regional pay rates rather than those in central London. Employers in some industries are satisfied that this is happening. Others, such as those in the large hotel and catering sector, are unhappy about the role of independent council members.

So far the Government has been content to take its cue from employers in the industries concerned. In the course of the review which led up to the Wages Act of 1986 the CBI told

## Plea for logic over secrets

From Mr Anthony Cavendish  
Sir, Sir Douglas Dodds-Pletter (July 7) is timely and sensible.

Whilst everybody who worked in the intelligence service will agree their work should be secret, there is no point in forbidding officers to write accounts of their service 30 years later when any secret is cold.

The plethora of injunctions which have been showered on newspapers quoting from books, *Inside Intelligence*, though the Attorney General said he does not contend that the disclosure of security, is a breach of the Official Secrets Act, is a result of the confusion caused by Wright's book *Spycatcher*, published at a time when the Official Secrets Act had still not been revised.

Now that the White Paper on official secrets has been published (report, June 30) nobody from the intelligence community will plain about it, but most will agree that logic will prevail and a system for memoirs which introduces no secrets will be introduced. Yours etc,  
ANTHONY CAVENDISH,  
Carlton Club,  
69 St James's Street, SW1.  
July 7.

## Airbus tragedy

From Instructor Lieutenant Commander Robert Moss, RN (retired)  
Sir, Your leader, "Beyond Aegis" (July 5), is a masterpiece of exposition of the current state of the art of action information that is to say, the rapid, coordinated representation of state of enemy and friendly forces on and under water and in the air. It was developed by the British Navy from small beginnings in the Hitler war, the United States Navy developed its "bat information" along completely parallel lines.

One can but hope that either from the East or from the West, whether combatants or involved observers reporting in the press, radio, or television, heed the wisdom of your concluding paragraph.

A commander's decision in the heat of battle depends upon "facts" allegedly substantiated by hindsight, but upon his own appreciation of the "balance of probabilities" at the moment when he makes it.

More modern technology



VISIT TO ABERDEEN

The cards for tomorrow's programme are attached. The following expands on the main part of the programme:

1450 Arrive Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, Forester Hill. You will be met by Mr Charles Ellis (Chairman of the Grampian Health Authority), Mr Graham Page (Accident and Emergency Consultant) and Mr James Barber (Unit General Manager).

You will then tour the ward and meet the patients and hospital medical staff involved in the emergency.

1530-1600 Meet representatives of the Rescue Services involved in the emergency. Assuming it is dry, this will be on the lawn beside the helipad. There will be four Sea King crew, one helicopter engineer, one from NIMROD, one from the Rescue Control Centre, four policemen and four coastguards.

The press will want an opportunity of a photocall and words from you. I suggest this is the best time: it keeps the press out of the hospital building and minimises the risk of them trampling into the ward and causing distress to the patients.

1615 Arrive Headquarters of Occidental UK where you will be met by Armand Hammer. You will meet there representatives of Occidental Company who have been involved in the emergency.

There is the possibility - no more at this stage - that the Prince of Wales will decide to go to Aberdeen tomorrow. Even if he does, he is unlikely to arrive before you have left the hospital.

The Lord Provost of Aberdeen may take the opportunity of your visit to announce the launching of an Appeal Fund. Against the contingency that he does, you can announce that the Government will contribute (the Chancellor has agreed up to £1 million).

When you speak to the press, I suggest you do not just praise the official emergency services but also the excellent spontaneous response from local fishermen who played a significant part in bringing survivors ashore.

As background briefing, I attach:

Flag A - a copy of the Secretary of State's Statement to the House this afternoon;

Flag B - a note on the Grampian hospitals and NHS in Scotland.

I will let you have an updated note on the state of play tomorrow before the aeroplane journey.

Mr Rifkind will also be with you on the aeroplane on the way up to Aberdeen. So, if you wish, there is the opportunity to discuss a number of outstanding policy issues with him:

- Education: you could stress to him you are expecting him to come forward with the right sort of proposals, before the Recess, on Opting Out and Testing.
- Dounreay;
- flexi-ownership schemes (Mr Rifkind's variant is rents into mortgages).

DM

DOMINIC MORRIS  
7 July 1988

DS3ABI



050

205c



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
2 PALACE GREEN  
LONDON W8 4QB  
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל  
לונדון

7.7.88

Dear Prime Minister,

I write to express to you  
my deep anguish over the  
North Sea oil rig disaster. My  
heart goes out to the bereaved  
families just as I pray for  
the speedy recovery of the injured.  
Respectfully,  
Yehuda Avner

SUBJECT a MASTER  
OPS



PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T107 B/88

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

July 7, 1988

Dear Margaret,

News of last night's tragic explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha oil rig in the North Sea in which, I understand, 160 people are missing and feared dead came as a shock to all of us.

I extend to you and the families of those who perished my personal condolences as well as those of all Canadians. We share your sorrow with this disaster and our prayers and sincere sympathy go out to the loved ones of those on the Piper Alpha whose lives were lost.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Michael MacArthur".

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
10 Downing Street  
London, England

020

SAÍD NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place  
SW1X 7HR

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 0AA

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
SERIAL No. T1074/88

7 July 1988

*Subject commstr  
OPS*

I have learned with great sadness of the appalling loss of life and suffering in the North Sea oil disaster.

My colleagues in the Government join me in expressing our deepest sympathy at this tragedy.

Please convey my condolences and those of the Irish people to the bereaved and injured.

Charles Haughey T.D.  
Taoiseach





# EMBASSY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

*The Charge d'Affaires a.i.*

London, 7 July 1988

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have the honour to forward to Your Excellency on behalf of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic the following message.

Premierministerin  
des Vereinigten Königreiches  
von Großbritannien und  
Nordirland

Ihre Exzellenz  
Frau Margaret Thatcher  
10 Downing Street  
London

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. 1106B/88

*Subject cc nalt  
OPS*

Zu dem schweren Explosionsunglück auf der Bohrinsel 'Piper Alpha', das zahlreiche Menschenleben forderte, übermittle ich Ihnen und den Angehörigen der Opfer mein aufrichtiges Beileid.

Erich Honecker

Generalsekretär des Zentral-  
komitees der Sozialistischen  
Einheitspartei Deutschlands und  
Vorsitzender des Staatsrates der  
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik

*H.E. Herr Erich Honecker*

May I also take this opportunity to express to  
Your Excellency as well as to the bereaved families my  
deepest sympathy.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my  
highest consideration.

*Yours sincerely*  
*H. Bock*

H. Bock

A

STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT - 7 JULY 1988 - PIPER ALPHA EXPLOSION

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha platform last night.

At about ten o'clock last night a serious explosion occurred at the platform. The Coastguard service was informed and an emergency control centre was established. All emergency services were immediately alerted. Royal Navy, RAF and Coastguard helicopters and surface vessels in the area, including a NATO detachment, were committed to the search for survivors. Occidental, who are the operators of the platform, activated their emergency centre to control the fire and oil and gas flows.

The explosion appears to have been so violent that the platform was effectively destroyed. My RHF, the Minister of State, went early this morning to Aberdeen. He has kept me in continuous touch with developments. My latest information is that there were 229 people on the platform at the time of the explosion of whom 65 are known to have survived. There were three people in a small boat involved in the rescue of whom one is known to have survived. 16 are known to be dead and 150 at present unaccounted for.

HM The Queen has asked me to convey to all those concerned her heartfelt sympathy for the injured and bereaved and her admiration for the gallant efforts of the firefighting, rescue and medical services in preventing even greater loss of life. I am sure the whole House will wish to join in expressing our sympathies and in paying tribute to the efforts of the emergency services.

Oil and gas production in the hostile environment of the North Sea demands the greatest attention to safety. Safety is the first priority of the Government and of the operators. We apply the highest safety standards to all phases of development; design, construction and operation. We have also established procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency. These are regularly rehearsed.



The Government is determined to establish urgently the cause of the explosion and the lessons to be learnt. Nearly 30,000 people work in the UK sector of the North Sea. They and their families have the right to expect the fullest possible investigation. The Government will therefore be setting up a full public inquiry as soon as possible.

B

Recurrent Expenditure

1. Grampian Health Board has done well out of SHARE (the Scottish equivalent of RAWP), which was introduced to even out inequalities in recurrent expenditure by Scottish Health Boards. As a result, Grampian's share of available resources has risen (from 8.5% to 9.3% of the Scottish total) and the Board is £13m better off than if SHARE had not existed. Grampian Health Board's allocation has risen by 32% in real terms since the Government came to power - compared with 23.5% for Scotland as a whole.

Building Programme

2. Capital expenditure in Grampian has increased in real terms by 98% between 1979-80 to 1987-88, compared with a Scottish real-terms increase of 23%. Construction starts in October on the first phase of Royal Cornhill Hospital, Aberdeen, to improve facilities for mentally ill patients. The replacement of the Maryhill Maternity Unit at Elgin (costing more than £1m) will start soon. At Foresterhill, a new Blood Transfusion Centre (run by the Common Services Agency, which provides Blood Transfusion services throughout Scotland) costing £3m is planned to open in 1991.

Cardiac Surgery

3. The Government recently announced the extension of cardiac surgery, as a national specialty, to Aberdeen. This will mean a capital investment of some £1.2m over the next 5 years and extra funding of about £250,000 per annum - centrally-funded by the Scottish Home and Health Department.

Proposed Closure of Peripheral Maternity Units

4. A recent review of maternity beds in the Grampian Health Board area has revealed widespread underuse of beds in peripheral units. The Board issued a consultative document on future plans and, after considering comment and representations received, it has requested the Secretary of State for Scotland's approval to the closure of 4 peripheral maternity units - at Inverurie, Inch, Torphins and Arduathie (near Stonehaven). These closures have been opposed by the local communities concerned, because of the need to travel the maternity units further from their homes. The Secretary of State has not yet reached a decision on the closure proposal.

5. An allied issue is the recent decision by the Board not to establish a consultant obstetric unit in Elgin (where the maternity unit is staffed by GPs). The main factor influencing the Board's decision was the expected level of use, which would be insufficient to maintain the necessary professional skills to provide a competent and safe service. Again, this is opposed by local people and Mr Michael Forsyth, Scottish Health Minister, is meeting the local health council on 18 July to enable them to put their views.

Scottish Home and Health Department  
Division IVD

7 July 1988

C:EGW189F4



## NHS IN SCOTLAND: POSITIVE POINTS

### 1. Finance

Total revenue spending on the Health Service in Scotland has risen from £1,053m in 1979/80 to an expected £2,334m in 1987/88. This is an increase of over 120% in money terms, and 26% in 'real' terms (using GDP deflator). Provision for 1988/89 is £2,451m - an increase of £117m and is expected to rise by a further £92m to meet the cost of the review body pay awards.

### 2. Staff Numbers

Increases (whole-time equivalents) from September 1979 to September 1987:-

Consultants - 10%

General Medical Practitioners - 13%

General Dental Practitioners - 25%

Qualified Nurses - 30%

Professions allied to medicine - 34%

### 3. Pay

Percentage increases in real terms from 1979 to 1988:-

Doctors and dentists - 38.2%

Nurses and midwives - 44%

Professions allied to medicine - 40%

### 4. Buildings

Completed since 1979 - 52 hospital projects providing 5,800 beds and over 480 day places.

Examples - Paisley DGH:	£53m	708 beds
Crosshouse DGH, Kilmarnock	£30m	703 beds
Raigmore, Inverness:	£30m	680 beds
Glasgow Royal Infirmary:	£56m	214 beds

In the pipeline - 34 developments (with a cash value of almost £300m) to provide 4,480 beds (9 under construction, 2 being commissioned, 23 in planning).

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5. Activity

Between the years ending 31 March 1979 and 1987 the following have increased, showing substantial increases in efficiency of services:

a) Number of patients discharged during the year:

General and acute - 16½%

All specialties - 14%

b) Average number of cases per bed:

General and acute - 29%

All specialties - 21%

c) Day cases:

General and acute - 91%

All specialties - 98%

6. Waiting Lists

Industrial action raised waiting lists to 88,303 in 1983. This reduced to 77,772 by 1987. £3.6m allocated specifically for measures to reduce waiting lists as part of the special allocation of funds in December 1987. £3m made available in April 1988 to fund specific projects to reduce waiting times.

7. Efficiency Savings

a) Ancillary services - £16½m by Sept 1987 by improving efficiency of in-house services and competitive tendering.

b) Over all - £11½m in 1985/86

£23m in 1986/87

£27½m in 1987/88

£25m in 1988/89

£87m

c) Income from Property Disposals

1984/85	£1.9m
1985/86	£2.5m
1986/87	£3.6m
1987/88	£7.9m
1988/89	Target £8m

Specialist Services

Specific funding is provided for 3 major specialist services serving the whole of Scotland:

1. Cardiac Surgery

1 unit in Edinburgh and 2 in Glasgow (plus associated paediatric units in each city).

Funding for 1988-89 - £11.9 million

Over 2,000 operations a year.

2. Bone marrow transplantation

Centre in Glasgow


Funding for 1988-89 - £392,000

3. Lithotripsy

Lithotripter bought for £680,000.

1988-89

Running expenses for lithotripter - £200,000



# GRAMPIAN HEALTH BOARD

1 ALBYN PLACE  
ABERDEEN AB9 8QP

Telephone 0224 689901

## PRESS INFORMATION

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7th July 1988

43/88

Late on Wednesday evening of 6th July, the Accident and Emergency Department of Aberdeen Royal Infirmary was alerted to an incident on the Piper Alpha platform in the North Sea. The Board's Major Offshore Accident Plan was put into effect. An offshore surgical team flew to the scene while medical, nursing, records, administrative, catering and ancillary staff were brought in to the hospital to prepare to receive casualties.

Ten helicopter landings brought a total of 63 survivors. Of these, 42 have been discharged following examination and treatment if required for minor conditions. Two patients are currently classified as being in a serious condition and six as stable, with the others being satisfactory. It is not anticipated that any further survivors will be admitted to the hospital. As of 12.30 pm, 7th July the emergency condition has been stood down.

All our staff responded magnificently in this crisis, and we are very pleased that our emergency procedures worked so well. The contribution from staff at all levels and in all disciplines was enormous, and this was matched by the efforts of volunteers including the WRVS, and many offers of help from hospitals throughout the country. We will certainly benefit from this support in the aftermath of the immediate crisis.