

SECRET

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

~~British Consultations with France~~

~~and Germany~~ FRANCE/UK/FRG RELATIONS

FOREIGN POLICY

S  
3006


April 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>3.4.87</del>							
<del>11.4.87</del>							
<del>21.4.87</del>							
<del>13.5.87</del>							
<del>29.5.87</del>							
<del>12.11.87</del>							
20-1-89							

PREM 19 / 3334

TOP SECRET

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3334</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Powell to Gwyn dated 19 February 1991</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>17/6/2017</i>  <i>G. Gwyn</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

# **A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PR 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3334</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Cradock to Powell dated 31 May 1990 with attachment</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>17/6/2017</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.


Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

# **A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3334</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Cradock to Powell dated 26 October 1989 with attachment</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>17/6/2017</i>  <i>G. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTERMEETING THE HERR TELTSCHIK

I went to Bonn on 20 January for a meeting with Herr Teltschik.

Modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons

This was the main subject. The German Government has not yet reached an agreed position. But the chances are that it will be unsatisfactory when they do, although Teltschik himself has some quite sensible ideas.

Teltschik said that Chancellor Kohl's personal view on modernisation was close to yours. But he had to reach an accommodation with the FDP. The problem was Genscher. I asked why Chancellor Kohl did not stand up to Genscher on this. Where else did the FDP have to go? Teltschik said you could never be sure with Genscher.

Teltschik said that there had been a coalition meeting before Christmas. The only point agreed then was that no-one wanted a third zero. There would be another meeting in the next ten days to try to reach agreement on other aspects. There were two main issues: when the Alliance should take decisions on modernisation; and what arms control conditions should be attached to them.

Chancellor Kohl's view was that there was no reason to delay a decision, provided the new US Administration confirmed very soon that it still wanted to modernise TASM and LANCE. He argued that, since both parties in the government were opposed to a third zero, this meant that both accepted the continuing need for effective SNF, which in turn meant that modernisation was necessary. The Soviet Union would have no incentive to negotiate reductions if NATO failed to modernise. Genscher, on the other hand, argued that there was no hurry. No decision was needed until 1991. He wanted to get through the



Federal Elections in 1990 first. But his real motive was his hope that the Soviet Union would take further steps before then which would make it impossible to go ahead with modernisation at all, by eroding public support for it. Shevardnadze's statement the day before detailing reductions in Soviet SNF would be grist to Genscher's mill. In this situation, Kohl's immediate aim was to tie the FDP down by getting a decision that modernisation was necessary. Even if it had to be postponed until 1991, it must be clear that the decision would definitely be taken then.

*If we can't tie them down now - we should in 1991 if the G. is still there which I believe he will be.*

The second aspect was the place of modernisation in the comprehensive concept. Genscher wanted it linked to an explicit commitment to negotiate with the Soviet Union now on reductions in SNF. Chancellor Kohl was not looking for immediate negotiations. But some substance had to be given to the commitment in the NATO Reykjavik communique that there would be negotiations on reductions. The question was how to formulate it. You had said in the past that negotiations on SNF could be held only when a balance of conventional forces and elimination of chemical weapons had been achieved. That might mean 15/20 years and was too remote. We should look for some intermediate formulation which held out the prospect of SNF negotiations if there was progress on conventional and chemical reductions.

No

*SNF by which I mean getting nuclear weapons out of NATO Europe.*

I said that the last NATO summit had agreed on the need for modernisation. We now needed to decide specifically that NATO would deploy successor systems for TASM and LANCE. The last US Administration had made clear that a decision was needed this year. There was no reason to expect the Bush Administration to reach a different conclusion. Chancellor Kohl had given a clear impression in Washington in November and to you in Rhodes in December that he wanted an early decision. I assumed he would not resile.

I continued that we were absolutely opposed to negotiations with the Russians on reductions in SNF. We could not identify any result from such negotiations which would not weaken NATO.

Negotiations would be used as an excuse to delay modernisation. They would distract from the need to negotiate reductions in conventional forces and eliminate chemical weapons. And the most probable outcome was that we would be trapped into a third zero. Your view on this was very firm indeed. If the Germans agreed to take the decision on modernisation but linked it to negotiations with the Russians on SNF reductions, we were in for a very difficult time. We accepted the NATO Reykjavik communique as it stood. But we could not start to interpret it as meaning that there could be SNF negotiations if there was 'progress' or even 'substantial progress' on conventional and chemical weapons.

---

I suggested that a better way forward was for the Alliance to link modernisation with autonomous reductions in nuclear artillery and munitions and then challenge the Russians to match us. There was general agreement that we could do with fewer warheads in Europe in the context of modernisation. This should surely satisfy German opinion. Teltschik said that his mind was moving in the same direction. He had proposed a new position to Chancellor Kohl, under which NATO should set a ceiling for the number of nuclear warheads it needed, while retaining the freedom to deploy them between TASM, the LANCE replacement and nuclear artillery as necessary. In practice holdings of nuclear artillery shells could be very considerably reduced if not eliminated altogether. We would then offer to negotiate with the Russians not on systems, but only on a common ceiling. This would meet Germany's need to demonstrate considerable reductions in the number of nuclear warheads while leaving NATO with the systems which it really needed. I said that this seemed a more promising approach, although I did not see it was necessary to negotiate the common ceiling with the Russians. They would only try to widen the negotiations. Teltschik did not know whether the FDP would accept his idea at all: they were less likely to do so without some provision for negotiation.

I said that I could see quite a serious clash approaching if the German Government came out in the next ten days or so with a position on modernisation which also linked it to SNF negotiations. It would certainly cast a shadow over the Anglo-German Summit. Would it help if you sent Chancellor Kohl a message setting out your views? Teltschik said that it certainly would. Chancellor Kohl would want to avoid a public row with you. The message should be sent as soon as possible. I urged him to continue to develop his idea for autonomous reductions by NATO.

Teltschik said that it was hard to divine exactly what game Genscher and the Foreign Ministry were playing. He hoped the Foreign Secretary would press Genscher on this issue when they met next week. Chancellor Kohl would do his best to get the right decision: but he had to keep the coalition government together.

#### NATO Summit

Teltschik asked whether we still supported an early NATO Summit. I said that you were willing in principle. But we had to give President Bush time to reach a view. And it had to be a Summit which reached the right conclusion. Teltschik said that a decision by a Summit would be the best way to compel the German Government to reach the right decision on modernisation. They could then present it as the united view of all sixteen NATO member states. Chancellor Kohl remained very keen to have the Summit before the European elections and before Gorbachev's visit to the FRG which was now expected in June. Otherwise Gorbachev would only exploit his visit to move German opinion against modernisation.

Teltschik said that the French might find it easier to have a Summit in Brussels than in London. I said that we were not wedded to London if Brussels was easier for President Bush. But I could not see why the French should object to London.

Gorbachev's visit

Teltschik said that Shevardnadze had told Genscher in Vienna last week that Gorbachev wanted to visit Germany in early June. On the face of it this was rather surprising, as it would help the CDU in the European elections. The Russians were keen to have a Joint Declaration and had submitted a draft which was 'eighty per cent all right'. I said that we were sceptical of such documents and had discouraged the Russians from pursuing a similar idea in our case. Teltschik asked whether Gorbachev was coming to the United Kingdom. I said that it was being discussed.

Poland

Teltschik is engaged in preparing Kohl's visit to Poland. It would be difficult: the Poles were demanding financial help and the Germans had a lot at stake, as a result of the vastly over-generous credits granted by the SPD government in the 1970s. I said that I hoped Chancellor Kohl would be no less firm than you on the need for political reform as the condition for help. From Teltschik's demeanour I doubt that he will be.

Anglo-German Summit

Teltschik said that the German Foreign Ministry had suggested there should be a Joint Statement. But their draft had been fairly free of content. I said that I did not think you felt a need for this. It was clear what needed to be discussed: nuclear modernisation, EC matters including agriculture and financial aspects, South Africa. There would no doubt be a number of common themes which you and Chancellor Kohl could emphasise at the press conference.

South Africa

Teltschik thought Leutwiler's visit had been worthwhile. I told him that the South Africans were expecting some

follow-up. You would want to discuss this at Frankfurt. Progress over Namibia should further reduce pressure for sanctions. Teltschik suggested that Britain and Germany might undertake some joint projects to help Black South Africans.

Libya: Chemical Weapons

Teltschik said that Chancellor Kohl was upset in equal measure with Genscher and with the Americans. Genscher had been in possession of the information about German involvement since May last year without passing it on. The Americans had treated the FRG like a banana republic instead of a country which practised the rule of law and needed evidence which stood up in court before it could act.

Economic Summit

Teltschik said that the French would want to give prominence to environmental issues, to debt (particularly of middle income countries) and to Bangladesh. The Germans had suggested there might be a declaration on human rights, to mark the bicentenary of the French Revolution. I wondered whether this might give rise to problems of definition.

Franco-German Relations

Teltschik claimed that these were rather in the doldrums. Mitterrand was increasingly interested only in grand events which would secure his place in (French) history. It was difficult to get anywhere on substance with the French at present.

Follow-up

You will want to send an early message to Kohl on the modernisation issue to help him with the debate within the Coalition. A draft is in the box.

C. J. P.

Charles Powell  
20 January 1989

B.R.

110

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Herr Teltschik has suggested that I should go over to Bonn for a talk in the fairly near future. The main purpose would be to discuss very frankly and outside normal channels the position on modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons and related problems. It would also be an opportunity to prepare your meeting with Chancellor Kohl in February, and go over the ground on Dr. Leutwiler's visit to South Africa.

If you agree, I would propose to go over on Friday 20 January when you are on a regional tour.

Agree?

Yes [initials]

CDJ

CHARLES POWELL

10 January 1989

106  
GPJ

SECRET AND PERSONAL  
SECRET



cdc

File SKW  
9

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

12 November 1987

**MEETING WITH HERR TELTSCHIK**

I enclose a copy of my note about my meeting with Herr Teltschik in Bonn on Wednesday evening. It is probably best not to circulate it at all widely. I am sending a copy on the same personal basis to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Alex Allan (Treasury), who may be interested in the paragraphs on the German economy.

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTERMEETING WITH HERR TELTSCHIK

I had a long talk in Bonn with Herr Teltschik yesterday. The following are the main points we touched upon.

Franco-German Defence Cooperation

I explained your misgivings about the course which Franco-German defence cooperation was taking. We were concerned that the creation of a privileged Franco-German relationship with institutions which paralleled those of the NATO Alliance could in the long term lead to the unravelling of NATO. I was not of course saying that this was the intention. But it might be the effect. I gave Herr Teltschik a summary of what we had learned from President Mitterrand and M. Bujon.

Herr Teltschik gave a long account of the history of Franco-German defence cooperation adding little to what we already know. He was more interesting when it came to current plans. He confirmed the intention to create a Defence Council, which would be agreed in principle at least at the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the Elysée Treaty next January. The Council was likely to have a small permanent secretariat to prepare its meetings. It would have a number of tasks, so far as the Germans were concerned:

- coordinating military concepts and strategies;
- strengthening NATO's southern flank; ?
- handling the integrated Franco-German military units;
- drawing France gradually into forward defence and out of its national redoubt;
- discussing arms control policies; and



- giving Germany an arm-lock on French planning for use of pre-strategic nuclear weapons, so that they would not be used on German territory.

For the French, the main purpose seemed to be to anchor Germany more firmly in the West. They were worried by the risk that Germany might become neutral. (Interestingly Teltschik did not appear to think this far-fetched.)

I said that in some ways this account increased my worries. What he was describing could be seen as a fully-fledged institution discussing all the same issues as NATO and duplicating its work. The logic of strategic developments should in the long-term bring France back into full-scale cooperation with NATO. The Germans were instead offering them an easy way out, and actually reducing the pressure on them to turn back to NATO. These suspicions were increased by the French invitation to other countries to join in. No-one wanted to put any barriers between France and Germany. But this degree of institutionalisation of their defence relationship threatened to divide both Europe and NATO.

This set Teltschik off on a long justification of German policy. Chancellor Kohl would never do anything to weaken NATO. The worst case for Germany would be to have to choose between the United States and France, but if it ever came to it, they would choose the US. The intention was to bring France closer to NATO. There were absolutely no grounds for mistrust. President Mitterrand was no less conscious of the importance of not decoupling the US from Europe. Although German thinking had not yet got very far, they would like to see Franco-German institutions extended to take in all WEU countries and become eventually the nucleus of a defence community of the Twelve - which would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. Non-stick - it would divide & weaken NATO

I said that this was reassuring so far as it dealt with German motivations. But it still did not get over the problem of appearances: it was bound to look exclusive and divisive of

NATO. It was difficult for us as a major member of NATO and contributor to Germany's defence to see a new institution created to discuss strategic issues of direct concern to us, of which we were not a part. Surely the Germans should at least use progress with Franco-German cooperation to put pressure on the French to come back towards NATO. For instance could there not be some declaration at the time of the establishment of the Defence Council to the effect that the purpose of Franco-German cooperation was to strengthen NATO and that its discussions would be conducted within the ambit of NATO's agreed strategy and policies. It seemed to me that the Germans were not actually exacting any price from the French. Teltschik said that this bore thinking about, as did the need to take account of the susceptibilities of others. Perhaps the process of extending the proposed Franco-German framework to others should be speeded up. I said that this was not really the point. Our concern was not that we wanted to belong to the institutions of Franco-German cooperation, but that we did not want that cooperation to detract from NATO or confuse its policies.

Teltschik asked about Franco-British nuclear cooperation. I said that in your view the practical scope for this was limited. Teltschik said that Germany's main concern in this area was with France's short-range systems. They did not like these when deployed in France, since they could only be used on German soil. And they did not want them deployed forward into Germany, as President Mitterrand had suggested, since this would increase the number of nuclear systems in Germany at a time when they were being reduced elsewhere. The best solution would be to get rid of them altogether. If President Mitterrand were re-elected this might be the result. He had little confidence in the role and efficacy of short-range systems, believing that massive retaliation offered the only credible deterrence.

Arms Control

I said that I had two worries about the present pace of arms control negotiations. First they had outstripped the development of other aspects of East/West relations which was undesirable since it implied that arms could be reduced without change in the Soviet Union's conduct in world affairs; and second there was no clear concept of what would follow 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons yet a definite and perhaps growing expectation in public opinion that the process of reduction would continue. We had to educate opinion to accept that it was a question of so far and no further.

Herr Teltschik said that this was why NATO needed the overall negotiating concept for which Germany was pressing. This should be worked out carefully and not hurried. There was no need to try to reach agreement at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. The correct approach was to start by analysing what NATO needed for its security in the wake of the INF agreement and then relate arms control priorities to that. The conclusion would be that the next steps should be in the field of conventional arms control. This would be a long drawn-out process. From Germany's point of view the prospect of reductions in short-range nuclear weapons must be kept alive (and they had been disappointed that the recent NPG meeting had not stuck to the language agreed at the NATO meeting in Reykjavik on this). But Germany was emphatically not seeking a third zero-zero option: all that they wanted was to bring down the scale of the Soviet Union's present superiority in short-range nuclear weapons. The modernisation of NATO's own short-range nuclear systems also needed to be thought out carefully, with the emphasis put not on battlefield systems but longer range weapons (400-500 km).

I asked if the Germans had a view on the need for a NATO Summit before or after the US/Soviet summit. Our own views were tending towards a summit in Europe next spring, ahead of a further US/Soviet meeting in Moscow. Teltschik said that it

was hard to work out what US intentions were. But Chancellor Kohl was rather sceptical of the value of a NATO summit of the sort which had followed the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. It would be more useful if the main NATO countries were to get together either collectively or - more feasibly - in a series of consecutive bilateral meetings.

#### East/West relations

I would record only two points from our discussion on this:

- the Germans assess that Gorbachev is secure for the time being. But they believe he has only about two years to produce results. If he fails, his position will be rapidly eroded. They base this view largely on what has been said to them by leading East Europeans (quite a number of whom have visited Bonn recently);
- they are expecting Gorbachev to visit Bonn quite soon, probably in the first half of next year. They had received several clear hints to this effect.

#### European Community

I said that you had the impression from your last talks with Chancellor Kohl that the Germans were reckoning on having to settle the future financing issue at the European Council under their Presidency. Was this still the view? Teltschik thought that it was, although the Chancellor hoped that some points at least could be settled in Copenhagen and put on one side, so that the German Presidency did not have to cope with everything. He also thought that the French would be under considerable pressure to make progress at Copenhagen. They feared an additional European Council might be called in March, right on the eve of their elections, at which they would be at a disadvantage.

I explained that you could not manage a visit to Bonn before the European Council but would be ready to meet Chancellor

Kohl in Copenhagen the evening before the European Council. Teltschik thought this a good idea and will discuss it with the Chancellor. He suggested for his part that officials dealing with the EC in the Federal Chancellery - Thiele, Grimm, Bitterlich - might come to London soon to try to sort out differences. I said that they should see Mr. Lavelle. I would ask him to get in touch.

### World Economy

I gave Teltschik a summary of your views. The Americans had to act on the budget deficit. Thereafter we envisaged an early meeting of the G7 at which others would declare their contributions to overcoming the current problems. That would require some significant steps by Germany. I recalled that Chancellor Kohl had specifically told you in the margins of the Venice Economic Summit that he would be ready to take such steps if German growth had not picked up by the end of the year.

Teltschik said that the Chancellor agreed with you on the seriousness of the situation. He too had sent a message to President Reagan saying that the time had come to take decisions on the budget deficit. There had been no reply.

More generally Teltschik said that he was surprised by how unruffled the German government as a whole seemed by the situation in the markets. This was partly because of Stoltenberg's preoccupation with events in Schleswig-Holstein. The Chancellor had summoned a meeting of his ministerial colleagues for today to consider what might be done. There were two principal options: bringing forward tax reform from 1990, although the complexities were enormous: or invoking the Stability Law (Stabilitätsgesetz) which gave the government powers to bring forward various public investment measures to help growth. He thought action under the latter was quite likely (but he is not directly involved in these matters). He agreed on the need for an early G7 meeting once the Americans had acted.

French Elections

It was clear from Teltschik's comments that Chancellor Kohl expects Mitterrand to run and to win, and that this is his preferred outcome. He also expects Mitterrand thereafter to divide the conservative parties and bring some of them into a coalition government with the Socialists. Kohl is increasingly dubious about Chirac whom he finds erratic and not dependable.

Comment

The Germans are rushing ahead on defence cooperation with France without thinking through the implications for NATO. They seem to be driven by a need to mark the anniversaries and milestones of Franco-German post war treaties with a series of symbolic steps of no great practical significance in themselves but whose consequences could be far-reaching. They can now be in no doubt about your concern. It will be important for you to raise it with Kohl.

On arms control it seems clearer than ever that the main pressure for early negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons comes from Genscher rather than Kohl.

On Europe there is little - indeed no - sign that Kohl has begun to wrestle with the substance. He is unlikely to do so until the last moment. There is no great feeling of urgency in the Federal Chancellery.

CDA

CHARLES POWELL

12 November 1987

cc: Sir Percy Cradock

7

PRIME MINISTER

## TRIPARTITE MEETINGS

At the end of our talks in Bonn today, both Herr Teltschik and M. Attali said that they thought it would be useful to continue our meetings. They were an invaluable way of ensuring that the personal views and priorities of Heads of Government on major international issues were well understood and, where possible, reconciled. They proposed that there should be a further meeting to prepare for the forthcoming European Council.

I said that you had agreed to this particular series of meetings to deal with a specific problem on arms control. I would need to check whether you were willing to see them continue on other issues and become a regular feature. There were, of course, particular sensitivities vis-a-vis other member states in meeting to discuss EC issues in this circle, and it would be even more important to preserve confidentiality.

You may like to discuss this with the Foreign Secretary after the Election. I think that the meetings are useful as a way of bringing Europe's three leading powers to make a habit of working together. But they do need very careful handling to ensure that they do not cut across or pre-empt work properly and better done by other people in other meetings. They should remain occasional rather than regular, and related to specific issues or occasions where the direct involvement of Heads of Government is a particular feature.

CDP

mt

C.D. POWELL

29 May 1987

SECRET

BM2BFJ

SECRET



file MJ2A22

bc pc 6

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

13 May 1987

*From the Private Secretary*

*Dear Tony,*

SRINF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had some discussion this afternoon of the problems which have arisen with the Germans over the handling of SRINF in the INF negotiations. It was agreed that we should continue to do everything possible, at every level, with the German Government to encourage them to reach a decision within a reasonable time scale. In that connection, it was agreed that I should visit Bonn on Friday 15 May for a further discussion with Herr Teltschik, based on the speaking note enclosed with Lyn Parker's letter of 11 May (which you are having translated into German).

It was also agreed that we needed to work out a statement of our own position which could be used publicly to refute allegations that the United Kingdom was responsible for delay in these negotiations. The Foreign Secretary said that he would let the Prime Minister see a text as soon as possible. The Prime Minister suggested that the Foreign Secretary might like to include a suitable passage in a speech, which could then be circulated more widely.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Charles Powell*  
Charles Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

*DTJ*



PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I sent the Foreign Secretary a copy of the note about my talk with Attali and Teltschik. His comments are attached.

On a possible Quadripartite Meeting at Head of Government level during the President's visit to Europe, I have asked Sir A. Acland to sound out Carlucci privately, to establish the President's reaction to the idea and the feasibility.

On the idea of a Tripartite breakfast at the next European Council, the Foreign Secretary has misgivings and I suggest you discuss this with him at your next bilateral. I think you should hold your ground. After all, you have an invitation.

Finally, there is the question of a further meeting with Attali and Teltschik. The Foreign Secretary has no objection to a meeting in London on 5 May. It would need to be in No.10, I think. Can I please have authority to go ahead with this?

*Yes - it is necessary*

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

21 April 1987



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1987

*Dear Charles,*

Many thanks for your letter of 11 April about your meeting with Attali and Teltschik. As you requested, I have shown it only to the Foreign Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that this was a useful meeting, though he endorses everything you say about the need for such meetings to be discreet, and to watch closely the Chirac/Mitterrand angle.

We are clearly moving into a difficult phase on INF: we shall be writing to you after the Shultz debrief tomorrow with a preliminary analysis, and I will not anticipate that. The Foreign Secretary thinks that we must try to get a coherent line on this subject within the Alliance very rapidly if we are not to appear totally disorganised to the Western press. For this a military input is necessary, and he is worried by the somewhat leisurely pace of military consideration at present envisaged in the NATO machinery. It may prove difficult to speed this up, though we shall try. But he hopes that we will not allow this to deter us from deciding what position our own national interest dictates that we should seek to establish in the Alliance. The implication of this is that our own military may well have to be pressed to give views in advance of NATO decisions, which they will be reluctant to do.

Of the matters covered in your letter, some are relatively easy:

- it is clear that we should resist strongly the incorporation of dual-use aircraft into any negotiations
- it is also clear that we should keep a strong link between any discussion of short range nuclear weapons (SNF) with conventional and chemical forces. Gorbachev's approach actually seems likely to facilitate this.

Treatment of SRINF will be much more difficult. Sticking to the present Alliance position as long as it is tenable clearly makes sense. But the Foreign



Secretary is inclined to think that it will not look sensible for long to resist an agreement purely in order to defend a theoretical option of deployment of SRINF weapons which in practice would be very difficult if not impossible to implement (the inclusion or non-inclusion of the German Pershing IAs will be a complicating factor). It is possible that Gorbachev's offer, if he has indeed made it, will be one which in the end we cannot refuse. Crucial to this will be an assessment of:

- whether there is or is not an adequate range of responses remaining to us without either LRINF and SRINF;
- whether holding on to a theoretical option to deploy SRINF would in practice improve that range of responses.

Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary agrees with the French suggestion that we should avoid talking about the denuclearisation of Europe. Like you, he is less certain whether a formal reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to use strategic nuclear weapons in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack on Europe would be helpful.

#### EC Questions

The Foreign Secretary fully endorses the points you made.

#### WEU

I need hardly say that he also endorses your point on this subject.

#### South Africa

It is helpful to know that Teltschik and Attali are unenthusiastic about a statement on South Africa at the Economic Summit. We hope that following the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington the Americans will not press this idea.


/Quadripartite

Quadripartite/Tripartite Meetings

This at the moment rests with my letter to you. I understand from Andy Bearpark that you did not wish it to be taken any further until your return. The Foreign Secretary thinks that it might conceivably be possible to arrange a Berlin Four meeting at Head of Government level in the context of the 750th Anniversary of the city. But in general he fears that any attempt to do this on a wider scale could well jeopardise the very successful quadripartite cooperation which takes place regularly at a less visible level. As regards tripartite meetings, he can see the attractions of breakfast meetings of the Berlin Three, but he believes that it would create such a hubbub among our other Community partners that it would probably make the whole enterprise more hindrance than help.

Further Meetings

The Foreign Secretary sees no objection to your holding a further meeting in London as proposed.

Yours ever,  


(A C Galsworthy)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

cite  
SR  
410 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1987

Dear Tony,

As the Foreign Secretary is aware, the Prime Minister agreed that I should attend an informal meeting with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik in Paris on 10 April. I enclose a note of our discussions. As you will see, there are three points for eventual decision:

- whether the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl should make a common presentation of their views on INF questions to the Americans after George Shultz' visit to Moscow. This is something we can determine only when we know the outcome of that visit and what the Russians propose;
- whether the Prime Minister should take a lead in suggesting to President Reagan that there should be a meeting of the Berlin Four at Head of Government level during his visit to Europe this summer;
- and whether Attali, Teltschik and I should meet again in about three weeks' time.

Both Attali and Teltschik emphasised that no-one other than their respective Heads of Government knew about our meeting. We shall see. But there is everything to be said for limiting knowledge of it if we can and I should be grateful if you would show this letter and my note to the Foreign Secretary only.

yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

File 12  
[Signature]

3

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

I attach, strictly for your private information, a note of a meeting which I had in Paris on 10 April with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik. Only the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are aware that the meeting took place. The contents of the discussions were not particularly sensitive but all three Heads of Government are keen to keep knowledge of the meeting very close indeed.

CDP

C. D. POWELL

11 April 1987

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

## ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I attach a note recording the main points from my talks with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik in Paris yesterday (which were of course held before Mr. Gorbachev's latest proposals on arms control). They were quite useful, principally in underlining the desire of our three Governments to co-ordinate our views as closely as possible on arms control issues. The points for decision which arose are three:

- whether you, Mitterrand and Kohl should make a common presentation of your views on INF questions to the Americans after George Shultz' visit to Moscow. This is something we can determine only when we know the outcome of that visit and what the Russians propose;
- whether you should take a lead in suggesting to President Reagan that there should be a meeting of the Berlin Four at Head of Government level during his visit to Europe this summer;
- whether Attali, Teltschik and I should meet again in about three week's time.

C.D.P.  
C. D. POWELL11 April 1987

SLHAIC

## NOTE FOR THE RECORD

## ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I had some three hours of discussions in Paris yesterday with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik. The initiative for the meeting came from them.

Attali and Teltschik evidently meet regularly. The extension of their meetings to include us was, they said, stimulated by the Prime Minister's initiative in consulting President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl before her visit to Moscow. This had made a powerful impact. Both are keen to continue tripartite contacts in this group (see below). In Attali's case there is an element - of which we need to be cautious - of reinforcing President Mitterrand's role at the expense of Chirac.

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow

I gave them a rather more detailed account of the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow on arms control than we provided in the message to European Heads of Government.

Arms Control

Most of the time was spent on arms control. There was not much new in substance. The main point was the strong wish to co-ordinate French, German and British views as closely as possible, particularly on INF matters. Our discussions took place before news of Gorbachev's latest proposals.

The INF negotiations were very much in the forefront of their concerns, and particularly how the West should react to a Soviet offer of zero SRINF. Attali and Teltschik expected such an offer to be made, thought that the United States would be very tempted to accept it, and that public opinion in Europe would be impressed, constricting the room for manoeuvre of European governments. But both made clear that their governments would prefer to avoid zero-zero if possible and were alive to the dangers of being led inexorably down the



path towards elimination of United States nuclear weapons in Europe.

There were also some differences of nuance. Attali reflected President Mitterrand's familiar scepticism about the military value of shorter-range nuclear weapons. His three main points were:

- we should not talk about the 'denuclearisation' of Europe since this implied that the United Kingdom and French strategic deterrents might be subject to constraints or eliminated altogether. We should not admit this possibility, even by implication;
- strong French opposition to negotiations on shorter-range systems which would impinge on the new French missiles shortly to be deployed (with a range of 400 km). This led him to the conclusion that any follow-on negotiations after an INF agreement should be limited to systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. There should be a 'Chinese wall' against negotiations below that range; and
- negotiations on INF and (if unavoidable) shorter-range systems should be balanced by a formal reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to use strategic nuclear weapons in the event of Warsaw Pact attack on Europe.

Teltschik reflected the schizophrenia of the German government's position, pulled in different directions by Kohl and Genscher. Genscher's aim was to get an INF agreement signed and sealed as rapidly as possible and he was prepared to jettison virtually any awkward conditions about shorter-range systems to achieve this. Kohl's objective was to avoid a zero option for systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. The question was: what were the best tactics to achieve this? The ideal solution would be Soviet agreement to equal ceilings greater than zero on such systems, embodied in

the text of an INF agreement. But if - as the Germans suspected - this proved unnegotiable, it would be better to leave these systems to the follow-on negotiations, with the western right to match unimpeded. The German view - unlike that of the French - was that these follow-on negotiations would then cover the whole range from 150 km - 1000 km. Teltschik did not conceal his differences with the French on this point, stemming from German anxiety to see the short-range systems (150 km - 500 km) which threaten Germany and no-one else reduced drastically, while longer-range systems are preserved. He also reflected German worries about being left as the only country in western Europe stationing weapons - the Pershing Is - in the SRINF category. The Germans would want to see some willingness on the part of Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy if not to station Pershing Is at least to store them, so that they could be moved forward into Germany in times of increased tension. This would spread the load.

I said that we should argue strongly for inclusion of equal ceilings above zero on SRINF in an INF agreement, as the Prime Minister had done in Moscow. The arguments why this was necessary in order to preserve western security were strong. We should not be defeatist about convincing public opinion in Europe of them, and we should not let ourselves be bounced into a new zero option. It was important to stick firmly to the agreed position on this, as set out in the American draft Treaty. But we also had to bear in mind that a western right to match might in practice be difficult to exercise. I did not fully share Attali's view on the need for a reaffirmation of the United States commitment to use its strategic nuclear weapons in defence of Europe: this might actually make it appear that we doubted the commitment. Part of the importance of common ceilings above zero on shorter-range systems was to avoid removing any further rungs from the ladder of flexible response, after an INF agreement. I warned of the likelihood that the Soviet Union would try to draw the American dual-capable aircraft in Europe into negotiations on short-range systems. This must be resisted. We should link

follow-on negotiations on short-range systems to progress in reducing imbalances in chemical and conventional weapons.

Attali raised the question how our three governments might best put their views to the United States Administration after Shultz' visit to Moscow (and the expected Soviet offer of a zero option on SRINF). He wondered whether there might be a joint letter from the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. I said that the important thing was to coordinate our responses so that, so far as possible, we all said the same thing. How we did it was a tactical question which could only be decided when we saw what emerged from Shultz' meeting. A common letter might appear confrontational, but equally could be an impressive demonstration of solidarity. We should keep an open mind.

We talked less about other arms control topics. We were all three sceptical about the prospects of progress on conventional weapons. Attali argued for preserving a clear distinction between negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons and on conventional force reductions.

#### EC Questions

There was no time for full discussion of these but I made two points:

- the United Kingdom would definitely not accept an Inter-Governmental Agreement this year, as the Commission seemed likely to propose;
- the European Council in June would be only a beginning to serious discussion by Heads of Government of future financing of the Community.

#### WEU

Teltschik said that the German government were keen to make early progress in strengthening the WEU. This must include moving the institutions to Brussels, to be alongside NATO and the EC. Attali saw no problem with this latter point (but

subsequently telephoned me to say that he discovered that the French government were keen to keep the Secretariat in Paris). He appeared to see the future of WEU partly in domestic political terms: Chirac was taking a lead, so Mitterrand was cautious. I said that our views had been set out in the Foreign Secretary's recent speech.

#### South Africa

Teltschik and Attali said that the Americans had recently proposed to them that the Economic Summit should issue a statement on South Africa. They were not enthusiastic. I said that we would be very much opposed.

#### Quadripartite/Tripartite Meetings

There was some discussion of a possible Berlin Four meeting at Head of Government level this year, given that the 750th Anniversary of the City would provide good cover for such a meeting. It was agreed that it would not be appropriate to hold it in Venice, but it might be possible to do so at some other point in President Reagan's visit to Europe. Attali subsequently telephoned to say that he had discussed this with President Mitterrand who was enthusiastic and wondered whether the Prime Minister might like to suggest the idea to President Reagan. She could quote his support and readiness to host a meeting in Paris if convenient.

It was also suggested that the Berlin Three might meet at Head of Government level over breakfast at European Councils.

#### Further Meetings

Attali and Teltschik were keen to meet again in this group fairly soon (and suggested 5 May in London). I said that I would have to obtain confirmation of this.

C.D.P

C. D. POWELL

11 April 1987  
SLHAIA

We 10/11/1

## NOTE FOR THE RECORD

## ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I had some three hours of discussions in Paris yesterday with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik. The initiative for the meeting came from them.

Attali and Teltschik evidently meet regularly. The extension of their meetings to include us was, they said, stimulated by the Prime Minister's initiative in consulting President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl before her visit to Moscow. This had made a powerful impact. Both are keen to continue tripartite contacts in this group (see below). In Attali's case there is an element - of which we need to be cautious - of reinforcing President Mitterrand's role at the expense of Chirac.

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow

I gave them a rather more detailed account of the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow on arms control than we provided in the message to European Heads of Government.

Arms Control

Most of the time was spent on arms control. There was not much new in substance. The main point was the strong wish to co-ordinate French, German and British views as closely as possible, particularly on INF matters. Our discussions took place before news of Gorbachev's latest proposals.

The INF negotiations were very much in the forefront of their concerns, and particularly how the West should react to a Soviet offer of zero SRINF. Attali and Teltschik expected such an offer to be made, thought that the United States would be very tempted to accept it, and that public opinion in Europe would be impressed, constricting the room for manoeuvre of European governments. But both made clear that their governments would prefer to avoid zero-zero if possible and were alive to the dangers of being led inexorably down the

path towards elimination of United States nuclear weapons in Europe.

There were also some differences of nuance. Attali reflected President Mitterrand's familiar scepticism about the military value of shorter-range nuclear weapons. His three main points were:

- we should not talk about the 'denuclearisation' of Europe since this implied that the United Kingdom and French strategic deterrents might be subject to constraints or eliminated altogether. We should not admit this possibility, even by implication;
- strong French opposition to negotiations on shorter-range systems which would impinge on the new French missiles shortly to be deployed (with a range of 400 km). This led him to the conclusion that any follow-on negotiations after an INF agreement should be limited to systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. There should be a 'Chinese wall' against negotiations below that range; and
- negotiations on INF and (if unavoidable) shorter-range systems should be balanced by a formal reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to use strategic nuclear weapons in the event of Warsaw Pact attack on Europe.

Teltschik reflected the schizophrenia of the German government's position, pulled in different directions by Kohl and Genscher. Genscher's aim was to get an INF agreement signed and sealed as rapidly as possible and he was prepared to jettison virtually any awkward conditions about shorter-range systems to achieve this. Kohl's objective was to avoid a zero option for systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. The question was: what were the best tactics to achieve this? The ideal solution would be Soviet agreement to equal ceilings greater than zero on such systems, embodied in

the text of an INF agreement. But if - as the Germans suspected - this proved unnegotiable, it would be better to leave these systems to the follow-on negotiations, with the western right to match unimpeded. The German view - unlike that of the French - was that these follow-on negotiations would then cover the whole range from 150 km - 1000 km. Teltschik did not conceal his differences with the French on this point, stemming from German anxiety to see the short-range systems (150 km - 500 km) which threaten Germany and no-one else reduced drastically, while longer-range systems are preserved. He also reflected German worries about being left as the only country in western Europe stationing weapons - the Pershing Is - in the SRINF category. The Germans would want to see some willingness on the part of Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy if not to station Pershing Is at least to store them, so that they could be moved forward into Germany in times of increased tension. This would spread the load.

I said that we should argue strongly for inclusion of equal ceilings above zero on SRINF in an INF agreement, as the Prime Minister had done in Moscow. The arguments why this was necessary in order to preserve western security were strong. We should not be defeatist about convincing public opinion in Europe of them, and we should not let ourselves be bounced into a new zero option. It was important to stick firmly to the agreed position on this, as set out in the American draft Treaty. But we also had to bear in mind that a western right to match might in practice be difficult to exercise. I did not fully share Attali's view on the need for a reaffirmation of the United States commitment to use its strategic nuclear weapons in defence of Europe: this might actually make it appear that we doubted the commitment. Part of the importance of common ceilings above zero on shorter-range systems was to avoid removing any further rungs from the ladder of flexible response, after an INF agreement. I warned of the likelihood that the Soviet Union would try to draw the American dual-capable aircraft in Europe into negotiations on short-range systems. This must be resisted. We should link

follow-on negotiations on short-range systems to progress in reducing imbalances in chemical and conventional weapons.

Attali raised the question how our three governments might best put their views to the United States Administration after Shultz' visit to Moscow (and the expected Soviet offer of a zero option on SRINF). He wondered whether there might be a joint letter from the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. I said that the important thing was to coordinate our responses so that, so far as possible, we all said the same thing. How we did it was a tactical question which could only be decided when we saw what emerged from Shultz' meeting. A common letter might appear confrontational, but equally could be an impressive demonstration of solidarity. We should keep an open mind.

We talked less about other arms control topics. We were all three sceptical about the prospects of progress on conventional weapons. Attali argued for preserving a clear distinction between negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons and on conventional force reductions.

#### EC Questions

There was no time for full discussion of these but I made two points:

- the United Kingdom would definitely not accept an Inter-Governmental Agreement this year, as the Commission seemed likely to propose;
- the European Council in June would be only a beginning to serious discussion by Heads of Government of future financing of the Community.

#### WEU

Teltschik said that the German government were keen to make early progress in strengthening the WEU. This must include moving the institutions to Brussels, to be alongside NATO and the EC. Attali saw no problem with this latter point (but



subsequently telephoned me to say that he discovered that the French government were keen to keep the Secretariat in Paris). He appeared to see the future of WEU partly in domestic political terms: Chirac was taking a lead, so Mitterrand was cautious. I said that our views had been set out in the Foreign Secretary's recent speech.

#### South Africa

Teltschik and Attali said that the Americans had recently proposed to them that the Economic Summit should issue a statement on South Africa. They were not enthusiastic. I said that we would be very much opposed.

#### Quadripartite/Tripartite Meetings

There was some discussion of a possible Berlin Four meeting at Head of Government level this year, given that the 750th Anniversary of the City would provide good cover for such a meeting. It was agreed that it would not be appropriate to hold it in Venice, but it might be possible to do so at some other point in President Reagan's visit to Europe. Attali subsequently telephoned to say that he had discussed this with President Mitterrand who was enthusiastic and wondered whether the Prime Minister might like to suggest the idea to President Reagan. She could quote his support and readiness to host a meeting in Paris if convenient.

It was also suggested that the Berlin Three might meet at Head of Government level over breakfast at European Councils.

#### Further Meetings

Attali and Teltschik were keen to meet again in this group fairly soon (and suggested 5 May in London). I said that I would have to obtain confirmation of this.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

11 April 1987  
SLHATA

DP  
7/4.

PRIME MINISTER

CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY

Herr Teltschik in Chancellor Kohl's office telephoned me this afternoon to say that he and M. Attali were under instructions from Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand respectively to hold a tripartite meeting of the sort you discussed with them last month. The purpose would be to talk over a number of defence and EC issues. They wondered whether I would be ready to take part in such a meeting. They would like it to be in London on 14 April, when Herr Teltschik will be on his way to the United States.

I would of course be perfectly happy to take part in such a meeting if you so wished. There might be some unhappiness on the part of the Foreign Office, particularly if there seemed any likelihood of any such meetings becoming institutionalised (though this has not been suggested).

My suggestion would be that we should agree to hold at least the first meeting in this form, and discuss at the meeting itself how this sort of consultation might best be carried on.

Yes no

You may wish to mention this to the Foreign Secretary on Monday.

Yes no

May I agree to take part in this meeting? Since you will not be in No. 10 on 14 April, might I hold the meeting here?

Yes - We shall need to consider the agenda.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL


3 April 1987

VC4ANB

# Grey Scale #13



**A** 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19



## Colour Chart #13

Blue Cyan Green Yellow

