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FILE TITLE: Chancellor Schmidt's Visit to Moscow		SERIES GERMANY
FRG Relations with USSR		
<u>CLOSED</u>		PART: 1
PART BEGINS: April 1980	PART ENDS: February 1991	CAB ONE: 

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Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(81) 38 th Meeting, item 2	26/11/1981
CC(80) 27 th Meeting, item 1	03/07/1980

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray

Date 15/6/2017

PREM Records Team

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GERMAN-SOVIET GENERAL STAFF TALKS

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING BY MAJ GEN NAUMANN ON HIS CALL ON THE SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF. NO PROGRESS ON CFE RESUBORDINATION ISSUE, BUT NAUMANN BELIEVES MOISEEV, REALISING THAT THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT SOVIET ACTIONS, WILL TRY TO FIND A FACE-SAVING SITUATION. NAUMANN ENDORSES US APPROACH TO CFE 1A. MOISEEV DISPLAYED MISTRUST OF US IN CONNECTION WITH THE GULF WAR AND A DESIRE TO UNDERMINE NATO AND THE US PRESENCE IN EUROPE. NAUMANN REGISTERED CONCERN ABOUT EVENTS IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS.

DETAIL

2. NAUMANN BRIEFED THE MINISTER ON 8 FEBRUARY ABOUT HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR STAFF TALKS, AND HANDED OVER HIS RECORD OF HIS MEETING ON 7 FEBRUARY WITH MOISEEV. TRANSLATION FOLLOWS BY BAG. (NAUMANN'S CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED. HE HAS ORALLY BRIEFED SENIOR AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND FEDERAL CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS, BUT NOT CIRCULATED HIS RECORD.) MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS.

CFE

3. MOISEEV HAD RAISED CFE RATIFICATION, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS IN THE SOVIET INTEREST BUT DIFFICULT. IN THE SOVIET PARLIAMENT IT HAD BEEN STATED THAT AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE WARSAW PACT, NATO AS AN INTACT BLOC WAS SUPERIOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD MADE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS. HOWEVER, MOISEEV AND THE GENERAL STAFF WANTED TO FIGHT FOR RATIFICATION.

4. NAUMANN HAD EMPHASISED THAT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN PARIS WAS A PRECONDITION FOR OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND FOR COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES. HE HAD REFERRED TO THE BREACH OF CFE ARTICLE 3 BY SOVIET BEHAVIOUR OVER THE THREE COASTAL DEFENCE DIVISIONS, AND PRESSED FOR A REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE NEGATIVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES - WHICH NOBODY WANTED - OF SOVIET

INSISTENCE ON THEIR POSITION. SOVIET REFERENCE TO THE CFE MANDATE'S EXCLUSION OF NAVAL FORCES WAS LEGALLY UNTENABLE. THE MILITARILY INSIGNIFICANT GAIN OF THREE DIVISION MUST COUNT FOR LESS THAN THE POLITICAL DAMAGE WHICH A BREACH OF THE TREATY WOULD CAUSE. MOISEEV HAD GIVEN NO SIGN OF MOVEMENT, BUT UNLIKE GENERAL DENISOV THE PREVIOUS DAY, HAD NOT DECLARED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE. NAUMANN'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT MOISEEV HAD RECOGNISED THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOUR WITH THE COASTAL DEFENCE DIVISIONS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AND WOULD TRY TO FIND A FACE-SAVING SOLUTION WHICH PRODUCED CONFORMITY WITH THE TREATY.

5. NAUMANN TOLD THE MINISTER THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH HOLIK (AUSWAERTIGES AMT) THE US PROPOSAL FOR HANDLING CFE 1A (UKDEL VIENNA TELNO 21) WHICH SEEMED SENSIBLE. HE HAD TOLD GOMPERT (NSC) ON 1 FEBRUARY THAT GERMAN WANTED CFE1A TO AVOID SINGULARISATION. THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE MANPOWER, WHICH COULD MEAN LIMITATIONS OR REDUCTIONS. (COMMENT: THIS MEANS GERMANY WILL NOT INSIST ON REDUCTIONS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS.) NAUMANN ACCEPTED GERMANY WOULD NOT ACHIEVE A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT.

NATO/US PRESENCE

6. MOISEEV HAD DESCRIBED NATO AS SUPERFLUOUS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT. HE HAD ACCUSED NATO, UNDER US PRESSURE, OF EVEN QUIETLY WIDENING ITS FIELD OF INFLUENCE. HE HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE GULF WAR SPREADING AND THE SUSPICION THAT THE US WOULD DRAW NATO INTO THE WAR. MOISEEV HAD SEEMED CONCERNED THAT THE US COULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. IN REPLY, NAUMANN HAD EXPLAINED THAT NATO WAS ESSENTIAL AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE THE BALANCE IN EUROPE AND AS A TRANSATLANTIC BOND. HE HAD REJECTED AS BASELESS THE ACCUSATION OF A CREEPING EXTENSION OF THE NATO AREA IN THE SHADOW OF THE GULF WAR. NAUMANN HAD EXPLAINED WHAT NATO WAS DOING TO DEFEND TURKEY AND UNDERLINED THAT THESE MEASURES WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE USSR. NAUMANN HAD ASKED MOISEEV TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NATO MEASURES AND STEPS UNDERTAKEN AGAINST IRAQ BY NATO STATES IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT UN SCR 678.

8. MOISEEV HAD INTERVENED TO UNDERLINE THE USSR'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROVEN POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY OF THE US, AND FEAR OF AN EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT. NAUMANN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR HOW DEEP-ROOTED THIS MISTRUST OF THE US WAS AND THAT MOISEEV WOULD BE HAPPY TO DIVIDE GERMANY FROM THE US, IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE SOVIET POWER EVEN WHEN IT WAS COLLAPSING. MOISEEV HAD AGREED WITH

HIM, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS BETTER TO COUNTER AN AGGRESSOR LIKE SADDAM HUSSEIN NOW IN A LIMITED WAR, TO BAN AGGRESSION AS A MEANS OF POLITICS, BEFORE SUCH A REGIME ACQUIRED THROUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH BARELY CONTAINABLE CONFLICTS.

SOVIET INTERNAL/BALTICS

9. NAUMANN TOLD THE MINISTER THAT, WITH REFERENCE TO THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, HE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD FORGET ABOUT THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE IF IN SOME ROOMS THERE WAS NO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS WAS NOT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT A MATTER OF COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE PARIS CHARTER. THE SOVIET GENERALS HAD NOT DISPUTED THIS, BUT MOISEEV HAD SPOKEN ABOUT SERIOUS INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND SAW NO SOLUTION. THE KEY POINT FOR THE SOVIET MILITARY WAS TO HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TOGETHER.

10. NAUMANN SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER TO GO AHEAD WITH THE STAFF TALKS. HE THOUGHT THE DECISION TO GO HAD BEEN RIGHT: HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK CLEARLY TO THE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERSHIP. (AT MODUK REQUEST, HE HAD ASKED INDIRECTLY WHY THE SOVIET MILITARY HAD CANCELLED TALKS WITH THE UK. THE REPLY HAD BEEN THAT NO TRAVELLING WAS PERMITTED DURING THE GULF CONFLICT.) MOISEEV HAD CONFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO VISIT GERMANY IN 1991. NAUMANN HAD TOLD MOISEEV THAT THE PROGRAMME OF GERMAN/SOVIET MILITARY CONTACTS FOR 1992 AND 1993 COULD BE AGREED WITHIN 2 TO 3 WEEKS.

SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

11. MOISEEV HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE GERMAN/SOVIET COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY OVER THE SOVIET FORCE WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD COMPLAINED THAT GERMANY HAD NOT YET FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO ARRANGE TRANSPORT TO THE POLISH BORDER AND TO BEGIN BUILDING HOUSING (IN THE SOVIET UNION). NAUMANN HAD REJECTED THESE ASSERTIONS AND TOLD MOISEEV THAT TRANSIT THROUGH POLAND WAS A BILATERAL MATTER FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND. GERMANY HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL SUMS OF MONEY AVAILABLE AND NOW EXPECTED FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE WITHDRAWAL TREATY.

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
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
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GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO GERMANY: 9-10 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. SUCCESSFUL VISIT WITH NO SURPRISES. SIGNATURE OF UMBRELLA TREATY ON BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TREATY ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION. ECONOMIC COMMISSION SET UP TO GIVE ADVICE ON RESTRUCTURING SOVIET ECONOMY. KOHL UNDERTAKES TO LOBBY WESTERN PARTNERS FOR AID TO SOVIET UNION. SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT REMAINING TROOPS IN EX-GDR.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV PAID HIS FIRST VISIT TO UNITED GERMANY FROM 9-10 NOVEMBER, ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SITARYAN AND CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL MOISSEEV. ON 9 NOVEMBER HE HAD LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VON WEIZSAECKER (PLUS WIVES), AND THEN HAD TALKS WITH KOHL (WHILE HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUES MET THEIR GERMAN OPPOSITE NUMBERS). THEN CAME A PLENARY DISCUSSION, AFTER WHICH KOHL AND GENSCHER SIGNED THE TREATY ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION. AT THE SAME TIME SITARYAN AND HAUSSMANN (ECONOMICS MINISTER) SIGNED THE TREATY ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SHEVARDNADZE AND BLUM (LABOUR MINISTER) SIGNED A LABOUR AGREEMENT. IN THE EVENING THERE WAS A FORMAL DINNER. AFTER EARLY MORNING MEETINGS ON 10 NOVEMBER WITH PARTY LEADERS LAMBSDORFF (FDP), WAIGEL (CSU), AND VOGEL AND LAFONTAINE (SPD), GORBACHEV THEN VISITED KOHL'S HOME REGION IN THE RHEINLAND PALATINATE, WHILE GENSCHER TOOK SHEVARDNADZE TO HALLE.

3. KASTRUP, THE MFA'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR, BRIEFED EC HEADS OF MISSION ON 12 NOVEMBER. HE SAID THAT BOTH GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION REGARDED THE NEW PHASE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AS INSEPARABLE FROM THE PROCESS OF PAN-EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT

THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WERE NOW ARISING AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CHANGES IN EUROPE. GORBACHEV'S AFTER-DINNER SPEECH ON 9 NOVEMBER HAD BEEN 'MOST REMARKABLE', WITH MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST BETWEEN NATIONS. GORBACHEV HAD REFERRED TO THE GERMANS' FAITH IN THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RUSSIANS' FAITH IN THE PERMANENCE OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY, WHICH HAD LEARNED THE LESSONS OF ITS NAZI PAST. THE GERMANS FELT THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR SIMILAR EXPERIENCE OF BUILDING DEMOCRACY OUT OF DICTATORSHIP THEY HAD MUCH TO OFFER THE SOVIET UNION.

ECONOMIC

4. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT A BILATERAL ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE SET UP QUICKLY TO GIVE ADVICE TO THE SOVIET UNION ON RESTRUCTURING ITS ECONOMY. ANOTHER WORKING GROUP WOULD DISCUSS HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE 400 ODD TREATIES CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EX-GDR. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, KOHL HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO GIVE ACTIVE SUPPORT TO SOVIET REFORM PROCESSES AND HAD UNDERTAKEN TO APPEAL TO GERMANY'S WESTERN PARTNERS FOR CONCRETE HELP FOR THE SOVIET UNION. KASTRUP SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THIS WOULD INCLUDE FOOD AID, BUT DID NOT RULE THAT OUT. HE ADDED, IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, THAT SOVIET EXPECTATIONS OF KOHL AS CHAMPION OF THEIR INTERESTS EXTENDED BEYOND THE ECONOMIC SPHERE TO THE MORE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE CREATION OF A NEW PAN-EUROPEAN STRUCTURE. HE ALSO IMPLIED INDIRECTLY THAT KOHL'S HELP COULD BE SEEN AS A FAVOUR IN RETURN FOR WHAT GORBACHEV HAD DONE TO PROMOTE THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY.

REMAINING SOVIET FORCES IN THE EX-GDR

5. THERE HAD BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REMAINING SOVIET FORCES IN THE FORMER GDR. GORBACHEV'S CONCERN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY EVIDENT DURING HIS SPEECH AT DINNER ON 9 NOVEMBER. THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS: THE DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE SOVIET TROOPS' INDISCIPLINED BEHAVIOUR (DRUGS, DRINK, CRIME), AND THE ANIMOSITY FELT BY THE POPULATION OF THE EX-GDR TOWARDS THE 'BAYONETS WHICH HAD UPHELD A HATED REGIME'. IT HAD BEEN CLEAR TO THE GERMANS THAT ANY HUMILIATING INCIDENTS CONCERNING SOVIET SOLDIERS MIGHT CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR GORBACHEV DOMESTICALLY, BY PROVIDING AMMUNITION FOR OLD THINKERS, WHO WERE UNHAPPY WITH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG HAD EMPHASISED THAT THEY WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS OVER ALL THIS, AND HAD

URGED THAT THE MIXED COMMISSION TO BE SET UP AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY ON STATIONING AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES SHOULD MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GULF

6. SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. OTHERWISE NOTHING NEW.

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7. SHEVARDNADZE REPORTED ON HIS RECENT DISCUSSION WITH BAKER ABOUT HOW TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE ON THE PROBLEM OVER THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT. HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL BUT SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO TALK TO THE RELEVANT PARTIES, ESPECIALLY TURKEY.

8. SHEVARDNADZE TRIED TO GET THE GERMANS INVOLVED AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION IN RESOLVING THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES OVER CSBMS. GENSCHER REFUSED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT A GERMAN PROBLEM. KASTRUP SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SEEMED INTENT ON FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

INTERNAL

9. GORBACHEV HAD MADE CLEAR DURING HIS BREAKFAST WITH LAMBSDORFF THAT HE WAS VERY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION AND THE TENDENCY TOWARDS WHAT HE CALLED 'THE LEBANONISATION' OF EUROPE. HE HAD INDICATED THAT THE UNION TREATY WOULD BE PUBLISHED SOON.

COMMENT

10. NO CONCRETE RESULTS, OTHER THAN THE AGREEMENT TO SET UP THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION TO ADVISE ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THE GERMAN PUBLIC REACTION REFLECTED SYMPATHY FOR THE CURRENT SOVIET PREDICAMENT BUT WAS RELATIVELY LOW KEY: THERE WAS NONE OF THE EUPHORIA OF GORBACHEV'S FIRST VISIT IN JUNE 1989.

11. NONETHELESS, THE VISIT IS CLEARLY REGARDED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AS HAVING MADE A WORTHWHILE CONTRIBUTION TO THE BUILDING UP OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH KOHL CONTINUES TO REGARD AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS CONFRONTING

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VISIT OF HELMUT KOHL TO THE SOVIET UNION 15/16 JULY

1. IT WAS ANNOUNCED BY TASS ON 29 JUNE THAT HELMUT KOHL WILL VISIT
THE SOVIET UNION ON JULY 15 AND 16 AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 November, 1988.

MEETING WITH HERR TELTSCHIK

Herr Teltschik came over from Bonn today to report on the Chancellor's visit to Moscow and discuss a number of other issues, including South Africa on which I have written separately. He had a brief meeting with the Prime Minister, and a rather longer talk with me. This letter elides the two discussions.

Chancellor Kohl's Visit to Moscow

Herr Teltschik said that Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow had been well received in the Federal Republic. There was a feeling that Germany had now caught up with the other major Western powers in terms of relations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev was a very popular figure in the Federal Republic, and this was a political reality of which the Government had to take account.

Herr Teltschik continued that the Germans had found Mr. Gorbachev in excellent shape. It had been clear from the beginning that he was determined to make a success of Chancellor Kohl's visit. There had been no spectacular surprises, but the net effect had been to normalise relations. The Germans had the clear impression that Yakovlev was now number two in the Soviet hierarchy, and part of an inner ring comprising also Shevardnadze and Ryzkhov. Ligachev seemed to be out of the limelight; at the official dinner he had been placed on the second table. Another point which had struck the Germans was that Gorbachev's ideas seemed not to have percolated down to working level in the Soviet bureaucracy. This was very evident when it came to trying to negotiate texts. There had been particular problems, still unresolved, over finding language to deal with the inclusion of West Berlin in the texts of planned bilateral agreements.

Herr Teltschik said that Gorbachev had outlined the three main areas of interest for the talks with

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Chancellor Kohl: bilateral relations, shaping Europe and improving international relations. On the bilateral front, Gorbachev had warned Kohl against trying to embarrass him over "my Germans". He had talked of restoring an autonomous area for Germans in the Soviet Union and introducing a law to provide better protection for minorities. The Germans were prepared to take him at his word on this. Shaping Europe was another term for Gorbachev's talk of a Common European Home. He had stressed that this should not mean any weakening of existing alliances or change in the post-war order in Europe. These were the basis from which any progress in European relations must start. He had also made clear that the United States and Canada were inhabitants of the Common European Home. Under the heading of improving international relations, Gorbachev had talked mostly about arms control, but the Germans had been more impressed by what he did not say than what he did. He had made no mention of a third zero option for SNF. Nor had he raised the issue of modernising Lance. On the other hand, he had criticised Franco-German military cooperation and the revival of WEU. He had emphasised that the Soviet Union was serious in seeking reductions in conventional forces.

Herr Teltschik continued that Gorbachev had also discussed economic relations, adopting a rather defiant tone and warning the Germans against treating the Soviet Union as simply an economic hinterland. He had also spoken of his problems in trying to get rid of internal barriers between the defence sector and the civil economy in the Soviet Union. In discussion of human rights issues, Gorbachev had stressed the importance of holding a human rights conference in Moscow. Chancellor Kohl had said that he was open-minded on this. The Western countries would see what emerged from the planned meetings in Paris and Copenhagen, and then decide whether sufficient progress had been made. The German view was that Gorbachev probably needed a conference to push forward human rights against internal opposition. The Prime Minister made clear to Herr Teltschik that we took a more astringent view of this subject, and were not prepared to contemplate attending a conference unless various agreed criteria for human rights performance had been met and sustained. She also enquired about reports that the Soviet Union had backed down from its commitment during Chancellor Kohl's visit to free all political prisoners. Herr Teltschik said rather defensively that this had been put in Chancellor Kohl's press conference statement at Herr Genscher's insistence, following his own talks with Shevardnadze. In practice, Shevardnadze had said nothing to Genscher that he had not earlier said to Shultz and to the French Government during his visit to Paris.

Franco-German Cooperation

Herr Teltschik was rather pessimistic in speaking about Franco-German cooperation. The Germans found President Mitterrand very difficult to pin down. His staff had no new ideas for developing Franco-German cooperation. At the moment, very little was happening.

US Elections

Herr Teltschik thought it very important that the Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl should convey very similar messages to the incoming President during their visits to Washington, both on East-West relations, the US economy and the Middle East. From our conversation, there did not seem to be any significant distance between us on these issues. Herr Teltschik thought that Vice-President Bush, if elected, would be anxious to hold an early NATO Summit. His advice was that we should convert the NATO Spring Ministerial Meeting in London into a Summit, as a means of binding the new President into agreed Alliance positions.

Modernisation of Nuclear Weapons

Herr Teltschik said that Chancellor Kohl was still committed to take the necessary decisions for replacement of LANCE. Given the political difficulties in the Federal Republic, he would need all the help he could get from us. It would be important to combine replacement of LANCE with a reduction in NATO's nuclear artillery. It would also be helpful to rally the widest possible support in the Alliance for early decisions on modernisation, so that the Chancellor could argue the need to go along with pressure from Germany's allies. In response to my specific question, Herr Teltschik said that he was confident that the necessary decisions would be taken before the next German elections. He would like to discuss these matters in greater detail with me shortly.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C.D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

a Bp

PRIME MINISTER

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MEETING WITH MR TELTSCHIK

You have agreed to see Mr Teltschik briefly on Monday morning so that he can brief you on Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow. He will also be discussing with me the text of the speaking note for Mr Leutwiler to use with President Botha.

Points which you might raise with Mr Teltschik are:

Significance of the visit

You might ask Teltschik to convey congratulations to Chancellor Kohl on the success of his visit and on the way in which he abided firmly by agreed NATO positions.

Human rights

The Russians seem to be back-tracking somewhat on the assurance which they apparently gave to Chancellor Kohl about the release of political prisoners. You hoped that, on his part, Chancellor Kohl made clear the West could not attend a human rights conference in Moscow until the Soviet Union had implemented its obligations under the Helsinki Accords in full.

Economic relations

You will want to question Teltschik on the Chancellor's approach to economic assistance - credits, loans, etc. - to the Soviet Union and the East European countries. You will want to tell him of the firm line which you took in Poland and how you think talk of anything resembling a Marshall Plan is misplaced.

Modernisation of nuclear weapons

You might take the opportunity to stress to Mr Teltschik - for Chancellor Kohl's benefit - the great importance you attach to timely decisions on modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons. In the present state of change and flux in East/West relations it is very important not to give

the wrong signal but rather to proceed smoothly with
implementing the decisions already taken by Heads of
Government. We must, in particular, get a decision on a
successor to Lance through in good time.

South Africa

You might say to Teltschik that we think Mr Leutwiler
should go to South Africa fairly soon now that the local
elections are out of the way.

You will want to say that you are looking forward to meeting
Chancellor Kohl over breakfast in Rhodes on 2 December.

C.S.P.

Charles Powell

4 November 1988

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SOVIET UNION/WEST GERMANY: KOHL VISIT

SUMMARY

1. POLITURO WELCOME PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COLLABORATION BUT TAKE A TOUGH LINE ON GERMAN QUESTION.

DETAIL

2. THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE POLITBURO'S DISCUSSIONS OF THE KOHL VISIT READS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE POLITBURO APPROVED THE OUTCOME OF M S GORBACHEV'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH FEDERAL CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND ALSO OF THE TALKS BETWEEN N I RYZHKOV, E A SHEVARDNADZE, A N YAKOVLEV AND D T YAZOV WITH WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS AND BUSINESSMEN. THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS CONFIRMED THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEEPENING OF THE MULTI-FACETED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE FRG, AND WERE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO FULFILLING THE TASK SET BY BOTH SIDES, - TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS AIM PRESUPPOSES RESPECT FOR THE EXISTING TERRITORIAL-POLITICAL REALITIES IN EUROPE, WHICH ARE UNDERPINNED IN THE MOSCOW TREATY, AND OTHERS BETWEEN THE FRG AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON WEST BERLIN (IC), AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

3. "THE RICH PRACTICAL RESULTS OF THE VISIT UNDERLINE THE GREAT POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-WEST GERMAN COOPERATION IN VARIOUS SPHERES, ESPECIALLY IN ECONOMIC AREAS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL PROFIT. THE CONVICTION WAS EXPRESSED THAT M S GORBACHEV'S FORTHCOMING VISIT WOULD PERMIT THE STRENGTHENING OF POSITIVE TENDENCIES IN RELATIONS WITH THE FRG, AND GIVE THEM A NEW DYNAMISM AND INCREASED SCOPE."

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
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MY TELNO 1782 AND BONN TELNOS 1068/1069: KOHL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
SUMMARY

1. THERE WAS LESS IN THIS VISIT THAN MET THE EYE. BUT THE GERMANS
HAVE SECURED A GOOD POSITION FOR STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC TIES AND
DEFENCE EXCHANGES.

DETAIL

2. THE FIRST SOVIET COMMENTS ON THE KOHL VISIT ARE NOW BEING
PUBLISHED. THEIR LEITMOTIF IS THAT THE VISIT BEGAN A 'NEW CHAPTER'
OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS. IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE CASE THAT THINGS
HAVE COME A LONG WAY IN THE TWO YEARS SINCE KOHL'S FAUX PAS ABOUT
GOEBBELS. BUT, ALTHOUGH THE COMMENTATORS ARE AGREED THAT THE
INTENTIONS ON BOTH SIDES ARE GOOD, THERE IS OBVIOUS UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
THE SUBSTANCE OF FUTURE RELATIONS. KOHL'S UNCOMPROMISING
CHAMPIONSHIP OF REUNIFICATION, BERLIN AND THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC
GERMANS WILL HAVE BEEN A REMINDER OF THE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES THAT
REMAIN. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE SHOWED THAT NEW THINKING HAS NOT GONE
FAR ON THE CENTRAL POLITICAL PROBLEM OF EUROPE: DIVIDED GERMANY.
KOHL'S WORDS ABOUT SNF WILL HAVE SHOWN THAT PICKING OFF THE WEST
GERMANS IN THE MODERNISATION DEBATE WILL NOT BE AS EASY AS THE
RUSSIANS MAY HAVE THOUGHT. AND MEYER-LANDRUT'S BRIEFING SHOWED THAT
EVEN IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE NOT ALL IS ROSY.

3. GORBACHEV WILL BE SATISFIED TO HAVE SEEN THE PROMISES OF LAST
SUMMER ABOUT GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FOOD-PROCESSING INDUSTRY
CONSOLIDATED BY AN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT. (THE PRESS HAS
GIVEN DETAILS OF THE GERMAN FIRMS INVOLVED, WHICH MY COMMERCIAL
DEPARTMENT ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY.) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OTHER
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WILL ONLY BE SEEN WHEN WE GET A CHANCE TO READ
THE TEXTS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE GERMANS CONCLUDED AN
AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, AT A TIME WHEN THE
RUSSIANS ARE TELLING US THAT OUR REQUIREMENTS ARE TOO INTRUSIVE. IT
MAY ALSO BE SIGNIFICANT THAT AN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENT WAS
NOT SIGNED.

4. THE SCHOLZ-YAZOV MEETING AND THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO SCHOLZ,
INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS A MILITARY ACADEMY, WAS CLEARLY

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IMPORTANT TO THE RUSSIANS. YAZOV HAD BEEN WELL BRIEFED ON SCHOLZ: HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE GERMAN'S STATEMENTS NO DOUBT CONTRIBUTED TO THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE. HE SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE KEY ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, PLAYING OLD GRAMOPHONE RECORDS ON 'TANKS FOR AIRCRAFT' AND THE DEFENCE BUDGET. NONETHELESS HIS ACCEPTANCE OF SCHOLZ'S INVITATION TO VISIT WEST GERMANY, AND FOR THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN AKHROMEYEV VISIT, LEAVES THE GERMANS WELL-PLACED IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THE AMERICANS FOR THE POST-AFGHANISTAN PERIOD. IT COULD ENABLE THE GERMANS TO SPEAK WITH GREATER AUTHORITY IN FUTURE ALLIED DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.

5. THE PATTERN OF ACADEMIC AND TRAINING EXCHANGES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND CONTAINED IN THE 'AGREED PRESENTATION' IS AMBITIOUS, BUT TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET NEEDS. THE GERMANS NO DOUBT REGARD IT AS ONE MORE INSTRUMENT FOR DEVELOPING PROFITABLE COMMERCIAL, AS WELL AS POLITICAL, LINKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

6. GORBACHEV'S DETERMINED REJECTION OF A NEW 'MARHSALL PLAN' MAY PARTLY STEM FROM HIS RUSSIAN NATIONAL PRIDE. BUT HE IS IN ANY CASE RIGHT TO JUDGE THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION WILL ONLY OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE RUSSIANS' OWN EFFORTS, AND THAT WESTERN COOPERATION, HOWEVER USEFUL, IS ESSENTIALLY PERIPHERAL.

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
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KOHL'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION : FRG PRESS AND POLITICAL REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. HIGH EXPECTATIONS BEFORE THE VISIT, AS A RESULT OF HEAVY ADVANCE BRIEFING AND PRESS COVERAGE. LITTLE ELSE IN THE FRG MEDIA THIS WEEK. SOME SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT AT LIMITED RESULTS, ESPECIALLY ON BERLIN. BUT THE PRESS HAS WELCOMED THE RESUMPTION OF TOP-LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACT. FAVOURABLE REACTION BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

DETAIL

2. IN INTERVIEWS BEFORE THE VISIT, KOHL SAID HE EXPECTED HIS JOURNEY TO MOSCOW TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER. SUCH COMMENTS, TOGETHER WITH MASSIVE ADVANCE PRESS COVERAGE HELPED TO BUILD UP A HEADY ATMOSPHERE OF EXPECTATION.

3. GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH DER SPIEGEL ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT (WOODS' LETTER OF 25 OCTOBER AND TELELETTER DATED 26 OCTOBER FROM TUCKER, MOSCOW, TO SOVIET DEPARTMENT) HAD THE EFFECT OF LOWERING EXPECTATIONS. COVERAGE OF THE EARLY PART OF THE VISIT CONCENTRATED ON KOHL'S AND GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC REFERENCES TO BERLIN AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THOUGH MUCH WAS MADE OF GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT THAT 'THE ICE WAS BROKEN' THE PRESS CLEARLY SENSED THAT THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE A BREAKTHROUGH ON THOSE OR OTHER MAJOR ISSUES. A TYPICAL COMMENT WAS THAT THE VISIT 'WOULD NOT HAVE THE LANDMARK QUALITY OF ADENAUER'S IN 1955 OR BRANDT'S IN 1970'.

4. FROM THAT POINT ON, MEDIA COMMENT BECAME MORE DOWN TO EARTH, CONCENTRATING ON THE PROGRAMME AND AGREEMENTS. THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ) SAID THAT 'GORBACHEV'S WORDS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION MAKE IT CLEAR HOW MUCH INTEREST HE HAS IN IT: HARDLY NONE'. DIE WELT SAID THAT 'THE VISIT IS NOT PROCEEDING IN QUITE AS A STREAMLINED A MANNER AS MANY HAD HOPED' BECAUSE OF GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY. THE SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ADDED THAT GORBACHEV 'HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD PROBABLY HAVE

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TO RETURN TO BONN WITHOUT A PRESENT FROM HIS HOST''.

5. DESPITE COMMENTS OF THIS SORT, KOHL HAS BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR A SOLID AND RELIABLE PERFORMANCE, AND IN PARTICULAR FOR HAVING SUCCESSFULLY RE-ESTABLISHED TOP-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACT. THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN WELCOMED. THERE HAS BEEN NO TENDENCY TO ARGUE THAT MORE COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, IF KOHL HAD PLAYED THE VISIT DIFFERENTLY. SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS HAVE COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON KOHL'S ADHERENCE TO ALLIED POSITIONS.

6. THE COALITION PARTNERS AND THE SPD HAVE COMMENTED FAVOURABLY. FOR THE SPD, EGON BAHR DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION THE PARTICIPATION OF THE DEFENCE MINISTER, SCHOLZ, SAYING THIS WAS A GENUINE AND WELCOME ''FIRST''. SO FAR, NO SPD LEADER HAS SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD HAVE DONE BETTER. THE OUTCOME ON BERLIN, SAID BAHR, HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISING. FRAU GEIGER (FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN OF THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY GROUP) DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS OF ''GREAT, PERHAPS EVEN HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE'', ADDING (WITH SOMETHING LESS THAN COMPLETE LOGIC) THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD MADE CLEAR BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE THAT NO SENSATIONAL RESULTS WERE TO BE EXPECTED. THE FDP SAID THAT THE RESULTS WERE DUE TO A POLICY OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. THE FDP HAD PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THIS FROM THE BEGINNING.

COMMENT

7. SO FAR THEREFORE THE PRESS AND PUBLIC RECEPTION OF THE VISIT HAS BEEN FREINDLY WITHOUT BEING ECSTATIC. NO LINE OF CRITICISM HAS YET OPENED UP AND THERE ARE NO OBVIOUS OPENINGS FOR THIS. KOHL WILL, I ASSESS, BE JUDGED AS HAVING DONE A COMPETENT JOB BUT NOT ONE THAT WILL GREATLY BOOST HIS POSITION DOMESTICALLY.

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KOHL'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SUMMARY

1. GERMAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR DESCRIBES VISIT AS MAJOR TURNING POINT AND NEW CHAPTER IN RELATIONS. DATES FOR GORBACHEV'S RETURN VISIT NO FIXED BUT LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER 1989 SEEMS LIKELY. SOVIET INTEREST IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH EC. SOME CONCERN FROM GORBACHEV ABOUT FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION. JOINT HOPE THAT VIENNA CSCE MEETING SHOULD END NEXT MONTH AND THAT CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GERMANS CLEAR THAT SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT ALL PERSONS REGARDED BY WEST AS POLITICAL DETAINEES IN USSR WOULD BE RELEASED THIS YEAR.

DETAIL.

2. THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS THIS MORNING ON THE BUSINESS PART OF KOHL'S VISIT. RICHTHOFEN HAD RETURNED WITH GENSCHER YESTERDAY. KOHL RETURNS TONIGHT. RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW WOULD DO AN EC BRIEFING AND HE HIMSELF WOULD BRIEF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 2 NOVEMBER. RICHTHOFEN DISTRIBUTED COPIES IN ENGLISH OF AN 'AGREED PRESENTATION', DRAWN UP WITH THE RUSSIANS, OF THE RESULTS OF KOHL'S VISIT. TEXT SENT BY FAX TO SOVIET DEPARTMENT.

3. RICHTHOFEN DESCRIBED KOHL'S VISIT AS A MAJOR TURNING POINT IN GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, A NEW CHAPTER IN WHICH MANY OF THE PAGES STILL NEEDED TO BE WRITTEN. THERE WAS GROWING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND GREATER PREPAREDNESS TO LOOK FOR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION.

PROGRAMME

4. KOHL HAD SPENT 10 HOURS ALTOGETHER WITH GORBACHEV AND HAD SEPARATELY SEEN RYZHKOV. GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD HAD 2 AND A HALF HOURS OF TALKS AND A PRIVATE DINNER. GENSCHER HAD ALSO SEEN YAKOVLEV. SCHOLZ, THE FIRST FEDERAL GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTER TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION, HAD HAD FRIENDLY AND SUBSTANTIAL TALKS WITH

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YAZOV, ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THREE SOVIET ARMED SERVICES. YAZOV HAD AGREED THAT ASYMMETRIES IN FORCES IN EUROPE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED BY NEGOTIATIONS. THE GERMANS HOPED THAT YZAOV WOULD ACCOMPANY GORBACHEV ON HIS VISIT NEXT YEAR TO THE FRG. KOHL HAD ALSO SEEN SAKHAROV, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GERMAN MINORITY IN THE SOVIET UNION INCLUDING 30 ABOUT TO EMIGRATE, AND THE PATRIARCH OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH. SOME 30 CONTRACTS HAD BEEN SIGNED BY GERMAN FIRMS. THE DM 1 BILLION CREDIT COORDINATED BY THE DEUTSCHE BANK HAD BEEN CEREMONIALLY APPROVED (IN LINE, RICHTHOFEN COMMENTED, WITH RECENT BANK CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND ITALY.)

KOHL-GORBACHEV TALKS

5. RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT KOHL AND GORBACHEV HAD AGREED THAT PRERESTROIKA CREATED FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR GREATER EAST-WEST COOPERATION. GORBACHEV HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND CMEA AND THE SOVIET UNION. KOHL HAD REAFFIRMED THAT THE COMMUNITY AFTER 1992 WOULD REMAIN AN OPEN AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER: ALL EC PARTNERS AGREED THAT THE SINGLE MARKET WOULD NOT INTRODUCE 'A NEW CURTAIN' ACROSS EUROPE. GORBACHEV HAD RAISED, IN CRITICAL TONE, THE GROWING COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. KOHL HAD CITED FRANCO-GERMAN RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION AS A MODEL IN EUROPE, WHICH WAS DIRECTED AGAINST NO-ONE.

6. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ACHIEVE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.

7. KOHL HAD SAID THAT THE DIVISION OF GERMANY SHOULD BE OVERCOME BY PEACEFUL MEANS. COHESION OF THE GERMAN NATION WAS PART OF THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL REALITY IN EUROPE. THE WORST CONSEQUENCES OF DIVISION SHOULD BE REMOVED. GORBACHEV HAD UNDERSTOOD THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THIS AND HAD SEEMED REALISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE, IN THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT THE MORE EUROPE GREW TOGETHER, THE MORE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY GERMAN DIVISION COULD BE OVERCOME. KOHL WELCOMED INCREASED GERMAN EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR AND CALLED FOR BETTER CONDITIONS FOR GERMANS STAYING THERE.

8. IN A PLENARY MEETING OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS, GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN A STRONG AND DETERMINED IMPRESSION, KEEPING HIS TEAM FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL. GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT THE IDEA OF THE EUROPEAN HOME WAS RECEIVING INCREASINGLY POSITIVE REACTIONS. IT DID NOT MEAN TEARING DOWN ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE TWO HALVES OF EUROPE, BUT

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BUILDING ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS. RICHTHOFEN COMMENTED THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A HINT HERE THAT THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONS INCLUDED THE TWO ALLIANCES.

9. I WASKED WHETHER THE GERMANS HAD SAID ANYTHING TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE QUESTION OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT KOHL, IN HIS SPEECH AT THE KREMLIN DINNER, HAD SPOKEN OF NEGOTIATIONS, IN LINE WITH THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE AT REYKJAVIK, AND HAD CALLED ON THE RUSSIANS TO ELIMINATE THEIR SUPERIORITY IN THIS FIELD OF WEAPONS AS IN OTHERS.

10. RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT NO DATES HAD BEEN FIXED FOR GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE FRG IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1989. BUT KOHL HAD SAID THAT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE IN A TIME OF GOOD WEATHER. (TODAY'S GERMAN PRESS SPECULATES ABOUT MAY OR JUNE).

KOHL'S OTHER MEETINGS.

11. RYZHKOV TOLD KOHL THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD DECIDED ON MAXIMUM INTEGRATIOON INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY. THE USSR COULD ACHIEVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ALONE BUT INTEGRATION WOULD ACCELERATE IT.

12. SAKHAROV HAD SUGGESTED TO KOHL THE IDEA OF A DEMILITARISED CORRIDOR, FREE OF ALL TYPES OF FORCES AND WEAPONS, IN THE MIDDLE OF EUROPE. SAKHAROV AND MRS BONNER HAD SAID THAT, OF 800 PERSONS IN POLITICAL DETENTION LAST YEAR IN THE SOVIET UNION, ALL HAD BEEN RELEASED EXCEPT 100. THE LATTER FIGURE INCLUDED 15 PEOPLE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL HOSPITALS, DOWN FROM 200 A YEAR AGO.

GENSCHER'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

13. RICHTHOFEN SAID THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED THE JOINT POLITICAL DOCUMENT WHICH THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED TO ISSUE WHEN GORBACHEV VISITS THE FRG. ITS TITLE HAD YET TO BE AGREED. SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN GENSCHER LAST MONTH IN NEW YORK SOME ELEMENTS FOR THIS. SOME OF THIS MATERIAL WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG. BUT THE GERMANS HAD ADDITIONAL IDEAS WHICH THEY WOULD SOON PRESENT TO THE RUSSIANS. SHEVARDNADZE WOULD VISIT BONN EARLY IN 1989 TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

14. SHEVARDNADZE HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CSCE MEETING IN VIENNA WOULD END IN MID-NOVEMBER. HE HAD MADE THE CASE FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW AFTER THOSE IN PARIS AND COPENHAGEN. GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT THE THREE CONFERENCES MUST FOLLOW THE SAME RULES. THERE WERE ALSO OTHER PRE-CONDITIONS, WHICH HE HOPED THE

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SOVIET UNION WOULD MEET: THE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL DETAINEES AND PROVISIONS ABOUT RADIO JAMMING, EMIGRATION, FREE TRAVEL AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THERE WERE NO POLITICAL DETAINEES IN THE USSR BUT THAT ALL THE PERSONS REGARDED AS SUCH BY THE WEST WOULD BE RELEASED IN 1988. ON THE OTHER CONDITIONS MENTIONED BY GENSCHER, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ADHERE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN THE DOCUMENT TO BE AGREED IN VIENNA. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD AGREED THAT THE REMAINING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS COULD BE SOLVED. SHEVARDNADZE HAD MENTIONED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT MEETING OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, TO GIVE A BOOST TO ARMS CONTROL ESPECIALLY CST. HE HAD ALSO PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRE TO ELIMINATE THE DANGER OF WAR AND SURPRISE ATTACK. GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE FRG, LIKE FRANCE, WOULD FAVOUR A SUMMIT WITH US AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION BUT THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS CONVENTIONAL STABILITY. A SUMMIT WOULD NEED CAREFUL PREPARATION. GENSCHER HAD ASKED FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE IDEA OF A NEW CENTRE TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT A CONFERENCE IN PARIS IN EARLY 1989 CONCERNED WITH THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL.

15. SEE MIFT.

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MIPT : KOHL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : INITIAL COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF VISIT HERE LIKELY TO BE THAT KOHL MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BUT THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN EAST-WEST AND GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. APPARENTLY NO GERMAN CONCESSIONS OR MAJOR SOVIET PLOYS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. RUSSIANS IN POSITION TO USE QUESTION OF DATES FOR GORBACHEV'S RETURN VISIT IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE FRG'S POSITIONS ON EAST-WEST MATTERS EG SNF.

DETAIL

2. I SHALL SEND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VISIT'S IMPLICATIONS WHEN WE HAVE ALL THE RELEVANT INFORMATION. THIS TELEGRAM OFFERS INITIAL COMMENTS.

3. KOHL CAME BACK WITH 5 NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A CULTURAL PROGRAMME AS WELL AS DECISIONS TO MOVE FORWARD ON A NUMBER OF OTHER BILATERAL MATTERS. HE IS SEEN HERE AS ALSO HAVING ACHIEVED SOME PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. IN LINE WITH HIS COMMITMENT TO KEEPING THE GERMAN QUESTION OPEN, HE TOOK THE RISK OF REFERRING IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS TO IT AND TO BERLIN IN PUBLIC AND IN HIS TALKS WITH GORBACHEV.

5. THE IMPRESSION CREATED HERE BY THESE ASPECTS, TAKEN TOGETHER, IS LIKELY TO BE THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAS MANAGED TO MAKE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT THAT THERE ARE STILL LIMITS TO WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN EAST-WEST AND GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. IF THAT IMPRESSION SINKS IN HERE, THERE COULD BE A CHECK TO PUBLIC EUPHORIA ABOUT GORBACHEV.

6. ON THE INFORMATION SO FAR, I SEE NO SIGN THAT KOHL AND GENSCHER CONCEDED NEW POINTS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. NOR THAT GORBACHEV

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PULLED ANY SURPRISES OR PLOYS, SUCH AS PROPOSING A THIRD ZERO ON SNF.

7. THE 'AGREED PRESENTATION' OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT, DRAWN UP BY THE GERMANS AND THE RUSSIANS, SHOWS THAT THERE IS STILL MUCH UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. THAT WILL TAKE UP PART OF THE TIME WHEN GORBACHEV MAKES HIS RETURN VISIT. BUT THE RISK MUST PERSIST THAT MULTILATERAL MATTERS WILL TAKE UP MORE TIME ON THAT OCCASION AND THE 'JOINT POLITICAL DOCUMENT' TO BE ISSUED THEN, EVEN IF IT ALSO COVERS BILATERAL MATTERS, MAY BE USED BY THE RUSSIANS IN AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE GERMANS TO NEW POSITIONS. THE RUSSIANS ARE ALSO IN A POSITION TO DELAY SETTING FIRM DATES FOR GORBACHEV'S RETURN VISIT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE LEVERAGE OVER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO EAST/WEST AND SECURITY QUESTIONS (ESPECIALLY SNF MODERNISATION) IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1989.

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.EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS	PROTOCOL
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FM BONN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 305

OF 301705Z MARCH 88

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, ATHENS

GENSCHER'S SPEECH IN ATHENS: 28 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. ANOTHER OPTIMISTIC SPEECH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BUT A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO REACT WITH RESOLVE IF GORBACHEV'S DEEDS DO NOT MATCH HIS WORDS. RISK THAT THESE REPEATED OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENTS WILL MAKE DEFENCE DECISIONS, EG SNF MODERNISATION, EVEN HARDER.

DETAIL

2. ON 28 MARCH GENSCHER MADE A SPEECH IN ATHENS WHICH CONCENTRATED ON RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. GENSCHER SAID IN ANSWER TO THOSE WHO ARE SCEPTICAL ABOUT GORBACHEV'S INTENTIONS THAT 'WE CAN TEST GORBACHEV'S WORDS BY HIS DEEDS'. WHEN THE WEST FOUND THAT SOVIET ACTIONS DID NOT CORRESPOND TO SOVIET WORDS, THE WEST WOULD DRAW APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS WITH THE SAME DETERMINATION AS HAD BEEN SHOWN IN ANSWER TO SOVIET SS20 DEPLOYMENT. GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV REALISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S INFLUENCE IN WORLD POLITICS INCREASED WHEN IT WAS NOT BASED PRIMARILY ON ARMED MIGHT, BUT ON THE CREATIVE FORCE OF ITS TALENTED PEOPLES. AND IF GORBACHEV'S WORDS TURNED OUT TO BE MERE WORDS, THEN HE HAD MUCH MORE TO LOSE THAN THE WEST.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE WEST MUST COME FORWARD WITH SERIOUS, CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THERE WAS A CHANCE FOR EUROPE HERE. THIS REQUIRED BOLD PLANNING FOR THE BUILDING OF A EUROPEAN PEACE OR A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE. THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT WE HAD TO GIVE UP OUR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. THE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS INDISSOLUBLE.

5. THE GERMANS, GENSCHER SAID, HAD FOR HISTORICAL REASONS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. GERMAN/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE, BUT GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO BUILD A RELIABLE RELATIONSHIP OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS SHOULD GIVE NO ONE IN THE WEST CAUSE FOR MISTRUST.

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COMMENT

6. THIS SPEECH IS IN LINE WITH GENSCHER'S OTHER RECENT EAST-WEST STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE DAVOS SPEECH OF JANUARY 1987 (WHEN HE COINED THE PHRASE EVENTUALLY TRANSLATED AS 'HOLDING GORBACHEV TO HIS WORD'.) THERE IS THE SAME TONE OF OPTIMISM ABOUT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BUT THIS TIME THERE IS ALSO A FLAVOUR OF WILLINGNESS TO REACT NEGATIVELY IF GORBACHEV'S DEEDS DO NOT LIVE UP TO HIS WORDS. THE REAL RISK WITH THIS TYPE OF PRESENTATION, AS I SEE IT, IS THAT THE OPTIMISTIC TONE MAY ENCOURAGE EXCESSIVE HOPES, IN PUBLIC OPINION AND THUS MAKE DECISIONS LIKE SNF MODERNISATION, WHICH WILL ANYWAY BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT HERE, EVEN MORE CONTROVERSIAL. HENCE MY QUESTIONS TO GENSCHER ABOUT THE SPEECH (MY TELNO 303).

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FM BONN 241515Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 943 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY PARIS ROME THE HAGUE BRUSSELS UKDEL VIENNA UKDEL MADRID
CICC(G) AND MOD (DS 17)

INFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO

OTTAWA REYKJAVIK

MIPT:

BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM BREZHNEV'S
DINNER SPEECH.

DANGERS OF TNF MODERNISATION

2. QUOTE. WE REGARD THE SITUATION AS ALARMING. THE GREATEST POWER
IN THE WEST IS SEEKING TO ESCALATE THE ARMS RACE. LOOK AT THE
ADOPTION OF A POWERFUL NEW PROGRAMME TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC AND OTHER
ARMAMENTS: LOOK AT THE START OF PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON WEAPON....
THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY AND, AS
IT WERE, THE LOGIC OF A QUOTE LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR UNQUOTE.....
WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT THE PLANS TO STATION NEW US NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND
ABOVE ALL ON FRG TERRITORY, CREATE A MORE PRESSING DANGER THAN
HAS EVER EXISTED BEFORE. PEOPLE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THIS DANGER AND
MUST SURELY BE EXPECTING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BE DONE TO REMOVE
IT.

THE ZERO SOLUTION

3. (THE USSR IS TAKING THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUSLY, BUT THE US
APPARENTLY NOT.) THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE US GOVERN-
MENT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MEDIUM
RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE MERELY CONFIRMS THESE FEARS.....
NATURALLY WHAT WE SEE HERE IS NOT ANY KIND OF QUOTE ZERO SOLUTION
UNQUOTE. WE ARE BEING CALLED UPON TO DISARM OURSELVES UNILATERALLY,
WHILE HUNDREDS OF LAND AND SEA BASED MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT
CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DIRECTED AT OUR COUNTRY AND AGAINST OUR
ALLIES - THIS WHOLE THREATENING ARSENAL BELONGING TO THE USA AND
OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN AREA - IS TO REMAIN UNTOUCHED.

/THAT

THAT MEANS, IF THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE CAN BE CHARACTERISED ROUGHLY AS ONE TO ONE, THAT THE USA IS TRYING NOW TO TURN INTO A RELATIONSHIP OF ABOUT TWO TO ONE IN FAVOUR OF NATO. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN NEVER GIVE ITS AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN OPTION.

MORATORIUM PROPOSAL

4. BOTH SIDES SHOULD REFRAIN, SO LONG AS THE TALKS LAST, FROM THE STATIONING OF NEW, AND THE MODERNISING OF EXISTING, MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS DOES NOT MEAN ANY KIND OF PERMANENT FREEZE OF THE PRESENT MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR BALANCE.... WE WOULD GO FURTHER AS A GESTURE OF GOODWILL WE COULD UNILATERALLY REDUCE A CERTAIN PART OF OUR MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN SECTOR OF THE USSR. WE COULD MAKE, SO TO SPEAK, A PUMP-PRIMING REDUCTION IN THE SPIRIT OF MOVING TOWARDS A LOWER LEVEL SUCH AS MIGHT BE AGREED BETWEEN THE USSR AND USA AS THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A NEW AND VITAL ELEMENT IN OUR POSITION.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATIONS

5. IN THE COURSE OF ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USA WE WILL PRESS RESOLUTELY FOR RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE. NATURALLY, THE CONCRETE FIGURES MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. SO FAR AS OUR SIDE IS CONCERNED, WE WOULD BE READY TO COUNT THE REDUCTIONS NOT IN DOZENS, BUT IN HUNDREDS OF WEAPONS UNITS IN THIS CATEGORY..... AND IF OUR PARTNERS SHOWED THEMSELVES READY TO AGREE ON A COMPLETE RENUNCIATION OF ALL TYPES OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES - WEST AND EAST - WHICH ARE AIMED AT TARGETS IN EUROPE, WE WOULD BE IN FAVOUR. WE GENERALLY SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT EUROPE SHOULD IN THE END RESULT BE FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS - MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS AND ALSO TACTICAL WEAPONS. THAT WOULD BE A TRUE QUOTE ZERO SOLUTION UNQUOTE, A JUST SOLUTION FOR ALL PARTIES. UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS SAVING ABOVE

TAYLOR

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FM BONN 170930Z NOV 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 916 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO MOSCOW WASHINGTON

BONN TELNO 879 AND 880. BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN

1. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION ABOUT GERMAN/SOVIET ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT, GUENTER THE USSR DESK OFFICER AT THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY LISTED THE FOLLOWING AS POINTS ON WHICH BOTH SIDES EXPECTED AGREEMENT.

A) THE COMPLETION AND SIGNATURE OF ANCILLARY CONTRACTS CONNECTED WITH THE PIPELINE (CRANES, PIPELAYERS, ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT).

B) A CONTRACT BETWEEN KLOECKNER AND ONE OF THE STOS TO PUT UP A SILICON PLANT. VALUE DM 600 MILLION.

C) A CONTRACT TO SCHLOEMANN-SIEMAG FOR A STEEL PLATING PLANT AT OSKOL. VALUE DM 500-600 MILLION.

D) FUTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SOVIET ENERGY SECTOR. SALZGITTER, KRUPP AND RUHRKOHLE ARE EXPECTED TO PRESENT THEIR IDEAS ESPECIALLY THOSE CONNECTED WITH COAL LIQUIFACTION.

E) A DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT.

F) OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A RORO FACILITY BETWEEN LUBECK OR KIEL AND KLAPAEDA (MEMEL).

2 GUENTER REMARKED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WERE ONLY QUOTE PFENNIGS UNQUOTE AWAY FROM AGREEMENT ON GAS PRICING: THERE IS NOW EVERY INDICATION THAT AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED BY 18 NOVEMBER (BONN TELNO 915 TO FCO).

**THIS TELEGRAM
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ADVANCED**

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FM BONN 121625Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 896 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW UKDEL NATO MOD(DS12) CICC(G) PARIS BMG BERLIN
EAST BERLIN WASHINGTON AND UKDEL MADRIDINFO SAYING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME AND UKDEL VIENNAWRG
13 NOV 1981
Action Taken

95 96 18 MY TELS NOS 879, 880 AND 885 AND MIPT (NOT TO ALL):

BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN.

1. VON DER GABLENTZ (CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE) TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT. HE SAW IT MAINLY IN TERMS OF PROMOTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IE. HELPING BREZHNEV UNDERSTAND WHAT THE WEST WANTS AND FINDING OUT MORE ABOUT WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AIMING AT. HE DID NOT SEE THE FRG AS AN INTERMEDIARY: HE WOULD BE MAKING IT CLEAR TO BREZHNEV THAT THE FRG WAS FIRMLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, INCLUDING OVER LRTNF. BUT HE FELT THERE WAS A JOB OF INTERPRETATION TO BE DONE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH BREZHNEV ENABLED HIM TO PLAY A ROLE IN THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS REALISTIC ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AND HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL HIS OWN BUREAUCRACY.

2. THE RUSSIANS TOO, SAID GABLENTZ, WERE CONCERNED TO HAVE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE, THOUGH THEY ALSO HAD AIMS WHICH THE GERMANS DID NOT SHARE. THE GERMANS WERE STRUGGLING TO KEEP THE VISIT A WORKING ONE THOUGH OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND STATUS. THE CHANCELLOR INTENDED TO DISCUSS EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY, AND TO PRESS FOR A REAGAN/BREZHNEV MEETING AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT (HE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN). HE WOULD LAY GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY OF ACHIEVING AT LEAST SOME ACTUAL REDUCTIONS IN LRTNF BY SUMMER 1983. HE WOULD ARGUE THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO INFLUENCE THE EXTENT OF WESTERN DEPLOYMENT OF TNF (AND COULD EVEN, IF THE ZERO OPTION WAS TAKEN SERIOUSLY, OBLIATE THE NEED FOR ANY WESTERN

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/ DEPLOYMENT).

DEPLOYMENT). IT WOULD ALSO GIVE THE RIGHT SIGNAL FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD THUS MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT LIMITING FUTURE US PROGRAMMES. HE WOULD STICK TO THE LINE AGREED AT MONTEBELLO, AND WOULD ARGUE THE NEED FOR WORLD WIDE RESTRAINT AND MODERATION AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

3. SCHMIDT WOULD REPEAT WHAT HE SAID TO BREZHNEV ABOUT AFGHANISTAN IN JULY 1980, AND WOULD URGE THE MERITS OF YOUR

PROPOSALS AS THE RIGHT WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

4. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, GABLENTZ SAID THE CHANCELLOR WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG TERM BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THOUGH THE GAS PIPE LINE DEAL WAS NOT YET FINALLY CONCLUDED, THE GERMANS NOW EXPECTED IT WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE DURING THE VISIT. NO FORMULA FOR THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY HAD YET BEEN AGREED, BUT LAMBSDORFF MIGHT ATTEND FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALL THIS HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS DURING RASHISH'S VISIT (FCO TELNO 490 TO BONN, PARA. 2). SCHMIDT WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF ETHNIC GERMANS LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF PERMITTING THIS BOTH IN HUMANITARIAN TERMS AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE FRG. (IN A BUNDESTAG DEBATE YESTERDAY, ALL POLITICAL PARTIES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO THIS).

5. HE WOULD IMPRESS ON BREZHNEV THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO CHANGE THE FRG'S POSITION IN NATO THROUGH PROPAGANDA IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT OR THE PROMOTION OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FRG. THIS WOULD MERELY RESULT IN CHANGING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HERE IN A DIRECTION HOSTILE TO SOVIET INTERESTS (FROM WHICH I TOOK HIM TO MEAN BRINGING DOWN THE COALITION AND LETTING IN THE CDU/CSU).

6. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE IN TURS HAVE EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION ABOUT THE VISIT WITH OTHER OFFICIALS. PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 892 (NOT TO ALL) REPORTS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD ABOUT THE

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HANDLING OF MBFR.

(A) LRTNF

THE GERMANS CLEARLY EXPECT A SOVIET INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA BUT HAVE NO INDICATION WHAT IT WILL BE. THEY THINK IT LESS LIKELY TO BE A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL TO SCHMIDT THAN AN IDEA DIRECTED AT PUBLIC OPINION, E.G. IN BREZHNEV'S DINNER SPEECH:

(B) ON MADRID, THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A GEOGRAPHICAL RATHER THAN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CBMS, AND THAT THE WEST WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO MODIFY ITS POSITION ON THIS. THEY SEE LITTLE REAL POSSIBILITY OF SECURING FURTHER RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS OVER CDE:

(C) THOUGH NO CULTURAL AGREEMENT IS IN PROSPECT, THERE WILL BE VARIOUS CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS IN THE MARGINS OF THE VISIT. THE SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER FOR CULTURE WILL BE HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A SOVIET EXHIBITION IN COLOGNE ON 20 NOVEMBER, THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR HIGHER EDUCATION WILL BE HERE AROUND THE SAME TIME (POSSIBLY TO DISCUSS INTENSIFICATION OF BILATERAL ACADEMIC EXCHANGES) AND LEADING BOLSHOI SINGERS WILL BE PERFORMING IN AN OPERA IN COLOGNE ON 23 NOVEMBER:

(D) THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PRESSING FOR FURTHER BILATERAL ENERGY COLLABORATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR POWER. THEY ARE RUMOURED TO HAVE RESPONDED WITH INTEREST WHEN RAU (SPD PREMIER OF NORTH-RHINE-WESTPHALIA) DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE HIGH TEMPERATURE REACTOR AT SCHMEHAUSEN. THERE WAS TALK OF A JOINT FRG/USSR ENERGY SYMPOSIUM AND EXHIBITION AT NOVOSIBIRSK. THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL MINISTER PROMOTED THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN A SPEECH IN MUNICH THIS WEEK. THE GERMANS

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SAY IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WILL RAISE THIS QUESTION, BUT THE RUSSIANS MAY:

(E) THE GERMANS REGARD REUNIFICATION OF ETHNIC GERMAN FAMILIES AS ONE AREA WHERE THEY COULD POCKET ANY RUSSIAN CONCESSION WITHOUT EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO PRESSURE. BUT THEY SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT A CONCESSION WILL BE OFFERED:

(F) THE GERMANS ARE ONLY JUST ON THE POINT OF TABLING THEIR DRAFT FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, BECAUSE OF DELAYS IN GETTING MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT. IT IS LIKELY, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, TO BE LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS THAN THE RUSSIAN DRAFT, GIVEN TO VON STADEN IN MOSCOW, IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS.
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Mr Gillmore

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FM MOSCOW 021500Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 403 OF 2 JULY

INFO BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

[Handwritten mark]

VISIT BY BRANDT TO MOSCOW

1. BRANDT ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 29 JUNE. HE HAD NEARLY 3 HOURS OF TALKS WITH BREZHNEV ON 30 JUNE. ON 1 JULY HE HAD A MEETING WITH PONOMAREV.

2. THE TASS REPORT OF BRANDT'S MEETING WITH BREZHNEV DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AS "FRINDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE". IT MENTIONED THE MAIN POINTS TOUCHED ON DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE FRG EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT.

3. BREZHNEV OPENED WITH A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN ENDANGERED BY THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE US SEARCH FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HE PLEADED FOR DETENTE TO BE PRESERVED. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE, WHICH WAS THE DOMINANT SUBJECT OF THE MEETING. WESTERN PLANS WERE NOT MODERNISATION BUT A NEW THREAT REPRESENTING AN ALTERNATIVE CHANGE. THE USSR DID NOT CHANGE THE MILITARY

3. BREZHNEV OPENED WITH A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN ENDANGERED BY THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE US SEARCH FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HE PLEADED FOR DETENTE TO BE PRESERVED. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ON TNF, WHICH WAS THE DOMINANT SUBJECT OF THE MEETING. WESTERN PLANS WERE NOT MODERNISATION BUT A NEW THREAT REPRESENTING A QUALITATIVE CHANGE. THE USSR DID NOT CHANGE THE MILITARY BALANCE. HE CLAIMED THAT FIGURES SHOWED THAT IF NATO IMPLEMENTED ITS 1979 DECISION IT WOULD ACHIEVE A POSITION OF SUPERIORITY. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS INCLUDING FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, MEDIUM RANGE ROCKETS AND BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. IF THE NATO DECISION WERE IMPLEMENTED THE USSR WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE COUNTER MEASURES. IT HAD SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO TALK BY PROPOSING SIMPLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT NUCLEAR AND MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THOSE HELD BY THE UK AND FRANCE. THE MORATORIUM SHOULD COVER QUANTITY AND QUALITY. TALKS SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A COVER TO INTRODUCE NEW US SYSTEMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET SIDE DOUBTED WHETHER THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON TNF.

4. BREZHNEV CLAIMED THAT SOVIET IDEAS ON A NORTHERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE WERE A NEW EXAMPLE OF SOVIET DEVOTION TO PEACE. BRANDT GOT NO EXEGESIS, BREZHNEV USED A DIFFERENT FORMULATION FROM THE PUBLIC ONE, BUT THE FRG EMBASSY SAW NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE. BREZHNEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. HE CRITICISED US POLICIES TOWARDS CHINA. ON NORTH/SOUTH HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT OF THE COLONIAL POWERS. THE SOVIET UNION DID A GREAT DEAL TO HELP THE UNDERDEVELOPED. ~~BOOFRFB~~ THE EXCUSESUMMIT IDEA WAS CONCERNED X SOME FORM OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION. (THIS HAS BEEN INTERPRETED IN PRESS BRIEFING TO MEAN THAT BREZHNEV HIMSELF MIGHT GO TO MEXICO. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY BREZHNEV WAS BEING AS POLITE AS POSSIBLE TO BRANDT BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL INTEREST IN NORTH/SOUTH PROBLEMS).

5. BRANDT STRESSED THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND REGRETTED THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MILITARY FOLLOW-UP TO DETENTE. THE FRG'S ROLE WAS LIMITED. SOVIET MEDIA CRITICISM, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE POLISH CONTEXT, DID NOT HELP. SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS AGREED BY NATO. SS20'S HAD BEEN A LONG TERM PREOCCUPATION OF THE WEST AND OF SCHMIDT IN PARTICULAR. THERE WERE BIG DIFFERENCES IN THE

TALK ON THE BASIS AGREED BY HAIG. SCRO'S HAD BEEN A LONG TERM PREOCCUPATION OF THE WEST AND OF SCHMIDT IN PARTICULAR. THERE WERE BIG DIFFERENCES IN THE DATA BASE USED BY EACH SIDE WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE ZERO OPTION WAS A DESIRABLE OUTCOME. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CLARIFY WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DONE WITH THEIR SS4'S AND SS5'S AND WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS WERE ON DEPLOYING FURTHER SS23'S. TALKS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE MOST DANGEROUS PROBLEM, THE ROCKETS, LEAVING FBS TO A LATER STAGE. BREZHNEV COMPLAINED OF A "TENDENCY TO INTERFERE" IN POLAND AND MENTIONED THE SALE OF PRINTING EQUIPMENT TO SOLIDARNOSC. BRANDT SAID THAT IF THIS COMPLAINT WAS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SPECIFIC DETAILS WERE NEEDED, WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NEVER BEEN WILLING TO GIVE.

6. MY TEL NO 401 INCLUDED WHAT WE KNOW OF THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN BRANDT AND PONOMAREV ON AFGHANISTAN. THE TWO ALSO DISCUSSED ARMS CONTROL, WITH PONOMAREV RESTATING THE SOVIET POSITION ON TNF. PONOMAREV SAID THAT THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WAS NOW SUCH THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DOUBTED US READINESS TO NEGOTIATE. THE PROPOSED GROMYKO/HAIG MEETING IN NEW YORK WAS NOT EQUIVALENT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

7. BRANDT HAS DESCRIBED HIS VISIT AS "FACT FINDING". BREZHNEV SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED HIM WITH RESPECT AND EVEN FRIENDSHIP, AND POSSIBLY FOR THIS REASON BRANDT'S AIDES HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO GIVE THE PRESS AN OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF WHAT WAS SAID.

KEEBLE

PARA 4 LINE 10 SO FAAR AS THE CANCUN SUMMIT IDEA WAS CONCERNED HE DID NOT EXCLUDE SOME FORM OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION.

IMMEDIATE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 238 OF 05 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MOSCOW TOKYO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
PRIORITY PARIS ROME

FCO TEL NO 179 TO PEKING: BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN

BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN.

VAN WELL LAST NIGHT TOLD PUS THAT GENSCHER HANDED TO BREZHNEV A LETTER FROM SCHMIDT MAKING THE POINT THAT JUNE WOULD BE INCONVENIENT AND OFFERING A DATE AFTER 23 JULY. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIET SIDE (INCLUDING REFERENCES TO THE INCONVENIENCE OF LATE JULY BECAUSE OF SUMMER HOLIDAYS) BREZHNEV SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE INVITATION AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE VISIT QUOTE IN THE COURSE OF THE YEAR UNQUOTE. THEY SHOULD DISCUSS DATES. AS REGARDS AN ANNOUNCEMENT, THE SOVIET SIDE WISHED NOTHING TO BE SAID BEFORE NEXT FRIDAY 10 APRIL. THEY WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH BONN ABOUT THE TIMING. VAN WELL SPECULATED THAT BREZHNEV WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THE VISIT WITH THE POLITBURO AT ITS MEETING ON 9 APRIL. BUT HE AGREED WITH THE PUS'S COMMENT THAT THERE COULD BE OTHER AND MORE SINISTER REASONS ALSO FOR THIS SUGGESTED DELAY.

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FM MOSCOW 040830Z APR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 4TH APR 81

IMMEDIATE INFO PEKING (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) PRIORITY INFO
BONN PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO.GENSCHER'S VISIT.

1. VAN WELL GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING AT THE END OF GENSCHEER'S VISIT.
2. GENSCHEER SPENT SEVEN HOURS WITH GROMYKO AND TWO WITH BREZHNEV. THE TONE WAS GOOD. THERE WERE NO POLEMICS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT THE SOVIET POSITION ON MOST ESSENTIAL ISSUES SHOWED NO MOVEMENT.

SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS.

3. BOTH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO MADE MUCH OF THE CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE PUBLISHED SPEECHES (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL) THAT THEY WISHED TO PLACE THE VISIT IN THIS CONTEXT .

SOVIET-US RELATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN.

4. BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO SAW THE US RELATIONSHIP AS A KEY ISSUE. THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE BUT ARGUED THAT CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WERE THE FAULT OF THE AMERICANS. THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE CO-OPERATION AND DETENTE WITH THE WEST. THEY WERE KEENLY INTERESTED IN ASSESSING AMERICAN POLICY, WHICH IN THEIR VIEW WAS BASED ON CONFRONTATION AND AN ATTEMPT TO ATTAIN SUPERIORITY. GENSCHEER POINTED OUT THAT THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO REVIEW ALL ITS POLICIES, BUT REVIEW DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN CHANGE AND IN THOSE AREAS WHERE POLICY HAD SO FAR BEEN DEFINED IT WAS POSITIVE. NEVERTHELESS, REAGAN'S ELECTION REFLECTED DEEP AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND SCEPTICISM ABOUT DETENTE. THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN A TURNZIIHOMMVTTTTT AND IF THERE WERE TO BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS THERE WAS NEED FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

5. GROMYKO BRIEFLY REPLIED, THAT ON AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WAS WELL KNOWN AND HE HAD NO MORE TO SAY. GENSCHEER THEREFORE WENT ONCE AGAIN THROUGH THE WESTERN POSITION. BREZHNEV ON THE SECOND DAY REVERTED TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT ONLY TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE U.S. WAS UNDER-MINING ATTEMPTS BY PAKISTAN TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE (WHETHER BILATERAL, TRILATERAL OR IN THE PRESENCE OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE). THE US WANTED ONLY TO MAINTAIN TENSION IN THE AREA AS A PRETEXT FOR DEVELOPING ITS MILITARY POWER THERE. THE

- BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN THE GULF REGION WAS CONTRARY TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AND TO THE INTERESTS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF TOGETHER. THIS BROUGHT BREZHNEV BACK TO THE QUESTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS THE MOST DECISIVE FACTOR ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN THE RELATIONSHIP AND BREZHNEV INTERJECTED "ARE YOU TELLING ME THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL?" SUBSEQUENTLY GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO TIME PRESSURE. AMBASSADORS COULD MEET ALL THE TIME, BUT A SUMMIT WAS IMPORTANT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, GO CAP IN HAND LOOKING FOR IT.

6. THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV. THERE WERE SEVERAL EXCHANGES ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL, WHICH GENSCHER MADE PLAIN WAS UNACCEPTABLE, WAS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIRST SOVIET POSITION AS PUT BY GROMYKO WAS THAT THE MORATORIUM WHICH WOULD COVER DEPLOYMENT AND PREPARATION OF SITES, BUT NOT PRODUCTION, WOULD NEED TO BE MADE EFFECTIVE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. GENSCHER SAID THIS SOUNDED LIKE A PRECONDITION. AT A SECOND SESSION WITH GROMYKO, GENSCHER DEVELOPED THE ARGUMENT THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AND REACH A QUICK FIRST RESULT. HE REMINDED GROMYKO OF THE ALLIANCE DECISION WHICH INCLUDED REVIEWING THE NEED FOR LONG-RANGE T.N.F. IN THE LIGHT OF RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO SAID IT WAS RASH TO REJECT THE MORATORIUM IDEA BEFORE EVEN ASKING QUESTIONS, TO WHICH GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN STUDIED CAREFULLY AND THE VIEW OF THE WHOLE ALLIANCE WAS THAT IT WAS NOT A FAIR OR HELPFUL IDEA. GENSCHER ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION STILL STOOD BY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO SCHMIDT, THAT THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS T.N.F. , LEAVING ASIDE THE NATO DECISION AND THE FINAL MEETING BREZHNEV REVERTED TO THIS , SAYING THERE HAD BEEN SOME "INSINUATION" THAT THE MORATORIUM WAS A PRECONDITION. HE STOOD BY WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID TO THE CHANCELLOR. HE WAS READY TO START TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE MORATORIUM WAS SIMPLY A COMPLEMENTARY IDEA WHICH THEY THOUGHT MIGHT FACILITATE MATTERS.

7. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF TNF NUMBERS IN THE COURSE OF WHICH BREZHNEV ARGUED THAT LAUNCHER NUMBERS WERE AT PRESENT APPROXIMATELY EQUAL , WHEREAS THE WEST HAD A 1.5:1 SUPERIORITY IN WAR HEADS. AFTER T.N.F. MODERNISATION IT WOULD HAVE MORE THAN THIS SUPERIORITY IN LAUNCHES TOO. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THERE WAS AN EASTERN SUPERIORITY . BREZHNEV MUTTERED TO GROMYKO THAT PERHAPS EXPERTS SHOULD MEET AND DISCUSS THE NUMBERS AND GENSCHER TRIED TO FOLLOW THIS UP, BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. IN DISCUSSION OF T.N.F. WEAPONS THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT THEY INCLUDED THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS WELL AS F111. F4 AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES. ON THE SOVIET SIDE THEY INCLUDED MEDIUM RANGE BOMBERS, SPECIFICALLY BACKFIRE. THEY ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES WHICH WAS CAPABLE OF REACHING AMERICAN TERRITORY AND WERE TAKEN BACK BY GENSCHER'S REPLY THAT FOR THE NATO

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ALLIANCE THE TERRITORY OF ALL MEMBERS CONSTITUTED A STRATEGIC UNITY. VAN WELL'S CONCLUSION ON T.N.F. WAS THAT AT LEAST THE MORATORIUM IDEA HAD NOW EFFECTIVELY BEEN BURIED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT PURSUE IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

CSCE.

8. GROMYKO EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINAL ACT AND SAW MADRID ONLY AS ONE STAGE IN A LONG TERM PROCESS (VAN WELL COMMENTED THAT THIS SUGGESTED SOVIET HAGGLING AT MADRID WAS ONLY FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES). THEY WANTED A SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT ON MADRID AND WERE STUDYING THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PAPER, BUT HAD NOT YET REACHED A FINAL OPINION ON IT. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT IT CONTAINED SOME POSITIVE POINTS BUT OTHERS THAT WERE DIFFICULT AND IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS. THE FINAL DOCUMENT MUST COVER ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT. ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, BREZHNEV SAID IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TONAUE ITS CONTRIBUTION. HE COULD NOT TELL GENSCHER WHAT FORM IT OUGHT TO TAKE. VAN WELL HAD A SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH KOVALEV AND KORNIENKO IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE CLARIFICATION AND WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET HOPE WAS FOR SOME CONCESSION RELATING TO MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS FROM THE U.S. TO EUROPE. ON VERIFICATION GROMYKO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION , STRESSING THAT NON-INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WAS A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD DEPEND ON THE NEW MEASURES AND WOULD BE NEGOTIATION. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER THE WESTERN POSITION ON A DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WAS FOR TWO PHASES OR FOR TWO CONFERENCES. GENSCHER SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE DECISION ON A NEW PHASE OR A NEW CONFERENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEGOTION ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

POLAND.

9. IN HIS FIRST PRESENTATION TO GROMYKO GENSCHER SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT POLAND, STRESSING THE WEST'S DEEP CONCERN AND THE NEED FOR NON-INTERVENTION. GROMYKO IGNORED THIS IN HIS REPLY. GENSCHER THEREFORE TOOK IT UP WITH BREZHNEV WHO AGAIN IGNORED IT. GENSCHER FINALLY REFERRED TO POLAND IN HIS SPEECH AT LUNCH.

MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER AREAS.

10. GENSCHER WENT THROUGH THE EUROPEAN POSITION. IN REPLY GROMYKO SAID IT CONTAINED POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS. BUT THERE WAS NEED TO PROVIDE FOR THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE (VAN WELL COMMENTED THAT THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS HE FELT THERE WAS SERIOUS SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO AMERICAN POLICY). THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON AFRICA WHICH GAVE GENSCHER THE CHANCE TO REFER TO THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A NAMINIA SOLUTION THROUGH

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THE U.N. ON NORTH/SOUTH QUESTION GROMYKO TOOK A STANDAR LINE ABOUT WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY . GENSCHER REFERRED TO THE VIENNA MEETINGS AND GROMYKO SAID IT WAS "NOT EASY" FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT A POSSIBLE INVITATION. ON BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN QUESTIONS GENSCHER REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION TO BE BASED ON THE WHOLE TREATY COMPLEX, INCLUDING THE PREAMBLE. GROMYKO IN REPLY STRESSED THE NEED TO RESPECT SOVEREIGNTY. ON BERLIN GENSCHER REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND VAN WELL COMMENTED ON THE ABCSCENCE OF ANY SOVIET COMPLAINT. ON BILATERAL AND HUMANITARIN QUESTIONS GENSCHER HANDED OVER A LIST OF PERSONAL CASES WHICH GROMYKO SAID WOULD BE STUDIED.

THE GAS PIPELINE WAS MENTION ONLY BRIEFLY IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

11. VAN WELL DID NOT MENTION SCHMIDT'S LETTER.

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TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 OF 1 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) BONN, PARIS, ROME,
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. THE STATE SECRETARY IN THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TELEPHONED THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY AT HOME THIS EVENING TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM HERR GENSCHER. THE LATTER WOULD HAVE WISHED TO SPEAK PERSONALLY TO LORD CARRINGTON BUT IN VIEW OF HIS ABSENCE HAD ASKED VAN WELL TO CONVEY MESSAGE THROUGH PALLISER.

2. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BONN HAD CONVEYED TO HERR GENSCHER THE DESIRE OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION CONVEYED IN MOSCOW LAST SUMMER BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO RETURN THE LATTER'S QUOTE WORKING VISIT UNQUOTE AT THE END OF JUNE IN BONN. HERR GENSCHER, WHO LEAVES TOMORROW FOR A 48 HOURS VISIT TO MOSCOW, WISHES TO REPLY WHEN HE CALLS ON BREZHNEV ON 3 APRIL. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THIS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE POLISH SITUATION. THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE SOVIET APPROACH SINCE THIS SHOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE DRASTIC ACTION TOWARDS POLAND. BUT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WOULD WISH FIRST TO HAVE SEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN: AND WOULD ALSO WISH THE OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT TO HAVE PRECEDED ANY MEETING WITH BREZHNEV. ACCORDINGLY, HERR GENSCHER INTENDED TO TELL BREZHNEV THAT A MEETING IN JUNE WOULD BE INCONVENIENT BUT THAT ONE COULD TAKE PLACE AFTER 27 JULY. THE INTENTION IS THAT IT SHOULD BE A SHORT TWO-DAY WORKING VISIT AS FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT LAST YEAR TO MOSCOW.

3. THE GERMANS HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THIS TODAY TO THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH AND HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ITALIANS. THE AMERICANS HAD CONCURRED IN THEIR APPROACH. THEY CONSIDERED IT WISE NOT TO TURN DOWN THE SOVIET REQUEST BUT ALSO DESIRABLE TO GAIN SOME MORE TIME (WITH AN EYE TO POLAND) AND THAT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT SHOULD COME FIRST. THE FRENCH HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR

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whatever the rationalisation, there can be no doubt of German commitment to a substantial and growing economic relationship with the Soviet Union and the Federal Government will not accept that the German economic stake in the Soviet Union can be jeopardised by anything less than a major European crisis. The value of FRG exports to the USSR last year was about DM 6.6 mrd, an increase of 5.1 per cent on 1978; imports from the Soviet Union were 7.3 mrd, an increase of 35.7 per cent: the steep rise largely accounted for by the jump in world energy prices. In contrast with the FRG's stake, that of /US is seen here as short term and relatively easy to manipulate (agricultural products account for about 85 per cent of US exports to the USSR). The German economic effort in the Soviet Union is based overwhelmingly on heavy plant (chemicals, metallurgy etc) and energy: all of which require, since a state trading nation is involved, a full framework for financial commitment over a long period. Industry here has therefore been as interested in the creation of long term programme as, for its own purposes, the Soviet Union.

4. The long term programme is not expected to produce short term changes in the trend of bilateral business: leaders in FRG/Soviet trade tell us they anticipate steady but unspectacular growth in the region of 5-10 per cent over the next few years. (To put things into perspective trade with the USSR is not much greater in value terms than with Denmark.) But German industry is clear in its own mind that the Soviet Union's economic potential is far from realised. Its oil, gas and raw materials reserves and its possibility as a market for manufactured goods make it an attractive market for most FRG businessmen: the more so with economic activity dropping as the second half-year begins and the outlook for 1981 as yet unclear. In particular, the gas/pipes deal comes at the right moment for the hard pressed steel sector, although on this front difficult negotiations lie ahead because of Soviet financing requirements regarded by German industry as unreasonable.
5. The German position in Alliance terms is one of rectitude: the Chancellor told Brezhnev very clearly that the long term programme in no way prejudices the FRG's commitment to Cocom or the OECD consensus; but Schmidt believes that it is in the

/long term

long term interest of the Alliance itself to mesh the Soviet Union inextricably into the Western economies. This view has two immediate implications: when I discussed it at lunch with van Well he said the Chancellor was "fascinated" by the general problem of how the whole world should cooperate to solve its energy problems in the future. The implication, consistent with views of other contacts here, is that the West should cooperate with the Soviet Union across the energy sector from exploration to R&D.

6. Van Well confirmed that the Federal Government continued to be interested in energy discussions in the context of ECE, for Berlin reasons certainly, but not solely for Berlin reasons. The Federal Ministry of the Economy have no doubt that without Western know-how (not necessarily German) the Soviet Union will be unable to realise the potential of its energy resources. Problems such as boring through permafrost are currently beyond their capabilities. Western expertise is therefore essential if the USSR is to be kept from entering the world market as a major importer.

7. The Federal Chancellor's second major consideration is that the Soviet Union must be brought to recognise the realities of the North/South dialogue, its responsibilities in this context and the dangers for the world economy of OPEC surpluses, non-oil debt indebtedness and industrial recession. In Moscow he treated Brezhnev to a Schmidt lecture on international economics and, his officials say, left with the view that he had opened new doors of awareness for the Soviet leadership.

8. To sum up: the FRG sees jobs, business profits and political advantage in its economic relationship with the Soviet Union. Selfseeking to the extent that FRG industry wants the trade and needs the raw materials; but in Schmidt's view, in the broader interests of the West, if it draws the USSR from its economic isolation and confronts it with the need to contribute as a partner to international stability.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 599 OF 4 JULY 1980
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Germany

BONN TELNO 530: CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. I AM PUZZLED BY THE REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF BONN TUR TO THE FRENCH NEUTRON BOMB IN THE CONTEXT OF SCHMIDT'S STATEMENT TO THE BUNDESTAG ABOUT THE "DECISION" ANNOUNCED IN PRESIDENT GISCARD'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 26 JUNE. IN FACT, THE ONLY DECISION ANNOUNCED THEN WAS TO DEVELOP A MOBILE STRATEGIC LAUNCHER, WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY REPLACE THE FIXED MISSILES ON THE PLATEAU D'ALBION AND WHICH WOULD OF COURSE HAVE A CAPACITY TO ATTACK TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION SIMILAR TO THE LRTNF STRIKE CAPACITY WHICH NATO AGREED TO CREATE IN ITS DECISION OF 12 DECEMBER. THIS HAS NOTHING IN COMMON WITH FRENCH PLANS FOR A NEUTRON BOMB, ON WHICH THE FRENCH HAVE TAKEN NO DECISION. PRESIDENT GISCARD SPOKE OF A CONTINUATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB WITH A VIEW TO DECIDING IN 1982/83 WHETHER TO UNDERTAKE PRODUCTION.

2. IT IS ODD THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PRESIDENT GISCARD A SPECIAL ACCOLADE BY SINGLING OUT FRANCE IN THIS WAY. I NOTED THAT HE SINGLED FRANCE OUT SOMEWHAT SIMILARLY IN THE PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN IN HIS SPEECH IN MOSCOW (FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE EXTRACT IN MOSCOW TELNO 448). IT IS NORMAL FOR THE FRG AND FRANCE TO GIVE EACH OTHER MUTUAL PRAISE AND SUPPORT WHEN DETENTE IS AT ISSUE, BUT IT SEEMS ECCENTRIC TO PICK FRANCE OUT FOR PRIVILEGED MENTION WHEN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND RESISTENCE TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE ISSUES.

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MIPT: SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: PROPOSED GAS DEAL.

1. THIS IS A MAJOR EVENT, ABOUT WHICH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, OFFICIALS AND PRESS HAVE BEEN AMAZINGLY COY, THERE HAS BEEN FULL COVERAGE IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES.
2. IN ESSENCE BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOW ENDORSED PRIVATE SECTOR NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AFTER THE 1978 ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT. COMMERCIAL CONTACTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN UNDER WAY FOR SOME MONTHS (SEE LONGWORTH'S LETTER OF 25 JANUARY TO EESD). NEGOTIATIONS ARE, IN THE ESTIMATE OF GERMAN OFFICIALS, LIKELY TO LAST UNTIL SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. THEY WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY BY GERMAN FIRMS. BUT THE GERMAN POLITICAL ENDORSEMENT IS SIGNIFICANT GIVEN THE TIME AND SCALE OF THE PROJECT.
3. AS REPORTED IN MOSCOW CREDA 42 (NOT TO ALL), THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES TO EXPORT ANOTHER 40 BILLION CUBIC METRES OF GAS ANNUALLY FROM SIBERIA AS PART OF THE BIGGEST SUCH PROJECT THEY HAVE PLANNED. THE CHAMBER OF DUETSCHER BP TOLD ME THAT 4000 KMS OF NEW PIPELINE ARE REQUIRED, OF WHICH 400 KMS WILL BE THROUGH PERMAFROST (THIS APPARENTLY COMPARES WITH AN ALASKAN PIPELINE OF 1600KMS.). THE GERMANS SAY THAT THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE READY IN 1984 OR 1985. AN EXTRA 10 BILLION CUBIC METRES WILL BE ABSORBED IN RUNNING THE SYSTEM.
4. WITHIN THESE OUTLINES MUCH REMAINS TO BE SETTLED. THE COST OF THE PROJECT IS ESTIMATED BY BOTH BP AND THE PRESS AT DM 20 BILLION BUT OUR OFFICIAL CONTACTS WILL NOT CONFIRM THIS, PARTICULARLY SINCE A GOOD DEAL OF THE FINANCING WILL BE ON COMPENSATION TERMS. NOR IS PARTICIPATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE YET FIXED.

AN EXTRA 10 BILLION CUBIC METRES WILL BE ABSORBED IN RUNNING THE SYSTEM.

4. WITHIN THESE OUTLINES MUCH REMAINS TO BE SETTLED. THE COST OF THE PROJECT IS ESTIMATED BY BOTH BP AND THE PRESS AT DM 20 BILLION BUT OUR OFFICIAL CONTACTS WILL NOT CONFIRM THIS, PARTICULARLY SINCE A GOOD DEAL OF THE FINANCING WILL BE ON COMPENSATION TERMS. NOR IS PARTICIPATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE YET FIXED. GERMAN OFFICIALS REFER TO THE OPERATION AS A WESTERN EUROPEAN ONE, BP TELL ME THAT FRENCH, BELGIAN AND DUTCH INTERESTS ARE ALSO INVOLVED, WITH THE FRG TAKING 40 PER CENT. THERE ARE STILL TWO COMPETING CONSORTIA BUT THE GERMANS THEMSELVES SEEM BOUND TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH RUHRGAS, MANNESMANN AND THE DEUTSCHE AND DRESDNER BANKS TAKING A PROMINENT PART. DEUTSCHE BP WILL BENEFIT WHETHER IN THEIR OWN RIGHT OR THROUGH THE HOLDING IN RUHRGAS. OTHER PARTICIPANTS WHO HAVE BEEN MENTIONED INCLUDE SHELL, ESSO, GAZ DE FRANCE, DISTRICTGAS (BELGIUM), AND GASUNI (NETHERLANDS).

5. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE GERMAN CABINET DECIDED RECENTLY TO RAISE THE UPPER LIMIT FOR FRG DEPENDANCE ON SOVIET GAS TO 30 PER CENT. THE PRESENT PROJECT, OF WHICH THE GERMANS EXPECT TO TAKE ABOUT A THIRD, I.E. AN ADDITIONAL 14-16 BILLION CUBIC METRES, SHOULD RAISE THE DEPENDENCE TO ABOUT 26 PER CENT.

6. THE CHAIRMAN OF DEUTSCHE BP CLAIMED TO ME RECENTLY THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ACCEPTED THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF THE DEAL. IT WAS BETTER FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE TO MEET ITS NEEDS FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES RATHER THAN COMPETE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR MIDDLE EAST SUPPLIES. IT IS NEVERTHELESS BOUND TO BE READ AS A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF QUOTE BUSINESS AS USUAL UNQUOTE, DESPITE AFGHANISTAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGMOTHER NATO POSTS AND UKDEL VIENNA

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00 ROME

00 UKDEL VIENNA

GRS 285

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FM BONN 041350Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 538 OF 04 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON PARIS AND MOSCOW

INFO IMMEDIATE TO OTHER NATO POSTS UKDEL VIENNA AND BMG BERLIN

MY TELNO 535: SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ATTEMPT A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON THE WESTERN INTEREST OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. THAT MUST DEPEND IN PART ON THE TRUE VALUE OF THE TNF OFFER, WHICH HAS YET TO BE ASCERTAINED, AND ON THE CONSIDERED IMPACT OF THE VISIT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON.

2. BUT THIS AT LEAST CAN BE SAID. THE CHANCELLOR SEEMS TO HAVE WALKED THE TIGHTROPE HE ERECTED FOR HIMSELF WITH CONSUMMATE SKILL AND PRODUCED SOMETHING TO PLEASE AND DISPLEASE THE SUPERPOWERS IN EQUAL MEASURE. HE WILL HAVE OFFENDED THE RUSSIANS AND PLEASSED THE AMERICANS WITH HIS ROBUST TALK. HE WILL HAVE OFFENDED THE AMERICANS AND PLEASSED THE RUSSIANS BY MAKING THE VISIT AT ALL, THUS SIGNIFYING BUSINESS AS USUAL. AND HE HAS DONE BOTH HIMSELF AND THE RUSSIANS A GOOD TURN WITH THE NATURAL GAS DEAL. THIS DEAL PUTS PAID TO ANY IDEA OF DETERRENT ACTION AGAINST (SEE MY IFT) THE RUSSIANS AFTER WHAT THEY

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RELATIONS BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON.

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3. THERE CAN MOREOVER BE NO DOUBT AT ALL ABOUT THE BENEFIT OF THE VISIT IN DOMESTIC ELECTORAL TERMS. THE CHANCELLOR HAS BEEN SEEN ON GERMAN TELEVISION RECEIVING RED CARPET TREATMENT IN MOSCOW, WITH HONOUR GUARDS AND PRACTICALLY THE WHOLE OF THE SOVIET HIERARCHY PARADED TO MEET HIM. HIS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AMID THE CEREMONY WILL HAVE ADDED TO GERMAN PRIDE AT THE ROLE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND ITS CHANCELLOR ARE NOW PLAYING IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND ALLAYED GERMAN FEARS THAT DETENTE MIGHT BE AT RISK. STRAUSS'S PERFORMANCE IN THE BUNDESTAG, CONFUSED, RAMBLING, UNTARGETED AND INEFFECTIVE, PRESUMABLY REFLECTS HIS FEELING THAT THE CHANCELLOR IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTION HAS CAPTURED BOTH THE WORLD STAGE AND THE GERMAN PUBLIC MOOD.

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FM BONN 031604Z JULY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 530 OF 3 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON,
LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME, UKDEL VIENNA, BMG
BERLIN

MY TELNO 525: SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. IN HIS GOVERNMENT DECLARATION IN THE BUNDESTAG THIS MORNING (TEXT BY BAG TO WED), THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR COVERED BROADLY THE SAME GROUND AS IN VON STADEN'S ACCOUNT TO ME, WITH THE IMPORTANT ADDITION OF PASSAGES ON TNF AND MBFR.
2. SCHMIDT LAID GREAT STRESS ON ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE VISIT AND ON THE FACT THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO POSITIONS WHICH THE ALLIES HAD ENDORSED. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND HER PARTNERS. HE HAD ROBUSTLY DEFENDED THE UNITED STATES AGAINST SOVIET CRITICISM.
3. HE SINGLED OUT FRANCE FOR SPECIAL MENTION IN SEVERAL PLACES, MADE A GOOD DEAL OF PLAY WITH THE FRANCE-GERMAN DECLARATION OF 5 FEBRUARY, AND INTERRUPTED HIS ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS SAID IN MOSCOW ABOUT MILITARY BALANCE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO GISCARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF 26 JUNE ABOUT A FRENCH NEUTRON BOMB:
QUOTE PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF 26 JUNE ANNOUNCED A DECISION WHICH IN MY VIEW SERVES AS MUCH AS THE NATO DECISION OF 12 DECEMBER TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE. I SHARE WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD THE BELIEF THAT MILITARY BALANCE IS AN INDISPENSABLE CONDITION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE UNQUOTE.
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS PLAYED DOWN AND RELEGATED TO A SHORT PASSAGE NEAR THE END OF THE DECLARATION IN WHICH HE RECORDED THE SIGNATURE AT AMBASSADOR LEVEL OF THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROGRAMME AND AGREEMENT TO BEGIN PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AND A QUOTE EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM UNQUOTE ABOUT A LARGE NATURAL GAS PROJECT. THE PROBABLE VALUE OF THE CONTRACT WAS NOT MENTIONED.

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5. ON TNF, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO START NEGOTIATING ON SALT III UNTIL THEY HAD A CLEARER IDEA OF THE PROBABLE FATE OF SALT II: THAT THE SOVIET UNION ADHERED TO ITS POSITION THAT BREZHNEV'S NEGOTIATING OFFER OF 6 OCTOBER 1979 WAS CONDITIONAL ON NATO SUSPENDING ITS DECEMBER DECISION ON TNF: THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY UNILATERAL LIMITATION ON ITS OWN MILITARY POTENTIAL, EVEN FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, AND HAD REJECTED HIS OWN IDEA OF A MUTUAL UNDERTAKING NOT TO DEPLOY MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6. BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT BREZHNEV HAD IN THIS CONNECTION PUT FORWARD QUOTE A NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL UNQUOTE. BREZHNEV HAD QUOTE DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ABOUT LIMITING MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II. THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE TO COVER THE MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS OF BOTH SIDES AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCED THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THIS AREA. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SO-CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE INCLUDED, THAT IS TO SAY THOSE AMERICAN WEAPONS WHICH ARE ALREADY STATIONED IN EUROPE AND WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE SOVIET UNION. ANY AGREEMENTS WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD IN (BREZHNEV'S) OPINION ENTER INTO FORCE ONLY AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II UNQUOTE.

7. THE CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT THIS CREATED A NEW SITUATION: THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR NATO TO REVOKE ITS DECEMBER DECISION NO LONGER STOOD IN THE WAY OF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A MUTUAL LIMITATION ON MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS. WITHOUT CLAIMING THAT THIS REPRESENTED A QUOTE BREAK-THROUGH UNQUOTE, SCHMIDT CLAIMED THAT IT QUOTE OPENED UP THE CHANCE OF AVOIDING AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE IN THIS AREA UNQUOTE.

8. ON MBFR, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE AND GENSCHER HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DATA QUESTION AND DRAWN ATTENTION TO NATO'S DECEMBER PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. HE WENT ON: QUOTE THE SOVIET SIDE GAVE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY INTEND SHORTLY TO PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS IN VIENNA WHICH WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD REPRESENT AN IMPROVEMENT ON THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS UNQUOTE.

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9. ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, THE THIRD WORLD AND BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE CHANCELLOR'S ACCOUNT TALLIED WITH THAT GIVEN BY VON STADEN. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD NOT BEEN BRIDGED. BOTH SIDES HOWEVER HAD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND THE COMMUNIQUE HAD REFLECTED THE JOINT VIEW THAT SUCH A SOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE INDEFINITELY POSTPONED BUT SHOULD BE PURSUED WITH MAXIMUM SPEED (SCHNELLSTMÖGLICH). THE CHANCELLOR CLAIMED THAT THIS FORMULATION REPRESENTED QUOTE A SMALL STEP ALONG A ROAD WHICH WE ALL KNOW TO BE EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT UNQUOTE.

10. THE CHANCELLOR CONCLUDED BY ASSESSING THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT AS POSITIVE: BOTH SIDES NOW HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S POSITION AND IN CERTAIN QUESTIONS, NOTABLY TNF, INDICATIONS HAD BEEN GIVEN WHICH COULD FORM THE STARTING POINT FOR NEW SOLUTIONS. IN HIS OWN AND GENSCHER'S OPINION, THE VISIT HAD QUOTE COMPLETELY FULFILLED ITS PURPOSE UNQUOTE.
FCO PASS SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS AND UKDEL VIENNA

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FROM UKDEL NATO 031710Z JUL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF3 JULY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW.

SAVING BRUSSELS OTTAWA ANKARA OSLO ROME COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE

ATHENS LISBON REKYJAVIK BMG BERLIN AND LUXEMBURG.

*Read full.**MT*MY TELNO 321 (NOT TO ALL) BRIEFING BY VAN WELL ON CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : TNF/SALT

1. VAN WELL BRIEFED THE COUNCIL IN RESTRICTED SESSION THIS MORNING ON THE SCHMIDT VISIT. MY THREE IFTS REPORT HIS BRIEFING ON MBFR, CSCE AND AFGHANISTAN.
2. ON TNF/SALT, VAN WELL GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE TWO QUESTIONS WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ASKED SCHMIDT TO PUT TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP (PARA 4 OF BONN TELNO 525 REFERS).
3. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF SALT II PENDING RATIFICATION, BREZHNEV HAD MERELY SAID THAT THE PROVISIONS OF A TREATY COULD NOT BE BINDING UNTIL THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE. THE GERMANS HAD THE IMPRESSION HOWEVER THAT BREZHNEV WAS STATING THIS AS AS A POINT OF PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THAT IT DID NOT MEAN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE PREPARED IN PRACTICE TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF SALT II. IN ADDITION TO BLAMING THE US ADMINISTRATION FOR THE FAILURE TO RATIFY SALT II, BREZHNEV HAD CRITICISED THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE FOR NOT PUTTING SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON THE US OVER THIS.
4. IN ANSWER TO THE SECOND AMERICAN QUESTION (WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO PREPARATORY TALKS ON SALT III BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II) BREZHNEV HAD ADVANCED FOUR LINES OF THOUGHT. IN THE FIRST, HE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD SEE LITTLE GAIN FROM ENTERING INTO TALKS ON SALT III WHEN SALT II HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED. HE WENT ON TO CRITICISE IN STANDARD TERMS THE ALLIANCE DECISION ON TNF AS AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HE SAID THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC COULD NOT ESCAPE PART OF THE BLAME FOR THE DECISION (SCHMIDT HAD RESPONDED THAT NOT ONLY HAD HE AGREED TO THE DECISION BUT HAD PLAYED A LEADING PART IN PROMOTING IT). BREZHNEV ARGUED THAT THE DANGERS OF THE SS20 HAD BEEN WILDLY EXAGGERATED, ? IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION THEY WOULD REPLACE THE SS4 AND SS5. THEY WERE QUOTE MODERN UNQUOTE BUT NOT QUOTE NEW UNQUOTE WEAPONS SINCE, UNLIKE NATO/TNF, THEY INVOLVED

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NO INCREASE IN YIELD. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT STRIVING FOR SUPERIORITY IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE NOR FOR A FIRST STRIKE CAPACITY. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN ON MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1979.

IF STATIONING OF ALLIANCE TNF WENT AHEAD, THE SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES WOULD TAKE ALL MEASURES TO RESTORE THE BALANCE EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE AGAINST AN ARMS RACE.

5. THE SECOND LINE OF THOUGHT WAS THAT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE ALLIANCE DECISION OF 12 DECEMBER 1979, MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT III. BUT ALL STRATEGIC FACTORS WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT THAT TIME AND IN ANY CASE THE WAY WAS BLOCKED AT PRESENT BECAUSE THE US HAD NOT RATIFIED SALT II.

6. THIRDLY, BREZHNEV REJECTED THE IDEA OF NON-DEPLOYMENT PENDING NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE THIS WOULD INVOLVE A UNILATERAL MEASURE BY THE SOVIET UNION.

7. FINALLY BREZHNEV ~~MADE~~ THE SUGGESTION IN MOSCOW TELNO 456 FOR DISCUSSIONS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES NOW WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II. VAN WELL THOUGHT THAT BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT THAT THE RESULTS OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL AFTER RATIFICATION OF SALT II MIGHT IMPLY THAT THE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE COMPLETED AND AN AGREEMENT DRAWN UP EVEN BEFORE SALT II WAS RATIFIED. BREZHNEV HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ENDLESS DISCUSSIONS. GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED US FBS INCLUDED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, BUT NOT UK, FRENCH AND CHINESE SYSTEMS. GROMYKO HAD ADDED HOWEVER THAT QUOTE ALL COMPONENTS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN SALT III UNQUOTE. (VAN WELL COULD NOT CLARIFY WHAT GROMYKO MEANT PRECISELY BY THE TERM QUOTE COMPONENTS UNQUOTE.

8. SCHMIDT SAID THAT THE LAST SOVIET SUGGESTION WAS INTERESTING AND HE WOULD INFORM THE US AND THE OTHER ALLIES. HE ASKED WHETHER HIS ASSUMPTION THAT SS20, S4 S5 AND BACK-FIRE WERE INCLUDED IN SOVIET CRITERIA FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS WAS CORRECT. GROMYKO'S REPLY WAS QUOTE THE APPETITE GROWS WITH EATING UNQUOTE.

9. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY GERMAN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT A REVERSAL OF THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISION WAS NO LONGER A SOVIET PRECONDITION FOR TALKS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES. THEY DID NOT REGARD THE SOVIET SUGGESTION AS A QUOTE BREAKTHROUGH UNQUOTE BUT THOUGHT THAT IT REPRESENTED SOME MOVEMENT AND DESERVED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND STUDY IN THE ALLIANCE. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR INCLUSION OF FBS IN THE TALKS WOULD MEAN ACCEPTING LIMITATION ON SUCH WEAPONS IN ADVANCE. VAN WELL ATTRIBUTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION TO A REALISATION THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO ITS TNF DECISION.

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10. THIS LAST POINT WAS ECHOED BY MYSELF AND GLITMAN (US). VAN WELL TOLD VAN USSEL (BELGIUM) IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT THE NEW SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TALK WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY POSITIVE BELGIAN AND DUTCH DECISIONS ON TNF BASING, AND AGREED WHEN LUNS SUGGESTED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, ANY SIGNS OF WAVERING IN THE ALLIANCE WOULD WEAKEN THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL TALKS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM OLCAY (TURKEY) VAN WELL SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT GIVEN ANY INDICATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS THEY ENVISAGED FOR DISCUSSIONS ON FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. HARDY (CANADA) SPECULATED ON WHETHER PREPARATORY US/SOVIET TALKS WOULD MERGE AT SOME POINT WITH SALT III IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I AND ARNAUD (FRANCE) INTERVENED TO SAY THAT WE SAW NO REASON TO INDULGE IN SPECULATION OF THIS SORT AT THIS STAGE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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file

Germany BK

3 July 1980

Thank you for your letter of 1 July and enclosed text of Chancellor Schmidt's speech in Moscow. I have read the Chancellor's speech with great interest and will, of course, draw it to the Prime Minister's attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Dr. Jurgen Ruhfus, K.B.E.

SB

GRS 320

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FM MOSCOW 021015Z JULY 80

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 2ND JULY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON AND PARIS

MY TEL NO 451: SCHMIDT VISIT

1. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE HAS NOW BRIEFED ME ON THE VISIT. THE FORMAL ALLIED BRIEFING WILL BE GIVEN BY VAN WELL SO I SHALL NOT GO OVER THE DETAIL.
2. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT BREZHNEV SAID THAT DISCUSSION OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WOULD PROPERLY BE FOR SALT III BUT THIS WAS BLOCKED BECAUSE OF THE NON-RATIFICATION OF SALT II. THE IDEA OF PRELIMINARY SALT III TALKS, PENDING SALT II NOTIFICATION, WAS "NOT PROMISING", BUT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE THINKING THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL (BUT NOT, BY IMPLICATION, OTHERS) WITH THE UNITED STATES NOW. THE RESULTS OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II.
3. THE SCHMIDT IDEA OF NON-DEPLOYMENT PENDING NEGOTIATIONS WAS REJECTED ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE A UNILATERAL SOVIET CONCESSION. THE SOVIET UNION WAS "NOT WILLING TO MAKE A BINDING STATEMENT" ON SALT II IMPLEMENTATION PENDING RATIFICATION.
4. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WIECK SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF GENSCHER MENTIONED THE PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. WIECK CONFIRMED THAT IT SEEMED THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WERE ENVISAGED, NOT "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" AND THAT NO PRIOR CONDITIONS WERE SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.
5. THE SEPARATE TALK WITH USTINOV WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT. THE CHANCELLOR, SPEAKING IN PART AS A FORMER DEFENCE MINISTER, WAS TRYING TO SHOW USTINOV HOW THE STRATEGIC THREAT LOOKED FROM A WESTERN VIEWPOINT AND USTINOV WAS RESPONDING IN KIND. WIECK DESCRIBED IT AS A "PSYCHOLOGICAL EXERCISE".
6. THE RUSSIANS ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON A PROPOSAL FOR MBFR AGREEMENT ON FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS OF 20,000 BY THE SOVIET UNION (IN ADDITION TO THE EARLIER WITHDRAWAL FROM GDR) AND 13,000 BY THE UNITED STATES. SCHMIDT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THIS.

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TELNO 451 OF 2 JULY 80

RPTD PRIORITY TO BONN WASHINGTON AND UDEL NATO

AND INFO ROUTINE TO PARIS, OTTAWA, ANKARA, OSLO, COPENHAGEN,

THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ATHENS, LISBON REYJAVIK, BMG BERLIN

AND KABUL.

*2 ltr: read it
full***MY TELNO 446: VISIT OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT**

1. SCHMIDT'S TALK WITH BREZHNEV CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 1 JULY. HE LEFT IN THE EVENING. ACCORDING TO THE TASS ACCOUNT, THEY WERE "BUSINESSLIKE" AND CONCENTRATED ON ARMS CONTROL. "ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES." THE TWO SIDES ALSO EMPHASISES THE NEED OF RATIFICATION OF SALT 2. BREZHNEV SUBSEQUENTLY DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS "NECESSARY AND USEFUL". VIEWPOINTS HAD DIFFERED BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW EACH OTHERS, POSITIONS BETTER. SCHMIDT WAS QUOTED BY THE SOVIET PRESS AS SAYING THAT HIS VISIT HAD FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS, AND HAD CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF MEETING AND TALKING FRANKLY.

2. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER ALSO HAD A SEPARATE TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH USTINOV AND OGARKOV.

3. THE LONG TERM PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WAS SIGNED DURING THE VISIT AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IE. BY SEMENOV AND WRECK.

4. SCHMIDT GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET LEADER HAD STUCK RIGIDLY TO THEIR PUBLIC LINE. ON TNF, HE CLAIMED THAT HIS BELIEF THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE TALKS, BUT DECLINED TO GIVE DETAILS. THE FRG'S ALLIES NEEDED TO BE BRIEFED FIRST. HE REPORTED THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS THE IDEA OF A 3 YEAR FREEZE ON DEPLOYMENT, BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS: THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD AFFECT THEIR DEPLOYMENT BUT NOT THE NATO PLANS (SCHMIDT ADDED DRILY THAT THIS SEEMED A FAIR ASSESSMENT). HE SAID THAT HE HAD USED HIS MEETING WITH USTINOV TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE SS20 AND BACKFIRE. IN CONCLUSION HE ARGUED THAT HIS TALKS, AND OTHER EAST-WEST MEETINGS HAD BROUGHT A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION AND THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS.

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5. A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S PRESS. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

- (A) BILATERAL. STRESS ON ADHERENCE TO SIGNED TREATIES, AND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
 - (B) DETENTE. THE SIDES REGARDED DETENTE AS NECESSARY, POSSIBLE AND USEFUL, AND EXPRESSED THEIR WILL TO ENSURE THAT IT REMAINED THE LEADING TREND IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
 - (C) CSCE. THE PROCESS SHOULD BE CONSISTENTLY DEVELOPED.
- THE SIDES HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON CBM'S AND AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT MADRID.
- (D) ARMS CONTROL. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED. THE SIDES HAD PUT FORWARD THEIR VIEWS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND PAID ATTENTION TO THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR WILL TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE SUCCESS OF MBFR.
 - (E) AFGHANISTAN. "BEING AWARE OF THE NECESSITY OF SECURING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION THAT HAS FORMED IN CONNECTION WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE SIDES STATED THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEW POINTS THOROUGHLY AND WITH GREAT FRANKNESS."

6. FROM THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS MY IMPRESSION IS THAT SCHMIDT'S PRINCIPAL SUCCESS HAS BEEN IN MAKING A FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE MAJOR CURRENT ISSUES. ON AFGHANISTAN HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MET WITH AN INFLEXIBLE SOVIET POSITION AND THIS IS REINFORCED BY AN EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S PRAVDA WHICH MERELY RESTATES ALL THE MORE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY ON THIS QUESTION (MY TELNO 452 REFERS).

THE INTERESTING AREA IS OF COURSE TNF. THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVE NO INDICATION OF ANY MOVE ON POINTS OF SUBSTANCE BY EITHER SIDE, BUT BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT AT DINNER THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO A "FRUITFUL DIALOGUE" ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES, SCHMIDT'S SEPARATE MEETING WITH USTINOV AND HIS CLAIM TO HAVE DETECTED SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION COULD SUGGEST THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID SOMETHING WHICH SCHMIDT FEELS HE MUST TAKE SERIOUSLY. I SHALL BE SEEING MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE LATER TODAY AND WILL REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

KEEBLE

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DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

Weekend Post.

Handwritten initials

London, July 1st, 1980

Prime Minister.

Mr Brezhnev will not have enjoyed
listening to his speech.

Handwritten initials and date: Amt-2/7

Dear Michael

Handwritten initials

I have great pleasure in enclosing the English translation of the speech that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made in Moscow on June 30th.

Sincerely yours
Jürgen Ruhfus

Jürgen Ruhfus

Michael Alexander, Esq.
Cabinet Office
10, Downing Street
London, S.W.1

RTURM - KLANGHART - JEM - EOM

translation

speech by chancellor schmidt in moscow on 30 june 1980

mr general secretary,

mr chairman of the council of ministers,

ladies and gentlemen,

thank you for the words you have just addressed to us, mr general secretary. at the same time i should like to thank you and the other members of the soviet leadership, also on behalf of foreign minister genscher and the entire delegation, for the invitation to visit moscow and for the hospitality extended to us this evening. this is my fifth visit to moscow. in view of the current grave international situation i consider it a very important visit. we are able, mr general secretary, to follow on from your visit to the federal republic of germany in 1978 and the various high-level talks that have been held since then.

the relations between our two countries, which we set on a sound foundation about 10 years ago with the german-soviet treaty of 12 august 1970, must prove to be stable, durable and capable of development in difficult times, too. otherwise we would not be able to live up to the obligations we have assumed in the treaty itself and in our joint declarations of 1973 and 1978. in this context i also mention the quadripartite agreement of 1971 which has noticeably eased the situation in and around berlin.

the federal republic of germany abides firmly by the agreements it has concluded. we adhere strictly to the multilateral conventions which form a link between us. in particular i have in mind the cosce final act. we still have to do some work together to bring

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about its realization. in co-ordination with our allies and through intensive consultations with all participants in the conference we are preparing ourselves for the madrid follow-up conference at which political and economic issues, certain security aspects as well as human rights will feature prominently. the madrid conference can also bring about important decisions in the field of arms control. we can hope for greater security in europe if we succeed in elaborating confidence-building measures which are of military relevance to the entire european continent and binding on all the participants. (a conference on the military aspects of security in europe would be a suitable forum for the commencement of negotiations on this subject.) we hope that a substantive mandate for negotiations can be agreed in madrid. the preamble to the csce final act refers to detente which is "universal in scope" and to "recognizing the close link between peace and security in europe and in the world as a whole". and in our joint declaration of 6 may 1978 we pledged ourselves to respect the "indivisibility of peace and security throughout the world".

the alarming development of international relations during recent months has demonstrated quite clearly how important this statement is. the afghanistan crisis is casting a broad shadow on east-west relations in europe. it is causing deep concern and great anxiety particularly in the states of the third world, in the non-aligned countries, especially the islamic ones.

we must respect the voice of these peoples whose security, freedom and self-determination are at stake. world peace depends increasingly on all peoples - even those not belonging to an alliance - being able to rely on their sovereignty and independence being ensured. non-alignment has now become a real factor of international peace.

in the matter of the afghanistan crisis, my government supports, together with france, with its partners in the european community and the participants in the venice summit of 22 and 23 june, and with the overwhelming majority of the international community, the united nations general assembly resolution of 14 january 1980 as well as the position expressed by the islamic conference at its last two meetings.

the common objective of these resolutions and initiatives is to restore an independent, non-aligned afghanistan, free from foreign troops - an afghanistan in keeping with the wishes of the afghan people and the legitimate interests of afghanistan's neighbours.

i am sure that you, mr general secretary, would make a vital contribution to defusing this dangerous crisis if you could declare that the announced withdrawal of some soviet troops from afghanistan is the beginning of a movement which will be continued until withdrawal is complete.

i am also concerned about the stagnation in the peace-keeping efforts as regards the israeli-arab conflict. acts of violence intensify the danger emanating from this area of conflict for the entire region. together with its european partners my government

is pressing for progress in the quest for a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement.

here, too, it is the recognition and realization of fundamental principles of the international community which are involved: the right to security of all states of the region, including israel, as well as justice for all peoples, i.e. also the legitimate rights of the palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

these principles must also gain acceptance in southern africa if the nations of the region and the world as a whole are to be spared bloody racial warfare. developments in zimbabwe show that conflicts can be resolved by peaceful means. my government will do everything possible so that namibia acquires its independence on the basis of security council resolution 435. it supports without reservation those who advocate self-determination and human dignity. in south africa, racial discrimination must give way to a policy of equality for all.

the hostage-taking in tehran concerns all nations, not only the americans who can count on us in their patient endeavours to obtain the release of the hostages. the international community expects each state to do its share in pressing for an early humane decision by the iranian authorities.

in former indochina, there is still no peace after the great suffering of the viet nam war. millions of people have become the victims of grave internal and eksternal conflicts. together with our european partners, we support asean's responsible commitment to regional security and co-operation.

only recently in the preface to the german edition of your speeches and interviews you, mr general secretary, pointed out that crises occurring anywhere in the world today have far-reaching repercussions on international relations as a whole. i share your view. in addition to regional conflicts which we must seek to resolve by peaceful means there are global tasks which we can only resolve jointly.

the necessary reconciliation of interests between north and south, between industrialized and developing countries, has been made increasingly more difficult but also more urgent by the population explosion in the third world and the explosion of the oil prices. we are all called upon to assist in mastering this task of the century - for moral reasons and because we bear a joint responsibility for world peace. that means western and eastern industrialized countries, the large oil-eksporting countries but then also the developing countries themselves.

those who care for peace in this world must refrain from imposing their own political, social and economic ideas on the third world. the countries of the third world have a right to plurality, to run their own internal and eksternal affairs, and to be free from domination.

we must give priority to ensuring internationally secure, adequate energy supplies. or else there will be the danger of a world-wide struggle for the distribution of energy with devastating effects. the industrialized countries, the oil-producing countries and the non-oil-producing developing countries are dependent on one another if they want to develop their own potential for economic advancement and prosperity. our two countries can achieve a great deal through their co-operation. from the outset i welcomed your proposal, mr general secretary, for an all-european energy conference and i shall continue to support it.

however, we can only do what is expected of us if we feel secure and are, in fact, secure. the military balance of power, both regional and global, i.e. in europe and in the world as a whole, is an indispensable key element for a peaceful future.

the preservation of equilibrium where it already exists and the creation of equilibrium where it does not yet exist must, therefore, be a priority issue of our co-operation. we must find ways of stopping the arms race which is both futile and irresponsible. the east and the west must therefore intensify their efforts to achieve agreements on arms control and arms limitation.

the american-soviet salt treaty of last june is, in our opinion, a vitally important step along this path. we hope that it will soon be ratified and shall continue to advocate its ratification. the two super powers bear a special responsibility for peace. we hope, therefore, that the united states, which has expressly said so, and the soviet union abide by the provisions of the treaty even without formal ratification.

in the field of medium-range nuclear missiles, there has, unfortunately, been a continuing development which runs counter to the gain in stability resulting from the conclusion of salt ii. foreign minister genscher and i myself have repeatedly drawn attention to this dangerous development, both publicly and in our talks with the soviet leadership. nobody could or can be in doubt about our concern.

from 1978 onwards the western alliance had to prepare concrete steps to counter the imbalance in this important field. the outcome of the lengthy and responsible deliberations is well-known: the nato decision of december 1979, which comprises both a decision on defence and a proposal for arms limitation. i am appealing to our soviet hosts not to cast aside this offer of negotiations.

we have read the declaration of the warsaw pact states of 15 may. in it they state their readiness to negotiate on all weapons systems. put this willingness into practice by agreeing to begin preparatory negotiations on medium-range systems without prior conditions.

mr general secretary, ladies and gentlemen, i have had to talk about crises, areas of tension, and conflicts. many people in my

....

country - and not only there - are concerned about the preservation of peace. precisely for that reason, two things are important:

first, we must ensure that particularly in difficult times the communication between those holding political responsibility is maintained and intensified. we must undertake even greater efforts in future to find ways and means of preventing conflicts, at least of making them manageable.

second, political action must be marked by great circumspection and a firm resolve for peace.

my government's will for peace is demonstrated by its calculable policy, which is based on a realistic assessment of the situation and on clear-cut premises. i would like to name the three underlying elements:

-the firm integration of the federal republic of germany in the atlantic alliance and the european community, in the knowledge that it shares common values and interests with the united states of america and the other allies.

-the policy of detente and co-operation with our eastern neighbours.

-the policy of partnership on equal terms with countries of the third world.

the german and the soviet people both have vivid memories of the horrors of war, of death, expulsion and destruction. we have both, mr general secretary, spoken repeatedly of the particular responsibility of the generation we belong to, which consciously experienced the entire war. we germans in the heart of europe could only lose everything and gain nothing from another war. the people in my country are aware of this. they are therefore agreed on the basic course of our policy. and it is precisely this consensus which makes our political course stable and clear: a course aimed at peace.

but there is not only cause for concern - there is also cause for hope. the co-operation and contacts between germans on both sides of the river elbe have improved. last year i visited bulgaria, poland and hungary. i experienced the measure of co-operation we have achieved and i know that nobody wants to question the achievements.

it is gratifying to note that particularly in our relations with the soviet union we have achieved an exchange of views and consultations of remarkable intensity. we are thus able to gauge the interests and problems of the other side better. our long-term economic co-operation also helps to safeguard peace.

between our two states there exists a problem which still causes great human suffering: i am referring to the plight of the divided families. i am appealing to you, mr general secretary, to make possible a similarly favourable development with respect to the reunification of families. this is not so much an issue based on reason, but a matter of the heart.

our bilateral relationship is, i feel, a good illustration that problems can be settled, conflicts resolved and tension alleviated by a readiness for negotiation and by a will for the reconciliation of interests. in this way the governments of our

two countries have made a contribution towards equilibrium and stability. it is now paramount to prevent new dangerous imbalances arising which could jeopardize our joint achievements.

i therefore welcome this opportunity of direct negotiations. i wanted to present our own views, which are based on positions shared by our friends and partners. but i also wanted to hear the views of the soviet leadership. i hope that we can - above and beyond our bilateral co-operation - contribute towards finding solutions to the problems besetting us and our partners.

mr general secretary, i propose a toast to your personal health, to the well-being of the soviet leadership, to good relations between the soviet union and the federal republic of germany, to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and to peace in europe and the world which we all need so urgently.

GRS 730
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FM BONN 301043Z JUNE 80
TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 515 OF 30 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON,
LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL NATO, BMG BERLIN, ROME

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT LEFT THIS MORNING FOR HIS TWO-DAY VISIT TO MOSCOW, ACCOMPANIED BY GENSCHER. THERE IS EXTENSIVE PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE LIKELY OUTCOME, MUCH OF IT REFLECTING OFFICIAL BRIEFING. THE OVERALL IMPRESSION IS UNCERTAIN AND CONFUSED. THIS REFLECTS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ON THE ONE HAND THE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO AVOID RAISING UNREALISTIC HOPES AND TO STRESS THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH SCHMIDT WILL PRESENT THE ALLIANCE POSITION AND ON THE OTHER, THE CHANCELLOR'S NEED TO BE SEEN TO PRODUCE A SUCCESS IN MOSCOW WHICH WILL GIVE FURTHER MOMENTUM TO THE COALITION'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND SATISFY THE SPD'S DESIRE FOR PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL.
 2. THE GENERAL ANZEIGER, REFLECTING BRIEFING BY THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, IDENTIFIES THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BELIEVES MIGHT REALISTICALLY BE OBTAINABLE ON AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO:
 - (A) AGREEMENT BY THE RUSSIANS TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSION WITH THE THREE-MAN COMMISSION SET UP BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND PERHAPS ALSO WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL:
 - (B) SOVIET AGREEMENT TO START PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH THE US, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, ABOUT THE PROCEDURE FOR, AND CONTENT OF, NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FURTHER LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS PARTICULARLY MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES:
 - (C) A DECLARATION BY THE SOVIET UNION OF THE NEED TO END THE HOSTAGE AFFAIR IN IRAN, PLUS CONFIRMATION OF EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GULF REGION FOR WORLD ENERGY SUPPLY.
- THE CHANCELLOR IS ALSO EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION: AND THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROGRAMME AGREED DURING TICHONOV'S RECENT VISIT TO BONN IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED DURING THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH NOT (IF THE GERMANS HAVE THEIR WAY) BY THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF.
3. IF ANY OR ALL OF THESE THREE OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED, THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT THE VISIT TO HIS OWN PUBLIC OPINION AS A MAJOR SUCCESS. BUT THE CATCH OF COURSE LIES IN THE PRICE WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE MAY SEEK TO EXACT. AFTER THE MUCH PUBLICISED RESTORATION OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AT VENICE AND ANKARA, THERE CAN HARDLY BE ANY QUESTION OF THE GERMANS DEROGATING

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/IN MOSCOW

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IN MOSCOW FROM NATO'S DECEMBER DECISIONS IN ORDER TO STRIKE SOME KIND OF BARGAIN WITH THE RUSSIANS. BUT, AS SOME PRESS COMMENT (NOTABLY IN A WELL-INFORMED PIECE IN SPIEGEL ON THE VENICE SUMMIT) POINTS OUT, THE RUSSIANS COULD PUT THE CHANCELLOR NEATLY INTO A DILEMMA IF THEY WERE IN EFFECT TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL WHICH HE HAS STRONGLY DENIED MAKING FOR A MUTUAL EAST/WEST MORATORIUM ON THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND THE FURTHER THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GO TOWARDS AGREEING TO NEGOTIATE THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, THE STRONGER THE DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN THE FRG WOULD BE TO TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD, ESPECIALLY WITHIN THE SPD. SPD AND CDU SPOKESMEN ARE ALREADY STAKING OUT THEIR POSITIONS IN THIS REGARD: BAHR IS QUOTED TODAY AS SAYING THAT ARMS CONTROL WILL BE THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IN MOSCOW. DREGGER, ON THE OTHER HAND, AS POINTING OUT THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF TNF WOULD BE MEANINGLESS WITHOUT A MORATORIUM ON PRODUCTION.

4. IN SHORT, THE RISK FOR SCHMIDT SEEMS TO BE THAT, IF HE RETURNS WITH COMPLETELY EMPTY HANDS, HE WILL BE FIERCELY CRITICISED FOR HAVING MADE THE VISIT TO NO PURPOSE. BUT IT WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO COME UP WITH AN OFFER (EITHER ON ARMS CONTROL OR EVEN ON AFGHANISTAN) TOO ATTRACTIVE FOR THE GERMANS TO REJECT OUT OF HAND BUT TOO COSMETIC TO APPEAL TO THE AMERICANS. THE RIFT IN THE ALLIANCE WHICH HAS BEEN AT BEST PRECARIOUSLY PAPERED OVER AT VENICE AND ANKARA WOULD THEN BE SHARPLY REOPENED, AND A DEBATE TRIGGERED OFF INSIDE THE FRG ON THE GROUND ON WHICH THE SPD IS PERHAPS MOST VULNERABLE TO OPPOSITION ATTACK.

5. IN SHORT, WHAT STARTED OUT, ON THE GERMAN SIDE, AS AN EXERCISE WITH THE DOMESTIC ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER IN VIEW, AN EXERCISE WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO ABET, AT A PRICE, SINCE THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SCHMIDT TO DEAL WITH THAN STRAUSS, HAS BEEN CAUGHT UP IN SUPER POWER RIVALRY FOR THE SOUL OF GERMANY. NO WONDER GENSCHER, WHEN I OFFERED HIM ON SATURDAY MY BEST WISHES FOR HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW, REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED ALL THE GOOD WISHES HE COULD GET.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 16 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

QUADRIPARTITE BREAKFAST: SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. GENSCHER (WHO OTHERWISE TOOK ONLY A SMALL PART IN THE DISCUSSION) VOLUNTEERED THE FOLLOWING REPORT ON SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL WOULD GO FIRST, AND IT WOULD THEN BE FINALLY DECIDED WHETHER OR NOT SCHMIDT WOULD GO. (THE IMPLICATION HOWEVER WAS THAT HE WOULD). IF HE DID, IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF JUNE OR THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF JULY IE AFTER THE VENICE SUMMIT AND BEFORE THE OLYMPIC GAMES. THE GERMAN ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GO DURING AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER. SCHMIDT WOULD GO ON HIS OWN BEHALF, BUT WOULD NOT ADOPT A POSITION AT VARIANCE WITH THE ALLIANCE OR WITH THE NINE. HE WOULD BEHAVE AS THE FRENCH HAD IN RECEIVING GROMYKO. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT TALKING TO THE RUSSIANS WAS A GOOD THING AT PRESENT, BUT REFERRED TO THE RECENT TIMES EDITORIAL ON THE DANGER OF THE QUOTE DANIFICATION UNQUOTE OF EUROPE. HE HOPED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD MAKE SOME ROBUST PRO-WESTERN AND PRO-ALLIANCE OBSERVATIONS BEFORE THIS VISIT. GENSCHER AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE FACILITATED BY THE ATTACKS ON THE FRG IN THE LATEST WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE.

GORDON

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SIR D MAITLAND
MR BULLARD
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GRS 430

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FM BONN 291745Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 29 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

Read in full
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SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. BOTH VON STADEN AND VAN WELL EMPHASISED TO ME TODAY THAT SCHMIDT HAS STILL NOT FINALLY MADE UP HIS MIND ABOUT WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO MOSCOW. VAN WELL TOLD ME THAT THE TWO MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING HIS DECISION WOULD BE: FIRST, THE ADVICE HE RECEIVED FROM HIS FELLOW HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: HE WOULD NOT GO UNLESS HE WAS SATISFIED THAT HE HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF HIS MAIN ALLIES. SECONDLY, HE WOULD NEED TO BE ASSURED BY HIS STAFF THAT THERE WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING WORTH-WHILE RESULTS DURING HIS VISIT. THE TIMING REMAINS SOMETIME BETWEEN AFTER THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE OLYMPICS THEMSELVES. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOUR OF SUCH A VISIT. THIS ITSELF PRESENTS SCHMIDT WITH A DILEMMA: IF HE REFUSES, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN HIS REFUSAL TO PUBLIC OPINION: IF HE GOES, HE HAS TO BRING BACK SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE TO PUBLIC OPINION.

2. I REALISE THAT THERE WILL BE MANY WIDE-RANGING CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL AFFECT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE CHANCELLOR. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ANGLO/GERMAN RELATIONS, HOWEVER, IT CAN ONLY DO GOOD IF THE REPLY ENCOURAGES HIM TO GO TO MOSCOW. TO BEGIN WITH IT IS WHAT HE WANTS TO DO, BOTH FOR POLITICAL REASONS AND ALSO BECAUSE HE GENUINELY FEELS THAT EAST-WEST COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BROKEN DOWN AND NEED TO BE RE-ESTABLISHED. SECONDLY, IT WILL FLATTER HIS EGO AFTER THE BATTERING IT HAS RECEIVED AT LUXEMBOURG. THIRDLY, IT WILL BE A MARK OF BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN HIM AT A TIME WHEN HE NEEDS A BIT OF A BOOST TO MORALE. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THE PRESSURES HE MAY BE UNDER FROM HIS OWN PARTY, SCHMIDT HIMSELF IS ENOUGH OF A REALIST ABOUT THE RUSSIANS TO BE RELIED UPON NOT TO LET THE SIDE DOWN. MOREOVER, WE CAN DO OURSELVES A BIT OF GOOD WITH THE GERMANS IF WE CAN HELP TO BRING ROUND THE AMERICANS. THE PROBLEM WILL BE TO FIND A SUBJECT OF SUBSTANCE ON WHICH TO MAKE PROGRESS. ARMS CONTROL MAY BE ONE SUCH SUBJECT.

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/ 3. I SUGGEST

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3. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT ELEMENTS OF ANY REPLY MIGHT INCLUDE:-
A) ENCOURAGEMENT TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION;
B) SUITABLY FLATTERING REFERENCES TO HIS UNIQUE POSITION OF
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE; AND
C) THE SUGGESTION THAT, BEFORE FINALLY MAKING UP HIS MIND HE
MIGHT WANT TO PREPARE THE GROUND BY SENDING ONE OF HIS COLLABORATORS
TO MOSCOW TO EXAMINE THE LIKELIHOOD OF USEFUL RESULTS.
SINCE VAN WELL IS LIKELY TO BE THE PATHFINDER IN ANY CASE, THIS
WOULD HAVE THE ADDED VIRTUE OF ENCOURAGING SCHMIDT TO DO WHAT HE
WANTS TO DO IN THE WAY HE WANTS TO DO IT, WITHOUT, IN MY
JUDGEMENT, ANY REAL DANGER OF HIS SELLING PASSES.

WRIGHT

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 358 OF 25 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

Read in full.

BREZHNEV'S INVITATION TO SCHMIDT

1. I WAS HOST TODAY AT ONE OF THE REGULAR QUADRIPARTITE LUNCHES FOR VAN WELL AND MY AMERICAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES AND ONE OF THE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION WAS BREZHNEV'S INVITATION TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. I ASKED VAN WELL WHAT THE GERMAN ANALYSIS WAS OF THE REASONS FOR THE INVITATION TO BE ISSUED AT THIS TIME.

2. VAN WELL SAID THAT, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP HAD TAKEN A DECISION IN MID-MARCH BEFORE BREZHNEV WENT ON HOLIDAY THAT THE THEME SHOULD BE QUOTE BUSINESS AS USUAL IN EUROPE UNQUOTE. THIS HAD A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST, THE RUSSIANS HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE AMERICANS WERE INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. (STOESSEL STRONGLY DENIED THIS). SECONDLY, THE RUSSIANS NATURALLY WISHED TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE AMERICANS: GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS AND THE INVITATION TO SCHMIDT TO VISIT MOSCOW WERE ALL PART OF THE SAME TACTICS. OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH POINTED IN THE SAME DIRECTION WAS THE PRESENT VISIT OF THE POLISH VICE-PREMIER TO BONN AND THE COMPARATIVE EASE WITH WHICH THE PRESENT ROUND OF INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS WAS BEING CONDUCTED. BRUNET CONFIRMED THAT HIS LUNCH WITH ABRASIMOV ON 23 APRIL HAD BEEN AS UNEVENTFUL AS MY LAST LUNCH WITH HIM ON 19 MARCH HAD BEEN: ABRASIMOV HAD MADE HIS USUAL LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN A COMPARATIVELY MILD FORM. I POINTED OUT THAT IN THE PAST BREZHNEV HAD BEEN VERY INSISTENT THAT TOP LEVEL MEETINGS SHOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER THE MEETING HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY PREPARED AND WHEN THERE WERE AGREEMENTS TO BE SIGNED. HAD THE SITUATION NOW CHANGED? VAN WELL SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD DELIVERED BREZHNEV'S INVITATION, THERE HAD BEEN NO QUESTION OF FRESH AGREEMENTS TO BE SIGNED BUT SEMYONOV HAD SAID ONLY THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE AT THE MEETING TO JEOPARDISE THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE BY RAISING EXTRANEOUS SUBJECTS.

3. I THEN ASKED VAN WELL WHAT, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, WAS TO BE GAINED FROM SUCH A MEETING. VAN WELL REPLIED THAT THERE WERE VERY FEW BILATERAL SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION: ONE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE RE-UNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, WHICH HAD FALLEN OFF IN RECENT MONTHS. BUT THERE WERE OTHER GENERAL SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. TO BEGIN WITH IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO FIND OUT WHETHER DOBRYNIN'S RECENT APPROACH TO VANCE WAS INTENDED AS A SOVIET REPLY TO EUROPEAN IDEAS ABOUT A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN. SECONDLY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO RE-STATE THEIR GENERAL POSITION ON THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, WHICH HAD INITIALLY BEEN HELPFUL. THIRDLY, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THERE WOULD BE AN

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/OPPORTUNITY

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OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER TO THE OFFENSIVE ON THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF THE NATO DECISION OF 19 DECEMBER. VAN WELL HASTENED TO ADD THAT THIS WOULD BE QUOTE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS UNQUOTE, THAT IS TO SAY, THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF HOLDING UP THE NATO DECISION ON TNF MODERNISATION. FINALLY, VAN WELL ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATION. AFTER THE SPD DIS-ARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN COLOGNE LAST WEEK-END IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR THE CHANCELLOR, IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HIS PARTY, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECT OF THE NATO DECISION HAD NOT BEEN LOST SIGHT OF.

4. AS FOR TIMING, VAN WELL SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE VENICE SUMMIT. THIS WOULD BE TO EMPHASISE THAT SCHMIDT WOULD ONLY GO TO MOSCOW AFTER THE FULLEST CONSULTATION WITH HIS WESTERN PARTNERS AND THEREFORE, AS IT WERE, FROM A POSITION FOUR-SQUARE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT, IF THE INVITATION WERE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD BE FOR A DATE BETWEEN THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE START OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES. VAN WELL EMPHASISED THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD TAKEN NO FINAL DECISION TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION, BUT THE WHOLE TENOR OF HIS REMARKS ASSUMED THAT THE CHANCELLOR WAS WORKING TOWARDS AN EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE.

5. I AGREE WITH VAN WELL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO SCHMIDT OF THE INVITATION. A REFUSAL WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD LOCALLY, BOTH IN VIEW OF THE GERMAN LONGING FOR DETENTE TO BE SEEN TO CONTINUE AND ALSO AS A POWERFUL CHANCELLOR-BONUS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS.

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FM WASHINGTON 242330Z APRIL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1607 OF 24 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW.

CURTEL NO 1563: FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW.

1. NSC STAFF HAVE TOLD US THAT THE GERMANS WILL BE MAKING A FORMAL APPROACH TO VANCE THIS AFTERNOON ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. THAT SCHMIDT WISHES TO SOLICIT PRELIMINARY VIEWS FROM THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS GOING TO MOSCOW TO MEET BREZHNEV AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW AMERICAN REACTIONS BEFORE HE MEETS HIS EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:

B. THAT HE HIMSELF IS OPEN-MINDED AT PRESENT ON THE MATTER:

C. THAT IN ANY EVENT HE HIMSELF WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE VISITING MOSCOW BEFORE THE END OF JUNE: AND

D. THAT THE AMERICANS COULD REST ASSURED THAT IF HE DID GO HE WOULD CLEAVE TO ORTHODOX ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON THE SUBJECTS OF IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND T.N.F.

2. NSC STAFF REITERATED THEIR INTEREST IN KNOWING HMG'S THINKING AT THIS STAGE AS TO WHAT ADVICE THE CHANCELLOR SHOULD BE GIVEN.

HENDERSON

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SUBJECT

Germany

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T92/80

00 241108Z
BONN FROM LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL 0008

BT

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

MESSAGE BEGINS:-

DEAR HELMUT,

"I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE INFORMAL INDICATIONS WE
HAVE HAD THAT YOU WOULD CONSULT US, TOGETHER WITH OUR US
AND FRENCH ALLIES, BEFORE ACCEPTING MR. BREZHNEV'S INVITATION
TO VISIT MOSCOW. NO DOUBT YOUR FOREIGN OFFICE WILL BE IN TOUCH
WITH OURS IN DUE COURSE, BUT IN THE MEANTIME I WONDER IF WE
COULD HAVE A PRELIMINARY WORD ABOUT THIS IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT
IN LUXEMBOURG ON THE 27TH OR 28TH?"

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER

MESSAGE ENDS.

BT

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

To go on the direct line.

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

T 92/80

MESSAGE BEGINS

Dear Helmut,

"I was most grateful for the informal indications we have had that you would consult us, together with our US and French allies, before accepting Mr. Brezhnev's invitation to visit Moscow. No doubt your Foreign Office will be in touch with ours in due course, but in the meantime I wonder if we could have a preliminary word about this important development in Luxembourg on the 27th or 28th?"

Yours sincerely,

Signed Margaret Thatcher

MESSAGE ENDS

No. Distribution
Given by COMMLEN.

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(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

You will see from the
latest telegram (Bonn 349,
A attached) that the Germans are
planning to consult us, through
their Embassy here, about the
Chancellor's visit to Moscow. It
looks to me as though the
process will be one of information
rather than consultation. Unless
the Germans get in touch with us
early to-morrow, I would be inclined
to send a message (on the direct line)
along the lines proposed.

Don't think understood that
last part of direct telegraph message

234-80



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1980

Dear Michael,

K.S. [Signature]

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

At the same time as we were receiving your letter of 17 April, we had thought it advisable to instruct the Embassy in Bonn to put down a preliminary marker with the Chancellor's office about the need for close consultation about the Chancellor's visit. You will have seen Bonn telegram number 342 in reply (copy attached for ease of reference), which makes it clear that the Chancellor has not yet finally made up his mind but is very much inclined to go to Moscow sooner or later. The Germans have not, however, made any approach to us yet to seek our views.

[You have
seen this
already]

You will also have seen Bonn telegram number 343 (copy also attached) in which the Embassy argue that it would be a mistake for HMG to adopt too negative an attitude to Herr Schmidt's accepting the invitation. Lord Carrington accepts the Embassy's view on this, for the reasons set out in paragraph 7 of the second telegram under reference. From Washington telegram number 1563 (enclosed) it would appear that the Americans have similarly come to the conclusion that it will be impossible to dissuade Herr Schmidt from making the visit and that the important thing is for the FRG's allies to make sure that he speaks on the basis of a unified allied approach.

B.
C.

As for timing, we do not yet know what the Chancellor has in mind, but if he is to represent the Allies jointly in some way it would clearly make sense for his visit not to take place until after the various meetings planned for June (European Council, Venice Summit and NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Ankara). This would give time for the more important issues for his briefing to be properly co-ordinated beforehand. And if Gromyko goes to Vienna for the Austrian State Treaty celebrations, and there are meetings between him and other Western Foreign Ministers (Vance, Genscher, Francois-Poncet and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary are also likely to be there) the case for an early visit by Herr Schmidt to Moscow looks less strong.

As requested, I attach a draft telegram to Bonn containing a message for transmission to Chancellor Schmidt about the Prime Minister's desire for a private word with him about the visit in the margins of the European Council meeting.

D.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
G.G.H.

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

ADVANCE COPY

05 41 KK

IMMEDIATE

QBU UG
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to Legasson

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PP WASHINGTON

PP PARIS

GRS 430
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DESKBY 231800Z

FM BONN 231630Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 349 OF 23 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS

MY TELNO 342 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1563: FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW.

1. ARNOT, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DEPARTMENT IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE CONSULTATION REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 OF MY TUR WILL BE DONE THROUGH THE FEDERAL GERMAN EMBASSIES IN THE THREE CAPITALS. THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN DRAFTED AND ARE AT PRESENT WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND HERR GENSCHER. ARNOT EXPECTS THEM TO ISSUE QUOTE SHORTLY UNQUOTE BUT COULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC.

2. ON THE TIMING OF THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, THE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS (PRESUMABLY REFLECTING THE CHANCELLOR'S WISHES AS CONVEYED TO OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH ARNOT DID NOT SAY THIS) INDICATE THAT THE CHANCELLOR DOES NOT WANT THE VISIT RELEGATED TO THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR BUT IS PREPARED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. ASKED WHETHER THE GERMANS FORESAW DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THIS TIMING IN RELATION TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND GERMAN NON-PARTICIPATION IN THEM, ARNOT SAID THAT THEY SAW NO DIFFICULTY FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW. THE RUSSIANS MIGHT OF COURSE SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY. (IN OTHER WORDS THE GERMANS WOULD

NOT EXPECT A VISIT BY THE CHANCELLOR TO MOSCOW IN LATE JUNE OR JULY TO AFFECT GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN A BOYCOTT OF THE GAMES, BUT THEY RECOGNISE THAT THE BOYCOTT COULD CAUSE THE RUSSIANS TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE INVITATION.)

3. IF THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUE ALONG THE LINES PREDICTED BY ARNOT, IT WILL I THINK MEAN THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN ACCOUNT OF OUR CONCERN THAT THEY SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS WHICH ARE IN PROSPECT TO CO-ORDINATE AN ALLIANCE BRIEF FOR THE VISIT AND ALSO THAT THEY WANT TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF UNDUE WASTE IN TAKING UP THE INVITATION. THE PROPOSED TIMING WILL ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S DESIRE FOR THE VISIT TO TAKE PLACE SOON ENOUGH TO ENABLE HIM TO INFLUENCE SOVIET REACTIONS TO ANY FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE IRAN CRISIS. ON THIS BASIS, AND ASSUMING THAT THE GERMANS CONFIRM THE CHANCELLOR'S READINESS TO SPEAK TO A CO-ORDINATED ALLIANCE POSITION, I HOPE THAT OUR RESPONSE CAN BE IN RATHER MORE POSITIVE TERMS THAN THOSE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY BRZEZINSKI (PARA 3 OF WASHINGTON TOR), WHICH SEEM TO POINT TOWARDS INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT. DEFERRING THE VISIT UNTIL AFTER THE VENICE SUMMIT WILL MEET WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE MAIN AMERICAN CONCERN; AND IT WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT HERE IF THE UK AND THE US WERE TO LINE UP ON THE DISCOURAGING SIDE OF THE FENCE WITH THE FRENCH (SEE PARIS TELEGRAM NO 379) GOING ALONG WITH SCHMIDT'S DESIRE TO STRIKE WHILE THE IRON IS STILL REASONABLY HOT.

GOODALL


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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>P1207 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3350</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telegram N° 343 dated 21 April 1980</i>	
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Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

GR 550

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DESKBY 230800Z

FM WASHINGTON 222230Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1563 OF 22 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

BONN TELNO 342: FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW

1. AMERICAN REACTIONS TO DATE HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY MUTED, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN AWARE OF GERMAN INTEREST IN TOP LEVEL CONTACT WITH MOSCOW AS LEAST SINCE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF 17 JANUARY. DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND MOSCOW FEATURED IN THE US PAPER "GOALS AND ACTIONS" WHICH VANCE USED DURING HIS VISIT TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS IN FEBRUARY. THE PAPER CONTAINED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SCHMIDT.

2. THE AMERICAN CONCERN IS MORE TO ENSURE THAT THE TIMING OF ANY SUCH VISIT IS RIGHT AND THAT THERE IS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE ALLIES AND PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF ABOUT WHAT HE SHOULD SAY, AND NOT SAY, IN MOSCOW ON MATTERS RELATED TO ALLIED INTERESTS AS A WHOLE. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1536, SCHMIDT'S MAVERICK REMARKS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL AT ESSEN CERTAINLY CAUSED ANNOYANCE HERE. THE AMERICANS FEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT THESE: AND THAT THE VISIT, COUPLED WITH PERHAPS NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE WARSAW PACT MEETING IN MID-MAY AND THE AFGHAN REGIME'S PROPOSAL OF 17 APRIL FOR TALKS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN AND A REGIONAL CONFERENCE, COULD LEND ITSELF IN A DAMAGING WAY TO MOSCOW'S ANTICIPATED PEACE OFFENSIVE. THEY SHARE OUR FEELING THAT EVEN IF SCHMIDT DOES NOT GO TO MOSCOW UNTIL AFTER THE VENICE SUMMIT, THE TIMING WILL STILL BE TRICKY, EG IN RELATION TO THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS.

3. WE NOW LEARN FROM NSC STAFF THAT BRZEZINSKI WILL BE CONSIDERING THIS AFTERNOON THE DRAFT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO SCHMIDT ABOUT THIS INVITATION. THE DRAFT WOULD EXPRESS AGREEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH MOSCOW BUT WOULD QUESTION WHETHER ALLIED INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY THE VISIT TAKING PLACE "IN THE NEXT MONTHS". IT WOULD GO ON TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT IN PARTICULAR THE VISIT SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE VENICE SUMMIT, IN ORDER TO PERMIT ALLIED SOLIDARITY TO BE MANIFESTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BEFORE ANY INDIVIDUAL ALLIED LEADER MEETS BREZHNEV. THE DRAFT WOULD SAY THAT THERE MAY COME A TIME THIS YEAR WHEN IT WOULD SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS FOR SUCH A MEETING TO TAKE PLACE. THAT JUDGEMENT WOULD DEPEND PARTLY ON SOVIET ACTIONS. THE FIRST PRIORITY, ACCORDING TO THE DRAFT, IS TO

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GET AN UNEQUIVOCALLY UNIFIED APPROACH AMONG THE ALLIES ON HOW TO DETER FURTHER SOVIET AGGRESSION. THERE WOULD THEN BE A PARAGRAPH THANKING SCHMIDT FOR MAKING CLEAR BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE THAT HIS ESSEN SPEECH ON TNF DID NOT REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM THE 12 DECEMBER ALLIANCE DECISION, AND WARNING AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF A MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN DEPLOYMENTS.

4. NSC STAFF GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ANY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE LIKELY TO GO WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HMG WOULD NOW CONSULT RAPIDLY WITH THEM AS TO THE TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR OWN PROPOSED RESPONSE. THEY WOULD ALSO WELCOME ANY FURTHER INDICATIONS (BEYOND PARIS TEL 379) WE MAY HAVE OF LIKELY FRENCH ATTITUDES PARTICULARLY ON THE TIMING OF A SCHMIDT VISIT TO MOSCOW.

5. AS BACKGROUND TO CURRENT US THINKING YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO SEE THE LINE WHICH THE US AMBASSADOR IN PARIS WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAKE WITH FRANCOIS-PONCET BEFORE THE GROMYKO VISIT. TEXT OF US INSTRUCTIONS, GIVEN US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, IS IN M I F T.

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6	FM FCO 232000Z APRIL 1980
7	IMMEDIATE BONN
8	TELEGRAM NO
9	1. Please pass following message from Prime Minister to
10	Chancellor Schmidt:-
11	Begins
12	I was most grateful for the informal indications we have had that
13	you would consult us, together with our US and French allies,
14	before accepting Mr Brezhnev's invitation to visit Moscow. No
15	doubt your Foreign Office will be in touch with ours in due
16	course, but in the meantime I wonder if we could have a
17	preliminary word about this important development in Luxembourg
18	on the 27th or 28th? I would be especially interested to
19	know your views on the timing of the Russians' invitation <i>any visit that you might make to Moscow</i>
20	Ends
21	Signed Margaret Thatcher
22	
23	CARRINGTON
24	NNNN
25	


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any visit that you might make to Moscow

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept S/S office	Distribution PS/No 10
Drafted by (Block capitals) G G H Walden		
Telephone number 233 5791		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 14</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3350</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telegram N° 1564 dated 22 April 1980</i>	
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Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

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GRS 320

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FM BONN 211315Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 21 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS

Prime Minister.
This, in my view, strengthens the case for a
summit level meeting sooner rather than later.
It may be that you should talk to Helmut
Schmidt on the telephone tomorrow & ask him
to delay any announcement until after the weekend.
You should also float the idea of a meeting if
the Foreign Secretary talks with Helmut Genscher
have been at all encouraging.

FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW

1. WADE-GERY, WHO IS IN GERMANY ON OTHER BUSINESS, PAID A COURTESY CALL ON VON STADEN THIS MORNING. HE FOUND VON STADEN WORRIED ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IN CONTRAST TO THE US ADMINISTRATION (CF SIR N. HENDERSON'S CONVERSATION WITH BREZINSKI REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1536), VON STADEN SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S MAIN WORRY WAS OVER IRAN RATHER THAN AFGHANISTAN. HE EMPHASISED AGAIN THE GERMAN FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY MEASURES (E.G. A US NAVAL BLOCKADE) AND INDICATED THAT ANXIOUS CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN HERE TO POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH SOVIET AND THIRD WORLD (OTHER THAN IRANIAN) VESSELS MIGHT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF SUCH A BLOCKADE.
2. HE EMPHASISED THAT IT WOULD BE THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INTENTION TO GO TO MOSCOW AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIANCE. HE ALSO GAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD VIRTUALLY MADE UP HIS MIND TO GO, AND THAT A POSITIVE DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE END OF THIS WEEK SUBJECT TO THREE PROVISOS: A) ANY NEW FACTORS WHICH MAY EMERGE FROM GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS, BEARING IN MIND THE GERMAN BELIEF THAT GROMYKO IS AT PRESENT IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: B) POSSIBLE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF THE INVITATION (WHICH THE GERMANS CLEARLY DO NOT EXPECT), FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT ON 23 APRIL OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO RECOMMEND GERMAN NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE OLYMPICS: C) ANY MAJOR OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE ON THE PART OF THE FRG'S THREE PRINCIPLE ALLIES. VON STADEN GAVE NO SIGN OF BEING AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE INADEQUACY OF THE FRG'S PERFORMANCE SO FAR, AND DID NOT APPEAR TO FORESEE ANY SERIOUS OBJECTION ON THE PART OF THE US ADMINISTRATION.
3. WADE-GERY, WHO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NO (NO) BRIEF TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE, CONFINED HIMSELF TO EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION OF THE GERMAN READINESS TO CONSULT.

Shut

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cc Germany

bcc: Mr Alexander
No 10

Visit of Schmidt
to Moscow

Assured by P.M.

H. Paul

- 2/4

Private Secretary

GUADELOUPE II

- A
1. At the end of his conversation with the Prime Minister on 16 April Dr Kissinger expressed surprise that no attempt had been made to organise a second 4 power summit meeting on the model of Guadeloupe. The Prime Minister is recorded as saying that she would reflect on this point. Mr Alexander has invited FCO advice.
 2. The idea is open to all the usual objections: risk of excessive expectations leading to disappointment, offence to those not invited etc. Certainly Italy, Canada and Japan may feel sore at having got in on the Venice Group only to be up-staged by a second Guadeloupe.
 3. All the same I find Dr Kissinger's suggestion attractive. The announcement alone could do something to reduce Trans-Atlantic disunity, of which we have seen so many signs recently. The task of preparing for a summit would have a steadying effect in the 4 capitals. And one hopes that the meeting itself would produce something valuable.
- B
4. As to how to explain matters to the uninvited, perhaps we could make use of Chancellor's Schmidt's request for advice on how to reply to the invitation to him to visit Moscow this summer. The 3 Heads of Government whom he has consulted about this are the 3 who would be present at Guadeloupe II. We could take the line that Chancellor Schmidt's approach has crystallised the idea of a second meeting of this kind and made it natural to bring together the German Chancellor with the representatives of the 3 Western powers holding special responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole. And Chancellor Schmidt might find it easier to reply to the invitation, whether positively or negatively, with a Quadripartite summit behind him.
 5. In the absence this afternoon of the PUS and Sir D Maitland I am sending you this minute direct. If the Secretary of State thought the idea worth pursuing, he might wish to hold a small meeting on Monday morning, and perhaps to speak to the Prime Minister after that.

J L Bullard

18 April 1980

J L Bullard

Copies: PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/Mr Blaker
 PS/FUS
 Sir D Maitland
 Lord N Gordon Lennox
 Mr Fergusson
 WED

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Germany

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- Ps(S)
- Ps/LPL
- Ps/MR HOLD
- Ps/MR BLAKER
- Ps/Pos
- Sir D MATLAND
- Sir A ACLAND
- MR BULLARD
- MR FERLUSSEN
- Hassof WED
- EESD
- NAD

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GRS 950

SECRET

FM BONN 181900Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 342 OF 18 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS

No Cab. Office

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M.I.P.T. CONVERSATION WITH VON STADEN; FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION TO MOSCOW

1. AS INSTRUCTED IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH GLADSTONE AND VEREKER, I RAISED WITH VON STADEN THE QUESTION OF BREZHNEV'S INVITATION TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO VISIT MOSCOW. I SAID THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED IN VON STADEN'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WADE-GERY ON 16 APRIL. THE VERY PRELIMINARY REACTION IN LONDON WAS THAT THERE WOULD CLEARLY BE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS ABOUT WHAT, IF IT TOOK PLACE, WOULD BE THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS ON TIMING. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REACTION OF BRITISH MINISTERS, OFFICIALS IN LONDON THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED INCLUDED (A) HOW THE VISIT SHOULD BE RELATED TO THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ANKARA; AND (B) WHAT ITS IMPACT WOULD BE ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES, BEARING IN MIND THAT, IF IT TOOK PLACE IN THE EARLY SUMMER, IT WOULD FALL IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE FINAL DECISION ON WESTERN PARTICIPATION AND THE GAMES THEMSELVES. THESE QUESTIONS APART, WE ASSUMED THAT, IF THE CHANCELLOR DID GO TO MOSCOW, HE WOULD WISH TO SPEAK TO A BRIEF WHICH HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CO-ORDINATED WITH HIS ALLIES AND WOULD WANT TO MAKE FULL USE FOR THIS PURPOSE OF THE VARIOUS SUMMIT MEETINGS WHICH WERE IN PROSPECT. I ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HERR GENSCHER COULD HAVE A WORD ABOUT ALL THIS WITH YOU IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.

2. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD THIS MORNING

2. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD THIS MORNING GIVEN A CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO A GROUP OF TRUSTED JOURNALISTS WHICH WOULD BE REFLECTED IN TOMORROW'S PRESS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD TAKEN NO DECISION YET ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION. HE DID NOT REGARD ARMS CONTROL/TNF AS THE MOST URGENT ITEM FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS WERE AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN: THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR COULD DEVELOP INTO A SERIOUS CRISIS WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRIMARILY A US/IRAN PROBLEM, IT WOULD CERTAINLY FIGURE ON ANY AGENDA FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS.

3. THE CHANCELLOR HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE DID NOT REGARD THE INVITATION AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE OR ONE IN WHICH ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD PLAY A PART. HIS ONLY INTEREST IN GOING TO MOSCOW WOULD BE TO CONTRIBUTE TO DE-ESCALATING THE WORLD CRISIS. NOR HAD HE MADE UP HIS MIND ON TIMING: HE CERTAINLY HOPED TO GO TO MOSCOW SOONER OR LATER: BUT WHETHER IT SHOULD BE IN JUNE OR LATER IN THE YEAR OR EVEN IN 1981 WAS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. ASKED WHAT THE ELEMENTS IN HIS DECISION WOULD BE, THE CHANCELLOR HAD REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT DISCLOSE THEM. BUT THEY WOULD INVOLVE IN THE FIRST PLACE A CAREFUL CO-ORDINATION (SORGFAELTIGE ABSTIMMUNG) WITH THE FRG'S ALLIES AND SECONDLY PRECISE PREPARATION (GENAUER VORBEREITUNG) WITH THE SOVIET SIDE. HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH THOSE OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN WHO HAD EMPHASISED THAT, IF HE WENT TO MOSCOW, HE SHOULD GO IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS PART OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

4. VON STADEN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS FROM THE PRESS REPORTS OF THIS BRIEFING THAT THE CHANCELLOR WAS IN NO HURRY TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION AND WOULD BE GOING, IF AT ALL, ONLY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIANCE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD THEN HAVE TO SWALLOW THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE NEXT WEEK THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS RECOMMENDING AGAINST GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF THAT DECISION, THE SOVIET INVITATION WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

5. ON CONSULTATION, VON STADEN SAID THAT HE HAD ASSURED WADE-GEY, BRZEZINSKI AND WAHL THAT THE THREE ALLIES WOULD BE CONSULTED FIRST AND THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE DONE THROUGH MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MODALITIES HAD NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER: THIS WOULD HAPPEN ON SUNDAY AND THE GERMANS WOULD PROBABLY BE IN TOUCH WITH US ON MONDAY 21 APRIL. THE SUGGESTION THAT GENSCHER MIGHT DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH YOU ON 21/22 APRIL WAS A VERY HELPFUL ONE, WHICH HE WOULD TRANSMIT.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS ON TIMING INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF POSTPONING THE VISIT UNTIL LATER IN THE YEAR. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE TIMING CONSIDERATIONS WHICH I HAD REFERRED TO EARLIER. HE WAS ALSO DETERMINED TO MAKE THE VISIT, IF AT ALL,

TO EARLIER. HE WAS ALSO DETERMINED TO MAKE THE VISIT, IF AT ALL, ONLY ON A QUOTE REALISTIC BASIS UNQUOTE - I.E. IF HE WERE ABLE TO REACH PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH THE ALLIES, AND ALSO WITH THE SOVIET SIDE, ON THE GROUND TO BE COVERED. AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO DE-ESCALATION AT A TIME WHEN THE CRISIS SEEMED MOST THREATENING. THIS COULD POINT TO AN EARLIER RATHER THAN A LATER DATE. THE CHANCELLOR WAS THE LAST MAN TO OVERSTIMATE HIS OWN WEIGHT; NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE SOME MITIGATING EFFECT ON SOVIET REACTIONS TO US MEASURES AGAINST IRAN.

7. VON STADEN WENT ON TO EMPHASISE THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN IN NO WAY EAGER TO RECEIVE THE SOVIET INVITATION. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AS WELL AS PLEASED BY THE POSITIVE REACTION OF OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN. APART FROM HIS STATEMENT OF READINESS TO GO TO MOSCOW MADE DURING THE GOVERNMENT DECLARATION IN JANUARY, HE HAD SENT NO SIGNALS TO THE SOVIET SIDE. HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS - AND ESPECIALLY OF THE RISK OF APPEARING TO LEND HIMSELF TO SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING TACTICS. WE COULD HOWEVER RELY ON HIM TO DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO PURSUE SUCH TACTICS. THE CHANCELLOR'S READINESS TO TAKE UP THE INVITATION STEMMED SOLELY FROM HIS VERY DEEP ANXIETY THAT THE IRAN CRISIS IN PARTICULAR COULD BE ESCALATING TOWARDS A SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION AND CONSEQUENT RISK OF WAR UNLESS THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION COULD SOMEHOW BE KEPT GOING.

GOODALL

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17 April 1980

Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Wade-Gery's minute to me of 16 April on this subject. She has expressed the strong hope that Chancellor Schmidt will decide to decline the Soviet invitation to visit Moscow.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 16 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS AND ROME

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POSSIBLE VISIT BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO MOSCOW

1. THE GOVERNMENT DEPUTY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK DELIVERED AN INVITATION TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO VISIT MOSCOW IN THE EARLY SUMMER. GRUNEWALD SAID THAT NO REPLY HAD YET BEEN SENT TO THIS INVITATION. A NUMBER OF THE ALLIES HAD BEEN INFORMED OF IT BUT SO FAR THEY HAD EXPRESSED NO REACTION.

They have not had much chance to do so.

GOODALL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

I hope we say 'No' very firmly

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OID
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CABINET OFFICE

B/D
Ref: B05938MR ALEXANDERcc Mr Franklin
Mr Wright
Mr Walden, FCO
Mr Burns, FCO
Mr Bullard, FCOChancellor Schmidt

In Sir Robert Armstrong's absence, Herr von Staden of the Bundeskanzleramt telephoned me this morning. The Chancellor had just finished informing a meeting of his Cabinet that he had a few days ago received an invitation (or rather formal confirmation of an invitation) to visit Moscow this summer. He wished the Prime Minister to know of this at the earliest possible moment, but had felt obliged to inform his own Cabinet first. He was now similarly informing President Carter and President Giscard.

2. The Chancellor had not replied to the invitation. The Germans would first wish to consult the British, French and American Governments. They would be in touch with us about these consultations, which would probably be handled through Foreign Ministry channels.

3. I thanked Herr von Staden and promised to inform the Prime Minister immediately. I felt sure that she would much appreciate the Chancellor's courtesy.

16th April 1980

He can't possibly go out
Prime Minister
Chancellor Schmidt is evidently tempted. It seems rather extra ordinary that he should consider going at a time when he is wishing his athletes to boycott the Olympics!
Rmt - 16/4

R L Wade-Gery
R L WADE-GERY



16 APR 1980



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