

HT  
JM

Confidential Filing

Herr Jergen RUFUS is to replace Herr  
Rucke as Federal German Ambassador in  
London / Prime Minister's meetings with FRG  
Ambassador.

GERMANY

JUNE 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>19.6.79</del>		<p>See PM's mtgs with German Govt.</p> <p>PREM 19 / 3355</p>					
<del>18.12.79</del>							
<del>18.1.80</del>							
<del>26.9.88</del>							
<del>25.11.88</del>							
<del>23.1.89</del>							
<del>11/2/91</del>							
<del>14.2.91</del>							
<del>27.2.91</del>							
<del>28.2.91</del>							

~~////~~  
~~////~~  
~~////~~  
~~////~~  
**CLOSED**

CONFIDENTIAL



*SUBJECT cc member*

*FILE KK*  
*c/Economic/Previce*

*bc PC*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

19 February 1991

**GERMAN AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:  
19 FEBRUARY 1991**

The German Ambassador paid a brief courtesy call on the Prime Minister today.

Welcoming the Ambassador, the Prime Minister said that he had very much enjoyed his recent discussions with Chancellor Kohl. He was looking forward to developing further his good personal relationship with Chancellor Kohl, while tackling the difficult political and economic issues ahead.

The Ambassador expressed his condolences to the Prime Minister for the suspected Provisional IRA attack on No. 10 Downing Street. He was also appalled by the further bomb outrage at Victoria Station. Germany was fully supportive of the UK's efforts to stamp out terrorism.

The Prime Minister said that Britain faced difficult economic circumstances at present. Some believed that interest rates could have been reduced further without membership of the ERM. He did not accept that argument. Sterling had remained strong, despite recent uncertainties in the markets because of membership of the ERM. A firm exchange rate had certainly helped Germany and Japan - now the only two major economies still exhibiting growth. Although lower interest rates in the UK would be desirable on domestic grounds, action could be taken only as exchange markets were persuaded that UK inflation was falling. His own belief was that inflation was already falling more rapidly than generally appreciated.

The Prime Minister said that he and Chancellor Kohl were in agreement on a wide range of policies, notably on the problems in the Baltics and the Soviet Union; on the future development of Eastern Europe; and on the importance of preserving NATO. In particular, he was grateful for the contribution towards the UK's costs in the Gulf. (The Ambassador indicated that a first tranche of Dm 400 million would be paid over shortly.)

The Prime Minister said that there were differences with Germany over the IGC on Economic and Monetary Union. The Ambassador noted that Germany like the UK favoured "hardening" the ecu. The Prime Minister said he believed that Stage 2 must be substantial. At present the French, German and UK economies

CONFIDENTIAL

were diverging rather than converging. Closer union would not be manageable until the scale of fiscal transfers implied was reduced.

The Ambassador said that German policy was designed to bind Germany ever closer into Europe. There were still difficulties on defence and security policy in Germany. He regretted it had not been possible for Germany to send troops to the Gulf. Their objective was a common European policy at the United Nations wherever possible. That would ease Germany's situation on a political basis although Germany would not seek a permanent seat on the UK Security Council.

Finally, the Ambassador asked whether the UK was likely to respond positively to President Gorbachev's proposals for settling the Gulf war.

The Prime Minister said that the Russian proposals fell well short of what was required to meet UN resolutions. Although the UK and USA were sceptical, it was up to Iraq to respond. But there were serious deficiencies in the Russian proposals. For example, there was no reference to Security Council resolutions after Resolution 660, no timetable for Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait, and no mention of prisoners of war or of any renunciation of the claim of Kuwait. In short, there was nothing yet to justify a cease-fire. Inevitably, any peaceful resolution would depend upon direct discussions between the Allied countries and Iraq.

The Ambassador said that Germany was grateful for the consultations on the post-war settlement in the Gulf. It was unfortunate that thinking in the United States on Israel was not on the same lines as that in Europe. It might be difficult to secure Israeli cooperation. On the other hand, while policy differed with that in Europe, the US carried greater weight with the Israelis.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister looked forward to improved relations with Germany and with Chancellor Kohl personally. The Ambassador asked whether the Prime Minister would be willing to send a message to the Konigswinter conference. The Prime Minister confirmed that he would do so; and the Ambassador undertook to write further, setting out what would be appropriate. (No doubt you are doing the same.)

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry).

(BARRY H. POTTER)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER

✓  
German: Amb  
file

MEETING WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

The German Ambassador is to pay a brief courtesy call on you tomorrow, so that he can say that he has had a formal meeting with you as Prime Minister before the Anglo-German Summit on 11 March. I imagine that you know him quite well already.

You will want to say how much you appreciate your regular telephone contacts with Chancellor Kohl: and what a success your meeting with him in Britain last week was. You are looking forward to the Anglo-German Summit. You are working on your suggestion that Kohl should come over for a country weekend once the weather is better. You might also confirm that you will be happy to give a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on 11 March.

On EC matters, you could say that you want steadily to try to increase the common ground between us which will mean both sides shading their views. You explained some of the political constraints here to Chancellor Kohl and were very grateful for his understanding of them.

On the Gulf, you will want to repeat your thanks to the German Government for their generous financial contribution and deplore some of the comment in the British press, which the Ambassador has taken great pains to counteract. You might stress the importance of maintaining a very firm front against specious ceasefire proposals. We must have the Iraqis out of Kuwait and their military capability severely weakened.

On the Baltic Republics, you could say that you found your talk with Chancellor Kohl particularly helpful in preparing for your

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

discussions with President Gorbachev. You agree on the need for the Baltics to move gradually.

Finally, you might recall that Chancellor Kohl envisaged a possibility that he might come to London even before the Anglo-German Summit on 11 March, to discuss party political matters. He would be very welcome at any time. But you would not want to put him to additional trouble. As far as you are concerned, the discussion of cooperation between the Conservative Party and the CDU (and the EDG and EPP) can be conducted in the margins of the Anglo-German Summit of 11 March. Mr Patten could accompany you for the purpose.

CDO

CHARLES POWELL

18 February 1991

c\german (kw)

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

15 February 1991

*Dear Charles,*

German Ambassador's Call on the Prime Minister:  
19 February 1991

The German Ambassador is making his first call on the Prime Minister. Baron von Richthofen has been Ambassador in London since December 1988. He enjoys good connections to Chancellor Kohl but is not always fully informed of developments in Genscher's office. A personality note is enclosed.

Bilateral

The Prime Minister's meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 11 February was covered in very positive terms in the German media and the Germans are cheered by recent coverage in the British press (eg the interview with Kohl in Daily Mail of 14 February). The Anglo-German Summit in Bonn is on 11 March. Chancellor Kohl will receive an honorary degree at Edinburgh University on 23 May.

The Prime Minister might like to:

- express satisfaction at the talks with Chancellor Kohl on 11 February;
- stress our keenness to participate in integrating the former GDR by ensuring that the business opportunities are fully understood here, and through involvement in English-language training.

EC

The Prime Minister might say:

- we are looking for specific EC areas where we might work together closely;
- seems to be some common ground developing between us on need for proper convergence before moving between stages of EMU;

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- Chancellor Kohl understands the political constraints. Welcome his public statement that his policy is "not to box any party into a corner".

Gulf Crisis

The German financial commitment to the allied forces is some DM15.6 billion, including DM800 million (£275 million) pledged to the UK. The Germans earlier gave us equipment worth DM60 million (£20 million). The Ambassador has been active in countering criticism in the British press of German inability to take part in military operations to free Kuwait.

The Prime Minister might wish to:

- thank the Germans again for their help. A demonstration of solidarity between Allies.

- express our support for the Chancellor's wish to change the German Constitution so that German forces can be sent abroad, in support of UN-endorsed activities.

*Yours ever,  
Christopher Prentice.*

(C N R Prentice)  
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

**RICHTHOFEN, HERMANN FREIHERR VON**

FRG Ambassador in London.

Born 1933 in Silesia. Trained in industry (1953-55). Studied law (1955-63). Joined the Auswärtiges Amt in 1963. Served in Boston, Saigon and Jakarta. Worked in the Legal Department of the Auswärtiges Amt (1970-74), then in the Federal Permanent Representation in East Berlin (1975-78). Head of Department for Inner German Relations and Berlin in the Auswärtiges Amt from 1978 to 1980, when he was promoted to Under Secretary for the same subjects in the Federal Chancellery, returning in 1986 as Chief Legal Adviser and later Political Director.

A charming, clever, highly conscientious man. An active Christian, for whom the moral side of every decision, personal or official, is always important. His intellectual style, perhaps influenced by his legal background, is thorough and cautious rather than obviously brilliant. He thinks about underlying trends and general directions, as well as about the decisions of the day.

Speaks good English as does his companionable wife, who is a psychoanalyst with an active practice in Bonn. Three children.



*JK*



*c/hall*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

11 February 1991

Calls on the Prime Minister by the Japanese and German Ambassadors have been arranged as follows:

Japanese Ambassador                      Monday 18 February at 1530  
(introductory call)

|| German Ambassador                      Tuesday 19 February at 1200 noon  
(first call since  
Mr. Major's appointment)

I should be most grateful if the departments could provide short briefing notes covering points to make, and CVs for the Prime Minister's Box on Friday 15 February and Monday 18 February respectively.

Many thanks,

SANDRA PHILLIPS

Simon Hall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*tw*



file DS3AFP

cc PC  
FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 January 1989

When you called on the Prime Minister you mentioned the CDU Economic Council's invitation to her to address them in Bonn on 17 or 18 October. We have now looked more closely at the practicalities of this and I am afraid that the Prime Minister simply cannot undertake it because of her need to arrive in Kuala Lumpur for the opening of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on 18 October. However, I hope that the Council will not abandon the idea and feel able to renew the invitation to the Prime Minister for some future occasion.

If by any chance the Council were to wish another senior British Minister to speak in the Prime Minister's place this year, I hope you will let me know and I will do my best to help arrange it.

C. D. POWELL

His Excellency Baron Hermann von Richthofen

cu



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January 1989

*Jean Charles,*

CDU Economic Council, 17-18 October

Thank you for your letter of 10 January recording the Prime Minister's meeting with the new Federal German Ambassador. You asked for further details about the CDU Economic Council to which the Prime Minister has been invited.

The CDU Economic Council, a gathering of about 1500 top German businessmen, meets roughly once every two years. This year the Council will meet in Bonn. In 1987, the key participants were Kohl and several Federal Ministers. The 1989 programme suggests a similar cast, with the addition of Bangemann, Waigel (the new leader of the CSU) and Herrhausen (Head of Deutsche Bank).

The audience at the Economic Council will be as influential and sympathetic as could be found in the Federal Republic. There would be excellent German media coverage. This would be a good opportunity to get across our thinking on economic policy and the development of the Community to an audience which shares many of our views on competition and deregulation.

The organisers had envisaged a speech by the Prime Minister at 1830 on 17 October. They hoped that she might stop over on her way from London to Malaysia, but I understand that travel arrangements to CHOGM will probably make this impossible. Should the invitation be renewed for some future meeting of the Council, it would certainly be worth considering. If you had the impression from von Richthofen that the invitation for 1989 might be transferable to another member of the Government, Sir Christopher Mallaby is confident that the Chancellor or perhaps Lord Young would be welcomed by the Council participants.

*Yours ever,*

*Richard Gozney*

(R H T Gozney)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Germany: Pm3 mtg. W. L.

FRC Ambassador

June 79

231  
PM-9

SUBJECT CC MATHU



file DASASL

bc = PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 January 1989

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with the new Federal German Ambassador.

The Prime Minister referred to the great dangers posed by Libya's chemical weapons facility. It was vital that no country or Government should give any help to the Libyans in this area. The Ambassador said that Chancellor Kohl was personally supervising the investigation into the alleged involvement of German firms. No hard evidence had yet been produced to sustain the allegation. But the German Cabinet would be meeting today to consider tightening regulations in this area.

The Prime Minister said that the results of the Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris were likely to be modest. While welcoming the Soviet Union's intention to begin destroying its stocks of chemical weapons, one had to bear in mind that they had repeatedly misled the world about the scale of their holdings of these weapons. We should not place too much credence upon their claims now. The main purpose of Shevardnadze's speech had been to secure propaganda advantage.

The Prime Minister said that she remained very concerned about the prospect of a Human Rights Conference in Moscow. The United Kingdom would only attend such a conference if there were in practice major improvements in Soviet human rights performance between now and 1991. The Ambassador said that his Government shared this view.

The Ambassador referred to the signs of an approaching trade war between the European Community and the United States. His Government believed this must be avoided and both parties should return to the negotiating table. The Prime Minister commented that there had been no need to get into the situation in the first place. There was no scientific evidence to justify banning the hormones used by the Americans in producing beef.

The Ambassador referred to the recent visit to the United Kingdom of the German State Secretary for Employment. There

had been a useful discussion of the European Community's social dimension. The Prime Minister said that it must be quite clear that the United Kingdom would not accept worker participation in management on the German model. We arranged these things differently: we did not want to encourage a "them" and "us" approach. We put the emphasis instead on encouraging employee share ownership. The Ambassador said that his Government believed that each country must be free to go its own way on this issue, with no central regulation from Brussels.

The Prime Minister referred to the great importance of early agreement in NATO on the comprehensive concept for defence and arms control. We could not afford further delay to decisions on the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons. She had been encouraged by her talk with Chancellor Kohl in Rhodes to believe that agreement could be reached which preserved NATO's vital defence interests. She recalled that Chancellor Kohl had been keen to have a NATO Summit well ahead of the European elections in June. She would wish to discuss this subject very fully with Chancellor Kohl at the forthcoming Anglo-German Summit. The Ambassador made no substantive comment beyond reiterating that Chancellor Kohl continued to hope for a NATO Summit before mid-May.

The Prime Minister said that she was very much looking forward to the bilateral summit in Frankfurt. The Ambassador said that Chancellor Kohl was also keen to make arrangements for the Prime Minister's subsequent private visit to his home. He wanted to show her personally something of the Rheinland-Pfalz and Heidelberg. The Prime Minister said that the invitation was very precious. She and Chancellor Kohl should meet as often as possible and stick together closely on the main international issues. The Ambassador said that Chancellor Kohl very much agreed and wanted to give the Anglo-German alliance a higher profile.

The Ambassador said that he had been asked to extend an invitation to the Prime Minister to address the CDU Economic Council in October. The Prime Minister said she would be glad to do so one day although October might be difficult, given that she had her own Party Conference then and would also have to travel to Malaysia for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. The Ambassador subsequently told me that the Economic Council would meet on 17 October. I think this almost certainly rules out the Prime Minister accepting. But you might like to ask HM Ambassador in Bonn to obtain further details.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

## MEETING WITH THE NEW GERMAN AMBASSADOR

You are to see the new German Ambassador on Monday. He is Baron von Richthofen, grandson of the World War One flying ace. He is also a great improvement on his predecessor. Even so, you will want to bear in mind that he works primarily for Genscher not for Kohl. He arrived in December. A biographical note is in the folder.

After welcoming him, you will want to refer to the forthcoming Anglo-German Summit in Frankfurt. You will be staying overnight and attending a concert and a large reception which Chancellor Kohl is arranging in your honour. You are also going to meet some German bankers (including, we hope, Karl-Otto Poehl).

The most topical issue is Libya. We are convinced that the Libyan plant at Rabta is intended for the manufacture of chemical weapons, even though this purpose can rapidly be disguised.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

When you saw Chancellor Kohl in Rhodes you promised to send him material about how we ban or limit exports of particular chemicals. This has been done and the Germans are now introducing legislation.

You may like to look forward in the European Community where the main topic over the next few months will probably be monetary cooperation. Our hope is that the Federal Republic will address the issues in a practical and concrete way - so admirably set out by Herr Poehl - rather than go for political froth. As the two major European economies run on genuine free market principles, Britain and the FRG have a strong, underlying common interest in this area.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

You should also raise what seems bound to be the major issue between us in the first half of the year, that is the Comprehensive Concept, modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons and the question of SNF arms control. I have put back in the folder the note which you saw over the Christmas/New Year period. You will recall that Chancellor Kohl told you that there would be an internal German meeting in January to settle German policy. You might enquire how preparations for this are going. The essential point is that it is virtually impossible to devise an SNF arms control negotiating position which meets NATO's security requirements. There may be scope for further reducing NATO's holding of nuclear artillery shells unilaterally while modernising LANCE and our nuclear bombs. But we do not want to give the Russians a card of entry in this field. You will want to be sure that the Ambassador reports back that you continue to hold firm views on this issue; it is one where the substance is too important to be bridged by a form of words.

You might refer to Chancellor Kohl's suggestion that you and he should talk regularly on the telephone. You intend to follow-up this proposal, but have seen no reason to disturb Kohl over the Christmas/New Year period.

ed?

(C. D. POWELL)  
6 January 1989

CONFIDENTIAL



## HERMANN, FREIHERR VON RICHTHOFEN

Born 20 November 1933 in Breslau.

1953-55 underwent training in industry. 1955-58 studied Law at the Universities in Heidelberg, Munich and Bonn. 1963 received PhD in Law. 1963 entered Federal Foreign Service. 1965-66 Desk Officer in the Foreign Affairs Ministry Legal Department. Postings to Saigon and Jakarta. 1970 Legal Adviser in Foreign Affairs Ministry, later Deputy Head of Department for International Law. 1975-78 Head of Section the Political Department in the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin (East). 1978-80 Head of Department in the Political Directorate General. 1980-86 Head of Working Unit Covering Inner German Relations and Berlin, in the Federal Chancellory. 1986 Deputy Under Secretary, Director-General for Legal Affairs and Special Adviser on International Law in the Foreign Ministry. Since October 1986 promoted to the rank of Deputy Under Secretary (Political Director) in the Foreign Ministry

Von Richthofen is charming in a rather formal and conscious way. He is clever and highly conscientious. His intellectual style, perhaps influenced by his legal background, is thorough and cautious rather than visibly brilliant. An active Christian, he is married to Christa Countess Schwerin, who was born in East Prussia. She is a psychoanalyst. They have three children: Peter, 21, doing military service before reading Economics at University; Anna-Fita, 17, and Esther 8, both at school in England.

Baron von Richthofen has good contacts to the SPD, having been in the Federal Chancellery for the last part of Schmidt's period as Chancellor.

His hobbies are skiing, swimming, country walking, and reading, particularly politics and history. Speaks good English.

PRIME MINISTER

COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

You asked to see some background papers on the Comprehensive Concept of arms control. The attached folder contains:

- a short explanatory note by the Cabinet Office;
- the first draft of a Comprehensive Concept put forward by the United Kingdom;
- the current NATO draft (which is a dog's breakfast and scarcely worth your reading);
- a paper on options for Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) arms control, which we recently put to the Germans to show how difficult it is to devise any acceptable option; and
- a letter on the same subject from Michael Alexander.

It all boils down to a simple question: can the Germans be brought to take firm and specific decisions on the modernisation of NATO's SNF without a commitment by the Alliance to negotiate with the Russians on further reductions in SNF? You have of course discussed the subject with Chancellor Kohl.

It is clear from the attached papers that Sir Michael Alexander and others are deep into examining possible options for SNF negotiations, either because they believe this is the best way to head off the Germans by demonstrating the damage which would be done to NATO's capabilities; or because (in Michael's case) they think that we are going to have to give in to the Germans on this and may as well start now. The problem is that it gives the wrong signal to the Germans. Once we concede it is a subject which can be discussed, there is no going back.

In the end it's a matter of judgment whether we can get the Germans to the right conclusion on modernisation without

selling the pass on SNF negotiations. We did it - or just about - on the INF Agreement although it was a painful process. It will be even more difficult this time. My own view is that, rather than make concessions to them on SNF negotiations, we should look for some unilateral action by NATO, for instance linking modernisation of SNF with a unilateral decision to reduce SNF munitions and particularly nuclear shells (for which we have no real use).

This may be an issue which you will want to discuss with the Defence and Foreign Secretaries at one of the two meetings on defence matters we already have planned for January, namely Chemical Weapons and SDI. Agree?

*But who do I discuss with Jack? John Stanley used to be tough but he is no longer there.*

*C.D.P.*

*not*

CHARLES POWELL

22 December 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

EAMAKT

cc/pe?

Ref. A088/3676

NOTE FOR RECORD

CDB  
2/1/12

cc Mr Lavelle  
Mr Weston  
Mr Powell  
Mr Adams (Foreign Office)

Call by West German Ambassador

Baron von Richthofen, the new West German Ambassador, called on Sir Robin Butler at 11.00 am on 19 December.

2. Baron von Richthofen said that part of his role would be to give more public emphasis to the close friendship and commonality of interests and values which existed between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the United Kingdom. These were long-standing, but had not received adequate recognition. Sir Robin Butler said that Sir Christopher Mallaby, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the FRG, was similarly concerned to raise the profile of the Anglo-German relationship. Chancellor Kohl's invitation to the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher to stay at his home in the country had been greatly appreciated.

3. Baron von Richthofen said that Chancellor Kohl attached particular importance to the establishment of a secure telephone link between his office and No 10. This was not designed to bypass the very good links which already existed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but rather to provide rapid contact at high level to forestall major problems which might damage the Anglo-German relationship. Sir Robin Butler said that the Prime Minister took a particularly close interest in certain issues, and it would sometimes be valuable to be able to

give the Chancellor early notice where this was the case. Baron von Richthofen said that this was just the kind of use that Chancellor Kohl envisaged for the link.

4. Baron von Richthofen continued by asking how the Cabinet Secretariat was structured. Sir Robin Butler outlined the Cabinet's Committee structure and that of the secretariats which supported it. The two secretariats of most interest to Baron von Richthofen were the European Secretariat, headed by Mr Roger Lavelle, and the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, headed by Mr John Weston. The European Secretariat was rather more closely involved, on a day-to-day basis, in the co-ordination of the United Kingdom's approach to European matters than was the Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the co-ordination of the matters with which it was concerned. In the latter case, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence often advised the Prime Minister directly on issues, without Cabinet office mediation. Within No 10, Mr Charles Powell (who had close contacts with Herr Teltschik) would also be an important contact.

*Paul H Turner*

P H TURNER

21 December 1988

The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of  
Arms Control and Disarmament

---

"We have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the Alliance raise complex and interrelated issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of Alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence." (Reykjavik Communique)

This project, which is the responsibility of the NATO Ambassadors meeting as the North Atlantic Council in permanent session, was launched by Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik in June 1987. The NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels this December directed that the work on the concept should be completed by June 1989, when NATO Foreign Ministers next hold a scheduled meeting in London. A NATO Summit earlier in 1989 would shorten the deadline further.

2. The so-called comprehensive concept is largely a procedural fig leaf to cover NATO's confusion about how to deal with short range nuclear forces (SNF) both in defence programme and in arms control terms. After the INF agreement the Germans took fright at the prospect that NATO's arms control agenda (START, conventional forces, chemical weapons) made no clear provision for further arms control on SNF. This phobia is encapsulated in their slogan: "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans". The dilemma over SNF was papered over with a formula to the effect that SNF reductions should be sought "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons". But there is no

agreement about whether this means a simultaneous or a sequential process. Moreover, the Germans argued that decisions on the necessary modernisation of SNF could not be taken piecemeal and needed to be related to the overall picture of how NATO's security needs are met and the place of arms control in this. The current difficulties in advancing the drafting of the comprehensive concept derive principally from this underlying problem, which has been accentuated by Gorbachev's adroit diplomacy.

3. For nine months after the Reykjavik directive to draw up a comprehensive concept virtually no progress was made. The Americans and the Germans both dragged their feet on the exercise, hoping thereby to stymie SNF arms control and modernisation respectively. In March 1988 the United Kingdom therefore circulated a full national draft of the comprehensive concept (Annex A) in an attempt to move things forward. We also tried to engage the Americans and the Germans behind the scenes in a trilateral effort to crack the problem. This offer was not taken up and we have therefore had to work on each of them separately. Meanwhile the NATO drafting exercise has stagnated, as the impoverished NATO draft of December 1988 (Annex B) shows. The nub of the drafting revolves around three points: *- how arms control*



a. Is arms control the handmaiden of defence policy, or are they full and equal partners?

*Defence policy is of course predominant*

b. How much if at all does Gorbachev's new thinking alter the equation?

*Not at all*

c. How to reconcile SNF arms control and modernisation.

*The way we have agreed all along - no further nuclear reductions in the Convention. Symmetry is allowed and chemical weapons also in effect.*

4. If there is to be agreement on the comprehensive concept in the first half of 1989, it is increasingly the view of our Ambassadors in Bonn and NATO that a bargain must be struck which says something for German ears about the prospect of negotiations at some stage in relation to SNF, in return for some fairly precise guidelines on SNF modernisation (sufficient for United States Congressional purposes), accompanied by a decision on downward adjustment of NATO's existing stockpile of SNF warheads (~~especially~~ <sup>of</sup> nuclear artillery shells <sup>only</sup>). It is hard to devise an SNF arms control negotiating position as such which would meet NATO's security requirements.

But it is perhaps not wholly impossible to define a position which would give the Germans enough to meet their political needs while maintaining strong pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF preponderance and simultaneously presenting TASM and the Lance replacement as logical ways of restructuring the NATO stockpile in the direction of fewer SNF holdings overall. For this aim to be attainable during 1989, it will be essential to galvanise the Bush Administration quickly to address the whole subject with greater imagination than the Americans have so far shown. Without some break-through on this key issue between ourselves, Washington and Bonn, the comprehensive concept will continue to be little more than second order skirmishing.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

Cabinet Office  
19 December 1988





*File to*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 December, 1988.

Thank you very much for your letter, and welcome to London.

The Prime Minister would be very happy to see you. Unfortunately the time which we originally offered on 19 December is no longer available, but she suggests that you should come on Monday, 9 January, at 1730.

I would be delighted to see you at your convenience. Perhaps your secretary would telephone the Duty Clerk at No.10 to fix a time.

(C.D. Powell)

His Excellency Baron Hermann von Richthofen

*K12*

Do

ccpc

1730-1800

Monday 9 January



DER BOTSCHAFTER  
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

London, 8 December 1988

TG  
8/12

Dear Mr. Powell,

as you know I have arrived in London on Monday, December 5th and taken up my functions in the German Embassy.

I already had the privilege to be received by Sir Geoffrey Howe for my first courtesy call as well as by Minister of State Mrs. Lynda Chalker and the Permanent Secretary of State Sir Patrick Wright. I have been informed that the date for the presentation of my Letters of Credence to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. has been set for December 16th.

In view of the forthcoming Anglo-German summit early next year it would attach great importance to call on the Prime Minister. I understand that her timetable for December is already crammed. I therefore should like to ask you to kindly arrange a meeting at the earliest convenience in January if an appointment in December is not possible after all. As you know I would be of the disposition of the Prime Minister at any given time and would in this regard make any appropriate arrangements in my calendar. In the meantime I would be happy to come to see you in your office and would be grateful if you let me know which date would be convenient.

Yours sincerely,

Mr. Charles D. Powell  
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
10, Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

Ambassador  
of the Federal Republic of  
Germany



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Tessa~~

Any chance of

$\frac{1}{2}$  an hour.

~~Charles~~

C

Thursday 12th Jan.

Would 5.30 pm after the  
Governing Mayor of Berlin (5.00)

be ok? ~~W. M. M.~~

lg.  
7/12

~~Tessa~~ <sup>Yes.</sup>

79  
8/12

Can we say  
5.35. can

CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT

cc MASTER

file

PM3AET

bc = PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

25 November 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR

The Prime Minister received the Federal German Ambassador for a farewell call this morning.

The Prime Minister complimented the Ambassador on the achievements of his five years in London, referring in particular to the very successful visit by President von Weizsaecker. She spoke of the importance of close Anglo-German co-operation and of her great confidence in Chancellor Kohl, who was absolutely firm on crucial issues of defence and East/West relations. She looked forward to her meeting with the Chancellor in Rhodes. They always managed to get through a great deal of business on these occasions. She would hope to hear at first hand about his experiences in Moscow and Washington and to discuss her own forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. The Prime Minister continued that she attached the greatest importance to NATO reaching decisions on the modernisation of its nuclear forces by the middle of 1989 and had been encouraged by Chancellor Kohl's reported statements in Washington.

The German Ambassador recalled that, at his first meeting with the Prime Minister some five years earlier, he had raised the subject of WEU and she had been very dismissive. That no longer seemed to be the British view. The Prime Minister said that the WEU was quite useful for issuing statements and offered the means of involving France and Spain more closely in Europe's defence. But NATO was the executive agency. The WEU was not, and must not become, in any sense an alternative to NATO. She was worried that some countries might see it as an alibi for not co-operating more closely in or with NATO.

The Prime Minister said that she understood that the Ambassador was intending to run for the European Parliament. It was not a body on which she had a very high opinion. Indeed, she did not consider it a real Parliament. The Ambassador supposed that its powers would increase gradually and its sense of responsibility in parallel. The Prime Minister remained sceptical, but stressed the importance of avoiding a socialist majority in the Parliament.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Ambassador said that there would have to be agreement on a comprehensive concept of arms control before the Federal Republic could agree to modernisation of SNF. The Prime Minister said there was no difficulty in principle over this. What worried her was that certain people seemed determined to drag out the discussion of the comprehensive concept so as to block decisions on modernisation. That was unacceptable.

The Ambassador said that he noted from the press that the Prime Minister continued to have reservations about Herr Genscher. The Prime Minister said that she and Herr Genscher had their differences. She was very glad that we did not have a coalition government in this country.

The Prime Minister thanked the Ambassador once again for his work in London. She looked forward to meeting his successor.

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ce BOP

## PRIME MINISTER

## MEETING WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

You are to receive the German Ambassador for a brief farewell call tomorrow. As you know, he is leaving the German diplomatic service and going into politics as a candidate for Genscher's party in the forthcoming elections in the European Parliament.

Points which you may like to make are:

- thank him for his work in London, where he has been some five years. It has been a good time for Anglo-German relations and he deserves great credit for that;

- recall what was perhaps the highlight, the visit by President von Weizsaecker;

- confirm that you see a close Anglo-German understanding as of crucial importance for Europe and indeed the West as a whole. You put great value on your regular meetings with Chancellor Kohl;

- you look forward to seeing Chancellor Kohl in Rhodes. You would like to hear first hand about his visits to Moscow and Washington, which will be important in preparing for your own meeting with President Gorbachev;

- you particularly welcome Kohl's statement in Washington that the so-called comprehensive concept for arms control must be ready for adoption by the middle of next year so that necessary decisions on SNF modernisation can be taken then.

He will not be aware of the plan to send Dr. Leutwiler to South Africa as a special emissary of Chancellor Kohl. You should not mention it.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

You will not want to keep him more than 20 minute as you have  
President Vassiliou immediately afterwards.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

24 November 1988

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 November 1988

ofo  
 Dear Charles,

Call by FRG Ambassador

The Federal German Ambassador, Baron von Wechmar, is to pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister on 25 November. I enclose a personality note. On leaving London, von Wechmar will retire from the German Diplomatic Service and enter politics. He is to lead the FDP list in the elections to the European Parliament next June. We understand that he was Herr Genscher's personal choice. At the last such elections the FDP failed to clear the 5% hurdle and so at present have no Members of the European Parliament. Their current showing in the opinion polls suggests that they will do better this time. The Prime Minister could ask von Wechmar how he views the prospects and how the FDP is faring after the election of Lambsdorff to the post of Secretary-General.

During his five years in London, von Wechmar has tended not to get too closely involved in day-to-day business between the two Governments but to concentrate on building up wider political, commercial and cultural contacts. He has travelled extensively in the United Kingdom. Among the high spots in Anglo-German relations while he has been here have been the State Visit by President von Weizsacker in July 1986 and the visit to Germany last autumn by the Prince and Princess of Wales, in which von Wechmar took part.

Major issues of substance have been the reform of Community financing and the drive to 1992, the INF negotiations and the new East/West situation. Earlier this year von Wechmar tended to share in a rather uncritical way the prevailing concern about Anglo-German differences on some of these issues. It would be helpful for the Prime Minister to confirm that she sees close Anglo-German understanding as of crucial importance for the Alliance and much values her regular discussions with Chancellor Kohl.

This could be put in the context of looking forward to the bilateral meeting with Chancellor Kohl just before the Rhodes European Council. Neither we nor the Germans at official level believe that it will be necessary to devote much time at that meeting to European Community issues.

/It



It will, however, be a valuable opportunity, after the Prime Minister's and Kohl's visits to Washington and Kohl's visits to Moscow and before Gorbachev's visit here, to discuss priorities for the Alliance over the coming months. Although we do not recommend that the Prime Minister go into detail with von Wechmar, she could take the opportunity to welcome Chancellor Kohl's public comments in Washington that NATO's comprehensive concept, (which the Germans and others have argued must provide the rationale for SNF modernisation decisions) should be ready for adoption by the middle of 1989; and that SNF modernisation should be clarified in the framework of this concept.

We doubt if von Wechmar will raise South Africa. We must assume that he is not aware of your contacts with the Chancellery on this.

*Yours etc,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

VON WECHMAR, BARON RÜDIGER

FRG Ambassador in London.

Born 1923 in Berlin. War service. POW in the US. Journalist, 1946-58, ending up as chief of UP's Bonn Bureau. Press Attache at FRG Consulate-General, New York, 1958-63. Head of the Vienna Buro of ZDF (Second German Television), 1963-68, then briefly Head of German Information Centre in New York, 1969. Returned to Bonn to become first deputy and, in 1970, Chief Government spokesman, a post which he held until 1974, where he was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative at the FRG Mission to the United Nations in New York. He remained in New York until 1981; he was President of the Security Council (1978-79) and President of the General Assembly (1980-81). Ambassador in Rome, 1981-83. Appointed to London in November 1983.

A big, bluff, likeable man who is widely respected in Germany as one of the country's most eminent diplomats. Clearly has Genscher's ear. His appointment as President of the General Assembly was widely acclaimed by the German Press as marking the FRG's emergence as a power with world-wide interests. He obviously enjoyed his time in New York, retains a house on Long Island, and returns fairly frequently on UN business in which he is still occasionally engaged.

During his tenure of the Presidency of the General Assembly his handling of the "global negotiations" caused the Western caucus numerous problems. This did not, however, detract from his reputation in the FRG and the end of his tenure of the Presidency was marked by the highly unusual step of a telegram of congratulations from the Federal President, the main thrust of which was that his performance had done great credit to the FRG.

Married with three children. Fluent American-English.

*TEMPORARILY RETAINED*  
THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

Charles

11045

Friday

25th

Nov.

T.G.



10 DOWNING STREET

1255a

Charles

Can we split.

The German Ambassador

is leaving end November and  
would like to bid farewell  
to the P.M. during November,  
preferably 25/11/88.

Do you wish to pursue / discuss ?

Duty Clerk: To advise

Victoria Von Ziemerann

235 5033 EXT 303

RTS

26/9



~~30/11~~ CK  
Bl in per  
Bonyon  
CK  
30/11

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Dwyer.

Would you pl. arrange with  
Mr. Rother of the German Embassy  
for his Ambassador to pay a  
breve call on the same  
studies in December (30 minutes)

A.F.C. —  $\frac{15}{11}$

Caroline

Could you deal with this  
please?

RR  $\frac{20}{11}$

TV 13 Dec - 18/11 CK  
12-15



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

18 December 1979

*Hans Ruete*

*Paul*

*Dear Caroline,*

Farewell Call by the FRG Ambassador

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Hans Hellmuth Ruete, is to pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister on Thursday 20 December. I attach a personality note on Herr Ruete. This is his last post, and he is retiring to his home near Bonn.

We have not thought it necessary to provide a separate brief for the Prime Minister; the farewell call will be extremely short and there are no particular points we wish to recommend the Prime Minister to make. The Prime Minister is conscious of the closeness of relations between the UK and the FRG, maintained by the regular series of consultations at Head of Government level. The next meeting is due at the end of March, immediately before the 1980 Königswinter Conference in Cambridge which both the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt plan to attend.

Herr Ruete completes his mission in London on 31 December. He is a quiet unassuming man - a marked contrast with his more flamboyant predecessor, Herr von Hase. He has also appeared latterly to be in poor health (he lost a leg in the war). But he has a shrewd brain and has acquired a wide circle of friends, especially in Parliament. His successor is Dr Jürgen Ruhfus, at present principal foreign policy adviser in the office of Chancellor Schmidt. Dr Ruhfus is young (49) and immensely hard-working; we are fortunate in having as the future FRG Ambassador in London an official in whom the Chancellor has such complete confidence.

*Yours ever*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Miss Caroline Stephens  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

HE HERR HANS-HELLMUTH RUETE GCVO

Federal German Ambassador to London since 22 April 1977

1. Herr Ruete was born in 1914 in St Petersburg and studied law at the Universities of Kiel, Marburg, Lausanne and Tokyo. He did Doctoral work on the Extra-territorial rights of the European powers in China and Japan. During the war he served in North Africa and the Soviet Union. He completed his studies after the war and joined the Federal Ministry of Justice in 1950. .
2. In 1952 he transferred to the Foreign Ministry and served successively as Counsellor in Tokyo (1952-56); Head of the Soviet Department in the Foreign Ministry (1956-60); Harvard Center for International Affairs (1960-61); Consul-General Calcutta (1961-64). From 1964-66 he was Assistant Under Secretary in charge of East/West relations. From 1966-70 he was Deputy Under Secretary and Head of the Second Political Department at the Foreign Ministry. From 1970-72 Herr Ruete was Federal German Ambassador in Paris, and from 1972-77 Ambassador in Warsaw. He has reached retirement age (65) this year. His appointment in London ends on 31 December 1979, and his successor Herr Ruhfus, at present in the Chancellor's Office, arrives in the New Year.
3. Herr Ruete is married with three children. He speaks good English as well as French, Russian and Japanese, and is reported to have English ancestors. His interests are listed as music, literature and theatre. His wife Ruth speaks French and English.
4. Herr Ruete has a wooden leg, and looks more than his age. He has the manner - and the wisdom - of an old-fashioned family doctor. He and his wife did not find it altogether easy to follow in the footsteps of their dynamic and publicity-conscious predecessors, the von Hases. But he has an obvious affection and admiration for Britain and warms up in response to friendliness.

18 DEC 1979







10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Alexander.

Gene Ambassador.

17.15 No 10

Thursday 20 December

Copy requested  
by 19/12.

C.S.

17/12.

20



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

①

Mrs Stephens

14 December 1979

Am

Prime Minister

Yes not

Dear Michael,

Apex (because of Lord Carrington's views)?

Proposed Farewell Call by the FRG Ambassador

Am

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany have asked us if their Ambassador, Herr Hans-Hellmuth Ruete, could pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister before his mission in London ends on 31 December.

Lord Carrington accepts that only in a very few cases is there justification for the Prime Minister receiving departing Ambassadors. The importance to the UK of the Federal Republic of Germany suggests that the FRG Ambassador is one of these few. Lord Carrington would therefore see advantage, if time could be made available, in the Prime Minister receiving Herr Ruete for a very brief farewell call.

Yours etc

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

14 DEC 1979



1. BGL } O.R.H.W.  
2. CAW } 27/6/79



MAP 27/6/79

Mr Cartledge

*With the compliments of*

SIR MICHAEL PALLISER

'50 office

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1

27/6/1979

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Germany

Ruhfus is an outstanding official of the  
postwar German type.

22/6

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BONN.

19 June 1979



Sir Michael Palliser GCMG  
FCO

1. The Embassy  
2. The Foreign Office  
3. The Defence

This, if it happens, will be  
an enormous improvement.  
cc with my copy to:  
Sir J Hunt  
Mr Castle (no. 1)

THIS COPY FOR

Dear Michael,  
25/6

[Signature]  
20/6

1. In case you have not already felt them, the vibes we are getting in Bonn suggest that Jürgen Ruhfus, at present Deputy Under Secretary - equivalent in the Chancellor's Office, is to replace Ruete as next Federal German Ambassador in London. This is not yet, I fancy, official, and both the sources who have told us (not Ruhfus himself) have sworn us to silence. I hope their confidence will be respected, not least since neither I, nor I am sure you, would wish anything to come between the intention and its execution.

2. I imagine that Jürgen Ruhfus is well enough known in London, at No 10, and the Ministry of Defence as well as at the FCO, not to require any introduction by me. Needless to say it is an excellent choice. His last post overseas was Ambassador in Kenya so he ought to add an understanding of our curious Commonwealth to his many other qualifications. That he should be coming to us from the Chancellor's Office is itself a mark of the high regard in which he (and perhaps we) are held. As you know, he and his delightful and cheerful wife are excellent company and will go down very well in London. They clearly follow the von Herwarth and von Hase tradition and not any other. He is 49.

Yours very truly  
[Signature]

Oliver Wright  
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

# Grey Scale #13



**A** 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19



Inches 1 2 3  
Centimetres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

## Colour Chart #13

Blue Cyan Green Yellow

