

SECRET

640

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Visit of Crown Prince Hassan.

JORDAN

July 1983

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*File to  
F. Hassan*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 March 1991

**VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN**

The Prime Minister has seen Amman telegram No.223 about Crown Prince Hassan's wish to see him when he visits Britain between 15 and 21 March. The Prime Minister simply cannot take this on. He would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary would see the Crown Prince.

C.D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM AMMAN  
TO DESKBY 071200Z FCO  
TELNO 223  
OF 070857Z MARCH 91

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*CW/*  
*✓* *for not been*  
*- can F.S. rep*  
*been.*

MY TELNO 211: VISIT BY THE CROWN PRINCE TO BRITAIN

SUMMARY

1. CROWN PRINCE PLANS TO BE IN BRITAIN BETWEEN 15 AND 21 MARCH AND HOPES TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF.

DETAIL

2. THE CROWN PRINCE'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ASKED ME TO CALL ON 6 MARCH TO DISCUSS A FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN BY THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRINCESS SARVATH.

3. PRINCE HASSAN PLANS TO TRAVEL TO BRITAIN ON FRIDAY, 15 MARCH. HE IS TO GIVE A SPEECH AT OXFORD ON 17 MARCH AND HE LIKELY TO LEAVE FOR AMERICA ON 21 MARCH. HE MAY STOP OFF IN BRITAIN ON HIS RETURN, PERHAPS ON 25 OR 26 MARCH. PRINCESS SARVATH WILL BE WITH HIM IN BRITAIN, THOUGH SHE MAY TRAVEL SEPARATELY.

4. NASSER JUDEH SAID THAT PRINCE HASSAN WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD FIND TIME TO SEE HIM. THERE WAS MUCH TO TALK ABOUT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR, AND IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE KING WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT BRITAIN FOR A WHILE YET. HE WOULD ALSO VERY MUCH WELCOME A MEETING WITH YOU. NASSER JUDEH SAID THAT THE PRINCE COULD PROBABLY MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME DURING THE PERIOD 16-20 MARCH INCLUSIVE, THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID 20 MARCH ITSELF, WHICH IS HIS BIRTHDAY. HE WILL BE STAYING AT HIS LONDON HOUSE THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD.

5. AS FORESHADOWED IN MY TUR, I RECOMMEND THAT BOTH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER SEE PRINCE HASSAN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. HE HAS PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN SOME BALANCE IN JORDANIAN POLICY DURING THE CRISIS, THOUGH NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFULLY. I AM SURE THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN ENCOURAGING THE KING TO SEEK EARLY RECONCILIATION WITH OTHER ARAB STATES AND IN PRESSING HIM TO FOLLOW PRUDENT

POLICIES.

6. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE AN EARLY INDICATION ABOUT YOUR, AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S, AVAILABILITY DURING THIS PERIOD.

REEVE

YYYY

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NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

The PM has a  
reception on  
the evening of  
the 14<sup>th</sup> Dec  
and a requiem  
mass on 15 Dec.

Ananda  
7/12

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PA  
F6  
cm  
c: Foreign  
Hassan

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 December 1989

VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN

I have seen Amman telno 611 about the visit of Crown Prince Hassan.

The Prime Minister would find it extremely difficult to see him on the dates in question. Apart from Questions on the afternoon of 14 December, she also has a major reception, and on 15 December a regional tour which will take her out of London all day. It may be necessary, therefore, for the Foreign Secretary to see him on her behalf.

CHARLES POWELL

R N Peirce Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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KK

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FM AMMAN AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 6TH DECEMBER 89  
TO DESKBY 070900Z FCO  
TELNO 611  
OF 061300Z DECEMBER 89  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO LONDON

1. I WAS TELEPHONED TODAY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO INFORMED ME THAT CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON ON 13 DECEMBER TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH. THE KING HAS ALSO ASKED THE CROWN PRINCE TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER. PRINCE HASSAN PROPOSES TO ARRIVE IN LONDON ON 14 DECEMBER, THOUGH HIS ARRIVAL TIME IS AS YET UNCERTAIN. HE WILL BE IN LONDON AT LEAST UNTIL SATURDAY, 16 DECEMBER.
2. MARWAN QASEM ASKED ME TO ENQUIRE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR MRS THATCHER TO RECEIVE PRINCE HASSAN. GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PRINCE'S ARRIVAL TIME IN LONDON, THE SAFEST DAY FOR SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE FRIDAY, 15 DECEMBER.
3. IF HER DIARY PERMITS IT, I SHOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD FIND TIME TO SEE PRINCE HASSAN. THE KING HIMSELF MISSED HER ON HIS LAST VISIT TO LONDON (DURING CHOGM) AND, IN THE PRESENT DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION HERE, MAY BE UNABLE TO RETURN TO LONDON FOR SOME TIME. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SEEING HASSAN. SUDDARTH UNDERSTANDS THAT THE MESSAGE TO BUSH DEALS WITH POLITICAL, RATHER THAN ECONOMIC MATTERS.

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YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 4

PS/NO 10

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PAGE 2  
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Prime Minister

CSC

②

Message from  
Crown Prince  
HassanCDP  
24/1.

الملكة  
الملكة

Amman, 16 February 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

It was indeed a pleasure to meet with you again during my recent visit to London and may I say how much I enjoyed our stimulating exchange of views.

I do indeed feel that the City of London Mission was extremely successful and will no doubt contribute to the qualitative relationship we seek to establish with the United Kingdom. The exchange was highly instructive and will, I am sure, assist us in our hopes of establishing Jordan as a centre of excellence in the Middle East.


On a political level, we have always greatly valued British understanding and cooperation and our talks reconfirmed my belief in the value of constructive dialogue. It is through such personal contact that policies can be found to meet the future with greater confidence and strength.

I look forward to another opportunity of meeting with you in the not too distant future to continue our talks on matters of mutual interest. In the meantime, you might be pleased to know that since my return I have met with the British Minister of Defence team during their visit to Amman. I was greatly heartened by our discussions and am looking forward to receiving their report.

with my personal good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher



Handwritten text in the center of the page, possibly a name or address, written in a cursive script.

Faint, mostly illegible text covering the lower half of the page, appearing to be the main body of a letter or document.



*SUBJECT cc MASTER* 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 February 1986

*Dear Robert,*


**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN**

The Prime Minister had an hour's conversation with Crown Prince Hassan this evening. The talk ranged widely over the Crown Prince's views on Jordan's role in the regional economy, problems of access to the European Community market, Jordan's economic development, the implications of recent events in South Yemen and Arab-Israel. I do not propose to record the conversation in detail but only to pick out one or two salient points.

In dealing with events in South Yemen, Crown Prince Hassan was inclined to view them as a consolidation of the Soviet position in the area. He tended to see a link between the Soviet hold on Ethiopia, the developing contacts between Ethiopia and the Sudan and between Ethiopia and Somalia and the growing isolation of the Yemen Arab Republic as part of a Soviet masterplan. The Prime Minister suggested to the Crown Prince that one could interpret events in South Yemen rather differently and argue that the confidence of other regimes with close links to the Soviet Union would be shaken by the speed with which the Russians had abandoned their erstwhile ally President Ali Nasr.

On Arab-Israel, Crown Prince Hassan showed the Prime Minister a telegram which he had received from Amman summarising recent developments in discussions with the PLO and with the Americans. This was very much on the lines of Mr. Coles' reports. The Prime Minister gave an account of her talk with Mr. Peres and asked the Crown Prince to inform King Hussein that she had subsequently sent a firm message to President Reagan about the need to do everything possible to keep the King's initiative alive. Crown Prince Hassan seemed to be somewhat more optimistic than the reports from Amman about the possibility of keeping the PLO in play. He appeared to think that matters could run to March before King Hussein would feel constrained to bring his efforts to an end. (This may simply reflect the fact that he has been away from the scene of the action.) He spoke bitterly of the inadequacy of US policies and of the President's recent message on arms sales. He criticised the US more widely for encouraging the notion of "strategic Israel". This only reduced the incentive for the Israelis to make a serious effort to launch peace negotiations.

As he was leaving, the Crown Prince handed over to the Prime Minister the document prepared for his visit to London on "Financial Institutions, Science and Technology and Industrial Development in Jordan". He also handed over the enclosed note entitled "Aspects of the Sudan's needs for rehabilitation of its shattered economy" but did not appear to suggest that any comment or reply was required.

Yours sincerely,  


(Charles Powell)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file

Original sent to  
FCO

A VERY BRIEF NOTE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE SUDAN'S  
NEEDS FOR REHABILITATION OF ITS SHATTERED ECONOMY

After 16 years of ruthless dictatorship, economic and financial mismanagement, the Sudan is, among other things, totally bankrupt, externally and internally. The rehabilitation of the economy and the restoration of economic and financial health is arduous and requires not only a great deal of self-help, but all the external assistance it can muster.

The Kuwait, Saudi and Arab Funds had reached agreements with the Sudan, which will enable resumption of their respective operations. For the next two or three years they will concentrate on the completion of the on-going projects in transport and communications and on the rehabilitation of the sugar industry, power and the Gezira agricultural scheme. Some friendly countries are giving non-famine commodity aid. Saudi Arabia and Libya had given free of charge petroleum products which will suffice the bare minimum requirements of the Sudan up to the end of March 1986.

It is hoped that a mutually acceptable stabilisation Agreement with the IMF will be concluded soon, which will not only provide much needed, albeit insufficient, balance of payments support but will also pave the way for a greater inflow of concessionary lending from the World Bank and other bilateral agencies as well as more realistic rescheduling by the Paris Club and also by the international commercial banks.

All the above is welcome and necessary, but the main factor in rehabilitating the economy and restoring financial viability, is increased local production, in both the agricultural and the industrial sectors for local consumption and for exports. But for this to be achieved three basic things are needed, petroleum products (roughly estimated at 1,500,000 tons) for the 1986/7 agricultural season together with fertilisers (estimated at


300,000 tons) and insecticides. The Sudan has not a single penny to procure these items and is, as yet, not credit worthy to borrow to purchase them. Somehow, somebody or a number of countries, have to supply them free.

Secondly, most industrial enterprises and some agricultural schemes in the private sector, producing import substitutes are either not working or producing far below capacity. The main reason beside energy is spare parts, and some other essential materials for production. No foreign exchange is available to import these requirements although most, if not all, these enterprises have the local funds to do so.

What is needed is a sizeable loan to the Sudan to enable allocation of foreign exchange for the import of the spares etc., needed by the private sector enterprises, against their payment of the local currency equivalent. The said loan can also be very useful in rehabilitating the social capital infrastructure, the hospitals, the universities, the other institutes and schools, offices, other Government buildings, city streets and increasing the capital of the industrial and agricultural banks. All these entities, save perhaps the industrial and agricultural banks, at some time in the future, are not bankable, but their rehabilitation is one of the prerequisites for the resumption of economic and financial health and the amelioration of the miseries of the citizens. The local currency equivalent of the proposed loan should not go to the ordinary budget of the government, but to a special rehabilitation account in the Bank of Sudan, to be spent on the rehabilitation of the aofresaid items of the social overhead capital on the basis of well prepared plans for the major maintenance and/or rehabilitation of each item. Said rehabilitation will also have the additional advantage of putting to work unemployed Sudanese professionals, contractors, artisans and workers.

It is to be mentioned that at the present official rate of exchange a mere \$50 million loan will generate 125 million Sudanese pounds, which while not adequate for the advocated purpose, will go some way to improving the condition of some of the main components of the tattered social overhead capital and other non-bankable necessities.

# **A** The National Archives

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN

Crown Prince Hassan will pay a courtesy call tomorrow. He has been shooting at Sandringham. He is also attending a two-day programme of presentations organised by DTI and Bank of England about how British financial, commercial and research institutions operate and how they can help Jordan. He will also be telling representatives of British companies about the Jordan Five Year Plan.

You will probably want to talk mostly about Arab/Israel. You will have seen from the telegrams that talks about an international conference are at a critical stage, and may collapse (because of Arafat's inability to take decisions). You will want to give the Crown Prince a resume of your talks with Mr. Peres; and tell him that you have sent a firm message to President Reagan.

You will recall that the Crown Prince sent you a paper in December entitled "The Middle Way", for which you have thanked him. A summary is in the folder.

C.P.

(Charles Powell)

3 February 1986

DCA.14

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CC Pa  
VBU



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 February 1986

*Dear Charles,*

Visit of Crown Prince Hassan to London

Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan is due to call on the Prime Minister for half an hour at 6 pm on Tuesday, 4 February. The Prime Minister has agreed to the call out for gratitude for the Crown Prince's hospitality to her in Jordan last September.

During the call, the Prime Minister may wish to concentrate on recent developments in the peace process. This now appears to be at a critical stage following talks in Amman this week between King Hussein and Arafat intended to elicit a PLO commitment to accept SCRs 242 and 338. You will recall that Prince Hassan wrote to the Prime Minister on 9 December enclosing a paper on the Arab/Israel dispute. I enclosed a summary of this paper with my letter to Mark Addison of 7 January. The Prime Minister replied to the Prince on 8 January. I enclose for ease of reference copies of these papers and the record of her talks with King Hussein on 16 February.

*L past*

The Crown Prince arrived in Britain on 25 January and, together with Princess Sarvath, has spent a few days shooting at Sandringham. The main purpose of his visit is to attend and participate in a two-day programme of discussions and presentations on 4 and 5 February arranged by the Bank of England and the Department of Trade and Industry. The aim is to enable the Crown Prince and a large accompanying team of Jordanian experts to learn at first hand how British financial, commercial and research institutions operate and how they might assist Jordan's economic and industrial development. The Crown Prince will also address representatives of major British companies on the new Jordanian Five Year Plan. Mr Channon will host a lunch for him at the DTI on 5 February and Mr Renton will attend a dinner in his honour at the Bank of England on 4 February.

*Yours ever,*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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STATION AND TELEPHONE OFFICE

STATION AND TELEPHONE OFFICE





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HASSAN BIN TALAL, HRH PRINCE

Crown Prince since 1965.

Born Amman 1947. The younger of Hussein's two brothers. Educated privately and at a British school in Amman; subsequently at Summerfields, Harrow and Christchurch, Oxford (into which he had some difficulty in passing by reason of his weakness in Mathematics). Formally appointed Heir Apparent, 1 April 1965 since when he has acted as Regent during the King's absences abroad. He took his final exams at Oxford while the June war was taking place, and was awarded a third-class degree in Arabic and Hebrew without fulfilling the normal residence requirements.

King Hussein has devolved to Crown Prince Hassan responsibility for the overall planning of economic and internal affairs. He has been the driving force behind the preparation of successive development plans since 1973. He has an apparently unquenchable liking for national and international conferences and seminars and the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, a research centre for Government policy, which was his brain-child. Though the immediate results of these large international conferences may not be great, they have helped to assure both Arab and Western aid-givers that Jordan has a competent leadership in the economic, scientific and developmental fields, which can be expected to make effective use of financial, technical and scientific aid.

In his own sphere of development planning Crown Prince Hassan, with his Royal patronage, interest and sheer hard work, provides an impetus to projects which otherwise might be frustrated or at any rate long delayed by the effects of Middle Eastern inertia. It has, however, sometimes been awkward for him that he is not an integral part of the executive government machine in which the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance control government expenditure.

Although in the past there were reports of differences between King Hussein and the Crown Prince, their relationship now appears to

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be one of considerable mutual respect and support. Crown Prince Hassan is more intellectual than the King but his political judgement and grasp of the practical are less impressive. He reads widely and though much of his thinking may not be original, he has the ability to adopt many interesting and valid ideas from others. But these are often difficult for his listeners to grasp since they tend to be delivered at great speed and in language too frequently obscured by unhelpful jargon.

Prince Hassan's qualities are recognised in Jordan but he lacks the King's easy charm and warm immediate friendliness. If something happened to the King, Prince Hassan's succession would be likely to take place smoothly, but it remains an open question whether he would be able to maintain the kind of loyalty which the King's personality inspires. Prince Hassan has been doing his best to minimise any difficulties on this score by, for example, spending a great deal of time getting to know the Armed Forces and going out with them frequently on manoeuvres.

Crown Prince Hassan has a high regard for Britain and has many friends in governmental and academic circles. He is also blessed with a happy family life and is devoted to his Pakistani-born wife, Princess Sarvath who is intelligent, attractive and charming but who can be difficult at times. They have 4 children; 3 daughters and a son.

Awarded an honorary GCVO by The Queen during the State Visit, March 1984.

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Mr Guy [Signature] pa NENAD (4)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 January 1986

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Dear Mark,

Letter from HRH Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan

(89) NFX 023/3 (185)

Thank you for your letter of 23 December, enclosing copies of a letter and paper sent to the Prime Minister by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan.

/ I enclose as requested a draft reply for the  
/ Prime Minister's signature, and a short summary which we have prepared of Crown Prince Hassan's paper.

If the Prime Minister is content with the draft, I suggest that we should send the letter to Amman for delivery by Mr Coles. A bag closes here on 10 January.

Yours ever

[Signature]

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

## SUMMARY

### THE MIDDLE WAY: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO PEACE

The paper emphasises the need to tackle the underlying causes of terrorism and prevent further radicalisation in the Middle East. It points to the importance of finding solutions to Middle East conflicts to reduce international tension. It analyses the extent to which the Middle East is an inter-dependent area and how the three conflicts (Lebanon, Iran/Iraq and Arab/Israel) impinge on each other. No state in the area is immune from these tensions. It is argued that the Arab/Israel dispute is the central factor. Jordan has shown its consistent commitment to work for peaceful solutions and will maintain this stance. The paper outlines Arab diplomatic efforts for progress towards peace, culminating in the 11 February agreement with the PLO which offers the best hope for progress and deserves wider Arab support. If this opportunity is missed the consequences will be further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, with serious implications for global stability, and the potential to trigger a nuclear conflict between the super-powers.

The paper describes the European position as evolving positively towards greater even-handedness, noting the importance of the Venice Declaration, but calls for a more active European role in the peace process, particularly in inducing the United States to adopt a more positive and even-handed approach. The Europeans should put their full weight behind an international conference, attended by the Security Council permanent members and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO. The US should accept that Camp David has run its course and call jointly with the USSR for an international conference. Pressure should be put on Iran to accept mediation and end the senseless bloodletting.

The paper concludes with a call for united action to promote international stability and peace by adopting policies related to human needs and to the human dimension.





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NEWAD fixation  
post + pic

10 DOWNING STREET

8 January 1986

THE PRIME MINISTER

NEX 023/3	
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10 JAN 1986	
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PS/Mr Denton  
Mr E Ferguson  
Mr Egerton

Your Royal Highness

Thank you for your letter of 9 December in which you kindly enclosed the most interesting paper "The Middle Way".

It paints a sombre picture of the risks for the Middle East, and for world stability, if progress towards the peaceful solution of the region's conflicts is not pursued energetically. I fully share the conviction that only a just settlement, freely negotiated, can allow all the peoples of the region to live in peace.

As you know I have followed with interest, and with admiration, Jordan's determined efforts to promote moderate, realistic moves towards negotiations. We will continue to give these our full support and I look forward to discussing with His Majesty shortly his latest thoughts on the way ahead.

I have the happiest recollections of my visit to Jordan and our discussions there; I too look forward to continuing them during your visit to London next month.

Your sincerely  
Raymond Denton

His Royal Highness Prince Hassan bin Talal



4  
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Mr E Ferguson  
Mr Mark Thomas

From the Private Secretary

22/1

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20 JAN 1986
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Mr Miers o.a  
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Dear Sir,

Rm 17

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

The Prime Minister had a working supper with King Hussein at 10 Downing Street this evening. The King was accompanied by the Jordan Prime Minister, Zaid Rifa'i. The Foreign Secretary and Mr. Egerton were also present. The King was in good heart and humour though evidently took little encouragement from the present Middle East situation and showed himself thoroughly disillusioned with the United States.

Visit of Joint Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation

The Prime Minister repeated her regret that a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Joint Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation had not, after all, taken place last October. But she remained convinced that it had been right to try. The King acknowledged that it had been a sad episode and a missed opportunity. He ascribed it to the ebbing of the PLO's political courage as the Murphy talks had dragged on without result. The Prime Minister commented that she thought that the United States had been much at fault in failing to bring the Murphy mission to a successful conclusion.

Jordan/PLO Relations

King Hussein said that he had taken a firm line subsequently with the PLO. They had to reorganise and dissociate themselves from violence. They must also speak with one voice and accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. He wanted a document from Arafat on this. He had not yet received a definite answer from Arafat but would be seeing him on his return to Amman. If he got the assurances he was seeking on 242 and 338, he would be in the strong position to move straight to an international conference. But if Arafat faltered again, he would go for a conference anyway and leave the Palestinians to sort themselves out. In this situation, Arafat would lose prestige and support. Jordan's rapprochement with Syria had been pursued in part to put pressure on Arafat. He thought that it was having some effect. The animosity between

President Asad and Arafat was as strong as ever. Asad had pressed him to find any other Palestinian leader but Arafat. The King thought that there were various possibilities. Mr. Egerton suggested that one possibility might be to revert to the notion of a Palestinian Government in exile with Arafat kicked upstairs as President. The Prime Minister pointed out that this would imply a commitment to a full Palestinian state which would be a move away from the 11 February agreement and anathema to the United States. Zaid Rifa'i thought it most unlikely that Arafat would deliver PLO acceptance of 242 and 338. He wanted to but couldn't. Equally, he did not want to say that he couldn't. So he would procrastinate.

### Jordan/Syria

King Hussein described the importance of Jordan's rapprochement with Syria. He believed that Syria was genuinely committed to an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Prime Minister wondered whether any agreement with President Asad was likely to be durable. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that Asad traditionally made progress by inactivity. There was always a risk that when it came to the point he would do nothing. King Hussein judged that Asad was under some pressure. Syria's latest efforts in Lebanon had not worked out very well and his credibility had suffered as a result. Syria's economy was in a difficult situation. Syria was unable to match Israel's military strength. As a result Asad was feeling more and more isolated. The King added that Iraq understood Jordan's motives in seeking rapprochement with Syria. In the longer term it could help bring about improvement in relations between Syria and Iraq.

### Jordan/Soviet Union

King Hussein referred to discussions with the Soviet Union in which the Jordanians had explained their ideas for an international conference. The Soviet Union appeared willing to take part. He had been invited to visit Moscow in the Spring or Summer.

### International Conference

King Hussein expanded somewhat on his ideas for an international Conference. In the Jordanian plan, the conference would be chaired by the United Nations Secretary General. The Syrians had wanted a single Arab delegation but Jordan had rejected this. There would be a number of working groups to deal with the individual problems. Progress in one group would be an incentive for progress in another. But it must be possible to make reference back to the five permanent members of the Security Council in the event of deadlock. The Prime Minister suggested that this indicated a shift in the King's position since they had last discussed the matter in October. At that stage he had appeared to envisage the conference as just a framework. Now the conference itself appeared to have a role in trying

to solve difficulties.

Zaid Rifa'i said that a certain amount of agreement had been reached with the United States about the conference but there were two outstanding points of difficulty. First, the role of the conference, where the United States seemed to want it to be little more than a "cocktail party"; and second, the question of Palestinian representation. The United States now seemed to accept that the Conference would have a continuous role. But would still not admit that it should have substantive powers. Its only function would be to receive progress reports and provide moral influence. It was essential from Jordan's point of view that if a deadlock were reached in a working group there should be the right to take the matter back to the conference as a whole which would be the ultimate arbiter. Without that, Israel would be under no pressure at all. The Americans wanted to act as arbiters themselves, in part because they wanted to exclude the Soviet Union from any active role. But there was no reason to think that they would bring any significant pressure to bear on Israel. It was impracticable to exclude other permanent members of the Security Council from a role.

The Prime Minister wondered whether it would not be possible to give an external mediator a role, for instance someone like Brian Urquhart. King Hussein thought this could be useful. But it would still not solve the problem of what happened when there was deadlock. The conundrum was that the only issue on which deadlock was likely was withdrawal from the occupied territories: and on this the five permanent members of the Security Council were agreed.

As regards Palestinian representation, the key lay in whether Arafat and the PLO agreed to accept 242 and 338. If they did so, there would be no need to discuss the names of Palestinian representatives in advance with Israel and the United States. They would become "ex-terrorists" like Shamir. But both the Israelis and the Americans were being devious on this point and refusing to answer outright the question whether Arafat could definitely attend the conference if he accepted 242 and 338. Zaid Rifa'i pointed out the irony that Syria and Israel agreed in wanting to exclude the PLO from an international conference.

#### Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Peres

The Prime Minister asked what message she might usefully convey to Mr. Peres next week. King Hussein identified two main points. The first was the need for early progress. Jordan had tried to help Peres. But he had to act too and not just hide behind the excuse of coalition difficulties. Secondly, there was a need to do something to improve conditions in the Occupied Territories. Israel could not go on with the same old tactics of stifling all forms of political life. He hoped the Prime Minister would also press Peres to agree that if the PLO accepted 242 and 338 there should be no difficulties over their attendance at an international conference. The Prime Minister remarked

that she thought that conditions on the West Bank were one of the weakest points in Israel's reputation. She had pressed Peres on the matter when they had met in New York at the end of October. But he had taken refuge in the difficulties of getting any change through his coalition.

Jordan/United States

King Hussein displayed considerable disillusion with the United States, saying that they had "lost all credibility" and "have let us down throughout". The Americans just echoed Israeli positions. Indeed the point had been reached where Israel was easier to deal with than the United States. He believed that the President could secure Congressional approval for the arms package for Jordan, if he really put his mind to it. The Prime Minister said she would be sending President Reagan a full account of her talk with the King and with Mr. Peres. She would make absolutely clear that in her view, the United States owed the King something. She would stress the need not to equivocate on the question of Palestinian representation at a conference. She noted that we would soon be approaching the 20th Anniversary of UN SCR 242. There might be some psychological leverage in this Anniversary to secure progress.


Libya

King Hussein spoke disparagingly of American tactics vis-a-vis Libya which simply had the effect of building up Gadaffi and giving him more publicity. The protracted campaign of pressure had simply united all Arabs around him.

Egypt

King Hussein expressed great concern about President Mubarak's position. He seemed unable to assert himself. If he went, a successor regime was likely to be either of the extreme Left or extreme Right and would tear up the Camp David agreements. The situation in Sudan was also very worrying and was going Gadaffi's way.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  
  
(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

original filed on  
JORDAN: King Hussein's  
visits: PL3

CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2)

London SW1A 2AH

10 January 1986 Prime Minister

Dear Charles

ms

CDP

11/1

Visits of King Hussein and Crown Prince  
Hassan to London

Thank you for your letter of 31 December about the Prime Minister's plans to receive King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan during their forthcoming visits to London.

Mr Coles has now confirmed to us that the King gratefully accepts the Prime Minister's offer of a small, informal working supper on 16 January at 7.00 for 7.30. The King proposes bringing with him Prime Minister Zeid Rifai only. Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Egerton will attend from the FCO.

JORDAN -  
Prince Hassan visit  
July 83.

Mr Coles has also reported Crown Prince Hassan's grateful acceptance of a meeting with the Prime Minister at 6.00 p.m. on 4 February.

Yours ever

*(Signature)*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No.10 Downing Street

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original filed on  
JORDAN: King  
Hussein's visits: Pt 3

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JDB AHB  
bc. Sir P. E

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 December, 1985.

VISITS OF KING HUSSEIN AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO LONDON

Thank you for your letter of 24 December about the forthcoming visits of King Hussein to London.

The Prime Minister would be happy to see King Hussein in the week beginning 13 January. It would really not be possible to give a formal lunch or dinner that week. But the Prime Minister could manage a small informal working supper on Thursday, 16 January, at say 7.00 for 7.30. Would you please find out whether this would be agreeable to the King, and whom he would like to bring? On our side, I envisage the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary if available, Mr. Egerton and myself.

The Prime Minister could see Crown Prince Hassan for half an hour at 1800 on Tuesday, 4 February. This is out of gratitude for his recent hospitality to her in Jordan, and should not be interpreted as meaning that she would expect to see him as a matter of course.

C.D. Powell

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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JB

Original filed on  
JORDAN: King  
Hussein's visits: Pt 3.

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①

PRIME MINISTER

VISITS OF KING HUSSEIN AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN

The attached letter conveys Mr. Coles' recommendation that you should see King Hussein during his visit to London for medical treatment in mid-January and if possible give him a meal. Against the background of your recent visit to Jordan I am sure that you will want to see the King. It would be very difficult to fit in a lunch or dinner but a small working supper could be arranged. Agree to this?

Yes mr

Crown Prince Hassan will also be in London in early January. Again against the background of your recent visit I think it would be polite to offer to see him for half an hour. Agree?

Yes

mr

CDP.

CHARLES POWELL  
30 December 1985

ECL/84

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THU  
16 JAN

TUE 18:00  
WED 3:00  
THU 4:00  
FEB.



original filed on  
JORDAN: King  
Hussein's visits: R3.

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COP  
or

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 December 1985

Dear Charles,

Visits of King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan to London

Mr Coles has reported that King Hussein of Jordan expects to be in London on about 12 January, primarily for a medical check-up. The King has asked whether it would be possible to call on the Prime Minister during his stay.

Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan also intends to visit London, on 4 and 5 February, to hold meetings with the Bank of England and other financial and scientific institutions. This visit stems from a meeting between the Crown Prince and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England when the latter visited Jordan and discussed ways in which British financial institutions could help to foster Jordan's industrial development.

A meeting with King Hussein would be a timely opportunity to renew high level contacts with Jordan and enable the Prime Minister to gain a first hand account of current Jordanian thinking on the Arab/Israel peace process shortly before the visit of Mr Peres. Our last Ministerial contact with the Jordanians was on 16 October when Mr Renton called on the King in London. Mr Coles, who hopes to see the King again soon after Christmas, has said that he would try to influence the timing of the King's visit if the Prime Minister were able to suggest convenient times for a meeting in the week beginning 13 January. Mr Coles suggests that as this will be the King's first call since the Prime Minister's visit to Jordan, Mrs Thatcher may wish to consider offering some hospitality on this occasion.

Sir Geoffrey Howe endorses this advice. A meeting with King Hussein would in his view greatly reduce the case for a meeting with Crown Prince Hassan. But you will wish to bear in mind that the Prime Minister spent some time with the Crown Prince during her visit to Jordan. The Crown Prince and Princess Sarvath entertained her and Mr Thatcher to lunch. Even though the Crown Prince's performance then was less than impressive, especially when he clumsily presented thoughts on the Jordanian economy, the Prime Minister may nevertheless regard this as a suitable opportunity to offer the Crown Prince some reciprocal attention.

/Arrival

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hanches out.  
Dunno difficult  
? Thursday 16/1

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Arrival and departure dates for the Crown Prince are not yet known and he might decide to spend longer than 4-5 February in London. But a short call in the early evening of either of these days might be best.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would welcome calls by King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan along these lines.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R N Culshaw', with a checkmark at the end.

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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الرسالة  
البرقية

25<sup>th</sup> July 1983.

Dear Prime Minister,

As I prepare to leave for Amman on Wednesday I am writing to thank you for your kindness in receiving me. Your interest and support are always a source of encouragement and I would be happy to elaborate on any of the principle topics we discussed in the context of the Jordanian perception. We look forward to seeing you again in the near future.

Yours most sincerely,

Salman Z. Fayed

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CC MASTER

File

HL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 July 1983

*See log.*

Call by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan on the Prime Minister

Crown Prince Hassan called on the Prime Minister at 2.45 p.m. today for a 30-minute conversation. Sir Anthony Parsons was also present.

The main points made by Hassan were as follows. The Lebanon situation was pathetic and its partition seemed to be only a matter of time. Shultz had got nowhere in Damascus and the French were adopting an "I told you so" attitude.

There was now a danger of Jordan becoming a permanent repository for the Palestinians. Kuwait was thinking in terms of getting rid of its Palestinian community and other Gulf States were moving in the same direction. A situation resembling the Nigerian expulsion of other West Africans was now a possibility. The Russians had told the Jordanians that the Syrians were considering opening a corridor to permit Palestinians from the Lebanon and elsewhere to enter Jordan. This would be a life and death issue for Jordan who could not be expected to absorb such numbers.

It was important that there should be some activity during the American election period. He hoped that there could be at the outset agreement among the Presidential candidates to avoid controversy over the Middle East. Perhaps there could be a United States Review of the situation in the occupied territories and, in particular, the effect of events on the Israeli and Arab identity. What was needed was some activity to engage the attention of the American and Israeli Foreign Ministers. One objective of this activity would be to arrest the tendency to push the Palestinians back into Jordan. He wondered whether Senators Baker and Pell might be prepared to take on this Review. In any event it must be supported by the United States.

The strategic aspect had to be taken into consideration. The Israelis were telling the Americans that the rapid deployment force was far more expensive than heavy investment in Israel. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister had told him that one Russian reaction to the deployment of Cruise might be to strengthen the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and pose a direct threat to the Gulf. On another point, it was very striking, as Mr. Genscher had confirmed to him, that there had been no reference to the Middle East in Chancellor Kohl's talks in Moscow.

/When

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When in Brussels recently he had raised the question of aid for Jordan with the European Commission. The Community's aid programme to Jordan had fallen by one-third. But the Jordanians could not preserve their present quality of life without it. Their income of \$2,000 per capita was artificially inflated by remittances from the Gulf, an uncertain source. The Community's decision to cut food aid was an additional burden. A review was needed and the EC Development Commissioner had been very understanding of the problem. The Commission would be sending a task force to Jordan in September. He hoped that there would be a modified Co-operation Council meeting to study the Jordanian case. Without this kind of help, Jordan's task of perserving stability was a very difficult one.

With regard to the possibility of an outbreak of fighting between Syria and Israel, Hassan said that it was now a matter of when rather than if. And the ripple effects would be the partition of Lebanon and demographic movement.

In response to these remarks, the Prime Minister said that the present situation was indeed disturbing. No progress was being made on the fundamental problems. Meanwhile, there was an underlying movement towards the consolidation of Israeli objectives.

Her initial reaction to Hassan's remarks about the preservation of stability in Jordan was that, while progress on the Arab/Israel problem was halted, there were attractions in trying to help with the "Jordan case". At a time when the region was being de-stabilised our American and European friends should see the need to protect and help Jordan. It might be necessary for us to take an initiative in the European Community, perhaps together with the Germans. The important point was that during the US election period we should at least try to prevent the situation deteriorating.

As regards the Crown Prince's idea of a United States Review of the situation in the occupied territories, she very much doubted whether, during a US election period, it would be possible to engineer a bipartisan approach.

At the end of the discussion Hassan said that King Hussein still very much hoped that the Prime Minister would be able to visit Jordan. The Prime Minister said that she would try to do so within the next year. She also hoped that it might be possible for The Queen to pay a visit in due course.

The Crown Prince left three documents with the Prime Minister, one on Jordan/EC relations, the second on "Israeli colonisation of Arab lands" and the third on "Centrist approach to politics". I imagine that he has made these available separately to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Please let me know if you need copies.

*Yours are  
for Wla.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

MR. COLES ✓ *on 12/7*

PRINCE HASSAN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

I wish I could think of something more than tea and sympathy to be offered to Prince Hassan. The weekend telegrams and today's newspapers reveal a very bleak landscape in the Middle East.

As expected, Shultz's visit to Damascus failed to move the Syrians, although he seems to have established something of a personal relationship with Assad. The latter is still engaged in his power struggle to tame the PLO. Arafat is trying to fight back, but it does not look as though he will emerge in any shape capable of resuming negotiations with King Hussein in the context of the Reagan plan.

Meanwhile, there has been a further eruption on the West Bank with the killing of an Israeli in Hebron and the subsequent sacking of the (Israeli-appointed) Mayor. Obviously, the Israeli settlers are going to demand even tougher measures against the Palestinians.

On Israel/Lebanon, it looks as though the Israelis may already have started a step-by-step unilateral withdrawal - they are reported as having handed over a position close to Beirut to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The probability is that this process will continue over the next month or so with an acceleration after Begin's visit to Washington, it it takes place.

Prince Hassan will probably wish to develop his ideas as to how the United States and Western Europe might act to protect the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Here again, it is extremely difficult to see what we can do in practice. We should not express enthusiasm about Prince Hassan's idea of a high level American Commission to examine the legality of the Israeli position in the occupied territories etc. I happen to know that the Americans have turned the idea down flat. We should not reveal this to Hassan, who may himself not have been informed. Equally, I see no virtue in our taking any lead in reference to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion. For different reasons, the Israelis and the Palestinians would be opposed to such a move. Given the composition of the court, the outcome would probably be a fearful squabble with a series of minority judgements.

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/One positive

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- 2 -

One positive possibility is aid to the West Bank and Gaza channelled through the EDF. Prince Hassan was due to talk about this to the Brussels Commission last week and may have something to say on the subject.

ADP

A.D. PARSONS  
12 July 1983

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1983

Prime Minister

I have highlighted the points  
which you need to read.

A.J.C. 13/7.

Dear Sir,

Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan's Call on the Prime Minister:

13 July

I enclose a brief for Crown Prince Hassan's call on the Prime Minister at 3 pm on 13 July, with two extra copies.

The Prime Minister may like to know that, at Mr Luce's request, the Crown Prince has agreed to see Mrs John Smith at the FCO immediately after his meeting with Mrs Thatcher. This is to enable Mrs Smith to thank the Crown Prince for King Hussein's efforts to obtain the release of her husband detained in Baghdad, and to urge him not to give up reminding President Hussein of the need to show clemency in this case.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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CROWN PRINCE HASSAN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 13 JULY

Points to Make

General

1. Will His Majesty be visiting London this summer?

Arab/Israel

1. Situation in the Occupied Territories. Concerned at renewed violence in Hebron, and dismissal of Mayor and Council. Israeli restrictions on travel to Jordan and remittances to West Bank must add to sense of isolation for Palestinians there. Has this and dispute inside PLO affected attitudes to peace negotiations?
2. Share Crown Prince's interest in practical help for West Bankers. We have small bilateral aid programme, and some EC aid channelled through private organisations. Fully intend to continue this. Would a major increase provoke Israelis and jeopardise present efforts?
3. Concerned at deadlock in Arab/Israel peace efforts. UK/Ten wish to help regain momentum. Still believe Reagan plan a good basis. Can it be reactivated?
4. Reference to ICJ. See some advantage if this would keep public attention focussed on West Bank issues, and assist Egyptian rapprochement with Arabs; but not convinced that we or the Europeans best placed to make the running on this subject.

CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 13 JULY

Essential Facts

1. Crown Prince Hassan (cv attached) arrived in London on 24 June and will stay here until 27 July. During this period he will visit Geneva, Brussels and take a week's holiday in France. [REDACTED]
2. He is a frequent visitor to the UK. Two of his children are being educated in England.
3. Though not a member of the Jordanian Government he is responsible for the overall planning of economic and internal affairs in Jordan. He also acts as regent in the (many) absences abroad of King Hussein.
- A. 4. The record of the Secretary of State's call on the Crown Prince on 30 June is attached. Mr Luce held a lunch in honour of the Crown Prince on 12 July.

Anglo-Jordanian relations

5. Britain's relations with Jordan are close and friendly. Jordan is important to us as a stable country in the unstable area and for the moderate and generally constructive policies she follows in the Arab/Israel dispute. Both these qualities depend heavily on the Hashemite regime which has received our constant support. King Hussein made a courageous, albeit unsuccessful attempt earlier this year to work out with the PLO

a mandate for negotiations on the basis of President Reagan's peace initiative.

6. There are no major bilateral problems between us. Jordan is not rich but is now one of our more important export markets in the Middle East. The British share of the market is high. Our exports in 1982 at £295 million showed a 45% increase in value terms over the previous year. Much of this growth reflected deliveries of the Khalid Tank (Jordan ordered 274 in 1979) but even after taking this into account our exports here increased in recent years. The outlook for 1983 is less rosy, as the shortfall in Arab payments agreed at the 1974 Baghdad summit means that some development projects will have to be delayed owing to shortages of funds. Imports from Jordan are low, totalling only £18 million in 1982.

7. The UK has offered £8 million in capital aid and technical assistance towards the 1981-85 Five Year Development Plan although cuts in our bilateral aid programme mean that disbursement may have to be stretched over a longer period.

8. The most sensitive point in our otherwise cordial relations and one which is constantly referred to by the King and other senior Jordanians is the lack of a return State Visit (King Hussein's State Visit was in 1966). It has recently been agreed that The Queen should visit Jordan in February or March 1984, subject to the prevailing political situation. The

N.B.

|| Jordanians have not yet been told of this decision. The Duke and Duchess of Kent visited Jordan in March 1983. Mr Pym



visited Jordan in November 1982.

6-

HASSAN BIN TALAL, HEIR PRINCE

Crown Prince since 1965.

Born Amman 1947. The younger of Hussein's two brothers. Educated privately and at a British school in Amman; subsequently at Summerfields, Harrow and Christchurch, Oxford (into which he had some difficulty in passing by reason of his weakness in Mathematics). Formally appointed Heir Apparent, 1 April 1965 since when he has acted as Regent during the King's absences abroad. He took his final exams at Oxford while the June war was taking place, and was awarded a third-class degree in Arabic and Hebrew without fulfilling the normal residence requirements.

King Hussein has devolved to Crown Prince Hassan responsibility for the overall planning of economic and internal affairs. He has been the driving force behind the preparation of successive development plans since 1973, and his patronage, interest and sheer hard work have frequently given impetus to projects which might otherwise have run into the sand. He has an apparently unquenchable liking for national and international conferences and seminars and the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, a research centre for Government policy, which was his brain-child. Though the immediate results of these large international conferences may not be great, they have helped to assure both Arab and Western aid-givers that Jordan has a competent leadership in the economic, scientific and developmental fields, which can be expected to make effective use of financial, technical and scientific aid.

In his own sphere of development planning Crown Prince Hassan, with his Royal patronage, interest and sheer hard work, provides an impetus to projects which otherwise might be frustrated or at any rate long delayed by the effects of Middle Eastern inertia. It has, however, sometimes been awkward for him that he is not an integral part of the executive government machine in which the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance control government expenditure. This was more of a problem when the Prime Minister was Zaid Rifai with whom Crown Prince Hassan's relations were reported to be strained.

Although in the past there were reports of differences between King Hussein and the Crown Prince, their relationship now appears to be one of considerable mutual respect and support. Crown Prince Hassan is more intellectual than the King and works much longer hours at his desk. Unlike the King, he reads widely and has an impressive grasp of detail. Though much of his thinking may not be original, he has the preception to adopt many interesting and valid ideas from others. But these are often difficult for his listeners to grasp since they tend to be delivered at great speed and in language too frequently obscured by unhelpful jargon.

Prince Hassan's qualities are recognised in Jordan but he lacks the King's easy charm and warm immediate friendliness. If something happened to the King, Prince Hassan's succession would be likely to take place smoothly, but it remains an open question whether he would be able to maintain the kind of loyalty which the King's personality inspires. Prince Hassan has been doing his best to minimise any difficulties on this score by, for example, spending a great deal of time recently getting to know the Armed Forces by going out with them frequently on manocuvres.

Crown Prince Hassan has a high regard for Britain and has many friends in governmental and academic circles. He is also blessed with a happy family life and is devoted to his intelligent Pakistani-born wife, Princess Sarvath. They have 4 children; 3 daughters and a son.

## Essential Facts

## Arab/Israel

1. At his meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary the Crown Prince laid emphasis on what he calls 'the human dimension', ie helping the Palestinians in practical ways. He seemed to be unaware that the Ten already have a modest aid programme in the West Bank and Gaza (current budget 1.65 million Units of Account, or about the same in dollars). A major increase in the amount of Western aid would be likely to provoke the Israelis, who have the power to channel funds to projects of their choosing. But this is an area when we and the Ten can continue to give practical help.

2. The Crown Prince has put to us two ideas for new approaches to the Arab/Israel problem. The first is for an American-sponsored review body to look at the facts and submit proposals for solution of some aspects of the Palestinian problem. The Crown Prince has deliberately left the details vague in the hope that the Americans will take it up, but they have shown no interest. His second idea is to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legality of settlements and other issues raised by the Israeli occupation. He left a set of suggested questions with Sir G Howe (attached).

We see the attraction of keeping public opinion focussed on the settlements problem by referring the matter to the ICJ. But the question would need to avoid inviting the ICJ to rule on a point which had already been settled by UN resolutions. The Crown Prince's questions would need amending to avoid this difficulty. We have encouraged the Crown Prince to develop his ideas, but doubt whether the UK/Ten should take the initiative in putting the proposal forward, particularly if the Arab states themselves are not disposed to do so.

w/  
Flag A.



3. The situation in the Occupied Territories has become more tense. After an incident in Hebron on the West Bank in which a Jewish settler was murdered, the Israeli authorities dismissed the Mayor and Council of Hebron. There were disturbances in which an Arab is reported to have been shot dead. This may well trigger off a further round of disturbances in the Occupied Territories which will meet with a heavy-handed Israeli response.

4. This incident comes on top of other unsettling developments for the Palestinians in the Territories. After the breakdown of the Jordan/PLO talks in April, the Jordanians imposed restrictions on travel by Palestinians between the Occupied Territories and Jordan, designed to forestall an Israeli attempt to create a further exodus. The measures have caused considerable alarm in the Territories. The Israelis have also been disrupting travel across the bridges to Jordan and the movement of funds into the Territories. There have in addition been reports that as Israeli Ministerial Committee had decided to rehouse many of the refugees in the Territories and refurbish and in some cases move the camps. The Palestinians see this as a move to integrate them against their will into an Israeli - administered West Bank and Gaza.



VISIT TO THE UK OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

Military Situation

1. Iraqis awaiting new, probably limited, attack on central front. Meanwhile they conduct spoiling raids against concentrations of Iranian troops.

Peace Initiative - UN

2. Follow-up to UN Mission of Enquiry will be critical. Encouraging that both Iran and Iraq accepted report as objective. President (China in July) trying to draft statement acceptable to both sides. Despite prospect of new Iranian attack, signs are slightly more encouraging than for some time. UAE/Kuwait mediation attempt still in play, but Iranians now cool following ill-advised public comments on mission by Kuwaitis.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

Military Situation

1. Both sides reorganising for renewed hostilities. Iranian strategy is to mount limited attacks against Iraqi positions and allow time for Iraq's economic problems to mount. Iran still suffering from shortage of spares for air force. Iraq has shown more aggression in recent weeks, and still holds 200-300 sq ks of Iranian territory. Iran holds sliver 30-50 sq ks of Iraqi territory. Iraqi attacks on shipping into Iranian ports increasingly successful. Delivery later this year of 5 French Super Etendard equipped with Exocet will increase Iraq's ability to hit shipping south of Kharg Island (principal loading point for Iran's oil exports) and may provoke fierce Iranian response.

Peace Initiatives - UN

2. UN report described accurately damage suffered by civilian population during indiscriminate bombing by both participants. Iran has patently suffered more. Security Council has difficult job in trying to follow up the report. Iranians want to use report to condemn aggressor, but have already said UN Security Council has, for the first time, demonstrated its responsibility in producing a balanced report. Iraq wishes to reduce impact of report by highlighting Iran's failings in treatment of POWs (Iran has already given new undertaking to ICRC on access). If Iraq and its friends push the Security Council too hard, the Iranians will conclude that they have little to gain in a dialogue with the UN. We cannot afford to be seen as prime movers. But we remain in close and discreet contact with Pakistan and President of Security Council to explore ways of meeting some of Iran's concerns.

GCC Initiative (Gulf Cooperation Council)

3. GCC sent Kuwait Foreign Minister and UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to Tehran and Baghdad in mid-May primarily to discuss the oil slick. No progress was made and the Iranians showed

/no sign of

no sign of responding to any GCC peace proposals. Kuwait believes prospects for mediation poor, while UAE is more optimistic. Mission is likely to return to Iran after Ramadhan (ended 10 July).

Iraq/Jordan

4. Jordan has supported Iraq in the war.

RETAINED BY  
DEPARTMENT  
UNDER  
SECTION 3 (4)

Jordan is a major route for Iraq and has supplied military equipment. Leadership in the Jordanian armed forces has resisted any inclination by King Hussain to commit regular forces, but Jordanian volunteers have served with Iraqis. The Jordanians will press us to follow-up the UN Mission of Enquiry with a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal. Jordan is currently a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

Oil Slick

5. No sign that discussions held under the auspices of the Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Maritime Environment (ROPME) will lead to progress except in clearing up pollution in lower Gulf. Iraq insists that repair work can only be carried out as part of a UN-supervised ceasefire. Signs of oil coming ashore on the coast of Saudi Arabia, but the Kuwait Scientific Institute is confident that there is no huge threat at present, although wildlife may have been badly hit, according to a recent publication by World Wildlife Fund (which has not yet been analysed interdepartmentally).



CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORDER

Points to make [if raised]

1. Welcome any moves to improve the international community's awareness of and response to humanitarian problems.
2. What progress have the Jordanians made with their independent commission on international humanitarian issues?
3. Will the Jordanians expect the General Assembly to do more than take note of any progress made towards establishing the commission?

## CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

## NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORDER

Essential Facts

1. Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan introduced his proposal for a 'new international humanitarian order' at the UN General Assembly in 1981. He proposed a new universal declaration of humanitarian principles, a code of conduct for compassionate action in the face of human suffering and new monitoring machinery. Subsequent discussion resulted in the adoption by consensus of a resolution which requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of governments: we sent in the attached statement of our views in May 1982. In December the General Assembly passed another resolution inviting governments that had not responded to do so and noting that the Jordanians were proposing to establish a commission, outside the UN system, to consider the matter further.

2. Several notable international personalities have been invited to join this commission. These include Mr Robert McNamara, Mr Gough Whitlam and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Ramphal. We so not know who has accepted and so far as we know the commission has not yet met. The Crown Prince tried to interest Mr Heath, Lord Carrington and Sir Ian Gilmour in joining the commission, without success. Dr David Owen, has recently agreed to join the Commission.

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NOTE AND REPORT OF 10 FEBRUARY 1988 ON THE JORDANIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORDER

The United Kingdom has studied with interest the Jordanian proposal for a New International Humanitarian Order contained in A/36/245. This proposal draws timely attention to a number of problems in the humanitarian field, and sets out some interesting ideas designed to improve the international community's ability to respond to them.

The United Kingdom naturally favours any moves which would heighten the international community's awareness of humanitarian problems, and increase its effectiveness in dealing with them. There could certainly be advantage in developing a more co-ordinated approach in this field.

The United Kingdom agrees with the Jordanian view that any such work should stimulate the process of streamlining up-dating and improving the relevant institutional mechanisms, although it will be important to ensure that it does not in any way impair the effectiveness of those mechanisms and fora: the United Kingdom attaches the highest value to the advances achieved in the humanitarian field in the period since the United Nations Organisation was founded.

In the human rights field a corpus of instruments and mechanisms has been established based on the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This includes notably the two International Covenants on Human Rights,

and the machinery established to monitor their observance. On a regional basis, potentially even far-reaching obligations have been undertaken, for example under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the associated judicial machinery, to which the United Kingdom is a party. The most important means of furthering humanitarian aspiration in the human rights field is to promote widespread adherence to the existing international instruments, and to improve where necessary the effectiveness of their monitoring and enforcement machinery.

It will also be important to ensure that work on the Jordanian proposal does not overlook work on the separate but related initiatives on human rights and mass exoduses, measures to avert new flows of refugees and the coordination of humanitarian relief; the United Kingdom believes that in consideration of the Jordanian proposal priority should be given to the question of practical measures to respond to these problems.

The United Kingdom awaits the views of other governments with interest and looks forward to participating in future discussion of these important matters.

N. Faylor

I have told  
Mr A. Sarans  
who will  
arrange A.F.C. 17.



CF

Arranged.  
cont.

(BF) ①

A

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Crown Prince Hassan of

Jordan.

The above has hinted in a letter  
to Tony Sarans that he would  
like to see you next week.

We do not think he has  
any particular business to discuss.

Your diary for Tuesday and  
Wednesday (the days on which he is  
available) is already crowded.  
Do you want to see him for 30  
minutes at 1500 hrs. on Wednesday,

13 July?

A.F.C.  $\frac{5}{7}$

Yes  
no

# Grey Scale #13



**A**

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**B**

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