PREM 19/3419

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Visit of the Amir of Kuwait

Visit of Crown Prince Shaikh Saad

KUWAIT.

DECEMBER 198

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PREM 19/3419

CC PC

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

J S Wall Esq
Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

Department of Trade and Industry

Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6RB

Direct line
071-215 4440

DTI Enquiries
071-215 5000

5 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE AMIR OF KUWAIT: 4 OCTOBER

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 4 October to Christopher Prentice. This recorded the call on the Prime Minister by the Amir of Kuwait, which took place the same morning. This letter picks up three points: the Amir's complaints about the Kuwait-British Fire Group and BP, and our interest in the reconstruction of Kuwait's Naval Base. A draft letter to the Amir is attached.

Firefighting : The Kuwaiti British Group

Mr Lilley was of course very concerned about the Kuwaitis' dissatisfaction with the Kuwait-British Group (KBG). He immediately asked senior representatives of the three companies concerned (Amec, Taylor Woodrow and Wimpey) to call on him urgently. The resulting meeting took place on 7 October.

There are of course two sides to every story; and the companies were emphatic that there had been no delays, and indeed that they had met all contractual requirements ahead of the deadlines in their contract. They made the following key points:

(a) There has been a persistent misunderstanding on the part of senior Kuwaitis at a distance from the operations about the date on which KBG signed the contract. It has frequently been suggested that they signed the contract back in the summer, presumably because of the damage assessment work they did at that stage. In fact they signed the contract on 4 September. This essentially required the client's approval for purchases and their agreement for mobilisation. The latter agreement was only forthcoming on 26 September, and required mobilisation within 14 days. In fact the equipment arrived there on 3 October, and the team on 8 October - well in advance of the 14 day deadline. We understand that on 11 October, over 270 people were working on the KBG contract in Kuwait.

(b) The companies emphasise that comparisons with other teams are misleading, even if they are inevitable. Other countries have essentially provided fire fighting teams to work for Bechtel. The UK contract is wholly different and far wider in scope, since it carries broad responsibility for reconstruction in the Subriyah oil field as well as for fire-fighting; indeed the fire-fighting is a minor part of the contract. It is also important to recognise that there are parties within the Kuwaiti administration and within Bechtel and their other competitors who have an interest in generating misleading and critical stories about the UK effort.

Mr Lilley entirely accepts that Kuwait remains a difficult place in which to do business and that there are strong US interests which have been resistant to the KBG's contract.

Nonetheless he left the companies in no doubt about the deep concern there was within government about the Kuwaitis' dissatisfaction; and he also left the companies in no doubt that he was expecting them to make every effort to ensure that the position was retrieved and that the contract was carried out effectively. Our latest information is that the KBG fire-fighting team has indeed arrived and that they are now starting work.

The attached draft letter to the Amir points up a few of these facts in a tactful fashion, but essentially looks to the future. Mr Lilley emphasised that the KBG should keep the DTI and the Post closely informed about progress, and he will continue to take a close personal interest in the matter.

BP

There is little to add to the FCO's earlier advice on BP. The FCO has been in touch with the company, who accept that the issue is a sensitive one. BP are re-formulating their proposals, and will be returning to Kuwait shortly to take forward discussions with the Kuwait Oil Company. They fully recognise the importance of an agreement, and they have given a clear assurance that there will be no problem of substance or attitude from them. On 10 October our Ambassador in Kuwait re-inforced the points made by the Prime Minister to the Amir at a meeting with the Crown Prince. The latter said he was grateful for the Prime Minister's interest; he was glad too to hear that BP was returning with a new proposal. The Kuwaiti Oil Minister has also reassured our Ambassador that the Kuwaitis' irritation has now blown over.

Naval Base

MOD has been pressing the Kuwaitis for some time to allocate the naval base contract to the UK. Most recently Alan Thomas, Head of Defence Export Services, met the Crown Prince and Defence Minister in Kuwait last week; I attach a copy of the

report of his visit. Both Ministers confirmed that the UK will get this business, which is worth £75m. MOD hopes that it will also lead to further contracts under a defence procurement agreement which is currently being considered. Mr Thomas is now writing to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence in support of the British Kuwait Defence Group, a broad consortium of British companies which has put forward proposals for the naval base.

Letter to the Amir

I attach, as requested, a draft letter to the Amir, which sets out the present position on all three issues. On the fire-fighting, in particular, it is important to be clear about our own perception of events, without of course spoiling for an argument with the Kuwaitis. The draft seeks to do this by referring obliquely and in passing to some of the key points discussed above.

I am copying this letter to Christopher Prentice (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours

STEPHEN SPEED
Private Secretary

PE10272

true as amended

[B-B]

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ~~SA'AD AL ABDULLAH AL SALIM AL SABAH KCMG~~

I was delighted to have the opportunity of a further discussion with you on 4 October, and pleased to hear of the excellent progress which your country is making in restoration and reconstruction.

I was of course concerned to hear Your Highness's comments on the Kuwait British Group, and I have made some urgent enquiries about the position. My understanding is that their contract was signed on 4 September. Subsequently a mobilisation order was required before equipment and personnel could be dispatched. This was signed on 26 September. I believe that the Group's equipment arrived in Kuwait on 3 October and their team on 8 October, well in advance of the contractual deadlines. By 11 October, we understand that there were over 270 people working for the KBG in Kuwait.

The UK contract is of course much wider in scope than the contracts of most other countries, since it carries broad responsibility for reconstruction in the oil field as well as fire-fighting. The companies have given every assurance that they are committed to doing an excellent job and I am sure that they will do so. I am pleased to hear that their team is now in Kuwait and I am confident that we may now look forward to the successful implementation of this important contract.

[A - A]

~~I am pleased to confirm that BP are re-formulating their proposals, which will be, as far as possible, within the framework of their long-standing technical services agreement with the Kuwait Oil Company. I understand that their team are now returning to Kuwait to take forward discussions with the Kuwait Oil Company.~~ They recognise the importance of an agreement which enables them to assist you in rebuilding Kuwait's oil industry, and I am confident that they will try to resolve outstanding issues in a constructive manner.

I welcomed Your Highness's wish for British companies to assist in the reconstruction of Kuwait's naval base. We in Britain have considerable experience in this field, and I know that our companies will do an excellent job. Alan Thomas, Head of Defence Export Services, discussed this important project with His Highness the Crown Prince and His Excellency the Defence Minister in Kuwait last week, and he will shortly be following this up with a letter to the Kuwait Ministry of Defence.

HEAD OF DEFENCE EXPORT SERVICES

D/HDES/1/29

7 October 1991

Secretary of State

Copy to:

PS/Minister(AF)	CDP
PS/Minister(DP)	COSSEC
PS/US of S(AF)	MEA
PS/US of S(DP)	FCO - AUS(ME)
PUS	

VISIT TO KUWAIT 29 SEPTEMBER - 1 OCTOBER

I made a short visit to Kuwait last week to see the Prime Minister, Sheikh Sa'ad; the Defence Minister Sheikh Ali Sabah; KMOD Under Secretary Faisal Daoud and former Finance Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa. I was accompanied by HMA and RMD1.

The purpose of my visit was to progress our important defence sales interests, notably: Active Skyflash; air defence recommendations made following our ADAT Study; tanks and APC's; and the reconstruction of the naval base.

I was again warmly received, especially by the Crown Prince. He is keen to see the UK receives its due share of defence contracts. The main outcomes of my meetings were:

(i) At Sheikh Sa'ad's instruction, Active Skyflash will be discussed by the Higher Defence Council this week. BAe has offered to provide a credit package. The main Kuwaiti concerns are:

a. how many other users are there likely to be?

b. how quickly will the Americans allow integration?

(ii) Sheikh Sa'ad was enthusiastic about Starburst as a readily available and low cost method of protecting the West Base after the arrival of the F18's, and as part of a phased air defence programme. The Kuwaitis now await an invitation from Shorts to send a team to the UK for discussions.

(iii) I reminded Sheikh Sa'ad of our selection of Challenger II. He and Sheikh Ali agreed that an invitation should be issued to KMOD to send officers to the UK in November to witness trials. I acknowledged that Vickers may be asked to negotiate a buy-back of the Kuwaitis Yugoslavian M84 tanks. I explained to both Ministers that our British Advisory Team's study called for 300 MBT and 600 APC's and the British armoured brigade concept would simplify training and logistics. The Kuwaitis are keen on Piranha (manufactured by GKN under licence) and have subsequently told our Ambassador that early delivery of Piranha is the key: if they opt for Piranha, they will also choose Challenger.

(iv) The Defence Minister and Under Secretary confirmed that the reconstruction of the naval base will be allocated to the UK.

More generally, we pressed the case for the British studies by ADAT and the BAT. The Kuwaitis are awaiting similar proposals from the Americans due at the turn of the year. It will be difficult to make progress unless we have a permanent presence in country.

Finally we agreed that now that the Kuwaitis had signed their agreement with the Americans, they would focus on the UK Defence Cooperation Agreement. Having settled that, we would then be ready to discuss the defence equipment MOU. Quite clearly, credit will be an essential element in the early years. The Head of ECGD will shortly be visiting Kuwait.

Alan Thomas

KUWAIT: visits by Amin Dec '82

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CC PC

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S.W.O.V.

THE RT HON JOHN WAKEHAM MP

Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE
071 238 3290

Barry Potter Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

15 October 1991

Dear Barry,

only record attached

My Secretary of State was concerned to see the critical remarks made by the Amir of Kuwait to the Foreign Secretary, and subsequently to the Prime Minister, about the involvement of the Kuwait British Group (KBG) and BP in the reconstruction of Kuwait. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Trade and Industry have briefed in detail. Not yet

As your office is aware, my Secretary of State does not believe that the Amir's comments have been fair.

As far as BP are concerned, their proposals were made in response to a formal request from the Kuwaiti Petroleum Minister and are designed to help the Kuwaitis in formulating their own reconstruction strategy. BP have never sought an equity share in Kuwait petroleum production although they are seeking reasonable remuneration based on the opportunity cost of the resources which they are putting in. We understand that BP negotiators have returned to Kuwait and that they are optimistic about the outcome.

As far as the Kuwait British Group is concerned, the fact is that they have made excellent progress and indeed are ahead of schedule in carrying out their contract for firefighting and restoration work which was signed on 4 September. It was entirely the fault of the Kuwaitis that the negotiations were so long and difficult and that a contract was not signed sooner. Obviously it is unfair to compare the KBG's performance with that of other contractors, who were mobilised, in some cases, before the end of the hostilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

My Secretary of State feels that it is important that we should continue to give both these initiatives all possible encouragement.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO), Martin Stanley (DTI) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours
John

J S NEILSON
Principal Private Secretary

SUBJECT MASTER

Filed on:

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Sh
ack

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1991

Dear Christopher,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE AMIR OF KUWAIT: 4 OCTOBER

Thank you for the briefing which you provided for the call on the Prime Minister by the Amir of Kuwait, which took place this morning. Mr. Hogg and David Gore-Booth were present.

The Amir said that things in Kuwait were gradually getting back to normal. It would take longer to achieve the psychological adjustment than material re-building. 540 oil well fires had been put out and if things went well, all the oil well fires would be under control by the end of the year. The Amir formally invited the Prime Minister to visit Kuwait.

The Amir went on to raise the two issues which he had discussed yesterday with the Foreign Secretary: the British Kuwait Fire Group and BP. He spoke in similar terms to those recorded in your letter of 3 October.

The Amir went on to say that he had sent some points to the Prime Minister for consideration about a defence agreement. He was keen to have British companies bid for the reconstruction of Kuwait's naval base. He wanted British companies to secure the contract and would approach them before approaching any other companies so that they would have an advantage.

The Amir said that the British City Kuwait Group had made a tender, on compensation business, of $60 million. They had later halved their tender to $30 million, but other companies had bid at half that level. The Amir was very keen that British companies should secure this business but their bid had been way above that of the market.

Finally, the Amir raised the question of detainees in Iraq. The continued detention of Kuwaiti citizens had a big, adverse psychological impact. He hoped Britain would continue to press for their release.

The Prime Minister said we were doing all we could do in respect of the detainees and would continue to do so. We had no intention of letting the matter drop either in the UN or more directly. He wanted to see those concerned brought home. Iraq had cheated, lied and sought to obstruct the work of the United

CONFIDENTIAL

Nations on every occasion, especially over its nuclear establishment. This was not acceptable to us

(a) because the security of the whole region was at stake
(b) because if Iraq got away with it, others might follow suit.

So we would continue to take a very tough line. We were determined that Iraq should abide to the letter by the resolutions of the UN Security Council, whatever it took to achieve that. Iraq was in no doubt that we would not budge. So far, on each occasion, they had backed down. We would ensure that that continued.

The Prime Minister said he was sorry to hear what the Amir had to say about the British Kuwait Fire Group and about BP. The BKFG were determined to do a good job and would do so. The first team was due in Kuwait next week and the second a week later.

The Prime Minister said he was puzzled at what the Amir had to say about BP. BP accepted that this was a matter of great sensitivity. They were re-formulating their proposals. Their negotiating team would be returning to Kuwait shortly to discuss with the Kuwait Oil Company proposals which, as far as possible, would be within the framework of the longstanding Technical Services Agreement. There would be no problem of substance or attitude from BP and the Prime Minister hoped the difficulties could be resolved speedily and to mutual satisfaction. Both the Prime Minister and BP were aware of the immense importance of an agreement and of the need for sensitivity and a modern outlook. The Prime Minister expected that attitude to be shown. We could not allow the relationship between our two countries to be upset.

The Prime Minister said he was very pleased to hear what the Amir had had to say about the naval base and hoped that a satisfactory conclusion could be reached. He had been sorry to hear what the Amir had to say about the City Kuwait Group. Mr. Gore-Booth said that there had in fact been a big gap in the bids but the British companies remained interested.

The Prime Minister said that he had read the Amir's speech at the UN. It had been well timed and very welcome. We welcomed the Amir's commitment to elections to the National Assembly next October. The extraordinary events of the last year had put Kuwait in the world's eye, so people would be pleased to see the direction of policy. The other aspect of the situation was that any difficulties were observed and magnified and it was all the more important to examine them carefully. The fact that the Amir was taking a direct and positive interest would encourage people to have confidence that the right changes would happen. As one of Kuwait's oldest friends, we welcomed those developments.

Finally, the Prime Minister thanked the Amir for his invitation to visit Kuwait. He hoped to be able to go there at a mutually agreeable time.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Hogg if he wanted to add anything and Mr. Hogg raised the issue of the treatment of Palestinians in Kuwait. They had been there a long time and had nowhere else to go. Their well-being was a matter of concern to the international community and a generous approach would be admired elsewhere in the world.

The Amir said this was a very difficult issue. As regards those rights and remunerations that were within the control of the Government of Kuwait, then what was necessary either had been done or would be done. But people felt very bitterly about what had happened and he could not force people to give the Palestinians work. Kuwait had spent $1½ million on remuneration for Palestinians and others but he reiterated that reaction against the Palestinians ran very deep and was very difficult to mend. The Prime Minister said that he understood that, but he hoped it would be possible to deal with the problem. The Amir said that he, for his part, had raised a number of problems out of his wish to maintain a close and frank relationship with Britain. The Prime Minister said that he understood and appreciated that.

The Amir agreed with the Prime Minister's assessment of Iraq. The present regime would manoeuvre to gain time in the belief that the attitude of the international community would change. Saddam Hussain hoped things would work to his own interest. The Prime Minister agreed. That was why we were not prepared to give an inch at the United Nations. We wanted Iraq's nuclear installations removed as soon as possible. The Prime Minister had told President Bush, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the EC leaders that Iraq could not come back into the international community while the present regime remained. The Amir said that the whole of the region would feel unsafe while Saddam Hussain's regime remained in power.

Follow-up

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Gore-Booth to talk to BP in the light of his meeting with the Amir. I have been in touch with the DTI about the British Kuwait Fire Group. The Prime Minister would like a bomb put under them.

The Prime Minister would also like to be sure that we follow up the opportunities that have been given us to compete for the reconstruction of the naval base. He thinks it important that British companies tender in a realistic way. He thinks the performance of the City Kuwait Group reflects very badly on them. He has asked that Mr. Lilley continue to take a close personal interest in this matter.

The Prime Minister would like to write next week to the Amir setting out where we stand on these commendations - BP and the BKFG. If he can say anything about British companies' interest in the naval base, the Prime Minister would like to do so.

I should be grateful if the DTI could, in consultation with the FCO, let me have a draft.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), and John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

Stephen

(J. S. WALL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

Two FCO briefs for tomorrow's call at 0830 are attached.

The Amir will arrive accompanied by a group of about 10 children whose parents are still detained in Iraq. They will leave after a short photocall.

The main issues you will wish to cover are:

(i) threat from Iraq; our continuing commitment to ensure destruction of Iraq's NBC capacity

(ii) the tragic plight of Kuwaitis still missing in Iraq

(iii) security structures for the region

(iv) human rights issues

(v) commercial issues including responding to the two points which the Amir raised with the Foreign Secretary earlier today.

Stephen

J.S. Wall
3 October 1991
c: amir (MJ)

(1) Inv. to Kuwait.

BP
Flow to work.

0/0

CCPC
Bup

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

3 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

Retainers

Call on the Prime Minister by the Amir of Kuwait: 4 October

The Prime Minister should be aware, in advance of his meeting with the Amir at 0830 on 4 October, that the Amir complained to the Foreign Secretary when they met this afternoon about:

(a) the performance of the British Kuwait Fire Group (BKFG), which he described as dilatory;

(b) the approach of BP to a new contract with the Kuwait Oil Company, which he described as reminiscent of the 1950s and unacceptable.

/ I enclose a copy of the full record of the meeting. It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could respond to these points as follows:

- The Foreign Secretary has told me of the two concerns you raised with him:

(a) First, the British Kuwait Fire Group are determined to do a good job: the first team is due in Kuwait on 7 October and the second a week later.

Reputation

(b) Second, can assure you that BP are in no way trying to go back to the 1950s : they accept that this is a matter of great sensitivity within Kuwait and they are in the process of reformulating their proposals: their negotiating team will be returning to Kuwait shortly in order to discuss with Kuwait Oil Company proposals which will be as far as possible within the framework of their long-standing Technical Services Agreement.

Very keen

The background on these points is as follows:

(a) In fact the BKFG has been slow, its approach uncoordinated and its representatives too junior: there is a possibility of some embarrassment but HMA Kuwait has now been assured that the BKFG is going as fast as possible.

RESTRICTED

Visit

Total Reparations $60m. – $30m

Peace Agreement – Observation to be sent to me.

Bucas. Naval Base. – early contact to give them adv.

(b) BP are under attack by opponents in Kuwait: the Kuwaiti Oil Minister made a tendentious speech last week accusing BP of colonialist intentions: this startled BP as much as anybody.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON AMIR OF KUWAIT: 3 OCTOBER
SUMMARY

1. In a 30-minute courtesy call on Shaikh Jabir the Secretary of State covered:
- Kuwaiti detainees in Iraq: Shaikh Jabir said this was his top priority. The Secretary of State said the Allies remained committed to making Iraq fulfil their obligations.
- Iraq: Shaikh Jabir said no country in the region could feel safe while Saddam Hussein remained in power.
- Jordan: Shaikh Jabir showed continuing hostility to King Hussein for his support for Saddam Hussein.
- Financing of SCR 687: Shaikh Jabir agreed to consider a UN approach for further funds.
- Kuwait internal: the Amir confirmed that elections would be held on time in October 1992.
- Regional security: Shaikh Jabir said that GCC discussions were going in the right direction, albeit slowly. Kuwait's right to conclude bilateral arrangements was accepted by GCC partners. A

P OFFICE C N R PRENTICE 2069

Gulf 3/x

Kuwaiti response would be forthcoming soon on the draft UK/Kuwait bilateral defence agreement.

- Bilateral: Shaikh Jabir had two complaints: the slow pace of work by the British/Kuwait Fire Group and the unacceptable 1950s-style BP approach to their oil contract negotiations with Kuwait.

DETAIL

2. The Secretary of State called on the Amir at the Conrad Hotel, Chelsea Harbour for 30 minutes on 3 October, accompanied by David Gore-Booth. Shaikh Sabah al Ahmed and Abdulrahman Al Atiqi were present on the Kuwait side. Shaikh Jabir looked well and was in sparky form.

KUWAIT DETAINEES

3. After congratulating the Amir on Kuwait's progress since the hostilities, the Secretary of State asked what his priorities now were. Shaikh Jabir described at length his personal concern, shared by many in Kuwait, over the fate of the Kuwaitis still held in Iraq. He confirmed that they had no clear information about their fate but it appeared that those who were still ~~alive and~~ being held were constantly moved around by the Iraqis.

IRAQ

4. The Secretary of State said that the return of Kuwaitis to Kuwait was part of the obligations which the international community had imposed on Iraq. We had all undertaken to help bring about their return. The sanctions regime against Iraq had again recently been confirmed. He had spoken to Ekeus in New York. Ekeus' teams would continue their work against Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. No-one, either in the region or outside, would feel safe while Saddam Hussein retained any WMD capacity. Shaikh Jabir agreed. No-one could feel safe in the region while Saddam Hussein remained in power.

JORDAN

5. ~~Arising out of~~ In answer to a question ~~by~~ from the Secretary of State about

other Arab states' attitude to Saddam Hussein, Shaikh Jabir said that ~~revealed clearly that he retained considerable animosity to King Hussein to the stance he took during the Gulf conflict.~~ those countries which had stood with Kuwait remained steadfast against Saddam Hussein. ~~some of those~~ Others who had supported Saddam Hussein were now trying to mend fences, but he doubted whether the people of Kuwait were psychologically prepared to accept such approaches. The Secretary of State said that he presumed the Amir was referring to King Hussein. The King had changed his position but found it difficult to admit this publicly. He depended on the understanding of his Arab brothers for this difficult position, though some of what he wrote and said did not help achieve this. Shaikh Jabir said firmly that it was not as simple as that: one could not understand a man who ~~is~~ was hostile in public but all sweetness in private.

FINANCING OF SCR 687

6. The Secretary of State described the UN's difficulties in financing the special commission and other important aspects of SCR 687, until Iraqi funds became available. A further UN approach to Kuwait and others for temporary financing was likely. He would be grateful if the Amir could consider personally what might be done to ensure that this vital work was able to continue. Shaikh Jabir noted that the Secretary General had not raised this with him in New York but said that he would consider a request when made. The Secretary of State said that the problem had arisen only very recently.

KUWAIT INTERNAL

7. The Secretary of State said that there was certain to be interest in Parliament when the new session opened about progress in Kuwait towards the elections which the Amir had announced for October 1992. He understood that there had been some difficulties with the electoral roll and ~~the~~ computers, which the Iraqis had stolen. But he hoped that he could assure

the House of Commons that the elections were on track for October 1992. Shaikh Jabir said that they had taken these expected difficulties into account in setting the date and confirmed that the elections would be held on time. The Secretary of State said that this would be very welcome to Kuwait's friends.

REGIONAL SECURITY

8. In answer to a question, Shaikh Jabir said that the GCC discussions on collective security arrangements were going in the right direction, if slowly. But it was accepted in the GCC that each member state ~~country~~ was allowed to conclude bilateral arrangements. These would ~~were~~ not be at the expense of any collective arrangements within the GCC. Shaikh Jabir volunteered that a reply - quote some comments unquote - on the UK draft for a bilateral defence agreement would be passed to us shortly. The Secretary of State welcomed this and undertook to consider these quickly: we were keen to renew this aspect of our relationship.

BILATERAL

9. In answer to a question about Kuwaiti oil production, Shaikh Jabir registered two complaints:

(i) the Kuwait/British Fire Group had been slow to get up and running. He hoped they could speed up, since, in view of our historical relationship, he wanted the Kuwait people to see that British companies were as good as the Americans in this field.

(ii) British Petroleum. Kuwait had asked BP to bid for a management contract for the Kuwait oil sector. They wanted BP to have this contract because of their past experience. They were not negotiating with anyone else. BP, however, had put in an offer which was entirely unacceptable and reminded the Kuwaitis of the mentality of the 1950s. BP should realise that times had changed. The Secretary of State said that he knew BP were very keen to help Kuwait ~~through~~ with this contract. He undertook to contact the Chairman immediately and see what might be done (David Gore-Booth is pursuing).

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

HURD

YYYY
MAIN
IRAQ/KUWAIT

NNNN

cc B'op
PC

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

3 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Amir of Kuwait :
4 October 1991

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Shaikh Jaber, the Amir of Kuwait, at 0830 on Friday, 4 October. The Amir will have received courtesy calls, at his hotel, by the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary on the same day. We understand that Mrs Thatcher will be calling on the Amir at 0915 am on 4 October; he will then see The Queen at 1100 before leaving for Paris to see M Mitterrand before returning to Kuwait.

/ The Amir (personality note enclosed) was last in Britain on a private visit in October 1990, and saw Mrs Thatcher. The Prime Minister called on him in Taif on 7 January. He was still in Taif when the Prime Minister visited Kuwait on 6 March: so the Prime Minister met the Crown Prince, Shaikh Saad, in his stead.

The Amir will be accompanied by the Kuwaiti Ambassador in London, Mr Ghazi al Rayes, and an interpreter. He will also bring with him to No 10 a group of children of Kuwaitis still detained in Iraq. They will leave after a short photo-call. On our side, Mr Hogg and David Gore-Booth could attend the meeting if required.

/This visit

This visit comes towards the end of a tour by the Amir to the capitals of the Arab and Western states who did most to help Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion. The Amir met President Bush in Washington on 1 October (Washington telno 2510, copy enclosed). He also visited New York where he thanked the United Nations General Assembly for their help in restoring Kuwait's independence.

Our Ambassador in Kuwait reports that Kuwait today is unrecognizable as the country which the Prime Minister visited in March. While the situation remains far from normal, two thirds of the oil fires have been extinguished, and oil production and refining have restarted. By the end of the year it is hoped that all the oil fires will be out, that production will have risen to 500,000 barrels per day, and that refining capacity will comfortably meet domestic demand. Public services have been largely restored, and the Government seems to have reasserted its authority. There is no disputing the magnitude of what has been achieved, though some would say this was despite rather than because of the efforts of the Government. The Amir has begun to play a more active political role, though he continues to leave the day to day running of the country in the hands of the Crown Prince.

British companies have not secured as large a slice of the Kuwait reconstruction business as had been hoped, though over £474 million of contracts have been obtained so far. This includes a contract for extinguishing and rehabilitating burning oil wells, worth approximately £50 million, awarded in September to a joint venture consortium, the Kuwait British Group. The Prime Minister

 /wrote to

wrote to the Crown Prince, Shaikh Sa'ad, on 17 September to express appreciation (though the contract was much smaller than had originally been hoped). The window of opportunity for reconstruction business is unlikely to last beyond the end of the year at most, after which Kuwait is expected to revert to the £250 million a year pre-war market. Mr Sainsbury will lead a group of businessmen to the "Rebuild Kuwait" Exhibition being held in Bahrain in November. The Prime Minister may wish to say:

- I would ask you to give particular attention to the following British bids:

  - The Anglo/Kuwait Loss Adjustment Group (AKLAG) proposal for assessing compensation for the public sector (worth up to US$2 million). The City has evolved expertise in this area, and indeed it controls 75 per cent of world insurance business.

  - The Tarmac/WS Atkins World Recovery Proposal for clearing up the oil lakes and converting the residue into tarmac (contract worth US$500 million and value to Kuwait of the recovered material standing at US$1.5 billion). Tarmac, as their name suggest, have unique capability in this area. (The Kuwaiti Oil Company are currently considering their bid).

  - GEC/Plessey Telecommunications (GPT) are keen to bid for the large tender for static telephone exchanges which the Ministry of Communications are expected to issue shortly. (Background: Although GPT were awarded a contract for one mobile exchange (£3 million), they were not invited to bid for a

further four exchanges, which were awarded to Alcatel. We wish to make sure that GPT are invited to bid for the further, much bigger, static exchange contract.)

In his meeting with the Prime Minister the Amir can be expected to express his gratitude to Britain for our commitment to a free Kuwait, and in particular for our substantial military contribution to the coalition forces. He may propose to pay compensation to families of deceased British servicemen, in which case the Prime Minister will clearly wish to welcome the proposal (but he should not raise it).

The Amir is also likely to express concern about the remaining Kuwaiti prisoners of war and others still missing in Iraq (of whom we believe there are over 2,000). This is arguably the single most important issue in Kuwaiti minds

Addressing the UNGA in New York, the Amir referred to it as a blatant violation by Iraq of Security Council Resolutions, and appealed to the conscience of the world to ensure the freedom of these prisoners. In this context the Amir is likely to refer to the continued threat posed by Saddam Hussain. The Prime Minister may wish to reassure him that we intend to see through the task of removing Iraq's capacity to deploy weapons of mass destruction; and to secure full Iraqi compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. He might say:

/- Iraq's

- Iraq's obstruction of UN inspections is intolerable. We are determined to ensure that Iraq will never again threaten its neighbours with weapons of mass destruction. Cannot rule out the use of force, if Saddam continues to defy the UN Security Council. If this becomes necessary we know we will be able to count on support (both political and, if necessary, practical) from Kuwait;

- We will maintain the pressure on Iraq (including economic sanctions) to comply with all its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The tragic plight of Kuwaitis still missing in Iraq is a particularly important omission by the Iraqis. We have emphasised this point this week in the latest review in the Security Council of the sanctions regime and Iraq's compliance.

Discussions within the GCC and between the Gulf States and Egypt and Syria (G8) have made little progress in establishing new security structures for the region. But all participants remain committed to closer economic, political and defence cooperation. The GCC Summit in December will consider an Omani proposal for a joint GCC force of 100,000 men (which has attracted little support) and the Saudi preference for looser coordination between expanded national forces. Meanwhile the Kuwaitis propose to rely on their recent defence co-operation agreement with the US and a similar agreement under discussion with us (they also have hopes of negotiating an arrangement with the French). Neither we nor the US are willing to commit ourselves to more than consultations in time of need. The Prime Minister might say:

/- it is

- it is important that the States of the region develop effective security arrangements for the region to deter future potential aggressors. We are ready to support and underpin these arrangements;

- to this end we hope that early progress can be made in negotiating an umbrella bilateral defence co-operation agreement. We gave the Kuwaitis our suggested draft in July. Signature would open the way for more detailed agreements on other defence-related issues.

- know that General de la Billière was talking yesterday with Shaikh Ali (the Kuwait Defence Minister) about the defence agreement and other matters: we are ready to send a British Military Mission to Kuwait.

It is possible that the Amir may touch on the question of human rights in Kuwait, on which he attempted to set the record straight in his recent address to the UN General Assembly. The two main points at issue have been the ill-treatment of alleged collaborators (including many Palestinians) after liberation and the "collaboration trials" which handed down 29 death sentences, all subsequently commuted to life imprisonment; and the status of non-Kuwaitis, many of whom are being forced out of the country as a matter of policy. We and our EC Partners have repeatedly expressed our concern on both issues to the Kuwaitis, and, though some abuses continue, the situation has improved. Related to this issue is the Amir's commitment to elections in October 1992, and to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. President Bush did not apparently go into any detail on Kuwaiti domestic issues during his meeting with the Amir. But in public the

~~Professor~~

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President did refer to US hopes for expanded political participation in Kuwait in the freest possible atmosphere.

The Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will say:

- We welcome the Amir's commitment to elections to the National Assembly in October next year and stress the importance of carrying this through. We hope that the Kuwaitis will consider a relaxation of censorship in the run-up to the elections.

- We acknowledge that the treatment of Palestinians and other detainees has improved in recent months, but there are still disturbing signs of isolated abuses. We know the Amir shares our concern about this problem. It is also important that foreigners leaving the country should be fairly treated; the Amir will no doubt be aware of representations which we and our EC partners have made on this point in recent months.

- We hope Kuwait will act with particular care towards those foreign residents who have nowhere else to go, eg Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Stephen Speed (DTI).

Yours ever,
Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

39. HH SHAIKH JABIR AL AHMAD AL JABIR AL SABAH GCMG

Amir of Kuwait.

Born 1926. Traditional local education only. Public Security Department, with responsibility for Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) area 1950–56. Ruler's representative with the KOC and Aminoil 1956–59. President of the Finance Department, the Housing Department, the Civil Service Commission and the General Oil Affairs Office 1959–62. Minister of Finance and Economy 1962–63. Minister of Finance and Industry 1963–65. Prime Minister from December 1965. Named Heir Apparent May 1966, and became Amir on the death of Shaikh Sabah al Salim on 31 December 1977.

As a young man drew attention to himself by his energy, ability and ambition. From at least the early 60s, when he became Finance Minister, has always been a major political figure in Kuwait. When Crown Prince, was often responsible for running the country during the then Amir's long periods of absence and was regarded as the controlling hand. Respected for his administrative ability, but sometimes criticised as hard and remote. His authority appears unquestioned. Closely involved in all major Government decisions, and said to have a keen grasp of day-to-day Government business.

Was responsible for the decisions to dissolve the Assembly both in 1976 (when he was Crown Prince and Prime Minister) and in 1986. But in the latter case at least appears to have acted with genuine regret at being forced to take this step by the behaviour of Assembly members which was causing the government serious embarrassment in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Married many times, with many children. Avoids ostentation, and is said to be a devout Muslim.

Survived an attempt on his life by Shiite extremists in 1985.

Understands English, can speak it, but prefers to speak Arabic. Survived an air crash in the 70's and hates flying. After a long period with few absences from Kuwait, 1989 saw him undertake several foreign trips, including state visits to Egypt and France.

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INFO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT
INFO PRIORITY OTHER GULF POSTS, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK

AMIR OF KUWAIT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 1 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. DURING A BRIEF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE AMIR ASKED FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN KUWAIT. THE PRESIDENT URGED KUWAIT TO BUILD ON THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION. ONLY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF KUWAITI DOMESTIC ISSUES (AND NONE OF KUWAITI DETAINEES) BUT BOTH COVERED IN PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE AMIR OF KUWAIT MADE A FOUR-HOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 1 OCTOBER. HIS ONLY ENGAGEMENT WAS A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT WHICH, BECAUSE OF PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE, LASTED ONLY 20 MINUTES. WE HAVE OBTAINED A READOUT FROM NSC AND STATE DEPARTMENT.

3. THE AMIR'S MAIN CONCERN WAS THE SECURITY OF KUWAIT. HE ASKED THAT THE US BATTALION-STRENGTH FORCE, CURRENTLY DUE TO LEAVE KUWAIT IN LATE DECEMBER, BE RETAINED UNTIL FEBRUARY 1992. THE PRESIDENT WAS NON-COMMITTAL. HE ASKED THE AMIR ABOUT FOLLOW-UP TO THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION. THE AMIR WAS RELATIVELY UPBEAT ABOUT KUWAITI CONTACTS WITH BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD OFFERED WHATEVER TROOPS HE NEEDED IN KUWAIT: HE WAS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING HIS RESPONSE.

4. STATE AND NSC COMMENTED TO US THAT THIS DID NOT SQUARE WITH REPORTS WHICH THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM CAIRO AND DAMASCUS. SO FAR AS THEY WERE AWARE THE KUWAITIS HAD TAKEN NO PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS ESTABLISHING AN EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN SECURITY PRESENCE.

5. HAASS (NSC) TOLD THE MINISTER THAT HE HOPED WE MIGHT REINFORCE WITH THE AMIR THAT, IN THE LONGER TERM, THE US AND WESTERN PRESENCE IN THE GULF WAS BOUND TO BE OVER THE HORIZON RATHER THAN ON THE SPOT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS UP TO THE KUWAITIS TO WORK

OUT PROPER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE GULF WITH OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS. HAASS ADDED THAT HE DID NOT RULE OUT A FURTHER SHORT EXTENSION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN KUWAIT, BUT REPEATED THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF A LONG TERM US PRESENCE.

6. THE AMIR DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF KUWAITIS DETAINED IN IRAQ. BUT NSC WERE WELL AWARE OF THE AMIR'S CONCERN. THEY INCLUDED A PASSAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE MEETING WHICH CONDEMNED IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO FREE THE MANY KUWAITIS HELD IN IRAQ AND CALLED FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE (FULL TEXT BY FAX TO GIRDLESTONE, MED). THE AMIR BROUGHT WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON THE TEN CHILDREN OF DETAINED KUWAITIS, BUT THEY DID NOT VISIT THE WHITE HOUSE. (THEY WERE RECEIVED SEPARATELY BY ELIZABETH DOLE, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS).

7. THE PRESIDENT BARELY TOUCHED ON KUWAITI DOMESTIC ISSUES. HE DID, HOWEVER, ENCOURAGE THE AMIR TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO IMPROVE KUWAIT'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. NSC TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS BRIEFED TO URGE THE AMIR TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON THE KUWAITI PRESS AS THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF IMPROVING KUWAIT'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. ACCORDING TO HAASS, THE PRESIDENT CHOSE NOT TO DO SO. BUT THE PRESIDENTS' STATEMENT INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO KUWAIT'S ENDEAVOURS TO EXPAND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND US HOPES THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD DEVELOP QUOTE IN THE FREEST POSSIBLE ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE (NSC CODE FOR A FREE PRESS).

8. STATE AND NSC SAID THAT, DESPITE THE BREVITY OF THE MEETING, THE ATMOSPHERICS HAD BEEN GOOD AND THE AMIR APPEARED SATISFIED WITH RESTATEMENTS OF US SUPPORT FOR KUWAIT.

RENWICK

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MR WALL

SUGGESTED PRESS LINE; KUWAITI CHILDREN

The FCO News Department have phoned through the following proposed line:

> ICRC conducting negotiations between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi authorities to try to secure the early release of missing Kuwaitis.
>
> Security Council determined to maintain sanctions regime until Iraq has fully complied with requirements of SCR 687 and other relevant Resolutions (this includes the need to return Kuwaiti prisoners).
>
> Security Council met on 2 October to review the sanctions regime and concluded that Iraq was still in serious breach of its obligations. Sanctions therefore remain in place.
>
> We continue to press the Iraqi authorities for full compliance of SCRs, including the return of these missing Kuwaitis.

Peter

PETER BEAN
3 October 1991

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

To: STEPHEN WALL PS/PM

SECRETARY OF STATE'S
PRIVATE OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1E 6RB

TELEPHONE
071-215 5425

FAX NUMBER
071-215 5468

From: Stephen Speed

Date: 2/Oct/91

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW 1

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DATE _____

Stephen,

My note to SoS re MoT & Kuwait for information as promised.

Steve

PEFAX

SECRETARY OF STATE

file

I heard from Stephen Wall at No 10 this morning that the Amir of Kuwait, who is in London later this week to see the Prime Minister, will also see Mrs Thatcher. It is believed he will invite her to visit Kuwait.

Mrs Thatcher's office tell me that she has decided to wait until she has seen the Amir before responding to your letter about the possible establishment of and an Anglo Kuwait Group. Apparently, she intends to contact you by telephone sometime next week. If you like, I will call her office on Monday to try arrange a time for a phone call.

I should add, for information, much of the agitation for this seems to be coming from Mr Bitu Bahalla (whose idea the whole scheme was originally). He has been in touch with Stephen Wall at No 10 several times over the last couple of days and, I suspect, with Mrs Thatcher's office too.

STEPHEN

2 October 1991

cc: Mr Adams
Mr Vinall
Mr Anisfeld Sp Adv

PE10062

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Stephen

I have asked if Mrs T could see him at 9.45 so that we fall the 9.00 slot. Will let you know if this is the programme they think can be changed for this, but will confirm.

S 1/10

Have we now fixed a time?

Stephen

P.A

S 3/10

cc PC

B'op

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 October 1991

Dear Stephen,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Emir of Kuwait

We spoke this morning about the consequences of the Delors/Lubbers meeting at 1530 on 3 October for the planned call on the Prime Minister by the Emir of Kuwait. As I passed to the Duty Clerk this morning, the only alternative time for the Emir of Kuwait to call on the Prime Minister is on the morning of 4 October before 1015. The Emir has an audience with The Queen at 1100 and will then fly to Paris, for an appointment with President Mitterrand that afternoon.

I have now heard that a call by the Emir that morning may not be possible in the Prime Minister's diary. I would be grateful if we could have a word about this.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

FILE

SR

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1991

Dear Christopher,

VISIT OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO LONDON

Thank you for your letter of 20 September about the forthcoming visit of the Amir of Kuwait.

Abide by rearranging his programe, with some difficulty, the Prime Minister can see the Amir for <u>half an hour</u> at 1545 on Thursday 3 October.

I should be grateful for a brief to reach me by Wednesday 2 October.

Yours,
Stephen

(J. S. WALL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister
Only possible at the expense of speechwriting time for Party Conference.
45 minutes at 15.45 on 3 October?
or
Plead diary + regret on this occasion (Mrs Hogg's preference).

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

20 September 1991

No I should see their Cor 1/2 hr.

Dear Stephen,

Visit of the Amir of Kuwait to London

Our Ambassador in Kuwait has been told that the Amir is hoping to make a short private visit to London on 3 October on his way back from the United Nations' General Assembly in New York. The Amir has asked whether the Prime Minister would be able to see him. He has also asked about the possibility of an audience with HM The Queen on 4 October.

The Prime Minister last saw the Amir in Taif on 7 January, ie before the liberation of Kuwait. We believe that the main purpose of his call would be to thank us formally for helping in the liberation of Kuwait. During the proposed visit, the Amir has also asked whether he could meet the families of British soldiers killed in Operation Desert Storm. It is understood that this might involve the award of some sort of compensation to those families. It is expected that the Amir will call on President Bush in Washington on 25 September.

The Prime Minister has no firm FCO commitments from 26 September to 10 October. You are considering a request for a call from Mr Rutskoi, the Russian Vice President, in the period 22-25 September. We have not consulted the Foreign Secretary but I am confident that, if the Prime Minister was willing and had the time to fit in a short meeting with the Amir, the Foreign Secretary would welcome this. A meeting with the Amir would allow him to give appropriate recognition of our contribution to the liberation of his country. It would also help our considerable Commercial and Defence Sales interests in Kuwait.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Stephen Speed (DTI).

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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(c: 1 foreign/cons)
bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 June 1991

Dear Christopher,

CROWN PRINCE OF KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 25 June containing briefing for the call which the Crown Prince of Kuwait made on the Prime Minister this afternoon. Our Ambassador, Michael Weston, was also present.

The Crown Prince conveyed the good wishes of the Amir and the gratitude of the Kuwaiti people. They particularly appreciated the excellent work of the British forces in helping to liberate Kuwait.

The Prime Minister said he understood that the Crown Prince had discussed with Mrs Thatcher the idea of her playing a part in a high level Anglo-European Group. The Crown Prince said that he had told Mrs Thatcher that Kuwait would discuss this idea. (Comment: I think the way is now open for the Prime Minister's letter to the Amir to issue. I enclose it and would be grateful if you would arrange its delivery.)

The Crown Prince said things were returning to normal in Kuwait. 70-80 per cent of the Kuwaiti people had returned. Kuwaitis were returning daily from other Gulf states. Free flights from Egypt and Syria would be operating for another month. Oil production would be resumed very soon at about 35-50,000 barrels per day for a start. As regards Palestinians, there had at the beginning been some cases [of reprisals] but not any more and their extent had been exaggerated by the media.

The Prime Minister acknowledged that there was always a danger of these issues being blown up. It was very important, given the tremendous affection for Kuwait around the world, that Kuwait should be seen to be acting generously and openly. The more open the judicial process could be the better. The Crown Prince said that most of the cases before the courts were minor ones. Twenty-nine people had been sentenced to death but mostly in absentia. He had decided (only last night) to endorse all the sentences except those for capital punishment. The capital sentences would be commuted to life imprisonment. The Minister of Justice would announce this shortly. The Prime Minister said this would be a very welcome decision which reflected great credit on the Crown Prince and on Kuwait. He agreed with the

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DTS

Crown Prince that we should tell the press (and this was done subsequently by our Press Office and Michael Weston).

The Prime Minister said he was very pleased with the work which British firms had been able to undertake in Kuwait. He understood that the Kuwait British Fire Group had just submitted a damage and remedial work assessment. They would be happy to agree a contract and he hoped that would be possible. A number of senior Ministers had recently visited Kuwait. We were keen to help in the rebuilding. He commended the proposals of the City Kuwait Group on preparing claims for compensation against Iraq. Questioned by Michael Weston, the Crown Prince said the Cabinet would soon take a decision on the establishment of a National Compensation Commission (but he did not say it with great conviction).

The Crown Prince welcomed the Prime Minister's firm statement in the House on Northern Iraq. The Prime Minister said we would stand firm. The Crown Prince commented that Saddam Hussein needed to be squeezed hard every day. He had received a report two days ago on movement by the Iraq Army in the South. The Prime Minister said we would not relax our guard. He described the steps we were taking to ensure that between 400-500 UN guards were on the ground of Iraq by the end of July. The Crown Prince referred to reports that Iraq had refused access to nuclear facilities. The Prime Minister said that we were pressing on this front also and would co-operate with the French and others in neutralising Iraq's nuclear waste.

The meeting ended with the Crown Prince looking forward to promoting close relations in every field. He hoped the Prime Minister would visit Kuwait again soon.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours,

J. S. WALL

Christopher Prentice, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1 2AH

cc PC
blup
Prek

25 June 1991

Prime Minister

Dear Stephen,

Visit of HH Shaikh Sa'ad : Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

The Prime Minister has agreed to receive Shaikh Sa'ad at 1545 on 26 June during his private visit to London for his regular medical check-up. They met briefly at the Gulf Parade on 21 June. Mr Michael Weston, our Ambassador in Kuwait, and Mr Ghazi al Rayes, the Kuwaiti Ambassador will attend. I enclose personality notes on the Crown Prince and on Mr al Rayes.

The Prime Minister previously met the Crown Prince in Kuwait on 6 March immediately following liberation. Shaikh Sa'ad has received a number of British ministers and business teams in Kuwait, including Mr Wakeham, Mr Heseltine and Mr Lilley. The Foreign Secretary will call on Shaikh Sa'ad on 27 June at his London home.

The Kuwaiti Ambassador tells us that the Crown Prince wishes to discuss with the Prime Minister the situation in Iraq and "security measures and cooperation". In addition the Prime Minister will wish to raise human rights in Kuwait and specific opportunities for British firms in Kuwaiti reconstruction.

Iraq

Although much weakened Saddam Hussein's position still appears secure for the time being. We cannot confirm recent reports of an imminent offensive against the Shi'a in the south. We have warned the Iraqis this week of the serious consequences of any renewed repression. In Northern Iraq the Kurds appear to be close to an agreement with the Iraqis. Coalition forces in northern Iraq have been reduced. The United States has agreed to retain forces there until mid-July. We and our coalition partners are looking at the possibility of retaining a rapid deployment force in Turkey. UN underpinning of any Kurdish/Iraqi agreement, strong warnings to the Iraqis and sanctions provide the other elements for deterrence.

/Gulf Security

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Gulf Security and Defence Cooperation

We are committed to keeping the residual element of our battle group in Kuwait until the end of July. The Americans will retain a brigade until September. Efforts by the GCC to build up their own regional security on the basis of the Damascus Declaration of March are making only slow progress. Both we and the Americans have made clear that there is no question of retaining ground troops in the area in the longer term but we are ready to help underpin the GCC with a continuing naval presence, exercises and training. In response to a Kuwaiti request to Mr Weston in May we shall soon put to the Kuwaitis a draft defence cooperation agreement and we are working up proposals to advise the Kuwaitis on reorganisation of their armed forces. Royal Ordnance (with support from 150 men of the Royal Engineers) have started work in mine clearance. If the Kuwaitis need an overall coordinator for this we would be willing to take this on.

Human Rights

Kuwait's reputation is tarnished by continuing reports of ill treatment of minorities, especially Palestinians. Over 300 alleged collaborators with the Iraqi occupation have now appeared before martial law courts, of whom 29 have been sentenced to death (several in absentia). So far as we know none have been sentenced to death for murder. Sentences are subject to review by a panel of 3 senior judges and confirmation by the Crown Prince as Martial Law Administrator. Despite assurances to Mr Weston on 15 June by the Crown Prince that there would be no forcible deportations the ICRC have not been allowed to interview deportees. They have recorded 470 deportations since 9 June. Of these 59 were born in Kuwait and 100 were Iraqis, of whom 42 had asked not to be notified to the Iraqi authorities. It will be important to be able to say that the Prime Minister raised with Shaikh Sa'ad our continuing concerns over the handling of the trials, the death sentences and the deportations. This can be presented to Shaikh Sa'ad in terms of Kuwait's own interest in restoring/protecting its international reputation.

Reconstruction

British firms have so far gained a welcome £200m of contracts. As a result of the export drive led by Ministers we have a high profile. The main contracts are mine clearance (Royal Ordnance - £60m) and the refurbishment of 205 schools (British Council/Laing - £30m). It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could mention our interest in 2 further opportunities:

/The Prime Minister

- The Prime Minister wrote to Shaikh Sa'ad on 27 March in support of the Kuwait British Fire Group (KBFG). KBFG submitted on 23 June a damage and remedial work assessment under a £1.5m contract. Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) appear to be confining fire fighting contracts to US firms. Shaikh Sa'ad appears to be well disposed to British involvement in fire fighting. The Prime Minister may wish to say that he hopes KOC will quickly agree a contract with KBFG to extinguish fires in 80 burning wells in the Sabriya field and to implement their plan for rehabilitating it.

- The City Kuwait Group has made proposals to help Kuwait establish internal machinery to prepare claims for compensation against Iraq to put to the UN Compensation Commission. These were approved by Shaikh Sa'ad but the Kuwaitis have not taken the idea further. The Prime Minister may wish to mention that the City Kuwait Group will shortly visit Kuwait. We hope that the Kuwaitis will make use of their expertise.

/ I enclose a copy of a minute from David Gore-Booth, as we discussed, which records developments over the idea to establish a high-level Anglo-Kuwait Group.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb, Ministry of Defence, and Martin Stanley, DTI.

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

4. H H SHAIKH SA'AD AL ABDULLAH AL SALIM AL SABAH, KCMG

Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

Born 1928. A son of the late Amir Abdullah. Educated in Kuwait. Police Department 1945–53. Hendon Police College 1953–54. Deputy Head of Town Police 1954–59. Deputy President of Police and Public Security Department 1959–61. President of Police and Public Security Department 1961–62. Minister of Interior 1962–4. Minister of Interior and Defence 1964–78. Nominated Crown Prince by the Amir on 31 January 1978, and as Prime Minister on 8 February. Shaikh Saad's relations with the National Assembly were bedevilled by members criticisms of his Government which only just stopped short of attacking him personally. He attended Assembly sessions only rarely and is believed to have pressed for its dissolution.

Dignified and hard-working Does not have the power and authority which his office should command. But seems to be consulted by the Amir and Shaikh Sabah.

He commands more affection amongst ordinary Kuwaitis Said to have lost some popularity through being two closely identified with calls for the closure of the National Assembly in 1986.

Friendly to Britain. Keeps a house in London and likes to spend time there. Had successful eye operations in the UK in 1979 and 1985

Accepted invitation to pay official visit to UK in March 1990.

A strict Muslim as is his wife Latifa,who has business interests of her own

One son and five daughters.

Speaks adequate English.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

HE MR GHAZI MOHAMMED AMIN AL-RAYES

Kuwaiti Ambassador to London since December 1980. Concurrent accreditation to Oslo.

Born in 1935. Graduated from University of Cairo in 1962 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Has held a number of appointments, including postings to Washington and Beirut. Ambassador to Bahrain from 1973-1980.

Together with his brother Sabah, maintains extensive shareholdings in the Al-Rayes group of trading companies in Kuwait. His main private interest is collecting old cars. He is said to have a fine collection of old Rolls Royces and other old autos.

Seems a little dour but is in fact a kind and pleasant man. Married to Taibah Al-Rayes (born 1942) with four children (ages 15, 14, 13, 10), all living in London and attending the American School in St. John's Wood. Mrs Al-Rayes is a keen collector of antique jewellery, particularly Middle Eastern. Both speak good English.

NBQAXD

From: D A Gore-Booth

Date: 25 June 1991

Private Secretary

CALL BY KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE ON PRIME MINISTER, 26 JUNE

1. I submit the draft briefing letter provided by the Department.

2. Since it was commissioned there has been a development of which you should be aware and to which you know the background, but which is not covered in the draft.

3. The DTI heard from Sir Michael Craig-Cooper that Mrs Thatcher saw the Crown Prince last night, amongst other things to discuss the establishment of an Anglo-Kuwait Group under her Chairmanship. I thought this trail had gone dead in No 10, though I understand privately from the DTI that there may have been telephonic communication between No 10 and Mrs Thatcher. I also understand that the meeting took place with Mrs Thatcher in sparkling form and the Crown Prince delighted with his guest. He agreed that such a group would be a good idea. There was very little discussion of detail but she did describe it as both commercial and cultural. It was left that the Kuwaitis would prepare a proposal for the Kuwaiti Ambassador to put to us. There is an obvious risk that the Kuwaitis will come up with different terms of reference and different suggestions as to participation. If, as seems likely, the Crown Prince raises this issue with the Prime Minister, and assuming that he is indeed content that this should go ahead, he might welcome the progress that has been made and suggest that advisers on both sides get together to work out the details.

D A Gore-Booth

25 June 1991

Private Secretary

Prime Minister

The Crown Prince will be at the Gulf Parade tomorrow and you will have an opportunity to shake him by the hand — though not for a proper conversation.

A briefward may suffice. Indeed, you could see him on 26 June by taking the FCO's bilateral slot. You can talk to the FCO

on the plane to
Luxembourg and
we have a separate
briefing meeting fixed
on the European Council
anyway.

Stephen
20/6

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The Crown Prince of Kuwait still wants a meeting with you. The only slot is your FCS bilateral on 26 June. M Fahd is prepared to sacrifice it.

Agree?

Surely I shd. see Foreign for other week? Cannot something else go?

Stephen

24/6

T.

Andrew

The PM might look at this in the car

[illegible] 1/6

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 June 1991

Prime Minister

Dear Stephen,

You probably won't have time for any substantive talk. If you do you should mention human rights. Stephen

Visit of HH Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, to London, 20 - 27 June 1991

My letter to you of 19 June (copy enclosed) proposed that the Prime Minister should receive Shaikh Sa'ad briefly at No 10 next week during his private visit to London for medical treatment (a routine check on an eye condition).

We have heard today that the Lord Mayor and the City Corporation have invited Shaikh Sa'ad to attend the Gulf parade at the Mansion House tomorrow. They propose that Shaikh Sa'ad should arrive at 1105 accompanied by the Kuwait Ambassador. He will be escorted to the Salon where he will meet the guests assembled there. The Prime Minister, Mr Hurd and Mr King are due to join the guests in the Salon at 1120. We shall ask the Lord Mayor's office to arrange for Shaikh Sa'ad and the Prime Minister to meet. The Guildhall propose that Shaikh Sa'ad should view the parade and fly past, from the balcony. He will leave immediately afterwards and will not attend the Guildhall reception.

The Prime Minister may like to wish Shaikh Sa'ad well with his medical treatment. In discussion the Prime Minister might draw on the following topics:

Reconstruction: British firms have so far gained £200 million of contracts. We have achieved a high profile. Since the Prime Minister's own visit Shaikh Sa'ad has received Mr Hurd, Mr King, Mr Wakeham and Mr Heseltine during their visits.

Defence cooperation:

We are committed to keep the residual element of our battle group in Kuwait until the end of July. We are working on proposals to advise the Kuwaitis on re-organising their armed forces and hope to put to them soon a draft defence cooperation agreement. Royal Ordnance (with support from 150 men of the Royal Engineers) have started work on mine clearance. If the Kuwaitis need an overall coordinator we would be willing to take this on.

/Oil Fires

Oil fires:

About 160 fires have now been extinguished. The British Group Survey of the Salmiya field is going well. We hope that contract terms can quickly be agreed to enable the British Group to start putting out fires.

Human rights:

There is continuing concern about Kuwaiti treatment of minority groups, especially Palestinians. The Crown Prince's recent instruction that mistreatment of detainees must cease and offenders be punished is welcome. Following the enforced deportation of a group of Iraqis we also welcome his assurance to Mr Weston that deportees will not be sent to a country against their will. Over 300 alleged collaborators with the Iraqi occupation have now been put on trial and several have been sentenced to death (subject to review by a tribunal and confirmation by the Amir). The Prime Minister may wish to emphasise the importance for Kuwait's reputation that procedures are seen to be followed fairly.

UN Compensation Commission

We are grateful for Kuwait's support for our proposal that the UN commission and fund should be located in London. We hope that Kuwait will take up the proposals of the City of London group to help the Kuwaiti National Commission prepare claims.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Stanley (DTI).

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

The news today is that Kuwait has restarted oil production, with exports expected to resume by the end of the year.

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

19 June 1991

Dear Stephen,

Visit of the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait to London

Our Ambassador in Kuwait has reported that the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait is planning to visit London at short notice privately for routine medical treatment. We understand that he will arrive on the afternoon of 20 June and depart towards the end of next week. Shaikh Sa'ad has said that he would like to call on the Prime Minister if possible.

The Foreign Secretary would be grateful if the Prime Minister could see Shaikh Sa'ad at No 10. The possible timing is constrained by Shaikh Sa'ad's planned eye treatment over the weekend, which causes him some discomfort and vision difficulties. Wednesday 26 June may be the earliest he would be available to call on the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary has offered to call on Shaikh Sa'ad at his home at 0945 on Thursday 27 June.

Other FCO calls in the Prime Minister's diary next week are the Anglo-French Summit on 24 June, Sir David Wilson, Chief Buthelezi and Prime Minister Santer (probably) on 25 June and the European Council on 28-29 June.

Shaikh Sa'ad is a key figure in Kuwait and there are a number of topics which could usefully be covered in a short meeting. As martial law administrator he is closely concerned with the conduct of the present collaboration trials before the martial law courts. In view of recent criticism in Parliament and the media, the Prime Minister might re-emphasise our concern that the legal process is followed and that fundamental human rights of the defendants are respected.

The Crown Prince is also well disposed towards our commercial interests in Kuwait and has received a number of

/visiting

RESTRICTED

visiting Ministers together with parties of businessmen in the last 3 months. The Prime Minister could usefully draw his attention to 2 major areas where we hope the Kuwaitis will award contracts to UK consortia (firefighting, and the London City Group's offer to prepare Kuwait's claim to the UN Compensation Fund). Shaikh Sa'ad may also wish to raise the subject of a bilateral defence agreement, which his Government has recently requested: a draft is being cleared with Ministers before submission to the Prime Minister.

Grateful if you would let me know whether a call by Shaikh Sa'ad next week will be possible. We would provide briefing.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Stanley (Department of Trade).

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

Stephen
C Primrose will discuss with Richard whether FCS bilat (at 1645 on 26 June) might be taken over for this — PM + FCS to meet on 27th + travel to Luxembourg together. Will let us know tomorrow.
SD

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

19 June 1991

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Prime Minister ①

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Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice.

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

MASTER as SUBJECT
filed on For Pol: Visit to Gulf, Dec 1990

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 January 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with the Amir of Kuwait in the Sheraton Hotel in Taif in Saudi Arabia. This lasted about one hour and was followed by a briefer session with the Crown Prince. During the main discussion the Amir was supported by the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sheik Nasser (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), Suleimin Mutawa (Minister of Planning) and Abdul Rahman Atiqi (Adviser to the Amir). HMA Kuwait was also present.

The Amir expressed regret that his first meeting with the Prime Minister took place in such sad circumstances with his country under occupation. The Prime Minister said he entirely shared this regret. We watched with horror what was happening in Kuwait, both the invasion by Iraq and the subsequent treatment of Kuwait's citizens. Britain had given the strongest possible support to the UN Security Council Resolutions, and had sent the largest expeditionary forces to leave Britain since World War Two to the area. He would be interested to have the Amir's assessment of what was happening in Kuwait itself.

The Amir said that he was most grateful for Britain's support. Kuwait had expected this from one of its oldest friends. As to the situation in his country, there had been no real change since the early days of the invasion. The events there were sickening. Kuwait's small population could not take the treatment being meted out to them for long: many had left. He found it hard to predict what would happen. Saddam Hussein could never be trusted. But he still hoped that Iraq might withdraw peacefully. The Prime Minister observed that the international coalition assembled against Saddam Hussein was almost unprecedented. But it was still not clear whether Saddam Hussein understood that Iraq would be attacked if it did not withdraw from Kuwait. The Amir commented that Saddam thought only of himself not of his people or his country. It was quite possible that he still thought something would turn up before 15 January to change the situation to his advantage, or that the international coalition would fall apart.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister said that, on the basis of his discussions with President Bush and others in Washington, he was absolutely convinced of the Americans' resolve to liberate Kuwait, using force if necessary. We shared that resolve. The message that Secretary Baker would give Tariq Aziz in Geneva on 9 January was that Iraq must withdraw or face all the consequences. The Amir said there were two main considerations in his mind. The first was the possibility of a partial Iraqi withdrawal. Saddam Hussein might believe that a sufficient number of countries would regard this as acceptable and let him get away with it. He saw a real danger of this. The second eventuality was that Iraq would make a complete withdrawal but still remain heavily armed and a threat to its neighbours. In that case there would need to be guarantees from the international community, and particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, that nothing similar to the invasion of Kuwait would happen again.

The Prime Minister said that he could be categoric on these points. A partial withdrawal would not be acceptable. Iraq must withdraw fully and without any sort of reward for its invasion. It must also pay reparations for the destruction wrought on Kuwait. A great deal of thought needed to be given to the future security of the region and how to prevent Iraq from acting in the same way again. There were various scenarios. If Iraq did not withdraw peacefully, there would be a war. Iraq would lose and its military power would be destroyed. The immediate danger from Iraq would be dealt with. If on the other hand Iraq withdrew with its forces and weapons intact, it would inevitably remain a source of fear and instability in the region. We recognised that countries of the region would wish to discuss arrangements to ensure that future security. We would want to hear the views of the Arab Governments, both through the Gulf Cooperation Council and bilaterally, so that we can consider how best to contribute. But he could assure the Amir that Britain would be prepared to play a role in ensuring the future security of the region. The Amir said there were no clear proposals on the table yet for the form of regional security arrangements. They could include both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Doha had set up a committee to make recommendations. The Prime Minister said we looked forward to hearing these resolutions. It was obviously of great importance that the arrangements should satisfy the countries of the region themselves.

The Prime Minister continued that we had watched the treatment of Kuwait and its people with dismay, but were also looking forward to the phase of reconstruction once the legitimate government was restored. He assumed that the Kuwait Government was even now giving thought to this. The Amir confirmed that his Government were indeed discussing this thoroughly and looking at the options. Such was the damage that they would have to start effectively from zero and would need a lot of help from Kuwait's friends. The Prime Minister said that Britain would be very ready to help in reconstruction, both in terms of emergency aid, about which the Crown Agents were already

in discussion with the Kuwait Government, and on longer term projects. The Amir said that he found it natural that the UK should be interested in taking part in the rebuilding of Kuwait. The Prime Minister proposed that our Ambassador should discuss the details further with Kuwaiti Ministers. The Amir assented to this.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Amir believed that, if it came to conflict, the Iraqis would give way speedily or fight to the last. The Amir said that it was difficult to know with Saddam Hussein. For instance, there were rumours that he had two aircraft standing by to whisk him out of the country in the event of a war. Whether or not this was true, he did not believe that Saddam Hussein would want to die in battle. His main aim would be to save his own skin. One possibility was that he would flee and encourage his troops to continue to fight. But his armed forces were not psychologically well prepared for this. They were fed up at seeing the gains of their war against Iran given away.

The Prime Minister said that we very much welcomed the success of the Kuwait National Convention. He wondered how the Amir saw its conclusions being taken forward. The Amir said that they would provide the basic guidelines for his Government on their return. But their first task would be to assess what had actually happened in Kuwait itself and deal with that.

The Prime Minister said the first discussion must be to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and the Amir back. We hoped that could be achieved speedily. He was grateful for the very useful discussion which he and the Amir had been able to conduct. Britain would continue to offer every possible help to resolve the situation. He looked forward to being able to welcome the Amir to London following his restoration. The Amir shared the Prime Minister's positive assessment of their discussions. He asked the Prime Minister to convey his greetings to the Queen and to the British Forces in Saudi Arabia whom he would be visiting shortly.

Subsequently there was a further brief meeting with the Crown Prince and other Ministers in an adjoining room, which covered much of the same ground. The Crown Prince commented that the morale of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait was very poor. Many of them said openly that they would surrender if attacked. They had been deceived about the reasons for being sent to Kuwait in the first place. The Prime Minister asked whether there was an actual line to which Iraq might withdraw, if it contemplated only partial withdrawal. The Crown Prince said that the Iraqis might try to retain the disputed oil field in Northern Kuwait and the two islands. But this would be totally unacceptable. There must be complete withdrawal in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions.

The Crown Prince expressed some concern about the attitude of European countries. The Prime Minister said that all supported the UN Security Council Resolutions, although a number

of them hankered after a unilateral approach to Saddam Hussein. Britain had discouraged this forcefully and so far with success. The Crown Prince asked whether the countries concerned thought they could persuade Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. If they were reluctant to see force used, what alternative did they have? The Prime Minister said they wished to do everything to avoid a conflict. But he agreed with the Crown Prince that there might be no other way in the end except the use of force. Sanctions were having an effect, but not enough. Meanwhile Kuwait continued to suffer.

The Crown Prince asked whether the Prime Minister expected a resolution from the meeting between Secretary Baker and Tariq Aziz. The Prime Minister said this was hard to predict. The purpose of the meeting was to make clear beyond any doubt to the Iraqis that Iraq would be attacked if it did not leave Kuwait. It still seemed that the message was not getting through. The Crown Prince indicated that he expected the Iraqis to try to find ways to spin things out beyond the 15 January deadline.

The Crown Prince referred to the Prime Minister's exchange with the Amir about reconstruction of Kuwait following Iraq's withdrawal. The Council of Ministers had already convened a committee of ministers principally concerned to discuss plans and had sent a team to Washington to work with experts there. They were also having contacts with the Crown Agents. The Prime Minister repeated that our Ambassador was more than ready to enter into discussions with Kuwaiti Ministers about contributions which Britain and British firms could make. The Crown Prince indicated that this would be welcome.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office), and Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 December 1990

Dear Charles,

Visit to London of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait : Possible Call on the Prime Minister

As you know Shaikh Sa'ad asked earlier in the week whether he could call on the Prime Minister before the weekend. The Shaikh, who is in London for medical treatment is due to leave on Saturday or Sunday. We have told the Kuwaitis that the Prime Minister's diary is full

Shaikh Sa'ad has now offered to postpone his departure until early next week if a call could be arranged. I guess that this may also be difficult. If the Prime Minister could not see Shaikh Sa'ad early next week the Prime Minister may wish to write to him at his London home. By flagging up his visit in January he may discourage the Kuwaitis from pressing for an appointment, without leaving them feeling snubbed.

Yours ever

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Em

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO:

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah
Al Salim Al Sabah KCMG
11A Belgrave Square
LONDON SW1

I wanted to write to you personally to say how sorry I am not to see you during your visit here this week. Unfortunately my ~~Alas! My~~ diary is absolutely full. I hope that your medical treatment here has been successful and that it will be possible for us to meet at No 10 next time you are here.

I should tell you that I hope to be able to call on His Highness the Amir and to meet you in Taif when I visit the Gulf very early in the New Year. Our Ambassador in Saudi Arabia will be consulting the Saudi government and the Government of Kuwait very soon.

I much look forward to meeting you.

CT

File

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c/foreign/Amir.

bc PC

Subject cc master

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1990

Mtg Record

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with the Amir of Kuwait, who was accompanied by the Kuwait Ambassador and an interpreter.

After welcoming the Amir, the Prime Minister said that she was a little concerned at reports of what Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia was alleged to have said about territorial concessions which Kuwait might make after Iraqi withdrawal. She had instructed our Ambassador in Riyadh to seek immediate clarification. We were prepared to commit our armed forces to recover Kuwait in its entirety. Any suggestion that part of it might subsequently be given away was utterly wrong. The Amir said that he agreed wholly with the Prime Minister and understood her concerns. He had himself taken President Mitterrand to task for his remarks at the United Nations. The President had assured him there was no change in France's policy that Iraq must not be allowed to benefit from its aggression. President Mitterrand had also added that the longer Iraq's occupation dragged on, the more it served Saddam Hussein's purpose. A way had to be found to compel him to comply with United Nations resolutions.

The Amir continued that he had come above all to repay the courtesy of the call which the Prime Minister had made on him in New York and to thank her on behalf of the people of Kuwait for all that Britain had done. After thanking the Amir for these kind words, the Prime Minister said that the longer it took to bring matters to a head, the greater would be the danger that Saddam Hussein would open up divisions between the nations confronting him, and the more play he could make with radical Arab Governments. Moreover one could not keep troops waiting for ever. We had to bear in mind the climatic conditions and their effect on possible military operations. It was important to remind everyone that Saddam Hussein got publicity from any remark which indicated a difference of view between countries. We all had to remain absolutely united and keep Saddam Hussein isolated.

The Prime Minister continued that if Saddam Hussein were to withdraw voluntarily that would be good: but we would still need to make clear that he must give up chemical and biological weapons and that his nuclear weapons programme must be constrained, otherwise he would only be in a position to strike again. His argument that Iraq must have an outlet to the sea was

false: he had no legitimate territorial claims on Kuwait. The United Nations resolutions must be observed in their entirety and Saddam Hussein must not gain one square foot from his aggression (the Amir nodded vigorously). He must also pay compensation for the damaged done to property and people.

The Prime Minister continued that President Bush had been absolutely firm on these points. There were some people who appeared to think it necessary to go back to the United Nations to authorise the use of force to recover Kuwait. She was not happy with this. First we might not get the necessary resolution: and second we anyway had the authority under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the various requests from the Amir and the Kuwaiti Government. Equally, some people were suggesting that the United Nations Secretary-General should use his good offices to negotiate a solution. But this would only open up divisions with those countries less wholeheartedly committed to implementing the UN resolutions. Mr. Primakov had been to see her as an emissary from President Gorbachev and had urged that some face-saving solution should be found for Saddam Hussein. She had put him right on this.

The Prime Minister added that our own forces would soon complete their deployment to Saudi Arabia. She had told Secretary Cheney that American forces could not withdraw without the issue of Iraq's aggression being resolved now and for the future. Meantime, Mr. Heath had gone to Iraq on his own initiative to try and secure the release of some hostages. The important point to emphasise was that none of the hostages should have been taken in the first place.

The Prime Minister said that we had enquired about the mobile broadcasting units that the Amir had requested. We understood that jamming of broadcasts to Iraq and Kuwait had now ceased and that the Kuwaiti Government had been given time on a Saudi transmitter, and that the Egyptians had also given them a frequency. While that might take care of the immediate problem, it might still be useful to have a mobile broadcasting facility in case military operations started. It could be useful for undermining the morale of Iraqi troops.

The Prime Minister said that we had consulted further with the Americans about a draft letter from the Amir to our two Governments asking them to use force to recover Kuwait. The text was agreed between us. She would hand it to the Amir and hope that he would be able to confirm, after he had had time to study it, that it was acceptable. Rather than sign it now, it would be best to keep it against the day that it might become necessary.

The Amir said that he would like to thank the Prime Minister for everything she had said. He could not himself have expressed all these points more forcefully than she had, even though he was the person most directly concerned. He would certainly consider the letter and let the Prime Minister have any comments. He understood the point about not signing it now. He would like the Prime Minister to know that some 15,000 Kuwaitis had now been rounded up by the Iraqis and imprisoned in Iraq. He would also like to underline that the United Nations Security Council could

not apply resolutions in one direction and not in another, that is to the Palestinians. The Prime Minister agreed that the Palestinian question must be dealt with, but not in a way which suggested it was linked with Iraq/Kuwait. The Amir agreed that the two situations were fundamentally different.

The Amir said that the Kuwaiti People's Congress held in Jeddah had been very successful. All sectors of Kuwaiti society had been represented. The meeting had resolved to send delegations all over the world to explain the desire of all the people of Kuwait to recover their country.

We shall need to follow up in due course to see whether the Kuwaitis have any comments on the letter.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 October 1990

Dear Charles,

Visit to London by Amir of Kuwait

The Prime Minister has agreed to see the Amir of Kuwait, His Highness Shaikh Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, at 11 am on 23 October. The Prime Minister last met the Amir in New York on 1 October. I enclose the record of that meeting. The Amir is undertaking an image-boosting tour of a number of European capitals, including Paris - where he will meet President Mitterrand - and probably Rome, Bonn and Moscow.

The Kuwaitis have been impatient for a military solution to the conflict for some time, as was evident in the Prime Minister's meeting with the Amir in New York. We have made it clear to the Kuwaitis that we remain committed to the full implementation of Security Council Resolutions, encompassing the complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government. We need to give sanctions time to work, and there is evidence to suggest that this is succeeding (such as the recent Iraqi announcement of petrol rationing). But Iraqi aggression will not be allowed to stand and the military option remains.

The Prime Minister and the Amir discussed at their last meeting the possibility of a written Kuwaiti request for military action to recover Kuwait. We have now discussed and agreed the draft text of a letter with the Americans. Despite their misgivings, we are telling them (on 22 October) that we intend to go ahead and clear the text with the Kuwaitis now, but not have it signed until it is needed (timing to be jointly decided with the Americans). The Prime Minister may wish to explain to the Amir how we should like to proceed, hand over the enclosed draft, and ask for early approval in principle. If necessary, the Prime Minister could say that we should prefer to use our own draft rather than the one the Kuwaitis surfaced in Riyadh earlier this month, since it has been cleared with the Americans and contains rather fuller argumentation which could be useful publicly.

The Amir may also ask about our views on reparations and war crimes. The Iraqis will have to pay for the

consequences of their actions. It is clear that the Iraqis have systematically looted Kuwait and the cost of restoring the infrastructure will be immense. Iraq is a potentially rich country and Kuwait and the wider international community have a right to expect recompense. We have stated publicly that Iraqis will be held individually responsible for the actions they have committed in violation of international law in Iraq and Kuwait. But we cannot at this stage decide on detailed arrangements to put them into practice.

It is important that we should continue our efforts towards equitable burden sharing. The Prime Minister could express our appreciation for Kuwait's efforts so far. The Kuwaitis have pledged $5 billion towards the military and economic costs of the crisis. This represents over 19% of Kuwaiti GDP - by far the largest contribution. It is important that the Kuwaitis, along with the other nations who are making a considerable contribution, should encourage others to play their part. The Kuwaitis may wish, in particular, to raise this issue with some of the other Gulf states. Financial help for Jordan in particular is now becoming urgent. Our assessment is that the Jordanian performance on sanctions has improved.

The Prime Minister could congratulate the Amir on the outcome of the Kuwaiti People's Congress, which was held in Jedda from 13-16 October. This proved a successful rallying of popular support behind the Al Sabah, with public differences avoided. The Crown Prince committed the Al Sabah to the implementation of the 1962 Constitution. It would be helpful to have the Amir's latest thinking on what form a restored Kuwait Government might take, and how far he intends to go, post-crisis, in developing democratic institutions in Kuwait.

The Amir asked the Prime Minister on 1 October about purchase of mobile broadcasting equipment. We have followed this up energetically with both the Kuwaitis and a number of British companies. It turns out, however, that the equipment available is of extremely limited range. The Kuwaitis have been given time on a Saudi transmitter and have also received an offer from the Egyptian Government of a Radio Cairo frequency. They have shown no enthusiasm to follow up the information we have given them on mobile transmitters. The other options they are pursuing seem likely to be more practical and effective.

/ I enclose a background note on the Amir and the members of his delegation.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER

2 (a-b)

MEETING WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

You are seeing the Amir of Kuwait tomorrow morning, immediately before you depart for Victoria Station to meet President Cossiga. The Amir is on an image-and-morale-boosting tour of capitals, to thank Governments for the help which Kuwait is receiving. He is going to Paris, Rome, Bonn and Moscow. You last saw him in New York on 1 October.

The main business of the meeting is to settle the text of a letter from the Amir. You will want to:

- hand over the attached text;
- explain that it has been agreed with the Americans;
- say that we prefer it to an earlier Kuwaiti draft because it contains fuller argumentation which could be useful publicly;
- ask for early approval in principle;
- but explain that we do not want it signed until it is needed, when we and the Americans will consult jointly with him.

That apart you will want to survey with him recent developments and obtain his assessment of Arab opinion. You will want to explain our view on compensation and war crimes. You should applaud Kuwait's contribution to burden-sharing (19 per cent of GDP), but say he might like to encourage some of the other Gulf States to do more.

He has recently held a successful Kuwaiti People's Congress (in Jedda) at which the Crown Prince committed the Al Sabah to implementation of the 1962 Constitution. You might congratulate

him on this, while asking him what form he expects a restored Kuwaiti Government to take and whether he envisages democratic institutions.

We have passed on copious information to the Kuwaitis about mobile broadcasting equipment. But the Saudi's have now given them time on a Saudi transmitter, and the Egyptians have also given them a frequency.

You will find the note of your last meeting in the folder, together with a letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
22 OCTOBER 1990

a:\foreign\Amir.MRM

39. HH SHAIKH JABIR AL AHMAD AL JABIR AL SABAH GCMG

Amir of Kuwait.

Born 1926. Traditional local education only. Public Security Department, with responsibility for Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) area 1950–56. Ruler's representative with the KOC and Aminoil 1956–59. President of the Finance Department, the Housing Department, the Civil Service Commission and the General Oil Affairs Office 1959–62. Minister of Finance and Economy 1962–63. Minister of Finance and Industry 1963–65. Prime Minister from December 1965. Named Heir Apparent May 1966, and became Amir on the death of Shaikh Sabah al Salim on 31 December 1977.

As a young man drew attention to himself by his energy, ability and ambition. From at least the early 60s, when he became Finance Minister, has always been a major political figure in Kuwait. When Crown Prince, was often responsible for running the country during the then Amir's long periods of absence and was regarded as the controlling hand. Respected for his administrative ability, but sometimes criticised as hard and remote. His authority appears unquestioned. Closely involved in all major Government decisions, and said to have a keen grasp of day-to-day Government business.

Was responsible for the decisions to dissolve the Assembly both in 1976 (when he was Crown Prince and Prime Minister) and in 1986. But in the latter case at least appears to have acted with genuine regret at being forced to take this step by the behaviour of Assembly members which was causing the government serious embarrassment in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Married many times, with many children. Avoids ostentation, and is said to be a devout Muslim.

Survived an attempt on his life by Shiite extremists in 1985.

Understands English, can speak it, but prefers to speak Arabic. Survived an air crash in the 70's and hates flying. After a long period with few absences from Kuwait, 1989 saw him undertake several foreign trips, including state visits to Egypt and France.

SULEIMAN ABDUL RAZZAK AL MUTAWA

Minister of Planning since June 1990.

Born 1933.

Studied at Institute of Higher Education, London University 1958.

MA from Columbia University, New York 1962.

Former Headmaster of Shuweikh Secondary School.

Former Deputy Managing Director of KOC.

Director of the Institute of Economic and Social Planning in the Middle East.

Member of Civil Service Council since 1986.

Married with three sons and a daughter. Wife was first Kuwaiti woman to appear regularly on TV.

Speaks excellent English.

34. SHAIKH ALI KHALIFA AL ATHBI AL SABAH

Minister of ~~Oil since July 1986.~~ FINANCE SINCE JUNE 1990.

Born 1945.

Member of a minor branch of the Sabah family.

Educated at American University Beirut and the Universities of California and London.

Joined the then Ministry of Finance and Oil, where he rose to Assistant Under-Secretary in charge of petroleum affairs. Became Under-Secretary at the newly separated Ministry of Finance in early 1975, until his appointment as Minister of Oil in February 1978. Chairman of the Gulf International Bank 1976–78. His appointment was confirmed in the new Cabinet after the re–establishment of the National Assembly in March 1981. In 1983, he took on the Finance portfolio upon the resignation of Abdul Latif al Hamad. Minister of Oil and Industry from 1985.

An experienced negotiator. In 1981 he masterminded the establishment of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) of which he is Chairman. KPC is an umbrella company coordinating subsidiaries in all aspects of the oil sector. KPC now occupies the majority of Ali Khalifa's time in Kuwait.

A highly intelligent and combative interlocutor, one of the ablest Kuwaitis of his generation. Has established a reputation as a tough and shrewd negotiator in OPEC.

Trusted by the Amir. One of the handful of Sabah insiders who run Kuwait, but his bloodline does not permit him to aspire to higher office. Was the mastermind behind KIO's heavy investment in BP shares in 1987/88 and led the subsequent negotiations over the divestment order of the MMC.

Speaks excellent English.

Married with children.

2. ABDUL RAHMAN SALIM AL ATIQI

Special Adviser to the Amir.

Born 1928. Educated in Kuwait. Clerk with KOC 1945–8. Police Department 1949–53. Private Secretary to Shaikh Sabah al Salim 1953–6. Director, Police Department 1959–61. Ambassador in Washington 1961–2. Under-Secretary, MFA 1962–7. Minister of Finance and Oil from 1967, losing the Oil portfolio in 1975. Dropped from the Cabinet in 1981, almost certainly at his own request.

Comes from an old, but relatively minor, Kuwaiti family which has historically close ties with the Sabah. Has long-standing connections with the Amir. Is married to one of his half-sisters.

A trusted adviser, but not a major voice in Kuwaiti politics. The Amir uses him as an occasional personal emissary and probably as a channel to the Islamic fundamentalists, with whom he has a fair relationship.

Friendly, if sometimes evasive. Speaks excellent English.

45. SHAIKH NASSER AL MOHAMMED AL AHMAD AL JABIR AL SABAH
OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SINCE JUNE 1990.
Minister ~~for Social Affairs and Labour since January 1988.~~

Born 1941. Son of the Amir's elder brother, now dead. A leading figure in the younger generation of the Sabah family.

Primary education in Kuwait. 1955–59 took GCE 'O' and 'A' levels in UK. Bachelor's degree in Science Economique et Sociale at US-linked university in Geneva, 1959–64.

Third Secretary, Kuwait's mission to the UN 1964–65. Minister and Kuwait's Permanent Representative at the UN in Geneva and Consul-General in Switzerland 1966–68. Ambassador in Tehran 1968–78 (Dean of the Diplomatic Corps from 1975). In Kuwait with MFA but without portfolio 1979–81. Under Secretary, Ministry of Information from 1981 until his appointment as Minister in 1985.

Genial but tough. A fairly effective and popular Information Minister. Said to have been moved from the Ministry (partly at his own request) because of misgivings about the extent of the current press censorship regulations. His apparent demotion to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour will probably not affect his position as a strong contender for higher office in the long term. Said to be the Amir's favourite nephew.

Shaikh Nasser speaks English and French well. He paid a successful official visit to the UK in 1982. A widower with two children, one at Durham University, the other being educated in Switzerland.

POSSIBLE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

Begins

I wish to express the renewed gratitude of my government and the people of Kuwait for the firm and clear measures taken by the government of in order to bring the Iraqi invasion and occupation to an end and to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.

Unfortunately these measures, and those taken by other friendly nations at the request of the government of Kuwait and in response to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions to deal with the Iraqi aggression, have not produced the desired result. Nor does it appear that they will before our country, our citizens and foreign nationals in Kuwait suffer an unacceptable level of damage and injury. Instead, Iraq continues in unlawful occupation of our territory, in defiance of the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, which call for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of our lawful authority as well as the release of foreign nationals held against their will.

Accordingly, I hereby request that, in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the government of take such further military steps as are necessary to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of foreign nationals held against their will.

Ends

156101
MDADAN 0521

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA
TO DESKBY 190800Z FCO
TELNO 220
OF 190611Z OCTOBER 90
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, MODUK (FOR DESO)

ADVANCE COPY

FROM BLACKLEY
FCO TELNO 182 TO JEDDA: VISIT TO LONDON OF AMIR OF KUWAIT.

1. AMIR CONFIRMS ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AT 11AM ON 23 OCTOBER. HE SEES PRESIDENT MITTERAND AT 6PM ON 22 OCTOBER.

2. HIS DELEGATION IS LIKELY TO INCLUDE THE MINISTER OF PLANNING (MUTAWA), THE MINISTER OF FINANCE (SHAIKH ALI KHALIFA), THE AMIR'S ADVISER (ABDUL RAHMAN AL ATIQI) AND POSSIBLY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (SHAIKH NASIR MUHAMMAD).

3. THIS WILL BE AN IMAGE-BOOSTING TOUR. IT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO FOLLOW THE AMIR'S UN APPEARANCE AND CALL ON BUSH. HE WANTS TO BE SEEN THANKING BRITAIN AND FRANCE FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND WORKING ON THE FRENCH TO KEEP THEM SOLID. THE SUCCESS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE SHOULD HELP TO CONVINCE MITTERAND THAT THE KUWAITI PEOPLE HAVE ADEQUATELY EXPRESSED THEIR DEMOCRATIC WILL AND HAVE DECLARED THEIR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR RULE BY THE AL SABAH. THE AMIR HAS NO DOUBTS ABOUT BRITAIN'S SUPPORT AND HIS ENTOURAGE HAVE OBSERVED WITH DELIGHT THE TONIC EFFECT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN NEW YORK.

4. ON 23 OCTOBER THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT COVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH THE AMIR:

(A) PEOPLE'S CONGRESS.
CONGRATULATIONS ON SUCCESSFUL RALLYING OF POPULAR SUPPORT. UNDERSTAND THAT STAGING SUCH A CONFERENCE WAS A GAMBLE. TRIBUTE TO CAREFUL MANAGEMENT BY AMIR AND GOVERNMENT WITH DUE REGARD TO SAUDI SENSITIVITIES THAT CONFERENCE TURNED OUT SO WELL. IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO PEOPLES OF THOSE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WHO SUPPORT KUWAIT. NOTED CARE TAKEN TO EMPHASIZE LINK WITH THOSE STILL IN KUWAIT. INTERESTED TO HAVE AMIR'S VIEW ON THE STRENGTH OF E.G. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS AND HOW GOVERNMENT WILL COPE WITH THEM AFTER RESTORATION. LIKEWISE RESISTANCE GROUPS. THOSE WHO STAYED WILL FEEL THEY HAVE A STRONG MORAL CLAIM FOR SPECIAL

CONSIDERATION IN FUTURE.

(B) HALF LOAVES, AND FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
INTERESTED IN AMIR'S VIEWS ON THE PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL SCENARIOS WHICH ARE CIRCULATING. IRAQI MAPS. MITLAA WALL. PRIMAKOV'S ACTIVITY. ONLY ATTRACTION MIGHT BE POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERING MAJOR PART OF KUWAIT WITHOUT FIGHTING TO SERVE AS LAUNCH PAD FOR FINAL EXPULSION OF IRAQIS BY MILITARY MEANS. HOW DOES AMIR SEE KUWAIT'S FUTURE SECURITY BEING ASSURED? BILATERAL DEFENCE AGREEMENTS? A UN SECURITY COUNCIL GUARANTEED ARRANGEMENT? ISLAMIC/ARAB STATES UPFRONT BACKED DISCREETLY BY THE US, JAPAN AND EC? AMERICAN BASES? UNITED KINGDOM WILLING TO HELP IN ANY WAY WITH RESTRUCTURING OF KUWAITI ARMED FORCES (HDES' MEETING WITH KUWAITI DEFENCE MINISTER ON 18 OCTOBER).

(C) UN ACTION.
IT WILL BE WORTHWHILE TAKING THE AMIR THROUGH CURRENT AND FUTURE UN ACTIVITY ON COMPENSATION, WAR TRIALS ETC. THE CROWN PRINCE STATED AT THE PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE (PARA 4 OF JEDDA TELNO 210) THAT KUWAIT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CLAIM COMPENSATION FROM IRAQ. THE AMIR WILL BE INTERESTED IN HOW SUCH COMPENSATION WOULD BE PAID. ON POSSIBLE FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION HE MIGHT BE ASKED HOW PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE CONFERENCE FINAL STATEMENT (JEDDA TELNO 215) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED. A CALL FOR ARTICLE 42 ACTION? OR A DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS PHRASE WHICH LEFT ALL OPTIONS OPEN? OR A DISINCLINATION TO SEEK UN AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACTION?

(D) RECONSTRUCTION AND OIL PRODUCTION.
HOW IS KUWAITI GOVERNMENT INTENDING TO TACKLE THIS MASSIVE TASK? HOW FINANCED? NO DOUBT INTEND TO RESTORE OIL PRODUCTION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND INCREASE IT TO MAXIMUM LEVEL. IRAQ WILL WANT TO DO THE SAME. SAUDI ATTITUDE? EFFECT ON OPEC? (THE KUWAITIS WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY RESTRAINT ON THEIR PRODUCTION DURING THE YEARS OF RECONSTRUCTION. ONE WAY OF COMPENSATING KUWAIT (AND IRAN) FOR IRAQI AGGRESSION MIGHT BE TO ALLOCATE THE RESERVES OF THE RUMEILA OIL FIELD IN ITS ENTIRETY TO KUWAIT AND OF THE MAJNOON FIELD TO IRAN, SUGGESTED SHAIKH ALI KHALIFA SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND THINKING ALOUD).

TUNNELL

YYYY

133101
MDADAN 0521

DISTRIBUTION 38

ADVANCE 38

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR SLATER
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SENT
18 OCT 1990

RESTRICTED

FILE
DA
PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1990

VISIT OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

I have seen Jedda telegram number 212 about the proposed visit to London of the Amir of Kuwait. The Prime Minister would be able to see him at 11.00 am on 23 October.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

137450
MDADAN 9748

CDP

1100am on 23 Oct

Agreed

Can we do this?

AP 15/10

CDP

RESTRICTED
FM JEDDA
TO DESKBY 151000Z FCO
TELNO 212
OF 150903Z OCTOBER 90
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME

ADVANCE COPY

FROM BLACKLEY

VISIT TO LONDON BY AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. THE AMIR IS PLANNING A TOUR OF SOME EUROPEAN CAPTIALS, STARTING IN PARIS ON MONDAY 22 OCTOBER.

2. HE HAS ASKED IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD RECEIVE HIM ON 23 OCTOBER.

3. HE INTENDS ALSO TO VISIT ROME BUT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE APPROACHED UNTIL THE ANSWER FROM LONDON IS RECEIVED.

4. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY REPLY BY DESKBY TELEGRAM.

TUNNELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 38

ADVANCE 38

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR SLATER
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO

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MDADAN [illegible]48

HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Kuwait: visits of

FCO

DEPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1990

Dear Hugh,

VISIT OF SHAIKH SA'AD

Thank you for your letter of 30 July about the invitation to Shaikh Sa'ad. The Prime Minister agrees rather reluctantly to invite him for the period of 28-30 November. We could do a Guard of Honour followed by a lunch here with talks in the early afternoon on 28 November (but you will wish to bear in mind that the Prime Minister is due to address the North Atlantic Assembly in Westminster Hall at 1100 that morning). I hope very much she could be spared a return banquet and no commitment should be made on this.

Incidentally, you are wrong to say that Shaikh Sa'ad is the only official visitor in November for whom you are seeking the Prime Minister's involvement: I recall that Senor Gonzalez is coming on 26 November.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ce/c ①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

30 July 1990

You could just manage this, & we want to bolster the Kuwaitis. But you should be aware that you are addressing the North Atlantic Assembly that morning: and you have Senor Gonzalez two days earlier. Agree nevertheless?

Dear Charles,

CDP 30/7

Agp

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad
Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

You and Simon Gass spoke on the telephone about your letter of 6 July.

Yes

You will recall that Shaikh Sa'ad postponed at the last minute the official visit he was to make to the UK in March. Since then the Prime Minister has written to him twice - on 31 May about defence sales, and on 2 July to congratulate him on his reappointment as Prime Minister. On both occasions, she expressed the hope that Shaikh Sa'ad would be able to visit Britain later this year.

We have been looking for possible dates. Diaries are already very full. But we understand that HM The Queen, the Prince and Princess of Wales and the Lord Mayor are all likely to be available during the period 28-30 November. We are suggesting a visit from Wednesday to Friday inclusive. This would enable Shaikh Sa'ad to call on The Queen on the first day of his visit, as he requested. Noon on 28 November has been pencilled into The Queen's diary (Her Majesty is not available later in the day). As for the Prime Minister's involvement, we would propose, also on 28 November, a guard of honour, followed by lunch at No 10 and then talks; and - if possible - the Prime Minister's attendance at Shaikh Sa'ad's return banquet (perhaps on 29 November).

We should be grateful to know if the dates suggested would suit the Prime Minister. We realise that the end of November will be an exceptionally busy time for her. However, 28-30 November are likely to be the only dates before Christmas which HM The Queen and other members of the Royal Family could manage. Shaikh Sa'ad's is so far the only official visit in November for which we are seeking the Prime Minister's involvement. Following the Prime Minister's two recent letters to Shaikh Sa'ad, the Kuwaitis are expecting an invitation for the autumn, and we risk causing offence if we do not propose dates for a visit before the end of this year.

No. Also Gonzalez

/If

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If Shaikh Sa'ad cannot accept the November dates, we shall suggest that he postpone his visit until late 1991 or 1992. The Royal Visits Committee have recommended that, subject to Ministerial and Palace approval, we should offer the first half of 1991 State Visit to the Amir of Kuwait. Visits by both the Amir and the Crown Prince within six months may seem excessive. But there are good reasons for inviting both, given our relations with Kuwait and the special circumstances behind each invitation.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) since the Ambassador at Kuwait has recommended a meeting between the Defence Secretary and Shaikh Sa'ad and we shall want to use the visit to advance our defence sales interests in Kuwait.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

KUWAIT : Visit of Amir. Decl

CONFIDENTIAL

File CM

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 July 1990

Dear Simon,

VISIT OF SHAIKH SA'AD

Thank you for your letter of 5 July about the visit of Shaikh Sa'ad. The end of November is a very risky period to be trying to fix visits, with the likelihood of summits of various sorts in the offing. Moreover, my understanding is that the Amir of Kuwait will be coming on a State Visit in early 1991. I am therefore a bit dubious about the wisdom of trying to get Shaikh Sa'ad here at the time in question. 28 November is not a particularly good day for the Prime Minister, since she is addressing the North Atlantic Assembly that morning: and she would, I am sure, be most reluctant to attend a return dinner on 29 November, given that it will be an exceptionally busy time of year.

In short, my preference would be to postpone the visit until late 1991.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

S L Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

010

Charles
This is the day of the North Atlantic Assembly speech at 11.00.
CDS

Charles
She has a reception and dinner on 29th
CDS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1990

Dear Charles,

But what about 24 November instead? Margaret
CDS

Can we do 28 November?
CDP

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

You will recall that Shaikh Sa'ad postponed at the last minute the official visit he was to make to the UK in March. The reasons were a mixture of perceived inadequacies in the programme, and domestic preoccupations (Shaikh Sa'ad was then conducting nationwide consultations on constitutiona reform in the wake of pressure to revive the Kuwait National Assembly).

Shaikh Sa'ad later told HM Ambassador that he very much hoped to come to London in the autumn. We have been looking for possible dates. Diaries are already full. But we understand that HM The Queen, the Prince and Princess of Wales and the Lord Mayor are all likely to be available during the period 28-30 November. We are suggesting a visit from Wednesday to Friday inclusive, since this would enable Shaikh Sa'ad to call on The Queen on the first day of his visit, as he requested. Noon on 28 November has been pencilled in to The Queen's diary (Her Majesty is not available later in the day). As for the Prime Minister's involvement, we envisage a Guard of Honour, followed by lunch at No 10 and then talks, also on 28 November; and - if possible - the Prime Minister's attendance at Shaikh Sa'ad's return dinner (perhaps on 29 November). We should be grateful to know if the dates proposed would suit the Prime Minister. Shaikh Sa'ad is so far the only official visit in November for which we are seeking the Prime Minister's involvement.

We do not intend to press Shaikh Sa'ad too hard. If he shows hesitation over November, we shall suggest he postpone his visit until late 1991 or 1992. We do not wish to jeopardise the Amir of Kuwait's possible State Visit, in spring 1991 (the invitation has not yet issued).

/I am

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) since the Ambassador at Kuwait has recommended a meeting between the Defence Secretary and Shaikh Sa'ad and we shall want to use the visit to advance our defence sales interests in Kuwait.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

010

Copy

cell

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON S.W.7

سفارة دولة الكويت
لندن

13th March 1990

CDP 1613

The Embassy of the State of Kuwait presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose two messages from His Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad AlAbdullah AlSalem AlSabah, addressed to His Royal Highness Prince Charles, and to the Prime Minister , The Rt Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

The Embassy of the State of Kuwait avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT UNITED KINGDOM

The Protocol Department,
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London, S.W.1.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T41A/90
Subject cc Master
cc OPS

DIWAN OF THE
CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER
STATE OF KUWAIT
*****

21st February 1990

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street, London.

Your Excellency

I would like to thank you sincerely for your kind message concerning my official visit to London which was originally planned to begin 12th March 1990. I was looking forward to the visit as an effective contribution to our common objective of further consolidating the historical cooperation between our two friendly countries and as a good opportunity for a valued exchange of views on various issues of mutual concern.

However, I regret very much that, due to a recent revision of my schedule which requires my presence at home for the coming few months, I shall be unable to visit London next month. I am sure that you will understand the circumstances that have led to this, and I earnestly hope to realise the visit at a mutually convenient future date.

With best wishes,

and warmest personal regards

Saad AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah
Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

دولة الكويت
ديوان سمو ولي العهد ورئيس مجلس الوزراء

سعادة السيدة مارغريت ثاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة - لندن

أود أن أعرب لكم عن خالص الشكر لرسالتكم الودية بشأن زيارتي الرسمية الى لندن والتي كان مقررا أن تبدأ في ١٢ مارس ١٩٩٠ .

ولقد كنت أتطلع الى هذه الزيارة باعتبارها اسهاما فعالا في تحقيق هدفنا المشترك لتعزيز التعاون التاريخي بين بلدينا الصديقين ، وفرصة طيبة لتبادل قيّم لوجهات النظر حول مختلف القضايا ذات الاهتمام المشترك . ولكن يؤسفني كثيرا أنني بسبب تعديل طرأ مؤخرا على برنامجي مما يتطلب وجودي في البلاد خلال الشهور القليلة القادمة، سوف لا أتمكن من زيارة لندن في الشهر القادم .

انني على ثقة من أنكم سوف تتفهمون الاعتبارات التي أدت الى ذلك ، ولي وطيد الأمل بأن أقوم بالزيارة في موعد مناسب للطرفين مستقبلا .

مع خالص التحيات

واطيب التمنيات

سعد العبدالله السالم الصباح
ولي العهد ورئيس مجلس الوزراء

الكويت في ٢٥ رجب ١٤١٠ هـ
٢١ فبراير ١٩٩٠ م

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF THE CROWN PRINCE OF KUWAIT

The Crown Prince of Kuwait has postponed his visit in March, citing domestic political problems. He does indeed have some:

We shall probably never know. But he has said that he hopes to come towards the end of the year.

CDP

MT

CHARLES POWELL
19 February 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Pow
cc/c

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 February 1990

VISIT OF THE CROWN PRINCE OF KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 13 February about the difficulties which have arisen over the programme for the visit of the Crown Prince of Kuwait. The Prime Minister agrees that he cannot be accorded treatment equal to that given to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. She is content for our Ambassador to speak in the terms suggested in your letter.

C. D. POWELL

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc P.C.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister Agree? CDP

13 February 1990

Dear Charles

top. Yes 13/2

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait: 12-14 March

Since your letter of 31 January, a serious complication has arisen over this visit. Shaikh Sa'ad, inspired by the arrangements made for Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in June 1988, has asked for a number of changes to his programme, including the bringing forward of the Audience of The Queen to the first day, and the conversion of the Mansion House lunch into a dinnner.

We shall try to show some flexibility over the programme, but we cannot go so far as to accord Shaikh Sa'ad treatment equal to that given to Crown Prince Abdullah. Shaikh Sa'ad's programme is prestigious by any standards, and we shall try through HM Ambassador to persuade him to drop the more unreasonable of his demands. It would help us to do so, and to make it more difficult for the Crown Prince to withdraw from the visit at this stage, if Mr Hinchcliffe could be authorised to convey an oral message from the Prime Minister. This might say that the Prime Minister has asked him to reaffirm how much she is looking forward to the Crown Prince's visit next month; that she attaches major importance to it as symbolising the very close ties between the UK and Kuwait, as an opportunity to strengthen our bilateral cooperation, and as an occasion for detailed discussion of regional and international issues of concern to both countries; and that she hopes for the sake of both our countries that it will be an outstanding success.

We would be grateful for urgent approval of an oral message on these lines.

Yours ever

Bob

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

KUWAIT: visit of Amir 12/82.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

KK

c/Foreign/Saad

tc PC
AP
Supt. Butler

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1990

VISIT OF SHAIKH SA'AD: RETURN DINNER

I have consulted the Prime Minister about Shaikh Sa'ad's invitation for her to attend a return dinner on 14 March at Claridge's. The Prime Minister has agreed to go. I should be grateful if you could inform the Kuwaitis and arrange also for a Private Secretary to be invited.

BF/1

Could you also please say to the Kuwaitis that we must avoid any public knowledge of the Prime Minister's attendance, for as long as possible, on security grounds.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

26 January 1990

Prime Minister

These return banquets are the devil. It is a Wednesday, which you don't like: and you already have the Chief Whip's drinks.

But Arabs are sensitive.

Agree to go? Yes/no

Or refuse, pleading preparations for Cabinet/Question?

CDP 30/1

Dear Charles

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait: 12-14 March

Shaikh Sa'ad will visit London as a Guest of Government at the Prime Minister's invitation from 12-14 March inclusive. The visit will begin with a Guard of Honour, talks and lunch with the Prime Minister.

Other firm items on the Crown Prince's programme include a luncheon hosted by the Lord Mayor and a dinner to be given by Mr Hurd on Tuesday 13 March, an audience with The Queen at Buckingham Palace and a luncheon hosted by The Prince and Princess of Wales on Wednesday 14 March. The Kuwaiti Ambassador has now told us that Shaikh Sa'ad wishes to offer a return dinner, probably at Claridges, on the final evening of his visit, and would like to invite the Prince of Wales, the Prime Minister and the Lord Mayor.

We believe that Shaikh Sa'ad attaches considerable importance to reciprocating hospitality at the end of this visit. The Kuwaitis are sensitive on protocol matters. The attention publicly paid to Shaikh Sa'ad will be carefully noted by them. The Kuwaitis have noted the attention given to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 1988, and will be hoping for a similar high level programme. The Prime Minister attended the return dinner given by Crown Prince Abdullah.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should if possible agree to attend a return dinner given by Shaikh Sa'ad. He is likely to be the most senior official Arab visitor to London this year. We believe this would be seen by the Kuwaitis (and by other Gulf countries) as a significant and special gesture, marking the closeness of our friendship. If the Prime Minister were able to pay this additional attention to the Crown Prince, it would give great satisfaction not only to Shaikh Sa'ad personally but also to the Amir of Kuwait who is likely to pay a State Visit to Britain in 1991.

Yours ever

Robin

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

21 December 1989

Dear Charles

Private Visit to London of Shaikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani: Amir of Quatar

We have learned that Shaikh Khalifa and his family will pay a private visit to London from 9 January (after a visit to Algeria). They will be staying at his house in Hampstead, but we do not know for how long.

In her letter of thanks to Shaikh Khalifa following her stopover in Doha on her way back from CHOGM, the Prime Minister expressed the hope that they might meet again before long, if the Amir visited London. He would no doubt welcome a meeting in January. It would contribute to our continuing efforts to cultivate the Qatari ruling family. However, we understand that the Prime Minister's diary commitments in January may rule out a meeting on this occasion.

I enclose a draft letter of welcome which the Prime Minister might wish to send. Such a message would be warmly received. We have included a general reference to a possible meeting. We are also informing the Palace of the Amir's forthcoming visit to London.

Yours ever

Bob

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Reply from the Prime Minister

I am delighted to welcome you on your private visit to London. I hope that you and your family have a very pleasant and enjoyable stay here.

I recall with enormous pleasure and gratitude our recent meeting in Doha and your generous hospitality on that occasion. I was glad to experience for myself how close and confident our relations are.

You may not want to be bothered with any official business on this visit, although I should like to try to find an opportunity to continue our discussions next year. Meanwhile, I shall be glad to ask a Foreign Office Minister to call on you if you would like this.

If there is any other way we can help you, please let me know.

CMP

His Highness Shaikh Khalifa
bin Hamad Al Thani, GCB, GCMG
c/o Embassy of the State of Qatar

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 October 1989

CDP

Dear Charles

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, March 1990

Thank you for your letter of 25 September conveying the Prime Minister's agreement to the visit beginning on 12 March.

I enclose a formal letter of acceptance from Shaikh Sa'ad to the Prime Minister in response to her letter of 3 August.

Shaikh Sa'ad has also written to The Prince of Wales in response to his personal letter in support of the Prime Minister's invitation.

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

file DB
cc: (Foreign. Kuwait)
bc: PC

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 September 1989

INVITATION TO THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT

Bob Peirce wrote to me on 22 September asking whether 12 March 1990 would be convenient for Shaikh Sa'ad's visit. We have put this in the diary and it can be considered agreed.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPR

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1989

Agreed
Can we do it?
CP

Yes
noted in diary
AP
25/9

Dear Charles

Invitation to Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

The Prime Minister wrote to Shaikh Sa'ad on 3 August inviting him to visit the United Kingdom as a Guest of Government during the week beginning 12 March 1990.

The Crown Prince has accepted the period proposed and asked that his greetings be conveyed to the Prime Minister (Kuwait telno 248, copy enclosed).

Stephen Wall's letter of 22 February explained why talks and a meal with the Prime Minister would be a most important element of his visit. His letter of 31 July recommended offering Shaikh Sa'ad a Guard of Honour. As a Prime Minister he qualifies for this honour. His neighbours the Crown Prince of Qatar and Saudi Arabia received Guards of Honour during their visits last year.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be content for Shaikh Sa'ad's visit to begin on Monday 12 March with a Guard of Honour at about 1145 am to be followed by talks (1200 - 1245) and lunch at No 10 (1245 or 1300).

Yours ever

Bob Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

121374
MDLIAN 9215

CONFIDENTIAL
FM KUWAIT
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 248
OF 100618Z SEPTEMBER 89

Mr Langman
Mr Heigl
11/9.

We should inform the Palace and No 10. This tel. needs a wider distr. within the FCO

FOR MED

MISS ASHDOWN'S LETTER OF 7 AUGUST AND HEIGL'S LETTER OF 17 AUGUST: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE TO UK

1. THE CROWN PRINCE RECEIVED ME AT SHORT NOTICE ON 9 SEPTEMBER TO DELIVER THE LETTERS FROM THE PRINCE OF WALES AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE DATE WILL SUIT, AND ASKED FOR HIS GREETINGS TO BE CONVEYED TO HRH AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ALSO SENT BEST WISHES FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY TO MR HINCHCLIFFE (MED PLEASE PASS TO 01-444-8565).

Done. 11/9

2. SHAIKH SAAD DOES NOT YET HAVE ANY PARTICULAR SUGGESTIONS FOR HIS PROGRAMME. I FLOATED THE CITY, NEW TECHNIQUES IN POLICE OR INTERNAL SECURITY WORK, HENDON ETC WITHOUT GETTING A TAKE. IT IS RATHER EARLY TO EXPECT HIM TO FOCUS ON NEXT MARCH, BUT HE KNOWS WE ARE READY TO TRY TO FIX WHATEVER REQUESTS EMERGE. HE HAS NOT DECIDED WHETHER SHAIKHA LATIFA WILL GO AND NEED A SEPARATE PROGRAMME, WILL GO PRIVATELY, OR WILL NOT GO AT ALL.

3. SHAIKH SAAD CAN MANAGE WELL WITHOUT AN INTERPRETER. SHAIKHA LATIFA WOULD PROBABLY NEED A FEMALE ONE.

BLACKLEY

NBK027/1

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 1

MAIN 1

NO DISTRIBUTION MED

NNNN

Date 12/9.

CONFIDENTIAL

PROTOCOL DEPT.

LPS.
PS/PUS
PS/Mr WALDEGRAVE.
Mr TOMKYS.
Mr GORE-BOOTH.

Additional Distribution req'd.
P.K.H.
12/9.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DIWAN OF
THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER
STATE OF KUWAIT
******

20 September 1989

Your Excellency

I received with deep appreciation your kind letter dated 3rd August 1989 and the gracious invitation to pay an official visit to your great country.

We still remember your visit to Kuwait in September 1981 during which we had the pleasure of meeting with you, and also the following meetings and fruitful talks we had with Your Excellency in the course of my private visits to your beautiful country which further consolidated the strong bonds of friendship existing between the State of Kuwait and the United Kingdom.

While accepting with pleasure your kind invitation to pay an official visit to the United Kingdom in the date proposed in your letter, and meeting again with Your Excellency and HRH Prince Charles and top officials in the British Government, I express my confidence that this visit will provide another opportunity to discuss with you personally issues of mutual concern to our two friendly countries and peoples and other issues of mutual concern.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my best wishes for your good health and happiness and for the continued prosperity and progress of the friendly people of the United Kingdom.

With my best wishes

Sgd.

Saad AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah
Crown Prince and Prime Minister

The Rt. Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

سعادة السيدة مارغريت ثاتشر

رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة

لندن

صاحبة السعادة

تسلمت ببالغ التقدير رسالتكم الودية المؤرخة في ٣ أغسطس ١٩٨٩ والمتضمنة دعوتكم الكريمة لنا لزيارة بلدكم العظيم .

اننا لانزال نذكر زيارتكم للكويت في سبتمبر ١٩٨١ التي سعدنا فيها بلقائكم وكذلك باللقاءات والمحادثات المثمرة اللاحقة التي تمت بيننا أثناء زياراتي الخاصة لبلدكم الجميل والتي اسهمت في تعزيز العلاقات الوثيقة المتميزة القائمة بين المملكة المتحدة ودولة الكويت .

وانه اذ يسرني قبول دعوتكم الكريمة للقيام بزيارة رسمية للمملكة المتحدة في الموعد المقترح في رسالتكم والالتقاء مجددا بسعادتكم وبصاحب السمو الملكي ولي عهد المملكة المتحدة الامير تشارلز وكبار المسئولين في الحكومة البريطانية ، فانني على ثقة بأن هذه الزيارة ستتيح فرصة أخرى للتباحث معكم شخصيا في الامور التي تهم بلدينا وشعبينا الصديقين والامور الاخرى ذات الاهتمام المشترك .

وأغتنم هذه المناسبة لابعث لسعادتكم بأطيب تمنياتي بوافر الصحة والسعادة وبدوام التقدم والازدهار لشعب المملكة المتحدة الصديق .

مع أطيب تمنياتي

سعد العبدالله السالم الصباح

ولي العهدورئيس مجلس الوزراء

الكويت في ٢٠ صفر ١٤١٠ هـ

٢٠ سبتمبر ١٩٨٩ م

file SKW
acto

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 August 1989

Your Highness,

It gives me great pleasure to invite Your Highness to visit the United Kingdom as a Guest of Her Majesty's Government in 1990.

I remember well Your Highness's kindness to me during my visit to Kuwait in September 1981. Since then the relations between our two countries have gone from strength to strength and I look forward to renewing our acquaintance. I know that Their Royal Highnesses The Prince and Princess of Wales are also looking forward to meeting you again.

I would like to propose the week beginning 12 March 1990, in the hope that this might be convenient to Your Highness.

I should like to take this opportunity to convey my best wishes to Your Highness and the people of Kuwait.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah, KCMG

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

I have marked this in the diary. Please let me know when you have timings.

Amanda
1/8

10 DOWNING STREET

Amanda

Is the timing all right for the PM?

M

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 July 1989

Dear Charles,

Invitation to Shaikh Sa'ad, Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has agreed that we should invite Shaikh Sa'ad to visit the United Kingdom as a Guest of Government early next year (your letter of 7 March).

In my letter of 22 February, I explained why we attach importance to this visit and why talks and a meal with the Prime Minister would be an important feature of the visit. We now propose that the visit should take place in the week beginning 12 March 1990. We understand from informal soundings that this would fit Shaikh Sa'ad's diary. It would also appear to fit The Prince of Wales' diary and that of others whom we expect to feature during the visit.

We would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister would be content with this timing.

We presume that you would prefer the formal invitation to be issued in the name of the Prime Minister (my letter of 22 February refers). I attach a draft letter of invitation which the Prime Minister may wish to send.

The Prince of Wales is willing to take part in the programme; he met Shaikh Sa'ad during his visit to Kuwait in March. We think it would be useful if he could write personally to Crown Prince Sa'ad, to say that he is looking forward to the visit. The Prince of Wales sent a similar letter to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in 1987 to coincide with an invitation from the Prime Minister and the formula seems to have worked well.

We recommend offering Shaikh Sa'ad a Guard of Honour. As a Prime Minister he qualifies for this honour. And his neighbours the Crown Princes of Qatar and Saudi Arabia received Guards of Honour during their visits last year.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

HH Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah
al Salim al Sabah
Crown Prince and Prime Minister of
the State of Kuwait

Copies to:

SW2AYP

SUBJECT:

It gives me great pleasure to invite Your Royal Highness to visit the United Kingdom as a Guest of Her Majesty's Government in 1990.

I remember well Your Royal Highness's kindness to me during my visit to Kuwait in September 1981. Since then the relations between our two countries have gone from strength to strength and I look forward to renewing our acquaintance. I know that Their Royal Highnesses The Prince and Princess of Wales are also looking forward to meeting you again.

~~would that that~~ like to propose

I wonder ~~whether~~ the week beginning 12 March 1990, ~~would~~ in ~~be~~ be hope that this might be convenient to Your Royal Highness?.

I should like to take this opportunity to convey my best wishes to Your Royal Highness and the people of Kuwait.

CR

P12ABI

KUWAIT: visit of Crown Prince Shaikh Sa'ad

Dec 82



CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary 7 March 1989

VISIT OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT AS GUEST OF GOVERNMENT

Thank you for your letter of 22 February with the proposal that we should invite the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait for a Guest of Government visit in the early part of next year. The Prime Minister is content with this subject to our finding convenient dates.

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 February 1989

Prime Minister

Agreed that an invitation be issued in your name to the Crown Prince of Kuwait for a visit early next year?

Yes

CDP 22/2

Dear Charles,

Visit of the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait as Guest of Government

Following the Foreign Secretary's visit to the Gulf in January, he has been giving some thought to future inward visits from the Gulf States. The President of the UAE has agreed the dates for his State Visit in July. And the Royal Visits Committee is considering our suggestion that the State Visit by the Emir of Kuwait (originally scheduled for 1983) be reinstated in 1991. These two State Visits will complete the cycle of inward State Visits since Her Majesty The Queen went to the Gulf in 1979.

During 1987 and 1988 we received the Crown Princes of Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as guests of the Government. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi was invited in 1984 but turned the visit into a private one shortly before it occurred. After Shaikh Zaid's State Visit in July, we will want to consider when the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince's visit should be reinstated and how best to maintain the momentum of contacts with the ruling families of the other Emirates. The Sultan of Oman is, of course, coming privately in July, and will be lunching with the Prime Minister.

The Foreign Secretary's present proposal is to invite the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, HH Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah, to visit London as a guest of the Government during the early part of next year. The likely timing would be early March, although it is too soon to propose precise dates. A visit in that period would be well timed. It would fall almost midway between the visit by The Prince and Princess of Wales to Kuwait next month, and the possible State Visit by the Emir in 1991.

We have not previously had a senior Kuwaiti here as a guest of Government since 1935. Shaikh Sa'ad does, however, make regular private visits to London. On the last occasion, in March 1988, he called on the Prime Minister for talks. An important ingredient of the Crown Prince's visit would, therefore, be talks and a meal with the Prime Minister.

/As

As the Crown Prince is also the Prime Minister, we presume you would prefer the invitation to be issued in the name of our Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister is content, we should ask our Ambassador to convey an oral invitation soon to Shaikh Sa'ad for early 1990. This could then be mentioned to The Prince of Wales before His Royal Highness visits Kuwait next month, so that he can offer to meet the Crown Prince during his visit here (if the Prime Minister agrees).

Yours,

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

EMBASSY
OF
THE STATE OF KUWAIT
46 QUEEN'S GATE
LONDON S.W.7

سفارة دولة الكويت
لندن

CDP
18/7

18th, July, 1988.

Our Ref: KKA 124/88.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to enclose the original letter (a copy has been sent previously)from His Highness The Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah.

With the assurance of my highest consideration.

Ghazi Al-Rayes

Ghazi Al-Rayes,
Ambassador.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
10 Downing St.,
London, S.W.1.

Encs...

043102
MDLOAN 5538

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO PRIORITY KUWAIT
TELNO 198
OF 111200Z JULY 88

MIPT: VISIT OF SHEIKH SA'AD

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SHEIKH SA'AD:

BEGINS. I AM SORRY NOT TO BE ABLE TO MEET YOU ON THIS OCCASION DURING YOUR BRIEF VISIT TO LONDON. I MUCH ENJOYED OUR DISCUSSION IN MARCH. SADLY, DESPITE OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS AT THE UN, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ SHOWS NO SIGN OF NEARING A SETTLEMENT. WE ARE NONETHELESS RELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY THREAT TO KUWAIT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN RECENT WEEKS.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO VISITING KUWAIT NEXT WEEK. I ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO HIS VISIT AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM REMAINS READY TO HELP KUWAIT WITH HER DEFENCE NEEDS AND I KNOW THAT A NUMBER OF ITEMS OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT ARE CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. I HOPE THESE TALKS WILL BE BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION WHICH IS SATISFACTORY TO BOTH OF US.

I SEND TO YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF KUWAIT MY WARM GOOD WISHES. I HOPE YOU WILL SOON RETURN TO LONDON FOR A LONGER VISIT. MEANWHILE MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WISH YOU A SAFE AND PLEASANT ONWARD JOURNEY. ENDS.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 107

MAIN 102

LIMITED
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NEWS DEPT

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
MR MUNRO
MR BOYD

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DEFENCE DEPT
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MR RATFORD
SIR D MIERS
MR SLATER
MR CARRICK

ADDITIONAL 5

NO 10
SEC(O)(C), MOD

HDES

NNNN

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

THE CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER
STATE OF KUWAIT

9 July, 1988

Your Excellency

I received with appreciation your kind message on my stop-over in London and I would like to thank you most cordially for your good wishes.

It is regrettable that despite all the efforts towards a settlement to the Iraq-Iran war, including Security Council Resolution 598, the tragic conflict has gone on unabated for almost eight years now. We earnestly hope that the five permanent Members of the Security Council will assume their responsibility and find the means to bring about an early end to this devastating war.

I will be abroad when your Secretary of State for Defence visits Kuwait next week. But I am sure he will have full cooperation and help from his counterpart and other concerned officials in Kuwait. I wish him a successful and fruitful visit. We highly appreciate the United Kingdom's readiness to help us with our defence needs and believe this truly reflects the longstanding close relationship between our two countries.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

We share the deep sadness over the tragic explosion of the North Sea Piper Alpha oil rig and I wish to convey once again, my sincere condolences and heartfelt sympathies to you and, through you, to the families of the victims.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely

Saad Sabah

Saad AlAbdullah AlSalim AlSabah

The Right Honourable,
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London.

File CCRO PA

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 March 1988

Your Highness,

I am writing without delay to thank you for the magnificent gift which arrived this morning. It is a most handsome piece and will be a great adornment to No.10 Downing Street. I am most grateful for your Highness' kindness and generosity.

I very much enjoyed our meeting yesterday and found it invaluable to have the benefit of your Highness' wisdom on developments in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East. I also have very much in mind the matter of a school for Your Highness' son. I shall follow this up and write to you in due course.

I hope that Your Highness has had an interesting and rewarding visit. I send my warm greetings to His Highness the Emir.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani

With the Compliments of

Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani

Heir Apparent

of the State of Qatar

SUBJECT
cc MASTER

CONFIDENTIAL

file

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1988

Dear Robert,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT

The Prime Minister had a talk this evening with the Prime Minister of Kuwait. Shaikh Sa'ad was accompanied by the Kuwaiti Ambassador (at least I think it was him).

Introduction

The Prime Minister asked for her warm greetings to be conveyed to the Amir. Shaikh Sa'ad said that he brought regards to the Prime Minister from the Amir. Her visit was well remembered in Kuwait and the Amir hoped that she would come again soon.

The Gulf

The Prime Minister asked Shaikh Sa'ad how he saw the prospects in the Gulf War. Shaikh Sa'ad said that the situation seemed to have gone from bad to worse in the last few days. Kuwait hoped that the United Nations' Security Council would take firm steps to put an end to the disastrous war, by following up SCR 598 and imposing an arms embargo on Iran. He had heard that the Soviet Union was now suggesting that the United Nations' Secretary General should go on a fresh mission to the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom was very anxious to see the Security Council pass a follow up resolution and had been working hard to achieve that. The Chinese Foreign Minister had said that China would accept such a resolution. The main difficulty lay with the Soviet Union. She hoped that the Arab Governments would exercise as much pressure as possible on the Soviet Union to agree to an arms embargo on Iran. She expected Secretary Shultz would be pressing this at his meeting with Mr Shevardnadze. Resumption of the War of the Cities had been a setback but must not discourage us from continuing to press ahead in New York. The priority must be to get a second resolution in place. Thereafter there might be scope for a further initiative to negotiate a truce.

Shaikh Sa'ad said that Kuwait and indeed other Gulf States were well content with the United Kingdom's policy. However, he had heard rumours that we might be considering a reduction in our naval presence in the Gulf. He hoped that this was not true. The Prime Minister said there was no question of reducing the Armilla Patrol. But in view of the virtual cessation of mining by the Iranians, we would be reducing the number of our minehunting and minesweeping vessels slightly. The remaining vessels would be co-operating much more closely than hitherto with the Belgians and Dutch, so there should be no significant overall reduction in the effectiveness of our effort.

The Prime Minister asked whether Shaikh Sa'ad had any information about developments within Iran. Shaikh Sa'ad commented only that Ayatollah Khomeini remained in absolute control and no-one else in Iran dared argue with him. While he lived, the war would go on.

Arab/Israel

The Prime Minister explained to Shaikh Sa'ad our approach to the Arab/Israel problem. We had continually pressed the United States to take an initiative. The current unrest on the West Bank and on Gaza made it more urgent than ever to start negotiations. It was important that King Hussein's position should be fully protected. He must have absolute assurance that the proposals now put forward by the Americans would not get only as far as interim arrangements for the West Bank and then grind to a halt. The King needed an assurance that Jordan would get back territory in return for peace. Little progress had been made during Mr Shamir's recent visit to Washington. We now looked to the Americans to put further pressure on him to accept their proposals. It was important that King Hussein should not meanwhile reject them: indeed it would be desirable for him to give some public sign of support. Early elections in Israel were a possibility, but her feeling was that Shamir would only agree to these if he was confident that he would win.

BP/KIO

The Prime Minister said that she wanted to mention the matter of Kuwait investment in BP. She had publicly welcomed the original investment. We had been grateful for the assurances that Kuwait would not be seeking board representation, and indeed had no interest in control or a management role, seeing their holding as a long term investment. The Prime Minister went on to explain the OFT's role. There was nothing discriminatory about their investigation: similar investigations had been initiated in the past in cases involving substantially lower shareholdings. But the fact was the larger the Kuwaiti shareholding the greater the likelihood there would be of a reference to the Monpolies and Mergers Commission. There was also a further point. Under US law, a foreign company could not be granted rights to exploit natural resources in the United States

unless its own country granted reciprocal rights. Kuwait did not grant such rights and there was a real risk that BP's competitors in the United States would argue that the substantial Kuwait shareholding disqualified BP from obtaining further concessions there. It would undoubtedly improve the perception of BP in the United States if Kuwait's shareholding was somewhat reduced. Indeed such a reduction was likely to increase the profitability of the shareholding both for Kuwait and for other shareholders. We wanted Kuwait to have a successful investment. If Shaikh Sa'ad accepted her analysis, the Kuwait Government might consider reducing their shareholding over a period to say 15 per cent.

Shaikh Sa'ad contented himself with remarking "I see, I understand", at various points in the Prime Minister's explanation.

Defence Sales

The Prime Minister said that she understood that Kuwait was considering its future defence spending plans. We believed that the Challenger Tank was particularly well adapted to Kuwait's needs. The version which we were offering them was that which was entering service with the British Army. We believed that the Warrior Desert Fighting Vehicle was equally well adapted for Kuwait and we hoped they would also give consideration to acquiring Tornado. She stressed that Britain was now through its economic difficulties and growing faster than any other European country. It was well worth doing business with us. Shaikh Sa'ad made no intelligible comment.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Stephen Ratcliffe (Department of Trade and Industry) and Stephen Hadrill (Department of Energy).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Charles Powell

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., MVO.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone ~~01-930 7022~~ 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/17/3L

22nd March 1988

CDJ 22/3..

Dear Charles,

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KUWAITI PRIME MINISTER

In your letter of 9th March you asked for a short brief for a possible meeting between the Prime Minister and Sheikh Sa'ad.

After some years in which there have been no major purchases of defence equipment, we have information that Kuwait has allocated approximately £7bn for a procurement programme for a wide range of equipment. A meeting between the Prime Minister and Sheikh Sa'ad will provide an opportunity to emphasise that the UK places a high value on close defence links with Kuwait and that the purchase of British equipment would enhance our already close defence co-operation.

There are three projects in which UK industry has particular interests.

a. Fighter aircraft. Kuwait is looking at the American F16 and F18 and the French Mirage 2000. It is rumoured that a political agreement has been reached recently between France and Kuwait for the supply of 40 Mirage 2000. Against the background that the Kuwaiti Air Force (KAF) is known to be impressed by the Tornado the Prime Minister might stress the advantages that Tornado has over its competitors. It has a substantial advantage in the range at which targets can be identified which in turn increases its kill probability and makes other KAF aircraft more effective (the 'force multiplier' effect). An order for a squadron of aircraft (18) and the associated support package would be worth in excess of £800M.

b. Tanks. Kuwait wishes to update its tank fleet, currently Chieftains. Challenger is well regarded by the Kuwait Defence Committee but the American M1 tank is being offered at a very competitive price. The total requirement is for two hundred

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

tanks worth nearly £800M. It is the latest version of Challenger, now entering British Army service and yet to be sold overseas, which is being offered. It incorporates a new fire control system, advanced night vision equipment and the unrivalled protection afforded by Chobham Armour.

c. Infantry Fighting Vehicles, for which Kuwait has a long-standing requirement. Following trials in Kuwait in 1984, GKN have produced the Desert Fighting Vehicle version of Warrior, specially suited to operations in the Middle East. Although Kuwait had agreed to in-country trials of this version this summer, we are concerned that they may have taken a decision in favour of the Russian BMP-2. Comparative hot weather trials would be very much to Warrior's advantage and would demonstrate its speed, carrying capacity and all terrain ability as well as its superior armour protection and maintenance characteristics. The Kuwaitis are believed to have an initial requirement of 245. The Russians have offered a maximum of 200. Warrior could be supplied without any limitation. The value of an order could be up to £250M, extending to £500M over a ten year period. Warrior has not yet been sold overseas.

I am sending copies of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Stephen Ratcliffe (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely

(D C J BALL)
Private Secretary

cc BUP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT

You are to see the Prime Minister of Kuwait, Shaikh Sa'ad, tomorrow evening. He is here on a private visit (he has a house in London) and for medical treatment.

He does not have much influence on oil and investment matters. But you will want to mention the BP/KIO problem. There is a note by the Department of Energy in the folder, together with my record of your talk with Sir Peter Walters. I suggest that you come to this issue late in the discussion.

You might start by talking about the situation in the Gulf and Arab/Israel: there is some material in the FCO letter in the folder.

You should also raise defence sales prospects (note by the Ministry of Defence). The best prospects are for Challenger, where the version being offered to Kuwait is the advanced one about to come into service with the British Army. We also believe they need Tornado and the Warrior desert-fighting vehicle.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

21 March 1988

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PK
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CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 March 1988

CDP 22/3

Dear Charles

Call on the Prime Minister by His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

When Mr Mellor called on Shaikh Sa'ad on 10 March he conveyed an oral invitation to him to call on the Prime Minister. The call will take place at 5.30 pm tomorrow. Shaikh Sa'ad is a regular visitor to London, where he owns a house in Belgrave Square. He has been here since 28 February for medical treatment. A personality note is attached. This briefing letter has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary.

BP/KIO apart, our relations with Kuwait are in good shape. The Gulf conflict, and in particular Britain's role in trying to promote a settlement through the UN, have enabled us to develop our political dialogue over the past year. Shaikh Sabah, the Deputy Prime Minister, had talks with the Foreign Secretary last September. Mr Mellor has seen his opposite number four times in the past nine months. Kuwaiti Ministers seem more ready to make themselves available to British Ministers and officials when in London. The occasion of Shaikh Sa'ad's private visit provides a useful opportunity to continue the dialogue with Kuwaiti Ministers at the highest level.

The subject uppermost in Shaikh Sa'ad's mind will be the Gulf situation and in particular the Iranian threat to Kuwait. The Kuwaitis are in a very vulnerable position. They cleverly played off the US and the Soviet Union over the issue of re-flagging last year, and thereby secured protection for their shipping at little national cost. They continue to argue that protection is the responsibility of the international community. We have discouraged further re-flagging of Kuwaiti ships on to the British register on the grounds that Armilla cannot provide full protection up to Kuwait and that our resources are already fully stretched. Meanwhile we would like the Kuwaitis to keep up the Arab pressure on the Russians to agree an arms embargo resolution against Iran; and to counsel restraint on Iraq

/lest

DE2ABW

lest momentum towards sanctions and eventual ceasefire be lost. The Prime Minister may wish to ask Shaikh Sa'ad for his views on the rationale behind continuing Iraqi attacks on cities. Shaikh Sa'ad may also raise the Arab/Israel dispute and the problem of the occupied territories.

The Prime Minister is being briefed separatley by the Ministry of Defence on our defence sales prospects for Kuwait. She might emphasise that the Challenger being offered to Kuwait is the advanced version, about to come into service with the British Army. The value of the contract is about £500 million. Other items of defence equipment for which the Kuwaitis have a need are: Warrior (desert fighting vehicle); Shorts Tucano training aircraft; and Tornado.

The Department of Energy are providing separate briefing on BP/KIO. It remains important that this issue should not spill over into areas such as defence sales, where it could adversely affect our prospects. Britain remains one of Kuwait's major foreign suppliers and currently we have just over 10% of the market share, behind Japan, the US and FRG (British export in 1987 were £225.3 million: our imports from Kuwait were £95 million).

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DE2ABW

34. H H SHAIKH SA'AD AL ABDULLAH AL SALIM AL SABAH KCMG

Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

Born 1928. A son of the late Amir Abdullah. Educated in Kuwait. Police Department 1945–53. Hendon Police College 1953–54. Deputy Head of Town Police 1954–59. Deputy President of Police and Public Security Department 1959–61. President of Police and Public Security Department 1961–62. Minister of Interior 1962-4. Minister of Interior and Defence 1964–78. Nominated Crown Prince by the Amir on 31 January 1978, and as Prime Minister on 8 February. Shaikh Saad's relations with the National Assembly were bedevilled by members criticisms of his Government which only just stopped short of attacking him personally. He attended Assembly sessions only rarely and is believed to have pressed for its dissolution.

Dignified and hard-working Does not have the power and authority which his office should command. But seems to be consulted by the Amir (see no.24) and Shaikh Sabah (see no.33).

He commands more affection amongst ordinary Kuwaitis Said to have lost some popularity through being two closely identified with calls for the closure of the National Assembly in 1986.

Friendly to Britain. Keeps a house in London and likes to spend time there. Had successful eye operations in the UK in 1979 and 1985

A strict Muslim as is his wife Latifa,who has business interests of her own

One son and five daughters.

Speaks adequate English.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

MR. GRAY

KUWAIT/BP

The Prime Minister had some discussion after lunch today with Sir Peter Walters of BP about Kuwait's shareholding in BP.

Sir Peter said that his main concern was the effect of a substantial Kuwaiti shareholding on the perception of BP, particularly in the United States. It would be argued that BP was no longer a wholly British company and therefore not "reliable" as a supplier. This could affect defence contracts in particular. Moreover, under US law, a foreign company could not be granted rights to exploit natural resources in the United States unless its own country granted reciprocal rights. Kuwait did not grant such rights and there was a real risk that BP's competitors in the United States would argue that the substantial Kuwait shareholding disqualified BP from obtaining further concessions in the United States. The Prime Minister asked whther these were just debating points or real concerns. Sir Peter assured her that they were real concerns.

The Prime Minister asked why BP had initially encouraged the Kuwaitis to buy BP shares. Sir Peter denied that BP had had any hand in this. They had first heard about Kuwait's intention from Sir David Scholey, who had picked it up from his contacts. But it had of course benefitted BP in the difficult time after the sale of the Government shareholding.

The Prime Minister asked what Sir Peter's objective now was. Sir Peter said that he would like to see the Kuwait shareholding reduced to 15%. He realised that this could not be achieved immediately. But BP were ready to help the Kuwaitis dispose of their shareholding above that figure quietly to United States' institutional investors over a period of, say, six months. They would argue that this would improve the perception of BP in the United States and

therefore benefit all the company's shareholders, including Kuwait.

The Prime Minister asked Sir Peter what points he would like her to make to the Kuwaiti Prime Minister when she saw him on 22 March. Sir Peter said that he hoped the Prime Minister would focus on the point he had made about the perception of BP in the United States and argue that if the Kuwaitis agreed to reduce the size of their shareholding, its value would be likely toincrease. He hoped that she would also say that we took at face value Kuwait's commitment not to interfere in the management of the company or to seek a seat on the board.

CHARLES POWELL

21 March 1988

VC2ATA

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT: 22 MARCH

BP/KIO

Line to Take

- Welcome overseas investments in Britain including those by the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO).

- Grateful for your assurances that KIO will not be seeking Board representation for the foreseeable future and to consult HMG before any disposal; also that KIO have no interest in control or a management role and that the holding is intended as a long term investment.

- As the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Energy have made clear to Shaikh Ali Khalifa (Oil Minister), there are particular problems about the size of the KIO shareholding in BP

  (i) it exceeds by ten times that of any other single shareholder in BP and is in effect by an overseas government.

  (ii) there has been growing political concern in Parliament and the Press as the shareholding has increased.

- The larger the shareholding, the greater the political pressures will become. Since I am sure we both wish to avoid this, a decision to contain the size of the holding, preferably at a level somewhat lower than the present level, would be extremely helpful.

- The OFT is investigating and the decision on reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission will be for the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. I cannot prejudge it. I can only repeat that the larger the holding the greater the likelihood of a reference.

Background

The KIO holding in BP has built up since November to just under 22%. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Energy saw Shaikh Ali Khalifa on 28 January and again on 2 March and urged him to restrain the holding below 20%. Shaikh Khalifa has given informal undertakings not to seek Board representation for the foreseeable future and to consult HMG before any disposal but held out on 2 March for 25%. On 11 March the KIO announced that they did not intend to take their stake above 22.5%, though their Deputy Director (Faoud Jaffar) subsequently made clear that this could alter if the situation changed.

The OFT are required to recommend to Lord Young, in the light of their investigation of the KIO holding, whether or not there should be a reference to the MMC. They cannot at this stage negotiate undertakings with the Kuwaitis but will report on the facts including any reduction the Kuwaitis now make. If Lord Young decided on a reference the MMC can recommend obtaining undertakings and also make recommendations about the size of the holding.

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM KUWAIT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 129
OF 200730Z MARCH 88
INFO ROUTINE MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

SIC ACA/Z8G

(MODUK FOR DESO)

FOR MED

1. I SEE FROM A TELEGRAM U/N 1817242K FROM BARBER IN DESO MOD, NOT VISIBLY REPEATED TO FCO, THAT WHEN MR MELLOR CALLED ON SHAIKH SA'AD ON 11 MARCH HE CONVEYED AN INVITATION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO AN INFORMAL MEETING AT 1730 ON 22 MARCH. ACCORDING TO THE TUR, THE INVITATION CAME AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE MOD WITH DEFENCE SALES, PARTICULARLY CHALLENGER, IN MIND. DEFENCE SALES MAY ALSO BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER TO RAISE WARRIOR AND THE TORNADO.

2. I VERY MUCH WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF A MEETING BETWEEN SHAIKH SA'AD AND MRS THATCHER AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER CONSOLIDATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE KUWAITIS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AS THE MEETING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE MUCH APPRECIATED HERE I WOULD EXPECT A FAIR AMOUNT OF PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN LOCALLY TO IT. AT THE SAME TIME, AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS AND WITHOUT HAVING SEEN THE RECORD OF MR MELLOR'S CALL ON SHAIKH SA'AD, I HOPE WE WILL TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GO WIDER THAN BILATERAL DEFENCE SALES MATTERS AND ENGAGE SHAIKH SA'AD IN A DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE GULF WAR AND BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE AREA. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE APPROPRIATE AND INDEED VALUABLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO RAISE CHALLENGER. HOWEVER OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE KUWAITIS HAVE SOME WAY TO GO BEFORE THEY ARE READY TO SIGN (MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT SERIOUS TALKS ON PRICES HAVE YET TO BEGIN WITH VICKERS). SHEIKH SAAD REPORTEDLY TOLD MR MELLOR - THE MODUK TUR - THAT VICKERS ''WOULD HAVE TO REVISE THEIR PRICES''. WE CANNOT EXPECT SHAIKH SA'AD TO GIVE AWAY VERY MUCH AT THIS STAGE AND I DOUBT IF HE WILL GO FURTHER THAN SAYING THAT CHALLENGER IS A CONTENDER (THEY ARE LOOKING AT OTHER TANKS) BUT THE PRICE MUST BE RIGHT

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SRWBHX

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 March 1988

Dear David,

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KUWAITI PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter about the possibility of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Sheikh Sa'ad. The Prime Minister would in principle be willing to see him subject to it being possible to find a convenient time. I should be grateful if the FCO could let me know how long Sheikh Sa'ad is in London. Meanwhile both you and FCO will want to prepare a short brief.

I am copying this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Stephen Ratcliffe (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

David Ball, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

cc PC ①

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2112

MO 6/17/3V

8th March 1988

Prime Minister
I think it is probably right that you should see Sheikh Sa'ad, although you may not want to be too much involved in individual defence sales projects. But a call here would help create the right climate.
Agree to offer to see him?
Yes mt CDP 8/3

CALL BY KUWAITI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

The Prime Minister will be aware that Sheikh Sa'ad al Abdullah al Salim al Sabah KCMG, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, is now in London on a private visit. Mr Mellor is arranging to call on him. Mr Younger is of the view that it would be timely and appropriate, if the Prime Minister's diary permits, if she was able to invite Sheikh Sa'ad to pay a short call to No 10.

The background to this recommendation is that HE Sheikh Salim al Sabah, the former Kuwait Minister of Defence (and now the Minister of the Interior) was in London recently and called on Mr Mellor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 3rd March. I understand that during the conversation Sheikh Salim said that the Kuwait Defence Committee, on which he sits, had been looking at future defence spending and had given "good consideration" to the Challenger Main Battle Tank (MBT). The MBT is one of a number of major procurements that the Kuwaitis are known to be considering for re-equipping their armed forces (we are led to believe that the equivalent to £7bn is being allocated for this). The last major purchase of defence equipment by Kuwait was of the BAe Hawk aircraft in 1983. Other main areas of current interest to the United Kingdom are Tornado aircraft, in competition with France and the United States, and Warrior APCs, in competition with the Soviet Union.

The Kuwaitis have been lobbied strenuously on defence equipment purchases by the Russians, Americans and French in particular. M. Chirac played a significant personal role in the deal to provide Jordan with the Mirage 2000 aircraft and it is believed that he is actively supporting that aircraft again with the Kuwait Government. The Defence Secretary believes that Sheikh Sa'ad's presence in London provides a unique opportunity to press

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

the British case on major procurement matters at what is a critical time, after budgetary provision has been agreed but before firm decisions on equipment types have been made.

I am sending copies of this letter to Robert Culshaw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Stephen Ratcliffe (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely

David Ball

(D C J BALL)
APS/S of S

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 March 1988

I enclose a copy of a reply from the Kuwaiti Prime Minister to the Prime Minister's recent message. As you will see he would like to follow up the offer of a talk with a Foreign Office Minister.

Charles Powell

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., MVO.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

OFFICE OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND
PRIME MINSTER
STATE OF KUWAIT.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

1st March,1988.

Your Excellency

I would like to thank you most cordially for your letter of 29th February 1988, in which you kindly welcomed me to London. For me, it is always a special pleasure to visit your great country.

I would also like to convey my appreciation of your expression of the readiness of your Foreign Office Ministers to discuss with me any current matters and though my present visit is a private one I will surely be happy to do that.

With personal best wishes and warmest regards.

Yours Sincerely
Saad Sabah

Saad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah.

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
London.

MT

Sent by hand to
11A Belgrave Sq

cfco

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 February 1988

Your Highness

I am pleased to be able to welcome you once again to London. As you are here on a private visit I shall not impose on your time. However, should you wish to discuss any current matters, a Minister from the Foreign Office would of course be very ready to call on you.

May I take this opportunity to wish you a restful and enjoyable stay.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah, KCMG.

ccpf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 February 1988

Dear Charles

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

Shaikh Sa'ad is making a private visit to London, arriving on Sunday 28 February for up to two weeks (during which time he will receive medical treatment as an out-patient at a London Hospital).

During his visit to London last year Shaikh Sa'ad was sent a message of greeting from the Prime Minister, and in 1986 he was sent a message of good wishes from Her Majesty following an operation. We hope the Prime Minister will agree to send a message of greeting to Shaikh Sa'ad again this time; I attach a draft.

Shaikh Sa'ad is likely to take up the offer of a call by an FCO Minister: Mr Mellor could call on him during the week beginning 7 March.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

D[illegible]11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

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CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:

HH Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah
Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

I am pleased to be able to welcome you once again to London. As you are here on a private visit I shall not impose on your time. However, should you wish to discuss any current matters ~~of mutual interest~~, a Minister from the Foreign Office would of course be ~~glad~~ very ready to call on you.

May I take this opportunity to wish you a restful and enjoyable visit to London.

CDP.

Kuwait – Visit of Amir
Dec 82

File PA

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 February 1987

I enclose a copy of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister's reply to the Prime Minister's recent message of welcome to him.

(Charles Powell)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DTS.

NOT A 'T'

CCPC ②

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Prime Minister
CDD
24/2

OFFICE OF THE CROWN PRINCE

AND PRIME MINISTER

24 February 1987

Your Excellency

I would like to express to you my cordial appreciation for your warm message of welcome on my present private visit to the United Kingdom .

I would also like to express my sincerest thanks for your kind congratulations on the 26th anniversary of the National Day of Kuwait .

May I take this opportunity to extend to you my warmest personal regards and wish you every good health and happiness.

With my best wishes

Yours Sincerely

Saad Salah

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom .

ECL

CET-CO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 February 1987

Your Highness,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you once again to London. As you are here on a private visit I do not intend to impose on your time. But should you wish to discuss government matters I shall gladly ask a Minister from the Foreign Office to call on you.

May I take this opportunity of sending you my best wishes on the 26th National Anniversary on Wednesday.

I trust you will have a restful and enjoyable visit.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah, K.C.M.G.

11A Belgrave Sq, SW1

8RW

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1987

Dear Charles,

Visit of Shaikh Sa'ad
Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait

Shaikh Sa'ad is making a private visit to London arriving on Sunday 22 February. He is expected to stay for up to two weeks during which time he will have a medical check-up.

We think it would be appropriate for a message of greeting to be sent to the Crown Prince from the Prime Minister, and attach a suggested form of words.

Shaikh Sa'ad received a letter from the Prime Minister following a medical operation during his visit to London last year and a message of good wishes from Her Majesty. The proposed letter offers a call by an FCO Minister on Shaikh Sa'ad should he so wish.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
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TO:

His Highness Shaikh Sa'ad
Al Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah KCMG
Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait
11A Belgrave Square
London SW1

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

87.

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you once again to London. As you are here on a private visit I do not intend to impose on your time. But should you wish to discuss government matters ~~of mutual interest~~ I shall gladly ask a Minister from the Foreign Office to call on you.

May I take this opportunity of sending you my best wishes on the 26th National Anniversary on Wednesday. I trust you will have a restful and enjoyable visit.

With best wishes.

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Top Copy on Greece, Feb '83. Visit by Kuwait President Marcos

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

9 February 1983

Dear John,

INWARD STATE VISIT, JUNE 1983

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 7 February to John Coles about the inward State Visit in June.

In the light of the considerations set out in your letter, the Prime Minister would be content for an invitation to be extended to President Marcos to pay a State Visit here in June.

I am copying this letter to Sir Philip Moore.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

John Holmes Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Top copy on Greece, Feb '83 Visit by President Marcos

MR BUTLER
PRIME MINISTER

INWARD STATE VISIT

The Amir of Kuwait cannot come in June this year. Should President Marcos come instead? Yes

This is a controversial proposition which needs careful consideration. The Royal Visits Committee and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommend that Marcos should be invited. The arguments are set out fairly in the attached FCO letter and I will not add to them except to say that:-

FERB 7.2

(a) failure to invite Marcos will be conspicuous, since he has long expected to come at about this time and is the only ASEAN Head of State not to have done so.

(b) if we did decide to go for an alternative, I think there are stronger reasons for inviting the President of Greece than the attached letter suggests. Greece is a fellow member of the European Community and will hold the Presidency in the second half of 1983.

There is a problem of timing. The Queen leaves for her American tour on 13 February. A decision is desirable before then - and if there is any question of seeking an alternative to Marcos the time available is very short indeed.

Is the Prime Minister content that an invitation be extended to President Marcos for June?

A.S.C.

7 February, 1983

Top Copy on Greece, Feb 83, visit by President Marcos.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 February 1983

Dear John,

Inward State Visit, June 1983

I wrote to you recently seeking the Prime Minister's approval to our carrying out the Royal Visits Committee's recommendation that we extend an invitation to the Amir of Kuwait to pay a State Visit this year and offer him the choice of coming in June or October. We have now heard through our Ambassador that the Amir, although most grateful for the invitation and eager to accept, is unable to reply firmly now in view of his concern with current difficulties and uncertainties in the Arab world. He definitely cannot come in June, although he might be able to come in October if the invitation were still open then.

We now need to decide fairly quickly, therefore, whom to invite for the summer State Visit. You will recall that the other candidate recommended for 1983 by the Royal Visits Committee was President Marcos of the Philippines. The Committee also considered the King of Spain and President Karamanlis of Greece, but in view of the difficulties over Gibraltar it agreed that King Juan Carlos should not be invited this year, but that we should be ready to respond quickly if the Gibraltar situation improved sufficiently with an invitation for a State Visit in 1984; as regards President Karamanlis, the Committee considered there were no strong reasons of State for inviting him this year and he should be a leading contender for a visit next year.

Mr Pym believes that we should follow the recommendations of the Royal Visits Committee and invite President Marcos. President Marcos, who has been President of the Philippines since 1965, is the only ASEAN Head of State not to have made a State Visit to the United Kingdom and was led as long ago as January 1979 to expect an invitation some time in the early 1980's. The Philippines is a friendly, if geographically distant, country, forming part of the ASEAN bulwark against communism in South East

/Asia.

Asia. The promotion of our commercial and other interests there could be seriously impeded if President Marcos' invitation to visit Britain is not soon confirmed. Our exports to the Philippines are not at present very large (about £100 million a year). But the prospects for significant expansion are there, particularly if we were to be successful in winning one of the large development projects that come up from time to time. We have not so far managed this. Presidential goodwill would be an important asset. As it happens, Davy McKee are at present bidding for part of the work on a large steel plant in the Philippines. The value of the contract to the United Kingdom could be at least £114 million. And the Secretary of State for Trade is contemplating a visit to the Philippines in the spring.

The reasons for inviting President Marcos to Britain are therefore strong. A State Visit would, however, present some problems. President Marcos and his wife are not the most attractive of potential visitors. They would certainly be on their best behaviour in Britain, as they were recently in the United States. More difficult are the level and persistence of interest in the human rights record of the Marcos Government, or rather of its internal security apparatus. In particular, this has caught the attention of Amnesty International who published a report last autumn which speaks of 'firm evidence of a disturbingly high incidence of illegal practices'. Mr Pym and other Ministers have so far had nearly fifty letters from MPs, prompted for the most part by correspondence from local Amnesty groups. And Early Day Motion No 537, which has now lapsed, eventually attracted 86 signatures.

The Amnesty campaign provoked more sustained interest than we had expected. The interest has been kept alive by the recent decision of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, with the approval of the Minister for Overseas Development, to make a loan for an oil palm plantation project in the Philippines, Amnesty and the Catholic Institute of International Relations, among others, dissenting. It is, however, relevant that the Philippines have had a civil war and Communist insurgency on their hands for more than a generation and that, before Marcos took over, the Philippines was in the grip of a violent anarchy. All in all, the Philippine record is not conspicuously bad by the standards of the contemporary Third World. The Philippines is a relatively open

/society

society and what goes on there is widely - and colourfully - reported. It is also a member of a group of countries, ASEAN, which has, in spite of what happened in Viet Nam, brought an unprecedented degree of stability and prosperity to South East Asia - to the benefit of the region itself and of the West.

On balance, therefore, we think it right to go ahead with the proposal for a State Visit, though we must be prepared for (and do what we can in advance to minimise the risk of) some public protest, including perhaps a demonstration or two. We accepted rather similar risks for the Indonesian State Visit in 1979, which passed off satisfactorily in the event. It is also relevant that Marcos paid a State Visit last autumn to the United States, where the majority of exiled Philippine dissidents live. The visit was scarcely a public relations triumph for visitor or host, but it was not an embarrassing fiasco either. We should, of course, do what we discreetly could to persuade Marcos' advisers of the need to generate the most favourable climate possible in the run up to the visit in our mutual interest. Fortunately, as the Royal Visits Committee noted, if President Marcos comes in June it will be possible to have the visit at Windsor, which should reduce the problems with demonstrations.

The proposal to invite President Marcos needs The Queen's agreement and in view of the foregoing considerations, it clearly also requires the agreement of the Prime Minister. I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content that an invitation be extended to President Marcos to pay a State Visit here in June.

it would be most helpful if it were possible for Mrs Thatcher to give her consent before The Queen's departure for Her tour of the West Coast of America on 13 February.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

file

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 December 1982

Proposed Inward State Visit in 1983 of the Amir of Kuwait

Thank you for your undated letter on this subject.

The Prime Minister is content with the recommendations of the Royal Visits Committee that an invitation should be extended to the Amir of Kuwait to pay a State Visit in 1983 and that he should be offered a choice between a visit in June and one in October.

I am copying this letter to Sir Philip Moore.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree to recommendations in para. 2?

A.J.C. 16/12

Yes MT

Dear John,

Proposed Inward State Visit in 1983 of the Amir of Kuwait

You will be aware that The Queen has agreed that there may be three inward State Visits next year and that President Kaunda of Zambia has accepted an invitation for the first visit to take place in March. We now need to start arrangements for the other two visits to be held on 7-10 June and 25-28 October.

At the last meeting on 24 November the Royal Visits Committee recommended that an invitation should be extended to the Amir of Kuwait. It also recommended that the Amir of Kuwait should be offered a choice between a visit in June and one in October, since the former dates were likely to be very close to Ramadan (expected to start around 10/11 June), which might make them unsuitable for him as he would probably wish to conclude his visit a couple of days before hand.

Mr Pym is content with the Committee's recommendations. I should be glad to know whether the Prime Minister is also content.

If the Prime Minister accepts the Royal Visits Committee's recommendation, Her Majesty's agreement can then be sought for us to send appropriate instructions to our Ambassador at Kuwait (a draft telegram is enclosed). If the Amir accepts the invitation and makes his choice of dates we would then proceed with arrangements for The Queen's formal invitation to be sent to him.

When the Amir's visit is sorted out, we shall wish to consult the Prime Minister on the third candidate for a State Visit next year. President Marcos is most likely but King Juan Carlos remains an outside possibility.

I am copying this to Sir Philip Moore.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	ROUTINE

ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO ROUTINE KUWAIT
TELEGRAM NUMBER

STATE VISIT OF AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. It has been agreed that the Amir of Kuwait should be invited for a State Visit next year.

2. You should now put informally to the Diwan the proposal that the Amir be invited to pay a State Visit to the United Kingdom as guest of Her Majesty The Queen and offer a choice of the following dates:

a) 7 - 10 June 1983;

b) 25 - 28 October 1983

3. It is unusual to offer a choice but we wish to be as forthcoming as practicable bearing in mind that, because of Her Majesty's heavy programme in 1983 (and the Prime Minister's and the Secretary of State's) the dates have had to be carefully fitted in between other engagements and, regrettably, it would be impossible to find alternatives in 1983. Also we realise that Ramadan will commence around 10/11 June and appreciate that the Amir might not wish to be away just before. It would be as well to mention

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword: also that
File number	Dept: PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution: MINIMAL: PCD, MED
Drafted by (Block capitals): J E HOLMES		COPIES TO: SIR P MOORE, BUCKINGHAM PALACE
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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also that, if he were to opt for June, unfortunately the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State would be unable to be present at his ceremonial arrival if he arrives at Victoria (although The Queen would be there to welcome him as usual) as they would still be attending the European Council meeting in Germany on 6/7 June.

4. The programme for a State Visit follows a set pattern. It lasts from Tuesday morning until Friday morning and contains certain fixed elements of ceremonial but also provision for accommodating the Head of State's own special interests. The first day of the programme usually includes a call on Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother and concludes with the State Banquet. During the second day the visiting Head of State hosts a reception for the Diplomatic Corps and is given a luncheon or dinner by the Lord Mayor and Corporation of the City of London. On the third day he hosts a return banquet and the fourth day he takes leave of The Queen.

5. Once we have the Amir's informal agreement to dates we can arrange for The Queen's formal invitation to be sent through you for transmission to the Amir and can consider the timing of the announcement.

PYM

NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

FILE SW.

14 January, 1982

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Kuwait when he called at No. 10 Downing Street this afternoon.

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Subject
cc Martin

RESTRICTED

Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Kuwait at 5.30 on 14 January at No. 10 Downing Street

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. Moberly
Mr. Coles

Sheikh Sa'ad
Mr. Ghazi Al-Rayes

Sheikh Sa'ad said he was delighted to hear that the news about the Prime Minister's son in Algeria was better. The Prime Minister said that we were awaiting confirmation that he was safe and well. The Algerian Government's efforts had been most impressive.

The Prime Minister referred to the attack by Iran on some of Kuwait's oil installations. Sheikh Sa'ad said Iran had denied involvement but the proof was clear. The Kuwaitis knew the airports from which the Iranian planes had taken off.

The Prime Minister said that her impression was that Iraq wanted to bring hostilities with Iran to an end. Sheikh Sa'ad agreed. The problem was that the Iranians maintained their position that they would not cease hostilities until Iraq withdrew all its troops from Iranian territory. It was very difficult for Iraq to meet this condition.

The Prime Minister then referred to the recent Arab Summit meeting at Fez. It was disappointing that there had been disagreement over the Saudi initiative on the Arab/Israel issue. But since then the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights had perhaps restored Arab unity. Sheikh Sa'ad said that, given the differing views at Fez on point 7 of the Saudi plan, the King of Morocco had thought it better to postpone the conference. Time was needed for Arab discussion of the Saudi

RESTRICTED

/plan

plan. When he had visited Kuwait, the Syrian President had not been totally opposed to the initiative but wanted more time to consider it. When a consensus had emerged, the Summit conference could be re-convened. Mr. Moberly asked when this was likely to happen. Sheikh Sa'ad said that he had discussed this question with the King of Morocco. The latter had no date in mind. Arab Foreign Ministers might meet in March or April and the Summit might take place after April. The Arabs wished to see complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai first.

The Prime Minister explained that we had just delivered a reply to Israel's earlier letter concerning European participation in the Sinai force. We were most anxious that Israeli withdrawal from Sinai should be completed. Otherwise, President Mubarak would be in great difficulties. There appeared to be few precise ideas as to how the negotiating process might be carried forward after Israeli withdrawal. Sheikh Sa'ad asked whether we felt that the Israelis would not withdraw. The Prime Minister replied that she thought they would implement the agreement. She believed they had made their decision on the Golan Heights knowing that we and other countries set great store by withdrawal from Sinai and would therefore be careful in our reaction to the Golan move. We had been among the first to condemn the annexation of the Golan and had done so vigorously. The Prime Minister recalled that the day after the Israeli move she had made a particularly strong criticism of it in a speech to a large dinner organised by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. The Security Council was now discussing the Israeli move but there seemed little doubt that the United States would veto the Syrian Draft Resolution since it provided for mandatory sanctions. Sheikh Sa'ad asked whether it was possible to devise a moderate solution which the United States would not feel obliged to veto. Mr. Moberly said that it now seemed inevitable that the Syrian Resolution (which had been amended slightly) would be put to the vote and be vetoed. We considered it might have been better to work for language designed to have united international condemnation of the Israeli move.

/Sheikh Sa'ad

Sheikh Sa'ad said that if the United States Government insisted on vetoing, the Arab people might take certain steps. The Arab Foreign Ministers had postponed a planned meeting until the results of the Security Council debate were known. The Prime Minister said that she did not believe a United States veto meant that America approved the annexation. President Reagan had more than once spoken out clearly against Israeli actions. Sheikh Sa'ad said that, nevertheless, a United States veto would be regarded by the Arabs as direct support for Israel. The Arab Foreign Ministers would meet and consider next steps.

Sheikh Sa'ad described briefly the main subjects discussed during his recent tour of North Africa. The Prime Minister enquired whether he had met Qadhafi before or after the recent coup in Ghana, for Libya had been quick to support Rawlings. Sheikh Sa'ad said that his meeting with Qadhafi had been before the coup. He had discussed the future of Spanish Sahara with the President of Mauretania whose attitude was that Morocco should negotiate direct with Polisario. However, negotiations would be difficult for Hassan. It was expected that the Seven-Country Committee on the problem would meet before the end of January.

The Prime Minister asked whether Kuwait had any contacts with President Mubarak. Sheikh Sa'ad said there had been no direct contact.

The Prime Minister referred to the recent Iranian moves which seemed designed to destabilise Bahrain through the Shi'a. Sheikh Sa'ad said these events had been alarming for the Gulf States as a whole. Mr. Moberly said it was not clear whether the Iranian Government or some Iranian group was behind the incidents.

The Prime Minister enquired about future meetings of the Gulf Co-operation Council. Sheikh Sa'ad said that Ministers of the Interior would meet soon. Defence Ministers would also meet this month.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister referred to Kuwait's efforts on its air defence system following the Iranian attack on oil installations. She also enquired about progress towards a new civil airport. Sheikh Sa'ad said that the Kuwaiti authorities were trying to find another area for an airport. It would be a big project - implementation would take seven or eight years.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister referred to the very happy memories of her visit to Kuwait and enquired after the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and Minister of Health.

A.J.C.

14 January 1982

Kuwait

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 January 1982

Prime Minister

13/1

Dear Mr

Call by the Prime Minister of Kuwait

Shaikh Sa'ad, the Prime Minister of Kuwait, is calling on the Prime Minister at 5.30 pm on Thursday 14 January. I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister which takes account of the suggestions of HMA Kuwait, whose telegram No 6 you will have seen. The brief concentrates on the two most appropriate of the the several non-military commercial opportunities we are currently pursuing: the Prime Minister cannot be expected to raise them all.

Shaikh Sa'ad is here on a private visit. He has been out of Kuwait since before Christmas, visitng North Africa (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauretania and Morocco). He arrived here from Spain where he has also spent a few days on a private visit. In London he is spending a week or so having medical treatment for an eye complaint and inspecting a newly acquired flat in Grosvenor Square.

The Prime Minister last met him when she visited Kuwait at the end of September. He was her official host. He is likely to speak English on this occasion, which he can do without much difficulty. He will be accompanied by the Kuwaiti ambassador, Mr Ghazi al Rayes. Mr Moberly is ready to attend for the FCO if the Prime Minister wishes.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

10 Downing Street

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT, THURSDAY 14 JANUARY

POINTS TO MAKE:

Gulf War

1. What are the prospects for mediation? Will Kuwait play a role here? Is Kuwait in greater danger from Iranians if they think they are now winning the war?

Kuwait Air Defence

2. Pleased we can help with Kuwait's air defence needs, by seconding an RAF team. Good example of practical co-operation. Happy to supply equipment needs in air defence field as elsewhere. Will Kuwait be pressing for wider Gulf co-operation on air defence?

Defence Sales

3. Glad to know Kuwait Armour Committee are returning to UK to look at new Challenger tanks.

Gulf Security and Co-operation

4. How do you see defence co-operation developing within Gulf Co-operation Council? Will internal security co-operation be increased following recent events in Bahrain?

YAR

5. Important we contribute to YAR's stability and development. British technical aid and Kuwait aid funds can co-operate usefully. How does YH assess the prospects for lessening PDRY dependence on the Soviet Union?

UK/KUWAIT Commercial Relations

6. (i) Railways:

Interested in your plans for railway link to Iraq and to the rest of the Gulf. Pleased that Transmark have discussed both projects with Kuwait and other Gulf states. Hope we can help in setting up national railways authority.

/(ii)

(ii) Port Extension:

Kenneth Clarke (Department of Transport) has just returned from Kuwait where he discussed plans for new port extension, including a road/rail bridge to a new container depot. Look forward to helping you develop these plans.

UK/Kuwait Relations

7. Happy to see that in military and civilian fields co-operation has blossomed since my visit. I know YH understands we have limited resources of skilled personnel, but are glad to make them available to you because of our traditional friendship. Important we develop our partnership and shared interests with Kuwait. But our partnership is practical, not sentimental. Would not expect you to buy from us merely because of long friendship. But naturally hope that when our firms are competitive you will bear in mind the contribution our technical assistance is able to make and let us have our share.

Arab/Israel: Golan (if raised)

8. Extreme resolution would attract US veto. This would suit Israel, risk further polarisation in the Middle East and make peace process harder. We prefer a resolution, supported by all, which condemns Israeli move and allows for appropriate measures from individual nations.

ESSENTIAL FACTS:

Gulf War

1. There has been some recent talk of Kuwaiti and Syrian mediation. But Iran may be encouraged by recent military successes to strike again at Kuwait as a warning not to give Iraq too much support. It is Kuwait's transit facilities for Iraqi war equipment, rather than the Gulf states' financial aid to Iraq, which annoys the Iranians. In early November Iranian aircraft bombed a Kuwaiti oil installation, presumably as a warning.

Kuwait Air Defence

2. Perhaps as a result of this raid, the Kuwaitis asked for a British team to make an urgent report on Kuwait's air defence last November. After this report the Kuwaitis asked for a British air defence team to be seconded. The likely team leader has already made a preliminary visit to Kuwait. The four-man team is due to begin work on 1 March, and initially will be established for two years. It will advise on all aspects of air defence, attempting to create a properly integrated air defence system from Kuwait's existing equipment, which has been bought from many countries.

Defence Sales

3. The Kuwaiti Defence Minister has said he expects the team will recommend some British equipment, but the Kuwaitis will wish to keep their options open as far as possible. A number of British firms are in the market to supply air defence equipment and the British team has a good chance of helping them gain some business.

4. In 1981 the Kuwaiti Armour Committee visited the UK to see the improved Chieftain tank, but instead expressed interest in the newer Challenger. It will come back shortly to see Challengers. These may supplement the Chieftain tanks which Kuwait already has and for which the problems of supplying spare parts appear to have been ironed out.

Gulf Security and Co-operation

5. Kuwait may present a defence co-operation plan to the GCC, despite earlier reservations about the value of defence co-operation. Following evidence of Iranian involvement in a plot against the government of Bahrain in December, Kuwait and other GCC states are

/likely

likely to want to see internal security co-operation.

YAR

6. Kuwait takes a close interest in events in the YAR, whose President has recently visited Kuwait. The Kuwait fund for Arab Economic Development has large funds which can be channelled to the YAR; ODA officials will shortly be discussing with the Kuwaitis prospects for triangular projects involving British technology and Kuwaiti finance.

UK/Kuwait Commercial Relations

7. Plans for a railway between Iraq and Kuwait seem to be delayed while the Gulf war continues. The Kuwaitis may prefer to see a Gulf-wide railway system set up. Transmark have made preliminary contacts and British Rail last February offered to place BR expertise at the disposal of the Kuwaitis to help them set up a national railway authority.

8. The Kuwaitis are interested in a large scale development of their port facilities which may involve constructing a road/rail bridge to a new container depot. The British firm Freeman Fox have, amongst others, been invited to bid for the design study. Mr Clarke, PUSS for Transport, visited Kuwait from 2-4 January to discuss this and other projects. The Kuwaitis may ask HMG for help in recruiting experts to man a department within the Kuwaiti Public Works Ministry to produce their own overall plan.

UK/Kuwait Relations

9. HMA Kuwait has pointed out how much expert help we provide to various Kuwaiti Ministries (Defence, Electricity, Health, Education, and Planning) and has suggested the Prime Minister ask for these to be taken into account when the Kuwaitis award major contracts. The Kuwaitis are hard-headed and do not like giving the impression of awarding contracts for sentiment's sake. But the Prime Minister can usefully make a bid to Shaikh Sa'ad, who is one of the Kuwaiti Ministers most favourably disposed to us.

/Arab/Israel Golan

Arab/Israel: Golan

10. The Syrian draft resolution, which is supported by all Arab states, calls for mandatory military, economic and diplomatic sanctions, invoking Chapter VII language of the UN charter. The Americans will veto this, if tabled, and we may join them if the French will also. The Zaireans have drafted an alternative resolution, using tough language and implicitly invoking Chapter VII, but without any explicit call for sanctions. We may support negotiations on the basis of such a draft even if the US are likely to veto. The Saudis understand the need for a broadly accepted condemnation of Israel and might be prepared to argue with the Syrians for a compromise. The Kuwaitis are likely to remain content with the extreme line and might support recriminations against Western countries who fail to match up to expectations.

Middle East Department
13 January 1982

JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 January 1982

O/F 13/1

PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT

As I told your office earlier today, the Prime Minister agrees to receive Shaikh Sa'ad for forty-five minutes at 5.30 on Thursday, 14 January. I should be grateful if a brief could reach me by tomorrow night.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1).

Prime Minister

Prime Minister of Kuwait

Sheikh Sa'ad is in London this week, primarily for medical treatment.

2. The F/C.O. advise that you receive him if possible. I think it will be misconstrued if we do not offer a call.

3. Agree to see him for 45 minutes at 5.30 on Thursday?

Yes MT

A.J.C.

11-1-82

cc Mrs Goodchild
Mr Gow
Mr Ingham

Prime Minister

This means that the lunch you were going to host next Wednesday (6 January) has had to be cancelled.

MCS WR 30/12

RESTRICTED

GRS 110
RESTRICTED
FM TUNIS 241110Z DECEMBER 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 241300Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 24 DECEMBER
INFO TO ROUTINE KUWAIT ALGIERS

MY TEL NO 209: VISIT OF KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE.

1. KUWAITI EMBASSY TELEPHONED TODAY TO SAY THAT SHAIKH SAAD WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PM'S INVITATION BUT AFTER HIS CURRENT TOUR OF THE MAGHREB HIS PROGRAMME SO FAR INCLUDED ONLY A PRIVATE HOLIDAY IN SPAIN. WHEN PRESSED ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS TO VISIT BRITAIN PRIVATELY, THE MESSAGE ABOUT HIS PROGRAMME WAS REPEATED. IT SEEMED FROM THE LANGUAGE (ARABIC) IN WHICH IT WAS EXPRESSED THAT THE REPLY WAS BEING READ FROM WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE SAME REPLY WAS BEING SENT VIA THE KUWAITI EMBASSY.

STIRLING

LIMITED
MED
NENAD
P & CD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR MOBERLY

RESTRICTED

Kuwait

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 December 1981

cc Mr. Goodfellow.

AOR 23.12

Dear John,

The Prime Minister has agreed to offer the Kuwaiti Prime Minister talks at 1200 on Wednesday 6 January, followed by lunch. We have asked our Embassy in Kuwait, as well as the Kuwaiti Embassy in London, to let us have urgent confirmation that this invitation will be accepted by Shaikh Sa'ad.

Meanwhile, I enclose, as you requested, a draft guest list of forty names, with substitutes where appropriate. We have consulted the Ministry of Defence about the names of Defence Sales firms. The Prime Minister will be aware that the Kuwaitis have asked for a British team of experts to review Kuwait's entire air defence needs. There will consequently be enhanced opportunities for the sales of British defence equipment.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT GUEST LIST FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF KUWAIT : WEDNESDAY 6 JANUARY

1. The Prime Minister

2. Mr Ian Gow, PPS to PM

3. Private Secretary to the PM

4. HE Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah Al Sabah, Prime Minister of Kuwait, c/o Embassy of the State of Kuwait, 45/46 Queen's Gate, London SW7 (Tel 589 4533)

5. HE Mr Ghazi Muhammad Amin al Rasyes, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait. Address as above

6 - 8. Up to three other Kuwaitis who may be accompanying Shaikh Sa'ad . Address as above.

9. Shaikh Fahad Al Sabah, Head of the Kuwait Investment Office, St Vedast House, 150 Cheapside, London EC2 (Tel 606 6551)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10. Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP, Minister of State (Tel 233 7809)

11. Mr J C Moberly, Assistant Under-Secretary (Tel 233 3718)

Ministry of Defence

12. Mr J Blyth, Head of Defence Sales (Tel 218 3042)

13. Mr J M Stewart, AUS/Defence Staff (Tel 218 7174)

14. Air Marshal Sir David Craig OBE, Vice Chief of the Air Staff (Tel 218 6316)

15. Mr K P Jeffs, AUS/Sales (Tel 218 6828)
(Mr Jeffs accompanied the Prime Minister in her discussions in Kuwait in September and met Shaikh Sa'ad separately)

16. Gen K Perkins, Director of the Military Assistance Office (Tel 218 0480)
(Gen Perkins,during a recent visit to Kuwait, arranged for the air defence survey)

Firms connected with the defence sales effort in Kuwait

17. Sir Ernest Harrison OBE,Chairman, Racal Electronics Ltd., Western Road, Bracknell, Bucks (Tel 0344 3244)

/Mr F K Chorley

18. Mr F K Chorley, Deputy Chairman, Plessey Electronic Systems Ltd., Vicarage Lane, Ilford, Essex (Tel 478 3040 ext 3302)

19. Mr Arthur Walsh OBE, Managing Director, Marconi Company Ltd The Grove, Stanmore, Middx (Tel 954 2311)

20. Sir Austin Pearce CBE, Chairman, British Aerospace, Brooklands Road, Weybridge, Surrey (Tel 930 1020)

21. Mr David Plastow, Chairman, Vickers Group, Millbank Tower, 21-24 Millbank, London SW1 (tel 828 7777)
(Vickers supply tanks to Kuwait)

Other Government Departments

22. Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP, Secretary of State for Energy

Members of Parliament

23. Mr Dennis Walters MBE MP, House of Commons (Tel 821 0377)

24. Rt Hon Lord Shawcross QC, House of Lords

(Lord Shawcross is a member of the Kuwait Investment Board)

25. Rt Hon Lord George Brown, House of Lords (Tel 379 6805)

26. Rt Hon Denis Healey CH MBE MP, House of Commons (Tel 219 4060)

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27. Rt Hon Gordon Richardson MBE,Governor of the Bank of England, Threadneedle Street. London EC2 (Tel 601 4121)

28. Sir A Lamb CMG DFC, Samuel Montagu Ltd, 114 Old Broad Street. London EC 2 (Tel 588 6464)
(Sir A Lamb,also of BNOC,is a former ambassador to Kuwait)

29. Mr Henry Lambert, Chairman, Barclay's Bank International, 168 Fenchurch Street, London EC3 (Tel 283 8989)

30. Mr Peter Cazalet, Executive Director, British Petroleum, Brittanic House, Moor Lane, London EC2 (Tel 920 8000)

31. Lord Selsdon, Chairman, Committee for Middle East Trade, Bury House, 33 Bury Street, London SW1 (Tel 839 1170)

32. Sir William Atkins CBE, Chairman, WS Atkins & Partners, Woodcote Grove, Ashley Road, Epsom, Surrey (Tel 037 27 26140)
(the firm are active as consultants in Kuwait)

/33. Sir John Buckley

33. Sir John Buckley, Chairman, Davy McKee International Ltd, 15 Portland Place, London W1 (Tel: 637-2821)

34. Lord Weinstock, GEC, 1 Stanhope Gate, London W1 (Tel: 493-8484)

35. Admiral Sir Rae McKaig CBE, Chairman, Gray MacKenzie Ltd, 40 St Mary Avenue, London EC3 (Tel: 283-4680)

36. Lord MacFadzean of Kelvinside, Chairman, Rolls Royce, 65 Buckingham Gate, London SW1 (Tel: 222-9020)

37. Mr Edward Mortimer, The Times

38. Mr Jonathan Wallace, Middle East Economic Digest, 21 John Street, London WC1 (Tel: 404-5513)

39. Mr J Hoare, Wessex Health Authority (linked with Kuwait), Highcroft, Romsey Road, Winchester, Hants (Tel: 0962-63511)

40. Mr E A Croker, Secretary, The Football Association, 16 Lancaster Gate, London W2 (Tel: 262-4542) (Shaikh Sa'ad takes a keen interest in football)

RESERVES

(for 6) Mr Fouad Khaled Ja'far, Kuwait Investment Office, St Vedast House, 150 Cheapside, London EC2 (Tel: 606-6551)

(for 22) Dr Gerard Vaughan, Minister for Health, DHSS (visited Kuwait last year)

(for 24) Mr John Browne MP, House of Commons

Mr David Crouch MP, House of Commons

Hon Charles Morrison MP, House of Commons

Mr Robert Adley MP, House of Commons

Mr Cyril Townsend MP, House of Commons

(for 26) Mr David Watkins MP, House of Commons

Mr Andrew Faulds MP, House of Commons

(for 27) Mr A Loehnis, Bank of England, Threadneedle Street London EC2 (Tel: 601-3485)

/(for 37) Mr R Johns

(For 37) Mr R Johns, Middle East Editor, Financial Times, Bracken House, 10 Cannon Street, London EC4 (Tel: 248-8000)

(For 38)

(For 39) Mr G A Hart, AUS, DHSS

Lord Denman CBE MC, c/o Committee on Invisible Exports, 7th Floor, The Stock Exchange, London EC2

Mr Nicholas Goodison, Chairman of the Stock Exchange, London EC2

file ds

cc Caroline Stephens
Sue Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 22 December 1981

BF

Visit by the Prime Minister of Kuwait

The Prime Minister could offer talks at 12 noon on 6 January, followed by lunch (your letter of 21 December refers). On the assumption that Shaikh Sa'ad can accept this offer we shall have little time to make the arrangements for the lunch. I therefore hope you can provide a suggested guest list as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 December 1981

Prime Minister
Worth doing, I think. Agree to talks at 12 noon on 6 January, followed by lunch?
A.J.C. 21/12

Yes mt

Dear John,

Visit by the Prime Minister of Kuwait

We have heard that Shaikh Sa'ad, the Prime Minister of Kuwait, will probably be paying a private visit to London for a few days beginning on 5 January.

The Prime Minister last saw him when he was her host during her visit to Kuwait in late September. Besides being the Head of the Kuwaiti Government, Shaikh Sa'ad has for us an added importance in that he is probably the Kuwaiti Minister most sympathetic to British interests and British views on international affairs. The Prime Minister will doubtless recall that Kuwaiti Ministers do not necessarily see eye to eye with us, despite the real interests we share. In her exchanges with the Kuwaitis the Prime Minister may have found them complacement about the dangers to the Gulf and unrealistic in weighing the balance of the intentions and capabilities of the two super-powers. Moreover, with their large Palestinian population, they sometimes take a radical line on the Arab/Israel issue which is somewhat at variance with their moderate Arab neighbours and is not as receptive as it might be to European policy.

In addition to these major political issues, the Prime Minister might also find it useful to discuss certain bilateral matters. Among these is a recent request from the Kuwaiti Government for a team from the Ministry of Defence to review Kuwait's air defence capability. This seems likely to lead to the establishment of a further number of loan service personnel and could well open the way to enhanced UK defence sales against stiff competition. Though Shaikh Sa'ad is not the originator of this idea, a word to him as Head of the Government could be valuable in helping to tip important decisions in our direction.

Lord Carrington therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should if possible see Shaikh Sa'ad during his visit, and thus continue the process she began last September, of trying to bring closer our views and those

/of a

of a country which has much importance for us. Would the Prime Minister be prepared to see Shaikh Sa'ad after her return to Downing Street on 6 January? Or would she, depending on her other engagements, be prepared to offer him lunch, as she did to Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia?

If the Prime Minister is agreeable in principle, Lord Carrington believes a message from the Prime Minister offering the meeting would be appropriate. This could have some value on its own, since if Shaikh Sa'ad does not in the event come, the message would provide an opportunity to maintain the dialogue with him and get over one or two important points to the Kuwaitis.

Yours ever.

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Grey Scale #13

C Y M

A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19