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CAB ONE

PART 34 CAB ONE

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Situation in the Middle East  
Conflict between Iraq/Kuwait, Saudi  
Arabia et al  
**CAB ONE**  
UK Policy towards the Conflict

MIDDLE  
EAST

Part 1: May 1979

Part 34: 18 Nov 1990

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>22.11.90</del>							
<del>23.11.90</del>							
<del>24.11.90</del>							
<del>3.12.90</del>							
6.12.90							
 <p><b>PREM 19/3439</b></p>							

PART 34 ends:-

FCS to PM 6.12.20

PART 35 begins:-

pc to COP 7.12.20



PM/90/94

PRIME MINISTER

Thanks!  
4.7.12

2  
Prime Minister  
For discussion in  
OPD(G) early next  
week. CDD. G/Ki;

Advice to British Communities in War Risk Countries

1. As you know, the British community in the Gulf region numbers approximately 50,000. Many live in countries which are at direct risk from Iraqi military action or face the possibility of violent demonstrations in support of the Iraqis. It is unlikely we shall get much warning of the outbreak of hostilities. We need to reduce the size of our communities in the main danger areas. The passage of Security Council Resolution 678 offers an opportunity to give further advice to the British community to thin out while there is still time for them to leave in an orderly fashion by normal commercial means.

2. Of course, we do not want to cause alarm, disrupt vital services, upset governments or separate families unnecessarily. There can be no question of advising all British nationals to leave the region. But by issuing a formal Consular warning (copy attached) for the areas most at risk that non-essential workers and dependants should leave, we could significantly reduce the numbers of those who would be most vulnerable in the event of hostilities. At the beginning of the crisis we encouraged communities to thin out but many have drifted back. On 27 November we modestly reinforced our advice

/BY



by recommending that school children should not travel out to Bahrain, Qatar or the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia for Christmas and that families should get together for the holiday in the UK. We further advised that those leaving the Gulf for Christmas should not return until the situation became clearer.

3. The communities most at risk are:

	British Community
Bahrain	4725
Qatar	2870
Saudi Arabia (Eastern region)	8000
Yemen	360
Jordan	1000
Riyadh	6500

The risk is not identical for these countries. Bahrain, Qatar and the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia and Riyadh are within easy range of Iraqi missiles and likely to be the targets in the event of hostilities. In Yemen and Jordan the risk would be from demonstrations against Westerners.

4. Other areas of potential risk are the Western extremities of the United Arab Emirates and Israel. But I do not think they need to be included at this stage. The risk to the UAE is much less than to Bahrain, Qatar and the Eastern province. The Israelis would deeply resent the issue of a Consular warning: they believe they can look after all those residents in and visiting their country. The Americans consider (but we shall check again) that the issue of such advice for Israel to be

/politically



politically too difficult to contemplate. Our EC partners take a similar view.

5. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 678 has changed the political situation in the Gulf. The risk of conflict has perceptibly increased. If we are to get the communities thinned out it is important that we give advice soon. An added advantage of taking action soon is that it would allow families to make practical arrangements to cover the Christmas period and beyond, eg children in schools locally.

6. I hope we can discuss this next week. I understand the misgivings which colleagues have repeatedly shown on this subject. But I think we have a duty to those concerned as the prospect of war comes closer, and that we shall be much criticised if we neglect it. We have larger communities in the area than the US or any European country, and to some extent they look to us for a lead. I would propose if colleagues agree to tell the Americans and our EC partners of the advice which we intend to issue before Christmas and to proceed on these lines unless they strongly differ, informing the Arab Governments concerned shortly in advance.

7. I am copying this minute to other members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has the following advice for British nationals resident in Bahrain, Qatar, the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, ~~Yemen and Jordan:~~

In view of the possibility of hostilities in the Gulf and the ensuing danger, ~~either directly of or as a result of civil disturbance to civilian populations,~~ British dependants are advised to leave the area ~~as soon as possible and in any event~~ well before the deadline of 15 January which has been set by the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. British companies operating in these areas are also advised to consider carefully whether any of their staff could be spared until the situation returns to normal.

Our advice to visitors remains unchanged. Tourists should not visit the area, but those who have necessary business to conduct should not be deterred. They should register their arrival with the nearest British Diplomatic Mission, and should tell the Mission how long they expect to stay.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAKER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN  
RELATIONS COMMITTEE

## SUMMARY

1. STRONG PERFORMANCE BY BAKER IN WHICH HE EMPHASISED THE NEED TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE EARLY USE OF FORCE. CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC CALLS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS A CHANCE TO WORK.

## DETAIL

2. SECRETARY BAKER APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY (5 DECEMBER). HE GAVE A LONG OPENING STATEMENT COVERING US STRATEGY, THE REASONS WHY THE US HAD TO PREPARE TO USE FORCE AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE.
3. BAKER SAID THAT, IN PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOUR STATED OBJECTIVES, THE STRATEGY HAD BEEN TO IMPOSE INCREASING PRESSURES ON IRAQ (POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY). THE HOPE WAS THAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION WOULD CAUSE SADDAM TO WITHDRAW, BUT AFTER FOUR MONTHS HE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF COMPLYING WITH ANY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE MESSAGE OF UNSCR 678 WAS THAT SADDAM HAD ONE LAST CHANCE TO COME TO HIS SENSES. QUOTE YOU CAN CHOOSE PEACE BY RESPECTING THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO YOU WILL RISK ALL UNQUOTE.
4. ON HIS MISSION TO BAGHDAD, BAKER SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE THE BEGINNING OF A NEGOTIATION EITHER ON THE UN RESOLUTION OR OTHER ISSUES (THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, LEBANON). IT WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN TO SADDAM THE CHOICE HE FACED. BAKER ADDED - POINTEDLY - THAT, TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, HE HAD TO GO WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
5. BAKER SAID THAT SADDAM WAS UNLIKELY TO MAKE THE PEACEFUL CHOICE UNLESS HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WAS COMPLIANCE UNDER FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION ON ECONOMIC



SANCTIONS WAS NOT WHETHER THEY WERE HURTING IRAQ BUT WHETHER THEY WOULD COMPEL SADDAM'S WITHDRAWAL. AFTER FOUR MONTHS, THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTED THEY WERE HAVING LITTLE, IF ANY, EFFECT ON HIS INCLINATION TO WITHDRAW. WAITING WOULD BENEFIT SADDAM AND IMPOSE COSTS ON THE ALLIES (CONTINUING RAPE OF KUWAIT, MANIPULATION OF HOSTAGES, BUILDING OF CW/BW CAPABILITY, EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY). QUOTE AS WE WAIT, HE EXPECTS OTHER ISSUES TO DEFLECT OUR ATTENTION, TO WEAKEN OUR RESOLVE, AND TO DISSOLVE THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION .... THAT IS WHY WE THINK WE MUST MAKE CREDIBLE OUR PREPARATIONS TO USE FORCE UNQUOTE. FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE MILITARY PREPARATIONS NOW WOULD UNDERCUT DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE BY SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGE TO IRAQ, TEND TO LEGITIMISE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT AND RISK, IRRESPONSIBLY, INCURRING GREATER CASUALTIES IN ANY CONFLICT.

6. BAKER ACKNOWLEDGED THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPLANATION OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE. HE SAID THIS WAS BECAUSE THERE WERE MULTIPLE CAUSES, THREATS AND DANGERS. QUOTE PUT VERY BLUNTLY, A VERY DANGEROUS DICTATOR, ARMED TO THE TEETH, IS THREATENING A CRITICAL REGION AT A DEFINING MOMENT IN HISTORY UNQUOTE. EXPANDING ON THIS, BAKER NOTED THAT THE SUCCESS OF SADDAM'S AGGRESSION WOULD GUARANTEE MORE CONFLICT AND EVENTUALLY A WIDER WAR, WITH LITTLE HOPE FOR ANY EFFORT AT PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. QUOTE MORALLY WE MUST ACT SO THAT INTERNATIONAL LAWS, NOT INTERNATIONAL OUTLAWS, GOVERN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD ..... HISTORICALLY, WE MUST STAND BY THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT ..... POLITICALLY, WE MUST STAND FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP - NOT BECAUSE WE SEEK IT, BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE NO-ONE ELSE CAN DO THE JOB UNQUOTE.

7. QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE FOCUSED ON WHETHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MIGHT YET FORCE SADDAM TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. A NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC SENATORS (BIDEN, PELL, SARBANES, KERRY) ARGUED THAT SANCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO WORK. SARBANES WAS PARTICULARLY INSISTENT THAT THE US SHOULD STAY THE COURSE AND NOT ACT OUT OF FRUSTRATION, PARTICULARLY WHEN US LIVES WERE AT RISK. QUOTE I CANNOT SAY TO A FAMILY THAT LOSES A SON OR DAUGHTER IN A CONFLICT ..... THAT WE EXHAUSTED EVERY POSSIBILITY FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION ..... BECAUSE THE SANCTIONS OPTION HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED UNQUOTE. (HE MENTIONED BRIGADIER CORDINGLEY'S REPORTED COMMENTS THAT CASUALTIES COULD RUN TO 15 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE).

8. SENATORS ALSO RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF BURDENSARING, ARGUING THAT OTHER WESTERN NATIONS AND OIL PRODUCING STATES SHOULD BE DOING MORE. IN PARTICULAR, THE GULF STATES SHOULD

BE USING THEIR WINDFALL PROFITS FROM HIGHER OIL PRICES TO SUPPORT STATES IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF SANCTIONS AND HIGHER OIL PRICES: THIS WOULD ALLOW MORE TIME FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK.

9. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO HOLD DIRECT, HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS. BAKER WAS PRESSED TO SAY THAT IN HIS TALKS IN BAGHDAD, HE WOULD SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY AND LOOK FOR WAYS OF ALLOWING SADDAM TO CLIMB DOWN. BAKER STUCK TO THE LINE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WERE NON-NEGOTIABLE.

COMMENT

10. A POWERFUL AND WELL-ARGUED PERFORMANCE BY BAKER WHICH (PACE BAKER'S COMMENTS TO YOU - FCO TELNO 2117) STILL LEFT DEMOCRATIC SENATORS UNCONVINCED. BAKER HAS ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER THE GROUND TOMORROW WHEN HE TESTIFIES BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IN THE US  
SUMMARY

1. TWO WEEKS OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS SHOW THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS AT ODDS AND ENTRENCHED IN THEIR VIEWS. PUBLIC OPINION SO FAR REMAINS SUPPORTIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION. AS LONG AS IT REMAINS SO, THE ADMINISTRATION CAN PROBABLY AFFORD TO SIDE-LINE CONGRESS. BUT, IF AND WHEN THE TIME COMES TO GO TO WAR, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NEED TO HOPE FOR SWIFT SUCCESS. AND, SHOULD THE PUBLIC MOOD CHANGE AGAIN, A DECISION TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE WILL BE THAT MUCH HARDER.

DETAIL

2. AFTER SOME TWO WEEKS OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE GULF, THIS MAY BE A GOOD TIME TO ASSESS THE DOMESTIC DEBATE ON US POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF. FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S POINT OF VIEW, THE PICTURE IS MIXED.

3. AT THE HEART OF THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IS THE QUESTION WHETHER US INTERESTS ARE ENOUGH AT RISK IN THE PRESENT CRISIS TO WARRANT INITIATING A WAR WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN MANY THOUSANDS OF US CASUALTIES. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT ENOUGH IS AT STAKE: CONGRESS DOES NOT AGREE, AND PUBLIC OPINION IS UNCERTAIN.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE - WELL PUT RECENTLY BY THE PRESIDENT, BAKER, CHENEY AND OTHERS - RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT INVASION, AGGRESSION, AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (EG HOSTAGE HOLDING AND THE BLOCKADE OF EMBASSIES) MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, WHICH THE END OF THE COLD WAR HOLDS IN PROSPECT, IS TO BECOME A REALITY. A SUB-THEME IS THAT A DICTATOR LIKE SADDAM SHOULD NOT CONTROL HALF THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES. AS BAKER SUCCINCTLY PUT IT A VERY DANGEROUS DICTATOR, ARMED TO THE TEETH, IS THREATENING A CRITICAL REGION AT A DEFINING MOMENT IN HISTORY.

5. CONGRESS HAS NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES. ITS CONCERN CENTRES ON WHETHER THE US NEEDS TO START AN EARLY, AND NO DOUBT COSTLY, WAR TO REVERSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF

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IRAQ'S INVASION. THE MAJORITY IN CONGRESS BELIEVES THAT, SHORT OF A CLEAR PROVOCATION FROM SADDAM, SANCTIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED MORE TIME TO WORK. EVEN IF SANCTIONS DO NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT, CONGRESS ARGUES THAT THEY WILL - IF APPLIED FOR, SAY, ANOTHER YEAR - SO WEAKEN IRAQ'S ARMY AS TO MAKE THE MILITARY TASK FACING THE US MUCH EASIER. TIME IS ON THE COALITION'S SIDE.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION DISPUTE THIS. THEY SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE OF SANCTIONS HURTING AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN INDEFINITE AMOUNT OF TIME IS AVAILABLE FOR THEM TO DO SO. THE RAPE OF KUWAIT CONTINUES. BOTH THE US AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, ALREADY CLOSE TO RECESSION, NOW HAVE TO FACE THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MUCH HIGHER OIL PRICES. THE TASK OF DEALING WITH IRAQ WILL BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT THE LONGER IT IS DELAYED, GIVEN IRAQ'S CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO BUILD UP ITS CW/BW CAPABILITY AND ITS EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. AS THIS WEEK'S HEARINGS HAVE SHOWN, CONGRESS WITH ITS DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY BUYS LITTLE OF THIS. THE NUCLEAR ISSUE HAS BEEN DISMISSED AS A RED HERRING. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ARGUMENT ABOUT THE HIGHER ECONOMIC COSTS IS SEEN OFF WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SAUDIS, AND OTHER ARAB BENEFICIARIES OF THE WINDFALL OIL GAINS, SHOULD COMPENSATE THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE SUFFERING. MORE GENERALLY, THE PRESIDENT NEED NOT RUSH INTO WAR: HIS OBJECTIVES CAN BE MET BY OTHER MEANS. AS SENATOR KENNEDY PUT IT, IT MUST SURELY BE CHEAPER TO WAIT ANOTHER YEAR FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK THAN TO START A WAR NOW.

8. A SUB-THEME IS CONGRESS'S CLAIM TO A SAY IN INITIATING WAR. ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION CLEARLY STATES THAT CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR. THE 1973 WAR POWERS RESOLUTION WAS INTENDED TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO COMMIT US FORCES WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. NO PRESIDENT SINCE THEN HAS ACCEPTED THAT THE RESOLUTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL. BUT ON 4 DECEMBER, THE HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS ADOPTED A NON-BINDING RESOLUTION (177-37) DECLARING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION WITHOUT FORMAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, UNLESS US LIVES WERE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER. IN PARALLEL, THE US FEDERAL COURT HEARD OPENING ARGUMENTS IN THE LAW SUIT BROUGHT BY 54 HOUSE DEMOCRATS SEEKING AN INJUNCTION AGAINST A US ATTACK ON IRAQ WITHOUT PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

9. NEITHER OF THESE MOVES IS LIKELY TO LIMIT SIGNIFICANTLY THE PRESIDENT'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE CLEAR MESSAGE FROM ALL OUR CONTACTS, REINFORCED BY BAKER TO YOU, IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL GO TO WAR IF NECESSARY, WHATEVER THE CONGRESS MAY THINK. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE FAR MORE COMFORTABLE IF

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CONGRESS WAS ON SIDE - NOT LEAST BECAUSE DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SEND THE WRONG SIGNALS TO IRAQ AND THEREBY COMPLICATE THE ADMINISTRATION'S TASK BETWEEN NOW AND THE START OF ANY OFFENSIVE.

10. THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS HAVE SHOWN THAT BOTH SIDES ARE NOW ENTRENCHED IN THEIR VIEWS. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF EITHER WINNING THE OTHER OVER. BOTH ARE MORE CONCERNED TO WIN OVER PUBLIC OPINION. SO FAR THE INCREASINGLY OUTSPOKEN CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISMS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE HAD MUCH IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. LATEST POLLS SHOW THAT 90 PER CENT APPROVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND BAKER TO BAGHDAD, THAT A MAJORITY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BAKER'S VISIT WILL PRODUCE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, AND THAT OVER 60 PER CENT BELIEVE - IN THAT EVENT - THAT THE US SHOULD GO TO WAR TO FORCE IRAQ OUT. AS LONG AS THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST IRAQ HOLDS, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CONFIDENT THAT PUBLIC OPINION WILL REMAIN SUPPORTIVE: AND WITH PUBLIC OPINION ON THEIR SIDE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED HAVE NO FEAR OF CONGRESS IFOR WHEN THE TIME COMES TO TAKE ACTION.

11. IF THEY ARE RIGHT, WELL AND GOOD. BUT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT THE LONGER ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUED AND, SHOULD PUBLIC OPINION TURN SIGNIFICANTLY AGAINST WAR IN THE COMING WEEKS, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE IN TROUBLE COME NEXT YEAR IF THEY DECIDED THE MILITARY OPTION HAD TO BE EXERCISED. SO FAR THERE IS NO SIGN OF A FURTHER SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT AS THE NSC REMINDED US TODAY, MUCH CAN HAPPEN BETWEEN NOW AND 15 JANUARY. THE NSC'S MAIN CONCERN IS THAT, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND BAKER TO BAGHDAD AND WITH SADDAM'S DECISION TO FREE HOSTAGES, PUBLIC OPINION MAY INDEED BEGIN TO WONDER WHETHER THERE NOW WAS ENOUGH AT STAKE TO WARRANT WAR INSTEAD OF PERSISTING WITH THE POSSIBLE PATH TO PEACE WHICH THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE OPENED.

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RELEASE OF DETAINEES

1. AS THE NEWS THAT SADDAM HAS ASKED THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO ALLOW ALL FOREIGNERS TO LEAVE IRAQ HAS BROKEN ON A THURSDAY AFTERNOON IT IS NOT SURPRISINGLY PROVING IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN STRAIGHTAWAY OFFICIAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT.
2. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARY IF IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO COVER KUWAIT AS WELL AS IRAQ PROPER.
3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS TO MEET IN APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR'S TIME. THINGS MAY BEGIN TO BECOME A LITTLE CLEARER AFTER THAT. MEANWHILE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ADVISE INDIVIDUAL DETAINEES TO BELIEVE IN THEIR EXIT VISAS ONLY WHEN THEY SEE THEM IN THEIR PASSPORTS. THERE MAY YET BE VARIOUS BUREAUCRATIC COMPLICATONS. FOR EXAMPLE, MEN WHOM THE IRAQIS REGARD AS STILL HAVING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS HERE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN RELEASE LETTERS FROM THEIR SPONSORS. THERE MAY BE DELAYS OVER TRAVEL PERMISSION FOR PEOPLE LIKE THE BECHTEL EMPLOYEES IN THIS COMPOUND WHO ARE NOT PROPERLY REGISTERED. WE WILL REPORT JUST AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN.
4. WE SHALL TAKE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO FIND OUT WHETHER IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES FOREIGN CHARTER AIRCRAFT WILL BE ALLOWED TO LAND AT SADDAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.
5. WE SHALL LIKEWISE BE EXAMINING WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE FOR EVACUATING PEOPLE FROM KUWAIT.

WALKER

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OUR TELNO 1500 : IRAQ/KUWAIT : COMMENTS BY DUMAS AND CHEVENEMENT

## SUMMARY

1. DUMAS REFERS TO THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ME PROBLEMS AFTER THE GULF CRISIS HAS BEEN RESOLVED. FURTHER PERSONAL IDEAS SUGGESTED BY CHEVENEMENT, INCLUDING HINTS ABOUT POSSIBLE REDRAWING OF KUWAIT'S FRONTIERS.

## DETAIL

2. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION AT THE WEU ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY, DUMAS REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO SETTLE ALL MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS: IT COULD ACT AS 'AN UMBRELLA FOR A NUMBER OF SUBSIDIARY CONFERENCES. IT WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY, RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND OF COURSE DISARMAMENT.' DUMAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CONVENING THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BEFORE THE GULF CRISIS HAD BEEN SETTLED.

3. DEFENCE MINISTER CHEVENEMENT ANSWERED ANOTHER QUESTION AT THE WEU ASSEMBLY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ BY SAYING THAT AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST AGGRESSION. HE HAD BEEN REPORTED AS SAYING EARLIER ON FRENCH TELEVISION THAT, IF SADDAM AGREED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, THE QUESTION OF ITS FRONTIERS WITH IRAQ COULD BE LOOKED AT.

## COMMENT

4. UNLIKE TODAY'S 'TIMES' WHICH REFERS TO CHEVENEMENT'S COMMENTS ABOUT KUWAIT'S FRONTIERS AS EVIDENCE OF FRENCH 'READINESS TO BREAK RANKS OVER KUWAIT', THE FRENCH MORNING PRESS PAID NO SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THESE REMARKS. LE MONDE WAS CONTENT WITH A FACTUAL REPORT HEADLINING THE 'INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE'. CHEVENEMENT HAS

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BEEN SEEN FOR SOME TIME AS THE ODD MAN OUT IN THE CABINET. ALTHOUGH HIS ANTI-WAR VIEWS MAY REFLECT A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF FRENCH OPINION OPPOSED TO FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ (57 PERCENT ACCORDING TO THE LATEST POLLS), HIS IS NOT THE DECISIVE VOICE WITH MITTERRAND, WHO LOOKS FOR ADVICE TO DUMAS AND HIS PRINCIPAL ELYSEE ADVISERS BIANCO (SECRETARY-GENERAL) AND LANXADE (MILITARY ADVISER). DUMAS DIRECTEUR DE CABINET KESSEDJIAN TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT ON GULF POLICY CHEVENEMENT HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN SIDELINED.

5. DUMAS'S COMMENTS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ARE A REFINEMENT OF THE IDEAS SKETCHED OUT BY MITTERRAND IN HIS UNGA SPEECH. THERE ARE TWO MAIN DIFFERENCES. FIRST, DUMAS REVERSES THE ORDER OF EVENTS. MITTERRAND INDICATED AT NEW YORK THAT AFTER TALKS HAD BEEN HELD TO SOLVE THE MAJOR MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD 'AT THE END OF THE ROAD' TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. DUMAS APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FIRST TO ACT AS AN UMBRELLA COVERING SEVERAL SUBSIDIARY CONFERENCES (THOUGH WHETHER THEY WOULD HAPPEN AT THE SAME TIME AND PLACE IS UNCLEAR). SECONDLY, DUMAS'S VISION OF ONE SUPER AND SEVERAL SUB-CONFERENCES IMPLIES THAT HE IS TEMPTED BY THE IDEA OF A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT TO ME PROBLEMS - AN APPROACH SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT BY MITTERRAND IN THE UNGA. ONE SHOULD NOT, THOUGH, EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NUANCES, PARTICULARLY AS DUMAS WAS TALKING OFF THE CUFF AT THE WEU ASSEMBLY. AND, CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY PHILIP JACOBSON IN THE TIMES, DUMAS APPEARS TO BE WHOLLY SOUND ON THE NEED TO AVOID REWARDING SADDAM BY ESTABLISHING ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND OTHER ME PROBLEMS.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
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PS/MR HOGG  
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

HD/SED  
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MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)


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PS/PUS  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR BROOMFIELD  
MR SLATER  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR GOULDEN  
MR JAY  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
HD/MED  
HD/AMD  
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HD/ECD(E)  
HD/NAD  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NPDD  
HD/SECPOL D

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Mem 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	3439	
Extract details: letter and enclosures from wall to Powell dated 5 December 1990 with attachment		
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Enter the department and series,  
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eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

39 (a-b)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

SECRET UK EYES A

5 December 1990

*Dear Choles,*

*AM/MS*

Prime Minister's Meeting with Prince Bandar, 5 December:  
Saudi Request for Anthrax and Botulin Vaccines

In my letter of 4 December (not copied) I promised to let you have a line to take should Prince Bandar raise the Saudi application to purchase 50,000 doses of vaccine against Anthrax and Botulin Toxin (BTx).

The background is that the Saudis have placed an order with Porton International Plc (the marketing organisation for the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR), which operates under the Public Health Laboratory Service) for 50,000 doses of vaccines for use against Anthrax and Botulin Toxin, two known biological weapon agents, which we assess that the Iraqis possess. Porton International submitted an export licence application for the Anthrax vaccine to the DTI on 8 November. Since then the Saudis have been pressing us, both here and in Riyadh, to approve the licence and allow the order to go ahead.

Consideration of the export licence has, in fact, been put on hold pending a Ministerial decision on whether to immunise our forces in the Gulf against Anthrax (the Defence Secretary is expected to raise this in OPD(G) next week). Although the vaccine production line at CAMR is working at full stretch, we would not even in the best of circumstances have any vaccine to spare for the Saudis before the beginning of February if it were decided to begin an immunisation programme. If it were decided against an immunisation programme, Ministers would have to consider whether to release vaccine to the Saudis, thus allowing them to immunise their forces while other members of the multi-national force were not so protected. CAMR does not currently produce BTx vaccine and at least three months would be

/required

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b

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required to establish a production line (rather than pursue an immunisation programme against BTx we have chosen instead to concentrate on stock-piling BTx serum, which can be used as a post-attack treatment). Neither vaccine is readily obtainable on the open market. Apart from the Soviet Union (which we believe produces "live" - and thus more dangerous - Anthrax vaccine), only we and the Americans have a known production capability: CAMR is the only facility in the UK and the US authorities are currently stock-piling both Anthrax and BTx vaccine for a possible immunisation programme of their own.

If Prince Bandar raises the export licence application, we suggest that the Prime Minister should draw his attention to the very limited availability of vaccine. He could add that we have not yet decided how to use the limited quantity available to us but that we had an obligation to take account of the position of our own troops. We were thus unable to agree to supply the Saudis now but would be in touch as soon as we were clear about the position.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb at the Ministry of Defence.

*Yours ever*  
*S. L. Gass*  
(S. L. Gass)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A

CONFIDENTIAL



REC  
PM  
SUBJECT c/Mante

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

cc/PC

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1990

See later,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this evening with Prince Bandar, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington.

Prince Bandar said that he brought good wishes from King Fahd, who had been most grateful for the Prime Minister's message. The Prime Minister said that he hoped to meet the King soon. He was planning to visit the Gulf in early January, although it had not yet been possible to fix dates. Prince Bandar said that the Prime Minister would always be welcome.

Prince Bandar continued that the way in which the world community handled the present crisis in the Gulf was of vital importance for us all in the 1990s. We had been optimistic about the next decade, following the great changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had carried us back to the mentality and behaviour of 30 years ago. The Prime Minister said that he could assure Prince Bandar straight away that he would not find a shred of difference in Britain's policy on the Gulf between the new Government and that of his predecessor. What had happened in Kuwait was unforgivable and unacceptable. Iraq must withdraw and the legitimate government must be restored. If Iraq's aggression was not dealt with, no small country anywhere would be safe. He would be just as resolute as his predecessor. Prince Bandar should inform King Fahd of that.

Prince Bandar said he was most grateful for this assurance, which would be much appreciated by the King. The Saudis were a little anxious about President Bush's recent proposal to invite Tariq Aziz to Washington and send Secretary Baker to Baghdad. They had been jolted by the suddenness of the announcement. The Prime Minister said that the President had made absolutely clear there would be no negotiation. But he needed to retain the support of Congress and American public opinion: and it was in the interests of all of us that he should do so. He knew from talking to him on the telephone that the President was as resolute as ever. Prince Bandar said he had received some firm assurances from Secretary Baker. It was helpful that support for the Administration's policy had increased sharply following the President's announcement.

Prince Bandar said he hoped the Prime Minister would take a direct interest in the Al Yamamah project which had served both countries well. Saudi Arabia was very pleased with the support

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- 2 -

which it had received from the United Kingdom. A whole range of other economic activities had grown out of the project. The Prime Minister indicated he was aware of the project and it had his support.

The Prime Minister said he was concerned about the situation in Jordan. He could well understand why the Saudis were fed up with King Hussain's behaviour, but Jordan's stability was important to us all. Prince Bandar said that what hurt most was that King Hussain had been a close personal friend of the Saudi Royal Family. They felt correspondingly let down by his behaviour. He had made the mistake of joining Nasser in 1967. Now once again he was annoying all the wrong people. There had been recent feelers through Oman about a possible improvement in relations. But for this to happen, King Hussain must change his policies. He hoped that the United Kingdom would persuade him.

Prince Bandar said that the Saudi government were not comfortable with the French, whom they found difficult and finicky. There were signs that Monsieur Dumas now wanted to go to Baghdad. The Prime Minister said that we were doing our best to dissuade the French from such a course. It would be best if Secretary Baker were to go there representing the views of the Permanent Five.

Prince Bandar said there was only one item of unfinished business between Britain and Saudi Arabia, and that was the Saudi request for documents relating to the border with the Yemen. I explained that we had been unable to undertake the necessary research into the archives on this, because those concerned were required for duty in the Gulf Emergency Unit. We hoped to respond positively as soon as possible. Prince Bandar said he understood the difficulties but wanted to underline that it was a matter of importance for the Saudis.


I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

*Yam ...*  
*C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>REM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3439</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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AND TO PRIORITY RIYADH, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW

AND TO PRIORITY PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

AND TO ESC LONDON, MODUK, ACTOR

SIC

MY TELNOS 2894 AND 2898: FOLLOW UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS OF  
30 NOVEMBER

### SUMMARY

1. POSITIVE REACTIONS FROM PRESS AND CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT'S  
STATEMENT. ADMINISTRATION HEAVYWEIGHTS UNDERLINE THAT PRESIDENT  
IS NOT PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE A COMPROMISE DEAL.

### DETAIL

2. THE REACTIONS HERE TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HAVE  
GENERALLY BEEN EXTREMELY POSITIVE. THE WASHINGTON POST OF 2  
DECEMBER SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FOLLOWED BY  
THE OFFER OF DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WAS QUOTE A THOUGHTFULLY  
CONCEIVED, SKILFULLY EXECUTED ONE-TWO SEQUENCE WHICH HAS PUT IN  
PLACE A COHERENT STRATEGY, STRENGTHENED MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC  
OPTIONS ALIKE AND ..... SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED CHANCES THAT THE  
CRISIS WILL BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY AND ON UN TERMS UNQUOTE. THE  
POST CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD EARNED BROAD DOMESTIC  
SUPPORT TO MATCH THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT HE ALREADY HAS. MOST  
OTHER PRESS REACTIONS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY POSITIVE.

3. A LONE VOICE, HOWEVER, IS THAT OF KISSINGER, WHO HAS ARGUED  
THAT THE US'S ALLIES WILL INTERPRET US-IRAQI DIRECT TALKS AS  
NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IT WOULD THEN BECOME DIFFICULT, IF NOT  
IMPOSSIBLE, TO HOLD THE ANTI-IRAQ COALITION TOGETHER. SO FAR THE  
WASHINGTON TIMES EDITORIAL TODAY (3 DECEMBER) HAS TAKEN UP THIS  
THEME, BUT FEW OTHER COMMENTATORS SEEM TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IT.

4. PART OF THE REASON IS THAT OVER THE WEEKEND THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS NOT TO COMPROMISE, BUT TO TELL SADDAM PERSONALLY WHAT HE IS UP AGAINST. SUNUNU AND QUAYLE MADE STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT ON 1 DECEMBER, AND BAKER, SCOWCROFT AND CHENEY APPEARED ON THE THREE CURRENT AFFAIRS TALK SHOWS ON 2 DECEMBER TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE (TRANSCRIPTS FAXED TO EMERGENCY UNIT, FCO).

5. BAKER WAS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE. HE SAID HIS OBJECTIVE IN BAGHDAD WOULD BE TO MAKE SURE SADDAM HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS QUOTE VERY, VERY SERIOUS UNQUOTE ABOUT NOT RULING OUT THE USE OF FORCE. HE STATED TWICE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATING ANY WATERING DOWN OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. HE AGREED THAT, IF SADDAM COMPLIED WITH UN RESOLUTIONS THEN HIS QUOTE REWARD UNQUOTE WAS THAT HE WOULD NOT FACE MILITARY ATTACK BY THE US. ASKED HOW A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION WOULD DEAL WITH THE THREAT FROM IRAQ'S DISPROPORTIONATE MILITARY POWER AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, HE SAID ONLY QUOTE WE WOULD HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES UNQUOTE.

6. ON CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS (AT LAST WEEK'S SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING) THAT SANCTIONS BE GIVEN LONGER TO WORK, BAKER SUGGESTED THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ALONE WOULD NEVER GET SADDAM OUT OF KUWAIT. HE WELCOMED THE CONGRESSIONAL

HEARINGS AS A MANIFESTATION OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY BUT SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO UNDERCUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. QUOTE THERE IS AN EXCELLENT CHANCE THAT WE COULD SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT ONCE HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE US AS A WHOLE, IS DETERMINED TO SEE THAT HAPPEN UNQUOTE. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT, IF SADDAM RAISED THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, HE WOULD MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE TWO QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT BE LINKED.

7. SCOWCROFT AND CHENEY ECHOED HIS GENERAL LINE. THEY WERE ALSO ASKED ABOUT SANCTIONS. SCOWCROFT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE BEING PATIENT, BUT SADDAM HAD TO BE SHOWN THAT THERE WAS NO WAY OF OUTLASTING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. QUOTE WHAT WE'RE TELLING HIM IS NOTHING'S GOING TO TURN UP. IF SANCTIONS WILL WORK IN A YEAR, IN 18 MONTHS, THEN OUR PEACE MOVE RIGHT NOW WILL

WORK UNQUOTE. CHENEY ARGUED THAT SANCTIONS COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO MAKE IRAQ WITHDRAW. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MIGHT NOT HOLD TOGETHER LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE SANCTIONS THE YEAR OR MORE TO WORK THAT SOME CONGRESSMEN WERE DEMANDING.

8. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE ALSO WELCOMED THE HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH IRAQ. SENATOR NUNN, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, WELCOMED QUOTE THIS CHANGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY UNQUOTE BUT ADDED THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD INCLUDE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION. DEMOCRATIC LEADERS GENERALLY WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO EXPLORE ALL CHANNELS TO A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION BUT SOME SENATORS (NOTABLY KENNEDY AND BIDEN) CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE TIME TO WORK. CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS SHOULD BECOME CLEARER AS CHENEY AND BAKER TESTIFY BEFORE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES THIS WEEK.

## COMMENT

9. THE PRESIDENT CAN BE SATISFIED WITH THE DOMESTIC RESPONSE SO FAR TO HIS STATEMENT. HE IS NOW SEEN TO BE OFFERING A COHERENT POLICY AND, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, AS HAVING THE INITIATIVE. BUT FURTHER RESPONSES FROM CONGRESS, AS THEY TAKE SHAPE DURING THE VARIOUS COMMITTEE HEARINGS THIS WEEK WILL BE IMPORTANT IN INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION.

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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
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MR GORE-BOOTH  
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MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
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FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 2922  
OF 040433Z DECEMBER 90

38 (a-b)

IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. WHEN I TOOK SIR D HANNAY TO SEE KIMMITT ON 3 DECEMBER, THE LATTER HAD ALREADY SEEN AND DISCUSSED WITH BAKER YOUR MESSAGE IN FCO TELNO 2095, WHICH I HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD DELIVERED.
2. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER WAS INCLINED TO FAVOUR A MEETING ON THE LINES PROPOSED, BUT HAD NOT YET CLEARED THE PROPOSAL OR COME TO A FIRM DECISION. KIMMITT PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT A MEETING JUST BEFORE OR AFTER THE NAC WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND BAKER MIGHT GO STRAIGHT ON THEREAFTER TO BAGHDAD. THIS WOULD AVOID HIS HAVING TO CROSS THE ATLANTIC TWICE, AND WOULD GIVE HIM A BREATHING SPACE FROM HIS ALMOST CEASELESS TRAVEL. KIMMITT WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE LIKELY AVAILABILITY OF SHEVARDNADZE, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN ABSENT FROM MOSCOW A GREAT DEAL AND WAS INCREASINGLY A KEY FIGURE THERE. THE TIMING MIGHT NOT PROVE POSSIBLE FOR HIM. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT WITHOUT ANY PRE-ARRANGEMENT OR CLEARANCE WITH US, DUMAS HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE MEETING PUBLICLY (PARIS TELNO 1500).
3. AS REGARDS TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT HERE, KIMMITT SAID THAT, AS YET, THERE HAD BEEN NO FORMAL RESPONSE FROM THE IRAQIS. THE AMERICANS WERE AIMING FOR THE LATTER PART OF THE WEEK BEGINNING 10 DECEMBER, BECAUSE SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE WITH BAKER IN TEXAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK AND WOULD BE SEEING THE PRESIDENT ON 12 DECEMBER IN WASHINGTON. 13 OR 14 DECEMBER SEEMED THE MOST PROMISING DATES.
4. I ASKED HOW FAR US THINKING HAD GOT ON DEALING WITH IRAQI QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN THE EVENT THAT THERE WAS ANY HINT OF IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO OBSERVE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. KIMMITT MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO FIRM LINE HAD YET BEEN WORKED OUT. IT WAS IMPORTANT HOWEVER TO MAKE A VERY FIRM DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EVENTS CONDITIONAL RPT CONDITIONAL ON WITHDRAWAL (IE LINKAGE WHICH IMPLIED REWARD FOR WITHDRAWAL AND WAS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE) AND EVENTS CONSEQUENTIAL RPT CONSEQUENTIAL TO WITHDRAWAL. AS REGARDS THE LATTER, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD ON THE PRESIDENT'S OWN STATEMENT ON 1 OCTOBER THAT ALL MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE KUWAITIS HAD ALSO SAID THAT ISSUES IN DISPUTE COULD BE PUT TO

PAGE 1  
SECRET



INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES SUCH AS ARBITRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND KIMMITT HAD RECENTLY CHECKED WITH KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVES BOTH IN NEW YORK AND IN WASHINGTON THAT THIS REMAINED THE POSITION. SIR D HANNAY AND I SUGGESTED THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID THE DANGER OF LINKAGE TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION, IT COULD BE BENEFICIAL IF THE US ADMINISTRATION COULD RESTATE THEIR POSITION UNILATERALLY AND THEREAFTER THEY NEED DO NO MORE THAN REFER TO THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENT.

5. TURNING TO THE FUTURE, AND ON THE HIGHLY UNCERTAIN ASSUMPTION THAT HOSTILITIES COULD BE AVOIDED, KIMMITT ASKED WHETHER UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ WOULD AUTOMATICALLY FALL ONCE THE IRAQIS HAD COMPLIED WITH THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. SIR D HANNAY REFERRED TO THE USEFUL PRECEDENT OF RHODESIA, WHERE WE AND THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN THE VIEW THAT UN SANCTIONS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY CEASE, BUT THE UN MEMBERSHIP HAD DECIDED OTHERWISE AND HAD INSISTED ON A SEPARATE RESOLUTION. ON THIS OCCASION IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO FALL IN WITH THAT MAJORITY VIEW. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO REMOVE SANCTIONS ON NORMAL IMPORTS BUT TO KEEP THEM FIRMLY IN PLACE FOR THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND SPARE PARTS. THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL WILL FOR THIS. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAINTAIN THE EMBARGO ON IRAQI OIL EXPORTS AS AN ADDITIONAL STRONG LEVER, BUT HE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HE AGREED WITH SIR D HANNAY'S COMMENT THAT AN IMMEDIATELY LOWER OIL PRICE WOULD BE EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE UN MEMBERSHIP.

6. FINALLY, I ASKED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS. KIMMITT SHOWED SOME EXASPERATION AT THEIR CONSTANTLY CHANGING VIEWS. THEY HAD INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR A FURTHER UN RESOLUTION, BUT WERE NOW SAYING THAT IT DID NOT APPLY TO THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE. BAKER WOULD BE GIVING TWO DAYS OF TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES ON 4 AND 5 DECEMBER. HE WOULD ALSO BE MAKING MANY INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS. THE PRESENT ESTIMATE WAS THAT A RESOLUTION APPROVING OR ENDORSING THE UN RESOLUTION WOULD PASS IN THE SENATE WITH A MAJORITY OF ABOUT 55-45 VOTES. THE SITUATION IN THE HOUSE WAS EVEN MORE UNCERTAIN. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT WANT TO GO FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION UNLESS, AS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, THEY COULD BE SURE BOTH OF SUCCESS AND OF A FIRM SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN (FOR SPEAKER FOLEY'S VIEWS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL ASPECTS, SEE MIFT).

ACLAND



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Sir R. Butler

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

FILE KK



38 (a-b)

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

**SIR ROBIN BUTLER**  
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**HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS**

The third paragraph of your note of 3 December on the Handling of the Gulf Crisis moves me to a few personal reflections.

Of course my post is not the opposite number of the National Security Adviser. They are at entirely different levels of responsibility. No single person is the exact opposite number for General Scowcroft because our system is different. The moral is surely that one has to be flexible and guided by common sense. You should obviously deal with the National Security Adviser where your responsibilities as Cabinet Secretary are concerned, including your special responsibilities for nuclear matters. The Chairman of the JIC should equally deal with him on matters relating to intelligence and the interpretation of it, and the implications for foreign policy. The Ambassador in Washington deals with him as he must with all senior members of the US Administration. There is also a role for the Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs and Defence) in No. 10 as the person with the most direct access to the Prime Minister of the day and the terminal point of the secure line which the President and Prime Minister use for direct communication.

I have done that with five National Security Advisers over nearly seven years. The contacts have covered a very wide range of issues, not just the Gulf crisis as your minute implies. They have, I believe, been thought useful both by Prime Ministers here and Presidents in the United States, as one part of the very extensive network of intimate communication between the US and the UK. They have been enhanced in some cases by personal friendship (going back, in the case of the present National Security Adviser, some nineteen years). Those contacts have not and have never sought to intrude on the preserve of others: there, for instance, have been no attempts to set up meetings. The vast majority of the contacts have been properly documented and recorded for the FCO. In the few cases where that has not

SECRET AND PERSONAL

happened, it has been on the personal instructions of the Prime Minister (or sometimes the President or National Security Adviser) of the day.

In that perspective, I think your abrupt dismissal of this one strand in the thick cable of US/UK contacts, and injunction that you will in future take them over, is unfortunate. One of the achievements of recent years has been that people in the Civil (including Diplomatic) Service have been freed to operate effectively regardless of their rank and grade where they can produce results. One thinks of Sir Robin Renwick as an Assistant Secretary solving the problem of Zimbabwe's independence: of David Williamson's mastery of European policy: of the role played by Richard Wilson in the Cabinet Office. Indeed you have rightly been one of the great beneficiaries of that yourself. It would be a pity to see it stifled for others. My own advice to the Prime Minister when I leave is that my successor should continue to maintain direct contacts, of an appropriate nature, with the National Security Adviser of the day even though he may be as lowly a creature in civil service rank as I am.

C. D. POWELL  
4 December 1990

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37

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

**HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS**

I am sorry you feel that my note of your discussion with the Prime Minister on 30 November of Handling of the Gulf Crisis was not accurate. I showed it before despatch to Mr. Turnbull, who had also been present and who found it a fair account: and I do not actually see that it is very different from paragraph 2 of your minute, only more staccato.

Paragraph 3 of your minute raises a wider issue, to which I would like to respond on a more personal basis. I am minuting separately on it.

C. D. POWELL  
4 December 1990

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*ccx*  
*36(A-I)*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

*4* December 1990

*2004/ki*

*Dear Charles,*

THE GULF: STRATEGIC AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

You might find it helpful to have the enclosed copy of the record of discussions between officials from here and their US counterparts earlier this month.

A copy goes to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*In date*  
*Jim Webb*

(S WEBB)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq

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AUS(C)4/6/1/2(425/90)

MOD REPRODUCTION COPY NO 1 OF 2 COPIES

21 November 1990

PS/S [REDACTED]

6/17/91

Copy to:  
 PSO/CDS  
 PSO/Joint Commander  
 FCO (Mr Broomfield)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: UK/US DISCUSSIONSSummary

The Joint Commander and I spent 3½ hours at the Pentagon yesterday in discussion of strategic and military objectives and guidance to military commanders with Paul Wolfowitz (Under Secretary Defence Policy) and Lt General Howard Graves (Assistant to the Chairman, JCS). We found a substantial measure of agreement on substance, with no major areas of difference. Discussion of the military option revealed no surprises, though there is evidently a very cautious approach to its adoption and a willingness to regard partial withdrawal as a constructive move by Iraq.

General

2. After some discussion the US side accepted the requirement, if UK forces were to be committed to a US-led operation, for a clear and mutually agreed understanding of the objectives of military action and of the guidance to be given to commanders. They showed some reluctance to contemplate (but did not rule out) a formal bilateral UK/US document, since this might (if it became known) be difficult to explain to the Saudis and French. They thought that an informal understanding, buttressed by co-ordinated and harmonised but separate political directives to commanders, might be a more satisfactory approach.

Strategic Objectives

3. There appears to be as yet no US Government consensus on strategic (as opposed to military) objectives. Wolfowitz and Graves were not convinced that we needed to seek agreement on these in the context of a document designed to provide a framework for military operations; but they did not disagree in substance with those identified in our position paper. They felt, however, that we should discriminate between the essential and the desirable and make clear where the priorities lay. They thought it important not to establish objectives which, in the event, we might fall short of achieving, since this might turn

success into apparent failure (especially if the objectives later became public knowledge).

4. The US side regarded our first objective (withdrawal from Kuwait, paragraph 1a) as the central requirement, with the second (hostages, 1b) very important but subsidiary (and they would prefer to see the deletion of 'all', which they regard as unattainable - see also below). Objectives 1c (compensation) and 1d (war crimes) they consider secondary and no more than desirable. They accept the (secondary) importance of 1e (NBC threat), though they think it would be more realistic to seek to "bring under control" than to "eliminate" the threat (but see also below under military objectives). They would prefer to delete the second half of 1f (longterm security structure) as possibly detracting from the more important first half and suggesting lack of commitment. 1g (Israel) they think is expressed too starkly and would prefer

"To the extent possible, to avoid Israeli military involvement in a way that would put at risk the achievement of the primary objective."

5. We referred to the possible addition of the destruction of the Iraqi military machine as a strategic objective. The US side felt that this risked setting sights too high and ignored the importance of maintaining a regional balance vis-a-vis Iran (though this did not currently require a major capability): in practice they expected that military action would have a severe impact on Iraqi military capability and, to the extent that it did not, this was a problem to be addressed in the establishment of a regional security structure. /

#### Military Objectives

6. The US side agreed that the essential objective was to secure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (paragraph 3a). I took them through the hostage problem as set out in the Foreign Secretary's minute of 15 November: they accepted the political case for taking all reasonable steps to rescue and protect hostages, though we got a clear impression that they attached less importance to this than UK Ministers do, but they would prefer 3b to read

"To make every reasonable effort to rescue or secure the release of hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq."

Part of their thinking on the hostage issue is attributable to the importance they attach to deterring future hostage-takers by not appearing to be deflected from primary objectives by this particular form of blackmail. The Joint Commander took the opportunity to seek to establish close co-ordination of planning on the hostage issue and General Graves is following this up.



7. The US side questioned whether the destruction of Iraq's NBC capability should be an objective in its own right - or regarded as an essential side-effect of military action to free Kuwait. They were clear, however, that if military action were taken we should attack the nuclear as well as the chemical and biological capability, given the longterm threat to security which it represented: they were not greatly impressed with the argument that its destruction might not be necessary in the immediate context of liberating Kuwait.

#### Guidance to Military Commanders

8. The US side expressed the view that, although they did not dissent from the substance of paragraphs 4 to 7 of our paper, it was important that the guidance to military commanders should be framed so as to give them positive authority rather than to impose restrictions: they described our draft as verging on the legalistic. They thought the references to 'scorched earth' and not occupying Iraqi territory unclear. It appears, however, that the Rules of Engagement provided to General Schwarzkopf may contain the sort of restrictions identified in our paper.

9. We were given a copy of a draft strategic directive for Schwarzkopf (attached): this has not yet been formally submitted for approval by Mr Cheney. We agreed that we would examine this and, as appropriate, propose amendments for consideration with the US at a follow-up meeting on an inter Agency basis (perhaps in 2 weeks' time). I shall be giving further consideration to how to handle this.

#### The Military Option

10. We concluded with an exchange about the military option. General Graves (Wolfowitz was temporarily absent) indicated that maximum US operational capability would be ~~at~~ sustained by 15 January. Given the importance of Ramadan this restricted the window of opportunity for starting offensive operations to the period from then until the end of February, although the military capability could be held until 1 July. Thereafter, if the long haul option was selected (and he did not rule this out) forces would need to be run down to a level which could be sustained by roulement. He considered that the use of force would be viable politically only if Iraq had shown no movement towards withdrawal: if Saddam 'adjusted his position' the military option would be more difficult - and in terms of the domestic consensus a 'cold start' offensive (i.e with no Iraqi provocation) would be difficult to sell.

11. In the event of partial Iraqi withdrawal, General Graves (expressing a personal view) thought the Arab coalition would unravel and that the military option would become a US/UK one - which he regarded as non-viable politically, even if (unlikely) the Saudis were to approve it. In that event (which he regarded as a constructive move by Iraq which could be built on in negotiation) the US approach might be to adopt the long haul

option, retaining defensive and offensive capabilities, and to seek to maintain all sanctions except food to secure full withdrawal. We pointed out that acceptance of partial withdrawal would reward aggression, but General Graves reiterated that we did not think that there would be domestic US or international support for military action in those circumstances.

12. General Graves said that most of the allies (though not the French, whose forces Wolfowitz described as small and unreliable) had signed up to the idea of a single Commander-in-Chief (Schwarzkopf) for the planning and conduct of offensive operations. <sup>07.5</sup> Allies would, however, be told as little and as late as possible about the details of the offensive, though Arab air forces should take part in the air campaign. As to the campaign itself, he confirmed that the 4-phase option remained valid (air attack against targets in Iraq to eliminate NBC capability, knock out C<sup>2</sup> and achieve air superiority, defence suppression in Kuwait, air attacks against military targets in Kuwait (to include neutralisation of the RCGF) and a ground force attack to isolate residual forces in Kuwait). On an optimistic assessment the air attacks would take days and the ground campaign weeks, but it could be weeks and months respectively. It was important to give Ministers a realistic assessment on duration and casualties: we were facing a war of European intensity in the desert: he expected fatal US casualties to lie in the 1000-10,000 range. It would be an objective to keep casualties to a minimum and this reinforced the case for seeking to isolate Iraqi troops in Kuwait rather than to attack them head-on. The US recognised the presentational difficulties associated with a prolonged air campaign, but saw a direct trade-off with the number of casualties on land.

13. Four final points:

- a. General Graves expressed the view that the US should use napalm and fuel-air explosives to destroy artillery ammunition in Kuwait, which otherwise had the capability to inflict serious allied casualties.
- b. Given the long lines of communication, the provision of tank transporters was a high priority. They (and we) should consider approaching NATO partners (especially Germany) and East Europeans for assistance.
- c. There were encouraging signs of Turkish willingness to become involved, including the possibility of a Turkish division (equivalent to a reinforced brigade) being deployed to Saudi Arabia and the use of Turkish airfields for air operations.
- d. General Graves acknowledged the potential importance of deception and psychological operations, while emphasising the political constraints that applied to the latter.

14. In sum, this was a useful first discussion of the issues, revealing a satisfactory degree of convergence on the substance of our position paper. It will be important to follow it up soon on a wider basis, with a view to achieving a mutually agreed position.

*M. Brennan*  
AUS(C)

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WORKING PAPERS

DRAFT PROPOSED STRATEGIC DIRECTION TO  
COMBINED COMMANDER

1. (S) Task. Undertake operations to seek the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in accordance with the terms of UN resolutions and sanctions. If necessary and when directed, conduct military operations to destroy Iraqi armed forces, liberate and secure Kuwait to permit the restoration of its legitimate government, and make every reasonable effort to repatriate foreign nationals held against their will in Iraq and Kuwait. Promote the security and stability of the Arabian/Persian Gulf region.

2. (TS) Authorization. When directed, you are authorized to conduct air operations throughout Iraq and land and sea operations into Iraqi territory and waters as necessary to liberate and secure Kuwait and to destroy Iraqi forces threatening the territory of Kuwait and other participating coalition states. Forces should be prepared to initiate offensive operations no later than February 1991.

At any time, you are authorized to take advantage of the full or partial withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by introducing forces under your command to secure Kuwaiti territory and waters, defend against renewed aggression, and permit the restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait.

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WORKING PAPERS

Pending authority to execute operations to destroy Iraqi forces and liberate Kuwait, defend Saudi Arabia. Should Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia, you are authorized to conduct air, land, and sea operations throughout Kuwait and Iraq, their airspace, and territorial waters.

3. (TS) Operational Guidance. The objectives of your offensive campaign will be to destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities and weapons of mass destruction; occupy southeast Iraq until combined strategic objectives are met; destroy or neutralize the Republican Guard Forces Command; destroy, neutralize, or disconnect the Iraqi national command authority; safeguard, to the extent practicable, foreign nationals being detained in Iraq and Kuwait; and degrade or disrupt Iraqi strategic air defenses.

4. (U) Logistics. Logistical support of all national forces participating in the operations of the combined force remains the responsibility of the respective nations. This responsibility includes agreements between nations for specific logistical support. You will be responsible for coordinating the identification of the logistical requirements of the forces under your command, coordinating logistics activities, and referring logistical deficiencies that will adversely affect operations to national authorities.

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WORKING PAPERS

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
5p. (TS) Coordination with operations of other Forces and Agencies. In addition to psychological and deception operations ongoing, you may recommend other operations, to include special operations, to ensure a coordinated effort to accomplish aims of the combined governments.

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WORKING PAPERS

MIDDLE EAST *Abstract* P 34



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Lee JS

Jp 01220

PRIME MINISTER

The Gulf: OPD(G) 5 December

Among the subjects you may wish to explore at tomorrow's OPD(G) meeting will be:

- a. Tactics in the interval from now to the expiry of the deadline on 15 January.
- b. Likely Iraqi policy in the light of the US approach and the Security Council Resolution.
- c. The allied response.

Item 1, the oral report by the Foreign Secretary, provides the peg.

Tactics up to 15 January

2. This question has been complicated by the US offer of talks with the Iraqis. Although the initiative was no doubt dictated by the exigencies of US Congressional and domestic opinion, it carries with it a variety of dangers. It boosts Saddam Hussein and encourages him to believe that the US is flinching; it offers him the opportunity to spin a web of proposals and counter-proposals which will extend well beyond the expiry of the deadline (and perhaps the window of military opportunity) and will make it hard for the allies to declare that talks have failed and that force must be used; it encourages individual initiatives from other members of the Five; and it has obviously worried the Saudis and could encourage them and Gulf allies to think of making their peace separately with Iraq. The dividing line between a message and a negotiation will be elusive. If Baker is simply going to Baghdad to repeat the Security





✓ Council Resolution, the visit is otiose and his message will carry less authority than the collective message of the Security Council. If, on the other hand, he is going to do more than simply demand compliance, we are moving into very deep waters. The lack of consultation about the initiative is also very disturbing.

✓ 3. We have no option but to support the US move while insisting on the most restrictive terms, ie no negotiation. To be fair, the President has reaffirmed this interpretation in his message to you. Our object should be to recover as much unity as possible among the Five and to ensure that any further message is a collective one from the Five - that we should say little, and that little should be in strict unison. A meeting of the Five in London to fit in with Baker's visit on 17 December would be useful. We also need to be sure that any meeting between Americans and Iraqis is strictly *à deux*, without representatives, eg of the Gulf States, present. Otherwise Saddam will insist on bringing in the PLO etc and we shall find ourselves with a mini-Middle East conference.

#### Likely Iraqi Policy

✓ 4. Saddam has naturally accepted the offer and will probably want to play for time so as to exhaust the period up to 15 January and, if possible, the pre-Ramadan period (his offer to release hostages extends to 25 March). The effect would be to deny us the military option and to encourage the coalition to dissolve. His ultimate intention, whether to hold on to Kuwait and fight if need be, or to withdraw, remains obscure: he probably has not made up his mind. If he fights he may seek to bring in Israel and so transform the war into one between the Arabs on the one hand and Israel and the West on the other. He could do this with a missile attack: the tests over the weekend could be a reminder that this option exists. If, on the other hand, he withdraws, he could pose some



difficult problems for us. Withdrawal could be spun out so as to occupy the remaining months of military opportunity and we would probably not know until the end whether it was going to be a complete or a partial withdrawal, ie retaining the two islands and the Kuwaiti part of the Rumailah oilfield. We could not, of course, attack Iraq while a withdrawal was proceeding and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get US domestic support for a war over two islands and an oilfield.

### Allied Responses

5. If Iraq does not withdraw our course is clear, though involvement of Israel, particularly at the outset, would deeply unsettle Arab allies and could cause defections. If Iraq withdraws, we could be left with a dangerous situation, ie survival of Saddam and his war machine intact, and with much reduced allied capacity to eliminate this danger. We are saying, correctly, that if Saddam complies with the Security Council resolutions (not simply withdraws), we would not attack him. Full withdrawal would still leave the question of compensation unsettled and could still leave hostages unreturned. These are matters covered in Security Council resolutions and would give us some continuing hold on Iraq. But they are not a *casus belli*. We should have to fall back on sanctions as a means of enforcing the dismantling of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but it is, to say the least, doubtful whether we could engage enough international support to make such a sanctions régime effective. The hard fact is that only a war and effective air bombardment is likely to bring about the necessary emasculation of Iraq. There are also tricky military issues likely to be raised by a withdrawal. As Saddam withdraws, do we follow him up into Kuwait? Presumably yes. With Arab troops in the forefront? Presumably yes. How would we be placed if withdrawal was interrupted and we had to fight on the new lines?

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6. Some of these issues will need to be addressed with the Americans in the joint planning talks envisaged for 14 December. The question of destroying or dismantling Iraqi weapons of mass destruction also bears on the paper on strategic objectives which will be before OPD(G). It would be useful if OPD(G) was able to give a steer.

103

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'P. Craddock', is located below the main text.

PERCY CRADOCK

4 December 1990

MIDDLE EAST (Jehuda) 1934



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Copy No 1 of 8 Copies  
Plus Annex of 5 pages

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PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF: STRATEGIC AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Last month your predecessor approved as a basis for discussion with the United States Government a draft statement of our strategic and military objectives in the Gulf and the way in which they might be reflected in military planning. A first discussion between my staff and officials of the Department of Defense revealed no major disagreements of substance, but it was agreed that the paper should be recast to reflect some minor differences of approach. A revised draft is attached.

[You have seen this] C.D.P.

2. The paper is intended to provide a political framework, acceptable to both governments, against which either a joint directive or separate national directives to our respective military commanders can be drafted. This will give us the confidence that the operations in which our forces participate will be consistent with objectives to which we are willing to subscribe; and that account will be taken of policy, legal and presentational considerations which we regard as important.

3. Particular issues on which you may wish to focus are set out below.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

4. The various objectives described have, at US suggestion, been set out in an order of priority. The overriding objective is to secure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government. Whether this is achieved peacefully or by resort to the military option may influence the chances of achieving the

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second and third order objectives. After peaceful withdrawal, for example, exercising control over the threat posed by Iraq's NBC capability will be a major task for the international community: in this case and to secure the payment of compensation for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait, continuing sanctions may be essential - but in these circumstances we are less likely to be able to bring to account those responsible for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. Any US intention to undertake not to attack Iraq if she withdraws voluntarily, while it may promote a peaceful solution, may make it more difficult to secure some of our objectives (as Secretary Cheney hinted in his evidence to the Congress on 3rd December).

#### HOSTAGES

5. Although the overriding aim must remain to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, in political terms our success in protecting and securing the release of British hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq will influence perceptions about the acceptability of our policy towards the crisis. This must be reflected in our strategic and military objectives (paragraphs 3a and 8b respectively) and in our approach to military operations (paragraph 9e). In discussion with the US officials it appeared that they see major difficulties in rescuing hostages during military operations and have come to accept the inevitability that some hostage lives will be lost in the event of hostilities. They would prefer not to aim too high in setting our objectives, lest we be seen to fail: accordingly they would prefer to omit the references to "all" hostages in paragraphs 3a and 8b.

#### NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY

6. Our best assessment is that Iraq is 3-5 years away from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, although the JIC are reassessing her progress towards developing a crude nuclear device in the light of recent American reports that this may be imminent. The interest of regional security require this capability to be brought under control.



C

Offensive military action would provide the opportunity to destroy Iraq's nuclear weapons potential, but there is no current nuclear weapons threat to forces engaged in the liberation of Kuwait that would require or justify such action. It would therefore have to be taken in the context of the 'restoration of international peace and security' to which UNSCR 678 refers. It is clear that the US are determined to destroy Iraq's nuclear weapons potential: we shall need to establish with them that this can be done without causing serious problems of nuclear fall-out.

7. By contrast there is a clear Chemical and Biological Weapons threat to allied forces (as well, of course, as a long term threat to regional security). It is not entirely clear, however, that this capability can be destroyed without disproportionate civilian casualties or long term environmental damage. Preliminary studies by my officials have suggested that there could in certain circumstances be very substantial areas of chemical and biological contamination following an attack, which could lead to civilian casualties including in Baghdad. This assessment will need to be discussed with the US; meanwhile I consider that their destruction should continue to be an objective of military action, although the means of achieving it would be subject to the constraints described in paragraph 9 of the paper.

#### DIRECTIVE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

8. To meet the requirements of international law as it applies to hostilities, military action must conform to certain constraints. Paragraphs 9 of the paper refers to these as well as giving guidance on the way in which action should be carried out to meet policy requirements such as minimising casualties and the duration of operations. It specifies which target categories may be attacked and those for which specific political authorisation is required. The final consideration - to protect so far as possible Iraq's economic infrastructure (paragraph 9f) - is important if we are to "win the



peace" and to minimise the post-war economic burden on other countries; but the Americans are understood to feel that it is over-prescriptive and places an unreasonable constraint on the conduct of military operations. In my view it would be better to leave it out.

9. If colleagues are content with the draft paper, my intention is to send it to Dick Cheney with a view to a further discussion by officials (MOD, FCO, Cabinet Office with DOD, State Department, NSC) for which a meeting on 14th December has been provisionally arranged.

10. I am sending a copy of this minute to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney-General and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

4 December 1990

(T.K)

(Approved by the Secretary  
of State and signed in his  
Absence)



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E

DRAFT

IRAQ/KUWAITUK POSITION PAPERPurpose

1. The purpose of this paper is to provide a political framework against which directives to military commanders can be drafted.

Strategic Objectives

*Primary Objective*

2. The primary strategic objective is to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 660. The strategy currently selected to achieve this objective is to impose financial and economic sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequent relevant Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of her failure to withdraw.

3. Additional objectives of great importance are

a. To secure the release of [all] hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq

*Ad. Sub*

threat to lib. of K.  
2. Power.

F

3/5 yr or more

remove the

? lay targets  
in early  
air strike

b. To ~~bring under control~~ the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons potential/ capability and her long range missile capability

inventory

||

c. To establish a long term regional security structure

4. Other objectives are

How?

a. To secure the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait

b. To bring to account those responsible for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

Will this  
exc. a conflict?

5. An important ancillary objective is

a. To avoid to the extent possible Israeli military involvement in a way that would put at risk the achievement of the primary objective.

✓

6. It is not a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); we should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

✓

Military Objectives

7. Current military objectives are
- a. To enforce the maritime and air embargoes on trade with Iraq
  - b. To deter and, as necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states against further Iraqi aggression
8. If the current strategy fails to achieve the primary strategic objective (paragraph 2), the military option is available in accordance with UNSCR 678. If it were to be used, our additional military objectives are seen as
- a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait
  - b. To make every realistically possible effort to rescue or secure the release of [all] hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq
  - c. To ~~destroy~~ <sup>remove the danger of</sup> Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons capability/potential and her long range missile capability.

It would not be an objective to enter Iraqi territory except so far as may be necessary to achieve the military objectives.

Directive to Military Commanders

*oblig of intl law*

9. The basis for the use of military force will be SCR 678. The means chosen to achieve the military objectives must therefore be justifiable as ~~reasonably~~ necessary to achieve the stated purposes of SCR 678, and must meet the general requirements of international law including those affecting the selection of targets and the methods and means of warfare. Account must be taken of the need to minimise casualties and the duration of operations consistent with meeting the military objectives set, as well as their impact on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion. National military commanders will therefore be guided by the following principles, which will be supplemented by Rules of Engagement (ROE):

*Paddy  
- content?*

a. Tactical military planning and (subject to ROE) the selection of targets and method of attack will be the responsibility of the military commanders.

✓

b. Any target which provides direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait may be attacked. Examples include military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems and Government command centres as well as purely military targets.

*Military  
discussions  
to attack*

*Part  
or Rev*

c. Civil electronic communications, water facilities, civil shipping and civil port and harbour installations should not be attacked without specific political authorisation.

d. Account must be taken of the need to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage, to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance and to avoid creating long term environmental damage.

✓


e. The risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations and the minimisation of casualties amongst our own forces. Similarly planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist hostages (and other refugees) to the extent realistically possible.

*With  
w/out refer  
to political?*

✓

*approval*

[f. While giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.]



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33(A-C)

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF OPD(G)

You have your first meeting of OPD tomorrow morning. The agenda is just inside the cover of the folder, which in turn contains various supporting papers. Since there are so many of them, I will not bore you with much more. My note just summarises the main points.

*Plan I* Follow-up to UN Security Council Resolution

This is really just an opportunity to talk over recent developments and what lies ahead. The main news has been President Bush's proposal to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad and what may flow from that. There is a note by Percy Cradock which sets out some of the difficulties we may encounter, such as a partial Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Even if they pull out altogether we shall still have some problems: how do we then go about dealing with Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability? How do we ensure payment of reparations? Cynical as it may seem, life might actually be easier if Saddam Hussain does not withdraw and we have to use force: at least that would allow a more definitive solution of the problem. The human cost is terrible to contemplate: but it may be even higher in future if we do not deal with him definitively this time.

*has FS. considered?*

*Plan II* Gulf: Strategic and Military Objectives

You saw the draft paper on strategic and military objectives which we gave to the Americans. It has now been somewhat revised following discussion with them, although the substance has not very much altered. The main change is to try to rank the objectives in order of priority. Nonetheless there are still some problems to be resolved:

- should we make release of all hostages an aim? Or is this too ambitious as the Americans believe?

SECRET

R.R.

- should we go for destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical capability? What about the risk of collateral damage to civilians?

*With a touch of force?*

- do Ministers agree with what is said in Paragraph 9e about the risk to hostages not being allowed to override selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations?

- do we need paragraph 9f, which counsels inflicting minimum long term damage on Iraq's economic infrastructure (presumably on grounds that they won't pay reparations if they don't have a functioning economy)?

There are two other important aspects of which you need to be certain.

✓

First, is the Attorney-General content with the guidance to Military Commanders and confident that it is consistent with UN resolutions?

*Jan.*

Secondly, at what point will you go to full Cabinet for authority to engage in military action if necessary? There is probably no need before early January, but a full Cabinet discussion cannot be delayed much longer than that.

Iraq/Kuwait: Sustaining National Unity

This is the Foreign Secretary's paper which you saw earlier this week and discussed with him. It has proposals which you will wish to take the Committee through, on how to maintain unity behind the Government's policy in the Gulf. The Cabinet Office brief enumerates the main decisions required.

The only additional issue which has arisen concerns the proposed debate in the House next week on the Gulf. The Opposition are urging that it should be on the adjournment, to minimise any appearance of division, and the Foreign Secretary supports this. The Whips' office are apparently wanting to put down a Motion, to



SECRET

- 3 -

bring the opposition of the left-wing of the Labour Party to what we are doing in the Gulf into the open. You may like to invite the Chief Whip to attend this part of the discussion.

Forward Look

Finally you will want to note the papers which are being prepared for next week: BW immunisation, future of the Embassy in Kuwait, consular advice to British citizens, the consequences of partial withdrawal, handling of the press.

We are also arranging a military presentation for you as soon as possible.

You will find in the folder:

- a Cabinet Office brief
- a note by Sir Percy Cradock
- a note on strategic and military objectives
- a note on Iraq/Kuwait; sustaining national unity.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

4 December 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\opd (srw)

SECRET

H. R.



SECRET - UK EYES A

32(A-9)

Ref. A090/2947

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): 5 December

Item 1: Follow-up to UNSCR 678

✓  
You may wish to invite the Foreign Secretary to bring the Committee up-to-date on the latest developments. These include your telephone discussion with President Bush on 30 November and President Bush's subsequent written message to you, the Foreign Secretary's meeting with M. Dumas on 3 December, the Foreign Secretary's message to Mr Baker of 3 December and the Foreign Affairs Council today. Relevant future events include the European Council on 14-15 December, the proposed meeting in London of Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent members of the Security Council before or just after the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 17-18 December, and your own visit to the United States on 21 December. Mr King will be seeing Mr Cheney this week and the Chief of Defence Staff is seeing General Powell today.

who attend this?

✓✓  
2. The key question is how to maintain the unity of the Permanent Five in the interval between now and the expiry of the Security Council Resolution 678 deadline on 15 January. President Bush has assured you that the US attitude is still firm, though there are disturbing pressures from Congress and US public opinion. The French, Russian and Chinese attitudes remain difficult to predict: there is still a danger that they will be attracted by any hints of compromise by Iraq.

SECRET - UK EYES A

Has F. Sec  
considered  
? Part of a/d manual  
CW+BW?



SECRET - UK EYES A

1. Not comply attacked. Comply - not attacked.
  2. No other F.M.'s to visit.
  3. No linkage Arab/Israel.
- See Perry Contact note.

VIP

3. The proposed Foreign Ministers' meeting in London will be of crucial importance. The Foreign Secretary's message to Mr Baker rightly said that the aim should be to give Saddam the clear message that if he did not comply fully with UN Resolutions he would be attacked, whereas if he complied fully he would not be attacked. The Foreign Secretary will confirm that the aim of the meeting will be to give Mr Baker this mandate, and to dissuade other Foreign Ministers from travelling to Baghdad or conveying a weaker message.

X  
What are dangers  
of Baker arriving  
(R.P.) X

4. An essential element in preserving the unity of the Five, and the requirement for unconditional implementation of UN Resolutions is that there should be no third parties involved in Mr Baker's discussions or linkage with Arab/Israel issues. President Bush's message was reassuring on this point.

- ①
- ②
- ③

5. You might conclude the discussion by endorsing the Foreign Secretary's approach, which will underlie your own planned meeting with President Bush, and asking him to keep OPD(G) colleagues informed on preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting. You might also refer to the need at a later stage to secure Cabinet endorsement of our approach, and contingent authority for the military option, at a date before the 15 January deadline (e.g. Cabinets on 20 December or 10 January).

Item 2: Gulf: Strategic and Military Objectives

6. The paper is designed to provide an agreed UK/US political framework to guide the directives (joint or separate) to military commanders. It will form the basis for inter-agency military

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

planning talks with the United States Government which have now been fixed for 14 December in Washington (MoD, FCO, Cabinet Office with Defense Department, State Department and National Security Council).

7. You might invite the Defence Secretary to open the discussion. Paragraph 2 of the paper sets out the primary strategic objectives. Paragraphs 3-6 describe additional objectives which flow from the Security Council Resolutions but are not all explicitly sanctioned in them. They are important to Western and our own national interests.

8. The Foreign Secretary strongly believes that one of our objectives should be to secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq. As the Defence Secretary's minute points out, the Americans consider this over-ambitious. If necessary, we could fall back on dropping the word "all".

9. The most contentious section could be paragraph 3(b) (bringing under control Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missile capability). These installations are likely to be a key set of targets in the first phase of air strikes against Iraq. There may be some public criticism that these targets are not vital to the liberation of Kuwait, though UNSCR 678 refers to the "restoration of international peace and security" which would cover the destruction of these potential threats. Saddam Hussain is assessed to have a chemical and biological capability, which he might well use in Kuwait. Despite recent US statements it is not clear that Iraq yet has a nuclear capability, but Saddam Hussain cannot be left with the opportunity (as well as the evident desire) to acquire such a capability in the foreseeable future. The Foreign Secretary will be briefed to emphasise the need to minimise any collateral

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

damage, in line with paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Defence Secretary's covering minute. The US Government considers controlling Iraq's NBC capability an objective of great importance and it would be useful if Ministers would confirm that this is our view too.

10. The military objectives flow from the strategic objectives. Ministers will wish to examine carefully the section on the directive to military commanders (paragraph 9) since it will guide the operational decisions of US and UK military commanders. The preambulatory part of the paragraph defines the obligations under international law: the Attorney General can confirm that he is content. Paragraph 9(b) and (c) are particularly significant since they distinguish between targets which can be hit by commanders without further reference to capitals (paragraph 9(b)) and those where specific political authorisation will be required (paragraph 9(c)). It would be helpful if Ministers would confirm that they are content with the distinctions between the two types of target.

11. Paragraph 9(e) carefully balances the overriding need to secure military success against the importance of reducing the risk to hostages and assisting their safe return. Again, it would be helpful if Ministers would endorse this sub-paragraph.

12. Paragraph 9(f) is favoured by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but not by the Americans or the Ministry of Defence. You may consider that it is not essential.

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

Item 3: Iraq/Kuwait: Sustaining national unity

✓ 13. You have already discussed the basic issues with the Foreign Secretary and were broadly in agreement with his earlier paper. The present memorandum is a revised version of this paper designed to take account of your comments. You might wish to invite the Foreign Secretary to open the discussion.

14. You might begin by asking for colleagues' agreement to the Government's objectives defined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the paper. You might then ask whether colleagues are content with the proposed handling of discussions with the Opposition Parties (paragraph 6) and the Government's own supporters (paragraph 7).

✓ 15. You might confirm that a short White Paper should be published in January (paragraph 8) to present the Government's case: the FCO to draft. You might ask the Foreign Secretary for further detailed proposals on Ministerial broadcasts. You and he agreed that the Defence Secretary should be the principal Ministerial spokesman: you might seek OPD(G)'s agreement, and to proposals on the churches in paragraphs 9 and 10.

X ✓ 16. You might seek agreement to the proposals on media handling in paragraph 11. The Ministry of Defence are preparing a paper on the subject, which you might encourage the Defence Secretary to present at an OPD(G) meeting next week. You might also confirm agreement that a group of Ministers should be fully briefed and tasked with expounding the Government's policy (paragraph 13). You agreed that they should for the moment be the Foreign, Defence, Energy and Home Secretaries and the Party Chairman. You might suggest that the Foreign Secretary should come back later with proposals on the timing of briefing for senior backbenchers such as Mr Howell and Sir Peter Blaker.

SECRET - UK EYES A



SECRET - UK EYES A

You might conclude the discussion by emphasising the importance of this issue and endorsing the proposals in the paper.

Forward Look

17. If there is time, you might confirm that it would be useful for the following papers to be prepared for OPD(G) next week:

- a. BW immunisation: the Defence Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff will be seeing Mr Cheney and General Powell this week and should come forward with recommendations next week. Further delay will mean that full immunisation will not be possible in the timescale;
- b. the future of the Embassy in Kuwait (FCO): should we close the Embassy and, if so, when;
- c. consular advice to British citizens (FCO): if and when should we give advice to British citizens to begin to withdraw from the war risk zone (Phase 2 advice). It is mentioned in paragraph 5(c) of the Foreign Secretary's paper on sustaining national unity;
- d. partial withdrawal (FCO and MoD): two separate papers are in preparation on the military and political implications of a partial Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (a tactic which Saddam Hussein may try at some point);

SECRET - UK EYES A



G

SECRET - UK EYES A

It would be useful for Ministers to have discussed these to provide a steer for the US/UK military planning talks on 14 December;

e. media handling (MoD): the paper mentioned in paragraph 16 above.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

Cabinet Office  
4 December 1990

SECRET - UK EYES A



112, EATON SQUARE,  
LONDON SW1W 9AE  
Tel: 071- 235 1543  
071- 235 7409



4th December, 1990

*CD Jxi*

*Douglas*

I seem to have spent most of the last fortnight in Oman partly for the Sultan's National Day Celebrations and partly for a conference of European and American Conservatives, of which I am Chairman, and which he invited us to hold in Oman.

In the course of these visits I had various meetings with the Sultan. The following points are perhaps worth passing on to you.

1. He has been very worried by the estrangement of King Hussein of Jordan and King Fahd. This is partly because he has a real personal affection for King Hussein and tended to look on him as his model when he came to power. He also believes that King Hussein may have a very useful role to play whether the present crisis is ended by diplomacy or war. He accordingly had King Hussein to stay for a couple of days. The object of the exercise being to urge him to restore relations with the Saudis. King Hussein realised that this was necessary in his own interests, though still apparently deeply offended at the treatment he had received from the Saudis. The Sultan then passed on to Riyadh King Hussein's wish for reconciliation and his own personal hope that this might come about.

../.

The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

I am not sure how far this bridge building exercise has borne fruit but the Sultan's Foreign Minister, Yousuf Alawi, was in Amman in the last day or two and I gathered from him that some progress was being made.

2. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tarik Aziz, arrived just before a dinner I went to at the Sultan's invitation *21 Nov.* The Sultan told me that Tarik Aziz wanted to start a dialogue with King Fahd. The Sultan said that he avoided any commitment beyond saying that he was prepared to pass on Tarik Aziz's request. I asked him whether he thought that the desire for a dialogue was real or simply a device to gain time. He said he found it impossible to say but that he had thought Tarik Aziz surprisingly uneasy and nervous. He might, of course, have been feeling unwell but the Sultan thought it possible that he and Saddam were genuinely frightened at the situation they had got themselves into.

3. In a wider conversation the Sultan said that the Iraqis must, of course, withdraw from Kuwait and accept the restoration of the regime ~~but~~ he very much hoped that war could be avoided. Oman had endured war in the north in the late 50s and more seriously in the south in Dhofar before and after he himself had come into office. They had some experience of war and the devastation it caused. While he would like to see a change at the top in Iraq he was not altogether happy at the prospect of Iraq breaking up.

He accepted that one inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the present crisis was that the principal oil producing countries were not strong enough to protect their resources by themselves or even together. They would need to have external support. The question was how to provide this in a reasonably unobtrusive manner.

I am copying this to No. 10 and to Tom King.

*Julian*

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

*Life*



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
071-270 3000

4 December 1990

Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP  
Secretary of State for Trade  
and Industry  
Department of Trade and Industry  
1-19 Victoria Street  
LONDON  
SW1H 0ET

*com rti*

*Dear Peter*

**IRAQ/KUWAIT SANCTIONS: ENFORCEMENT AND CO-ORDINATION**

*Blair*

You sent John Major a copy of your letter of 26 November to Douglas Hurd about the enforcement and co-ordination of sanctions policy.

Like you I have been impressed by the work of the Embargo Enforcement Unit and by the close and enthusiastic co-operation of all Departments involved in this work. I know that my own Departments have played their full role in this, and I agree with your conclusion that current procedures are running smoothly and effectively.

I recognise that some areas can raise issues which must be handled sensitively. My Departments are well aware of this, and the Enforcement Unit is an excellent forum for liaison and exchanges of information. However, within this overall framework when there is well-founded suspicion that breaches in sanctions are occurring we must all recognise that the Commissioners of Customs and Excise must continue to perform their statutory independent law enforcement role and must take, and be seen to take, their own decisions without being subject to external influences.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd,  
Tom King, Malcolm Rifkind, John Wakeham, Michael Howard,  
Patrick Mayhew, Sir Robin Butler, Sir Brian Unwin and  
Gus O'Donnell.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Norman Lamont".

**NORMAN LAMONT**



MIDDLE EAST:  
Site P434

SECRET

3(A-C) ~~CCPS~~



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1990

C D 4/mi

Sean Charles,

**THE GULF**

Your letter of 3 December asked for briefing on three points on the Gulf which were covered in the Cabinet Office sitrep of 30 November.

**POSSIBLE NEW FRENCH INITIATIVE**

Line to Take

- Mr Hurd met M. Dumas in New York on 29 November and again in London on 3 December. Following the adoption of SCR 678, the Five will continue to consult closely in the period leading up to the deadline of 15 January.

Background

Shortly before the Security Council debate on SCR 678 the French proposed an informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. In the event the proposal was subsumed in the dinner hosted by Mr Baker after the debate on 29 November.

The Foreign Secretary met M. Dumas again in London on 3 December. They agreed that it would be a good idea for Foreign Ministers of the Permanent Five should meet before Mr Baker's visit to Baghdad. Monsieur Dumas said he had been put on the spot by the US offer of talks with the Iraqis. He had felt the need to protect his position by not ruling out a visit to Baghdad himself. The Foreign Secretary said he did not want to visit Baghdad since if everyone went this would only sow confusion. If the Foreign Ministers of the Five were to meet prior to Mr Baker's visit, he would be seen to carry a clear message to Saddam Hussain. M. Dumas also suggested that a Summit of the Five might be held in the first half of January. The Foreign Secretary reserved our position on this.

You will have seen the exchange in the House of Commons on 3 December occasioned by the PNQ put down by

SECRET

SECRET

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Mr Kaufman.

YEMENI INITIATIVE

Line to Take

- In a meeting with a visiting IPU delegation on 29 November the Yemeni Minister of State for Foreign Affairs outlined a proposal for resolving the Gulf Crisis. Since then the Yemenis have not reverted to the idea. Any initiative which might encourage Saddam Hussain to think he could gain from his aggression would be unhelpful. He must withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and meet the requirements placed on him by the Security Council.

Background

The Yemeni Minister of State for Foreign Affairs announced a new peace proposal to a visiting Inter-Parliamentary Union Delegation on 29 November. The Yemenis hoped to be able to negotiate an Arab solution to the Gulf Crisis comprising an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government; the stationing of an Arab force along the Iraq/Kuwait frontier as a guarantee for the future; and the opening of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait to settle outstanding differences between the two countries. HM Ambassador Sana'a has asked for more details of the initiative. So far the Yemenis have not reverted to the idea, which is not far from the SCRs, but which could allow Saddam Hussain a further opportunity to prevaricate.

BRITISH CASUALTIES

Line to Take

- It would be wrong to speculate on the number of casualties likely in any hostilities in the Gulf.

- No-one wants conflict: our aim is to resolve the crisis by peaceful means through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. The existence of a credible military option is the best way to achieve this. But if force becomes necessary, the more effective the allied force the quicker Iraq would be ejected and the lower our casualties would be.

SECRET

SECRET



Background

During an interview with the BBC on 29 November the Commander of 7 Armoured Brigade warned that there might be thousands of British casualties if war broke out. The report also quoted an unattributed estimate that in the event of war, about 15% of the British force might be casualties.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD).


*John  
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET





MIDDLE EAST P  
87  
Pt 84

SUBJECT  
cc MASTER

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Free  
30(A-c)

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 December 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Powell was accompanied by the American Ambassador and by a Staff Officer. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff were also present.

NO FURTHER COPIES SHOULD BE MADE of this letter, and it should be made available ONLY to other Ministers and officials with a STRICT NEED TO KNOW of its contents.

The Prime Minister said he was glad that the relationship between British and United States forces in the Gulf was so good. General Powell said he was very pleased with the way they operated together. He and the Chief of the Defence Staff kept in close and regular touch by telephone, which was a great help.

The Prime Minister asked about training by forces in the Gulf. General Powell said there had been some initial problems with the Saudis over live-firing ranges. But the time in the desert was now being put to good advantage to train. Command and control arrangements were satisfactory. The real challenge was the logistics.

The Prime Minister asked General Powell what worried him most about Iraq's military capabilities. General Powell replied that he was most concerned by Iraq's CW capability. It was not clear if they had weaponized BW. The Americans were doing everything possible to target the CW systems early on in their bombing campaign, so as to protect their forces from that kind of attack. The philosophy of the American targeting plan was to take out the Iraqi radar, air force, air defence systems, logistics, command and control systems and the Republican Guard units in the early stages. They would not bother initially with the front-line infantry who did not represent a great threat.

The Prime Minister asked how General Powell expected the Iraqis to respond. Presumably they would not just sit still. Were they likely to move against American forces in Saudi Arabia? General Powell said that he expected the Iraqis to respond initially with missiles. They might, for instance, strike at Israel. Or they might try to damage oil fields and desalination plants in Saudi Arabia, with the aim of causing national outrage and demands for an end to the war. But he doubted they would attempt to sustain ground operations against US forces in Saudi

SECRET AND PERSONAL

B

Arabia: the American air strikes would simply be too devastating to enable them to try this. The Americans themselves would not start ground action until they had shaped the battlefield to the form they liked through air attacks. The Defence Secretary noted that Iraq's static defences would make it difficult for them to advance. The Chief of the Defence Staff added that they had not shown much propensity for offensive mobile action anyway. He thought they were more likely to resort to missile attacks on Israel and to terrorism. General Powell agreed that the Iraqis had built themselves a stockade in the south of Kuwait. The American aim would be to build another to the north of them, so that they were boxed in.

The Prime Minister asked whether General Powell was confident that the Americans knew where the most sensitive Iraqi installations were. General Powell said that American forces had done an exceptional job of targeting the main Iraqi installations and forces, although CW stocks were very widely dispersed. They had a good understanding of Iraq's military and petroleum infrastructure. They would limit their strikes to military-related targets and avoid purely civilian, religious or cultural sites. The attacks would not be directed at the Iraqi people.

The Prime Minister asked what General Powell thought would happen if Saddam Hussein was killed in the air attack. General Powell said he would expect to see a sudden change in what the Iraqis would be prepared to accept. The Prime Minister wondered whether Saddam Hussein would have delegated leadership against that eventuality. General Powell said that Saddam Hussein's death would be catastrophic to the regime in Iraq. There was no one else to whom people were loyal. The Prime Minister asked whether the Americans knew where Saddam Hussein could be found. General Powell said they knew the fixed facilities where he operated, but it was unlikely that Saddam Hussein would be there. He had told American commanders not to expect to be able to eliminate Saddam Hussein.

The Prime Minister asked how many of the air strikes would be conducted by countries other than the United States or the United Kingdom. General Powell said there would be some Saudi and Kuwaiti involvement. But the bulk of it would have to come from the UK and US.

The Prime Minister asked whether it was possible to defend Saudi oil fields and desalination plants. General Powell said that Patriot air defence batteries had been deployed in such a way as to help defend important Saudi civil sites. Most of these were fairly spread out and could only be seriously damaged by sustained Iraqi attacks, which the Americans hoped to prevent. The Defence Secretary pointed out that, nonetheless, successful Iraqi action against some of them could be very damaging to Saudi Arabia's infrastructure. A single desalination plant provided eighty per cent of water for Riyadh.

The Prime Minister asked how long General Powell thought hostilities might last in a worst case. General Powell said that it was very difficult to be sure about this. If all went well, he would hope to see an air campaign lasting some 7-14 days

followed by ground action, taking anything up to some three weeks in all to break the back of Iraq's resistance. This would have to be followed by mopping up. But if things did not go well, the whole operation could last two months. The Chief of the Defence Staff agreed with this assessment, while pointing out that if Arab countries were to resupply Iraq, that calculation could be upset. This could arise if the Israelis were involved. General Powell commented that most Arabs took the line that if the Israelis were provoked by a direct Iraqi attack, that would not affect their own determination to continue the war against Iraq. If Israel got involved without provocation, that would be a different story.

The Prime Minister asked General Powell's assessment of whether the Iraqis would be able to target US and UK forces in Saudi Arabia. General Powell said that the Americans' first task was to blind the Iraqi forces by disabling their radar, which ought to make it very difficult for them to strike successfully against British and American forces. General Powell continued that once a conflict was started, the Americans would use everything they had. The President had given him carte blanche on what to use. They would go in to win, not to persuade Saddam Hussein to change his mind: the opportunities for that would have been exhausted. They would use their F117 Stealth aircraft in the early stages, and would also use F16s, F15Es, B52s and so on. The Prime Minister asked how many aircraft General Powell expected the Americans to lose. General Powell said the computations suggested they might lose 40 or so aircraft in the first couple of days. They would hope to recover half of the pilots: and would expect half of the remainder to survive. They saw that as an acceptable rate of loss.

The Prime Minister asked to what extent the Americans hoped to achieve surprise when they moved against Iraq. General Powell said there would be no strategic surprise: that simply was not possible in the American system. The Iraqis would know that they were going to be attacked, but not when, where or how.

The Prime Minister referred to the difficulty which press coverage of military operations could create. General Powell said the Americans had given careful thought to this. He agreed about the difficulty. The Americans were determined to control press access as strictly as possible.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



30 A (a)

Ref. A090/2907

MR POWELL

Handling of the Gulf Crisis

*will obtain if reqd.*

I should like to make one gloss on your note of my discussion with the Prime Minister on 30 November. It relates to the paragraph headed "Contacts with the United States Government".

2. I did not understand the Prime Minister as deciding "that No 10 should remain the main point of contact with General Scowcroft and the White House" or that "this had been specifically requested by the President". As I heard him, the Prime Minister said no more than that the main point of business which the President had raised during his congratulatory telephone call to the Prime Minister on 27 November was about the future point of contact with General Scowcroft. I said that I thought it essential that your line to General Scowcroft should continue but that Sir Antony Acland should be used for conveying messages to senior levels of the United States Administration when this would be a useful way for HMG to gain access without sending people from London. The Prime Minister accepted this.

3. For the record, I should say that, while I think it useful to continue using the channel you have established with General Scowcroft to exchange messages between the President and the Prime Minister on the Gulf crisis, I shall want to propose in due course that we revert to the arrangement, with which Sir Patrick Wright agrees, that my post rather than yours should be regarded as the opposite number at this end of the National Security Director.

R.R.B.

3 December 1990


ROBIN BUTLER

SECRET



Pat. 2000/2001

MR. HALL



I should like to see the... the paragraph headed "Cont... Government"

I did not understand the Prime Minister as deciding that he... in contact with General... and the White House... requested by the President... said he felt that the main point of business with the... President had raised during his complimentary... the Prime Minister on it however was about the future point of... contact with General... I said that I thought it... essential that your line to General... should continue... that Sir Anthony... would be used for conveying messages to... senior levels of the United States Administration when this would... be a useful way for GND to gain access without routing... the London. The Prime Minister accepted this.

For the record, I should say that, while I think it would... to continue using the channel you have established with General... however to exchange messages between the President and the... Prime Minister on the call cables, I still want to propose in due... course that we return to the arrangement with which Sir... might agree, that my post rather than yours should be... as the opposite number at this end of the National Security... Director.

1951  
KATH WILSON

1 December 1951

cc. air force out - 2 -

B

to destroy the Iraqi air force, missiles, CW and BW capability, radar, communications and radio and t.v. broadcasting facilities. The attack would then move on to air bombardment of Iraqi ground forces in and near Kuwait, as well as lines of supply. Only when the maximum effect had been achieved by air action, would the ground attacks on Iraqi forces in Kuwait begin. You will want to ask him how the Americans believe that the Iraqis will respond. Will they try to carry the battle to the Americans in Saudi Arabia? Will they launch a pre-emptive attack on Israel, to try to rally Arab support to their side? How does he assess the likely Israeli response?

- chemical and biological weapons. How does he rate the likelihood that the Iraqis will use these weapons? And how does he judge their likely effectiveness? There is some dispute within the intelligence community over whether the Iraqis have actually weaponized their BW stocks. More importantly, how will the Americans respond if the Iraqis use these weapons? Just with conventional weapons? Or do they envisage using CW or even in extremis nuclear weapons? You might also touch on the issue of immunization: and ask how the Americans assess the recent Iraqi test firings of missiles (which were apparently intended to simulate a CW attack).
  
- Anglo/US cooperation. You will want to ensure that he is satisfied with the nature and role of the British forces in the Gulf and the additional ones on the way. When the latter arrive, we shall have two full armoured brigades, with artillery and helicopters and a divisional headquarters. The Americans intend to assign us one of their brigades, to make up a full British division: plus our air and naval contribution. The force will be under American strategic direction, although Ministers maintain ultimate control over our units. The command arrangements seem to be working well. The Americans regard our forces as the only ones they can really count upon if it comes to a fight.

- hostages. You might ask how far the Americans have taken their military plans for rescuing the hostages in the event of a conflict - and for avoiding targets where the hostages are known to be held (the scope for this is fairly limited).
- casualties. While soldiers (or good ones) are notoriously reluctant to give estimates of casualties, you might ask what assumptions he has given the President on this score.
- timing of military action. You might ask him about the timing of military action. The Americans have previously accepted that it cannot begin later than 15 February, because the temperatures start to rise in March and there is also Ramadan. Equally, they are unlikely to be fully ready before 1 February, although they might start the air action before all the ground forces are in place.
- horror stories. Finally, you might ask him what he thinks is the worst that could happen and go wrong. What should we be steeling ourselves against as the worst case scenario?

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

3 December 1990



SUBJECT CC  
MASTER10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AATLO  
SM  
cc PC  
Janice

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1990

The Prime Minister had a word with the Foreign Secretary this morning on the question whether he ought to pay an early visit to the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that he had been instinctively opposed to the idea, on the grounds that a visit to our forces so early in his time as Prime Minister might look gimmicky. Equally, it would look wrong if he had not found time to pay them a visit before any conflict. He had identified three options:

- not to go himself, but to ask the Defence Secretary to pay a Christmas visit to the forces;
- to make a special visit himself either just before Christmas or in early January;
- or to go direct to the Gulf on his return from Washington, asking the Defence Secretary to join him there.

The Prime Minister invited the Foreign Secretary to think over these options and give him a view.

The Foreign Secretary said his first reaction was that the Prime Minister ought to pay an early visit. He did not think such a visit could be limited to meeting British forces: he would have at least to call on King Fahd. He had himself been planning to visit the Gulf in January to deal with the diplomatic side.

In further discussion, it emerged that it was almost certainly impracticable for the Prime Minister to visit the Gulf between his visit to Washington and Christmas: it might anyway only underline the fact that, while he would be returning to his own family for Christmas, our troops in the Gulf would not. The presumption should therefore be that he would pay a visit in the first part of January, but the visit should be announced before Christmas. However, before reaching a final conclusion, the Prime Minister would speak also to the Defence Secretary, and would welcome the Foreign Secretary's further reflections.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

The Prime Minister subsequently spoke to the Defence Secretary, and agreed as a result that the latter would pay a Christmas visit to British forces and would also see King Fahd and assure him that the change of Government meant no change of policy. The Prime Minister himself would then pay a visit, probably in the week beginning 6 January. A final decision on the date will depend on whether the House will - as hoped - remain in recess until 15 January.

I should be grateful if you could now produce a draft programme for a three day visit to the area. But this should remain confidential for the time being.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

SUBJECT CC  
MASTER.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



29(A-B)

KW

c/foreign defence

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

CC DEFENCE:  
Prouse  
pt 9

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S BILATERAL WITH THE DEFENCE SECRETARY

The Prime Minister had a talk this afternoon with the Defence Secretary, covering a number of current defence issues. This note summarises the main points.

Much of the discussion was about the Gulf. The Prime Minister said that he would like an early military presentation (we are trying to arrange this for next week): and in the meantime it would be helpful to have some written briefing on the size, nature, disposition and equipment of our forces. He had read the draft Strategic Objectives and was generally content with them, although they gave rise to a number of questions. For instance, how would we secure payment of compensation by Iraq? And how would we eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's NBC capability? He would also find it helpful to have, in advance of the military presentation, a written note on the military planning and targets, and in particular how it was proposed to conduct the air campaign.

The Prime Minister also raised the question of immunisation of our forces against possible use of BW by the Iraqis. While recognising the presentational problems which could arise if we immunised our forces before the Americans were in a position to do likewise, and before there was enough vaccine for civilians, he nonetheless inclined to the view that we could not fail to protect our own forces if sufficient vaccine was available. The Prime Minister also asked a number of searching questions about the nature of the vaccine, the degree to which it had been tested, the likelihood of side effects, and the effect on the morale both of our forces and their families of using it. The Defence Secretary promised to let the Prime Minister have a note on these points.

I have written separately on the question of visits by the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary to the Gulf.

Turning to other areas of defence policy, the Prime Minister asked whether the German Government was likely to pull out of the European Fighter Aircraft project following the German elections. The Defence Secretary said that we hoped they would complete the development phase, which would take a further two years. But

SECRET AND PERSONAL

they might not go further. There was likely to be trouble with the Germans on a number of defence issues. The Prime Minister noted the Future Main Battle Tank and the EH101 helicopter as projects which caused him particular concern. The Defence Secretary commented that the future of a number of procurement projects would have to be considered.

The Defence Secretary briefed the Prime Minister on the problems which had arisen with stress corrosion cracking in some of our nuclear submarines. The outlook was not very bright but he hoped we could keep an adequate number of them functioning. He would keep the Prime Minister informed of progress.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

153155  
MDADAN 7393

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WELLINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 030930Z FCO  
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OF 030420Z DECEMBER 90  
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SIC Z7A/I9M

MODUK FOR DCDS(C)  
UKREP BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

*Jim Bolger*

*You are seeing  
him tomorrow  
CJA*

FCO TELNO 340 AND MODUK U/N TEL OF 281645Z (NOT TO ALL): NEW  
ZEALAND CONTRIBUTION TO MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE GULF

SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER, JIM BOLGER, ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT WILL SEND TWO C-130 HERCULES AIRCRAFT AND A MEDICAL TEAM TO JOIN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE GULF. REQUEST FOR INTER-SERVICE CONSULTATIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF HERCULES UNDER UK TACTICAL CONTROL.

DETAIL

2. ON 3 DECEMBER, THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED THAT NEW ZEALAND WOULD OFFER TWO HERCULES TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND A MILITARY MEDICAL TEAM AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO OBSERVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE HERCULES AND THE MEDICAL TEAM WOULD BE DEPLOYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND CERTAINLY WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, WOODS, HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA DIVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND TRADE, BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, UK, AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN MISSIONS. WOODS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PROMPT AND HELPFUL RESPONSES TO THE REQUEST REPORTED IN MY TELNO 502. THESE RESPONSES HAD GREATLY ASSISTED THE GOVERNMENT IN AGREEING ON THE SHAPE OF THE OFFER TO BE MADE. THE GOVERNMENT

HAD NOTED THAT ALL THOSE CONSULTED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AUSTRALIA, HAD INDICATED THAT THE HERCULES WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY WERE ATTRACTED BY OUR PROPOSAL THAT THE AIRCRAFT MIGHT COME UNDER UK TACTICAL CONTROL AND OPERATE OUT OF RIYADH AS PART OF OUR HUB AND SPOKE RESUPPLY SYSTEM. THEY WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO PURSUE THIS, AND IF WE WERE AGREEABLE, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF, AIR VICE MARSHALL KLITSCHER WOULD LEAVE FOR LONDON ON WEDNESDAY 5 DECEMBER FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH MODUK AND RAF.

4. THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT ALL PARTIES CONSULTED SAW A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MEDICAL SUPPORT. THEY THEREFORE WANTED TO FOLLOW AN AUSTRALIAN SUGGESTION THAT, SUBJECT TO US AGREEMENT, AN ANZAC MEDICAL TEAM MIGHT BE FORMED TO OPERATE ON US NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS. IF FOR ANY REASON THIS OPTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT TO EXPLORE THE OPTION OF SENDING MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO WORK WITH UK UNITS. WOODS POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT REFERRED TO A 'MEDICAL TEAM' THE NEW ZEALANDERS WERE NOT THINKING OF SENDING A SELF CONTAINED UNIT BUT RATHER A GROUP OF PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT WORK ALONGSIDE MEDICAL STAFF FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

5. WOODS CONFIRMED THAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS WOULD NOW BE CONSULTING WITH THE SAUDIS, AND WOULD KEEP THE KUWAITIS INFORMED OF THEIR INTENTIONS.

6. WOODS ALSO SAID THAT A NUMBER OF RESPONSES HAD SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING A TANKER. BUT AS NO PARTICULAR NEED HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR ENDEAVOUR AND AS IT WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT BEFORE DEPLOYMENT TO THE GULF, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PURSUE THAT OFFER.

7. WE UNDERSTAND FROM DEFENCE CHANNELS THAT THE HERCULES DEPLOYMENT WILL INVOLVE 69 PERSONNEL AND THE MEDICAL GROUP 31 PEOPLE.

8. EMERGENCY UNIT PLEASE REPEAT TO ME POSTS AS NECESSARY.

SOUTAR

YYYY

010



ccp

2

Lord Brabazon of Tara  
Minister of State  
Department of Transport  
2 Marsham Street  
LONDON  
SW1 3EB

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

TPM 1

London SW1 2AH

From The Minister of State

3 December 1990

✓

Some Minister  
Some good ideas  
CB  
11/12

Dear Tom.

At the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf on 19 November, I raised the question of the threat to British civil aviation overseas. Although the minutes do not, unfortunately, record the point, I suggested that we draw up a contingency plan for the protection of British civil aviation overseas as a counterpart to the arrangements which your Department have already put in place for domestic aspects of civil aviation.

There is no doubt that, if there should be an outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, there will be an upsurge in Iraqi-inspired terrorism. Nor is there much doubt that British targets are likely to be given a high priority. A number of Palestinian groups which have indicated their support for Iraq have expertise in the sabotage and hijacking of aircraft. It is impossible to predict exactly what form of attack will be mounted or where it can be expected. Nevertheless, I am sure that we must take, and be seen to take, every possible precaution to protect British airlines.

The first priority is to make the greatest possible improvements in the general standard of security at airports overseas. As you know, our two Departments have mounted a major lobbying exercise with this aim in mind and considerable progress has been made. We intend to pursue those countries, 17 or so, where further improvements are required.

Beyond that, however, I would like to reiterate my suggestion that a contingency plan be prepared which could be brought into effect for a limited period of weeks immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. In preparing such a plan, I believe that we should look at the possibility of further restrictions on the carriage of electrical equipment and on where cargo may be taken on board. We should also consider whether there are some airports which should (temporarily) be avoided by British aircraft.




A further measure which, I believe, needs urgent examination is the possibility of employing 'sky marshals' to cover at least the initial period of greatest danger. I am aware that our policy up to now has been against the employment of sky marshals, partly because they may seem to have posed more risks than they prevent. However, we can now anticipate a very much increased threat and I believe that the matter should be reviewed. I am conscious that other airlines at serious risk, such as the Americans and Israelis, employ armed guards on at least some of their aircraft. If we were to find that a British aircraft was hijacked shortly after the commencement of hostilities, we might find it very difficult to explain why we had taken no such precautions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ministers of State at the MOD, Treasury and to Sir R Butler.

Yours  
D Hogg

Douglas Hogg





CONFIDENTIAL

file



a: bush. dsj

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 December 1990

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Bush about his latest proposals on the Gulf, following up their talk on the telephone on 30 November. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

December 3, 1990

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to pass the enclosed message  
from President Bush to you.

Sincerely,




Henry E. Catto  
Ambassador

Enclosure:  
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The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3439</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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CC MASTER

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me GAm  
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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

3 December 1990

From the Private Secretary

**IRAQ/KUWAIT: SUSTAINING NATIONAL UNITY**

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 30 November on Iraq/Kuwait: Sustaining National Unity (PM/90/089). He agrees broadly with it, and went over the ground briefly with the Foreign Secretary this morning.

The Prime Minister agrees particularly on the need for a solid and clear message about why we are in the Gulf, as set out in paragraph 5(a) of the Foreign Secretary's minute, and the need to explain convincingly to public opinion in due course why the moment has come when we cannot wait any longer for a peaceful solution.

On the question of briefing the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign Secretary to establish through Mr Kaufman whether Mr Kinnock was likely to welcome such a briefing. He would be ready to see Messrs Ashdown, Molyneux and Owen in January.

The Prime Minister further agreed that it would be right to appoint a Ministerial spokesman to deal with day to day announcements during any war, and that the Defence Secretary would be the right person to do this. He would certainly be ready to see the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Carey: I will make the necessary arrangements. He saw merit in the proposal to brief a limited number of senior Ministers on the Gulf so that they could expound policy in speeches and broadcasts. It was agreed that, for the present, this should be restricted to the Energy Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Party Chairman (in addition of course to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary). Somewhat later, consideration should be given to doing the same for senior back benchers such as David Howell and Sir Peter Blaker.

The other points in the minute were agreed.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Colin Walters (Home Office), Robert Canniff (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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INFO IMMEDIATE HQBFME, UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

SIC AAA/I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US/IRAQ MEETINGS

SUMMARY

1. SAUDIS ISSUE COOL STATEMENT DESCRIBING PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE AS POSITIVE, BUT IMPLICITLY STRESSING NEED TO AVOID NEGOTIATION. IN PRIVATE THEY FEAR THE AMERICANS MAY BE PREPARED TO CUT DEALS, AND ARE WORRIED THAT THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM WILL EASE. THEY ARE ALSO UPSET BECAUSE PRESIDENT BUSH INFORMED KING FAHD AFTER HIS INITIATIVE BECAME PUBLIC IN WASHINGTON. THE AMERICANS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MEND FENCES.

DETAIL

2. THE SAUDIS ISSUED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE EVENING OF 3 DECEMBER. THIS SAYS THE KINGDOM SEES NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH'S DECISION TO RECEIVE TARIQ AZIZ IN WASHINGTON AND SEND SECRETARY BAKER TO BAGHDAD, AND ARAB LEAGUE, OIC AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE STATEMENT LISTS ONCE AGAIN THE STEPS REQUIRED OF IRAQ BY THOSE RESOLUTIONS - UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, THE RETURN OF THE AMIR, THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES, AND ALSO AN END TO IRAQI THREATS AND THE IRAQI BUILD-UP AGAINST THE KINGDOM. IT NOTES THAT THE KING STATED RECENTLY IN PUBLIC THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SHAME FOR SADDAM IN WITHDRAWAL. THE KINGDOM LOOKED FORWARD TO SADDAM'S RESPONSE. GIVEN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD CONFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN UN AND OTHER RESOLUTIONS, THE KINGDOM WAS CONTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. IT CONSIDERED IT A POSITIVE STEP, IN SO FAR AS IT AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE PRINCIPLES. THE STATEMENT CONCLUDES BY

RECALLING THAT FOREIGN TROOPS ARE HERE AT THE INVITATION OF SAUDI ARABIA, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAD STATED THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA.

3. PRINCE TURKI BIN MUHAMMED (ACTING HEAD OF WESTERN DEPT, MFA AND NEPHEW OF THE KING) TOLD DHM THIS MORNING THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED BOTH AT THE MANNER AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT. THE SAUDIS HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE. PRESIDENT BUSH HAD TELEPHONED THE KING, BUT ONLY AFTER THE NEWS HAD COME OUT IN WASHINGTON. SAUDI ARABIA WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS, BUT THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT RISKED REDUCING THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM AND THUS MAKING SUCH AN OUTCOME LESS LIKELY. SADDAM WAS CLEVER AND WOULD EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY HE HAD BEEN GIVEN. PRINCE TURKI SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT, IN DIALOGUE WITH SADDAM, BLUR SOME OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DEMANDS UPON HIM. HE SPOKE AT ONE POINT OF PRIVATE DEALS, AND INSISTED THAT SADDAM MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO EMERGE WITH ACHIEVEMENTS TO HIS CREDIT IN ARAB EYES. PRINCE TURKI REFERRED TO REMARKS BY BAKER IN WASHINGTON ON 2 DECEMBER, WHICH HAD PRESUMABLY BEEN INTENDED TO BE REASSURING. BUT THEY HAD NOT REASSURED ON THE SUBJECT OF SADDAM'S ARSENAL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND WHAT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN IN RESPECT OF THEM IF HE WITHDREW PEACEFULLY AS A RESULT OF THE NEW DIALOGUE.

4. PRINCE TURKI SAID THIS WAS NO WAY TO TREAT AN ALLY. AT ONE POINT HE COMPARED IT TO US TREATMENT OF THE SHAH IN HIS LAST DAYS. THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT DOMESTIC OPINION. THE SAUDIS HAD THEIR OWN INTERNAL SITUATION TO CONSIDER, BUT HAD REJECTED FEELERS FROM SADDAM THROUGH THE OMANIS AND THE LIBYANS. HE ASKED IF THE UK HAD BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF BUSH'S INITIATIVE. PLUMBLY SAID THAT HE HAD NO DETAILED INFORMATION BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD TELEPHONED THE PRIME MINISTER. THE IMPORTANT THING SURELY WAS THAT THE IRAQIS BE GIVEN A CLEAR AND RESOLUTE MESSAGE IN ANY MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD.

5. THE AMERICANS LOCALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE A PROBLEM OVER THIS WITH THE SAUDIS. THE US DCM TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT BUSH MIGHT SEND A MESSAGE TO THE KING IN AN ATTEMPT TO SMOOTH RUFFLED FEATHERS. THE DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER TO GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF SEPARATELY DEFENDED THE ADMINISTRATIONS'S INITIATIVE, BUT ADMITTED THEY HAD BEEN AT FAULT IN NOT CONSULTING THE SAUDIS IN ADVANCE. KINNEY CLAIMED THAT WITHOUT POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF



THIS SORT THE NEXT 6 WEEKS WOULD BE VERY UNCERTAIN ONES, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE RISK OF AN IRAQI PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE, POSSIBLY AGAINST ISRAEL.

## COMMENT

6. PRINCE TURKI IS ACCUSTOMED TO SPEAKING BLUNTLY. BUT ON THIS OCCASION HE WAS CLEARLY WORRIED, AND LOOKING TO US AS A POSSIBLE ALLY. HE IS NOT ALONE HERE IN HIS CONCERN. EVEN MASKERI, THE OMANI GCC ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL, TOOK A NOT DISSIMILAR LINE WITH US YESTERDAY, AT LEAST IN SO FAR AS THE POSSIBLE BLURRING OF THE IMPACT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF FORCE WAS CONCERNED. THE SAUDIS HAVED BEEN COUNTING ON THE PRESSURE THIS WILL CREATE, AND NOW FEAR THAT IT MAY DISSIPATE. THEIR PRIDE IS OF COURSE ALSO HURT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED BY THE AMERICANS, WHO IN CONTRAST SEEM TO HAVE KEPT THEM FULLY IN THE PICTURE ON RESOLUTION 678 BEFORE IT WAS PASSED.

7. IF I GET MY AUDIENCE WITH KING FAHD THIS WEEK, HE MAY WELL REFLECT THIS NEW CONCERN OVER US RESOLVE (MY TELNO 1276).

MUNRO

YYYY

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MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
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SECRET



*File*

28

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 December 1990

*See report.*

**THE GULF**

The Prime Minister was asked for briefing on a number of points about the Gulf which arose from recent Sitreps, mainly in the context of Questions in the House. In particular:

- in relation to reports (J.180 for 30 November, para.7) of a possible new French initiative he has asked whether the Foreign Secretary should not speak to Dumas;
- in relation to para.8 of the same report and the Yemeni initiative disclosed to visiting British MPs. He has asked for briefing for PQs;
- similarly in relation to para.15 and BBC reports quoting a senior British commander on the subject of casualties in a Gulf war, he has again asked for briefing.

*You see,*  
*C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SUBJECT cc MASTER



file

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

27 (a-b)

*From the Private Secretary*

3 December 1990

Dear Stephen,

IRAQ/KUWAIT

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a talk this morning about the Gulf situation, covering among others the points in the Foreign Secretary's two minutes of 30 November to the Prime Minister. I will record separately the Prime Minister's views on these latter.

NO FURTHER COPIES SHOULD BE MADE of this letter, and it should be made available ONLY to other Ministers and officials with a STRICT NEED TO KNOW of its contents.

On wider issues relating to the Gulf, the Prime Minister referred to his telephone conversation on 30 November with President Bush about the decision to invite Tariq Aziz to Washington and to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad. He thought the President's main purpose was to safeguard his domestic position. He had been very firm in making clear that there was no weakening in the US position on the need for Iraq to withdraw totally and unconditionally from Kuwait. Nor was the United States willing to negotiate. The Foreign Secretary said that he had received no hint of this plan from Secretary Baker, who presumably had not been aware of it at the time they had spoken in New York. He had thought the Americans might send a private emissary to bring home to Saddam Hussein that, if Iraq did not withdraw, the Americans would use force, but had no inkling that the Americans would make such a public proposal. It was a pity that the very clear position established by the recent Security Council Resolution had been so quickly muddled by this new proposal, which was open to misinterpretation. However, we had no alternative but to take American assurances at face value.


The Prime Minister said that he was instinctively not keen on the idea which had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers of the Permanent Five Members in New York for a Summit meeting before a decision to use force. He was not sure what such a meeting would produce. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought the proposal had probably been overtaken by President Bush's subsequent initiative.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

The Prime Minister said that nonetheless, in the light of the decision to talk to the Iraqis, and the subsequent news that Monsieur Dumas was also likely to visit Baghdad, the Government had to have an answer to the question: what was Britain doing to try to ensure a peaceful end to the conflict? There was some risk that we would appear war-hungry and unwilling to play our part in attempts to resolve the situation peacefully. The Foreign Secretary said that he would be reluctant to go to Baghdad himself or to send a British Minister. In further discussion, it was suggested that a way round the problem might be to organise a further meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Permanent Five, perhaps in London, before Secretary Baker visited Baghdad, so that he could go in the knowledge of the views of all five Governments. The Foreign Secretary agreed to pursue this.

The Foreign Secretary reported that the Opposition were seeking an SO 20 debate on the Gulf for 4 December. He did not think there was a particularly strong case for this, not least because it might lead to demands for a further debate before Christmas. Equally, the Whips' office saw opportunity to have an SO 20 debate on a relatively uncontroversial subject. If the debate were to be granted and to be held on 4 December, he could not himself take part as he would be in Brussels. He assumed the Prime Minister would not want to take the debate at this stage, in which case the answer might be to invite the Defence Secretary to do so. The Prime Minister said that on balance he thought it would be best to go along with the Opposition request and get the debate out of the way now. He agreed that the Defence Secretary should be invited to lead for the Government. It would probably be useful if he were himself to take a debate on the Gulf, but at a slightly later stage.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Your sincerely,  


CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



File <sup>26</sup>

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 December 1990

*Dear Sir,*

**IRAQ/KUWAIT**

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 30 November on Iraq/Kuwait (PM/90/090). He agrees with the Foreign Secretary's assessment of the outcome of the debate in the Security Council and the meeting of the Permanent Five Foreign Ministers. I have recorded separately the Prime Minister's misgivings about the Soviet proposal for a Summit of the Five, which anyway now looks less likely to be pursued in the light of President Bush's proposal to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad and receive Tariq Aziz in Washington.

The Prime Minister has also commented that he would wish to see Sir Antony Acland when he returns to London.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely,*

**CHARLES POWELL**

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

25

You should know that, at 4.30 this morning, we picked up the Iraqis firing four missiles. The preliminary evidence is that these were test-firings. They took place somewhere just to the north of Kuwait and were fired in a WNW direction, impacting some 600 kms away, within Iraq. There is no evidence that they were directed at Israel.

The missiles were probably modified Soviet SCUDS whose range the Iraqis have been extending. If you want to test-fire a missile of that range in Iraq without it landing on anyone else, then just north of Kuwait is quite a good place to do it from.

On the other hand, one has to ask: why now? And how will others interpret it? We are discussing both points with the Americans and examining all the evidence. There is no sign yet that the Israelis have interpreted the firing as a hostile act. But if they were looking for an excuse.....

I don't think there is anything more I can sensibly tell you at the moment. If further significant evidence or assessment comes up during the day, I will keep you informed.

CHARLES POWELL

2 December 1990

**SECRET**



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24iii  
Prime Minister

COO  
30/11

30 November 1990

I had a briefing on all this  
a.s.o.p. 7.12

See [unclear]

**THE GULF**

General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening to say that the President was about to announce that he was willing to invite Tariq Aziz to come to Washington to see him: and to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein. He wanted to underline that this was not in any way evidence that the Americans were going wobbly. It was intended as a tactical move to satisfy those, particularly in Congress, who argued that it was inconceivable to go to war without at least trying to talk the Iraqis into seeing reason.

I took the opportunity to ask General Scowcroft whether the Americans had any indicators of unusual military activities and preparations on the Iraqi side. We had picked up one or two ambiguous signs of preparation for some sort of activity. General Scowcroft said he had seen nothing at all credible or worth passing on. But if the Americans did pick up anything unusual over the weekend, he would let me know straightaway.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  
[Signature]


Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**SECRET**



# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3439</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Crodock to Powell dated 30 November 1990</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
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CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister  
To discuss with you  
Far/See at your meeting

AT 20/1/4

PM/90/089

PRIME MINISTER

Iraq/Kuwait: Sustaining national unity

The Problem

1. We may face a big test of national steadiness. British public opinion has, so far, been resolute in support of the Government's Gulf policy (Annex A). None of our allies enjoys such a degree of national unity.
2. We must sustain this mood over the approach to and the duration of a possible war. Yesterday's Security Council Resolution takes the crisis into a new and critical phase. Setting a date after which military action would have the blessing of the UN will concentrate minds. As the 'deadline' approaches, we must be ready for candlelit vigils, tearful protests by hostage families, demonstrations outside military bases, the latter possibly exploited violently by ultra-left and anarchist groups. The police will need to be prepared. Other political issues may become insignificant as 15 January approaches.
3. If war comes, it will involve the greatest deployment of British forces since 1945. Reserves may be called up. It would be more difficult than during the Falklands campaign to control or censor media reports from the Gulf. Although TV reports from Saudi Arabia will, physically, have to be sent from Dhahran, the power of

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the US press will probably oblige the US censors to interpret their guidelines liberally. ITV and the BBC will be able to buy US networks' film. There are likely to be many more bodies and burns in the Gulf than there were in the Falklands, where many lives were lost at sea. Any civilian or hostage casualties caused by allied bombing of Iraq would doubtless be shown to Western TV and news correspondents by the Iraqis. Jim Baker told me he thought the US had the technical means to stop such transmissions from the war zone. I am seeking expert advice.

*U. helpful  
if he can.*

GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

4. We need a plan to sustain and reinforce public support for the Government's policy. The greater national unity the better.

5. Our objective must be to achieve this by:

a) Strengthening public understanding of our objectives in the Gulf

There is substantial confusion in the US because of the varied reasons given by the President and his colleagues for the American effort. In the age of the soundbite such confusion is easy. Here our message has been more coherent. "If we want a safe world order, aggression must be reversed. Anything else is dangerous." We must keep the message solid, and clear.

*Yes.*

b) Exhausting and being seen to exhaust every avenue for peace

The UN resolution authorising force is of key importance. We shall have difficulty with a peace party, led initially by Benn and the Labour Left, but possibly including Ted Heath. Whether they can recruit a wider swathe of anxious public opinion depends largely on us -

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✓ we must respond with language which is firm but which also acknowledges the public's fear of heavy casualties. We need in particular to show that we have gone the last mile for peace and provide a strong answer to the question: why not wait longer? I have put this in hand.

c) Doing and being seen to do all possible to protect British people in peril

British families in the Gulf region have already been advised not to bring their children to the Middle East for the Christmas holidays and British dependants spending Christmas in this country are being advised not to return to the Gulf. Proposals that all dependants and non-essential workers should leave may come forward soon to OD(G). MOD is building into its military planning the need to do everything possible to rescue British citizens in hiding or held hostage. We must continue to emphasise this to the Americans.

TARGET AUDIENCES

6. Opposition Parties

a) Labour

We should acknowledge in public the support given by the Opposition frontbench. Questions following my statement last Thursday revealed considerable Labour backbench unease about their frontbench's robust line. I have briefed Mr Kaufman. You may want to speak to Mr Kinnock soon, ie before, as well as during, any war.

(Mrs Thatcher offered Privy Counsellor briefings to Mr Foot during the Falklands conflict, but he declined.) Tom King is in touch with his counterpart. I propose to continue my contacts with Gerald Kaufman and Douglas Hogg his with George Robertson. It would be unhelpful if colleagues' speeches or CCO literature attacked the Labour frontbench over the Gulf.

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Review with  
For. Sec.

A word  
with Mr.  
Patten.



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b) Other Opposition Parties

*Yes.*  
You might see Messrs Ashdown, Molyneux and Owen in January. Douglas Hogg could deal with the Nationalists and the other Ulster parties.

7. Parliamentary Opinion

- ✓*
- a) Both Houses of Parliament will expect to be kept informed about developments.
  - b) Douglas Hogg and Mark Lennox-Boyd are arranging to brief sympathetic MPs of all parties.
  - c) I remain in close touch with David Howell, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and Sir Peter Blaker, Chairman of the Backbench Foreign Affairs Committee.

8. Public Opinion

- ✓*
- a) A short White Paper, published in January, would present in a readily accessible form the Government's case for its Gulf policy.
  - ✓*  
b) Ministerial broadcasts were not used during the Falklands conflict, but could be a useful tool in the event of war. Authoritative ministerial statements will carry far more weight than briefings by departmental spokesmen.
  - Yes.*  
c) We should agree on a ministerial spokesman to deal with day-to-day announcements during any war. The Secretary of State for Defence seems to me the best person for this job.

9.\* Churches, whose opinion will be influential\*

*Or earlier*  
You might see the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Carey (who did much of his National Service in Iraq) during early January. Cardinal Hume, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland and the Chief Rabbi are also

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✓ important. FCO Ministers could speak to sympathetic churchmen like the Bishops of Oxford and Peterborough.

✓ 10. Royal Family

I shall call on The Prince of Wales before Christmas following a brief exchange last month.

✓ 11. British Moslems

Douglas Hogg and Angela Rumbold are in touch about how best to brief British Moslem leaders and the British Asian media.

✓ 12. Media

Heads of Information at No 10, FCO and MOD meet regularly to discuss Gulf matters. In addition to the usual contacts with diplomatic and defence correspondents, FCO Ministers are arranging to brief selected editors and columnists about the Government's policy and objectives. This will have to be continuous.

✓ 13. It will be important to have Ministers available for TV and radio broadcasts during the Christmas recess. The media then will be desperate for stories and we must not allow opponents of our policy to dominate the news. Douglas Hogg could be available from the FCO. Tom King may also wish to nominate a member of his ministerial team.

14. Ministerial direction of policy

It seems to me that we need urgently a group of persuasive Ministers who are fully briefed and tasked with expounding the policy in speeches and broadcasts. You will obviously want to do this from time to time yourself. At the moment, Tom King and I do it and will of course continue, but we shall need help. Similarly we

Yes - and  
senior h. launch,  
Gen. D. Powell  
P. Blake  
etc /.



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need a group of persuasive backbenchers who can back us up nationally and locally. CND were thwarted by this means ten years ago, and we may need something similar temporarily in 1991.

15. I am copying this minute to the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robin Butler.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
30 November 1990

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ANNEX A

British Public Opinion: Gallup Poll Evidence

1. Would you support the use of British forces to achieve the following:

	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Aug</u>
Restoring independence to Kuwait?			
Yes	86	75	84
No	12	15	11
DK	2	9	5
Toppling Saddam Hussain's regime in Iraq?			
Yes	70	68	69
No	26	22	26
DK	4	10	5
Defence of Israel if attacked?			
Yes	76	59	66
No	18	25	22
DK	5	16	12
Protecting the West's Oil Supplies?			
Yes	78	78	87
No	19	13	9
DK	3	8	4

2. There are two views about the line that Britain and America should take given that large numbers of Britons and Americans are now being held hostage in Kuwait and Iraq. Which of these two statements comes closest to your view?

a) If necessary Britain and America should be ready to take military action against Iraq even if it means putting the lives of British and American hostages at some degree of risk.	63	58	63
b) Britain and America should not under any circumstances take military action against Iraq if it means putting the lives of British and American hostages at some degree of risk.	30	35	31
c) Don't know	7	7	6



SECRET

Prime Minister

To discuss at meeting  
with Mr. Sec

AT 20/4

241(A-D)

PERSONAL

PM/90/090

PRIME MINISTER

Discussion with  
Mr. Haed plus  
(+ with CAP Gen) / 1.12

Iraq/Kuwait

1. You will have seen the telegrams reporting yesterday's debate in the Security Council, my talks with Baker, and the exceptionally frank dinner of the Permanent Five Foreign Ministers last night.

✓ 2. The resolution was a remarkable personal achievement by Jim Baker.

3. Our aim is presumably to:

✓ (a) do everything possible to bring about Saddam Hussein's peaceful withdrawal by 15 January;

✓ (b) join in the military option after that date if necessary, with effective arrangements on the ground and sufficient public support at home;

✓ (c) to clear up afterwards.


(c) is a huge subject outside the scope of this minute. Opinions vary about the possibility of (a). The Russians, some Israelis, some Arabs, believe he will withdraw, but the majority opinion is against. We can maximise the possibility by:

SECRET

/(i)



SECRET



- (i) making it wholly clear that if he does not go he will be forced out;
- (ii) making it equally clear that if he does go he will not be attacked.

There will be a need for further pressure on him after withdrawal so long as he is dangerous and armed with chemical, biological and eventually nuclear weapons. Sanctions, especially the arms embargo, will be needed and we may have to keep a deterrent force on the ground. But that will be Chapter 2. If he leaves Kuwait completely, restores the Kuwaiti Government, and frees all hostages Chapter 1 will be over. He will have complied with the Security Council resolutions and the authority to use force confirmed by yesterday's resolution will lapse. I have long thought and said that message (ii) was important and yesterday, for the first time, Baker and others said the same emphatically.

3. The discussion last night centred on how we convey to Saddam Hussein messages (i) and (ii). The Secretary General should do so on behalf of the UN, and will now consider how and when. We discussed last night how to keep the Permanent Five together as a means of pressure. I need to know fairly soon how you view the thought of a summit for this purpose. You will see from the telegram that Baker and I were cautious about the Soviet suggestion. (The greater the difficulty Gorbachev has at home, the greater the attraction of summitry for him.) But it is the sort of idea which catches on. One could

*What are the advantages?  
Views of the  
others?  
What will be the outcome?*

SECRET

/for



SECRET

for example imagine a London summit in the first weeks of January. There would be intense drama surrounding it, because it would represent a formal effort by the international community to emphasise its demands on the edge of war. There would be plenty of hazards, not least from the Chinese, but some presentational advantage.

4. (b) above depends in part on maximising national unity at home. I am sending you a separate paper on this, which I think is crucial.

5. I found Baker robust. But it is clear that the Americans have a big struggle ahead of them with Congress and public opinion. They hope to defuse the anti-war sentiment by stressing the Security Council resolution, but there is strong pressure for Congress to be recalled. Peace demonstrations and TV interviews are becoming frequent. There is a widespread feeling that the US effort is disproportionately large in terms of likely casualties. I came away convinced that we should help them on the US media as the most impressive European contributor. I am asking Sir A Acland to come back to see me, and you might like to see him yourself.

yes.

6. You may want to have a proper Cabinet on this (on a paper?), but I would be grateful for a chance to go over

SECRET

/the



SECRET

the ground with you first. The above was, incidentally, written before the Americans' surprise announcement of this afternoon but holds good.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Defence Secretary.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'DH'.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
30 November 1990

SECRET

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FM WASHINGTON (CORRECTED VERSION - PARAGRAPH NO.S)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2898

OF 302320Z NOVEMBER 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW

AND TO IMMEDIATE PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

AND TO ESC LONDON, MODUK, ACTOR

OUR TEL 2894 : IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS OF 30  
NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. CLEAREST SIGNAL YET THAT THE US WILL GO TO WAR IF NECESSARY. POWERFUL PERFORMANCE BY THE PRESIDENT WHICH ADDRESSES A RANGE OF CONCERNS IN THIS COUNTRY. BUT CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISMS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES REMAIN.

DETAIL

2. THIS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE AND POWERFUL PERFORMANCE BY THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED AS THE CLEAREST POSSIBLE SIGNAL BOTH TO IRAQ AND TO US PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO GO TO WAR IF IRAQ DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. BUT THE PRESIDENT ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT HE REMAINED AS ANXIOUS AS EVER FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THIS WAS NOT A WAR MONGERING SPEECH. IT WAS A MEASURED AND MODERATE APPEAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REASON.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO SADDAM TO RECEIVE TARIQ AZIZ IN WASHINGTON AND TO SEND BAKER TO BAGHDAD IS A SKILFUL MOVE. BAKER ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO YOU THAT THE IDEA STEMMED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK ON 29 NOVEMBER (UKMIS NY TELNO 2158), AND THAT THE PURPOSE WAS STRICTLY CONFIRMED TO THE UNSCRS. THERE HAS BEEN CONCERN HERE THAT, BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF HIS REGIME, SADDAM HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM REALITY AND DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE IS UP AGAINST. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND BAKER TO BAGHDAD ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS. IT UNDERLINES THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION

TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WITHOUT COMPROMISING ON THE DEMANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT ALSO ADDRESSES THE CALL, WHICH HAS BEEN HEARD INCREASINGLY IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY, FOR DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE US AS THE CRISIS ENTERS ITS CRITICAL PHASE. BUT THE PRESIDENT WAS CAREFUL TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL NOT BE TO NEGOTIATE: HE REPEATED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT: IRAQ HAD TO COMPLY WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

4

. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ADDRESSED HIMSELF DIRECTLY TO THE GROWING CHORUS FROM THOSE HERE WHO HAVE BEEN QUESTIONING WHETHER MILITARY ACTION IS IN THE US NATIONAL INTEREST AND WHETHER SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN MORE TIME TO WORK. A ROW OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HAVE THIS WEEK ARGUED THAT FORCE SHOULD NOT BE USED: THAT THE US DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES WOULD LEAD INEXORABLY TO A WAR WHICH WOULD DAMAGE LONG-TERM US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE AN INCREASING IMPACT OVER THE NEXT YEAR: AND THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE GIVEN MORE TIME TO WORK. IN HIS STATEMENT THE PRESIDENT CLEARLY DESCRIBED THE US INTERESTS AT STAKE. HE WAS VISIBLY MOVED WHEN ASKED WHETHER THESE INTERESTS JUSTIFIED US CASUALTIES, BUT HIS RESPONSE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD FIGHT IF HE HAD TO. ON SANCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SAY THAT THEY ALONE WOULD GET THE JOB DONE, WHICH WAS ONE REASON WHY HE WELCOMED YESTERDAY'S UN RESOLUTION.

5. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ALSO ADDRESSES THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US SHOULD SHOW FURTHER PATIENCE. HE REFERRED TO THE PLIGHT OF THE US EMBASSY IN KUWAIT, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE IRAQI DECISION TO SEND IN SOME SUPPLIES TO THE BELEAGURED STRUCK AN INTERESTING NEW NOTE. THE TREATMENT OF THE EMBASSY VIOLATED EVERY CIVILISED PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMACY AND Demeaned THE US. HE ALSO SPOKE ABOUT THE RAPE, ASSASSINATION, COLD-BLOODED MURDER AND RAMPANT LOOTING IN KUWAIT. HE REPEATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT SADDAM'S EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SPOKE ABOUT THE SEVERE ECONOMIC DAMAGE WHICH IRAQ'S INVASION WAS CAUSING WORLDWIDE. THE OVERALL EFFECT WAS TO INDICATE THAT TIME WAS NOT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S SIDE. AS HE PUT IT, QUOTE TIME IS RUNNING OUT, YOU MUST LEAVE KUWAIT AND WE WILL GIVE YOU TIME TO DO JUST EXACTLY THAT UNQUOTE.

THIS PICKS UP A THEME ADDRESSED BY VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE IN A SPEECH ON 29 NOVEMBER IN WHICH HE SAID THAT DELAYING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ HAD ITS COSTS, AND AMONG OTHER THINGS INCREASED THE RISK OF US CASUALTIES.

6. ANOTHER MAJOR CONCERN HERE IS THE RISK THAT CONFLICT IN THE GULF COULD LEAD TO ANOTHER BLOODY STALEMATE AS IN VIETNAM. AGAIN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ANOTHER PROTRACTED CONFLICT: IRAQ'S SUPPLY POSITION WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM VIETNAM'S, THERE WAS STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE US, THE TOPOGRAPHY OF KUWAIT WAS DIFFERENT, AS WAS THE MOTIVATION OF THE US FORCES. MORE IMPORTANT, IF THERE HAD TO BE WAR, THE PRESIDENT UNDERLINED THAT - UNLIKE VIETNAM - HE WOULD NOT PERMIT US FORCES TO HAVE THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. IF FIGHTING WERE TO START US FORCES WOULD GO INTO BATTLE WITH ENOUGH FORCE TO WIN AND THEN TO GET OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WOULD BE NO HALF WAY EFFORT.

7. THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS WILL ALSO BE SEEN AS SOMETHING OF A CHALLENGE TO CONGRESS TO PUT UP OR SHUT UP. CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY HAS CONTINUED, IN PARTICULAR WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS THIS WEEK, POSSIBLY EXACERBATED BY SELECTIVE MEDIA REPORTING AND BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION NOT TO ALLOW ITS WITNESSES TO APPEAR BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THERE HAVE BEEN CALLS FOR AN EARLY RECALL OF CONGRESS, BUT NO DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN. AT BEST, A CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE NOW WOULD PROBABLY SEND MIXED SIGNALS TO IRAS WHICH WOULD SUGGEST LESS THAN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT. THE VIEW HERE IS THAT, IF THE PRESIDENT WANTS UNEQUIVOCAL CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT, HE NEEDS TO PREPARE THE GROUND CAREFULLY. WITH THE PASSAGE OF SCR 673 AND WITH CHENEY AND BAKER TO TESTIFY NEXT WEEK BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES, HE MAY NOW BE READY TO DO SO: AND ALL THE MORE SO IF HIS ADDRESS OF 30 NOVEMBER HAS THE EFFECT OF REGAINING THE INITIATIVE WITH PUBLIC OPINION.

ACLAND



YYYY

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
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ADVANCE 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT  
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 PS/MR HOGG  
 PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
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 MR FAIRWEATHER  
 MR BROOMFIELD  
 MR SLATER  
 MR GORE-BOOTH  
 MR GOULDEN  
 MR JAY  
 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
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 HD/ECD(E)  
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 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/NENAD  
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HD/SED  
 HD/UND  
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
 MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
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 (BY TUBE H29)  
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 AUS (C) MODUK  
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
 MR WICKS HMT  
 EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)  
 RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You wanted  
these papers back,  
so that you  
could look at  
the list of issues  
on the Gulf,  
attached to FERB,  
minute. C.D. 30 xi

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

DINNER OF THE FIVE

SUMMARY

*Put privately*

1. AT A DINNER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FIVE THIS EVENING ALL AGREED THAT WE SHOULD USE THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND 15 JANUARY TO PERSUADE SADDAM HUSSEIN OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MILITARY THREAT, BUT ALSO OF THE FACT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF HE WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT AND COMPLIED WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN THIS BUT THAT A MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO BE CONVEYED BILATERALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH PROPOSED IN A SUMMIT OF THE FIVE TO EMPHASISE SOLEMNITY OF THE WARNING.

DETAIL

2. BAKER HOSTED A DINNER FOR HIS PERMANENT MEMBER COLLEAGUES THIS EVENING. ONLY MINISTERS AND INTERPRETERS WERE PRESENT, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS ALLOWED ME TO BE SMUGGLED IN. BEFORE DINNER STARTED BAKER CONFIRMED THE STORY WE HAD HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS IN LONDON AND HERE TODAY THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY TO BE TOLD THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD RESUPPLY THE U S EMBASSY IN KUWAIT WITH FRUIT, WATER AND CIGARETTES. IF THIS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE IT WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT SIGNAL: THE IRAQIS WERE WORRIED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT USE THE EMBASSY AS A TRIGGER FOR MILITARY ACTION. THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ASKED THE IRAQIS TO SUPPLY THE EMBASSY BUT THERE HAD BEEN SPECULATION ABOUT RESUPPLY IN THE AMERICAN PRESS.

3. ONCE DINNER STARTED BAKER SAID THAT HIS PURPOSE IN CALLING THE MEETING WAS TO TALK INFORMALLY AND OFF THE RECORD ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS. DUMAS SAID THAT WE SHOULD MAKE THE MOST OF THE 45 DAYS WHICH LAY AHEAD. WE MUST FIND A WAY OF LETTING SADDAM HUSSEIN KNOW THAT WE WERE VERY DETERMINED. LIKE MANY OTHER DICTATORS IT COULD WELL BE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS NOT GIVEN ACCURATE INFORMATION BY HIS MINISTERS. THE FIVE SHOULD TELL HIM THE TRUTH IE THE IF HE DID

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NOTHING HE WAS INCURRING GREAT RISKS FOR HIS COUNTRY, HIS REGIME AND HIMSELF PERSONALLY. COULD WE FIND A WAY THROUGH? IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD HAVE A ROLE THOUGH HE HAD BEEN RATHER OBSCURE ABOUT IT IN HIS INTERVENTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT FROM WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE EARLIER IN THE DAY HE WAS THINKING OF WAITING FOR ABOUT A WEEK TO ENABLE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO DIGEST THE RESOLUTION AND WOULD THEN MAKE CONTACT TO SEE IF THERE WAS SCOPE FOR RENEWING HIS SEPTEMBER INITIATIVE. BUT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OUGHT TO BE ENGAGED THOUGH THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT OTHERS COULD NOT CARRY THE SAME MESSAGE.

5. BAKER SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH BOTH DUMAS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN RAN TRUE TO FORM HE WOULD BEAT HIS CHEST A BIT OVER THE RESOLUTION, SO IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO WAIT. BAKER TOO HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS POORLY INFORMED, BUT THAT VIEW WAS NOT SHARED BY SHEVARDNADZE. BAKER AGREED THAT BEFORE THE NEXT SIX WEEKS WERE UP WE MUST SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE OF OUR SERIOUSNESS. THE FIRST THING TO DECIDE WAS WHAT ADVICE THE FIVE SHOULD JOINTLY GIVE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE NON CONTROVERSIAL FOR HIM TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE RESOLUTION, IF POSSIBLE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN HIMSELF.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS ILL INFORMED AND WAS ONLY TOLD WHAT HE WANTED TO HEAR BY HIS ADVISERS. HE DID KNOW WAS WAS HAPPENING. WHAT WAS EQUALLY TRUE WAS THAT HE KNEW HOW TO PLAY ON CONTRADICTIONS. THE FIVE MUST REACH AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES. THEY COULD AVERT A MILITARY CLASH IF THEY WERE UNITED AMONG THEMSELVES NOT JUST AT MEETINGS LIKE THIS, BUT IN PRACTICAL ACTION. THEY HAD TO MAKE THEIR VIEW FELT, PERHAPS THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE FIVE COULD ALSO ACT ALONE AND INDEPENDENTLY BUT EACH SHOULD KNOW WHAT THE OTHERS WERE DOING. HE WOULD RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT OF THE FIVE. IT WE WERE GOING TO LIBERATE KUWAIT WE MUST USE EVERY DEVICE. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE EARLIER IN THE DAY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARAB FACTOR. HIS FINAL POINT WAS THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD TRY TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. THEY HAD TOLD THE RUSSIAN THEY WOULD DO SO. THERE WAS NOTHING TERRIBLE ABOUT THAT. IT COULD BE USED. THEY WERE ALSO PLACING HIGH HOPES ON ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH THE SAUDIS. THEY BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD BE CRUCIAL AND IT WAS

CERTAINLY SOMETHING TO BE BORNE IN MIND. WE SHOULD ALL TRY TO SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH INDEED AND HE HAD BEEN TOLD IN CLEAR TERMS THAT IF THE IRAQIS WANTED TO SAVE THEIR COUNTRY THEY HAD TO LEAVE KUWAIT. TARIQ AZIZ' REACTION TO THIS HAD BEEN DISTRESSED. HE HAD NOT BEEN EXPECTING SUCH A BRUTAL DISCUSSION. SHEVARDNADZE IMPLIED THAT THE BRUTALITY HAD BEEN QUITE DELIBERATE EVEN THOUGH THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT RULE OUT WHAT HE CALLED THE DRAMATIC RESPONSE. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS A SKILLED PROPAGANDIST AND MANY OF THE ATROCITIES COMMITTED IN KUWAIT WERE NOT WELL KNOWN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, HENCE THE ILLUSIONS ABOUT HIM. MAYBE A SUMMIT OF THE FIVE WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. HE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED IT EVEN WITH GORBACHEV, BUT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THINGS TO COME TO THE POINT OF MILITARY CONFLICT. THAT WOULD BE TRAGIC.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW ADVANTAGE IN THE FIVE FOREIGN MINSTERS MEETING AGAIN. BUT HE WONDERED WHAT WOULD BE GAINED BY A SUMMIT. THE EXPECTATIONS WOULD BE ENORMOUS AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY NEED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE RESULTS AND PREPARE IT WELL. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT ANY SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE NEAR 15 JANUARY. THE IDEA OF SUCH A MEETING WOULD HAVE ENORMOUS IMPACT AND IF MAJOR DECISIONS WERE TO BE TAKEN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THAT KIND OF LEVEL. THE SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE THE LAST CALL.

8. BAKER SAID THAT BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH IRAQ WERE NOT RULED OUT PROVIDED THEY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REWARD FOR AGGRESSION. WE MUST MAINTAIN THE SAME CONSISTENT LINE ON WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD SEND A STRONG, CLEAR MESSAGE THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT WITHDRAW VOLUNTARILY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT UNLESS WE KNEW WHAT WE WANTED FROM A SUMMIT WE SHOULD BE CHARY ABOUT CALLING ONE. THE ONLY ADVANTAGE OF A SUMMIT WOULD BE PUBLICITY. BUT WE COULD SEND A JOINT MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WITHOUT A SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET AGAIN IN ABOUT FIVE WEEKS TIME AND TAKE STOCK, PERHAPS EMPOWERED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO SEND A MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT WOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE AND COULD BE COMBINED IN SOME WAY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. WE SHOULD MAKE IT EXPLICIT THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. PERHAPS THAT WAS THE MESSAGE HE SHOULD HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT. BAKER AGREED THAT IRAQ SHOULD HEAR FROM THE U S BUT NOT JUST YET. SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT DETECT ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW. HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONVINCED SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE MUST LEAVE

KUWAIT ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FOR US TO DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED IN IRAQ AFTER WITHDRAWAL. A GUARANTEE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF HE WITHDREW COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. PEOPLE SPOKE OF SAVING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FACE. HE DID NOT FOLLOW THAT ARGUMENT. BAKER COMMENTED THAT WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT WAS SAVING HIS ARSE NOT HIS FACE. HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ARGUED THAT THE MECHANISM FOR GETTING THE MESSAGES TO SADDAM HUSSEIN NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE MESSAGE WOULD NEED TO BE GOT THROUGH PRIVATELY AS WELL AS PUBICLY. BAKER HAD SOME DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL WAS THE BEST WAY OF DOING IT GIVEN THE EXPECTATIONS THAT WOULD BE AROUSED AND POSSIBLE DISAPPOINTMENT. WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN NEEDED TO KNOW WAS WHAT THE RULES OF THE GAME WOULD BE AFTER WITHDRAWAL. HE NEEDED A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT IF HE PULLED OUT (A) HE WOULD NOT BE DESTROYED, (B) THERE WOULD BE SOME REDUCTION OF SANCTIONS LINKED TO HIS LEVEL OF ARMAMENT. THE U S CERTAINLY HAD NO DESIRE TO KEEP ITS TROOPS ON THE GROUND ANY LONGER THAN NECESSARY. THEY WERE NOT LOOKING FOR A GRAND PRESENCE IN THE AREA THOUGH SOME CONTINUING SECURITY ARRANGEMENT OF THE KIND THAT HAD EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS WOULD BE NEEDED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WITHDREW BUT STILL HAD HIS ENORMOUS ARMY WE COULD NOT GO FOR A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. BAKER AGREE BUT COMMENTED THAT NONETHELESS A MAJOR BURDEN WAS PLACED ON THE U S. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THERE WOULD BE VERY GREAT PROBLEMS INDEED IF WAR BROKE OUT. TODAY'S RESOLUTION OPENED A GOOD PROSPECT FOR SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

9. THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW SADDAM HUSSEIN DID KNOW THE SITUATION VERY CLEARLY. ALL THE RECORDS OF HIS OWN CONVERSATIONS HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM BY THE CHINESE. TARIQ AZIZ WAS ANOTHER MATTER. HE NOTED WHAT WAS SAID TO HIM BUT WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION. TARIQ AZIZ COULD NOT REACH DECISIONS. ANY TALK SHOULD BE DIRECT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD TO MEET HIM. WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE USE OF SOME ARAB STATES WHO HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN EG MUBARAK (THE OTHER FOREIGN MINSTERS ALL COMMENTED THAT MUBARAK'S RELATIONS WERE NO LONGER GOOD). CHINA THOUGHT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS AND WAS LOOKING FOR SOME FACE SAVING REWARD FOR WITHDRAWAL. HE WAS VERY AFRAID OF WAR AND ONE OF THE REASONS WHY HE HAD FORMALLY ANNEXED KUWAIT WAS SO THAT HE COULD BE BETTER PREPARED MILITARILY AGAINST ATTACK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REITERATED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FIVE TO MEET AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO SAY IN PUBLIC WHAT MIGHT ALSO BE CONVEYED PRIVATELY IE THAT WE WERE DETERMINED THAT IF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WERE MET THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK.

SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS NOT CLEAR BUT HE WAS CAPABLE OF ANALYSIS. HE WAS MORE AND MORE CONVINCED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT IF THE FIVE ACTED TOGETHER. IF THEY SENT DIFFERENT SIGNALS THEN THEY WOULD GET INTO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. WHEN PRIMAKOV HAD TAKEN A DIFFERENT LINE FROM SHEVARDNADZE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD EXPLOITED IT. BAKER AGREED ON THE NEED TO ENGAGE IN EVERY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. HE HAD IN MIND FIRST OF ALL A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, SECONDLY BILATERAL MESSAGES (BUT THE SAME MESSAGE FROM EACH MEMBER OF THE FIVE) AND THIRDLY ACTION BY THE FIVE AROUND 1 JANUARY. DUMAS THOUGHT THAT WE NEEDED TO INJECT MORE DRAMA INTO OUR ACTION. THAT WAS THE ADVANTAGE OF THE FIVE LEADERS SENDING A FIRM MESSAGE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IN THE EVENT OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL THEY WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BUT THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT WITHDRAW THEN HE WAS PLACING HIMSELF AND HIS COUNTRY AT ENORMOUS RISK. THERE COULD BE NO BETTER GUARANTEE OF SECURITY FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN THAN A STATEMENT OF THE FIVE AND EQUALLY HE COULD HAVE NO HOPE OF ESCAPING IF HE KNEW THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIVE'S PURPOSES. BAKER AGREED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TO KNOW THAT THE THREAT OF FORCE WAS REAL. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT WE COULD NOT DECIDE NOW ON A SUMMIT, BUT THE IDEA WAS A VERY FORCEFUL THING. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION WITHIN HIS COUNTRY AND WE COULD NOT COUNT ON HIS OVERTHROW.

10. BAKER SAID THAT MEMBERS OF THE FIVE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME BE CAREFUL NOT TO LOSE THE SUPPORT OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY SEEMING TO ARROGATE TOO MUCH AUTHORITY TO OURSELVES.

11. AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DUMAS LEFT THE MEETING THEY AGREED THAT A FURTHER MEETING OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN EUROPE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. THEY AGREED TENTATIVELY THAT LONDON WOULD BE THE RIGHT PLACE TO MEET.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA*From the Private Secretary*

30 November 1990

Dear Mr Wall,

## PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening at his home in his constituency.

This letter contains sensitive material and should be seen only by the very restricted number of people authorised to do so.

The President began by saying it was very good news that the Prime Minister was able to come over to Washington before Christmas, and 21 December would suit him very well. He hoped the Prime Minister would come up to Camp David that evening and stay the night, bringing Mrs Major with him. The Prime Minister said he was very grateful for the invitation. He was sure Mrs Major would like to come.

The President continued that the main purpose of his call had been to brief the Prime Minister on the proposal he had made at his press conference earlier in the day, about which General Scowcroft had informed me, namely to invite Tariq Aziz to Washington and offer to send Jim Baker to Baghdad. The proposal reflected his determination to take one last step to achieve a peaceful solution. But he wanted to assure the Prime Minister that there would be no negotiation or conciliation or concession of any sort. His thinking was simply that, having got the United Nations Resolution authorising the use of force, it would be helpful to signal a willingness to talk. But the message must be that Saddam Hussein must fulfil the Security Council Resolutions. The purpose would be to convince him that the United States and its Allies were deadly serious in saying they would use force if Iraq did not withdraw. The signal was: here's what you are up against, here's what you have to do.

The Prime Minister said that he had been very pleased with the United Nations Security Council Resolution. He hoped that Saddam Hussein was beginning to get the message that there could be no negotiations. He saw the advantage of the President's proposal, in terms of showing that the United States was ready to go the last mile and give every opportunity for a peaceful solution, provided it was absolutely clear there would be no negotiation.

The President said he could assure the Prime Minister that there had been no direct or indirect contact beforehand with the Iraqis. They would have heard his proposal for the first time at the press conference. Personally, he doubted whether Saddam Hussein would accept it, although the Saudis thought he would do so. His main concern, however, was that the Prime Minister should know that the United States was not - to use Mrs Thatcher's phrase - going wobbly. It was indeed just a question of going the extra mile before facing up to the tough decision in mid-January on the use of force. There would be no pulling back.

The Prime Minister said that he was extremely grateful for the President's explanation. He did not think there was a shred of difference between British and American views. The President said that he did not doubt that Saddam Hussein would try to negotiate, and demand access to the Gulf or a few islands, or some other concession. But that was unacceptable to him and to others. We must not give any indication of willingness to compromise.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours Sincerely*  
*Suzanne McCadden*

cc CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

30 November 1990

*See Hople,*

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this evening to say that the President was about to announce that he was willing to invite Tariq Aziz to come to Washington to see him: and to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein. He wanted to underline that this was not in any way evidence that the Americans were going wobbly. It was intended as a tactical move to satisfy those, particularly in Congress, who argued that it was inconceivable to go to war without at least trying to talk the Iraqis into seeing reason.

I took the opportunity to ask General Scowcroft whether the Americans had any indicators of unusual military activities and preparations on the Iraqi side. We had picked up one or two ambiguous signs of preparation for some sort of activity. General Scowcroft said he had seen nothing at all credible or worth passing on. But if the Americans did pick up anything unusual over the weekend, he would let me know straightaway.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*You need.  
Charles Powell*

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS

Your minute of 29 November to me set out some procedural proposals for the handling of the Gulf crisis by the new Government. You discussed these with the Prime Minister this morning.

Committee Machinery

The Prime Minister agreed that OPD(G) should be the inner body for discussions on the Gulf crisis. It should be attended by exactly the same people as the former OD(G), with Mr Appleyard added to the list of secretaries to take the minutes.

The official group (AHGG) should continue to meet regularly with the Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Hamilton) or, if he is unavailable, the Minister of State, FCO (Mr Hogg) in the chair.

Distribution of Documents

The Prime Minister agreed to the list of people to whom the most sensitive documents on the Gulf crisis should be available, set out in paragraph 5 of your minute. But this was on the understanding that only one copy should be sent to FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office respectively and no further copies made in Departments.

The existing restrictive rules for circulation of OPD(G) and AHGG papers were confirmed.

Contacts with the United States Government

The Prime Minister decided that No.10 should remain the main point of contact with General Scowcroft and the White House. This had been specifically requested by the President. However, HM Ambassador Washington should be kept informed of all such contacts: and should be used for conveying messages from Ministers to senior levels of the US Administration when this could be useful.

Military Presentation

The Prime Minister agreed that a British military presentation should be arranged for next week. He would welcome a briefing from a senior US commander in due course.

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Visit to Washington

The Prime Minister has already agreed to pay a brief working visit to Washington and the date of Friday 21 December has been informally suggested to the White House.

Visit to the Gulf

The Prime Minister will give further thought to a visit to our forces in the Gulf, and will discuss the proposal with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. His initial instinct was against it, but he recognised there was a risk of seeming to display lack of interest in British forces, especially following the President's visit to US forces.

Machinery in the event of Hostilities

The Prime Minister will look at your proposals on this, as well as the list of issues to be settled on the Gulf, over the weekend.

Finally it was agreed that OPD(G) should meet on 4 December.

C.P.

Charles Powell

30 November 1990

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

SUMMARY

1. MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTS A MEETING OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE. MAIN AIM WOULD BE TO PROMOTE MOVEMENT ON ARAB/ISRAEL. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO SUGGESTS NEED FOR GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY TURKEY IN TRYING TO TALK SENSE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. ON SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS SHEVARDNADZE WARNS OF DANGER OF THE SOVIET UNION BREAKING UP.

DETAIL

UK/SOVIET RELATIONS

2. SHEVARDNADZE CONGRATULATED SECRETARY OF STATE ON HIS REAPPOINTMENT. HE WAS SECRETLY RATHER GLAD THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD NOT WON THE LEADERSHIP ELECTION BECAUSE THE TWO OF THEM GOT ON SO WELL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SUSPECTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SECRET FORCE AT WORK JEOPARDISING HIS CHANCES. NOW HE KNEW FOR CERTAIN. MORE SERIOUSLY, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WANTED TO REASSURE SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SUPPORT FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CONTINUE UNCHANGED. MR SHEVARDNADZE WOULD KNOW FROM HIS OWN MEETING WITH MR MAJOR WHEN THE LATTER WAS FOREIGN SECRETARY THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO GOOD RELATIONS WOULD BE UNCHANGED.

THE GULF

3. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE UN RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE WAS PRINCIPLED BUT FLEXIBLE. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD SECURE THE NECESSARY VOTES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW SHEVARDNADZE SAW THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE RESOLUTION. WE NEEDED TO USE THE PAUSE OF GOODWILL TO STRESS TO THE IRAQIS THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT IT COULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO ADDRESS THIS VERY PROBLEM AND IN A PRELIMINARY WAY TO GIVE ATTENTION TO WHAT HE CALLED THE ARAB FACTOR. SOME ARAB COUNTRIES TOOK A FIRM STAND AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. OTHERS

WERE HESITANT. A VERY FEW SUPPORTED HIM. SO WE SHOULD ALL DEPLOY A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS WAS THE MESSAGE FROM THE RECENT VISITS TO THE REGION BY SOVIET ENVOYS. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO THOUGHT THAT WHAT HE CALLED THE EUROPEAN FACTOR HAD TO BE USED VERY INTENSIVELY. HE KNEW THAT BRITAIN HAD NEW IDEAS, THE ITALIANS TOO. AT THE VERY LEAST WE HAD TO BEGIN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON ARAB/ISRAEL ON THE LINES DISCUSSED BY THE PERMANENT FIVE AT THEIR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO DELAY.

4. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT TURKEY'S POSITION WAS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. IN PRINCIPLE SHE WAS TAKING THE CORRECT STAND, BUT GEOPOLITICALLY HER SITUATION WAS SUCH THAT SHE COULD DO MORE TO INFLUENCE IRAQ AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE HER TO DO SO. SHEVARDNADZE THOUGHT THAT IRAN WAS TAKING A DECENT STAND. THE KEY POINT WAS THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO AVERT A MILITARY CLASH IF WE EXERTED OURSELVES TO MAKE IRAQ LEAVE KUWAIT.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. SHEVARDNADZE'S IDEAS WERE INTERESTING. A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD BE MUCH MORE FRUITFUL IF ALL HAD VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION. THERE COULD BE SOME DIFFICULTY IF THE CHINESE HAD ABSTAINED. WE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD HAVE A ROLE AS UNIQUE INTERPRETER OF UN RESOLUTIONS. HE HAD BEEN REBUFFED IN SEPTEMBER. BUT THAT HAD PERHAPS BEEN TOO EARLY IN THE PROCESS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO MAKE A FURTHER EFFORT. ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IN THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENTS BEFORE AND WOULD NO DOUBT DO SO AGAIN AT ITS DECEMBER MEETING. AS HAD EMERGED CLEARLY AT THE LUNCH IN SEPTEMBER MUCH OF THE DIFFICULTY LAY IN WASHINGTON. THE U S ADMINISTRATION WAS ANXIOUS TO KEEP AMERICAN OPINION UNITED ON THE GULF AND DID NOT WANT TO ANTAGONISE IT BY THE STANCE THEY TOOK OVER ARAB/ISRAEL. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A FACTOR BUT HE HAD NOTED SOME NUANCES IN THE AMERICAN POSITION. THE FIVE SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSULT THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS. A MEETING OF THE 5 TO PREPARE THE GROUND NEED NOT BE HIGH PROFILE. BUT WE SHOULD NOT LET SADDAM HUSSEIN CAPITALISE ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE SHOULD BUILD ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TACKLE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, ALBEIT AT A LATER STAGE. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO THINK ABOUT THE PROCEDURE. WE HAD TO SHOW THE ARABS WE WERE SERIOUS AND NOT JUST PLAYING WITH WORDS. WE ALSO NEEDED TO WORK ON THE PLO. COULD THE RUSSIANS USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE PLO TO PERSUADE THEM TO ABANDON THEIR SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN? SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT STRANGE AS IT MIGHT SEEM THERE WAS SOME LOGIC IN ARAFAT'S POSITION:

HE WAS ISOLATED AND SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS SETTING HIMSELF UP AS HIS DEFENDER. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD DO SOME WORK ON ARAFAT BUT THEY WOULD NEED TO SHOW HIM THAT THERE WAS A LONG TERM PROSPECT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ARAFAT COULD FIND SOME FORM OF WORDS WHICH WOULD HELP THE U S RESUME THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE HAD SOME PLANS IN THIS RESPECT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE DOUBTED WHETHER TURKEY WOULD COME VERY FAR WITH US ON MILITARY ACTION. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE MILITARY ACTION IN MIND. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TURKS WERE IN A POSITION TO TALK VERY FRANKLY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD ALL SEEK TO DO JUST THAT AND CONVINCED SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE IRAQ WAS BY LEAVING KUWAIT. TURKEY HAD A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ALL THIS. HER POSITION WAS ONE TO WHICH IRAQ WAS VERY SENSITIVE. SO AFTER THE VOTE TODAY WE SHOULD ALL BEGIN THINKING ABOUT WHAT ACTION WE COULD TAKE.

#### SOVIET INTERNAL

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET INTERNAL SCENE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT TO STABILISE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEED A YEAR, A YEAR AND A HALF, OR TWO YEARS. THE PLAN OF ACTION WAS CLEAR. THE MAIN SHORTAGE WAS TIME. BUT THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC MOOD AND A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER. PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS ACTION AND NOT DEMAGOGUERY THAT WAS NEEDED. AS REGARDS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLICS AND THE NEW LAW ATTITUDES DIFFERED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE CONCLUDED WITH RUSSIA, AZERBAIJAN, KAZAKHSTAN AND BYELORUSSIA. THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS WITH OTHER REPUBLICS. PROGRESS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE STEP BY STEP BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON THE BASIS OF ONE STANDARD FOR ALL THE REPUBLICS.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED THE SORT OF HELP WE COULD GIVE FROM THE KNOW HOW FUND AND REFERRED TO THE DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE ROME EUROPEAN COUNCIL. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS EXPECTING A GREAT DEAL FROM THAT MEETING. THEY NEEDED A LOT OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER PARTNERS. THE STABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL OF EUROPE. TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH AN UNSTABLE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE COUNTRY WAS VAST. GIVEN ITS MULTI ETHNIC COMPOSITION IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THE SOVIET UNION WHOLE AND INTEGRAL. SOME PEOPLE HAD SAID THAT LATVIA AND ESTONIA HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION SO WHY NOT LET THEM GO NOW? BUT 49 PER CENT OF THE LATVIAN POPULATION WAS RUSSIAN. OF THE 1.4 MILLION PEOPLE IN ESTONIA 400,000



WERE RUSSIAN SPEAKERS AND THEY WERE THE BEST ORGANISED. WITHDRAWAL WOULD MEAN A CIVIL WAR THERE. IN MOLDAVIA THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN SPEAKERS WAS NOT THAT GREAT. BUT THE MOVEMENT THAT HAD BEEN STARTED THERE HAD PUT THE WHOLE REPUBLIC IN TURMOIL AND IT WAS PROVING VERY DIFFICULT TO CALM IT DOWN. IN KAZAKHSTAN ONLY 40 PER CENT WERE KAZAKS. SIMILAR FIGURES APPLIED IN OTHER REPUBLICS. 60 MILLION PEOPLE LIVED OUTSIDE THEIR ETHNIC REPUBLICS. IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT FIND UNITY LOOK WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN YUGOSLAVIA, THE BALKANS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA? PRESIDENT HAVAL WANTED RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE POSITION OF SLOVAKIA? WHAT ABOUT SPAIN? ONCE DISINTEGRATION SET IN NOTHING WOULD BE LEFT OF THE PARIS TREATY. HE WAS PAINTING A GLOOMY PICTURE. IT WOULD NOT BE AS BAD AS THAT. BUT THOSE WERE THE DANGERS.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE THREE BALTIC REPUBLICS DID HAVE A DIFFERENT HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BASIS. BUT WE URGED THEIR LEADERS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES. THERE WAS NO WESTERN INTEREST IN FORMENTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS. IT WAS IN OUR INTERESTS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUCCEED.

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21(A-B)

Support on Gulf.

PRIME MINISTER

HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS

The attached note by Sir Robin Butler sets out proposals for Ministerial handling of the Gulf crisis. He hopes to discuss it with you later this morning.

The main points are:

- add (PG)*
- Tab*
- Committee Structure. Your predecessor ran the Gulf crisis through an informal group of Ministers. She chaired it, and the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff were members. The Energy Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretary and the Chairman of the JIC were invited to attend. I did the meeting brief and the minutes. The purpose was to maintain the highest possible degree of secrecy.

There are two points to be settled:

- NO*  
*- as now.*
- do you want to change the membership? The main question is over the Energy Secretary. Although there is of course an oil interest, he was there mainly for political balance. You will want to consider whether there is anyone you wish to add.
  - are you happy to see the group transformed into a regular Cabinet Sub-Committee, serviced by Cabinet Office staff rather than by me?
  - Contacts with the US Administration

Because of secrecy constraints we have hitherto stuck to very restricted channels of communication with the

SECRET

President

United States Administration on the most sensitive issues: Defence Secretary to Secretary Cheney, CDS to General Powell, me to General Scowcroft in the White House. I have a special direct and secure telephone to General Scowcroft. Sir Robin proposes that the Ambassador in Washington should be made the main channel for conveying messages to the White House and other parts of the US Administration. It would be a pity to sacrifice the direct No.10-White House link: not least because the White House like it. But I suppose the two channels could run in tandem.

✓

- Military Presentation: It is suggested that you should receive a presentation on the military aspects of the Gulf crisis early on. Arrangements are already in hand for this.

Yes

✓

Visit to Washington. It is recommended that you should pay a one-day visit to Washington soon to meet the President. You have already agreed this. I am discussing Friday 21 December with the White House.

- Visit to the Gulf. Sir Robin suggests you should consider a pre-Christmas visit to our forces in the Gulf. You have decided against this.

~~Yes~~

- Daily Routine if there is a war. There is a proposed time-table for the conduct of affairs in the event of a war. Your proposed involvement would be to chair a daily meeting of the Ministerial Group from 1030-1130.

✓

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

30 November 1990

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER: IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BAKER SAID THE POLITICAL MOOD OF THE ADMINISTRATION WAS FIRM. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR OPTIONS ON DATES FOR THE MILITARY OPTION. THESE WOULD RANGE FROM MID JANUARY TO MID FEBRUARY. BAKER CONFIRMED A THREE WEEK BOMBING CAMPAIGN WOULD BE NECESSARY. BAKER PROPOSES A VISIT TO LONDON AROUND THE TIME OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (17 -18 DECEMBER) TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER. BAKER CONFIRMS THAT AMERICANS IN KUWAIT CAN HOLD OUT UNTIL JANUARY. SOME FORM OF EVACUATION OR SUPPLY MISSION NOT RULED OUT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH JIM BAKER IN NEW YORK BEFORE A WIDER DISCUSSION WHICH IS COVERED IN MIFT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL REPORT MORE FULLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE END OF THE DAY.

MOOD OF THE ADMINISTRATION

3. BAKER SAID WE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH WAS RESOLUTE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO MRS THATCHER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AT THE WEEKEND WHICH HAD CONVEYED JUST THAT IMPRESSION. BAKER WAS PLEASED WITH THE WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL TODAY WHICH HAD TAKEN CONGRESS TO TASK, SAYING THAT NOW THAT CONGRESS WAS ABOUT TO GET WHAT IT HAD ALWAYS WANTED - A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORISING FORCE - IT SHOULD NOT TRY TO ADD NEW CONDITIONS. MR BAKER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STILL HAD PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESSIONAL OPINION BUT HE WAS GENERALLY UPBEAT.

DATES FOR MILITARY OPTION

4. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR OPTIONS ON DATES FOR THE START OF THE MILITARY OPTION. THESE WOULD RANGE FROM MID JANUARY TO MID FEBRUARY, ANYTHING BEFORE 15 JANUARY BEING BLOCKED

PAGE 1  
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OFF BY TODAY'S EXPECTED RESOLUTION. BAKER CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A THREE WEEK BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND THAT THIS WAS NECESSARY. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO GET PUBLIC SUPPORT IF THERE WERE AIR BOMBARDMENT BEFORE ACTION ON THE GROUND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED AT THE IMPACT OF A THREE WEEK BOMBING CAMPAIGN WITH HOSTAGES AND OTHER CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AS RECORDED BY THE MEDIA. BAKER SAID THAT ONE OF THE FIRST OBJECTIVES WAS TO TAKE OUT TV TRANSMISSION CAPACITY. THE U S HAD SOPHISTICATED, THOUGH UNTRIED, KIT FOR THIS PURPOSE. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT BAKER WAS TALKING ABOUT TAKING OUT NOT JUST THE IRAQI TRANSMITTERS BUT WHATEVER GROUND STATION IS NEEDED FOR BROADCAST BY THE TELEVISION CHANNELS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EXPERT ADVICE ON THIS).

## VISIT TO LONDON

5. BAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE COMING TO BRUSSELS FOR THE NAC ON 17 -18 DECEMBER. HE ASKED IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE CAME TO LONDON FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE U S WANTED TO CONTINUE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH US. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSULT THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD INDEED BE USEFUL.

## MISSIONS IN KUWAIT CITY

6. BAKER SAID THAT THE MILITARY WERE CLEAR THERE WAS NO EASY WAY TO HAVE A DELTA FORCE OPERATION FOR THE U S EMBASSY SEPARATE FROM THE MAIN MILITARY OPTION. BUT A RED CROSS HELICOPTER MISSION FOR SUPPLY OR EVACUATION WAS NOT RULED OUT., THOUGH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. NO DECISIONS WERE, HOWEVER, NEEDED JUST YET AND NONE HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE AMERICANS IN KUWAIT COULD LAST OUT UNTIL EARLY JANUARY.

7. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NUMBER 10.

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(VIA TUBE H29)

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Ref. A090/2873

MR POWELL

*20 B la-gh*

*Pl. a/c for For. Sec.*

*(w-lated) and COS/Tom Laps*

*voice log. 4.2.12*

Handling of the Gulf Crisis

I am putting in to the Prime Minister proposals for Cabinet Committees, for discussion with him tomorrow. There are some additional aspects of the handling of the Gulf crisis, which I cover in this separate note.

Committee Machinery

2. I propose that OD(G) - or as it will be OPD(G) - should continue to be the inner body for discussions on the Gulf crisis. The Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff should continue as members; and the Prime Minister will want to consider whether, in the new circumstances, he wants to ask the Energy Secretary to remain a member.

3. I suggest that the Attorney General and the Chairman of the JIC should continue to be asked to attend, and I should like the Committee in future to operate like a normal Cabinet Committee, with briefing provided by the Cabinet Office and minutes taken by the Secretariat. For this purpose, I propose that Mr Appleyard and I attend as Secretaries.

4. I also suggest that the official group (AHGG) which meets in the Cabinet Office on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays with a Ministerial Chairman, to communicate instructions, share problems and chase progress should continue as the means of instituting and chasing action.

*Archive Hamilton*

Distribution of Documents

5. I should like to suggest a closed list of people to whom the



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most sensitive documents on the Gulf crisis should be available.  
It should be as follows:

No 10 - Prime Minister, Sir Percy Cradock and yourself;

Cabinet Office - Mr Appleyard and myself;

FCO - Foreign Secretary, Sir Patrick Wright, Mr Broomfield and Mr Fairweather;

MOD - Defence Secretary, Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Michael Quinlan, Air Marshal Hayr and Mr Bevan;

The restrictive rules agreed by Mrs Thatcher on circulation of both OPD(G) papers and the minutes of the Cabinet Office Group (AHGG) should be maintained.

#### Contacts with the United States Government

6. With the strong support of the FCO, I propose that HM Ambassador in Washington should be brought into the circle of confidentiality and used for conveying messages from the Prime Minister and others to the White House and other parts of the Administration. We have not hitherto made use of this on the spot means of gaining access to the thinking of the US Administration and discussing with them.

#### Military Presentation

7. I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to receive a British military presentation, which it would be convenient to give to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary at the same time, perhaps at a meeting of OPD(G) next week. Subsequently, the Prime Minister might wish to have a military briefing from a senior US Commander, either here or in Washington.



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8. I recommend that the Prime Minister should pay a very early visit to Washington, even if only for a day via Concorde, to make personal contact with the President and assure the United States Government of the continued support of the new administration. The Prime Minister may also want to consider whether he should pay a pre-Christmas visit to our forces in the Gulf.

✓  
 Reply  
 P. Harl. 1

Machinery in the event of Hostilities

9. It is not necessary yet to consider firmly the handling of hostilities, but, on the basis of the handling of the Falklands operation, I have agreed a preliminary basis with the Chiefs of Staff, MOD and FCO, that the daily outline might be as follows:

0600	CIG to discuss the daily Immediate Assessment (IA).
0715/0730	Assessments Staff compiles the IA in the light of the CIG.
0800	Whitehall closed-circuit TV briefing begins with Assessments Staff giving conclusions of the IA, followed by FCO and DIS and OPS briefings.
0800-0815	Chiefs of Staff meet. They could listen to the oral briefing. They will have advanced copies.
0830	Clean advanced copies will be ready for distribution to Ministers.
0900	Cabinet Secretary's morning meeting with FCO, MOD, CDS and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to identify issues for OPD(G).
1030	OPD(G)
1130	Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group in the Cabinet Office to inform and commission action on Ministers' decisions at OPD(G).





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- 1600 Meeting of the JIC to consider developments and to discuss with the Assessments Staff points to be pursued in the Immediate Assessment of the following morning.
- 1800 Daily close of play meeting held by Mr Appleyard in the FCO to consider developments and identify issues for the following morning.

I propose that all these meetings should take place in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room, unless the Prime Minister wished to continue to take OPD(G) in the Cabinet Room.

Issues to be Settled on the Gulf

- 10. The Prime Minister might like to see the attached note of forthcoming issues on the Gulf which will need to be resolved in the period ahead.
11. I hope that there will be an opportunity to discuss these matters with the Prime Minister at the meeting with him tomorrow morning.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

29 November 1990

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GULF CRISIS: DECISION CHECKLIST

CURRENT ISSUES

1. Military Presentation

It would be very useful for the Prime Minister to have a military presentation as soon as possible from the Chief of the Defence Staff and Air Chief Marshal Hine on the present balance of forces in the Gulf and the contingency planning for hostilities, including duration, tactical pattern and likely casualties. (Action: No 10 and MoD Private Offices to arrange) ✓

2. BW immunisation policy

Ministers will need to decide by early December whether to proceed with immunisation of British forces in the Gulf, taking into account US policy and the lack of sufficient vaccine for civilians and other nations. We have enough vaccine for our own troops but the US Government does not have enough for all its troops and is unwilling to agree to a unilateral UK programme. (Action: papers with Defence Secretary) ✓

*It is not  
to use this  
vaccine as  
some army  
is it possible.*

3. Planning of UK participation in offensive operations

We need to reach agreement with the US Government on strategic and military objectives and on the guidance to military commanders, including targetting. (Action: Anglo-American discussions in week of 10 December: recommendations to Ministers thereafter) ✓

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4. Military plans in relation to hostages/detainees

We need to co-ordinate with the US Government plans for the evacuation of hostages released in conventional operations and on the scope for special extraction operations. ✓

(Action: recommendations to Ministers after Anglo-American discussions)

5. Medical support

We should develop rapidly plans for the greater use of NHS to receive casualties and/or the call-out of TA and other volunteer medical staff. (Action: MoD currently preparing papers) ✓

6. Consular

We should decide very soon what advice we give to the wives of hostages who want to visit their husbands for Christmas. ✓  
(Action: FCO to advise shortly)

DECISIONS BEFORE CHRISTMAS

1. Visits to Washington/Gulf

The Prime Minister will wish to decide whether/when he would like to visit Washington (before or after the European Council on 14-15 December?), and the troops in the Gulf. The visit to the Gulf ought to take place before mid-January. (Action: Prime Minister to decide)

*Review  
For. Sec.  
? on way back from  
Camp David?*

2. Consular advice

We will have to decide when to move to giving strong advice to dependents and non-essential workers to leave the area (Phase II warning). The precise geographic scope of the

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warning needs to be considered as well as the timing (i.e. which Gulf States and whether Israel, Yemen or Jordan are included). (Action: FCO to advise soon)

*likely up  
and to  
co-ordinate with  
other countries  
on this - not act unilaterally*

3. Gas masks

We will also need to decide when gas masks should be issued to British citizens in the war risk zone. (Action: FCO to advise soon) ✓

4. Kuwait

We shall soon have to come to a decision on when we close the Embassy in Kuwait, and what advice we give at the same time to British citizens still hiding in Kuwait. (Action: FCO to advise in 2 weeks) ✓

EARLY JANUARY

1. Rules of Engagement

We will need agreed Rules of Engagement for US and UK forces for general hostilities. (Action: MOD to advise in the next 2-3 weeks) ✓

2. British Armoured Division

We will need a clear idea, agreed with the US forces, of the precise role of the new British Armoured Division, by the beginning of January, or sooner if possible. (Action: as above) ✓

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER: MAIN  
MEETING

SUMMARY

1. BAKER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREE ON NEED FOR A FOLLOW UP MESSAGE TO IRAQ AFTER ADOPTION OF TODAY'S RESOLUTION, AND ON A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. BAKER RAISES POSSIBILITY OF MEETING BETWEEN THE FIVE AND TARIQ AZIZ. SECRETARY OF STATE BRIEFS BAKER ON OUR PLANS TO WARN BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE THE DANGER AREA. SOME U S RESERVATIONS. BAKER BELIEVES ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REMAINS GENERALLY SOUND BUT IS VERY HOSTILE TO PROPOSED UN RESOLUTION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SECRETARY OF STATE ARGUES THE CASE FOR A U S ABSTENTION.

DETAIL

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONGRATULATED BAKER ON ALL HE HAD DONE TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR TODAY'S RESOLUTION. BAKER SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN OUTSTANDING IN HIS EFFORTS TO GET THE CHINESE AND THE CUBANS ON BOARD. THE SAUDIS, EGYPTIANS AND KUWAITIS HAD ALSO WEIGHED IN WITH THE CHINESE. HE THOUGHT THE CHINESE WOULD PROBABLY ABSTAIN.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE QUESTION OF SOME KIND OF FOLLOW UP TO THE RESOLUTION. IN THEIR EARLIER PRIVATE DISCUSSION BAKER HAD SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS WITH TARIQ AZIZ IF ALL FIVE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF ALL FIVE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR. OTHERWISE THE IRAQIS WOULD DRIVE WEDGES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER BOTH AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A ROLE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. PICKERING (U S AMBASSADOR TO THE UN) SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHO WAS VERY UNWILLING TO BE THE MAN WHO WAS SENT TO MAKE PEACE AND FAILED, LEADING INEVITABLY TO WAR. BUT PICKERING THOUGHT THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR COULD PROBABLY BE PERSUADED. BAKER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT SOME INVOLVEMENT BY THE

PAGE 1  
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SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO WOULD ANYWAY FORMALLY HAVE TO TRANSMIT THE RESOLUTION TO THE IRAQIS, WAS DESIRABLE.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE SHOULD PERHAPS MAKE IT CLEARER THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DID HAVE THE OPTION OF SAVING HIS OWN SKIN. WE HAD TALKED PUBLICLY ABOUT HIS HAVING THE OPTION TO CHOOSE PEACE, BUT WE HAD NEVER SAID THAT IF HE WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT HE WOULD NOT GET CLOBBERED. KIMITT NOTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN APPEARED CONSTANTLY TO BE ASKING WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPLIANCE WOULD BE. BAKER SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TO MAINTAIN E.G. THE ARMS EMBARGO, BUT RESOLUTION 660 HAD TALKED ABOUT DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. WE COULD FIND SOME FORM OF WORDS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS ONE THING TO SAY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NOT BE HIT IF HE COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS. IT WAS ANOTHER TO GO BACK TO RESOLUTION 660 AND THE IMPLICATION THAT WE COULD GET INTO SOME SORT OF DETAILED NEGOTIATION ABOUT GUARANTEES OF ACCESS TO THE SEA ETC. SIR DAVID HANNAY SAID THAT WE MIGHT FIND A FORMULATION MAKING CLEAR THAT THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AUTHORISED THE USE OF FORCE BUT THAT THE NEED FOR FORCE WOULD FALL AWAY IF THERE WAS WITHDRAWAL AND COMPLIANCE.

✓ 5. THE DISCUSSION DID NOT REACH A FIRM CONCLUSION BUT BAKER CLEARLY AGREED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT SOME SORT OF STATEMENT THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT BE HIT IF THEY COMPLIED WITH UN RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

#### DEPENDENTS

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESCRIBED OUR RECENT NOTIFICATION TO PEOPLE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE, BAHRAIN AND QATAR NOT TO BRING THEIR CHILDREN OUT FOR THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS. IN FACT WE HAD A TOTAL OF 25,000 PEOPLE IN THE WAR RISK AREA AND THEIR EVACUATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF WE HAD TO START EVACUATING THEM IN A NEAR WAR SITUATION. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DO IT GRADUALLY. BAKER AND KIMITT SAID THIS WAS AN ISSUE THE U S WOULD NEED TO EXAMINE. KIMITT IN PARTICULAR WAS CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE ANY DRAW DOWN IN A WAY WHICH DID NOT FOR EXAMPLE HAVE ALL THE ARAMCO EMPLOYEES LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA, WITH OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL PRODUCTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE.

#### ISRAELI ATTITUDES

7. BAKER SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE TAKING THINGS VERY WELL, THOUGH THEY WERE NATURALLY NERVOUS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD REPORTED THE IRAQIS AS SAYING THAT IF THEY WERE ATTACKED THEY WOULD HIT ISRAEL FIRST. THE

U S WAS VERY ANXIOUS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THERE WAS A STRIKE AGAINST ISRAEL.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT U S ATTITUDES TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. PICKERING SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SCOPE TO NEGOTIATE ON THE RESOLUTION, BUT BAKER TOOK A HARDER LINE. ALL THE FOCUS NOW SHOULD BE ON THE GULF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW MUCH HARM WOULD BE DONE IN ARAB CAPITALS IN PARTICULAR IF THE U S VETOED. BAKER ARGUED WITH SOME FORCE THAT THOSE WHO WANTED TO SOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM ON THE BACK OF THE GULF ISSUE WERE MAKING A BIG MISTAKE. THERE WERE 400,000 AMERICAN LIVES AT STAKE. HAVING A RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS INEVITABLY MAKING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE 2 ISSUES. THERE WAS AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT AT STAKE OVER THE NEXT 6 - 8 WEEKS. HE WOULD HATE TO SEE THE ISRAELIS COME OUT OF THEIR BOX DURING THAT PERIOD. HE REPEATED THE ARGUMENTS HE HAD USED BEFORE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE U S ADMINISTRATION TO FIND THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE DEGREE OF UNPOPULARITY THEY HAD BEEN READY TO COURT AT HOME. IF, AFTER THE GULF PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED, WE NEEDED TO HAMMER SOMETHING OUT THE U S WOULD BE FAIRLY RESPONSIVE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED BAKER TO CONSIDER WHETHER A RESOLUTION INVOLVING THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER WHO WOULD NOT GO TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BUT WOULD SIT IN NEW YORK WORKING UP REPORTS WAS ONE ON WHICH THE AMERICANS COULD ABSTAIN. BAKER SAID THAT WITH SO MUCH AT STAKE HE HOPED RATHER THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER A VETO.

9. GORE-BOOTH POINTED OUT THE DANGERS OF CREATING LINKAGE THE OTHER WAY. WE MUST DO SOMETHING ON THIS ISSUE. BAKER DISAGREED. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO PUSH THE RESOLUTION AWAY. WE COULD STILL GENERATE SUFFICIENT VOTES TO KICK IT OVER TO JANUARY. HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE U S SHOULD VETO OR NOT.

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
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# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3439</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Cradock to Lowell dated 28 November 1990</i> <i>with attachment</i>	
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STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
28 NOVEMBER

With permission Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on developments in the Middle East since my statement on 24 October.

The international coalition is holding firm. Our objectives remain: the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; and the release of all hostages. President Saddam Hussain continues to show little sign that he intends to comply with the will of the international community and withdraw. He continues to rebuff the United Nations, to strengthen his military position in Kuwait, to destroy Kuwait's fabric and national identity, and to manipulate the fate of British and other citizens trapped in Iraq and Kuwait.

Only by intensifying all the pressures at our disposal - diplomatic, economic and military - can we persuade Saddam Hussain that he has no alternative to withdrawal. Sanctions are being applied rigorously. We hope that the existing pressures will be sufficient to persuade Saddam Hussain to withdraw. If they are not sufficient we need to convince Saddam that the military option is a serious

For that military option to be fully credible, the international community must show that it has the political will to exercise it. The Security Council is expected to meet at Ministerial level within the next few days and vote on a resolution authorising "all necessary means" - that is to say including force - to be used to

/ensure

ensure Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolution 660 and later resolutions. The resolution will include a date - probably in the first half of January - by which time Iraq is required to comply in full with these resolutions. It does not follow from this that military action will follow immediately thereafter - nor indeed that military action will necessarily take place at all. Rather, the purpose of the grace period is to allow Saddam Hussein an opportunity in which he can safely withdraw from Kuwait and release the hostages. If he does not do so, he must face the possibility of military action and certain defeat.

We remain anxious for the well being of the many hundreds of British hostages who remain in Iraq and Kuwait. Some have been released through the intervention of political figures and relatives. We understand the suffering of the families and the humanitarian motives of those who go to Iraq. But Saddam Hussain exploits these visits for his own unacceptable ends. The international community is united in resisting that blackmail.

under constant review our advice to British communities in other parts of the Gulf. We advise those living in the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain with children in Britain not to bring them to the area, but to spend the Christmas holiday here, and to remain outside the Gulf until the situation becomes clearer. This does not mean that we foresee hostilities around that time: but it is sensible to minimise the number of dependents when we are entering such a critical phase.

I am able to report some positive political steps. On 27 September we announced the resumption of relations with Iran. Today I can tell the House that we are resuming relations with Syria with immediate effect. The respective heads of the Interests Sections in London and Damascus will be Charges d'Affaires pending the exchange, as soon as practicable, of Ambassadors. We have received from the Syrian Government assurances that Syria will continue its strenuous efforts to obtain the release of Western, including British, hostages in Lebanon and confirmation that Syria rejects acts of international terrorism and will take action against the perpetrators of such acts which are supported by convincing evidence. We have also had a confidential account of the Syrian position on the Hindawi affair. I am glad that it has proved possible to overcome the differences between the UK and Syria.

a:\gulf

The Gulf

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken of a decade of opportunities at home and in Europe. But there is one black cloud, a very black one indeed. That is Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Nothing can justify it.

Nor Iraq's brutal treatment of the Kuwaiti people.

Nor Saddam Hussain's detention of hundreds of British hostages, causing such suffering and anxiety to their families. Indeed to all of us.

Iraq is going to have to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam Hussain can do it the peaceful way. He simply has to obey the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Our policy of sanctions and other pressures is intended to persuade him that there is no alternative to withdrawal.

But if that fails, there is another way. The military option. We do not want to use it. But the world community is losing patience.

This evening Douglas Hurd is with other Foreign Ministers at the United Nations Security Council in New York. If all goes well, they will agree a further resolution. It will authorise use of "all necessary means" - and that includes force - if Iraq does not withdraw by early January.

That resolution will give Saddam Hussain a last chance to leave peacefully and without conditions. We hope he takes it.

But we are not bluffing. If he does not leave Kuwait, he must reckon with certain defeat. At very heavy cost.


There is nothing aggressive about our country, Mr. Chairman. No lust for war. But we have learned from the past. Some principles are so important they must be defended.

And that's what is at stake in the Gulf. The right of a country, however small, to live in peace and keep its independence. If you allow that principle to be over-turned we shall all be at risk. And our hopes for a better and safer world will be put in jeopardy.

That's why we have sent our forces to the Gulf. To stand alongside our Arab, American and European allies. To ensure that international law is upheld: and that aggression does not succeed.

We shall do whatever is necessary. Because we are Britain. And that is our way.

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	<i>REM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	<i>3439</i>	
Extract details: <i>letter and enclosures from Wall to Powell dated 28 November 1990 with attachment</i>		
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*cepk*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 32/8S

27<sup>th</sup> November 1990

*Dear Jeremy,*

*COB  
3-7/Ki*

IRAQ; PREMIUM REFUNDS

*filed RT33*

The Secretary of State for Defence has seen the letter dated 8th November from the Minister for Trade. He has no comment to make since he understands that none of the 145 contracts likely to be affected is for defence equipment.


2. I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Stephen Wall (FCO), Andrew Walker (DTI) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*

*B H Wells*

(B H WELLS)  
Private Secretary

Jeremy Heywood Esq  
PS/Chief Secretary to the Treasury



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PRIME MINISTER

MIDDLE EAST

I am afraid I misinformed you: the Foreign Secretary is intending to make a statement on the Middle East tomorrow, not just answer questions. It seems there was considerable pressure in the House yesterday, with Tam Dalyell demanding a S020 debate, and the Speaker  minded to grant it. Mr. Kaufman has been pressing today for a statement, and the Lord President is content. The Foreign Secretary is therefore intending to go ahead.

cap

ms

CHARLES POWELL  
27 November 1990

C:\FOREIGN\MIDDLEEAST

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

27 November 1990

**OMAN/IRAQ**

I saw Brigadier Landon on other business today. He had just returned from Oman, where he had been staying with the Sultan, and gave me an account of the Sultan's meeting with Tariq Aziz. This corresponded in almost every detail with the account which Yusuf Alawi gave to our Ambassador, so I will not repeat it at any length. Tariq Aziz had been vehement about the Al Sabah family and quoted Saddam Hussain as saying that he would be prepared to crawl all the way from Baghdad to Kuwait City for a chance of despatching them once and for all. Tariq Aziz had confirmed what we have heard from other sources, namely that if there was a conflict, Iraq would strike first at Israel, and would generally cause as much damage as possible. They would flood the Gulf with oil, and attack Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Syria. Iraq could afford to lose people, but did not believe the Americans could.

I asked how the new military arrangements were functioning. Landon thought that General Baskervyle-Glegg was doing well but was frustrated by the continuing presence of Erik Bennett, who constantly interposed himself between the General and the Sultan.

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C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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OF 270253Z NOVEMBER 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

MY TELNO 2086 AND YOUR TELNO 989: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. FIVE AGREE TEXT OF DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON ACCOMPANYING NATIONAL STATEMENTS (INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED DESKBY 271430Z. DRAFT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED TO OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET AGAIN AS AGREED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 26 NOVEMBER.

3. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE U S DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. IT WOULD PREFER THE DATE CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION TO BE 15 JANUARY. THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE MODIFIED SLIGHTLY TO REMOVE THE DEADLINE FROM THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. THIS WOULD HELP GIVE THE IRAQIS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OFFERED THEM A PEACEFUL WAY OUT.

4. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID THAT MOSCOW WAS NOW HAPPY WITH THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION, SUBJECT TO THE INCLUSION IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE WORDS 'AS A PAUSE OF GOOD WILL'. THESE WERE THE WORDS THAT GORBACHEV HAD USED IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER LEADERS IN PARIS. AFTER DISCUSSION THIS WAS ACCEPTED, ALONG WITH BALANCING LANGUAGE WHICH I HAD PROPOSED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT DURING THIS PAUSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MAINTAIN ALL ITS PREVIOUS DECISIONS. OTHER SMALL CHANGES WERE MADE.

5. ON THE ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT OF POLICY IT WAS AGREED AD REFERENDUM THAT THE CHAPEAU SHOULD DISAPPEAR, WITH THE REFERENCE TO 'NO ADVERSE CHANGES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES' INSTEAD INCORPORATED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH. VORONTSOV SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO INSERT A REFERENCE IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH TO POSSIBLE USE BY IRAQ OF 'OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION'. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) AND BLANC

BOTH OBJECTED. BLANC IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICY. PICKERING SAID THAT THE REFERENCE RAISED LONG STANDING US/SOVIET DIFFERENCES ABOUT FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WERE NOT GOING TO BE RESOLVED IN THIS CONTEXT. THE REFERENCE TO SUCH WEAPONS ALSO HAD TO BE DISSOCIATED FROM THE REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925. IT WAS LEFT THAT INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE POINTS WOULD BE SOUGHT OVERNIGHT. POLITICAL COUNSELLORS WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 271500Z TO TACKLE THE REMAINING PROBLEMS OF WORDING. WE ARE FAXING AN ANNOTATED TEXT TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND UND AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 271430Z.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD SEEK FINAL CLEARANCE FROM OUR GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION (TELECONS WITH FAIRWEATHER AND ELDON REFER). AND THEN BRIEF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. LI (CHINA) DEMURRED WHEN PICKERING SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS 'BROADLY ACCEPTED' BY THE FIVE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FORMULA 'CONSULTED UPON BY THE FIVE' SHOULD IF NECESSARY BE USED: ANY ENQUIRIES ABOUT THE POSITIONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL PERMANENT MEMBER SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE MEMBERS CONCERNED.

7. LATER IN THE AFTERNOON PICKERING, VORONTSOV AND I BRIEFED THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. PICKERING INTRODUCED THE TEXT. I DESCRIBED (ORALLY AND IN GENERAL TERMS) THE POINTS WHICH WOULD GO IN THE ACCOMPANYING NATIONAL STATEMENTS OF POLICY. VORONTSOV EXPRESSED THE SOVIET UNION'S FULL SUPPORT. HE DESCRIBED THE RESOLUTION AS ONE DIRECTED TO SOLVING THE GULF CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL POLITICAL MEANS. THE COUNCIL COULD NOT WAIT INDEFINITELY FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW: THERE MUST BE A BOTTOM LINE. THE REACTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED WAS MUTED AND THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO DISCUSSION. AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) ASKED POINTEDLY WHETHER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS SUBMITTED FOR OBSERVATION OR FOR INFORMATION: PICKERING SAID WE WERE SEEKING COMMENTS, NOT JUST PROVIDING INFORMATION. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) QUERIED THE ALTERNATIVE DATES IN THE TEXT. PICKERING EXPLAINED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PREFERENCE FOR 1 JANUARY, AND VORONTSOV THE SOVIET DESIRE TO GIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN A LITTLE MORE TIME.

8. PICKERING, VORONTSOV AND BLANC SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A SIMILAR BRIEFING TO THE NON-NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. ALL THREE WERE GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE, ALTHOUGH TORNUDD (FINLAND) ASKED SEARCHING QUESTIONS. BOTH TORNUDD AND FORTIER (CANADA) EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR THE LATER DEADLINE OF 15 JANUARY.

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INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, ACTOR

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YOUR TELNO 984 TO UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. PICKERING'S INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN CLEARED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND NOT BY SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER ALONE. A COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF A DEADLINE WAS SEEN AS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION ON BOARD AND TO CONTAIN SOVIET REQUESTS FOR FURTHER MODIFICATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.
2. ACCORDING TO CONTACTS IN BOTH STATE AND THE PENTAGON, THE DETAILS OF THIS RESOLUTION ARE BEING HANDLED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN WASHINGTON. HUGHES (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS) IS THE MOST SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIAL WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RAISE THIS EVENING. HE IS CONFIDENT OF TWO THINGS:
  - THAT THE MOST SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE MILITARY, ARE IN THE LOOP AND WILL HAVE FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBLE RISKS IMPLIED IN ANY DEADLINE SET: AND
  - THAT GENERAL SCHWARTZKOPF REMAINS CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO COPE WITH ANY PREEMPTIVE STRIKE SHOULD THIS OCCUR.
3. WOLFOWITZ (DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY AND PLANS) WAS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 23 NOVEMBER. HUGHES IS REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THE QUESTION OF A DEADLINE WAS ONE OF THE ISSUES RAISED AT THAT MEETING.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

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PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

MR P J WESTON

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR GOULDEN

~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~

[MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)]

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OF 260649Z NOVEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

YOUR TELNO 984: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DISCUSSION IN THE FIVE. AMERICANS PROPOSE REVISION OF OPERATIVE PARA 1 OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TO MEET RUSSIAN DESIRE FOR CLEARER TWO-TIER APPROACH. PROPOSED THAT OTHER SOVIET POINTS BE DEALT WITH IN SEPARATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MET AGAIN ON THE EVENING OF 25 NOVEMBER PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HE HAD REPORTED THE COMMENTS MADE BY PARTNERS AT THE EARLIER MEETING, AND IN PARTICULAR THE CONCERNS OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAW NO INSUPERABLE IMPEDIMENT TO AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET IDEA OF A TWO-STAGE PROCESS WAS WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER. HOWEVER THE IDEA OF SAYING NO FURTHER RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT WOULD BE PASSED DURING THE GRACE PERIOD RAISED SOME PROBLEMS: THE MESSAGE MIGHT BE PUT ACROSS BY SOME MEMBERS IN A DIFFERENT WAY, BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE TO COMMIT ITSELF. ON THE OTHER POINTS RAISED BY VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) HE HAD MUCH SYMPATHY BUT DID NOT WANT THE RESOLUTION TO STRAY TOO FAR FROM ITS CENTRAL THEME. IF SOME SUBSIDIARY THOUGHTS WERE INCLUDED THIS WOULD INVITE ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE OTHERS. PERHAPS THE POINTS COULD BE DEALT WITH IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ITSELF.

3. PICKERING THEN WENT THROUGH THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 2079). CHEMICAL WEAPONS MIGHT BE DEALT WITH BY REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925. THE POINT ABOUT NOT HARMING FOREIGN HOSTAGES HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE, BUT MIGHT BE LOOKED AT AGAIN. ALLOWING FOREIGN NATIONALS TO LEAVE IRAQ HAD ALREADY BEEN THE CENTRE-PIECE OF SCR 664.

4. I SAID THAT I DID NOT YET HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS CLEARED BY MINISTERS: I COULD COMMENT ONLY ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY TEXT EMERGING FROM OUR MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO MINISTERS OVERNIGHT. ON THE POINTS RAISED BY VORONTSOV WE TOO HAD

MUCH SYMPATHY BUT WERE DOUBTFUL ABOUT INCLUDING NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE RESOLUTION. WE WERE HOWEVER WILLING TO LOOK AT A RE-ORDERING OF PARAGRAPH ONE TO MAKE A TWO-TIER APPROACH CLEARER PROVIDED THAT IT STILL CONSTITUTED A CLEAR AUTHORISATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE. WE DID HOWEVER STILL HAVE A PROBLEM ABOUT THE WHOLE PRINCIPLE OF A DEADLINE. WE REMAINED DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF CREATING ARTIFICIAL TENSION AROUND A GIVEN DATE AND POSSIBLY INVITING PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION FROM THE IRAQIS. BUT IF THERE WAS TO BE A DEADLINE, 1 JANUARY WAS AS GOOD AS ANY. WE WERE PREPARED TO SAY IN DEBATE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER RESOLUTIONS, BUT IT MIGHT BE UNWISE TO SEEK A DECISION TO THIS EFFECT BY THE WHOLE COUNCIL.

5. LI (CHINA) SAID PEKING WAS STILL STUDYING THE TEXT. A DECISION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN HASTE. HE COULD NOT YET COMMENT. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE WOULD ONLY RECEIVE HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MORNING OF 26 NOVEMBER. BUT BOTH MADE CLEAR THAT THEY NEEDED TO PUT THE RESULT OF THE CURRENT U S/SOVIET EXCHANGES TO THEIR CAPITALS OVERNIGHT SO THAT THEY COULD BE IN A POSITION TO REACT BY THE NEXT MORNING.

6. THERE FOLLOWED A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THE POSSIBLE WAYS OF ACCOMMODATING SOVIET CONCERNS. VORONTSOV SAID HE AGREED THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE SHORT AND SHARP. BUT A WAY SHOULD BE FOUND OF INDICATING THAT DURING THE GRACE PERIOD THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT ADOPT ANY RESOLUTION IMPOSING NEW SANCTIONS OR TIGHTENING EXISTING ONES. (OTHERS POINTED OUT THAT EQUALLY THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF RELAXING EXISTING MEASURES.) THE POINT ABOUT A RESPONSE TO ANY MALTREATMENT OF HOSTAGES WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE, IN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR THE FIRST TIME TO INDICATE READINESS TO USE FORCE.

7. I EXPLAINED OUR DOUBTS ABOUT NUREMBERG-TYPE PROCEDURES. I SUGGESTED FURTHER EXPLORATION OF THE IDEA (DERIVED FROM PARA 2 III OF TUR) THAT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT MAKE SEPARATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS COVERING SOME OF THE SUBSIDIARY POINTS RAISED BY THE RUSSIANS. PICKERING EVENTUALLY PRODUCED A SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF THE RESOLUTION, INTRODUCING A TWO-STAGE APPROACH AND A DEADLINE OF 1 OR 15 JANUARY (TEXT IN MY FIRST IFT). HE ALSO PROPOSED THE FORM OF A POSSIBLE SERIES OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION A TEXT EMERGED, TO BE DESCRIBED AS 'ELEMENTS OF A STATEMENT OF POLICY' (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT). THIS WOULD MAKE CLEAR ITS STATUS AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT RATHER THAN A DEFINITION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES. IT MIGHT BE MADE IN IDENTICAL TERMS BY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS (PRESUMABLY EXCLUDING CHINA), AND BY ANY

OTHER COUNCIL MEMBER THAT WISHED TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE INITIATIVE.

8. WE AGREED TO TRANSMIT BOTH TEXTS TO CAPITALS OVERNIGHT AND TO MEET AGAIN AT 261430Z TO PURSUE OUR DISCUSSIONS.

COMMENT

9. ON OUR WAY OUT VORONTSOV TOLD ME HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT HE COULD NOW RIDE MOSCOW OFF ITS DESIRE TO FESTOON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH EXTRANEIOUS ELEMENTS. BUT THESE WERE OF GREAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPORTANCAE TO THE SOVIET UNION: THEY SHOULD ALSO BE WELCOME TO OTHERS SINCE THEY SIGNALLED A COMMITMENT TO POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. IN PUTTING FORWARD HIS TWO-TIER DRAFT PICKERING HAS HELPFULLY TAKEN UP OUR SUGGESTION (BERMAN'S MINUTE OF 23 NOVEMBER) THAT THE SCOPE OF THE TEXT NEEDED TO BE NARROWED A LITTLE. WE ASSUME THE REVISED TEXT WAS PUT FORWARD WITH WASHINGTON'S AGREEMENT. PICKERING ALSO SIGNALLED FAIRLY CLEARLY THAT A TWO-WEEK EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE TO 15 JANUARY WAS OBTAINABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. HE WAS READY TO RECOMMEND BOTH TEXTS THAT EMERGED FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS TO WASHINGTON. HE IS CLEARLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO DO ALL HE CAN TO BRING THE RUSSIANS FIRMLY ON BOARD.

11. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 261400Z.

HANNAY

YYYY

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MR GOULDEN  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)  
HD/AMD  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ISD(O)  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NPDD  
HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD  
HD/SECPOL D  
HD/UND  
HD/SCD  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
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CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
(CABINET OFFICE VIA TUBE H29)  
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
RESIDENT CLERK

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

26 November 1990

*Prime Minister*  
COP  
26/11

*Dear Charles,*

Iraq/Kuwait: Next steps at the United Nations

You will have seen the telegrams from UKMis New York covering the proposed resolution authorising use of force against Iraq.

The Foreign Secretary spoke to the US Secretary of State on the telephone this afternoon. Mr Baker made clear that a deadline in the resolution by which Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait was essential for Soviet support. He shared some of our reservations about including a deadline but thought that securing support was an overriding objective. The Foreign Secretary agreed. He and Mr Baker both thought that the deadline of 1 January was preferable to the deadline of 15 January canvassed by the Soviet Union. The first date was obviously a political deadline. The second looked too close to being a military deadline. Mr Baker made clear, however, that he would not die in the ditch on dates.

The Foreign Secretary has now sent authority to Sir David Hannay to work for a text on these lines. I enclose UKMis telno 2084 which gives the latest version of the operative paragraphs of the resolution.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (HMT) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Jws.*  
*Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 261600Z UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO

OF 261445Z NOV 90

INFO DESKBY 261600Z WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PARIS, MOSCOW AND PEKING

SECRETARY OF STATE'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY BAKER:

IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. The Secretary of State and Baker agree on two-stage resolution with deadline (preferably 1 January).

DETAIL

2. The Secretary of State telephoned Baker, who was in Houston this morning. The Secretary of State said we had in the past seen disadvantage in including a deadline in the UN resolution authorising the use of force. He assumed Baker had concluded that a deadline was necessary to secure support. Baker confirmed that a deadline was necessary for the Soviet Union who were crucial. The Russians felt strongly on the issue and we needed their positive vote or at worst abstention. A deadline would not hinder US military deployments. The Secretary of State said we had two concerns. The first was that a deadline would create excitement and hysteria, and the second that it might slightly increase the risk of a pre-emptive strike. Baker said both arguments were valid and had been weighed by the Americans. On

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J S WALL

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the other hand, apart from securing Soviet agreement, the inclusion of a deadline would enable others to rally to the resolution because the deadline involved a grace period. He reiterated that we would not get what we wanted without a deadline.

3. The Secretary of State said that the date of 1 January was preferable to the Soviet date of 15 January. Baker agreed but went on to say that in terms of US military preparations another couple of weeks slippage was possible even beyond the second date. The US were not therefore too concerned on this point and might concede 15 January in the end.

4. The Secretary of State said it was vital to avoid a further UN Security Council debate as a prelude to military action. We had some concern that the draft resolution was not watertight. Baker agreed that the second stage must not involve further meetings or decisions by the Security Council. The Russians had originally had in mind two separate resolutions and large part of the thinking behind the present two-stage approach was to avoid that. The Secretary of State said that we could agree to go ahead on this basis. The cleaner and shorter the text the better. Other points should be dealt with in side statements alongside the main statement as was now proposed. Baker strongly agreed.

5. Baker said he was still aiming for Thursday for the resolution. He had talked to all the countries concerned except the Cubans who he would see in New York on Wednesday. The Yemenis and Cubans would vote against. He thought the Chinese and Malaysians would abstain. The more influence that could be brought to bear on the Malaysians the better. The Secretary of State said that the Prime Minister had sent a message. Baker said the Colombians would want assurances on eg guarantees for Saddam Hussein if he withdrew peacefully. The Secretary of State said that Colombia was somewhat in our debt because of the

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help we had given them over drugs. We would see if we could influence them. Baker welcomed this. He added that the Finns were coming along but if the Soviet Union became squishy then Finland would go soft as well.

6. The Secretary of State asked Baker about the US public response to the idea of a resolution with a deadline. Baker said the idea had been around for some time. He thought overall it would help with public opinion and Congress.

7. The Secretary of State told Mr Baker that either he or another FCO Minister would be in New York for the debate.

FOLLOW-UP

8. As we discussed, this phone conversation gives you the authority you need. We retain a strong preference for 1 January since any debate after that would, as the Secretary of State told Baker, give the new Security Council members scope to re-open the issue of proceeding without more ado to the use of force. The Secretary of State has considered whether to go for quote 30 days from the date of this resolution unquote instead of 1 January, but has concluded that this would be wasted ingenuity.

9. In amplification of the point in para 4 above, we see some risk that demanding Iraq to comply fully with Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions will leave open the question of which provisions of which resolutions Iraq is able and supposed to comply with, and impel us into a second debate in January. Deadline language should therefore be as tight and unambiguous as possible.

10. A re-draft of the proposed statement of policy is being faxed to you separately. It incorporates revised versions of the language on hostages and on CW/BW. Our aim should be to secure the support of as many members as possible for the statement, a presidential statement being the optimum.

11. Grateful if telegrams on this subject could be repeated to

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MODUK (for Sec(O(C)) and PS/Mr King.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET) (UND)

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MDADAN 6279

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 FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
 TO DESKBY 260730Z FCO  
 TELNO 2084  
 OF 260650Z NOVEMBER 90  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2.

BEGINS

1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND DECIDES IN ORDER TO ALLOW IRAQ ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY, THAT IRAQ BE GIVEN UNTIL JANUARY 1 SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN 15 SQUARE BRACKETS END , 1991 TO DO SO:

2. AUTHORISES MEMBER STATES CO-OPERATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, UNLESS IRAQ ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 1 SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN 15 SQUARE BRACKETS END, 1991 FULLY IMPLEMENTS, AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS, TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS PASSED IN RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA.

ENDS.

HANNAY

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET  
 PS  
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 PS/MR HOGG  
 PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD  
 MR P J WESTON  
 MR FAIRWEATHER  
 MR BROOMFIELD  
 MR GOULDEN  
 MR GORE-BOOTH  
 MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)  
 HD/AMD  
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 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
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 (CABINET OFFICE VIA TUBE H29)  
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*ALC*

The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP  
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE, MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AH

Department of  
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street  
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071-215 5000

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Fax 071-222 2629

*CDP  
26/11*

Direct line 071-215 5623  
Our ref PE11146

Your ref  
Date *26* November 1990

*Dear Secretary of State,*

**IRAQ/KUWAIT SANCTIONS: ENFORCEMENT AND CO-ORDINATION**

*at flap M27*  
On 4 September I wrote to you about my concern to ensure that the arrangements between departments for the pursuit of reports about potential breaches of sanctions should be adequately and expeditiously implemented. I thought that at the end of the first quarter of the sanctions operations it would be timely to circulate to you and colleagues reports on the work of the Sanctions Units here in this department.

I enclose two reports, one from the Sanctions Licensing Unit and one from the Embargo Enforcement Unit. They both tell a tale of an impressive amount of work which is being done both to look after the interests of Kuwait and to enforce sanctions. What they do not indicate, however, is the extent to which the results which we have achieved have been crucially dependent upon the co-operation and wholehearted support of officials in other departments. I said in my letter of 4 September that it was important for departments to co-operate fully and I am glad to be able to report such a satisfactory outcome.

A crucial area of work which has still to be fully addressed is the way we should handle any Iraqi-owned companies which are still operating in this country and which may be controlled from Iraq. There are a number of legal difficulties here which the

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Embargo Enforcement Unit is pursuing at an inter-departmental level, and there is also the risk that we could cause considerable difficulties for legitimate businesses being carried on respectably and responsibly by Iraqi nationals whose affection for the regime in Baghdad is no greater than ours. Particular difficulties are, of course, being presented in the case of the attempt to buy out Matrix Churchill from Iraqi control and while our priority must be to deal with that particular case we must not lose sight either of the small companies which played such an important role in the Iraqi arms procurement activities prior to sanctions, nor to the adverse consequences both for the government and for industry of taking precipitant decisions which may have quite unfortunate effects on legitimate UK businesses. This is an area on which officials will need to get very thorough legal advice and proceed with considerable circumspection and caution.

I believe that the policy we have operated, which was set down in the attachment to my letter of 4 September, has proved robust in the face of all the developments during the past three odd months, but I shall not hesitate to write to you and colleagues again should I feel that we need to amend it in any way.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, John Major, Tom King, Cecil Parkinson, John Wakeham, Michael Howard, Patrick Mayhew, Robin Butler, Brian Unwin and Bernard Ingham.

Yours sincerely  
Ronald W.

(Approved by the Secretary of State  
and signed his absence.)

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IRAQ AND KUWAIT SANCTIONS UNIT - FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT

1. IRAQ AND KUWAIT SANCTIONS UNIT

1. Since the introduction in the first week of August of national measures to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 661 a small team within the department's export control organisation has been dealing with applications for licences to trade with Iraqi and Kuwaiti individuals and companies.
2. The recorded number of applications over the first three months of the sanctions licensing system shows an initial lull, presumably while the effects of the sanctions regulations were being digested, followed by three weeks of fairly constant levels of application (40, 45 and 41 for each of the weeks). Applications then dipped for two weeks before picking up steadily until the end of the quarter. Notably the last two weeks of the quarter show a marked increase in applications.
3. In considering applications the views of other interested government departments have been sought before a decision on whether a licence should be issued has been taken. The views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been sought in all cases while other applications have been circulated to various other departments on the basis of their subject matter.
4. The average time taken to issue a licence over the first quarter was 8 days, while the range of time taken was 1-42 days. 78% of licences were issued within 10 days. The vast majority of licences issued were issued so that the assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait would be protected (as required by SCR 661).
5. A diverse range of applications for licences have been received. These vary from applications for humanitarian food supplies to applications for licences to protect intellectual property rights in Iraq and Kuwait. There has been a noticeable evolution over the quarter from the initial straightforward supply of goods applications to more sophisticated applications concerning the need for licences to provide trade-related services such as insurance or to deal with financial instruments related to contracts caught by the sanctions regulations.
6. In addition to the licensing provision of the domestic sanctions regulations the department has also received delegated authority under the Treasury Directions which were introduced in August to impose a freeze on Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets. This authority allows the department to deal with requests for permission to make payments under contracts of insurance or certain bonds to Iraqi or Kuwaiti persons.

7. The increasing volume of applications at the end of the quarter can in part be attributed to the growth of such finance related applications.

8. In addition to the 655 applications received in the quarter a further 775 written enquiries were dealt with. The sanctions unit also dealt with several thousand telephone calls during the quarter. As an indication of the volume of calls the first five weeks of the quarter saw a total of 8449 calls of which 3610 were incoming. Figures for the rest of the quarter are not currently available.

## 2. EMBARGO ENFORCEMENT UNIT

1. The Embargo Enforcement Unit (EEU) was set up following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the subsequent imposition of the trade embargo against those two countries, in order to co-ordinate information about potential violations of the embargo, and resultant action.

2. In the first three months of its existence the EEU has consider over 200 separate cases where information has been received about potential violations of the embargo. In deciding what action should be taken against the company concerned, the EEU considers whether the nature of the information is serious enough to warrant a visit by either DTI or Customs and Excise, or whether a standard warning letter from DTI may suffice. In all Customs and Excise have undertaken to visit nearly 50 firms, and DTI have seen nearly 30, with several more planned.

3. Of the reported cases some 150 (75%) have been placed in a "No Further Action" category which will only be changed should further information come to light. In most cases the reports themselves make it clear that no action is needed, but in all cases a warning letter is sent. Similar letters have been sent to some 10,000 business and 600 Trade Associations and Chambers of Commerce. These letters have produced a useful feedback indicating that recipients are taking sanctions very seriously.

4. In a small number of cases where the EEU considers that enforcement action beyond a visit is required, Customs and Excise have alerted all UK ports to possible attempts to illegally import or export goods. Several companies that have either made repetitive offers to supply commodities (and appear not to have had any success so far) or that are known to be acting suspiciously have been placed under Customs and Excise or Police surveillance.

5. In some half a dozen cases where companies are being inadvertently involved in possible sanctions - busting through the activities of subsidiary companies, the DTI has been able to use established contacts to warn them.

6. Of the export licences that have been issued by DTI for medical and/or pharmaceutical goods so far, nearly half (20) have featured in the EEU's deliberations by virtue of the reporting on the companies that have obtained the licences. This suggests that some 50% of total commercial traffic may be under review : if so the paucity of any evidence of serious attempts to evade export controls could reasonably be read across to UK industry generally. Even if the assumption about proportions is wrong the 'sample' size of 200 cases is large enough to give a certain measure of comfort as to the 'unseen' exchanges between this country and Iraq.

7. The EEU has also considered a regular stream of information that it receives from various Immigration Officers at UK ports who have intercepted suspect individuals. Reports have also been received from British Embassies on alleged attempts to breach the embargo. These have been pursued vigorously. Finally, there have been several occasions when information has been supplied by informers to DTI or to the DTp Hotline. This information has usually tied in with other material, and has added to the overall picture that the EEU tries to build up on particular companies.

STATISTICAL REPORT - SANCTIONS UNIT - CASE PROCESSING

First quarterly report

Applications received	665	
Licences issued (I)	327	(49%)
Applications outstanding	133	(20%)
Applications refused (X)	77	(12%)
Licences revoked (R)	12	(2%)
Advised that no licence is required (NLR)	45	(7%)
Advised that application covered by OGEL (ships stores, aircraft stores)	1	
Advised application covered by Open General Supply Licence (OGSL)	23	(3%)
Applications withdrawn by applicant(E)	6	(1%)
Applications withdrawn on advice of DTI (D)	41	(6%)

Written enquiries received and answered 775

The average time taken to issue a licence = 8days  
with a range of 1day to 42days


Actual figure of licences issued in less than 10 days is 78%

H Stevens  
Sanctions Unit

1 November 1990




# Case Processing



# Distribution of Case Processing

% of licences issued



No of working days taken

■ % of licences issued

STATISTICAL REPORT - SANCTIONS UNIT

First quarterly report

Distribution of licence applications received

<u>Week ending Friday</u>	<u>No. received</u>
3/8	1
10/8	5
17/8	40
24/8	45
31/8	41
7/9	24
14/9	30
21/9	73
28/9	61
5/10	33
12/10	63
19/10	92
26/10	110


Distribution of written enquiries received

<u>Week ending Friday</u>	<u>No. received</u>
3/8	1
10/8	12
17/8	38
24/8	49
31/8	40
7/9	89
14/9	91
21/9	118
28/9	75
5/10	95
12/10	60
19/10	34
26/10	20


H STEVENS  
Export Control Organisation  
Sanctions Unit

1 November 1990

# Distribution of applications received



# Distribution of written enquiries



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YOUR TELNO 982: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY


1. DISCUSSION WITH THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN ADVANCE OF MEETING OF THE FIVE. BAKER AIMING FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON 29 NOVEMBER. I SEEK CLARIFICATION ON THE INCLUSION OF A DEADLINE IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND COMMENT ON THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT.

DETAIL

2. THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE DULY ASKED OUR CHINESE CO-ORDINATOR TO ARRANGE A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS ON THE MORNING OF 25 NOVEMBER. IN ADVANCE OF THAT WE HAD A BILATERAL DISCUSSION. HE WAS THEN GOING ON TO A SIMILAR MEETING WITH MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE.

3. PICKERING BEGAN BY READING TO ME THE MESSAGE FROM BAKER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HANDING ME THE TEXT OF THE UNITED STATES DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE. HE SAID THE AMERICANS WERE PLANNING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, TO BEGIN AT 1500 LOCAL TIME ON 29 NOVEMBER. BAKER HAD SENT INVITATIONS TO ALL HIS SECURITY COUNCIL MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING CUBA. THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD SO FAR BEEN GIVEN TO THE FRENCH AND OURSELVES, SHOWN TO THE RUSSIANS AND READ TO THE CHINESE. BAKER'S HOPE WAS THAT AFTER THE MEETING OF THE FIVE AMBASSADORS THEY COULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND SECURE INSTRUCTIONS TO AGREE THE TEXT AT A FURTHER MEETING LATER IN THE DAY. THE AGREED TEXT COULD THEN BE PASSED ON TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON 26 NOVEMBER: HE HOPED OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS COULD JOIN IN BRIEFINGS OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE NON-NON-ALIGNED, AS WITH EARLIER RESOLUTIONS. THE DEBATE ON THE RAPE OF KUWAIT COULD BEGIN ON 27 NOVEMBER. BAKER WOULD PLAN TO BE IN NEW YORK FROM MIDDAY ON 28 NOVEMBER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. WE ALSO NEEDED TO DISCUSS HOW WE FITTED IN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

PAGE 1  
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4. PICKERING NOTED THAT IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION THE AMERICANS HAD NOW REINSTATED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 FROM OUR ORIGINAL DRAFT. THEY HAD ALSO INCLUDED A DEADLINE OF 1 JANUARY 1991 AT THE REQUEST OF THE RUSSIANS AND TO SOME EXTENT ALSO THE FRENCH. PICKERING SAID THE CHINESE WERE NOT YET SURE WHETHER THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD TRAVEL TO NEW YORK: HE WAS BEING OFFERED THE INDUCEMENT OF A BILATERAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON IF HE DID.
5. PICKERING THEN RAN THROUGH THE POSITION ON VOTING INTENTIONS. UK AND FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE DRAFT WAS GUARANTEED. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT 100 PER CENT CERTAIN BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID HE WOULD COME TO NEW YORK: IT WOULD BE CRITICAL TO SECURE A POSITIVE VOTE FROM HIM. THE CHINESE WERE PROBLEMATIC, BUT SAID THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE RESOLUTION. THE CANADIANS, ROMANIANS AND FINNISH SEEMED TO BE ON SIDE DESPITE SOME INITIAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON THE PART OF THE FINNS. COTE D'IVOIRE, ETHIOPIA AND ZAIRE WERE VERY POSITIVE. THE YEMENI PRESIDENT HAD TOLD BAKER HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES CUBA SEEMED BOUND TO DO SO AS WELL. PICKERING HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY READ OUT OF BAKER'S TALKS IN BOGOTA BUT THE SIGNS WERE NOT VERY GOOD. THE MALAYSIANS WERE ALSO HESITANT. IT LOOKED THEREFORE AS IF OF THE LATTER FOUR THERE WOULD BE TWO ABSTENTIONS AS WELL AS TWO VOTES AGAINST.
6. PICKERING SAID THE WORST OUTCOME WOULD BE IF SHEVARDNADZE CAME TO NEW YORK AND DECLINED TO COMMIT HIMSELF. THE AMERICANS WOULD NEED TO INVOKE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U S/ SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IN ORDER TO BRING HIM TO A DECISION. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE A MOVE TO SUBSTITUTE A LATER DATE FOR 1 JANUARY. ON THE OTHER HAND IT COULD BE HELPFUL IF DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON THE DATE RATHER THAN ON OTHER ELEMENTS (EG REFERENCES TO THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE OR ELEMENTS OF THE 'PEACE INITIATIVE' WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE CAUSE PROBLEMS.
7. I SAID THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS I COULD GIVE NO COMMITMENT ABOUT MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE ON OUR PART, ESPECIALLY SINCE 29 NOVEMBER WAS THE DAY ON WHICH THERE COULD BE A THIRD ROUND OF BALLOTING IN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP CONTEST. PICKERING SAID HE KNEW THAT BAKER HAD ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. WASHINGTON WOULD NOW NEED TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION THAT HAD ARISEN, AND WOULD NO DOUBT PURSUE THE MATTER BILATERALLY WITH US.
8. I SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE REMAINED UNEASY ABOUT THE INTRODUCTION OF A DEADLINE INTO THE DRAFT. THIS COULD CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION AND HYSTERIA AROUND THE SPECIFIED DATE, AND



COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF AN IRAQI PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW AMERICAN THINKING ON THIS POINT.

9. PICKERING SAID IT WAS THE AMERICAN JUDGMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE FRENCH (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE CHINESE) WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IF THEY DID NOT HAVE TO GIVE A TOTALLY BLANK CHEQUE FOR MILITARY ACTION. THE INCLUSION OF THE DATE WOULD ALSO PERMIT THEM TO TAKE ANY ACTION THEY FELT NECESSARY TO GIVE PEACE A LAST CHANCE. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE A SIMPLE DATE IN THE RESOLUTION THAN TO HAVE TO ADMIT INTO THE TEXT SPECIFIC ELEMENTS RELATING TO A FINAL SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE INCLUSION OF THE DATE DID NOT PRE-DETERMINE RECOURSE TO MILITARY ACTION, OR THE DATE ON WHICH IT MIGHT BE TAKEN. IT CREATED A FURTHER ELEMENT OF PRESSURE. IT COULD REASONABLY BE DEFENDED AS A LAST ELEMENT OF PEACEFUL PERSUASION, AND NOT A HOSTILE OR WAR-LIKE TACTIC.

10. I BRIEFED PICKERING ON MY TALKS IN PARIS. THE FRENCH SEEMED CLEARLY TO ACCEPT THAT THE CURRENT AROUND WAS THE LAST ONE REQUIRED AT THE UN. BUT THEY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT BEING MADE CLEAR THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT IN ITSELF A DECISION TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, SUCH A DECISION BEING A MATTER FOR SUBSEQUENT CONCERTATION AMONG THE FORCE CONTRIBUTORS.

11. ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION I MADE THE TWO COMMENTS IN BERMAN'S MINUTE OF 23 NOVEMBER. WE HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT 'AUTHORISES' IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 AND WOULD PREFER 'DECIDES' OR POSSIBLY 'CALLS UPON'. THE RECASTING OF THE OBJECTIVE IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH NOW WENT VERY WIDE, AND MIGHT BETTER BE CLARIFIED BY A REFERENCE TO 'IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 660 AND RELATED RESOLUTIONS'. PICKERING TOOK NOTE. PICKERING ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT AS YET RAISED THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING IN THE TEXT REFERENCES TO SUCH IDEAS OF THEIR OWN AS CONSULTATION IN THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. BUT THIS DID NOT GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD NOT AT A LATER STAGE.

12. I SHALL SEND A FURTHER FLASH TELEGRAM REPORTING ON DISCUSSION AMONG THE FIVE.

HANNAY

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IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

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**FLASH**

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. MEETING OF THE FIVE. RUSSIANS PROPOSE RE-ORDERING DRAFT RESOLUTION TO CLARIFY 'TWO-TIER' APPROACH AND ADDITION OF SOME FURTHER ELEMENTS. BUT THEY ARE CLEAR THAT NO FURTHER RESOLUTION SHOULD BE REQUIRED. CHINESE SUGGEST MUCH WEAKER TWO-TIER FORMULA. FIVE TO MEET AGAIN AT 260230Z. INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED DESKBY 260130Z.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS DULY MET AT 1600Z. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) DESCRIBED THE PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND INTRODUCED THE U S DRAFT RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH ME (MIPT). ON THE TEXT, HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD AIMED FOR MAXIMUM SIMPLICITY. A DATE HAD BEEN INCLUDED FOLLOWING EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN THIS ON THE PART OF SEVERAL OF THE MINISTERS CONSULTED BY BAKER. THIS WOULD GIVE A LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE. THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, WHICH WOULD BE NEW TO SOME PARTNERS, WAS DESIGNED TO PARALLEL THE PROVISIONS IN THE CHARTER UNDER WHICH STATES ARE ASKED TO CO-OPERATE WITH ACTION OF THE SORT ENVISAGED.

3. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) SAID THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS CLEAR AND EXPRESSED THE BASIC INTENTIONS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. BUT THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE MATERIAL DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET IDEA WAS TO HAVE A TWO-TIER RESOLUTION. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD REFLECT THE IDEA OF A 'PAUSE OF GOODWILL'. THIS PERIOD SHOULD LAST UP TO THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY. IT WOULD GIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN A MONTH AND A HALF TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND FREE ALL HOSTAGES. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH WOULD SAY THAT IF IRAQ HAD NOT ACTED ACCORDINGLY BY THE END OF THE SPECIFIED PERIOD THEN ALL NECESSARY MEANS WOULD BE USED TO FORCE HIM TO COMPLY. VORONTSOV EMPHASIZED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SEE THE NEED FOR ANY FURTHER RESOLUTION: AFTER THE STIPULATED DATE THE AUTHORISATION OF MILITARY ACTION WOULD AUTOMATICALLY COME INTO EFFECT. THERE

PAGE 1  
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DESPATCHED

SHOULD NOT BE ANY NEW RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT DURING THIS GRACE PERIOD.

4. VORONTSOV ADDED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ALSO WANTED TO SEE CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE RESOLUTION:

(A) A STIPULATION THAT 'NUREMBURG PROCEDURES' WOULD BE APPLIED AGAINST ANYONE WHO ORDERED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS:

(B) A SIMILAR PROVISION THAT 'NUREMBURG PROCEDURES' WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE WHO BROUGHT HARM TO FOREIGN HOSTAGES:

(C) A PROVISION THAT ALL FOREIGNERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO LEAVE IRAQ DURING THE PERIOD OF GRACE IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, WITH ANY FINANCIAL QUESTIONS THAT AROSE BEING SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. I SAID THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION REFLECTED THE POLITICAL APPROACH WHICH WE BELIEVED TO BE NECESSARY. LEGALLY SPEAKING SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS NOT REQUIRED BUT WE ACCEPTED ITS POLITICAL DESIRABILITY. WE ALSO AGREED WITH THE IDEA OF A SIMPLE TEXT. WE DID HOWEVER HAVE QUESTIONS TO RAISE (BUT NOT OBJECTIONS) ABOUT THE IDEA OF A TIME LIMIT. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE WE WERE SEEKING IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION. ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION WOULD EMPOWER STATES TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION THIS WOULD NOT BE AUTOMATIC. BUT A DEADLINE COULD INVITE A PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE ON THE PART OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND THERE COULD BE UNDESIRABLE TENSION AND HYSTERIA CREATED AROUND THE STIPULATED DATE.

6. BLANC (FRANCE) SAID HE WOULD REPORT. HE HOPED TO HAVE HIS GOVERNMENT'S REACTIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY. LI (CHINA) SAID THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY HIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS STILL STUDYING IT. HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN HE WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS. BUT 'THINKING ALOUD' HE WONDERED WHETHER THE SECOND STAGE OF A TWO-STAGE FORMULA MIGHT NOT BETTER PROVIDE THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD 'CONSIDER THE USE OF ALL NECESSARY MEANS'.

7. PICKERING SAID THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF A TWO-STAGE APPROACH WAS ALREADY IN THE DRAFT TEXT, BUT PERHAPS NOT CLEARLY ENOUGH EXPRESSED. IN PRINCIPLE HE FELT THERE WAS A BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT. HE HAD ALSO NOTED THE SOVIET POINTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND FOREIGN HOSTAGES. HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS THAT THE TWO-STAGE PROCESS SHOULD INVOLVE THE TWO REAL DECISIONS. IT SHOULD BRING ABOUT EXTRA PRESSURE, NOT A GUARANTEED BREATHING SPACE, AS LI'S SUGGESTION WOULD DO.

8. LI ASKED HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED. THE CHOICE LAY BETWEEN TRYING TO

ACHIEVE AN AGREED VIEW AND FOR THE AMERICANS TO GO AHEAD AND BRIEF OTHERS ON WHAT WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS A U S WORKING PAPER. I SAID WE NEEDED TO ACT VERY QUICKLY. MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO SEE A DIFFERENT PROCEDURE FOR BRIEFING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL COMPARED WITH THAT ADOPTED OVER PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE PREFERABLE IF THE FIVE COULD QUICKLY REACH 'BROAD AGREEMENT', THE FORMULA USED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. WE WOULD WISH TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH ANY BRIEFING CONDUCTED BY THE AMERICANS. ON THE TWO-TIER APPROACH, ONE WAY OF HANDLING THE CONCEPT WOULD BE TO HAVE A FIRST PARAGRAPH AUTHORIZING THE USE OF ALL NECESSARY MEANS AND A SECOND PARAGRAPH SUSPENDING THAT UNTIL A PARTICULAR DATE. VORONTSOV COMMENTED THAT THIS REVERSED THE EMPHASIS. HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD PREFER A FIRST PARAGRAPH DEMANDING THAT IRAQ COMPLY WITH PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND A SECOND PARAGRAPH STATING THAT THE USE OF ALL NECESSARY MEANS WOULD BE AUTHORISED IF IRAQ DID NOT COMPLY. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO MAINTAIN A UNIFIED POSITION OF THE FIVE. BLANC AGREED.

9. IT WAS FINALLY AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 260230Z TO COMPARE NOTES FURTHER, HAVING CONSULTED OUR GOVERNMENTS.

COMMENT

10. THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE FIRMLY ON BOARD FOR A ONE-SHOT SECURITY COUNCIL USE OF FORCE AUTHORISATION, ALBEIT WITH A GRACE PERIOD WHICH THE RUSSIANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO STRETCH A BIT BEYOND 1 JANUARY. THE LESS GOOD, BUT NOT UNEXPECTED, NEWS IS THAT THE CHINESE ARE STILL DITHERING OVER THE IDEA OF A ONE-SHOT AUTHORISATION AND ARE TOYING WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE VERSION WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO THERE BEING NO AUTHORISATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE AT ALL AT THIS STAGE.

11. I HOPE THAT WE DO NOT FEEL THE NEED TO PRESS OUR OWN DOUBTS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF THE GRACE PERIOD ANY FURTHER. SO FAR THESE DOUBTS HAVE, IF ANYTHING, BEEN MILDLY USEFUL TACTICALLY TO THE AMERICANS BY SHOWING THE SOVIETS THAT THE IDEAS OF A GRACE PERIOD IS NOT UNCONTROVERSIAL. BUT NOW THAT WE HAVE HAD AN EXPLANATION FROM THE AMERICANS AND HAVE HEARD WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TO SAY, IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR OWN UNWILLINGNESS TO COME ON BOARD WILL MERELY BLOCK THE PROCESS OF GETTING THE AGREEMENT OF THE FIVE (OR FOUR) TO A TEXT AND THUS DELAY THE PROCESS OF CONSULTING OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL. I DOUBT IF THE AMERICANS WILL GIVE ANY GROUND AT THIS STAGE ON THE DATE ITSELF, RESERVING THAT FOR BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSION ON 28/29 NOVEMBER, BUT IT WOULD BE A HELP TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD LIVE WITH A LATER DATE EG 15 JANUARY.

12. IT IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE AMERICANS WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ANY RE-DRAFTING AT THIS STAGE TO ACCOMMODATE THE SOVIET WISH FOR A CLEARLY TWO-PART TEXT. THEY KNOW ABOUT OUR WHEEZE INVOLVING A FIRST PART AUTHORIZING FORCE AND A SECOND PART SUSPENDING THAT AUTHORISATION FOR A FIXED PERIOD. THE TROUBLE IS THE SOVIETS ATTACH A LOT OF IMPORTANCE TO PUTTING IT THE OTHER WAY ROUND. BUT I HOPE I CAN HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY IF THE AMERICANS DO THIS EVENING SHOW WILLINGNESS TO RE-JIG THEIR TEXT.

13. NOR DO I KNOW HOW THE AMERICANS WILL REACT TO THE REST OF THE SOVIET WISH LIST (CHEMICAL WEAPONS, HOSTAGES, WAR TRIALS). IN SUBSTANCE THESE SEEM TO GO IN A HIGHLY DESIRABLE DIRECTION BUT PROCEDURALLY THEY COULD BE SEEN AS OVERLOADING THE BOAT A BIT. I HOPE THERE TOO I CAN HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY TO GO AS FAR AS THE AMERICANS MAY WISH TO GO.

14. FINALLY ON THE SOVIET DESIRE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WILL BE ADOPTED DURING THE GRACE PERIOD, THIS SEEMS TO ME POSITIVELY HELPFUL AS IT WILL HAMPER THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEACE BRIGADE.

15. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 260130Z.

HANNAY

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
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MY TELNOS 28 AND 39 AND FCO TELNO 49: IRAN/IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. DURING VISIT TO BAGHDAD VELAYATI FOUND SADDAM HUSSEIN CONFIDENT AND OFFERING NO HINT OF CONCESSIONS ON KUWAIT. SADDAM PROFESSED TO BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY OPTION WAS NO MORE THAN A THREAT AND THAT IF IT DID MATERIALISE HE COULD DEFEND HIMSELF. IRANIANS UNABLE TO TELL WHETHER HE WAS BLUFFING. IRAN CONCERNED THAT MILITARY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED. NO FAITH IN SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE GULF, FOUMANI, INVITED ME TO CALL ON HIM ON 24 NOVEMBER TO FOLLOW UP MY CONVERSATION WITH SADEGHI (2ND TUR).

3. FOROUMI CONFIRMED THAT VELAYATI'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO AN INVITATION FROM TARIQ AZIZ. THE TIMING HAD BEEN DICTATED BY VELAYATI'S WISH TO MAKE PROGRESS ON POWS, FRONTIER DEMARCATION, AND ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES, AND BY IRAN'S INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE GULF CRISIS. VELAYATI HAD ALSO URGED THE IRAQIS TO RELEASE THEIR HOSTAGES.

GULF CRISIS

4. I ASKED FOR FOUMANI'S IMPRESSIONS OF SADDAM. HE REPLIED THAT SADDAM AND TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN WELL INFORMED ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THEY SEEMED TO THINK - OR PRETENDED TO THINK - THAT THE THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION WAS NO MORE THAN A THREAT, BUT IN ANY CASE HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THEIR READINESS AND ABILITY TO MEET ANY MILITARY ACTION. SADDAM

PAGE 1  
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HAD EXUDED CONFIDENCE, AND HAD GIVEN ABSOLUTELY NO HINT OF READINESS TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THE IRANIANS COULD NOT JUDGE WHETHER HE MEANT IT.

5. SADDAM HAD MADE A CONSIDERABLE BUT UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO WIN OVER THE IRANIANS, AS PART OF HIS WIDER CAMPAIGN TO DIVIDE THE OPPOSITION AGAINST HIM. TRYING TO PLAY ON IRAN'S NATURAL SUSPICIONS, HE HAD NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD FIRST CLAIMED MERELY TO WANT TO DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA. THEN THEY HAD CHANGED TO WANTING TO ATTACK IRAQ AND RE-TAKE KUWAIT. THEIR REAL OBJECTIVE, HOWEVER, WAS TO MAINTAIN A PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION. THE BRAINS BEHIND THIS PLAN WERE THE WARMONGERING BRITISH. IRAN SHOULD HELP RESIST THIS UNHOLY ALLIANCE.

6. I SPOKE ON STANDARD LINES TO REJECT SUCH TRANSPARENT RUBBISH. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, I REASSURED FOUMANI THAT HMG'S POLICY ON THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT WOULD NOT CHANGE DESPITE THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN BELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY THREAT WAS NOT SERIOUS, HE WAS MAKING A BAD MISTAKE. FOUMANI WELCOMED THIS, BUT SAID THAT SADDAM'S MISTAKE WAS INCREASINGLY UNDERSTANDABLE AS TIME WENT BY: THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AT LEAST WERE NOT TAKING ''SERIOUS ACTION''. THE HAJJ WAS GETTING CLOSER. SADDAM HAD TO BE TACKLED BEFORE THEN. FOUMANI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOMEONE EG CHINA MIGHT VETO A RESOLUTION APPROVING THE USE OF FORCE.

7. I REFERRED (WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION) TO ALLEGATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE SETTING UP TRANSPORT AND OTHER OFFICES IN IRAN (RIYADH TELNO 1169), SAYING THAT WE HAD HAD NO DIRECT EVIDENCE OURSELVES TO CAUSE US TO CAST DOUBT ON IRAN'S SINCERITY ON IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS. FOUMANI SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS CLEAR. VELAYATI HAD EXPLAINED IT TO THE IRAQIS. WE NEED HAVE NO DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE. BUT NOR SHOULD WE BE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT SANCTIONS COULD HAVE ANY SERIOUS EFFECT IN ANYTHING MUCH LESS THAN A YEAR. THE IRANIANS HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF POPULAR PRESSURE DEVELOPING IN IRAQ AGAINST SADDAM.

POWS

8. FOUMANI SAID THAT THE RESULTS OF DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT WERE ALREADY EVIDENT (BAGHDAD TELNO 2387 TO FCO). THE IRANIANS HAD NOT BELIEVED IRAQ'S CLAIMS THAT THEY HAD RETURNED



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ALL IRANIAN POWS. IF, AS SEEMED CERTAIN, THE IRAQI'S HAD MURDERED A NUMBER OF IRANIAN PRISONERS, THEY SHOULD ADMIT IT AND IF POSSIBLE RETURN THE BODIES. IRAN HAD A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE HEAD FOR HEAD EXCHANGE OF REGISTERED POWS (100 PER DAY), AND HELD A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF UNREGISTERED PRISONERS. THE IRANIANS WERE CAREFULLY KEEPING BACK THE MOST IMPORTANT IRAQIS.

9. I ASKED WHETHER VELAYATI HAD DISCUSSED THE POSITION OF THE MOJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ IN IRAQ. FOROUMI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN READY TO TALK ABOUT THEM, AND HAD APPEARED TO WANT TO DO A DEAL. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THEY WERE AFTER IN EXCHANGE. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION. THE IRANIANS WERE IN NO HURRY TO DISCUSS THE MOJAHEDIN AND WANTED TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF POWS FIRST.

UNIIMOG

10. PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 49.

HAJJ

11. FOUMANI HAD VISITED SAUDI ARABIA THE PREVIOUS WEEK. THE TWO SIDES WERE STILL HAGGLING OVER NUMBERS, WITH THE SAUDIS ON 90,000 AND IRANIANS ON 150,000 (EVEN THOUGH FOUMANI HAD TOLD THE SAUDIS THEY SHOULD REALLY BE ALLOWING THE ENTIRE IRANIAN BACKLOG OF ABOUT 600,000 TO MAKE THE HAJJ). TIME TO REACH AGREEMENT WAS RUNNING OUT. THE IRANIANS WERE ARGUING THAT THEIR PILGRIMS WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS. THEY WERE ALSO KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE BY ARGUING THAT IT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE SAUDIS TO ADMIT, AS THEY NOW WERE, THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAQ IN THE GULF WAR HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. IRAN WANTED FINANCIAL HELP FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF TOWNS DAMAGED BY THE IRAQIS WITH SAUDI FINANCE AND OTHER HELP. THE SAUDIS, BOLSTERED BY US SUPPORT, WERE NOT RESPONDING TO THIS ARGUMENT. THE IRANIANS WANTED EARLY PROGRESS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

COMMENT

12. FOUMANI REFLECTED CONCERNS VELAYATI EXPRESSED TO THE VISITING IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER, AND RAFSANJANI AIRED PUBLICLY THE SAME DAY IN A MEETING WIDELY REPORTED IN THE MEDIA, THAT THE ALLIANCE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN MAY IN THE END LACK THE DETERMINATION TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. FOUMANI ( A MULLAH )

PAGE 3  
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MADE NO CRITICISM OF BRITISH POLICY, BUT SPOKE APPROVINGLY OF OUR DETERMINATION TO STAND BY KUWAIT. THIS ATTITUDE IS OF COURSE LIKELY TO CHANGE IN THE EVENT OF IRAQ'S DEFEAT.

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MEETING RECORD  
MIDDLE EAST:  
Situation At 34.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1990

Dear Greville,

**PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH: THE GULF**

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this afternoon to give her an account of his visit to the Gulf.

The President said there was not a great deal to add to what had been reported publicly. It had been a real joy to see British and American units side by side. Members of the Desert Rats had come to join the First Marine Division for his visit, and he had been able to talk to them and their Brigadier.

The President continued that, after talking to General Schwarzkopf, he was absolutely convinced we could 'do the job' against Iraq, and relatively promptly. It would not be another Vietnam. The cooperation between the US and British units could not be better, and the overall strategic planning was very good and very firm. He still hoped that Saddam Hussein would get the message. But if not, we were ready.

The President continued that he had had a good talk with King Fahd and other members of the Saudi Royal Family. There were in fact very few problems with American forces in Saudi Arabia. His only complaint was that King Fahd had kept him up until 3 a.m. While he was in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Baker had flown to the Yemen. The Saudis had not been very pleased about this, but he had insisted that the US had to try to get them on board for a further UN Resolution. The result had been quite useful. Sana'a had not really understood the amount of force which the Americans had put down there. They had talked of being able to drop "a little rain" on Iraq. Baker had told them they were going to see the "damnedest rain storm" they had ever witnessed. The President added that it made him wonder whether Saddam Hussein himself realised what was going to hit him. The Prime Minister said she doubted whether he did. He thought he was a sort of demi-god, and was surrounded by sycophants who would not tell him the truth. She did not think we had yet convinced him that he had to withdraw.

President Bush said he agreed with this assessment. We must keep pushing forward. Things seemed to be going quite well with the further UN Security Council Resolution. He had spoken by telephone to President Gaviria of Colombia who seemed to be on board. Secretary Baker was seeing the Colombian Foreign Minister today, and would then go on to meet the Malaysian Foreign

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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MEETING RECORD

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MIDDLE EAST:  
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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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Minister in Los Angeles. It was very important that the Security Council should agree a Resolution this coming week. The Prime Minister said that she had received a very positive impression of the prospects from her talk with President Mitterrand. She thought there would be general support for a resolution authorising whatever steps were necessary. She understood that would help the President with Congress.

The President said that he was more determined than ever to do whatever was necessary to get Iraq out of Kuwait. If Congress wanted to sit on the sidelines, that was their business. He was confident of bringing them round once there was a UN Resolution. He had taken Congressional leaders with him to the Gulf, and Congressman Foley in particular had been very good. But a majority of Congressmen still feared another Vietnam-type war. The Prime Minister commented that there were enormous differences both in terms of terrain and of the overall circumstances. Moreover, the Americans were not alone this time.

The President said that he had travelled on to Egypt and seen President Mubarak, who was the same as ever. He had also thought it important to see President Assad of Syria, even though this had brought him some criticism at home, mostly from the Jewish community. Assad had appeared resolute about committing Syrian forces, and would probably also be ready to use them against Iraq. His problems lay with Israel, and American arms supplies, rather than with the Gulf. The Prime Minister commented that, by meeting President Assad, the President had given him extra authority and standing which he would not otherwise have had. It had been a very good move to go.

The President said that his talk with the Prime Minister in Paris had been extremely useful, and he felt they were still very closely together. The Prime Minister recalled that we had taken the decision to send additional forces to the Gulf. There had been no difficulty about this in Cabinet or with the House of Commons. There was no weakening of resolve on the part of public opinion in this country. The President said that the decision was Thatcherism personified. The Prime Minister continued that the President's trip would have strengthened his position with Congress and with the American people. The President said that it was vital not to let Saddam Hussein believe there was some compromise available. The Prime Minister agreed about this. She thought that the President's visit to the area would help harden opinion generally.

The President said that he did not want to go over the ground with the Prime Minister again about her resignation following their talk on Thursday. But her service to the world had been magnificent, and the way in which she had handled her resignation superb. There was so much respect for her. The Prime Minister said that you had to take what came in politics. She had always believed in being right up front, and this had been true over the Gulf as well. Everyone had fallen in behind. If she detected any sign of faltering, she had every intention of speaking up publicly.

The President said that he would tell his press spokesman that he had brought the Prime Minister up to date on the Gulf.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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He felt that would be useful to maintaining the coalition against Iraq. The Prime Minister said she would do the same. Saddam Hussein must see that it was business as usual.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Sir Robin Butler, and Sir Percy Cradock.

*Yours sincerely,  
C.D. Powell*

C.D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE



*File  
Eam*

*cc  
Co  
Flo  
MOP  
10/11/90*

REF No. T.260/90

*subject cc Master  
cc OPS*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 November, 1990

*Dear Helmut:*

As I told you when we met in Paris, I was grateful for your letter of 13 November, in which you confirmed the willingness of the Federal Republic to assist our British forces in the Gulf area. I welcome the spirit of your decision, and gladly accept your support.

As you have rightly indicated, our best hope of a peaceful restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait lies in Saddam Hussein becoming convinced that the world stands shoulder to shoulder against his aggression, and is prepared to use force if necessary, should he refuse to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This contribution from the Federal Republic will send an unmistakable signal of international solidarity to Baghdad.

I have asked our Ministry of Defence to be in touch urgently with yours to discuss the details.

*Yours ever  
Margaret*

His Excellency Dr Helmut Kohl

*lv*



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do



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 November 1990

*Dear Sir,*

I enclose the Prime Minister's reply to Chancellor Kohl's message about assistance to British forces in the Gulf. I should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered as soon as possible.

*C. D. Powell*  
C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1990

Dear Stefan

ADVICE TO BRITISH NATIONALS IN  
WAR-RISK COUNTRIES

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 23 November covering advice which it is intended to give to families in war-risk countries not to bring children to the area for Christmas. She is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MDADAN 6210

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ADVANCE COPY

FM MUSCAT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 546

OF 240827Z NOVEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, ACTOR

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT

SUMMARY

1. TARIQ AZIZ JUSTIFIES IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT AS A RESPONSE TO A KUWAITI AND AMERICAN PLOT TO DESTABILISE IRAQ AND WARNS THAT IRAQ IS READY TO INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES IF ATTACKED, INCLUDING ON ISRAEL. THE OBJECTIVE WAS PROBABLY TO FRIGHTEN THE OMANIS AND THROUGH THEM OTHER GCC STATES.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON YOUSUF ALAWI ON 23 NOVEMBER HE TOLD ME ABOUT TARIQ AZIZ'S ONE-DAY VISIT ON 21/22 NOVEMBER ON HIS WAY BACK FROM SANA'A. HE SAID THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN SEEKING SUCH A VISIT FOR SOME TIME BUT THE OMANIS HAD KEPT PUTTING IT OFF. THEY FELT THEY HAD TO ACCEPT THIS TIME AND THEY WANTED IN ANY CASE TO TELL THE IRAQIS HOW THEY SAW THE CRISIS. TARIQ AZIZ AND THE HEAD OF THE ARAB DEPARTMENT, IRAQI MFA, HAD AN AUDIENCE WITH THE SULTAN ON THE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER (KEEPING HIS DISTINGUISHED PERSONAL GUESTS TO THE NATIONAL DAY FESTIVITIES WAITING FOR HOURS) AND A MORNING OF TALKS WITH YUSUF ALAWI THE NEXT DAY.

3. SPEAKING WITHOUT NOTES FOR ABOUT 1/4 HOUR, ALAWI SAID TARIQ AZIZ HAD GIVEN A LONG JUSTIFICATION OF IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. HE SAID ALL IRAQ'S RULERS SINCE KING FAISAL HAD MAINTAINED A CLAIM TO KUWAIT. THE BAATH WAS THE ONLY IRAQI REGIME TO COOPERATE WITH KUWAIT ON A NORMAL BASIS. HOWEVER THE IRAQIS HAD NOTICED A CHANGE IN KUWAIT'S ATTITUDE AFTER THE CEASEFIRE. KUWAIT BEGAN TO EXPLOIT ITS OIL TO HURT IRAQ AND TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OF THEIR FRONTIER DISPUTE. IRAQ HAD SAID IT WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DISPUTE AND HAD PROPOSED A 4-POWER CONFERENCE OF IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND UAE BEFORE THE LAST HAJJ. A MEETING WAS HELD AFTER THE HAJJ ON THE LEVEL OF OIL MINISTERS AND AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON RAISING OIL PRICES. BUT KUWAIT THEN RENEGED ON THE AGREEMENT, SAYING IT WAS FOR TWO MONTHS' DURATION ONLY. IRAQ CONSIDERED THIS AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO HARM ITS POST-WAR RECOVERY. IRAQ HAD ALSO

PAGE 1  
RESTRICTED

PROPOSED A SETTLEMENT OF THE FRONTIER DISPUTE. KUWAIT HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A TECHNICAL NOT A POLITICAL MATTER. AT THE JEDDA SUMMIT KUWAIT HAD TAKEN THE ATTITUDE THAT IF IRAQ THREATENED IT WOULD CALL IN THE AMERICANS. IRAQ ITSELF FELT THREATENED BEFORE 2 AUGUST AND DECIDED TO ACT AGAINST KUWAIT. WHAT FOLLOWED HAD EXPOSED THE AMERICAN PLOT AGAINST IRAQ.

4. ACCORDING TO ALAWI, TARIQ AZIZ THEN SET OUT STARKLY IRAQ'S ATTITUDE TO THE PRESENT POSITION. HE SAID IF THE WORST CAME TO THE WORST, IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A CATASTROPHE IN THE GULF. HE CLAIMED THE WEST UNDERESTIMATED IRAQ'S STRENGTH, AT LEAST AS IT WAS DESCRIBED IN THE WESTERN MEDIA. HE MENTIONED THAT IN THE BATTLE OF FAO THE IRAQIS HAD RAINED 5 MILLION SHELLS ON THE IRANIANS. IRAQ WAS READY TO FIGHT, THOUGH IT WAS ALSO READY TO NEGOTIATE. THE IRAQI PEOPLE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A RETREAT FROM KUWAIT UNDER PRESSURE BUT WOULD IF IT WAS AS THE RESULT OF A FIGHT.

5. TARIQ AZIZ SAID IRAQ WOULD PREFER AN ARAB SOLUTION BUT IT COULD ONLY ACCEPT A SUMMIT IF ALL QUESTIONS WERE PUT ON THE AGENDA. BUT IRAQ WOULD FIRST LIKE A DIALOGUE WITH THE SAUDIS. IRAQ WOULD SHOW THAT IT WAS PRAGMATIC AND READY TO MAKE SACRIFICES. IRAQ WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PLAYING FOR TIME: IT WANTED A SOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. ALAWI SAID THE SULTAN HAD COMMENTED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A GAP BETWEEN IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA. ALAWI SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THIS NEEDED TO BE BRIDGED.

7. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IF FOREIGN POWERS WANTED TO JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION, THAT WAS FINE, PROVIDED THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THAT THEY HAD NOT ONLY INTERESTS BUT OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

8. ALAWI CONCLUDED THAT THE IRAQIS SEEMED PREPARED TO GO TO WAR AND TO SUFFER AND INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES. IF THE ALLIES ATTACKED IRAQ, TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THAT IRAQ WOULD HIT AT ISRAEL AND RISK THE CONSEQUENCES. YUSUF ALAWI ADDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE IRAQIS WOULD USE JORDAN AS A PROXY FOR INCITING ISRAEL. THE IRAQIS FELT THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED TO DESTROY THE BAATH SO THEY MIGHT AS WELL FIGHT AND AT LEAST INFLICT SOME DAMAGE ON THE US.

9. ALAWI GAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI POSITION. HE BELIEVED FIRST THE IRAQIS WERE PREPARED IN THE END TO LEAVE KUWAIT BUT NOT TO RESTORE THE AL SABAH TO POWER. SECONDLY, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE DESPERATE TO TALK TO THE SAUDIS. THIRDLY, HE

THOUGHT SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD NOT LEAVE KUWAIT UNTIL AFTER AN ATTACK AND SOME RESISTANCE, WHEN HE COULD SHOW HIS PEOPLE HE HAD TRIED TO KEEP WHAT WAS THEIRS AND HAD WITHDRAWN BEFORE UNEQUAL ODDS. HE WOULD THEN BE A HERO.

10. I ASKED WHAT TARIQ AZIZ HAD WANTED FROM OMAN. ALAWI SAID HE HAD WANTED OMAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S CAUSE IN THE GCC. I THEN ASKED WHAT OMAN'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN AND ALAWI SAID THEY HAD GIVEN NO UNDERTAKING TO HELP.

11. I SAID I HOPED HE REALISED THAT THIS IRAQI ACCOUNT OF THE 'FACTS' WAS RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES. IT SEEMED TO ME IRAQ WAS UNDER A DELUSION ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF ITS SITUATION. THEY WERE STILL TRYING TO DICTATE THEIR TERMS FOR A SOLUTION. THEY WERE STILL TRYING TO DICTATE THEIR TERMS FOR A SOLUTION. THEY COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THE SAUDIS TO TALK TO THEM SO LONG AS THEY REMAINED IN KUWAIT. ALAWI SAID TARIQ AZIZ HAD SHOWN A VERY AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE AND SEEMED SERIOUS IN THREATENING DESTRUCTION ALL ROUND IF IRAQ WAS ATTACKED.

12. I ASKED FINALLY WHAT OMAN'S POSITION WAS, AS THERE WERE RUMOURS CIRCULATING THAT IT FAVOURED SOME COMPROMISE SOLUTION, CEDING PARTS OF KUWAIT TO IRAQ. HE SAID OMAN'S POSITION WAS UNCHANGED AND REMAINED FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. HE DISSOCIATED THE OMAN GOVERNMENT FROM SUCH RUMOURS, WHICH HE SAID WERE THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF INDIVIDUALS (ONE OF WHOM I KNOW TO BE DR OMAR ZAWAWI, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SULTAN, AND ANOTHER IS YAHYA OMAR, THE LIBYAN SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SULTAN).

COMMENT

13. ALTHOUGH HE AVOIDED SAYING HOW HE HAD REACTED TO TARIQ AZIZ, YUSUF ALAWI SPOKE AS IF HIS APPARENT INDIFFERENCE TO THE PROSPECT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF ACCEPTING AND INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES HAD HAD A SPINE-CHILLING EFFECT ON HIS HOSTS. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF ALAWI REGISTERED THE IRAQ ATTITUDE WITH HIS GCC COLLEAGUES NEXT WEEK AND IF HE URGED THE SAUDI TO THINK ABOUT OPENING A LINE TO THE IRAQIS.

CLARK

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
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ADVANCE

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IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
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SUBJECT  
CC MASTER  
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PRIME MINISTER'S

(M) PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 258A/90

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR  
TELNO 503  
OF 231725Z NOVEMBER 90

IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO DR MAHATHIR ABOUT A POSSIBLE UN RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE.

BEGINS

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEGUN TO CONSIDER WHAT FURTHER STEPS WE CAN TAKE COLLECTIVELY TO MAKE IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. WHILE SANCTIONS ARE HAVING A SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC EFFECT ON IRAQ, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WILL LEAD TO IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. INDEED, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 19 NOVEMBER OF A MASSIVE REINFORCEMENT (250,000) OF HIS TROOPS IN KUWAIT CONFIRMS THE IMPRESSION OF IRAQI INTRANSIGENCE.

I RECOGNISE THE CONCERN THAT HAS PROMPTED MALAYSIA AND OTHER NON ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO PROMOTE A 'PEACE INITIATIVE'. BUT THERE IS NO ESCAPING THE FACT THAT IRAQ, A POWERFUL AND HEAVILY ARMED COUNTRY HAS INVADDED THE SMALL DEFENCELESS STATE OF KUWAIT, HAS SYSTEMATICALLY LOOTED AND BRUTALISED THE COUNTRY SINCE, AND HAS ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE POLICY TO DRIVE OUT THE KUWAITIS. INDEED IF ACTION IS NOT TAKEN SOON, KUWAIT WILL LITERALLY CEASE TO EXIST AS A STATE.

I AM CONVINCED THEREFORE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO SEND SADDAM HUSSEIN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE SIGNAL THAT HE MUST WITHDRAW NOW FROM KUWAIT. HE MUST BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THE ALTERNATIVE IS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST HIM AND HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT LEGALLY NECESSARY, I BELIEVE ON THE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD IN PARIS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, THAT A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE WOULD SEND AN UNMISTAKABLE MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED WITH THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WOULD UNDERLINE THE CONTINUING UNITY OF PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

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I VERY MUCH HOPE, PRIME MINISTER, THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF BRINGING FURTHER PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THAT YOU WOULD THEREFORE SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK TO SUPPORT IT.  
ENDS

2. FOR FURHTER BACKGROUND ON CURRENT UN ACTIVITY SEE FCO TELNO 515 TO CAIRO.

HURD

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

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PAGE 2  
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PRIME MINISTER

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cert ①

Prime Minister  
Content?

CD

23/Ki

Yes

ADVICE TO BRITISH NATIONALS IN WAR-RISK COUNTRIES

1. At OD(G) on 15 November we discussed ways of encouraging members of British communities in war-risk countries in the Gulf to leave the area until the danger of war had receded. It was agreed that I would prepare draft advice to families not to bring children to the area for Christmas, for consideration at the next OD(G).

2. The need for advice is urgent. Families are making plans for the Christmas holidays, and those with children at boarding schools in the UK have already made bookings for children to visit them. In view of the cancellation of the OD(G) meeting planned for 21 November, I am circulating with this minute the draft text of advice which I believe we should issue now.

3. As agreed at OD(G), we have discussed this with the Americans. Their position (which is always in the form of instructions to US officials from which the community are expected to get their briefings), is that dependants are authorised to leave, but not yet ordered to do so. Kimmitt has told us that, although they think that the Christmas period will be relatively safe, a time will come when they have to review their advice. Indeed, this is under discussion in Washington. Kimmitt understood the difficulties we face.

4. We agreed when we discussed this question that we would give the Americans and our community partners advance notice of the advice we proposed to issue, and would encourage them to give similar advice to their own communities. We would also inform the

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Governments of the countries concerned - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar - of our advice, in advance. Reports we have received from Posts suggest that they will not interpret it as a sign of lack of confidence.

5. I am copying this minute to Tom King, John Wakeham, Patrick Mayhew and Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'DH', written in a cursive style.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
23 November 1990

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


ADVICE TO BRITISH COMMUNITIES IN BAHRAIN, QATAR AND THE EASTERN  
REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

British nationals resident in Gulf countries have asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whether they should bring children at school in the UK to the area for the Christmas holidays.

We advise those living in the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain not to bring children to the area. Our advice is that those families should spend the Christmas holiday in the UK if they are able to do so. After the holiday we advise that all dependents of those families should remain outside the area until the situation in the Gulf becomes clearer.

Our advice to tourists and visitors remains unchanged. Tourists should not visit these countries. Those who have business in the area should not be deterred from travelling, but should notify the British Embassy of their presence on arrival.





✓  
c: Mahathir

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 November 1990

**MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA**

BK (

Thank you for your letter of 22 November enclosing a draft message to Dr. Mahathir about a possible UN Resolution authorising the use of force. The Prime Minister is content for the message to issue.

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

D



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 November 1990

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 1 October about the provision of protective equipment to British civilians in the United Arab Emirates. I am sorry for the delay in replying.

The threat to British citizens posed by the possible outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf is kept under constant review. The situation varies from country to country and each is looked at separately. Our latest assessment for Dubai is reflected in our travel advice, a copy of which is enclosed. At present, as the Consulate-General in Dubai will have told you, we do not believe that the level of risk in Dubai merits the issue to British civilians of protective equipment against chemical weapons attack. But if your company nevertheless wished to make protective equipment available to its employees, we could if necessary advise on sources of supply. If you would like to pursue this you should in the first instance contact the Ministry of Defence (Mr David Simpson in DESS on 071 218 2969). The export of all such equipment requires an export licence from the Department of Trade and Industry: MOD officials can give you advice on how to pursue this.

Charles Powell

Captain Anthony Abrahams

MS  
c. Abrahams  
cfo  
hw

Travel Advice:

GENERAL

Country                      Advice

Iraq/Kuwait

Do not attempt to visit.

Iran

Diplomatic relations with Iran were restored on 27 September and our Embassy at Tehran re-opened on 28 October. We no longer advise British nationals against travelling to Iran, but they should take due care to ensure that their passports, visas and any other necessary documents are in order. We urge them to inform the Embassy at Tehran of their arrival and travel plans.

Cyprus  
Egypt  
Greece  
Morocco  
Algeria  
Oman  
Libya

No reason for people to change their plans. Travellers should stay in close touch with events and keep their plans under review.

Israel

It is, of course, for you to decide whether or not to visit Israel. The situation in the Middle East is clearly tense and there is an element of unpredictability. We see no reason to discourage visitors to Israel, although travellers should stay in touch with events through the media and keep plans under review. When in Israel, visitors should take sensible precautions, listen to or read the media (BBC and local) and keep clear of large crowds and demonstrations. Travellers with any doubts about routes should check with the British Consulates in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, with which they can register if they wish.

The Israeli authorities are now distributing gas masks in a planned, gradual way to the Israeli civilian population, and are emphasising that the exercise is not related to any specific expectation of an Iraqi attack. The Israeli authorities have indicated that tourists would be given masks in an emergency.

Under present conditions, we advise British

nationals seriously to consider the wisdom of visiting or staying in East Jerusalem or other Occupied Territories (Gaza and the West Bank). West Jerusalem remains secure. It is unwise for Westerners to go on foot in Arab neighbourhoods as tensions and confrontations have been exacerbated by developments in the Gulf and they could become the target of hostilities. Security measures, which include restrictions on movement, could affect tourists.

For those who do visit those areas, risks are minimised by using experienced tour operators and taxi drivers with local knowledge. Travellers are also recommended to keep track of regional developments from media broadcasts during the current period of Middle East tension.

#### Syria

No reason not to visit but travellers should keep in close touch with events and keep their plans under review. Visitors should be aware that the UK has no formal diplomatic relations with Syria. The British Interests Section of the Australian Embassy in Damascus can offer only limited consular assistance.

#### Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Qatar

UAE

Republic of Yemen

Jordan

#### Visitors:

Those with business in these countries should not be deterred from making necessary visits. Tourists and others whose visits are a matter of choice should defer their journeys. But the situation is fast-moving: travellers should stay in close touch with events and keep their plans under review.

#### Returning Residents:

##### Saudi Arabia

- Eastern Province: Non-essential staff and dependants should delay their return if possible until situation becomes clearer.
- Western and Central Province: Those wishing to return should do so; including dependants if employers agree.

Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Jordan

Those who need to return to work should do so; but dependants should consider delaying their return until the situation



becomes clearer.

Sudan

Travellers should only visit Sudan if their journey is essential. All who travel to Sudan are advised not to travel to the south of the country, except under the auspices of UN Operation Lifeline, and to consult the British Embassy in Khartoum before travelling to the West of Sudan. Chadian rebel activity in Northern Darfur makes that area unsafe.

Turkey

There is at present no reason not to travel to Turkey. Travellers should nevertheless be aware that there have been recent terrorist incidents in the South East of Turkey in the provinces of Diyarbakir, Elaziq, Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt. The main tourist cities of Diyarbaki Dogubayazit and Van have been unaffected. There have been no incidents in North East Turkey.

Visitors are advised against travelling off the main roads between provincial capitals and travelling after dark. If in doubt the British Embassy in Ankara should be consulted.

Tunisia

Visitors should avoid large crowds and political discussion.

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SECRET



// KW  
c/foreign/webb

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 November 1990

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE GULF

The Prime Minister has seen the Attorney's letter of 21 November about our strategic objectives in the Gulf. She thinks it would be a good idea if a military appreciation of the sort which he suggests could be prepared rapidly.

I am copying this letter to the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General, the Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Robin Butler, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq  
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1990

Dear Charles,

Letter to the Prime Minister from Channel Air PLC

Your letter of 3 October asked for a draft reply to a letter the Prime Minister had received from Captain Anthony Abrahams of Channel Air PLC. I enclose a draft.

Our assessment is that the risk of Iraqi chemical attack against Dubai is very low. OD(G) agreed on 8 November to preposition respirators for British civilians in Bahrain, Qatar, and the Eastern and Central Regions of Saudi Arabia only, and noted that if a decision were later taken to issue respirators, costs should be recovered from employers wherever possible. The decision to preposition is not yet public knowledge.

You should be aware that core staff at our posts in the Gulf (including Dubai) have been issued with NBC suits. Knowledge of this has been kept to a small number of staff in each mission. If it became public, we would justify it on the grounds that the staff concerned would be required to remain at post during any hostilities, while we would expect civilians to leave.

(S L Cass)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SCANNED

DRAFT LETTER FROM PS/NO 10

To: Captain Anthony Abrahams  
Director  
Channel Air PLC  
'Bridgers'  
Roundabout Lane  
WEST CHILTINGTON  
West Sussex RH20 2RB

*To Mr*

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 1 October about the provision of protective equipment to British civilians in the United Arab Emirates. I am sorry for the delay in replying.

The threat to British citizens posed by the possible outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf is kept under constant review. The situation varies from country to country and each is looked at separately. Our latest assessment for Dubai is reflected in our travel advice, a copy of which is enclosed. At present, as the Consulate-General in Dubai will have told you, we do not believe that the level of risk in Dubai merits the issue to British civilians of protective equipment against chemical weapons attack. But if your company nevertheless wished to make protective equipment available to its employees, we could if necessary advise on sources of supply. If you would like to pursue this you should in the first instance contact the Ministry of Defence (Mr David Simpson in DESS on 071 218 2969). The export of all such equipment requires an export licence from the Department of Trade and Industry: MOD officials can give you advice on how to pursue this.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1990

Yes  
not

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

Agree to send  
this message?

Message from the Prime Minister to the  
Malaysian Prime Minister

CD 24/11

The Prime Minister had it in mind to send a message to Dr Mahathir about the possibility of a UN Resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq. I enclose a draft.

Yes,  
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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IMMEDIATE

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FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR  
TELNO  
OF

10 IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MALAYSIAN PRIME  
11 MINISTER

12  
13 1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister  
14 to Dr Mahathir about a possible UN Resolution authorising the  
15 use of force.

16 BEGINS

17 As you know, we have begun to consider what further steps we can  
18 take collectively to make Iraq comply with the decisions of the  
19 UN Security Council. While sanctions are having a significant  
20 economic effect on Iraq, there is no evidence that they will  
21 lead to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Indeed, Saddam Hussein's  
22 announcement on 19 November of a massive reinforcement (250,000)  
23 of his troops in Kuwait confirms the impression of Iraqi  
24 intransigence.

25  
26 I recognise the concern that has prompted Malaysia and other Non  
27 Aligned members of the Council to promote a "peace initiative".  
28 But there is no escaping the fact that Iraq, a powerful and  
29 heavily armed country has invaded the small defenceless state of

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Kuwait, has systematically looted and brutalised the country since, and has engaged in a deliberate policy to drive out the Kuwaitis. Indeed if action is not taken soon, Kuwait will literally cease to exist as a state.

I am convinced therefore that the time has come to send Saddam Hussein the strongest possible signal that he must withdraw now from Kuwait. He must be left in no doubt that the alternative is military action against him and his inevitable defeat. Although this is not legally necessary, I believe on the basis of conversations I have had in Paris with President Bush, President Gorbachev and President Mitterrand, that a resolution authorising the use of force would send an unmistakable message to Saddam Hussein, particularly if such a resolution were adopted with the overwhelming support of the Security Council. This would underline the continuing unity of purpose of the international community.

I very much hope, Prime Minister, that you will agree that such a resolution would be an effective way of bringing further pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein and that you would therefore send instructions to your Permanent Representative in New York to support it.

ENDS

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (UND)

NNNN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

22<sup>nd</sup> November 1990

Dear Charles

COO 22/xi

GULF: FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS

I attach a copy of the statement which my Secretary of State intends to make to the House of Commons this afternoon at 3.30.

I am copying this letter to the Private Offices of members of OD, the Attorney-General and the Chief Whip, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(MISS J R BINSTead)  
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street



GULF: FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS

PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT

The Rt Hon Tom King MP

22nd November 1990

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on further deployments of British forces to the Gulf.

2. It is now over three and a half months since Iraq invaded Kuwait and has continued to defy the United Nations demand to withdraw. Sanctions have left Iraq increasingly isolated; the Royal Navy has played an important part in this embargo. But Saddam Hussein shows no sign yet of complying with UN Resolutions, and ending his barbaric treatment of the Kuwaiti people and the hostages he has detained illegally. Moreover there are now over 400,000 Iraqi troops in and near to Kuwait.

3. It remains the Government's firm objective to resolve this crisis as soon as possible and by peaceful means. To do this, it is essential to establish a credible offensive military option. Saddam Hussein must be made to realise that he is faced with a military force which will otherwise compel him to withdraw.

4. The House will be aware that there are now 30 countries involved in this multinational effort by land, sea and air, and of the significant increases in forces now in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries. In particular President Bush has announced very substantial increases in US forces.

5. The Government believes that it is right to make a further significant contribution to this multinational effort. My Hon

Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces announced last week that

we were reducing the notice to move of army units to allow prompt deployment once the final decision was taken. The Government has today decided to deploy an extra brigade and a Divisional HQ and supporting arms. These will join 7 Armoured Brigade in Saudi Arabia to form the 1st Armoured Division.

6. The additional brigade will be the 4th Brigade from Germany, with an armoured regiment of Challenger tanks, two armoured infantry battalions, equipped with Warrior fighting vehicles, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, a Field Regiment Royal Artillery together with engineers and other supporting services.

7. Additional equipment deploying with the Division will include M109 and M110 self-propelled guns, tracked and towed Rapier, and two Multiple-Launch Rocket batteries. Lynx anti-tank helicopters and additional support helicopters will also be sent. In all, some 14,000 additional Army personnel will be deployed, which will bring the strength of 1 Armoured Division to some 25,000, and the total number of UK forces committed to over 30,000.


8. The command arrangements we have agreed provide for UK forces to be placed under tactical control of a US commander for specific actions where this makes military sense. On the same basis, 1st Armoured Division may have a US brigade assigned to its tactical control.

9. Certain key skills required for this deployment will need to be offset by the selective use of Reservists. I hope that this can be met by asking individual members of the Reserve - particularly those with medical training and experience - to rejoin on short-term engagements and I would be grateful if employers would take a sympathetic view of any such requests.

10. The Government has also decided to send two more Mine Countermeasures Vessels to the Gulf.

11. These force increases will raise the operating cost of the deployment by £10 million per week and there will be substantial initial costs too.

12. The formation of a UK Armoured Division will represent a potent increase in the fighting capability of British forces in Saudi Arabia. Together with the further major American deployments, and the continued build-up of units from 30 other countries in the multinational force, the deployment I have announced today is the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that there is a credible military option, and that he must now observe Resolution 660, end his aggression, release the hostages, and leave Kuwait.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1990

*Dea Charles*

GULF CRISIS: GERMAN ASSISTANCE

Thank you for your letter of 15 November, enclosing Chancellor Kohl's letter of 18 November to the Prime Minister.

We have already had help from the Federal Ministry of Defence (without, we suspect, the Chancellor's knowledge) in a number of practical ways: for example, 7 Armoured Brigade have been provided with East German armoured personnel carriers and T-72 tanks, of the type operated by Iraq, for examination.

The full extent of assistance now offered is not spelled out; but we understand MOD see this as a potential advantage, as it should enable them to match the German assistance as closely as possible to their own requirements, by negotiation with the Federal MOD. They will of course seek to use the indefinite nature of the offer to maximise the value of the assistance actually provided. Chancellor Kohl suggests that Defence Ministers should discuss the assistance in detail, but there seems no need for this and MOD are keen to move ahead at official level. I enclose a draft reply, cleared with MOD, which covers this point.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (HMT) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*John*  
*Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

As I told you when we met in Paris, I was grateful for your letter of 13 November, in which you confirmed the willingness of the Federal Republic to assist our British forces in the Gulf area. I welcome the spirit of your decision, and gladly accept your support.

As you have rightly indicated, our best hope of a peaceful restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait lies in Saddam Hussein becoming convinced that the world stands shoulder to shoulder against his aggression, and is prepared to use force if necessary, should he refuse to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This contribution from the Federal Republic will send an unmistakable signal of international solidarity to Baghdad.

I have asked our Ministry of Defence to be in touch urgently with yours, to discuss the details.

*cm*

His Excellency Herr Helmut Kohl  
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

MIDDLE EAST : SW P13

10a-b *ccpc*



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS  
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE  
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155  
Direct line 071-828 1386

21 November 1990

C D Powell Esq  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON S W 1

*R. L. Lister*  
*We ought to ask the military for an appreciation* *CDP*

*Dear Charles*

The Attorney General has seen your letter of 18 November to Juliet Wheldon.

*21/ki*

He recalls that any force used in collective self-defence must be justified by the international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. Military operations carried out with the objective of the total destruction of the Iraqi war machine and directed towards Iraqi troops not engaged against Kuwait would not be lawful, unless those operations were necessary to liberate Kuwait and proportionate to that aim.

*Yes*

The answer to the question whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality are met will depend on all the circumstances known to us at the time when the decision is to be taken, and would in practice have to derive from a military appreciation.

The Attorney does not doubt that the military appreciation of the extent of the Iraqi war effort engaged in the occupation and subjection of Kuwait is frequently updated. He has, however, seen no such appreciation. To have as our objective (even if not fully attainable by military means) the complete destruction of the Iraqi war machine in the absence of a military appreciation that justified it, would foreseeably lead to the carrying out of operations not justifiable under international law.






I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock.


*Yours  
E S Wilmshurst*

E S WILMSHURST



*[Faint, illegible handwriting]*

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>3439</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter and enclosures from Carr to <del>and</del> Powell</i> <i>dated 20 November 1990 with attachment</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>16/1/18</i> <i>Mr. [Signature]</i>
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*Instructions for completion of Dummy Card*

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

9a-b



SECRET

AO90/2796

PRIME MINISTER

Cabinet: 22 November:  
Gulf: Reinforcement of British Forces

This will be the last item on the agenda for Cabinet. By then there will have been a discussion of the current situation in the Gulf under Foreign Affairs.

2. You are very familiar with the background. It would be useful for you to outline the strategic requirement for an offensive capability on the part of both British and American forces, and the need for an early decision.

3. The Defence Secretary could then introduce his minute. The Chief of the Defence Staff, who has been invited to attend, could summarise briefly the military implications of the three options and lend his support to the preferred solution. The Foreign Secretary could comment on the foreign policy implications of the decision.

4. You might then invite the Chief Secretary to comment on the public expenditure implications: he is consulting the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chief Secretary is expected to flag up his concerns and to suggest that the costs be dealt with bilaterally with the Defence Secretary.

5. The Health Secretary could be asked to confirm that he accepts the effect on the Health Service (paragraph 8(4) on page 6 of the Defence Secretary's minute).

SECRET



b

SECRET

6. The Attorney General has been invited to comment on the legal implications of the call-up of a Royal Auxiliary Air Force medical evacuation squadron, and he may want to comment on the legal position over the call-up of reservists generally (paragraph 8(5) on pages 6 and 7 of the minute).

7. You might then invite contributions from other colleagues. The Chief Whip may wish to comment on the Parliamentary aspects.

8. Finally, you could remind colleagues that the Saudi Government is being informed of the decision and that the Defence Secretary will inform Parliament either by an oral statement or a written answer (to be confirmed) in the afternoon. You and the Defence Secretary may also wish to send messages to President Bush and Mr Cheney respectively.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

Cabinet Office  
21 November 1990

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INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: THE GULF

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE THIS AFTERNOON THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT SEEMED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT MORNING THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE VERY CLOSE. WE UNDERSTOOD GORBACHEV WANTED TO INCLUDE A DATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD CONSIDERED VARIOUS OPTIONS CAREFULLY. IF THERE WAS TO BE A RESOLUTION, WE NEEDED TO CONSULT THE CHINESE, FRENCH AND OTHERS CLOSELY. THE SOVIET UNION SAW IT AS A TWO-STAGE PROCESS. THE FIRST STAGE WAS A WARNING TO SADDAM HUSSEIN GIVING HIM ANOTHER CHANCE, PERHAPS UNTIL 15-20 JANUARY, THOUGH THAT WAS SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATION. THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO BEGIN TO WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS AND RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES. THAT FIRST PHASE WOULD LAST UNTIL BETWEEN 15-20 JANUARY. AFTER THAT, IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SAW NO EVIDENCE OF ACTION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, IE IF HE FAILED TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND RELEASE THE HOSTAGES, THEN WE WOULD HAVE TO TALK ABOUT OTHER MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN MIND THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE ADOPTED BEFORE 1 DECEMBER BUT THEY DID NOT WANT IT BROADCAST THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THAT KIND OF RESOLUTION BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO WORK ON YEMEN, CUBA, MALAYSIA AND OTHERS, AND ESPECIALLY CHINA. HE HAD PLACED A PHONE CALL TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE HOPE OF AGREEING A DATE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THEM.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WOULD, OF COURSE RESPECT THE SOVIET CONFIDENCE. AS REGARDS THE DATE, THERE WERE TWO REASONS WHICH HAD LED US TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. ONE WAS THAT IF YOU PUT A DATE IN THE RESOLUTION THAT WOULD CREATE GREAT EXCITEMENT, EVEN HYSTERIA. SECOND, SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO MAKE A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK ON OUR FORCES JUST BEFORE THAT DATE. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR, HE AGREED, THAT THERE WAS A PEACEFUL WAY OUT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN, IE THAT HE COULD WITHDRAW IN PEACE. PERHAPS THAT COULD BE MADE CLEAR WITHOUT SPECIFYING A DATE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE. PERHAPS MORE WORK WAS NEEDED ON THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION. HE THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO INDICATE A DATE SO THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN KNEW THAT THE ISSUE HAD TO BE RESOLVED WITHIN A CERTAIN TIMESCALE OR THINGS MIGHT TURN OUT BADLY FOR HIM.

FERGUSSON

YYYY

CDP Mr

①

8a-n



Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15/1D

PRIME MINISTER

The Defence Secretary's recommendation for Cabinet tomorrow is:

- an additional Armoured Brigade plus divisional troops to form a division (with US participation).

- to consider 24 more Tornados  
- ~~not~~ not to send a Carrier Group.

GULF: REINFORCEMENT OPTIONS

Following the United States decision to deploy additional forces, I have been considering whether we should reinforce our forces in the area. During his recent visit the US Secretary of State, Mr Baker made specific requests: the expansion of our ground force to an Armoured Division; transport units to assist US forces; and additional mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs).

CDP  
21/15

The Need for Reinforcements

2. At present Saddam Hussein shows no sign of willingness to withdraw from Kuwait. It is therefore not sufficient simply to have forces in place, we must make absolutely clear our determination and our ability to evict him by force if necessary. Although there are sufficient Allied forces in place to give confidence in their ability to defend Saudi Arabia we should not underestimate the problems of an offensive. There are some 26 Iraqi divisions totalling some 400,000 men in the Kuwait area which have been developing elaborate defensive positions for some three months and are continuing to do so. (And Saddam Hussein has just claimed that he is sending another 250,000 troops to the area).

3. What we therefore need to do is to reinforce the Allied forces on the ground so that there is a genuine offensive force which is





manifestly capable of defeating the Iraqi Army and recapturing Kuwait. We must encourage the maximum number of other non-US forces to be ready to participate in an offensive. We cannot, however, rely on them and must therefore assume that such an operation would have to be mounted principally by UK/US forces. Even when the additional US divisions announced last week are operational in January the ground force ratios would remain in Iraq's favour:

	End Nov 1990	January 1991
	Iraq US/UK	Iraq US/UK
Troops	2.4:1	1.4:1
Tanks	3.8:1	1.3:1
Artillery	3.8:1	2.2:1

Despite Allied air superiority, they demonstrate clearly the need for additional armoured/mechanised forces of the sort announced by President Bush and requested by Mr Baker.

#### Options for Increased UK Ground Forces

4. There are three ways in which the UK ground force contribution could be enhanced:

a. Strengthening 7 Armoured Brigade. The fighting power of 7 Armd Bde could be increased by including any or all of an additional armoured, artillery or engineer regiment and a mechanised infantry battalion.

b. Additional Mechanised Brigade. An additional mechanised brigade would consist of one Challenger tank regiment, two mechanised infantry battalions, one artillery



regiment and brigade troops. Additional support helicopters also be required. The total number of reinforcements would be just under 8500 troops (see Annex A).

c. Formation of a UK Armoured Division. Mr Baker's request was for the formation of an Armoured Division normally comprising 3 brigades and divisional troops (artillery, aviation, engineers, logistics). We could find one but not two additional mechanised brigades (as described in (b)) from our own resources, but we have established that the US would be prepared to place one of their brigades (with its own support elements) under UK control in a composite division. On this basis, the formation of a Division would require some 5500 men (over and above those in the additional Mechanised Brigade) to provide the HQ and the UK divisional troops - see Annex B and full divisional Order of Battle at Annex C.

5. Costs. Our broad estimate of additional costs for the existing deployments for this financial year is £400M. The estimated additional costs of the three options are as follows:

	<u>Modifications &amp; Procurement</u>	<u>Deployment</u>	<u>Running Costs(per week)</u>
(a) Enhanced Brigade	up to £65M	up to £16M	up to £2.8M
(b) Additional Brigade	£170M	£25M	£6M
(c) Armoured Division	£260M	£50M	£11M



(mechanised) brigade would be significant militarily and politically, it would be less effective both because it would lack the additional combat power contributed by the divisional troops and because the combat power and tactical employment of two UK brigades would be maximised if they were formed into a UK division. This would also be the most economical effective logistic arrangement. Enhancing 7 Armoured Brigade would provide a useful increase in its fighting power, this would be much less significant than the other options in terms of overall Allied strength.

8. We do, however, need to consider carefully the implications, particularly if deploying an additional brigade or a full division. Apart from cost, the key considerations are:

(1) Both a second brigade and a full division would probably be 'one-shot' options. We would find it very difficult to find sufficient rotational troops to maintain these force levels in full for more than six months. Nor would we be able to meet Mr Baker's request for transport assistance with either of these options.

(2) All three options would further curtail BAOR's operational capability. For an additional brigade or a division, BAOR would suffer a severe reduction in operational viability.

(3) Although a second brigade or a full division would be a considerably more effective fighting formation than an enhanced 7 Armd Bde, they would be more difficult to sustain operationally. There are problems with the necessary equipment and logistic preparations to make a



force of this size fully viable. In particular, we would only have sufficient engine spares to sustain the Challenger tank force for a period of mobile operations of about 20 days, against 30 at present. We could meet our ammunition requirements only by drawing on the stocks of allies. Initial soundings have indicated a general willingness to release stocks for our use. On that basis, I am satisfied that the procurement and logistic problems are not insuperable.

(4) It would, of course, be necessary to increase medical provision to correspond with an increase in combat troops. Casualty rates are very difficult to predict but NATO planning, tempered by experience from the 1967 Arab/Israeli War, suggests we should plan on an additional 1000 beds to cope with possible peak rate casualties from heavy combat by a UK Division. This would require closure of most service hospitals both in UK and Germany which will in time add to the pressure on the NHS. I hope, however, that it will be possible temporarily to withdraw to this country some surgical staff who have set up the initial medical facilities for 7 Armoured Brigade and return them to the Gulf in January.

(5) An additional brigade or a division would require the deployment of some 80 specialist reservists (principally medical staff, engineers, artillery) and perhaps up to 800 more to replace regulars deployed to the Gulf. Initially we will call for volunteers from both the Regular Reserves (ie individuals who have left the regular forces) and the Volunteer Reserves. If those are insufficient we will call-up Regular Reserves selectively under Section 11 of



the Reserve Forces Act 1980, although Parliament would have to be notified. I aim to avoid compulsory call-out of the TA. There may, however, be a need to use a Royal Auxiliary Air Force medical evacuation squadron which would be needed on the outbreak of hostilities. These cannot be called out under Section 11 but initial legal advice is that it would be possible to do so under the alternative Section 10, if hostilities were imminent. I should be grateful for the Attorney General's advice on this point.

9. In summary, the formation of a UK Armoured Division would be the single most effective military and political contribution we could make to the Allied effort. It would, however, have severe implications for BAOR; it would be less operationally sustainable than a single Brigade; and we should not be able to assist with the US transport needs. Nevertheless, the military priority is to provide the most substantial combat reinforcement, to offset the Iraqi numerical superiority. For this reason, I believe that we should expand our ground contribution to a division as outlined in paragraph 4c.

10. I must, however, warn of the cost implications. I agreed a cost-sharing arrangement with the Chief Secretary for the present Gulf operations but the scale of this enlargement would be such that it could only be funded from the Reserve.

#### MCMVs

11. Mr Baker also specifically requested the deployment of additional Mine-counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs). The US are short of such vessels and if amphibious or naval gunfire



operations are planned (even as deception tasks) it will be necessary to ensure that the relevant sea area is clear of mines. Two additional MCMVs are currently being prepared for despatch to the Gulf and could be there by mid-January.

#### Possible Additional Reinforcements

12. I am also considering two other ways in which we might reinforce our forces:

a. Offensive Air. An increase in offensive air power could itself add to the capability of the ground force. This could be provided by deploying up to 24 further Tornado GR1s supported by additional tanker aircraft. Until we know more about additional US air reinforcements and about the practicalities of basing additional aircraft in the area, it is not possible to reach a firm decision. We are taking some initial steps to prepare these aircraft, without any commitment, to allow them to be deployed rapidly if needed. I will report further on this in due course.

b. CVS Group. Although not mentioned by Mr Baker or General Schwarzkopf, the Americans have suggested that the UK deploy a CVS Group (a carrier, two escorts and two auxiliaries) to the Red Sea to take over coordination of embargo operations there in order to release one of the US large strike carriers so that its offensive air capability can be turned to best effect. I am at present not persuaded of this case. Maritime Operations is one area where other Allies can make substantial contributions and



do more. I am also mindful that, while we must be prepared to pay our share of the cost of defeating this aggression, it will be very expensive and if this is an area where Allies can contribute they should be urged to do so.

These possibilities are outlined in more detail at Annex D.

#### CONCLUSION

13. I recommend that we should proceed immediately with the despatch of an additional mechanised brigade and other reinforcements to form a UK Armoured Division. We must recognise, of course, that our greater involvement will increase the possible scale of losses - both in men and materials. But they will also reduce the chances of having to fight at all, and reduce the likely casualties if we have to fight. I would need to discuss the cost to the Reserve with the Chief Secretary, taking into account any assistance which we may be able to obtain from our allies. I invite colleagues to note that I am considering the need for further reinforcements to our offensive air capability and the possibility of sending a CVS Group to the Red Sea.

14. I am sending copies of this minute to the members of OD, the Health Secretary, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Attorney-General, and to the Cabinet Secretary.

Ministry of Defence  
20 November 1990

(T K)



### ADDITIONAL MECHANISED BRIGADE

1. Organization. Mechanised brigade consisting of Challenger regiment, and two mechanised infantry battalions together with an artillery regiment and brigade troops.
2. Logistic Support. Further third line, or line of communication, logistic support will be required to sustain the brigade between the rear maintenance area and the brigade positions.
3. Divisional Support. The brigade will be dependent on the divisional formation into which it will be integrated for additional combat support such as area Air Defence (normally provided by Rapier), general support artillery, reconnaissance and anti tank aviation support.
4. Movement. Movement of the brigade to the Gulf by sea would take in the order of 30-40 days which includes the time required to collect shipping from trade, move to the port and load the shipping. On arrival in theatre the formation will need to unload, move forward, shake out, acclimatize for operations and conduct the necessary battle procedures. Total period required to become fully operational is about 65 days.
5. Summary of Main Equipments and Manpower

MBT	59
Warrior	186
Scorpion	11
Scimitar	63
Striker	18
Milan	51
Mortar 81mm	17
M109	42
Javelin	47

#### Manpower



Fighting Echelon	4,350
Immediate logistic support	1,771
Rear logistic support	1,447
	<u>7,568</u>
Battle Casualty Replacements	220
TOTAL	<u>7,787</u>
Support Helicopters	600
GRAND TOTAL	<u>8,388</u>



ANNEX BDIVISIONAL ELEMENTS

<u>Headquarters</u>	160
<u>HQ Signal Regiment</u>	974
<u>Electronic Warfare Regiment</u>	215
<u>Divisional Artillery</u>	2103
Heavy Regiment (12 x M109 guns, 12 x M110 guns + locating battery)	
2 x Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Batteries	
Air Defence Regiment (Rapier missiles)	
<u>Divisional Engineers</u>	736
<u>Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment</u>	422
(Additional to element with 7 Armd Brigade)	
<u>Aviation Regiment</u>	463
Attack/Reconnaissance Helicopters	
	<u>5102</u>

**UK ARMoured DIVISION**



<b>Second Line Logistic Support (1946)</b>	<b>Second Line Logistic Support (1771)</b>	<b>Third Line Logistic Support (2627)</b>	
<b>Third Line Logistic Support (2688)</b>	Transport Regiment 699	Tank Transporter Regiment 322	Total 2nd and 3rd Line Support  <b>9032</b>
	Engineer & Ambulance Transport Sqns 121	Transport Regiment 928	
	Armoured Field Ambulance 505	Ambulance Squadron 200	
	Ordnance Company 78	Field Hospital (600 bed) 754	
	Armoured Workshop 264	Ordnance Company 190	
	Provost Platoons 83	Aircraft Workshop 64	
	Postal and Courier 21	Other units 169	

Battle Casualty Replacements (BCRs) (3%) :	<b>400</b>
7th Armoured Brigade BCRs (in theatre) :	<b>276</b>
<b>Total Battle Casualty Replacements</b>	<b>676</b>

Additional support elements for 7th Armd Bde (in theatre) **1263**

**TOTAL STRENGTH 24980**

\* - includes support for Divisional elements


ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENT OPTIONSOffensive Air

1. Tornado GR1. Up to 24 additional Tornado GR1 could be deployed by the end of January 1991 as the best means of increasing the RAF offensive strike capability in theatre. There are, however, considerable logistic and, particularly, basing problems at present. Additional weapon stocks would be required and fuel resupply at Tabuk would require further investigation. In particular, there is insufficient ramp space available in either Saudi Arabia or Bahrain at present, although this constraint would be likely to reduce at the district of hostilities, especially once the threat of Iraqi air attack on bases had been removed. One option would therefore be to prepare some or all of these aircraft to permit rapid deployment at a later stage; this might include forward basing, for example in Cyprus.
2. Supporting Air-to-Air refuelling. The distance of potential targets from our main bases in Saudi Arabia requires AAR to extend range/duration of our offensive and defensive aircraft. AAR tankers are required to provide some augmentation of in theatre offensive and defensive air assets (and indeed, aircraft arriving from out of theatre). Two further VC10Ks could be deployed to bring the total to 9 (the complete VC10K fleet); 8 Victors could also be deployed. Basing options might include Luxor in Egypt.
3. Naval Carrier Group (CVS). The US Group in the Red Sea (which is based on a large strike carrier) is employed on embargo enforcement, control of allied maritime navies, surface surveillance and area air defence. This prevents it from realising its full potential as part of a US offensive force. This is not an economical use of the force available and a small UK Carrier Group would also be able to undertake these duties and would thus be one way of releasing the US Group. Work is in hand on a possible operating concept for RN co-ordination of embargo operations in the Red Sea, taking into account the rather different circumstances and problems from the Gulf. It is also worth noting that the present US concept of operations in the Red Sea appears to be rather different from that in the Gulf area and has given rise to some problems. There may be other roles for which CVS Group would provide a valuable asset, in terms of air defence or command and control, for example in evacuation operations.



4. Costs. Some broad estimates of additional costs of these options are:

	<u>Modifications</u>	<u>Operating (per week)</u>
a.	Tornados        £ 3M	) Depends on numbers ) deployed and ) consumption rates. )
b.	AAR                -	
c.	CVS Group        £12.0M	£0.2M



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201330Z NOV  
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TO DESKBY 201615Z FCO  
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OF 201330Z <sup>NOVEMBER</sup> OCTOBER 90  
INFO DESKBY 201615Z PARIS  
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, RIYADH, WASHINGTON, ESC LONDON  
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, GULF POSTS, TEHRAN

PARIS: FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

FCO TELNO 567 TO AMMAN: ALLEGED ROAD FOR SANCTIONS EVASION

SUMMARY

1. NO EVIDENCE FROM US OR OUR OWN SOURCES TO SUPPORT SAUDI ALLEGATIONS ABOUT JORDANIAN SANCTIONS-BUSTING ACTIVITIES ALTHOUGH SOME EVASION AND SMUGGLING UNDOUBTEDLY PERSISTS.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US EMBASSY WHOSE MILITARY ATTACHE RECENTLY VISITED THE AREA SPECIFICALLY TO CHECK THIS STORY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH ROAD NEAR THE PLACES MENTIONED IN RIYADH TELNO 1169.

3. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE JORDANIAN ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE AREA FROM H4/RUWEISHED (THE JORDAN CUSTOMS POST) AND THE ACTUAL BORDER WITH IRAQ 72 KM DUE EAST (10KM SHORT OF THE IRAQ CUSTOMS POST AT TURAYBIL). THE CONTRACT WAS LET IN MARCH 1988 AND REFLECTED THE INCREASE IN JORDAN-IRAQ TRADE DURING THE PAST 10 YEARS.

4. THE H4/RUWEISHED-IRAQ BORDER ROAD IS BEING UPGRADED AND IN PLACES A NEW ROAD IS BEING BUILT PARALLEL (NOT MORE THAN 500 METRES AWAY). A NEW ROAD HAS BEEN BUILT DUE SOUTH FROM THE JORDAN POLICE POST ON THE ACTUAL BORDER TO THE JORDAN NATURAL GAS EXTRACTION PLANT AT RISHEH. HEAVY PLANT IS CONCENTRATED BOTH AT H4/RUWEISHED AND AT A CONSTRUCTION CAMP HALFWAY ALONG THE ROAD FROM THERE TO IRAQ.

5. ALTHOUGH THE AREA EAST OF H4/RUWEISHED IS NORMALLY CLOSED (TO PREVENT SMUGGLING) WE HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE ACCESS WHILE EVACUEES WERE PASSING THROUGH JORDAN ALONG THE TURAYBIL-H4/RUWEISHED ROAD. MANY VISITS TO THIS AREA WERE MADE BY WESTERN POLITICIANS, DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS AND IT SEEMS UNLIEKLY THAT CONSTRUCTION OF AN ENTIRELY NEW ROAD WOULD HAVE GONE UNNOTICED. HOWEVER, THE ONLY WAY TO BE SURE WOULD BE TO OBTAIN OVERHEAD COVERAGE OF THE AREA.

6. RIYADH TELNO 1184 DESCRIBES FURTHER ALLEGATIONS ABOUT SANCTIONS-BUSTING ACTIVITIES BY THE JORDANIANS. WE SHALL TRY TO CHECK FURTHER ON THESE, BUT OUR INITIAL REACTION, WHICH IS SHARED BY THE AMERICANS, IS THAT A FREE ZONE ESTABLISHED FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD BE HARD TO CONCEAL: AND THE EXISTING ONE AT ZERQA

IS REGULARLY VISITED EG BY EMBASSY OFFICIALS CLEARING INCOMING DUTY-FREE GOODS. IN ANY CASE, LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF GOODS INTO IRAQ WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO USE THE ROAD THROUGH RUWEISHED AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE PICKED UP BY OUR MONITORING EXERCISE.

7. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT SOME SANCTIONS EVASION IS TAKING PLACE. THE REAL ISSUE IS ON WHAT SCALE AND WHETHER IT IS WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES. BOTH WE AND THE AMERICANS (WHO HAVE OF COURSE MORE RESOURCES TO DEVOTE TO SANCTIONS MONITORING) AGREE BROADLY THAT TRAFFIC ON THE ONLY OFFICIAL ROAD TO IRAQ REMAINS AT A LOW LEVEL (FROM A PRE-CRISIS RATE OF AROUND 700 LADEN TRUCKS A DAY TO SOMETHING LESS THAN 5 PER CENT OF THAT FIGURE, AND AT LEAST SOME OF THE LATTER CAN BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED). ADMITTEDLY OUR MONITORING OF THIS TRAFFIC IS IMPERFECT BUT WE ARE SATISFIED THAT IT IS GOOD ENOUGH TO CATCH ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE.

8. A MORE DIFFICULT AREA IS SMUGGLING WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY TAKING PLACE BY SMALL VEHICLES AND EVEN DONKEY TRAINS. BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN OVER THE MOST OBVIOUS GROUND FOR SMUGGLING (NORTH FROM THE EAST-WEST ROAD TO THE SYRIAN BORDER) AND HAVE DETECTED NO SIGN OF LARGE-SCALE VEHICLE MOVEMENTS. SOME OF THE ALLEGATIONS ORIGINATING IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE IN ANY CASE DIFFICULT TO FATHOM. WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A DUTY FREE ZONE NEEDED FOR WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A SMUGGLING OPERATION? IS IT LIKELY THAT A BOUNTY OF JD 1500, WHICH FOR A JORDANIAN TRUCK DRIVER IS MORE THAN HALF A YEAR'S SALARY, WOULD BE PAID FOR EACH CARGO? AND SO ON. THUS, IF THERE IS HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SOME OF THE ALLEGATIONS ORIGINATING IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY IT BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO MONITOR AS BEST WE CAN.

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PARIS: FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

POSTPONEMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

SUMMARY

1. US REASONS FOR POSTPONEMENT: KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT AND IRAQI INITIATIVE ON HOSTAGES. THE KING APPEARS INCREASINGLY DIVORCED FROM HIS OWN POLICY-MAKING APPARATUS.

DETAIL

2. IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON JORDAN RADIO ON 19 NOVEMBER THAT KING HUSSEIN'S PROPOSED MEETING IN PARIS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH (APPARENTLY FIXED AT SHORT NOTICE) HAD BEEN 'POSTPONED' AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMERICANS.

3. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE REASONS FOR THE AMERICAN DECISION WERE TWO-FOLD: FIRST, THE CONTENT OF THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT (MY TELNO 789): AND SECONDLY, SADDAM'S ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, ON WHICH THE AMERICANS DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE USING THE KING AS AN INTERMEDIARY FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. HARRISON SAID THAT WHAT HAD PARTICULARLY UPSET THE AMERICANS WAS THE KING'S ALLEGATION THAT THEIR MAIN PURPOSE IN INTERVENING IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE OIL RESOURCES. HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH THE KING, MAKING THE POINT THAT BUSH HAD NEVER QUESTIONED THE KING'S MOTIVES OVER THE GULF CRISIS AND DID NOT EXPECT THE KING TO CHALLENGE HIS, ESPECIALLY IN PUBLIC. THE ABSENCE OF ANY CRITICISM OF, OR REFERENCE TO, THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD ALSO BEEN NOTED.

COMMENT

5. BOTH IN HIS SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT AND IN HIS SUBSEQUENT ADDRESS TO A CONFERENCE OF JORDANIAN YOUTH, IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO 'POWERS WHO WERE NOW TRYING TO ACHIEVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY WHAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED GEOGRAPHICALLY THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT', THE KING SEEMS TO HAVE IGNORED OFFICIAL JORDANIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE CRISIS. LOCAL PRESS COMMENT ON BOTH SPEECHES (NO DOUBT OFFICIALLY INSPIRED) HAS STRESSED THAT HE IS ACTING AS THE CONSCIENCE OF THE ARAB NATION AND THAT HE IS REFLECTING THE POPULAR MOOD IN JORDAN.

*I doubt if this phrase was coined by the King.*

6. IT IS NOT SO SURPRISING THAT THE KING CONTINUES TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE GOVERNMENT. THAT HAS BEEN A FEATURE OF THE



(ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT) BALANCING ACT WHICH HE HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO PERFORM SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS. WHAT IS MORE WORRYING IS THAT BOTH SPEECHES SEEM TO INDICATE A FAILURE TO APPRECIATE - OR TO BE INTERESTED IN - THE EFFECTS OF SUCH COMMENTS ON THE OPINION OF THE WIDER WORLD - PARTICULARLY AMONG JORDAN'S TRADITIONAL FRIENDS.

7. I SUSPECT THE ABSENCE OF THE CROWN PRINCE MAY BE PART OF THE EXPLANATION. HAD HE BEEN CONSULTED, I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THESE TWO SPEECHES THROUGH. THE KING APPARENTLY SAID IN PRIVATE THAT HE DID NOT DISCUSS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT IN ADVANCE AND MERELY READ WHAT WAS PRESENTED TO HIM. THIS SEEMS A BARELY CREDIBLE EXPLANATION AND IF TRUE, TO OFFER A TELLING COMMENT ON HIS CURRENT LACK OF GRIP ON THE POLICY-MAKING MACHINE.

8. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HARRISON'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED SINCE HE HAS NOT YET SPOKEN TO THE KING.

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SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERVIEW WITH ABC TELEVISION

SUMMARY

1. ON 15 NOVEMBER SADDAM REPEATS HIS CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL DIALOGUE. HE STRESSES THAT THE DECISION FOR WAR (OR NOT) RESTS WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND CALLS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF ALL MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. HE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RULE OUT A WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. SLIGHT SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY OVER THE POLICY OF HOSTAGES BUT NO CHANGE IN HIS BASIC ARGUMENT FOR THEIR DETENTION.

DETAIL

2. ON 17 NOVEMBER IRAQI TV BROADCAST SADDAM'S INTERVIEW OF 15 NOVEMBER WITH THE ABC JOURNALIST PETER JENNINGS. SADDAM EMPHASISED THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS WAR RESTED WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND THOSE WHO WERE PUSHING IT IN THIS DIRECTION. HE REPEATEDLY CLAIMED THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE WANTED PEACE AND STABILITY AND THAT THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS THROUGH DIALOGUE.

3. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS REMARK THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE, SADDAM SAID THAT WHILE THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE READY TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR PEACE THEY WERE AT THE SAME TIME READY TO MAKE SACRIFICES IN WAR IF THEY WERE DRIVEN TO IT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NATURE OF THE SACRIFICES REQUIRED SHOULD BE DECIDED UPON THROUGH DIALOGUE. SADDAM SAID THAT BECAUSE PEACE WOULD BE A BIG PRIZE THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE REGION, AND ONE FROM WHICH THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD BENEFIT, THEN THE CONCERNED PARTIES SHOULD MAKE SACRIFICES AND IRAQ WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO MUST DO SO.

4. SADDAM GAVE NO DIRECT INDICATION OF HOW HE IMAGINED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE QUOTE ROAD TO PEACE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF SYRIA, SAYING THAT IF SYRIA WERE ASKED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS LEBANON IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR IT TO DO SO UNLESS THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS REWARD. IT WAS NECESSARY TO OFFER SOME PRIZE, HE SAID, AND THE ARABS CONSIDERED THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE AND JERUSALEM TO BE SUCH A PRIZE.

5. SADDAM ACCUSED BUSH OF HAVING CHANGED THE RULES OF THE GAME SINCE 2 AUGUST. HE HAD SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL MISSION OF HIS TROOPS HAD BEEN THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA, THEN HE HAD BEGUN TO SPEAK ABOUT OIL, AND THEN, WHEN CRITICIZED FOR THIS, HAD TALKED

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MORALITY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTI-IRAQ COALITION, SADDAM SAID THAT SOME OF THEM HAD A SHARED OBJECTIVE, OTHERS WERE NOT AGREED. HE WENT ON TO ALLEGE (TO JENNINGS' EVIDENT DISBELIEF) THAT AMERICA'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTROL THE WHOLE WORLD NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE SCENE: IT WAS BEGINNING WITH EUROPE AND JAPAN AND TO CONTRL THEM NEEDED TO CONTROL THE MIDDLE EAST OIL FIELDS.

6. WHEN ASKED OUTRIGHT HOW HE BELIEVED THE PROBLEM OF KUWAIT COULD BE SOLVED SADDAM REITERATED HIS BELIEF IN DIALOGUE AND SAID THAT WHEN THE GULF CRISIS WAS DESCRIBED AS THE RESULT AND NOT THE CAUSE, AND WHEN A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION WAS SOUGHT, THEN ALL PROBLEMS WOULD BE SOLVED. SADDAM SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE BETWEEN THOSE WHO WERE SEEKING TO ATTACK AND THOSE WHO WERE THE TARGET. IT SHOULD HAVE INTERNATIONAL AND ARAB PARTICIPATION FROM THE PARTIES CONCERNED WITH GLOBAL SECURITY AND PEACE. HE DECLINED TO GIVE DETAILS BUT SAID THAT IF AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS REQUIRED THEN IT HAD TO HAVE THE RIGHT CLIMATE AND THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE WHO HAD TO ENTER INTO DIRECT DIALOGUE WERE IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA. IF THE SOLUTION WAS TO BE AN INTERNATIONAL ONE THEN THE MOST IMPORTANT INTERLOCUTORS WERE IRAQ AND THE US. HE SAID IT WAS NATURAL THAT QUOTE FINAL DECISIONS UNQUOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, PLUS GERMANY AND JAPAN.

7. WHEN ASKED IF HE WAS PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT SADDAM REPLIED THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO SEARCH FOR PEACE FOR THE WHOLE REGION: BUT THE SAME CRITERIA SHOULD BE USED FOR ALL PROBLEMS. HE REFERRED TO A REMARK OF MR HEATH'S CONCERNING KUWAIT WHICH HE QUOTED AS : QUOTE HOW CAN YOU NOT HOLD A DIALOGHUE WITH BAGHDAD. DO YOU WANT BAGHDAD TO WITHDRAW TO BORDERS WHICH I (IE MR HEATH) MYSELF DREW UP, OR DO YOU WANT BAGHDAD TO WITHDRAW TO BORDERS UPON WHICH THE AMIRS OF KUWAIT SUBSEQUENTLY ENCROACHED? UNQUOTE. SADDAM SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH MUTUAL HUMILITY TO ARRIVE AT A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION.

8. ON HOSTAGES SADDAM SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO ONCE THE IRAQIS FELT THAT WAR WAS NOT IMMINENT AND THAT THERE WAS THINKING AMOG AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT SUGGESTED THEY HAD BEGUN TO LOOK AT ALTERNATIVES. SADDAM HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE TOO FAR AWAY.

9. WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ABU AL ABBAS AND ABU NIDAL SADDAM DESCRIBED THEM AS ARAB CITIZENS ABOUT WHOM THE IRAQI OPINION DIFFERED FROM THE AMERICAN ONE. THEY WERE, SADDAM SAID, STRUGGLERS FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN ALL CASES HE HAD ADVISED PALESTINIAN STRUGGLERS TO AVOID COMMITTING MISTAKES THAT DAMAGED THEIR REPUTATION. WHEN ASKED THIS REFERRED TO THE ROME AIRPORT ATTACK OR THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR HE REFUSED TO GO INTO DETAIL.

#### COMMENT

10. THE INTERVIEW WAS NOTABLE, BY THE STANDARDS OF OTHER SIMILIAR OCCASIONS RECENTLY, FOR ITS MODERATION. IT WAS RELATIVELY FREE OF SELLIOERENT RHETORIC AOTHOUGH REFERENCES TO IRAQI'S READINESS TO DEFEND ITSELF WERE INCLUDED FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION. THE REPEATED REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE AND SADDAM'S PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION PERHAPS INICATE A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS AWAY FROM DEFIANCE. THE WORDING OF THE CONDITION FOR THE RELEASE OF WESTERN HOSTAGES IS LOOSER THAN PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, SUGGESTING THAT A DECLARATION OF INTENT OR SIMPLY AS CHANGE IN IRAQI PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT MIGHT SUFFICE.

11. SADDAM'S QUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR ABU AL-ABBAS AND OTHER TERRORISTS  
CONTRASTS WITH HIS EARLIER FULSOME ENDORSEMENTS OF THEM AND THEIR  
ACTIVITIES. HE DISTINGUISHED, THIS TIME, BETWEEN THE MEN AND THEIR  
DEEDS, POSSIBLY AS AN ATTEMPT TO OFFSET THE DAMAGE , IN FOREIGN EYES,  
THAT HIS OPEN ASSOCIATION HAS DONE SO FAR.

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INFO PRIORITY BIS DAMASCUS, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING

FOLLOWING FOR THE UK DELEGATION

EGYPT/GULF CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SPECIAL ADVISER THINKS THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAS STEADIED SATISFACTORILY IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE PRIMAKOV VISIT. THE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA WILL FIGHT IF THE MILITARY OPTION HAS TO BE INVOKED. EGYPTIAN ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE SYRIANS AND LIBYANS TO PURSUE MORE MODERATE POLICIES.

DETAIL

INTRODUCTION

2. I SAW PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SPECIAL ADVISER (OSAMA EL BAZ) ON 19 NOVEMBER. HE ALSO WANTED TO SHARE VIEWS ON IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE YOUR VISIT TO CAIRO LAST MONTH.

SOVIET POSITION

3. THIS WAS AT THE TOP OF OSAMA'S MIND. HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN ANOTHER SOVIET ENVOY, NAMELY BELONGOV, A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AND A FORMER SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. OSAMA RECALLED THAT PRIMAKOV, DURING HIS LAST MISSION TO CAIRO, HAD GIVEN A CERTAIN VERSION OF THE SOVIET POSITION WHICH COINCIDED WITH THAT OF EGYPT ON THE MAIN ISSUES EG. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT/RETURN OF THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT ETC. . THE RUSSIANS ALSO AGREED WITH EGYPTIAN IDEAS ON SANCTIONS, NAMELY THAT THEY SHOULD BE ESCALATED IN ORDER TO GENERATE FURTHER PRESSURE ON SADDAM. MOREOVER PRIMAKOV HAD UNDERSTOOD THE REASON FOR THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA.

4. NEVERTHELESS PRIMAKOV HAD EXPRESSED POSITIONS WHICH DIFFERED AT ANY RATE IN NUANCE FORM THAT OF EGYPT. ALTHOUGH THEY AGREED WITH EGYPT (AND FOR THAT MATTER WITH BRITAIN) ON THE NECESSITY FOR NOT REWARDING SADDAM, THEY NEVERTHELESS EMPHASISED, MORE THAN DID THE EGYPTIANS, THE NECESSITY OF FINDING SOME FACE SAVER FOR THE IRAQI LEADER. PRIMAKOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT KUWAITI AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SECURED IN ADVANCE TO THE PROPOSITION THAT WHEN THE IRAQIS WITHDREW, THE KUWAITIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND GENEROUSLY ON THE MAIN ISSUES, AND THAT THIS WILLINGNESS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED IN ADVANCE. EGYPT REJECTED THIS. PRIMAKOV HAD ALSO WANTED AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SADDAM HAD

ATTAINED SOME ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. OF COURSE (SAID OSAMA) EGYPT WAS COMMITTED TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ETC ON REACHING A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND WAS PREPARED TO SAY SO NOW, BUT THIS WAS NOT THE SAME CONCEPT AS THE KIND OF LINKAGE THAT PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN TRYING TO SELL. AGAIN PRIMAKOV HAD OVER-EMPHASISED OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE, CLAIMING THAT EVEN A LIMITED MILITARY CONFRONTATION WOULD RESULT IN UNTOLD HORRORS. PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OSAMA HAD SORTED OUT PRIMAKOV ON ALL THESE POINTS.

5. UNFORTUNATELY IN DAMASCUS PRIMAKOV HAD ASKED ASSAD WHAT SADDAM WOULD SAY TO HIS ARMY AND PEOPLE TO JUSTIFY HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. ASSAD HAD APPARENTLY REPLIED THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES HE, THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT, WOULD BE WILLING TO CONVENE A SUMMIT. REGRETTABLY PRIMAKOV HAD CONVEYED THIS INFORMATION TO GORBACHEV WHO HAD APPARENTLY MIS-INTERPRETED ASSAD'S POSITION AND HAD HIMSELF CALLED FOR AN ARAB SOLUTION. (THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS HAD MEANWHILE BEEN ABLE TO SORT OUT SYRIAN THINKING ON THIS ISSUE IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT TRIPARTITE MEETING.).

6. THE RECENT VISIT OF BELONGOV SHOWED THAT MOSCOW HAD REACTED HEALTHILY TO THE DISQUIET WHICH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND GORBACHEV'S PARIS STATEMENTS HAD PROVOKED. THE DIFFERENCES IN NUANCE BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD APPARENTLY DISAPPEARED. OF COURSE THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE EGYPT, THE UK AND AMERICA, FAVOURED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. BUT THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT SADDAM MUST BE BROUGHT TO REALISE THAT IF HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE SCRS', A MILITARY STRIKE WAS INEVITABLE. THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED THAT THEY COULD NOT STOP OR OPPOSE THIS. OSAMA THOUGHT THAT BELONGOV HAD ALSO UNDERSTOOD THE FORCE OF EGYPTIAN ARGUMENT THAT SUCCESSIVE ATTEMPTS TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES/MEDIATION EFFORTS WITH BAGHDAD WERE A DISSERVICE TO ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT AND, IN A SENSE, TO SADDAM HIMSELF, SINCE THEY GAVE HIM THE ILLUSION THAT HE COULD MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO STRESSED TO BELONGOV THE IMPORTANCE OF MOSCOW COOPERATING OVER THE ATTEMPT TO DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COVERING THE MILITARY OPTION. BELONGOV HAD GIVEN NO COMMITMENT BUT HAD LED OSAMA TO BELIEVE THAT THIS COOPERATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

#### EGYPTIAN POLICY

7. I THEN TOLD OSAMA THAT THE BRITISH PRESS (I WAS THINKING OF THE DAILY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE OF 13 NOVEMBER) HAD MADE RATHER A HASH OF REPORTING PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MAYO INTERVIEW AS REGARDS THE POSSIBLE USE OF EGYPTIAN FORCES SHOULD THE MILITARY OPTION BE EXERCISED (MY TELNO 797 REFERS). OSAMA SAID THAT THE BRITISH PRESS WERE NOT THE ONLY ONES TO BLAME. THE EGYPTIAN EDITOR OF MAYO (ANIS MANSOUR) HAD ALSO (OSAMA CLAIMED) MISINTERPRETED THE PRESIDENT ON THIS POINT. OF COURSE PRESIDENT MUBARAK DID NOT WISH TO SHOW HIS HAND IN PUBLIC, PARTLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS AND PARTLY FOR REASONS OF MILITARY SECURITY. HOWEVER THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD BE USED TO LIBERATE KUWAIT AND IF THIS MEANT THAT THEY HAD TO TROUGH IRAQ ON THE WAY TO KUWAIT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE EGYPTIANS, HOWEVER, DID NOT WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN A LAND WAR WHOSE OBJECTIVE WAS SPECIFICALLY TO ATTACK IRAQ RATHER THAN TO LIBERATE KUWAIT. IT WAS NATURALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY PRECISELY HOW PARTICULAR FORCES WOULD BE USED UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT MILITARY SITUATION MIGHT FACE US. OSAMA THOUGHT A QUICK AND DECISIVE AIRSTRIKE WOULD BE THE MAIN FEATURE, BUT THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR A FOLLOW UP BY LAND FORCES IN ANY FULL SCALE OPERATION. I SAID THAT WE WOULD TREAT ALL THE ABOVE IN CONFIDENCE.

8. I THEN SAID THAT I HAD ALSO SEEN REFERENCES IN THE MAYO INTERVIEW AND ELSEWHERE SUGGESTING THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK MIGHT

WISH TO REACT TO A CLEAR PRIOR UNDERTAKING BY SADDAM THAT HE WOULD FULLY COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WHAT DID THE EGYPTIANS HAVE IN MIND ?. WERE THEY THINKING ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL ?. OSAMA SAID THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES MUBARAK COULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO CONVENVE AN ARAB SUMMIT BUT THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS AGAINST GETING INTO THE BUSINESS OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL. AFTER ALL, THE IRAQIS HAD INVADED KUWAIT IN A FEW HOURS. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE THAN 10 DAYS AT THE OUTSIDE TO MOVE OUT. MOREOVER THERE SHOULD BE NO BARGAINING WITH IRAQ ABOUT SUCH MATTERS AS KUWAITI CLAIMS FOR DAMAGE TO THEIR COUNTRY WHICH WERE LEGITIMATE. I STRONGLY AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE EMERGENCY SUMMIT MEETING IN CAIRO IN AUGUST HAD ALSO PASSED A RESOLUTION IN FAVOUR ON MAKING IRAQ PAY REPARATIONS. TAKING THIS AS A CUE, OSAMA ADDED I WAS QUITE RIGHT TO EMPHASISE THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CAIRO EMERGENCY SUMMIT WHICH HAD IN EFFECT DEFINED 'THE ARAB SOLUTION'. SOVIET AND FRENCH ATTEMPTS TO LOOK FOR A DIFFERENT KIND OF 'ARAB SOLUTION' WERE THOROUGHLY MISGUIDED.

#### SYRIA/LIBYA

9. IN CONCLUSION, OSAMA SAID THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S RECENT VISITS TO TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. QADDAFI'S POSITION HAD BEEN RELATIVELY SATISFACTORY. HE HAD CONFIRMED HIS DECISION TO EXPEL ABUL ABBAS. HE HAD CONVENED ALL HIS MAIN ADVISERS, INCLUDING JALLOUD, TO HEAR PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S COMMENTS EG. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LIBYA NOT GETTING INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN SYRIA MUBARAK HAD ASKED ASSAD TO ABANDON HIS HYSTERICAL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST AMERICA.

#### OTHER ACCOUNTS OF MUBARAK'S VISITS TO TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS

10. AT THE OMANI RECEPTION ON 18 NOVEMBER THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CHEF DE CABINET (DIWANI) , WHO HAD BEEN WITH HIS MASTER IN TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS, TOLD ME THAT ALTHOUGH QADDAFI CONTINUED TO BE VERY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE FOREIGN (PARTICULARLY AMERICAN) PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA, HE WAS ORTHODOX ABOUT THE NEED FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HE ALSO SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO CAIRO. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE (WISNER) ALSO TOLD ME THAT IN HIS DEBRIEFING HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT A SENIOR LIBYAN (PROBABLY JALLOUD) HAD SAID IN THE PRESENCE OF MUBARAK AND QADDAFI THAT IRAQI FORCES COULD DEFEAT THE AMERICANS. QADDAFI HAD APPARENTLY COMMENTED POLITELY THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD NO DOUBT GIVE THEM A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT.

#### COMMENT

11. OSAMA'S RECOLLECTIONS OF THE PRIMAKOV VISIT, IF ACCURATE, WERE STRIKINGLY MORE FRANK THAN THOSE OF ABDUL MAGID ON 29 OCTOBER (MY TELEGRAM NO.742).

12. I THINK THAT THIS REPORT (PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE) TAKEN WITH WHAT MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TOLD ME ON 14 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 797) SHOULD DISPEL DOUBTS ABOUT EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT - IF THIS BECOMES NECESSARY. YESTERDAY EVENING, 18 NOVEMBER, WISNER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN OVER THE SAME GROUND WITH OSAMA THAT DAY. OSAMA HAD CONFIRMED THE POSITION A S STATED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELNO 797. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS APPEARED TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT BUSH TO WAIT 2 OR 3 MONTHS BEFORE RESORTING TO THE MILITARY OPTION (MY TELNO 810). THIS PHRASEOLOGY HAD GONE DOWN BADLY IN WASHINGTON. WISNER COMMENTED TO ME THAT IF PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO CAIRO THIS WEEK DID NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING ELSE IT SHOULD ENABLE MR BUSH AND MUBARAK TO AGREE ON HOW THEY SHOULD PRESENT TRICKY

ISSUES OF THIS KIND TO THE PUBLIC.

13. I STILL DO NOT HAVE A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT IS IN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MIND WHEN HE SAYS (SEE PARA 8 ABOVE) EG. IN THE MAYO INTERVIEW, THAT IF SADDAM GAVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL PRIOR ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD COMPLY WITH THE SCRS THEN HE (MUBARAK) WOULD GET IN ON THE DIPLOMATIC ACT. NO DOUBT THIS WILL EMERGE IN DUE COURSE.

14. I ALSO DID NOT HAVE TIME TO PRESS OSAMA ON EGYPTIAN IDEAS FOR A POST-CRISIS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE BUT OTHERS WHO HAVE TAKEN VISITORS TO SEE HIM RECENTLY TELL ME THAT HE ENVISAGES A LARGE ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE BEING STATIONED IN KUWAIT OF WHICH EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD FORM A MAJOR COMPONENT.

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Subject as Marked

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

19 November 1990

From the Private Secretary

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH: THE GULF

Most of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Bush in the United States Embassy in Paris this morning was concerned with developments over the Gulf. I have written separately about other aspects.

This letter contains extremely sensitive material and should be seen only by a very small number of people with access to this correspondence.

The President began by saying that he had publicly dismissed Saddam Hussain's latest offer over the hostages, although King Hussein had tried to sell it to the Americans as a significant move. General Scowcroft added that King Hussein had asked to come and see the President, and a tentative arrangement had been made for him to travel to Paris on 20 November. However, the President had been indignant at King Hussein's anti-Western speech to the Jordanian Parliament and, following further contacts with the King yesterday, it had been decided that the meeting would not take place. The Prime Minister commented that the evidence suggested that Jordan was again evading sanctions, by building a dirt road through the desert.

The Prime Minister said that she had discussed with Secretary Baker the possibility of our sending additional forces to the Gulf and we were ready in principle to do so. The most likely contribution would be a further armoured brigade, but she still had to discuss this with her colleagues later in the week. In her view, it was the least we could do in response to the American lead in sending additional forces. We had already sent some additional minesweepers, since they would take a considerable time to get to the Gulf. We had also shortened the notice to move for the armoured brigade. The President said this would be magnificent and would help him a great deal with Congress.

The President continued that he was facing considerable difficulties with Congress over the Gulf. They did not want to

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oppose him openly, but equally were not prepared to sanction any action. They preferred to sit on the sidelines and say what he could not do. But if it came to use of force, he thought they would probably support him provided the action was not too long drawn out. He still believed the crucial factor in securing public support in the US was to focus on saving lives, particularly the lives of American citizens. That was why he was so pre-occupied with the question of the American Embassy in Kuwait, although he sometimes felt he was the only one who did worry about this. He heartily wished that Saddam Hussain would provide some provocation which would give the Americans a clear excuse to retaliate.

The President continued that he could not invoke the military option until the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured him that they had enough force to do the job. The Prime Minister said that, if we waited too long, we risked missing the climatic window. She hoped that we could be ready to move by mid-January. Military operations always tended to take longer than you thought. The President observed that he was hoping for a Six-Day war, but this was not what the Joint Chiefs expected. The Prime Minister said she understood that the Americans were planning three weeks of air attacks before any movement on the ground. That meant that the campaign could well be eight weeks altogether, or longer. It might be necessary to start the air campaign before all the additional American forces were in place. General Scowcroft commented that this was perfectly possible. The Prime Minister referred to the growing desperation of British citizens hiding in Kuwait. They were hoping for early action to relieve them.

The Prime Minister continued that she understood that the Americans were making progress with the further UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force. The President said that Secretary Baker would be briefing him on that. President Mitterrand seemed to be on board, although he kept saying that the resolution must be properly drafted. A resolution would be immensely helpful with American public opinion: it would be difficult for Congress not to support something agreed by the UN. But he kept coming back in his mind to the plight of the American Embassy in Kuwait. It would be much easier if there could be some trigger point for military action. The Prime Minister said she did not understand the President's problem. Surely Saddam Hussain had done more than enough to warrant the use of force. She thought ordinary people well understood that such evil had to be stopped. The President said that American opinion was not so firm. He still wondered whether it would not be possible to send in a boat to Kuwait with Red Cross markings to replenish the Embassy's food stocks. That would be fully justified under the UN resolutions. If Saddam Hussain did not let it in, he would be defying international law. The Prime Minister said she was not sure this was realistic. It might just lead to the crew being killed, or add to the number of hostages. Moreover such an exercise would take everyone's eye off the main issue and distract them from the task of preparing for effective military action. The President emphasised again that he needed a provocation to justify action: if only the Iraqis would fire off a SCUD missile or cause an

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explosion somewhere. The Prime Minister said that she did not see the need for a provocation nor did she think that public opinion needed it. Horrific things were happening daily in Kuwait which justified action. The President asked how the use of force from a cold start would be justified. The Prime Minister said we would base ourselves on the putative Security Council resolution. No further warning to Iraq would be necessary.

The President reverted to the subject of the resolution, asking whether the Prime Minister would be seeing President Gorbachev. He was the key to getting the resolution through. Secretary Baker had the feeling that the Russians would go along, and that should keep the Chinese aboard. The question would be whether you went for a resolution passed by nine votes to six. In his view that was better than no resolution, although less effective than having the Soviet Union and China aboard. The Prime Minister said she would raise the matter with President Gorbachev, and would be ready to help with other Security Council members such as the Malaysians.

The Prime Minister referred to the paper on strategic objectives which we had sent to the Americans. General Scowcroft said that he understood a team was coming out to Washington with whom the Americans could discuss it. The Prime Minister continued that she would now like to add a further objective, that of destroying the Iraqi military machine so that it could not pose a threat to Kuwait again. We must destroy their capacity to attack. We would not necessarily want to go deep into Iraqi territory to do this, but should rely mainly on air attack. General Scowcroft asked whether this would include attacks on Iraqi troops not involved in action against Kuwait, for instance those on Iraq's northern border. The Prime Minister said that this would depend in part on the terms of a UN resolution and also on the practicality. The President said that these matters would have to be looked at very carefully.

The Prime Minister mentioned that it was difficult to decide what advice to give to our civilians in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. We did not want to frighten those who provided essential services into leaving. But we were intending to discourage families from bringing children out to the Gulf for Christmas. The President commented that, if the American air attack against Iraq was as effective as the planners predicted, it should be difficult for the Iraqis to lob missiles into Saudi Arabia which might put civilian lives at risk. The Prime Minister said she thought it defied the odds to expect to hit all Iraqi missile sites. Some missiles would probably get through. We were taking the precaution of sending out gas masks for our people.

The Prime Minister said she hoped that Britain and the US could agree on how to handle the press in the event of a war. They were likely to make our lives very difficult. The President gloomily agreed, saying there would be endless pictures of the bodies of Iraqi civilians killed as a result of air attacks. But he did not see how this could be avoided. The Prime Minister said we had to keep up a constant campaign to portray Saddam

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
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Hussain as an utterly evil person. The President said he was not sure this was fully accepted by opinion in the US: but perhaps he was wrong.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), to Sir Robin Butler and to Sir Percy Cradock).

Yours sincerely,



CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1990

*EW*

*19/Ki*

*Dear Charles,*

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY OPTION

The Foreign Secretary asked M. Dumas in private this evening whether the French would participate in military operations in January if there had been a prior UN Security Council Resolution. M. Dumas said he could not yet answer that question. First it would depend on the UN Resolution and its clarity. He confirmed that the French would support a suitable resolution but the drafting would be important. Second, they were largely in the dark about US objectives. The French wanted to talk to the US about their detailed objectives but had not yet done so. For example, did the United States want to get rid of Saddam Hussein? He suspected that they did. Mr Hurd cited what the Prime Minister had said at her press conference this morning and M. Dumas agreed with that approach. He said a further complication was differences within the French government. M. Dumas added that President Mitterrand was against military action that was seen to be for the liberation of Kuwait. He had said that he would not have French servicemen dying to enable the Al Sabah to refill their Swiss bank accounts. Upholding international law and the world order was a different proposition.

M. Dumas asked whether we had been involved in the recent US military exercise. The Foreign Secretary said he was not sure about particular exercises but, of course, the whole issue of command and control was less sensitive for us than for the French. We were considering what further forces we might send. M. Dumas said that the French had been asked to send more troops to the area and he thought that they would do so. The Foreign Secretary stressed the importance of the French being involved in any military operation politically and militarily.

It was clear from the conversation that one inhibition on the French is the fact that they have had no detailed account from the Americans of their military objectives. Being French, they will not ask and there is, therefore, a risk that they will end up not participating when the time comes. The Foreign Secretary proposes to suggest to Mr Baker that the Americans should offer the French an early and detailed military briefing.

*Jans*  
*Stephen Wall*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

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#### JORDAN/SAUDI RELATIONS

##### SUMMARY

1. COMMENTS ON RECENT SAUDI ALLEGATIONS ABOUT JORDANIAN  
MILITARY INTENTIONS.

##### DETAIL

2. RIYADH TELNO 1180 REPORTED (PARA 3 (H)) KING FAHD'S  
EXPRESSION OF CONCERN TO THE DEFENCE SECRETARY ABOUT A POSSIBLE  
JORDANIAN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ. PRINCE  
SULTAN ALSO CLAIMED TO MR KING THAT JORDAN WAS AMONG COUNTRIES  
QUOTE CURRENTLY ENCOURAGING VOLUNTEERS TO GO TO IRAQ UNQUOTE  
(JEDDA TELNO 250 TO YOU).

3. WHILE IT IS REASSURING TO LEARN THAT THE SAUDIS CONTINUE  
TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO PRESERVING THE HASHEMITE REGIME IN JORDAN  
(PARA 3F OF RIYADH TUR), IT IS DISTURBING THAT THEY CONTINUE ALSO  
TO BELIEVE (AND PROPAGATE) THESE WILDER ALLEGATIONS ABOUT  
JORDANIAN RELATIONS. THE NOTION THAT JORDAN HAS IN FACT ANY  
PLANS TO ATTACK SAUDI ARABIA (IN CONJUNCTION WITH YEMEN OR ANYONE  
ELSE), EVEN IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF, STRIKES ME  
AS VERY FAR-FETCHED. THE STORY SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO HAVE ITS  
ROOTS IN THE RUMOUR WHICH FIRST SURFACED IN OMAN DURING THE  
SUMMER OF AN IRAQI/JORDANIAN/YEMENI PLOT TO CARVE UP SAUDI ARABIA  
AMONGST THEMSELVES.

4. IT IS AT LEAST SOME COMFORT THAT THE SAUDIS ARE NOT  
CLAIMING THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE MASSING TROOPS ON THE BORDER, AS  
THEY CLAIM THE YEMENIS ARE (PLUMBLY'S TELELETTER OF 15 NOVEMBER  
TO ELDON, EMERGENCY UNIT): AND IS PERHAPS WORTH ADDING THAT THERE  
ARE NO SIGNS OF ANY SUCH JORDANIAN DEPLOYMENTS, WHICH WOULD NO  
DOUBT BE DETECTED VERY SOON BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER.

5. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN VOLUNTEERS FOR IRAQ, YOU WILL RECALL  
FROM OUR REPORTING THAT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CRISIS THERE  
WERE PRESS REPORTS OF UP TO 40,000 JORDANIANS SIGNING UP IN  
JORDAN TO JOIN THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THOSE  
WHO HAVE ACTUALLY DONE SO (PROBABLY A SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER  
NUMBER) HAVE BEEN DEFLECTED BY THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES INTO THE  
PEOPLE'S ARMY, THE LOCAL VERSION OF THE TA, AND THAT THERE IS NO  
INTENTION OF ALLOWING ANY OF THEM ACTUALLY TO REACH IRAQ. WE DO  
NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY JORDANIAN VOLUNTEERS MAY HAVE MADE THEIR WAY  
TO IRAQ ITSELF TO SIGN UP - BAGHDAD MAY BE ABLE TO COMMENT - BUT

WE DOUBT IF THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN MANY.

6. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON RECENT SAUDI ALLEGATIONS ABOUT JORDANIAN MOVES TO CIRCUMVENT SANCTIONS.

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WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

FOLLOWING FOR PS, PS/MR HOGG, PS/PUS, MR FAIRWEATHER,  
MR BROOMFIELD AND MR SLATER

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BAKER: 18 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. BAKER MAKING GOOD PROGRESS IN SECURING SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES. SHOWS SECRETARY OF STATE A TEXT BASED ON OUR DRAFT BUT WITH SOME AMENDMENTS. ANTICIPATES DEBATE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL ON 28/29 NOVEMBER PRECEDED BY A DEBATE ON KUWAIT ON 26/27 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. AT A MEETING IN PARIS THIS EVENING BAKER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE HE NOW THOUGHT WE HAD SUPPORT FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FROM 7 COUNTRIES NOT COUNTING THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, WHOSE VETO HE DID NOT IN ANY CASE ANTICIPATE. THE FRENCH WERE VERY SOLID, AS WERE ETHIOPIA, ZAIRE, CANADA AND ROMANIA. HE WOULD NOT TALK TO THE CUBANS BUT HE WOULD SEE THE COLOMBIANS AND WOULD CALL THE MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEND A MESSAGE TO MAHATHIR. BAKER SAID HE HAD SHOWN A TEXT TO DUMAS BUT HAD AGREED WITH HIM THAT WE SHOULD SAY NOTHING IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A TEXT. ONCE THE EXISTENCE OF A TEXT WAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, WE WOULD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AND IF THE TEXT DID NOT THEN EMERGE IN THE FORM EXPECTED, WE WOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE FAILED. THE LINE BAKER WAS TAKING PUBLICLY WAS THAT HE WAS EXPLORING WITH OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WHETHER THERE WAS INTEREST IN A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ALLOW A POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE - WHICH WE DID NOT RULE OUT. WE WOULD NOT GO FOR A RESOLUTION UNLESS WE WERE REASONABLY SURE OF THE OUTCOME.

3. BAKER SHOWED THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE TEXT OF THE US DRAFT RESOLUTION BUT DID NOT HAND OVER A COPY. THE MAIN CHANGES ARE THAT THE AMERICAN TEXT AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES TO TAKE ACTION AND INCLUDES IN SQUARE BRACKETS THE WORDS 'INCLUDING IF NECESSARY THE USE OF FORCE'. THE DRAFT CONTAINS NO REFERENCE TO PROCURING THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT AND THE RESTORATION OF THE AUTHORITY OF ITS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. OUR OPERATIVE PARA 2 (REQUESTING ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT) IS DELETED. OUR OPERATIVE PARA 3 IS



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RETAINED. THE REFERENCE TO THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT IS REPLACED BY A REFERENCE TO BRINGING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

4. BAKER AND KIMMITT EXPLAINED THAT THEIR LAWYERS HAD STRONGLY RECOMMENDED INCLUDING SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION IN THE RESOLUTION. THEY RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS AN ARGUMENT THAT ARTICLE 51 ALREADY GAVE YOU AUTHORITY BUT THEY THOUGHT A SPECIFIC REFERENCE WAS LEGALLY AND POLITICALLY DESIRABLE. THE REFERENCE TO THE USE OF FORCE WAS THERE IN SQUARE BRACKETS BUT COULD BE TAKEN OUT. MITTERRAND HAD WANTED SUCH A REFERENCE. MITTERRAND HAD ALSO WANTED THE REFERENCES TO THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT ETC REMOVED. HE HAD SAID THAT FRENCHMEN WOULD NOT DIE TO LIBERATE KUWAIT BUT THEY WOULD TO UPHOLD THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE AMERICANS HAD DELETED OUR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO SIMPLIFY THE RESOLUTION AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THAT ASKING ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT MIGHT MAKE THE SQUEAMISH THINK THEY WERE IMPLICATED IN THE USE OF FORCE AND DETER THEM FROM SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION. BAKER HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT LIVE WITH ANY RESTRICTIONS IN THE RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF FORCE. THE FINNS HAD WANTED TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS HAVING BEEN TRIED BUT HAVING FAILED BUT BAKER GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD RIDDEN THEM OFF THIS. THE FINNS HAD ALSO SHOWN INTEREST IN A REFERENCE BACK TO THE MARITIME RESOLUTION AND TO THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE. BAKER MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT WANT SUCH A REFERENCE.

5. ON TIMING, BAKER SAID HE HOPED FOR A TWO DAY DEBATE ON 28/29 NOVEMBER AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT A PRIOR DEBATE ON THE DESPOLIATION OF KUWAIT. BAKER DID NOT SEEM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE WORK ON THIS BUT KIMMITT SAID THAT THE US ENVISAGED SUCH A DEBATE ON 26/27 NOVEMBER AS A GOOD LEAD-IN TO THE USE OF FORCE RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER AGREED ON THE NEED TO URGE THE KUWAITIS TO MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION. BAKER REFERRED TO THE HORRIFIC EVIDENCE OF TORTURE WHICH HE HAD SEEN BUT WHICH THE US PRESS HAD REFUSED TO COVER - BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE BEING SET UP BY PR FIRMS. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN TOM LANTOS, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE WAS THINKING OF INVITING SOME OF THE SAME PEOPLE TO HEARINGS IN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER AND THIS MIGHT MESH IN WELL.

6. BAKER REVERTED TO THIS SUBJECT LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, REFERRING TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OFFER TO RELEASE HOSTAGES OVER THE 3 MONTH PERIOD FROM CHRISTMAS DAY. IT DID NOT TAKE A ROCKET SCIENTIST TO WORK OUT THAT THIS TOOK YOU CONVENIENTLY UP TO RAMADAN AND THE RAINY SEASON. BAKER THOUGHT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SHOULD GO AHEAD AND GET OUR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WITH OR WITHOUT POSITIVE SOVIET SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT WE COULD GET 9-10 POSITIVE VOTES AND DID NOT RULE OUT ANOTHER 13:2 RESOLUTION. A RESOLUTION THAT WENT THROUGH WITH A SOVIET ABSTENTION WOULD BE BETTER THAN RELYING ON ARTICLE 51 ALONE WHICH WOULD LAY US OPEN TO CASTIGATION BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE FRENCH. IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE THE RESOLUTION IN OUR POCKET EVEN IF IT ONLY WENT THROUGH 9:6.

7. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION. BAKER SAID HE STILL NEEDED OUR HELP IN KEEPING THE GANG OF 4 RESOLUTION AT BAY. THE US WAS LOOKING FOR A CLEAR PERIOD OF 2 WEEKS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THINGS SEEMED TO BE A BIT BETTER, WITH THE PROSPECT OF AIME RETURNING TO THE AREA. BUT KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES RESOLUTION COULD COME BACK INTO FOCUS OVER THE NEXT WEEK.

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FCO: FOR PS, PS/MR HOGG, PS/PUS, MR FAIRWEATHER, MR BROOMFIELD ONLY FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BAKER: THE MILITARY OPTION

SUMMARY

1. BAKER THINKS FRENCH ARE ON BOARD FOR THE MILITARY OPTION. CONFIRMS THAT THE US HAVE IN MIND A THREE WEEK AERIAL BOMBARDMENT.

DETAIL

2. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW BAKER IN PARIS THIS EVENING, HE ASKED HIM HOW HE HAD GOT ON WITH DUMAS ON THE ISSUE OF FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE MILITARY OPTION. BAKER SAID HE HAD NOT YET HAD A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE BUT THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE FRENCH WANTED TO BE PART OF THE MILITARY OPTION BUT NOT TO PUT THEIR FORCES UNDER US COMMAND. BAKER AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES TO SEE HOW THEY COULD BE EFFECTIVE. BAKER SAID THAT WHEN THE FRENCH TROOPS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE AREA THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THAT THEY BE STATIONED NOT TOO CLOSE TO THE AMERICANS BUT MITTERRAND HAD THEN BEEN RATHER DISTURBED TO DISCOVER THAT THEY HAD BEEN PUT FAR OUT ON THE FLANK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FRENCH BEING PART OF THE MILITARY EFFORT.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD SEEN A MILITARY REPORT SUGGESTING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING OF A THREE WEEK AERIAL BOMBARDMENT BEFORE THEY MOVED IN ON THE GROUND. CITING WHAT HE CALLED THE KATE ADIE FACTOR, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN PUBLICLY. HE THOUGHT THE GAP BETWEEN THE START OF THE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND TROOPS GOING IN ON THE GROUND SHOULD BE SHORTER. BAKER SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THIS PLAN. THE AMERICANS HAD ALWAYS HAD IN MIND A 4-PHASE OPERATION WITH THE THIRD PHASE BEING AERIAL ATTACK ON IRAQI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS WHO WERE NOW FORMIDABLY WELL DUG IN. WITHOUT SUCH A SOFTENING UP, THE CASUALTY FIGURES WOULD BE DOUBLED. KIMMITT ADDED THAT PHASE 3 HAD BEEN STRETCHED SOMEWHAT BECAUSE THE IRAQIS HAD DOUBLED THEIR TROOP STRENGTH ON THE GROUND FROM 2,500 TO 4,500. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS ONLY HEIGHTENED THE IMPORTANCE OF SUSTAINING POLITICAL BACKING FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING. THREE WEEKS WOULD BE A VERY LONG TIME. BAKER COMMENTED THAT TWO WEEKS WITH

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TWICE THE RATE OF CASUALTIES WOULD BE EVEN LONGER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IT WOULD BE HARD TO GET PEOPLE TO SUPPORT AN OPERATION IN WHICH OUR OWN HOSTAGES WERE BEING KILLED BY THE BOMBARDMENT. THERE WOULD BE DAILY TELEVISION REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. BAKER AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY. NOR DID HE BELIEVE THAT THE AIR WAR ALONE WOULD BRING VICTORY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE TEAM THAT WERE GOING OVER TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK. BAKER SAID THEY WOULD FIND A WELL WORKED OUT PLAN IN PLACE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING FOR THE RETRIEVAL OF HOSTAGES WHERE POSSIBLE. BAKER AGREED.

FERGUSSON

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SECRET

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*cc/pj*



*NBPM  
at his  
stage*

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Hon Tim Sainsbury MP  
Minister for Trade  
Department of Trade and Industry  
1 - 19 Victoria Street  
London  
SW1

*19* November 1990

*Dear Tim*

**IRAQ: PREMIUM REFUNDS**

*Diap*

Thank you for your letter of 8 November.

2. I understand that ECGD faces potential losses on Iraq of around £850 million, of which £150 million is likely to fall due in this financial year. These losses will arise because ECGD continued to insure exports into Iraq well beyond the time it was prudent to do so. The costs of this unwise policy will now have to be picked up by the taxpayer.

3. Against this background of enormous loss, it is questionable whether we should make any ex-gratia payments at all to policyholders on Iraq. Whatever their position on the frustrated contracts, many of them will have exported goods to Iraq in recent years on the back of ECGD cover and will now be paid for these exports by the taxpayer. In view of this, there is a case of taking a strict view and making no refunds. However, I recognise that there would be political difficulties if we took a harder line on Iraq policy holders than ECGD usually does in premium refund cases. Therefore, I would be prepared to agree to the current refund policy being applied to these policyholders ie a 75 per cent refund if the contract is frustrated before any finance has been drawn from an ECGD - guaranteed loan.

4. However, I could not agree to either increasing the percentage or paying refunds when part of the loan has already been drawdown and where claims are bound to arise. As far as the percentage is concerned we should stick with the usual figure; while in the Iraq case a 25 per cent retention may exceed the administration cost, in other markets it may be below them. On a


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swings and roundabouts basis we aim for recovery of administration costs and there is no case for reducing the charge in high premium markets. To do so risks an under-recovery overall.

5. I cannot follow the case for paying refunds in cases where the loan has already been partially drawdown. Surely this breaks the fundamental principle of insurance that the claims that arise from some policyholders are paid for out of the income derived from those who do not claim or whose claims are less than the premium. If ECGD operated generally this way it would never collect net premium at all and its financial position would be even worse than now. Indeed, it could not possibly avoid losses because of such a policy.


6. Apart from arguments of cost and principle against giving policy holders on Iraq special treatment, there is the risk of repercussions. First, as far as ECGD is concerned more generous treatment in this case will lead to a precedent being set for the future on premium refunds that could become quite costly. Second, and even more seriously, it would erode our general policy that the Government will not pay compensation for losses incurred as a result of the application of financial sanctions. To extend special compensation arrangements for ECGD contracts on Iraq would make it very difficult to hold the line elsewhere and expose the Government to potentially enormous costs. We simply cannot risk this and so I must insist that the arrangements for refunding premium on Iraq contracts are no different from existing general arrangements.

7. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Norman Lamont', is written above the printed name. The signature is fluid and cursive.

NORMAN LAMONT

MIDDLE EAST: Sit P733



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ce PC* 2

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

18 November 1990

The Prime Minister has considered the Attorney-General's minute of 16 November about our strategic objectives in the Gulf. She has commented that this week's JIC report shows that 80 per cent of Iraq's armour and 50 per cent of its troops are engaged in the subjugation and occupation of Kuwait. In the light of that, she thinks that inclusion of destruction of the Iraqi military machine among our strategic objectives would be fully justified. In practice we would want to ensure that as much as possible in the way of destruction was achieved by the initial air attacks: and it is unlikely that we or the Americans would want to involve ourselves in land operations deep inside Iraq, except possibly to rescue hostages. We might therefore find that full attainment of the objective of destroying the Iraqi military machine would have to be left to non-military means, such as long-term security arrangements. But this should not inhibit us from including it among the objectives.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock.

C. D. POWELL

Miss Juliet Wheldon,  
Law Officers' Department.

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*make  
call*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1990

*Dear Hugh,*

GULF CRISIS: EXTRACTION OF BRITISH HOSTAGES AND  
DETAINEES IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES

The Prime Minister has read the Foreign Secretary's minute of 15 November about extraction of the hostages and detainees in Iraq and Kuwait in the event of hostilities. She agrees that we need to talk to the Americans on the basis of the points made in the Foreign Secretary's minute and that we must keep release of the hostages very high among our objectives.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely  
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

