

S
3007

PREM 19 / 3440

TOP SECRET

Confidential Filing

Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE EAST

Conflict between Iraq/Kuwait, Saudi Arabia et al

Part 1 May 1979

UK Policy towards the conflict.

Part 35 Dec 1990

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
18.12.90 21.12.90 31.1.90		P R E M		19 / 3440			
∇ Parents							
△							

53a-e

Copy No 1 of 4 Copies
Page 1 of 3 pages



Pl. ask Mr. Fray what action
can be taken to speed up
decision-making in view of
- ensure earlier decisions.

Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15/1

PRIME MINISTER

TIMING OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ

Our military now says that
they will not be ready for
offensive ground operations until
end-January, & do not believe the
Americans will be better. If the air

I have seen the note of your meeting with the President on
21st December and the discussion of the timing of military action.

campaign takes 7-10 days, that may not

2. The overall judgement of the best timing for military action
is predominantly for the United States. They are providing the
vast majority of the forces; and are best placed to balance the
conflicting factors. My own advisers are surprised that the US
military authorities had advised that they would be ready
by 15th January. From information reaching us through US contacts
in Riyadh we would have expected them to offer a date nearer the
end of the month, though not as late as mid-February. On 30th
December, General Powell confirmed to the Acting CDS (General Vincent) that
US land forces would not be fully ready for offensive operations
by 15th January, but if necessary could continue their final
preparations during the extended air campaign expected to precede
a land offensive.

matter.
But we
cannot
be
responsible
for delay.

3. You should be aware of the position of our own forces. Because
our naval and air forces deployed earlier they will be ready for
an offensive by 15th January; so too will 7th Armoured Brigade.
The plan for the rest of 1 Armoured Division was that they should
"begin to arrive in early January and its elements would become
progressively operational with the division as a whole fully
operational by the end of January" (C(90)1 - para 6). Most of the
move has gone to schedule. All personnel will be in the Gulf by
5th January. Of 64 ships taken up from trade, 16 have already
arrived, and 42 are due by 12th January. Some cargoes have left
later than hoped; these are mainly further key supplies of ammunition
which we had to borrow from NATO Allies whose Governments were
painfully slow to agree to our requests.

you may
have
to guarantee
before 15 January
to have
from
Division
ready
by
26
January
CDN
41



4. Although the bulk of stocks will be available to 1 Armoured Division by 15th January, they will be short in some important areas:

- On average about 50% of the ammunition stocks needed for sustained operations;
- About 35% of field operating theatres and hospital beds will be available;
- Only about one half of fighting vehicles modified with the special side-armour needed for offensive operations.
- A new type of tank ammunition (JERICO - designed to be less likely to explode if a tank is hit) will not be available in adequate numbers for issue to units.

The later part of January is also scheduled for acclimatisation and training for 4 Brigade and 1 Division as a whole.

5. I am advised that the Division will be capable of defensive operations only by 15th January. As illustrated at Annex A, the position will improve quite quickly, with a capability for offensive operations achieved by the end of the month. There are military grounds for delaying operations until then. The US case for earlier readiness assumes there will be a period, while the air campaign is underway, in which land forces can continue working up. This depends on the form that an Iraqi response might take and whether it inhibits logistic supply (eg ships in transit or unloading) or final training. I believe that the military preference would be to wait until the end of the month (given that the US are if anything behind us in their preparations). There are, however, political pressures



too on the US. If the President remains inclined to an early offensive - and his military advisers support him in that view - it cannot be for us to seek to delay the whole campaign. If, however, our contacts with the US suggest they are thinking of a later date we should not, I suggest, seek to dissuade them.

6. I will provide an updated assessment of the readiness position of 1 Armoured Division for your return from Saudi Arabia but you will wish to discuss it with General de la Billiere too. Meanwhile I am taking what steps I can to accelerate availability of key items.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary and Sir Robin Butler. It should not be shown to anyone else.

Ministry of Defence
31st December 1990

(T K)
(Approved by the Defence Secretary and signed in his absence).

ANNEX A TO
LAND OPS 6H
DATED 28 DEC 90

1 (BR) ARMD DIV - OP READINESS MATRIX

	15 JAN 91	22 JAN 91	29 JAN 91	5 FEB 91
1 ARMD DIV PERS IN THEATRE - 25,506!	100%	100%	100%	100%
CR UPARMOURING	52%	66%	66%	100%
WR UPARMOURING	33%	52%	52%	100% (by 8 Feb)
3RD LINE MEDICS AVAILABLE	BEDS 35% FST 35%	BEDS 46% FST 51%	BEDS 83% FST 100%	BEDS 100% FST 100%
WATER % OF DAILY NEEDS	55%	75%	88%	100%
AMMO STOCKS IN THEATRE				
155mm SHELL	50%	50%	100%	100%
155mm SMOKE	35%	35%	35%	100%
155mm ILLUMINATING	58%	58%	58%	100%
8in HE	52%	52%	100%	100%
MLRS	35%	35%	100%	100%
TOW	53%	53%	100%	100%
81mm HE	67%	95%	98%	100%
120mm JERICHO 1 (L14)	33%	35%	47%	47%
120mm JERICHO 2 (L26)	14%	26%	47%	47%
INLOADING OF FFMA	66%	75%	100%	100%
TRAINING				
DIVISION	STUDY DAYS ONLY	NO CHANGE	DIV FTX UNDERWAY	COMPLETE
4 ARMD BDE	UNIT TRG ONLY	BDE FTX	COMPLETE	COMPLETE
7 ARMD BDE	COMPLETE	COMPLETE	COMPLETE	COMPLETE

LEGEND:

- CR - Challenger Main Battle Tank
- WR - Warrior Combat Vehicle
- HE - High Explosive
- FFMA - Force Forward Maintenance Area (ie combat supplies for fighting units).
- FST - Field Surgical Teams
- TOW - Helicopter Anti-Tank Missile
- FTX - Field Tactical Exercise

e

ARTILLERY	UNIT ONLY	COMPLETE	COMPLETE	COMPLETE
COMBAT ENGINEERS	UNIT ONLY	COMPLETE	COMPLETE	COMPLETE
SUSTAINABILITY IN DAYS AT 60KM A DAY				
CR	15	20	20	22
WR	12	17	17	17
OTHER VEHICLES	23	28	30	30

RESTRICTED



CCG
CCG

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

CF

TELEPHONE 071-21 89000
DIRECT DIALING 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

31st December 1990

Dear Patrick,

G/S
Any comment
on the enclosed PPS?
C.D.P.?
3/1

see system
G/S

GULF CRISIS: MEDIA HANDLING

Thank you for your letter of 17th December, suggesting that it might be desirable to draw the attention of the media to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1989.

We have given careful thought to the most effective way of securing media co-operation in the event of hostilities, with a view to ensuring particularly that no information is published which prejudices the success of military operations. As I explained in my paper for OPD(G) our approach has been based on the conclusions which the Government reached in the light of the Beach report on censorship which was commissioned after the Falklands conflict. There are two strands to this. In theatre, journalists attached to our forces will be given accreditation as war correspondents: in return they will be expected to conform to a set of reporting ground rules (attached at Annex A) and to submit their copy for clearance before release. In all other cases no form of censorship will be applied, but editors will be provided with extensive written guidance (Annex B) identifying the subjects on which information should not be published without consulting the Ministry of Defence.

Rt Hon Sir Patrick Mayhew QC MP
Attorney General

RESTRICTED



The guiding principle behind this approach is voluntary co-operation, in effect an extension of the D-Notice System. The sanction of the Official Secrets Act clearly remains available in the event of offences falling within it; and editors are likely to be well aware of this. But given the delicacy of our relationship with the media, the importance of securing their co-operation and our decision to seek this through voluntary means, I believe it would appear a little heavy-handed to draw their attention to the Act in this context. May we keep your idea in reserve for now?

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister, to other members of OPD(G), to Sir Percy Cradock and to Sir Robin Butler.

Tom King

MEDIA GROUND RULES

THE GROUND RULES BELOW WILL PROTECT THE SECURITY AND THE SAFETY OF THE TROOPS INVOLVED WHILE ALLOWING YOU REASONABLE FREEDOM AND ACCESS IN COVERING YOUR STORY.

1. No specific locations should be used when filing stories although the general geographic area is permissible e.g. From the southern Arabian Gulf, eastern Saudi Arabia.
2. You must remain with your military escort at all times, until released, and follow your instruction. This is necessary to facilitate troop movement, ensure your own safety and protect operational security.
3. Except where already released by MOD, Military Command or Joint Information Bureau, information on the following subjects should not be published without consulting MOD or in theatre Public Relations Staff:
 - a. Number of troops.
 - b. Number of ships and aircraft.
 - c. Numbers regarding other equipment e.g. Artillery, tanks, radars, vehicles, water.
 - d. Names of military installations or specific locations of UK or Allied military units.
 - e. Information regarding future operations.
 - f. Information concerning security precautions at military installations.
 - g. Photography that would show level of security at military installations.
 - h. Photography that would reveal the name of specific location of military forces or installations.
 - i. Rules of engagement details.
 - j. Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods and results.
 - k. Information on current operations against hostile targets.
 - l. Information on special forces and their operational techniques.
 - m. Operational techniques of regular forces.

- n. Information identifying postponed or cancelled operations.
 - o. Information covered by additional specific guidelines in the case of operational necessity in order to protect tactical security.
 - p. Embargoed information until expiry of the embargo.
4. The following categories of information are releasable:
- a. Arrival of major units in theatre when officially announced. Mode of travel (sea or air) and date of departure from home station.
 - b. Approximate friendly force strength figures announced by UK/Allied spokesman.
 - c. Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures for each action or operation.
 - d. Approximate enemy casualty and POW figures for each action or operation.
 - e. Non-sensitive unclassified information regarding UK air, ground and sea operations (past and present).
 - f. Friendly force size in action or operation will be announced using general terms. Specific force/unit identification/designation may be released when it has become public knowledge and no longer warrants security protection.
 - g. Identification and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack.
 - h. Generic origin of air operations such as "land" or "carrier based."
 - i. Date/time/location of previous conventional operations and actions as well as results.
 - j. Types of ordnance expended will be released in general terms rather than specific amounts.
 - k. Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions flown in theatre or operational area.
 - l. Type of forces involved (infantry, armour, air, defence, naval task group).
 - m. Weather and climate conditions.
 - n. Allied participation by type (ships, aircraft, ground units etc) in an operation after approval of host nation government.
 - o. Conventional operation nicknames.

p. Names and hometowns of military units and individuals may be released but note casualty reporting restrictions below.

CASUALTY REPORTING

5. Casualty reporting is an area of particular concern and, while it is appreciated that circumstances in Saudi Arabia may allow rapid coverage of operations or incidents/accidents leading to casualties, information on the following should not be published without prior consultation, unless it has been officially released or is already within the public domain:

- a. Any loss or damage to, or attack upon any naval vessel or military aircraft.
- b. The extent of casualties sustained by particular military units or formations.
- c. Names of casualties (until they have appeared in official casualty lists), or information as to the units or geographical area in which they were serving.
- d. Identifiable pictures of casualties unless the casualties have been named in an official casualty list.
- e. The nature and extent of any damage to military capability.

MEDIA EQUIPMENT

6. Media must carry and individuals (the media) are responsible for any personal and professional equipment they take with them including protective cases for cameras, batteries, cables and converters.

CONCLUSION

7. If in doubt about the Ground Rules consult your escort officer or Public Relations staff in the Joint Information Bureau before releasing your story.

MOD GUIDANCE ON THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION1. Military Operations

There is an obvious danger that publication of authoritative information about the operations, current and/or future, of British or Allied forces could unwittingly jeopardise their success. Similarly, information about other preparations relevant to operations - for example the location and movement of units; logistic activity; command appointments - could give the enemy vital clues. Less obviously, considerable care is needed in the reporting of matters which might give an indication of the ability to sustain current operations. Publicly-aired speculation about future operations, particularly where it gives the appearance of being well-informed or authoritative, also carries the risk of causing an actual or potential enemy to consider possibilities that otherwise might not have occurred to him.

Therefore, information on the following subjects should not be published, except where it has been released for publication by the MOD or allied authorities or the MOD has been consulted:

- i. Current, future or prospective military (i.e. naval, land or air) operations of British or Allied forces;

- ii. current operational orders;
- iii. the logistic and other support of current or future military operations
- iv. the current or planned location, composition and functions of military units (including ships);
- v. manpower and unit/formation movements related to current or planned operations, including new appointments to senior operational command - i.e. at and above the level of RN Captain, Colonel, Group Captain;
- vi. current or projected operational tactics and techniques (including camouflage and other deceptive measures)

2. Military Equipment and Capabilities

Release of classified information about current capabilities, whether in terms of equipment quantities and effectiveness or of the state of training units, could allow the enemy to use his resources to the best effect and to exploit any weaknesses. It is requested therefore that information in the following categories, that has not previously been officially released, should not be published without consultation with MOD.

- i. Specific quantities of military equipment (Naval, land or air) currently in service or reserve;
- ii. munition stockpile quantities;
- iii. actual or planned deliveries of new military equipment and munitions, orders placed and rates of production.

- iv. design details, technical specifications, materials, production methods and code names and numbers of military equipment and munitions;
- v. equipment performance and operational capabilities, shortcomings and possible counter-measures;
- vi. plans for modifying existing equipment and developing new equipment and munitions, and details of the technology involved;
- vii. details and specifications of physical protection and defensive measures at military headquarters and other establishments;
- ix. state of readiness and detailed operational capability of individual military units and formations;
- x. military manpower totals and training organisation throughput.

This guidance applies to both Allied and to British forces' equipment and capabilities.

3. Military Losses and Casualties

It will often be desirable to give as much information as the operational situation permits, as early as possible, to counter rumour and speculation which might portray a situation far worse than it actually is. Nevertheless, there is a danger that specific information about ship or aircraft losses, or about the extent of damage to fighting units, could be of advantage to an

enemy, either by disclosing weaknesses that might otherwise be unrealised or by confirming what was otherwise uncertain. Related to this, the naming of units sustaining casualties may yield useful information about unit locations and roles. Furthermore, distress can be caused to relatives by the disclosure of losses and casualties before official casualty lists are available and next-of-kin have been informed. Unless it has been officially released, editors are requested therefore not to publish information on the following without having first consulted the MOD:

- i. Any loss, damage to, or attack upon any naval vessel or military aircraft;
- ii. The extent of casualties sustained by particular military units or formations;
- iii. Names of casualties (until they have appeared in official casualty lists), or information as to the units or geographical area in which casualties were serving;
- iv. Identifiable pictures of casualties, until enquiries have established with reasonable certainty that the individuals concerned have been named in an official casualty list;
- v. The nature and extent of any damage (including casualties) to defence establishments or installations in the UK or overseas, whether due to enemy action or accident. Particular care should be taken in the case of establishments in the UK over the disclosure of

additional information gleaned from local civil sources.

4. Command, Control and Communications

Information about military organisation, the nature and siting of military facilities and headquarters, and communications links

and capabilities may be valuable in enabling an enemy to piece together command structures and to identify the most attractive targets for attack. Disclosure of details connected with military communications technology may give important clues to encryption and coding. Information in the categories below, that has not previously been officially released, should not be published without consultation with the MOD.

- i. The organisation of the Armed Services or the Ministry of Defence;
- ii. The location, functions and size of British or Allied military headquarters (including possible military war headquarters) and other defence and military establishments;
- iii. Information about the nature, extent and routing of communications links between the MOD, military headquarters and other defence establishments, and military units (including ships);
- iv. Information related to the means by the UK or Allied Governments to preserve the security of transmitted

material, including all details of encryption and encoding practices and technology in use in Government and military communications;

- v. Details of any call-signs or messages passed through military communications channels.

5. Intelligence and Information about the enemy

While it is obviously necessary not to reveal the activities, and particularly the successes and failures, of the Security and Intelligence Services in connection with operations against Iraq both in the UK and Overseas, it is also necessary to avoid giving credence to enemy propaganda, constraints on the publication of information or speculation about enemy plans, operations and capabilities have several objectives. Useful indicators of deficiencies in enemy planning or equipment may be revealed inadvertently and it is important that the enemy should not receive any information as to the success or otherwise of operations undertaken by special forces infiltrated into the UK or into the countries of its allies. The judgement as to what might be damaging is a difficult one and the guidance of the MOD should be sought prior to the publication of any material about the activities of British (and Allied) Security and Intelligence Services, or about enemy plans, operations or capabilities. Areas which are likely to be particularly sensitive are:

- i. Activities of GCHQ and of the Security and Intelligence Services either in UK to counter Iraqi activities or overseas;
- ii Operations of enemy ground forces;

- iii. Details of enemy air attacks;
- iv. Details of enemy casualties or of numbers captured;
- v. Details of the activities, interrogation, control, movement, location or identity of enemy prisoners of war or internees in the UK or elsewhere;
- vi. Speculation about possible methods of attack, on any scale, on the UK or its allies.



CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

PM/90/101

(1) to-activated approach.
(natl. representatives
of a non-involved
nation
in hostilities)

For discussion in
OPD (G) tomorrow.
C D ?
2/i

PRIME MINISTER

(2) A.S. prior.

British Embassy, Baghdad

1. We are considering whether we should pull out all the remaining UK-based staff from our Embassy in Baghdad before 15 January. I have already instructed that the staff should be reduced to a core of six before 3 January, when we are due to expel eight Iraqi diplomats and over sixty Iraqi students from the UK.

2. The arguments for and against withdrawing all our Embassy staff in Baghdad are finely balanced. The advantages are that, in the event of hostilities, staff would not be exposed to the threat of Iraqi reprisals which could be violent (whether officially inspired or the result of mob action); there would be no danger of staff being caught up in allied military action; and, if withdrawal were coordinated with the US and other Europeans, it would send a powerful additional signal to the Iraqi leadership that we are serious about military action.

3. On the other hand, the small residual British community in Iraq would be left without consular protection (this would be particularly hard on Ian Richter, the British businessman serving a life sentence in Baghdad); we would have no means of conducting business direct with the Iraqi authorities, whether over political or consular matters; our standing, and our ability to act to the full as a permanent member

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

of the Security Council would be diminished. This might be particularly important if, as seems likely, there were a flurry of diplomatic activity around 15 January. We should not rule out at least a partial Iraqi withdrawal nearer the deadline, which might reduce the risk of early hostilities. Moreover, it may be important in the aftermath of hostilities to have someone actually on the spot ready to talk to whoever is in control about a range of practical problems. Once an Embassy is closed it is often hard to reopen.

4. My preference is to plan on the possibility of leaving a minimum of two people in the Embassy after 15 January. (One person alone is not really an option since he would need communications backup.) I do not underestimate the possible danger, particularly from mob violence. Iraqi history is strewn with attacks on Embassies, including our own. Those left behind would clearly have to be volunteers. In order to lessen the risk to their safety, we would locate them in the Deputy Head of Mission's house, which is in a residential area and has emergency communications. Mr Walker will discuss this with his staff when he returns to Baghdad on 31 December.

5. But much will depend on the intentions of the Americans and other Europeans. Some of the disadvantages of withdrawal would be reduced if a number of Western countries acted together. Jim Baker talked to you in Washington last week in terms of "breaking relations" with Iraq, possibly before 15 January. He may have simply meant withdrawal of staff. I would be against our taking the initiative in formally breaking relations, given the problems always associated with re-establishing them. With memories of the Tehran Embassy siege, the



CONFIDENTIAL

Americans are likely to be anxious not to risk their diplomats in Baghdad being taken hostage in the event of hostilities. Our European partners, whom we have consulted, have not yet reached firm conclusions, though a number see merit in a joint EC position. We shall need to discuss this in detail at the Foreign Affairs Council which I am attending on 4 January.

6. I hope that we can discuss the problem at OPD(G) if it meets on 3 January, though probably a final decision should wait until the following week.


7. I am copying this minute to the other members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.


DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
31 December 1990

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter and attachment from Webb to Powell dated 31 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>3/12/2018</i> <i>B. Gray</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



Page 1 of 1 page
Copy 1 of 8 copies

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

36 December 1990

Dear Charles,

Thanks
- Y is worrying
f. z. b.

36
The Minister
COB
2/1

CONTAINING IRAQI CW/BW CAPABILITY

At their discussions in Washington on 11th December US and UK officials agreed to look further at the implications of attacking Iraqi chemical and biological facilities in the light of our assessment that serious environmental damage might be caused. The US team undertook to study our assessment and further work on analysis and target selection was to be undertaken in theatre between US and UK military staffs.

These military discussions have not yet been completed. But the Defence Secretary has noted that President Bush told the Prime Minister that he was confident of limiting wider environmental damage by a 'one-two' punch in which initial high explosive attack would be followed by dropping incendiaries which would destroy most of the toxic substances. At Mr King's request, MOD experts have made an assessment of the likely success of this method of attack, with results that are not entirely reassuring.

In the case of chemical storage sites, mustard and nerve agents are flammable, so that an incendiary device would indeed reduce the downwind spread of freed agent. Biological weapon agent on the other hand is liquid slurry and not flammable, being able to withstand temperatures up to 900 C: an incendiary bomb would be likely to distribute the agents rather than limit its spread.

Further analysis is being undertaken, but on the face of it there remains a difference of technical view between us and the Americans on this issue. The current discussions in theatre may throw further light on it.

The next round of official discussions in Washington on 7th January will provide an opportunity to seek to resolve these ambiguities.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,
John Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

31 December 1990

Dear Charles,

Advice to British Communities in the Middle East

As you know, we have now issued advice to the dependents of British nationals in a number of Gulf countries that they should leave the area well before 15 January. The Foreign Secretary has been considering whether we should extend similar advice to the dependents of British nationals in Jordan, Yemen and Israel.

HM Ambassadors in all three countries recommend that British nationals should be advised to send their dependents home soon. They believe that in the event of hostilities, nationals of Western countries could be at risk from mob violence in Yemen, Jordan and the Occupied Territories. In Israel, civilians could be at risk from Iraqi missiles armed with chemical warheads.

Since the matter was last discussed in OPD(G), most Western countries (including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the US) have now advised their nationals to withdraw dependents from Yemen and Jordan. In some cases this advice has been extended to all nationals. France has advised dependents and non-essential staff in Jordan and Yemen to consider leaving. Italy has not yet issued advice to its nationals in Jordan and Yemen, but expects to do so soon.

In view of this, the Foreign Secretary proposes to issue at once Phase II advice for the dependents only of British nationals in Jordan and Yemen. But he does not intend, at this stage, to extend the advice to Israel or the Occupied Territories or to non-essential staff.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries of OPD(G) colleagues and to Sonia Phippard.

Yours ever
S. L. Cass
(S. L. Cass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles D Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 812

OF 311600Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, BELGRADE

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER:
31 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER BELIEVES THAT ON 4 JANUARY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MUST CONSIDER HOW TO DRIVE HOME THE MESSAGE THAT IRAQ WILL NOT BE ATTACKED IF SHE COMPLIES WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AGREES ON NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMERICANS. DOES NOT FAVOUR EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO GENSCHER THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT EC/IRAQ CONTACTS AND TO ASK GENSCHER WHAT HE THOUGHT SHOULD EMERGE FROM THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD RECONFIRM THE EC'S POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GULF CRISIS. MINISTERS SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW TO DRIVE HOME TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THE MESSAGE THAT IF IRAQ IMPLEMENTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IT WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. GENSCHER HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR WHO HAD SAID THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SHORTLY SEND A MESSAGE TO THE PERMANENT FIVE ABOUT HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD. LONCAR HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS READY TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BUT HE WANTED AFTERWARDS A CONFERENCE ON ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE GULF REGION AND ALSO GUARANTEES THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. LONCAR HAD TOLD SADDAM HUSSAIN THAT HE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD LINE UP BEHIND THE AMERICANS. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE EC SHOULD REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE AND SHOW SADDAM HUSSAIN A WAY OUT. HE WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ONCE WE HAD BOTH RECEIVED A WRITTEN ACCOUNT OF LONCAR'S VISIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT LONCAR WAS RIGHT AND THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN PROBABLY BELIEVED HE WOULD BE ATTACKED WHATEVER HE DID. IT WAS QUITE RIGHT TO DRIVE HOME THE MESSAGE THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF THEY COMPLIED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS - BUT EQUALLY, WE SHOULD

NOT BLUR THE SECOND HALF OF THE MESSAGE THAT IF HE REMAINED, HE WOULD BE ATTACKED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER AND HE KNEW THAT GENSCHER HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CONFUSION AND WAS WORRIED BY THE IDEA THAT POOS MIGHT VISIT BAGHDAD ALTHOUGH THE EC MIGHT FIND OTHER METHODS OF CONTACT. GENSCHER WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT POOS HAD SAID ON THE BBC THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC TO GO TO BAGHDAD. ALTHOUGH DE MICHELIS HAD PRESSED AT THE LAST FAC FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, THE UK AND GERMANY HAD SEEN THIS IDEA OFF ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE US MUST FIRST BE GIVEN A CHANCE. EVEN AFTER 3 JANUARY THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO EUROPE BUT NOT AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO POOS WHO NOW SAID THAT HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT GOING TO BAGHDAD AND HAD AGREED THAT MINISTERS WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES ON FRIDAY. THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT ON THE US/IRAQ FRONT AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ANY EC DECISIONS SHOULD NOT COMPLICATE THIS. GENSCHER AGREED AND SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE A LAST CONTACT WITH THE US ON 3 JANUARY BEFORE THE FAC. HE WOULD SPEAK TO BAKER.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

273

MAIN 229

IRAQ/KUWAIT (PO)
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44

IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE

TELNO 225

OF 311300Z DEC 90

INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER
SUMMARY

1. VAN DEN BROEK AGREES THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD BUT THAT SOME EC CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS MAY BE NECESSARY IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS. POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED VAN DEN BROEK THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF EC/IRAQ CONTACTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FAC MEETING ON 4 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD POOS SAY ON THE BBC THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC TO GO TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS GOING RATHER FAR. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE WAS RATHER SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, THE GERMANS, FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF CONTACT IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE US/IRAQ TALKS WERE NOT GOING TO MATERIALISE. BUT NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID AT THE LAST FAC ABOUT VISITING BAGHDAD. IN ANY CASE VAN DEN BROEK THOUGHT THAT EC TALKS WITH IRAQ SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE LINES AGREED BY THE FAC ON 4 DECEMBER - IN OTHER WORDS TARIQ AZIZ WOULD HAVE TO COME TO EUROPE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER WHO HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DEVELOPMENT ON THE PROPOSED US/IRAQI TALKS. WE MUST NOT COMPLICATE THAT EXERCISE. IF POOS WERE MANDATED TO VISIT BAGHDAD THE IRAQIS WOULD SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR THAT VISIT RATHER THAN DEALING SENSIBLY WITH THE US. THEY WOULD TRY TO DIVIDE US. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT SOME EC CONTACTS WITH IRAQ PROBABLY WOULD NEED TO BE AUTHORISED BUT THE QUESTION WAS WHAT SORT. VAN DEN BROEK AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY. IF POOS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE WOULD GO TO BAGHDAD, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO SET UP TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE US SHORTLY BEFORE THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING. VAN DEN BROEK WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO COUNTENANCE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD. ANY CONTACT WITH IRAQ

WITHOUT THE US WOULD ITSELF BE SIGNIFICANT AND NOT WITHOUT RISK ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE MANAGED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND IN LINE WITH WHAT WAS AGREED ON 4 JANUARY. BUT IT WOULD BE DAMAGING IF PEOPLE BEGAN TO TALK AS THOUGH THERE WAS ALREADY A CONSENSUS FOR POOS TO VISIT BAGHDAD.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE POSSIBLE EC MOVE MIGHT BE FOR THE TROIKA, OR THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE UK AND FRANCE, AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO SUMMON TWO OR THREE IRAQI AMBASSADORS TO GIVE THEM THE RIGHT MESSAGE. BUT WE SHOULD AVOID ANY EXPECTATION THAT POOS WOULD GO TO BAGHDAD. HE INTENDED TO SPEAK TO POOS AND THAT HE WOULD URGE HIM TO CONTACT BAKER.

5. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO EYSKENS ALONG SIMILAR LINES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE BELGIANS WOULD BE HELPFUL, AS THEY HAD BEEN AT THE FAC ON 18 DECEMBER. DUTCH SUPPORT FOR MILITARY EFFORT IN THE GULF

6. VAN DEN BROEK THANKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HIS MESSAGE ABOUT FURTHER ASSISTANCE. HE WAS TRYING TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES TO SENDING MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO THE GULF ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT THINK IT LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND MORE THAN 20 OR 30 DOCTORS OR MEDICAL STAFF. OBVIOUSLY THEY WANTED TO DO IT ON A VOLUNTEER BASIS.

7. VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO WOERNER ABOUT THE TURKISH REQUEST FOR BELGIAN AND GERMAN F-16S FROM THE ACE MOBILE FORCE. HE HAD TOLD WOERNER THAT IF THE BELGIANS OR GERMANS COULD NOT SUPPLY THEM, THEN HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GET THE DUTCH TO DO SO. BUT WOERNER WAS KEEN AT THIS STAGE TO GET THE GERMANS AND BELGIANS TO AGREE TO THE REQUEST.

8. VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED THE DUTCH MOD TO CONTACT THEIR UK OPPOSITE NUMBERS TO FIND OUT WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANY ROLE FOR DUTCH MARINES (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT VAN DEN BROEK HAD IN MIND). THE COALITION PARTNERS WERE ARGUING THAT THE MARINES HAD ONLY LIGHT EQUIPMENT AND COULD NOT, THEREFORE, PLAY A USEFUL PART. BUT VAN DEN BROEK SAW SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE CHANGED IF WE CAME UP WITH A CLEAR-CUT REQUEST.

9. FINALLY, VAN DEN BROEK SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD DROP A HINT TO THE FRENCH THAT AT THE NEXT WEU MEETING ON 17 JANUARY, THE TURKS AND NORWEGIANS, AS WELL AS THE GREEKS AND THE DANES SHOULD BE INVITED AS OBSERVERS.

HURD

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG

TELNO 109

OF 311300Z DEC 90

INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN
MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. POOS AGREES THAT AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD COULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL. SOME FORM OF EC/IRAQ CONTACT WILL BE NEEDED BUT THE FORM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ON 4 JANUARY. ALSO AGREES THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE POSITIONS WHICH PREJUDGE THAT MEETING. DETAIL
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED POOS THIS MORNING AFTER HEARING HIS INTERVIEW ON THE BBC IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY TO VISIT BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER AND THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME MOVEMENT ON US/IRAQ CONTACTS ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOTHING DEFINITE. HE THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT POOS SHOULD KEEP IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS OVER POSSIBLE EC CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS. POOS SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH BAKER AND THAT HE WOULD DO SO AGAIN.
3. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS, POOS SAID THAT THE MEDIA PORTRAYED AN ESCALATING WAR OF WORDS BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE UNTIL ABOUT 10 JANUARY. HE THOUGHT THAT AT THE MEETING ON 4 JANUARY MINISTERS SHOULD REVISIT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WHICH UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND IRAQ IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH OTHERS, BUT WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE MANNER. BUT IT SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATIONS.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CONTACT WAS NOW AGREED, ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND IN COORDINATION WITH OTHERS. IN HIS VIEW, AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD BY POOS OR THE TROIKA WOULD OPEN UP THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFUSION AND DIVISION. POOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO HAVE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD

WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE FOR TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT EUROPE. ALL THIS WOULD NEED DISCUSSION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES AS WELL. IN ANY EVENT WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING FIRM POSITIONS ON THE FORM OF ANY CONTACT BEFORE FRIDAY. POOS AGREED SAYING THAT IT WAS ONLY THE FORM OF THE CONTACT WHICH WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSION. HE ADDED THAT THE MEETING ON 4 JANUARY SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE SECURITY OF THE GULF REGION AFTER THE CRISIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

273

MAIN 229IRAQ/KUWAIT (PO)
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 929

OF 311200Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, WASHINGTON

JORDAN/SYRIA

1. AT MY AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 30 DECEMBER, HE MENTIONED THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS, HAD ENQUIRED WHAT THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF ISRAEL WERE TO ATTACK JORDAN. BADRAN HAD RECEIVED AN ASSURANCE THAT SYRIA WOULD REGARD SUCH AN ACTION AS AN ATTACK UPON ITSELF AND WOULD RENDER APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE.

2. THE KING COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS HELPFUL AS FAR AS IT WENT, THOUGH HE HAD MANY RESERVATIONS ABOUT ASSAD'S PRESENT POLICIES. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT HIS GAME REALLY WAS. IN A RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, ASSAD HAD SHED VERY LITTLE LIGHT ON HIS INTENTIONS.

3. I ENQUIRED WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF JORDAN'S PRESSING NEED FOR ADDITIONAL WATER RESOURCES, BADRAN HAD ALSO RAISED THE WAHDA DAM. THE KING SAID NOT, ADDING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE STILL WRESTLING WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE DELICATE ISSUE OF ISRAELI DEMAND FOR ADDITIONAL OFF-TAKE FROM THE DAM.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

147

MAIN 135

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
HD/CONSULAR D
ECD(E)

SCD
SOVIET D
UND
WNAMD/ODA
EMERGENCY UNIT (2 VIA FTP)


HD/INFO D
LEGAL ADVISERS
MED
NAD
NEWS D
NPDD
PLANNERS
PUSD
RAD
RMD
SED

PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
CHIEF CLERK
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR SLATER
MR GREENSTOCK
MISS SPENCER
MR GORE-BOOTH

ADDITIONAL 12

ARAB/ISRAEL

NNNN



204

312103Z
FOR EMERGENCY UNIT
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELNO 909
OF 311200Z DECEMBER 90
INFO DESKBY 312130Z WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS. BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER
SUMMARY

1. NO SIGN OF A FRENCH INITIATIVE BEFORE THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY
ON CONTACTS WITH IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO DUMAS THIS EVENING ABOUT
THE MEETING OF THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT THE TWELVE
WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS WHETHER THEY COULD MAKE A USEFUL CONTACT
WITH THE IRAQIS. BAKER STILL HOPED FOR MOVEMENT ON THE PROPOSED
US/IRAQ MEETINGS BUT HAD NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THIS. BUSH WAS
UNLIKELY TO CHANGE HIS POSITION ON DATES FOR THOSE MEETINGS.
ALTHOUGH THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME INDIRECT CONTACTS WHICH MIGHT
LEAD TO DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK. BAKER WAS
STILL INTERESTED IN A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE BUT WAS NOT
SURE HOW THE RUSSIANS WOULD BEHAVE. HE

WONDERED WHETHER DUMAS HAD HAD ANY CONTACTS WITH SHEVARDNADZE?
DUMAS SAID THAT HIS ONLY CONTACT WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS RESIGNATION HAD BEEN A MESSAGE ON
A DIFFERENT POINT. HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE RUSSIANS HAD CHANGED
THEIR MINDS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A PERMANENT FIVE MEETING.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO POOS
BECAUSE OF HIS INTERVIEW ON THE BBC IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE
EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC TO VISIT BAGHDAD. WHEN THE
SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED HIM, POOS HAD VOLUNTEERED THAT
HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF GOING TO BAGHDAD - THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME
CONFUSION. DUMAS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR POOS
SAY WHAT HE HAD - INDEED HE HAD SAID IT TWICE. HE HAD CLEARLY
GONE FURTHER THAN HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE LAST FAC.

4. IN CONCLUSION, DUMAS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD NO SPECIFIC
IDEAS FOR CONTACTS WITH IRAQ - HE WAS WAITING FOR FRIDAY'S
MEETING AND FOR 3 JANUARY. BEFORE WHICH BAKER HAD NOT WANTED THE
EC TO TAKE ACTION. HE AGREED WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE
PROPOSED THAT THEY SHOULD TELEPHONE EACH OTHER AGAIN ON 2 OR
3 JANUARY TO COMPARE NOTES.

HURD

YYYY
(HARRIS)
MAIN
IRAQ/KUWAIT (PD)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 2237

OF 310925Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PEKING, EC POSTS, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH BAKER: 30 DECEMBER
SUMMARY

1. BAKER SEES NO OBJECTION TO SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENCY, FLANKED BY UK AND FRANCE, MIGHT CALL IN IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN RELEVANT CAPITALS, BUT IS NOT ATTRACTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TWELVE INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO EUROPE. BELIEVES THAT THIS WOULD BE DIVISIVE. BAKER SEES ADVANTAGE IN MEETING OF PERMANENT FIVE BETWEEN 3 AND 12 JANUARY - BUT SOVIET POSITION IMPORTANT. SECRETARY OF STATE TO SOUND OUT EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES ON POSSIBLE EC INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE EC AND US CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS.

3. BAKER HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE (OUR TELNO 2233, NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE CHRISTMAS PERIOD ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDIRECT OVERTURES FROM THE IRAQIS ABOUT THE DATES FOR US/IRAQI MEETINGS. HE HAD A HUNCH THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT COME UP WITH A NEW PROPOSAL ON DATES AROUND 2/3 JANUARY. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FROM THE US POSITION. BUT MUCH DEPENDED ON WHAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT PROPOSE.

4. BAKER SAID THAT HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE IDEA FLOATED IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE THAT, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVES WE SHOULD PROPOSE A JOINT EC APPROACH - SUCH AS THE PRESIDENCY, FLANKED BY THE UK AND FRANCE (AS PERMANENT MEMBERS) SUMMONING THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES. BUT BAKER SAID THAT THE IRAQIS NEEDED TO HEAR A MESSAGE THAT, IN ORDER TO BE CONVINCING, COULD ONLY COME FROM THE AMERICANS - THAT THEY WOULD HAVE QUOTE A FREE RIDE UNQUOTE IF THEY COMPLIED WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. BAKER WAS NOT ATTRACTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TWELVE INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT EUROPE FOR TALKS - THIS WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE IRAQIS.

5. BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD TWICE FROM GENSCHER IN THE LAST 5 DAYS ABOUT THE DATES FOR A US/IRAQ MEETING. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN BONN HAD BEEN PUSHING THE LINE THAT EACH PRESIDENT

SHOULD NOMINATE THE DATE FOR SEEING THE OTHER'S FOREIGN MINISTER. BAKER HAD EXPLAINED TO GENSCHER THAT THIS WAS A STANDARD AND UNACCEPTABLE IRAQI POSITION.

6. BAKER RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL TO BE SAID FOR IT AT SOME POINT BETWEEN 3 AND 12 JANUARY. THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF A STRAIGHTFORWARD MEETING BY FOREIGN MINISTERS, OR THE PERMANENT FIVE COULD INVITE TARIQ AZIZ TO MEET THEM. BAKER ASKED AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD STILL BE WILLING TO HOST SUCH A MEETING. BAKER SAID THAT A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD TURN ON THE SOVIET POSITION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD REMAIN CONFUSED FOR SOME TIME AND THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT TO CROSS THE US OVER THE GULF. BUT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT USE THE GULF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLAMP DOWN AT HOME. A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE IF THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING TO SHILLY-SHALLY.

7. BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD HAD TWO MESSAGES RECENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE FIRST HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE OF THEIR POLICY IN THE GULF, WHILE THE SECOND HAD BEEN A REPORT OF THE RECENT VISIT OF THE SOVIET DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO BAGHDAD, AND HAD BEEN LARGELY ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS. BOTH MESSAGES HAD COME FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN FROM SHEVARDNADZE. THEY HAD SHOWN, AT LEAST, A WILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE. BAKER WAS RELUCTANT TO TRY TO ENGAGE SHEVARDNADZE ON THE POSITION WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD TAKE AT A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE SINCE HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE WONDERED, THOUGH, WHETHER HE SHOULD GET PRESIDENT BUSH TO SEND A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV ASKING FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY A PROPER PART IN SUCH A MEETING. HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE, TOO, WOULD THINK FURTHER ABOUT A POSSIBLE PERMANENT FIVE MEETING.

8. ON THE EC FRONT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD SPEAK INITIALLY TO GENSCHER AND POOS. THE TROUBLE WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE APPROACH WAS THAT ALTHOUGH IT WOULD SATISFY THE FRENCH, IT WOULD NOT SATISFY OTHERS, SUCH AS THE ITALIANS AND SPANISH WHO WANTED SOMETHING WITH AN EC LABEL. IT WOULD BE DAMAGING IF ONE OR MORE OF THE 12 HEADED OFF IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE WANTED TO PREVENT THAT. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO SEE WHAT INITIATIVES MIGHT BE COOKING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. BAKER ASKED THAT IF WE HEARD OF AN INITIATIVE IN GESTATION WHICH WE THOUGHT MIGHT BE DIVISIVE, WE SHOULD LET THE US KNOW QUICKLY - PRESIDENT BUSH WAS ON GOOD TERMS WITH MOST

COMMUNITY LEADERS AND COULD TRY TO HEAD OFF AN UNHELPFUL INITIATIVE IF THE US KNEW OF IT IN TIME.

9. FINALLY, BAKER COMMENTED THAT CONGRESS WOULD NEED A GOOD DEAL OF HANDLING. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD NEED SOME SORT OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION BETWEEN NOW AND THE USE OF FORCE, ALTHOUGH HE REPEATED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT INCLINED TO MOVE FROM THE US POSITION ON THE DATES OF A MEETING WITH IRAQ.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

MAIN

15

NO DISTRIBUTION
PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/PUS
MR WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GORE-BOOTH

MR YOUNG, EMERGENCY UNIT
MISS EVANS, UND
MR CORNISH, NEWS D
PS/NO 10
MR APPELYARD, CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

NNNN

RESTRICTED

FM MUSCAT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 626

OF 310841Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, SANA'A, AMMAN, MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OMANI VIEWS OF SITUATION

SUMMARY

1. OMANI EQUIVALENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER FORECASTS IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AT ELEVENTH HOUR BUT EXPRESSES DOUBT ABOUT CONSEQUENCES.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I CALLED ON GENERAL ALI MAJID, MINISTER OF PALACE OFFICE AFFAIRS ON 31 DECEMBER, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HIM HOW HE SAW THE KUWAIT CRISIS DEVELOPING.

3. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD STAY IN KUWAIT UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT AND WOULD THEN WITHDRAW. HE WONDERED HOWEVER WHERE THIS LEFT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD SURVIVE. WHATEVER HAPPENED, HE FELT SURE THAT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGION AND FOR THE WEST WOULD BE FELT OVER A LONG PERIOD.

4. I SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A GRAVE DANGER OF FURTHER MISCALCULATION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO DECIDE WHEN THE LAST MOMENT HAD ARRIVED. IT COULD BE THAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE COULD HAVE ALREADY STARTED TO MOVE AND IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE THEN TO STOP IT. HE AGREED. I QUESTIONED HOWEVER WHETHER WITHDRAWAL NECESSARILY MEANT THE END OF SADDAM HUSSEIN IN VIEW OF HIS GRIP ON THE COUNTRY AND ABILITY TO MANIPULATE THE PEOPLE. HE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD NOT SURVIVE.

5. HE WONDERED ALOUD WHAT THE JORDANIANS AND YEMENIS WERE UP TO. HE SAID THINGS HAD GONE VERY QUIET IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND SPECULATED THAT THIS COULD PRESSAGE SOME KIND OF MILITARY ACTION BY THEM IN THE REAR IF IT CAME TO HOSTILITIES.

6. I SAID THAT IT WAS TO THE GOOD IF BOTH THESE COUNTRIES HAD QUIETENED DOWN AS IT WOULD FACILITATE BETTER RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. I DOUBTED WHETHER EITHER COUNTRY WAS PREPARED TO JOIN WITH

IRAQ AGAINST THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

7. MENTIONING YEMEN GAVE ME A CUE TO ASK WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE FRONTIER DISPUTE. HE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. OMAN'S POSITION WAS CLEAR AND UNCHANGEABLE.

8. I ASKED HOW HE SAW THE OMANI CONTINGENT'S ROLE IN ANY HOSTILITIES. HE SAID UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT WAS THERE TO FIGHT. HE CLEARLY MEANT IN AN OFFENSIVE AS WELL AS A DEFENSIVE CAPACITY.

CLARK

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

39

ADVANCE

30 37

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS (2)	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	[EMERGENCY UNIT]
HD/SECPOL D	

NNNN

*File in has
seen*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 2237

OF 310925Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PEKING, EC POSTS, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH BAKER: 30 DECEMBER
SUMMARY

1. BAKER SEES NO OBJECTION TO SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENCY, FLANKED BY UK AND FRANCE, MIGHT CALL IN IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN RELEVANT CAPITALS, BUT IS NOT ATTRACTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TWELVE INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO EUROPE. BELIEVES THAT THIS WOULD BE DIVISIVE. BAKER SEES ADVANTAGE IN MEETING OF PERMANENT FIVE BETWEEN 3 AND 12 JANUARY - BUT SOVIET POSITION IMPORTANT. SECRETARY OF STATE TO SOUND OUT EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES ON POSSIBLE EC INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE EC AND US CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS.

3. BAKER HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE (OUR TELNO 2233, NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE CHRISTMAS PERIOD ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDIRECT OVERTURES FROM THE IRAQIS ABOUT THE DATES FOR US/IRAQI MEETINGS. HE HAD A HUNCH THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT COME UP WITH A NEW PROPOSAL ON DATES AROUND 2/3 JANUARY. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FROM THE US POSITION. BUT MUCH DEPENDED ON WHAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT PROPOSE.

4. BAKER SAID THAT HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE IDEA FLOATED IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE THAT, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVES WE SHOULD PROPOSE A JOINT EC APPROACH - SUCH AS THE PRESIDENCY, FLANKED BY THE UK AND FRANCE (AS PERMANENT MEMBERS) SUMMONING THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES. BUT BAKER SAID THAT THE IRAQIS NEEDED TO HEAR A MESSAGE THAT, IN ORDER TO BE CONVINCING, COULD ONLY COME FROM THE AMERICANS - THAT THEY WOULD HAVE QUOTE A FREE RIDE UNQUOTE IF THEY COMPLIED WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. BAKER WAS NOT ATTRACTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TWELVE INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT EUROPE FOR TALKS - THIS WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE IRAQIS.

5. BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD TWICE FROM GENSCHER IN THE LAST 5 DAYS ABOUT THE DATES FOR A US/IRAQ MEETING. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN BONN HAD BEEN PUSHING THE LINE THAT EACH PRESIDENT

SHOULD NOMINATE THE DATE FOR SEEING THE OTHER'S FOREIGN MINISTER. BAKER HAD EXPLAINED TO GENSCHER THAT THIS WAS A STANDARD AND UNACCEPTABLE IRAQI POSITION.

6. BAKER RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL TO BE SAID FOR IT AT SOME POINT BETWEEN 3 AND 12 JANUARY. THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF A STRAIGHTFORWARD MEETING BY FOREIGN MINISTERS, OR THE PERMANENT FIVE COULD INVITE TARIQ AZIZ TO MEET THEM. BAKER ASKED AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD STILL BE WILLING TO HOST SUCH A MEETING. BAKER SAID THAT A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD TURN ON THE SOVIET POSITION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD REMAIN CONFUSED FOR SOME TIME AND THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT TO CROSS THE US OVER THE GULF. BUT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT USE THE GULF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLAMP DOWN AT HOME. A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE IF THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING TO SHILLY-SHALLY.

7. BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD HAD TWO MESSAGES RECENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE FIRST HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE OF THEIR POLICY IN THE GULF, WHILE THE SECOND HAD BEEN A REPORT OF THE RECENT VISIT OF THE SOVIET DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO BAGHDAD, AND HAD BEEN LARGELY ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS. BOTH MESSAGES HAD COME FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN FROM SHEVARDNADZE. THEY HAD SHOWN, AT LEAST, A WILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE. BAKER WAS RELUCTANT TO TRY TO ENGAGE SHEVARDNADZE ON THE POSITION WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD TAKE AT A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE SINCE HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE WONDERED, THOUGH, WHETHER HE SHOULD GET PRESIDENT BUSH TO SEND A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV ASKING FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY A PROPER PART IN SUCH A MEETING. HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT WE, TOO, WOULD THINK FURTHER ABOUT A POSSIBLE PERMANENT FIVE MEETING.

8. ON THE EC FRONT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD SPEAK INITIALLY TO GENSCHER AND POOS. THE TROUBLE WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE APPROACH WAS THAT ALTHOUGH IT WOULD SATISFY THE FRENCH, IT WOULD NOT SATISFY OTHERS, SUCH AS THE ITALIANS AND SPANISH WHO WANTED SOMETHING WITH AN EC LABEL. IT WOULD BE DAMAGING IF ONE OR MORE OF THE 12 HEADED OFF IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE WANTED TO PREVENT THAT. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO SEE WHAT INITIATIVES MIGHT BE COOKING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. BAKER ASKED THAT IF WE HEARD OF AN INITIATIVE IN GESTATION WHICH WE THOUGHT MIGHT BE DIVISIVE, WE SHOULD LET THE US KNOW QUICKLY - PRESIDENT BUSH WAS ON GOOD TERMS WITH MOST

COMMUNITY LEADERS AND COULD TRY TO HEAD OFF AN UNHELPFUL INITIATIVE IF THE US KNEW OF IT IN TIME.

9. FINALLY, BAKER COMMENTED THAT CONGRESS WOULD NEED A GOOD DEAL OF HANDLING. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD NEED SOME SORT OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION BETWEEN NOW AND THE USE OF FORCE, ALTHOUGH HE REPEATED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT INCLINED TO MOVE FROM THE US POSITION ON THE DATES OF A MEETING WITH IRAQ.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

MAIN 15

NO DISTRIBUTION

PS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/PUS

MR WESTON

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR YOUNG, EMERGENCY UNIT

MISS EVANS, UND

MR CORNISH, NEWS D

PS/NO 10

MR APPELYARD, CABINET OFFICE

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE
TELNO 225
OF 311300Z DEC 90
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER
SUMMARY

1. VAN DEN BROEK AGREES THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD BUT THAT SOME EC CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS MAY BE NECESSARY IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS. POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED VAN DEN BROEK THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF EC/IRAQ CONTACTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FAC MEETING ON 4 JANUARY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD POOS SAY ON THE BBC THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC TO GO TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS GOING RATHER FAR. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE WAS RATHER SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, THE GERMANS, FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF CONTACT IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE US/IRAQ TALKS WERE NOT GOING TO MATERIALISE. BUT NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID AT THE LAST FAC ABOUT VISITING BAGHDAD. IN ANY CASE VAN DEN BROEK THOUGHT THAT EC TALKS WITH IRAQ SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE LINES AGREED BY THE FAC ON 4 DECEMBER - IN OTHER WORDS TARIQ AZIZ WOULD HAVE TO COME TO EUROPE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER WHO HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DEVELOPMENT ON THE PROPOSED US/IRAQI TALKS. WE MUST NOT COMPLICATE THAT EXERCISE. IF POOS WERE MANDATED TO VISIT BAGHDAD THE IRAQIS WOULD SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR THAT VISIT RATHER THAN DEALING SENSIBLY WITH THE US. THEY WOULD TRY TO DIVIDE US. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT SOME EC CONTACTS WITH IRAQ PROBABLY WOULD NEED TO BE AUTHORISED BUT THE QUESTION WAS WHAT SORT. VAN DEN BROEK AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY. IF POOS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE WOULD GO TO BAGHDAD, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO SET UP TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE US SHORTLY BEFORE THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING. VAN DEN BROEK WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO COUNTENANCE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD. ANY CONTACT WITH IRAQ

WITHOUT THE US WOULD ITSELF BE SIGNIFICANT AND NOT WITHOUT RISK ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE MANAGED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND IN LINE WITH WHAT WAS AGREED ON 4 JANUARY. BUT IT WOULD BE DAMAGING IF PEOPLE BEGAN TO TALK AS THOUGH THERE WAS ALREADY A CONSENSUS FOR POOS TO VISIT BAGHDAD.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE POSSIBLE EC MOVE MIGHT BE FOR THE TROIKA, OR THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE UK AND FRANCE, AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO SUMMON TWO OR THREE IRAQI AMBASSADORS TO GIVE THEM THE RIGHT MESSAGE. BUT WE SHOULD AVOID ANY EXPECTATION THAT POOS WOULD GO TO BAGHDAD. HE INTENDED TO SPEAK TO POOS AND THAT HE WOULD URGE HIM TO CONTACT BAKER.

5. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO EYSKENS ALONG SIMILAR LINES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE BELGIANS WOULD BE HELPFUL, AS THEY HAD BEEN AT THE FAC ON 18 DECEMBER. DUTCH SUPPORT FOR MILITARY EFFORT IN THE GULF

6. VAN DEN BROEK THANKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HIS MESSAGE ABOUT FURTHER ASSISTANCE. HE WAS TRYING TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES TO SENDING MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO THE GULF ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT THINK IT LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND MORE THAN 20 OR 30 DOCTORS OR MEDICAL STAFF. OBVIOUSLY THEY WANTED TO DO IT ON A VOLUNTEER BASIS.

7. VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO WOERNER ABOUT THE TURKISH REQUEST FOR BELGIAN AND GERMAN F-16S FROM THE ACE MOBILE FORCE. HE HAD TOLD WOERNER THAT IF THE BELGIANS OR GERMANS COULD NOT SUPPLY THEM, THEN HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GET THE DUTCH TO DO SO. BUT WOERNER WAS KEEN AT THIS STAGE TO GET THE GERMANS AND BELGIANS TO AGREE TO THE REQUEST.

8. VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED THE DUTCH MOD TO CONTACT THEIR UK OPPOSITE NUMBERS TO FIND OUT WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANY ROLE FOR DUTCH MARINES (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT VAN DEN BROEK HAD IN MIND). THE COALITION PARTNERS WERE ARGUING THAT THE MARINES HAD ONLY LIGHT EQUIPMENT AND COULD NOT, THEREFORE, PLAY A USEFUL PART. BUT VAN DEN BROEK SAW SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE CHANGED IF WE CAME UP WITH A CLEAR-CUT REQUEST.

9. FINALLY, VAN DEN BROEK SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD DROP A HINT TO THE FRENCH THAT AT THE NEXT WEU MEETING ON 17 JANUARY, THE TURKS AND NORWEGIANS, AS WELL AS THE GREEKS AND THE DANES SHOULD BE INVITED AS OBSERVERS.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

273

MAIN 229

IRAQ/KUWAIT (PO)
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44

IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG
TELNO 109
OF 311300Z DEC 90
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN
MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. POOS AGREES THAT AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD COULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL. SOME FORM OF EC/IRAQ CONTACT WILL BE NEEDED BUT THE FORM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ON 4 JANUARY. ALSO AGREES THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE POSITIONS WHICH PREJUDGE THAT MEETING. DETAIL
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED POOS THIS MORNING AFTER HEARING HIS INTERVIEW ON THE BBC IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY TO VISIT BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER AND THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME MOVEMENT ON US/IRAQ CONTACTS ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOTHING DEFINITE. HE THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT POOS SHOULD KEEP IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS OVER POSSIBLE EC CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS. POOS SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH BAKER AND THAT HE WOULD DO SO AGAIN.
3. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS, POOS SAID THAT THE MEDIA PORTRAYED AN ESCALATING WAR OF WORDS BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE UNTIL ABOUT 10 JANUARY. HE THOUGHT THAT AT THE MEETING ON 4 JANUARY MINISTERS SHOULD REVISIT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WHICH UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND IRAQ IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH OTHERS, BUT WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE MANNER. BUT IT SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATIONS.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CONTACT WAS NOW AGREED, ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND IN COORDINATION WITH OTHERS. IN HIS VIEW, AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD BY POOS OR THE TROIKA WOULD OPEN UP THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFUSION AND DIVISION. POOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO HAVE AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD

WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE FOR TARIQ AZIZ TO VISIT EUROPE. ALL THIS WOULD NEED DISCUSSION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES AS WELL. IN ANY EVENT WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING FIRM POSITIONS ON THE FORM OF ANY CONTACT BEFORE FRIDAY. POOS AGREED SAYING THAT IT WAS ONLY THE FORM OF THE CONTACT WHICH WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSION. HE ADDED THAT THE MEETING ON 4 JANUARY SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE SECURITY OF THE GULF REGION AFTER THE CRISIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

273

MAIN 229IRAQ/KUWAIT (PO)
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Selection of two telegrams
on the file attached

There are 2 further
files expected shortly.

Max

Duty Clerk

21.12.90

50 ea



file

bcpc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 December 1990

See record.

THE GULF



I wrote to you on 28 December about the Prime Minister's meeting with the Foreign Secretary at Chequers the previous day and their discussions of the Gulf. There was one point which I omitted: in the event that hostilities do take place, the Prime Minister would need to make a broadcast on the day they started to explain to the nation the reasons for the initiation of hostilities and why our forces were involved. It would be helpful if some early thought could be given to the shape and content of the statement which he would make in such circumstances.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(CHARLES POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from the Prime Minister to the Prince of Wales dated 29 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>26/1/12</i> 
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER from Charles Powell



The Mail on Sunday have got the story of the missing documents (you will know what I mean). They seem to have got virtually all the details, and the source is pretty clearly the Metropolitan Police (the story has been obtained by their crime reporter, and the Met have confirmed the details). The secretary of the D Notice Committee is seeing the Editor of the Mail at the moment. We hope to dissuade them from running the story or at least only to use a bowdlerized version. If that fails, we have the option of going for an injunction. Michael Quinlan has already sworn out an affidavit. The MOD are, of course, considering what to say to the Americans in the event that the story is published.

There is little more I can tell you at present, except that we are doing our best to keep the story suppressed. We shall probably not know what degree of success we achieve for three or four hours.



JEAN

1420: 29 December 1990

Ref. A090/3128

MR APPLEYARD

c - Sir C Powell (No 10)Options for dealing with an Iraqi withdrawal

During our visit to Washington, Mr Gates told me that he is conducting a very small working party to consider options for the alliance for dealing with a gimmick by Saddam Hussain. He had in mind that, if Saddam Hussain made some "offer", the alliance may need to make a very rapid response. He therefore hoped to clear the lines proposed by the United States with us in advance. Those taking part in his working party are Wolfowitz, Kimmit and Jeremiah. Nobody else knows about it.

2. Gates said that his group have seen no particular difficulty about offers of conditional withdrawal or partial withdrawal. We already have an established line on those, which is to reject them. The problem lies with protracted unconditional withdrawal. Here Gates has in mind, contrary to what we were previously informed, setting a series of deadlines for the Iraqis to vacate specific areas, starting with the coastal strip and the Island, and alliance forces filling in behind them. If Saddam Hussain protested that he was not able to get his equipment out in time, he would be told to get his soldiers out and come back for the equipment later.

3. I said that we would be very glad to discuss these options with him, and suggested that they should be discussed with our team for the inter agency talks, especially since the American side of these talks coincides so closely with the membership of his working party.

b


4. You might like to give Gates a ring on a secure telephone some time during the week after Christmas to show that we have registered the point and to explore whether he will be ready to discuss this when you go to Washington for the next round of inter agency talks.

NCDavidson

for ROBIN BUTLER

28 December 1990

(Approved by Sir Robin Butler
and signed in his absence)



... you might give Gates a ring on a secure telephone
some time after Christmas to show that we have
registered a point and to explore whether he will be ready to
discuss this when you go to Washington for the next round of
inter-agency talks.

W. C. Sullivan

ROBIN BUTLER

(Approved by Bill Butler
and signed in his absence)

28 December 1990

PRIME MINISTER

We shall need to consult MOD for an answer to some of the points in the attached letter from The Prince of Wales. If you agree, I will do so .

I further agree with Prince Charles on water + food being lovely and expensive?!

f. 1/5 please

Meanwhile, you may want to consider sending a manuscript reply which:

- thanks HRH for going to the Gulf. The visit seems to have had an excellent effect on the morale of our forces and was very well received by public opinion here;
- says you will look into the points in his letter and will write more fully to him on your own return from the Gulf.


C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

28 December 1990

Attached!
f 29.12

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from the Prince of Wales to the Prime Minister dated 28 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>26/1/18</i> <i>ML</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

Severn



49B

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 December

Prime Minister

BW Immunisation

This is the fuller note which
you requested. I think it
answers the main points you
raised. The new point - to me at
least - is that we have been
manufacturing and using the vaccine
since 1963. This puts it in a
different light.
Content?

C. D. P. 20/xii



FROM; T.J. SUTTON
DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1990

LORD PRESIDENT


cc: Chief Whip
Deputy Chief Whip
Mr. Maclean
Mr. Morris (No. 10)
PS/Secretary of State for Defence
Mr. Russell
Miss Phippard
Miss Turnbull
Mrs. Thomson

TAM DALYELL, MP: REQUEST FOR RECALL OF PARLIAMENT


Mr. Dalyell rang this Office on Thursday 27 December to put on record his request that the immediate recall of Parliament be considered, to allow for debate on the compulsory call-up of Reservists to serve in the Gulf. (The media had given quite extensive coverage to the possibility that MOD's request for volunteers from the Reserves would not produce sufficient and that compulsory call-up might therefore be necessary).

He was told that his request would certainly be passed on to you promptly, and that you would no doubt consider it alongside any other representations that you received.

I recommend no further action for now. As with requests for the recall of Parliament in early August, in the immediate aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, you would need a formal request from the official Opposition to start thinking seriously about a recall. But you and copy recipients should be aware of Mr. Dalyell's request.


T.J. SUTTON
Principal Private Secretary

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Item 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Butler to Curwen dated 28 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>26/1/18</i> <i>M. W.</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

(2)

PRIME MINISTER

*This all went
rather well. 4 30.12*

RESERVISTS FOR THE GULF

Although the response to the call for volunteers has been good, the MOD are still 233 people short (out of 1500 requested). They will therefore announce today that they need to call up around 250 additional Army personnel. This means actually writing to about 480, in order to be sure of getting 233. The RAF Auxiliary Medical Evacuation Squadron will also be called up.

C.P.P.

Charles Powell

28 December 1990

*P.S. Please now see
attached letter
which came in
subsequently.*

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

28th December 1990

Dear Charles,

THE GULF: CALL-OUT OF SELECTED RESERVISTS

Now we have assessed the scale of the response to our request for volunteer reservists, it has become clear that there is a shortfall in the numbers and in the range of medical skills required. The shortfall is not as great as expected - some 233 to meet the Army medical support plan; my Secretary of State has however decided that a call-out of reserves will be necessary to meet this requirement.

He is also planning to call out No. 4626 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force in view of the specialised training and skills they possess in the field of medical evacuation. The Squadron is about 140 strong.

Since it will be necessary to start sending out call-out notices from midday today, we plan to issue an explanatory press release from the MOD shortly; a copy of this is attached.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO), Stephen Alcock (Health), Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(S J AMBLER-EDWARDS)(MISS)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

CALL OUT OF SELECTED RESERVISTS

A substantial number of men and women reservists with medical skills have volunteered for active service in support of our commitments in the gulf. A requirement remains however in certain of the medical skills. The Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King, has therefore decided to call out some reservists under Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act. In all cases, these will be personnel who have the Medical skills required.

It is anticipated that some further 250 individual Army reservists, in addition to those who originally volunteered, will be needed. Call out notices will be sent out to a number of people asking them to report for interview and assessment with a view to starting training at the beginning of January.

No 4626 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force - about 140 personnel - will also be called out in view of their highly specialised training and skills in the field of medical evacuation.

Under the Reserve Forces Act, all those called out will enjoy protection of civilian employment, the payment of a call-out gratuity and additional measures to supplement income where necessary.

The Secretary of State said:

"I am very encouraged by the number of reservists who have volunteered to help ensure that we have good medical support for our forces in the Gulf. Most of our additional needs have been met by these volunteers but we still need some extra reservists and it is for this purpose that the call out letters have been issued."



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 December 1990

MEETING RECORD
cc MASTER.

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary met at Chequers yesterday. Part of their discussion touched on the Gulf and follow-up to the Prime Minister's talks with President Bush at Camp David. This letter records the points for action arising from their talk.

The annex to this letter should be seen only by the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Robin Butler and Sir Percy Cradock.

BW Immunisation

The Prime Minister said that he had agreed in principle to the immunisation of British forces in the Gulf against anthrax, on the basis of the paper circulated by MOD shortly before Christmas. But before giving a final go-ahead, he would want a further note from MOD setting out details of the tests made on the vaccine, the approval mechanism and other similar details. I subsequently spoke to Jane Binstead (MOD) and her letter to me of 27 December deals with these points.

Embassies in Baghdad

The Prime Minister said that, on the basis of his talks with the President, he believed we should start thinning out our Embassy in Baghdad very soon and aim to withdraw it completely before the UN deadline of 15 January, unless very compelling reasons could be advanced for keeping a skeleton staff. Other considerations apart, withdrawal would be a powerful signal to Saddam Hussain. We should presumably consult other EC countries and the US, and try to co-ordinate action so far as possible.

The Foreign Secretary said that action was already in hand to thin out our Embassy from next week, and we were consulting other countries as to their intentions. He accepted that there were strong arguments for complete withdrawal. Equally, there was a case for keeping at least one person in Baghdad - not necessarily the Ambassador - to act as a channel of communication (not least in the immediate aftermath of a conflict) and to show that we had not abandoned people like Ian Richter, who was still in prison. The Prime Minister commented that anyone left behind in the Embassy must be a volunteer.

In subsequent discussion, it was agreed that further thought was needed before final decisions were reached. We should try to concert action so far as possible with the US and other members of the Twelve. The issue should be considered by OPD(G) next week on the basis of a paper by the FCO. The Foreign Secretary would talk to Secretary Baker and subsequently discuss our conclusions with other EC Foreign Ministers at the FAC on 4 January. Meanwhile, the action to thin out our own staff should go ahead, as should the planned expulsions of members of the Iraqi Embassy.

Contracts with the Iraqi Government

The Prime Minister said that the Americans were clearly uncertain whether Secretary Baker would visit Baghdad - or Tariq Aziz come to Washington - before the 15 January deadline. They would not be too concerned if there was no meeting. Equally, there were presentational difficulties about having a complete void between now and 15 January. On the basis of his earlier conversation with President Mitterrand, it seemed possible that the French might send Dumas to Baghdad, whether or not there were contacts between the Americans and the Iraqis. This would not be helpful.

The Foreign Secretary agreed that it would be better if Dumas and De Michelis did not go to Baghdad, in the absence of any US contact with the Iraqis. Otherwise it would be seen as a split in the hitherto united US/European position. If Dumas did go, it was all too likely that he would put forward a different view on linkage to the Palestinian problem. The Foreign Secretary continued that he had been reflecting on possible alternatives to a visit. One possibility would be for the Luxembourg Presidency, perhaps flanked by the troika or by Britain and France, to summon an Iraqi Ambassador and deliver a solemn message on behalf of the Twelve about the necessity for Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council's Resolutions. Such a message could be agreed at the FAC on 4 January. A further alternative would be to invite Tariq Aziz to visit Europe.

In discussion it was agreed that it would be better to avoid an invitation to Tariq Aziz. A message would be better, although even with that, there might be difficulties with some of our European partners on the aspect of an international conference on the Middle East: and it could not be ruled out that Dumas would still visit Baghdad. The Foreign Secretary should discuss the handling of this issue with Secretary Baker and subsequently with his colleagues in the Twelve.

Domestic Opinion

The Prime Minister said that domestic opinion in the United Kingdom about the Gulf had so far been gratifyingly firm. But we were just entering what was likely to be the most difficult period and consideration needed to be given to further possible steps to get across the Government's case.

In discussion, the following steps were identified:

- a number of Ministers had already been extensively briefed on the Gulf situation. They should now be encouraged to give interviews and put across the Government's case, concentrating in particular on the broad principles at stake in the Gulf. The FCO should consult the Ministers concerned and ask them to take up opportunities for interviews;
- as a basis for this, the FCO should prepare a briefing paper on the main arguments to be advanced (and those to be avoided). It should deal in particular with ways to answer the question: why not give sanctions a chance and wait longer before considering the use of force?
- more extensive use should be made of the Amnesty International report. Amnesty should be encouraged to send it to all MPs (if they have not already done so);
- it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister in due course to brief newspaper editors individually. The timing of this should be considered on his return from the Gulf;
- the Prime Minister should also see the Archbishop of Canterbury in the period 10-15 January;
- the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should brief other party leaders on Privy Counsellor terms. In principle the Prime Minister should offer to see Mr. Kinnock and Mr. Ashdown, while the Foreign Secretary would see Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Owen. While the briefings would be given in the week of Parliament's return, they should be offered now, not least because this might reduce pressure from the official Opposition for an early debate;
- the Prime Minister would in addition offer briefings in his room in the House to Mr. Heath and Mrs. Thatcher. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries should brief selected back-benchers, including Mr. David Howell and Mr. Michael Mates;
- the Prime Minister said that fuller argumentation needed to be worked up, for his own use and that of other Ministers, on our views on war crimes and on reparations. He had not felt entirely comfortable in dealing with these points in speaking to the media in Washington. The FCO should prepare a line.

Parliamentary Handling


The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed that there might be pressure for a debate on the Gulf in the week of Parliament's return: indeed there were already some demands for an early recall. There was no case for the latter. But if the Opposition front-bench were to seek an early debate, the

Government would be bound to agree. Indeed there was a case for the Government offering a debate, which might give less opportunity for awkward questions than a statement by the Prime Minister on his visit to the Gulf. The views of the Government's business managers should be sought in the week beginning 6 January. In either case, 14 January would probably be the most appropriate date (although that would necessitate postponing the Prime Minister's visit to Paris for lunch with President Mitterrand). It would almost certainly be right for the Prime Minister to open and the Foreign Secretary to wind up. Work should be put in hand now by the FCO on a draft speech.

Cabinet

Cabinet on 10 January would need to be briefed on the latest situation in the Gulf. It would be helpful if the Foreign Secretary were to circulate a paper as a basis for discussion.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,


C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ANNEXPrime Minister's meeting with the Foreign Secretary at Chequers
on 27 December

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discussed President Bush's clear indication at Camp David that he was leaning towards initiating military action against Iraq in the period 15-20 January. The Prime Minister said that he could see no advantage in hanging on until the next 'window' in mid-February, provided that the military advice supported earlier action. Our wider interests, including the impact on the world economy, favoured the earliest possible resolution of the Gulf issue. The Foreign Secretary agreed this assessment, while underlining the need to do more to prepare public opinion in the United Kingdom. (Steps to achieve this are dealt with in the body of my attached letter).

e. D. P.


C. D. POWELL

28 December 1990

c:\ts (slh)

Copy 1 = Fw
2 = MoJ
3 = CO
4 = PC
5 = file

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>letter from Powell to Webb dated 28 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>26/1/1998</i> <i>Mr. M.</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER

We shall need to consult MOD for an answer to some of the points in the attached letter from The Prince of Wales. If you agree, I will do so .

Meanwhile, you may want to consider sending a manuscript reply which:

- thanks HRH for going to the Gulf. The visit seems to have had an excellent effect on the morale of our forces and was very well received by public opinion here;
- says you will look into the points in his letter and will write more fully to him on your own return from the Gulf.

C. D. POWELL

28 December 1990

SECRET

SECRET

FM ROME

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1154

OF 281415Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, BAGHDAD

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

ADVANCE COPY

ROME TELNO 1144: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

SUMMARY

1. ITALIAN MFA GIVE MORE DETAILS OF THEIR PLANS. THEY INCLINE TOWARDS OUR OPTION (II), BECAUSE ONLY A FEW ITALIANS NOW REQUIRE CONSULAR PROTECTION IN IRAQ.

DETAIL

2. WE SPOKE AGAIN TO PLAJA (HEAD OF MFA CRISIS UNIT). HE SAID THAT ITALY NOW PLANNED TO WITHDRAW ALL BUT SEVEN OF ITS EMBASSY STAFF BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THOSE TO REMAIN WOULD BE THE AMBASSADOR, HIS DEPUTY (BETTARINI), A CYPHER CLERK, A COMMUNICATOR AND THREE ARAB-BORN (BUT ITALIAN NATIONAL) LOCAL STAFF.

3. PLAJA ADDED THAT THERE WERE HARDLY ANY ITALIAN CITIZENS LEFT IN IRAQ. INDEED, THE ONLY GROUP OF CONCERN TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY WERE THE TEN OR SO PEACE ACTIVISTS WHO FLITTED BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND THE IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER. THEY HAD BEEN ADVISED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION TO LEAVE IRAQ. PLAJA THEREFORE EXPECTED THAT ONCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN, ITALY WOULD SEEK TO WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING DIPLOMATIC STAFF FROM BAGHDAD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WOOD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

32

ADVANCE

32

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS 2

PS/PUS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

~~MR P WESTON~~ MR. GREENSTOCK~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~~~MR BROOKFIELD~~

MR GOULDEN

MR GORE-BOOTH

~~MR SLATER~~ MR. RAYNE

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/AMD

HD/NEWS D

HD/ISD(O)

HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/UND 2

HD/SCD

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST~~

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)

MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

MR APPEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

SECRET

SECRET
FM LISBON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 622
OF 281515Z DECEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

YOUR TELNO 2226 TO WASHINGTON: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD. ✓

SUMMARY

1. PORTUGUESE POSITION UNDECIDED. AMBASSADOR CURRENTLY ON LEAVE BUT EXPECTED TO RETURN BEFORE 15 JANUARY. SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION NOT YET ADDRESSED.

DETAIL


2. SECOND SECRETARY CALLED ON FAWOR (DEPUTY HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPT MFA) AND TOOK HIM THROUGH IDEAS IN PARA 2 OF TUR. FAWOR SAID THAT THE MFA HAD NOT YET ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF FUTURE OF THE PORTUGUESE EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD POST 15 JANUARY 1991 (APPARENTLY AT NEITHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE NOR POLITICAL LEVEL). IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN AT A 'CORE LEVEL'. THE AMBASSADOR WAS THE ONLY CARREER DIPLOMAT. CURRENTLY ON LEAVE IN PORTUGAL HE WAS PLANNING TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD (ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY WITHOUT HIS WIFE).

3. THE MISSION WAS CURRENTLY BEING RUN BY A SECOND SECRETARY ON LOAN FROM ANKARA (FAWOR EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT FORMALLY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES).

4. FAWOR UNDERTOOK TO INFORM US OF ANY DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORTUGUESE POSITION.

ARBUTHNOTT

YYYY



DISTRIBUTION

32

ADVANCE 32

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS 2

PS/PUS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

~~MR P J WESTON~~ MR GREENSTOCK~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~~~MR BROOMFIELD~~

MR GOULDEN

MR GORE-BOOTH

~~MR SEATER~~ MR BAYNE

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/AMD

HD/NEWS D

HD/ISD(O)

HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD

NNNN

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/UND 2

HD/SCD

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST~~SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST~~

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)

MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

MR APLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

SECRET



ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

46

SECRET

046341
MDADAN 0803

SECRET
FM THE HAGUE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 536
OF 280952Z DECEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS
INFO IMMEDIATE MADRID, BAGHDAD

MY TELNO 534: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

1. VAN DEN BROEK HAS NOW SENT INSTRUCTIONS THAT TWO OUT OF THE FOUR DUTCH EMBASSY STAFF SHOULD LEAVE BAGHDAD IMMEDIATELY. THE DUTCH HAVE ALSO SENT A COREU SEEKING FURTHER CONSULTATION.

FLOWER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

31

ADVANCE 31

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
PS
PS/PUS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
MR P J WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR SLATER
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/AMD
HD/NEWS D
HD/ISD(O)
HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD
HD/PUSD
DEPUTY HD/PUSD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/UND
HD/SCD
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)
MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

NNNN

PAGE 1
SECRET

SECRET

(1) We do need to
work with
US.



(2) If US/UK
leave I would

10 DOWNING STREET

Rene Minister hope Euro's
would do so
as well.

Embassies in

Bangkok. P.S. what of French?

A selection of
tentative views from
some EC countries

on withdrawing

embassies from

Bangkok.

CAP 20/12



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 DecemberPrime MinisterBW Immunisation

This is the fuller note which you requested. I think it answers the main points you raised. The new point - to me at least - is that we have been manufacturing and using the vaccine since 1963. This puts it in a different light.

Content?

C. D. P. 28/xii



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071- 21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

27 December 1990

Dear Charles

BW IMMUNISATION

Following Simon Webb's letter of 24th December you asked for some further information about how and by whom Anthrax vaccine is licenced.

I am advised by the Department of Health that the Product Licence awarded by the Licensing Authority (which consists of the Health and Agriculture Ministers of the United Kingdom) indicates that the safety, quality and efficacy of the vaccine have been properly assessed. The Licensing Authority is itself advised by the Medicines Control Agency of the Department of Health, which in turn advised by external experts.

The manufacturer of a Product Licence product has to follow carefully the terms of the Licence, and in the case of biological products such as Anthrax vaccine, has to submit data on each batch produced to the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC), an organisation set up on behalf of the Medicines Control Agency. After the NIBSC have reviewed the data, providing all is in order, they authorise the release of each individual production batch. In the case of Anthrax vaccine, where the Department of Health is the Product Licence holder, independent scrutiny of the production dossier of each batch of vaccine manufactured is also undertaken.

Records immediately to hand in the Department of Health show that the vaccine has been being regularly manufactured since at least 1983, with an average of 3,750 doses made each year. These have been being used principally for vets, abattoir workers, tanners, and others liable to be exposed to the dangers of Anthrax.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and the Secretary of State for Health, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R Binstead
 (MISS J R BINSTEAD)
 Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
 10 Downing Street

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MADRID
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1105
OF 271755Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, BAGHDAD, EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 2226 TO WASHINGTON : FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

SUMMARY : SPANISH PREFERENCE TO KEEP CORE STAFF AT LEAST UNTIL
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH MFA MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT THE OPTIONS OUTLINED IN TUR. BUITRAGO (ASSISTANT DESK OFFICER) SAID THAT THE MFA HAD STILL NOT MADE UP ITS MIND ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT ITS EMBASSY STAFF IN BAGHDAD. THEY DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING EVERYONE SOON AFTER 15 JANUARY (OPTION ONE) BUT IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAT A CORE STAFF WOULD BE KEPT IN PLACE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. BUITRAGO SAID THAT IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWELVE TO AGREE ON A CONCERTED PLAN OF ACTION.
2. RE FCO TELNO 1693 TO BAGHDAD. BUITRAGO CONFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN MADRID HAD MADE NO DEMARCHE TO THE SPANISH OVER A MEETING BETWEEN THE EC AND TARIQ AZIZ.

FEARN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

30

ADVANCE

30

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS (3)

PS/PUS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

MR P. ~~WESTON~~ *Greenstock*

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR ~~BROWNFIELD~~

MR GOULDEN

MR GORE-BOOTH

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/UND(2)

HD/SCD

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

MR ~~SLATER BAINES~~

HD ~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

HD/AMD

HD/NEWS D

HD/ISD(O)

HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD

(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)


MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

MR APPLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

RESIDENT CLERK



NNNN

SECRET

FM DUBLIN

TO DESKBY 271630Z FCO

TELNO 902

OF 271515Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, EC POSTS, BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 2226: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

SUMMARY

1. IRISH POSITION NOT YET FORMED.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT THIS MORNING OF TUR, WE CALLED ON SWIFT (COUNSELLOR, DFA POLITICAL DIVISION) AND OUTLINED THE OPTIONS IN ITS PARA 2. SWIFT WAS GRATEFUL THAT WE WERE POOLING OUR THOUGHTS. THE IRISH WERE THINKING ABOUT WHETHER TO CLOSE THEIR EMBASSY COMPLETELY. THEIR INTERNAL CONSULTATIONS HAD VIRTUALLY STOPPED OVER THE CHRISTMAS BREAK: SWIFT HIMSELF HAD ONLY LOOKED BRIEFLY INTO THE DFA, WHICH WAS OFFICIALLY CLOSED TODAY.

3. SWIFT COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE SCOPE FOR THE IRISH TO REDUCE TO A CORE STAFF: THEY WERE ALREADY DOWN TO TWO, OF WHOM ONE, THE AMBASSADOR (MAC UNFRAIDH) WAS IN DUBLIN FOR CHRISTMAS. MAC UNFRAIDH WAS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN DUBLIN'S DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THEIR EMBASSY'S FUTURE. SWIFT THOUGHT IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT MAC UNFRAIDH WOULD RETURN TO BAGHDAD, EVEN IF ONLY FOR A WEEK OR SO SHOULD HOSTILITIES BREAKOUT.

4. SWIFT ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD CONSIDER OURSELVES IN A STATE OF WAR WITH IRAQ IF HOSTILITIES DID BREAK OUT, AND WHETHER THIS WOULD AFFECT OUR DECISION ON OUR EMBASSY'S CONTINUED OPERATION. WE SAID WE WERE UNBRIEFED ON THIS, BUT THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE THREE OPTIONS (INCLUDING OPTION (111) IN WHICH CORE STAFF WOULD REMAIN IN BAGHDAD - ALBEIT BRIEFLY - ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES), APPEARED AT THE MOMENT TO BE PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL RATHER THAN LEGAL ONES. SWIFT SAID THAT THE IRISH WERE LOOKING AT THIS ISSUE. THEY HAD NOTED THE AUSTRIANS' CONCLUSION THAT THE USA WOULD NOT FORMALLY BE A COUNTRY AT WAR AND THEREFORE BY AUSTRIAN LAW PROHIBITED FROM MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS.

5. THE DFA WOULD LET US KNOW EARLY NEXT WEEK HOW THEIR THINKING ON

THE EMBASSY QUESTION HAD DEVELOPED.

FENN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

39

MAIN

39

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
NO DISTRIBUTION
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/ACDD
HD/AMD
HD/ISD(O)
HD/MED
HD/NEWS D
HD/NENAD
HD/NPDD
HD/PUSD
DEPUTY HD/PUSD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/UND
HD/SCD
PS
PS/PUS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

MR P J WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MISS SPENCER
MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR BERMAN
MR SLATER
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK 10 DOWNING ST
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE
MR APPELYARD CAB OFFICE
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MISS WILMHURST LAW OFFICERS
(ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPT)

NNNN

SECRET

FM THE HAGUE CORRECTED VERSION (TITLE)
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 534
OF 271138Z DECEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS
INFO IMMEDIATE MADRID, BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 2226 TO WASHINGTON: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD ✓

SUMMARY

1. DUTCH INCLINED TOWARDS EARLY WITHDRAWAL BUT CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICAL SIGNALS AND WANT COORDINATED WESTERN LINE.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON ROELL, DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, MFA, AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. HE SAID THAT THE DUTCH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD WERE ALREADY DOWN TO 4 NL-BASED STAFF (CHARGE, SECOND SECRETARY, AO AND SECRETARY). MINISTERS HAD NOT TAKEN ANY FIRM VIEW ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM. ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR VAN DAM, FAVOURED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE OR AROUND 15 JANUARY. OTHERS INCLUDING ROELL HIMSELF, RECOGNISED THE RISKS BUT WOULD PREFER TO KEEP OPTIONS (AND THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION) OPEN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

3. ROELL WAS CONCERNED THAT EFFECTIVE CLOSURE OF WESTERN EMBASSIES WOULD SEND A VERY STRONG SIGNAL TO IRAQ. SOLIDARITY WOULD BE VITAL BUT MIGHT BE HARD TO ACHIEVE. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITHDREW STAFF WITHOUT THE AMERICANS DOING SO. CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE TWELVE SHOULD BE INITIATED URGENTLY, STARTING WITH A REQUEST FOR ADVICE FROM THE EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD AND PERHAPS THEN A MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP OR POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

4. ROELL HAS SINCE CONSULTED HIS POLITICAL DIRECTOR (VAN WALSUM) AND SECRETARY GENERAL (BOT). THEY WILL SEEK GUIDANCE FROM VAN DEN BROEK TODAY AND ROELL WILL INFORM ME OF THE RESULT.

5. YOUR TELNO 810 TO BONN: IRAQI AMBASSADOR AL-FALAKI IS NOT ATTENDING THE MEETING IN AMMAN AND IS STILL IN THE HAGUE.

FLOWER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

40

MAIN 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

NO DISTRIBUTION

MR P J WESTON

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

MR FAIRWEATHER

HD/ACDD

MR BROOMFIELD

HD/AMD

MISS SPENCER

HD/ISD(O)

MR GOULDEN

HD/MED

MR GORE-BOOTH

HD/NEWS D

MR BERMAN

HD/NENAD

MR SLATER

HD/NPDD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

HD/PUSD

SIR P CRADOCK 10 DOWNING ST

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

HD/SECPOL D

MR REEVES CAB OFFICE

HD/UND

MR APPELYARD CAB OFFICE

HD/SCD

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE

HD/WED

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

PS/PUS

MISS WILMHURST LAW OFFICERS

PS/MR HOGG

(ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPT)

NNNN

SECRET **SECRET**

40
045137
MDADAN 0732

ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

FM BRUSSELS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 479

OF 271401Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, OTHER EC POSTS, BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO: 2226 TO WASHINGTON: FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

SUMMARY

1. NO DECISIONS LIKELY BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. POSSIBILITY THAT JUST THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR WILL REMAIN.

DETAIL

2. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, MFA, TOLD ME TODAY THAT LITTLE THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN SO FAR TO THE RUN-DOWN OF PERSONNEL IN THEIR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. THIS WAS PARTLY BECAUSE THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS STILL HOPEFUL OF SOME FORM OF SETTLEMENT BEFORE 15 JANUARY AND PARTLY BECAUSE NO MORE THAN THREE PEOPLE WERE NOW LEFT IN THE MISSION. IF THE SITUATION WERE TO DETERIORATE AND A DECISION TO WITHDRAW HAD TO BE TAKEN, THEY WOULD PROBABLY LEAVE JUST THE AMBASSADOR EN POSTE. BUT MINISTERS WERE UNLIKELY TO FOCUS ON THIS BEFORE THE NEW YEAR.

MCCARTHY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

33

ADVANCE 33

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
PS
PS/PUS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
MR P J WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH

HD/PUSD
DEPUTY HD/PUSD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/UND
HD/SCD
HD/WED
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PAGE 1
SECRET

MR SLATER
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/AMD
HD/NEWS D
HD/ISD(O)
HD/NENAD
HD/NPDD

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)
MR APLEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

FM COPENHAGEN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 464
OF 271500Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 2226 TO WASHINGTON : FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

SUMMARY

1. DANISH THINKING STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE.

DETAIL

2. ACTION TAKEN WITH THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT CONCERNED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. MUNK RASMUSSEN SAID THE DANES ARE IN FAVOUR OF A COORDINATED EC APPROACH BUT THEIR OWN THINKING HAS NOT YET PROGRESSED VERY FAR. THEIR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAS A PERMANENT STAFF OF 3 DANES, ALL OF WHOM WILL SHORTLY BE IN DENMARK ON LEAVE (THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS SECRETARY ARE ALREADY HERE, THE ATTACHE WILL ARRIVE IN A DAY OR SO). AN OFFICIAL FROM THE MFA HAS GONE TO BAGHDAD TO ACT AS CHARGE, THE IDEA BEING THAT HE WOULD STAY UNTIL 10 JANUARY WHEN THE AMBASSADOR AND THE ATTACHE ARE DUE TO RETURN. BUT THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THE 10 JANUARY CHANGE AROUND SHOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED.
3. MUNK RASMUSSEN SAID THAT IN DECIDING WHAT TO DO THE DANES WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THAT AN ATTACHE FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT WAS STILL IN BAGHDAD TRYING TO GET AN EXIT VISA. IT WOULD BE HARD ON HIM TO WITHDRAW STAFF FROM THE BAGHDAD EMBASSY AND LEAVE HIM ON HIS OWN.
4. MUNK RASMUSSEN'S ONLY COMMENT ON OUR THREE OPTIONS WAS TO QUESTION WHETHER IN PRACTICE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET IRAQI AGREEMENT TO THE DEPARTURE OF A CORE OF STAFF AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES (OPTION II).

ASTLEY

YYYY

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

32

ADVANCE 32

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS

PS/PUS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

MR P J WESTON *Readstock*~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~~~MR BROOKFIELD~~~~MR GOULDEN~~

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR SLATER *Bayne*~~HD/EMERGENCY UNIT~~

HD/AMD

HD/NEWS D

HD/ISD(O)

HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/UND

HD/SCD

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)

MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)

MR APPELYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)

MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SECRET



the department for Enterprise

SEP

The Hon. Tim Sainsbury, MP
Minister for Trade

The Rt Hon David Mellor MP
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
HM Treasury
Parliament Street
LONDON
SW1 3AG

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-215 4294

DM
5/12

Direct line 071-215 5144
Our ref WO1
Your ref
Date 27 December 1990

New Chief Secretary

Plg A134

IRAQ: PREMIUM REFUNDS

1. I am replying to Norman Lamont's letter dated 19 November. (I enclose a copy of earlier correspondence for your convenience).
2. Whilst I of course sympathise with the Treasury's general point that we must take account of ECGD's potential losses on Iraq in setting our refund policy, I am afraid that Norman's proposal does not properly address the reality of the difficulties which we face. Perhaps I can best explain this by dealing with the specific points in his letter:
 - 2.1 The Treasury argue that ECGD's losses will arise because it continued to insure exports into Iraq well beyond the time it was prudent to do so. This seems to me what the Americans call 20:20 hindsight. ECGD's potential losses have arisen because of the Gulf crisis, not for balance of payments reasons. These events were unpredictable, and questions of prudence are not relevant to risks driven by force majeure reasons.
 - 2.2 ECGD's administration costs are not, as Norman implied, recouped by a uniform percentage levy on the premium rates. Such an approach would lead to an over-reliance upon high risk business (which generates high premium) to



Recycled Paper

cover administration costs. Accordingly, the administrative margin in the Iraqi premium rate is considerably less, in percentage terms, than the average of 20% for all business. Reflecting this in the proportion of refund would not, therefore, lead as you fear to ECGD under-recovering its overall administration costs in a manner consistent with financial objectives.

- 2.3 In most of these cases, the only insurance contract which exists is between ECGD and Midland in respect of the non-payment of the loan by Iraq. This is because of the way in which these particular lines of credit with Iraq were structured. The lines of credit cover many small contracts, in respect of which the Exporter has not entered into any sort of written agreement with ECGD. Technically the obligation to pay premium was upon the Bank, but they fulfilled that obligation by asking the Exporters to pay directly to ECGD. Having now examined the many cases coming forward for premium refunds, we suspect that the entire nature of the arrangements may not have been explained to the Exporters, and they may not have been aware that the credit could be suspended or terminated in certain circumstances. The situation is complicated because there are two classes of Exporters: those who have a contract with ECGD (where premium is being paid by deferred instalments), and those who do not. In any event there would appear to be a risk of application for judicial review on the grounds that suppliers had been encouraged to have reasonable expectations of payment which, in the event, have been denied.

ECGD is now conducting an urgent review of its lines of credit arrangements, but the results will not help us to deal with Iraq. There is an obvious risk that judicial review could stray into wider areas and it is, in my view, in the Government's interest that we should



The Rt Hon David Mellor MP

December 1990

try to minimise the possibility of Judicial Review by being more flexible on refunds of premium.

- 2.4 Therefore, contrary to the argument set out in paragraph 6 of Norman's letter, I believe that if we were to follow that course, there is a significant risk of a Court action against ECGD to recover premium which could have consequences for our wider stance of refusing to pay compensation for losses arising as the result of sanctions.

As I mentioned above, some exporters affected are paying ECGD premium by deferred instalment (this is standard policy so that the exporter's contract cash flow can be matched to his premium obligations to ECGD). This would mean some exporters who had drawn less finance than the premium payable to ECGD would, in fact, still have obligations in respect of premium instalments which are not yet due. It is possible that some exporters will refuse to pay the instalments, in which case ECGD need to take legal action to recover the sums concerned, and this again could expose our general policy on Sanctions to Court scrutiny.

3. However, in order to reflect the Treasury's concerns, I am prepared to adjust my original proposals. In determining the amount of refunds to be paid to exporters who have drawn less finance than premium paid, we would also take into account interest which had accrued under the ECGD-guaranteed loan. Thus we would subtract from the premium payable the amount of drawing plus the accrued interest, and refund to the exporter 85% of the difference. Thus we would completely cover any potential loss before making any refund.

4. ECGD estimate that the cost of these revised proposals would be about £9.0m. This compares to the cost of my original proposal of £9.7m, and to the cost of the Treasury's of £4.5m.



The Rt Hon David Mellor MP

December 1990

5. In the light of my arguments, I hope that you will feel able to accept this proposal. As I said in my earlier letter, this will not stem the flow of representations and complaints, which is continuing, but it can still be defended as a reasonable balance between the exporter and taxpayer.

6. As you know, the Export and Investment Guarantees Bill has its Second Reading on 15 January. It would be most helpful if you would agree before then.

7. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours Sincerely

Tim Sainsbury

pp

TIM SAINSBURY

(approved by the Minister for Trade and signed in his absence)

38EA}



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071 21 8211/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

27 December 1990

Dear Charles

BW IMMUNISATION

Following Simon Webb's letter of 24th December you asked for some further information about how and by whom Anthrax vaccine is licenced.

I am advised by the Department of Health that the Product Licence awarded by the Licensing Authority (which consists of the Health and Agriculture Ministers of the United Kingdom) indicates that the safety, quality and efficacy of the vaccine have been properly assessed. The Licensing Authority is itself advised by the Medicines Control Agency of the Department of Health, which is in turn advised by external experts.

The manufacturer of a Product Licence product has to follow carefully the terms of the Licence, and in the case of biological products such as Anthrax vaccine, has to submit data on each batch produced to the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC), an organisation set up on behalf of the Medicines Control Agency. After the NIBSC have reviewed the data, providing all is in order, they authorise the release of each individual production batch. In the case of Anthrax vaccine, where the Department of Health is the Product Licence holder, independent scrutiny of the production dossier of each batch of vaccine manufactured is also undertaken.

Records immediately to hand in the Department of Health show that the vaccine has been being regularly manufactured since at least 1983, with an average of 3,750 doses made each year. These have been being used principally for vets, abattoir workers, tanners, and others liable to be exposed to the dangers of Anthrax.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and the Secretary of State for Health, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead
 (MISS J R BINSTEAD)
 Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
UK COMMS ONLY
FM RIYADH
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1382

✓
ADVANCE COPY

OF 241043Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE, CAIRO, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY, GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

SIC AAA/I9M

DISCUSSION WITH CROWN PRINCE

1. DURING THE CROWN PRINCE'S LUNCH ON 23 DECEMBER FOR THE PRINCE OF WALES, I HAD SOME TALK ABOUT THE KUWAIT CRISIS WITH PRINCE ABDULLA. THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST TO EMERGE WERE:

A) AN UNABATED HOSTILITY TOWARDS SADDAM HUSSEIN - A THUG AND A CRIMINAL - COUPLED WITH SIGNS OF GREATER DOUBT WHETHER HE WOULD WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY THAN I FOUND WHEN I SAW THE CROWN PRINCE LAST MONTH. SIGNIFICANTLY PRINCE ABDULLA (WHO HAS INCIDENTALLY HAD MORE DIFFICULTY THAN THE KING OR SULTAN IN CONTEMPLATING THE PROSPECT OF WAR WITH IRAQ) ASSERTED, WHEN I RAISED THE PROSPECT OF SADDAM TRYING TO SPIN OUT WITHDRAWAL TO TEST THE ALLIANCE'S RESOLVE, THAT WE COULD AFFORD NO MORE THAN A FEW DAYS GRACE PERIOD TO EVALUATE THE POSITION. TO WAIT LONGER MEANT LOSING MOMENTUM. ABDULLA WAS CERTAIN THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND HER TWO MAIN ARAB PARTNERS, EGYPT AND SYRIA WOULD NOT FALTER B) ABDULLA WAS CONVINCED IRAQ'S NEXT RULER (HE HOPED AS A RESULT OF SADDAM'S EARLY OVERTHROW) WOULD COME FROM WITHIN THE ARMY. THE BAATH PARTY HAD SPAWNED SADDAM BUT IT WAS NOW A SHELL. THE POWER BASE LAY IN THE ARMY. GIVEN IRAQ'S PROPENSITY FOR GOVERNMENT BY STRONGMEN, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE TO KEEP HER GUARD HIGHER HENCEFORWARD. HE STRESSED AGAIN THE NEED TO CUT IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPACITY DOWN TO A SIZE MORE IN BALANCE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS, WHILE SAUDI ARABIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH WOULD HAVE TO BE INCREASED.

C) THE GCC HAD TO BE TURNED INTO THE CORE OF ARABIA'S SECURITY. ABDULLA DISCOUNTED SUGGESTIONS OF RECENT OMANI EQUIVOCATION OVER FACING UP TO IRAQ. HE WAS CONFIDENT THE DOHA SUMMIT WOULD COME OUT WITH A CLEAR MESSAGE TO BAGHDAD ON UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

D) AN EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR OUR ROLE IN ADVISING THE NATIONAL GUARD ON MOBILISATION SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS. HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE DEFENCE SECRETARY FOR HAVING AGREED TO EXTEND BRIG COCKING'S APPOINTMENT DURING THIS CRITICAL TIME.

2. I SOUNDED OUT PRINCE ABDULLA ON THE ISSUE OF THE HANDLING OF THE LARGE NUMBERS OF IRAQI POWS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM A CONFLICT, AND MENTIONED THE CONCERN OF THE ICRC TO HAVE A HAND IN THEIR TREATMENT. THIS BROUGHT THE OLD BEDOUIN OUT IN ABDULLA WHO CLAIMED THAT MOST PRISONERS WOULD BE ROUNDED UP IN KUWAIT, AND SHOULD BE HELD THERE. THOSE WHO SURRENDERED PEACEFULLY MERITED FAIR TREATMENT, BUT THOSE CAPTURED RESISTING MERITED NO MORE THAN TO BE DISARMED, HELD WITH FOOD AND WATER FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS AND THEN TIPPED BACK INTO IRAQ. THE TASK OF TRYING TO JUSTIFY THE GENEVA CONVENTION TO A SCEPTICAL ABDULLA, AND IN ARABIC, DEFEATED ME. (FORTUNATELY OUR CONTACTS IN THE MFA, WITH WHOM WE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE ON INSTRUCTIONS, APPEAR TO BE TAKING A MORE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF THIS POTENTIALLY LARGE PROBLEM.)

3. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION DURING THE CROWN PRINCE'S LUNCH PRINCE SULTAN (WHO HAD PUT OFF A LUNCH IN HONOUR OF THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER) TOLD ME HE NOW SAW NO REAL SIGNS FROM BAGHDAD THAT SADDAM WOULD COMPLY WITH SCR 678'S DEADLINE. SADDAM LOOKED LIKELY TO TRY TO SPIN THINGS OUT. SULTAN WELCOMED THE PRINCE OF WALES' VISIT FOR THE SIGNAL OF COMMON PURPOSE IT WOULD SEND TO BAGHDAD. BOTH HE AND ABDULLA EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT AS AN EARLY CHANCE TO GET ACQUAINTED.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

40

ADVANCE 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/SECPOL D	RESIDENT CLERK
10000	



10 DOWNING STREET

He forgot
Charles, to tell MOD
Private Office!

This is the "hard" copy of
what you have already
passed to the PM.

As you will recall on
hearing that the PM was content
subject to FCS's agreement,
I telephoned the MOD resident
clerk on your behalf to inform
him of this.

25/12.



38(A-G)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

MO 6/17/15/1D

TELEPHONE 071-21 89000

244

December 1990

DIRECT DIALING 071-21 8211/3

Dear Charles,

BW IMMUNISATION POLICY

At the meeting of OPD(G) on 19th December, the Defence Secretary informed his colleagues that the Chiefs of Staff had made contingency plans in case some batches of Anthrax vaccine failed to be awarded a product licence; but in all cases he recommended that an immunisation programme should proceed. It was agreed that it would be essential to handle public presentation of the immunisation programme - and the Saudis in particular - with the greatest care.

Two of the three batches being retested (totalling 30k doses) have now been awarded a product licence. Retesting of the third batch has indicated that there should be no problems; but a licence cannot be awarded until the vaccine has been put in ampoules. This is due for completion on 31st December. There is, therefore, sufficient vaccine (59,400 doses) to begin a phased programme and, probably, for simultaneous immunisation of all military personnel deployed in the Gulf and civilians in direct support.

The US has taken a decision to proceed with a partial immunisation programme, to protect 100,000 of their personnel (about a quarter) against Anthrax; they intend to retain a pool of Anthrax vaccine, sufficient for 35,000 personnel, for use as a post-attack treatment in conjunction with a 30 day regime of antibiotics. The US also plan to vaccinate 35,000 personnel against BTx. We do not have this vaccine but, like the US, are manufacturing BTx serum for use as post-attack treatment.

The US will finalise plans for presentation to the Allies and the public at a meeting on 26th December. So far as the Allies are concerned, we propose that the decision to proceed with an immunisation programme should be placed in the context of the uncertainty about the threat; the efficacy of existing defences and countermeasures (including NBC suits); and the range of post-attack medical treatment available. The Defence Secretary plans to send

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street



messages to his counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and France on 29th December. He will also inform countries that have units serving with British forces such as New Zealand. Guidance telegrams along similar lines will be sent to capitals of other nations contributing to the multinational force, proposing that Governments of major contributors (eg Egypt and Syria) should be informed at the appropriate level about the programme and providing advice for others to draw on as necessary.

The draft letter to Prince Sultan (copy attached) specifically addresses the Saudi request for 50,000 doses of Anthrax vaccine. OPD(G) on 12th December took the view that any vaccine surplus to the UK's requirement should be offered to British Aerospace (3,300 doses), the World Health Organisation (WHO) (300 doses) and then the Saudis. Even if there are now failures in production, the Saudi order could not be fully met until Mid-March. We propose that the Saudis should be offered a choice: delivery as soon as possible of a limited amount of vaccine or that the UK would pool any surplus vaccine with the US to use if necessary as a post-attack treatment. In view of the political concern about the Saudi reaction to an immunisation programme, it would be possible, if the third batch is licensed, to offer the Saudis delivery of a token amount of 5,000 doses in early January in advance of meeting the BAe and WHO requirements and more in February.

Following consultation with the US, the Defence Secretary has agreed that it would be preferable for the MOD to give a routine unattributable briefing to the press on the CBW threat and the countermeasures available, rather than make a formal announcement: proposed bull points are attached. This is planned for 2nd January, the day the immunisation programme starts. Briefing for service personnel involved in the programme will be on similar lines but include classified information about the Anthrax immunisation programme, and other countermeasures. The US would arrange for a suitable question to be asked at their daily press briefing to achieve the same effect.

Finally, the Defence Secretary has been giving further consideration to the requirement for signature of a consent form. Although we will only be administering licensed vaccine which has passed all the safety tests, a consent form would provide evidence that a programme was voluntary. As none of the services ask personnel to sign such a form for routine immunisation with a licensed vaccine, however, to do so would give rise to unnecessary concern about the Anthrax vaccine's safety. We therefore, propose that the medical officer administering the vaccine should brief each individual about the nature of the product; why it is being given; its possible side effects (eg redness and slight swelling); and explain that the programme is not compulsory.



Unless there is any change in plan following the US meeting on the 26th December, the Defence Secretary proposes to proceed on this basis. He would be grateful to know by the evening of 27th December if colleagues have any difficulties.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and the Secretary of State for Health, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yrs sincerely

Jim Webb.

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

BW IMMUNISATION - PUBLIC PRESENTATIONBULL POINTS

Protective measures against threat of CW or BW attack under continuous review in consultation with Allies.

Iraq is party to 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of chemical and biological agents and has signed 1972 protocol prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

UK would take gravest view of Iraqi use of such weapons. Consequences for Iraq would be very severe. Such action would be irrational but we must take all prudent precautions to protect against it.

Confident that capability of multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against CBW delivery systems but other specific defensive measures are available.

These include

- protective clothing and respirators (against both CW and BW).
- devices to detect the use of both chemical and biological agents.
- medical procedures and treatment, involving vaccines for prophylactic and post-attack use, antitoxins and antibiotics.
- decontamination procedures.

Confident that these measures provide effective defence and will make Iraqi use of CW/BW pointless as well as irrational.

In contact with Allies to ensure sharing of information and pooling of facilities as appropriate.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

SECRET

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELNO

OF

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

MIPT: BW IMMUNISATION

Please pass the following message from Mr King to Prince Sultan:

1. We have been reviewing all aspects of our defensive measures against the possible use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons or biological weapons in the event of hostilities involving the multinational force.

BEGINS

2. As you know we have made it very clear publicly that the British Government would take a very grave view of any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons. The US Government has expressed the same view. It is to be hoped that Saddam Hussain will take full account of the gravity of these warnings. But we cannot of course be confident that he will. Hence the need to examine the question of defensive measures in some detail.

- We are confident that the capability of the multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against Iraqi CBW delivery systems.
- All members of our contingent to the multinational force have been issued with respirators and NBC protective equipment. This equipment will be the first line of defence for all our forces in the event of a CBW attack and provides by far the

E14AFN

EU

S G ELDON

270 3309

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

most effective protection against these weapons. We have also deployed appropriate detection equipment.

- BW may present less of a potential threat than CW. Iraq has not hitherto used it in battlefield conditions, or indeed in any other context as far as we are aware. Furthermore BW is typically much slower to take effect - a period of hours and possibly days.
- We have also examined the question of post attack treatment against BW with the use of antibiotics. I am advised that there is a great deal that can be done in the treatment of anthrax and plague with this method. I am asking the CBFME to make advice available via allied medical liaison channels. We can also provide advice on sources of the antibiotics concerned, should your authorities have difficulties in obtaining them.
- The facilities of our military hospitals in-theatre will be made available on a best endeavours basis for post-CW and BW attack treatment of Saudi and other members of the multinational force.
- Anthrax vaccine is currently in short supply. Production facilities are very limited. But as it becomes available we shall hold some in reserve for post-attack treatment for as long as necessary. This will be made available, on a best endeavours basis, to Saudi and other members of the multinational force.

3. I believe these proposals constitute a reassuring and effective line of defence against the possible exposure of our forces against CW and BW. As an additional contingency step, we have decided to proceed with a programme of vaccination against anthrax. It will begin on 2 January.

4. In view of Saudi Arabia's special position within the alliance we could if you wished offer 5000 doses of anthrax vaccine for Saudi use. It would be available on 2 January. This

represents the very maximum amount we can make available to you at the present time. We will not be making a similar offer to other allies and would be grateful if knowledge of this could be very closely held. If you decided not to take it up we would make the vaccine available for post-attack treatment as described above. Because of the very limited production capacity for anthrax vaccine I cannot yet say when further deliveries will be available, but it is unlikely to be before early February.

5. We do not propose to make a public announcement of the anthrax vaccination programme, though we will be briefing the press off the record on the whole range of our defensive measures. We are also informing host countries and close allies. Vaccination as such is not new and the information might just be of some value to the Iraqis. If asked by the media, we shall say that we liaise closely with host countries and key allies on CBW defensive measures. We would add that we were not prepared to discuss the details of any current or planned measures, for operational reasons.

ENDS

6. If the Saudis ask how many of our troops we intend to vaccinate you should say that we would hope eventually to cover them all, but that this will depend on the availability of vaccine.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
UK COMMS ONLY
FM RIYADH
TO DESKBY 241200Z FCO
TELNO 1385
OF 241053Z DECEMBER 90
INFO DESKBY 241200Z MODUK, HQBFME, WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE, PARIS, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ACTOR

*Pl. file
a*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. CHENEY AND POWELL VISIT SAUDI ARABIA TO EVALUATE PREPAREDNESS AND OPTIONS WITH US MILITARY. CHENEY SEEKS TO REASSURE SAUDIS THAT US WILL NOT COMPROMISE. CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH CONCERNED ABOUT AMERICAN RESOLVE. SULTAN WELCOMES US TRAINING, PRE-POSITIONING AND SALES POST-CRISIS.

DETAIL

2. DEFENCE SECRETARY CHENEY AND CHIEF OF STAFF POWELL SPENT 4 DAYS IN SAUDI ARABIA FROM 19 - 22 DECEMBER. THE US EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF CHENEY AND POWELL'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS. THE VISITORS' MAIN PURPOSE HOWEVER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY POSITION WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF AND THE US COMMAND. IN MEDIA TERMS CHENEY'S THUNDER WAS STOLEN BY GENERAL WALLER'S GAFFE IN SAYING THAT US LAND FORCES WOULD NOT BE READY FOR ACTION UNTIL FEBRUARY.

3. ON THE SAUDI SIDE CHENEY WAS RECEIVED BY CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRINCE SULTAN. HE DID NOT SEE THE KING. THE LATTER WAS IN MEDINA FOR MOST OF THE VISIT, AND THE AMERICANS WERE TOLD THAT A MEETING COULD NOT BE FITTED IN (COMMENT: THE KING'S REASON FOR VISITING MEDINA WAS TO REVIEW THE PROPHET'S MOSQUE EXPANSION PROJECT, AND THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS OF THE VISIT WAS HEAVILY ISLAMIC).

4. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, CHENEY'S MAIN PURPOSE WITH ABDULLAH AND SULTAN WAS TO DISPEL SAUDI DOUBTS ABOUT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT ENGENDERED BY CONGRESSIONAL GRUMBLINGS AND BY THE US OFFER OF DIALOGUE WITH TARIQ AZIZ. CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH CROSS-

EXAMINED CHENEY CLOSELY ON THIS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER SADDAM BELIEVED THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO ATTACK. HE RAISED THE SPECTRE OF A PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND ASKED HOW THE US WOULD REACT. CHENEY SAID THAT THERE WERE NO MILITARY SIGNS TO SUGGEST THAT SADDAM PLANNED TO WITHDRAW. IF HE DID, CHENEY'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SETTLE FOR NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HE HAD COME TO DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF. THE FINAL DECISION RESTED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND KING FAHD. BUT THE SAUDIS SHOULD NOT MISREAD THE INTERNAL DEBATE IN THE US. THE PRESIDENT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE.

5. THE US EMBASSY SAY ABDULLAH TOOK A FIRM LINE ON THE NEED TO REVERSE THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, BUT RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THIS QUESTION OF AMERICAN WILL. SULTAN ON THE OTHER HAND SEEMED MORE COMFORTABLE WITH AMERICAN INTENTIONS. HE DESCRIBED HIS TOUR OF GCC STATES, ON WHOM HE HAD URGED EXPANSION OF THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE. CHENEY ONLY RAISED LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN GENERAL TERMS. HE MENTIONED TRAINING, PRE-POSITIONING OF US EQUIPMENT AND US EQUIPMENT SALES, AND SULTAN WE ARE TOLD WELCOMED ALL THESE IDEAS, THOUGH NEITHER HE NOR CHENEY WENT INTO ANY DETAIL. CHENEY SAID US TROOPS WOULD LEAVE WHEN THEIR JOB WAS DONE. SULTAN SAID THAT THAT JORDAN, SUDAN, TUNISIA AND THE PLO WOULD SUFFER AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

COMMENT

6. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER IF WE LEARN MORE ABOUT BILATERAL BUSINESS TRANSACTED DURING THIS VISIT. THE US ACCOUNT SUGGESTS NO DIMINUTION IN THE RESOLVE OF ABDULLAH AND SULTAN BUT DOUBTS ON THE PART OF THE FORMER AS TO AMERICAN DETERMINATION. AT ABDULLAH'S LUNCH FOR THE PRINCE OF WALES YESTERDAY, I FOUND HIM FIRM ON THE MILITARY OPTION AND HOSTILE TO A GRACE PERIOD AFTER 15 JANUARY (SEE MY SEPARATE TEL OF TODAY'S DATE FOR FULLER ACCOUNT). SULTAN, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, SEEMED TO THINK MILITARY ACTION INCREASINGLY LIKELY. AGAINST THAT, THE VIEW AMONG MOST OF OUR NON-AL SAUD OFFICIAL CONTACTS, IS THAT SADDAM IS LIKELY TO WITHDRAW EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART AROUND 15 JANUARY, AND THAT WAR IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY. THEY ARGUE THAT IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT SADDAM IS UNAWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES RANGED AGAINST HIM OR THE INADEQUACY OF HIS OWN RESOURCES (AT THE CROWN PRINCE'S LUNCH THE OIL MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IRAQ'S PRODUCTION OF AVIATION FUEL AND KEROSENE WERE INADEQUATE FOR WAR). IN PART PERHAPS THIS EXPECTATION REFLECTS

UNWILLINGNESS TO FACE UP TO FACTS. MAYBE THE OLDER GENERATION OF THE AL SAUD ARE MADE OF STERNER STUFF. THE COMMERCE MINISTER ALSO SAID (IN CONTRAST TO PRINCE ABDULLAH) THAT HE ASSUMED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY CONTINUED SANCTIONS RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION: BUT HE POSITED THIS ON LACK OF US, RATHER THAN ARAB, RESOLVE. GENERAL WALLER'S COMMENTS WILL NOT HAVE HELPED.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 273MAIN 229IRAQ/KUWAIT
LIMITED MEDADDITIONAL 44IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

EXAMINED CHENEY CLOSELY ON THIS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER SADDAM BELIEVED THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO ATTACK. HE RAISED THE SPECTRE OF A PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND ASKED HOW THE US WOULD REACT. CHENEY SAID THAT THERE WERE NO MILITARY SIGNS TO SUGGEST THAT SADDAM PLANNED TO WITHDRAW. IF HE DID, CHENEY'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SETTLE FOR NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HE HAD COME TO DISCUSS THE NEXT STEPS WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF. THE FINAL DECISION RESTED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND KING FAHD. BUT THE SAUDIS SHOULD NOT MISREAD THE INTERNAL DEBATE IN THE US. THE PRESIDENT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE.

5. THE US EMBASSY SAY ABDULLAH TOOK A FIRM LINE ON THE NEED TO REVERSE THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, BUT RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THIS QUESTION OF AMERICAN WILL. SULTAN ON THE OTHER HAND SEEMED MORE COMFORTABLE WITH AMERICAN INTENTIONS. HE DESCRIBED HIS TOUR OF GCC STATES, ON WHOM HE HAD URGED EXPANSION OF THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE. CHENEY ONLY RAISED LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN GENERAL TERMS. HE MENTIONED TRAINING, PRE-POSITIONING OF US EQUIPMENT AND US EQUIPMENT SALES, AND SULTAN WE ARE TOLD WELCOMED ALL THESE IDEAS, THOUGH NEITHER HE NOR CHENEY WENT INTO ANY DETAIL. CHENEY SAID US TROOPS WOULD LEAVE WHEN THEIR JOB WAS DONE. SULTAN SAID THAT THAT JORDAN, SUDAN, TUNISIA AND THE PLO WOULD SUFFER AS A RESULT OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

COMMENT

6. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER IF WE LEARN MORE ABOUT BILATERAL BUSINESS TRANSACTED DURING THIS VISIT. THE US ACCOUNT SUGGESTS NO DIMINUTION IN THE RESOLVE OF ABDULLAH AND SULTAN BUT DOUBTS ON THE PART OF THE FORMER AS TO AMERICAN DETERMINATION. AT ABDULLAH'S LUNCH FOR THE PRINCE OF WALES YESTERDAY, I FOUND HIM FIRM ON THE MILITARY OPTION AND HOSTILE TO A GRACE PERIOD AFTER 15 JANUARY (SEE MY SEPARATE TEL OF TODAY'S DATE FOR FULLER ACCOUNT). SULTAN, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, SEEMED TO THINK MILITARY ACTION INCREASINGLY LIKELY. AGAINST THAT, THE VIEW AMONG MOST OF OUR NON-AL SAUD OFFICIAL CONTACTS, IS THAT SADDAM IS LIKELY TO WITHDRAW EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART AROUND 15 JANUARY, AND THAT WAR IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY. THEY ARGUE THAT IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT SADDAM IS UNAWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES RANGED AGAINST HIM OR THE INADEQUACY OF HIS OWN RESOURCES (AT THE CROWN PRINCE'S LUNCH THE OIL MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IRAQ'S PRODUCTION OF AVIATION FUEL AND KEROSENE WERE INADEQUATE FOR WAR). IN PART PERHAPS THIS EXPECTATION REFLECTS

UNWILLINGNESS TO FACE UP TO FACTS. MAYBE THE OLDER GENERATION OF THE AL SAUD ARE MADE OF STERNER STUFF. THE COMMERCE MINISTER ALSO SAID (IN CONTRAST TO PRINCE ABDULLAH) THAT HE ASSUMED PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY CONTINUED SANCTIONS RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION: BUT HE POSITED THIS ON LACK OF US, RATHER THAN ARAB, RESOLVE. GENERAL WALLER'S COMMENTS WILL NOT HAVE HELPED.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 273MAIN 229IRAQ/KUWAIT
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 44IRAQ/KUWAIT
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

Sever

(1)



Yel.
Contract N.
- - - - - N.
Fund 11 equally

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

contract.

BW Immunization

26.12

This is the Septa
meeting; draft paper on
BW immunization, on which
a decision is needed by
27 December.

It seems desirable to go
ahead as planned. You
forewarned Mr. Brindley: &
he made clear that the
Americans are going ahead
with a partial vaccination
programme. Contract? C.D.P.

Sir C. Powell

37(A-2)

SECRET UK EYES A

DRAFT

You might like an advance look at a letter I will probably circulate on 24 December for clearance by 27 December.

JW.

DRAFT MINUTE FROM PS/S OF S TO PS/PM

BW IMMUNISATION POLICY

The Release Secretary

1. At the meeting of OPD(G) on 19 December, ~~(Mr King)~~ informed his colleagues that the Chiefs of Staff had agreed a range of contingency plans in case some batches of Anthrax vaccine failed to be awarded a product licence, but that an immunisation programme should proceed. It was agreed that it would be essential to handle public presentation of the immunisation programme - and ~~discussion~~ with the Saudis in particular - with the greatest care.

2. Two of the three batches being retested (totaling 30k doses) have now been awarded a product licence. Retesting of the third batch has indicated that there should be no problems; but a licence cannot be awarded until the vaccine has been put in ampoules. This is due for completion on 31 December. There is, therefore, sufficient vaccine (59,400 doses) to begin a phased programme and probably for simultaneous immunisation of all military personnel deployed in the Gulf and civilians in direct support.

3. The US has taken a decision to proceed with a partial immunisation programme, to protect 100,000 personnel ^(about a third) against Anthrax and 35,000 against BTX. They intend to retain a pool of Anthrax vaccine, sufficient for 35,000 personnel, for use as a post-attack treatment in conjunction with a 30 day regime of antibiotics, ~~(which recent research has indicated should be more efficient than previously envisaged)~~ Like us, the US are also manufacturing BTX Serum for use as post-attack treatment.

4. The US will finalise ^{plans} ~~(the theme and modalities)~~ for presentation to the Allies and the public at a meeting on 26 Decemeber. So far as the Allies are

concerned, ^{we} it is proposed that the decision to proceed with an immunisation programme should be placed in the context of the uncertainty about the threat; the efficacy of existing defences and countermeasures (including NBC suits); and the range of post-attack medical treatment available. The Defence Secretary plans to write to his counterparts in Saudi Arabia, ^{and} Bahrain, (France, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) on 29 December. Guidance telegrams along similar lines will be sent to capitals of other nations contributing to the multinational force; proposing that Governments of major contributors (eg Egypt and Oman) should be informed at the appropriate level about the programme and providing advice for others to draw on as necessary.

5. The draft letter to Prince Sultan (copy attached) specifically addresses the Saudi request for 50,000 doses of Anthrax vaccine. OPD(G) on 12 December took the view that any vaccine surplus to the UK's requirement should be offered to British Aerospace (3,300 doses), the ^{World Health Organisation (WHO)} WHO (300 doses) and then the Saudis. Even if there are no failures in production, the Saudi order could not be fully met until Mid-March. It is proposed that the Saudis should be offered a choice: delivery as soon as possible of a limited amount of vaccine or that the UK would pool any surplus vaccine with the US to use if necessary as a post-attack treatment. In view of the political concern about the Saudi reaction to an immunisation programme, it would be possible, if the third batch is licensed, to offer the Saudis delivery of a token amount of 5,000 doses in early January in advance of meeting the ²BAE and WHO requirements and more in February.

6. Following consultation with the US, the Defence Secretary has agreed that it would be preferable for the MOD to give a routine unattributable briefing on the CBW threat and the countermeasures available, rather than make a formal

SECRET UK EYES A

announcement: proposed bull points are attached. This is planned for 2 January, ^{(the day} with the immunisation programme starting ³ ~~the same day~~. Briefing for service personnel involved in the programme will be on similar lines but include classified information about the Anthrax immunisation programme, and other countermeasures. The US would arrange for a suitable question to be asked at their daily press briefing to achieve the same effect.

7. Finally, the Defence Secretary has been giving further consideration to the requirement for signature of a ~~consent~~ ^{consent} form. A consent form would provide evidence that a programme ~~would be~~ ^{was} voluntary. ~~As none~~ ^{As none} of the services ask personnel to sign such a form for routine immunisation with a licensed vaccine, however, it could give rise to unnecessary concern about the Anthrax vaccine's safety. ~~It is~~ ^{We} therefore, proposed that ~~the requirement for a voluntary scheme should be met by~~ the medical officer administering the vaccine ^{should} (briefing each individual about the nature of the product; why it is being given; its ^{possible} side effects; and that the programme is not compulsory.

8. Unless there is any change in plan following the US meeting on the 26 December, Mr King proposes to proceed on this basis.

9. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of O(D)(G) and the Secretary of State for Health, and to Sonia Phippard (Casualty Office).

BW IMMUNISATION - PUBLIC PRESENTATION

BULL POINTS

Protective measures against threat of CW or BW attack under continuous review in consultation with Allies.

Iraq is party to 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of chemical and biological agents and has signed 1972 protocol prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

UK would take gravest view of Iraqi use of such weapons. Consequences for Iraq would be very severe. Such action would be irrational but we must take all prudent precautions to protect against it.

Confident that capability of multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against CBW delivery systems but other specific defensive measures are available.

These include

- protective clothing and respirators (against both CW and BW).
- devices to detect the use of both chemical and biological agents.
- medical procedures and treatment, involving vaccines for prophylactic and post-attack use, antitoxins and antibiotics.
- decontamination procedures.

Confident that these measures provide effective defence and will make Iraqi use of CW/BW pointless as well as irrational.

In contact with Allies to ensure sharing of information and pooling of facilities as appropriate.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

SECRET

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELNO

OF

AND TO IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, ROME, WELLINGTON,
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE, DOHA, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI,
AND TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, DHAKA, BRUSSELS, SOFIA, PRAGUE
AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN, CAIRO, ATHENS, BUDAPEST, JEDDA
AND TO IMMEDIATE RABAT, ABIDJAN (FOR MSER), OSLO, ISLAMABAD
AND TO IMMEDIATE, WARSAW, LISBON, BUCHAREST, DACCA, MADRID
AND TO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

SIC

MODUK EXCLUSIVE FOR BEVAN, AUS(C) AND ALDRED, SEC(O)(C)
FCO TELNO 825: BW IMMUNISATION

1. Ministers have decided to authorise a BW immunisation programme for British forces in the Gulf theatre. This will begin as soon as host governments and key allies have been informed. The target date is 2 January. The US have been consulted. (They propose to begin a partial immunisation programme for US forces the same day.)
2. There will be a small quantity of anthrax vaccine surplus to the requirements of British forces available from 14 January onwards. Ministers have decided that the priority candidates are British Aerospace, WHO, the Saudis, British Airways and other UK

E14AFM

EU

S ELDON

270 3309

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

civilians in the Gulf. MIFT (to Riyadh only) contains the text of a message from Mr King to Prince Sultan on what we can do for the Saudis.

3. Consideration has been given to minimising any adverse affects on public opinion and the international coalition in the Gulf. We have identified a number of such measures including advice on antibiotic regimes and a best endeavours offer of anthrax vaccine supply for post-attack treatments.

4. Mr King is sending separate messages about the immunisation programme also to his counterparts in Bahrain and in France, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Other addressees should take appropriate action to inform their host government drawing on the points in my second IFT. In view of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit, Cairo and Muscat should inform the staff of the President and the Sultan at an appropriately senior level. Jedda (for the Kuwaitis), Rabat, Doha, Damascus and Abu Dhabi should make a mid-level approach to foreign (and if appropriate Defence) Ministries. Other addressees have discretion not to take action if they think it would be counter-productive.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

SECRET

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELNO

OF

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

MIPT: BW IMMUNISATION

Please pass the following message from Mr King to Prince Sultan:

1. We have been reviewing all aspects of our defensive measures against the possible use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons or biological weapons in the event of hostilities involving the multinational force.

BEGINS

2. As you know we have made it very clear publicly that the British Government would take a very grave view of any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons. The US Government has expressed the same view. It is to be hoped that Saddam Hussain will take full account of the gravity of these warnings. But we cannot of course be confident that he will. Hence the need to examine the question of defensive measures in some detail.

- We are confident that the capability of the multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against Iraqi CBW delivery systems.
- All members of our contingent to the multinational force have been issued with respirators and NBC protective equipment. This equipment will be the first line of defence for all our forces in the event of a CBW attack and provides by far the

E14AFN

EU

S G ELDON

270 3309

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

- most effective protection against these weapons. We have also deployed appropriate detection equipment.
- BW may present less of a potential threat than CW. Iraq has not hitherto used it in battlefield conditions, or indeed in any other context as far as we are aware. Furthermore BW is typically much slower to take effect - a period of hours and possibly days.
 - We have also examined the question of post attack treatment against BW with the use of antibiotics. I am advised that there is a great deal that can be done in the treatment of anthrax and plague with this method. I am asking the CBFME to make advice available via allied medical liaison channels. We can also provide advice on sources of the antibiotics concerned, should your authorities have difficulties in obtaining them.
 - The facilities of our military hospitals in-theatre will be made available on a best endeavours basis for post-CW and BW attack treatment of Saudi and other members of the multinational force.
 - Anthrax vaccine is currently in short supply. Production facilities are very limited. But as it becomes available we shall hold some in reserve for post-attack treatment for as long as necessary. This will be made available, on a best endeavours basis, to Saudi and other members of the multinational force.
3. I believe these proposals constitute a reassuring and effective line of defence against the possible exposure of our forces against CW and BW. As an additional contingency step, we have decided to proceed with a programme of vaccination against anthrax. It will begin on 2 January.
4. In view of Saudi Arabia's special position within the alliance we could if you wished offer 5000 doses of anthrax vaccine for Saudi use. It would be available on 2 January. This

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

represents the very maximum amount we can make available to you at the present time. We will not be making a similar offer to other allies and would be grateful if knowledge of this could be very closely held. If you decided not to take it up we would make the vaccine available for post-attack treatment as described above. Because of the very limited production capacity for anthrax vaccine I cannot yet say when further deliveries will be available, but it is unlikely to be before early February.

5. We do not propose to make a public announcement of the anthrax vaccination programme, though we will be briefing the press off the record on the whole range of our defensive measures. We are also informing host countries and close allies. Vaccination as such is not new and the information might just be of some value to the Iraqis. If asked by the media, we shall say that we liaise closely with host countries and key allies on CBW defensive measures. We would add that we were not prepared to discuss the details of any current or planned measures, for operational reasons.

ENDS

6. If the Saudis ask how many of our troops we intend to vaccinate you should say that we would hope eventually to cover them all, but that this will depend on the availability of vaccine.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
SECRET

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE DOHA

TELNO

OF

AND TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, BUENOS AIRES, DHAKA,
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, SOFIA, PRAGUE, COPENHAGEN, CAIRO
AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BUDAPEST, JEDDA, RABAT, OSLO, ISLAMABAD
AND TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN (FOR MGER), WARSAW, LISBON, BUCHAREST,
AND TO IMMEDIATE DACCA, MADRID, DAMASCUS
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, WASHINGTON, MODUK

MY SECOND IPT: CBW DEFENSIVE MEASURES

1. Please draw on the following information in briefing appropriate interlocutors about our review of chemical and biological weapon defensive measures in the Gulf theatre.
2. We have been reviewing all aspects of our defensive measures against the possible use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons or biological weapons in the event of hostilities involving the multinational force.
3. As you know we have made it very clear publicly that the British Government would take a very grave view of any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons. The US Government has expressed the same view. It is to be hoped that Saddam Hussain will take full account of the gravity of these warnings. But we cannot of course be confident that he will. Hence the need to examine the question of defensive measures in some detail.

E14AFW

EU

S G ELDON

270 3309

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

(a) We are confident that the capability of the multinational force, including air defences will be effective against Iraqi CBW delivery systems.

(b) Respirators and NBC protective equipment provide the first line of defence for all our forces in the event of CBW attack and provides by far the most effective protection against these weapons. We have also deployed appropriate detection equipment.

(c) BW may present less of a potential threat. Iraq has not hitherto used it in battlefield conditions, or indeed in any other context as far as we are aware. Furthermore BW is typically much slower to take effect - a period of hours and possibly days.

(d) We have also examined the question of post attack treatment against BW with the use of antibiotics. I am advised that there is a great deal that can be done in the treatment of anthrax and plague with this method. If it would be helpful we would be prepared to advise on treatment methods. We can also provide advice on sources of the antibiotics concerned, should your authorities have difficulties in obtaining them.

(e) The facilities of our military hospitals in-theatre will be made available on a best endeavours basis for post-CW and BW attack treatment of members of the multinational force.

(f) We shall hold some anthrax vaccine for post-attack treatment for as long as necessary. This reserve too would be made available, on a best endeavours basis, to other members of the multinational force.

4. We believe these proposals constitute a reassuring and effective line of defence against the possible exposure of our forces against CW and BW. As an additional contingency step we have decided to proceed with a programme of vaccinations against anthrax. It will begin on 2 January.

5. We will be briefing the press in general terms about the results of our review of CBW defensive measures but we will not

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

discuss the details of current or planned measures, for operational reasons.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

SECRET

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN

TELNO

OF

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

FCO TELNO TO RIYADH: BW IMMUNISATION

Please pass the following message from Mr King to the Bahraini Minister for Defence:

1. We have been reviewing all aspects of our defensive measures against the possible use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons or biological weapons in the event of hostilities involving the multinational force.

2. As you know we have made it very clear publicly that the British Government would take a very grave view of any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons. The US Government has expressed the same view. It is to be hoped that Saddam Hussain will take full account of the gravity of these warnings. But we cannot of course be confident that he will. Hence the need to examine the question of defensive measures in some detail.

- We are confident that the capability of the multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against Iraqi CBW delivery systems.
- All members of our contingent to the multinational force have been issued with respirators and NBC protective equipment. This equipment will be the first line of defence for all our forces in the event of a CBW attack and provides by far the

(Note: Same text for Italy, Netherlands and France)

E14AF0

EU

S G ELDON

270 3309

- most effective protection against these weapons. We have also deployed appropriate detection equipment
- BW may present less of a potential threat than CW. Iraq has not hitherto used it in battlefield conditions, or indeed in any other context as far as we are aware. Furthermore BW is typically much slower to take effect - a period of hours and possibly days.
 - We have also examined the question of post-attack treatment against BW with the use of antibiotics. I am advised that there is a great deal that can be done in the treatment of anthrax and plague with this method. I am asking the CBFME to make advice available via allied medical liaison channels. We can also provide advice on sources of the antibiotics concerned, should your authorities have difficulties in obtaining them.
 - The facilities of our military hospitals in-theatre will be made available on a best endeavours basis for post-CW and BW attack treatment of Bahraini and other members of the multinational force.
 - Anthrax vaccine is currently in short supply. But as it becomes available we shall hold some for post-attack treatment for as long as necessary. This will be made available, on a best endeavours basis, to Bahraini and other members of the multinational force.
3. I believe these proposals constitute a reassuring and effective line of defence against the possible exposure of our forces against CW and BW. As an additional contingency step we have decided to proceed with a programme of vaccinations against anthrax. It will begin on 2 January.
4. We will be briefing the press off the record and in general terms about the results of our review of the wide range of defensive measures described above. We shall say that we liaise closely with host countries and key allies on CBW defensive

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

measures. We would add that we were not prepared to discuss the details of any current or planned measures, for operational reasons.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN

ECRET

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

SECRET

(Note: Same text for
New Zealand and
Canada)

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELNO

OF

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK

FCO TELNO TO RIYADH: BW IMMUNISATION

Please pass the following message from Mr King to the Australian Minister for Defence:

1. We have been reviewing all aspects of our defensive measures against the possible use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons or biological weapons in the event of hostilities involving the multinational force.
 2. As you know we have made it very clear publicly that the British Government would take a very grave view of any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons. The US Government has expressed the same view. It is to be hoped that Saddam Hussain will take full account of the gravity of these warnings. But we cannot of course be confident that he will. Hence the need to examine the question of defensive measures in some detail.
- We are confident that the capability of the multinational force, including air defences, will be effective against Iraqi CBW delivery systems.
 - All members of our contingent to the multinational force have been issued with respirators and NBC protective equipment. This equipment will be the first line of defence for all our forces in the event of a CBW attack and provides by far the

E14AFP

EU

S G ELDON

270 3309

- most effective protection against these weapons. We have also deployed appropriate detection equipment
- BW may present less of a potential threat than CW. Iraq has not hitherto used it in battlefield conditions, or indeed in any other context as far as we are aware. Furthermore BW is typically much slower to take effect - a period of hours and possibly days.
 - We have also examined the question of post-attack treatment against BW with the use of antibiotics. I am advised that there is a great deal that can be done in the treatment of anthrax and plague with this method. I am asking the CBFME to make advice available via allied medical liaison channels. We can also provide advice on sources of the antibiotics concerned, should your authorities have difficulties in obtaining them.
 - The facilities of our military hospitals in-theatre will be made available on a best endeavours basis for post-CW and BW attack treatment of Australian and other members of the multinational force.
 - Anthrax vaccine is currently in short supply. But as it becomes available we shall hold some for post-attack treatment for as long as necessary. This will be made available, on a best endeavours basis, to Australian and other members of the multinational force.
3. I believe these proposals constitute a reassuring and effective line of defence against the possible exposure of our forces against CW and BW.
4. As an additional contingency step, we have decided to proceed with a programme of vaccinations against anthrax. It will begin on 2 January. If you agree we are prepared to vaccinate at the same time those Australian forces serving with British units. The limited availability of the vaccine means that we are not able at the present time to supply it for pre-treatment. We
-
-

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

wish to keep this information confidential at the present time and ask you not to reveal it to others. We will be briefing the press off the record and in general terms about the results of our review of the wide range of defensive measures described above. We do not propose to make a public announcement of the anthrax vaccination programme. Vaccination as such is not new and the information might just be of some value to the Iraqis. If asked by the media, we shall say that we liaise closely with host countries and key allies on CBW defensive measures. We would add that we were not prepared to discuss the details of any current or planned measures, for operational reasons.

HURD

YYYY

IRAQ/KUWAIT (SECRET)

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

no / 23 December 1990
alk

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Bernard Dowiyogo, President of the Republic of Nauru.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for Prime Ministerial signature. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Monday 7 January.

(C. D. POWELL)

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



36

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 December 1990

Dear Sir,

**THE THREAT TO BRITISH CIVIL AVIATION
IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT IN THE GULF**

The Prime Minister has seen the Transport Secretary's minute of 20 December outlining steps to deal with the increased threat to British civil aviation in the event there is a conflict in the Gulf. Subject to the views of colleagues he is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(T), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. Powell
(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Whiteley, Esq.,
Department of Transport.

SECRET

SECRET

Sp 5.

ZCZC
LNW8AN 0962 OCMIAN 2021
SECRET
OO WASHI
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
220107Z DEC
GRS 379

SECRET
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 2226
OF 220107Z DECEMBER 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, MADRID
AND TO IMMEDIATE LISBON, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, LUXEMBOURG

*Yes - Rather overridden
by your talks
with the President
- they're inclination is to
thin' as op + w/draw
by say, 10th. of*

(Signature)

FUTURE OF EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD

1. WE ARE CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD IN THE LIGHT OF THE APPROACHING 15 JANUARY DEADLINE AND OF THE ENSUING RISK OF HOSTILITIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND SOME OF OUR EC PARTNERS ARE ALSO LOOKING AT THIS.

2. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE MAIN OPTIONS:

- (I) TO WITHDRAW ALL UK-BASED STAFF FROM THE EMBASSY AT A NATIONAL DATE VERY SHORTLY AFTER 15 JANUARY.
- (II) TO REDUCE TO A CORE STAFF, WHOM WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
- (III) TO REDUCE TO A CORE STAFF, WHO WOULD STAY IN BAGHDAD (IN ONE OF THE EMBASSY HOUSES AWAY FROM THE COMPOUND) AT THE OUTSET OF HOSTILITIES, AND WHO WOULD TRY TO LEAVE BY ROAD TO TURKEY AS SOON AS THIS WAS POSSIBLE.

3. THE MAIN ADVANTAGES OF OPTION (I) ARE THAT STAFF ARE NOT EXPOSED TO THE THREAT OF IRAQI REPRISALS WHICH WE JUDGE TO BE HIGHLY LIKELY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES AND WHICH COULD BE VIOLENT (WHETHER OR NOT OFFICIALLY INSPIRED, OR THE RESULT OF MOB ACTION); IN ADDITION, WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A FURTHER SIGNAL TO THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE MILITARY OPTION, BUILDING ON THE PRESSURES GENERATED BY SCR 678. OPTION (II) WOULD REDUCE THE RISK TO STAFF, BUT NOT ELIMINATE IT.

4. AGAINST THIS, WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAVE THE (NOW) SMALL BRITISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ WITHOUT CONSULAR PROTECTION; WE COULD NO LONGER CONDUCT BUSINESS DIRECT WITH THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WHETHER OVER POLITICAL OR CONSULAR MATTERS; NO POLITICAL REPORTING; THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF STAFF TO BAGHDAD COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI BARGAINING.

5. PLEASE DISCUSS URGENTLY WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. YOU SHOULD GO OVER THE OPTIONS, AND THE PROS AND CONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AS OUTLINED ABOVE, MAKING CLEAR THAT MINISTERS ARE STILL CONSIDERING THE QUESTION AND THAT, IF POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD PREFER TO ACT IN STEP WITH OUR ALLIES AND PARTNERS. WE HOPE THEY WILL KEEP US INFORMED OF THEIR THINKING.

6. INITIAL REACTIONS BY 24 DECEMBER WOULD BE WELCOME.

HURD

MR POWELL

THE GULF - JORDANIAN MILITARY MOVEMENTS

Sir Percy is out of the office, but Gordon Barrass spoke to me on the telephone at 11 a.m. this morning Washington time. He offered the following three points about the Tel Aviv telegram:

1. We don't know on what material the claim about unusual activity in para. 1 was based. However, both Jordan and Israel increased their alerts on 9 December, but since then have lowered them.
2. Both the Jordanians and the Israelis are edgy. The Israelis fear that Jordanian activity could be a prelude to an Iraqi attack. We don't believe this because we don't think the Iraqis would share such thoughts with the Jordanians. The most likely explanation is that the Israelis and Jordanians are over-reacting to each other's activities.
3. The MOD are in touch with the appropriate people in Washington, first of all on the question of fact, and secondly asking what the Americans are doing about it.

Finally, Gordon Barrass commented that although it seems that this could be 'a daisy chain' of a story - all getting a little blown up - until we find out what is really happening on the ground he wouldn't want to be too categorical.



Duty Clerk

21 December 1990

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

*Seen by President Bush
his underlines what
we were discussing
in the car.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1584

OF 211508Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ACTOR, RIYADH

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PEKING, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

Paris

MY TELNO 1571: IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO LAUNCH A COMPETING DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ. BUT POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL CONTACT AFTER 4 JANUARY NOT RULED OUT, IN THE ABSENCE OF US/IRAQ TALKS.

DETAIL

2. ADMIRAL LANXADE (MITTERRAND'S DEFENCE ADVISER) CONFIRMED TO ME ON 21 DECEMBER, THAT ONE OF THE MAIN PURPOSES OF MITTERRAND'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 19 DECEMBER (TUR) HAD BEEN TO PREPARE FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR. BUT HE ADDED THAT MITTERRAND REMAINED CONCERNED THAT THERE MIGHT BE NO WESTERN CONTACT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN BEFORE THE 15 JANUARY DEADLINE. AT A LATER POINT HE REMARKED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WANT GUARANTEES THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF HE BEGAN, BUT HAD NOT COMPLETED, A WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BY 15 JANUARY (HE WOULD BE MILITARILY VULNERABLE DURING THE RETREAT). THIS WAS THE SORT OF ISSUE THAT LANXADE EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED IN ANY US/IRAQ TALKS.

3. LEVITTE (QUAI ASIA DIRECTOR) TOLD US SEPARATELY ON 20 DECEMBER THAT DUMAS DID NOT FEEL THAT HIS HANDS WERE TIED OVER DIRECT CONTACT WITH IRAQ AFTER 4 JANUARY.

COMMENT

4. I THINK IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT MITTERRAND HIMSELF WOULD VISIT BAGHDAD, AS EYSKENS HAS SUGGESTED (ROME TELNO 1135). IT WOULD BE QUITE OUT OF CHARACTER FOR HIM TO PUT HIMSELF IN THE FIRING LINE IN SUCH A WAY. BUT THE FRENCH HAVE NEVER RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME BILATERAL CONTACT (MOST LIKELY BETWEEN DUMAS AND TARIQ AZIZ), IF NO US/IRAQ TALKS TAKE PLACE BY 3 JANUARY. AS OUR TUR POINTED OUT, MITTERRAND REMAINS VERY AWARE OF THE RISK OF LAUNCHING A COMPETING DIALOGUE. BUT THE COMMENTS IN PARA 2 AND 3 (THOUGH NO MORE THAN STRAWS IN THE WIND) SHOW THAT THE IDEA IS ALIVE.

FERGUSSON

DISTRIBUTION
CHANCERY LIMITED

PLUS

MR A. SMITH
MR MCMILLAN
DR SKLAROFF
MS FRASER

ACTION OFFICER
MR PUBLICOVER

KD

CONFIDENTIAL

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Telegram SIC. UZG 19m dated 21 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>25/1/18</i> <i>ML</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2335

OF 210430Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, MIDDLE EAST POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, OTTAWA, HELSINKI, ABIDJAN, ADDIS ABABA

INFO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR, HAVANA, KINSHASA, ACTOR

MY 2IPTS; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. FINAL NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON DRAFT RESOLUTION AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AT WHICH SCR 681 IS ADOPTED.

DETAIL

2. EARLY ON 20 DECEMBER THE FINNS, AMERICANS, MALAYSIANS AND YEMENIS NEGOTIATED ON THE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN PARA 9 OF TUR. TO GET ROUND THE DIFFICULTIES OVER LINKAGE IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SUGGESTED THAT ALL REFERENCE TO IRAQ/KUWAIT BE REMOVED AND THAT THE PARAGRAPH REFORMULATED TO READ "IN THE VIEW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT IS IMPORTANT AND UNIQUE AND MUST BE ADDRESSED INDEPENDENTLY ON ITS OWN MERITS". AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SPENT SOME TIME ARGUING FOR REMOVAL OF THE WORD "UNIQUE" BUT EVENTUALLY GAVE WAY. ON THE TIMING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IT WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT SHOULD SIMPLY NOTE THAT THERE WAS NO UNANIMITY.

3. ONCE NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETE, COUNCIL MEMBERS MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO EXCHANGE MUTUAL CONGRATULATIONS AND TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF ITEMS OF OTHER BUSINESS.

DISTRIBUTION
CHANCERY LIMITED

ADVANCE COPIES TO
H OF C
MR PUBLICOVER

ACTION OFFICER
MR PUBLICOVER

AM

/...4.

RESTRICTED

4. THE COUNCIL THEN MET IN FORMAL SESSION. THE (YEMENI) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL READ OUT THE AGREED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE COUNCIL THEN MOVED ON TO THE VOTE. IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS STILL LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED; THE LOSS OF LIFE AND RECENT DEPORTATIONS ADDED TO THE CONCERN. ETHIOPIA REITERATED THE CALL FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE. LA SABLIERE (FRANCE) DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AS INTERESTING. HIS AUTHORITIES WERE FOLLOWING FAVOURABLY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS, INCLUDING THE SENDING OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE REGION. FRANCE CONDEMNED THE RECENT EXPULSIONS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACT WITH DETERMINATION AND UNANIMITY AS IT HAD OVER SCRS 672 AND 673. THE IDEA OF A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OPENED UP INTERESTING PROSPECTS. THE PROPOSALS IN THE RESOLUTION FOR MONITORING AND REPORTING TO THE COUNCIL WOULD IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIANS. DIALOGUE WAS NECESSARY TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD OFFER A FRAMEWORK. FRANCE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. LA SABLIERE REFERRED TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT EARLIER IN THE DAY.

5. THE VOTE THEN TOOK PLACE. THERE WERE 15 VOTES IN FAVOUR, NO VOTES AGAINST AND NO ABSTENTIONS. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AS SCR 681.

6. IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE, BAGBENI NZENGEYA (ZAIRE) SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD SHOW CONSTANT CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF PALESTINIANS THROUGH THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE RESOLUTION. TORNUDD (FINLAND) SAID HIS DELEGATION HAD ENCOURAGED THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF SCRS 672 AND 673 AND SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. IT WAS TIME TO IMPROVE MONITORING OF THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ALTHOUGH THE STEPS TO PROTECT THE PALESTINIANS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION WERE MODEST. A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION MIGHT GIVE AN AUTHORITATIVE VIEW ON THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION.

7. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF SCR 681 WAS AN IMPORTANT MOMENT FOR THE COUNCIL. THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION WOULD SEND A STRONG SIGNAL TO ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD NOW MONITOR THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, APPOINTING EXTRA PERSONNEL IF NECESSARY. THIS WAS THE CORE OF THE RESOLUTION. THE ACCEPTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, EVEN THOUGH EXPRESSED ONLY IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, MARKED A CLEAR COMMITMENT BY THE COUNCIL. THE PROPER REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM IN THE RESOLUTION SHOWED THAT IN FUTURE THE COUNCIL WOULD OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY. THE COUNCIL HAD ALSO SET OUT CLEARLY ITS OBJECTION TO DEPORTATIONS. RAZALI CRITICISED THE PROCEDURAL DEVICES THAT HAD BEEN USED DURING THE DISCUSSION. THERE WAS A DANGER OF THE COUNCIL BEING SHANGHAIED BY POWERFUL COUNTRIES.

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3102
OF 210003Z DECEMBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR

IRAQ/KUWAIT; MR HEATH'S TESTIMONY TO THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (HASC)

SUMMARY

1. MR HEATH TELLS HASC THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ CAN WORK ;
WAR WOULD BE TOO COSTLY; DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT
SHOULD BE PURSUED; ROOM FOR FURTHER ARAB INVOLVEMENT. JORDAN
TREATED SHABBILY.

DETAIL

2. MR EDWARD HEATH GAVE TESTIMONY TO THE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HASC) CHAIRED BY
ASPIN (D-WISCONSIN) ON 20 DECEMBER. HE SPOKE FOR NEARLY THREE
HOURS.

3. MR HEATH SAID SADDAM DID NOT TRUST EITHER THE UK OR US.
TALK OF WAR TRIALS AND REPARATIONS REINFORCED SADDAM'S VIEW THAT
THE COALITION'S AIM WAS HIS DESTRUCTION AND THAT OF IRAQ (WITH A
SUBSEQUENT REDISTRIBUTION OF TERRITORY TO TURKEY, IRAN AND
SYRIA). SADDAM THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE ATOMIC
WEAPONS AGAINST HIM, AS PROBABLY WOULD ISRAEL. SADDAM HAD
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND WOULD HAVE TO USE THEM ; HE
HAD NO ALTERNATIVE.

4. MR HEATH SAID THAT SADDAM WAS CLEVER AND ASTUTE. HE HAD
TOLD SADDAM THAT HOLDING THE HUMAN SHIELDS WAS ONLY HURTING HIS
CAUSE. THERE WAS WORLDWIDE ABHORRENCE. HE HAD TOLD SADDAM THAT
BRITISH HOSTAGES WOULD NOT DETER MRS THATCHER FROM BOMBING
STRATEGIC SITES. SADDAM HAD ASKED, IF HE WITHDREW, WHAT
GUARANTEE WOULD HE HAVE THAT THE COALITION WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIM
TO BAGHDAD. MR HEATH HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE COULD
PROVIDE A BUFFER.

5. MR HEATH EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. THE
ARABS, AND PARTICULARLY THE ARAB LEAGUE, HAD TO BE ALLOWED
GREATER ROLE. THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF WAR WOULD BE
EXTREMELY HIGH FOR BOTH SIDES (SADDAM RECOGNISED THIS). WAR
WOULD CAUSE HATRED TOWARDS THE WEST AMONG ARABS THAT COULD LAST
FOR DECADES. SANCTIONS COULD STILL WORK, BUT MR HEATH WOULD NOT
GIVE A TIMESCALE.

(EB/CHY)

DISTRIBUTION
CHANCERY LIMITED

/...6.

OL 0493/AM

6. ON THE TARIQ AZIZ /BAKER VISITS, MR HEATH IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS SHOWING INSUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY. HE HOPED THE TALKS WOULD GO AHEAD AND WOULD PROVE FRUITFUL. HE REGRETTED THAT THE CALL IN UNSCR 660 FOR IMMEDIATE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT HAD LARGELY BEEN IGNORED. KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN TRYING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ; NOBODY HAD GIVEN HIM ANY CREDIT. OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION JORDAN WAS SUFFERING THE MOST. THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH THE US AND BRITAIN HAD BEEN QUOTE YOU DO EXACTLY AS WE TELL YOU AND THEN WE WILL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP UNQUOTE.

7. ASPIN ASKED IF MR HEATH THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A CHANGE IN UK GULF POLICY AS A RESULT OF MRS THATCHER'S RESIGNATION. MR HEATH SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THAT BRITISH POLICY WOULD CHANGE GREATLY, BUT HE HOPED THAT MR MAJOR WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION.

8. MR HEATH'S APPEARANCE WAS PART OF A SERIES OF HASC HEARINGS ON THE GULF. OTHER INVITEES THIS WEEK HAVE INCLUDED FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE AND FORMER UN AMBASSADOR JEAN KIRKPATRICK. SEVERAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS SAID THAT MR HEATH WAS THE MOST IMPRESSIVE WITNESS IN NEARLY TWO WEEKS OF HEARINGS.

9. THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS SECRETARY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT MR HEATH'S POINT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO IN UNSCR 660 WERE NOT BEING PURSUED WITH ENOUGH VIGOUR. FITZWATER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DISAGREED. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WENT TO AMMAN OFFERING TO HAVE TALKS. HE FOUND NO ENCOURAGEMENT. THE US HAD OFFERED TALKS, WITH FIFTEEN SEPERATE DATES. THERE WAS STILL NO RESPONSE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN.

WOOD

DESKBY 202230Z

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 202230Z FCG
TELNO 3096
OF 202222Z DECEMBER 90
AND TO DESKBY 202230Z CABINET OFFICE
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, BAGHDAD, OTHER GULF POSTS
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MODUK, ACTOR

SIC

PLEASE PASS URGENTLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY ABOARD THE
AIRCRAFT

IRAQ/KUWAIT; READINESS OF US FORCES

SUMMARY

1. EMBARRASSMENT IN WASHINGTON AT COMMENTS BY THE DEPUTY
COMMANDER OF US FORCES IN THE GULF THAT AMERICAN TROOPS WILL
NOT BE READY FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION BY 15 JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. GEN SCHWARZKOPF'S DEPUTY, LT GEN CALVIN WALLER, SAID IN
AN INTERVIEW WITH REPORTERS ON 19 DECEMBER THAT HIS TROOPS
QUOTE WILL NOT BE READY FOR COMBAT ACTIVITIES UNQUOTE BY 15
JANUARY AND HE COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD
ORDER AN OFFENSIVE THAT SOON. HE SAID THAT MAJOR AMERICAN
REINFORCEMENTS STILL IN TRANSIT FROM EUROPE AND THE US WOULD
NOT BE COMBAT-READY UNTIL QUOTE SOMETIME BETWEEN 15 JANUARY
AND THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY UNQUOTE. HE WOULD ADVISE DEFENCE
SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL THAT QUOTE UNTIL OUR FULL
COMPLEMENT OF FORCES ARE ON THE GROUND... WE SHOULD NOT
INITIATE HOSTILE ACTIVITIES UNQUOTE.

3. WALLER'S COMMENTS HAVE EMBARRASSED THE PENTAGON. THE
CONTEXT AND EMPHASIS RECALL SIMILAR INDISCRETIONS BY GENERAL
DUGAN EARLIER IN THE YEAR (OUR TELNO 2246). THE WHITE HOUSE
HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY WALLER'S COMMENTS. FITZWATER SAID
ON 20 DECEMBER THAT, WHILE US FORCES MIGHT NOT BE AS READY AS
THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE FOR ALL THE CONTINGENCIES, THEY WOULD
BE READY TO DO WHATEVER THEY WERE CALLED UPON TO DO.

(AJP/CHY)

/...COMMENT

DISTRIBUTION
CHANCERY LIMITED

COMMENT

4. GEN WALLER'S REVELATIONS WILL NOT HAVE COME AS A SURPRISE TO YOU, OR TO THE BETTER INFORMED AMONG THE US PUBLIC. 1 FEBRUARY HAS BEEN QUOTED MORE OFTEN THAN NOT AS THE DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF COMBAT-READY BUILD UP. BAKER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 26 NOVEMBER THAT IN TERMS OF US MILITARY PREPARATIONS, A COUPLE OF WEEKS SLIPPAGE WAS POSSIBLE EVEN AFTER 15 JANUARY (FCO TELNO 989). CHENEY AND POWELL MADE SIMILAR PUBLIC STATEMENTS LAST WEEK, THOUGH IN MORE GUARDED TERMS, AND CHENEY SAID ON 18 DECEMBER THAT WHILE MOST US FORCES WOULD BE IN POSITION BY 15 JANUARY, TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO ACCLIMATISE THE TROOPS AND MATCH THEM TO THEIR EQUIPMENT.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE HOWEVER PLACED INCREASING EMPHASIS ON 15 JANUARY AS A DEADLINE, IN AN EFFORT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE IRAQIS, LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD BE AT DIRECT RISK FROM THE FIRST HOURS OF 16 JANUARY ONWARDS. BY SPEAKING SO BALDLY WALLER HAS DAMAGED THIS APPROACH AND UNDERCUT ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO AGREE TO A BAKER/SADDAM MEETING BEFORE 12 JANUARY.

6. I WOULD NOT OTHERWISE BE INCLINED TO TAKE WHAT HAS HAPPENED TOO SERIOUSLY. US FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE AFTER 15 JANUARY HAS NOT BEEN MATERIALLY AFFECTED. THE US AIR FORCES, WHICH WOULD BEAR THE BRUNT OF THE INITIAL ACTION, ARE READY. AND OUR CONTACTS IN THE PENTAGON HAVE EMPHASISED THAT US GROUND FORCES WILL BE PREPARED TO ACT ON 16 JANUARY IF ORDERED TO DO SO, THOUGH BETTER PLACED TO ATTACK SOMEWHAT LATER. PROVIDED SADDAM HUSSEIN IS IN NO DOUBT HE WILL BE ATTACKED AT SOME TIME - AND NOTHING WALLER SAID IMPLIED ANYTHING ELSE - HIS POLICY DILEMMA WILL NOT BE EASED BY UNCERTAINTY AS TO EXACTLY WHEN THE FIRING WILL START.

WOOD

010 SERIAL NO 2012
COPY NO 1 OF 10.

SECRET



Prime Minister

Barrett

Prime Minister
Content with the approach set out by the Transport Secretary?
34A-I

THE THREAT TO BRITISH CIVIL AVIATION IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT IN THE GULF

C. Drzycki

1. The Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf has been looking in detail at the security of British airline operations if there is conflict in the Gulf. I have been reviewing the situation in the light of the Ad Hoc Group's preliminary views. There are a number of important decisions which will need to be taken and I would draw colleagues' attention, in particular, to the conclusions (paragraph 23) of this Minute.

The nature of the threat

2. Saddam Hussein has said that Iraq will resort to terrorism as part of a war in the Gulf.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

British aviation will be a major potential target, with British Airways as the prime target. The threat is considerably higher overseas than in the UK.

3. We are unlikely to receive intelligence about specific attacks. We must therefore try to ensure that there are in place by 15 January general levels of security which are adequate in terms of the threat to British civil aviation. To do so requires a major effort.

4. It is, however, impossible to provide absolute guarantees of security or even to take effective preventative measures against certain kinds of terrorist attack. There is probably no feasible way of stopping an attack using ground launched missiles on an aircraft taking off or landing; an attack on passengers waiting to check in; or one that is launched airside by terrorists coming in on an aircraft over whose security we have had no control. The best that might be done in such circumstances is to engage the terrorists whilst an attack is in

progress.

SECRET

5. There is a much better prospect of countering attempts to bring an aircraft down with a bomb or to hijack one. On the evidence of recent years the former is probably the greatest danger we face; but hijack attempts cannot be ruled out.

6. Our objective ought to be to ensure that all possible and practicable steps are taken in association with overseas governments and our airlines to prevent and deter terrorist attacks on British aircraft or at British airports.

Existing arrangements for aviation security

7. The Chicago Convention makes each state responsible for the security of international flights into and out of its territory. Thus the UK is responsible for the security of British and foreign airlines using its airports; whilst states overseas are responsible for the security of British airline operations in their territories. The exception is the USA which seeks to lay down and enforce security standards worldwide for US airline operations.

8. Security in the UK for international flights is tightest for high risk flights such as those by US airlines and El Al where all hold baggage is screened. On other flights between 5% and 10% of hold baggage is screened depending upon the assessed risk. In addition all passengers are questioned about their hold baggage to try to establish if they have been duped into carrying a bomb. All passengers and hand baggage are screened for weapons and explosives and one in three passengers and hand baggage are also hand searched. Access to airside areas is controlled at all UK airports by means of a pass system; at our main international

SECRET

airports this is computer based. With some exceptions, this is a higher standard of security than at international airports overseas.

Measures to improve security: domestically

9. My Department has drawn up a contingency plan to tighten security even further if there is a war. We have warned airlines and airports that tighter controls will be required, for example, over the reconciliation of passengers and hold baggage; screening of transfer, misrouted and rush baggage; acceptance of cargo; and transit passengers. But it will not be possible to do very much more than this. In the time available before the likely outbreak of war extra security staff cannot be recruited, vetted and trained to step up the level of searches and screening; nor is the space and the equipment which they would need available.

10. There is one step we might take. So far we have left it to airports to discuss with the police whether there is a need for an armed presence. Whilst the threat of terrorist operations at British airports is assessed as low, there may be value in a general armed presence at all our international airports, just as there presently is at our major airports. The Joint Intelligence Organisation believe knowledge of the presence of armed police has a deterrent effect.

Measures to improve security: internationally

11. The areas in which terrorists are thought likely to operate against British aircraft are the Middle and Far East, the Indian sub-continent, Europe and Africa. The security position in many of these countries has traditionally been less satisfactory than in the UK.

SECRET

SECRET

12. Since the invasion of Kuwait my Department has worked with British airlines to establish the security picture at some 95 airports in the regions which concern us. We have identified a dozen security requirements we would wish to see at overseas airports to support British airline operations. These include procedures for passenger and cabin baggage screening; the screening and supervision of hold and rush baggage; and controls over aircraft access, catering supplies, transit passengers and cargo. Governments overseas were asked in August to ensure that these measures are in place for British Airways. Because of the threat of war, they have now been asked to put them in place for all British airlines.

13. We shall also try to work with the US Government who share our concerns about the terrorist threat, although they have fewer international services and have had higher security levels for several years because of the threat to their operations. We may meet US officials in January to compare contingency plans and explore the scope for co-operation.

14. Judged by requirements, whilst a number of countries have introduced new security measures for British airlines at our request, the picture overseas is still a patchy one, not least in Europe where there are some administrations with little effective security and no apparent will or capability to improve matters. I am contacting my opposite numbers overseas in some two dozen European and other countries to draw their attention to continuing deficiencies and to urge improvements. We are monitoring the position closely and inspectors from my Department will visit as many European airports as possible in the New Year to assess the latest position on the ground.

15. Where overseas governments will not take effective steps to improve security, we are in the process of asking British airlines to do so. British Airways have already introduced new

SECRET

6

SECRET

measures, for example, in France and Italy. But we have to recognise the limitations under which they are working. They cannot avoid being dependent on foreign nationals and companies for searching and screening and on foreign airports to make space or facilities available. They may not always get co-operation. The USA have taken responsibility for their aircraft overseas for many years although this had led to friction with other states, including the UK, and arguably has discouraged some states from accepting their international obligations. One of the consequences was that the administration had to accept strong domestic condemnation for the "failure of security" which led to the Lockerbie disaster although none of the events were within US jurisdiction.

16. Imposing security obligations on our airlines where overseas governments do not prove up to the task is a significant step and means our accepting responsibilities which properly belong to states overseas. Whilst this shift in policy may be temporary, it could prove difficult to reverse once the crisis is over. Nevertheless if there were to be a terrorist attack we must recognise that it would be the British government which would be called to account. Neither Parliament nor the public are likely to accept that we should rely solely on foreign governments for the security of British aircraft.

17. The Ad Hoc Group has also considered whether some overseas flights might carry armed sky marshals. There are difficulties with the idea including possible resistance from flight crews and their unions. The Group has yet to take a final decision.

Decisions if war breaks out

18. With the extra security measures to which airlines and airports have been alerted, security at British airports will be as tight as we can realistically make it should there be a conflict. The only additional possibility, as I have

SECRET

F

SECRET

suggested, would be to introduce an armed police presence at all our international airports and not just the major ones.

19. We can take no final decisions about the security of British airline operations overseas until a conflict breaks out. These will need to reflect the security position at the time at overseas airports and the nature of the threat. But we should be clear before a conflict whether particular security measures are acceptable in principle. We shall probably be faced with three broad areas for decision:

- (i) at those overseas airports which meet the minimum security requirements which we regard as necessary, we will still need to decide if those requirements remain sufficient in terms of the threat as assessed on the outbreak of war. We would expect them to be sufficient;
- (ii) where not all security requirements are met we will need to decide if the risk can be reduced to acceptable levels by taking other measures eg by stopping British airlines from carrying unscreened hold baggage or picking up cargo or by preventing passengers from ending their journey at transit stops; and
- (iii) where security requirements are not met and insufficient remedial measures can be taken to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, there may be no alternative to stopping flights by British airlines. The extensive spread of international operations, particularly by British Airways, and the patchy level of security overseas may mean there is no alternative but to stop a number of services. Although we have the power to do this, by directing the Civil Aviation Authority to suspend an airline's operating licence

SECRET

SECRET

for a route, British Airways have said they would much prefer to suspend a service voluntarily rather than be seen to have their business directed by the Government.

20. It is, however, too early to be categoric about what will have to be done if war breaks out. Until it does, my Department and the FCO will continue to work with overseas governments and airlines to improve security as we have done since August. We should know by early January what action we may need to take in the event of a war.

21. However long a war may last, the threat of terrorist attack will not then come to an end. On the contrary, the threat may intensify motivated by revenge for an Iraqi defeat. In my view, we must plan for a terrorist threat that may last many months and perhaps longer.

A public warning about the risks of flying

22. Finally, if a conflict starts, it seems indisputable the public will have to be warned about the risks of flying. There has already been one warning of the enhanced risk. Whilst the terms of a warning cannot yet be drafted it is inevitable the public will have to be warned in starker terms than have ever been used before.

Conclusions

23. My officials will continue to work closely with those in other Departments, overseas governments and our airlines to ensure adequate security in the event of a conflict. In particular:

SECRET

- (i) contrary to our policy hitherto, we shall have to impose security requirements on British airlines where overseas governments fail to provide adequate security;
- (ii) despite the assessed low threat to British airports, there may be deterrent value in extending an armed police presence to all our international airports;
- (iii) no decision has yet been taken to introduce armed sky marshals onto some overseas flights;
- (iv) where security overseas is inadequate, we will seek to remedy the position by introducing other measures including stopping British airlines carrying unscreened hold baggage or picking up cargo or preventing passengers from ending their journeys at transit stops;
- (v) but where measures such as these prove inadequate we will have to consider stopping flights by British airlines where the risk is unacceptable. They are likely to do so voluntarily; and
- (vi) if there is a conflict, we shall have to issue a stern warning to the public about the risks to civil aviation.

Unless colleagues disagree, and subject to final decisions on questions such as sky marshals, I propose that we seek to prevent and deter terrorist attacks in the way I have outlined.

SECRET

24. I am copying this minute to colleagues in OPD(T), David Mellor and Sir Robin Butler.


MR.

MALCOLM RIFKIND

20 December 1990

SECRET

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Curwen to Butler dated 20 December 1992</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>25/1/18</i> <i>M. King</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

IN CONFIDENCE



*Prime Minister
To note
AT 2/1/90*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 071-21 89000
DIRECT DIALLING 071-21 82111/3

D/S of S/PS3S

December 1990



John Major

I am writing to let you know that the US Air Force intend to deploy a number of A10 aircraft from RAF Alconbury to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield over the Christmas period.

A total of twenty-three aircraft are planned to leave RAF Alconbury on 27th December, between 8am and 9.30am, en route for Saudi Arabia. The reason for the early departure is that the aircraft are staging through Sicily, and the Americans are anxious to arrive before darkness falls.

I hope that your constituents will not be unduly disturbed by this air activity.

2
—————>
1

Tom King

The Rt Hon John Major MP

IN CONFIDENCE

IN CONFIDENCE

Annex B to:
D/Sec(AS)35/11
dated 18 Dec 1990

DEFENSIVE LINES TO TAKE ON DEPLOYMENT OF A10s FROM RAF ALCONBURY
TO SAUDI ARABIA

- These A10 aircraft are being deployed from RAF Alconbury to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield.

- The UK Government has been consulted about the forward deployment of these UK-based aircraft.

- [If asked where/when/how USAF will use the A10s once they are in Saudi Arabia] This is a matter for the Americans.

IN CONFIDENCE

SECRET

33A (a)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

Prime Minister

19K December 1990

Dear Charles

AD

will supply if reqd.

DEPLOYMENT OF TORNADO AIRCRAFT

In his minute of 20th November about reinforcement options (recommending the deployment of 1 Armoured Division to the Gulf), the Defence Secretary said that he would report further on the possibility of deploying up 24 Tornado GR1 aircraft to add to the offensive capability of our forces. These aircraft were already being modified to allow them to deploy rapidly if necessary, but, at the time of the Defence Secretary's minute, it was not possible to reach a firm decision.

We have had a request from the US Commander, General Schwarzkopf, for additional all weather attack aircraft, particularly with an anti-airfield capability. The Prime Minister may recall from Monday's briefing how important it would be to put Iraqi airfields out of action quickly in any air campaign. The Tornado GR1, equipped with the JP 233 airfield denial weapon, is ideally suited for this role. We have now established that the Saudis can make space for 12 aircraft to be based at Dhahran. The additional weapons stocks and stores required can be prepositioned by making use of the shipping which is transporting the ground reinforcements to the Gulf. The Defence Secretary has concluded that 12 aircraft should be deployed to Dhahran after Christmas. (The extra costs of this increase are not significant). The other 12 aircraft being modified would remain in Europe and offer a means of rapid reinforcement or replacements for losses during hostilities.

Although a modest increment to Allied airforces, the Prime Minister might like to mention this enhancement during his talks with President Bush. The Saudi authorities are already aware of it because of the discussion on airfields.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to other members of OPD(G) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Janet Binstead
(S WEBB)
for Private Secretary *AD*

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1990

*Dear Charles,**DM 19/12***IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

We agreed earlier this month to send you progress reports every three weeks in future.

Saddam Hussein's propaganda continues to play on "peace" themes, seeking to present the Americans and ourselves as aggressors, to link the crisis to the Palestinian question and to divide the allies. Much has been made of reluctance by some in the US Congress to support military action. The hostages were used with some success to divert public attention in the West from the central issues.

The recent release of the hostages makes it easier for us to keep attention focussed on our main themes, which are: the strength of international support for the Security Council Resolutions requiring complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, which form the non-negotiable basis for a solution to the crisis; the illegality and brutality of the Iraqi occupation and the progressive destruction of Kuwait; and emphasising that Saddam Hussein faces a powerful and united military force against which he cannot win.

We continue to provide briefing notes, updated weekly, covering these themes and dealing with other important points. These include the Palestinian dimension - and our rejection of linkage. Recent reporting from posts shows that our extensive output of television, radio and press material on the crisis continues to be widely used by the media in Arab and other Islamic countries including Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. In particular, our six television programmes on atrocities and destruction in Kuwait have been broadcast in whole or in part throughout the Gulf region.

The Kuwaitis, who were lamentably slow at first, have recently begun to put their own case much more effectively. The UN Security Council debate on the rape of Kuwait helped to galvanise them into action, with support from us.



They have begun television broadcasting from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, making their own material - including interviews with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries earlier this month - and using what we supply. The two London-based organisations, the Association for Free Kuwait and the Campaign for Free Kuwait, have good professional advice and are mounting lively campaigns in the United Kingdom. The Saudi performance still leaves much to be desired. Access for foreign journalists to the Kingdom remains inadequate and senior Saudis are generally reluctant to put their case before the media. However, a Saudi Information Mission to London earlier this month went well, and Prince Abdulla bin Faisal bin Turki who led it has appeared widely on British television.

In the coming weeks we shall continue to urge the Kuwaitis and Saudis to further efforts. (The multiplier effect here is important, since they create outlets for our material while feeding us with their own.) We shall produce more television material on the atrocities committed in Kuwait. We are interviewing many returned hostages about conditions there. We are also taking every opportunity to show Arab audiences the powerful and multinational character of the military force facing Iraq.

We are sending information packs on the Gulf crisis to selected politicians, leading journalists and church leaders in the United Kingdom under letters from FCO Ministers.



I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Len Appleyard (Cabinet Office).

James,
Shepha Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Attachment to letter from Walsh to Powell dated 19 December 1970</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>25/1/18</i> 
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

FILE
JA
PC



SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 December 1990

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH HM AMBASSADOR BAGHDAD

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this morning with our Ambassador in Baghdad, whom he thanked warmly and handsomely for the tremendous performance which he and the Embassy staff have put up since August.

Much of the conversation was about conditions in Baghdad and the likely reaction of Saddam Hussain as the 15 January deadline came closer. I think you already know Mr. Walker's views on this.

The other main point on which the Prime Minister sought Mr. Walker's views was the future of the Embassy. Mr. Walker said that much would depend on what the Americans decided to do. If they pulled out, we should certainly go as well. Equally if they decided to remain, it would be difficult for our Embassy to go. But the consular workload should be considerably diminished from early January which would enable us to thin out staff: and the Iraqis were anyway likely to retaliate if we decided to expel any members of their Embassy here. The Prime Minister said he assumed Mr. Walker would be reflecting on this over the Christmas period. If he had any further thoughts, he should let us know.

CHARLES POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1990

Des David,

CSJ.

will request of reat

Visit by Mr Howarth to the UAE and Bahrain

Thank you for your letter of 14 December giving the advice of MISC 136 on Mr Howarth's proposed visit.

We await the decision of the Secretary of State for Education on whether Mr Howarth's departmental commitments will prevent him from travelling overseas at that time. In the Foreign Secretary's view this is the main question.

If Mr Howarth has no domestic constraints, we would support his wish to visit Dubai and Bahrain as planned, unless there is firm evidence of a specific security risk to him. The visit will be over before the UN deadline of 15 January. Other sources continue to indicate that the Iraqis will not attack the allies unless we initiate operations against them. We have no intention of doing so before 15 January except in response to Iraqi provocation. We therefore see little prospect of the kind of terrorist incident described in your letter. Furthermore, three Cabinet Ministers have already visited the UAE since the Iraqi invasion and the Foreign Secretary is planning to go there again after Mr Howarth. Lastly, our Ambassador in Abu Dhabi is confident that the UAE authorities will take all the action necessary to protect Mr Howarth at his one public appearance and indeed throughout his visit. The Foreign Secretary is frankly surprised at the line taken by MISC 136.

As Mr Hogg said in his letter of 22 November to Mr Howarth, the Dubai Gulf Education Exhibition is a major exercise of its type. We are sure that the DES would derive significant credit if Mr Howarth were there to support the British participants and organisers; and his involvement would continue the series of high level visits that we have been seeking to maintain during the Gulf crisis. We have made a significant investment in backing the Gulf states against Iraqi aggression and we are doing all that we can to encourage British companies to tough out the present difficulties so that they are poised after the Gulf crisis to benefit from the significant export and investment opportunities which should be ours for the asking. Mr Howarth's attendance would help keep our end up. The DTI share our view.

For these reasons we hope that Mr Howarth will be able to spare the time to go to Dubai and Bahrain at this crucial time in the Gulf crisis.

SECRET



SECRET

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10) and to Mr Howarth's Private Secretary in the Department of Education and Science.

James
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

D J Gowan Esq
Cabinet Office

SECRET



SECRET

I am enclosing this letter to the Honorable Earl Warren (No. 10) and to
Mr. Robert F. Kennedy in the Department of Justice
and Attorney General.

*John
Edgar Hoover*

(2 1/2 x 3 1/2)
Private Secretary

U. S. GOVERNMENT
GENERAL OFFICE



SECRET

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 December 1990

Dear Col.,

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

The Prime Minister has considered the Home Secretary's minute of 18 December and agrees that a draft Bill and Regulations should be prepared to provide necessary emergency powers in the event of a conflict in the Gulf. It should be ready by 14 January.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of Cabinet, to Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Sonia Phippard (Sir Robin Butler's Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Colin Walters, Esq.,
Home Office.

SECRET

FILE
epc
DSG
31

Appalling!

Prime Minister

FCO PRESS LINE

You may like just to
dig into this, especially
page 10 onward. What it

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 19 DECEMBER 1990

The Amnesty International report released today speaks for itself. As the Secretary of State said on 11 December, the Iraqi aim is clear: to eradicate Kuwait as an independent nation. The harrowing accounts in the report will strengthen the world's determination that Iraq must immediately and fully comply with the Security Council Resolutions.

revels is horrifying.
De Beider is said
to have been deeply

Do you have supporting evidence?

- [If asked]: There is no secret about what is happening. Returning British hostages have told similar accounts of the murder, torture and brutality of the Iraqi regime in Kuwait.

Updated by it
C Dr.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL NEWS RELEASE

BRITISH SECTION • 99-119 ROSEBERY AVENUE • LONDON EC1R 4RE
Telephone: 071-278 6000 Direct Line 071-278 2139 • Fax: 071-833 1510

Embargoed for 0001hrs gmt, Wednesday, December 19th 1990

IRAQ: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL URGES END TO TORTURE AND K'LLINGS

Major report details widespread human rights violations

Amnesty International has called on the Iraqi government to follow the release of hundreds of Western nationals by ending the imprisonment, torture and killing of thousands of people in Kuwait.

In its first comprehensive report on human rights violations in Kuwait since the invasion on 2 August, Amnesty International details how Iraqi forces have tortured and killed many hundreds of victims, taken several thousand prisoners and left more than 300 premature babies to die after looting incubators from at least three of Kuwait City's main hospitals.

The report catalogues 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi military, including cutting off people's tongues and ears, shooting them in the limbs, applying electric shocks to their bodies, and raping them.

"The Iraqi forces' brutality in Kuwait has shocked many people in the past four months," Amnesty International said, "but such abuses have been the norm for people in Iraq for more than a decade."

Amnesty International said it welcomed the release of the Western nationals, but feared that the plight of thousands of victims of gross human rights violations in Kuwait and Iraq might now be forgotten. The organization called on governments to appeal to Iraq to stop the gross human rights violations.

Most of the abuses detailed in the report took place in the first three months after the invasion, when dissent among Kuwaitis and other nationals was widespread and its suppression ruthless.

BY THE
OF THE
DATE



- 10. The body of a man said to be an Iraqi soldier executed for looting on 16 August. This body was publicly hung from a crane in Kuwait City.



cepc
②

PM/90/098

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

C 87
187xii

X | activating requests for interviews to Ministers?
Fine - but are we
/ S.I.

Iraq/Kuwait: Sustaining National Unity

1. It was agreed at OPD(G) on 5 December that members of OPD(G), the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster should be briefed on, and take the opportunity to expound, the Government's policy on the Gulf crisis. I enclose a set of briefing notes on the crisis, which have been deliberately kept concise, covering the main aspects of Government policy.

2. If any recipient would like more detailed briefing, we have a great deal of further information we can supply. I shall arrange for up-dated briefing to be circulated if and when major developments occur.

3. I very much hope that those concerned will be able to use these notes in broadcasts and speeches.

4. I am copying this minute to members of OPD(G), the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robin Butler.

D.H.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 December 1990

THE GULF CRISIS : BRIEFING NOTES

1. KEY POINTS

- Iraq's illegal occupation of Kuwait has been the subject of 11 mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions, which have set out the conditions for a settlement of the crisis. The main conditions are:
 - Full and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
 - The Restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government
 - The release of all hostages.
- The last of these conditions now fulfilled, but the other two remain. These are not British or US requirements, but those of the international community, as embodied in Security Council Resolutions.
- SCR 678 authorises the use of "all necessary means" if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. This deadline is not a trigger for military action. Conflict is not automatic from that date. Rather, there is a period of goodwill during which Iraq can safely withdraw from Kuwait. If Iraq complies fully with the Resolutions by 15 January, it need have no fear of attack.
- We still want a peaceful solution. But that lies in Saddam Hussain's hands. He can choose peace today. There can be no compromise which falls short of the requirements of the United Nations.
- We welcome the US initiative for talks with Iraq. This is an opportunity to ensure that Saddam Hussain understands what is required of him, viz full compliance with Security Council Resolutions. EC Presidency will reinforce this message. This is not negotiation, but a restatement of the international commitment to the Security Council Resolutions. Iraqi rejection of US-proposed dates for meetings casts doubt on Iraqi seriousness.

- We welcome the release of all hostages. But they should never have been held against their will.

2. FURTHER BACKGROUND POINTS

- Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was in flagrant breach of its international obligations under the UN Charter and the Arab League Charter, both of which it has signed. The cause of the crisis is Iraq's naked and unprovoked aggression.
- By its actions Iraq has been isolated internationally. The United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organisation have all condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and called for Iraqi withdrawal.
- The multinational forces in the Gulf are there at the express request of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states in pursuance of the aims of the international community as expressed in the Security Council Resolutions. There is no wish to keep the international forces there longer than is necessary to do the job for which they have been deployed. Over 25 nations have sent contingents.
- Following the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions on Kuwait there will have to be consideration of a security structure to guarantee the long term stability of the region. The nature of such a system must be primarily for the countries of the region to agree, but the wider international community, including Britain, stand prepared to play its part.
- In the long term, it will be necessary to resolve the other problems of the region. We have long supported the idea of an international conference on the Arab/Israel problem. The invasion of Kuwait set back the search for peace and a settlement between the Arabs and Israel. But once the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait has been reversed we can and shall again focus our efforts in the search for a peaceful solution to this dispute.

3. SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS

Q: Why not wait longer?

- Waiting is a not a cost-free solution. The real cost is to the lives of people in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation and to the fabric of their society, which is being systematically and continually destroyed. The methods of the Iraqi forces are ruthless and brutal.
- The decision to release hostages does not reflect a change of heart but was a calculation that it was no longer in Iraq's interests to hold them because this reinforced the determination of the international community to oppose Iraq. But he still holds tens of thousands of hostages - every Kuwaiti man, woman and child. The Kuwaiti people cannot afford to wait.

Q: But what about sanctions?

- Many countries have united in a sincere effort to make sanctions have an effect on Iraq. Iraq has been unable to sell its oil, earn foreign exchange or import vital industrial goods. But, after over four months, Saddam Hussain still holds out. The test of the effectiveness of sanctions is if they persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The evidence is that sanctions alone will not be enough.
- The existence of the military option is an essential component of the peaceful pressures on Iraq. To remove that pressure is not to go the extra mile for peace, but to abdicate responsibility in a way which would mean that no small state could feel safe.

30A (a-c)

Jp 01239

✓
Fed/C

Copy No 1 of 2 copies

PRIME MINISTEROPD(G): 19 December
Gulf Crisis: Visit to Washington

The second oral item on the agenda concerns your trip to Washington. You may want to use it to consider your main objectives in the Gulf context when you see the President. Alternatively you may prefer to hold this over until your formal briefing session tomorrow afternoon.

2. Whichever way you play it, I set out below some of the points you may wish to include under the head of "objectives".

a. You will want to convey that our policy on the Gulf remains as clear and firm as under your predecessor and that we remain as reliable allies of the United States in this enterprise, and others. You will also wish to demonstrate that you yourself are in command of the subject.

b. You will want to satisfy yourself that Bush himself, and Baker, remain firm, that any final contacts with the Iraqis will take place under the strictest constraints, that they are alive to the appalling consequences of an apparent climbdown or a fudged solution, and that they are prepared to lead and form US opinion rather than the reverse. This will obviously be a very delicate exploration, given the uncertain state of Congress and our relatively small military contribution; but our standing is high and with luck we should be able to perform our dual role of strengthening the Administration's will and helping to clarify their thinking. The latest assessment from Antony Acland is mildly encouraging.

✓
Can't dial down
Can't hedge.

b

c. You will wish to underline the need for the closest US/UK co-ordination and joint planning. Planning talks between officials have already been held and have gone well. They are to continue in the New Year. We are in broad agreement on our strategic and military objectives, though further discussion on points of detail will be needed.

d. We need to explore how the US Administration plan to handle the period up to 15 January.

- 3
- i. If talks with the Iraqis take place, how will they frustrate Saddam's likely objective of stringing things out beyond the deadline?
 - ii. If there are no talks?

We remain of the view that the less said to the Iraqis beyond the Security Council resolutions the better and that what little is said should be in strict unison. (We want no more surprises.)

e. We need to think through with the Americans the implications of partial or full Iraqi withdrawal and plan our reactions, both pre-emptive and if such events occur. This is in many ways the most dangerous contingency and we want to have as many defences in place against it as we can manage.

f. We need to check our assessment of likely Israeli policy and agree the need to keep Israel out of the conflict as far as possible. Provision of timely US intelligence to Israel will play an important part here.

g. We need to establish our joint policy on attacks on NBC targets. Further military discussion is needed here.

h. We need to stress the importance of tight and coordinated media handling on our own side. Further discussions are planned early in the New Year in Washington. On the Iraqi side we attach importance to silencing their TV and radio transmission capability.

i. We need joint planning on long-term security arrangements for the area, covering both troop presence and the sanctions régime, designed to deal with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

3. Most of the above can be left as broad-brush statements of agreement with the President, leaving the details to be worked out elsewhere. What is more important than the fine print is the establishment of an atmosphere of openness, trust and determination. The stakes are now very high: great prizes in terms of the future international order could be in our hands if we can rise to the occasion and carry this operation through successfully; the downside risks if it is botched are even greater. It would be helpful if you could convey to the President your sense of the critical nature of the decisions to be taken.

PERCY CRADOCK

18 December 1990

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3068

OF 180059Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, TEL AVIV

INFO PRIORITY ROME, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ESC LONDON, MODUK, ACTOR

UKDEL NATO FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

SIC

MY TELNO 2964: IRAQ/KUWAIT: CHAPTER 2

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION STILL PREPARED FOR WAR IF NEED BE. BUT NEXT MOVES UP TO IRAQ. IF THE IRAQIS SHOW NO SIGN OF LEAVING KUWAIT BY 15 JANUARY, ADMINISTRATION AT PRESENT DETERMINED TO USE FORCE. BUT IRAQ MAY TRY TO MAKE THAT DECISION MORE DIFFICULT BY DRAWING THE AMERICANS INTO TALKS OR PARTIALLY WITHDRAWING. US IDEAS ON CONTAINING IRAQ POST-CRISIS FOLLOWING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES. WE SHOULD DISCUSS OUR OWN APPROACH WITH THEM.

DETAIL

2. WITH CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY OVER TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND BAKER'S TO BAGHDAD, YOU MIGHT FIND USEFUL AN ACCOUNT OF CURRENT US THINKING. THE FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUND FOR MY OWN VISIT TO LONDON. WE WILL PROVIDE ANY NECESSARY UPDATING JUST BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 21 DECEMBER.

3. THE PUBLIC MOOD HAS BEEN THROUGH A NUMBER OF SWINGS SINCE 2 AUGUST, AND WILL NO DOUBT GO THROUGH MORE BETWEEN NOW AND 15

JANUARY. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF TALKS WITH BAGHDAD (WHICH WAS GREETED HERE WITH A SIGH OF RELIEF), SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO LET THE HOSTAGES GO, AND THE EVACUATION OF THE US EMBASSY IN KUWAIT, TOGETHER LENT CREDENCE LAST WEEK TO A WIDESPREAD PUBLIC ASSUMPTION THAT A TIDE TOWARDS NEGOTIATION HAD SET IN. THE EDGE HAS NOW GONE OFF THAT, BECAUSE OF THE QUESTION MARKS OVER DATES. THE LATEST POLLS, FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH, SHOW US PUBLIC OPINION AS SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE ON THE USE OF FORCE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY IN CONGRESS CONTINUE TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF LONG-TERM PRESSURE THROUGH SANCTIONS.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. SENIOR US REPRESENTATIVES STRESS THE PRESIDENT'S CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NEED BE, AND THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY UNDERLINED THE POINT IN SPEAKING TO ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON 17 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 3067). IN THAT EVENT, I DOUBT IF CONGRESS WOULD STAND IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S WAY. DETAILED MILITARY PLANNING, AND THE MILITARY BUILDUP, CONTINUE. THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY ADVISERS SEEM MORE CONFIDENT THAN THEY WERE SOME WEEKS AGO OF BEING ABLE TO DELIVER. UNLESS SADDAM IS OUT OF KUWAIT BY 15 JANUARY, OR CLEARLY MOVING OUT BY THEN, I WOULD EXPECT THE PRESIDENT BEFORE TO LONG THEREAFTER TO AUTHORISE THE USE OF FORCE TO GET HIM OUT.

5. SO THE KEY TO WHAT HAPPENS NEXT LIES WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. IF HE WITHDRAWS COMPLETELY, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT ATTACK. IF HE SIMPLY REFUSES TO TALK, OR OBVIOUSLY EXPLOITS THE PROPOSED MEETINGS TO STRING THE AMERICANS ALONG, THE PRESIDENT COULD ARGUE THAT, IN GOING THE EXTRA MILE, HE HAD ALSO SHOWN THERE TO BE NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO FORCE. HE WOULD STILL FACE QUESTIONS HERE OVER THE POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF LONG TERM SANCTIONS. CONGRESS IS UNLIKELY TO BE CONVINCINGLY ON BOARD. SO THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE EXTRA REASON TO HOPE FOR A QUICK VICTORY WHICH WOULD TURN CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AROUND. BUT THE PRESENT DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT IS SUCH THAT I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL ACT IF THERE IS STILL DEADLOCK BY MID-JANUARY.

6. THE IRAQIS CAN, HOWEVER, ALTER THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE HIS DECISION, THEREBY MAKING THE USE OF FORCE MORE DIFFICULT. IF THEY EITHER TAKE UP THE US OFFER OF A MEETING OR MAKE A PRE-EMPTIVE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, WE SHOULD

ALREADY BE IN CHAPTER 2 (YOUR CONVERSATION OF 10 DECEMBER WITH DUMAS, PARIS TELNO 1536) OR AT ANY RATE LEAVING RAPIDLY TOWARDS IT.

7. IF MEETINGS ARE EVENTUALLY ARRANGED, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO PLAY FOR TIME, OR TO NEGOTIATE. THE IRAQIS WILL BE THE BETTER PLACED TO BROADEN THE AGENDA, THE LONGER ANY TALKS MAY CONTINUE. THE AMERICANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THESE DANGERS: THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF BARGAINING. BUT THERE MUST BE A RISK THAT MEETINGS WILL, DESPITE CURRENT US INTENTIONS, MARK THE START OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATION. (AT A MINIMUM, THE TIMING OF ANY IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED, AND PERHAPS THE ISSUES OF HOW BEST EVENTUALLY TO SETTLE MATTERS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, AND, BY IMPLICATION AT LEAST, THE EVENTUAL SHAPE OF A REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE.) UNLESS, THEREFORE, THE IRAQIS PROVE SO OBDURATE AT THE FIRST TWO ENCOUNTERS AS TO MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE, THERE MUST BE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MEETINGS NOW COULD LEAD TO A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION, WITH THE MAIN WEAPON ON THE ALLIED SIDE BEING THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF FULL SANCTIONS, RATHER THAN THE THREAT OF FORCE.

8. EVEN WITHOUT ANY MEETINGS, THE IRAQIS WOULD STILL HAVE THE OPTION OF PREEMPTIVE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. THE US RESPONSE WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL. THE OBVIOUS US ANSWER WOULD BE THE RAPID MOVEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES TOWARDS THE NEW DE FACTO FRONTIER (PERHAPS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A UN FLAG IN DUE COURSE), RESTORATION OF THE AL SABAH AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FULL RANGE OF SANCTIONS UNTIL WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETE. SOME IN THE ADMINISTRATION SAY THAT A PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL NEED NOT PREVENT AN ALLIED ATTACK. BUT CLEARLY IT WOULD BE HARDER TO JUSTIFY TO OPINION HERE.

9. WHATEVER HAPPENS, IMPLEMENTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DEMANDS IS ONLY PART OF THE STORY. RIGHT FROM 2 AUGUST, THE PRESIDENT HAS HAD A FOURTH OBJECTIVE, TO SAFEGUARD THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO CONTAIN IRAQ MILITARILY ONCE THE GULF CRISIS IS OVER. IF IRAQ IS DEFEATED IN WAR, THE TASK WILL BE SIMPLER, THOUGH THE OVERALL MIDDLE EAST SITUATION COULD PROVE VOLATILE, AND THE AMERICAN POSITION COMPLICATED. IF THE GULF CRISIS IS RESOLVED SHORT OF

WAR, ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS IN CONTAINING IRAQ WOULD BE A CONTINUED US PRESENCE IN THE AREA, WITH GROUND TROOPS BEING DRAWN DOWN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE IN FAVOUR OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES: A NETWORK OF ALLIANCES BETWEEN THE GULF STATES, BUT PERHAPS ALSO INCLUDING EGYPT AND MAYBE SYRIA OR TURKEY: AND AN ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM. THE MOST READILY IDENTIFIABLE ELEMENT OF THE LATTER WOULD BE CONTINUED CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE ITEMS TO IRAQ. THE IDEAL ROUTE TO THAT OBJECTIVE WOULD BE THROUGH THE MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING UN SANCTIONS, RATHER THAN THE IMPOSITION OF A NEW SET. THERE IS STILL HOWEVER MUCH DETAILED PLANNING TO BE DONE TO ESTABLISH WHICH ITEMS SHOULD BE CONTROLLED AND HOW. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD WELCOME OUR IDEAS.

10. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NEVER EXPLICITLY SAID THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI NBC CAPABILITY IS ONE OF THEIR OBJECTIVES. BUT THE LIMITATION AND FRUSTRATION OF THAT CAPABILITY ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SUBJECT OF A NUCLEAR FREE MIDDLE EAST WAS BROACHED DURING THE 10-11 DECEMBER TALKS WITH SHEVARDNAZE AND WITH SHAMIR, BUT WITHOUT ANY DEFINITIVE RESULT. IT MAY IN PRACTICE BE EASIER TO PROCEED THROUGH CONTINUED EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CSBMS THAN TO GO STRAIGHT FOR AN OUTRIGHT REGIONAL BAN, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE WAY THAT THIS QUESTION LINKS UP WITH THE WIDER ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

11. FINALLY, ARAB-ISRAEL. THE AMERICANS OF COURSE ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO WANT TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH APPEARS TO REWARD SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR HIS AGGRESSION, OR WHICH MIGHT ENABLE HIM TO CLAIM THE ROLE OF A HERO IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL STRUGGLE. THEY ARE VERY CONSCIOUS TOO OF WHAT THEY SEE AS THE PRESENT POLITICAL REALITIES IN ISRAEL: A PEACE MOVEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN OBLITERATED BY RECENT EVENTS, AND A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY LITTLE DOMESTIC ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE, EVEN IF IT WANTED TO BE FLEXIBLE. AT PRESENT, THEY SEE A GREATER NEED TO REASSURE AND KEEP THE ISRAELIS ON SIDE THAN FOR MORE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. HENCE THEIR PRESENT SCEPTICISM AS TO THE UTILITY OF TALKING NOW ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR EVEN A ROLE FOR THE PERMANENT FIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY BELIEVE THAT, PROVIDED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN BE DEALT WITH, THERE OUGHT IN THE FUTURE TO BE MORE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL, WITH THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF CSBMS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD EXPLOITING IT.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

40

ADVANCE 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/SECPOL D	RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SECRET



30/A-8
①

Content

Prime Minister

Agree to give authority
for dropping this Bill
on a country-by-country basis?

Prime Minister

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

CAF
10/7/81

Officials in a number of Departments, under Cabinet Office chairmanship, have been considering draft legislation which might be needed for the Gulf Crisis.

There is a precedent in the 1982 Falklands crisis. At that time a draft Bill and Regulations were prepared but never used. Much of the content of both of those drafts would be useful this time, although there are obvious differences in the situation.

The 1982 draft regulations dealt with the broad categories of:

- requisitioning and compensation;
- navigation instructions;
- drivers hours;
- trade with hostile states;
- nationals of hostile states;
- offences, penalties and police powers.

Some of these powers might not be needed in the present circumstances but other new ones may, eg;

- provision to ease the position of United Kingdom firms under contractual obligation in, or in relation to, Iraq (especially in respect of performance bonds for which there is probably a United Kingdom liability of some tens of millions of pounds);
- additional powers to enable the Government to make special defensive provisions at places which may be at risk of terrorist attack;

SECRET

SECRET

B

2.

- alteration to, or suspension of, some of the regulations under which coroners operate (in the case of large numbers of casualties returning here), and cremation requirements.

Departments have been asked to give urgent consideration to identifying any precise requirements.

The Home Office co-ordinated the 1982 exercise and we have in any case a standing obligation to keep general emergency legislation for use in war at a state of readiness.

A meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on the Gulf, under Sir Robin Butler's chairmanship, concluded on Friday that it would be prudent to have a Bill and Regulations fully prepared by 14 January. I agree with officials that we cannot afford to leave this kind of preparation to the last minute even if, in the event, it is not needed.

Since there is a wide measure of agreement amongst Departments I hope you will agree that authority is given for the drafting of a Bill on a contingency basis.

Copies of this go to Cabinet colleagues, the Law Officers, the Chief Whip and Sir Robin Butler.

K.S.

18 December 1990

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 December 1990

SECRET

Dear Charles,

Meeting Between Prime Minister and
HM Ambassador, Baghdad

Mr Harold (Hooky) Walker, our Ambassador in Baghdad, is calling on the Prime Minister at 1130 tomorrow, 19 December. I attach a biographical note.

Mr Walker returned to London for consultations last Thursday. He has seen the Foreign Secretary and held a joint press conference today with Mr Hogg. The Prime Minister may wish to cover the following areas in discussion:

(a) Political. The Prime Minister will wish to ask about the mood of the Iraqi population, its attitude to the invasion of Kuwait and to the imposition of sanctions, and to seek Mr Walker's views on the stability of the regime, and in particular Saddam Hussain's chances of survival if Iraqi withdraws fully from Kuwait, whether as a voluntary act or after hostilities.

Mr Walker is of the view that Saddam Hussain will not wait until 15 January before making a move of his own. Destabilising Jordan is a possible Iraqi option.

The Prime Minister will also wish to look at Iraqi options in the event of hostilities, in particular the extent to which Iraq may try to drag in Israel, whether directly or indirectly, in order to give the conflict a pan-Arab dimension.

/(b)

SECRET



SECRET

(b) Hostages. The decision to release all foreign nationals has lifted a burden of work and anxiety from the Embassy in Baghdad, and from Mr Walker personally. Over the past three months the Embassy has devoted most of its energies to consular activity. With the departure of all but a small group of British citizens (we estimate that there will be around 10 by the New Year), the question arises as to whether it is necessary or prudent to keep staff in Baghdad at all. We shall be discussing shortly with the Americans their intentions over the future of their own Embassy. The Foreign Secretary is likely to raise this with the Prime Minister tomorrow afternoon.

(c) Iraqis in the UK. The position of the Embassy in Baghdad is complicated by the likely expulsion of 8 Iraqi intelligence officers from the Embassy in London and of 64 Iraqi students (probably on 3/4 January). This will have been discussed earlier in the day in OPD(G). The Iraqis are likely to retaliate against our Embassy in Baghdad.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET




MR HAROLD (BERNERS) WALKER CMG

(HM Ambassador at Baghdad)

Mr 'Hooky' Walker was born at Holbrook, Suffolk on 19 October 1932 and was educated at Winchester and Worcester College, Oxford, where he took a degree in Modern History. He is the son of the late Admiral Sir Harold Walker KCB RN. Between school and university he did National Service in 1951 and 1952 and was commissioned in the Royal Engineers.

Following a year as a Temporary Assistant Principal in Information Policy Department of the Foreign Office, he was successful in the 1956 Open Competition for the Administrative Branch of the Foreign Service. He continued in his original appointment, as an established Third Secretary. In 1957 he was assigned overseas as a full-time Arabic language student at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies at Shemlan in Lebanon and, on the successful completion of his course, a year later, was appointed Assistant political Agent at Dubai. He remained there for two years and then returned to the Foreign Office for a tour of duty. First he served in Arabian Department for two years and in 1962 became Private Secretary to the Parliamentary under-Secretary, Mr Peter Thomas. In 1964, having spent a year as Principal Instructor at MECAS, he was posted to Cairo as Second, later First, Secretary and two years later was transferred to Damascus as First Secretary, Head of Chancery and HM Consul. In 1967, following the break in relations between Syria and the UK, he returned to London once again, working first in North and East African Department and then, for 1968 to 1970, as Head of The Diplomatic Service Administration Office. In 1970 he became

D



First Secretary (Commercial) in Washington and three years later, on promotion to the rank of Counsellor, he was appointed Head of Chancery at Jeddah. In 1975 he was transferred to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to fill the post of Deputy Head of Personnel Operations Department becoming, a year later, Head of the Department. Late in 1978 he did a sabbatical term at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and from 1979 to 1981 he served as HM Ambassador and HM Consul-General at Bahrain. In 1981 he was appointed HM Ambassador at Abu Dhabi, and in 1986 became HM Ambassador at Addis Ababa in April 1986. He took up his present appointment as Ambassador in Baghdad at the beginning of 1990. Mr Walker was made a CMG in the 1979 Birthday Honours.

In 1960 he married (Agnes) Jane Bittleston, his second cousin, who was born at Greenwich in 1934, the daughter of the late Captain C J L Bittleston DSC RN. They have two daughters, born in 1961 and 1965, and a son, born in 1963. Before her marriage Mrs Walker was for a time an Assistant Purser with the Orient Line and later worked at the British Council.

December 1990

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING OF OPD(G): THE GULF

My efforts to cancel tomorrow's meeting of OPD(G) have failed. Sir Robin Butler insists that it is necessary, to ensure that you are briefed up to the eye-balls on the Gulf before you go to Washington. There is an inordinate amount of paper in the folder, much of it repetitive and not all of it very relevant in the short-term at least. I think you can actually despatch the real business quite quickly. The main items are as follows.

Expulsion of Suspect Iraqis from the United Kingdom

There are 8 Iraqi intelligence agents in the Iraqi Embassy: and 63 Baath party activists loose in the United Kingdom. They could be extremely dangerous in the event of a war, particularly by involvement in terrorist activity (or even by using hand-portable CW or BW - although this is unlikely). We have to get rid of them, but should do so in a way which poses least risk to our own Embassy in Baghdad. The proposal is to move against them, by expelling them on 3/4 January. By then our Embassy's functions in relation to the British community in Iraq will have been much reduced. It would be better to avoid arrests, in case of retaliation against our people.

It seems the obvious commonsense thing to do, and I doubt much discussion is needed.

Current International Situation

The Foreign Secretary will report orally on a number of developments, most of which you are familiar with and none of which require action at present.

Your visit to the United States

Again the Foreign Secretary will give you his views (and has two further opportunities to do so during the day: at the briefing meeting of the visit and during his bilateral with you). There is also the note by officials on their visit to Washington last week which you have already seen.

There are really three points of action:

- to establish whether there is agreement on the revised text of the strategic objectives attached to the Cabinet Office note;
- to ask CDS to tell you the four or five crucial points you need to put to the President;
- to run over the main aspects of the Gulf crisis which you will need to cover in your talks with the President. There is an excellent note by Percy Cradock.

You might also use the opportunity to find out where on earth MoD have got to on BW immunisation: are the white mice still keeling over?

X

Israeli Policy

There is also a JIC paper on how the Israelis are likely to behave (although we have not actually received it yet): and a note by the FCO on the Arab/Israel problem which is frankly for the birds just at the moment. I would not devote a great deal of time to the latter aspect at least.

I hope this brief note is some guide to finding your way through the quagmire of paper inside.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

18 December 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\opd(g) (srw)

Ref. A090/3102

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 19 December

Item 1: Expulsion of suspect Iraqis from the United Kingdom

The Home Secretary will be present for this item only. The paper OPD(G)(90)11 has been agreed by the Foreign and Home Secretaries.

8 X
2. You might begin by inviting the Foreign Secretary to introduce the paper. Originally the intention had been to proceed with the expulsion of the eight Iraqi Embassy personnel with intelligence connections on 20 December on the assumption that all the British hostages who wanted to leave would have done so. Mr Walker, our Ambassador in Baghdad has recommended that the expulsions be carried out later in case the Iraqis take action against any remaining hostages and expel Embassy staff whose job it would be to assist them to leave.

The FCO and Mr Walker accept that the Iraqis would retaliate by expelling Embassy staff in Baghdad but by then the consular workload should have been cut drastically. We know from the UK/US talks that the Americans are reviewing the future of their Embassy in Baghdad after 15 January: you might ask the Foreign Secretary for the FCO's view.

63
THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

4. You might conclude the discussion by inviting Ministers to accept the recommendations of the Foreign and Home Secretaries.

Item 2: Current international situation

Ir
62
no early Jan
Ka.

5. You might begin by asking the Foreign Secretary where we stand on the return of British hostages. At the time of drafting there were some 68 British citizens in Iraq and 34 in Kuwait. Those in Kuwait appear to be the hard core of stayers-on. In Iraq most of the 68 are expected to be out by Christmas but the Iraqis are making difficulty about a small number of exist visas. You are seeing Mr Walker, our Ambassador in Baghdad and Mr Weston and Mr Banks from Kuwait who are being extensively covered in the media. The consular advice agreed at OPD(G) last week has been issued.

6. On the international front, subject to overnight developments, there has still been no progress on US/Iraqi meetings, or on a meeting of the Permanent Five Foreign Ministers, where the Iraqis continue to string out the process. The Foreign Secretary had breakfast with Mr Baker today and may have the latest picture on US thinking. The EC Foreign Affairs Council will be discussing today contacts between the EC Presidency and Tariq Aziz: Mr Garel-Jones has a firm brief to argue for no contacts prior to or independent of Mr Baker. At the United Nations, complex and protracted negotiations continue over US and non-aligned texts for a Resolution on the occupied territories: the issue could come to a head this week. The argument turns in part on whether the US Government can accept a reference to a Middle East

Conference. The North Atlantic Council meeting, which the Foreign Secretary attended, produced a reasonably robust Gulf statement. President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria continues his efforts over Arab mediation with no visible evidence of headway.

Item 3: Your visit to the United States

7. You will be having a more general briefing on your visit later in the day. The present discussion is intended to allow you to run over the main Gulf Items. The report by officials on the UK/US talks on 14 December has been circulated as background (OPD(G)90 12).

8. You might begin by inviting the Foreign Secretary to outline the main points. The Foreign Secretary may want to begin by seeking Ministers' approval for the revised text of strategic and military objectives attached to the note on the UK/US talks subject to the outcome of an agreed assessment on collateral damage (paragraph 9c of the objectives). This would enable the UK team to go into the next round with a strong hand. The Foreign Secretary may propose dropping paragraphs 4 and 5 of the revised objectives as the US want. The Attorney General may have views on whether, in the preamble to paragraph 9 of the objectives, the word "must" has to be used or whether, as the US proposed, this could become "should".

9. Turning to your talks with President Bush, the Chief of the Defence Staff has been giving thought to the answer to your question on Monday about the four or five crucial points you need to put to the President. You may wish to confirm the determination of both governments to insist on full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and their readiness to adopt the military option if Saddam Hussain does not comply. A key point will be to stress the need for adequate and timely consultation before the military option is exercised. You

might add that we are very pleased with the extent of US co-operation on military planning in-theatre between military commanders and with the wide measure of agreement on strategic and military objectives revealed in the UK/US talks last week. In this context you might ask the President for his assessment of US Congressional and public opinion as the 15 January deadline approaches.

10. You may want to seek the President's views on Iraqi tactics over US/Iraqi contacts and to express your support for the robust line which he and Mr Baker have taken. This might lead into a more general discussion of the chances of Iraqi partial withdrawal and how both governments should continue to work together to deter Saddam from taking the partial withdrawal option (by making clear now that it would not be enough: as President Bush, Mr Baker, the European Council and the North Atlantic Council have been doing) and how we would react if he did nevertheless announce his intention to keep the oilfields and the islands (by marshalling support in advance for insistence on full compliance).

11. An even more difficult option would be partial withdrawal disguised as full withdrawal: the Americans are beginning to grapple with the implications for military and diplomatic policy. Looking further ahead, you may want to discuss the implications of full withdrawal and the need to establish a strict regime of NPT provisions, an arms embargo and rigorous limits on technology transfer plus continued sanctions, including an oil embargo, if these are politically obtainable. In the OPD(G) discussion you may wish to draw in the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Percy Cradock on this complex of issues which were covered also in the UK/US talks (the Americans share our concerns and approach: it is important that we have a further round in the New Year).

12. An important component of the overall picture is the Israeli factor. This will at the top of President Bush's mind following Mr Shamir's visit: it could perhaps be dealt with under the next agenda item. On more detailed issues, depending on latest developments, you might wish to ask how President Bush sees the complex question of dealing with Iraq's NBC capability and the risks of collateral damage. You might also mention the importance of continued UK/US co-operation on media handling. You may need to raise the disposition of British forces (resubordination) and BW immunisation if these military issues have not been sorted out by then: the Chief of the Defence Staff can bring you up to date.

13. You might conclude the discussion by saying that the points which have been raised should be covered in the briefing for your visit to Camp David.

Item 4: Israeli policy

14. This item consists of a JIC paper JIC(90)CIG 195, commissioned at last week's OPD(G), on Israel's options if Saddam withdraws from Kuwait with his military machine intact and a longer term set of two papers by the FCO on an Arab/Israel settlement.

X 15. You might invite Sir Percy Cradock to introduce briefly the JIC paper. You might ask whether Iraq's more formidable capability has fundamentally changed the balance of advantage for Israel against a preemptive strike. In the UK/US talks (paragraph 14 of the note) the Americans interpreted Israeli statements that they would not launch a pre-emptive strike "in this crisis" as meaning that they would not do so while there were major US forces in the Gulf: this seems to be broadly in line with the JIC assessment. But if a credible regional security structure had not been set up after Iraqi withdrawal all bets would be off.

f

16. You might ask Sir Percy and the Foreign Secretary for their assessment of the (different) scenario, which seems plausible, of an Iraqi missile attack on Israel, before or after an allied offensive, followed by Israeli retaliation. Since the Israelis would have to fly through Jordanian or Syrian airspace, could this bring about a more general Israeli/Jordanian or Israeli/Syrian conflagration and threaten the survival of the Jordanian monarchy? You might ask what we can do to avert such a situation and what should be the US and UK positions if the situation did arise. The Chief of the Defence Staff can comment on US plans to pre-empt an Iraqi missile attack.

17. You might then invite the Foreign Secretary to say a brief word on the two papers on Arab/Israel which are essentially for longer term consideration. If there is time at Camp David, it would be useful to sound out President Bush and Mr Baker on the prospects for progress towards an Arab/Israel settlement. The US attitude will be crucial: the friendly Arabs in the Gulf coalition will be looking for action after an Iraqi withdrawal. The second paper reviews a 6-stage new approach to a settlement (paragraph 6 onwards) based on: resumption of efforts to foster dialogue between Israel and representative Palestinians; political steps to resolve Israel's differences with her neighbours; and confidence-building measures. External pressure to kick-start the process is based on US-Soviet co-operation. There is no need to look at the paper in detail, and the Foreign Secretary will not want you to include these ideas in your Camp David talks.

18. You may wish to conclude the discussion by highlighting those points raised in discussion for inclusion in your Camp David talks and inviting the Foreign Secretary to return to the Arab/Israel issue when it seems likely to require decisions or further consideration.

g

Next meetings

19. We have an OPD(G) pencilled in for 3 January to be called if needed and a substantive booking before Cabinet on 10 January: the last date before the 15 January deadline.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

18 December 1990




THE LAST DATE BEFORE THE 15 JANUARY DEADLINE
NEEDS NOT A TENTATIVE DEADLINE BELOW (PLEASE SEE 15 JANUARY)
FOR A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE 15 JANUARY DEADLINE

100

100

100



Jp 01240

PRIME MINISTER

OPD(G): Wednesday 19 December

At your meeting tomorrow, in addition to oral reports by the Foreign Secretary, you will have three papers:

- a. a joint Foreign Office/Home Office paper on the expulsion of suspect Iraqis from the UK;
- b. a JIC assessment on likely Israeli action if faced with a Gulf settlement which leaves Saddam's military machine intact.
- c. a Foreign Office paper on the implications of the Gulf crisis for our policy on the Arab/Israel issue.

2. On the expulsion of Iraqis, my main concern is security. We have a good deal of intelligence pointing to plans by Iraq and associated terrorist groups to carry out terrorist attacks in the event of hostilities. We are taking what preventive action we can, eg improving precautions by airlines and alerting our posts abroad. It is essential to take similar action at home. The eight intelligence officers in the Iraqi Embassy and the sixty-three Baathist activists in the Iraqi community here are the obvious vehicles for terrorist activity, though we shall still have to reckon with independent terrorist groups.

3. There is the further possibility, more remote but not to be excluded, that Iraq may seek to carry out BW or CW attacks in the UK when hostilities begin. You have already seen JIC papers on the subject. We have no hard evidence that Saddam intends such action; but he has spoken of carrying the war to Western capitals; he has the materials

in question and they could be readily transported in small quantities by the diplomatic bag to Iraqi Embassies and used, with few practical problems but devastating effects. The recent warnings to Embassies in Washington by the "Brotherhood of Allah" (the FBI think this a hoax, though it could conceivably be Iraqi psychological pressure) are a reminder of the danger. We doubt very much whether Saddam would entrust such materials to independent terrorist groups; he would almost certainly rely on Iraqi officials; which gives added point to the need to remove the intelligence officers.

4. For these reasons I should be very much happier if we had cleared out the intelligence agents and the community activists well before 15 January. We have had this in mind for some time, but have held our hand until the situation regarding hostages was clearer. There is still a counter-argument that the Iraqis would almost certainly retaliate against our Embassy in Baghdad. But, given the threat, I think this a secondary consideration.

5. The second paper, on Israeli options, is inevitably speculative. There is no doubt that the Israelis would be dissatisfied and apprehensive if Saddam escaped this crisis with his military machine intact. They would reasonably fear an assault by him at some point in the future and would be bound to consider the practicality and desirability of a pre-emptive attack. But we doubt whether, by themselves, and without using nuclear weapons, they could now destroy Iraqi NBC capability in one go: a deterrent balance has built up over the last few years and they would have to contemplate the possibility of very damaging Iraqi retaliation. The logic of this should lead them to carry out a pre-emptive attack at a time when it had the most chance of drawing in the Americans, ie while large US forces were still present in the Gulf. But, if this were done after what looked like a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the effects on US/Israeli relations would be

2 b/c

serious. The Israelis could still calculate that, in the end, the US would be compelled to defend Israel. They could also judge that US/Israeli relations would eventually recover. But they would be incurring great dangers to their most important relationship.

6. Our latest information from Washington is that the Administration seem reasonably confident of continuing Israeli caution. The Administration's view is that Israel would wish first to see the outcome of this crisis and the kinds of constraints to be applied to Iraq's NBC facilities before deciding their policy. Another factor in Israeli thinking is that they might wish to see how effective an anti-missile screen they can build up with US help.

Nuc, Bio/Chem.

7. On balance, therefore, we judge that the Israelis, lacking Iraqi provocation, might hesitate before launching a pre-emptive strike and might prefer the course of containment and deterrence. In the meantime our policy course, like that of the US, should be to continue to urge them to lie low.

8. The third paper, on Arab/Israel, is interesting but at this stage largely academic. Our present course is clear enough, a declaratory policy sufficiently convincing to the Arabs to preserve the cohesion of the alliance, while not assisting Saddam by creating linkage. After the crisis the basic obstacles will still remain in place, a supreme effort will be needed, but how we play it will depend on how the cards fall after the crisis is over. Further than that we cannot go at present.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

18 December 1990



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3


MO 6/17/15/1J

Prime Minister

18th December 1990

POD 15/12/90

Dear Charles,



You asked for advice, following a question from the Leader of the Opposition, on whether the Prime Minister should seek an additional Australian medical contribution when he speaks tonight to Mr Hawke.

The Australians have already contributed a destroyer, a frigate and a support ship to the multinational effort, as well as contributing 4 medical teams, comprising some 40 personnel, to one of the US hospital ships, the COMFORT. This contribution is welcome, though it is not among the largest of the international responses. The Prime Minister could express appreciation for the contributions already made by Australia, but he could certainly also mention to Mr Hawke our own shortage of medical personnel and say that any assistance that the Australians might be able to provide, by deploying additional medical personnel to our own hospitals in the Gulf, would be much appreciated.

Yours sincerely

J R Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTead)
Private Secretary

c/w Mtg. - Refer.

*Uruguay: Agric.
S.A. - Stay in Touch*

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828 1386

L.V. Appleyard Esq
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London
SW1

CD. 18/Dec

18 December 1990

Dear Len

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

Prop

The Attorney General has seen your letter of ~~17~~ 18 December to Simon Webb. He has asked me to record that, as he has previously advised, the question whether "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen" (the conditions set out in Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act) is one of fact and not of law. His own view remains that the imminence of warfare in the Gulf and the concomitant hazards facing the very large number of British personnel employed there are highly relevant factors in determining whether "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen". Whether in fact either or both of those circumstances are now established is a question for the Secretary of State and not for him to decide. For his part the Attorney has made it clear that he would consider such a decision readily defensible if challenged, and likely to be upheld. At the meeting of OPD(G) yesterday morning the Attorney understood Ministers present to have concluded that the circumstances were in fact established.

I am copying this letter to **Charles Powell (No. 10)**, Stephen Wall (FCO), Simon Webb (Defence), John Neilson (Energy). the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Percy Cradock and Sonia Phippard.

*Yours
E S Wilmshurst*

E S WILMSHURST

THE LEGAL RECORD
SIR JOHN HENRI'S CHAMBERS
1 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1W 9SP



1955

Out. 1/1/55

J. V. [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]

18 December 1955

MILITARY SERVICE FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

The Attorney General has been your letter of 17 December to Simon Webb. He has asked me to report that, as he has previously advised, the question whether "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen" (the distinction set out in section 10 of the National Service Act) is one of fact and not of law. His own view remains that the imminence of war in the East and the concomitant hazards facing the very large number of British personnel employed there are highly relevant factors in determining whether "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen". Whether in fact either or both of these circumstances are now established is a question for the Secretary of State and not for him to decide. For his part the Attorney has made it clear that he would consider such a decision readily challengeable if challenged, and likely to be upheld. At the meeting of 20/12/55 yesterday evening the Attorney understood Ministers present to have concluded that the circumstances were in fact established.

I am copying this letter to [unclear] (15), Stephen Wall (150), Simon Webb (150), John Nathan (150), the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Percy Caskin and other relevant.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

2 2 WITHIN 10

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH HMA BAGHDAD

Hooky Walker, our Ambassador in Baghdad, is coming in tomorrow morning. There are four points:

- thank him for the tremendous performance which he and his staff have put up since August coping with the hostages, having to deal with the Iraqis and constantly appearing on television and radio;
- try to get some feel from him of the mood of the Iraqi population and how they are likely to react to the risk of war;
- sound out his views on what Saddam Hussain is likely to do. He will tell you that he thinks Saddam Hussain is likely to make a move before 15 January;
- ask him frankly whether he thinks it will be wiser to close down the Embassy in early January rather than leave them at risk with only limited functions.

*Remember
U.S. actions*

C. D. P.

C. D. POWELL

18 December 1990

c:\foreign\hma (slh)



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

AUSTRALIA HOUSE
STRAND
LONDON WC2B 4LA
071-438 8220

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

18 December 1990

Mr Charles Powell
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

CM

Dear Charles,

I am attaching for your information a copy of a statement made by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon Bob Hawke, to the Australian Parliament on 4 December in relation to the Gulf crisis.

I particularly draw your attention to pages 7 and 8.

Yours sincerely,

Douglas McClelland

(Douglas McClelland)

Enc

PAGE 1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

INFO : CPO

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

7.23 04/12/90
O.CH607030

LHLH546

O.CH607030 4.12.90 1616 UNC FIRST

TO:
II BAGHDAD/1018 WASHINGTON/4690 DAMASCUS/5506
II RIYADH/235 CAIRO/8351 TEL AVIV/4865
II UN NEW YORK/3971 AMMAN/4405
PP ALL POSTS/148

840/3/3

FM. CANBERRA / T3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

MEDIA ARTICLE

MEDIA COVERAGE EXTRACTS:

'STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE GULF CRISIS'
TUESDAY 4 DECEMBER 1990

MR SPEAKER,

I WISH TO INFORM THE HOUSE AND THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA, OF THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF CRISIS, AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO THOSE DEVELOPMENTS.

MEMBERS WILL KNOW THAT ON 29 NOVEMBER THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PASSED AN EXTREMELY GRAVE RESOLUTION. THAT RESOLUTION IS MOMENTOUS, AND IN SOME RESPECTS IT IS QUITE UNPRECEDENTED.

RESOLUTION 678 AUTHORIZES MEMBER-STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FROM 15 JANUARY 1991, TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS. ESSENTIALLY, THOSE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS CALL ON IRAQ TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT, AND TO RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES.

THE RESOLUTION ALSO REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE RESOLUTION.

THE WORDS 'ALL NECESSARY MEANS' CARRY A CLEAR MEANING IN THIS RESOLUTION: THEY ENCOMPASS THE USE OF ARMED FORCE TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS.

THE UN HAS OFTEN AUTHORISED THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES TO

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

PAGE 2

INFO : CPD

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

I N W A R D

I N W A R D

7.23 04/12/90
0.CH607030

PREVENT CONFLICT; BUT ONLY ONCE BEFORE HAS IT AUTHORISED THE USE OF ARMED FORCE TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS. THAT WAS IN KOREA, FORTY YEARS AGO.

KOREA IS IN THAT RESPECT A PRECEDENT FOR THE ACTION WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NOW TAKEN. BUT IN OTHER RESPECTS, AND IN VERY IMPORTANT RESPECTS, THIS RESOLUTION IS QUITE UNPRECEDENTED.

NEVER BEFORE HAS SUCH A GRAVE AND MOMENTOUS RESOLUTION BEEN SO BROADLY SUPPORTED. HONOURABLE MEMBERS WILL KNOW THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS CARRIED BY A VOTE OF TWELVE TO TWO, WITH ONE ABSTENTION. THEY MAY NOT REALISE THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS ACTUALLY SPONSORED BY SIX MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING NOT JUST THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, BUT ALSO THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE, CANADA AND ROMANIA.

THE FACT THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS WERE PREPARED, WITH FOUR OTHER NATIONS, TO SPONSOR THIS RESOLUTION SHOWS IN THE MOST CONCRETE TERMS THAT THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD ARE OVERWHELMINGLY UNITED IN THEIR CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION; AND IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO DO WHATEVER IT TAKES - TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS - TO MAKE SURE IRAQ'S AGGRESSION IS NOT ALLOWED TO STAND.

IN A CENTURY MARKED BY TERRIBLE WARS, UNEASY PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL DISTRUST, THIS SORT OF RESPONSE TO ARMED AGGRESSION HAS PROVED AN ELUSIVE DREAM. NOW IT IS A REALITY.

RESOLUTION 678 OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT OF A JUST AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. IN PASSING RESOLUTION 678 THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT SEEKING WAR. ON THE CONTRARY, THE RESOLUTION, WHILE EXPLICITLY CONTEMPLATING THE USE OF FORCE IF NECESSARY, IS FOUNDED ON THE HOPE THAT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THAT PREPAREDNESS WILL IN FACT AVOID WAR.

AS PRESIDENT BUSH WROTE TO ME IN A LETTER OVER THE WEEKEND ON HIS DECISION TO SEEK HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE IRAQIS,

"I KNOW OF YOUR HOPE - WHICH I SHARE - THAT MILITARY FORCE BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT".

RESOLUTION 678 IS SEEKING TO SHOW IRAQ'S LEADERS, JUST AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE, THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS GIVEN IRAQ'S LEADERS, IN THE WORDS OF THE RESOLUTION, 'ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY, AS A PAUSE OF GOODWILL, TO DO SO.

THIS RESOLUTION IS A STARK SIGNAL, BUT IRAQ'S LEADERS HAVE SHOWN THAT NO SOFTER SIGNAL WILL MOVE THEM. THEY HAVE IGNORED STATEMENTS FROM

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

U N C L A S S I F I E D

I N W A R D

I N W A R D

I N W A R D

7.23 04/12/90
0.CHE07030

AROUND THE WORLD CONDEMNING THEIR ACTIONS, AND THEY HAVE IGNORED THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THAT CONDEMNATION IN THE MANDATORY AND COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UN.

THOSE SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN VERY WIDELY COMPLIED WITH, AND EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED. MANY COUNTRIES, LIKE AUSTRALIA, HAVE PAID HEAVILY IN LOST EARNINGS, AND MANY, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA, HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ENFORCING THE SANCTIONS. NOTHING COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THESE SANCTIONS IN PERSADING IRAQ TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT, EXCEPT THE THREAT OF ARMED FORCE.

THIS GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARMED FORCE MAY NEED TO BE USED AS A LAST RESORT TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS.

THE QUESTION IS, WHETHER NOW IS THE RIGHT TIME TO CONTEMPLATE THIS FURTHER AND GRAVER STEP. SHOULD THE SANCTIONS NOT BE GIVEN LONGER TO WORK? TO ANSWER THAT WE HAVE TO CLARIFY HOW THE SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO WORK. HAS THEIR AIM BEEN TO STARVE IRAQI PEOPLE INTO SUBMISSION, OR HAS IT BEEN TO SHOW IRAQIS LEADERS THAT THE WORLD WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEIR INCORPORATION OF KUWAIT?

THE ANSWER IS PLAIN. THE AIM OF THE SANCTIONS HAS BEEN TO PROVE TO IRAQ, BOTH THROUGH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ACTION ITSELF, AND THROUGH THE GREAT SACRIFICES WHICH THE SANCTIONS HAVE IMPOSED ALREADY BOTH ON IRAQ AND ON ITS FORMER TRADING PARTNERS, THAT THE WORLD WOULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

STARVING IRAQ'S PEOPLE INTO SUBMISSION WAS NOT THE UN'S AIM IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS. THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE DECISION TO ALLOW EXCEPTIONS IN CASES OF HUMANITARIAN NEED. NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT FURTHER ECONOMIC HARDSHIP FOR IRAQ'S PEOPLE IS LIKELY TO CHANGE THE MINDS OF IRAQ'S LEADERS. SANCTIONS CAN BE VERY POWERFUL INSTRUMENTS OF PERSUASION - AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN SOUTH AFRICA - BUT THEY CANNOT FORCE THE HAND OF A DICTATORIAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IS WILLING TO IGNORE THE INTERESTS OF ITS PEOPLE.

I AM MYSELF SURPRISED AND DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAT IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP SHOULD HAVE PROVEN ITSELF SO RESISTANT TO THE MESSAGE OF SANCTIONS; SURPRISED BECAUSE NO RATIONAL READING OF IRAQ'S SELF-INTEREST BY ITS LEADERS SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THEM TO IGNORE THE MESSAGE THE SANCTIONS SENT.

THE SANCTIONS HAVE SUCCEEDED FOR OVER THREE MONTHS IN VIRTUALLY STOPPING ALL IRAQ'S TRADE WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. AND YET THEY HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING IRAQ'S LEADERS TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, NOR TO SHOW THE LEAST SIGN OF RECONSIDERING THEIR DISASTROUS POSITION.

PAGE 4
INFO : CPD

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

7.23 04/12/90
O.CHE07030

MEANWHILE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS IS CAUSING DAMAGE TO FRAGIL DEVELOPING-COUNTRY ECONOMIES AROUND THE WORLD, AND THE DIFFICULTY AND UNCERTAINTY OF RELYING ON SANCTIONS ALONE TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IS BECOMING ALL TOO APPARENT.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THEREFORE TIMELY TO SEND AN EVEN CLEARER SIGNAL - THE CLEAREST AND STRONGEST SIGNAL THAT CAN BE SENT - THAT IRAQ MUST LEAVE KUWAIT. WE BELIEVE THE RESOLUTION MUST IMPROVE WHATEVER PROSPECT THERE ARE THAT IRAQ WILL WITHDRAW. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RESOLUTION OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT THAT WAR CAN BE AVOIDED.

SINCE RESOLUTION 678 WAS PASSED, IRAQ'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PRESIDENT BUSH'S OFFER OF TALKS, TO BE HELD STRICTLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON THE GULF CRISIS, SHOWS THAT ALREADY IRAQ MAY BE RE-ASSESSING ITS POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THAT RESOLUTION.

BUT WE RECOGNISE THAT THE POWER OF RESOLUTION 678 DEPENDS ON THE ACCEPTANCE BY UN MEMBERS THAT IN THE LAST RESORT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO COMPEL IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THE UN'S RESOLUTION BY FORCE OF ARMS. OTHERWISE IT IS EMPTY; SOMETHING THAT IRAQ CAN SHRUG OFF; SOMETHING THAT WOULD FAIL TO COMPEL IRAQ'S LEADERS TO ADDRESS THE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW; A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO DRIVE HOME THE BENEFITS FOR THEM AND FOR THEIR COUNTRY OF MAKING A CHOICE FOR PEACE.

THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION MAKES IT IMPORTANT TO RESTATE THE REASONS WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ'S ACTIONS MUST BE REVERSED, EVEN TO THE POINT OF USING ARMED FORCE, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THAT IMPORTANT AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE.

IRAQ'S SEIZURE OF KUWAIT WAS AN ACT OF PURE Agression, MOTIVATED SOLELY BY THE DESIRE OF IRAQ'S LEADERS TO INCREASE THEIR TERRITORY, THEIR WEALTH AND THEIR POWER. I WOULD ASK ANYONE WHO IS INCLINED TO CREDIT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CLAIMS OF A WIDER MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB PEOPLE, TO EXPLAIN THE INCORPORATION OF KUWAIT AS THE NINETEENTH PROVINCE OF IRAQ. I WOULD ASK THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PLUNDERING OF KUWAITI PROPERTY AND THE PERSECUTION OF ITS RESIDENTS.

AND I WOULD ASK THEM TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST WEEK BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE FLED FROM KUWAIT. EVEN ALLOWING FOR THE EXAGGERATION COMMON IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS TESTIMONY WAS INDEED SHOCKING.

AS WELL, AUSTRALIA HAS BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE IF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION WAS ALLOWED TO STAND.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

PAGE 5

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

INFO : CPO

7.23 04/12/90
O.CHE07030

WHO COULD DOUBT THAT HAVING SWALLOWED KUWAIT, A STRONGER IRAQ WOULD NOT THEN TURN ON ITS OTHER NEIGHBOURS? WHO WILL EXPLAIN HOW IRAQ COULD THEN BE PREVENTED FROM ESTABLISHING AN HEGEMONY OVER THE ENTIRE REGION; AND HEGEMONY BACKED NOT ONLY BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BUT SOONER OR LATER BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL? AND WHO COULD DOUBT THE BRUTALITY OF THAT HEGEMONY?

THESE ARE NOT SCARE-MONGERING SPECULATIONS. THEY ARE SERIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF THE REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING IRAQ'S AGGRESSION TO STAND. AND THEY CARRY WITH THEM THE TERRIBLE QUESTION - WERE WE TO TURN A BLIND EYE NOW, WHAT STILL GREATER CRISIS, WITH WHAT STILL GREATER STAKES, WOULD WE HAVE TO ACT TO RESOLVE IN THE FUTURE, AT WHAT STILL GREATER COST?

THESE ARE CRUCIAL ISSUES. THEY RELATE TO THE FATE OF VAST NUMBERS OF OUR FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS. BUT THESE HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS DO NOT STAND ALONE. THEY STAND ALONGSIDE, AND REINFORCE, IMPORTANT AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS WHICH ARE DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE GULF.

FIRST, AUSTRALIA HAS A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS AN IMPORTANT MARKET FOR OUR PRODUCTS AND AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF IMPORTS. AUSTRALIA NEEDS THE GULF'S OIL, AND OUR TRADING PARTNERS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD NEED THE GULF'S OIL. SO STABILITY IN THE GULF IS IMPORTANT TO ALL AUSTRALIANS.

BUT MOST OF ALL, STANDING HIGHER THAN ALL THE FACTORS I HAVE MENTIONED, AUSTRALIA HAS AN INTEREST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN FROM THE OUTSET, AND REMAINS, THE GOVERNMENT'S GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN THIS CRISIS.

OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: THAT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES MUST NOT BE SETTLED BY FORCE; THAT NATIONAL BORDERS MUST BE RESPECTED; AND THAT AGGRESSORS MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO PREVAIL.

THOSE PRINCIPLES WERE ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER BY THE GENERATION WHO SAW THE WORLD SLIDE INTO CHAOS IN THE 1930'S, AND WHO STROVE IN 1945 TO BUILD AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHICH WOULD STOP THAT HAPPENING AGAIN.

WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR THE NEED TO REBUILD THAT ORDER IS URGENT. IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT PROVES THE URGENCY OF THAT NEED, AND PROVIDES THE FIRST TEST OF OUR ABILITY TO MEET IT. WITH THE MOMENTOUS CHANGES - CHANGES SO MUCH FOR THE BETTER - IN THE WORLD POLITICAL SCENE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS THE WORLD COMMUNITY HAS A

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

INFO : CPD

7.23 04/12/90
O.CH607030

TREMENDOUS OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A MORE SECURE AND JUST ORDERING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO TRY AGAIN TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THE FOUNDERS OF THE UN ASPIRED.

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT ORDER ENGAGES OUR DIRECT INTERESTS AS WELL AS OUR SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF MIDDLE POWERS LIKE AUSTRALIA WILL IN THE YEARS AHEAD DEPEND DIRECTLY ON THE STRENGTH OF THE UN'S PRINCIPLES. AND THE STRENGTH OF THOSE PRINCIPLES IN THE YEARS AHEAD DEPENDS ABSOLUTELY ON THE SUPPORT WE GIVE THEM TODAY. TO PUT IT BLUNTLY, IF WE OR OUR NEIGHBOURS WERE SUBJECT TO AGGRESSION IN THE FUTURE, WE WOULD WANT, AND WE MAY NEED, THE SUPPORT OF THE UN. IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO SUPPORT THE UN TODAY.

THAT SUPPORT MUST INCLUDE OUR RECOGNITION THAT THE UN SHOULD BE WILLING TO DEFEND ITS PRINCIPLES WITH ARMED FORCE IF NECESSARY.

WAR IS A TERRIBLE THING. SOME PEOPLE WILL FIND IT PARADOXICAL THAT THE UN, AS AN ORGANISATION DEVOTED TO PEACE, SHOULD CONTEMPLATE WAR. BUT THAT TRAGIC PARADOX HAS TO BE ACCEPTED. IT CAN BE NECESSARY TO BE PREPARED TO FIGHT, AND IN FACT TO FIGHT, IN ORDER TO SECURE PEACE IN THE FUTURE.

THAT NECESSITY WAS RECOGNISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AT ITS OUTSET, AND IS INHERENT IN ITS NATURE. NO ONE KNEW THE HORRORS OF WAR BETTER THAN THE GENERATION WHO BUILT THE UN. DR EVATT, WHO AS AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN ESTABLISHING THE UN, SAID IN THIS HOUSE IN 1945 THAT IF ECONOMIC OR DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS

"ARE DEEMED INAPPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION OR PROVE INEFFECTIVE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION NECESSARY TO SUPPRESS THE AGGRESSOR".

WE WOULD ALL FERVENTLY HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. BUT IF WE RULE OUT THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST A REGIME WHICH HAS ALREADY USED IT, WE HAVE GIVEN UP SEEKING A RESOLUTION AT ALL. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE SIMPLY ACQUIESCED IN IRAQ'S AGGRESSION.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE GOVERNMENT UNRESERVEDLY SUPPORTS THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678.

OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION IMPOSES ON US AN OBLIGATION TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST, IN ITS THIRD PARAGRAPH, FOR ALL NATIONS TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE RESOLUTION. I EMPHASISE THAT THE RESOLUTION NOT ONLY AUTHORISES ALL NECESSARY MEANS, IT EXPLICITLY REQUESTS THAT MEMBER STATES PROVIDE SUPPORT.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

7.23 04/12/90
O.CH507030

MEMBERS WILL BE AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED EARLIER BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY DEPLOYING A TASK FORCE OF THREE SHIPS OF THE RAN - TWO FRIGATES AND A SUPPLY SHIP - TO HELP ENFORCE THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ. OUR SHIPS HAVE BEEN PERFORMING THAT TASK WITH GREAT DISTINCTION, AND HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. THEY HAVE BROUGHT CREDIT TO THEMSELVES AND TO THEIR COUNTRY.

THE PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION 678 CLEARLY REQUIRES US TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD EXTEND THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF OUR TASK FORCE TO ALLOW IT TO PREPARE FOR, AND IF NECESSARY TO PARTICIPATE IN, OPERATIONS ENVISAGED BY THE RESOLUTION.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIRECT AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS WHICH ARE ENGAGED IN THE CRISIS, AND IN THE LIGHT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION, THIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT AUSTRALIA SHOULD TAKE THIS COURSE.

I THEREFORE INFORM THE HOUSE THAT AUSTRALIA IS PREPARED TO MAKE OUR NAVAL TASK FORCE AVAILABLE TO SERVE WITH ALLIED FORCES IN OPERATIONS AUTHORISED BY RESOLUTION 678, SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY.

ACCORDINGLY, IF CONFLICT OCCURS OF A KIND WHICH IS CONTEMPLATED AND AUTHORISED BY THE RESOLUTION, OUR SHIPS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ACTION WITH THE ALLIED FLEET IN THE GULF, WHERE THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO ITS AIR-DEFENCE CAPABILITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOW AUTHORISE THE ADF TO DEPLOY SHIPS OF OUR TASK FORCE FROM THE GULF OF OMAN INTO THE PERSIAN GULF TO EXERCISE AND OPERATE WITH ALLIED NAVAL FORCES IN PREPARATION FOR THAT ROLE. THE ADF WILL ALSO NOW PARTICIPATE IN ALLIED MILITARY PLANNING.

THESE STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN NOW BECAUSE THEY ARE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING THAT OUR SHIPS ARE FULLY PREPARED TO OPERATE AS SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE SHOULD CONFLICT ERUPT. THEY DO NOT FORMALLY COMMIT AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO ANY ACTION, ADF UNITS WILL REMAIN AT ALL TIMES UNDER AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMAND.

OUR SHIPS WILL OPERATE PRINCIPALLY WITH SHIPS OF THE US, BRITAIN AND CANADA, UNDER US OPERATIONAL CONTROL. THIS IS NORMAL UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WILL CONTRIBUTE BOTH TO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND TO THE SAFETY OF OUR SHIPS AND MEN. UNDER THESE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS, THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF OUR SHIPS WOULD BE SPECIFIED BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE IN CONFORMITY WITH GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT SPECIFIC TASKS ASSIGNED TO AUSTRALIAN SHIPS CONFORM TO THESE SPECIFIED ROLES

7.23 04/12/90
0.CH607030

AND MISSIONS, AND HE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REFER ANY DISAGREEMENTS BACK TO THE CDF AND THE GOVERNMENT FOR DECISION. IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AUSTRALIA WILL RETAIN PRIORITY OVER THE ASSIGNMENT OF OUR SHIPS.

AS WELL AS MAINTAINING THE TASK FORCE OF THREE SHIPS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEND ANOTHER TWO MEDICAL TEAMS - TOTALLING SOME TWENTY PEOPLE - TO JOIN THE TWO ALREADY SERVING ON HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE GULF.

IT IS NOT PROPOSED TO MAKE ANY OTHER CONTRIBUTION OF NAVAL AIR OR GROUND FORCES.

AUSTRALIA'S NAVAL TASK FORCE WILL BE MAINTAINED AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF TWO COMBAT SHIPS AND A SUPPLY SHIP. THE FRIGATES HMAS DARWIN AND HMAS ADELAIDE WILL LEAVE THE GULF REGION TO RETURN TO AUSTRALIA IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, AFTER BEING REPLACED BY THE FRIGATE HMAS SYDNEY AND THE DESTROYER HMAS BRISBANE.

THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT WHICH IS PROPORTIONATE TO THE INTERESTS WE HAVE AT STAKE AND TO OUR NATIONAL RESOURCES. IT IS ALSO A PRACTICAL COMMITMENT. OUR SHIPS ARE IN THE AREA, AND THEY ARE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR THIS TASK. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL BE PROPERLY PREPARED FOR THE ROLE THEY MAY HAVE TO PLAY.

SHOULD CONFLICT BREAK OUT, NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF COULD FACE A SERIOUS THREAT, PARTICULARLY FROM IRAQI AIRCRAFT. THE ROLE OF OUR SHIPS WILL BE TO HELP DEFEND AGAINST THAT THREAT. IT WILL BE A HAZARDOUS ROLE. THE DECISION I AM ANNOUNCING TODAY IS THEREFORE A VERY SERIOUS ONE. I HAVE CONSULTED THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION ON IT. IN TAKING THAT DECISION I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULT TASK WE ARE ASKING OUR NAVY TO PERFORM. WE RECOGNISE THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION THEY ARE MAKING TO AUSTRALIA, AND TO WORLD PEACE.

I KNOW THERE WILL BE SOME WHO WILL ASK WHY WE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE IN THE GULF WHEN OTHERS DO NOT. THE ESSENTIAL ANSWER IS THIS - THAT WHAT OTHERS DO OR DON'T DO DOES NOT DEVIATE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO JUDGE FOR OURSELVES WHAT IS RIGHT, AND WHAT IS IN OUR INTERESTS, AND TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. WE ALSO NEED TO RECOGNISE THAT NOT ONLY SHOULD WE CONTRIBUTE, BUT UNLIKE MANY OTHERS, WE CAN CONTRIBUTE - WE HAVE A RELEVANT CAPABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE.

I KNOW THERE WILL ALSO BE SOME WHO CAVIL AT THE LEADING ROLE BEING PLAYED IN THE GULF BY THE UNITED STATES. THEY WILL SUSPECT THAT OTHER NATIONS WHO PARTICIPATE WILL ONLY BE SERVING AMERICAN INTERESTS. THAT VIEW IS PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN.

THE U.S. IS CERTAINLY PLAYING A LEADING ROLE, AS WE WOULD EXPECT FROM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

7.23 04/12/90
0.CH507030

A NATION AS WEALTHY AND POWERFUL AS THE U.S. INDEED, WE WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED IF THE US DID NOT PLAY SUCH A LEADING ROLE. BUT THE US ROLE HAS BEEN CLEARLY AT ONE IN THIS CASE WITH THE WIDER INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 678 IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THERE ARE EVEN THOSE WHO HAVE PURPORTED TO BASE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE GULF SITUATION ON THE PRESUMPTION OF MORAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAQI POSITIONS. IF SUCH VIEWS WERE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, IT WOULD REFLECT VERY POORLY ON THE STANDARD OF OUR PUBLIC DEBATE. LET THERE BE NO AMBIGUITY HERE - NO MINDLESS MUDDYING OF THE WATERS. IF IT COMES TO CONFLICT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT BE THE AGGRESSOR. THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER ALLIES WILL NOT BE THE AGGRESSOR. THE AGGRESSOR IS THE NATION THAT TOOK, OCCUPIED AND ANNEXED KUWAIT IN AUGUST.

THE LABOR PARTY COMES TO THIS ISSUE WITH A LOT OF HISTORY. FOR MUCH OF ITS ONE HUNDRED YEARS THE ALP HAS STRUGGLED TO ENSURE THAT AUSTRALIA'S ARMED FORCES ARE NOT USED TO FIGHT OTHER PEOPLES' WARS. IN THE 1930'S THAT LED LABOR TO TURN ITS BACK ON AGGRESSION, AS SO MANY OTHERS DID IN SO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD.

BUT LABOR LEARNT THE LESSONS OF THAT MISTAKE, AND DID MORE THAN ITS SHARE TO CORRECT IT. DR EVATT RECOGNISED NOT ONLY THAT AGGRESSION MUST BE RESISTED, WHEREVER IT OCCURS, AND BY ARMED FORCE IF NEED BE. HE ALSO RECOGNISED THAT ALL NATIONS MUST BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT TASK. AS HE SAID IN 1945:

'IT MUST BE MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE NATIONS SEEKING REPRESENTATION IN THE WORLD ORGANISATION MUST BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR SHARE OF PHYSICAL FORCE TO RESTRAIN THE ACTION OF PROVED AGGRESSORS.'

SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT, LABOR HAS BEEN COMMITTED TO STRENGTHENING THE UN AS THE ARBITER OF A BETTER WORLD ORDER. THAT IS STILL OUR GOAL, MORE SO THAN EVER, AS THE PASSING OF THE COLD WAR BRINGS THE GOAL CLOSER TO OUR GRASP. AND WE RECOGNISE THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THOSE ASPIRATIONS IMPOSE ON US AS A NATION.

CONFIDENT AS I AM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS AND THE CORRECTNESS OF OUR APPROACH, I CANNOT DENY THAT THE DECISIONS WE ARE TAKING ARE ONEROUS INDEED. SHOULD IT COME TO CONFLICT, AUSTRALIANS MAY BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN NEARLY TWENTY YEARS - ALBEIT IN VERY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS IS A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY, BUT I AND MY GOVERNMENT WILL NOT SHIRK THE EXERCISE OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD
INWARD
INWARD

PAGE 10

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

INFO : CPD

7.23 04/12/90
D.CH507030

BEFORE CLOSING, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RESTATE WHAT I HAVE STRESSED BEFORE. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE NO ILL-WILL TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, AND WISH THEM NO HARM. FOR THEIR SAKE AS MUCH AS FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT PEACE WILL PREVAIL. IF IRAQ HAS GENUINE GRIEVANCES THEY CAN BE HEARD IN RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, BUT NOT UNTIL IRAQ HAS COMPLIED WITH THE UN'S RESOLUTION.

LET ME TURN LASTLY TO THE ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN MOST CONSTANTLY IN OUR THOUGHTS THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS; THE SITUATION OF AUSTRALIANS, AND OF OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS, HELD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AGAINST THEIR WILL.

WE HAVE ALL HEARD IN THE LAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF SUGGESTIONS - INCLUDING FROM IRAQ'S AMBASSADOR IN AUSTRALIA - THAT AUSTRALIAN HOSTAGES MAY SOON BE RELEASED. OF COURSE WE HOPE THAT IS TRUE. WE SAY TO IRAQ, AS WE HAVE SAID CONTINUALLY OVER RECENT MONTHS - LET THEM ALL GO.

LIKE ALL AUSTRALIANS - WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF IRAQ'S PROPAGANDA LOTTERY BEING PLAYED OUT IN BAGHDAD - I HOPE THAT AS MANY OF OUR PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE MAY FIND THEIR FREEDOM THROUGH IT. BUT I RECOGNISE, AS MOST AUSTRALIANS DO, THAT THAT LOTTERY IS ENTIRELY ARBITRARY. THERE IS NO WAY TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF ALL OUR PEOPLE, EXCEPT PERHAPS BY SURRENDERING OUR POLICY AND OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ENTIRELY TO THE HOSTAGE-TAKER. MOST AUSTRALIANS UNDERSTAND THAT, INCLUDING MANY OF OUR PEOPLE HELD IN IRAQ, AS I KNOW THROUGH CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME. IT DOES THEM GREAT CREDIT THAT THEY DO UNDERSTAND THAT.

THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE THE RELEASE OF ALL OUR HOSTAGES IS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS. AND THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IS TO PRESS IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THAT IS WHAT RESOLUTION 678 IS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE. WE BELIEVE IT IS OUR BEST CHANCE.

WE SEE IN RESOLUTION 678 OUR BEST CHANCE TO GET ALL THE HOSTAGES HOME, TO GET IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT, TO BRING STABILITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO TAKE A VITAL STEP TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A NEW WORLD ORDER IN WHICH NATIONS LIKE AUSTRALIA CAN LIVE IN PEACE. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE SUPPORTED IT BY WORD, AND THAT IT WHY WE WILL SUPPORT IT BY DEED.

WE SEE IN RESOLUTION 678 THE TRAGIC NECESSITY TO CONFRONT AGGRESSION, IF NECESSARY WITH ARMED FORCE.

AND WE SEE IN RESOLUTION 678 THE HOPE THAT, THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, WOULD-BE AGGRESSORS WILL IN FUTURE BE DETERRER BEFORE THEY BEGIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

INWARD

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDINWARD
INWARD
INWARD7.23 04/12/90
D.CHE07030

MR SPEAKER, I FINISH ON A PRACTICAL NOTE. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION OF THE GULF, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE TIMETABLE IMPLIED BY RESOLUTION 678, I HAVE DECIDED THAT I SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME PLAN TO BE AWAY FROM AUSTRALIA IN JANUARY 1991. I HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT I WILL AT THIS POINT DEFER MY PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE AT THAT TIME AS HAD BEEN PLANNED.

ONE PURPOSE OF THAT VISIT HAD BEEN TO ALLOW ME TO PURSUE AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS IN THE URUGUAY ROUND, IF THE ROUND IS NOT CONCLUDED THIS YEAR. I WILL OF COURSE REMAIN COMMITTED TO, AND ACTIVE IN, PURSUING THESE INTERESTS, INCLUDING BY TRAVELLING FOR DIRECT TALKS AT A DIFFERENT TIME IF THAT IS REQUIRED.

XC. D.CHE07030
1018 4690 5506 235 8351 4865 3971 4405 148

CM.

SE. 000
SU. LBEO
SU. JANC
SU. JANF
SU. DFB
SU. OGFBA
SU. CAAD

NNNN-----

ACTION -----

MINISTER POLITICAL

INFORMATION -----

HIGH COMMISSIONER
MINISTER COMMERCIAL
COUNSELLOR COMM

DEPUTY HIGH COMM
OFFICIAL SECRETARY
COUNSELLOR POLITICAL

DEPUTY SECRETARY
COUNSELLOR AGRIC
FIRST SEC (POL/TDE)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDINWARD
INWARD
INWARD

SECRET

ST. ANDREW'S HOUSE
EDINBURGH EH1 3DG

cell
25

CDP *W/ki*



The Rt Hon Tom King Esq MP
The Secretary of State for Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2HB

18 December 1990

Dear Tom,

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

attached (back folder)

I refer to your letter of 14 December to the Prime Minister recommending the retention of the UK service hospitals and the consequent call for Territorial Army reservists from the NHS.

You suggest that a complete unit from Scotland should be deployed, the 205 General Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corp (Volunteer) based in Glasgow. I confirm that while this would create difficulties for the NHS in Scotland, I recognise the arguments and am prepared to support the proposal. I would suggest however that the impact of the removal of NHS personnel from Scottish hospitals is borne in mind at the stage when casualties are dispersed to NHS hospitals for treatment.

Copies of this letter go to members of OPD(G), the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Health, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,
Ian

IAN LANG

SECRET

28

SECRET

18 DEC 1950

1950

1950



The Rt Hon. Tom King MP
 The Secretary of State for Defence
 Main Building
 Whitehall
 LONDON
 SW1A 2BB

18 December 1950

Dear Sir

MINISTER OF HEALTH FOR WRITING PAPER SHOULD LAST

I refer to your letter of 14 December to the Prime Minister recommending the retention of the UK services hospitals and the consequent call for Territorial Army specialists from the NHS.

You suggest that a complete unit from Scotland should be employed, the 202 General Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corp (Volunteers) based in Glasgow. I confirm that while this would create difficulties for the NHS in Scotland, I recognise the arguments and am prepared to support the proposal. I would suggest however that the impact of the removal of NHS personnel from Scottish hospitals is severe in view of the stage when specialists are dispersed to NHS hospitals for treatment.

Copies of this letter go to members of OPHS, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Health, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and to Sir Robin Fisher.

John Gammie

John Gammie

THE KING

SECRET

10/10/50 11/10

CONFIDENTIAL
GULF CRISIS - MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE
(including financial contributions to military costs and offset contributions)

21 Nov 90

COUNTRIES

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
US	Details attached	Full cost of \$1.5bn to end of 1990 (\$3bn per month)	
UK	Details attached	Full cost of £630m to end FY90/91 (£2m/day, £220m one-off)	
Canada	1 frigate, 1 destroyer, 1 support ship, 18 CF-18 aircraft, 170 troops	Extra cost of C\$348M to end FY 1990/91	1360
France	Details attached	£150m start up costs, £2m per day. £304m to end 90	
FRG	No forces committed to the Gulf	DM1bn for military eqpt, DM400M for transport, DM200M for NBC equipment. Support package for UK being negotiated. 60 NBC recce vehs to US	
Italy	3 destroyers/frigates, 1 support ship, 8 Tornados	£54.5M to end of 1990	1110
Japan	-	Contribution of \$2bn in 1990/91. Support package for UK being negotiated	

OECD

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Australia	2 destroyers/frigates, 1 support ship	Extra costs of Aus\$102M for 12 months	555
Austria	-	-	
Belgium	2 MCMV, 1 support ship, 1 frigate, 4 C130 aircraft	£1.16m per month	380
Denmark	1 corvette	£2.6M to end of 1990	100
Finland	-	-	
Greece	1 frigate	-	175
Iceland	-	-	
Ireland	-	-	
Luxembourg	-	\$2M for Benelux countries and Portugal	
Netherlands	2 frigates	Gv14.6M to end of 1990	370
New Zealand	-	-	
Norway	1 coastguard vessel	Sealift assistance, fuel, charter tanker for US et al (cost £10M)	60
Portugal	1 naval transport vessel for use of UK	£1.4M	30
Spain	1 frigate, 2 corvettes	Between Pts4 and 5bn to end of 1990	520
Sweden	-	-	
Switzerland	-	-	
Turkey	-	-	

MIDDLE EAST AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

Nation	Forces Committed (under command of Saudi Joint Force Cdr)	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Bangladesh	2500 troops deployed to Saudi Arabia, another 3000 if hostilities break out		5500
Bahrain	200 troops in Saudi Arabia. 24 combat ac, 2 support ac in Bahrain	For UK: airfield services, medical treatment and accommodation	200
Egypt	17000 troops with 156 tanks to Saudi Arabia, SF troops to UAE. Further 14500 troops plus F-16 sqn to be sent		31500
Kuwait	2000 troops, 18 Chieftain and 40 M84 MBTs, 40 combat ac and 25 hel 1 support aircraft in Oman.	\$5bn offset contribution to US costs to end of 1990	2000
Morocco	1400 troops to Saudi, 550 to UAE. 5000 in UAE pre-conflict. Another 2000 to be sent		8950
Oman	1000 troops with artillery in Saudi. 44 combat ac, 4 support ac in Oman	Aircraft fuel and airfield services for UK	1000
Pakistan	2000 troops deployed, another 3000 may be sent		5000
Qatar	1900 troops with light tanks in Saudi. 21 combat ac in Qatar		1900
Saudi Arabia	About 40000 troops committed to Saudi/Kuwait border area, with armour. 289 combat aircraft, 61 support aircraft	\$150-250M per month offset contributions to US costs. Aircraft fuel, airfield services, POL, food and water for UK	40000
Syria	6300 troops (of which 3200 SF) with 140 MBT to Saudi, 600 to UAE. Another 6000 likely to be sent		12900
UAE	900 troops plus artillery and missiles in Saudi Arabia. 84 combat aircraft, 24 support aircraft in the UAE	\$1bn offset contribution to US costs	900

OTHERS

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Argentina	1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 1 transport plane		450
Bulgaria	Medical unit offered		
Czechoslovakia	1 chemical defence unit		180
Hungary	Offer of medical unit		40
Niger	1 x infantry battalion in Saudi Arabia		480
Poland	Field hospital to be sent to Saudi Arabia, hospital ship to the Gulf		220
Romania	Offer of chemical decontamination unit		160
Senegal	1 x infantry Battalion in Saudi Arabia		500
South Korea	-	\$50M in cash, \$70M for transport, NBC kit etc in 90/91	

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ/KUWAIT
POSITION PAPER

Purpose

1. The purpose of this paper is to provide a political framework against which directives to military commanders can be drafted.

Strategic Objectives

2. The primary strategic objective is to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 660. The strategy currently selected to achieve this objective is to impose financial and economic sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequent relevant Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of her failure to withdraw.

3. Additional objectives of great importance are

a. To remove the danger of the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons potential/capability and her long range missile capability;

b. to promote long term regional security, including consideration of appropriate structures for this purpose.

[4. Other objectives are to play our part in the implementation of UNSCRs on

a. the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses

b

arising from the invasion of Kuwait;

b. the accountability of those responsible for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.]

[5. An important ancillary objective is

a. To avoid to the extent possible Israeli military involvement in a way that would put at risk the achievement of the primary objective.]

6. It is not a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); that is a choice for the Iraqi people. We should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

Military Objectives

7. Current military objectives are

a. To enforce the maritime and air embargoes on trade with Iraq;

b. To deter and, as necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states against further Iraqi aggression.

8. If the current strategy fails to achieve the primary strategic objective (paragraph 2), the military option is available in accordance with UNSCR 678. If it were to be used, our additional military objectives are seen as

a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait;

b. To destroy to the extent possible Iraq's Nuclear,

C

Biological and Chemical weapons capability/potential and her long range missile capability.

It would not be an objective to hold Iraqi territory except so far as may be necessary to achieve the military objectives and to bring about the termination of hostilities.

Guiding Principles for Development of Military Directives

9. The basis for the use of military force will be SCR 678. The means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be necessary to achieve the stated purposes of SCR 678, and must meet the general requirements of international law including those affecting the selection of targets and the methods and means of warfare. Account must be taken of the need to minimise casualties to our own forces and the duration of operations consistent with meeting the military objectives set, as well as their impact on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion. National military commanders will therefore be guided by the following principles, which will be supplemented by Rules of Engagement (ROE):

- a. Tactical military planning and (subject to ROE) the selection of targets and methods of attack will be the responsibility of the military commanders.
- b. Any target which provides direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait may be attacked. Examples include (but are not limited to) military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems and Government command centres as well as purely military targets.
- [c. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons and associated facilities, civil electronic communications, water facilities, civil shipping and civil port and harbour installations should not be attacked without

d

specific political authorisation.]

d. Account must be taken of the need to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage, to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance and to avoid creating long term environmental damage.

e. Planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist nationals and refugees to the extent realistically possible.

File 2(A-B)
EA
SUBJECT CC MASTER10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 December 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE LEADER OF
THE OPPOSITION: THE GULF

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Leader of the Opposition in his room in the House of Commons last night about the situation in the Gulf. They met on Privy Council terms.

The Prime Minister spoke generally to your letter of 15 December. In reply, Mr Kinnock made a number of points:

- he did not entirely accept the assessment that, if the US and UK failed to initiate military action within the reasonably near future, then the moderate Arab states would seek their own accommodation with Saddam Hussein. He doubted that Arab opinion was as volatile as that. If we decided to give sanctions more time to work, he thought we could keep moderate Arab Governments with us;

- he questioned whether it would be enough for de Michelis alone to see Tariq Aziz on the European side. He was not a very credible figure. It might be better if the Foreign Secretary and Monsieur Dumas were also present, representing countries making a significant military contribution, to bring home the point that force would be used if Iraq failed to withdraw. The Prime Minister said that he would discuss this point with the Foreign Secretary.

- in discussion of the Defence Secretary's decision to call up some reservists to strengthen medical services in the Gulf, Mr Kinnock suggested that we should ask the Australian Government to provide medical personnel. The Prime Minister said he would consider this: he was likely to be in touch with Mr Hawke in the next few days;

- he wondered how long the UK could sustain a military effort in the Gulf. Some reports reaching him suggested that the position on spares and supplies generally meant that we were in a position to fight for only a relatively short time. The Prime Minister said that no one could predict how long a war might last. But he had discussed this with the Chiefs of Staff and was confident that our

- 2 -

forces had sufficient stocks to enable them to sustain a conflict. Mr Kinnock said that, from various accounts he had received, the Falklands War had finished just in time, before our forces ran seriously short of essential supplies;

- partial withdrawal by Iraq from Kuwait would present a very difficult problem. It was only realistic to recognise that, in the event of a substantial but partial withdrawal, support for the immediate use of force would be much diminished and we would probably have to give more time for peaceful persuasion to work. He was not suggesting there would have to be a deal: that was ruled out. But our dilemma would be very much more difficult. The Prime Minister acknowledged that we would face difficult choices, but our position would remain that the Security Council Resolutions must be implemented in full.

The Prime Minister invited Mr Kinnock to get in touch at any point if he had particular questions to pursue or wished for a further briefing.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET

23B1a
R. Hunter
12/12
Copy No 1 of 3 copies

B.0692

MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Gulf Crisis: UK/US Talks

I attach a note recording the main points of the UK/US talks on 14 December, which I gather may be mentioned at the OPD(G) Gulf presentation later this morning. Some of the points will be reflected in the briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Camp David which will be discussed at OPD(G) on Wednesday 19 December.

2. Much of the time was taken up with discussing the text of the paper on strategic and military objectives. There was considerable overall agreement on the objectives, both strategic and military. Apart from some uncontroversial drafting amendments, the main American problem lay with the concept of a document itself. They were plainly worried in case the document leaked in Washington at a later date and was used in the furtherance of inter-agency disputes or to brand the military for failing to meet all the objectives.

3. The main point of difficulty arose over paragraph 9c of the paper which dealt with those installations which should not be attacked without specific political authorisation. The Americans were reluctant to sign up to this without further bilateral discussion and joint work in-theatre to analyse the implications of attacking NBC targets. The Joint Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, will contact General Schwarzkof to follow up. Air Chief Marshal Hine will then put recommendations to the Defence Secretary

TOP SECRET

6

TOP SECRET

which can be discussed by OPD(G). The Americans made clear that at present they were not planning to attack water facilities, civil shipping and civil port and harbour installations unless there was a specific military target in those areas. We had a useful discussion about civil electronic communications (including Iraqi radio and TV transmissions) which is recorded in paragraph 8 of the note.

4. We agreed with the Americans on the need for urgent joint work on the problems created by partial and complete Iraqi withdrawal. The Americans accepted the need for the Allies to concert in advance rapid statements insisting on full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions if the Iraqis announced a partial withdrawal.

5. The Americans agreed with us on the importance of co-ordinated media handling, and further discussions will take place in Washington early in the New year.

6. We obtained helpful clarification on the Israeli position and confirmed that the Americans are giving this problem the same priority as ourselves.

7. Both sides agreed that there should be a further meeting early in the New Year, probably in the period 4-10 January, to finalise the strategic and military paper and take forward the other points raised in discussion.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
17 December 1990

C

TOP SECRET

NOTE BY OFFICIALS ON INTER AGENCY TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON
14 DECEMBER 1990

1. Talks took place in the Pentagon on 14 December between Mr Wolfowitz (Under Secretary Defence Policy) Mr Kimmit (Assistant Secretary State Department), Lt Gen Graves (Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) and ACM Sir Patrick Hine (UK Joint Commander), Mr Bevan (MOD), Mr Appleyard (Cabinet Office) and Mr Broomfield (FCO).

Strategic and Military Objectives

2. There was a detailed discussion of the UK position paper which had previously been handed over by the Defence Secretary to Mr Cheney.

3. The Americans began by expressing general concern about the purpose of the paper. Was it intended to be an inter-governmental agreement signed by both sides? They were also worried whether it would restrict the ability of the Force Commanders to take the necessary military action in theatre. We explained that the paper was intended to provide the political framework against which subsequent directives to the Military Commanders could be drafted. It was designed to enable Ministers on both sides to give the necessary political clearance in advance so that operations, should they become necessary, could proceed on an agreed and effective basis.

4. In further discussion a number of detailed drafting amendments were suggested by the American side. They are reflected in the attached revised text which, it was agreed, would be referred to Ministers on both sides.

TOP SECRET

d

5. The major points which arose in discussion were:

a. References to the release of hostages were deleted throughout the paper. Mr Kimmit, however, flagged the need for further discussion and agreement about the implications for military action against Iraq of retaining our Embassies in Baghdad after 15 January.

b. Paragraph 4 - Some drafting amendments were agreed ad referendum. The Americans did not deny that these objectives stemmed from the Security Council Resolutions. But they had doubts about the wisdom of stating them so explicitly in a document which they feared would become public at their end. They believed the objectives were probably unattainable anyway and the document might be used against the Administration by people wishing to prosecute their individual claims. They asked that this paragraph and paragraph 5 should be placed in square brackets pending further consideration on their side.

c. Paragraph 5 - The Americans agreed on the importance of avoiding Israeli involvement (see paragraph 14 below) and had no problems with the text itself. They thought, however, that this aim could be jeopardised if it emerged in public that the two governments had formally committed themselves to it.

d. Paragraph 9 - At the Americans' request the sub-heading was changed to reflect their general concern that the position paper should not be seen as a direct instruction to Military Commanders. They also queried the need to set out the general legal principles when they were clearly accepted by both sides. We resisted the deletion of the paragraph on the grounds that it was a useful restatement of a common position. The Americans also pressed to change "must" to "should" throughout, which we resisted. Both sides agreed to reflect further.

e. Paragraph 9C - The Americans had serious reservations about this sub-paragraph. It appeared inconsistent with the objective stated previously in the paper to remove the NBC threat. Their approach was to leave targetting decisions to the discretion of the Force Commander, taking into account the general advice to minimise civilian casualties and avoid long term environmental damage set out in paragraph 9(d). In further discussions we handed over a paper giving our assessment of the potential risks of collateral damage from attacking NBC targets. They undertook to study it and accepted that there were hazards in relation to attacking chemical and BW storage tanks. They were studying these questions and would soon be reviewing them in Riyadh (Cheney, Schwarzkopf and Powell).

We emphasised that we were at one with the US on the importance attached to dealing with Iraq's NBC capabilities. Our Ministers needed, however, to have as clear a picture as possible of the attendant risks, before final decisions were taken. It was agreed that further work on analysis and target selection would be undertaken in theatre between the Joint Commander's staff and General Schwarzkopf's as a matter of urgency.

On the other targets mentioned in this sub-paragraph the US confirmed that, except insofar as they had military connections it was not their intention to attack them in their own right. Provided that both sides were satisfied about the collateral risks and Ministers had had an opportunity to take a political decision, it was considered that this sub-paragraph might eventually be dropped.

There was a separate discussion of civil electronic communications (see paragraph 8 below).

f

The Americans insisted on placing sub paragraph 9 (c) in square brackets.

6. Both sides agreed to reflect further on the discussion and to contact each other after reference to Ministers. It was noted that in substance there was almost complete agreement on the basic issues covered in the paper. Questions remained principally on matters of form and procedure.

Targeting of Nuclear Facilities

7. The Americans did not dissent from our view that there was no immediate prospect of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons. It was nevertheless desirable to attack these targets. The rationale was the restoration of peace and security in the area referred to in UNSCR 678.

Iraqi TV and radio transmission capability

8. We asked what the US intentions were with regard to these targets and how they intended to tackle them. The Americans explained that they attached importance to disrupting Saddam Hussein's ability to project propoganda to his people. Civil communications were, on occasion, used for military transmissions. They intended to use precision guided coventional weapons. They were well aware of the need to avoid collateral damage to civilians in built up areas. They did not think that cutting off power supplies would be efective as the Iraqis had standby generators for their transmitters. The Americans made no mention of any plan to prevent western TV broadcasts being sent as a result of an attack on these installations. Nor did they show any awareness of the "sophisticated but untried kit" referred to recently by Mr Baker.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET

Implications of Partial and Full Withdrawal

9. We handed over the conclusions to the Foreign Secretary's OPD (G) paper on partial withdrawal and the defence secretary's paper on the military implications. We emphasised the importance of deterring Saddam Hussein from opting for partial withdrawal. Mr Baker should warn the Iraqis direct that partial withdrawal would not be enough. We should do our best to ensure the other Permanent Members of the Security Council and our allies took the same line, especially in the first few hours after any announcement.

10. On the political side, with one exception, the Americans were in full agreement with the course proposed on partial withdrawal. They thought it unwise to set a new deadline for Saddam to withdraw. Their inclination was to leave the threat of military action suspended over him and to add that if he was serious about his intention to withdraw they would expect that to be accomplished in a relatively short period. The Americans thought it would be helpful to study these questions further with us. The essential point was that withdrawal had to be complete and that there should be no linkage with other questions. The timing of any attack, should it become clear that Saddam was spinning out the withdrawal process, would in part be dependant on the military assessment of the latest date by which hostilities had to commence taking into account Ramadan (which the US were inclined to discount as an obstacle to hostilities), and the onset of the hot weather.

11. As far as statements to the Iraqis were concerned the Americans confirmed that their commitment not to attack Saddam was confined to his fulfilment of the three (now two) main conditions - full withdrawal, restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait and release of the hostages.

12. The Americans thought that post withdrawal, the overriding priorities were to control Iraq's NBC capabilities, and to impose an arms embargo which would curtail Iraq's conventional offensive capability. They thought they had implicit UN cover for maintaining sanctions including an oil blockade, through the reference to the restoration of "international peace and security in the area" in operative paragraph 2 of UNSCR 678. They aired the possibility of going for a further Security Council Resolution between 15 January and the end of that month to commit other UN members to support an arms/NBC embargo. In the longer term the Americans envisaged the US contribution to regional security as consisting more of visits, training and exercises, than permanent basing. It was agreed that we would be in touch with Mr Kimmit (State Department) to arrange further discussion of partial and full withdrawal.

Media Handling

13. We welcomed the cooperation between MOD and Pentagon on media handling. We were particularly concerned to ensure that journalists were not in a position to reveal planned or on-going operations. We would also like to exchange views on what could be done to avoid a situation in which media reporting undermined the morale of public opinion at home or caused grief to families by showing casualties. We asked whether the Americans had done any thinking about transmissions from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. The Americans said that these issues were also causing concern to them. They would welcome more detailed discussions. It was agreed that the MOD's Chief of Public Relations would be invited to visit Washington for discussions with his Pentagon and other counterparts in the first or second week of January.

Israel

Israel

14. We asked for the US assessment of Israeli thinking and intentions in the light of President Bush's discussions with Mr Shamir. The Americans said that the Israelis had made clear that if they were attacked by the Iraqis, they would retaliate. If they were not attacked, they would not launch a preemptive strike "in this crisis". This delphic phrase was not apparently further defined. The Americans, however, interpreted this as Israeli acceptance of US advice that it would be counterproductive for the Israelis to launch an attack while there were major US forces in the Gulf. If Saddam Hussein withdrew peacefully and the Western allies established a credible and effective regime to restrict Iraq's access to advanced technology and NBC equipment, then, in the US view, the Israelis would not attack. If, on the other hand, Saddam Hussein had withdrawn and the Western allies had not set up an effective control mechanism in these respects, the Israelis would not feel themselves bound by any assurances. If the situation in Jordan became explosive, the Israelis might well be drawn into any ensuing chaos. Finally, the Americans commented that the Israelis were more aware now of the limitations of what they could do militarily vis-a-vis Iraq.

Strategic Deception

15. The Americans showed little awareness of this possibility. Discussions might be proceeding on other channels. As far as Turkey was concerned they thought that there was a good chance that its airfields would become available for US use after hostilities had started. They also thought that demonstrative activity on the Turkish/Iraqi border would have little effect unless Turkish forces had already been deployed in Saudi Arabia, and they now saw little likelihood of that.

Future Contact

16. It was agreed that a further meeting before 15 January would be useful. The Americans suggested a meeting in the period 4-10 January, probably in Washington. We agreed to be in contact about dates.

SECRET / *SECRET*

23A (A-B)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DEDIP

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 171900Z FCO

TELNO 637

OF 171757Z DECEMBER 90

INFO DESKBY 171900Z WASHINGTON

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH BAKER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A SHORT BILATERAL WITH BAKER AT THE NAC TODAY. THE GULF WAS THE ONLY SUBJECT.

U.S. OPINION

2. BAKER SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS NOT YET SURE OF CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, PUBLIC OPINION WAS NOW 63 PERCENT IN FAVOUR OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY, WITH 56 PERCENT FAVOURING THE USE OF FORCE IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BY 15 JANUARY. IF FORCE WAS USED, THERE WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE RALLYING TO THE PRESIDENT BUT THAT WOULD DIMINISH WITH EVERY DAY THAT PASSED AND WITH CASUALTIES.

MEETING OF THE FIVE

3. BAKER SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE IN EARLY JANUARY AND TO AVOID THE FRENCH RUNNING AWAY WITH IT, IE IT SHOULD BE HELD IN LONDON. BAKER SAID HE WOULD TRY TO STEER THE MEETING TOWARDS LONDON AND THOUGHT THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD FOLLOW HIS LEAD. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY ACTION TO BE TAKEN NOW. HE WAS NOT GOING TO CHASE AFTER THE IRAQIS, WHO HAD MORE TO GAIN FROM A MEETING THAN THE AMERICANS. 3 JANUARY WAS A DATE BEYOND WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GO BECAUSE IT WOULD ALLOW THE IRAQIS TO MANIPULATE THE DEADLINE. IF THE IRAQIS AGREED TO A MEETING ON 3 JANUARY, IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE JUST BEFORE THAT OR (LESS GOOD) ON THE WAY BACK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A LOT TO BE SAID FOR BAKER GOING WITH A CLEAR MESSAGE AS LONG AS THE FRENCH AND THE CHINESE DID NOT TRY TO COMPLICATE IT. BAKER THOUGHT THE CHINESE PROBABLY WOULD ATTEND SUCH A MEETING AND THAT, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD NOT SIGNED UP TO RESOLUTION 678, THE VERY ACT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO IRAQ.

PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD MAKE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHEN HE WAS UP AGAINST THE DEADLINE. BAKER SAID THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD FOLLOW RIGHT ON IN WITH OUR FORCES, RE-INSTALL THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KUWAIT AND KEEP SANCTIONS ON IN FULL. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD OCCUPY RUMEILA AND BUBYIAN, BUT WHETHER TO USE SANCTIONS OR FORCE TO PUSH HIM OUT WOULD BE A DECISION FOR THE TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT OUR PRECISE STRATEGY COULD NOT BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE, THOUGH WE MUST BE CLEAR THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. MR WESTON COMMENTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS UNLIKELY TO ANNOUNCE THAT HE WOULD BE WITHDRAWING PARTIALLY. HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE WAS WITHDRAWING BUT MAYBE HE WOULD SIMPLY THIN OUT HIS TROOPS ACROSS THE BOARD. WE SHOULD PERHAPS MAKE CLEAR NOW THAT WE WOULD BE WATCHING AND WOULD NEED EARLY SIGNS OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. BAKER SAID THAT, IF SADDAM HUSSEIN THINNED OUT HIS FORCES, HE WOULD BE VERY VULNERABLE. THE UN RESOLUTION CALLED FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE OUT BY 15 JANUARY. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT GOING TO ALLOW HIM TO START SOME NEW PROCESS BY HAVING TALKS WITH HIM ON 12 JANUARY.

SECRET / *SECRET*

①

BUREAU - /

BURDEN-SHARING

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW WE WOULD HANDLE THE GAP BETWEEN THE 15TH AND THE DAY THE MILITARY OPTION STARTED. BAKER SAID THAT CONGRESS WOULD RETURN ON 3 JANUARY. THEY HAD THEN INTENDED TO ADJOURN UNTIL THE 22ND. THEY WOULD NOT NOW DO SO, THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CONDUCT NORMAL BUSINESS. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE, HOWEVER, CONSIDERING POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, INCLUDING THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS THAT MIGHT COME FORWARD URGING A STAY OF EXECUTION ETC. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO ACT TO KEEP THE CONGRESS STEADY. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY, NOT LEAST TO HELP WITH CONGRESS, FOR THE AMERICANS TO GO ROUND AGAIN ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARING, ESPECIALLY TO THE GULF STATES AND TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHO, UNLIKE BRITAIN, WERE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE MILITARY EFFORT. BAKER HIMSELF MIGHT GO ROUND IN PERSON BEFORE 15 JANUARY. BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN AMERICAN FORCES ON THE GROUND, THE EXISTING EFFORT ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARING HAD ONLY GIVEN THE AMERICANS COVER TO ABOUT 50 PER CENT. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FLAK IN CONGRESS ABOUT THE PROFITS THE GULF STATES WERE MAKING FROM THE OIL WINDFALL.

ISRAEL

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BAKER SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD GIVEN SOME OF THE BROADEST COMMITMENTS EVER ABOUT NOT TAKING PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION. BAKER THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GOT ABOUT AS FIRM AN ASSURANCE AS THEY COULD HAVE. IF THERE WAS MILITARY ACTION AND SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTACKED ISRAEL, ISRAEL WOULD HIT BACK. BUT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ARAB COALITION, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SYRIA, HAD SAID THAT THAT WOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR ATTITUDE. THIS OF COURSE WAS ON THE CONDITION THAT THE PROVOCATION CAME FROM IRAQ.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

7. BAKER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SOFT-PEDALLED THIS ISSUE. THERE MIGHT NOT BE MUCH CHANCE OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS PEACEFULLY BUT THAT CHANCE WOULD EVAPORATE IF SADDAM HUSSEIN THOUGHT HE WAS EITHER GOING TO BE BLOWN TO PIECES OR PROSECUTED IF HE WITHDREW PEACEFULLY. BAKER AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONCLUSION THAT WE SHOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THAT WE WERE NOT PROPOSING ANY PARTICULAR JURISDICTION BUT SIMPLY POINTING OUT TO INDIVIDUALS THAT THEY WERE LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PHASE 2 WARNING

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE ISSUING A PHASE 2 WARNING TO DEPENDANTS TODAY. IT WAS LIMITED IN SCOPE BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO LAUNCH A MILITARY EVACUATION OF OUR PEOPLE AND WE THOUGHT IT BETTER TO MOVE NOW THAN IN TWO WEEKS' TIME. BAKER DID NOT COMMENT.

MEETING BETWEEN THE EC AND TARIQ AZIZ

9. BAKER ENDORSE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO SEE TARIQ AZIZ BEFORE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IF THE EC DECLINED TO SEE HIM, THAT WOULD DRIVE HIM TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. BAKER WONDERED HOW LONG IT WOULD BE BEFORE MITTERRAND WENT TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DOUBTED WHETHER HE WOULD DO SO. ZOELLICK SAID THAT, IF THERE WERE SLIGHT GRADATIONS IN THE MESSAGES SADDAM HUSSEIN GOT THEN HE WOULD NOT PULL BACK AND THAT WOULD COST LIVES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

NOT
ABE

ALEXANDER

Temporarily retained

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

NO DISTRIBUTION

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/NPDD

PS

PS/M. Hogg

PS/PUS

Mr Fairweather

Mr Gore-Barth

Mr Broomfield

Mr Goulden

PS/N^o 10, Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH OUR AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT

Our Ambassador in Kuwait, Michael Weston, and his colleague, Larry Banks, are coming to see you at 1645 tomorrow accompanied by the Foreign Secretary. I have also suggested that they bring their families, who comprise:

- Mrs. Weston (also a member of the Diplomatic Service);
- daughter Antonia (20) by first marriage, who teaches dyslexic children;
- Mrs. Banks;
- Alison (20) at Birmingham University;
- Tim (19) at Blackheath College of Art;
- Aidan (14) at Stonyhurst.

We envisage a photograph of all of you outside the front door. You might then show them the Cabinet Room, before going upstairs for a talk. The meeting has to finish by 1710 to allow you to meet the Sultan of Brunei at 1715.

A fuller note by the FCO is in the folder.

C D P

C. D. POWELL

17 December 1990

C:\wpdocs\foreign\kuwait (pmm)

SUBJECT COPY
MASTER

UNCLASSIFIED

027646
MDLOAN 6866

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO ROUTINE SUVA
TELNO 266
OF 181425Z DECEMBER 90

SPD
ACTION COPY
~~Head~~ ART, /lin
Assistant
Miss Smith Gate

PPROZ01	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY	
-2 JAN 1991	
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY
INDEX PA	Action Taken

IRAQ KUWAIT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF NAURU

PLEASE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF NAURU:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF 7 DECEMBER, ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES FROM IRAQ AND KUWAIT. WE ARE ALL VERY GLAD THAT IRAQ HAS FINALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. IT IS, OF COURSE, A GREAT JOY TO THE FAMILIES THAT THEIR LOVED ONES WILL BE WITH THEM AT CHRISTMAS TIME. ALTHOUGH THIS IS WELCOME, WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT IRAQ HAS MUCH TO DO TO MEET THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN FULL.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR INTEREST AND SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. I WISH YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF NAURU A JOYFUL CHRISTMAS AND A PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 1

MAIN 1

NO DISTRIBUTION SPD

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. 123A/90



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 December 1990

RESTRICTED

Per Charles,

✓

Call on the Prime Minister by HMA Kuwait and
British Consul

The Prime Minister has agreed to meet Mr Michael Weston, HMA Kuwait and Mr Larry Banks, First Secretary and Consul, on their return to this country on 18 December at 1645. I understand that their families will also be permitted to be present.

Mr Weston and Mr Banks held out under siege at our Embassy in Kuwait from 24 August. Their only contact with the outside world has been via a radio link with our Embassy in the United Arab Emirates and by telephone with the British community in Kuwait. Electricity and water supplies were cut off in August and they have had to rely on what food they then had supplemented with fresh vegetables grown by Mr Banks. Despite these considerable constraints the Embassy assisted with the evacuation of women and children in September and the final departure of male British nationals following the Iraqi announcement of 6 December permitting foreign nationals to leave.

The Prime Minister might wish to congratulate Mr Weston and Mr Banks for their assistance to the British community under such adverse conditions and thank them for maintaining a British presence in Kuwait for so long. An important political point has been made - that we do not accept Iraq's illegal occupation of Kuwait. The British Ambassador was the last Head of Mission to withdraw. Mr Weston and Mr Banks were eager to remain in Kuwait until its liberation. The Prime Minister might express understanding for this wish but explain that, for reasons of their own personal safety and for the peace of mind of their families, it was decided that, with the majority of the British community having left, it was right for them to be withdrawn.

RESTRICTED

cc:K
cc:Back-up



RESTRICTED

Mr Hogg, Mr West and Mr Banks will give a joint press conference on 19 December. Mr Weston has been our Ambassador in Kuwait since March this year and will be accompanied to No.10 by his wife, Christine Ferguson, who is also a member of the Diplomatic Service, and his daughter, Antonia (20) from a previous marriage. Antonia teaches at a school for dyslexic children. Mr Banks, who has been our Consul in Kuwait since January 1988, will be with his wife, Liz, and their three children, Alison (20) presently at Birmingham University, Tim (19) who is at Blackheath Art College and Aidan (14) still at Stonyhurst College.

Yours ever,
Liz

(S I. Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-270 0360

SECRET

17 December 1990

B.0694

Dear Simon,

Medical Support for British Forces Middle East

At a brief meeting of OPD(G) ^{attached} this morning Ministers discussed and approved the Defence Secretary's minute MO 6/17/15/18 of 14 December to the Prime Minister. Ministers concluded that the call-out of certain essential reservists under Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 would be necessary. The Attorney General confirmed that the conditions for the exercise of this section of the Act had been met.

2. In addition to all OPD(G) Ministers, the offices of the Lord President, the Health Secretary, the Scottish Secretary and the Chief Secretary, Treasury had been consulted and had confirmed that their Ministers were content with what was proposed, though in some cases they might have comments of detail on the implementation.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Stephen Wall (FCO), John Neilson (Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers), the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Percy Cradock and Sonia Phippard.

Yours ever,

Len

L V Appleyard

Simon Webb Esq
Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall SW1

SECRET

SECRET

file. 22



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1990

Dear Simon,

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 14 December proposing calling out some 1,000 reservists to provide medical support - principally in this country - for our forces in the Gulf: and the call out of 4626 Sqn RAuxAF under section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act. Subject to the views of colleagues, the Prime Minister agrees these are necessary steps and that Parliament should be informed as soon as possible this week.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office), Stephen Alcock (Department of Health), Jim Gallagher (Scottish Office), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET



9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

071-828 1884

com
18/12

The Rt Hon. T.J. King, MP.,
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London
SW1A 2HB

17 December 1990

Dear Tom:

GULF CRISIS: MEDIA HANDLING

At the Meeting of OPD(G) on 12 December we discussed the proposed arrangements for handling of the media in the event of hostilities. In that context I thought it might be useful if I drew to your attention the desirability of including reference to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1989 as they apply to defence.

The definition of "defence" is set out in Section 2(4) of the Act, and the criteria which determine whether a disclosure is damaging are in Section 2(2). These provisions are clearly worded, and could usefully be explained to journalists with little difficulty. A journalist who disclosed material falling within those definitions would be guilty of an offence only if he satisfied the requirements of Section 5 of the Act, which extends the protection given by the other sections to disclosures made by a person receiving the information from a Crown servant or Government contractor in certain circumstances.

Since the Act has been in force for less than a year it is my view that it would be prudent to provide a general briefing to journalists and also to editors.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to other Members of OPD(G), to Sir Percy Cradock and to Sir Robin Butler.

James King

18/12

- (b) it is of information or a document or other article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to cause such damage or which falls within a class or description of information, documents or articles the unauthorised disclosure of which would be likely to have that effect.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the time of the alleged offence he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article in question related to security or intelligence or, in the case of an offence under subsection (3), that the disclosure would be damaging within the meaning of that subsection.

(6) Notification that a person is subject to subsection (1) above shall be effected by a notice in writing served on him by a Minister of the Crown; and such a notice may be served if, in the Minister's opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is or includes work connected with the security and intelligence services and its nature is such that the interests of national security require that he should be subject to the provisions of that subsection.

(7) Subject to subsection (8) below, a notification for the purposes of subsection (1) above shall be in force for the period of five years beginning with the day on which it is served but may be renewed by further notices under subsection (6) above for periods of five years at a time.

(8) A notification for the purposes of subsection (1) above may at any time be revoked by a further notice in writing served by the Minister on the person concerned; and the Minister shall serve such a further notice as soon as, in his opinion, the work undertaken by that person ceases to be such as is mentioned in subsection (6) above.

(9) In this section "security or intelligence" means the work of, or in support of, the security and intelligence services or any part of them, and references to information relating to security or intelligence include references to information held or transmitted by those services or by persons in support of, or of any part of, them.

Defence.

2.—(1) A person who is or has been a Crown servant or government contractor is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he makes a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to defence which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as such.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above a disclosure is damaging if—

- (a) it damages the capability of, or of any part of, the armed forces of the Crown to carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of those forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations of those forces; or
- (b) otherwise than as mentioned in paragraph (a) above, it endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad; or
- (c) it is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the time of the alleged offence he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article in question related to defence or that its disclosure would be damaging within the meaning of subsection (1) above.

(4) In this section "defence" means—

- (a) the size, shape, organisation, logistics, order of battle, deployment, operations, state of readiness and training of the armed forces of the Crown;
- (b) the weapons, stores or other equipment of those forces and the invention, development, production and operation of such equipment and research relating to it;
- (c) defence policy and strategy and military planning and intelligence;
- (d) plans and measures for the maintenance of essential supplies and services that are or would be needed in time of war.

3.—(1) A person who is or has been a Crown servant or government contractor is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he makes a damaging disclosure of— International relations.

- (a) any information, document or other article relating to international relations; or
- (b) any confidential information, document or other article which was obtained from a State other than the United Kingdom or an international organisation,

being information or a document or article which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as a Crown servant or government contractor.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above a disclosure is damaging if—

- (a) it endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad; or
- (b) it is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects.

(3) In the case of information or a document or article within subsection (1)(b) above—

- (a) the fact that it is confidential, or
- (b) its nature or contents,

may be sufficient to establish for the purposes of subsection (2)(b) above that the information, document or article is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of the effects there mentioned.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the time of the alleged offence he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article in question was such as is mentioned in subsection (1) above or that its disclosure would be damaging within the meaning of that subsection.

(6) In this section "legal custody" includes detention in pursuance of any enactment or any instrument made under an enactment.

5.—(1) Subsection (2) below applies where—

(a) any information, document or other article protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act has come into a person's possession as a result of having been—

(i) disclosed (whether to him or another) by a Crown servant or government contractor without lawful authority; or

(ii) entrusted to him by a Crown servant or government contractor on terms requiring it to be held in confidence or in circumstances in which the Crown servant or government contractor could reasonably expect that it would be so held; or

(iii) disclosed (whether to him or another) without lawful authority by a person to whom it was entrusted as mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) above; and

(b) the disclosure without lawful authority of the information, document or article by the person into whose possession it has come is not an offence under any of those provisions.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, the person into whose possession the information, document or article has come is guilty of an offence if he discloses it without lawful authority knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act and that it has come into his possession as mentioned in subsection (1) above.

(3) In the case of information or a document or article protected against disclosure by sections 1 to 3 above, a person does not commit an offence under subsection (2) above unless—

(a) the disclosure by him is damaging; and

(b) he makes it knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it would be damaging;

and the question whether a disclosure is damaging shall be determined for the purposes of this subsection as it would be in relation to a disclosure of that information, document or article by a Crown servant in contravention of section 1(3), 2(1) or 3(1) above.

(4) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (2) above in respect of information or a document or other article which has come into his possession as a result of having been disclosed—

(a) as mentioned in subsection (1)(a)(i) above by a government contractor; or

(b) as mentioned in subsection (1)(a)(iii) above,

unless that disclosure was by a British citizen or took place in the United Kingdom, in any of the Channel Islands or in the Isle of Man or a colony.

(5) For the purposes of this section information or a document or article is protected against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act if—

Information resulting from unauthorised disclosures or entrusted in confidence.

copy 21

CDP
17/xii

SECRET

Copy No. ... ?

with copy ?

Prime Minister (Copy No. 1)

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

I received a copy of Tom King's 14 December minute about the deployment of medical support in the Middle East. I would support his proposals.

2. I believe that the handling of casualties would be assisted by the availability of Military Hospitals, both as a first call resource on day 1 of the conflict while the NHS is running down its non-urgent cases to free beds, and because the MOD hospitals provide a base of expertise and valuable facilities (especially their intensive care).

3. All NHS Regions have been drawn into our operational plan for receiving war casualties. The choice of a Territorial Unit from Scotland is therefore helpful to us. Overall, however, the number of reservists who might be called upon would be comparatively small when spread across the country as a whole. I understand that in all some 165 doctors (40 or so hospital specialists and many of the rest GPs) and 500 or so nurses would be required along with technicians and stretcher bearers.

4. We would not want to lose in this call-out those scarce specialists from areas like burns, spinal injuries or neurology where the hospital units would be under heavy pressure in the event of war. But the arrangements in paragraph 9 of the minute suggest that the Ministry of Defence could exercise some scrutiny of volunteers, and might be able to liaise with officials here if there seemed to be a danger of weakening a key super-specialist unit.


5. I welcome the Treasury decision to enable topping up of pay to be centrally financed.

6. I am copying this minute to Tom King (Copy No. 2) and those who received his minute.

W W

W W

Secretary of State for Health
December 1990



CONFIDENTIAL
UK COMMS ONLY

FM RIYADH
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1350

OF 170936Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WAHSINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR, MODUK, TEHRAN
INFO IMMEDIATE HQBFME, JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

ADVANCE COPY

SIC AAA/I9M

*Pl. fill
er*

CALL ON SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. PRINCE SAUD WELCOMES VISITS OF THE PRINCE OF WALES AND THE PRIME MINISTER, HINTS HE MAY VISIT LONDON AFTER THE GCC SUMMIT. SAUDIS HOPE THAT EUROPEANS WILL HAVE NO TALKS WITH TARIQ AZIZ, IF AMERICANS DO NOT. KING FAHD SEEKS TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT MIGHT SUGGEST PREPAREDNESS ON HIS PART TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRAQIS, HENCE HIS DECISION SO FAR NOT TO RECEIVE BENJEDID. SAUD DESPAIRING OF THE JORDANIANS. COMMENTS ON GULF SECURITY. DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON PRINCE SAUD AL FAISAL ON 16 DECEMBER. PRINCE SAUD SAID THE SAUDIS VERY MUCH WELCOMED THE PLANNED VISITS OF THE PRINCE OF WALES AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE REGRETTED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO STOP OFF IN THE UK AS WELL AS ROME AND BONN BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. WHEN I ENCOURAGED HIM TO DO SO, HE SAID HE HOPED TO PASS THROUGH LONDON TO SEE YOU AND IF POSSIBLE THE PRIME MINISTER, AFTER THE GCC SUMMIT (IE AROUND TURN OF THE YEAR).

3. I BRIEFED PRINCE SAUD ON THE OUTCOME OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, DRAWING ON ROME'S REPORTING TELEGRAMS. PRINCE SAUD WELCOMED THIS EARLY BRIEFING, AND THE FIRM TONE OF THE STATEMENT ON THE GULF. HAD THE GERMANS LACKED RESOLVE? HE SAID THAT DURING HIS VISITS TO ROME AND BONN HE HAD FOUND HIS INTERLOCUTORS GENERALLY FIRM, THOUGH CHANCELLOR KOHL - WHO SPOKE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A COUNTRY WHICH HAD KNOWN DEFEAT IN WAR - WAS MORE RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE THE PROSPECT OF HOSTILITIES, AND STRESSED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. PRINCE SAUD HAD TOLD HIM

THAT SANCTIONS MIGHT IN THE END DO MORE DAMAGE, INCLUDING TO IRAQ, THAN HOSTILITIES. I SAID HIS VISIT TO BONN MIGHT HAVE HELPED TO STEADY THINGS. PRINCE SAUD ASKED WHETHER THE TWELVE WOULD RECEIVE TARIQ AZIZ IF THE AMERICANS DID NOT. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THEY WOULD NOT. DI MICHELIS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD ONLY MEET TARIQ AZIZ AFTER THE AMERICANS DID.

4. I ASKED SAUD ABOUT PRESIDENT BENJEDID'S TOUR (YESTERDAY'S SAUDI NEWSPAPERS CONTAINED AN EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN KING FAHD AND BENJEDID ON THE OCCASION OF THE LATTER'S AIR FLIGHT OVER THE KINGDOM, IN WHICH BOTH EMPHASISED THE STRENGTH OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES: NOTWITHSTANDING THE WARM TONE OF THESE, THE FACT OF THE EXCHANGE PUBLICLY UNDERLINES THE KING'S RELUCTANCE SO FAR TO RECEIVE THE ALGERIAN). PRINCE SAUD SAID THE SAUDIS RECOGNISED THAT THEIR POSITION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AGAINST IRAQ WAS KEY- 'SAUDI ARABIA IS THE POLE OF THE TENT'. HENCE, THE KING WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE EXPLOITED TO SUGGEST HE MIGHT NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRAQIS. TOO MANY PARTIES WERE INDULGING IN DISINFORMATION. WHEN BENJEDID HAD FIRST TALKED OF HIS INITIATIVE, THE SAUDIS HAD URGED HIM TO CONCENTRATE ON IRAQ AND PRESS FOR WITHDRAWAL. INSTEAD HE HAD EMBARKED ON A REGIONAL TOUR. THE SAUDIS AS YET HAD NO ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTS. THEY WOULD WAIT AND SEE BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY MEETING BETWEEN BENJEDID AND THE KING.

5. I ASKED PRINCE SAUD ABOUT THE GCC SUMMIT, AND POST-CRISIS REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT MUCH DEPENDED ON WHETHER THE CRISIS WAS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR NOT. (FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY TOLD ME BEFORE WE WENT IN THAT HE - SHAWWAF - WAS CERTAIN CURRENT PRESSURES WOULD COMPEL SADDAM, WHO WANTED TO SURVIVE, TO WITHDRAW BEFORE HE WAS ATTACKED. PRINCE ABDUL RAHMAN, DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER, ALSO TOLD MINISTER (AF) YESTERDAY THAT SADDAM MUST HAVE SOMETHING UP HIS SLEEVE HERE). SAUD SAID THE FOCUS NOW MUST BE ON STRENGTHENING THE GULF COUNTRIES' FORCES, WHETHER IN THE SHAPE OF THE PENINSULA SHIELD OR NATIONALLY. THERE WAS A FURTHER REQUIREMENT FOR MEASURES TO PROTECT KUWAIT'S NORTHERN BORDER. UNTIL THESE MILITARY ELEMENTS WERE IN PLACE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE CLEARLY THE SHAPE OF BROADER LONG TERM REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I MENTIONED OUR INPUT TO GCC SECRETARIAT THINKING.

6. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK PRINCE SAUD FOR HIS ASSISTANCE OVER THE RESTORATION OF UK RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. HE SAID HIS SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUES AT THE RECENT TRIPARTITE

MEETING IN CAIRO HAD BEEN APPRECIATIVE OF OUR MOVE. PRINCE SAUD RAISED LEBANON. THE STEPS CURRENTLY BEING TAKEN THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT. THE SUPPORT EXPRESSED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WAS MOST HELPFUL. IBRAHIMI WAS IN LEBANON AT THE MOMENT, AND REPORTED THAT THE MOOD WAS VERY POSITIVE.

7. I MENTIONED JORDAN AND MY RECENT EXCHANGE WITH KING FAHD, AND ASKED HOW THE SAUDIS SAW PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE OMANI INITIATIVE (CF FCO TELNO 397 TO MUSCAT). PRINCE SAUD SAID THE SAUDIS REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT JORDAN, AND AWARE OF THE DANGERS. THEY HAD MADE CONSTANT EFFORTS TO GET BACK ON TERMS (HE REFERRED TO PRINCE TURKI AL FAISAL'S VISIT TO AMMAN SOME TIME AGO). REGRETTABLY THERE HAD STILL BEEN NO REAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE JORDANIAN POSITION. PRINCE SAUD CITED KING HUSSEIN'S LATEST UNHELPFUL STATEMENT AT THE MILITARY GRADUATION CEREMONY. HE ALSO OBJECTED TO A PUBLIC REMARK BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO THE EFFECT THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS RESTRAINED BY AMERICAN PRESSURES FROM IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. SO LONG AS KING HUSSEIN DEMONSTRATED POSITIVE ASPECTS IN THE ACTION SADDAM HAD TAKEN, THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA.

COMMENT

8. THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO RESIST ARAB ATTEMPTS TO DRAW THEM INTO CONTACT WITH SADDAM. SAUD'S REMARKS STILL LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN BENJEDID AND THE KING. BUT FOR THE SAUDIS TO PLAY ALGERIA LONG IN THIS WAY TAKES NERVE, GIVEN ALGERIA'S WEIGHT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THEIR COLLABORATION OVER LEBANON. ON FUTURE REGIONAL SECURITY SAUD EVIDENTLY REGARDS PREPARATION OF LONGER TERM ARRANGEMENTS AS PREMATURE BEFORE OUTCOME OF CRISIS IS CLEAR. SAUDI PRIORITY WILL BE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY DEFENSIVE SCREEN POST CRISIS (THIS TIES IN WITH WHAT PRINCE FAHD ABDULLA TOLD ME LAST WEEK). SAUD DID NOT HOWEVER CHALLENGE MY SUGGESTION OF WIDER REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN A UNSC FRAMEWORK. ON JORDAN I SENSE NO EARLY PROSPECT OF A FURTHER CONCILIATORY GESTURE SO LONG AS KING HUSSEIN PEDDLES NEGOTIATION.

9. SEE MY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS FOR PRINCE SAUD'S REACTION TO OUR PLANNED PHASE II CONSULAR ADVICE, AND TO MY DEMARCHE ON VISAS FOR BRITISH JOURNALISTS.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION


40

ADVANCE 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/SECPOL D	RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER



THE GULF: MILITARY BRIEFING

You are to have a military briefing tomorrow on our forces in the Gulf and operational planning for their use to recover Kuwait. You may want to have with you

- the structure of our forces ✓
- the note on operational planning ✓
- our strategic objectives. ✓

C.D.P

Charles Powell

16 December 1990

c; Military (MJ)

TO 1261

MR POWELL

Spoke
EDP 17/xi
 CC: Sir Robin Butler
 Mr Appleyard

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST *units esp.*

Would you please refer to the Defence Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 14 December. The proposal is that this should be discussed in the margins of tomorrow's presentation to OPD(G) in the Ministry of Defence. The Ministers present for this will be the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, the Energy Secretary and the Attorney General. However, other Ministers have an interest in the medical support question: the Health Secretary, the Scottish Secretary (marginally), the Chief Secretary, Treasury and the Lord President. All have had copies of the minute. The Defence Secretary wishes to announce the measures he proposes by Written Answer tomorrow. Time is therefore short.

2. I have discussed handling with the Cabinet Secretary, who has asked me to check with you, and also with the Private Offices of the non-attending Ministers, whether the Prime Minister and those other Ministers are content. If so, the matter can be left for resolution in the margins of the presentation. If not, the Cabinet Secretary suggests that all interested Ministers should assemble at 12.15 in the Defence Secretary's office in MOD for a short meeting to take a decision.

3. I should be grateful to know whether you are content with this mode of proceeding.

WDR
mes

W D REEVES

Cabinet Office

16 December 1990

C1379/D120189



177



ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3051

OF 150127Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, DAMASCUS
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TUNIS, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR

Prime Minister
not unlike your
concerns
with him.
copy.

SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: 11-13 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION CONSIDER SHAMIR VISIT A SUCCESS. GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND BROAD AGREEMENT OVER THE GULF. ADMINISTRATION PUT DOWN MARKERS ON PEACE PROCESS AND ISRAELI PRACTICES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE DEPARTMENT (KURTZER, DAS/NEA) AND WELCH (NSC) ABOUT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
3. SHAMIR'S MAIN MEETINGS WERE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND CHENEY ON 11 DECEMBER AND BAKER ON 13 DECEMBER. BOTH KURTZER AND WELCH THOUGHT THAT THE VISIT HAD GONE WELL. ALTHOUGH ALL SUBJECTS HAD BEEN COVERED, THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE DAY, THE GULF CRISIS, HAD BEEN SUFFICIENT TO OVERSHADOW DIFFERENCES ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
4. ON THE GULF CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE AN OUTCOME IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. NONE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S RECENT MOVES - HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE, CLOSING OF THE KUWAIT EMBASSY ETC - WERE TO BE SEEN AS ANY DIMINUTION OF THIS. THE US DID NOT INTEND TO GET DRAWN INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND REMAINED FIRMLY AGAINST ANY LINKAGE WITH THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS AND WAS ALSO

IN ISRAEL'S OWN INTEREST. SHAMIR APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION IN WHATEVER IT CHOSE TO DO TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

5. THERE WAS A GENERAL EXCHANGE ON THE POST-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WOULD MEET THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, IT WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CRISIS. SHAMIR AGREED ON THE NEED TO TACKLE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING IRAQ'S NON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND MAINTAINING SANCTIONS BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED.

6. THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT IT WAS IN THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROVIDE ARMS TO MODERATE ARAB STATES FOR THEIR SELF DEFENCE. SHAMIR DID NOT DISPUTE THE PRINCIPLE BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE OF RECENT AND UPCOMING ARMS SALES (PARTICULARLY TO SAUDI ARABIA) AND THE RISK OF DIVERSION. THE PRESIDENT (AND IN MORE DETAIL CHENEY) REPEATED US COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL SECURITY AND ITS MILITARY QUALITATIVE EDGE IN THE REGION.

7. THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD WANT TO SEE EARLY MOVEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS ONCE THE GULF CRISIS WAS RESOLVED. BAKER WENT OVER THIS GROUND IN MORE DETAIL AND, ACCORDING TO KURTZER, IN FAIRLY BLUNT TERMS. BAKER NOTED THAT, FOR A PERIOD OF A YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THOUGHT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE TOWARDS AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE BUT THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE A DECISION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE GIVING THOUGHT TO HOW THE PROCESS MIGHT BE RESUMED AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, MAKING DECISIONS IN ADVANCE RATHER THAN STAVING THEM OFF. WHEN BAKER SUGGESTED THAT NEW IDEAS WERE REQUIRED, SHAMIR RESPONDED DEFENSIVELY THAT THE ISRAELIS STILL HAD A PERFECTLY GOOD PEACE PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE - THEIR FOUR POINTS OF MAY 1989. BAKER SAID THAT AN ADMINISTRATION TEAM LED BY ROSS WOULD VISIT ISRAEL IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TALK THROUGH POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD.

8. BAKER SUGGESTED TO SHAMIR THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD KEEP AN OPEN MIND ON THREE POINTS: SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, A ROLE FOR THE UN AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS. BAKER NOTED THAT THE HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE GULF CRISIS MEANT THAT ISRAEL COULD NO LONGER DISMISS OUT OF HAND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. SHAMIR ACKNOWLEDGED THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE GULF CRISIS, BUT SAID THAT IT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY

HOSTILE TOWARDS ISRAEL OVER THE YEARS AND HE REMAINED SCEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER IT COULD CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY ON ARAB/ISRAEL. ON SYRIAN INTENTIONS, BAKER SAID HE HAD NO UNDUE EXPECTATIONS, BUT COULD NOT RULE OUT THAT, FOLLOWING THE GULF CRISIS, SYRIA MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN INVOLVING ITSELF IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SHAMIR WAS VERY DEFENSIVE. HE SAID HE SAW LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE AND OUTLOOK BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ. SYRIA'S INTEREST IN BRINGING DOWN SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ITS BROADER REGIONAL INTERESTS. SYRIAN AMBITIONS IN LEBANON, PARTICULARLY ITS APPARENT INTEREST IN PROVOKING CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL IN THE SOUTH, WERE CAUSING ISRAEL INCREASING CONCERN.

9. ON SETTLEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER REITERATED US OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI POLICY. BAKER SAID THAT US OPPOSITION WAS IF ANYTHING GROWING STRONGER SINCE THE WORSENING SITUATION IN THE OTS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY. SHAMIR COMMITTED HIMSELF PERSONALLY TO LEVY'S LETTER OF 2 OCTOBER TO BAKER ON

SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS. HE ALSO REITERATED THAT SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS IN ISRAEL WAS BEYOND THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF ISRAEL, BUT HE MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR FURTHER US HELP.

10. BAKER ALSO MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS ON ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OF THE OTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSED THE RUMOURED REINTRODUCTION OF DEPORTATION, WERE CONCERNED ABOUT USE OF IDF SHARP SHOOTERS TO COMBAT STONE THROWING, URGED THE ISRAELIS TO REDUCE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AND URGED THEM TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO BRING SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMAL LIFE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (IN PARTICULAR BY REOPENING UNIVERSITIES). COMMENT

11. ONE OBJECTIVE OF THIS VISIT WAS CLEARLY TO IMPROVE THE PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SHAMIR AND THE ADMINISTRATION (PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT). ON THE GULF, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO REASSURE SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL'S INTERESTS WERE NOT BEING FORGOTTEN AND ENCOURAGE HIM TO MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE. SHAMIR'S COMMENTS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (...VERY GOOD AND FRIENDLY CONVERSATION... FULL SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.... PRESIDENT EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR OUR BEHAVIOUR, FOR OUR POLICY AND FOR OUR PROBLEMS) SUGGEST THESE OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED. BUT DESPITE THIS IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN ESPECIALLY OVER THE PEACE PROCESS.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

39

ADVANCE

39

IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

PS/MR HOGG

PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/PUS

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR BROOMFIELD

MR SLATER

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR GOULDEN

MR JAY

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

HD/MED

HD/AMD

HD/CONSULAR D

HD/ECD(E)

HD/NAD

HD/NEWS D

HD/NENAD

HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/SED

HD/UND

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST

CABINET OFFICE 010

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

MR WICKS HMT

EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

Secret

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 3050

OF 150119Z DECEMBER 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, RIYADH, MODUK, ACTOR

MY TELNO 2984: IRAQ/KUWAIT: ISRAELI INTENTIONS

1. IN VIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC WE HAVE ASKED THEM WHETHER PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD SHED ANY MORE LIGHT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAEL TAKING PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ.

2. BOTH STATE AND NSC TOLD US SHAMIR HAD INCREASED THE CONFIDENCE IN WASHINGTON THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNILATERAL ACTION. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ANTI-IRAQ COALITION, OR OF ISRAEL ITSELF, FOR ISRAEL TO START A WAR. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WOULD DO CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO ISRAEL'S POSITION IN THE US. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT SUGGESTIONS THAT ISRAEL MIGHT LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON IRAQI MISSILE SITES. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER CONSIDERED A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK AND WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO OPEN A MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

3. SHAMIR WENT ON TO SAY THAT, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ISRAELI FORBEARANCE, HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE OF IRAQI ACTIVITIES FROM THE AMERICANS SO AS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CIVIL DEFENCE PREPARATIONS. STATE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN LOOKING HARD AT WHETHER THEY COULD UPGRADE THE QUALITY AND TIMELINESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ANY REAL TIME SUPPLY OF INTELLIGENCE WOULD REQUIRE A DIRECT SATELLITE DOWN-LINK TO ISRAEL AND THIS WAS QUITE OUT OF THE QUESTION.

4. SHAMIR WAS ASKED DURING A PUBLIC MEETING WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD MAKE PRE-EMPTIVE OR RETALIATORY ATTACKS ON IRAQ. HE SAID QUOTE ISRAEL HAS DECLARED VERY CLEARLY THAT IT DOES NOT THINK AND PLAN ANY PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. AND WHAT HAPPENS AFTERWARDS, IF IT WILL BE ATTACKED OR NOT, IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO RESPOND UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

5. CLEARLY THERE CAN BE NO CAST-IRON GUARANTEES IN THIS

SITUATION. NEITHER DID THE PRESIDENT OR BAKER PRESS SHAMIR ON THE ISRAELI RESPONSE IN ALL THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR REASSURED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS NOT LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A GO AT THE IRAQIS. THEY ATTRIBUTE THIS IN PART TO SHAMIR'S ACCEPTANCE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF SADDAM'S IRAQ (WHETHER BY WAR OR PEACE) AND THAT IN REACHING A SOLUTION ISRAEL'S INTERESTS WOULD BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

32

ADVANCE 32

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET
PS
PS/PUS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
MR P J WESTON
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR GOULDEN
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR SLATER
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/AMD
HD/NEWS D
HD/ISD(O)
HD/NENAD
HD/NPDD

HD/PUSD
DEPUTY HD/PUSD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/UND
HD/SCD
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE VIA H29)
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE (VIA H29)
MR APPEYARD CAB OFFICE (H29)
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE (H29)
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

Secret



file 10

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 December 1990

See Resident Clerk.

AMMUNITION FOR BRITISH FORCES IN THE GULF


Jane Binstead sent us various messages during the European Council in Rome asking for help with persuading the German and Dutch Governments to take early decisions on the supply of ammunition for British forces in the Gulf, and the Belgians on sending a field hospital. I spoke to Peter Hartmann in Chancellor Kohl's office and Mr Merkelbach in Prime Minister Lubbers' office. Both undertook to expedite decisions, if possible on 17 December. I know that the Foreign Secretary was intending to try to speak to Genscher and van den Broek but do not know whether he was successful.

I am afraid I was unable to find a Belgian who knew anything about it.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Charles Powell

Resident Clerk
Ministry of Defence

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3440 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from Powell to Wall dated 15 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>25/1/10</i> <i>M. M.</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



Thank you.
Who will be with me?
Charles? Andrew?
Robin B?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 December 1990

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

Can we do
brief Mr. Kinnoch or
Nashley evening in your room
in the home.

Gulf

Thank you for your letter of 12 December about the Prime Minister's intention to brief the Leader of the Opposition on the Gulf crisis on 17 December.

Release of the Hostages

I

The release of the hostages has tended to overshadow other developments on the Gulf in recent days. The Prime Minister might indicate that we believe Saddam Hussein probably acted because he realised the hostage policy was doing him no good and to put the Iraqis in a better position for their contacts with the Americans. We have acted promptly to get over 800 of our people out; the vast majority on charter aircraft which we have organised. In all, we have now evacuated about 1400 people from Iraq and Kuwait. We have met and assisted the hostages on arrival, with the cooperation of other government departments, notably the DSS: these arrangements seem to have gone well.

The great majority of our citizens have now left Iraq and Kuwait. We are strongly urging the rest to go too. We estimate that the community remaining in Kuwait now numbers about 40. We expect the number in Iraq to be down to about 90 by 17 December. From now on most of those leaving will probably make their way out of Iraq on scheduled flights via Jordan. But we will be prepared to charter further aircraft if needed. Inevitably, a hard core (mainly British wives of Iraqi and Kuwaiti citizens and those who have chosen to make their lives in Iraq and Kuwait) will choose to stay.

The staff of our Embassy in Kuwait will probably be withdrawn on 16 December. Mr Weston and Mr Banks are expected to arrive in London on 18 December. It will be impossible to provide those in Kuwait with consular assistance thereafter (before their withdrawal Mr Weston and Mr Banks were in touch with as many as possible to urge them to leave). We may also need to thin out our staff in Baghdad as a precaution against the outbreak of hostilities. (Mr Walker, our Ambassador in Baghdad, is in London for consultations to discuss this and other issues. He will return after Christmas.)

British communities in war risk countries

copy please

The Prime Minister will wish to explain the background to the revised consular advice agreed by OPD(G) on 12 December, which we intend to issue on 17 December. There are some 50,000 British nationals in the Gulf, many in countries at direct risk from Iraqi military action. It is unlikely we will get much warning of an outbreak of hostilities. We have decided to issue



advice aimed at reducing the size of our communities in the main danger areas: Bahrain, Qatar, the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, and the cities of Riyadh and Tabuk. About 19,000 British nationals live in these areas, of whom about 7,000 will be directly affected by the advice.

We are concerned not to cause alarm or separate families unnecessarily. But by advising dependants to leave these areas we can significantly reduce the numbers at risk. We consulted the Americans and our EC colleagues in advance: but, as in Iraq, we have much the largest western community in the area and are concerned that we should give them the best advice we can. We anticipate that those affected will have time to leave on normal commercial flights.

US/Iraqi contacts

The Prime Minister might recall that the Iraqis have suggested their Foreign Minister should go to Washington on 17 December for talks with Secretary Baker and President Bush. The Americans are unlikely to agree before a date is fixed for Mr Baker's visit to Baghdad. The US Administration are insisting this visit take place before 3 January: the Iraqis have proposed 12 January in an attempt to spin out the process. After his meeting with Baker in Houston on 10 December, Shevardnadze said publicly this was too late. The Prime Minister might tell Mr Kinnock that President Bush has assured him that there will be no dilution of the basic message to Saddam Hussein at their meetings with the Iraqis. The release of the hostages has not reduced either their opposition to negotiations or their determination to see the relevant Security Council Resolutions implemented in all their parts. Like us they would much prefer a peaceful solution (see below) but are prepared to use force if necessary.

The Prime Minister might go on to give an account of the European Council's discussions and statement on the Gulf. He might explain the guidelines set for the Presidency's meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister after his talks in Washington, to ensure that the Iraqis are given a robust statement of the Twelve's determination to see them out of Kuwait. He might add that the French have confirmed that they will reinforce their troops in the Gulf, while the Germans have indicated that they are working to sustain public support for our common policy.

Finally, the Prime Minister might mention that there is broad agreement on the desirability of a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Five before Baker goes to Baghdad (though the Chinese may still play hard to get). The Russians told us on 10 December that Shevardnadze highly valued this initiative. But it is unlikely to be possible to fix a date before Baker's plans are clearer.

Peace initiatives

The Prime Minister might explain, if necessary, that both the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis have denied media reports of negotiations over ceding the southern end of the Rumaila oil field and leasing the two disputed islands of Bubiyan and Warba to Iraq. He might add that the Iraqis appear to have shown no readiness to comply with the UN Resolution to the President of Algeria on his recent visit to



Baghdad, and that the determination of Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait to resist an 'Arab Solution' remains firm. Further 'peace initiatives' are to be anticipated in the run-up to 15 January.

Will we go to war? Why not wait longer?

Following the debate in the House of Commons on 11 December, Mr Kinnock is likely to probe the Prime Minister's thinking on the timing of any hostilities and perhaps argue that sanctions should be given more time to work. The Prime Minister will want to judge how far to take him into his confidence but could make the following points:

- SCR 678 is not a call to arms. It sets a date after which those Governments assisting Kuwait will be authorised to use all necessary means (including force) to secure the implementation of Security Council Resolutions on the Gulf crisis;
- no decisions have yet been taken on the use of force. The multinational force will not be fully operational by 15 January. Weather conditions in the Gulf are likely to make a campaign difficult much after the beginning of April. The Saudis would also be reluctant to see hostilities commence after the beginning of Ramadan (mid-March), though on past precedent there would be nothing to prevent fighting continuing into Ramadan;
- sanctions are having some effect but are unlikely of themselves to be enough to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw within this timescale. The test of their effectiveness is not whether they are inflicting damage on the Iraqi economy (they are) but whether they will bring Saddam to withdraw. The arguments against waiting longer are:
 - the international coalition has held together partly because it expects to succeed in driving Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The foundation-stone for this is the belief of the Arabs in the resolve of the US and UK to go to war if necessary. They are as aware as us of the time-window for military action. If Saddam Hussein does not withdraw, and if we do not use force, they are likely to conclude that we do not have the resolve to fight. Indeed, it would be hard to gainsay this. The Americans could not maintain their forces at their present level indefinitely in the Gulf. If they do not go into action within the time-window, they will be obliged to withdraw some of their forces. We, too, would find it difficult to maintain our forces indefinitely. Once the Arabs conclude that we are not prepared to fight, they are likely to conclude that Saddam Hussein will win - they have no faith in sanctions. And they want to come out on the winning side. Under those circumstances, Kuwaitis and others are likely to try to strike a deal with Saddam which may leave him in the advantageous position that we have sought to avoid;
 - the Middle East cannot be stable if the Arabs perceive their natural leader to be Saddam Hussein with his massive army. The situation would become still worse if, as we fear, he were able to develop nuclear weapons in the next few years;



- no decision has been taken on military action. Much hangs on the Americans and their ability to keep public opinion on-side. But the possibility of military action between 15 January and April is a real one;
- the longer we wait the more Saddam Hussein will be seen to have successfully driven a coach and horses through the accepted rules of international behaviour. We cannot afford to be seen to let him get away with this;
- the continued despoliation of Kuwait, both in terms of damage to property and Iraqi efforts to drive the Kuwaitis from their country;
- too much delay will give the Iraqis even more opportunity to build up their defences and make the job of ejecting them more difficult and costly in terms of human lives;
- Mr Kaufman's argument that, while hating the idea of war over Kuwait, we have even more the idea of a war throughout the Middle East at a later date if Saddam is allowed to win now.

The Prime Minister will wish to emphasise that we are not looking for war: our aim is to get Saddam out of Kuwait in accordance with the Security Council Resolutions: it would clearly be much better if this could be done without bloodshed.

Israel

The Prime Minister might mention that we are following Israeli reactions to the Gulf crisis carefully. Mr Shamir outlined to him Israel's fears that a peaceful settlement which left Saddam Hussein in charge, with his military machine intact, would pose a grave threat to Israel. We continue to make it clear to the Israelis that their intervention would be fatal for the alliance and to reassure them, as best we can, that we will not settle for a solution which leaves Iraq in a position to destabilise the region.

Defence issues

The Prime Minister may wish to give the Leader of the Opposition some details of British military deployments, drawing on the enclosed sheet. Some 35,000 UK personnel are now committed to the Gulf, from all three services. About 17,000 are already in theatre. Around a further 15,000 Army personnel, with RAF helicopter support, are being deployed to form 1st (British) Armoured Division, which will be fully operational in Saudi Arabia by the end of January.

The agreed command arrangements for UK forces in Saudi Arabia stipulate that any military action by British forces, other than in self-defence, should be agreed with the Saudi and US commands, and that British forces will act in accordance with the 'overall strategic guidance' of the Saudi Supreme Commander.

British forces in the Gulf are under operational command of the UK Joint Commander at RAF Strike Command, High Wycombe, and operational control of British Forces Commander Middle East in Riyadh. Although ultimate national command would be retained, it is likely that tactical control of British forces would be delegated



to a US Commander. Equally, a US brigade may be assigned to 1st Armoured Division's tactical control.

The main units in the Gulf are four destroyers and frigates, 7th Armoured Brigade alongside the US Marines in north-east Saudi Arabia, air-defence Tornados at Dhahran in north-east Saudi Arabia, ground attack Tornados at Tabuk in north-west Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and ground attack Jaguar aircraft in Bahrain.

Visits to the Gulf

The Prime Minister will wish to consider whether to give Mr Kinnock advance notice of the visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt planned by himself and, to Saudi Arabia only, by The Prince of Wales, over the Christmas period.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD).

Jws.
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET
OPERATION GRANBY - UK FORCES COMMITTED AS AT 130700Z DEC 90

2

CLASSIFIED FIGURES

a) In theatre	17005
b) Outside theatre	16513
Total UK Forces committed	33518

PUBLIC FIGURES

a) In theatre	About 17000
b) Outside theatre	About 18000
Total UK Forces committed	About 35000

DD/FF in theatre		MCMVs in theatre		ROYAL NAVY			RFA's/LSUs in theatre			Outside Theatre		
Ship	Personnel	Ship	Personnel	Ship	RFA	RN	Unit	ETA/Loc	Personnel	Unit	ETA/Loc	Personnel
HMS CARDIFF	297	HMS ATHLETIC	47	RFA PORT GRANGE	158	66	HMS DULVERTON	Royalth	50	HMS LEDBURG	Royalth	50
HMS LONDON	304	HMS CATTISTOCK	47	RFA DULDIGNE	44	136	12 x SEA KING	Yeovilton	310			
HMS BRAZEN	252	HMS HURWORTH	48	RFA ORANGELEAF	58	5						
HMS GLOUCESTER	285	HMS HERALD (Conv ship)	136	RFA RESOURCE	159	5						
Ashraf bc. FSU	104			RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	85	298						
				ZUIDERKUIJ		21						
				SR GALAHAD	56	3						
				SR PERCIVAL	55	6						
Total RN personnel in theatre				2060	* - 2 Dutch ships supporting UK vessels and operating in Sea Kings from RFA Q. 94			Total RN pers outside theatre			410	
Total RFA personnel in theatre				815				Total RFA pers o/s theatre			0	

Armia Roulement
 Vessels not
 included in
 totals)

Ship	Personnel	Destination	ETA	Replacing/by

Ships taken up from trade **48**

Other LSUs in use **2**

ARMY

Divisional Troops		1st British Armoured Division - in theatre				4th Brigade		1 BR Arm Div - outside theatre				
Personnel	Total	7th Armoured Brigade		4th Brigade		Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total	Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total	
Fighting Echelon	374	Fighting Echelon	4600	Fighting Echelon	3			9969			4873	
2nd Line Support	2	2nd Line Support	4153					44th Bde (incl. 458 BCRs)				
3rd Line Support		3rd Line Support						Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total		
Battle Casualty Regt		Battle Casualty Regt	196	Support elements of 4 Brigades included in Divisional Troops totals				Challenger MBT		77		
		Adml support elem	1336					Warrior AFV		192		
Total Divisional Troops	378	Total 7th Arm Bde	10285	Total 4th Brigade	3			Scorpion/Scimitar/Striker		96		
								M109 155mm SP gun		38		
								M10 Howitzer		13		
								MLRS		13		
								Lynx helicopters		23		
								Gazelle helicopters		23		
								RAPIER		32		
								AVLB, AVRE, CET		66		
								Javelin		47		
Total other Army support personnel in theatre: signals, medical, engineers, Javelin detts, Armia, miscellaneous											797	
Total 1 British Arm Div in theatre											10664	
Total Army personnel in theatre											11461	
* - total no of equipment in theatre, inc. stock												
Size/int deta											Cyprus	13
Total 1 Div pers o/s theatre											14842	
Total Army pers o/s theatre											14856	

ROYAL AIR FORCE


In Theatre			Outside Theatre			
Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	Loc	Pers	
18 x TORNADO F3	Dhahran		10 x TORNADO GR1	Tabuk		
HQ 4 Wg + LAS	Dhahran	525	4 x TORNADO GR1 ALARM	Tabuk	523	
12 x JAGUAR GR1	Muharraq		HQ 3 Wg RAF Regt	Tabuk		
13 x TORNADO GR1	Muharraq		3 x NIMROD MR2	Deeb		
4 x VC10 TANKER	Muharraq	861	3 x VC10 TANKER	Seeb	209	
RAF Regt RAPIER and LAS	Muharraq		3 x C130	Riyadh	80	
5 x Puma	Al Jubayl	395	1 x HS 125	Riyadh	7	
Jaguar support	Thumrait	15	Miscellaneous	All locations	152	
Total RAF personnel in theatre			2889	Total RAF pers o/s theatre		1248

Total US forces in theatre 261973
 as at 130700Z Dec 90

Total Reservists employed on Regular duty 208
Total personnel in HQBFME 188

Total Reservists deployed to theat 13
Total medical personnel in theatre 2024
Total female personnel in theatre 318

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter from Wall to Powell dated 15 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>25/1/12</i> <i>M. W.</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS

1. The European Community and its member States remain firmly committed to full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and of its legitimate government remain the absolute conditions for a peaceful solution of the crisis.

2. Security Council Resolution 678 sends the clearest possible signal to Iraq that the international community is determined to ensure full restoration of international legality. The responsibility lies on the Iraqi government to ensure peace for its people by complying fully with the demands of the UN Security Council including complete withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January. *particularly*

3. The European Community and its member States earnestly hope that implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions can be peacefully secured. To this end, they support a dialogue of the sort President Bush has offered. They also favour action by the UN Secretary General and hope that the UN Security Council's Permanent Members will remain actively involved as well. They ^{hope} believe that Arab countries should continue to play an important role in the efforts for a peaceful solution. The European Community and its member States underline the value of a contact between the Presidency and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, aimed at securing, in coordination with other members of the international community, full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.

x 4. The European Council [✓] expresses relief at Iraq's decision to release all foreign hostages, but underlines its deep concern at Iraq's failure to withdraw, at its oppressive and inhuman occupation of Kuwait and its attempt to destroy the fabric of the country.

SECRET

15(A-G)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

14 December 1990
[Private Secretary in answer]
C Powell

Dear Sir Kenneth,

BRITISH FORCES IN THE GULF: CALL OUT OF RESERVES

My Secretary of State has been reviewing plans for medical support of our forces in the Gulf in the light of the increase in our ground forces to a division and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 678. He has concluded that the call out of certain essential Reservists under Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 will be necessary, and he is recommending this course to his colleagues for their endorsement. The full background is explained in the attached minute which has been circulated to members of the Cabinet.

Subject to their agreement at a meeting on Monday morning, my Secretary of State would wish to sign an Order under Section 10 of the Act and then notify Parliament, if possible by means of a written answer on Monday afternoon.

The Secretary of State is therefore likely to have to seek The Queen's authorisation on Monday that members of the Reserve forces may be called out under Section 10 of the Act, in view of the Government's advice that national danger is imminent and a great emergency has arisen.

We will let you know when the Government has reached its conclusion.

I am sending a copy of this letter to **Charles Powell** (No 10) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely
Simon Webb

S WEBB
(Private Secretary)

Sir Kenneth Scott KCVO CMG
Deputy Private Secretary to the Queen

SECRET



MO 6/17/15/1S

PRIME MINISTER

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

I have been reviewing plans for medical support in the Gulf as part of the increase in our ground forces to a division. This raises difficult issues over the impact on the NHS and the call-out of reservists.

Arrangements in The Gulf

2. Casualty rates are difficult to predict and depend to a great extent on specific circumstances. Based on NATO planning and experience from the 1967 Arab/Israeli war, we are planning to increase from 750 to 1850 beds in theatre. Most of the additional 1400 personnel needed can be found from regular forces. In some specialisms (surgeons, anaesthetists, theatre nurses and technicians) a shortage of regulars will make it necessary to deploy a small number of reservists.

Evacuation

3. Evacuation will be by air to the UK either direct or first to Cyprus. The increased force will require additional specialists including 160 aeromedical evacuation personnel of 4626 Sqn Royal Auxiliary Air Force (a volunteer unit). The need for RAuxAF personnel raises a particular difficulty which is discussed separately in paragraph 11.



Impact Elsewhere of Deployment to the Gulf

4. Two Service Hospitals will have to close anyway. Without use of reservists, a medical deployment on this scale would lead to the closure of all surgical facilities at the remaining 6 UK Service Hospitals, although some out-patient services could be maintained. In Germany two hospitals would close and a reduced service would be provided at the others, with assistance from the Germans. We cannot safely withdraw medical staff from Northern Ireland, the Falklands and Belize. This means that, in the UK, the choice is:

- either to employ sufficient reservists to keep UK Service Hospitals open; or
- to rely almost entirely on the NHS.

These options are discussed below.

Option 1: Keep Open UK Service Hospitals

5. Medical planning so far has assumed that returning casualties would be admitted to Service Hospitals, trained for battle casualties. This would provide a buffer period before significant casualties would need to be passed to NHS hospitals. With the increase in our forces maintaining UK Service Hospitals at the minimum level required for this approach would require some 1000 reservists. We must also have the correct mix of specialists. A recently completed trawl of over 3000 ex-regular reservists and members of the Territorial Army (TA) has established that only some 300 of those willing and able to volunteer would be in the right categories. Many others were interested but felt unable to come



forward because of worries about getting their jobs back. Call-out under the Reserve Forces Act 1980 would give statutory job protection and, for public sector employees, compensation for loss of earnings.

Option 2: Reliance on NHS

6. The alternative would be to base our plan for the treatment of casualties in the UK almost exclusively on the NHS. This would avoid the need to replace regulars deploying to the Gulf with reservists to keep Service Hospitals operational, and Service personnel and dependents in the UK would have to look to the NHS for medical care for the duration of the deployment.

Comparison of Options

7. An argument for relying almost exclusively on the NHS is that it would limit the medical reserve requirement to a minimum of some 225 to fill critical shortages. Our trawl suggests that this could be largely achieved by volunteers. It would reduce the need to use statutory powers but would impose an immediate additional load on NHS hospitals. Our contacts with the Department of Health suggest that the early transfer of up to 1000 patients and a large number of out-patients would be unwelcome. They would prefer to keep Service hospitals open even though the use of reservists would itself have an impact on the NHS.

8. The military arguments also favour the continued use of Service hospitals which would:

- Rely on well understood and practised casualty procedures.
- Provide a desirable "buffer" at the outset of hostilities.



- Allow concentration of casualties around particular airfields, facilitating reception arrangements and next of kin visits.
- Allow Service Hospitals in the UK to provide a reasonable level of care to Service personnel prior to hostilities.

9. We would aim to meet as much of the requirement as possible from calling out individuals known to be willing to serve. With job protection guaranteed, this is likely to meet the bulk of our need. Any shortfall would have to be met by calling out individual ex-regular reservists compulsorily. In view of the limited time available and the Christmas holiday period, I think it is fair to warn the reservists concerned now that they may be required if sufficient volunteers do not come forward. Although we would not call out members of the TA compulsorily, there would be considerable advantage in meeting part of the requirement by deploying a TA field hospital to the Gulf if most of a unit will volunteer. They are used to working together as a team in the role for which its members have trained. The unit we have in mind is 205 General Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corps (Volunteer) of some 350 personnel, based in Glasgow. Initial consultation with the Scottish Home and Health Department suggests that this should not create undue difficulties for the Health Service there.

Pay

10. Treasury officials have agreed that we should pay a supplement to reservists who are called out to make up any difference between their civilian earnings, up to a maximum of £55,000 a year, and their military pay. This is in line with my undertaking that Service personnel will not suffer financially as a result of being sent to the Gulf and should encourage a larger number of volunteers



to come forward. It would also remove any need for the Department of Health or Area Health Authorities to make continuing payments, except in respect of superannuation contributions.

RAuxAF Medical Evacuation Squadron

11. Most categories of reservists can be called out under Section 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 ("when warlike operations are in preparation or progress"). The RAuxAF can only be called out under Section 10, when "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen." Use of either section has to be reported to Parliament, which must be recalled if not sitting. The very latest that 4626 Squadron can form, to be operational at the same time as 1 Armoured Division, would be 2nd January 1991. To allow personnel reasonable notice to set their affairs in order this would imply call out, at the very latest, by the time Parliament rises on 20th December. Now that UNSCR 678 has been passed, authorising the use of force after 15th January, and there is still no indication of Iraqi withdrawal, it appears that both national danger is imminent and that a great emergency has arisen. I would particularly welcome the Attorney General's view on this point.

Conclusion

12. The military arguments point clearly to providing medical support in the UK through a combination of Service Hospitals and the NHS (Option 1 above). This would entail use of some 1000 reservists. I propose to seek volunteers to be called out from both ex-regular reservists and the TA, making it clear that if there remains a shortfall it will be necessary to call out selected ex-regular (but not TA) reservists compulsorily. In addition, we



need to call out 4626 Sqn RAuxAF under Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act. I indicated in the Gulf debate on 11th December that it might be necessary to call out limited numbers of reservists and I believe this will be generally accepted.


13. Subject to confirmation that colleagues are content and, in particular, that the consequences for the NHS would be acceptable to the Secretaries of State for Health and Scotland, I propose to inform Parliament of these steps by Written Answer early next week, if possible on Monday 17th December.

14. I am sending a copy of this minute to members of OPD(G) (who will have an opportunity to discuss it on Monday morning), the Lord President, the Secretaries of State for Health and for Scotland, and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence
14th December 1990

(T K)
(Approved by the Defence
Secretary and signed in his
absence)

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>letter and attachment from Woods to Powell dated 14 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>25/1/98</i> <i>mi h-</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1990

IRAQ-KUWAIT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF NAURU

Thank you for your letter of 14 December to Charles Powell. We were grateful for the draft reply to the President of Nauru attached with it. I do wonder whether at the end of the first paragraph it should add:

"Although this is welcome, we have to remember that Iraq has much yet to do to meet the UN Security Council Resolutions which must be implemented in full".

Subject to that addition, I am sure the Prime Minister would be content for the reply to issue.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

File SR

cc PC

c/party/iraq

DSS

*col o/r.*

①

Prime Minister

MO 6/17/15/1S

PRIME MINISTER

Agree that we should call up reservists for medical duties in connection with ~~the~~ a only war?

MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES MIDDLE EAST

I have been reviewing plans for medical support in the Gulf as part of the increase in our ground forces to a division. This raises difficult issues over the impact on the NHS and the call-out of reservists.

*CDP**15/12*Arrangements in The Gulf

2. Casualty rates are difficult to predict and depend to a great extent on specific circumstances. Based on NATO planning and experience from the 1967 Arab/Israeli war, we are planning to increase from 750 to 1850 beds in theatre. Most of the additional 1400 personnel needed can be found from regular forces. In some specialisms (surgeons, anaesthetists, theatre nurses and technicians) a shortage of regulars will make it necessary to deploy a small number of reservists.

Evacuation

3. Evacuation will be by air to the UK either direct or first to Cyprus. The increased force will require additional specialists including 160 aeromedical evacuation personnel of 4626 Sqn Royal Auxiliary Air Force (a volunteer unit). The need for RAuxAF personnel raises a particular difficulty which is discussed separately in paragraph 11.



Impact Elsewhere of Deployment to the Gulf

4. Two Service Hospitals will have to close anyway. Without use of reservists, a medical deployment on this scale would lead to the closure of all surgical facilities at the remaining 6 UK Service Hospitals, although some out-patient services could be maintained. In Germany two hospitals would close and a reduced service would be provided at the others, with assistance from the Germans. We cannot safely withdraw medical staff from Northern Ireland, the Falklands and Belize. This means that, in the UK, the choice is:

- either to employ sufficient reservists to keep UK Service Hospitals open; or
- to rely almost entirely on the NHS.

These options are discussed below.

Option 1: Keep Open UK Service Hospitals

5. Medical planning so far has assumed that returning casualties would be admitted to Service Hospitals, trained for battle casualties. This would provide a buffer period before significant casualties would need to be passed to NHS hospitals. With the increase in our forces, maintaining UK Service Hospitals at the minimum level required for this approach would require some 1000 reservists. We must also have the correct mix of specialists. A recently completed trawl of over 3000 ex-regular reservists and members of the Territorial Army (TA) has established that only some 300 of those willing and able to volunteer would be in the right categories. Many others were interested but felt unable to come



forward because of worries about getting their jobs back. Call-out under the Reserve Forces Act 1980 would give statutory job protection and, for public sector employees, compensation for loss of earnings.

Option 2: Reliance on NHS

6. The alternative would be to base our plan for the treatment of casualties in the UK almost exclusively on the NHS. This would avoid the need to replace regulars deploying to the Gulf with reservists to keep Service Hospitals operational, and Service personnel and dependents in the UK would have to look to the NHS for medical care for the duration of the deployment.

Comparison of Options

7. An argument for relying almost exclusively on the NHS is that it would limit the medical reserve requirement to a minimum of some 225 to fill critical shortages. Our trawl suggests that this could be largely achieved by volunteers. It would reduce the need to use statutory powers but would impose an immediate additional load on NHS hospitals. Our contacts with the Department of Health suggest that the early transfer of up to 1000 patients and a large number of out-patients would be unwelcome. They would prefer to keep Service hospitals open even though the use of reservists would itself have an impact on the NHS.

8. The military arguments also favour the continued use of Service hospitals which would:

- Rely on well understood and practised casualty procedures.
- Provide a desirable "buffer" at the outset of hostilities.



- ✓ - Allow concentration of casualties around particular airfields, facilitating reception arrangements and next of kin visits.
- ✓ - Allow Service Hospitals in the UK to provide a reasonable level of care to Service personnel prior to hostilities.

X 9. We would aim to meet as much of the requirement as possible from calling out individuals known to be willing to serve. With job protection guaranteed, this is likely to meet the bulk of our need. Any shortfall would have to be met by calling out individual ex-regular reservists compulsorily. In view of the limited time available and the Christmas holiday period, I think it is fair to warn the reservists concerned now that they may be required if sufficient volunteers do not come forward. Although we would not call out members of the TA compulsorily, there would be considerable advantage in meeting part of the requirement by deploying a TA field hospital to the Gulf if most of a unit will volunteer. They are used to working together as a team in the role for which its members have trained. The unit we have in mind is 205 General Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corps (Volunteer) of some 350 personnel, based in Glasgow. Initial consultation with the Scottish Home and Health Department suggests that this should not create undue difficulties for the Health Service there.

Pay

10. Treasury officials have agreed that we should pay a supplement to reservists who are called out to make up any difference between their civilian earnings, up to a maximum of £55,000 a year, and their military pay. This is in line with my undertaking that Service personnel will not suffer financially as a result of being sent to the Gulf and should encourage a larger number of volunteers



to come forward. It would also remove any need for the Department of Health or Area Health Authorities to make continuing payments, except in respect of superannuation contributions.

RAuxAF Medical Evacuation Squadron

11. Most categories of reservists can be called out under Section 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 ("when warlike operations are in preparation or progress"). The RAuxAF can only be called out under Section 10, when "national danger is imminent" or "a great emergency has arisen." Use of either section has to be reported to Parliament, which must be recalled if not sitting. The very latest that 4626 Squadron can form, to be operational at the same time as 1 Armoured Division, would be 2nd January 1991. To allow personnel reasonable notice to set their affairs in order this would imply call out, at the very latest, by the time Parliament rises on 20th December. Now that UNSCR 678 has been passed, authorising the use of force after 15th January, and there is still no indication of Iraqi withdrawal, it appears that both national danger is imminent and that a great emergency has arisen. I would particularly welcome the Attorney General's view on this point.

Conclusion

12. The military arguments point clearly to providing medical support in the UK through a combination of Service Hospitals and the NHS (Option 1 above). This would entail use of some 1000 reservists. I propose to seek volunteers to be called out from both ex-regular reservists and the TA, making it clear that if there remains a shortfall it will be necessary to call out selected ex-regular (but not TA) reservists compulsorily. In addition, we




need to call out 4626 Sqn RAuxAF under Section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act. I indicated in the Gulf debate on 11th December that it might be necessary to call out limited numbers of reservists and I believe this will be generally accepted.

13. Subject to confirmation that colleagues are content and, in particular, that the consequences for the NHS would be acceptable to the Secretaries of State for Health and Scotland, I propose to inform Parliament of these steps by Written Answer early next week, if possible on Monday 17th December.

14. I am sending a copy of this minute to members of OPD(G) (who will have an opportunity to discuss it on Monday morning), the Lord President, the Secretaries of State for Health and for Scotland, and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence
14th December 1990

(T K)
(Approved by the Defence
Secretary and signed in his
absence)



8

CCPC.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

14 December 1990

Dear Charles,

Iraq-Kuwait: Message From The President of Nauru

The President of Nauru has sent the following message to the Prime Minister:

7 December 1990

Dear Prime Minister,

I wrote to your predecessor, the Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, back in August expressing my concern over the action of the Iraq President to detain British citizens in Kuwait and Iraq as hostages.

not read (1990)

Your former Prime Minister very kindly acknowledged my message.

I am very happy to hear today that Iraq has now decided to free all foreign hostages without delay. I hope that the news is true.

I understand that there are over a thousand British trapped in the area, and I am sure you and your Government and your people are very pleased and happy with this wonderful development. We on this small island, rejoice with you all.

I hope your people will arrive home safely without any further delay to enjoy the festivities of Christmas and the New Year with their loved ones.

With lots of best wishes.

Yours sincerely
Bernard Dowiyogo - President



The original is being sent direct from Nauru to
/ No 10. I enclose a suggested draft reply.

Yours ever,
[Handwritten Signature]

(S. L. Gass)
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER TO HE MR BERNARD DOWIYOGO, PRESIDENT OF NAURU

Thank you for your kind message of 7 December, about the release of the hostages from Iraq and Kuwait. We are all very glad that Iraq has finally understood that the holding of hostages is counter-productive. It is, of course, a great joy to the families that their loved ones will be with them at Christmas time.

I am most grateful for your interest and support on this issue over the past few months. I wish you and the people of Nauru a joyful Christmas and a prosperous New Year.

MIDDLE EAST
SIX A 35





④

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

Prime Minister

CD

12/xii

Call on Cardinal Hume

1. You have kindly agreed to call on Cardinal Basil Hume to discuss with him the various issues connected with the Gulf crisis which are of concern to the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations.
2. Officials here have prepared a paper which I hope you will find useful in setting out our views on the major questions posed by the crisis. I also enclose copies of the pastoral letter from the Catholic Bishops of England and Wales which was read in Catholic churches on 2 December and of the statement by the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland of 7 December, which was signed by Cardinal Hume amongst others.
3. Finally, I thought you might be interested to see the rather good article by the Bishop of Oxford which appeared in The Independent on 31 October. It neatly counters some of the arguments put forward by those with doubts about our policy. I also enclose a copy of Sir Arthur Hockaday's article in the Tablet last October, which also addresses the 'just war' question in a helpful way.
4. If you would find it helpful to have an FCO official with you during the call or need further briefing, please let me know. I would be interested to hear what Cardinal Hume has to say.
5. I am copying this minute to members of the OPD(G), the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary and Sir Robin Butler.

D.H.

(DOUGLAS HURD)



CALL BY MR PATTEN ON CARDINAL HUME

The Gulf Crisis: A Just War?

1. In recent weeks there has been increasing discussion, particularly amongst the Christian denominations, of whether war in the Gulf to recover Kuwait would be justified. Argument has been based on the long established Christian tradition of a "just war". Although there are a number of views as to what exactly constitutes the basis for a just war, there are certain basic criteria which all are agreed must be fulfilled. They are:

- (1) That the cause should be just.
- (2) That all peaceful means of resolving a dispute have been exhausted.
- (3) That the likely consequences of military action are not out of all proportion to the injustice it seeks to correct or prevent, ie proportionality.

2. Some commentators add other criteria to the three set out above. The most commonly mentioned are that military action should be properly authorised; that there should be a probability of victory; and that those undertaking military action should do so on the basis of a "right intention".

The Views of the Churches

3. There is a wide spectrum of views on the crisis within all the major Christian denominations ranging from strong support for the Government's position right through to a completely pacifist line. Cardinal Hume has associated himself with two statements on the crisis. The first was the pastoral letter from the Catholic Bishops of England and Wales which was read out in all Catholic Churches on 2 December. The second was a statement by the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland on 7 December. The latter was also supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury and various other Protestant leaders.



4. The two statements are broadly similar and express concern as to whether the criteria for a just war have been met. The Council of Churches' statement says that the churches are not convinced that all reasonable attempts have been made to find a peaceful settlement and that they have "grave difficulties" with the idea that the consequences of a war would be proportionate with the injustice it sought to prevent or correct. The Catholic Bishops expressed the same reservations and, in addition, called for respect for the role of the UN and suggested that a real prospect should exist of achieving the just objectives of a war before it was launched.

5. The Government's position is that the criteria for a just war have been met:

a) Do we have "just cause"?

- The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August was an unprovoked and naked act of aggression against a sovereign and independent state, which is a member of the United Nations. It violated Iraq's obligations as a signatory of the UN Charter and the Charter of the Arab League which both call for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

- The UN Security Council, reflecting the will of the international community, has adopted a series of resolutions which express condemnation of Iraq's aggression. They call for complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate government and the release of all foreign nationals.

- The Iraqis have refused to comply with these mandatory resolutions and have only now begun to release foreign nationals, for their own reasons.

- The international community must enforce respect for its will if necessary. Many nations have committed forces to the Gulf to that end.



b) Have we made all "reasonable attempts" to secure a peaceful outcome?

- Our earnest hope throughout this crisis has been that a peaceful solution should be found. That is why we have not hastened to use the military option.

- The aims of the international community are set out in the Security Council resolutions. The means have been peaceful pressures on Iraq - diplomatic and economic. We have sought to make clear Iraq's diplomatic isolation and to bring home the consequences of its action. The United Nations has imposed stringent economic sanctions, which have been tightly enforced, to increase the pressure on the Iraqi leadership. But the threat of military action is perhaps the most potent means of bringing home to Saddam Hussain that he must reverse what he has done. To be effective it must be credible: forces have been assembled which are strong enough to give effect to the international community's will if necessary.

- By these means we have sought to put growing but peaceful pressure on Iraq to reverse its aggression. Security Council Resolution 678 set a date of 15 January for Iraqi compliance and gave authorisation for the use of all necessary means to enforce its resolutions. This is the latest and firmest of peaceful pressures on Iraq. It is not a deadline for military action. By that date Iraq will have been given over five months to reverse its aggression.

- The test of whether sanctions are effective is not whether they are inflicting damage on Iraq's economy. It is clear that they are. But Saddam Hussain is no respecter of the hardships of his people, as the last ten years of his brutal rule have shown. The proof that sanctions are effective would be Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. That is their purpose. The evidence suggests that, on the contrary, Saddam Hussein is preparing for a long siege and that sanctions alone will not succeed.



- Meanwhile the oppression and suffering of the Kuwaiti people continues. The destruction of the fabric and infrastructure of the state of Kuwait is well attested. Saddam is seeking to obliterate Kuwait's identity following formal annexation in August. Each day that we delay increases the suffering and damage and allows the Iraqis to continue to build up their forces and prepare their defences, making the cost of the liberation of Kuwait higher the longer we delay.

- President Bush is to meet the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz and Secretary Baker will travel to Baghdad to meet Saddam Hussain. Their intention is clear. It is to speak plainly so that Iraq's leaders understand exactly what is required of them and the consequences if they continue to defy the Security Council. Saddam Hussein will also be told that if Iraq does comply, he need have no fear of attack. The European Community will repeat this message to Tariq Aziz through the Italian Presidency. As President Bush has said we are going "the extra mile" for peace.

c) Will the consequences of a war be out of all proportion to the evil it seeks to address?

- The consequences of a conflict are extremely difficult to assess. No one wants war or doubts the cost if conflict were to break out.

- But the consequences of not dealing with Iraq's aggression effectively are enormous. The rape of Kuwait will continue. The will of the international community will have been defied and the resolve of some may erode with time. Iraq could be left with the fruits of its aggression. The law of the jungle would be seen to pay. No small state would feel safe. There is no guarantee that Kuwait is the limit of Saddam's ambition. He is a ruthless adventurer, already responsible for two major conflicts.

- The consequences of war for the future of the Middle East are also hard to calculate. But there will never be stability in the region if Saddam Hussein is allowed to succeed. Israel could never have the security which is essential to a solution of the Arab/Israel problem; nor can the other Arab states feel safe while they have an over-armed tyrant on their doorsteps.



- If Iraq is not dealt with now, we will face the Iraqi threat for years to come. Saddam Hussain is continuing to develop horrific weapons of mass destruction - chemical, biological and nuclear. Instability in the Middle East will grow.

- If a new world order based on respect for the rule of law is to mean anything, then the international community must be prepared to take action to enforce its collective will.

6. The release of hostages has raised hopes for a peaceful solution. But the hostages should never have been taken. Iraq still has to comply with the rest of the Security Council resolutions. Talk of "negotiation" is misplaced. There is nothing to negotiate with Iraq before it complies with UN resolutions. As Resolution 660 makes clear, once Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait then talks to resolve the differences between the two countries should take place.

MESSAGE FROM THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF ENGLAND AND WALES READ
OUT IN ALL CHURCHES ON SUNDAY 2 DECEMBER

At our recent meeting in London we have considered together many issues arising from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. This grave act of aggression has brought crisis and anxiety to peoples and nations the world over. We were particularly conscious of those personally caught up in this dangerous situation and offer them the support of our prayers. In this we have in mind not only the armed forces and their families, but also those innocent persons held hostage in a manner that is indefensible and inhuman.

We have been greatly encouraged by the achievements of the United Nations in securing an international response to this unjust act. It is our belief that efforts to achieve a just solution without recourse to military action, especially by economic and diplomatic means, must be given every opportunity to succeed. In this the paramount role of the United Nations should be recognised, respected and supported.

But if, despite such persevering efforts, all this should fail to bring an end to this injustice and cruelty those in authority must still weigh carefully whether or not to go to war. They must be satisfied that there is a real prospect not only for achieving the just objectives sought by the use of military force, but also of not causing in the process physical and political damage out of all proportion to the injustice such action seeks to correct or prevent. Such terrible and difficult decisions have to be taken by those bearing political and military responsibilities. They too need the full support of our prayers.

At this time our primary calling is for prayer that the aggression of Iraq may be overcome without the tragedy of war. This is a duty which we share with all the churches and with all others who have faith in God. The season of Advent, in which we prepare for the coming of the Prince of Peace, must this year be for us all a time of constant prayer for a peaceful and just solution to this very dangerous situation. We urge you to renewed efforts in this regard. We ask you, our people and priests, to make special provision for such prayer in your churches and in your homes.

7 DECEMBER 1990

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE GULF CRISIS

As the joint Presidents of the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland, we call upon all the Churches to pray that the aggression of Iraq will be overcome without the tragedy of war.

Following the recent resolution of the United Nations Security Council authorizing military action if Iraq has not withdrawn from Kuwait by mid-January, we welcome the signs of renewed diplomatic activity between the governments of the United States and Iraq, and we call upon all the Churches in our Council to continue to pray that the path towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis will remain open.

A number of statements on the Gulf Crisis have issued from various quarters in the Churches of Britain and Ireland in recent weeks. They illustrate the widespread and deep concern felt by so many Christians at the prospect of a war which could entail death and destruction on an appalling scale, with consequences for the welfare of the human family far beyond the Middle East, especially for the poorest peoples of the world.

Although there are sincere differences of conviction among Christians regarding the legitimacy of armed conflict, and some would rule out the use of force as a matter of principle, there is profound and wide agreement among most Christians in Britain and Ireland that war cannot be a moral option unless all reasonable attempts at a peaceful solution have been exhausted. Even then the likely consequences of war must not be out of all proportion to the injustice which it seeks to correct or prevent. We are not convinced that in the case of the Gulf the first of these conditions has so far been met, and in view of the possible physical and political consequences of a Gulf war, the fulfilment of the second condition poses grave difficulties. We are united in hoping that those who carry the awesome responsibilities for decision will be guided by these moral principles.

As the season of Christmas approaches our minds are drawn even more closely to that region of the world where our Saviour Jesus Christ came in such humility and poverty, and was worshipped by those who brought gifts from the East. We extend our sympathy to the suffering people of Kuwait, to the hostages and their families, and to all whose lives have been disrupted by Iraq's breaches of international law. We call upon the Christians of Britain and Ireland to hold in their thoughts and prayers all the peoples of the Middle East, of all faiths, who yearn for security, freedom, justice and peace. Especially, we greet the Churches of the Middle East in the love of Christ, assuring our brothers and sisters of our continuing concern for them, and our desire to enter with them into deeper relationships of understanding, support and common witness to the gospel of God's reconciling love.

SIGNED BY:

The Most Revd Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury

Cardinal Basil Hume, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster

The Revd Dafydd H. Owen, General Secretary, Presbyterian Church in Wales

Christine Davis, Religious Society of Friends, Scotland

The Most Revd Father Olu A. Abiola, President, Council of African and Afro-Caribbean Churches

The Rt Revd John R. W. Neill, Bishop of Tuam, Ireland

PRESIDENTS, COUNCIL OF CHURCHES FOR BRITAIN AND IRELAND

DECEMBER 7 1990

***** E N D S *****

Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford, takes issue with those who say no Western first strike in the Gulf could morally be justified

The path to a just war

THE CHURCHES have been relatively quiet about the morality of military action in the Gulf. This is partly because there has been a broad consensus of support for the action so far taken. The peace has now been disturbed, however, by a number of voices saying that there is not and could not be a case for a just war to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

The phrase "a just war" may imply moral self-righteousness. But this is not its intent. The underlying assumption is that war, if morally inescapable, is a tragic necessity in a fallen world, in which we are all sinful. No one has captured this sense more strongly than the great American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, whose prayers contain such petitions as: "We pray for wicked and cruel men, whose arrogance reveals to us what the sin of our own hearts is like when it has conceived and brought forth its final fruit."

The main criteria that have to

be met before an offensive is launched are: the action must be properly authorised; there must be just cause; all peaceful means of resolving the dispute must have been exhausted; there must be a reasonable expectation that the war will not unleash more evil that would otherwise be averted; there must be a probability of victory.

In addition, the war must be fought with a right intention. Recently, Philip Crowe (Principal of Salisbury and Wells Theological College) and Rowan Williams (Professor of Theology, at Oxford) have argued, in an open letter to the House of Bishops, that no war in the Gulf could be just because it fails this and other tests. They argue that the United States and other West-

ern powers are only in the Middle East to protect their own interests. Yet the presence of self-interest does not by itself rule out the possibility of a war being just. It is in the interest of all nations to prevent any country thinking that it can simply

The churches should unite in keeping the governments on their present course

march across the borders of a neighbour and take it over.

Rowan Williams and Philip Crowe also draw attention to double standards. They point to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the American action in Nicaragua, Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank and the immunity of Pol Pot. But a fail-

ure to act in the past hardly justifies a present failure to do so; it should make us more determined to see justice done now.

The other point made by Rowan Williams and Philip Crowe is that Western nations bear responsibility for the

tragic mess in the Middle East, because the Arab peoples were manipulated and their national boundaries drawn by the British and other powers to serve Western interests. Moreover, we supported Iraq against Iran, providing massive supplies of arms. However, whatever our culpability in the past we still have a responsibility to resist

aggression in the present. To take historic sinfulness as a reason for refusing to use military force would be to paralyse all human action and hand the world over to total anarchy.

The most relevant of the just-war criteria is that all peaceful means of achieving a resolution must first have been exhausted. The present policy is to use sanctions and diplomatic pressure to force President Saddam to withdraw. The presence of military forces is a reminder of the terrible consequences that could ensue if he failed to do so.

This policy, together with the restraint which has so far gone with it, has been widely commended by church bodies both sides of the Atlantic. But the military option remains and morally must continue to do so.

In the end, only the governments concerned can decide whether every peaceful means of achieving a resolution has been tried and failed. Only they can then decide whether a military victory is possible and whether one could be achieved without a disproportionate cost, both in terms of human suffering and long-term political damage to the whole area.

Meanwhile, the churches should unite in keeping governments on their present course. This involves being absolutely adamant that Saddam Hussein must withdraw from Kuwait, and be rendered harmless for future aggression. It means being at once resolute on the objective while exploring every possibility of achieving this short of war. Time is running out but it has not yet done so.

Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford, is the author of 'Christianity and War in a Nuclear Age' (Mowbrays).

War and justice

Arthur Hockaday

The Christian tradition of just war has application, which is much debated, to the present situation in the Gulf. The view expressed here is that of a former second permanent under-secretary in the Ministry of Defence who is chairman of the British group of the International Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament.

I shall not rehearse in this article the reasons why I hold a broadly just war rather than a pacifist position. The arguments on both sides are well known to readers of *The Tablet*. They reflect the tensions within the teaching of Scripture and of the Church between an ethic of justice and an ethic of mercy, and between the call to live as though Christ's role on earth had already begun and an acceptance that, so long as the Kingdom of God has not come on earth, the world must be governed under God's authority but within the terms of its own politics and jurisprudence.

The just war tradition starts from the presumption that war is an evil: Aquinas (ST, 2a 2ae, 40, 1) addresses himself expressly to the question whether to go to war is always sinful. The tradition seeks to explore whether there are circumstances in which it may be permissible to go to war, and if so what they are; and to define the limits within which it may be permissible to wage a war upon which it is legitimate to embark. The tradition should perhaps be construed as an enquiry into whether a war may be "justifiable" rather than "just" in the senses that we would normally attach to the latter term.

It is sometimes suggested that any war fought with modern technology is bound to inflict damage on a scale that renders the categories of the schoolmen irrelevant. But this objection is likely to be founded on the propositions that the destruction inflicted by any modern war cannot but be both indiscriminate between combatants and non-combatants and disproportionate to any good that it may achieve or any evil that it may avert. These propositions are themselves derived from just war criteria, and it is by no means self-evident that the just war tradition is irrelevant or outmoded.

Given the possibility that a number of Western and Middle Eastern nations, including our own, may before long find themselves at war with Iraq, this article seeks to explore how far the just war criteria might be relevant to such a war. I shall examine in turn the criteria of lawful authority, just cause, last resort, reasonable prospect of success, righteous intention, discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, and proportion between the damage inflicted and the good thereby achieved or evil thereby averted. In doing so I shall concentrate on the applicability of the criteria rather than attempt to prescribe answers for hypothet-

ical circumstances. The context of the discussion will be an operation led by the United States to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait and, in Secretary of State James Baker's words, "reverse Iraq's capacity for aggression".

Lawful authority is not relevant in the sense that Aquinas had in mind when he required the authority of the sovereign and said that a private person has no business to declare war. We are thinking about governments, not private individuals or even groups that may be described from different viewpoints as freedom fighters or terrorists. But the criterion becomes relevant in terms of the authority of the United Nations. There are two questions here. The first is whether the authority of the United Nations is necessary before recourse to war can be legitimate: the

'The intention must be righteous . . . those who wage a just war must intend peace.'

second is how much of such authority exists in the present conjuncture.

The UN charter confirms the right of self-defence "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security", and permits the Security Council itself to employ armed force. Nevertheless, while we can unreservedly welcome the remarkable and unprecedented consensus in the Security Council for the actions so far undertaken, and hope for its continuance, the question remains whether, if other criteria for firm action to maintain international peace and security are satisfied, yet the Security Council for some reason does not take action, individual nations or groups of nations may legitimately do so with or without United Nations backing.

An assessment of the degree of authority already conferred turns essentially on how far the resolutions of the Security Council, condemning Iraqi aggression and calling for withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of its legitimate government and freedom of the hostages, may be held in themselves to imply endorsement of at least the minimum military action required to enforce them. Explicit approval has been given for such measures as are necessary to enforce the economic sanc-

tions imposed. The American and British governments have indicated that, should further action appear to be called for, specific United Nations approval would be welcome but is not in their view necessary. This judgement could be challenged by other members of the Security Council and political expediency might dictate a reference back for further authority. Whatever the merits of the question, however, it seems clear that the traditional criterion of lawful authority is very relevant.

Aquinas defined just cause in the sense that those who are to be attacked do so on account of some wrong that they have done. He quoted an observation of Augustine that just wars are, usually so described because they avenge wrongs, as when a state has failed to make amends for wrongs committed by its own citizens or where what it has wrongly seized is the property of its citizens needs to be returned in respect of the seizure of Kuwait, this judgement of the United Nations thereupon, and the outrages reported to have been committed by Iraqi troops.

"As Walter Stein said in a letter to *The Tablet* (15 September), last resort will be the criterion of crucial importance. Although some Kuwaiti and Saudi officials have been reported as pressing for early military action, the bulk of political and public opinion both within those nations that have deployed forces in Saudi Arabia, and more widely throughout the world as reflected in the United Nations, would not doubt be to be satisfied before any such action, the meaning of which would be a blockade of the Gulf, is undertaken. It is effective nor could it be. The prudent, in particular, would be holding the anti-Iraqi coalition together likely to reinforce the just war tradition. Repeated statements from the American and British authorities have stressed that the first priority must be to maintain the economic pressures upon Iraq. And the Iraqis have been compelled both to impose petrol rationing and to offer oil for sale at \$21 a barrel, to raise revenue. But there may be a complication in that the relatively cool season, within which the military commanders would certainly wish to encompass any military operations, that might be approved, lasts only through February and does not recommence until November. It may therefore be necessary not later than, say, early January, to make judgements upon whether and within what timescale operations are likely to compel an Iraqi withdrawal.

Which leads to the criterion of reasonable prospect of success. Under this, soldiers should not be committed to battle, or "enemy" combatants or non-combatants put at risk, unless there is a reasonable prospect that by doing so the just cause can be vindicated and the righteous intention put into effect. It will be an extremely important criterion for decisions on launching operations against a powerful military machine. The numerical strength of the Iraqi forces, especially in tanks, suggests that to dislodge them from Kuwait would be a very considerable operation.

A/

IRAQ/KUWAIT

French. & to decision.
Saudi
13(A-G)

UK POSITION PAPERSTRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Our strategic objectives are as follows:
 - a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. ✓
 - b. To secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq. ✓
 - c. To secure the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait. *How??*
 - d. To bring to account those responsible for atrocities by committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. ✓
 - e. To eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical and long range missile capability. *How??*
 - f. To establish a long term regional security structure that involves minimum Western participation.

- g. To avoid any Israeli involvement in the crisis. ✓

It would not be a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); we should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

2. The strategy currently selected to achieve the most immediate of these objectives is to secure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of non-compliance.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

3. If Iraq fails to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions within a reasonable timeframe, the military option will come into play. In that event our military objectives are seen as:

a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; ✓

b. To rescue or secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq; ✓

c. To destroy Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capability/potential and her long range missile capability; ✓

4. No avoidable constraints should be placed on the conduct of military operations, if the duration of hostilities and associated casualties are to be minimised. Nevertheless, the means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be justifiable within the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Moreover the impact of military operations on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion will need to be kept in mind.

5. Air operations against targets in Iraq will be an essential element in military operations but we should avoid a 'scorched earth' policy.

6. Land operations in Iraq should be limited to those necessary to liberate Kuwait or to rescue hostages. There should be no intention to occupy any part of Iraqi territory.

GUIDANCE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

7. Tactical military planning to meet these objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Planning should conform to the following criteria

a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be

relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

- b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;
- c. targets for attack may include facilities which provide direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait (e.g. military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems, Government command centres);
- d. civil targets which have no military connections (e.g. desalination plants) should not be attacked;
- e. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible; e.g. by selecting the appropriate method of attack or giving prior warning;
- f. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;
- g. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations. Where possible these concerns should be met by alternative methods of attack.

h. Although the first priority is to ensure the success of military operations, planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist hostages (and other refugees).

i. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.

CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIES

8. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations. Co-operation with them and with the Saudis is fundamental and the role and tasks of UK forces in relation to both of them will need to be determined and agreed at political level. It will be important for the French and other principal Arab forces to be involved in any operation and to be brought into co-ordination and planning. The requirement for "joint decision" will entail consultation at the highest level with the Saudis.

18

4. Although the first priority is to ensure the success of military operations, planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist hostages (and other refugees).

5. While giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.

CO-ORDINATION WITH ALGERIA

6. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations. Co-operation with them and with the Saudis is fundamental and the role and tasks of UK forces in relation to both of them will need to be determined and agreed at political level. It will be important for the French and other principal Arab forces to be involved in any operation and to be brought into co-ordination and planning. The requirement for "joint decision" will entail consultation at the highest level with the Saudis.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 December 1990

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a further message to the Prime Minister from President Bush about the Gulf. It has crossed with the Prime Minister's reply to the President's last message. It does not seem to me to call for a reply ahead of the Prime Minister's visit to Camp David.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

K

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter from Turnbull to Webb dated 12 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>25/1/14</i> <i>M. L. H.</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

Jp 01233

PRIME MINISTER

Implications of Iraqi Withdrawal from Kuwait

OPD(G) (90) 6 and 8

These are two important papers. They deal with a situation which was always possible but which has become more likely following the passage of Security Council Resolution 678 and the US proposal of direct talks. They both deal with the crucial end-game phase of the crisis.

2. Among the points they bring out are:

a. The fragility of the coalition in the event of a partial Iraqi withdrawal, even when its incomplete nature becomes plain. In particular, there would be a deleterious effect on US Congressional opinion.

b. The even greater fragility if Saddam withdraws completely.

c. The fact, often overlooked, that we would face the long-term problem of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction even after a successful war (the facilities might not be fully destroyed and, in any case, could be rebuilt, since the knowledge is there), or even if Saddam Hussein were overthrown (his successor might be little better).

d. The need, whether there has been war or not, for stringent control of imports of technology and military equipment into Iraq. At the same time, the difficulty in enforcing an efficient embargo.

- e. The prospect of Iraqi/Kuwaiti negotiations after the crisis and the risks inherent in such negotiations unless the Kuwaitis are stiffened.
- f. The need for long-term security arrangements in any event.
3. What the papers do not address so clearly are:
- a. The chances of Saddam surviving a complete withdrawal. He could probably manage it, but it is not a foregone conclusion, and in order to maximise the chances of his overthrow it will be essential to deny him any face-savers or diplomatic prizes, eg in the Palestinian context. So far as we can, we have to show him as a defeated figure.
- b. The dangerous implications for the area of a successful Iraqi withdrawal: the great boost to Saddam's prestige of having survived confrontation with the United States, the consequent shift of allegiances among the Arabs, the temptation to Israel to strike.
- c. The immediate military implications: Should the allies follow into Kuwait? With the Arab forces leading? What would our vulnerability be?
- d. The problem in setting up a regional security structure: are we to concentrate on Iraq/Kuwait or do we go at once for a wider net, including Syria and Israel? The second is tempting, but would soon be wrecked on Israeli intransigence. We shall probably have to go for the first, but we shall have to be ready with justifications for a partial approach. They can probably be found by references to Iraq's behaviour: only Iraq has used its weapons of mass

destruction; only Iraq has sought to extinguish a neighbouring state.

- e. The fact that, despite all our efforts, Iraq is likely to retain or redevelop its NBC weapons and that security may therefore come to depend on a balance of deterrence in the area, rather than on unrealistic hopes of a weapon-free Middle East. As part of that deterrence we might consider offering Western guarantees to any neighbouring countries threatened with Iraq's nuclear or NBC weapons.
4. In the immediate future the question is how would we and the Americans make the best of a bad job, ie the recovery of Kuwait but the survival of Saddam plus his weapons? There are a number of possible answers, or rather palliatives:
- a. Arrange pre-emptive statements that partial withdrawal will not do, that only if Saddam is out, in full, by 15 January is he safe from attack.
- b. Avoid the implication that once he has fully withdrawn the crisis is over and we can all go home. In particular bring out now in public the fact that we cannot be satisfied with reversion to the *status quo ante*, that Saddam is still a pariah and a danger.
- c. Stress, again in public, the unfinished business, the need for compensation, the need for a continuing embargo, the need for long-term security arrangements.
- d. Keep as much of the UN machinery in place as possible. A new Security Council resolution will be needed to lift the sanctions now in force. Further security measures we take could be covered under the general rubric of Security Council Resolution 678

(measures to restore international peace and security in the area).

e. Use the leverage in the timing of allied forces withdrawals.

f. Continue to warn the Israelis off. It is illusory to suppose they could do the job for us. But they could drag us in, in the worst possible political conditions, or force us to split from the Americans on the issue, which would be even more damaging.

g. Above all, talk the situation through at top level with the Americans, ensure that we are saying the same thing and that we shall have the same reactions ready if any of the withdrawal scenarios materialise.

k

PERCY CRADOCK

12 December 1990

CCB/JP
11(A-E)

SECRET

B.0688

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 13 December

Objective of the meeting

The meeting will now only last half an hour, so that you may wish to use the time for a brisk first-reading discussion of the key issues covered in the first two items. This will provide useful guidance for the UK team at the UK/US talks on 14 December, which will cover some of the ground. The last paper, Item 3, seeks a decision. However, you may wish to ask the Defence Secretary to begin with a word on the BW programme, on which there appears to be bad news.

BW Immunisation

2. The Defence Secretary will explain. Apparently we have heard from the Department of Health that one of the first three batches of anthrax vaccine is defective. The MoD are assessing the implications. At first sight it looks as though we may not be able to do a full programme. Nor will we know for another week whether the other two batches are satisfactory. So no question at present of contacting the US Government until we have a clearer picture. The Defence Secretary will report further.

Item 1: Implications of Iraqi partial withdrawal from Kuwait

3. There are two papers under this item: OPD(G)(90)6 by the FCO and OPD(G)(90)7 by the Defence Secretary. They both describe neatly the problems partial withdrawal would pose but, reasonably enough, do not come up with any ready-made solutions.

SECRET

SECRET

4. You might open the discussion by inviting the Foreign Secretary to highlight briefly the conclusions of his paper (OPD(G)(90)6). The problems for us include the probability that Saddam might spin out and obfuscate the process to prevent being attacked in the pre-Ramadan window, that partial withdrawal would encourage moves to settle for a compromise, put strains on the Western/Arab coalition and undermine the determination of the international community and US public opinion to insist on full implementation of UN Resolutions. While the effect on British public opinion might be less damaging than in the US, it is worth exploring with colleagues how they would expect the British Parliament, press and public to react. The risk that the Israelis might launch their own attack is a further factor.

5. The responses set out in paragraph 15 of the FCO paper include ensuring that the meeting of the Five Foreign Ministers sends a tough message in favour of full withdrawal via Mr Baker: this seems sensible. The Italian Presidency may be disposed to take a less firm line, but this point could usefully be raised at the European Council before Signor de Michelis meets Tariq Aziz. The further measures in paragraph 16 after a partial withdrawal seem less likely to have an impact on Saddam: giving Saddam a further deadline (option h) could weaken the effect of the military option on Saddam. This section would benefit from further analysis and work.

6. You might invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his paper (OPD(G)(90)7) which presents an equally bleak picture though there is no evidence so far that the Iraqis are preparing a defensive line (paragraph 3). You might then ask Sir Richard Vincent for his brief assessment of the three military options in paragraphs 5-10 of the paper. The paper comes to no firm conclusions: everything depends on circumstances at the time.

SECRET

7. You might conclude the discussion by instructing the UK team to seek US views at the UK/US talks and to report back. Thereafter the FCO and MOD might prepare a joint contingency paper with firmer proposals marrying the political and factors for discussion in OPD(G), though the detailed military planning will presumably need to remain highly confidential.

Item 2: Implications of a total Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait

8. You might invite the Foreign Secretary briefly to introduce his paper. The intention had been for the FCO to produce a companion piece on constraining Iraq's nuclear, CBW and missile capability but it proved impossible at the last moment for the Foreign Secretary to approve it in a satisfactory form.

9. [If there is insufficient time, you might skip this section.] The major objectives in paragraph 2 seem uncontroversial. The section on means (paragraphs 4-5) rightly distinguishes between a unilateral and a forced Iraqi withdrawal (the latter not automatically enabling us to impose our will to the full on Saddam) and points again to the Israeli factor, which OPD(G) dealt with earlier today. You might ask the Foreign Secretary how realistic are the chances of maintaining credible sanctions after full withdrawal, securing the compensation provided for in UN Resolutions and persuading arms supplying countries to maintain an effective embargo. The Defence Secretary will have views on retaining Western forces in the Gulf: probably unavoidable in the short term even if at a tripwire level, though better under UN cover. Similarly there may need to be a fuller peace-keeping force with Arab and other contingents. As the paper suggests, the Kuwaitis may well have to democratise their government (paragraphs 6-7). The section on negotiations on a settlement (paragraph 10) can justifiably be left for later consideration.

SECRET

10. Since the separate NBC paper is not available you might ask the Foreign Secretary to highlight the key features of an NPT regime and regional security structure (paragraphs 11-13). Further work could perhaps be done in this area. You might conclude the discussion by inviting the UK team at the UK/US talks to cover this issue too with the US Government and report back. Thereafter, as above, the FCO and MoD might prepare a joint paper with firmer proposals for discussion in early January, incorporating the elements of a revised NBC paper.

Item 3: Gulf Crisis: Distribution of Respirators to Civilians

X 11. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his paper. For the sake of speed you might focus discussion on paragraph 14 containing conclusions and recommendations. The first decision is whether to distribute respirators. If it is agreed that distribution should go ahead, the next decision is timing: (i) as soon as adult respirators are in place on 12 December; (ii) when supplies are also available for children (7 January) and at any rate before 15 January; (iii) or when the risk is assessed to have increased. MoD favour option (ii) since the risk of a pre-emptive attack is minimal and it would be administratively simpler and presentationally easier: you may wish to seek approval for option (ii). //

X 12. On the scope of distribution (paragraph 14 b), you may think it would be sensible to be consistent with the consular advice by including Riyadh, as OPD(G) decided today. You might also agree that we should inform but not consult the US Government, if the Foreign Secretary is confident that this will not cause problems.

SECRET

13. Finally, you will wish to look at the press line in paragraph 13. The Energy Secretary and Defence Secretary will have views.
14. You may wish to conclude the discussion by approving the Foreign Secretary's paper subject to the points made in discussion.
15. The next meeting of OPD(G) will be Wednesday 19 December at 0900.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
12 December 1990

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING ON THE GULF

There is another meeting of OPD(G) on the Gulf tomorrow morning. The agenda is unrealistically meaty and long, given that there is only half an hour for the meeting itself. I suggest you concentrate on three things:

- ✓
- 3
- (i) hear the explanation from the Defence Secretary about what has gone wrong on anthrax immunisation. The Department of Health have discovered that one of the first three main batches of vaccine is defective. What are the implications for the programme as a whole? What does it do to the timetable agreed yesterday for immunising our troops? Will they have some answers for you before you go to Washington next week?
 - (ii) what to do about the issue of respirators to British civilians in danger areas in the Gulf. We have enough respirators out there already for adults: but the kiddie size will not be ready until 7 January. The choices are: to issue them to adults now; to wait until 7 January and issue adult and kiddie respirators simultaneously; or to issue them only when there is a more distinct threat. The MOD recommend the second of these which seems sensible. There is no reason to think the CW threat is absolutely imminent: on the other hand, once we have them available for everyone, it makes sense to get them issued. We shall not be the first country to do so;
 - (iii) on the complex of papers about the implications of partial or total Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, you cannot realistically aim to do more than give a general steer to officials who will be going to Washington on Friday. The points are best set out in Percy Cradock's minute. Both partial and total withdrawal would create

very substantial difficulties in terms of weakening public opinion and the international coalition against Iraq. They also leave us with the problem of what to do about Iraq's formidable armoury. There are not any clear-cut answers. The essentials are:


- ✓ - we should not accept partial withdrawal as any way satisfactory and this must be made clear in public statements;
- ✓ - we should make clear the military option remains, as does UN authorisation for it, unless there is total withdrawal by 15 January;
- ✓ - to stress that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait does not by any means solve all the problems, and that Iraq remains a pariah;
- ✓ - the continuing need for sanctions, particularly on imports of technology and military equipment;
- ✓ - some sort of continuing security arrangements for the Gulf after Iraq's withdrawal.

I do not think you can realistically do more than authorise officials to talk to the Americans on the basis of these papers and report back for fuller discussion in OPD(G) next week before you go to Washington.

C. D. POWELL

12 December 1990

c:\foreign\opdg (slh)

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>letter from the US President to the Prime Minister dated 12 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>zalicis</i> <i>Mr. ...</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071-21 82111/3

Copy No 1 of 2 copies

9(A-C)

MO 6/17/15/1

12 December 1990

✓
 Sir Minister
 CPM 12/11

Dear Charles

I attach a note about operational planning for Operation Granby. You will understand that this is highly sensitive.

The presentation to members of OPD(G) by Air Chief Marshal Hine and General Wilkes on 17th December will illustrate the plans and give more detail.

Yours sincerely
 Sir Webb

(S WEBB)
 Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street

PERSONAL
 TOP SECRET

CDS 2066/2/2

OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OP GRANBY - BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER

1. General Schwarzkopf (CINCENTCOM) is confident that he already has more than enough forces in theatre to defeat any Iraqi attempt to invade the NE part of Saudi Arabia, and that he would have sufficient warning to re-position his ground forces to thwart any such attack. Moreover, there is a rolling daily air plan to conduct both defensive and offensive air operations should the Iraqis launch a pre-emptive attack. The likelihood of a major Iraqi ground operation into Saudi Arabia is now very remote, but the possibility of a 'bolt from the blue' air attack with surface-to-air missiles and manned aircraft remains. A high proportion of allied surface-to-air missiles are kept on immediate or near-immediate alert to counter such a surprise attack, and fighter patrols with airborne early warning and control are also maintained on a round-the-clock basis. An Iraqi attack of this kind on any scale would almost certainly lead Schwarzkopf to seek political authority to implement the air campaign plan described below.

2. The overall operational plan for an offensive operation to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait has yet to be finalized, as the ground operations plan is being revised to reflect the very significant reinforcements that President Bush recently agreed should be sent to the area. These reinforcements should be in theatre and operational by end January or early February - a timing that coincides with our own projection for 1(UK) Armd Div becoming operational. How the UK Division is to be employed has yet to be decided, but the Joint Commander (ACM Hine) has strongly recommended that the Division be re-subordinated from MARCENT (the US Marines) to ARECENT (with the US Army's VII Corps). This minute assumes CINCENTCOM's agreement.

Air Campaign

3. The air campaign plan is well developed and comprehensive. It is to be conducted in 4 phases. Phase 1, which is scheduled to last 4-6 days, is directed against key targets in Iraq itself. It is designed to achieve air superiority (and here our Tornado GR1s with their JP 233 airfield denial weapons have a vital role to play) to disrupt the Iraqi High Command's C3 system, and to interdict the main lines of communication between Central Iraq and the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO). Planning to attack CW, BW and nuclear facilities, oil refineries, power stations and 'civil electronics' installations (to prevent Saddam Hussein, if possible, from communicating with his people) and to begin attrition of the Republican Guards Divisions which constitute the most serious ground threat to the International Force has also been undertaken.

4. Phase 2 is aimed at suppressing Iraqi surface-to-air defences (both SAM and AAA) in and close to Kuwait so that allied aircraft can subsequently attack Iraqi ground forces with minimum risk (Phase 3). These two phases are likely to overlap somewhat, and Phase 3 will be focused on (continuing) attacks against the

1 of 2

Republican Guards, other Iraqi armoured forces, artillery and forward prepared defensive positions where it is intended that the allies should 'break in.' Phases 2 + 3 may last a week or more, and it is planned that the allied ground operation should begin only when the key Iraqi divisions have been reduced to 50% strength. Phase 4 will be air operations in support of the ground plan, and will be aimed at maintaining air superiority, interdiction of Iraqi supply lines and main storage depots, and support of ground operations. Phase 4 will continue for as long as necessary.

Ground Plan

5. The ground plan envisages attacks into Kuwait by the US Marines (MARCENT) and Arab (Egyptian, Saudi, Kuwaiti and perhaps Syrian) forces. MARCENT will be on the right (coastal) side with the Arabs on their left and attacking into the SW of Kuwait. The depth of these attacks will depend on the strength of Iraqi opposition and the effectiveness of their well-prepared defences. To the extent that our forces can exploit penetrations, so much the better, but the main allied attack will be into SE Iraq, with a powerful armoured thrust, spearheaded by the US VII Corps and including 1(UK) Armd Div, on a wide left hook, aimed at engaging and defeating the Republican Guards before cutting off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the north. This should prove the decisive battle, but Iraqi opposition inside Kuwait could continue and would be suppressed by sustained allied joint land/air operations. If the Iraqis had not sought a cease fire by this stage, opportunities could arise for the insertion of one or two US marine brigades from offshore amphibious ships, one aim being to prevent an Iraqi withdrawal into Kuwait city and thereby minimising the risk of street fighting.

Targeting Constraints

6. The air campaign plan seeks to inflict minimum collateral damage, avoid the risk of damage to sites of religious significance and to minimise civilian casualties. The US also plans to attack strategic targets such as oil refineries and power stations in a way that will not keep them out of action for a lengthy period following cessation of hostilities. Finally, the Americans are studying as a matter of urgency the likely or possible effects of attacks against CW and BW storage facilities. They too are concerned about the release of such agents into the atmosphere where they could be carried downwind over quite considerable distances and cause substantial ill-effects amongst the civilian population.

Liaison


7. We have a couple of Army and RAF staff officers who work alongside their US counterparts in theatre on the preparation of ground and air plans for offensive operations.

TOP SECRET

Republican Guards, other Iraqi armed forces, artillery and forward prepared defensive positions. It is intended that the allies should 'break in' Phase 3 + 4 say last week or more, and it is planned that the allied ground operations should begin only when the key Iraqi divisions have been reduced to 50% strength. Phase 4 will be air operations in support of the ground plan, and will be aimed at maintaining air superiority, interdiction of Iraqi supply lines and main storage depots, and support of ground operations. Phase 4 will continue for as long as necessary.

Ground Plan

2. The ground plan envisages attacks into Kuwait by the US Marines (MARINE) and Arab (QATAR, SAUDI, KUWAIT) and perhaps Syrian) forces. MARINE will be on the right (coastal) side with the Arabs on their left and attacking into the SW of Kuwait. The bulk of these attacks will depend on the strength of Iraqi opposition and the effectiveness of their well-prepared defenses. To the extent that our forces can exploit penetrations, so much the better, but the main allied attack will be into the SW and a powerful armored thrust, spearheaded by the US VII Corps and including (UK) and a wide tank force, aimed at engaging and defeating the Republican Guards before cutting off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the north. This should prove the decisive battle, but Iraqi opposition inside Kuwait could continue and would be suppressed by sustained allied joint land/air operations. If the Iraqis had not sought a cease fire by this stage, opportunities would exist for the insertion of one or two US marine brigades from the Gulf to Kuwait city and thereby maintaining the threat.




3. The attack plan is to follow similar collateral damage, avoid the use of weapons of religious significance and to minimize civilian casualties. The US also plans to attack the Iraqis such as oil refineries and power stations in a way that will not keep them out of action for a lengthy period following cessation of hostilities. Finally, the Iraqis are studying as a matter of urgency the likely possible effects of attacks against CW and BW storage facilities. They are concerned about the release of such agents into the atmosphere where they could be carried downwind over quite considerable distances and cause substantial ill-effects amongst the civilian population.

Mission

4. We have a couple of key and key staff officers who work alongside their US counterparts in theatre on the preparation of ground and air plans for offensive operations.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>minute from Turnbull to the Prime Minister dated 12 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>25/1/18</i> <i>M. Wilson</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

ref: gulf. dsj

file



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 December 1990

GULF

Tentative arrangements have been made for the Prime Minister to brief the Leader of the Opposition on the Gulf, on Privy Councillor terms, on the evening of Monday 17 December. I should be grateful if you would prepare a note of points which the Prime Minister should make.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

P-a. 8p 17/12 (1)

PRIME MINISTER

Handwritten signature

GULF: BRIEFING FOR THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

You said you would like to give the Leader of the Opposition a briefing on Privy Councillor terms about the Gulf before Christmas. The only mutually convenient time we have been able to find is at 2030 hours on Monday 17 December in your room at the House. You are due to address Norman Tebbit's constituency association in Room A at 2100.

Subject to your agreeing to this, I have commissioned some speaking notes.

CJP

*✓ Sande no notes
r*

Charles Powell

12 December 1990

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE KK

be PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 December 1990

**IRAQ/KUWAIT: PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER
TO THE PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 10 December enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Bush's recent message on the Gulf. I am sending you a revised version which the Prime Minister has approved. I should be grateful if it could be delivered as soon as possible.

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1D

11 December 1990

Dear Andrew,

ROYAL VISITS TO THE ARMED FORCES

The Defence Secretary has seen your letter of 5th December about possible Royal visits to the Armed Forces, and Stephen Wall's letter of 7th December.

We had, in fact, already identified the value of visits by members of the Royal Family to some of those service families who will be unaccompanied over Christmas. As you say, these need to cover the Navy and RAF as well as the Army in Germany.

The Defence Secretary would see value in a visit by a member of the Royal Family to the Gulf over this period. He liked the idea of the Prince of Wales (and the Princess too if that is the advice from our people in Saudi Arabia). The Duke of Kent has also been mentioned to us as a alternative.

For similar reasons to those discussed earlier, the Defence Secretary is reluctant to advise The Queen to visit the Joint Control Centre at High Wycombe. We will continue to look out for a suitable opportunity, but there would certainly be a place for a "thank you" visit at the end of the operation if nothing else looks sensible before then.

Yours sincerely,

Sam Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

A Turnbull Esq
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

*? Would
steering on?*

Put together

B(A-G)

SECRET

B.0686

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 12 December

Item 1: BW Immunisation

The Health Secretary is attending for this item only. You might invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his note which, although it touches on BTx and plague, is effectively concerned with immunisation against anthrax.

Threat/Def.

2. You might begin the discussion by asking whether Sir Percy Cradock or the Foreign Secretary have any comments on the threat (paragraphs 2-3). The section on countermeasures is purely technical. The key point under UK production of anthrax vaccine is in paragraph 9 which argues that if the anthrax immunisation programme begins on 17 December it can provide protection for all Service personnel in theatre by early February. You might ask the Health Secretary to say whether he accepts the impact which the calls for whooping cough vaccine, as an adjunct to the anthrax doses, could have on the NHS, and the political fall-out which this could cause (paragraph 8).

X X

3. The US position is more exposed, since they cannot apparently cover all their much larger numbers. Colleagues presumably do not share the US view (paragraph 11) that the minimum defensible programme will have to cover the whole of the multinational force and oilfield workers. You might ask the Defence Secretary whether US policy has evolved further since his note, in the light of the bilateral discussions on 10 December. Earlier contacts with the US Administration

SECRET

SECRET

How will U.S. agree? B

indicated that, in the US view, a unilateral UK decision could threaten the unity of the coalition. I understand that the latest position is that the US does not intend to initiate a programme at present but no final decision has been made.

4. You could ask the Attorney General to confirm that he is content with paragraph 13 on the legal considerations which mean that Service personnel will need to sign a consent form. You might then ask the Foreign Secretary if he endorses the Defence Secretary's conclusions (paragraphs 14-16) on other international considerations. He may want to question whether there will be more of an outcry than the paper suggests. In particular the Saudi request for 50,000 doses will need careful handling (paragraph 15).

5. You might ask colleagues to confirm that it is agreed that the first duty is to protect British forces and that an immunisation programme cannot be concealed. There is the additional point that a decision to immunise our troops will be a powerful signal of our seriousness of purpose to Saddam and might help to deter him from use of BW on the battlefield or against civilians.

6. You might ask colleagues to agree, as the Defence Secretary proposes, that an anthrax immunisation programme should be initiated as soon as practicable. Before this is done, major Allies should be informed. You might invite the Foreign and Defence Secretaries to concert on how and when this should be done, and whether offers to discuss post-attack ways of dealing with BW will be any real help. You may also wish to decide the order of priority to whom extra

SECRET

SECRET

does can be allocated. Paragraph 20 of the paper suggests that the order should be BAe, WHO, Saudis, and British Airways and other UK civilians. The Foreign Secretary may have views, especially on the Saudi requirement. You might invite the Defence and Foreign Secretaries to commission their officials to prepare a low-key statement together with press and Parliamentary briefing (war correspondents will be covered) and to discuss the timing of an announcement. MoD will need to brief the troops and their families. Finally, you might ask the Defence Secretary to confirm that for BTx post-attack treatment is proposed: will that cover all UK front line troops? You might also invite the Defence Secretary to let the Group have the further proposals on dealing with plague (paragraph 7) as soon as possible.

Item 2: Current International Situation

7. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to brief colleagues orally on the latest state of play. Subject to overnight developments, we have identified four possible items of current interest: release of hostages; US/Iraqi contacts; the European Council; and Israeli policy.

8. The release of hostages is also relevant to Item 5: the future of the Embassy in Kuwait. By the end of 11 December, there should have been two flights direct from Baghdad to the UK, and a number of indirect flights, on which the great majority of British hostages (perhaps over 800) should have been evacuated from Iraq and Kuwait. This probably leaves somewhere over 200 British citizens in Iraq and a small handful in Kuwait, though the numbers can only be an estimate. There is likely to be an irreducible minimum of British citizens who stay on in Kuwait because

SECRET

SECRET

they are married to Kuwaitis or because they feel their whole life is invested in Kuwait. You might ask the Foreign Secretary about the timing when we estimate that all those who want to leave will be able to leave.

9. On US/Iraqi contacts, it looks as though Tariq Aziz will travel to Washington for talks on 17 December, though this is subject to confirmation. No dates have yet been fixed for Mr Baker's trip to Baghdad, but he has said that it has to be before 3 January. The Iraqis are trying to spin out the process. No dates have been fixed either for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent members of the Security Council: this is essentially a diary rather than a political problem. Mr Shevardnadze has sent a message, after his talks with Mr Baker in Texas, to say that he will do his best to find suitable dates. The Chinese are still being difficult. It will be crucially important for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers to give Mr Baker a tight mandate to tell Saddam Hussain that he must withdraw otherwise he will be attacked, and to reject any form of pre-withdrawal negotiation. The Kuwaitis and Iraqis have denied being involved in secret talks about a compromise involving ceding the two islands and the oilfields.

Baker
Visit

12/3
Visit

Road
Station

10. There will be a statement on the Gulf at the European Council, which will be prepared by the Political Directors and discussed by Foreign Ministers. The statement will reaffirm the commitment of the Twelve to UN Resolutions. Our objective will be to prevent any importation of compromise language undermining the UN Resolutions: the Italian first draft was not very attractive. At the

SECRET

Council you will want to pin down the Italians on the line to take at the contacts between the Presidency and Tariq Aziz on his way back from Washington.

11. Mr Shamir's visit to Washington, and Deputy Foreign Minister Netanyahu's talks with Mr Hogg on 10 December, illustrate Israeli concern over the possibility that Saddam Hussain might withdraw fully or partially from Kuwait. We have asked the JIC for an assessment of the likelihood of an Israeli pre-emptive strike and their capability to destroy Iraq's NBC installations and weapons (it is by no means self-evident that the Israelis could do the job alone). You may want to conclude the discussion of this point by suggesting that OPD(G) look at the Israeli angle next week in advance of your talks with President Bush.

Item 3: Media Handling

12. You might invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his paper. Many of the arrangements proposed have been agreed with the media.

13. You might begin by noting the differences from the Falklands operation: no exclusive UK control; heavy US leverage; Saudi sensitivities; other Allies; and geographic proximity in the age of the satellite. You might then ask the Defence Secretary if he is content with the arrangements for journalists visas and the balance of media representation on the outbreak of hostilities. This could be a major hassle if not tackled effectively in advance: the Foreign Secretary may have views on this and on co-operation with the US and Saudi Governments. The FCO will need to be fully involved in the arrangements.

SECRET

SECRET

Small Media R/T 35

14. From an operational standpoint, it is vital that the Media Response Teams should not be in a position to reveal operations in advance or to prejudice ongoing operations by revealing current dispositions. You might ask the Defence Secretary to confirm that this is the case: especially for the initial strikes. This control has to be exercised very largely, if not entirely, in theatre. The co-ordination between London and the Gulf seems to be well in hand, with the Defence Secretary the principal Ministerial spokesman and members of OPD(G) plus the Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster briefed as additional presenters of the Government's case. It would be useful to check that arrangements for these briefings are being made. You might ask colleagues to confirm that there should be no general home censorship but you will need to be satisfied that there are mechanisms to persuade editors at the last moment not to print/show items likely to add to casualties among our troops if such items slip through the in-theatre net. You might also ask for colleagues' advice on how to minimise the impact of combat and casualties on civilian morale. The best antidote is rapid military success combined with obvious combat efficiency: but a long drawn out battle is much harder to deal with.

15. You might conclude the discussion by asking colleagues to approve the paper subject to points made in the discussion, and invite the Defence Secretary to come forward with more detailed recommendations on how to minimise the damage to civilian morale caused by reports of bombing and casualties and (as proposed) how to deal with broadcasts from Iraq.

SECRET

G



SECRET

Item 4: Advice to British Communities in War Risk Countries

16. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his minute. You might then ask whether colleagues have any general comments.

17. The advice to British communities seems entirely right in the light of UN Security Council Resolution 678 and the 15 January deadline, which provides a convenient benchmark on timing. You might invite colleagues to approve the proposals in the Foreign Secretary's minute, including informing other countries in advance, and that the announcement should be made before Christmas. The announcement will have the incidental benefit of giving another clear signal to Saddam that we mean business.

*Wam
Farely
no Advance*

Item 5: British Embassy in Kuwait

18. You might ask the Foreign Secretary to remind colleagues why he believes it right to announce later tomorrow the decision to withdraw Mr Weston and Mr Banks. The precise timing has not yet been set (depending in part on hostage departures) but it will be before 18 December. Colleagues are unlikely to object, but in approving the proposal you might ask the Foreign Secretary to convey the appreciation of yourself and colleagues for the courage and resilience shown by Mr Weston and Mr Banks.

*Pr. off
that will be
leave-hans.*

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
11 December 1990

Build up pres

SECRET



CCPC

1

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

PM/90/097

PRIME MINISTER

Center for us
to withdraw the
Embassy within the
week?

CCPC/Kii

British Embassy in Kuwait

1. Now that there is a good prospect of the British community leaving Kuwait before the end of this week, we need to consider whether to retain the British Embassy there.

2. Mr Weston (Ambassador) and Mr Banks (Consul) have been on their own in the Embassy in Kuwait since 8 October. They have been performing two main functions:

- providing a lifeline for the remaining British community, who until recently numbered around 400 and have been in hiding;
- showing the Iraqis that we reject their occupation and annexation of Kuwait, and their decision to close down foreign Embassies.

With the departure of British nationals, the first of these functions will fall away. The second remains valid, and Mr Weston has recently confirmed that he attaches sufficient importance to this political objective to be willing to stay on in Kuwait, if necessary after 15 January, the deadline set by SCR 678. Mr Weston and Mr Banks have provisions to last at least until the end of January.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

3. I believe, however, that the time has come to withdraw Mr Weston and Mr Banks. They have shown enormous courage and resilience under siege. But the Embassy is vulnerably sited on the sea front and has no hardened shelter. They would be in serious danger in the event of hostilities. We should therefore withdraw them while we can in the overriding interest of their safety. Mr Weston has already made a powerful political statement by holding out until now. He will be the last Ambassador to leave Kuwait.

4. The American Ambassador and his staff are being withdrawn on 11 December.

5. Subject to discussion in OPD(G) on 12 December, I would propose to make an announcement later that day that we intend to withdraw Mr Weston and Mr Banks. We need not specify a date at this stage, but I have in mind that they should leave by 18 December at the latest. We would make clear that, while the staff are being withdrawn, the Embassy remains formally open. An early announcement might usefully have the effect of persuading some of the community who are remaining in Kuwait not to hang on indefinitely.

6. I am copying this minute to OPD(G) colleagues and to Sir Robin Butler.

DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

SECRET

7.

PRIME MINISTER
MEETINGS ON THE GULF

You have meetings on the Gulf tomorrow and Thursday. There is quite a full agenda tomorrow: please see inside cover of the folder. The Cabinet Office brief deals extensively with the issues, most of which you are already familiar with.

There is only one issue which I would mention, and which might be considered under discussion of the Current International Situation. That is the position of the Israelis. Although Shamir was quite calm with you, I saw the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister yesterday and found him distinctly more agitated (he is pretty hawkish at the best of times). He took the line that the US and UK were about to funk dealing properly with Iraq's military capability: and by guaranteeing Iraq would not be attacked if it withdraw from Kuwait, we would in effect be giving Saddam Hussein immunity behind which to develop nuclear weapons with the purpose of destroying Israel. Israel might in such circumstances have to do whatever was necessary to protect its own security.

One has to lay off a bit: he tends to talk for effect. But if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, I think we have to recognise that the risk of an Israeli pre-emptive attack on Iraq's missiles, chemical weapons, etc. will grow: they will want to do it while the Americans are still in Saudi Arabia, so that they get dragged in too.

What would stop them? Possibly nothing. But the best chance is clear evidence that we intended to take severe action to constrain Iraq in future, and compel it to dismantle at least the most dangerous parts of its arsenal. That would not be at all easy to achieve, even though it would be in the interests of the Gulf States just as much as Israel. We shall need to give some very serious thought to how we might hold the Israelis off: and it is one of the subjects you will need to discuss with the President at Camp David.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

11 December 1990

a:\foreign\gulf.eam

SECRET

SECRET



FILE KK
6

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS

I share your aversion to prolonging this correspondence. But your latest minute is tantamount to suggesting that I deliberately misreported a discussion, and cannot be left unanswered.

The joint recollection of Mr. Turnbull and myself is that the Prime Minister reported the President as wishing to maintain the special and important channel of communication to the White House on the Gulf. So far as I am aware, that exists only between No. 10 and the White House.

Similarly the joint recollection and understanding of Mr. Turnbull and myself is that the Prime Minister agreed that Sir Antony Acland should be informed of all direct contacts between No. 10 and the White House, and should be used when appropriate to deliver specific messages. But the main channel of communication should remain through No. 10.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL
10 December 1990

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 December 1990

Cole JM
WFO
Pres

Dear Paddy,

As you know, on 6 December Saddam Hussein wrote to the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly proposing that travel restrictions on foreigners in Iraq should be lifted. The National Assembly approved this on 7 December. Our Embassy in Baghdad spent the weekend trying to establish that all our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait would be free to return home. This was finally confirmed by the Iraqis. We estimate that there are about 1,100 of our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. We expect the majority will want to return home. We are strongly urging everyone to do so.

Our aim is to get everyone back as quickly as possible. The first party arrived this morning at Heathrow on a British Airways aircraft. We have chartered aircraft to bring the bulk of the remainder home and a Boeing 747 is due to arrive at Gatwick this evening. A further 747 will leave Baghdad tomorrow, having connected with two aircraft we are sending down to Kuwait to pick up the community there. They should arrive at Gatwick tomorrow evening.

At this stage we expect most of the remainder to take normal commercial flights from Baghdad to Amman and to fly on from there. But we will send our aircraft to pick them up if the flow cannot be handled by scheduled flights.

The communities are being kept informed by announcements over the World Service of the BBC and by the Embassies through the wardens.

We are also taking steps to make sure that people are offered advice and help on practical matters once they are back.

I thought you would find it useful to know how we are proceeding.

Your sincerely,
P.A.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 December 1990

Dear Jim,

As you know, on 6 December Saddam Hussein wrote to the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly proposing that travel restrictions on foreigners in Iraq should be lifted. The National Assembly approved this on 7 December. Our Embassy in Baghdad spent the weekend trying to establish that all our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait would be free to return home. This was finally confirmed by the Iraqis. We estimate that there are about 1,100 of our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. We expect the majority will want to return home. We are strongly urging everyone to do so.

Our aim is to get everyone back as quickly as possible. The first party arrived this morning at Heathrow on a British Airways aircraft. We have chartered aircraft to bring the bulk of the remainder home and a Boeing 747 is due to arrive at Gatwick this evening. A further 747 will leave Baghdad tomorrow, having connected with two aircraft we are sending down to Kuwait to pick up the community there. They should arrive at Gatwick tomorrow evening.

At this stage we expect most of the remainder to take normal commercial flights from Baghdad to Amman and to fly on from there. But we will send our aircraft to pick them up if the flow cannot be handled by scheduled flights.

Ali
ufw
Pres

The communities are being kept informed by announcements over the World Service of the BBC and by the Embassies through the wardens.

We are also taking steps to make sure that people are offered advice and help on practical matters once they are back.

I thought you would find it useful to know how we are proceeding.

Your sincerely,
John

— 2 —



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 December 1990

Dear David

As you know, on 6 December Saddam Hussein wrote to the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly proposing that travel restrictions on foreigners in Iraq should be lifted. The National Assembly approved this on 7 December. Our Embassy in Baghdad spent the weekend trying to establish that all our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait would be free to return home. This was finally confirmed by the Iraqis. We estimate that there are about 1,100 of our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. We expect the majority will want to return home. We are strongly urging everyone to do so.

Our aim is to get everyone back as quickly as possible. The first party arrived this morning at Heathrow on a British Airways aircraft. We have chartered aircraft to bring the bulk of the remainder home and a Boeing 747 is due to arrive at Gatwick this evening. A further 747 will leave Baghdad tomorrow, having connected with two aircraft we are sending down to Kuwait to pick up the community there. They should arrive at Gatwick tomorrow evening.

At this stage we expect most of the remainder to take normal commercial flights from Baghdad to Amman and to fly on from there. But we will send our aircraft to pick them up if the flow cannot be handled by scheduled flights.

Ali M
UKW
Pres

The communities are being kept informed by announcements over the World Service of the BBC and by the Embassies through the wardens.

We are also taking steps to make sure that people are offered advice and help on practical matters once they are back.

I thought you would find it useful to know how we are proceeding.

Yours sincerely,
John

— 2 —



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 December 1990

Dear Weir

As you know, on 6 December Saddam Hussein wrote to the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly proposing that travel restrictions on foreigners in Iraq should be lifted. The National Assembly approved this on 7 December. Our Embassy in Baghdad spent the weekend trying to establish that all our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait would be free to return home. This was finally confirmed by the Iraqis. We estimate that there are about 1,100 of our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. We expect the majority will want to return home. We are strongly urging everyone to do so.

Our aim is to get everyone back as quickly as possible. The first party arrived this morning at Heathrow on a British Airways aircraft. We have chartered aircraft to bring the bulk of the remainder home and a Boeing 747 is due to arrive at Gatwick this evening. A further 747 will leave Baghdad tomorrow, having connected with two aircraft we are sending down to Kuwait to pick up the community there. They should arrive at Gatwick tomorrow evening.

At this stage we expect most of the remainder to take normal commercial flights from Baghdad to Amman and to fly on from there. But we will send our aircraft to pick them up if the flow cannot be handled by scheduled flights.

etc
etc
Pres

[Handwritten mark]

The communities are being kept informed by announcements over the World Service of the BBC and by the Embassies through the wardens.

We are also taking steps to make sure that people are offered advice and help on practical matters once they are back.

I thought you would find it useful to know how we are proceeding.

Your sincerely,
John H.

210/12



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1990

Mr Charles,

British Communities in Iraq and Kuwait

We spoke about the Prime Minister's wish to write to political leaders. I enclose a draft letter which explains the steps we are taking to get our people home as quickly as possible from Iraq and Kuwait.

If the Prime Minister is content the, Mr Hogg would be willing to write to the remaining party leaders.

Yours ever
A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'S L Gass'.

(S L Gass) (11/12/90)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO:

The Rt Hon Neil Kinnock MP and
The Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP

*Mr - Hon James Callaghan
Mr - Hon David Owen.*

As you know, on 6 December Saddam Hussein wrote to the Speaker of the Iraqi National Assembly proposing that travel restrictions on foreigners in Iraq should be lifted. The National Assembly approved this on 7 December. Our Embassy in Baghdad ^{sent me word - end} immediately sought ^{urgent clarification} that all our nationals in Iraq and Kuwait would be free to return home. This was ^{confirmed} by the Iraqis ~~over the weekend.~~

We estimate that there are about 1,100 ^{British} ~~British~~ ^{of our} nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. We expect the majority will want to return home. We are strongly urging everyone to do so.

Our aim is to get everyone back as quickly as possible. The first party arrived this morning at Heathrow on a British Airways aircraft. We have chartered aircraft to bring the bulk of the remainder home ~~home~~ and a Boeing 747 is due to arrive at Gatwick this evening. A further 747 will leave Baghdad tomorrow, having connected with two aircraft we are sending down to Kuwait to pick up the community there. They should arrive at Gatwick tomorrow evening. ~~We will lay on further aircraft if necessary.~~ ^{But} at this stage we expect most of the remainder to take normal commercial flights from Baghdad to Amman and to fly on from there.

But
↳

We will send out aircraft to pick them up if the flow cannot be handled by scheduled flights. // The communities are being kept informed by announcements over the World Service of the BBC and by the Embassies through the wardens.

~~ensuring that our people~~ ^{taking steps to make sure that people} are offered advice and help on practical matters once they are back.

~~I will keep you informed of any further developments.~~

I thought you would find it useful to know how we are proceeding.

Ref. AO90/2997

MR POWELL

Handling of the Gulf Crisis

Many thanks for your minute of 4 December.

2. I do not want to prolong this exchange, but I think it worth putting on record that there were two important differences between your note of my discussion with the Prime Minister and my recollection. One is that your minute suggested that the President of the United States had requested specifically that Number 10 should remain the main point of contact with General Scowcroft, whereas I heard the Prime Minister say no such thing. The second was that you recorded the Prime Minister as deciding that Number 10 should remain the main point of contact with General Scowcroft and the White House whereas what actually happened was that I was suggesting that Sir Anthony Acland should be used when that would be helpful (though your link should also continue) and the Prime Minister assented.

3. These are not insignificant differences. I comment separately on your personal minute.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

10 December 1990



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

10 December 1990

Dear Charles,

Iraq/Kuwait : President Bush's
Letter to the Prime Minister

-file with HT

Thank you for your letter of 3 December, enclosing a message from President Bush to the Prime Minister, following up their telephone discussion of 30 November. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister in the form of a telegram to Washington.

The draft inevitably covers some of the same ground as in the Foreign Secretary's reply to a message received from Mr Baker on 1 December. I enclose a copy. The Foreign Secretary is in contact with his Permanent Member colleagues about a possible meeting of the Five around 18 December.


Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Draft PM to US President attached to letter ... Garrison to Lowell dated 10 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>3/2/2018</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,

eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .

eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELNO 2095

OF 031200Z DEC 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

1 cc Dahl / psc
2. M. Eldon

205/12

Dahl
Back to us 10/12
8/12

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR BAKER

1. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR BAKER'S MESSAGE OF 1 DECEMBER: BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 1 DECEMBER. IT WAS ALSO USEFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ABLE TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

WE QUITE UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO INVITE TARIQ AZIZ TO WASHINGTON AND TO ASK YOU TO TALK TO SADDAM HUSSEIN IN BAGHDAD. BY BRINGING HOME TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THE ALTERNATIVE TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, WE MAY STILL MANAGE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. NO-ONE HERE DOUBTS THE RESOLVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

WE WOULD LIKE TO DO ANYTHING WE CAN TO COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION AND THAT THE MESSAGE THAT IS SENT TO BAGHDAD SHOULD NOT BE BLURRED. I AM NOT MYSELF IN FAVOUR OF A STRING OF EMISSARIES GOING TO BAGHDAD AS THAT WILL ENCOURAGE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO TRY TO DIVIDE US. WE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE TO ENSURE THAT OUR EFFORTS ARE EFFECTIVE.

I THINK, THEREFORE, THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOLLOW UP THE IDEA WHICH WE DISCUSSED OVER DINNER IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK OF A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FIVE. IDEALLY THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE YOU GO TO BAGHDAD. I SEE FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WISH YOU TO GO AFTER 15 DECEMBER. WE MIGHT AIM FOR A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE IN LONDON EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE, OR JUST AFTER, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 17/18 DECEMBER. IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSAL, I WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH OUR SOVIET AND CHINESE COLLEAGUES. I DISCUSSED THE IDEA WITH ROLAND DUMAS, WHO HAS BEEN HERE TODAY, AND HE IS IN FAVOUR. THE PURPOSES WOULD BE TO RE-EMPHASISE OUR SOLIDARITY BEHIND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND TO CONVEY AGAIN TO IRAQ THE

PR

CLEAR MESSAGE THAT IF THEY DO NOT COMPLY THEY WILL BE ATTACKED
WHEREAS IF THEY COMPLY FULLY THEY WILL NOT.
ENDS

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION


25

MAIN 25

NO DISTRIBUTION
PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX BOYD
PS/PUS
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
HD/EU

HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/NAD
HD/NEWS D
HD/PROTOCOL D
PS/NO 10.
SIR P CRADOCK
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/CABINET SECRETARY
MR APPELYARD, CABINET OFFICE

NNNN



SECRET

①

Content. Splendid.
7.10.12

4(A-C)

PRIME MINISTER

President Bush sent you a message about his proposal to establish contacts with the Iraqis. It followed his telephone conversation with you: and I suspect it was basically a round-robin to several Heads of Government. Nonetheless, it would be right to send a brief reply, even though the Foreign Secretary has already had some communication with Jim Baker. I attach a draft reply for your approval.

C.D.P.


CHARLES POWELL

10 DECEMBER 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\Note.MRM

SECRET

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3440</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Attachment to Powell to PM dated 10 December 1990</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>3/2/2018</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 868

OF 091150Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, JEDDAH, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS, SANA'A, TUNIS

MY 2 IFTS: AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. THE KING'S CONTACTS WITH SADDAM AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS ARE OBVIOUSLY CLOSELY LINKED. FROM HIS COMMENTS ON BOTH SUBJECTS, I DRAW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

A) HE HAS NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH HE MAY BELIEVE IS NOW MORE ATTAINABLE THAN HITHERTO. NO DOUBT HE ALSO HOPES THAT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME, IF ACHIEVED, WILL BE SEEN AS A VINDICATION OF HIS OWN APPROACH TO THE CRISIS.

B) HE IS AWARE THAT THIS ACTIVITY MAY MAKE A RECONCILIATION WITH THE SAUDIS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

C) HIS INTEREST IN A RECONCILIATION IS CLEAR, BUT, JUDGING BY THE OUTCOME OF OMANI MEDIATION EFFORTS, HE IS NOT PREPARED TO GO FAR ENOUGH IN THE DIRECTION OF APOLOGISING. IN PART, THIS RELATES TO POINT (A) (A HOPE THAT FAR FROM APOLOGISING TO THE SAUDIS, THE REVERSE MAY EVENTUALLY BE THE CASE). BUT I SUSPECT IT MAY ALSO BE BECAUSE JORDAN IS NOT YET ON ITS KNEES ECONOMICALLY. MONEY IS NOW TRICKLING IN FROM THE WESTERN DONOR STATES IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO KEEP THE COUNTRY AFLOAT, PARTICULARLY SINCE ONLY ESSENTIAL DEBTS ARE BEING REPAID. UNLESS ECONOMIC COLLAPSE BECOMES AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT, I DOUBT WHETHER THE KING WILL BE PERSUADED TO EAT SUFFICIENT HUMBLE PIE TO MAKE A RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE. MATTERS ARE NOT HELPED BY HIS UNCERTAIN GRASP OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS: IT IS CLEAR FROM THE CROWN PRINCE'S RECENT EXCHANGE WITH YOU THAT HE IS MUCH MORE AWARE THAN HIS BROTHER OF THE ECONOMIC REALITIES.

D) IF THIS ANALYSIS IS RIGHT, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET VERY FAR WITH OUR OWN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A RECONCILIATION: INDEED, WE MIGHT MERELY CREATE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH BOTH PARTIES. ARAB INTERMEDIARIES, SUCH AS THE OMANIS, WILL CERTAINLY BE NEEDED, BUT

EVEN THEY WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BIDE THEIR TIME.

E) IF A WAR IS AVOIDED, AND THE KING PLAYS SOME PART IN THIS, HE MAY YET EMERGE WITH SOME CREDIT IN SOME ARAB AND WESTERN QUARTERS - AND WITH THE BASIS OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ LARGELY UNIMPAIRED - THOUGH ALSO WITH HORRENDOUS DAMAGE TO THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, A RECONCILIATION WITH THE ARAB DONORS MIGHT OCCUR THOUGH IT WOULD NO DOUBT TAKE TIME. IF, HOWEVER, A WAR CANNOT BE AVOIDED, THE KING'S REFUSAL TO MEND FENCES AT THIS STAGE COULD PROVE DISASTROUS FOR HIM. HE WILL NO DOUBT BE PERCEIVED BY THE SAUDIS AND THEIR ALLIES AS HAVING BACKED THE LOSER AND THEREFORE NOT DESERVING OF HELP. WHETHER, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS FOR KEEPING JORDAN AFLOAT WILL STILL CUT SOME ICE WITH KING FAHD IS NOT A QUESTION I CAN ANSWER. BUT KING HUSSEIN MUST SURELY BE TAKING A MAJOR RISK IN ALLOWING THE SORE TO FESTER.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

39

ADVANCE 39

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	<u>PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST</u>
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	EMERGENCY UNIT (ACTIONED)
HD/SECPOL D	RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 867

OF 091135Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, JEDDAH, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ALGIERS, SANA'A, TUNIS

MIPT: AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBES HIS LATEST MEETING WITH SADDAM. BELIEVES SADDAM WILL NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT SOME FACE-SAVER. KING LIKELY TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. I ASKED THE KING ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH SADDAM, THE YEMENI VICE PRESIDENT, AND ARAFAT.

3. THE KING SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN USEFUL IN ENABLING HIM TO GAUGE SADDAM'S MOOD AFTER A RELATIVELY LONG INTERVAL. HE FOUND THAT LITTLE HAD CHANGED. SADDAM REMAINED CONFIDENT, CALM, AND COOL. HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE FAVOURED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT WAS NEVERTHELESS PREPARED FOR WAR. THE KING SAID THAT SINCE HIS RETURN, HE HAD IMPRESSED ON THE AMERICANS (THROUGH THE US AMBASSADOR) THAT THEY SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES AS REFLECTING WEAKNESS OR FEAR ON SADDAM'S PART: NOR SHOULD THEY USE THEIR DIALOGUE WITH HIM TO DELIVER AN ULTIMATUM. HE WAS VERY PLEASED ABOUT SADDAM'S DECISION OVER THE HOSTAGES: HE HAD BEEN URGING HIM STRONGLY TO SPEED UP THEIR RELEASE AND HAD RECEIVED GOOD SUPPORT ON THIS FROM YEMEN AT THE BAGHDAD MEETING. I SAID (ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT) THAT I KNEW THAT WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME ABOUT HIS EFFORTS OVER THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN LONDON. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT SADDAM HAD HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELEASING THEM, THOUGH NO LONGER, IT SEEMED, ON MILITARY GROUNDS. HE HAD COMMENTED THAT AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE HOSTAGES WERE PRESENT, HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH SOME KEY COUNTRIES. IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH, FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD NOTED THAT AS SOON AS THE LAST HOSTAGE HAD BEEN FREED, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAD CEASED TO HAVE ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM.

4. SADDAM HAD GONE OVER THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT IN GREAT

DETAIL. HE HAD EMPHASISED THE INCREASING CONCERN HE HAD FELT AT THE ECONOMIC WAR BEING WAGED AGAINST HIM BY KUWAIT AND THE UAE, AND HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS (HERE HE REFERRED TO THEIR ALLEGED SECRET DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIANS). IT HAD BEEN HIS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW BUT THE ARRIVAL OF US TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA HAD FORCED HIM TO REMAIN IN PLACE. SINCE HE COULD NOT FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS, HE HAD HAD TO MAKE FAR MORE CONCESSIONS TO IRAN THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE GOT. SADDAM HAD EMPHASISED HIS INTEREST IN A REGIONAL PEACE AND HAD ASKED THE OTHERS WHETHER, IF HE WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT, THEY COULD GIVE HIM ANY GUARANTEE THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WOULD BE TACKLED. IF SO, HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES. HE WOULD DESTROY HIS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IF OTHERS IN THE REGION DID LIKEWISE. WHAT HE COULD NOT DO WAS TELL HIS SOLDIERS TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WHEN HE HAD NOTHING TO SHOW THEM IN RETURN. THEY WOULD BE COMPLETELY DEMORALISED, AND WHAT WOULD HIS PEOPLE SAY?

5. HAVING REMINDED THE KING THAT SADDAM HAD NOT EVEN MENTIONED PALESTINE UNTIL 12 AUGUST, I ASKED HIM, FIRST, WHETHER SADDAM HAD CLEARLY SPELT OUT THE NATURE OF THE LINKAGE HE WAS SEEKING ON PALESTINE: AND SECONDLY, WHETHER HE HAD REFERRED TO ANY SIMILAR LINKAGE OVER KUWAIT ITSELF IE INSISTANCE ON RETAINING THE DISPUTED AREAS. THE KING SAID THAT SADDAM WAS NOT INSISTING ON A SIMULTANEOUS SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION BUT BEYOND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT SADDAM'S POSITION WAS, EITHER ON PALESTINE OR KUWAIT. BUT ON THE LATTER, ALL PRESENT AT THE BAGHDAD MEETING HAD ONCE AGAIN URGED HIM TO WITHDRAW.

6. ON THE NEXT STEPS, THE KING MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORT AT THE BAGHDAD MEETING FOR AN ARAB-ARAB DIALOGUE. THE PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA WOULD PROBABLY BE VISITING AMMAN, BAGHDAD AND POSSIBLY RIYADH, BEGINNING ON 11 DECEMBER. THERE HAD BEEN PLANS TO HOLD AN ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING BUT THESE HAD NOW BEEN SHELVED IN THE LIGHT OF THE US/ARAB DIALOGUE. THE KING REMAINED UNSURE WHETHER THE SAUDIS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH SADDAM.

7. FOR COMMENTS ON THIS AND MIPT, SEE MIPT.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

40

ADVANCE 40

IRAQ/KUWAIT	HD/SED
PS	HD/UND
PS/MR HOGG	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	MR APLEYARD CABINET OFFICE
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	(BY TUBE H29)
PS/PUS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR BROOMFIELD	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR SLATER	(BY TUBE H29)
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
MR JAY	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
HD/MED	CABINET OFFICE D10
HD/AMD	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/CONSULAR D	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/ECD(E)	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/NAD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/NEWS D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
HD/NENAD	MR WICKS HMT
HD/NPDD	EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/SECPOL D	RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 866

OF 091130Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, JEDDAH, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ALGIERS, SANA'A, TUNIS

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 611: JORDAN/SAUDI ARABIA/OMAN

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN CLAIMS TO HAVE DONE ALL HE CAN TO REPAIR FENCES WITH KING FAHD. SEES NO FURTHER SCOPE FOR OMANI MEDIATION AT THIS STAGE.

DETAIL

2. AT MY AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 8 DECEMBER, I USED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 614 NOT TO ALL) AS A PEG TO LAUNCH A DISCUSSION ABOUT RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. I EMPHASISED THAT WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO INTERFERE OR TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES IN WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY AN ARAB MATTER, BUT THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP.
3. THE KING IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT HE WELCOMED OUR INTEREST IN WHAT FOR HIM WAS A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE. HE FELT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE MORE THAT HE HIMSELF COULD DO. THE JORDANIAN PRESS WHICH HE KNEW THE SAUDIS COMPLAINED ABOUT WAS BEYOND HIS CONTROL: AND IF THIS SAFETY VALVE HAD NOT EXISTED, THE SITUATION NOW MIGHT HAVE BEEN FAR WORSE. I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITIES ATTACHING TO THE MEDIA IN THIS NEW PHASE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY: NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THE NATIONAL INTEREST WAS AT STAKE, THERE MIGHT BE SOME SCOPE FOR GUIDANCE. THE KING DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS.
4. I SAID THAT, APART FROM THE CONCERN ABOUT THE JORDANIAN MEDIA, THE SAUDIS WANTED A MORE FORCEFUL CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ'S ACTION. HAD THERE BEEN ANY PROGRESS WITH THE OMANI MEDIATION WHICH I UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO PRODUCE A STATEMENT THAT MIGHT SATISFY THE SAUDIS? THE KING REPLIED THAT HE HAD MADE SUCH STATEMENTS (IE, I SUPPOSE, CONDEMNING IRAQ) IN OMAN AT THE TIME OF HIS LAST VISIT, AND SUBSEQUENTLY. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, NOTHING WAS HAPPENING ON THE OMANI FRONT. HE HAD SENT THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR BACK TO RIYADH WHICH WAS INTENDED AS A

CHARLES POWELL

CPA

The Prime Minister had a brief telephone call with Tom King this afternoon, mainly to inquire after his health which now seems fine.

They agreed that instead of Mr King going to see the troops before Christmas, Archie Hamilton could go instead since the Prime Minister himself was going so soon after Christmas.

Kate Waldoo

for

DOMINIC MORRIS

8 December 1990

c\king.kw

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2984

OF 080030Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, RIYADH, BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR

US/ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. THE ADMINISTRATION THINK ISRAELI ANXIETY OVER THE GULF CRISIS INCREASING. VISIT OF SHAMIR WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO REASSURE THEM ON US DETERMINATION TO DEAL WITH THE IRAQI THREAT.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE AND NSC ABOUT THEIR PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS ON THE GULF AND THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR.

3. NEITHER STATE NOR NSC CLAIMED TO HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. ROSS (PLANNING STAFF, STATE) DESCRIBED THE ISRAELIS AS UNEASY AND NEEDING REASSURANCE OVER AMERICAN POLICIES. THEY CONTINUED TO SEE THE GULF CRISIS AS A ZERO SUM GAME. THEIR PRESENT LEVEL OF ANXIETY WAS GOING UP. ROSS MADE IT PLAIN THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SEE THIS AS A GOOD TIME TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS OVER THE OTS OR ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTIONS. ISRAEL HAD MAINTAINED A LOW PROFILE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT US POLICIES TOWARDS IRAQ WOULD REMAIN RESOLUTE. THEY HAD TO BE RECONFIRMED IN THAT ASSUMPTION, AND REASSURED AS TO EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEM. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF SADDAM WERE ALLOWED IN ANY SENSE TO SUCCEED, A MAJOR WAR WOULD BE INEVITABLE. THAT MEANT A LONG-TERM POLICY OF CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ, ASSUMING THE PRESENT CRISIS WERE TO BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY, WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE WIDER ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUES. THE SAME APPLIED TO THE ARAB MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT COALITION.

4. THE NSC AT DESK LEVEL TOLD US THEY SAW A CONTINUING RISK THAT IF THE ISRAELIS THOUGHT THE GULF CRISIS MIGHT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT CUTTING BACK IRAQ'S MILITARY POWER, THEY COULD TAKE ACTION TO BRING ABOUT A MILITARY CONFLICT. ALTERNATIVELY, GIVEN ISRAEL'S HIGH STATE OF ANXIETY, AN IRAQI MOVE - SUCH AS LAST WEEKEND'S TEST MISSILE FIRINGS - COULD CONCEIVABLY PUSH THEM OVER THE BRINK. BUT THAT WAS SPECULATION.

5. KURTZER (NEA, STATE) THOUGHT THAT SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THE ISRAELIS WITH

SOME REASSURANCE. SHAMIR WOULD MEET THE PRESIDENT AND CHENEY (11 DECEMBER), VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE (12 DECEMBER) AND BAKER (13 DECEMBER, AFTER BAKER'S RETURN FROM HIS MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN HOUSTON). KURTZER THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE IN NO MOOD TO CONFRONT SHAMIR OVER THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDED THEM, PARTICULARLY SETTLEMENTS, UNLESS SHAMIR CHOSE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THEM. HE AND BAKER WOULD, HOWEVER, WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEIR INSISTENCE ON AVOIDING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE GULF CRISIS AND ARAB/ISRAEL DID NOT DIMINISH THEIR SUPPORT FOR A REVIVED PEACE PROCESS ONCE THE GULF CRISIS WAS RESOLVED.

6. ON THE GULF CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY THAT ISRAEL'S ADOPTION OF A LOW PROFILE HAD, FOR THE MOST PART, BEEN WORKING WELL, AND THAT THE US APPRECIATED THEIR DOING SO DESPITE THEIR HIGH LEVEL OF CONCERN OVER THE IRAQI THREAT. KURTZER SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD EMPHASISE TO SHAMIR THE HIGH PRIORITY WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WAS GIVING TO POST-CRISIS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION: THE INFERENCE BEING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THERE BE A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THERE WAS, THEREFORE, NO REASON FOR ISRAEL TO FEEL THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD NOT MEET HER CONCERNS.

7. STATE EXPECTED SHAMIR TO OUTLINE ISRAEL'S NEED FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BAKER AND CHENEY, WHO WOULD DO NO MORE THAN LISTEN AND REMIND SHAMIR OF US BUDGETARY DIFFICULTIES. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, BE ABLE TO TELL HIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE MOVING QUICKLY ON THE REMAINDER OF THE SAUDI ARMS REQUEST.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

18

ADVANCE 18

.ARAB/ISRAEL	HD/NENAD
PS	HD/NEWS D
PS/MR HOGG	HD/MED
PS/PUS	HD/PUSD
MR P J WESTON	HD/UND
MR FAIRWEATHER	NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR GORE-BOOTH	CABINET OFFICE DIO
MR SLATER	HD/EMERGENCY UNIT [VIA FTP]

PAGE 2

HD/CONSULAR D

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



file kw

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 December 1990

Dear Steph,


UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

I should record that, as I mentioned to you, Prince Bandar telephoned me today about the draft Security Council Resolution on the Occupied Territories. His main point was that it would be a mistake to include a reference to an international conference in a resolution at this juncture, because that would seem a victory for Saddam Hussein. He had been in touch with the US Administration to urge them to take the reference out, or otherwise block the resolution. He had the clear impression they would do so, but wanted support from others.

I said that support for an international conference was established UK, US and indeed Saudi policy and it was not easy to object to it. I had some sympathy with the point about linkage, and was frankly surprised that the Americans had gone along with a drafting exercise which put a reference to the international conference in the resolution at this stage. We had not been consulted. I was sure we would be ready to talk to the Americans: but the main effort would have to come from them.

You subsequently told me that Secretary Baker had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and indicated that the US would probably veto the resolution. The Foreign Secretary said that we would abstain.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Your sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq LVO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

kw



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

7 December 1990

Dear Andrew,

Prop

Royal Visits to Military Sites

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 5 December to Simon Webb.

For the reasons you give, the Foreign Secretary is in favour of an early visit by a member of the Royal Family to the Gulf. He thinks that if, for example, The Prince and Princess of Wales were able to visit the Gulf before or immediately after Christmas, this would have an excellent effect on morale. It would also take the heat out of popular press criticism that not enough is being done for the troops. The Foreign Secretary realises that no visit is presentationally risk-free but he thinks that the risks can be minimised by careful briefing and that the odds are strongly in favour of such a visit being a big success.

We assume that any visit would be under MOD auspices so the security aspects would be readily manageable.

The Foreign Secretary is also strongly in favour of visits by female members of the Royal Family to spouses in Germany or left behind in Britain. But he thinks this should be in addition to, and not instead of, a visit by a member of the Royal Family to the Gulf.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).


Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Andrew Turnbull Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST - SA PTJH





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
 Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

AT/ P. return
[Handwritten signature]

7K December 1990

[Handwritten signature]

000

10/12/90

Dear Charles,

BRITISH FORCES IN THE GULF

As requested during the Prime Minister's talk with the Defence Secretary on 3rd December, I attach some notes about British forces deployed to the Gulf area. We have included the standard summary of forces which we use for internal briefing here. If you would find it convenient to have a copy, perhaps weekly, please let me know.

I also have some highly sensitive notes on operational planning prepared by the staff here. We have not had an opportunity to show these to the Defence Secretary (because of their sensitivity they cannot go out of the office), but I expect to let you have them early next week and well ahead of the planned presentation.

Yours sincerely
[Handwritten signature]

(S WEBB)
 Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

BRITISH FORCES IN THE GULF - OPERATION GRANBY**Military Tasks**

- UK military tasks in the Gulf, in conjunction with allies:
 - to deter and, if necessary, to repel further Iraqi aggression;
 - to maintain an effective embargo on shipment of goods to or from Iraq and Kuwait;
 - to prepare for offensive operations.

UK Force Levels (see attached table)

- Some 33,000 UK forces are committed to the Gulf, from all three Services. About 17,000 are already in theatre. Around a further 16,000 Army personnel are being deployed to form 1st (British) Armoured Division (total personnel around 26,000), which will be fully operational in Saudi Arabia by the end of January.

Command and Control

- British forces in the Gulf are under operational command of the UK Joint Commander at RAF High Wycombe and operational control of British Forces Commander in Riyadh, who may delegate tactical control of British forces to US commanders for specific missions.

Locations (see attached Map A)

- Royal Navy vessels operate in the Persian Gulf and just outside, in the Gulf of Oman.
- 7th Armoured Brigade is situated alongside the US Marines in north-east Saudi Arabia, with its supply depot at Al Jubayl on the coast (see attached Map B).
- The RAF has air-defence aircraft at Dhahran in north-west Saudi Arabia, ground-attack aircraft at Tabuk in north-west Saudi Arabia and at Muharraq in Bahrain, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft at Seeb in the north of Oman.

SECRET

Details of forces already in the Gulf

Royal Navy

- Four destroyers and frigates, equipped with air-defence and anti-ship missiles, guns and multi-purpose helicopters;
- Three mine counter-measures vessels with one command ship;
- Six support ships carrying fuel, food, stores, repair facilities and support helicopters;
- Two light logistic support ships.

Army

- 7th Armoured Brigade (around 10,500 personnel) comprising:
 - Two armoured regiments with total of 117 Challenger tanks;
 - One armoured reconnaissance squadron with 16 light armoured vehicles;
 - One infantry battalion with 52 Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicles;
 - One artillery regiment with 24 self-propelled guns;
 - Air-defence, engineer, transport and other support.

Royal Air Force

- 18 air-defence Tornado aircraft equipped with medium- and short-range anti-aircraft missiles and cannon;
- 27 ground-attack Tornado aircraft with range of anti-tank, anti-personnel, anti-radar and runway-cratering weapons;
- 11 ground-attack Jaguar aircraft with range of weapons;
- 3 Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft;
- 7 refuelling tankers;
- 15 support helicopters.
- Anti-aircraft and airfield defence detachments.

SECRET

SECRET

Details of additional forces to be deployedRoyal Navy

- Two mine counter-measures vessels;
- 12 Sea King medium support helicopters.

Army

- Divisional troops (around 11,000 personnel) comprising:
 - Three armoured reconnaissance squadrons with 32 light armoured vehicles;
 - One artillery regiment with 12 self-propelled guns and 12 self-propelled howitzers;
 - One artillery regiment with 12 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems;
 - One air-defence regiment with 24 surface-to-air missile launchers;
 - One engineer regiment;
 - One Army Air Corps regiment with 18 anti-tank helicopters and 18 reconnaissance/liaison helicopters.
- 4th Brigade (around 5,000 personnel) comprising:
 - One armoured regiment with 57 Challenger tanks;
 - One armoured reconnaissance squadron with 16 light armoured vehicles;
 - Two infantry battalions with 106 Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicles;
 - One artillery regiment with 24 self-propelled guns;
 - Air-defence, engineer, transport and other support.
- Additional medical support.

Royal Air Force

- 4 reconnaissance Tornado aircraft to Tabuk;
- 12 Chinook large support helicopters;
- 4 Puma medium support helicopters;

E

SECRET

OPERATION GRANBY - UK FORCES COMMITTED AS AT 060700Z DEC 90

CLASSIFIED FIGURES

(a) In theatre	16698
(b) Outside theatre	16792
Total UK Forces committed	33490

PUBLIC FIGURES

(a) In theatre	About 17000
(b) Outside theatre	Over 13000
Total UK Forces committed	Over 30000

ROYAL NAVY

DD/FF in theatre			MCMVs in theatre			RFAs in theatre			Outside Theatre			
Ship	Personnel		Ship	Personnel		Ship	RFA	RN	Ship	ETA/Loc	Personnel	
HMS CARDIFF	297		HMS ATHERSTONE	47		RFA FORT GRANGE	158	72	HMS DULVERTON	Rosyth	50	
HMS LONDON	305		HMS CATTISTOCK	48		RFA OLNA	95	64	HMS LEDBURY	Rosyth	50	
HMS BRAZEN	249		HMS HURWORTH	48		RFA DILIGENCE	44	136				
HMS GLOUCESTER	283		HMS HERALD	135		RFA ORANGELEAF	58	5				
Ashore (inc. FSU)	101					RFA RESOURCE	159	5				
						RFA ARGUS (PCRS)	85	294				
Total RN personnel in theatre									2090	Tot RN pers outside theatre		100
Total RFA personnel in theatre									599	Tot RFA pers o/s theatre		0

Armilla Roulement

Vessels (not included in totals)

Ship	Personnel	Destination	ETA	Replacing/by	Ships taken up from trade	LSLs in use
					35	2

ARMY

1st (British) Armoured Division - in theatre						1 (BR) Armd Div - outside theatre			
Divisional Troops		7th Armoured Brigade		4th Brigade		Personnel	ETA/Loc	Total	
Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total	Personnel	Total				
Divisional HQ		Fighting Echelon	4547	Fighting Echelon		4th Bde (incl. 458 BCRs)		10879	
Fighting Echelon		2nd Line Support	4400	(Support elements of 4 Brigade included in Divisional Troops totals)		Equipment	ETA/Loc	Total	
2nd Line Support		3rd Line Support				Challenger MBT		59	
3rd Line Support		Battle Casualty Repl	205			Warrior AFV		142	
Battle Casualty Repl		Additional support elms	1303			Scorpion/Scimitar/Striker		93	
Total Divisional Troops	0	Total 7th Armd Bde	10456	Total 4th Brigade	0	M109 155mm SP gun		42	
Equipment Total		Equipment Total		Equipment Total		M110 Howitzer		13	
	Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str	Tot *	Fgt Str		13	
M109 155mm SP gun		Challenger MBT	140	117	Challenger MBT			20	
M110 Howitzer		Warrior AFV	128	101	Warrior AFV			20	
MLRS		Scorpion	22	17	Scorpion			20	
Rapier		Scimitar	25	20	Scimitar			14	
Lynx helicopters		M109 155mm SP gun	28	24	Striker			76	
Gazelle helicopters		Javelin	47	35	M109 155mm SP gun				
					AVLB, AVRE, CET				
Total other Army support personnel in theatre (signals, medical, engineers, Javelin deta (Armilla), miscellaneous)						806	Sigs/Int deta	Cyprus	13
Total 1 British Armd Div in theatre						10456	Tot 1 Div pers o/s theatre		15775
Total Army personnel in theatre						11262	Tot Army pers o/s theatre		15788

ROYAL AIR FORCE


In Theatre						Outside Theatre			
Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	Loc	Pers	Unit	ETA/Loc	Personnel	
18 x TORNADO F3	Dhahran		10 x TORNADO GR1	Tabuk		4 x F4 Phantom + sup	Cyprus		
HQ 33 Wg + LAS	Dhahran	548	4 x TORNADO GR1 (ALARM)	Tabuk	497	1 x RAPIER sqn	Cyprus	695	
11 x JAGUAR GR1	Muharraq		HQ 3 Wg RAF Regt	Tabuk		1 x RAF Regt LAS	Cyprus		
13 x TORNADO GR1	Muharraq		3 x NIMROD MR2	Seeb		HQ BF Cyprus	Cyprus	9	
4 x VC10 TANKER	Muharraq	872	3 x VC10 TANKER	Seeb	189				
RAF Regt (RAPIER and LAS)	Muharraq		3 x C130	Riyadh	80	4 x Tornado GR1A	EDM	200	
15 x Puma	Al Jubayl	393	1 x HS 125	Riyadh	8		14 Jan 91		
Jaguar support	Thumrait	15	Miscellaneous	All locations	144				
Total RAF personnel in theatre						2747	Tot RAF pers o/s theatre		904

Total US force in theatre as at 060700Z Dec 90 242763

Total Reservists employed on Regular duty 177
Total personnel in HOBFME 205

SECRET

Total Reservists deployed to theat 20
Total medical personnel in theatre 2022
Total female personnel in theatre 339



SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

IN THE GULF
DESTROYERS/
FRIGATES

KUWAIT

BAHRAIN
MUHARRAQ
TORNADO GRI | JAGUAR

RIYADH
HQBFME

TABUK
TORNADO GRI

SAUDI ARABIA

AL JUBAYL
7 ARMD BDE
(1(BR) ARMD DIV)

UAE


DAHHRAN
TORNADO F3

OMAN

SEEB
NIMROD

**UK FORCES
DEPLOYED IN GULF AREA**

7 ARMoured BRIGADE DISPOSITION



CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2965

OF 070125Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, BUCHAREST, HELSINKI, ABIDJAN
INFO PRIORITY BOGATA, ADDIS ABABA, KUALA LUMPUR, HAVANA
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, KINSHASA, ACTOR

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 2209 AND 2210: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. BAKER STATES PUBLICLY THAT THE US IS NOT SUPPORTING A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEEK TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ADMINISTRATION STILL HAVE TWO OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST TEXT. STATE WILL BE SEEKING BAKER'S VIEWS OVERNIGHT. POSSIBILITY HE MAY WISH TO CONSULT YOU.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE DEPARTMENT (NEA AND IO) ABOUT US INTENTIONS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, FOLLOWING THE PRESS STORY TODAY ABOUT A CHANGE IN US POLICY ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

3. STATE WERE PHEGMATIC ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE EPISODE. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THE NOTIONAL ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A RESOLUTION, WHICH PICKERING HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH THE MALAYSIANS, HAD NOT INCLUDED WORDING ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WHEN THE MALAYSIANS HAD PRESSED FOR THIS, PICKERING HAD AGREED TO PUT IT TO WASHINGTON (WHILE COMMENTING THAT HE WAS SURE WASHINGTON WOULD NOT ACCEPT A REFERENCE IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS). STATE TOLD US THAT THE TEXT WHICH EMERGED FOLLOWING US/ MALAYSIAN DISCUSSIONS (SECOND TUR) WAS MERELY INDICATIVE OF WORK IN PROGRESS AND DID NOT EVEN HAVE AD REFERENDUM STATUS. STATE THOUGHT THAT THE MALAYSIANS MIGHT HAVE OVERSOLD IT (INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REFERENCE) TO THEIR CONSPONSORS, THUS SPARKING PRESS INTEREST. BUT STATE ALSO IMPLIED THAT PICKERING HAD NOT HANDLED THE MATTER VERY ADEPTLY.

4. STATE SAID THAT, PRIOR TO THE PRESS STORY, THEY HAD BEEN WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE POINT. SINCE THE FINNISH WORDING CLOSELY REFLECTED EXISTING US POLICY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO REJECT OUTRIGHT. BUT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME, AND OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION. A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN A BRIEF PREAMBULAR REFERENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE DRAWN LESS ATTENTION. BUT STATE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOW NO POSSIBILITY OF THE US ACCEPTING ANY WORDING ON ANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. SECRETARY BAKER HAD SPELT OUT THE US POSITION ON THE HILL THIS MORNING (TEXT IN MIFT).

5. STATE COMMENTED THAT, ASIDE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE POINT, THE ADMINISTRATION STILL HAD TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST DRAFT:

I) THEY WERE NOT READY TO SUPPORT A MEETING OF HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES (HCP), NOR TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF THE HCP (AS A BODY) URGING ISRAEL TO RESPECT THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THEY COULD LIVE WITH WORDING WHICH CALLED ON STATES (WHICH WERE HCP) TO TAKE ACTION BILATERALLY WITH ISRAEL.

II) THEY ALSO HAD TROUBLE WITH THE IDEA OF CHARGING UN PERSONNEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH MONITORING AND OBSERVING THE SITUATION. THEY THOUGHT THIS WOULD JEOPARDISE THE WORK OF THE UN AGENCIES. THEY WERE LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS WHICH CALLED ON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MONITOR AND OBSERVE (WITHOUT SPECIFYING HOW HE WOULD DO THIS).

6. IN VIEW OF THESE PROBLEMS, STATE SAID THEY WOULD BE SEEKING BAKER'S VIEWS THIS EVENING. THEY WOULD BE ASKING WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES REMAINING, THE SECRETARY WISHED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT (BY PURSUING THE IDEAS IN PARA 5 ABOVE). STATE EXPECTED BAKER TO AUTHORISE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE MALAYSIANS. IF HE DID NOT, THEY WOULD SEEK HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON VOTING. THEIR ADVICE TO HIM WAS NOT YET AGREED INTERNALLY BUT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE WITH ARAB GULF COALITION PARTNERS AS A RESULT OF A US VETO WERE NOT SO SEVERE AS TO OUTWEIGH THE OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO THE RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, THEY WERE STILL LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY

OF DEFEATING THE RESOLUTION WITHOUT USE OF THE VETO, BY
PERSUADING ENOUGH OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS TO ABSTAIN. STATE
THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE BAKER MIGHT WISH TO CALL YOU EARLY
TOMORROW TO DISCUSS THIS.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 144

MAIN 132

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
HD/CONSULAR D
ECD(E)
HD/INFO D
LEGAL ADVISERS
MED
NAD
NEWS D
NPDD
PLANNERS
PUSD
RAD
RMD
SED

SCD
SOVIET D
UND
WNAMD/ODA
EMERGENCY UNIT (2 VIA FTP)
PS
PS/MR HOGG
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
CHIEF CLERK
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR SLATER
MR GREENSTOCK
MISS SPENCER
MR GORE-BOOTH

ADDITIONAL 12

ARAB/ISRAEL

NNNN

CBM

90-12-07 10:07
Msg 281 Title:

MEMORANDUM

TO THE AMBASSADORS OF CUBA, COLUMBIA, AND YEMEN.
IN LONDON. H.E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE STATES OF MALAYSIA,
FROM SPECIAL MISSION FOR 242 AND 598.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES,

PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED COPY LETTERS SENT TO THE U.N. ORGANISATION FOLLOWING THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN GENEVA OF MAY 1990, BOTH ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS KNEW OF THIS DESIRE TO ACT FOR THEM WHICH HAS BEEN ACTIVE DAILY SINCE MAY 25TH 1990.
PLEASE FIND ALSO, ALSO A COPY OF RESOLUTION 242. I HAVE LODGED WITH THE OFFICE OF H.E. HENRY CATTO TO DAY THOSE RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT IN REGARD TO THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DISPUTE.

WILL YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT YOUR PRESENT ACTIVITIES ARE AT THE U.N. ORGANISATION IN NEW YORK? WE TOOK UP THE APPOINTMENT ON 25TH MAY AS DESCRIBED IN THE WRITTEN AND CIRCULATED SPEECH OF MR. YASSER ARAFAT, THE ACCEPTED LEADER OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND BELIEVE THAT THIS MATTER IS STILL ACTIVE AND ALIVE. WE HAVE ACTIVE AGENTS SPEAKING ALL LANGUAGES OF THE 'OCCUPIED TERRITORIES' AND WHO REPORT TO US DIRECTLY WHEN WE OURSELVES ARE NOT IN JERUSALEM. THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS GIVE FULL CO OPERATION IN THIS MATTER. WE THUS WOULD TOTALLY OPOSE THE APPOINTMENT OF ANYONE IN OUR STEAD IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, OR REASONABLE, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE ASK THAT YOU SPEAK WITH H.E. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THIS MATTER WHO HAS BEEN INFORMED OF OUR INTEREST THROUGHOUT TO ASSIST THE PALESTINIANS, AND WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN IN CONSTANT CONTACT AS WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAN. LIKewise, H.E. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, H.E. PRESIDENT SHAMIR AND H.E. YASSER ARAFAT PRESIDENT OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE. YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MATTER IS WELL UNDERWAY, AND YOU MAY NOT HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS MATTER BY US, AS YOUR STATE IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS UNDERSTOOD BY H.E. PRESIDENT SHAMIR. NOR SHOULD EITHER OF YOUR FOUR STATES BE PARTIES, IN THE TERMS OF HISTORICAL AND ACTUAL CLAIM ON LAND AS DESCRIBED IN THE RESOLUTION ITSELF AND WHICH IS COMPOSED IN THE EVIDENCE NOW BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

SPECIAL MISSION FOR 242 AND 598. FORMED GENEVA. 1990.MAY.

URGENT
FAXED TO JERUSALEM AND OTHER KNOWN PARTIES TO A LEGAL SETTLEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ON NOTICE SINCE 2ND AUGUST, 1990.

Mh

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. NEW YORK.

24th September, 1990.

FROM: MISSION FOR 242 AND 598.

RE. STATE OF IRAQ ATTS. THE U.S.A. AND OTHERS TO INCLUDE THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GT. BRITAIN.

ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL M. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLR.

U.N. HEADQUARTERS UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK.

COPY I.C.J. DEN HAAG. NETHERLANDS

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN ON NOTICE SINCE EARLY AUGUST, 1990, OF THE INTENTION OF THE STATE OF IRAQ IS TO BRING AN ACTION BEFORE THE COURT IN THE MATTER OF LAND, OIL REVENUES, REPARATIONS AND ANCILLARY MATTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WE HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED WITH THE RESPONSE OF RICHARD BOURCHER AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT IN THEIR PACIFIC COMMENTS CONCERNING STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MINDING TO ACCEPT THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS AND ANCILLARY MATTERS TO INCLUDE A PEACE TREATY AS BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAN AND THE STATE OF IRAQ ON TERMS TO BE APPROVED BY THEIR PEACE LOVING NEIGHBOURS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

THE PROPOSED DEBATE AT THE U.N. NATIONS IS A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO OUST THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 33.(3). AND NOW THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE STATED ACCEPTANCE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE NO DEBATE IS ALLOWED AND WE SHALL TAKE ACTION PERSONALLY AGAINST ANY MEMBER OF THE U.N. SENDING REPRESENTATIVES WHEN ON NOTICE, OR ANY EMPLOYED STAFF OF THE U.N. NOTING OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 100. OF THE CHARTER.

WE SEEK OUR COSTS FOR YOUR ILLEGAL CONDUCT AND SEND A COPY OF THIS TO ALL NEIGHBOURS OF THE STATE OF IRAQ TO INCLUDE THE STATE OF PALESTINE IN AMMAN.

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT TO BAGHDAD.

'REGISTRARS OFFICE.' "I.C.J.

303367

Valerie Brans
Warrick Hotel
Geneve

Fax 022. 867. 279. 1
teln 23. 630
HWARN.

Fax US.

212. 963. 4879.

H. G. Perry de Cuellar Esq.,
Secretary General
United Nations HQ New York.

29th May, 1990.

Sec. Arab Times 16/7/90
re 242
published Kuwait
City

Courtesy:

Re: Security Council Meeting 25th/26th May 1990. Request of Mr Arafat.
President of the State of Palestine.

Further to my FAX letter of 27th May confirm my willingness to go
directly to Israel and report back to you.

I hope to speak to the Israeli Mmmm in Geneva this morning, 10 a.m.

Last evening, I discussed this matter with the Foreign Ministry
BAGDAD in great detail - they are very nice.

Concerning the leave now given in the blasphemy matter "three world
religions" Res. 194(8) it would be interesting to consider the aspect
of Judaism in regard to the city of Jerusalem and with the Rabbis.

I consider military intervention, at this stage, totally undesirable.

It is the three religions that remain to be considered.

Let us not lose any more time.

Yours sincerely,

Valerie Brans

Valeri A Skavens

bn-chem,

Warwick Hotel,

Fon: 022 867.279.

FAX: 08:

212.963.4879.

Genève

Telen: 23.630.

#WARW.

H. G. Perry de Cuellar bsp.,

Secretary General,

United Nations H. Q

New York

breukeny:

Re: Security Council Meeting 25th/26th May, 1990. "Request" of Mr. Yasser Arafat,
President of the State of Palestine.

It was a helpful and constructive meeting.

I request that I be allowed to continue the work for peace in the
region and may be appointed by you for that purpose.

It was enjoyable to meet the Israeli delegates and they were considerate
and charming. We already have the right contacts.

I hope to meet you in the near future in New York.

Best wishes

Valeri A. Skavens

Genève.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. <u>The General Assembly</u>	
Resolution 104 (S-1) of 5 May 1947 Hearing for Jewish Agency for Palestine	1
Resolution 105 (S-1) of 7 May 1947 Hearing for Arab Higher Committee	1
Resolution 106 (S-1) of 15 May 1947 Special Committee on Palestine	1
Resolution 107 (S-1) of 15 May 1947 Threat or use of force	2
Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 Future government of Palestine	3
Resolution 185 (S-2) of 26 April 1948 Protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants: reference to the Trusteeship Council	23
Resolution 186 (S-2) of 14 May 1948 Appointment and terms of reference of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine	23
Resolution 187 (S-2) of 6 May 1948 Protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants: appointment of a Special Municipal Commissioner	25
Resolution 189 (S-2) of 14 May 1948 Appreciation of the work of the United Nations Palestine Commission	26
Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator	27
Resolution 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 Assistance to Palestine Refugees	32
Resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949 Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations	36
Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 Assistance to Palestine Refugees	37
Resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949 Palestine: Question of an international regime for the Jerusalem area and the protection of the Holy Places	39

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 356 (IV) of 10 December 1949 Appropriation of funds for the permanent international regime for Jerusalem	40
Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 Assistance to Palestine Refugees	41
Resolution 394 (V) of 14 December 1950 Progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Repatriation or resettlement of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them	43
Resolution 468 (V) of 14 December 1950 Supplementary budget for the economic exercise of 1950	44
Resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952 Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.	44
Resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 Assistance to Palestine Refugees: reports of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East . . .	45
Resolution 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952 Report of the Directors of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	46
Resolution 619 (VII) of 21 December 1952 Complaint of violation of Arab States of their obligations under the Charter, United Nations resolutions and specific provisions of the general armistice agreements concluded with Israel, requiring them to desist from policies and practices of hostility and to seek agreement by negotiation for the establishment of peaceful relations with Israel	47
Resolution 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	47
Resolution 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	49
Resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	50
Resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	51

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	51
Resolution 999 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	51
Resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	51
Resolution 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	52
Resolution 1002 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	52
Resolution 1003 (ES-1) of 10 November 1956 Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956	53
Resolution 1120 (XI) of 24 November 1956 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	53
Resolution 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956 Question considered by the First emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	53
Resolution 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	53
Resolution 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956 Administrative and Financial arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force	55
Resolution 1123 (XI) of 19 January 1957 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	56
Resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	56
Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	56
Resolution 1126 (XI) of 22 February 1957 Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, 1 to 10 November 1956 .	56

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957 Administrative and Financial arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force	57
Resolution 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	58
Resolution 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957 United Nations Emergency Force	60
Resolution 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	61
Resolution 1204 of 13 December 1957 Cost Estimates of United Nations Emergency Force	61
Resolution 1212 (XII) of 14 December 1957 Clearance of the Suez Canal	62
Resolution 1263 (XIII) of 14 November 1958 Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Emergency Force	63
Resolution 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	64
Resolution 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958 Cost estimates for the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force	65
Resolution 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959	66
Resolution 1442 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 United Nations Emergency Force	66
Resolution 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	67
Resolution 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 Cost estimates for the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force	68
Resolution 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961 Report of the Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	69
Resolution 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 Report of the Director General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	70

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 1733 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 United Nations Emergency Force: Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force	71
Resolution 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962 Report of the Commissioner General of United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	72
Resolution 1864 (XVII) of 20 December 1962 United Nations Emergency Force	72
Resolution 1875 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963 United Nations Emergency Force: Cost estimates and financing for the period 1 July to 31 December 1963.	73
Resolution 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963 Report of the Commissioner General of United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	74
Resolution 1983 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 United Nations Emergency Force	75
Resolution 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965 Extension of the mandate of United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	76
Resolution 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 Reports of the Commissioner General of United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	77
Resolution 2115 (XX) of 21 December 1965 United Nations Emergency Force	78
Resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 Report of the Commissioner General of United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East	80
Resolution 2194 (XXI) of 16 December 1966 United Nations Emergency Force	81
Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 Humanitarian assistance	82
Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem	83
Resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem	83
Resolution 2256 (ES-V) of 21 July 1967 The situation in the Middle East	83
Resolution 2257 (ES-V) of 18 September 1967 The situation in the Middle East	83

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 2304 (XXII) of 13 December 1967 United Nations Emergency Force.	84
Resolution 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA	85
Resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories.	86
Resolution 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA	86
Resolution 2535 (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	88
Resolution 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969 Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories	90
Resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970 The situation in the Middle East.	91
Resolution 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 Establishment of a Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.	92
Resolution 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	93
Resolution 2727 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 Report of the special committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories	94
Resolution 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 Report of the working group on the financing of UNRWA	95
Resolution 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 Working Groups on the Financing of UNRWA.	96
Resolution 2792 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	97
Resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971 The Situation in the Middle East.	98
Resolution 2851 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.	100

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 2949 (XXVII) of 8 December 1972 The Situation in the Middle East	101
Resolution 2963 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	103
Resolution 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA	105
Resolution 3089 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	106
Resolution 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA	108
Resolution 3092 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories	108
Resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force	111
Resolution 3210 (XXIX) of 14 October 1974 Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization	112
Resolution 3211 (XXIX) of 31 October 1974 Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces	113
Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 Question of Palestine	115
Resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization	115
Resolution 3240 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices affecting the Human Rights of population of Occupied Territories	116
Resolution 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA	118
Resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	119

CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Resolution 3374 (XXX) of 30 October 1975 Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force . . .	122
Resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East	128
Resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 Question of Palestine	130
Resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 The Situation in the Middle East	132
Resolution 3419 (XXX) of 8 December 1975 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	134
X Resolution 3525 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories	139



REPUBLIC OF NAURU

222/12
regstrd.

Office of the President

7th December, 1990.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. J5G190

SUBJECT CC MASTER
CC OPS

The Rt. Honourable John Major,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
Office of the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London,
United Kingdom.

Dear Prime Minister,

I wrote to your predecessor, the Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, back in August expressing my concern over the action of the Irag President to detain British citizens in Kuwait and Irag as hostages.

Your former Prime Minister very kindly acknowledged my message.

I am very happy to hear today that Irag has now decided to free all foreign hostages without delay. I hope that the news is true.

I understand that there are over a thousand British trapped in the area, and I am sure you and your Government and your people are very pleased and happy with this wonderful development. We on this small island, rejoice with you all.

I hope your people will arrive home safely without any further delay to enjoy the festivities of Christmas and the New Year with their loved ones.

With lots of best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Bernard Dowiyogo

(Bernard Dowiyogo),
PRESIDENT.

FAXED 7/12/90
3:00pm



REPUBLIC OF NAURU
NAURU ISLAND, CENTRAL PACIFIC

A FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

MESSAGE SERIAL NO. RON

DATE : 7th December, 1990

TO FAX NUMBER : 679 301406 SUVA
FROM FAX NUMBER : 674 - 3331 - NAURU - EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
FOR : BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
SUVA
FROM : DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
NAURU
NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS PAGE) : TWO (2)

[IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES PLEASE PHONE

674 - 3330
=====

MESSAGE:

Compliments.

The Department of External Affairs has the honour to request the latter to please convey the following message to its highest destination as soon as received.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

MR. O. MENKE
ACTING SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

①

Sandra
Can we please
request a time -
30 minutes
off

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Kinnock would like to take up your offer of a meeting on the Gulf on Privy Councillor terms. The question is whether you would prefer to do it before or after Christmas. Now that Parliament is not returning until 14 January, you may feel that after Christmas is a bit late. Equally I doubt Mr. Kinnock would be away all that time: and you might prefer to brief him after you yourself have been to the Gulf.

Like us to fix a date in the second week of January?

Or

Try to fit it in before Christmas?

✓
A.P.12

C.D.P?

C. D. POWELL
7 December 1990

tmw a:KINNOCK

Charles
Only mutually convenient
time is

Mon 17 Dec at 2030
in the House

(Mr Kinnock arrives
back from Brussels at
approx 1900 Thursday,
but should be in the
House in time).

The Prime Minister is
addressing Norman Tebbit's
Association in Room A in the
House at 2100.

S 17/12

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 071900Z UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 1041

OF 071936Z DEC 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, TUNIS, BAGHDAD

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

ARAB/ISRAEL AND THE GULF: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH
JIM BAKER

SUMMARY

1. BAKER SOLICITS OUR HELP IN REMOVING REFERENCE TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FROM UN RESOLUTION ON ARAB/ISRAEL. US WILL OTHERWISE VETO BECAUSE OF LINKAGE WITH INVASION OF KUWAIT. US INTENTIONS ON KUWAITI EMBASSY.

DETAIL

2. BAKER TELEPHONED THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS EVENING PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS THE ARAB/ISRAEL RESOLUTION AT THE UN. HE SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE THE PERCEPTION OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. THIS PERCEPTION WOULD BE HEIGHTENED BY THE IRAQI ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND PRESS REPORTS THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE PRESS WERE ALREADY LINKING THESE TWO STORIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE US COULD NOT AGREE TO A RESOLUTION CONTAINING LANGUAGE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME TO DO SO. BAKER WAS, THEREFORE, APPEALING FOR OUR HELP. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEND A SIGNAL THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO VETO ALONG WITH THE US.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT WE WERE ON RECORD AGAIN AND AGAIN AS BEING IN FAVOUR OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE HAD SAID SO YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE PRESENT DRAFT TEXT WHICH WE COULD OBJECT TO. WOULD IT HELP IF WE ASKED YOU TO WORK FOR POSTPONEMENT? BAKER SAID THAT HIS PROBLEM WENT FURTHER THAN THIS. NEVERTHELESS THE US WAS TRYING HARD TO AVOID HAVING TO VETO A RESOLUTION AND WAS WORKING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED TO AGREE A TEXT WHICH THE US COULD ACCEPT - EVEN IF ISRAEL COULD NOT. WE MUST AIM FOR A TEXT WHICH DID NOT REFER TO AN INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE. THAT WAS THE KEY US PROBLEM. THEY COULD NEGOTIATE ON THE OTHER ISSUES. IT WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARILY BAD FROM THE GULF ANGLE TO AGREE FOR THE FIRST TIME TO INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN A UN RESOLUTION. THAT WOULD BE LINKAGE. IF NECESSARY, THE US WOULD VETO. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE IN THIS TOGETHER. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE US POSITION WAS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE USEFUL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. EVEN PRINCE BANDAR WAS PRESSING THE US TO VETO, ARGUING THAT A RESOLUTION NOW SUPPORTING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS HE WOULD ASK YOU TO WORK FOR THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES: A TEXT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: POSTPONEMENT: OR IF NECESSARY ABSTENTION ON THE TEXT - IN THE LATTER CASE, PERHAPS THE US COULD TOO.

5. BAKER SAID THAT ONE IDEA WAS A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT REPEATING WHAT BAKER HAD SAID IN TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE YESTERDAY (WASHINGTON TELNO 2966). BAKER THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD MEET BOTH SIDES' DIFFICULTIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE COULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT SUCH A PROPOSAL. WE COULD NOT VETO SOMETHING WHICH WE HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED. LINKAGE IN ANY CASE DID NOT READ SO STRONGLY ON THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. BAKER ASKED THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE TOUGH. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.
KUWAIT EMBASSY

6. BAKER ALSO SAID THAT HE WANTED TO GIVE US A HEADS UP ON THE FUTURE OF THE US EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. AT PRESENT THE ADVICE TO AMERICAN CITIZENS TRAPPED THERE WAS TO KEEP THEIR HEADS DOWN FOR NOW. THE US WOULD NOT CLOSE ITS EMBASSY AS LONG AS IT HAD CITIZENS IN KUWAIT WITH WHOM TO COMMUNICATE. BUT AFTER THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO EVACUATE THEIR EMBASSY STAFF ALTHOUGH WITHOUT FORMALLY CLOSING THE EMBASSY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS SOUNDED SENSIBLE.

HURD

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

174533
MDHOAN 3172

DISTRIBUTION

284

MAIN 239

IRAQ/KUWAIT/ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
MED
ECD(E)

RMD
WNAMD/ODA
PS/MR HOGG

ADDITIONAL 45

IRAQ/KUWAIT
ARAB/ISRAEL
(PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

NNNN

PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
 FM WASHINGTON
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELNO 2966
 OF 070130Z DECEMBER 90
 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, BUCHAREST, HELSINKI, ABIDJAN
 INFO PRIORITY BOGOTA, ADDIS ABABA, KUALA LUMPUR, HAVANA
 INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, KINSHASA, ACTOR

MIPT:ARAB/ISRAEL: US POLICY ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
 1. DURING HIS TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
 TODAY (6 DECEMBER), SECRETARY BAKER MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

WE HAVE NOT IN ANY WAY, OR TO ANY EXTENT, OR TO ANY DEGREE,
 SHIFTED OUR POLICY REGARDING THE QUESTION OF AN
 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

FIRST OF ALL WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION FOR A LONG TIME
 THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, PROPERLY STRUCTURED AT AN
 APPROPRIATE TIME, MIGHT BE USEFUL. THAT HAS BEEN THE POLICY
 OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A LONG TIME. WE ARE NOT NOW
 RECOMMENDING THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ARAB-
 ISRAEL CONFLICT BE HELD, NOR ARE WE SUPPORTING A RESOLUTION
 IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WOULD SEEK TO CONVENE SUCH A
 CONFERENCE. PRECISELY BECAUSE OF OUR CONSISTENT POSITION
 THAT WE WILL NOT LINK THE GULF CRISIS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI
 DISPUTE, THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR AN
 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. UNQUOTE

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

17

ADVANCE 17

.ARAB/ISRAEL	HD/NENAD
PS	HD/NEWS D
PS/MR HOGG	HD/MED
PS/PUS	HD/PUSD
MR P J WESTON	HD/UND
MR FAIRWEATHER	NO 10 DOWNING ST

PAGE 1

MR GORE-BOOTH
 MR SLATER
 HD/CONSULAR D

CABINET OFFICE DIO
 HD/EMERGENCY UNIT [VIA FTP]
 RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

→ (A-G)

Prime Minister

thank you. for 12

*COP
7/dec*

Jp 01226

MR POWELL

Collateral Damage in the Event of Allied Attacks on Iraqi
CBW or Nuclear Facilities

minutes attached — (where ???)

At OPD(G) on Wednesday the Prime Minister asked about this subject.

2. The attached paper draws heavily on work done by the Ministry of Defence. It may need amendment in the light of next week's discussions with the Americans.

3. As you will see, the conclusions at this stage are that there might be considerable damage in the Baghdad area from CW or BW, subject to meteorological factors. Contamination from bombing of nuclear facilities seems likely to be confined to the sites concerned.

PC

PERCY CRADOCK

7 December 1990

COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN THE EVENT OF ALLIED ATTACKS ON IRAQI CBW OR NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Introduction

1. We consider the collateral damage which could be caused in the event of allied attacks on Iraqi CBW or nuclear facilities.

CBW and Nuclear facilities

2. There are a total of 16 installations in Iraq that are associated with CBW and nuclear production, storage or training. These are listed at Annex A.

3. The main CW production site is at Samarra and it is thought that CW agents are also produced at Salman Pak. There are also three CW-related facilities near Habbaniyah, but it is not thought that CW agent is either produced or stored there. The largest CW storage site is also at Samarra, where there are nine bunkers; we believe that each bunker is likely to contain no more than 100 tons of agent.

4. Production and storage of BW agents, anthrax and botulinum toxin (BTX), takes place at Salman Pak. The quantities of stockpiled agent are unknown, but there could be some 100 tons each of anthrax and BTX.

5. Some of these facilities are located in isolated areas, but others are in, or relatively close to, major populated areas, including Baghdad (see map at Annex B).

Meteorological conditions

6. Meteorological conditions play an important part in the spread of any contamination. Peculiar desert effects also make the time of day quite important in terms of both wind velocity and direction; and both of these factors change materially with height.

Attack techniques

7. Attack techniques will vary the effect on the agents, but only marginally. A bomb delivered from high level will have greater penetration than a retarded bomb from low level and might have a greater chance of fracturing a bunker. Larger US bombs (2,000 lbs) might throw agent higher than smaller UK bombs; and this could increase the size of the contaminated area.

Effects of attacks on CW facilities

8. The total stockpile of chemical agents in Iraq is assessed to be 6,000-10,000 tonnes of sulphur mustard, tabun and sarin. (The proportions are unknown; but there is likely to be much more mustard than nerve agent.)

9. The precise effects of CW contamination after an attack are not known. But as an example, a daytime attack on Samarra, releasing 900 tons of agent, would create a downwind hazard covering 12 kms for nerve agent and 5 kms for mustard. At night, the downwind hazard would extend to 100-120 kms for both agents. As Samarra is about 100 kms north-west of Baghdad and the prevailing wind is from the north, some casualties in Baghdad might arise from a night attack. If larger amounts of agent were released, the area of the downwind hazard would be the same - not extending much beyond 120 kms - although the density of contamination would be greater.

10. But the 10,000 tons of agent assessed to be at Samarra would be unlikely to be released en masse. The storage quantities are usually restricted, for safety reasons, to about 100 tons in any single bunker. Further, a bunker could be struck and destroyed without the agent being released; for example, a bunker which collapsed could bury all or most of the agent contained within it. Which local towns and villages might be affected, would be largely determined by the wind direction and velocity; and the degree of contamination in Baghdad would depend on other complicating factors, such as rain and dust, the density of the inhabitation, and the precautions taken in terms of warning and other shelter procedures.

11. The risk of long-term contamination would depend on the type of agent and the prevailing weather conditions. In the winter months, there would be more rain than in summer, helping to disperse chemical agent. But we judge that there would be no permanent contamination.

Effects of attacks on BW facilities

12. Salman Pak is some 30 km south-east of Baghdad and its destruction could, if meteorological conditions were adverse, cause casualties there. The destruction of storage containing 100 tons of anthrax would release around 200 kg into the air. Lethal concentrations of spore could extend for up to 100 kms and this distance would be little influenced by time of day or quantity of material. Release of anthrax spore would cause ground contamination and it could be expected that some spores would persist in the ground and,

theoretically, present a risk of skin anthrax. The most likely downwind hazard distance for BTX would be 10kms.

Effects of attacks on nuclear facilities

13. There are two identified nuclear-related sites, Tuwaitha and Al Qaim, at which radioactive material other than natural uranium¹ is likely to be present in significant quantities.

14. Tuwaitha is a large and complex site, with a number of nuclear facilities within its earthwork perimeter; of prime interest are two reactors, the reprocessing plant and associated storage buildings, the pilot fuel fabrication facility, and the radio-isotope laboratory. (The Osirak reactor on the site has not been re-commissioned following the Israeli raid in 1981.) It is not possible to determine the amount of nuclear material present in any individual building; but the total radio-activity on the site is a few thousand curies², made up from fuel for the reactors.

15. There is no risk of fire causing thermals which could lead to fuel debris being introduced into the atmosphere and causing contamination on a continental scale. Indeed, release of radioactive material from an Iraqi nuclear facility is not likely to cause any radiological hazard outside Iraq.

16. But damage to or destruction of nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha would result in local contamination, probably confined to the site, unless there were unusual weather conditions. The likely maximum radiation dose to personnel within the facility would be some tens of rads per hour, and rapid evacuation of the site (within 5-6 hours) would be advised. Tuwaitha is situated 23 km south-east of Baghdad, and the maximum feasible release would result in a measurable, but not dangerous radiological hazard to anyone within the city.

17. In normal conditions, the site at Al Qaim would contain no radioactive material, other than natural uranium. There is a very slight possibility that

1 Natural uranium can be considered a local hazard if it becomes airborne in a finely-divided particulate form, but it does not constitute a major radiological risk.

2 To place this in perspective, while the total site activity at Tuwaitha is a few thousand curies, the Windscale incident in 1957 released about 30,000 curies into the atmosphere and the Chernobyl accident released in the region of 50 million curies into thermal currents which resulted in long-range transmission.

fuel, irradiated in one of the reactors at Tuwaitha, may have been transported to Al Qaim for processing to extract enriched uranium. If this is the case, then the maximum radioactive inventory at this site will be approximately a thousand curies. Any release of this material would result in only local contamination and the maximum likely dose to any personnel would be in the low tens of rads per hour, again making early evacuation of the site advisable.

18. There has been a single, unconfirmed report that fuel, originally for the Osirak reactor, is being stored at another location near Baghdad. If this fuel were to be damaged, then a low-level hazard could be caused, making evacuation of the local area advisable.

Conclusions

19. Maximum downwind hazard distances following attacks on Iraq's chemical and biological facilities could extend to 120 kms for nerve agents and mustard, 10 kms for BTX and 100 kms for anthrax. The footprint areas would be much the same however much agent there was in the target area; but the density of contamination would be proportional to the amount dispersed.

20. The nature and extent of any downwind contamination will be highly dependent upon a number of factors, many of which can, at best, be only roughly predicted - eg meteorological conditions. Attack techniques will also vary the effect on the agents - but only marginally; and against some of the targets, bombs could cause storage bunkers to collapse and contain the agent.

21. It is impossible, in most cases, to assess the scale of civilian casualties that attacks will cause. Some facilities are sufficiently isolated for collateral damage to be minimal, whereas those close to Baghdad could potentially cause thousands of civilian casualties.

22. Contamination from attacks on Iraq's nuclear facilities seems likely to be confined largely to the sites concerned.


7 December 1990

WSI 3/B1732

CBW AND NUCLEAR PRODUCTION, STORAGE AND TRAINING FACILITIES

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| 1. Samarra | - | main CW production and storage facility | |
| 2. Habbaniya CW facility | - | produces chlorine and sodium hydroxide for use in the production of CW agents | |
| 3. Salman Pak CBW facility | - | has two research and production areas | |
| 4. Habbaniyah CW facility | - | has production and storage buildings, but does not appear to be operational | |
| 5. Habbaniyah CW facility | - | CW agent and precursor production, but does not appear to be operational | |
| 6. Al Hadr CW test facility | - | only occupied when tests are in progress | |
| 7. Salah Ad Din CW training facility | - | infrequently used, but has a test area | |
| 8. Ban Al Sad CW school | - | training facility for the Iraqi army | |
| 9. Karbala | - | storage depot for CBW | |
| 10. Baghdad Nuclear Research Tuwaitha | - | Iraq's principal nuclear facility | |
| 11. Al Qaim Plant | - | includes a hydrogen fluoride and possible uranium recovery facility | |
| 12. Saad 4-6 South | - | a small site at this facility is suspected of uranium enrichment | |
| 13. Fallujah ammunition depot | } | reports of suspect storage bunkers for CBW | |
| 14. An Nasiriyah storage facility | | | |
| 15. Ad Divaniyah storage facility | | | |
| 16. Tikrit ammunition depot | | | |

WSI3/B1733



SECRET

SECRET

SECRET UK EYES A
WNINTEL

TOP SECRET

*Prime Minister
Cdn*

Jp 01228

Copy No 1 of 3 copies

MR POWELL

*JIC (90) (IA) 75
9.11.90*

Iraqi CW/BW Capability

At OPD(G) this week the Prime Minister asked how much we knew about Iraqi capability in this field. He may wish to glance through the attached JIC paper, which provides the best up-to-date summary.

Thank you

PERCY CRADOCK

7 December 1990

TOP SECRET

PART 34 ends:-

FCS to PM . 6.12.20

PART 35 begins:-

PC to CDP 7.12.20

